

THE EFFICACY OF GRACE ACCORDING TO DOMINGO BAÑEZ

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Abstract

The Spanish Dominican theologian Domingo Bañez, in the controversy with the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, developed his own theology of efficacious grace. He held a distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. For the latter, the efficacy is solely due to itself, no human consent being required. In this article, we will investigate Bañez's theology of efficacious grace. We begin by discussing the metaphysical foundation of efficacious grace: God as the exclusive cause of our existence and movement. This metaphysics implies that when we act, God does not work alongside us to produce the effect, but premoves us to act. It is through the principle of divine premotion that Bañez established his understanding of efficacious grace: a grace granted by God to infallibly move the elected people to convert to Himself. According to this principle, the efficacy of grace arises from God's will, rather than from His foreknowledge of man's response to His calling. Since efficacious grace is granted by God to the elected people, its implication for predestination will be discussed. In the last section of this article, we will explore how Bañez harmonised efficacious grace with human freedom. For him, grace moves the human will infallibly, but it happens in such a gentle way that grace never impedes human freedom. Bañez concluded that true human freedom is not indifferent to the good. On the contrary, it is a fruit of grace's work.

Key Words

Domingo Bañez, efficacious grace, divine premotion, predestination, free will

The Council of Trent, in its Decree of justification and its Canons concerning justification, asserted the existence of human free will and condemned any teaching that contradicted it¹. This Council, however, did not provide an explanation on the relation between human free will and grace. After the Council, different explanations of the compatibility of free will and grace led to many controversies between theologians. The most famous controversy is the one

¹ Heinrich Denzinger – Adolfus Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* (DS) (Barcinone: Herder, 1967), n. 1521, 1554-1555.

between Dominicans and Jesuits concerning the efficacious grace at the end of the sixteenth century.

The Spanish Dominican Domingo Bañez, who is considered to be a representative of “modern Thomism”², played a leading role in this controversy. Bañez was born on 29 February 1528 in Medina del Campo, a small town in Valladolid. He began his philosophical studies at the University of Salamanca in 1543³. After making his Dominican profession on 3 May 1547, he studied theology from 1548 to 1551 under some renowned theologians, such as Melchior Cano. Bañez occupied the chair of Durandus in Salamanca from 1577 to 1580. He was then appointed to the primary chair of theology at Salamanca in 1581, following the death of Bartolome de Medina (30 December 1580). He would hold this position for twenty-four years. After lecturing on most parts of the *Summa Theologiae* for a number of years from 1577, he turned to lectures on grace in the academic year of 1599-1600. Bañez’s commentary on the *Summa*⁴, which made him one of the greatest commentators of St. Thomas, was based on these lectures. In 1604, Bañez died in Medina del Campo, his birthplace.

The controversy between Dominicans and Jesuits begun on the 20th January 1582 in Spain when a Jesuit named Prudencio de Montmayor denied that grace predetermined the human will to do particular good. His argument was based on the claim that this proposition is not reconcilable with human freedom. The Spanish Inquisition prohibited his thesis after receiving a report from Dominican. This event symbolised the approach of the Society of Jesus in establishing its own theological system- following St. Thomas, but not in every theological

² For the usage of “modern Thomism”, see Serge-Thomas Bonino, ‘Le Thomisme “moderne” de Dominique Bañez’, in C. González-Ayesta (ed.). *El alma humana: esencia y destino. IV Centenario de Domingo Báñez (1528-1604)* (Colección de pensamiento medieval y renacentista, no. 75), (Eunsa, Pamplona, 2006), 15-35.

³ This short biography of Bañez is based on Banes, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (DTC)* (Paris: Letouzey, 1903-1972), Tome 2, Col. 140-145; Bañez and Bañezianism, *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, second edition (Farmington Hills: Gale, 2003-), Vol.2, 49-51; Bañez, in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche (LTK)* (Freiburg: Herder, 1993-2001), Band 1, Col. 1384-1386.

⁴ The commentary on the *Summa* Ia, q. 1-64 was published in Salamanca in 1584. Four years later, the commentary on the remaining questions of the *Summa* Ia appeared. The commentary on the *Summa* IIaIIae concerning the theological virtues and law/justice published in Salamanca in 1584 and in 1589. Bañez’s commentary on the *Summa* Ia-IIae, which covers the part on grace, was edited by Vicente Beltrán de Heredia and was published in three volumes (1942-1948). For a chronology of Bañez’s lectures, see Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, *Valor doctrinal de las Lecturas del P. Bañez, La Ciencia tomista* 39 (1929), 79-81.

issue so as to distinguish itself from the Dominican approach⁵. The controversy escalated in 1588 when Luis de Molina, S.J. published his work *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis*. Cardinal Albert of Austria requested Bañez to examine this work. Bañez found that six propositions in the *Concordia* amounted to forbidden positions. In 1593 a new index of forbidden books prepared by the Universities of Alcalá and Salamanca included Molina's works. Molina then appealed to the Inquisition of Castile and accused Bañez of being a Lutheran heretic⁶. In 1594 public disputations between the Dominicans and Jesuits took place in Valladolid. A Dominican father, Diego Nuno Calbezudo, attacked the *Concordia*, while the Jesuit Antonio de Padilla responded the attack in these public disputations. The two sides charged each other with being heretics on the issue of the efficacy of grace. After these disputations had reached Rome, the secretary of the Papal State Cardinal Aldobrandino announced the Pope's decision in June 1594: in order to seek a common ground and to avoid disorder, the Pope would reserve the resolution to himself⁷. The University of Salamanca where Bañez was teaching chose to censure nine propositions of Molina on the 22nd June 1595. Molina's propositions were seen by the theology professors in the University as new doctrine which was in contradiction with the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In the same year Molina revised and published his *Concordia* together with the arguments defending his own position. Meanwhile, the Dominican provincial of Castile, Tomas Guzman, prohibited his confreres from engaging in further dispute with the Jesuits. But in order to advance the Dominican position to Rome, he asked a number of eminent theologians from his province to compose theological analyses concerning the efficacy of grace and the propositions in Molina's *Concordia*. Bañez, on the 27th October 1594, presented to the delegate of the Holy Office a treatise on the efficacy of grace and human freedom in order to give explanations from the Dominican side to the higher ecclesiastical authorities⁸. Between September 1594 and April 1595, seven Dominicans under the charge of Bañez⁹ wrote *Apologia*

⁵ Introduccion historica, Vicente Beltran de Heredia (ed.), *Domingo Banez y las controversias sobre la gracia: textos y documentos*. (Biblioteca de teologos españoles, no. 24), (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1968), 16-17.

⁶ Introduccion historica, 82.

⁷ Introduccion historica, 90.

⁸ Introduccion historica, 92-93.

⁹ Their names are: Fr. Joannes la Fuente (Magister), Fr. Didacus de Yanguas (Magister), Fr. Petrus de Herrera (Magister, Salamanticensis cathedrarius), Fr. Christophorus Rodriguez (praesentatus et prior), Fr. Petrus de Ledesma (praesentatus et

fratrum praedicatorum in prouincia Hispaniae sacrae theologiae professorum, aduersus nouas quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris Ludouici Molinae nuncupati. This work was delivered to Rome by Fr. Diego Alvarez, a lecturer of sacred scripture at San Pablo in Valladolid. Bañez's above mentioned treatise on the relation between grace and human freedom was then incorporated into the first part of the *Apologia*. This treatise is also the early version of *Tractatus de uera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter mouentis humanam uoluntatem*, which was published with Bañez's commentary on the part of the *Summa* dealing with the issue of grace.

To solve this controversy between the two religious orders, Rome intervened in 1598 by establishing a dicastery. Since its task was to solve the question on the help of God (*auxilium*), the dicastery was called *Congregatio de auxiliis*. Although some propositions from Molina's works were nearly condemned around the time of his death, there was no definitive decision made during the pontificate of Clement VIII because of the interventions from the Jesuit side. Pope Paul V declared in 1607 that neither Dominicans nor Jesuits were heretics and they were granted freedom to defend their own teachings¹⁰.

The essential element in this debate was the efficacy of grace: whether grace is intrinsically efficacious or whether it depends on human consent. Bañez insisted on a real distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace. Here we should clarify the terminology. According to scholastic theology, grace on account of subject and effects (*ratione subjecti et effectuum*), can be divided into habitual grace and actual grace. Actual grace is the transient divine help by which God illumines the human mind and helps the will to make supernatural acts. Actual grace can be further divided into two kinds: efficacious grace and sufficient grace. Efficacious grace is that which attain the effect with certainty and infallibility. Sufficient grace is the grace granting man the power of performing a salutary act. Bañez argued for the difference of these two kinds of grace and emphasised that the efficacy of efficacious grace is due solely to itself. Luis de

regens sancti Thomae Abulensis), Fr. Didacus Nuño (praesentatus) and Fr. Didacus Alvarez (praesentatus et lector sacrae scripturae Vallisoletanus).

¹⁰ For the history of the *Congregatio de auxiliis* and the controversy between Dominicans and Jesuits, see Jacques-Hyacinthe Serry, *Historia congregationum de auxiliis diuinae gratiae sub summis pontificibus Clemente VIII. et Paulo V.*, (Antverpiae: sumptibus Societatis, 1709), a work written by a Dominican. From the Jesuit side, there is Gerhard Schneemann, *Controversiarum de diuinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia*, (Freiburg: Herder, 1881).

Molina, however, contended that God only bestows sufficient grace to humans. Only human consent then renders this grace efficacious. On this issue, the Jesuits accused Bañez of being a Calvinist and the Dominicans called Molina a Semi-Pelagian. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, this controversy survived in the Dominican theologian Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's debate with Jesuits, such as Adhémar d'Alès¹¹.

In this article, I will try to explore Bañez's understanding of the efficacy of grace on the basis of the relevant texts in his commentaries on St. Thomas' *Summa theologiae*, the *Tractatus* on grace and free will and the *Apologia*¹². Since he regarded actual grace as a divine motion which moves human beings to salvation, we will first explore divine motion in Bañez's thinking and look at how he makes the argument for the proposition that grace is intrinsically efficacious rather than depends on human consent. His interpretation here was related to i) his criticism of Molina's middle knowledge, which is adopted to secure human autonomy and ii) his understanding of predestination: God predestinates the elected to glory by granting them efficacious grace¹³. Finally, Bañez's explanation of efficacious grace necessarily leads to the question on the relation between efficacious actual grace and human freedom. Will Bañez's interpretation of the efficacy of grace lead to the denial of human freedom? The answer is no. There is no difficulty to reach a real concordance between them basing on Bañez's definition of human freedom.

¹¹ E.g. Fr. d'Alès's article in *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 8(1917), 1-35 and Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's response *S. Thomas et Le Néomolinisme*, which is reprinted as appendix in *Dieu, Son Existence et sa Nature*, (Paris: Beauchesne, 1950).

¹² *Tractatus de uera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter mouentis humanam uoluntatem* (*Tractatus*). The edition which we shall follow in this article is in *Comentarios ineditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomas, III* (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1948), 351-420. For Bañez's commentary on the first volume of St. Thomas' *Summa*, we shall use the online edition in *The Digital Library of the Catholic Reformation*: <http://solomon.dlcr.alexanderstreet.com/>, which is scanned from the edition published in 1614 by Typographia Petri Borremans, Douai. For the text of the *Apologia*, we shall follow the edition of Vicente Beltran de Heredia (ed.), *Domingo Bañez y las controversias sobre la gracia*, 115-378.

¹³ Bañez defined "gratia" in his commentary on the *Summa*: Gratia est per quam homo acceptatur ad gloriam. Et datur per proprietatem ipsius gratiae haec definitio. Nam ex eo quod sumus filii Dei per gratiam, proprietatem consequens est acceptatio ad gloriam, et quod simus heredes gloriae. See Bañez, *In Summam I-IIae*, q. 110, a. 4. For three other elements of the definition, see the commentary on the same article.

1. Divine motion

St. Thomas' discussion of the division of grace appears in the *Summa Ia-IIae*. According to his view, grace is spoken of in two ways: i) a habit modifying the essence of the soul which is *gratia gratum faciens*. In English it is called sanctifying or habitual grace. ii) *Gratia gratis data*, which are the charismatic gifts beyond the capacity of nature, such as the capacity to proclaim the Gospel through miracles. God causes man to act virtuously and to be in union with him by sanctifying grace, but Thomas insisted that some preparations are needed. In other words, prior to justification man should be disposed to receive sanctifying grace. So the first conferring of sanctifying grace presupposes an internal movement of mind or disposition towards God. This disposition for sanctifying grace is made through Divine assistance. In q.109 a. 6 Thomas made it clear that the cause of this movement is the "assistance of God" (*auxilium Dei*). This is what later theologians will call actual grace, though Thomas did not use this term himself. In this article we will limit ourselves to the *auxilium Dei* as a *motus*, which relates to Bañez's discussion of divine motion and occupies the centre of his controversy with Molina. The Thomistic understanding of divine motion begins from the acknowledgement of the uncreated action of God, which is opposed to the created movement of creatures¹⁴. In other words, God is immanent and eternal in the sense that He is the efficient cause of all creatures and from God all creatures receive their being (*esse*). St. Thomas explained this point principally in the *Summa Ia*, q. 13 a. 12 and q. 45 a. 3. Bañez faithfully followed Thomas in his commentary on the *Summa*. He acknowledged that God as the creator is immanent and transcendent. Creation is essentially the immanent action of God, which does not depend on the human intellect. On the contrary, the creatures *per se* and intrinsically are dependent on the Creator as His effect¹⁵. God causes the existence of all agents and moves them. So the priority of the divine motion, in Bañez's theological and philosophical system, refers to causality, rather than time.

When we make a further study of divine motion according to Bañez's interpretation of Thomas, his commentary on the *Summa Ia* q. 105 a. 5 (Whether God works in every agent?) should be taken into account. In the original text¹⁶ of Thomas there are three main arguments

¹⁴ See *Prémotion physique*, DTC 13, Col. 31-77.

¹⁵ Bañez, *In Summam Ia*, q. 45, a.3.

¹⁶ *Summa Ia* q.105 a. 5.

for saying that God operates in everything. To highlight the point, I re-organise the arguments as follows:

- I. In all things God is properly the cause of universal being (*ipsius esse uniuersalis*) which is innermost in all things;
- II. Where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first, for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself, and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent.
- III. God not only moves things to operate (creations were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, nevertheless does not give the axe its form); but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.

The first argument relates to the agents' dependence on God for their existence. The second and the third arguments relate to the agent's being moved by God. Therefore, the motion of a thing is not separated from its existence, which is an essential element of understanding divine motion. In fact, this reading can be supported by Bañez's words:

[Q]uia causa prima est prior quam secunda non solum in essendo, sed etiam in causando et in mouendo. Et confirmat hoc ex illo *Act. 17* (v. 28): *In ipso uiuimus, mouemur et sumus*¹⁷.

Bañez cited the words from the Bible to argue that God is immanent and transcendent by highlighting three words: *uiuimus*, *mouemur* and *sumus*. God not only causes our existence, but also our motion. Both *uiuimus* and *sumus* relate to our existence and apparently *mouemur* relates to motion. These three elements used by Bañez are the outline of Thomas's three arguments listed above. We will examine Bañez's understanding of divine motion by discussing his interpretation of these three arguments. We will begin with the dependence of existence on God.

In his short commentary on the *Summa* Ia q.105, a. 5 where Thomas made three arguments, Bañez firstly affirmed the conclusions which Thomas had made in the text, but he did not develop his own position apart from writing something for the third argument. So we have to look for Bañez's comments in other sources.

¹⁷ *Apologia* III, Ch. VI, n. 55; see also Bañez, *In Summam* Ia, q. 105, a. 5.

According to Thomas's view in argument I, God is properly the cause of universal being. Bañez highlighted this point by saying that only God is the cause of being (*esse*), and the secondary cause relates to an existence as such (*ens tale*, for example, Socrates is a white man). It will be helpful to read it together with Bañez's commentary on the question "whether God is in all things?" (Ia q. 8, a. 1): "*nulum agens praeter Deum est causa ipsius esse, prout esse est actualitas entis, inquantum ens.*" The point is made clear that only God could cause the being (*esse*) of secondary agents. The secondary cause is so limited that it causes the existence *as such* (*ens tale*), e.g. a person in a particular place or in a specific color. An agent can be such a thing only after its *simpliciter* existence is received from God, because only God can create from nothing. Similarly, the causality between agents must presume their existence, since it is not possible for them to cause or conserve something from nothing. Bañez said:

Quia fieri ens in quantum ens, non potest, nisi ex non ente simpliciter, quod solus Deus potest facere. Dicendum ergo, quod solus Deus est causa efficiens entis, in quantum ens, quia solus ex nihilo facit, et conseruat ens, in quantum ens. Caeterum agens particulare efficit tale ens, imo efficit hoc ens ex non hoc ente¹⁸.

The distinction between *esse* (only from God) and *tale ens* made above is crucial, because it differentiates God from all secondary causes: God *simpliciter* causes the existence of all things, but the secondary cause determines the effect in a specific way¹⁹.

The same view of Bañez can be found in his commentary on the question "whether in God the existence and the essence are identical?" Because God's existence and essence are identical, He does not receive existence from others, rather he is the being itself. In this commentary, Bañez followed Thomas by using the words from *Exodus* "I am who I am" to support the claim that God himself is existence. He also considered some opinions of other theologians with whom he could not totally agree. For example, to the assertion that

¹⁸ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 8, a. 1.

¹⁹ Bañez highlights this point by citing Francis Silvester (Ferrariensis): "Inter Thomistas uero Ferrar. 2. cont. gent. cap. 21. hanc solum constituit differentiam inter Deum, et causas secundas in productione esse, quod Deus simpliciter et sine addito causat existentiam rerum, creaturae uero non causant illud absolute, sed determinate". (*In Summam* Ia, q. 3 a.4). Francis Silvester (1474-1526) was an Italian Dominican theologian. He was elected as the master general of the Order of Preachers in 1525. His most famous work is the commentary on St. Thomas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, which was printed with original text in the Leonine edition of St. Thomas' *Opera omnia*.

God only produces the existence as such, his response was clearly made: "*Dicimus ergo, quod nulla causa producit esse effectiue praeter ipsum Deum*". It is evident for Bañez that apart from God, there is no cause which can give existence (*esse*).

Now we can move on to Bañez's understanding of the second argument of Thomas: God is the cause of every agent's action or motion²⁰, because the secondary agent always acts by the power of (*virtute*) the first cause, i.e. God. Bañez's interpretation is that God is in each of His effects with immediacy, because He is the cause of all beings and of being itself²¹. It will be easier to note this new aspect of Bañez's interpretation if we consider two other Dominican commentators' understanding on the same issue reported in Bañez's commentary. According to Bañez's citation, Ferrariensis, in his commentary on the *Summa Contra Gentiles* III Ch. 70, claimed that it was not wrong to argue that the same effect is immediately from God and the inferior agent. From God it is by the immediacy of power (*immediatione uirtutis*), but from the inferior agent it is by the immediacy of substance²² (*immediatione suppositi*). This claim of Ferrariensis consists in the distinction between an agent and its power, a distinction made by Thomas. The power (*uirtus*) of the inferior depends on the power of the superior agent, because the superior agent gives its own power to the inferior agent at the same time. In this sense, the action of the inferior agent is both from the superior agent and through the power of the superior agent. Therefore, Ferrariensis held that the power of the primary agent (i.e. God) is found immediately in causing the effect.

Cajetan had his own interpretation as well. In Cajetan's view, there is a need to make a distinction between material creatures and spiritual creatures. In the case of spiritual creatures, God causes them by the immediacy of substance. However, for material creatures, because form comes from the potency of matter (*educere formam de potentia materiae*), God cannot be the cause by the immediacy of substance, but only by the immediacy of power.

²⁰ Here the word "cause" signifies that God moves the secondary agents to act.

²¹ Bañez said "*Ipse Deus est intimus, immediatiusque secundum suam substantiam in omni effectu, quia Deus est causa totius entis et ipsius esse, respectu cuius solus Deus est causa efficiens et conseruans*". (*In Summam* Ia, q. 8 a. 1).

²² In Thomas' metaphysics suppositum can be understood as a subject or a substance: "the suppositum is said to be a substance". (*Summa* Ia q. 17 a. 1 ad. 7). So here we translate *suppositum* as substance.

Bañez, however, was not totally satisfied with the solutions given by these two predecessors of the Dominican Thomistic school. On the one hand, he agreed with Cajetan's position of God's causality by the immediacy of substance. The doctrine of God's simplicity reveals that His power to act is His own substance, so if He operates by the immediacy of power as claimed by Ferrariensis, He must also operate by the immediacy of his own substance. On the other hand, Bañez emphasised that only God is the cause of every being (*causa essendi omnibus rebus*), not only material, but also spiritual. So Cajetan's distinction between material and spiritual beings was irrelevant for Bañez's interpretation. For him, the difference between God and the inferior agent consists in that the operation of the inferior agent is only immediately by the immediacy of substance. But for the operation of God it *also* happens by the immediacy of the power. Bañez added that, strictly speaking, only God acts by the immediacy of power, because the concurrence of other inferior agents was said to be by the immediacy of power in the respect of this or that agent, not of all agents.

Bañez's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas brings some new nuance to the Dominican Thomistic tradition. Firstly, if we say that both Ferrariensis and Cajetan left some space for the secondary cause, Bañez was more radical by insisting that in every creature, whether it is spiritual or material, God is the exclusive cause of their action by the immediacy of power and substance. For Cajetan, the secondary cause modifies the primary cause²³, but according to Bañez, it is not right to insist on this opinion because the primary cause accounts, in the first instance, for the existence of all beings and their concrete existence²⁴. Secondly, in Bañez's argument God's immediate concurrence on a secondary cause depends on God as the exclusive cause for

²³ *In Summam* Ia q. 19 a. 8, Cajetan introduces his conclusion that the secondary cause modifies the primary cause. The analogy he makes is that a writer and his pen. The quality of the pen this writer uses influences his state and intellectual fruits. Cajetan believes that the secondary maybe reduced to nothing unless it is given some weight in causality: "Ipsa secunda nullum effectum producit, nisi uirtute primae concurrente et coniungente uirtutem secundae suo effectui, quoniam prima omnia attingit immediate immatione uirtutis, ut in qu. VIII (art. 1, Comment.) declaratum est".

²⁴ "Sed displicet quod ait uirtutem primae causae modificari per causam secundam... Imo uero diuina uoluntas omnia modificat, dum causa est uniuersalissima et efficacissima cuiuslibet rei et quantum ad fieri et quantum ad esse et quantum ad modum." Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 19 a. 8. Bañez's reading of St. Thomas' text is supported by Serge-Thomas Bonino's studies of Thomas' *De Veritate* Q. 2; see Serge-Thomas Bonino, *De la vérité. Question 2: La science en Dieu* (Fribourg: Ed. Universitaires, 1996), 556.

every being. Although in some readings these two arguments of Thomas were thought to be mixed in Bañez's interpretation²⁵, I think by using this way of argument, Bañez closely linked Thomas' argument I and argument II. Here we will not discuss whether Bañez mixed these two arguments or not, but we would like to explain Bañez's intention in this way: for him the causality of an inferior agent's motion consists in God's action (argument II), but it ultimately depends on the being (*esse*) given by God (Argument I). Therefore, God as the exclusive cause of every creature's being (*esse*) is the fundamental reason for Bañez's understanding of divine motion²⁶. Just as we have said at the beginning of this section, God as the immanent and transcendent Creator on which every creature depends is the key for grasping the concept of divine motion.

Having explored how Bañez understood St. Thomas' argument II (i.e. all agents act in virtue of God Himself), we will take a further step to look at his interpretation of how we are moved by God. We see that this is not a new conclusion once "all agents act in virtue of God Himself" is established. Among his works, Bañez's commentary on the *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 109 a.1 is an important text in which he gives his interpretation of God's premotion²⁷. At the beginning of this commentary, Bañez cited Cajetan's report that some people insisted that when God ceases to move a heavenly body (*cessante motu caeli*)²⁸, fire can still be burning. This view seems to deny the dependence of the secondary agent's motion on the primary cause, i.e. God. In Bañez's view, Thomas used the example of fire to demonstrate that human beings not only are dependent on God for their being and conservation, but also for their operation and movement. So when He does not operate or move us, we cannot move, even if He conserves in us the existence with all operative principles. More importantly,

²⁵ See Em. Neveut, *Le concours divin, Pensée de St. Thomas, de Bañez et de Molina*, *Revue des sciences ecclésiastiques*, 1909, 1047-1061; and 1910, 29-40.

²⁶ For example, *In Summam* Ia q.105 a. 5: "Omnis uirtus operatiua et ipsummet esse causae secundae, dependet a Deo in fieri et conseruari: ergo pendet ab illo in omni operatione sua, uide Capreolum in 2. sent. d. 1. q. 2. ad argumenta contra 6. Conclusionem."

²⁷ *Comentarios ineditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomas, III* (1948), Index "praemotio, quid est."

²⁸ The original text of Thomas' *Summa* I-II q. 109, a.1 is "Primum autem mouens in ordine corporalium est corpus caeleste. Vnde quantumcumque ignis habeat perfectum calorem, non alteraret nisi per motionem caelestis corporis. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut omnes motus corporales reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in primum mouens corporale; ita omnes motus tam corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum mouens simpliciter, quod est Deus."

Bañez compared God as the primary cause with other existence as inferior causes. For the latter, they do not determine a specific effect and may even be determined by their own secondary cause. Sometimes this concurrence is determined by the disposition of a particular moveable thing. The example he gave is the sun. It shines on the earth with the same light. Some clay easily become dry because of their disposition, while some plants with different dispositions may benefit from the same light. This comparison brings us an important element in Bañez's definition of God's premotion: it causes its effects only on account of its own providence: *quae quidem motio praemotio dicitur secundum diuinae prouidentiae rationem, non secundum necessitatem naturae*. So it is because of this feature, that God's motion of secondary causes can be seen as premotion, since everything is not only moved by God, but also is moved according to His own providence rather than on account of the disposition of the thing caused. Bañez, basing himself on the *Summa Contra Gentiles* III Ch. 67, concluded this point in the same commentary:

[C]oncludit diuus Thomas uniuersaliter quod actio intellectus et cuiuscumque entis creati dependet a Deo non solum in quantum ab ipso habet perfectionem uel formam, sed etiam in quantum ab ipso mouetur ad agendum. Et non solum concomitanter ut partialis causa concurrat ad effectum²⁹.

The last sentence emphasises that God is not only the partial cause producing the effect. Thomas' argument III and Bañez's commentary will illustrate this point. There are two elements in Thomas' argument: When God moves everything, i) He applies their forms and powers to operate. An example is a workman who makes use of the axe to cut; ii) He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in existence. When he commented on Thomas' argument, Bañez was definitely in agreement with what Thomas said³⁰ and made it clear that Durandus's position on the same issue was unacceptable. Durandus' claim was summarised by Bañez in this way: *ipsae causae secundae postea per uirtutem illam receptam a Deo operantur, ita ut in suis operationibus non egeant actuali Dei motione et operatione*³¹. Here we see a basic difference between Bañez and Durandus. For Bañez, when God moves a secondary cause, the secondary cause not only operates in virtue of God, but also has God's operation within itself.

²⁹ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia-IIae q. 109, a. 1.

³⁰ Bañez, *In Summam*, Ia q. 105 a. 5: "Prima conclusio est affirmatiua."

³¹ Bañez *In Summam* Ia q.105 a.5.

For Durandus, however, the secondary cause is only moved through the power received from God in such a way that in its own operations it no longer needs God's motion and operation. It was firmly held by Bañez that though a secondary cause has its own operation³², it operates in dependence on God and needs God's pre-movement.

Therefore, for Bañez the statement that God moves created agents has two elements: He gives the principle of operation to the created agents (secondary cause) and also applies the principle to operate in them. God really moves the secondary cause, rather than only causes the effect. In his commentary on the *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 109 a.1 Bañez particularly criticised some theologians who denied that God influences the secondary cause, but only the effect. In other words, God operates *with* the secondary cause to produce effects. Although he did not mention any names, the Jesuit theologian Molina undoubtedly was one of the people whom Bañez referred to. Molina left us a well-known paragraph on this issue in Disputation 26 of the *Concordia*. In this disputation, Molina confessed his difficulties in understanding Thomas' position. The first difficulty was that he could not understand why there should be a motion in the secondary causes by which God moves them to act. Secondly, Thomas's doctrine would seem to lead to the impression that God only moves or concurs mediately, i.e. by means of secondary causes, which was in a contradiction to the statement that God acts immediately by an immediacy of the substance. The solution given by Molina was that God's concurrence and the secondary causes are partial causes of the effects. The effects are both from God and from the secondary causes. He liked to use an analogy to illuminate his own position:

At cum dicimus neque Deum per concursum uniuersalem neque causas secundas esse integras, sed partiales causas effectuum, intelligendum id est de partialitate causae, ut uocant, non uero de partialitate effectus. Totus quippe effectus et a Deo est et a causis secundis; sed neque a Deo neque a causis secundis ut a tota causa, sed ut a parte causae quae simul exigit concursum et influxum alterius, non secus ac, cum duo trahunt nauim, totus motus proficiscitur ab unoquoque trahentium, sed non tamquam a tota causa motus, siquidem quiuis eorum simul efficit cum altero omnes ac singulas partes eiusdem motus³³.

³² He cited Augustine's words in *De ciuitate Dei* Lib. VII, Ch. 30 to support this point: "Deus sic administrat omnia quae creauit; ut etiam ipsa proprios motus exercere, et agere sinat."

³³ Luis Molina (ed. criticam cur. Iohannes Rabeneck), *Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, diuina praescientia, prouidentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione Concordia*,

It is clear that for Molina, just as a boat is dragged by two men, neither of them being the complete cause for the moving of this boat, i.e. neither God's concurrence nor the secondary causes provide the total cause of the motion. This understanding of Molina, in fact, is not new. As Jacob Schmutz pointed out, it is a classical expression of the Franciscan school, which can be found in the works of Duns Scotus as well as other friars of the school, such as André of Neufchâteau, a fourteenth century philosopher³⁴. I think that Molina's approach made it easier for him to establish two order of causality. Once this two-causality order is applied in the discussion of the relation between grace and human freedom, Molina is able to leave more space for human autonomy, without this autonomy denying God's influence. Such an approach also made it possible for him to deny that grace can be intrinsically efficacious. We will discuss this point later.

Bañez criticised Molina's approach to the relation between primary cause and secondary cause, directly responding to the second difficulty of Molina. His emphasis was that when we say God moves or acts immediately, this statement should not exclude the substance and power of the secondary causes which God moves. The word *immediate* refers to the perfect power of God who operates in everything, rather than God not acting through the secondary causes. In God's movement of everything, He, as the cause in himself, has the power of action. There are two elements in God's causality: one is the influence (*influxus*) from God to keep secondary causes in existence, and the other is the influence that actually moves it to produce the actual effects. This influence reaches the secondary causes and their effects immediately. So the effects can be said to be dependent on God and also on the secondary causes. For this reason, Bañez conceded that with regard to the effect, God produces the effect by the mediacy of the secondary causes³⁵.

Moreover, Bañez claimed that secondary causes are subordinated to God, even if the secondary causes are complete in their own order. This subordination consists in the proposition that Bañez reckoned as fundamental: secondary causes depend on the primary cause,

(Oniae: Collegium Maximum, 1953), *Disputatio* 26, n. 15. We shall follow this edition in this article.

³⁴ Jacob Schmutz, *La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (XIIIe- XVIIe siècles)*, *Revue Thomiste* 101 (2001), 254.

³⁵ *Tractatus* II, Ch. I n. 4. For Molina, it is not the primary cause that operates upon the secondary cause, but these two causes work together to produce the effect.

because they are insufficient of themselves to act without the movement of the primary cause.

2. Efficacious grace according to Bañez

Bañez's theology of grace is seen as the application of his metaphysics of causality³⁶. Therefore, after the exploration of Bañez's understanding of divine motion, we will discuss his application of divine motion to the question of the efficacy of actual grace.

1. What is efficacious grace?

As we have seen in this article, grace is seen by St. Thomas as help (*auxilium*). For Bañez, divine help (*Auxilium Dei*) works not only on the supernatural level, but also on the natural level. The natural assistance (*auxilium naturale*) refers to the assistance ordered to human operations for their natural end³⁷. God, as the Creator of the universe, moves everything according to its nature. God not only conserves things, but also moves them according to the arrangement of divine providence. This is the principle of divine motion we have discussed above. Bañez further applied it to human beings, since human beings are the noblest of creatures. The first natural assistance which God confers on them is their use of reason. This natural assistance bestowed on human beings is also an actual illumination (*actualis illuminatio*) because it is by this assistance that human beings are illuminated to know speculative or practical truth. In this sense, human beings only have the passive motion on their own side. Similarly, Bañez insisted that the primary operation of the will should be attributed to the Creator of nature. It is by his motion that our will moves to will an object³⁸.

The supernatural assistance (*auxilium supernaturale*) orders man to the supernatural end through supernatural operations. In this

³⁶ See Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A history of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, vol. 2. *From 1500 to the present day*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986), 95.

³⁷ See *Tractatus*, II, Ch. II.

³⁸ Bañez made a distinction between God's grace as promotion of the human will to the good and God's permission of evil to happen. "licet admitteremus Deum non concurrere ad materiale peccati in ratione entis auxilio efficaci praemouente uoluntatem ad tale materiale, nihilominus asserendum est ad actus supernaturales esse necessarium huiusmodi efficax auxilium." *Apologia*, I, Ch. IV, n. 9.

sense, Bañez defined grace in such a way: *Gratia est forma supernaturalis quae confert nobis esse et uitam supernaturalem*³⁹. Grace brings human beings to salvation, so its *final* end should be considered on the supernatural level. Apart from its operation on the natural level, grace more importantly operates for man's supernatural end⁴⁰. Since on the supernatural level grace is also a divine motion, in Bañez's theology the principles we discussed above apply to grace as well, i.e. grace moves the human will (secondary cause) to produce salutary acts (effects).

Before moving on to efficacious actual grace, we should note that actual grace was the essential element of Bañez's theology of grace. Bañez stated clearly that his disagreement with Molina did not encompass habitual grace: *Non loquimur hic de gratia habituali iustificante, sed loquimur de gratia actuali praemouente*.⁴¹ In other words, it concerns the premotion of the human will to accept grace. So Bañez's difficulty with Molina consisted in whether the disposition of grace, at least partially, depends on the human will. Bañez and his confreres refused to accept the theological proposition that human beings had the capacity to prepare for habitual grace (*se disposuit ad gratiam*). On the contrary, the ultimate disposition and preparation for grace should be attributed to actual grace which efficaciously *prepares* and *premoves* the will. The question of the efficacy of actual grace concerns how divine motion works to cause human beings supernatural acts for their salvation.

In Bañez's analysis, actual grace as *auxilium* is prevenient to our use of freedom. Here Bañez took grace as divine inspiration since it is a certain sudden illumination of God inspiring the soul to the good. Hence grace is prior and works in human beings to make them adhere to God. In the *Tractatus* Bañez appealed to Can. 20 of the second Council of Orange⁴² *multa bona in homine fiunt quae non facit homo* to support his contention that the intellectual and volitional operations of human beings are caused by the motion of God which

³⁹ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 4.

⁴⁰ Thomas Aquinas claims in the state of corrupt nature, people need grace to receive salvation and do natural good (*Summa* Ia-IIae, q. 109 a.2); see also Bañez's commentary of this question.

⁴¹ *Apologia* I, Ch. II, n. 2; "tota nostra disceptatio est circa auxilia actualia", *Tractatus* II, Ch. II, n.7.

⁴² The Second Council of Orange took place in July 529 and aimed to settle some controversies on grace and predestination in Gaul. This council followed the teaching of Augustine that God's grace proceeded any human performance of good works. For the canons on grace promulgated by this Council, see DS, n.373-395.

is prior to the use of human freedom. So every human being is the passive recipient of grace. Bañez observed that on this issue there was no difference between him and the Jesuits⁴³. The problem was how actual grace as *auxilium* works with our freedom. As we have said the core of the controversy concerns man's consent to God's call. Bañez and his Dominican colleagues disagreed with the Jesuit viewpoint of how man's consent came about in the work of grace. These two orders also debated whether actual grace itself was efficacious or only sufficient for consent.

In the *Tractatus* Bañez endeavoured to present his solution systematically. He stated the problem at stake by clarifying the difference between sufficient grace and efficacious grace:

Quaestio igitur principalis est an sit idem et unum auxilium quod respectu conuersionis mentis in Deum, siue per fidem, siue per caritatem, dicitur sufficiens et efficax.⁴⁴

Hence the principal question is whether in man's conversion to God, grace is sufficient and efficacious, or only sufficient and dependent on human consent. To answer this question, the first point he held is that it is necessary to draw a distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace. Although he realised that neither Augustine nor Thomas Aquinas made this division directly in their works, Bañez contended the clue of the division can be found in these great theologians. He also appealed to Augustine for this division:

Ait enim diuus Augustinus saepissime, quod primo homini datum est posse perseuerare, non autem perseuerare, et datum est ut posset non peccare, sed non est datum ut non peccaret⁴⁵.

So in Bañez's understanding of Augustine there is a distinction between the possibility and the fact (*de facto*): God's grace makes human beings *able* to persevere or not to sin, but this does not necessarily happen *de facto*, since *de facto* not every human being would persevere to the end. Similarly, it is Catholic doctrine that the satisfaction and redemption of Christ are for all human beings. Christ's satisfaction is sufficient in the sense that his redemption makes it possible for all people to be saved. But the Scriptures do tell us that Christ's redemption does not apply efficaciously to everyone, but only to those

⁴³ *Apologia* II, Ch. III, n.3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Tractatus* II, Ch. III, n. 6. In this chapter Bañez mentioned two works of Augustine: *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseuerantiae*.

who are predestinated. Bañez notes that Paul spoke about God as “the Saviour of all people, especially of those who believe” (I Tim 4:10). Depending on these Biblical sources, Bañez believes that it is justified to highlight that sufficiency of Christ’s redemption is universal, but it is not *de facto* efficacious in everyone.

Once establishing the difference between efficacy and sufficiency, Bañez pointed out that it was when grace causes the effects, that we call it efficacious. Then we have two ways of speaking of efficacious grace:

- i) Sometimes the effects are caused with human consent;
- ii) Sometimes without the consent of free will.

It is only in the condition of i) that Bañez’s distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace is valid. According to him, in ii) we consider it from the perspective of God as a mover (*secundum quod est a Deo mouente*), then grace is absolutely efficacious. In Bañez’s words, actual grace spoken in this way is *efficax alicuius effectus ad quem ex beneplacito diuinae uoluntatis absoluto mittitur*.⁴⁶ This distinction can be traced back to Thomas’s discussion of the preparation for grace in the *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 112 a.3. There, Thomas tried to give his answer from two perspectives: first in considering free will (*secundum quod est a libero arbitrio*) and second from the perspective of God as a mover (*secundum quod est a Deo mouente*). In the first aspect, there is no necessity to obtain grace, but in the second aspect, i.e. from God the Mover’s perspective, there is a necessity. In his *Tractatus* Bañez almost copied Thomas’s words to explain his own position:

[S]i consideretur secundum quod est a Deo mouente, habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest.⁴⁷

In other words, on the metaphysical level the motion of God gives the principle of operation to the created agents (secondary cause) and also applies the principle to operate in them as the mover of everything. This divine motion must be infallible and His intention cannot fail. Bañez did not stop here, but rather applied it to the operation of grace. If we speak from God’s aspect as a mover, His intention of

⁴⁶ *Tractatus* II, Ch. III, n. 6.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* The original text of St. Thomas is: “Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a Deo mouente. Et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest.” *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 112, a. 3.

movement cannot fail, or His grace that is a divine motion upon human hearts must be infallible to have its effects. Grace seen from this aspect is efficacious for human beings. So if we speak of the efficacy of grace only in the second way (i.e. from God without considering human consent), grace must be intrinsically efficacious. In this way of speaking, there is no need of a distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. However, in the other way, when human consent is involved, God permits that some people do not accept His grace. This statement implies that not all grace is efficacious.

So we have found two ways of speaking about efficacious grace in Bañez's theology. On the one hand, when we consider human free will in the discussion of grace, Bañez thought that the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace had to be introduced since, according to Scripture and Catholic dogma, not everybody in fact (*de facto*) accept God's grace. The efficacy of grace spoken in this way is evident in the chosen people's conversion to God. On the other hand, if we consider it *only* from God as the mover, His grace must be absolutely efficacious.

Bañez's position can become clearer if we bear in mind the position of Molina to which he was opposed. As Catholic theologians, both Bañez and Molina confirmed the necessity of prevenient grace, i.e. grace must come first⁴⁸. But Molina's position contends: i) no grace is given except as it is sufficient in itself; ii) whether grace is only sufficient or efficacious depends on the freedom of the person who receives it; iii) this human consent is foreseen by God's middle knowledge (*scientia media*)⁴⁹. From these three points we can find that for Molina grace is always sufficient before human consent. There is only a real distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace *after* human consent. In other words, whether grace is efficacious relies on human consent. In this sense, human consent is one of the elements which are necessary for the movement of a boat. Without this secondary cause, grace as primary cause is only sufficient. The boat will not move ahead. On the contrary, Bañez never spoke about the dependence of efficacious grace on human freedom. For him Molina's view was in danger of subjecting the

⁴⁸ See *Apologia* I, Ch. VIII, n. 1.

⁴⁹ *Concordia*, disp. 40; See also Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (Translator: The Dominican Nuns, Corpus Christi Monastery, Menlo Park, California), *Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 109-14*, (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1952), 205. The definition of middle knowledge and Bañez's criticism will be discussed in the next sub-section "Bañez's criticism of middle knowledge."

efficacy of grace to dependency on human free will. Even in Bañez's first way of speaking of the efficacy of grace, he emphasised that grace itself is efficacious, though a man still freely converts to God (*homo libere uel credit, uel conuertitur in Deum*⁵⁰). In his words God *non solum illuminando intellectum et proponendo obiectum, sed etiam realiter et efficaciter mouendo liberum arbitrium, ut deliberando consentiat*⁵¹. So according to Bañez, if we consider the role of human freedom⁵², efficacious grace moves it, according to its nature, rather than its efficacy depends on whether free will consents to it or not. On this point Bañez said:

Sed eius efficacia prout est a Deo in hoc exercetur, ut efficaciter *eleuet* liberum arbitrium ad consentiendum *cum Deo*, non autem uiceuersa, ut Molina intendit, liberum arbitrium *eleuet* auxilium ipsum et faciat efficax ut ipse Deus consentiat cum homine et concomitetur actionem liberam tandiu quandiu ipse homo pro innata sibi libertate uoluerit⁵³. (The emphasis is mine)

His difficulty with Molina expressed here justifies our reading of their difference stated above. The way of dealing with the role of free will distinguished these two theologians and led to two ways of understanding of efficacious grace. According to Bañez, free will is elevated by efficacious grace. But for Molina sufficient grace becomes efficacious in the free will's consent, so that free will seems to elevate or render sufficient grace efficacious.

Bañez believes that his position on the efficacy of grace follows Augustine's teaching on grace⁵⁴. For example, he followed Augustine's words: *ipse* (God) *facit ut illi* (human beings) *faciant quae praecepit; non illi faciunt ut ipse faciat quod promisit*⁵⁵ to contend that grace itself had its effects if God wishes. It is God who decrees what we will do, rather than we do something meriting salvation and then

⁵⁰ *Tractatus*, II, Ch. III, n. 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² The canons on justification of the Council of Trent (See DS, n. 1554) condemned any theological proposition which denied human free choice; we should note the difference between the condemned proposition and Bañez's position here. Bañez, unlike some Protestant theologians, never claimed the intrinsically efficacious grace took away human freedom.

⁵³ *Apologia* II, Ch. III, n.1.

⁵⁴ For Bañez, both Church Fathers and St. Thomas are the authority for theologians. For example, "...docendi huius rei ueritatem (*i.e.* the doctrine on grace and human freedom-my note) prout ex doctrina diui Augustini et diui Thomae et aliorum patrum accepimus", Cited from the preface of the *Tractatus*; See also 'Le Thomisme "moderne" de Dominique Bañez' (2006).

⁵⁵ See *Apologia* III, Ch. VI, n. 7.

he is obliged to give assistance⁵⁶. In this sense, any possibility of a Nominalist interpretation of *facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam* is excluded in Bañez's theology⁵⁷. He believed that in Augustine's time there were people who thought that reason was not sufficient for having faith, hope and love. Human beings are not able to be called to the supernatural end without the concurrence or consent of their wills. In contrast to this position, Augustine placed God's mercy in first place, rather than the concurrence of the human will, simply because the human will should be seen as something prepared by God. Undoubtedly, when applying his interpretation of divine motion to efficacious grace, Bañez did not have any difficulty with the Augustinian position referred to here. God's mercy towards the elect is the divine motion which premoves the will of these people to accept grace. Human salutary acts always depend on God's initiatives.

2. Bañez's criticism of middle knowledge

We have touched on Bañez's divergence from Molina on whether sufficient grace and efficacious grace are really different. In Bañez's works he frequently mentioned the following statement which he considers to be unacceptable: God wills to create a human being and places him in a particular circumstance in which he can freely consent to God's grace⁵⁸. What he is referring to is Molina's famous theory of middle knowledge which is adopted by this Jesuit to reconcile God's grace and human autonomy. Since Bañez's criticism of middle knowledge is one part of his insistence on the intrinsic efficacy of grace, in this section I would like to examine what middle knowledge is and Bañez's criticism of it.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* More quotations from *De praedestinatione* can be found in the text. The works of Augustine appealed by Bañez are mostly composed in the period of Augustine's controversial with the Pelagians. For Bañez's notice of this anti-Pelagian context, see *Tractatus* III.

⁵⁷ The final form of this axiom is thought to be fixed in the 12th century. Its origin can be traced to Irenaeus: "If you offer to Him what is yours, that is faith in Him and subjection, you shall receive Him, and become a perfect work of God". In Radulphus Ardens' (+1200) *Homilies* we find usage of this axiom. For a discussion of its development in the medieval period, see Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A history of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, vol. 1. From the Beginning to 1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986), 83-91. For a presentation of the Nominalists' interpretation, see the same book p. 166-172. Thomas Aquinas mentioned and criticised this reading in the *Summa* I-II, q. 112 a. 3.

⁵⁸ For example, *Tractatus* II, Ch. III, n. 8.

Based on his interpretation of the medieval theologians⁵⁹, Molina made a three-fold division of God's knowledge: natural knowledge, middle knowledge and free knowledge. Natural knowledge is God's comprehension of all possibilities which could hypothetically obtain (some philosophers prefer to describe it as a knowledge of "metaphysically necessary states of affairs"⁶⁰). God possesses it naturally before any free determination of His will, so it is not dependent on His will and is essential to God's omniscience. Because of this, this knowledge of God is called natural knowledge. There is another kind of knowledge which is posterior to God's free act to cause one of the possible orders known by his natural knowledge. By this knowledge, he knows "absolutely and determinately, without any condition or hypothesis" which one of the possible orders "were in fact going to obtain and, likewise, which ones were not going to obtain"⁶¹. It is after God's free act of will, so is called free knowledge. Molina thought that there is a third knowledge, which stands between natural and free knowledge:

Tertiam denique mediam scientiam qua ex altissima et inscrutabili comprehensione cuiusque liberi arbitrii in sua essentia intuitus est, quid pro sua innata libertate, *si in hoc uel illo uel etiam infinitis rerum ordinibus collocaretur*, acturum esset, cum tamen posset, si uellet, facere re ipsa oppositum, ut ex dictis disp. 49 et 50 manifestum est⁶².
(The emphasis is mine)

Hence God's middle knowledge refers to knowledge of what would happen in certain circumstances. To put it in another way, this is the divine knowledge of which decisions will be made by his creatures freely under a certain set of circumstances⁶³. Both God's middle

⁵⁹ For Thomas's view, see the *Summa* Ia q. 14 a. 8; For Scotus, see William Lane Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents: from Aristotle to Suarez* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 7) (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 136-137.

⁶⁰ See Alfred J. Freddoso, *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia*, (Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell university press, 2004), Introduction.

⁶¹ Molina, *Concordia*, 52,9.

⁶² Molina, *Concordia*, 52, 9.

⁶³ An example may be helpful to get the point: by his natural knowledge, God knows Peter would deny or not deny Christ when Peter is put under a certain set of possible circumstances. But by his middle knowledge, God knows what Peter would do if he is put under these possible circumstances. When God created a world, God brings a certain set of circumstances to act. So God by his free knowledge knows what Peter would exactly do. See Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, 175-76.

knowledge and natural knowledge are prevolitional knowledge⁶⁴. Since middle knowledge is prior to God's determination to bring a world into existence, God's volitional act depends on his middle knowledge, i.e. what would occur under any given circumstances. God does not have control over what he knows through middle knowledge⁶⁵. In this sense, God's middle knowledge can be considered dependent on what creatures would do.

In fact, the invention of middle knowledge is a necessary outcome of Molina's preference for human autonomy without denying God's grace at the same time. As we have seen in the discussion of divine motion, for Molina the primary cause does not work upon the secondary cause (premotion), but rather directly upon the effects. When it is applied to God's help on the supernatural level, grace does not work directly upon the human will to move it to the salutary acts. Grace operates along with human beings to bring about its effects. Therefore, as we have shown, Molina claimed that grace is neither intrinsically efficacious nor inefficacious. Because of this neutral character of grace, reconciling it with a provident and omnipotent God, which is not a dispensable Christian doctrine, may be a challenge for Molina. To keep God's providence in place, therefore, God's prevolitional knowledge must have the character of knowing which effects would in fact freely obtain in a certain set of circumstances⁶⁶. For Molina, God's natural knowledge does not have this feature. There must be another kind of prevolitional knowledge before God's divine decree. For this reason, by adopting the concept of middle knowledge, on the one hand, he can defend God's providence, since it still is God who finally wills or determines which one of the circumstances will actually obtain. On the other hand, to avoid leading to intrinsically efficacious grace, Molina, with the help of the concept of middle knowledge, gave some room for human freedom prior to God's determination, because God cannot change what a man wills in specific circumstance⁶⁷.

⁶⁴ Because these two types of knowledge are logically prior to the act of the divine will, they are called prevolitional.

⁶⁵ "God cannot annul the fact that if a free creature were to be placed in a certain set of circumstances, he would choose to do a certain act." See Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, 176.

⁶⁶ See Freddoso, *On Divine Foreknowledge*, Introduction, 23.

⁶⁷ For example, God through his middle knowledge knows that Peter in a certain circumstance ([C] a) will deny Christ. But if He determined to keep Peter's faith to Christ, God could put Peter in another set of circumstance ([C]b). Since middle

Undoubtedly, Bañez did not agree with Molina's position. If grace were bestowed according to God's foreknowledge of the possible human reactions, it would lead us to think that God's will depends on human decisions. In other words, Molina's viewpoint that God has the knowledge of what a person would freely do in certain circumstances and then He decrees to make it happen may be contrary to God's omnipotence (*contraria diuinae maiestati*). Bañez's systematic criticism of it can be found in the *Apologia*: Firstly, Molina put too much emphasis on the role of human consent in the discussion of the efficacy of grace, and naturally by his theory of middle knowledge the certitude of divine knowledge comes from what a person would freely do in certain circumstances. In this model, God's determination conceptually follows and depends on this knowledge. It also implies that God's determination originates from human beings' free will, so God's divine free will is indirectly excluded. Moreover, Molina's position can lead to the assertion that man can be the cause of some good. Bañez's great reservation was that this implication of Molina's position was in contradiction with Christian doctrine: God is the cause of all good. Therefore, Bañez claimed that the problem of Molina's theory should be corrected by this proposition: there is no future good act that can be thought of as coming from human free will, unless divine free will is recognised as the cause of this future good act⁶⁸.

Bañez's position on efficacious grace left him unsatisfied with the proposition that God decrees freely to create a person in a specific circumstance after He knows what this person would do. For Bañez God's decree should be infallible and intrinsically efficacious to make human beings do good, so the decree of the divine will should always proceed a person doing good. Therefore, Bañez and his confreres said:

[A]rbitramur quod ipsammet actionem liberam non solum praesciuit (God, my note) si futura est, sed et praedelibrando praedefiniuit illam qualiter et quando fieret a libero arbitrio hominis⁶⁹.

From this quotation, we see why Molina's middle knowledge was not acceptable to Bañez and his colleagues: the key element in their theology of grace, i.e. predilection, was excluded by Molina. In their view, the *primum liberum* which should be properly attributed to

knowledge is a prevolitional knowledge, God cannot change Peter's denial of Christ in [C]a. What He can do is to create Peter in [C]b.

⁶⁸ *Apologia* I, Ch. XVI, n. 3; Because of the loss of Bañez's correspondences with St. Teresa, it is hard for us to reconstruct his theological system from the perspective of his spirituality.

⁶⁹ *Apologia* I, Ch. XVI, n. 3.

God was instead given to human freedom. This could possibly lead to deforming God's image as the master of the universe and also deviates from the teachings in the Bible⁷⁰.

Secondly, Bañez had difficulty with middle knowledge itself. Since middle knowledge, as a prevolitional knowledge, entails God's knowledge of human agents (*causa creata*) before His determination, it seems that God has knowledge of the effects of His grace through human agents. However, this cannot be reconciled with Bañez's position on divine knowledge. I think Bañez's point is that God does not have knowledge through knowing the secondary cause, but only from His essence⁷¹. Similarly, nothing moves God's will, except His goodness⁷². Therefore, divine knowledge apart from Himself cannot be reduced to extrinsic cognition, but only dwells in God Himself. For the same reason, the principle of God's volitional operation is in His goodness. So middle knowledge, which put the created agents' act conceptually prior to the infallible divine knowledge, violates the principle that God knows and wills independently. To avoid Molina's problem, Bañez presented the solution from the Dominican side:

Nos autem hanc infallibilitatem diuinae praescientiae non quaerimus extra Deum, sed eam constituimus in libero decreto Dei, qui operetur omnia secundum consilium uoluntatis suae; uel si mala sunt, permittit ea secundum consilium uoluntatis suae.

Sufficit ergo distinctio communis theologorum diuinae scientiae, in scientiam simplicis intelligentiae, et scientiam uisionis, ita ut per illam priorem naturaliter cognoscat Deus rerum omnium possibilium essentias, et per hanc alteram liberam cognoscat omnia futura quatenus fundatur in decreto libero Dei uolentis bona quaedam fieri, et quaedam mala permittere ad ostensionem sapientiae et omnipotentiae suae⁷³.

So the Dominicans contended that divine foreknowledge consisted in God's free determination, which moves every thing according to itself. It is this divine decree that brings about all good and permits evil. In this sense, a two-fold division of divine knowledge is sufficient for Bañez's purpose: knowledge of simple intelligence and

⁷⁰ The citation in the *Apologia* is Proverb 21:1; and the prayer appeared in *Missale Romanum*, see *ibid*.

⁷¹ Bañez's main source here is from Thomas's *Summa* Ia q. 14, a. 13.

⁷² Here Bañez refers to Thomas' view of God's will that appears in the *Summa* Ia q. 19, a. 2. In his reply to the second objection, Thomas made an analogy between the principle of God's understanding and will: "quae semper habet (God, my note) bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab eo secundum essentiam."

⁷³ *Apologia* I, Ch. XVI, n. 6.

knowledge of vision. They are basically equivalent to natural knowledge and free knowledge in Molina's division. Through the former, God knows all possibilities; and through the latter, He knows all future contingents which are decreed by his divine will freely: good is brought about by God and evil is only permitted to manifest His wisdom and power. Between these two kinds of knowledge is God's will. This Bañezian division is not difficult for us to understand: the core of Bañez's theology of grace is that actual grace which prepares some people's coming to salvation must be intrinsically efficacious. Moreover, this efficacy comes from God's will to predestine some persons and from His infallible decree. In his controversy with Molina, this Jesuit's emphasis on human autonomy introducing middle knowledge was seen by Bañez as the denial of God's majesty and an exaggeration of human autonomy.

3. *Efficacious grace and predestination*

We have seen how Bañez insisted there was a real distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. For him, free will could not resist efficacious grace, which must be followed by its effect. In this way he reminded his opponents that in any good the human being was not glorified, but God. Therefore, any good of human beings must be caused by God and no one would be better than another if God did not will a greater good to one rather than to another. In other words, the efficacy of grace ultimately comes from God's divine decree by which He realises His plan for everything to attain their end. This is predestination⁷⁴. In this sense, a more comprehensive understanding of Bañez's theology of efficacy of grace should be paired with predestination.

God elects and predestinates some people, rather than others, to be granted efficacious grace⁷⁵. The salutary acts of these people are

⁷⁴ "rationem praeexistentem in mente diuina circa media efficacia ad consequendum finem appellari praedestinationem", Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 23, a. 2.

⁷⁵ It should be highlighted that in Bañez's theology the predestination only refers to Beatitude. He never contended for human's predestination to evil. For Bañez God only permits the evil to show His mercy in the predestinated people ("ostensio misericordiae maioris in predestinatis"). See *Apologia* I, Ch. XXVI, n.4. Bañez's position is the same as the Catholic teaching on this issue: e.g. Leo X's epistle *Congratulamur uehementer* to the Patriarch of Antioch in 1053: "Deum praedestinasse solummodo bona, praesciuisse autem bona malaque." (DS 685). Can. 17 of Council of Trent's *Canones de iustificatione*: "Si quis iustificationis gratiam non nisi praedestinatis ad uitam contingere dixerit, reliquos uero omnes, qui uocantur, uocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote diuina potestate praedestinos

willed by God. In his commentary on the *Summa* q. 23 a. 4 Bañez followed Thomas by contending that predestination presupposed election, and love preceded election. God loves some persons first and then elects them. What Bañez emphasised is the priority of God's love in his selection and predestination. God, out of his love, wishes good to someone, simply because He is the cause of all good⁷⁶.

God loves some persons, and then He elects and predestinates them to salvation by bestowing on them the mean to attain salvation, i.e. efficacious grace. The precedence of love in the order of predestination prompts Bañez to insist that predestination formally imposes an act of divine will (*praedestinatio formaliter importet actum diuinae uoluntatis*⁷⁷). God's will realises His providence, which causes his act to save some persons. By rejecting Molina's middle knowledge, Bañez contended that God did not foresee some people accepting his grace by free will in certain circumstance and then rendering grace efficacious to them. On the contrary, he loves some persons and then bestows on them efficacious grace by which these persons will be moved smoothly (*suauiter*, in Bañez's words⁷⁸) to salutary acts by efficacious grace. Love here takes precedence, as an act of will, so predestination consists in God's will, rather than God's foreknowledge (God's intellect) of the decision of created agents.

Let us examine Bañez's argument for this position in some detail⁷⁹. The scriptural foundation of his argument is from *Mat.* 22 where the evangelist says that many are called, but only a few are chosen. In *Rom.* 9:13 Paul says God has loved Jacob, but he has hated Esau. Bañez explained that this love was not due to what Jacob had done, but only because of God's calling. In these verses, predestination is seen as election that presupposes love. Election and love are acts of will, so predestination is the act of will as well⁸⁰.

God's decree to give some people efficacious grace presupposes the distinction of natural and supernatural orders. Bañez said:

Cognouit Deus omnes homines possibiles, ex quibus quosdam dilexit quantum ad esse naturae, et hos uoluit creare, ex quibus adhuc quos-

ad malum: an. s." (DS 1567). Following the teaching of the Church, Bañez rejected double predestination.

⁷⁶ See *Summa* Ia q. 23 a. 4.

⁷⁷ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q. 23, a. 2.

⁷⁸ Therefore, Bañez, following St. Thomas, denied that God imposed necessity on all human beings. This point is essential for understanding Bañez's viewpoint of human freedom. See the last section of this article.

⁷⁹ Here we mainly follow Bañez's commentary on the *Summa* Ia q. 23 a. 2.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

dam dilexit ad finem supernaturalem, quae diuina dilectio electio dicitur, quatenus ex aliis, quos creare uolebat, istos separauit sibi, et denique hos electos praedestinauit, hoc est prouidit et ordinauit, ut per quaedam media supernaturaliter efficaciter peruenirent in finem supernaturalem⁸¹.

According to Thomistic theology, God's knowledge comprehends all possible things, but His will selects some of them to be realised. Therefore, the words of St. Thomas: "God's knowledge is the cause of things" cannot be understood in the sense that all possibilities will be actualised, but in the sense that His will is joined to His knowledge so that only certain possibilities will be actualised⁸². This is the meaning of the quotation: God knows every human possibility, but He only wills to create some of them. Bañez adopted it as his solution by differentiating two levels: first the level of nature, in which divine knowledge is presupposed, i.e. God knows every possible thing from eternity. He created the world. The second level is God's election of people out of His love, so it is in the supernatural order. Seen from the natural order, God created every thing. But in the supernatural level, He only elects some people out of his creation for ultimate happiness through the efficacious grace. In the supernatural order, out of His love, God selects people for the supernatural end. In a word, what Bañez emphasised is that predestination should be sought in God and is constituted in His divine will. This predestination is realised through efficacious grace which is also prevenient to human free consent and brings elected people to a supernatural end. It was also in this sense that efficacious grace was called by Bañez as the *means (media)* of God's predestination.

Now we can link Bañez's theology of efficacious grace and predestination. The foundation of efficacy of grace consists in predestination, by which God predestines some people to a supernatural end. Therefore, on the one hand, God bestows on every human being sufficient grace, which is sufficient for his salvation, though he might not in fact respond to this universal call; on the other hand, efficacious grace does, in fact, effectively produce salvation, otherwise God's decrees would not be infallible. By rejecting Molina's theory of middle knowledge, Bañez reinforced his position by seeking the root of divine providence in God Himself, rather than in the merits foreseen by Him.

⁸¹ Bañez, *In Summam* Ia q.23, a. 2.

⁸² *Summa* Ia q. 14 a. 8. In St. Thomas' theology, this understanding of God's knowledge as the cause of things is called the "knowledge of approbation", i.e. by this knowledge God's will selects what will obtain.

3. The concordance between efficacious grace and human freedom

In Bañez's theology of grace, God loves some people and predestines them to beatitude by bestowing on them efficacious grace. This grace moves the human will efficaciously according to the nature of the will and this efficacy does not rely on human consent. However, in his understanding of efficacy of grace, Bañez had to answer such questions as: is human freedom still real? Although the title "Calvinist" given by his opponents is unfair, one can ask whether the doctrine of Bañez weakened the role of human freedom. Did he adopt the same approach as the Protestant theologians who created a radical tension between grace and freedom⁸³? Or did he sacrifice human freedom to the role of grace in our salvation? In this part, after examining Bañez's doctrine of efficacious grace, I would like to explore how Bañez reconciled the efficacy of grace and human freedom.

In the *Tractatus* Pars I and the *Apologia* Pars Prima Bañez offered the same definition of human freedom:

Liberum arbitrium est facultas intellectus et uoluntatis ad agendum uel non agendum, uel ad agendum unum uel aliud⁸⁴.

This definition is a typical Thomistic understanding of human freedom, which considers both reason and will in its definition of freedom. According to Bañez's interpretation, the basis and the principle of freedom consist in the intellectual indifference to the means for an end to be attained (*intellectus iudicat indifferentiam alicuius medii secundum se ad finem*⁸⁵). The form of this freedom originates from the will's choice of such and such a mean. This interpretation is rooted in Thomas' doctrine of will: the intellect only understands all the means for reaching an end, but it is not attached to one mean. Will has the ability to act or not act, even desire this or that. In particular, Bañez emphasised that his statement does not involve "velle contrarium" (to will some contrary things)⁸⁶. Hence, what Bañez denied was the definition made by Molina and Suarez:

⁸³ In *Apologia* I, Ch. XXIII, n. 3-4 Bañez and his colleagues have realised this consequence. In their view, Molina's theology of grace gave an excuse for Luther's denial of freedom, since in the Molinaist logic it is a necessary consequence to claim lack of freedom if there is predestination and grace can be intrinsically efficacious.

⁸⁴ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n.8. This paragraph was copied exactly in *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.2.

⁸⁵ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n. 5.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Also see *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n. 6-8.

Liberum arbitrium est quod, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere hoc uel non agere, aut uelle contrarium. Haec forma definitionis liberi arbitrii neque apud Aristotelem, neque apud Magistrum, neque apud diuum Thomam, nec apud aliquem grauem doctorem inuenitur, nisi apud Almainum et alios nominales⁸⁷.

There are two elements in Molina's definition of human freedom: i) it is able to act or not to act; ii) it is able to want some contrary things⁸⁸. The second point was the one to which Bañez was opposed. There are two aspects to this opposition. In the first, he distinguishes the composite sense and the divided sense of a proposition⁸⁹. In the composite sense, when the human will is determined by reason to choose the good, it is impossible that the will fails to do so under such a command from reason (*ut impossibile sit uoluntatem non eligere stante tali rationis imperio*⁹⁰). Similarly, speaking of the composite sense, we cannot claim that under the operation of the divine help or the divine motion, the human will is not moved. It is not possible at the same time for the contrary (i.e. human will fails to act) to be true. But Bañez conceded that only in the divided sense (considered in itself apart from temporal considerations), is this proposition possible: God moves the free will by efficacious grace, and the free will *possibly* does not act⁹¹. There is no logical problem to link these two

⁸⁷ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n.4 and *Apologia* I, Ch. XII, n.1. Jaques Almain (1480-1515) is a French Scotist theologian famous for his support of Gallicanism. Since there is some similarity between Molina and Suarez's position on two-order causality, Scotists went along the same line with them. Juan de Rada (1545-1609), Archbishop of Patti, a consulate of the *Congregatio de auxilii*, claimed the Thomistic doctrine of the causality was false and worthless. See Schmutz, *La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure*, 256.

⁸⁸ See Freddoso, *On Divine Knowledge*, 25.

⁸⁹ This is the logical distinction made by medieval theologians. St. Thomas called the composite sense as *de dicto*, and the divided sense as *de re*, e.g. *Summa* Ia q.14 a.13 ad 3; The proposition "It is possible for a white thing to be black" ("*album possibile est esse nigrum*") is true in the divided sense (i.e. it is applied to an individual thing), because a white thing can become black by being painted. However, it is false to say in the composite sense that "a white thing is black" ("*album esse nigrum*"), because it violates the principle of non-contradiction.

⁹⁰ *Apologia* I, Ch. 12, n. 2.

⁹¹ *Haec enim copulatiua uerificari potest: Deus mouet liberum arbitrium auxilio efficaci, et liberum arbitrium possibiliter non eligit; quia utraque pars huius copulatiuae non destruit alteram, ac proinde simul sunt compossibiles. Apologia, I, Ch. 12, n.2; some paragraphs later, Bañez stated his position again: Nos autem negamus talem compositionem esse possibilem, uidelicet Deus mouet efficaci auxilio uoluntatem ad eligendum, et uoluntas non eligit id quod Deus uult ipsam eligere. Similiter etiam impossibile iudicamus quod aliquis sit praedestinatus, et non saluetur, quamuis haec copulatiua sit uera, Petrus est praedestinatus, et Petrus possibiliter non saluatur.*

phrases. When seen from these two points of view together, Bañez thought that these words of St. Thomas fit well into the context of his argument:

Si Deus mouet uoluntatem ad aliquid, impossibile est huic positioni quod uoluntas ad illud non moueatur. Non tamen est impossibile simpliciter. Vnde non sequitur quod uoluntas a Deo ex necessitate moueatur.⁹²

What needs to be highlighted is the second part of the quotation. According to Molina's definition of human freedom, even in the composite sense (*de dicto*), human freedom can cause actual resistance to efficacious grace. On the contrary, Bañez claimed that the efficacy of grace did not necessarily destroy human freedom. It is compatible with human freedom. In his commentary on the *Summa* Ia q. 23 a. 6, Bañez's used the strategy of making a distinction between the sense of composite and the divided sense to argue for a concordance between efficacious grace and human freedom⁹³. In the composite sense, a man cannot be seated and standing at the same time. However, in the divided sense this man retains the ability to stand when sitting. Therefore, in this sense, we can say a man can stand when he is sitting. Similarly, when we apply this distinction to the discussion of grace, in the composite sense, efficacious grace infallibly moves the human will. But in the divided sense, the human will retains the capacity of not being moved by grace, even if the will is in fact moved⁹⁴. In other words, by introducing a distinction between two senses of a proposition, Bañez evidently finds a way to emphasise that man's freedom is not replaced by grace in the process of human consent to God.

Bañez, therefore, not only contended for the infallibility of the divine will, but also highlighted that God does not impose necessity on every thing. Although Bañez acknowledges the freedom of the

⁹² *Summa* Ia-IIae q.10 a.4, see *Apologia* I, Ch. 12, n.2; in *Apologia* III, Ch. IV, n. 3, Bañez appealed to Thomas by referring to another paragraph from Ia q. 23 a. 6, ad 3: "Vnde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non praedestinare quem praedestinavit, in sensu composito accipiendo; licet absolute considerando, Deus possit praedestinare uel non praedestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur praedestinationis certitudo."

⁹³ The text is: "Secunda conclusio in solutione ad tertium. Non oportet dicere, quod Deus possit non praedestinare, quem praedestinavit in sensu composito accipiendo, quamuis simpliciter loquendo istum hominem de quo dicimus, quod est praedestinatus, possit Deus non praedestinare".

⁹⁴ It will be interesting to note that for Calvin, regarding the divided sense, this capacity of the human will does not remain unless efficacious grace is removed. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 304.

human beings by saying that God's motion of human will is not a necessity⁹⁵, he did not thereby intend to discard the efficacy of the divine will. Hence we observe that Bañez's definition of freedom has two elements: i) God does not move the human will in a necessary way ii) freedom does not consist in the ability to do something contrary, but rather in the inclination to the good.

Furthermore, in Bañez's interpretation of freedom, he went on to explore the true meaning of human freedom, and its concordance with grace. The solution given by Bañez was to appeal to the perfect model of freedom in God in order to define freedom in human beings. Considered from this aspect, if *uel contrarium* were intrinsically necessary for freedom, no freedom would be found in God. The outcome would be that God has less freedom than human beings. This is definitely unacceptable to Bañez. On the contrary, the perfect freedom found in God suggests that true human freedom consists in the choice of good:

[Q]uamuis nulla creatura sit natura sua omnino impeccabilis...si uirtute gratiae Dei confirmetur in bono ita ut peccare non possit, non ideo destruitur libertas ad electionem boni necessariam, sed potius perfectiori modo erit libera creatura quanto magis per gratiam (Deo) assimilatur⁹⁶.

According to this interpretation, the notion of freedom is derived from freedom in God. When human beings are assimilated to God's grace and choose the good, they have perfect freedom, the freedom to bring about its fulfillment. Just as in God, the perfect goodness is conjoined with the necessity of the divine nature, the human will is also determined (*determinata*) to its own object, which is good in general. In fact, because of the imperfection of human beings, evil can become the object of the human will. However, Bañez contended that we do not wish to do the evil for the sake of the evil itself (*sub ratione mali*). Rather, we intend to pursue the good as we understand it. For this reason, according to Bañez's theology, we cannot assert that the freedom of human beings consists in their ability to sin, which is the contrary of good⁹⁷. Otherwise, sinners have more freedom than the people in the state of grace who only walk in the ways of God. Therefore, we can say that the realisation of the freedom of human beings depends on the inclination to the good,

⁹⁵ Bañez *In Summam Ia* q.23, a. 6.

⁹⁶ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.3.

⁹⁷ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n. 8; *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.2-4.

rather than the choice of evil⁹⁸. When somebody makes a necessary choice of the good in the state of grace, his freedom cannot be said to be destroyed. On the contrary, created freedom works in a more perfect way. In this sense, both the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Apostles merit by being obedient through an act of divinely mandated freedom. This idea of freedom allows St. Thomas' resistance to the interpretation of the will's indifference regarding contraries⁹⁹ and contended that the human will's inclination is to its end, namely, beatitude. In the light of this understanding of freedom, God has the highest level of freedom, and the angels have more freedom than human beings. Although he denied any indifference regarding the end, Bañez conceded the indifference of the intellect in the choice of the *means* to reach the end. In the *Tractatus*, regarding these two aspects, there is a proper account of freedom (*propria ratio libertatis*)¹⁰⁰. Therefore, a free agent in Bañez's thought should be that *operatur propter finem cum cognitione seu ex cognitione indifferentiae mediorum ad finem*¹⁰¹. In other words, the principle of the freedom consists in the factor that *intellectus iudicat indifferentiam alicuius medii secundum se ad finem*¹⁰².

Having understood these two aspects of Bañez's interpretation of freedom, his version of the concordance of human freedom and grace will be easy to understand. By denying that human freedom consists in indifference to do something or to do something contrary, Bañez sought its proper meaning in the human will's choice of the good. When we chose the good, rather than its contrary, freedom is not destroyed. On the contrary, true harmony between grace and human freedom is realised. Any person who is joined to God by His grace, is also moved by the Holy Spirit to do what God commands¹⁰³. Under the efficacious work of the Holy Spirit, humans are joined to God's will as the sons of God by imitating the Father. Since the proper meaning of the true freedom does not consist in indifference toward

⁹⁸ "quin potius posse peccare imperfectio maxima et infirmitas est liberi arbitrii, quod quidem de se ut est a Deo habet inclinationem et ordinem ad bonum, usque adeo ut etiam dum peccat, non intendat formaliter malum, sed semper mouetur sub aliqua ratione boni." *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.2.

⁹⁹ See *Summa* Ia-IIae q. 10 a. 2 and Pinckaers's notes on this article in S. Pinckaers, *Les Actes Humains*, (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 332.

¹⁰⁰ *Tractatus* I, Ch. I, n. 9.

¹⁰¹ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.7.

¹⁰² *Apologia* I, Ch. XIII, n.5.

¹⁰³ St. Thomas's view in the *Summa* IIa-IIae q. 24 a. 11 was appealed to confirm the power of the Holy Spirit.

good and evil (but in the inclination to the good), the freedom of the sons of God wills what the Holy Spirit commands and should be regarded as being perfected by grace, rather than its destruction. Besides, since God does not move human beings in a necessary way, the operation of grace must be both gentle and strong (*sic fortiter et suauius ducuntur ad operandum quod Deo placitum est*¹⁰⁴). Efficacious grace itself has the power of moving the human will. This is a process of perfecting the will and intellect, but it works in a gently way, not by denying human freedom. This is also the classical Thomistic viewpoint summarised by Aidan Nichols in his introduction to the great 20th century Thomist Garrigou-Lagrange:

Pray, abandon yourself to divine Providence, watch that you do not resist sufficient grace which comes to you as good inspirations, and God will grant you the efficacious grace that will bring you to the ever more perfect charity¹⁰⁵.

Seen from this perspective, Christ's freely given obedience to death, and the Virgin Mary's "fiat" to God are the examples of the concordance between grace and human freedom.

To summarise, Bañez's viewpoint on human freedom is a supplement to his position on the efficacy of grace. What concerned Bañez was both the certainty of grace and human freedom. Both of them are important for a Catholic theologian. Following St. Thomas, he contended that God did not move the human will in a necessary way, though in an infallible way. In other words, God's movement is infallible but not necessary—that is, it does not force the will. Garrigou-Lagrange made an important comment on this point: *de facto* "the human will can resist efficacious grace if it so wills, as the Council of Trent declares, but as long as the will is under efficacious grace, it never wills to resist"¹⁰⁶. In other words, grace operates gently and with power. Moreover, Bañez defined freedom of will as the faculty of choosing the means in view of an end to be attained. This definition allows him to set the perfect model of freedom under God's grace. Therefore, the proper meaning of human freedom does not consist in

¹⁰⁴ *Apologia* I, Ch. XIV, n.1; *fortiter et suauius* are the words used frequently by Bañez to explain his viewpoint of efficacious grace; e.g. "efficacia diuini auxilii ut est ab Spiritu Sancto non destruit sed perficit libertatem, quatenus Spiritus fortiter et suauius mouet uoluntatem perficiendo facultatem intellectus et uoluntatis. *Apologia* I, Ch. 14, n.3.

¹⁰⁵ Aidan Nichols, *Reason with Piety, Garrigou-Lagrange in the Service of Catholic Thought* (Sapientia Press, 2008), 104.

¹⁰⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *Grace*, 422.

the refusal of God who is goodness itself, but rather in the assimilation into God's grace. Human freedom can only be actualised and perfected in grace. For this reason, in Bañez's own theological system, efficacious grace does not necessarily move in a way that contradicts human freedom.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we have explored Bañez's viewpoint on the efficacy of grace, which was one of the most important theological controversies in the 16th century. The Council of Trent insisted on the existence of human free will, but the Council did not clearly state how human freedom interacts with grace. The principle laid down by the Council, therefore, left space for theologians to debate how grace can be in concordance with human freedom. This ambiguity led to the debate on whether grace is intrinsically efficacious and how this efficacy can be harmonious with human autonomy. Bañez strongly contended for the legitimacy of distinguishing efficacious grace from sufficient grace. The starting point of his theology of efficacious grace is metaphysical. Bañez regarded God's grace as a divine motion, which creates a dependence of human beings on God for their own existence (*esse*). By adopting a radical interpretation of St. Thomas, Bañez contended that only God *simpliciter* causes the existence of all things. The secondary causes only determine effects in a specific way (*tale ens*). This distinction allowed him to claim that God is the exclusive cause of the secondary agent's action. According to Bañez this dependence of existence also means that all secondary agents act in virtue of God Himself: He assigns the principle of operation to the created agents (secondary cause) and also supplies the principle to operate in them. It is God, therefore, that premoves the secondary agents to act, not that God and the secondary agents operate together to produce effects.

Applying the principle of divine motion to grace, Bañez firmly insisted on a real difference between sufficient grace and efficacious grace, and on that the latter is intrinsically efficacious. Just as God moves a secondary agent to produce the effects, efficacious grace infallibly moves the human will. To refute Molina's middle knowledge theory, Bañez emphasised grace's feature of "premotion". It is God's love that bestows efficacious grace and premoves man, rather than it being His foreknowledge of a person's freely consenting to his grace that renders sufficient grace efficacious. In this context, Bañez linked predestination with efficacious grace. To those elected by Him,

God grants efficacious grace and premoves their minds. Here grace is a means to realise God's predestination.

Last but not least, as a Catholic theologian, Bañez did not forget about the existence of human freedom under the operation of grace. According to his understanding, grace does not impede human freedom. On the contrary, it is only actualised and perfected in grace. Efficacious grace moves human will in a gentle way, never imposing itself on human freedom in a necessary way. By introducing "divided sense" into his argumentation, Bañez found a way to contend that the human will retains the ability of not being moved, even if the will itself *de facto* is moved by God.

Bañez deserves an important place in the history of theology for his efforts in elucidating the theology of efficacious grace. In his system of efficacious grace, the majesty of God is the essential element and he never ceased to defend and give priority to this majesty. So I would like to quote the last words of the *Apologia* to end our discussion:

Profecto nullam rationem proferre poterunt, praeter diuinam liberam uoluntatem, quae misericorditer quos uoluit elegit; reliquos uero, ut ostenderetur ordo diuinae sapientiae et iustitiae, permisit deficere per peccatum et in eo permanere. Clamemus igitur omnes: *O altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei. Ipsi Gloria in saecula*¹⁰⁷.

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¹⁰⁷ *Tractatus* III, n.10.