

A MIND-CENTERED APPROACH OF *IMAGO DEI* A DYNAMIC CONSTRUCTION IN AUGUSTINE'S *DE TRINITATE* XIV

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Abstract

The present article argues that the dynamism of *imago Dei* in Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIV should be approached as a mind-centered epistemology, that ontology and epistemology should be combined in order to understand Augustine's use of *imago Dei*. Previous interpretations of *imago Dei* in *De Trinitate* XIV remained on the ontological level. As such, the epistemological dimension of the *imago Dei*, facilitated by the shift from the mind's 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God', is not taken into account. This epistemological and dynamic reading is based on the observations that, for Augustine: (1) the triad 'remember – understand – love' is a logic that the mind applies to itself and God (rather than an ontological change), and (2) the mind's self-knowing and self-thinking distinguishes 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' from 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

Key words

De Trinitate, *imago Dei*, *mens*, 'remember God – understand God – love God', *se nosse*.

Introduction

The concept of *imago Dei* is an important Biblical concept in Augustine's thinking.¹ As a link between man and God, this concept

¹ The explicit texts for the *imago Dei* concept are mainly to be found in Genesis and the Pauline letters, as for example in the following citations (NIV Bible version):

Genesis:

Gn 1:26: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground.'"

Gn 1:27: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them."

Gn 9:6: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man."

plays a significant role in our understanding of Augustine's anthropology. J. Heijke's anthology² demonstrates that the theme of *imago Dei* is widely dispersed among Augustine's writings, including *Confessiones*, *De Genesis ad Litteram*, *De Civitate Dei*, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, *Epistulae*, *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, and *De Trinitate*, etc.³ Among these works, *De Trinitate* is important in coming to understand what "image of God" means.⁴ In this great masterpiece, the concept

Pauline letters:

I Cor 11:7: "A man ought not to cover his head, since he is the *image and glory of God*; but the woman is the glory of man."

II Cor 4:4: "The god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot see the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the *image of God*."

Col 1:15: "He is the *image of the invisible God*, the firstborn over all creation."

Col 3:10: "... and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the *image of its Creator*."

For a thorough analysis of Augustine's *imago Dei* concept, see *inter alios*: Isabelle Bochet, "Imago", *Augustinus-Lexikon* III/3-4 (2006): 507-519, esp. 514-517. Johannes Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus. Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De trinitate"*, (Hamburg: Meiner, 2000), esp. 213-250. Adalbert-Gauthier Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu. Essai d'une anthropologie chrétienne dans l'Église des cinq premiers siècles*, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1987), 238-277.

See also: Johannes Brachtendorf, "Mens", *Augustinus-Lexikon* III/5-6 (2010): 1270-1280, esp. 1257-1280. Volker Henning Drecoll, "Triaden, Analogien und das Verhältnis zur Hypostasenlehre des Neuplatonismus", V. H. Drecoll (ed.), *Augustinus Handbuch*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 450-456. Cornelius Mayer, "Homo", *Augustinus-Lexikon* III/3-4 (2006): 381-416, esp. 400-401, 404-405. For an elaborated state of the art of the significance of *imago* in *De Trinitate*, see Roland Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu "De trinitate"*, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum/Studies and Texts in Antiquity and Christianity 22, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 227-240.

² John Heijke, "St. Augustine's comments on "*imago Dei*": An Anthology from all his Works exclusive of the *De Trinitate*", *Class. Folia, Suppl.* 3 (1960): 1-95.

³ According to Heijke's study, the occurrences are as follows:

Confessiones: III, 12; VI, 4; XI, 11; XIII, 12; XIII, 32; XIII, 35; XIII, 47.

De Genesis ad Litteram: III, 19; III, 20; III, 22; VI, 12; VI, 19; VI, 27; VII, 22; IX, 17; X, 2-3; XI, 42; XII, 7; XII, 31.

Enarrationes in Psalmos: XXIX, 2; XXXII, 2; XXXIV, 2; XXXV, 11; XLII, 6; XLVIII, 1; XLVIII, 2; XLIX, 2; LIV, 3; LVII, 1; LVII, 11; LXIII, 11; LXVI, 4; LXX, 2; LXXV, 3; XCII, 1; XCIV, 2; CI, 1; CII, 3; CIII, 4; CXVIII, 18; CXXXVIII, 14; CXLV, 5; CXLVI, 18.

Epistulae: XI, 3; XXIII, 1; LV, 11; LV, 20; XCII, 3; CXX, 2; CXX, 3; CXX, 4; CXLVII, 19; CLXIX, 1; CLXIX, 2, etc.

De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII: Q. 12; Q. 18; Q. 23; Q. 51, 1-4; Q. 58, 2; Q. 67, 4; Q. 74.

De Trinitate: IV, 7; VII, 2; VII, 5; VII, 12; XI, 8, etc.

⁴ In his impressive study *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, Roland Kany gives a *status quaestionis* of the research of *De Trinitate* since 1841 (edition in *Patrologia Latina*). Kany observes that modern systematic theology distanced itself from Augustine's doctrine of Trinity, because of Augustine's emphasis on the intra-personal and monotheistic

of *imago Dei* is constructed alongside the so-called psychological triads, such as 'lover – love – loved', 'mind – knowledge – will', 'memory – intellect – will', etc.⁵ Augustine's psychological program is founded

dimension of the Trinity and because of his so-called neglect of the inter-personal and relational aspect of God. Kany finds the confirmation that this rejection is incorrect, in a shift of interpretation that has taken place during the last decades, in the course of which the neo-scholastic approach of Augustine has been abandoned, a better insight into the church-historical and theological context (the Trinitarian controversies of the 4th century) has been gained, and philosophy has become interested in Augustine. According to Kany, contemporary philosophers rediscovered the original basis of Augustine's Trinitarian thinking, namely the theory of human self consciousness that he learned from antique philosophy, and in doing so, they revised the interpretation that *De Trinitate* is merely theological. Augustine's contribution, Kany concludes, to contemporary theology of Trinity, is a doctrine based on an understanding of human self-consciousness. Recently, van Bavel summarized Augustine's unique contribution to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in the following points: "1) Augustine carried out pioneering work in the distinction between absolute qualities, such as wisdom and goodness, and relational qualities, such as fatherhood and promises, of God. 2) God is presented especially as relationship, both within Himself and within Creation, and this Falque [Emmanuel Falque, "Saint Augustin ou comment Dieu entre en théologie. Lecture critique des Livres V-VII du *De Trinitate*]", *Nouvelle revue théologique* 117 (1995): 84-111] calls a crucial moment in the history of theology. 3) Love emerges not only as a divine gift but as divine life itself. 4) Love as the distinguishing appellation for the Holy Spirit. 5) Man is not only created 'in' the image of God, but 'is' the image of God himself. 6) Attributing the manifestations of God solely to the Son, as less transcendent, is discontinued, and as a consequence hierarchy in the divine persons is avoided." Tarsicius-Jan van Bavel, "To See the Ineffable by Way of the Inexpressible: the Trinity", Tarsicius-Jan van Bavel (ed.), Margaret Clark & Paul Holberton (trans.), Bernard Bruning (red.), *Saint Augustine*, (Brussels: Mercatorfonds, 2007), 97-103, 98. For an overview of the studies devoted to the theological and philosophical aspects of Augustine's trinitarian psychology, trinitarian ontology and logics and *imago Dei*, see Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu "De trinitate"*, 227-240; 272-294.

⁵ The term psychological triad or psychological analogy does not originate from Augustine's own work. However, it has become an authentic expression since Michael Schmaus's *Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, (Munster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927). The term generally refers to the triad cluster that appears within the realm of the latter half of *De Trinitate*.

Scattered mainly within the realm of the latter half of *De Trinitate*, the psychological triads are generally referred to as:

1. 'lover – love – loved' (*amans - amor - amatus*) [VIII, 14].
2. 'mind – knowledge – love' (*mens - notitia - amor*) [IX, 3].
3. 'memory – understanding – will' (*memoria - intelligentia - voluntas*) [X, 11, 7].
4. 'the body that is seen – vision – attention of the mind' (*corpus quod videtur - visio - animi intentio*) [XI, 2].
5. 'body retained in memory – inner vision – will' (*corpus quod in memoria manet - visio interna - volitio*) [XI, 9].
6. 'knowledge to faith – thinking – love' (*scientia (fidei) - cogitatio - amor*) [XIII, 20, 26].

on the fact that man is the image of God. The concept *imago Dei* becomes more vivid through the unfolding process of the psychological triads. As such, *imago Dei* is closely aligned to the said psychological triads. For example, E. Hill, the Augustine scholar who has translated *De Trinitate* in *The Works of Saint Augustine* series,⁶ understands the psychological triads as a search for the image of God.⁷ J. E. Sullivan also aligns psychological triads to *imago Dei* in his classification of the triads. He sees two distinctions: 'vestiges of the Trinity' and 'image of the Trinity',⁸ which use the image of God as criteria to determine their importance.

In formulating the *imago Dei* doctrine, *De Trinitate* XIV plays a particularly crucial role. The phrase *imago Dei* appears 62 times

7. 'remembering itself – understanding itself – loving itself' (*memoria sui - intelligentia sui - uoluntas sui*) [XIV, 9].

8. 'remembering God – understanding God – loving God' (*memoria Dei - intelligentia Dei - amor Dei*) [XIV, 15].

Some scholars also identify other triad patterns, but the examples outlined above are the most important ones. Some other examples of the triad pattern include Yves Congar's list, as follows:

1. *amans - amatus - amor* (VIII, 10, 14; cf. IX, 2, 2).

2. *mens - notitia - amor* (IX, 3, 3).

3. *memoria - intelligentia - uoluntas* (X, 11, 7).

4. *res (uisa) - uisio (exterior) - intentio* (XI, 2, 2).

5. *memoria (sensibilis) - uisio (interior) - uoluntas* (XI, 3, 6-9).

6. *memoria (intellectus) - scientia - uoluntas* (XII, 15, 25).

7. *scientia (fidei) - cogitatio - amor* (XIII, 20, 26).

8. *memoria Dei - intelligentia Dei - amor Dei* (XIV, 12, 15).

See Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit (vol III): the River of Life Flows in the East and in the West* (New York: Seabury, 1983), 89.

⁶ Saint Augustine, *The Trinity, The Works of Saint Augustine* I-5, Edmund Hill (trans.), (New York: New City Press, 1991).

⁷ The titles he gives to each book in the latter half of his translation of *De Trinitate* reflect his intention:

Book IX – "Psychological: Mental Image, First Draft",

Book X – "Psychological: Mental Image, Second Draft",

Book XI – "Psychological: Mental Image, Lesser Analogies",

Book XII – "Man's Case History: The Image Broken Up, The Fall",

Book XIII – "Man's Case History: The Image Repaired, Redemption",

Book XIV – "Man's Case History: The Image Perfected",

Book XV – "The Absolute Inadequacy of the Perfected Image".

See also Edmund Hill, "Introduction", in Saint Augustine, *The Trinity*, WSA I-5, 21-27.

⁸ The concept of 'vestiges of Trinity', refers to three triads: Trinity in external vision (visible object – act of vision – attention of the mind), Trinity in internal vision (memory – internal vision – the will) and Trinity of faith (highest form in *ratio inferior*). The 'image of Trinity' refers to the following three triads: '*mens - notitia sui - amor sui*', '*memoria - intelligentia - uoluntas sui*', '*memoria Dei - intelligentia - uoluntas*'. See John Edward Sullivan, *The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its influence*, (Iowa: Priory Press, 1963), 85-161.

(both explicitly and implicitly) in this single book, accounting for nearly one-third of all the references in the whole *De Trinitate*.⁹ It is also the book in which Augustine's *imago Dei* doctrine comes explicitly to the foreground. Although all psychological triads are related to *imago Dei*, the concept remains vague throughout Augustine's quest in Books VIII – XIII.¹⁰ The real *imago Dei* only appears when we come to Book XIV (from Book XIV, 11 onwards), because only then does Augustine clearly state that the *imago Dei* has been finally discerned.¹¹ Instead of being defined negatively, in Book XIV, this concept now finds its positive assertion within the mind. Moreover, Augustine endows the *imago Dei* doctrine with a highly dynamic character in Book XIV, which makes Augustine's *imago Dei* a very powerful and influential concept in his theology. 'Dynamic' means that this *imago Dei* should not be regarded as an inner structure of the human mind and

⁹ The lexicon analysis is done through *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* (CAG). *Imago Dei* in explicit sense refers to all the phrases which appear explicitly in the form of *imago Dei* like *imaginem Dei*, *imaginis Dei*, *imagine Dei*, *imagini Dei*. *Imago Dei* in implicit sense refers to those *imago* terms (without the qualification *Dei*), which when looked into their context, mean *imago Dei*. The total sum is 216 entries.

¹⁰ In Books IX–XIII *imago Dei* is only defined in a negative way. Augustine states that the images signified by the triads are not the image of God, or are 'imperfect'. This use of *imago Dei* can be summarized as follows:

BK IX, 2	Referring to the trinity concluded in BK VIII, namely 'lover, what is loved, and love', and regarding it as an imperfect image.
BK IX, 18	Referring to another trinity by focusing on mind as subject: 'mind, its knowledge, its love'.
BK X, 19	Referring to trinity: 'memory, understanding, and will', and regarding it as an imperfect image.
BK XI, 1	Start of the journey to trace the Trinity in outer man, i.e. through bodily senses, which is not the image of God.
BK XI, 18	In the end of BK XI, Augustine confesses that the image of God cannot be sought in the outer man, and he now turns back to the inner man to search the image of God.
BK XIII, 26	Referring to the triad of faith: 'remembering, contemplating, and loving of the faith', but stating that this triad is still not the image of God.

¹¹ *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 426): "If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not yet God indeed, but now finally an image of God." "Hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum sed iam imaginem Dei." (CCL 50, 436.) The translation is taken from: *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church 45, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963).

therefore static in nature.¹² Rather, it is subjected to a renewal process. *Imago Dei* is a journey of growth in *sapientia*, undergoing a transformation from *sapientia* of man to the *sapientia* of God. Such a dynamic renewal is especially highlighted by the fact that man's psychological triad can shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' (XIV, 11) to 'remember God – understand God – love God' (XIV, 15). When the mind comes to the stage of 'remember God – understand God – love God', that is, a God-centered stage, the renewal process reaches its climax, and the mind is said to be 'wise' and so a real *imago Dei* emerges.¹³

Therefore, in order to understand Augustine's *imago Dei* doctrine, especially its dynamic character, we have to carry out a detailed study of Book XIV. The special focus of our study falls on the rationale behind the shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. What is the relationship between the two triads? What happens in the shift to a real *imago Dei*? While many scholars discern the importance of the

¹² The standpoint that Augustine's *imago Dei* is the inner structure of the human mind and therefore an analogy to the inner being of God is formulated by Colin Gunton. (See Colin Gunton, "Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West", *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43 (1990): 33-58, 48). His interpretation has been criticized among Augustine scholars. For a general review, see Lewis Ayres, "Augustine, the Trinity and Modernity", *Augustinian Studies* 26:2 (1995): 128-32; Michel Rene Barnes, "Rereading Augustine's Theology of the Trinity", Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, Gerald O'Collins (eds.), *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). *Imago Dei*'s 'dynamic' dimension has also been brought forth by scholars. Walter H. Principe points out that Augustine opts for verbs which have a dynamic quality to describe the vital drive of the highest image toward the Trinity in *De Trinitate* XIV-XV. Augustine namely prefers to use the verbs (e.g. *meminisse*, *intelligere*, *amare*) instead of the nouns (e.g. *memoria*, *intellegentia*, *amor/dilectio*). Walter H. Principe, "The Dynamism of Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person", *Studia Patristica* 17/3 (1982): 1291-1299.

¹³ *Trin.* XIV, 15 (FC, 432). "Unless the *mens* is actively participating in the life of God, the image is imperfect (*Trin.* 14.8.11). This implies, of course, that when the mind most fully knows and loves God, it most fully knows and loves itself – a theme familiar from the *Confessiones* and elsewhere in Augustine's writing (14.14.18). It is set free for the proper and effective love of the neighbor (14.14.19), and occupies its due place in the universe, its desire being satisfied with the unchanging presence of God, for the enjoyment of which it was made (14.14.19). The contemplative, sapiential knowledge of God is what is most deeply natural for the *mens*, so that when we come to this perfection and realize what we are made for, the self that self-knowledge and self-love relate to is a self wholly turned away from self-preoccupation or self-protection, a self whose object is God in a so total sense that there is no self to be seen or known apart from relation to God. This is our eschatological hope (14.17.23-14.19.25)." Rowan Williams, "Trinitate, De", Allan Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, (Grand Rapids (MI) – Cambridge (UK): William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 845-851, 849-850.

shift as the cornerstone of Augustine's dynamic *imago Dei*, they limit their view most often to its ontological dimension – an ontological shift from self to God. The present article analyzes the shift more thoroughly by putting it within the whole context of Book XIV. It aims to go beyond the ontological interpretation of the dynamism, and brings the missing mind-centered dynamism of the *imago Dei* to the foreground and reveals its significance to our understanding of Augustine's theology. Mind-centered dynamism means that the shift closely aligns to the noetic activities of the mind. Apart from the ontological dimension, this dynamism is highly epistemological. In doing so, we will firstly review the current ontological trend in interpreting the *imago Dei*'s dynamism. Secondly, we will introduce our thesis of mind-centered dynamism to fill the lacuna in current interpretations. Subsequently, this mind-centered phenomenon will be further elaborated through two themes: the 'remember – understand – love' logic and the mind's self-knowing (*se nosse*) and self-thinking (*se cogitare*). Finally we will consider the specific significance of this specific kind of dynamism.

The Ontological Trend in Interpreting the *Imago Dei*'s Dynamism

Ontological Interpretations Based on Book XIV, 15

The understanding of the dynamism of *imago Dei* is overshadowed by the interpretation that it is a purely ontological issue. In explaining the shift, that is, the transition from the stage at which the mind will 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' (XIV, 11) to the stage of 'remember God – understand God – love God' (XIV, 15), many scholars focus on the connection of man's *sapientia* to God,¹⁴ a link that easily leads to an ontological connection. This seems to be supported by the following often quoted passage, through which many Augustine scholars find their pivot in their ontological interpretations:

Book XIV, 15: "Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand,

¹⁴ *Trin.* XIV, 3 (FC, 413). "Nul texte n'affirme avec plus de force le caractère ontologique de l'image que ce chapitre du livre XIV. L'image ne se surajoute pas à une âme déjà créée, mais elle est constitutive de la *mens*, et, comme telle, inamissible. Elle commence avec l'âme, demeure dans le pécheur, est rénovée par la justification, s'épanouit dans la vision." Joseph Moingt, in Augustin, *La Trinité. Deuxième Partie: Les images*, Bibliothèque Augustinienne/Œuvres de Saint Augustin 16/IV, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), 630.

and love Him by whom it was made. And when it does so, it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though it remembers itself, knows itself, and loves itself, it is foolish. Let it, then, remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and understand Him and love Him.¹⁵

This passage reveals the criteria a real *imago Dei* should meet. It does not just stay on the level of remembering, understanding, and loving itself, but clarifies that God should be considered as the *imago Dei*-object that we need to remember, understand and love. Referring to this passage, scholars tend to assume a transition of object in the dynamism. It is moving from the object 'self' to the object 'God'. Such a treatment implies a split of objects, a split between man and God, leading to the conclusion that the dynamism is a totally God-centered state. With such presupposition, the shift is perceived as an ontological transformation of man, like in the case of mystical union, sanctification or deification, etc. In general, the ontological dimension of the shift raised by the said scholars could be categorized into three schemes.

Three Kinds of Ontological Interpretation

The first line of interpretation is the transformation paradigm of G. B. Ladner, G. Bonner and M. Marocco. These scholars try to identify the renewal of *imago Dei* as an ontological transformation of man. Ladner takes it as a reformation.¹⁶ Bonner aligns it closely (if not equally) with the Eastern concept of deification, like that of Athanasius.¹⁷ Marocco, being highly influenced by Ladner and Bonner, also develops her view along this line, and goes even further by considering it as a complete process, in that *imago Dei* is a life journey with different stages like the state of the fall and the state of renewal, etc. Through the process of 'remember God – understand God – love God', man participates in God, invoking the activation of the image,¹⁸ leading to

¹⁵ *Trin.* XIV, 15 (FC, 432). "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit seque intellegit ac diligit, stulta est. Meminerit itaque Dei sui ad cuius imaginem facta est eumque intellegat atque diligit." (CCL 50, 442-443.)

¹⁶ Gerhart B. Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God", *Augustinus Magister*. Actes du Congrès international augustinien, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1954), vol. II, 867-878.

¹⁷ Gerald Bonner, "Augustine's Doctrine of Man: Image of God and Sinner", *Augustinianum* 24:3 (1984): 495-514, 510.

¹⁸ Mary Marocco, "Participation in Divine Life in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine", *Augustinianum* 42 (2002): 149-185, 157.

the state of renewal of the image,¹⁹ transforming the previous state of the fall of the soul.²⁰

Another approach is the moral application of Th. A. Fay. According to him, 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is a kind of natural power, whereas 'remember God – understand God – love God' is God's grace on the supernatural level of wisdom.²¹ It is a life invoked by the intimate life of the divine Trinity. *Imago Dei* thus means being united with God and being made alike to Him.²² He emphasizes the 'wise' dimension in his interpretation, in that being wise or foolish depends solely on the ontological *sapientia* level. He accentuates the moral dimension through the ontology of *sapientia*.

The third line of approach is the object-shift interpretation of J. E. Sullivan. The previous two schemes result in the object split interpretation, in that the self is in a totally different state than God, with very little awareness of the relationship between self and God. The objects, God and the self, are thus split. These two approaches are interested only in the object God. They focus on the description of the God-centered state, on the transformation of man and the state of "being wise", in which the role of the self is almost dismissed. However, in Sullivan's object shift approach, the relationship between the two objects is also taken into account. He notes that in the quoted passage, Augustine has brought to the fore two objects for discussion: God as object and self as object. With this observation, it could be said that Sullivan moves a step further than the two previous interpretations. He remains, however, within the ontological framework of the discussion. In an ontological sense, the dynamism implies that man is to replace the object self with the object God. "Self must be related to God as the object, and in a subordinate way."²³ In that sense, self and God are still placed in a counter-position. Therefore in treating the three triads of 'mind – knowledge – love', 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', 'remember God – understand God – love God', Sullivan prefers to categorize the first two as one group and the third as a separate scheme, because the former perceive self as object and the latter God. Moreover, the triad 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is regarded to be only a refinement and development of the

¹⁹ Marocco, "Participation in Divine Life in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine", 160.

²⁰ Marocco, "Participation in Divine Life in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine", 159.

²¹ Thomas A. Fay, "'*Imago Dei*'. Augustine's Metaphysics of Man", *Antonionum* 49 (1974): 173-197, 186.

²² Fay, "'*Imago Dei*'. Augustine's Metaphysics of Man", 187.

²³ Sullivan, *The image of God*, 137.

previous one: 'mind – knowledge – love'.²⁴ The jump from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God' would inevitably proceed within the ontological level. All of the above interpretations often emphasize too much the contrast between the self and God, which seems to imply that 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', is totally meaningless, unless it can be altered to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. In order to highlight the contrast, this shift is portrayed as undergoing a radical change – a change of solely ontological concern. These studies, however, have never really paid attention to the relationship between the self and God. What happens in the shift? What enables the shift from the self to God? Apart from its undeniable ontological dimension, the shift is also largely involved within the mind's noetic activities, which opens up the epistemological dimension of the *imago Dei*.

The Mind-Centered Dynamism: An Epistemological Concern of *Imago Dei*

Instead of perceiving the self-reflexive 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and the God-centered 'remember God – understand God – love God' as two different ontological stages, it is more appropriate to regard them as two different modes of the self's existence – a self-centered mode and a God-centered mode respectively – situated both in the mind. As such, the differentiation between the two stages is not perceived ontologically but epistemologically. This is what we call the epistemological dimension of the *imago Dei*.

Although the psychological approach, like that of M. Schmaus, has already rendered an ontological discourse within the human reflection, and therefore has presupposed an epistemological dimension, our approach of mind-centered dynamism could contribute to the epistemological dimension in a more profound way. Firstly, our approach aims to drill into the rationale behind the transition of the triads, and so to focus on the sophistication of the mind's epistemological action. Secondly, while the psychological approach is widely criticized as based on the assumed presupposition that man can build up an analogical triad to the Trinity through speculative reflection of the human ability,²⁵ which

²⁴ Sullivan, *The Image of God*, 134.

²⁵ Schmaus speaks of "analogische Bewährung des Dogmas". Schmaus, *Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre des Heiligen Augustinus*, 183.

is actually not Augustine's own concern,²⁶ our mind-centered approach will reveal this presupposition and bring out the epistemological dimension through reading Augustine's context carefully.

The Epistemological Elements in the Lexicon Imago Dei

In analyzing the term *imago Dei*, we have first to distinguish the meaning of '*imago Dei*' in *De Trinitate* from that of '*ad imaginem Dei*' in the Christian tradition and Augustine's earlier writings. The reflections on *imago Dei* among church fathers mainly sprang from an interpretation of the Bible phrase "make man in our image and likeness" ("*faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*") (Gen 1:26). In the tradition preceding Augustine, church fathers in general think that *imago Dei* can only refer to the Son. The human being, on the other hand, is the *imago* of the *imago Dei* (the Son), and is therefore regarded as created towards the image of God '*ad imaginem Dei*'. This is the general Western stance (e.g., Marius Victorinus²⁷) and also the stance Augustine takes in his earlier writings.²⁸ However, being affected by Ambrose and through his renewed and deepened understanding of Paul, Augustine rejects his earlier thinking and becomes sure that man is already the '*imago Dei*' instead of the '*ad imaginem Dei*'.²⁹ Instead of separating the value of *imago* and *similitudo* as in the Eastern Greek tradition, Augustine affirms that man is the image and likeness of God. But as only the Son is the Father's image and likeness in the sense of equality, man's image is a created image and his likeness is an unequal likeness (as opposed to Son's equal likeness).³⁰ Book VII, 12 shows that

²⁶ Roland Kany states that this is not Augustine's own concern. He cites Matthew Drever's comment that we should take God as the premise: "The movement of self to God is premised on the opposite and prior movement of God to self: it is only because God has created humans in the image of the Trinity and redeemed that image through Christ that the human self has a triadic structure capable of granting some understanding of the Trinity." Matthew Drever, "The Self before God? Rethinking Augustine's Trinitarian Thought", *Harvard Theological Review* 100 (2007): 233-242, 242. For Kany's comment on Schmaus, see Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 136-142.

²⁷ Robert A. Markus, "'Imago' and 'similitudo' in Augustine", *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 10 (1964): 125-143, 125.

²⁸ Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 229.

²⁹ Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 229.

Bochet, "Imago", 514: Augustine abandons the distinction between the Son as image and man as created to the image around 395, when he composes *diu. qu.* 74: because the Son is absolutely equal to the Father, one can say that man is image of God, without questioning the distinction between Son and man. Moreover, man is image of God as Trinity, and not only image of the Son.

³⁰ Markus, "'Imago' and 'similitudo' in Augustine", 135.

Augustine in *De Trinitate* clearly takes the stance that man is '*imago Dei*' and that he rejects the interpretation of '*ad imaginem Dei*'.³¹

In the '*ad imaginem Dei*' context, the exploration of man as image is mainly ontological in affirming that man is the highest creature.³² However, taking distance from the '*ad imaginem Dei*' framework, Augustine begins to understand the notion '*imago Dei*' in a Trinitarian context. He did not consider *imago Dei* only in anthropological terms, but perceives also epistemological links in it for his search for the Trinity. He has already fostered this intention in Question 51 of *De diuersis quaestionibus*.³³ The Trinitarian context of *imago Dei* makes it a highly epistemological concept. First, in *De Trinitate*, searching for *imago Dei* is regarded as a kind of 'exercise of the mind' (*exercitatio animae/mentis*), a purification process through which man can obtain the vision of the Trinity. Although the term *exercitatio animae/mentis* only appears four times in *De Trinitate* (XIII, 26; XV, 1; XV, 5; XV, 10), it is widely recognized as one of the keys in interpreting this work.³⁴ Although there is no agreement on how to interpret such a mental exercise, the epistemological dimension it displays is undisputed.³⁵ Secondly, *imago Dei* in Book XIV also includes forms that are epistemologically-oriented. We can categorize the occurrences of *imago Dei* in Book XIV into three image-forms: 'created to the image' (*facimus ad imaginem Dei*),³⁶ 'walk in/according an image' (*in imagine*

³¹ *Trin.* VII, 12 (FC, 240).

³² Augustine has in some places mentioned that between God and *imago Dei* there is no interposition of any other nature ('*nulla natura interposita*'), and so *imago Dei* is the highest creature. *Gn. Litt. Imp.* XVI, 55-60; *Gn. Litt.* III, 19; *Trin.* XI, 8. Also see Heijke, "St. Augustine's comments on '*imago Dei*'", 4-7.

³³ *diu. qu.* 51, 3. Question 51 also reveals that *imago Dei* is not only the highest exemplary image of the Creator among all other creations. It is an immediate link between the mind and God. The *imago Dei* is an analogical site where man can participate in God. Robert Markus even proposes that Augustine has re-interpreted Genesis 1:26 and introduced *imago Dei* into a Trinitarian context. Markus, "'Imago' and 'similitudo' in Augustine", 132; Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God", 873.

³⁴ Frederick Van Fleteren regards obtaining knowledge of God to be Augustine's lifelong purpose in his theology. As such, he considers *exercitatio* as an integrating concept of the whole interior search in *De Trinitate* VIII-XV (Frederick Van Fleteren, "Thematic Reflections on the *De Trinitate*", *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, vols. 12-13, (1987-88): 221-227). John Cavadini treats the latter half of *De Trinitate* as two ascents seated in Bk VIII and Bk IX-XIV (John C. Cavadini, "The Structure and Intention of Augustine's *De Trinitate*", *Augustinian Studies* 23 (1992): 103-123). Lewis Ayres sees the *exercitatio animae* that happens in Book XIII as a key in interpreting Books VIII-XV (Lewis Ayres, "The Christological Context of Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIII: Toward Relocating Books VIII-XV", *Augustinian Studies* 29:1 (1998): 111-139).

³⁵ John Cavadini thinks that the *exercitatio animae* is a kind of practice similar to the Plotinian ascent. This stance, however, receives strong critique from Lewis Ayres, who proposes that the process of *exercitatio animae* is a participation in a Christian transformation based on Christ's saving action. Lewis Ayres, "The Christological Context of Augustine's *De Trinitate* XIII", 113-117.

³⁶ Such use mainly exists in the accusative form: *ad imaginem*. It is mainly related to bible quotations of Gn 1:26-27: "*Let us make man to our image and likeness*", "*And God made man to the image of God*" and Col 3:10: "*Stripping yourself of the old man with*

ambulat),³⁷ ‘reformed to the image’ (*imaginem transformamur*), as in the following chart:³⁸

Verses	Image-forms	Contents
XIV, 1-6	XIV, 6: ‘Walk in an image’ (mind as a candidate for eternal <i>imago Dei</i> , in that it knows or can know God).	From faith triads to wisdom of man.
XIV, 7-15		Mind as the better candidate of being <i>imago Dei</i> .
XIV, 16-18	XIV, 16: ‘Created to the image’. XIV, 18: ‘Reformed to the image’.	Mind in remembering God – understanding God – loving God.
XIV, 19-26	XIV, 19-21: ‘Walk in an image’ (the nature sustains even amid great evils, i.e. the sinful state of mind still does not reduce its ability to be <i>imago Dei</i>). XIV, 22-25: ‘Reformed to the image’ (XIV, 22-23: reform to likeness to God; XIV, 23-25: reform of the vision of God).	The permanent capability of mind in the present sinful state, and some foresights of the eschatological reformation.
XV, 1-5		Set up to seek God the Trinity.
XV, 6-10		Seek God-triad (Wisdom – Knowledge – Love) through linguistic logics.
XV, 11-41	XV, 14-16: ‘See through the image’.	Seek God the Trinity through the mirror.
XV, 42-51	XV, 14, 20-21: ‘Reformed to the image’ (likeness of created image approaches likeness of born image). XV, 39-44: ‘See through the image’.	Integrated argument: overall unlikeness.

his deeds, put on the new man, that is being renewed in the knowledge of God, according to the image of him who created him,” and their related texts: XIV, 4; XIV, 6; XIV, 16; XIV, 22; XIV, 25; XV, 5; XV, 20; XV, 39; XV, 49. It emphasizes the God-man relation as creator and creature. Therefore the image of God is of a created nature. Concerning man (image of God) as nature, it first points out that man is made according to “our” image, instead of “your” image (especially the quotation of Gn 1:26-27). Man is made according to the Trinitarian God instead of the Son only. Augustine spent much ink to explicate this in Bk XII. As being made to the image of God, the mind is the best nature among creatures, and therefore it is the best nature in reflecting God.

³⁷ Such use mainly exists in ablative form: *in imagine*. It is mainly related to the bible quotations of Ps 38:7 [Ps 39:6] “Although man walks in an image, yet he is disquieted in vain; he stores up, and he knows not for whom he shall gather those things”, other related image-phrases include ‘vanity of the image’, ‘the trinity of the image’, ‘realized in the image’, etc. They mainly appear in Bk XIV, 6 & XIV, 19.

³⁸ Such use exists in the nominative form *imago*, genitive form *imaginis*, and accusative form *imaginem*. Phrases of such category include ‘transformed to the image’

The epistemological dimension is clearly displayed in the third form 'reformed to the image'. What Augustine regards as a reformation in the image is not purely an ontological transformation. The reformation is tightly connected with the epistemological dimension, the knowledge of God: "For the likeness to God in this image will then be perfect when the vision of God will be perfect."³⁹ Since the three image-forms are interwoven neatly together, Augustine's epistemological intention also applies to the other two forms. As such, there exists a strong foundation that *imago Dei* in Book XIV could open up its epistemological perspective.⁴⁰

(XIV, 23; XV, 14), 'reform of the image' (XV, 22), 'perfection of the image' (XIV, 23; XIV, 25), 'renewed to the image' (XIV, 18; XIV, 20; XIV, 22; XIV, 23; XIV, 25; XV, 21). The latter is the most often used form, which points out that the image can be renewed from one state to another, and even could be perfected. Moreover, through the mediation of Col 3:10, this use points out that the image's renewal is related to knowledge, as it is renewed in the knowledge of God, or it points out that the renewal is related to the vision of God.

³⁹ *Trin.* XIV, 23 (FC, 445). Other similar passages include: *Trin.* XIV, 24 (FC, 445): "Hence, it is clear that the full likeness to God will then be realized in this image of God when it shall receive the full vision of Him..." "Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem quando eius plenam perceperit uisionem..." (CCL 50, 455). *Trin.* XIV, 25 (FC, 447): "But the image which is being renewed day by day in the spirit of the mind and in the knowledge of God, not outwardly but inwardly, will be perfected by the vision itself which will then be after judgement face to face, but it is making progress towards it now through a mirror in an obscure manner." "Imago uero quae renouatur in spiritu mentis in agnitione Dei [Col 3:10] non exterius sed interius de die in diem [II Cor 4:16], ipsa perficietur uisione quae tunc erit post iudicium facie ad faciem [I Cor 13:12], nunc autem proficit per speculum in aenigmate [I Cor 13:12]." (CCL 50, 457). "Die Umwendung der mens von der Torheit zur Weisheit nennt Augustinus *renouatio* des Bildes: ein Prozeß, in dem die mens von der Erkenntnis der Körper zur Selbsterkenntnis und zur Gotteserkenntnis aufsteigt. Während die Gotteserkenntnis im irdischen Leben nicht über eine Schau im Spiegel und Gleichnis hinausgelangt, wird sie in der Ewigkeit zur Schau von Angesicht zu Angesicht (*Trin.* 14,25). In der jenseitigen Vollendung tritt die mens zur Teilname an der göttlichen Natur hinzu und wird selbst unwandelbar (ib. 14,20)." Brachtendorf, "Mens", 1278.

⁴⁰ Renewal of human person is a theme that clearly displays that Augustine's understanding of *imago Dei* is not solely ontological, but also epistemological. The ontological and epistemological elements are entwined together to form a whole unity. The renewal of the human person is a renewal in the knowledge of God – a renewal in true justice and holiness. The renewal involves human's turning of his love from temporal things to eternal things (*Trin.* XIV, 23). The love perspective implies that the renewal must include a pursuit of ethical (and so ontological) renewal in the human being. Yet, we have to note that, Augustine's understanding of love always comes together with knowledge. In Book IX, his discussion of love (the love triad: Lover – love – loved) brings him to the discussion of knowledge. There he even unites knowledge and love together in word. (*Trin.* IX, 15: "Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare uolumus, cum amore notitia.") Knowledge of God and love of God are intertwined. As such, we can see why in the very

'Remember Itself – Understand Itself – Love Itself': Mind as imago Dei

The epistemological dimension of *imago Dei* is also displayed in the fact that the *imago Dei* revolves in the mind. It should be noted that not only the stage of 'remember God – understand God – love God' (Book XIV, 15) should be qualified as *imago Dei*. Earlier in Book XIV, 11, Augustine has already clearly stated that 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is qualified enough to be *imago Dei*. Although as reflected in Book XIV, 15 'remember God – understand God – love God' should be a better candidate, it does not abolish Augustine's recognition that 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' is finally an *imago Dei* during the quest.⁴¹

Book XIV, 11: "But we have now finally arrived at that point in our discussion where we begin to consider the principal part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find therein an image of God. ..."

"Behold! The mind, therefore, remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself; if we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not yet God indeed, but now finally an image of God."⁴²

beginning of Book XIV Augustine regards wisdom as a lovable worship or veneration of God (*Trin.* XIV, 1), and why the renewal of the human person is also a renewal in the vision of God (*Trin.* XIV, 23). The renewal is invoked with both love and knowledge. It is therefore ontological in some sense, yet also highly epistemological. For the entwinement of love and knowledge, see Volker H. Drecol, "*Mens – notitia – amor: Gnadenlehre und Trinitätslehre in De Trinitate IX*", Johannes Brachtendorf (ed.), *Gott und sein Bild: Augustins De Trinitate im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung*, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000), 137-154

⁴¹ In light of Book XIV, 11, Augustine's discourse in Book XIV, 15 should not be interpreted as a total nullification of the candidacy of 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' as *imago Dei*. Instead it should be understood as a comparison between 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God', and the latter is to be regarded as an even better candidate of *imago Dei*. This will become clearer in the latter section of this article, especially in the part of 'Mind-Centered Dynamism Construction II: the Mind's Knowing Itself and the Mind's Thinking Itself', where we will see how Augustine confirms the *imago Dei*'s candidacy in both cases.

Trin. XIV, 15 (FC, 432): "This trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made ... " (See above n. 15.)

⁴² *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 425-6). "Nunc uero ad eam iam peruenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo nouit Deum uel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiatur imaginem Dei. Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se. Hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum sed iam imaginem Dei." (CCL 50, 435-436.)

Augustine points out in these passages that when the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself, it is already an image of God. In light of this clear proclamation, we should understand Book XIV, 15 and Book XIV, 11 together in respect of *imago Dei*'s identity. This implies that the candidacy of *imago Dei* is not based on God, but on the mind. The subject involved in being *imago Dei* is the mind. As such, the shift would probably not be an ontological concern alone, but also an epistemological one. It is the shift in the attentiveness of the mind, the noetic change of the mind that enables the mind to be sometimes the *imago Dei*, and sometimes not the *imago Dei*. That is, the dynamism should be a mind-centered dynamism. This indicates that Augustine's concern in Book XIV is the mind or its activities instead of a state with God as its only dimension.

In the philosophical context of Augustine's thinking, 'mind' is a very important concept, because it is God's image if we remember, understand and love God as our Creator. Plotinus gives it even a cosmological importance. In Plotinus's thought, the human mind and soul, though not identifiable with the One, are 'divine' extensions of the hypostases, with which, in a sense, they form a continuity. Such an intellectual environment would without doubt leave its traces on Augustine, although we know that his own preference was to maintain the discontinuity between God and mind. As G. O'Daly has pointed out, in maintaining the discontinuity, that is, the idea that God is transcendent and immutable, whereas human nature (even human reason) is mutable, Augustine still manages to put the God-mind relation in a high position by shifting it to the knowledge level.⁴³ That is, the way for man to reach God, can only be achieved by means of an appropriately directed self-knowledge: God is 'within' us. The mind must transcend self-knowledge if it is to gain even such an incomplete understanding of the divine.⁴⁴ This means that at the knowledge level, although there is no continuity between God and mind, there is, in Augustine's thought, no dichotomy between the quest for self-knowledge, and the quest for knowledge of God.

The importance of the mind can be seen in the flow of argumentation in Book XIV. Throughout that whole book, we can say that Augustine is shaping the discussion into the mind. Book XIV, 1-6 is a discussion of the triad of faith, in reference to the mind. It is in a comparison between the triad of faith and the mind that the mind's

⁴³ Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, (L.A.: University of California Press, 1987), 1.

⁴⁴ O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, 1.

candidate as *imago Dei* is being drawn out. Subsequently in Book XIV, 7-10, Augustine readily shifts the whole focus to the mind. He gives here special treatment to the mind's inner activities, to the mind's knowing and thinking, which is a hint to us that the mind's inner activities are closely related to the *imago Dei*. In Book XIV, 11-18, Augustine continues to elaborate how man comes to the stage of 'remembering God – understanding God – loving God', and still the mind remains at the centre of discussion. Book XIV, 11-15 focuses on how the mind's inner activities stand out from the previous temporal things (the *scientia*).⁴⁵ Book XIV, 16-18 displays how 'remember God – understand God – love God' revolves around the mind. Subsequently, on the basis of the previous arguments, Augustine makes a final reflection on the dynamic *imago Dei* as the renewal of the *imago Dei*. What is this? This is a kind of renewal in "the spirit of your mind". Again, this concerns the dynamism relating to the mind. Therefore, we can postulate that Augustine's treatment in Book XIV centers on the mind as *imago Dei*.

The epistemological elements of the term *imago Dei*, and also the focus on the mind have shown that *imago Dei*'s dynamism in Book XIV is highly epistemological and is a mind-centered dynamism. The *imago Dei*'s dynamism, displayed fully in the shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God', is a noetic action that happens within the mind. The *imago Dei* is dynamic in the sense that it is a growth of mind's knowledge of God, a growth in the mind's noetic activities that are directed to God. This mind-centered approach in understanding *imago Dei*'s dynamism is further supported by the noetic tools that Augustine employs in illustrating the shift from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. The most obvious tools are two interrelated themes: the mind's 'remember – understand – love' logic, and the mind's self-knowing (*se nosse*) and self-thinking (*se cogitare*). In elaborating these two themes, we will see how Augustine constructs his *imago Dei* doctrine with highly noetic elements, and therefore the *imago Dei*'s dynamism is a mind-centered dynamism.

⁴⁵ *Trin.* XIV, 13 (FC, 430).

Mind-Centered Dynamism Construction I: Mind's 'Remember – Understand – Love' Logic

'Remember – Understand – Love': Its Epistemological Nature

The epistemological dimension of the dynamism of the *imago Dei* can be shown in Augustine's use of the 'remember – understand – love' logic.⁴⁶ The triad 'remember – understand – love' should not be regarded

⁴⁶ Luigi Gioia, in his *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate*, Oxford theological monographs, (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2008), accentuates the inner coherence and structural unity of *De Trinitate*. This unifying force of *De Trinitate* is according to Gioia's analysis, theological epistemology: how to know (God). Augustine himself considered his writing as having a consistent unity (cf. *Epistula* 174). Based on this presupposition, Gioia elaborates that *De Trinitate* is a treatise on the theological understanding of the knowledge of God. By explaining the practice of the knowledge of God – namely loving worship of God as Trinity – Augustine shows the conditions of the knowledge of God, not critically but theologically. "That *De Trinitate* is based on the presupposition that it is impossible to dissociate questions concerning the identity of the God we believe in from those related to the way we have actually come to know him. The Trinitarian identity of God is the only way to explain how we come to know him. As a result, investigation into the identity of the Trinity changes the way we perceive ourselves and our own identity and in this process theology discovers its critical responsibility not only with regards to epistemology but also to anthropology." (p. 3.) Exactly because the question of the identity of God is connected with the theological epistemology – how to know God – the doctrine of the Trinity is interwoven with Christology, soteriology, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the doctrine of revelation, and the doctrine of the image of God. In the last chapter, *The Image of God* (pp. 232-297), Gioia gives a historical survey of Augustine's thinking on image-exemplar and image-relation from *Quaestio* 51 of *De diuersis quaestionibus* and his doctrine of creation from *De uera religione*, *Confessiones* and *De Genesi ad litteram*, distinguished from the Platonic participation theory and the concept of image in Plotinus and Marius Victorinus. Augustine writes, especially in books XIV-XV, that true happiness can only be found in the relation to the Trinity, as an image-relation (*imago Dei*) between creature and Creator (expressed in the triad of memory, knowledge and love), in which the original capacity to know God (*capax Dei*) is restored by the *gratia Christi* making even a participation in God possible. Man is God's image, both ontologically and ethically. On the ontological level, God rescues from the tendency of the contingent nature of a creature towards nothingness (resulting from the *creatio ex nihilo*), to fulfill the teleological character of the created nature, namely finding its fulfillment in its creator. Ethically, the dynamic relation between creature and creator makes the creature able to overcome its sinful inclination, graciously saves it from its covetousness and pride. "We can say that the image is a fundamental threefold dependence of creature on the creator (this is its 'capacity') and reaches its fulfillment when this dependence in being, knowledge, and love becomes conscious and is converted into worship, i.e. acknowledged, thankful dependence (this is its 'participation'). At heart, the acknowledgement of this dependence consists in love, in *dilectio*. But love is inseparable from knowledge, and therefore worship coincides with remembering or rather, in *being reminded of God* and in being given, in Christ through the Holy Spirit, the possibility of *knowing* and *loving* God." (p. 297.) Gioia concludes (pp. 298-302) by identifying the theological

as an ontological status. Indeed it is epistemological-oriented as its origin can be traced back to the ancient noetic triad '*esse – uiuere – intelligere*'.⁴⁷ The noetic triads, no matter under the traditions of Plato and Plotinus,⁴⁸ or of Porphyry and Victorinus,⁴⁹ all focus on the interaction between the three hypostases – an interaction which is being identified as

epistemology of *De Trinitate* with the primacy of love. "You do see the Trinity if you see charity' [*Trin.* VIII, 12]: hence the decisive role of love in this vision, i.e. in knowledge of God; hence also the conclusion of our investigation: *love comes first*. *Love comes first* because the inner life of the Trinity is a life of love (*dilectio*) and the substantial unity of the Trinity is a unity of love." (p. 298.) As such, love comes first on the Christological-soteriological level (incarnation, faith in Christ and grace as love), on the epistemological level (love directs to Love), on the level of reality (no knowledge without God) and on the level of the *imago Dei* (acknowledgement of the threefold dependence – being, knowing, loving – on God in *dilectio*).

⁴⁷ The notion '*esse – uiuere – intelligere*' has a long tradition in ancient Greek philosophy. It can be even tracked back to the idea in the pre-Socratic Anaxagoras. (David N. Bell, "'*Essere, vivere, intelligere*': the Noetic Triad and the Image of God", *RTAM* 52 (1985): 5-43). Augustine has also mentioned '*esse – vivere – intelligere*' in *Trin.* X, 18: "Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singular dicuntur etiam simul, non pluraliter sed singulariter dicuntur." (CCL 50, 331.) Although Augustine has shifted the focus of the noetic triad into the mind, like 'mind – knowledge – love' and 'memory – understanding – will', the influence of the noetic tradition to Augustine's triad is widely recognized. See Bell, "'*Essere, vivere, intelligere*': the Noetic Triad and the Image of God"; Edward Booth, "St. Augustine's 'notitia sui' related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists", *Augustiniana* 27 (1977): 70-132, 364-401; 28 (1978): 183-221; 29 (1979): 97-124. See also E. Booth, "St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* and Aristotelian and neo-Platonist Noetic", *SP XVI*, Part Two, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985), 487-90.

⁴⁸ The noetic triad in Plato and Plotinus focuses on building a vertical hierarchy within the three triad elements. It appears in the form of 'motion, life, soul' in Plato's *Sophist* 248e-249a, and 'One-Mind-World' in Plotinus's *Enneads* I, 6.7, V, 4.2, V, 6.6. See Bell, "'*Essere, vivere, intelligere*': the Noetic Triad and the Image of God"; David N. Bell, "The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition", *RTAM* 47 (1980): 16-52; John Dillon, "Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early Christianity", Godfrey Vesey (ed.), *The Philosophy in Christianity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-14; Christopher Stead, "The Intelligible Word, in Platonic Tradition, Marius Victorinus and Augustine", in *Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity: Arius, Athanasius, Augustine*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), chapter XVI, 1-14. Theo Huijbers considers Augustine's concept of *mens* as *imago Dei* – in the framework of knowledge of God and self knowledge – to be neoplatinian. "Conclusio est: etiam in opere maturae aetatis 'De Trinitate' conceptus mentis S. Augustini remansit neoplatonicus". Theo Huijbers, "Zelfkennis en Godkennis in de geest volgens S. Augustinus" "De Trinitate"', *Augustiniana* 4 (1954): 269-304.

⁴⁹ The noetic triad in Porphyry and Victorinus focuses on building a horizontal hierarchy within the three triad elements. It appears in Porphyry's (?) *Commentary on Parmenides* and Victorinus's *Candidus* I, 3.16 and *Ad candidum* 2, 22. M.J. Edwards, "Porphyry and the Intelligible Triad", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 110 (1990): 14-25; Mary T. Clark, "Victorinus and Augustine: Some Differences", *Augustinian Studies* 17 (1986): 147-159; Peter Manchester, "The Noetic Triad in

parallel to the inner relation and activities of God the Trinity.⁵⁰ As a noetic triad, 'remember – understand – love' does not emphasize the ontological status, but the epistemological link to God and the Trinity. The epistemological dimension of 'remember – understand – love' becomes clearer upon investigation of its pattern in Book XIV.

The triads 'remember – understand – love' are scattered throughout the whole Book XIV in a variety of forms such as 'remember – understand – love',⁵¹ 'memory – sight – love',⁵² 'memory – thought – will',⁵³ 'memory – vision – love',⁵⁴ etc. Although such a change of words creates difficulties in the making of a very precise lexicon analysis on this triad (or this triad group), L. Ayres has helped us to gain a substantial picture. According to his research, the triad appears around 35 times in Augustine's *corpus*, and over 20 of these entries appear in *De Trinitate*.⁵⁵ It is not difficult to see that the most frequent use of the triad of 'remember – understand – love' is to be found in Book XIV:

Verse	Object	Text
Book XIV, 4	Faith	"... <u>memory</u> , <u>sight</u> , and <u>love</u> of this same <u>faith</u> that is present and abides, will then be found to have been dealt with and past, and not as still enduring."
Book XIV, 5	Faith	"... just as now we retain it in our <u>memory</u> , perceive it in our <u>thought</u> , and love it with our <u>will</u> , so too then, when we shall retain it in our <u>memory</u> and <u>recall</u> that we once had it, and shall join both of these together by the <u>will</u> as third, the same trinity will remain."
	Outer and Inner Body	"... the image of this body, ... remains in the <u>memory</u> , and because the <u>gaze of thought</u> is formed from it, and both are joined together by the <u>will</u> as a third, ..."

Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine", Richard Wallis (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism*, (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1992), 207-222.

⁵⁰ Manchester, "The Noetic Triad in Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine", 217.

⁵¹ Like *Trin.* XIV, 9 (FC, 422) and *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 426), etc.

⁵² Like *Trin.* XIV, 4 (FC, 415).

⁵³ Like *Trin.* XIV, 5 (FC, 415).

⁵⁴ Like *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 427).

⁵⁵ Lewis Ayres, "'It's not for eatin' – it's for lookin' 'through': *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* and the argument of Augustine's *De Trinitate* IX – X", D. Vincent Twomey, Lewis Ayres (eds.), *The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Fourth Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 1999*, (Portland: Four Court Press, 2007), 38. See the passage: "Including some variations on the third term found in Book XV of the *De Trinitate*, Augustine uses the triads *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* and *memoria, intellectus, voluntas* around 35 times in his *corpus*. This rather vague figure stems from the difficulty of assessing passages where the triad and its constituent terms are discussed over a number of complex sentences. Even with such imprecise figures it is striking that over 20 of the uses occur in the *De Trinitate*."

Book XIV, 8	Itself (Mind)	"The <u>gaze of thought</u> was formed in the <u>memory</u> , ...that by which both are joined together, namely, <u>love</u> or the <u>will</u> ."
Book XIV, 9	Itself (Mind)	" <u>The mind always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself.</u> For if this is so, then the mind did not have these three things, so that <u>it remembered itself, understood itself, and loved itself; ...</u> "
	Art	"For he <u>remembers</u> this art, <u>understands</u> it, and <u>loves it</u> ."
Book XIV, 10	Itself (Mind)	"The inner memory of the mind by which it <u>remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, ...</u> "
	Itself (Mind)	"The image is rather to be recognized in these three things, namely, <u>memory, understanding, and will.</u> "
Book XIV, 11	Itself (Mind)	"Behold! The mind, therefore, <u>remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself ...</u> "
	Temporal things	"These and other things of the kind have their own proper order in time, wherein the trinity of <u>memory, vision, and love</u> appeared more easily to us."
Book XIV, 12	Virtues	" <u>Hold on to them</u> as present, <u>contemplate them, and love them</u> [virtues] ..."
Book XIV, 13	Itself (Mind)	"Who do not see that the retention in the memory is prior in time to the sight in recollection, as well as to the combining of both of these by the will ..."
Book XIV, 14	Itself (Mind)	"So in a present thing, which the mind is to itself, that is not reasonably to be called <u>memory</u> , by which the mind is present to itself, so that it can be <u>understood</u> by its own thought, and both can be joined together by the <u>love</u> of itself."
Book XIV, 15	Itself (Mind) and God	"Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind <u>remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself</u> , but because it can also <u>remember, understand, and love Him</u> by whom it was made. And when it does so, it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though <u>it remembers itself, knows itself, and loves itself</u> , it is foolish. Let it, then, <u>remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and understand Him and love Him.</u> "

Book XIV, 18	Itself (Mind) and God	“ <u>Never does it not remember itself, never does it not understand itself, never does it not love itself.</u> ” “But when the mind does <u>love God</u> and by consequence, as we have said, <u>remembers and understands Him.</u> ”
Book XIV, 19	Itself (Mind)	“Yet even amid these great evils, which reveal its weakness and delusions, it could not lose the <u>natural memory, understanding, and love of itself, ...</u> ”
Book XIV, 20	Itself (Mind)	“It would be unable to <u>love itself</u> if it were altogether ignorant of itself, that is, if it did not <u>remember itself nor understand itself; ...</u> ”

In analyzing the context of these occurrences, we made three observations:

1) The triad ‘remember – understand – love’ is not solely reserved to God and the mind. Instead, it can refer to various things as its object, like faith (XIV, 4; XIV, 5), outer and inner body (XIV, 5), art (XIV, 9), temporal things (XIV, 11), etc.

2) The triads in reference to the mind and to God are interwoven neatly together. In between Book XIV, 11 and Book XIV, 15, where the two most important passages of *imago Dei*’s dynamism are seated, the discussion mainly focuses on the mind. There is also no clear transition from ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ to ‘remember God – understand God – love God’, or vice versa.

3) The triad ‘remember God – understand God – love God’, although widely treated in the study of Augustine as a very important concept to understand *imago Dei*, appears only once in Book XIV, 15 (or twice if we consider the odd reference in Book XIV, 18). Instead, the triad comes up mostly (more than half of the occurrences) with mind as object: ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’. The second highest number of occurrences are to the faith-triads (Book XIV, 1-6) and related matters (Book XIV, 11-12). Therefore, ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ should not neglect its wider context – its relationship with ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ and its relationship to faith.

These observations support our claim that ‘remember – understand – love’ should be regarded as a Trinitarian logic. Instead of being an ontological structure of the mind, Augustine prefers to treat ‘remember – understand – love’ as a logic framework that he applies to find a real *imago Dei*. This logic shows two characteristics.

1) A Logic Rooted in Mind

As 'remember – understand – love' can apply to many other things other than God and mind, we should not restrict its use only to an ontological description of how the three elements are structured in the mind as well as in God. Instead, in all these occurrences, we can see that what concerns Augustine is the 'oneness and threeness' framework displayed through 'remember – understand – love'. As R. Williams has pointed out, the analogy in 'remember – understand – love' might better be called an analogy of oneness and threeness,⁵⁶ instead of an analogy of structure. That means, instead of constructing an ontological analogy between the mind's 'remember – understand – love' and God's 'Father – Son – Holy Spirit', the importance of 'remember – understand – love' lies in the fact that it displays a condition that is one and three at the same time. If something can fit into this 'oneness-and-threeness' framework, then it is the real *imago Dei*. The logic also points out the fact that it is mind-oriented. In the quest of *imago Dei*, Augustine has searched through many things to examine their suitability. However, the candidacy of being *imago Dei* lies not in the object alone, but in the object's relation to the mind. Objects like faith (XIV, 4; XIV, 5), virtues (XIV, 12), or outer body and inner body (XIV, 5) are not *imago Dei* because when the mind remembers, understands, loves them, the mind can stay in an everlasting 'oneness-and-threeness' condition. In retention, contemplation, and love of faith, the mind is one and three at the same time, but this condition is not everlasting.⁵⁷ The mind's referencing to the outer body cannot maintain the 'oneness-and-threeness' condition. As such, being *imago Dei* or not, depends not on the external attributes of the object, but the discernment within the mind.

2) A Logic Rooted in Faith

The 'remember – understand – love' logic is seated in the faith context. The discussion of 'remember – understand – love' and the mind (including 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God') in Book XIV, 7-20 is seated in the context of the faith-triad. In Book XIV, 2-6, Augustine is performing a search for the criteria for being a real *imago Dei*. Augustine is concerned about whether the mind can find an object for

⁵⁶ Rowan Williams, "Augustine on Christ and the Trinity", van Bavel (ed.), *Saint Augustine*, 239-249, 242.

⁵⁷ *Trin.* XIV, 4-5 (FC, 414-417).

eternal contemplation. He says that retention, contemplation, and love of the temporal faith cannot be called the *imago Dei*,⁵⁸ because the object has to enable the mind's everlasting contemplation: "For the mind, when it sees its own faith by which it believes that which it does not see, does not see anything everlasting."⁵⁹ Also the faith-triad will change, because "the faith which is now in our mind, as that body in place, while it is retained, seen, and loved, produces a kind of trinity, but this trinity will no longer exist when this faith in the mind, like that body in place, will no longer exist. But the trinity which will then exist, when we shall remember that it was in us and is there no longer, will certainly be different."⁶⁰ Such a searching for the object as the mind's eternal contemplation continues to dominate the discussion in Book XIV, 1-10.

However, the importance of the faith-triad lies not on its being an *imago Dei* candidate. The significance the faith-triad brings forth is that the 'remember – understand – love' logic should be understood in the context of Trinitarian faith. The faith-triad of Book XIV, 1-6 is not an isolated construction, but a continuation of the theme of faith in Book XIII (and even of the wider context of Book XI-XIII). Book XI is an investigation on searching *imago Dei* in outer vision and inner vision, which is coherent to the searching process in Book XIV, searching for a condition of the mind that can remain in a one-and-three everlasting situation. Book XIII contains a digression that has puzzled many commentators.⁶¹ The digression is that, instead of searching for a one-and-three condition, Book XIII is mainly occupied with the motif of *scientia* approaching *sapientia*. The triad of *scientia* is mentioned only as an after-thought at the end of the book (XIII, 26), and when it does appear, it is not a triad of *scientia* at all but a triad of faith.⁶² Also, the details of this triad are never explained to us. We are left to surmise from hints earlier in the book (XIII, 4) that the object of *scientia* is the significance of the salvation story and to construct our own triad on that basis.⁶³ As such, the

⁵⁸ *Trin.* XIV, 4 (FC, 414).

⁵⁹ *Trin.* XIV, 4 (FC, 414). "Quippe humana cum fidem suam uidet qua credit quod non uidet non aliquid sempiternum uidet." (CCL 50, 425.)

⁶⁰ *Trin.* XIV, 5 (FC, 417). "... sed non ipsa erit quando fides haec in animo sicut corpus illud in loco iam non erit. Quae uero tunc erit quando eam recordabimur in nobis fuisse, non esse, alia profecto erit." (CCL 50, 427.)

⁶¹ Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1980), 86.

⁶² Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 86.

⁶³ *Trin.* XIII, 4 (FC, 374): "But we are treating now of the inner man and his science, that science namely, which is concerned with temporal and changeable things; when in carrying out this function it assumes something even from things

motif of *scientia* approaching *sapientia* is highly related to the faith-triad in Book XIV, 1-6, and so the 'remember – understand – love' logic in 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

The theme of *scientia* approaching *sapientia* reveals that the 'remember – understand – love' logic is not constructed in speculation. Instead, it is an epistemology rooted in Christian faith. According to Augustine, *scientia* refers to the function of the lower reasoning, whereas *sapientia* is the proper activity of the higher reason, and these two functions are inextricably mixed together within the mind (Book XII). The inseparability of these two concepts is displayed clearly in Augustine's illustration of the Prologue of John's Gospel (Book XIII, 1-2), where he regards the first part of the text as signaling unchangeable and everlasting entities, whereas the second part is a mixture of eternal realities with temporal things.⁶⁴ As such, our contemplative knowledge (*sapientia*) of eternal things is inseparable from, and is actually based upon, our knowledge (*scientia*) of temporal things in the world. Therefore our searching of the Trinity (*sapientia*) is rooted in our faith through the Bible and Christ events (*scientia*).⁶⁵ B. Studer rightly points out that our knowledge of the Trinity is closely aligned to our knowledge of faith,⁶⁶ and consequently the relationship between

pertaining to the outer man, it must assume it for this purpose, that something may be learned from it that may help rational science..." "Nunc autem agimus de homine interiore et eius ea scientia, quae rerum est temporalium et mutabilium. In cuius intentionem cum assumitur aliquid etiam de rebus ad exteriorem hominem pertinentibus, ad hoc assumendum est ut aliquid inde doceatur quod rationalem adiuuet scientiam, ..." (CCL 50, 385.)

⁶⁴ *Trin.* XIII, 2 (FC, 370).

⁶⁵ Manfred Svensson indicates the development ("eine langsame, aber tiefe und kohärente Entwicklung", p. 224) in Augustine's thinking on the relation between theory and praxis, evolving from a concept of *sapientia* as a unified form of knowing (including practical and contemplative components) to differentiating *sapientia* from *scientia*, an evolution influenced by a deepening of his understanding of Christianity and by a growing knowledge of the Scriptures which he interpreted in a philosophical way. Svensson argues that the latter distinction is not identical to the Aristotelian schema of *sophia* and *phronêsis*, that Augustine's concept of *scientia* even resembles the Aristotelian notion of *phronêsis* (rather than *epistêmê*), and thus is a form of practical reason. Augustine's solution of the 'theory-praxis problem' is by the author considered as a middle position between Plato and Aristotle. Manfred Svensson, *Theorie und Praxis bei Augustin. Eine Verhältnisbestimmung*, (München: Alber, 2009).

⁶⁶ Basil Studer has clearly demonstrated that a link exists between the Trinitarian knowledge and the faith elements. He points out the importance of the terms *cognitio historica* (which comprises *fides* and *cogitatio*) and *res narratae* to the role of Trinitarian knowledge in *De Trinitate*. See Basil Studer, "History and Faith in Augustine's *De Trinitate*", *Augustinian Studies* 28:1 (1997): 7-50.

scientia and *sapientia* shows that *intellegere* should be taken together with *credere*. In effect, the ‘remember – understand – love’ logic is rooted in the mind and at the same time rooted in faith. Already in his early work, Augustine has linked *auctoritas* and *ratio* to human knowledge, to fight against Manichaeism.⁶⁷

In light of ‘remember – understand – love’s logic nature, we can justify why Augustine can regard both ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ and ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ as the real *imago Dei*. ‘Remember – understand – love’ is an ‘oneness and threeness’ framework that the mind uses in accommodating itself to be *imago Dei*. Both cases, the mind’s referencing to itself and the mind’s referencing to God, can be regarded as *imago Dei* because they both can provide a possible noetic condition that allows the mind to pertain to an everlasting condition. As such, the *imago Dei* criteria are anchored in the epistemological dimension.

Mind-Centered Dynamism Construction II: the Mind’s Knowing Itself and the Mind’s Thinking Itself

Although both ‘remember itself – understand itself – love itself’ and ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ could be regarded as *imago Dei*, the latter seems, from Augustine’s point of view, to be a more perfected *imago Dei*. What constitutes the difference between the two? In this section, we will show the epistemological elements that enable Augustine to differentiate between these two situations. It is the mind’s self-knowing (*se nosse*) and the mind’s self-thinking (*se cogitare*) activities that constitute their difference. In employing such a noetic dimension of the mind, Augustine can illustrate the subtle difference between the two cases, and maintain that only ‘remember God – understand God – love God’ is a real *imago Dei*.

Augustine’s Understanding of Se Nosse and Se Cogitare

Augustine’s references to self-knowing (*se nosse*) are always displayed in the context of the God-self relation. They are mainly employed in assuring the mind’s immediate self-presence to itself – an

⁶⁷ Basil Studer, *Augustins De Trinitate: Eine Einführung*, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005), 97.

everlasting state that is analogical to God's permanence.⁶⁸ The notion of self-knowing could be traced back to *Confessiones* X,⁶⁹ where Augustine delves into the question of how the mind knows itself during his reflection of the soul's God-searching journey.⁷⁰ Reflecting upon the profundity of memory during this self-seeking process, he raises the question of self-knowing: the memory proves that the soul is near to itself. Augustine nevertheless cannot understand why the soul cannot grasp the totality of itself.⁷¹ This self-knowing issue causes further investigation of the nature of memory, but the question remains unsolved in *Confessiones*.⁷² When it comes to *De Trinitate*, the issue of self-knowing reemerges and is constructed with more sophisticated arguments.⁷³

⁶⁸ The notion of *se nosse* has been largely discussed by scholars like Edwards Booth, Ludger Hölscher and Johannes Brachtendorf. Booth traces the origin of *se nosse* back to the Aristotelian noetic triad tradition. Hölscher explains that the self-certainty of the mind is established through *se nosse*, to strengthen his argument that the mind is a spiritual substance. Brachtendorf emphasizes the immediacy of *se nosse* to establish that man's knowledge of the Trinity could be a kind of natural knowledge. In spite of a wide variety of interpretations of *se nosse*, the three scholars all point out the basic nature of *se nosse*: it assures the mind's immediate self-presence. Booth, "St. Augustine's 'notitia sui' related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists"; Ludger Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind: Augustine's Philosophical Argument for the Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance*, (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*. For the link *imago, mens, cogitatio, nosse, notitia, ...* see also: Drago Pintaric, *Sprache und Trinität. Semantische Probleme in der Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus*, Salzburger Studien zur Philosophie 15, (Salzburg/München: A Pustet, 1983). Marko J. Fuchs, *Sum and cogito. Grundfiguren endlichen Selbstseins bei Augustinus und Descartes*, Augustinus - Werk und Wirkung 1, (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010).

⁶⁹ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 168.

⁷⁰ Regarding the self as an enigma to God (I Cor 13:2), Augustine parallels the God-searching process to the soul's self-seeking and asks the question to what extent the soul can seek itself. See *Conf. X*, 7 (Henry Chadwick edition, 182).

⁷¹ *Conf. X*, 15 (Chadwick, 187): "This power of memory is great, very great, my God. It is a vast and infinite profundity. Who has plumbed its bottom? This power is that of my mind and is a natural endowment, but I myself cannot grasp the totality of what I am. Is the mind, then, too restricted to compass itself, so that we have to ask what is that element of itself which it fails to grasp? Surely that cannot be external to itself; it must be within the mind. How then can it fail to grasp it?" "Magna ista uis est memoriae, magna nimis, Deus meus, penetrale amplum et infinitum. Quis ad fundum eius peruenit? Et uis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum. Ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est, ut ubi sit quod sui non capit? Numquid extra ipsum ac non in ipso? Quomodo ergo non capit?" (CCL 27, 162.)

⁷² Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 168.

⁷³ *Se nosse* also appears in *De Genesi ad litteram* VII, 27-28. Augustine uses this notion to argue for the incorporeality of the soul.

Augustine starts the discussion of self-knowing in *De Trinitate* X, so as to affirm the mind's immediate self-presence on one hand, and on the other hand as an attempt to resolve the paradox of love and knowledge:⁷⁴ how can the mind love when it seeks to know itself while it is still unknown to itself.⁷⁵ Throughout book X, Augustine strives to prove that the mind's knowing of itself is an innate everlasting power, that the mind knows itself permanently.⁷⁶ Augustine argues that the mind that seeks to know itself must already know itself. The mind knows itself knowing, and when it seeks knowledge of itself, it already knows itself seeking (Book X, 5).⁷⁷ Also, the mind exists as an incorporeal intelligence, so that the mind's knowledge of itself is knowledge through the whole of itself, of its whole self (Book X, 6).⁷⁸ Furthermore, the knowledge in mind's self-knowing is most immanent. It is different from being told to know an object.⁷⁹ E. Booth points out that the notion of self-knowing in *De Trinitate* X is an advancement to that of *Confessiones* X. Augustine transforms the concern of self-knowledge regarding the totality (*totum*) relating to the passage of time to the wholeness (*tota*) relating to the timeless equality condition,⁸⁰ and reconciles it to the question of totality (*totum*).⁸¹ As

⁷⁴ *Trin.* X, 2 (FC, 292).

⁷⁵ Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 158.

⁷⁶ Hölscher has given a very elaborated and well structured analysis on this. See Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 128-141, 157-161.

⁷⁷ *Trin.* X, 5 (FC, 297-298).

⁷⁸ *Trin.* X, 6 (FC, 299-300).

⁷⁹ *Trin.* X, 10 (FC, 304).

⁸⁰ The difference in the dimension of wholeness is shown in Augustine's emphasis on *tota* instead of *totum* in *Trin.* X, 6 (FC, 299): "But it is absurd to claim that it does not know as a whole (*totam*) what it knows. I do not say that it knows wholly (*totum*), but that what it knows, it knows as a whole (*totam*). When it, therefore, knows something, nor can it know something except as a whole (*tota*). Therefore, it knows itself as a whole (*totam*)."
"Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: totum scit; sed quod scit tota scit. Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. Scit se aliquid scientem, nec potest ququam scire nisi tota. Scit se igitur totam." (CCL 50, 318.)

Booth indicates the distinctive aspects of self-knowledge displayed in *Confessiones* and *De Trinitate*. *Confessiones* concerns the 'all-ness' (*totum*) while *De Trinitate* the 'whole-ness' (*tota*). The former is mainly related to the consciousness of the passage of time, and this kind of self-knowledge is more empirical: a knowledge of one's own qualities, pursued under a moral compulsion. This kind of knowledge has no ending: "nec ipse capio totum quod sum" (*Conf.* X, 5, CCL 27, 162). The latter is more metaphysical, non-empirical and timeless, and it focusses on the equality of the subject and object (mind being subject and object at the same time): "mens et amor et notitia eius ... eum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt" (*Trin.* IX, 4, CCL 50, 297). Booth, "St. Augustine's 'notitia sui' related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists", 190-191.

⁸¹ *Trin.* IX, 7: "When the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself perfectly, its knowledge extends through all of it..." "Mens uero cum se totam nouit, hoc est perfecte nouit, per totum eius est notitia eius;..." (CCL 50, 299.)

such, the argument of self-knowledge can be established to be an eternal condition.

Self-thinking (*se cogitare*) is also a notion raised in *De Trinitate* X. It is regarded as the most explicitly cognitive way for man knowing himself.⁸² As such, as self-knowing is a permanent condition sprung forth from the mind's own nature, self-thinking is the actual condition that the mind knows itself. The former is an everlasting ability, whereas the latter is the real condition to actualize the ability. Self-thinking could be regarded as an explicit form of self-knowing.⁸³ In *De Trinitate* X, although Augustine differentiates self-thinking from self-knowing,⁸⁴ his assent is placed on the latter and self-thinking is used to reinforce the claim that the mind knows itself.⁸⁵

Application of Se Nosse and Se Cogitare to Imago Dei (De Trinitate XIV)

Augustine's employment of self-knowing and self-thinking can be seen in a parallel relationship to the two *imago Dei* triads: 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God'. Firstly, the argument of self-knowing in Book X is important in affirming 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' as *imago Dei* in Book XIV. As the mind is always present to itself, the triad 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' can already pertain to an everlasting state. It does not need to depend on the outside

⁸² Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 133.

⁸³ The understanding of the relationship between self-thinking and self-knowing has parallels with the terms of explicit self-knowledge and implicit self-knowledge. These two terms have been employed by both Hölscher and Brachtendorf in elaborating their understanding of mind's knowing activities. See Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 176-181; Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 167-173. Hölscher applies the two terms in reference to the theory of sub-consciousness (Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, 180), whereas Brachtendorf aims to expound the transcendence of the implicit knowledge to establish a natural knowledge of the Trinity (Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 167-173; see also his "...prius esse cogitare quam credere": A Natural Understanding of 'Trinity' in St. Augustine?", *Augustinian Studies* 29:2 (1998): 35-45, 44).

⁸⁴ Augustine explains that it is one thing not to know oneself, and another thing not to think oneself. In illustrating the difference, he raises an example that a man who is skilled in many sciences is not ignorant of grammar when, not thinking of it, he thinks about the art of medicine (*Trin.* X, 7; FC, 301).

⁸⁵ Augustine contrasts the act of self-thinking explicitly to three other acts of knowledge. 1) The knowledge on the basis of what we have been taught about them (*Trin.* X, 12); 2) the attempts to grasp the inner being of others (*Trin.* X, 12); 3) the manner we see our own face and eyes. He points out that self-thinking is the most immediate form of knowledge in which the mind itself is grasped. See Hölscher's illustration in *The Reality of the Mind*, 133-142.

world, and does not even follow the perception logic of material things. Therefore, in this way, Augustine fulfills the ontological criteria of *imago Dei* with the noetic foundation of the mind's knowing of itself. Furthermore, the most important support of our claim comes from the correspondence seen in self-thinking and 'remember God – understand God – love God'. In Book XIV, Augustine elaborates self-thinking more deliberately and places it in the context of *imago Dei*. The topic of self-thinking occupies the discussion in Book XIV, 7-10 (and also implicitly in Book XIV, 11-15). Augustine refers to self-thinking as a necessity of the mind's real knowledge, and so only through the act of thinking the mind can come from an inborn state (self-knowledge) to an actual state:

Book XIV, 7: "But so great is the power of thought that not even the mind itself may place itself, so to speak, in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself.⁸⁶"

Book XIV, 13: "And, therefore, when it is turned to itself by thought, then arises a trinity, in which a word, too, can at last be identified, for it is formed from thought itself, and the will which unites both. Here, then, we may recognize more clearly than before the image which we are seeking.⁸⁷"

The differentiation of self-thinking from self-knowing can actually find its correspondence in *imago Dei*'s participation (*particeps Dei*)⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 420). "Nihil enim tam nouit mens quam id quod sibi praesto est, nec menti magis quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi." (CCL 50, 429.)

⁸⁷ *Trin.* XIV, 13 (FC, 431). "Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione conuertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et uerbum possit intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, uoluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus." (CCL 50, 441). The importance of this passage lies in its clear statement that the *imago Dei* is not simply to be found by disclosing the mind's continuous self-knowing structure. Instead, it is found in the mind's active cognition of itself as remembering, understanding and willing. Ayres, "It's not for eatin' – it's for lookin' 'through'", 63. "Das *se cogitare* und das *se nosse* der *mens* unterscheidet Augustinus durch das Kriterium der Zeitlichkeit. Im *se cogitare* greift die *mens* auf ein Selbstwissen zurück das vor dem Akt der *cogitatio* bereits existiert, so daß die *cogitatio* später auftritt als dieses Wissen. Im *se nosse* hingegen sind alle Momente gleichzeitig. Hier gilt, daß die *mens* sich durch die *memoria interior* ihrer immer erinnert, sich durch die *intellegentia interior* immer einsieht und sich durch die *uoluntas interior* immer liebt (*trin.* 14,10), wenn sie sich auch auf der Ebene des *cogitare* nicht immer als verschieden von äußeren Gegenständen denkt (ib. 10,19; 14,9). Alle Inhalte der *mens* verhalten sich wie Ankömmlinge (*aduenticia*), die in die bereits existierende *mens* eintreten, mit Ausnahme des *se nosse*. Dieses bildet den Wesenskern der *mens* und ist daher immer schon da, seitdem *mens* existiert (ib. 14,13). Der Selbstbezug der *mens* im *se nosse* ist stetig, unveränderlich, mit dem Wesen der *mens* unauflöslich verknüpft und somit unverlierbar. Durch die trinitarische Struktur des *se nosse* ist sie jener Spiegel, in dem der dreifaltige Gott gesehen werden kann." Brachtendorf, "Mens", 1277-1278.

⁸⁸ For the dynamic interplay between ontology and epistemology in Augustine's thinking of man's *participatio* in divine *sapientia* (within the framework of Augustine's

and capacity (*capax Dei*),⁸⁹ the two conditions of *imago Dei* that Augustine has mentioned several times in *De Trinitate* XIV (Book XIV, 6; XIV, 11; XIV, 15).⁹⁰ The mind could be regarded as *imago Dei* because its immortality is already implanted by its immortal Creator (XIV, 11). This makes that the mind knows God and can know God. Nevertheless, just because the mind knows God and can know God, the mind's actuality and ability is differentiated. If we need to ascertain the mind as real *imago Dei*, the most important aspect of this concern is its actuality. As such, although the mind's ontological nature could be regarded as *imago Dei* in its ability, we still need to strive to actualise it as the real *imago Dei*. This is not done in the ontological dimension, the mind's ability. The realization only comes when the mind actually knows God, the mind's actuality dimension.

Moreover, the self-thinking process is regarded as a kind of conversion.⁹¹ Augustine employs self-thinking to discuss how man can turn away from his own ignorance to God.⁹² J. Brachtendorf also reminds us that the Delphic Command "Know Thyself" in Book X

christological transformation of this neo-platonic notion, based on the ontological status of man as *imago* and the epistemological link between love and knowledge), see Matthias Smalbrugge, "La notion de la participation chez Augustin. Quelques observations sur le rapport christianisme-platonisme", *Augustiniana* 40 (1990): 333-347. See also: Herman Somers, "L'image comme sagesse. La genèse de la notion trinitaire de la sagesse", *Recherches augustiniennes* 2 (1962): 403-414.

⁸⁹ Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate*, 235; Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 214-217. See also: Emanuel Bermon, "Analyse du "De Trinitate" de saint Augustin", M. Caron (ed.), *Saint Augustin, Les cahiers de l'histoire de la philosophie*, (Paris: Cerf, 2009), 53-76, 75-76.

⁹⁰ *Trin.* XIV, 6 (FC, 419): "... but that image of the Creator, that has been implanted immortally in its own immortality, must be found in the soul of man, that is, in the reasonable or intellectual soul." "... sed ea est inuenienda in anima hominis, id est rationali siue intellectuali, imago creatoris quae immortaliter immortalitati eius est insita." (CCL 50, 428). *Trin.* XIV, 11 (FC, 426): "We begin to consider the principal part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find therein an image of God. ... For it is His image by the very fact that it is capable of Him, and can be a partaker of Him." "Nunc uero ad eam iam peruenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo nouit Deum uel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiamus imaginem Dei. ... Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest,..." (CCL 50, 435-436). *Trin.* XIV, 15 (FC, 432): "Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made." "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est." (CCL 50, 442-443.)

⁹¹ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 419).

⁹² *Trin.* XIV, 6 (FC, 419).

is not only a theoretical cognitive formula.⁹³ It is also a command with moral dimensions that demands the mind to move away from its ignorant situation to a more blessed stage.⁹⁴ As such, self-thinking is analogical to the purification process *imago Dei* undertakes when it goes from 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

A conceptual analysis of self-knowing (*se nosse*) and self-thinking (*se cogitare*) leads us to see that our concern in seeking an everlasting situation can only be realized in self-thinking but not in self-knowing. For this reason, 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', as parallel to the self-knowing condition, is not enough to be *imago Dei*. We can also see why the faith-triad cannot be a candidate to be *imago Dei*, even though it somehow fits into the 'remember – knowledge – love' framework, as the faith-triad can only work at the thinking level, a mutable state. Although we can recall each time the faith event in our memory, the triad formed each time is different.⁹⁵ Therefore, on the thinking level, the mind cannot come to an everlasting situation through 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself', because the mind is always attracted by the sensible world, so that it "begins to experience pleasure through the senses of the body, a pleasure that is so much the greater the more unfamiliar it is."⁹⁶ The example of the squint-eyed infant in Book XIV, 7 is good evidence of the mind's vulnerability to lose its way.⁹⁷ Therefore, the mind needs to contemplate

⁹³ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 173.

⁹⁴ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, 173.

⁹⁵ This is what Augustine has tried to explain in *Trin.* XIV, 4-6 (FC, 414-7), esp. *Trin.* XIV, 6 (FC, 417): "Therefore, neither will the latter trinity, which is not now, be the image of God, nor is the former trinity the image of God, which then will not be..." "Nec illa igitur trinitas quae nunc non est imago Dei erit, nec ista imago Dei est quae tunc non erit, ..." (CCL 50, 427-428). See: Matthias Smalbrugge, *La nature trinitaire de l'intelligence augustinienne de la foi*, ASTh 7, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988).

⁹⁶ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 419). "The mind exhibits best its nature as image when it remembers, understands and loves itself appropriately – without being consumed by desire for created objects – and both towards and in its Creator. Augustine's language here is strong: the mind that 'cleaves' to God shares in the divine nature and sees all that it sees in that unchangeable nature. The mind is perfected as *imago Dei* not merely when the object of desire is God, but when it acts as mind is towards, from and in the divine." Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 307.

⁹⁷ *Trin.* XIV, 7 (FC, 419): "Thus, if one, less cautious or unaware of what might happen, places a light at night where an infant is lying down, and at such an angle that from its prostrate position it can turn its eyes to it without being able to turn its neck, the gaze of that infant is not withdrawn from it, so that we know of some who have even become squint-eyed as a result, since their eyes, while still tender and soft,

something that is totally good, and also through such contemplation it is able to return to the real self-thinking state, that is, 'remember God – understand God – love God'.

In this sense, through the noetic difference between mind's knowing and mind's thinking, Augustine successfully ascertains the importance of God's role, and also the reality of the mind's sinful tendency. The shift from self to God does not involve a total deserting of the self, but it is the shift from mind's potential knowledge of the self to its active knowledge (thinking) of God. It can only be obtained when it has a perfected self-awareness, that is, a perfected self. Therefore, the epistemological dimension helps to entwine the self and God together, without dismissing their ontological difference.⁹⁸

Significance of the Mind-Centered Approach in *Imago Dei*'s Dynamism

An Epistemological Way to Bridge the Ontological Otherness

The mind-centered approach in interpreting Augustine's dynamic *imago Dei* in *De Trinitate* XIV is significant in bridging the ontological otherness between self and God. The mind-centered approach brings the epistemological dimension to the foreground. The

retained that form which habit had in some way impressed upon them." "... ut si quisquam minus cautus aut nesciens quid inde possit accidere nocturnum lumen posuerit ubi iacet infans, in ea parte ad quam iacentis oculi possint retorqueri nec ceruix possit inflecti, sic eius inde non remouetur aspectus ut nonnullos ex hoc etiam strabones fieri nouerimus eam formam tenentibus oculis quam teneris et mollibus consuetudo quodam modo infixit." (CCL 50, 427-430.)

⁹⁸ "Im Sich-gegenwärtig-Sein, im Sich-Einsehen und Sich-Lieben ist der Geist Gottes Bild. Hier findet er, anders als im Glauben, nicht etwas außerhalb seiner selbst, sondern in sich findet er sich ohne zeitlichen Verlauf. Die Weisheit des Geistes liegt aber, wie bereits gesehen, nicht schon darin, sich seiner selbst zu erinnern, sich einzusehen und zu lieben, sondern in der Fähigkeit, zugleich denjenigen zu erinnern, einzusehen und zu lieben, von dem er geschaffen ist. Wenn der Geist dies nicht tut, bleibt er zwar Bild Gottes, ist aber nicht weise. Nicht durch sein eigenes Licht, sondern durch Teilhabe an Gottes Licht wird der Geist weise. Nur dann ist die Weisheit des Menschen zugleich diejenige Gottes, der im Gegensatz zum Menschen die Weisheit ist und nicht an ihr nur teilhat. Wer in dem Geist, mit dem er Bild Gottes ist, Gott "dem Herrn anhängt", der allein noch über ihm steht, der "ist ein Geist mit ihm" (1 Kor 6, 17). Diese Hinwendung des Geistes zu Gott geht nicht vom Menschen selbst aus, sondern ist letztlich der Gnade zu verdanken. Sich selbst kann der Geist zwar deformieren, aber nicht reformieren. Vollendet wird die Erneuerung dereinst in der Schau Gottes von Angesicht zu Angesicht. In ihr findet die *contemplativa sapientia* des menschlichen Geistes ihre Vollendung." Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 527-528.

God-man relation is no longer an ontological issue, but a relation secured through both ontology and epistemology. The ontological gap becomes solvable through the epistemological level. On one hand, the ontological difference between Creator and creature can be upheld because the epistemological change in the dynamic *imago Dei* does not imply an ontological alignment of man to God at all. On the other hand, an ongoing God-man relation can also be upheld as their ontological otherness has been bridged through the noetic activities of the mind. Through self-knowing and self-thinking, Augustine successfully connects the mind's actual mutable state (self-thinking) to its possible immutable capacity (self-knowing). The ontological concern – mutability or immutability – has been transformed into an epistemological issue. 'Remember self – understand self – love self' can then be aligned to 'remember God – understand God – love God' not through an ontological clash, but via the noetic turn of the mind, from mind's potential knowledge to active thinking. The immutable state of 'remember God – understand God – love God' becomes reachable. Firstly, although the state of 'remember God – understand God – love God' is difficult to achieve, the possibility is always present because the mind's self-knowing has already proved its capability to immutability. Secondly, the active thinking of God is achievable because it shares close affinity to the mind's inherent self-knowing ability. The active thinking of God implies growth of the self. In this way, the gap between self and God, while upheld ontologically, is bridged epistemologically.

Imago Dei: An Example of an Entwinement in Theology and Philosophy

Augustine's thought has been interpreted as existing in two vastly different and incompatible realms – theology and philosophy. These two dimensions are regarded to oscillate from one extreme to the other among Augustine's different works, and it is difficult to find a balanced angle of interpretation. The case of *De Trinitate* is even more obvious. This work has been widely read among scholars either with a philosophical spectacle, or through a theological Christian dimension. Endeavors to fill the huge gap between the philosophical and theological interpretations have been recently attempted, for example in Kany's *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*⁹⁹ and Brachtendorf's *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*.¹⁰⁰ In spite of

⁹⁹ Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*.

¹⁰⁰ Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*.

their meticulous research and invaluable insights, their interpretations are still criticized as over-emphasizing one dimension at the cost of the other,¹⁰¹ and the problem of division between philosophical and theological aspects is still unresolved.¹⁰²

The present article may serve as providing an example that Augustine's theological and philosophical thoughts can find a balanced entwinement. A mind-centered dynamic *imago Dei* is a vivid demonstration that Augustine combines theology with philosophy in constructing his theology. While *imago Dei* can be regarded as a highly Christian element, the epistemological dimensions of *se nosse* and *se cogitare* are widely recognized as philosophical concepts. In spite of their incompatible tendencies, Augustine places them in an interdependent position. On one hand, the growth of *imago Dei* is a Christian spiritual formation that we should renew day by day, but this spiritual exercise should be understood in a highly philosophical con-

¹⁰¹ Brachtendorf has been criticized by Kany that too much emphasis is put on constructing the theories of self-reference in *De Trinitate* IX-X, and theological interpretations have in turn been neglected (Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 147). Kany has been criticized by Maarten Wisse that the philosophical aspects are emphasized at the cost of the theological aspects, especially on his reading of the second half of *De Trinitate* (Maarten Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology Beyond Participation: Augustine's De Trinitate and Contemporary Theology*, T&T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology 11, (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2011).

¹⁰² Peter Burnell advocates that Augustine understands humanity, human nature and person, human society essentially as a unity. Burnell indicates the interplay between theology and anthropology in Augustine's thinking. On the one hand, his theology is anthropological, because of the centrality of the *imago Dei* and the incarnation in Augustine's reflections. Augustine finds unity, his primary concern, in the human individual, anthropology, ethics, sociology, eschatology, theology through his thinking on the human being as created according to the divine image and God becoming man in Christ. On the other hand, his anthropology can be labelled as theological because he develops his anthropology departing from his theological positioning, e.g. the theological controversy with the pelagians led Augustine to the conviction that the human condition is determined by the relation between man and God. Burnell finds this anthropological unity of person and nature confirmed in *De Trinitate*. *De Trinitate* asserts that there is a unity in a person's mind. Knowledge, will, love, memory are not distinct substances. They act together, imply each other, form a whole and as such function as a single mind. The faculties do not operate separately, autonomously, but constitute one single mind (pp. 54-70). The human image of God in man goes beyond the mere human nature. In the human person is the image of the triune divine Persons. Deification is the uniting – by being graciously extricated from sin – of human nature with God's as the fulfilment of each individual *imago Dei*. Mankind participates in the life of the Trinity through Christ's experience of the human suffering – His incarnate compassion. Human suffering, in the personal sense, is inherent in the divine original because Christ's compassion is God. Divine image, incarnation, unity come together (pp. 173-193). Peter Burnell, *The Augustinian Person*, (Washington (D.C.): Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

text, the transition from the mind's self-knowing to self-thinking.¹⁰³ On the other hand, 'remember – understand – love' is a noetic logic originating from ancient Greek philosophy, but this epistemological means cannot be employed without the role of faith. The 'remember – understand – love' logic is anchored in the paradigm of *scientia* approaching *sapientia*, so that Augustine's epistemological philosophy is framed by his Trinitarian faith. As such, we can see through a mind-centered dynamism of *imago Dei*, that Augustine entwines epistemology with ontology, and also theology with philosophy.

Conclusion

In this article, we have thoroughly investigated the dynamism of *imago Dei* in Book XIV, and have put forward the thesis that the dynamism should be interpreted from the mind-centered approach as a dynamic in epistemological sense.

The investigation centered on the shift from the mind's 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' to 'remember God – understand God – love God'. While many scholars employ ontological interpretations, we propose that we should be aware of the neglected epistemological dimension in triggering the shift. 'Remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God' are noetic conditions of the mind. Moreover, the noetic trend is further supported by two aspects. First, the 'remember – understand – love' is a logic (rather than an ontological change) that the mind applies to itself and God. It is more a framework for *imago Dei* than an ontological structure. Second, the mind's self-knowing and self-thinking is an important theme in illustrating the difference between 'remember itself – understand itself – love itself' and 'remember God – understand God – love God'. In this way, the indicated dynamism of *imago Dei* is an entwinement of ontology and epistemology. Such a form of dynamism – the mind-centered dynamism – is important to Augustine in establishing his understanding of the God-man relation. It combines ontology with epistemology. The ontological difference between self and God can be resolved in an epistemological way. Self and God find a new point of union in the mind's epistemological dynamic growth in *imago Dei*. More than that, the mind-centered approach in *imago Dei*'s dynamism can also serve as an example of an entwinement

¹⁰³ The self-reference (Selbstbezüglichkeit) is regarded by many as the philosophical aspect of *De Trinitate*. See Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 233.

between philosophy and theology. The Christian element *imago Dei* is interpreted through the philosophical self-knowing and self-thinking, while the philosophical 'remember – understand – love' logic is submitted to the Trinitarian faith framework.

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Abstract

This article provides a historical and doctrinal introduction to the translation of, James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet* I, 17, which discusses whether or not the pope has the right to absolve usurers. The article argues that the principal interest of the *Quodlibet* lies in the philosophical justification it provides for the pope's supremacy in temporal matters. It also examines the relation between the *Quodlibet* and the later *De regimine Christiano* and points to a slight shift in James' position towards greater moderation.

Key words

James of Viterbo, *Quodlibet* I 17, *De regimine Christiano*, pope's supremacy

Dans l'excellente introduction de sa récente édition et traduction du *De regimine Christiano* de Jacques de Viterbe, l'historien anglais R. W. Dyson écrit que le *De regimine* « is James's only venture into political analysis ».¹ Or, s'il est vrai que Jacques de Viterbe n'a consacré qu'une seule œuvre d'envergure à la politique – contrairement à Gilles de Rome, par exemple, son maître dans l'ordre des augustins, auteur de deux ouvrages importants et volumineux sur le thème² –, il est inexact, en revanche, qu'il n'ait écrit strictement rien d'autre sur la question. Il traite, en effet, assez longuement des rapports entre les pouvoirs spirituel et temporel dans le *Quodlibet* I, question 17 « Utrum papa possit absolvere aliquem usurarium, abquo hoc quid usuras restituat », tenu en 1293, soit un peu moins de dix ans avant la rédaction du *De regimine*,³ ignoré par

¹ Dans *James of Viterbo, De Regimine Christiano. A Critical Edition and Translation*, ed. R. W. Dyson, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2009 (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 174; Brill's Texts and Sources in Intellectual History, vol. 6), p. xvi.

² Il s'agit, on le sait, du *De regimine principum* (une compilation *De regimine principum libri III ad franciscanum regem Philippum III cognominatum Castellum, quibus universis de moribus philosophia continetur*, Rome, Apud A. Sinesium, 1585) et du *De ecclesiastica potestate*, édition critique et traduction anglaise par R. W. Dyson, *Giles of Rome's On Ecclesiastical Power: A Medieval Theory of World Government. A Critical Edition and Translation*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004.

³ La question est éditée dans Jacques de Viterbe, *Disputationes prope de Quodlibet*, ed. E. Ypma OSA, Augustinus-Verlag, Würzburg, 1968 (A Scripta Septuaginta Augustinianorum, I, 1, Cassiciacum, Suppl. Band II), p. 207-217. La traduction que l'on