

The doctrine of justification according to Augustine of Rome

(Favaroni) († 1443) *)

F. — The Formal Element of Justification.

On concluding the second point of investigation in the previous chapter we felt authorised to state that Favaroni undoubtedly held supernatural intrinsic justice and very probably, its adequate explanation. The purpose of the present chapter is to examine further his concept of the intimate nature of the state of justification, to see namely, what can be said for and against the contention that he holds the existence of created grace as a gift physically present in the soul. And since the existence or non existence of created grace is to be argued from his position on the question of supernatural habits, our present question on the formal element of justification is the question of the existence of infused habits. Does God move the faculties of man immediately and directly by Himself, only by a transient motion to the acts of justice, or does He move them through the mediation of interposed supernatural habits, taking very special account of the habit of charity.

It was also pointed out in the previous chapter that the minimum we can say of Favaroni is that he holds the opinion commonly attributed to Peter Lombard. The real opinion of the Master of the Sentences is an object of controversy even at the present day ¹⁾. Consequently, in order to stabilise our position still more, we will first permit a fuller consideration of the Master's opinion in the light of modern discussion.

*) *Augustiniana* vii (1957) pp. 100-117; 349-366; 515-530; viii (1958) pp. 164-189; 299-327.

¹⁾ J. SCHUPP, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus*, Freiburg 1932, pp. 228 sqq.

In the course of the dispute carried on between Prof. F. Zigon of the Seminary of Gorizia, writing in *Divus Thomas*, and Prof. J. Stuffer of Innsbrück, writing in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* two interpretations were proposed as to what should be the exact interpretation of the opinion of the Master ²).

The first interpretation — that of Prof. F. Zigon — considers the Holy Ghost « reduplicative quatenus est Tertia Persona Ss. Trinitatis » as operating the work of sanctification. The Holy Ghost therefore, not merely by appropriation but inasmuch as He is the third Person of the most Holy Trinity exclusively considered in Himself, and as it were, independently of the other two Persons, unites Himself to the soul of man. This union of the Holy Ghost is to be considered as a union analogical with the Hypostatic union of the Second Person with the human nature of Our Lord Jesus Christ. This union of man with God in sanctification, according to this interpretation, ends « terminative » with the Holy Ghost and not with the other two Persons. The acts of justice proceed from the Holy Ghost and from the justified soul « immediate, immediate suppositi ».

The second interpretation of the Master's opinion — that of Prof. J. Stuffer — makes the work of man's sanctification, like all the other divine works « ad extra », a work of the whole Trinity common to the three Persons, and only reserved by appropriation to the Holy Ghost. So when the Master says that the Holy Ghost is the immediate principle of the act of charity he wishes to exclude only created secondary causes, as the infused virtue of charity, but not to exclude the concurrence of the other Divine Persons in effecting the act — efficienter a tota Trinitate. The act proceeds therefore, from the Holy Ghost, and immediately, but not « immediate suppositi ». Perhaps Peter Lombard may have admitted some special sort of union with the Holy Ghost but he has not told us of what nature it is, but that the motion to the act of

²) J. STUFLE S. J., *Divi Thomae Aquinatis doctrina de Deo Operante*, Oenipontanae 1923; F. ZIGON, *S. Thomae art. 1 de Caritate et Praemotio physica*, *Divus Thomas* (Fr.) 2 (1924) pp. 24-34; J. STUFLE, *Der erste Artikel der Qq. Disp. de Caritate des h. Thomas*, *ZKTh.* 48 (1924) pp. 407-422; F. ZIGON, *Der Begriff der Caritas beim Lombarden und der h. Thomas*, *Divus Thomas* 4 (1926) pp. 404-424; J. STUFLE, *Petrus Lombardus und Thomas von Aquin über die Natur der Caritas*, *ZKTh.* 51 (1927) pp. 399-408.

charity is from the whole Trinity and only by appropriation, from the Holy Ghost, seems almost sure ³⁾).

From this ambiguity occasion could arise for a condemnation of this opinion. Certainly, if the interpretation of Prof. Zigon is correct, the doctrine of the Master would seem to be in contradiction with the decisions of the Church, as Stuffer himself remarked ⁴⁾, not only in questions regarding the Trinity, but also in the matter of justification.

That the second interpretation does not conflict with catholic faith is the more common opinion of theologians, although some are inclined to judge it more severely, inasmuch as it does not sufficiently explain intrinsic justice ⁵⁾. St. Thomas himself rejects it as unsustainable on scientific grounds ⁶⁾. Although theologians subscribe to the philosophical reasons adduced by the Angelic Doctor, they point out that these reasons are not of such a nature as to induce metaphysical certitude. They do not absolutely exclude the possibility of an internal transient elevation of the faculties, while at the same time the soul remains in a state of habitual relation to the Holy Ghost, for which relation the other virtues could provide the foundation.

Scholastic theology provides a more constructive and satisfying explanation of the internal rectification of man. In every supernatural act — even charity — there are two elements to be distinguished, firstly the supernatural ontological elevation of the soul, either in its essence or in its powers, by which the soul is empowered to elicit supernatural acts conformable to its end, and secondly, the supernatural activity of the soul so elevated, by the exercise of the acts conformable to its elevated nature. The first ontological elevation is effected « formaliter » by *habitual* sanctifying grace, the second by the virtues. Both Scotists and Thomists hold this. In the further explanation of the intimate nature of grace they differ, for while St. Thomas and his School hold that grace is « per primo » radicated in the essence of the soul and thence flows to the powers

³⁾ J. SCHUPP, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus*, Freiburg 1932, p. 225. In diesem Punkt dürfte J. Stuffer Recht behalten.

⁴⁾ Cf. *ZKTh.* 1924, p. 407 sqq.

⁵⁾ PETAVIUS, *De Trinitate*, l. 8, c. 6, n. 3-4. « Immo et fidei decreto notatur ». Both SUAREZ (*De Car. D.* 3, Sec. 1 n. 1) and FRANZELIN (*De Deo Trino*, Thesis 43) give the opposite as certain.

⁶⁾ II-II, q. 23, a. 1; *Qq. Disp. de Car.* art. 1.

— habitus entitativus, Scotus holds that it is formally in the powers of the soul — habitus operativus. But both attribute this ontological elevation of man, which precedes « *natura saltem* » the exercise of the supernatural act, even the act of charity, to the existence of a created quality in the soul.

With this foreword we shall determine the state of our own question. We have two questions to solve. Firstly, in view of the contested opinion of the Master we must see which interpretation does Favaroni follow: we shall see that he holds the second one, and of this we feel quite certain. Secondly, does he really exclude the existence of a created quality, particularly in the case of charity, in the soul. Our answer is: expressly he neither excludes it nor affirms it, but he quite clearly presupposes its existence.

One of his most lengthy expositions on how the Holy Spirit is the life of the soul is given on the occasion of his exegesis of the words of the Apostle « *si spiritu vivimus, spiritu et ambulemus* » ⁷⁾). We must distinguish, he tells us, a double life in the supernatural order, just as we distinguish a double life in the natural order. In the natural order the soul communicates the first life to the body by its union with it (*actus primus vite*), so that the body participates in the life of the soul. The second life proceeds from this first life, and consists in the actual vital operations of the soul ⁸⁾). The same consideration holds good in the supernatural life. The first life is communicated to the soul by its union with God ⁹⁾). The second life consisting in good works, similarly proceeds from this — *tamquam fructus egredientes a radice spiritus primo iustificati* ¹⁰⁾).

⁷⁾ *Gal.* 5, 25.

⁸⁾ Sicut in vita materiali quam dat anima suo corpori, inter se distinguuntur vita prima et vita secunda, quae dicuntur *actus primus* et *actus secundus vite*. Prima (quidem) vita et *primus actus vite* est illa unio anime et corporis per quam sese intimat corpori, communicando ei seipsam in esse vite ... secunda vero vite est actualis operatio vitalis quae procedit a prima vita. *In ep. ad Gal.* A 641 36 v2.

⁹⁾ Sic conformiter in vita spiritali considerandum est quemadmodum vita naturali: iam dictum est quod haec duo distinguenda sunt vita prima et vita secunda. Vita quidem prima est unio Dei ad animam per internum illapsus, quo divinus Spiritus et increatus unit seipsum spiritui nostro et anime nostre ad vitam ... ut eadem vita vivat anima per unionem divinitatis ad ipsam qua vivit Deus per suam naturam. *Ibid.* A 641 37 r1.

¹⁰⁾ Pro intellectu vero alterius verbi quo dicit '*spiritu et ambulemus*' notanda est secunda vita et secundus actus vite spiritalis. Quemadmodum etenim, a primo actu vite naturalis ... egreditur actualis operatio sicut audire, videre, cogitare ...

God, by some mysterious communication of Himself, communicates to the soul its justice, from which the soul is rendered capable of living its own life of operation in the performance of good works.

Does this work end « terminative » or « attributive » with the Holy Ghost ?

Our first reason for saying that the work of justification is a work of the whole Trinity is that the work of justification is a work of the omnipotence of God. The work of justification is of the same order as the work of creation — to justify the sinner requires the same power as to create the just ¹¹). The exercise of power is something common to the three Persons, which therefore can never be considered as exclusive of the Holy Ghost.

Secondly the same place in man's justification is attributed to the second Person of the Blessed Trinity as is attributed to the third. For example, to the Son is attributed to inspire faith ¹²), Christ is said to dwell « permansive » in our hearts ¹³), Christ according to his divinity in which therefore He is one with the Holy Ghost,

sic conformiter ex prima vita spiritus procedit secunda vita que est spiritualis operatio ut actus caritative amationis circa Deum et proximum, et gaudium et pax et ... que dicuntur fructus egredientes a radice spiritus primo iustificati. *Ibid.* A 641 37 r1.

Against the beginning of this quotation we find the « mysterious writing » not on the wall, but on the manuscript, on which A. V. Mueller founds his denial of intrinsic justice (cf. *op. cit.* p. 16). « Negat habitum a Deo infusum, propterea omnino falsa profert ». We would like to note that Favaroni's idea is taken from St. Augustine *De Civ. Dei* l. xx, cc. 25-6 ML. 41, 656 and *Enarr. in Ps.* 70, Ser. 2, n. 3 ML. 36, 893: and that from the words of Augustine the same difficulty was proposed and solved by St. Thomas in *Qq. Disp. de Ver.* q. 27, a. 1 ad 1 cf. I-II, q. 110, a. 1 ad 2 and *I Sent.* D. 17, q. 1 art. 1, ad 2.

¹¹) Quarta Conclusio: iustificare peccatorem non est maioris potentie quam primo creare iustum. Hanc conclusionem satis potest speculari aliquis ex conclusionibus precedentibus; verumptamen plane ponit ipsam beatus Augustinus 70 Sermone in Joannem ... deinde querit Augustinus quod horum maius opus sit an creare iustos an sanctificare peccatores et primo dicit quod hic non audet precipitare sententiam; deinde dicit quod utrumque est equalis potentie ubi plane ponit premissam conclusionem. *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 171 r1.

¹²) Poterit quidem Christus omnibus electis per se ipsum inspirare fidem, ad aures cordis per se ipsum loquendo sicut prophetis et sicut apostolis, sed ... *Ibid.* A 376 218 r1.

¹³) ... sed quoniam dicit inhabitare Christum per fidem, et inhabitatio non dicit momentaneam presentiam sed diuturnam et permansivam, ideo per roboracionem dicit 'Christum inhabitare per fidem'. *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 67 r2.

is called the « *formalis vita animae* » ¹⁴). As regards the divine nature the Second Person occupies an equal place with the Holy Ghost in the sanctification of man.

And this is a point to which we must carefully advert when speaking of the sanctification of Christ. Christ was constituted one Person by the union of the human nature to the « *esse* » of the Second Person: but from this he was not sanctified, He was sanctified by the inhabitation of the three Persons — or, which is evidently the same for Favaroni — by the inhabitation of the Holy Ghost ¹⁵). Therefore, even in Christ the immediate cause of sanctity was not the Hypostatic union but the inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity in his soul. Unreasonably then should we try to astrue for man the opposite position i. e. that his sanctification arises from a personal union with the Holy Ghost, analogical to the Hypostatic union, and not from the action of the whole Divine Trinity in his soul.

We think therefore, that we can accept his own repeated and explicit affirmations that the justification of man is a work of the whole Trinity ¹⁶), and is to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost only in an appropriated sense ¹⁷). This life therefore, of the soul consists

¹⁴) Advertendum est quod Christus factus est nobis iustitia secundum hominem effective quidem, prout nobis meruit internam iustificationem, ... secundum vero divinitatem ipsius, est nobis iustitia formalis, formaliter intrinsecus iustificans. Apostolus autem in istis passibus et sequentibus cum de iustitia Dei loquitur, intendit illam formalem que intrinsecus est nobis, non prout Christus dicitur factus est nobis iustitia, sed ut Spiritus Sanctus et tota Trinitas est iustitia Dei formaliter iustificans mentem, et hoc, merito Christi, quod Apostolus notificat cum dicit 'per fidem Jesu Christi'. *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 156 v2. Cf. *In ep. ad Heb.* A 376 5 r1.

¹⁵) Preterea ad conclusionem: sicut anima Christi non est formaliter iusta et sancta ex unione personali, alias sanctificaretur et iustificaretur per esse personale a solo Verbo, quemadmodum in esse personali soli Verbo unita est; sanctificatur ergo per inhabitantem Deum secundum esse divinitatis in quo tres Persone sunt unus Deus inhabitans et sanctificans ... tota ergo iustificatio et sanctificatio anime Christi fit et consurgit ex inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti, sanctificantis et iustificantis ipsam per affectum caritatis diffusum in ipsam. *In Apoc.* V 50 v1. Cf. Cum Deus sit humanitati (Christi) formalis vita ... *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 193 v1.

¹⁶) ... Non prout Christus dicitur factus est nobis iustitia, sed ut Spiritus Sanctus et tota Trinitas est iustitia Dei formaliter iustificans mentem ... *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 156 v2.

¹⁷) Et cum hec (sanctificatio et impressio characteris) fiant per substantiam Dei, in qua unum sunt tres Persone divine, tamen attribuntur tertie Persone que appropriate dicitur Spiritus Sanctus Dei eo quod Ipse est amor ex sua proprietate

in a communicated gift, at least in the line of supernatural illumination and motion, to the human intellect and will, elevating man to a new supernatural order ¹⁸⁾ and not in any pantheistic union.

Whatever therefore may be the truth of Prof. Zigon's interpretation of Peter Lombard, his interpretation cannot be accommodated to the text of Favaroni, although our theologian appeals to Peter Lombard as one of his sources ¹⁹⁾. And by this exposition we hope to exclude any theory which makes the soul united in such a way to the Holy Ghost as to form one principle of action from which the justifying act would proceed « immediate, immediatione suppositi ».

By way of a corollary we might add a few words on the use of the term « *formalis vita* », « *formalis iustitia* » just as we had to remark on the use of « *formalis* » when treating of original sin. There are many expressions in Favaroni where he speaks of God as being « *formalis iustitia* » or « *formalis vita animae* » ²⁰⁾. If « *formalis* » is here taken in the thomistic sense of the active principle of determination, these expressions either lead to Prof. Zigon's interpretation of the Master, or to the Protestant contention of imputed justice. This sense is, however, impossible. Firstly because our justice is constantly distinguished from the inherent justice of God ²¹⁾. Secondly, we have apodictically proved in the preceding chapter

personalis, et ex sua origine que est amoris spiratio. Sanctificatio autem mentis vestre principalius fit per actum amoris: ideo illi Persone divine principalius attribuitur sanctificatio que est amor ex sua proprietate personali, verumptamen est opus totius Trinitatis. *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 75 v2. Cf. *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 205 r1.

¹⁸⁾ Et est ulterius speculandum quod hec vita vere divina et increata quam Deus per unionem Sui communicat anime, non solum quantum ad effectivam partem ut rectificat et reformat volitivam partem nostram, sed etiam quantum ad intellectivam partem, ut ipsam suo lumine illustret... *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 37 r2.

¹⁹⁾ Certe secundum Magistrum Sententiarum L. I D. XVII, non est alia caritas diffusa in cordibus nostris que nos faciat amatores Dei et proximi nisi Ipse Spiritus Sanctus qui est Increata caritas ... *In Ep. ad Gal.* A 641 7 r1.

²⁰⁾ Est enim Deus formalis vita iustorum et beatorum... *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 193 v1. Cf. *In ep. ad Gal.* A 641 7 v2; 37, r1.

²¹⁾ Iustitia hic (*Rom.* I, 17) intelligenda est Dei, non qua ipse Deus iustus est, sed qua iustificat impium. *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 118 v1. ... multiplex potest dici iustitia Dei; primo, ipsa iustitia qua Ipse formaliter in seipso iustus est; secundo, iustitia qua formaliter nos iustificat et reddit iustos. *Ibid.* A 376 157 v1. Dei iustitia non intelligitur hic (*Rom.* 10, 3) qua Deus ipse essentialiter iustus est, sed Dei iustitia intelligitur quam nobis infundit per gratiam, ut iustificemur, et de impiis pii et iusti famur. *Ibid.* A 376 217 r1.

that justice essentially consists in charity — an act of the will. It is impossible that God should be « formaliter » a created act. Hence « formalis » does not mean intrinsic, and any proof which rests merely on the use of this term is patently equivocal.

Appropriately we can collect here, for convenience sake, all that we know of the ontological structure of the supernatural life in man according to Favaroni, even though individual points have been elsewhere treated. This is the question of the fundamental basis on which the internal renovation of man is operated in justification, and will be helpful as a background to what we shall have to say on created habits.

Justice consists essentially in charity: not however charity as independent of the other virtues, but charity as a legal virtue which exacts the observance of all the virtues in view of the specific supernatural end ²²). Amongst these virtues we can distinguish theological and moral. Whoever receives baptism sufficiently disposed to receive the sacrament validly, receives the impression of the sacred character, which is an indelible sign impressed on the soul ²³). Whoever receives baptism sufficiently disposed to receive the sacrament fruitfully, receives the theological virtues as well; infants in habitu, adults in actu ²⁴). Unlike the theological virtues, the moral virtues are not infused in justification, but these are to be acquired by the constant exercise of the acts.

To be noted, first of all, is the frequency with which the term « infusio » is used with regard to grace even in his later works e. g. in the baptism of Christ but not in that of St. John « verum etiam infusio fit gratiae ad extinctionem concupiscentiae » ²⁵), « ... liberatio a peccato fieret per solam infusionem gratiae sanctificantis » ²⁶), « justitia quam Deus nobis infundit per gratiam » ²⁷), « a morte quidem solus Christus resuscitavit per infusionem gratiae » ²⁸) « ... Deus infundit spem ... recte sperat per infusam caritatem » ²⁹). The purpose of this grace, as already pointed out, is to nobilitate and render

²²) *Augustiniana* viii (1958) pp. 308-314.

²³) *Ibid.* viii (1958) p. 176.

²⁴) *Ibid.* viii (1958) pp. 177-8.

²⁵) *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 191 r2.

²⁶) *In ep. ad Gal.* A 641 27 v1.

²⁷) *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 217 r1.

²⁸) *Ibid.* A 376 159 bis r2.

²⁹) *Ibid.* A 376 177 v1.

worthy of God the operation of the natural faculties. *Infusion* to perfect natural powers clearly exhibits the notion of « accidens supernaturale ».

Describing faith ³⁰⁾, which is strictly dogmatic faith, and has nothing to do with the fiducial faith of the Protestants ³¹⁾ and hope ³²⁾ he uses the term 'habitus', 'habitus mentis', which he distinguishes not from the act but from the object. Since Favaroni holds supernatural justice and supernatural faith there is no reason why the term should not be allowed its technical meaning of permanent supernatural disposition. We accept therefore that he admits the existence of a supernatural habit of faith and hope.

Introducing the question of the existence of a created or infused habit of charity we can immediately note that it is a rather obscure question in Favaroni. Obscurity, indeed, has been perceptible wherever a more fundamental philosophico-theological explanation of the Church's dogma has been attempted ³³⁾ while the enunciation of the dogma itself is usually quite sufficient and clear. But mention must be made of what we have found in his works relative to the point at issue, even though some may think our demonstration not

³⁰⁾ Circa quod est advertentum quod fides dupliciter sumitur: uno modo pro illo habitu mentis quo credimus, alio modo pro illa veritate quam credimus, et que est objectum fidei primo modo dicto. Sicuti caritas aliquando sumitur pro illo habitu virtuoso quo bene afficimur ad Deum et proximum, aliquando vero sumitur pro eo quod caritative agimus circa Deum et proximum, similiter de fide distinguendum est: interdum accipitur pro habitu mentis quo credimus, alio modo sumitur pro veritate quam credimus. *In Ep. ad Heb.* A 376 86 v2.

³¹⁾ *Augustiniana* viii (1958) pp. 169-170.

³²⁾ Spes namque, quemadmodum et fides et sapientia et scientia, interdum sumitur pro habitu vel actu sperandi qui est in mente, interdum sumitur pro objecto vel re que speratur. *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 54 r1. Cf. *In ep. ad Col.* A 641 112 v2.

³³⁾ A propos of our present question, a nice example of the ease with which he « prescinds » from finer points may be gleaned from his *De Perfecta Iustitia* where he simply says deletion of the guilt of sin may be attributed either to the Holy Ghost or to grace: Non enim ipsa culpa vel obliquitas in opere operato contra beneplacitum divine voluntatis lavatur per lavacrum aliquod ecclesiasticum sed per lavacrum potius quod est ipse Spiritus Sanctus vel gratia per Ipsum diffusa (188 r1) in cordibus nostris dirigens affectum internum et intentionem operantis: hoc namque peccatum debet prius esse deletum per infusionem gratiae antequam ad aliquod ecclesiasticum lavacrum accedamus quoniam correctus et emendatus debet accedere ad ecclesiastica sacramenta ut per ea abluatur a peccato quod est reatus pene. V 187 v2.

quite convincing. In general we can say that there are very pronounced leanings towards admitting the habit of charity in his earlier works, while in the later ones no express retraction can be found of this ³⁴). The contention that he admitted the existence of a created habit of charity rests on a reasonably sound foundation.

A distinction is definitely placed between the habit and the act of charity in this « *Tractatus de Merito Christi* » as has been already pointed out ³⁵). Charity as a habit is the criterion of value of the habits, charity as an act is the criterion of value of the acts of the other virtues. Elsewhere too, we get this distinction of act and habit. Sin, for example, is the destroyal of the act or habit of sanctifying grace ³⁶). We have already commented on his distinction between habit and object in faith, hope and charity as expressed in the Commentary to the epistle to the Hebrews: why cannot we not accept habit in this context as distinguished from act also ?

His longest and most exhaustive treatment of the question of charity as a created quality occurs on the occasion of the difficulty as to how venial sins lessen charity. In order that the question may be clearer, and that we may be able to locate better the theological position of Favaroni, we shall expound the whole question just as he himself expounds it.

The problem is: if by venial sins charity is lessened, then it follows that the charity of the « saints » here below must every day diminish, from which it follows that, firstly, the just would not progress in virtue, and secondly, in due course of time their grace

³⁴) Against our contention the strongest expression is perhaps, the following: Non puto hic Ap. distinguere inter caritatem diffusam et Spiritum Sanctum datum, sed unum et idem esse ut sentit Augustinus XV de Trinitate sicut diffuse ostendi circa XVII Dist. primi libri Sententiarum. Ipse enim Spiritus Sanctus caritas est increata et diffusa in cordibus nostris et hec est que Apostolus dicit 'caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris': caritas Dei qua Ipse Deus diligit nos, diffusa est in cordibus nostris ut eadem caritate formali, et nos Deum diligamus et Deus nos; et quia caritas hic nomine Spiritus Sancti nominatur, ideo dicit Apostolus per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis: quasi dicat 'quia Spiritus Sanctus datus est nobis qui est caritas diffusa in cordibus nostris'. In *ep. ad Rom.* A 376 177 vl.

³⁵) *Augustiniana* viii (1958) pp. 311-312.

³⁶) Ex quo apparet talis reatus non est reatus culpe, sive debitum actualis iustitie perditæ, sed alius ab eo, quoniam cum talis resurgeret ad gratiam iustificantem, reatus culpe cedit redimenti iustitie actuali, ut supra dixi. Voco autem hic iustitiam actualem, contra iustitiam originalem, actum vel habitum gratie iustificantis. *De Peccato* V 210 r1.

would be entirely lost ³⁷⁾. To this difficulty he gives three replies without explicitly assenting to either of them. Then he gives his own reply, which undoubtedly exhibits true doctrine, but is not in the least relevant to our question.

The first opinion distinguishes between charity and the fervour of charity: so that by venial sin, charity itself as a habit of the soul is left intact, while the fervour is diminished ³⁸⁾. And the precise reason for this opinion is — as Favaroni tells us — the above difficulty, which if they concede they think themselves obliged to say that by venial sins the whole of charity can be annihilated.

Whose is this first opinion? Probably that of St. Thomas. We have already shown that Favaroni knew, and quoted literally the Qq. Disp. de Malo when he wrote the tract on original sin and the Summa Theologica when he wrote the commentary to the epistle to the Romans. Now the present tract on Perfect Justice forms one with the Tract on Original Sin since they both form part of a contribution ³⁹⁾ by Favaroni to his friend Cosmatius, very probably the then Archbishop of Florence, legate to Lombardy, and afterwards Pope Innocent VI ⁴⁰⁾. Therefore we can conclude that the Qq. Disp. formed one of his sources for these tracts. Now precisely in the

³⁷⁾ Sed contra secundam conclusionem et istam simul que in illa fundatur, potest sic argui: si iste conclusiones sint vere sequitur quod cotidie caritas remittitur in sanctis per fidem hic ambulantibus. Consequentia patet, quoniam omne peccatum aut totaliter tollit ut mortale, aut saltem minuit caritatem, ut veniale. Sed per istas conclusiones nulla sunt hic membra ecclesie que non cotidie peccant, non quidem mortaliter sed venialiter, ut dicit Augustinus in aliis pluribus locis. Igitur, cotidie caritas minuitur in sanctis per fidem hic ambulantibus, et consequens est falsum tum primo, quia sancti non proficerent in presenti, sed potius a profectu deficerent; tum secundo, quoniam in eis per cotidiana peccata totaliter evacuaretur caritas eorum; hec autem dissona sunt. *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 196 r1.

³⁸⁾ Dicunt quidam quod caritas non minuitur per veniale peccatum, sed per ipsum fervor caritatis minuitur et debilitatur, ideo negant consequentiam supra factam. Negant autem per veniale minui caritatem ne cogantur dicere quod per sola venialia posset caritas totaliter auferri et ex tota evacuari: quoniam, ut aiunt, si per « A » veniale tantum, minuitur caritas per « B » gradum, exempli gratia, per equale « A » minuitur gradus equalis « B ». Sed cum in tota caritate sit precise finita multitudo talium graduum, tunc per finitam multitudinem venialium, que satis in brevi tempore posset committi, tota prorsus caritas evacuaretur, quod merito debet respui. *Ibid.* V 196 r1.

³⁹⁾ Cf. the dedication of the four tracts on Perfect Justice, Original Sin, Satisfaction and Merit of Christ, and the Priesthood of Christ in V 187 r2.

⁴⁰⁾ EUBEL, *Hierarchia Catholica*, Monasterii 1913, i, pp. 26, 141.

Qq. Disp. de Malo we find this distinction introduced to explain the effect of venial sin on charity ⁴¹⁾.

A confirmation of this is to be found in Favaroni's confutation of the opinion. He rejects it, not precisely because of the uselessness of the existence of any created quality in charity, but he rejects the « habitus entitativus subjectatus in essentia animae » or as he himself says « the habitus subjective in anima » ⁴²⁾. Everyone knows that St. Thomas holds grace to be a habitus entitativus in anima.

Hence we consider that his first opinion here referred and refuted to be very probably the opinion of St. Thomas.

The second opinion referred denies the existence of any created quality in charity, but holds that the Holy Ghost concurs immediately to the acts of charity. This immediate union of the soul with the Holy Ghost is something habitual, by which the will is habitually in a state of union with God ⁴³⁾.

From this short and concise exposition we can nevertheless well conclude that it is none other than the opinion of the Master of the Sentences. But this too, he rejects — Dimitto.

The third opinion forms a synthesis of the above two. Against the opinion of Peter Lombard it denies that the Holy Ghost is the immediate principle of the act of charity, but that in charity, as in the other virtues, there is a created quality. Against the first opinion it denies this quality to be, in any way, intrinsically composite. Wherefore, charity must be considered as a simple essence which immediately affects the will to a greater or lesser degree,

⁴¹⁾ Qq. Disp. de Malo, q. 7, a. 2.

⁴²⁾ Sed isti non intelligunt seipsos in ista materia: non enim curamus de essentia qualitatis que dicatur caritas distincta per gradus ipsam intrinsece (196 v1) componentes. Hanc enim possit Deus ponere subjective in anima, et non facere voluntatem per ipsam affici circa Deum et proximum: et posset Deus meus afficere voluntatem ad presentiam ejus. Si igitur talis essentia qualitatis esset subjective in anima, non tamen per ipsam voluntas recte afficeretur ad Deum vel proximum, nihil iustitie, nihil sanctitatis tali voluntati inesset, quantumlibet talem qualitatem in se subjective habuerit. *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 196 r2.

⁴³⁾ Dimitto quod quidam posuerunt, non dari talem essentiam qualitatis que sit caritas creata in anima, sed dicunt ipsum Spiritum Sanctum esse caritatem menti iustificate per quam sufficienter voluntas habitualiter afficitur caritative ad Deum et proximum: et isti respondere haberent ad difficultatem tactam, si per venialia remittitur caritas in sanctis viris. *Ibid.* V 196 v2.

just as the preceding opinion says of increased charity ⁴⁴). That which particularly appeals to our theologian in this opinion is the intimate connection it puts between the created quality and the act, and by which the act is considered to hold priority over the habit ⁴⁵).

The exposition of this opinion is too skimpy and general to allow its being associated with any particular author. It nevertheless bears the impression of the Franciscan school ⁴⁶).

His own solution to the difficulty is that the diminution of charity by venial sin is repaid by the re-acquisition of grace by meritorious good acts ⁴⁷), which is irrelevant to our question.

The question therefore, regards not only the existence or not of the created quality of charity, but also the nature of the quality. Our question suggests itself then: to which of the three opinions brought forward does Favaroni adhere.

He has explicitly excluded the first and the second, so that of itself should leave us with the third. Having recorded it, he should have denied it too if he did not wish to hold it.

After distinguishing two kinds of venial sins, of which the first are, practically speaking, imperfections which do not affect charity, the second are venial sins in the true sense of the word, he says of these last: *hec siquidem venialia de se apta sunt reprimere aliquatenus caritatis affectum, et minuere, nedum ejus ardorem verum etiam et essentiam qualitatis, qua non minuta de communi cursu,*

⁴⁴) Alii vero, etsi ponunt caritatem creatam per quam voluntas afficitur, non tamen dicunt ipsam intrinsece componi ex gradibus, sed in simplici essentia consistere: per ipsam tamen dicunt voluntatem plus et minus diversimodo affici sicut precedentes dicunt de caritate increata que est ipse Spiritus Sanctus. *Ibid.* V 196 v2.

⁴⁵) Et etiam isti respondere haberent si per venialia minuitur caritas; quia intelligerent quod non queritur nisi si affectus caritatis minuitur, et hoc est quod per se concernitur in difficultate presenti. *Ibid.* V 196 v2.

⁴⁶) Ita S. Bonaventura In 1 Sent. D. XVII, p. 2, art. unicus, q. 3 Contra. Caritas est forma simplex et uniformis per totum, ergo quod adimit de caritate, qua ratione adimit unam partem adimit et totum, et si hoc, ergo numquam diminitur. J. KAUP, *Die Theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des h. Bonaventuras, Franziskanische Studien*, Beiheft 12, Münster 1927. It is commonly admitted to-day that S. Bonaventura did hold the created habit in charity.

⁴⁷) Opera meritoria sunt nutrimenta caritatis et fomenta quedam ex quibus caritas convalescit. *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 196 v2. Also: ad formam igitur articuli ... (197 r2) potest primo dici quod utique in eis pro aliquo momento minuitur caritas per quod reprimatur aliquantulum caritatis affectus et minuitur etiam essentia qualitatis sed ... et tota prorsus deperdi, consequentia non valet quoniam inter venialia intercipiuntur opera meritoria. *Ibid.* V 197 r1.

non minuitur etiam ipse fervor caritatis ⁴⁸⁾). He could not possibly write these words if he did not admit in charity some kind of a created quality.

Summing up the points of doctrine made in the present chapter:

1. Should it be claimed that Favaroni follows the opinion of Peter Lombard on the formal element of justification, the explanation given by him steers clear of any tendencies either to compromise the unity of the Divine Nature, or to exaggerate man's deification. Expressions like « *formalis vita* » placed in conjunction with his more complete expositions of the dogma, must be considered ambiguous, and not as the starting point of interpretation.

2. On the question of created charity we would like to express our opinion by the aid of a distinction between formal teaching and implied doctrine. Granted that our theologian does not formally teach the existence of a created quality, his doctrine certainly implies or supposes it. It is unhealthy interpretation to decide any fundamental question — whether it be in our favour or against us — on the use of a mere term. Terms must find their true sense in textual exposition. But oft-repeated expressions scattered in different works cannot be completely ignored. The preceding pages have shown a distinction between the habit and the act of charity to be frequently supported. Hence we feel entitled to conclude that a not inconsequential case has been made to establish our theologian's opinion in favour of charity as a created quality in the soul.

* * *

The task proposed in undertaking this work now seems sufficiently accomplished — even though not all questions we would like to see solved are in point of fact solved. The primary purpose was to establish the orthodoxy or unorthodoxy of Favaroni's doctrine on Original Sin and Justification. On the points selected for research we have consistently found true doctrine — except perhaps for the question of the direct effect of the sacrament of Penance: and since these same points provide the central doctrines of Original Sin and Justification, we consider our task substantially completed.

By this the first three accusations of A. V. Mueller are radically disposed of: Favaroni does not teach that through original sin human nature is internally corrupted, nor that concupiscence is sin, even

⁴⁸⁾ *Ibid.* V 197 vl.

before baptism much less after it: and so the host of lutheran errors following in the wake of this erroneous fundamental assumption is excluded. He does not teach the lutheran doctrine of double justice, he does not teach the inefficacy of baptism as a sacrament conferring grace *ex opere operato*.

The question however of Favaroni's place in a « school » still remains tempting and provocative. We find the principal pro-Scotist learnings: sin can, of itself, be the penalty for sin, rejection of grace as *habitus entitativus*, the infusion of grace compared with creation ⁴⁹⁾: and indeed much more could be found. But it appears strange that no text, either propounding or using the 'distinctio formalis ex natura rei' — usually taken as the hallmark of Scotism — has come forward. We have not set ourselves the task of finding the doctrinal current to which historically our theologian belongs: however a calm perusal of the forgoing will convince the reader how futile and unfounded are the alleged pro-lutheran tendencies and how much more reasonably his place will be sought among the followers of pre-scholastic Augustinianism and subsequent Scotism.

Appendix

Since the tracts on Perfect Justice, Original Sin, and the Satisfaction of Christ have had for our work a very special importance, we reproduce here a list of the conclusions contained therein, and their exact collocation in the Chigi Ms. (Vatican, Chigi, B VII, 118) ¹⁾.

DE PERFECTA IUSTITIA MILITANTIS ECCLESIE IN PRESENTI

1^a Conclusio: Mater Domini Salvatoris adeo perfecte in hac vita (f. 188 r2) fuit mundata in carne ab omni languore nature, quod

⁴⁹⁾ In the thomist theory creation is verifiable only of subsistant entities, but grace is an accident. Scotus holds grace to be created: cf. P. MINGES, *Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Phil. et Theol.* Quaracchi 1930, p. 408.

¹⁾ Chronological indications and a description of the manuscript will be found in H. DENIFLE, *Die abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther über Iustitia Dei (Rom. 1, 17) und Iustificatio*, Mainz 1905, pp. 220-223. The eight small tracts on the Apocalypse, excluding however, his Commentary on the Apocalypse proper, will also be found in paper ms. G. 33 of the Archivium S. Petri. At the conclusion of the last tract it gives the date an. 1390. Neither of these mss. contain the tract « De Libero Arbitrio » which Ciolini, probably after Perini and Jedin, asserts to be in the ms. of the Chigiano Library.

- in ea non fuit aliqua rebellio vel repugnantia contra spiritum ad aliquod opus bonum.
- 2^a Conclusio: Excepta Matre Domini Salvatoris, nullus umquam (f. 189 v1) sanctorum, quantecumque fuit perfectionis et sanctitatis, fuit in hac vita adeo perfecte mundatus ab omni vicio concupiscentie carnis ut non haberet in carne quid resisteret spiritui ad complendum in eo iustitiam.
- 3^a Conclusio: Ecclesia peregrina in terris numquam adeo fuit a (f. 192 v2) Christo mundata ut esset in hoc seculo sine ruga, uno dumtaxat ejus membro excepto.
- 4^a Conclusio: Christus cotidie mundat ecclesiam ut non habeat ru- (f. 193 r1) gam, licet ea in hac vita omnino carere non potest.

De Peccato secundo modo sumpto.

- 1^a Conclusio: Mater Domini Salvatoris, post sacrum Domini con- (f. 193 r2) ceptum, adeo fuit perfecte iustitie et sanctitatis, quod nullum de cetero habuit omnino peccatum.
- 2^a Conclusio: Nullus ceterorum sanctorum tante fuit in hac vita (f. 193 r2) iustitie et sanctitatis, ut vixerit in presenti omnino sine peccato.
- 3^a Conclusio: Nemo iustus in hac vita, quantecumque fuerit per- (f. 194 v1) fecte iustitie et sanctitatis, implevit tamen in presenti illud primum et maximum preceptum iustitie, diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo.
- 4^a Conclusio: Ecclesia que peregrinatur in terris, per fidem ambu- (f. 195 v1) lans, non adeo perfecte mundatur a Christo in hac vita, ut sit ipsa in presenti sine macula et ruga.

TRACTATUS DE PECCATO PER ORIGINEM TRAJECTO

- 1^a Conclusio: Nulla essentia qualitatis, in quocumque subjecto exis- (f. 200 r2) tat, est complete peccatum originale.
- 2^a Conclusio: Ipsa affectio anime que dicitur concupiscentia carnis (f. 200 v2) sive fomes peccati, non est formaliter ipsum originale peccatum.
- 3^a Conclusio: Illa affectio anime que dicitur concupiscentia carnis (f. 202 r1) sive fomes peccati, per se considerata non est ipsa carentia originalis iustitie, formaliter sumpta.
- 4^a Conclusio: Carnalis affectio anime que dicitur concupiscentia (f. 202 r1) carnis per se considerata, non est aliqua culpa.
- 5^a Conclusio: Carentia originalis iustitie per se considerata, non est (f. 202 v1) aliqua culpa, ideo nec ipsa est formaliter originale peccatum.
- 6^a Conclusio: Propagati seminaliter ab adam per originem trahunt (f. 202 v2) carentiam originalis iustitie propter peccatum ade.

- 7^a Conclusio: Descendentes ab adam per seminalem propagationem (f. 203 r2) per originem trahunt quemdam reatum quod per sacramentum baptismatis in regeneratione dimittitur.
- 8^a Conclusio: Omnes propagati seminaliter ab adam eodem actu (f. 207 v1) prevaricationis ade, prevaricati sunt preceptum Dei quod dederat ipsi ade.
- 9^a Conclusio: Omnes descendentes seminaliter ab adam per generationem contrahunt reatum pene sensitive, distinctum a reatu culpe.
- 10^a Conclusio: Parvuli decedentes in solo originali peccato puniuntur (f. 212 v1) pena sensitiva, licet eorum sit mitissima pena.
- 11^a Conclusio: Peccatum quo peccavit adam adhuc punitur et perpetuo punietur. (f. 223 v2)
- 12^a Conclusio: Omnes infantes decedentes in solo originali peccato, (f. 223 v2) post hanc vitam, pena sensitiva equaliter puniuntur.

TRACTATUS DE MERITO CHRISTI ET CONDIGNA SATISFACTIONE PRO ELECTIS

A. Valor Operis: De Valore actus interioris in seipso (f. 224 r2).

- 1^a Conclusio: Inter omnes habitus quibus iuvamur ut bene et recte (f. 224 v1) vivamus sola caritas est vera virtus in homine vel ipsi soli convenit essentialiter et intrinsece, ratio vere virtutis.
- 2^a Conclusio: Quilibet habitus virtuose operativus tanto magis sortitur rationem vere virtutis quanto ex officio suo magis servit officio caritatis, sive illi bono quod caritas diligit.
- 3^a Conclusio: Omnis actus emanans ab habitu virtuoso tantus est (f. 225 v1) in esse actualis virtutis quantus est affectus caritatis cujus gratia a suo habitu emanavit.
- 4^a Conclusio: Sola caritas in homine est per essentiam suam vera (f. 225 v1) iustitia per quam homo iustificatur, et iuste vivit coram Deo.
- 5^a Conclusio: Omnis actus emanans a caritate tantus est in esse (f. 226 r1) actualis iustitie precise quantus est in esse virtutis et e contrario.
- 6^a Conclusio: Omnis actus dilectionis Dei in anima Christi tanta (f. 226 r2) fuit actualis iustitia precise quanta fuit actualis virtus, sive actus virtutis, et e contrario.
- 7^a Conclusio: Anima Christi infinito amore amabat divinitatem (f. 228 r1) Christi cui erat personaliter sociata.
- 8^a Conclusio: Quelibet virtuosa affectio circa Deum in anima (f. 228 r1) Christi fuit infinita virtus, vel actus infinitae virtutis.
- 9^a Conclusio: Quilibet actus amoris circa Deum in anima Christi (f. 228 r1) fuit infinita iustitia actualis, per quam ipsa anima iusta reddebatur coram Deo.

- 10^a Conclusio: Omnis actus virtutis in anima Christi fuit melior in
(f. 228 r2) esse virtutis quam aliqua culpa mortalis possit esse
mala in esse culpe vel vicii.
- 11^a Conclusio: Omnis operatio virtuosa in anima Christi fuit, ex
(f. 228 v2) valore sue intrinsece bonitatis, sufficiens meritum pro
omnibus culpis mortalibus redimendis.

B. « Amodo secundum principale videndum est: de imputabilitate
virtuose operationis in Christo, sive de efficacia ejus ad
merendum » (f. 230 v1).

- 1^a Conclusio: Impossibile est aliquam creaturam rationalem dili-
(f. 230 v1) gere Deum perseveranter, et nihil ei in futurum a
Deo retribui.
- 2^a Conclusio: Quam impossibile est Deum iniustum esse, tam im-
(f. 230 v2) possibile est Ipsum non retribuire quandoque semet-
ipsum in premium beatificum omni creature rationali
amanti ipsum perseveranter.
- 3^a Conclusio: Cum vita eterna redditur iustis in premium pro ope-
(f. 231 v1) rata iustitia, plus habet rationem iuste et debite retri-
butionis, quam gratuite donationis.
- 4^a Conclusio: Omnis creatura rationalis inherens Deo per veram
(f. 232 r1) dilectionem meretur vitam eternam de condigno.
- 5^a Conclusio: Quelibet creatura rationalis resurgens a culpa mor-
(f. 236 v1) tali et de cetero Deum amans perseveranter, quam
de condigno meretur premium beatificum, tam de
condigno meretur liberari ab utraque pena prefata.
- 6^a Conclusio: Quelibet virtuosa affectio anime Christi, ex valore
(f. 236 v2) intrinseco sui, sufficit pro relaxatione utriusque pene
in quocumque redimendis.
- 7^a Conclusio: Quelibet virtuosa affectio Christi in natura assumpta
(f. 236 v2) ex se sufficit pro quantacumque gratia iustificante
in via, et relevante a culpa mortali.
- 8^a Conclusio: Quelibet affectio anime Christi virtuosa in natura
(f. 237 r1) assumpta ex se sufficiens fuit ad promerendam quan-
tancumque latitudinem glorie pro redimendis.
- 9^a Conclusio: Quelibet virtuosa affectio Christi in natura assumpta
(f. 237 r1) tantum Christo imputabatur secundum eandem natu-
ram quantum talis affectio habebat rationem vir-
tutis.
- 10^a Conclusio: Tantum Christus merebatur per quamlibet virtuosam
(f. 237 v1) ejus operationem, quantum talis operatio ei imputa-
batur secundum naturam assumptam.
- 11^a Conclusio: Quam iniustum fuisset Christo non imputare secun-
(f. 237 v2) dum naturam assumptam operationem virtuosam
quam habuit secundum illam naturam, tam iniustum
fuisset sibi petenti premium denegare.
- 12^a Conclusio: Christus per quamlibet suam virtuosam operationem
(f. 237 v2) meruit de condigno premium beatorum.

- 13^a Conclusio: Humanitas Christi totam beatitudinem comprehensoris quam habet et habuit ab instanti conceptionis, habet eam ex iure unionis personalis.
- 14^a Conclusio: Omnis caritativa affectio circa Deum quam Christus habuit secundum naturam assumptam, dupliciter fuit sua et sui iuris secundum eandem naturam: iure personalitatis et iure spontanee libertatis.

C. « Utrum mors Christi, quantum spectat ad opus exterius operatum fuit pretium sufficiens ad satisfaciendum de condigno » (f. 238 r2).

- 1^a Conclusio: Persona divina, ut persona est, sive ipsa proprietas (f. 238 v2) personalis, de se et formaliter dicit aliquam dignitatem.
- 2^a Conclusio: Persona divina in esse persone est infinite dignitatis. (f. 238 v2)
- 3^a Conclusio: Humanitas Christi ex unione personali consequitur infinitam dignitatem persone divine in esse persone. (f. 239 r1)
- 4^a Conclusio: Humanitas Christi per unionem personalem consequitur infinitam dignitatem per ydentitatem realem, ut ipsa sit realiter infinita dignitas.
- 5^a Conclusio: In foro iustitie satisfactive, quantitas premii non attenditur penes essentialem valorem rei date in pretium. (f. 239 r1)
- 6^a Conclusio: Humanitas Christi quando moriebatur in cruce, licet in esse nature non erat pretium infinitum, in esse tamen persone erat pretium utique infinitum. (f. 239 r1)
- 7^a Conclusio: Mors Christi fuit infinita obedientia exhibita Patri. (f. 239 r2)
- 8^a Conclusio: Obedientia usque ad mortem crucis suffecit satisfacere ad condignum pro quibuslibet inobedientiis seu transgressionibus. (f. 239 r2)

Nicolaus TONER, O. E. S. A.