


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AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW DEVOTED TO THE STUDY
OF ST AUGUSTINE AND THE AUGUSTINIAN ORDER

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REVUE POUR L'ÉTUDE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN ET DE L'ORDRE DES AUGUSTINS

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Key words

De Trinitate, *imago Dei*, *mens*, 'remember God – understand God – love God', *se nosse*.

Introduction

The concept of *imago Dei* is an important Biblical concept in Augustine's thinking.¹ As a link between man and God, this concept

¹ The explicit texts for the *imago Dei* concept are mainly to be found in Genesis and the Pauline letters, as for example in the following citations (NIV Bible, 1988):

Genesis:

Gen 1:26: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the cattle, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground.'"

Gen 1:27: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them."

Col 3:10: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man."

A MIND-CENTERED APPROACH OF *IMAGO DEI* A DYNAMIC CONSTRUCTION IN AUGUSTINE'S *DE TRINITATE* XIV

Cheuk Yin Yam and Anthony Dupont

Abstract

The present article argues that the dynamism of *imago Dei* in Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIV should be approached as a mind-centered epistemology, that ontology and epistemology should be combined in order to understand Augustine's use of *imago Dei*. Previous interpretations of *imago Dei* in *De Trinitate* XIV remained on the ontological level. As such, the epistemological dimension of the *imago Dei*, facilitated by the shift from the mind's 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God', is not taken into account. This epistemological and dynamic reading is based on the observations that, for Augustine: (1) the triad 'remember – understand – love' is a logic that the mind applies to itself and God (rather than an ontological change), and (2) the mind's self-knowing and self-thinking distinguishes 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' from 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

Key words

De Trinitate, *imago Dei*, *mens*, 'remember God – understand God – love God', *se nosse*.

Introduction

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Gn 1:27: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them."

Gn 9:6: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man."

plays a significant role in our understanding of Augustine's anthropology. J. Heijke's anthology² demonstrates that the theme of *imago Dei* is widely dispersed among Augustine's writings, including *Confessiones*, *De Genesis ad Litteram*, *De Civitate Dei*, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, *Epistulae*, *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, and *De Trinitate*, etc.³ Among these works, *De Trinitate* is important in coming to understand what "image of God" means.⁴ In this great masterpiece, the concept

Pauline letters:

I Cor 11:7: "A man ought not to cover his head, since he is the *image and glory of God*; but the woman is the glory of man."

II Cor 4:4: "The god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot see the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the *image of God*."

Col 1:15: "He is the *image of the invisible God*, the firstborn over all creation."

Col 3:10: "... and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the *image of its Creator*."

For a thorough analysis of Augustine's *imago Dei* concept, see *inter alios*: Isabelle Bochet, "Imago", *Augustinus-Lexikon* III/3-4 (2006): 507-519, esp. 514-517. Johannes Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus. Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De trinitate"*, (Hamburg: Meiner, 2000), esp. 213-250. Adalbert-Gauthier Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu. Essai d'une anthropologie chrétienne dans l'Église des cinq premiers siècles*, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1987), 238-277.

See also: Johannes Brachtendorf, "Mens", *Augustinus-Lexikon* III/5-6 (2010): 1270-1280, esp. 1257-1280. Volker Henning Drecoll, "Triaden, Analogien und das Verhältnis zur Hypostasenlehre des Neuplatonismus", V. H. Drecoll (ed.), *Augustinus Handbuch*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 450-456. Cornelius Mayer, "Homo", *Augustinus-Lexikon* III/3-4 (2006): 381-416, esp. 400-401, 404-405. For an elaborated state of the art of the significance of *imago* in *De Trinitate*, see Roland Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu "De trinitate"*, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum/Studies and Texts in Antiquity and Christianity 22, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 227-240.

² John Heijke, "St. Augustine's comments on "*imago Dei*": An Anthology from all his Works exclusive of the *De Trinitate*", *Class. Folia, Suppl.* 3 (1960): 1-95.

³ According to Heijke's study, the occurrences are as follows:

Confessiones: III, 12; VI, 4; XI, 11; XIII, 12; XIII, 32; XIII, 35; XIII, 47.

De Genesis ad Litteram: III, 19; III, 20; III, 22; VI, 12; VI, 19; VI, 27; VII, 22; IX, 17; X, 2-3; XI, 42; XII, 7; XII, 31.

Enarrationes in Psalmos: XXIX, 2; XXXII, 2; XXXIV, 2; XXXV, 11; XLII, 6; XLVIII, 1; XLVIII, 2; XLIX, 2; LIV, 3; LVII, 1; LVII, 11; LXIII, 11; LXVI, 4; LXX, 2; LXXV, 3; XCII, 1; XCIV, 2; CI, 1; CII, 3; CIII, 4; CXVIII, 18; CXXXVIII, 14; CXLV, 5; CXLVI, 18.

Epistulae: XI, 3; XXIII, 1; LV, 11; LV, 20; XCII, 3; CXX, 2; CXX, 3; CXX, 4; CXLVII, 19; CLXIX, 1; CLXIX, 2, etc.

De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII: Q. 12; Q. 18; Q. 23; Q. 51, 1-4; Q. 58, 2; Q. 67, 4; Q. 74.

De Trinitate: IV, 7; VII, 2; VII, 5; VII, 12; XI, 8, etc.

⁴ In his impressive study *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, Roland Kany gives a *status quaestionis* of the research of *De Trinitate* since 1841 (edition in *Patrologia Latina*). Kany observes that modern systematic theology distanced itself from Augustine's doctrine of Trinity, because of Augustine's emphasis on the intra-personal and monotheistic

of *imago Dei* is constructed alongside the so-called psychological triads, such as 'lover – love – loved', 'mind – knowledge – will', 'memory – intellect – will', etc.⁵ Augustine's psychological program is founded

dimension of the Trinity and because of his so-called neglect of the inter-personal and relational aspect of God. Kany finds the confirmation that this rejection is incorrect, in a shift of interpretation that has taken place during the last decades, in the course of which the neo-scholastic approach of Augustine has been abandoned, a better insight into the church-historical and theological context (the Trinitarian controversies of the 4th century) has been gained, and philosophy has become interested in Augustine. According to Kany, contemporary philosophers rediscovered the original basis of Augustine's Trinitarian thinking, namely the theory of human self consciousness that he learned from antique philosophy, and in doing so, they revised the interpretation that *De Trinitate* is merely theological. Augustine's contribution, Kany concludes, to contemporary theology of Trinity, is a doctrine based on an understanding of human self-consciousness. Recently, van Bavel summarized Augustine's unique contribution to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in the following points: "1) Augustine carried out pioneering work in the distinction between absolute qualities, such as wisdom and goodness, and relational qualities, such as fatherhood and promises, of God. 2) God is presented especially as relationship, both within Himself and within Creation, and this Falque [Emmanuel Falque, "Saint Augustin ou comment Dieu entre en théologie. Lecture critique des Livres V-VII du *De Trinitate*", *Nouvelle revue théologique* 117 (1995): 84-111] calls a crucial moment in the history of theology. 3) Love emerges not only as a divine gift but as divine life itself. 4) Love as the distinguishing appellation for the Holy Spirit. 5) Man is not only created 'in' the image of God, but 'is' the image of God himself. 6) Attributing the manifestations of God solely to the Son, as less transcendent, is discontinued, and as a consequence hierarchy in the divine persons is avoided." Tarsicius-Jan van Bavel, "To See the Ineffable by Way of the Inexpressible: the Trinity", Tarsicius-Jan van Bavel (ed.), Margaret Clark & Paul Holberton (trans.), Bernard Bruning (red.), *Saint Augustine*, (Brussels: Mercatorfonds, 2007), 97-103, 98. For an overview of the studies devoted to the theological and philosophical aspects of Augustine's trinitarian psychology, trinitarian ontology and logics and *imago Dei*, see Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu "De trinitate"*, 227-240; 272-294.

⁵ The term psychological triad or psychological analogy does not originate from Augustine's own work. However, it has become an authentic expression since Michael Schmaus's *Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, (Munster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927). The term generally refers to the triad cluster that appears within the realm of the latter half of *De Trinitate*.

Scattered mainly within the realm of the latter half of *De Trinitate*, the psychological triads are generally referred to as:

1. 'lover – love – loved' (*amans - amor - amatus*) [VIII, 14].
2. 'mind – knowledge – love' (*mens - notitia - amor*) [IX, 3].
3. 'memory – understanding – will' (*memoria - intelligentia - voluntas*) [X, 11, 7].
4. 'the body that is seen – vision – attention of the mind' (*corpus quod videtur - visio - animi intentio*) [XI, 2].
5. 'body retained in memory – inner vision – will' (*corpus quod in memoria manet - visio interna - volitio*) [XI, 9].
6. 'knowledge to faith – thinking – love' (*scientia (fidei) - cogitatio - amor*) [XIII, 20, 26].

on the fact that man is the image of God. The concept *imago Dei* becomes more vivid through the unfolding process of the psychological triads. As such, *imago Dei* is closely aligned to the said psychological triads. For example, E. Hill, the Augustine scholar who has translated *De Trinitate* in *The Works of Saint Augustine* series,⁶ understands the psychological triads as a search for the image of God.⁷ J. E. Sullivan also aligns psychological triads to *imago Dei* in his classification of the triads. He sees two distinctions: 'vestiges of the Trinity' and 'image of the Trinity',⁸ which use the image of God as criteria to determine their importance.

In formulating the *imago Dei* doctrine, *De Trinitate* XIV plays a particularly crucial role. The phrase *imago Dei* appears 62 times

7. 'remembering itself – understanding itself – loving itself' (*memoria sui - intelligentia sui - uoluntas sui*) [XIV, 9].

8. 'remembering God – understanding God – loving God' (*memoria Dei - intelligentia Dei - amor Dei*) [XIV, 15].

Some scholars also identify other triad patterns, but the examples outlined above are the most important ones. Some other examples of the triad pattern include Yves Congar's list, as follows:

1. *amans - amatus - amor* (VIII, 10, 14; cf. IX, 2, 2).

2. *mens - notitia - amor* (IX, 3, 3).

3. *memoria - intelligentia - uoluntas* (X, 11, 7).

4. *res (uisa) - uisio (exterior) - intentio* (XI, 2, 2).

5. *memoria (sensibilis) - uisio (interior) - uoluntas* (XI, 3, 6-9).

6. *memoria (intellectus) - scientia - uoluntas* (XII, 15, 25).

7. *scientia (fidei) - cogitatio - amor* (XIII, 20, 26).

8. *memoria Dei - intelligentia Dei - amor Dei* (XIV, 12, 15).

See Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit* (vol III): *the River of Life Flows in the East and in the West* (New York: Seabury, 1983), 89.

⁶ Saint Augustine, *The Trinity, The Works of Saint Augustine* I-5, Edmund Hill (trans.), (New York: New City Press, 1991).

⁷ The titles he gives to each book in the latter half of his translation of *De Trinitate* reflect his intention:

Book IX – "Psychological: Mental Image, First Draft",

Book X – "Psychological: Mental Image, Second Draft",

Book XI – "Psychological: Mental Image, Lesser Analogies",

Book XII – "Man's Case History: The Image Broken Up, The Fall",

Book XIII – "Man's Case History: The Image Repaired, Redemption",

Book XIV – "Man's Case History: The Image Perfected",

Book XV – "The Absolute Inadequacy of the Perfected Image".

See also Edmund Hill, "Introduction", in Saint Augustine, *The Trinity*, WSA I-5, 21-27.

⁸ The concept of 'vestiges of Trinity', refers to three triads: Trinity in external vision (visible object – act of vision – attention of the mind), Trinity in internal vision (memory – internal vision – the will) and Trinity of faith (highest form in *ratio inferior*). The 'image of Trinity' refers to the following three triads: '*mens – notitia sui – amor sui*', '*memoria – intelligentia – uoluntas sui*', '*memoria Dei – intelligentia – uoluntas*'. See John Edward Sullivan, *The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its influence*, (Iowa: Priory Press, 1963), 85-161.

(both explicitly and implicitly) in this single book, accounting for nearly one-third of all the references in the whole *De Trinitate*.⁹ It is also the book in which Augustine's *imago Dei* doctrine comes explicitly to the foreground. Although all psychological triads are related to *imago Dei*, the concept remains vague throughout Augustine's quest in Books VIII – XIII.¹⁰ The real *imago Dei* only appears when we come to Book XIV (from Book XIV, 11 onwards), because only then does Augustine clearly state that the *imago Dei* has been finally discerned.¹¹ Instead of being defined negatively, in Book XIV, this concept now finds its positive assertion within the mind. Moreover, Augustine endows the *imago Dei* doctrine with a highly dynamic character in Book XIV, which makes Augustine's *imago Dei* a very powerful and influential concept in his theology. 'Dynamic' means that this *imago Dei* should not be regarded as an inner structure of the human mind and

⁹ The lexicon analysis is done through *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* (CAG). *Imago Dei* in explicit sense refers to all the phrases which appear explicitly in the form of *imago Dei* like *imaginem Dei*, *imaginis Dei*, *imagine Dei*, *imagini Dei*. *Imago Dei* in implicit sense refers to those *imago* terms (without the qualification *Dei*), which when looked into their context, mean *imago Dei*. The total sum is 216 entries.

¹⁰ In Books IX–XIII *imago Dei* is only defined in a negative way. Augustine states that the images signified by the triads are not the image of God, or are 'imperfect'. This use of *imago Dei* can be summarized as follows:

BK IX, 2	Referring to the trinity concluded in BK VIII, namely 'lover, what is loved, and love', and regarding it as an imperfect image.
BK IX, 18	Referring to another trinity by focusing on mind as subject: 'mind, its knowledge, its love'.
BK X, 19	Referring to trinity: 'memory, understanding, and will', and regarding it as an imperfect image.
BK XI, 1	Start of the journey to trace the Trinity in outer man, i.e. through bodily senses, which is not the image of God.
BK XI, 18	In the end of BK XI, Augustine confesses that the image of God cannot be sought in the outer man, and he now turns back to the inner man to search the image of God.
BK XIII, 26	Referring to the triad of faith: 'remembering, contemplating, and loving of the faith', but stating that this triad is still not the image of God.

¹¹ *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 426): "If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not yet God indeed, but now finally an image of God." "Hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum sed iam imaginem Dei." (CCL 50, 436.) The translation is taken from: *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, *The Fathers of the Church* 45, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963).

therefore static in nature.¹² Rather, it is subjected to a renewal process. *Imago Dei* is a journey of growth in *sapientia*, undergoing a transformation from *sapientia* of man to the *sapientia* of God. Such a dynamic renewal is especially highlighted by the fact that man's psychological triad can shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' (XIV, 11) to 'remember God – understand God – love God' (XIV, 15). When the mind comes to the stage of 'remember God – understand God – love God', that is, a God-centered stage, the renewal process reaches its climax, and the mind is said to be 'wise' and so a real *imago Dei* emerges.¹³

Therefore, in order to understand Augustine's *imago Dei* doctrine, especially its dynamic character, we have to carry out a detailed study of Book XIV. The special focus of our study falls on the rationale behind the shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. What is the relationship between the two triads? What happens in the shift to a real *imago Dei*? While many scholars discern the importance of the

¹² The standpoint that Augustine's *imago Dei* is the inner structure of the human mind and therefore an analogy to the inner being of God is formulated by Colin Gunton. (See Colin Gunton, "Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West", *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43 (1990): 33-58, 48). His interpretation has been criticized among Augustine scholars. For a general review, see Lewis Ayres, "Augustine, the Trinity and Modernity", *Augustinian Studies* 26:2 (1995): 128-32; Michel Rene Barnes, "Rereading Augustine's Theology of the Trinity", Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, Gerald O'Collins (eds.), *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). *Imago Dei*'s 'dynamic' dimension has also been brought forth by scholars. Walter H. Principe points out that Augustine opts for verbs which have a dynamic quality to describe the vital drive of the highest image toward the Trinity in *De Trinitate* XIV-XV. Augustine namely prefers to use the verbs (e.g. *meminisse*, *intelligere*, *amare*) instead of the nouns (e.g. *memoria*, *intellegentia*, *amor/dilectio*). Walter H. Principe, "The Dynamism of Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person", *Studia Patristica* 17/3 (1982): 1291-1299.

¹³ *Trin.* XIV, 15 (FC, 432). "Unless the *mens* is actively participating in the life of God, the image is imperfect (*Trin.* 14.8.11). This implies, of course, that when the mind most fully knows and loves God, it most fully knows and loves itself – a theme familiar from the *Confessiones* and elsewhere in Augustine's writing (14.14.18). It is set free for the proper and effective love of the neighbor (14.14.19), and occupies its due place in the universe, its desire being satisfied with the unchanging presence of God, for the enjoyment of which it was made (14.14.19). The contemplative, sapiential knowledge of God is what is most deeply natural for the *mens*, so that when we come to this perfection and realize what we are made for, the self that self-knowledge and self-love relate to is a self wholly turned away from self-preoccupation or self-protection, a self whose object is God in a so total sense that there is no self to be seen or known apart from relation to God. This is our eschatological hope (14.17.23-14.19.25)." Rowan Williams, "Trinitate, De", Allan Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, (Grand Rapids (MI) – Cambridge (UK): William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 845-851, 849-850.

shift as the cornerstone of Augustine's dynamic *imago Dei*, they limit their view most often to its ontological dimension – an ontological shift from self to God. The present article analyzes the shift more thoroughly by putting it within the whole context of Book XIV. It aims to go beyond the ontological interpretation of the dynamism, and brings the missing mind-centered dynamism of the *imago Dei* to the foreground and reveals its significance to our understanding of Augustine's theology. Mind-centered dynamism means that the shift closely aligns to the noetic activities of the mind. Apart from the ontological dimension, this dynamism is highly epistemological. In doing so, we will firstly review the current ontological trend in interpreting the *imago Dei*'s dynamism. Secondly, we will introduce our thesis of mind-centered dynamism to fill the lacuna in current interpretations. Subsequently, this mind-centered phenomenon will be further elaborated through two themes: the 'remember – understand – love' logic and the mind's self-knowing (*se nosse*) and self-thinking (*se cogitare*). Finally we will consider the specific significance of this specific kind of dynamism.

The Ontological Trend in Interpreting the *Imago Dei*'s Dynamism

Ontological Interpretations Based on Book XIV, 15

The understanding of the dynamism of *imago Dei* is overshadowed by the interpretation that it is a purely ontological issue. In explaining the shift, that is, the transition from the stage at which the mind will 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' (XIV, 11) to the stage of 'remember God – understand God – love God' (XIV, 15), many scholars focus on the connection of man's *sapientia* to God,¹⁴ a link that easily leads to an ontological connection. This seems to be supported by the following often quoted passage, through which many Augustine scholars find their pivot in their ontological interpretations:

Book XIV, 15: "Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand,

¹⁴ *Trin.* XIV, 3 (FC, 413). "Nul texte n'affirme avec plus de force le caractère ontologique de l'image que ce chapitre du livre XIV. L'image ne se surajoute pas à une âme déjà créée, mais elle est constitutive de la *mens*, et, comme telle, inamissible. Elle commence avec l'âme, demeure dans le pécheur, est rénovée par la justification, s'épanouit dans la vision." Joseph Moingt, in Augustin, *La Trinité. Deuxième Partie: Les images*, Bibliothèque Augustinienne/Œuvres de Saint Augustin 16/IV, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), 630.

and love Him by whom it was made. And when it does so, it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though it remembers itself, knows itself, and loves itself, it is foolish. Let it, then, remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and understand Him and love Him.¹⁵

This passage reveals the criteria a real *imago Dei* should meet. It does not just stay on the level of remembering, understanding, and loving itself, but clarifies that God should be considered as the *imago Dei*-object that we need to remember, understand and love. Referring to this passage, scholars tend to assume a transition of object in the dynamism. It is moving from the object 'self' to the object 'God'. Such a treatment implies a split of objects, a split between man and God, leading to the conclusion that the dynamism is a totally God-centered state. With such presupposition, the shift is perceived as an ontological transformation of man, like in the case of mystical union, sanctification or deification, etc. In general, the ontological dimension of the shift raised by the said scholars could be categorized into three schemes.

Three Kinds of Ontological Interpretation

The first line of interpretation is the transformation paradigm of G. B. Ladner, G. Bonner and M. Marocco. These scholars try to identify the renewal of *imago Dei* as an ontological transformation of man. Ladner takes it as a reformation.¹⁶ Bonner aligns it closely (if not equally) with the Eastern concept of deification, like that of Athanasius.¹⁷ Marocco, being highly influenced by Ladner and Bonner, also develops her view along this line, and goes even further by considering it as a complete process, in that *imago Dei* is a life journey with different stages like the state of the fall and the state of renewal, etc. Through the process of 'remember God – understand God – love God', man participates in God, invoking the activation of the image,¹⁸ leading to

¹⁵ *Trin.* XIV, 15 (FC, 432). "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit seque intellegit ac diligit, stulta est. Meminerit itaque Dei sui ad cuius imaginem facta est eumque intellegat atque diligit." (CCL 50, 442-443.)

¹⁶ Gerhart B. Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God", *Augustinus Magister*. Actes du Congrès international augustinien, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), vol. II, 867-878.

¹⁷ Gerald Bonner, "Augustine's Doctrine of Man: Image of God and Sinner", *Augustinianum* 24:3 (1984): 495-514, 510.

¹⁸ Mary Marocco, "Participation in Divine Life in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine", *Augustinianum* 42 (2002): 149-185, 157.

the state of renewal of the image,¹⁹ transforming the previous state of the fall of the soul.²⁰

Another approach is the moral application of Th. A. Fay. According to him, 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is a kind of natural power, whereas 'remember God – understand God – love God' is God's grace on the supernatural level of wisdom.²¹ It is a life invoked by the intimate life of the divine Trinity. *Imago Dei* thus means being united with God and being made alike to Him.²² He emphasizes the 'wise' dimension in his interpretation, in that being wise or foolish depends solely on the ontological *sapientia* level. He accentuates the moral dimension through the ontology of *sapientia*.

The third line of approach is the object-shift interpretation of J. E. Sullivan. The previous two schemes result in the object split interpretation, in that the self is in a totally different state than God, with very little awareness of the relationship between self and God. The objects, God and the self, are thus split. These two approaches are interested only in the object God. They focus on the description of the God-centered state, on the transformation of man and the state of "being wise", in which the role of the self is almost dismissed. However, in Sullivan's object shift approach, the relationship between the two objects is also taken into account. He notes that in the quoted passage, Augustine has brought to the fore two objects for discussion: God as object and self as object. With this observation, it could be said that Sullivan moves a step further than the two previous interpretations. He remains, however, within the ontological framework of the discussion. In an ontological sense, the dynamism implies that man is to replace the object self with the object God. "Self must be related to God as the object, and in a subordinate way."²³ In that sense, self and God are still placed in a counter-position. Therefore in treating the three triads of 'mind – knowledge – love', 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', 'remember God – understand God – love God', Sullivan prefers to categorize the first two as one group and the third as a separate scheme, because the former perceive self as object and the latter God. Moreover, the triad 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is regarded to be only a refinement and development of the

¹⁹ Marocco, "Participation in Divine Life in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine", 160.

²⁰ Marocco, "Participation in Divine Life in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine", 159.

²¹ Thomas A. Fay, "'Imago Dei'. Augustine's Metaphysics of Man", *Antonionum* 49 (1974): 173-197, 186.

²² Fay, "'Imago Dei'. Augustine's Metaphysics of Man", 187.

²³ Sullivan, *The image of God*, 137.

previous one: 'mind – knowledge – love'.²⁴ The jump from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God' would inevitably proceed within the ontological level. All of the above interpretations often emphasize too much the contrast between the self and God, which seems to imply that 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', is totally meaningless, unless it can be altered to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. In order to highlight the contrast, this shift is portrayed as undergoing a radical change – a change of solely ontological concern. These studies, however, have never really paid attention to the relationship between the self and God. What happens in the shift? What enables the shift from the self to God? Apart from its undeniable ontological dimension, the shift is also largely involved within the mind's noetic activities, which opens up the epistemological dimension of the *imago Dei*.

The Mind-Centered Dynamism: An Epistemological Concern of *Imago Dei*

Instead of perceiving the self-reflexive 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and the God-centered 'remember God – understand God – love God' as two different ontological stages, it is more appropriate to regard them as two different modes of the self's existence – a self-centered mode and a God-centered mode respectively – situated both in the mind. As such, the differentiation between the two stages is not perceived ontologically but epistemologically. This is what we call the epistemological dimension of the *imago Dei*.

Although the psychological approach, like that of M. Schmaus, has already rendered an ontological discourse within the human reflection, and therefore has presupposed an epistemological dimension, our approach of mind-centered dynamism could contribute to the epistemological dimension in a more profound way. Firstly, our approach aims to drill into the rationale behind the transition of the triads, and so to focus on the sophistication of the mind's epistemological action. Secondly, while the psychological approach is widely criticized as based on the assumed presupposition that man can build up an analogical triad to the Trinity through speculative reflection of the human ability,²⁵ which

²⁴ Sullivan, *The Image of God*, 134.

²⁵ Schmaus speaks of "analogische Bewährung des Dogmas". Schmaus, *Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 183.

is actually not Augustine's own concern,²⁶ our mind-centered approach will reveal this presupposition and bring out the epistemological dimension through reading Augustine's context carefully.

The Epistemological Elements in the Lexicon Imago Dei

In analyzing the term *imago Dei*, we have first to distinguish the meaning of '*imago Dei*' in *De Trinitate* from that of '*ad imaginem Dei*' in the Christian tradition and Augustine's earlier writings. The reflections on *imago Dei* among church fathers mainly sprang from an interpretation of the Bible phrase "make man in our image and likeness" ("*faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*") (Gen 1:26). In the tradition preceding Augustine, church fathers in general think that *imago Dei* can only refer to the Son. The human being, on the other hand, is the *imago* of the *imago Dei* (the Son), and is therefore regarded as created towards the image of God '*ad imaginem Dei*'. This is the general Western stance (e.g., Marius Victorinus²⁷) and also the stance Augustine takes in his earlier writings.²⁸ However, being affected by Ambrose and through his renewed and deepened understanding of Paul, Augustine rejects his earlier thinking and becomes sure that man is already the '*imago Dei*' instead of the '*ad imaginem Dei*'.²⁹ Instead of separating the value of *imago* and *similitudo* as in the Eastern Greek tradition, Augustine affirms that man is the image and likeness of God. But as only the Son is the Father's image and likeness in the sense of equality, man's image is a created image and his likeness is an unequal likeness (as opposed to Son's equal likeness).³⁰ Book VII, 12 shows that

²⁶ Roland Kany states that this is not Augustine's own concern. He cites Matthew Drever's comment that we should take God as the premise: "The movement of self to God is premised on the opposite and prior movement of God to self: it is only because God has created humans in the image of the Trinity and redeemed that image through Christ that the human self has a triadic structure capable of granting some understanding of the Trinity." Matthew Drever, "The Self before God? Rethinking Augustine's Trinitarian Thought", *Harvard Theological Review* 100 (2007): 233-242, 242. For Kany's comment on Schmaus, see Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 136-142.

²⁷ Robert A. Markus, "'Imago' and 'similitudo' in Augustine", *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 10 (1964): 125-143, 125.

²⁸ Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 229.

²⁹ Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 229.

Bochet, "Imago", 514: Augustine abandons the distinction between the Son as image and man as created to the image around 395, when he composes *diu. qu.* 74: because the Son is absolutely equal to the Father, one can say that man is image of God, without questioning the distinction between Son and man. Moreover, man is image of God as Trinity, and not only image of the Son.

³⁰ Markus, "'Imago' and 'similitudo' in Augustine", 135.

Augustine in *De Trinitate* clearly takes the stance that man is '*imago Dei*' and that he rejects the interpretation of '*ad imaginem Dei*'.³¹

In the '*ad imaginem Dei*' context, the exploration of man as image is mainly ontological in affirming that man is the highest creature.³² However, taking distance from the '*ad imaginem Dei*' framework, Augustine begins to understand the notion '*imago Dei*' in a Trinitarian context. He did not consider *imago Dei* only in anthropological terms, but perceives also epistemological links in it for his search for the Trinity. He has already fostered this intention in Question 51 of *De diuersis quaestionibus*.³³ The Trinitarian context of *imago Dei* makes it a highly epistemological concept. First, in *De Trinitate*, searching for *imago Dei* is regarded as a kind of 'exercise of the mind' (*exercitatio animae/mentis*), a purification process through which man can obtain the vision of the Trinity. Although the term *exercitatio animae/mentis* only appears four times in *De Trinitate* (XIII, 26; XV, 1; XV, 5; XV, 10), it is widely recognized as one of the keys in interpreting this work.³⁴ Although there is no agreement on how to interpret such a mental exercise, the epistemological dimension it displays is undisputed.³⁵ Secondly, *imago Dei* in Book XIV also includes forms that are epistemologically-oriented. We can categorize the occurrences of *imago Dei* in Book XIV into three image-forms: 'created to the image' (*facimus ad imaginem Dei*),³⁶ 'walk in/according an image' (*in imagine*

³¹ *Trin.* VII, 12 (FC, 240).

³² Augustine has in some places mentioned that between God and *imago Dei* there is no interposition of any other nature ('*nulla natura interposita*'), and so *imago Dei* is the highest creature. *Gn. Litt. Imp.* XVI, 55-60; *Gn. Litt.* III, 19; *Trin.* XI, 8. Also see Heijke, "St. Augustine's comments on '*imago Dei*'", 4-7.

³³ *diu. qu.* 51, 3. Question 51 also reveals that *imago Dei* is not only the highest exemplary image of the Creator among all other creations. It is an immediate link between the mind and God. The *imago Dei* is an analogical site where man can participate in God. Robert Markus even proposes that Augustine has re-interpreted Genesis 1:26 and introduced *imago Dei* into a Trinitarian context. Markus, "'Imago' and 'similitudo' in Augustine", 132; Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God", 873.

³⁴ Frederick Van Fleteren regards obtaining knowledge of God to be Augustine's lifelong purpose in his theology. As such, he considers *exercitatio* as an integrating concept of the whole interior search in *De Trinitate* VIII-XV (Frederick Van Fleteren, "Thematic Reflections on the *De Trinitate*", *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, vols. 12-13, (1987-88): 221-227). John Cavadini treats the latter half of *De Trinitate* as two ascents seated in Bk VIII and Bk IX-XIV (John C. Cavadini, "The Structure and Intention of Augustine's *De Trinitate*", *Augustinian Studies* 23 (1992): 103-123). Lewis Ayres sees the *exercitatio animae* that happens in Book XIII as a key in interpreting Books VIII-XV (Lewis Ayres, "The Christological Context of Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIII: Toward Relocating Books VIII-XV", *Augustinian Studies* 29:1 (1998): 111-139).

³⁵ John Cavadini thinks that the *exercitatio animae* is a kind of practice similar to the Plotinian ascent. This stance, however, receives strong critique from Lewis Ayres, who proposes that the process of *exercitatio animae* is a participation in a Christian transformation based on Christ's saving action. Lewis Ayres, "The Christological Context of Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIII", 113-117.

³⁶ Such use mainly exists in the accusative form: *ad imaginem*. It is mainly related to bible quotations of Gn 1:26-27: "*Let us make man to our image and likeness*", "*And God made man to the image of God*" and Col 3:10: "*Stripping yourself of the old man with*

ambulat),³⁷ ‘reformed to the image’ (*imaginem transformamur*), as in the following chart:³⁸

Verses	Image-forms	Contents
XIV, 1-6	XIV, 6: ‘Walk in an image’ (mind as a candidate for eternal <i>imago Dei</i> , in that it knows or can know God).	From faith triads to wisdom of man.
XIV, 7-15		Mind as the better candidate of being <i>imago Dei</i> .
XIV, 16-18	XIV, 16: ‘Created to the image’. XIV, 18: ‘Reformed to the image’.	Mind in remembering God – understanding God – loving God.
XIV, 19-26	XIV, 19-21: ‘Walk in an image’ (the nature sustains even amid great evils, i.e. the sinful state of mind still does not reduce its ability to be <i>imago Dei</i>). XIV, 22-25: ‘Reformed to the image’ (XIV, 22-23: reform to likeness to God; XIV, 23-25: reform of the vision of God).	The permanent capability of mind in the present sinful state, and some foresights of the eschatological reformation.
XV, 1-5		Set up to seek God the Trinity.
XV, 6-10		Seek God-triad (Wisdom – Knowledge – Love) through linguistic logics.
XV, 11-41	XV, 14-16: ‘See through the image’.	Seek God the Trinity through the mirror.
XV, 42-51	XV, 14, 20-21: ‘Reformed to the image’ (likeness of created image approaches likeness of born image). XV, 39-44: ‘See through the image’.	Integrated argument: overall unlikeness.

his deeds, put on the new man, that is being renewed in the knowledge of God, according to the image of him who created him,” and their related texts: XIV, 4; XIV, 6; XIV, 16; XIV, 22; XIV, 25; XV, 5; XV, 20; XV, 39; XV, 49. It emphasizes the God-man relation as creator and creature. Therefore the image of God is of a created nature. Concerning man (image of God) as nature, it first points out that man is made according to “our” image, instead of “your” image (especially the quotation of Gn 1:26-27). Man is made according to the Trinitarian God instead of the Son only. Augustine spent much ink to explicate this in Bk XII. As being made to the image of God, the mind is the best nature among creatures, and therefore it is the best nature in reflecting God.

³⁷ Such use mainly exists in ablative form: *in imagine*. It is mainly related to the bible quotations of Ps 38:7 [Ps 39:6] “Although man walks in an image, yet he is disquieted in vain; he stores up, and he knows not for whom he shall gather those things”, other related image-phrases include ‘vanity of the image’, ‘the trinity of the image’, ‘realized in the image’, etc. They mainly appear in Bk XIV, 6 & XIV, 19.

³⁸ Such use exists in the nominative form *imago*, genitive form *imaginis*, and accusative form *imaginem*. Phrases of such category include ‘transformed to the image’

The epistemological dimension is clearly displayed in the third form 'reformed to the image'. What Augustine regards as a reformation in the image is not purely an ontological transformation. The reformation is tightly connected with the epistemological dimension, the knowledge of God: "For the likeness to God in this image will then be perfect when the vision of God will be perfect."³⁹ Since the three image-forms are interwoven neatly together, Augustine's epistemological intention also applies to the other two forms. As such, there exists a strong foundation that *imago Dei* in Book XIV could open up its epistemological perspective.⁴⁰

(XIV, 23; XV, 14), 'reform of the image' (XV, 22), 'perfection of the image' (XIV, 23; XIV, 25), 'renewed to the image' (XIV, 18; XIV, 20; XIV, 22; XIV, 23; XIV, 25; XV, 21). The latter is the most often used form, which points out that the image can be renewed from one state to another, and even could be perfected. Moreover, through the mediation of Col 3:10, this use points out that the image's renewal is related to knowledge, as it is renewed in the knowledge of God, or it points out that the renewal is related to the vision of God.

³⁹ *Trin.* XIV, 23 (FC, 445). Other similar passages include: *Trin.* XIV, 24 (FC, 445): "Hence, it is clear that the full likeness to God will then be realized in this image of God when it shall receive the full vision of Him..." "Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem quando eius plenam perceperit uisionem..." (CCL 50, 455). *Trin.* XIV, 25 (FC, 447): "But the image which is being renewed day by day in the spirit of the mind and in the knowledge of God, not outwardly but inwardly, will be perfected by the vision itself which will then be after judgement face to face, but it is making progress towards it now through a mirror in an obscure manner." "Imago uero quae renouatur in spiritu mentis in agnitione Dei [Col 3:10] non exterius sed interius de die in diem [II Cor 4:16], ipsa perficietur uisione quae tunc erit post iudicium facie ad faciem [I Cor 13:12], nunc autem proficit per speculum in aenigmate [I Cor 13:12]." (CCL 50, 457). "Die Umwendung der mens von der Torheit zur Weisheit nennt Augustinus *renouatio* des Bildes: ein Prozeß, in dem die mens von der Erkenntnis der Körper zur Selbsterkenntnis und zur Gotteserkenntnis aufsteigt. Während die Gotteserkenntnis im irdischen Leben nicht über eine Schau im Spiegel und Gleichnis hinausgelangt, wird sie in der Ewigkeit zur Schau von Angesicht zu Angesicht (*Trin.* 14,25). In der jenseitigen Vollendung tritt die mens zur Teilname an der göttlichen Natur hinzu und wird selbst unwandelbar (ib. 14,20)." Brachtendorf, "Mens", 1278.

⁴⁰ Renewal of human person is a theme that clearly displays that Augustine's understanding of *imago Dei* is not solely ontological, but also epistemological. The ontological and epistemological elements are entwined together to form a whole unity. The renewal of the human person is a renewal in the knowledge of God – a renewal in true justice and holiness. The renewal involves human's turning of his love from temporal things to eternal things (*Trin.* XIV, 23). The love perspective implies that the renewal must include a pursuit of ethical (and so ontological) renewal in the human being. Yet, we have to note that, Augustine's understanding of love always comes together with knowledge. In Book IX, his discussion of love (the love triad: Lover – love – loved) brings him to the discussion of knowledge. There he even unites knowledge and love together in word. (*Trin.* IX, 15: "Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare uolumus, cum amore notitia.") Knowledge of God and love of God are intertwined. As such, we can see why in the very

'Remember Itself – Understand Itself – Love Itself': Mind as imago Dei

The epistemological dimension of *imago Dei* is also displayed in the fact that the *imago Dei* revolves in the mind. It should be noted that not only the stage of 'remember God – understand God – love God' (Book XIV, 15) should be qualified as *imago Dei*. Earlier in Book XIV, 11, Augustine has already clearly stated that 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is qualified enough to be *imago Dei*. Although as reflected in Book XIV, 15 'remember God – understand God – love God' should be a better candidate, it does not abolish Augustine's recognition that 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is finally an *imago Dei* during the quest.⁴¹

Book XIV, 11: "But we have now finally arrived at that point in our discussion where we begin to consider the principal part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find therein an image of God. ..."

"Behold! The mind, therefore, remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself; if we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not yet God indeed, but now finally an image of God."⁴²

beginning of Book XIV Augustine regards wisdom as a lovable worship or veneration of God (*Trin.* XIV, 1), and why the renewal of the human person is also a renewal in the vision of God (*Trin.* XIV, 23). The renewal is invoked with both love and knowledge. It is therefore ontological in some sense, yet also highly epistemological. For the entwinement of love and knowledge, see Volker H. Drecoll, "*Mens – notitia – amor: Gnadenlehre und Trinitätslehre in De Trinitate IX*", Johannes Brachtendorf (ed.), *Gott und sein Bild: Augustins De Trinitate im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung*, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000), 137-154

⁴¹ In light of Book XIV, 11, Augustine's discourse in Book XIV, 15 should not be interpreted as a total nullification of the candidacy of 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' as *imago Dei*. Instead it should be understood as a comparison between 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God', and the latter is to be regarded as an even better candidate of *imago Dei*. This will become clearer in the latter section of this article, especially in the part of 'Mind-Centered Dynamism Construction II: the Mind's Knowing Itself and the Mind's Thinking Itself', where we will see how Augustine confirms the *imago Dei*'s candidacy in both cases.

Trin. XIV, 15 (FC, 432): "This trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made ... " (See above n. 15.)

⁴² *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 425-6). "Nunc uero ad eam iam peruenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo nouit Deum uel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiatur imaginem Dei. Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se. Hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum sed iam imaginem Dei." (CCL 50, 435-436.)

Augustine points out in these passages that when the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself, it is already an image of God. In light of this clear proclamation, we should understand Book XIV, 15 and Book XIV, 11 together in respect of *imago Dei*'s identity. This implies that the candidacy of *imago Dei* is not based on God, but on the mind. The subject involved in being *imago Dei* is the mind. As such, the shift would probably not be an ontological concern alone, but also an epistemological one. It is the shift in the attentiveness of the mind, the noetic change of the mind that enables the mind to be sometimes the *imago Dei*, and sometimes not the *imago Dei*. That is, the dynamism should be a mind-centered dynamism. This indicates that Augustine's concern in Book XIV is the mind or its activities instead of a state with God as its only dimension.

In the philosophical context of Augustine's thinking, 'mind' is a very important concept, because it is God's image if we remember, understand and love God as our Creator. Plotinus gives it even a cosmological importance. In Plotinus's thought, the human mind and soul, though not identifiable with the One, are 'divine' extensions of the hypostases, with which, in a sense, they form a continuity. Such an intellectual environment would without doubt leave its traces on Augustine, although we know that his own preference was to maintain the discontinuity between God and mind. As G. O'Daly has pointed out, in maintaining the discontinuity, that is, the idea that God is transcendent and immutable, whereas human nature (even human reason) is mutable, Augustine still manages to put the God-mind relation in a high position by shifting it to the knowledge level.⁴³ That is, the way for man to reach God, can only be achieved by means of an appropriately directed self-knowledge: God is 'within' us. The mind must transcend self-knowledge if it is to gain even such an incomplete understanding of the divine.⁴⁴ This means that at the knowledge level, although there is no continuity between God and mind, there is, in Augustine's thought, no dichotomy between the quest for self-knowledge, and the quest for knowledge of God.

The importance of the mind can be seen in the flow of argumentation in Book XIV. Throughout that whole book, we can say that Augustine is shaping the discussion into the mind. Book XIV, 1-6 is a discussion of the triad of faith, in reference to the mind. It is in a comparison between the triad of faith and the mind that the mind's

⁴³ Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, (L.A.: University of California Press, 1987), 1.

⁴⁴ O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, 1.

candidate as *imago Dei* is being drawn out. Subsequently in Book XIV, 7-10, Augustine readily shifts the whole focus to the mind. He gives here special treatment to the mind's inner activities, to the mind's knowing and thinking, which is a hint to us that the mind's inner activities are closely related to the *imago Dei*. In Book XIV, 11-18, Augustine continues to elaborate how man comes to the stage of 'remembering God – understanding God – loving God', and still the mind remains at the centre of discussion. Book XIV, 11-15 focuses on how the mind's inner activities stand out from the previous temporal things (the *scientia*).⁴⁵ Book XIV, 16-18 displays how 'remember God – understand God – love God' revolves around the mind. Subsequently, on the basis of the previous arguments, Augustine makes a final reflection on the dynamic *imago Dei* as the renewal of the *imago Dei*. What is this? This is a kind of renewal in "the spirit of your mind". Again, this concerns the dynamism relating to the mind. Therefore, we can postulate that Augustine's treatment in Book XIV centers on the mind as *imago Dei*.

The epistemological elements of the term *imago Dei*, and also the focus on the mind have shown that *imago Dei*'s dynamism in Book XIV is highly epistemological and is a mind-centered dynamism. The *imago Dei*'s dynamism, displayed fully in the shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God', is a noetic action that happens within the mind. The *imago Dei* is dynamic in the sense that it is a growth of mind's knowledge of God, a growth in the mind's noetic activities that are directed to God. This mind-centered approach in understanding *imago Dei*'s dynamism is further supported by the noetic tools that Augustine employs in illustrating the shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. The most obvious tools are two interrelated themes: the mind's 'remember – understand – love' logic, and the mind's self-knowing (*se nosse*) and self-thinking (*se cogitare*). In elaborating these two themes, we will see how Augustine constructs his *imago Dei* doctrine with highly noetic elements, and therefore the *imago Dei*'s dynamism is a mind-centered dynamism.

⁴⁵ *Trin.* XIV, 13 (FC, 430).

Mind-Centered Dynamism Construction I: Mind's 'Remember – Understand – Love' Logic

'Remember – Understand – Love': Its Epistemological Nature

The epistemological dimension of the dynamism of the *imago Dei* can be shown in Augustine's use of the 'remember – understand – love' logic.⁴⁶ The triad 'remember – understand – love' should not be regarded

⁴⁶ Luigi Gioia, in his *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate*, Oxford theological monographs, (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2008), accentuates the inner coherence and structural unity of *De Trinitate*. This unifying force of *De Trinitate* is according to Gioia's analysis, theological epistemology: how to know (God). Augustine himself considered his writing as having a consistent unity (cf. *Epistula* 174). Based on this presupposition, Gioia elaborates that *De Trinitate* is a treatise on the theological understanding of the knowledge of God. By explaining the practice of the knowledge of God – namely loving worship of God as Trinity – Augustine shows the conditions of the knowledge of God, not critically but theologically. "That *De Trinitate* is based on the presupposition that it is impossible to dissociate questions concerning the identity of the God we believe in from those related to the way we have actually come to know him. The Trinitarian identity of God is the only way to explain how we come to know him. As a result, investigation into the identity of the Trinity changes the way we perceive ourselves and our own identity and in this process theology discovers its critical responsibility not only with regards to epistemology but also to anthropology." (p. 3.) Exactly because the question of the identity of God is connected with the theological epistemology – how to know God – the doctrine of the Trinity is interwoven with Christology, soteriology, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the doctrine of revelation, and the doctrine of the image of God. In the last chapter, *The Image of God* (pp. 232-297), Gioia gives a historical survey of Augustine's thinking on image-exemplar and image-relation from *Quaestio* 51 of *De diuersis quaestionibus* and his doctrine of creation from *De uera religione*, *Confessiones* and *De Genesi ad litteram*, distinguished from the Platonic participation theory and the concept of image in Plotinus and Marius Victorinus. Augustine writes, especially in books XIV-XV, that true happiness can only be found in the relation to the Trinity, as an image-relation (*imago Dei*) between creature and Creator (expressed in the triad of memory, knowledge and love), in which the original capacity to know God (*capax Dei*) is restored by the *gratia Christi* making even a participation in God possible. Man is God's image, both ontologically and ethically. On the ontological level, God rescues from the tendency of the contingent nature of a creature towards nothingness (resulting from the *creatio ex nihilo*), to fulfill the teleological character of the created nature, namely finding its fulfillment in its creator. Ethically, the dynamic relation between creature and creator makes the creature able to overcome its sinful inclination, graciously saves it from its covetousness and pride. "We can say that the image is a fundamental threefold dependence of creature on the creator (this is its 'capacity') and reaches its fulfillment when this dependence in being, knowledge, and love becomes conscious and is converted into worship, i.e. acknowledged, thankful dependence (this is its 'participation'). At heart, the acknowledgement of this dependence consists in love, in *dilectio*. But love is inseparable from knowledge, and therefore worship coincides with remembering or rather, in *being reminded of God* and in being given, in Christ through the Holy Spirit, the possibility of *knowing* and *loving* God." (p. 297.) Gioia concludes (pp. 298-302) by identifying the theological

as an ontological status. Indeed it is epistemological-oriented as its origin can be traced back to the ancient noetic triad '*esse – uiuere – intelligere*'.⁴⁷ The noetic triads, no matter under the traditions of Plato and Plotinus,⁴⁸ or of Porphyry and Victorinus,⁴⁹ all focus on the interaction between the three hypostases – an interaction which is being identified as

epistemology of *De Trinitate* with the primacy of love. “‘You do see the Trinity if you see charity’ [*Trin.* VIII, 12]: hence the decisive role of love in this vision, i.e. in knowledge of God; hence also the conclusion of our investigation: *love comes first*. *Love comes first* because the inner life of the Trinity is a life of love (*dilectio*) and the substantial unity of the Trinity is a unity of love.” (p. 298.) As such, love comes first on the Christological-soteriological level (incarnation, faith in Christ and grace as love), on the epistemological level (love directs to Love), on the level of reality (no knowledge without God) and on the level of the *imago Dei* (acknowledgement of the threefold dependence – being, knowing, loving – on God in *dilectio*).

⁴⁷ The notion '*esse – uiuere – intelligere*' has a long tradition in ancient Greek philosophy. It can be even tracked back to the idea in the pre-Socratic Anaxagoras. (David N. Bell, “‘*Essere, vivere, intelligere*’: the Noetic Triad and the Image of God”, *RTAM* 52 (1985): 5-43). Augustine has also mentioned '*esse – vivere – intelligere*' in *Trin.* X, 18: “Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singular dicuntur etiam simul, non pluraliter sed singulariter dicuntur.” (CCL 50, 331.) Although Augustine has shifted the focus of the noetic triad into the mind, like ‘mind – knowledge – love’ and ‘memory – understanding – will’, the influence of the noetic tradition to Augustine’s triad is widely recognized. See Bell, “‘*Essere, vivere, intelligere*’: the Noetic Triad and the Image of God”; Edward Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’ related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists”, *Augustiniana* 27 (1977): 70-132, 364-401; 28 (1978): 183-221; 29 (1979): 97-124. See also E. Booth, “St. Augustine’s *De Trinitate* and Aristotelian and neo-Platonist Noetic”, *SP* XVI, Part Two, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985), 487-90.

⁴⁸ The noetic triad in Plato and Plotinus focuses on building a vertical hierarchy within the three triad elements. It appears in the form of ‘motion, life, soul’ in Plato’s *Sophist* 248e-249a, and ‘One-Mind-World’ in Plotinus’s *Enneads* I, 6.7, V, 4.2, V, 6.6. See Bell, “‘*Essere, vivere, intelligere*’: the Noetic Triad and the Image of God”; David N. Bell, “The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition”, *RTAM* 47 (1980): 16-52; John Dillon, “Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early Christianity”, Godfrey Vesey (ed.), *The Philosophy in Christianity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-14; Christopher Stead, “The Intelligible Word, in Platonic Tradition, Marius Victorinus and Augustine”, in *Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity: Arius, Athanasius, Augustine*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chapter XVI, 1-14. Theo Huijbers considers Augustine’s concept of *mens* as *imago Dei* – in the framework of knowledge of God and self knowledge – to be neoplatinian. “Conclusio est: etiam in opere maturae aetatis “De Trinitate” conceptus mentis S. Augustini remansit neoplatonicus”. Theo Huijbers, “Zelfkennis en Godkennis in de geest volgens S. Augustinus’ “De Trinitate””, *Augustiniana* 4 (1954): 269-304.

⁴⁹ The noetic triad in Porphyry and Victorinus focuses on building a horizontal hierarchy within the three triad elements. It appears in Porphyry’s (?) *Commentary on Parmenides* and Victorinus’s *Candidus* I, 3.16 and *Ad candidum* 2, 22. M.J. Edwards, “Porphyry and the Intelligible Triad”, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 110 (1990): 14-25; Mary T. Clark, “Victorinus and Augustine: Some Differences”, *Augustinian Studies* 17 (1986): 147-159; Peter Manchester, “The Noetic Triad in

parallel to the inner relation and activities of God the Trinity.⁵⁰ As a noetic triad, 'remember – understand – love' does not emphasize the ontological status, but the epistemological link to God and the Trinity. The epistemological dimension of 'remember – understand – love' becomes clearer upon investigation of its pattern in Book XIV.

The triads 'remember – understand – love' are scattered throughout the whole Book XIV in a variety of forms such as 'remember – understand – love',⁵¹ 'memory – sight – love',⁵² 'memory – thought – will',⁵³ 'memory – vision – love',⁵⁴ etc. Although such a change of words creates difficulties in the making of a very precise lexicon analysis on this triad (or this triad group), L. Ayres has helped us to gain a substantial picture. According to his research, the triad appears around 35 times in Augustine's *corpus*, and over 20 of these entries appear in *De Trinitate*.⁵⁵ It is not difficult to see that the most frequent use of the triad of 'remember – understand – love' is to be found in Book XIV:

Verse	Object	Text
Book XIV, 4	Faith	"... <u>memory</u> , <u>sight</u> , and <u>love</u> of this same <u>faith</u> that is present and abides, will then be found to have been dealt with and past, and not as still enduring."
Book XIV, 5	Faith	"... just as now we retain it in our <u>memory</u> , perceive it in our <u>thought</u> , and love it with our <u>will</u> , so too then, when we shall retain it in our <u>memory</u> and <u>recall</u> that we once had it, and shall join both of these together by the <u>will</u> as third, the same trinity will remain."
	Outer and Inner Body	"... the image of this body, ... remains in the <u>memory</u> , and because the <u>gaze of thought</u> is formed from it, and both are joined together by the <u>will</u> as a third, ..."

Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine", Richard Wallis (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism*, (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1992), 207-222.

⁵⁰ Manchester, "The Noetic Triad in Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine", 217.

⁵¹ Like *Trin.* XIV, 9 (FC, 422) and *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 426), etc.

⁵² Like *Trin.* XIV, 4 (FC, 415).

⁵³ Like *Trin.* XIV, 5 (FC, 415).

⁵⁴ Like *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 427).

⁵⁵ Lewis Ayres, "'It's not for eatin' – it's for lookin' 'through': *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* and the argument of Augustine's *De Trinitate* IX – X", D. Vincent Twomey, Lewis Ayres (eds.), *The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Fourth Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 1999*, (Portland: Four Court Press, 2007), 38. See the passage: "Including some variations on the third term found in Book XV of the *De Trinitate*, Augustine uses the triads *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* and *memoria, intellectus, voluntas* around 35 times in his *corpus*. This rather vague figure stems from the difficulty of assessing passages where the triad and its constituent terms are discussed over a number of complex sentences. Even with such imprecise figures it is striking that over 20 of the uses occur in the *De Trinitate*."

Book XIV, 8	Itself (Mind)	"The <u>gaze of thought</u> was formed in the <u>memory</u> , ...that by which both are joined together, namely, <u>love or the will</u> ."
Book XIV, 9	Itself (Mind)	" <u>The mind always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself</u> . For if this is so, then the mind did not have these three things, so that <u>it remembered itself, understood itself, and loved itself; ...</u> "
	Art	"For he <u>remembers</u> this art, <u>understands</u> it, and <u>loves it</u> ."
Book XIV, 10	Itself (Mind)	"The inner memory of the mind by which it <u>remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, ...</u> "
	Itself (Mind)	"The image is rather to be recognized in these three things, namely, <u>memory, understanding, and will</u> ."
Book XIV, 11	Itself (Mind)	"Behold! The mind, therefore, <u>remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself ...</u> "
	Temporal things	"These and other things of the kind have their own proper order in time, wherein the trinity of <u>memory, vision, and love</u> appeared more easily to us."
Book XIV, 12	Virtues	" <u>Hold on to them</u> as present, <u>contemplate them, and love them</u> [virtues] ..."
Book XIV, 13	Itself (Mind)	"Who do not see that the retention in the memory is prior in time to the sight in recollection, as well as to the combining of both of these by the will ..."
Book XIV, 14	Itself (Mind)	"So in a present thing, which the mind is to itself, that is not reasonably to be called <u>memory</u> , by which the mind is present to itself, so that it can be <u>understood</u> by its own thought, and both can be joined together by the <u>love</u> of itself."
Book XIV, 15	Itself (Mind) and God	"Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind <u>remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself</u> , but because it can also <u>remember, understand, and love Him</u> by whom it was made. And when it does so, it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though <u>it remembers itself, knows itself, and loves itself</u> , it is foolish. Let it, then, <u>remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and understand Him and love Him</u> ."

Book XIV, 18	Itself (Mind) and God	“ <u>Never does it not remember itself, never does it not understand itself, never does it not love itself.</u> ” “But when the mind does <u>love God</u> and by consequence, as we have said, <u>remembers and understands Him.</u> ”
Book XIV, 19	Itself (Mind)	“Yet even amid these great evils, which reveal its weakness and delusions, it could not lose the <u>natural memory, understanding, and love of itself, ...</u> ”
Book XIV, 20	Itself (Mind)	“It would be unable to <u>love itself</u> if it were altogether ignorant of itself, that is, if it did not <u>remember itself nor understand itself; ...</u> ”

In analyzing the context of these occurrences, we made three observations:

1) The triad ‘remember – understand – love’ is not solely reserved to God and the mind. Instead, it can refer to various things as its object, like faith (XIV, 4; XIV, 5), outer and inner body (XIV, 5), art (XIV, 9), temporal things (XIV, 11), etc.

2) The triads in reference to the mind and to God are interwoven neatly together. In between Book XIV, 11 and Book XIV, 15, where the two most important passages of *imago Dei*’s dynamism are seated, the discussion mainly focuses on the mind. There is also no clear transition from ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ to ‘remember God – understand God – love God’, or vice versa.

3) The triad ‘remember God – understand God – love God’, although widely treated in the study of Augustine as a very important concept to understand *imago Dei*, appears only once in Book XIV, 15 (or twice if we consider the odd reference in Book XIV, 18). Instead, the triad comes up mostly (more than half of the occurrences) with mind as object: ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’. The second highest number of occurrences are to the faith-triads (Book XIV, 1-6) and related matters (Book XIV, 11-12). Therefore, ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ should not neglect its wider context – its relationship with ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ and its relationship to faith.

These observations support our claim that ‘remember – understand – love’ should be regarded as a Trinitarian logic. Instead of being an ontological structure of the mind, Augustine prefers to treat ‘remember – understand – love’ as a logic framework that he applies to find a real *imago Dei*. This logic shows two characteristics.

1) A Logic Rooted in Mind

As 'remember – understand – love' can apply to many other things other than God and mind, we should not restrict its use only to an ontological description of how the three elements are structured in the mind as well as in God. Instead, in all these occurrences, we can see that what concerns Augustine is the 'oneness and threeness' framework displayed through 'remember – understand – love'. As R. Williams has pointed out, the analogy in 'remember – understand – love' might better be called an analogy of oneness and threeness,⁵⁶ instead of an analogy of structure. That means, instead of constructing an ontological analogy between the mind's 'remember – understand – love' and God's 'Father – Son – Holy Spirit', the importance of 'remember – understand – love' lies in the fact that it displays a condition that is one and three at the same time. If something can fit into this 'oneness-and-threeness' framework, then it is the real *imago Dei*. The logic also points out the fact that it is mind-oriented. In the quest of *imago Dei*, Augustine has searched through many things to examine their suitability. However, the candidacy of being *imago Dei* lies not in the object alone, but in the object's relation to the mind. Objects like faith (XIV, 4; XIV, 5), virtues (XIV, 12), or outer body and inner body (XIV, 5) are not *imago Dei* because when the mind remembers, understands, loves them, the mind can stay in an everlasting 'oneness-and-threeness' condition. In retention, contemplation, and love of faith, the mind is one and three at the same time, but this condition is not everlasting.⁵⁷ The mind's referencing to the outer body cannot maintain the 'oneness-and-threeness' condition. As such, being *imago Dei* or not, depends not on the external attributes of the object, but the discernment within the mind.

2) A Logic Rooted in Faith

The 'remember – understand – love' logic is seated in the faith context. The discussion of 'remember – understand – love' and the mind (including 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God') in Book XIV, 7-20 is seated in the context of the faith-triad. In Book XIV, 2-6, Augustine is performing a search for the criteria for being a real *imago Dei*. Augustine is concerned about whether the mind can find an object for

⁵⁶ Rowan Williams, "Augustine on Christ and the Trinity", van Bavel (ed.), *Saint Augustine*, 239-249, 242.

⁵⁷ *Trin.* XIV, 4-5 (FC, 414-417).

eternal contemplation. He says that retention, contemplation, and love of the temporal faith cannot be called the *imago Dei*,⁵⁸ because the object has to enable the mind's everlasting contemplation: "For the mind, when it sees its own faith by which it believes that which it does not see, does not see anything everlasting."⁵⁹ Also the faith-triad will change, because "the faith which is now in our mind, as that body in place, while it is retained, seen, and loved, produces a kind of trinity, but this trinity will no longer exist when this faith in the mind, like that body in place, will no longer exist. But the trinity which will then exist, when we shall remember that it was in us and is there no longer, will certainly be different."⁶⁰ Such a searching for the object as the mind's eternal contemplation continues to dominate the discussion in Book XIV, 1-10.

However, the importance of the faith-triad lies not on its being an *imago Dei* candidate. The significance the faith-triad brings forth is that the 'remember – understand – love' logic should be understood in the context of Trinitarian faith. The faith-triad of Book XIV, 1-6 is not an isolated construction, but a continuation of the theme of faith in Book XIII (and even of the wider context of Book XI-XIII). Book XI is an investigation on searching *imago Dei* in outer vision and inner vision, which is coherent to the searching process in Book XIV, searching for a condition of the mind that can remain in a one-and-three everlasting situation. Book XIII contains a digression that has puzzled many commentators.⁶¹ The digression is that, instead of searching for a one-and-three condition, Book XIII is mainly occupied with the motif of *scientia* approaching *sapientia*. The triad of *scientia* is mentioned only as an after-thought at the end of the book (XIII, 26), and when it does appear, it is not a triad of *scientia* at all but a triad of faith.⁶² Also, the details of this triad are never explained to us. We are left to surmise from hints earlier in the book (XIII, 4) that the object of *scientia* is the significance of the salvation story and to construct our own triad on that basis.⁶³ As such, the

⁵⁸ *Trin.* XIV, 4 (FC, 414).

⁵⁹ *Trin.* XIV, 4 (FC, 414). "Quippe humana cum fidem suam uidet qua credit quod non uidet non aliquid sempiternum uidet." (CCL 50, 425.)

⁶⁰ *Trin.* XIV, 5 (FC, 417). "... sed non ipsa erit quando fides haec in animo sicut corpus illud in loco iam non erit. Quae uero tunc erit quando eam recordabimur in nobis fuisse, non esse, alia profecto erit." (CCL 50, 427.)

⁶¹ Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1980), 86.

⁶² Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 86.

⁶³ *Trin.* XIII, 4 (FC, 374): "But we are treating now of the inner man and his science, that science namely, which is concerned with temporal and changeable things; when in carrying out this function it assumes something even from things

motif of *scientia* approaching *sapientia* is highly related to the faith-triad in Book XIV, 1-6, and so the 'remember – understand – love' logic in 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

The theme of *scientia* approaching *sapientia* reveals that the 'remember – understand – love' logic is not constructed in speculation. Instead, it is an epistemology rooted in Christian faith. According to Augustine, *scientia* refers to the function of the lower reasoning, whereas *sapientia* is the proper activity of the higher reason, and these two functions are inextricably mixed together within the mind (Book XII). The inseparability of these two concepts is displayed clearly in Augustine's illustration of the Prologue of John's Gospel (Book XIII, 1-2), where he regards the first part of the text as signaling unchangeable and everlasting entities, whereas the second part is a mixture of eternal realities with temporal things.⁶⁴ As such, our contemplative knowledge (*sapientia*) of eternal things is inseparable from, and is actually based upon, our knowledge (*scientia*) of temporal things in the world. Therefore our searching of the Trinity (*sapientia*) is rooted in our faith through the Bible and Christ events (*scientia*).⁶⁵ B. Studer rightly points out that our knowledge of the Trinity is closely aligned to our knowledge of faith,⁶⁶ and consequently the relationship between

pertaining to the outer man, it must assume it for this purpose, that something may be learned from it that may help rational science..." "Nunc autem agimus de homine interiore et eius ea scientia, quae rerum est temporalium et mutabilium. In cuius intentionem cum assumitur aliquid etiam de rebus ad exteriorem hominem pertinentibus, ad hoc assumendum est ut aliquid inde doceatur quod rationalem adiuuet scientiam, ..." (CCL 50, 385.)

⁶⁴ *Trin.* XIII, 2 (FC, 370).

⁶⁵ Manfred Svensson indicates the development ("eine langsame, aber tiefe und kohärente Entwicklung", p. 224) in Augustine's thinking on the relation between theory and praxis, evolving from a concept of *sapientia* as a unified form of knowing (including practical and contemplative components) to differentiating *sapientia* from *scientia*, an evolution influenced by a deepening of his understanding of Christianity and by a growing knowledge of the Scriptures which he interpreted in a philosophical way. Svensson argues that the latter distinction is not identical to the Aristotelian schema of *sophia* and *phronêsis*, that Augustine's concept of *scientia* even resembles the Aristotelian notion of *phronêsis* (rather than *epistêmê*), and thus is a form of practical reason. Augustine's solution of the 'theory-praxis problem' is by the author considered as a middle position between Plato and Aristotle. Manfred Svensson, *Theorie und Praxis bei Augustin. Eine Verhältnisbestimmung*, (München: Alber, 2009).

⁶⁶ Basil Studer has clearly demonstrated that a link exists between the Trinitarian knowledge and the faith elements. He points out the importance of the terms *cognitio historica* (which comprises *fides* and *cogitatio*) and *res narratae* to the role of Trinitarian knowledge in *De Trinitate*. See Basil Studer, "History and Faith in Augustine's *De Trinitate*", *Augustinian Studies* 28:1 (1997): 7-50.

scientia and *sapientia* shows that *intellegere* should be taken together with *credere*. In effect, the ‘remember – understand – love’ logic is rooted in the mind and at the same time rooted in faith. Already in his early work, Augustine has linked *auctoritas* and *ratio* to human knowledge, to fight against Manichaeism.⁶⁷

In light of ‘remember – understand – love’s logic nature, we can justify why Augustine can regard both ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ and ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ as the real *imago Dei*. ‘Remember – understand – love’ is an ‘oneness and threeness’ framework that the mind uses in accommodating itself to be *imago Dei*. Both cases, the mind’s referencing to itself and the mind’s referencing to God, can be regarded as *imago Dei* because they both can provide a possible noetic condition that allows the mind to pertain to an everlasting condition. As such, the *imago Dei* criteria are anchored in the epistemological dimension.

Mind-Centered Dynamism Construction II: the Mind’s Knowing Itself and the Mind’s Thinking Itself

Although both ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ and ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ could be regarded as *imago Dei*, the latter seems, from Augustine’s point of view, to be a more perfected *imago Dei*. What constitutes the difference between the two? In this section, we will show the epistemological elements that enable Augustine to differentiate between these two situations. It is the mind’s self-knowing (*se nosse*) and the mind’s self-thinking (*se cogitare*) activities that constitute their difference. In employing such a noetic dimension of the mind, Augustine can illustrate the subtle difference between the two cases, and maintain that only ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ is a real *imago Dei*.

Augustine’s Understanding of Se Nosse and Se Cogitare

Augustine’s references to self-knowing (*se nosse*) are always displayed in the context of the God-self relation. They are mainly employed in assuring the mind’s immediate self-presence to itself – an

⁶⁷ Basil Studer, *Augustins De Trinitate: Eine Einführung*, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005), 97.

everlasting state that is analogical to God's permanence.⁶⁸ The notion of self-knowing could be traced back to *Confessiones* X,⁶⁹ where Augustine delves into the question of how the mind knows itself during his reflection of the soul's God-searching journey.⁷⁰ Reflecting upon the profundity of memory during this self-seeking process, he raises the question of self-knowing: the memory proves that the soul is near to itself. Augustine nevertheless cannot understand why the soul cannot grasp the totality of itself.⁷¹ This self-knowing issue causes further investigation of the nature of memory, but the question remains unsolved in *Confessiones*.⁷² When it comes to *De Trinitate*, the issue of self-knowing reemerges and is constructed with more sophisticated arguments.⁷³

⁶⁸ The notion of *se nosse* has been largely discussed by scholars like Edwards Booth, Ludger Hölscher and Johannes Brachtendorf. Booth traces the origin of *se nosse* back to the Aristotelian noetic triad tradition. Hölscher explains that the self-certainty of the mind is established through *se nosse*, to strengthen his argument that the mind is a spiritual substance. Brachtendorf emphasizes the immediacy of *se nosse* to establish that man's knowledge of the Trinity could be a kind of natural knowledge. In spite of a wide variety of interpretations of *se nosse*, the three scholars all point out the basic nature of *se nosse*: it assures the mind's immediate self-presence. Booth, "St. Augustine's 'notitia sui' related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists"; Ludger Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind: Augustine's Philosophical Argument for the Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance*, (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*. For the link *imago, mens, cogitatio, nosse, notitia, ...* see also: Drago Pintaric, *Sprache und Trinität. Semantische Probleme in der Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus*, Salzburger Studien zur Philosophie 15, (Salzburg/München: A Pustet, 1983). Marko J. Fuchs, *Sum and cogito. Grundfiguren endlichen Selbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes*, Augustinus - Werk und Wirkung 1, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010).

⁶⁹ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 168.

⁷⁰ Regarding the self as an enigma to God (I Cor 13:2), Augustine parallels the God-searching process to the soul's self-seeking and asks the question to what extent the soul can seek itself. See *Conf. X*, 7 (Henry Chadwick edition, 182).

⁷¹ *Conf. X*, 15 (Chadwick, 187): "This power of memory is great, very great, my God. It is a vast and infinite profundity. Who has plumbed its bottom? This power is that of my mind and is a natural endowment, but I myself cannot grasp the totality of what I am. Is the mind, then, too restricted to compass itself, so that we have to ask what is that element of itself which it fails to grasp? Surely that cannot be external to itself; it must be within the mind. How then can it fail to grasp it?" "Magna ista uis est memoriae, magna nimis, Deus meus, penetrale amplum et infinitum. Quis ad fundum eius peruenit? Et uis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum. Ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est, ut ubi sit quod sui non capit? Numquid extra ipsum ac non in ipso? Quomodo ergo non capit?" (CCL 27, 162.)

⁷² Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 168.

⁷³ *Se nosse* also appears in *De Genesi ad litteram* VII, 27-28. Augustine uses this notion to argue for the incorporeality of the soul.

Augustine starts the discussion of self-knowing in *De Trinitate* X, so as to affirm the mind's immediate self-presence on one hand, and on the other hand as an attempt to resolve the paradox of love and knowledge:⁷⁴ how can the mind love when it seeks to know itself while it is still unknown to itself.⁷⁵ Throughout book X, Augustine strives to prove that the mind's knowing of itself is an innate everlasting power, that the mind knows itself permanently.⁷⁶ Augustine argues that the mind that seeks to know itself must already know itself. The mind knows itself knowing, and when it seeks knowledge of itself, it already knows itself seeking (Book X, 5).⁷⁷ Also, the mind exists as an incorporeal intelligence, so that the mind's knowledge of itself is knowledge through the whole of itself, of its whole self (Book X, 6).⁷⁸ Furthermore, the knowledge in mind's self-knowing is most immanent. It is different from being told to know an object.⁷⁹ E. Booth points out that the notion of self-knowing in *De Trinitate* X is an advancement to that of *Confessiones* X. Augustine transforms the concern of self-knowledge regarding the totality (*totum*) relating to the passage of time to the wholeness (*tota*) relating to the timeless equality condition,⁸⁰ and reconciles it to the question of totality (*totum*).⁸¹ As

⁷⁴ *Trin.* X, 2 (FC, 292).

⁷⁵ Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 158.

⁷⁶ Hölscher has given a very elaborated and well structured analysis on this. See Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 128-141, 157-161.

⁷⁷ *Trin.* X, 5 (FC, 297-298).

⁷⁸ *Trin.* X, 6 (FC, 299-300).

⁷⁹ *Trin.* X, 10 (FC, 304).

⁸⁰ The difference in the dimension of wholeness is shown in Augustine's emphasis on *tota* instead of *totum* in *Trin.* X, 6 (FC, 299): "But it is absurd to claim that it does not know as a whole (*totam*) what it knows. I do not say that it knows wholly (*totum*), but that what it knows, it knows as a whole (*totam*). When it, therefore, knows something, nor can it know something except as a whole (*tota*). Therefore, it knows itself as a whole (*totam*)."
"Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: totum scit; sed quod scit tota scit. Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. Scit se aliquid scientem, nec potest ququam scire nisi tota. Scit se igitur totam." (CCL 50, 318.)

Booth indicates the distinctive aspects of self-knowledge displayed in *Confessiones* and *De Trinitate*. *Confessiones* concerns the 'all-ness' (*totum*) while *De Trinitate* the 'whole-ness' (*tota*). The former is mainly related to the consciousness of the passage of time, and this kind of self-knowledge is more empirical: a knowledge of one's own qualities, pursued under a moral compulsion. This kind of knowledge has no ending: "nec ipse capio totum quod sum" (*Conf.* X, 5, CCL 27, 162). The latter is more metaphysical, non-empirical and timeless, and it focusses on the equality of the subject and object (mind being subject and object at the same time): "mens et amor et notitia eius ... eum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt" (*Trin.* IX, 4, CCL 50, 297). Booth, "St. Augustine's 'notitia sui' related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists", 190-191.

⁸¹ *Trin.* IX, 7: "When the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself perfectly, its knowledge extends through all of it..." "Mens uero cum se totam nouit, hoc est perfecte nouit, per totum eius est notitia eius;..." (CCL 50, 299.)

such, the argument of self-knowledge can be established to be an eternal condition.

Self-thinking (*se cogitare*) is also a notion raised in *De Trinitate* X. It is regarded as the most explicitly cognitive way for man knowing himself.⁸² As such, as self-knowing is a permanent condition sprung forth from the mind's own nature, self-thinking is the actual condition that the mind knows itself. The former is an everlasting ability, whereas the latter is the real condition to actualize the ability. Self-thinking could be regarded as an explicit form of self-knowing.⁸³ In *De Trinitate* X, although Augustine differentiates self-thinking from self-knowing,⁸⁴ his assent is placed on the latter and self-thinking is used to reinforce the claim that the mind knows itself.⁸⁵

Application of Se Nosse and Se Cogitare to Imago Dei (De Trinitate XIV)

Augustine's employment of self-knowing and self-thinking can be seen in a parallel relationship to the two *imago Dei* triads: 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God'. Firstly, the argument of self-knowing in Book X is important in affirming 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' as *imago Dei* in Book XIV. As the mind is always present to itself, the triad 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' can already pertain to an everlasting state. It does not need to depend on the outside

⁸² Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 133.

⁸³ The understanding of the relationship between self-thinking and self-knowing has parallels with the terms of explicit self-knowledge and implicit self-knowledge. These two terms have been employed by both Hölscher and Brachtendorf in elaborating their understanding of mind's knowing activities. See Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 176-181; Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 167-173. Hölscher applies the two terms in reference to the theory of sub-consciousness (Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 180), whereas Brachtendorf aims to expound the transcendence of the implicit knowledge to establish a natural knowledge of the Trinity (Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 167-173; see also his "...*prius esse cogitare quam credere*": A Natural Understanding of 'Trinity' in St. Augustine?", *Augustinian Studies* 29:2 (1998): 35-45, 44).

⁸⁴ Augustine explains that it is one thing not to know oneself, and another thing not to think oneself. In illustrating the difference, he raises an example that a man who is skilled in many sciences is not ignorant of grammar when, not thinking of it, he thinks about the art of medicine (*Trin.* X, 7; FC, 301).

⁸⁵ Augustine contrasts the act of self-thinking explicitly to three other acts of knowledge. 1) The knowledge on the basis of what we have been taught about them (*Trin.* X, 12); 2) the attempts to grasp the inner being of others (*Trin.* X, 12); 3) the manner we see our own face and eyes. He points out that self-thinking is the most immediate form of knowledge in which the mind itself is grasped. See Hölscher's illustration in *The Reality of the Mind*, 133-142.

world, and does not even follow the perception logic of material things. Therefore, in this way, Augustine fulfills the ontological criteria of *imago Dei* with the noetic foundation of the mind's knowing of itself. Furthermore, the most important support of our claim comes from the correspondence seen in self-thinking and 'remember God – understand God – love God'. In Book XIV, Augustine elaborates self-thinking more deliberately and places it in the context of *imago Dei*. The topic of self-thinking occupies the discussion in Book XIV, 7-10 (and also implicitly in Book XIV, 11-15). Augustine refers to self-thinking as a necessity of the mind's real knowledge, and so only through the act of thinking the mind can come from an inborn state (self-knowledge) to an actual state:

Book XIV, 7: "But so great is the power of thought that not even the mind itself may place itself, so to speak, in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself.⁸⁶"

Book XIV, 13: "And, therefore, when it is turned to itself by thought, then arises a trinity, in which a word, too, can at last be identified, for it is formed from thought itself, and the will which unites both. Here, then, we may recognize more clearly than before the image which we are seeking.⁸⁷"

The differentiation of self-thinking from self-knowing can actually find its correspondence in *imago Dei*'s participation (*particeps Dei*)⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 420). "Nihil enim tam nouit mens quam id quod sibi praesto est, nec menti magis quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi." (CCL 50, 429.)

⁸⁷ *Trin.* XIV, 13 (FC, 431). "Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione conuertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et uerbum possit intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, uoluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus." (CCL 50, 441). The importance of this passage lies in its clear statement that the *imago Dei* is not simply to be found by disclosing the mind's continuous self-knowing structure. Instead, it is found in the mind's active cognition of itself as remembering, understanding and willing. Ayres, "It's not for eatin' – it's for lookin' 'through'", 63. "Das *se cogitare* und das *se nosse* der *mens* unterscheidet Augustinus durch das Kriterium der Zeitlichkeit. Im *se cogitare* greift die *mens* auf ein Selbstwissen zurück das vor dem Akt der *cogitatio* bereits existiert, so daß die *cogitatio* später auftritt als dieses Wissen. Im *se nosse* hingegen sind alle Momente gleichzeitig. Hier gilt, daß die *mens* sich durch die *memoria interior* ihrer immer erinnert, sich durch die *intellegentia interior* immer einsieht und sich durch die *uoluntas interior* immer liebt (*trin.* 14,10), wenn sie sich auch auf der Ebene des *cogitare* nicht immer als verschieden von äußeren Gegenständen denkt (ib. 10,19; 14,9). Alle Inhalte der *mens* verhalten sich wie Ankömmlinge (*aduenticia*), die in die bereits existierende *mens* eintreten, mit Ausnahme des *se nosse*. Dieses bildet den Wesenskern der *mens* und ist daher immer schon da, seitdem *mens* existiert (ib. 14,13). Der Selbstbezug der *mens* im *se nosse* ist stetig, unveränderlich, mit dem Wesen der *mens* unauflöslich verknüpft und somit unverlierbar. Durch die trinitarische Struktur des *se nosse* ist sie jener Spiegel, in dem der dreifaltige Gott gesehen werden kann." Brachtendorf, "Mens", 1277-1278.

⁸⁸ For the dynamic interplay between ontology and epistemology in Augustine's thinking of man's *participatio* in divine *sapientia* (within the framework of Augustine's

and capacity (*capax Dei*),⁸⁹ the two conditions of *imago Dei* that Augustine has mentioned several times in *De Trinitate* XIV (Book XIV, 6; XIV, 11; XIV, 15).⁹⁰ The mind could be regarded as *imago Dei* because its immortality is already implanted by its immortal Creator (XIV, 11). This makes that the mind knows God and can know God. Nevertheless, just because the mind knows God and can know God, the mind's actuality and ability is differentiated. If we need to ascertain the mind as real *imago Dei*, the most important aspect of this concern is its actuality. As such, although the mind's ontological nature could be regarded as *imago Dei* in its ability, we still need to strive to actualise it as the real *imago Dei*. This is not done in the ontological dimension, the mind's ability. The realization only comes when the mind actually knows God, the mind's actuality dimension.

Moreover, the self-thinking process is regarded as a kind of conversion.⁹¹ Augustine employs self-thinking to discuss how man can turn away from his own ignorance to God.⁹² J. Brachtendorf also reminds us that the Delphic Command "Know Thyself" in Book X

christological transformation of this neo-platonic notion, based on the ontological status of man as *imago* and the epistemological link between love and knowledge), see Matthias Smalbrugge, "La notion de la participation chez Augustin. Quelques observations sur le rapport christianisme-platonisme", *Augustiniana* 40 (1990): 333-347. See also: Herman Somers, "L'image comme sagesse. La genèse de la notion trinitaire de la sagesse", *Recherches augustiniennes* 2 (1962): 403-414.

⁸⁹ Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate*, 235; Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 214-217. See also: Emanuel Bermon, "Analyse du "De Trinitate" de saint Augustin", M. Caron (ed.), *Saint Augustin, Les cahiers de l'histoire de la philosophie*, (Paris: Cerf, 2009), 53-76, 75-76.

⁹⁰ *Trin.* XIV, 6 (FC, 419): "... but that image of the Creator, that has been implanted immortally in its own immortality, must be found in the soul of man, that is, in the reasonable or intellectual soul." "... sed ea est inuenienda in anima hominis, id est rationali siue intellectuali, imago creatoris quae immortaliter immortalitati eius est insita." (CCL 50, 428). *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 426): "We begin to consider the principal part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find therein an image of God. ... For it is His image by the very fact that it is capable of Him, and can be a partaker of Him." "Nunc uero ad eam iam peruenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo nouit Deum uel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiamus imaginem Dei. ... Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest,..." (CCL 50, 435-436). *Trin.* XIV, 15 (FC, 432): "Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made." "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est." (CCL 50, 442-443.)

⁹¹ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 419).

⁹² *Trin.* XIV, 6 (FC, 419).

is not only a theoretical cognitive formula.⁹³ It is also a command with moral dimensions that demands the mind to move away from its ignorant situation to a more blessed stage.⁹⁴ As such, self-thinking is analogical to the purification process *imago Dei* undertakes when it goes from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

A conceptual analysis of self-knowing (*se nosse*) and self-thinking (*se cogitare*) leads us to see that our concern in seeking an everlasting situation can only be realized in self-thinking but not in self-knowing. For this reason, 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', as parallel to the self-knowing condition, is not enough to be *imago Dei*. We can also see why the faith-triad cannot be a candidate to be *imago Dei*, even though it somehow fits into the 'remember – knowledge – love' framework, as the faith-triad can only work at the thinking level, a mutable state. Although we can recall each time the faith event in our memory, the triad formed each time is different.⁹⁵ Therefore, on the thinking level, the mind cannot come to an everlasting situation through 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', because the mind is always attracted by the sensible world, so that it "begins to experience pleasure through the senses of the body, a pleasure that is so much the greater the more unfamiliar it is."⁹⁶ The example of the squint-eyed infant in Book XIV, 7 is good evidence of the mind's vulnerability to lose its way.⁹⁷ Therefore, the mind needs to contemplate

⁹³ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 173.

⁹⁴ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 173.

⁹⁵ This is what Augustine has tried to explain in *Trin.* XIV, 4-6 (FC, 414-7), esp. *Trin.* XIV, 6 (FC, 417): "Therefore, neither will the latter trinity, which is not now, be the image of God, nor is the former trinity the image of God, which then will not be..." "Nec illa igitur trinitas quae nunc non est imago Dei erit, nec ista imago Dei est quae tunc non erit, ..." (CCL 50, 427-428). See: Matthias Smalbrugge, *La nature trinitaire de l'intelligence augustinienne de la foi*, ASTh 7, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988).

⁹⁶ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 419). "The mind exhibits best its nature as image when it remembers, understands and loves itself appropriately – without being consumed by desire for created objects – and both towards and in its Creator. Augustine's language here is strong: the mind that 'cleaves' to God shares in the divine nature and sees all that it sees in that unchangeable nature. The mind is perfected as *imago Dei* not merely when the object of desire is God, but when it acts as mind is towards, from and in the divine." Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 307.

⁹⁷ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 419): "Thus, if one, less cautious or unaware of what might happen, places a light at night where an infant is lying down, and at such an angle that from its prostrate position it can turn its eyes to it without being able to turn its neck, the gaze of that infant is not withdrawn from it, so that we know of some who have even become squint-eyed as a result, since their eyes, while still tender and soft,

something that is totally good, and also through such contemplation it is able to return to the real self-thinking state, that is, 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

In this sense, through the noetic difference between mind's knowing and mind's thinking, Augustine successfully ascertains the importance of God's role, and also the reality of the mind's sinful tendency. The shift from self to God does not involve a total deserting of the self, but it is the shift from mind's potential knowledge of the self to its active knowledge (thinking) of God. It can only be obtained when it has a perfected self-awareness, that is, a perfected self. Therefore, the epistemological dimension helps to entwine the self and God together, without dismissing their ontological difference.⁹⁸

Significance of the Mind-Centered Approach in *Imago Dei*'s Dynamism

An Epistemological Way to Bridge the Ontological Otherness

The mind-centered approach in interpreting Augustine's dynamic *imago Dei* in *De Trinitate* XIV is significant in bridging the ontological otherness between self and God. The mind-centered approach brings the epistemological dimension to the foreground. The

retained that form which habit had in some way impressed upon them." "... ut si quisquam minus cautus aut nesciens quid inde possit accidere nocturnum lumen posuerit ubi iacet infans, in ea parte ad quam iacentis oculi possint retorqueri nec ceruix possit inflecti, sic eius inde non remouetur aspectus ut nonnullos ex hoc etiam strabones fieri nouerimus eam formam tenentibus oculis quam teneris et mollibus consuetudo quodam modo infixit." (CCL 50, 427-430.)

⁹⁸ "Im Sich-gegenwärtig-Sein, im Sich-Einsehen und Sich-Lieben ist der Geist Gottes Bild. Hier findet er, anders als im Glauben, nicht etwas außerhalb seiner selbst, sondern in sich findet er sich ohne zeitlichen Verlauf. Die Weisheit des Geistes liegt aber, wie bereits gesehen, nicht schon darin, sich seiner selbst zu erinnern, sich einzusehen und zu lieben, sondern in der Fähigkeit, zugleich denjenigen zu erinnern, einzusehen und zu lieben, von dem er geschaffen ist. Wenn der Geist dies nicht tut, bleibt er zwar Bild Gottes, ist aber nicht weise. Nicht durch sein eigenes Licht, sondern durch Teilhabe an Gottes Licht wird der Geist weise. Nur dann ist die Weisheit des Menschen zugleich diejenige Gottes, der im Gegensatz zum Menschen die Weisheit ist und nicht an ihr nur teilhat. Wer in dem Geist, mit dem er Bild Gottes ist, Gott "dem Herrn anhängt", der allein noch über ihm steht, der "ist ein Geist mit ihm" (1 Kor 6, 17). Diese Hinwendung des Geistes zu Gott geht nicht vom Menschen selbst aus, sondern ist letztlich der Gnade zu verdanken. Sich selbst kann der Geist zwar deformieren, aber nicht reformieren. Vollendet wird die Erneuerung dereinst in der Schau Gottes von Angesicht zu Angesicht. In ihr findet die *contemplativa sapientia* des menschlichen Geistes ihre Vollendung." Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 527-528.

God-man relation is no longer an ontological issue, but a relation secured through both ontology and epistemology. The ontological gap becomes solvable through the epistemological level. On one hand, the ontological difference between Creator and creature can be upheld because the epistemological change in the dynamic *imago Dei* does not imply an ontological alignment of man to God at all. On the other hand, an ongoing God-man relation can also be upheld as their ontological otherness has been bridged through the noetic activities of the mind. Through self-knowing and self-thinking, Augustine successfully connects the mind's actual mutable state (self-thinking) to its possible immutable capacity (self-knowing). The ontological concern – mutability or immutability – has been transformed into an epistemological issue. 'Remember self – understand self – love self' can then be aligned to 'remember God – understand God – love God' not through an ontological clash, but via the noetic turn of the mind, from mind's potential knowledge to active thinking. The immutable state of 'remember God – understand God – love God' becomes reachable. Firstly, although the state of 'remember God – understand God – love God' is difficult to achieve, the possibility is always present because the mind's self-knowing has already proved its capability to immutability. Secondly, the active thinking of God is achievable because it shares close affinity to the mind's inherent self-knowing ability. The active thinking of God implies growth of the self. In this way, the gap between self and God, while upheld ontologically, is bridged epistemologically.

Imago Dei: An Example of an Entwinement in Theology and Philosophy

Augustine's thought has been interpreted as existing in two vastly different and incompatible realms – theology and philosophy. These two dimensions are regarded to oscillate from one extreme to the other among Augustine's different works, and it is difficult to find a balanced angle of interpretation. The case of *De Trinitate* is even more obvious. This work has been widely read among scholars either with a philosophical spectacle, or through a theological Christian dimension. Endeavors to fill the huge gap between the philosophical and theological interpretations have been recently attempted, for example in Kany's *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*⁹⁹ and Brachtendorf's *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*.¹⁰⁰ In spite of

⁹⁹ Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*.

¹⁰⁰ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*.

their meticulous research and invaluable insights, their interpretations are still criticized as over-emphasizing one dimension at the cost of the other,¹⁰¹ and the problem of division between philosophical and theological aspects is still unresolved.¹⁰²

The present article may serve as providing an example that Augustine's theological and philosophical thoughts can find a balanced entwinement. A mind-centered dynamic *imago Dei* is a vivid demonstration that Augustine combines theology with philosophy in constructing his theology. While *imago Dei* can be regarded as a highly Christian element, the epistemological dimensions of *se nosse* and *se cogitare* are widely recognized as philosophical concepts. In spite of their incompatible tendencies, Augustine places them in an interdependent position. On one hand, the growth of *imago Dei* is a Christian spiritual formation that we should renew day by day, but this spiritual exercise should be understood in a highly philosophical con-

¹⁰¹ Brachtendorf has been criticized by Kany that too much emphasis is put on constructing the theories of self-reference in *De Trinitate* IX-X, and theological interpretations have in turn been neglected (Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 147). Kany has been criticized by Maarten Wisse that the philosophical aspects are emphasized at the cost of the theological aspects, especially on his reading of the second half of *De Trinitate* (Maarten Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology Beyond Participation: Augustine's De Trinitate and Contemporary Theology*, T&T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology 11, (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2011).

¹⁰² Peter Burnell advocates that Augustine understands humanity, human nature and person, human society essentially as a unity. Burnell indicates the interplay between theology and anthropology in Augustine's thinking. On the one hand, his theology is anthropological, because of the centrality of the *imago Dei* and the incarnation in Augustine's reflections. Augustine finds unity, his primary concern, in the human individual, anthropology, ethics, sociology, eschatology, theology through his thinking on the human being as created according to the divine image and God becoming man in Christ. On the other hand, his anthropology can be labelled as theological because he develops his anthropology departing from his theological positioning, e.g. the theological controversy with the pelagians led Augustine to the conviction that the human condition is determined by the relation between man and God. Burnell finds this anthropological unity of person and nature confirmed in *De Trinitate*. *De Trinitate* asserts that there is a unity in a person's mind. Knowledge, will, love, memory are not distinct substances. They act together, imply each other, form a whole and as such function as a single mind. The faculties do not operate separately, autonomously, but constitute one single mind (pp. 54-70). The human image of God in man goes beyond the mere human nature. In the human person is the image of the triune divine Persons. Deification is the uniting – by being graciously extricated from sin – of human nature with God's as the fulfilment of each individual *imago Dei*. Mankind participates in the life of the Trinity through Christ's experience of the human suffering – His incarnate compassion. Human suffering, in the personal sense, is inherent in the divine original because Christ's compassion is God. Divine image, incarnation, unity come together (pp. 173-193). Peter Burnell, *The Augustinian Person*, (Washington (D.C.): Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

text, the transition from the mind's self-knowing to self-thinking.¹⁰³ On the other hand, 'remember – understand – love' is a noetic logic originating from ancient Greek philosophy, but this epistemological means cannot be employed without the role of faith. The 'remember – understand – love' logic is anchored in the paradigm of *scientia* approaching *sapientia*, so that Augustine's epistemological philosophy is framed by his Trinitarian faith. As such, we can see through a mind-centered dynamism of *imago Dei*, that Augustine entwines epistemology with ontology, and also theology with philosophy.

Conclusion

In this article, we have thoroughly investigated the dynamism of *imago Dei* in Book XIV, and have put forward the thesis that the dynamism should be interpreted from the mind-centered approach as a dynamic in epistemological sense.

The investigation centered on the shift from the mind's 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. While many scholars employ ontological interpretations, we propose that we should be aware of the neglected epistemological dimension in triggering the shift. 'Remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God' are noetic conditions of the mind. Moreover, the noetic trend is further supported by two aspects. First, the 'remember – understand – love' is a logic (rather than an ontological change) that the mind applies to itself and God. It is more a framework for *imago Dei* than an ontological structure. Second, the mind's self-knowing and self-thinking is an important theme in illustrating the difference between 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God'. In this way, the indicated dynamism of *imago Dei* is an entwinement of ontology and epistemology. Such a form of dynamism – the mind-centered dynamism – is important to Augustine in establishing his understanding of the God-man relation. It combines ontology with epistemology. The ontological difference between self and God can be resolved in an epistemological way. Self and God find a new point of union in the mind's epistemological dynamic growth in *imago Dei*. More than that, the mind-centered approach in *imago Dei*'s dynamism can also serve as an example of an entwinement

¹⁰³ The self-reference (Selbstbezüglichkeit) is regarded by many as the philosophical aspect of *De Trinitate*. See Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 233.

between philosophy and theology. The Christian element *imago Dei* is interpreted through the philosophical self-knowing and self-thinking, while the philosophical 'remember – understand – love' logic is submitted to the Trinitarian faith framework.

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Abstract

This article provides a historical and doctrinal introduction to the translation of James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet* I, question 17, on whether or not the pope has the right to absolve heretics. The article argues that the principal interest of the *Quodlibet* lies in the philosophical justification it provides for the pope's supremacy in temporal matters. It also examines the relation between the *Quodlibet* and the later *De regimine Christiano* and points to a slight shift in James' position towards greater moderation.

Key words

James of Viterbo, *Quodlibet* I 17; *De regimine Christiano*; pope's supremacy

Dans l'excellente introduction de sa récente édition et traduction du *De regimine Christiano* de Jacques de Viterbe, l'historien anglais R. W. Dyson écrit que le *De regimine* « is James's only genuine into political analysis ».¹ Or, s'il est vrai que Jacques de Viterbe n'a consacré qu'une seule œuvre d'envergure à la politique – contrairement à Gilles de Rome, par exemple, son maître dans l'ordre des augustins, auteur de deux ouvrages importants et volumineux sur le thème² –, il est inexact, en revanche, qu'il n'ait écrit strictement rien d'autre sur la question. Il traite, en effet, assez longuement des rapports entre les pouvoirs spirituel et temporel dans le *Quodlibet* I, question 17 : « Utrum papa possit absolvere aliquem usurarium, absque hoc quod usuras restituat », tenu en 1293, soit un peu moins de dix ans avant la rédaction du *De regimine*.³ Ignoré par

¹ Dans *James of Viterbo, De Regimine Christiano. A Critical Edition and Translation*, éd. R. W. Dyson, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2009 (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 174; Brill's Texts and Sources in Intellectual History, vol. 6, p. 1).

² Il s'agit, on le sait, du *De regimine principum* (titre complet : *De regimine principum libri III ad francorum regem Philippum III*) d'Augustinus Patibetko, quibus utiturque de moribus philosophiam continetur, Rome, Apud A. Blotius, 1587, et du *De ecclesiastica potestate*, édition critique et traduction anglaise par R. W. Dyson, Gilles of Rome's *On Ecclesiastical Power: A Medieval Theory of World Governance. A Critical Edition and Translation*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004.

³ La question est éditée dans Jacques de Viterbe, *Dispositio Brevis de Quodlibet*, éd. E. Ypma OSA, Augustinus Verlag, Würzburg, 1962 (A. Ypma, *Quodlibet I, Dispositio Brevis de Quodlibet*, I, 1, Cassiciarum, Suppl. Band II, p. 207-214).

LE *QUODLIBET* I, QUESTION 17 DE JACQUES DE VITERBE: INTRODUCTION, TRADUCTION ET NOTES

Antoine Côté

Abstract

This article provides a historical and doctrinal introduction to, and annotated translation of, James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet* I, 17, in which James asks whether or not the pope has the right to absolve usurers. The article argues that the principal interest of the *Quodlibet* lies in the philosophical justification it provides for the pope's supremacy in temporal matters. It also examines the relation between the *Quodlibet* and the later *De regimine Christiano* and points to a slight shift in James' position towards greater moderation.

Key words

James of Viterbo, *Quodlibet* I 17; *De regimine Christiano*; pope's supremacy

Dans l'excellente introduction de sa récente édition et traduction du *De regimine Christiano* de Jacques de Viterbe, l'historien anglais R. W. Dyson écrit que le *De regimine* « is James's only venture into political analysis ».¹ Or, s'il est vrai que Jacques de Viterbe n'a consacré qu'une seule œuvre d'envergure à la politique – contrairement à Gilles de Rome, par exemple, son maître dans l'ordre des augustins, auteur de deux ouvrages importants et volumineux sur le thème² –, il est inexact, en revanche, qu'il n'ait écrit strictement rien d'autre sur la question. Il traite, en effet, assez longuement des rapports entre les pouvoirs spirituel et temporel dans le *Quodlibet* I, question 17 « *Utrum papa possit absolvere aliquem usurarium, absque hoc quod usuras restituat* », tenu en 1293, soit un peu moins de dix ans avant la rédaction du *De regimine*.³ Ignoré par

¹ Dans *James of Viterbo, De Regimine Christiano. A Critical Edition and Translation*, ed. R. W. Dyson, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2009 (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 174; Brill's Texts and Sources in Intellectual History, vol. 6), p. xvi.

² Il s'agit, on le sait, du *De regimine principum* (titre complet: *De regimine principum libri III ad francorum regem Philippum IIII cognomento Pulchrum, quibus universa de moribus philosophiae continetur*, Romae, Apud A. Bladum, 1556), et du *De ecclesiastica potestate*, édition critique et traduction anglaise par R. W. Dyson, *Giles of Rome's On Ecclesiastical Power: A Medieval Theory of World Government: A Critical Edition and Translation*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004.

³ La question est éditée dans Jacques de Viterbe, *Disputatio Prima de Quolibet*, ed. E. Ypma OSA, Augustinus-Verlag, Würzburg, 1968 (*Corpus Scriptorum Augustinianorum*, I, 1, Cassiciacum, Suppl. Band I), p. 207-215. La traduction que l'on

la plupart des historiens de la pensée politique médiévale⁴ et par les deux traducteurs du *De regimine*,⁵ ce *Quodlibet* est pourtant loin d'être dépourvu d'intérêt. Jacques y développe une conception des rapports entre pouvoirs spirituel et temporel largement favorable à la cause pontificale, fondée sur une impressionnante érudition juridique et théologique, mais qu'il justifie, de manière originale, par un recours à un argument métaphysique, qui anticipe nettement sur les conclusions du *De regimine*. Ce sont les traits saillants de cette conception que nous aimerions mettre en évidence dans les lignes qui suivent. Pour ce faire, nous nous proposons tout d'abord (1) d'évoquer brièvement le contexte dans lequel Jacques inscrit sa réflexion – contexte qui ne relève en rien, a priori, de la politique – pour décrire ensuite (2) pas-à-pas sa démarche dans le *Quodlibet*, avant (3) de relever les points de recoupements et de divergence les plus remarquables avec la doctrine du *De regimine*, et d'évoquer, enfin (4), la question de sa postérité dans la pensée politique du Moyen Âge. La traduction de la question est donnée en appendice.

trouvera à la fin du présent article a été réalisée à partir de cette édition. Pour la datation du premier *Quodlibet* de Jacques de Viterbe, voir J. F. Wippel, « The Dating of James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet* I and Godfrey of Fontaines' *Quodlibet* VIII », *Augustiniana*, 24 (1974), p. 348-386. Signalons également la question « Utrum melius sit regi ab optimo (viro) quam ab optimis legibus », *Quod.* IV, q. 30, ed. Ypma, p. 107-110. Notons que Jacques de Viterbe n'est pas le seul, dans la littérature quodlibétique, à avoir consacré une question portant sur le pouvoir du pape de suspendre l'obligation de restitution. On trouve dans le *Quodlibet* IV, 11 du Carme catalan Guy Terrena une question dont l'intitulé est presque identique à celui du Viterbien: « Utrum Papa posset usurarium absolvere absque restitutione ». Ce petit *Quodlibet* a été tenu en 1316, soit plus de vingt ans après le *Quod.* I, 17 de Jacques, dans un contexte doctrinal évidemment différent. Sur la datation des *Quodlibets* de Guy, voir Ch. Schabel, « Carmelite *Quodlibeta* », dans *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, ed. Ch. Schabel, Leiden, Brill, 2007 (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 7), p. 518-519. Cf. sur la pensée et l'œuvre de Gui Terrena, Fr. B. M. Xiberta, O. carm., « De Mag. Guidone Terreni, Priore Generali ordinis Nostris, Episcopo Maioricensi et Elnensi », *Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum*, Annus XIV – volumen V (1924), 113-206. Pour la pensée politique de Gui de Terrena, on se reportera à l'ouvrage classique de B. Tierney, *The Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350*, Leiden, Brill, 1972, p. 238-72.

⁴ Avec la seule exception de M. Kempshall, dont on consultera avec le plus grand profit l'excellent ouvrage *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1999 [abrégé désormais *The Common Good*], et qui examine d'assez près le *Quod.* I, 17. Voir aussi les quelques remarques de R. Lambertini, « Political *Quodlibeta* », dans *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Ch. Schabel, Leiden, Brill, 2006 (Brill's Companion to the Christian Tradition, vol. 1), p. 450.

⁵ Nulle mention dans la traduction italienne. Cf. *Il governo della chiesa (De regimine christiano)*, a cura di Aurelio Rizzacasa e Giovanni Battista M. Marcoaldi, Firenze, Nardini Editore, 1993 (Biblioteca Medievale).

1. Le contexte

Jacques Le Goff a employé le mot de « schizophrénie » pour décrire l'attitude des médiévaux vis-à-vis de l'usure.⁶ D'une part, en effet, l'usure, entendue au sens d'un prélèvement d'intérêt, si minime soit-il, sur un prêt d'argent, fait l'objet au XIII^e siècle d'une réprobation quasi-unanime : prohibée par l'Église, qui la considère comme un péché assimilable au vol, condamnée par les théologiens et les canonistes,⁷ flétrie par les prédicateurs et confesseurs, elle inspire la répulsion du petit peuple qui a le plus à souffrir des taux parfois exorbitants pratiqués par les prêteurs sur gages. En même temps, le prêt d'argent à intérêt est généralisé,⁸ au point que les « usuriers » ont pu apparaître à certains comme les véritables « initiateurs du capitalisme ».⁹ Même les censeurs les plus fermes parmi les scolastiques s'accordent à reconnaître la nécessité du prêt à intérêt dans des cas spécifiques.¹⁰ Et s'il est vrai que la législation ecclésiastique prévoyait de lourdes sanctions contre les usuriers, aucune sanction pénale n'est réservée à leur endroit par les pouvoirs royaux,¹¹ signe que leur activité était tolérée, voire « cultivée ».¹² Qui plus est, comme l'ont souligné les historiens, les textes conciliaires semblent viser à réprimer avant tout les taux d'intérêt excessifs. C'est le cas du troisième concile du Latran (1179) qui vise les usuriers

⁶ J. Le Goff, *La bourse et la vie. Économie et religion au Moyen Âge* [abrégé désormais *La bourse et la vie*], Paris, Hachette, 1986 (Pluriel), p. 64.

⁷ Voir, par exemple Hostiensis, *Summa aurea*, 5, De usuris, no. 10 ainsi que T. P. McLaughlin, « The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII and XIV c.) », *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940), p. 1-12, cité par R. H. Helmoltz, « Usury and the Medieval English Church Courts », *Speculum* 61 (1986), p. 365. Voir aussi K. Weinzierl, *Die Restitutionslehre der Frühscholastik* [abrégé désormais *Die Restitutionslehre*], München, Max Hueber Verlag, 1956, p. 85.

⁸ Voir D. Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 (Cambridge Medieval Textbooks), p. 167.

⁹ J. Le Goff, *La bourse et la vie* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 6], p. 119, qui reprend cette hypothèse à B. N. Nelson, « The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Businessmen and the Ecclesiastical Law of Restitution 1100-1500 », *Journal of Economic Thought*, supplément 7 (1947), p. 121.

¹⁰ C'est le cas de Thomas d'Aquin. Voir, par exemple, la *Somme de théologie*, II^aII^{ae}, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3.

¹¹ Pour la France, voir B. Schnapper, « La répression de l'usure et l'évolution économique », *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 37 (1969), p. 53-57; pour l'Angleterre, Helmoltz, « Usury and the Medieval English Church Courts » [article cité *supra*, n. 7], p. 369. Voir aussi les remarques de B. Nelson, « The Usurer and the Merchant » [article cité *supra*, n. 9], p. 112.

¹² B. Schnapper, « La répression de l'usure et l'évolution économique » [article cité *supra*, n. 11], p. 56.

« manifestes », ¹³ peut-être les prêteurs sur gage exerçant au vu et au su de tous leur activité dans des quartiers dédiés, et du quatrième (1215) qui épinglent les usures « graves et immoderatas », laissant libres les banquiers, marchands et autres prêteurs de haute volée brassant des sommes d'argent autrement importantes, pourvu qu'ils ne revendiquassent pas publiquement leur qualité d'usuriers. ¹⁴

Les peines prévues par l'Église dans les cas d'usures avérées comprenaient l'excommunication, le refus de la sépulture chrétienne et l'*obligation de restitution* des sommes usuraires perçues. Le principe selon lequel un bien mal acquis, que ce fût ou non par voie usuraire, devait être restitué à son propriétaire légitime était admis de tous les juristes, tant romanistes que canonistes et bénéficiait d'appuis solides et nombreux dans l'Écriture, chez les Pères de l'Église de même que dans le droit romain. ¹⁵ Pourtant, si le principe était admis,

¹³ Voir Nelson, « The Usurer and the Merchant » [article cité *supra*, n. 9], p. 108, pour le sens de cette expression.

¹⁴ Ainsi que l'écrivit R. de Roover, « Les censures canoniques contre l'usure n'atteignaient donc pas les grands banquiers comme les Médicis ou les Fugger, mais s'abattaient de tout leur poids sur les prêteurs sur gages, souvent des Juifs ou des Lombards d'Asti ou de Chieri en Piémont, qui avançaient de petites sommes à de petites gens ». R. de Roover, *La pensée économique des scolastiques. Doctrines et méthodes*, Montréal, Institut d'études médiévales, 1971 (Conférence Albert-le-Grand, 1970), p. 85. Cf. B. N. Nelson, « The Usurer and the Merchant Prince » [article cité *supra*, n. 9], p. 108.

¹⁵ Cf. à propos de la restitution et du droit romain, K. Weinzierl, *Die Restitutionstheorie* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 7], *passim*. Notons que Jacques de Viterbe s'est intéressé à la restitution au *Quod*. II, q. 21: « Utrum praescribens rem aliquam teneatur in foro conscientiae illam restituere », mais dans un tout autre contexte: celui de la « prescription acquisitive ». C'est un sujet qui a également intéressé Thomas d'Aquin, dont le *Quodlibet* XII, q. 16 est intitulé « Quaerebatur utrum ille qui mala fide praescripsit teneatur ad restitutionem ». Cf. (M. Cuyás, S. J., *La buena fe en la prescripción extintiva*, Romae, Apud aedes Universitatis Gregoriana, 1962 (Analecta Gregoriana, 122. Series Facultatis Iuris Canonici: section B, n. 10); ainsi que Urbano Navarrete, *La buena fe de las personas jurídicas en orden a la prescripción adquisitiva: estudio historico-canónico*, Romae, Apud aedes Universitatis Gregoriana, 1959 (Analecta Gregoriana, 122. Series Facultatis Iuris Canonici: section B, n. 7). Rappelons qu'en droit médiéval, est dit « prescrire » un bien immeuble celui qui devient le propriétaire de droit de ce bien après en avoir été le propriétaire de fait, par suite de la négligence du propriétaire initial à faire valoir son droit (Voir O. Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools*, Leiden, Brill, 1992 [Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters; Bd. 29], p. 551). Dans sa réponse, assez détaillée, le Viterbien est amené à aborder nombre de questions intéressantes que nous ne pouvons malheureusement que mentionner ici: le problème de la légitimité des lois positives; le droit de propriété; les rapports entre droit et morale. La réponse de notre auteur est que, de manière générale, le prescripteur n'est pas tenu dans le for de sa conscience de restituer le bien prescrit, mais qu'il peut être tenu de le faire dans certaines circonstances

son application pouvait s'avérer délicate, suivant les circonstances exactes du délit, de l'identité des personnes impliquées, etc..¹⁶ Ainsi, à qui restituer les usures d'un usurier notoire lorsque l'identité des personnes lésées était inconnue? L'obligation de restitution s'appliquait-elle également au principal? Et aux biens acquis par l'usurier grâce aux fruits de ses usures? L'obligation de restitution cessait-elle avec la mort du coupable ou était-elle transférable à ses héritiers? De telles interrogations ont nourri une abondante littérature d'études de cas, tant chez les juristes que chez les théologiens.¹⁷ Outre notre question 17, Jacques a d'ailleurs lui-même consacré une autre brève discussion au problème de la restitution dans le contexte de l'usure, la question I, 20: « Utrum procuratores vel ministri usurariorum tenentur ad restitutionem ».¹⁸

Si l'obligation de restitution bénéficie de cautions aussi nombreuses et prestigieuses, comment concevoir que quiconque ait le droit de s'y soustraire? S'agissant du pape, la question comportait cependant un intérêt théorique évident: elle pouvait conduire à mieux mesurer l'étendue de son pouvoir, à mieux en affirmer le caractère absolu, le cas échéant à en marquer les limites. Mais la question n'avait pas qu'un intérêt purement théorique. Il est possible, comme l'a supposé Kempshall,¹⁹ qu'elle ait été suscitée par des événements d'actualité — et on sait que c'est dans le cadre de disputes quodlibétiques que les interrogations à caractère pratique étaient soulevées dans le milieu universitaire²⁰ —, notamment le problème du financement de la Croisade.

précises. Jacques en discerne quatre: 1) si le propriétaire initial ignore que le bien lui appartient; 2) en cas de scrupule de conscience chez celui qui prescrit; 3) par volonté de faire œuvre parfaite—mais Jacques admet qu'il s'agit d'un acte surérogatoire; 4) en cas de doute.

¹⁶ Voir D. Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 8], p. 166-171.

¹⁷ On en trouvera un échantillon sur le site www.quodlibase.cheff.fr, base de données de *Quodlibets* théologiques de 1230 à 1350.

¹⁸ On peut résumer ainsi la solution du Viterbien dans cette question. Le serviteur d'un usurier est tenu à restitution s'il tire un gain des activités illicites de son maître. Cette obligation tombe a) s'il n'est pas rémunéré à même les usures ou b) s'il assiste son maître dans des activités licites. Travailler pour le compte d'un prêteur dont la qualité d'usurier est notoire reste néanmoins un péché, même en l'absence d'une obligation de restitution.

¹⁹ Voir M. S. Kempshall, *The Common Good* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 4], p. 250. Voir aussi les remarques dans le même sens de R. Lambertini, « Political Quodlibeta », *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Ch. Schabel, Leiden, Brill, 2007 (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 7), p. 446, en liaison avec un *Quodlibet* d'Henri de Gand.

²⁰ Voir J. F. Wippel, « Quodlibetal Questions chiefly in Theology Faculties », dans B. C. Bazán, J. F. Wippel, G. Fransen, D. Jacquart, *Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, Turnhout, Brepols, 1985 (Typologie des sources du Moyen Age occidental), p. 222,

Rappelons qu'en 1268, Clément IV avait autorisé le roi du Portugal, Alphonse, à convertir en subsides pour la Terre Sainte pendant une période de trois ans les legs *in pios usus indistincte relictas*, c'est-à-dire les legs destinés aux œuvres pieuses mais sans mention explicite des bénéficiaires.²¹ Il l'avait également autorisé à convertir au même usage et toujours pendant une période de trois ans tous les biens acquis « par voie d'usure, de rapines ou de quelque façon illégitime que ce soit » en son royaume.²² Comme il n'est pas indiqué si ce droit concernait les usures « certaines » ou « incertaines », c'est-à-dire celles dont l'identité des victimes était connue ou non, on peut supposer qu'il s'étendait à toutes les usures, ce qui implique que la papauté s'estimait autorisée à suspendre l'obligation de restitution dans certains cas. Mais en vertu de quel droit? Au nom de quels principes?

2. Les deux pouvoirs dans le *Quodlibet I*, question 17

C'est à de telles interrogations que Jacques de Viterbe va apporter une réponse en se livrant à un examen serré du problème de l'étendue de la *jurisdiction* du souverain romain. Il va le faire en s'appuyant sur une remarquable érudition juridique, mais animé d'une réelle sensibilité de théologien-philosophe. Sa réponse se divise en trois parties: la première et la plus longue cherche à mesurer l'étendue du pouvoir du pape dans les affaires temporelles; la deuxième, beaucoup plus brève, à préciser l'étendue du droit des souverains vis-à-vis du patrimoine de leurs sujets; la troisième, enfin, apporte la réponse à la question initiale. Examinons chaque partie tour à tour.

Concernant la première question – l'étendue du pouvoir du pape dans les affaires temporelles –, Jacques distingue deux positions principales. La première est la position « dualiste », qu'il récuse et qu'il

et J. Hamesse, « Theological Quaestiones quodlibetales », *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Ch. Schabel, Leiden, Brill, 2006 (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 6), p. 46.

²¹ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, inde ab anno post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad annum MCCCIV*, 2 vols., ed. A. Potthast, vol. 1, Berolini, prostat in Aedibus Rudolphi de Decker, 1874-1875, vol. 2, # 20,425.

²² « Eisdem committit, ut a quibuslibet personis regni Portugalliae bona, quae acquisiverunt per usurariam pravitatem, rapinas aliosque modos illicitos usque ad triennium recipere valeant convertenda in subsidium Terrae sanctae », *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* [voir note précédente], # 20,427. Voir, J. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, p. 186, cité par Kempshall, *The Common Good* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 4], p. 250.

va plus loin réfuter: elle pose que le pape est souverain au spirituel, mais non au temporel; la deuxième, qu'on peut qualifier de « hiéocratique », et dont il annonce aussitôt qu'elle « lui paraît plus raisonnable » (§12), postule que le pape possède les deux pouvoirs, à l'instar du Christ, qui est à la fois roi et prêtre. L'originalité de la démarche de notre auteur tient aux raisons qu'il fait valoir en faveur de cette thèse. Car si l'ordre spirituel l'emporte sur le temporel, ce n'est pas simplement sous l'angle de la dignité (*dignitas*), comme il est banal de l'affirmer avec les canonistes,²³ mais aussi du point de vue de la *causalité*, terme qui nous transporte sur le terrain de la métaphysique. La thèse du Viterbien, qu'on peut reconstituer à partir des indications fournies dans les §§12, 20 et 32, est inspirée de la métaphysique néoplatonicienne de la causalité, et plus particulièrement de celle du pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite.²⁴ Elle énonce que lorsque deux causes coordonnées sont telles que l'une est plus parfaite que l'autre, la cause supérieure possède à un degré éminent tout le pouvoir causal de la cause inférieure. Tel serait justement le cas ici: le pouvoir spirituel est une cause plus parfaite que le temporel. Il s'ensuit que le pape, souverain au spirituel, possède aussi le pouvoir temporel et peut, en principe, intervenir dans l'ordre temporel sans qu'on puisse lui faire reproche d'usurper le pouvoir du prince séculier. Encore faut-il montrer que le spirituel est effectivement une cause plus parfaite que le temporel. Deux preuves sont avancées à cet effet. Tout d'abord, une preuve par l'ordre des choses (§13): assimilant, de façon classique,²⁵ le spirituel au principe animateur des êtres vivants et le temporel à leur principe corporel, Jacques fait observer que c'est toujours ce principe animateur qui régit le corporel – il pense en ce cas aux êtres animés – et il en conclut que le spirituel – au sens juridictionnel, cette fois – régit le temporel. Ensuite, deuxième preuve, par l'ordre des fins (§15): c'est toujours à l'art qui porte sur les fins ultimes qu'il appartient de commander aux autres arts. Or la fin visée par le spirituel est la béatitude, la fin des fins en quelque sorte. C'est donc à cet art qu'il importe de commander aux autres, c'est-à-dire à ceux qui président aux fins de la cité.

Notre auteur tire deux conséquences de ces considérations. La première concerne la légitimité des lois dans la cité: puisque le spirituel est supérieur au temporel et qu'il appartient au supérieur de commander

²³ Cf. W. Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism*, Westport, Conn. Hyperion Press, 1979, p. 85.

²⁴ Jacques cite nommément le pseudo-Denys au §12; voir *infra* la note 68.

²⁵ Voir Thomas d'Aquin, *S. Th.*, II^aII^{ae}, q. 60, a. 6, ad 3. Cf., pour un commentaire, Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 23], p. 81-82.

à l'inférieur, Jacques croit pouvoir en déduire que les lois temporelles sont nulles et non avenues si elles ne sont pas « approuvées » par le pape (§17). La seconde conséquence concerne la légitimité du *pouvoir*. Jacques explique, en invoquant l'autorité d'Hugues de Saint-Victor (§18), source de prédilection des auteurs de tendance hiéocratique, que « la dignité sacerdotale sanctifie le pouvoir royal par la bénédiction et le *forme par l'institution* » (nous soulignons). Si la sanctification semble avoir un caractère purement spirituel, il n'en va pas de même de l'« institution ».²⁶ Celle-ci n'est pas une simple caution morale apportée par le pape; elle a, au contraire, une *fonction constitutive de la nature même des vertus politiques*. C'est ce que montre, d'abord, la « confirmation » alléguée par le Viterbien (au §19) sous la forme d'une citation de saint Augustin selon laquelle un état ne saurait être juste « s'il n'est régi par le Christ », ensuite, la conclusion que c'est le pape qui confère sa rectitude au gouvernement civil.

Parce que le pape, successeur de saint Pierre, se situe à une moindre distance de la cause première, à savoir le Christ, que le prince séculier, il détient de façon immédiate son pouvoir de lui; et comme ce pouvoir contient par mode d'éminence le pouvoir temporel, le pape tient les deux pouvoirs du Christ à titre *immédiat*. Le prince séculier, en revanche, ne dérive son pouvoir temporel du Christ que par l'intermédiaire du pape. Mais alors, se demandera-t-on, s'il en est ainsi le primat de la papauté dans les deux ordres ne rend-il pas superflu l'office du prince? Notre auteur n'en croit évidemment rien: le pape détient les deux pouvoirs; la fonction du monarque – prince, roi ou empereur – n'en reste pas moins nécessaire. Pour faire comprendre ce point, Jacques réactive une distinction introduite par les décrétistes entre deux types de primauté: la primauté dans l'ordre de l'autorité et celle dans l'ordre de l'exécution.²⁷ Le pape possède la primauté dans l'ordre de l'autorité au spirituel et au temporel, mais il ne possède la

²⁶ Sur le sens de ce terme et son importance dans l'élaboration de la conception hiéocratique, voir W. Kölmel, *Regimen Christianum. Weg und Ergebnisse des Gewaltenverhältnisses und des Gewaltenverständnisses (VIII.-XIV. Jahrhundert)* [abrégé désormais *Regimen Christianum*], Berlin, De Gruyter, 1970, p. 210.

²⁷ Cf. la Somme *Animal est substantia*, commentaire, datant du début du XIII^e siècle, au Décret de Gratien anciennement connu sous le nom de *Summa Bambergensis*. A la dist. 22, chap. 1, on lit: « Dicendum est quod papa habet utrumque gladium, spirituale auctoritate et executione, materiale auctoritate tantum. Imperatores autem habent executione et a domino papa ». L'édition provisoire de cette œuvre importante est donnée par C. Coppens sur le site suivant: http://web.mac.com/eccoppens/Animal_est_substantia/Distinctiones_files/Distinctio%2022.pdf C.

primauté selon l'exécution qu'au spirituel. Le prince civil, pour sa part, ne possède la primauté qu'au temporel. La raison d'être de cette répartition des autorités est la suivante. L'office du pape étant d'abord un office spirituel, ordonné à une finalité qui transcende les fins de la cité, il importe qu'il soit libre de se consacrer entièrement à sa fonction sacerdotale, chose qu'il serait incapable de faire s'il devait assumer les deux charges. Le pape transfère donc l'exécution du pouvoir séculier au monarque, du moins dans son exercice régulier et ordinaire, sans cesser pour autant d'exercer une entière primauté suivant l'autorité. La précision « dans son exercice régulier » est importante, car Jacques rappelle que, indépendamment de sa prééminence dans l'ordre de l'autorité, il est des domaines dans lesquels la papauté exerce depuis longtemps une primauté dans l'ordre d'exécution au temporel. Il en énumère cinq (dans les §§26 à 30), mais leur nombre varie d'un auteur à l'autre.²⁸ Quoi qu'il en soit, le fait que l'Église ait historiquement exercé une primauté selon l'exécution montre la fausseté de la position « dualiste », qui veut que le pouvoir temporel selon l'exécution soit, par principe, l'apanage exclusif du temporel. Au surplus, la position dualiste est aussi incohérente, fait valoir notre auteur, car comment imaginer que la papauté dispose d'un pouvoir qu'il lui serait impossible d'exercer (§25)? Sans aller jusqu'à dire que le pape doive exercer les deux pouvoirs – on a vu qu'il ne le pouvait, en pratique, sans nuire à l'efficacité de son sacerdoce qui l'accapare entièrement – il suffira de dire que le pape possède effectivement les deux pouvoirs à titre immédiat et selon l'autorité, et que, fort de cette primauté, il choisit de transférer l'exécution du temporel au chef séculier. Jacques voit une confirmation de cette conception dans le célèbre passage du *De consideratione* de saint Bernard, allégué par presque tous les partisans de la théocratie pontificale²⁹ (§25). Le cistercien y explique que le pape possède les deux glaives, le glaive spirituel et le glaive matériel, et que c'est à lui qu'il revient de le dégainer, mais seulement *ad nutum*, sur un signe.³⁰

Après avoir longuement discuté de la question des deux rapports, notre théologien en vient, en <II>, à la deuxième interrogation: comment les prélats se rapportent-ils aux biens appartenant à leur sujets? Après avoir tant insisté sur le primat du prince dans son ordre, on s'attendrait à ce que le Viterbien affirme le droit de celui-ci de disposer à sa guise

²⁸ Cf. Kölmel, *Regimen christianum* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 26], p. 232.

²⁹ Cf. Kölmel, *Regimen christianum* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 26], p. 222-25.

³⁰ Cf. l'article, ancien mais utile, de J. Leclercq, « L'argument des deux glaives », dans *Recherches de science religieuse* 7 (1931), p. 299-339.

du patrimoine de ses sujets. Il n'en est rien: le prince et les prélats de l'Église doivent user avec discrétion et bonne foi des biens de leurs sujets. Cette conclusion vise à tempérer celle de la première partie, en rappelant les obligations qui lient le prince à ses sujets, sans parvenir à modérer la conclusion énoncée en <III>.

La réponse, donnée en <III>, au problème initial découle naturellement de la primauté du pouvoir pontifical. Le pape détient un droit d'absolution dans les cas concernant le patrimoine de l'Église, où il exerce un primat selon l'autorité et l'exécution; le prince possède un droit équivalent dans l'ordre séculier, où il est premier dans l'ordre de l'exécution. Pourtant, on se doute que ce ne saurait être là le fin mot de l'affaire pour un auteur aussi pénétré que le Viterbien de la prééminence causale de l'office pontifical. De fait, nous apprenons (dans les §§44 à 46), que, à la différence du prince dont la souveraineté ne s'étend qu'aux laïcs, le pape peut aussi dispenser l'absolution *lorsque le prêt implique des personnes ne relevant aucunement du ressort de l'Église*. Qui plus est, il possède également le droit de contraindre le pouvoir civil de lui obéir³¹ (§46), et même, en cas de refus de celui-ci, le droit d'assurer lui-même l'exécution de sa volonté (§47).

Il résulte de cette doctrine une nette *relativisation* du dualisme des pouvoirs. S'il est vrai que le droit (canon) affirme que « les affaires temporelles ne regardent pas la juridiction du pape », cette affirmation doit cependant être *interprétée*. Il faut, en effet, préciser, comme le fait notre auteur, que cette indépendance des affaires temporelles ne vaut que dans l'ordre de l'exécution (§34). Jacques respecte donc l'autonomie des compétences, mais en la subordonnant à un droit discrétionnaire du pape d'outrepasser les limites de la juridiction ecclésiastique dans certaines conditions, dans la droite ligne de la doctrine *propter peccatum*, qui domine la pensée pontificale depuis Innocent III.³²

³¹ Il est piquant de relever que, contrairement au Viterbien, le Carme Guy Terrena, connu pour avoir été un ardent défenseur de la toute-puissance et de l'infailibilité pontificales, se refuse apparemment, en son *Quod*. IV, 11, à accorder au pape un quelconque droit d'intrusion dans les affaires séculières: « Si autem usuras extorsit (ms.: extorsas) a personis laycis et secularibus in quarum bonis papa non habet sic dominium dispensandi et administrandi, credo quod non potest eum absolvere absque quod satisfaciat illi vel per eum vel per alium, puta per communitatem quam defendit vel per quam militat et ratio est quia cum quilibet secularis in bonis suis habeat ius et proprietatem et non papa vel alius, nullus de hiis bonis potest contra voluntatem eius nisi in casu propter bonum rei publicae intenderet princeps ». *Quodlibet* IV, 11, ms. BAV, Borghese, 39, f. 191va.

³² Cf. les remarques de Dyson dans *Aquinas. Political Writings*, ed. R. W. Dyson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 (Cambridge Texts in the History of

3. La position du *Quodlibet* I, 17 par rapport à celle du *De regimine Christiano*

Grâce aux travaux d'Arquillière et de Dyson, entre autres, la teneur de la doctrine politique de Jacques de Viterbe dans le *De regimine Christiano* est bien connue.³³ Les parties les plus originales de cette

Political Thought), p. xix. Il est vrai que dans les décrétales Innocent fonde le droit d'intervenir dans les affaires temporelles sur celui de juger de la qualité morale des actions des hommes au temporel, alors que Jacques, dans le *Quodlibet*, revendique simplement le droit du pape d'intervenir hors de sa juridiction « pour la grande utilité de l'Église », ce qui est tout différent. L'important est que les deux croient à l'existence d'un droit d'exception. Il reste que cette doctrine s'exprime chez le Viterbien par un recours au principe métaphysique du pseudo-Denys. Une rapide comparaison de l'argument avancé en faveur de ce droit chez Innocent dans sa grande décrétale « Per venerabilem » et le Viterbien peut d'ailleurs nous permettre de mieux faire ressortir l'originalité de la démarche du docteur spéculatif. On sait que dans la décrétale « Per venerabilem », Innocent justifie sa décision de ne pas faire droit à la requête du comte Guilhelm de Montpellier, qui lui avait demandé de légitimer ses deux enfants bâtards, par le fait qu'en agissant de la sorte il empiéterait sur la juridiction des suzerains temporels de Guilhelm. Mais dans la même missive, Innocent avait commencé par affirmer le droit de *principe* du pape à légitimer les enfants adultérins en raisonnant que, ayant de toutes façons le droit de légitimer des enfants en vue d'exercer une activité spirituelle, il devait également avoir celui de légitimer des enfants en vue d'exercer une activité séculière (« Ex quo verisimilius creditur et probabilius reputatur, ut eos ad actus legitimare valeat saeculares, praesertim si praeter Romanos Pontifices inter homines superiorem alium non cognoscant, qui legitimandi habeat potestatem; quia, quum maior in spiritualibus tam providentia quam auctoritas et idoneitas requiratur, quod in maiori conceditur licitum esse videtur et in minori »). Innocent III, « Per venerabilem », *Liber extravagantium decretalium* (*Decretales Gregorii IX*) [abrégé désormais *Liber Extra*] (1234), lib. IV, t. XVII, cap. 13, in *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, t. 2, ed. E. Friedberg, Leipzig, Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1881, col. 714. Le principe opératoire dans ce raisonnement, comme l'a montré John Watt, est l'adage juridique selon lequel « in eo (quod) plus sit, semper inest minus » (*Digeste*, 50. 17. 110). Le docteur spéculatif est d'accord sur le fond – le pape peut intervenir en dehors des cas explicitement prévus par le droit –, mais au lieu de s'appuyer sur l'autorité d'un lieu *juridique* (« qui peut le plus peut le moins »), c'est sur un principe *métaphysique* qu'il se fonde: ce qui existe dans les effets préexiste dans les causes. La doctrine de la préexistence du séculier dans le spirituel apparaît ainsi comme la transposition philosophique de cette thèse. Cf. J. Watt, *The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century* (*The Contribution of the Canonists*), London, Burns & Oates, 1965, p. 129, n. 49. Ainsi que le souligne Watt, cet adage allait être repris dans la liste des « règles du droits » de Boniface VIII (*Liber Sextus Decretalium*, in *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, t. 2, ed. Friedberg, col. 1123, reg. 53), avec, entre autres, la règle « *peccatum non dimittitur, nisi restituatur ablatum* ».

³³ R. Scholz, *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz' VIII.: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Anschauungen des Mittelalters* [abrégé désormais *Die Publizistik*], Stuttgart, Enke, 1903 (reprint: Amsterdam: P. Schippers, 1962) (*Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen*, Heft 6-8); J. Rivière, *Le problème de l'Église et de l'État au temps de Philippe le Bel* [abrégé désormais *Le problème de l'Église et*

doctrine sont exposées au chapitre 7 de la deuxième partie dans lequel Jacques compare les pouvoirs spirituel et temporel. Les analyses y sont plus détaillées qu'au *Quodlibet* I, 17, mais elles s'en inspirent largement sur des points de doctrines essentiels, hormis sur un point significatif, ainsi que nous allons le voir.

Le chapitre 7 se divise en deux parties.³⁴ L'auteur décline d'abord les divers points sous lesquels le pouvoir spirituel peut être qualifié de supérieur au temporel; il cite ensuite divers exemples destinés à confirmer la théorie. Je ne parlerai ici que de la première partie.

Comme dans le *Quodlibet*, Jacques soutient dans le *De regimine* que le spirituel jouit d'une double préséance vis-à-vis du temporel: il l'emporte sur lui en dignité et du point de vue de la causalité.³⁵ Ce dernier type de prééminence, le seul qui nous intéressera ici, se divise en deux modes: supériorité du point de vue de la cause finale et supériorité du point de vue de la cause agente. Le spirituel est d'abord la cause finale du temporel dans la mesure où la béatitude surnaturelle est la cause finale de la félicité naturelle. Mais il est aussi la cause agente du temporel, et ce, de trois façons distinctes.

1) Il en est d'abord la cause du point de vue de l'institution, car il appartient, écrit le Viterbien – qui renvoie au *De sacramentis* de Hugues de Saint-Victor, le *locus classicus* en la matière – au spirituel d'*instituer* le temporel. Nous retrouvons ici la thèse de la primauté d'institution que nous avons rencontrée plus haut dans le *Quodlibet* (cf. §§18 et 19), avec une différence notable toutefois. Certains, explique maintenant notre maître augustin, considèrent que le pouvoir temporel provient directement de Dieu et ne dépend en rien du pouvoir

de l'État], Louvain, « Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense » Bureaux; Paris, Honoré Champion, 1926 (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense. Études et documents, fasc. 8), p. 228-251; H.-X. Arquillière, *Le plus ancien traité de l'Eglise. Jacques de Viterbe. De regimine christiano (1301-1302)* [abrégé désormais *Le plus ancien traité*], Paris, Beauchesne, 1926 (Études de théologie historique), chapitres 5 et 6; M. Wilks, *The problem of Sovereignty in the later Middle Ages*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life & Thought. New Series: volume 9), p. 118-148; Kölmel, *Regimen Christianum* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 26], p. 361-97; Dyson, dans James of Viterbo, *On Christian Government*, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 1995, « introduction ».

³⁴ Voir le résumé détaillé qu'en fait W. Kölmel, *Regimen Christianum* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 26], p. 361-97.

³⁵ En fait, le Viterbien distingue trois modes de comparaison: du point de vue du temps (p. 206), de la dignité (p. 208), et de la causalité (p. 208-218).

spirituel (c'est la position dualiste, que Jacques avait réfutée en *Quod. I, 17*, §§25 et 26); d'autres soutiennent que le pouvoir temporel est *illégitime* s'il n'est pas conjoint, dans la même personne, au pouvoir spirituel, ou s'il n'est pas *institué* par lui – thèse défendue par Gilles de Rome dans le *De ecclesiastica potestate*,³⁶ paru peu de temps avant le *De regimine*.³⁷ Or, Jacques présente ces deux opinions comme des points de vue extrêmes entre lesquels il dit vouloir choisir une *voie moyenne* (*via media*) qui lui paraît plus raisonnable. Citons-le :

Entre ces deux opinions on peut ménager une voie moyenne qui paraît plus raisonnable, à savoir que l'institution de la puissance temporelle tire son existence sous un mode matériel et inchoatif de l'inclination naturelle des hommes et, par suite, de Dieu, dans la mesure où l'œuvre de la nature est l'œuvre de Dieu; mais elle tire l'existence sous un mode perfectif et formel de la puissance spirituelle, qui découle de Dieu selon un mode spécial. Car la grâce n'abolit pas la nature, mais la perfectionne et lui donne forme.³⁸

Alors que pour Gilles de Rome le spirituel institue en constituant le pouvoir temporel dans sa nature même de pouvoir temporel, puisque celui-ci n'a *rien* qu'il n'ait reçu du spirituel : « Nulla est itaque potestas in materiali gladio que non sit in spirituali », ³⁹ pour Jacques de Viterbe le pouvoir temporel possède de soi une légitimité, inchoative et imparfaite certes, mais qui est indépendante de son rapport au pape ou à l'Église. C'est là une différence notable et un progrès indéniable par rapport à la conception égidienne.⁴⁰ Mais c'est aussi, il vaut la peine de le souligner, une différence avec la position exprimée par le même Jacques de Viterbe à l'époque du *Quod. I, 17*. Certes, le

³⁶ *De ecclesiastica potestate* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 2], II, 14, ed. Dyson, p. 252.

³⁷ Il y a de bonnes raisons de penser que Jacques avait sous les yeux un exemplaire du *De ecclesiastica potestate* lors de la rédaction du *De regimine*. Voir les arguments avancés par Dyson dans James of Viterbo, *On Christian Government* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], p. xvii.

³⁸ « Inter has autem duas opiniones potest accipi via media que rationabilior esse uidetur: ut dicatur quod institutio potestatis temporalis materialiter et inchoative habet esse a naturali hominum inclinatione, ac per hoc a Deo, in quantum opus nature est opus Dei; perfective autem et formaliter habet esse a potestate spirituali, que a Deo speciali modo deriuatur. Nam gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit eam et format... ». *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], ed. Dyson, p. 210.

³⁹ *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], ed. Dyson, p. 210.

⁴⁰ Cette différence avait déjà été relevée par Scholz, *Die Publizistik* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], p. 142-144, ainsi que Rivière, *Le problème de l'Église et de l'État* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], p. 234, mais c'est à Arquillière que l'on doit d'y avoir insisté et d'avoir mis en évidence les probables origines thomasiennes de la de cette doctrine chez Jacques. Voir *Le plus ancien traité* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], p. 68-69, 72-77.

Viterbien ne disait pas *expressis verbis*, au §19, que le pouvoir civil était « illégitime », mais il le laissait clairement entendre en se refusant à reconnaître rectitude ou justice à une société chrétienne dont le pape ne serait pas le chef de droit. Il semblerait donc que la pensée du Viterbien sur ce point ait évolué, ou du moins qu'elle ait gagné en précision. On peut d'ailleurs mesurer plus exactement cette évolution en comparant le §19 du *Quodlibet* avec la longue analyse que le Viterbien consacre au même passage de la *Cité de Dieu* au chapitre X de la seconde partie du *De regimine*. Est-il vrai, demande Jacques, que, comme le pense Augustin, tout empire, et en particulier celui de Constantin, ne soit que brigandage? C'est bien en tout cas ce que pensait Gilles de Rome, qui en avait conclu que, contrairement à ce qu'affirmait la fameuse fausse « Donation de Constantin », Constantin n'avait pas pu transférer l'empire au pape, puisqu'il n'en avait jamais été le propriétaire légitime.⁴¹ Jacques, pour sa part, répond que l'existence des royaumes et celle du pouvoir politique sont un bien pour l'homme. S'il est vrai que les empires naissent dans le brigandage et la violence, il est faux que toute société politique soit irrémédiablement vouée à l'injustice tant qu'elle n'est pas soumise au Christ.⁴² Le terme de brigand ne convient que pour les sociétés d'où toute forme de justice est absente. Or tel n'était pas le cas de l'Empire romain où l'on observa « une certaine justice », même si ce n'était pas celle qui est formée par la foi du Christ, « qui seule est dite justice véritable ».⁴³ Plus largement, c'est le cas de toute société humaine: ce fut le cas des Gentils Melchisédech et Job; celui des juifs et même des infidèles, qui peuvent connaître des formes de gouvernement justes, même si elles ne sont pas justes à tous égards.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Voir Gilles de Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 2], partie III, chapitre 10, ed. Dyson, p. 381.

⁴² Contrairement, une fois encore, à ce que pensait Gilles: « Et si dicatur quod non omnis potestas regia est per sacerdocium instituta, dicemus quod nulla est potestas regia non per sacerdocium instituta que vel non fuerit non recta, propter quod magis erat latrocinium quam potestas; vel non fuerit sacerdocio coniuncta ». *De ecclesiastica potestate* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 2], ed. Dyson, p. 22. Plus loin: « Regnum ergo non per sacerdocium institutum vel non fuit regnum sed latrocinium, vel fuit sacerdocio coniunctum ». *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴³ « Ad id ergo quod obicitur quod regnum Romanum, cum esset sine iustitia fuit latrocinium, dicendum est quod illud regnum est latrocinium in quo est defectus iustitie qualiscumque. In regno autem Romano, precipue postquam cepit augeri, fuit quidem aliqua iustitia, non tamen illa que est formata per fidem Christi, que sola dicitur uera iustitia ». *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], ed. Dyson, p. 318.

⁴⁴ « Apud infideles autem, quantumcumque aliter recte uiuentes, potest esse iustum regnum secundum aliquid, non tamen per omnem modum ». *Ibid.*

2) La puissance spirituelle est aussi cause agente du temporel en ce sens qu'il lui appartient de la juger comme toute puissance supérieure vis-à-vis de la puissance qui lui est subordonnée: on voit là la reprise de l'idée, chère à Hugues de Saint-Victor, mentionnée au §13. Elle est au temporel ce que l'intellect est au sens, dont il corrige les erreurs, ou comme la science sacrée à l'égard de la science physique. Jacques en tire des conséquences pratiques:

Il lui appartient (sc. la puissance spirituelle) de la juger, car elle peut et doit la corriger et diriger, punir et lui infliger une peine non seulement spirituelle mais temporelle à raison du crime et du délit et même aller jusqu'à la destitution si la nature du délit l'exige.

3) Enfin, la puissance spirituelle est cause agente du point de vue du commandement. Dans les arts et les disciplines, c'est à la discipline qui regarde la fin principale qu'il appartient de commander aux autres. C'est l'architecte, par exemple, commande aux corps de métiers. Or la fin visée par la puissance spirituelle n'est autre que la béatitude, alors que la fin de la cité est la félicité terrestre, une fin secondaire; il appartient donc au chef séculier d'obéir au commandement du spirituel. Ce troisième type de supériorité s'apparente fort à la supériorité du point de vue de la cause finale que Jacques a déjà commentée, ainsi que nous venons de le voir – redite qu'il faut mettre sur le compte de la précipitation avec laquelle il a rédigé son travail.⁴⁵ Quoi qu'il en soit, une fois de plus, Jacques ne se fait pas faute de tirer les conséquences pratiques – qui ne sont pas sans rappeler celles évoquées dans les §§45 et 46 du *Quodlibet* – de cette comparaison, assimilant le rapport du temporel au spirituel à une relation de type féodal:

Il s'ensuit que le temporel est appelé à aider le spirituel. Lorsqu'il est ainsi appelé, il doit apporter cette aide et remplir ses obligations.⁴⁶

Le docteur spéculatif conclut en dégageant de ces différentes manières dont le spirituel l'emporte sur le temporel eu égard à sa causalité une « comparaison » qui les sous-tend et les résume à la fois:

De ce qui précède on peut tirer une comparaison du point de vue de la contenance. Parce que les puissances inférieures sont contenues dans les supérieures, et parce que ce qui appartient aux effets préexiste dans les causes, il s'ensuit que la puissance temporelle, qui se compare à la spirituelle comme l'inférieur au supérieur et comme le causé à la

⁴⁵ Cf. Dyson, dans *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], introduction, p. xxxiii.

⁴⁶ *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], ed. Dyson, p. 216.

cause, est contenue dans la puissance spirituelle. C'est pour cela qu'on dit que les droits des empires céleste et terrestre ont été concédés au bienheureux Pierre, car Pierre et tous ses successeurs, en qui réside la plénitude du pouvoir spirituel, précontent la puissance temporelle, non cependant suivant le mode d'après lequel le possède le prince temporel, mais selon un mode supérieur et plus digne et plus excellent.⁴⁷

On retrouve donc bien ici la doctrine de la précontenance esquissée dans le *Quodlibet* (§20) avec mention de l'adage dionysien selon lequel les effets préexistent dans les causes. La doctrine du *De regimine* se situe donc dans le prolongement de celle du *Quodlibet* qu'elle développe en la précisant parfois. On y retrouve, aménagés un peu différemment, non d'ailleurs sans maladresse et redites, nous venons de le voir, quelques-uns des mêmes éléments principaux.

Essayons de synthétiser ces différences. Le *Quodlibet* comme le *De regimine* fondent tous deux la primauté du spirituel aux dépens du temporel sur une primauté causale. Dans le *Quodlibet*, celle-ci fait l'objet d'une démonstration par l'ordre des choses et par l'ordre des fins qui servent de caution métaphysique à une triade de prérogatives politiques et juridiques: l'approbation des lois, l'institution des monarques et le droit de juger les écarts. À cette conception, s'associe une doctrine de l'articulation des deux pouvoirs, ou, si l'on veut, de leur

⁴⁷ « Ex dictis autem potest accipi comparatio eorum secundum continentiam. Nam quia uirtutes inferiorum continentur in superioribus, et que sunt causatorum preinsunt causatis, ideo temporalis potestas, que comparatur ad spiritualem sicut inferioris ad superius et sicut causatum ad causam, continetur a potestate spirituali. Et propter hoc a Christo dicuntur esse concessa beato Petro iura celestis imperii et terreni, quia Petrus et quilibet eius successor, in quo plenitudo spiritualis potestatis residet, prehabet potestatem temporalem; non tamen secundum eundem modum secundum quem habetur a principe temporali, sed modo superiori et digniori et prestantiori ». *Ibid.*, p. 216. Et encore: « ... spiritualis potestas prehabet temporalem superiori et excellentiori modo. Ad id ergo quod obicitur primo, de distinctione potestatum, dicendum est quod hec (*sic*) potestates distincte sunt, et tamen una preexistit in alia excellentiori modo, sicut uirtutes corporum inferiorum distincte sunt a uirtutibus corporum superiorum, et tamen preexistunt in illis modo nobiliori ». *Ibid.*, p. 292. La même idée sous-tend la réponse du Viterbien à l'objection que le pape ne détiendrait pas les deux pouvoirs selon le droit divin puisque, comme l'écrit Bernard à l'adresse d'Eugène, « En ces matières (sc. les matières temporelles) tu succèdes non à Pierre mais à Constantin ». Jacques exprime son désaccord avec cette façon de voir: c'est bien à Pierre que succède le pape en matière temporelle selon le droit divin; il succède à Constantin selon le droit humain. Ce que veut dire le docteur spéculatif c'est qu'en confiant le pouvoir spirituel à Pierre, le Christ lui a aussi confié le pouvoir temporel, « car le temporel préexiste dans le spirituel comme l'inférieur dans le supérieur » (*Ibid.* p. 298). Sur le thème de la préexistence du temporel dans le spirituel dans le *De Regimine*, voir Kölmel, *Regimen Christianum* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 26], p. 380-88.

« cohabitation », à l'aide de la distinction entre l'ordre de l'autorité et l'ordre de l'exécution. Dans le *De regimine*, la primauté causale du spirituel a un caractère plus technique et plus systématique que dans le *Quodlibet*. Jacques parle maintenant de primauté sur le plan de la causalité finale et de primauté sur le plan de la causalité agente. Les deux premières espèces de cette causalité agente exercée par le spirituel sont le droit d'approbation et le droit d'institution, la troisième étant la causalité selon le commandement. Les deux primautés causales, celles de la cause finale et de la cause agente, sont métaphysiquement ancrées dans une causalité de la précontenance ou de la préexistence.

4. « Maître Jacques de Vyterbe » et « sez Questions » : Postérité du *Quodlibet* I, q. 17

Parler de « postérité » dans le cas de notre modeste *Quodlibet* pourrait surprendre : avec les développements abondants et circonstanciés que le *De regimine* mettait à la disposition des successeurs du Viterbien, pourquoi ceux-ci puiseraient-ils dans le *Quodlibet* ? De fait, l'on sait que les théologiens ne se sont pas fait faute d'exploiter les thèses du *De regimine* dans leur plaidoyer en faveur de la toute-puissance pontificale. Cette influence semble surtout s'être exercée à l'occasion du conflit opposant Jean XXII et Louis de Bavière. Dante a peut-être connu le *De regimine*⁴⁸ ; l'Augustin Alexandre de Saint-Elpide s'inspire à coup sûr et très largement des thèses du *De regimine* dans son *De ecclesiastica potestate* ; le franciscain Alvaro Pelayo, surtout, en démarque de longs passages dans son *De planctu ecclesiae*.⁴⁹ Pourtant, notre *Quodlibet* ne fut pas sans écho, ainsi que l'atteste le *Somnium Viridarii*, mieux connu sous le titre de sa traduction française, le *Songe du Vergier*. Qui plus est, l'aspect qui a retenu l'attention de l'auteur est justement celui que nous avons mis en lumière.

Le *Somnium*, on le sait, est une compilation réalisée à la demande expresse de Charles V en 1374 de textes se rapportant au problème des juridictions entre la royauté et la papauté, mettant en

⁴⁸ Cf. U. Mariani O.E.S.A., *Chiesa e stato nei teologi agostiniani del secolo XIV*, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura 1957 (Uomini e dottrine, 5), p. 172.

⁴⁹ Voir Scholz, *Die Publizistik* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], p. 151-152. Voir également Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], *passim*. Pour la liste des « emprunts » par Alvaro au *De regimine*, voir N. Iung, *Un franciscain, théologien du pouvoir pontifical aux XIV^e siècle*, Alvaro Pelayo, évêque et pénitencier de Jean XXII, Paris, Vrin, 1931 (L'Église et l'État au Moyen Âge, III), p. 40.

scène un clerc, porte-parole de la position pontificale, et un chevalier, représentant la thèse régaliennne.⁵⁰ Au chapitre LXXVII du texte latin, le clerc explique que le ministre d'une loi supérieure a préséance sur le ministre d'une loi inférieure, pour en conclure que le pape a préséance sur le roi. S'étant vu répondre par le chevalier que cette préséance ne valait que dans l'ordre spirituel, le clerc revient alors à la charge en invoquant l'autorité « d'un certain maître en théologie ». Suit alors une longue citation du *Quodlibet* I, 17, correspondant aux §§12 à 18 de notre traduction, c'est-à-dire à la section doctrinalement la plus significative du texte: celle qui traite de la relation causale entre le spirituel et le temporel. Le compilateur avait vu là un argument sans équivoque en faveur de la position pontificale, en quoi il n'avait pas tort! Le clerc en conclut, en bonne logique viterbienne, que « puisque le pouvoir spirituel, est supérieur au séculier, même du point de vue de la causalité, <il s'ensuit> que le pape détient les deux pouvoirs, c'est-à-dire le spirituel et le temporel, de façon immédiate de Dieu ».⁵¹ Dans le texte français, la citation fait l'objet d'une traduction libre qui suit le déroulement des arguments, mais sans mention de l'axiome du pseudo-Denys, qui est tout de même énoncé dans d'autres chapitres (« lez choses qui sont dez choses causees si sont de celles choses causees »⁵²). Néanmoins, le clerc ne manque pas de tirer le principal enseignement de l'exposé de maistre Jacques, à savoir que « le Pape puet bailler loys et contitucions aux seigneurs seculiers, selon lezquelles ilz devient gouverner la temporalité; et ne puent lez princes seculiers avoir ne faire loys ou constitucions, se elles ne sont approuves par le Saint Pere de Rome ».⁵³

Le clerc invoque l'autorité d'un certain maître en théologie, mais ne précise pas lequel. Il s'agit sans doute de Thomas d'Aquin, dont les *Quodlibet* ont été très influents dans la pensée médiévale. Cependant, il est possible que le compilateur ait eu en tête un autre auteur, comme le maître de la maison de Viterbe, Pierre de Jean Olivi, ou même un maître de la scolastique plus récente, comme le maître de la maison de Paris, Thomas de Viterbe. En tout cas, l'argument invoqué est celui de la préséance du spirituel sur le temporel, qui est un thème central de la pensée médiévale.

⁵⁰ Cf. M. Schnerb-Lièvre, *Le songe du Vergier*, Paris, Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982 (Sources d'histoire médiévale), t. I, p. lxix. Cf. Rivière, *Le problème de l'Église et de l'État* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 33], p. 148 et p. 246.

⁵¹ *Somnium Viridarii*, ed. M. Schnerb-Lièvre, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 1993 (Sources d'histoire médiévale), p. 90.

⁵² *Le songe du Vergier* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 50], ed. Schnerb-Lièvre, p. 62, titre 1, et p. 63, titre 3, où l'auteur-traducteur attribue la phrase à Aristote.

⁵³ Ibid. p. 167, titre 4.

Traduction

<I>

(1) Dix-septième question: Le pape peut-il absoudre un usurier de sorte qu'il n'ait pas à restituer les usures?⁵⁴ Il semble que non, car, comme le dit Augustin dans la *Lettre à Macédonius*: « Il n'y a point de rémission du péché sans restitution du bien dérobé ».⁵⁵

(2) On argumente en sens contraire, car il a été dit à saint Pierre et à ses successeurs: « tout ce que tu as délié sur terre sera tenu pour délié dans les cieux ».⁵⁶

(3) Je réponds que celui qui détient injustement le bien d'autrui ne peut être absous que s'il restitue <le bien mal acquis> ou si celui-ci lui est concédé et accordé par son propriétaire légitime. Parce que l'usurier détient injustement le bien d'autrui, le pape ne peut donc pas l'absoudre sans qu'il <sc. l'usurier> restitue les usures, à moins qu'il <sc. le pape> ne puisse en droit lui concéder ou lui faire grâce de l'argent mal acquis. Or, du fait que l'argent, ou ce qui est mesuré par lui, est quelque chose de temporel, il s'ensuit que le pape ne peut accorder un don ou un pardon de cette sorte s'il ne détient pas le pouvoir et la juridiction sur les <biens> temporels. Ainsi, afin d'élucider la question, il faut, en premier lieu, examiner le pouvoir ou la juridiction que possède le pape dans les affaires temporelles.

(4) Deuxièmement, il convient d'examiner comment les prélats et les princes séculiers se rapportent aux biens temporels qui sont soumis à leur pouvoir.

(5) Troisièmement, il faut en venir au problème qui est soulevé dans la question.

⁵⁴ « Usures » au pluriel désigne le gain usuraire, par opposition au singulier qui désigne le péché. Cf. S. Piron, « Le devoir de gratitude. Émergence et vogue de la notion d'*antidota* au XIII^e siècle », *Credito e usura fra teologia, diritto e amministrazione. Linguaggi a confronto (sec. XII- XVI). Convegno internazionale di Trento, 3-5 settembre 2001*, a cura di D. Quaglioni, G. Todeschini, G. M. Varanini, Rome, École Française de Rome, 2005 (Collection de l'EFR, 346), p. 73-101.

⁵⁵ Augustin d'Hippone, *Epistulae*, epist. 153, ed. Goldbacher, Turnhout, Brepols (CSEL 44), p. 419; cf. *Liber Extra* 5, 19, 5, ed. Friedberg [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 812-813.

⁵⁶ Matt. 16, 19.

(6) Pour ce qui est du premier point, il convient de savoir que les opinions concernant le pouvoir du pape sont légion. Certains ont soutenu que le pape ne possède que le pouvoir spirituel, et qu'il ne possède le pouvoir temporel que si celui-ci lui est concédé par les princes séculiers. A l'appui de cette assertion ils invoquent plusieurs arguments.

(7) Premièrement, <l'argument selon lequel> les pouvoirs spirituel et temporel sont des pouvoirs distincts,⁵⁷ ainsi que cela ressort <du *Décret*>, distinction X, au chapitre « Quoniam idem »⁵⁸ et de la distinction XCVI « Cuius », au chapitre « Ad verum » et au chapitre « Duo quippe sunt ».⁵⁹ Et ils sont distincts, à ce qu'ils disent, en ce

⁵⁷ La distinction des offices est sans doute, comme l'écrivait naguère Rivière, un « lieu-commun de la politique chrétienne », parce que cette distinction « s'entend sous le bénéfice des précisions suggérées ailleurs sur leur rôle respectif » (*Le problème de l'Église et de l'État*, p. 27). Les partisans de la stricte distinction des compétences, c'est-à-dire ceux qui n'admettent aucun droit d'intervention dans la sphère de l'autre, se recrutent parmi les civilistes. La formulation la plus claire de leur thèse se trouve peut-être dans le *Liber de regimine civitatum* de Jean de Viterbe, qui estimait qu'aucun des deux pouvoirs ne saurait s'immiscer dans les affaires de l'autre sans son autorisation: « nec alter in alterius messem falcem suam mettere debet sine permissu alterius... ». Jean de Viterbe, *Liber de regimine civitatum*, ed. C. Salvemini, Bononiae, In aedibus successorum Monti, 1901 (reprint: Turin, Bottega d'Erasmus, 1962), (Bibliotheca iuridica Medii Aevi, 3), p. 266; cité dans R. W. Carlyle et A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, vol. V (*The Political Theory of the Thirteenth Century*), Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1952, p. 358, n. 1.

⁵⁸ La décrétale « Quoniam idem »: lettre du pape Nicolas 1^{er} à l'empereur byzantin Michel III, qui présente l'affirmation classique de la distinction des deux offices, spirituel et temporel: « Ainsi, les empereurs chrétiens auraient besoin des pontifes pour la vie éternelle, cependant que les pontifes feraient usage des lois impériales, (mais) uniquement pour le cours des affaires temporelles, afin que l'action spirituelle reste à distance des incursions charnelles, et (afin que) celui qui combat pour Dieu ne se mêle pas des affaires séculières et, pareillement que ne passe pas pour présider aux affaires de Dieu, celui qui serait chargé des affaires séculières ». *Decretum*, pars I, dist. X, cap. 8, ed. Friedberg, t. I [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 21.

⁵⁹ *Decretum*, pars I, dist. XCVI, cap. 4, ed. Friedberg, t. I [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 340. La décrétale « Duo quippe sunt » contient le début de la lettre de Gélase 1^{er} à l'empereur Anastase, qu'on peut à bon droit considérer comme l'expression classique de la conception dualiste du pouvoir qui sera remise à l'honneur dans le contexte de la controverse opposant Philippe le Bel à Boniface VIII. En voici la traduction: « Il y a deux pouvoirs, auguste empereur, par lesquels ce monde est régi: l'autorité sacrée des pontifes et le pouvoir royal. Mais le pouvoir des prêtres est d'autant plus lourd qu'ils devront, au Jugement dernier, rendre compte au Seigneur des rois eux-mêmes » (trad. Pacaut, *La théocratie. L'Église et le pouvoir au Moyen Age*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1989 [Bibliothèque d'Histoire du Christianisme, n. 20], p. 20). La suite de la lettre est encore plus explicite quant au caractère irréductible des deux autorités: « Tu sais aussi, entre autres choses, que tu dépends de leur jugement et qu'il ne te faut pas chercher à les réduire à ta volonté. Si, en effet, pour tout

qu'ils sont irréductibles l'un à l'autre, car de même que l'autorité spirituelle vient de Dieu de façon immédiate, ainsi en va-t-il de <l'autorité> temporelle. C'est ainsi que l'autorité vient de Dieu seul, comme cela est suggéré à la cause XXIII, question 4 « Quaesitum ».⁶⁰

(8) Deuxièmement, ils font valoir qu'on ne peut, selon le droit, en appeler au pape pour contester la sentence de l'empereur, ainsi qu'il ressort du *Complément* <au *Décret* de Gratien>,⁶¹ au traité des appels, chapitre « Si duobus ».⁶²

(9) De même, du *Complément*, « Les fils légitimes » et « Causam », il ressort que les biens temporels ne tombent pas sous la juridiction du pape.⁶³

ce qui regarde l'ordre public, les prélats de la religion reconnaissent l'Empire qui t'a été conféré par une disposition surnaturelle et obéissent à tes lois, avec quelle affection dois-je alors leur obéir, à eux qui dispensent les mystères divins » (*Ibid.*). Sur la papauté de Gélase en général ainsi que sur sa pensée politique, voir W. Ullmann, *Gelasius I. (492-496): das Papsttum an der Wende der Spätantike zum Mittelalter*, Stuttgart, A. Hiersemann, 1981 (Päpste und Papsttum, Bd. 18), chapitre VII, sections 5 et 6.

⁶⁰ *Decretum*, pars II, causa XXIII, q. 4, cap. 45, ed. Friedberg, t. 1 [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 924.

⁶¹ Pour cette traduction, voir Jean Gaudemet, *Les sources du droit canonique. VIIIe – XXe siècle*, Paris, Cerf, 1993 (Droit canonique), p. 127.

⁶² L'appel est la contestation de la sentence d'un juge auprès d'une autorité à laquelle ce juge est directement soumis. La procédure d'appel est encadrée par une législation très stricte, codifiée dans le décret de Gratien. En règle générale, l'appel n'est valable que si l'autorité invoquée en appel occupe une fonction qui suit immédiatement dans la hiérarchie ecclésiastique la fonction occupée par le juge dont la sentence est contestée. Cette règle a pour effet d'interdire, par exemple, qu'un plaignant en appelle à l'archevêque pour contester le verdict d'un juge directement soumis à l'autorité de l'évêque diocésain. Le décret prévoit un certain nombre d'exceptions à cette règle. L'une d'entre elles concerne le pape. « Juge ordinaire de tous les chrétiens », son autorité peut être immédiatement invoquée en appel pour toute affaire relevant du domaine spirituel; qui plus est, n'ayant pas de supérieur au spirituel, ses propres jugements sont sans appel. Mais il y a plus: l'autorité du pape peut aussi être invoquée en appel pour des affaires temporelles, à condition que celles-ci relèvent de sa juridiction temporelle – dans le cas, par exemple, d'un litige concernant un vassal. C'est cette précision qui éclaire le sens de notre objection: l'empereur ne relevant pas de la juridiction du pape et n'ayant pas de supérieur au temporel, son jugement ne saurait être contesté par un appel au souverain pontife. Cf. J. Gaudemet, *Eglise et cité: histoire du droit canonique*, Paris, Cerf, 1994, p. 522. Voir également I. S. Robinson, « The Institutions of the Church 1073-1216 », dans *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, IV/1, D. Luscombe et J. Riley-Smith (dirs.), chapitre 11.

⁶³ *Liber extra*, ed. E. Friedberg [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], lib. IV, tit. XVII, c. vii, « Qui sunt filii legitimi », col. 712. Sous le titre « Qui sunt filii legitimi » sont rassemblées dans les collections de droit canonique les décrétales d'Alexandre III et

(10) Troisièmement, ils allèguent le fait que l'Église reconnaît les biens temporels des princes séculiers. C'est pourquoi l'Église paye un tribut à l'Empereur, ainsi qu'il ressort de la <Cause> XI <du Décret>, question I, chapitre « Magnum ».⁶⁴ Ils invoquent de multiples arguments en faveur de ce point.

(11) D'autres, en revanche, soutiennent que le pape possède les deux pouvoirs. Pour le montrer, ils allèguent ce qui est écrit à la distinction XXII <du Décret>, chapitre « Omnis »,⁶⁵ où il est dit que lui seul, à savoir le Christ, fonda l'Église et l'édifia sur la pierre de la foi aussitôt naissante, et confia en même temps à saint Pierre, le porteur de la clé de la vie éternelle, les droits des empires terrestre et céleste. C'est ce qu'ils confirment par le fait que l'empereur prête serment au pape, que le pape dépose l'empereur, et que le pape transféra l'empire d'Orient en Occident.⁶⁶ Et ils invoquent plusieurs autres arguments pour établir le même point.

d'Innocent III relatives à la filiation légitime, que l'Église pouvait à bon droit considérer comme relevant de sa compétence, puisqu'elle dépendait étroitement du mariage, au sujet duquel sa juridiction était admise de tous. La question de la légitimité revêtait une importance humaine, sociale et politique capitale, puisque de la légitimité d'un enfant dépendait son droit à l'héritage (Voir à ce propos l'étude de A. Lefebvre-Teillard, « *Causa natalium ad forum ecclesiasticum spectat*: un pouvoir redoutable et redouté », *Cahiers de Recherches Médiévales et Humanistes* 7 (2000), p. 93-103). C'est d'ailleurs un litige successoral qui est à l'origine de la décrétale « *causam* » invoquée par l'objectant. Ce litige opposait deux Anglais, un certain R., à son oncle, lequel, contestant la légitimité de la naissance de la mère de R. et, par conséquent le droit de ce dernier à hériter, l'avait fait déposséder de son héritage. Saisi de cette affaire, le pape avait, dans un premier temps, ordonné que R. soit réintégré dans la possession de ses biens « si celui-ci en avait été spolié par la violence ». Or cette intervention, dans un domaine, celui de la propriété, qui relevait de la juridiction séculière, ayant « fortement et ému et troublé » le roi Henri II d'Angleterre, le pape avait ensuite donné l'ordre à ses légats, chargés de l'affaire, de se borner à juger de la « cause principale », c'est-à-dire la question de la légitimité, laissant au roi le soin de juger des questions de propriété (« *mandamus, quatenus regi possessionum iudicium relinquentes, de causa principali, videlicet utrum mater quando avus suos profiscendi, plenius cognoscatis* »). Pour un argument similaire, cf. *Quaestio de potestate papae (Rex Pacificus) An Enquiry into the Power of the Pope*, ed. et trad. R. W. Dyson, Lampeter, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999, p. 11. Une abondante bibliographie a été consacrée au problème de la légitimation. On consultera le classique de P. Génestal, *Histoire de la légitimation des enfants en droit canonique*, Paris, E. Leroux, 1905.

⁶⁴ *Decretum*, pars II, causa 11, q. 1, cap. 28, ed. Friedberg, t. 1 [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 634.

⁶⁵ *Decretum*, pars I, dist. XXII, cap. 1, ed. Friedberg, t. 1 [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 73.

⁶⁶ « l'empereur prête serment au pape ». Le serment est le moment décisif du cérémonial du sacre, par lequel le pape consacre le monarque dans sa dignité royale ou impériale. Cf., à ce propos, les remarques de J. Rivière, *Le problème de l'Église et de l'État*, p. 8, qui explique que « en vertu d'un usage élevé à la hauteur d'une

(12) Et cette seconde opinion paraît plus raisonnable. La raison en est que le pouvoir spirituel est supérieur au temporel, non seulement en dignité mais aussi en causalité.⁶⁷ Mais « ce qui appartient aux effets préexiste dans les causes », ainsi que l'affirme Denys dans *Les noms divins*.⁶⁸ Il importe donc que le pouvoir temporel réside en celui qui est le souverain prélat de l'Église universelle. La majeure de ce raisonnement s'explique ainsi. Que le pouvoir spirituel soit supérieur en dignité, cela est suffisamment manifeste et tous l'accordent. C'est pourquoi il est dit à la distinction XCVI <du *Décret*>, chapitre « Duo quippe »:⁶⁹ « Le sacerdoce l'emporte bien plus sur le pouvoir royal que l'or n'est plus précieux que le plomb ».

règle de droit public, c'est seulement après la cérémonie du sacre que le roi de Germanie pouvait se dire empereur et être obéi comme tel ». Voir également l'ouvrage ancien – auquel renvoie Rivière – d'Anton Diemand, *Das Ceremoniell der Kaiserkrönungen von Otto I. bis Friedrich II.*, Munich, Lüneburg Verlag, 1894 (Historische Abhandlungen), qui contient, dans les appendices (p. 124 et ss), les *ordines* réglant le déroulement de la cérémonie du couronnement.

Cf. O. Hageneder, « Das päpstliche Recht der Fürstenabsetzung: Seine kanonistische Grundlegung », *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae*, 1 (1963), p. 53-95. Werner Goetz, *Translatio Imperii: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geschichtsdenkens und der politischen Theorien im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit*, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.

⁶⁷ Cf. *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], cap. IX, 262. Cf. aussi Hostiensis, *In Decretalium Libris Commentarii*, I, 15, 1, 40; cité par Carlyle et Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West*, vol. V [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 57], p. 329, n. 2.

⁶⁸ Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite, *Les noms divins*, II, 8 [*De divinis nominibus*, ed. B. R. Suchla, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, Bd. 133)]; (Corpus Dionysiacum, I, p. 133, 3-4); *Dionysiaca*, edd Ph. Chevallier et al., Bruges, Desclée de Brouwer, 1937, t. I, p. 101]. A propos de l'utilisation du pseudo-Denys par les penseurs politiques du Moyen Âge, voir D. Luscombe, « Some examples of the use made of the works of the pseudo-Dionysius by University teachers in the later Middle Ages », dans *The Universities in the Late Middle Ages*, P. Paquet et J. IJsewijn (dirs.), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1978 (Mediaevalia Lovaniensia, series I / Studia VI), p. 228-241 et en particulier les p. 231-232 concernant Jacques de Viterbe. Signalons que, selon l'éditrice du *Somnium Viridarii* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 51], p. 334, la proposition « quae sunt causatorum praeinsunt causis » proviendrait du *Liber de causis*. On comprend qu'elle puisse ensuite s'étonner que la même citation dans la *Quaestio de potestate papae* soit attribuée au pseudo-Denys (cf. *Quaestio de potestate papae*, ed. Dyson, p. 9: « Item, Dionysius in libro De divinis nominibus dicit quod quae sunt causatorum insunt causis etc. »). En réalité, c'est bien d'une citation du pseudo-Aréopagite qu'il s'agit, ce qui ne veut pas dire que certaines thèses du *Liber* relatives à l'ordre des causes ne se prêtaient pas à être exploitées dans le même sens que celles de Denys. On consultera à ce sujet la très éclairante étude de Francis Cheneval, « Proclus politisé: La réception politique de Proclus au moyen âge tardif », *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 78 (1996), p. 11-26.

⁶⁹ *Decretum*, pars I, d. XCVI, cap. 10, ed. Friedberg, t. I [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 340.

(13) Que le pouvoir spirituel soit supérieur sous l'angle de la causalité, à savoir parce que le pouvoir temporel dépend du pouvoir spirituel, on le montre de deux manières. Premièrement, cela peut se montrer à partir de l'ordre des choses. Ainsi, on voit, parmi les choses, que les corporelles sont régies par les spirituelles et en dépendent comme de leur cause. Et cela on peut le voir, à la fois dans le cas de <choses> diverses – ainsi les corps célestes sont régis par les anges – et dans le cas d'une même chose, par exemple en l'homme, en qui l'âme régit le corps et le meut. C'est pourquoi, de manière semblable, le pouvoir spirituel exerce une causalité sur le temporel <et pourquoi> le temporel dépend du spirituel comme de sa cause. En effet, le <pouvoir> temporel regarde davantage le régime de la vie corporelle, alors que le <pouvoir> spirituel concerne davantage le régime de la vie spirituelle. Hugues de Saint-Victor évoque cet argument au livre II du *Traité des sacrements*, deuxième partie, chapitre 4,⁷⁰ où il distingue deux vies, à savoir la corporelle, en vertu de laquelle le corps vit grâce à l'âme, et la spirituelle, en vertu de laquelle l'âme vit grâce à Dieu; et deux genres de biens desservant les biens de deux vies, à savoir les biens terrestres et les <biens> célestes ou spirituels; et deux peuples, à savoir les laïcs et les clercs; et deux pouvoirs, à savoir le <pouvoir> séculier et le spirituel. Or, s'il y a plusieurs degrés dans chacun de ces genres, ils se rapportent cependant tous à un <seul> chef. Établissant une comparaison entre ces deux pouvoirs, il écrit: « Autant la vie spirituelle est plus digne que la terrestre et l'esprit que le corps, autant le pouvoir spirituel l'emporte sur le pouvoir terrestre ou séculier en honneur et en dignité. Car c'est au pouvoir spirituel qu'il incombe d'instituer le pouvoir terrestre afin qu'il soit, et de le juger s'il n'a pas été bon. Quant à lui <sc. le pouvoir spirituel>, il a d'abord été institué par Dieu, et s'il dévie, il ne peut être jugé que par Dieu, ainsi qu'il est écrit: 'Le spirituel est juge de toutes choses, mais il n'est lui-même jugé par personne' ».⁷¹

(14) De ces propos il ressort avec évidence que le pouvoir spirituel est supérieur au temporel, non seulement en dignité, mais aussi sous l'angle de la causalité, puisqu'il lui revient de l'instituer et de le juger.

(15) Deuxièmement, la même chose peut être démontrée à partir de l'ordre des fins. Nous voyons ainsi, dans des arts <hiérarchiquement>

⁷⁰ Cf. Hugues de Saint-Victor, *Hugonis de Sancto Victore De Sacramentis Christianae fidei* [abrégé désormais *De sacramentis*], ed. R. Berndt, Münster, Aschendorff, 2008 (Corpus Victorinum. Textus historici, Vol. 1), p. 338-39; PL 176, 417-18.

⁷¹ *Idem, ibid.*, p. 339, 3-8; PL 176, 418.

ordonnés, que l'art auquel ressortit la fin dernière et principale commande aux autres arts, auxquels ressortissent les fins secondes. Or les pouvoirs en question sont comme des arts; mieux: le gouvernement des sujets est l'art des arts, et <ce,> maximalement en ce qui a trait à l'âme.⁷² Mais la fin vers laquelle doivent tendre les pouvoirs séculier et spirituel est le bien de la multitude, lequel consiste principalement à vivre selon la vertu. Car c'est dans l'opération de la vertu que consiste la félicité, qui est le bien parfait et final.

(16) Cependant, le pouvoir séculier et le pouvoir spirituel ne visent pas le bien de la multitude de la même façon. Le pouvoir séculier vise le bien de la multitude auquel il peut parvenir par des moyens naturels de même <qu'il vise> les biens qui contribuent à <l'obtention de> ce bien. La puissance spirituelle vise le bien surnaturel de la multitude, à savoir la béatitude éternelle, et y oriente. Or la fin surnaturelle est plus puissante et plus principale que toute autre fin. C'est pourquoi le pouvoir spirituel est supérieur au pouvoir séculier. Et parce que nous poursuivons ce bien par la puissance et l'opération du Christ, qui nous a fait entrer dans cette gloire, il s'ensuit que son vicaire l'emporte absolument en dignité et en causalité. Comme l'art supérieur dit à l'inférieur de quelle manière il doit opérer, de même le pouvoir spirituel commande au séculier.

(17) De là vient que c'est le pape qui transmet les lois aux princes d'après lesquelles ils exercent et doivent exercer leur juridiction temporelle. Et les princes séculiers ne sauraient tirer d'ailleurs les lois si celles-ci n'ont pas été préalablement approuvées par le pape.

(18) De là vient aussi que le pouvoir spirituel est dit sacerdoce royal. Parce que le Christ est à la fois roi et prêtre, son vicaire détient le pouvoir royal et le sacerdoce. Aussi est-ce par lui que le pouvoir royal est institué, ordonné, sanctifié et béni. C'est ainsi qu'il est écrit dans l'Ancien Testament, comme le dit Hugues⁷³ dans l'ouvrage cité: « Le sacerdoce fut d'abord institué par Dieu puis le pouvoir royal fut ordonné par le sacerdoce sur l'ordre de Dieu. » Et aussi, dans l'Église la dignité sacerdotale sanctifie le pouvoir royal par la bénédiction et le forme par l'institution.

⁷² Le même argument est repris au *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], ed. Dyson, p. 216.

⁷³ Hugues de saint-Victor, *De sacramentis* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 70], L. II, pars 2, c. iv, ed. Berndt, p. 339, 11-12; PL 176, 418.

(19) On peut confirmer cette thèse par les propos d'Augustin qui dit, au livre II de la *Cité de Dieu*, chapitre 21, que sans justice la chose publique ne peut être gouvernée. Or la vraie justice ne se trouve pas dans la chose publique si elle n'est pas régie par le Christ.⁷⁴ C'est pourquoi il n'y a pas de chose publique droite et vraie comme doit l'être la conduite du peuple chrétien, si son gouvernement ne regarde pas de droit le pape, qui est le vicaire du Christ.

(20) Il appert ainsi, le pouvoir spirituel étant supérieur même sous le rapport de la causalité au séculier, et ce qui se trouve dans l'effet préexistant de manière plus éminente dans la cause, que ce pouvoir spirituel précontient de manière plus excellente la juridiction et le pouvoir temporel. Ainsi, le pape détient de Dieu de façon immédiate les deux pouvoirs, alors que le prince séculier possède <le sien> de Dieu par l'intermédiaire du pape, si bien que les deux <pouvoirs> viennent de Dieu, puisque selon l'Apôtre « il n'y a pas de pouvoir qui ne vienne de Dieu ».⁷⁵

(21) Mais parce que tout ce qui vient de Dieu procède de lui selon un certain ordre, <et que> les deux pouvoirs viennent de Dieu et se ramènent à lui, il paraît raisonnable de dire que, puisqu'il y a une Église et un peuple de fidèles ainsi qu'un corps mystique, il y a aussi un seul chef dont dépendent les membres spirituellement et temporellement. Il s'ensuit que tout pouvoir dans l'Église, qu'il soit spirituel ou temporel, dépend d'un <principe> en lequel les deux résident, à savoir le successeur de Pierre et le vicaire du Christ, lequel dit de lui-même, à la fin <de l'Évangile selon saint> Matthieu: « Tout le pouvoir du ciel et de la terre m'a été donné ».⁷⁶

(22) Il faut cependant considérer que si les deux pouvoirs résident en la personne du pape c'est de façons différentes, car le pouvoir spirituel est en lui selon l'autorité première et l'exécution immédiate, alors que le temporel réside en lui selon l'autorité première mais non selon l'exécution immédiate, afin que celui qui combat pour Dieu ne s'en-

⁷⁴ *De civitate dei*, II, c. 21. Pour un commentaire de cette thèse cardinale de la pensée politique de saint Augustin, voir H.-X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme politique. Essai sur la formation des théories politiques du Moyen-Age*, Paris, Vrin, 1955 (L'Église et l'État au Moyen-Age, II), chapitre 2.

⁷⁵ Rom. 13, 1.

⁷⁶ Matt. 28, 18

combre pas des affaires de la vie civile,⁷⁷ et afin que les biens spirituels ne soient pas entravés par les temporels, <de sorte que>, plus le pouvoir spirituel sera affranchi de ces derniers, plus il pourra se consacrer aux choses divines.

(23) Le pape a donc les deux pouvoirs, seulement il transfère le pouvoir temporel et son exécution aux princes séculiers.

(24) Certains, toutefois, affirment que le pape possède les deux <pouvoirs> selon une autorité première et suprême, alors que l'empereur tient l'exécution du pouvoir temporel immédiatement de Dieu.

(25) Mais cela paraît douteux. En effet le pape posséderait en vain le pouvoir temporel s'il ne s'en servait pas ou s'il ne pouvait en concéder l'usage à un autre. Ainsi, il paraît plus raisonnable de dire que comme le pape institue le pouvoir séculier, il transfère aux princes séculier le pouvoir temporel, son usage ou son exécution. C'est ce que confirment les propos de Bernard,⁷⁸ au livre IV de la *Considération*, lorsqu'il écrit au pape Eugène: « Qu'essayes-tu encore de faire usage du glaive alors que tu as déjà reçu l'ordre de le remettre au fourreau? Pourtant celui qui nie que ce glaive t'appartient ne me semble pas avoir suffisamment porté attention à cette parole du Seigneur qui dit: 'remets ton épée au fourreau.'⁷⁹ Il est donc à toi et c'est à toi qu'il revient de le dégainer, sinon par ta main du moins à ton signe. Autrement, s'il ne te concernait en aucune manière, le Seigneur n'aurait pas répondu aux apôtres disant 'voici deux glaives': 'cela suffit', mais 'c'en est trop'.⁸⁰ Les deux <glaives> donc, le glaive spirituel et le matériel, appartiennent à l'Église, seulement celui-ci est dégainé au nom de l'Église, alors que le premier doit être dégainé par l'Église, l'un <par la main> du sacerdoce, l'autre par la main du soldat, mais bien entendu sur un signe du détenteur du sacerdoce et sur l'ordre de l'Empereur. »

(26) Qui plus est, il faut savoir que bien que le pape n'exerce pas régulièrement sa juridiction temporelle de manière immédiate, cependant il l'exerce immédiatement dans certains cas, ainsi qu'il ressort

⁷⁷ 2 Tim. 2, 4; *Decretum*, pars II, causa XXI, q. 2, cap. 4, ed. Friedberg, t. 1 [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 856.

⁷⁸ Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione*, l. IV, dans *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq, Romae, Editiones Cistercienses, 1957, vol. III, p. 454.

⁷⁹ Io. 18, 11.

⁸⁰ Lc 22, 38.

du *Complément*, articles « Qui filii sunt legitimi » et « Per venerabilem ». ⁸¹ Il s'agit des cas suivants, ainsi qu'il est indiqué dans le droit : premièrement, quand, par dévotion, les princes temporels accordent un bien temporel à l'Église du Christ, ce qui se produit de deux manières. Car il arrive parfois, comme le montre Hugues ⁸² dans le livre cité, que les princes ne concèdent à l'usage de l'Église que la seule utilité, c'est-à-dire l'usufruit, sans le pouvoir d'exercer la justice ; parfois, au contraire, ils accordent l'utilité et le pouvoir. Ainsi, bien que l'Église perçoive les fruits de la possession terrestre, elle exerce cependant son pouvoir de justice, non par l'intermédiaire d'ecclésiastiques, mais par l'intermédiaire de laïcs.

(27) Deuxièmement, quand il y a difficulté ou ambiguïté. En ce cas, il faut avoir recours au Siège Apostolique, ainsi que cela ressort du *Complément*, « Qui filii sunt legitimi », et « Per venerabilem. »

(28) Troisièmement, en raison d'un délit, par exemple si le prince séculier est un hérétique.

(29) Quatrièmement, en raison d'un défaut du juge séculier.

(30) Cinquièmement, en cas de vacance de l'empire.

(31) De ce qui précède on peut réfuter les arguments allégués en faveur de la seconde opinion.

(32) Concernant ce qui est dit en premier, à savoir que les <deux> pouvoirs sont distincts, il faut dire que cela est vrai. Seulement, l'un est subordonné à l'autre ; il est réductible à l'autre comme à sa cause. Ils sont donc, pris en eux-mêmes, distincts quant à leurs objets et quant à leurs fins. Cependant, du point de vue de ceux qui les détiennent, ils ne sont pas distincts suivant leur autorité première, car les deux conviennent à un seul de cette façon. Pour ce qui est de l'exécution immédiate, même du point de vue de ceux qui détiennent <le pouvoir>, ils sont distincts. Les deux pouvoirs viennent de Dieu, de manière immédiate en ce qui concerne le pape, qui détient les deux de par l'institution divine ; par contre, pour ce qui est des rois, ils viennent de Dieu par l'intermédiaire

⁸¹ *Liber Extra*, Lib. IV, t. XVII, cap. 13, ed. Friedberg, t. 2 [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 714-16.

⁸² Hugues de saint-Victor, *De sacramentis* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 70], L. II, pars 2, c. vii, ed. Berndt, p. 341, 5-13 ; PL 176, 420.

du pape, à qui il incombe d'instituer les princes séculiers et de les juger, ainsi que cela a été dit plus haut.⁸³ D'où il ressort que lorsqu'on dit que l'autorité vient de Dieu seul, cela est vrai, car elle ne vient pas de l'autorité humaine, mais de l'autorité divine. Il n'en découle pas, toutefois, qu'elle ne vient pas du pape; elle est bien de lui, non en tant qu'il est homme, mais en tant qu'il représente la personne de Dieu.

(33) Et quant à ce qu'on affirme en deuxième lieu, à savoir qu'on ne peut en appeler au pape, il faut dire que cela est vrai de manière générale, mais que dans les cas ardues et certaines circonstances il peut y avoir appel.

(34) Quant à ce qui est dit dans le droit, à savoir que les biens temporels ne relèvent pas de la juridiction du pape, il faut le comprendre relativement à l'exécution immédiate et régulière.

(35) Pour ce qui est avancé en troisième lieu, <à savoir> que l'Église reconnaît l'autorité exercée par le prince séculier, il faut dire que cela est vrai pour ce qui est de l'exécution immédiate; en revanche, pour ce qui est du pouvoir même, le prince séculier doit être reconnu par le pape.

(36) Quant à ce qui est ajouté à propos d'un tribut, il faut dire que l'Église ne paye pas un tribut à l'empereur comme à un supérieur, en reconnaissance de son autorité, mais en vue de la paix et de la tranquillité au nom desquelles l'Église doit être préservée et défendue, ainsi qu'il est écrit à la distinction XXII, question 8, chapitre « Tribut ».⁸⁴ Qui plus est, l'Église n'acquitte pas de tribut sur tout, car elle n'en paye pas sur les prémices, les dîmes, les offrandes et sur ce qu'on lui verse pour les sépultures; elle ne paye de tribut que sur les dons qu'elle perçoit de la part des vivants ou bien des séculiers, ainsi que cela ressort de la distinction XXIII, question 8, « Secundum canonicam ».

(37) De la sorte on peut répondre à n'importe quelle autre objection.

(38) En effet, le pape détient les deux juridictions ou pouvoirs, ainsi que cela a été dit. Si certains ont relevé d'autres arguments en faveur des princes, il reste que l'ordre institué par Dieu est immuable.

⁸³ *Supra*, §§13 et 14.

⁸⁴ Cf. *De Regimine Christiano* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 1], p. 292. Voir également le commentaire de Kempshall, *Common Good* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 4], p. 251.

Ainsi, quoi qu'il en soit ou quoi qu'il advienne en fait, il en est en droit comme nous l'avons dit plus haut.

(39) Il s'ensuit que lorsque le pape affirme qu'il ne possède pas la juridiction temporelle, il faut comprendre cela du point de vue de l'exécution régulière et immédiate. En cela aussi il veut conserver la paix des princes et par conséquent <celle> de l'Église. Les prélats de l'Église y sont incités aussi, afin qu'ils ne soient pas enclins à s'immiscer dans les affaires séculières.

<II>

(40) Après avoir vu de quelque façon ce qu'il en était du pouvoir du pape, il faut examiner de quelle manière tant les princes séculiers que les prélats doivent se comporter vis-à-vis des biens temporels de ceux qui sont soumis à leur pouvoir. Or ils ne sont pas les maîtres <de ces biens>, mais les administrateurs, protecteurs et intendants. D'où ces propos d'Augustin dans sa lettre au comte Boniface, repris dans la cause XXIII, question 8 « Quod autem nobis »:⁸⁵ « Si, à titre individuel, nous possédons de quoi nous suffire, ces biens ne sont pas à nous mais aux pauvres dont nous sommes en quelque sorte les administrateurs: ne revendiquons pas leur propriété par une usurpation condamnable ». Ce qui est requis de l'administrateur et de l'intendant est la bonne foi.⁸⁶ Ainsi que l'affirme l'apôtre en I Cor. 4: « Ainsi qu'on nous considère comme les serviteurs du Christ et les intendants des mystères de Dieu. Du reste, ce qu'on demande à des intendants c'est que chacun soit trouvé fidèle. »

(41) Et ainsi les prélats qui administrent des biens temporels doivent en user en bonne foi. Ils doivent les dépenser ou les distribuer pour un motif raisonnable et d'après la règle de charité, par exemple pour l'utilité de l'Église ou pour les pauvres ou pour d'autres usages pieux. De manière semblable, les princes séculiers ne doivent exiger ou recevoir des biens temporels de leurs sujets que pour des motifs raisonnables, car ils sont les administrateurs et les protecteurs de ces biens, et non les maîtres.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ *Decretum*, pars II, causa XXIII, q. viii, cap. 3, ed. Friedberg, t. 1 [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 32], col. 951.

⁸⁶ Pour le sens technique de cette expression et ses origines dans le droit romain, voir A. Beck, « Zu den Grundprinzipien der bona fides im römischen Vertragsrecht », dans *Aequitas und Bona Fides: Festgabe zur 70. Geburtstag von August Simonius*, Basel, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1955, p. 9-27.

⁸⁷ Cf. Kempshall, *Common Good* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 4], p. 250-251.

<III>

(42) Après ces considérations, il faut dire à propos de ce qui est avancé dans la question, que si les usures concernent les biens des clercs et des Églises, alors il faut dire catégoriquement que le pape peut faire grâce des usures ou les donner à l'usurier et, ainsi, l'absoudre, sans qu'il ait à restituer les usures à ceux à qui il les a extorquées. Mais il ne peut accorder un tel pardon que pour un motif raisonnable.

(43) Les usures peuvent aussi être perçues sur des biens appartenant à des laïcs relevant immédiatement de la juridiction de l'Église. En ce cas aussi, il peut tenir quitte, comme le peuvent également, pour une raison légitime, les princes séculiers avec les biens de leurs sujets. Et le pape en a d'autant plus le pouvoir qu'il possède une autorité plus pleine plénière et plus principale qu'un prince séculier quelconque.

(44) Cependant, <même> s'il le faisait sans motif raisonnable, ce qui adviendrait aurait force de loi, et celui à qui le pardon serait accordé ne serait pas tenu de restituer. Cependant, en agissant ainsi, le pape ne serait pas à l'abri de tout péché. Mais quand il agit ainsi, il faut toujours présumer qu'il le fait pour un motif raisonnable, à moins que le contraire ne soit manifestement vrai.

(45) Ou bien <les usures> ont été extorquées sur les biens appartenant à des laïcs tombant de façon immédiate sous la juridiction des princes séculiers. Et alors, il convient de dire que dans de tels cas où il peut exercer sa juridiction temporelle vis-à-vis de tels sujets, il peut accorder le pardon pour un motif raisonnable, ainsi que cela a été dit des autres cas.

(46) Si aucun de ces cas ne se présente, mais que le pape considère qu'un tel pardon est utile à l'Église ou, sinon, qu'il doit advenir pour un motif raisonnable, il doit exiger du prince séculier <que ce pardon soit accordé>, comme il doit le requérir aussi pour la défense et l'aide de l'Église.

(47) Toutefois, si le prince rechigne à obtempérer, le pape peut <accorder le pardon> lui-même, même s'il ne convient pas que ce soit lui, si ce n'est pour la plus grande utilité de l'Église et après considération des autres circonstances requises.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Cf. W. Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism* [ouvrage cité *supra*, n. 23], p. 93-94 pour l'importance donnée par les canonistes au XIII^e et XIV^e siècle à l'idée que l'Église peut exiger le concours de la puissance temporelle en vue de l'utilité de l'Église.

(48) Ainsi apparaît la solution à ce qui a été objecté en sens contraire. Quelqu'un peut bénéficier d'une remise de péché sans <obligation de> restitution si celui qui la lui accorde a le droit de le faire.⁸⁹

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LES ERMITES DE SAINT AUGUSTIN EN HONGRIE MÉDIÉVALE: ÉTAT DES CONNAISSANCES

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Abstract

Compared to the three other Mendicant Orders that settled down in Hungary during the Middle Ages, the Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine is the less investigated by researchers. This article (including a table of convents and a map) focuses on four topics that have been more or less explored until now: (1) the implantation of the Order in the Carpathian Basin, (2) the religious activities and spiritual trends of the Hungarian Hermits, (3) the material running of their friaries, (4) their general situation (crisis or revival?) at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Nearly as numerous as the Dominicans, the Hungarian Hermits soon got support from the royal court and the nobility. They were highly educated, took part in missions and sometimes bishopric. The Augustinian friaries owned real estate from the beginning. Even though they occasionally came into conflicts with burghers, all of them were not declining at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Key words:

Hungary; Middle Ages; Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine; Mendicant friars; Central Europe; poverty

Des quatre *ordines mendicantes* implantés à l'intérieur des frontières du royaume de Hongrie au Moyen Âge, l'Ordre des ermites de saint Augustin est, en proportion du nombre de couvents et de frères concernés, de très loin le moins étudié.² Cette désaffection s'explique

¹ Je remercie le secrétaire de rédaction de la revue *Augustiniana*, Geert Van Reyn, de m'avoir sollicitée pour cette contribution et de m'avoir transmis le texte du *Catalogus* (voir note 33).

² Les Carmes, également délaissés par l'historiographie, n'avaient en tout et pour tout que quatre établissements en Hongrie – soit environ dix fois moins que les Ermites de saint Augustin. Voir REGÉNYI, Kund Miklós, *Die Ungarischen Konvente der Oberdeutschen Karmelitenprovinz im Mittelalter*, Budapest-Heidelberg, Magyar Egyháztörténeti Enciklopédia Munkaközösség, 2001. Les localités situées hors des frontières hongroises sont nommées ici dans la langue officielle de l'État dans lequel elles se trouvent aujourd'hui.

aisément. Les Frères mineurs – conventuels³ et observants⁴ – d'une part, et les Ermites de saint Paul – ordre de création hongroise associant, comme chez les Ermites de saint Augustin, vie érémitique et apostolat⁵ – d'autre part, bénéficiaient d'une position nettement plus avantageuse en Hongrie à la fin du Moyen Âge: ils fournissaient évêques, théologiens, prédicateurs et confesseurs de rois ou d'aristocrates et disposaient d'une solide assise populaire.

Après un rapide tour d'horizon de l'historiographie et de la documentation connue à ce jour, je regrouperai les principaux acquis de la recherche en quatre thèmes: (1) l'implantation de l'Ordre dans le bassin carpatique, (2) les activités ecclésiastiques et les tendances spirituelles des ermites augustiniens hongrois, (3) le fonctionnement matériel des prieurés de Hongrie et enfin (4) leur situation générale – crise ou renouveau? – au tournant des xv^e et xvi^e siècles.

Aperçu diachronique de l'historiographie

Une première tentative de synthèse sur les Ermites augustiniens en Hongrie médiévale a été effectuée dans la seconde moitié du xviii^e siècle par un membre de l'Ordre – né en Hongrie occidentale et écrivant depuis le prieuré de Vienne –, Xystus Schier.⁶ Il est l'auteur d'une histoire générale des maisons de la province de Hongrie (1778)⁷ ainsi que d'un répertoire alphabétique par couvent (1776).⁸ L'une et l'autre rassemblent de précieux matériaux, tant textuels qu'archéologiques – dont certains ont disparu depuis. Ils s'appuient cependant sur un faible volume de sources originales et puisent abondamment dans la tradition

³ KARÁCSONYI, János, *Szent Ferencz rendjének története Magyarországon 1711-ig* [Histoire de l'ordre de saint François en Hongrie jusqu'en 1711], Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1922-1924, 2 vol.

⁴ de CEVINS, Marie-Madeleine, *Les Franciscains observants hongrois de l'expansion à la débâcle (vers 1450 - vers 1540)*, Rome, Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini, Bibliotheca seraphico-cappuccina 83, 2008.

⁵ ROMHÁNYI, Beatrix, « A pálos rendi hagyomány az oklevelek tükrében. Megjegyzések a pálos rend középkori történetéhez [La tradition historiographique de l'Ordre des ermites de Saint Paul à l'épreuve des sources. Observations sur l'histoire de l'ordre paulinien au Moyen Âge] », *Történelmi Szemle*, 2008 n° 3, p. 289-312; *Ead.*, « Die Pauliner im mittelalterlichen Ungarn », dans K. ELM (dir.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Paulinerordens*, Berlin, 2000, p. 143-156.

⁶ MIKSCH, Ferdinand Leopold, « Der Augustinerhistoriker Xystus Schier (1727-1772) », *Augustiniana* 18 (1968), p. 333-397.

⁷ SCHIER 1778. Les références bibliographiques indiquées dans l'Annexe III (Bibliographie) sont abrégées dans les notes dès la première occurrence.

⁸ SCHIER 1776.

de l'Ordre, forgée à partir de la fin du ^{xvi}^e siècle. Il en résulte des lacunes, confusions et erreurs à la fois chronologiques, toponymiques et topographiques.

L'histoire médiévale des Ermites augustiniens de Hongrie ne commença à bénéficier des progrès de la science historique qu'un siècle et demi plus tard. Asztrik Gábel examina, à l'aide de matériaux de première et de seconde main, le rôle intellectuel des membres hongrois de l'Ordre, en particulier celui d'Alexandre de Hongrie, maître à l'université de Paris au début du ^{xiv}^e siècle.⁹ Dans le genre synthèse, Ferenc Fallenbüchl (1873-1953), ermite augustinien, entreprit de broser une vaste fresque sur l'histoire de l'Ordre en Hongrie en étoffant la base documentaire ancienne à l'aide des sources éditées depuis le ^{xix}^e siècle.¹⁰ Paru en 1943 (puis traduit en allemand en 1965), son livre consacre un chapitre au Moyen Âge. L'auteur y rappelle les grandes étapes de l'implantation de l'Ordre en Hongrie – des origines guillemites aux bulles pontificales reconnaissant l'existence d'une province de Hongrie et accordant à ses membres les privilèges reconnus à l'ensemble de l'Ordre. Il expose les événements majeurs (chapitres provinciaux, relations avec la direction de l'Ordre, faveurs royales, etc.), dresse la liste des prieurs provinciaux et inventorie les prieurés hongrois – en citant parfois *in extenso* les chartes de donation ou de confirmation promulguées en leur faveur.

En dépit de ces avancées, l'ouvrage de Ferenc Fallenbüchl reçut un accueil réservé de la part des médiévistes hongrois. On lui reprocha la place étiquée de la période médiévale – une trentaine de pages, pour un volume qui en compte 241 – et plus encore son manque de rigueur historique. De fait, outre les erreurs d'identification¹¹ et les anachronismes du raisonnement ou de la formulation, l'auteur accorde la même valeur documentaire à la tradition de l'Ordre (Schier inclus) qu'aux textes authentiques et ne prend pas en compte les recueils de sources et monographies publiés dans l'entre-deux guerres. Dès 1943, Elemér Mályusz (1898-1989) pointa ces défauts dans une recension publiée dans la revue réformée *Egyháztörténet*.¹² Il saisit cette occasion pour suggérer des pistes de recherche. Sortant de l'ombre plusieurs documents (parfois inédits), il réfuta la vision de Fallenbüchl selon laquelle les Ermites de saint Augustin hongrois seraient restés en retrait

⁹ GÁBEL 1941.

¹⁰ FALLENBÜCHL 1943.

¹¹ Guillaume de Malavalle, fondateur des Guillemites, est ainsi présenté par Ferenc Fallenbüchl (p. 27) comme « duc d'Aquitaine »...

¹² MÁLYUSZ 1943.

dans les débats théologiques et ecclésiologiques de la fin du Moyen Âge – à l'époque où Martin Luther entraînait chez les Augustins réformés d'Erfurt.

Les fouilles archéologiques et les enquêtes d'histoire de l'art ont apporté de précieux renseignements sur le bâti d'une douzaine de prieurés¹³ – confirmant ou démentant selon les cas les hypothèses antérieures (à Buda¹⁴). Jointes aux données textuelles, ces éléments ont permis de compléter et réviser le contenu des inventaires généraux par établissement dont on disposait jusqu'alors. La « monastérologie » de Damianus Fuxhoffer, moine bénédictin de Pannonhalma qui élabora au milieu du XIX^e siècle le tout premier répertoire des établissements réguliers de Hongrie, comporte un volume sur les prieurés augustiniens.¹⁵ Il est remplacé aujourd'hui par l'inventaire exhaustif, assorti de cartes et de graphiques, publié par Béatrix Romhányi en 2000 et mis à jour en 2008.¹⁶ Le dictionnaire des couvents et monastères de Transylvanie, du Banat et de la région du Mureș dirigé par Adrian Andrei Rusu constitue un outil de travail également très utile sur la partie orientale du bassin carpatique.¹⁷

Cependant, hormis une poignée de monographies locales fondées principalement sur le matériel archéologique, les travaux d'analyse et de synthèse font cruellement défaut – comme le constataient déjà Gabriella Erdélyi en 2002¹⁸ et Beatrix Romhányi en 2005.¹⁹ Les ermites augustiniens affleurent de façon sporadique dans les publications historiques traitant indistinctement de tous les frères mendiants hongrois au Moyen Âge – à propos des pratiques économiques des frères,²⁰

¹³ Voir le bilan dressé dans ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 91.

¹⁴ Des découvertes récentes ont prouvé que l'église conventuelle des Ermites augustiniens de Buda ne se trouvait pas à l'emplacement de l'actuelle église des Capucins, comme on le pensait jadis. ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 91, note 4.

¹⁵ FUXHOFFER, Damianus, *Monasteriologia Regni Hungariae*, t. II: *Sacrae domus canonicorum, cisterciensium, ordinum equestrium et eremitarum augustinorum*, Pest-Vienne, 1869.

¹⁶ ROMHÁNYI 2000-2008.

¹⁷ RUSU 2000. S'il comporte de menues imperfections (les prieurés de Gătaia et Lipova ont été omis) et s'appuie pour l'essentiel sur l'historiographie (notamment ROMHÁNYI 2000), l'ouvrage fournit le plan de plusieurs établissements (Dej) ainsi que des indications complémentaires fondées sur les dernières fouilles archéologiques menées *in situ*.

¹⁸ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 52.

¹⁹ ROMHÁNYI 2005.

²⁰ ROMHÁNYI, Beatrix, « Kolostori gazdálkodás a középkori Magyarországon [Économie régulière en Hongrie médiévale] », dans A. KUBINYI, J. LASZLOVSKY, P. SZABÓ (dir.), *Gazdaság és gazdálkodás a középkori Magyarországon: gazdaságtörténet, anyagi kultúra, régészet*, Budapest, Martin Opitz, 2008, p. 401-412; de CEVINS,

de leur insertion dans la ville,²¹ de leurs relations avec le clergé paroissial.²² On les rencontre dans les études d'histoire locale ou régionale – dans la récente histoire du diocèse de Pécs,²³ par exemple – ou à propos de telle famille bienfaitrice (le lignage des Újlak²⁴). Pour obtenir une vue d'ensemble de la province augustinienne de Hongrie, il faut se contenter, en dehors de l'aperçu qu'en donne le chapitre de *Fallenbüchl* mentionné précédemment, des courts paragraphes qui lui sont consacrés dans les ouvrages généraux sur l'histoire religieuse de la Hongrie au Moyen Âge,²⁵ fussent-ils en partie obsolètes.²⁶ Il va sans dire que la littérature d'édification est d'un piètre secours.²⁷

Les apports les plus substantiels de ces dix dernières années sont redevables à Gabriella Erdélyi, qui a entrepris avec méthode, acuité et détermination l'exploration de plusieurs fonds romains. En confrontant les archives centrales de l'Ordre à ce que l'on sait par ailleurs des mesures réformatrices prises dans d'autres provinces, allemandes notamment, elle a reconstitué les étapes du processus de réforme parti du centre de l'Ordre dans les années 1420 et 1430 puis dans les deux premières décennies du XVI^e siècle.²⁸ Elle s'est livrée d'autre part à l'examen minutieux – sous l'angle religieux mais aussi social et anthropologique – d'un procès mettant en cause le comportement des frères du prieuré de Körmend en 1518, qui offre un éclairage

Marie-Madeleine, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie en Hongrie médiévale. L'état de la recherche », *Études franciscaines*, n. s., 3, 2010, fasc. 2, p. 166-207.

²¹ de CEVINS, Marie-Madeleine, « Les religieux et la ville au bas Moyen Âge: moines et frères mendiants dans les villes du royaume de Hongrie des années 1320 aux années 1490 », *Revue Mabillon*, n. s., t. 9, 1998, p. 97-126, ici p. 111-114.

²² de CEVINS, Marie-Madeleine, « Clercs de paroisse et frères mendiants dans les villes hongroises à la fin du Moyen Âge: entre coopération et concurrence », *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung* 1999 (85), p. 277-297.

²³ FEDELES Tamas, SARBAK Gábor, SÜMEGI József (dir.), *A pécsi egyházmegye története*, t. I: *A középkor évszázadai (1009-1543)* [Histoire du diocèse de Pécs, I: Les siècles du Moyen Âge (1009-1543)], Pécs, Fény Kft, 2009, ici p. 304-305 et 382-385.

²⁴ FEDELES, Tamás, « Egy középkori főúri család vallásossága » [La religiosité d'une famille aristocratique médiévale. L'exemple des Újlak], *Századok* 145 (2011), 2, p. 377-418.

²⁵ MÁLYUSZ 1971, p. 295-296.

²⁶ HERMANN, Egyed, *A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon 1914-ig* [Histoire de l'Église catholique en Hongrie jusqu'en 1914], München, Aurora Könyvek (Dissertationes Hungaricae ex historia Ecclesiae I), 1973 (1^e éd.), 1982 (2^e éd.), ici p. 85, 147-148.

²⁷ PUSKELY, Mária, « „Keressük együtt Isten árcát”. Az Ágoston-rendiek Magyarországon » [„Cherchons ensemble le visage de Dieu”. Les ermites de saint Augustin en Hongrie], *Vigilia* 62 (1997/ 9), p. 660-663 (rapide survol apologétique truffé d'anachronismes).

²⁸ ERDÉLYI 2002.

unique sur la question de la « crise » éventuelle des établissements augustiniens à la veille de la Réforme luthérienne.²⁹

Des sources éparées

Faire l'inventaire des sources relatives à l'histoire médiévale des Ermites de saint Augustin en Hongrie est une gageure, tant elles sont disséminées: aucun fonds conventuel ni provincial hongrois n'a subsisté, et les archives romaines n'ont été que très partiellement investiguées.

Les actes des prieurs généraux de l'Ordre³⁰ – en cours d'édition par l'Institut historique des Ermites de saint Augustin de Rome³¹ et dont les éléments hongrois ont été répertoriés par Pál Timkovics dans les années 1970³² – constituent un fonds précieux encore peu exploré. Par ailleurs, les sondages de Gábor Dózsa dans les archives centrales de l'Ordre ont fait surgir trois listes de couvents dressées à des dates différentes, avec des lacunes il est vrai, et une déformation systématique des toponymes qui rend les identifications délicates. Le plus ancien, inédit et fragmentaire, aurait été établi entre 1419 et 1460. Le second, édité sous forme abrégée,³³ a été rédigé entre 1539 et 1551, au moment où l'Ordre commençait à souffrir des destructions turques et de la propagation du luthéranisme. Plus détaillé puisqu'il procède *districtus* par *districtus*, il comporte des oublis manifestes (Visegrád, Borovo, Lövő et Güssing) et des erreurs (en mentionnant des couvents disparus ou fermés depuis la fin des années 1520, comme Ilok et Buda).³⁴ La

²⁹ ERDÉLYI 2005. Résumé en anglais, agrémenté de parallèles avec la réforme d'autres ordres religieux en Hongrie à la fin du Moyen Âge, dans: ERDÉLYI, Gabriella, « Conflict and Cooperation: The Reform of Religious Orders in Early Sixteenth-Century Hungary », dans M. CRĂCIUN et E. FULTON (dir.), *Communities of Devotion: Religious Orders and Society in East Central Europe, 1450-1800*, Aldershot, Ashgate (Catholic Christendom, 1300-1700), 2011, p. 121-152.

³⁰ *Archivum Generalis Ordinis Eremitarum sancti Augustini* (à Rome), en particulier les *Registri dei Revenrendissimi Padri Generali*, Serie Dd et les *Collette del Padre Generale* 1441-1519.

³¹ *Fontes Historiae Ordinis Sancti Augustini*, Series I: *Registra Priorum Generalium*, Rome, Istituto Storico Augustiniano, 1976-

³² Regeste manuscrit conservé au département des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque de l'Université ELTE de Budapest (Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Egyetemi Könyvtár, Kézirattár, H 306, *Timkovics-hagyaték*).

³³ P.P.E., « Catalogus conventuum O.E.S. Augustini tempore prioris generalis Hieronymi Seripandi (a. 1539-1551) », *Analecta Augustiniana* 6 (1915), p. 68 (*Provincia Ungariae*), abrégé ci-après en *Catalogus*.

³⁴ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 96-97, note 37.

troisième liste, partielle elle aussi, est postérieure à 1542. Aucun inventaire antérieur n'ayant survécu, l'état du réseau des prieurés augustiniens pendant les deux premiers siècles de leur histoire échappe à toute observation, condamnant les chercheurs à de fragiles hypothèses en matière de chronologie.³⁵

D'autres surprises attendent ceux d'entre eux qui sont prêts à s'aventurer dans les archives du Vatican. En témoigne la découverte fortuite par Gabriella Erdélyi, dans le Fonds Barberini de la Bibliothèque du Vatican, d'un registre contenant les dépositions des 49 témoins interrogés pour instruire le procès impliquant les Ermites de Körmend en 1518,³⁶ document d'une richesse exceptionnelle.³⁷

Le procès-verbal de visite dressé en 1505 au prieuré de Bardejov est l'un des rares textes issus de la province hongroise qui soient parvenus jusqu'à nous.³⁸ Les sources externes à l'Ordre existent mais posent d'épineux problèmes d'interprétation. Il y est souvent question d'« ermites », ou d'« ermites de saint Augustin » (*fratres heremitae Sancti Augustini*) mais la formule s'applique aussi aux autres ermites suivant théoriquement la même « règle ». Il en résulte de fréquents amalgames dans l'historiographie ancienne entre Ermites de saint Paul et Ermites de saint Augustin, sans parler des Guillemites (ou Wilhelmites).³⁹ Seul le croisement de toutes ces sources – qui suppose le dépouillement systématique des comptes municipaux, testaments, chartes royales ou seigneuriales de fondation ou de donation, des actes de confirmation épiscopaux – permettra d'élucider ces problèmes d'affiliation.

Le matériel archéologique est peu abondant : les bâtiments et leur mobilier ont généralement disparu. Ils n'ont survécu que là où les établissements augustiniens sont passés entre les mains d'autres ordres

³⁵ Beatrix Romhányi suggère par exemple d'avancer la naissance du prieuré de Lipova, où Charles-Robert d'Anjou avait fondé un couvent franciscain, à la première moitié du XIV^e siècle, bien que sa première mention ne date que de 1460. ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 95, note 26.

³⁶ Édition (avec introduction et notes) : ERDÉLYI Gabriella, *The Register of a Convent Controversy (1517-1518)*, Budapest-Rome, 2006 ; ms : Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Fondo Barberiniani Latini, vol. 2666.

³⁷ Voir ERDÉLYI 2005.

³⁸ Édition : WAGNER Carolus, *Diplomatarium comitatus Sarosiensis, Posonii-Cassoviae*, 1780, p. 540.

³⁹ On a longtemps affirmé que les Guillemites, implantés dans le bassin carpatique avant les Ermites de saint Augustin, s'étaient fondus dans l'Ordre augustinien au milieu du XIII^e siècle, en application des bulles *Licet Ecclesiae* d'Alexandre IV (1256) puis *Ea quae iudicio* de Clément IV (1266). En réalité, dans 4 ou 5 cas au moins (Körmend, Komár, Velký Šariš et Újhely), les sources hongroises laissent penser que les liens avec la congrégation guillelmitique ont perduré au-delà du XIII^e siècle. ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 91-92.

(comme à Bardejov, Križevi, Osijek et probablement à Velike) et se situent presque toujours en dehors des frontières actuelles de la Hongrie – la Slovaquie et la Transylvanie ayant été moins affectées par les guerres turques.⁴⁰ Et lorsque les Ermites avaient repris les murs d'autres réguliers – comme à Bátmonostor, fondé à partir d'un monastère bénédictin –, on peine évidemment à y repérer des traits augustinien. Les douze chantiers de fouilles ouverts jusqu'à présent ont néanmoins permis d'affiner la localisation des prieurés dans l'espace urbain, de dater les vestiges exhumés et d'en savoir plus sur le périmètre des couvents (présence ou non d'un cimetière, comme celui qui entourait le prieuré de Buda).⁴¹

I. L'IMPLANTATION DE L'ORDRE EN HONGRIE MÉDIÉVALE

Nombre de couvents et de frères

La date de naissance officielle de la province augustinienne de Hongrie demeure obscure. Plutôt que 1262 (la bulle *Religiosam vitam* ne parlant pas de *provincia*), les historiens penchent aujourd'hui pour 1278 (première mention dans les archives centrales de l'Ordre d'un provincial de Hongrie) et au plus tard 1295 (première mention de la province de Hongrie).⁴² L'affiliation augustinienne des deux couvents de moniales de Veszprém et de Cluj (Koloszvár) – alléguée par la tradition interne jusqu'à Xystus Schier – ne trouvant pas confirmation dans les sources médiévales, on considère que l'Ordre n'était présent en Hongrie que sous sa forme masculine.

Les estimations quantitatives sur les Ermites hongrois ont connu une inflation constante au fil des siècles. Alors que les auteurs du XVII^e et du début du XVIII^e siècle s'en tenaient à une douzaine ou une quinzaine de prieurés, Schier porte leur nombre à 24 et Fuxhoffer aboutit à un total de 23.⁴³ Fallenbüchl comptabilise 23 maisons en 1484 puis 20 en 1498, sur la foi des actes des chapitres provinciaux.⁴⁴ Toutefois, en additionnant toutes les mentions puisées dans la documentation consultée (de fiabilité certes aléatoire, on l'a vu), il suppose l'existence d'une trentaine de maisons à la fin du Moyen Âge.⁴⁵ Elemér Mályusz considère qu'il faut revoir les chiffres anciens à la hausse, dès le XIV^e siècle, et

⁴⁰ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 98.

⁴¹ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 98.

⁴² GUTIÉRREZ 1985, p. 50-51.

⁴³ Brève rétrospective dans: FALLENBÜCHL, p. 33-34.

⁴⁴ FALLENBÜCHL, p. 29 et 33.

⁴⁵ FALLENBÜCHL, p. 57.

avance un total de 25 à 30 établissements vers 1500.⁴⁶ L'inventaire du milieu du xvi^e siècle (1539-1551), incomplet, fait état de 32 établissements – dont l'un (*Iegut* = Malý Šariš?) signalé comme tombé aux mains des protestants depuis 1540.⁴⁷ En croisant ces indications avec les données archéologiques, Beatrix Romhányi obtient un maximum absolu de 43 communautés affiliées à l'Ordre des ermites de saint Augustin.⁴⁸ Mais l'existence de 4 prieurés demeure hypothétique (leur fondation, programmée, resta peut-être lettre morte); 4 ou 5 autres couvents guillemites ont pu le demeurer plusieurs décennies après 1266; et 4 créations au moins eurent une durée de vie très courte.⁴⁹

Ce gonflement numérique conduit à réviser la place de l'Ordre dans le paysage monastique et mendiant hongrois.⁵⁰ Moins nombreux certes que les Frères mineurs – surtout après l'essor spectaculaire de l'Observance, dans la seconde moitié du xv^e siècle –, les Ermites de saint Augustin arrivent presque à égalité avec les Prêcheurs, implantés en Hongrie dès 1221. Le cas est singulier en Europe centrale: pour comparaison, le royaume de Bohême ne comptait que 15 prieurés augustiniens avant les guerres hussites. En Silésie, sur 55 couvents mendiants, seulement 5 ou 6 relevaient de l'Ordre.⁵¹ Certes, tandis que les établissements dominicains abritaient une vingtaine de frères à la fin du Moyen Âge,⁵² les prieurés augustiniens dépassaient rarement la douzaine de membres, du moins d'après les maigres indices textuels⁵³ et archéologiques⁵⁴ disponibles, qui corroborent leur nature érémitique.

⁴⁶ MÁLYUSZ 1971, 276 (258-259); MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 431.

⁴⁷ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 96-97, d'après les indications fournies par Gábor Dózsa.

⁴⁸ ROMHÁNYI 2000, p. 156.

⁴⁹ Voir Annexe I.

⁵⁰ À leur apogée numérique vers 1500, les frères mendiants hongrois (environ 3000) se répartissaient en quelque deux cents couvents masculins – sur un total de 350 à 400 communautés régulières – dont environ 40 couvents dominicains (soit 400 à 600 frères) et 110 établissements franciscains, parmi lesquels 70 (soit 1500 à 1700 frères) appartenaient à la vicairie puis province observante de Hongrie. ROMHÁNYI 2000, *passim*.

⁵¹ FONT, Márta (dir.), *Dinasztia, hatalom, egyház. Régiónk formálódása Európa közepén, 900-1453* [Dynastie, pouvoir et Église. La formation des régions au cœur de l'Europe de 900 à 1453], Pécs, 2009, p. 429-430.

⁵² HARSÁNYI, András, *A domonkosrend Magyarországon a reformáció előtt* [L'Ordre des dominicains en Hongrie avant la Réforme], Debrecen, 1938.

⁵³ Une charte royale de 1482 dressée au nom de Mathias Corvin prévoyait la livraison aux frères du prieuré de Dej d'une partie de la production extraite de la saline royale voisine... à condition qu'ils soient au moins douze à prendre part à la messe fondée dans leur église pour le salut de l'âme des rois de Hongrie. MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 431.

⁵⁴ Le cloître de Pápóc ne comportait qu'une aile, au lieu des quatre corps de bâtiment habituels. ROMHÁNYI 2000, p. 50.

Le poids des maisons hongroises dans la dynamique de l'Ordre doit être revalorisé en conséquence. Alors que les prieurés de Bavière, d'Autriche, de Bohême-Moravie et de Pologne-Lituanie formaient une seule *provincia* jusqu'à la fin du Moyen Âge, la province autonome de Hongrie regroupait près d'un dixième des établissements répertoriés en 1329 dans les 24 provinces augustiniennes.⁵⁵ Le choix d'Esztergom comme lieu de réunion du chapitre général de 1385 n'est certainement pas sans rapport avec cette réalité.⁵⁶

La province de Hongrie avait-elle atteint alors son épanouissement maximal pour le Moyen Âge? La chronologie des fondations diffère nettement en tout cas de celle des Frères mineurs (conventuels et observants) et Prêcheurs, plus étalée.⁵⁷ Entre les années 1240 et la reconnaissance de l'Ordre en 1256, quatre établissements guillemites affleurent dans la documentation (Esztergom, Sáros, Komár et Körmend).⁵⁸ Les créations véritablement augustiniennes se succédèrent jusqu'à la fin du XIII^e siècle à un rythme modéré (probablement 6 ou 7 maisons) – sans aucun moyen de savoir d'ailleurs d'où venaient les premiers Ermites de Hongrie (étaient-ils toscans, bavarois ou hongrois?). La plupart des prieurés semblent remonter au siècle suivant, en particulier au règne de Charles-Robert (ou Charles) I^{er} d'Anjou (1301/1310-1342) – qui correspond au pic des fondations (13) –, même s'ils n'apparaissent parfois nominalement que dans les inventaires des XV^e et XVI^e siècles. À l'inverse des Franciscains de l'Observance, les fondations se raréfient au XV^e siècle (une dizaine au plus), se poursuivant néanmoins après la propagation du luthéranisme (1521).⁵⁹

Répartition géographique et insertion dans la topographie urbaine

Le réseau des couvents d'Ermites de saint Augustin couvrait le bassin carpatique de façon assez homogène⁶⁰ – ce que reflète le découpage administratif de la province hongroise au milieu du XVI^e siècle, articulé en 7 *districti* portant respectivement les noms d'Esztergom (6 *conventus*), Pécs (5), Eger (3), Sépusie (4), Zala (5), Slavonie (3) et Transylvanie (5).⁶¹ Il était lâche dans les secteurs les moins peuplés, comme le centre de la

⁵⁵ GUTIÉRREZ, *passim*.

⁵⁶ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 431.

⁵⁷ Aperçu visuel de la chronologie des fondations (et des fermetures) de couvents: ROMHÁNYI 2000, p. 113.

⁵⁸ BÁNDI 1979, p. 360-361.

⁵⁹ Voir Annexe I en fin d'article.

⁶⁰ Voir Annexe II.

⁶¹ Source: *Catalogus*. Voir Annexe II.

Grande Plaine (aucun couvent) ou la Transylvanie, et plus resserré près des concentrations de peuplement (en Transdanubie, dans le Coude du Danube, en Sépusie). Un seul « blanc » pose problème: le centre et le nord de la Slovaquie actuelle (« Haute Hongrie »). Cette anomalie résulte vraisemblablement de la présence ancienne de couvents dominicains et surtout franciscains (conventuels) dans cette partie du royaume,⁶² ainsi que, au sud-est de la Slovaquie, de la forte densité de maisons d'Ermites de saint Paul dans une région déjà parsemée de monastères bénédictins.⁶³ De la même manière, Beatrix Romhányi explique l'absence de prieurés augustinien dans les territoires saxons de Transylvanie par l'installation précoce des Frères mineurs et prêcheurs.⁶⁴

On mesure mal le rôle du fondateur dans le choix des sites conventuels. La proximité d'une résidence seigneuriale, épiscopale ou royale pouvait constituer un critère décisif. La présence des Ermites augustinien dans plusieurs villes royales ou épiscopales (Buda, Székesfehérvár, Esztergom, Oradea, Pécs, Vác) tient manifestement à l'identité de leur fondateur. Inversement, comme le montre la géographie des couvents à l'échelle du royaume, l'existence préalable d'autres établissements réguliers, mendiants et érémitiques notamment, a eu un effet répulsif.

En dehors de quelques prieurés installés dans les grands centres urbains du royaume magyar (dont Buda et Esztergom), la plupart des couvents augustinien étaient érigés dans des bourgades, voire de modestes villages regroupant moins de 400 ou 500 âmes à la fin du ^{xv}^e siècle (Borovo, Ercsi, Lórév, Kaza...).⁶⁵ La vocation érémitique de l'Ordre était ainsi préservée.

Les chantiers de fouilles ayant permis de localiser précisément les prieurés dans l'espace urbain – à Buda, Pécs, Esztergom, Oradea et Székesfehérvár – tendent à prouver que, derniers arrivés dans la ville (jusqu'à la vague de fondations de l'Observance franciscaine), les Ermites augustinien s'installaient souvent dans des quartiers excentrés, plus que les Franciscains ou les Dominicains (à Buda comme à Pécs⁶⁶). À l'instar des autres établissements réguliers, ils restaient à bonne distance des églises paroissiales. Le prieuré Saint-Anne d'Ilok jouxtait l'église paroissiale de la ville; mais cela explique peut-être que le seigneur-patron ait demandé sa démolition en 1475.⁶⁷

⁶² Voir Annexe II et ROMHÁNYI 2000, p. 152 et 150.

⁶³ Voir cartes dans ROMHÁNYI 2000, p. 148 et 142.

⁶⁴ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 96-97.

⁶⁵ de CEVINS, « Les religieux et la ville... », p. 111-114.

⁶⁶ FEDELES *et alii* (dir.), *A pécsi...*, p. 383.

⁶⁷ FEDELES 2011, p. 389.

Précaution supplémentaire pour garantir leur subsistance, les frères augustinien s'éloignaient autant que possible des établissements réguliers préexistants. Ils y étaient parfois contraints : en 1344, le pape Clément VI, répondant à la plainte des Frères mineurs d'Ilok, ordonna aux Ermites de respecter une distance minimale de 140 *cannae* par rapport au cloître franciscain.⁶⁸

Fondateurs

Ce n'est pas un hasard si les inflexions de la courbe des fondations augustinien se calquent sur les ruptures dynastiques royales. Pendant tout le Moyen Âge en effet, le souverain se taille la part du lion.⁶⁹ Béla IV (1235-1270) est redevable presque à lui seul de la première vague de créations, à partir des années 1240. Il s'inscrivait dans le programme de reconstruction du royaume, dévasté par l'invasion tataro-mongole de 1241-1242. Après une pause au tournant des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles, Charles-Robert d'Anjou renoua avec les fondations érémitiques. Des années 1320 à 1350, la proportion de créations royales frôle les deux tiers – soit bien plus que dans tout autre ordre régulier. Cette seconde vague prolongeait la tradition angevino-napolitaine. Rappelons que le cardinal Richard Annibaldi, protecteur de l'Ordre et fervent partisan de l'avènement du capétien Charles d'Anjou sur le trône de Sicile, avait couronné celui-ci en 1266;⁷⁰ au début du règne de Charles-Robert, la cour de Naples écoutait avec ferveur le théologien et prédicateur augustinien *Augustinus Triumphus* (ou Trionfo de Ancona) (1243-1328), élève de Thomas d'Aquin.⁷¹

On manque cependant d'éléments pour apprécier cette « continuité angevine », plus aisément repérable chez les Frères mineurs.⁷² Elle passait parfois par les femmes. Élisabeth Łokietek, veuve de Charles-Robert, aurait fondé le couvent de Bardejov. Son testament (1380) gratifie simultanément de 300 florins chacune des trois provinces

⁶⁸ FEDELES *et alii* (dir.), *A pécsi...*, p. 384.

⁶⁹ Voir tableau récapitulatif dans ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 94.

⁷⁰ GÁBRIEL 1941, p. 25; FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 31. Voir aussi : BOESPFLUG-MONTECCHI Thérèse, « Riccardo Annibaldi, cardinal de Saint-Ange », *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* 46 (1992), p. 30-50.

⁷¹ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 31, note 2; HERMANN, *A katolikus...*, p. 147-148.

⁷² de CEVINS, M.-M. et KOSZTA, L., « Noblesse et ordres religieux en Hongrie sous les rois angevins (v. 1323-1382) », dans N. COULET et J.-M. MATZ (dir.), *La noblesse dans les territoires angevins à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Actes du colloque d'Angers-Saumur (3-6 juin 1998), Rome, École Française de Rome, Collection de l'E.F.R. n° 275, 2000, p. 585-606.

dominicaine, franciscaine et augustinienne de Hongrie – placées ainsi sur un pied d'égalité, ce qui est assez inhabituel – tandis qu'elle lègue (seulement) 200 florins aux Ermites de saint Paul.⁷³ En revanche, les membres des dynasties suivantes (Luxembourg, Habsbourg et Jagellon) manifestèrent un moindre intérêt envers les Ermites. Le prieuré de Bardejov est probablement la dernière fondation royale *ex nihilo*. Les dons se poursuivaient néanmoins. Vers 1520, le roi Louis II Jagellon (1516-1526) soutenait la politique réformatrice du provincial Blaise de Pécs.⁷⁴

Les évêques hongrois, presque tous issus du clergé séculier, ne furent pas les plus ardents propagateurs du *propositum vitae* des Ermites de saint Augustin. À peine un huitième des fondations leur serait imputable. La plus ancienne, le prieuré d'Oradea, remonte au XIII^e siècle. Trois créations épiscopales suivirent sous le règne de Charles-Robert – sur les 13 de la période 1308-1342. Cette faveur permit aux Ermites de s'implanter dans cinq centres de diocèse (sur 12 à 14): Vác, Eger, Pécs, Alba Iulia et Oradea – leur présence à Esztergom résultant de l'initiative royale. Il faut dire que nombre de cités épiscopales enserraient déjà dans leurs murs des couvents franciscains ou dominicains à l'époque de la reconnaissance officielle de l'Ordre.⁷⁵

Des aristocrates prirent le relais des fondations royales et épiscopales à partir du milieu du XIV^e siècle et des nobles les imitèrent au siècle suivant. En tant que *patronus*, ils se préoccupaient de garantir à la fois la réputation et la prospérité de « leur » couvent. Fondé avant 1350, le prieuré d'Ilok bénéficia ainsi d'indulgences pontificales à la demande du seigneur local.⁷⁶ Parmi les laïcs, on pourra s'étonner de la faible participation des bourgeois aux fondations augustinienes, en comparaison du soutien qu'ils apportaient aux Frères mineurs et prêcheurs.

Ces remarques rejoignent deux autres questions cruciales: celle de la participation des frères de la province augustinienne hongroise aux grands chantiers de l'Église latine d'une part et celle de leur rayonnement auprès des laïcs, d'autre part.

⁷³ FEJÉR, György (éd.), *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, Buda, Regia Universitas, 1829-1844, t. IX, vol. 5., p. 400-406, ici p. 404; ms original: Archives Nationales Hongroises (*Magyar Országos Levéltár*, Budapest), Dl 6692.

⁷⁴ ERDÉLYI 2002 p. 60 et 67 note 70.

⁷⁵ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 93-94.

⁷⁶ FEDELES 2011, p. 401.

II. DES FRÈRES POLYVALENTS

Missions, épiscopat et promotion de la croisade

La position de la Hongrie comme avant-poste de la chrétienté face aux païens et aux « schismatiques » avait motivé l'arrivée très précoce, dès le début des années 1220, de Frères prêcheurs puis mineurs. En dépit de leur moindre engagement sur les fronts missionnaires de la *christianitas*, les Ermites de saint Augustin semblent avoir été mis à contribution en Hongrie, peut-être dès le XIII^e siècle – au prieuré de Gătaia⁷⁷ – et au plus tard pendant le siècle angevin. Beatrix Romhányi observe que l'on trouve un prieuré augustinien dans les deux quartiers urbains du royaume magyar qualifiés d'« arménien(s) » (*Örmény*) ou peuplés d'« Arméniens » – terme générique désignant tous les chrétiens orientaux sans distinction ethnique ou géographique –, c'est-à-dire à Esztergom (quartier d'*Örmény*) et à Buda (quartier Saint-Pierre).⁷⁸ Charles-Robert et Louis d'Anjou, qui avaient à cœur de rallier les « schismatiques » à Rome pour contenter la papauté mais aussi favoriser leur expansion dans les Balkans, ont pu voir dans les Ermites augustinien de précieux auxiliaires dans l'accomplissement de leurs projets.

La carrière ecclésiastique de l'un d'entre eux, Étienne de l'Île – probablement sorti du prieuré de Lórév, à en juger par son nom (*de Insula* ou *de Franco*) – semble confirmer cette hypothèse. Après plusieurs années de campagnes d'évangélisation auprès des Coumans (encore païens) et des « schismatiques », il fut nommé évêque de Nitra (1349-1367) – un diocèse où des groupes de Vaudois avaient été repérés – puis enfin archevêque de Kalocsa (1367-1382) – second archevêché du royaume, marqué jusqu'à la fin du Moyen Âge par une orientation missionnaire, puisqu'il comptait des évêchés suffragants à la frontière serbe et abritait de nombreuses communautés valaques orthodoxes en Transylvanie.⁷⁹ Enfin, plusieurs membres de l'Ordre furent installés, à l'instigation des rois angevins, à la tête des évêchés frontaliers de Belgrade et de Milcov (Milkó).⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Fondé par le roi Béla IV au sud de la Grande Plaine, dans une zone où les Coumans avaient été autorisés à s'installer peu après 1240, ce prieuré ferma ses portes avant 1330, après le départ des Coumans. ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 95.

⁷⁸ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 93.

⁷⁹ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 93; UDVARDY 1956; ENGEL, Pál, *Magyarország világi archontológiája, 1301-1457*, Budapest, MTATTI, 1996 [version numérique complétée, 2001, rubrique « Főpapok »]. L'île dont il est question ici est celle de Csepel, au sud du district actuel de Budapest.

⁸⁰ À Belgrade sont mentionnés « frère Paul » (1332-1339), qui représentait le roi Charles-Robert à Avignon, puis « frère Jean » en 1363 et Nicolas *de Frusten* en 1365 – ce

De façon générale, depuis qu'elles ont été complétées par les monographies et les répertoires prosopographiques, les listes épiscopales font apparaître une implication des Ermites plus active qu'on ne le croyait jadis dans le fonctionnement des évêchés hongrois. Elle caractérise le siècle angevin mais aussi le début du règne de Sigismond de Luxembourg (1387-1437). On assiste alors à la recrudescence des investitures d'évêques issus de l'Ordre. Xystus Schier en avait relevé quatre entre 1390 et 1395 – au siège (virtuel) de *Nicopolis*, peu avant la croisade de ce nom, mais aussi à Pécs et à Esztergom.⁸¹ Ferenc Fallenbüchl ajoute à cette liste un auxiliaire (*suffragans*) de l'évêque d'Eger mentionné en 1399.⁸² Ces promotions cadrent mal avec les réticences exprimées par Sigismond au concile de Constance quant à l'accession des réguliers à l'épiscopat. L'orientation missionnaire des Ermites de saint Augustin faisait d'eux, semble-t-il, une exception.

Le xv^e siècle correspond toutefois à un net recul dans l'animation par ceux-ci des évêchés hongrois. En 1460, le roi Mathias Corvin nomma l'ermite augustinien nommé Marc, originaire de Fiume, au siège de Zengg, en Dalmatie – traditionnellement occupé par des Dominicains sous les rois angevins puis par des Franciscains observants; c'est lui qu'il envoya en 1464 plaider auprès de Pie II la canonisation de Marguerite de Hongrie.⁸³ Le cas est isolé. Dans l'ensemble, les rois de Hongrie recrutaient de préférence leurs conseillers privilégiés chez les Mineurs ou les Prêcheurs. En dehors peut-être de Jean, originaire de Souabe, chapelain de Sigismond de Luxembourg en 1428 qui serait entré ensuite au couvent de Körmend,⁸⁴ aucun des confesseurs attirés du roi de Hongrie ne semble avoir appartenu à l'Ordre.

Bien que leur engagement soit resté nettement plus discret que celui des Franciscains observants, les Ermites comptèrent apparemment eux aussi parmi les promoteurs de la guerre sainte contre les Ottomans. Dès 1375, le pape Grégoire IX avait dépêché en Hongrie auprès de Louis le Grand l'ermite Bonaventure de Padoue, pour qu'il incite le roi à lutter contre les Turcs; devenu cardinal, il serait retourné en Hongrie en 1389.⁸⁵

dernier étant d'origine bavaroise mais membre de la province de Hongrie; à Milcov (Milkó), on relève la présence de Thomas de Nempte en 1347, alors chapelain de Louis le Grand, puis de Nicolas de Buda (1371). ENGEL, Pál, *Magyarország...*; MÁLYUSZ 1971, p. 286; GUTIÉRREZ 1981 p. 59; ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 55, 62 note 16.

⁸¹ SCHIER, *Memoria Provinciae...*, p. 14, que suit MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 485. Deux de ces évêques obtinrent ensuite un poste à la Curie ou dans un évêché italien.

⁸² FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 32-33.

⁸³ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 33.

⁸⁴ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 32, sans donner de référence.

⁸⁵ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 31.

Un demi-siècle plus tard, un prieur hongrois accompagné de sept compagnons aurait rejoint l'armée de volontaires levée par Jean de Capistran. Selon la tradition de l'Ordre, tous y auraient trouvé la mort en martyrs en 1456.⁸⁶ À moins qu'il ne s'agisse là d'une construction narrative à visée « mémorielle » forgée après le désastre de Mohács (1526) pour exalter le courage des frères et redorer leur image...

Formation et niveau intellectuels

Pour Elemér Mályusz, si tant d'Ermites de saint Augustin furent appelés à coiffer la mitre en Hongrie, c'est parce qu'ils brillaient par leur formation intellectuelle.⁸⁷ Ferenc Fallenbüchl mentionne le nom de deux figures éminentes de l'époque de Mathias Corvin – un Florentin, Aurélien Brandolini, maître à l'Académie istropolitaine (à Presbourg) et conseiller du roi hunyade à la fin des années 1480,⁸⁸ et un Hongrois, Simon *de Hungaria*, lecteur à Bologne en 1481. Il évoque également l'œuvre de *Stephanus Forestus*, auteur de sermons et de commentaires des Sentences au début du XIV^e siècle, et décrit la brillante carrière de Jean de Pécs, qui enseigne entre 1390 et 1395 aux couvents de Sienne et de Florence, avant d'accéder à l'épiscopat à son retour dans le royaume de Hongrie.⁸⁹ Asztrik Gábel ajoute à ces figures connues de longue date celle d'*Alexander de Hungaria*. Au terme d'études parisiennes, il obtint le baccalauréat en 1300, seulement vingt ans après que le tout premier Ermite eut obtenu ce grade. Maître régent (*magister regens*) de l'université de Paris en 1303, il y enseigna au début du XIV^e siècle – signant l'appel au concile lancé par Philippe le Bel contre Boniface VIII. Son brillant élève, Prosper de Reggio, le cite à quatre reprises dans ses œuvres, aux côtés des plus grands auteurs scolastiques. Un sermon sur la Trinité semble pouvoir lui être attribué.⁹⁰

Qu'en était-il des simples frères? Trois des dix ou onze couvents mendiants de Hongrie ayant abrité un *locus credibilis* au Moyen Âge appartenaient à l'Ordre: Velký Šariš, Székesfehérvár (dont le couvent dressa en 1305 une sentence d'excommunication de l'archevêque

⁸⁶ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 33, à partir d'un récit moderne provenant de l'Ordre.

⁸⁷ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 484.

⁸⁸ C'est à Buda que le brillant humaniste aurait écrit les premières pages de son traité *De la comparaison entre la république et la monarchie*. T. KLANICZAY, J. JANKOVICS (dir.), *Matthias Corvinus and the Humanism in Central Europe*, Actes du colloque de Székesfehérvár (16-19 mai 1990), Budapest, 1994, p. 188.

⁸⁹ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 62 note 16.

⁹⁰ GÁBEL 1941, p. 27-29 et 33-35.

d'Esztergom) et Alba Iulia (doté d'un sceau dès 1295).⁹¹ Cette fonction notariale – confiée en Hongrie depuis la fin du XII^e siècle à environ 80 puis 40 chapitres canoniaux, monastères, commanderies ou couvents, ainsi dotés du pouvoir d'authentifier et de produire des chartes – procurait aux clercs qui y travaillaient une solide culture juridique. Mais on manque de preuves textuelles et sigillographiques pour s'assurer du caractère permanent de cette activité.

On ignore quand et comment fut appliquée en Hongrie la prescription du chapitre général de Sienne de 1338 imposant l'institution dans chaque province d'un *studium provinciale*. Les sources hongroises n'en disent rien. Il en existait forcément un, puisque plusieurs prieurs augustinien hongrois s'honorent du titre de *lector* (en 1331 puis 1420), développé en *lector sacre theologie* au début du XVI^e siècle.⁹² La mention d'un *lector* au couvent de Pécs en 1309 ainsi que l'occurrence fréquente d'ermites venus de Pécs parmi les étudiants augustinien hongrois inscrits dans les universités de Paris ou de la péninsule italienne laissent penser que ce *studium* se trouvait à Pécs dès le siècle angevin⁹³ – en rapport avec la fondation à Pécs de la première université de Hongrie par Louis le Grand en 1367. On manque cependant d'inventaires de bibliothèques et de manuscrits autographes pour évaluer le résultat de cette formation.⁹⁴

La proportion d'Ermites hongrois qui parachevèrent leur instruction hors des frontières nationales semble avoir été assez élevée. Dès 1318, un *examinator promovendum ad studia in Hungaria* (Gabriel de Lucques) avait manifestement pour fonction de les sélectionner.⁹⁵ Les

⁹¹ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 52, 53, 55-56.

⁹² MÁLYUSZ, p. 484.

⁹³ FEDELES *et alii* (dir.), *A pécsi...*, p. 383; ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 95, qui suit MÁLYUSZ, *Egyházi társadalom...*, p. 283-284 et PETROVICH, Ede, « Új magyar egyetemi vonatkozású adatok a XV. századból egy római levéltárban » [Nouvelles données sur les universitaires hongrois du XV^e siècle dans un fonds d'archives romain], *Filológiai Közlöny* 16 (1970), p. 158-163.

⁹⁴ Le document qu'invoque Elemér Mályusz (MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 484) pour vanter le caractère complet et électique de la formation des Ermites ne prouve rien. En effet, le cahier écrit vers 1490 à l'école de Sárospatak par Ladislav de Szalkó (1475-1526), futur archevêque-primat d'Esztergom d'origine paysanne tombé à Mohács en 1526, lorsqu'il suivait l'enseignement du *lector* Jean de Kiszvárd – cahier où il est question aussi bien d'astronomie, de philosophie, de rhétorique que de musique – n'a rien d'« augustinien ». Il n'y avait pas de prieuré augustinien à Sárospatak mais une école paroissiale et un couvent de franciscains observants, où Ladislav de Szalkó semble avoir été novice. FÜGEDI Erik, « Les intellectuels et la société dans la Hongrie médiévale », dans E. FÜGEDI, *Kings, Bishops, Nobles and Burghers in Medieval Hungary*, Londres, Variorum Reprints, 1986, p. 14.

⁹⁵ FALLENBÜCHL, p. 31.

registres édités attestent la présence de neuf membres hongrois de l'Ordre hébergés pour études dans les prieurés italiens de Bologne, Padoue, Florence, Sienne et Vérone en l'espace de dix années, entre 1383 et 1393. La plupart décrochèrent au bout d'un an seulement le grade de *lector*, reconnu par le prieur général – grade dont on sait qu'il couronnait habituellement environ cinq années de formation.⁹⁶ La brillante carrière universitaire d'un Alexandre puis d'un Simon de *Hungaria* tiendrait donc aussi à ces filières internationales organisées au plus haut niveau. Toutefois, il n'est pas certain que cette formation supérieure ait bénéficié à la province augustinienne: les sondages effectués par Gabriella Erdélyi dans les fonds de la Pénitencerie apostolique révèlent qu'à la fin du Moyen Âge, nombreux étaient les frères mendiants (tous ordres confondus) qui demandaient à quitter l'habit sitôt leurs études terminées.⁹⁷

Saints protecteurs

L'état actuel des connaissances ne permet pas d'isoler un profil spirituel qui caractériserait les Ermites de saint Augustin hongrois. Les vocables des prieurés méritent l'attention: même lorsqu'ils avaient été imposés par le fondateur, ils n'en faisaient pas moins des couvents augustinien des canaux de diffusion du culte rendu au saint patron de l'établissement. Comme chez les autres ordres mendiants et dans les églises paroissiales, la dominante est, sans surprise, mariale. Neuf prieurés au moins (sur la quarantaine de prieurés dont on peut supposer l'existence) étaient placés sous la protection de la Vierge Marie, et deux sous celle de sainte Anne.⁹⁸ Les Ermites ont contribué par conséquent à l'essor du culte marial dans le bassin des Carpates. En comparaison, les deux vocables à saint Augustin (à Pécs et Velike), qui renvoient à l'identité de l'Ordre, font pâle figure.

Une tonalité centre-européenne se dégage des vocables des couvents fondés au XIII^e et au début du XIV^e siècle. Elle tient vraisemblablement à l'origine géographique de leurs premiers hôtes: les frères venus d'Allemagne méridionale auraient importé avec eux les patronages à Élisabeth, Anne et saint Étienne (protomartyr), et ceux de Petite Pologne celui de Stanislas, confiné jusqu'alors dans les limites du diocèse de

⁹⁶ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 62 note 16, à partir des registres du généralat de Barthélemy Veneto (1383-1400) édités par Arnulfus Hartmann (*Bartholomei Veneti OSA, Registrum generalatus*, I-III, Romae, 1998-1999). Voir aussi PETROVICH, « Új magyar... ».

⁹⁷ ERDÉLYI, « Conflict... », p. 127... sans comparaison chiffrée entre les quatre ordres mendiants.

⁹⁸ Voir Annexe I.

Cracovie.⁹⁹ Par ailleurs, le jeu des fondations royales et aristocratiques associa les Ermites aux dévotions en vogue à la cour de Hongrie. Le patronage de sainte Élisabeth de Hongrie, mentionné au prieuré de Komár à la fin des années 1230 – quelques années seulement après sa canonisation officielle (1235) –, témoigne de son culte très précoce à Buda. Le souvenir de Thomas Becket (attesté à Gătaia au plus tard en 1270, couvent appelé *domus sancti Thome martiris*), présent dans les cours occidentales dans la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle, montre l'internationalisation de son culte promu par la papauté à des fins « théocratiques ».¹⁰⁰

Les vocables dynastiques reflètent la volonté des rois angevins (et Luxembourg) de s'inscrire dans la lignée de la *beata stirps* arpadienne. Charles-Robert a sans doute placé délibérément le couvent d'Újhely, fondé peu avant 1324, alors que son autorité était à peine établie sur l'ensemble du royaume, sous la protection de saint Étienne de Hongrie.¹⁰¹ Il donna au prieuré de Visegrád le vocable de Ladislas en souvenir peut-être d'un fils de ce nom mort en bas âge en 1325.¹⁰² Au total, ces patronages dessinent un sanctoral très curial et aristocratique – plus encore que celui des autres ordres mendiants ou érémitiques.

Des Ermites hongrois s'acquirent-ils eux-mêmes une réputation de sainteté? Henri de Frimar († 1340), provincial de Saxe-Thuringe et auteur de l'une des premières histoires de l'Ordre (*De origine et progressu ordinis fratrum Eremitarum sancti Augustini*), rapporte qu'un ermite nommé Guy de Pannonie (*Vitus Pannonius*), de sang royal et provenant d'Oradea, aurait ramené miraculeusement un défunt à la vie: un *Elizeus* se serait réveillé lorsque son cercueil heurta par inadvertance la tombe de Guy au cours de l'année 1297. Depuis lors, il serait souvent invoqué contre la peste.¹⁰³ Mais, à ma connaissance, aucune autre source ne mentionne ce personnage.

Rayonnement spirituel

Pour apprécier l'aura des prieurés augustiniens parmi les fidèles, il faudrait sonder les sources testamentaires, les chartes de donations et les registres de comptabilité municipale mentionnant des dons aux

⁹⁹ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 96.

¹⁰⁰ GYÖRFFY, György, « Becket Tamás és Magyarország » [Thomas Becket et la Hongrie], *Filológiai Közöny* 16 (1970), p. 156, que reprend ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 96.

¹⁰¹ Le vocable à Saint-Stanislas (à Velký Šariš) ne doit rien en revanche à son influente épouse polonaise, Élisabeth Lokietek, puisqu'il remonte au règne de Béla IV (voir *supra*).

¹⁰² ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 94, note 23.

¹⁰³ FALLENBÜCHL 1943, p. 31; GÁBRIEL 1941, p. 23.

couvents, sans oublier les statuts des confréries qui leur étaient rattachées – ce qui n’a pas encore été effectué à grande échelle.

Des liens privilégiés unissaient les frères aux fondateurs et bienfaiteurs des prieurés augustinien et à leurs descendants. En 1478, le provincial Barthélemy de Pécs engageait les frères du prieuré de Bátmonostor à réciter une messe quotidienne pour le salut du lignage des Kisvárdá, bienfaiteurs du couvent.¹⁰⁴ Tel était l’usage dans les autres communautés régulières. De même, à l’instar d’autres ordres, les Ermites augustiniens avaient instauré à la fin du Moyen Âge la formule associative de la *confraternitas*, qui permettait à des laïcs de bénéficier des grâces spirituelles de l’Ordre sans contraintes liturgiques. En 1415, le provincial de Hongrie, Jean de Tapolcsan, admettait ainsi un capitaine dans la confrérie de l’Ordre.¹⁰⁵ Il faudrait disposer d’exemples en nombre plus élevé pour cerner le profil des laïcs qui gravitaient autour des prieurés augustiniens.

En situation de monopole local, autrement dit là où le seul établissement régulier était un prieuré augustinien, les Ermites occupaient une place centrale dans la vie religieuse des habitants. C’est du moins ce que tend à prouver l’exemple de Körmend au début du XVI^e siècle. Gabriella Erdélyi y constate l’existence de relations ambivalentes entre les frères et les fidèles. Les seconds considéraient les premiers comme des auxiliaires indispensables pour accéder au bonheur éternel, leurs services spirituels étant posés comme irremplaçables. Cela ne les empêchait pas de critiquer sévèrement les ermites. Ils craignaient en effet que leur comportement immoral ne rende leurs suffrages inefficaces, au détriment de l’ensemble de la communauté locale, dont les chances de salut étaient du coup fortement compromises. Curieusement, ce rapport de dépendance ne s’établit pas avec leurs successeurs franciscains, installés sur ordre de l’archevêque-primat entre 1513 et 1517. Alors qu’ils jouissaient d’une grande popularité partout ailleurs dans le royaume, ceux-ci durent quitter la ville dès 1524. Les Ermites avaient donc su créer avec les habitants de la bourgade des liens de solidarité et d’amitié très forts, que leurs écarts disciplinaires ne suffirent pas à entamer.¹⁰⁶

Sources de litiges récurrents, les échanges matériels que les frères entretenaient au quotidien avec les habitants composaient une part de cette proximité.

¹⁰⁴ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 433.

¹⁰⁵ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 433.

¹⁰⁶ Voir la quatrième partie de cet article.

III. LA PAUVRETÉ EN PRATIQUE

Contexte: les ordres mendiants et l'économie en Hongrie médiévale

Les liens entre ordres mendiants et économie au Moyen Âge – « économie réelle » et « économie du sacré » – ont fait l'objet de travaux très féconds depuis une douzaine d'années, qui ont porté sur les moyens de subsistance des frères comme sur la place des éléments matériels dans leur identité.¹⁰⁷ Le terrain hongrois commence tout juste d'être exploré sur ce plan.¹⁰⁸ Les sondages documentaires permettent d'ores et déjà de penser que les frères de Hongrie ne furent pas les derniers en Occident à subordonner l'idéal rigoureusement pauvre des fondateurs des deux premiers ordres mendiants à la nécessité de se prémunir contre les aléas de la dépendance au jour le jour. Une fois passé le temps des fondations (vers 1220 - vers 1250), ils acceptèrent terres, maisons, fermages, rentes, loyers et versements périodiques (royaux, municipaux, privés). Ils continuaient de grossir leur capital meuble et immeuble au début du XVI^e siècle et en tiraient des revenus largement supérieurs au produit des aumônes.¹⁰⁹

Toutefois, des différences importantes s'observent d'un ordre mendiant à l'autre. Elles font apparaître deux comportements extrêmes. Les Dominicains hongrois – qui disposent aussi de la documentation la plus fournie – s'illustrent par la recherche précoce d'une stabilité matérielle passant par la possession – ou du moins l'usage exclusif – de terres (céréalières et viticoles), d'étangs piscicoles, de moulins, de granges et de rentes.¹¹⁰ Ils ne se démarquaient des moines, des chanoines réguliers et des membres des ordres hospitaliers que par l'étroitesse relative de leur assise foncière, par la faible part des maisons urbaines dans leur « temporel », et par le fait qu'ils ne levaient pas de dîmes.

¹⁰⁷ BÉRIOU, Nicole et CHIFFOLEAU, Jacques (dir.), *Économie et religion. L'expérience des ordres mendiants (XIII^e-XV^e s.)*, Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon (Collection d'histoire et archéologie médiévales 21), 2009; TODESCHINI, Giacomo, *Richesse franciscaine. De la pauvreté volontaire à la société de marché*, Paris, Verdier, 2008 (trad. fr.).

¹⁰⁸ Une enquête collective sur ce thème portant sur l'ensemble de l'Europe centrale est actuellement en cours, sous la direction conjointe de M.-M. de Cevins (coordinatrice), L. Viallet et G. Klaniczay (projet sélectionné par l'ANR en 2012, sous l'acronyme MARGEC, pour « Marginalité, économie et christianisme. La vie matérielle des couvents mendiants en Europe centrale (v.1220-v.1550) »).

¹⁰⁹ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... »; ROMHÁNYI, « Kolostori gazdálkodás... ».

¹¹⁰ ROMHÁNYI, Beatrix, « Domonkos kolostorok birtokai a későközépkorban [Les possessions des couvents dominicains à la fin du Moyen Âge] », *Századok* 144 (2010), n° 2, p. 395-410.

À l'inverse, partisans d'une interprétation rigoureuse de l'exigence de pauvreté communautaire, les Frères mineurs de l'Observance hongroise refusèrent toujours les biens-fonds. En conséquence, on peut supposer que les aumônes représentaient une part non négligeable de leurs moyens de subsistance, qu'il s'agît de rentes perpétuelles rétribuant des services *pro anima*, de dons ponctuels en nature ou du produit des quêtes.¹¹¹

D'après les données recueillies jusqu'à présent, le fonctionnement matériel des prieurés augustinien hongrois semble plutôt se rapprocher de celui des Frères prêcheurs. Forts de l'autorisation accordée à l'Ordre dès le milieu du XIII^e siècle de posséder des biens à titre collectif, ils optèrent *ab initio* pour la sécurité matérielle.

Les Ermites et la terre

Les prieurés augustinien comptent en effet parmi les établissements mendiants les plus précocement dotés de revenus stables. Celui d'Esztergom en obtint dès 1262: c'est alors que Béla IV lui céda des droits sur le quartier « arménien » d'Esztergom, droits que ses successeurs confirmèrent jusqu'à la fin du XV^e siècle. Dix ans plus tard, ils recevaient le village de Dág du comte-ispán Hermann.¹¹² En 1270, Étienne V concédait aux Ermites de Gátaia un moulin royal. D'autres donations foncières suivirent, royales (à Velký Šariš en 1274-1285, à Hrabkov vers 1334) ou aristocratiques (en 1363 à Pápóc). Elles permirent aux prieurés de disposer d'une confortable assise immobilière. Celui de Velký Šariš possédait, entre autres biens, 39 lopins cultivés, d'après les registres fiscaux de 1427.¹¹³ Les frères de Bardejov, déjà mentionnés comme propriétaires de terres en 1424 et 1488, possédaient 13 *villae* au moment de leur évacuation en 1528.¹¹⁴ À tel point que la papauté jugea que les Ermites de Pápóc étaient allés trop loin. La dotation prévue en 1359 par la fondatrice de l'établissement, constituée de parcelles cultivées réparties dans quatre comitats différents, se heurta à l'opposition d'Innocent IV, qui la jugea incompatible avec leur état de mendiants.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 191-195; *Ead.*, *Les Franciscains observants...*, p. 95-99, 216-229.

¹¹² ROMHÁNYI, Beatrix, « Bilan sur les couvents mendiants de Hongrie », à paraître dans *Études franciscaines*.

¹¹³ ROMHÁNYI, « Bilan... ».

¹¹⁴ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 184-185.

¹¹⁵ BEDY 1939, p. 52-57; ROMHÁNYI, « Bilan... ».

Le mouvement observant n'entraîna pas davantage de changements que chez les Dominicains dans les pratiques économiques des prieurés : ils continuèrent de recevoir biens fonciers et rentes jusqu'à l'occupation ottomane.¹¹⁶ La base foncière des prieurés hongrois se composait généralement de vignes (à Esztergom), de moulins (à Eger, Gătaia, Kaza) et d'étangs à poissons (à Dej) – qui s'ajoutaient parfois au gros bétail (à Bardejov) –, mais aussi de terres de labour (à Bardejov, Velký Šariš), plus souvent mentionnées que chez les Dominicains et les Franciscains conventuels.¹¹⁷

Les Ermites ne se séparaient pas volontiers de leurs biens-fonds. Bien au contraire, ils les accumulaient, au moyen d'échanges avantageux (à Esztergom en 1320) et d'acquisitions opportunes (à Spišské Podhradie vers 1399). Et ils s'opposaient avec ténacité à ceux qui leur en disputaient la propriété. De longs procès contre les seigneurs laïques ou ecclésiastiques voisins l'attestent, à Velký Šariš (jusqu'en 1346), à Hrabkov (en 1351, où un noble des environs restitua aux Ermites les terres qu'il occupait), à propos du moulin de Sátorajjáújhely (contre les Ermites de saint Paul) et à Pápóc (de 1439 à 1475, date à laquelle le roi Mathias rétablit les frères dans leurs droits contre les chanoines).¹¹⁸

Revenus profanes et religieux

Dès la fin du XIII^e siècle, les Ermites furent également mis à l'abri du besoin par la perception de revenus réguliers, en vivres et matériaux divers mais aussi en numéraire. Le roi, les seigneurs puis les municipalités les gratifièrent de péages, de taxes diverses – sur les marchés, sur l'exploitation de mines et de moulins (royaux ou seigneuriaux). La livraison périodique du sel extrait des mines royales aux frères augustiniens de Dej, commencée en 1310, leur fut confirmée par le roi Charles-Robert en 1325 puis par Mathias Corvin en 1466, et celui-ci en augmenta le volume en 1482. De la même manière, le prieuré de Turda recevait une partie du produit des mines royales sous Mathias Corvin et semble avoir eu fonction d'entrepôt à sel.¹¹⁹ Celui de Pápóc recevait une fraction de la taxe sur le marché local, sur des moulins et diverses redevances seigneuriales.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 193.

¹¹⁷ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 185-187; ROMHÁNYI, « Bilan... ».

¹¹⁸ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 186-190; ROMHÁNYI, « Bilan... ».

¹¹⁹ ROMHÁNYI, « Bilan... », à partir de : ENTZ, Géza, *Erdély építészete a 14.-16. században*, Kolozsvár, 1996, p. 490.

¹²⁰ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 183-184, notes 92 à 94.

Lors de travaux importants sur l'église et le cloître, le seigneur ou la municipalité apportaient leur concours. Le prieuré de Boró avait été bâti en pierres avant 1427 grâce au soutien des membres du lignage des Mikola. Le conseil de Bardejov consentit des subsides au couvent de la ville au début des années 1420 et il l'approvisionnait régulièrement en denrées alimentaires et vestimentaires, ainsi qu'en combustible (bois de chauffage ou charbon de bois).¹²¹

Fait plus exceptionnel pour un ordre mendiant (évoqué à propos de la formation des frères), les Ermites hongrois accomplirent sans réticence, moyennant rétribution, des tâches notariales. Rien ne permet toutefois de savoir quels émoluments cette activité procurait aux religieux.

Comme les autres frères mendiants, les Ermites de saint Augustin tiraient un profit matériel de l'exercice de la pastorale laïque, non sans conflits avec le clergé paroissial. En 1475, ils aboutirent à un compromis avec le curé de Dej. Il reconnaissait aux frères de la ville le droit de confesser et d'ensevelir les fidèles de toute condition dans leur église, ainsi que la possibilité de percevoir une part des biens qu'ils laissaient à leur mort, à condition de respecter le principe de la quarte funéraire.¹²² Les rentes associées aux services annuels, en plein essor dans la seconde moitié du XV^e siècle, assuraient des rentrées d'argent substantielles, surtout lorsqu'elles émanaient de donateurs prestigieux. Mathias Corvin accorda ainsi en 1482 au prieuré de Dej 200 florins annuels, en échange de la célébration par les frères d'une messe quotidienne pour le salut de l'âme de tous les rois de Hongrie.¹²³

Dérives

Ces données sont évidemment trop éparpillées pour se faire une idée précise de l'état de santé économique – prospérité ou précarité? – des couvents augustiniens hongrois au Moyen Âge. L'absence de bilan comptable (conventuel ou provincial) nuit également à la connaissance des méthodes gestionnaires des Ermites hongrois. On ignore s'ils se contentaient de pratiquer une économie « naturelle » (ou « féodale »), ou s'ils investirent dans les biens les plus lucratifs (vignes et moulins), comme le faisaient alors les Ermites de saint Paul et certains

¹²¹ C'est ce que montrent les comptes de la municipalité de Bardejov, édités par Béla IVÁNYI, *Bártfa szabad királyi város levéltára. 1319-1526* [Les archives de la ville royale libre de Bardejov (1319-1526)], Budapest, 1910 et Jeno ÁBEL, *A bártfai Szent Egyed templom könyvtárának története* [Histoire de la bibliothèque de l'église Saint-Gilles de Bardejov], Budapest, 1885, *passim*.

¹²² MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 431.

¹²³ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 431.

Bénédictins.¹²⁴ Sans doute mettaient-ils en vente une part de la production de leurs domaines. Pour preuve, les transports de denrées agricoles effectués depuis le couvent de Velký Šariš jusqu'à Bardejov, rapportés par les sources judiciaires du tournant des ^{xv}^e et ^{xvi}^e siècles.¹²⁵

Les ensembles architecturaux les mieux préservés sont ceux de Bátmonostor et de Pápóc. Le premier est un ancien monastère bénédictin dont les Ermites ne reprirent les murs qu'en 1345. Ils ajoutèrent un chœur allongé polygonal à l'église primitive, ce qui lui donna une physionomie conforme au goût gothique, ne comportant qu'une seule nef et pas de clocher.¹²⁶ L'église de Pápóc, très exigüe, fut agrandie au cours du ^{xv}^e siècle; mais les bâtiments claustraux restèrent modestes.¹²⁷ L'équipement des églises augustinienes (mobilier, ornements et livres liturgiques, orgue) échappe à l'observation, faute d'inventaires. Un organiste est mentionné au prieuré de Dej vers 1450: le gouverneur Jean de Hunyad garantit alors sa rétribution sur le produit de la saline royale.¹²⁸

Les Ermites en oublièrent-ils leur état de mendiant? Le principe de la pauvreté personnelle n'était pas toujours respecté. Cinq dispenses furent accordées à des frères de la province augustinienne hongroise (en 1424, 1434, 1438, puis 1477) pour leur permettre d'hériter de biens meubles et immeubles.¹²⁹ Sans autorisation cette fois, le prieur de Bardejov confondait au début du ^{xv}^e siècle biens communautaires et biens personnels. Les habitants l'accusèrent vers 1420 d'avoir pris quatre chevaux appartenant à son couvent, ainsi qu'une maison, une grange emplies de céréales, des champs et l'argent tiré de la vente d'une ferme par son prédécesseur. Il aurait également vendu pour son seul bénéfice une vache, un cheval et la cire entreposée à la sacristie. On le soupçonnait enfin de puiser dans les dons des fidèles pour passer commande de vêtements et de livres auprès d'artisans locaux, aux frais de la communauté et pour son usage exclusif.¹³⁰

¹²⁴ ROMHÁNYI, Beatrix, « Pálos gazdálkodás a 15-16. században » [La gestion économique des ermites de saint Paul aux ^{xv}^e et ^{xvi}^e siècles], *Századok* 141 (2007), n° 2, p. 299-351, en particulier p. 346-350; KISS, Gergely, « A szerzetesi intézmények gazdálkodása [La gestion des institutions régulières] », dans FEDELES *et alii* (dir.), *A pécsi...*, p. 465-484, ici p. 469.

¹²⁵ Il est peu probable en effet qu'ils aient seulement servi à ravitailler les membres du prieuré de Bardejov. ROMHÁNYI, « Bilan... ».

¹²⁶ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 98, d'après les comptes-rendus de fouilles de Piroška Biczó.

¹²⁷ ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 98, d'après les comptes-rendus de fouilles d'Ilona Valter et d'Erika Hajmássy.

¹²⁸ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 431.

¹²⁹ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 55 et p. 62 note 17.

¹³⁰ de CEVINS, « Les frères mendiants et l'économie... », p. 196; source: J. ÁBEL (éd.), *A bártfai...*, op. cit., p. 2-3.

Cumulées avec la solide assise foncière des prieurés augustiniens, ces entorses au principe de la pauvreté individuelle au ^{xv}^e siècle – pendant que s'exprimaient partout dans la chrétienté latine, et notamment dans la Bohême voisine, les critiques contre la richesse de l'Église et les doutes sur l'utilité des réguliers –, conduisent à s'interroger sur la capacité des Ermites augustiniens hongrois à se réformer à la fin du Moyen Âge.

IV. DES PRIEURÉS EN CRISE AU TOURNANT DES ^{xv}^e ET ^{xvi}^e SIÈCLES?

La situation des ordres mendiants en Occident à l'extrême fin du Moyen Âge fait l'objet d'appréciations divergentes dans l'historiographie. Les uns insistent sur les difficultés internes et, à l'image du parcours personnel d'un Martin Luther, voient en elles les germes de la Réformation. Les autres soulignent au contraire la faculté de ces ordres à se renouveler sans cesse, notamment par l'Observance, lancée un siècle avant le mouvement de réforme des ordres monastiques anciens. Jusqu'au milieu du ^{xx}^e siècle, cette problématique n'avait été abordée en Hongrie qu'à partir d'exemples dominicains et surtout franciscains. Elemér Mályusz est le premier à l'avoir appliquée aux Ermites de saint Augustin.

Les réformes du début du ^{xv}^e siècle

C'est à Esztergom que, deux ans avant la réforme du couvent de Lecceto (1387), habituellement considérée comme le point de départ de l'observance augustiniennne, le prieur général de l'Ordre, Barthélemy Veneto, avait ordonné la réforme des couvents augustiniens toscans, en encourageant d'autres couvents à suivre « spontanément » leur exemple.¹³¹ Dès 1384, il avait envoyé deux visiteurs dans la province de Hongrie. Constata-t-il des abus sur place, au prieuré d'Esztergom, à l'occasion du chapitre général? Toujours est-il qu'en 1388, il demanda au provincial de Hongrie (Mathieu de Turda) de mettre fin aux désordres (*nonnulla mala enormia*) commis dans ce couvent.¹³²

Il n'est pas certain que ces mesures aient été suivies d'effets. Après une pause d'environ une génération – qui n'est peut-être que le reflet trompeur des lacunes documentaires –, les problèmes ressurgissent

¹³¹ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 54.

¹³² ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 62-63 note 18. Le choix du couvent d'Esztergom comme lieu de réunion de ce chapitre général, initialement prévu dans la province de Germanie, ne résulte pas de cette situation locale: il tenait à des contraintes d'organisation matérielle. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

dans les années 1420 et 1430. Les archives centrales de l'Ordre font état de multiples violations aux vœux d'obéissance et de pauvreté: rébellions de frères contre leur prieur, abus de pouvoir de la part des supérieurs, provinciaux ne réunissant pas le chapitre chargé de les réélire (en 1423) ou élections douteuses (1431), difficultés à percevoir la *collecta* de 24 ducats due par la province hongroise à la Curie – non parce qu'elle n'avait pas les moyens de la verser mais parce que les fonds étaient mal gérés ou dérobés (entre 1423 et 1439) –, aumônes détournées, biens des frères spoliés à leur mort par leur prieur au détriment du couvent (en 1424). Sont également mentionnés le refus d'admettre des novices – auquel répondit l'ordre donné par le général en 1434 à chaque prieur d'admettre au moins un novice par an – ainsi que de graves négligences dans la formation des frères (1423).¹³³

La direction de l'Ordre réagit en dépêchant sur place dès 1423 un *vicarius generalis* chargé de procéder à la *reformatio* des couvents hongrois. Mais, une fois élu provincial, il fut accusé de malversations et finalement excommunié (1433). La province hongroise paraît alors coupée du centre de l'Ordre: aucun délégué (*diffinitor*) hongrois n'assista aux trois chapitres généraux de 1419, 1425 et 1430.¹³⁴ Dans le contexte du concile de Bâle, dont on sait la détermination à mettre en œuvre la réforme de l'Église, d'autres vicaires généraux agirent en Hongrie à partir de 1431, à la demande du général et sans doute de Sigismond de Luxembourg. Georges de Schöntal (ou *de Valle Speciosa*), provincial de Bavière, (en 1431) et peut-être Berthold Puchhauser de Ratisbonne (en 1435) – qui avaient procédé à la restauration de la discipline régulière en Bavière avant d'agir sur le terrain hongrois – s'y employèrent successivement.¹³⁵ Ils semblent avoir été mal accueillis: leur présence donna lieu à des plaintes et réclamations financières de la part des frères.¹³⁶

La seconde vague réformatrice (début du xvi^e siècle)

Bien que la documentation ne rapporte pas d'infractions jugées scandaleuses au cours du demi-siècle suivant, la vie des frères n'était pas nécessairement plus conforme à leurs engagements à la fin du xv^e siècle. En 1483, le pape Sixte IV demandait aux deux archevêques

¹³³ Cela correspond d'ailleurs à un creux dans la courbe des inscriptions des Ermites augustiniens hongrois dans les universités italiennes (seulement 2 entre 1419 et 1439!). ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 55-56.

¹³⁴ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 56.

¹³⁵ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 432; ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 56.

¹³⁶ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 57.

d'Esztergom et de Kalocsa de promouvoir la réforme de l'Ordre dans le royaume magyar. En 1488, le général Anselme de Montefalco félicitait le provincial de Hongrie pour la réforme qu'il avait conduite ... mais en 1494, le même général ordonnait au provincial de restaurer la discipline régulière en Hongrie!¹³⁷

Contradictoires à la fin du xv^e siècle, les indices le sont encore au début du siècle suivant. Elemér Mályusz voyait dans la présence à la bibliothèque du prieuré d'Oradea d'un livre imprimé à Venise en 1508 contenant les privilèges accordés l'année précédente par le pape à la congrégation observante lombarde le signe tangible d'une réforme « observante ».¹³⁸ Toutefois, on en a retrouvé de nombreux exemplaires ailleurs, dans des établissements non réformés autant que réformés.¹³⁹ Le provincial de Hongrie (Martin de Pécs en 1509, Paul Dombus en 1516 et sans doute Blaise de Pécs en 1518) ajouta aux statuts provinciaux les huit articles sur la discipline, la pauvreté personnelle et la liturgie commune qu'exigeait désormais le général Gilles de Viterbe avant confirmation.¹⁴⁰ Concessions purement formelles cependant, à en juger par les rappels à l'ordre successifs des généraux, assortis en 1509 de la demande de déposition du provincial Martin de Pécs.

Cette destitution n'était pas la première. En 1481, Barthélemy de Pécs, membre du couvent de Pécs élu provincial en 1475, fut démis de ses fonctions par le chapitre général.¹⁴¹ En 1508, un nouveau différend serait apparu entre le prieur de Pécs et le centre de l'Ordre.¹⁴² Peut-être portait-il sur la formation des religieux. Toujours est-il que les dirigeants de l'Ordre tentèrent de mieux la contrôler. En 1512, le maître en théologie Augustin de Vicence (Agostino da Vicenza) fut envoyé au *studium* d'Esztergom dans un but pédagogique mais aussi réformateur. Un conflit éclata cependant, autour de sa prise en charge matérielle d'après les sources, mais probablement aussi en raison de divergences sur la formation des frères et sur la discipline régulière. Il n'est pas sans rappeler le litige qui opposait alors la direction de l'Observance franciscaine aux frères de Hongrie pour des motifs similaires.¹⁴³ En

¹³⁷ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 65 note 47.

¹³⁸ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 432, 436-437.

¹³⁹ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 57-58.

¹⁴⁰ MARTIN, Francis X., *The Augustinian Order on the Eve of the Reformation*, *Miscellanea Historiae Ecclesiasticae* 2 (Bibliothèque de la Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique 44), Louvain, 1967.

¹⁴¹ FEDELES *et alii* (dir.), *A pécsi...*, p. 384-385.

¹⁴² FEDELES *et alii* (dir.), *A pécsi...*, p. 385.

¹⁴³ ERDÉLYI 2002 p. 58-59 et ERDÉLYI 2005, p. 56-57. Sur le conflit analogue qui éclata dans les mêmes années chez les Franciscains observants, voir de CEVINS, *Les franciscains observants...*, p. 164-165.

1518, Gilles de Viterbe ordonnait au provincial de Hongrie d'envoyer davantage de religieux hongrois poursuivre leurs études en Italie.¹⁴⁴

Crise ou mutation?

D'autres éléments contredisent néanmoins l'idée d'une crise généralisée – à la fois institutionnelle, morale et spirituelle – de la province augustinienne hongroise à cette période. Les registres centraux attestent le versement régulier de la *collecta*. Le provincial semble s'être acquitté de son obligation d'effectuer des tournées d'inspection régulières dans les couvents hongrois – certes, il y fut parfois conspué, comme le raconte un témoin interrogé à Körmend en 1518.¹⁴⁵ Il répondait aux plaintes éventuelles des habitants en envoyant des commissaires sur place (à Bardejov en 1505).¹⁴⁶ Les Ermites hongrois rentraient encore diplômés de leurs études universitaires en Italie.¹⁴⁷ Surtout, l'Ordre demeurait attractif. On note une grande stabilité des établissements jusqu'à la fin du xv^e siècle. À l'exception de Gătaia et Reghin, les abandons de couvents furent rares, même après la peste de 1510. Une lettre du prieur général au vicaire Blaise de Pécs saluait en 1521 (!) la création de deux couvents supplémentaires dans la province hongroise.¹⁴⁸ Dans les années 1530, le flux des vocations n'était toujours pas tari: le couvent d'Oradea admit cinq nouveaux membres en 1531.¹⁴⁹ L'effondrement des effectifs ne commence qu'après Mohács.¹⁵⁰

La liste des écarts de conduite rapportés par les 49 témoins interrogés à Körmend en 1518 est impressionnante: diminution drastique du nombre des frères vivant dans les murs du couvent – un ou deux certaines années –, par refus d'en admettre d'autres; négligence dans la célébration de l'office et des messes prévues par le fondateur; état délabré des bâtiments, par négligence; fréquentation des tavernes, si tôt le matin que plusieurs témoins brocardent les frères en disant que c'est là qu'ils célèbrent la messe, et non à l'église; beuveries,

¹⁴⁴ ERDÉLYI 2005, p. 55-56.

¹⁴⁵ ERDÉLYI 2002, p. 59-60.

¹⁴⁶ D'après le rapport de visite de 1505, édité par Carolus WAGNER, *Diplomatium comitatus Sarosiensis, Posonii-Cassoviae*, 1780, p. 540.

¹⁴⁷ ERDÉLYI 2002 p. 59 et ERDÉLYI 2005, p. 58.

¹⁴⁸ ERDÉLYI 2005, p. 59.

¹⁴⁹ MÁLYUSZ 1943, p. 432-433, qui édite (note 10) le texte de ces professions, écrit à la main sur les pages initiales du livre de 1508 provenant du prieuré augustinien d'Oradea.

¹⁵⁰ Selon Ferenc Fallenbüchl (p. 29), on passe de 20 couvents (200 frères) en 1498 à 3 (15 frères) en 1543; la quasi-totalité des prieurés fermèrent leurs portes dans le second quart du siècle, deux seulement ayant survécu (Bardejov et Križevi). Voir Annexe I.

ivrognerie et rixes avec les paysans des environs; commerce avec des femmes, qu'ils font venir dans le couvent ou rencontrent à l'extérieur (ce qui donne lieu à maintes anecdotes). Certes, les Ermites de Körmend ne furent pas à court d'arguments pour répondre à ces accusations – arguments suffisamment convaincants pour que le pape revienne sur sa décision initiale de transférer le couvent aux Franciscains, après une première enquête, en désavouant le primat Thomas Bakócz, son propre légat, qui était aussi *patronus* du couvent et seigneur de Körmend. Outre leur dénonciation d'une procédure qu'ils considéraient comme illégale (le prieur général n'ayant pas été saisi), les Ermites disaient mener une vie irréprochable; ils s'accordèrent seulement des circonstances atténuantes, à savoir les contraintes pratiques découlant du manque de dons de la part des habitants.¹⁵¹

Unique en son genre, cette affaire ne suffit pas à accréditer l'hypothèse selon laquelle tous les prieurés hongrois auraient traversé une crise générale au début du XVI^e siècle. Car était-ce beaucoup mieux (ou pire) dans les décennies précédentes? Elle montre à tout le moins que les liens entre les frères et les laïcs s'étaient considérablement détériorés. Avant de s'adresser au primat, les habitants de Körmend avaient usé de tous les moyens (réprimandes, conseils, discussions, etc.) pour obtenir des religieux qu'ils amendent leur comportement. Ce sont leurs protestations qui incitèrent Thomas Bakócz à demander en 1513 au pape Léon X l'autorisation de réformer le couvent puis de le transférer aux Franciscains observants. D'après les dépositions enregistrées au cours de la seconde enquête, ce qui inquiétait le plus les fidèles, c'étaient moins les mœurs débauchées des frères que la négligence qu'elles entraînaient dans l'accomplissement de la liturgie. Estimant que le salut de l'ensemble des fidèles était en danger, ils avaient le sentiment d'avoir été trahis. Cette attitude illustrerait plus largement, selon Gabriella Erdélyi, le rôle actif qu'avaient pris les laïcs dans le mouvement de réforme de l'Église à l'extrême fin du Moyen Âge.¹⁵² Elle confirme que, surtout dans les villes, ils exerçaient une mainmise croissante sur les établissements ecclésiastiques, séculiers (paroisses¹⁵³ et hôpitaux¹⁵⁴) mais aussi réguliers, mouvement qui facilita ensuite l'adoption du luthéranisme.

¹⁵¹ ERDÉLYI 2005, *passim*.

¹⁵² ERDÉLYI 2005, p. 189-203.

¹⁵³ de CEVINS, Marie-Madeleine, « Relations de dépendance spirituelle entre corps de ville et églises paroissiales en Hongrie au bas Moyen Âge », *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* vol. XCII, 1997, n° 2, p. 395-418.

¹⁵⁴ de CEVINS, Marie-Madeleine, « Assistance et charité en Hongrie médiévale (fin XIII^e - début du XVI^e siècle) », dans Ph. HAUDRÈRE (dir.), *Pour une histoire sociale des villes. Mélanges offerts à Jacques Maillard*, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006, p. 381-402.

La situation des établissements d'Ermites augustiniens à l'automne du Moyen Âge variait donc fortement d'un couvent à l'autre, pour des raisons que les lacunes documentaires ne permettent pas de déterminer.

Bilan et perspectives

Au total, les recherches sur l'histoire des Ermites de saint Augustin hongrois au Moyen Âge font ressortir les traits suivants: forte emprise de l'Ordre dans le royaume magyar (derrière les Frères mineurs mais presque au niveau des Prêcheurs); formation supérieure et variété des responsabilités confiées à ses membres (missions, épiscopat); liens étroits avec la cour royale et l'aristocratie (dont le vocable des prieurés reflète la spiritualité), plus lents à s'établir avec la bourgeoisie urbaine; fonctionnement économique préférant dès l'origine la stabilité à la précarité; difficultés manifestes à se réformer à la fin du xv^e et au début du xvi^e siècle, sans crise générale cependant.

Des pans entiers de leur histoire demeurent inexplorés – du fonctionnement administratif de la province hongroise à la spiritualité des frères et à la perpétuation de leur identité régulière. Pour les aborder et consolider (ou infirmer) les hypothèses anciennes, la priorité absolue est d'élargir la base documentaire. L'interrogation des fonds des Archives nationales de Hongrie – que recommandait déjà Elemér Mályusz en 1943¹⁵⁵ – ne devrait plus tarder, puisqu'elles viennent d'être entièrement numérisées. Elle donnera une image plus précise des fondations, dotations et donations royales et aristocratiques. Le dépouillement systématique des registres municipaux des villes où des prieurés étaient implantés permettrait d'affiner la chronologie des constructions de couvents et, en les confrontant aux indices archéologiques, de suivre la transformation des bâtiments. En examinant les séries testamentaires, on apprécierait le degré de popularité et le rayonnement social des frères, notamment par rapport aux autres ordres mendiants et aux desservants paroissiaux. Mais c'est du côté des sources romaines qu'il y a le plus à attendre. Après les archives centrales de l'Ordre, il faudrait poursuivre les investigations dans les fonds du Vatican. La forêt est touffue mais nombre de réponses aux questions en suspens s'y cachent assurément.

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¹⁵⁵ MÁLYUSZ, p. 439-440.

ANNEXES

I. LISTE DES PRIEURÉS HONGROIS D'ERMITES DE SAINT AUGUSTIN
(XIII^E-XVI^E S.)

localité ¹⁵⁶ ÉTAT ACTUEL (si hors Hongrie) <i>nom hongrois</i>	date de fondation et fondateur	dernière mention ou fermeture	vocable, caractéristiques et principaux événements	références bibliographiques utilisées ¹⁵⁷
Alba Iulia RO <i>Gyulafehérvár</i>	avant 1295 par l'évêque	1556	Saint-Étienne-protomartyr Sceau (1295)	ROM p. 29 RUSU, p. 47
Bardejov SLO <i>Bártfa</i>	avant 1400 par le roi Louis le Grand ou sa mère (veuve) Élisabeth Lokietek?	1528	Saint-Jean-Baptiste 1400: indulgences de Boniface IX	ROM p. 11 ROMHÁNYI 2005 p. 94
Bátmonostor	1345 fondé (par transfert) par Töttös de Becse, comte-ispán de Pilis	avant ou en 1543	? Ancien monastère bénédictin désaffecté. 1478: les Kisvárdá sont mentionnés comme bienfaiteurs	ROM p. 11
Borovo CRO <i>Boró</i>	avant 1427 par un membre du lignage noble des Mikola	avant ou en 1526	Sainte-Marie 1438: sous le patronage des Gara, après l'extinction des Mikola	ROM p. 14
Buda (faubourg Saint-Pierre)	1256-1276 par le roi	1526-1529 (avant 1541)	Saint-Étienne-protomartyr Cimetière très étendu, doté d'une chapelle (d'après les fouilles arch.)	ROM p. 15

¹⁵⁶ L'indication (???) signale les établissements dont l'existence demeure très hypothétique.

¹⁵⁷ Ne sont indiquées ici, faute de place, que les références qui ne figurent pas dans les notices de ROMHÁNYI 2000-2008 (abrégé en ROM dans ce tableau).

(???) Coșeu Ro <i>Kusaly</i>	avant 1473	?	? 1473: un frère originaire de ce prieuré (ou désigné par son lieu de naissance?) étudié alors en Italie	ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 94, note 2
Dej Ro <i>Dés</i>	1310 (achevé en 1335) par le roi Charles-Robert	après 1553	Sainte-Marie 1475: conflit et compromis avec le curé à propos des sépultures 1482: donation royale associé à une messe pour le salut des rois de Hongrie	ROM p. 21 MÁLYUSZ, p. 431 RUSU, p.125
Eger	avant 1346 par l'évêque	1552	Saint-Nicolas (car rattaché à la chapelle Saint-Nicolas, préexistante) 1498: chapitre provincial	ROM p. 22
Ercsi	1482 (donation après transfert) - v. 1500 (occupation effective) par le roi Mathias Corvin	après 1523 (vers 1529?)	Saint-Nicolas (?) Ancien monastère cistercien	ROM p. 23 ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 99
Esztergom (faubourg d'Örmény)	avant 1272 par le roi (?)	1543	Sainte-Anne Centre de la province hongroise de l'ordre (1272) et (?) <i>studium provinciale</i> 1385: chapitre général de l'Ordre	ROM p. 24
Gătaia Ro <i>Mezősomlyó</i>	1256-1270 par le roi Béla IV	après 1330	Saint-Thomas-Becket 1270: doté d'un moulin royal Vocation missionnaire auprès des Coumans (?)	ROM p. 45
Güssing AUT <i>Németújvár</i>	1475-1485 par Laurent d'Ilok / Újlak	après 1526	Sainte-Marie 1519: donation foncière 1526: clocher en pierre	ROM p. 47 FEDELES p. 389

Hánta (?)	avant 1450	après 1542	?	ROM p. 30 d'après G. Dózsa
Hrabkov SLO <i>Harapkó</i>	v. 1334 par Nicolas de Péreny (ou resté „guillemite”?)	1536	Saint-Esprit	ROM p. 30
Ilok CRO <i>Újlak</i>	avant 1344 (sans doute) par la famille d'Ilok / Újlak	1526 (?), à la prise d'Ilok par les Turcs (mentionné dans l'inventaire de 1539-1541)	Sainte-Anne 1344: jugé trop proche du couvent franciscain par le pape 1400: indulgences v. 1465: conflit avec l'évêque de Bosnie, qui leur valut l'interdit 1475: le seigneur-patron demande la démolition et le déplacement du couvent	ROM p. 70 VUKIČEVIĆ p. 477 FEDELES p. 389, 401 FEDELES <i>et alii</i> (dir.), <i>A pécsi...</i> , p. 384-385
Kaza	avant 1315 par un membre du lignage noble de Rátót	après 1510	Saint-Jean-l'Év. 1315, 1322: incendies	ROM p. 35 ROMHÁNYI 2005 p. 95.
Komár	1237 (1241)-1256 destiné initialement aux „Guillemites” par le roi Béla IV	avant 1524 (transfert aux Domini-cains)	Sainte-Élisabeth 1412: propriétaire de champs et de forêts	ROM p. 38
Körmend	(1238) 1241-1256 destiné initialement aux „Guillemites” par le roi Béla IV	1513-1524	Sainte-Marie 1513-1518: accusés de mener une vie dissolue, d'où transfert aux franciscains obs. (1513-1517) par l'archev. d'Esztergom; les frères font appel de cette décision auprès du pape (1518), en vain	ROM p. 39 ERDÉLYI 2005


Križevi CRO <i>Kőrös</i>	avant 1325	1529-1540	Sainte-Marie	ROM p. 39
Lipova RO <i>Lippa</i>	avant 1460 (ou dès le XIV ^e s.?)	1542-1551	?	ROM p. 41 d'après G. Dózsa
Lórév	avant 1345 (?) ou avant 1460 par un membre de la famille royale (?)°	après 1541	? L'év. de Nitra (1349- 1367) puis archev. de Kalocsa (†1382) Étienne de l'Île (<i>de Insula/Franco</i>), sortait (?) de ce prieuré	ROM p. 41 d'après G. Dózsa ROMHÁNYI 2005 p. 93
Lövö	avant 1480 par un membre du lignage noble des Salamonvár	1541	Sainte-Marie	ROM p. 42
(???) Malý Šariš SLO <i>Kissáros</i>	avant 1460 (?)	1540 (aux luthériens)	?	ROM p. 37 d'après G. Dózsa, qui l'identifie à „Iegut”
(???) Nádasd	avant 1512 (?)	?	?	ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 94, note 22
Oradea RO <i>Nagyvárad</i> (faubourg „latin” ou Olosig / <i>Olaszi</i>)	avant 1339 par l'évêque	après 1556	Saint-Nicolas Riche bibliothèque (manuscripts et incunables) 1449: décision du gou- verneur Jean de Hunyad et de l'év. Jean Vitéz de transférer le couvent (vide ou presque) à un autre ordre mendiant (non appliqué)	ROM p. 47 MÁLYUSZ, p. 431-432
Osijek CRO <i>Eszék</i>	v. 1330 ou avant 1400 par un membre du lignage noble des Kórógy (?)	1539-1551 (conquête ottomane en 1543)	?	ROM p. 24 FEDELES <i>et alii</i> (dir.), <i>A pécsi...</i> , p. 382
(???) Pankota	avant 1473 (???)	?	? 1473: un frère de ce prieuré serait venu étudier en Italie (... mais son nom se réfère sans doute à son lieu de naissance)	ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 94, note 21.

Pápóc	1359 par Marguerite, veuve de Paul de Gerse	1552	Sainte-Marie à partir d'une chapelle Saint-Michel 1359: importante dotation foncière, jugée excessive par le pape	ROM p. 50 BEDY, A <i>pápóci...</i>
Pécs	avant 1309 par l'évêque (?)	1543	Saint-Augustin 1309: un <i>lector</i> 1477: <i>studium particulare</i> 1508: conflit entre le couvent de Pécs et la direction de l'Ordre	ROM p. 50-51 FEDELES <i>et alii</i> (dir.), <i>A pécsi...</i> , p. 383-385
Peleske / Pölöske	avant 1460 famille Ördög de Peleske?	1539-1552	?	ROM p. 51
(???) Reghin Ro Régen	1382-1387 (?) par le baron Ladislás de Losonc (mais peut-être resté à l'état de projet)	avant 1400 ou 1452	Sainte-Marie à partir d'une église paroissiale	ROM p. 54
Spišské Podhradie SLO Szepesváralja	avant 1328 par le roi Charles-Robert ou son épouse Élisabeth	1560	Sainte-Élisabeth	ROM p. 65
Sredani CRO Peker	? par un membre du lignage noble des Peker?	1539-1551	?	ROM p. 51 [sauf 2008]
Szekcső (?) (conventus insule Danubii)	avant 1460 ou 1475 par un noble?	après 1542	?	ROM p. 61 d'après G. Dózsa, qui l'identifie à „Esterch”
Székesfehérvár	avant 1303 par le roi (?)	1543	Saint-Michel Peut-être fonctions paroissiales (?)	ROM p. 61
Turda Ro Torda	avant 1331 par le roi Charles-Robert	1556	Sainte-Marie	ROM p. 69

Újhely	avant 1324 à partir d'un groupe d'ermites antérieur (?) par le roi Charles-Robert	1546	Saint-Étienne-Roi 1524: désigné comme „Guillemite”	ROM p. 70 ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 92
Vác	1319 par l'évêque	1541	Saint-Jacques	ROM p. 70-71
Velika CRO <i>Velike</i>	avant 1435 sans doute par la famille Velike	vers 1544 (abandonné avant 1573)	Saint-Augustin	ROM 2008 FEDELES <i>et alii</i> (dir.), <i>A pécsi...</i> , p. 385
Velký Šariš SLO <i>Sáros</i>	avant 1256 (?), au plus tard en 1270 initialement aux „Guillemites” par le roi Béla IV	après 1528 et avant 1539	Saint-Stanislas 1427: 39 lopins cultivés (selon les registres fiscaux)	ROM p. 57
Visegrád	1323 (?), avant 1355 par le roi Charles-Robert (?)	1542	Saint-Ladislav 1414: son prieur est mentionné en tant que <i>procutor</i> des Dominicains d'Eszter- gom	ROM p. 73-74 ROMHÁNYI 2005, p. 94
Zákány	avant 1460 par un membre du lignage comtal de Korbávia	1539-1552	?	ROM p. 74 [sauf 2008]

II. CARTE DES ÉTABLISSEMENTS DE LA PROVINCE HONGROISE DES ERMITES DE SAINT AUGUSTIN

Carte établie d'après ROMHÁNYI 2001, p. 156.



III. BIBLIOGRAPHIE

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DIE AUTOBIOGRAPHISCHEN AUFZEICHNUNGEN DES NÜRNBERGER AUGUSTINEREREMITEN NIKOLAUS BESLER

Hans Schneider

Abstract

Nikolaus Besler OESA was one of the most notable representatives of the order at the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th centuries. In the German observant congregation he held several positions as a prior of various friaries, as a delegate to Rome, as a companion of the vicar general on visitation journeys, definitor in chapters, etc. He left two versions of his autobiographical records until 1525, which are presented here in an annotated edition.

Key words

Nikolaus Besler (+ after 1529), German observant congregation, Reformation, Johann von Staupitz (+ 1524).

Der aus Nürnberg stammende Augustinereremit Nikolaus Besler gehörte zu den angesehensten deutschen Vertretern seines Ordens im frühen 16. Jahrhundert. In fünf Klöstern bekleidete er das Amt des Priors, hielt sich mehrere Jahre als Abgesandter des Generalvikars Johann von Staupitz in Rom auf, hatte während einer Amtsperiode als Provinzialvikar die Aufsicht über zehn süddeutsche Konvente, begleitete mehrfach Staupitz und dann dessen Nachfolger Wenzel Linck auf Visitationsreisen, und wiederholt wurde ihm die Ehre zuteil, als einer der Diffinitoren die Kapitel der Kongregation vorzubereiten und zu leiten. In den Auseinandersetzungen um die Theologie seines Ordensbruders Luther stand er als prominenter Vertreter auf der Seite der Luther-Gegner. Beslers autobiographische Aufzeichnungen, die hier in einer neuen Edition vorgelegt werden, sind keine Autobiographie im modernen Sinne, sondern eher ein Itinerar der Stationen seines Lebens. Für die Geschichte der deutschen Reformkongregation der Augustinereremiten im frühen 16. Jahrhundert stellen sie eine besonders wertvolle historische Quelle dar. Aber auch für andere Fragestellungen bieten sie nützliche Informationen. So sind etwa Beslers Angaben über die Routen seiner Hin- und Rückreise nach und von Rom sowie seiner Reisen in Italien – von Rom nach Vercelli und später nach Bologna und jeweils wieder nach Rom zurück – für die Erforschung der Reisewege im späten Mittelalter nicht ohne Interesse.¹

¹ Werner PARAVICINI (Hg.), Europäische Reiseberichte des späten Mittelalters. Eine analytische Bibliographie, Teil 1: Deutsche Reiseberichte, bearb. von Christian HALM, Frankfurt/ Main ²2001, verzeichnet Beslers Bericht nicht.

Nach einem Blick auf Beslers Leben (I) und editorischen Angaben zu seinen Aufzeichnungen (II) wird die kommentierte Edition (III) vorgelegt.

I

BESLERS VITA

Besler hat die wichtigsten Lebensstationen und -daten in seinen autobiographischen Aufzeichnungen selbst mitgeteilt, die den Leitfaden für die folgende Übersicht bieten. Seine Angaben lassen sich teilweise durch andere Quellen bestätigen und ergänzen.²

Nikolaus Besler ist wohl 1463/64 oder früher in Nürnberg geboren.³ Er trat nach seiner eigenen Angabe 1486 in das Augustinereremitenkloster seiner Heimatstadt ein,⁴ wo er im folgenden Jahr die Profess ablegte. 1488 empfing er die Priesterweihe. Da Nürnberg zur Diözese Bamberg gehörte, war für die Erteilung der Weihe der Bamberger Bischof zuständig. Nach dem Studium der artes liberales in Ingolstadt, das er bis zum Grad eines Baccalaureus absolvierte, kehrte er in seinen Nürnberger Heimatkonvent zurück und war von 1495 bis 1500 dessen Prior. In den folgenden Jahren, von 1500 bis 1503, bekleidete er dann das Amt des Priors in Esslingen.

Beide Konvente, Beslers Heimatkonvent Nürnberg und der in Esslingen, waren observant, d.h. gehörten zur deutschen Reformkongregation der Augustinereremiten.⁵ Auf deren Triennalkapitel 1503 in Eschwege wurde Besler zum Prior in München bestimmt; hier trat er die Nachfolge von Johannes von Staupitz an, den dasselbe Kapitel zum neuen Generalvikar der Kongregation wählte.⁶ Beide verband in

² Zu den Einzelheiten vgl. unten Beslers Aufzeichnungen mit meinen Erläuterungen.

³ Da Besler 1488 die Priesterweihe empfing, gemäß den kirchenrechtlichen Bestimmungen aber ein Kandidat zum Zeitpunkt der Weihe das 24. Lebensjahr vollendet haben, also mindestens im 25. Lebensjahr stehen sollte (c. 3 C 1. 1, 5; Emil FRIEDBERG, *Corpus iuris canonici*, II, Leipzig 1881 [Ndr. Graz 1959], 1140: "in vigesimo quinto aetatis suae anno"), muss Besler schon 1463/64 oder früher geboren sein.

⁴ Zum Nürnberger Augustinerkloster vgl. Julie ROSENTHAL-METZGER, *Das Augustinerkloster in Nürnberg*, Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg 30 (1931) 1–106; HEMMERLE 66–70.

⁵ Zu Nürnberg vgl. KUNZELMANN III, 270–274; V, 410. Esslingen blieb mit anderen südwestdeutschen Konventen seit Einführung der Reform zwar immer zwischen Kongregation und rheinisch-schwäbischer Provinz umstritten (vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 423, 451, 468 f., 509), doch konnten sich die Observanten behaupten.

⁶ Zum Eschweger Kapitel vgl. Alfred OVERMANN, *Urkundenbuch der Erfurter Stifter und Klöster*, III: Die Urkunden des Augustinereremitenklosters, Magdeburg 1934, 384f. Anhang Urk. 6; KUNZELMANN V, 181 und 435–447.

den folgenden eineinhalb Jahrzehnten eine enge Zusammenarbeit. Offenbar schätzte Staupitz die administrative und seelsorgerliche Erfahrung, die Besler bei der Leitung der Konvente erworben hatte. Schon während der ersten mehrmonatigen Visitationsreise, die der neue Generalvikar im Jahre 1504 in den Klöstern Sachsens und Thüringens durchführte, erschien Besler als sein Begleiter.

Im folgenden Jahr betraute Staupitz den Münchner Prior mit einer besonders wichtigen ordenspolitischen Mission; er sandte ihn nach Italien, wo Besler eine Verbindung mit der lombardischen Reformkongregation, dem bedeutendsten italienischen Reformverband, anbahnen sollte. Die auf dem Kapitel der Lombarden in Vercelli im April 1505 getroffenen Vereinbarungen bestanden in einer für die deutschen Observanten vorteilhaften Privilegienkommunikation, die auch eine weitgehende Unabhängigkeit von der römischen Ordensleitung bedeutete. Besler gelang es, diesen Vertrag auch vom Heiligen Stuhl bestätigen zu lassen. Doch da er die Verhandlungen in Vercelli und an der päpstlichen Kurie während einer Sedisvakanz des Generalats unter Umgehung der Ordensleitung geführt hatte, erfolgte von deren Seite eine heftige Reaktion.⁷ Besler bekam nicht nur persönlich den Zorn des (Generalvikars und seit Herbst 1505) neuen Generalpriors Augustinus von Terni und des Ordensprokurators Johannes Antonius von Chieti zu spüren. Es gelang der Ordensleitung auch – was Besler in seinem Bericht nicht erwähnt –, im Frühjahr 1506 ein päpstliches Breve zu erhalten, das die Verbindung der deutschen mit der lombardischen Kongregation zwar nicht aufhob, aber die Privilegienkommunikation und deren Bestätigung durch die Bulle des Vorjahres restriktiv auslegte und das Vorgehen von Staupitz' mit scharfen Worten tadelte.⁸ Es konnte scheinen, als stehe nun sogar die Existenz der deutschen Reformkongregation auf dem Spiel.⁹ Doch im Sommer 1506 entstand nach dem Tod des Augustinus von Terni und dem Amtsantritt des neuen Generalvikars und späteren Generalpriors Aegidius von Viterbo, der selbst ein Verfechter der Observanz war, eine gewandelte Situation, die für die Ordenspolitik von Staupitz und seine Reformkongregation neue Perspektiven eröffnete.

⁷ Vgl. zu den Vorgängen ausführlich Hans SCHNEIDER, Eine hessische Intervention in Rom für Johannes von Staupitz und die deutschen Augustinerobservanten (1506), in: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 115 (2004) 295–317.

⁸ Breve »Nuper Nobis« vom 24. März 1506. Ausfertigung: Generalarchiv des Augustinerordens, Rom, Bull. 5-30/I. Abgedruckt: Laurentius Empoli (ed.), Bullarium Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini, Rom 1628, 202–204. Vgl. Alonso, Bullarium IV, Nr. 119. – Von Besler wird dieses Breve nicht erwähnt.

⁹ Zu den Bemühungen Staupitz' um politische Rückendeckung vgl. SCHNEIDER, Intervention (wie Anm. 7).

Besler, der noch weiterhin in Rom als „Generalkommissar und Generalprokurator der reformierten Union des Augustinereremiten-Ordens in Deutschland“ wirkte,¹⁰ konnte schließlich im Frühjahr 1509 nach München zurückkehren. Dort wurde er im folgenden Jahr zum Subprior gewählt. Im Sommer 1511 begleitete er Staupitz erneut auf einer Visitationsreihe, diesmal in die Niederlande. 1512 wurde er von diesem mit der Vorbereitung des Kölner Kapitels der Reformkongregation beauftragt. Dieses Kapitel sollte den Streit beilegen, der wegen eines von Staupitz vorbereiteten Anschlusses der sächsischen Provinz an die Kongregation ausgebrochen war und der schon zu heftigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen dem Generalvikar Staupitz und sieben oppositionellen observanten Konventen geführt hatte.¹¹ Besler geht auf diesen Konflikt mit keinem Wort ein, obwohl sein Nürnberger Heimatkonvent und der Rat der Reichsstadt die Speerspitze der Opposition gegen Staupitz gebildet hatten. So geschah es kaum ohne kluge Überlegung, dass nach der Beilegung der Streitigkeiten auf dem Kölner Kapitel gerade der Staupitzfreund Besler noch einmal als Prior in sein Nürnberger Mutterkloster geschickt wurde, dem er nun ein zweites Mal von 1512 bis 1516 vorstand. Anschließend leitete er von 1517 bis 1519 als Prior das Kloster in der schwäbischen Stadt Mindelheim. Gleichzeitig nahm er ein übergeordnetes Leitungsamt wahr, denn auf dem Triennalkapitel in Gotha 1515 war Besler zum Provinzialvikar des süddeutschen Distrikts gewählt worden.¹² Eine Entsendung als Delegierter der Kongregation zum Generalkapitel in Italien lehnte Besler allerdings wegen seiner einstigen Erfahrungen mit der römischen Ordensleitung ab. Das Amt des Provinzialvikars hatte er bis zum nächsten Kapitel in Heidelberg 1518 inne.¹³ Noch einmal

¹⁰ So lautet seine Amtsbezeichnung in zwei Indulgenzbrieffen, die er 1508 erwirkte; vgl. Josef HEMMERLE, Archiv des ehemaligen Augustinerklosters München, München 1956 (Bayrische Archivinventare 4), 43f., Urkunden Nr. 86 und 87.

¹¹ Vgl. Hans SCHNEIDER, Contentio Staupitiana. Der „Staupitz-Streit“ in der Observanz der deutschen Augustinereremiten 1507–1512, in: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 117 (2007) 2–44; DERS., Neue Quellen zum Konflikt in der deutschen Reformkongregation der Augustinereremiten zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts, in: Analecta Augustiniana 71 (2008) 9–37; ders., Martin Luthers Reise nach Rom – neu datiert und neu gedeutet, in: Studien zur Wissenschafts- und zur Religionsgeschichte, Berlin 2011 (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Neue Folge 10), 1–157, hier 38ff.

¹² Zum Amt des Provinzialvikars (Distriktvikars) vgl. Wilhelm Ernst WINTERHAGER, Martin Luther und das Amt des Provinzialvikars in der Reformkongregation der deutschen Augustiner-Eremiten, in: Vita Religiosa im Mittelalter. Festschrift für Kaspar Elm, hg. v. Franz J. FELTEN und Nikolas JASPERT (Berliner Historische Studien. Ordensstudien 31), Berlin 1999, 707–738.

¹³ Eine Wiederwahl in dieses Amt auf dem nächsten Kapitel war nicht möglich; vgl. Constitutiones 32, 177–179.

begleitete er dann 1521–22 den Generalvikar, nunmehr Staupitz' Nachfolger Wenzel Linck, auf einer ausgedehnten Visitationsreise.

Inzwischen hatten die öffentlichen Auseinandersetzungen um Beslers Ordensbruder Martin Luther und seine Lehren schon einen Höhepunkt erreicht und auch innerhalb des Augustinerordens zu Fraktionsbildungen geführt. Besler muss dem etwa eineinhalb Jahrzehnte jüngeren Luther mehrmals begegnet sein: Beide hatten 1512 an dem Kapitel der Kongregation in Köln teilgenommen;¹⁴ beide waren auch auf dem nächsten Kapitel in Gotha 1515 anwesend. Während Besler selbst berichtet, dass er hier zum Provinzialvikar des süddeutschen Distrikts gewählt wurde, übergeht er mit Schweigen die gleichzeitige Wahl Luthers zum Provinzialvikar des thüringisch-sächsischen Distrikts auf demselben Kapitel,¹⁵ vor dem Luther auch predigte.¹⁶ Auch auf dem Heidelberger Kapitel 1518 waren wohl beide anwesend; für Luther ist dies quellenmäßig belegt,¹⁷ aber auch für Besler in seinen Funktionen als süddeutscher Provinzialvikar und als Mindelheimer Prior ist dies äußerst wahrscheinlich. Außerdem ist Besler vermutlich nach den Visitationsreisen 1521–22, auf denen er den Generalvikar Linck begleitete, und vor dem Pfingstkapitel 1522, das in der kursächsischen Stadt Grimma stattfand, zusammen mit Linck in Wittenberg gewesen.¹⁸ Allerdings erwähnt Besler in seinen Aufzeichnungen die Person Luthers niemals, sondern nur dessen Anhänger.¹⁹ Umgekehrt findet sich in Luthers Briefwechsel (soweit er erhalten ist) nur eine sichere Erwähnung Beslers als Nürnberger Prior: In einem Brief, den Luther im Herbst 1516 an seinen Freund und damaligen Erfurter Prior Johann Lang schrieb,²⁰ scheint er einen Konflikt Langs mit Besler zu berühren, über den aber sonst nichts bekannt ist. Hier heißt es: "Gegenüber dem Nürnberger Prior bemühe dich um eine sanftmütige Haltung, weil es sich so geziemt, da jener eine harte Haltung eingenommen hat.

¹⁴ Zu Luthers Anwesenheit vgl. SCHNEIDER, Contentio 45, Anm. 244; ders., Reise 87, Anm. 393; 128f.

¹⁵ Vgl. WINTERHAGER (wie Anm. 12).

¹⁶ Luther predigte dort am 1. Mai (WA 1, 44–52 / WA 4, 675–683). Zur Wirkung vgl. WA.B 1, Nr. 14 mit Anm. 2; ein Jahr später ließ Luther in seinem Bekanntenkreis eine Abschrift der Predigt verbreiten (vgl. WA.B 1, Nr. 20).

¹⁷ Vgl. Hans SCHNEIDER, Staupitz' Ausschreiben zum Kapitel der deutschen Augustinerkongregation in Heidelberg 1518. Ein Quellenfund, Blätter zur Pfälzischen Kirchengeschichte 74 / Ebernburg-Hefte 41 (2007) 361–372 (65–76) (Lit.).

¹⁸ Linck hielt sich von Ende April bis mindestens Mitte Mai in Wittenberg auf; vgl. WA.B 2, 511, 11f.; 534, 56–58.

¹⁹ "Lutheri sequaces", "Lutherana illa secta", "Lutheri sectatores", "Lutherani", "schismatica factio Lutherana", "diabolica illa Lutherana heresis".

²⁰ Zu Lang vgl. WENTZ 482; KUNZELMANN V, 95f. und Anm. 529.

Denn nicht der Harte treibt den Harten aus, d.h. nicht der Teufel den Teufel, sondern der Sanftmütige (d.h. der Finger Gottes) vertreibt die bösen Geister.”²¹ Außerdem enthält vielleicht noch eine zweite Stelle in einem Brief des Jahres 1522 eine Anspielung auf Besler.²² In den Auseinandersetzungen um Luther stand er auf der Seite von dessen Gegnern. Auf dem beschlussunfähigen Kapitel in Grimma gehörte er zu den Unterzeichnern einer Erklärung, die sich von den Lehren Luthers distanzierten.

Beslers autobiographische Aufzeichnungen reichen bis zum November 1525, als ihn der neue Generalvikar Johann Bethel von Spangenberg als Prior in dem Konvent in Köln einsetzte, in dem sich eine Fraktion von Luther-Anhängern gebildet hatte, die dort für Unruhe sorgte.²³ Eine Visitation Spangenbergs im Vorjahr hatte keine dauerhafte Befriedung gebracht. Daher bat der Rat der Stadt, dass Spangenberg entweder “alldae selbs das Regiment” übernehmen oder einen anderen tapferen Mann schicken solle, um eine dauerhafte Ordnung im Kloster herzustellen.²⁴ Spangenbergs Wahl fiel auf Nikolaus Besler, den er am 23. November persönlich in das Amt als Prior einführte. Die letzte Bemerkung in Beslers Manuskript ist eine Klage über das, was er von den dortigen Mitbrüdern ertragen musste — “was ich in den 33 Jahren [meines Lebens im Orden] vorher niemals erlebt habe” —, und der Hinweis auf P. Husden und andere Ungenannte, die ihm zur Seite standen. Damit bricht der Bericht ab.

Obwohl Besler vom Kölner Rat kräftig unterstützt wurde, gelang es ihm während der nächsten Jahre nicht, die Lage nachhaltig zu stabilisieren. Im Frühjahr 1529 legte er mit Zustimmung Spangenbergs sein Amt nieder.²⁵ Über seine weiteren Lebensschicksale ist

²¹ “Erga Priorem Nurnbergensem suavem animum indue, quia sic expedit, cum ille asperum induerit. Non enim asper asperum, id est, non diabolus diabolum, sed suavis asperum (id est, digitus Dei) eiicit daemonia.” WA.B 1, 67, Nr. 26, 71–74 (vgl. Lk 11,20). Besler war von 1512 bis zum 4. Dezember 1516 Prior in Nürnberg.

²² In einem Brief an Wenzel Linck vom 12. April 1522 erwähnt Luther ironisch ein Schreiben von Melchior Miritsch, jenes höchst ruhmreichen Solon, “qui Christum adeo prudenter negavit, ut nemo audeat id negatum Christum appellare, nisi quicquid non Mirischijs Mesleranus” [andere Lesart: “Meslerus”] (WA.B 2, Nr. 473, 10–13). Otto CLEMEN, der Bearbeiter des Bandes, bemerkt dazu (Anm. 6): “Mesleranus oder Meslerus weiß ich nicht zu deuten.” Er verweist auf Walchs Deutung von Meßler als Messpfafe. – Es könnte sich nach meinem Urteil um ein Wortspiel (Besler – Meßler) handeln, das Miritsch als Besleraner, Parteigänger Beslers, bezeichnet und damit den Anklang an Meßler (Messer, Meßner) verbindet.

²³ Vgl. Wilhelm ROTSCHEIDT, Die Kölner Augustiner und die Wittenberger Reformation, in: Monatshefte für Rheinische Kirchengeschichte 11 (1917) 33–58.

²⁴ Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, Bestand 20, Briefbücher 54, fol. 72^v–73^r.

²⁵ Brief des Rates an Spangenberg vom 31 März 1529; Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, Bestand 20, Briefbücher 54, fol. 207^v–208^r.

nichts bekannt.²⁶ Möglicherweise zog er sich nach Langensalza im Herzogtum Sachsen zurück, wo das dortige Augustinerkloster während der Regierungszeit des altgläubigen Herzogs Georg des Bärtigen bestehen blieb.²⁷ Hier hielt sich im Frühjahr 1529 auch Spangenberg auf,²⁸ der in diesem Jahr ebenfalls sein Amt als Generalvikar niederlegte.²⁹ In Langensalza hatten auch einige hessische Augustinermönche nach der Auflösung ihres Heimatklosters Eschwege Zuflucht gefunden.³⁰ Falls die Handschrift der Langversion von Beslers Aufzeichnungen (s. u.) aus einem sächsischen Kloster stammte, böte dies vielleicht eine Erklärung dafür, wie sie 1730 auf die Leipziger Auktion (s.u.) gelangte.

II

BESLERS AUFZEICHNUNGEN

Im Jahre 1912 veröffentlichte P. August Feutry OESA in den *Analecta Augustiniana* autobiographische Aufzeichnungen Beslers.³¹ Die Editionsgrundlage bildeten Eintragungen Beslers in einem Band der Universitätsbibliothek Gent.³² Feutry verzichtete auf eine historische

²⁶ Die Angabe bei Leonard ENNEN, Geschichte der Stadt Köln, IV, 314, dass Besler (den er stets falsch Bresler nennt) nach Nürnberg zurückgegangen sei, hat schon KOLDE 399, Anm. 3, bezweifelt, der auch auf die nachweislich falsche Behauptung hinweist, dass er 1525 Prior in Nürnberg gewesen sei. Auch über Spangenbergs weiteren Lebensweg macht Ennen irrige Angaben, wenn er (IV, 315, Anm. 1) ihn evangelischen Pfarrer in Nordhausen werden lässt (Verwechslung mit dem gleichnamigen Johann Spangenberg aus Hardeggen).

²⁷ Vgl. dazu demnächst Hans SCHNEIDER, Das Augustinereremitenkloster Langensalza in der Reformationszeit (erscheint in der Zeitschrift Herbergen der Christenheit).

²⁸ Am 23. April ist er dort urkundlich nachweisbar. Den von KOLDE 400 erwähnten Brief Spangenbergs aus Langensalza konnte ich im Historischen Archiv der Stadt Köln nicht auffinden.

²⁹ Die Meinung der neueren Forschung, dass Spangenberg bis zu seinem Lebensende altgläubig geblieben sei (KOLDE 397–399, KUNZELMANN V, 514f., Johannes SCHILLING, Klöster und Mönche in der hessischen Reformation, Gütersloh 1997 (Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationgeschichte 67), 227, Anm. 2, ist unzutreffend. Vgl. Gisela MÖNCKE, Johann Bethel von Spangenberg – ein gewesener Mönch, in: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 112 (2001) 205–219.

³⁰ Noch 1537 stellten drei Augustiner aus Eschwege dort eine Urkunde aus: Albert HUYSKENS, Die Klöster der Landschaft an der Werra (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Hessen IX,1), Marburg 1916, Nr. 871.

³¹ P. Nicolai Beslerii Nürimbergensis autobiographia, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 4 (1911/12) 293–294.

³² Damals unter der Signatur Vol. 519 Sectionis Iurisprudentiae. Vgl. dazu August FEUTRY, Aliud exemplar constitutionum ordinis an. 1504 pro vicariatu Germaniae editarum, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 4 (1911/12) 292f.

Kommentierung und Auswertung, die er, wie er bescheiden formulierte, Kundigeren überlassen wollte.³³ Auf diese Aufzeichnungen Beslers hat P. Adalbero Kunzelmann OSA in seiner Darstellung der Geschichte der deutschen Augustiner-Eremiten mehrfach zurückgegriffen; vor allem diente sie ihm bei der Schilderung der Auseinandersetzungen in der deutschen Reformkongregation unter dem Generalvikariat Johanns von Staupitz als eine wichtige Quelle.³⁴

Feutry ist unbekannt geblieben, dass die Autobiographie Beslers bereits im 18. Jahrhundert veröffentlicht worden war. Im Jahre 1732 erschien in der 'Fortgesetzten Sammlung von Alten und Neuen Theologischen Sachen' (FSANTS), der Zeitschrift der Wittenberger lutherischen Orthodoxie,³⁵ ein Beitrag mit folgendem Titel: "Vita Nicolai Besleri Augustiniani ab ipso conscripta. Ex Autographo ejus. Ubi De statu et calamitate Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini, potissimum tempore Reformationis, singularia multa commemorantur. Ex M[anu] S[crip]to."³⁶ Die Vorlage dieses Abdrucks bildete eine Handschrift, die Christian Gottlob Haltaus³⁷ 1730 auf einer öffentlichen Auktion ersteigert und 1731 der Leipziger Ratsbibliothek geschenkt hatte. Haltaus schreibt: "Hic *Beslerus* Joh. Staupitii fuit familiaris ac perpetuus quasi comes, vir magnae inter suos auctoritatis, ac diu Prior Ordinis: qui etiam literas et privilegia Ordinis S. Augustini, Minorum, Predicatorum, Carmelitarum ac Servorum B. Mariae a pluribus Pontificibus concessa et confirmata, vulgo *Mare Magnum* dicta, in usum suum collegit indicibusque instruxit. Quod opus in forma 8. manu Besleri nitide scriptum, in auctione Lips[iae] ante biennium vili pretio comparavi, et Bibliothecae Senat[oriae] Lips[iensi] gratae mentis ergo lubens merito dicavi."³⁸

Ein Vergleich mit dem von Feutry veröffentlichten Text ergibt, dass es sich um zwei verschiedene Versionen handelt. Gegenüber der von Feutry edierten Fassung, die im Jahre 1517 endet, ist der in FSANTS publizierte Text wesentlich ausführlicher und reicht bis zum

³³ "Studium et dilucidationem huius documenti peritioribus relinquo" (293, Anm. 1).

³⁴ KUNZELMANN V 448–450. 452. 464. 467. 471. 475. 508. 512f. 515. 518 sowie Anm. 2241 und 2343.

³⁵ Vgl. Franz BLANKMEISTER, Die erste theologische Zeitschrift, Leipzig 1893 (Aus dem kirchlichen Leben des Sachsenlandes 2); Martin GRESCHAT, Zwischen Tradition und neuem Anfang. Valentin Ernst Löscher und der Ausgang der lutherischen Orthodoxie, Witten 1971 (Untersuchungen zur Kirchengeschichte 5), 180–189.

³⁶ FSANTS 1732, 356–371.

³⁷ Zu Christian Gottlob Haltaus (1702–1758) vgl. Franz SCHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 10 (1879) 453.

³⁸ FSANT 1732, 357, Nota.

23. November 1525. Den Textabdruck in FSANTS haben vor allem evangelische Kirchenhistoriker in ihren Untersuchungen zur Romreise Luthers herangezogen,³⁹ während er in der katholischen Forschung kaum bekannt und nur wenig benutzt wurde.⁴⁰

Eine Neuedition beider Fassungen erscheint aus mehreren Gründen sinnvoll. Wie eine Überprüfung der Edition Feutrys ergab, ist sie recht unzuverlässig, weist Auslassungen einzelner Wörter und Satzteile auf und enthält eine Fülle gravierender Lesefehler. Vergleichsweise wurde die Langversion bei ihrer Erstveröffentlichung 1730 insgesamt sorgfältig transkribiert, doch finden sich auch in ihr eine Reihe von — z.T. den Sinn entstellenden — Fehllesungen und einzelne Auslassungen.⁴¹ Bei ihr kommt noch hinzu, dass die Bände der FSANTS keineswegs überall zugänglich sind. Vor allem aber verdienen die Ausführungen Beslers eine historische Kommentierung durch Erläuterungen zu Personen, Orten und Sachen.

Die Kurzversion ist von Besler auf dem Titelblatt eines Buches und auf der Innenseite des Rückendeckels niedergeschrieben worden. Dabei handelt es sich um ein Exemplar der Konstitutionen der deutschen Reformkongregation, die Staupitz 1504 oder 1506 in Nürnberg hatte drucken lassen.⁴² Nach dem schon bekannten Band in der Universitätsbibliothek Jena⁴³ war Feutry erfreut, in Gent ein zweites Exemplar entdeckt zu haben.⁴⁴ Es befindet sich auch derzeit noch in

³⁹ Vgl. außer KOLDE etwa Heinrich BÖHMER, *Luthers Romfahrt*, Leipzig 1914; Otto SCHEEL, *Martin Luther. Vom Katholizismus zur Reformation*, II, Tübingen ^{3/4}1930; zuletzt SCHNEIDER, *Reise* (wie Anm. 11).

⁴⁰ Vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 512, Anm. 2470 (Hinweis auf KOLDE, der aber die Langfassung der Autobiographie Beslers vorliegen hatte!); Hubert JEDIN, *Die römischen Augustinerquellen zu Luthers Frühzeit*, in: *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 25 (1928) 256–270; Wolfgang GÜNTER in *Constitutiones*.

⁴¹ Auf einige hat bereits KOLDE 228, Anm. 2, und 232, Anm. 1, hingewiesen.

⁴² *Constitutiones fratrum Eremitarum sancti Augustini ad Apostolicorum privilegiorum formam pro reformatione Alemanniae*, ed. Wolfgang GÜNTER, in: Johann von Staupitz, *Sämtliche Schriften. Abhandlungen, Predigten, Zeugnisse*, hrsg. von Lothar GRAF ZU DOHNA und Richard WETZEL, Bd. 5: *Gutachten und Satzungen*, Berlin u.a., 2001, 103–360. Zur Frage des Datums vgl. GÜNTER 135, Anm. 117.

⁴³ UB Jena: 8 Hist.ecccl.VIII,10.

⁴⁴ Inzwischen ist aber eine ganze Reihe von Exemplaren bekannt. GÜNTER weist in seiner Edition (s.o. Anm. 42) außer den Bänden in Jena und Gent Exemplare in der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen und in der Scheurl'schen Bibliothek Fischbach sowie eine handschriftliche Kopie in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München nach. Ergänzend lassen sich noch weitere Stücke in der Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin, in der Staatsbibliothek München, in der Staatsbibliothek Neuburg/Donau sowie in der Vatikanischen Bibliothek nennen.

der Universitätsbibliothek Gent und hat heute die Signatur BHSL-RES-0520 (2-3).

Das Titelblatt weist verschiedene Besitzvermerke auf: "Codex patris prioris provincialis fratrum Augustinensium Coloniensis provincie." Wenn der Band in diesem ersten Vermerk als Eigentum des Provinzials der Kölner Ordensprovinz deklariert ist – leider sind weder dessen Name noch ein Datum genannt –, so wird man davon ausgehen können, das sich der Band ursprünglich im Besitz des Kölner Konvents befand. Das erklärt auch, wie Beslers Notizen in dieses Buch gelangten. Die spätere Besitzgeschichte lässt sich aus weiteren Eintragungen auf dem Titelblatt erschließen. Unter dem ersten Vermerk steht von anderer Hand: "Fr. Ludovicus Bergius August[inianus] Brugen[is]", der seinen Wahlspruch hinzugefügt hat: "Malum odi." Darunter befindet sich, wieder von anderer Hand, der Eintrag: "Hic liber pertinet ad Bibl[iothecam] Aug[ustinianam] Gand[avensem] ita extat huc 4 Martii 1606. Fr. Alipius prior." Seit Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts befand sich der Band also in Gent. Diese Pertinenz wird schließlich bestätigt durch den letzten Vermerk: "Bibliothecae FF. [Fratrum] Erem[itarum] S[ancti] August[ini] Gandavi 1695."

Die Handschrift mit der Langversion, die Haltaus einst der Leipziger Ratsbibliothek schenkte, befindet sich heute in der Handschriftenabteilung der Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig und hat die Signatur: Rep. II, 162. Das Manuskript besteht aus drei Teilen:

Der erste Teil (fol. 1^r–212^r) umfasst: "MARE MAGNUM,⁴⁵ id est copia literarum ac privilegiorum ordinis fratrum S. Augustini, Minorum, Praedicatorum, Carmelitarum ac Servorum B. Mariae, per Fr. Nicol. Beslerium Norib. augustinianum Eremitam collecta et propria eius manu descripta et indice copioso instructa." Es handelt sich um Abschriften von Urkunden der fünf Bettelorden, die Besler während seines Romaufenthaltes (1505–1509) angefertigt hat.⁴⁶ Das Ende seiner Arbeiten hat er auf fol. 201^r datiert: "Benedictus deus cum sanctis suis. Finis apud S. Mariam de p[o]p[u]lo de urbe, die Sabbati 28. mensis Martii anno domini 1506. Frater Nicolaus besler augustinianus monachensis."

Der zweite Teil der Handschrift (fol. 216^r–221^r) enthält: "FR. NICOL. BESLERI VITA ab ipso scripta, pertinens usque ad ann[um]

⁴⁵ Der Titel ist angelehnt an das Incipit der Bulle ›Mare magnum privilegiorum‹ (1476) für den Karmeliterorden.

⁴⁶ Vgl. unten Beslers Schilderung seines Romaufenthalts.

1525." Bei diesem Stück handelt es sich um die Langversion der autobiographischen Aufzeichnungen.

Der dritte Teil (fol. 221^v-222^r) besteht aus Aufzeichnungen zur Topographie Roms, die Besler 1507 während seines Aufenthalts angefertigt hat: "Ego frater Nicolaus Beslerius Augustinianus heremitum Monachensis, dum legatione fungirer egregiae unionis nostrae reformatae per Alemanniam, Romae constitutus usuali ac solito gressu meo subscripta ibidem loca mensuram ivi."⁴⁷

Die Grundsätze der vorliegenden Edition orientieren sich an den Empfehlungen, die ein Arbeitskreis der Arbeitsgemeinschaft außeruniversitärer historischer Forschungseinrichtungen 1981 vorgelegt hat.⁴⁸ Ferner wurden zur Erleichterung der Lesbarkeit in Beslers Text, der fortlaufend geschrieben ist, Absätze eingefügt. Im Langtext ist in eckigen Klammern jeweils die Seitenzählung des Abdrucks in FSANTS 1732 angegeben, um ein Auffinden der Zitate in der älteren Literatur zu ermöglichen.

Abgekürzt zitierte Literatur:

Constitutiones: Constitutiones fratrum Eremitarum sancti Augustini ad Apostolicorum privilegiorum formam pro reformatione Alemanniae, ed. Wolfgang GÜNTHER, in: Johann von Staupitz, Sämtliche Schriften. Abhandlungen, Predigten, Zeugnisse, hrsg. von Lothar GRAF ZU DOHNA und Richard WETZEL, Bd. 5: Gutachten und Satzungen, Berlin u.a., 2001, 103–360 [zitiert nach cap. und Zeilen].

HEMMERLE: Josef HEMMERLE, Die Klöster der Augustiner-Eremiten in Bayern, München-Pasing 1958 (Bayrische Heimatforschung 12).

KOLDE: Theodor KOLDE, Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation und Johann von Staupitz, Gotha 1879.

KUNZELMANN: Adalbero KUNZELMANN, Geschichte der deutschen Augustiner-Eremiten. I–VII. Teil, Würzburg 1969–1976 (Casiciacum 26,1–7).

VAN LUIJK: Benignus VAN LUIJK, Le monde augustinien du XIII^e au XIX^e siècle, Assen 1972.

WA: Martin LUTHER, Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Weimar 1883ff.

⁴⁷ Vgl. dazu mit Teiledition Hans SCHNEIDER, Ein Franke in Rom. Römische Wanderungen des Augustinereremiten Nikolaus Besler im Jahre 1507, in: Prüft alles, und das Gute behaltet. Zum Wechselspiel von Kirchen, Religionen und säkularer Welt. Festschrift für Hans-Martin Barth zum 65. Geburtstag, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, 239–270.

⁴⁸ Empfehlungen zur Edition frühneuzeitlicher Texte der Arbeitsgemeinschaft außeruniversitärer historischer Forschungseinrichtungen, in: Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 72 (1981) 299–315.

WA.B: Martin LUTHER, Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefwechsel, Weimar 1930ff.

WENTZ: Gottfried WENTZ, Das Augustinereremitenkloster in Wittenberg, in: Das Bistum Brandenburg, II, Berlin 1941 (Germania Sacra I/3,2), 440–499.

III

BESLERS AUFZEICHNUNGEN

Kurzversion

Ego, frater Nicolaus Beslerius L[ector] Augustinianus Eremita Nurenbergensis, ingressus sum ibidem ordinem anno domini 1486, Martii 2. Vestitus autem 16 eiusdem atque anno evoluto professusque, postea in angaria autem immediate sequente ordinatus accolitus, et, statim ante natalem domini subdiaconus: post hoc mox in angaria anni 1488 diaconus: et sabbato Sitientes proxime sequente presbyter, quod erat martii 22. Egi autem prima sacrificia deinde aprilis 20.

Langversion

FR[ATRIS] NICOL[AI] BESLERI VITA ab ipso scripta, pertinens usque ad annum 1525. II [356] In nomine Domini nostri Iesu Christi Amen.

Ego, frater Nicolaus Beslerius L[ector] Augustinianus Eremita II [357] Nurenbergensis,⁴⁹ ingressus sum⁵⁰ ibidem ordinem anno Domini 1486 die Martii 2., vestitus⁵¹ autem 16. eiusdem evolutoque professus item Martii 2. anno 1487. Postea in angaria crucis⁵² tempore autumnii immediate sequente ordinatus accolitus⁵³ et statim ante nativitatem Domini⁵⁴ subdiaconus. Post hoc mox in angaria cinerum⁵⁵ anni 1488 diaconus ac sabbato Sitientes⁵⁶ proximo sacerdos, quod erat Martii 22. Feci autem prima sacrificia⁵⁷ subsequenter Aprilis 20.

⁴⁹ Zum Nürnberger Kloster vgl. HEMMERLE 66–69.

⁵⁰ Eintritt als Postulant.

⁵¹ Einkleidung als Novize.

⁵² Quatember nach Kreuzerhöhung (14. September).

⁵³ Akkolut.

⁵⁴ Wahrscheinlich Quatember nach Lucie, also 19. Dezember 1487.

⁵⁵ Quatember nach Invokavit, 26. Februar 1488.

⁵⁶ *Sitientes venite ad aquas* ist der Introitus am Samstag nach Laetare bzw. vor Judica, also 22. März 1488. Dieser Tag gehört zu den Tagen, an denen nach kirchlichem Brauch die höheren Weihen erteilt werden. Vgl. Paul HINSCHIUS, Das Kirchenrecht der Katholiken und Protestanten in Deutschland. System des katholischen Kirchenrechts mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Deutschland, I, Berlin 1869 [Nachdr. Graz 1959], 114.

⁵⁷ Primiz.

⁵⁸ 4. Oktober.

Anno postea eodem ad festum Francisci fui promotus ad studium Ingolstadii. A quo post susceptum baccalaureatum revocatus prefui fratribus iunioribus in conventu Nurenbergensi annis ferme 5. Postea ibidem electus prior in v[igili]a apostolorum Simonis et Iude anno 1495, feci officium usque ad annum 1500, quando in capitulo Vallis molarie veni ad Eslingam prior, deinde Eschveghe in capitulo triennali ad Monachum anno 1503 prior. Postea ivi Romam, ut in fine.^{62a}

Anno autem postea eodem circa festum Francisci⁵⁸ promotus fui ad studium Ingolstadii,⁵⁹ a quo post susceptum in artibus baccalaureatum post festum corporis Christi⁶⁰ anni 1490 revocatus aliquanto tempore procurator conventus existens, postea prefui fratribus iunioribus⁶¹ in conventu item Nurenbergensi annis plus quam II [358] tuor. Electus deinde prior in vigilia Simonis et Iude⁶² anno 1495 continuavi officium usque ad annum 1500, quando in conventu Vallis Molarie⁶³ celebrato ad festum S. Augustini⁶⁴ capitulo absolutus, prior veni Esslingam⁶⁵ usque ad capitulum Eschvegense⁶⁶ dominica Iubilae⁶⁷ anni 1503, ubi reverendus pater Magister Ioannes de Staupitz⁶⁸ (reverendo Patre Andrea Proles⁶⁹ ob senium officio cedente⁷⁰) electus vicarius me in priorem loco sui confirmavit Monachensem.⁷¹

⁵⁹ Immatrikuliert am 9. Oktober 1488: "Frater Nicolaus Pesler ordinis S. Augustini conventus Nurenbergensis 1 gr." Götz FRHR. VON PÖLNITZ, Die Matrikel der Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität Ingolstadt-Landshut-München, Teil I: Ingolstadt, 1: 1472–1600, München 1937, Sp. 186.

⁶⁰ Fronleichnam, 10. Juni 1490.

⁶¹ Novizenmeister.

⁶² Simonis et Iudae = 28. Oktober, also 27. Oktober.

^{62a} *in fine* verweist auf das Ende des Buches, wo Besler die Fortsetzung seines Berichts auf der Innenseite des Buchdeckels eingetragen hat.

⁶³ Mülheim im Tal / Ehrenbreitstein. Vgl. J. Jacob WAGNER, Das ehemalige Kloster der Augustiner-Eremiten in Ehrenbreitstein und seine Beziehungen zu Martin Luther, Erfurt und Wittenberg, Koblenz 1931; KUNZELMANN V, 483–489.

⁶⁴ 28. August.

⁶⁵ Zum dortigen Konvent vgl. Robert UHLAND, Die Esslinger Klöster im Mittelalter, in: Esslinger Studien 8 (1961) 7–42, hier 25–29; KUNZELMANN I, 187–191 (Anfänge); Joachim J. HALBEKANN, Esslingen, in: Württembergisches Klosterbuch. Klöster, Stifte und Ordensgemeinschaften von den Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart, Ostfildern 2003, 237f.

⁶⁶ Zum Kapitel in Eschwege (Hessen) vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 435–447.

⁶⁷ 7. Mai 1503.

⁶⁸ Zu Johannes von Staupitz vgl. Wolfgang GÜNTHER, Johann von Staupitz (ca. 1468–1524), in: Erwin ISELOH (Hg.), Katholische Theologen der Reformationszeit, 5 (Katholisches Leben und Kirchenreform 48), Münster 1988, 11–31 (Lit.); Adolar ZUMKELLER, Staupitz, in: Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 14 (1990) 1184–1196; Klaus KIENZLER, Staupitz, in: Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 10 (1995) 1250–1253 (Lit.); Berndt HAMM, Staupitz, Johann von, in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie 32 (2000), 119–127 (Lit.).

Eschwege autem exiens veni per Nurenbergam ad Eßlingam, ubi prior fueram, acceptisque rebus nostris ante festum corporis Christi⁷² veni Monachum. Et ibidem permansi usque ad festum Georgii⁷³ anno 1504, quando celebrari debuit convocatio patrum⁷⁴ in Mindelhain.⁷⁵ Quo dum ego et alii forte 5 vel 6 venissimus priores, patres conventuum provincie interioris, Missene⁷⁶ videlicet Saxonie etc., Nurenbergam interim usque venerant. Qui cum propter bellum, quod inter Albertum ducem Monachensem et Palatinum Rheni⁷⁷ tum ceperat, ad convocationem venire non poterant, scripsit mihi P. Vicarius Staupitz, ut ad se Nurenbergam properarem. Cumque illuc venissem, iam interioris provincie patres ad suos rediere conventus, patre vicario sine socio relicto. Qui cum Bavariam ut optabat, adire propter pericula non posset, sicut nec ego, accepto consilio ad Sa- ll [359] xoniam, Missenam, Thu-

⁶⁹ Zu Andreas Proles vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 407–433; Adolar ZUMKELLER, Proles, Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 7 (1994) 998f. (Lit.); Ralph WEINBRENNER, Klosterreform im 15. Jahrhundert zwischen Ideal und Praxis. Der Augustinere mit Andreas Proles (1429–1503) und die privilegierte Observanz (Spätmittelalter und Reformation 2), Tübingen 1991.

⁷⁰ Der 73 Jahre alte Proles starb einen Monat später, am 6. Juni 1503, in Kulmbach.

⁷¹ Zum dortigen Konvent vgl. HEMMERLE 50–57; Georg Schwaiger, Das Münchener Augustinerkloster im 16. Jahrhundert, in: Reformation und Katholizismus. Festschrift für Gottfried Maron zum 75. Geburtstag, Hannover 2003, 49–65.

⁷² Fronleichnam, 15. Juni 1503.

⁷³ 23. April.

⁷⁴ *Convocatio* bezeichnet eine Zusammenkunft zwischen den Triennalkapiteln („Zwischenkapitel“). Vgl. Constitutiones, Decretum promulgationis, Anm. 19.

⁷⁵ Mindelheim. Zum dortigen Kloster vgl. Friedrich ZOEPFL, Geschichte des ehemaligen Augustinerklosters in Mindelheim, in: Archiv für die Geschichte des Hochstifts Augsburg 5 (1916/19) 255–320. HEMMERLE 47–50.

⁷⁶ Meißen.

⁷⁷ Der 1503 ausgebrochene Landshuter Erbfolgekrieg (um das Erbe Georgs des Reichen von Landshut) zwischen Herzog Albrecht IV. und dem Kurfürsten Ruprecht von der Pfalz. Vgl. Andreas KRAUS, Grundzüge der Geschichte Bayerns (Grundzüge 54), Darmstadt 1984, 67f.; Rudolf EBNETH / Peter SCHMID (Hgg.), Der Landshuter Erbfolgekrieg. An der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit, Regensburg 2004.

Ego frater Nicolaus Beslerius Augustinianus eremita Monachensis prior, noto quod anno domini 1505, die ianuarii, id est, S.S. Vincentii et Anastasii martyrum, circa horam decimam ante meridiem exivi cum patre Henrico Rietbusch lectore Monachum, venimus autem Romam, 6 martii, post solis caesum in tenebris. In mane sequentis diei, id est 7 martii quae erat 6 feria ante dominicam Judica, intravimus conventum S. Marie de populo.

ringiam⁷⁸ etc. euntes certos visitavimus conventus. Inde demum reversi per Nurenbergam⁷⁹ Augustamque⁸⁰ Monachum in profesto sancte Barbarae⁸¹ venimus aliquot ibi hebdomadas quiescentes.

Consequenter autem anno 1505 die 22. Ianuarii et in festo Vincentii et Anastasii Martyrum⁸² circa horam 10. ante meridiem, adhuc prior (nam interim redituros sperabar) exivi Monachum cum patre lectore Heinrico Rietbusch,⁸³ viro egregio, pedestri (quod usum ipse equitandi non haberet⁸⁴) iuncto fratre Laurentio Bauer⁸⁵ sarcinulas nostras baiulante Romam petiturus. Prima nocte in Schefftlein,⁸⁶ monasterio ordinis Premonstratensis, sequenti die ad Benedicti Beuren⁸⁷ proficiscentes, ubi montana incipiunt ad usque Bassanum⁸⁸ durantia, deinde per Tridentum⁸⁹ (ubi et carnisprivium⁹⁰ fecimus) Bassanum⁹¹

⁷⁸ Am 5. Juli 1504 war Staupitz in Erfurt. Vgl. KOLDE 226 mit Anm. 1.

⁷⁹ Am 11. November 1504 ist Staupitz in Nürnberg nachweisbar. Vgl. Walter FRIEDENSBURG, Geschichte der Universität Wittenberg, Halle 1917, 22f., Anm. 1 (Sächs. Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Urk. Nr. 9582).

⁸⁰ Augsburg.

⁸¹ *Profestum* = vigilia S. Barbarae (4. Dezember), also 3. Dezember.

⁸² 22. Januar.

⁸³ Zu Heinrich Rietbusch vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 448f., Anm. 2343.

⁸⁴ Für Reisen zu Pferd bedurften die Mönche der schriftlichen Genehmigung des Generalvikars. Constitutiones 20, 27f.

⁸⁵ Lorenz Bau(e)r, ein Laienbruder des Münchner Konvents.

⁸⁶ Schäftlarn. Vgl. Sigisbert MITTERER (Hg.), 1200 Jahre Kloster Schäftlarn 762–1962, Schäftlarn 1962; Norbert BACKMUND, Die Chorherrenorden und ihre Stifte in Bayern, Passau 1966, S. 187–190.

⁸⁷ Benediktbeuren, Benediktinerkloster. Vgl. Leo WEBER, Kloster Benediktbeuern. Hoheits-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturzentrum seit dem frühen 8. Jahrhundert im Pfaffenwinkel, Regensburg 2003.

⁸⁸ Bassano.

⁸⁹ Trient. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Marco (Prov. Venetiarum); vgl. VAN LUIJK 44.

⁹⁰ Wohl gemeint *carnisprivium clericorum*: der Sonntag Quinquagesima = Estomihi als Beginn der Fastenzeit der Kleriker, 2. Februar 1505.

⁹¹ Bassano. Augustinereremiten-Klöster S. Maria (Prov. Venetiarum) und S. Caterina (Congr. Montis Orthonis). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 44 und 49.

Tervisiumque⁹² iter prosecuti venimus Venetias.⁹³ Unde Chiosam⁹⁴ Ariminumque⁹⁵ navigio ducti, pedestri via Pensauram⁹⁶ Auximum⁹⁷ Mariam de Loretto⁹⁸ Maceratam⁹⁹ quoque transeuntes Tolentinum¹⁰⁰ sabbato Letare¹⁰¹ iunximus,¹⁰² ubi sacris sancti Nicolai visis reliquiis¹⁰³ per Spoletum,¹⁰⁴ Terrenam,¹⁰⁵ Narniam¹⁰⁶ etc. Romam tandem 6. Martii post solis occasum¹⁰⁷ in tenebris applicuimus. In mane sequentis diei, id est 7. Martii, qui erat 6.

⁹² Treviso. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Margherita (Prov. Venetiarum); VAN LUIJK 44. Chiara VOLTAREL, La chiesa di Santa Margherita. Storia di un monumento dimenticato, Treviso 2007.

⁹³ Venedig. Augustinereremiten-Klöster S. Stefano, S. Cristoforo, S. Andrea della Certosa, S. Giorgio in Alga (Prov. Venetiarum); S. Cristophero della Pace (Congr. Montis Orthonis); vgl. VAN LUIJK 49.

⁹⁴ Chioggia. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Nicolò (Prov. Venetiarum). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 44. Die Kirche wird heute als Konzert- und Theatersaal genutzt.

⁹⁵ Rimini. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Giovanni / S. Agostino (Prov. Roman-diolae); VAN LUIJK 42. Vgl. Pier Giorgio PASINI, Guida breve per la chiesa riminese di Sant'Agostino, Rimini 2007 (Lit.).

⁹⁶ Pesaro. Augustinereremiten-Kloster SS. Agostino e Lorenzo (Prov. Marchiae Anconitae); VAN LUIJK 39. Zur Klostergeschichte vgl. Gli agostiniani e le Marche. Personaggi e conventi. Catalogo, Tolentino 1989, 36f.

⁹⁷ Osimo. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Agostino (Prov. Marchiae Anconitae); VAN LUIJK 39. Vgl. Gli agostiniani e le Marche 34.

⁹⁸ Loreto, das Marienheiligtum in den Marken. Vgl. Giuseppe SANTARELLI, Loreto. Ein Führer durch Kunst und Geschichte, Ancona 1996.

⁹⁹ Macerata. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Agostino (Prov. Marchiae Anconitae); VAN LUIJK 39. Vgl. Gli agostiniani e le Marche 25f.

¹⁰⁰ Tolentino. Augustinereremiten-Kloster (Congr. Lombardiae); VAN LUIJK 39. Vgl. Gli agostiniani e le Marche 48.

¹⁰¹ 1. März 1505.

¹⁰² Fehlt in FSANTS.

¹⁰³ Nikolaus von Tolentino (1245–1305), 1446 heiliggesprochen. Vgl. Adolar ZUMKELLER, Nikolaus von Tolentino, in: Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 6 (1993) 931f. (Lit.); Roberto TOLLO, San Nicola da Tolentino e le Marche. Culto e arte, Tolentino 1999.

¹⁰⁴ Spoleto. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Nicolò (Prov. Umbriae); VAN LUIJK 44. Heute ist der Klosterkomplex ein Kongress- und Ausstellungszentrum.

¹⁰⁵ Terni. Augustinereremiten-Kloster SS. Agostino e Pietro (Prov. Umbriae); VAN LUIJK 44. Guerriero BOLLI, La Chiesa di S. Pietro dei Fabbri in Terni. Certezze ed ipotesi sulla sua origine e sulla sua vicenda storica, Arrone 1998.

¹⁰⁶ Narni. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Agostino (Prov. Umbriae); VAN LUIJK 44.

¹⁰⁷ FSANTS: anno eodem.

Ultima autem die eiusdem mensis exivi Romam Vercellas usque ad capitulum congregationis Lombardie cum fratre Laurentio Baur. Et pervenimus illuc 16 aprilis, postea 25 die eiusdem exivimus Vercellas et venimus Romam 10 maii quae fuit vigilia Penthecostes

(transeundo autem Romam a Monacho civitate per Tridentum, montes incipiunt in Benediktenbeuren et terminantur in Bassano).

feria¹⁰⁸ ante dominicam Iudica, intravimus conventum Dive Marie de Populo,¹⁰⁹ ubi a reverendo patre Laurentio de Cremona,¹¹⁰ tunc priore, ac patribus ceteris hilariter caritativeque suscepti¹¹¹ gratias Deo referebamus.

Ultima autem die eiusdem mensis¹¹² Romam egressus cum fratre Laurentio Baur¹¹³ prefato, Ver- II [360] cellas¹¹⁴ versus ad capitulum patrum Congregationis Lombardie,¹¹⁵ ubi postquam 16. Aprilis illuc pervenimus; contracta societate cum patribus fraterne charitatis per patentes etiam eorum literas¹¹⁶ communionis quoque privilegiorum iuxta sedis apostolice placitum iterum Vercellas exeuntes mensis eiusdem 25. die, venimus Romam Maii 10., que erat vigilia Penthecostes.

[s. o.]

¹⁰⁸ Freitag.

¹⁰⁹ S. Maria del Popolo. Vgl. Enzo BENTIVOGLIO / Simonetta VALTIERI, Santa Maria del Popolo (con una appendice di documenti inediti sulla chiesa e su Roma), Roma 1976.

¹¹⁰ Zu Laurentius de Cremona vgl. Aegidii Viterbiensis O.S.A. Resgestae Generalatus, I: 1506–1514, ed. Albericus DE MEIJER, Rom 1988, Nr. 36, 132, 264 n.

¹¹¹ Vgl. Constitutiones 202,41.

¹¹² 31. März.

¹¹³ S.o. Anm. 85.

¹¹⁴ Vercelli im Piemont.

¹¹⁵ Zur Lombardischen und den anderen italienischen Reformkongregationen vgl. Katherine Walsh, The observant congregations of the Augustinian friars in Italy c. 1385 – c. 1465, Diss. Oxford 1972 [UB Tübingen], sowie die von Wolfgang GÜNTHER, Einleitung zu Constitutiones 119f., Anm. 5, und 126, Anm. 47, genannte Literatur. – Das Kapitel von Vercelli tagte in der Kirche S. Bernardo. Zur Geschichte des Bauwerks vgl. Alessia MEGLIO, La chiesa di San Bernardo a Vercelli. L'edificio ed il suo apparato decorativo alla luce delle vicende costruttive e dei restauri, Vercelli 2005. – Präsident des Kapitels und Verhandlungspartner Beslers war Alfonso di Mussio, der wiedergewählte Generalvikar der Lombardischen Kongregation. Über ihn vgl. Donato CALVI, Delle memorie storiche della Congr. Osser. di Lombardia dell' Ord. Erem. di S. Agostino, I, Milano 1669 [Exemplar: Biblioteca del Seminario arcivescovile, Torino], 182ff.

¹¹⁶ Urkunde vom 19. April 1505 im Bayerischen Hauptstaatsarchiv München, Aug U 81. Besler gibt im Mare magnum (fol. 149^v–150^r) den Wortlaut des Dokuments wieder: "Quaesivistis a nobis humiliter [...] per venerandum sacrae theologiae cursorem,

Tunc cepi sollicitare apud sedem apostolicam pro communione privilegiorum congregationis patrum Lombardie predicta, ea namque causa a patribus unionis nostre¹¹⁷ Romam missus fui. Qua vero non¹¹⁸ sine labore per bul- ll [361] lam apostolicam¹¹⁹ obtenta, remisi fratrem Laurentium¹²⁰ una cum bulla eadem in Alemanniam ad P. Vicarium Ioannem Staupitz post festum circumcisionis¹²¹ anni 1506.¹²² Eodem postea anno P. Lector H. Rietbusch predictus febrium laborans circa festum Bartholomei¹²³ Rome defungitur, in S. Maria de Populo ad latus imaginis eiusdem¹²⁴ coram venerabili sacramento in sepulchro, quo nemo antea positus fuerat, honorifice sepultus.

fratrem Nicolaum Besler, Monasterii Monacensis benemeritum priorem, ut duo vobis ex gratia speciali concedere dignaremur. Unum, ut vestram congregationem nostrae aggregamus, associaremus, uniremus, non ea tamen unione, qua ex duabus istis congregationibus una fierit, nec ut vestri istinc huc ad nos vel nostri hinc isthuc ad vos religiosi demorandi causa se transferrent, verum remanentibus in suo robore utriusque congregationis moribus, legibus et institutis, [...] ad id solum, ut privilegiorum nostrorum possetis esse participes. Alterum, ut procurator nostrae congregationis generalis, qui pro tempore in curia Romana per diffinitorium nostrum deputabitur, vestrae congregationis perinde ac nostrae posset procurator agere, sollicitare et expedire negotia. Quae praedicta bina, in quantum licite possumus et debemus, elargimur." Regest bei HEMMERLE, Archiv (wie Anm. 10), 40, Nr 79.

¹¹⁷ *Unio nostra* = die deutsche Reformkongregation der Augustinereremiten. Vgl. die Belege für diesen Sprachgebrauch in Constitutiones 358 (Register s.v.).

¹¹⁸ In FSANTS fehlt *non*. Vgl. schon KOLDE 228, Anm. 2.

¹¹⁹ Bulle ›Romani pontificis consueta benignitas‹ vom 21. Juni 1505; Ausfertigung: Bayer. Hauptstaatsarchiv München, Aug. U 81. Eine Abschrift der Bulle hat Besler in Mare Magnum, fol. 150^r–151^v, aufgenommen. Regest: Carolus ALONSO (ed.), Bullarium Ordinis Sancti Augustini. Regesta, IV: 1492–1572, Rom 1999, Nr. 101; HEMMERLE, Archiv (wie Anm. 10) 41, Nr. 81.

¹²⁰ Lorenz Baur, s.o. Anm. 85.

¹²¹ 1. Januar.

¹²² Warum Besler die Bulle erst über ein halbes Jahr später an Staupitz schicken konnte, liegt wohl nicht daran, dass er die Ausfertigung erst so spät erhielt (Kolde 228, Anm. 2), sondern an den im Folgenden erwähnten Schwierigkeiten von Seiten der Ordensleitung, die eine Revision der päpstlichen Entscheidung anstrebte und deshalb wohl eine Versendung der Bulle nach Deutschland zu verhindern suchte.

¹²³ 24. August.

¹²⁴ Gemeint ist das verehrte Marienbild auf dem Hauptaltar, das als vom Evangelisten Lukas gemalt galt und von Papst Gregor IX. nach einer Pest 1231 aus dem Lateran hierher gebracht worden sein soll. Vgl. Herbert VOSSBERG, Die angeblich

Quantas autem inter hec ego a patre generale, tunc Magistro Augustino de Interanna,¹²⁵ et ordinis procuratore,¹²⁶ Magistro Petro Antonio,¹²⁷ qui imprimis vite regularis esse promotores debuissent, molestias pertulerim, quo negotium religionis, pro quo Rome versabar, impediretur, quoties coram eis vocatus et de punctis diversis ab eis confictis examinatus et quoties mihi carcer preparatus, quoties sub pena excommunicationis late sententia¹²⁸, ne urbem exirem, prohibitus fuerim, etiam sub 100 ducatorum pena, quo item periculo, ne clam captus extinguerer per urbem tanto tempore incessem, novit Dominus et conscientia mea, futurorum, que nos ipsi nobis postea essemus illaturi, malorum tunc nescius.

Item postquam Julius Papa secundus obierat Bononiae oppulso Jo[anne] Bentivol, ex mandato patris generalis

Successu deinde temporis, postquam Iulius Papa II. Bononiam recepit,¹²⁹ expulso Ioanne Bentivol,¹³⁰ mandante

wahren Christusbilder in Rom, in: Kirchenblatt für evangelisch-lutherische Gemeinden. Amtliches Blatt der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Altpreußens 110 (1960) 183–186; vgl. auch Peter STRIEDER, Hans Holbein der Aeltere und die deutschen Wiederholungen des Gnadenbildes von Santa Maria del Popolo, in: Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 22 (1959), 253–267.

¹²⁵ Agostino Faccioni da Terni, Generalprior des Ordens vom 5. September 1505 bis 26. Juni 1506. Vgl. Rafael LAZCANO, Generales de la Orden de San Agustín. Biografías – Documentación – Retratos (Studia Augustiniana Historica 10), Rom 1995, 101.

¹²⁶ Zum Amt des Ordensprokurators vgl. Philipp HOFMEISTER, Die General-Prokuratoren der Ordensleute beim Hl. Stuhl, in: Im Dienste des Rechtes in Kirche und Staat. Festschrift für Franz Arnold, Wien 1963, 235–260.

¹²⁷ Besler irrt sich beim Vornamen. Ordensprokurator war von 1505 bis 1519 Magister *Ioannes* Antonius de Chieti. Über ihn vgl. LAZCANO, Generales 113.

¹²⁸ Bei einer *excommunicatio latae sententiae* tritt die Exkommunikation als unmittelbare Folge einer Handlung ein, die mit dem Bann bedroht wird. Im vorliegenden Fall wurde Besler unter Androhung der Exkommunikation das Verlassen der Stadt Rom verboten.

¹²⁹ Vgl. Mario FANTI, Bologna nell'età moderna (1506–1796), in: Antonio FERRI / Giancarlo ROVERSI (edd.), Storia di Bologna, Bologna 1978 [1984], 206.

¹³⁰ FSANTS: *Rentviol.* – Zu Giovanni Bentivoglio vgl. Cecilia M. ADY, The Bentivoglio of Bologna. A Study in Despotism, London [1937] Reprint 1969, 202–206.

magistri Egidii Viterbiensis exivi Romam, Bononiam versus ad reverendum patrem vicarium qui et ipse tunc Bononiam venerat, exivi autem urbem 14 Januarii anno domini 1507 et veni Florentiam 19 eiusdem, ubi mansi 2 noctibus, postea veni Bononiam 22 eiusdem, id est in festo Vincentii et Anastasii. Recessi iterum a Bononia 29 eiusdem et veni Romam 5 februarii.

mihi patre generale¹³¹ Magistro Egidio de Viterbio,¹³² Magistro Augustino de Interanna, quo supra, iam defuncto,¹³³ exivi iterum Romam, Bononiam versus 14. Ianuarii anni 1507 ad patrem vicarium Staupitz, qui et ipse tunc illuc ad papam venerat.¹³⁴ Veni autem Florentiam 19. eiusdem, ubi duabus mansi noctibus 11 [362] in conventu S. Galli¹³⁵ extra muros, qui est locus Congregationis Lombardie, et post 22. eiusdem mensis, id est in festo Vincentii et Anastasii martyrum,¹³⁶ Bononiam¹³⁷ attigi. Ubi facto comperto¹³⁸ patri vicario de his, que per duos annos transactos egerim, quid item exposuerim, iterum Bononiam a p[aternalitate] sua exivi, Romam repetiturus 29.¹³⁹ eiusdem.

¹³¹ Aegidius von Viterbo war damals noch nicht Ordensgeneral, sondern führte nur als Generalvikar die Amtsgeschäfte. — KOLDE 232 stellt die Vorgänge so dar, als seien die Maßnahmen, die von der alten Ordensleitung über Besler verhängt worden waren, von dem neuen Generalvikar Aegidius aufgehoben und Besler sodann von Staupitz zum Rapport nach Bologna zitiert worden. Das entspricht aber nicht Beslers Bericht, der ausdrücklich feststellt, er sei auf Anordnung des Aegidius nach Bologna gereist.

¹³² Vgl. David S. CHAMBERS, Egidio Antonini of Viterbo, in: *Contemporaries of Erasmus. A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation*, I, Toronto-Buffalo-London 1985, 64f.; Remigius BÄUMER, Egidio da Viterbo, *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* 9 (1982) 301–304 (Lit.); LAZCANO, *Generales* 102–111 (Lit.).

¹³³ Augustinus von Terni war am Ende Juni 1506 gestorben. Zum Datum (24., 25. oder 26. Juni) vgl. E[ustasio] E[STEBAN], *De capitulis generalibus ordinis tempore Aegidii Viterbiensis celebratis*, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 9 (1919) 171–182, hier 171f. Die Angabe bei KOLDE 231 („Ende des Jahres“) ist unzutreffend.

¹³⁴ Anlass der Reise Staupitz' war neben den Ordensangelegenheiten vor allem der Auftrag von Kurfürst Friedrich dem Weisen, für die neugegründete Universität Wittenberg die päpstliche Bestätigung einzuholen, die er am 21. Dezember erhielt. Am 23. Dezember nahm er in Bologna an der feierlicher Doktorpromotion des Juristen Christoph Scheurl teil, mit dem die Wittenberger schon seit über einem Jahr wegen der Übernahme einer juristischen Professur verhandelten (vgl. Christoph Scheurl's Briefbuch, hg. v. Franz von SODEN und J[oachim] K[arl] F[riedrich] KNAAKE, I, 1872 [Ndr. Aalen 1962], 4. 7. 42f.).

¹³⁵ Kirche und Konvent wurde 1529 zerstört; heute erinnern daran nur noch die Porta San Gallo und die Via San Gallo.

¹³⁶ 22. Januar.

¹³⁷ In welchem Konvent sich Staupitz aufhielt und Besler ihn antraf, wird nicht gesagt. Eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht für S. Maria della Misericordia, der zur Congregatio Lombardiae gehörte. Vgl. zur Kirche Angelo RAULE, *La chiesa di Santa Maria della Misericordia in Bologna*, Bologna 1961; Elena GOTTARELLI, *La chiesa di Santa Maria della Misericordia attraverso i secoli*, Bologna 1981; Marco POLI, *Santa Maria della Misericordia*, Bologna 1997.

¹³⁸ FSANTS liest: *facto capitulo!* Vgl. schon die Korrektur bei KOLDE 232, Anm. 1.

¹³⁹ FSANTS: 19. Vgl. schon die zutreffende Korrektur bei KOLDE (ebd.). Besler war erst am 22. Januar in Bologna eingetroffen.

Item tandem exivi Romam cum lectore Gregorio Mayr 5 maii anno Domini 1509 et veni Monachum ultima eiusdem.

Quo cum 5. Februarii venissem secunda paternitatis sue iussa expleturus; cepi tempore intermedio impetrare indulgentias ad clausulam *Et famulos tuos N. Papam*, quam ultime in fine misse complende annectere solemus, ad clausulam etiam in fine misse defunctorum addendam. Indulgentias item ad pedum lotionem tam in adventu hospitum, ut in capitulo 19. constitutionum nostrarum habetur,¹⁴⁰ quam etiam in die coene Domini.¹⁴¹ Ad orationem quoque, quam coram altari dicere solemus, aliquo euntes eadem vel sequenti die non reversuri, ut in capitulo predicto.¹⁴² Item denique ad orationem transeundo per sepulturam defunctorum, de qua capitulo 26 ordinarii.¹⁴³ Indultum quoque, quod dicere possimus *Gloria in excelsis* in missis etiam privatis de S. Trinitate et de Beata Virgine contra rubricam misalis communem. Et alia quedam.

Anno etenim 1508 ad festum S. Luce¹⁴⁴ in capitulo Monachi celebrato, ubi etiam, frustra licet, Magister Egidius generalis antedictus expectabatur, fui ego ab officio prioratus Monachensis absolutus (dum adhuc de meo in Alemanniam reditu certo non constaret) electo mei loco patre Gregorio Mayr,¹⁴⁵ lectore Monachensi. Cum quo II [363]

¹⁴⁰ Constitutiones 19, 12–37.

¹⁴¹ Zur liturgischen Fußwaschung am Gründonnerstag vgl. Thomas SCHÄFER, Die Fußwaschung im monastischen Brauchtum und in der lateinischen Liturgie. Liturgiegeschichtliche Untersuchung, Beuron 1956.

¹⁴² Constitutiones 19, 62–70.

¹⁴³ Ordinationes fratrum heremitarum ordinis sancti Augustini, cap. xxvi: Qualiter officium et misse pro defunctis cantari debeant. In: Regula beati Augustini vna cum expositione Hugonis de Sancto Victore. Constitutiones fratrum eremitarum sancti Augustini [...], [Venedig]: De Gregoriis 1508 [Augustinus-Institut Würzburg]. Frdl. Hinweis auf dieses Werk von Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Günter, Horben.

¹⁴⁴ 18. Oktober.

¹⁴⁵ Vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 495, Anm. 2409. — Der Zeitpunkt des Wechsels im Priorat, der von WENTZ 460 und KUNZELMANN VI, 339 nur *vermutet* worden war, lässt sich durch Beslers Angabe sicher feststellen. — Mit der Entsendung Mayrs nach Rom bediente sich Staupitz eines Vertrauensmannes, denn Mayr war ihm seit der gemeinsamen Studienzeit in Tübingen bekannt und 1504 Prior des Wittenberger Augustinerkonvents gewesen.

Mansi postea ibidem sine onere usque ad festum nativitatis Marie, quando per reverendum patrem Vicarium conventualiter ibi institutus sum, donec

dum ad generalem postea, nescio qua causa, Romam venisset, anno 1509 Maii 5. urbem exivi,¹⁴⁶ eques per Bononiam, Modonam,¹⁴⁷ Parmam,¹⁴⁸ Placentiam,¹⁴⁹ Paviam sive Papiam,¹⁵⁰ Mediolanum¹⁵¹ etc., lacum Cumensem,¹⁵² vallem Telinam¹⁵³ quoque ac Bormium¹⁵⁴ peragravimus, Helvetios tangentes Mals¹⁵⁵ venimus, Seefeld¹⁵⁶ deinde et Mittenwald usque Tölzt. A quo cum equis defatigatis, Isera¹⁵⁷ vecti, Maii ultima Monachum applicuimus.

Ubi sine onere quievi usque ad festum nativitatis Marie,¹⁵⁸ quando per reverendum P. Vicarium Staupitz conventualiter ibidem institutus sum, donec

¹⁴⁶ Am 23. April 1509 hatte Georg Mayr vom Generalprior die Erlaubnis zur Rückkehr erhalten: "Fratri Gregorio qui ex congregatione ad nos missus est facta est facultas redeundi" (Aegidii Viterbiensis O.S.A. Resgestae Generalatus, Bd. 1: 1506-1514, ed. Albericus DE MEIJER, Rom 1988, Nr. 210, dort ohne Identifizierung der Person).

¹⁴⁷ Modena. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Agostino (Congr. Lombardiae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 49.

¹⁴⁸ Parma. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Luca degli Eremitani (Congr. Januensis). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 48; Francesco BAROCELLI, La chiesa di San Luca e gli Eremitani di Parma, in: Aurea Parma 70 (1986) 109-121; Francesca SPECULATI, La Chiesa di San Luca degli Eremitani in Parma. Studi e ricerche sul patrimonio artistico disperso, Parma 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Piacenza. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Maria degli Angeli (Congr. Lombardiae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 49; Stefano Luigi ASTENGO, Gli Agostiniani in Piacenza (appunti), Piacenza 1924.

¹⁵⁰ Pavia. Augustinereremiten-Kloster S. Paolo (Congr. Lombardiae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 49.

¹⁵¹ Mailand. Augustinereremiten-Kloster La Consolazione (Congr. Lombardiae) und S. Maria Incoronata (Congr. Lombardiae); vgl. VAN LUIJK 49. Besler übernachtete wohl eher in letzterem Konvent, da dieser an der Fernstraße zum Comer See lag. Zu diesem Kloster vgl. Maria Luisa GATTI PERER, Umanesimo a Milano. L'osservanza agostiniana all'Incoronata, Milano 1980.

¹⁵² Comer See.

¹⁵³ Veltlin.

¹⁵⁴ Bormio.

¹⁵⁵ Mals im Vinschgau.

¹⁵⁶ Zum dortigen Augustinereremitenkloster vgl. Florian NOTHEGGER, Das Augustinerkloster zu Seefeld in Tirol, Cor Unum 19 (1961) 15-24.

¹⁵⁷ Isar (Fluss).

¹⁵⁸ 8. September.

¹⁵⁹ S.o. Anm. 145.

sequenti estate etiam in presentia paternitatis sue supprior fui electus anno 1510.

Deinde a paternitate sua vocatus veni ad Vallis Mollarie in die S. Luce, ubi cum reverendo patre magistro Jo. Paltz, tunc ibidem priore, mansi per hiemem usque ad 13 martii anni 1511, quando obiit.

Et paulo post in vigilia Palmarum venit reverendus pater Vicarius generalis magister Jo. de Staupitz cum quo eadem estate vidi conventus Holandie, Brabantie, Westvalie et Saxonie. Denique venimus per Nurenbergam usque Salisburgum. Unde postea in carnisprivio anni 1512 missus fui usque Coloniam, ubi in capitulo tunc

sequenti estate in presentia etiam paternitatis sue, absoluto priore Gregorio Mayr¹⁵⁹ et electo Stephano Weynachter¹⁶⁰ in priorem, ego electus fui subprior anno 1510.

Cum autem id officii non sine causa graviter ferrem, P. Vicarius eadem estate, misso quo veherer equo,¹⁶¹ ad Vallis Molarie¹⁶² conventum me vocans, ut suum ibi adventum prestolarer demandavit. Quo cum in die S. Luce Evangeliste¹⁶³ venissem, mansi cum reverendo Patre Magistro Ioanne Paltz,¹⁶⁴ tunc ibi priore, per hiemem usque ad 13. Martii anni 1511, quando diem ipse clausit extremum.

Paulo post in vigilia Palmarum¹⁶⁵ supervenit et Pater Vicarius, cum quo estate eadem conventus vidi Holandie, Brabantie, Westvalie et Saxonie, deinde redeuntes per Nurenbergam Ratisbonamque¹⁶⁶ Salisburgum venimus. Unde postea anno 1512 in carnisprivio¹⁶⁷ a [paternitate] sua missus sum Coloniam ob capituli ibi celebrandi

¹⁶⁰ Die Angaben zu Stephan Weihnachter bei KUNZELMANN III, 279 (Prior in Nürnberg 1505 und 1508), können also nach Besler ergänzt werden: Prior in München 1510. Urkundlich begegnet er als solcher schon am 10. April 1510 (vgl. Ernest GEISS, Die Reihenfolgen der Pfarr- und Ordensvorstände Münchens von der Gründungszeit bis zur Gegenwart, in: Oberbayerisches Archiv für vaterländische Geschichte 21 [1859/61] 3–60, hier 17).

¹⁶¹ Vgl. oben Anm. 84.

¹⁶² Mülheim im Tal/ Ehrenbreitstein. S.o. Anm. 63.

¹⁶³ 18. Oktober.

¹⁶⁴ Zu Johannes Paltz vgl. Marcus FERDIGG, De vita et operibus Joannis de Paltz, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 30 (1967) 210–311; DERS., De doctrina Joannis de Paltz, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 31 (1968) 155–318; KUNZELMANN V, 437–443; Adolar ZUMKELLER, Paltz, in: *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon* 6 (1993) 1473f. (Lit.); Berndt HAMM, Paltz, in: *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* 25 (1995) 606–611 (Lit.).

¹⁶⁵ Palmarum 13. April 1511, vigilia also 12. April.

¹⁶⁶ Zum dortigen Konvent vgl. HEMMERLE 76–80; DERS., Zur geschichtlichen Bedeutung der Regensburger Augustiner, in: *Verhandlungen des Historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg* 101 (1961) 147–163.

¹⁶⁷ Quinquagesima = Estomihi (vgl. oben Anm. 90), 21. Februar 1512.

celebrato fui confertus prior Nurenbergensis 5 maii que erat dies mercurii post dominicam Iubilare. Applicui autem Nurenbergam 15 maii.

Postea in capitulo Gotense fui electus scrutator vocum, diffinitor et superioris Germaniae vicarius 1515.

Deinde 1516 decembris 4 Nurenberge a prioratu absolutus, statim post festa natalia una cum reverendo patre nostro

preparationem¹⁶⁸ cum P. Magistro Ioanne Mechelinia,¹⁶⁹ qui tunc Romam missus redierat. In eo capitulo denuo II [364] confirmatus fui Nurenbergensis prior 5. Maii, que erat dies Mercurii post dominicam Iubilare 1512. Applicui autem Nurenbergam Maii 18.

Anno 1514 in crastino corporis Christi¹⁷⁰ cecidit super me infirmitas capitis sive <...>.¹⁷¹ Anno deinde 1515 in capitulo Gotensi¹⁷² volebant me patres mittere ad capitulum generale ordinis, quod recusavi propter ea, que antea in Italia expertus timui. Fui tamen tunc in eodem Gotensi capitulo electus vocum scrutator, diffinitor et superioris Germanie vicarius super 10 tantum conventus.¹⁷³

Item nota. 1516 Iunii 18 visitavi conventum Culmachensem¹⁷⁴ et 23 eiusdem in vigilia Ioannis Baptiste ante prandium celebravi capitulum, ubi absolvi P. Baccalaureum Christoferum Fladenstein¹⁷⁵ et mox recenter electum in priorem P. Ioannem Schutz,¹⁷⁶ tunc plebanum in Steinach, confirmavi.

Anno posthac sequenti, videlicet 1516, Decembris 4., Nurenberge a prioratu absolutus, ut statim post festa natalis

¹⁶⁸ FSANT: *properationem*.

¹⁶⁹ Zu Johann von Mecheln vgl. WENTZ 473f.; Alberic DE MEIJER, Adriaan Florisz van Utrecht in zijn contacten met de Augustijnen, in: Archief voor de geschiedenis van de Katholieke Kerk in Nederland 2 (1960) 7, n. 2, und unten Anm. 239. Zu seiner Romreise vgl. SCHNEIDER, Reise (wie Anm. 11) 80f., 85, 112f., 119f., 122 u.ö.

¹⁷⁰ Fronleichnam, 15. Juni 1514.

¹⁷¹ Unleserlich.

¹⁷² Das Kapitel der Kongregation war von Staupitz auf den Sonntag Jubilate (29. April 1515) nach Gotha einberufen worden. Vgl. oben Einleitung bei Anm. 12.

¹⁷³ Zugleich mit Besler, den man zum Provinzialvikar über die süddeutschen Konvente der Kongregation wählte, wurde Luther – was Besler nicht erwähnt – Provinzialvikar über zehn Konvente in Meissen und Thüringen. Vgl. oben Einleitung Anm. 6.

¹⁷⁴ Kulmbach. Vgl. HEMMERLE 33–36.

¹⁷⁵ Zu Christoph Fladenstein vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 495 u. Anm. 2411.

¹⁷⁶ Johannes Schütz (bei KUNZELMANN III und V nicht erwähnt).

Vicario predicto aliquot pro crediti tunc michi officii debito conventus visitavi, donec vocante nos domino Adam de Fruntsperg milite Myndelhain venientes prioratus ibidem officium invitissimus suscipere coactus fui Aprilis 23, que est festum S. Georgii, 1517.

Christi una cum patre vicario, aliquot pro tunc crediti mihi officii debito, conventus visitarem. Inter hec, vocante nos domino Adam de Fruntsperg¹⁷⁷ milite, Myndelhain venientes, absoluto priore,¹⁷⁸ officium ego prioratus suscipere coactus sum invitissimus die 23. Aprilis, qui est festum S. Georgii, anno 1517.

Unde iterum cum patre vicario recedens postque ebdomadas aliquot Nurenbergam veniens, receptis rebus nostris, in festis Penthecostes, Mindelhain mansurus applicui. Manens igitur prior ibidem usque ad adventum Domini, feria 4. angarie¹⁷⁹ recessi, id est 14. Decembris anni 1519. Literis pluribus P. Gregorii Mayr¹⁸⁰ antedicti provocatus, offi- II [365] cio cedens, facta tamen prius legali in presentia officialium domini Georgii de Fruntsperg¹⁸¹ computatione (nam patre vicario volente, cogebar ob legitimarum tunc iudicio suo in conventu personarum defectum, ad tempus facere officia granarii, magistri censuum, cliniarii et procuratoris) exivi Myndelhain circa finem adventus per Monachum, veni Monachum 16. Decembris mane, ubi in festo nativitatis Domini subsistens in crastino circumcisionis Domini¹⁸² anni 1520* Salisburgum me contuli, quasi, quoad viverem, stationem conventus Monachensis ibi acturus. Sed cum non sequeretur fides

¹⁷⁷ Adam von Frundsberg, Herr von Mindelheim († 1518), Bruder von Georg (s.u. Anm. 181).

¹⁷⁸ Johannes Mathei, Prior 1511–1517. 1519–22 (23?). Vgl. HEMMERLE 49.

¹⁷⁹ Mittwoch der Quatemberwoche: 14. Dez. 1519.

¹⁸⁰ S.o. Anm. 145.

¹⁸¹ Georg von Frundsberg (1473? – 1528), Landsknechtsführer, Ritter, nach dem Tod seines Bruders Adam 1518 (s.o. Anm. 177) erhielt er die Herrschaft Mindelheim. Vgl. Friedrich ZOEPFL, Neue Deutsche Biographie 5 (1961) 670f. (Lit.).

¹⁸² 1. Januar.

* [Anmerkung Beslers:] Nota. Quod postquam Salisburgam venissem, contigit P. Joannem Ruecker, priorem in Rapoltzwiler, fungi vita. In cuius locum mox P. Vicarius Staupitz me sufficere voluit, sed nolui. Iterum cum deinde post pasca convocatio in Issleben fecerit

n exhibendo, que fuerat in permit-
tendo, declinare malui. Scripsi igitur
ob id patri vicario novo, Magistro
Wenceslao Linck,¹⁸³ in mense Ianuarii
1521. (Nam Magister Ioannes de
Staupitz anno precedente in capitulo
Isslebens¹⁸⁴ officio vicarii cesserat.)
Qui cum in paschate anni 1521 Mona-
chum venisset, Magister Ioannes
Staupitz et ego e II [366] Salisburgo
ipsum accessimus, tribus aut 4 diebus
secum manentes. Ibi me, etiam M. Ioan-
nis de Staupitz consilio, in socium
assumpto per Mindelhain et Ulmam in
die Philippi et Iacobi¹⁸⁵ Eßlingam ivi-
mus. Unde per Cantopolim alias
Cantstat¹⁸⁶ via regia¹⁸⁷ ascendentes
Argentinam¹⁸⁸ et Sletzstadium¹⁸⁹ vidimus
in dominica Ascensione¹⁹⁰ Rapoltz-
wilram.¹⁹¹ Post hoc Rheni lineam i

(in qua idem pater vicarius officio cessit) essemque ego electus prior Gandavensis; adiuvante eodem, descendere recusavi, unde confirmatus Erffurdensis prior misso mihi Salisburgum prioris sigillo officium acceptare nolui, sed remisi sigillum, fui denique petitus instanter in Nova civitate et in Northusen; iter cum M. Wenceslao faciens, sed simpliciter renui acceptare prioratum. —

Zu Johannes Rücker vgl. KUNZELMANN III, 279, Anm. 1071. Er starb am 13. Februar 1520.

Die Bemerkung über eine convocatio nach Ostern 1520 in Eisleben, auf der Staupitz aus dem Amt geschieden sei, beruht auf einem Erinnerungsfehler. Das Kapitel in Eisleben fand erst im August 1520 statt. KOLDE 326, Anm. 2, erwägt eine Verwechslung mit einer Zusammenkunft in Kulmbach, zu der Staupitz für den 21. April 1520 eingeladen hatte.

¹⁸³ Vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 210–212 u.ö., Anm. 1568; Wolf-Friedrich SCHÄUFELE, Linck, Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 15 (1999) 864–870 (Lit.).

¹⁸⁴ Kapitel der Kongregation im St. Annenkloster in Eisleben, 26.–28. August 1520. Vgl. WA.B 2, 101, 8f. und das Eislebener Chronikon bei Karl KRUMHAAR, Die Grafschaft Mansleben im Reformationszeitalter, Eisleben 1855, 66.

¹⁸⁵ 1. Mai.

¹⁸⁶ Cannstatt.

¹⁸⁷ Die ‚Königsstraße‘ führte von Württemberg nach Straßburg.

¹⁸⁸ Straßburg, Augustinereremitenkloster (Prov. Rheno-Sueviae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 54; KUNZELMANN II, 17–38.

¹⁸⁹ Schlettstadt.

¹⁹⁰ Himmelfahrt Christi, 9. Mai 1521.

¹⁹¹ Rappoltswiler (Ribeauvillé/Elsass). Augustinereremitenkloster S. Augustin (Prov. Rheno-Sueviae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 54; Xavier OHRESSER, Le couvent des Ermites de Saint-Augustin à Ribeauvillé, in: Archives de l'Église d'Alsace 33 n.s. 17 (1969) 267–325.

descendentes, Penthecosten egimus Heidelberg, deinde per Franckfordiam et Mertenam¹⁹² venientes Coloniam, Holandiam, Flandriam, Brabantiam, usque Hannoniam¹⁹³ perreximus. Ubi visis conventibus, inter quos etiam Gandavensis¹⁹⁴ et Angiensis,¹⁹⁵ iterum ascendimus per Lovanium¹⁹⁶ et Tugaris¹⁹⁷ Coloniamque revidentes per Hassiam,¹⁹⁸ Missenam, Turingiam transeuntes ac Culmach, infra octavam assumptionis Marie¹⁹⁹ Nurenberg venimus, ubi hieme transacta mox in prima ebdomade Quadragesime²⁰⁰ 1522 iterum inde exeuntes, certis visis conventibus, pater vicarius in Grymm²⁰¹ capitulum vicariatus²⁰² celebrari constituit, ad quod praeter Lutheri sequaces, inter quos ex precipuis ipse Magister Wenceslaus,²⁰³ tunc vicarius noster (nam tum Lutherana illa secta pullulabat), pauci aliorum conventuum patres fermeque nulli comparuerunt,

¹⁹² Merten an der Sieg, wo es ein Augustinerinnen-Kloster gab, das dem Provinzial der Kölnischen Ordensprovinz unterstand. Vgl. Augusta NESSELRODE, Die Reform des Augustinerinnenklosters in Merten an der Sieg am Ausgang des Mittelalters, in: Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein 118 (1931) 46–58.

¹⁹³ Hennegau (flämisch Henegouwen, französich Hainaut).

¹⁹⁴ Gent. Augustinereremitenkloster S. Stephanus (Prov. Flandriae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 53.

¹⁹⁵ Enghien. Augustinereremitenkloster S. Nicolaus (Prov. Flandriae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 53.

¹⁹⁶ Louvain / Leuven / Löwen. Augustinereremitenkloster S. Joannis Baptistae (Prov. Flandriae). Vgl. VAN LUIJK 53.

¹⁹⁷ Tongres / Tongeren / Tongern.

¹⁹⁸ KOLDE 365 behauptet aufgrund dieser Bemerkung: "In Hessen muß Link besondere, uns unbekannte Zwecke verfolgt haben. Er durchzog das ganze Land, ohne doch das einzige Kloster, was zu seiner Jurisdiktion gehörte, Eschwege, zu besuchen." Ihm folgt KUNZELMANN V, 509: "In Hessen verweilte Link längere Zeit, ohne das ihm unterstehende Kloster Eschwege zu besuchen." Diese Behauptung ist durch Beslers Text aber keineswegs gedeckt.

¹⁹⁹ Zwischen dem 16. und 22. August.

²⁰⁰ Zwischen dem 10. und 15. März 1522.

²⁰¹ Grimma, südöstl. von Leipzig. Zum dortigen Kloster vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 202–214.

²⁰² Das Kapitel der Kongregation fand am Pfingstsonntag (8. Juni) 1522 statt. Die Akten des Kapitels sind abgedruckt bei Johann Erhard KAPP (Hg.), Kleine Nachlese einiger, größten Theils noch ungedruckter, und sonderlich zur Erläuterung der Reformations-Geschichte nützlicher Urkunden, Leipzig 1727, S. 535ff.

presumentes nihil boni pro vite regularis sinceritate ibi expediri posse, ut et rei postea eventus docuit, unionis nempe nostre totalis pene scissio secuta est, non existente capite, scilicet vicario, qui vitam iuxta regulam, statuta patrumque sanctiones tueretur regularem. Inde sequi II [367] luce meridiana clarius²⁰⁴ visum est, conventus damnate illi adherentes secte omnes prorsus in cultu divino, vita regulari, temporalique substantia aliquos ad solum usque defecisse. Fructus eni cernuntur fidei nostre. In iam dicto capitulo Grymmensi fui ego cum Magistro Gasparo Gietel,²⁰⁵ tunc Islebensi priore, electus vocum scrutator. Et postea iunctis nobis Magistro Melchiore Myrisch²⁰⁶ et priore Magdeburgensi simul electi fuimus diffinitores. Post finem autem capituli Magister Wenceslaus,²⁰⁷ iterum vicarius electus, cum M. Gasparo²⁰⁸ predicto me ad Islebensem remisit, ibidem ipsum quasi exspectaturum. Ipse autem ad Aldenburg,²⁰⁹ principis electoris Saxonie oppidum, ibi predicaturus sese recepit. Sed ut sanctus ait Iob, *Tentatio est vita hominis super terram*.²¹⁰ Anno enim sequenti, videlicet 1523, in

²⁰³ Wenzel Linck, s.o. Anm. 183.

²⁰⁴ Vgl. Is 18,4: *sicut meridiana lux clara est*.

²⁰⁵ Kaspar Güttel. Vgl. Gustav KAWERAU, Kaspar Güttel. Ein Lebensbild aus Luthers Freundeskreis, Zeitschrift des Harz-Vereins für Geschichte und Altertums-kunde 14 (1881) 33–132 [auch separat: Halle 1882]; Otto CLEMEN, Kaspar Güttel, Ergänzungen zu Kawerau, Zeitschrift des Harz-Vereins für Geschichte und Altertums-kunde 31 (1898) 316–322, wieder abgedruckt in: DERS., Kleine Schriften zur Reformationsgeschichte (1897–1944), hg. v. Ernst KOCH, I, Leipzig 1982, 92–98; KUNZELMANN V, 502–505.512, Anm. 2443.

²⁰⁶ Vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 121f.193.314.467.470.498.512. Anm. 654.1029.

²⁰⁷ S.o. Anm. 183.

²⁰⁸ Kaspar Güttel, s.o. Anm. 205.

²⁰⁹ Vgl. Jürgen LORZ, Das reformatorische Wirken Dr. W. Lincks in Altenburg und Nürnberg (1523–47), Nürnberg 1978.

²¹⁰ Job 7,1 (Vulg.): *militia est vita hominis super terram*.

Quadragesima²¹¹ misit sigillum officii cum litteris²¹² ad M. Melchiorum,²¹³ tanquam seniore diffinitorem, fingens, se quasi civili quadam morte defunctum.²¹⁴ Post hoc autem duabus aut 3 ebdomadibus, abiecto nedum officio, sed et habitu et religione professionis sue oblitus, uxorem se in Aldenburge duxisse scripsit, cum qua ad 4. feriam post dominicam in albis²¹⁵ esset nuptias habiturus.²¹⁶ Tempore intermedio M. Gasparus²¹⁷ et prior Magdeburgensis²¹⁸ diffinitorum officium reiicientes (quia Lutheri et ipsi sectatores)²¹⁹ nihil se unionis nostre rebus ulterius perficiendis consulere posse aiebant.

Mens namque eorum aliorumque Lutheri sectatorum fuit et est, ut ore rotundo²²⁰ me etiam audiente plures testificati sunt eorum, totam interire unionem nostram. Sicut et Magister Wenceslaus uli- II [368] mum se unionis nostre vicarium existere arbitrabatur. Sed non prevalebis, Deo propitio, o apostata. Visum autem fuit Magistro Melchiori, quantotius iterum

²¹¹ Entweder: am Sonntag Invocavit = 22. Febr. 1523 oder allgemein (so wohl hier): in der Fastenzeit.

²¹² Der Vorgang wird auch erwähnt in einem schreiben Herzog Georgs vom 18. April 1523 an Miritsch. Felician Gess, Akten und Briefe zur Kirchenpolitik des Herzogs Georg von Sachsen, I, Leipzig, 1905 [Ndr. 1985], Nr. 495.

²¹³ Zu Melchior Miritsch vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 121f., Anm. 654.

²¹⁴ "... dass er gewissermaßen durch einen bürgerlichen Tod gestorben sei". D.h., er ist bürgerlich, weltlich geworden, somit keine *persona religiosa* mehr und in den Augen des Ordens "gestorben".

²¹⁵ Dominica in albis, "weißer Sonntag" = Quasimodogeniti; Mittwoch nach Quasimodogeniti = 15. April 1523.

²¹⁶ Vgl. Bernd MOELLER, Wenzel Lincks Hochzeit. Über Sexualität, Keuschheit und Ehe in der frühen Reformation, in: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 97 (2000) 317–342; wieder abgedruckt in: DERS., Luther-Rezeption. Kirchenhistorische Aufsätze zur Reformationsgeschichte, hg. v. Johannes SCHILLING, Göttingen 2001, 194–218.

²¹⁷ Kaspar Güttel, s.o. 197.

²¹⁸ Melchior Miritsch. s.u. "ex Magdeburgo".

²¹⁹ "Weil sie [Anhänger] Luthers und selbst Sektierer waren".

²²⁰ Vgl. Horaz, Ars Poetica 323 (freundlicher Hinweis von Prof. Dr. Monika Renner, Marburg). Hier: vollmundig, eloquent.

in Grymmis convocandum capitulum,²²¹ tanquam seniori diffinitori, cui incumbere negotium. Mihi vero sicut et Magistro Gasparo apparuit non festinandum sed deliberandum maturius. Consensi tamen etiam ego, quamquam quod evenit, timerem. Estimabam enim, propter Lutheranos non venturos ceteros, et sic evenit. Cum igitur de 5 vel 6 vix conventibus convenissemus ad dominicam 4. post Penthecosten²²² in Grymmis, in quam capitulum celebrandum conventibus scripseramus, nolimus ob paucitatem quicquam incipere capitulare, sed ad Lipsim²²³ quotquot tunc Grymmis fuimus²²⁴ euntes, conclusimus capitulum in Valle Molaria²²⁵ prope Confluentiam,²²⁶ ad diem nativitatis Marie²²⁷ proximum celebrandum, vicarium quoque eligendum multi venirent, vel pauci.²²⁸ Hoc facto, ego (cui Magister Melchior sigillum vicarii per fratrem nuntium ex Magdeburgo ad Grymmis miserat,²²⁹

²²¹ Zweites Kapitel in Grimma 1523.

²²² 4. Sonntag nach Pfingsten: 21. Juni 1523.

²²³ Leipzig.

²²⁴ Anwesend waren "Johannes Nathin, Professor der heiligen Theologie und Diskret des Klosters Erfurt, Johannes Spangenberg, Professor der heiligen Theologie und Prior des Klosters Eschwege, Nikolaus Besler, Lektor der Theologie und Definitor des nächst vorangegangenen Kapitels, Conrad Aldorff, Diskret des Eschweger Klosters, Georg Doliatoris, Diskret des Heidelberger Klosters, und Kaspar Piscatoris, Diskret des Klosters Sternberg" (s.u. Anm. 228).

²²⁵ Mülheim im Tal / Ehrenbreitstein. S.o. Anm. 63.

²²⁶ Koblenz.

²²⁷ 8. September.

²²⁸ Die Erklärung, die im Leipziger Minoritenkloster vor einem päpstlichen Notar und in Gegenwart des Provinzialministers der sächsischen Provinz der Minoriten und des Luthergegners Augustinus von Alvelt O.F.M. abgegeben wurde, enthielt auch die Versicherung, "quod, cum nova quaedam et peregrina in Germania surrexit sive orta sit doctrina, quam Martinianam sive Lutheranam dicunt, nos non velle eidem adherere doctrine nec adhesisse unquam, sed adherere nunc et in futurum, quemadmodum et antecessores nostri adheserunt et steterunt determinationi sancte matris ecclesie catholice." Text der Urkunde bei Alfred OVERMANN, Urkundenbuch (wie Anm. 6), Nr. 588; der Abdruck bei KOLDE 451 ist fehlerhaft.

²²⁹ Zur Rückgabe des Amtssiegels vgl. Constitutiones 33, 50 u.ö.

ipse ob certas causas comparere impotens) conscientie ac ordinis debito satisfacere volens solus relictus diffinitor, habito tamen cum patribus Magistris Ioannes Natin²³⁰ et Ioannes Spangenberg²³¹ et aliis Grymmis et Lipsi mecum constitutis, maturo consilio, ad conventus interiores, meo, ut diffinitoris, ipsorum quoque nominibus, capitulares misi literas. A Noviburgo²³² deinceps Nurenbergam adire festinans, 11. Iulii ibi constitutus, cepi reliquas conficere literas omnes. Cumque Monachum, II [369] Myndelhain et Ramsau²³³ misissem, residuas ad Culmach videlicet et lineam Rheni iam omnino perfectas, absolute sum mittere prohibitus a conventu nostro nativo Nurenbergensi. Quare et literas perdere compulsus sum eadem. Sed neque conventus Nurenbergensis literas aliquas recipere voluit ad capitulum vocatorias.

Qua ego de causa necesse habui quam citissime mittere sigillum vicarii ad r[everendos] patres Magistros Ioannem Natin et Ioannem Spangenberg, qui Grymmis et Lipsi una cum aliis mecum tractabant, suppliciter rogans, ut ipsi saltem, adiutore Deo, quod mihi deerat virium, supplerent. Nedum enim, ut prefatus sum, mittendarum literarum, verum etiam adeundi locum celebrandi capituli preclusa mihi via erat. Nam prior Nurenbergensis cum suis, ut mihi ipse retulit, iam, ne quicquam haberet cum vicario aut congregatione commune, coram notario protestatus fuit et testibus.

²³⁰ Zu Johannes Natin vgl. KUNZELMANN V, 443–446 und Anm. 540; Adolar ZUMKELLER, Neu entdeckte Schriften des Erfurter Theologieprofessors Johannes Natin OSA, in: Augustiniana 54 (2004) 653–658.

²³¹ Johannes Bethel von Spangenberg, KUNZELMANN V, 173, 175.181–183.446.487.499.513–515.518, Anm. 941. 2243.

²³² Neuburg an der Donau.

²³³ Ramsau. Zum dortigen Kloster vgl. HEMMERLE 73–76.

Convenientibus autem deinde certorum conventuum patribus, die locoque preassignatis, elegerunt in unionis nostre vicarium reverendum Patrem Magistrum Ioannem de Spangenberg, virum utique dignissimum. Qui postea per Patrem Ioannem Steudel,²³⁴ priorem Culmachensem, secum conventus sui causa constitutum, datis ad me literis 4. post Iubilaeum 1524²³⁵ liberum mihi ad se aditum patefaciens evocavit. Sed ecce dum Nurenberge, meliora prestolatus, aliquantis per subsisto, malis peiora succedunt. Nam regulari penitus obtrita observantia, omnique religionis postposita honestate, scismatica illa increscente factione Luthe- II [370] rana divini cultus officium, etiam missa ipsa, a primeva sanctorum patrum consuetudine ecclesiasticoque ritu immutata sunt prorsus et alienata. Qua de re, urgente me, ut religionis membrum, conscientia, fugam meditatus, octava Augusti eodem anno, ad Culmachum me recepi. Ubi a reverendo patre priore prefato et conventu non tam desideratus quam benigne susceptus, salvus adhuc ibidem pro maiori parte unionis nostre legibus, ulteriorem Domini Dei dispositionem expectabo. Deinde 1525 circa pascha, mirum dictu, Wolfgang Volprecht,²³⁶ qui anno 1516 in locum mei electus fuit prior Nurenbergensis, oblitus votorum Deo et ordini factorum se et suos voluntarie, nullo cogente, una cum conventu, abiecto ordinis habitu, consulatui cum

²³⁴ Zu Johannes Steudel (Studlin, Stüdlin) vgl. KUNZELMANN III, 198, Anm. 734, 200. Er war also schon 1524 Prior.

²³⁵ 20. April 1524.

²³⁶ Zu Wolfgang Volprecht vgl. KUNZELMANN III, 279 (Prior in Nürnberg 1517–1525) und V, 514.

omnibus bonis et loco subiecit Nurembergensi.²³⁷ Cum autem Culmach ego degerem predicatoris utcumque officium gerens, animo tamen non admodum quieto: eo quod priorem precipue iugum subiectionis vicario detrectare cernerem, etsi secus verba sonarent. Accidit interea (ut solet nonnunquam) in conventu Coloniensi inter reverendum Patrem Magistrum Iohannem de Husden,²³⁸ tunc priorem, et aliquos de conventu fratres turbatio quedam. Cui (ut didici) diabolica illa Lutherana heresis, eidem reverendo patri magistro multum adversa, fomitem ministravit aliquibus liberius quam statuta cavent ordinis vivere, et ob hoc alii quam licuit, illegitimo vicario (puto Magistrum Ioannem Mechelinia²³⁹) se subicere volentibus. Eam ob causam ipso a senatu Coloniensi reiecto verus noster legitimusque Vicarius Magister Ioannes de Spangen- II [371] berg ab eodem senatu adscitus ex Hassia, tanquam conventui consulturus, literis et voluntate eiusdem reverendi Patris Nam cum a priore et conventu Culmachensi (ut prefertur) ex Nuremberg tanquam latrina heretica evocatus fuisset, statui ibidem dies consummare vite mee, dummodo legitimum vicarium

²³⁷ Am 13. Dezember 1524 boten die Augustiner dem Rat die Übergabe des Klosters an; am 22. März 1525 ergriff der Rat vom Kloster und sämtlichem Gütern Besitz. Vgl. Julie ROSENTHAL-METZGER, Das Augustinerkloster in Nürnberg, Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte der Stadt Nürnberg 30 (1931) 84, Anm. 1, und 101–103. HEMMERLE 68.

²³⁸ Johannes Huesden. Vgl. KUNZELMANN V, Anm. 2268. 2474.

²³⁹ Als Margareta von Österreich, die Statthalterin der Niederlande, 1522 den niederländischen Observantenkonventen die Teilnahme am Kapitel in Grimma verbot und ihre Ablösung von der deutschen Kongregation verlangte, wählten die Konvente auf einem Kapitel in Dordrecht am 27. Juli 1522 Johann von Mecheln zum Vikar. Am 23. Nov. 1523 wurde er vom Papst bestätigt. Noch im Mai 1524 bekleidete er dieses Amt. Vgl. Norbert TEEUWEN / Albéric DE MEIJER, Documents pour servir à l'histoire médiévale de la province augustiniennne de Cologne. Extraits des registres des prieurs généraux 1357–1551, I, Louvain 1961, Anm. 581; II, Louvain 1970, Anm. 45 und 188.

²⁴⁰ 1. November.

ut verum recognoscerent prelatum. Exivi igitur Culmach, oboedire volens cum nuntio pro me misso, in die omnium sanctorum²⁴⁰ 1525 venique usque Confluentiam ad conventum Vallis,²⁴¹ ubi reperi reverendum patrem nostrum vicarium, adventum meum desiderantem, qui mecum Coloniam descendens, in prioratus officio, ipso die S. Clementis Pape et Martiris²⁴² [me] instituit. Ibi denique divinam de me ordinationem prestolabor. Sed que ibidem a fratribus quibusdam dyscolis pertulerim (que antea in 33 annis nunquam expertus fueram) novit Dominus Deus et propria conscientia. Habui tamen reverendum Patrem Magistrum Ioannem de Husden²⁴³ et alios quosdam (ni fallor) Dei servos religionisque cultores fideles, mei, ut potuerunt, adiutores.

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²⁴¹ Mülheim / Ehrenbreitstein, s.o. Anm. 63.

²⁴² 23. November.

²⁴³ S.o. Anm. 238.

DAI PELAGIANI AI RECENTIORES: L'AFFAIRE DU PLAGIAIRE (GARASSE) NELL'AUGUSTINUS¹ E NELLA CORRISPONDENZA DI CORNELIS JANSEN

Chiara Catalano

Abstract

On the first of September 1626 *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne* (1625) of Jesuit François Garasse (1584-1631) was condemned by Sorbonne, after a dispute between the author and Jean Duvergier de Hauranne (1581-1643). Jansenius' friend wrote a confutative work *Somme des fautes* (1626), composed of three books. However, only the first one was published before the condemnation. Did this book have an influence on this *affaire*? Which one? These are the questions this essay begins from. In this article there are both a reconstruction of the French polemical context of the Seventeenth Century – whose one of the protagonists was Garasse – and an analysis of the criticism addressed to the modern Pelagian opinion of Garasse in *Somme des fautes* and in Jansenius' *Augustinus* (1640).

Indeed, this *affaire* also interests to Jansenius. In his Correspondence to Saint-Cyran it appears the expression *affaire du Plagiaire* in order to refer to the case of Garasse and the events of his writing's condemnation.

The term 'Plagiaire' comes from the work *Deffence pour Estienne Pasquier, vivant conseiller du Roy etc. contre les impostures et calomnies de François Garasse*, written by his sons and Antoine Rémy against Garasse. After an historical and introductive part, this essay addresses Jansenius' criticism to modern Pelagian Garasse contained in his *opus magnum* and in his letters. The aim of this work – which is particularly concerned with *Augustinus* – is to show how the criticism to the Pelagian opinion reveals a polemical target addressed not only to the ancient Pelagians, but to the modern ones too.

May be the Lovanist (Jansenius) considered a new 'Augustine'?

¹ L'edizione a cui ho fatto riferimento in questo articolo è quella lovaniense del 1640 (di cui è disponibile anche una ristampa anastatica pubblicata a Francoforte da Minerva nel 1964): CORNELIUS JANSENIUS, *Augustinus, seu Doctrina S. Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate, ægritudine, medicina adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses, tribus tomis comprehensa*, Lovanii, typis et sumptibus Iacobi Zegeri, 1640. Ricordo che dell'opera esistono altre edizioni: quella parigina del 1641 (Parisiis, sumptibus Michaelis Soly et Matthæi Guillemot, 1641), quella di Rouen del 1643 (Rothomagi, sumptibus Ioannis et Davidis Berthelin, fratr., 1643) e del 1652 (Rothomagi, sumptibus Ioannis et Davidis Berthelin, fratr., 1652).

Key words

Jansenius, Garasse, Saint-Cyran, Pelagians, Jesuits

Introduzione

Il presente lavoro prende le mosse da una ricostruzione di quello che Cornelis Jansen (1585-1638) chiama l'*affaire du Plagiaire*. Con questa espressione, a partire dalla lettera scritta da Madrid, il 30 giugno 1626,² indirizzata all'amico Jean Duvergier de Hauranne (1581-1643), abate di Saint-Cyran, il Lovaniense si riferisce alla vicenda che ha per protagonista il gesuita François Garasse (1584-1631),³ l'autore de *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne* (1625).⁴ Contro di lui Saint-Cyran ha scritto in forma anonima la *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales contenues en la Somme théologique du Père François Garasse* (1626),⁵ che ha dato vita ad una vera e propria *querelle*. Quest'ultima, contrassegnata dalla pubblicazione di una serie di libelli, sia da parte dell'una⁶ che dell'altra fazione,⁷ sembra che abbia indotto la Sorbona a chiedere ai suoi dottori un riesame, dopo il quale l'opera del gesuita, il primo settembre 1626, è stata condannata.

In questa vicenda, sebbene non giochi direttamente un ruolo attivo, Jansen è in qualche modo coinvolto, in quanto informato dei fatti. Infatti, egli assiste alla redazione del primo volume dello scritto

² *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 30 juin 1626, *Cor.* XCI, pp. 317-318, in part. p. 318.

³ Padre gesuita nato nel 1584, morto nel 1631, famoso per le sue polemiche contro ugonotti, gallicani, libertini. A seguito della condanna della sua *Somme théologique* fu costretto a lasciare Parigi e a trasferirsi a Poitiers dove poi morì nel 1631.

⁴ FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne*, Paris, Chez Sebastien Chappelet, 1625.

⁵ [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales contenues en la Somme théologique du Père François Garasse de la Compagnie de Jésus. Divisée en IIII tomes*, Paris, Par Ioseph Boüillerot, 1626.

⁶ Saint-Cyran scrive nel 1626, nel periodo successivo alla redazione del primo volume (gennaio 1626) della *Somme des fautes* e precedente alla condanna (1 settembre 1626) la *Réfutation de l'abus prétendu, et de la decouverte de la véritable ignorance et vanité du P. François Garasse* e l'*Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la verité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique du Pere François Garasse de la Compagnie de Jésus*.

⁷ Dopo aver fatto sospendere la stampa del primo volume della *Somme des fautes* di Saint-Cyran, Garasse (o forse un suo confratello) scrive *L'abus decouvert en la censure prétendue des textes de l'Escriture sainte et des propositions de théologie tirées par un censeur anonyme de la Somme théologique du P. François Garasse de la Compagnie de Jésus*.

dell'amico Saint-Cyran – in particolare durante il periodo della loro convivenza a Parigi, tra il luglio 1625 e l'aprile 1626 –; in seguito, anche dopo la condanna dell'opera di Garasse, fino al 1630, mostra di nutrire un interesse per l'*affaire* e chiede informazioni al suo corrispondente.

Nelle sue lettere, a partire dal giugno 1626 – come si è detto – Jansen utilizza il termine *Plagiaire* per designare Garasse, ossia l'avversario di Saint-Cyran. Ebbene, tale termine non è certo di sua invenzione, ma è preso in prestito da un'altra polemica che ha avuto come protagonista il padre gesuita: deriva dalla *Deffence pour Estienne Pasquier, vivant conseiller du Roy etc. contre les impostures et calomnies de François Garasse* (Paris, Thomas de la Ruelle, 1624¹; ristampato nel 1627 con il titolo di *Anti-Garasse*), ossia dalla difesa di Étienne Pasquier (1529-1615) da parte dei figli e di Antoine Rémy contro Garasse.⁸

Ora per le evidenti ed importanti implicazioni storiche, prima di procedere all'analisi della corrispondenza e del luogo dell'*Augustinus* (1640)⁹ in cui Jansen critica una sentenza di Garasse sulla mortalità del primo uomo – sentenza che è tra quelle contestate anche nella *Somme des fautes* –, è fondamentale definire le coordinate di questo *affaire*.

Si tratterà, nel prosieguo di questo saggio, di ricostruire sia il contesto generale – quello dei polemisti antilibertini francesi del XVII secolo, tra i quali primeggiano Garasse e Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), e delle precedenti polemiche di Garasse (come quella con Pasquier) – sia quello particolare in cui si inserisce la *querelle* tra Garasse e Saint-Cyran. Questo anche al fine di ponderare il ruolo che lo scritto confutatorio di quest'ultimo può aver giocato nella condanna del gesuita: si tratta di quanto mi propongo di fare nella prima parte di questo lavoro; una parte, per così dire, preliminare al resto dell'indagine.¹⁰

Nella seconda¹¹ passerò ad analizzare più nel dettaglio la critica gianseniana alla sentenza di Garasse, estratta da *La somme théologique*: quella che nega che Adamo in Paradiso sia stato immortale e che è additata come pelagiana e contraria alla dottrina agostiniana nel capitolo quarto del *Liber singularis de statu naturæ innocentis seu de Gratia primi hominis, et Angelorum* del secondo tomo dell'*Augustinus*. Contestualmente all'analisi di tale critica da parte del Lovaniense,

⁸ Cfr. JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran et son temps (1581-1638)*, («Les origines du Jansénisme», 2), Paris, Vrin, 1947, p. 269, n. 2.

⁹ LS, cap. IV, col. 89A-92C.

¹⁰ Cfr. *infra*: *Attorno alla condanna de La somme théologique (1625) di Garasse*, pp.156 ss.

¹¹ Cfr. *infra*: *La filosofia pelagiana di Garasse sotto accusa in Augustinus II, LS IV*, pp.168 ss.

diretta contro il gesuita francese, procederò ad un confronto con quella sviluppata da Saint-Cyran nel quarto tomo della *Somme des fautes*.

Infine, nell'ultima parte del saggio,¹² tratterò alcune considerazioni a partire da un *excursus* attraverso la corrispondenza gianseniana degli anni 1626-1630 e – in particolare – a partire dall'analisi dei riferimenti all'*affaire du Plagiaire* ivi contenuti. Infatti, come avrò modo di far notare, se da un lato, senza dubbio, Jansen sembra seguire con vivo interesse la redazione della *Somme des fautes* contro Garasse e non si lascia sfuggire occasione anche per esultare, quando lo scritto è particolarmente polemico nei confronti del gesuita francese, dall'altro, dopo la condanna del *Plagiaire*, teme che possa essere svelata l'identità dell'autore (il suo corrispondente Saint-Cyran).

Tuttavia, l'apprensione e la paura del Lovaniense non sembrano essere dettati solo dall'amicizia e dalla condivisione delle vicende dell'*affaire*: Jansen stesso ha paura di poter essere in qualche modo coinvolto in un'eventuale operazione polemica diretta contro il suo amico. Infatti, anch'egli, come Saint-Cyran, si stava battendo contro i gesuiti: prima durante le ambascerie per conto dell'Università di Lovanio in Spagna (1624-1625; 1626-1627), dopo anche redigendo, su invito dell'amico, uno scritto sulla vicenda delle università e contro la pretesa dei gesuiti d'insegnare nei Paesi Bassi – testo che, però, lascia inedito, proprio in virtù dei suoi timori.

Attorno alla condanna de *La somme théologique* (1625) di Garasse

Nel 1625, a seguito dell'approvazione da parte della Sorbona di Parigi,¹³ è dato alle stampe uno scritto in tre libri intitolato *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne* del padre gesuita François Garasse (1584-1631),¹⁴ contenente un'epistola dedicatoria al cardinale di Richelieu.¹⁵ L'in-folio dal titolo magniloquente

¹² Cfr. *infra*: *L'affaire du Plagiaire nella corrispondenza di Jansen*, pp. 181-186.

¹³ L'approvazione è datata 9 agosto 1625 e firmata dai dottori della Facoltà di Teologia della Sorbona, Georges Froger (†1646) e S. de Montereul.

¹⁴ Padre gesuita nato nel 1584, morto nel 1631, famoso per le sue polemiche contro ugonotti, gallicani, libertini. A seguito della condanna della sua *Somme théologique* fu costretto a lasciare Parigi e a trasferirsi a Poitiers dove poi morì nel 1631.

¹⁵ L'epistola dedicatoria al Cardinale di Richelieu (FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *À mon très illustre Seigneur Le Cardinal de Richelieu*, p. 12 in *La somme théologique des vérités capitales*) è datata il 15 agosto 1625 e non 25 agosto 1625, come riportato da Orcibal [JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran*, in part. p. 261, n. 1], che a sua volta si riferisce alla tesi di dottorato di Anna Przyrembel (*La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le P. Garasse*, Paris, Rousseau, 1917, p. 49).

suscita ben presto non poco scalpore ed in particolare attira l'attenzione di Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, che ne scrive una confutazione: la *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales contenués en la Somme théologique du Père François Garasse*.

L'episodio, in seguito, sarà considerato da alcuni come all'origine della lotta tra gesuiti e giansenisti. Il giansenista Pierre Nicole (1625-1695) nella terza lettera (15 aprile 1664) de *Les imaginaires ou Lettres sur l'hérésie imaginaire*, nel trattare delle lotte tra i gesuiti e i loro avversari, ne propone «une image raccourcie de toute cette longue guerre de Théologiens»¹⁶ iniziando in questo modo:

«Ce fut l'an 1626 qu'elle commença par le livre d'un Jésuite nommé Garasse, intitulé: *Somme des vérités capitales de la Religion Chrétienne*. Feu Mr. l'Abbé de Saint Cyran y aiant remarqué un nombre prodigieux de falsifications de l'Ecriture et des Pères, et de propositions Hérétiques et impies, crut que l'honneur de l'Eglise demandoit de lui, qu'il en entreprît la Refutation».¹⁷

Pierre Bayle, a sua volta, nel *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, dopo aver accennato alla critica predisposta da Saint-Cyran contro *La somme théologique*, rivela l'impressione che Garasse sia stato «l'Hélène de la guerre entre les Jésuites et le les Jansénistes».¹⁸

La querelle sviluppatasi attorno allo scritto tra Garasse e Saint-Cyran ha, d'altronde, suscitato grande interesse già negli autori allora contemporanei, ed in particolar modo sulla questione dell'approvazione de *La somme théologique*. Il teologo di Lovanio, futuro vescovo d'Ypres (Ieper), Cornelis Jansen in una lettera a Saint-Cyran del 25 luglio del 1626 mette in evidenza la lacheté degli esaminatori.¹⁹ In tempi più recenti, verso la fine dell'Ottocento, torna a parlarne anche il curatore delle *Mémoires* di Garasse – pubblicate postume nel 1860 – Charles Nisard (1808-1890). Egli nella sua introduzione sostiene che *La somme théologique* avrebbe ottenuto l'approvazione solo perché i due esaminatori, spaventati dalla sua mole, non l'avrebbero letta.²⁰ Di

¹⁶ PIERRE NICOLE, *Lettre III, 15 avril 1664* in *Les imaginaires ou Lettres sur l'hérésie imaginaire*, Paris, chez Antoine Barbie, I, p. 51.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ PIERRE BAYLE, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Amsterdam, chez P. Brunel, 1730⁴, II, p. 531.

¹⁹ CORNELIS JANSEN, *Lettre à Saint-Cyran, 25 juillet 1626, Cor. XCV*, p. 327: «Les Juges qui devoient censurer le Plagiaire, se sont à la verité signalés en lacheté. Il on esté trop en nombre pour faire quelque chose qui valust».

²⁰ CHARLES NISARD, *Notice sur la vie et les écrits de François Garasse*, in FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *Mémoires de Garasse*, avec une notice de Charles Nisard, Paris, Amyot

diverso avviso è Auguste Carayon (1813-1874), curatore di un altro scritto di Garasse, l'*Histoire des Jésuites de Paris pendant tres années (1624-1626)*. Quattro anni dopo Nisard, nella sua introduzione²¹ tesse le lodi de *La somme théologique* sottolineandone la fortuna presso il pubblico e riferendo dell'approvazione della Sorbona.

Al di là dei pareri contrastanti, c'è un dato di fatto che non può essere senz'altro trascurato: l'opera è stata sottoposta ad un riesame ed il primo settembre del 1626 è condannata. Infatti, a seguito di una denuncia del Rettore dell'Università durante l'assemblea del 2 marzo 1626, la Facoltà di Teologia affida a due dottori un riesame. Sebbene, in seguito, il 2 maggio sia espresso un parere favorevole alla condanna dell'opera, i dottori che hanno firmato l'approvazione chiedono ulteriore tempo per preparare la difesa. Il primo luglio, però, devono cedere, perché l'opera contiene diversi punti che essi non sono in grado di spiegare e che Garasse non ha corretto, nonostante la promessa che avrebbe provveduto a farlo. I tempi si dilazionano ulteriormente: la condanna è rinviata ancora una volta,²² perché i provvedimenti contro il gesuita sono legati e divenuti un *affaire* annesso a quello di Antonio Santarelli (1599-1649).²³

Éditeur, 1860, in part. p XXIII: «Qui le croirait? La Sorbonne approuva d'abord, et sans difficulté, ce livre estrange. Deux docteurs furent chargés de l'examiner. On doit croire qu'effrayés à l'aspect de cet énorme manuscrit, ils ne le lurent ni l'un, ni l'autre, et qu'ils se communiquèrent leurs avis, comme s'ils l'avaient lu en effet. Par malheur, ils se trouvèrent d'accord. Mais les ennemis de Garasse y regardèrent d'un peu plus près. Saint-Cyran, comme je l'ai dit, fit l'anathomie de la *Somme*; le Recteur s'en plaigit à la Faculté; on ordonna un second examen».

²¹ AUGUSTE CARAYON, *Introduction*, p. XLI, in *Histoire des Jésuites de Paris pendant tres années (1624-1626)*, écrite par le P. François Garasse de la Compagnie de Jésus et publiée par le P. Auguste Carayon de la même Compagnie, Paris, L'Écureux Librairie, 1864: «La *Somme* passiona le public comme les autres ouvrages de notre auteur: approuvée en Sorbonne, louée en latin par Dousset, Sirmond et le P. Coton, chantée par Malherbe et Racan, elle révolta Saint-Cyran. L'inventeur du jansénisme fit une charge à fond contre la *Somme*, et Bayle un autre bon apôtre, applaudit de toutes ses forces à la censure de son compère en théologie réformée. La *Somme* fut le signal de la guerre entre le jésuites et les jansénistes: Bayle nous dit, en homme nourri de la belle antiquité: *Garasse fut l'Hélène de cette guerre!* Il pouvait ajouter: il en fut la victime».

²² Cfr. la nota di Jean Orcibal contenuta nella corrispondenza di Jansen da lui curata (*Cor.* pp. 329-330, n. 8) e anche JEAN-PIERRE NICERON, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des hommes illustres dans la République des lettres, avec un catalogue raisonné de leurs Ouvrages*, t. XXXI, Paris, chez Briasson, 1735, pp. 386-387.

²³ Gesuita italiano, è stato autore del *Tractatus de hæresi, schismate, apostasia, sollicitatione in sacramento Pœnitentiæ, et de potestate Romani Pontificis in his delictis puniendis* (Romæ, apud hæredem B. Zannetti, 1625), un trattato che riconosceva al Papa la supremazia sui re e la possibilità di farli cadere in caso non fossero all'altezza del loro titolo. In tal modo Santarelli riproduceva le proposizioni condannate diverse volte nei trattati di Juan de Mariana (1536-1624), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) e Roberto Bellarmino (1542-1621) e per questo il suo scritto, che pure aveva ricevuto

Nel considerare le vicende riguardanti l'*affaire* di Garasse, senza dubbio, si deve tener conto anche del ruolo giocato dalle accuse e dalle critiche dell'abate di Saint-Cyran²⁴ esposte nella sua *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, opera che, come s'è detto, è apparsa anonima. La loro efficacia tuttavia è stata in parte smorzata, in un primo momento, ad opera dello stesso Garasse. Infatti, il gesuita, ricorrendo ad un importante magistrato,²⁵ è riuscito ad ottenere la sospensione della stampa del primo volume, terminato dall'autore già dal mese di gennaio del 1626.²⁶ Inoltre, si è fatto consegnare dallo stampatore il manoscritto²⁷ ed ha scritto un opuscolo intitolato *L'abus*

l'approvazione del Papa e del generale della Compagnia, ricevette la condanna. Alla condanna da parte del Parlamento (il 13 marzo 1623) seguì quella della Sorbona, che durante l'assemblea del 16 marzo decise di affidare a quattro dottori l'esame dell'opera e che, ricevuti il primo aprile i relativi rapporti, il 4 aprile si esprime in tale senso, confermando la sua decisione il 20 aprile. Per ulteriori approfondimenti si veda ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le Père Garasse*, pp. 24-30 e VICTOR MARTIN, *Le gallicanisme politique et le clergé de France* («Bibliothèque de l'Institut de droit canonique» - Université de Strasbourg, III), Paris, Éditions Auguste Picard, 1929, in part. pp. 163-244.

²⁴ Sulla polemica tra Garasse e Saint-Cyran si rimanda ad ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le Père Garasse*, a JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Haurann* e a LÉON WUILLAUME, *Aux origines du jansénisme en France*, Roma, Institutum historicum S.J., 2009.

²⁵ Come riferito da Orcibal, si sarebbe trattato o del presidente di Verdun o dell'avvocato generale Molé. Cfr. JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne*, pp. 263-264.

²⁶ Cfr. a riguardo JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran*, in part. pp. 263-264 e *Cor.* p. 299, n. 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 264. Riguardo alle circostanze della sospensione della stampa del primo volume della *Somme des fautes*, lo stesso autore si esprime. [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la vérité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique du Pere François Garasse de la Compagnie de Iesus*, in *Anti-Garasse touchant sa Somme théologique. A tous amateurs de la vérité*, Paris, 1626, p. 10 s.: «et par des moyens, qu'il ne m'est pas loisible de dire, a fait si puissamment intimider l'Imprimeur, qu'il l'a empêché de passer outre en l'impression de mon ouvrage. Son dessein est maintenant, à ce qu'il a dit luy mesme, ayant veu les véritables fautes et les faussetés inexcusables, dont on l'accuse, de corriger son livre sur mes cayers imprimés, qu'il tient par force, comme un larrecin^a (a. Avant que je les aye peu revoir), ayant mieux aymé confesser en particulier qu'il avoit failly, pour rendre quelque raison de l'empeschement qu'il a apporté à une chose si juste, que de se voir publiquement convaincu de tous les mes, que peut commettre un homme qui fait des livres pour acquerir une fausse reputation. Mais quoy qu'il ait employé une autorité plus grande que la sienne pour empescher la publication de sa honte, et la reparation de l'honneur qu'il a ravy à la vérité, je luy declare par cest escrit, que je mets à dessein en lumiere, qu'il n'est pas en sa puissance, quoy que j'aye esprouvé en ceste occasion, que celle de son Ordre est importune et violente, d'empescher que ces quatre Tomes ne soient mis en lumiere, icy ou ailleurs, et que je ne fasse retentir au milieu de la France, et audelà des Alpes, et des Pyrenees, et en

descouvert en la censure prétendue des textes de l'Escriture sainte et des propositions de théologie tirées par un censeur anonyme de la Somme théologique du P. François Garasse de la Compagnie de Jésus (probabilmente composto da un confratello di Garasse) in cui espone centoundici proposizioni condannate da un censore che vuole far credere essere Saint-Cyran e a cui risponde.²⁸

Per le ragioni appena richiamate si è verificato un ritardo nella pubblicazione della *Somme des fautes*; e dunque solo il primo dei tre tomi effettivamente dati alle stampe è apparso prima della condanna della *Somme théologique*, ossia il 18 aprile 1626, mentre il secondo ed il quarto sono successivi e del 7 ottobre 1626. Nel progetto originario la *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales* avrebbe dovuto comprendere quattro tomi: il primo sugli errori di Garasse sulle Sacre Scritture, su Sant'Agostino e su Basilio di Seleucia; il secondo su quelli sui Padri della Chiesa ed altri autori (Origene, Dionigi l'Areopagita, Tertulliano, Ireneo, Ilario, Epifanio, Macario, Prospero, Ambrogio, Tommaso, Isidoro di Pelusio, Teodoreto, Paciano, Anastasio del Sinai, Socrate, Ippolito, Zenone di Verona, Aldelmo, Fulgenzio, Lattanzio, Crisologo, Eusebio di Cesarea, Porfirio, Seneca, Tacito, Aristotele, Filone, Pierre Charron); il terzo, invece, mai pubblicato, avrebbe dovuto riguardare gli errori in materia teologica, filosofica, cronologica, chirografica e storica; il quarto raccoglie tutte le eresie, gli errori, le empietà, le irriverenze, le buffonerie, le vanità e le vanterie insopportabili di Garasse.²⁹

toutes les contrees, où les verités Catholiques sont recogneues dans les Universités, qui font profession de les defendre, les propositions hérétiques, qu'il a osé publier, avec l'Approbation de son Ordre, dans la ville Capitale du Royaume très Chrestien, pour les épandre par tout le monde».

²⁸ ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controversie théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le P. Garasse*, p. 69.

²⁹ [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la verité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique*, p. 4 s.: «Les deux premieres [si tratta dei primi due tomi della *Somme des fautes*] contiennent un nombre incroyable de passages corrompus et falsifiés tant des escritures saintes latines, Grecques, et Hebraïques que des Peres anciens et de toutes sortes d'autres Auteurs. Où il y a des hardiesses à citer les passages des Auteurs si estranges, que j'en ay rougi plus d'une fois, les ayant confrontés avec leurs vrais originaux. De sorte qu'il n'y a personne, qui ne fust excusable de croire que c'est un affronteur, qui les a ramassés, s'il ne sçavoit que l'Auteur est un Religieux. Le troisieme contient un nombre innombrable de fautes commises contre toute sorte de Philosophie, de Mathematique, de Chronologie, Cherographie, d'Histoire Grecque, Latine Romaine, Barbare, sainte et prophane, et surtout contre le sens commun de la nature raisonnable et contre les conclusions, qui estant tirees des principes de nostre foy, forment cette science, qu'on appelle Theologie. Le quatriesme et le principal de tous contient un nombre de propositions hérétiques condamnées formellement et en termes clairs et precis par les saints Pères et par les Conciles anciens, un nombre de propositions impies, temeraires, erronees,

Come si diceva, dei quattro tomi, però, sono apparsi solo tre (il primo, il secondo e il quarto) e perdipiù solo il primo è precedente alla condanna. Perciò il quadro di tutte le accuse rivolte da Saint-Cyran a Garasse, nel settembre 1626, non è ancora completo, sebbene l'amico di Jansen abbia avuto modo già di sferrare un duro attacco contro l'opera.

Infatti, dopo l'episodio della sospensione della stampa del primo volume della *Somme des fautes* e in risposta a *L'abus decouvert en la censure prétendue des textes de l'Escriture sainte et des propositions de théologie tirées par un censeur anonyme de la Somme théologique*, Saint-Cyran compone una *Réfutation de l'abus prétendu, et de la decouverte de la véritable ignorance et vanité du P. François Garasse*³⁰ e a seguire – presumibilmente prima dell'uscita del primo volume³¹ – un opuscolo di poco più di una decina di pagine, intitolato

scandaleuses, un nombre de vanités et de vaneries si extravagantes que je defie ceux qui ont le plus curieusement recueilli ce qui se trouve de plus arrogant et presumptueux dans les livres des Payens et des hérétiques, dans les fables et dans le Romans, qui nous ont appris le langage des Geans et des Rodomons, d'y trouver rien qui approche des paroles superbes, hautaines, et fastueuses, qui se trouvent en cette somme Theologique».

³⁰ Lo scritto risale al 16 marzo 1626. Cfr. ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le Père Garasse*, p. 72. Sulla reazione di Garasse allo scritto Pierre Nicole scrive [*Lettre III, 15 avril 1664 in Les imaginaires ou Lettres sur l'hérésie imaginaire* I, p. 52]: «Pour traverser encore davantage le dessein de cette censure, le Pere Garasse s'avisait d'une supercherie aussi subtile et aussi digne des Jesuites qu'aucune autre qu'ils aient pratiqué dans la suite de ces contestations. Il avoit couru un bruit dans Paris que l'Auteur de la Refutation devoit montrer plus de cinquante propositions Hérétiques ou erronées dans la somme de Garasse. Ce bruit étoit veritable. Mais cette partie qui contenoit la conviction des erreurs de Garasse, n'estoit point encore sortie du cabinet de Mr. de S. Cyran. Le Pere Garasse néanmoins ne laissa pas de supposer qu'il avoit trouvé moyen de sçavoir ce qu'on avoit à lui reprocher. Il choisit cinquante-trois propositions dans son livre les plus aisées à defender qu'il put trouver, et don't il n'y en avoit pas trois qui fussent du nombre de celles de Mr. S. Cyran l'accusoit dans son ouvrage».

³¹ Lo scritto, che non riporta una data precisa di pubblicazione, potrebbe essere stato composto tra il gennaio del 1626 – mese in cui si colloca la fine della stesura del primo volume della *Somme des fautes* e l'episodio della sospensione della stampa – e il 18 aprile dello stesso anno, in cui è dato alla luce il volume: è possibile affermarlo sulla base dei riferimenti a questi episodi ivi contenuti (*Advis à tous les sçavans*, p. 10 ss.). Anna Przyrembel lo colloca orientativamente nello stesso periodo della lettera indirizzata ad un *très-sçavant personnage* (annessa poi alla *Somme des fautes* I, pp. 120-126) – e dunque dopo il 16 marzo 1626, data della *Réfutation de l'abus prétendu, et de la decouverte de la véritable ignorance et vanité du Père François Garasse* (inserita nella *Somme des fautes et faussetés* I, pp. 127-167) –, ma al tempo stesso ipotizza che possa essere successivo alla pubblicazione del primo volume della *Somme des fautes*, avvenuta il 18 aprile 1626 (cfr. ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le Père Garasse*, pp. 72-73 e 80-81). Tuttavia, nell'opuscolo non ci sono riferimenti espliciti alla pubblicazione del primo

*Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la verité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique du Pere François Garasse de la Compagnie de Jésus.*³² In questo secondo libello, che anticipa in qualche modo le accuse che svilupperà più profusamente nella *Somme des fautes*, Saint-Cyran scrive:

«il se rencontre aussi que le verités y sont tellement meslées avec les mensonges, et les choses réelles avec celles, qui ne sont qu'apparentes, et les imaginations creuses, fabuleuses et chymériques, avec les pensées et les conceptions solides de la vraye Theologie, qu'en conscience je puis dire n'avoir jamais rien veu de pareil, soit que la comparaison, se fasse avec les Autheurs nouveaux, ou avec les anciens, qui ont porté le nom de Catholiques. [...] Je passe bien plus avant, et ose dire sous le temoignage, que ma conscience rend à cette verité, qu'il n'y a point d'Autheur hérétique ny ancien, ny nouveau, dont j'aye cognoissance, qui se soit esgaré de la sorte en escrivant, et qui ait manié si honteusement, et avec tant d'opprobre les armes de l'Eglise, doit qu'ils ayent escrit les uns contre les autres, ou chacun à part, ou tous ensemble contre les Docteurs Catholiques».³³

Il passo citato fornisce – in una versione condensata e molto stringata – un saggio delle accuse che l'autore rivolge a Garasse nell'opera successiva: il gesuita avrebbe mischiato nel suo scritto verità e menzogne, cose reali ed apparenti, immaginazioni, chimere con le concezioni della vera teologia. Nel suo giudizio Saint-Cyran precisa di non essersi confrontato mai con un autore simile, sia dell'antichità che dell'età moderna, che si dica cattolico, così come eretico, nessuno che abbia in un modo simile criticato la Chiesa e i suoi Dottori. Tuttavia, questo non è che solo un assaggio dell'aspra

volume, ma semmai alle difficoltà intervenute che avrebbero impedito la pubblicazione di tutti e quattro i volumi della *Somme des fautes*. Infatti, Saint-Cyran scrive: «je luy declare par cest escrit, que je mets à dessein en lumiere, qu'il n'est pas en sa puissance, quoy que j'aye esprouvé en ceste occasion, que celle de son Ordre est importune et violente, d'empescher que ces quatre tomes ne soient mis en lumiere, icy ou ailleurs, et que je ne fasse retentir au milieu de la France, et audelà des Alpes, et des Pyrenees, et en toutes les contrees, où les verités Catholiques sont recogneues dans les Universités, qui font profession de les defendre, les propositions hérétiques, qu'il a osé publier, avec l'Approbation de son Ordre, dans la ville Capitale du Royaume très Chrestien, pour les épandre par tout le monde» (*Advis à tous les sçavans*, p. 11).

³² [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Advis à tous les sçavans*. Lo scritto è preceduto da una *Apologie pour le Reverend Père Garasse de la Compagnie de Iesus, contre le libertins de ce temps* (1626), apparso anonimo e probabilmente scritto da un confratello di Garasse e seguito da un altro, sempre anonimo, intitolato *Advis de Charité au censeur anome des escrits du Père François Garasse, de la Compagnie de Iesus* (Paris, 1627).

³³ [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la verité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique*, pp. 2-3.

critica che prepara per il gesuita: nello stesso *Advis à tous les sçavans* rinvia proprio alla successiva pubblicazione della *Somme des fautes*,³⁴ giunta a compimento solo dopo la decisione della Sorbona.

La vicenda che coinvolge Garasse e che conduce alla condanna di quello che, a parere dell'autore, sarebbe dovuto essere lo scritto decisivo³⁵ nella sua lotta contro l'ateismo ed il libertinismo, sembra essere tanto più sorprendente se si considera che fino ad allora egli s'era distinto come apolegeta, sbaragliando tutti i suoi avversari, e come autore, in quanto il più letto e conosciuto tra i gesuiti.³⁶

La sua *Somme théologique* prosegue la linea apologetica cattolica ed al tempo stesso offensiva nei confronti dell'ateismo e del libertinismo, già stabilita negli scritti precedenti, le *Recherches et autres œuvres de Maistre Estienne Pasquier* del 1622 e *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels*,³⁷ pubblicata il 18 agosto del 1623.³⁸ Garasse, schieratosi nel 1622 contro le *Recherches de France* di Pasquier, nell'opera successiva del 1623 rivolge una condanna generale a *les beaux esprits*, ossia ad atei, ugonotti, cattolici, gallicani, liberi pensatori, libertini e nuovi epicurei,³⁹ in qualche modo rappresentati da Théophile de Viau (1590-1626)⁴⁰ e dal suo *Parnasse satyrique* (1622).

³⁴ [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la vérité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique*, p. 4: «C'est ce qui me persuade, que ce qu'on n'aura pas conceu en gros des excès, et de l'horreur de ce livre, on le comprendra peut estre facilement, lors qu'on verra l'examen, qu'on en fait avec toute sorte de modestie, divisé en quatre tomes, et chaque tome distribué en divers textes refutés l'un apres l'autre, comme si on avoit eu soin, pour le faire mieux cognoistre par le menu, d'en faire une anatomique dissection».

³⁵ Cfr. FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *L'auteur au lecteur*, in ID., *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels*, Paris, Chez Sebastien Chapelet, 1623 e JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne*, in part. pp. 260-261.

³⁶ Cfr. BENJAMIN DUPAS, *Autour du Père Garasse, 1623-1626: l'invention collective d'un auteur unique*, in I. Moreau / G. Holtz (éds.), «Parler librement». *La liberté de parole au tournant du XVIe et du XVIIe siècle*, Lyon, ENS Éditions, 2005, pp. 45-62.

³⁷ FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels*, Paris, Chez Sebastien Chapelet, 1623.

³⁸ JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne*, p. 260, n. 4.

³⁹ CHARLES NISARD, *Notice sur la vie et les écrits de François Garasse*, in FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *Mémoires de Garasse*, in part. pp. XIV-XV.

⁴⁰ FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *L'auteur au lecteur*, in *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels*: «Et quant au sieur Theophile, qu'il sache, que quand il aura plus vivement poursuivi les Imprimeurs qu'il dit avoir pardonnés, et que je dis qu'en chose si importante et en la cause de Dieu, il devoit avoir fait condamner, pour tout à fait se retirer du soupçon, trop vrai semblable, qu'il est Auteur des abominations qu'ils lui attribuent: quand il aura fait publiquement brûler non seulement le *Parnasse Satyrique*, boutique de toute impiété et saleté, qui porte son nom en tête: mais encores la seconde partie de ses œuvres, livre auquel feignant de desavouer

Sebbene, come è noto, in quegli anni Garasse non sia stato il solo ad ingaggiare una lotta contro l'ateismo ed il libertinismo⁴¹ – nel 1623, lo stesso anno della pubblicazione de *La Doctrine curieuse* e due anni prima di quella della somma garassiana,⁴² il minimo Marin Mersenne (1588-1648) dà alle stampe le *Quæstiones celeberrimæ in Genesim*⁴³ e l'anno seguente *L'impiété des Déistes, Athées et Libertins de ce temps*⁴⁴ –, tuttavia il gesuita si distingue per la prolificità della sua produzione apologetica.⁴⁵ Come riconosciuto dalla letteratura critica,⁴⁶ i due predicatori Garasse e Mersenne sarebbero stati i principali protagonisti nella polemica contro i libertini ed avrebbero entrambi contribuito alla nascita e alla fortuna del termine 'libertino'

ce qu'on lui met sus, il le confirme trop clairement par un grand nombre de propositions indignes d'une plume Chrestienne, et tracées par une plume trempée dans l'athéisme, l'impiété et le libertinage». A proposito della critica di Garasse contro Théophile si veda anche GERHARD SCHNEIDER, *Der Libertin: zur Geistes- und Sozialgeschichte des Bürgertums im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, Metzler, 1970, trad. it. a cura di G. Panziera, *Il libertino: per una storia sociale della cultura borghese nel XVI e XVII secolo*, Bologna, Il mulino, 1974, pp. 212-213 e n. 27.

⁴¹ Cfr. GERHARD SCHNEIDER, *Der Libertin*, trad. it. *Il libertino*, in part. pp. 207-225.

⁴² Non è ovviamente casuale l'utilizzo nel titolo dello scritto del 1625 (*La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne*) dell'espressione *somme théologique*. Infatti, l'autore si richiama alla *Summa theologiæ* tomista, spinto dal desiderio di emularla e al tempo stesso di rinnovarla, trattando di questioni nuove. Nella lettera dedicatoria al cardinale Richelieu scrive: «Si je traitais les mêmes Questions que nous voyons solidement debatues dans la *Somme* d'Alexandre, et de saint Thomas, je me garderais bien de qualifier mes Écrits du nom de la *Somme Theologique*, je me contenterais de lecher la poussière de leurs pas, ou pour signaler mon courage, je tâcherais de faire à leur endroit ce que fait la Bryone autour des ormeaux, et m'incorporant avec eux je monterais à la faveur de leurs branches: Mais puis que le malheur des siècles nous a fourni de nouveaux sujets, et mis en nature des questions qu'on eût peut être estimé des sacrilèges en ce siècle bien-heureux, ils approuveraient par leur suffrage le titre de mon Œuvre et me déchargeraient avec honneur du crime d'usurpation, ou de temerité» (p. 7). Cfr. JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran*, p. 261 e LÉON WUILLAUME, *Aux origines du jansénisme en France*, p. 55.

⁴³ MARIN MERSENNE, *Quæstiones celeberrimæ in Genesim*, Sumptibus Sebastiani Cramoisy, Lutetia Parisiorum, 1623.

⁴⁴ MARIN MERSENNE, *L'impiété des Déistes, Athées et Libertins de ce temps*, Paris, Chez P. Bilaine, 1624.

⁴⁵ Tra il 1623 e il 1626 Garasse è molto produttivo ed alle prese con una *querelle* che gli oppone Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, François Ogier, Antoine Remy. Cfr. BENJAMIN DUPAS, *Autour du Père Garasse*, in part. pp. 48-52 e anche GERHARD SCHNEIDER, *Der Libertin*, trad. it. *Il libertino*, in part. pp. 207-225.

⁴⁶ Cfr. GERHARD SCHNEIDER, *Der Libertin*, trad. it. *Il libertino*, p. 208, ISABELLE MOREAU, *Libertinisme et philosophie*, «Revue de synthèse», 126, 5^e série/1 (2005), pp. 139-160, in part. p. 152, JEAN-PIERRE CAVAILLÉ, *Libérer le libertinage*, «Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales» 1/2009 (64^e année), p. 45-78 [http://www.cairn.info/revue-Annales-2009-1-page-45.htm].

nel XVII secolo, soprattutto nella sua accezione negativa: ma sarebbe stato il primo ad aver dato un contributo maggiore in tal senso.⁴⁷

Nella produzione garassiana, dunque, si può riconoscere una sostanziale continuità d'azione nella lotta ingaggiata contro ateismo e libertinismo: è lo stesso autore che suggerisce, riconosce ed anticipa – nella seconda pagina della prefazione al lettore – nella *Doctrine curieuse* la filiazione, il legame tra quella e l'opera successiva del 1625. Garasse chiarisce anche che si riserva la possibilità di sferrare un attacco più deciso, servendosi delle armi della teologia e della vera filosofia in quello che rappresenta la seconda parte del suo progetto, la *Somme théologique*. Scrive:

«Premièrement, que ce que tu vois de mon dessein, n'en est qu'une partie: car comme ici je ne combats pas à fer es moulu l'impiété des Athées, et Libertins (me reservant à la seconde partie, en laquelle selon ma profession, je me servirai des fortes armes de la Theologie, et vraie Philosophie, pour l'atterrer entièrement) aussi maintenant me suis-je contenté d'agir par une autre methode (conforme aux humeurs de beaucoup de personnes du siècle present) qui est propre pour rendre méprisable, et décréditer cette damnable doctrine, ce que je fais par la découverte des sottises, absurditez, et enormes méchancetez d'icelle».⁴⁸

Tuttavia, la *Somme théologique*, che anche secondo lo stesso autore preserva l'intenzione polemica ed apologetica caratterizzante l'opera del 1623 e le precedenti, diversamente dalle altre non si rivolge ad un bersaglio individuale, ad una persona in particolare: se le *Recherches* hanno Étienne Pasquier quale obiettivo e la *Doctrine curieuse* Pierre Charron (1541-1603),⁴⁹ ma soprattutto Théophile de Viau, lo scritto del 1625 scaglia un attacco più generale contro

⁴⁷ FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *Recherches des recherches et autres œuvres de Maistre Estienne Pasquier, pour la defence des nos Roys, contre les outrages, calomnies, at autres impertinences du dit Autheur*, Paris, Chez Sebastien Chappelet, 1622, p. 682: «Par le mot de libertin je n'entens ny un Huguenot, ny un Athée, ny un Catholique, ny un Hérétique, ny un Politique, mais un certain composé de toutes ces qualités».

⁴⁸ FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *L'auteur au lecteur*, in *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels*, p. II. Cfr. JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne*, in part. pp. 260-261. Anche nell'*Avant-propos* del V trattato del secondo libro, allorché Garasse deve introdurre la questione teologica della Trinità, scrive: «Il faut ajouter à cette consideration que le dessein de mon œuvre, qui est comme une *Somme de Theologie* avec un ordre tout nouveau, et des pensées, tant que nous pouvons toutes nouvelles, ne serait pas accompli de tout point, si nous ne parlions de la Trinité des Personnes» (p. 452).

⁴⁹ Per la critica a Charron cfr. FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits*, pp. 27-28.

l'ateismo, ampliando la platea degli avversari.⁵⁰ Infatti, Garasse non opera una distinzione netta tra ateismo e libertinismo ed inserisce nella definizione comune sette eretiche sia dell'antichità che dell'età moderna.⁵¹

Quello che va spiegato, però, è come, nonostante l'obiettivo che si propone – peraltro in modo più invasivo, come s'è visto, rispetto alle opere precedenti – l'opera di Garasse sia poi in corsa nella condanna che ho ricordato all'inizio. Ma, per farlo, è necessario richiamarsi ad alcune circostanze storiche, il cui esame può contribuire a spiegare la sorte destinata alla *Somme*. La vicenda che lo vede protagonista s'inserisce, infatti, in un contesto più generale di lotte del Parlamento e della Sorbona nei confronti dei gesuiti papisti,⁵² acuitesi in occasione della pubblicazione di due libelli diretti contro il re Luigi XIII (1601-1643) e la politica del suo primo ministro Richelieu (Armand-Jean Du Plessis de, 1585-1642):⁵³

⁵⁰ In una sua recente pubblicazione Girolamo de Liguori sostiene che l'azione apologetica di Garasse si sia distinta per aver sferrato, almeno nel suo periodo più fiorente (anni 1622-1626), un attacco 'generico' ed 'emotivo'. GIROLAMO DE LIGUORI, *L'ateo mascherato. Immagini del materialismo e dell'ateismo nell'apologetica cattolica da Cartesio a Kant*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 2009, in part. p. 29: «il suo attacco è generico e generale: non contro determinati e ben individuabili autori (Cartesio, Gassendi, Charron, i libertini, ecc.) ma contro *les beaux esprits de ce temps*, vale a dire, contro una certa cultura dominante e diffusa; nonostante l'obiettivo della sua prima opera sia esplicitamente indirizzato in modo specifico contro Charron e Etienne Pasquier». Inoltre, prosegue de Liguori (pp. 29-30): «il suo attacco è emotivo e rozzo, non sostenuto da una chiara individuazione dell'obiettivo da abbattere. Ateismo e scetticismo sembrano gli obiettivi principali, ma la classificazione che ce ne dà resta estremamente vaga, di natura emotiva e poco caratterizzata».

⁵¹ Garasse nella prima sezione del secondo trattato del primo volume parte dal presupposto aristotelico (ARISTOTELES, *Analytica Posteriora*, II, 6, Bekker, I. 92a 20-24) che il male sia ciò che è divisibile, al contrario del bene, e lo utilizza per qualificare la molteplicità delle sette che costituiscono i movimenti eretici: rinvia indifferentemente a sette sia dell'antichità che dell'età moderna. Poi, richiamando esplicitamente il principio platonico del *Protagora* per cui Dio è il centro da cui si dipartono tutte le linee che vanno alla circonferenza, così che ci sia un solo centro e molteplici linee, sostiene che anche l'ateismo, allontanandosi da Dio, si divida in molteplici specie. Quindi ne distingue cinque, tra le quali colloca anche il libertinismo (FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne*, I. I, traité II, sect. I, pp. 44-45).

⁵² Infatti, dopo l'assassinio di Enrico IV di Borbone (1553-1610) furono condannati dei trattati che proclamavano la supremazia del pontefice sui re: il trattato di Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) *De rege et regis institutione* (1598), il *Tractatus de potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus, adversus Gulielmum Barclay* (1610) di Roberto Bellarmino (1542-1621) e la *Defensio fidei catholicae et adversus anglicanae sectae errores* di Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Cfr. ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le Père Garasse*, pp. 14ss.

⁵³ Charles Nisard, il curatore dell'edizione delle *Mémoires* di Garasse scrive a riguardo [*Notice sur la vie et les écrits de François Garasse*, in FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *Mémoires de Garasse*, p. XX]: «Chaque jour enfantait de nouveaux libelles contre la

si tratta dell'*Admonitio ad Ludovicum decimum tertium*,⁵⁴ data alle stampe all'inizio di settembre del 1625, e delle *Quæstiones Politicæ, Quodlibeticæ, agitandæ in maiori aula Sorbonicæ, diebus Saturnaliciis, mane et vesperi, præsidente illustrissimo Domino Cardinali de Richelieu, sive de Rupella, anno 1626, cum facultate superiorum* pubblicate tra il dicembre 1625 e il gennaio 1626.

Attorno agli scritti, pubblicati sotto pseudonimi, nascono dei sospetti volti a risalire all'identità degli autori. Per l'*Admonitio* i sospettati, tutti gesuiti, sono Andreas Eudaemon-Joannes (ca. 1560-1625), Jakob Keller (1568-1631), Carolus Scribani (1561-1629) e Garasse. Lo scritto, che attira, ovviamente, le antipatie del governo, è ben presto condannato, il 30 ottobre 1625, dal Parlamento e riceve la censura dalla Sorbona il primo dicembre.

Le voci che hanno attribuito l'*Admonitio* a Garasse, si rianimano anche a proposito delle *Quæstiones*, così da spingere il cardinale Richelieu a richiedere una perizia stilistica. Secondo la ricostruzione che Garasse presenta nelle sue *Mémoires*,⁵⁵ l'indagine, volta a verificare la conformità stilistica tra le *Quæstiones* e gli scritti precedenti del gesuita, è ordinata lo stesso giorno in cui, su consiglio dei suoi superiori, egli si reca a parlare di persona con il cardinale, ossia il 26 gennaio 1626. Essa è affidata a Jacques Favereau (1590-1638) e Isaac de Laffemas (1583-1657), entrambi ostili alla Compagnia, che rintracciano nell'opuscolo venticinque o trenta luoghi conformi. Contemporaneamente anche il Parlamento prende dei provvedimenti e stabilisce che il testo debba essere bruciato pubblicamente il 28 gennaio del 1626.

Dunque, tali fermenti e voci ostili a Garasse hanno caratterizzato i sei mesi successivi alla pubblicazione della *Somme théologique*, che

politique et la personne de Louis XIII et de son ministre. On voulait absolument que Garasse y ait eu part; on lui attribuait notamment les *Quæstiones politicæ, quodlibeticæ*; on croyait y reconnaître sa main, son style et jusqu'aux caractères d'impression, les mêmes que dans ses autres ouvrages». BENJAMIN DUPAS, *Autour du Père Garasse*, pp. 57 ss.: «Tout change dès le mois de septembre 1625. Jusqu'alors, Garasse maîtrisait ses adversaires en dominant et en orientant avec brio le jeu des écrits croisés vers son "territoire" polémique, les égratignant par des traits d'esprit acerbes [...]. Mais le déplacement de la polémique vers la personne de Louis XIII, et plus encore vers celle de Richelieu, va constituer un piège fatal pour Garasse, puisque celui-ci va perdre le contrôle de la figure auctoriale qu'il avait instaurée. À partir de la fin de l'année 1625, ce sont les adversaires du jésuite qui dominent la construction de la fonction-auteur, et la font basculer dans l'inacceptable». Cfr. anche ANNA PRZYREMBEL, *La controverse théologique et morale entre Saint-Cyran et le Père Garasse*, pp. 14 ss.

⁵⁴ [JACOB KELLER o ANDREAS EUDAEMON-JOANNES] *G.G.R. Theologi ad Ludovicum decimum tertium Galliae et Navarrae regem christianissimum Admonitio, fidelissime, humilissime, verissime facta, et ex Gallico in Latinum translata*, Augustae francorum, Cum facultate Catholica Magistr., 1625.

⁵⁵ FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *Mémoires de Garasse*, pp. 177 ss.

ciononostante è rimasta illesa ed inattaccata fino a quando Saint-Cyran, nel marzo del 1626, non ha iniziato a dissezionarla, scovandovi diversi errori relativi alle Scritture, ai Padri della Chiesa ed altri autori,⁵⁶ dei quali presenterò un esempio nel paragrafo seguente.

Neanche Jansen è rimasto indifferente alla *Somme théologique*. Egli da un lato sembra essere interessato sia alle vicende che hanno condotto alla condanna dell'opera, che a quelle successive ad essa – e di fatti ne parla nella sua corrispondenza con Saint-Cyran –, dall'altro si confronta più in particolare con la sentenza 'pelagiana' di Garasse relativa alla mortalità del primo uomo e la critica nel secondo tomo del suo *Augustinus (Liber singularis, capitolo quarto)*. In quest'ultimo analizza e confuta nello specifico un passo del terzo libro de *La somme théologique* – sedicesima sezione (*Le Corps de Jésus-Christ, nonobstant toutes ses perfections estoit possible et mortel, mais volontairement, et d'une façon du tout noble*) del secondo trattato (*De l'incarnation et de la sacree humanité de Jésus-Christ*).

Si tratta, del resto, della sentenza garassiana su cui si è espresso prima di lui anche Saint-Cyran – nel quarto tomo della sua *Somme des fautes et faussetés* –, servendosi degli stessi luoghi conciliari ed agostiniani che sarebbero stati utilizzati in seguito dall'amico.⁵⁷

Dunque, sulla base dei rilievi appena fatti, vorrei analizzare la posizione di Jansen circa l'*affaire* Garasse e confrontarla con quella di Saint-Cyran. In particolare, intendo procedere con l'analisi del quarto capitolo del *Liber singularis* del II tomo dell'*Augustinus*, in cui è messa a tema la sentenza garassiana sulla mortalità del primo uomo, con il confronto con quanto Saint-Cyran sostiene a proposito della stessa ed infine proporre un *excursus* attraverso la corrispondenza di Jansen degli anni 1626-1630, incentrato sul caso in questione.

La filosofia pelagiana di Garasse sotto accusa in *Augustinus II, LS IV*

Il quarto capitolo del *Liber singularis* del secondo tomo dell'*Augustinus* è intitolato *Utrum Adam corpore esset moriturus, si non*

⁵⁶ [JEAN DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE], *Advis à tous les sçavans et amateurs de la vérité touchant la refutation de la Somme théologique*, p. 4: «anatomique dissection».

⁵⁷ Non deve suscitare meraviglia il fatto che i due amici avessero utilizzato gli stessi luoghi tratti dai concili e da Agostino. Infatti, negli anni 1611-1617 s'erano ritirati a Camp-de-Prats, nelle vicinanze di Bayonne, per studiare la Bibbia, i Concili e i Padri, sostenendo ritmi di studio intensissimi e compilando una sorta di schedario dei luoghi comuni utili a confrontare le varie dottrine dei Padri. Jean Orcibal in *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne*, p. 148 scrive: «Après avoir établi, par le rapprochement de multiples passages, les doctrines des divers Pères, ils [Jansen e Saint-Cyran] les confrontaient». Si veda anche *Jansenius d'Ypres*, pp. 72-73.

peccasset e ha come sottotitolo *Duplex mortalitas, et immortalitas*. Esso riprende la questione della mortalità del primo uomo, che Jansen aveva avuto già modo di affrontare nel primo tomo, in particolare nel capitolo tredicesimo del secondo libro, intitolato *De corpore primi hominis*.⁵⁸

Se nel *De corpore primi hominis* Jansen criticava la sentenza pelagiana sulla mortalità del primo uomo e riaccendeva la stessa polemica che Agostino aveva tessuto contro Giuliano di Eclano (385 ca.-455), sia nel *Contra Iulianum* (421), sia nell'*Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* (429-430), e citava e scagliava le stesse accuse del Dottore della Chiesa, nel capitolo quarto del secondo tomo – una volta terminata (nel precedente tomo) la storia dell'eresia pelagiana⁵⁹ – non identifica solo nel pelagianesimo il suo bersaglio privilegiato. Infatti, Jansen scrive:

«Nam ex eodem fonte fluxit et illa cuiusdam recentioris exorbitatio, qua mortem corporis Adamo, etiam sine peccati merito, venturam esse sensit et scripsit».⁶⁰

Da una stessa fonte sarebbe giunta quella deviazione di qualcuno più recente (*cuiusdam recentioris exorbitatio*) che ha sostenuto la sentenza pelagiana per la quale la morte del corpo avrebbe colpito noi ed Adamo anche senza la colpa del peccato. Ma qual è questa fonte? Jansen lo scrive alla fine del capitolo precedente, il terzo del *Liber singularis*:

«Unde nihil mirum, si quemadmodum olim Philosophi fuerunt Patriarchæ Hæreticorum; ita nunc Philosophia intemperantius usurpata fiat mater errorum».⁶¹

⁵⁸ HP, I. II, cap. XIII, coll. 121A-122B.

⁵⁹ Il primo tomo dell'opera (*De hæresi pelagiana*) si compone di otto libri. Il primo libro tratta della storia del pelagianesimo e del semipelagianesimo; il secondo (*Quo continentur dogmata ad naturam primi hominis spectantia*) dei dogmi pelagiani relativi alla natura del primo uomo; il terzo (*Quo continentur dogmata Pelagianorum ad statum naturæ lapsæ spectantia*) di quelli relativi allo stato della natura lapsa; il quarto (*Quo continentur dogmata ad vires naturales bene vivendi spectantia*) di quelli relativi alle forze naturali per vivere bene; il quinto (*Quo continentur tres primi status Pelagianismi*) dell'etnicismo, del semietnicismo e del giudaismo; il sesto (*Quo continentur quartus status Pelagianismi; cæteraque dogmata et mores Pelagianorum*) del semicristianesimo; il settimo (*Qui de Semi-Pelagianis primus est*) e l'ottavo (*Qui de Semi-Pelagianis secundus*), infine, del semipelagianesimo.

⁶⁰ LS, cap. IV, col. 89A. Trad.: «Infatti, dalla stessa fonte è venuta anche quella deviazione di qualcuno più recente, in base alla quale ha pensato e scritto che la morte sarebbe sopraggiunta ad Adamo, anche senza la colpa del peccato».

⁶¹ LS, cap. III, col. 88C. Trad.: «Quindi non ci si deve stupire se, come un tempo i filosofi furono patriarchi degli eretici, così ora la filosofia, riconquistata più smoderatamente, sarà madre degli errori». L'idea dei filosofi come patriarchi degli eretici ha un suo precedente in Tertulliano e in Girolamo. Si veda TERTULLIANUS, *Adversus Hermogenem*, VIII («hæreticorum patriarchæ philosophi»; PL 2, 204C, CCSL 1, 404, 14-15) e HIERONYMUS, *Epistola ad Ctesiphontem*, CXXXIII, 2 («Philosophi patriarchæ Hæreticorum»; CSEL 56, 243, 1-2, PL 22, 1148). A tali autorità si richiama

La fonte della rinata sentenza pelagiana è dunque la filosofia: ma quello di Jansen non è un riferimento generico. Nel capitolo quarto, Jansen si riferisce esplicitamente, infatti, alla filosofia di François Garasse. Sarebbe quest'ultimo ad aver riproposto in età moderna la sentenza pelagiana e a sostenere che nello stato d'innocenza l'uomo sarebbe morto anche senza peccare, in particolare nella sezione XVI del secondo trattato del terzo libro de *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne*.⁶² Jansen riporta in traduzione latina nel corpo del testo il passo garassiano, mentre in originale francese in una nota a margine. Scrive:

«*In hoc innocentiae statu fuisset adversus omnes iniurias et invasiones elementorum impassibilitatis dote muniti; in omnibus imaginabilibus commoditatibus praeterquam immortalitatis. Tandem namque, utpote qui ex iisdem eramus conflati elementis, quibus nunc compositi sumus, necesse fuisset videre finem istius opificii. Mortui fuisset sine dolore: ut verbo dicam, fuisset mortui*».⁶³

Nel passo appena citato Garasse sostiene che l'uomo nel suo stato d'innocenza nel Paradiso ha potuto godere dell'impassibilità e di tanti altri agi immaginabili, ma non dell'immortalità e che, sebbene senza dolore, sarebbe comunque morto, in quanto costituito degli stessi

lo stesso Jansen nel sesto libro del *De haeresi pelagiana* intitolato *Prima origo totius haeresis Pelagianae et omnium gratiae interpolatorum Philosophia* in cui scrive [HP, I, VI, cap. XVIII, col. 377A]: «ut quod olim universim de haereticis dixit Tertullianus, de nullis verius quam de Pelagianis cum Hieronymo dici possit *haereticorum* [Tertull. lib. advers. Hermog. c. 8] *Patriarchae Philosophi*». E ancora nel capitolo terzo del *Liber Proemialis* del secondo tomo Jansen scrive: «Semper enim Philosophia, quemadmodum mater haeticorum fuit, ita rerum divinarum arcanis definiendis adhibita, mater errorum est» [LP, cap. III, col. 8B]. A tal proposito rimando anche a JEAN-LOUIS QUANTIN, *La philosophie corruptrice de la théologie selon Jansénius*, in *Philosophie et théologie à l'époque moderne. Anthologie tome III*, volume dirigé par Jean-Christophe Bardout, Paris, Cerf, 2010, pp. 187-197, in part. p. 189. Quantin mette in relazione l'affermazione gianseniana del capitolo III del libro proemiale con un altro luogo tratto da Tertulliano, ma non esplicitamente citato da Jansen: TERTULLIANUS, *De praescriptione*, VII, 3 [«Ipsae denique haereses a philosophia subornantur»; cfr. PL 2, 19A, CCSL 1, 192, 6-7].

⁶² FRANÇOIS GARASSE, *La somme théologique des vérités capitales de la religion chrétienne*, I, III, traité II, sect. XVI, p. 700: «Nous eussions en cet estat d'innocence [...] esté munis par l'impassibilité, contre toutes les iniures et invasions des Elemens, [...] en toutes les commodités imaginables, excepté celle de l'immortalité. Car en fin estant composés des mesmes elemens que nous sommes composés maintenant, il eust fallu voir la fin de l'ouvrage: Nous fussions morts sans douleur, mais en fin nous fussions morts».

⁶³ LS, cap. IV, col. 89A. Trad.: «Noi in quello stato d'innocenza contro tutte le ingiurie e le invasioni degli elementi saremmo stati muniti della dote dell'impassibilità; in tutte le comodità immaginabili, fuorché quella dell'immortalità. Alla fine, infatti, poichè eravamo formati dagli stessi elementi di cui ora siamo composti, sarebbe necessario vedere la fine di quest'opera. Saremmo morti senza dolore: per dirlo in breve, saremmo morti».

elementi di cui è costituito tuttora, dopo la caduta. Jansen sentenzia a tal proposito che sarebbe stato proprio l'aver riconosciuto quella composizione del corpo con gli elementi (*compositio corporis ex elementis*) ad aver tratto in inganno il gesuita, a tal punto da condurlo alla sentenza condannata dalla Chiesa stessa, ossia a quella dei pelagiani.⁶⁴ Per mostrare la vicinanza della sentenza garassiana a quella pelagiana, Jansen⁶⁵ ricorre all'autorità agostiniana: egli cita il *De Genesi ad Litteram* (401-415) VI, 22, nel quale Agostino sostiene che per i pelagiani Adamo sarebbe morto a causa del corpo animale,⁶⁶ ossia in quanto dotato di esso, e che dunque la morte del corpo non sarebbe avvenuta a causa del peccato, ma naturalmente, come quella degli altri animali («*ut videlicet mors corporis non de peccato accidissee videatur, sed naturaliter, ut animalium caeterorum*»).⁶⁷

Non deve sorprendere che Jansen critichi il gesuita: come si è fatto notare, già l'amico Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abate di Saint-Cyran, si era scagliato contro lo stesso scritto che il teologo di Lovanio qui cita. Nel quarto tomo Saint-Cyran si riferisce allo stesso passo che in seguito Jansen, nel capitolo qui in esame – ossia il capitolo quarto del *Liber singularis* del II tomo –, ha riproposto. In particolare, Saint-Cyran considera la proposizione della sedicesima sezione del terzo libro de *La Somme théologique* eretica e già condannata nelle opere di Sant'Agostino, degli altri Padri, nei Concili e nelle Sacre Scritture. Infatti, scrive:

«Cette proposition contient une hérésie, aussi formelle et manifeste, que jamais hérétique en ait prononcé en l'Eglise de Dieu. Elle est condamnée en divers endroits dans les œuvres de saint Augustin, et des autres Peres, dans les Conciles, et dans l'Ecriture sainte».⁶⁸

A tal proposito Saint-Cyran accenna, come controprova, alle sentenze del Concilio di Palestina e alla ritrattazione di Pelagio,⁶⁹ al secondo Concilio di Cartagine (416) contro i pelagiani – assimilando la posizione di questi ultimi a quella di Garasse⁷⁰ – alla condanna del secondo canone

⁶⁴ LS, cap. IV, col. 89A: «Nam compositio corporis ex elementis eum in exorbitantem illam traxit sententiam, quam Catholica Ecclesia tanquam hæresin proscripsit».

⁶⁵ LS, cap. IV, col. 89B.

⁶⁶ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 22, Lov. III, p. 237, col. 1C: «eum [Adamum] propter corpus animale exiturum fuisse de hoc corpore». Cfr. CSEL 28/1, p. 195, ll. 14-15.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 2.

⁶⁹ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 2. In particolare cita la sentenza pelagiana come riferita da Agostino nel capitolo 11 del *De gestis Pelagii*. Lo stesso luogo agostiniano è citato anche da Jansen in *HP*, l. II, c. XIII, col. 121A.

⁷⁰ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 4: «Et long temps auparavant, le Concile de Carthage receu par toute l'Eglise Catholique, a condamné vostre proposition, sous peine d'anatheme, plus de douze cens ans devant que vous fussiez né, et

del Concilio d'Orange (529),⁷¹ alla condanna del primo canone del Concilio di Cartagine o del secondo Concilio di Milevi (416).⁷²

Dunque, considerando le vicende conciliari, anche solo accennate da Saint-Cyran, i relativi canoni citati, così come i luoghi di Agostino e della Bibbia, e mettendoli in relazione con quelli gianseniani, mi sembra che siano opportune alcune considerazioni. Innanzitutto, che l'intero apparato argomentativo di note e citazioni di autorità ecclesiastiche, senza dubbio predisposto per dimostrare che la tesi di Garasse sulla mortalità del primo uomo sia d'ascendenza pelagiana ed in quanto tale eretica, conduca alla stessa conclusione di Jansen, posta nel quarto capitolo del *Liber singularis* dell'*Augustinus*; e che i luoghi agostiniani e biblici citati da Saint-Cyran sono in molti casi gli stessi che Jansen cita sia nel capitolo tredicesimo del secondo libro del *De hæresi pelagiana* che nel capitolo quarto del *Liber singularis*, come avrò modo di far notare nel prosieguo.

Ritengo opportuno, quindi, sin d'ora rilevare una convergenza dei giudizi di Saint-Cyran e di Jansen sulla tesi di Garasse circa la mortalità del primo uomo ed in particolare una comune condanna di quella come eretica e vicina al pelagianesimo; ma quanto detto emergerà ancor più chiaramente nel corso dell'analisi.

Anche Saint-Cyran nel suo già citato quarto tomo insiste sullo stesso passaggio della tesi di Garasse. L'aver riconosciuto nel primo uomo la composizione degli stessi elementi di cui siamo fatti ora costituirebbe il legame diretto di Garasse con l'eresia pelagiana: egli avrebbe abbracciato il principio capitale di tale eresia e di conseguenza anche tutti gli altri da esso derivanti. Saint-Cyran scrive:

«N'est-ce pas ceste mesme proposition condanné, que vous avancez de mot à mot? Car qu'est-ce, *necessitate naturæ*, comme disoit Pelagius, sinon par ce que nous estions *composez des mesmes elemens que nous sommes maintenant*, comme vous interpretez plus clairement l'hérésie

la met en teste pour couper la racine de toute l'heresie des Pelagiens, qui est sortie de ceste proposition, comme je le feray voir s'il est besoin».

⁷¹ Si veda il canone 2 del Concilio d'Orange II in *Mansi* VIII, col. 712C-D: «Si quis soli Adæ prævaricationem suam, [...] aut certe mortem tantum corporis, quæ pœna peccati est, non [...] per unum hominem in omne genus humanum transisse testatur, iniustitiam Deo dabit, contradicens apostolo dicenti: *Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors* [...]». Il canone è citato in *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, pp. 3-4 e in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90C.

⁷² *Mansi* IV, coll. 326C-327A «Placuit ergo omnibus episcopis, qui fuerunt in hac sancta Synodo, [...] Ut quicumque dicit [...] primum hominem mortalem factum, ita ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, sed necessitate naturæ, anathema sit»; citato in *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 4 e in *JANSEN, LS*, cap. IV, col. 90C.

de Pelagius? Puis que vous tenez donc le chef et le principe de toutes les hérésies Pelagiennes,⁷³ ce n'est plus de merveille que vous en ayez embrassé quasi toutes les autres principales propositions, comme je le monstrey en ce discours».⁷⁴

Saint-Cyran prosegue ancora riferendo che a dimostrazione della sua posizione su Garasse si possono citare centinaia di luoghi agostiniani, che provano tutti la vicinanza del gesuita ai pelagiani e la distanza dalla vera sentenza della Chiesa Cattolica.⁷⁵ Infatti, a tal proposito consiglia Garasse di leggere il primo libro del *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de Baptismo parvulorum* (412), facendo particolare riferimento al capitolo quarto,⁷⁶ tutto il *De gestis Pelagii* (417), il quarto capitolo del quarto libro del *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifacium Romanæ urbis Episcopum*,⁷⁷ cita l'epistola 106 *ad Paulinum* (citata anche da Jansen⁷⁸).

Dal canto suo, Jansen, riferita la sentenza pelagiana di Garasse, prosegue riutilizzando lo stesso passo citato nel tredicesimo capitolo *De corpore primi hominis* e tratto dal primo libro dell'*Opus imperfectum* (cap. 67),⁷⁹ laddove Agostino riporta l'opinione di Giuliano secondo

⁷³ Anche Jansen, come Saint-Cyran, ricorda che il capo e il principio di tutta l'eresia pelagiana consiste nel dogma per cui Adamo sarebbe morto sia che avesse peccato che non l'avesse fatto e, in particolare, nella formula condannata dal Concilio secondo di Cartagine e dopo da quello di Milevi e citata da Agostino nel capitolo undicesimo del *De gestis Pelagii*, per la quale il primo uomo sarebbe morto comunque *necessitate naturæ*. A tal proposito si rimanda al capitolo tredicesimo del secondo libro del primo tomo dell'*Augustinus*, in particolare col. 121: «Qua in re dogma eorum capitale fuit et veluti cardo cæterorum. *Adam mortalem factum*: quod ut plenius exponeretur quomodo dictum esset, addebant declarante Augustino, *qui sive peccaret sive non peccaret moriturus esset* [liber de *gestis Pelag.*, c. 11]. Quam clausulam ita interpretatur idem Augustinus et Concilium Carthaginense [concil. Carth. canone 1], quo dogmata eorum iugulata sunt, ut mors Adamo obventura fuisse significaretur, *non peccati merito sed necessitate naturæ*».

⁷⁴ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁵ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 5: «Que si vous voulez arrester à ce qu'en dit saint Augustin, vous trouverez qu'il enseigne en plus de cent endroits comme un article de la foy Catholique, que nous ne fussions pas morts en l'estat d'innocence; tant s'en faut qu'il nous eust fallu mourir, et voir la fin de l'ouvrage, comme vous l'enseigniez icy».

⁷⁶ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de Baptismo parvulorum*, I, 4, Lov. VII, p. 278, col. 1B-C. Lo stesso capitolo del *De peccatorum meritis* è citato in JANSEN, *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90A.

⁷⁷ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 5. Si veda AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifacium Romanæ urbis Episcopum*, IV, 4, Lov. VII, p. 471, col. 2D: «His ita se habentibus, quid prodest novellis hæreticis, inimicis crucis Christi et divinæ oppugnatoribus gratiæ, quod ad Manichæorum errorem sani videntur, et alia sua pestilentia moriuntur?»

⁷⁸ *HP* I, II, cap. XIII, col. 122B.

⁷⁹ *HP* I, II, cap. XIII, col. 121A: «*Mortalitatem enim*, aiebat Iulianus, *caro animalium de naturæ institutione suscepit*, ut significaret, eandem esse carnis humanæ

cui la carne degli animali assume la mortalità per legge di natura. Di contro, pone la vera sentenza cattolica, per la quale Adamo non sarebbe morto se non avesse peccato, supportata dall'autorità di Agostino che, nel *De Civitate Dei* (413-426) XIII, 3,⁸⁰ sostiene che, se i primi uomini non avessero peccato, non avrebbero sofferto alcun genere di morte, ma, peccando, hanno subito una morte condannando ad essa il resto della loro stirpe.

Quindi, le opzioni che si sarebbero potute presentare al primo uomo erano due: la mortalità o l'immortalità. La scelta dell'una o dell'altra sarebbe dipesa dal peccato. Infatti, a tal proposito Jansen⁸¹ cita quanto Agostino scrive nel *De peccatorum meritis* (I, 2), ossia che, se Adamo non avesse peccato, non sarebbe stato spogliato del suo corpo, ma sopravvestito d'immortalità («supervestendus immortalitate»).

Jansen si appoggia ancora sullo stesso scritto e, in particolare, sull'interpretazione ivi fornita (*De peccatorum meritis*, I, 4) di *Genesi* 3, 19 – «Terra es, et in terram ibis» – per avallare ulteriormente l'idea che, senza il peccato, non ci sarebbe stata la morte. Nell'interpretazione di Agostino riferita dal Lovaniense il ritorno dell'uomo alla terra indica la morte del corpo,⁸³ a cui egli si sarebbe potuto sottrarre, se solo non avesse peccato e fosse rimasto retto come era stato creato.⁸⁴ Dunque,

brutorumque rationem [Lib. 1 *oper. imperf. cont. Iul.*]. Unde mors illa corporis communis et naturalis a Pelagio vocabatur». Cfr. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra secundam Iuliani responsionem. Operis imperfecti libri duo priores*, nunc primum ex manuscriptis codicibus editi. Additu est et eiusdem Augustini liber *de Gestis Pelagii*, ante paucos annos editus. Nunc primum in lucem editus cura Cl. Menardi, Lutetiae Parisiorum, Apud Sebastianum Chappelet, 1617, I, 66, p. 15, col. 1D-E: «ad mortalitatem nostri corporis retulisse, quam caro inquis, animalium de naturae institutione suscepit». Cfr. anche PL 45, col. 1086.

⁸⁰ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Civitate Dei*, XIII, 3, *Lov.* V, p. 147, col. 2A: «Quapropter fatendum est, primos quidem homines ita fuisse institutos, ut si non peccassent, nullum mortis experirentur genus: sed eosdem primos peccatores ita fuisse morte mulctatos, ut etiam quicquid eorum stirpe esset exortum, eadem poena teneretur obnoxium». Cfr. CSEL 40/1, p. 617, ll. 20-24; CCSL 48, p. 386, ll. 9-13. Il passo è citato in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 89B.

⁸¹ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 89C.

⁸² AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione, deque Baptismo parvulorum, ad Marcellinum*, I, 2, *Lov.* VII, p. 287, col. 2B. Cfr. CSEL 60, p. 4, l. 19.

⁸³ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione.*, I, 4, *Lov.* VII, p. 288, col. 1B «Quod nisi de morte corporis intelligi possit, ignoro» (Cfr. CSEL 60, p. 5, ll. 22-23). Il passo è citato in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 89C: «Quem Scripturae locum [Gen 3, 19] etiam alibi allegat; et ita manifestum esse putat, ut dicat: *Quomodo nisi de morte corporis intelligi possit ignoro* [Lib. 1 *de pecc. merit.* c. 2 et 4]».

⁸⁴ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 89C: «Quo ipso in loco doctrinam istam in Scriptura illa fundat: *Terra es, et in terram ibis*. Nam per illam, *mors corporis*, inquit [*De Trinitate Dei*, XIII, 12, *Lov.* III, p. 161, col. 2A; CCSL 50A; p. 403, ll. 8-10], *præunciata est; quia nec ipsam fuerat experturus, si permansisset, ut factus est rectus. Quod vero viventi ait: Terra es, ostendit totum hominem in deterius commutatum*».

l'espressione «Terra es» rinvia ad un cambiamento in atto della condizione umana in peggio («totum hominem in deterius commutatum»).⁸⁵

Come riferisce Jansen, infatti, sulla scorta di Agostino (*De peccatorum meritis*, I, 16),⁸⁶ Dio aveva preannunciato all'uomo che, se si fosse cibato dell'albero della conoscenza, sarebbe morto: di fatto i primi uomini cominciarono a morire lo stesso giorno in cui Adamo aveva ricevuto la legge della morte. Jansen riporta anche le parole di Paolo quando scrive «per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors» (*Rm* 5, 12) e «corpus mortuum est propter peccatum» (*Rm* 8, 10) e a riguardo dei passi paolini anche la loro interpretazione agostiniana contenuta nel *De peccatorum* (I, 4):

«[...] Augustinus: *Corpus, inquit, mortuum est, non propter fragilitatem terrenam, quia de terrae pulvere factum est; sed propter peccatum. Quid amplius querimus? Et vigilantissime non ait, mortale, sed mortuum*,⁸⁷ nempe quia corpus illud, quod mori poterat, quia ab homine peccari poterat, per peccatum necessitati mortis obstructum est».⁸⁸

Una volta confutata la sentenza d'ascendenza pelagiana di Garasse, tramite l'autorità biblica ed agostiniana e riferiti anche il primo canone del Concilio di Cartagine, il secondo di quello d'Orange⁸⁹ (529) – gli stessi che aveva citato anche Saint-Cyran nel suo quarto tomo della *Somme des fautes*⁹⁰ – e il primo della quinta sessione di quello di Trento (17 giugno 1546),⁹¹ Jansen passa ad illustrare la dottrina della duplice mortalità ed immortalità.

Dopo aver chiarito che Agostino, a proposito della mortalità di Adamo intendeva dire ch'egli lo potesse essere, se avesse peccato e non

⁸⁵ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate Dei*, XIII, 12, *Lov.* III, p. 161, col. 2A; CCSL 50A, p. 403, l. 10.

⁸⁶ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, I, 16, *Lov.* VII, p. 281, col. 2A: «annos multos postea vixerint, illo tamen die mori cœperunt, quo mortis legem, qua in senium veterascerent, acceperunt» (Cfr. CSEL 60, p. 21, ll. 7-9). Il passo citato è in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90A.

⁸⁷ AUGUSTINUS, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, I, 4, *Lov.* VII, p. 278, col. 1B-C. Il passo è citato in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90A. Cfr. CSEL 60, p. 6, ll. 8-11.

⁸⁸ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90A. Trad.: «Agostino dice: il corpo è morto non per fragilità terrena, o per l'autore della natura, poiché è stato creato dalla polvere della terra, ma a causa del peccato. Cosa chiediamo di più? E accuratissimamente [Paolo] non dice che è mortale, ma che è morto, appunto perché quel corpo, che poteva morire, perché poteva essere commesso dall'uomo un peccato, a causa del peccato è posto davanti alla necessità della morte».

⁸⁹ *Mansi* VIII, col. 712C-D. Il canone è citato in *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, pp. 3-4 e in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90C. Si veda *supra*, nota 71.

⁹⁰ *Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales*, t. IV, p. 4. Si veda *supra*, note 71 e 72.

⁹¹ *Mansi* XXXIII, col. 27C. Il canone è citato in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 90C.

che lo fosse,⁹² Jansen spiega che si può intendere e chiamare la mortalità in due modi, come anche l'immortalità. Infatti, l'una è quella per cui si può morire («qua quis mori potest»),⁹³ l'altra è quella per cui si deve morire («qua [quis] mori debet»).⁹⁴ Ritorna qui la distinzione, che aveva già presentato nel capitolo tredicesimo e mutuata da Agostino nella sua polemica contro Giuliano,⁹⁵ quella tra *possibilitas moriendi* e *necessitas moriendi*.

Prosegue Jansen interpretando Agostino: la mortalità per cui si può morire o possibilità di morire apparteneva al primo uomo prima del peccato originale, mentre l'altra, ossia la necessità di morire, appartiene all'uomo dopo il peccato e a tutti i suoi posteri. Infatti, l'uomo prima del peccato *poteva* morire, in quanto *poteva* peccare, mentre con il peccato consegue una necessità della morte.⁹⁶ Quindi, con il peccato quella che era la possibilità di morire si trasforma in una necessità.

Oltre ad una duplice mortalità, Jansen seguendo Agostino riconosce una duplice immortalità: l'una è quella per cui si può non morire («qua quis potest non mori»); l'altra quella per cui non si può morire («qua quis non potest mori»).⁹⁷ La prima, ossia la possibilità di non morire, apparteneva ad Adamo prima del peccato, in quanto poteva non peccare; mentre la seconda appartiene solo a coloro che risorgeranno alla beatitudine eterna («ad æternam beatitudinem resurgentium»).⁹⁸

Jansen cita Agostino (*De peccatorum meritis* I, 5) per illustrare la duplice mortalità, in particolare riguardo alla prima, ossia alla possibilità di morire, scrive:

«Antequam mutaretur (corpus Adæ) in illam incorruptionem, quae in sanctorum resurrectione promittitur, poterat esse mortale, quamvis non moriturum: sicut hoc nostrum potest, ut ita dicam, esse ægrotabile,

⁹² In *LS*, cap. IV, col. 91B Jansen cita lo stesso passo di *HS*, l. II, cap. XIII, col. 121B, ossia AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra secundam Iuliani responsionem*, I, 68, ma 66, p. 15, col. 2B. (PL 45, col. 1090). Si veda la tabella sotto:

<i>HS</i> , l. II, cap. XIII, col. 121B: «Mortalem enim Augustinus Adamum hactenus dixerat, quia poterat mori, poterat namque peccare».	<i>LS</i> , cap. IV, col. 91B: «Adamum se hactenus dixisse esse mortalem, quia poterat mori: poterat namque peccare».
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⁹³ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 91B.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra secundam Iuliani responsionem*, I, 67, ma 66, p. 15, col. 1D-E: «ad mortalitatem nostri corporis retulisse, quam caro inquis, animalium de naturæ institutione suscepit». Cfr. PL 45, col. 1090.

⁹⁶ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 91B: «Nam ante peccatum mori potuit, quia peccare potuit: peccato vero iam perpetrato, necessitas moriendi consecuta est».

⁹⁷ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 91B: «Simili ratione duplex immortalitas statui potest, una, qua quis potest non mori; alia, qua quis non potest mori».

⁹⁸ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 91B: «Illa fuit Adami ante peccatum: hæc vero ad æternam beatitudinem resurgentium».

*quamvis non ægroturum: cuius enim caro est, quæ non ægrotare possit, etiamsi aliquo casu, priusquam ægrotet, occumbat? sic et illud corpus iam erat mortale».*⁹⁹

Nel passo citato da Jansen Agostino sostiene che il corpo di Adamo fosse già mortale e che non dovesse necessariamente morire, ma che tuttavia ne aveva la possibilità. Inoltre, Agostino per illustrare meglio la possibilità della morte si serve dell'esempio della malattia, come di qualcosa che può accaderci, ma che non è detto che accada ed addirittura si spinge a dire che in certi casi si può avere una morte anche senza alcuna malattia. Jansen adduce un'ulteriore evidenza testuale¹⁰⁰ per spiegare la dottrina agostiniana dell'immortalità richiamandosi ad un passo tratto dal capitolo dodicesimo del *De correptione et Gratia* (426-427), dove è posta da Agostino la distinzione tra l'immortalità di Adamo prima del peccato, che è potenziale, e quella dei beati che è necessaria:

*«Prima immortalitas (Adami) erat, posse non mori; novissima (beatorum) erit multo maior, non posse mori».*¹⁰¹

A tal proposito Jansen cita anche quanto Agostino scrive nel *De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 30¹⁰² e nel *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 25. Scrive richiamandosi a quest'ultimo testo:

*«Utramque vero simul tam duplicem mortalitatem, quam immortalitatem oculis diserte subiicit, de corpore primi hominis disputans: Illud (corpus) ante peccatum et mortale secundum aliam, et immortale secundum aliam causam dici poterat: id est, mortale quia poterat mori, immortale, quia poterat non mori. Aliud est enim non posse mori, sicut quasdam naturas immortales creavit Deus: aliud est autem posse non mori, secundum quem modum primus creatus est homo immortalis».*¹⁰³

⁹⁹ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, 4, *Lov.* VII, p. 288, col. 1C. Cfr. CSEL 60, p. 6, ll. 12-17. Il passo è citato in *LS*, cap. IV, col. 91C. Trad.: «Prima infatti che fosse mutato in quell'incorruttibilità che è promessa nella risurrezione dei santi, (il corpo di Adamo) poteva essere mortale, sebbene non sarebbe morto, come questo nostro può, per così dire, essere malato, sebbene non si ammalerà: infatti di chi è la carne, che non possa ammalarsi, anche se per un qualche caso, soccomba prima d'ammalarsi? Così anche quel corpo era già mortale».

¹⁰⁰ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 92A.

¹⁰¹ AUGUSTINUS, *De correptione et gratia*, I, 12, *Lov.* VII, p. 538, col. 1C; PL 44, 936. *LS*, cap. IV, col. 92A. Trad.: «La prima immortalità (di Adamo) era poter non morire, l'ultima (dei beati) sarà molto maggiore: non poter morire».

¹⁰² Si veda *LS*, cap. IV, col. 92A: «*Sicut prima immortalitas fuit, quam peccando Adam perdidit, posse non mori; novissima erit non posse mori: ita etc.*». Trad.: «Come la prima immortalità, che Adamo ha perso peccando, fu di poter non morire; l'ultima sarà non poter morire: così ecc.». AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Civitate Dei*, XXII, 30, *Lov.* V, p. 311, col. 2A. Cfr. CSEL, 40/2, p. 667, ll. 10-12; CCSL 48, p. 864, ll. 64-67.

¹⁰³ *LS*, cap. IV, col. 92A. Trad.: «E l'una e l'altra, però, insieme, tanto la duplice mortalità che l'immortalità, ha sottoposto chiaramente ai [nostri] occhi, disputando

Nel passo appena citato è senza dubbio spiegata con chiarezza la distinzione tra mortalità ed immortalità in riferimento alla natura del corpo del primo uomo, che era mortale, in quanto poteva morire, ed insieme immortale, in quanto poteva non morire. Ciononostante, ad ulteriore supporto della dottrina, Jansen cita un altro passo sempre tratto dallo stesso luogo di Agostino (il *De Genesi ad Litteram* VI):

«Et paulo post: *si enim corpus animale, utique mortale, quia et mori poterat: quamvis et immortale ideo, quia et non mori poterat. Neque enim immortale, quod mori omnino non possit, erit nisi spirituale; quod nobis futurum in resurrectione promittitur: ac per hoc illud animale, et ob hoc mortale etc. factum est propter peccatum non mortale, quod et antea erat, sed mortuum, Quod paulo inferius exponit per necessitatem moriendi, quam illud non habuit. Nam quamvis ante peccatum hactenus mortalis esset, quia peccando mori poterat, eo tamen die, quo peccavit, in ipso mortalitatis genere longe peior factus est*».¹⁰⁴

Agostino qui spiega chiaramente che il corpo di Adamo era mortale in quanto animale e che il peccato non lo ha reso mortale, ma morto. Sempre seguendo Agostino, Jansen fa riferimento al capitolo successivo del *De Genesi ad Litteram* VI (ossia il 26), in cui il Dottore della Chiesa sostiene che la differenza tra Adamo e i posteri è data dalla necessità della morte, che prima Adamo non aveva e che noi ora abbiamo.¹⁰⁵ Secondo Jansen, la mortalità di Adamo va intesa nel senso della possibilità della morte in caso di peccato: e questo è attestato dal fatto che lo stesso giorno in cui Adamo ha peccato la sua condizione è mutata in peggio («in ipso mortalitatis genere longe peior factus est»).¹⁰⁶ Scrive:

del corpo del primo uomo: *Quello (il corpo [di Adamo]) prima del peccato poteva chiamarsi mortale per un motivo e immortale per un altro: cioè mortale perché poteva morire, immortale invece perché poteva non morire. Una cosa è infatti non poter morire, come Dio ha creato alcune nature immortali; un'altra cosa è poi poter non morire, secondo il qual modo il primo uomo è stato creato immortale*». AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 25, Lov. III, p. 237, col. 2B. Cfr. CSEL 28/1, p. 197, ll. 7-12.

¹⁰⁴ LS, cap. IV, col. 92A-B. Trad.: «E poco dopo: *Se infatti il corpo era animale, certamente mortale, poiché poteva anche morire, sebbene fosse nello stesso tempo immortale, poiché poteva anche non morire, in realtà è immortale, per il fatto che non potrà assolutamente morire, solo se spirituale, cosa che ci è promessa per il futuro nella risurrezione. Per questo motivo quello [il corpo] animale, e perciò mortale, ecc... non è diventato mortale a causa del peccato, che c'era anche prima, ma morto*».

¹⁰⁵ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 26, Lov. III, p. 237, col. 2C: «*necessitatem moriendi, quod illud non habuit*». CSEL 28/1, p. 198, l. 4.

¹⁰⁶ LS, cap. IV, col. 92B: «*Nam quamvis ante peccatum hactenus mortalis esset, quia peccando mori poterat, eo tamen die, quo peccavit, in ipso mortalitatis genere longè peior factus est*».

«Mutata quippe in deterius est vitiatque natura, atque a ligno vitæ separatione iustissima, mortis in eis etiam corporalis necessitas facta est: cum qua nos necessitate nati sumus».¹⁰⁷

Prima del peccato il corpo si trovava nell'anima vivente («in animam viventem»)¹⁰⁸ e non si poteva dire morto: era il suo legame con l'albero della vita a far sì che non morisse. Infatti, sostiene Jansen seguendo Agostino,¹⁰⁹ la costituzione stessa dell'uomo è tale ch'egli non sarebbe potuto sfuggire alla morte, se non grazie alla sua unione con l'albero della vita. Scrive:

«Nam si internam corporis compositionem spectes, nihil in se habebat, quo eius interitus arceretur».¹¹⁰

Dunque, il corpo del primo uomo, in quanto animale, è mortale, ma di una mortalità potenziale, che sarebbe rimasta tale, se l'uomo non avesse peccato e non fosse stato spezzato il legame con l'albero della vita. Infatti, riprendendo ancora Agostino (*De Genesi ad Litteram* VI, 25), Jansen ricorda che l'immortalità d'Adamo dipendeva dal suo legame con l'albero della vita e non da una costituzione di natura e con il suo maestro ribadisce a conclusione del suo capitolo:

«*Mortalis ergo erat [Adam] conditione corporis animalis; immortalis autem beneficio conditoris*».¹¹¹

Sebbene, come i pelagiani, Jansen, insieme ad Agostino, riconosca una mortalità del primo uomo, che in quanto dotato di un corpo mortale per natura deve morire, tuttavia, essa è solo potenziale: Adamo sarebbe venuto meno alla legge di natura e non sarebbe morto, se non avesse peccato, in virtù del *beneficium conditoris*, in particolare in virtù del suo legame con l'albero della vita. Dunque, come Agostino contro i pelagiani, così Jansen contro un 'nuovo' pelagiano quale Garasse

¹⁰⁷ LS, cap. IV, col. 92B. Trad.: «La natura effettivamente è mutata in peggio ed è viziata, e con giustissima separazione dall'albero della vita, è stata inserita nelle cose corporali la necessità della morte, con la quale per necessità siamo nati».

¹⁰⁸ LS, cap. IV, col. 92B-C.

¹⁰⁹ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 25 Lov. III, p. 237, col. 2B: «ante peccatum et mortale secundum aliam, et immortale secundum aliam causam dici poterat: id est, mortale quia poterat mori, immortale, quia poterat non mori. Aliud est enim non posse mori, sicut quasdam naturas immortales creavit Deus: aliud est autem posse non mori, secundum quem modum primus creatus est homo immortalis». Cfr. CSEL 28/1, p. 197, ll. 7-12.

¹¹⁰ LS, cap. IV, col. 92C. Trad.: «Infatti, se si considera la composizione interna del corpo: non aveva nulla in sé che potesse tener lontana la sua distruzione».

¹¹¹ AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI, 25 Lov. III, p. 237, col. 2B. Cfr. CSEL 28/1, p. 197, ll. 15-16.

sostiene che il passaggio del corpo del primo uomo da mortale a morto e la trasformazione della possibilità di morire in necessità di morire si realizzano solo – per dirlo ribaltando l'asserto attribuito ai pelagiani – *peccati merito sed non necessitate naturæ*.

Alla luce dell'analisi qui svolta relativamente al capitolo quarto del *Liber singularis* del secondo tomo, è possibile tracciare alcune considerazioni conclusive. Mi sembra che i testi considerati possano fornire un campione di alcuni degli obiettivi polemici che Jansen individua nel corso di tutta la sua opera. Infatti, considerando l'incipit del capitolo e mettendolo in relazione con la chiusa di quello precedente – il terzo, intitolato *Utrum fuerint in homine primo innati et intensi appetitus excellentiæ et laudis, et superbiæ tenetationes, ut quidam volunt* – ho avuto modo di segnalare la critica gianseniana alla filosofia, che in quanto madre di errori ha generato ancora una volta una rinata sentenza pelagiana: quella di Garasse sulla mortalità del primo uomo.

Infatti, Jansen, alla stregua di Tertulliano e Girolamo,¹¹² alla fine del terzo capitolo riconosce il ruolo assunto dai filosofi nel passato, quali patriarchi degli eretici, e a sua volta assegna un ruolo alla filosofia aristotelico-scolastica nel presente, ossia quello di essere madre di errori, tra i quali si collocano, come mostra nel capitolo successivo, anche quelli del gesuita Garasse. D'altronde, anche in altri luoghi precedenti Jansen non manca di riconoscere la filiazione di quell'eresia dalla filosofia pagana in generale e da quella stoica o aristotelica in particolare.¹¹³

Dunque, quelli contemporanei, celati dietro movimenti e scuole di pensiero dell'antichità, sono gli avversari reali di Jansen, quelli contro cui nella sua opera scaglia l'imponente apparato argomentativo del maestro Agostino. D'altra parte, al di là delle definizioni (che nel suo *Augustinus* li abbia chiamati pelagiani o semplicemente accostati ad essi, come nel caso di Garasse), Jansen si era dovuto effettivamente scontrare con coloro che critica: nella fattispecie i gesuiti.

Contro questi era schierato in prima linea, in quanto rappresentante delle istanze dell'Università di Lovanio, contro le loro pretese d'insegnare

¹¹² Si veda *supra*, n. 61.

¹¹³ Per quanto riguarda la critica gianseniana alla filosofia rinvio a titolo esemplificativo ad alcuni luoghi. Per la critica alla filosofia pagana, ad esempio ad *HP* I. V, cap. I, col. 236B, laddove Jansen qualifica il primo stato del pelagianesimo, ossia l'etnicismo, come «*purum putumque Ethnicæ Philosophiæ somnium*» e a tutto il capitolo e a quello seguente. Per la critica alla filosofia stoica rinvio, ad esempio, ad *HP* I. IV, cap. XIX, laddove Jansen fa derivare l'*impeccantia* pelagiana dall'*'apatia'* stoica, ad *HP* I. IV, cap. XXII, ad *HP* I. V, capp. I e II. Per la critica alla filosofia aristotelica ad *HP* I. VI, cap. XVIII, ad *LP* capp. III, V, VI e XXVIII.

filosofia, nel corso delle due missioni in Spagna: la prima che va dal luglio 1624 al maggio 1625; la seconda dall'aprile 1626 all'aprile 1627.¹¹⁴ Inoltre, di ritorno da Madrid e prima di ripartire per la seconda ambasceria, all'incirca tra il mese di luglio 1625 e l'aprile del 1626, ha modo di soggiornare dall'amico Saint-Cyran ed assistere alla redazione della *Somme des fautes* contro il gesuita Garasse. Quindi inizia a seguire l'*affaire du Plagiaire* in cui è implicato l'amico e ben presto si rende conto, anche dopo la condanna del gesuita, di avere a che fare con un avversario, o meglio degli avversari pericolosi.¹¹⁵

L'*affaire du Plagiaire* nella corrispondenza di Jansen

Se si segue la corrispondenza di Jansen relativamente all'arco tempo temporale compreso tra il 17 aprile 1626 e il 3 maggio 1630, è possibile saggiare quale vivo interesse abbia avuto nei confronti di tale *affaire*, in cui in qualche modo era coinvolto, se non altro perché ne aveva avuto conoscenza tramite l'amico e lo aveva in parte condiviso con lui da vicino a Parigi¹¹⁶ – quando Saint-Cyran era impegnato nella stesura della *Somme des fautes* – e poi da lontano, da Madrid, da

¹¹⁴ Cfr. RAOUL DE SCORRAILLE, *Jansénius en Espagne (1624-1625 et 1626-1627)*, «Recherches de science religieuse», 7 (1917), pp. 187-254 e JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jansénius d'Ypres (1585-1638)*, Paris, Études Augustiniennes, 1989, in part. pp. 131-156.

¹¹⁵ Nel gennaio 1626 è sospesa la stampa del primo tomo della *Somme des fautes*, perché Garasse chiede l'intervento di un importante magistrato. Cfr. JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran*, in part. pp. 263-264 e *Cor.* p. 299, n. 2. Inoltre, nella lettera da Madrid a Saint-Cyran del 30 dicembre 1626, successiva alla condanna del testo di Garasse del primo settembre 1626, Jansen scrive: «Combien qu'à dire la vérité, vous ne me sçauriez dire tant du venin que vous avez recogneu en ceste affaire, que je n'en ay creu autant et plus, dès le jour qu'elle fust entreprise, d'autant que j'ay tousjours jugé que l'auteur qui oseroit faire un tel scandale à des innocens [gesuiti] (comme ils croyent) ne sçauroit estre tenu par les blessés, que pour une furie de l'Enfer, et plus abandonnée de Dieu que ceux que le Plagiaire a combatus [gli atei], et partant digne d'estre persecutée jusques à l'estouffer» (*Cor.* CVII, p. 358).

¹¹⁶ Léon Wuillaume in *Aux origines du jansénisme en France* (in part. p. 282) ha insistito particolarmente sul periodo di convivenza e sull'interesse di Jansen nei confronti dell'*affaire du Plagiaire* fino a spingersi a scrivere: «Le premier tome de la *Somme des Fautes* de Saint-Cyran est terminé au début du mois d'avril 1626. Jansénius rentre à Bruxelles vers le 8 avril de la même année après avoir séjourné chez Saint-Cyran depuis le mois de juillet 1625. Le 14 mars 1626, sollicité par ses collègues de Louvain, pour la seconde ambassade à Madrid, Jansénius avait répondu de Paris être accaparé par un travail "pas inutile" [precisamente Jansen scrive: "detentus negotio aliquo serio", *Cor.*, p. 297] pour la cause de Louvain. Il est vraisemblable qu'il aura collaboré à la rédaction de la *Somme des Fautes* et notamment à la préparation de ce chapitre [*Somme des fautes*, p. 299 ss.].». Non si riscontrano, tuttavia, nelle argomentazioni di Wuillaume elementi sufficienti a supportare questa che resta solo un'ipotesi.

Bruxelles e da Lovanio. Bisogna anche ricordare che, durante la sua seconda missione in Spagna, il 20 febbraio 1627 Jansen, ricevuto all'Università di Salamanca, dopo un discorso davanti ai professori di teologia e al vicerettore, consegna loro dei documenti utili alla causa dell'Università di Lovanio contro i gesuiti e che tra questi c'è proprio una copia della censura de *La somme théologique* di Garasse redatta dalla Facoltà di Teologia della Sorbona.¹¹⁷

Jansen s'interessa all'opera di Saint-Cyran contro Garasse e sollecita l'amico affinché gli invii l'epistola dedicatoria al cardinale Richelieu,¹¹⁸ che apre il primo volume. Su di essa esprime un parere, sottolineando la discrepanza stilistica tra quella e il contenuto del volume stesso.¹¹⁹ Apprezza il titolo del quarto volume¹²⁰ che considera «furieux» e «qui monstre qu'il n'a point affaire à des enfans».¹²¹ Dopo aver letto l'epistola dedicatoria del secondo tomo della *Somme de fautes* – dedicata a Richelieu e orientata alla difesa di Pierre Charron, che era stato bollato come ateo da Garasse ne *La somme théologique*, come anche nella *Doctrine curieuse*¹²² – scrive all'amico che essa

¹¹⁷ Cfr. RAOUL DE SCORRAILLE, *Jansénius en Espagne*, p. 227 e JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jansénius d'Ypres*, in part. p. 145 e n. 92.

¹¹⁸ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 30 juin 1626, *Cor.* XCI, p. 318: «Je suis fort aise que l'affaire du Plagiaire est tant avancées. Envoyez moy l'epistre, s'il vous plaist, avec ce qui a esté fait contre la Sorbonne, s'il n'est pas trop grand».

¹¹⁹ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 25 juillet 1626, *Cor.* XCV, pp. 326-327: «L'escrit de Célis [S. Cyran] est véritablement une excellente piece et au delà. Comme le restaurateur de l'Eloquence françoise [Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, 1597-1654] disoit, et ne crois pas que l'affection qu'il avoit à la personne qui il est dédié, ait emporté son jugement. Il n'y manque qu'une chose, à sçavoir de n'avoir pas trouvé une maison, qui meristast d'estre orné d'un tel frontispice, qui servira neantmoins à ce que le monde y entrera plus volontiers, pensant que le reste du bastiment luy semblera. Celuy qu'il porte sur le front sera insensible, s'il ne fait une recherche curieuse de l'auteur». Come riferisce Orcibal, la diversità stilistica tra l'epistola e il volume aveva indotto i gesuiti a credere che potessero essere due gli autori e non uno solo. Infatti il primo volume «n'est pour la grande part, qu'une juxtaposition sans ordre de sèches remarques érudites au sujet de citations bibliques» [*Cor.* p. 329, n. 6]. Riguardo ai sospetti dei gesuiti che attribuivano la paternità della *Somme des fautes* a Jansen si veda *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 3 mai 1630, *Cor.* CXL, p. 460: «Le R. pere Scribanus [Carolus Scribani, 1561-1629, gesuita belga] [...] a dit à un honneste homme, par qui il est venu à la cognoissance de Sulpice [Jansen], que Sulpice est autheur d'un ouvrage contre le Plagiaire [Garasse]. Mais il croit que ce n'est que par soubçon, à cause que Pilmot [trattazione della grazia] et Seraph [Agostino] y prennent si grand part».

¹²⁰ *Tome quatrième de la Somme des fautes et faussetés capitales contenues en la Somme des vérités capitales du Père François Garasse, où sont contenues plusieurs hérésies, erreurs, impiétés, irreverences, bouffonneries, vanités, et vanteries insupportables*. La stampa e la pubblicazione del tomo è avvenuta a partire dal 7 ottobre del 1626, come indica l'*Extraict du privilege du Roy* [«Par grace et privilege du Roy, en datte du septiesme jour d'Octobre mil six cens vingt-six»] alla fine dello stesso.

¹²¹ *Ibidem*, *Cor.* p. 327.

¹²² *Supra*, n. 49.

rende giustizia delle calunnie del *Plagiaire*.¹²³ Un apprezzamento simile Jansen l'esprime anche in occasione della lettura della sentenza contro Garasse, che ricompensa in qualche modo i tanti sforzi fatti da Saint-Cyran impegnato nella sua critica.¹²⁴ Tuttavia l'*affaire* è ben lungi da risolversi.

Infatti, la corrispondenza di Jansen successiva alla condanna della Sorbona del settembre 1626 rivela una certa apprensione da parte dei due amici circa il fatto che potesse essere rivelata l'identità dell'autore della *Somme des fautes*:¹²⁵ Jansen si preoccupava che l'amico potesse essere scoperto perché egli, a sua volta stava scrivendo un testo sull'*affaire des Universités*, che nasceva proprio dalle due ambascerie in Spagna.¹²⁶ Infatti, Jansen inizia la *deduction de l'affaire des Universités*, spinto dall'amico, a partire dal maggio 1627 – ossia dopo l'ultima spedizione spagnola terminata nell'aprile del 1627¹²⁷ – e

¹²³ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 30 décembre 1626, *Cor.* CVII, p. 358: «J'ay leu l'Epistre que Mr D'Arguibel m'a envoyée. Elle traicte comme il faut le bonhomme [Garasse] sur les calomnies qu'il a vomies contre le mort [Pierre Charron, 1541-1603]». Prosegue scrivendo addirittura: «J'avois pensé auparavant, qu'il seroit expedient d'en faire mention ou representation au frontispice de la maison [epistola dedicatoria del I tomo]; mais on l'a prevenu et mieux accomply ma pensée».

¹²⁴ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 4 février 1627, *Cor.* CIX, p. 365: «J'ay prins plaisir à lire la sentence du Plagiaire et de voir que ceux qui l'ont accusé n'ont pas crié en vain. C'est une grande consolation et appuy pour ceux, en cas qu'ils feussent decouverts, de quoy je crois qu'il n'y aura pas de dangier».

¹²⁵ A tal proposito si vedano la lettera del 30 aprile 1627, in cui Jansen scrive dei sospetti dei padri oratoriani stabilitisi in Belgio circa l'identità dell'autore della *Somme des fautes*, e quella del 22 dicembre 1628, in cui Jansen riferisce dell'apprensione dopo un probabile tentativo di smascherare S. Cyran e dichiara di temere per sé e per il suo scritto in tre tomi contro i gesuiti. Si veda *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 30 avril 1627, *Cor.* CXII, p. 384: «Il y en a icy qui sçavent que le Plagiaire [Garasse] a esté condamné, et croyent qu'un Cordelier a escrit contre luy. Ils [i padri dell'Oratorio] ont acheté ses livres pour leur recreation, l'estimant un bouffon, particulièrement en son premier ouvrage». *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 22 décembre 1628, *Cor.* CXXIV, p. 415: «J'ay bien compris ce que vous m'avez escrit de l'affaire du Plagiaire, ce qui m'avoit donné grande apprehension pour un semblable affaire de Boece [Jansen], qui a, comme vous avez ouy, fait un ouvrage de trois livres contre Gorphoste [gesuiti] sur le sujet de l'affaire des Communautés dont il est membre».

¹²⁶ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 16 juillet 1627, *Cor.* CXV, p. 389: «Celle là achevée, il se retirera en sa solitude, là où il a desja grandement avancée l'œuvre des Actes de Gophoroste [gesuiti], auquel Celas l'incita. Les commencemens monstrent que ce sera un terrible ouvrage, voire plus que contre le Plagiaire [la *Somme des fautes*]. Car, outre les actes, qui comprendront environ deux de ces pieces comme contre le Plagiaire, il s'y adjoudera une autre piece, qui ne tiendra que le suc de tout le narré, compris en un tel tome entier, et explicera leurs propriétés. La difficulté est de n'estre pas cogneu» [corsivo mio].

¹²⁷ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 14 mai 1627, *Cor.* CXIII, p. 386: «L'avis de Celas [Saint-Cyran] me demeure tousjours en la teste, que je suis obligé d'escire ce livre de ses actions en suite de ma negotiation passé».

la conclude all'inizio del 1629. Tuttavia, alla fine deciderà di non pubblicarla.¹²⁸

Un'ulteriore prova della convergenza di posizioni di Jansen e Saint-Cyran è attestata dalle parole dello stesso Lovaniense che nella lettera del 25 maggio del 1629 scrive:

«Sulpice [Jansen] est fort occupé depuis environ six semaines à digérer [discutere] les opinions des adversaires de Pilmot [della grazia]. Il le fait très-exactement et peut estre trop, car l'ouvrage en devient fort long. Il croit que l'historique et dogmatique de ces Pilmotaires [Pélagiens; si riferisce al primo tomo dell'*Augustinus*] reviendra bien à près de deux de ces tomes contre Plagiaire [i due tomi della *Somme des fautes*]. Il voudroit vous le pouvoir monstrier, pour voir si vous le trouverez bon, mais il est impossible de le faire escrire au net tant il est grand desja».¹²⁹

È Jansen stesso che ha modo, dunque, di far notare all'amico quanto siano vicini i due tomi della *Somme des fautes* contro Garasse ed il primo tomo dell'*Augustinus* sulla storia dei pelagiani. Queste affermazioni in qualche modo trovano conferma e sviluppo nel quarto capitolo del *Liber singularis* – come ho cercato di mostrare nell'analisi sopra svolta – al quale, il 25 maggio del 1629, data della lettera del Lovaniense, l'autore, che aveva da poco terminato il primo tomo, era ancora ben lungi dal mettere mano, lasciando correre due anni prima di riprendere la stesura del suo *Pilmot*¹³⁰ (*Augustinus*).¹³¹ Ma la possibilità,

¹²⁸ Cfr. JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jansénius d'Ypres*, in part. p. 155.

¹²⁹ *Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 25 mai 1629, *Cor.* CXXIX, p. 429 (corsivo mio).

¹³⁰ È lo pseudonimo utilizzato nella corrispondenza, che qui prendo nell'accezione di *Augustinus*. Infatti, come fa notare Orcibal nella tavola («Clefs des lettres à Saint-Cyran» in *Cor.*, p. 617) posta in appendice alla corrispondenza, «Pilmot» indica innanzitutto la grazia, in particolare la grazia efficace, che per Jansen è l'unica vera grazia. Tuttavia, la gran parte dell'*Augustinus* non tratta della grazia: Jansen lo afferma sia nella lettera CLXXXVII (*Cor.*, p. 564: «Et je voie que l'affaire [Pilmot, ossia la grazia] iroit à plusieurs années si je n'y travaille à toute force, tant de matiere trouvé je partout. Car on traicte le procès, dès les fondemens, ce qui occupera plus de temps et de matiere que l'affaire principale, la quelle il est impossible d'entendre sans ces preambules qui ont desjà occupé quasi un tome entier») che nella lettera CXCI (*Cor.*, p. 571: «Entre autres choses il me dit qu'il a employé plus de quatre mois entiers sur le point de *Statu puræ naturæ*, et l'a achevé ces jours passés. Quinquabre [Jansen] se va donner aux affaires qui touchent de près Madame de Pilmot [la grazia], et se desveloperont avec plus de facilité, à cause que son advocat a deduit tous les fondamens de son procès par plusieurs mois»). Dunque, soltanto il terzo dei tre tomi tratta dell'argomento principale. Inoltre, proseguendo, Orcibal fa notare che sarebbe stato Saint-Cyran a dare al termine una maggiore estensione di significato fino all'accezione di *Augustinus*, che sarebbe stata introdotta nella corrispondenza dopo il secondo viaggio in Spagna (presumibilmente dopo l'aprile del 1627).

¹³¹ Jansen ha avviato la stesura del primo tomo dell'*Augustinus* nel dicembre del 1627 (*Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 31 décembre 1627, *Cor.* CXVI, p. 392), termina il primo libro verso febbraio o marzo 1628 (*Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 11 février 1628, *Cor.* CXVII, p. 400; *Lettre*

che ho sopra percorso, di istituire, *a posteriori* per così dire, un confronto fra il quarto capitolo del *Liber singularis* e quanto Saint-Cyran scrive a proposito della sentenza 'pelagiana' di Garasse sulla mortalità del primo uomo, consente di constatare la vicinanza nelle loro posizioni (compresa l'utilizzazione degli stessi riferimenti ai Concili e ad Agostino) e, insieme, l'esistenza di una preoccupazione e di una strategia polemica comune.

Per quanto poi, più particolarmente, attiene alle critiche che Jansen sviluppa nei confronti della sentenza di Garasse e alla assimilazione di questa alla posizione pelagiana, esse devono essere considerate alla luce di un contesto più ampio: quello dello scritto in cui sono inserite, lo stesso nel quale sono additati, sin dal titolo dell'opera stessa (*Augustinus, seu Doctrina S. Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate, ægritudine, medicina adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses*), gli obiettivi polemici per antonomasia, ossia i pelagiani e i marsigliesi. Essi, infatti, sono i nemici dichiarati a cui Jansen dedica la sua storia *De hæresi pelagiana* nel primo tomo, i medesimi che tuttavia non manca di attaccare nel resto dell'opera, talora rinnovando la critica che il maestro Agostino aveva predisposto per loro e scagliandola contro i 'nuovi' pelagiani, *recentiores* come Garasse.¹³²

Infatti, come dalla filosofia in passato è derivata l'eresia pelagiana, così, fa notare Jansen nel capitolo quarto del *Liber singularis*, nel presente quell'eresia è rinata nella deviazione di matrice filosofica che ha per autore qualcuno più recente (*exorbitatio cuiusdam recentioris*):¹³³ Garasse.

Dunque, quello di Garasse qui affrontato rappresenta un caso esemplificativo di critica letteraria e non nei confronti di un bersaglio polemico contemporaneo a Jansen, additato dall'autore per il suo pelagianesimo. Garasse non è solo il gesuita che ha rinnovato la sentenza pelagiana sulla mortalità del primo uomo e contro cui Jansen scaglia la dottrina del maestro Agostino, ma è anche l'avversario di Saint-Cyran.

à Saint-Cyran, 28 avril 1628, *Cor.* CXIX, p. 404). Dopo una pausa di un anno, riprende nel gennaio 1629 e fino all'ottobre dello stesso anno compone i libri dal II al V, procede con la stesura dei libri VI, VII e VIII. Di quest'ultimo ha già scritto l'ultimo capitolo alla data del 15 febbraio 1630. Il 27 marzo successivo invia a Saint-Cyran la tavola delle materie dell'intero tomo. Inoltre, come fa notare Orcibal, quell'ultimo libro (*Lettre à Saint-Cyran*, 27 mars 1630, *Cor.* CXXXVIII, p. 453: «dans le dernier livre, il a bien donné sur les doigts aux Pacuviens [gesuiti]») a cui Jansen fa riferimento nella lettera del 27 marzo del 1630, probabilmente sarebbe diventato l'appendice del III tomo che mette a confronto gli errori dei marsigliesi con quelli dei gesuiti (JEAN ORCIBAL, *Jansénius d'Ypres*, p. 208). Dalla stesura del I tomo a quella del secondo passano due anni.

¹³² Jansen assimila i gesuiti ai marsigliesi: ne è una prova l'*Erroris Massiliensum et opinionis quorundam Recentiorum parallelon et Statera* del III tomo (coll. 1072-1144), che si compone di cinque capitoli. Si veda a tal proposito la nota 2 in *Cor.*, p. 455.

¹³³ LS, cap. IV, col. 89A.

È per queste ragioni che credo di poter affermare, a conclusione della mia indagine, che nell'opera del teologo di Lovanio non riviva semplicemente la polemica 'antipelagiana' di Agostino, ma quella di un nuovo 'Augustinus'.

In questo saggio sono partita da una ricostruzione dell'*affaire du Plagiar*e e del suo contesto insistendo dapprima sull'importanza che hanno attribuito gli interpreti alla *querelle* tra Saint-Cyran e Garasse e alle vicende della condanna dell'opera del gesuita. Infatti, alcuni di loro, quali Pierre Nicole e Pierre Bayle, hanno visto in questo episodio l'inizio della lotta tra giansenisti e gesuiti, altri, invece, come Jansen stesso, Auguste Carayon e Charles Nisard, si sono soffermati soprattutto sulle vicende dell'approvazione della Sorbona e della successiva condanna de *La somme théologique*.

Dunque, tale *affaire* ha suscitato grande interesse sin dal XVII secolo: ha d'altronde segnato la fine della fortuna del polemista francese (Garasse) nelle sue lotte contro i libertini e gli atei. A tal proposito, infatti, come ho suggerito nel corso di questa indagine, le lotte interne alla Sorbona e al Parlamento nei confronti dei gesuiti papisti possono aver influito in qualche modo sulle vicende della condanna de *La somme théologique*: è in tale contesto – quello che iniziava a profilarsi come sfavorevole al gesuita – che hanno attecchito le accuse delineate da Saint-Cyran in diversi libelli e nella *Somme des fautes* contro Garasse.

Come più volte dichiarato, quest'ultimo è stato sia il principale bersaglio polemico di Jean Duvergier de Hauranne sia uno degli imputati dell'amico lovaniese: come Saint-Cyran, anche Jansen si è schierato nei confronti dei gesuiti, quelli che nella sua corrispondenza denuncia come pericolosi e contro cui si scaglia anche dopo le ambascerie spagnole e nel suo capolavoro postumo. Nell'*Augustinus*, infatti, come si è visto, laddove in generale addita la loro sentenza come pelagiana, replica e rinnova le accuse di Duvergier de Hauranne contro Garasse. È questa una prova dell'esistenza di una strategia comune da parte dei due amici – cosa che attesta anche la corrispondenza, come si è visto – contro i rispettivi avversari che nell'*Augustinus* Jansen qualifica come semipelagiani moderni (*recentiores*).

A conclusione del mio saggio, ritengo di poter affermare che le vicende qui esaminate risultino rilevanti non solo rispetto ad una prospettiva generale di studi sul giansenismo e sulle controversie tra giansenisti e gesuiti, come attestato già dai primi interpreti secenteschi, e poi da quelli settecenteschi ed ottocenteschi, ma anche rispetto alla prospettiva – forse meno battuta – degli studi gianseniani.

A tal proposito, vorrei richiamare i risultati che ritengo di aver conseguito nell'analisi del capitolo quarto del *Liber singularis* del secondo tomo dell'*Augustinus*.

Se da un lato nel capitolo ho trovato un'ulteriore conferma dell'interesse di Jansen per l'*affaire du Plagiaire* e dell'ostilità nei confronti di Garasse, entrambi attestati già nella corrispondenza degli anni 1626-1630, dall'altro vi ho potuto individuare una critica particolareggiata alla sentenza del gesuita sulla mortalità di Adamo. In tal modo, è emersa un'indubbia vicinanza del lovaniese all'amico francese Saint-Cyran, non solo da un punto di vista politico, ma anche dottrinale e teologico.

Abbreviazioni

- [Bekker] ARISTOTELES, *Opera* ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia Regia Borussica, Accedunt indices Sylburgiani, Oxonii, e Typographeo academico, 1831-1870, 6 vols.
- [BETL] Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, Leuven, Leuven University Press/Uitgeverij Peeters, 1947-
- [Cor.] CORNELIS JANSEN, *Correspondance de Jansénius*, («Les origines du Jansénisme», 1), éd. par Jean Orcibal, Louvain/Paris, Bureaux de la Revue/Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1947
- [CCSL] *Corpus christianorum*. Series Latina, Turnhout-Paris, Brepols, 1953 -
- [CSEL] *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*, Vindibonæ, apud C. Geroldi filium-Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1866 -
- [Denzinger] Denzinger H. (hrsg. von), *Enchiridion Symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder, 1854¹
- [HP] CORNELIS JANSEN, *De hæresi pelagiana*, in *Augustinus, seu Doctrina Sancti Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate, ægritudine, medicina adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses*, tribus tomis comprehensa, Lovanii, typis et sumptibus Jacobi Zegeri, 1640, I

- [Lov.] *Opera D. AURELII AUGUSTINI Hipponensis episcopi per theologos lovanienses*, Antverpiæ, 1576-1577
- [LP] CORNELIS JANSEN, *Liber Proœmialis de ratione et auctoritate in rebus theologicis, in quo limites humanæ rationis in rebus theologicis indagantur; et auctoritas S. Augustini in tradendo mysterio prædestinationis et gratiæ declaratur*; in *Augustinus*, II
- [LS] CORNELIS JANSEN, *Liber singularis de statu naturæ innocentis seu de Gratia primi hominis, et Angelorum*, in *Augustinus*, II
- [Mansi] MANSI G. D., *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, Florentiæ, Expensis Antonii Zatta, 1759-1827¹
- [PL] *Patrologiæ Cursus Completus*, Series Latina, Parisiis, 1844-1864¹

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AUGUSTINE THE SEMI-PELAGIAN

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Abstract

Pelagius's contributions to the controversy on grace survive only in a fragmentary and incoherent selection, probably chosen by Augustine to support his caricature "Pelagianism." Thus the letters of Prosper (*ep.* 225) and Hilary (*ep.* 226) are invaluable, for revealing both the coherent doctrine of grace and free will proposed by his "semi-Pelagian" opponents and for their pointing to his own early anti-Manichaean writings, and especially *lib. arb.*, as their source and inspiration. After some attempts to refute this claim, Augustine in fact finally acknowledged his part (in *praed. sanct.* 3,7-4,8).

Manichaeism of Augustine's time and place was promoted as the true because Pauline Christianity; thus the anti-Manichaean position of Augustine's reaction never was the naive defense of free will prior to taking account of original sin, as he likes to suggest, but a carefully considered defense of a minimum of free will in the face of original sin (see *lib. arb.* III,20,56). By the time of Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, it had become the main alternative to his anti-Pelagianism, and arguably the only way to reconcile grace and free will. As late as *spir. et litt.* 33,57 ff. he posed clearly and nearly without bias the fundamental question about the *initium gratiae*, whether God's universal gift of free will in Creation (as in all version of pelagianism, including his own) or Recreation in Christ (as in his anti-Pelagianism). Only thereafter did he gradually harden his choice of Recreation via Christ's grace to the destruction of free will in the ungraced. His decision to defend his fellow bishops' appeal, in the trial of Caelestius, to infant damnation probably contributed more to this turn than his response, years earlier, to the questions of Simplicianus.

To see that Pelagius was also a follower of Augustine's own semi-pelagianism requires learning to read Augustine critically. Though that project will require the facing of some unpleasant truths about his polemical methods, beyond them there are rewards. The apparent lack of impartial but forceful critical referees meant that the intellectual quality of the Pelagian controversy was far lower than it should have been. Fortunately, we can make up part of that loss by critical reading.

Today we can decide which Augustine we prefer, rather than being obsessed by the question of which is the real Augustine, the "semi-pelagian" or the anti-Pelagian. The real Augustine is he who can be credited for the flourishing of the concept of Christian grace far beyond the narrow bounds of theological controversy.

Key Words

grace of creation – *Lib. arb.* III, 20,56 – *Spir. et litt.* 34,60 – infant damnation – reprobation

Eleonore Stump, in her recent study "Augustine on Free Will," takes as her starting point the "remarkable" range, in the scholarly literature, of views on Augustine's account of free will: "it is sometimes difficult to believe they are reading the same texts."¹ This essay shall ignore the question of whether Augustine ever destroyed free will in those who are given grace, and confine the question to the state of those denied grace, both because it was primarily on that question that the Pelagians were concerned to oppose Augustine and because it is probably much the more relevant and interesting question just at present, engaging most religions, not just Christianity.

Augustine is thrice-over the "Doctor of Grace," founder of all three doctrines of grace most in currency today, and not only of the familiar anti-Pelagianism that is usually assumed to be virtually the same as his own position. He is also, just as Prosper's "semi-Pelagian" opponents claimed, the originating source and perhaps the inventor of "semi-pelagianism," and *not* as a position he opposes. Even today there are some commentators who seem to think that if we just look hard enough we can find some way to have the best of both, grace as in his anti-Pelagianism and free will as in his (early) semi-pelagianism. But the ultimate weapon (infant damnation) he inherited, even if reluctantly, from Caelestius's judges in Carthage puts into doubt the validity of his continuing to impute free will to the ungraced. The sharp sensitivity he was to show from then on to charges that he had destroyed free will suggests that he was himself well aware of the problem.² Finally, his credit as inventor of semi-pelagianism has been obscured by his third invention, "Pelagianism," that is, his caricature of the positions of his first opponents (perhaps devised in an attempt to spare his own semi-pelagianism). These statements above will require redefinition or more precise definition of all of these terms.

Almost everything Augustine says in the summary of Pelagianism in Chapter 88 of *De haeresis* needs to be examined critically and

¹ Pages 124-147 of Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). This essay, so stimulating that it is almost irrelevant how far one agrees with it, is also available online at <https://sites.google.com/site/stumpep>.

² That this doubt is now widely acknowledged at least in the English-speaking world is suggested by two recent collections, the one cited in the previous note and Robert Dodaro and George Lawless, eds., *Augustine and His Critics* (New York: Routledge, 2000). Most of the essays which deal with the question are more concerned to correct than to defend Augustine on free will.

much of it can be accepted only with qualifications, sometimes radical. His characterization of the Pelagians, for example, as “enemies of grace” is at best a begging of the question, accurate only if you accept Augustine’s own quite controversial anti-Pelagian theory of grace.³ In fact, one can say the same of most of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian arguments.

He sometimes inadvertently exposes his own misrepresentations, as in the following sentence: “They claim that men *do not receive* these (spiritual gifts) from God (*haec non ab ipso accipere*) but acquire them by themselves, for they say that the grace of God by which we are liberated from impiety *is given (dari)* in return for our merits” (*haer.* 88,4).⁴ (We shall later observe Augustine himself distinguishing these two positions here confused, so as to refute the first by appealing to the second.) Except that it is rather *Augustine* who insists that any human preparation be called merit, the second of these formulations is reasonably accurate and gives the lie to the first statement, which is his central charge against “Pelagians” – that they say men achieve their own grace and save themselves – and which unfortunately usually appears elsewhere without the correcting self-contradiction.

Similarly, a charge that “they negate the prayers of the Church” is belied by Augustine’s earlier statement in this very document (and elsewhere) that Pelagius claimed that grace enables us to “do more easily what we can do without it.” So far as that, we have probably all smiled at Pelagius’s shallowness revealed in that “more easily.” But when we smiled, did we think Augustine’s anti-Pelagian alternative: that the ungraced have *no free choice at all, except as a “choice” between evils*? In fact, that is just what the sentence quoted in the previous paragraph means; “merit” for the *anti-Pelagian* Augustine includes any good will prior to grace. It was his own insistence – against the Pelagian teaching of a required

³ The characterization would be a falsehood, if meant as sometimes taken, to suggest that Pelagians were *professed* enemies of grace, but, to be fair to Augustine, it must be admitted that *haer.* in effect defines the phrase as “friends of free will (in the ungraced).”

⁴ “Haec quippe non ab ipso accipere, sed a seipsis homines habere contendunt, gratiam Dei qua liberamur ab impietate dicentes secundum merita nostra dari.” Translations from Augustine’s works are mine, but have been carefully compared with others’ translations, in the series of *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, *The Library of Christian Classics*, *The Fathers of the Church*, and *The Works of St. Augustine*. The Latin texts used are from the online *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana*, available at www.augustinus.it.

preparation for grace – that any such preparation is a meriting of grace that forced him – against his own observations of life, no doubt – into affirming in effect “total depravity.” As we shall see in due time, the sentence quoted in the last paragraph but one also exposes the other major misrepresentation: that the Pelagians say that the universal gift of human nature in the act of creation is grace period. But first we must observe Augustine showing them how to save free will by starting with the grace of Creation as a foundation for the grace of Recreation.

Augustine the Founder of Pelagianism

Augustine’s dubious accounts of Pelagianism also obscure his own part in initiating or developing the doctrine he later turned against. An accusation found not just in *haer.* but often elsewhere is that Pelagius invented a “new heresy.” Quite the contrary, if what the Pelagians held was indeed a new heresy, as against an acceptable or even commonly held set of assumptions of the day, then we can find its origins far earlier in Augustine’s own writings than in Pelagius’s. I should define my terms. What Augustine invented and what has always been the real alternative to late Augustinianism – and therefore what is my concern – is what is or was usually called “semi-Pelagianism.” Almost certainly Pelagius was semi-pelagian, as we shall see, and probably Caelestius was too, at least by the time they were excommunicated. They may well have had more radical followers who justified Augustine’s caricatures, but to explore that possibility would be to leave the main road of history for obscure and probably trackless by-ways. At any rate, it is probably impossible to define a “Pelagianism” as distinct from “semi-Pelagianism” once we subject Augustine’s caricatures to criticism.

If we put on side P early Augustine, the semi-Pelagians described in the letters of Prosper and Hilary, Thomas Aquinas, and probably the majority of modern academic theologians, and on side A late Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Jansen, and some “conservative” theologians (one might guess they are a minority even in the churches of Luther and Calvin), the main motives controlling the theology of grace and the methods of realizing those motives emerge clearly enough. The main motive of side P is universalism, the judgment that condemning anyone, of any time or any place, to the fires of Hell, without that person’s having a free choice of avoiding such a fate, cannot be reconciled with the justice of God. This is the main thesis

of Augustine's anti-Manichaean writings. So far as its application to pagans, see Porphyry's question and Augustine's answer in *ep. 102: Contra paganos*. This interpretation of the main motive is not the only possible one, and so one of the purposes in what follows will be to recommend and support it.

On side P up through Thomas at least, the key method of preserving both God's justice and human free will without invoking merit prior to grace is to locate the beginning of grace – the preparation for it – in the gratuitous gift of universal human nature. As Peter Lombard has it, in the *Sentences*, Book Two, Distinction 25: "The natural powers also are from grace, belonging certainly to that grace of God given to all" (*naturalia ex gratia [sunt], ad generalem quippe Dei gratiam pertinent.*) In II *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, Thomas restores to the Grace of Creation just those verses Augustine had wrested to the Grace of Recreation by reading into them the word *good*, in a context assuming total perversity, verses such as John 15: 5: "Without me you can do nothing" and 2 Cor 3: 5.

On side A, on the other hand, we have in Augustine's late writings the repeated insistence that if there is any way of salvation except Christian faith and/or baptism, then "Christ died in vain."⁵ See Augustine's answer to Porphyry in *ep. 102 (Contra paganos)* as reinterpreted in *Retractationes* and in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*. If one wishes to read Augustine critically, instead of simply taking his version at face value, and so succumbing passively to his manipulations, it is essential that one understand and always keep in mind the main motives on either side and understand further that Augustine was once a thoroughgoing semi-pelagian and even the inventor of pelagianism. I shall make use of these anachronistic terms, both to invoke the whole historical context of the controversy and to help cleanse the terms of accumulated prejudice, but shall forego caps when referring to Augustine's version.

The essential text for revealing both of these points is *De libero arbitrio*, Book Three, Chapters 18-20 (III,18,52-20,58). In fact, most revealing is to start with Augustine's three denials in his later writings of the obvious semi-pelagianism of this early work; it is these denials above all that have caused the confusion about free will in Augustine referred to by Eleonore Stump, these and the fact that he does not in *lib. arb* insist explicitly that free will is to be attributed also to non-

⁵ *Nat. et gr.* 9,10, for example. As we shall see, however, Augustine never ruled out the salvation of virtuous pagans. He is rather intent on defining all salvation as Christian.

Christians. That latter step he will take only after deciding that all salvation is Christian.

He even claims in *retr.* that *lib. arb.* refuted Pelagianism before it existed (8,4 and 6).⁶ (Note this backward admission of his own priority.) In each of these denials, he correctly pointed out that in *lib. arb.* III,18 he had affirmed the necessity of grace for full restoration of freedom of the will (this twist emerging abruptly – and retrospectively? – at the end of what had seemed an unqualified universal vindication of free will against the Manichaeans).

However, he does not acknowledge that his repeated formula for the fallen state is thoroughly (semi-) pelagian: “ignorance and difficulty.” And in all three he fails to acknowledge the semi-pelagianism that follows immediately in Chapters 19-20. In *De natura et gratia* 67,81, he does quote the beginning of his semi-pelagian statement (from III,19,53), and then brings himself and the moment to life on the page by yielding to a human impulse just like our own, to overlook an inconvenient truth, a useful instance to set the tone of our study, so long as we judge it rightly: original sin, yes; total perversity, no. After the still somewhat inconclusive words: “You are judged as guilty not because you are ignorant against your will, but because you neglect to search for what you don’t know, not because you do not bandage your wounded members, but because you ignore the one who wants to heal them,” he stops, just before the next and telling sentence: “These are personal sins of your own” (*ista tua propria peccata sunt*).⁷ And so he goes on at the end of III,20,56 to make an almost perfect statement of the essence of semi-pelagianism:

⁶ These revealing paragraphs in *retr.* 8 should be studied closely. They do rule out semi-pelagianism, but at the cost of denying free will to the ungraced (unless one devises an ad hoc definition of “free will” to avoid such a result). What they really prove, then, is (1) Augustine was quite aware that the “Pelagians” were really semi-pelagians, for otherwise there would be no need to take such a dangerous position to refute them, and (2) his own position in *lib. arb.* was semi-pelagianism, since it pointedly preserves free will in the yet ungraced, as we shall see. That is exactly the thesis of my essay. In addition to the two denials noted in the text, see *perseu.* 11,26-27. In 27, Augustine notes that some of his opponents have accepted his version of traducianism, but still do not agree that infants must be baptized in order to avoid damnation. He professes to be puzzled by this, but we can easily recognize the “Pelagian” and anti-Manichaean insistence on free will as necessary for the justice of God’s dealings with mankind. Note also that semi-Pelagians would not necessarily reject original sin *ex traduce*, except as accompanied by total perversity or infant damnation. Recall in this context that the opponents cited by Prosper and Hilary openly appealed to their own grounding in Augustine’s anti-Manichaean writings.

⁷ “... non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod inuitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras; neque illud quod uulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod uolentem sanare contemnitis: ista tua propria peccata sunt.”

Ignorance [of what is right] and difficulty [in doing it] will not be a punishment of sin for growing souls, but a warning to become better and wiser and a starting point toward perfection. For prior to any merit whatever for good works, it is enough that the soul has received from nature the power of judging, so as to prefer wisdom to ignorance and tranquility to difficulty, thus to acquire these good things by its efforts, though lacking them at birth. If the soul is unwilling to do all this, it will with justice be held guilty of sin, just as was the one that did not use well the talent it had received. For although the soul is born in ignorance and difficulty, it is not constrained by any necessity to remain in that state in which it was born.⁸

It is probable that Pelagius took his position on grace from these concluding chapters, at least after having been charged with heresy, and virtually certain that the semi-Pelagians pointed to by Hilary and by Prosper did so (see *ep.* 225,4 especially). According to Hilary, they appealed relevantly and effectively to at least two of Augustine's early works, including *lib. arb.* We shall not have space to discuss these two letters in detail, but they are key evidence for the argument for Augustine as the originating source of semi-Pelagianism. They are short and easily available in Augustine's letters. Then, it is easy to go from them to Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas. In the other direction, the "semi-pelagian" context defined here will make sense of the otherwise incoherent and fragmented account of Pelagius's teaching that emerges from Augustine's writings. In short, both Pelagius and the "semi-Pelagians" were followers of the anti-Manichaean Augustine.

Indeed, several times, as in *praed. sanct.* 3,7-4,8, Augustine openly contradicts his own denials. At the beginning of 4,8, he acknowledges once having held the same position on grace and free will as that attributed to these final opponents, and goes on to acknowledge in the same section that he turned against free will only later, in writing the much cited *Ad Simplicianum*. What he acknowledges, that he once believed that faith is "our own," goes further in pelagianism than what the semi-Pelagians or Thomas (and even Pelagius?) need

⁸ "... non erit nascentibus animis ignorantia et difficultas supplicium peccati, sed proficiendi admonitio, et perfectionis exordium. Non enim ante omne meritum boni operis parum est accepisse naturale iudicium, quo sapientiam praeponat errori, et quietem difficultati, ut ad haec non nascendo, sed studendo perueniat. Quod si agere noluerit, peccati rea iure tenebitur, tamquam quae non bene usa sit ea facultate quam accepit. Quamquam enim in ignorantia et difficultate nata sit, non tamen ad permanendum in eo quod nata est, aliqua necessitate comprimitur." See III,16,45 for a "preview" of this general grace of nature as being the grace before free will. Someone might object that this "semi-pelagianism" applies only if souls are newly created for each individual; but see the "preview" just cited and *ep.* 143, 5-6. *Supplicium peccati* is probably a reference to *poena peccati*, the term for original sin.

claim, the former two at least going no further than our "asking, seeking, knocking" (ep. 225,4).

By placing early Augustine in the context of the "semi-Pelagians" described by Hilary and Prosper (with some attention to Caelestius and Pelagius between those two points) and then going on to the scholastics of the Middle Ages and especially Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, we can easily see that what we have at the end of *lib. arb.* is not merely a few thoughtless remarks on free will made in the absence of any consideration of grace, but a well worked out attempt to preserve a minimum of free will in the face of grace, perhaps in fact the only way of reconciling the two. The question of Augustine's possible predecessors as inventors of pelagianism shall be left mostly to the side; all of the others just mentioned started from early Augustine.⁹

⁹ Vittorino Grossi's thought-provoking essay "Il peccato originale nella catechesi di s. Agostino prima della polemica pelagiana" (*Augustinianum* 10 [1970] 325-359, 458-492) shows that there are two rather different influences on the various possible accounts of grace, though both attributable to Paul. One of course is the familiar direct commentary on the history of man from Adam to Christ, especially in Romans. But he shows (338 ff.) that Augustine and others preparing candidates for baptism also went back to the narrative itself, in the Old Testament, of God's Providence over and love for man, starting of course with the Creation and the disobedience of Adam and Eve and going on to present in summary form the story he was later to elaborate in detail in *De civitate Dei*, including repeated backslidings followed by healing punishments. It of course included the story of the unjust as well, and in the great work Augustine indeed suspected that the history of the city of the just was not continuous, sometimes lapsing for a time. Still, one would get a rather different and less pessimistic impression of the force and the nature of original sin from this story as compared with the direct commentary of Paul, especially as interpreted by Augustine. This reminds us that Paul's influence on Christian theology and on the doctrine of grace was far wider and more ambiguous than we might assume, judging only from the direct commentary on fallen man, designed to promote the exclusionary theme of Jesus Christ as the only mediator. On the other hand, it is the same Paul who sanctions the Jewish scriptures as part of the sacred story, the Old Testament or Contract. The saints of the Old Testament too are saved and not only those after the promise to Abraham, not even only those after the written Law given to Moses, but those also who did "by nature" what the Law requires and therefore can be said to have had the law written on their hearts. For his part, Augustine shows that the City of God starts immediately after the fall, with Abel. Pelagius's account of original sin and grace, as cited by Augustine in *gr. et pecc. or.* II,24,28 (see below) seems to derive from this less provincial context, and to be similar to Augustine's anti-Manichaean versions of them. Further, even after going over, whether abruptly in *simpl.* or more gradually, to the "semi-Manichaean" account in Romans, Augustine deemphasizes but does not abandon the account derived from the Old Testament, including the salvation not only of ancient Hebrews but of some pagans. He cannot, because Paul has established that account as "fact."

This account fits perfectly with Peter Lombard's use of Augustine. He prudently continues to treat Augustine as the great doctor of grace and Pelagius as a heretic, but he goes on to use Augustine's frequent lapses, even late in his life, into what we would call semi-Pelagianism to vindicate free will against the anti-Pelagian Augustine.

And seeing early Augustine as a semi-pelagian directs attention to the ambiguity or ambivalence of his anti-Pelagian writings. If we let Peter Lombard sharpen our awareness of openings for human free will prior to grace and even to faith, we notice that the larger part of what we might call the concrete application of *his own* (?) doctrine of grace (as against the anti-Pelagian theory in its abstract form), even in the anti-Pelagian writings, is semi-Pelagian, in that the fundamental assumption of that concrete application is that we should ask and pray for grace. More than that, we see that especially at the beginning of his campaign against the Pelagians, he vacillated between two very different strategies: attacking them as "Pelagians" from a semi-pelagian perspective and attacking them as semi-Pelagians from an anti-Pelagian perspective. One of the most significant cases of this applied semi-pelagianism rises again to the level of explicit theory (*nat. et gr.* 16,17) and is used to define *by contrast* Pelagius's position by distinguishing and setting against each other the two positions on grace that, at the beginning of this essay, we saw Augustine deliberately confuse in *haer.*: "An et istam [sapentiam] quisquam abrogare audet gratiae Dei et eam superbissima uanitate ponit in hominis potestate? Cur ergo oratur ut accipiatur, si ab homine est ut habeatur?" (Who would dare seize Wisdom away from the grace of God and with vain and supreme pride place It within human power? Why then do we pray that we receive It, if it is from man that It is to be had?)¹⁰ Below, I shall cite another use of this same semi-pelagian argument, from *gr. et lib. arb.* 4,9; see also *praed. sanct.* 20,41.

We must be clear on the following point: what separates the anti-Pelagian Augustine from his semi-Pelagian opponents, including his earlier self, is not acceptance or rejection of original sin in itself, as he likes to claim, over-simplifying this point, like so much else, to an either/or. For Pelagius on original sin, see the passage from *gr. et pecc. or.* II,26,30 cited below. In fact, some of the opponents described by Prosper accepted original sin *ex traduce*, actually going beyond

¹⁰ We find the same semi-pelagianism turned against the caricature "Pelagianism" even very late, as in *perseu.* 2.3: "Cur autem perseuerantia ista poscitur a Deo, si non datur a Deo?"

what even the anti-Pelagian Augustine will affirm. It is rather *total perversity inherited from Adam, in whatever way*, that is required by his rejection of the pelagian preparation for grace and also probably needed to help infant damnation go down without indigestion. But he surely did not really believe in total perversity; who could, except compelled by ideology?

Finally, this is perhaps the place to pay to Augustine what admittedly might at first glance look like a back-handed compliment: that his own writings have done far more to advance the Pelagian cause, whether defined narrowly or by potential extension to such positions as deism, than all of the writings of the Pelagians, and not only because those writings have survived mainly in his own. This situation is indeed partly a function of what we will turn to just below, the obviously and extremely poor quality of some of the arguments he was forced to make against the Pelagian appeal to free will while being constrained to deny that he was destroying free will in the ungraced. But more stress should be put on the admirable if terrible honesty with which he presented the horrifying parts of his anti-Pelagian position, such as reprobation and above all infant damnation. The monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles are good examples of the double-edged effects of Augustine's "anti-Pelagian" writings, perhaps reflecting suppressed ambivalence on his own part. But could this undercutting of his explicit position be entirely inadvertent? This honesty is especially impressive compared with the over-refinement of recent supporters, who, like Alexander Pope's "soft Dean... never mention Hell to ears polite."¹¹

By the time we reach Thomas, the positive contributions of Augustine's own semi-pelagian school come to the fore.

Reading Augustine Critically

It is remarkable that after a millennium and a half, prejudice against Pelagius, even among those likely to agree with him, and even in a world situation that should be favorable to his rehabilitation, is

¹¹ Thus, on page 328 of the essay mentioned in note 9, Vittorino Grossi condescends to the Pelagian rationale for grace: "al massimo, facilitare la volontà nel voler [il bene]" without any hint of the severe problems raised by going beyond that maximum. Suppressing the real purposes behind the pelagian position (including Augustine's) is to fail in interpreting accurately and thus to undervalue not only theirs but Augustine's writings.

only now just beginning to relax its grip, and mainly among specialists on the controversy.¹² The problem starts with the fact that Augustine was one of the world's great masters of polemical rhetoric. His attacks on Pelagius are not only so effective but so extreme, in their purpose (excommunication) and in their methods (of stretching the truth), that supporters of Augustine might very naturally have some anxiety that

¹² Vittorino Grossi begins his essay "Il peccato originale nella catechesi di s. Agostino prima della polemica pelagiana" with a gratuitous because nearly irrelevant account of "pelagianismo" which turns out to be a skimming off of the old familiar jibes from Augustine's caricatures. One might have thought that the precious few citations of Pelagian writings saved in Augustine's would demand attention from a scholar of his standing, but no. Perhaps encouraged by Augustine's freedom of invention, Grossi goes even further, being especially fond of charging Pelagians with "naturalismo," as if anyone ever believed humans could make their own heaven and make their own way there. Augustine himself was content with a charge of softness on infant damnation, when, in *gr. et pecc. or.* II,5,5, he cited *Libellus fidei Romae* for Caelestius's rationale for baptism, *quia uires naturae non habent [regnum coelorum], conferri necessarium est per gratiae libertatem*. Grossi allows hostility to "naturalismo" to suggest invidious words, *umanizzare il divino* (327), which remind one of the anecdote of the pious student at a Christian college who leapt before he looked in belittling ancient Greek paganism – for showing a god come down to walk the earth. More to the point, that belittling phrase points to the aspect of Christianity perhaps most dear to Augustine. The lazy scholarship in this brief opening passage is especially telling in its contrast with the impressive work shown in the real subject of the essay, as cited above. In fact, Grossi puts to shame many anti-Pelagians with his acute acknowledgment (346 ff) of the difficulties of explaining satisfactorily the justice of the imposition of original sin, whether taken as an imputed guilt, or a disability which makes one's own sin unavoidable. He could have been even more forthright, by citing *lib. arb.* III,19,53, for Augustine's own response to carplings against the justice of original sin: "Recte enim fortasse quererentur, si erroris et libidinis nullus hominum uictor existeret: cum uero ubique sit praesens, qui multis modis per creaturam sibi Domino seruientem auersum uocet, doceat credentem, consoletur sperantem, diligenter adhortetur, conantem adiuuet, exaudiat deprecantem; non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod inuitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras; neque illud quod uulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod uolentem sanare contemnitis: ista tua propria peccata sunt." That brings us back to the Old Testament on original sin and grace. The prejudice of those not anti-Pelagian is perhaps even more significant: "The theology of Pelagius was the theology of deism: his ethics were the ethics of naturalism." John Burnaby, trans., *Augustine: Later Works*. Library of Christian Classics, vol. 8 (London: SCM Press, 1955), 192. Burnaby appears to be a good example of a modern semi-Pelagian (*De spiritu et littera* is his favorite of the books against the Pelagians) who, perhaps to maintain his distance from a "heresy," retains too much of the prejudice against Pelagianism instilled so skillfully by Augustine. If we call Pelagius a deist we shall probably also have to use the term of Augustine, as hinted above and as we shall see below. On the other hand, Burnaby is to be credited for recognizing at least as early as the work cited (see pages 191-92) that the critics of late Augustine described by Prosper and Hilary were very close to early Augustine on grace.

beginning to doubt the fairness of Augustine's charges risks reaction against him.

But even after allowing for this, it must be admitted that partiality for Augustine is at worst pardonable (Pelagius simply cannot compete as an interesting and original writer) and at best in many ways justified; yet modern scholarship, or at least some of it, must set itself against such partiality and attempt to see the controversy as in itself it really is. There is a huge backlog of commentary and even translation, sometimes so partial as to be untrustworthy, as in the late 19th century translation commonly known today as "The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Edition" that is still much consulted online and that is still, admittedly, quite useful otherwise.

With the partial exception of *De spiritu et littera*, Augustine's contributions were not open and disinterested exchanges on the theory of grace, but attempts first to shut the mouths of Pelagians and then to drive them from the Church. There is no use measuring out politically correct blame today, for what happened so long ago and in a situation we can only partly enter into; on the other hand, failure to assert our own morals and manners as thinkers can endanger them.

Augustine's worst arguments can seem insults to one's intelligence; recognizing rather than suppressing one's anger at that can promote catharsis and reconciliation as well as serve usefully to sharpen wits and will for reviving the true interest and importance of the questions raised by this ancient controversy, via reading Augustine critically. It can also greatly enhance the interest of reading the anti-Pelagian tracts, whose obsessive repetition, otherwise nearly insufferable, can prove most useful for critical reading. The apparent lack of impartial critical referees (though Rome seems to have tried to play such a part) means that the intellectual quality of the debate is far lower than it should have been. Fortunately, we can make up part of that loss by critical reading.

The need for criticism of Augustine's polemical methods is easiest to illustrate vis-à-vis *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*. On one hand, by now Augustine in addressing Pelagius's followers was holding up the latter's testimony in Palestine as a model of orthodoxy (though of course not of sincerity!). On the other hand, by the time he was asked to respond to doubts about Pelagius's heresy, it was too late for Augustine to contemplate any sort of compromise or retreat, for the Church, at his own prompting (and against its own better judgment?), had issued its official condemnation and so Augustine was locked into his account of Pelagius as heretic (and thus into his own position as anti-Pelagian). It is worth studying closely Book One,

Chapter 2. Has there ever been a more ingenuous rationale for misreading?

But let us go to *gr. et pecc. or.* I,22,24, a major transition in the argument:

“Qui currit”, [Pelagius] inquit, “ad Dominum, et ab eo se regi cupit, id est, uoluntatem suam ex eius uoluntate suspendit; qui ei adhaerendo iugiter, unus, secundum Apostolum, cum eo fit spiritus, non hoc nisi de arbitrii efficit libertate.” Videte quantam rem dixerit non effici nisi arbitrii libertate; ac per hoc sine adiutorio Dei nos Deo existimat adhaerere; hoc est enim, “nonnisi de arbitrii libertate”; ut cum adhaeserimus eo non adiuuante, tunc iam quoniam adhaesimus, etiam adiuuari mereamur.

This is translated by Peter Holmes, in the NPNF edition, as follows:

“The man,” says he, “who hastens to the Lord, and desires to be directed by Him, that is, who makes his own will depend upon God’s, who moreover cleaves so closely to the Lord as to become (as the apostle says) ‘one spirit’ with Him, does all this by nothing else than by his freedom of will.” Observe how great a result he has here stated to be accomplished only by our freedom of will; and how, in fact, he supposes us to cleave to God without the help of God: for such is the force of his words, “by nothing else than by his own freedom of will.” So that, after we have cleaved to the Lord without His help, we even then, because of such adhesion of our own, deserve to be assisted.

Augustine’s interpretation rests on what is by no means the only, and probably not the most obvious, meaning of *non... nisi*; it can introduce a necessary but not sufficient cause, “this is not effected except out of freedom of choice.” As it happens, a comment of Augustine’s own, in *nat. et gr.* 18,20, on praying for help to avoid future sins, neatly illustrates this other meaning: “Quod licet non fiat, nisi uoluntas adsit; tamen ut fiat, uoluntas sola sufficit.” (See also the first sentence of *ep.* 217,6,23.) If the quoted comment is from Pelagius’s *Pro libero arbitrio* and written after the controversy had begun, it is not credible that Pelagius would have handed his enemies such obvious ammunition as Augustine claims, certainly not if he were as cleverly devious as Augustine paints him.

And in fact, in I,7,8 of *gr. et pecc. or.*, Augustine had already quoted Pelagius as complaining against exactly the misrepresentation made in 22,24, that is, being taken to attack grace because he insists on free will, or, to put it another way, to claim he believes free will is the whole of grace because he says it is the *beginning* of grace, or again, to say that he denies the grace of recreation because he insists

on the grace of creation (as did Augustine's early account of grace): "because we say that grace can by no means perfect holiness in us without our wills, as if God of His grace would command something and would not give the aid of His grace to those to whom he had given commands, so that what men were commanded to do through free choice they might be able to fulfill more easily through grace."¹³

Even a translation favorable to Augustine should at least mention such strong reasons for doubting his interpretation of Pelagius's comment in I,22,24, but Peter Holmes, in the NPNF translation, does not merely fail to do so. In effect, he conceals the problem by imposing Augustine's tendentious and dubious interpretation on *Pelagius's own words* as quoted: "does all this by nothing else than by his freedom of will." But to blame Peter Holmes or question his language skills is to risk falling victim ourselves to the millennium and a half of profound and uncritical prejudice against Pelagius, and affecting even those not partial to Augustine (as Holmes certainly was).

These passages also illustrate another of Augustine's fallacies, which I will just mention here but not take space to demonstrate, since it is so common in the anti-Pelagian tracts that anyone can easily observe it: the either/or fallacy: when interpreting Pelagius, it is a question of either God's will or Man's will, whereas when presenting his own theory the two can comfortably coexist.

There is even more that commentators have failed to point out. *Gr. et pecc. or.* I,22,23-24 are transitional chapters; they begin the accusation that Pelagius holds that we merit grace through right use of free will (see the passage just above from 22,24 that I started with). But in Book One up until these chapters Augustine had used an argument (continued from *nat. et gr.*) quite at odds with this new charge: that, according to Pelagius, grace *is* human nature with free will. There is, as we have seen, a model which shows how these two otherwise mutually contradictory positions can be made to fit together: the passage from Augustine's own *lib. arb.* above identified as the perfect definition of "semi-pelagianism." A possible motive then for Augustine's present misrepresentation might have been to obscure his own credit as founder of pelagianism.

¹³ "Hic nos imperitissimi hominum putant iniuriam diuinae gratiae facere, quia dicimus eam [gratiam] sine uoluntate nostra nequaquam in nobis perficere sanctitatem: - quasi Deus gratiae suae aliquid imperauerit, et non illis quibus imperauit, etiam gratiae suae auxilium subministret, ut quod per liberum homines facere iubentur arbitrium, facilius possent implere per gratiam."

To be sure, the contexts of Augustine's exhibiting the two "heretical" halves of semi-pelagianism usually keep those two halves well separated from each other, but the less skilled case against Pelagius in Palestine, as reported in Augustine's *De gestis Pelagii* 14,30, yanks both of these mutually contradictory teachings from context in Caelestius and yokes them face to face together: "In tertio capitulo scripsisse Coelestium: 'Gratiam Dei et adiutorium non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, uel in lege ac doctrina.' Et iterum: 'Dei gratiam secundum merita nostra dari, quia si peccatoribus illam det, uidetur esse iniquus.'" Since these extracts from Caelestius were probably paraphrased (see 13,29), we can only guess at what Caelestius's original might have said.

I am tempted to say that the obvious self-contradiction of these two charges and, more importantly, the obvious directions in Prosper's *ep.* 225 on how to put them back together, ought to have alerted scholarship to the need for critical reading. But I must confess that it was long into my project to read Augustine critically before I noticed these "obvious" points, such is the power of prejudice against Pelagius, even on the part of those not disposed against him.

In *gr. et pecc. or.* Augustine's strategy is to atomize Pelagius's whole account of grace into its component parts: grace *is* free will, or the Law, or the teaching or example of Christ, or forgiveness of past sins, and yet grace is something we merit *through* free will. We see the same strategy in *De gratia et libero arbitrio* of some 8 or 9 years later, perhaps because it is Augustine's response to the charge that his account of grace has destroyed free will, so that he tries there, perhaps for the last time and not very successfully, to occupy the semi-pelagian position and thus has to deny it to the Pelagians. The fundamental fallacy of Augustine's method of fragmentary quotation could easily be demonstrated by raking through his own writings, right up to the end, for evidence that he was a Pelagian heretic. The resulting evidence would be overwhelming: for example, see *perseu.* 2,3. Scholarship ought to have been alerted much sooner to the dubiousness of Augustine's account of Pelagianism, by its very incoherence. The great value of Hilary's and especially Prosper's letters (*ep.* 225 and 226) is that they show us that coherent whole, and they trace it back to Augustine himself.

Returning to *gr. et pecc. or.*, we should note that Augustine's argument in 1,22,23 that the letter to Demetrias promotes the idea that we merit grace fails to hold; she had been baptized (see Pelagius's letter, 19,1) and was accepted as a believing Christian; Augustine's own remarks on the "inclusive" preaching of grace in *perseu.* 22,58,

together with his concept of cooperative grace, make it plain that he too would have urged her to merit an increase of grace. In fact, Augustine himself notes this possible response in 22,24, and his reply to it takes us back to the beginning of this section and the misinterpretation of *non ... nisi*.

The transcript, in *gr. et pecc. or.* II,3,3, of the inquisition of Caelestius at Carthage prefigures the technique of Augustine's own procedure in this very book in its brusque brushing aside of meaningful nuances so as to force oversimplified questions on the opponent. Caelestius in Carthage replied to the charge that he had said that Adam's sin harmed only himself and not the human race by replying: "Dixi de traduce peccati dubium me esse." (That is probably a good example of the disparity between what Pelagians really said and what they are reported to have said.) But the crucial distinction between original sin *per se* and original sin *via traducianism* implied by that comment was ignored.¹⁴ Again, when asked if he had taught that infants at birth are in the same state as Adam before his transgression, he almost certainly asked for a definition of Adam's moral and psychological state before his transgression (for example, good but able to sin). This question, if answered fully, would almost certainly have embarrassed his inquisitors and revealed profound differences among them and between some of them and Augustine. But the questioner refused to let the definition go beyond whether Adam was mortal or not before sin (even to this oversimplified question, Augustine's answer probably would not have agreed fully with his fellow bishops'). Caelestius again tries to say that what he is against is traducianism and that it is a matter of debate and not of heresy – and so it probably was, in the Church as a whole, at the time of the Carthage trial. Like the first, this second attempt to get things right is brutally brushed aside.¹⁵

¹⁴ Even today this crucial distinction is often brushed aside, as in the article on "Original Sin" in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). It begins with this definition: "a sin inherited from Adam by way of propagation." To be sure, this is an encyclopedia on Augustine. On the other hand, we know that Augustine never committed himself to traducianism.

¹⁵ Marcellinus, on the other hand, got it right, as reported in *pecc. mer.* III,1, in whatever question it was he asked about those who deny *ex eius peccato quidquam ad eius posteros propagando transisse*. Had he consulted "Pelagians" as well as their enemies? Or was he responding to Augustine's offer in *pecc. mer.* II,36,59 to discuss tentatively and with open mind, among other questions going to the heart of the controversy, whether we could avoid judging God Himself author of the very guilt requiring the redemption of baptism, especially if He created souls "de traduce." In any

That Pelagius knowingly deceived his questioners in Palestine could be truthfully said only on the assumption that he was fully aware that the Church (not merely Augustine or even the African Church) considered traducianism the only possible orthodox doctrine of original sin. On the contrary, by Augustine's own testimony in *gr. et pecc. or.* II,5,5-6,6, Caelestius had been completely open in his book published in Rome and in the church proceedings there, declaring that *peccatum ex traduce firmare... longe a catholico sensu alienum est*. Augustine quotes Caelestius there to prove that what Caelestius stated openly is what Pelagius believed but was "hiding." If instead of passively allowing ourselves to be manipulated by Augustine, we read critically, we see instead evidence that proves much more directly and firmly that in 417, in Rome at least, there was no consensus that traducianism was the only orthodox doctrine of original sin. Indeed, recent accounts of Zosimus's attitude to the charges against Pelagius and Caelestius belie Augustine's account of his condemning Caelestius's doctrine though charitably refraining from excommunication (II,6,7).¹⁶

In fact, as we know, Augustine himself could not affirm traducianism in the full sense of generation of the soul from the parent(s), and so had to fall back on round-about and dubious arguments for original sin. As late as 418, he seems to have felt it necessary to impart to Sixtus a basic education in anti-Pelagian doctrine, including the risky double-edged argument for original sin as needed to vindicate God's justice to infants that he had used in *pecc. mer.* III,2,3 (see below); see *ep.* 194,10,46: "Audeant ergo dicere quod a iusto Deo innocens condemnabitur, si nullo uinculo peccati originalis innectitur." Augustine certainly did not lack nerve, but was willing to go way out there in the blue.

Why then should Pelagius be accused of deceit for not answering questions according to a doctrine of original sin he did not himself hold and which his eastern questioners probably did not believe, certainly not uniformly? Given the extremely harsh language Augustine

case in *pecc. mer.* III,10,13 Augustine explicitly acknowledges the question whether the soul itself is produced by human propagation and, as always, fails to take a stand which would justify calling Pelagians heretics on this point. There is considerable evidence that Marcellinus was not the passive disciple Augustine tries to persuade him that he is; his early death may have been a greater tragedy than we know. For certain there is a loss of flexibility and openness of mind after *De spiritu et littera*.

¹⁶ See Roland Teske, ed. and trans., *Answer to the Pelagians I* (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997), pages 387-88, and page 729 of *Augustine through the Ages* (see note 14).

uses about Pelagius's supposed deceitfulness and the fact that it is exactly that skillfully deployed rhetoric that has subsequently led readers uncritically to credit Augustine as against Pelagius, it seems that our duty, however unpleasant, is to raise the question of who it is that is trying to deceive us in *gest. Pel.* or *gr. et pecc. or.* When in I,26,27 he counsels Pelagius to clear his name by ceasing to conceal *impudentissimo pudore* that he *used to be* a heretic, we cannot help remembering that Augustine at that moment is failing to acknowledge once having published a doctrine that is heretical if Pelagius's is so judged.

One is tempted to say that Augustine succeeded in prosecuting his opponents by getting away with a daring bluff or begging of the question, assuming with what appeared to be supreme confidence and unquestioned authority that traducianism compounded by total perversity was the only possible orthodox theory of original sin and explanation for baptism. He seems to have had no great respect for the intelligence of the friends addressed in *gr. et pecc. or.* If there had been impartial or even friendly critics of greater backbone and acuteness, the quality of the Pelagian controversy would have been much higher. Fortunately, we can recover some of that lost opportunity if we read critically ourselves.

But we should give Augustine credit for several times acknowledging that the Pelagians did not really say (they did not *dare* to) what he puts in their mouths, such as, that we do not need baptism (*pecc. mer.* III,13,22) or the help of God or – an especially obvious misrepresentation – that we *ought not* to pray (*spir. et litt.* 2,4, *ep.* 145,8, *ep.* 175,3-4)! Rather, this is his own interpretation or misinterpretation of what is entailed by what they do say (*pecc. mer.* II,2,2), an interpretation which in fact may be judged correct only if you share his assumptions. In *ep.* 186,10,34, he explains that Pelagius's believing that our wills are equally capable of good or evil (as against being totally perverse, presumably) leaves no place for grace (or prayer, no doubt). These naively rationalistic accounts of the human mind do not square with the great psychologist's sophistication elsewhere. He certainly does not apply this either/or logic to his own doctrine, when he appeals to Paul's mind divided against itself, as in "Who shall free me from this body of death?"

A passage from *ep.* 217: *Vitali*, thought to be from about the same time as the insurrection in Hadrumentum, presents an especially revealing summary of Augustine's argument and his rhetorical strategy. According to Augustine's account, Vitalis was what we would call a semi-Pelagian, claiming for man only the *initium fidei*, and he tries both to separate his position from that of the bogey "Pelagians"

(7,29) and to implicate him in their errors, the latter described according to his own caricature:

They [Pelagians] attribute everything belonging to man's faithful and pious life to free will to such a degree that they think it all to be had from ourselves and not to be asked from God. You, on the other hand, if what I hear is true, will not have the beginning of faith [*initium fidei*] – where also begins a good and pious will – to be a gift of God, but argue that we have it from ourselves that we begin to believe. You agree, however, that the other good things of a religious life God gives to those who, already faithful (*iam ex fide*), seek, ask, knock.¹⁷

We have to hope that Vitalis was alert enough to see the sleight of mind being practiced on him, as faith somehow is passed from the object side (*initium fidei*) of seeking, asking, knocking to the subject side (*iam ex fide*). Probably in the act of writing Augustine noticed that otherwise there would be no difference from his own semi-pelagian *a Domino esse poscenda*. And we have to hope too that Vitalis did not act on Augustine's challenge to throw off his pretenses and show his real opinion of prayer, suggesting perhaps a vulgar or even obscene gesture: *Exsere contra orationes Ecclesiae disputationes tuas* (1.2)!

What is most important to note here is that, even twenty years or more after his own semi-pelagianism, he still remembers it and its distinction from his own caricature "Pelagianism," that it depends on a small opening for universal free will, and as well perhaps on a vanishingly thin distinction between inner and outer: see the discussion of *gr. et lib. arb.* 5,10 below.

We must learn to appreciate Augustine's supreme rhetorical skills so that we become able to look through them to something closer to the truth. This letter is a good example of Augustine's favorite stratagem of suppressing his opponents' point of view and the justifying rationale for their position and replacing it with one which will bias the reader against their motives. He looks at the dispute from within the closed circle of Christian faith, so that the Pelagian hesitations about putting grace before free will look like stubborn "pride" or ingratitude to God, and so that his own putting of free will under

¹⁷ "Illi [Pelagiani] quippe omnia ad fidelem piamque uitam hominum pertinentia ita tribuunt libero uoluntatis arbitrio, ut habenda ex nobis, non a Domino putent esse poscenda: tu autem, si ea quae de te audio uera sunt, initium fidei, ubi est etiam initium bonae, hoc est piae uoluntatis, non uis donum esse Dei, sed ex nobis nos habere contendis ut credere incipiamus; cetera autem religiosae uitae bona Deum per gratiam suam iam ex fide petentibus, quaerentibus, pulsantibus, donare consentis."

question can be ignored. Over and over we must consciously remind ourselves that, on the contrary, looking at the dispute also from beyond that closed circle, Pelagians are concerned, not with self-glory, but with God's justice to those who never heard of Christ and so get "disappeared" from Augustine's perspective. His power in brushing aside the interior of the Pelagian point of view is shown by the fact that he can even afford often to notice that the justice of God *is* their concern (in *ep.* 217, at 6,19), so that he can cite against them the potter's snub of the pots.

A comparison of these two ways of looking at one's religion might also seem to be a useful way of finding the contemporary interest of the controversy, so long as we can take both perspectives and treat them with respect.

This is also to say that there is a way to make Augustine's position coherent, his attacks on the Pelagians accurate and candid, and the controversy relevant and vital today and that is to take his real objection to them to be to their saying *publicly* that for God to condemn some of his human creatures to damnation without their having freedom to choose salvation is inconsistent with the justice of God. That would seem to imply that Christianity is not the sole path to salvation.

Pelagius the Semi-Pelagian

The exact position of Pelagius himself is probably of less significance, so far as the subsequent history of teachings on grace, than are the letters of Prosper and Hilary, pointing as they do back to early Augustine and forward to scholastic writers such as Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas. But at least as early as Peter Lombard Pelagius got chosen as the figure against whom Augustine had defined himself. Further, it is his comments on Pelagius that force upon our attentions the necessity of critical reading of Augustine. Therefore, we shall follow up the case already started in the previous section that Pelagius was a "semi-Pelagian," at least after having been attacked for heresy, and probably a student of early Augustine from the time of his earliest writings. But that latter detail, like the question of whether there were radical followers of Pelagius and Caelestius who in fact held the views attributed by Augustine to "Pelagians," we must agree to leave aside, however interesting, unless further facts emerge. In any case they are departures from the main line of the history of grace.

Since it must answer those who accused his doctrine of destroying free will, it is not surprising that *gr. et lib. arb.* starts off with a position much like his early semi-pelagianism. Indeed, he begins with the assertion that in this treatise he is refuting those who make the complementary and opposite error from that of the Pelagians, that is, those who destroy free will in the name of grace. By now, of course, we know enough not to get our hopes up that free will shall be extended to the ungraced. And by the end (22,44) he is arguing that damnation of unbaptized infants reveals and clarifies what (the illusion of?) adult free will obscures: that there is no free will before grace, even though the evil must be punished for their evil will.

What is new and significant is that he acknowledges, to the critical eye, that the "Pelagians" are now semi-Pelagians. We noted in the previous section that Augustine's strategy was to atomize the "Pelagians'" doctrine into its parts – all of which are parts of his own concept of grace, and so are "new heresies" only when judged apart from a unifying structure and rationale. What pointed to his fallacy was his also arguing that they claimed that grace was something that we merit, thereby revealing that "nature with free will" was not the whole of grace for them, but the starting point only, the *initium fidei*, the grace before any possible merit, as in his own early semi-pelagianism.

Now he tries a new strategy (14,27) for separating semi-pelagianism into heretical parts; he acknowledges both parts but separates them in time. Having been proven wrong in saying that grace is nature or the Law or remission of sins, they have turned around to a new account: grace is given not for the merits of good works, since those are the result of grace, but is given in return for the merits of a good will: "*quia bona voluntas*", *inquiunt*, "*praecedit [orationem] orantis, quam praecessit uoluntas credentis, ut secundum haec merita gratia sequatur exaudientis Dei.*" It is important to notice one solid fact here: that by now Pelagians did not claim faith as our own, as did early Pelagius following early Augustine (prior to the public controversy), but only *uoluntas credentis*, knocking, praying, seeking.

Two of Augustine's favorite arguments for the function of free will in the process of grace are both semi-pelagian in tendency (1) that the purpose of the Law is to teach us that we can only fulfill it by praying for help and (2) that the surest proof that grace is a gift of God occurs when our prayers for it are answered. These arguments persist in his anti-Pelagian writings, whether as attempts to conceal his putting free will into question or as inadvertent revelations of his own beliefs on grace and free will. In *gr. et lib. arb.* 4,9 he rehearses these

arguments: "Nec tamen sufficit arbitrium uoluntatis humanae, nisi a Domino uictoria concedatur oranti, ne intret in tentationem. Quid uero euidenti-
us quam Dei ostenditur gratia, ubi quod oratur accipitur?" and concludes that "*Homo ergo gratia iuuatur, ne sine causa uoluntati eius iubeatur.*" That last could almost be a quotation of Pelagius's words in *gr. et pecc. or.* I,7,8 (see above).

Then in the following paragraph (*gr. et lib. arb.* 5,10) he attributes what is in substance exactly the same position to the Pelagians, but turns theirs into heresy by adding the mere word *merit*, even while acknowledging that Pelagius in Palestine had censured that word (no doubt counting the gift of human nature as the *initium gratiae* before merit). Then in a passage that might have brought joy to the heart of Jean-Paul Sartre and maybe even a smile to his lips, he struggles futilely to extricate himself from the tar-baby of human subjectivity. He tries to distinguish his from the Pelagian reading of *Conuertimini ad me, et conuertar ad uos*: "Nec attendunt qui hoc sentiunt, quia nisi donum Dei esset etiam ipsa ad Deum nostra conuersio, non ei dicere-
tur: *Deus uirtutum, conuerte nos...*"

This address to the monks of Hadrumetum dates to after Pelagius's disappearance from the scene, so we need to look for an earlier direct acknowledgement. *Ep.* 194: Sixtus of 418 is from shortly after Pelagius's excommunication. It advises Sixtus on how to deal with the remaining "Pelagians," some by repression (*coercere*), some by gentler means. It is especially valuable because it forearms Sixtus with the arguments they are liable to make against this repression. He points to their answer when asked the crucial question of what grace without any preceding merits Pelagius had in mind when making his famous answer in Palestine: "respondent sine ullis praecedentibus meritis gratiam ipsam humanam esse naturam in qua conditi sumus: neque enim antequam essemus, mereri aliquid poteramus ut essemus" (*ep.* 194,3,8). Augustine tells Sixtus how to reply to this *fallacia*: such is not the grace that Paul speaks of. But it is Augustine's response that is the fallacy. As we have had to observe over and over, the gift of nature is not the whole of grace, but only the first grace or the *initium gratiae*, the grace, exactly as they had replied, *sine ullis praecedentibus meritis*. Augustine's own founding statement of semi-pelagianism, with which we started, makes this plain enough, and shows us how to put the present misrepresentation together with the other one – that the Pelagians say we merit grace – so as to make sense. Augustine's perfect statement of semi-pelagianism in *lib. arb.* III,20,56 fully explains Pelagius's answers in Palestine. See also *gr. et lib. arb.* 14,27 just above.

Gr. et pecc. or. I,31,34 demonstrates exactly the same fallacious charge of heresy Augustine manufactures by splitting his own early doctrine of grace into two parts; this time, such is his skill at sleight of mind that he can make the unmerited gift of human nature disappear though it is right there on the page before you:

“In illis”, [Pelagius] inquit, “nudum et inerme est conditionis bonum”; in eis dicit, qui christiani non sunt. Deinde cetera contexens: “In his uero”, inquit, “qui ad Christum pertinent, Christi munitur auxilio.”

This is to prove that Pelagius was deceiving us when he rejected the meriting of grace in Palestine.

Main Motives

As quoted directly by Augustine, the transcript of Caelestius's trial in Carthage, of 411-412, does not mention the word *grace*, the bishops' main concern being baptism as the one cure for original sin and so the one opening to salvation. They took Caelestius to have denied original sin and so perhaps were concerned to insure that the Catholic Church, through its rite of baptism, held the keys to the Kingdom.

The “Pelagian” statements brought forward by Hilary in *ep.* 156 again do not mention grace itself, but rather challenge the damnation of unbaptized infants on the grounds of their sinlessness, and thereby probably also suggest the salvation of those who are said to live without sin. There are also some remarks attributed to those Christians of Syracuse which smack of perfectionism, thereby perhaps reviving the trauma of the Donatist controversy.

Augustine's *ep.* 157 in answer to Hilary puts the topic of grace at the center; when the trial of Caelestius is cited, his statements are characterized as *has ipsas contra Christi gratiam disputationes* (3,22). To be sure, *ep.* 186,1,1, taken together with *gr. et pecc. or.* I,35,38, suggests that Pelagius had complained as early as 406 of being wrongfully accused of promoting free choice to the exclusion of grace. The former also suggests that, for Augustine, the charge of attacking grace refers mainly to undermining the exclusivity of Christian salvation. This suggests that at this point in the controversy, grace is being used as a “code word.” Another possible reason for Augustine's focusing on grace is that he knew, or was soon to find out, that neither Pelagius nor even Caelestius in fact denied the need for baptism: see, for example, *gr. et pecc. or.* II,4,3-4.

A further possible reason for Augustine's substitution of grace for baptism in the terms of the controversy might at first seem paradoxical: to preserve an opening to salvation, so long as Christian salvation, for non-Christians. Augustine probably never denied the salvation of some "virtuous pagans," though his anti-Pelagian definition of grace does require him to deny that their never having heard of Christ provides them an excuse for not believing (see his remarks on the Sidonians and Tyrians in *praed. sanct.* and *perseu.*). But that same definition denies to Christians, even infants, also any excuse for not receiving grace. In short, Augustine's recasting of the controversy in terms of grace could have been motivated in part by a desire to keep a balance between the institutional and the personal, leaving open direct access to God.

Of course, it was almost inevitable that the theme of God's grace would get drawn into disputes about the damnation of unbaptized infants and in fact the topics had no doubt already been intertwined, following Paul. Augustine himself is painfully aware of the seeming inconsistency of infant damnation with human ideals of justice, and especially as invoked in the case of infants of Christian families. To his credit, he confronted this problem so directly, that the appeal against human merits, however dangerous, was the only one of his solutions that can be taken seriously (see "Semi-Manichaeism" below). He should have left it at that.

As with so much else in his anti-Pelagianism, this denial of human merit would almost certainly have been condemned as heretical, if he had not been able so skillfully to justify it from the writings of Paul. See the passage below from *uera rel.* 14,27 for his own earlier "orthodox" sense of how destructive to our ordinary way of thinking of ourselves and living as human beings would be the denail of free will and responsibility and praise and blame. On the other hand, his genius especially shows in his efforts to make a virtue of this "heresy". He makes a plausible case that other "ways" of life, whether Jewish or Pagan, even of the philosophers, are "Pelagian" in substituting self-justification for God's justification, and that self-justification can easily weaken to conceiving of oneself as just rather making oneself just. Still, however easy to sneer at the lowest common denominator of "orthodoxy" guaranteed by the policeman on the corner, the butcher just down the street, and one's neighbor, *Heart of Darkness* suggests that we not be too quick to scorn it.

As a final point on baptism, we should note its paradoxical role in both sustaining and finally virtually undermining anti-Pelagianism. The obvious reflection that no humans know what God's dispensation

actually is surely would soon have lead to some sort of compromise, were it not for this seeming proof of His actively and openly condemning souls, some of them without any personal sin of their own. Even more troubling, the condemnation applies not just to unspecified individuals but to a whole class of souls, and an almost open-ended class, unless some way of defining its closure is found. The softening vagueness is gone that allowed us to assume that there is some hidden though comprehensible justice at work in grace. Most troubling of all, it is not here as with the answer to Simplicianus concerning Rom 9, a question of unidentified and hypothetical souls (except for Esau), but a class of identifiable and actual souls; as we might say today, the news has been “personalized.”

Is it not here, more than in *simpl.* I,2, that the decisive turn in Augustine’s position occurred, and a turn, moreover, that he was no longer in firm control of? Note, in the discussion of Lettieri’s *L’Altro Agostino* below, the assumption that Augustine’s anti-Pelagianism entails the universal condemnation of pagans. Almost certainly, he never intended such an implication nor sanctioned it. Yet it may have been very difficult for him to reject it openly. Baptism always was a requirement with huge exceptions, being accessible to what in Augustine’s day was only a tiny minority of all who ever lived. Except insofar as he got involved in anti-Pelagianism, that fact was no real problem for Augustine, whose position always was that (Christian) faith remained the same at its core, though defined in different ways and supported by different ceremonies in different times and places, as arranged by God’s infinite wisdom.

With the present virtual abandonment of infant damnation, might it not be better to acknowledge the failure of Augustine’s anti-Pelagianism so as to be able to turn decisively to defining and celebrating his sustainable achievements in defining and recommending grace?¹⁸

The Pelagians, of course, did not agree that they denied grace. In fact, it is so easy to say that of course you acknowledge and pray for God’s help by whatever name, that one must have some sympathy with Augustine’s desire to make them pay more for those verbal

¹⁸ James J. O’Donnell, in *Augustine: A New Biography* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2005), names his chapter on the Pelagian controversy “Augustine’s Great Failure” and ends it with this judgment: “To take this late Augustine seriously is to expose him to criticism that he is finally unable to sustain, and his partisans and opponents are of one party on this” (285). But surely it is due finally to Augustine that the concept of Christian Grace flourishes far beyond the narrow boundaries of learned theological controversies.

acknowledgments, even as one judges his attempt to enforce sincerity and detect lack of it a very dangerous and even pernicious path to set out on. What both sides did agree on was the question of how to do justice to both grace and free will, without destroying one to favor the other. So long as the problem is put that way the Pelagians, following early Augustine, have mostly won in the long term, for they had gone as far as you can in favoring grace without destroying free will (in the ungraced). To be sure, their victory waited a situation where the point of view of religions other than one's own had to be recognized. At any rate, here is a way of stating the controversy which should prove most fruitful if we revive interest in the Pelagian controversy, but only so long as we improve on the original, by treating *both* points of view with respect. What are the advantages and disadvantages of thinking of one's own religion as the only true one, or of recognizing that others have equal claims to truth, at least in the abstract?

Given then that the price of grace had to be measured in terms of other currencies, we must assay them as well. It is significant that in *pecc. mer.* Augustine argues not from original sin to baptism, so as to rationalize the sacrament, as we might expect, but vice-versa, taking Christ's establishment of baptism as the firm fact and trying to infer original sin as its rationale, and this despite having to make a dangerously two-edged appeal to the justice of God in an argument *for* infant damnation (III,2,3): "Let them cast about to find some way of proving it just that persons without any sin come not to eternal life but the wrath of God and are condemned and damned by God – without any sin, I say, if that means not only no sin of their own commission but also without original sin."¹⁹

After their excommunication had been accomplished, in *gr. et pecc. or.* II,1,1 – 6,6 Augustine rounds off a perfectly circular argument by acknowledging that Pelagians do accept baptism but not for the right reason: original sin (see also II,17,19 – 18,19). He now feels secure enough in managing his readers to misrepresent Pelagians as rejecting original sin period, even while quoting the transcript of Caelestius trial in Carthage and the book Caelestius "openly" submitted to Zosimus in Rome (II,6,6), both of which show clearly that what the Pelagians rejected was traducianism, not original sin *per se*. I have

¹⁹ "Iam nunc uideant isti, qua iustitia temptent uel conentur adserere non ad uitam aeternam, sed ad iram Dei pertinere et iudicari diuinitus atque damnari homines, qui sine peccato sunt, si quemadmodum proprium ita nullum in eis est etiam originale peccatum."

cited the latter above to support Caelestius' claim in Carthage that original sin *ex traduce* was not then dogma.

A passage he quotes from Caelestius's book submitted to Zosimus is worth citing as one of the best surviving statements of their own of the main motive of Pelagianism, at least prior to the letters of Prosper and Hilary. In *gr. et pecc. or.* II,6,6, he is quoted as acknowledging that infants should be baptized for remission of sins, so as not to imply different kinds of baptism, but with the proviso that those sins are not *ex traduce*, for that would ascribe them to nature and not to will, and so blame them on the Creator of man's nature.²⁰

It seems safe to identify the main motive of the Pelagians, in the controversy with Augustine, as defense of free will, but in such a way as to defend themselves from the charge of denying grace, in other words, exactly the anti-Manichaeism, or semi-pelagianism, of early Augustine, as we shall see. Whether their interest in grace was sincere, or only a part of their self-defense, is difficult to say, and better left unworried, for we have only their words to go by, and not many of them. We certainly cannot trust Augustine on this point. Their interest in grace was not as profound as Augustine's, but whose is?

Almost certainly what attracted hostile attention was not the defense of free will itself, unless they initiated the controversy, but their universalism, the implication of their defense of free will that the justice of God requires that all men, of any time or place, have a free choice of avoiding damnation. Whether this universalism was their main motive or only an implication of their teaching on free will, perhaps even an implication drawn by their enemies, is hard to say, given the fragmentary nature of their surviving documents. What we

²⁰ "In remissionem autem peccatorum baptizandos infantes, non idcirco diximus, ut peccata ex traduce firmare uideamur: quod longe a catholico sensu alienum est. Quia peccatum non cum homine nascitur, quod postmodum exercetur ab homine: quia non naturae delictum, sed uoluntatis esse monstratur. Et illud ergo confiteri congruum, ne diuersa Baptismatis genera facere uideamur, et hoc praemunire necessarium est, ne per mysterii occasionem, ad Creatoris iniuriam malum antequam fiat ab homine, tradi dicatur homini per naturam." The phrase *ex traduce* does not precisely fit the context of the Pelagian controversy. It is well known that Augustine, though aware on the one hand that the transmission of the soul from the parent(s) and ultimately from Adam would better rationalize his conception of original sin, on the other hand was wary of committing original sin to that one vehicle (see, for example, *ep.* 143, to Marcellinus, and *ep.* 166, to Jerome.) Caelestius defines *ex traduce* here well enough for my purposes in this essay, and we note that sin in human nature versus sin in the human will does precisely reflect the terms used in Augustine's anti-Manichaean polemics, and so presumably explains the implication of Caelestius's remark about Augustine's present position.

do have shows no great desire to save hosts of pagans, so it might be safer to say that their main concern was the justice of God.

The motive of their enemies is easier to guess; no doubt it was not the defense of free will per se, but the implications or the assertions, whichever, of the possibility of salvation outside of Christianity that made the attack, or counter-attack, on the Pelagians seem winnable, to a degree that such a complex and subjective concept as grace never could. As Augustine puts it in *gr. et lib. arb.* 13,25: "*Si ex lege iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est... Si ex natura iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est.*" *Ep.* 186:Paulino. 1,1 finally puts the implications of Pelagius's starting with the grace of general nature accurately: "*ut uidelicet haec intellegatur doctore ipso gratia Dei, quae Paganis atque Christianis, impiis et piis, fidelibus atque infidelibus communis est.*" But we must face a huge paradox or contradiction here, due to the distortions in his doctrine of grace Augustine's involvement in the Bishops' anti-Pelagianism caused. It is obviously far more Augustine than the cautious and orthodox Pelagius who opens salvation to both sides of the last two disjunctions, and probably in the case of the Pagan/Christian disjunction as well.

In fact, in *gr. et pecc. or.* I,31,34, of a year or so later, Augustine was to censure Pelagius for granting a sort of generic advantage to Christians over non-Christians, claiming that amounted to saying that Christians merited grace, though the context clearly shows that Pelagius, following the anti-Manichaean, semi-pelagian Augustine, was counting the grace of Creation as the unmerited *initium gratiae*. There are two fundamental problems with concept of grace responsible for these contradictions.

Augustine clearly understands that he cannot simply destroy the concept of merit, whether against the language of the Bible or against universal human values. He allows merit back in after the first grace with his distinction between operative and cooperative grace. Consequently, his argument with Pelagians ought to focus on the *initium gratiae*. But with some exceptions, as we shall see, he simply squashes their process of grace flat, ignoring its stages, so rendering most of his attack on them, for those who expect a high standard of argument, one vast either/or fallacy, either grace or merit.

As for the other problem, we can credit Augustine's careful analysis with raising this question: whether there is some fundamental contradiction between the concept of *unmerited* grace and the concept of *Christian* grace (at least if that means exclusively Christian grace). One may fairly say that he did not adequately address this problem; he either did not notice that it had been raised, or pretended not to. On

the other hand, as we have begun to notice, Augustine probably never ruled out the salvation of those we would normally think of as non-Christians, his concern rather being to define all salvation as Christian salvation. Perhaps, given his times, that is the most we should expect, excepting of course always a higher quality of argument, worthy of his own great abilities.

There are at least two substantial passages in Augustine's attacks that do seem to show Pelagius asserting the universality of *access* to salvation for its own sake and not just as an universal implication of free will. The first, from *nat. et gr.* 2,2, I shall not quote, since it is long and not certainly a quotation from Pelagius. I do agree with the Latin text of the *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana* and the two recent English translations in *The Fathers of the Church* and *The Works of St. Augustine* series, which put quotation marks around the passage, taking it as a direct quotation from Pelagius's *De natura*. But the Latin texts of *Patrologia Latina* and of CSEL have no such marks, thus presumably taking the words as Augustine's, though probably as summarizing Pelagius's position. And the ambiguity does not stop there. The discussion above of Augustine's unusual argument from baptism to original sin (rather than vice-versa), via daring to argue that God could not justly condemn infants with no sins of their own unless they were infected with original sin, and especially the passage quoted from *pecc. mer.* III,2,3, if compared carefully with the passage under consideration, will show that it could express Augustine's own position.

To be sure, Augustine immediately responds that if such salvation of those who never heard of Christ is possible then "Christ has died in vain" (thus transforming His mission to save all men into the rationale for the damnation of many). But the passage contains nothing that Augustine does not also affirm. We cannot impute any special credit – or blame – to Pelagius as an early source of deism; if we are to call Pelagius a "deist" then we shall have to call Augustine (and not just early Augustine) a deist also. They both get their "deism," such as it is, from the same safe source: the "facts" of the Old Testament as interpreted by Paul, especially in Hebrews and Romans. Augustine also, and even *after turning against Pelagius*, acknowledges the salvation not only of ancient Hebrews, some under the natural law, but also of some not Hebrews (such as Job, Ahazuerus /Artaxerxes,²¹ and the

²¹ Augustine cites to disprove Pelagianism instantaneous conversions supposedly somewhat like his own, in which God conquers a resisting mind, such as Paul's or that of Ahazuerus/Artaxerxes in the additions to the Book of Esther (Chapter 15; cited in *gr. et pecc. or.* I,24,25). Let us just note in passing that Augustine's allegorical

inhabitants of Nineveh); see for example, *gr. et pecc. or.* II,24,28-26,30. Even after turning against the Pelagians, for Augustine it is *not* limitations of time or place that rule out Christian salvation; rather, he places it beyond the reach of human free will whatever the time or place, *when*, that is, he is stating his ultimate defense against *semi*-Pelagianism. We *could* read the passage in question as Augustine's own position, *if* we take it as setting up his doctrine of original sin and the subsequent absence of any good in human wills prior to grace, these topics being the subject of the surrounding paragraphs of *nat. et gr.*

In fact, there is an unusual twist here; it is mainly after writing *simpl.*, the supposed turning point defeating free will in the name of grace, that Augustine publicly affirms the possibility of the salvation of pagans, as in *ep.* 102 (*Contra paganos*). It is as if determining that all salvation is Christian, that is, initiated by the grace of Christ, so that any perplexity of a multi-cultural salvation is avoided, is what freed Augustine to acknowledge the salvation of *some* pagans.

If we find it a puzzle that the early anti-Manichean Augustine was less open in vindicating the free choice of salvation in pagans even as he vindicated free choice in general, the answer may be that he did not want to jeopardize the latter by pushing it into dangerous paths. In *uera rel.* there is statement that may help to explain this puzzle and perhaps much more; it occurs in the context of asserting the conventional theological rationale for free will, and doing so in the context of original sin (14,27 ff.): "But although God heals souls in every sort of way adapted to the particular circumstances of the times, arranged by His wonderful wisdom – but these are not to be discussed, or only among the pious and the perfect –

reading of Artaxerses' sudden change of attitude to prove *interna et occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum* seems insensible to the great literary skill lavished on the appearance and behavior of Ester, and perhaps on her skill, as causes for the change. Augustine's argument would also seem to require that such conversions at least be typical. Thomas denies that Paul's conversion is typical; in fact he characterizes it as miraculous, unlike most (*ST*,1a2ae, 113, a. 10). In fact, Augustine's "conversion" (if he can be said ever to have left Christianity, as against the Catholic Church) seems much closer to Thomas's account of "external" habits being gradually internalized and deepened than to Paul's conversion. The dramatic scene in the garden was not a conversion to Christianity, but to asceticism, away from the world. A theory of grace must be adapted to its living context. Augustine's, arising from the age of adult conversions from paganism, had to be adapted to fit an age such as Thomas's, now long thoroughly Christianized. Our own age has rendered "Augustinian" conversions relevant again, though many of them away from Christianity to novel or fanatical versions of religion, including Christian.

nevertheless in no way more beneficent did He show care for the human race than when... *the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us*" (16,30).²²

If we posit a personal doctrine of grace of Augustine's own, in distinction from the one he proclaimed publicly at the request of his fellow bishops on behalf of the Church, and allow ourselves to speculate about that silent and vanished doctrine, it is at least possible that the main difference between Augustine and Pelagius is that Augustine believed that the interests of the Church ruled out *public* discussion of the possible non-exclusivity of Christian salvation. So far as that, it is possible that the leading Pelagians also accepted that caution, until "outed" by indiscreet enemies.

The authenticity of Augustine's direct quotation of the second "universalist" passage from Pelagius (identified as his in *C. ep. Pel.* I,21,39) seems more certain. Its context is also instructive: *gr. et pecc. or.* II,24,28 appeals to the hardened version of anti-Pelagianism we would expect after the condemnation of Pelagius and Caelestius. It is one and the same faith, in the incarnation and death and resurrection of Christ, that is the only salvation and required of all men (even if not offered to all), even for the saints mentioned or not mentioned in the Old Testament, including any non-Hebrews such as Job. Furthermore, the grace that cures is absolutely before any human merit, not necessarily, however, before any human acts of will, for in 24,29 he repeats his familiar "semi-pelagian" version of the function of the Law: to show people that they could not be justified by law, whether of nature or the written Law, so that they would ask God for help. This account of law leading to the grace of Christ before Christ probably enabled Thomas's "implicit" faith, the faith not explicitly Christian but sufficient to Christian salvation, and like it operates so far as we can tell naturally as against, or as well as, supernaturally. Consequently, if anything Pelagius's version (26,30), in implying that before Christ salvation was available through His *discipuli*, appears more conventionally "orthodox" than Augustine's, in "dividing the times":

Let us not then, like Pelagius and his disciples, divide the times, saying that men had first lived as just from nature, then under the Law, thirdly under grace, "from nature," that is, starting from

²² Sed cum omnibus modis medeatur animis Deus pro temporum opportunitatibus, quae mira sapientia eius ordinantur, de quibus aut non est tractandum, aut inter pios perfectosque tractandum est; nullo modo beneficentius consuluit generi humano, quam cum... *Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis* (16,30).

Adam, that very long age when the Law had not yet been given. They say, "For then the Creator was recognized by the power of reason, and how one should live was carried written in the heart, not the written Law but the law of nature. But customs and morals became corrupted," they go on, "when nature now corroded began not to suffice, the Law was added to nature; by it, as by a file, the rust was polished away and nature restored to its pristine brightness. But afterwards," thus they argue, "the habit of sinning too much prevailed, for curing which the law had too little strength. Christ then came, as the physician himself, by his own presence, and not just through his assistants, comes to relieve a desperate disease."²³

The only difference I can find between the two that might be implied here is that the Law operates through Pauline reverse psychology in Augustine and presumably straightforwardly in Pelagius.²⁴ But any adequate psychology surely must include both: law must operate straightforwardly before it can operate by reverse psychology.

This brings us to a final point about main motives, an important one that nevertheless must be treated too briefly: sympathies change radically as we look at this controversy from changing perspectives. So long as Augustine sticks to the psychology of grace, he mostly has the best of it, especially in appealing to Paul. But when we have to contemplate God carefully and even lovingly creating a human soul

²³ Non igitur, sicut Pelagius et eius discipuli, tempora diuidamus, dicentes primum uixisse iustos homines ex natura, deinde sub lege, tertio sub gratia. Ex natura, scilicet ab Adam tam longa aetate, qua lex nondum erat data. "Tunc enim", aiunt, "duce ratione cognoscebatur Creator, et quemadmodum esset uiuendum, scriptum gerebatur in cordibus, non lege litterae, sed naturae. Verum uitatis moribus, inquit, ubi coepit non sufficere natura iam decolor, lex ei addita est, qua, uelut lima, fulgori pristino detrita rubigine redderetur. Sed posteaquam nimia, sicut disputant, peccandi consuetudo praeualuit, cui sanandae lex parum ualeret: Christus aduenit, et tamquam morbo desperatissimo, non per discipulos, sed per se ipsum medicus ipse subuenit." We should observe at least two additional points of interest here: (1) the reference to Rom 2:12-16 on the gentiles who have the law written on their hearts and (2) Pelagius's version of original sin, probably taken from early Augustine.

²⁴ It is not until later (*ep.* 164, 6,17-18) that Augustine will succeed in separating himself from semi-Pelagians on this point, though only to implicate himself in semi-pelagianism on a more important point. He speculates, or asserts, that before His coming in the flesh and indeed starting with Adam and Eve, the to-be-incarnated Christ (he must avoid the implied universalism of citing the Logos here) came down "in spirit": *ad utrosque [malos et bonos] admonendos, ut alii ad salutem suam crederent, alii ad poenam suam non crederent, ipse utique non in carne, sed in spiritu ueniebat, uisis congruis alloquens, quos uolebat, sicut uolebat.* We can be much more confident of the Pelagians' desire to blame the ungraced than of their desire to save them – they were no Origenists. So Augustine's blaming of the unbelieving here, and in the context of their failure to respond to Christ's admonitions, implies that those who do heed in some sense are meriting grace; see his argument to this effect in *simp.* 1,2,8 ff.

with the purpose of sending it to eternal agony, not because respecting its freedom to choose, but via denying it the freedom to choose, Augustine's position becomes all but untenable, and even appealing to Paul does him little good on this point. His own and his followers' attempts, even at the cost of self-contradiction, to prove that the ungraced somehow merit their lack of grace virtually acknowledge that reprobation cannot be made acceptable in theological terms, that is, as consistent with the justice of God, however convincing from a psychological perspective. The abilities of the Pelagians did not measure up to Augustine's, but it must be admitted that they gradually forced him onto such ground.

After Augustine's death, Prosper compiled two lists of charges made by Pelagians against Augustine's destroying of free will via predestination. Prosper tries, usually in vain except for keeping up appearances, to answer them. Probably falling into the Pelagians' trap, he even anathematizes them, generally in an introduction and specifically in some cases. One of these is that, according to Augustine, God uses some (the ungraced) as means to serve the ends of the chosen.²⁵ Despite Prosper's indignant denial, it is easy to find evidence for this charge, such as *persev.* 8,18 or *praed. sanct.* 16,32-33, and in fact as early as *simpl.* I,2,18. Prosper's revulsion from the idea, even though his difference from Augustine is cosmetic, shows how far Augustine was from winning the war even after the defeat of Pelagius and Caelestius.

But let mere opinion make way for the question itself. The Pelagian controversy, revived as it ought to have been, asks these questions: Is it possible to rationalize reprobation, faced honestly and directly? If not, what follows?

Semi-Manichaeism: Adam Died to Save God from Sin

One of Augustine's great strengths is his facility in argument, but it can be a weakness too. He shows too much tolerance for self-contradiction, or fondness for paradox, if you prefer. Some of this is forced on him by the circumstances of his times. Religions rise and develop in a particular time and place, and when any of them aspire to universality and that is taken to imply exclusivity in truth, apologists will face difficulties in defining that universality. Most embar-

²⁵ *Answers to the Objections of the Gauls and Answer to the Vincentian Articles* in Prudentius De Letter, SJ, (trans.), *Prosper of Aquitaine: Defense of St. Augustine* (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1963). See Objection 13 of the former.

rassing perhaps is Augustine's repeated turning of 1 Tim 2:4 into the tautology that God desires to save all men whom he desires to save.²⁶ In *pecc. mer.* I,18,23, he cites Christ's mission to save all mankind against itself: "Sine ista ergo regeneratione saluos in aeternum posse paruulos fieri quis audeat adfirmare, tamquam non pro eis mortuus sit Christus?" ("Who would dare claim that without the rebirth [of baptism] little ones could attain eternal salvation, as if Christ died not for them?").

Gaetano Lettieri, in his massive and monumental *L'Altro Agostino*, provides a useful formula for classifying interpretations of Augustine on grace, original sin and free will.²⁷ It must be evident that the present essay agrees with him in holding that by some point a change occurred rendering Augustine's later anti-Pelagianism irreconcilable with what went before it. On the other hand, this account finds much more continuity than he between the two Augustines. He finds such a decisive and definitive break between "la scoperta della grazia indebita e predestinata in *Ad Simplicianum* I,2" and "la platonizzante teologia" that went before that he spends much time refuting details of the traditional chronology which would seem to weigh against a decisive turn at that point. But if the writings prior to *simpl.* show "arcaica e del tutto 'superficiale' rispetto alla nuova, rivoluzionaria dottrina della grazia" and "il minimo accenno" to it, by what signs are we assured that *simpl.* is more sincere and serious?²⁸ And what about *simpl.* I,1's "archaic" answer to the first question, about Rom 7? Is not the evidence better for the trial of Caelestius as forcing a decision on a temporizing Augustine? And even then, does he not contemplate a compromise in *spir. et litt.*? Are the questions involved so easy to answer that we cannot understand and even share a desire to defer them? So far as those who would make a semi-Pelagian out of (late) Augustine, it is true that they would be overlooking his intentions, unless they acknowledged their own part in the transformation. But

²⁶ Prosper is often referred to as having broken with Augustine on this crucial point, but at most he can be said to put on a good show, as in the title itself: *De uocatione omnium gentium*. Chapters 9-12 of Book One provide much amusement, as you watch his futile struggle to find a more acceptable way of parsing the tautology. They provide instruction as well. The original sin, so to speak, of Augustine's concept of original sin is that, in the context of the Pelagian controversy, it was invoked to enforce Christian exclusivity, and so you can never get beyond that, except by taking a new start.

²⁷ *Ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi metamorphosi del De doctrina christiana*. Brescia: Morcelliana, 2001.

²⁸ For the quotations, see page 7. For the argument about chronology, see Chapter Two. The complaint about Augustine's minimal and superficial nods toward grace sound exactly like Augustine's complaints about Pelagius!

after all, if the Church has in effect condemned reprobation, what else in serious fact and in honest logic is left of his anti-Pelagianism? And what is the ultimate implication of Lettieri's ridiculing of them (besides the admitted fun of it)? That the Church should condemn its condemnation of reprobation? Or, on the contrary, that it should condemn Augustine as a semi-Manichaean heretic?²⁹

In sum, Lettieri's position on several points is perfect for an illuminating comparison with this essay, whichever is correct. (1) If this essay is correct about Augustine's acquaintance with the problems raised by Paul on grace at least as early as his time with the Manichaeans, Lettieri's failure to recognize that, or take it seriously, can be seen to lead to far too sharp a break between Augustine's anti-Pelagianism and whatever exactly it is that Lettieri opposes to it. (2) On page 547 of the note on Rottmanner, Lettieri appears to agree that a doctrine of Augustine's that belies attempts to reconcile him with semi-Pelagianism is "quella dell'universale condanna dei pagani." If Lettieri can demonstrate any such doctrine in Augustine, he should do so. There is no question that Augustine's anti-Pelagian doctrine of grace does not grant to pagans any excuse for never having heard of Christ, just as it does not grant any excuse to anyone – how could it, after condemning unbaptized infants? – and he certainly does not promise special hope for salvation of all virtuous pagans, just as he does not promise such hope to virtuous anyone. But all of that is far from a doctrine of universal condemnation of pagans. Unless Lettieri can find such proof, he should consider what Grossi reminded us of – that Paul's inclusion of the Old Testament in the sacred story makes for rather significant qualifications of Paul's own exclusionary account in Romans. See note 9 above. And let Lettieri compare *nat. et gr.* 2,2 (discussed at length just above in "Main Motives") with the end of *nat. et gr.* 67,81, where he ends the essay by approving a quotation from *lib. arb.* taking a position indistinguishable from the one of Pelagius he began by finding heretical. Is not this human figure, struggling, sometimes in vain, to organize his feelings and make up his mind, a much more interesting and believable figure than an unhesitating and infallible dispenser of definitive dogma? And perhaps a wiser one, too.

The anti-Manichaean vindications of free will that caused Augustine embarrassment later were no thoughtless utterances prior to reading Paul or to thinking about grace and "original sin." He would

²⁹ See, in *L'Altro Agostino*, pages 544-549: "Nota [bibliographica] XI – Contra Rottmanner: su alcune interpretazioni "semipelagiane" di Agostino."

have become acquainted with all of the elements of his various theories of grace well before leaving the Manichees; the later developments of his teaching were rearrangements of those elements, in response to friends as well as to opponents (if we could define which were which!). In fact two of those elements are almost certainly among the various motives which led to his conversion to Manichaeism. One would be the question of the nature of God, especially in the context of accounting for the existence of evil, their clearing God of any responsibility for evil being an attractive if short-sighted solution. And then there is his life-long fascination with the mind or will divided against itself, both attracted to but rebelling against the good or the Law. This latter, the cornerstone of Western psychology, is perhaps the essence of the *uncontroversial* contribution to Christianity of the Pelagian controversy.

Augustine's effort in written attacks is often, but not always, to portray Manichaeism as a rival religion to Christianity, and not as a sect of Christianity, but at least two of his Manichee opponents, Fortunatus and Faustus, strongly resist this attempt and instead portray their religion as the true because Pauline version of Christianity, the one which accurately reflects Paul's "rejection" of the Law and of the "Old" Testament and his explanation for the source of evil in the "old" or "fleshly" man.³⁰ I shall have to leave to experts in that field to give an authoritative account of the version of Paul Augustine was likely to have gotten both before and after his conversion to Manichaeism, but it seems to me likely that under the Manichees he would have gotten a thorough-going privileging of grace over free will; that would seem to follow from his almost single-minded emphasis on their destroying of free will, in his reaction against them.

Augustine's break with the Manichees required him to find an alternative source for evil, neither in a independent force of Darkness nor in the good Creator (his Manichee opponents claimed that is the

³⁰ These themes might seem to anticipate the millenarian interpretations of Paul during medieval Christianity and during 17th century England, and in William Blake. So far as a "Christianized" version of Manichaeism, at least in North Africa, Grossi's discussion of the stages of initiation into Christianity, via preparation for baptism, illustrated in the writings of Augustine, reveals the use of some of the same terms as in Manichaeism, such as "Auditors" and "Elect;" see page 331 of the essay referred to above. The article on "Manichaeism" in *Augustine through the Ages* asserts that recent research now points to Christianity as the main influence on Manichaeism. Augustine does try to force his Manichee opponents onto the ground of their non-Christian mythology, such as their theological dualism, but Fortunatus seems almost unfamiliar with the matter, and appears at the end to promise to convert to Catholicism if his superiors cannot answer Augustine's objections.

explanation Catholics are left with). It had to be the human will, and in fact, to separate clearly from their conceptions both of man and of God, it must be the human *free* will. When, nearly a quarter of a century later, Augustine decided to sanction and to rationalize the appeal of the Church at Carthage to that complex of salvation as exclusively Christian, of original sin, and of infant damnation, in the trial of Caelestius, that leaves Adam as the only human exemplar of free will prior to grace.

A little knowledge of Augustine's anti-Manichaean writings can throw light not only on his semi-pelagian reaction against them but on his partial return to Manichaeism in reaction against the Pelagians, just as the latter charged. He was right to deny this charge in that he did not return to Manichaean dualistic theology, but they were right in that he did return, in effect, to Manichaean dualistic anthropology, with the exception of the brief moments of Adam's innocence and free choice, before his fall, thus putting immense pressure (more than it can sustain?) on this vanishingly short beginning of human history. Can that fleeting moment justify God in washing His hands of responsibility for saving those who cannot be saved without His help and saved from His own *poena* imposed on them, for some their only sin?³¹

Before turning to his attempt to deal with that hard question, let us look at what might be the most enduring of Augustine's positions on grace, the "semi-pelagian" interlude before his return to "semi-Manichaeism." His attempts to refute the Manichees did not mean that he rejected their appeal to Paul's critique of free will and to his teaching of the grace of Christ as the only remedy for consequences of Adam's sin. He does, though, to put it carefully, refute Manichaean interpretations of Paul that totally destroy free will, even in the ungraced, that, in other words, insist on total perversity or otherwise put grace beyond the free choice.³² Experts can probably tell us

³¹ If Augustine does decide deliberately, instead of casually and ad hoc, to abandon original sin *ex traduce* and totally perverse, in his comment on the Tyrians and Sidonians in his last writings, in favor of resting all on God's predestination, maybe we glimpse the possibility that backing away from Manichaean anthropology risks returning to Manichaean dualistic theology. It may be easier to accept God's leaving some in a state of total perversity that is his own *poena*, than to accept His damnation, before they had a chance of avoiding it, of those not entirely despicable. See *ep.* 186,6,18ff. for Augustine's own reasoning to this effect.

³² Granted, the recognition of the problem that he was soon to call "original sin" is so abrupt in the early *lib. arb.* as to suggest later addition. But in the almost contemporaneous *vera rel.* he invokes *homo uetus et exterior et terrenus* (26,49). And the early debate (392) with Fortunatus confirms that *ergo duo sint genera malorum, peccatum et poena peccati* (15). In short, Augustine the anti-Pelagian could plausibly and even rightly claim a certain consistency from beginning to end in his doctrine of grace,

whether either the Manichees or Augustine while under their influence or, in fact, later, as a semi-pelagian, held original sin to be *ex traduce*. But as noted above, even in *pecc. mer.*, baptism was used to prove original sin, not vice versa. And at the least Augustine does not in the early writings treat original sin as a settled theological doctrine widely enough accepted as to preclude the need for interpretation and explanation based on human experience.

Perhaps the most interesting – and significant, in influencing semi-pelagianism, including Thomas's – of these early treatments of original sin is in *c. Fort.* 22. The familiar order of *poena* first and then *peccatum* is reversed. To be sure there is an "original" aspect, an excessive love of pleasure and consequent tendency to form (bad) habits, but the actual loss of free will to bad habit must be activated by personal sins or acts:

Hodie namque in nostris actionibus antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid, uel non faciendi. Cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid, et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciose dulcedo et uoluptas, eadem ipsa sua consuetudine sic implicatur, ut postea uincere non possit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est.

The similarity to modern theories of addiction is obvious. This version of original sin, unlike his anti-Pelagian version, clearly spares free will in the ungraced and even allows them to be blamed, obviously and straightforwardly, for incurring God's *poena*.³³ In *simpl.*

but as my analysis has made clear, I trust, that claim is not entirely in good faith, not until in the last two tracts he admitted that he had once held the view of grace and free will as now his semi-Pelagian critics held.

³³ On page 342 of the work cited in note 9, Vittorino Grossi seems to regret that his research has not been able to improve much on a contemporary disproportion in treating original sin: "Oggi s'insiste sull'aspetto dommatico del peccato originale, qualcosa quindi che ne trascende l'aspetto fenomenologico." Those interested in a nuanced conception of original sin instead of a doctrinal absolute can find more of interest in these early writings. In *ex. prop. Rom.* 38,45, he explicates Paul's *lex peccati* as "carnalis consuetudo." More interestingly, in *simpl.* I,1,11, he describes the *poena* imposed on Adam's progeny as *mortalitas quasi secunda natura* causing *concupiscentia* – Carpe Diem? – which is then *mole consuetudinis roborata*. Could the explanatory significance of *mortalitas* be a reference, indirectly if not directly, to the great passage in which Aristotle explains reproduction (in all living beings including ants and plants) as the aspiration of the mortal for immortality and as the most "natural" act of life, apparently even more so than nutrition, presumably because anything has to achieve "a certain magnitude" (here of duration) to be significant; see *On the Soul*, II, 4 (415^a 23 - ^b 8)? I rather hope not; it would be a sad caricature. It is not surprising that right after the appeal to infant damnation in Caelestius's trial, Augustine should have difficulty adjusting from a nuanced conception of original sin adapted

I, 1, 13, he cites Sap 9: 15 as what we can take to express well his version of traducianism, original sin passed down by the body and not directly by the soul and as probably the theory of original sin held by Pelagius and even by Caelestius: *Corpus enim quod corrumpitur aggrauat animam*. Probably it is the version of original sin he would have retained, except for needing to reject Pelagianism. Maybe with close reading, we could even find evidence he did retain it, at least in private. In short we may say that Augustine's early conception of original sin is "Pelagian," which may simply be to say that Pelagius defended himself out of early Augustine, after being attacked; we certainly seem to be able to track him all over Augustine's early writings. In the absence of any factual knowledge about which of these two had priority, we can be confident that it is Augustine who was clearly the original thinker, even to the point of being the potential heretic!

Before turning, as promised, to an evaluation of Augustine's attempts to prove that his anti-Pelagian account of original sin does not destroy free will, it is appropriate to recognize, if too briefly, a recent attempt to render Augustine's arguments in terms of contemporary theology and philosophy, Paul Rigby's article, "Original Sin," in *Augustine through the Ages*.³⁴ It can be highly recommended as a supplement, or antidote, or whatever, to the present essay, for several reasons, one being that it does not limit itself strictly to the Pelagian controversy as does the present essay. Above all, it can be recommended as a good starting point for reviving and improving the Pelagian controversy, though perhaps it is more successful in reviving interest in Augustine's thought than in elucidating it, at least for those who require some overt signs of critical difference between the perspectives of interpreter and interpreted, in order to be fully satisfied that elucidation has occurred.

Rigby's for-and-against-at-once case for free will in the context of original sin seems to owe something, directly or indirectly, to Sartre's paradoxical fusion of an ethical perspective with its absolute demand for free will in action with a psychological or anthropological perspective rendering free will impossible, or nearly so. And indeed,

to adult free will to the new doctrinal absolute. In *ep.* 157: *Ilario*, 3, 15, on Paul's law of sin and death, he seems to catch himself in mid sentence: "Quae tamen nisi mala postea consuetudine roboretur, facilius uincitur, non tamen nisi gratia Dei." In fact he never abandoned trying to blame the ungraced for their own lack, however incompatible with the new conception of original sin as prior to will.

³⁴ P. Rigby, "Original Sin", in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 607-614.

if we include the “nearly so” this might seem a fair statement of the human condition to both sides or all sides, except to any who would reject it as “semi-Pelagian.” Indeed, a possible reservation about Rigby’s case is whether it is semi-Pelagian or anti-Pelagian. In saying that one of the dimensions of Augustine’s “mature” conception of original sin is that “baptism is the necessary means of salvation for all, including infants” (p. 608a), he would imply or at least entail that the real “turning point” is better to be found in the decision to rationalize the bishops’ condemnation of Caelestius than is *simpl.* Since infants do not have actual free will, original sin would have to be a doctrinally defined *penalty* imposed by God; on the other hand, some of the “phenomenological” aspects of original sin Rigby appeals to, in order to blame the loss for free will on human nature, seem to refer back to original sin as in Augustine’s early anti-Manichaean days. But maybe Rigby answers these questions in his fuller treatment in book form.

Perhaps the same can be said of another question absent from the encyclopedia article, but absent unfortunately almost always, in discussions of original sin: an adequate recognition that unless you start with comparable versions of unfallen states of nature you do not have comparable versions of original sin. So far as this problem is solved at all, it is by letting Augustine impose his versions, but that solution will not work if we are to revive interest in the controversy. Furthermore, this question about the unfallen state may return in what we have really been about all along, the state of beatitude.

On the one hand, Augustine’s conception of unfallen human nature without any trace of concupiscence certainly does vindicate his argument that only via divine intervention is fallen nature to be recovered. On the other hand it gives us an alien Adam, with whom we cannot identify, at least in case of the male, and unless Viagra was among the unforbidden fruits. Augustine’s starting point is simply too idiosyncratic to serve as a universal. Any real comparison between Augustine and Pelagius on original sin is probably precluded by this factor.

Might not the great classical definition of man as the rational animal have been a better version of the starting point? It is certainly open to fall into “original sin,” no problem there. At any rate it would enable a somewhat more warmly human version of innocence regained. There is of course no disputing tastes in beatitude, but those who feel that Augustine has left out a rung or two of the Platonic ladder of love could turn to *La Chartreuse de Parme*, our guide back to Dante and Boccaccio and others on the summit of Christian culture,

and especially to the great scene in Chapter 15. At a party at Count Zurla's, for more than an hour, those two magnificent women, the Duchessa and Clelia Conti, contemplate, enjoy and reflect back the signs of passion in each other, surrounded by a circle of otherwise silly courtiers now transformed into the blessed. Love of the human capacity to love is the first rung above the limitations of concupiscence and towards its transformation and transcendence. Those need not be driven by finding fault with concupiscence itself – that would only increase its fascination, as Augustine well knew – but by the vastly greater and wider power to love to be found in the spirit as compared with the poor weak body, its love being (relatively) unsharable, like all lesser because material goods. See the exposition in *Purgatorio*, 15, 44-75, Virgil's, interestingly.

The scene is greater still; it contains the seeds of the fall from innocence: the two women do not know yet they are in love with the same man, not even Clelia quite knows it yet. So we are still on earth, but with a glimpse of the goal, as in the ending of *Passage to India*, and everywhere in Chekhov.

This is the occasion to mention briefly a profound problem behind our subject, but without any presumption to solve it, if indeed it is solvable, beyond saying that it too touches on tastes which are not to be disputed. Rigby and Lettieri share an account of Augustine which emphasizes the "dark," the "tragic," the "mystery," the "anti-rational," though whether because that is their taste too we do not know. They are certainly not inventing this aspect of Augustine. We might generalize and interpret this theme by referring to one of the best known cases of it, T.S. Eliot's preference, at least in the first years after his conversion, for a "hard" God as we might put it, "Christ the Tiger" (a reference to Blake's "The Tyger," burning bright in the forests of the night and seemingly from a different Creator than the lamb's?). One supposes that such a God has the advantage of not seeming a figment of human wish-fulfillment, much as Eliot's attraction to pain might be as a disproof of solipsism. This taste in religion might also be compared to the preference for the "harder" reading in theory of interpretation. Speaking of the latter, and perhaps of the former, we might wonder if the considerable value in the approach needs to be balanced by care not to slide into perversity. Does not the beginning of the gospel of John weigh against making too much of a dark and non-rationalized God?

Clearly one of the valid reasons for revival of original sin in our time is as a response to its tragic history. We just need to be wary that any version of the doctrine of the total perversity of the

ungraced, along with a non-rationalized God, does not cause tragic history.

There is one more question to be raised, in connection with Rigby (though not singling him out), and recalling Eleonore Stump's comment we began with, on the too many versions of Augustine on free will. In the early work, the *De duabus animabus*, he spends much time wondering over and trying to explain his long failure to see through the obvious and pernicious Manichaean error of denying free will, so as to help others see through this and other sophistical arguments. To accomplish this, he renounces all "obscure and profound points, such as, given the few who understand them, often give rise to suspicion of fraud or ostentation" (10.13).³⁵ He uses thought experiments rather like "Frankfurt stories" (omitted here, but much recommended) designed to elicit definitions of free will and other recognitions which "nature herself proclaims... in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the youth to the old man, from kindergarten to the judgment seat of the wise" (10.14).³⁶ Could Augustine's versions of free will in those not given grace pass such a test? Or again, it may be the resistance of the laity to the "philosophical" versions of free will in Augustine and followers that has in fact more than anything else brought about the near-triumph of Pelagianism, even if not in name. Predestination was almost never mentioned and when mentioned was explained away as foreknowledge in the Presbyterianism of my youth, Southern Presbyterianism at that! Much more recently I have heard a Franciscan Friar tell students that predestination is "a Protestant problem."

In view of these questions, it seems appropriate here to make as blunt and as direct a case as possible, in the spirit of his own test, against Augustine's claims that he did not destroy free will. Then we can see what can be said in response, thereby at least gaining some clarification.

When he undertook to defend and rationalize in the name of grace his fellow bishops' appeal to original sin *ex traduce*, especially as proved by the damnation of unbaptized infants, many will judge

³⁵ "Quisquamne me ista tractantem, posset dicere, in rebus obscuris abditisque uersari, ubi propter intellegentium paucitatem uel fraudis uel ostentationis suspicio nasci solet?" We need not be quite so suspicious of the motives behind the use of specialist language nor quite so confident of the truth-telling of "natural" language to agree that Augustine, like Orwell's 1984 and like that spoof "scientific" essay in deconstructionist jargon accepted for publication, gives a fair warning here.

³⁶ "Haec cum in omnibus hominibus, quos interrogare non absurde possumus, a puero usque ad senem, a ludo litterario usque ad solium sapientis, natura ipsa proclamet."

that it became impossible for him to reconcile grace with free will in the ungraced, or all but impossible, shall we say. The embarrassment caused to Pelagians by this diabolical argument, to Augustine's great satisfaction, hid the even more damaging embarrassment it was to cause to his own reasoning, even if he was able to hide that from himself and until recently from others. He could lean on our ordinary sense that humans are responsible for their evil acts, and he was careful not to contradict that, even as his theory of grace and of merit undermines the ordinary rationale for that ordinary sense.

An unmistakable sign of the real difference between his semi-pelagianism and his anti-Pelagianism appears on the question of which is prior, foreknowledge or predestination. By the time of the last essays, Augustine was not one to confront his opponents best arguments, if they gave him bad ones to savage. In *praed. sanct.* the once subtle ironist and humorist inflicts upon us ten tedious pages of loud railing at the stupidity of men who, to preserve free will, hold that God's predestination was based upon His foreknowledge. Not content with that, even while saying he is ashamed to be thought to take their argument seriously, he resumes his rebuttal in ten even more tedious pages in *persev.*, and this despite the fact that Hilary had pointed out to him (*ep.* 226,3) that these men had appealed to his own arguments to this effect.³⁷

Some followers of Luther and Calvin, and perhaps of Augustine himself, seem to acknowledge implicitly the danger of a return to a semi-Manichaean dualistic *theology* by attempting to soften predestination via distinguishing different concepts of it and choosing the one which makes God responsible for all the good of the graced but for none of the evil of the ungraced, and Augustine himself certainly tries to take such a position. But, even if you judge that such a position is a paradox and not simply a self-contradiction, the attempt is futile, for he has himself as the first step in his teaching defined original sin as a penalty, *poena*, so as to identify two kinds of sin, *peccatum et poena peccati*, with the latter being pointedly distinguished from personal sin of one's own committing.

Probably the best comment on this attempt to soften predestination by blaming the ungraced is Augustine's own argument in *simpl.* 1,2,8 ff., where he acknowledges that to blame Esau for not receiving grace entails ascribing merit to Jacob. The method in this tract of

³⁷ *Ex. prop. Rom.* 52,60 puts God's foreknowledge (of faith) prior, in time and as cause, to predestination, with the explicit purpose of not destroying free will. In *ep.* 102.14, he applies a similar argument to whole ages.

raising objections from his earlier attempts to preserve free will (especially in *ex. prop. Rom.*) and then countering them head-on is so much more candid and searching than his later attempts to reconcile grace and free will that we must agree with his later assessment that in *simpl.* grace won out over free will, literally. But the result is so "unacceptable," shall we say, that his later fudging seems to reflect not only a concern not to cross Rome but a sense of taboo deep within himself.³⁸

The very number of different explanations of how the fallen can be said to have free will – or failing that, how God can be absolved of injustice for condemning to eternal torment those who never had a free choice of avoiding damnation – argues that Augustine himself, to his credit, did not find them valid.

Augustine often appeals to what some readers will consider an inadequate definition of free will, as the absence of external compulsion, so that if you do something because you desire to do it, you do it freely. But how does this distinguish the human from the animal? Can a being capable only of evil thoughts or acts be said to have free will, in a context where that will mean eternal torment, as against the fates of those capable of the alternatives of good and evil? Augustine's own attempt to argue that there can be free choices without there being alternatives (*nat. et gr.* 46,54 and 49,57) has apparently been revived by some modern thinkers.³⁹ Without professing to be able thoroughly to sort the grain from the bran on this interesting puzzler, one can point to the obvious fact that, even if, on one hand, you take exceptions to prove that absence of an alternative does not in itself necessarily rule out free will, on the other hand, those exceptions certainly do not prove that alternatives are never necessary for us to judge that there is free will. That is surely a matter of judgment going far beyond logic.

Then there is the argument (seeming to acknowledge the futility of the previous one) that his descendents did have a free choice with an alternative while "in Adam." Without dismissing this one immediately and definitively, one may suspect that those who appeal to it without facing its difficulties do so because they see that otherwise

³⁸ One probably should say that the fudging begins with *simpl.* itself. To the first question in Book I, the question about Paul's "semi-pelagian" Rom 7, on the mind divided against itself, Augustine's answer is semi-pelagian. In the long term, Augustine may be right to ascribe decisive importance to this book, but immediately he seems to have left the two answers suspended in equilibrium.

³⁹ See Stump, "Augustine on Free Will", p. 125-26 et passim.

"the game is up." But we do need some concept of "original sin" at least in the sense of supra-individual sin. We need a communal confession of generic human failings so powerful and so comprehensive that it transcends and renders irrelevant our paltry personal shames and anticipates our harshest critics, such as offspring and students. Besides, nothing in literature puts one in such a good humor as reading Book IV of *Gulliver's Travels*. In those days no one need suffer an inferiority complex.

Finally, the worst of these fallacious arguments seems to reveal how lacking was impartial critical oversight in those days and how damaging its absence: Augustine's argument that grace in his account does not destroy but establishes free will, openly taking away with one hand from the ungraced what it gives to the graced, and pretends to give generally, with the other. At *ep.* 217,6,23, it would fall far short to talk of his pressing paradox to the breaking point; he frolics in open self-contradiction. He uses it even in his least willful tract, in *spir. et litt.* 30,52. We cannot believe that Augustine himself was taken in by this argument. Indeed, it is so bad, as answer to the criticism of the Pelagians, that we must believe that only those were taken in by it who were more than willing to cooperate in being taken in, thus absolving Augustine of some blame.

In fact he gives the game away on all of these attempts to justify the (in)justice of God by one which is at least more dead-on accurate in assessing his own doctrine if not the thing in itself: that the justice of God is opaque and hidden from the human mind.

In the beginning of anti-Pelagianism, even after the fateful appeal to infant damnation, there was still the possibility of acknowledging the state of infants as a special case, as Thomas was to, and not as the test case the bishops meant it to be. But Augustine at the end of his life (*praed. sanct.* 12,23) was so far from treating infant damnation as a special case that instead he treated (the illusion of?) adult free will as the special case!

... tamen apud eos, qui nisi aliquid sibi assignent, quod priores dent ut retribuatur eis, ab omni studio pietatis reprimi se putant, [omnis haec ratio] laborat aliquantum in aetate maiorum iam utentium uoluntatis arbitrio: sed ubi uenitur ad paruulos, ... omnis deficit praecedentium gratiam Dei humanorum assertio meritorum.

In fact, we can find the same idea much earlier, in *ep.* 186: *Paulino* 6,19 and *gr. et lib. arb.* 22,44.

Not entirely without reason, some have preferred to assimilate him to Thomas by taking his doctrine of original sin to mean no more

than that before grace there are no possible good thoughts or acts of *salvific significance*. The problem with that – for Augustine, not for us – is that it did not rule out Pelagianism: that is exactly what Pelagians need, a good thought or act which does not merit, but does prepare for, grace. In fact, this explanation for why he did not repair the obvious flaws in his anti-Pelagian doctrine of grace applies to all of the preceding problems and many more. Whenever you see a problem in his doctrine of grace that you think could have been repaired, the probable answer is that the repair would have yielded semi-Pelagianism. First get over prejudice against Pelagius, and then you can have Augustine's own semi-pelagianism. Or again, for those interested in an speculative experiment to extract Augustine's "real" position on grace from his anti-Pelagianism, total depravity is probably a good place to start.

Could a person of his abilities have failed to know that his were not valid arguments and that therefore our intelligences are being insulted? The most important question for a revived and improved Pelagian controversy, and not just for Christianity, is whether reprobation can be justified and reconciled with divine justice, if faced *honestly and directly*. If Augustine used fallacious arguments to avoid facing this question honestly and directly, then he could be judged responsible for bequeathing futile and divisive conflict to those after him.

There is, however, another and more positive way, and certainly more charitable, to take those arguments, even if judged invalid: as acknowledging what he maintains elsewhere and always or almost always, that grace must not be so understood that it destroys free will. Using obviously invalid arguments can be taken to acknowledge that he has not yet succeeded in reconciling them, but without thereby either abandoning the attempt or yielding victory to the other side, since success may still be possible. And after all, reading even the great Thomas's attempts to reconcile grace and free will may cause one to suspect that orthodoxy is a middle which cannot be formulated between intelligible but unacceptable extremes.

Short of definitive answers to these questions, we can fairly compare Augustine's own early and late definitions of free will, explicit or implicit. In *duab. an.* 10,12, Augustine uses a sort of "Frankfurt story" to censure the Manichees' destruction of free will.⁴⁰ At first it seems that presence or absence of external compulsion is the

⁴⁰ I use, perhaps loosely, the definition of Stump, "Augustine on Free Will", p. 143.

deciding factor, thus being consistent with one of the definitions judged fallacious above. But then it appears that if the person compelled had conspired with the person compelling him, his attempt to appear innocent would fail. We must also remember that in an anti-Manichaean context, "external" compulsion would be God's refusing to endow the person with "internal" freedom. It would be most valuable to continue such an inductive research into the similarities and especially the differences in the concepts of free will in early and late Augustine, assuming the reader is not satisfied with Augustine's own better-late-than-never confession that he had once argued as a "semi-Pelagian." But it would take too long to do that here, so let us go to the deductive.

The telling distinction between the early and late positions on free will is the prominence in the early writing and the nearly complete absence in the later writing of what we can call the conventional theological rationale for free will: God wanted man's love and obedience to be unforced and thus meaningful, and so gave him the freedom to withhold those, if he chose. *Vera rel.* 14.27 is a most useful text for this point as well as closely related points: the injustice of blaming those who have no alternative and the destructive effect on religious (and surely social) discipline of abolishing blame (and praise).⁴¹

As the complementary but opposing theme in the late writing, we can take the favorite phrase of Luther, Calvin, and their followers: "the Sovereignty of God," whether or not Augustine actually uses the exact phrase. Sometimes the assumption seems to be that God is not able, even if He so desired, to withdraw His power so as to make enough space for man's free will. Augustine seems to approach such a position in his last writings, and it becomes more serious as an argument as modern theology leans on modern physics, metaphysics,

⁴¹ "Defectus autem iste quod peccatum uocatur, si tamquam febris inuitum occuparet, recte iniusta poena uideretur, quae peccantem consequitur, et quae damnatio nuncupatur. Nunc uero usque adeo peccatum uoluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit uoluntarium; et hoc quidem ita manifestum est, ut nulla hinc doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat. Quare aut negandum est peccatum committi, aut fatendum uoluntate committi. Non autem recte negat peccasse animam, qui et poenitendo eam corrigi fatetur, et ueniam poenitenti dari, et perseuerantem in peccatis iusta lege Dei damnari. Postremo, si non uoluntate male facimus, nemo obiurgandus est omnino, aut monendus: quibus sublatis Christiana lex et disciplina omnis religionis auferatur necesse est. Voluntate ergo peccatur. Et quoniam peccari non dubium est, ne hoc quidem dubitandum uideo, habere animas liberum uoluntatis arbitrium. Tales enim seruos suos meliores esse Deus iudicauit, si ei seruirent liberaliter: quod nullo modo fieri posset, si non uoluntate, sed necessitate seruirent."

psychology and biology. When the individual is put in the context of the whole universe, it is hard to rationalize human free will. Of course, some sort of answer to that difficulty is that we are not trying to make the far edges of the universe reverberate with our claims to power; we are just trying to cultivate a microscopic postage stamp of a garden.

Most who favor the Sovereignty of God, including Augustine, simply use it in place of the traditional rationale for free will, rather than do what we must therefore do for them: bringing the two into confrontation. They were no doubt aware that the traditional rationale too obviously would deconstruct the argument from Sovereignty and may also have felt that, at least with lay-persons, the traditional view would have a decisive advantage, fair or not. Astonishing is the frequency with which Augustine will puzzle over the fact that God does not save all men, despite desiring to do so, without betraying the least awareness that there is an obvious answer; but this failure no doubt is due to the fact that he was only too well aware that the conventional theological rationale for free will is the heart of Pelagianism; see the *Letter to Demetrias*, chapter 3.

Here is a most promising confrontation of conceptions of human life. On the one hand, the traditional rationale for free will almost instantly deconstructs all of Augustine's, Luther's, and Calvin's (and we may as well include Paul's) theological challenges to free will (in the ungraced at least), and far beyond just that, it is perhaps the last and best hope for sustaining a "humanistic" concept of free will against modern trends of thought. On the other hand, after reading Augustine's acute deconstruction of free will, especially if supported by those modern trends, who can avoid feeling that the orthodox rationale is rather childish in its hopeful superficiality. We need Samuel Johnson just at this turn.

The whole Pelagian controversy can aptly be summarized by Samuel Johnson's famous comment over dinner, recorded in Boswell's *Life*: "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it." Indeed the remark, though almost certainly referring to contemporary theological and scientific debates on free will, could as well have been inspired by thinking of Augustine's vacillations. And Augustine's most trenchant defense of free will, in *De duabus animabus*, though not as concise as the following of Johnson's, is equally definite in arguing from our own experience as incontrovertible: "Sir, we *know* our will is free, and *there's* an end on it." If theology cannot support what we know, as against "all theory," what good is theology?

The Spirit and the Letter

There are profound ambiguities in *De spiritu et littera*, which we may never be able to clarify with certainty. Augustine first directs his attention against those who claim that it is possible for a person to live without sin (2,3). This is a charge made against Pelagians several times in the early stages of the controversy, but he is only able to show, in *nat. et gr.*, that Pelagius said that it is *possible*, something Augustine himself does not deny. This point is probably an implication of the theory of sin and free will (as it will be for the young Thomas). Both Pelagius and the anti-Manichaean Augustine deny that an act or thought is a sin unless it can be avoided; it follows in theory that all sins can be avoided, one by one and with sufficient time to prepare at least. Nor does Augustine himself show much concern to refute this possibility, unless the claim is that a sinless life is possible without grace. Finally, this charge disappears from the later anti-Pelagian writings. But if Augustine's critique of sinlessness is largely a distraction or even a red herring in the limited context of the Pelagian controversy, it is a much more solid achievement in the broad context of Christian culture.

The real problem is in saying that righteousness or even a beginning of it is possible without God's help (2,4). But even while Augustine seems to imply that Pelagians hold such heresy, he admits that they don't dare to say it, avoiding the charge by defining this help as human nature with free will and God's law prescribing how we should live. It is important to note that Augustine has to acknowledge that these *are* aspects of God's grace. We have noted above Augustine's tactic of dividing into parts a position very close to, or even copying, his own early semi-pelagianism, into parts each of which alone can be defined as a heresy. To those two agreed upon components, Augustine here adds the Holy Spirit's pouring love of the law into our hearts by and as God's grace, to heal original sin, our fault / punishment (*ueteris hominis noxa*. 20,35). But when he explains our receiving of grace, the only difference from Pelagians seems to be whether the law functions straightforwardly or in reverse. The function of the Law according to Augustine is to show that we cannot justify ourselves, and so must seek for God's help (6,9; 9,15; 10,16, etc.). Surely any adequate theory must accept both of these functions.

Another way to put this is to say that in *spir. et litt.* Augustine explores refuting the Pelagian challenge to the exclusivity of Christian salvation by resting it on the doctrine of God's call, as worked out in *simpl.*, rather than on a complete disabling of the wills of the ungraced

by original sin, as implied in the trial of Caelestius, and furthermore, by suggesting that the ungraced deserve their lack of grace by rejecting it, even while also trying to maintain that grace precedes free will, so that no one can accept it except as led by God.⁴² But when he refers (5,7) to Rom 8:29-30 to invoke predestination and the call, he follows the Biblical text by putting foreknowledge first, though without any interpretation, leaving it uncertain whether God's predestination follows from His foreknowledge of faith, as he had argued in the semi-pelagian *ex. prop. Rom.* 47,55 and especially 52,60, or not, as in his refutation of that argument in *simpl.* I,2,5 ff. And see *spir. et litt.* 24,40.

But the revival/reassessment, as we might call it, in *spir. et litt.* of his earlier semi-pelagianism needs more thorough examination than we can give it here. The nominal question of Marcellinus, with which he starts, is far from the most significant and challenging question about grace and free will acknowledged. Could Marcellinus himself, perhaps preparing to referee this dispute as he had the Donatist dispute, have expressed fundamental reservations about the position reached in *pecc. mer.*? In fact, the conclusion to the second book of *pecc. mer.* anticipates the compromising spirit and tentative tone of *spir. et litt.* There Augustine acknowledged that Pelagians do rationalize baptism, just using a different word in place of redemption (II,36,58). He offers to reexamine the question of whether the soul is created via traducianism, as the body is, and even whether God's predestination follows from his foreknowledge of merits, and to do so tentatively and thoughtfully (36,59). It sounds as if he had some presentiment of the probable cost of this developing debate.

Or Marcellinus may have passed on reservations from others, whether Pelagians or observers such as Volusianus and his relatives. Letters such as *ep.* 137: *Volusiano* and *ep.* 143: *Marcellino* show a tone and compromising spirit similar to *spir. et litt.* and at odds with most of the other anti-Pelagian tracts. At *ep.* 143,6, he even goes so far as to point out that in *lib. arb.* he had not said anything to offend those who reject the damnation of unbaptized infants, and so, presumably, original sin via traducianism. What could possibly be his motive for that remark? Is he offering to go back to the semi-pelagianism of *lib.*

⁴² We must impute Augustine's eventual abandonment of this position not to its evident self-contradiction (though he must have known it to be so) as to the fact that blaming the ungraced for their own failure to attain grace is the heart of semi-Pelagianism, as in their attempts to ascribe the withholding of baptism to God's foreknowledge of "future" rejections of grace. But in *spir. et litt.* the presence of this argument is another reason for characterizing the essay as an attempt to compromise with the Pelagians or their friends.

arb.? Or is he blaming the Pelagians for starting the controversy? Is there a hint here of a difference between Rome and Carthage as to the best strategy for converting pagans? At the very least he is expressing reservations about the doctrinal formula aimed by the bishops against Caelestius. Are these enough (along with the absence of grace in their formula) to suggest it was not Augustine who devised that formula?

Augustine also in *ep.* 102: *De GRATIAE* ["*Contra paganos*"] and *ep.* 137: *Volusiano* expressed a compromising attitude in dialogue with intelligent pagans. Did he retain a sense from his years as a Manichee that his superior knowledge of, and skill in marshalling, Biblical texts made it easy for him to bully fellow Christians, whereas the need to appeal to universal principles made the task much more delicate with non-Christians? Whatever the motives, we may use *spir. et litt.* to help us recover the more edifying Pelagian controversy that might have been had the Church in Carthage not brought Caelestius to trial, or, perhaps, had Marcellinus not been executed.

Let us now turn to the most significant question, whether raised by Marcellinus, Volusianus, the Pelagians, or by Augustine himself. In the course of distinguishing the old and new covenants as based not on different "laws" but on whether those are external laws written on stone or internal laws written on hearts, Augustine takes up a difficulty raised by Rom 2:12-16, the Gentiles who do by nature what the law requires and thus can be said to have a law written on hearts (*spir. et litt.* 26,43). This certainly seems a passage Pelagians or pagans would use to challenge Augustine's new doctrine of grace as formulated in *pecc. mer.*; it implies that some good will is possible prior to grace, and so challenges the nexus of traducianism, total perversity, and the consequent priority of grace, implied by the argument from the damnation of unbaptized infants. In fact, Pelagius seems to appeal to Rom 2:12-16 in the passage quoted by Augustine (*gr. et pecc. or.* II,26,30) to accuse Pelagius of "dividing the times" (see above).

Augustine's answer will take us back in many ways to his early "semi-pelagian" position. Therefore we should note that his first and presumably preferred interpretation is that these verses refer to Gentiles who have been converted to Christianity and that their "natures" refer to natures restored by grace (25,42-27,47). In 27,48-28,49 Augustine works out a second interpretation, in case the first is rejected. Presumably this alternative interpretation is permissible, even if not preferred.

Here the Gentiles are still heathen, but some of them do deeds we must approve, however suspicious we are of the ultimate purpose for which they do them. Here, probably for the only time in his *anti-*

Pelagian writings, Augustine in a general theoretical statement of doctrine rules out total depravity of the fallen. Although his general criticism of the Pelagians in his early works against them is that they have not advanced beyond the Old Testament, in that they say grace consists in the law along with free will, and in that they open salvation to those given the natural as well as the written law, his own statement of the (potential for?) faith in these heathen is hard to distinguish from Pelagius's. In a rather obscure passage in the middle of 28,48, he seems to say that the Hebrew saints of the Old Testament would have been saved by the vestiges of the natural law they retained as "rational animals," and not by the written Law.

Augustine soon regresses to familiar sleights of mind, actually taking away from the ungraced the free will he boasts of giving to the graced and even generally: "Liberum ergo arbitrium euacuamus per gratiam? Absit, sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus. Sicut enim lex per fidem, sic liberum arbitrium per gratiam non euacuatur, sed statuitur" (30,52). He does not acknowledge that he has confirmed his critics' charges; he rather pretends that he has answered them. But what really counts here is Augustine's acknowledgment that he has been charged with destroying free will and that the charge has hurt.

In fact, as if acknowledging the frivolity of that argument, at 33,57 Augustine goes on to face directly and without blinking the crucial question posed by the Pelagians, and in his own early semi-pelagianism, so as to determine whether or not all have a free choice of the gift of grace: "utrum uoluntas illa qua credimus etiam ipsa Dei donum sit an ex illo naturaliter insito libero adhibeatur arbitrio?" ("Whether that act of will by which we believe is itself the gift of God or results from that free choice implanted by nature?") That is the central question somewhere behind just about every sentence in this study, and is one more proof, if any is needed, that Pelagius by now was a semi-Pelagian. And he acknowledges with unusual openness the difficulty of answering without destroying either grace or free will. Whatever else we make of this most significant passage, it is important to note that it shows his perfect retrospective understanding of his own semi-pelagianism and presumably that of Pelagius, so that we must suspect that his refutations elsewhere that depend on "failures" to understand are only tactical pretenses.

To understand the answer to that crucial question we need to read and interpret closely a long, complicated and difficult sentence at 34,60, which I shall cite so as to include a useful portion of the preceding context:

33,59... Quae dilectio diffunditur in cordibus nostris nec per sufficientiam propriae uoluntatis nec per litteram legis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis.

34,60. Haec disputatio, si quaestioni illi soluendae sufficit, sufficiat. Si autem respondetur cauendum esse, ne quisquam Deo tribuendum putet peccatum, quod admittitur per liberum arbitrium, si in eo, quod dicitur: *Quid habes quod non accepisti?* propterea etiam uoluntas, qua credimus, dono Dei tribuitur, quia de libero existit arbitrio, quod cum crearemur accepimus, adtendat et videat non ideo tantum istam uoluntatem diuino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est, quod nobis naturaliter concreatum est, uerum etiam quod uisorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut uelimus et ut credamus, siue extrinsecus per euangelicas exhortationes, ubi et mandata legis aliquid agunt, si ad hoc admonent hominem infirmitatis suae, ut ad gratiam iustificantem credendo confugiat, siue intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate quid ei ueniat in mentem, sed consentire uel dissentire propriae uoluntatis est.

I shall translate the sentence beginning *Si autem*, since my reading differs from any of the translations I have so far found. They admittedly have an advantage as readable translations, since they break up this Ciceronian monster – that’s what Latin will do to you – into parts, while I shall try to stay as close as possible to the original, with the exception of needing to add a bracketed *et* just before *propterea*. The difficulty of the sentence begins with *si in eo* and ends with that missing *et*, and my solution to the difficulty starts with assuming that we need the two *alternatives* named in the central question just posed at the beginning of 33,57 (see the previous paragraph) and developed in the remainder. The idiom *in eo* I interpret in accordance with the familiar formula for whatever is “in us” as nature or gift or nature/gift, and shown in the last sentence of 33,59 above as well as in the omitted parts of 33,57, and prefigured by the *insito* in the sentence posing the central question at 33,57. The *eo* I take as “one” or as standing in for some such word as *homine*, and I take the citation of 1 Cor 4:7 as his favorite touchstone definition for the gifts of the Holy Spirit (I cannot resist pointing at the ambiguity of *accipere*, before hurrying on). And I add the *et* after the citation because I need *propterea* to mean *therefore* and not *because*, as in some other translations, and that because, again, I need the *alternative* to free will as produced by Christian grace, that is, free will as the *initium fidei* or *gratiae* given to all in creation. That gives us the clear alternatives as in the question introducing this part of the book, at 33,57 (see above), but with a “Pelagian” bias to the answer. The reason given for this bias is indeed the same as in a passage from Pelagius (his *pro. lib. arb.* III?) quoted by Augustine at

gr. et. pecc. or. I,17,18, to explain that Pelagius hesitated to attribute free will to the gift of grace because that might seem to blame our failures of will on God. Augustine himself seems to accept this reasoning at *spir. et litt.* 31,54.⁴³ Even more relevantly, in the very paragraph 33,57 where the decisive question is raised (see just above), the same Pelagian objection is acknowledged in a slightly different form, as giving unbelievers and sinners an excuse if they are not given God's grace as the will to believe.

I shall give the whole of my English sentence, since the second half, though not difficult at all, is most significant in taking us right into St. Thomas:

If, however, someone responds that we must preclude that anyone should think that sin is to be attributed to God, if it is committed by free will that is in man [in eo] in accordance with the words "What do you have which you have not received [i.e., from the Holy Spirit]?, [and] therefore even the will by which we believe is attributed to the gift of God in the sense that it arises from the free will that we received when we were created, he [who so responds] should observe and understand that this [act of] will [by which we believe] is attributed to a divine gift not only for the reason that it [voluntas] was concreated as nature in us, but also because God brings about by the stimuli of our perceptions that we should will and should believe, stimuli either from the outside, through evangelical exhortations – in which even the mandates of the Law effect something, if they warn man of his weakness, for the purpose that he flee to justifying grace by believing – or from within, where no one has in his power what comes into his mind (but to consent to or dissent from these stimuli is within our own will).

⁴³ "Vide nunc utrum quisque credat, si noluerit, aut non credat, si uoluerit. Quod si absurdum est - quid est enim credere nisi consentire uerum esse quod dicitur? Consensus autem utique uolentis est -, profecto fides in potestate est. Sed, sicut Apostolus dicit: *Non est potestas nisi a Deo*. Quid igitur causae est cur non et de ista [uoluntate?] nobis dicatur: *Quid enim habes quod non accepisti?* Nam et ut credamus, Deus dedit. Nusquam autem legimus in sanctis Scripturis: "Non est uoluntas nisi a Deo". Et recte non scriptum est, quia uerum non est; alioquin etiam peccatorum - quod absit! - auctor est Deus, si non est uoluntas nisi ab illo." The analysis of faculties here seems very similar to Pelagius's, as it is to be cited in Chapters 4 and 5 of *gr. et pecc. or.*, Book Two. And it would seem to acknowledge that even if faith is defined as God's gift – and after all, who thinks that faith in things unseen depends solely on our wills? – Pelagians can still find an opening for human free will in knocking, seeking, finding, as had Augustine's own semi-pelagianism. At *pecc. mer.* II,18,29 Augustine tries to turn this argument back against the semi-pelagian premise that the process of grace begins with the *gratuitous* and *universal* gift of free will, but his argument depends on slipping in the word "good" (*bona uoluntas*), with the result that he actually confirms, not refutes, his opponents' argument.

Translated so, this sentence summarizes the argument (and perhaps the conclusion?) of the whole book, according to which Augustine would be basing the exclusivity of Christian salvation not on disabling totally the free will of the ungraced (as in most of the other anti-Pelagian tracts and as implied by the damnation of unbaptized infants, as defended in *pecc. mer.*), but on the teaching of the (exclusive?) call from God, as defined in *simpl.* But there is a problem here; Augustine never, so far as I know, rules out the salvation of some pagans, virtuous pagans we might say, for the reason that the Old Testament, as interpreted by Paul, cites cases of such salvations, such as Job and the inhabitants of Nineveh, and so opens the possibility of yet others. But there is an even more startling reason given in 33,58.

There he proposes a compromise, according to which the free will given as part of the rational soul by God as universal Creator is a neutral power capable of either faith or infidelity (as Pelagians have argued), but for that very reason needing the call of God that they must *receive/accept* in order to have faith. But then comes the startling twist, in which he does two things completely uncharacteristic of his anti-Pelagian tracts as a whole. He cites 1 Tim 2:4, but straightforwardly and not as his tautology that God desires to save all whom he desires to save. And he cites the conventional theological rationale for free will: “Vult autem Deus omnes homines saluos fieri et in agnitionem ueritatis uenire, non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo uel bene uel male utentes iustissime iudicentur.”⁴⁴

Surely this is too good to be true! And in fact, Gerald Bonner judged that when free will is referred to as a “*media uis*, a neutral power” in 33,58 it is to be understood as that “original” free will granted to *Adam*.⁴⁵ But as I have shown, the main argument of this book follows from an attempt to answer the Pelagians by a doctrine short of total depravity, and even to reach a compromise with them or some of them. And the long sentence quoted just above clearly refers to the human race as whole as having free will.

Why did the compromise fail? Perhaps the Pelagians called his bluff by accepting it. Maybe the offer never reached them. If

⁴⁴ Note that this appeal to the conventional rationale for free will can be said to have been already implied by Augustine's previous recognition of the gift of free will as an essential aspect of human nature in creation, if we ask why it was given.

⁴⁵ G. Bonner, “Augustine and Pelagianism,” *Augustinian Studies* 24 (1993): 33. That meager acknowledgment must not stand as the only sign of the great debt this essay owes to the grounding provided by Bonner's writings.

challenged from the other side, Augustine could have appealed to one of his dubious definitions of free will, such as doing something freely because we desire to do so and are not compelled, as unsatisfactory as that might appear, face to face with the conventional rationale. But the way out that he has obviously prepared ahead, in case he should need it, is to say that this second interpretation of the gentiles who had the law written on their hearts, was not his preferred reading. Even granted that this qualification seems to disappear as an operative bracket around our reading of *spir. et litt.*, it is impossible to prove wrong.

It seems that is a hazard of wrestling with the Pelagian controversy to fall into suspicion of being hoodwinked by devious language, a suspicion well expressed by Augustine of Pelagius, in *gr. et pecc. or.* I,2,2, but for us, suspicion of being hoodwinked by Augustine as well. On one hand it is fatal to turn one's back blindly against such suspicion, as shown by the incompatible interpretations of Augustine on free will, with which we began. On the other hand unless counterbalanced, such suspicion could undermine the essential empathy required for reading to understand, to "get inside" a writer's mind. For one thing, we can turn our suspicion of each writer against his suspicion of the other. But I shall suggest an appeal to what we can call the justice of influence. A writer who exploits the ambiguities of words and of syntax allows his readers to use him for their own purposes, whether with awareness or not. I think Peter Lombard was fully aware of his exploitation of Augustine's ambiguities and ambivalences. And that raises questions about Augustine's intentions. Maybe he did really mean what he said, that all people have free will, even if he could not find a convincing way of formulating it.

This turn would also take us back to Augustine's wonderful defense of "mistaken" reading, in *util. creed.* Maybe if he had maintained such freedom as a reader of Paul, things might have turned out better.

This is the point at which to end the main argument, which is that Augustine was the origin and source not only for the "anti-Pelagian" theory of grace revived by followers such as Luther and Calvin but also for the "semi-Pelagian" theory, in its scholastic version, against which Luther and Calvin reacted. I trust that nowadays no one, at least among the experts on Augustine, would decide between them simply on the ground that it is true because it is Augustine's final opinion, as against which doctrine is the better, in the individual reader's considered judgment. So long then, as we are careful to recognize

that the two doctrines are probably incompatible, so that we probably have to choose between them, so long as we are careful to acknowledge that it is we who are deciding, it is up to us. Seen that way, I suspect that we can say that at present at least, the semi-pelagian Augustine has largely won out over the anti-Pelagian Augustine.

The position summarized in the letters of Proper and Hilary, formulated by defenders of free will against Augustine's anti-Pelagianism but claimed by them to derive from Augustine's own defense of free will against Manichaeism, a claim confirmed by Augustine himself (*praed. sanct.* 3,7-4,8), whatever we call it, is a position so well thought out as to be nearly irrefutable and in the long run irresistible, no doubt thanks mainly to Augustine, with some help from Pelagians. Most of the genius of it is contained in the opening appeal to the free and gracious gift of free will by God as universal Creator, thereby setting in motion the eventual sapping from within of invidious claims to partial universality, whether by Christianity or other religion, by elevating those claims into a higher form of universality.

There is much genius also in Augustine's attempt to refute his own semi-pelagianism. But Pelagians have no need to oppose either the fall from a state of innocence nor original sin; they can be refuted only by pushing these doctrines to the obviously false extreme of total perversity of *human nature*, passed down literally *ex traduce*, the latter step avoided even by Augustine himself. In fact, the attack on Pelagians would not have succeeded even temporarily except for the appeal to the dangerously double-edged instrument of infant damnation.

But the failure of his attacks to engage precisely and effectually with semi-Pelagianism has actually been to Augustine's advantage, allowing the most of his great achievements as teacher of grace to survive quite well without those daunting extremes, and in fact, within semi-Pelagianism itself.

As with Jonathan Swift centuries later, a large part of Augustine's polemical impulse was inspired by horror of religious controversy bitter enough to disturb the peace of the world. If we start by assuming that so intelligent a mind could not have been unaware of the obvious fallacies in his attempt to limit God's desire that all men be saved, can we take the next step of imagining him as quite content that his opponents, including his younger self, should triumph eventually, once Christianity was firmly established? After all, Augustine never denied the salvation of "virtuous pagans," but only arguments that such salvation is fully merited, not freely given.

Augustine and Thomas Aquinas

We can examine this vast topic only very selectively and briefly, so as to outline the influence of Augustine the semi-pelagian. We noted above Peter Lombard's use of Augustine on grace and free will. He prudently continues to treat Augustine as the great doctor of grace and Pelagius as a heretic, but he goes on to use Augustine's frequent lapses, even late in his life, into what we would call semi-Pelagianism to vindicate free will against the anti-Pelagian Augustine.

For example, see Peter's Book II, Distinction 26. In a chapter with the significant title "De illa cogitatione boni quae praecedit fidem," Peter Lombard quotes (in an edited version) a passage from *Enarrationes in Psalmos* on verse 20 of Psalm 118 (119): "Concupiui desiderare, inquit, non desideravi. Videmus enim ratione nonnunquam quam utiles sunt iustificationes Dei; sed infirmitate praepediti aliquando non desideramus. Praeuolat ergo intellectus, sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus; scimus bonum, nec delectat agere, et cupimus ut delectet."

There is a neat irony here: Peter Brown cites this last sentence, and goes on to call this "ostensibly a thoroughly 'Pelagian' Psalm" with "its static code of precepts" which Augustine managed in his commentary to turn triumphantly to his own (anti-Pelagian?) purposes.⁴⁶ We need to learn to be on the lookout for minute traces of pelagian free will (whether for approval or blame) as sharply as our long-ago predecessors did! Almost certainly for Thomas the origin of his doctrine of grace was in Augustine as interpreted and cited by Peter, not in Pelagius and certainly not in the almost vanished Rufinus.

In II *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, as a first step Thomas restores to the Grace of Creation just those verses one had noticed Augustine impressing into service to the Grace of Recreation by reading into them an unstated and tendentious word *good*, verses such as John 15: 5: "Without me you can do nothing" and 2 Cor 3: 5. Then in ad 3 he puts grace into the universal context of what we can call Thomas's Unified Field Theory of Love, according to which everything which exists is given motion by love of its source and Creator. Those who have encountered this theory in its grand vision in Dante's *Commedia*

⁴⁶ P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*, new ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 376. It is worth noting that as late as *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, 9, a.1, Thomas quotes from Peter's paraphrase of this passage, not from Augustine's original. This one niggardly reference must not be allowed to misrepresent the great help I have derived from Peter Brown's writings.

will perhaps more readily notice its subtler expressions in Thomas. The mind open to the inner promptings of God's grace is thus aided by senses open to "exterior occasions" bearing witness to God's love and the love of God.

We need to note in certain quarters the powerful motive to assimilate the two, whether Thomas to Augustine or Augustine to Thomas. For certain purposes this is quite proper, so long as we are quite aware of our own contribution, but not for scholars, except insofar as the likeness is really there.

Recently one sees the argument that Thomas Aquinas by the time of the *Summa Theologiae* turned against his earlier semi-Pelagianism and assimilated himself to Augustine, a thesis that is probably yet another result of unexamined prejudice against Pelagianism. See, for example, the notes and commentary in the Blackfriars edition of the *Summa Theologiae*, Vol. 30 (1a2ae, 106-114), edited by Cornelius Ernst, O.P., and also Joseph P. Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action*.⁴⁷ But Wawrykow relies on a flawed argument by Bernard Lonergan in his dissertation, published as *Grace and Freedom*.⁴⁸ Lonergan argues that in his last period, under the influence of Augustine, Thomas renounced as heretical because Pelagian the grace within nature, and above all external events as stimulating preparation for grace, that he had affirmed in his early writings (see pages 21, 39, 122, and 142 for this thesis). But this argument relies heavily on a misreading of a passage from *Quodl.* 1, Q. 4, A. 2 (A. 7), in effect reading the correlatives *non solum... sed etiam* as *non... sed*. Despite the importance Lonergan attributes to the passage, referring to it 9 times, he never cites the Latin, or gives a full translation, but unfortunately only summary paraphrases, probably from his note cards in those days before photocopying. If he had checked the original, he would surely have noticed his obvious (and most uncharacteristic) oversight:

Dicendum est ergo, quod homo indiget auxilio gratiae non solum ad merendum, sed etiam ad hoc quod se ad gratiam praeparet; aliter tamen et aliter. Nam meretur homo per actum uirtutis, cum non solum bonum agit, sed bene, ad quod requiritur habitus, ut dicitur in II Ethic., et ideo ad merendum requiritur habitualiter gratia. Sed ad hoc quod homo praeparet se ad habitum consequendum, non indiget alio habitu, quia sic esset procedere ad infinitum. Indiget autem diuino auxilio non

⁴⁷ J.P. Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action*. "Merit" in the *Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

⁴⁸ B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom. Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas*, ed. J. Patout Burns, S. J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971).

solum quantum ad exteriora mouentia, prout scilicet ex diuina prouidentia procurantur homini occasiones salutis, puta praedicationes, exempla, et interdum aegritudines et flagella; sed etiam quantum ad interiorem motum, prout Deus cor hominis interius mouet ad bonum, secundum illud Prou. XXI, 1: *cor regis in manu Dei; quocumque uoluerit, uertet illud*. Et quod hoc necessarium sit, probat philosophus in quodam cap. de bono fortunae. Hoc enim agit uoluntate; uoluntatis autem principium est electio, et electionis consilium. Si autem quaeratur qualiter consiliari incipiat, non potest dici quod ex consilio consiliari inceperit, quia sic esset in infinitum procedere. Vnde oportet aliquod exterius principium esse quod moueat mentem humanam ad consiliandum de agendis. Hoc autem oportet esse aliquod melius humana mente. Non ergo est corpus caeleste, quod est infra intellectualem uirtutem, sed Deus, ut philosophus, ibidem, concludit.

I have quoted more than the sentence in question, which starts with *Indiget autem*, given the interest of the passage in the context of this essay. Indeed the whole article is useful.

If you compare that passage from *Quodl.* with II *Sent.*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, you will find no change in the balance of internal versus external “premotion.” And that long passage compared with the long sentence from *spir. et litt.* 34,60 cited above well summarizes the influence of Augustine on Aquinas. As to internal premotion, Thomas’s citation of Aristotle above reminds us that it operates universally, as well as via Christian grace, and sometimes in preparation for the latter. On that point see also *Summa Theologiae*, 1a2ae, 109, a. 1, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne uerum, a quocumque dicatur, est a spiritu sancto sicut ab infundente naturale lumen, et mouente ad intelligendum et loquendum ueritatem. Non autem sicut ab inhabitante per gratiam gratum facientem, uel sicut a largiente aliquod habituale donum naturae superadditum, sed hoc solum est in quibusdam ueris cognoscendis et loquendis; et maxime in illis quae pertinent ad fidem, de quibus apostolus loquebatur.” If Thomas had rejected the grace within nature, his system would have fallen apart into two discontinuous halves, the discussion of natural virtues being irrelevant to Christians, except perhaps in inducing pagans to treat them well.

After all the grief of and from Augustine and Pelagius, our reward is the unstrained effortlessness and even the Aristotelian obviousness — how could we have missed it! — of Thomas’s solution to the problem of grace and free will. We hardly need to look beyond the question itself of *ST*, 1a2ae, 112, 3, except to confirm the sudden insight we have received: “utrum necessario detur gratia se praeparanti

ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est?" ("Whether grace is necessarily given to one who prepares himself for grace, or to one who does what is in her?"). The conclusion of course is negative, but that negative turns on the qualification "necessario," at once preserving the freedom of both God and man and allowing grace to transcend, not suspend, divine justice. Is this formulation perhaps what Augustine always was struggling towards, and might have reached, except for infant damnation?

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Abstract

Quotations from Augustine have always been attractive, especially those quotations that help religious people to cope with sorrow and pain or armed with any evils that might occur in human life. In the recently destroyed Augustinian Church at Würzburg, a room has been made into a parson for people in mourning. It is decorated with a sentence attributed to Augustine: "I want you to be" ("Ich will, dass Du bist"). The present article intends to demonstrate the insufficiency of this sentence with Augustine's theology and pastoral care.

Key Words

Der Mensch als Gottes Geschöpf; Christe Heilswerk; christliche Existenz; Erlösung; Liebe.

Als ich am 26. 11. 1991 den Festgottesdienst zur Wiedereröffnung der Augustinerkirche nach dem Umbau besuchte, fiel mir gleich hinter dem Eingang der angebliche Augustinus-Spruch auf einer Wand *Ich will, dass Du bist* ins Auge. Dieser Satz, dessen Fundstelle nicht angegeben ist, so dachte ich, dürfte wohl zumindest unvollständig, wenn nicht gar unangenehm sein. Es geht nämlich aus der Sentenz nicht hervor, ob Augustinus diesen Satz als seinen eigenen äußert, oder ob er ihn als von Gott gegebenem suggerieren will. Eines ist ich für unabweisbar: Ist Augustinus, wie es sagt, für verkürzt, oder für unzutreffend. Denn wenn Augustinus für Gottes Willen der tragende Grund alles Erschaffenen ist, ist Augustinus auch Gott. Wie der Schöpfer jede Ziege, jede Maus, jedes Tier zu sein will, so schließt sich

AUGUSTINUS: «ICH WILL, DASS DU BIST» (?) ZUM PROBLEM DER ANGEBLICH AUGUSTINISCHEN HERKUNFT DIESER SENTENZ

*Suae Sanctitati Papae Benedicto XVI
diuino quodam spiritu inflammato adque uigorem
fidelium animos excitanti doctissimo aestimatori
litterarum sancti Augustini septemdecim lustra peragenti
dedicauit Cornelius Petrus Mayer OSA*

Abstract

Quotations from Augustine have always been attractive, especially those quotations that help religious people to cope with sorrow and pain, or indeed with any event that might occur in human life. In the recently renovated Augustinian Church at Würzburg, a room has been made into a parlour for people in mourning. It is decorated with a sentence attributed to Augustine: "I want you to be" ("Ich will, dass Du bist"). The present article intends to demonstrate the insufficiency of this sentence to fit in with Augustine's theology and pastoral care.

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so will er natürlich auch den Menschen. Aber, was den Menschen betrifft, so begnügt er sich mit dessen Existenz allein nicht. Sein Wollen zielt da auf mehr.

Wirft man einen Blick in den elektronischen Text der Werke des Kirchenvaters und ruft dort die entsprechenden 382 Stellen *ut sis* mit Augustin oder gar mit Gott als Subjekt auf, so heißt es da in der Regel: *ut sis spiritalis* (Auslegung einiger Fragen aus dem Brief an die Römer 62), *ut sis christianus* (Auslegung des Johannesevangeliums 11,5), *ut sis filius altissimi* (Predigt 15,8), etc., etc. Gleich in einer der ersten Fundstellen, in der Schrift *Über den freien Willen* 3,45 heißt es vielsagend:

«Deus autem nulli debet aliquid, quia omnia gratuito praestat. Et si quisquam dicet aliquid ab illo deberi meritis suis, certe ut esset non ei debebatur; non enim erat cui deberetur. Et tamen, quod meritum est conuerti ad eum ex quo es, ut ex ipso etiam melior sis ex quo habes ut sis? Quid ergo ei praerogas ut tamquam debitum poscas? Quando si nolles ad eum conuerti nihil ei deesset, tibi autem ipse, sine quo nihil esses et ex quo ita es aliquid, ut, nisi conuertendo te ad illum reddideris ei quod ab ipso es, non quidem nihil, sed miser tamen eris. Omnia ergo illi debent: primo quidquid sunt in quantum naturae sunt, deinde quidquid melius possunt esse si uelint quaecumque acceperunt ut uelint, et quidquid oportet eas esse».	Gott schuldet niemandem etwas, weil er alles unentgeltlich gewährt. Und wenn einer sagt, ihm gebühre aufgrund seiner Verdienste etwas, so dürfte doch sicher sein, dass ihm sein Dasein nicht geschuldet war, denn einem noch nicht Existierenden schuldet man nichts. Und überhaupt, was ist das für ein Verdienst, dich an den zu wenden, von dem du deine Existenz hast, damit du, von dem du das Sein hast, noch besser wirst? Was zahlst du ihm also voraus, um es gleichsam als Schuld einfordern zu können? Wenn du dich nicht zu ihm hinwenden wolltest, fehlte ihm nichts, dir selbst jedoch würde der fehlen, ohne den du nichts wärest. Durch ihn bist du in dem Maße etwas, dass du, wenn du ihm nicht zurückgibst, was du durch ihn bist, indem du dich zu ihm hinwendest, du zwar nicht nichts, jedoch unglücklich sein wirst. Alle Wesen schulden also (alles) ihm: zunächst was immer sie als Naturen sind, dann (aber auch) dass sie etwas Besseres sein können, wenn sie die verliehene Fähigkeit dazu akzeptieren wollen, und schließlich auch alles, was sie sein sollen.
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Wir haben also in diesem Text das existentielle *ut sis* und das darüber hinausgehende *ut... melior sis*, das natürlich das existentielle *ut sis* voraussetzt, aber – und dies ist wichtig – jenes erst als christliches qualifiziert. Demnach ist im Sinne Augustins zu unterscheiden

und zu scheiden zwischen dem *Sein*, das der Mensch mit allen Wesen hat, das kreatürliche Sein, und jenem Sein, das ihn über das Kreatürliche hinaus in dem Sinn qualifiziert, dass es ihn zu Gott in besondere Beziehung setzt. Augustinus hat das Kreatürliche gewiss nicht vernachlässigt, aber als christlicher Theologe hat er in Bezug auf den Menschen bereits das kreatürliche *uolo ut sis* im Heilshandeln Gottes verankert.

Meinen Informationen zufolge berief man sich bezüglich der angeblich augustinischen Herkunft der Sentenz *Ich will, dass Du bist* auf eine undatierbare Predigt, die der Bischof höchstwahrscheinlich in seiner Heimatdiözese Hippo bei einem Märtyrerfest sozusagen aus dem Stegreif gehalten zu haben scheint. Im Verzeichnis des *Augustinus-Lexikons* ist dies der *Sermo Lambot* 27 bzw. der *Sermo* 335i., den ich nach der Edition des CAG 2 auch in Übersetzung im Anhang beifüge. Ich gebe hier zunächst den in 5 Teile gegliederten Gedankengang dieses *Sermo* wieder.

1. *Durch den Tod Christi ist auch Tod der Märtyrer kostbar.* Offensichtlich sang man in der Liturgie des Gedenktages den Vers 15 aus dem *Psalm* 115: *Kostbar ist in den Augen des Herrn der Tod seiner Heiligen.* Der Prediger bezieht diesen Vers in seiner typologisierenden Exegese auf den Kreuzestod Christi. Sein zur Vergebung der Sünden vergossenes Blut ist der Preis für das Heil der Sünder, zu denen aufgrund ihrer Adamsabstammung auch die Märtyrer gehören. Als Erlöser nämlich ist Christus auch ihr «emptor», «Freikäufer».

2. *Liebt der Erlöser Sünder, weil er für sie starb?* Mitnichten! Jesus ist nicht aus Liebe zu den Sündern für die Sünder gestorben, lautet der Kernsatz, den der Prediger zu klären bemüht ist: «*Neque enim Iesus amando peccatores pro peccatoribus mortuus est* – Denn auch Jesus ist nicht aus Liebe zu Sündern für Sünder gestorben». Dies ist der christologisch-soteriologische Schlüsselsatz. Dass er für sie starb, besagt nicht, er habe sie als Sünder geliebt, im Gegenteil. Der herangezogene Beleg aus *Joh* 5,14 ... *schon bist du geheilt, sündige nicht mehr...*, illustriert bereits die Grundintention des *volo ut sis* seitens des Erlösers. «Drohend – minaciter» verbietet er, so der Prediger, was Sünder liebten: das Sündigen.

3. *Zur Dialektik des uolo ut sis.* Der Prediger verwickelt nun seine Hörer in ein fiktives Gespräch, das argumentativ den Sinn des Erlöserleidens und damit auch den theologischen Sachverhalt des *uolo ut sis* klären soll. Wie kann jemand etwas wollen, ohne es zu lieben? Lieben und Sein stehen in einem dialektischen Verhältnis zueinander. Was immer man liebt, von dem will man auch, dass es sei. Umgekehrt soll nicht sein, was man «überhaupt – omnino» nicht liebt. Kann Gott

die Sünde lieben? Nie und nimmer! Also kann das *uolo ut sis* von Gott her, wie schon erwähnt, nur bedeuten: *uolo ut sis christianus, filius, spiritualis* etc. etc. Der Abschnitt endet vielsagend mit einem Appell an den Hörer der Predigt: «Bist du ein Gläubiger, hast du an ihn (deinen Erlöser) geglaubt, hast du dein Herz nach oben gerichtet,... so tilgte er (an dir), was du warst (Sünder)».

4. *Das Opfer Christi im Unterschied zu den Tieropfern des Alten Bundes.* Mit Hilfe der Allegorese des Psalmverses 15,4 versucht nunmehr der Prediger die Vergeblichkeit der Sündentilgung und damit die Seinsrettung des Sünders durch die Vollzüge der alttestamentlichen Opferriten im Unterschied zu dem einen Opfer Christi aufzuzeigen – ein in der patristischen Exegese, freilich auch schon im Neuen Testament wiederholt erörtertes Thema. Das Blut der Opfertiere änderte am Sündenstatus der Opfernden so gut wie nichts. Christen kommen zwar aus der Sünde, dank des Opfers Christi sind sie jedoch «gereinigt, geheiligt» (1 Kor 6,11).

5. *Das rechte Verständnis der Liebe Christi zu den Sündern; der auf das eschatologische Heil abzielende augustinische Doppelaspekt des volo ut sis.* Gott liebt jene Sünder, die dank des Opfers seines Sohnes nicht mehr das sind, was sie waren: Sünder. Ein Widerspruch? Keiner, sofern sie zur Schar der Auserwählten zählen, worauf jedoch der Prediger hier nicht eingeht, sondern Konsequenz des Heilshandelns Gottes am Menschen, paradigmatisch erklärt am Verhalten des Arztes an den Kranken: was der Arzt erreichen will, liebt er, was er beseitigen will, liebt er nicht. Vollendete Christen – und das sind die Märtyrer – sind unter einem doppelten Aspekt Gottes Geschöpfe. Augustin spricht von «servi - Sklaven» und von «liberi - Freien»: sie sind Erschaffene und Erlöste dank des Heilshandelns Gottes. Qualifiziert sowohl als Sklaven wie auch als Freie Christi werden sie durch dessen Heilswerk. Der Prediger nennt sie «Eigentumserwerbungen des Schöpfers und Brüder des Erlösers». Unter Berufung auf das Evangelium spricht er von einer Kaufurkunde und von einer Transaktion: «Die Kaufurkunde für Sklaven wurde zum Testament für Söhne».

Wie ich hörte, waren Mitarbeiter vom Zentrum für Augustinus-Forschung bei den Recherchen des Satzes *Ich will, dass Du bist* involviert. Von ihnen erfuhr ich, dass der Satz etwas mit Heidegger zu tun habe. Der in Eichstätt Philosophie lehrende Professor Norbert Fischer habe in seinen Veröffentlichungen darauf aufmerksam gemacht. In der Tat las ich in einem mir zugeschickten Vortrag von Norbert Fischer anlässlich der Präsentation seines Buches *Die Gnadenlehre als «salto mortale» der Vernunft?* (erschieden bei Alber 2012): Im Zentrum neuer Untersuchungen zu Heidegger und

Augustinus stehe ein Satz zum Wesen der Liebe, von dem Heidegger sage, er habe ihn bei Augustin gefunden. Der Satz laute: «*Amo: uolo ut sis*». Ich fand diesen Satz, wie schon gesagt, im Gesamtwerk Augustins nicht. Fischer verwies mich bei meinen näheren Erkundigungen an Tatjana Noemi Tömmel. Sie bat ich daraufhin um Auskunft über *amo: uolo ut sis* bei Augustin laut Heidegger. Post- bzw. e-mail-wendend erhielt ich folgende Antwort: «.... Um ein (Augustinus-) Zitat im strengen Sinne handelt es sich nicht, denn die Formulierung stammt von Heidegger. Norbert Fischer, der Augustinus natürlich viel besser kennt als ich, hat aber mehrfach darauf hingewiesen, dass Heidegger Augustins Gedanken zu Recht so zusammenfasst. Meines Wissens finden sich die Worte zum ersten Mal in Heideggers Vorlesung *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus* vom Sommersemester 1921: «Die eigentliche Liebe hat die Grundtendenz auf das dilectum, ut sit. Liebe ist also Wille zum Sein des Geliebten» (Heidegger, *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*, GA 60,29f.). Später ändert er dann die Formulierung, spätestens in einem Brief an Hannah Arendt vom Frühjahr 1925. Für Sie aber sicherlich interessanter ist, dass Heidegger diese Formulierung bei der Auslegung des *Tractatus in Epistulam Ioannis ad Parthos* VIII,5 prägt: In der Nachschrift von Oscar Becker lautet Heideggers Übertragung dieser Stelle: «Jede Liebe schließt in sich ein gewisses Wohlwollen (*benevolentia*) für den ein, welcher geliebt wird. (Sinnliche Liebe = *amor*. *Dilectio* bezieht sich auf Höherwertiges.) Wir lieben nicht so die Menschen, wie der Herr Petrus frug: Liebst Du mich? Aber auch so sollen wir Menschen nicht lieben, wie die Schlemmer reden, wenn sie sagen: ich liebe Krammetsvögel. Der Schlemmer liebt sie nur, um sie umzubringen. Er liebt sie also, damit sie nicht sind (*non esse*). So darf man nicht Menschen lieben, dass man sie in den eigenen Zweck hineinstellt.» (Heidegger, *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*, GA 60,291). Ich denke, die Stelle muss zusammen mit *Nihil enim aliud est amare, quam propter se ipsam rem aliquam appetere* verstanden werden, auf den Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* zumindest indirekt hinweist.»

Nun findet sich der Satz *Nihil enim aliud est amare, quam propter se ipsam rem aliquam appetere* im Unterschied zu *amo: uolo ut sis* tatsächlich im Werk Augustins, und zwar in einer Sammlung von Antworten auf Fragen an ihn aus seiner Presbyterzeit (391-395), die der Bischof unter dem Titel *Über dreiundachtzig verschiedene Fragen* publizierte. Die Frage 35 trägt die Überschrift *Quid amandum sit – Was zu lieben ist*. Bei der Beantwortung des *quid amandum* geht es allerdings letztlich um das Ewige, *de quo recte fiditur, quod amanti*

aufferri non potest – von dem man zu Recht glauben kann, dass es dem Liebenden nicht genommen werden kann. Und das ist Gott: *Quid uero aeternum est... nisi deus?* (ebd. 35,2).

Selbstredend ist es legitim, dass Heidegger von Augustin Gedanken aufnimmt, die er auf seine Existenzphilosophie hin auslegt, zumal er auch sagt, dass er Augustins Liebesbegriff so interpretiere. Nun spielt das Interpretieren im Umgang mit geistesgeschichtlichen Texten eine wichtige Rolle. N. Fischer spricht zu Recht von einem «reflektierten Verstehen», das den Interpretationen in der Regel vorausgeht. Platon habe dies so mit Parmenides und Heraklit gehalten. Und ich füge hinzu, in der Theologie ist dies nicht viel anders. Augustinus legte Texte der Paulusbriefe abweichend von Origenes aus, um nur diese beiden Koryphäen der Bibelhermeneutik zu erwähnen. Apropos Bibelhermeneutik! Wo sind die Grenzen der Interpretation der von der Kirche als offenbart anerkannten und verehrten Schriften? Gegen deren Uferlosigkeit haben sich bekanntlich schon die Konzilien der frühen Kirche mit ihren Definitionen eines Credo zur Wehr gesetzt. Augustinus selbst hielt es nach seiner Bischofsweihe für seine vorrangigste Aufgabe, eine wissenschaftliche Abhandlung über die Regeln der Hermeneutik zu schreiben: *De doctrina christiana* – Die christliche Wissenschaft.

Gerade im Blick auf die Prinzipien dieser auf Gottes Transzendenz hin ausgerichteten Hermeneutik gilt es zu sehen, dass Heidegger einem anderen Transzendenzverständnis das Wort redete als Augustinus, und zwar einem radikal anderen. Ich darf dazu aus dem Band V der *Abendländischen Weltanschauung* von Hans Meyer (Paderborn 1966, S. 438) zitieren: «Transzendenz heißt Überstieg.... Heidegger bezeichnet Transzendenz als eine vor aller Verhaltung geschehene Grundverfassung des Seienden.... Subjektsein heißt <in und als Transzendenz seiendes Sein>.... Transzendenz besagt auch nicht ein Verhältnis zu Gott, sondern zu seiner eigenen Seinsweise, zu seinen eigenen Möglichkeiten. Was überstiegen wird, ist gerade das Seiende selbst; im Überstieg kommt das Dasein auf <es als es selbst zu>.... ». In der Tat geht Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* speziell im §69 «Die Zeitlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins und das Problem der Transzendenz der Welt» wiederholt darauf ein. «Die Transzendenz der Welt» ist nach seinen eigenen Worten «eine horizontale» (*Sein und Zeit*, 10. Auflage, S. 366).

Einem anderen Transzendenzverständnis begegnet man bei Augustinus, der über die Existenz des Menschen bekanntlich nicht weniger zu sagen hatte als Heidegger. Schon in seiner Frühschrift *Soliloquia* – *Alleingespräche* steht der lapidare Satz: *Deum et*

animam scire cupio... Nihil aliud – Gott und die Seele will ich wissen... Sonst nichts. Kaum etwas anderes beschäftigte schon den Neubekehrten mehr als das Übersteigen, das Ausrichten und Erstrecken der menschlichen Existenz – jedoch auf Gott hin, und zwar deshalb, weil Gott dies wolle, habe er doch dem Menschen eine Art existentielle Unruhe auf ihn, den schlechthin Transzendenten hin, ins Herz gelegt. Programmatisch beginnen deshalb seine *Bekenntnisse* mit dem vielleicht bekanntesten Satz aus all seinen Schriften: ... *auf dich hin hast du uns geschaffen, und ruhelos ist unser Herz, bis es ruhet in dir* (1,1).

Kommen wir auf den angeblichen Leitsatz Augustins *Ich will, dass Du bist* im Eingangsraum der umgebauten Augustinerkirche zurück, in dem Trauerarbeit konkret werden soll. Man wird diesem Leitsatz zugestehen, dass vorzüglich auf das Dasein bezogene Hilfen bei Bewältigung von Trauer, was der Satz ja suggeriert, etwa in der Psychotherapie oder bei ähnlichen Hilfestellungen selbst in kirchlichen Kreisen, durchaus angemessen sind. Aber in einer vorzüglich von Augustinus geprägten Pastoral?! Viele der Zeitgenossen Augustins wandten sich bei ihrer Trauer Trost suchend an ihn. Die noch vorhandenen Briefe legen davon beredte und rührende Zeugnisse ab. So gut wie nie ließ er es bei einem *ut sis* bewenden, er, der zweifelsohne größte Theologe seiner Zeit. Dennoch dürfte seine hohe Reputation in der Theologie von seiner Pastoral noch in den Schatten gestellt worden sein. Man greife zu einem der schönsten Bücher, die über ihn geschrieben worden sind: *Augustinus der Seelsorger* von F. van der Meer. Es ist demnach bedenklich, den angeblich den Schriften Augustins entnommenen Satz *Ich will, dass Du bist* unter Berufung auf Augustinus pastoral in Anspruch nehmen zu wollen. Er verschweigt nämlich die Intention jenes Seelsorgers, der die Existenz des Menschen mit all seinen Höhen und Tiefen radikal auf Gott hin bezogen wissen wollte – zumindest bringt er dies nicht genügend, geschweige denn vorrangig zum Ausdruck. Außerdem legte Augustinus, für dessen Schriften gebildete Christen sich nicht nur interessierten, sondern aus denen sie auch ausgiebig zitierten, auf exaktes Zitieren denkbar großen Wert.

Bekanntlich hat Papst Benedikt XVI. zum 11. Oktober ein Jahr des Glaubens ausgerufen, das einer Säkularisierung, <einer Verdunstung der Glaubenssubstanz>, entgegenwirken soll. *Neuevangelisierung* lautet das Programm, wozu er bereits ein Apostolisches Schreiben mit dem Titel *Porta fidei – Tor des Glaubens* herausgab. Darin zitiert er wie nahezu in allen seinen Publikationen des öfteren den Kirchenvater Augustinus, weil dieser sich sowohl

in seiner Theologie wie auch in seiner Pastoral wegweisend um die Wahrung und Vertiefung des Evangeliums bemühte. Nahezu die Hälfte seiner theologischen Werke verfasste dieser Kirchenvater gegen die Feinde der *«catholica»*, nicht nur um diese zu widerlegen, sondern auch um das Kirchenvolk im Glauben zu erhalten und zu stärken. Darüber hinaus sollten Abgefallene womöglich wieder in den Schoß der Kirche zurückfinden. «Ich schulde dir Liebe...», schrieb er z. B. dem jungen, zum Pelagianismus neigenden Vincentius Victor, «damit du nicht ein neuer Irrlehrer wirst – *ne sis nouus haereticus* –, sondern ein solcher Katholik seiest, dem kein Irrlehrer widerstehen kann – *et ut sis talis catholicus, cui resistere nullus possit haereticus*» (*Natur und Ursprung der Seele* 3,1).

Dass nach Augustinus nicht Irdisches der beherrschende pastorale Gesichtspunkt des von der christlichen *«caritas»* diktierten Umgangs mit Menschen sein dürfe, illustriert er in einer Predigt zum *Ersten Johannesbrief* über die Feindesliebe (Traktat 8,10), in der er die verschiedenen Objekte seines *ut sis* gleichsam Revue passieren lässt, sie zugleich der Reihe nach ablehnt, um die von der *«caritas»* her qualifizierten zu empfehlen.

Quomodo, inquis, fratres diligimus? Quaero quare diligas inimicum: quare illum diligis? Vt sanus sit in hac uita? Quid, si non illi expedit? Vt dives sit? Quid, si ipsis diuitiis excaecabitur? Vt uxorem ducat? Quid, si amaram uitam inde patietur? Vt filios habeat? Quid, si mali erunt? Incerta sunt ergo ista quae uideris optare inimico tuo, quia diligis eum; incerta sunt. Opta illi ut habeat tecum uitam aeternam; opta illi ut sit frater tuus.	Wieso, sagst du, sollen wir Brüder lieben? Ich frage, warum solltest du den Feind lieben: weshalb liebst du ihn? Dass er in diesem Leben gesund sei? Was aber, wenn es ihm nichts nützt? Dass er reich sei? Was, wenn Reichtum ihn verblendet? Dass er sich vereheliche? Was, wenn er ein bitteres Leben führen muss? Dass er Söhne habe? Was, wenn sie missraten? Ungewiss sind somit diese Dinge, die du deinem Feind zu wünschen scheinst, weil du ihn liebst, wahrlich ungewiss sind sie. Wünsche ihm, dass er mit dir das ewige Leben erhält; wünsche ihm, dass er dein Bruder sei.
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Ich will diese Apologie augustinischer, vorzüglich auf Gott hin zentrierter Daseinsauslegung *volo ut sis spiritalis, christianus, filius altissimi* etc. etc. mit einem Text beschließen, in dem der Verfasser der *Confessiones* sich im letzten Buch dieser viel gelesenen Schrift an Gott wendet, der ihn erschaffen hat, der ihn jedoch,

«seinen verlorenen Sohn», nicht vergessen hat. Der rhetorisch vollendete Text, ein Gebet des ins Vaterhaus Zurückkehrenden, der nunmehr ein Leben führen soll, das dem Wollen seines Schöpfers entspricht, lautet:

13,1 Inuoco te, *deus meus, misericordia mea* [Ps 58,18], qui fecisti me et oblitum tui non oblitus es. Inuoco te in animam meam, quam praeparas ad capiendum te ex desiderio, quod inspiras ei: nunc inuocantem te ne deseras, qui priusquam inuocarem praeuenisti et institisti crebrescens multimodis uocibus, ut audirem de longinquo et conuerterer et uocantem me inuocarem te.

Tu enim, domine, deleuisti omnia mala merita mea, ne retribueres manibus meis, in quibus a te defeci, et praeuenisti omnia bona merita mea, ut retribueres manibus tuis, quibus me fecisti, quia et priusquam essem tu eras, nec eram, cui praestares ut essem, et tamen ecce sum ex bonitate tua praeueniente totum hoc, quod me fecisti et unde me fecisti.

Neque enim eguisti me, aut ego tale bonum sum, quo tu adiuueris, dominus meus et deus meus, non ut tibi sic seruiam, quasi ne fatigeris in agendo, aut ne minor sit potestas tua carens obsequio meo, neque ut sic te colam quasi terram, ut sis incultus, si non te colam, sed ut seruiam tibi et colam te, ut de te mihi bene sit, a quo mihi est, **ut sim, cui bene sit».**

Ich rufe dich an, *mein Gott, meine Barmherzigkeit* (Ps 58,18), der du mich geschaffen hast, mich, der dich vergaß, den du aber nicht vergessen hast. Ich rufe dich in meine Seele, die du bereitest, dich in Sehnsucht zu fassen. Verlass den jetzt zu dir Rufenden nicht, dem du schon bevor ich rief, zugekommen bist, du, der mich häufig und mit vielerlei Stimmen bedrängt hast, dich aus der Ferne zu hören, umzukehren und dich, den Rufenden, anzurufen.

Denn du, Herr, hast all meine Vergehen getilgt, damit du nicht vergelten müsstest meiner Hände Werk, kraft derer ich dir abtrünnig geworden bin. Du (jedoch) kamst all meinen guten Werken zuvor, um belohnen zu können deiner eigenen Hände Werk, die mich schufen. Ehe nämlich ich war, warst du, und ich war nicht einer, dem du das Sein schuldetest. Und siehe, dennoch bin ich dank deiner zuvorkommenden Güte voll und ganz das, was du schufst und woraus du mich schufst.

Du hast nämlich meiner nicht bedurft; noch bin ich solch ein Gut, auf das du angewiesen wärest, mein Herr und mein Gott. Es ist keineswegs so, dass ich dir zu Diensten sein könnte. Damit du in deinem Schaffen nicht ermüdest, oder damit deine Macht Einbuße erlitte, wenn sie meines Dienstes entbehrte. Auch will ich dich nicht wie ein Stück Land kultivieren, als bliebst du unkultiviert, sofern ich dich nicht pflegte. Nein, dir dienen und dich kultisch ehren soll ich, damit es mir von dir her wohl sei, von dem mir zukommt **zu sein und wohl zu sein.**

Anhang: *Sermo Lambot 27 (CAG 2: Sermo 335i)*

27,1 Scimus quid cantauimus, et bene tenemus: *Pretiosa in conspectu domini mors sanctorum eius* [Ps 115,15]. Pretio quippe eius pretiosa est mors sanctorum. Non itaque mirandum est mortem esse pretiosam eorum qui tanto sunt pretio empti. Non enim appenditur mundus contra eius sanguinem per quem factus est mundus. Vt autem haberet sanguinem quem pro nobis funderet, *uerbum caro factum est, et habitauit in nobis* [Io 1,14]. Sanguis ergo eius pretium est omnium nostrum, qui tamen sanguis in remissionem fusus est peccatorum.

Quid enim ualebant peccatores, aut quanti ualebant? Itane uere erat ille sanguis pretium peccatorum? Etenim Christus pro impiis mortuus est apostolum audi: *Commendat caritatem suam, inquit, Deus in nobis, quia cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est* [Rm 5,8]. *Cum adhuc peccatores essemus*, tanti ualebamus? Immo, nihil ualeremus, si peccatores remaneremus. Emptor ille noster pretio mundauit quod emerat. Peccator enim quomodo tanti emeretur, nisi suo pretio mundaretur?

27,2 Quod ergo antequam nos emeret eramus non respiciamus, ne in uia remaneamus. Et non respiciamus, et tamen memoria teneamus. Si enim respexerimus, ad hoc redimus; si oblit erimus, ingrati erimus. Quod ergo fuimus, et meminisse bonum est, et cito odisse: meminisse ut gratias agamus, odisse ne ad uetera redeamus. Neque enim Iesus amando peccatores pro peccatoribus mortuus est.

1. Wir wissen, was wir gesungen haben, und wir halten daran fest: *Kostbar ist in den Augen des Herrn der Tod seiner Heiligen* (Ps 115,15). Durch seinen (Christi) Preis nämlich ist kostbar der Tod der Heiligen. Kein Wunder also ist es, dass der Tod (auch) derer kostbar ist, die mit solch hohem Preis erkaufte worden sind. Es wiegt nämlich die Welt das Blut dessen nicht auf, durch den die Welt erschaffen wurde. Damit er (Christus) aber Blut habe, um es für uns zu vergießen, *ist das Wort Fleisch geworden und hat unter uns gewohnt* (Joh 1,14). Sein Blut also, das jedoch als Blut zur Vergebung der Sünden vergossen wurde, ist unser aller Preis. Was waren denn die Sünder wert oder wie hoch war ihr Wert? War nicht jenes Blut wirklich der Preis für Sünder? Ist doch Christus für Gottlose gestorben – höre den Apostel: *Gott erweist seine Liebe zu uns darin*, sagt er, *dass Christus für uns, als wir noch Sünder waren, für uns gestorben ist* (Röm 5,8). *Als wir noch Sünder waren*, waren wir so viel wert? O nein, nichts wären wir wert gewesen, wären wir Sünder geblieben. Jener unser Freikäufer läuterte (erlöste), mit einem Preis, was er erstand. Wie wäre nämlich ein Sünder zu so hohem Preis freizukaufen, wäre er nicht durch seinen (Christi) Preis gereinigt (erlöst) worden?

2. Was wir also waren, bevor er uns loskaufte, darauf wollen wir nicht zurückschauen, um nicht auf der Strecke zu bleiben. Wir wollen zwar nicht zurückschauen, es aber dennoch im Gedächtnis bewahren. Schauen wir nämlich zurück, so könnten wir (womöglich) dorthin zurückkehren; vergäßen wir es, würden wir undankbar. So ist beides gut, uns zu erinnern, was wir waren, und dies zugleich zu hassen: zu erinnern, um Dank zu sagen; zu hassen, um nicht in den alten Zustand zurückzukehren. Denn

Quod quidem in superficie si quaeramus, occurrit difficultas nonnulla quaestionis. Quomodo enim non amauit pro quibus mori uoluit? Et qui sunt pro quibus mori uoluit? Apostolum audistis: *Cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est* [Rm 5,8]. Si ergo amauit pro quibus mortuus est, et peccatores sunt pro quibus mortuus est, peccatores ergo amauit.

Taceat peccator, loquatur saluator. Noui unde ueniat quod loqueris, o peccator: amas esse peccator. Neque enim diceres: peccatores amauit saluator, nisi amares esse peccator. Taceat ergo, ut dixi, peccator; loquatur saluator. Quid loquitur saluator? *Ecce iam sanus factus es, noli peccare, ne quid tibi deterius contingat* [Io 5,14]. Quam minaciter prohibuit quod amabas! Amat ergo ille quod esse uoluisti, cui talia minatur, si reuolueris quod fuisti?

27,3 Quomodo ergo pro peccatoribus mortuus est, si non amat peccatores? Prorsus non amando peccatores, pro peccatoribus mortuus est. Intellege, et non laboras. Tu me interrogas quomodo non amauit peccatores qui mortuus est pro peccatoribus. Dic mihi prius quod ego te interrogo, et tibi ipse de eo quod interrogaueras respondebis.

Quod quisque amat, uult esse, an non uult esse? Puto quia, si amas filios tuos, uis illos esse; si autem illos non uis esse, non amas. Et quodcumque amas, uis ut sit, nec omnino amas quod cupis ut non sit.

auch Jesus ist nicht aus Liebe zu Sündern für die Sünder gestorben.

Freilich, betrachten wir dies nur oberflächlich, so stoßen wir in dieser Frage auf keine geringe Schwierigkeit. Wie nämlich liebte er (Christus) die nicht, für die er (doch) sterben wollte? Und wer sind diese, für die er sterben wollte? Ihr habt den Apostel gehört: *Als wir noch Sünder waren, ist Christus für uns gestorben* (Röm 5,8). Hat er also geliebt, für die er starb, und sind dies Sünder, für die er starb, so hat er (doch) Sünder geliebt!

Es schweige der Sünder, es spreche der Erlöser! Ich weiß, o Sünder, woher du argumentierst: du liebst es, Sünder zu sein. Sonst würdest du nämlich nicht behaupten, der Erlöser liebt die Sünder, wenn du nicht liebtest, Sünder zu sein. Es schweige somit, wie ich sagte, der Sünder; es rede der Erlöser! Was spricht der Erlöser? *Siehe, schon bist du geheilt, sündige nicht mehr, damit dir nicht Schlimmeres zustößt* (Joh 5,14). Wie drohend verbot er, was du liebtest! Liebt demnach jener, was du sein wolltest, der solches androht, falls du rückfällig wirst?

3. Wie also starb er für die Sünder, wenn er Sünder nicht liebt? Er starb in der Tat für die Sünder, indem er Sünder nicht liebt. Bemühe dich, dies zu verstehen, und du wirst nicht unangenehm berührt sein. Du fragst mich, wie liebte der Sünder nicht, der (doch) für Sünder gestorben ist. Beantworte mir zuerst, was ich dich frage, und du wirst bezüglich deiner Frage dir selbst Antwort geben.

Was einer liebt, will er, dass es sei, oder will er, dass es nicht sei? Ich vermute, wenn du deine Söhne liebst, willst du (auch), dass sie seien; willst du indes, dass sie nicht seien, so liebst du sie nicht. Und was immer du liebst, willst du (auch), dass es sei; und du liebst überhaupt nicht, von dem du willst, dass es nicht sei.

Quid ergo uoluit dominus, cum moreretur pro nobis? Vt peccatores essemus, an ut a peccatis liberaremur? Si propterea mortuus est pro nobis ut peccata nostra deleteret, numquid amauit quod deleuit? Quis delet quod amat? Si fidelis es, si in eum credidisti, si sursum cor habes, ut scriberet quod es, deleuit quod fuisti.

27,4 Vide illum. Audi loquentem in Psalmo per prophetiam: *Multiplicatae sunt, inquit, infirmitates eorum, postea accelerauerunt* [Ps 15,4]. Quid est, *multiplicatae sunt infirmitates eorum*? *Lex subintrauit, ut abundaret delictum* [Rm 5,20]. Et quid, *postea accelerauerunt*? *Vbi abundauit delictum, superabundauit gratia* [Rm 5,20]. Quid deinde? *Postea accelerauerunt, quia morbis impleti medicum quaesierunt. Quid deinde? Non congregabo conuenticula eorum, inquit, de sanguinibus* [Ps 15,4]. Quid est, *non congregabo conuenticula eorum de sanguinibus*? Non per illa sacrificia pecorum congregabo eos, non de sanguinibus, sed de sanguine, propter quem sanguinem pretiosa in conspectu domini mors sanctorum eius.

Iam ergo *non congregabo conuenticula eorum de sanguinibus*. Illis enim sanguinibus conuincebantur, non mundabantur. Datus est, fusus est unus sanguis mundans, pro multis sanguinibus conuincendo. Datus est unus sanguis, et quid deinde? *Nec memor ero nominum eorum per labia mea* [Ps 15,4].

Was nun wollte der Herr, als er für uns starb? Dass wir Sünder seien, oder dass wir von den Sünden befreit würden? Wenn er deshalb für uns gestorben ist, damit er unsere Sünden tilgte, liebte er dann etwa, was er tilgte? Wer tilgt schon, was er liebt? Wenn du ein Gläubiger bist, wenn du an ihn (Christus) geglaubt hast, wenn du das Herz nach oben gerichtet hast, um festzuhalten, was du (nunmehr) bist, so tilgte er, was du warst.

4. Betrachte ihn, höre ihn über eine Prophetie im Psalm: *Gehäuft wurden, (sagt er), ihre Schwächen, im Nachhinein wurden sie (noch) beschleunigt* (Ps 15,4). Was heißt das, *gehäuft wurden ihre Schwächen*? (wenn nicht dies) *Das Gesetz trat noch hinzu, damit das Vergehen überhandnehme* (Röm 5,20). Und was (heißt) *im Nachhinein beschleunigt*? (wenn nicht:) *Wo die Übertretung zunahm, ist die Gnade übergroß geworden* (Röm 5,20). Was sodann? *Im Nachhinein (noch) beschleunigt*, weil von Krankheiten geplagt, suchten sie einen Heiler. Was sodann? *Ich will ihre Versammlungen nicht vereinen*, sagt er, *an denen Blut haftet* (Ps 15,4) Was meint dies, *ich will ihre Versammlungen nicht vereinen, an denen Blut haftet*? (Wenn nicht dies:) nicht zum Opfer von Tieren will ich sie vereinen, nicht zum Blut von Tieren, wohl aber zum Blut (des einen Geopferten), aufgrund welchen Blutes in den Augen des Herrn der Tod seiner Heiligen kostbar ist.

So will ich nunmehr ihre Versammlungen, an denen Blut haftet, nicht vereinen. Durch solches Blut (der Tiere) wurden sie überführt, nicht geläutert. Gegeben wurde dagegen und vergossen das reinigende Blut des einen anstelle von vergeblichem Blut vieler Tiere. Gegeben wurde das Blut eines einzigen (Opfers), und was folgt? *Ich will ihrer Namen nicht mehr gedenken noch nennen* (Ps 15,4).

Antequam funderetur ille unus sanguis, quando congregabantur conuenticula eorum de sanguinibus, nomina eorum non moriebantur: adulter, adulter erat; fur, fur erat; plagator, plagator erat; sacrilegus, sacrilegus erat. Fusus est unus sanguis: *non memor ero nominum illorum per labia mea. Nolite errare, ait apostolus, neque fornicatores, neque idolis seruientes, neque adulteri, neque molles, neque masculorum concubito- res, neque fures, neque auari, neque ebriosi, neque rapaces, neque maledici, regnum dei possidebunt* [1 Kor 6,9-10]: haec erant nomina illorum. Et ut scias quia haec erant nomina illorum, audi quid sequitur: *Et haec quidem fuistis* [1 Kor 6,11]. Et ubi est: *nec memor ero nominum eorum per labia mea? Sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis* [1 Kor 6,11]. Ergo iam quod fuistis non estis.

27,5 Certe amat Deus peccatores: Certe peccatores, per sanguinem ipsius, quod fuerunt non sunt. Quomodo amantur, cum dominus Christus iustos amauit, non peccatores? Quod facere uoluit amauit, non quod inuenit. Medicus, si implet quod uocatur, sanos amat, non aegrotos. Et prorsus audeo dicere, et uerum est, ideo uenit ad aegrotum, quia non amat aegrotum.

Contrarium uidetur quod dixi, sed interrogo: quare uenit ad aegrotum? Vt faciat sanum. Ergo non amat aegrotum. Quod uult facere amat, quod uult tollere non amat. Facti ergo sunt sani martyres sancti, tanti empti, a creatore suo redempti. Bis serui, quia et facti et empti. Et unde bis serui, inde liberi: mancipia creatoris, fratres redemptoris. Vt uideas seruos, euangelium lege tamquam instrumentum: ibi uide ubi

Bevor das Blut jenes einen (Christus) vergossen wurde, als ihre Versammlungen, an denen Blut von Tieren haftet, stattfanden, da verschwanden ihre (der Opfernden) Namen nicht: ein Ehebrecher blieb Ehebrecher, ein Dieb Dieb, ein Verführer Verführer, ein Gottloser Gottloser. Ein einziges Blut (Christi) wurde vergossen: *Ich werde der Namen jener nicht gedenken noch nennen. Täuscht euch nicht, sagt der Apostel, weder Unzüchtige, noch Götzendiener, noch Ehebrecher, noch Weichlinge, noch Knabenschänder, noch Diebe, noch Habgierige, noch Säufer, noch Räuber, noch Lästere werden das Reich Gottes erben* (1 Kor 6,9-10). Dies waren die Namen jener. Und damit du den Namen jener recht ermessenst, höre, was folgt: *Und dies wart ihr* (1 Kor 6,11). Und wo steht: *Ich will nicht mehr ihrer Namen gedenken noch sie nennen? Ihr aber seid gereinigt, ihr seid geheiligt* (1 Kor 6,11). Somit seid ihr nicht mehr, was ihr wart.

5. Gewiss liebt Gott die Sünder: Gewiss (jedoch) die Sünder, die dank seines Blutes nicht mehr (das) sind, was sie waren. Auf welche Weise sollten sie (auch) geliebt werden, da (doch) der Herr die Gerechten liebte, nicht die Sünder? Was er erreichen wollte, liebte er, nicht was er vorfand. Ein Arzt, wenn er erfüllt, wozu er berufen ist, liebt die Gesunden, nicht die Kranken. Ja, ich wage es zu sagen, und es ist so, er kommt deshalb zum Kranken, weil er den Kranken nicht liebt.

Es scheint dem zu widersprechen, was ich sagte, ich frage jedoch: weshalb besucht er den Kranken? Um ihn gesund zu machen. Also liebt er den Kranken nicht. Was er erreichen will, liebt er, was er beseitigen will, liebt er nicht. Geheilt wurden also die heiligen Martyrer – die um solch einen Preis erkaufen, die von ihrem Schöpfer erlöst. Doppelt sind sie Sklaven (Gottes), weil erschaffen und erlöst. Und woher

sunt empti. Adtende ipsa commercia: sacculus pretii eorum pendend in ligno, percussus est, fusus est. Fudit, et emit: legis, et inuenis seruorum instrumentum. Fecit eos fratres de seruis, et quod erat seruorum instrumentum, factum est filiorum testamentum. Amen.

sie zweifach Sklaven sind, daher sind sie auch Freie: Eigentumserwerbungen des Schöpfers, Brüder des Erlösers. Um die Knechte wahrzunehmen, lies das Evangelium gleichsam als die Kaufurkunde. Siehe dort, wo sie erkauft sind. Beachte den Geschäftsvorgang: das Geldsäckel mit dem Preis für sie hing am Holz des Kreuzes, es wurde durchstoßen und ausgeschüttet. Er goss (den Preis) aus und löste (sie) ein. Du liest und findest die Kaufurkunde für die Sklaven. Er machte sie aus Sklaven zu Brüdern, und was die Kaufurkunde für Sklaven war, wurde zum Testament für Söhne. Amen.

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L'ORDRE DES FRÈRES ERMITES DE SAINT-AUGUSTIN EN MÉDITERRANÉE ORIENTALE ET LEUR COUVENT NICOSIATE (XIII^e-XVI^e SIÈCLES)*

Philippe Trélat

Abstract

The history of the presence of the Hermits of Saint Augustine in the eastern Mediterranean and particularly in Cyprus during the medieval period is poorly understood. Yet few mentions in the sources show the birth of the first convent in Acre in 1290 and the location of the *prouincia ultramarina*'s establishments in the 14th c. The Nicosia convent is the best documented house because of its high status and its prosperity. The Lusignan monarchy, the Italian merchants and the local elites, with strong financial support, intended to receive some spiritual benefit, and wanted to be buried in the friars' church. The friars developed the influence of their convent (now Omeriyeh Djami) which has served as a repository for relics of saint Nicolas of Tolentino and saint Spyridon. Additionally, the study of different sources enables one to identify the function and dedication of the north chapel of the Augustinian church (Saint-Nicolas of Tolentino) that was previously unknown to us.

Keywords Middle Ages, Hermits of Saint Augustine (mendicant order), province of the Holy Land, Nicosia (Cyprus), Nicolas of Tolentino (saint, 1245?-1305)

Reprenant à leur compte la hiérarchie établie par le Saint-Siège au XVI^e siècle, les historiens de l'Orient latin ont accordé plus de faveurs aux Franciscains et aux Dominicains qu'aux trois autres ordres mendiants, les Carmes, les ermites de Saint-Augustin et les Servites.¹ Pourtant, avec des couvents moins nombreux dans les villes et une influence plus discrète sur les puissants, les «*other Friars*» (F. Andrews),

* Je me dois de remercier vivement Christopher Schabel (Université de Chypre) et Michalis Olympios (Université de Chypre) pour leur relecture minutieuse et pour leurs précieuses remarques et suggestions.

¹ *Dictionnaire des ordres religieux, ou Histoire des ordres monastiques, religieux et militaires et des congrégations séculières de l'un et de l'autre sexe, qui ont été établies jusqu'à présent*. Tome 1 par Pierre Hélyot, Marie-Léandre Badiche, l'abbé Tochou, publié par l'abbé Migne, Paris 1847, col. 302.

participent aussi, à leur mesure, à la *cura animarum* et au mouvement de prédication qui se développent à partir du XIII^e siècle dans toute la chrétienté médiévale.²

En Méditerranée orientale, les Prêcheurs et les Mineurs ont mis en place un réseau de couvents dont la fonction et l'histoire, parmi des populations majoritairement non latines, sont désormais bien connues. Plus à l'est, ils ont pris une part prépondérante sur les autres ordres dans l'œuvre missionnaire et ont fait l'objet de plusieurs solides études.³ De même, la présence des Carmes, au moins en Terre sainte, n'a pas été négligée par les historiens en raison du lien originel qu'entretient l'ordre avec le Mont Carmel.⁴ En revanche, les ermites de Saint-Augustin, regroupés au sein d'une province de Terre sainte, dénommée encore d'Outre-Mer ou de Chypre, et présents à diverses époques, à Chypre, à Corfou, en Crète, dans le Péloponnèse, à Rhodes et à Acre n'ont pas bénéficié des mêmes éclairages. La publication d'une partie des registres généraux de l'ordre permet désormais de mieux connaître la chronologie et la géographie des implantations des établissements augustins dans les villes du monde gréco-latin.⁵

Aujourd'hui, les traces de cette présence en Méditerranée orientale sont plutôt rares. À Nicosie, capitale du royaume chypriote des Lusignan (1192-1474) puis de la colonie vénitienne (1474-1570), l'église du couvent des augustins occupe une place centrale, dominant encore maintenant le quartier environnant, non loin de l'actuel archevêché orthodoxe.⁶ Ses dimensions, environ quarante mètres de longueur

² Sur les ordres mendiants secondaires, voir la synthèse de F. Andrews, *The Other Friars: The Carmelite, Augustinian, Sack, and Pied Friars in the Middle Ages*, Woodbridge 2006.

³ G. Golubovich, *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente francescano*, Quaracchi 1906-1927, I-V; J. Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au moyen-âge*, Rome-Paris 1977; C. Delacroix-Besnier, *Les Dominicains et la chrétienté grecque aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles*, Rome 1997.

⁴ A. Jotischky, *The Perfection of Solitude. Hermits and Monks in the Crusader States*. University Park, PA: Penn State Press 1995; id., *The Carmelites and Antiquity. Mendicant Views of the Past in the Middle Ages*. Oxford: OUP, 2002.

⁵ Les registres de l'ordre sont publiés par l'*Institutum Historicum Augustinianum* dans la collection *Fontes historiae Ordinis Sancti Augustini*. 1^{ère} série. *Registra priorum generalium* depuis 1976.

⁶ La présence des ermites de Saint-Augustin à Chypre est abordée chez J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, Londres 1909, rééd. New York 1972; trad. grecque augmentée de C. I. Papaïoannou, *Ιστορία της Ὀρθοδόξου τῆς Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Κύπρου*, Athènes-le Pirée 1923-1932, I-III. (Les références renvoient à la première édition.), p. 500, 610-611; A. Palmieri, «De monasteriis ac Sodolibus ESA in insula Cypro», *Analecta Augustinia* 1 (1905-1906), p. 93-96; N. Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1195-1312*, Aldershot 1997, p. 242-243; P. Leventis, *Twelve Times in Nicosia*, Nicosie 2005, p. 211-213; Ph. Plagnieux,

pour une largeur de onze mètres, font de cet édifice, composé d'une nef unique dépourvue de transepts et de collatéraux, divisée en trois travées et terminée par une abside à cinq pans coupés, la plus vaste église de la capitale après Sainte-Sophie.⁷ Son importance contraste avec la pauvreté de la documentation dont on dispose pour reconstituer la présence des ermites sur l'île. Les archives de l'établissement ont disparu, sans doute avec la prise de Nicosie par les Turcs en 1570, et l'on doit bien souvent se contenter de mentions éparses dans les sources. Leur analyse minutieuse confrontée aux conclusions des historiens de l'art permet toutefois de rendre justice au rôle joué par les augustins nicosiates sur l'île et dans la province de Terre Sainte ainsi que de réévaluer leur lien avec les habitants de la capitale et les autorités insulaires.

Naissance et développement de l'ordre au XIII^e siècle

La création de l'ordre des ermites de Saint-Augustin (*Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*, O. E. S. A), qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec les chanoines augustins, également présents en Orient, est le fruit du rassemblement de divers rameaux de communautés ermites qui essaient dans toute l'Italie du début du XIII^e siècle.⁸ Certains

Th. Soulard, «L'église des Augustins», in J.-B. de Vaivre, Ph. Plagnieux (éds.), *L'art gothique en Chypre*, Paris 2006, p. 176-180; P. Trélat, *Nicosie, une capitale de l'Orient latin, société, économie et espace urbain (1192-1474)*, Université de Rouen 2009, II p. 226-234; M. Olympios, *Gothic Church Architecture in Lusignan Cyprus, c. 1209 - c. 1373 Design and Patronage*, Ph D thesis, Londres 2010, I p. 218-228; N. Coureas, G. Grivaud, C. Schabel, «Frankish and Venetian Nicosia», in D. Michaelides (éd.), *Historic Nicosia*, Nicosie 2012, p. 192-195.

⁷ Pl. 1 et 2; pour une présentation de l'édifice: C. Enlart, *L'Art gothique et la Renaissance en Chypre*, Paris 1899, I p. 162-167; G. Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus. Studies in the Archaeology and Architecture of the Island*, Nicosie 1918, rééd. Londres 1983, p. 39-41; R. Gunnis, *Historic Cyprus. A guide to its towns and villages, monasteries and castles*, Londres 1936, réimp. Nicosie 1973, p. 71-74; de Vaivre, Plagnieux, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 176-180; Olympios, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], I, p. 218-228.

⁸ La seule synthèse historique disponible sur les ermites de Saint-Augustin est D. Gutiérrez, *Los Agustinos en la edad media*, 1, 1256-1356, Rome, 1977; 2, 1357-1517, Rome 1980, *The Augustinians in the Middle Ages 1256-1356* trad. A. J. Ennis, Villanova, 1984 (la version espagnole est prise en référence). On peut également consulter le chapitre que consacre Frances Andrews à cet ordre: Andrews, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 2], p. 69-171 et les notices des dictionnaires spécialisés: *Dictionnaire des ordres religieux*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 1], col. 292-309; B. Rano, «Agostiniani», *Dizionario degli Istituti di Perfezione*, Rome I (1974), col. 278-381; M. Th. Disdier, «Augustin (1^{er} Ordre dit de Saint-) (Ermites)», *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*, V (1931), col. 498-581.

groupes prétendent déjà suivre la règle de saint Augustin, alors que d'autres sont sous les ordres de figures saintes locales. Face à cette désorganisation, le pape Innocent IV charge le cardinal Riccardo Annibaldi, protecteur des ermites de Toscane, d'organiser en 1244 ces communautés autour de Florence sous l'autorité d'une règle. Alexandre IV poursuit la tâche de son prédécesseur et constitue un ordre monastique, le 9 avril 1256, par la «Grande Union» (*Magna Unio*) réunissant les congrégations de Saint-Guillaume, des Brettinesi, des fidèles du bienheureux Jean le Bon, des ermites du Mont Favale et divers agrégats d'ermites toscans vivant sous différents régimes. Il leur donne une règle qui s'inspire d'une série de préceptes édictés par l'évêque d'Hippone à la fin du IV^e siècle. Le nouvel ordre des frères ermites de Saint-Augustin est divisé en quatre provinces (Italie, France, Allemagne, Espagne) avec un provincial à la tête de chacune. Le chapitre général, composé des provinciaux et de représentants des provinces, se réunit à intervalle régulier et porte à sa tête le premier prieur général, Lanfranc Septala, un Milanais de la congrégation des Jean-bonites.⁹

Comme les autres ordres mendiants, les frères ermites sont très rapidement encouragés à s'implanter au cœur des villes pour l'exercice de la prédication et de la confession, par la bulle *Hiis qui relictis* d'Alexandre IV en 1259.¹⁰

Ils échappent au décret *Religionum diuersitatem* du second Concile de Lyon en 1274, supprimant les ordres mendiants qui ne peuvent pas prouver leur existence avant le quatrième Concile de Latran de 1215. En Occident, le nombre de couvents et de provinces se multiplie dans la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle jusqu'à l'adoption en 1290, au chapitre général de Ratisbonne, des Constitutions de l'ordre en vigueur pendant près de trois siècles.¹¹ Confirmés dans leur légitimité par le pape Boniface VIII en 1298, les ermites de Saint-Augustin ont pu alors établir des positions plus solides, éloignées de leurs bases italiennes, notamment en Terre sainte où sont déjà installés les autres ordres mendiants.

⁹ F. Roth, «Cardinal Richard Annibaldi first protector of the Augustinian order 1243-1276», *Augustiniana* 2 (1952), p. 26-60, 108-149, 230-247; 3 (1953), p. 21-34, 283-313; 4 (1954), p. 5-24.; Gutiérrez, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 8], p. 38-112; E. L. Saak, «The Creation of Augustinian Identity in the Later Middle Ages I», *Augustiniana* 49 (1999), p. 109-164; id., *High Way to Heaven: the Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524*, Leiden 2002, p. 1-138.

¹⁰ C. Alonso (éd.), *Bullarium Ordinis Sancti Augustini Regesta* II (1362-1415), Rome 1997, n° 60; P. Volti, *Les couvents des ordres mendiants et leur environnement à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Paris 2003, p. 18.

¹¹ R. W. Emery, «The Second Council of Lyons and the Mendicant Orders», *Catholic Historical Review* 39 (1953), p. 257-261.

Dès 1290, Nicolas IV ordonne au patriarche de Jérusalem de vendre aux Augustins le couvent d'Acre, propriété des frères pénitents de Jésus-Christ ou du Sac, un ordre mendiant supprimé en 1274.¹² Les ermites à qui était destiné l'établissement n'émigrent sans doute pas d'Italie mais gravitent peut-être déjà autour des Lieux saints sans être encore formellement rattachés à l'ordre créé par Alexandre IV. La perte d'Acre, en 1291, ne leur permet pas de s'installer durablement et les force à trouver refuge à Chypre.

Les sources pontificales confirment cette chronologie. Absents de l'île, les Augustins ne peuvent figurer au titre des bénéficiaires du testament du roi chypriote Jean I^{er} (1284-1285) aux côtes des trois principaux ordres mendiants.¹³ La date de 1299 constitue le *terminus ad quem* de leur arrivée car la bulle *Gerentis cordi negotium* de Boniface VIII adressée à la province franciscaine, aux prieurs des dominicains et des frères augustins, atteste alors la présence de l'ordre à Nicosie.¹⁴

Composés de réfugiés acconitains, les premiers effectifs de l'ordre ne doivent pas être très fournis et se fondent probablement parmi les autres communautés religieuses fraîchement débarqués sur les rivages chypriotes. Les sources restent muettes sur les premières années des Augustins à Chypre, leur résidence, leurs activités et plus généralement leur insertion dans la société chypriote. Trop peu nombreux pour justifier leur maintien sur l'île et conduire une activité pastorale, les augustins de Nicosie ont accueilli des frères en provenance d'Occident à la fin du XIII^e ou au début du XIV^e siècle. Deux des trois mendiants, Michale de Montechiano et Guillelmo de Panormo, signataires du traité entre le roi chypriote Hugues IV et la république de Gênes en 1338 témoignent par leur nom de l'importance d'un courant migratoire en provenance de Sicile sans que l'on

¹² *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registri Vaticani* 45, fol. 89 dans Alonso (éd.), *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], II (1362-1415), Rome 1997, n° 163; E. Langlois (éd.), *Registres de Nicolas IV*, Paris, 1886-1893, n° 3379; Th. de Herrera, *Alphabetum Augustinianum, in quo praeclara Eremitici Ordinis germina, atque virorum et feminarum domicilia recensentur*, Madrid 1644, I p. 73; D. Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom: A Corpus*, Cambridge 2010, IV p. 50.

¹³ C. Schabel (éd.), *Bullarium Cyprum, vol. II Papal Letters Concerning Cyprus 1261-1314*, Nicosie 2010, p. 196-197.

¹⁴ *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registri Vaticani* 49, fol. 175v dans Alonso (éd.), *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], I (1256-1362), n° 209; *Bullarium Cyprum, op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 13], p. 243-244; Coureas, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 136 et 243. On ne peut retenir la date de 1226 pour l'arrivée des Augustins à Chypre comme l'affirme Étienne de Lusignan: É. de Lusignan, *Chorograffia, et breve historia universale dell'isola di Cipro principiando al tempo di Noè per il fino al 1572*, Bologne 1573, réimp. Fama-gouste 1973, Nicosie 2004, p. 33.

puisse dire si ces liens se sont maintenus au-delà de la période de formation du couvent.¹⁵

Ne possédant pas encore leur grand établissement au centre de la ville, ni de province autonome, les ermites de Saint-Augustin ne peuvent, par conséquent, prétendre tenir un rang égal aux autres ordres mendiants. Ainsi, cette présence discrète encore informelle dans la capitale chypriote explique l'absence de frères de cet ordre dans les sources relatant l'usurpation d'Amaury de Tyr en 1306 ou dans les actes du procès des Templiers en 1310.¹⁶

Après cette installation au cœur du bassin méditerranéen oriental, les ermites de Saint-Augustin choisissent les principaux centres urbains du monde gréco-latin pour fonder de nouveaux couvents. Ils sont rapidement assez nombreux pour justifier l'érection d'une nouvelle province.

L'identification des établissements de la province de Terre sainte

Avec des frontières mal définies, la province de Terre sainte comprend une dizaine de couvents dont l'histoire est mal connue et reste encore à écrire. Elle se constitue sans doute au début du XIV^e siècle comme le suggère une lettre pontificale datée de 1317 qui reconnaît la possession par l'ordre de trois terrains *in transmarinis partibus*, en Grèce, en Crète et en Chypre.¹⁷ La pauvreté de cette province est souvent soulignée ce qui ne l'empêche pas d'être pratiquement toujours représentée lors des différents chapitres généraux de l'ordre jusqu'à celui de 1753.¹⁸ La disparition des établissements

¹⁵ L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, Paris 1852-1861, II p. 179. Le troisième mendiant Jean de Colle serait originaire du couvent de Colle di Val d'Elsa dans la région de Sienne plutôt que de la famille de Terre sainte, de Colle, comme le propose la notice accompagnant la publication de sa pierre tombale: B. Imhaus (éd.), *Lacrimae Cypriae*, Nicosie 2004, I n° 276.

¹⁶ L. de Mas Latrie, «Texte officiel de l'allocation adressée par les barons de Chypre au roi Henri II pour lui notifier sa déchéance (1306)», *Revue des questions historiques* 43 (1888), p. 540-541; A. Gilmour-Bryson (éd.), *The Trial of the Templars in Cyprus*, Leyde 1998.

¹⁷ *Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Registri Vaticani* 66, fol. 96v; *Registri Avenionensi* 6, fol. 638v-639r dans Olympios, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], I, p. 327-328 et résumé dans Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], I (1256-1362), Rome 1997, n° 312.

¹⁸ Au chapitre général de Montpellier en 1357, la province de la Terre sainte doit une contribution minime en raison de son extrême pauvreté. Les mêmes dispositions sont réitérées au chapitre général de Vienne en 1362. En 1397, au chapitre général de Munich, toutes les provinces participent au financement de la canonisation de Nicolas de Tolentino à l'exception de celle de Terre sainte. En 1465, le chapitre général

augustins fait suite au recul territorial progressif de Venise en Méditerranée orientale devant l'expansion ottomane. Cependant aucune série d'archives d'un établissement oriental n'est parvenue jusqu'au siège de la province générale.¹⁹ Ainsi l'identification des couvents orientaux repose donc encore en grande partie sur les travaux des historiens de l'ordre de l'époque moderne comme l'atlas du père Lubin et sur quelques mentions dans les registres conservés à Rome.²⁰ En plus de ces sources internes à l'ordre, les études augustiniennes peuvent également s'enrichir des informations fournies par les travaux récents sur l'expansion occidentale en Orient.

Avec cinq couvents, la Crète abrite les plus importantes communautés d'ermites de Saint-Augustin du bassin méditerranéen oriental. L'île compte les établissements suivants: Saint-Grégoire attesté en 1368 (sous la dédicace Sainte-Marie en 1380 et Sainte-Marie de la Miséricorde au milieu du XV^e siècle) à Chania-Souda (Cidonienne/Cydonia),²¹ Saint-Sauveur à Candie (1360/mi-XVI^e s.),²²

exempte la province de Terre sainte du paiement de 24 ducats: «Antiquiores quae exstant definitiones Capitulum Generalium Ordinis» *Analecta Augustiniana* 4 (1911-1912), p. 333, 429; 5 (1913-1914), p. 150-151; «Acta capituli generalis ordinis Erem. S. Augustini Appamiis anno 1465 celebrati», *Analecta Augustiniana* 7 (1917-1918), p. 110; «Acta capituli generalis ordinis Erem. S. Augustini Bionobiae anno 1753 celebrati», *Analecta Augustiniana* 13 (1929-1930), p. 90-91.

¹⁹ B. van Luijk, «Sources italiennes pour l'histoire générale de l'Ordre des Augustins», *Augustiniana* 8 (1958), p. 397-424.

²⁰ B. van Luijk, *Le monde augustinien du XIII^e au XIX^e siècle*, Assen 1972; A. Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus sive conventuum O. Erem. S. A. chorographica et topographica descriptio*, Paris 1659, 1671, 1672, p. 302-306; id., *Chorographia Augustiniana*, Paris 1659, carte n° 24. On peut ajouter trois listes anonymes de couvents augustins souvent fautives, une liste du milieu du XV^e et deux du milieu du XVI^e siècles: A. do Rosario, C. Alonso, «Actas inéditas de diez capitulos generales: 1419-1460», *Analecta Augustiniana* 42 (1979), p. 5-133; E. Esteban (éd.), «Catalogus conventuum ordinis sancti Augustini tempore Hieronymi Seripandi (1539-1551)», *Analecta Augustiniana* 6 (1915), p. 68; Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 958 (R. 5. 9), fol. 1-28.

²¹ Le couvent est mentionné dans les registres pour les années 1482, 1545 et 1583: «Acta capituli generalis ordinis Erem. S. Augustini Perusii an. 1482 celebrati», *Analecta Augustiniana* 7 (1917-1918), p. 290; Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I p. 179; A. Hartmann (éd.), *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus*, Rome 1996-1999, II (1387-1389), n° 267; Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 958 (R. 5. 9.), fol. 1-28.

²² Le couvent mentionné dans les registres jusqu'en 1542 aurait possédé un *studium generale*: Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I p. 169; S. Mc Kee, *Wills from late Medieval Venetian Crete*, Washington 1998, I p. 337 (1348), II p. 875 (1376); *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 21], I (1383-1387) n° 173, 486, 1018a; II (1387-1389) n° 56, 65, 66, 267, 649; III (1389-1393), n° 887, 894, 895; D. Gionta (éd.), *Iuliani de Salem O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus 1451-1459*, Rome 1994, n° 1203; D. Gutiérrez (éd.), *Hieronymus Seripando O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus*, Rome 1982-1990, I (1538-1540) p. 26, 77; II (1540-1542), p. 261; III (1542-1544), p. 83. L'église du couvent a été convertie en mosquée par les Turcs avant de

Sainte-Marie à Rethymno (1380/1551),²³ Sainte-Catherine à Sitia (1410/mi-XVI^e s.),²⁴ Sainte-Marie à Scopulos, un toponyme non identifié mais attesté par les registres de 1387 à 1551,²⁵ et un couvent dont la dédicace n'est pas connue à Melidoni-Methymne.²⁶

Corfou abrite un couvent fondé en 1419, dédié à sainte Marie de l'Annonciation et mentionné dans les registres pour les années 1482, 1486, 1524, 1540 et 1560.²⁷

Une *domus* placée sous l'invocation de saint Augustin est signalée en 1410 sur l'île de Rhodes, mais sa fondation est certainement bien antérieure. En 1326, un prieur OESA de *Burgo ville Roddi* est chargé d'envoyer un *pallium* à un évêque de l'archevêché hongrois de Colocsa.²⁸ Giovanni Corsini, frère d'un archevêque de Florence fonde une chapelle Sainte-Catherine dans le couvent où il est inhumé en 1388.²⁹ Détruit par les Turcs en 1525, l'établissement rhodien donne un martyr, Philippe Emilius de Penavillo, à l'ordre mendiant.³⁰

devenir plus tard une école pour filles. Elle a été détruite en 1970: B. K. Panagopoulos, *Cistercian and Mendicant Monasteries in Medieval Greece*, Chicago 1979, p. 94.

²³ Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], II p. 133; Mc Kee, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 22], II p. 994 (1392); le frère Gabriel de Rethymno occupe la charge de provincial de la Terre sainte jusqu'en 1390: *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 21], II (1387-1389), n° 267, 269, 271, 322; III (1389-1393), n° 422, 423; *Iuliani de Salem O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 22], n° 1204; *Christophori Patavini O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus 1559-1560*, Rome 1985-2002, I (1551-1552), n° 72; un autre couvent Sainte-Marie à Milopotamos dans la région de Rethymno figure dans les deux listes du XVI^e siècle. Il a pu être réuni ensuite du couvent principal de Rethymno comme le suggère Lubin: Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 958 (R. 5. 9.), fol. 1-28; Esteban (éd.), *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 68; Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus, op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 303.

²⁴ Nicolaus Zancharolus de Candie est prieur de ce couvent en 1419: Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], II, p. 421; Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], II (1362-1415), n° 642.

²⁵ Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], II, p. 421; *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 21], II (1387-1389), n° 267; *Christophori Patavini O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 23] I (1551-1552), n° 75. Ce couvent figure également dans trois listes: Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 958 (R. 5. 9.), fol. 1-28; Esteban (éd.), *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 68; Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus, op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 302, 305. Le père van Luijk considère que ce couvent est un doublon de celui de Chania-Souda dédié également à Sainte-Marie: van Luijk, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], 1972, p. 44.

²⁶ van Luijk, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], 1972, p. 44.

²⁷ Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus, op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 303; «Acta capituli generalis ordinis Erem. S. Augustini Perusii», art. cit., p. 290; «De capitulo generali Ordinis Erem. S. Augustini anno 1486 Senis celebrato», *Analecta Augustiniana* 7 (1917-1918), p. 377; Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I p. 172, 178; *Hieronymus Seripando O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 22], II (1540-1542), p. 70.

²⁸ A. Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam Sacram* Rome 1859, I n° DCCLXXXI et DCCLXXXII p. 508.

²⁹ A. Luttrell, «The Hospitaliers of Rhodes between Tuscany and Jerusalem: 1310-1431», *Revue Mabillon* 64 (1992), p. 128.

³⁰ N. Crusenio, «Epitome Historica FF. Augustiniensium», *Revista Agustiniana* 2 (1883), p. 43; Disdier, art. cit., col. 514. D'autres références à ce couvent dans:

Dans le Péloponnèse, on compte des couvents à Pylos (Navarino), Corinthe et Clarentza (attesté en 1390 dans les registres de l'ordre).³¹

Thomas de Herrera complète ce tableau en ajoutant les couvents d'Acre,³² de Chio et de Kythnos dans les Cyclades, les deux derniers fondés en 1419,³³ Herodiani (toponyme non identifié) en 1551,³⁴ Zara en 1422 qui passe de la congrégation de Dalmatie et Pola (Pula d'Istria) à la province de Venise.³⁵

À Chypre, l'historiographie augustinienne de l'époque moderne n'enregistre que deux établissements, l'un dédié à saint Antoine à Famagouste et l'autre au saint éponyme de l'ordre à Nicosie.³⁶ Selon les archives pontificales, il apparaît que le couvent nicosiate est le seul établissement des mendiants dans le premier quart du XIII^e siècle. En 1328, Jean XXII confie aux nonces Pierres de Manso et Arnald de Fabricis le soin d'ériger deux nouveaux couvents augustins, probablement à Famagouste et à Limassol.³⁷ Le premier, désigné également sous la dédicace de Saint-Augustin dans les registres de la *Massaria*, reçoit au même titre que le couvent nicosiate un don de 25 besants du marchand pisan Giovanni Raù en 1333 ainsi que cinq autres legs par

Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], II p. 364, 368; «Acta capituli generalis ordinis Erem. S. Augustini Perusii», art. cit., p. 290; F. Scalamonti, E. W. Bodnar, C. Mitchell (éds.), *Vita uiri clarissimi et Famosissimi Kyriaci Anconitani*, Philadelphie 1996, p. 124; Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], III (1417-1492), Rome 1998, n° 166 et 860; N. Coureas, «The Migration of Syrians and Cypriots to Hospitaller Rhodes in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries», in K. Borchardt, N. Jaspert, et H. J. Nicholson, (éds.), *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*, Ashgate 2007, p. 105; *Iuliani de Salem O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 22], n° 1205; *Hieronymus Seripando O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 22], II (1540-1542), p. 261.

³¹ Van Lwijk, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], 1972, p. 43-44; *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 21], III (1389-1393), n°423; sur le couvent de Pylos: S. Davies, «Pylos Regional Archaeological Project, Part VI, Administration and Settlement in Venetian Navarino», *Hesperia* 73 (2004), n° 51 p. 71.

³² Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I, p. 73

³³ Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I, p. 172.

³⁴ Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I, p. 362.

³⁵ Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I p. 497, II p. 317; Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 305-306.

³⁶ Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 303-304; Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I p. 262. Seul l'historien chypriote, Étienne de Lusignan note l'existence de trois couvents augustins dans son île natale (Nicosie, Famagouste et Limassol): É. de Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Chypre*, Paris 1580, réimp. Famagouste 1968, Nicosie 2004, fol. 89v-90r.

³⁷ G. Mollat et alii (éds.), *Lettres communes du pape Jean XXII analysées d'après les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican*, Paris 1904-1947, I-XVI, n° 41573; J. Richard (éd.), *Bullarium Cyprium*, t-14/6/28, (à paraître); C. Schabel, C. Kaoulla, «The Inquisition against Peter de Castro, vicar of the Dominican province of the Holy Land, in Nicosia, Cyprus, 1330», *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 77 (2007), p. 126.

des hommes d'affaires, principalement génois et vénitiens, pour un montant total de 315 besants entre 1361 et 1369.³⁸ Les archives pontificales désignent l'établissement famagoustain comme une *domus* en 1459.³⁹ Saint-Antoine est encore en activité en 1570, car un témoignage sur la chute de Famagouste est livré au Collège de Venise par un prieur de ce couvent.⁴⁰ Localisé près de la chapelle des Saints-Pierre-et-Paul dans un document des archives pontificales daté de 1371, l'établissement pourrait correspondre aux ruines de l'église et de l'hôpital près du port de Famagouste, identifiées sur le plan de Gibellino sous le nom «Saint-Antoine».⁴¹ Cependant, les actes du notaire génois Lamberto di Sambuceto mentionnent, déjà à la fin du XIII^e siècle, un hôpital Saint-Antoine sur le port qui serait desservi par l'ordre hospitalier Saint-Antoine de Viennois.⁴² Si la chronologie ne coïncide pas avec l'arrivée des ermites de Saint-Augustin à Famagouste, on ne peut exclure l'hypothèse qu'il n'y ait qu'un seul établissement hospitalier dédié à saint Antoine dans la ville de Famagouste d'autant que les Antonins suivent la règle des Augustins depuis 1247.⁴³

Absent des testaments, le couvent du diocèse de Limassol, peut-être une simple *domus*, voit ses revenus revenir en 1384 au franciscain Jean Stinus.⁴⁴ Lors du passage du pèlerin allemand Paulus Walther à

³⁸ C. Otten-Froux, «Notes sur quelques monuments de Famagouste à la fin du Moyen Âge», in J. Herrin, M. Mullett, C. Otten-Froux (éds.), *Mosaic (Festschrift for A. H. S. Megaw)*, Londres 2001, p. 149; C. Otten-Froux, «Documents inédits sur les Pisans en Roumanie aux XIII^e-XIV^e siècles», in M. Balard, A. E. Laiou, C. Otten-Froux (éds.), *Les Italiens à Byzance*, Paris 1987, p. 185; C. Otten-Froux, «Un notaire vénitien à Famagouste au XV^e siècle. Les actes de Simeone, prêtre de San Giacomo dell'Orio (1362-1371)», *Thesaurismata* 33 (2003), n° 175, 185, 195.

³⁹ Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], III (1417-1492), Rome 1998, n° 477.

⁴⁰ N. Morosini (éd.), *Relation del Reverrendo Padre Fra Agustin Famagustano, fo prior in Famagosta nel monasterio de San Antonio de l'Ordine Ermitano, della perdita di Famagosta....*, Venise 1891; le couvent figure également sur la liste des établissements de la province de Terre sainte du ms 958 de la bibliothèque Angelica au milieu du XVI^e siècle: Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 958 (R. 5. 9), fol. 1-28.

⁴¹ *Archivio Segreto Vaticano Registri Avenionensi* 173, fol. 410v dans Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], II (1362-1415), Rome 1997, n° 96; C. Otten-Froux, «Notes sur quelques monuments», art. cit., p. 149; Ph. Plagnieux, Th. Soulard, «L'Hôpital Saint-Antoine», in de Vaivre, Plagnieux (éds.), *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 248-250.

⁴² M. Balard, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (11 ottobre 1296- 23 Giugno 1299)*, Gênes 1983, n° 24 p. 33; Plagnieux, Soulard, «L'Hôpital Saint-Antoine», art. cit. [ci-dessus, n. 41], p. 248.

⁴³ A. Mischlewski, *Un ordre hospitalier au Moyen Âge, les chanoines réguliers de Saint-Antoine-en-Viennois*, Grenoble 1995, p. 22.

⁴⁴ W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, «Le royaume et l'Église de Chypre face au Grand Schisme (1378-1417) d'après les registres des Archives du Vatican», *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome, Moyen Âge, Temps Modernes* 94/2 (1982), p. 645. À la différence des Carmes, le compte de Bernard Anselme dressé en 1367 dans le diocèse

Limassol en juillet 1482, un frère augustin compte parmi les desservants de l'église cathédrale, mais la documentation manque pour témoigner du maintien d'un établissement mendiant à Limassol.⁴⁵

Tel n'est pas le cas de l'édifice nicosiate qui a accueilli les frères augustins du XIII^e au XVI^e siècle. Son histoire est assez bien éclairée par les récits de voyage et les chroniques chypriotes, même si la dédicace de l'église des Augustins a causé quelques soucis aux historiens. La plupart d'entre eux ont confondu à juste titre la principale mosquée Omeriyeh au sud de la ville avec le couvent médiéval. Suivant la tradition la plus répandue, le vocable actuel d'Omeriyeh Djami (on trouve également Emergié, Omerieh, Omergheh, Omeriye ou encore Omerie) dériverait du nom du calife, Omar, qui aurait effectué une halte à Nicosie et se serait reposé sous le porche d'une église en ruine, lors d'un voyage qui le conduisait de Syrie en Égypte dans la première moitié du VII^e siècle. Après la prise de Nicosie par les armées ottomanes en 1570, le général Lala Mustapha aurait reconnu l'église des Augustins comme celle de la légende et lui aurait attaché le nom du calife.⁴⁶

Le comte de Mas Latrie, premier historien à avoir identifié l'édifice grâce aux dalles funéraires, semble ignorer cette tradition et préfère admettre pour la dédicace «Omeriyeh», une altération de *Mariem* ou *Meriem*, soit Marie en arabe et en turc. Le savant linguiste déplorait que personne n'ait pu lui venir en aide pour résoudre ce problème d'onomastique et reconnaît que sa proposition n'est qu'une conjecture.⁴⁷ Elle paraît toutefois peu probable car il n'y a pas, à notre connaissance, de sources qui placent l'établissement nicosiate sous l'invocation de la Vierge. Malgré l'absence de preuves, la dédicace de Mas Latrie a fait florès dans de nombreuses publications.⁴⁸

de Limassol n'enregistre aucune possession des ermites de Saint Augustin: J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIV^e-XV^e siècles)*, Paris 1962, p. 86.

⁴⁵ G. Grivaud, *Excerpta Cypria Nova, vol. I: Voyageurs Occidentaux à Chypre au XV^e siècle*, Nicosie 1990, p. 113. L'établissement de Limassol a peut-être été détruit en 1400 si l'on en croit le témoignage peu fiable d'Étienne de Lusignan: Lusignan, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 14], fol. 90r.

⁴⁶ Jeffery, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 7], p. 39; Gunnis, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 7], p. 72; R. C. Jennings, *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640*, New York 1993, p. 55-56.

⁴⁷ L. de Mas Latrie, «Nicosie, ses souvenirs historiques et sa situation présente», *Le Correspondant* 18 (25 juin 1847), p. 870; id., «Second rapport à M. le Ministre de l'instruction publique par M. de Mas Latrie, chargé en 1846 d'une mission en Chypre» *Archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires*, 1^{re} série, 1 (1850), p. 538.

⁴⁸ F. S. Maratheftis, *Location and development of the Town of Leucosia (Nicosia), Cyprus*, Nicosie 1977, p. 68; *Lacrimae Cypriae, op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 15], I p. 273; Leventis, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 211; Pringle, *The churches, op. cit.* [ci-dessus,

La localisation centrale du couvent lui permet d'échapper aux démolitions vénitiennes de la deuxième moitié du XVI^e siècle. Converti en mosquée en 1570, l'édifice est un des monuments les plus souvent cités par les voyageurs qui fréquentent la ville sous domination ottomane. En 1631, Vincent de Stochove remarque que le cloître est toujours visible mais endommagé.⁴⁹ Au cours du même siècle, le vénitien Gianantonio Soderini comme le voyageur et humaniste italien, Francesco Piaccenza, relèvent la véritable dédicace de cette église à saint Augustin.⁵⁰ Au XVIII^e siècle, Paul Lucas ou Richard Pococke prennent la peine d'identifier correctement le monument, tandis que l'archimandrite Kyprianos, trompé sans doute par la fonction hospitalière d'une partie des bâtiments encore en place, attribue cette église aux chevaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem.⁵¹ Les confusions, plus fréquentes au XIX^e siècle, conduisent les voyageurs à des identifications erronées. Peut-être guidé par une lecture hâtive de la pierre tombale de Lucrèce de Lusignan inhumée au couvent en 1566, le comte de Marcellus croit reconnaître l'église Saint-Dominique qui préserverait dans ses entrailles les sépultures des Lusignan ainsi que leur couronne.⁵² L'archiduc Louis Salvator assure, quant à lui, que cette église est dédiée à saint Nicolas sans qu'aucune tradition ne corrobore cette assertion.⁵³

n. 12], p. 173; le panneau placé à l'entrée des bâtiments qui prolongent la mosquée et les dépliants touristiques, notamment celui du *Nicosia Master Plan* (p. 52), dédient également l'église à sainte Marie.

⁴⁹ V. Stochove, *Voyage du Sieur de Stochove, fait es années 1630, 1631, 1632*, Bruxelles 1643, p. 249.

⁵⁰ G. A. Soderini, *Viaggi in Cipro, Egitto, Hyerusalem*, Museo Correr, Venise, ms Cicogna 999 bis, fol. 12v; N. Christofidou, «Ο Ιταλός Περιηγητής Francesco Piaccenza και η Κύπρος», *Ἑπετηρίς τοῦ Κέντρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἑρευνῶν* (=EKEE) 18 (1991), p. 208.

⁵¹ A. Pouradier Duteil-Loizidou, «Un antiquaire français à Chypre malgré lui», *EKEE* 25 (1999), p. 172; C. D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria. Materials for a History of Cyprus*, Cambridge 1908, réimp. Nicosie 1969, p. 259; Kyprianos Archimandrite, *Ἱστορία χρονολογικὴ τῆς νήσου Κύπρου*, Venise 1788 et rééd. Nicosie 1902, Nicosie 1974, Nicosie 2001. (La citation renvoie à la dernière édition.), p. 588. L'hypothèse d'une attribution de l'édifice aux Hospitaliers est également reprise chez A. Lenoir, *Instructions à l'usage des voyageurs en Orient publiées sous les auspices du comité de la langue de l'histoire et des arts de la France. Monuments de l'ère chrétienne*, Paris 1856, p. 21.

⁵² L.-M. Martin du Tyrac dit comte de Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, Paris 1839, I, p. 318; B. Imhaus, «La mort dans la société franque de Chypre», *EKEE* 24 (1998), p. 75. Sans avoir visité les lieux, Olfert Dapper commet la même erreur que le comte de Marcellus: O. Dapper, *Description exacte des isles de l'Archipel, et de quelques autres adjacentes: dont les principales sont Chypre, Rhodes....* Amsterdam 1703, p. 31.

⁵³ L. Salvator, *Levkosia, Hauptstadt von Cypern*, Prague 1873, rééd. en anglais, Londres 1881, p. 34 (la référence renvoie à l'édition en anglais.).

Après avoir repris les errances étymologiques et parfois les erreurs d'identification des voyageurs et savants, l'historiographie chypriote doit se résoudre à suivre les historiens de l'ordre des Augustins qui n'ont jamais cessé de reconnaître dans l'établissement nicosiate une église éponyme de l'ordre, comme on en rencontre à Rhodes ou fréquemment en Italie.⁵⁴

Conseiller les puissants et soigner les malades au couvent nicosiate

La documentation n'est pas suffisamment abondante pour rendre compte en détail du développement de l'ordre mendiant sur l'île, ni pour établir la chronologie des travaux de construction de l'édifice nicosiate.

En revanche, les sources renseignent mieux sur la place privilégiée tenue par les ermites augustins auprès des souverains chypriotes. De passage sur l'île en 1335, le frère augustin Jacques de Vérone révèle la présence de trois condisciples aux côtés de deux Prêcheurs et de prêtres séculiers parmi les dix chapelains du roi Hugues IV.⁵⁵ Ce sont peut-être les trois mêmes mendiants, Jean de Colle, Michale de Montechiano et Guillelmo de Panormo qui figurent en qualité de témoins en bas d'un traité entre Hugues IV et la République de Gênes en 1338.⁵⁶ L'activité soutenue de plusieurs frères ermites dans l'entourage royal pendant la première moitié du XIV^e siècle, correspond à la période de construction de l'église du monastère, si l'on suit les conclusions des travaux récents des historiens de l'art.⁵⁷ La participation de la monarchie chypriote au financement de ce chantier au cœur de la capitale est donc hautement probable. Les hommes d'affaires italiens, proches par leur origine géographique des ermites, ont également sans doute participé à l'avancement des travaux par les

⁵⁴ Lubin, *Orbis Augustinianus*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], p. 304, 307; Van Luijk, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 20], 1972, p. 37-50.

⁵⁵ R. Röhrich (éd.), «*Liber peregrinationis Fratris Jacobi de Verona*», *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 3 (1895), p. 176.

⁵⁶ L'hypothèse est émise par Olympios, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], I, p. 218-228; L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, Paris 1852-1861, II p. 179. Les pierres tombales de Jean de Colle et Michale de Montechiano, inhumés dans l'église des Augustins, sont conservées au château de Limassol: *Lacrimae Cypriae*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 15], I n° 276 et 286.

⁵⁷ C. Enlart, *L'Art gothique et la Renaissance en Chypre*, Paris 1899, I p. 167; Jeffery, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 7], p. 40; Plagnieux, Soulard, «*L'église des Augustins*», *art. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 180; en examinant attentivement la documentation pontificale, Michalis Olympios avance une date de fondation du couvent comprise entre 1317 et 1326: Olympios, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], I, p. 218-228.

legs qu'ils effectuent au XIV^e siècle.⁵⁸ Le soutien des Augustins au pouvoir royal ne faiblit pas dans la période trouble qui suit le règne de Pierre I^{er}. Les chroniques chypriotes, et particulièrement celle de Machairas, relatent avec force détails les ruses dont a fait preuve la reine Éléonore, alors à Cérines, pour entrer en contact avec le roi retenu à Nicosie en 1374 par les Génois. Elle confie des lettres à son jeune secrétaire Demetrios Daniel qui, se faisant passer pour un berger livrant du lait à la ville, parvient à les remettre à son confesseur augustin.⁵⁹ Aux côtés des Nicosiates, les frères ermites maintiennent leur fidélité à la dynastie des Lusignan contre l'envahisseur génois. Du point de vue de la topographie urbaine, le couvent constitue pour le pouvoir politique un point d'appui indéfectible dans une partie orientale de la ville où les institutions civiles et religieuses sont peu présentes à cette époque.

La confiance qu'accorde la monarchie des Lusignan aux augustins nicosiates permet à ces derniers d'accroître leur influence au sein de l'ordre. Ainsi, en 1391, c'est un des leurs, Jean de Chypre, qui accède à la charge de provincial de la Terre sainte pour succéder à Gabriel de Rethymno.⁶⁰

Au XV^e siècle, l'ordre poursuit son développement, sans que l'on puisse distinguer précisément les différentes phases d'aménagement du couvent. Les effectifs des Augustins ont été suffisamment importants pour nécessiter la construction d'un deuxième cloître suivant les modèles des couvents des Prêcheurs et des Mineurs de Nicosie ou du prieuré du Saint-Sépulcre à Jérusalem.⁶¹ Selon Machairas, dans les années 1410, l'hospice du monastère – το ξενοδοχίον

⁵⁸ C. Otten-Froux, «Documents inédits sur les Pisans en Romanie aux XIII^e-XIV^e siècles», in M. Balard, A. E. Laiou, C. Otten-Froux (éds.), *Les Italiens à Byzance*, Paris 1987, p. 185; Otten-Froux, «Un notaire vénitien», *art. cit.*, n° 175.

⁵⁹ M. Pieris, A. Nicolaou-Konnari (éds.), *Λεοντίου Μαχαιρά. Χρονικό της Κύπρου. Παράλληλη διπλωματική έκδοση των χειρογράφων*, Nicosie 2003, p. 355; R. de Mas Latrie (éd.), *Strambaldi, Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Paris 1893, II, p. 266; R. de Mas Latrie (éd.), *Amadi, Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Paris 1891, I, réimp. Nicosie 1999, p. 467; R. de Mas Latrie (éd.), *Florio Bustron. Chronique de l'île de Chypre*, Paris 1886, rééd.: id., *Florio Bustron, Historia over Commentarii di Cipro*, Nicosie 1998, p. 325. L'attachement de la reine au monastère se devine également à la lecture de l'épithaphe d'un chevalier: MADAME: ELIENOR (*Lacrimae Cypriae*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 15], I n° 330). S'il s'agit bien d'Éléonore d'Aragon, on peut suggérer qu'un homme de son entourage ait choisi d'être inhumé dans l'église du couvent des Augustins.

⁶⁰ *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 21], III (1389-1393) n° 705.

⁶¹ M. Piccirillo (éd.), *Lo Notaio Nicola de Martoni: Il pellegrinaggio ai Luoghi Santi da Carinola a Gerusalemme 1394-1395*, Jérusalem 2003, p. 114; T. S. R. Boase, «Ecclesiastical Art in the Crusader States in Palestine and Syria», in H. W. Hazard

pour le manuscrit de Venise, τὸ σπιτάλλην pour les manuscrits d'Oxford et de Ravenne – est l'objet d'une restauration (ἀνάστυσεν). Janus et Charlotte de Bourbon ne se contentent pas de financer les travaux; la reine assume également les frais d'intendance nécessaires à l'accueil des étrangers (draps, couvertures, nourriture) et nomme Arnaud Guillaume, surintendant de l'établissement.⁶² L'exploitation du champ de blé de 30 *modia*, soit environ 6 acres, entourant le couvent que décrit Nicolas de Martoni à la fin du XIV^e siècle, ne peut suffire à subvenir aux dépenses courantes.⁶³

Un fait judiciaire relevé dans les archives pontificales marque encore l'histoire de la petite communauté de mendiants au XV^e siècle avec l'intrusion du pape dans ses affaires. Le meurtre d'un frère augustin, Pierre Stephan, nécessite l'intervention en 1443 du pape Eugène IV pour obtenir la libération de frère Thomas Baburi, accusé à tort. Selon toute vraisemblance, il s'agit d'un acte de légitime défense car la victime martyrisait l'infortuné Thomas depuis deux ans.⁶⁴

Cette affaire n'entache pas la réputation des frères ermites qui gardent la confiance des Lusignan. Les augustins les plus brillants s'illustrent dans l'histoire du royaume chypriote par leur carrière ecclésiastique comme Jean Petit, confesseur du roi Janus, qui obtient la charge d'archevêque de Tarse en 1407, puis celle d'évêque de Pafos en 1413.⁶⁵ Appartenant à une importante famille insulaire, peut-être d'origine syrienne, Guillaume Gonème apparaît, sans conteste, comme une figure majeure de la vie politique et religieuse du XV^e siècle. Suivant l'exemple d'autres frères de son ordre, il commence sa carrière en remplissant la fonction de confesseur du roi de Chypre, Jean II. Son destin prend une autre envergure lorsqu'il entre dans le cercle proche des conseillers du roi Jacques II qui le nomme archevêque de Nicosie en 1460, sans toutefois être reconnu par le Saint Siège avant

(éd.), *A History of the Crusades. Volume IV. The Art and Architecture of the Crusader States*, Madison 1977, IV, p. 77.

⁶² Pieris, Nicolaou-Konnari (éds.), *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 59], p. 429.

⁶³ Piccirillo, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 61], p. 114; une aquarelle réalisée vers 1880 par Frederick Vigers permet d'imaginer l'importance du domaine cultivé autour du monastère avec la représentation d'un père et de sa fille à une dizaine de mètres au sud de l'édifice cueillant des herbes au milieu d'un tapis végétal très fourni: R. C. Severis, *Travelling Artists in Cyprus 1700-1960*, Londres 2000, p. 190.

⁶⁴ G. Fedalto (éd.), *Acta Eugenii IV (1431-1447)*, Rome 1990, n° 1100 et 1131; N. Coureas, G. Grivaud, C. Schabel, *art. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 193.

⁶⁵ W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, «Le royaume et l'Église de Chypre», *art. cit.*, p. 688, 695; id., «Études de prosopographie généalogique des Chypriotes mentionnés dans les registres du Vatican», *Μελέται καὶ Ὑπομνήματα* 1 (1984), p. 531; Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], II (1362-1415), Rome 1997, n° 943.

1467.⁶⁶ Prenant une place active dans la conduite de la politique du royaume aux côtés du roi, il ne néglige pas pour autant les affaires de son ordre puisqu'il occupe également la fonction de prieur de la province de Terre sainte à partir de 1451. Retourné à l'état de simple frère mendiant quelques années avant sa mort en 1473, il est inhumé dans le couvent Saint-Augustin à Nicosie. Guillaume Gonème a également fait bénéficier son couvent d'origine de ses largesses en finançant la construction de bâtiments hospitaliers.⁶⁷

Doué de qualité d'administrateur, le bienfaiteur du couvent possède une solide formation intellectuelle pour exercer la charge de lecteur en théologie à Nicosie. À l'instar des autres ordres mendiants, l'activité d'enseignement constitue un pilier important de la vie des couvents. Les frères ermites doivent disposer à Nicosie d'une bibliothèque et d'un enseignement qu'ils complètent dans les universités italiennes. Parmi les frères ermites accueillis au *studium generale* Saint-Jacques de Bologne figure Richard «de Cipro» en 1386.⁶⁸ Trente ans plus tard, c'est le frère augustin, Jean de Chypre, peut-être le futur maître en théologie, qui est mentionné dans les registres de l'université de Padoue.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Rome privilégie la nomination de frères issus des ordres mendiants à la tête des diocèses situés dans les régions orientales. Les listes épiscopales des diocèses orientaux mentionnent toutefois plus rarement des frères ermites de saint Augustin: C. Delacroix-Besnier, «Les Ordres mendiants et l'expansion de l'église latine dans les Balkans», *Alle frontiere della cristianità. I frati mendicanti e l'evangelizzazione tra 200 e 300*, Società internazionale di studi Francescani, Spolète 2001, p. 232; G. Fedalto, *La chiesa latina in Oriente*, II *Hierarchia latina Orientis*, Vérone 1976, p. 43, 72, 101, 140 et *passim*.

⁶⁷ G. Kehagioglou (éd.), *Τζωρτζής (Μ)πουστρώς (Γεώργιος Βο(σ)τρ(υ)ηνός ή Βουστρώνιος) Διήγησις Κρονικας Κύπρου*, Nicosie 1997, p. 174-175; Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], I p. 298; L. de Mas Latrie, «Histoire des archevêques latins de l'île de Chypre», *Archives de l'Orient Latin* 2 (1884), p. 293-297; Hackett, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 557-558; A. Palmieri, «Un arcivescovo latino di Nicosia nel secolo XV (Fra Guglielmo Goneme O.S.A.)», *Bessarione* 9 (1904-1905), p. 205-214; G. Grivaud, «Les minorités orientales à Chypre (époques médiévale et moderne)», in Y. Ioannou, F. Metral, M. Yon (éds.), *Actes du colloque Chypre et la Méditerranée orientale: migrations, échanges et territoires. Identités et langue, image et mémoire* (Lyon, *Maison de l'Orient méditerranéen*, octobre 1997), Lyon 2000, p. 65; Alonso, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 10], III (1417-1492), Rome 1998, n° 690. Bien que le chapitre général de Ratisbonne en 1290 décrète que les couvents doivent vivre uniquement par le don, la propriété commune est largement répandue: F. Roth, *The English Austin Friars, 1249-1538*, New York 1961-1966, I p. 35-37.

⁶⁸ C. Piana, «Studenti agostiniani a Bologna negli anni 1381-1386», *Analecta Augustiniana* 55 (1977), p. 96-97. En 1384, les registres de l'ordre font mention de Richard de Chypre occupant la charge de lecteur au couvent nicosiate: *Bartholomaei Veneti O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 21], I (1383-1387) n° 353.

⁶⁹ Rudt de Collenberg «Etudes de prosopographie généalogique des Chypriotes», *art. cit.*, p. 544. Deux frères augustins portant un livre ouvert sur la poitrine sont

Parmi ces étudiants, certains d'entre eux ont pu revenir sur l'île pour rejoindre leur couvent d'origine. Des activités d'enseignement dans la capitale sont assurées par les maîtres en théologie, Jean de Chypre en 1457, ou l'archevêque de Nicosie, Guillaume Gonème en 1471.⁷⁰

Au XVI^e siècle, le couvent serait passé entre les mains d'augustins maronites, si l'on en croit les informations du père van Luijk extraites des archives générales de l'ordre.⁷¹ Quoi qu'il en soit, l'activité hospitalière se maintient et, comme la plupart des établissements monastiques de la capitale, ses revenus sont assurés par les assignations délivrées par la *reale* et la *camera* de Nicosie, trois fois plus importantes que celles concédées aux autres établissements mendiants de l'île.⁷² Par une ordonnance promulguée à Nicosie en 1561, le couvent doit encore recevoir un tiers du produit des amendes imposées à ceux qui enfreindront la réglementation sur les ornements vestimentaires et les plats servis lors des repas de fête.⁷³

La bienveillance que Venise accorde au couvent a certainement été mise à mal par la venue sur l'île du frère augustin Ambrogio Cavalli (vers 1500-1556), dont les prêches enflammés étaient très influencés par les idées de la Réforme. Condamné en 1537 par l'Inquisition de Milan pour sa prédication et acquitté peu après par l'Inquisition de Rome, il est demeuré suspect. Invité à Chypre par l'évêque de Limassol, Andrea Centanni, pour lui servir de vicaire, il finit en 1544 par prêcher le temps du Carême dans la cathédrale Sainte-Sophie avant de quitter l'île.⁷⁴ Arrêté à Venise et accusé

représentés sur des pierres tumulaires du couvent nicosiate: *Lacrimae Cypriae*, op. cit. [ci-dessus, n. 15], I, n° 276 et 286.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 538, 543. Alonso, op. cit. [ci-dessus, n. 10], III (1417-1492), Rome 1998, n° 232; Nous ne suivons pas Nicolas Coureas qui fait de Guillaume Gonème un chanoine augustin d'après le relevé de Rudt de Collenberg dans les archives du Vatican. L'inhumation de l'archevêque dans l'église du monastère plaide en faveur de l'appartenance à l'ordre érémitique: G. Boustronios, *A Narrative of the Chronicle of Cyprus 1456-1489*, N. Coureas trad., Nicosie 2005, n° 20 p. 71 n° 277 p. 128; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, «Le royaume et l'Église latine de Chypre et la papauté de 1417 à 1471», *EKEE* 13-16 (1984-1987), p. 172.

⁷¹ B. van Luijk, «L'ordine agostiniano e la riforma monastica» *Augustiniana* 19 (1969), p. 378-379. Les sources contredisent en revanche la date de 1526 qui marquerait une première suppression du couvent.

⁷² Venise, Marciana, ms It. VI, n° 80 (5767), fol. 184r; Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 1747, fol. 22r.

⁷³ G. Grivaud, «Les enjeux d'une loi somptuaire promulguées à Nicosie en 1561», in C. Maltezou, A. Tzavara, D. Vlassi (éds.), *I Greci durante la venetocrazia: Uomini, spazio, idee (XIII-XVIII sec.) Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi Venezia, 3-7 dicembre 2007*, Venise 2009, p. 368.

⁷⁴ Le dossier *Archivio di Stato, Venezia, S. Uffizio*, b. I, Processi 1541-1545, fasc 3: 1544-Fratri Ambrosij Madiolan, «Costituti» est résumé chez U. Rozzo, «Vicende

d'avoir propagé à Chypre «l'opinion luthérienne», Ambrogio est mis en cause par des témoins devant un tribunal d'inquisition pour avoir nié l'intercession de la Vierge et des saints. Un des enjeux du procès est de déterminer si Ambrogio séjournait à Nicosie dans le couvent des augustins. Dans sa déposition, Vincenzo Pasqualigo affirme que l'ermite proche des Réformés résidait dans le palais de Marc-Antonio Corner avant de se contredire, un peu plus loin, en ajoutant qu'il logeait au couvent mais vagabondait la nuit. Philippe Singlitico apporte, quant à lui, un démenti à la présence d'Ambrogio chez les augustins nicosiates.⁷⁵ Condamné à abjurer les articles de foi qui lui sont reprochés, le 31 mars 1545 à l'église Santa Maria Formosa à Venise, Ambrogio Calvalli a jeté la suspicion sur ses condisciples du couvent Saint-Augustin.⁷⁶ Il aura fallu attendre le milieu du XVI^e siècle pour voir les premières dissonances entre le pouvoir politique et le couvent des Augustins.

Encore mentionnée dans les récits des voyageurs de passage sur l'île ou dans les archives vénitiennes pour désigner le quartier environnant, l'église conserve sa fonction funéraire jusqu'à la prise de l'île par les Ottomans.⁷⁷ Elle figure également, pour la dernière fois, dans les registres de l'ordre avec Thomas Cyprius à la tête de l'établissement en 1544.⁷⁸

Saint Nicolas de Tolentino et Chypre

Bien qu'éloignés des principaux couvents occidentaux, les augustins nicosiates participent activement au rayonnement de leur ordre en reprenant la matière hagiographique développée autour du premier saint canonisé de l'ordre des ermites de Saint-Augustin, Nico-

inquisitoriali dell'eremitano Ambrogio Cavalli (1537-1545)», *Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa* 16 (1980), p. 234-236.

⁷⁵ Rozzo, *art. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 74], p. 243.

⁷⁶ Rozzo, *art. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 74], p. 248-250.

⁷⁷ G. von Hirschfeld, «Des Ritters Bernhard von Hirschfeld im Jahre 1517 und seine Wallfahrt nach dem heiligen Grabe (1517)», *Wochenblatt der Johanner-Ordens Balley Brandenburg*, 20 (1879), p. 271; P. von Hagen, «Hodoeporicon», in L. Conrady (éd.), *Vier Rheinische Palaestina Pilgerschriften des XIV, XV und XVI Jahrhunderts*, Wiesbaden 1882, p. 246; P. C. I. Zorattini, *Processi del S. Uffizio di Venezia contro ebrei e Giudaizzanti*, Florence 1980-1999, II p. 116; R. Lefevre, «Documenti pontifici sui rapporti con l'Etiopia nei secoli XV e XVI», *Rassegna di studi etiopici* 5 (1946), p. 41; Imhaus, «La mort dans la société franque», *art. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 52], p. 75.

⁷⁸ Herrera, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 12], II p. 201 (date erronée); *Hieronymus Seripando O.S.A., op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 22], II (1540-1542) p. 261; III (1542-1544), p. 220, 326.

las de Tolentino (1245-1305). Originaire de la région des Marches en Italie centrale, Nicolas entre très jeune dans l'ordre des Augustins après avoir entendu le prêche d'un frère ermite. Il parcourt ensuite l'Italie où il fonde plusieurs couvents, avant de s'établir en 1274 à Tolentino pour consacrer les trente dernières années de sa vie à prier, prêcher, confesser, aider les pauvres et rendre visite aux prisonniers. Menant une vie exemplaire, de nombreux miracles lui sont attribués.⁷⁹ Les différentes biographies du saint ne mentionnent pas de voyage ou de pèlerinage à Chypre, et les actes du procès de canonisation n'évoquent pas non plus l'île. Cependant quelques sources archéologiques et textuelles permettent d'affirmer que son culte se diffuse à Nicosie peu après sa mort, peut-être sous l'impulsion de frères venus d'Italie.

En premier lieu, le plan du couvent nicosiate, dressé par les historiens de l'art, dévoile une chapelle adossée au côté nord du chœur, composée d'une seule travée et d'une abside à cinq pans. Sur le mur ouest, on observe encore un oculus avec un quadrilobe central inscrit dans un cercle et entouré de triangles curvilignes. La fonction de la chapelle restait jusqu'à aujourd'hui indéterminée, peut-être un espace funéraire, une construction dédiée à une confrérie ou encore un lieu de pèlerinage.⁸⁰ Le testament d'Hugues Podocataro dressé en 1452 lève le voile qui enveloppe cette énigme. Le riche notable grec dont le palais est voisin du couvent des augustins, choisit en seconde option d'y être inhumé «*sopra a li scalini de l'altar grande, i(n) uno de li dui lochi, ov(er)o ava(n)ti li piedi di Se(n)to Nicola de Tolentino ov(er)o drieto a l'altar suo al moro soto la fenest(r)a grande*». ⁸¹ Si la grande fenêtre désigne l'oculus, l'autel de Saint-Nicolas de Tolentino serait alors localisé dans la chapelle nord de l'église des augustins.⁸²

Comment expliquer la diffusion du culte du saint des Marches dans une des plus pauvres provinces de l'ordre des Augustins? La construction du couvent nicosiate coïncide approximativement avec

⁷⁹ La bibliographie sur Nicolas de Tolentino et son culte est très riche. On peut se référer à D. Gentili, *Un asceta e un apostolo. S. Nicola da Tolentino*, Tolentino 1966, rééd. 1978; D. Lett, *Un procès de canonisation au Moyen Âge. Essai d'histoire sociale. Nicolas de Tolentino, 1325*, Paris 2008.

⁸⁰ pl. 2; Plagnieux, Soulard, «L'église des Augustins», *art. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], p. 180; Olympios, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 6], I, p. 295-298.

⁸¹ W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, «Les premiers Podocataro. Recherches basées sur le testament de Hugues (1452)», *Thesaurismata* 23 (1993), p. 143; D. Baglioni, *La scripta italo-romanza del regno di Cipro. Edizione e commento di testi di scriventi ciprioti del Quattrocento*, Rome 2006, p. 185.

⁸² La bulle d'ouverture du procès est fulminée le 23 mai 1325: Lett, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 79], p. 15.

l'ouverture du procès de canonisation de saint Nicolas. Les augustins nicosiates, dénués de tout enracinement local, ont pu souhaiter bénéficier de l'aura grandissante du saint dans la chrétienté en lui consacrant une chapelle et en cherchant à acquérir des reliques. Le patronage royal d'Hugues IV, mais aussi les origines italiennes des mendiants, ont peut-être été décisifs dans cette entreprise. Une version de la *Vita di San Nicola* écrite vers 1476 par Ambroise de Sienne, théologien augustin au couvent Santo Stephano de Venise, rapporte que trois gouttes de sang du saint assurent une grande renommée au couvent parmi les Nicosiates mais également chez les augustins des autres couvents.⁸³ Peu d'éléments permettent de préciser quand a pu s'effectuer ce transfert de reliques. L'hagiographie de saint Nicolas évoque le cas de Théodore, un moine allemand, qui aurait tenté, quarante ans après la mort du saint, d'emporter avec lui deux bras détachés du cadavre en Allemagne. Après cette tentative de vol de reliques, le sang s'est écoulé du corps du saint et a été recueilli pour être vénéré.⁸⁴ C'est donc sans doute après 1345 que le sang du saint des Marches est arrivé à Nicosie et qu'une chapelle est édiflée sur le flanc nord de l'église des Augustins pour accueillir ces reliques. Si cette datation est exacte, il faut alors admettre que la construction de la chapelle est postérieure d'au moins une vingtaine d'année au corps principal de l'église.

La vénération du saint à Chypre se maintient jusqu'à l'arrivée des Vénitiens sur l'île. Le succès rencontré par ce culte parmi les Nicosiates est illustré par le récit d'un miracle accompli sous le règne de Jacques II et rapporté encore dans la *Vita di San Nicola* d'Ambroise de Sienne :

«Item ve reduco a memoria quello escelso miraculo del Camerero del Re Sacho: Re di Cipri el qual e stato alli giorni nostri. havendo il re desinota: & lavando si le mani in tavola: pose il suo anello in sul lorlo del bacino: e el camerero no si accorse: & gitto laqua usa insieme con anello: & dalli a una hora el re domando il suo anello al camerero: & lui diceva che non sapeva cosa alcuna. La sacra maiesta del re infuriato disce presto el sia impicato a desso. Et il

⁸³ «Gloria posthuma San Nicolai Tolentinatis», *Acta Sanctorum* 42, Septembris III, Anvers 1750, p. 677; Bernardo Navarro, *Vida y milagros de S. Nicolàs de Tolentino, religioso del Orden de N. P. S. Agustín*, Barcelone 1612, fol. 25v

⁸⁴ Le reliquaire, aujourd'hui conservé dans le trésor de la basilique de Saint Nicolas de Tolentino est fabriqué au début du XV^e siècle à Fermo, sur la commission de Ludovico Migliorati, seigneur de Fermo, pour recueillir du coton imbibé du sang du saint des Marches: G. Liberati, *Il Gotico Internazionale a Fermo e nel Fermano*, Fermo Palazzo dei Priori 28 agosto-31 ottobre 1999, Fermo 1999, p. 116, 132.

confessor del Re che era frate Gullielmo del ordine de santo Augustino lo confessor a intendendo la innocentia di questo camerero gli disce raccomandati a santo Nicola devotamente: & cosi fece conduto al patibulo e impicato la sera fu trovato quel anello: e fu apsentato al Re: E quello dolente presto lo fece dispicare: e trovo quello vivo. E domandan dolo che voleva dire. Dice santo Nicola me ha liberato: E tutto el populo ogni mercore concorre a santo Augustino a laltare di santo nicola: per che questo miracolo fu di mercoredi.»⁸⁵

L'intervention de saint Nicolas pour sauver la vie du serviteur, injustement accusé d'avoir dérobé l'anneau royal de Jacques II, s'inscrit parfaitement dans la série de *miracula post mortem* opérés par le saint en Italie. Réputé guérir de la peste, le saint s'est également employé à réparer des erreurs judiciaires comme le relatent les actes de son procès de canonisation.⁸⁶ Si la nature du miracle survenu sur le gibet n'est pas originale ni dans l'hagiographie ni pour saint Nicolas, le lieu de son accomplissement est plus inattendu, mais il vient confirmer l'affection portée par les Nicosiates à ce saint homme.

Dans son récit, Ambroise de Sienne ne précise pas la confession de la foule qui se précipite au couvent. On peut penser que la figure de saint Nicolas attire davantage la dévotion des populations latines encore que les cultes populaires à Chypre dépassent les frontières religieuses.⁸⁷ Les augustins nicosiates conservent également des reliques de saint Spyridon à la fin du XV^e siècle ce qui leur assurent la dévotion de la population grecque.⁸⁸ Situé au cœur de la ville, le couvent

⁸⁵ *Questa è la vita del divo et glorioso confessore Santo Nicola da Tolentino, del Ordine di frati Heremitani di Santo Augustino: facta al tempo del beatissimo Pontefice Papa Joahnni 22, in el qual tempo liberò la chiesa di Dio da grande schisma. Il qual Santo Nicola fu al tempo di Santo Dominico et Santo Francisco. Questa legenda è stata translata di latino in vulgare con molti miracoli li quali forno recitati inanti a Papa Eugenio dal R.do di sacra theologia Maistro Ambrosio da Siena per sua devotione. Et è frate heremitano di Santo Augustino adi 25 agosto.* Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 791 (1491), ff. 88-112, fol. 103v; Navarro, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 83], fol. 40v-41r. Le récit figure également dans la traduction latine d'Ambroise de Sienne par Scipion Jardinus dans *Acta Sanctorum*, Septembris III, Anvers 1750, p. 697-698.

⁸⁶ R. Tollo, «Confezione dell'iconografia nicoliana: codificazione, diffusione, tradizione, variazione», *San Nicola da Tolentino nell'arte Corpus iconografica dalle origini al Concilio di Trento*, Tolentino 2005, p. 34

⁸⁷ G. Grivaud, «Pèlerinages grecs et latins dans le royaume de Chypre (1192-1474): concurrence ou complémentarité?», in C. Vincent (éd.), *Identités pèlerines*, Rouen 2003, p. 67-76.

⁸⁸ G. Nori (éd.), Antonio da Crema, *Itinerario al Santo Sepolcro 1486*, Pise 1996, p. 141. On ignore quand a eu lieu la translation des reliques de saint Spyridon à Nicosie. Aucune autre source n'évoque le culte du saint dans la capitale chypriote. Ses ossements ont quitté l'île sans doute au cours de la période troublée du VII^e siècle, pour être conservés dans différentes églises de Constantinople. Les reliques sont

conduisait une véritable «politique des reliques», garantissant sa renommée au sein de l'ordre des Augustins avec celles de saint Nicolas et son ancrage local avec celles de saint Spyridon.

Sous l'occupation vénitienne, les sources n'évoquent plus les reliques du couvent. Mais, à l'annonce de la perte de Chypre, Ambrogio Frigerio rapporte que le corps de Nicolas conservé au couvent de Tolentino laisse perler des gouttes de sang, rappelant une dernière fois l'attachement de l'ordre à cette terre éloignée.⁸⁹

Conclusion

La quasi-absence de sources sur la province augustiniennne de Terre sainte ne doit pas conduire à négliger le rôle de cet ordre dans les villes du monde gréco-latin où il s'est implanté. À partir de l'exemple du couvent de Nicosie, on a pu démontrer que les augustins s'imposent très rapidement, après leur arrivée sur l'île à la fin du XIII^e siècle, comme un auxiliaire politique des Lusignan au cœur de la ville. La vie du couvent témoigne du souci des frères de bien s'intégrer à la société nicosiate tout en préservant le prestige de leur couvent au sein de la province de Terre sainte et de l'ordre.

Proches des quartiers commerçants de la capitale, de la *ruga coperta*, ils attirent les legs des marchands italiens qui choisissent le couvent comme dernière demeure. À partir du XV^e siècle, le soin apporté aux malades, l'accueil réservé aux étrangers et le culte rendu aux saints Nicolas de Tolentino et Spyridon permettent au couvent de s'élever au rang de sanctuaire œcuménique réunissant toute la société nicosiate et même de rayonner au-delà des frontières insulaires.

Après 1570, la province de Terre sainte perd son principal couvent de la Méditerranée orientale et le souvenir de la présence des augustins affleure seulement à travers quelques récits de voyageurs occidentaux. Pourtant, aujourd'hui encore, le cloître du couvent des ermites de Saint-Augustin de Tolentino (diocèse de Camerino, dans la Marche d'Ancône) préserve une série de fresques réalisée par Agostino Orsini di Bologna et Giovanni Anastasi di Senigallia. Sur l'une d'elles figure le miracle chypriote de saint Nicolas apparaissant dans

ensuite transférées à Corfou vers 1460, peu après la prise de la ville impériale par les Ottomans. Le culte de saint Spyridon s'est maintenu à Tremethousia mais aucune relique n'y était conservée après le VII^e siècle. La translation dans l'église des Augustins à Nicosie a donc pu intervenir après 1453. Voir P. Van den Ven, *La légende de Saint Spyridon évêque de Trimithonte*, Louvain 1953, p. 143-149.

⁸⁹ *Acta Sanctorum*, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 83], p. 687; Navarro, *op. cit.* [ci-dessus, n. 83], fol. 25r.

le ciel au dessus du roi de Chypre avec en arrière-plan le gibet et l'innocent condamné à mort par Jacques II. Cette peinture de la première moitié du XVII^e siècle est l'ultime trace laissée dans les Marches par le culte chypriote de saint Nicolas de Tolentino.⁹⁰

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⁹⁰ pl. 3; B. Montecchi, D. Mori, L. Stroppa, «Illustrazione dei quadri del chiostro di San Nicola», *Il chiostro di San Nicola a Tolentino*, Biblioteca Egidiana, Tolentino 2001, p. 92-93; Quatre représentations des XIV^e-XV^e siècles font écho à cette figure de saint Nicolas de Tolentino sauvant un condamné à mort: *San Nicola da Tolentino salva dalla morte un uomo impiccato ingiustamente* (avt 1371), fresque dans la cathédrale d'Atri; *San Nicola da Tolentino che salva un impiccato* (1408-1409) Florence Orsanmichele; *San Nicola da Tolentino salva un uomo ingiustamente impiccato* (1450-1460 circa), Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, inv. 786 D A., 22 x 48 cm; *San Nicola da Tolentino salva dalla morte i fratelli Mizzolo e Vanni da Osimo impiccati ingiustamente* (1500-1501) Pise, Palazzo Reale, 26x 52 cm; *San Nicola da Tolentino nell'arte Corpus iconografica dalle origini al Concilio di Trento*, Tolentino 2005, n° 23 p. 243; n° 36 p. 250-251; n° 90 p. 278; n° 243 p. 356. Voir également: B. de Gaiffier, «Un thème hagiographique: le pendu miraculeusement sauvé» *Revue belge d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'art* 13 (1943), p. 123-148 repris dans id., *Études critiques d'hagiographie et d'iconologie*, Bruxelles 1967, p. 218-220.




Planche 1: Façade nord de l'église et de l'hôpital (?) du couvent Saint-Augustin de Nicosie (cliché Hesperia Iliadou).





Planche 2: Plan restitué de l'église médiévale du couvent Saint-Augustin de Nicosie par Philippe Dangles et Philippe Plagnieux. Avec l'aimable autorisation des auteurs (J.-B. de Vaivre, P. Plagnieux éd., *L'art gothique en Chypre*, Paris 2006, p. 177)



Planche 3: Saint Nicolas de Tolentino sauve le camérier du roi de Chypre. Cloître de Saint-Nicolas à Tolentino, XVII^e s. (cliché Orlando Ruffini, Biblioteca Egidiana)

Planche 3: Plan restitué de l'église médiévale du couvent Saint-Augustin de Tolentino par Philippe Dangles et Philippe Pignatelli. Avec l'aimable autorisation des auteurs (J.-B. de Vaire, P. Pignatelli eds, L'art gothique en Chypre, Paris 2006, p. 177)

THE EFFICACY OF GRACE ACCORDING TO DOMINGO BAÑEZ

Yilun Cai

Abstract

The Spanish Dominican theologian Domingo Bañez, in the controversy with the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, developed his own theology of efficacious grace. He held a distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. For the latter, the efficacy is solely due to itself, no human consent being required. In this article, we will investigate Bañez's theology of efficacious grace. We begin by discussing the metaphysical foundation of efficacious grace: God as the exclusive cause of our existence and movement. This metaphysics implies that when we act, God does not work alongside us to produce the effect, but premoves us to act. It is through the principle of divine premotion that Bañez established his understanding of efficacious grace: a grace granted by God to infallibly move the elected people to convert to Himself. According to this principle, the efficacy of grace arises from God's will, rather than from His foreknowledge of man's response to His calling. Since efficacious grace is granted by God to the elected people, its implication for predestination will be discussed. In the last section of this article, we will explore how Bañez harmonised efficacious grace with human freedom. For him, grace moves the human will infallibly, but it happens in such a gentle way that grace never impedes human freedom. Bañez concluded that true human freedom is not indifferent to the good. On the contrary, it is a fruit of grace's work.

Key Words

Domingo Bañez, efficacious grace, divine premotion, predestination, free will

The Council of Trent, in its Decree of justification and its Canons concerning justification, asserted the existence of human free will and condemned any teaching that contradicted it¹. This Council, however, did not provide an explanation on the relation between human free will and grace. After the Council, different explanations of the compatibility of free will and grace led to many controversies between theologians. The most famous controversy is the one

¹ Heinrich Denzinger – Adolphus Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* (DS) (Barcinone: Herder, 1967), n. 1521, 1554-1555.

between Dominicans and Jesuits concerning the efficacious grace at the end of the sixteenth century.

The Spanish Dominican Domingo Bañez, who is considered to be a representative of “modern Thomism”², played a leading role in this controversy. Bañez was born on 29 February 1528 in Medina del Campo, a small town in Valladolid. He began his philosophical studies at the University of Salamanca in 1543³. After making his Dominican profession on 3 May 1547, he studied theology from 1548 to 1551 under some renowned theologians, such as Melchior Cano. Bañez occupied the chair of Durandus in Salamanca from 1577 to 1580. He was then appointed to the primary chair of theology at Salamanca in 1581, following the death of Bartolome de Medina (30 December 1580). He would hold this position for twenty-four years. After lecturing on most parts of the *Summa Theologiae* for a number of years from 1577, he turned to lectures on grace in the academic year of 1599-1600. Bañez’s commentary on the *Summa*⁴, which made him one of the greatest commentators of St. Thomas, was based on these lectures. In 1604, Bañez died in Medina del Campo, his birthplace.

The controversy between Dominicans and Jesuits begun on the 20th January 1582 in Spain when a Jesuit named Prudencio de Montmayor denied that grace predetermined the human will to do particular good. His argument was based on the claim that this proposition is not reconcilable with human freedom. The Spanish Inquisition prohibited his thesis after receiving a report from Dominican. This event symbolised the approach of the Society of Jesus in establishing its own theological system- following St. Thomas, but not in every theological

² For the usage of “modern Thomism”, see Serge-Thomas Bonino, ‘Le Thomisme “moderne” de Dominique Bañez’, in C. González-Ayesta (ed.). *El alma humana: esencia y destino. IV Centenario de Domingo Báñez (1528-1604)* (Colección de pensamiento medieval y renacentista, no. 75), (Eunsa, Pamplona, 2006), 15-35.

³ This short biography of Bañez is based on Banes, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (DTC)* (Paris: Letouzey, 1903-1972), Tome 2, Col. 140-145; Bañez and Bañezianism, *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, second edition (Farmington Hills: Gale, 2003-), Vol.2, 49-51; Bañez, in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche (LTK)* (Freiburg: Herder, 1993-2001), Band 1, Col. 1384-1386.

⁴ The commentary on the *Summa* Ia, q. 1-64 was published in Salamanca in 1584. Four years later, the commentary on the remaining questions of the *Summa* Ia appeared. The commentary on the *Summa* IIaIIae concerning the theological virtues and law/justice published in Salamanca in 1584 and in 1589. Bañez’s commentary on the *Summa* Ia-IIae, which covers the part on grace, was edited by Vicente Beltrán de Heredia and was published in three volumes (1942-1948). For a chronology of Bañez’s lectures, see Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, *Valor doctrinal de las Lecturas del P. Bañez, La Ciencia tomista* 39 (1929), 79-81.

issue so as to distinguish itself from the Dominican approach⁵. The controversy escalated in 1588 when Luis de Molina, S.J. published his work *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis*. Cardinal Albert of Austria requested Bañez to examine this work. Bañez found that six propositions in the *Concordia* amounted to forbidden positions. In 1593 a new index of forbidden books prepared by the Universities of Alcalá and Salamanca included Molina's works. Molina then appealed to the Inquisition of Castile and accused Bañez of being a Lutheran heretic⁶. In 1594 public disputations between the Dominicans and Jesuits took place in Valladolid. A Dominican father, Diego Nuno Calbezudo, attacked the *Concordia*, while the Jesuit Antonio de Padilla responded the attack in these public disputations. The two sides charged each other with being heretics on the issue of the efficacy of grace. After these disputations had reached Rome, the secretary of the Papal State Cardinal Aldobrandino announced the Pope's decision in June 1594: in order to seek a common ground and to avoid disorder, the Pope would reserve the resolution to himself⁷. The University of Salamanca where Bañez was teaching chose to censure nine propositions of Molina on the 22nd June 1595. Molina's propositions were seen by the theology professors in the University as new doctrine which was in contradiction with the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In the same year Molina revised and published his *Concordia* together with the arguments defending his own position. Meanwhile, the Dominican provincial of Castile, Tomas Guzman, prohibited his confreres from engaging in further dispute with the Jesuits. But in order to advance the Dominican position to Rome, he asked a number of eminent theologians from his province to compose theological analyses concerning the efficacy of grace and the propositions in Molina's *Concordia*. Bañez, on the 27th October 1594, presented to the delegate of the Holy Office a treatise on the efficacy of grace and human freedom in order to give explanations from the Dominican side to the higher ecclesiastical authorities⁸. Between September 1594 and April 1595, seven Dominicans under the charge of Bañez⁹ wrote *Apologia*

⁵ Introduccion historica, Vicente Beltran de Heredia (ed.), *Domingo Banez y las controversias sobre la gracia: textos y documentos*. (Biblioteca de teologos españoles, no. 24), (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1968), 16-17.

⁶ Introduccion historica, 82.

⁷ Introduccion historica, 90.

⁸ Introduccion historica, 92-93.

⁹ Their names are: Fr. Joannes la Fuente (Magister), Fr. Didacus de Yanguas (Magister), Fr. Petrus de Herrera (Magister, Salamanticensis cathedrarius), Fr. Christophorus Rodriguez (praesentatus et prior), Fr. Petrus de Ledesma (praesentatus et

fratrum praedicatorum in prouincia Hispaniae sacrae theologiae professorum, aduersus nouas quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris Ludouici Molinae nuncupati. This work was delivered to Rome by Fr. Diego Alvarez, a lecturer of sacred scripture at San Pablo in Valladolid. Bañez's above mentioned treatise on the relation between grace and human freedom was then incorporated into the first part of the *Apologia*. This treatise is also the early version of *Tractatus de uera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter mouentis humanam uoluntatem*, which was published with Bañez's commentary on the part of the *Summa* dealing with the issue of grace.

To solve this controversy between the two religious orders, Rome intervened in 1598 by establishing a dicastery. Since its task was to solve the question on the help of God (*auxilium*), the dicastery was called *Congregatio de auxiliis*. Although some propositions from Molina's works were nearly condemned around the time of his death, there was no definitive decision made during the pontificate of Clement VIII because of the interventions from the Jesuit side. Pope Paul V declared in 1607 that neither Dominicans nor Jesuits were heretics and they were granted freedom to defend their own teachings¹⁰.

The essential element in this debate was the efficacy of grace: whether grace is intrinsically efficacious or whether it depends on human consent. Bañez insisted on a real distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace. Here we should clarify the terminology. According to scholastic theology, grace on account of subject and effects (*ratione subjecti et effectuum*), can be divided into habitual grace and actual grace. Actual grace is the transient divine help by which God illumines the human mind and helps the will to make supernatural acts. Actual grace can be further divided into two kinds: efficacious grace and sufficient grace. Efficacious grace is that which attain the effect with certainty and infallibility. Sufficient grace is the grace granting man the power of performing a salutary act. Bañez argued for the difference of these two kinds of grace and emphasised that the efficacy of efficacious grace is due solely to itself. Luis de

regens sancti Thomae Abulensis), Fr. Didacus Nuño (praesentatus) and Fr. Didacus Alvarez (praesentatus et lector sacrae scripturae Vallisoletanus).

¹⁰ For the history of the *Congregatio de auxiliis* and the controversy between Dominicans and Jesuits, see Jacques-Hyacinthe Serry, *Historia congregationum de auxiliis diuinae gratiae sub summis pontificibus Clemente VIII. et Paulo V.*, (Antverpiae: sumptibus Societatis, 1709), a work written by a Dominican. From the Jesuit side, there is Gerhard Schneemann, *Controversiarum de diuinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia*, (Freiburg: Herder, 1881).

Molina, however, contended that God only bestows sufficient grace to humans. Only human consent then renders this grace efficacious. On this issue, the Jesuits accused Bañez of being a Calvinist and the Dominicans called Molina a Semi-Pelagian. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, this controversy survived in the Dominican theologian Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's debate with Jesuits, such as Adhémar d'Alès¹¹.

In this article, I will try to explore Bañez's understanding of the efficacy of grace on the basis of the relevant texts in his commentaries on St. Thomas' *Summa theologiae*, the *Tractatus* on grace and free will and the *Apologia*¹². Since he regarded actual grace as a divine motion which moves human beings to salvation, we will first explore divine motion in Bañez's thinking and look at how he makes the argument for the proposition that grace is intrinsically efficacious rather than depends on human consent. His interpretation here was related to i) his criticism of Molina's middle knowledge, which is adopted to secure human autonomy and ii) his understanding of predestination: God predestinates the elected to glory by granting them efficacious grace¹³. Finally, Bañez's explanation of efficacious grace necessarily leads to the question on the relation between efficacious actual grace and human freedom. Will Bañez's interpretation of the efficacy of grace lead to the denial of human freedom? The answer is no. There is no difficulty to reach a real concordance between them basing on Bañez's definition of human freedom.

¹¹ E.g. Fr. d'Alès's article in *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 8(1917), 1-35 and Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's response *S. Thomas et Le Néomolinisme*, which is reprinted as appendix in *Dieu, Son Existence et sa Nature*, (Paris: Beauchesne, 1950).

¹² *Tractatus de uera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter mouentis humanam uoluntatem* (*Tractatus*). The edition which we shall follow in this article is in *Comentarios ineditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomas, III* (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1948), 351-420. For Bañez's commentary on the first volume of St. Thomas' *Summa*, we shall use the online edition in *The Digital Library of the Catholic Reformation*: <http://solomon.dlcr.alexanderstreet.com/>, which is scanned from the edition published in 1614 by Typographia Petri Borremans, Douai. For the text of the *Apologia*, we shall follow the edition of Vicente Beltran de Heredia (ed.), *Domingo Bañez y las controversias sobre la gracia*, 115-378.

¹³ Bañez defined "gratia" in his commentary on the *Summa*: Gratia est per quam homo acceptatur ad gloriam. Et datur per proprietatem ipsius gratiae haec definitio. Nam ex eo quod sumus filii Dei per gratiam, proprietatem consequens est acceptatio ad gloriam, et quod simus heredes gloriae. See Bañez, *In Summam Ia-IIae*, q. 110, a. 4. For three other elements of the definition, see the commentary on the same article.

1. Divine motion

St. Thomas' discussion of the division of grace appears in the *Summa Ia-IIae*. According to his view, grace is spoken of in two ways: i) a habit modifying the essence of the soul which is *gratia gratum faciens*. In English it is called sanctifying or habitual grace. ii) *Gratia gratis data*, which are the charismatic gifts beyond the capacity of nature, such as the capacity to proclaim the Gospel through miracles. God causes man to act virtuously and to be in union with him by sanctifying grace, but Thomas insisted that some preparations are needed. In other words, prior to justification man should be disposed to receive sanctifying grace. So the first conferring of sanctifying grace presupposes an internal movement of mind or disposition towards God. This disposition for sanctifying grace is made through Divine assistance. In q.109 a. 6 Thomas made it clear that the cause of this movement is the "assistance of God" (*auxilium Dei*). This is what later theologians will call actual grace, though Thomas did not use this term himself. In this article we will limit ourselves to the *auxilium Dei* as a *motus*, which relates to Bañez's discussion of divine motion and occupies the centre of his controversy with Molina. The Thomistic understanding of divine motion begins from the acknowledgement of the uncreated action of God, which is opposed to the created movement of creatures¹⁴. In other words, God is immanent and eternal in the sense that He is the efficient cause of all creatures and from God all creatures receive their being (*esse*). St. Thomas explained this point principally in the *Summa Ia*, q. 13 a. 12 and q. 45 a. 3. Bañez faithfully followed Thomas in his commentary on the *Summa*. He acknowledged that God as the creator is immanent and transcendent. Creation is essentially the immanent action of God, which does not depend on the human intellect. On the contrary, the creatures *per se* and intrinsically are dependent on the Creator as His effect¹⁵. God causes the existence of all agents and moves them. So the priority of the divine motion, in Bañez's theological and philosophical system, refers to causality, rather than time.

When we make a further study of divine motion according to Bañez's interpretation of Thomas, his commentary on the *Summa Ia* q. 105 a. 5 (Whether God works in every agent?) should be taken into account. In the original text¹⁶ of Thomas there are three main arguments

¹⁴ See *Prémotion physique*, DTC 13, Col. 31-77.

¹⁵ Bañez, *In Summam Ia*, q. 45, a.3.

¹⁶ *Summa Ia* q.105 a. 5.

for saying that God operates in everything. To highlight the point, I re-organise the arguments as follows:

- I. In all things God is properly the cause of universal being (*ipsius esse uniuersalis*) which is innermost in all things;
- II. Where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first, for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself, and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent.
- III. God not only moves things to operate (creations were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, nevertheless does not give the axe its form); but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.

The first argument relates to the agents' dependence on God for their existence. The second and the third arguments relate to the agent's being moved by God. Therefore, the motion of a thing is not separated from its existence, which is an essential element of understanding divine motion. In fact, this reading can be supported by Bañez's words:

[Q]uia causa prima est prior quam secunda non solum in essendo, sed etiam in causando et in mouendo. Et confirmat hoc ex illo Act. 17 (v. 28): *In ipso uiuimus, mouemur et sumus*¹⁷.

Bañez cited the words from the Bible to argue that God is immanent and transcendent by highlighting three words: *uiuimus*, *mouemur* and *sumus*. God not only causes our existence, but also our motion. Both *uiuimus* and *sumus* relate to our existence and apparently *mouemur* relates to motion. These three elements used by Bañez are the outline of Thomas's three arguments listed above. We will examine Bañez's understanding of divine motion by discussing his interpretation of these three arguments. We will begin with the dependence of existence on God.

In his short commentary on the *Summa* Ia q.105, a. 5 where Thomas made three arguments, Bañez firstly affirmed the conclusions which Thomas had made in the text, but he did not develop his own position apart from writing something for the third argument. So we have to look for Bañez's comments in other sources.

¹⁷ *Apologia* III, Ch. VI, n. 55; see also Bañez, *In Summam* Ia, q. 105, a. 5.

According to Thomas's view in argument I, God is properly the cause of universal being. Bañez highlighted this point by saying that only God is the cause of being (*esse*), and the secondary cause relates to an existence as such (*ens tale*, for example, Socrates is a white man). It will be helpful to read it together with Bañez's commentary on the question "whether God is in all things?" (Ia q. 8, a. 1): "*nulum agens praeter Deum est causa ipsius esse, prout esse est actualitas entis, inquantum ens.*" The point is made clear that only God could cause the being (*esse*) of secondary agents. The secondary cause is so limited that it causes the existence *as such* (*ens tale*), e.g. a person in a particular place or in a specific color. An agent can be such a thing only after its *simpliciter* existence is received from God, because only God can create from nothing. Similarly, the causality between agents must presume their existence, since it is not possible for them to cause or conserve something from nothing. Bañez said:

Quia fieri ens in quantum ens, non potest, nisi ex non ente simpliciter, quod solus Deus potest facere. Dicendum ergo, quod solus Deus est causa efficiens entis, in quantum ens, quia solus ex nihilo facit, et conseruat ens, in quantum ens. Caeterum agens particulare efficit tale ens, imo efficit hoc ens ex non hoc ente¹⁸.

The distinction between *esse* (only from God) and *tale ens* made above is crucial, because it differentiates God from all secondary causes: God *simpliciter* causes the existence of all things, but the secondary cause determines the effect in a specific way¹⁹.

The same view of Bañez can be found in his commentary on the question "whether in God the existence and the essence are identical?" Because God's existence and essence are identical, He does not receive existence from others, rather he is the being itself. In this commentary, Bañez followed Thomas by using the words from *Exodus* "I am who I am" to support the claim that God himself is existence. He also considered some opinions of other theologians with whom he could not totally agree. For example, to the assertion that

¹⁸ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 8, a. 1.

¹⁹ Bañez highlights this point by citing Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis): "Inter Thomistas uero Ferrar. 2. cont. gent. cap. 21. hanc solum constituit differentiam inter Deum, et causas secundas in productione esse, quod Deus simpliciter et sine addito causat existentiam rerum, creaturae uero non causant illud absolute, sed determinate". (*In Summam* Ia, q. 3 a.4). Francis Silvester (1474-1526) was an Italian Dominican theologian. He was elected as the master general of the Order of Preachers in 1525. His most famous work is the commentary on St. Thomas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, which was printed with original text in the Leonine edition of St. Thomas' *Opera omnia*.

God only produces the existence as such, his response was clearly made: "*Dicimus ergo, quod nulla causa producit esse effectiue praeter ipsum Deum*". It is evident for Bañez that apart from God, there is no cause which can give existence (*esse*).

Now we can move on to Bañez's understanding of the second argument of Thomas: God is the cause of every agent's action or motion²⁰, because the secondary agent always acts by the power of (*virtute*) the first cause, i.e. God. Bañez's interpretation is that God is in each of His effects with immediacy, because He is the cause of all beings and of being itself²¹. It will be easier to note this new aspect of Bañez's interpretation if we consider two other Dominican commentators' understanding on the same issue reported in Bañez's commentary. According to Bañez's citation, Ferrariensis, in his commentary on the *Summa Contra Gentiles* III Ch. 70, claimed that it was not wrong to argue that the same effect is immediately from God and the inferior agent. From God it is by the immediacy of power (*immediatione uirtutis*), but from the inferior agent it is by the immediacy of substance²² (*immediatione suppositi*). This claim of Ferrariensis consists in the distinction between an agent and its power, a distinction made by Thomas. The power (*uirtus*) of the inferior depends on the power of the superior agent, because the superior agent gives its own power to the inferior agent at the same time. In this sense, the action of the inferior agent is both from the superior agent and through the power of the superior agent. Therefore, Ferrariensis held that the power of the primary agent (i.e. God) is found immediately in causing the effect.

Cajetan had his own interpretation as well. In Cajetan's view, there is a need to make a distinction between material creatures and spiritual creatures. In the case of spiritual creatures, God causes them by the immediacy of substance. However, for material creatures, because form comes from the potency of matter (*educere formam de potentia materiae*), God cannot be the cause by the immediacy of substance, but only by the immediacy of power.

²⁰ Here the word "cause" signifies that God moves the secondary agents to act.

²¹ Bañez said "*Ipse Deus est intimus, immediatiusque secundum suam substantiam in omni effectu, quia Deus est causa totius entis et ipsius esse, respectu cuius solus Deus est causa efficiens et conseruans*". (*In Summam* Ia, q. 8 a. 1).

²² In Thomas' metaphysics suppositum can be understood as a subject or a substance: "the suppositum is said to be a substance". (*Summa* Ia q. 17 a. 1 ad. 7). So here we translate *suppositum* as substance.

Bañez, however, was not totally satisfied with the solutions given by these two predecessors of the Dominican Thomistic school. On the one hand, he agreed with Cajetan's position of God's causality by the immediacy of substance. The doctrine of God's simplicity reveals that His power to act is His own substance, so if He operates by the immediacy of power as claimed by Ferrariensis, He must also operate by the immediacy of his own substance. On the other hand, Bañez emphasised that only God is the cause of every being (*causa essendi omnibus rebus*), not only material, but also spiritual. So Cajetan's distinction between material and spiritual beings was irrelevant for Bañez's interpretation. For him, the difference between God and the inferior agent consists in that the operation of the inferior agent is only immediately by the immediacy of substance. But for the operation of God it *also* happens by the immediacy of the power. Bañez added that, strictly speaking, only God acts by the immediacy of power, because the concurrence of other inferior agents was said to be by the immediacy of power in the respect of this or that agent, not of all agents.

Bañez's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas brings some new nuance to the Dominican Thomistic tradition. Firstly, if we say that both Ferrariensis and Cajetan left some space for the secondary cause, Bañez was more radical by insisting that in every creature, whether it is spiritual or material, God is the exclusive cause of their action by the immediacy of power and substance. For Cajetan, the secondary cause modifies the primary cause²³, but according to Bañez, it is not right to insist on this opinion because the primary cause accounts, in the first instance, for the existence of all beings and their concrete existence²⁴. Secondly, in Bañez's argument God's immediate concurrence on a secondary cause depends on God as the exclusive cause for

²³ *In Summam* Ia q. 19 a. 8, Cajetan introduces his conclusion that the secondary cause modifies the primary cause. The analogy he makes is that a writer and his pen. The quality of the pen this writer uses influences his state and intellectual fruits. Cajetan believes that the secondary maybe reduced to nothing unless it is given some weight in causality: "Ipsa secunda nullum effectum producit, nisi uirtute primae concurrente et coniungente uirtutem secundae suo effectui, quoniam prima omnia attingit immediate immatione uirtutis, ut in qu. VIII (art. 1, Comment.) declaratum est".

²⁴ "Sed displicet quod ait uirtutem primae causae modificari per causam secundam...Imo uero diuina uoluntas omnia modificat, dum causa est uniuersalissima et efficacissima cuiuslibet rei et quantum ad fieri et quantum ad esse et quantum ad modum." Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 19 a. 8. Bañez's reading of St. Thomas' text is supported by Serge-Thomas Bonino's studies of Thomas' *De Veritate* Q. 2; see Serge-Thomas Bonino, *De la vérité. Question 2: La science en Dieu* (Fribourg: Ed. Universitaires, 1996), 556.

every being. Although in some readings these two arguments of Thomas were thought to be mixed in Bañez's interpretation²⁵, I think by using this way of argument, Bañez closely linked Thomas' argument I and argument II. Here we will not discuss whether Bañez mixed these two arguments or not, but we would like to explain Bañez's intention in this way: for him the causality of an inferior agent's motion consists in God's action (argument II), but it ultimately depends on the being (*esse*) given by God (Argument I). Therefore, God as the exclusive cause of every creature's being (*esse*) is the fundamental reason for Bañez's understanding of divine motion²⁶. Just as we have said at the beginning of this section, God as the immanent and transcendent Creator on which every creature depends is the key for grasping the concept of divine motion.

Having explored how Bañez understood St. Thomas' argument II (i.e. all agents act in virtue of God Himself), we will take a further step to look at his interpretation of how we are moved by God. We see that this is not a new conclusion once "all agents act in virtue of God Himself" is established. Among his works, Bañez's commentary on the *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 109 a.1 is an important text in which he gives his interpretation of God's premotion²⁷. At the beginning of this commentary, Bañez cited Cajetan's report that some people insisted that when God ceases to move a heavenly body (*cessante motu caeli*)²⁸, fire can still be burning. This view seems to deny the dependence of the secondary agent's motion on the primary cause, i.e. God. In Bañez's view, Thomas used the example of fire to demonstrate that human beings not only are dependent on God for their being and conservation, but also for their operation and movement. So when He does not operate or move us, we cannot move, even if He conserves in us the existence with all operative principles. More importantly,

²⁵ See Em. Neveut, *Le concours divin, Pensée de St. Thomas, de Bañez et de Molina*, *Revue des sciences ecclésiastiques*, 1909, 1047-1061; and 1910, 29-40.

²⁶ For example, *In Summam* Ia q.105 a. 5: "Omnis uirtus operatiua et ipsummet esse causae secundae, dependet a Deo in fieri et conseruari: ergo pendet ab illo in omni operatione sua, uide Capreolum in 2. sent. d. 1. q. 2. ad argumenta contra 6. Conclusionem."

²⁷ *Comentarios ineditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomas, III* (1948), Index "praemotio, quid est."

²⁸ The original text of Thomas' *Summa* I-II q. 109, a.1 is "Primum autem mouens in ordine corporalium est corpus caeleste. Vnde quantumcumque ignis habeat perfectum calorem, non alteraret nisi per motionem caelestis corporis. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut omnes motus corporales reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in primum mouens corporale; ita omnes motus tam corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum mouens simpliciter, quod est Deus."

Bañez compared God as the primary cause with other existence as inferior causes. For the latter, they do not determine a specific effect and may even be determined by their own secondary cause. Sometimes this concurrence is determined by the disposition of a particular moveable thing. The example he gave is the sun. It shines on the earth with the same light. Some clay easily become dry because of their disposition, while some plants with different dispositions may benefit from the same light. This comparison brings us an important element in Bañez's definition of God's premotion: it causes its effects only on account of its own providence: *quae quidem motio praemotio dicitur secundum diuinae prouidentiae rationem, non secundum necessitatem naturae*. So it is because of this feature, that God's motion of secondary causes can be seen as premotion, since everything is not only moved by God, but also is moved according to His own providence rather than on account of the disposition of the thing caused. Bañez, basing himself on the *Summa Contra Gentiles* III Ch. 67, concluded this point in the same commentary:

[C]oncludit diuus Thomas uniuersaliter quod actio intellectus et cuiuscumque entis creati dependet a Deo non solum in quantum ab ipso habet perfectionem uel formam, sed etiam in quantum ab ipso mouetur ad agendum. Et non solum concomitanter ut partialis causa concurrat ad effectum²⁹.

The last sentence emphasises that God is not only the partial cause producing the effect. Thomas' argument III and Bañez's commentary will illustrate this point. There are two elements in Thomas' argument: When God moves everything, i) He applies their forms and powers to operate. An example is a workman who makes use of the axe to cut; ii) He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in existence. When he commented on Thomas' argument, Bañez was definitely in agreement with what Thomas said³⁰ and made it clear that Durandus's position on the same issue was unacceptable. Durandus' claim was summarised by Bañez in this way: *ipsae causae secundae postea per uirtutem illam receptam a Deo operantur, ita ut in suis operationibus non egeant actuali Dei motione et operatione*³¹. Here we see a basic difference between Bañez and Durandus. For Bañez, when God moves a secondary cause, the secondary cause not only operates in virtue of God, but also has God's operation within itself.

²⁹ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia-IIae q. 109, a. 1.

³⁰ Bañez, *In Summam*, Ia q. 105 a. 5: "Prima conclusio est affirmatiua."

³¹ Bañez *In Summam* Ia q.105 a.5.

For Durandus, however, the secondary cause is only moved through the power received from God in such a way that in its own operations it no longer needs God's motion and operation. It was firmly held by Bañez that though a secondary cause has its own operation³², it operates in dependence on God and needs God's pre-movement.

Therefore, for Bañez the statement that God moves created agents has two elements: He gives the principle of operation to the created agents (secondary cause) and also applies the principle to operate in them. God really moves the secondary cause, rather than only causes the effect. In his commentary on the *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 109 a.1 Bañez particularly criticised some theologians who denied that God influences the secondary cause, but only the effect. In other words, God operates *with* the secondary cause to produce effects. Although he did not mention any names, the Jesuit theologian Molina undoubtedly was one of the people whom Bañez referred to. Molina left us a well-known paragraph on this issue in Disputation 26 of the *Concordia*. In this disputation, Molina confessed his difficulties in understanding Thomas' position. The first difficulty was that he could not understand why there should be a motion in the secondary causes by which God moves them to act. Secondly, Thomas's doctrine would seem to lead to the impression that God only moves or concurs mediately, i.e. by means of secondary causes, which was in a contradiction to the statement that God acts immediately by an immediacy of the substance. The solution given by Molina was that God's concurrence and the secondary causes are partial causes of the effects. The effects are both from God and from the secondary causes. He liked to use an analogy to illuminate his own position:

At cum dicimus neque Deum per concursum uniuersalem neque causas secundas esse integras, sed partiales causas effectuum, intelligendum id est de partialitate causae, ut uocant, non uero de partialitate effectus. Totus quippe effectus et a Deo est et a causis secundis; sed neque a Deo neque a causis secundis ut a tota causa, sed ut a parte causae quae simul exigit concursum et influxum alterius, non secus ac, cum duo trahunt nauim, totus motus proficiscitur ab unoquoque trahentium, sed non tamquam a tota causa motus, siquidem quiuis eorum simul efficit cum altero omnes ac singulas partes eiusdem motus³³.

³² He cited Augustine's words in *De ciuitate Dei* Lib. VII, Ch. 30 to support this point: "Deus sic administrat omnia quae creauit; ut etiam ipsa proprios motus exercere, et agere sinat."

³³ Luis Molina (ed. criticam cur. Iohannes Rabeneck), *Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, diuina praescientia, prouidentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione Concordia*,

It is clear that for Molina, just as a boat is dragged by two men, neither of them being the complete cause for the moving of this boat, i.e. neither God's concurrence nor the secondary causes provide the total cause of the motion. This understanding of Molina, in fact, is not new. As Jacob Schmutz pointed out, it is a classical expression of the Franciscan school, which can be found in the works of Duns Scotus as well as other friars of the school, such as André of Neufchâteau, a fourteenth century philosopher³⁴. I think that Molina's approach made it easier for him to establish two order of causality. Once this two-causality order is applied in the discussion of the relation between grace and human freedom, Molina is able to leave more space for human autonomy, without this autonomy denying God's influence. Such an approach also made it possible for him to deny that grace can be intrinsically efficacious. We will discuss this point later.

Bañez criticised Molina's approach to the relation between primary cause and secondary cause, directly responding to the second difficulty of Molina. His emphasis was that when we say God moves or acts immediately, this statement should not exclude the substance and power of the secondary causes which God moves. The word *immediate* refers to the perfect power of God who operates in everything, rather than God not acting through the secondary causes. In God's movement of everything, He, as the cause in himself, has the power of action. There are two elements in God's causality: one is the influence (*influxus*) from God to keep secondary causes in existence, and the other is the influence that actually moves it to produce the actual effects. This influence reaches the secondary causes and their effects immediately. So the effects can be said to be dependent on God and also on the secondary causes. For this reason, Bañez conceded that with regard to the effect, God produces the effect by the mediacy of the secondary causes³⁵.

Moreover, Bañez claimed that secondary causes are subordinated to God, even if the secondary causes are complete in their own order. This subordination consists in the proposition that Bañez reckoned as fundamental: secondary causes depend on the primary cause,

(Oniae: Collegium Maximum, 1953), *Disputatio* 26, n. 15. We shall follow this edition in this article.

³⁴ Jacob Schmutz, *La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (XIIIe- XVIIe siècles)*, *Revue Thomiste* 101 (2001), 254.

³⁵ *Tractatus* II, Ch. I n. 4. For Molina, it is not the primary cause that operates upon the secondary cause, but these two causes work together to produce the effect.

because they are insufficient of themselves to act without the movement of the primary cause.

2. Efficacious grace according to Bañez

Bañez's theology of grace is seen as the application of his metaphysics of causality³⁶. Therefore, after the exploration of Bañez's understanding of divine motion, we will discuss his application of divine motion to the question of the efficacy of actual grace.

1. What is efficacious grace?

As we have seen in this article, grace is seen by St. Thomas as help (*auxilium*). For Bañez, divine help (*Auxilium Dei*) works not only on the supernatural level, but also on the natural level. The natural assistance (*auxilium naturale*) refers to the assistance ordered to human operations for their natural end³⁷. God, as the Creator of the universe, moves everything according to its nature. God not only conserves things, but also moves them according to the arrangement of divine providence. This is the principle of divine motion we have discussed above. Bañez further applied it to human beings, since human beings are the noblest of creatures. The first natural assistance which God confers on them is their use of reason. This natural assistance bestowed on human beings is also an actual illumination (*actualis illuminatio*) because it is by this assistance that human beings are illuminated to know speculative or practical truth. In this sense, human beings only have the passive motion on their own side. Similarly, Bañez insisted that the primary operation of the will should be attributed to the Creator of nature. It is by his motion that our will moves to will an object³⁸.

The supernatural assistance (*auxilium supernaturale*) orders man to the supernatural end through supernatural operations. In this

³⁶ See Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A history of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, vol. 2. *From 1500 to the present day*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986), 95.

³⁷ See *Tractatus*, II, Ch. II.

³⁸ Bañez made a distinction between God's grace as premotion of the human will to the good and God's permission of evil to happen. "licet admitteremus Deum non concurrere ad materiale peccati in ratione entis auxilio efficaci praemouente uoluntatem ad tale materiale, nihilominus asserendum est ad actus supernaturales esse necessarium huiusmodi efficax auxilium." *Apologia*, I, Ch. IV, n. 9.

sense, Bañez defined grace in such a way: *Gratia est forma supernaturalis quae confert nobis esse et uitam supernaturalem*³⁹. Grace brings human beings to salvation, so its *final* end should be considered on the supernatural level. Apart from its operation on the natural level, grace more importantly operates for man's supernatural end⁴⁰. Since on the supernatural level grace is also a divine motion, in Bañez's theology the principles we discussed above apply to grace as well, i.e. grace moves the human will (secondary cause) to produce salutary acts (effects).

Before moving on to efficacious actual grace, we should note that actual grace was the essential element of Banez's theology of grace. Bañez stated clearly that his disagreement with Molina did not encompass habitual grace: *Non loquimur hic de gratia habituali iustificante, sed loquimur de gratia actuali praemouente*.⁴¹ In other words, it concerns the premotion of the human will to accept grace. So Bañez's difficulty with Molina consisted in whether the disposition of grace, at least partially, depends on the human will. Bañez and his confreres refused to accept the theological proposition that human beings had the capacity to prepare for habitual grace (*se disposuit ad gratiam*). On the contrary, the ultimate disposition and preparation for grace should be attributed to actual grace which efficaciously *prepares* and *premoves* the will. The question of the efficacy of actual grace concerns how divine motion works to cause human beings supernatural acts for their salvation.

In Bañez's analysis, actual grace as *auxilium* is prevenient to our use of freedom. Here Bañez took grace as divine inspiration since it is a certain sudden illumination of God inspiring the soul to the good. Hence grace is prior and works in human beings to make them adhere to God. In the *Tractatus* Bañez appealed to Can. 20 of the second Council of Orange⁴² *multa bona in homine fiunt quae non facit homo* to support his contention that the intellectual and volitional operations of human beings are caused by the motion of God which

³⁹ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 4.

⁴⁰ Thomas Aquinas claims in the state of corrupt nature, people need grace to receive salvation and do natural good (*Summa* Ia-IIae, q. 109 a.2); see also Bañez's commentary of this question.

⁴¹ *Apologia* I, Ch. II, n. 2; "tota nostra disceptatio est circa auxilia actualia", *Tractatus* II, Ch. II, n.7.

⁴² The Second Council of Orange took place in July 529 and aimed to settle some controversies on grace and predestination in Gaul. This council followed the teaching of Augustine that God's grace proceeded any human performance of good works. For the canons on grace promulgated by this Council, see DS, n.373-395.

is prior to the use of human freedom. So every human being is the passive recipient of grace. Bañez observed that on this issue there was no difference between him and the Jesuits⁴³. The problem was how actual grace as *auxilium* works with our freedom. As we have said the core of the controversy concerns man's consent to God's call. Bañez and his Dominican colleagues disagreed with the Jesuit viewpoint of how man's consent came about in the work of grace. These two orders also debated whether actual grace itself was efficacious or only sufficient for consent.

In the *Tractatus* Bañez endeavoured to present his solution systematically. He stated the problem at stake by clarifying the difference between sufficient grace and efficacious grace:

Quaestio igitur principalis est an sit idem et unum auxilium quod respectu conuersionis mentis in Deum, siue per fidem, siue per caritatem, dicitur sufficiens et efficax.⁴⁴

Hence the principal question is whether in man's conversion to God, grace is sufficient and efficacious, or only sufficient and dependent on human consent. To answer this question, the first point he held is that it is necessary to draw a distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace. Although he realised that neither Augustine nor Thomas Aquinas made this division directly in their works, Bañez contended the clue of the division can be found in these great theologians. He also appealed to Augustine for this division:

Ait enim diuus Augustinus saepissime, quod primo homini datum est posse perseuerare, non autem perseuerare, et datum est ut posset non peccare, sed non est datum ut non peccaret⁴⁵.

So in Bañez's understanding of Augustine there is a distinction between the possibility and the fact (*de facto*): God's grace makes human beings *able* to persevere or not to sin, but this does not necessarily happen *de facto*, since *de facto* not every human being would persevere to the end. Similarly, it is Catholic doctrine that the satisfaction and redemption of Christ are for all human beings. Christ's satisfaction is sufficient in the sense that his redemption makes it possible for all people to be saved. But the Scriptures do tell us that Christ's redemption does not apply efficaciously to everyone, but only to those

⁴³ *Apologia* II, Ch. III, n.3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Tractatus* II, Ch. III, n. 6. In this chapter Bañez mentioned two works of Augustine: *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseuerantiae*.

who are predestinated. Bañez notes that Paul spoke about God as “the Saviour of all people, especially of those who believe” (I Tim 4:10). Depending on these Biblical sources, Bañez believes that it is justified to highlight that sufficiency of Christ’s redemption is universal, but it is not *de facto* efficacious in everyone.

Once establishing the difference between efficacy and sufficiency, Bañez pointed out that it was when grace causes the effects, that we call it efficacious. Then we have two ways of speaking of efficacious grace:

- i) Sometimes the effects are caused with human consent;
- ii) Sometimes without the consent of free will.

It is only in the condition of i) that Bañez’s distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace is valid. According to him, in ii) we consider it from the perspective of God as a mover (*secundum quod est a Deo mouente*), then grace is absolutely efficacious. In Bañez’s words, actual grace spoken in this way is *efficax alicuius effectus ad quem ex beneplacito diuinae uoluntatis absoluto mittitur*.⁴⁶ This distinction can be traced back to Thomas’s discussion of the preparation for grace in the *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 112 a.3. There, Thomas tried to give his answer from two perspectives: first in considering free will (*secundum quod est a libero arbitrio*) and second from the perspective of God as a mover (*secundum quod est a Deo mouente*). In the first aspect, there is no necessity to obtain grace, but in the second aspect, i.e. from God the Mover’s perspective, there is a necessity. In his *Tractatus* Bañez almost copied Thomas’s words to explain his own position:

[S]i consideretur secundum quod est a Deo mouente, habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest.⁴⁷

In other words, on the metaphysical level the motion of God gives the principle of operation to the created agents (secondary cause) and also applies the principle to operate in them as the mover of everything. This divine motion must be infallible and His intention cannot fail. Bañez did not stop here, but rather applied it to the operation of grace. If we speak from God’s aspect as a mover, His intention of

⁴⁶ *Tractatus* II, Ch. III, n. 6.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* The original text of St. Thomas is: “Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a Deo mouente. Et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest.” *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 112, a. 3.

movement cannot fail, or His grace that is a divine motion upon human hearts must be infallible to have its effects. Grace seen from this aspect is efficacious for human beings. So if we speak of the efficacy of grace only in the second way (i.e. from God without considering human consent), grace must be intrinsically efficacious. In this way of speaking, there is no need of a distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. However, in the other way, when human consent is involved, God permits that some people do not accept His grace. This statement implies that not all grace is efficacious.

So we have found two ways of speaking about efficacious grace in Bañez's theology. On the one hand, when we consider human free will in the discussion of grace, Bañez thought that the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace had to be introduced since, according to Scripture and Catholic dogma, not everybody in fact (*de facto*) accept God's grace. The efficacy of grace spoken in this way is evident in the chosen people's conversion to God. On the other hand, if we consider it *only* from God as the mover, His grace must be absolutely efficacious.

Bañez's position can become clearer if we bear in mind the position of Molina to which he was opposed. As Catholic theologians, both Bañez and Molina confirmed the necessity of prevenient grace, i.e. grace must come first⁴⁸. But Molina's position contends: i) no grace is given except as it is sufficient in itself; ii) whether grace is only sufficient or efficacious depends on the freedom of the person who receives it; iii) this human consent is foreseen by God's middle knowledge (*scientia media*)⁴⁹. From these three points we can find that for Molina grace is always sufficient before human consent. There is only a real distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace *after* human consent. In other words, whether grace is efficacious relies on human consent. In this sense, human consent is one of the elements which are necessary for the movement of a boat. Without this secondary cause, grace as primary cause is only sufficient. The boat will not move ahead. On the contrary, Bañez never spoke about the dependence of efficacious grace on human freedom. For him Molina's view was in danger of subjecting the

⁴⁸ See *Apologia* I, Ch. VIII, n. 1.

⁴⁹ *Concordia*, disp. 40; See also Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (Translator: The Dominican Nuns, Corpus Christi Monastery, Menlo Park, California), *Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 109-14*, (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1952), 205. The definition of middle knowledge and Bañez's criticism will be discussed in the next sub-section "Bañez's criticism of middle knowledge."

efficacy of grace to dependency on human free will. Even in Bañez's first way of speaking of the efficacy of grace, he emphasised that grace itself is efficacious, though a man still freely converts to God (*homo libere uel credit, uel conuertitur in Deum*⁵⁰). In his words God *non solum illuminando intellectum et proponendo obiectum, sed etiam realiter et efficaciter mouendo liberum arbitrium, ut deliberando consentiat*⁵¹. So according to Bañez, if we consider the role of human freedom⁵², efficacious grace moves it, according to its nature, rather than its efficacy depends on whether free will consents to it or not. On this point Bañez said:

Sed eius efficacia prout est a Deo in hoc exercetur, ut efficaciter *eleuet* liberum arbitrium ad consentiendum *cum Deo*, non autem uiceuersa, ut Molina intendit, liberum arbitrium *eleuet* auxilium ipsum et faciat efficax ut ipse Deus consentiat cum homine et concomitetur actionem liberam tandiu quandiu ipse homo pro innata sibi libertate uoluerit⁵³. (The emphasis is mine)

His difficulty with Molina expressed here justifies our reading of their difference stated above. The way of dealing with the role of free will distinguished these two theologians and led to two ways of understanding of efficacious grace. According to Bañez, free will is elevated by efficacious grace. But for Molina sufficient grace becomes efficacious in the free will's consent, so that free will seems to elevate or render sufficient grace efficacious.

Bañez believes that his position on the efficacy of grace follows Augustine's teaching on grace⁵⁴. For example, he followed Augustine's words: *ipse* (God) *facit ut illi* (human beings) *faciant quae praecepit; non illi faciunt ut ipse faciat quod promisit*⁵⁵ to contend that grace itself had its effects if God wishes. It is God who decrees what we will do, rather than we do something meriting salvation and then

⁵⁰ *Tractatus*, II, Ch. III, n. 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² The canons on justification of the Council of Trent (See DS, n. 1554) condemned any theological proposition which denied human free choice; we should note the difference between the condemned proposition and Bañez's position here. Bañez, unlike some Protestant theologians, never claimed the intrinsically efficacious grace took away human freedom.

⁵³ *Apologia* II, Ch. III, n.1.

⁵⁴ For Bañez, both Church Fathers and St. Thomas are the authority for theologians. For example, "...docendi huius rei ueritatem (*i.e.* the doctrine on grace and human freedom-my note) prout ex doctrina diui Augustini et diui Thomae et aliorum patrum accepimus", Cited from the preface of the *Tractatus*; See also 'Le Thomisme "moderne" de Dominique Bañez' (2006).

⁵⁵ See *Apologia* III, Ch. VI, n. 7.

he is obliged to give assistance⁵⁶. In this sense, any possibility of a Nominalist interpretation of *facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam* is excluded in Bañez's theology⁵⁷. He believed that in Augustine's time there were people who thought that reason was not sufficient for having faith, hope and love. Human beings are not able to be called to the supernatural end without the concurrence or consent of their wills. In contrast to this position, Augustine placed God's mercy in first place, rather than the concurrence of the human will, simply because the human will should be seen as something prepared by God. Undoubtedly, when applying his interpretation of divine motion to efficacious grace, Bañez did not have any difficulty with the Augustinian position referred to here. God's mercy towards the elect is the divine motion which premoves the will of these people to accept grace. Human salutary acts always depend on God's initiatives.

2. Bañez's criticism of middle knowledge

We have touched on Bañez's divergence from Molina on whether sufficient grace and efficacious grace are really different. In Bañez's works he frequently mentioned the following statement which he considers to be unacceptable: God wills to create a human being and places him in a particular circumstance in which he can freely consent to God's grace⁵⁸. What he is referring to is Molina's famous theory of middle knowledge which is adopted by this Jesuit to reconcile God's grace and human autonomy. Since Bañez's criticism of middle knowledge is one part of his insistence on the intrinsic efficacy of grace, in this section I would like to examine what middle knowledge is and Bañez's criticism of it.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* More quotations from *De praedestinatione* can be found in the text. The works of Augustine appealed by Bañez are mostly composed in the period of Augustine's controversial with the Pelagians. For Bañez's notice of this anti-Pelagian context, see *Tractatus* III.

⁵⁷ The final form of this axiom is thought to be fixed in the 12th century. Its origin can be traced to Irenaeus: "If you offer to Him what is yours, that is faith in Him and subjection, you shall receive Him, and become a perfect work of God". In Radulphus Ardens' (+1200) *Homilies* we find usage of this axiom. For a discussion of its development in the medieval period, see Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A history of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, vol. 1. From the Beginning to 1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986), 83-91. For a presentation of the Nominalists' interpretation, see the same book p. 166-172. Thomas Aquinas mentioned and criticised this reading in the *Summa* I-II, q. 112 a. 3.

⁵⁸ For example, *Tractatus* II, Ch. III, n. 8.

Based on his interpretation of the medieval theologians⁵⁹, Molina made a three-fold division of God's knowledge: natural knowledge, middle knowledge and free knowledge. Natural knowledge is God's comprehension of all possibilities which could hypothetically obtain (some philosophers prefer to describe it as a knowledge of "metaphysically necessary states of affairs"⁶⁰). God possesses it naturally before any free determination of His will, so it is not dependent on His will and is essential to God's omniscience. Because of this, this knowledge of God is called natural knowledge. There is another kind of knowledge which is posterior to God's free act to cause one of the possible orders known by his natural knowledge. By this knowledge, he knows "absolutely and determinately, without any condition or hypothesis" which one of the possible orders "were in fact going to obtain and, likewise, which ones were not going to obtain"⁶¹. It is after God's free act of will, so is called free knowledge. Molina thought that there is a third knowledge, which stands between natural and free knowledge:

Tertiam denique mediam scientiam qua ex altissima et inscrutabili comprehensione cuiusque liberi arbitrii in sua essentia intuitus est, quid pro sua innata libertate, *si in hoc uel illo uel etiam infinitis rerum ordinibus collocaretur*, acturum esset, cum tamen posset, si uellet, facere re ipsa oppositum, ut ex dictis disp. 49 et 50 manifestum est⁶².
(The emphasis is mine)

Hence God's middle knowledge refers to knowledge of what would happen in certain circumstances. To put it in another way, this is the divine knowledge of which decisions will be made by his creatures freely under a certain set of circumstances⁶³. Both God's middle

⁵⁹ For Thomas's view, see the *Summa* Ia q. 14 a. 8; For Scotus, see William Lane Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents: from Aristotle to Suarez* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 7) (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 136-137.

⁶⁰ See Alfred J. Freddoso, *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia*, (Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell university press, 2004), Introduction.

⁶¹ Molina, *Concordia*, 52, 9.

⁶² Molina, *Concordia*, 52, 9.

⁶³ An example may be helpful to get the point: by his natural knowledge, God knows Peter would deny or not deny Christ when Peter is put under a certain set of possible circumstances. But by his middle knowledge, God knows what Peter would do if he is put under these possible circumstances. When God created a world, God brings a certain set of circumstances to act. So God by his free knowledge knows what Peter would exactly do. See Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, 175-76.

knowledge and natural knowledge are prevolitional knowledge⁶⁴. Since middle knowledge is prior to God's determination to bring a world into existence, God's volitional act depends on his middle knowledge, i.e. what would occur under any given circumstances. God does not have control over what he knows through middle knowledge⁶⁵. In this sense, God's middle knowledge can be considered dependent on what creatures would do.

In fact, the invention of middle knowledge is a necessary outcome of Molina's preference for human autonomy without denying God's grace at the same time. As we have seen in the discussion of divine motion, for Molina the primary cause does not work upon the secondary cause (premotion), but rather directly upon the effects. When it is applied to God's help on the supernatural level, grace does not work directly upon the human will to move it to the salutary acts. Grace operates along with human beings to bring about its effects. Therefore, as we have shown, Molina claimed that grace is neither intrinsically efficacious nor inefficacious. Because of this neutral character of grace, reconciling it with a provident and omnipotent God, which is not a dispensable Christian doctrine, may be a challenge for Molina. To keep God's providence in place, therefore, God's prevolitional knowledge must have the character of knowing which effects would in fact freely obtain in a certain set of circumstances⁶⁶. For Molina, God's natural knowledge does not have this feature. There must be another kind of prevolitional knowledge before God's divine decree. For this reason, by adopting the concept of middle knowledge, on the one hand, he can defend God's providence, since it still is God who finally wills or determines which one of the circumstances will actually obtain. On the other hand, to avoid leading to intrinsically efficacious grace, Molina, with the help of the concept of middle knowledge, gave some room for human freedom prior to God's determination, because God cannot change what a man wills in specific circumstance⁶⁷.

⁶⁴ Because these two types of knowledge are logically prior to the act of the divine will, they are called prevolitional.

⁶⁵ "God cannot annul the fact that if a free creature were to be placed in a certain set of circumstances, he would choose to do a certain act." See Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, 176.

⁶⁶ See Freddoso, *On Divine Foreknowledge*, Introduction, 23.

⁶⁷ For example, God through his middle knowledge knows that Peter in a certain circumstance ([C] a) will deny Christ. But if He determined to keep Peter's faith to Christ, God could put Peter in another set of circumstance ([C]b). Since middle

Undoubtedly, Bañez did not agree with Molina's position. If grace were bestowed according to God's foreknowledge of the possible human reactions, it would lead us to think that God's will depends on human decisions. In other words, Molina's viewpoint that God has the knowledge of what a person would freely do in certain circumstances and then He decrees to make it happen may be contrary to God's omnipotence (*contraria diuinae maiestati*). Bañez's systematic criticism of it can be found in the *Apologia*: Firstly, Molina put too much emphasis on the role of human consent in the discussion of the efficacy of grace, and naturally by his theory of middle knowledge the certitude of divine knowledge comes from what a person would freely do in certain circumstances. In this model, God's determination conceptually follows and depends on this knowledge. It also implies that God's determination originates from human beings' free will, so God's divine free will is indirectly excluded. Moreover, Molina's position can lead to the assertion that man can be the cause of some good. Bañez's great reservation was that this implication of Molina's position was in contradiction with Christian doctrine: God is the cause of all good. Therefore, Bañez claimed that the problem of Molina's theory should be corrected by this proposition: there is no future good act that can be thought of as coming from human free will, unless divine free will is recognised as the cause of this future good act⁶⁸.

Bañez's position on efficacious grace left him unsatisfied with the proposition that God decrees freely to create a person in a specific circumstance after He knows what this person would do. For Bañez God's decree should be infallible and intrinsically efficacious to make human beings do good, so the decree of the divine will should always proceed a person doing good. Therefore, Bañez and his confreres said:

[A]rbitramur quod ipsammet actionem liberam non solum praesciuit (God, my note) si futura est, sed et praedelibrando praedefiniuit illam qualiter et quando fieret a libero arbitrio hominis⁶⁹.

From this quotation, we see why Molina's middle knowledge was not acceptable to Bañez and his colleagues: the key element in their theology of grace, i.e. predilection, was excluded by Molina. In their view, the *primum liberum* which should be properly attributed to

knowledge is a prevolitional knowledge, God cannot change Peter's denial of Christ in [C]a. What He can do is to create Peter in [C]b.

⁶⁸ *Apologia* I, Ch. XVI, n. 3; Because of the loss of Bañez's correspondences with St. Teresa, it is hard for us to reconstruct his theological system from the perspective of his spirituality.

⁶⁹ *Apologia* I, Ch. XVI, n. 3.

God was instead given to human freedom. This could possibly lead to deforming God's image as the master of the universe and also deviates from the teachings in the Bible⁷⁰.

Secondly, Bañez had difficulty with middle knowledge itself. Since middle knowledge, as a prevolitional knowledge, entails God's knowledge of human agents (*causa creata*) before His determination, it seems that God has knowledge of the effects of His grace through human agents. However, this cannot be reconciled with Bañez's position on divine knowledge. I think Bañez's point is that God does not have knowledge through knowing the secondary cause, but only from His essence⁷¹. Similarly, nothing moves God's will, except His goodness⁷². Therefore, divine knowledge apart from Himself cannot be reduced to extrinsic cognition, but only dwells in God Himself. For the same reason, the principle of God's volitional operation is in His goodness. So middle knowledge, which put the created agents' act conceptually prior to the infallible divine knowledge, violates the principle that God knows and wills independently. To avoid Molina's problem, Bañez presented the solution from the Dominican side:

Nos autem hanc infallibilitatem diuinae praescientiae non quaerimus extra Deum, sed eam constituimus in libero decreto Dei, qui operetur omnia secundum consilium uoluntatis suae; uel si mala sunt, permittit ea secundum consilium uoluntatis suae.

Sufficit ergo distinctio communis theologorum diuinae scientiae, in scientiam simplicis intelligentiae, et scientiam uisionis, ita ut per illam priorem naturaliter cognoscat Deus rerum omnium possibilium essentias, et per hanc alteram liberam cognoscat omnia futura quatenus fundatur in decreto libero Dei uolentis bona quaedam fieri, et quaedam mala permittere ad ostensionem sapientiae et omnipotentiae suae⁷³.

So the Dominicans contended that divine foreknowledge consisted in God's free determination, which moves every thing according to itself. It is this divine decree that brings about all good and permits evil. In this sense, a two-fold division of divine knowledge is sufficient for Bañez's purpose: knowledge of simple intelligence and

⁷⁰ The citation in the *Apologia* is Proverb 21:1; and the prayer appeared in *Missale Romanum*, see *ibid*.

⁷¹ Bañez's main source here is from Thomas's *Summa* Ia q. 14, a. 13.

⁷² Here Bañez refers to Thomas' view of God's will that appears in the *Summa* Ia q. 19, a. 2. In his reply to the second objection, Thomas made an analogy between the principle of God's understanding and will: "quae semper habet (God, my note) bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab eo secundum essentiam."

⁷³ *Apologia* I, Ch. XVI, n. 6.

knowledge of vision. They are basically equivalent to natural knowledge and free knowledge in Molina's division. Through the former, God knows all possibilities; and through the latter, He knows all future contingents which are decreed by his divine will freely: good is brought about by God and evil is only permitted to manifest His wisdom and power. Between these two kinds of knowledge is God's will. This Bañezian division is not difficult for us to understand: the core of Bañez's theology of grace is that actual grace which prepares some people's coming to salvation must be intrinsically efficacious. Moreover, this efficacy comes from God's will to predestine some persons and from His infallible decree. In his controversy with Molina, this Jesuit's emphasis on human autonomy introducing middle knowledge was seen by Bañez as the denial of God's majesty and an exaggeration of human autonomy.

3. *Efficacious grace and predestination*

We have seen how Bañez insisted there was a real distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. For him, free will could not resist efficacious grace, which must be followed by its effect. In this way he reminded his opponents that in any good the human being was not glorified, but God. Therefore, any good of human beings must be caused by God and no one would be better than another if God did not will a greater good to one rather than to another. In other words, the efficacy of grace ultimately comes from God's divine decree by which He realises His plan for everything to attain their end. This is predestination⁷⁴. In this sense, a more comprehensive understanding of Bañez's theology of efficacy of grace should be paired with predestination.

God elects and predestinates some people, rather than others, to be granted efficacious grace⁷⁵. The salutary acts of these people are

⁷⁴ "rationem praeexistentem in mente diuina circa media efficacia ad consequendum finem appellari praedestinationem", Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 23, a. 2.

⁷⁵ It should be highlighted that in Bañez's theology the predestination only refers to Beatitude. He never contended for human's predestination to evil. For Bañez God only permits the evil to show His mercy in the predestinated people ("ostensio misericordiae majoris in predestinatis"). See *Apologia* I, Ch. XXVI, n.4. Bañez's position is the same as the Catholic teaching on this issue: e.g. Leo X's epistle *Congratulamur uehementer* to the Patriarch of Antioch in 1053: "Deum praedestinasse solummodo bona, praesciuisse autem bona malaque." (DS 685). Can. 17 of Council of Trent's *Canones de iustificatione*: "Si quis iustificationis gratiam non nisi praedestinatis ad uitam contingere dixerit, reliquos uero omnes, qui uocantur, uocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote diuina potestate praedestinos

willed by God. In his commentary on the *Summa* q. 23 a. 4 Bañez followed Thomas by contending that predestination presupposed election, and love preceded election. God loves some persons first and then elects them. What Bañez emphasised is the priority of God's love in his selection and predestination. God, out of his love, wishes good to someone, simply because He is the cause of all good⁷⁶.

God loves some persons, and then He elects and predestinates them to salvation by bestowing on them the mean to attain salvation, i.e. efficacious grace. The precedence of love in the order of predestination prompts Bañez to insist that predestination formally imposes an act of divine will (*praedestinatio formaliter importet actum diuinae uoluntatis*⁷⁷). God's will realises His providence, which causes his act to save some persons. By rejecting Molina's middle knowledge, Bañez contended that God did not foresee some people accepting his grace by free will in certain circumstance and then rendering grace efficacious to them. On the contrary, he loves some persons and then bestows on them efficacious grace by which these persons will be moved smoothly (*suauiter*, in Bañez's words⁷⁸) to salutary acts by efficacious grace. Love here takes precedence, as an act of will, so predestination consists in God's will, rather than God's foreknowledge (God's intellect) of the decision of created agents.

Let us examine Bañez's argument for this position in some detail⁷⁹. The scriptural foundation of his argument is from *Mat.* 22 where the evangelist says that many are called, but only a few are chosen. In *Rom.* 9:13 Paul says God has loved Jacob, but he has hated Esau. Bañez explained that this love was not due to what Jacob had done, but only because of God's calling. In these verses, predestination is seen as election that presupposes love. Election and love are acts of will, so predestination is the act of will as well⁸⁰.

God's decree to give some people efficacious grace presupposes the distinction of natural and supernatural orders. Bañez said:

Cognouit Deus omnes homines possibiles, ex quibus quosdam dilexit quantum ad esse naturae, et hos uoluit creare, ex quibus adhuc quos-

ad malum: an. s." (DS 1567). Following the teaching of the Church, Bañez rejected double predestination.

⁷⁶ See *Summa* Ia q. 23 a. 4.

⁷⁷ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 23, a. 2.

⁷⁸ Therefore, Bañez, following St. Thomas, denied that God imposed necessity on all human beings. This point is essential for understanding Bañez's viewpoint of human freedom. See the last section of this article.

⁷⁹ Here we mainly follow Bañez's commentary on the *Summa* Ia q. 23 a. 2.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

dam dilexit ad finem supernaturalem, quae diuina dilectio electio dicitur, quatenus ex aliis, quos creare uolebat, istos separauit sibi, et denique hos electos praedestinauit, hoc est prouidit et ordinauit, ut per quaedam media supernaturaliter efficaciter peruenirent in finem supernaturalem⁸¹.

According to Thomistic theology, God's knowledge comprehends all possible things, but His will selects some of them to be realised. Therefore, the words of St. Thomas: "God's knowledge is the cause of things" cannot be understood in the sense that all possibilities will be actualised, but in the sense that His will is joined to His knowledge so that only certain possibilities will be actualised⁸². This is the meaning of the quotation: God knows every human possibility, but He only wills to create some of them. Bañez adopted it as his solution by differentiating two levels: first the level of nature, in which divine knowledge is presupposed, i.e. God knows every possible thing from eternity. He created the world. The second level is God's election of people out of His love, so it is in the supernatural order. Seen from the natural order, God created every thing. But in the supernatural level, He only elects some people out of his creation for ultimate happiness through the efficacious grace. In the supernatural order, out of His love, God selects people for the supernatural end. In a word, what Bañez emphasised is that predestination should be sought in God and is constituted in His divine will. This predestination is realised through efficacious grace which is also prevenient to human free consent and brings elected people to a supernatural end. It was also in this sense that efficacious grace was called by Bañez as the *means (media)* of God's predestination.

Now we can link Bañez's theology of efficacious grace and predestination. The foundation of efficacy of grace consists in predestination, by which God predestines some people to a supernatural end. Therefore, on the one hand, God bestows on every human being sufficient grace, which is sufficient for his salvation, though he might not in fact respond to this universal call; on the other hand, efficacious grace does, in fact, effectively produce salvation, otherwise God's decrees would not be infallible. By rejecting Molina's theory of middle knowledge, Bañez reinforced his position by seeking the root of divine providence in God Himself, rather than in the merits foreseen by Him.

⁸¹ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q.23, a. 2.

⁸² *Summa* Ia q. 14 a. 8. In St. Thomas' theology, this understanding of God's knowledge as the cause of things is called the "knowledge of approbation", i.e. by this knowledge God's will selects what will obtain.

3. The concordance between efficacious grace and human freedom

In Bañez's theology of grace, God loves some people and predestines them to beatitude by bestowing on them efficacious grace. This grace moves the human will efficaciously according to the nature of the will and this efficacy does not rely on human consent. However, in his understanding of efficacy of grace, Bañez had to answer such questions as: is human freedom still real? Although the title "Calvinist" given by his opponents is unfair, one can ask whether the doctrine of Bañez weakened the role of human freedom. Did he adopt the same approach as the Protestant theologians who created a radical tension between grace and freedom⁸³? Or did he sacrifice human freedom to the role of grace in our salvation? In this part, after examining Bañez's doctrine of efficacious grace, I would like to explore how Bañez reconciled the efficacy of grace and human freedom.

In the *Tractatus* Pars I and the *Apologia* Pars Prima Bañez offered the same definition of human freedom:

Liberum arbitrium est facultas intellectus et uoluntatis ad agendum uel non agendum, uel ad agendum unum uel aliud⁸⁴.

This definition is a typical Thomistic understanding of human freedom, which considers both reason and will in its definition of freedom. According to Bañez's interpretation, the basis and the principle of freedom consist in the intellectual indifference to the means for an end to be attained (*intellectus iudicat indifferentiam alicuius medii secundum se ad finem*⁸⁵). The form of this freedom originates from the will's choice of such and such a mean. This interpretation is rooted in Thomas' doctrine of will: the intellect only understands all the means for reaching an end, but it is not attached to one mean. Will has the ability to act or not act, even desire this or that. In particular, Bañez emphasised that his statement does not involve "velle contrarium" (to will some contrary things)⁸⁶. Hence, what Bañez denied was the definition made by Molina and Suarez:

⁸³ In *Apologia* I, Ch. XXIII, n. 3-4 Bañez and his colleagues have realised this consequence. In their view, Molina's theology of grace gave an excuse for Luther's denial of freedom, since in the Molinaist logic it is a necessary consequence to claim lack of freedom if there is predestination and grace can be intrinsically efficacious.

⁸⁴ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n.8. This paragraph was copied exactly in *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.2.

⁸⁵ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n. 5.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Also see *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n. 6-8.

Liberum arbitrium est quod, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere hoc uel non agere, aut uelle contrarium. Haec forma definitionis liberi arbitrii neque apud Aristotelem, neque apud Magistrum, neque apud diuum Thomam, nec apud aliquem grauem doctorem inuenitur, nisi apud Almainum et alios nominales⁸⁷.

There are two elements in Molina's definition of human freedom: i) it is able to act or not to act; ii) it is able to want some contrary things⁸⁸. The second point was the one to which Bañez was opposed. There are two aspects to this opposition. In the first, he distinguishes the composite sense and the divided sense of a proposition⁸⁹. In the composite sense, when the human will is determined by reason to choose the good, it is impossible that the will fails to do so under such a command from reason (*ut impossibile sit uoluntatem non eligere stante tali rationis imperio*⁹⁰). Similarly, speaking of the composite sense, we cannot claim that under the operation of the divine help or the divine motion, the human will is not moved. It is not possible at the same time for the contrary (i.e. human will fails to act) to be true. But Bañez conceded that only in the divided sense (considered in itself apart from temporal considerations), is this proposition possible: God moves the free will by efficacious grace, and the free will *possibly* does not act⁹¹. There is no logical problem to link these two

⁸⁷ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n.4 and *Apologia* I, Ch. XII, n.1. Jaques Almain (1480-1515) is a French Scotist theologian famous for his support of Gallicanism. Since there is some similarity between Molina and Suarez's position on two-order causality, Scotists went along the same line with them. Juan de Rada (1545-1609), Archbishop of Patti, a consulate of the *Congregatio de auxilii*, claimed the Thomistic doctrine of the causality was false and worthless. See Schmutz, *La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure*, 256.

⁸⁸ See Freddoso, *On Divine Knowledge*, 25.

⁸⁹ This is the logical distinction made by medieval theologians. St. Thomas called the composite sense as *de dicto*, and the divided sense as *de re*, e.g. *Summa* Ia q.14 a.13 ad 3; The proposition "It is possible for a white thing to be black" ("*album possibile est esse nigrum*") is true in the divided sense (i.e. it is applied to an individual thing), because a white thing can become black by being painted. However, it is false to say in the composite sense that "a white thing is black" ("*album esse nigrum*"), because it violates the principle of non-contradiction.

⁹⁰ *Apologia* I, Ch. 12, n. 2.

⁹¹ *Haec enim copulatiua uerificari potest: Deus mouet liberum arbitrium auxilio efficaci, et liberum arbitrium possibiliter non eligit; quia utraque pars huius copulatiuae non destruit alteram, ac proinde simul sunt compossibiles. Apologia*, I, Ch. 12, n.2; some paragraphs later, Bañez stated his position again: *Nos autem negamus talem compositionem esse possibilem, uidelicet Deus mouet efficaci auxilio uoluntatem ad eligendum, et uoluntas non eligit id quod Deus uult ipsam eligere. Similiter etiam impossibile iudicamus quod aliquis sit praedestinatus, et non saluetur, quamuis haec copulatiua sit uera, Petrus est praedestinatus, et Petrus possibiliter non saluatur.*

phrases. When seen from these two points of view together, Bañez thought that these words of St. Thomas fit well into the context of his argument:

Si Deus mouet uoluntatem ad aliquid, impossibile est huic positioni quod uoluntas ad illud non moueatur. Non tamen est impossibile simpliciter. Vnde non sequitur quod uoluntas a Deo ex necessitate moueatur.⁹²

What needs to be highlighted is the second part of the quotation. According to Molina's definition of human freedom, even in the composite sense (*de dicto*), human freedom can cause actual resistance to efficacious grace. On the contrary, Bañez claimed that the efficacy of grace did not necessarily destroy human freedom. It is compatible with human freedom. In his commentary on the *Summa* Ia q. 23 a. 6, Bañez's used the strategy of making a distinction between the sense of composite and the divided sense to argue for a concordance between efficacious grace and human freedom⁹³. In the composite sense, a man cannot be seated and standing at the same time. However, in the divided sense this man retains the ability to stand when sitting. Therefore, in this sense, we can say a man can stand when he is sitting. Similarly, when we apply this distinction to the discussion of grace, in the composite sense, efficacious grace infallibly moves the human will. But in the divided sense, the human will retains the capacity of not being moved by grace, even if the will is in fact moved⁹⁴. In other words, by introducing a distinction between two senses of a proposition, Bañez evidently finds a way to emphasise that man's freedom is not replaced by grace in the process of human consent to God.

Bañez, therefore, not only contended for the infallibility of the divine will, but also highlighted that God does not impose necessity on every thing. Although Bañez acknowledges the freedom of the

⁹² *Summa* Ia-IIae q.10 a.4, see *Apologia* I, Ch. 12, n.2; in *Apologia* III, Ch. IV, n. 3, Bañez appealed to Thomas by referring to another paragraph from Ia q. 23 a. 6, ad 3: "Vnde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non praedestinare quem praedestinavit, in sensu composito accipiendo; licet absolute considerando, Deus possit praedestinare uel non praedestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur praedestinationis certitudo."

⁹³ The text is: "Secunda conclusio in solutione ad tertium. Non oportet dicere, quod Deus possit non praedestinare, quem praedestinavit in sensu composito accipiendo, quamuis simpliciter loquendo istum hominem de quo dicimus, quod est praedestinatus, possit Deus non praedestinare".

⁹⁴ It will be interesting to note that for Calvin, regarding the divided sense, this capacity of the human will does not remain unless efficacious grace is removed. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 304.

human beings by saying that God's motion of human will is not a necessity⁹⁵, he did not thereby intend to discard the efficacy of the divine will. Hence we observe that Bañez's definition of freedom has two elements: i) God does not move the human will in a necessary way ii) freedom does not consist in the ability to do something contrary, but rather in the inclination to the good.

Furthermore, in Bañez's interpretation of freedom, he went on to explore the true meaning of human freedom, and its concordance with grace. The solution given by Bañez was to appeal to the perfect model of freedom in God in order to define freedom in human beings. Considered from this aspect, if *uel contrarium* were intrinsically necessary for freedom, no freedom would be found in God. The outcome would be that God has less freedom than human beings. This is definitely unacceptable to Bañez. On the contrary, the perfect freedom found in God suggests that true human freedom consists in the choice of good:

[Q]uamuis nulla creatura sit natura sua omnino impeccabilis...si uirtute gratiae Dei confirmetur in bono ita ut peccare non possit, non ideo destruitur libertas ad electionem boni necessariam, sed potius perfectiori modo erit libera creatura quanto magis per gratiam (Deo) assimilatur⁹⁶.

According to this interpretation, the notion of freedom is derived from freedom in God. When human beings are assimilated to God's grace and choose the good, they have perfect freedom, the freedom to bring about its fulfillment. Just as in God, the perfect goodness is conjoined with the necessity of the divine nature, the human will is also determined (*determinata*) to its own object, which is good in general. In fact, because of the imperfection of human beings, evil can become the object of the human will. However, Bañez contended that we do not wish to do the evil for the sake of the evil itself (*sub ratione mali*). Rather, we intend to pursue the good as we understand it. For this reason, according to Bañez's theology, we cannot assert that the freedom of human beings consists in their ability to sin, which is the contrary of good⁹⁷. Otherwise, sinners have more freedom than the people in the state of grace who only walk in the ways of God. Therefore, we can say that the realisation of the freedom of human beings depends on the inclination to the good,

⁹⁵ Bañez *In Summam Ia* q.23, a. 6.

⁹⁶ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.3.

⁹⁷ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n. 8; *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.2-4.

rather than the choice of evil⁹⁸. When somebody makes a necessary choice of the good in the state of grace, his freedom cannot be said to be destroyed. On the contrary, created freedom works in a more perfect way. In this sense, both the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Apostles merit by being obedient through an act of divinely mandated freedom. This idea of freedom allows St. Thomas' resistance to the interpretation of the will's indifference regarding contraries⁹⁹ and contended that the human will's inclination is to its end, namely, beatitude. In the light of this understanding of freedom, God has the highest level of freedom, and the angels have more freedom than human beings. Although he denied any indifference regarding the end, Bañez conceded the indifference of the intellect in the choice of the *means* to reach the end. In the *Tractatus*, regarding these two aspects, there is a proper account of freedom (*propria ratio libertatis*)¹⁰⁰. Therefore, a free agent in Bañez's thought should be that *operatur propter finem cum cognitione seu ex cognitione indifferentiae mediorum ad finem*¹⁰¹. In other words, the principle of the freedom consists in the factor that *intellectus iudicat indifferentiam alicuius medii secundum se ad finem*¹⁰².

Having understood these two aspects of Bañez's interpretation of freedom, his version of the concordance of human freedom and grace will be easy to understand. By denying that human freedom consists in indifference to do something or to do something contrary, Bañez sought its proper meaning in the human will's choice of the good. When we chose the good, rather than its contrary, freedom is not destroyed. On the contrary, true harmony between grace and human freedom is realised. Any person who is joined to God by His grace, is also moved by the Holy Spirit to do what God commands¹⁰³. Under the efficacious work of the Holy Spirit, humans are joined to God's will as the sons of God by imitating the Father. Since the proper meaning of the true freedom does not consist in indifference toward

⁹⁸ "quin potius posse peccare imperfectio maxima et infirmitas est liberi arbitrii, quod quidem de se ut est a Deo habet inclinationem et ordinem ad bonum, usque adeo ut etiam dum peccat, non intendat formaliter malum, sed semper mouetur sub aliqua ratione boni." *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.2.

⁹⁹ See *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 10 a. 2 and Pinckaers's notes on this article in S. Pinckaers, *Les Actes Humains*, (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 332.

¹⁰⁰ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n. 9.

¹⁰¹ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.7.

¹⁰² *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.5.

¹⁰³ St. Thomas's view in the *Summa* IIa-IIae q. 24 a. 11 was appealed to confirm the power of the Holy Spirit.

good and evil (but in the inclination to the good), the freedom of the sons of God wills what the Holy Spirit commands and should be regarded as being perfected by grace, rather than its destruction. Besides, since God does not move human beings in a necessary way, the operation of grace must be both gentle and strong (*sic fortiter et suauius ducuntur ad operandum quod Deo placitum est*¹⁰⁴). Efficacious grace itself has the power of moving the human will. This is a process of perfecting the will and intellect, but it works in a gently way, not by denying human freedom. This is also the classical Thomistic viewpoint summarised by Aidan Nichols in his introduction to the great 20th century Thomist Garrigou-Lagrange:

Pray, abandon yourself to divine Providence, watch that you do not resist sufficient grace which comes to you as good inspirations, and God will grant you the efficacious grace that will bring you to the ever more perfect charity¹⁰⁵.

Seen from this perspective, Christ's freely given obedience to death, and the Virgin Mary's "fiat" to God are the examples of the concordance between grace and human freedom.

To summarise, Bañez's viewpoint on human freedom is a supplement to his position on the efficacy of grace. What concerned Bañez was both the certainty of grace and human freedom. Both of them are important for a Catholic theologian. Following St. Thomas, he contended that God did not move the human will in a necessary way, though in an infallible way. In other words, God's movement is infallible but not necessary—that is, it does not force the will. Garrigou-Lagrange made an important comment on this point: *de facto* "the human will can resist efficacious grace if it so wills, as the Council of Trent declares, but as long as the will is under efficacious grace, it never wills to resist"¹⁰⁶. In other words, grace operates gently and with power. Moreover, Bañez defined freedom of will as the faculty of choosing the means in view of an end to be attained. This definition allows him to set the perfect model of freedom under God's grace. Therefore, the proper meaning of human freedom does not consist in

¹⁰⁴ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIV, n.1; *fortiter et suauius* are the words used frequently by Bañez to explain his viewpoint of efficacious grace; e.g. "efficacia diuini auxilii ut est ab Spiritu Sancto non destruit sed perficit libertatem, quatenus Spiritus fortiter et suauius mouet uoluntatem perficiendo facultatem intellectus et uoluntatis. *Apologia* I, Ch. 14, n.3.

¹⁰⁵ Aidan Nichols, *Reason with Piety, Garrigou-Lagrange in the Service of Catholic Thought* (Sapientia Press, 2008), 104.

¹⁰⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 422.

the refusal of God who is goodness itself, but rather in the assimilation into God's grace. Human freedom can only be actualised and perfected in grace. For this reason, in Bañez's own theological system, efficacious grace does not necessarily move in a way that contradicts human freedom.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we have explored Bañez's viewpoint on the efficacy of grace, which was one of the most important theological controversies in the 16th century. The Council of Trent insisted on the existence of human free will, but the Council did not clearly state how human freedom interacts with grace. The principle laid down by the Council, therefore, left space for theologians to debate how grace can be in concordance with human freedom. This ambiguity led to the debate on whether grace is intrinsically efficacious and how this efficacy can be harmonious with human autonomy. Bañez strongly contended for the legitimacy of distinguishing efficacious grace from sufficient grace. The starting point of his theology of efficacious grace is metaphysical. Bañez regarded God's grace as a divine motion, which creates a dependence of human beings on God for their own existence (*esse*). By adopting a radical interpretation of St. Thomas, Bañez contended that only God *simpliciter* causes the existence of all things. The secondary causes only determine effects in a specific way (*tale ens*). This distinction allowed him to claim that God is the exclusive cause of the secondary agent's action. According to Bañez this dependence of existence also means that all secondary agents act in virtue of God Himself: He assigns the principle of operation to the created agents (secondary cause) and also supplies the principle to operate in them. It is God, therefore, that premoves the secondary agents to act, not that God and the secondary agents operate together to produce effects.

Applying the principle of divine motion to grace, Bañez firmly insisted on a real difference between sufficient grace and efficacious grace, and on that the latter is intrinsically efficacious. Just as God moves a secondary agent to produce the effects, efficacious grace infallibly moves the human will. To refute Molina's middle knowledge theory, Bañez emphasised grace's feature of "premotion". It is God's love that bestows efficacious grace and premoves man, rather than it being His foreknowledge of a person's freely consenting to his grace that renders sufficient grace efficacious. In this context, Bañez linked predestination with efficacious grace. To those elected by Him,

God grants efficacious grace and premoves their minds. Here grace is a means to realise God's predestination.

Last but not least, as a Catholic theologian, Bañez did not forget about the existence of human freedom under the operation of grace. According to his understanding, grace does not impede human freedom. On the contrary, it is only actualised and perfected in grace. Efficacious grace moves human will in a gentle way, never imposing itself on human freedom in a necessary way. By introducing "divided sense" into his argumentation, Bañez found a way to contend that the human will retains the ability of not being moved, even if the will itself *de facto* is moved by God.

Bañez deserves an important place in the history of theology for his efforts in elucidating the theology of efficacious grace. In his system of efficacious grace, the majesty of God is the essential element and he never ceased to defend and give priority to this majesty. So I would like to quote the last words of the *Apologia* to end our discussion:

Profecto nullam rationem proferre poterunt, praeter diuinam liberam uoluntatem, quae misericorditer quos uoluit elegit; reliquos uero, ut ostenderetur ordo diuinae sapientiae et iustitiae, permisit deficere per peccatum et in eo permanere. Clamemus igitur omnes: *O altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei. Ipsi Gloria in saecula*¹⁰⁷.

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¹⁰⁷ *Tractatus* III, n.10.

REVIEWS

Henry Chadwick, *Augustine of Hippo: a Life*, Oxford: OUP, 2009, 978-0-19-956830-7, 0-19-956830-8, XX + 177 p. (Foreword by Peter Brown.)

In 1981, the erudite scholar Henry Chadwick (1920-2008) composed a draft of the life of Augustine for the *Past Masters* series of Oxford University Press, which in the end was replaced by a different, shorter text (published in 1986; and with updated bibliography in 2001 as *Augustine: a very short introduction*). This draft was discovered among the papers Chadwick left after his death, and with the help of friends and colleagues, posthumously published in 2009. Since this “new” biography of Augustine is based on material of 1981, Chadwick could obviously not rely on the scholarship produced during those 28 years in between. However, there is no doubt that, despite this handicap, he produced another gem, which deserves its place on the bookshelf of students and professors alike, next to his other, shorter version of 1986.

Biographers of Augustine find themselves in a privileged position: they have at their disposal a dazzling account of the man himself, which covers roughly the time between his physical birth and his spiritual birth through baptism. In *Confessiones* Augustine presents us with his intimate life story, deeply reflecting on the events he believed worth sharing. This material gives us the rare opportunity to render a very detailed portrait of someone who lived some 1600 years ago. In 1991, a decade after writing this draft on the life of Augustine, Chadwick would delight his readers with a superb English translation of *Confessiones*, in which he does full justice to the poetry of this prose work. Nevertheless, it is not advisable to rely too heavily on *Confessiones* alone for composing a biography, because many other important aspects of the multifaceted Augustine would otherwise be left out. Fortunately, we have the luxury that most of Augustine’s writings have come down to us, including his letters and sermons, which can shed further light on this extraordinary man who was (pre-)destined to become a saint. On top of this, Augustine reviewed the whole corpus of his writings in *Retractationes*, and this, too, cannot but be a valuable source for anyone trying to tell his life story. Add to this the *vita Augustini* his friend Possidius composed, and it is beyond doubt that no other person of Antiquity – Cicero coming far behind in second

place —, has left us with such a wealth of source material for writing a biography. The fact that Chadwick has delved into the numerous writings of Augustine, was familiar with the background and context of Augustine's life, and as always, could fall back on his exquisite mastering of the English language, makes him one of the few people capable of writing within the confines of a mere 168 pages a fresh and valuable biography of Augustine. To think that this little gem had been gathering dust for more than a quarter of a century!

Because of this abundance of source material, writing a biography of Augustine is at the same time a daunting task and a tremendous challenge. It confronts the biographer with evaluating the value of Augustine's own version of his life story and of the *vita Augustini* of Possidius. It also confronts the reader with an unbalance in the material: a detailed, if subjective and selective, account until Augustine's baptism inevitably leaves traces on any biography of Augustine. After his baptism, the material becomes less readymade.

The appeal of Chadwick's book lies first of all in his mastery of the written English word. His beautiful phrasing delights the reader in a way similar to the way in which Augustine must have appealed to, and I would venture to say, at times even bewitched, his readers and audience.

Secondly, Chadwick's renowned erudition and his ability to present Augustine's life in a different way makes his introduction to Augustine fresh, original and therefore highly recommendable. John J. O'Meara (1954), Gerald Bonner (1963), Peter Brown (1967), James J. O'Donnell (1985 and 2005), and Garry Wills (1999) had already written their version of Augustine's life before this publication, while also Serge Lancel's admirable French biography (1999) soon became available in English (2002). To make the modern day reader once more interested in the life of Augustine requires something special, and Chadwick succeeds in delivering this little extra *magna cum laude*. Although certain episodes inevitably appear in nearly every biography, whereby one wonders whether they deserve so much attention (f.i. the story of Pinianus (p. 67-68)), there still remain plenty of unique touches and anecdotes to make it enjoyable. In short, Chadwick's immaculate skill as narrator, combined with his erudition cannot but lead to literary fireworks when dealing with a challenging topic such as the life of Augustine.

However, some minor criticisms need to be made as well. Sometimes, small errors have crept into the story: twice Augustine is said to have died on the 30th of August (p. 3 and p. 87), while it should be the 28th. Nebridius is said to be one of the friends present

at Cassiciacum (p. 33), but this surely must be wrong: Augustine regrets in *Confessiones* that Nebridius in the end decided not to go along with the small group to Cassiciacum (*Conf.* ix. iv(7)), while his letters written from Cassiciacum to his friend are further evidence of this absence. Even the mentioning of the plural “other friends” is misleading here, since there were no friends present besides Alypius: the rest of the group consisted of family members, two students, and some scribes and other personnel. Again, the idea that Nebridius went along with Augustine to Africa, fell sick, and went back to his family home near Carthage where he soon died (p. 43) cannot, as far as I am aware, be substantiated by conclusive evidence. For all we know, Nebridius may have left Milan at a later time, probably after Verecundus died, since he was helping him with teaching grammar. He then went back to his home, I believe, in Carthage, and fell ill somewhat later. On p. 12 Chadwick minimizes Augustine’s adherence to Astrology when he writes: “As a guide for life’s decisions he turned for a few years to astrology”. According to *Confessiones*, Augustine must have believed in astrology for almost as long as he did in Manichaeism, i.e. some nine years, if not longer. Furthermore, one should not underestimate the influence astrology exerted on Augustine’s thinking: it cannot be a coincidence that the twin argument used to demonstrate the falsity of astrology would at the same time support Augustine’s controversial ideas on freely given grace (the Biblical twins Jacob and Esau).

This leads us to a second point of criticism: the absence of bibliographical references in this more extended version of Augustine’s life is highly regrettable. As no other, Chadwick provides the reader with an unusual – and often delightful – small detail in his narrative, but the reader has no idea where this detail comes from. This lack of bibliographical references makes one – probably unnecessary – to be on one’s guard concerning the facts recounted. One has at times the feeling that suppositions and speculations have too easily become solid facts. Though this helps the flow of the story – to be constantly confronted with the obligatory *caveat* and cautious hesitation can become very tedious reading indeed –, from a scholar’s perspective, demonstrating an (over)confident hand makes one apprehensive.

Nevertheless, despite these hick-ups, Chadwick has woven a superb account of Augustine’s life, with plenty of little anecdotes to make a new generation of readers interested in the bishop, and to confront them with an age so far removed from ours, and yet with a person so much like us. Indeed, Chadwick regularly makes us aware

that Augustine lived in quite a different age to ours, which is very important, since *Confessiones* brings this Late Antique saint at the same time so close to us.

What is perhaps most rewarding about this book are the deep overall insights, epigrammatically written down, which can stimulate the reader to study Augustine more in depth. Let me give just one example. On p. 91, Chadwick writes: "The central theme of the *Confessions* is the alienation of man from his true self". This in itself opens up a profound psychological dimension of this work, which is worth exploring further. If we bring in two other citations: "Augustine's story of his quest is all his own, and yet is simultaneously (and evidently consciously) intended to be a portrait of Everyman" (p. 92), and "Augustine is hurt by personal attacks but unmoved by the theological assault, confident that his estimate of sexuality is based securely on universal, and not on his own private, experience" (p. 161), then I believe that Chadwick has pointed the way towards a very important issue: Augustine has much to say about the universal human condition, and therefore also about us, relying on the evaluation of his own particular life experience, and how well he could penetrate into the minds and souls of other people. Consequently, the success of his theology-philosophy-psychology may well depend on how successful he ultimately was in analyzing his own condition. This is reflected in the strong link he himself makes between self-knowledge and knowledge of God. It has been recognized that the struggle between Augustine and Julian roughly boils down to opposing views on mankind's condition here on earth. Peter Brown is probably right that Augustine was the better psychologist of the two. But being the better psychologist does not necessarily mean that his view on man's condition was flawless, and we can agree with Chadwick: "Augustine's diagnosis of the human condition is somber" (p. 152). Chadwick has detected at least one of the weaknesses in his psychology: "Augustine has failed to distinguish the desire from the disorder of the affections" (p. 164).

To conclude this review with an epigrammatic phrase: Chadwick's biography of Augustine can be regarded as an honorary salute to a great man, both in view of its subject matter as in view of its author.

Geert VAN REYN

Volker Henning Drecoll and Mirjam Kudella, *Augustin und der Manichäismus*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011, 978-3-16-150841-7, X + 292 p.

Any researcher or serious student of Augustine of Hippo or Manichaeism will benefit from having this concise, well-organized, and informed handbook on his or her shelf. The authors have done a fine job of reducing a large mass of material and many complex issues to clear and succinct summaries, making use of the very latest research on the focused subject indicated by the title. The work is organized into three parts: (1) Augustine as a Manichaean, with a treatment of the sort of Manichaeism with which he was familiar (9-86), (2) Augustine against the Manichaeans, contextualized by surveys of previous anti-Manichaean writers as well as of those who accused Augustine of continued Manichaean sentiments (87-206), and (3) a brief consideration of the possible influence of Manichaeism on Augustine (207-221). For those new to this subject, the volume will offer a well-written orientation; for those who already work in this material, it will provide a convenient resource for quick reference. Both sorts of readers can be confident that the authors present matters as they stand in the current scholarly consensus, and while in turns affirming or critical of various proposals, they are not pursuing novel or idiosyncratic interpretations of their own. The excellent bibliography is quite current, and includes many key studies of the subject not only from the side of Augustinian studies, but also from Manichaean studies. The authors thoughtfully aid a wider readership by systematically translating all Latin passages and expressions.

Particularly valuable is the detailed survey of Augustine's anti-Manichaean oeuvre, beginning with the works identified as anti-Manichaean by Augustine himself in *Retractationes* (by use of the expressions *contra/aduersus Manichaeos/um*), which the authors compare to the slightly longer list provided in the *Indiculus* (which adds a number of entries from *De diuersis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, while the authors argue for the inclusion of several more). The authors judiciously add *De uera religione* and *De utilitate credendi* to this category, before proceeding to a compilation of references to Manichaeism in other works, presented in tabular form (111-112). This table is far from complete, however, and does not include the references to Manichaeans in Augustine's Pauline commentaries, nor any of the many references in *Confessiones*. Indeed, the reader misses any consideration of the place of the latter work in Augustine's engagement with Manichaeism (despite the inclusion of Kotzé's 2004 study

in the bibliography, alongside of the extensive body of work of Feldmann on the same subject), even though the authors cite from it more than almost any other source. They elect to proceed thematically, rather than chronologically work-by-work, and this choice provides readers with a very useful overview of some of the principal issues on which Augustine engaged with Manichaeism in multiple works: the nature of evil (112-118), the interpretation of the Genesis creation account (119-122), the interpretation of Paul (122-129, where Augustine's Pauline commentaries finally receive notice, but where one misses any recognition that Augustine comes to accept the Manichaean reading of key Pauline passages against a free will position), and scriptural hermeneutics generally (129-133). This somewhat abbreviated set of issues is resumed with a different emphasis after an examination of Augustine's debates with the Manichaeans Fortunatus and Felix (134-144), with the focus now on points of criticism Augustine leveled rhetorically against Manichaeism (144-158), including its dualism, materialistic metaphysic, vivid mythology, and conception of human will and agency in relation to sin. Whereas the authors see the former set of issues as prompting Augustine's development in particular areas by way of reacting against Manichaean positions, they consider the latter set to have no such constructive role, but to be merely polemical targets. This approach means that the authors see no reason to discuss Augustine's own evolution on the matters of free will and grace in connection with his handling of Manichaean positions on these issues (the subject is touched upon in only the vaguest terms, 210-211).

The hope that the volume might offer a synthesis of the two distinct academic fields pertinent to its subject is unfortunately disappointed by the authors' (inconsistent) decision about the proper scope of resources to be drawn upon to inform an understanding of Augustine's engagement with Manichaeism. They are correct, of course, to guard against constructing a monolithic Manichaean system from sources stemming from a variety of times, regions, and "Sprachwelten" (16-17), and to avoid assuming the presence in North Africa of elements not directly attested by Augustine (18). But the result is a catalog of information drawn from Augustine that, as handy as it is to have in this summary form, could have been compiled (and was) in the 19th century, benefitting hardly at all from the tremendous advances in understanding Manichaeism from the religion's own texts discovered in the 20th century, only one of which belongs to the Latin west. The Medinet Madi and Kellis finds from Egypt are contemporaneous with Augustine, and numerous studies

have demonstrated connections between this material and the Manichaeism known to Augustine. The authors make no use of this material, yet they make free use of Greek, Syriac, and Coptic anti-Manichaean literature as background to Augustine's own anti-Manichaean writings, despite the fact that Augustine knew almost none of this literature. They even squeeze into this commendably concise volume an eight-page excursus on the anti-Manichaean remarks of Leo the Great, written well after Augustine's death.

Augustin und der Manichäismus, therefore, offers a very traditional patristics approach to its subject in which nearly all the voices stand outside and against Manichaeism, which makes it impossible for the reader to get a full picture of Manichaean positions, or to detect polemical distortion or misunderstanding on Augustine's part. Consequently, the reader of this volume will not have a secure grasp of the religion against which Augustine wrote (for which Nicholas Baker-Brian's *Manichaeism* [London: T & T Clark, 2011] can be recommended as a starting point). Nor will he or she be in much of a position to consider Augustine's strengths and weaknesses as a polemicist or an intellect without being able to see where his arguments effectively met his opponents and where they fell decidedly short in either fairness or incisiveness. Not surprisingly, the authors can offer only a brief and impressionistic sketch of areas in which Manichaeism may have influenced Augustine's own thought, because they are not working with a sufficient base of understanding of Manichaeism to peer through the polemical surface of Augustine's engagement with that religion to the quieter and more subtle places where he may have recouped Manichaean themes and concerns for his own idiosyncratic formulations of Nicene Christianity. Yet these weaknesses directly reflect the general state of Augustinian studies when it comes to the subject of Manichaeism, of which this volume is a well-composed report. New proposals are beginning to appear based upon more serious and balanced attention to Manichaean sources, but these have yet to win wide assent, so it perhaps would be too much to expect them to have a more prominent place here. The value of this book remains the efficiency of its treatment of so extensive a subject, and the clarity of its report of the existing scholarly consensus among those who work on it within Augustinian studies. Indeed, the evident difficulty the authors have in reporting anything decisive from previous scholarship on the possible influence of Manichaeism on Augustine (i.e., its possible significance other than as a foil or "anvil" on which Augustine hammered out some of his positions) should serve as a summons for Augustinian

studies and Manichaean studies to come together and at last work on the problem from a fully informed standpoint.

Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff Jason BEDUHN

Willigis Eckermann, *Pater Engelbert Eberhard (1893-1958) – Augustiner, Provinzial, General. Eine Biographie*, (Studia Augustiniana Historica, 18), Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2012, 978-3-429-03528-0, 331 p.

Based on thorough archival research, Eckermann presents the biography of the Augustinian Father Engelbert Eberhard. After his religious formation and classical studies (with a doctorate on Homer), he took several responsibilities in the United States. In 1930, he became Provincial in Germany and led his province through the difficult times of the Nazi regime and the Second World War. In 1953 he was elected as General of the Augustinian Order. As such, this biography does not only sketch the interesting life of a multi-faceted charismatic religious, but offers also a vivid image of the turbulent history of the Augustinian Order and the Catholic Church in the 20th Century before the Second Vatican Council.

Anthony DUPONT
Flori Lugdunensis Expositio in Epistolas beati Pauli ex operibus S. Augustini. Pars III. In Epistolam secundam ad Corinthos. In Epistolas ad Galatas, Ephesios et Philippenses. Cura et studio Paul-Irénée Fransen o.s.b., Luc De Coninck, Bertrand Coppieters 't Wallant, Roland Demeulenaere, (Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, 220B; Flori Lugdunensis Opera Omnia, Tomus VI), Turnhout: Brepols, 2011, 978-2-503-05205-2, XXXII + 566 p.

The present volume constitutes the first in an ambitious endeavor to provide the first modern edition of Florus of Lyon's *Expositio in Epistolas beati Pauli ex operibus S. Augustini (Expositio)*, a commentary on the Epistles of Paul made up entirely of fragments from the works of St. Augustine, which is widely considered to be one of the most important secondary sources for the bishop of Hippo's oeuvre. Though it is the first volume to appear, it appears to come third in the

envisioned series, containing Florus' commentary on Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians and his Epistles to Galatians, Ephesians and Philippians. The decision to first publish this part of the text is connected to its transmission, as is announced in the introduction. The parts of the *Expositio* which are edited in this volume are preserved in Lyon Bibl. Mun. 484 (*L*), the archetype of the transmission of the *Expositio* and a partial autograph. As such, the comparison of those sections of the text preserved in both the archetype *L* and its copies allows the editors to establish a stemma on which to base the edition of those sections of the work that have been lost to *L*.

The introduction consists of four parts. A first chapter is devoted to the manuscript that forms the basis for the text, *L*, offering a codicological description of the codex. The second section is far more elaborate and details the editorial principles, with particular emphasis on orthography and punctuation. The editors have intervened – with attention to the historic value of Florus' interpretation and reading of Augustine's text – particularly and systematically on two levels: orthography has been homogenized and Florus' system of punctuation has been translated into modern signs. Both aspects receive much attention in the introduction and the rigor with which the editors have sought to preserve Florus' interpretation rather than regard him solely as a medium toward the reconstruction of Augustine's original text is admirable and constitutes one of the major merits of this publication. However, it would seem that the attention paid to the orthography of Florus is slightly less of a necessity, as it has a far smaller direct impact on how we may recognize Florus' interpretation of Augustine, and Florus was also not completely consistent in his application and correction of the orthography. The third introductory chapter already offers a peek at the other witnesses of the *Expositio*, with the promise that they will be dealt with in the volume containing the sections on Romans and the First Epistle to the Corinthians. The final section of the introduction describes the apparatuses accompanying the edition. There are four. An analytical apparatus refers the reader to the original works from which the fragments were sourced. A second apparatus highlights all Biblical references. The critical apparatus attempts to reflect – or reconstruct in case of lacunae – as accurately as possible the state of *L*. Finally a comparative apparatus provides an exhaustive overview of the differences between Florus' text and the text in his source manuscripts where these have been identified. The apparatus also contains the indicators Florus has left in the source manuscripts both in the text and in the margins. The introduction is followed by a *conspectus siglorum* which offers in a summarized form the most

important information the reader needs to comprehend the symbols and abbreviations in the edition. Though a very useful tool, it cannot serve as a complete substitute for the introduction, as certain elements are not reiterated. For example, where *L* shows a lacuna and the text is based on the dependent manuscripts, their *sigla* are only offered when their readings differ from one another, not when they concur. Though this is a very reasonable choice, its representation in the apparatus without the accompanying explanation might prove confusing. The introduction as well as the *conspectus siglorum* are both crucial in order to grasp all that the edition has to offer. The edition itself has a transparent lay-out and structure, clearly distinguishing between the source texts, Florus' structural indicators, Bible quotations in the text etc. The connection to *L* and to its most important copy, *Troyes Bibl. Mun.* 96 is maintained through the foliation of both manuscripts, which is indicated in the margins. An *Index fontium* marks the end of the volume; a very important asset of the edition, it will be welcomed by those researching both the anthology itself and the source texts which it includes.

In conclusion, though *L* has been for some time available digitally as part of the corpus of digitized Merovingian and Carolingian manuscripts of the *Bibliothèque Municipale* of Lyon, this new addition to *Corpus Christianorum's Continuatio Mediaevalis* has made it accessible in new ways. The experience of the editors, both with medieval commentaries and anthologies and the edition and transmission of St. Augustine's work, specifically of his *sermons ad populum*, shines through in this work. The introduction is concise and to the point and though the emphasis lies predominantly on the questions posed by editing a text based on a single manuscript, the hints dropped throughout the text indicate that other aspects regarding the author, the work, its transmission and reception are scheduled to appear in another part of the project. The editorial principles are clearly outlined and the edition offers significant enriching information. Particularly the index and the apparatuses documenting source texts and source manuscripts will considerably facilitate the comparative study of Florus' technique and of Augustine's interpretation of the Pauline Epistles versus the views held in medieval times. I am certain many researchers join me in looking forward to the other parts of the series.

Shari BOODTS

Arne Hogrefe, *Umstrittene Vergangenheit. Historische Argumente in der Auseinandersetzung Augustins mit den Donatisten*, (Millennium Studies in the Culture and History of the First Millennium C.E., 24.), Berlin–New York: de Gruyter, 2009, 978-3-11-020363-9, XI +393 p.

In recent years, research on Donatism has enjoyed something of a revival, with several monographs focusing on different aspects of this heated controversy in Late Antique North Africa. Arne Hogrefe's monograph, a revision of his doctoral dissertation, which he submitted at the faculty of History and Cultural studies of the Philipps University Marburg (Germany), is another fine example of this renewed interest.

This study focuses on the historical arguments used by Augustine and the Donatists to further their case, arguments which mainly concerned events dating back to the origins of the schism, i.e. a century before. The author reminds us in his introduction of the way in which we should understand here the term *historical argumentation*: "Es geht nicht um eine Form der Geschichtsschreibung, sondern um eine Form der Beweisführung in einem Streitfall" (p. 5).

Three promising perspectives are held forth to the reader in this study: finding out more about the context in which Augustine used his historical arguments, learning more about the historical arguments the Donatists themselves used, and thirdly, offering a more precise account of a few historical details of the Donatist schism (p. 2-3).

As the structure of a book is a good indicator of the quality of its content, it is clear that the reader is in for a treat. In his first chapter, Hogrefe not only presents us with a decent *status quaestionis*, he also coherently explains the overall structure of his study, giving the reader at the start a helpful overview of what will be dealt with in each of the chapters. Also further on in the book, the reader is carefully guided through the author's logical analysis of the historical argumentation used by both sides. Although this book is divided into eight chapters, it falls into two bigger parts, if the introductory chapters 1 and 2 and the concluding chapter 8 are not taken into account.

Chapter 2 can indeed be considered an extension of the first introductory chapter, with a more general historical overview of the Donatist controversy, and of Augustine's involvement divided into three periods of time: 393-405, 405-411 and 411-430, separated by Honorius' *Edict of unity* against the Donatists in 405, and by the Council of Carthage in 411.

In chapters 3 to 5, the author analyses how Augustine and his opponents deploy and interpret historical information and documents

in the controversy. He focuses in chapter 3 on Augustine's *Books against the grammarian Cresconius*, and in chapter 4 on his anti-Donatist letters, in particular on *ep.* 43-45, 53, 76, 87-89, 93 and 105. This first part culminates as it were in chapter 5, discussing Augustine's high point thus far in his battle against Donatism: the Conference of Carthage in 411.

In a second part (chapters 6 and 7), the author focuses on two main elements in the historical argumentations both sides propounded: the dispute on the subject of *traditio* and *persecutio* (chapter 6), and the battle for their version of the *causa Caeciliani* (chapter 7), which proved to be a crucial issue in the controversy: "Augustinus hatte erkannt, dass das karthagische Urteil über Caecilianus das Zentrum der donatistischen Argumentation bildete, und seine Widerlegung entsprechend eingerichtet" (p. 335).

The "Caecilianus case" concerned the validity of the ordination of Caecilianus as successor to Mensurius, bishop of Carthage. Soon this ordination was declared null and void at a council in which seventy Numidian bishops were present, on the grounds that one of the consecrators, Felix of Abthugni, had himself been a *traditor*. These confessors, the "pure", those who had not handed over the sacred books in the past, elected Maiorinus instead.

Fulfilling the reader's by now high expectations about the structure of the book, the author presents in chapter 8 a clear summary of his findings and some concluding remarks. Earlier, Hogrefe had pointed out the importance of the proceedings of Cirta as a source: "das Protokoll von Cirta auch ein wichtiges Dokument für die Entstehungsgeschichte des Schismas. Sollten die Aussagen authentisch sein, ist zumindest die später von den Donatisten behauptete theologische Begründung des Schismas, die Reinheit der Kirche aufrechtzuerhalten, in Frage zu stellen" (p. 246). In an excursus he therefore discusses also the dating of the Council of Cirta (p. 355-361). At the very end some very helpful tools are added, such as a timetable of the relevant dates in the Donatist controversy, and a bibliography of the sources and of the secondary literature used. An index of names of people, of subjects and of place names completes this monograph.

It becomes clear in this study that the historical arguments used in the Donatist controversy have greatly helped us with reconstructing the historical beginnings of this schism. Many of the documents dealing with this subject matter have come down to us via Augustine's reliance on them in his writings. It also shows us how both sides tried to manipulate these sources to their own advantage, since, as the author pointed out in the beginning, theirs was not so much an exer-

cise in writing history, but in winning a case. It is up to us to try and extract the true, unbiased facts from these coloured versions, and Hogrefe has here made an excellent contribution to this task.

Another element which emerges from this study is how brilliantly Augustine handled the historical argument in the controversy. Eager to obtain the relevant sources, skilfully weaving his arguments based on this material, he left no doubt about who was going to win the debate when it came to reasoned argumentation. One is reminded of how brilliantly Augustine attacked the pagan ideology in his *De ciuitate Dei*, using their own history against them, and painstakingly pointing out its inconsistencies.

In his introduction, Hogrefe mentions that the basic scheme of Augustine's approach in his argumentation can already be witnessed in his earliest anti-Donatist work, the *Psalmus contra partem Donati*. He attacks the Donatists's case in three areas: on the themes of baptism and Christian community; violence and martyrdom; the origins of the schism (p. 3-4). In this very same psalm we already witness Augustine's worry that for all his efforts to build a strong, reasoned case against the Donatists, buttressed with solid historical argumentation, it may well turn out to become "*a quarrel without end*", because it all boiled down as to whether each party would accept the evidence put before them:

- 140 Quae si credere non uultis, // uos huc aliqua proferte
If you do not want to believe these, // then you will have to come up
with other proof
- 141 Quibus si et nos non credamus // erit rixa sine fine.
And if we do not believe these // it will be a quarrel without end

What Hogrefe has achieved in this excellent study, is a scholarly analysis of the way in which both Augustine and Donatists alike also tried to make their case with historical argumentations. In doing so, Hogrefe has not only offered us a glimpse of how available sources were sometimes (mis)used at the time, with each side accusing the other of falsifying the material, he also has made a fine contribution in the reconstruction of certain details in the history of the Donatist schism.

Geert VAN REYN

Paola Marone, *L'esegesi biblica di Ottato di Milevi*, (Studi e proposte, 5), Roma: Università La Sapienza, 2008, 889581407X, 9788895814070, 208 p.

Paola Marone studies the *Aduersus Donatistas* of Optatus of Milevis from the exegetical point of view. Although Optatus did not specifically intend to compose an exegetical study, this writing clearly reveals that interpreting Scripture was an integral part of anti-Donatist literature. In reacting against Parmenian, and in line with Cyprian, Optatus opted (similar to Parmenian) for allegorical exegesis, the framework within which Optatus engaged the debate with the Donatists. For this reason Optatus' reading of Scripture is aimed at collecting material which is relevant for the historical and theological/ecclesial context of fourth century Africa. The author first sketches the historical, ideological and literal context and offers a *status quaestionis* of the research regarding *Aduersus Donatistas*. Subsequently she compares the specific forms of exegesis of Parmenian, Optatus and Cyprian and analyses Optatus' particular way of quoting Scripture in general and in his *Aduersus Donatistas* in particular. Additionally, the present volume offers an overview of the general structure of Optatus' oeuvre and of his Biblical vocabulary.

Anthony DUPONT

Le Nain de Tillemont, Louis Sébastien, translated, introduced and annotated by Frederick Van Fleteren, in collaboration with George C. Berthold, *The Life of Augustine. Part One: Childhood to episcopal consecration (354-396)*, (Collectanea augustiniana), [Original title: *Vie de saint Augustin, Mémoire ecclésiastique*, vol. XIII], 2010, New York, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, Oxford, Wien: Lang, 978-1-4331-0284-4, XVIII + 367 p.

Le Nain de Tillemont, Louis Sébastien, translated, introduced and annotated by Frederick Van Fleteren, *The Life of Augustine of Hippo. Part Two: The Donatist Controversy (396-411)*, (Collectanea augustiniana), [Original title: *Vie de saint Augustin, Mémoire ecclésiastique*, vol. XIII], 2012, New York, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, Oxford, Wien: Lang, 978-1-4331-0285-1, XX + 388 p.

Louis Sébastien Le Nain de Tillemont (1637-1698), belonging to the Jansenist circles of Port-Royal, was an eminent historian. He composed two influential historical overviews: a history of the Roman emperors (*Histoire des empereurs et autres princes qui ont régné pendant les six premiers siècles de l'Église*) and of the Church in the first six centuries (*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles*). These studies are well documented, very detailed and are considered to be part of the start of historical critical surveys based on an analysis of all available sources. In theological studies in the seventeenth century in general and within the Jansenist circles of Port-Royal and Leuven in particular, the study of Augustine of Hippo played a crucial role. This is testified by the fact that the ca. 1200 pages counting thirteenth volume of his *Mémoire ecclésiastique* is dedicated to this Church Father. Tillemont brought together all available sources to reconstruct a historical and intellectual biography of Augustine. This monumental study is regarded to be the first modern biography of Augustine and is (besides, amongst others, the contemporary and also massive biography of Augustine by Serge Lancel) one of the most extensive (modern) biographies of Augustine, quoted even today. Frederick Van Fleteren, an internationally recognised scholar in the field of Augustine, intends to open this meritorious and historically interesting *Life of Augustine* for a contemporary international audience by translating Tillemont's biography into English. The English translation consists of three parts – each divided in chronologically ordered articles (and complementary notes): Childhood to Episcopal consecration (354-396), Donatist controversy (397-411), Pelagian controversy (412-430). The first two parts are available. Van Fleteren succeeded in translating Tillemont's biography of the bishop of Hippo in fluent English prose, accessible both to specialists and amateurs of Augustine. In a time of on the one hand very specialised studies and on the other hand very general overviews, an accurate, comprehensive biographical survey like Tillemont's *Vie de saint Augustin* remains to be an important research tool and source of inspiration. Combined with contemporary historical-critical hermeneutics and research instruments, it is an essential asset for each library devoted to Augustine, Patristic theology and Late Antique thinking, now made accessible by the translation efforts of Van Fleteren.

Anthony DUPONT

Karla Pollmann, Meredith J. Gill (eds.), *Augustine beyond the Book: Intermediality, Transmediality and Reception*, (Brill's Series in Church History: Religious History and Culture Series, Volume 6; Brill's Series in Church History, Volume 58), Leiden: Brill, 2012, 9004222138, 9789004222137, XXIII + 386 p.

Most studies on the reception of Augustine of Hippo are restricted to one specific author or period, and very few studies go beyond the scope of his textual reception. The present monograph, edited by K. Pollmann and M. J. Gill – two scholars known for their research in the (respectively textual and artistic) reception of Augustine – fills this lacuna. An international group of scholars present in an interdisciplinary way Augustine's legacy throughout a diversity of periods and approaches, such as art (visual, dramatical, musical), devotion (spirituality, confessional differences, homiletics), intellectual history (theories of art and music, science-faith debate, psychotherapy). Fourteen contributions illustrate both the diversity of the reception of Augustine's iconic authority and the processes of this history of transmission. The latter at the same time show the versatility of his authority. This diversity is caused by (1) the many roles and functions Augustine himself combined and the variety of his oeuvre; (2) the variety in readers and readings of Augustine throughout sixteen centuries; (3) the differences in medium used to receive Augustine. The present anthology is devoted to the study of the relation between the used reception medium and both the interpretation of Augustine's thinking and the appropriation of his authority. Each contribution explains three facets of this reception process: selection, transformation, impact and role of the use of Augustine. Regarding visual representations of Augustine – part one – K. Pollmann distinguishes three ways of portraying Augustine's authority (universal teacher, spiritual leader, existential example). V. Cvetkovic investigates Augustine's presence within orthodox iconography, despite the fact that Augustine's theological ideas in general and his thinking on the use of images in particular are quite different from orthodox theology. M. J. Gill demonstrates that in the Early Modern Period Jerome was a more popular presented Latin Father, since he was conceived to be more in line with the reform ideals of that era. The second part is devoted to the cultic-dramatic reception of Augustine. D. Weber pinpoints the shift of Augustine's presence in European drama, from sage in Medieval plays to a searcher in later periods. G. Proot analyses four Early Modern school plays devoted to Augustine. Subsequently, Augustine's reception within spiritual-devotional contexts is discussed. C. Muessig

investigates the use of Augustine in sermons: the *Confessiones* are quoted in more popular homilies, and his doctrinal writings in more academic sermons. She distinguishes mainly three presentations of Augustine: the sinner converted to a saint, the slayer of heretics and the spiritual teacher. J. D. Staykova establishes that the Pseudo-Augustine *corpus* was very popular amongst devotional writings until the Early Modern Period, sometimes even more popular than the authentic writings of Augustine and that it sometimes even framed the reception of the latter. F. Dietz substantiates that emblems did not solely function as illustrations, but as additional comments, testified by the fact that in reprints the text remained identical, but the emblems changed, corresponding to the piety of the specific period. J. Exalto investigates the reception of Augustine in the Dutch Reformed Church – more in particular in the Dutch vernacular context of the Dutch Puritans in the 16th and 17th century – in teaching, preaching, reading, writing and meditating. Part four looks at the musical reception of Augustine. E. Østrem highlights the use of Augustine in Renaissance musical theory, especially his *De musica*, and illustrates that Augustine sometimes was associated as an authority with musical issues he himself did not consider. S. Lichtenstein analyses Maria Antonia Walpurgis' *La Conversione di Sant'Agostino* (with Augustine as a sort of Christ and Monnica as a *mater dolorosa*), and Johann Adolf Hasse's musical relecture of this *libretto* (Augustine as the Jesuit ideal of a sinner turning into a saint and Monnica as the ideally meek woman). N. H. Petersen discusses Augustine's place in contemporary music (especially the *Confessiones* and *Soliloquia*), which appreciates Augustine for expressing the postmodern feelings of disrupted and searching humanity. The final part, entitled 'Augustine beyond himself', offers two case studies of conceptual-philosophical reception. P. de Felipe elucidates the use of Augustine's authority by Medieval and Modern scientists – especially his belief that science and theology should be concordant – regarding his denial of Antipodeans and his claims on the shape of the earth. A. Pârvan concludes the volume by describing the use of Augustine as authority for modern psychotherapy, for concepts and therapeutic practices. *Augustine beyond the Book* succeeds in fulfilling its promise: it substantiates and illustrates in a strong academic and highly readable way the ubiquity and diversity of Augustine. It really tastes for more.

Anthony DUPONT

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