

Introduction to the teaching of the Italian Augustinians of the 18th century on the nature of actual grace

CHAPTER I. PREPARING THE WAY FOR THE AUGUSTINIAN TEACHING ON GRACE. A SUMMARY OF SOME HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED SOURCES FROM THE PERIOD BEFORE L. BERTI.

Codex 2290 of the *Biblioteca Angelica* in Rome gives us some idea of the difficulties and the opposition which had to be overcome by the Augustinian theologians of the eighteenth century. At that time the battle over grace is still in full progress. We find one of the Consultors wondering whether after so many accusations the Augustinian teaching may still be pronounced to be free of censure, but proceeding to state at once that this doctrine is subscribed to by theologians of the Augustinian order and by Benedictines and is defended by members of other Orders as well, but that especially in France and in Spain *a theologis Instituti cuiusdam eorumque discipulis numero sane plurimis, tum et ab Episcopis etiam in eorum scholis enutritis* it is qualified as Calvinistic, Bajanistic, Jansenistic etc. and is even considered as a branch of Mohammedanism or atheism ¹⁾. Matters went so far that in France, out of sheer hatred against their doctrine, many Augustinians were not allowed to teach, to preach or to administer the sacraments ²⁾.

¹⁾ Biblioteca Angelica (B. A.) MS. 2290, p. 413.

²⁾ *I. c.*, pp. 413 and 414. In Rome I came across a booklet entitled *Enciclica del Rev. Padre Prior Generale degli Agostiniani e motivi pressanti per mandarla a tutti i conventi, esposti in alcune lettere fedelmente tradotte dalla francese nell'italiana favella*, Ratisbona etc.; printed c. 1780, without name of author or

In August 1758 under the pressure of these reverses the General of the Augustinian Order, Fr. X. Vasquez, had recourse to Pope Clement XIII in a memorial, the full text of which is to be found in MS. 2290 of the *Biblioteca Angelica*. The Holy See pronounced no other judgement than that:

« Satis provisum indemnitati Scholae Augustinianae in causa Norisiana et P. M. Laurentii Berti et Bellelli, necnon per Apostolicas Litteras Pauli III *Alias*, datas die 7 Augusti 1660; Innocentii XII *Reddidit*, datas die 6 Februarii 1694; Clementis XI *Pastoralis officii*, datas die 8 Augusti 1718; Benedicti XIII *Demissas preces*, datas die 6 Novembris 1724; necnon eiusdem Benedicti XIII *Pretiosus*, datas sub die 26 Maji 1727; Clementis XII *Exponit*, datas die 16 Aprilis 1732, et *Apostolicae providentiae*, datas die 2 Octobris 1733, et postremo per Benedictum XIV in Epistola ad Inquisitionem Hispaniae, quae incipit *Dum praeterito mense*, die 3 Julii 1748; et Pater Generalis Ordinis recurat in casibus particularibus. Et addiderunt ad mentem, quae est, quod quatenus P. Generalis hanc resolutionem sibi communicari quaeat, non fiat nisi de speciali mandato Sanctitatis Suae summarie et per sequentia verba « Satis provisum indemnitati Scholae Augustinianae... » per plura Brevia, Literas et Constitutiones Apostolicas, et P. Generalis in casibus particularibus ad S. Congregationem recurat, facto de omnibus verbo cum Sanctissimo... ».

On the 6th of August 1765 the same General resorted to the Holy See once more, because since 1758 his order had been subjected to an ever increasing number of new insinuations³⁾; but the Holy See itself has never condemned the Augustinian school or its teaching.

I shall now give a short survey of what was stated concerning the teaching on nature of actual grace by the various authors before Noris, whose writings are to be found mainly in the *Biblioteca Angelica* in Rome and in the archives of the Augustinian Generalate.

1. *Michael Salon*⁴⁾. First of all in opposition to Molina he

publisher. The contents are one mass of calumnies strung together without any thought of charity or even a spark of decency.

³⁾ B. A. MS. 2295, pp. 91 ff., contains the full text of this second memorial under the title: *Supplex libellus a Rev. P. Generali Augustiniano die 6 Augusti anni 1765 Clementi XIII exhibitus cum adnexis thesibus a Patribus Societatis Jesuitarum die 8 eiusdem mensis in Collegio Romano propugnatis*.

⁴⁾ See the archives of the Augustinian Generalate in Rome. The unsigned

states that God does not operate in man with a *concursum simulaneum* but with a *concursum praeuium*. Yet he supports Molina to a great extent by denying that grace is *efficax ab intrinseco* and that the distinction between *gratia efficax* and *gratia sufficiens* is determined by the effect which is produced by the disposition of the free will. Though he seems therefore to make the efficacy dependent on man's consent, on the other hand he asserts that this free cooperation must be assisted by this same divine grace. Salon is practically the only one of all the early Augustinians consulted for the present study whose views have a Molinistic tendency.

2. Jo. Bapt. Perusinus ⁵⁾ distinguishes *gratia operans* or *excitans* into *gratia sufficiens*, which brings it about that we are able to will, and *gratia efficax*, which brings it about that we do will, and which is not rejected by any obdurate heart but is given in order to remove this hardness of heart. In addition to the general *concursum* we must accept *gratia sufficiens* and *gratia efficax* especially because of our fallen nature.

Gratia efficax is efficacious from its inner nature (*ab intrinseco*). In connection with Congruism, which teaches that grace moves only *moraliter*, Perusinus expressly states with St. Thomas, q. 3 de *Malo*, that a moral cause is not really a true cause. God, however, is the true cause of our conversion; therefore not only can He move us *moraliter*, but He moves us physically as well ⁶⁾. Thus as early as the end of the 16th century this Augustinian theologian clearly teaches a physical causality of grace, though he is not in complete accord about it with the Dominican Fathers who extend it to a

codex is marked on the back: *Censura Theologorum in materia de Divinis Auxiliis*. From fol. 454 to 567 we find a *censura* in regard to Molina's teachings, written by Magister Michael Salon O. E. S. A. by order of the Holy Office; other copies of this same criticism are to be found in the B. A. MS. 888, fol. 2-70 and 72-143; MS. 877, fol. 398-469; MS. 882, fol. 199-251 (in Spanish; probably the autograph copy); MS. 1113, fol. 98-168.

For a sketch of Salon's life (d. 1621) see G. DE SANTIAGO VELA, *Ensayo de una Biblioteca Ibero-Americana de la Orden de San Agustín*, Vol. VII, pp. 72-89. Escorial 1925.

⁵⁾ B. A. MS. 894, pp. 115-122: *Summa brevis de Gratia, tradita a M. Jo. Bapt. Perusino* (Ord. S. Aug.) Card. Romae pro instructione.

⁶⁾ I. c., p. 120: « Item causa moralis non est vera et propria causa, ut docet D. Thomas q. 3 de *Malo*. Sed Deus est propria causa nostrae conversionis. Ergo non movet per gratiam moraliter, sed physice ».

praedeterminatio physica ⁷⁾). The meaning of Perusinus's still undeveloped opinion was to be further elucidated by the Augustinians after him.

3. Jo. Bapt. de Plumbino (d. 1613), Procurator General of his order, whom Portalié unjustly calls a defender of Molina at the time of the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* ⁸⁾, when giving a *votum* for this Congregation expresses the opinion that the Thomists asserting that God in his absolute and efficacious decree predetermines all good actions are not in agreement with Calvin at all, but that their assertion is the true doctrine of the Church. Moreover he repudiates the so-called *Scientia Media* as well as the proposition that God with his efficacious grace moves man's free will by mere suasion, enticement or some other way of acting *moraliter* only without actually bringing it about that free will moved by grace consents freely and infallibly (*libere et infallibiliter*). According to de Plumbino the opposite opinion is definable as a dogma ⁹⁾.

4. Gr. Nunnus Coronel, a Portuguese Augustinian, appointed first secretary of the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* by Clement VIII ¹⁰⁾, was a fierce anti-Molinist. His autograph writings are to be found also in the *Biblioteca Angelica* ¹¹⁾.

Gratia sufficiens, which in the state of man's fallen nature consists in interior inspirations, by which God stimulates, attracts, invites and persuades man, is given to aid man's potentiality, in this sense, however, that a richer grace is required for the willing

⁷⁾ *Ib.*: «Tertia (opinio) asserit gratiam efficacem esse physicam et physice movere et praedeterminare, nihilominus non tollere libertatem... (p. 121) Attamen remanet difficultas quomodo possit stare gratia efficaci physice movente cum libero arbitrio. Ego tamen puto vere et physice gratiam efficacem movere voluntatem salvo libero arbitrio, non tamen praedeterminare, sed ut intelligatur, dico quod aliud est movere physice et aliud determinare ».

⁸⁾ PORTALIÉ, *Augustinianisme*, Dict. de Théol. Cath., Vol. I, col. 2485.

⁹⁾ B. A. MS. 858 (an autograph signature proves Plumbinus to be the author), fol. 6v. and fol. 10.

¹⁰⁾ Cf. GR. DE SANTIAGO VELA, o. c., Vol. VI, pp. 46-56. His chief published works are: *Libri X de vera Christi Ecclesia*, Romae 1594; *Libri VI de optimo Reipublicae statu*, Romae 1597; *Apologeticum de traditionibus Apostolicis*, Romae 1597.

¹¹⁾ Cf. NARDUCCI, *Codicum manuscriptorum... in Bibliotheca Angelica*, Romae 1892. I have used MS. 682, fol. 211 sq.: *De necessitate gratiae Christi et eius efficacia*.

and acting done by man ¹²⁾. But *gratia efficax* « habet virtutem et efficaciam non ex futuro consensu liberi arbitrii, sed ex intentione, voluntate et omnipotentia Dei et a dominio quod habet in voluntatem hominum » ¹³⁾. In contrast to *gratia sufficiens* *gratia efficax* does not influence the will *moraliter*, but in a real and physical manner « qua Deus facit ut delectet, quod non delectabat et cum dilectione adimpleat, quod praecipit » ¹⁴⁾. This real and physical premotion of God upon man's will is needed to preserve the certainty and infallibility of the divine predestination, for they are not so saved by a purely moral premotion. Finally, in making man consent freely *gratia efficax* does not take away liberty, but it aids and perfects it ¹⁵⁾.

5. *Ph. Visconti*, a Milanese, born in 1596. He taught the students of the Augustinian order with great success at Milan, Florence, Padua and Rome. In 1649 he was chosen as Prior General. In 1657 Alexander VII appointed him bishop of a diocese in Calabria. He died in 1664. For a sketch of his life and a list of his writings see D. Perini O. E. S. A., *Bibliographia Augustiniana*, Vol. IV, pp. 56-59.

In MS. 2290 of the *Biblioteca Angelica* we read that he may be considered as a forerunner of Noris as regards Augustinian doctrine, though at first he did not know Jansenius, whose writings had not yet appeared. Visconti is said, however, to have followed in the steps of his own forerunners ¹⁶⁾. In MS. 895 we find a summary

¹²⁾ B. A. MS. 862, fol. 212 and 212v.

¹³⁾ I. c., fol. 214, Prop. XIII.

¹⁴⁾ fol. 217v.

¹⁵⁾ fol. 218v: « ... Quibus omnibus accedit, quod si Deus per gratiae suae auxilia non aliter corda hominum moveret, quam suadendo, invitando aut quovis alio modo moraliter tantum attrahendo, proculdubio tolleretur certitudo et infallibilitas fundamenti praedestinationis... » and: « Deus sua efficaci gratia movet hominum voluntates... non solum moraliter per modum proponentis obiectum divinis inspirationibus et suasionibus interius docendo et illuminando, sed etiam vera, reali et in hoc sensu physica motione agendo et efficiendo ut ipsae (fol. 219) sub eiusdem gratiae efficaci praemotione certo, infallibiliter et insuperabiliter se determinant ad actus libere eliciendos ».

¹⁶⁾ B. A. MS. 2290, p. 408: « L'anno 1657 il giorno 6 Febrajo l'accenato Generale dell'Ordine Filippo Visconti, che certamente nella Scuola Agostiniana aveva preceduto al Cardinale de Noris nella divisione de stati, e negl'altri punti della dottrina de S. Agostino, e nulla avea potuto apprendere dai libri di Gian-senio non ancor publicati, quand'egli sequendo l'orme de suoi maggiori era già provetto in questi domestici studi, fù... ».

made by Michael Heckius of a *censura* by Visconti¹⁷). Both of them start from a double aid in St Augustine, the *adiutorium sine quo non* and the *adiutorium quo*, the former being the aid for man's state before the Fall, the latter being the aid for man's fallen nature. The distinction they make in grace is based on this double aid, for to the second Adam a stronger grace is given by virtue of which man wills and loves with such charity that the will of the flesh, desiring the opposite, is overcome¹⁸).

These few points herald as it were the teaching of the Augustinians of the 18th century, in whose writings we also find this double divine aid as well as concupiscence and *gratia victrix*.

6. *Christianus Lupus*, who was friendly with Noris in Rome, further develops this teaching of victorious grace against concupiscence. He describes it as a good concupiscence fighting against evil concupiscence¹⁹). *Lupus* calls grace also charity (*caritas*), not as a theological virtue, but in so far as it touches the human heart by the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost ; this happens « per luminosam actualem caritatem divinitus inspiratam ac infusam »²⁰). We see here the ideas of illumination of the intellect and infusion of charity already fully developed. Moreover *Lupus* clearly indicates the necessity of grace, when he calls it « bellicose and yet always shy »²¹).

¹⁷) B. A. MS. 895, fol. 536-540: « Censura 5 Propositionum Jansenii dicta a Reverendissimo P. Nostro Philippo Vicecomite totius Ordinis nostri Generali et Consultore et Qualificatore S. Officii, coram S. Congregatione et Innocentio X. Per me M. Fr. Michaellem Hechium Gandavensem ex manuscriptis eius congesta et in meliorem formam redacta ac notis illustrata ». M. van Hecke (Heckius) was a Belgian Augustinian, who died at Rome in 1687. The greater part of his manuscripts is preserved in the Biblioteca Angelica.

¹⁸) « Adeoque haec est gratia victrix, quae vincit omnem supervenientem concupiscentiam, quali gratia Adam non egebat », MS. 895, fol. 539.

¹⁹) B. A. MS. 895, fol. 419-453v, entitled: *Iudicium super quinque propositionibus Cornelii Jansenii oblatum Reverendissimo Patri Vicecomiti tunc Generali, per Patrem Magistrum Christianum Lupum...* The manuscript is very hard to read because the ink has corroded the paper.

Fol. 428: « Interior namque Jesu Christi gratia... est nihil aliud quam concupiscentia bona pugnans adversus concupiscentiam malam ».

²⁰) I. c., fol. 430.

²¹) I. c., fol. 428: « Moderna quippe nostra gratia nequaquam ad instar primae gratiae in paradiso est quieta et pacifica, sed bellicosa semperque pavida, utpote

Finally he also seems to accept the doctrine of degrees in grace, held by later Augustinians, for he teaches that there is great variety in the powers of the different evil concupiscences and that therefore grace has also its « incunabula, incrementum, robur et perfectionem » ²²).

7. From France we have an unusual representative of the Augustinian school in *Carolus Moreau* ²³). As is indicated by the long subtitle of his work this Augustinian is in every respect an adherent of the Thomistic school, and especially so in teaching that physical predetermination does not take away liberty in the case of acts of the natural order either. For his argumentation he has recourse to St Thomas, whom he calls « in hac praedeterminatione physica Augustini discipulum » ²⁴). But even more than for the natural acts, physical predetermination is required for the supernatural acts, for which the human will has more need of the divine grace which moves it and predetermines it. There is a twofold reason for this: through Adam's sin the will is inclined to evil and therefore it has to be bent into the right direction again by grace, and secondly the intellect has also weakened and has become obscured by ignorance so that, like the will, it has to be restored by grace. According to Moreau therefore actual grace is primarily *medicinalis*, that is to say it is given to overcome rebellious concupiscence in man. This *gratia sanans* operates by virtue of a physical pre-motion ²⁵).

confligere habens non adversum carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus spiritualia nequitiae in coelestibus ac innumerabiles nobis ingenitas... animales cupiditates ».

²²) *Ib.* Chr. Lupus (1612-1681) was an Augustinian of the Belgian province and used to be called a « walking library » on account of his great erudition. He taught ecclesiastical history and canon law at Louvain. See OSSINGER, *Bibliotheca Augustiniana*, Ingolstadii et Augustae Vindeliolorum 1768; this book also contains a list of his writings.

Lupus's *Opera omnia* were published in twelve volumes at Venice in 1724-1729.

²³) B. A. MS. 679; entitled: *Spiritus medullae defaecatissimae Doctrinae summae Sancti Augustini*. For life and work of C. Moreau see OSSINGER, *Bibliotheca Augustiniana*, p. 613.

²⁴) The manuscript has no pagination. The text quoted is from the end of the first *Homilia*.

²⁵) *Homilia secunda*: « Vis aperte Augustinum audire asserentem Dei praedeterminationem physicam in omni bono opere praemoventem, impellentem, incipientem, tamquam causam primam efficientem et non solum moralem trahentem et allicientem, suavissimo pellicientem motu gratiae ? Accipe quod habet exerta (?) :

Moreau differs from the other Augustinians by accepting the *praedeterminatio physica* without making any distinction, that is to say accepting it also for the natural order, for which according to the later Augustinians it was not necessary. In his teaching of the physical premotion of grace, however, he is their illustrious forerunner.

8. *The Belgian School.* This term is used here to cover the theologians of the Augustinian order who taught at Louvain mainly in the seventeenth century; the *Biblioteca Angelica* in Rome possesses a great number of manuscripts and unpublished theses written by them. The considerable influence of these immediate predecessors of theirs on Berti and Bellelli is unmistakable. It is evident for instance from the numerous quotations from Belgian Augustinians in Berti's works ²⁶). My study of the relation between the seventeenth century Belgian Augustinians and their eighteenth century Italian brethren has only been cursory and confined to the topic of grace. I surmise, however, that in other matters as well very interesting points of agreement are to be found.

In order that the power of redeeming grace — that is the grace for the state of fallen human nature — may appear to fuller advantage these theologians distinguish with St Augustine between the grace of Adam's state of innocence before the Fall: the *adiutorium sine quo non*, and the grace of fallen human nature: the *adiutorium quo*. Adam needed grace, for he could not act salutarily without it, but as he was without concupiscence which inclines the will to evil, he had no need of the kind of grace which aids the will *efficaciter*. The first grace of Adam was such that he could reject it if he wished, but in which he could also persevere if he

Quoniam ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens. ... Attendant hic quantum honori Dei detrahant... qui fingunt sibi Deum solummodo causam finalem et moraliter tantum suavitate et voluptate attrahere voluntatem ad bonum... ».

In the third homily are quoted several of St. Augustine's texts which mention grace operating through a certain *delectation*, and, though we do not find Moreau using the word *delectatio victrix*, he has already all the elements for the doctrine of grace as a victorious delectation.

²⁶) Berti knew even these theses: « ... ad hanc usque diem omnes Augustiniani Lovanienses tradiderunt et propugnarunt, ut constat ex eorum thesibus collectis simul et in tria volumina distributis atque in Angelica Bibliotheca asservatis »; in *Systema Vindicatum*, p. 126.

wished. Now the grace of fallen human nature is much stronger ; it is the *delectatio victrix* ²⁷⁾.

And since this grace does not only give man the ability, but also the will (in the case of *gratia efficax*), or —as it is expressed by Petrus Clenaerts — not only the *adiutorium perseverantiae*, but the *perseverantia ipsa* ²⁸⁾, it can indeed be called a physical predetermination, which therefore with the above distinction between man's states is not present in the state of innocence ²⁹⁾. The necessity of this *gratia efficax*, which operates through the *delectatio victrix* and predetermines physically, arises from the fact that through Adam's sin the will has been weakened and has received an inclination towards what is wrong, which is called concupiscence. The *gratia efficax* makes of man who is unwilling (*nolens*) a « volentem et efficit ut homo tantum velit tantoque ardore diligit, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat » ³⁰⁾.

As the teaching on concupiscence forms the basis on which the Augustinians build their theory of the grace of our state, it is understandable that they call *gratia efficax* — which has to fight against concupiscence — a *victrix delectatio* ³¹⁾. It is true that Bellelli and Berti were the first to develop the theory of victorious delectation, but all the same by their quite frequent use of this expression of St Augustine the earlier Belgian Augustinians prepared the way for their Italian brethern who have expounded the doctrine of grace in extensive publications.

On the subject of the doctrine of grace *Joannes Libens* may well be considered one of the most important representatives of the Belgian school. I have been able to establish his authorship of a hitherto anonymous manuscript in the *Biblioteca Angelica* ³²⁾. In the margin of this manuscript there is a note — apparently by a different hand — to the effect that this treatise on grace was

²⁷⁾ Cf. B. A. MS. 421, fol. 17-20: Fr. PAUWENS, *Assertiones Theologicae...*

²⁸⁾ B. A. MS. 421, fol. 207 sq.: *Augustinus per seipsum docens notis explanatus*. Praesidebit F. Petrus Clenaerts etc. Lovanii 1688.

²⁹⁾ l. c., fol. 215: « Atqui praedeterminatio physica non tantum dat posse, sed et ipsum velle: ergo non habuit locum in natura integra, vel Angelis, inter quos et ipsam paritas est Augustini ».

³⁰⁾ Cf. PAUWENS, o. c., fol. 20.

³¹⁾ For a summary on the doctrine of concupiscence as taught by the Augustinians see my article in *Augustiniana* IV (1954), pp. 178-184.

³²⁾ B. A. MS. 1144; entitled: *Tractatus de arcano gratiae divinae mysterio*.

written in the Augustinian school of Louvain under the supervision of a certain N. for the purpose of having it examined by Rome. The manuscript is not paged; I follow my own pagination.

The conceptions occurring in this unknown work by Libens seem to me to be of the utmost importance in connection with the ideas on nature of actual grace developed later on by Berti. From internal evidence I also concluded that Libens wrote his treatise in 1713, that is two years after Bellelli published his *Mens Augustini de statu creaturae rationalis ante peccatum* at Antwerp in Belgium, our author's country. It may therefore seem surprising that Libens's list of Augustinians who defend the *gratia per se efficax* does not include Bellelli, who was one of its most ardent upholders. Nor does Libens make any mention of Henricus Noris who had died in the meantime. It is possible that he did not know Bellelli's work published only recently; but it seems highly improbable that he did not know Noris. The fact that he does not mention either of them may be an indication that he is independent of them in his teaching.

On the other hand it is very remarkable indeed that the works of Berti, who was for years librarian at the *Biblioteca Angelica* and so knew exactly what writings of his Belgian brethern it contained, show a great many points of resemblance to the treatise in question, the author of which was probably unknown to him too, for he does not mention his name anywhere. There are whole sentences in Berti which occur word for word in this manuscript of Libens and the latter's line of thought is certainly a familiar one to Berti³³).

Though in his teaching J. Libens does not differ from his Belgian brethern, he is conspicuous for his clear mode of expression. He says of the distinction between the grace given to Adam and that given to man's fallen nature that Augustine bases thereon his whole doctrine of grace³⁴). The grace of Adam was exactly similar

³³) MS. 1144 (fol. 7v): « ... unde solum transtulerunt Molinistae gratiam ab Augustino naturae integrae descriptam in locum gratiae medicinalis Christi quam S. Pater naturae lapsae et vulneratae ubique depredicat necessariam »; and BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 8, p. 14: « Quare Molina nihil aliud praestitit, nisi quod gratiam Conditoris in gratiam Salvatoris commutavit, et pro adiutorio huius status subrogavit illud, quod Augustinus tradit Angelis et primo homini necessarium ». A little further on we shall find a similar resemblance.

³⁴) l. c., fol. 7: « Siquidem in eo discrimine, quod ponit inter adiutorium hominis integri et adiutorium hominis lapsi fundat (Augustinus) totam doctrinam suam de gratia, ut videri potest cap. 11 et 12 lib. De Corrept. et Gratia... ».

to what the Molinists call *gratia sufficiens* for the state of fallen nature. Libens too finds the reason for the stronger grace of the Redeemer in the concupiscence which is a consequence of original sin and which has weakened the will and obscured the intellect ; in this state of misery the perfect state of liberty no longer prevails ³⁵).

Grace is distinguished into *gratia possibilitatis* and *gratia voluntatis et actionis*: the former gives only the ability, as the grace given to Adam in the state of innocence, or the *adiutorium sine quo non*, also called *gratia mere sufficiens* ; the latter is the *adiutorium quo*, which brings about the exercise of the will and the performance of the act, that is to say the *gratia efficax* of our fallen state ³⁶). Libens subdivides *gratia per se efficax* into the grace which brings about an imperfect willing and acting and the grace which brings about the perfect supernatural performance. The former he calls *excitans*, *inefficax* in the same way as the Thomists regard *gratia sufficiens* ; the latter corresponds to Thomistic *gratia efficax* ³⁷). When calling sufficient grace also *per se efficax* Libens, as we know, is referring only to the grace, of whatever kind it may be, of fallen human nature, which in contrast to the grace of the state of innocence intrinsically (*per se*) moves the will and is not, inversely, either accepted or rejected as it pleases the will ³⁸).

³⁵) After a quotation from St Augustine Libens concludes (fol. 12): « ... ideo in hoc statu opus esse huiusmodi gratia, quod homo cum illam arbitrii libertatem et integritatem amiserit, in qua sola gratia possibilitatis ad agendum sufficebat, lapsus sit in magnam infirmitatem, in qua ipsi non sufficebat nisi gratia dans ipsum velle ».

³⁶) MS. 1144 (fol. 4): « Gratia actualis duplex est: alia possibilitatis, alia voluntatis et actionis. Gratia possibilitatis est, quae dat tantum posse ut gratia quae data erat Adamo in statu innocentiae. Gratia voluntatis et actionis est, quae dat velle et agere: ut gratia quae datur in hoc statu naturae lapsae. Gratia illa possibilitatis vocari solet ab Augustino *adiutorium sine quo non*; gratia autem voluntatis et actionis *adiutorium quo*. Hodie vero a theologis illa passim dicitur gratia mere sufficiens; haec vero gratia per se efficax ».

³⁷) *Ib.*: « ... gratia voluntatis et actionis seu per se efficax iterum duplex est. Alia dat tantum velle et agere imperfectum, ut quae peccatori dat tantum initium bonae voluntatis et desiderium perfectae conversionis. Alia dat velle et agere perfectum, ut quae dat peccatori confessionem perfectam. Illa dicitur excitans, inefficax, sufficiens thomistice, haec vero thomistice efficax ».

³⁸) Libens here has in mind the *gratia sufficiens* of the Molinists, as is shown by the following texts: « ... illa gratia Augustino-Thomistice sufficiens est gratia per se efficax, non quidem ratione effectus quem excitat, sed ratione excitationis

From the above it is evident that the Augustinians when speaking of *gratia efficax* often understand by this also *gratia sufficiens*; but according to Libens there is no real difference of opinion between the Thomists and the Augustinians, even if the choice of words is not always the same, « nam etiam Augustini discipuli admittunt gratiam Thomistice sufficientem en inefficacem »³⁹).

A very important feature of Libens's conception of grace is his insistence that grace has a physical causality and not only a moral one⁴⁰). Moreover, what was said above already implied the same idea, for grace which brings about the actual willing in the will, as is taught by the Augustinians, must perforce operate physically, since a moral motion is only suasion, or no more than intellectual enlightenment, whereas physical causality operates on the will directly and immediately, and even brings about the right will itself.

Libens calls this grace a *delectatio victrix* in the same way as later Augustinians call it a victorious delectation⁴¹).

In order that with the many distinctions made in grace its unity shall not be lost sight of Libens finally indicates this unity in a few words by saying that, considered from the side of God, grace is also called uncreated grace and is nothing but God's gratuitously given mercy, His goodness, benevolence, goodwill or God Himself who effects in us the exercise of the will and the performance of

seu motus imperfecti. Gratia autem Molinistice sufficiens nullo modo est per se efficax, cum nullum saepe effectum producat, sed omni omnino effectum per voluntatem frustretur » (fol. 36); and (fol. 35v): « Gratia sufficiens apud Thomistas est gratia per se efficax quae voluntatem excitat ad effectum quem non producit ».

³⁹) MS. 1144, (fol. 36).

⁴⁰) *Ib.* (fol. 19v): « ... gratia efficax est quae causalitatem habet physicam », and (fol. 19): « ... Pelagiani admiserunt internas illustrationes, imo revelationes moraliter suadentes et voluntatem in Dei desiderium suscitantes... atqui Augustinus non est contentus ea morali suasionem... ».

⁴¹) *Ib.* (fol. 19v): « Gratia igitur efficax est victrix delectatio supra ipsum liberum arbitrium, sic dicta ab effectu, quia eius vincit renisum et duritiem, qua Deus operatur in homine voluntatem, ipsam volitionem, ipsum velle, occultissima et efficacissima potestate, qua in homine reluctantem prius habitus divinae vocationis procuratur, qua homines fiunt ex nolentibus volentes, ex repugnantibus consentientes, ex oppugnantibus amantes, qua Deus facit ut faciamus quod iubetur, qua voluntas insuperabiliter et indeclinabiliter agitur, ratione cuius Deus magis habet in potestate sua voluntates hominum quam ipsi suas, et habet humanorum cordium quo placuerit inclinandum omnipotentissimam potestatem, qua Deus etiam rebellam ad se, citra tamen libertatis dispendio, comprimit voluntatem ».

the act ; considered from our side grace is also called created grace and is nothing but the effect of God's mercy, goodness, benevolence etc. ⁴²⁾).

In his definition of grace Libens uses, as do his successors, the wonderful description of St Augustine: « Gratia est inspiratio dilectionis, ut cognita sancto amore faciamus » ⁴³⁾).

This brief account gathered from a few manuscripts in the *Biblioteca Angelica* may suffice as an indication of the connection existing between the earlier Augustinians and their Italian brethren of the eighteenth century whose doctrine of grace will be discussed in the following pages.

CHAPTER II. THE « ADIUTORIUM SINE QUO NON » OF ADAM ⁴⁴⁾.

Though the subject of this treatise is the actual grace of fallen human nature, a few words will have to be devoted to the grace granted to Adam in the state of innocence, since it is difficult to understand the Augustinian teaching on the nature and power of redeeming grace without some previous knowledge of the so-called « gratia Conditoris ». As Berti himself says: « Sed cum videatur (i. e. this question) necessaria ad percipiendum theologiae nostrae systema, in illam inquirendum est modo ; et alibi si quae residua erunt opportunius colligenda » ⁴⁵⁾. In all Augustinian writings

⁴²⁾ MS. 1144 (fol. 4): « Potest gratia intelligi vel ex parte Dei, vel ex parte nostra ; si ex parte Dei gratiam consideres, gratia increata est nihilque aliud quam gratuita Dei misericordia, bonitas, beneplacitum, bona voluntas, sive ipse Deus operans in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate... Si gratiam consideres ex parte nostra, gratia est creata, nihilque aliud est quam effectus gratuita Dei misericordiae, bonitatis, beneplaciti, bonae voluntatis, sive ipsius Dei gratuito in nobis operantis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate ».

The same distinction is made by BERTI in *De Theol. Discipl.*, lib. XIV, cap. 7, p. 38.

⁴³⁾ I. c. (fol. 4).

⁴⁴⁾ The following chapters will be restricted mainly to the teaching of the eighteenth-century Augustinians. A number of footnotes, however, indicating the connection with their ancestors will make it clear that as regards the doctrine of grace the Augustinian order has gone through a slow growth which culminated in the 18th century.

⁴⁵⁾ BERTI, *De Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, c. 8, p. 109. In their treatises on actual grace nearly all the earlier authors also discuss the grace given to Adam and, with

we find the teaching that the grace of Christ is more powerful and abundant than the grace received by Adam before the Fall.

In order to bring out clearly the great benefit of the grace of Christ the Augustinians lay much stress on Adam's free will before he had sinned, so that with the will weakened by sin the glory and the power of redeeming grace, seen especially as a « *gratia medicinalis* », show to full advantage.

Adam then had much freedom of will. Noris bases his assertion on St Augustine: « *Ex tot locuplentissimis sententiis (S. Augustini) colligimus Adamum habuisse magnas arbitrii vires, summam ac tantam non peccandi potestatem* » ⁴⁶).

And the grace of Adam was a *gratia Conditoris* not a *gratia Salvatoris* or healing grace, for, as the Augustinians say, those who are well do not need a physician, but the sick do.

The grace of the state of innocence, which consisted in an enlightenment of the mind and a certain inclination of the will towards the *bonum in communi* by which the will could choose this or that particular good, was *indifferens* and *versatilis* and only *efficax ab extrinseco* ⁴⁷). *Indifferens* and *versatilis* is used of the kind of grace which does not determine the will since there was no need for this before original sin ⁴⁸).

According to Bellelli it is an established fact that St Augustine

the exception of C. Moreau, they assume a fundamental difference between the nature of grace before and after original sin. See e. g. Ph. Visconti, B. A. MS. 895, fol. 539, and J. Libens, B. A. MS. 1144 (fol. 7): « *Siquidem in eo discrimine, quod ponit (S. Augustinus) inter adiutorium hominis integri et adiutorium hominis lapsi, fundat totam doctrinam suam de gratia...* ».

⁴⁶) NORIS, *Diss. V, Jansenii erroris calumnia sublata*, c. 2, col. 164.

⁴⁷) BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini de statu creaturae rationalis ante peccatum*, lib. II, c. 1, p. 147: « *Adiutorium versatile et indifferens voco gratiam Dei actuale adiuvantem nos ad bene operandum, non ex natura sua determinatam ad certum opus, uti e. g. ignis exurit et lumen illustrat, sed aequae indifferentem et vertibilem seu versatilem ceu rotundum globum, quocumque illam voluerit arbitrium inclinare. Nihil enim vetat quin illam reapse coniungat vel cum consensu vel cum dissensu. Hoc adiutorii genus vocari consuevit efficax ab extrinseco, quoniam ideo in opus influit, quia arbitrium eodem uti voluit* ».

⁴⁸) BELLELLI, o. c., lib. II, c. 2, p. 161: « *Porro adiutorium vi sua inclinans et determinans arbitrium in alteram partem, dum aequilibrium supponitur, omnino superfluum censendum est et absque ulla indigentia in statum sanitatis intrusum. Quid enim necesse est sanum arbitrium determinare et inclinare se ipsum?* ».

See also BERTI, o. c., lib. IV, c. 8, p. 109.

teaches that *gratia victrix et efficax* is only needed because of human weakness and the concupiscence which is an effect of sin and inclines to sin. Therefore determining grace (or *ab intrinseco efficax*) is only found in our state of misery ; before the first sin there was in Adam no concupiscence rebelling against his reason and therefore he did not need the grace which aids the weakened will. But, as every supernatural act can only be achieved with the aid of grace, he did need supernatural assistance without which he could not salutarily perform acts (*sine quo salutariter operari non poterat*). It rested with his free will, however, either to use this grace or to reject it.

If we now go a little further into the nature of this grace given to Adam we must consider what has already been indicated, namely that this grace is *efficax ab extrinseco*, that is to say it becomes *efficax* through the consent given by the free will and it is not such that it moves the will to consent as grace does in our fallen state. The reason for this is that in his state of happiness Adam did not have to fight against concupiscence and there was in him great harmony between the lower and the higher order of things and thus he had sufficient strength to perform supernatural acts with the aid of *gratia versatilis*. His will was not yet enslaved by sin and had no need to arm itself against the temptations which man now experiences. God had created Adam with a good will ; Adam therefore did not need a grace that would prepare this good will ⁴⁹⁾.

Noris, Bellelli and Berti agree in their assertion that the grace of Adam was *proxime sufficiens* ⁵⁰⁾.

Their thesis shows affinity to Molinism ; and in some measure our authors do admit as much, but the difference is at once obvious, since the Molinists apply this kind of grace also to the state of

⁴⁹⁾ Cf. BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, c. 12, Scholion p. 123.

⁵⁰⁾ BELLELLI, o. c., lib. II, c. 19, p. 258-259: « Consecrarium ex hucusque expositis descendit: gratiam scilicet Adamo concessam proxime sufficientem fuisse ad perseverandum. Illud namque adiutorium proxime sufficiens dicitur, cui nihil deest necessarium, ut actus reapse possit effici ad quem datur, si arbitrium velit. Iam vero liquet ex dictis nihil Adamo ad perseverandum defuisse, quoniam adiutorium habebat per quod posset si vellet ».

BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, pars II, c. 3, p. 62: « Sufficiens proxime est illa gratia ultra quam necessaria est alia gratia, ut voluntas actu operetur ; ut autem operetur vel non operetur, in libero relinquitur arbitrio. Talis fuit gratia Conditoris collata Angelis et primo homini et ab Augustino... appellata *Adiutorium sine quo non...* ».

fallen human nature. And in regard to the grace of Adam itself there is a further difference between the Molinists and the Augustinians, who assume for Adam not only an illumination of the intellect but also an inclination of the will to what is good ⁵¹). According to the Augustinians Molina simply put the grace God had granted to Adam on a par with the grace of the Redeemer, and introduced the *adiutorium sine quo non* of Adam as a substitute for the healing grace of the fallen state ⁵²).

Our authors are fully aware of the considerable difficulty arising from this Augustinian teaching, namely how God's supremacy over the created beings is maintained if no *concursum praeivus et determinativus* is given to Adam ; Bellelli even calls this problem a « res difficillima plerisque speculationum involucris foecata » ⁵³). I shall try to sum up in a few lines how they face this difficulty.

First of all to God's supremacy (*supremum Dei dominium*) corresponds an essential dependence of the created beings which implies that whatever is subjected to God cannot perform anything, « quin a supremo Domino in esse servetur et in quemlibet motum aut opus provida administratione cieatur » ⁵⁴). Bellelli then states that every creature needs at least God's *concursum generalis* in order to act. When this *concursum generalis* is limited to the *actus primus*, it is also called *praemotio (generalis)* ; and this *praemotio generalis* is necessary for every created being because of his essential dependence.

Once it has been established that God operates immediately upon the different causes, then this divine premotion is distinguished as follows. With free causes it is called *versatilis* and *indifferens*, but not *praedeterminativa* ; it is called *praemotio*, not *praedeterminatio*. With necessary causes, however, it is rightly called pre-determination.

⁵¹) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XII, c. 8, p. 308.

⁵²) BERTI, o. c., lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 38: « Quare Molina nihil aliud praestitit, nisi quod gratiam Conditoris in gratiam Salvatoris commutavit, et pro adiutorio huius status subrogavit illud quod Augustinus tradit angelis et primo homini necessarium ».

In B. A. MS. 1144 we find Libens writing almost literally the same: « ... unde solum transtulerunt Molinistae gratiam ab Augustino naturae integrae descriptam in locum gratiae medicinalis Christi quam S. Pater naturae lapsae et vulneratae ubique depredicat necessariam » (fol. 8).

⁵³) *Mens Augustini... ante peccatum*, lib. II, c. 21, p. 276.

⁵⁴) *Ib.*, p. 277.

As regards these free causes (such as man) the Augustinians say that their essential dependence on the Creator does not demand that they shall be physically predetermined by Him, since for the performance of an act the general premotion (*praemotio generalis*) is sufficient to ensure this essential dependence⁵⁵). Bellelli indeed thinks that it is a contradiction if one and the same faculty (viz. the will) is at once essentially indifferent, because it is free, and essentially *in actu primo determinata ad unum*⁵⁶).

The followers of the Augustinian school do demand — as we shall see below — victorious grace for the state of fallen human nature, but as their main arguments for the necessity of *gratia ab intrinseco efficax* are not based on God's supremacy over the created beings, but on the weakness consequent upon sin of the rational creatures themselves, they recognize for the state of innocence (Adam's), in which there was no ignorance and no concupiscence, only a *gratia* « *parva et versatilis* », the « *adiutorium sine quo Adam operari non poterat* », a grace *ab extrinseco efficax*.

CHAPTER III. GRACE IS « INSPIRATIO DILECTIONIS, UT COGNITA SANCTO AMORE FACIAMUS ».

Discussing the actual grace of our fallen state I shall deal first with the definition of it given by the Augustinians, then very briefly with the question whether actual grace consists « in actibus deliberatis an indeliberatis »; and finally with the question whether grace moves physically or only morally.

Since Henricus Noris concerns himself rather more with historical questions than with speculative ones, we shall find little or nothing pertinent to our subject in his writings. At any rate he does not provide us with a systematic exposition on the nature of actual grace. This does not imply that Noris did not have his own opinion about it, but his idea is so much spread out over his books that he cannot be said to treat this question *ex professo*, as it is

⁵⁵) Cf. BELLELLI, o. c., lib. II, c. 25, p. 298.

⁵⁶) Cf. *ib.* Note the mention of « in actu primo », for in the case of the so-called *actus secundus* — i. e. the applying oneself to act — Berti (*Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, c. 12, Scholion p. 123) simply admits that in both states (before sin and after sin) a *physica praedeterminatio* is required, though not because of the *essentialis dependentia*: « ... ad quem (i. e. actum secundum) in utroque sanae et infirmæ naturæ statu requiritur physica praedeterminatio ».

treated by the Augustinians after him. For this reason we shall have to concentrate mainly on Bellelli and Berti, who are the most important representatives of the Augustinian school on the subject of grace. Their writings, however, as they repeatedly mention, are based on the teachings of their predecessors and mostly on those of Noris, to whose ideas they give a systematic form. By means of quotations from Noris and from even earlier Augustinians I shall endeavour always to show the historical background of what is taught by Berti and Bellelli.

To a certain extent the previous chapter has already indicated that the theologians of the Augustinian school consider the grace of Christ mainly as a *gratia medicinalis*, i. e. as a remedy for the wounds inflicted by original sin. The consequence of Adam's sin was that man — besides losing the title of child of God — was left with a will which was weakened and sick, and tainted with concupiscence or an earthly love inclining the will to evil. Therefore, according to the Augustinians, it will be the task of grace to give new health and strength to the weakened forces of the will and to inspire it with the opposite love of heavenly things (the so-called *delectatio celestis* in contrast to the *delectatio terrestris*). Grace will also take away the darkness of the understanding so that with lucid enlightenment it will be easier for the will to do what is good.

In this connection Berti quotes a passage from St Augustine which clearly shows this double function of grace ⁵⁷). As Berti expresses it, grace considered in this way is an enlightenment of the mind (*illustratio mentis*) and an inspiration in the will to what is good (*inspiratio dilectionis in voluntate*) ⁵⁸). However, grace will mainly consist in the *inspiratio dilectionis*, because though the enlightenment of the mind does show us what we should do, it does

⁵⁷) BERTI, *Augustini... Quaestionum de gratia Reparatoris Dilucidatio*, Pisis, 1766, Pars II, c. 3, pp. 65-66: «Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est, sive quia latet an iustum sit, sive quia non delectat; tanto enim quidque vehementius volumus, quanto certius, quod bonum est, novimus eoque delectamur ardentius. Ignorantia igitur et infirmitas vitia sunt, quae impediunt voluntatem, ne moveatur ad faciendum opus bonum vel ab opere malo abstinendum. Ut autem innotescat quod latebat et suave fiat quod non delectabat, gratia Dei est, quae hominum adiuvat voluntates ».

⁵⁸) BERTI, *De Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 38.

not cause us actually to do it. Therefore the inspiration in the will to what is good is more necessary, for it brings it about that man does do that which he knows as good ⁵⁹).

Berti draws another argument to prove this thesis from the primacy of love: grace is ultimately nothing else but the principle of good works; now according to St Augustine it is love which is the *radix* and the *principium*, for properly speaking an act cannot be called good if it is not performed out of love ⁶⁰). Grace therefore consists mainly in love which inspires us to good acts, since love is the source of all the movements of the heart.

All these elements taken together lead to the description of actual grace which we frequently find in the writings of our theologians: « Gratia est inspiratio dilectionis, ut cognita sancto amore faciamus » ⁶¹).

For the sake of clearness a further analysis of this definition must be preceded by the following observations. Before he arrives at his definition of grace, Berti mentions a number of opinions about the nature of actual grace. Several Thomists, he says, think that it is an « *actuosa qualitas* » which brings about our willing physically. He agrees with them in so far as grace works physically, but he says he does not understand what is meant by this *actuosa qualitas*. Others think that the nature of grace lies in the indeliberate movements of mind and heart; others again are of the opinion that it is also effected (*effici*) by the faculties of the soul, because they are vital acts; « this opinion seems also to be fairly general with our theologians » ⁶²). Then there are those who teach that actual grace consists in a motion (*motio*) of God, Who anticipates our indeliberate acts. Finally there is the opinion of the theologians who consider grace to be nothing else but God's will and mercy in our hearts.

Berti himself, wishing to combine in one statement what is true in each of the above assertions, concludes that actual grace

⁵⁹) *Ib.*

⁶⁰) *Ib.*

⁶¹) BERTI, o. c., lib. IV, c. 11, p. 117: « Appellatur itaque Dei gratia supernaturalis quaedam vis nobis Dei liberalitate collata, unde omnes sanctae cogitationes et omnes motus bonae voluntatis proveniunt: quae definiri potest verbis Augustini lib. 4 contra duas Epist. Pelagianas cap. 5: Gratia est inspiratio dilectionis, ut cognita sancto amore faciamus ».

⁶²) *Id.*, o. c., lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 38.

is an enlightenment of the mind and an inspiration of love, but that it consists more in love than in enlightenment of the mind. It is brought about by a motion of God, or God's will, which infuses this love and delectation, and in a certain sense it may be called a quality ⁶³).

In Berti's opinion therefore grace consists mainly in love ⁶⁴). Since, however, as we have seen, several theologians describe grace as a *motio Dei* which anticipates love, Berti draws a distinction which must be explained in order to understand clearly his definition of grace.

There is a double aspect in grace: it can be considered from the standpoint of God, or from that of man. God is the *causa efficiens* of grace in so far as He moves our will and we receive this motion; this kind of grace is called uncreated grace, which is nothing else but God's benevolence and God himself Who inspires the act of love in us. But in so far as grace is considered from the standpoint of man it is nothing else but the effect of this divine motion, i. e. a movement of the soul (*motus quidam animae*) or love and delectation ⁶⁵).

So Berti is in agreement with those Thomists who hold that actual grace is a certain *motus animae* and not a *qualitas*, for « if it were a quality, then performing an act would require another grace, a movement of the soul, and then *gratia efficax* would predetermine not only the *actus secundus* but also the *actus primus* and thus reduce liberty to nothing » ⁶⁶).

⁶³) *Ib.*: « Ex his omnibus unam sententiam conficio, quam arbitror esse certissimam, nam in singulis veri aliquid inesse deprehenditur. Gratia est actus intellectus et voluntatis, sed magis in delectatione quam in illuminatione sita est; efficitur autem motione Dei, quae est ipsa Dei voluntas subministrans hanc delectationem et caritatem et potest sensu non malo qualitas appellari ».

⁶⁴) *I. c.*: « in amore gratia potissimum sita est ».

⁶⁵) *De Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 39: « Deus enim dilectionem inspirans est gratia considerata ex parte Dei, et ita assentimur theologis qui gratiam nihil aliud putant, nisi voluntatem et misericordiam Dei sive Deum ipsum qui nobis voluntatem bonam inspirat. Ipsa dilectionis inspiratio nihil est aliud quam Dei motio intellectum illuminans et inflammans: ideoque non recedimus omnino ab illorum opinione, qui gratiam constituunt in *motione quadam virtuosa*. At caritas, quae nobis inspiratur, est motus animi et sancta delectatio trahens ad opera salutaria et faciens ut faciamus: et consequenter in caritate vere et proprie consistit gratia, si consideretur ex parte nostri ».

⁶⁶) *Ib.*: « nam si esset qualitas, necessaria foret ad operationem alia gratia,

When the Augustinians speak of actual grace, they consider mainly this aspect, i. e. the effect of the divine motion in us or the *pia cogitatio* and the *sancta delectatio* or the *bona voluntas* ⁶⁷).

Again and again our Augustinian theologians speak of delectation and love (*delectatio, dilectio, caritas, amor*) as the principle of all our good works. A special difficulty arising from this is: how is it that grace *always* infuses a delectation in us, while we so often experience that we only do what is good with difficulty, even with a certain fear or dislike? The Augustinians wish to keep as much as possible to St Augustine's terminology. So in describing the nature of actual grace they also use his words *inspiratio dilectionis in voluntate*, because according to them every act is performed only under the direction of love ⁶⁸). They add, however, that this love should not be simply identified with the theological virtue of charity but that it is a kind of *inchoata caritas et dilectio* ⁶⁹). Now grace as *dilectio* or *caritas* is according to Berti nothing else but a striving after good or the inclination of the will towards what is good, that is to say an act of the will to which it is proper to will or to love what is good. Thus man always acts out of love. Berti quotes St Thomas for this pronouncement ⁷⁰). That one fears hell, says Berti, simply means that one loves beatitude; fear of death is really love of life, etc. ⁷¹).

So love is the principle of all good works, and when the will is drawn by a certain delight (*voluptas*) and man is moved by the loved good which causes a delectation — and in the last instance no one loves what he dislikes —, then according to the teaching

motus scilicet animae, et gratia efficax non tantum praedeterminaret actum secundum, sed etiam primum et libertatem everteret ».

⁶⁷) Chapter I, p. 367 we found this same teaching in the Belgian Augustinian J. Libens.

⁶⁸) BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini... ante peccatum*, lib. I, c. 14, p. 63: « Quocirca firmiter primo tenendum est iuxta Augustini principia omne et quodcumque bonum opus, quod fit a nobis quemadmodum fieri oportet, non nisi caritate dirigente fieri; ... propterquam sexcenties Augustinus repetit caritatem radicem esse omnium bonorum... ».

⁶⁹) Cf. BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini de modo rep.*, lib. II, c. 2, p. 3.

⁷⁰) *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, art. 6, corp. and ad 2.

⁷¹) BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, II, c. 3, p. 67; c. 4, pp. 152-153: « Nullus voluntatis actus potest cogitari, qui non sit ab aliquo amore, licet plures actus sint, qui non oriuntur ex Charitate proprie dicta, ut modo in Scholis accipitur, nempe a gratia sanctificante vel ab amore Dei benevolo ».

of the Augustinians it follows that grace consists in an inspiration of love by means of which what is known by the enlightened mind is pursued with a holy love. Thus it is clear that in the Augustinian definition of actual grace the terms *dilectio*, *delectatio* etc. are always used for *bona voluntas* or the inclination of the will to what is good ⁷²).

Our theologians also deal with the question whether grace consists « in actis deliberatis an indeliberatis ». This question is important in so far as it helps us to obtain a better insight into the true nature of actual grace as it is taught in the Augustinian School. What we are inquiring into is in how far created grace works in our faculties and their acts (which are *deliberati* and *indeliberati*), that is, we must try to discover what is the exact purport of that « *sancta cogitatio* » of the mind and that « *inchoata caritas* » of the will which come into being through God's premotion. This is no easy task and here it is perhaps more evident than anywhere else that the Augustinians are not so much concerned about clear speculative expression as about a true rendering of St Augustine's way of thinking in this field. The Augustinian *sententia* may be briefly reproduced as follows.

Bellelli says several times that the *auxilia actualia* consist in *motionibus indeliberatis* which are aroused in us by God's mercy and by which we are incited to deliberate acts ⁷³). He also says that God's inspirations and excitations (*piae inspirationes et excitationes*) are infused in the indeliberate acts of mind and will by God ⁷⁴).

These indeliberate movements are of a supernatural kind; therefore they cannot come into being by purely human powers without the aid of grace. For that reason, says Bellelli, the greater number and the best of the theologians, with whom he agrees,

⁷²) BERTI, *Augustinianum Systema vindicatum*, Diss. I, c. 3, p. 116: « ... vir doctissimus (Bellelli) ... testatur in definitione gratiae actualis *caritatem* accipi ampliori significatione, nec semper esse *caritatem actualem expressam*, sed universim loquendo *desiderium* amoremque virtutis, dilectionem iustitiae, inchoatam boni dulcedinem, piam animi affectionem, bonam voluntatem, cupiditatem boni et delectationem auxiliatricem »; cf. also *Dilucidatio*, P. II, c. 3, p. 67.

⁷³) BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini ante peccatum*, lib. II, c. 23, p. 290.

⁷⁴) ID., *Mens Augustini de modo reparationis*, lib. I, c. 1, p. 1: « Fiunt autem hi a Deo in nobis suntque a nobis ipsis sed non libere agentibus ».

admit some preceding supernatural power — a gift of God — which precedes also the indeliberate acts ⁷⁵). Now how it is that grace consists in indeliberate acts and yet that for these indeliberate movements themselves grace is required as well ?

It seems to me that the solution of this apparent contradiction is to be found in the already mentioned distinction of grace considered from the standpoint of God and from that of man. For we can see that an indeliberate movement does not exist apart from a deliberate movement, just as grace considered from the standpoint of God is no other than grace considered from our standpoint.

Bellelli calls the above-mentioned previous supernatural power (*virtus praevia*) God's mercy ; it is nothing else but uncreated grace or grace considered from the standpoint of God. The holy enlightenment and the pious delectation are the first effects of this prevenient grace ; and it are these movements which constitute grace considered from the standpoint of man. As we are not lifeless instruments under the working of this anticipating power of God, but have to co-operate freely, it seems right to conclude that actual grace works in such a way that the inspired divine *motus* reveals itself first by indeliberate acts of supernatural insight and love, which in the next moment become deliberate.

Berti's statement is a little more clearly expressed: by the sweet inspiration of the grace of the Holy Ghost God makes us find greater pleasure in what He commands us to do than in what is forbidden. This delectation and inspired love anticipate the movement of the will and only become deliberate when the will freely consents to this propelling *dilectio*. According to Berti Augustine's words: « *ut velimus, operatur Deus in nobis sine nobis* » refer to *gratia operans ex parte Dei*, which — as long as we do not co-operate — only causes *pias cogitationes et affectiones indeliberatas*. And if grace is thus considered from the standpoint of God, in so far as it is the divine mercy itself which moves us and inspires love, it is not connected with our deliberating. If, however, it is considered from our standpoint, then grace is that love which proceeds at once from the divine inspiration and from our own

⁷⁵) BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini de modo rep.*, lib. I, c. 3, p. 6: « Optima proinde ratione plerique insignes theologi, quibus plane assentimur, praevenientem quandam virtutem supernaturalem, quae Dei donum est, praeiviam ad singulos etiam indeliberatos actus agnoscunt et confitentur ».

will moved by God. And so the act of love is indoubtedly a deliberate act ⁷⁶).

A rather more important point from the Augustinian teaching on grace is the question whether grace works in us *physically* or only *morally*. The terminology and the words: *delectatio*, *suavitas*, *dilectio* etc. might lead one to conclude that the Augustinians advocate a moral premotion of grace and not a physical one, as is evident from the general interpretation of the Augustinian teaching on grace by non-Augustinian writers ⁷⁷). In the following lines I intend to show briefly that these writers labour under a misconception in this matter; in the chapter on *gratia efficax* we shall return to the subject.

We understand by God's physical premotion the effecting, intrinsic and immediate divine influence (*divinus influxus efficiens, intrinsecus et immediatus*) in man's faculties to perform supernatural acts, while moral motion is one which is extrinsic and acts by way of *causa finalis*. We have already seen that by His grace God enlightens the mind and causes a good will especially by inspiring love. The reason why according to the Augustinians grace consists more in the inspiration of love than in a supernatural enlightenment of the mind is this that the enlightening, though it makes us know what we have to do, does not in actual fact bring it about that we do it. To make us do it requires a grace which works directly in the will and immediately inspires the holy delectation which brings it about that we do what is good. Moreover God is the *causa efficiens* of grace and as such He moves our will and causes in us the good will by means of which we can act salutarily. If I am not mistaken all this does not point to a moral causality but to a physical one ⁷⁸).

⁷⁶) Cf. BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 8, p. 41; also *Dilucidatio*, Pars II, c. 4, p. 151; *Aug. Syst. Vindic.*, Diss. IV, c. 1, p. 96 ff.

⁷⁷) The Augustinian system of grace is called the « *systema praemotionis moralis* » by almost everybody; e. g. cf. Fr. DIEKAMP, *Theologiae dogmaticae manuale*, Parisiis, Tornaci, Romae 1935, Vol. III, p. 100; E. PORTALIÉ in *Dictionnaire de Théol. Cath.*, Vol. I, col. 2485 (s. v. *Augustinianisme*).

⁷⁸) Berti writes in his *De Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 38: « Et de efficientia quidem physica ego sane doctis viris plenissime adhaereo, cum moralem efficientiam attrahentem sola propositione obiecti, salva aliorum opinione, non valeat tarditas ingenii mei a lege atque doctrina discernere ».

Having mentioned elsewhere (o. c., lib. XIV, c. 9, p. 46) that St Augustine

CHAPTER IV. GRATIA EFFICAX IS A « VICTRIX DELECTATIO » OR AN ARDOUR OF LOVE BY WHICH THE OPPOSITE CONCUPISCENCE IS CONQUERED.

In this chapter we shall examine the question whether the Augustinians teach the idea of *gratia efficax ab extrinseco*, like the Molinists and Congruists, or that of *gratia efficax ab intrinseco*, like the Thomists. We shall also see what they mean by *delectatio victrix* and in what the efficacy of grace consists.

It is right to mention here that we are merely concerned with controversial theological questions. For centuries theologians of different schools of thought had been fighting to reach the clearest possible insight into the extremely difficult matter of the mystery of grace which is so narrowly bound up with our life, since it concerns the co-operation of God and man. The ultimate intention of all the disputes was none other than to represent the mystery in such a way as to safeguard it against contradictions. Through faith we know that God effects in us willing and acting by his efficacious grace. Furthermore we believe in the integrity of the free human will, which can resist even the most efficacious grace, for the very reason that it is free. For the believer there is not too great a difficulty, because the ways of God are inscrutable to us and God does not operate in a human manner. But when theologians probe into the mystery — not in order to solve it, which is impossible, but in order to reconcile the dogmata of God's grace and human liberty, where the philosopher thinks he can see a contradiction — then each one of them seeks to indicate the most plausible way to this reconciliation. It is after all for this same reason that the Augustinians consider the mystery of grace, while in their investigations they pursue a psychological course rather than a purely philosophical or speculative course.

refutes Pelagius because the latter interprets the words of the Apostle as advice and moral stimulation, he adds: « Quapropter Sanctus Doctor contendit sic esse apostolicam sententiam accipiendam, ut Deus non suadendo tantum quod bonum est, sed physice nobis etiam actum voluntatis inspirando et efficaciter ad operationem trahendo dicatur in nobis operari velle et perficere ».

And a little further on: « Salvatoris gratia efficiat in nobis voluntatis affectum, operetur in nobis ut operemur, agat nos ut agamus, neque sola nos morali excitatione prae-moveat, sed trahente, inclinante, agente et tantam voluntatem quae possit, velit, faciat, nobis divinitus inspirante ».

First of all the Augustinian theologians stand side by side with the Thomists in accepting a *gratia efficax ab intrinseco*, because they believe that this acceptance provides them with a better insight in the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Fathers of the Church, especially St Augustine. Several times the Augustinians affirm that in accepting a grace which is *efficax* by its nature (*ab intrinseco*) they are in agreement with the Thomists ⁷⁹). The grace which inspires us to carry into effect with a holy love that which we know is called *efficax*, when it makes us act (*facit ut faciamus*) by giving strength to our will to do so. There is no obdurate heart that repudiates it, for it is given to remove that very hardness of heart ⁸⁰). It is evident that in the view of the Augustinian School the efficacy of grace does not arise from a co-operation of free will or from a concurrence of certain circumstances (Congruism), but from a fixed decision of the will of God, Who by a special premotion accords to us that we can, that we will and that we carry into effect. Grace does not co-operate because we will, but we will because grace operates in us ⁸¹). This grace, which in our fallen state is stronger than the grace given to Adam before the Fall, assists the free will in its fight against wrong inclinations. Here again it is especially evil concupiscence and the wrong inclination of the wounded free will which determine the kind of grace ; it is above all *medicinalis*, that is to say it cures the will of its sickness and frees it from the bonds of concupiscence. This liberation can only come about because the inclination of concupiscence is overcome by an opposite inclination of grace ⁸²).

As is shown by the words « evil concupiscence », « weakened will », « wrong inclination » and so on, which we regularly find in Augustinian parlance, the Augustinians explain the efficacy of grace first of all from the state of fallen human nature. The Thomists defend the *praedeterminatio physica* on the ground of God's omnipotence and omni-causality and the total dependence of the

⁷⁹) BERTI, o. c., lib. XIV, c. 9, p. 45: « Postrema sententia est Thomistarum et Augustiniensium omnium affirmantium gratiam efficacem esse seipsa, non talem reddi aut cooperatione liberi arbitrii aut ex circumstantiis congruis... ». Cf. also ID., *Systema Vindic.*, Diss. IV, c. 1, p. 90 and *Dilucidatio*, P. II, *De Gratia*, c. 4, p. 155.

⁸⁰) Cf. *Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, c. 11, p. 117.

⁸¹) o. c., lib. XIV, c. 9, p. 45. We have already seen this same teaching in the writings of the earlier Augustinian theologians discussed in chapter I.

⁸²) BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini... ante peccatum*, lib. II, c. 5, pp. 176-177.

creature upon the Creator. They teach that there is *praedeterminatio physica* in the state of man before as well as after the Fall. The Augustinians on the other hand are of the opinion that God's causality and the dependence of the creature are sufficiently taken care of by a general *praemotio Dei*, which is indeed physical but not *praedeterminativa ad unum*. Therefore they exclude the Thomist *praedeterminatio physica* from the state of unfallen nature and from all natural actions before as well as after the Fall.

As I hope to show further on our authors do accept the *praedeterminatio physica* for all supernatural actions of the state of fallen nature, not relying, however, on Thomist arguments, but starting from the will weakened by sin, which cannot determine itself to this or that individual action without a predetermining grace. In chapter II we saw how the Augustinians try to demonstrate that the essential dependence of the creature does not require that he is physically predetermined by God ⁸³).

I shall not go further into this question here.

The Augustinian writers define grace which is *efficax ab intrinseco* as a victorious delectation (*victrix delectatio*) or as an inspiration of love by which the opposite desire is conquered: *inspiratio caritatis quae superat contrariam cupiditatem* ⁸⁴). This grace of man's fallen state, which makes our weak will to will efficaciously, brings about the victory over evil concupiscence. Fallen man needs

⁸³) See above, p. 372. BELLELLI, o. c., lib. II, c. 33, p. 331: « Gratia efficax Salvatoris ex capite dependentiae essentialis necessaria a nobis nullo pacto statuitur; sed dumtaxat ut infirmitati per peccatum relictæ succurrat ». Cf. also BERTI, *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, Diss. IV, c. 3, p. 142.

⁸⁴) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 8, p. 40.

H. BUZIUS, *Jo. Laurentii Berti... librorum XXXVII de Theol. Disc. accurata Synopsis*, Tom. II, lib. XIV, diss. III, c. 2, p. 82 Even earlier writers of the Augustinian school called grace a *victrix delectatio*: Fr. PAUWENS, *Assertiones Theologicae ex Prima Secundae...*, Bibliotheca Angelica MS. 421, fol. 20: « Atque haec est gratia quam Augustinus Hipponensis non semel delectationem victricem appellat ». J. LIBENS, B. A., MS. 1144, fol. 19v: « Gratia igitur efficax est victrix delectatio supra ipsum liberum arbitrium, sic dicta ab effectu, quia eius vincit renisum et duritiem, qua Deus operatur in homine voluntatem, ipsam volitionem, ipsum velle... ». BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, P. II, c. 4, p. 150: « Hospes itaque est in Augustini doctrina quisquis ignorat a beatissimo Pelagianorum impugnatore gratiam effectricem in inspiratione dilectionis sanctae, quae superat oppositam pravamque cupiditatem et in voluntate robusta, quae Spiritus Sancti ardore inflammatur, apertissime collocari ».

help which is by its nature *efficax*, because he is impelled by such a desire that he cannot conquer it by himself. But he can do so if God by His grace inspires such a love in him that his hardness of heart and the opposite desire are conquered.

Because, according to the Augustinians, grace rouses in man love and delectation (*dilectio* and *delectatio*) as a remedy against evil concupiscence and the love for earthly goods, this grace itself is also called love (*amor*, *dilectio*) delighting in heavenly things (*delectatio coelestis*); and the qualification « *victrix* » is added because this grace conquers earthly love and concupiscence.

The Augustinians teach that love is always the principle of good works, even if man acts from fear, hope etc.⁸⁵). Now in this kind of love and this delighting — when conquering « *amor non castus* » — our writers see the nature of *gratia efficax*⁸⁶).

In Berti's opinion his own pronouncement that the nature of *gratia efficax* lies in *delectatio victrix* is supported by writers of other schools, even though they do not agree with him in their explanation of *gratia efficax* itself. (In this connection he says e. g. that he differs from Bellarminus because the latter sees in grace only a moral attraction, whereas he — Berti — teaches that the *delectatio victrix* works in us physically⁸⁷).

Of the Thomists Berti repeatedly mentions Massoulié⁸⁸). His efforts to minimize the difference between his own and the Thomist

⁸⁵) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 8, p. 42: « Quisquis enim bene timet, bonam voluntatem habeat necesse est. Et quoniam timor supernaturalis referetur in Deum eumque respicit ut Judicem justum et rectum, nec aliud est pondus, quo fertur animus, nisi Amor; timor sanctus non sine aliquo amore excitatur ».

⁸⁶) ID., *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, Diss. IV, c. 1, p. 70: « Gloriosissimus gratiae Vindex (St Augustine) appellat auxilium efficax ardorem dilectionis et voluntatem spiritus, qua voluntas carnis contraria concupiscens vincitur ac superatur; appellat *delectationem* animi, quae superat quodcumque impedimentum alterius voluptatis aut doloris; appellat quoque expressis terminis *certam scientiam* ac *delectationem victricem*, adeo ut in meridie caecutiat necessum sit quisquis negat praemissam propositionem nostram esse Augustini ».

⁸⁷) I. c., p. 71: (gratiae efficacia requirit) « ut Deus inspirando certam scientiam et victricem delectationem *physice* in nobis operetur velle ac tam robustam voluntatem efficiat, ut quaelibet duritia cordis frangatur ».

⁸⁸) O. c., Diss. IV, c. 1, p. 114 he says that the teachings of Noris and Massoulié are contained in his books. In his *Expostulatio*, App., c. 2, p. 58 he writes: « Sacra Indicis Congregatio prohibet donec corrigatur Censuram Duacensem et mandat ut illinc deleatur nota Jansenismi inusta systemati P. Massoulié; et tale est systema nostrum ».

interpretation of grace are quite obvious. There is indeed a difference in the fact that the Thomists accept *gratia ab intrinseco efficax* also for the state of innocence, but when we speak about *gratia ab intrinseco efficax* we are in agreement on this grace ⁸⁹). Elsewhere too he tries to show that the difference between the Thomist and the Augustinian system of grace is not so great as is generally accepted. The two systems, he says, are based on the same principles. For the Thomist statement he quotes Didacus Alvarez, because in his opinion Alvarez is the most accurate writer on the controversies about grace ⁹⁰). Well then, he continues, in explaining the efficacy of grace and in placing its origin in the will and power of God — excluding Molinism and Congruism — we agree with the Thomist school. « Furthermore we are also in complete agreement in our definition and argumentation of *gratia efficax* » ⁹¹). For according to Berti and Alvarez *gratia efficax* is that divine assistance by which God brings it about that we proceed to act (*facit ut faciamus et operatur ut operemur*) not only by exhortations or invitations or by attracting us in whatever way moraliter only, but by determining our acting in a physical manner, even by predetermining it, so that our free will moved by God freely determines itself to an act ⁹²).

Bellelli also admits that the *praedeterminatio physica*, on account of our weakened human nature, is necessary for the performance of salutary acts ⁹³).

Berti expressly uses the words « *praedeterminatio physica* », which — he says — according to learned people are eminently suitable to indicate the *promotio Supremae Causae*. « I myself », he writes, « have repeatedly admitted, when speaking about the grace of our fallen state and expressing the opinion that a moral power of attraction was not enough to explain the energy of *gratia efficax*, that we need *physica praedeterminatio* » ⁹⁴). I fail to see

⁸⁹) o. c., p. 71.

⁹⁰) o. c., p. 89.

⁹¹) *Ib.*, p. 90.

⁹²) *Ib.*

⁹³) BELLELLI, *Mens Augustini ante peccatum*, lib. II, c. 27, p. 307; see also *Mens Aug. de modo Rep.*, lib. IV, cc. 37/38.

⁹⁴) « ... non semel fassus sum egere nos *physica praedeterminatione* », *Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, c. 12, p. 120. On p. 125 he writes: « Falsum est autem (in the system « *aliquorum Recentiorum* ») hanc illuminationem et delectationem moraliter

in which respect Berti here differs from Thomistic opinion except in the fact that he excludes physical predetermination from our natural actions, from the salutary actions in the state before original sin, and in the case of what the Thomists call the « *materiale peccati* ». From this one may perhaps conclude that Berti (and the greater part of the Augustinians as well) does not demand the *praedeterminatio physica* for the secondary causes to proceed to act and thus express their dependence on the first cause ; for this a general *praemotio non determinativa ad unum* suffices ⁹⁵).

Though from what we have already discussed it is clear that so far the Augustinians do not differ much from the Thomist theologians, they do go another way when explaining the efficacy of *gratia actualis*.

One of the specifically Augustinian theses is that there are gradations in grace, so that it cannot be said that *gratia efficax* and *gratia sufficiens* differ specifically and essentially ; they are but different degrees of the same grace ⁹⁶). In support of this Berti adduces the following argument. Grace, he says, is *medicinalis* and *sanans*. And just as some illness can be more serious or less serious

et non physice praedeterminare liberum hominis arbitrium ». In *Dict. de Théol. Cath.*, I, col. 2485 (s. v. Augustinianisme) Portalié writes that the Augustinian theologians deny the *praedeterminatio physica* and uphold a *praedeterminatio moralis*. Nearly all writers of theological textbooks repeat Portalié's incorrect observation ; cf. e. g. Fr. DIEKAMP, *Theol. Dogm. Manuale* (1935), Vol. III, p. 100: « *gratia efficax Augustinianorum... voluntatem non physice sed moraliter tantum praedeterminat* ».

⁹⁵) BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, Pars II, c. 4, p. 173: « Verum quidquid sit de hisce questionibus alibi discussis, certissimum puto inspirationem sanctae dilectionis, qua voluntas indeclinabiliter agit, *physice, non moraliter tantum* trahere ac determinare ipsam voluntatem ad actum, cum intrinseca sit, corda immutet et contrariam cupiditatem superet... ». As indicated above in chapter I even the earlier Augustinian writers — with the exception of J. B. Perusinus — teach the physical predetermination. In his *Systema Augustinianum de Divina Gratia excerptum ex operibus RR. PP. F. Bellelli et L. Berti*, Venetiis 1770, Qu. XII, p. 257 Bernenc writes: « Quaeres 2. utrum delectatio illa victrix physice praemoveat voluntatem an moraliter tantum ? Resp. physice praemovere, ex eo quod, ut ait S. Augustinus, illa delectatio suam habet efficaciam ab omnipotentia Dei et a supremo quod habet in voluntates hominum dominio... ». I am at a loss to understand how the Spanish Augustinian theologian H. Del Val. O. S. A. in his *Sacra Theologia Dogmatica*, Vol. II, p. 513 can say that the Augustinian system of grace rejects the *praemotio physica* and accepts « a certain *praemotio moralis* » in its place.

⁹⁶) Cf. BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 8, p. 41.

and evil concupiscence (which is also a weakness left in us by original sin) may be less violent or more violent, so a less strong or a stronger medicine will be administered to the sick. It is obvious that the movements of concupiscence are not always of the same kind and the same violence; one time they are hardly noticeable, another time they are very vehement. So a slight or less ardent *delectatio bona* suffices to conquer a slight concupiscence; but if there is a violent struggle God will infuse so much and such a strong *ardor caritatis* that the great contrary concupiscence can be conquered. To prove this Berti instances a martyr who will undoubtedly need more and stronger grace from God to endure the terrible tortures, than someone who only has to submit to a very slight injustice ⁹⁷). In both cases what is needed for the performance of the act is *gratia ab intrinseco efficax*, but in the one case more grace is needed than in the other. This is what the Augustinians call a difference of degree.

Even in one and the same person grace has not always the same intensity: a stronger concupiscence requires more grace than does the conquering of a slight temptation. The final issue of all this is that grace is called *efficax* when the possibility to act (*possibilitas agendi per gratiam sufficientem*) passes into the supernatural act, that is to say when God imparts such a *delectatio* and *caritas* that the contrary *delectatio terrestris* or *concupiscentia* is overcome. Therefore it is said that the efficacy of grace lies in the *delectatio victrix*, « sive in delectatione quae relative superior est contraria cupiditate et per quam, salva libertate indifferentiae, delectatio contraria vincitur et subternitur » ⁹⁸). So when grace is comparatively stronger than the contrary desire and overcomes it, grace is called victorious delectation and *gratia efficax*, because it grants victory which consists in not obeying the evil desire, but doing what is good ⁹⁹).

⁹⁷) I. c. N. B. For a clear perception of the difference from the Thomists' view one should note especially the different starting-points of the two theological schools. It may be said that the Thomistic approach is more speculative and the Augustinian more psychological.

⁹⁸) BERTI, *Expostulatio*, App., c. II, p. 53. BELLELLI in *Mens. Aug. de modo Rep.*, P. I, lib. III, pp. 128-129: « Efficacitas autem gratiae in eo sita est, quod sancta delectatio et illuminatio tantum accendatur et tantum crescat, ut vincat. Hoc est, ut homo gratia operante tantum velit, tantoque ardore diligit, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat ».

⁹⁹) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, p. 117: « Quod si sancta delectatio carnalem

If one has a clear notion of the Augustinian terminology, all this, I think, presents no further difficulties. Keeping in mind that grace (taken generally) consists in an enlightenment of the mind and a holy delectation in the will, it is obvious that *gratia efficax* is grace which inspires and brings about a certain knowledge and a victorious delectation ¹⁰⁰).

Since it has been established that all the Augustinians teach that the physical nature of actual grace consists in the *delectatio victrix* which overcomes the contrary desire ¹⁰¹), that is to say which is given with regard to the less or more violent contrary concupiscence, the question may arise whether this statement does not resemble Congruism. Our authors themselves have faced up to this difficulty. Berti deals with it as follows:

« Est etiam inter nos et Congruistas discrimen maximum ; quoniam illi putant conferri gratiam congruam, scilicet hominem vocari in hac opportuna circumstantia ob praescientiam boni usus liberi arbitrii ; quia nempe Deus praevidit quod in tali opportunitate vocatus obtemperabit et praebebit assensum : nos contra affirmamus non pendere a tali praescientia quod Deus talem gratiam inspiret, sed a voluntate efficaci, qua vult ac praedefinit eius qui vocatur assensum ; et ne voluntas illa absoluta ac divina frustretur effectui, inspirat talem dilectionem quae superat pugnantiem cupiditatem, et ex qua certo atque infallibiliter, omnino tamen libere, effectus ipse consequitur. Ita docuit Antoninus Massoulié, ita Aegidiani nostri,... ita nos Lib. XVIII, cap. 8 et 9 » ¹⁰²).

If one wishes to call grace *congrua*, the term must be used

superat concupiscentiam, reapse effectum sortitur et victrix est, ut dicitur ab Augustino ». Cf. also BERNENC, *Syst. Aug.*, Qu. XII, pp. 211 ff.

¹⁰⁰) BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, P. II, p. 150: « Hospes itaque est in Augustini doctrina quisquis ignorat a Beatissimo Pelagianorum impugnatore gratiam effectricem in inspiratione dilectionis sanctae, quae superat oppositam pravamque cupiditatem et in voluntate robusta, quae Spiritus Sancti ardore inflammatur, apertissime collocari ».

¹⁰¹) Cf. MARCELLI, *Institutiones Theologicae*, lib. XXIX, p. 198.

¹⁰²) BERTI, *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, diss. IV, p. 77; and *Id.*, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, p. 44: « Nec inde sequitur nos scientiam mediam aut sententiam Congruistarum probare: siquidem, ut supra cum Augustino monuimus, quod Deus adiuvet illum tantum, istum non tantum, non pendet a circumstantiis extrinsecis personae, loci vel temporis, neque a praescientia boni usus arbitrii, sed a secretae aequitatis ratione et potestatis divinae excellentia; et cum Deus efficaciter vult, inspirat tam vividam delectationem, quae facile vincat, salva semper indifferentia liberi arbitrii, contrarios motus pugnantis concupiscentiae ».

because of the *congruitas* brought about by grace itself, not because of any congruity caused by circumstances ¹⁰³).

CHAPTER V. THE INSPIRATION OF LOVE IS SOMETIMES SLIGHT AND ONLY
« REMOTE SUFFICIENS ».

A logical consequence of the theory of degrees of grace is that there will not always be an « ardor caritatis », but that sometimes God will inspire a lesser delectation which, however, is sufficient to enable the recipient to act.

On this point the terminology of the Augustinians does not differ much from that of the Jansenists, but unless I am mistaken the points of difference in doctrine are far from slight. In spite of the fact that the term « gratia sufficiens » was unknown to St Augustine and that the Augustinians like to follow the teaching of the *Doctor gratiae* as closely as possible, this term and the concept meant by it are to be found in their writings. It is, however, quite noticeable that these writings contain much more about *gratia efficax* than about *gratia sufficiens*. For the rest the Augustinians teach that every grace is *efficax* in a sense, because God never grants His gift without it having at least some effect. But to believe that our authors repudiate *gratia sufficiens* is a misconception ¹⁰⁴).

Sufficient grace then is an inner stimulating force which according to law is given to all men and to each man obliged to obey the commandments of God. It is, however, possible to resist it and it is in fact resisted ¹⁰⁵). Thus *gratia sufficiens* — also called *gratia possibilitatis* — is a power by means of which the free will *can* act (*agere potest*); which therefore does not bring about the act itself, but the possibility for it ¹⁰⁶).

In his defence against the Jansenists Bellelli accepts *gratia suffi-*

¹⁰³) BERTI, o. c., p. 49: « etiam Augustinenses Poncius, Mansius et Hispani communiter gratiam per se efficacem sanctam vocationem congruam appellant ».

¹⁰⁴) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XVIII, p. 139: « Dari in hoc statu hanc gratiam sufficientem fide firmissima tenendum est ».

¹⁰⁵) BELLELLI, *Mens Aug. de modo Rep.*, lib. I, c. 4, p. 7: « Haec autem interior virtus excitans est illa gratia sufficiens, quae urgente lege omnibus et singulis datur hominibus, qui Dei mandatis obedire tenentur ». Cf. also o. c., lib. I, c. 5.

¹⁰⁶) o. c., lib. IV, c. 16, p. 209: « Gratia vero sufficiens dat posse: sed posse supernaturale adjunctum libertati, non posse quod idem sit cum arbitrii potestate ».

ciens « Thomistico sensu » and then he goes on to say that this kind of grace is really sufficient to give the power to obey or at least to pray ¹⁰⁷). Berti does not speak otherwise and once more expressly states the difference of the Molinistic *gratia sufficiens* which would give to the will only the *posse* without producing any effect if it were not determined by the human will (without further grace which gives the performing of an act) ¹⁰⁸).

This grace which brings it about that we can act — a *gratia inefficax* or the *adiutorium sine quo non* — is the same as the *gratia excitans* which enlightens our mind and kindles the will, but not the same as the *gratia efficax* which gives certain knowledge and a *delectatio victrix* ¹⁰⁹).

As we noted above it follows from the theory of degrees in grace that not every grace is *efficax*; for if grace is described as a « *superna illustratio mentis et inspiratio sanctae dilectionis* » ¹¹⁰), and experience as well as faith teaches us that in comparison with *gratia efficax* inspiring *certa scientia* and *delectatio victrix* not every grace is *efficax*, then it is obvious that we are also to accept —

¹⁰⁷) o. c., c. 12, p. 199. On the same page: « Tribuit autem gratia sufficiens sufficientem virtutem et possibilitatem; nec aliud utique exigitur, quam ut per illam virtus et potestas homini conferatur. Cur ergo non sufficit? At insuper exigitur, inquires, gratia per se efficax, qua virtus potestasque illa operi complendo applicetur. Ita profecto est: sed non ut *virtus*, efficax exigitur gratia; sed ea exigitur ratione, qua genarum aperitio necessaria est, ut illuminatus oculus videat. Igitur, quemadmodum oculorum sufficiens virtus est, tunc etiam quando non vident, simplicis quoque gratiae auxiliatricis potestas, tunc etiam quando non adhuc operi complendo est applicata, sufficiens dicenda erit ».

¹⁰⁸) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 8, p. 40: « Est ergo gratia sufficiens sensu Thomistico ac nostro illa quae dat posse, non velle; aut si dat velle, istud adeo est invalidum atque imperfectum, ut desideria carnis contraria concupiscentis non vincat, nisi superveniente flagrantissima et potentissima caritate. Huiusmodi sunt inspirationes et pia animi desideria, quae perversam animam movent atque excitant aliquantulum, sed illam ad conversionem non trahunt... Ex quibus liquet gratiam sufficientem semper effectum producere, nempe pium animi motum et bonam voluntatem, sed invalidam et cui liberum arbitrium resistit ».

¹⁰⁹) BERTI, o. c., lib. XVIII, post c. 8, p. 139 (*Opusculum. In quo de Gratia sufficiente pertractatur*): « Est autem auxilium sufficiens idem ac gratia excitans, nempe nobis mentis illustrationem et voluntatis affectum inspirans, at non illam certam scientiam et victricem delectationem... ».

¹¹⁰) BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 38; Id., *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, Diss. IV, c. 1, p. 74.

as the Augustinians formulate it — a *parva et debilis voluntas spiritus* which does not conquer the opposing will of the flesh ¹¹¹).

The objection that there is no distinction between *gratia efficax* and *gratia sufficiens*, because both are an inspiration of love and always achieve some effect, is not a very serious matter, since we know that the Augustinians with their theory of degrees only deny a specific (essential) difference between the two kinds of grace. The teaching that *gratia sufficiens* is frustrated in its effect by a hardened concupiscence does not smack of Molinism or Congruism, for « quod Deus adiuvet illum tantum, istum non tantum, non pendet a circumstantiis extrinsecis personae, loci vel temporis, neque a praescientia boni usus arbitrii, sed a secretae aequitatis ratione et potestatis divinae excellentia ; et cum Deus efficaciter vult, inspirat tam vividam delectationem quae facile vincat, salva semper indifferentia liberi arbitrii, contrarios motus pugnantis concupiscentiae » ¹¹²).

From the above it is evident that on the one hand the Augustinians agree with the Thomists ¹¹³), but that on the other hand they differ from them by denying a specific differentiation between the two kinds of grace thereby according not only a potency to *gratia sufficiens* ¹¹⁴). The Augustinian theologians also like to speak of *gratia* « *inefficax* » when they mean *gratia sufficiens*. They consider the use of this term, however, more a question of grammar than of theology ¹¹⁵). It certainly is their conviction that *gratia inefficax* is only *remote* and not *proxime sufficiens* ¹¹⁶). The theolo-

¹¹¹) Cf. e. g. BERTI, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XVIII, *Opusculum*, p. 141; *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, l. c., p. 73.

¹¹²) *Id.*, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XIV, c. 7, p. 44. The difference between the *gratia parva* of the Jansenists and that of the Augustinians is dealt with at length by Berti in his *Augustinianum Systema de Gratia ab iniqua Baiani et Jansenii erroris insimulatione Vindicatum*, Pars II (in *Theol. Discipl.*, Venetiis 1760, tomus sextus).

¹¹³) We have seen Berti mentioning more than once that he accepts *gratia sufficiens* « sensu thomistico ».

¹¹⁴) BERNENC, *Syst. Aug. de Divina Gratia*, Proemium, pp. 3-4: « Augustiniani vero docent gratiam sufficientem penes tantum gradus distingui a gratia efficaci; unde sequitur gratiam sufficientem, quam admittunt ex voluntate Dei antecedente, non tantum ordinari ad potentiam, sed etiam ad actum. Ita ut si gratia illa sufficiens non sortiatur suum effectum, illud non se tenet ex parte gratiae, quasi ex se sola non sufficiat, sed ex parte voluntatis, quae huic gratiae nimiam concupiscentiam opponit, ut illam vincat ».

¹¹⁵) Cf. BERTI, *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, diss. IV, p. 79.

¹¹⁶) Passim; therefore it seems most strange to me that in 1758, in the 23 theses containing the official Augustinian teaching, Vasquez, the General of the Order,

gical basis for this statement is briefly as follows: the free will in Adam (before sin) was just as « *expeditum* » to commit a sin as to do good. But after the Fall the weakened and wounded will has lost this *potentia expedita* to do good. True, man has not lost his free will, but it is now ill, wounded and blinded by ignorance and evil concupiscence. It is still able to do good, but not without considerable difficulties. That is what the Augustinians wish to express when they say that the wounded nature of man lacks the *potentia proxime expedita*, i. e. the ease to act ¹¹⁷). Moreover they only call *proxime sufficiens* the grace which does not require any other to make the will act ; this is the kind of grace the angels and unfallen man had ¹¹⁸). *Remote sufficiens* is applied to the grace aided by which man still needs a stronger grace in order to act ¹¹⁹).

I do not think it is necessary to go further into this question. It often gives the impression of theological quibbling without a very clear picture emerging. Finally, it also seems to me that this whole question of *gratia sufficiens* belongs rather to the realm of the *necessity* of grace. This essay, however, must be restricted to the nature, the *character* of grace.

CHAPTER VI. GRACE, WHICH IS AN INSPIRATION OF THE GOOD WILL, DOES NOT DESTROY LIBERTY BUT MAKES IT MORE PERFECT.

In this final chapter I shall discuss some of the most important points concerning the compatibility of divine grace with our free will. On this point in particular the Augustinian theologians are often mentioned in the same breath with the Jansenists, who deny that grace leaves man free, in spite of the fact that the Augustinians have been repeatedly exonerated from Jansenist error, even in papal

says in the eleventh thesis that *gratia sufficiens* « *proximam tribuit potestatem agendi* », whereas Noris, Bellelli and Berti manifestly teach the opposite. Unless, perhaps by *proxima potestas* Vasquez means *realis et vera potestas*.

¹¹⁷) NORIS, *Jansenii erroris calumnia sublata*, cap. 4, col. 179.

¹¹⁸) BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, pars II, c. 3, pp. 62-63. *Id.*, *Theol. Disc.*, lib. XVII, c. 3, p. 94: « *Invasit in Scholis nostris illa distinctio: potentia alia est expedita ab omni impedimento impotentiae, alia est expedita ab omni impedimento nolentiae; prima est cum gratia sufficiente, altera cum gratia efficaci. Utere, si lubet, hac distinctione: non aliud dices barbarizans, quam plane et latine Norisius tuus* » (NORIS, *Jans. err. calumn. subl.*, c. 4, col. 177 f.).

¹¹⁹) *Ib.*

documents ¹²⁰). I do not want to write an apology for the Augustinians, however, I only wish to investigate whether it is true what e. g. Portalié alleges in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, when he says that Berti proclaims the death of liberty and that Jansenism is a logical consequence of the system of *delectatio victrix* ¹²¹).

The difficulty of reconciling grace and free will was realised from the moment the subject came to be considered. Already St Augustine wrote in *De peccatorum merit. et remiss.* (2, 18, 28): « Ne sic defendamus gratiam ut liberum arbitrium auferre videamur; rursus ne liberum sic asseramus arbitrium, ut superba impietate ingrati Dei gratiae iudicemur » ¹²²).

All our Augustinian authors candidly recognize that it is extremely difficult to reconcile the so-called *libertas indifferentiae* with *gratia efficax* ¹²³). The crux of the matter is whether liberty can co-exist with the *decretum Dei efficax, absolutum et antecedens* ¹²⁴).

¹²⁰) Cf. *Litteras Benedicti XIV ad Supremam Hispaniae Inquisitorem*, in DENZ., *Enchiridion Symbolorum* 1090, nota 1.

Moreover the Augustinian Generalate's archives in Rome possess a manuscript (Cc 78) which contains on fol. 17-31: « Votum D. Gioacchino Besozzi Abbata di S. Croce in Gierusalemme. Consultore del Santo Offizio »; on fol. 29-127: « Osservazioni », also issued from a high quarter and comprising an acquittal for Bellelli's works. The two texts by consultants of the Holy Office find not a vestige of Bajanism or Jansenism in the works of Bellelli and Berti. The first part has been published under the title *Censurarum Operum PP. Bellelli et Berti* in: *Alcuni apologetici scritti contro l'Autore della Storia Letteraria d'Italia*, P. I, pp. 121-152 (Napoli 1757).

¹²¹) PORTALIÉ, *D. T. C.*, vol. I, col. 2488 and col. 2489.

¹²²) *M. L.*, 44, 168.

¹²³) BELLELLI, *Mens Aug. de Modo Rep.*, I, lib. 3, p. 116: « Difficultas quam maxima est quod duo extrema, libertas videlicet et gratia, quorum alterum indifferens est, alterum vero determinatum, invicem ad agendum componantur, cum indifferens et determinatum ex diametro videantur pugnare ». *O. c.*, lib. 4, p. 299 Bellelli argues that our Faith knows more such apparently contradictory mysteries (like: Deus simul unus et trinus; Christus simul homo et Deus, etc.); but this makes our believing meritorious.

¹²⁴) BERTI, *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, diss. IV, p. 77: « Praeterea difficultas, quae invenitur in concilianda libertate cum gratia per se efficaci, non est an libertas indifferentiae consistere queat cum qualitate physica, cum motione divina, cum delectatione aut absoluta aut relativa; sed an consistere possit cum decreto efficaci, absoluto et antecedenti, cum praemotione inferente certo et infallibiliter actum praedefinitum ante exploratum voluntatis consensum, cum praedeterminatione ad unum actum trahente liberum arbitrium, priusquam illud sese ad agendum determinet.

All the Augustinians admit that it is not grace by itself which achieves in us the good work, but only grace together with our free will, the former inciting the latter and bringing it to activity. Therefore one may say that out of grace and the free will arises the complete principle of good works but in such a way that the will is subject to grace. And as without grace nothing salutary can be done, human liberty can only be put to a good use by grace ¹²⁵). Yes, as Noris says, the will does not obtain grace by its being free, but it obtains liberty by grace ¹²⁶).

When we look back on the Augustinian way of approaching the nature of *gratia efficax* and *victrix*, the reconciliation between grace and free will seems less difficult, for grace *aids* the weakened will, it does not remove it, because aid is always given in order to make it possible to act better. This holds good all the more when we speak of *gratia efficax*, which consists even in bringing about the willing. How then could *gratia victrix*, by inspiring a great love and actually helping the will, destroy the liberty of the will? And what is more: grace brings about (*efficit*) the good and free will.

It is common parlance used a thousand times by the Augustinian theologians that grace causes a *delectatio* and a *dilectio* or a *bona voluntas* and heals and strengthens the sin-weakened forces of the will and that thus from being a slave to sin the will is set free by grace to do what is good. Here I would like to refer the reader back to the part of this essay in which the nature of grace is discussed ¹²⁷).

Hic nodus est; et haec difficilis quaestio, quomodo gratia conciliari possit cum libertate ».

¹²⁵) NORIS, *Vindiciae Augustinianae*, c. 2, col. 284: « unde ex gratia et libero arbitrio fit completum principium actuum bonorum, ita tamen ut libertas gratiae ancilletur. Et sane cum sine gratia nihil fieri potest, prout oportet ad salutem, a sola gratia humana libertas in bonum et meritorium usum agi potest ».

¹²⁶) ID., *Historia Pelagiana*, lib. I, c. 23, col. 206.

¹²⁷) Cf. chapters III and IV. BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, P. II, c. 5, p. 210: « Haec libertas ea est, per quam cum simus mancipati peccato, nascamur filii irae, filii vindictae, et inolita carnis concupiscentia seu lege membrorum, servi simus et captivati in lege peccati, per gratiam Salvatoris eruimur a potestate tenebrarum, acquirimus adoptionem filiorum Dei atque efficaci suffulti adiutorio non gravamur sub dominatu peccati, sed erigimur et sumus iustitiae liberi. De hac libertate legimus in Evangelio Joan. 8, 36: *Si vos Filius liberavit, vere liberi estis*, et in lib. de Corr. et Gratia, cap. 1: *In bono liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab eo, qui dixit: si Filius vos liberavit, vere liberi estis* ».

CAROLUS MOREAU in MS. B. A. 897, in *Homilia quarta*: « Ubi Spiritus per

In the above way the difficulty may be obviated theologically, but philosophically the fact remains that it seems impossible to reconcile predetermining grace with the neutrality of liberty. This is not the place for an exposition of the philosophical ideas of the Augustinians on the will and human liberty. According to their own words these are the same as those of other scholastics of their time ¹²⁸).

In order to distinguish, however, between the Augustinian and the Jansenistic view of grace and liberty it is worth noting that Berti and his followers expressly teach that the free will is not a thing like a lifeless pair of scales moving between the good delectation and the wrong concupiscence so that it cannot but incline to what is more pleasing to it. No, the will is an *active* faculty and even after Adam's sin it possesses, when it is drawn either by concupiscence or by the good delectation, a so-called *indifferentia potentiae*. And it is this same indifference which is denied by the Jansenists; they only accept a *libertas a coactione*. It was Jansenius's mistake to think that man is all the time being *coerced* as it were by the stronger delectation be it a heavenly or a purely earthly one. The Augustinian teaching on the contrary is that the free will is never reduced to nothing by a relatively stronger grace, but is healed and aided in its weakness. Jansenius only recognized *gratia efficax* which *invincibly* draws the will to agreement ¹²⁹).

As regards the Augustinian system of grace and free will it seems best to quote here its most important representative, Laurentius Berti:

gratiam agit et movet fideles, ibi libertas: nulla coactio, necessitas nulla, sed gratia secundum naturam dirigit intellectum in rectum et verum; natura intellectus enim appetit verum; et voluntatem dirigit in verum bonum. Et has veluti duas alas humani arbitrii ignorantiae et concupiscentiae visco et laqueo impeditas solvit et expedit gratia... ».

¹²⁸) BERTI, *Dilucidatio*, P. II, p. 196 f. Id., *Theol. Disc.*, lib. IV, c. 13, p. 125. Cf. MARCELLI, *Institutiones Theologicae*, lib. XXIX, chapters 1, 2 and 3

¹²⁹) In *Dict. de Théol. Cath.*, s. v. *Augustinianisme*, col. 2491. Portalé also wrongly ascribes this teaching to the Augustinians, attributing to them the words « délectation invinciblement victorieuse ». His arguments to refute them are of course valueless. Expressions like « impuissante à résister », « elle (la volonté) est fatalement poussée », etc. prove that the author knows the doctrine of the Augustinians only from the writings of their opponents, who in former centuries reproached them with the same errors.

« At principium duarum delectationum, prout in Schola nostra defenditur, in hoc situm est, quod amor ac delectatio est pondus animi quo fertur, sive prosequendo bonum, sive fugiendo malum, quod ipsi bono adversatur, adeo ut semper voluntas bono aliquo sibi proposito alliciatur, praecedatque actionem liberam inspiratio quaedam delectationis, aut carnalis dum peccat, aut coelestis dum recte agit, aut naturalis dum officia exercet humana ; sed hac inspiratione praemissa operetur libera delectatione ac potestate ad utrumlibet indifferente: quoniam etsi amplectitur quod magis delectat fugitque malum quod bono delectanti adversatur, dummodo tamen bonum istud non sit summum, incommutabile et propositum absque indifferentia iudicii, utitur eligendo iure liberissimae potestatis ; neque succumbit necessitate sub maiori delectatione, nec indita potestate privatur sub delectatione minori. Hoc autem systema duarum delectationum est illud quod innoxie defendi potest » ¹³⁰).

I shall not go into the difference between the two systems ; this subject would require an essay to itself.

For a further understanding of the Augustinian teaching on this point there is no need for expatiating on how the different Augustinian theologians try to solve philosophically the problem of reconciling grace and free will. In this matter they proceed in the same way as the Thomists. We may think for instance of the famous distinction between « sensus compositus » and « sensus divisus », which is also employed by Bellelli ¹³¹). Another distinction is that between « actus primus » and « actus secundus » ¹³²) ; and between « necessitas antecedens » and « necessitas consequens » ¹³³). But all this is of course not specifically Augustinian.

CONCLUSION

The main object of my investigation was to examine, exclusively in its sources, the original teaching of the Augustinians con-

¹³⁰) BERTI, *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, diss. V, c. 3, p. 164, where he also writes: « ... (nos) demonstrantes victricem delectationem idem praestare quod praestat physica praedeterminatio, applicare scilicet ad actum secundum liberi arbitrii facultatem, salva in actu primo potestate ad oppositum ».

¹³¹) BELLELLI, *Mens Aug. de Modo Rep.*, P. I, lib. II, c. 16, p. 95.

¹³²) See note 130; o. c., p. 127.

¹³³) o. c., lib. IV, c. 39, p. 288; BERTI, *Aug. Syst. Vind.*, diss. IV, pp. 138 and 140.

cerning *gratia actualis*. On comparing the result with what is written about the Augustinian conception of grace by contemporaries of our authors as well as by later theologians it is at once obvious that the Augustinian system is always described as « *systema praemotionalis moralis* », whereas the theologians of our School unmistakably uphold a « *systema praemotionalis physicae* ». Perhaps the important Augustinian distinction between the state of man before and after the Fall has been rather overlooked. It is true that for the blessed state of paradise the Augustinians reject the *praedeterminatio physica* together with *gratia efficax*, but they insist on both all the more emphatically in the case of fallen man. And it is unscholarly to extend the grace of paradise to all granting of grace without making any distinction.

We have also seen that most of the non-Augustinian theologians found it very hard to form a clear idea of the so-called « *delectatio victrix* ». That was why the Augustinians used to be looked upon as Jansenists. In later times the *manualia theologiae* especially show that their conception of the notion « *delectatio* » is very different indeed from the Augustinian one.

This is one of quite a few reasons why a further study of the authentic teachings of the 18th century Augustinian writers would be far from superfluous.

Finally, it is my opinion that a study of the conception of grace in the writings of the Augustinians mentioned, who repeatedly refer to the *Doctor gratiae*, will be a usefull means to obtain a better insight into the teaching on grace of St Augustine himself.

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