




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


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CONTENT – SOMMAIRE

W. ECKERMANN, In Erinnerung an P. Dr. Dr. Adolar Zumkeller OSA (1915-2011)	7
D. MOORE, Truth and Image in Augustinian Epistemology	11
N. ADKIN, <i>Labor tam utilis</i> : Sallust in Augustine on the Vulgate.....	49
J. PALETTA, The <i>Ordo Sapientiae</i> : Augustine's Program for Philosophical Study in his Early Works	55
M. OLSZEWSKI, Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona. In primum Sententiarum.....	75
G. PARTOENS, The earliest phase of the Jansenist controversy among the Flemish Capuchins. Part I: Hildebrand's interpretation and the case of Eugenius of Bruges...	155

IN ERINNERUNG AN P. DR. DR. ADOLAR ZUMKELLER OSA (1915-2011)

Nach einem langen und erfüllten Leben als Ordensmann und Forscher verstarb P. Adolar Zumkeller am 21. April 2011 im Augustinerkloster zu Würzburg. Er verbrachte die längste Zeit seines Lebens in diesem Kloster, in dessen Geschichte und gelebtem Leben er sich bestens auskannte. Doch es war nur sein vorübergehender Aufenthalt. Auch für ihn galt, was unser aller Geschick ist, dass wir hier keine bleibende Wohnung haben und der Tod uns in ein anderes Leben abberuft.

P. Adolars wissenschaftliches Wirken wurde bereits verschiedentlich gewürdigt. Ich selbst tat es 1998 anlässlich seines diamantenen Priesterjubiläums. (Cor Unum 56 (1998) 71-77).

Sein Tod an Gründonnerstag erinnerte mich daran, dass er mir 1992 seine Edition der asketisch-mystischen Traktate des Heinrich von Friemar gewidmet hatte. Ich nahm sie deshalb zur Hand und las in ihnen, den P. Adolar vor Augen.

Die Schriften Heinrichs von Friemar waren Gegenstand der Forschungen von P. Adolar. Heinrich war 1340 im Erfurter Augustinerkloster gestorben. Den Theologen dieses Klosters hatte sich P. Adolar als gebürtiger Erfurter mit besonderem Eifer zugewandt, so auch Heinrich von Friemar. Ich meine deshalb, dass ich ihn dadurch am besten ehren kann, dass ich einige Gesichtspunkte aus dem Werk Heinrichs, das überschrieben ist mit „Über die sieben Stufen der Liebe“ herausgreife und sie mit dem Leben und Denken P. Adolars in Verbindung bringe.

Ich beginne mit den Autoren, auf die sich Heinrich in seinem Traktat in besonderer Weise bezieht. Es sind der hl. Augustinus und der hl. Bernhard von Clairvaux. Von Augustinus sagt Heinrich, er habe uns die Richtung angegeben und sei auch das vollkommene Vorbild für die Vorschriften, die es zu beobachten gilt.

P. Adolar hat in seinen zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen über die Werke des hl. Augustinus dessen Grundgedanken herausgestellt, indem er die Ordensregel kommentierte, die Gnadenschriften erläuterte und Augustins moraltheologische Abhandlungen in deutscher Übersetzung herausgab. Er edierte nicht nur Werke von und über Augustinus, sondern war auch bemüht, sein eigenes Leben nach augustinischen Grundsätzen auszurichten.

Vom hl. Bernhard zog Heinrich die Predigten über das Hohe Lied der Liebe heran, um die Liebesbeziehung zu Gott nicht fleischlich, sondern geistlich auszulegen.

Dies war auch das Bemühen P. Adolars in seinen geistlichen Vorträgen und Exerzitien, in denen er die Gottes- und Nächstenliebe herausstellte.

In seinem Traktat „Über die sieben Stufen der Liebe“ wählte Heinrich als Ausgangspunkt für seine Darlegungen den Psamlvers 83, 6 (LXX): „Selig der Mann, dessen Hilfe von Dir ist, er hat die Aufstiege in seinem Herzen bereitet.“ („Wohl den Menschen, die Kraft finden in dir, wenn sie sich zur Wallfahrt rüsten.“; Ps 84, 6 Einheitsübersetzung)

Als Voraussetzung für den Aufstieg über die sieben Stufen der Liebe fordert Heinrich die Geburt des ewigen Wortes im Herzen des Menschen. Mit dem anwesenden ewigen Wort im Menschenherzen soll dann der liebende Mensch oder die liebende Seele in ein Gespräch eintreten. Der Gesprächspartner ist das ewige Wort oder der Bräutigam der Seele. Als Methoden für das Gespräch werden die Betrachtung, die Bewunderung und die Entäusserung genannt.

Über das, was sich im Innern des P. Adolar mittels dieser Methoden zutrug, kann ich nicht urteilen. Äusserlich war jedenfalls bei ihm festzustellen, dass er ganz gewissenhaft die Betrachtung des göttlichen Wortes einhielt. Von seiner Veranlagung her war er eher jemand, der die intellektuelle Arbeit der affektiven Hingabe vorzog. So erkundigte er sich bis einige Wochen vor seinem Tod nach der Arbeit, die der Besucher durchführte und erweckte mit dieser Frage den Eindruck, dass er dieses oder jenes Projekt noch gern durchführen würde. Eine aktuelle Sehnsucht nach der Vollendung bei dem ewigen Wort konnte ich bei ihm nicht feststellen. Aber wahrscheinlich war ich dafür nicht sensibel genug. Wenn man ihn scherzhaft fragte, wie alt er denn werden wolle, dann antwortete er: Ich warte, bis der Herr mich ruft.

Nach dem Weggehen des Fragers hat er vielleicht mit Augustinus zu Gott gebetet: „Du rede in meinem Herzen wahrhaftig, denn so redest Du allein. Ich möchte die da draußen ihrem Treiben überlassen, dass sie in den Staub blasen und sich Sand in ihre Augen wirbeln, ich möchte in meine Kammer gehen und Dir Liebeslieder singen auf meiner Pilgerfahrt.“ (Confessiones 12, 16, 23)

Auf der Pilgerschaft seines langen Lebens hat P. Adolar von vielen Gewohnheiten, manchen Privilegien und einigen Bevorzugungen Abschied nehmen müssen. Obwohl er ein Asket war, ist ihm dies nicht immer leicht gefallen. Heinrich von Friemar bezeichnet diese

Haltung als ein Sterben, das dazu dient, den Menschen allein Gott näher zu bringen. Er siedelt es auf der siebten, der letzten Stufe der Liebe an.

Gegen Ende seines Lebens scheint P. Adolar diesen Zustand erreicht zu haben. Er war nicht mehr in der Lage, ein längeres Gespräch zu führen. Er glitt bei der Unterredung in einen anderen Bereich hinüber und erweckte den Eindruck, dass er nichts mehr aus eigener Kraft und eigener Entscheidung tun könne, sondern dass Gott immer mehr als der Handelnde in seinem Leben gegenwärtig werde. Heinrich von Friemar spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einem zarten Tod (*delicata mors*).

Die weiteren Ausführungen, angeregt durch Heinrich von Friemar, sind die guten Wünsche eines dankbaren Mitbruders, dem er nahe stand und der ihn auf seinem Lebensweg begleiten durfte und manche Anregungen durch ihn empfing.

Heinrich von Friemar beschreibt das Geschehen auf dieser Stufe der Liebe als ein Hineingerissenwerden der Seele in den Abgrund des göttlichen Lichtes und der göttlichen Süsse. Dadurch geht die Seele ganz in Gott ein und empfindet eine unsagbare Freude. Das Geschehen vergleicht Heinrich mit dem Aufscheinen der Morgenröte, die von der Helle der Sonne verschlungen wird, und mit einem Tropfen Wasser, der sich in hinreichend Wein ganz auflösen scheint.

Ich kleide meine Wünsche für den verstorbenen P. Adolar in die Worte des hl. Augustinus, die er in seinem Buch Über die wahre Religion (26, 49) niederschrieb, dass der Verstorbene die vollendete Gestalt gewinnen möge, „die geschaffen ist nach Gottes Ebenbild und Gleichnis“.

Willigis Eckermann OSA.

TRUTH AND IMAGE IN AUGUSTINIAN EPISTEMOLOGY¹

Abstract

Numerous authors have argued that an excessively Platonic view of the soul is discernible in Augustine's early writings. Before long however, so the argument runs, Augustine shifts away from these positions and adopts the more orthodox stances that characterize his later works. In this paper, I follow this progressive interpretation, but take the additional step of outlining the effect that this transition has on Augustine's epistemological system. Namely, whereas many suppose Augustine has a largely static theory of knowledge throughout his forty years of publication, I argue that there is in fact a discernible shift in Augustine's epistemology. Specifically, in his early work Augustine follows the Platonic assumption that the soul possesses Truth within, not images. Before long, however, Augustine jettisons Truth from the soul, preferring instead to argue that the soul has a vision of Truth which is above the soul; whilst only images of Truth abide in the soul. How and why this shift occurs is the subject matter of this paper.

Numerous authors have argued that an excessively Platonic view of the soul is discernible in Augustine's early writings.² Platonic themes such as a world-soul, the pre-incarnate existence of the soul, the partial immutability of the soul, and even the qualified divinity of the soul are alluded to in these early texts. Before long however, so the argument runs, Augustine shifts away from these positions and adopts the more orthodox stances that characterize his later works.³ In this paper, I follow this progressive interpretation, but take the additional step of outlining the effect that this transition has on Augustine's epistemological system.

¹ I would like to thank Peter Erb for a number of helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

² Robert O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) and Phillip Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

³ The progressive model has recently undergone some criticism by Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and John Peter Kenney, "Confession and the Contemplative Self in Augustine's Early Works," *Augustinian Studies* 38 (2007): 133-146.

Many suppose Augustine has a largely static theory of knowledge throughout his forty years of publication.⁴ In this paper, I argue there is in fact a discernible shift in Augustine's epistemology. Specifically, in his early work Augustine follows the Platonic assumption that the soul possesses Truth within, not images: "the figures of Geometry are in the Truth... Truth also is compelled to be in our mind... Or have that line or squareness or roundness other things which they imitate that they may be true? In no way can I believe that".⁵ Before long, however, Augustine jettisons Truth from the soul, preferring instead to argue that the soul has a vision of Truth which is above the soul; whilst only images of Truth abide in the soul: "So when we know God... that knowledge becomes a kind of likeness of God; yet that knowledge is of a lower kind, since it is in a lower nature".⁶ How and why this shift occurs is the subject matter of this paper.

1. Platonic Epistemology and the Early Augustine

The capstone of Platonic epistemology is the doctrine of recollection (*Meno* 81ff; *Phaedo* 73ff). According to it, human souls get a pre-incarnate glimpse of the Forms. Incarnate learning, therefore, is simply

⁴ Thus, Henry Bubacz, in *St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1981): 141-145, interchangeably cites from such chronologically distinct texts as *De Immortalitate Animae* and *De Trinitate*, as though Augustine expounds the same doctrine at both times. Similarly, Ronald Nash, in *The Light of the Mind* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969): 65-68, cites from *De Quantitate Animae* in one pen stroke, and *De Trinitate* in another, without indicating possible evolution. Nash does, however, discuss Augustine's shifting attitude toward recollection later in his book (Pg. 82-84). More recently, Robert Miner argues that roughly the same doctrine of Augustinian recollection that is at work in *Soliloquia* is evident in later works such as *De Magistro*, and perhaps even *Retractationes*. See Robert Miner, "Augustinian Recollection", *Augustinian Studies* 38 (2007): 435-450.

⁵ *Soliloquia* 2.33: Siue enim figurae geometricae in ueritate, siue in eis ueritas sit, anima nostra, id est intellegentia nostra, contineri nemo ambigit, ac per hoc in nostro animo etiam ueritas esse cogitur. Quod si quaelibet disciplina ita est in animo, ut in subiecto inseparabiliter, nec interire ueritas potest; quid, quaeso, de animi perpetua uita, nescio qua mortis familiaritate dubitamus? An illa linea uel quadratura uel rotunditas habent alia quae imitentur ut uera sint? Nullo modo id possum credere. — Translations follow C. C. Starbuck "Soliloquies" in *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, Vol. 1* (New York: Random House, 1948) ed. Whitney Oates, 259-300. To help with context, I occasionally cite a wider portion of the Latin text than appears in the translation.

⁶ *De Trinitate* 9.11.16: Ita cum Deum nouimus, quamuis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus, maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata uerbum est, fitque aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia; tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est.

a matter of unearthing the Truths that are already buried within. For example, in *Meno* 82, Socrates questions a servant boy about the mathematical structure of a triangle. The boy, who has never been educated in geometry, figures out the intricacies of the triangle by himself, with only some helpful prompting from Socrates. Socrates concludes the boy must have already possessed the Truths about the triangle within:

And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?... If the truth of all things always existed in the soul, the soul would be immortal.⁷

The boy already has the Truths of geometry buried within, and he simply needs to recollect or retrieve them.

A related principle in Plato's epistemological system is that knowledge is not possible if images are involved.⁸ In *Republic*, Plato argues that people who look to the sensible world of sights and sounds can have opinion (*doxa*), but not knowledge (*epistēmē*).⁹ The reason for this is that sensible objects are images of the actual intelligible objects, not the actual objects themselves.¹⁰ A sensible tree is an image of the Form of Tree, it is not the actual Form. Thus, to see the sensible tree is still not to grasp the Form itself. Since the slave boy has knowledge, and possesses Truth, it is safe to conclude that he does not possess an image of the Truth within, but rather possesses the actual Truth within. Plotinus, from whom Augustine most likely received his Platonism, stresses the fact that knowledge is not possible if the soul grasps an image of the Form as well.¹¹ This leads Plotinus to conclude

⁷ *Meno* 86a; translations follow *Meno*, Benjamin Jowett (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1949).

⁸ *Republic* 476-480; 510a and 514b. For secondary sources see Lloyd Gerson, *Knowing Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150ff; Francisco Gonzales, "Non-propositional Knowledge in Plato", *Apeiron* 31 (1998): 235-283. For an opposing account see Gail Fine, *Plato on Knowledge and Forms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). The interpretation given here has a neo-Platonic ring to it, but Augustine was undoubtedly exposed to neo-Platonic versions of Plato himself.

⁹ *Republic* 476ff and 507b.

¹⁰ *Republic* 476c; 509d and 510a.

¹¹ See *Ennead* 1.4.10; 4.6.1; 4.23.15; 4.5.2; 5.3.5; 5.3.8; 5.3.15; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.8.4; 5.9.5; 5.9.7. As secondary sources, see Mark Alfino, "Plotinus and the Possibility of Non-Propositional Thought", *Ancient Philosophy* 8 (1988): 273-285; A. C. Lloyd, "Non-Propositional Thought in Plotinus", *Phronesis* 31 (1986): 258-265; Eyjolfur Emilsson, *Plotinus on Intellect* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007): 124ff. For an opposing view, see Richard Sorabji, "Myths about Non-Propositional Thought",

that the actual Form must be present inside the intellect. Plotinus goes so far as to argue that the intelligible object is identical to the intellect.¹²

Augustine's early enthusiasm for the books of the Platonists is well documented.¹³ Indeed, Augustine's adherence to such Platonic teachings as the immortality of the soul, the existence of immaterial objects and the folly of the skeptical path is palpable. Here I attempt to demonstrate that the aforementioned Platonic framework is also evident in Augustine's early epistemology. There are several places where this framework is closely followed, one of which occurs during a prolonged argument for the immortality of the soul in the second book of *Soliloquia*. Here Augustine carries on a dialogue with reason about what and where Truth is. Reason wonders what Truth is, and responds by saying that falsity occurs when an image represents another thing: "We call that also a false tree which we see in a picture, and a false face which is reflected from a mirror".¹⁴ Reason goes on to assert that an image of a tree is more false than the relationship that a rock has to the tree, because at least the rock does not attempt to represent the tree, and so it cannot deceive people into thinking that it is the actual tree. Reason goes on to call shadows, echoes and paintings false as well, since they are both similar and dissimilar to the actual object. If they were not similar, they would not be false. If they were not dissimilar, they would not be false. But, since they are both similar and dissimilar, they are false.¹⁵ Augustine does not want images, which are only half-true and are therefore the origin of falsity, but rather Truth itself. He says that he will: "seek that Truth, which is not, as if laid out on a bifronted and self-repugnant plane, false on one side that it may be true on the other".¹⁶ Reason agrees with him and says that the actual object will be True, not an image of the object.

The outworking of this line of reasoning is that if the soul only possesses images of Truth, then humans do not have knowledge, they

Language and Logos eds. M. Nussbaum and M. Schofield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 295-314.

¹² See *Ennead* 1.4.10; 5.3.5; 5.3.8; 5.4.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.8.4; 5.9.5; 5.9.7; 6.5.7

¹³ Augustine acknowledges his indebtedness to what he calls the "books of the Platonists" (*Confessiones* 7.9.13). Concerning Plotinus, Augustine gives him the honorific title of being a second Plato in *Contra Academicos* 3.18.41. See also *Epistulae* 6. For a secondary source, see O'Connell.

¹⁴ *Soliloquia* 2.10: Dicimus item falsam arborem quam pictam uidemus, et falsam faciem quae de speculo redditur.

¹⁵ *Soliloquia* 2.29-30.

¹⁶ *Soliloquia* 2.18: Sed illud uerum quaerere, quod non quasi bifronte ratione sibi que aduersanti, ut ex aliqua parte uerum sit, ex aliqua falsum sit.

only have falsity: "Let us consider this last point, whether the body be not truly true, that is, whether there be in it, not truth, but a certain image of Truth".¹⁷ If an image of Truth is in the body, then the body is not truly true. As it turns out, the body does contain images, and is therefore false. However, actual intelligible objects, such as the idea of squareness and roundness, exist in the mind (*in animo/in subiecto*):

Or have that line, or squareness, or roundness, other things which they imitate that they may be true? In no way can I believe that... Or is not Truth where these things are?... Or is not the science in the mind.¹⁸

Since the science of geometry, and Truth in general, abides in the mind, humans can possess Truth rather than falsity.¹⁹

At this point, reason implores Augustine to conclude that the soul is immortal as well: "Therefore the soul is immortal: now at last yield to your own arguments, believe the truth; she cries out that she dwells in you, and is immortal, and that her seat cannot be withdrawn from her by any possible death of the body".²⁰ Since Truth dwells in the soul, and Truth is immortal, the soul is immortal. We will come to this argument again, but for now only the context is important. The immortality of the soul is only guaranteed because immortal Truth, rather than passing images, dwells in the soul. In *Soliloquia*, therefore, the presence of Truth rather than images in the soul undergirds both the ability to have knowledge and the immortality of the soul.

Augustine repeats the view that images are epistemologically incompetent in some of his early correspondence with Nebridius.

¹⁷ *Soliloquia* 2.32: Quare iam illud ultimum uideamus, utrum corpus non sit uere uerum, id est non in eo sit ueritas, sed quasi quaedam imago ueritatis.

¹⁸ *Soliloquia* 2.33: An illa linea uel quadratura uel rotunditas habent alia quae imitentur ut uera sint? Nullo modo id possum credere, nisi forte aliud sit linea quam longitudo sine latitudine, et aliud circulus quam linea circumducta undique ad medium aequaliter uergens. Quid ergo cunctamur? An ubi ista sunt, ueritas non est? Auertat Deus amentiam. An disciplina non est in animo? Quis hoc dixerit?

¹⁹ Augustine says that numbers and the sciences are (in) Truth on numerous occasions. See, for example, *Soliloquia* 2.17; 2.24; 2.33. Beyond this, numbers and the sciences have the same qualities that Truth has. For example, both are eternal, unchangeable and intelligible. Moreover, Augustine freely interchanges the sciences with Truth in his argument for the immortality of the soul. The soul is immortal because Truth is in the soul, and the soul is immortal because the sciences are in the soul. He also freely interchanges the presence of God in the soul with the presence of wisdom/Truth in the soul in *De Ordine* 2.1.3-2.2.7; 2.6.18-2.7.21. For a secondary source see Cary, 95-100.

²⁰ *Soliloquia* 2.33: Immortalis est igitur anima: iamiam crede rationibus tuis, crede ueritati; clamat et in te sese habitare, et immortalem esse, nec sibi suam sedem quacumque corporis morte posse subduci.

In *Epistulae* 6, Nebridius argues that “memory cannot occur without an image”. Knowing Augustine, Nebridius then says Augustine will disagree with him on this point: “But, you will say: what about our remembering that we have understood or thought something”. Nebridius is trying to suggest that our intellect contains only impressions or images, but he knows that Augustine will not like this argument. And of course, Nebridius is right. Augustine responds to him in the following letter: “You claim that memory cannot exist without images or those mental pictures which you wish to call fantasies. I think otherwise”.²¹ As an example of how memory can function without images, he cites Plato’s theory of recollection.²² According to Augustine, Plato’s theory implies that the actual ideas are present to the mind, not images of those ideas. He concludes:

If eternity itself always remains, and needs no mental image by means of which it may come into the mind, as if it were on a vehicle, and yet if it were unable to enter our mind unless we recalled it, then there can be memory of certain things without imagination.²³

Not only can the mind contain actual intelligible objects, but Augustine goes on to conclude that these objects can be “truly

²¹ *Epistula* 7: Memoria tibi nulla uidetur esse posse sine imaginibus uel imaginariis uisis, quae phantasiarum nomine appellare uoluisti: ego aliud existimo. – Translations follow Wilfrid Parsons “Saint Augustine Letters” in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1951).

²² He cryptically credits the Platonists with his priority of the actual object over an image of the object in *Soliloquia* 2.26 as well: “Shall we desist from our undertaking, and wait in hope that some book or other may fall into our hands, which may satisfy this question? For many, I think, have written before our age, whom we have not read: and now, to give no guess at what we do not know, we see plainly that there is much writing upon this theme, both in verse and prose; and that by men whose writing cannot be unknown to us, and whose genius we know to be such, that we cannot despair of finding in their works what we require.”

²³ *Epistula* 7: Ipsa aeternitas semper manet, nec aliqua imaginaria figmenta conquirat, quibus in mentem quasi uehiculis ueniat, nec tamen uenire posset, nisi eius meminissemus, potest esse quarundam rerum sine ulla imaginatione memoria. – Ronald Nash thinks *Epistula* 7 is one of the only places where Augustine endorses images in the soul of things thought (Pg. 55). Earlier in the *Epistula* Augustine divides mental images into three types, one of which is images of things thought. From this Nash concludes that Augustine thinks that there are these sorts of images. As *Epistula* 7 unfolds, however, Augustine deals with these three classes of images separately. For the first two classes, he acknowledges that there are images within the soul. However, when he considers the contentious class of things thought, he concludes that the actual intelligible object can be present without images. Thus, it is better to suppose that Augustine is introducing three possible classes of images, of which he eventually rejects the class of images of things thought. This interpretation puts *Epistula* 7 in harmony with the rest of his earlier works.

understood", while mental images are false, defective and diabolical shadows. Again, therefore, the presence of Truth in the soul is not only asserted, but is the required foundation for knowledge.

Similar themes emerge from the discussion recorded in *Contra Academicos*. Here Augustine deals with skepticism; an issue that had haunted him personally for some time. Since the title is called *Contra Academicos*, it is not surprising to see him refuting the skeptical path, and endorsing the view that knowledge is possible. The book starts by stating the skeptical claim that it is unwise to assent to something without knowing for certain that it is true. The truth is hidden due to certain "natural obscurities or because of resemblances among things".²⁴ These natural obscurities are various errors that arise due to the nature of sense perception.²⁵ Embedded in Augustine's lengthy response to the skeptic is the admission that sense perceptions may be deceptive, but the apprehension of intelligible objects is indubitable.²⁶ For example, *Contra Academicos* 3.10.23 says that although the skeptic thinks we cannot know whether there is one world or many, we can nevertheless be certain of the logic which says that there is either one world or many. This truth can be known "regardless of what condition our senses are in".²⁷ The academic claims that the senses are deceptive, for we may be dreaming, and all that appears to us would be false. However, Augustine argues that truths of mathematics remain in the mind whether the entire world is sleeping or not.²⁸ In all of these arguments, Augustine invokes the Platonic assumption that the senses are false, but there is still a Truth that can be possessed:

Whatever the Academicians maintain against the senses doesn't hold against all philosophers. There are philosophers who grant that everything the mind takes from the bodily senses can generate opinion. They deny that this is knowledge, however. They hold that knowledge is contained in the intelligence and abides in the mind, far removed from the senses.²⁹

²⁴ *Contra Academicos* 2.5.12.

²⁵ *Contra Academicos* 3.6.13; 3.18.40; 3.19.42.

²⁶ See Christopher Kirwan *Augustine* (London: Routledge, 1989): 28-29; Gerard O'Daly "The response to Skepticism and the Mechanisms of Cognition" *Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 161-163.

²⁷ *Contra Academicos* 3.13.29.

²⁸ *Contra Academicos* 3.11.25. See also 3.12.28.

²⁹ *Contra Academicos* 3.11.26: Quidquid enim contra sensus ab eis disputatur, non contra omnes philosophos ualet. Sunt enim qui ista omnia, quae corporis sensu accipit animus, opinionem posse gignere confitentur, scientiam uero negant. Quam tamen uolunt intelligentia contineri, remotamque a sensibus in mente uiuere. — Translations follow Peter King *Against the Academicians* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1995).

The reason that the sense world offers only falsehoods is because it is only an image of the real intelligible world.³⁰ On the contrary, the wise man actually possesses (*habere*, Augustine occasionally uses *possidet* and *contineri* as well) wisdom within, so he is not susceptible to such falsehood.³¹ In fact, since the skeptic acknowledges the wise man possesses wisdom, Augustine thinks the skeptic must acknowledge the wise man has knowledge.³² Augustine concludes by arguing the skeptic actually endorses this Platonic perspective, which he takes the time to endorse as well.³³ Evidently, then, Platonic themes are instrumental in the epistemology of *Contra Academicos* as well. The skeptics maintain that truth cannot be known, partially because of the fact that sense perceptions are images and therefore susceptible to error. Augustine counters this by asserting that Truth can be known because the soul possesses actual intelligible Truths, rather than images of intelligible Truths, and as such one need not worry about errors.

De Beata Vita follows *Contra Academicos* in assuming that humans can know Truth, while simultaneously rejecting the possibility of knowledge when images are involved.³⁴ From these assertions, as evident in the previous texts, the conclusion follows that the soul possesses Truth, not any sort of image of the Truth. The conclusion that the soul possesses Truth is arrived at in a different way as well in *De Beata Vita*. Augustine begins his search for the happy life by stating that "whoever possesses God is happy".³⁵ But what is it to possess God? Three opinions are given as to the meaning of this cryptic phrase, and they all revolve around the suggestion that to possess God is to be virtuous or pure. This does not refute my argument however. For, according to *De Beata Vita* 4.32-33, moderation is the greatest virtue. Moderation, so the argument runs, is the proper measure, since moderation entails that one can measure things out in proper accord. Augustine then argues that the proper measure of the soul is wisdom, for to have the equilibrium required to be properly measured, one must be wise. Wisdom, however, according to *De Beata Vita* 4.34, is the same as Truth. Thus to be happy means to possess God, which means to be virtuous, which eventually comes to mean that one possesses

³⁰ *Contra Academicos* 3.6.13; 3.17.37; 3.18.40.

³¹ *Contra Academicos* 3.12.27; 3.12.28; 3.14.32

³² *Contra Academicos* 3.3.5; 3.3.6; 3.5.12; 3.14.30; 3.14.32.

³³ *Contra Academicos* 3.20.43.

³⁴ *De Beata Vita* 2.8 says humans can know Truth; *De Beata Vita* 4.33; 4.35 rejects the use of images.

³⁵ *De Beata Vita* 2.11: Deum igitur, inquam, qui habet, beatus est.

Truth. This conclusion is not surprising, considering the fact that Augustine equates God with Truth in this text, as he is prone to do in other places as well.³⁶

This conclusion also makes sense of the fact that Augustine spends quite some time demonstrating why the skeptic, who does not possess Truth, cannot be happy. Since a happy life entails the possession of Truth, a skeptic who does not possess Truth cannot be happy. Augustine leaves the dialogue with the expectation that happiness can be achieved, a conclusion which supposes that the soul can possess Truth:

Whoever attains the supreme measure, through the truth, is happy. This means, to have God within the soul, that is, to enjoy God. Other things do not have God, although they are possessed by God... this then is the full satisfaction of souls, this is the happy life, to recognize piously and completely the one through whom you are led into the truth, the manner in which you enjoy the truth, and the bond that connects you with the supreme measure.³⁷

The soul possesses Truth and is connected to the Truth in some way. Augustine confirms that the soul possesses Truth in numerous other places in *De Beata Vita* as well.³⁸ The Augustinian assumption that Truth is present in the soul is therefore evident in *De Beata Vita*.

In *De Ordine*, Augustine again displays his view that humans can know Truth along with the view that images are impossible in bringing about Truth.³⁹ This again leads to the conclusion that humans possess Truth.⁴⁰ This conclusion is supplemented by the fact that Augustine argues the wise man is with God (*cum Deo*) in *De Ordine*. In *De Ordine* 2.1.4, Augustine defines being with God as "whatever understands God". The wise man understands God, so is with God. However, a wise man can move on a boat, so it seems that he is not with God. A response comes which states that it is not what the wise

³⁶ See, for example, *Soliloquia* 1.3; 1.15; *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.13.37; 2.15.39; *De Magistro* 8.21; *Confessiones* 3.6; 10.24; 10.35 and *De Trinitate* 4.3; 8.3. For an opposing position see Kenny (2007).

³⁷ *De Beata Vita* 4.34-4.35: Quisquis igitur ad summum modum per ueritatem uenerit, beatus est. Hoc est animo Deum habere, id est Deo frui. Cetera enim quamuis a Deo habeantur, non habent... Illa est igitur plena satietas animorum, haec est beata uita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a quo inducaris in ueritatem, qua ueritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo. — Translations follow Ludwig Schopp *The Happy Life* (London: Herder Book Co., 1939).

³⁸ See, for example, *De Beata Vita* 2.11; 2.12; 3.17; 3.19; 3.20; 3.21; 4.34.

³⁹ See *De Ordine* 2.20.53 for humans knowing Truth; See *De Ordine* 1.1.3; 2.2.4-2.2.6; 2.11.30; 2.15.43; 2.16.44 for the rejection of images.

⁴⁰ *De Ordine* 1.4.10; 1.8.24; 1.9-10; 1.10.28; 2.2.7; 2.7.20; 2.9.26.

man does, but what he knows that is with God. The interlocutor responds that the wise man knows his cloak and tunic, so this implies that the cloak and tunic is with God. However, the response is that whatever is known by the bodily sense is not with God, but what is known by the soul is. Indeed, to perceive something with the bodily sense is not knowledge, so it is the intellect of the wise man that is with God. Licentious approves and says that in this way the "wise man is utterly with God",⁴¹ in fact he "coheres with God".⁴² Therefore, in this early text as well, Augustine reveals his belief that the human soul possesses Truth and is with God.

The final early document is *De Immortalitate Animae*. In this text Augustine's argument for the immortality of the soul depends on the inseparable presence of Truth in the soul. He argues that science (*disciplina*), immutable art and unchangeable numbers (which, as we have seen, are equated with Truth in *Soliloquia*), are immortal and eternal, and that these things exist in the soul.⁴³ From these two premises he jumps to the conclusion that the soul is immortal.⁴⁴ We have seen Augustine make this argument before. It runs as follows: if the soul stopped existing, then Truth would suddenly have no place to exist in. However, Truth always exists, and must exist somewhere, so it is impossible for the soul to stop existing.

Importantly, the cornerstone of this argument is that Truth is inseparably present in the soul: it cannot not be present in the soul or the argument would fail.⁴⁵ Augustine goes into some detail about what 'inseparably present' means in *Soliloquia*. In *Soliloquia* 2.22, Augustine notes an important difference between an accidental property and an essential property of an object. He says that a wall could be a different colour, while still remaining a wall. However, fire could not be fire if it had no heat. Indeed, according to the ancient Greek conception of the four elements, whenever heat is present, in the human body for example, this is the presence of fire. He then argues that the soul has Truth essentially.⁴⁶ We can almost say that the soul could no longer be the soul if Truth were not present in it; that the presence of soul is the presence of

⁴¹ *De Ordine* 2.2.5: Sapiens prorsus cum Deo est. See also *De Ordine* 2.3.8; 2.5.17; 2.6.19.

⁴² *De Ordine* 2.2.6: Anima, inquit, sapientis perpurgata uirtutibus et iam cohaerens Deo.

⁴³ *De Immortalitate Animae* 1; 4.

⁴⁴ *De Immortalitate Animae* 1. See also *Soliloquia* 2.20-21; 2.33; *Epistulae* 3.

⁴⁵ *De Immortalitate Animae* 4; 6; 11.

⁴⁶ *Soliloquia* 2.22. See also *De Ordine* 1.9-10, 2.30; *Contra Academicos* 2.9; *De Beata Vita* 35.

Truth. This brings fresh meaning to Augustine's insistence that Truth is inseparably present in the soul. It is not possible that Truth could separate itself from the soul. The depth of this bond between the soul and Truth lends additional weight to the prevalent assumption that Augustine endorses the view that Truth itself is present in the soul.

Before moving on, I want to take stock. Augustine frequently repeats several Platonic assumptions in these early texts. First of all, the soul possesses Truth within it. Secondly, the immortality of the soul is demonstrated based on the presence of Truth within. Finally, the ability for humans to have knowledge is also founded on the presence of Truth within. Humans can have knowledge, but knowledge is not possible when false and deceptive images are involved, so Truth itself must be present within. Before long, the foundation that Truth is present in the soul will be rattled. As a consequence, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul will no longer receive rational justification, and the soul's possession of Truth will be limited.

2. The Shift in Augustinian Epistemology

In his early work Augustine achieves the seemingly happy result that humans possess Truth and that the soul is immortal. Why would Augustine shift away from these early positions? However, and here I follow O'Connell and Cary, lurking in the background of his early philosophical enterprise is the potential divinity of the soul. In this section I will briefly recapitulate the view that the soul is potentially divine in Augustine's early works, and demonstrate how Augustine shifts into a strong emphasis on the soul as an image of the divine; not divine itself. I will then spend the bulk of my time demonstrating how this shift affects his epistemology: namely, Augustine shifts from believing that the soul possesses Truth to the view that the soul only occasionally attains a vision of Truth which is above the soul.

As mentioned, numerous authors have noticed the potential divinity of the soul in Augustine's early writings. Phillip Cary argues that immutable elements such as Divine Reason and Good Will are present in the soul.⁴⁷ Immutability is an essential property of divinity, so this

⁴⁷ Cary argues that the first book of *De Libero Arbitrio*, written well before the second and third books, speaks of transcendent Good Will being in the soul (Pg. 109-111). See *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.25. Moreover, he points out that Divine Reason is also present within the soul in Augustine's early work (Pg. 77-91). See *De Ordine* 2.43; 2.48; 2.50; *Episulae* 13; *De Immortalitate Animae* 2.

implies the soul may be divine. It is clear from the preceding discussion that unchangeable Truth is present in the soul as well. Using the same line of reasoning, the soul possesses immutable Truth, whilst immutability is an attribute of divinity alone, so the soul may be divine. Perhaps without surprise, then, there are early texts in which Augustine liberally refers to the "divine spirit" of himself and his friends.⁴⁸ These and other such considerations lead some commentators to conclude the soul seems to be divine in Augustine's early writings: "In his earliest writings, under the influence of the books of the Platonists, Augustine still seems to have entertained the idea that the soul was divine".⁴⁹

It is the argument that the soul is immortal in virtue of the possession of immortal Truth which I would like to focus on. Recall that Augustine argues Truth is immortal, and Truth is inseparably present in the soul, so the soul is immortal. Plotinus presents an argument for the immortality of the soul which is similar in structure. Plotinus argues:

Wisdom and authentic virtue are divine, and could not be found in the chattel mean and mortal: what possesses these must be divine by its very capacity of the divine, the token of kinship and of identical substance.⁵⁰

The argument runs along the same vein as the one found in Augustine's early writings. Wisdom, or as Plotinus later describes it, the intellectual, cannot be found in a mortal vessel, but the intellectual is found in the soul, so the soul is immortal. The reason that the intellectual cannot be possessed by a mortal vessel is that they have an identical substance. Later in the *Ennead* Plotinus argues that the soul becomes an Intellectual Cosmos due to the presence of the intellectual within the soul. Plotinus is arguing that the soul is immortal because it becomes identical with the immortal intellectual principle.

In this same *Ennead*, Plotinus argues that the soul is divine in virtue of the fact that it is identical with the divine intellectual principle. Plotinus, of course, holds the One, the Intellectual Principle, and Soul to be divine.⁵¹ According to his doctrine of emanation, however,

⁴⁸ *Contra Academicos* 1.1.1; 1.1.3; 1.4.11; 1.8.22; 2.11.31; *De Beata Vita* 2.4 and 2.10;. For an alternate interpretation which would make this terminology sound more orthodox, see O'Meara *Academics*, Pg. 169

⁴⁹ Roland Teske "Augustine's Theory of Soul" *The Cambridge Companion To Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) eds. Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann: 117. See also O'Connell, 122-131; Cary 77-105.

⁵⁰ *Ennead* 4.7.10; Translations follow *The Enneads*, Stephen MacKenna (Burdet: Larson Publications, 1992).

⁵¹ See, for example, *Ennead* 4.7.10; 5.1.1 for the divinity of the soul. See *Ennead* 1.2.3; 2.3.18; 3.2.3; 3.2.16; 4.3.12; 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.3.7; 5.8.11; 6.9.11 for the divinity of the intellect.

the intellectual principle is more divine than the soul. The embodied human soul especially, in its lowly terrestrial state, forgets its divinity, and is less divine than it could be. In order to “enhance the divine quality of the soul”, the intellectual principle becomes immanently present.⁵² In *Ennead* 4.7.10, Plotinus demonstrates that the soul is divine because “noble things are immanent”. The noble thing is the intellectual principle, and the immanence means that the soul becomes an “identical substance” with the intellectual cosmos. Simply put, the intellectual principle is most divine, and the soul attains to cognitive identity with the intellectual principle, so the soul becomes more divine by the connection. Plotinus summarizes this process at the end of the chapter:

He will see all things in this Intellectual substance, himself having become an Intellectual Cosmos and all lightsome, illuminated by the truth streaming from the good, which radiates truth upon all that stands within that realm of the divine. Thus he will often feel the beauty of that word, ‘Farewell: I am to you an immortal God’, for he has ascended to the Supreme, and is all one strain to enter into likeness with it.⁵³

Although the soul already has a low degree of divinity, the soul recaptures a deeper divinity when it becomes an intellectual cosmos due to its identity with the intellectual level.⁵⁴ To briefly summarize, Plotinus argues that the soul is immortal and divine in virtue of the fact that it is cognitively identical with the eternal and divine intellectual principle. Augustine argues that the soul is immortal in virtue of the inseparable presence of Truth. However, since he also thinks that Truth is divine, the same argument leads to the conclusion that the soul is divine in virtue of the presence of divine Truth.⁵⁵ As soon

⁵² Plotinus begins *Ennead* 5.1.1 by lamenting the fact that embodied souls have forgotten their divine nature. A preliminary way to recall that the soul is divine is to discern the divinity and splendor of soul in nature, and recall that the human soul itself has such splendor (*Ennead* 5.1.2). Even with this knowledge, however, the soul is merely “nearing God... there is not much between” (*Ennead* 5.1.3). In order to travel further, the soul must look upward to the intellectual principle, which is the source of soul, and is more divine. This intellectual principle “enhances the divine quality of the soul” by being immanently present (*Ennead* 5.1.3).

⁵³ *Ennead* 4.7.10.

⁵⁴ See also *Ennead* 1.6.6; 3.5.10; 5.8.11 and 6.5.7 for similar arguments.

⁵⁵ There are two possible interpretations of this argument. First of all, and most straightforwardly, if the soul stopped existing, then Truth would suddenly have no place to exist in. However, Truth always exists, and must exist somewhere, so it is impossible for the soul to stop existing. This interpretation, offered up by Phillip Cary, suffers from several shortcomings. First of all, when one soul dies, Truth seems to still abide in other

as Truth is inseparably present within the soul, the soul attains to divinity in virtue of the presence of divine Truth. In order to avoid the

souls, so it still has a place to dwell. All of the human souls would have to die at the same time in order for immortal Truth to be homeless. So, it is not clear that this is Augustine's argument for the immortality of a soul. Secondly, why couldn't Truth abide in God's mind, which everyone in this discussion agrees is eternal? If Truth could abide there, it would not need a human soul to remain alive in order to have a home. A third problem, which Cary acknowledges, is that this interpretation of the argument assumes that the ontologically superior Truth is dependent for its existence on its inferior. Plotinus, who thinks that soul emanates out of the intellectual principle, could hardly agree that the intellectual principle could not exist if a soul did not. Augustine, who thinks that God is Truth, and God creates souls, could not suddenly endorse a view which said that God would cease to exist if souls did. As Cary concludes: "This makes God's existence dependent on ours... It is important to appreciate that this conclusion was as repugnant to Neoplatonists as it was to orthodox Christians" (Cary, Pg. 102). Cary thinks that despite these obvious problems, this is the argument that Augustine is attempting to make. His conclusion is that Augustine is "philosophically incompetent" (Cary, Pg. 102) at this point in his life, so it is not surprising that he would make an erroneous argument such as this. The second interpretation assumes that Augustine is merely echoing the Plotinian argument of 4.7.10; which he seems to have done in the case of the immortality of the soul already. Cary grants that Plotinus arrives at the immortality of the soul via this route, but thinks that Augustine is not aware of the argument (Cary, Pg. 30). There are several reasons to suppose that Augustine is aware of the famous Plotinian doctrine of the identity of the knower and the thing known. First of all, as De Labriolle and Verbeke have argued, *Ennead* 4.7 seems to be the source behind Augustine's argument for the immortality of the soul. Plotinus speaks about the identity of the knower and the thing known in *Ennead* 4.7, so it is reasonable to suppose that Augustine is aware of the doctrine. Moreover, Robert O'Connell notices that sections ten and eleven of Augustine's treatise *On the Immortality of the Soul* muses about whether reason is the act of contemplation or the very objective truth which is contemplated (O'Connell, Pg. 139), again indicating that Augustine toys with the identity of the knower and the thing known. Finally, *Soliloquia*, which by definition is a monologue, posits Augustine talking to a separate Reason, which leads to Truth, while at the same time admitting that there is only one person: "Suddenly someone addresses me, whether I myself, or some other one, within me or without, I know not. For this very thing is what I chiefly toil to know" (*Soliloquia* 1.1). These considerations demonstrate that Augustine is at least aware of Plotinus' doctrine. There is reason to suppose that Augustine follows the Plotinian doctrine of cognitive identity as well. First of all, as already alluded to, the only way that Augustine's argument for the immortality of the soul can actually work is if one assumes that he is embracing the Plotinian doctrine of the unity of the intellect. Since the structure of Augustine's argument is virtually identical to the structure of Plotinus', there is more reason to suppose that Augustine is following Plotinus. Beyond this, O'Daly (Pg. 196) points to several texts in which Augustine interchanges the concepts of intellect and intelligible. These considerations demonstrate the plausibility of concluding that Augustine follows Plotinus in his doctrine of cognitive identity. The drawback of this position is that it would certainly follow that Augustine held that the soul is divine in his early writings, for it is impossible for the soul to be identical with divine Truth without itself being divine. For my purposes it does not matter which interpretation is right, for both of them imply that Truth is present in the soul, and that the soul is in a qualified sense divine.

divinity of the soul, therefore, Truth would have to no longer be inseparably present within the soul. As we will see, Augustine does begin to emphasize the fact that the soul is not divine, but rather is made in the image of the divine. At the same time, a discernible shift away from the inseparable presence of Truth within the soul is evident.

First of all, though, I want to demonstrate that Augustine emphasizes the fact that the soul is not divine. Shortly after writing his *Cassiciacum* books, Augustine begins to reveal the Nicene doctrine that everything is either a creator or a creation.⁵⁶ According to this doctrine, the soul can have no divinity within it, nor can it be created out of any divine elements. Augustine, therefore, spends some time discrediting the Manichean view that the soul is partly divine.⁵⁷ The philosophical argument that Augustine deploys against the view that the soul is partly divine is that the soul is subject to change. If the soul is partly divine, then this renders God subject to change, which is impossible.⁵⁸ This crafty argument contrasts with his earlier view that the soul has unchangeable elements within it. Augustine is now armed with theological and philosophical reasons for resisting the conclusion that divine and unchangeable Truth is present within the soul.

Augustine replaces his emphasis on the inseparable presence of divine Truth within the soul with an emphasis on the soul being an image of the divine.⁵⁹ This shift is noticeable in *De Quantitate Animae*, which is the first philosophical book written after the *Cassiciacum*

⁵⁶ Cary, 59-60; 111ff; Joseph Torchia, *Creation Ex nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).

⁵⁷ *De Genesi Contra Manichaeos* 2.11; *De Genesi ad Litteram* 3.22.34; 7.2.3; 7.3.4-7.4.6; 7.5.8; 7.11.16; 7.28.43; *De Natura et Origine Animae* 1.4; 1.24; 2.4; 2.5; 3.3; *De Libero Arbitrio* 3.56-59; *De Duabus Animabus* 12.16; *Contra Faustum* 2.17-22; 24; *Contra Fortunatum* 1.10-18; *De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber* 60; *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 12; *De Duabus Animabus* 1.

⁵⁸ *Confessiones* 7.2.3; *De Genesi Contra Manichaeos* 2.11; *Epistulae* 166; *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.12.34. For a secondary source, see O'Daly, 32.

⁵⁹ Harrison, Pg. 74ff, argues that Augustine thinks the soul is created out of nothing, even in his earliest works. She cites many post-*Cassiciacum* texts to make her argument, and to this extent she seems to be correct. However, she also thinks that the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is evident in a *Cassiciacum* text, namely, the opening prayer of *Soliloquia* (Pg. 82). This text states that the universe is created out of nothing, but it does not say that the soul is created out of nothing, which is the issue at hand. More broadly, in writing *Retractationes*, Augustine is one of the few thinkers in history who devotes an entire book to amending previous works, so there seems to be reason to think that some of his thinking shifted over time. Specifically, some of his early musings on the soul are the exact things he shifts away from. See, for example, *Retractationes* 1.1.3; 1.4.4; 1.8.2.

texts. Not only does he mention it throughout,⁶⁰ but it makes an integral appearance at the end. In this final section, Augustine climbs up seven levels of soul, beginning with the lowest life giving level of soul that even plants have. He climbs up through the senses and reason before finally arriving at the seventh level of soul, which is the contemplation of Truth. According to the Cassiciacum texts, this Truth would be a possession of the soul, abiding within the soul. Perhaps to clarify that the soul no longer possesses divine Truth, Augustine announces:

The human soul is not what God is... therefore, it has been the divinely inspired and categorical teaching of the Catholic Church that no creature is to be adored by the soul (I prefer to use the very words by which these things were taught me), but that he alone is to be adored who is the creator of all things that are.⁶¹

God is more excellent than the soul, so no part of the soul is of the same nature with God. Not only does this text leave no doubt that divine Truth is not a possession of the soul, but Augustine also displays his recent conversion to this position.⁶²

The shift away from the inseparable presence of Truth within the soul has an immediate effect on Augustine's epistemology.

⁶⁰ *De Quantitate Animae* 1.2; 2.3; 28.55 and 34.77. See also *Epistulae* 18; 48; *De Ciuitate Dei* 12.23; *De Trinitate* 12.7.12; *Sermones de Scripturis de Nouo Testamento* 1; 2; 3; 40; *De Natura Boni* 13; *De Natura et Origine Animae* 4.20; *De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber* 60; *De Genesi Contra Manichaeos* 1.17.27-28; 2.9-11; *De Spiritu et Littera* 48; *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 13.4; 43.6; 49.2; 146.2; *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 18-20.

⁶¹ *De Quantitate Animae* 34.77: animam humanam non esse quod Deus est... Ideoque diuine ac singulariter in Ecclesia catholica traditur, nullam creaturam colendam esse animae (libentius enim loquor his uerbis quibus mihi haec insinuata sunt), sed ipsum tantummodo rerum, quae sunt, omnium Creatorem. – Translations follow Joseph Colleran "The Greatness of the Soul" (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1964). *Epistula* 18, written around the same time, also seems to demonstrate the newness of the doctrine to Augustine's mind: "Since I know you so well, here is something both great and short. There is a nature, which is subject to the changes of both time and space, as the body; and there is a nature which is not subject to space but only to time, as the soul; and there is a nature which is subject to neither space nor time, and that is God. What I have portrayed as changeable is called creature; what is unchangeable, the Creator". If the recipient of the letter knows Augustine so well, he would likely already know Augustine believed this teaching, and there would be no need to use up precious space to write about it.

⁶² Cary goes so far as to argue that Augustine's conversion to the doctrine of the creaturely nature of the soul is so new in *De Quantitate Animae* that it is mentioned, but it is not weaved into the fabric of the argument. I have attempted to show that it is worked in to the argument to some extent, but the manner in which he introduces the doctrine does seem to demonstrate the novelty of the idea to Augustine.

Remaining in *De Quantitate Animae* for a moment, there are two texts which are well worthy of investigation. In chapter two, Evodius wonders whether the soul is immortal. The Cassiciacum response would be to say that the soul has immortal Truth within it, so it is immortal. However, Augustine does not follow this route anymore. Rather, he does not directly respond to the question, and ends the conversation by asserting that the soul “does not possess the same power as He in whose likeness it has been made”. Where Augustine once would have provided an argument which implies that there are unchangeable elements in the soul, he now highlights the fact that the soul is a creation made in the likeness of God.⁶³

Later in the dialogue, Augustine repeats the familiar Plotinian phrase that one should return into oneself to find Truth. For Plotinus, as is evident from *Ennead* 6.5.7, this means that the divine intellect is within the soul, and one simply needs to turn away from the senses to reconnect with this divinity. In his early works, Augustine frequently implores his readers to return into oneself to find Truth as well, implying that Truth is within.⁶⁴ However, in this text here, Augustine suggests that we should rather ‘retire’ into ourselves, which does not imply the doctrine of pre-existence as strongly as ‘return’ does. Secondly, immediately after stating that one should retire into oneself to find knowledge, he says that this should be done in order to “become a child of God again...remake ourselves in his image”.⁶⁵ In the Cassiciacum texts, Augustine encourages his readers to return within to find Truth, while here he encourages his readers to retire within to become a child and a perfect image of God. We will come across this issue again, but for now it suffices to conclude that in *De Quantitate Animae*, Augustine no longer uses the argument for immortality which was based on the presence of Truth within, and he so dampens the claim that we can return within ourselves to find Truth that it now means that we will somehow become a child and an image of God.

In *De Magistro*, the shape of Augustine’s emerging epistemology is displayed. In his Cassiciacum works, Augustine occasionally

⁶³ Indeed, in *Retractationes* 1.5.1, Augustine is quite confused by his own argument in *De Immortalitate Animae*. To my knowledge, his later works bear no trace of an argument for the immortality of the soul, though Augustine would certainly have liked to prove it.

⁶⁴ See *Soliloquia* 2.33; *Contra Academicos* 1.8.23; 3.17.37; *De Ordine* 1.1.2; 1.1.3; 1.8.23; 2.2.4; 2.2.5; 2.2.6; 2.11.30; 2.19.

⁶⁵ *De Quantitate Animae* 28.55: ne se ultra quam necessitas cogit, refundat in sensus; sed ab his potius ad seipsam colligat, et repuerescat Deo... Quod omnino fieri non potest, nisi ad eius reformemur imaginem.

says the soul has a vision of Truth, but more frequently says the soul possesses Truth within.⁶⁶ In his post-Cassiciacum writings, he occasionally still says that the soul possesses Truth, but prefers to instead speak of having a vision of Truth.⁶⁷ What is the difference between possessing Truth, and having a vision of Truth? Simply put, when we possess something it is typically inside of ourselves, whereas when we see something it is typically outside of ourselves. The Platonic doctrine of recollection, since it suggests that Truths are buried within awaiting recall, implies that the soul possesses Truth within. In his early works, Augustine seems to accept the Platonic teaching of recollection, and the ensuing conclusion that the soul possesses Truth.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Some early texts where Augustine suggests that the soul has a vision of Truth include *De Ordine* 1.3.7; 2.2.5; 2.2.7; 2.11.33; 2.19.51. In the last text, notice that Augustine says 'qui erunt illi oculi', or 'what those eyes will be' or 'what will be in those eyes'. Either way, the implication is that Truth still resides within the soul in this early text, it is not above the soul. Augustine also speaks of a vision of Truth in *De Beata Vita* 4.35; 2.3.10, although here Augustine again says that the thing understood or seen is still present. *De Immortalitate Animae* 6; 10; *Soliloquia* 1.23; 1.25 also speak of having a vision of the Truth, but again these texts have been shown to assume that the Truth that is seen is present in the soul, not above the soul. Finally, *Contra Academicos* 1.2.6; 1.5.13; 2.7.18; 3.3.5; 3.3.6; 3.4.8; 3.4.10; 3.10.22; 3.12.27 mentions a vision of Truth, but we have seen that this text operates under the assumption that the Truth seen is unqualifiedly in the mind. See especially *Contra Academicos* 3.12.27: "If you ask my opinion, I think that man's highest good is in the mind". Of course, years later Augustine retracts the conclusion that man's highest good is in the mind, preferring instead to say that man's highest good is in god: "I should have said more truthfully 'in god', because to be happy the mind finds joy in him as its highest good" *Retractationes* 1.4.

⁶⁷ Some later texts where Augustine continues to say that the soul possesses Truth include *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.24; 2.8.24; 2.9.27; 2.13.36. But Augustine begins to write this book early, and finishes after he is ordained, so it is impossible to know exactly when which words were written. Moreover, Augustine qualifies his supposition that humans possess Truth with the additional caveat that Truth cannot be one's private possession (2.12.33; 2.14.37; 2.18.52). As we will see later, this qualification casts doubt on the depth of Augustine's conviction that the soul possesses Truth. Augustine also says that Truth dwells within in *De Magistro* 11.38, but he is now quick to say that Truth "presides over our minds within us". Again, in *De Magistro* 14.46 Augustine says Truth dwells within, but he now adds that Truth is "in heaven". See also *De Vera Religione* 3.5; *De Quantitate Animae* 22.38; 26.51; 27.53. Augustine is clear in these books that Truth is above and beyond the soul as well (*De Vera Religione* 39.72; *De Quantitate Animae* 26.50-27.53; 34.77). Augustine more frequently argues that the soul has a vision of Truth in these later works. See, for example, *De Vera Religione* 3.3; 8.15; 31.57; 32.59; 33.61; 44.82; 49.97; 51.100 and 52.101; *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.13.36; 2.6.14; 2.7.15; 2.8.24; 2.10.28; 2.13.36 and 2.16.42; *De Magistro* 11.36; 12.40 and 14.45.

⁶⁸ Some early texts where Augustine endorses recollection include *Soliloquia* 2.20.35; *Contra Academicos* 1.22; 2.9.22; *De Immortalitate Animae* 6; *De Quantitate Animae* 34; *Epistulae* 7 and *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.12.24. For secondary sources, see

Eventually, however, he comes to reject this doctrine.⁶⁹ In its place arises Augustine's theory of illumination, which teaches that humans can have a momentary vision of a Truth above the soul. The theory of illumination is formally introduced in *De Magistro*.

For our purposes, there are three important facets to the theory of illumination. First of all, humans now have a vision of Truth, rather than a possession of Truth. In chapters eleven and twelve Augustine compares the intellectual process to eyesight. Later on, in chapters twelve and fourteen, he speaks in terms of having a vision of Truth. Secondly, this vision of Truth is momentary. It occurs at a specific time and then it passes; we do not permanently possess Truth within. Imagine the sensible eye perceiving a tree in broad daylight. In order to perceive the tree, the tree must be present and it must also be light out. When the night comes, the tree can still be present, but the eyes do not see it. Likewise, the mind can only see an intelligible Truth if there is some illumination. It may have always been the case that 'Justice is Good', or ' $2+5=7$ ', but then a brief moment of insight comes upon a specific person, and they grasp the idea for the first time. In that moment, the divine teacher sheds light onto the intelligible realities, enabling the person to have a vision of them. Contrary to the doctrine of recollection, it is only in this moment of illumination or insight that the human has knowledge.

The final relevant component of the doctrine of illumination is that the illuminated Truths are above the mind. Augustine says:

It is Truth that presides within, over the mind itself; though it may have been words that prompted us to make such consultation. And He who is consulted, He who is said to dwell in the inner man, He it is who teaches – Christ – the unchangeable Power of God and everlasting Wisdom.⁷⁰

This text may, at first glance, seem to suggest the opposite; namely, that Truth and the divine illuminator are within the soul. Notice, however, that Augustine actually states that Truth is over the

Roland Teske, "Augustine's Philosophy of Memory" Pg. 148-152; Nash, Pg. 51; 82-84 and Gilson, Pg. 71-72. O'Daly, 201, is not convinced, however, preferring to conclude that Augustine is speaking metaphorically in these texts.

⁶⁹ *Retractationes* 1.1.3; 1.4.4; 1.7.2; *De Trinitate* 12.15.24.

⁷⁰ *De Magistro* 11.38: sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus ueritatem, uerbis fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia. See also 12.39; 12.40. Translations follow Joseph Collieran "The Teacher" (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1964).

mind as well. Moreover, by suggesting that Truth presides, he is again implying that Truth rules or is in some way above the soul. In his concluding remarks, Augustine again reveals that Truths and the divine light are above the soul: "We should not call anyone on earth a teacher, since there is one in heaven who is the teacher of all. What 'in heaven' means He himself will teach us".⁷¹ The term 'in heaven', if it means anything like what it normally means, implies that the Teacher and Truth is above and outside of the soul. The doctrine of illumination worked out in *De Magistro*, therefore, replaces the Platonic view that the soul constantly possesses hidden Truth within with the Augustinian view that the soul has a momentary glimpse of Truth above the soul. In so doing, Augustine introduces the seemingly paradoxical view that Truth is within the soul in the sense that it is above the soul. I will clarify this perplexing doctrine below.

De Vera Religione also reveals a gradual shift away from Truth being within the soul to having a vision of Truth which is above the soul. Augustine argues here that Truth is "higher than our minds" and "above the rational soul".⁷² His argument, located in chapter 30, is that the circularity of a wheel is judged to be perfectly circular based on an idea of a circle that is a higher standard than the one on the wagon. In the same way, the standard which judges all arts, which is called Truth, is higher than the human mind. During this argument, he also repeats the fact that the soul is mutable, whereas the Truth is not, so again the conclusion that Truth is no longer in the soul is reached. Augustine repeats this claim in *De Vera Religione* 36.67, and as though haunted by conclusions past, immediately moves on to the statement that it is an error to worship the soul in place of God, for the soul is a creation. Seemingly, the Truth is above the soul now, not within it, so it can in no way be considered to partake in divinity.

Augustine repeats this theme in *De Vera Religione* 39.72. Here Augustine articulates the traditional Platonic exhortation to return within oneself to find Truth, but he adds his twist again:

Do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth. If you find you are by nature mutable, transcend yourself. But remember in doing so that you must also transcend yourself even as a

⁷¹ *De Magistro* 14.46: ne nobis quemquam magistrum dicamus in terris, quod unus omnium magister in coelis sit. Quid sit autem in coelis docebit ipse.

⁷² *De Vera Religione* 3.3; 30.56: Supra mentem nostrum esse legem; *De Vera Religione* 31.57: quae supra rationem animam sit; *De Vera Religione* 36.67: Sed ipsi menti supereminet. — Translations follow John Burleigh "On True Religion" in *Augustine: Early Writings* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953).

reasoning soul. Make for the place where the light of reason is kindled. What does every good reasoner attain but truth?... Confess that you are not as it is.⁷³

Like in the previous books, we are encouraged to go within. However, as soon as we are there we see that we are a mutable creation, which is not as Truth is. In order to find the place where Truth is, we need to transcend, or go above, ourselves.

The second book of *De Libero Arbitrio*, completed after his ordination as a presbyter, contains the strongest arguments for why Truth is above the soul, rather than within the soul. Starting in chapter six, Augustine offers up a proof of the existence of God, which starts by suggesting that if there is something above the mind, this will be God. He then shifts his train of thought somewhat, by concluding that although each person has their own eyesight and mind, what the eye or the mind sees is common to all. The sense of taste allows only one person to eat a particular bite from an apple at a time, whereas the sense of sight allows numerous people to look at the same thing at once. He argues that the mind is more akin to sight, since many people can look at the Truths of numbers at the same time, or see the same wisdom. This leads him to conclude that Truth is common for everyone.⁷⁴ Implicit in this claim is the consequence that Truth is not private, which Augustine also acknowledges.⁷⁵ During this discussion, Augustine draws a contrast between a private sense of sight and the common sensible object, and between a private mind and the common intelligible Truth. The private things are contained within the individual soul, whereas the common things are outside the soul, available for all to see: "You will never deny that there is an unchangeable Truth... you will never be able to say that it belongs particularly to you or to me or to any man, for it is available and offers itself to be shared by all".⁷⁶ If Truth were within a particular soul, it would not be common and hence available for all to see. We will come upon this argument again, but for now it suffices to notice how it demonstrates that Truth has been lifted out of the soul.

⁷³ *De Vera Religione* 39.72: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat ueritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inueneris, transcede et te ipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. Quo enim peruenit omnis bonus ratiocinator, nisi ad ueritatem?... Confitere te non esse quod ipsa est.

⁷⁴ *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.8.24; 2.14.37; 2.14.38.

⁷⁵ *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.10.28; 2.8.24.

⁷⁶ *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.12.33.

After making this argument that Truth is in common space outside of the soul, he returns to his proof for the existence of God in chapter fourteen. He has just proven that Truth is outside and beyond human minds. Now, in line with the argument in *De Vera Religione*, Augustine states that wisdom, or Truth is the perfect unchangeable standard with which everything else is judged, and as such it is better than our minds. Since Truth is outside the mind in common space, and it is better than the mind since it is the standard to judge things by, Truth is very much superior to the human mind. But at the beginning of the argument it was agreed that if there was something better and beyond the human mind, this would be God. Truth, therefore, is better than and beyond the human mind, and it is God. This argument is predicated on the assumption that Truth is both outside of the mind in common space, and above and superior to the human mind. Augustine also argues here that Truth is outside the mind since the soul can be separated from Truth by a perverse will. Clearly, then, by the time of completing *De Libero Arbitrio*, Augustine has exorcised Truth from the human soul.

To summarize, in his Cassiciacum writings, Augustine rejects the use of images for they barred the soul from possessing actual Truths. As Augustine clearly rejects the divinity of the soul and focuses on the soul as an image of the divine, so his epistemology shifts from the soul possessing Truth to having a vision of Truth above the soul. This move generates several problems: what does the soul possess in place of the Truth that had once been in the soul? After seeing the Truth, what does the soul come to possess after the experience? The answer to these questions, as will be worked out in the final section, is that images (copies, transcriptions or impressions) of Truth come to be within the soul, while Truth rests unchangeably above.

3. Augustine's Later Epistemology

The assertion that the soul possesses images of intelligible Truths, rather than intelligible Truths themselves in considerably contested. There are a number of people who think Augustine is a representationalist with respect to both sensible and intelligible objects.⁷⁷ On the contrary, however, there are a number of people who think

⁷⁷ Bubacz, 86; Eugene Portalié, *A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine* (Chicago: Regnery, 1960): 111-113; Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961): 75-92.

Augustine is an ontologist, which teaches that the soul possesses, or at least glimpses, actual Truths.⁷⁸ In this section I argue that in two later works, *Confessiones* and *De Trinitate*, Augustine thinks images of Truth abide within the soul, not Truth itself.

The claim that the mind only possesses images of intelligible objects is more difficult to prove from *Confessiones*. Numerous authors agree that the memory contains images of sensible objects in *Confessiones* ten, but then argue that Augustine here states the memory contains the actual intelligible objects.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, I will argue that there is reason to think *Confessiones* paints a picture in which impressions of Truth abide in the mind, while Truth is above the mind.

In the first nine books of the *Confessiones*, Augustine recounts the story of his life to date. After catching up to the present day, book ten analyzes his current state of mind. He does this by turning to a study of the contents of his own memory. Memory, according to book ten, is an immense storehouse consisting of images of past experiences and bodily objects, and impressions of certain affections of the mind. All of the things in his storehouse are part of himself: "Great is the power of memory, something awe-inspiring... a deep and endless multiplicity; and this thing is my mind, and this thing am I myself".⁸⁰ This move, which will appear later as well, individualizes the memory.⁸¹ Everything within Augustine's memory is part of himself. The sense images within his mind are his own, while the actual sense objects remain outside and are not his own. If the intelligible realm follows the same pattern, then we can say that Truth remains outside. There is reason to think this must be the case. As shown in *De Libero Arbitrio*, Truth is common so it is difficult to see how it could be in Augustine's memory and therefore part of himself. Moreover, if he is his memory, and Truth is in his memory, then by the transitivity of identity, we have to admit that there is a sense in which Augustine is Truth. But we have seen how strongly Augustine shies away from

⁷⁸ Nash, 102-104; Cary, 70; Garreth Matthews "Knowledge and Illumination", *The Cambridge Companion To Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) eds. Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann: 179-180.

⁷⁹ Todd Breyfogle "Memory and Imagination in Augustine's Confessions", *Literary Imagination, Ancient and Modern* (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1999) ed. Todd Breyfogle: 139-154 and Roland Teske "Augustine's Philosophy of Memory" *The Cambridge Companion To Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) eds. Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann: 148-158.

⁸⁰ *Confessiones* 10.17.26. See also *De Natura et Origine Animae* 4.9-4.10.

⁸¹ Augustine will more fully individualize the memory in *De Trinitate* 10.11.17ff where the memory is one of three parts of himself, so it is as valid to say that he is the contents of his memory as it is to say that he is his mind.

such claims. Whereas Plato accepted the view that common and eternal Forms are buried within, Augustine thinks everything within the memory is part of himself.

As noted earlier, however, this conclusion is not shared by everyone. Even Phillip Cary, for example, who agrees that Augustine invents the inner self through this expanded memory, thinks that actual intelligible objects are within the soul.⁸² A common text in favour of this view is *Confessiones* 10.9:

Here also are all the skills acquired through the liberal arts which have not been forgotten. They are pushed into the background in some interior place – which is not a place. In this case I carry not the images but the very skills themselves. For what literature is, what the art of dialectical debate is, how many questions there are – all that I know about these matters lies in my memory in this distinctive way. It is not that I retain the images and leave the object outside me.⁸³

Most things in the memory are images of the actual object, but Augustine draws an exception here for the liberal sciences. In later chapters he adds that numbers are not present in the memory as images either, but as the actual numbers themselves. If this is the full and final word on the subject, it would appear as though my argument is in jeopardy. After all, numbers and the liberal sciences are the exact Truths that I have been arguing can no longer be present within the mind. Fortunately, there is reason to think that Augustine's position is more nuanced than this text alone indicates.

Central to Augustine's argument that numbers and the liberal sciences are not images is the observation that they do not come into the soul through the five senses. In chapter ten, Augustine explains how the nostrils, the ears and the other senses would speak up if the liberal sciences passed into the soul through them. Similarly, in chapter twelve, Augustine explains that numbers give off no odour or colour, so they do not come in through the senses. Unlike sense objects, therefore, numbers and the liberal sciences do not come into the soul from out in the sensible world. Thus it is no use to look outside in the world to find the liberal sciences or numbers. This is the sense in which we must go

⁸² Cary, 127

⁸³ *Confessiones* 10.9.16: Hic sunt et illa omnia, quae de doctrinis liberalibus percepta nondum exciderunt, quasi remota interiore loco, non loco; nec eorum imagines, sed res ipsas gero. Nam quid sit litteratura, quid peritia disputandi, quot genera quaestionum, quidquid horum scio, sic est in memoria mea, ut non retenta imagine rem foris reliquerim aut sonuerit et praeterierit. – Translations follow Henry Chadwick *Confessiones* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

within to find them, since they are not found in the sensible world. When we go within, however, we do not immediately find them in the same way we find a sense image of a city we visited earlier in our lives. On the contrary, we go within, but then we have to transcend the soul by looking above in order to find Truths and God.

There are two reasons to suppose that numbers and the liberal sciences are not simply within the mind; but they are within and above the mind. First of all, recall that Augustine equates unchangeable numbers and the liberal sciences with Truth. Truth, however, is also equated with God, or at least with the thoughts of God. Therefore, from the day Augustine learned his first math lesson, and probably before, God should be buried somewhere deep within him. Yet in considering when God first comes into the memory, Augustine makes the following observation: "Where did I find you to be able to learn of you? You were not already in my memory before I learnt of you".⁸⁴ Gerard O'Daly uses this text to demonstrate that God is not present in the soul before being consciously apprehended. He thinks, however, that Forms such as numbers can be present within the memory before they or God are deliberately contemplated.⁸⁵ But how, since numbers are Truths, and are thereby equated with the thoughts of God, can God be both present within the soul before having an experience of him, and at the same time not be present within the soul before having an experience of God? One explanation which overcomes this paradox is the suggestion that numbers are only present within the soul in the qualified sense that they are above the mind.

But did Augustine really attempt to qualify the presence of the liberal sciences, or of God more generally, within the soul? I will now argue that he does. In *Confessiones* 10.17.26, Augustine embarks on an attempt to find God. He starts out by assuming that God transcends the memory:

I will transcend even this, my power which is called memory. I will rise beyond it to move towards you, sweet light. What are you saying to me? Here I am climbing up through my mind towards you who are constant above me. I will pass beyond even that power of mind which is called memory, desiring to reach you.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ *Confessiones* 10.26.37: Ubi ergo te inueni, ut discerem te? Neque enim iam eras in memoria mea, priusquam te discerem.

⁸⁵ O'Daly, 212.

⁸⁶ *Confessiones* 10.17.26: Transibo et hanc uim meam, quae memoria uocatur, transibo eam, ut pertendam ad te, dulce lumen. Quid dicis mihi? Ecce ego ascendens per animum meum ad te, qui desuper mihi manes, transibo et istam uim meam, quae memoria uocatur, uolens te attingere.

Augustine's first inclination is to assume that God transcends the memory. He has to climb above and beyond his memory in order to find God – something which would not be necessary if God were present within his memory. Before long he stumbles upon a problem. How can he even desire to find God if he does not already know about God in some way? And how can he know about God in some way if God were not already present within his memory somehow? As he is trying to rise above his memory, he uses these problems to realize that God must be inside his memory after all.

Augustine ranges deep within his memory in order to find God, under the assumption that God is within him somewhere. Finally, in chapter 24, he thinks he has found God within himself. As he begins to explain the location of God, however, a new problem arises. Specifically, Augustine cannot locate the specific place where God is within. He does not find God within the part of memory that animals have, so he rises above that. He does not find God within the part where his emotions are stored, since God is not an emotion. Nor does he find God in the part where his mind is, since God is not Augustine's mind. As it turns out, God is above all of these things:

For you are the Lord God of the mind. All these things are liable to change. But you remain immutable above all things, and yet have deigned to dwell in my memory since the time I learnt about you. Why do I ask in which area of my memory you dwell, as if there really are places there?... Where then did I find you so that I could learn of you if not in the fact that you transcend me? There is no place, whether we go backwards or forwards; there can be no question of place. O truth, everywhere you preside over all who ask counsel of you.⁸⁷

God is present within the memory in the sense that He is above the memory; he transcends it and presides over it. Augustine here says that we can make sense of this paradox if we keep in mind the fact that immaterial objects do not have location. God and numbers are not present in a room in the memory, since only material objects can occupy a certain space. On the contrary, there is no place where God

⁸⁷ *Confessiones* 10.25.36-10.26.37: Quia Dominus Deus animi tu es, et commutantur haec omnia, tu autem incommutabilis manes super omnia et dignatus es habitare in memoria mea, ex quo te didici. Et quid quaero, quo loco eius habites, quasi uero loca ibi sint? Habitas certe in ea, quoniam tui memini, ex quo te didici, et in ea te inuenio, cum recorder te. Ubi Deus inuenitur, cum cognoscitur? Ubi ergo te inueni, ut discerem te? Neque enim iam eras in memoria mea, priusquam te discerem. Ubi ergo te inueni, ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? Et nusquam locus, et recedimus et accedimus, et nusquam locus. Veritas, ubique praesides omnibus consulentibus te.

is not.⁸⁸ But then, how can God be above the mind, or outside of the mind, as I have been claiming? As we have seen, God is ontologically above the mind, not spatially above the mind. He is the creator, not a creation; he is a superior being, and none of his being went into the making of the human mind. Augustine cannot countenance an equality of God and human mind, so he must say that God is above the mind in that he is ontologically distinct and superior. This point becomes clearer through a discussion of Augustine's mystical encounters with God in other parts of *Confessiones*.

Both the issue of the presence of God above the soul, and the issue of whether God abides within the soul after experiencing him, are clarified by further considering Augustine's discussion of his encounters with God. Here is Augustine's account of his first mystical vision:

I was caught up to you by your beauty and quickly torn away from you by my weight ... but with me there remained a memory of you ... but I did not possess the strength to keep my vision fixed. My weakness reasserted itself, and I returned to my customary condition. I carried with me only a loving memory.⁸⁹

Augustine is torn away from Truth, implying that Truth does not remain in him. Moreover, he 'only' possesses memories, which again implies he does not possess God. Finally, Augustine returns to his customary condition, which implies that his moment of viewing Truth is not his customary condition, nor does he continue to hold onto Truth when he returns to his customary position. Augustine later explains that the experience 'imprints' things on his memory.⁹⁰ An impression of the reality, however, is not the reality itself.

⁸⁸ In his Cassiciacum writings, Augustine emphasizes this point often. See, for example *De Immortalitate Animae* 6 (Augustine later retracts the remark made here that nothing can separate two immaterial objects) and *De Beata Vita* 3.21. This fits into his early view that God is present within the soul. What is not emphasized in these early writings is the additional fact that the soul is a creation, and as such is ontologically inferior to and separate from God.

⁸⁹ *Confessiones* 7.17.23: Sed rapiebar ad te decore tuo moxque diripiebar abs te pondere meo et ruebam in ista cum gemitu; et pondus hoc consuetudo carnalis. Sed mecum erat memoria tui... sed aciem figere non eualui et repercussa infirmitate reditus solitis non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem, quae comedere nondum possem.

⁹⁰ *Confessiones* 7.20.26. This pattern is repeated in his vision in chapter nine. He describes "And while we talked and panted after it, we touched it in some small degree by a moment of total concentration of the heart. And we sighed and left behind us 'the firstfruits of the spirit' bound to that higher world, as we returned to the noise of our human speech where a sentence has both a beginning and an ending ... if only it could last" (*Confessiones* 9.25).

In this text, Augustine is also 'caught up' to God, implying that God is above where Augustine normally dwells. Augustine clarifies what it means for God to be above him in an earlier description of his mystical experience:

I entered and with my soul's eye, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind – not the light of everyday... it was not that light, but a different thing, utterly different from all our kinds of light. It transcended my mind, not in the way that oil floats on water, nor as heaven is above earth. It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was made by it.⁹¹

God is above the human mind in the sense that He is ontologically superior to the human mind. God is the creator, and the human mind is created out of elements entirely devoid of divinity. Earlier Augustine merely went inside to find God, not to the outer sense world. This is the Plotinian move, and it implies that the human soul is divine, so one only needs to look at it to find God. Now, as we have seen in seed form in *De Quantitate Animae*, and as O'Connell and Cary point out, Augustine goes inside in the sense that he still does not look to the sense world, but then he has to look up, since the mind possesses no divinity in itself.⁹² Thus, when Augustine looks up and catches a glimpse of Truth, or of God, he does not take back a part of Truth as a possession of his soul, rather he takes back a memory, or an impression, of the event. In *De Trinitate* we will see how this happens exactly. For now, it is enough to conclude that *Confessiones* teaches Truth is above the soul, and though we catch a momentary glimpse of Truth, we do not bring it back into our individual memories.

De Trinitate is an attempt to explain the complex doctrine of the Trinity. One of Augustine's central strategies runs as follows: the human mind is more tangible than the divine Trinity, and the human mind is made in the image of God. So, if we can understand the human mind which is an accessible copy, then we will have a better understanding of the original. In studying the human mind, numerous trinities arise. For example, the memory, the understanding and the will are all different, but belong to one and the same

⁹¹ *Confessiones* 7.10.16: Intraui et uidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam lucem incommutabilem... Non hoc illa erat, sed aliud, aliud ualde ab istis omnibus. Nec ita erat supra mentem meam, sicut oleum super aquam nec sicut caelum super terram, sed superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea.

⁹² O'Connell, 51-86; Cary, 38-40.

mind.⁹³ By studying these Trinitarian images in the human mind, it is possible to come to at least a cursory understanding of the divine Trinity.

Integral to the project of *De Trinitate*, therefore, is the assumption that we will find images of God in the human mind. One of the images that Augustine discovers within the human mind is central to the wider epistemological shift being charted here. Namely, Augustine argues that the ideas that humans possess are images of the divine Truth, rather than the Truth itself. In contrast to his early work, where humans possess Truth within the soul, Augustine now argues that humans possess images of the Truth in the form of individual thoughts. Or, so I shall presently argue.

Perhaps the most straightforward way to demonstrate this point is to consider a text where he simply states that the human mind does not possess the actual Truth, but rather some sort of an image or copy of Truth. In book fourteen of *De Trinitate*, Augustine discusses the moral rules that all humans subscribe to. He wonders:

Where, then, are [these moral rules] written, unless in the book of that Light which is called Truth whence every righteous law is copied and transferred (not by migrating to it, but by being as it were impressed upon it) to the heart of the man that works righteousness; as the impression from a ring passes into the wax, yet does not leave the ring.⁹⁴

Moral rules are here included within the wider category of Truth. As a preliminary example of the relationship of Truth to the human mind, then, this text demonstrates that moral rules remain with Truth, while the human receives copies of the moral rules impressed upon the heart. Though the moral rules leave an impression on the human mind, they 'do not leave the ring'. In other words, they do not migrate into the human and rest there as possessions of the human mind. Rather, the humans possess impressions or copies of the moral rules, while Truth remains entirely within itself and above the human mind. I intend to now demonstrate how this pattern repeats itself in all

⁹³ *De Trinitate* 10.12.19. See 8.10.14; 9.3.3; 9.4.4; 10.10.13; 10.11.17 for some other Trinitarian images.

⁹⁴ *De Trinitate* 14.15.21: Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae ueritas dicitur? unde omnis lex iusta describitur, et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam, non migrando, sed tamquam imprimendo transfertur; sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit, et anulum non relinquit. — Translations follow Arthur West Haddan "On the Trinity" in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3* (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887).

cases of the relationship between Truth and the human mind. I will do so by demonstrating first of all that Truth remains outside, or better yet, above the human mind in *De Trinitate*. I will then demonstrate that the thoughts that arise within the human mind are best described as images of the Truth.

Returning to the aforementioned text for a moment, there are two key reasons which lead Augustine to conclude that moral rules abide only in Truth. First of all, moral rules are seen as unchanging by those who see them. They that think torturing children is wrong today will not think that perhaps it will be right tomorrow. The human mind, however, is subject to constant change, so the moral rules cannot be present within the mind. We have seen this argument from unchangeableness before, and we will see it again. Secondly, moral rules are righteous, whereas the human heart is unrighteous. This being the case, moral rules cannot dwell within the human heart. Both of these arguments demonstrate why moral rules, which are one part of Truth, cannot dwell in the human mind.

Later on, while considering Truth more generally, Augustine repeats the point that Truth is not present in the mind. He offers up two further reasons for this conclusion. The first is a version of the argument from unchangeableness: "But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love anything unchangeable".⁹⁵ When the mind knows itself, it does not know anything unchangeable. Truth, however, is unchangeable. If Truth is present within the individual mind, when the mind knows itself the mind would know something unchangeable, namely, the unchangeable Truth that is present within the mind. However, the mind never comes to know something unchangeable when it knows itself, so unchangeable Truth is not present in the soul.

Not only does the changeable nature of the soul demonstrate that Truth is not present within it, but the private nature of the mind demonstrates this as well. Augustine argues that the individual mind is opaque to other minds, whereas the Truth is accessible to all:

Whence it is manifest, that each sees a thing in himself, in such way that another person may believe what he says of it, yet may not see it; but another [sees a thing] in the Truth itself, in such way that another person also can gaze upon it.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ *De Trinitate* 9.6.9. See also 4.1.1; 14.14.20; 14.15.21.

⁹⁶ *De Trinitate* 9.6.9: Unde manifestum est, aliud unumquemque uidere in se, quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen uideat; aliud autem in ipsa ueritate quod alius quoque possit intueri.

A variant of this argument has already been used to demonstrate that Truth is above the human mind in *De Libero Arbitrio*. Here the assumption is much the same: the contents of my mind are private, only I can see them. Truth, however, is public. If Truth is public, and is also present within my individual mind, then another person should theoretically be able to see Truth in my mind, since it would remain public. This does not happen, however, so again the conclusion that Truth is not present within the mind is reached.⁹⁷ In summary, Truth is unchangeable, perfectly righteous and publically accessible (Augustine will add to this list of distinctions before he is through), while the individual mind is nothing of the sort. Truth is, therefore, above the mind, not present in the mind.⁹⁸

If Truth is above the mind, and not present in the mind, then we need to ask ourselves what it is that is present in the mind. The answer to this question, as already hinted at in the case of moral rules, is that an image or copy of Truth is found in the mind. Augustine describes this image as a word that is formed within us:

We behold, then, by the sight of the mind, in that eternal truth from which all things temporal are made, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason, either in ourselves or in things corporeal; and we have the true knowledge of things, thence conceived, as it were as a word within us, and by speaking we beget it from within.⁹⁹

Here Augustine explains that we see Truth with the mind. We do not, however, possess Truth within, as was the case in his early

⁹⁷ In *De Trinitate* 13.1, Augustine points out that everyone has a different sense image, though they are of the same object. He repeats this pattern by saying that faith (13.2) and desire (13.3) is the same for all, though every person has their own as well. *De Trinitate* 13.4-13.5 makes the same point with respect to the will. Everyone wills a blessed life, although everyone also has a different version of a blessed life. It isn't surprising to see Augustine concluding that there is one Truth, but everyone holds individual images within. This conclusion is also reached from Augustine's sign theory. The 'word' in one soul becomes a noise and is carried as a vehicle (*In Iohannis Euangelium Tractatus* 37.4) into the soul of another (*De Trinitate* 9.7.12; 15.10.19; 8.6.9; 15.11.20; *Sermones de Scripturis de Nouo Testamento* 2.20; *Sermones* 225.3). The noise, however, must transform back into another word in the soul of the receiver, through the enlightenment of the Inner Teacher (*Epistula* 144.1, *De Magistro* 11.38; 11.39; 12.39). Thus there is quite a distance and difference between the thought in one soul and the same thought in another soul (*De Magistro* 13.42).

⁹⁸ *De Trinitate* 9.6.10; 9.6.11; 12.14.23; 15.1.1.

⁹⁹ *De Trinitate* 9.7.12: In illa igitur aeterna ueritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam uel in nobis uel in corporibus uera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, uisu mentis aspicimus.

works. Rather, a word is conceived within the individual mind. What does he mean by this 'word'? The term is, of course, loaded with significance. It harkens back to the second person of the divine Trinity, the Word. Indeed, Augustine draws many of the appropriate parallels himself: like in the case of the divine Trinity, the human word within is conceived by love.¹⁰⁰ This human word is a bare idea, unclothed by language or sensible noise.¹⁰¹ The human word then, like the divine Word, becomes flesh by taking on sensible noise in the act of speech.¹⁰² Once it is flesh, it becomes a sign,¹⁰³ as the divine Word is a sign pointing to the Father. This human word is not, however, the divine Word. Although it imitates and runs parallel to the divine Word, the human word within is a separate thing. I will now attempt to demonstrate exactly this: namely, the separation and difference between the divine Word (i.e., Truth) and the human word.

De Trinitate 9.7.12 ends by suggesting that the human word is either conceived by Truth or by the human mind. In either of these cases, the human word is still regarded as separate from the divine Word, or Truth. I will first of all argue that if the word is conceived by Truth, this still does not mean that Truth is present in the human mind. Seemingly, since Truth conceives something in the human mind, the thing conceived is not Truth: the metaphor of conception implies that the thing born is independent of the parent. However, one could object that according to Augustine's Trinitarian theology, if the word is begotten by Truth, then there is a sense in which Truth can still be in the mind. Augustine argues that the second person of the Trinity, the divine Word, is begotten from the Father. Although the Word is a separate person from the Father, the Word is still divine and still one with the Father. Similarly, if the word within is begotten by Truth, though it is distinct from Truth, there would still be an important sense in which the word within the individual mind is one with Truth.

This possibility is ruled out by the very nature of the word within the human mind. This is evident in Augustine's explanation for how a word is conceived in *De Trinitate* 12.14.23:

And to attain to [intelligible things] with the eye of the mind is the lot of few; and when they are attained as much as they can be, he himself who attains to them does not abide in them, but is as it were repelled

¹⁰⁰ *De Trinitate* 9.7.12.

¹⁰¹ *De Trinitate* 15.10.19; 15.14.24.

¹⁰² *De Trinitate* 15.10.19; 15.11.20.

¹⁰³ *De Trinitate* 15.10.19; 15.11.20.

by the rebounding of the eye itself of the mind, and so there comes to be a transitory thought of a thing not transitory. And yet this transient thought is committed to the memory through the instructions by which the mind is taught; that the mind which is compelled to pass from thence, may be able to return thither again... whence yet once more it may be as it were written down and fixed in the mind. For the thought of man, for example, does not so abide in that incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body, as that reason itself abides.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps a few minds can for a moment get a glimpse of the Truth above, but they cannot stay for long. When they leave this vision behind, a transitory thought is generated within the memory. The thought within, being transitory, can certainly not be the unchangeable Truth. Rather, the thought is a transcription copied into the memory. Augustine goes on to point out that this word can be forgotten, and that it comes into being at a time. Truth, however, is perfect and eternal, so it is not the type of thing that is forgettable or conceived at a time.

There are two further reasons to conclude that the word within, if conceived by Truth, still is not Truth present within the soul. First of all, immediately after making the argument cited in the previous text, Augustine launches into a criticism of the Platonic epistemology that he had embraced earlier in his life. Recall that Plato says Truths are buried within, waiting to be recollected. Augustine disputes this claim by saying that we cannot already know the things we learn. For example, someone cannot understand the internal structure of a triangle due to having already learned it in the past, since geometers would have been even rarer in past lives, while everyone is able to understand triangles in this life. Augustine then argues that in the same way the eye sees sensible objects without having seen them in the past, so the mind sees intelligible objects without having seen them in the past. Since Augustine distances himself from the Platonism of his youth, it stands to reason that he is rejecting the possibility that Truths can be in some sense buried within the mind.

¹⁰⁴ *De Trinitate* 12.14.23: Ad quas mentis acie peruenire paucorum est; et cum peruenitur, quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse peruenitor, sed ueluti acies ipsa reuerberata repellitur, et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio. Quae tamen cogitatio transiens per disciplinas quibus eruditur animus, memoriae commendatur ut sit quo redire possit, quae cogitur inde transire.... idque inueniret ubi primum inuenerat, in illa incorporea ueritate, unde rursus quasi descriptum in memoria figeretur. Neque enim sicut manet, uerbi gratia, quadrati corporis incorporealis et immutabilis ratio, sic in ea manet hominis cogitatio. — See also *De Trinitate* 8.3.4; 9.6.10; 9.11.16; 13.20.26; 14.8.11.

Secondly, Augustine explains that the word within is merely a likeness or image of God. It exists on a much lower level, and it is not divine in any way:

So when we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew Him, and above all when the same knowledge being also liked and worthily loved becomes a word, and so that knowledge becomes a kind of likeness of God; yet that knowledge is of a lower kind, since it is in a lower nature; for the mind is creature, but God is Creator.¹⁰⁵

The word that resides within the human mind is lower than God, it is a likeness of God, and is created by God. Given these humble descriptions of the human word, it is safe to conclude that the presence of the human word within does not imply the presence of divine Truth within. Therefore, even if the word within is conceived by Truth, this still means that Truth is not present within the human mind when the word is.

Importantly, Augustine does not even seem to prefer the conclusion that the word is conceived by Truth. Instead he more frequently implies that the word is conceived by the human mind. Although Augustine spends some time discussing how the human word comes from the human mind in *De Trinitate* 9.11-12, he elaborates on this matter in the final book of the treatise. In these final sections, Augustine argues that humans now see God through a glass dimly, or 'in an enigma'. A glass replicates images off of its reflective surface. To say that we see God through a glass, then, is to say that we see God by considering the image of God which we ourselves are. The glass, Augustine goes on to say, is dim, or is an enigma. This means, according to chapter nine, that the glass is "obscure, and difficult to see through". We know God through considering our mind as the image of God, but our mind is so inferior to God that it is difficult to understand God just by looking at this faint image. However, since this is all that we have, he makes several attempts to discern the nature of the divine Trinity through a study of the human mind. Only one of these attempts concerns us here.

In *De Trinitate* 15.11, Augustine considers the precise origin of the human word. The word within the human mind is a "word of man, [a] word of the rational animal, [a] word of that image of God, that is

¹⁰⁵ *De Trinitate* 9.11.16: ita cum Deum nouimus, quamuis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus, maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata uerbum est, fitque aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia; tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus. — See also 9.4.4; 10.5.7; 10.6.8.

not born of God, but made by God".¹⁰⁶ The word within, then is generated out of the human mind, not out of divine Truth. God made the human mind, and the word came out of the human mind, so we can say that God made this word. However, since this word belongs to man, an animal and an image of God, we cannot say that it was born out of God or Truth. Augustine highlights this point later on: "Therefore, as our knowledge is unlike that knowledge of God, so is our word also, which is born from our knowledge, unlike that Word of God which is born from the essence of the Father."¹⁰⁷

Augustine uses this as an insight into the divine Trinity as gleaned from studying the image. As the human word comes out of the human mind, and then takes on flesh through the noise of language, so the divine Word comes out of the Father and takes on bodily flesh in the incarnation. If the human word had not come out of the human mind, but had instead come out of Truth, the parallel would break down, and no insight into the divine nature could be gleaned from the example. However, since Augustine uses this as a parallel, it is clear that the human word must come out of the human mind.

If the human word comes out of the human mind, then the word which humans possess can not be Truth. There are numerous reasons for this. Augustine spends chapters fifteen and sixteen explaining the differences between the human word and divine Truth. The human word is not eternal while the divine Word, or Truth, is. Similarly, the human word can be deceptive, while the divine Word, or Truth, cannot be false. To this we can add the aforementioned problems that a human word is forgettable, changeable and private.¹⁰⁸ All of these discrepancies validate Augustine's conclusion that the human mind is an obscure image of God. Since the image is so vastly inferior to the actual divinity, little can be learned from studying the image. This being the case, however, it is clear that the word within the human is a mere image of Truth, and is in no way Truth itself. If it were Truth, then we could

¹⁰⁶ *De Trinitate* 15.11.20: Perueniendum est ergo ad illud uerbum hominis, ad uerbum rationalis animantis, ad uerbum non de Deo natae, sed a Deo factae imaginis Dei. – See also *De Trinitate* 15.12.22.

¹⁰⁷ *De Trinitate* 15.13.22: Propter hoc, sicut nostra scientia illi scientiae Dei, sic et nostrum uerbum quod nascitur de nostra scientia, dissimile est illi Verbo Dei quod natum est de Patris essentia. See also 15.14.24; 15.15.25; 15.22.42.

¹⁰⁸ Gilson, 73, points out another reason why the human word cannot be Truth if it is conceived by the individual human mind: "Augustine emphasized the contradiction involved in the notion of a temporal soul engendering eternal truths by itself. Thus the mind, in conceiving truth, gets more from itself than it contains. Whence come such riches?" How can a lowly mutable and temporal soul give birth to, let alone sustain, the existence of immutable and eternal truths?

greatly understand Truth by studying ourselves, since Truth would be within the very thing we are studying.

Augustine spends the final pages of the *Trinity* solidifying the conclusion that there is a radical difference between our thoughts and Truth. He starts by saying we do not see God face to face when looking into our memory and understanding, but rather we see an image:

I have undoubtedly taken pains so far as I could, not indeed so that the thing might be seen face to face, but that it might be seen by this likeness in an enigma, in how small a degree soever, by conjecture, in our memory and understanding, to intimate God.¹⁰⁹

Understanding, knowledge and memory is "my own",¹¹⁰ and there is a great disparity between them and the divine Trinity above.¹¹¹ The thoughts humans possess then, since they are images that belong to an individual mind, are not the actual Truths found in God.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ *De Trinitate* 15.21.40: Deum Patrem, et Deum Filium, id est, Deum genitorem qui omnia quae substantialiter habet, in coaeterno sibi Verbo suo dixit quodam modo, et ipsum Verbum eius Deum, qui nec plus nec minus aliquid habet etiam ipse substantialiter, quam quod est in illo qui Verbum non mendaciter sed ueraciter genuit; quemadmodum potui, non ut illud iam facie ad faciem, sed per hanc similitudinem in aenigmate quantulumcumque coniciendo uideretur in memoria et intellegentia mentis nostrae, significare curaui.

¹¹⁰ *De Trinitate* 15.22.42.

¹¹¹ *De Trinitate* 15.23.43.

¹¹² Further evidence for this conclusion can be drawn from Augustine's views on sense perception. As Nash (Pg. 54) and Bubacz (Pg. 93-126) have documented, Augustine has a representational view of sense perception. A sensory object comes into the human via the bodily sight. From the bodily sight it is transformed and put in the animal sight. From the animal sight an image of the sensible object is put into the memory. Finally, from the memory an image is placed in conscious thought (*De Trinitate* 11.9.16). Thus, a sensible tree is transformed into an image of the tree, which is then transformed into an idea of the image of the tree. Augustine explains: "When we learn of bodies through the bodily sense, a likeness of them, which is a memory image, arises in our mind" (*De Trinitate* 9.16. See also *Confessiones* 10; *De Ciuitate Dei* 11.26). We have already dealt with the possibility that Augustine is a representationalist with respect to sense objects, but a direct realist with respect to intelligible objects. As a further point on this matter, Augustine frequently uses the sensible world to explain the intelligible world (See, for example, *De Trinitate* 11.1.1; 12.15.25; *De Utilitate Credendi* 13.28). He says that the mind is an inner eye, like the physical eye. The mind has a vision of Truth, like eyes have a vision of the sensible world. The mind needs illumination in order to see, as the eyes need sunlight in order to see the world. It is quite likely, therefore, that Augustine would follow his representationalism vis-à-vis sense objects with representationalism about intelligible objects. Indeed, he states as much himself: "...and what the vision of one seeing is to that species of the body from which the sense is informed, that the vision of one thinking is to the image of the body that is fixed in the memory, from which the eye of the mind is informed" (*De Trinitate* 11.4.7. See also *De Trinitate* 12.14.23; 12.15.24).

4. Conclusion

In his Cassiciacum writings, Augustine rejects the possession of images, and embraces the possession of Truth. In his later writings, Augustine embraces the possession of images, and rejects the possession of Truth. This move is largely inspired by a simple theological conviction: the mind is not divine; it is the image of the divine. Hence, the mind does not possess divine Truth; it possesses images of the Truth. Perhaps this is why he recants some of his earlier criticism of the academics. The academics often act in ways which they call 'truth-like'. By doing this they hope to avoid having truth, but at the same time be able to function practically in the world. The early Augustine criticizes this dependence on likenesses or images of Truth: "Therefore, the academicians... gave approval to falsehoods in which they recognized a commendable imitation of true things".¹¹³ Late in his life, Augustine retracts this statement. He retracts the suggestion that imitations should be considered falsehoods, and he retracts his suggestion that the academicians were wrong to approve of 'truth-like' things:

Again, I regret having said about the Academicians that they had known the truth, the likeness of which they call 'truth-like', and also that I called the truth-like itself, to which they gave their approval, false. What I said was wrong for two reasons. First, it was wrong because I said that something that was truth-like in some fashion was false: this too is true in its own way.¹¹⁴

In his early writings Augustine scorns images as false and inferior to possessing actual Truth. Later on, Augustine appreciates and endorses the possession of images, rather than actual Truth.

What effect does this shift have on the human ability to know? Unlike the teaching of the philosophers he originally embraced, Augustine eventually concludes that the human soul cannot permanently possess Truth. Rather, the human soul can perhaps get a momentary glimpse of Truth, and leave with an image and a memory of that moment. The human soul can perhaps see the divine, but it does not possess the divine within. I say perhaps because many texts

¹¹³ *Contra Academicos* 3.18.40: Ergo illi norant, et approbant falsa in quibus imitationem laudabilem rerum uerarum animaduertebant.

¹¹⁴ *Retractationes* 1.1.4: Item quod dixi de Academicis, quia nouerant uerum, cuius simile appellabant ueri simile, idque ipsum ueri simile appellaui falsum quod approbant, duas ob causas non recte dictum est: uel quod falsum esset quod aliquo modo esset simile alicuius ueri, quia in genere suo et hoc uerum est,

indicate that it is very difficult to see the divine, and a few even suggest it is impossible.¹¹⁵ On the contrary, however, Augustine acknowledges having his own religious experience, and does mention the momentary glimpse of Truth. Augustine therefore seems to stand in between the Platonic view that Truth is possessed, and the later medieval view that God is utterly unknowable. The representationalist is right to say Augustine claims we possess images of sense objects and intelligible objects, rather than the objects themselves, or Truth itself. The ontologist may not be right to say Augustine claims we possess Truth, but there is some room for her to say that a momentary vision of Truth is possible. One thing is certain, however. Augustine's epistemology shifts over time. He gradually moves away from the view that humans can possess Truth, to a more humble stance. If Augustine's epistemology is not seen through this developmental lens, then his views will appear more complex and paradoxical than they actually are.

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¹¹⁵ See, for example, *De Genesi Ad Litteram* 5.16.34; *Sermones* 117.5; *De Trinitate* 15.6.10.

LABOR TAM UTILIS: SALLUST IN AUGUSTINE ON THE VULGATE

Abstract

Though the famous correspondence between Augustine and Jerome has recently been the object of much scholarly attention, commentators have failed to identify the reminiscence of Sallust's *Jugurtha* (4,3: *tam ... utili labori*) which Augustine employs in *epist.* 71,6 in order to acclaim Jerome's "Vulgate" text of the Gospels; the same phraseology is again echoed by Augustine in the same connection at *epist.* 82,35. Augustine's use of this Sallustian language would seem to have been suggested by Jerome's own allusion to the same passage of the *Jugurtha* in the preface to his LXX Job.

The celebrated exchange of letters between Augustine and Jerome presents a fascinating picture of the disparate aims and temperaments of two of the Doctors of the Church. This correspondence has recently been the subject of a large number of substantial studies. In this connection reference may be made to the work of White,¹ Hennings,² and Fürst, who besides a monograph³ has also produced a 2-volume edition of the correspondence.⁴ This latter *opus magnum* equips the letters with a "sehr reichhaltige[n] Kommentierung", thanks to which "die Korrespondenz zum erstenmal richtig erschlossen [wird]".⁵ The Augustinian letters at issue in the present article have recently been supplied with a critical text by Daur, who also furnishes a comprehensive *apparatus fontium*.⁶ A new and fully annotated translation of these epistles of Augustine has likewise been made

¹ C. White, *The Correspondence (394-419) between Jerome and Augustine of Hippo* (Studies in the Bible and Early Christianity, 23), Lewiston-Queenston-Lampeter, 1990.

² R. Hennings, *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Augustinus und Hieronymus und ihr Streit um den Kanon des Alten Testaments und die Auslegung von Gal. 2,11-14* (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*, 21), Leiden, 1994.

³ A. Fürst, *Augustins Briefwechsel mit Hieronymus* (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband, 29), Münster, 1999.

⁴ A. Fürst, *Augustinus – Hieronymus: Epistulae mutuae I-II* (Fontes Christiani, 41/1-2), Turnhout, 2002.

⁵ So the review of Fürst, *Augustinus* by W. Löhr in *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 46 (2003), 182-186, on 183.

⁶ K. D. Daur, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini epistulae LVI-C* (CCSL, 31A), Turnhout, 2005.

available by the *Augustinian Heritage Institute*.⁷ The latest contribution is an article by Squires in the present journal.⁸ The aforementioned review of Fürst's most recent work states: "Der Kommentar... erschliesst dem Leser in bewundernswerter Fülle die Feinheiten einer Zitat und Anspielung souverän einsetzenden literarischen Hochkultur".⁹ It is therefore unfortunate that like all the rest of this recent scholarship on the correspondence between Augustine and Jerome Fürst's commentary should have failed to identify the echo of Sallust that is the object of the present note.

Labor tam utilis is the title of an important article by Tkacz.¹⁰ These words *labor tam utilis* are the syntagm with which a letter of Augustine to Jerome commends the latter's "Vulgate" version of the Gospels from the Greek: *si quaedam rarissima merito mouent, quis tam durus est qui labori tam utili non facile ignoscat?*¹¹ This very same syntagm had been employed in Sallust's defence of historiography in the preface to the *Jugurtha* (4,3): *ego credo fore qui, quia decrevi procul a re publica aetatem agere, tanto tamque utili labori meo nomen inertiae inponant*. No further instance of the combination of *labor* and *tam utilis* is provided by either the online *Library of Latin Texts* or by the *Patrologia Latina Database*. Augustine was thoroughly familiar with Sallust, who with Cicero, Virgil and Terence made up the *quadriga* of authors on which the educational system of late antiquity was based. In particular Augustine was fascinated by the preface of the *Jugurtha*.¹² As well as being common to Sallust and

⁷ R. Teske, *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century II, I: Letters 1-99*, New York, 2001.

⁸ S. Squires, *Jerome's Animosity against Augustine*, in *Augustiniana* 58 (2008), 181-199. Squires' paper detects in the epistolary exchange between Augustine and Jerome the shadow of the third of the four Doctors of the Church, Ambrose. Squires thereby draws heavily on the investigation of the relations between Ambrose and Jerome by N. Adkin: *Ambrose and Jerome: The Opening Shot*, in *Mnemosyne* n. s. 46 (1993), 364-376; id., *Jerome on Ambrose: The Preface to the Translation of Origen's Homilies on Luke*, in *Revue Bénédictine* 107 (1997), 5-14.

⁹ Löhr, rev. of Fürst, *Augustinus*, 183.

¹⁰ C. B. Tkacz, *Labor tam utilis: The Creation of the Vulgate*, in *Vigiliae Christianae* 50 (1996), 42-72.

¹¹ Augustine, *epist.* 71,6 (= [Jerome], *epist.* 104,6).

¹² Cf. H. Hagendahl, *Augustine and the Latin Classics II* (*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*, 20/2), Göteborg, 1967, 637f.; 757. It may be added that such passages from the beginning of a work were especially easy to remember; cf. P. Petitmengin, *Saint Jérôme et Tertullien*, in Y.-M. Duval (ed.), *Jérôme entre l'Occident et l'Orient. XVI^e centenaire du départ de saint Jérôme de Rome et de son installation à Bethléem. Actes du Colloque de Chantilly (septembre 1986)*, Paris, 1988, 43-59, on 50: "des emprunts incontestables, faits souvent au début ou à la fin d'un traité..., c'est-à-dire aux passages qui restent le mieux gravés dans la mémoire".

Augustine, the collocation *labor tam utilis* is also used by both in a way that is strikingly similar: in each text this phrase occurs as a dative singular at the start of a clause after a generic *qui* followed by a subjunctive. The context is likewise the same: in both passages the reference is to criticism of a work of literature. The conclusion may accordingly be drawn that the syntagm *labor tam utilis* has been appropriated by Augustine from Sallust: this hitherto unidentified echo should be added to the dossier of Augustine's borrowings from the Roman historian.

This Sallustian syntagm would appear to have left a further trace on the correspondence between Augustine and Jerome. A letter which Augustine wrote to Jerome two years later¹³ speaks of people *qui me inuidere putant utilibus laboribus tuis*.¹⁴ Again the reference is to Jerome's biblical translations. This time Augustine's *utilibus laboribus tuis* matches the Sallustian word-order exactly: *utili labori meo*. Furthermore the phrase now ends on each occasion with a possessive adjective: *meo / tuis*. In the present letter Augustine has merely shifted to the plural by a species of *auxesis*,¹⁵ which is no doubt intended to make a favourable impression on the epistle's recipient.

It is perhaps possible to show that Augustine's recourse to this Sallustian phrase in these two letters has been prompted by Jerome himself. The preface to Jerome's version of Job from the LXX had ended with the following sentence: *necnon et illa quae... ita corrupta erant, ut sensum legentibus tollerent, orantibus uobis magno labore correxi, magis utile quid ex otio meo ecclesiis Christi euenturum ratus quam ex aliorum negotio*. Jerome's antithesis between *otium* and *negotium* at the end of this text (*ex otio meo... euenturum... quam ex aliorum negotio*) has clearly come from the preface to Sallust's *Jugurtha* (4,4): *existumabunt... maius... commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae uenturum*.¹⁶ It has however been argued recently that Jerome's wording earlier in this sentence (*magno labore... utile*) has been inspired by Sallust's *tanto... utili labori*, which likewise

¹³ For the relative chronology cf. Fürst, *Augustinus*, 15.

¹⁴ Augustine, *epist.* 82,35 (= [Jerome], *epist.* 116,35).

¹⁵ Cf. H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*⁴, Stuttgart, 2008, 145f.

¹⁶ The echo is already registered in A. Luebeck, *Hieronymus quos nouerit scriptores et ex quibus hauserit*, Leipzig, 1872, 119. For a lengthy discussion of Jerome's "Christianization" of this Sallustian antithesis in the present passage of his prologue to Job cf. A. de Vogüé, *Histoire littéraire du mouvement monastique dans l'antiquité I: Le monachisme latin; De l'Itinéraire d'Égérie à l'éloge funèbre de Népotien* (384-396), Paris, 1993, 253-255.

occurs immediately before the antithesis of *otium* and *negotium*.¹⁷ Augustine himself refers to Jerome's version of Job from the LXX shortly before his own echo of the Sallustian *tanto tamque utili labori* in the first of the letters at issue in the present article (71,3). In particular Augustine also refers here to Jerome's use of asterisks and obeli, which had likewise been mentioned by Jerome himself in the sentence of his preface to Job immediately before the one containing his own reminiscence of the Sallustian *tanto... utili labori*. Augustine will certainly have recognized the verbatim echo of Sallust in Jerome's *ex otio meo... quam ex aliorum negotio*.¹⁸ Hence Augustine may also be supposed to have recognized in Jerome's antecedent wording an allusion to Sallust's similarly foregoing *tanto tamque utili labori*. When therefore shortly afterwards in the same letter Augustine himself employs the same Sallustian phrase with the same approbatory reference to Jerome's biblical renderings from the Greek, he may be supposed to have been prompted to do so by Jerome's own use of the very same language.

If Augustine recognized Jerome's allusion to Sallust's *tanto tamque utili labori* in the preface to Job, there may be evidence to show that Jerome in turn recognized Augustine's allusion to the same Sallustian text in letter 71.¹⁹ The Augustinian missive in question was answered by Jerome in the following year with his own letter 112, which begins with the following statement: *taceo de blanditiis, quibus reprehensionem mei niteris consolari*.²⁰ In the previous sentence Jerome himself employs a classical allusion: here Fürst assumes that Jerome has in mind only Augustine's reminiscence of the classics in letter 40,3.²¹ However the sentence immediately preceding Jerome's own echo of the classics in letter 112 refers directly to a statement of Augustine in the very same paragraph as the latter's evocation of Sallust.²² Jerome's resort to the classics in letter 112 may accordingly

¹⁷ Cf. N. Adkin, *Virgil, Eclogues 2 and 10 in Jerome*, in *Eirene* 35 (1999), 102-113, on 107f. In Sallust the two texts are found in directly successive sentences.

¹⁸ Since these words are the very last ones of Jerome's prologue, they will have stamped themselves with particular sharpness on Augustine's mind; cf. Petitmengin, *Jérôme*, 50 (cited in n. 12 above).

¹⁹ Jerome shared Augustine's fascination with the prologue to the *Jugurtha*; cf. H. Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers and the Classics: A Study on the Apologists, Jerome and Other Christian Writers* (*Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis*, 64/2), Göteborg, 1958, 412.

²⁰ Jerome, *epist.* 112,2 (= [Augustine], *epist.* 75,2).

²¹ Fürst, *Augustinus*, 172, n. 201.

²² *Epist.* 71,6; cf. Fürst, *Augustinus*, 172, n. 200.

have been prompted equally by his recognition of this Augustinian allusion to Sallust.²³

Augustine certainly expected that Jerome would recognize his phrase *labor tam utilis* as an echo of Sallust. Such a classical cachet with its double notion of toil and utility in a single terse and canonical formulation was unquestionably meant to flatter, especially since Augustine was thereby signalling his own recognition of Jerome's reminiscence of the same text: he was echoing his correspondent's echo. Such blandiloquence is also intended to gloze over the very slight reservation expressed at the start of this sentence in regard to Jerome's renderings from the Greek: *si quaedam rarissima merito mouent*. It is not therefore surprising that Augustine should have been upset to discover from the brusqueness of Jerome's response (*taceo de blanditiis*)²⁴ that his addressee had not been flattered: Augustine's ploy had accordingly miscarried. In the light of such literary prestidigitation on Augustine's part it will be appropriate to conclude this article by returning to its opening paragraph, where the reviewer of Fürst's commentary on Augustine's correspondence with Jerome was quoted as acclaiming this scholar for making clear "die Feinheiten einer Zitat und Anspielung souverän einsetzenden literarischen Hochkultur".²⁵ The foregoing examination of Augustine's use of the Sallustian phrase *labor tam utilis* would seem to have demonstrated that these epistolary "Feinheiten" were even "feiner" than Fürst has already shown.

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²³ The classical text at issue in *epist.* 112 is from Terence; for a hitherto unidentified echo of Terence in Jerome's immediately antecedent letter to Augustine (105,3) cf. N. Adkin, *Hieronymus Eunuchinus*, in *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 58 (2006), 327-334, on 329f.

²⁴ Cf. n. 20 above.

²⁵ Cf. n. 9 above.

THE *ORDO SAPIENTIAE*: AUGUSTINE'S PROGRAM FOR PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY IN HIS EARLY WORKS

Abstract

In *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* Augustine makes a distinction between rational knowledge of truth and rational knowledge of that upon which truth depends, and in both dialogues knowledge of that upon which truth depends is categorized as the higher form of the two. Knowledge of truth is attained through a version of the argument from judgement, that is, by reflecting on the immutable nature of reason. In regard to this argument Augustine notes that the knowledge it achieves is ambiguous because it does not establish whether the mind *is* truth or is *in* truth. The manner in which one arrives at knowledge of that upon which truth depends is left unexplained. Analysis of *De Immortalitate Animae*, however, establishes the theoretical foundation for the distinction between truth and that upon which truth depends made in *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine*. More specifically, Augustine overcomes the ambiguous form of knowledge arrived at via the argument from judgment and arrives at definitive knowledge concerning the nature of the soul and God in *De Immortalitate Animae* through the use of the argument from dependence.

In his article *Augustine's Ascent of the Soul in book VII of the Confessions* Frederick Van Fleteren interprets Augustine's earliest works in light of his intellectual conversion described in *Confessiones* book 7 chapters 10, 17, and 20, and concludes that the dominant theme found in these early works is the ascent of the mind to Truth.¹ These

¹ See F. VAN FLETEREN, "Augustine's Ascent of the Soul in Book VII of the *Confessions*: a Reconsideration", *Augustinian Studies*, 5 (1974), p. 68, and "A Reply to Robert O'Connell", *Augustinian Studies*, 21 (1990), p. 127. Concerning the relationship between the ascents described in the *Confessions* and those found in Augustine's early dialogues Van Fleteren notes the following: "It is somewhat surprising, however, that there has been no extensive attempt to show the relationship between these ascents of the mind [in the *Confessiones*] and the early works of Saint Augustine. This lacuna is all the more surprising since Augustine recounts these experiences as the apex of his intellectual conversion." See *Augustine's Ascent of the Soul*, p. 1. Van Fleteren observes that only Solignac ventured some brief thoughts on the subject in his commentary. See A. SOLIGNAC, *Les Confessions*, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962) vol. 13, n. 28, pp. 698 ff. It is worth noting, however, that Courcelle implies a connection. See P. COURCELLE, *Recherches sur les 'Confessions' de Saint Augustin*, (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950), pp. 165-167. More recently, Brian Dobell has addressed the relationship between the *Confessiones* and

ascents, says Van Fleteren, are based on the argument from judgment, an argument which reveals that Truth is that which is higher than the mind.² Van Fleteren is of course correct to accentuate the dominance of this argument in Augustine's early works, but his perspective can be broadened.³ In a recent article I maintain that Augustine makes a

the early dialogs. See B. DOBELL, *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Although these studies do not compare the early dialogs to the *Confessiones*, several notable works analyze the early dialogs from a philosophical perspective. See N. CIPRIANI, "Le Fonti Cristiane della Dottrina Trinitaria nei Primi Dialoghi di S. Agostino", *Augustinianum*, 34 (1994); O. DUROY, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*, (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966), pp. 82-8; E. ZUM BRUNN, *St. Augustine: Being and Nothingness*, trans. R. Namad (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1998), pp. 9-34; E. GILSON, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L. Lynch, (London: Gollancz, 1961), pp. 1-15. For a helpful survey of other topics see "Cassiciacum Dialogues" in *Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia*, ed. A. Fitzgerald, O.S.A., (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), and *Augustinus-Lexikon*, eds. Mayer and Chelius, (Basel: Schwabe, 1986).

² According to Van Fleteren "in both places [the *Confessiones* and the Cassiciacum dialogues], but especially in the dialogues, we find an ascent to Truth. Truth unites men to the Supreme Measure; true lovers desire to embrace the Truth. Augustine even strives to prove the immortality of the soul in the *Soliloquia* (and the *De Immortalitate Animae*) by the existence of a participation in subsistent Truth" (*Augustine's Ascent of the Soul*, p. 69). Van Fleteren also notes that, "in Augustinian noetic theory the mind performs judgments on extra-mental objects by confronting these objects with the eternal reasons imprinted upon the soul. The principles are the mind's participation in Truth itself and enable men to judge the truth or beauty present in an external object. Although his noetic theory is perhaps not fully elaborated in these early works, the germ of this theory is present there. In both the *Confessiones* and the Cassiciacum dialogues, the search for God is also a search for the source which enables man to perform these judgments. When man begins to recognize the power of his mind, he reaches another stage in the ascent toward God." See *Augustine's Ascent of the Soul*, p. 67. The classic presentation of the argument from judgment is given by Gilson. See E. GILSON, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, pp. 16-17. There has however been debate in regard to the precise nature of the argument. See T. KONDOLEON, "Augustine's Argument for God's Existence, *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book II", *Augustinian Studies*, 14 (1983); C. BOYER, "La preuve de Dieu augustiniennne", *Archives de Philosophie*, 7 (1930); R. TESKE, "The Aim of Augustine's Proof That God Truly Is", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 26 (1986); L. P. GERSON, "Saint Augustine's Neoplatonic Argument for the Existence of God", *The Thomist*, 45 (1981); and J. MOURANT, "The Augustinian Argument for the Existence of God", in *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy*, ed. J. Ross. (Westport: Greenwood, 1971), pp. 165-184.

³ Robert O'Connell also objected to Van Fleteren's thesis. O'Connell's specific objection was that Van Fleteren did not give sufficient attention to the chapters that fall between Augustine's ascents at 7.12, 7.17, and 7.20, a fact which O'Connell claimed renders his reconstruction incomplete. See R. O'CONNELL, "Faith, Reason, and Ascent to Vision in St. Augustine", *Augustinian Studies*, 21 (1990), pp. 83-126, and "Where the Difference Still Lies", *Augustinian Studies*, 21 (1990), 139-52. Van

distinction between two different arguments for God's existence and nature: the argument from dependence, which establishes that all beings are dependent upon Being Itself, and the aforementioned argument from Truth.⁴ Moreover, I conclude that the argument from dependence is the most probable argument described in *Confessiones* book 7 chapter 10 and 11, the passages in which Augustine first relates the content of the *libri Platoniorum*. The purpose of this article is to show that this reading of *Confessiones* is compatible with Augustine's early works. Taking Van Fleteren's methodological point of departure, several of Augustine's early texts will be reconsidered, and it will be shown that a close reading of *De Beata Vita*, *De Ordine*, and *De Immortalitate Animae* reveals that the theme of ontological dependence does critical conceptual work in these texts, a fact which establishes that its presence in the *Confessiones* does not signify an abrupt rupture in Augustine's understanding of the mind's ascent. More specifically, in *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* Augustine distinguishes between Truth and the source of Truth, a distinction which he uses to establish that a higher form of knowledge is achieved by recognizing Truth's ontological dependence, and a close reading of *De Immortalitate Animae* shows that the theoretical foundation for this distinction is the distinction between the argument from judgment and the argument from dependence. According to Augustine the argument

Fleteren did not neglect to defend his position. See F. VAN FLETEREN, "Per Speculum et in Aenigmate: 1 Corinthians 13:12 in the Writings of Saint Augustine", *Augustinian Studies*, 23 (1992), and *A Reply to Robert O'Connell*, pp. 127-37. Recently Brian Dobell has tried to address the deficiency O'Connell saw in Van Fleteren's work. Dobell attempts to structure these neglected chapters pointed out by O'Connell, but, because he accepts that Augustine uses the argument from judgement in 7.10 and 7.20, he does not escape contradiction. See *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion*, p. 138. Finally, it is worth noting that there is also debate concerning the continuity of the *Confessions* considered as a whole (i.e. how it is that books 1-10 and books 11-13 form a unity). See for example J. O'MEARA, *The Young Augustine: The Growth of Augustine's Mind up to His Conversion*, (London: Longmans and Green, 1954), pp. xv-xxxiv.

⁴ See J. PALETTA, "Saint Augustine's Milan Vision Reconstructed", *Augustiniana*, 58:3-4 (2008), pp. 151-180. Several other authors have identified Augustine's use of this argument in its various formulations. See E. PORTALIE, *A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine*, trans. R.J. Bastian, (Westport: Greenwood, 1975), pp. 125-126; *L'intelligence de la foi*, pp. 184-185, 191-192, and 93-194; E. GILSON, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, pp. 19-20, and fns. 35 and 36 on p. 19; G. ESSER, "The Augustinian Proof for God's Existence and the Thomistic Fourth Way", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 28 (1954), pp. 194-211; E. The use of the verb *facere* is common to all the arguments which are identified as examples by these authors.

from dependence produces a higher form of knowledge because it establishes the definitive nature of God and the soul.

1. The Theme of Ontological Dependence in *De Beata Vita*

The *De Beata Vita* is the account of a discussion that takes place between Augustine and some companions at a rural villa near Milan concerning the nature of happiness. In this work Augustine argues that knowledge of God is the essence of happiness, and in order to articulate the essential identity of God as the source of the *beata uita*, Augustine makes use of the theme of ontological dependence.⁵

In *De Beata Vita* Augustine takes up the question of happiness in opposition to the wealthy Epicure. Augustine uses the example of Sergius Orata. Orata, a wealthy man with a tremendous estate, was known for banquets of choice seafood and the construction of luxurious baths. According to Augustine, Orata is to be understood as having no wants at all for he does not want more than he already has.⁶ Augustine makes it clear that, in order for one's mind to be totally free from the temptation of Epicureanism, one must understand why one wouldn't be happy if one were in a state such as Orata's. One must understand why Orata's Epicurean values fail. Augustine attempts to solve this problem by giving his audience a clear definition of happiness. Augustine defines happiness (*beatitudo*) as not to be in want (*egestas*), for want, claims Augustine, is a lack or privation of some good. Simply, happiness is a state in which no additional good can increase one's sense of fullness (*plenitudo*).⁷ According to Augustine, happiness can only be attained when all want is eliminated, and, most importantly, this includes the

⁵ See *Confessiones*: 4.11.17 and P. VAN GEEST, "Stoic against his Will? Augustine on the Good Life in *De Beata Vita* and the *Praeceptum*", *Augustiniana*, 54 (2004) (Mélanges offerts à T.J. van Bavel à l'occasion de son 80e anniversaire, Leuven 2004).

⁶ *De Beata Vita*: 4.26: Quis enim facile dicat Oratam egestate laborasse, hominem ditissimum, amoenissimum, deliciosissimum, cui neque ad uoluptatem quidquam defuit, neque ad gratiam, neque ad bonam integramque ualeitudinem? Nam et praediis quaestuosissimis et amicis iucundissimis, quantum libuit, abundauit; et illis omnibus aptissime ad salutem corporis usus est, eiusque (ut breuiter totum explicem) omne institutum uoluntatemque omnem successio prospera consecuta est. — For Latin text see *Contra Academicos*, *De Beata Vita*, *De Ordine*, *De Magistro*, *De Libero Arbitrio*, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, 27, (Turnholti: Brepols, 1970), p. 79 (hereafter abbreviated CCL29).

⁷ *De Beata Vita*: 4.31/33.

desire of the intellect. It is in this manner that he demonstrates that Epicure's account of the good life is ultimately incomplete, for the Epicure is unable to obtain happiness insofar as he remains unable to know the highest good.

In book 4 of the *De Beata Vita* Augustine begins his analysis of virtue by opposing two moral concepts. According to Augustine, the Latin term worthlessness (*nequitia*), "the cause of all vice," is etymologically derived from that-which-is-nothing (*nequicquam*), while the virtue opposite to this vice, worth (*frugalitas*), is derived from fruit (*frux*).⁸ Augustine then identifies worth (*frugalitas*) with the term moderation (*modestia*), a concept that is almost convertible with *frugalitas* (but with a wider application than "frugality" because it signifies more than virtuous restraint), holding that this term is better understood as the opposite of "want" (*egestas*). He holds that the word moderation is derived from the word measure (*modus*), because wherever measure exists there is nothing either too much or too little and one is left with fullness (*plenitudo*).⁹ It is in this way that measure is like fullness, for it signifies a lack of want. He then claims that the ultimate measure (*modus*), or fullness (*plenitudo*), of the intellectual soul is wisdom, for all minds want to know: "[T]he measure of mind is wisdom."¹⁰ Thus, want is eliminated in the human mind only when it has been filled with wisdom. For Augustine, it is God Himself who is this wisdom, and it is this idea that is the ground of further knowledge:

But what wisdom should be so called, if not the wisdom of God? We have also heard through divine authority that the Son of God is nothing but the wisdom of God, and the Son of God is truly God. Thus, everyone having God is happy – a statement already acclaimed by everyone at the beginning of our symposium. But do you believe that wisdom is different from truth? For it has also been said: "I am the Truth." The truth, however, receives its being through a supreme measure, from which it emanates and into which it is converted when perfected. However, no other measure is imposed upon the supreme measure. For, if the supreme measure exists through the supreme measure, it is measure through itself... Who is the Son of God? It has been said: the Truth. Who is it that has no father? Who other than the supreme measure?¹¹

⁸ *De Beata Vita*: 2.8.

⁹ *De Beata Vita*: 4.32.

¹⁰ *De Beata Vita*: 4.32.

¹¹ *De Beata Vita*: 4.34: Quae est autem dicenda sapientia, nisi quae Dei Sapientia est? Accepimus autem etiam auctoritate diuina, Dei Filium nihil esse aliud quam

In the above Augustine makes a distinction between Truth (*veritas*) and the Supreme measure (*summum modus*), for he says that in order for Truth to be (*veritas autem ut sit*) it must be made through the supreme measure (*fit per aliquem summum modum*).¹² So the theme of ontological dependence does important work for Augustine in this his earliest work, for awareness of Truth's ontological dependence¹³ leads one to a higher level of knowledge, knowledge of that upon which truth depends, the highest measure. The claim that Truth leads one to a higher form of knowledge is supported by the fact that Augustine says later on in the passage that "whoever attains the supreme measure, through the Truth, is happy" (*Quisquis igitur ad summum modum per ueritatem uenerit, beatus est*). Truth is described as a type of medium

Dei Sapientiam (I Cor. I, 24): et est Dei Filius profecto Deus. Deum habet igitur quisquis beatus est: quod omnibus nobis iam ante placuit, cum hoc conuiuium ingressi sumus. Sed quid putatis esse sapientiam, nisi ueritatem? Etiam hoc enim dictum est: *Ego sum Veritas* (Io 14, 6). Veritas autem ut sit, fit per aliquem summum modum, a quo procedit, et in quem se perfecta conuertit. Ipsi autem summo modo nullus alius modus imponitur: si enim summus modus per summum modum modus est, per seipsum modus est... Quis est Dei Filius? Dictum est: *Veritas*. Quis est qui non habet patrem, quis alius quam summus modus? Quisquis igitur ad summum modum per ueritatem uenerit, beatus est. Hoc est animo Deum habere, id est Deo perfrui. Caetera enim quamuis a Deo habeantur, non habent Deum (CCL29, p. 84). The English translation is from *The Happy Life, Answer to the Skeptics, Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil, Soliloquies*, The Fathers of the Church (vol 5), trans. L. Schopp, (New York: Cima, 1948).

¹² Van Fleteren, Du Roy, and Cipriani note this formulation, but they do not appear to hold that Augustine makes a real distinction between the Being and Truth of God. See *Augustine's Ascent of the Soul*, p. 69; *Le Fonti Cristiane*, pp. 269-271; and *L'intelligence de la Foi* pp. 154-161. Although Augustine appears to make a real distinction between the Being and Truth of God in *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* he does not think that this leads to subordinationism or inequality among the persons of the Trinity. For example in *De Beata Vita* 4.34 Augustine says that Truth and Measure are one: Sed etiam summus modus necesse est ut uerus modus sit. Ut igitur ueritas modo gignitur, ita modus ueritate cognoscitur (CCL29, p. 84). Similarly in *De Beata Vita* 4.35 he says that the three persons of the Trinity are one substance: Illa est igitur plena satietas animorum, hoc est beata uita, pie perfecteque cognoscere a quo inducaris in ueritatem, qua ueritate perfruaris, per quid connectaris summo modo. Quae tria unum Deum intellegendibus unamque substantiam, exclusis uanitatibus uariae superstitionis, ostendunt (CCL29, p. 84). But the distinction between the source of knowledge and the source of being remains. Consequently, it seems that we have here an incipient formulation of Augustine's Trinitarian doctrine, a formulation which admits of certain inconsistencies. That is to say it is probable that at this stage in his theological development Augustine maintains that the persons of the Trinity are equal and that they are distinct in regard to their Being and Truth (i.e. the Father is the source of the Son while the Son is Truth itself) without understanding that this involves contradiction. This point will be discussed in more detail in the above.

¹³ See fn. 33.

in this passage for the goal is to move *through* Truth to the supreme measure. This language suggests that awareness of Truth's "contingent" status leads one to a more perfect knowledge. Further, in this passage Augustine does not intend to present a formal argument for God's existence. But the description of the relationship between God the Son and God the Father are specific enough to suggest that they are based on the argument from judgment and the argument from dependence respectively. In other words, as is clear from the reference to *John* 14:6 (*sum ueritas*), here Augustine reveals his incipient understanding of the defining characteristics of the first two persons of the Trinity: the Son is the source of supreme knowledge while the Father is the ontological ground of the Son. It is in this manner that Augustine demonstrates that the Epicurean account of the good life is ultimately incomplete, for the Epicure is unable to obtain happiness insofar as he remains unable to know Truth and the Highest Measure.

2. The Theme of Ontological Dependence in *De Ordine*

In the *Retractationes* Augustine says that he intended the topic of *De Ordine* to be the problem of evil, but when he saw that the subject matter was too difficult for his interlocutors he switched it to an examination of the order of study.¹⁴ Augustine's order of study consists of four levels of knowledge, the final level of which is distinguished from the others in that it reveals, just as *De Beata Vita*, that upon which Truth depends, a clear use of knowledge attained through ontological dependence. Augustine holds that knowledge of eternal Truth is provisional because it does not establish whether the mind *is* Truth or is *in* Truth, while knowledge of the *source* of Truth is a higher form of knowledge because it does not admit of this ambiguity. In other words, this form of knowledge reveals the definitive nature of God and the soul.

In *De Ordine* 2.9.26 Augustine outlines a pedagogical program intended to lead young minds to the contemplation of the highest Truth. According to Augustine, this program enables one to know, "(1) how much wisdom is embodied in those very precepts that he has been observing before understanding [i.e. authority], (2) what reason itself is which he – now strong and capable after the cradle

¹⁴ See *Retractationes* 1.3.1. In *De Ordine* 1.9.27 Augustine defines this order as that which leads one to God: *Ordo est quem si tuerimus in uita, perducet ad Deum, et quem nisi tuerimus in uita, non perueniemus ad Deum* (CCL29, p. 102).

of authority – follows and comprehends, (3) what intellect is in which all things are, or rather, which is itself the sum total of all things, and (4) what, beyond all things, is the source of all things.”¹⁵ Here one can see that the final level of Augustine’s program concerns knowledge of God attained through awareness of ontological dependence, for this level concerns knowledge of the source of all things (*uniuersorum principium*). In the following chapters, *De Ordine* 2.9.27-2.19.51, Augustine gives a detailed explanation of the nature of the four levels which constitute the order of study: in 2.9.27-2.10.29 he defines the nature of authority, in 2.11.30-2.17.46 he defines the nature of reason (and its creation of the liberal arts), in 2.18.47 he defines the nature of philosophy (the category into which the final two levels fall), in 2.18.48-2.19.50 he describes the nature of the intellect, and in paragraph 2.19.51 he describes the principle of all things (*uniuersorum principium*).¹⁶ Analysis of the final two levels will establish that Augustine gives a privileged position to knowledge of God arrived at through reflection on Truth’s ontological dependence.

In *De Ordine* 2.18.47 Augustine reintroduces the final two levels of knowledge which lead one to the happy life, a subset which he defines as philosophy. The first object of philosophy is to identify the nature of the soul while the second concerns identifying the nature of God.¹⁷ Augustine says that knowledge of the first delights, makes one fit for happiness, and is for beginners, while knowledge of the second is more precious, makes one happy, and is for the well instructed.¹⁸

¹⁵ *De Ordine* 2.9.26: Tum demum discet et quanta ratione praedita sint ea ipsa quae secutus est ante rationem, et quid sit ipsa ratio quam post auctoritatis cunabula firmus et idoneus iam sequitur atque comprehendit et quid intellectus, in quo uniuersa sunt, uel ipse potius uniuersa, et quid praeter uniuersa uniuersorum principium (CCL29, p. 122). Both Cipriani and DuRoy see the second and first persons of the Trinity in the final two stages of Augustine’s program, and both claim that the descriptions of each are based on Plotinian philosophy. See, *Le Fonti Cristiane*, pp. 306-308; *L’intelligence de la Foi*, pp. 127-128. English translation: *Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of St. Augustine’s De Ordine*, ed. R. Russell, (New York, New York: Kissinger Publishing, 1942).

¹⁶ Between his outline of the program and his account of the final levels Augustine describes the order of the liberal arts. See *Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion*, p. 118: “The remainder of the second book of *On Order* consists of Augustine’s description of ‘the order of learning,’ which is constituted by the study of the seven liberal disciplines: grammar (2.12.35-7), dialectic (2.13.38, rhetoric (2.13.38), music (2.14.39-41), geometry (2.15.42), astronomy (2.15.42) and arithmetic.”

¹⁷ *De Ordine* 2.18.47: Cuius duplex quaestio est: una de anima, altera de Deo (CCL29, p. 133).

¹⁸ *De Ordine* 2.18.47: Illa nobis dulcior, ista carior, illa nos dignos beata uita, beatos haec facit; prima est illa discentibus, ista iam doctis (CCL29, p. 133).

Most importantly, he says that the first allows the soul to know itself while the second allows one to know its origin (*Prima efficit ut nosmetipsos nouerimus, altera, ut originem nostram*).¹⁹ Here again one can see that Augustine understands the final level to concern knowledge of God reached through ontological dependence for it concerns knowing that upon which the soul depends. This, says Augustine, is the order of wisdom (*ordo sapientiae*) and it enables one to grasp the order of things (*ordem rerum*), distinguish between two worlds (*duos mundos*), and know the author of the universe (*ipsum parentum uniuersitatis*).²⁰

In chapters 2.18.48-2.19.50 Augustine describes the nature of the soul. He begins his analysis with a preview of the knowledge that the soul (educated in the liberal arts) attains about itself once it has become devoted to philosophy:

The soul therefore, holding fast to this order, and now devoted to philosophy, at first introspects itself and – as soon as that mode of learning has persuaded it that *reason either is the soul itself or belongs to it, and that there is in reason nothing more excellent or dominant than numbers, or that reason is nothing else than number* [emphasis added] – soliloquizes thus: “By some kind of inner and hidden activity of mine, I am able to analyze and synthesize the things that ought to be learned and this faculty of mine is called reason.”²¹

This is not the only place where Augustine observes that reason either *is* the soul or is *in* the soul. In *De Ordine* 2.19.50 he argues that the immortality of the soul is based on knowing the eternality of Truth:

Perhaps reason is not immortal? But, one to two, or two to four, is a ratio in the truest sense. That ratio was no truer yesterday than today, nor will it be truer tomorrow or a year hence. Even if the whole world should fall into ruins, that ratio will always necessarily be: it will always be such as it is now... Therefore, if reason is immortal, and if I who analyze and synthesize all those things, am reason, then that by

¹⁹ *De Ordine* 2.18.47.

²⁰ *De Ordine* 2.18.47: Hic est ordo studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit quisque idoneus ad intellegendum ordinem rerum, id est ad dignoscendos duos mundos et ipsum parentem uniuersitatis (CCL29, p. 133).

²¹ *De Ordine* 2.18.48: Hunc igitur ordinem tenens anima iam philosophiae tradita, primo seipsam inspicit, et cui iam illa eruditio persuasit, aut suam aut seipsam esse rationem, in ratione autem aut nihil esse melius et potentius numeris, aut nihil aliud quam numerum esse rationem, ita secum loquetur: Ego quodam meo motu interiore et occulto, ea quae discenda sunt possum discernere uel connectere, et haec uis mea ratio uocatur (CCL29, p. 133).

which I am called mortal is not mine. Or if the soul is not the same as reason, and I nevertheless use reason, and if through reason I am superior, then we ought to take flight from the lesser good to the greater, from the mortal to the immortal.²²

In the above Augustine claims that one to two or two to four is a ratio, and that this ratio *must* be true, it must necessarily be, for it will always be in the same manner as it is.²³ Moreover, this argument for the soul's immortality is clearly based on the argument from judgment. But even though the argument from judgment shows one something eternal, one is still left with a nebulous understanding of the mind.²⁴ According to Augustine, the conclusion of the argument establishes that either one is immortal because one *is* reason (i.e. "Therefore, if reason is immortal, and if I who analyze and synthesize all those things, am reason") or one is immortal because one is *connected* to reason (i.e. "or if the soul is not the same as reason, and I nevertheless use reason").²⁵ Because the conclusion it reaches does not establish what the mind is, Augustine must be speaking about the third level in the *ordo sapientiae*, for the ambiguous nature of the mind described at this level (one does not know if one is reason or if one contains reason within oneself) perfectly matches the description of knowledge of the soul related in 2.18.48 and 2.9.26. This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that this argument clearly does not show the soul's origin (*originem nostram*), the knowledge promised at the forth and highest level in *De Ordine* 2.18.47.

Augustine describes the final level of the *ordo sapientiae* in 2.19.51. Here, just as in *De Beata Vita*, Augustine makes a distinction

²² *De Ordine* 2.19.50: Igitur si immortalis est ratio et ego quae ista omnia uel discerno uel connecto ratio sum, illud quo mortale appellor non est meum. Aut si anima non id est quod ratio et tamen ratione utor et per rationem melior sum, a deteriore ad melius, a mortali ad immortale fugiendum est (CCL29, p. 134).

²³ *De Ordine* 2.19.50: Sed unum ad duo uel duo ad quatuor uerissima ratio est: nec magis heri fuit ista ratio uera quam hodie, nec magis cras aut post annum erit uera, nec si omnis iste mundus concidat, poterit ista ratio non esse. Ista enim semper talis est, mundus autem iste nec heri habuit, nec cras habebit quod habet hodie, nec hodierno ipso die uel spatio unius horae eodem loco solem habuit: ita cum in eo nihil manet, nihil uel paruo spatio temporis habet eodem modo (CCL29, p. 134).

²⁴ See *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion*, pp. 122-123: "As we will see, Augustine did not resolve this matter – which forms part of what he calls 'the question of the soul' – until after *De Immortalitate Animae*. Until that time, Augustine was unclear whether the soul was reason or merely used reason."

²⁵ In the first example Augustine claims this when he says that one should connect oneself to reason (i.e. in order to become immortal).

between the Father and the Son by making a distinction between Truth and the source of Truth:

But when the soul has properly adjusted and disposed itself, and has rendered itself harmonious and beautiful, then it will venture to see God, the very source of all Truth and the very Father of Truth... I shall say no more, except that to us is promised a vision of beauty – the beauty of whose imitation all other things are beautiful, and by comparison with which all other things are unsightly.²⁶

Augustine says that at the highest level of knowledge one sees the source from which flows all Truth (*ipsum fontem unde manat omne uerum*) and the Father of Truth (*Patrem Veritatis*). The language here clearly reflects a relationship of ontological dependence, because the highest level of knowledge concerns seeing that upon which Truth depends. As it has been shown, the language of ontological dependence is consistently used by Augustine throughout book 2 of *De Ordine* in order to describe this final level, for in 2.9.26 he promises to show the reader the principle of all things which is before all things (*praeter uniuersorum principium*) and in 2.18.47 he says that this level reveals the origin of the soul (*originem nostram*) and the Father of the universe (*parentem uniuersitatis*). Moreover, in the above Augustine explicitly states here that “he will not say more,” and so the precise nature of this highest level of knowledge is defined incompletely. The reason for this, as 2.18.47 suggests, is that knowledge of God reached via the argument from dependence is a higher form of knowledge suitable only for the educated.²⁷

Further, here, as in *De Beata Vita*, Augustine makes a real (as opposed to conceptual) distinction between Truth and the source of Truth.²⁸ Consequently, at this stage in Augustine’s intellectual development (at Cassiciacum) he is not in accord with the orthodox doctrine on the nature of the Trinity (at least the language he uses is not).²⁹ This

²⁶ *De Ordine* 2.19.51: Cum autem se composuerit et ordinauerit ac concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audebit iam Deum uidere, atque ipsum fontem unde manat omne uerum ipsumque Patrem Veritatis... Nihil amplius dicam, nisi promitti nobis aspectum pulchritudinis, cuius imitatione pulchra, cuius comparatione foeda sunt cetera (CCL29, p. 135).

²⁷ See fn. 18.

²⁸ It is of course possible that Augustine is referring to the truth possessed by the created mind. But the phrase *patrem ueritatis* and the precedent of *De Beata Vita* suggests, if we are to be conservative, that he still understands Truth to be dependent upon Being. Although not as strong as the examples found in the *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* it is worth noting that letter 11.4 also suggests this distinction.

²⁹ Certainly, however, by the time he writes the *De Trinitate* (and perhaps earlier) Augustine expresses the orthodox formulation. See *De Trinitate* 5.8.9.

should come as no surprise for Augustine entertained the possibility of basing the distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit on the distinction between being, knowing, and willing at least as late as the *Confessions*:

For I am and I know and I will. Knowing and willing I am. I know that I am and I will. I will to be and to know... When, however, through his investigation of these three, he has found something out and has made his report on that, he should not suppose that he discovered the immutable that transcends them – that which immutably is, immutably knows, and immutably wills. It baffles thought to inquire whether these three functions are the ground which constitutes the divine Trinity; or whether the three components are present in each Person, so that each Person has all three, or whether both these alternatives are true... who can readily conceive?³⁰

In the above Augustine says that he is not sure if the Trinity of being, knowing, and willing corresponds to the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively (i.e. the Father is Being, the Son is Truth, and the Spirit is Will) or if each of these qualities are able to be predicated of each person of the Trinity (i.e. the Father is Being, Truth, and Will, the Son is Being, Truth, and Will, etc.). Therefore, it seems very possible that the early dialogues represent an incipient formulation of the nature of the Triune God based on the triune structure of the mind.³¹

3. The Theme of Ontological Dependence in *De Immortalitate Animae*

De Beata Vita and *De Ordine* are not the only early works which make important use of the theme of ontological dependence. Close analysis reveals that in *De Immortalitate Animae* the distinction between Truth and the source of Truth made in *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* has its theoretical foundation in the distinction between the argument from Truth and the argument from dependence.

³⁰ *Confessiones* 13.11.12: Sum enim et scio et uolo: sum sciens et uolens et scio esse me et uelle et uolo esse et scire... Sed cum inuenerit in his aliquid et dixerit, non iam se putet inuenisse illud, quod supra ista est incommutabile, quod est incommutabiliter et scit incommutabiliter et uult incommutabiliter; et utrum propter tria haec et ibi trinitas, an in singulis haec tria, ut terna singulorum sint, an utrumque miris modis simpliciter et multipliciter infinito in se... quis facile cogitauerit?... – For latin text see *Confessionum Libri XIII*, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, 27, (Turnholti: Brepols, 1990), pp. 247-248. The English translation is by Chadwick. See *St. Augustine's Confessions*, trans. H. Chadwick, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

³¹ See fn. 12.

In *De Immortalitate Animae* 1.1-5.9 Augustine presents his most basic arguments for the soul's immortality. Moreover, these arguments are essentially variations on the argument from judgment, the ability to acquire inward knowledge of the immutable and eternal. For example, in the opening chapter Augustine claims that because knowledge (*disciplina*) is unchangeable, and because the soul adheres in knowledge like an accident within a subject (i.e. because it is always connected to knowledge), the soul will always be connected to the unchangeable, a fact which makes it immortal.³² In the chapters which follow Augustine identifies this immutable knowledge with reason, and reason with Truth.³³

In *De Immortalitate Animae* 6.10 Augustine goes on to note the same ambiguity that he does in *De Ordine* concerning knowledge based on eternal truth, for he says, "Reason is the aspect of the mind which (1) perceives the true *per se* and not through the body; or (2) it is the contemplation of the true, not through the body; or (3) it is the true itself which is contemplated."³⁴ Again, in this passage one can see the original ambiguity found in *De Ordine*, for Augustine says that the mind is either *in* truth (i.e. "it is the contemplation of the true") or that it *is* the truth (i.e. "it is the true itself").³⁵ Here, however, he rejects the possibility that the mind is identical to Truth, because he now sees that there is a duality in the perception of the true, a duality which requires both the mind *and* truth. Consequently, he modifies his understanding

³² *De Immortalitate Animae* 1.1: Si alicubi est disciplina, nec esse nisi in eo quod uiuit potest, et semper est, neque quidquam in quo quid semper est potest esse non semper; semper uiuit in quo est disciplina. Si nos sumus qui ratiocinamur, id est animus noster, nec recte ratiocinari sine disciplina potest, nec sine disciplina esse animus, nisi in quo disciplina non est, potest; est in hominis animo disciplina. – Latin text found in *Soliloques, De immortalitate Animae, De Quantitate Animae*, Bibliothèque Augustinienne (Dialogues Philosophiques 5: 2. Dieu et l'âme), trans. P. de Labriolle, (Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer, and Cie, 1948), p. 170 (hereafter abbreviated BA5).

³³ See for example *De Immortalitate Animae* 4.6: Sed cum uel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes, uel ab alio bene interrogati de quibusdam liberalibus artibus ea quae inuenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro inuenimus: neque id est inuenire, quod facere aut gignere; alioquin aeterna gigneret animus inuentione temporali (nam aeterna saepe inuenit; quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli ratio, uel si quid aliud in huiusmodi artibus, nec non fuisse aliquando, nec non fore comprehenditur?): manifestum etiam est, immortalem esse animum humanum, et omnes ueras rationes in secretis eius esse, quamuis eas siue ignoratione siue obliuione, aut non habere, aut amisisse uideatur (BA5, pp. 180 and 182).

³⁴ *De Immortalitate Animae* 6.10: Ratio est aspectus animi, quo per seipsum, non per corpus uerum intuetur; aut ipsa ueri contemplatio, non per corpus; aut ipsum uerum quod contemplatur (BA5, p. 186).

³⁵ Clearly he also lists here a new possibility which holds that reason is the part of the mind which perceives the true *per se*.

of the ambiguous knowledge achieved through the argument based on eternal truth, for he no longer believes that his mind could confuse itself with (i.e. that it could consider itself to be) truth.

But this new position does not erase the ambiguous nature of the knowledge achieved via the argument from judgment. Augustine refines his understanding of this knowledge by expressing it in the language of substance and accident: "[T]he connection between the mind which perceives and the true which it perceives is either such that the mind is the subject with the true in it as in a subject; or on the other hand the true is the subject with the mind in it as a subject; or, both are substances."³⁶ Essentially, the problem generated by awareness of eternal truth remains because knowledge of the soul's nature is still unclear.

In *De Immortalitate* 6.11 Augustine inquires into how this new ambiguity might be overcome. To that end he entertains the possibility that the relationship between the mind and the truth it contemplates is such that they can both be considered to be substances and *not* as accidents inherent in subjects.³⁷ A problem with this possibility, however, immediately surfaces. If the mind and the True are separate substances then it seems possible to hold that the mind could cease to be by separating itself from the true, a possibility which would threaten its status as something truly immortal.³⁸ Augustine then considers what could possibly effect such a separation. He says that nothing weaker than the soul could separate it from the True due to the principle which holds that the superior (i.e. the soul) cannot be overcome by the inferior (i.e. the body). Neither could it be separated by a power equal to it, that is, another soul which wants to contemplate the true, for the true can accommodate an unlimited number of souls without depleting its store. Further, it is not possible for the true itself to separate the soul from itself because the true is without envy, and therefore, there is nothing which could prevent the true from giving itself to the soul. Augustine concludes that the only remaining possibility is that the soul is separated from the true by its own free act of will. He immediately sets this

³⁶ *De Immortalitate Animae* 6.11: Quare ista coniunctio intuentis animi, et eius ueri quod intuetur, aut ita est ut subiectum sit animus, uerum autem illud in subiecto; aut contra subiectum uerum, et in subiecto animus; aut utrumque substantia (BA5, p. 188). Augustine will recall this ambiguity again at *De Immortalitate Animae* 10.17.

³⁷ See fn. 36.

³⁸ *De Immortalitate Animae* 6.11: Nam si animus substantia est, et substantia rationi coniungitur; non absurdè quis putauerit fieri posse, ut manente illa hic esse desinat. Sed manifestum est quamdiu animus a ratione non separatur eique cohaeret, necessario eum manere atque uiuere (BA5, p. 188).

consideration aside and concludes that if the soul does not *freely* separate itself from the true it cannot be destroyed through any form of forced separation. He then explains why this is the case:

However, if this force of reason [the true], through its very connection, affects the mind – for it cannot but affect it – it affects it certainly only in such a way that it gives it its being. And reason [the true] itself is there in the highest degree where changelessness is conceived in the highest degree. Therefore, reason [the true] forces that mind somehow to be, which it, from its own being, affects. Thus, without separation from reason [the true], the mind cannot be extinguished. But, a separation is impossible [i.e. forced separation], as we have reasoned above. Therefore, the mind cannot perish.³⁹

In the above Augustine says that if the power of reason (i.e. the True) effects the mind through their connection in any way it must be the case that it effects it by giving it being (*ut ei esse tribuat*). Consequently, if the mind does not separate itself from the True, the mind will not be destroyed. What is important to note about Augustine's reference to ontological dependence here is that the language he uses indicates that this claim is not based on a necessary conclusion arrived at through rational argument for he says, "if (*si*) the power of reason effects the mind" and "reason forces that mind somehow (*quodammodo*) to be." In other words, here Augustine does not explain to the reader the reason *why* one must hold that created things receive their being from God, he only asserts that one must hold this to be so. The reason for this is that Augustine has reasoned to the existence of the True only via a version of the argument from judgment, only by showing that the mind is attached to something eternal, and this argument does not demonstrate that created beings are dependent upon (i.e. made and sustained by) He Who Is.

In the next chapter, chapter 7.12, Augustine addresses whether or not it is possible for the soul to destroy itself by *freely* separating itself from the True. More specifically, he says that when the mind turns away from reason (the true) it can't help but suffer defect. Defect is a tending

³⁹ *De Immortalitate Animae* 6.11: At si illa rationis uis ipsa sua coniunctione afficit animum; neque enim non afficere potest; ita profecto afficit ut ei esse tribuat. Est enim maxime ipsa ratio, ubi summa etiam incommutabilitas intellegitur. Ita quaecumque ex se afficit, cogit esse quodammodo. Non ergo exstingui animus potest, nisi a ratione separatus; separari autem non potest, ut supra ratiocinati sumus: non potest igitur interire (BA5, p. 190). The English translation is from Schopp. See *Immortality of the Soul, Magnitude of the Soul, On Music, Advantage of Believing, Faith in Things Unseen*, The Fathers of the Church (vol 4), trans. Ludwig Schopp (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1984).

toward nothing (*nihil*), and to move toward nothing is to move toward destruction.⁴⁰ After reflecting on this chain of consequences he says, "Why this destruction does not fall upon the mind, although it is subject to defect is hard to say."⁴¹ This passage reveals that Augustine cannot explain why the soul is not destroyed when it separates itself from the True. He cannot advance an account of how it is that the mind is kept in existence even when it is separated from the True, because, again, he is lacking an argument which shows that the True sustains the soul in existence. As a result, from Augustine's perspective, if the soul is no longer connected with Truth it is not clear how it is protected from the chain of falsity, defect, and nothingness/destruction.

Four chapters later in *De Immortalitate Animae* 11.18 Augustine returns to this problem.⁴² But here, as opposed to chapter 7.12, he argues that the Truth is immutable, and that what is immutable truly *is*. Consequently, the mind either has its being from that which *is* in the highest degree or the mind has being through itself, that is, it is the source of its own being.⁴³ He says that if the mind has being through itself then nothing can destroy it. But if the mind has its being from some other essence an inquiry should be made into the nature of what is contrary to this source which might be able to destroy it (the soul), for just as the soul receives its being from this essence (*if* in fact it does) it seems possible that the soul may be destroyed by attaching itself to the opposite of that which gives being.⁴⁴

Augustine then says that this essence, that which *is* in the highest degree, is convertible with truth. Therefore, when a thing *is* it is true and when a thing *is not* it is false. It seems then that the soul may lose its existence when it clings to falsity, because when something

⁴⁰ *De Immortalitate Animae* 7.12: Omnis autem defectus tendit ad nihilum; et interitum nullum magis proprie oportet accipi, quam cum id, quod aliquid erat, nihil fit. Quare tendere ad nihilum, est ad interitum tendere (BA5, pp. 190 and 192).

⁴¹ *De Immortalitate Animae* 7.12: Qui cur non cadat in animum, uix est dicere, in quem defectus cadit (BA5, p. 192).

⁴² *De Immortalitate Animae* 11.18: Rursus igitur si quid metuendum est, id est metuendum ne deficiendo animus intereat, id est dum ipsa existendi specie priuatur (BA5, p. 204).

⁴³ *De Immortalitate Animae* 11.18: Sed si, quod nemini dubium est, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum ueritatem, quae semper eodem modo est, intuetur, eique immobilis inhaeret diuino amore coniunctus et illa omnium quae quoquomodo sunt summe maximeque est: aut ab illa est animus in quantum est, aut per seipsum est (BA5, p. 204).

⁴⁴ *De Immortalitate Animae* 11.18: Sed si per seipsum est, quoniam ipse sibi causa existendi est, et nunquam se deserit; nunquam interit, ut supra etiam disputauimus. Si uero ex illa, diligenter opus est quaerere quae res ei possit esse contraria, quae animo auferat animum esse quod illa praebet (BA5, p. 204).

is false it is not. But, according to Augustine, falsity causes the mind to be deceived, and one who is deceived must be alive, and so falsity cannot take away the mind's being.⁴⁵ He then says that the soul either derives its being from the first essence or has being through itself.⁴⁶ Here again, however, one can see that Augustine does not say that it is a consequence of rational necessity that one hold that He Who Is is the source of the soul's being, for knowledge of the soul's source of being is not definitive. Essentially, he still has not given an argument which would provide a definitive conclusion to the problem of the soul's identity.

In chapter 12 Augustine finally introduces the argument which shows why the soul cannot be destroyed by separating itself from the highest essence:

[There] is no contrary to any essence inasmuch as it is an essence, much less than is there a contrary to that first essence inasmuch as it is essence. The first statement is true. For the whole essence is not through another essence, but only because it *is*. Being, moreover, has no contrary except non-being: hence nothing is the contrary of essence. Therefore, in no way can anything exist as a contrary to that substance which supremely and originally *is*. If the mind has its essence from that itself which *is* (for since it does not have it from itself it cannot have it otherwise than from that thing which is superior to the mind itself); then there is nothing by which it may lose its being, because there is nothing contrary to that thing from which it has it.

Of course, the mind can possess wisdom in turning toward the source of its being, and can lose it by turning away from it. Now, turning away is the contrary to turning toward. But the mind cannot lose that which it has from that source to which no thing is contrary. Therefore, the mind cannot perish.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *De Immortalitate Animae* 11.18: Sed manifestum est, atque in promptu situm, quantum nocere animo falsitas possit. Num enim amplius potest quam fallere? at nisi qui uiuit, fallitur nemo. Non igitur falsitas interimere animum potest. (BA5, p. 204).

⁴⁶ This seems like a return to the original problem concerning the soul's nature presented in *De Ordine* (i.e. that it either is or is in Truth = it either exists through itself or it exists through the first essence). This is certainly a new version of this same problem. That having been said the new ambiguity expressed first at 6.11 (see fn.36) has not been forgotten for Augustine repeats it just before this passage in 10.17.

⁴⁷ *De Immortalitate Animae*: 12.19: Nam si nulla essentia in quantum essentia est, aliquid habet contrarium, multo minus habet contrarium prima illa essentia, quae dicitur ueritas, in quantum essentia est. Primum autem uerum est. Omnis enim essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est. Esse autem non habet contrarium, nisi non esse: unde nihil est essentiae contrarium. Nullo modo igitur res ulla esse potest contraria illi substantiae, quae maxime ac primitus est. Ex qua si habet animus idipsum quod est (non enim aliunde hoc habere potest, qui ex se non habet, nisi ab illa re quae

In the above Augustine begins by seeking the opposite of Truth.⁴⁸ He explains that strictly speaking there is no contrary to an essence or substance, and therefore that it is all the more impossible for the highest essence to have a contrary. The reason for this is that the highest essence exists through itself and not through some other form. It *is*, and the contrary of what *is*, Being, is non-being. Therefore, there is literally nothing contrary to that which supremely *is*. One knows that the mind receives its being from the first essence because the mind does not have being through itself, and what does not have being through itself must have it from that which is greater than itself (in being). This can only be He Who Is. Consequently, it is clear that in this passage Augustine presents a formal argument for God's existence and nature.⁴⁹

After having presented this argument Augustine concludes that the soul cannot be destroyed by the opposite of the first essence. But this is not the only problem that the argument solves. In the final paragraph above Augustine answers the question which has alluded him throughout the work, Can the soul destroy itself by separating itself from the True? Here he says no, for "the mind cannot lose that which it has from that source to which no thing is contrary." According to Augustine, the mind needs the first essence not only to know the true but also *to be*.⁵⁰ Therefore the argument from dependence shows that

illo ipso est animo praestantior), nulla res est qua id amittat, quia nulla res ei rei est contraria qua id habet; et propterea esse non desinit. Sapientiam uero, quia conuersione habet ad id ex quo est, auersione illam potest amittere. Conuersioni namque auersio contraria est. Illud uero quod ex eo habet cui nulla res est contraria, non est unde possit amittere. Non igitur potest interire (BA5, p. 206).

⁴⁸ In the *De immortalitate animae* Augustine refines his perspective in the sense that he no longer refers to "He Who Is" as the source of Truth. In fact, in this work, Augustine will make it clear that Truth and Being are identical. Despite this he still makes a distinction between knowledge gained through the argument from Truth and knowledge gained through the argument from dependence, and, as it will be seen, he ranks the latter as a more definitive form of knowledge than the former. This is the critical point.

⁴⁹ See fn. 4.

⁵⁰ What is assumed in this conclusion is the discussion at 8.14 where it is established that the essence which gives being to creation also sustains creation in being: "this force and incorporeal nature which effected the whole body, however, preserves the whole by its ever-present power. For after the making; it did not vanish and did not desert the thing made." According to Augustine, creation includes the act of sustaining that which was created. DuRoy and Gilson argue that this passage is an example of the argument from dependence. But this is not possible. Although he states that the material world is not the cause of its own existence and therefore needs such a cause he does not rule out the possibility that the mind is this cause. See *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, p. 19 fn. 35; *L'intelligence de la foi* pp. 193 and 194. It is also worth noting that this understanding of the mind as able to lose truth

the soul can separate itself from the first essence without being destroyed. Augustine states this definitively. But from chapter 6.11 it is clear that for the soul to be separable at all it must first be the case that God and the soul are each substances.⁵¹ Consequently, it must also be true that the argument from dependence shows that God and the soul are substances (this is supported by the fact that Augustine explicitly refers to God as a substance for the first time in this very chapter, a designation not assigned to God before this point). This knowledge in turn solves the problem concerning the soul's identity (i.e. concerning whether the mind is a subject with the true in it as in a subject, whether the true is a subject with the mind in it as in a subject, or whether they are both substances) produced by the argument from judgment, for it is now *certain* that God and the soul are distinct substances.

There is here a clear parallel between *De Immortalitate Animae* and *De Ordine* which establishes that Augustine intends to base his distinction between Truth and the source of Truth on the distinction between the argument from judgement and the argument from dependence, and which makes it clear that the latter is a higher form of knowledge than the former because it attains definitive knowledge concerning the nature of God and the soul. In *De Immortalitate Animae* the argument for the immortality of the soul based on the argument from judgment does not establish (1) whether the mind is a subject with the true in it as in a subject (i.e. as an accident in a substance), (2) whether the true is a subject with the mind in it as in a subject, or (3) whether they are both substances, an ambiguity which is based on the earlier ambiguity also found in *De Ordine* concerning whether or not the soul is *in* truth or *is* truth. Therefore in *De Immortalitate Animae* Augustine faces the same problem he does in *De Ordine*, the problem of the soul's identity. This problem is only solved in *De Immortalitate Animae* 12.19 where Augustine introduces the argument from dependence, just as in *De Ordine* 2.19.51 it is only solved through knowledge of the source of Truth. Therefore in *De Immortalitate Animae* one can see the theoretical foundation (the argument from Truth and the argument from dependence respectively) for the distinction between Truth and that upon which Truth depends made in *De Ordine*.

but not being would seem to confirm that Augustine references the argument from dependence in *De Trinitate* 8.2.5. See *Saint Augustine's Milan Vision*, pp. 168-173, and L. Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate* (Oxford Theological Monographs), (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁵¹ See fn. 38.

Conclusion

In *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* Augustine makes a distinction between Truth and that upon which Truth depends. In both of these works knowledge of that upon which Truth depends is described as a higher form of knowledge. Analysis of *De Immortalitate Animae* establishes the theoretical foundation for this distinction, and enables one to build upon Van Fleteren's thesis: the argument from judgement is a dominant theme in Augustine's early works but it is subordinate to and preparatory for knowledge attained through the argument from dependence. This reading also supports the thesis that *Confessiones* book 7 chapter 10 is the description of Augustine's use of the argument from dependence, for Augustine indicates its primacy in his earliest writings.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE EDITION OF THE PROLOGUE TO THE COMMENTARY ON THE SENTENCES BY AUGUSTINUS TRIUMPHUS OF ANCONA

The edition of the Prologue to the *Commentary on the Sentences* by Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona is based on the only extant manuscript of the *Commentary*, i.e. Bibliothèque Municipale Troyes, 296 described by Bouhot and Genest.¹ According to the *explicit* and the colophon reproduced by Bouhot and Genest, the codex was written down in Paris to order of John of Gendrey, a monk of Clairvaux Abbey. As the same notes inform, the codex was finished the 1st of June, 1303. The manuscript contains merely Augustine of Ancona's *Commentary* on Book I of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.

Several questions from Augustine of Ancona's *Commentary* have been edited by Schmaus and Randi.² The doctrinal contents of the Prologue have been analyzed recently by the editor,³ and that is why this edition is devoid of a historical study of the text.

The orthography used in the edition follows classical form, and the punctuation is modeled on contemporary German. Angle brackets <...> are used for *addenda*, other abbreviations follow conventional

¹ J.-P. BOUHOT, J.-F. GENEST, *La Bibliothèque de l'Abbaye de Clairvaux du XII^e au XVIII^e siècles. t. II: Les manuscrits conservés. Première partie. Manuscrits bibliques, patristiques et théologiques*, Paris – Turnhout 1997, 640-641.

² M. SCHMAUS, *Die Gotteslehre des Augustinus Triumphus nach seinem Sentenzenkommentar*, in: *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Festschrift Martin Grabmann* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband 3.2), Münster 1935, 896–953. E. Randi, *Talpe ed extraterrestri: Un inedito di Agostino Trionfo di Ancona sulla pluralità dei mondi*, in: *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 44/2 (1989) 311–326.

³ M. OLSZEWSKI, *Augustine of Ancona on the subject of theology*, in: *Acta Medievalea* 20 (2005) 371–398. IDEM, *Der Prolog zum Sentenzenkommentar des Augustinus Triumphus*, in: *Augustinianina* 59/3-4 (2009) 301–322 and two papers: *Contemplation as via media between Praxis and Theory. A Study of the Prologue to the Commentary on the Sentences by Augustine of Ancona* (XII International Congress of Medieval Philosophy “Universality of reason. Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages”, Palermo 11 – 22 September, 2007) and *The role of St Augustine's auctoritates in metatheology of two Augustinian authors: Giles of Rome and Augustine of Ancona* (Congrès de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la Théologie médiévale “Réceptions des Pères et de leurs écrits au Moyen Âge. Le devenir de la tradition ecclésiale”, Paris 11 – 14 June, 2008), both forthcoming in the conference volumes.

rules (*add.* – *addidit*, *corr.* – *correxī*, *iter.* – *iteravit*, *om.* – *omittendum*, *suppl.* – *supplevi*, *ms* – *manuscriptus*).

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Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona

In primum Sententiarum.

Prologus

14ral Quia finis imponit necessitatem agenti, agens vero formae et
5 forma materiae, cum Magister in Prologo¹ hanc doctrinam commendet
ex finis eius contemplatione, ex eius agentis libera communicatione,
ex suae formae ordinata traditione et ex eius materiae vel subiecti
distinctione, ideo antequam ad expositionem litterae accedamus, prop-
ter evidentiam eorum, quae in Prologo dicuntur, et propter universa-
10 lem notitiam istius doctrinae de qualibet istarum causarum aliqua
dubitabimus. Et primo de causa eius finali, quae <est> causa causa-
rum; secundo de agente, tertio de forma et quarto de eius materia vel
subiecto.

<Pars I

15 De causa finali theologiae>

De fine autem ipsius doctrinae contingit tripliciter dubitare. Nam ex
fine scientia sortitur nominationem, quia cuius finis est veritas, nomi-
natur speculativa; cuius vero finis est opus, dicitur practica, ut dicitur
II *Metaphysicae*²; sortitur dignitatem, quia scientia, cuius finis est
20 opus vel actio, <indignior est quam, quae est gratia sciendi>; sortitur
ulterius necessitatem, quia necessaria dicitur scientia, secundum quod
per eam consequimur finem. Tria ergo possunt quaeri de fine huius
scientiae: primo, <utrum theologia sit scientia speculativa, an practica,
secundo>, utrum debeat dici nobilior et dignior metaphysica et aliis
25 scientiis humanis, tertio, utrum sit ita necessaria, quod sine ipsa non
possumus consequi finem.

20 <indignior ... sciendi>] *suppl. cf. infra, qu. 2, arg. 3, l. 300-301.*

¹ Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, prol.: cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4), Grottaferrata 1971, 3, 2 – 4, 30.

² Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, II, 1, 993b 21: AL XXV, 3.2, 44, 24.

<Quaestio 1>

Ad primum ergo arguitur.

ET VIDETUR, quod sit principaliter practica et principaliter speculativa,
 30 quia non minus sufficienter provisum est homini ad consequendum
 finem supernaturalem quam ad consequendum finem naturalem. Sed
 propter consecutionem finis naturalis homo perficitur duplici scientia,
 scilicet practica et speculativa, et utraque principaliter; quia si non
 principaliter scientia practica sicut speculativa, tunc scientia practica
 35 tradita a philosopho esset scientia per accidens, quod est falsum. Ergo
 multo fortius propter consecutionem finis supernaturalis homo debet
 perfici utraque scientia principaliter. Sed scientia ad consequendum
 praedictum finem est theologia. Ergo ipsa est principaliter speculativa
 et practica.

40 <2.> Praeterea. Videtur, quod sit principaliter speculativa, quia debet
 denominari a fine. Sed finis et beatitudo nostra erit in visione et spe-
 culatione divina iuxta illud *Iohannis*, XVII: "haec est vita aeterna, ut
 cognoscant te, solum Deum verum et quem misisti Iesum Christum"³.
 Ergo debet principaliter <denominari> speculativa.

45 <3.> Praeterea. Videtur, quod principaliter debeat dici affectiva, quia
 scientia denominari debet a fine propinquo, non remoto. Sed finis via-
 toris in hac vita est dilectio iuxta illud Apostoli: "Finis praecepti est
 caritas, nam [4rbl in hoc universa lex pendet et prophetae"⁴. Dato ergo,
 quod nostra beatitudo consisteret in visione et speculatione divina,
 50 tamen quia iste est finis remotus, videtur, quod ista scientia principa-
 liter sit affectiva propter dilectionem ipsam, quae est finis propinquus.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod de ista quaestione sunt diversi modi
 dicendi. Primo ergo ad declarationem eius illos modos narrabimus et
 ostendemus, qualiter nullus eorum perfecte quietet intellectum.

55 Secundo ponemus modum illum, qui magis videtur esse consonus dic-
 tis sanctorum, ostendendo, qualiter haec doctrina nec pure speculativa,
 nec pure affectiva, nec simpliciter speculativa et practica debet appel-
 lari, sed debet nominari contemplativa.

³ Ioh. 17, 3.

⁴ I Tim. 1, 5.

<I>

60 Propter primum est sciendum, quod aliqui⁵ dicunt hanc scientiam principaliter esse practicam et principaliter speculativam. Nam, ut dicunt, finis et beatitudo hominis erit in speculatione et visione divinae essentiae. Et ista erit speculatio et cognitio perfecta, quia tunc "videbimus Deum, sicuti est"⁶. Est autem in nobis cognitio naturaliter inserta
 65 ipsius Dei, quae est valde imperfecta, quia omnibus est communis. Nunc autem ita est, quod ordine convenienti numquam ab imperfecto transitur ad perfectum nisi per aliquod medium. A cognitione ergo naturali, quae est imperfecta et communis, oportet pervenire ad speculationem et cognitionem divinam, quae erit perfecta et erit finis et
 70 beatitudo nostra, mediante cognitione sacrae theologiae, quae est perfectior cognitione naturali et imperfectior speculatione illa, quae erit nostra beatitudo. Ergo istam doctrinam principaliter speculativam oportet esse, ut per speculationem eius perveniamus ad illam speculationem. Non sufficit ad consequendam illam speculationem, in qua
 75 erimus beati, nisi quis mereatur ipsam per bonas operationes virtutum et per ipsam caritatem, quae est radix merendi iuxta illud Apostoli *I ad Corinthios*, XIII: "Si habuero omnem scientiam et omnem fidem ita, ut montes transferam, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil mihi prodest"⁷, scilicet ad vitam aeternam promerendam. Ideo, ut dicunt, etiam oportet hanc scientiam principaliter esse practicam et principa-
 80 liter de virtutibus et operationibus meritoriis considerare.

Ista est igitur positio istorum, quamvis intricate et diffuse in eorum scriptis ponatur, quod ista scientia debeat dici principaliter speculativa et principaliter practica propter quandam connexionem et habitudinem, quam habent speculatio et operatio ad ipsum finem extrinsecum, non intrinsecum. Unde propter talem connexionem et ordinem haec doctrina, ut dicunt, non debet dici scientia plures, sed una. Subiungunt

60 *In margine alia manu:* In veritate fatue loquitur iste, nec videt bene istum doctorem Godefredum, quem fatue reprobatur, quamvis enim non dicam, quin hic sit reprobandus. 79 scilicet] *corr. ex super.*

⁵ Cf. *Quodlibet XIII et XIV de Godefrido de Fontaines*, XIII, 1, corp.: ed. J. HOFFMANS (Les Philosophes Belges 5/3-4), Louvain 1935, 169-177.

⁶ I Ioh. 3, 2.

⁷ I Cor. 13, 2.

etiam, quod quamvis principaliter consideret de speculabilibus et agibilibus, tamen unus istorum finium tribuendus est huic scientiae magis principaliter, quia magis debet dici speculativa quam practica, tum
 90 14val quia speculatio secundum se est dignior quam praxis, tum quia magis convenit ista speculatio cum illa, ad quam ordinatur tamquam ad finem extrinsecum.

Sed ista opinio prima facie videtur implicare opposita. Nam in
 95 hoc, quod est esse principaliter vel esse perfectum, non est dare magis et minus, quia quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit, ut dicitur VI *Topicorum*⁸. Dicere ergo hanc doctrinam principaliter esse speculativam et practicam et principaliter considerare de speculabilibus et agibilibus et tamen magis dici speculativam quam practi-
 100 cam est dicere oppositum in adiecto, quia est dicere, quod sit principalis et non principalis. Nam non potest competere scientiae, quod sit magis speculativa quam practica, nisi ratione principalitatis finis, ut quia speculatio, quae est finis scientiae speculativae, principalius convenit sibi quam actio vel operatio, quae est finis scientiae practi-
 105 cae. Dicere ergo istam scientiam principaliter <practicam> et tamen magis denominari a speculatione quam ab actione est implicare contradictionem.

Amplius scientia non debet denominari a fine remoto, <sed> a fine propinquo. Nam si a fine remoto scientia reciperet denominationem, cum omnes morales sunt intentae, ut sedatis passionibus per
 110 debitos actus virtutum possit homo libere speculari et possit vivere magis secundum intellectum quam secundum sensum, sicut homo est magis intellectus quam sensus, ut dicitur IX *Ethicorum*⁹, tunc omnes scientiae humanae dicerentur speculativae. Propter connexionem ergo,
 115 quam habent speculatio et operatio ad ultimum finem, non debet sacra Scriptura dici practica et speculativa principaliter, quia a tali fine remoto scientia ista non debet denominari, sed vel debet denominari speculativa a speculatione, quae in ipsa intenditur, vel <practica> ab

117 denominari] corr. ex nominari.

⁸ Cf. Aristoteles, *Topica*, V, 5, 134b 25–26: AL V, 1–3, 102, 3–4.

⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, X, 7, 1077a sqq.: AL XXVI, 1–3/4, 576, 10 sqq.

actione, ad quam ordinatur, ad quodcumque istorum principaliter
intenditur in ipsa, ab eo denominationem habere.

Unde aliqui¹⁰, videntes utrumque istorum non posse esse principaliter finem istius scientiae, dixerunt ipsam esse principaliter speculativam, quia principaliter agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis, de quibus non agit, nisi inquantum per eos ordinamur ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua nostra beatitudo consistet. Ad hoc enim, ut dicunt, intenditur operatio bona, ut sedatis passionibus mundo corde possimus Deum speculari, unde *Matthaei* dicitur "beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt"¹¹ et Augustinus dicit, quod "tota operatio nostra in hac vita est, ut sanetur oculus mentis"¹².

Sed ista positio non videtur esse bona, quia si speculatio, unde speculatio est, esset finis principalis istius scientiae, cum talem speculationem habere possint mali homines sicut boni, immo interdum ratione alicuius aptitudinis mali homines magis cognoscunt Deum speculative quam boni, sequeretur igitur, quod mali potius quam boni consequerentur finem istius scientiae, cum talis speculatio, quae ponitur *l4vbl* finis, magis quandoque habeatur a malis quam a bonis, quod est falsum. Si ergo speculatio est finis, hoc est, prout informata est a caritate et operibus virtutis et prout per talem speculationem tenditur in Deum tamquam in finem et proponitur tamquam finis. Hinc est ergo, quod beatus Iacobus dicit, quod "fides vel cognitio sine operibus mortua est"¹³, et Apostolus *I ad Corinthios*, XIII, ait: "Si habuero omnem fidem et noverim mysteria omnia, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil mihi prodest"¹⁴, scilicet ad salutem. Nam sicut ad virtutes naturales acquirendas scire quidem modicum confert, operari vero multum, ut Philosophus dicit *II Ethicorum*¹⁵, sic ad salutem aeternam habendam speculari quidem modicum confert, diligere vero et

143 scilicet] *corr. ex super.*

¹⁰ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 8, qu. 3: Parisiis 1520, fol. 65R–66Z.

¹¹ Matth. 5, 8.

¹² Augustinus Hipponensis, *Sermo* 88, 5: PL 38, 542.

¹³ Iac. 2, 26.

¹⁴ I Cor. 13, 2–3.

¹⁵ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, II, 3, 1105b 2–3: AL XXVI, 1-3/4, 400, 28–29.

operari multum, maxime cum speculatio, quam de Deo habemus in hac vita, sit valde imperfecta, quia aenigmatica et obscura. Et si speculari aliquid valet, hoc est propter ipsam dilectionem, quia “finis praecepti est caritas”¹⁶, ut dictum est¹⁷.

Unde aliqui moderni doctores¹⁸ videntes, quod in tota sacra Scriptura principaliter et tamquam finis principalis intenditur operatio boni et dilectio caritatis, non confitentur istam scientiam esse speculativam. Verum quia talis operatio boni et talis dilectio caritatis non est ex operibus nostris, sed ex institutione divinae gratiae, quia “non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit”¹⁹, secundum Apostolum *Ad Titum*, ideo non confitentur ipsam esse practicam, sed dicunt eam esse affectivam vel dilectivam. Nam illa scientia debet practica appellari, ut dicunt, in qua intenditur bonum ex nostris operibus acquisitum, ut sicut ex frequenti domificare efficitur homo domificator, sic ex frequenti virtute operari efficitur homo virtuosus. Scientia igitur, in qua intenditur speculatio veri, dicitur speculativa, sed illa, in qua intenditur operatio boni, quod ex nostris operibus acquiritur, dicitur practica. Et quia philosophi non posuerunt aliud bonum nisi, quod poteramus ex nostris operibus adipisci, ideo secundum ipsorum doctrinam verum est omnem scientiam humanitus inventam collocari sub negotio practico vel speculativo. Sed quia in divina Scriptura non intenditur tamquam principalis finis speculatio, ideo non debet dici speculativa. Quia vero in ipsa non intenditur tale bonum, quod sit ex nostris operibus acquisitum, sed supernaturaliter nobis infusum, ideo non debet dici practica. Et quia tale bonum est ipsa caritas et dilectio, ideo dicunt, quod debet dici affectiva vel dilectiva.

Sed nec istud dictum videtur intellectum quietare, quia non magis est abstracta ista scientia, quam sit lumen fidei, cui innititur tamquam principio, et quam sit ipsa caritas, a qua, ut dicunt, denominatur tamquam a fine. Sed fides et caritas non trahuntur extra praedicamentum virtutum naturalium ex hoc, quod sunt habitus nobis supernaturaliter

¹⁶ I Tim. 1, 5.

¹⁷ Supra, eadem qu., arg. 3, l. 47-48.

¹⁸ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prolog., pars 4, qu. un., corp.: Venetiis 1521, fol. 7P-8B.

¹⁹ Tit. 3, 5.

infusi. Sunt enim fides et caritas in genere qualitatis, sicut aliae vir-
 180 tutes naturales. Ergo similiter ista doctrina, quantumcumque habeat
 pro principio ipsam fidem et pro fine habeat caritatem, non tra-
 hetur extra genus scientiae practicae vel speculativae, sed collocabitur
 sub negotio practico vel speculativo, sub quibus collocantur omnes
 scientiae humanitus acquisitae; sicut fides et caritas, quantumcumque
 185 sint virtutes supernaturales, in eodem praedicamento reponuntur, in
 quo sunt virtutes naturaliter acquisitae.

<II>

Viso ergo nullum istorum modorum perfecte intellectum quietare,
 volumus illum modum ponere, quem magis credimus esse verum et
 190 consonum dictis sanctorum, dicendo hanc scientiam nec esse princi-
 paliter speculativam et practicam, ut dicebat primus modus, nec prin-
 cipaliter speculativam et ex consequenti practicam, ut dicebat modus
 secundus, nec simpliciter affectivam, ut dicebat modus tertius, sed
 esse simpliciter contemplativam.

195 Primo tamen est intelligendum, quid nomine contemplationis
 intelligimus. Nam nomine contemplationis intelligimus non solum
 intellectus speculationem, qua aliquid cognoscitur pure speculative,
 sed etiam intelligimus affectus inflammationem, qua inflammatione
 illud, quod cognoscitur, vehementer diligitur. Quod autem per contem-
 200 plationem non pura notitia vel speculatio intellectus intelligatur, patet
 per verbum Gregorii super illo verbo *Ezechielis*, I: "quattuor facies
 uni et quattuor pennae uni"²⁰, ubi ait, quod "per faciem nisi notitia et
 quid <per> pennam nisi volatus exprimitur". Et subdit, quod "facies
 itaque ad notitiam pertinet, penna vero ad contemplationem"²¹. Si ergo
 205 contemplatio distinguitur a notitia vel a speculatione, oportet, quod
 nomine contemplationis importetur speculatio non quaecumque, sed
 talis, quae sit illuminativa et inflammativa.

Viso ergo, quid nomine contemplationis intelligimus, volumus
 ostendere, quod haec doctrina debet dici contemplativa, quod quantum
 210 ad praesens tribus rationibus ostendi potest: prima sumitur ex parte finis

²⁰ Ez. 1, 6.

²¹ Gregorius Magnus, *Homiliae in Hiezechielem prophetam*, III, 1: CCL 142, 142, 3-7.

istius scientiae, secunda ex parte modi tendendi in praedictum finem, tertia ex parte istius scientiae, ut differt ab aliis scientiis humanis.

Prima ratio sic ostenditur. Nam finis istius scientiae est ipse Deus, sed Deus non potest speculari nec cognosci ut finis nisi per dilectionem et amorem. Quamvis enim aliqua cognitione pure speculativa ipse possit cognosci sine caritate, ut inquantum est principium et causa entium et actus purus vel motor primus, cognitione tamen, qua aliquis praefigit sibi eum tamquam finem, sine dilectione cognosci non potest, nec etiam potest diligere sine cognitione, quia secundum beatum Augustinum²² non diligitur nisi cognitum. Et quia sub ista ratione Deus est finis in ista scientia, inquantum quilibet per hanc doctrinam proponit sibi ipsum Deum tamquam suum finem, cum hoc non possit esse per cognitionem pure speculativam, sed per speculationem inflammativam et dilectivam, oportet, quod finis istius scientiae dicatur contemplatio Dei, cuius contemplatio dicit speculationem non qualemcumque, sed inflammativam et accensivam. Et per consequens ista scientia contemplativa debet nominari. Haec autem ratio tangitur per beatum Augustinum I *De Trinitate*, 8 capitulo²³, ubi vult, quod finis omnium actionum nostrarum est contemplatio Dei.

Secundo hoc patet ex parte modi perveniendi ad hunc finem. Nam modus contemplandi ipsum Deum in hac vita et illa, quae dicuntur de Deo in ista scientia, non potest esse pure speculativus, quia, cum illa sint improporcionabilia nostro intellectui, nisi "intellectus captivaretur in obsequium Christi"²⁴, nullo modo assentiret eis, sed pura speculatio non habet intellectum captivare. Oportet igitur esse speculationem talem, quae sit inflammativa et illuminativa. Et hoc nomine contemplationis intelligimus, ut dictum est.

Tertio hoc idem ostenditur ex parte istius scientiae, ut differt ab aliis scientiis humanis. Nam habitus scientiae humanae per se est speculativus solum et actus procedens ex tali habitu directe et per se

218 cognosci] *corr. ex esse* 234 pura] *corr. ex pure*.

²² Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*, XCVI, 4: CCL 36, 571, 9–10.

²³ Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, I, 8, 17: CCL 50, 50, 80–81.

²⁴ II Cor. 10, 5.

solum debet dici speculatio. Si autem intellectus non sistit in tali actu, sed intendat actionem vel operationem transeuntem in exteriorem materiam, hoc est, prout intellectus convertitur ad voluntatem et prout extensione fit practicus. Nam sicut secundum doctrinam Philosophi intellectus directe intelligit universale, per extensionem autem et unionem ad sensum intelligit particulare, ut patet ex III *De anima*²⁵, ita directe intellectus fertur in speculationem. Si autem progrediatur in actionem, hoc est, prout unit se voluntati. Unde huius operatio ab utraque potentia progreditur formaliter, quia quod speculationis est ibi, formaliter est ab intellectu, quod vero est ibi actionis, formaliter est a voluntate. Et quia impossibile est duos actus formaliter distinctos et sub rationibus formalibus respicientes obiectum esse unum actum, ideo impossibile est eos habere rationem unius. Finis ergo scientiae humanae vel dicetur speculatio, vel operatio, nec potest esse unus finis utriusque scientiae humanae, videlicet practicae et speculativae, cum formaliter speculatio sit ab intellectu et dilectio vel actio formaliter sit a voluntate. Et duo actus formaliter distincti non possunt esse aequae principaliter intenti tamquam unus finis. Sed in hac divina scientia non est sic, quia habitus scientiae istius est a Deo inspiratus et infusus ipsi intellectui creato. Ideo cum sit formaliter in intellectu speculativo et illuminativo eius, formaliter procedit in intellectum. Verum quia, ut dictum est, talis habitus est a Deo infusus, qui est ignis consumens, ideo effective habet inflammare voluntatem. Et quia unus actus est, qui formaliter illuminat et effective inflamat, ideo non est inconveni- ens, quod contemplatio Dei, quae utrumque istorum complectitur non sub ratione distincta formali, sed unum formaliter et aliud effective, habeat rationem unius finis.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod sufficienter homo ad finem supernaturalem ordinatur per habitum istius scientiae, inquantum per eum illuminatur in intellectu formaliter de ipsis divinis et inflammatur in affectu effective, ut illa, quae cognoscit, meritorie diligere valeat.

AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod speculatio intenditur tamquam finis in ista scientia non quaecumque, sed talis, quae sit inflammativa, quae

²⁵ Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, III, 4, 429b 5 sqq.

nomine contemplationis intelligitur. Ideo ipsa debet dici finis eius, ut dictum est²⁶.

Similiter AD TERTIUM est dicendum, quod dilectio non quaecumque est finis istius scientiae, sed illa, quae est non solum inflammativa voluntatis effective, sed formaliter est illuminativa intellectus, ut ex dictis patet.

<Quaestio 2>

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ista doctrina sit dignior metaphysica et aliis scientiis humanis

ET VIDETUR, quod non, quia scientia, in qua est certitudo speculationis et adhaesionis simul, est dignior illa, in qua est certitudo adhaesionis tantum. Sed in metaphysica et in aliis scientiis humanis inventis est certitudo speculationis et adhaesionis simul. In hac autem doctrina solum est certitudo adhaesionis. Ergo videtur, quod ista sit indignior aliis.

<2.> Praeterea. Subiectum in metaphysica est totum ens. Subiectum autem in ista scientia est ipse Deus. Sed totum ens dignius est quam ipse Deus, ut probabitur, ergo etc. Minor probatur dupliciter. Primo sic, quia ens prima facie dividitur in ens creatum et increatum tamquam in partes suas. Sed duae partes sunt aliquid magis quam una tantum. Ergo totum ens est aliquid dignius et maius quam Deus solum. Secundo probatur ex dicto Philosophi in XII *Metaphysicae*²⁷, ubi dicit, quod post bonum primum est aliud bonum, scilicet bonum universi. Sicut ergo bonum universi ponit in numerum cum bono increato, ita ens creatum ponit in numerum cum ente increato. Et ita est aliquid maius utrisque simul quam ens increatum solum.

<3.> Praeterea. Scientia illa, quae solum est gratia sciendi, est nobilior illa, quae est gratia operandi. Sed in theologia maxime intenditur operatio et dilectio. Ergo videtur, quod sit indignior metaphysica, quae solum est gratia sciendi.

²⁶ Supra, eadem qu., corp., pars II, l. 208-229.

²⁷ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, XII, 10, 1075a 11-15: AL XXV, 3.2, 266, 463-465.

IN CONTRARIUM est, quia Philosophus I *Metaphysicae*²⁸ ostendit metaphysicam esse digniorem ceteris scientiis ex hoc, quod est de Deo. Sed haec doctrina principalius est de Deo quam metaphysica. Ergo dignior est ipsa.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum aliquos²⁹ huic quaestioni sic satisfacere. Dicunt enim hanc scientiam esse digniorem scientiis particularibus humanis, quia nulla scientia particularis directe considerat de Deo nec habet directe Deum pro subiecto sicut ista. Probant etiam ipsam digniorem esse metaphysica, quae est scientia communis, quia licet metaphysica habeat totum ens pro subiecto, non est tamen maius bonum Deus et totum universum, sive bonum creatum l5vbl et increatum, quam Deus tantum. Unde metaphysica, quae habeat ens creatum et increatum pro subiecto, non debet dici dignior ista scientia, quae habet pro subiecto ens increatum solum. Hoc autem probant tripliciter, secundum quod Deus in triplici genere causae comparatur ad ens creatum, scilicet formalis, efficientis et finalis, ut vult Commentator in XII *Metaphysicae*³⁰.

Prima ergo ratio sumitur ex parte causae formalis. Nam perfectio cuiuslibet formae accipitur ex esse, ideo videmus, quod cui deficit aliquod esse, deficit aliqua perfectio, ut quia igni deficit esse frigidum, quamvis habeat esse calidum, ideo sunt maius bonum ignis et aqua quam ignis tantum, eo quod aliqua perfectio reperitur in uno, quae non reperitur in alio. Cum igitur Deus sit ipsum esse, non potest sibi aliquod esse deficere et per consequens non potest sibi deficere aliqua perfectio. Unde Philosophus V *Metaphysicae*³¹ dicit, quod est dare aliquod ens perfectum universali perfectione, in quo reperiuntur perfectiones omnium generum, et ista est condicio primae causae, ut

²⁸ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 983a 4–5, 9–11: AL XXV, 3.2, 17, 144–146, 149–152; etiam J. HAMESSE, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval étude historique et édition critique* (Philosophes Médiévaux 17), Louvain-Paris 1974, 117 (27).

²⁹ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., pars 1, qu. 5, corp., fol. 5C–E.

³⁰ Cf. Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, com. 5: ed. Iunctina, t. VIII, fol. 293H; com. 6: fol. 295B.

³¹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, V, 16, 1021b 31 – 1022a 1: AL XXV, 3.2, 115, 650–654.

Commentator ibi³² dicit. Non igitur sunt maius bonum Deus et totum ens creatum quam Deus solum.

335 Secunda ratio accipitur ex parte causae efficientis. Nam cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, quidquid virtutis reperitur in causis creatis, "per amplius et perfectius"³³ reperitur in Deo. Sed quando-
cumque virtus, quae est in secunda causa, reperitur in prima, non sunt maius bonum prima causa et secunda quam prima tantum. Nam ideo
340 nauta et navis sunt maius bonum quam nauta solum, quia aliquid virtutis reperitur in navi, quae non reperitur in nauta. Et quia in nulla causa creata reperitur aliqua virtus, quae perfectiori modo non repe-
riatur in Deo, ideo non sunt maius bonum Deus et causae creatae quam Deus solum.

Tertia ratio accipitur ex parte causae finalis. Nam totum ens creatum comparatur ad Deum sicut ad finem. Talis autem comparatio
345 non est sicut entis ad ens vel sicut lineae ad lineam, sed sicut puncti ad lineam. Nam sicut punctus infinites sumptus numquam redderet lineam, sic ens creatum infinites acceptum numquam redderet nec numquam terminaret ens increatum, cum sit infinitum. Sicut ergo linea
et punctus non sunt aliquid maius quam linea solum, ita ens creatum
350 et increatum non sunt aliquid maius quam ens increatum tantum. Metaphysica igitur considerans totum ens creatum et increatum non erit dignior ista doctrina, quae habet pro subiecto ens increatum solum.

Sed istud, quamvis sit bene dictum, non tamen evacuat difficul-
tatem quaesiti, quia non solum una scientia est dignior alia ex hoc,
355 quod considerat aliquod subiectum dignius et maius quam alia, sed <etiam> ex hoc quod considerat plura et ex hoc quod ad plura se eius consideratio <extendit>. Cum igitur ens creatum et increatum plura sint quam ens increatum solum, quamvis non sint maius sicut punctus et linea, licet non sint aliquid maius quam linea tantum, sunt
360 tamen punctus et linea plus quam linea solum, ut Philosophus dicit III

337 et] *corr. ex in* 348 ergo] *corr. ex ego* 351 considerans] *corr. ex considera-*
tus 353 istud] *corr. ex istis*.

³² Cf. Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, V, com. 21: ed. Iunctina, t. VIII, fol. 131B.

³³ Hebr. 9, 11.

*Metaphysicae*³⁴, sic concedi potest ens creatum et increatum esse plus quam ens increatum solum. Et per consequens adhuc remanebit, quod metaphysica, quae habet totum ens creatum et increatum pro subiecto, sit dignior ista doctrina, quae habet pro subiecto ens increatum solum.

Incedentes ergo alia via dicamus unam scientiam esse digniorem alia aut ex parte rei consideratae, aut ex parte modi considerandi, aut ex parte finis, ad quem ordinatur. Nam ex parte rei consideratae metaphysica est dignior omnibus scientiis humanis, quia considerat optimum simpliciter in toto ente. Ex parte vero modi considerandi mathematica est dignior naturali philosophia, quia considerat modo abstractiori, quam faciat illa. Sed ex parte finis, ad quem ordinatur, scientiae architectonicae sunt digniores subservientibus, sicut militaris est dignior frenefactiva, quia ad nobiliorem finem ordinatur. Primus ergo modus dignitatis reperitur in scientia communi respectu specialis. Secundus reperitur in una scientia speciali speculativa respectu alterius. Tertius invenitur in scientiis moralibus, ut comparantur ad invicem.

Isto autem modo triplici possumus dicere hanc scientiam esse digniorem omnibus scientiis humanitus inventis. Nam ex parte rei consideratae excedit omnes scientias speciales speculativas, quia nulla talis scientia considerat ipsum Deum pro subiecto, sicut facit ista.

Ex parte vero modi considerandi excedit metaphysicam, quia non considerat de Deo secundum rationis modum, sicut metaphysica, sed secundum revelationis formam. Iste autem modus revelationis est dignior modo illo inventivo per rationem propter tria. Primo, propter eius communitatem, quia modus ille non convenit nisi hominibus ingeniosis et intellectu pollentibus, iste autem convenit omnibus, unde Augustinus I *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, dicit, quod sancta Scriptura etiam parvulis congruens nullius generis verba vitavit³⁵. Secundo, propter eius veritatem, quia modus ille est multis erroribus immixtus, iste autem ab omni confusione erroris est separatus. Tertio, propter eius libertatem, quia facit possessorem maxime liberum.

371 quam] *corr. ex quod.*

³⁴ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, III, 4–5, 1001b – 1002a: AL XXV, 3.2, 63, 426 sqq.

³⁵ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, I, 1, 2: CCL 50, 28, 38–39.

Sed ex parte finis excedit omnes scientias morales et mechanicas, quia finis istius scientiae est beatitudo aeterna, ad quam sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines moralium scientiarum.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod certitudo illa adhaesionis, quae reperitur in hac doctrina, est dignior et maior certitudine speculationis, quae reperitur in scientiis humanis, quia innititur lumini divino, cui non potest subesse falsitas. Illa autem innititur lumini rationis, cui error et falsitas admisceri potest.

AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod quamvis ens creatum [6rbl et increatum sunt plus quam ens increatum solum, theologia tamen considerat utrumque illorum modo nobiliori, quam faciat metaphysica. Et quamvis solum ens creatum consideret pro subiecto, tamen ea, quae de ente creato naturali ratione investigari possunt, modo revelatorio et inspirativo considerat. Ideo semper quantum ad modum considerandi ista doctrina est dignior metaphysica.

AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod quamvis in ista doctrina intendatur operatio boni, potissime tamen in ipsa intenditur speculatio veri. Bonum etiam, quod in ipsa intenditur, est tale bonum, quod est finis omnium entium. Ideo ex hoc non arguitur, quod sit indignior aliis, sed magis arguitur oppositum.

<Quaestio 3>

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ista doctrina sit ita necessaria, quod sine ipsa non possimus consequi finem

ET VIDETUR quod non, quia nobilior est illa res, quae potest consequi finem ex suis principiis naturalibus, quam illa, quae non potest consequi suum finem sine adminiculo alterius. Sed homo est dignior inter omnes creaturas. Ergo videtur, quod suum finem possit consequi sine aliqua cognitione supernaturaliter infusa.

<2.> Praeterea. Magister dicit in principio istius libri ex auctoritate Augustini I *De doctrina christiana*: "sacrae Paginae tractatum versari

403 utrumque] *corr. ex utrisque* 409 intenditur] *etiam add. ms, om.*

circa res et signa”³⁶. Sed de omnibus rebus sufficienter tractant scientiae humanae reales. De signis vero sufficienter tractant scientiae humanae sermocinales. Ergo videtur, quod ista doctrina non sit necessaria, sed superflua.

IN CONTRARIUM est Hugo in *Commento super Angelicam*³⁷, ubi ait, quod philosophi erraverunt, quia non habuerunt lumen gloriae et fidei christianae. Ideo necesse fuit tradi scientiam ab omnis erroris contagio absolutam.

<2.> Praeterea. Finis supernaturalis non potest cognosci per cognitionem naturalem. Sed homo ordinatur ad finem supernaturalem. Ergo oportet per aliquam doctrinam supernaturalem praedictum finem esse praecognitum.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod aliqui³⁸ dicunt necessariam esse artem tripliciter vel scientiam. Uno modo propter indigentiam corporalem supplendam. Et sic necessarium dividitur contra artes, quae sunt inventae sciendi gratia. Et de isto necessario loquitur Philosophus I *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit, quod aliae artes inventae sunt propter necessarium, aliae autem propter sciendi modum; et secundum istum modum solae artes mechanicae dicuntur necessariae.

Alio modo dicitur ars necessaria propter alium finem extrinsecum, ad quem ordinatur. Et sic necessarium dividitur contra honorabile, secundum quem modum loquitur Philosophus I *Metaphysicae* de necessario, ubi ait, quod “necessariores sunt quidem omnes metaphysica, dignior vero nulla”³⁹. Nam cum ipsa metaphysica non ordinetur ad aliam scientiam, omnes autem aliae ordinentur ad ipsam tamquam ad finem, sola ipsa secundum istum modum dicitur non necessaria. Omnes autem aliae scientiae humanae etiam speculativae necessariae dici possunt.

³⁶ Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, I, 1, 1: 55, 5–6; cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De doctrina christiana*, I, 2, 2: CCL 32, 7, 22.

³⁷ Cf. Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Expositio in Hierarchiam coelestem S. Dionysii*, I, cap. 1: PL 175, 925D–927A.

³⁸ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., pars 1, qu. 7, corp.: fol. 6E–G.

³⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 983a 10–11: AL XXV, 3.2, 17, 151–152.

Tertio modo dicitur scientia vel ars necessaria, 16^{val} quando illa, quae determinantur in illa scientia, non determinantur in alia secundum illum modum, <secundum quem determinantur in illa>. Et sic necessarium dividitur contra superfluum, quia ideo necessaria dicitur
 455 scientia quaelibet, quia non superfluit, inquantum aliqua possumus scire per illam, quae non cognoscimus per aliam scientiam saltem secundum eundem modum.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum ista doctrina dicatur necessaria, intendunt, quod non est necessaria primo modo, eo quod non est ars
 460 mechanica nec propter indigentiam corporalem supplendam est inventa. Nec dicitur necessaria secundo modo, quia omnes aliae scientiae humanae ordinantur ad istam. Ipsa vero ad nullam ordinatur. Sed dicitur necessaria tertio modo, quia non superfluit, eo quod aliqua cognoscimus per ipsam, quae per nullam scientiam humanitus inven-
 465 tam scire possumus.

Sed istud non videtur esse sufficienter dictum, quia tunc ista doctrina non esset magis necessaria quam philosophia naturalis, cum secundum aliquem modum aliqua possimus scire per philosophiam naturalem, secundum quem modum non cognoscimus per istam vel
 470 per aliquam aliam doctrinam. Quod tamen est falsum, quia finem possumus consequi etiam naturalem sine aliqua doctrina particulari humanitus acquisita, quod tamen finem supernaturalem consequi non possemus sine ista doctrina secundum ordinem a Deo institutum.

Dicamus ergo hanc doctrinam esse necessariam praeter philosophicas disciplinas propter quattuor. Primo propter divinorum facilem
 475 instructionem. Nam veritas divinorum, etiam eorum, quae ratione investigari possunt, per longum tempus acquiritur, cum ad ea intelligenda intellectus noster se habeat sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ut dicitur II *Metaphysicae*⁴⁰, et a paucis huiusmodi veritas percipitur,
 480 quia non nisi a bene complexionatis hominibus et ingenio atque intellectu pollentibus. Unde necessarium fuit talia divina revelatione spirari, ut faciliter illa quilibet capere posset. Unde Augustinus VI

462 ordinatur] corr. ex ordinantur.

⁴⁰ Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, II, 1 993b 9–11: AL XXV, 3.2, 43, 12–14; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 118 (35).

485 *Confessionum*, capitulo 5, loquens de sacra Scriptura ait, quod “non intellectu profundiore, servato verbis apertissimis et humilissimo loquendi genere se cunctis praebebat”⁴¹.

Secundo propter errorum extirpationem. Nam scientiae humanae tam de sensibilibus quam de intelligibilibus multis erroribus sunt admixtae, quia sunt inventae discurrendo, arguendo et syllogizando, in quibus actibus intellectus noster multipliciter errat. Ideo necessarium fuit nobis tradi aliquam scientiam, quae tam de humanis quam de divinis sinceram veritatem proponeret. Unde Hugo in *Commento super Angelica hierarchia* dicit, sicut supra allegabatur⁴², quod philosophi erraverunt, quia non habuerunt lumen gratiae et fidei christianae, ideo necesse fuit tradi scientiam ab omnis erroris contagio absolutam.

495 Tertio propter vitiorum correctionem et virtutum plantationem, quia licet per scientias humanas corripiantur vitia et instruantur homines ad virtutes l6vbl, non tamen ita perfecte sicut per hanc doctrinam. Unde dictum est *Ieremiae*, I: “Ecce dedi verba mea in ore tuo. Ecce constitui te super gentes et regna, ut evellas et destruas”, scilicet vitia et prava
500 “et aedifices et plantes”⁴³, scilicet virtutes et gratias.

Quarto est necessaria propter finis consecutionem. Nam supposito hominem ordinatum esse ad finem supernaturalem mediante lumine fidei, impossibile est ipsum finem consequi sine cognitione istius doctrinae, sicut impossibile est sine fide placere Deo. Unde
505 Apostolus *Ad Hebraeos*, XI ait, quod “accedentem ad Deum”, supple: tamquam ad finem, “oportet credere, quia est et sperantibus se remunerator fit”⁴⁴. Unde licet condicio scientiae vel inventio per comparationem ad scientes non sit necessaria per se ipsi scientiae, respectu tamen finis potest dici, quod per se competat scientiae, quia supposito
510 aliquem ordinari in finem mediante aliqua cognitione, necessarium est illam cognitionem traditam esse ad consequendum praedictum finem.

499 scilicet] *corr. ex super* 500 scilicet] *corr. ex super*.

⁴¹ Augustinus Hipponensis, *Confessiones*, VI, 5, 8: CCL 27, 78, 39–40: “in (!) intellectu profundiore, servaret verbis apertissimis et humillimo genere loquendi se cunctis praebens”.

⁴² Supra, eadem qu., arg. in contrarium 1, l. 428–429.

⁴³ Ier. 1, 9–10.

⁴⁴ Hebr. 11, 6; Vulgata “inquirentibus” loco “sperantibus”.

Exponendo igitur necessarium pro utili, ut idem sonet necessarium quod utile, possumus dicere, quod has quattuor necessitates, quas supra enumeravimus, propter quas necessarium fuit hanc doctrinam nobis a Deo revelari, tangit Apostolus *II ad Timotheum*, III, ubi dicit, quod "omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corrigendum et ad erudiendum"⁴⁵, ut dicatur necessaria vel utilis ad docendum omnes credentes propter facilem instructionem, ad arguendum incredulos propter errorum extirpationem, ad corripiendum inquietos propter vitiorum correptionem et ad erudiendum pro-
 vectos ad finis consecutionem.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod finem naturalem potest consequi homo ex suis principiis naturalibus nobiliori modo, quam faciat aliqua creatura. Sed ipse propter eius nobilitatem ordinatur ad quandam finem supernaturalem, ad quem cognoscendum non sufficit naturalis cognitio. Ideo competit ipsum per cognitionem naturalem de praedicto fine instrui.

AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod quamvis scientiae humanae tractent de rebus et de signis, non tamen tractant de eis secundum illum modum, secundum quem huiusmodi traduntur in ista scientia, quia ibi traduntur, ut sunt nota in lumine rationis, hic autem, ut sunt cognita lumine divino.

<Pars 2

De causa agente theologiae>

Quaesito de causa finali istius doctrinae restat quaerere de eius causa agente. Agens autem istius scientiae est ipse Deus, qui hanc scientiam principaliter docet. Et quia quidquid scitur, cognoscitur in aliquo lumine, ideo de causa agente istius doctrinae potest esse triplex quaestio. Prima est, utrum Deus infundat nobis aliquod lumen, in quo clarius cognoscatur quam per lumen fidei. Secunda est, utrum habitus istius scientiae divinitus inspiratae differat ab habitu fidei. Tertia est, utrum solus Deus hanc scientiam doceat. 17ral

⁴⁵ II Tim. 3, 16; Vulgata "et" loco "est".

<Quaestio 1>

Ad primum ergo sic proceditur.

545 ET VIDETUR, quod Deus nobis aliquod lumen infundat, in quo clarius cognoscatur quam per lumen fidei, quia quidquid cognoscitur, in aliquo lumine cognoscatur. Sed illa, quae sciuntur per sacram Scripturam, sciuntur clariori modo quam per lumen fidei. Ergo oportet ponere aliud lumen, mediante quo ipse Deus cognoscatur.

550 <2.> Praeterea. *Ad Corinthios*, XII, scribitur: “alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae; alii sermo scientiae, alii fides in eodem Spiritu”⁴⁶. Si ergo notitia fidei distinguitur per Apostolum a notitia scientiae, oportet, quod aliud sit lumen fidei et aliud ipsius scientiae, qua Deus cognoscatur.

555 IN CONTRARIUM est, quia nulla cognitio legitur in Scriptura, qua Deus in hac vita cognoscatur nisi aenigmatica et obscura. Sed talis cognitio obscura est cognitio fidei. Ergo non est aliud lumen nobis infusum praeter lumen fidei.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod aliqui doctores conati sunt ostendere
560 praeter lumen fidei aliud lumen esse infusum his, qui istam doctrinam habent, per quod clarius Deum cognoscunt quam illi, qui solum tendunt in ipsum per lumen fidei. Primo ergo ad declarationem istius quaestionis eorum positionem narrabimus. Secundo adducemus
565 rationes contra hanc positionem et ostendemus, quod talis imaginatio procedit ex falso intellectu. Tertio rationes ipsorum solvemus et exponemus auctoritates illas, quas pro eis assumunt.

<I>

Propter primum est sciendum, quod ex dictis ipsorum possunt elici tria, per quae haec positio roboratur. Nam quod sit aliud lumen praeter
570 lumen fidei nobis infusum, videntur primo probare ratione ducente ad impossibile, secundo ratione ostensiva, tertio per auctoritates.

559 conati] *corr. ex cognati.*

⁴⁶ I Cor. 12, 8–9. Vulgata “alteri” loco “alii”.

Ratio autem ducens ad impossibile est talis⁴⁷. Si de credibilibus et de articulis fidei non haberemus cognitionem per aliud lumen quam per lumen fidei, non clarius cognosceret ipsa credibilia unus fidelis
 575 quam alius, nec clarius sciret ipsa unus doctor sacrae theologiae quam unus simplex idiota. Sed hoc est falsum, quia secundum Augustinum XIV *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, “ista scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum”⁴⁸, quia, ut ibidem subdit: “aliud
 580 est scire tantummodo, quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est, et aliud est scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur”⁴⁹. Si ergo ipsa fide pollent omnes fideles, non autem omnes pollent ista doctrina, oportet aliud lumen esse fidei et aliud lumen istius doctrinae. Alias oporteret, quod fides et scientia aequiparentur, ut quanto quis
 585 amplius polleret fide, tanto magis polleret ista scientia. Sed hoc est falsum, quia aliqui plurimum pollent fide, qui non pollent ista scientia, ut patet per Augustinum.

Ratio autem ostensiva est talis⁵⁰. Dicunt enim ista tria per ordinem se habere: credere, intelligere et videre, quia credere habet esse
 590 in omnibus 17rbl fidelibus per lumen fidei, quod infunditur in baptismo, intelligere vero habet esse in illis, qui ex alio lumine supernaturali clarius cognoscunt ipsum Deum per istam scientiam quam per lumen fidei, sed videre oculo mentis aperta visione faciei ad faciem ipsum Deum habet esse in ipsis beatis. Imaginantur enim, quod primo
 595 sit in nobis habitus fidei infusio, postea est ipsorum terminorum incomplexorum articulorum fidei propositio, quia proponuntur nobis termini articulorum fidei, ut quid significatur per hoc nomen ‘Deus’ et per hoc nomen ‘trinus’ et quid nomine omnium istorum terminorum, quorum significationes naturaliter et per sensum scire possumus.
 600 Demum ex illis terminis complexis proponuntur nobis articuli fidei tamquam principia complexa ex illis terminis naturaliter cognitis, quibus principiis tum ex auctoritate sacrae Scripturae, tum ex adiutorio fidei iam infusae credimus et firmiter eorum veritati assentimus.

⁴⁷ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet XII*, qu. 2, sol.: ed. J. DECORTE, Leuven 1987 (Henrici de Gandavo *Opera omnia* 16) 15, 26–39.

⁴⁸ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3: CCL 50, 424, 61–63.

⁴⁹ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3: CCL 50, 424, 63–66.

⁵⁰ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet XII*, qu. 2, ad arg.: ed. DECORTE, 23, 6–8; 25, 30 – 27, 1.

Verum quia talis cognitio est universalis et obscura, ideo ad
 605 intelligendum praedictos terminos incomplexos, ut quid 'Deus' et quid
 'trinus', cognitione magis particulari et determinata et ad cognoscen-
 dum magis clare articulos fidei tamquam principia complexa ex illis
 terminis indigemus adiutorio supernaturalis luminis excedentis lumen
 fidei, mediante quo cognoscuntur praedicti termini, ut quid 'Deus' et
 610 quid 'trinus', non solum ut termini principii complexi credibilis, sicut
 in lumine fidei cognoscimus, sed etiam ut intelligibilis, quibus termi-
 nis cognitio statim cognoscuntur et intelliguntur principia complexa et
 615 ipsi articuli fidei, ex quibus articulis tamquam ex principiis extrinsecis
 et intrinsecis ex virtute praedicti luminis eliciuntur conclusiones
 ratione demonstrativa in hac scientia. Et habetur habitus intellectivus
 de principiis sacrae theologiae et habitus scientificus de conclusionibus
 credibilibus.

Probant autem hoc etiam per auctoritates⁵¹. Nam, dicitur *Isaiae*,
 VII: "nisi credideritis, non intelligetis"⁵². Per credere ergo volunt,
 620 quod intelligatur lumen fidei, sed per intelligere intelligitur lumen
 aliud clarius, in quo ipsa divina non solum creduntur, sed etiam intel-
 liguntur et cognoscuntur. Verum quia prius est credere per lumen fidei
 quam intelligere per lumen istius scientiae, ideo signanter propheta
 dixit: "nisi credideritis, non intelligetis".

625 Probant etiam hoc per auctoritatem Augustini⁵³ super illo verbo
Iohannis, I, "vita erat lux hominum"⁵⁴, ubi dicit, quod illa vita, quae
 lux est increata, illuminat homines duplici lumine, parvulos quidem
 lumine fidei, quo nutriantur in lacte, maiores vero lumine sapientiae,
 quo solido cibo vescantur. De qua sapientia loquitur Apostolus *I ad*
 630 *Corinthios*, II, ubi ait "sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos"⁵⁵.

<II>

Viso ergo, quomodo isti rationibus et auctoritatibus hanc positionem
 roborant, volumus ostendere, quod ista positio stare l7val non potest

⁵¹ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet XII*, qu. 2, ad arg.: ed. DECORTE, 22, 74-79.

⁵² Is. 7, 9.

⁵³ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet XII*, qu. 2, ad arg.: ed. DECORTE, 17, 82 - 18, 89. Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*, I, 18-19: CCL 36, 10, 27 - 11, 19.

⁵⁴ Io. 1, 4.

⁵⁵ I Cor. 2, 6.

et quod talis imaginatio ex falso intellectu procedit, quod quantum ad
 635 praesens triplici ratione probare possumus. Quarum prima sumitur ex
 parte principiorum credibilium, ut comparantur ad principia naturaliter
 cognita, secunda ex parte luminis supernaturalis, ut comparatur ad
 lumen naturale, tertia ex parte modi intelligendi viatorum, ut compa-
 ratur ad modum intelligendi comprehensorum.

640 Prima ratio sic patet. Nam tota certitudo conclusionum est ex
 certitudine principiorum, quia tunc scire opinamur unumquodque, cum
 cognoscimus causas et principia eius, ut dicitur I *Physicorum*⁵⁶. Si
 ergo aliqua concludimus ex articulis fidei vel si unum articulum
 contradicimus ex alio, tota certitudo praedictarum conclusionum erit
 645 ex certitudine principiorum. Et quia principia fidei non cognoscimus
 nisi in lumine fidei et inquantum sunt a Deo revelata, non cognosce-
 mus ipsas conclusiones, quae eliciuntur ex praedictis principiis nisi in
 praedicto lumine. Immo cum maior sit certitudo principiorum quam
 conclusionum, non poterit aliqua conclusio certitudinem aliquam
 650 habere, quae non reducat in certitudinem principiorum cognitorum
 lumine fidei. Nam si probamus Filium distingui a Patre et Spiritum
 Sanctum ab utroque per rem relatam, non absolutam, hoc est, quia
 praesupponimus Deum esse unum in essentia et trinum in personis.
 Tota igitur certitudo istius conclusionis dependebit ex illo principio,
 655 quod quidem non probamus, sed supponimus per lumen fidei. Nec est
 ibi aliqua cognitio vel certitudo speculationis praeter cognitionem
 fidei. Et si est ibi aliqualis speculatio, hoc est inquantum arguendo
 procedimus ex tali principio ad talem conclusionem, numquam tamen
 sumus certi de ista conclusione, quod in divinis sit distinctio per relata,
 660 nisi quatenus credimus sub lumine fidei Deum esse unum in substan-
 tia et trinum in personis. Secus autem est in principiis naturaliter
 cognitis, quia conclusiones scientificas cognoscimus per principia,
 quae sunt nobis nota naturaliter et in lumine naturali. Ideo in talibus
 est vera certitudo speculationis et cognitio *propter quid*. Sed si prae-
 665 dicta principia, quae sunt nobis naturaliter cognita, ut 'de quolibet esse

647 conclusiones] *corr.* ex cognitiones.

⁵⁶ Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica*, I, 1, 184a 12–14: AL VII, 1.2, 7, 5–7.

vel non esse' et 'omne totum est maius sua parte', excederent nostrum intellectum et non haberemus certitudinem de eis, nisi quia a Deo dictum est ita esse, tunc nullam aliam certitudinem haberemus de conclusionibus, quae concluderentur ex praedictis principiis, nisi quia talia essent a Deo revelata. Non igitur cognoscimus Deum in hac vita nisi cognitione fidei, nec in alio lumine nisi in lumine fidei.

Secunda ratio sic ostenditur. Nam in naturali cognitione non ponimus nisi unum lumen intellectus agentis, in quo cognoscuntur principia et conclusiones naturales. Nam si conclusiones cognoscuntur clariori modo, ut sunt elicitedae ex principiis, quam prout in principiis continentur, antequam ex eis deducantur, hoc est, prout magis explicantur deductae ex principiis per syllogismum demonstrativum quam in principiis existentes. In eodem tamen lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur principia et huiusmodi conclusiones, multo ergo fortius non erit aliud lumen supernaturale, in quo cognoscuntur articuli fidei et conclusiones, quae deducuntur ex eis, maxime cum nulla certitudo competat praedictis conclusionibus nisi illa, quae competit praedictis articulis, quae magis est adhaesionis quam speculationis. Adhaesimus namque ipsis articulis solum, quia sunt a Deo revelati.

Tertia ratio sic declaratur. Nam licet lumen fidei ex parte Dei infundentis sit limpidum et clarum, ut tamen recipitur in nobis adhuc in statu viae existentibus, obscure et aenigmaticè ipsum recipimus. Dicemus ergo, quod modus intelligendi omnium viatorum est obscurus et aenigmaticus. Non tamen praedictus modus est aequalis, quia unus viator clarius intelligit quam alius etiam articulos fidei et illa, quae sunt annexa articulis, inquantum per aliquas similitudines et manuductiones creaturarum clariori modo intelligit illa, quae sunt nobis a Deo revelata, et illa, quae per fidem cognoscimus. Numquam tamen ista claritas tanta est, quod faciat nos recedere a cognitione aenigmatica fidei et quod faciat nos scire de ipsis articulis fidei *quid rei* secundum intellectum naturalem aggenerantem certam cognitionem per causam intrinsecam et dicentem *propter quid*, quia isto modo cognoscunt Deum et illa, quae dicuntur de ipso, ipsi beati et ipsi comprehensores,

676 deducantur] *corr. ex deducatur* 659 aequalis] *corr. ex punctualis* 693 cognoscimus] *quam unus alius add. ms, om.* 696 naturalem] *corr. ex essentialem.*

qui ex aperta visione, quam habent de Deo, demonstrative sciunt, quod nos credimus.

Modus igitur intelligendi noster est simpliciter creditivus, sed modus intelligendi comprehensorum est scientificus et simpliciter cognitivus. Sicut ergo impossibile est modum cognoscendi viatorum esse modum intelligendi comprehensorum, ita impossibile est illud, quod creditum est a nobis, esse scitum in statu praesentis vitae. Articuli ergo fidei et illa, quae sacra doctrina ex sola fide tenet, quae sunt simpliciter credita a nobis, impossibile est in praesenti vita esse scita. Sed tunc sciemus ea, quando "videbimus Deum sicuti est"⁵⁷. Et per consequens impossibile est esse aliud lumen fidei, in quo credibilia credamus et in quo praedicta credibilia cognoscamus, sicut impossibile est secundum praesentem statum credita esse scita.

Procedit ergo ista positio ex falsa imaginatione, cum per hoc, quod unus viator intelligit clarius quam alius ipsa credibilia, ponat ea simpliciter esse scita, quod patet falsum esse. Nec hoc est commendare sacram Scripturam, sed magis est ipsam vilificare. Nam sicut si viator dicat se esse comprehensorem, se ipsum vilificat, quia dicit se habere, quod non habet, sic si aliquis sacrae Scripturae doctor dicat se cognoscere Deum per divinam Scripturam alio lumine quam per lumen fidei, praedictam Scripturam vilificat, quia dicit sibi id convenire, quod non convenit. Oportet namque praedictum lumen ponentes habere doctrinam clarioribus clariorem et tradere ipsam ordinationibus ordinationem, cum tamen ipsi magis obscure et magis inordinate scientiam tradant quam illi, qui solum per lumen fidei dicunt se Deum in hac praesenti vita cognoscere.

<III>

Ostenso ergo hanc positionem stare non posse volumus ipsorum rationes solvere et auctoritates exponere.

Ratio ergo prima ducens ad impossibile non probat unum viatorem cognoscere per aliud lumen ipsum Deum quam per lumen fidei ex hoc, quod clarius cognoscit credibilia, quam faciat alius. Sed bene probat unum viatorem clariorem notitiam habere de ipsis credibilibus

⁵⁷ I Ioh. 3, 2.

quam alium. Dicemus enim, quod per idem lumen fidei duplex cognitio haberi potest: una imperfecta, per quam quilibet fidelis scit, quid credere debeat ad eius salutem, et hac pollent omnes fideles; alia est
 735 cognitio fidei magis perfecta, secundum quam aliquis scit non solum, quid credere debeat, sed etiam scit ipsam fidem manifestare et alios ad credendum inducere ac contra impugantes ipsam defendere. De qua duplici cognitione fidei loquitur Augustinus, XIV *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, ubi ait, quod “hac scientia, scilicet perfecta, non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant fide”⁵⁸. Non tamen ista perfectio tanta est, quod trahat ipsam cognitionem extra speciem cognitionis fidei vel extra lumen fidei. Sed eadem cognitio fidei secundum speciem est in omnibus viatoribus, quamvis clariori modo sit in uno quam in alio, secundum quod aliquis ex studio librorum sacrae doctrinae et ex
 745 cognitione scientiarum humanitus inventarum potest per aliquas verisimilitudines et manuductiones creaturarum clarius cognoscere credibilia quam alius et potest contrarias rationes fidem impugnantes solvere, numquam tamen cognoscet simpliciter credibilia ut scita, sed ut credita et ut revelata a Deo.

750 Similiter ratio ostensiva non arguit, quod de terminis incomplexis articulorum fidei, ut quid ‘Deus’ et quid ‘trinus’, possumus scire *quid rei*, sicut scimus de principiis naturalibus cognitis lumine naturali, sed bene arguit, quod possumus scire *quid nominis*. Sed talis cognitio non est scientifica, nec facit scire *propter quid*, sed *quia*, cum ipsam evidentiam rei, quam proponunt articuli fidei, non possumus
 755 videre in hac vita nisi per lumen fidei.

Auctoritas etiam prima assumpta de *Isaia* non facit pro eis, sed magis contra eos. Nam ideo credimus et intelligimus illa, quae nobis proponit fides, quia unum articulum concludimus ex alio, ut concludimus in divinis esse distinctiones per relationes, quia supponimus et credimus per fidem Deum esse trinum et unum. Similiter intelligimus in emanatione personarum non esse intervalla temporum, quia supponimus et credimus omnium divinarum personarum esse unum
 760

739 scientia] *corr. ex super* 741 extra speciem cognitionis fidei] *iter*.

⁵⁸ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3: CCL 50, 424, 61–63.

esse et unam substantiam et fuisse quamlibet personam ab aeterno. Et
 765 quia si non est primum, non est secundum, ideo si non crederemus
 aliquid per fidem, nihil intelligeremus ex illo sequi. Voluit ergo pro-
 pheta dicere: “si nihil credideritis”, hoc est: nihil praesupposueritis
 per fidem, “nihil intelligetis”.

Alio modo potest exponi ista auctoritas, ut Augustinus exponit
 770 in fine VII *De Trinitate*, ubi, cum dixisset: in divinis non esse confu-
 sionem personarum et distinctionem essentiae⁵⁹, subdidit, quod “si
 intellectus haec capere non potest, fide teneatur, donec illucescat in
 cordibus nostris ille, qui ait per prophetam: «nisi credideritis, non
 intelligetis»”⁶⁰. Videtur ergo secundum Augustinum propheta velle
 775 dixisse, quod nisi credamus credibilia in hac vita per fidem, numquam
 Deus in futuro statu illucescet in cordibus nostris, ut ipsum aperte
 videre et intelligere valeamus, quia “qui non credit, iam iudicatus
 est”⁶¹. Nec auctoritas Augustini facit pro eis, quia non vult Augustinus
 esse aliud lumen in magnis quam in parvis praeter lumen fidei, sed
 780 vult, quod illud clarius sit in uno quam in alio. Dicemus enim, quod
 sicut secundum beatum Gregorium secundum “incrementa temporum
 crevit scientia sanctorum patrum”⁶², sicut secundum Apostolum nos
 respectu illorum, qui fuerunt in Vetere Testamento “revelata facie glo-
 riam domini speculamur”⁶³, ita in praesenti statu unus fidelis clariorem
 785 cognitionem habet de credibilibus quam alius et unus et idem fidelis
 per idem lumen fidei potest magis ac magis in praedicta cognitione
 crescere, numquam tamen aliquis in hac vita existens potest ita claram
 cognitionem de credibilibus habere, quin semper videat Deum “in spe-
 culo et in aenigmate”⁶⁴.

790 Et per hoc patet solutio AD PRIMUM ARGUMENTUM.
 SECUNDUM autem solvetur in sequenti quaestione.

⁵⁹ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, VII, 6, 12: CCL 50, 267, 175–176.

⁶⁰ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, VII, 6, 12: CCL 50, 267, 176–179.

⁶¹ Ioh. 3, 13.

⁶² Gregorius Magnus, *Homiliae in Hiezechielem prophetam*, II, 4, 12: CCL 142, 267, 340–341.

⁶³ II Cor. 3, 18.

⁶⁴ I Cor. 13, 12.

<Quaestio 2>

Secundo quaeritur, utrum habitus istius scientiae differat ab habitu fidei

ET VIDETUR quod sic, quia distinctus est habitus principiorum et conclusionum, ut patet per Philosophum VI *Ethicorum*. Sed fides est habitus principiorum et articulorum fidei, scientia autem nominat habitum conclusionum. Ergo videtur, quod habitus istius scientiae realiter distinguatur ab habitu fidei.

<2.> Praeterea. Quando aliqua duo sunt unum realiter, ubicumque reperitur unum, invenitur reliquum. Si ergo habitus <fidei> et habitus istius scientiae sunt idem realiter, quicumque haberet unum, haberet reliquum. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, XIV *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, ubi ait, quod “multi pollent ipsa fide, qui non pollent ista scientia”⁶⁵.

<3.> Praeterea. Quaecumque numerantur adinvicem, oportet esse distincta. Sed scientia ponit in numerum cum ipsa fide, ut patet per Apostolum I *ad Corinthios*, XII⁶⁶, ubi tam fides quam scientia numerantur inter dona gratis data.

IN CONTRARIUM est, quia si habitus istius scientiae esset alius ab habitu fidei, cum uterque l8val esset infusus, oporteret ponere duplex lumen infusum, quod reprobatur in superiori quaestione.

<2.> Praeterea. Habitus distinguuntur per actus. Sed unus est actus fidei et istius doctrinae de articulis fidei, quia credere. Ergo erit habitus unus utriusque.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod ad dissolutionem istius quaestionis oportet primo videre, quomodo ista tria, intellectus, scientia et sapientia, differunt, ut sunt habitus intellectuales et ut sunt dona gratum facientia et ut sunt dona gratis data. Secundo adducemus aliquas rationes ostendentes habitum istius scientiae, ut est de his, quae naturalem

809 gratis data] *corr. ex datis grata.*

⁶⁵ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3: CCL 50, 424, 61–63.

⁶⁶ I Cor. 12, 8–9.

rationem excedunt, non distingui ab habitu fidei. Tertio solvemus illa, quae videntur difficultatem facere in proposito.

<I>

Propter primum sciendum, quod secundum Philosophum, VI *Ethicorum*⁶⁷, quinque sunt habitus intellectuales, scilicet intellectus, scientia, sapientia, prudentia et ars, nam intellectus noster speculativus est et practicus. Speculatio ergo intellectus habet perfici triplici habitu.

Primo habitu principiorum et talis habitus vel notitia vocatur intellectus. Nam quandocumque potentia fertur in aliquid non discurrendo nec praeeligendo, talis cognitio vocatur eodem nomine, quo nominatur potentia. Unde quia voluntas non praeeligendo fertur in finem et intellectus non discurrendo fertur in principia, ideo sicut volitio finis vocatur voluntas, sic notitia principiorum vocatur intellectus.

Secundo potest perfici habitu conclusionum istarum rerum inferiorum. Et talis habitus vocatur scientia. Nam de istis rebus inferioribus, quae possunt demonstrari ex primis principiis, proprie est scientia. Ideo in eodem VI *Ethicorum* dicitur, quod scientia est habitus demonstrationis⁶⁸.

Tertio potest perfici habitu cognitionis superiorum causarum et talis habitus vocatur sapientia. Ideo in praedicto libro scribitur, quod sapientia est sicut caput habens respectu scientiae⁶⁹.

Intellectus autem practicus potest de istis agibilibus ratiocinari ratione et non ratione, ideo indiget habitu perficiente ipsum. Et talis habitus vocatur prudentia. Unde in praedicto libro prudentia dicitur recta ratio agibile⁷⁰.

Secundo praedictus intellectus exit in opus et per voluntatem exequentem operatur circa ipsa factibilia domificando. Et habitus dirigens ipsum ad hoc dicitur ars. Unde ibidem dicitur, quod ars est recta ratio factibilium⁷¹.

⁶⁷ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, 3, 1139b 15–17: AL XXVI, 1-3, 4, 480, 11–13; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 240 (108).

⁶⁸ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, 3, 1139b 32: AL XXVI, 1-3, 4, 480, 25–26.

⁶⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, 7, 1141a 20: AL XXVI, 1-3, 4, 484, 5; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 240 (113).

⁷⁰ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, 5, 1140b 20–21: AL XXVI, 1-3, 4, 482, 23–25; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 240 (112).

⁷¹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, 4, 1140a 21–22: AL XXVI, 1-3, 4, 481, 19–20; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 240 (111).

850 Differunt ergo intellectus, scientia et sapientia, ut sunt habitus intellectuales, quia intellectus est habitus principiorum, scientia vero est habitus conclusionum rerum inferiorum, sed sapientia est habitus cognitionis rerum superiorum.

855 Secundo differunt, ut sunt dona Spiritus Sancti gratum facientia, nam per talia dona anima coniungitur ipsi Deo. Talis autem coniunctio habet fieri tripliciter: primo ipsa credibilia nuda et aperta veritate fidei sine aliqua dubitatione contemplando, secundo ex praedicta veritate sic infallibiliter credita et contemplata alia inferiora iudicando et ordinando l8vbl, tertio per quandam certitudinem de istis inferioribus et
860 humanis actibus super humanum modum rectum iudicium proferendo, ut non solum bona pro bonis, quod est secundum humanum modum, sed etiam bona pro malis reddendo. Primum habet fieri per donum intellectus, quia secundum Gregorium⁷² donum intellectus de auditis per fidem et de istis credibilibus mentem illustrat. Secundum habet
865 fieri per donum sapientiae, quia sicut sapientis est ordinare et iudicare⁷³, sic homo spiritualis per hoc donum omnia iudicat. Sed tertium habet fieri per donum scientiae, quia per tale donum super humanum modum docetur homo conversari "in medio pravae nationis et perver-sae"⁷⁴.

870 Tertio differunt ista, ut sunt dona Spiritus Sancti gratis dantis, nam talia dona Deus non infundit omnibus etiam sanctis et perfectis viris, sed illis solum, quos novit esse proficuos ecclesiae et illorum saluti prodesse, non quod etiam sanctis viris aliquando huiusmodi
875 dona non tribuantur, sed pro tanto dicuntur praedicta dona gratis data, quia Deus ipsa gratis tribuit non solum bonis, sed quandoque malis, propter suae ecclesiae et aliorum fidelium utilitatem.

Ista autem utilitas potest esse triplex. Primo propter aliquam superexcellentem fidei adhaesionem, secundo propter aliquam superexcellentem cognitionem, ut non solum sciat firmiter aliquis, quid
880 credere debeat per firmam adhaesionem, sed etiam sciat ipsam fidem defendere et alios ad credendum inducere ac alios imbecilliores docere; et hoc dupliciter, quia aut per cognitionem rerum divinarum,

⁷² Cf. Gregorius Magnus, *Moralia in Iob*, I, 32: CCL 143, 48, 123–124.

⁷³ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 982a 17–19; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 116 (13).

⁷⁴ Phil. 2, 15.

aut per cognitionem rerum humanarum. Primum habet fieri per donum fidei, secundum per donum sapientiae, sed tertium per donum scientiae. Unde Apostolus, *I ad Corinthios*, XII, dicit, quod “alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, alii fides in eodem Spiritu”⁷⁵. Et quia ista dona non dantur omnibus, ideo subditur ibi, quod “haec omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus dividens singulis, prout vult”⁷⁶.

890 <II>

Viso ergo, quomodo differunt ista, ut sunt habitus intellectuales et ut sunt dona gratis data, volumus aliquas rationes adducere ostendentes habitum istius scientiae, ut est de ipsis credibilibus simpliciter, non distingui ab habitu fidei. Possumus autem dicere, quod quattuor inconvenientia sequerentur, si habitus istius scientiae distingueretur ab habitu fidei: nam primo sequeretur, quod meritum fidei perderetur, secundo, quod cognitio aenigmatica in hac vita consummaretur, tertio, quod nobilissimus habitus nobis occultaretur, quarto, quod idem sciretur et crederetur.

900 Primum sic patet. Nam sicut secundum beatum Gregorium “fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum”⁷⁷, sic si nobis aliquis habitus esset infusus istius scientiae alius ab habitu fidei, oporteret, quod duceret nos in cognitionem ipsorum credibilium certam et *propter quid*, cum in cognitionem *99al quia* ducamus per habitum fidei. Et sic meritum fidei perderetur.

910 Secundum sic ostenditur. Nam si in hac vita cognosceremus Deum per aliud lumen et per alium habitum distinctum ab habitu fidei, oporteret cognitionem aenigmaticam in hac vita consummari et terminari, quod est contra Augustinum, IX *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, ubi dicit, quod “certa fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem, sed cognitio

902 esset] corr. ex habet.

⁷⁵ I Cor. 12, 8–9.

⁷⁶ I Cor. 12, 11.

⁷⁷ Gregorius Magnus, *Homiliarum XL in euangelia libri duo*, II, 26, 1: CCL 141, 218, 5–6.

certa non perficietur nisi post hanc vitam, cum videbimus Deum
«facie ad faciem»^{78,79}.

Tertium sic declaratur. Nam si nobis esset talis habitus infusus,
occultaretur in nobis, cum nullus recta mente possit dicere se habere
915 aliam cognitionem de credibilibus praeter cognitionem aenigmaticam,
quae est cognitio fidei. Sed inconueniens est nobilissimos habitus exis-
tere in nobis et latere nos, ut dicitur II *Posteriorum*⁸⁰. Ergo in nobis
non est alius habitus nec aliud lumen praeter habitum fidei.

Quartum sic patet. Nam cum per habitum fidei articuli fidei sint
920 simpliciter crediti, oporteret, quod per istum habitum, qui ponitur dis-
tingui ab habitu fidei, tamquam per nobiliorem et clariorem praedicti
articuli essent simpliciter sciti. Idem ergo esset creditum et scitum,
quod est impossibile.

<III>

925 Restat ergo ultimo solvere illa, quae videntur facere difficultatem in
proposito. Et sunt illa, quae tacta fuerunt in arguendo.

PRIMUM ergo sic solvitur. Nam licet in cognitione humana differat
habitus conclusionum et habitus principiorum, hoc pro tanto est, quia
habitus principiorum est quasi naturalis, non quod anima oriatur natu-
930 raliter cum tali habitu, sed quia ex naturali lumine intellectus fertur in
cognitionem talium sine aliquo discursu, habitus vero conclusionum
est acquisitus per rationem et discursum syllogisticum. Ideo oportet
istum ab illo differre. Sed cognitio articulorum fidei et eorum, quae
sunt simpliciter credibilia, nec est nobis naturalis ex lumine nostri
935 intellectus, nec potest per nostram rationem investigari. Ideo de tali-
bus, sive supponantur ut principia, sive unum concludatur ex alio, non
est nisi unum lumen et unus habitus supernaturaliter infusus, qui est
lumen fidei. Verum quia in hac doctrina proponuntur nobis multa cre-
dibilia, quae tamen humana ratione investigari possunt, sicut Deum

920 crediti] *corr. ex credenti* . 938 Verum] *corr. ex Utrum*.

⁷⁸ I Cor. 13, 12.

⁷⁹ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, IX, 1, 1: CCL 50, 292, 24 – 293, 26.

⁸⁰ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, II, 19, 99b 15–16: AL IV, 1-4, 104, 16.

940 esse unum et esse actum purum vel primum motorem et potentiae
 infinitae, quae de Deo probaverunt etiam ipsi philosophi naturali
 945 ratione, ideo de talibus bene acquiritur habitus distinctus ab habitu
 fidei. Sed nos quaerimus, utrum habitus istius scientiae differat ab
 habitu fidei quantum ad illa, quae sunt simpliciter credibilia et quae

humana ratione investigari non possunt.
 SECUNDUM autem sic solvitur. Nam quantum ad illa, quae continentur
 in ista scientia, quae non excedunt nostrum intellectum, multi pollent
 ipsa fide, qui non pollent hac scientia. Similiter quantum ad illa, quae
 sunt simpliciter credibilia, 99b1 multi pollent ipsa cognitione fidei, ut
 950 simpliciter sciunt, quid credere debeant, qui non pollent cognitione et
 scientia praedicta, ut per eam contra impios fides defenditur et alii
 instruuntur. In utrisque tamen est unus habitus fidei non numero, sed
 specie, quamvis clariori modo et cum aliquo effectu sit in maioribus
 quam in minoribus.

955 Ex hoc autem patet solutio AD TERTIUM, quia ideo scientia ponit in
 numerum cum fide, quia cognitio fidei evidentior et cum aliquo dono
 gratis dato vel gratum faciente potest in uno quam in alio reperiri.

<Quaestio 3>

Tertio quaeritur utrum solus Deus hanc scientiam doceat

960 ET VIDETUR quod non, quia Deus non habet proportionem ad nos, cum
 ipse sit invisibilis et naturae intellectualis et careat omni phantasmate.
 Sed proportionem oportet esse inter magistrum et discipulum. Cum
 igitur nos recipiamus scientiam mediantibus sensibus et ipse Deus
 careat sensu, videtur, quod nos docere non possit.

965 <2.> Praeterea, nihil est in intellectu, quin prius non fuerit in sensu.
 Sed ipsa divina, de quibus principaliter est ista scientia, numquam
 fuerunt in sensu. Ergo numquam possunt esse in intellectu. Non ergo
 Deus hanc scientiam poterit nos docere.

IN CONTRARIUM, quia habitus istius scientiae est nobis a Deo infusus.
 970 Sed ab illo homo docetur, a quo habitum scientiae recipit. Cum igitur
 talem habitum unusquisque fidelis recipiat a Deo, videtur, quod solum
 ab ipso haec scientia doceatur.

<2.> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in fine libri *De disciplina christiana*, quod "cathedram habet in caelis, cuius schola est in terra"⁸¹.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod aliqui⁸² dicunt duo esse requirenda ad hoc, quod in aliquo doctrina causetur. Primum est lumen, secundum est ordinatio specierum. Nam sicut ad hoc, quod visio causetur in oculo, requiritur primo lumen, quia sine lumine non sit visio, cum color non moveat visum nisi per actum lucidi, ut dicitur in II *De anima*⁸³, secundo requiritur ordo specierum, quia oportet res visibiles diametraliter se offerre oculo, ut fiat visio; nam cum species rei visibilis per totum aerem se multiplicent, si quaelibet multiplicatio sufficeret ad visionem causandam, ita videret homo post se sicut ante se. Sic, ut dicunt, ad hoc, quod sciamus, requiritur primo lumen intellectus possibilis, qui est omnia fieri, et lumen intellectus agentis, qui est omnia facere⁸⁴, secundo requiritur ordinatio specierum, quia sicut eadem litterae uno modo ordinatae faciunt syllabas, quae aliter ordinatae nihil constituunt, ita eadem verba uno ordine prolata aggenerant scientiam, quae aliter prolata nihil faciunt scire.

Dupliciter ergo, ut dicunt, aliquis potest alium docere: vel quantum ad lumen, vel quantum ad ordinem specierum. Quantum ad lumen dupliciter: vel lumen de novo creando, et sic docet solus Deus, vel lumen creatum confortando, et sic potest docere angelus, quia lumen intellectus nostri ad praesentiam luminis substantiae separatae magis roboratur; vel lumen specierum ordinando, et sic potest docere homo, inquantum aliqua ordinate dicit vel scribit, propter quae audiens vel intelligens movetur ad scientiam capiendam.

Sed hoc non videtur esse sufficienter dictum, maxime de illo, quod dictum est de praesentia luminis substantiae separatae ad lumen intellectus nostri. Nam si ex praesentia luminis substantiae separatae lumen nostri intellectus confortaretur, aut hoc esset, quia ipse angelus

⁸¹ Augustinus Hipponensis, *Sermo de disciplina christiana*, 14, 15: CCL 46, 223, 382–383.

⁸² Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., pars 3, qu. un., corp: fol. 7K–M.

⁸³ Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, II, 7, 419a 7–10.

⁸⁴ Cf. Aristoteles, *De anima*, III, 5, 430a 18–20; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 186 (149).

mentem nostram illaberetur, aut quia per suum lumen nostro lumini uniretur, aut quia novum lumen per eius praesentiam nostro intellectui infunderetur, vel quia per eius praesentiam novum lumen de potentia nostri intellectus educeretur.

Primo modo esse non potest, quia nulla substantia creata potest illabi essentiam alterius. Nec potest esse secundo modo, quia cum lumen angeli sit maius lumine intellectus nostri, ex praesentia eius nostrum lumen non fortificaretur, sed magis corrumperetur, sicut ex praesentia maioris luminis corrumpitur lumen minus. Nec potest esse tertio modo, quia si angelus posset aliquod lumen novum nobis infundere, posset creare, quod nulli creaturae convenit. Nec istud potest esse quarto modo, ut quod educatur de potentia nostri intellectus, quia nihil educitur de aliquo, nisi praeexistat ibi. Oporteret igitur in nobis praeexistere aliquod lumen nobis occultum, quod ad praesentiam agentis fieret in manifesto, et sic nostrum discere esset reminisci, ut Plato dicebat⁸⁵. Cum igitur ista omnia sint inconvenientia, inconveniens est ponere ad praesentiam luminis substantiae separatae nostrum lumen confortari et per hoc in nobis aliquam scientiam creari. Unde illimet, qui istud posuerunt, videntes hoc esse impossibile in alio loco⁸⁶ retractaverunt et reprobaverunt illos, qui hunc modum loquendi habuerunt.

Dicamus ergo alia via incedendo unum posse alium docere quinque modis: primo, lumen creando et sibi praedictum lumen infundendo, secundo, lumen eius determinando et uniendo, tertio, speciem intelligibilem imprimendo, quarto, propositionem et sermonem ex illa impressione formando, quinto illas propositiones et sermones formatos aliis exprimendo et exponendo.

1027 quinto] *corr. ex quinta.*

⁸⁵ Augustinus videtur sumere notitiam de doctrina Platonis ex operibus Patrum, e.g. Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, VII, 22, 19: CSEL 19, 655, 16–17; Hieronymus Strydonensis, *Adversus libros Rufini*, III, 40, 1: CCL 79, 110, 7–9; Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XII, 15, 24: CCL 50, 377, 1–4. Cf. etiam Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, qu. 18, art. 7: EL 22.2 556, 87–95.

⁸⁶ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibet VI*, qu. 16, corp.: Lovanii 1646, p. 407a–408a.

1030 Primo modo possumus dicere, quod hanc doctrinam docet solus
Deus, quia cum ista scientia innitatur immediate lumini fidei, sicut
lumen nobis est a Deo infusum et creatum, sic oportet praedictam
doctrinam tali lumini innitentem solum a Deo nobis esse inspiratam.
Ideo *II Petri*, 1 capitulo, dicitur, quod "Spiritu sancto inspirati locuti
sunt Dei homines"⁸⁷, et per prophetam scribitur, quod ipse Deus est,
1035 "qui docet hominem scientiam"⁸⁸.

Secundo modo docet ipse angelus. Nam cum scire sit causam
rei cognoscere secundum doctrinam Philosophi⁸⁹, ille proprie dicitur
alium docere, qui facit eum causam alicuius cognoscere. Immo non
solum in scientia acquisita, verum etiam in scientia inventa hoc habet
1040 19vbl veritatem, quia, sive sit inveniens per se ipsum, sive addiscens
ab alio, ille proprie dicitur "scire, qui causam rei cognoscit"⁹⁰. Verum
quia inveniens per se ipsum scientiam, antequam causam inveniatur,
intellectus eius est dispersus et divisus, quia fertur in diversa, addis-
cens vero habet intellectum unitum, eo quod simul proponitur sibi
1045 effectus cum causa. Ideo difficilior est invenire quam addiscere. Hoc
igitur modo angelus potest nostrum lumen confortare et angelus supe-
rior potest angelum inferiorem illuminare, quia angeli multa sciunt et
multa vident in divina essentia, quae nos ignoramus. Ex hoc igitur,
quod nobis illa revelant, nostrum lumen determinatur et unitur, ut sicut
1050 antequam sciamus, noster intellectus vacillat et fertur in diversa, sic
postquam scimus et causam rei cognoscimus, noster intellectus unitur
et determinatur. Sic etiam quia angelus superior plura videt et limpi-
dius et clarius cognoscit aliqua in lumine gloriae vel in divina essentia
quam angelus inferior, potest angelus superior illa, quae sic clare
1055 cognoscit, angelo inferiori revelare, ex qua revelatione incipit angelus
inferior cognoscere <illa, quae> prius non cognoscebat. Et eius lumen
unitur et determinatur, sicut prius erat sparsum et divisum. Et per
consequens lumen eius dicitur esse fortificatum, quia virtus unita

1029 dicere] *corr. ex docere* 1041 qui] *corr. ex quando*.

⁸⁷ II Petr. 1, 21.

⁸⁸ Ps. 93, 10.

⁸⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, II, 11, 94a 20: AL IV, 1-4, 330, 13.

⁹⁰ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 2, 71b 10-12: AL IV, 1-4, 286, 13-16; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 311 (8).

fortior est se ipsa dispersa. Per hunc ergo modum hanc doctrinam potest docere ipse angelus et ideo de multis, quae in hac sacra doctrina continentur, per revelationes angelorum edocti sumus.

Tertio modo hanc scientiam docuit ipse Christus inquantum homo. Nam sicut unus homo potest imprimere speciem intelligibilem in intellectu alterius, inducere imprimendo aliquid in sensu, ex qua impressione formatur idolum et similitudo in phantasia, et ex phantasmate illo virtute intellectus agentis gignitur species intelligibilis in intellectu possibili, sic ipse Christus secundum quod homo per suam incarnationem impressit sensibus suorum discipulorum et aliorum credentium mysterium suae incarnationis, passionis, resurrectionis et ascensionis et aliquo modo mysterium divinitatis per diversorum miraculorum operationes, ex quorum impressione receperunt species intelligibiles in intellectu, per quas doceri poterant de omnibus, quae in hac doctrina continentur. Unde ipse Christus dicebat eis: “beati oculi, qui vident, quae vos videtis”⁹¹ et Augustinus in libro *De disciplina christiana*, quod magister, qui docet hanc scientiam, non est qualiscumque homo, sed “Christus, qui propter nos incarnatus est, pannis mortalitatis circumdatus, propter nos esurivit et sitivit, propter nos lassatus ad puteum sedit”⁹², per quae omnia ipse caput existens docuit sua membra.

Quarto modo hanc scientiam docuerunt apostoli, qui ex speciebus intelligibilibus, quas habebant de his, quae per sensus audierunt et viderunt, de Christo debitas propositiones et debitos sermones formabant et praesentes docebant et propter futuros et absentes in Scripturis redigebant. Unde Iohannes in *I Canonica* sua dicit, quod “audivimus et vidimus oculis nostris et manus nostrae pertractaverunt de verbo vitae”⁹³, hoc supple: annuntiamus vobis.

Quinto modo docent istam scientiam doctores et praedicatores, qui nunc sunt, qui illa, quae conscripta sunt per prophetas et apostolos de mysterio Trinitatis et de Christo incarnato, aliis inferioribus expri-

1082 formabant] *corr. ex formaliter.*

⁹¹ Matth. 13, 16.

⁹² Augustinus Hipponensis, *Sermo de disciplina christiana*, 14, 15: CCL 46, 223, 384–389.

⁹³ I Ioh. 1, 1; Vulgata “temptaverunt” loco “pertractaverunt”.

1090 munt et exponunt. Unde Damascenus I libro et capitulo ait: "omnia,
 quae tradita sunt nobis per legem prophetas et apostolos et evangelis-
 tas suscipimus et veneramur et cognoscimus nihil ultra haec
 inquirentes"⁹⁴.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod licet Christus secundum quod Deus
 sit nobis impropotionalis, secundum tamen quod homo ad nos pro-
 portionem habuit, ideo ipse perfecte hanc scientiam docuit. Vel potest
 dici, quod Deus docet hanc scientiam principaliter lumen infundendo
 et per subiectam creaturam potest ipsam docere exterioribus sensibus
 se demonstrando.

AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod licet ipsa divina non sint in sensibus
 secundum se, sunt tamen in sensu per suos effectus, per quorum cogni-
 tionem manuducimur in cognitionem eorum etiam supernaturalem
 praesupposito tamen lumine fidei.

<Pars 3

De causa formali theologiae>

1105 Dubitato de causa agente est nunc dubitandum de causa formali istius
 scientiae. Forma autem est illa, quae dat esse, ideo de esse, sive de
 forma istius scientiae, potest esse triplex quaestio: prima, utrum haec
 doctrina possit dici proprie scientia, secundo, utrum sit scientia com-
 munis vel specialis, tertio, utrum differat a scientia beatorum.

<Quaestio 1>

Ad primum ergo sic proceditur.

VIDETUR enim, quod ista doctrina proprie dicatur scientia, quia omnis
 doctrina, quae procedit ex scitis, est scientia. Sed theologia est talis,

1090 prophetas] *corr. ex prophetis.*

⁹⁴ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 1, 2: *De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E. BUYTAERT (Franciscan Institute Publications. Text Series 8), St. Bonaventure, New York 1955, 12, 27–30.

ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia illa, quae traduntur in hac doctrina, aut
 1115 sunt scita, aut ignorata. Si non sunt ignorata, ergo sunt scita. Quod
 autem non sunt ignorata, probatur per Augustinum *Super Iohannem*,
 ubi dicit: "conari debemus, ut sciamus verba Dei. Quare enim dicta
 sunt, nisi ut audiantur, quare audita sunt, nisi ut intelligantur?"⁹⁵.
 <2.> Praeterea. Omnis cognitio, quae reducit conclusiones in princi-
 1120 pia, per se non est scientia. Sed sacra Scriptura reducit omnes conclu-
 siones in articulos fidei, qui sunt per se noti lumine divino multo
 verius quam principia prima lumine intellectus agentis, ergo etc.

IN CONTRARIUM est, quia scientia est syllogismus *apodicticon*, id est
 1070 faciens scire [10rbl, ut scribitur I *Posteriorum*⁹⁶. Sed haec doctrina non
 1125 facit scire, sed credere. Ergo videtur, quod non sit proprie scientia.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod ad declarationem istius quaestionis sunt
 tria per ordinem dicenda, quia primo ponendae sunt opiniones illorum,
 qui diversimode de hac materia loquuntur, secundo assignandus est
 modus, qui magis rationabilis videtur, quomodo haec doctrina possit
 1130 dici scientia et quomodo non, tertio erit ostendendum, quomodo tri-
 partiti sunt possessores istius doctrinae, quia aliqui habent fidem sine
 hac scientia, aliqui vero habent scientiam sine fide, aliqui autem
 habent utrumque simul.

<I>

1135 Propter primum sciendum, quod aliqui dicunt hanc doctrinam proprie
 esse scientiam, ex quorum dictis potest accipi triplex ratio ad hoc pro-
 bandum, quarum una sumitur ex parte principiorum scientiae, secunda
 ex parte subiecti, tertia ex parte luminis, cui haec doctrina innititur.

Prima ratio⁹⁷ sic patet. Nam omnis scientia procedit ex principiis

1123 *apodicticon*] corr. ex *apoditicon*.

⁹⁵ Augustinus Hipponensis, *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*, XXI, 12: CCL 36, 219, 36–40.

⁹⁶ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 14, 79a 19: AL IV, 1–4, 32, 19.

⁹⁷ Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum*, prolog., art. 3, qu. 2: A. OLIVA, Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la *sacra doctrina*. Avec l'édition du Prologue de son commentaire des *Sentences*,

1140 per se notis. Sed ista doctrina procedit ex per se notis, ergo est scien-
 tia. Maior est manifesta, sed minor probatur. Nam principia sunt in
 duplici genere, quia quaedam sunt nota in scientia illa, in qua sumun-
 tur, quaedam vero sunt nota in scientia superiori, sicut videmus in
 1145 scientia subalternata et subalternante. Nam principia, quae assumuntur
 in scientia subalternante, sunt per se nota in eadem scientia. Sed prin-
 cipia, quae accipiuntur in scientia subalternata, non sunt per se nota ibi,
 sed tantum sunt credita, quia manifesta sunt in superiori scientia. Unde
 Philosophus I *Posteriorum* dicit, quod “necesse est credere principiis
 aut omnibus, aut quibusdam”⁹⁸. Et ibidem ait, quod principia scimus
 1150 et credimus, ut scire referatur ad notitiam principiorum per se notorum
 in eadem scientia, sicut credere referatur ad notitiam principiorum per
 se notorum in scientia superiori. Cum igitur articuli fidei, qui sunt
 principia istius scientiae, sint per se noti in scientia Dei et beatorum,
 sufficit praedicta principia credere ad hoc, quod cognitio istius doctri-
 1155 nae sit scientia proprie dicta.

Secunda ratio⁹⁹ sic ostenditur. Nam omnis cognitio, quae est
 alicuius primi subiecti et eorum, quae per se illi insunt et quae sibi
 attribuuntur et ex principiis et suppositionibus illius probat debitas
 conclusiones, videtur esse scientia. Sed talis est cognitio istius doctri-
 1160 nae, <quia> demonstrative probantur aliqua, quae in hac doctrina
 continentur.

Tertia ratio¹⁰⁰ sic patet. Nam haec cognitio innititur lumini fidei
 et quia hoc lumen est commune omnibus fidelibus, ideo oportet dare
 aliud lumen clarius, in quo clarius cognoscantur illa, quae in hac doc-
 1165 trina dicuntur, quam in lumine fidei. Formetur igitur sic ratio: illa
 cognitio proprie potest dici scientia, quae innititur lumini clariori

1151 sicut] *corr. ex sic.*

Paris 2006, 323, 72 – 324, 90; *Summa theologiae*, I Pars, qu. 1, art. 2: Taurini – Roma 1974, 3b.

⁹⁸ Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 2, 72a 27–28: AL IV, 1-4, 287, 24–25.

⁹⁹ Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, *Quodlibet XIII*, qu. 1: J. LECLERCQ, La théologie comme science d’après la littérature quodlibétique, in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 11 (1939) 351–374, 354–357.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet XII*, qu. 2, sol.: ed. DECORTE, 14, 20 – 15, 30.

lumine fidei, quod est obscurum et aenigmaticum. 110val Sed talis est cognitio istius doctrinae, ergo etc.

1170 Omnes autem istae rationes non concludunt hanc doctrinam esse scientiam proprie, sed magis probant oppositum. Dicemus enim quantum ad primam rationem verum esse, quod quaedam est scientia praesupponens principia per se nota in eadem scientia, quaedam autem praesupponit principia in scientia superiori. Quaelibet tamen istarum habet certitudinem speculationis. Nam scientia subalternans liquide 1175 speculatur sua principia, sicut 'totum esse maius sua parte' et cetera talia, quae ad sensum sunt manifesta. Similiter scientia subalternata praesupponit talia principia, quae sunt per se nota in scientia inventa ab homine. Et quia ab homine non invenitur scientia nisi via memoriae, sensus et experientiae, ideo semper praesupponuntur principia in 1180 utraque scientia esse nota sensui. Propter quod utraque cognitio potest proprie scientia appellari. Sed principia istius doctrinae nec sunt nota in hac doctrina, nec in aliqua doctrina ab homine inventa. Ideo non erit proprie scientia quantum ad cognitionem viatorum, sed quantum ad cognitionem comprehensorum.

1185 Similiter alia ratio non concludit, quia non potest esse maior certitudo in conclusionibus quam in principiis. Et quia principia istius scientiae non sunt per se nota in cognitione viatorum, ut dictum est, ideo nec conclusiones, quae ex talibus principiis concluduntur, cognitionem scientificam, quae proprie scientia appelletur, habere non poterunt. 1190

Ratio tertia de lumine reprobata fuit in superiori quaestione¹⁰¹.

Dicunt ergo alii hanc doctrinam non esse proprie scientiam, sed sapientiam, quod nituntur tripliciter probare.

1195 Primo¹⁰² prout scientia differt a sapientia. Nam Augustinus XIV *De Trinitate* dicit, quod "cognitio rerum divinarum proprie sapientia nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat"¹⁰³. Cum igitur haec doctrina principaliter sit de rebus divinis, quia nec est de sensibilibus, nec de his, quae habent sensibilia partem sui, sicut

¹⁰¹ Supra, pars 2, qu. 1, corp., pars II, l. 632-700.

¹⁰² Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., pars 2, qu. 1, corp.: fol. 6N-O.

¹⁰³ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1 3: CCL 50, 423, 54 - 424, 56.

metaphysica, ideo si metaphysica proprie sapientia appellatur, multo
 1200 fortius haec doctrina debet sapientia nuncupari.

Secundo¹⁰⁴ hoc probant ex hoc, quod sapientia probat ipsa prin-
 cipia et habet contra negantem principia disputare. Scientia autem hoc
 facere non valet, quia si negantur principia in aliqua scientia, non
 potest artifex illius scientiae disputare contra negantem ipsa. Unde
 1205 Philosophus I *Physicorum*, disputans contra Parmenidem et Melissum,
 qui negabant motum, non potuit disputare contra eos per scientiam
 naturalem, sed induit habitum sapientis vel metaphysici¹⁰⁵. Cum igitur
 haec doctrina probet articulos fidei eo modo, quo possibile est, 110vbl
 et disputet contra negantes eos, debet ex hoc magis sapientia quam
 1210 scientia appellari.

Tertio istud ostendunt, prout scientia differt a fide, opinione et
 suspicione. Dicunt enim esse quattuor genera probationum, quia quae-
 dam sunt probationes demonstrativae, quaedam logicae, quaedam rhe-
 toricae et quaedam poeticae. Probationes autem demonstrativae agge-
 1215 nerant scientiam, ideo demonstratio dicitur syllogismus *apodicticon*,
 id est faciens scire¹⁰⁶. Logicae vero aggenerant opinionem, rhetoricae
 autem aggenerant fidem, quia in probationibus rhetoricis non est
 assensus per speculationem tantum, sed prout sibi cooperatur voluntas,
 eo quod tales probationes applicatae sunt ad mores et ad actus homi-
 1220 num appetitum moventes et circa quod contingit aliquid amare et
 odire. Propter quod de ipsis animae passionibus ad rhetorem spectat
 determinare. Poeticae vero aggenerant suspensionem, quia aliqui cre-
 dunt testimonio versificatorum vel poetarum ex hoc, quod metrum
 fecerunt, ideo suspicantur, quae ibi continentur, vera esse, cum constet
 1225 eos sine causa hoc non fecisse. Quia ergo his, quae in hac sacra doc-
 trina continentur, assentit intellectus per imperium voluntatis, quia
 secundum Augustinum si cetera quis potest nolens, credere autem non

1215 *apodicticon*] *corr. ex apoditicon* 1217 *aggenerant*] *corr. ex aggenerante*.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol. pars 1, qu. 2, sc 2: fol. 2R.

¹⁰⁵ Aristoteles, *Physica*, I, 2–3, 184b 20 – 187a 10: AL VII, 1.2, 8, 10 – 18, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Supra, eadem qu., arg. in contrarium, l. 1123–1125.

potest nisi volens¹⁰⁷, ideo cum assentiendis articulis fidei maxime cooperetur voluntas et sit ibi tantum certitudo adhaesionis et non speculationis, cognitio istius doctrinae magis debet dici fides quam scientia.

Sed istud dictum non videtur sufficere, quia sicut ista doctrina non proprie dicitur scientia, quia est de divinis magis quam de humanis et quia non habet certitudinem illam speculationis, quae ad scientiam humanam requiritur, ita potest dici, quod non proprie dicatur sapientia eo modo, quo metaphysica sapientia appellatur, quia non habet certitudinem illam de rebus divinis, quae ad sapientiam humanam requiritur. Immo cum scire omnia per certitudinem speculationis sit propria condicio sapientiae, ut patet ex I *Metaphysicae*¹⁰⁸, ex quo ista doctrina non habet de divinis nisi certitudinem adhaesionis, videtur, quod nec scientia, nec sapientia proprie possit appellari, sicut scita numquam sunt proprie credita. Et si debet nominari aliquo istorum, magis deberet nominari scientia quam sapientia, eo quod de rebus humanis, de quibus est scientia, potest haberi certitudo speculationis, sed de rebus divinis saltem eo modo, quo tractantur in hac doctrina, non nisi certitudo adhaesionis habetur.

Ideo alii dicunt hanc doctrinam quantum ad illa, quae sola fide creduntur, non esse proprie intellectual scientiam, sed quantum ad illa, quae creduntur, humana tamen ratione investigabilia sunt, proprie scientiam esse. Dicunt enim, quod studentes in hac doctrina praeter habitum fidei, quo credunt articulos fidei, ad illa, quae excedunt nostrum intellectum, acquirunt sibi habitum scientificum. Unde quantum ad ista, quae continentur in ista doctrina, quae per nostram rationem investigari possunt, debet huiusmodi doctrina proprie scientia appellari.

Sed nec istud videtur bene dictum, quia cum “habitus distinguantur per actus et actus per obiecta”¹⁰⁹, eo ipso quod obiectum istius scientiae est unum formaliter, quantumcumque alius sit habitus nobis infusus quantum ad ipsa credibilia et alius sit habitus acquisitus quantum ad illa, quae per naturam possunt investigari, tamen quia omnia

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*, XXVI, 2: CCL 36, 260, 12–14.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 982a 20 – b 10: AL XXV, 3.2, 15, 100 – 16, 121.

¹⁰⁹ *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 179 (56).

ista considerantur sub una ratione formali obiecti, ut inquantum sunt
 1260 nobis divinitus inspirata, ideo non poterit dici scientia proprie propter
 habitum acquisitum et improprie propter habitum infusum nisi forte
 materialiter, aut quia alia sunt scita et alia credita. Tamen quia una
 1265 ratio formalis est, quia omnia considerantur, ut sunt divinitus revelata,
 ut dictum est, ideo formaliter loquendo debet dici, vel quod sit scien-
 tia proprie, vel improprie.

<II>

Viso ergo, quomodo diversimode diversi loquuntur de hac materia,
 volumus illum modum ponere, qui magis nobis rationabilis videtur.
 Sciendum est ergo, <quod> hanc doctrinam possumus tripliciter consi-
 1270 derare: primo, quantum ad ipsas res consideratas, secundo, quantum
 ad modum considerandi, tertio, quantum ad docentem sive inspirantem
 ipsam. Res autem, quae in hac doctrina considerantur, sunt in duplici
 genere, quia quaedam sunt divinae et quaedam sunt humanae. Cogni-
 1275 tio ergo istius doctrinae quantum ad res consideratas in ipsa proprie
 potest dici sapientia et proprie potest dici scientia, quia cognitio rerum
 divinarum proprie vocatur sapientia, humanarum vero proprie vocatur
 scientia secundum Augustinum XIV *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1¹¹⁰.

Quantum vero ad modum considerandi haec doctrina non pro-
 prie dicitur sapientia nec proprie dicitur scientia eo modo, quo cogni-
 1280 tio humana scientia et sapientia appellatur, sed nobiliori et excellen-
 tiori modo dicitur sapientia et certiori modo dicitur scientia. Nam
 cognitio humana, sive sit de divinis, sive de humanis, semper innititur
 lumini rationis. Si ergo huic lumini addatur lumen divinum, cui inni-
 1285 tatur cognitio tam de rebus divinis quam de humanis, talis cognitio erit
 altior et certior cognitione naturali. Nam cum lumen fidei non tollat
 lumen naturale, sed perficiat ipsum, sicut gratia non tollit naturam, sed
 perficit¹¹¹, oportet, quod ratio naturalis et lumen naturale subserviat

1264 sit] corr. ex scit.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1 3: CCL 50, 423, 54 – 424, 56.

¹¹¹ Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 9, qu. 1, art. 8, arg. 3: ed. P. MANDONNET, Paris 1929, 248; *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, qu. 2, art. 11, corp.: EL 23, 60, 211–213; *Summa theologiae*, I Pars, qu. 62, art. 5, corp.

lumini fidei. Ideo *II ad Corinthios*, X, scribitur: “in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium [11rbl] Christi”¹¹². Cognitio
 1290 ergo rerum divinarum, quae innitur lumini fidei, non dicitur sapientia, sicut metaphysica, quae est cognitio divinorum acquisita per lumen rationis, sed dicitur esse super hanc sapientiam. Et cognitio rerum humanarum, quae innitur eidem lumini fidei, non dicitur scientia sicut cognitio inventa per lumen naturale, sed dicitur super hanc scientiam,
 1295 ut sicut secundum Damascenum Deus non dicitur proprie “sciens, sed supersciens; nec sapiens, sed supersapiens”¹¹³, sic cognitio istius doctrinae, quae omnia considerat, tam res divinas quam humanas, non proprie dicitur scientia, sed superscientia, nec sapientia, sed supersapientia, loquendo de sapientia et scientia, ut dicunt cognitionem per naturalem rationem inventam.
 1300

Quantum autem ad inspirantem et docentem hanc doctrinam cognitio eius proprie debet dici sapientia et proprie scientia. Nam docens hanc doctrinam principaliter est ipse Christus, qui in quantum Deus docet nos de divinis perfectam sapientiam, in quantum vero homo
 1305 de humanis docet nos perfectam scientiam. Unde Augustinus XIII *De Trinitate*, capitulo 19, dicit, quod “scientia nostra Christus est, sapientia quoque nostra idem Christus est”¹¹⁴. Et subdit: “ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit, ipse de sempiternis exhibet veritatem. Omnes autem, qui sapientiam et scientiam tradere voluerunt sine
 1310 cognitione Christi, erraverunt”¹¹⁵. Unde Augustinus eodem libro et capitulo dicit, quod “illi praecipui gentium philosophi, qui invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicerere potuerunt, tamen quia sine mediatore, id est sine Christo homine, philosophati sunt, quem nec venturum prophetis, nec venisse apostolis crediderunt, sicut dictum est, «de illis veritatem detinuerunt iniquitate»”¹¹⁶¹¹⁷.
 1315

1296 supersciens] *corr. ex superficiens* **1308** temporalibus] *corr. ex temporaliter*.

¹¹² II Cor. 10, 5.

¹¹³ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* I, 8, 1: ed. E. M. BUYTAERT, 29, 20–21.

¹¹⁴ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIII, 19 3: CCL 50, 416, 50–51.

¹¹⁵ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIII, 19 3: CCL 50, 416, 51–52.

¹¹⁶ Rom. 1, 18.

¹¹⁷ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIII, 19 3: CCL 50, 416, 38–43.

<III>

Ostenso ergo, quomodo haec doctrina proprie et improprie possit dici scientia, restat declarare, quomodo tripartiti sunt possessores istius doctrinae. Nam possumus dicere, quod aliqui de his, quae continentur in hac doctrina, habent solum fidem, sicut communiter fideles, quibus proponuntur a maioribus omnia ut credibilia, aliqui autem habent certam scientiam et apertam visionem, sicut beati in patria existentes, qui "vident Deum, sicuti est"¹¹⁸, aliqui autem habent utrumque istorum simul, sicut praedicatores et doctores istius doctrinae, qui de simpliciter credibilibus habent fidem, sed de his, quae possunt per rationem investigari, habent scientiam et certam cognitionem.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod quamvis illa, quae continentur in hac doctrina, non sint ignorata, non sequitur tamen, quod sint scita cognitione demonstrativa, quae habet aggenerare scientiam proprie dictam, sed tantum sunt cognita per lumen fidei – maxime illa, quae nostram naturalem rationem excedunt.

AD SECUNDUM similiter est dicendum, quod haec doctrina non reducit conclusiones suas in principia per se nota lumine naturali, sed tantum lumine divino. Ideo cognitio ipsarum non debet dici proprie scientia sicut cognitio humanitus acquisita, sed modo altiori et nobiliori, ut supra dictum est¹¹⁹.

<Quaestio 2>

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ista scientia sit communis vel specialis

ET VIDETUR, quod sit communis, quia illa scientia est communis, cuius subiectum est commune. Sed subiectum istius scientiae est maxime commune. Ergo ipsa erit maxime communis. Maior de se patet. Minor probatur. Nam subiectum istius scientiae est ipse Deus. Sed Deus reperitur in omnibus entibus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Si ergo naturalis philosophia dicitur scientia communior medicina, quia corpus mobile, quod est subiectum in ipsa, in pluribus reperitur quam corpus sanum vel aegrum, quod est subiectum in medicina,

¹¹⁸ I Ioh. 3, 2.

¹¹⁹ Supra, eadem qu., corp., pars II, l. 1289-1296.

multo fortius haec doctrina debet dici omnibus communior, quia eius subiectum in omnibus reperitur.

1350 <2.> Praeterea. Scientia illa, quae considerat omnia, quae possunt sciri per hominem et quae non sunt ab homine scibilia, est communior illis, quae considerant solum illa, quae possunt per hominem investigari. Sed talis est haec doctrina, ergo etc.

1355 <3.> Praeterea. Quanto scientia est abstractior, tanto videtur, quod sit communior. Cum igitur haec doctrina sit de Deo, qui est abstractus ab omni materia sensibili et intelligibili, ergo videtur, quod ipsa sit maxime communis.

1360 IN CONTRARIUM est, quia plus est habere pro subiecto totum ens, quod comprehendit ens increatum et creatum, quam habere pro subiecto ens increatum solum. Sed metaphysica habet pro subiecto totum ens. Ista autem doctrina solum habet pro subiecto ipsum Deum. Ergo metaphysica erit communior ista.

1365 RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod aliqui¹²⁰ sic dicunt. Volunt enim, quod, cum scientia habeat communitatem et specialitatem a suo subiecto, oportet talem esse scientiam, quale est eius subiectum. Scientia igitur communis debet habere pro subiecto subiectum commune et scientia specialis debet habere pro subiecto subiectum speciale. Verum quia
1370 illud est per se tale et proprie, et per se facit medicus, quod facit in eo quod medicus secundum Philosophum I *Physicorum*¹²¹, ideo non sufficit scientiam habere subiectum commune, nisi habeat subiectum in eo quod commune, nec sufficit scientiam specialem habere subiectum speciale, nisi habeat subiectum in eo quod speciale. Et quia subiectum
1375 omnium scientiarum humanitus inventarum est aliquod commune et universale abstractum ab ipsis particularibus, cum particularium non possit esse scientia nec definitio, subiectum autem istius doctrinae nec proprie sit universale, nec particulare, cum sit ipse Deus, ideo, ut

1370 subiectum] *corr. ex eum* 1372 subiectum] *corr. ex eum*.

¹²⁰ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., pars 1, qu. 2, corp.: fol. 2L-Q.

¹²¹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica*, I, 8, 191a 34 – b10: AL VII, 1.2, 36, 7 – 37, 2.

dicunt, haec doctrina ex parte sui subiecti nec proprie universalis, nec particularis debet dici; scientiae 111vbl autem humanitus acquisitae, quia habent subiectum magis et minus universale secundum diversam
 1380 considerationem et abstractionem intellectus, potest esse una communior et specialior alia.

Sed istud quantum ad utrumque non videtur esse convenienter dictum. Nam non oportet scientia ad hoc, quod sit specialis, quod habeat subiectum speciale, nec oportet ad hoc, quod scientia sit communis, quod habeat subiectum commune, sed sufficit, quod modus
 1385 considerandi sit communis et specialis ad hoc, quod scientia communis vel specialis dicatur. Nam philosophia naturalis habet ipsum ens pro subiecto, tamen quia non considerat ens in eo quod ens, sed in eo quod mobile, ideo scientia specialis dicitur. Metaphysica etiam Deum
 1390 habet pro subiecto, quia si qua est scientia divinorum, ipsa est maxime scientiarum dea secundum Philosophum¹²²; tamen quia non considerat Deum in eo quod Deus, sed in eo quod ens, ideo dicitur scientia communis. Solus ergo diversus modus considerandi facit scientiam esse magis communem et minus communem. Similiter licet Deus secundum
 1395 se sit res quaedam simplicissima, tamen per comparisonem ad intellectum nostrum possumus ostendere ipsum sub ratione magis communi et minus communi, ut considerando ipsum sub ratione entitatis est communior se ipso considerato sub ratione deitatis vel sub aliqua alia ratione speciali. Nam universale et particulare, sive magis
 1400 commune et minus commune, sunt condiciones consequentes rem non secundum se, sed per comparisonem ad nostrum intellectum, quia intellectus est ille, qui facit universalitatem in rebus secundum Commentatorem I *De anima*¹²³. De Deo ergo, quantumcumque sit res specialissima secundum se, poterit esse scientia communis secundum
 1405 diversam considerationem nostri intellectus.

Dicamus igitur incedendo alia via, quod haec doctrina quantum ad rem principaliter in ipsa consideratam est omnibus scientiis specia-

1383 scientia] corr. ex scientiam **1407** consideratam] corr. ex consideram.

¹²² Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 983a 7–8: AL XXV, 1-1^a, 10, 11–12.

¹²³ Cf. Averroes, *In De anima*, I, 8: ed. CRAWFORD, 12, 25–26; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 176 (27).

lior. Quantum vero ad modum considerandi est omnibus scientiis specialior et communior. Quantum ad considerantes, sive scientes, ipsam
1410 est omnibus scientiis communior.

Primum autem patet. Nam in hac doctrina intenditur cognitio unius rei absolutae non unitate solum rationis, sed unitate reali, quia Deus, cuius cognitio hic principaliter intenditur, est unum aliquid realiter. Et si est universale, hoc est per causalitatem, non per abstractionem intellectus. Obiectum autem scientiarum humanitus inventarum
1415 est aliquod unum magis unitate rationis quam unitate reali. Et per consequens ista doctrina habens pro subiecto ipsum Deum est omni alia scientia humana specialior quantum ad rem principaliter in ipsa consideratam.

Secundum sic declaratur. 112^{ra} Nam modus considerandi istius scientiae talis est, ut omnia consideret, inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia. Non enim considerat ipsum Deum, ut est ens, secundum quem modum considerat metaphysica, sed considerat ipsum, ut est revelator et inspirator cognitionis sui ipsius, secundum quem modum ista doctrina est omni alia scientia humanitus acquisita communior, quia
1425 omnia illa, quae possunt sciri per scientias humanas, possunt divinitus revelari; et multa alia per divinam revelationem habentur, quae per nullam scientiam humanam investigari possunt. Est etiam quantum ad hunc modum omni alia scientia humana specialior, quia scire omnia
1430 per divinam revelationem nulli alteri scientiae convenit nisi isti. Propter quod distinguitur ab omnibus aliis scientiis humanitus inventis.

Tertium sic ostenditur. Nam scientes scientias humanas primo et per se per praedictas scientias non ducuntur nisi in cognitionem alicuius universalis, quod est per se obiectum ipsarum. Illa autem,
1435 quae sub dicto universali continentur, non cognoscuntur per huiusmodi scientias in speciali et in propria forma, nisi inquantum induunt rationem illius universalis. Sed scientes hanc doctrinam possunt omnia non solum in universali, verum etiam in speciali et in propria forma cognoscere, quia cum haec scientia sit immediate causata a divina sapientia, sicut divina sapientia est omnium rerum causativa et repraesentativa quantum ad esse universale et particulare ipsarum, sic
1440

scientes hanc doctrinam modum divinae sapientiae sequentem possunt omnia cognoscere non solum in universali, sed etiam in propria forma et in speciali. Per nullam igitur scientiam humanam possunt sciri tot
 1445 in propria forma, sicut per istam. Ideo solum illi, qui hanc scientiam sciunt, possunt de quolibet disputare et veritatem de omnibus rebus determinare, quia si unumquodque sicut se habet ad entitatem, sic se habet ad veritatem, ut patet ex Philosopho II *Metaphysicae*¹²⁴, quem-
 1450 admodum omnia sunt entia per entitatem primae causae, quae est Deus, sic omnia sunt vera eius veritate, et per consequens haec doctrina, quae immediate innititur primae veritati et ab ipsa est immediate revelata, habet omnem entitatem et omnem veritatem cognoscere. Et si contingat habentes istam scientiam omnem veritatem non cognoscere, hoc non est ex parte scientiae secundum se, sed magis ex parte
 1455 nostra, quia imperfecte possidemus eam.

Quantum igitur ad rem consideratam ista scientia est valde specialis, quantum vero ad modum considerandi est communis et est specialis, sed quantum ad scientes ipsam est magis communis quam aliqua alia, ut ex dictis est declaratum.

1460 AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod licet Deus in omnibus reperiatur per suam causalitatem, in se tamen existens est |12rbl una res simplicissima divisa ab omni alia. Et quia secundum talem modum consideratur in hac doctrina, ideo quantum ad hoc est specialior metaphysica vel alia scientia, quae considerat ipsum sub ratione causae vel sub ratione
 1465 entitatis.

AD SECUNDUM patet solutio, quia licet per modum divinae revelationis possint plura sciri quam per modum humanae investigationis, iste tamen modus est huic scientiae ita proprius, quod non convenit alteri. AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod, ut communiter ponitur, non est idem
 1470 esse magis commune et magis abstractum, quia secundum Philosophum VI *Metaphysicae*¹²⁵, si non esset aliqua alia substantia praeter substantias naturales et mobiles, tunc naturalis philosophia esset prima

1445 solum] iter. 1471 si] corr. ex sed.

¹²⁴ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, II, 1, 993b 30–1: AL XXV, 3.2, 44, 33.

¹²⁵ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, VI, 1, 1026a 28–30: AL XXV, 3.2, 127, 63–64.

scientia, hoc est, esset scientia magis communis, ut Commentator
 exponit¹²⁶, quia tunc metaphysica non esset. Tamen adhuc illa scientia,
 1475 quae consideraret praedictas substantias mobiles sub ratione entitatis,
 esset abstractior naturali philosophia considerante praedictas substan-
 tias sub ratione mobilitatis, non tamen esset magis communis et magis
 universalis, quia non de pluribus consideraret una quam alia. Non
 sequitur ergo, quod si haec scientia est magis abstracta, quod est magis
 1480 communis.

<Quaestio 3>

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ista scientia differat a scientia beatorum

ET VIDETUR quod non, quia habitus distinguuntur per obiecta. Cum
 igitur scientia sit quidam habitus, oportet, quod recipiat distinctionem
 1485 a suo subiecto vel obiecto. Sed obiectum in scientia ista et in scientia
 beatorum est unum et idem, quia ipse Deus. Ergo videtur, quod istae
 duae scientiae ad invicem non distinguantur.

<2.> Praeterea. Si haec doctrina differt ab illa, hoc est ratione luminis,
 quia illi cognoscunt in lumine claro, nos autem in lumine obscuro et
 1490 aenigmatico. Sed istud est falsum, quia si diversitas luminis sufficeret
 ad diversitatem essentialem scientiarum, oporteret unitas sufficeret ad
 unitatem. Cum igitur omnes scientiae humanae habeant unum lumen
 naturale, cui innituntur, tunc omnes scientiae humanae essent una
 scientia. Quod cum sit inconveniens, inconveniens est ponere scientias
 1495 habere diversitatem ex diversitate luminis, quemadmodum inconve-
 niens est eas habere unitatem ex unitate luminis.

IN CONTRARIUM est, quia scientiae distinguuntur secundum diversas
 rationes formales obiecti. Sed beati cognoscunt Deum sub lumine
 claro et manifesto, nos autem sub lumine obscuro et aenigmatico. Cum
 1500 igitur talis ratio diversa ex obiecto sumatur, quia sub alia ratione

1490 diversitas] *corr. ex adversitas* 1491 ad diversitatem] *corr. ex adversitatem*.

¹²⁶ Cf. Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, VI, com. 3: ed. Iunctina, t. VIII, fol. 146L–147A.

repraesentat se Deus eis quam nobis, videtur, quod istae cognitiones adinvicem distinguantur.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod ad intellectum <huius quaestionis tria sunt per ordinem dicenda: primo videbimus, quod docto>res in hac materia sibi ipsis contradicere videntur, secundo declarabimus, quod unitas luminis naturalis non sufficit nec ad unitatem, nec ad diversitatem scientiarum, tertio manifestabimus, quod unitas luminis supernaturalis sufficit ad unitatem scientiae et diversitas sufficit ad diversitatem scientiarum causandam.

<I>
Propter primum est sciendum, quod aliqui¹²⁷ dicunt hanc doctrinam posse tripliciter considerari: primo, quantum ad subiectum consideratum, secundo, quantum ad rationem, sub qua consideratur, tertio, quantum ad lumen, per quod consideratur. Tunc dicunt, quod in omnibus istis tribus haec doctrina differt a scientiis humanis inventis, quia differt in subiecto considerato, eo quod nulla scientia humana considerat Deum pro subiecto, sicut haec doctrina. Differt in ratione, sub qua consideratur, quia nulla scientia humana considerat Deum, ut videtur glorificator, sicut ista. Differt in lumine, quia scientiae humanae innituntur lumini rationis, haec autem innititur lumini divino.

A scientia vero Dei differt in duobus, videlicet in ratione considerandi, quia ipse cognoscit se sub ratione absoluta, nos autem cognoscimus eum sub ratione speciali, ut sub ratione glorificatoris vel beatificatoris, et in lumine per quod consideratur, quia ipse cognoscit se in lumine, quod est idem quod essentia sua, nos autem cognoscimus eum in lumine infuso, quod est quid creatum.

Sed a scientia beatorum differt solum in uno, quia ipsi cognoscunt Deum in lumine claro, nos autem in lumine obscuro et aenigmatico. In subiecto tamen considerato et in ratione considerandi haec scientia ab alia non differt secundum istos, sed solum in lumine, per quod consideratur.

1503-1504 <huius ... docto>] *suppl.*, cf. *initia responsionum partis 3, qu. 1, l. 1126-1127, et partis 4, qu. 2, l. 2074-2076.*

¹²⁷ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibet III*, qu. 2, corp.: p. 129a-130a.

Isti idem tamen, qui hoc dixerunt, in opere, quod super hunc librum fecerunt, videntur contrarium istius dixisse. Nam ibi¹²⁸ dixerunt scientiam habere actualitatem ex lumine intellectus agentis, quod quidem lumen praebebat quandam actualitatem omnibus scibilibus, cum virtute eius phantasmata depurentur et cognoscantur ab intellectu possibili. Et per consequens dat actualitatem omnibus scientiis. Aliam actualitatem dicunt habere scientiam ex objecto principali, quae sic differt ab illa, quia illa est communis et generalis, eo quod unum lumen intellectus agentis sufficit ad dandam actualitatem omnibus scientiis humanis. Sed actualitas obiecti est specialis, quia per hanc una scientia differt ab alia. Sicut ergo secundum istos ibidem unitas luminis naturalis non sufficit ad unitatem scientiae, sed idem lumen compatitur secum diversitatem specificam scientiarum humanarum, sic, ut ibi dicunt, unitas luminis supernaturalis non sufficit ad unitatem divinae scientiae, sed idem lumen supernaturale posset compati secum diversitatem specificam divinae scientiae; et per consequens diversitas praedicti luminis non sufficeret ad diversitatem scientiarum causandam. Quantumcumque igitur in alio lumine cognoscant ipsi beati et ideo in alio lumine cognoscamus nos ipsum Deum, non faciet diversitas praedicti luminis nostram scientiam distinctam esse a scientia ipsorum specifica differentia secundum istorum dicta.

<II>

Viso ergo, quomodo isti in hac materia sibi ipsis contradicere videntur, volumus declarare, quomodo unitas l2vbl luminis naturalis non sufficit ad unitatem vel diversitatem scientiarum humanarum. Propter quod sciendum, quod species, per quas nos cognoscimus, sunt causatae ab ipsis rebus. Et quia res extra animam existentes, cum sint materiales, non possunt immediate imprimere suas similitudines in ipsum intellectum, ideo oportet, quod depurentur per lumen intellectus agentis a condicionibus materialibus, ut sic recipiantur in intellectu, ut sunt repraesentativae rerum sub esse universali et non sub esse particulari. Et quanto huiusmodi similitudines a pluribus condicionibus particula-

¹²⁸ Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, pars 1, qu. 8, corp.: fol. 5P-Q.

1630 ribus sunt depuratae, tanto sunt rerum repraesentativae sub esse magis
 1565 universali. Et quia intellectus possibilis ducitur in cognitionem rerum
 per huiusmodi similitudines et species, secundum quod habent ipsas
 res repraesentare, ideo per similitudinem et speciem entis non poterit
 intellectus cognoscere in propria forma omnia illa, quae continentur
 1570 sub ente, nec per speciem corporis omnia poterit cognoscere, quae
 continentur sub corpore. Immo si volumus omnia talia in propria
 forma cognoscere, indigemus alia et alia specie, ut indigemus specie
 repraesentante rem sub ratione entitatis et alia specie repraesentante
 ipsam sub ratione corporeitatis, et alia specie repraesentante ipsam sub
 1575 ratione aegritudinis vel sanitatis. Et per hunc modum multiplicantur
 scientiae humanae et distinguuntur adinvicem secundum diversitatem
 istorum modorum intelligendi, quia ex primo modo intelligendi habemus
 cognitionem metaphysicalem, ex secundo vero habemus scientiam
 naturalem, ex tertio habemus scientiam medicinalem. Unitas ergo
 vel diversitas in scientiis humanis non accipitur ex unitate vel diver-
 1580 sitate luminis naturalis, sed ex diversitate vel unitate modi intellegendi
 ipsum obiectum, quia lumen nostri intellectus non est ita efficax, quod
 possit nobis omnia per unam speciem in propria forma repraesentare,
 sed per diversos modos intelligendi et per diversas similitudines. Ideo
 sicut multiplicantur modi intelligendi, sic multiplicantur cognitiones.
 1585 Sed si lumen intellectus agentis esset ita efficax, quod per unum
 modum intelligendi et per unam similitudinem distincte et in propria
 forma omnia nobis repraesentaret, tunc unitas talis luminis sufficeret
 ad unitatem scientiae et diversitas ad diversitatem.

<III>

1590 Ostenso ergo, quod unitas luminis naturalis non sufficit ad unitatem
 scientiae, volumus tertio manifestare, quod unitas vel diversitas lumi-
 nis supernaturalis sufficit ad scientiae unitatem vel diversitatem.

Sciendum est igitur, quod per lumen nobis supernaturaliter
 infusum possumus cognoscere omnia in propria forma, non solum sub
 1595 esse universali, sed etiam sub esse particulari et distincto, cuius ratio
 est, quia cognitio nobis supernaturaliter infusa sequitur modum divi-
 nae scientiae, cum sit ab illa immediate causata. Sicut ergo divina
 scientia est repraesentativa omnium rerum secundum esse particulare

et in propria forma, 113ra sic per hanc doctrinam modum divinae
 1600 sapientiae sequentem possumus omnia sub propria ratione cognos-
 cere. Si igitur esset alia scientia, quae inniteretur huic lumini fidei,
 1635 cui haec scientia innitur, tunc illa scientia superflueret, quia per
 illum eundem modum, per quem cognosceremus omnia per illam doc-
 trinam, per illum possemus omnia per hanc scientiam cognoscere.
 1605 Sed si est aliqua scientia, quae innitur alteri lumini supernaturali
 quam huic lumini fidei, cui innitur scientia ista, sicut est cognitio
 1640 beatorum, tunc oporteret illam scientiam ab ista distingui specifica
 differentia, quia eorum modus intelligendi est formaliter distinctus a
 modo intelligendi nostro, cum illa, quae nos cognoscimus confuse et
 1610 obscure et per consequens in quadam universalitate, ipsi clare et dis-
 tincte et in propria forma videant. Et quia ex diversitate modorum
 intelligendi causatur diversitas scientiarum, ideo oportet scientiam
 ipsorum a nostra formaliter distingui. Pro tanto igitur ex diversitate
 1615 luminum supernaturalium insurgit diversitas scientiarum, quia ex
 quolibet eorum consurgit diversus modus intelligendi, et per conse-
 quens diversa cognitio. Patet igitur, quod unitas luminis supernatura-
 1630 lis sufficit ad unitatem scientiae propter unitatem modi intelligendi,
 et diversitas praedicti luminis sufficit ad diversitatem propter diver-
 sitatem modorum cognoscendi.
 1620 Ex quo patet solutio AD PRIMUM, quia non sufficit subiectum esse
 unum ad unitatem scientiae, nisi sit unus modus cognoscendi illud.
 1635 SECUNDUM autem solutum fuit in secunda parte istius quaestionis.

<Pars 4

De causa materiali theologiae>

1625 Ultimo est quaerendum de causa materiali sive subiectiva istius scien-
 tiae. De subiecto autem istius doctrinae potest esse triplex quaestio:
 prima, utrum Deus inquantum Deus sit in hac scientia subiectum,
 secunda, utrum haec doctrina subalternetur scientiae beatorum, et ter-
 tia, utrum subalternet sibi omnes scientias humanas.

1630

<Quaestio 1>

Ad primum ergo arguitur.

1635

ET VIDETUR, quod Deus inquantum Deus sit in hac scientia subiectum, quia sub illa condicione Deus debet poni subiectum in hac scientia, quae est dignior et nobilior omni alia. Sed condicio deitatis, cum sit condicio absoluta, est dignior et nobilior omni alia condicione respectiva. Ergo sub ratione deitatis debet poni Deus hic subiectum et non sub alia ratione respectiva.

1640

<2.> Praeterea. Quando aliqua scientia imitatur aliam quantum ad subiectum consideratum et quantum ad modum considerandi, videtur, quod subiectum sub eadem ratione in utraque debeat assignari. Sed haec scientia est imago quaedam scientiae divinae, quia est derivata ab illa et imitatur ipsam quantum ad subiectum consideratum, quia utrobique Deus est subiectum, et quantum ad modum considerandi, quia sequitur modum divinae cognitionis, cum innitatur lumini divino, sicut illa innititur. Ergo sub eadem ratione in utraque Deus est subiectum. Sed Deus sub ratione deitatis est subiectum in scientia sua. ||3rbl Ergo sub eadem ratione erit subiectum in scientia ista.

1645

1650

<3.> Praeterea. Sub illa ratione Deus debet poni subiectum in scientia nostra, secundum quam erit finis nostrae beatitudinis, quia sub eadem ratione idem est finis scientiae et subiectum. Sed divina essentia ratione suae deitatis erit finis nostrae beatitudinis. Ergo sub hac ratione in nostra scientia debet poni subiectum.

1655

IN CONTRARIUM est, quia sub illa ratione Deus debet poni subiectum in hac scientia, secundum quam cognoscitur a nobis. Sed Deus non cognoscitur a nobis sub ratione deitatis, cum illa sit infinita, et nullum infinitum capiatur ab intellectu finito. Ergo sub hac ratione Deus non erit subiectum in ista scientia.

1660

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod quia de ista quaestione ac de aliis quaestionibus istius scientiae sunt diversae opiniones et continue inter professores istius doctrinae insurgunt novi modi dicendi, ideo primo ad declarationem eius ostendemus, quod utile est in hac doctrina diversas positiones et diversos modos dicendi de eisdem quaestionibus esse,

secundo declarabimus, quod Deus inquantum Deus subiectum in hac doctrina poni non debet, tertio dicemus, quod Deus ut inspirator et ut
 1665 revelator istius doctrinae debet in ipsa assignari subiectum, quarto ex hoc salvabimus omnia illa, quae de ista scientia dicuntur.

<I>

Possumus autem dicere utile esse propter tria professores istius doctrinae diversas positiones et diversos modos loquendi de eisdem
 1670 quaestionibus habere: primo propter ipsius scientiae augmentationem, secundo propter addiscentium ipsam diversam dispositionem, tertio propter veritatis elucidationem.

Primum autem sic patet. Nam sicut scientiae humanitus acquisitione receperunt augmentum ex parte docentium et invenientium ipsas,
 1675 quia nullus complete scientiam aliquam per se invenire potuit, sed sequentes adiuti aliquo modo per dicta praecedentium perduxerunt ipsam scientiam ad aliquam perfectionem et augmentum (unde Commentator super illo verbo II *Metaphysicae*: “si non fuisset Getosius, non fuisset Thimotheus, et si non fuisset Thimotheus, multam melodiam non haberemus”¹²⁹, dicit, quod “inventio scientiae non completur nisi per iuvamentum prioris ad sequentem”¹³⁰), sic sacra doctrina ex parte addiscentium et studentium in ipsa semper recipit augmentum, quia cum sit quidam thesaurus infinitus, quanto plus aliquis studet in ipsa, tanto plus proficit. Et quanto plures expositiones et varios
 1685 modos loquendi in ipsa conspiciunt, tanto plus cognoscunt scientiae profunditatem et sui intellectus debilitatem. Unde Augustinus IX *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, super illo verbo *Psalmi*: “quaerite Deum et vivet anima vestra”¹³¹ dicit, quod “sic quaeramus Deum tamquam inventuri et sic inveniamus tamquam quaesituri, quia «cum consummaverit
 1690 homo, tunc incipiet»¹³²”¹³³.

1669 diversas] adversas, ad expunxit ms 1689 inventuri] corr. ex inventiri.

¹²⁹ Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, II, 1, 993b 15–16: AL XXV, 3.2, 41, 18–20.

¹³⁰ Cf. Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, II, com. 2: ed. Iunctina, t. VIII, fol. 29G.

¹³¹ Ps. 68, 33.

¹³² Eccli. 18, 6.

¹³³ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, IX, 1, 1: CCL 50, 293, 28–30.

Secundum vero sic ostenditur. Nam cum actus activorum sint in
 patiente et disposito et cum unumquodque, "quod recipitur in aliquo,
 recipiatur per modum rei recipientis et non per modum rei recep-
 tae"¹³⁴, 113val oportet, quod sicut addiscentis hanc doctrinam sunt
 1695 variae et diversae dispositiones in recipiendo, sic in ipsa sint variae et
 diversae positiones et diversorum modorum locutiones, ut qui non
 possunt ipsam veritatem per unam opinionem et per unum modum
 loquendi capere, per aliam opinionem et per alium modum loquendi
 praedictam veritatem intelligant. Unde Augustinus I *De Trinitate*,
 1700 capitulo 3, hanc rationem assignans ait, quod "quia nullus hominum
 ita locutus est, ut in omnibus ab omnibus intelligeretur, ideoque utile
 est plura opera a pluribus fieri diverso stilo non diversa fide etiam de
 quaestionibus eisdem, ut ad plurimos res ipsa perveniat ad alios sic,
 ad alios autem sic"¹³⁵.

1705 Tertium sic declaratur. Nam cum noster modus intelligendi sit
 talis, ut arguendo et dubitando veritatem ipsam inquiramus, quia
 secundum Philosophum III *Metaphysicae* "volentibus veritatem de
 aliqua re inquirere necessarium est prae opere bene dubitare"¹³⁶, ideo
 utile est etiam ad ea, quae sunt per se nota nobis, dubitationes aliquas
 1710 pro et contra adducere, ut ex his veritas magis elucescat. Propter quod
 Philosophus in *Praedicamentis* signanter dixit, quod "dubitare de sin-
 gulis non est inutile"¹³⁷, quia ad singulas veritates cognoscendas dubi-
 tationes proponere, ut praedictae veritates magis elucescant secundum
 nostrum modum intelligendi, est utile et necessarium. Utile est igitur
 1715 in hac doctrina quantum ad articulos fidei et quantum ad simpliciter
 credenda dubitationes et rationes adducere, quibus et piis opitulentur
 et contra impios defendantur sine aliqua dubitatione et infidelitate. Sed
 quantum ad intelligenda et per rationem investiganda utile est diversas

1694 addiscentis] *corr. ex addiscentes.*

¹³⁴ *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 232 (12). Cf. *Liber de causis*, IX, 99: *Le Liber de causis. Edition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes*, ed. A. PATTIN, in: *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 28 (1966) 90–203, vide, 160, 46–49.

¹³⁵ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, I, 3, 5: CCL 50, 32, 14–15; 33, 25–28.

¹³⁶ Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, III, 1, 995a 27–28: AL XXV, 3.2, 48, 6–7.

¹³⁷ Aristoteles, *Categoriae*, 7, 8b 23–24: AL I, 1–5, 23, 20–21; etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 303 (30).

1720 opiniones et diversos modos dicendi esse, ut veritas ipsa magis eluces-
 1567 cat et hoc sine aliqua praesumptione et temeritate. Unde Augustinus
 IX *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, hanc rationem tangens ait, quod “de cre-
 dendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intelligendis vero nulla temeri-
 tate affirmemus”, et subdit, quod “in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his
 autem veritas est exquirenda”¹³⁸.

1725 <II>

Ostenso ergo utile esse in hac doctrina de eisdem quaestionibus esse
 diversos modos dicendi, diverso stilo, non tamen diversa fide, volu-
 mus ostendere, quod Deus inquantum Deus subiectum in hac scientia
 poni non debet. Hoc autem possumus tripliciter probare secundum tria,
 1730 quae in titulo istius quaestionis ponuntur. Nam hic ponitur ista redup-
 licatio ‘inquantum’, ponitur Deus et ponitur subiectum. Prima ergo
 ratio sumetur ex parte ipsius reduplicationis, secunda ex parte ipsius
 deitatis, et tertia ex parte ipsius subiecti.

Prima ratio sic patet. Nam ista reduplicatio ‘inquantum’, vel ‘in
 1735 eo quod’, importat quandam specificationem praecisam, quia l13vbl
 cuicumque additur, specificatur, per quem modum aliquid competat
 sibi et hoc cum quadam praecisione, ut potest haberi ex libro *Priorum*
 in illo capitulo *Reduplicatum autem*¹³⁹. Dicemus ergo, quod aliquando
 praedicta reduplicatio dicit praecisionem specificationis praedicati in
 1740 subiecto, aliquando vero dicit praecisam specificationem modi praedi-
 candi praedicati de subiecto; aliquando autem dicit praecisam specifi-
 cationem modi considerandi rei ab intellectu. Sicut diximus in *Scripto*,
 quod fecimus in *Prioribus* et in quodam tractatu, quem *De praedica-
 tione generis et speciei* intitulamus¹⁴⁰. Primo modo dicendo: ‘triangu-
 1745 lus habet tres inquantum triangulus’, ista reduplicatio dicit praecisam
 specificationem praedicati in subiecto, quia specificatur nobis per hanc
 reduplicationem, quod hoc praedicatum ‘habere tres’ ita praecise

1742 considerandi] *ex margine alia manu, consecrandi expunxit ms.*

¹³⁸ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, IX, 1, 1: CCL 50, 239, 31–33.

¹³⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica priora*, I, 38, 49a 10seqq.: AL, III, 1–4, 79, 16sqq.

¹⁴⁰ Haec duo opera Augustini Triumphus remanent inedita. Manuscripta recitat J. KÜRZINGER, *Handschriften philosophischer Werke des Augustinus Triumphus*, in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 53/3 (1940) 355–361.

conveniat triangulo, quod nulli alteri figurae vel subiecto non habenti numerum triangularem convenire possit.

1750 Secundo modo dicendo: 'animal praedicatur de homine in eo quod genus et album praedicatur de homine inquantum accidens, et animal rationale praedicatur de homine inquantum definitio', ista reduplicatio hic dicit praecisam specificationem modi praedicandi praedicati de subiecto. Nam cum sint diversa praedicata, quia substantialia et accidentalia, et superiora et inferiora, si ignotum est nobis, per quem
1755 modum huiusmodi praedicata praedicentur de subiectis, specificat nobis et dat nobis intelligere ista reduplicatio 'inquantum', quia talis praedicatur de homine in eo quod superius et in eo quod genus, et non in eo quod inferius; et rationale animal praedicatur de homine in eo
1760 quod aequale et in eo quod definitio, et non in eo quod superius.

 Sed tertio modo dicendo: 'ens mobile inquantum mobile esse subiectum in philosophia naturali', ista reduplicatio hic dicit praecisam specificationem modi considerandi rei ab intellectu, ut cum de ente mobili consideret tam metaphysicus quam naturalis philosophus, si
1765 ignotum est nobis, qualiter diversimode considerat uterque, specificat nobis et dat nobis intelligere ista reduplicatio 'inquantum', quia metaphysicus considerat de ente mobili inquantum ens ita, quod consideratio omnium rerum sub ratione entitatis ita praeciditur in metaphysico, quod talis modus considerandi nulli alteri artifice potest convenire
1770 nisi sibi. Naturalis vero considerat de ente mobili inquantum mobile ita, quod modus considerandi entia in eo, quod mobilia sunt, ita praeciditur in naturali philosopho, quod non convenit alteri nisi sibi.

 Si ergo diceremus 'Deum inquantum Deus esse in hac scientia subiectum', cum hic ista reduplicatio non possit dicere praecisam specificationem modi considerandi ipsius Dei a nostro intellectu ita, quod
1775 modus considerandi ipsius Dei inquantum Deus ita praecise conveniat nostrae scientiae, quod nulli alteri scientiae convenire possit et quod
1780 quidquid potest considerari de Deo inquantum Deus, totum praecise conveniat huic scientiae. Sed hoc est falsum quantum ad utrumque sensum. Nam falsum est quantum ad sensum negativum, ut quod nulli scientiae competat consideratio Dei inquantum Deus praecise nisi isti,

1767 metaphysicus] *corr. ex mathematicus* 1769 in ... considerandi] talis modus considerandi in metaphysico, quod, *ms*, *transponendum*.

quia convenit scientiae suae. Nam ipse cognoscit se esse Deum inquantum Deus. Similiter est falsum quantum ad sensum affirmativum, ut quod quidquid competit Deo et quidquid potest considerari de Deo inquantum Deus, totum praecise competat huic scientiae, quia talis consideratio praeciditur in scientia Dei et non convenit alicui scientiae creatae. Ex parte ergo istius reduplicationis communis 'inquantum' patet, quod Deus inquantum Deus non potest esse in nostra scientia subiectum.

Secunda ratio sic declaratur. Nam nomine deitatis importatur infinitas et incomprehensibilitas in primo et essentiali intellectu eius, quod patet per Damascenum I libro, capitulo 4, ubi dicit, quod "infinite est Deus et incomprehensibilis et hoc solum est incomprehensibile infinitas et incomprehensibilitas eius"¹⁴¹. Ex quo verbo habetur, quod hoc solum intelligimus nomine Dei: aliquid infinitum et incomprehensibile. Si ergo Deus inquantum Deus esset subiectum in nostra scientia, oporteret Deum intelligi a nobis modo incomprehensibili et modo infinito, quia omne illud, quod est de primo et essentiali intellectu alicuius, non potest intelligi non intellecto illo. Ut si rationale est de primo et essentiali intellectu hominis, non potest intelligi homo non intellecto rationali. Sic quia infinitas et incomprehensibilitas est de primo et essentiali intellectu istius nominis Dei, quia hoc solum intelligimus importari nomine Dei incomprehensibilitatem et infinitatem quandam, ut patet per Damascenum, ideo non potest intelligi Deus non intellecta eius infinitate et incomprehensibilitate. Sicut ergo quicumque cognosceret hominem inquantum homo, cognosceret eum inquantum rationalis, sic quicumque cognosceret Deum in eo quod Deus, cognosceret eum inquantum infinitus et inquantum incomprehensibilis, et per consequens, cognosceret eum modo infinito et incomprehensibili, quod est falsum, quia hoc modo solus Deus cognoscit se ipsum.

Formetur igitur talis ratio. Quandocumque aliquid est de primo et essentiali intellectu alicuius rei, si res illa intelligitur ab aliquo intellectu, oportet etiam illud intelligi, quod est de intellectu eius. Et si res illa intelligitur cum praecisione modi intelligendi, oportet etiam modum intelligendi illius, quod est de intellectu eius, praecidi. Sed

¹⁴¹ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 4, 5: ed. BUYTAERT, 21, 40–41.

infinitas et incomprehensibilitas est de primo et essentiali intellectu ipsius Dei, ut probatum est. Ergo si nos intelligamus Deum, intelligimus infinitatem et incomprehensibilitatem eius. Et si cognoscimus Deum inquantum Deus, cognoscimus eius infinitatem et incomprehensibilitatem modo incomprehensibili et modo infinito. Sed hoc non competit alicui intellectui creato 114rbl per talem modum Deum cognoscere.

Tertia ratio sic ostenditur. Dicemus enim, quod una scientia non distinguitur ab alia ratione subiecti, in quo sunt, quia cum omnes scientiae sint in intellectu, tunc omnes scientiae essent una scientia; nec ratione obiecti, ad quod referuntur, quia cum obiectum idem considerent diversae scientiae, similiter multae scientiae essent una scientia. Accipitur ergo distinctio unius scientiae ab alia ex formali consideratione ipsius obiecti diversimode se offerentis intellectui, ut quia ens offert se intellectui nostro in eo quod ens et in eo quod mobile, et in eo quod quantum, ideo sunt tres scientiae distinctae de ipso ente, quia in ipso ente est, quod possit sic et sic considerari. Nam scientia sumit speciem ex obiecto eo modo, quo sciens fertur in ipsum obiectum. Si ergo scientia Dei distinguitur a scientia nostra, hoc non potest esse ratione obiecti considerati, quia idem est obiectum in scientia sua et in scientia nostra, cum sit ipse Deus, nec ex parte subiecti considerantis, quia sic non accipitur distinctio unius scientiae ab altera formaliter, sed materialiter solum. Oportet ergo, quod distinguatur scientia sua a scientia nostra ex formali consideratione ipsius obiecti diversimode offerentis se intellectui, ut quia ipse se offert nostro intellectui sub ratione finita et terminata, sibi autem met se offert sub ratione infinita et incomprehensibili, ideo scientia sua et scientia nostra sunt duae scientiae formaliter distinctae. Sicut ergo quia ignotum erat nobis, qualiter ens mobile diversimode erat subiectum in metaphysica et in philosophia naturali, specificabat nobis hoc ista reduplicatio 'inquantum', quia ens mobile inquantum ens est subiectum in metaphysica, sed ens mobile inquantum mobile est subiectum in naturali philosophia, sic si ignotum est nobis, qualiter diversimode Deus est subiectum in scientia sua et in scientia nostra, specificabit nobis

1833 nam] eo modo *add. ms, omittendum.*

1850 hoc ista reduplicatio 'inquantum', quia Deus inquantum Deus est
subiectum in scientia sua, sed Deus inquantum inspirator et revelator
cognitionis sui ipsius est subiectum in scientia nostra.

1855 Iste autem tres rationes non solum probant Deum inquantum
Deus subiectum in hac scientia esse non posse, verum etiam solvunt
tria dicta quorundam doctorum¹⁴², quibus nituntur ostendere Deum sub
ratione absoluta et sub ratione deitatis esse in hac scientia subiectum.
Dicunt enim primo, quod Deus potest dici infinitus tripliciter: primo
modo ut res ipsa, quae est Deus, dicatur infinita; secundo, ut dicatur
infinita sub ratione infinita; tertio, ut illud, in quo sunt ista duo tam-
quam in subiecto, dicatur infinitum. Nam licet Deus sit quid simplex,
potest tamen isto triplici modo dici infinitus: primo, ut habet rationem
obiecti infinita repraesentantis, secundo, ut habet rationem infinita
comprehendentis, tertio, ut sub ratione infinita dicatur infinitus et
modo infinito comprehendatur. Omnibus autem his tribus modis Deus
dicitur esse subiectum in scientia sua, sicut dicunt.

1860 Secundo volunt, quod Deus sit subiectum in scientia nostra ut
sibi est annexa ratio infinitatis, non tamen quod ipsa ratio infinitatis
sit obiecta scientiae creatae vel quod habeat rationem subiecti respectu
eius, secundum quam formetur et terminetur, sed solum res ipsa, quae
1870 est Deus, est subiectum, cui sic annectitur ratio infinitatis, ut sub alia
ratione contraria subiectum in hac scientia esse non possit.

Tertio dicunt¹⁴³, quod scientia ex parte obiecti, circa quod ver-
satur, recipit distinctionem et speciem formaliter, ex parte vero
subiecti, in quo recipitur, recipit intentionem et remissionem, ut si
1875 lucidum sit obiectum visus, tunc sol ratione suae luciditatis videbitur
ab aquila, homine et noctua eadem visione formaliter, quantum est ex
parte sui. Sed materialiter clariori modo videbitur ab aquila quam ab
homine et ab homine quam a noctua¹⁴⁴. Secundum maiorem et
minorem capacitatem recipientis illam claritatem. Sic, ut dicunt, Deus

¹⁴² Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibetum XII*, qu. 1, sol.: ed. DECORTE, 5, 34 – 6, 44.

¹⁴³ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibetum XII*, qu. 1, ad arg.: ed. DECORTE, 7, 66 – 8, 87.

¹⁴⁴ De usu huius parabolae apud scholasticos cf. C. STEEL, *Der Adler und die Nachtule. Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik (Lectio Albertina 4)*, Münster 2001.

1880 secundum se est obiectum scientiae suae, beatorum et viatorum, sed
quod a se ipso cognoscatur modo infinito, ab aliis autem modo termi-
nato et finito, hoc est ex parte cognoscentium. Finitum igitur et infi-
nitum non se tenent ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis formaliter, sed
magis ex parte subiectorum cognoscentium materialiter.

1885 Primum autem istorum dictum solvitur per primam rationem
superius adductam¹⁴⁵, quia cum ista reduplicatio 'inquantum' dicat
praecisionem modi considerandi, si Deus inquantum Deus esset
subiectum in nostra scientia, oporteret Deum sub omni modo suae
infininitatis et sub omni modo suae incomprehensibilitatis a nobis consi-
derari ita, quod nullo modo possit aliquid considerari de eo nec aliquis
modus infinitatis sibi posset competere, quin totum praecise conveni-
ret scientiae nostrae; sicut quia ens inquantum ens est subiectum in
metaphysica, ideo nulla est consideratio entis nec alicuius rei, ut est
ens, quae non praecise conveniat scientiae metaphysicali.

1895 Secundum vero dictum solvitur per secundam rationem, quia
esse infinitum non est aliquid annexum Deo, sed est de primo et essen-
tiali intellectu eius, nec potest intelligi Deus non intellecta infinitate
eius. Quod autem est annexum alicui, potest intelligi principale non
intellecto eo, quod sibi annectitur. Deus ergo non poterit cognosci a
nobis inquantum Deus nisi cognoscatur infinitus et sub ratione infinita.

1900 Tertium autem dictum solvitur per tertiam rationem. Nam dis-
tinctio unius scientiae ab alia non accipitur ex parte subiecti nec ex
parte obiecti, sed ex formali consideratione obiecti diversimode se
offerentis intellectui; et quia Deus offert se suo intellectui sub ratione
1905 infinita, nostro vero intellectui 114vbl sub ratione finita, ideo per hanc
rationem formalem distinguitur scientia sua et scientia nostra. Et si
dicatur hoc non esse ex parte obiecti, sed ex parte subiecti, magis
dicetur, quod sicut sciens per scientiam suam fertur in obiectum, sic
scientia ex illo obiecto distinctionem et speciem trahit. Obiectum ergo,
1910 quod repugnat scienti materialiter, ne in ipsum feratur sub aliqua
ratione, repugnat formaliter scientiae, ne ab illo obiecto sub illa ratione
speciem et distinctionem trahat. Et quia Deus sub ratione deitatis et

1887 praecisionem] *ex margine*, processionem *in textu* 1908 suam] *corr. ex sua*.

¹⁴⁵ Parum supra, initium 1 partis eiusdem qu. l. 1673 sqq.

infininitatis repugnat materialiter nostro intellectui et sub hac ratione feratur in ipsum, oportet, quod repugnet formaliter scientiae nostrae, ut sub ista ratione ab ipso trahat distinctionem et speciem.

<III>

Declarato igitur Deum inquantum Deus non esse subiectum in ista scientia volumus ostendere, quod Deus inquantum inspirator et revelator istius doctrinae in ipsa debet poni subiectum. Hoc autem possumus quantum ad praesens quattuor rationibus probare, quarum prima sumitur ex parte Dei hanc scientiam inspirantis, secunda ex parte hominis, cui inspiratur, tertia ex parte ipsius scientiae, quae inspiratur, et quarta ex parte condicionis, sub qua subiectum debet poni in scientia.

Prima ratio sic declaratur. Nam subiectum debet poni in scientia secundum modum illum, secundum quem est primo cognitum in illa scientia et secundum quem offert se intellectui cognoscentis, quia sic se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam. Obiectum autem potentiae est illud, in quod primo potentia fertur. Sed Deus est cognitus in hac doctrina primo secundum quod inspirator et revelator eius. Nam licet secundum Damascenum I libro "cognitio existendi Deum sit ab ipso omnibus naturaliter inserta"¹⁴⁶, in hac tamen cognitione supernaturali Deus non cognoscitur a nobis, nisi ut est praedictae cognitionis inspirator et revelator. Ergo sub ista condizione Deus in hac doctrina debet poni subiectum. Hanc autem rationem videtur tangere Damascenus I libro et capitulo, ubi ait, quod Deus "prius per legem et prophetas, deinde Iesum Christum, secundum quod possibile nobis est, sui ipsius cognitionem inspiravit et manifestavit"¹⁴⁷.

Secunda ratio sic patet. Nam sicut obiectum debet esse proportionatum potentiae, sic subiectum debet esse proportionatum scientiae, eo quod actus activorum semper debent recipi in subiecto proportionato et disposito. Sed Deus inquantum Deus est improporcionabilis nostro intellectui ad cognoscendum, quia hoc modo solum proportionabilis est suo intellectui, qui sicut est infinitus, ita ipse secundum

¹⁴⁶ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 1, 2: ed. BUYTAERT, 12, 22–23.

¹⁴⁷ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 1, 2: ed. BUYTAERT, 12, 24–27.

1950 quod Deus et sub ratione infinita potest se sibi ipsi repraesentare. Ergo
 in nostra scientia ipse Deus erit subiectum ut inspirator et revelator
 cognitionis 115ra sui ipsius, quia secundum hoc conformabit se et
 coaptabit se intellectui cuiuscumque creaturae secundum proportionem
 et capacitatem recipientium. Istam rationem similiter tangit Damasce-
 nus eodem libro et capitulo, ubi dicit, quod "est igitur Deus omnia
 sciens et quod confert unicuique providens, quod utile est nobis
 cognoscere, revelavit. Quod autem non poteramus ferre, siluit. Haec
 nos diligamus et in his maneamus et non transferamus terminos aeter-
 nos neque transgrediamur divinam traditionem"¹⁴⁸.

1960 Tertia ratio sic manifestatur. Nam cum tota ista scientia conti-
 neatur in principiis et in articulis fidei, oportet, quod sicut Deus est
 subiectum articulorum fidei et principiorum istius scientiae, sic sit
 subiectum in tota ista scientia. Sed Deus est subiectum articulorum et
 principiorum istius doctrinae, ut est inspirator et revelator ipsorum,
 quia aliter praedicta principia non sunt magis cognita, nisi ut sunt a
 Deo inspirata. Ergo sub ista condicione Deus erit subiectum in tota
 doctrina ista. Hanc rationem satis innuit Augustinus II *De Trinitate*,
 capitulo 1, ubi ait, quod "duo proponuntur nobis ad inquirendam sub-
 stantiam Dei: Scriptura et creatura, ut per haec ipse quaeratur et dili-
 gatur, qui illam inspiravit et istam creavit"¹⁴⁹.

1970 Quarta ratio sic ostenditur. Nam sub illa ratione subiectum debet
 poni in scientia, secundum quam considerantur omnia, quae dicuntur
 et ponuntur in scientia. Sed omnia, quae considerantur in hac doctrina,
 sive sint simpliciter credibilia, sive sint per humanam rationem inves-
 tigabilia, considerantur sub una ratione formali obiecti, ut inquantum
 sunt divinitus revelata et divinitus inspirata. Ergo sub hac condicione
 formali Deus in hac doctrina debet poni subiectum. Istam autem
 rationem videtur tangere Dionysius I *De divinis nominibus*, ubi dicit,
 1975 quod "lex quidem divina definitam veritatem de Deo dictorum nos
 asservare iubet non in persuasibilibus humanae scientiae verbis, sed in

1951 ubi] *corr. ex ibi* 1954 et in his maneamus et non transferamus] *iter.* 1975 dic-
 torum] *corr. ex doctorum.*

¹⁴⁸ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 1, 2: ed. BUYTAERT, 13, 33–37.

¹⁴⁹ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, II, 1: CCL 50, 80, 15–19.

demonstratione veritatis theologorum a Spiritu Sancto motae et inspiratae”¹⁵⁰. Nam licet multa in hac doctrina contineantur, quae per humanam rationem sunt a philosophis investigata, non tamen assentimus eis nec confitemur ipsa, secundum quod sunt per homines inventa, sed secundum quod Spiritus Sanctus mentes scientiarum suarum de talibus inspiravit et secundum quod “Spiritu Sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines”¹⁵¹, ut dicitur *II Petri*, 1 capitulo.

Illam autem positionem¹⁵², quae ponit Deum ut redemptorem et glorificatorem in hac scientia esse subiectum, non reprobamus, tum quia illa positio non negat, quod sub alia condicione Deus non possit esse hic subiectum, sed solum negat, quod Deus inquantum Deus non deberet poni in praedicta scientia |15rbl subiectum, in quo cum eis convenimus, tum quia illa est opinio doctorum ordinis nostri, tum quia ad ipsam reprobandam noster intellectus non attingit.

<IV>

Viso ergo, quod Deus inquantum inspirator et revelator est subiectum in ipsa, volumus ex hoc salvare omnia illa, quae dicuntur de hac doctrina. Dicimus autem tria de cognitione istius doctrinae: primo, quod est scientia, secundo, quod est scientia una, tertio, quod differt ab omnibus aliis. Ponendo ergo, quod Deus, <ut> est inspirator et revelator istius doctrinae, est subiectum in ipsa, salvamus primum, quia si ista doctrina est scientia, hoc est, quia notitia conclusionum, quae in ipsa concluduntur (quarum notitia scientia appellatur), reducit in notitiam principiorum, eo quod omnis notitia conclusionum radicaliter et virtualiter continetur in principiis. Sed principia istius scientiae non sunt nota, nisi ut sunt a Deo revelata. Ergo ponendo Deum ut revelatorem et inspiratorem istius scientiae esse subiectum in ipsa possumus salvare, quod haec doctrina non solum est scientia, sicut est scientia humana, sed etiam quod sit supra humanam scientiam, ut sicut inspi-

¹⁵⁰ Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, I, 1, 6: *Dionysiaca*, Paris 1937, t. I, 5–6 (translatio Iohannis Saraceni).

¹⁵¹ *II Pet.* 1, 21.

¹⁵² Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prolog., pars 1, qu. 3, fol. 3L; etiam *Quodlibet III*, qu. 2: *Utrum Deus sub speciali ratione sit subiectum in sacra Pagina*, p. 123–126, et *De subiecto theologiae*, in: C. LUNA, Una nuova questione di Egidio Romano «*De subiecto theologiae*», in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 38 (1991) 129–173.

rator eius, non est sciens, sed supersciens, sic haec doctrina non sit scientia, sed superscientia, et sicut lumen, cui haec doctrina innititur, est super lumen naturale, cui innititur scientia humana, sic haec scientia sit super illam.

Secundo salvamus, quod haec scientia sit una. Nam cum in hac doctrina determinetur de creatore et creatura, de credibilibus et scibilibus ac de speculabilibus et agibilibus, non possent omnia ista ad unam scientiam pertinere, nisi considerarentur sub una ratione formali obiecti. Ista autem ratio est illa, secundum quam dicimus Deum in hac scientia esse subiectum. Nam considerando Deum, ut est omnium praedictorum inspirator et revelator, est considerare omnia sub una ratione formali, ut inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia, secundum quam considerationem salvatur istius scientiae unitas.

Tertio ex hoc possumus salvare, quod differat ab omnibus aliis. Dicemus enim, quod Deus inquantum Deus est subiectum in scientia sua, Deus vero inquantum ens potest dici subiectum in metaphysica, Deus autem inquantum inspirator et revelator cognitionis sui ipsius aenigmatae et obscurae est subiectum in scientia viatorum. Sed Deus inquantum inspirator et revelator praedictae scientiae clarae et apertae est subiectum in scientia comprehensorum et beatorum. Per hoc ergo distinguitur ab omnibus aliis scientiis.

Sicut igitur rationes superius factae ostensive probant Deum inquantum Deus non esse subiectum in ista scientia, sed ut inspirator et revelator eius, sic per haec tria dicta possunt formari tres rationes ducentes ad impossibile, quod ut inspirator et revelator istius doctrinae debet poni subiectum in ipsa, quia nisi hoc ponatur, sequetur, quod haec doctrina non sit scientia et quod non sit una, et quod non distinguatur ab aliis.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod Deus sub ratione absoluta debet poni esse subiectum in scientia sua, sed sub ratione respectiva debet poni subiectum in scientia nostra. Vel est dicendum, quod non semper condicio absoluta est nobilior respectiva, quia divina essentia sub ratione absoluta est productiva creaturarum, et sub ratione respectiva

2029 possunt] *corr. ex possent.*

est productiva personarum divinarum. Et constat, quod ista est nobilior
2040 illa.

AD SECUNDUM patet solutio, quia secundum alium modum conside-
randi nos cognoscimus Deum et secundum alium modum ipse cognos-
cit se ipsum, ideo sub alia ratione ipse est subiectum in scientia sua et
nostra.

2045 AD TERTIUM autem dicendum, quod Deus erit finis nostrae beatitudinis
ratione suae essentiae non quantum ad eius infinitatem, sed secundum
capacitatem recipientium et secundum quod unicuique suam gloriam
revelabit secundum proportionem recipientium ipsam.

<Quaestio 2>

2050 Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec scientia subalternetur
scientiae beatorum

ET VIDETUR quod non, quia scientia subalternans debet dicere causam
et *propter quid* eius, quod subalternata dicit *quia*. Sed beatorum scien-
tia non dicit causam et *propter quid* de ipso Deo vel de his, quae nos
2055 de Deo cognoscimus, cum ipse sit sibi ipsi causa, nec recipiat esse ab
alio. Ergo scientia nostra, quam habemus de Deo, non subalternetur
scientiae ipsorum.

<2.> Praeterea. Scientia subalternata accipit sua principia a scientia
subalternante. Sed haec scientia non accipit principia sua a scientia
2060 beatorum, sed immediate accipit ipsa a sapientia divina. Ergo haec
doctrina cognitioni beatorum non subalternatur.

<3.> Praeterea. Differentia est inter scientiam subalternantem et subal-
ternatam, ut dicitur I *Posteriorum*, quia scientia subalternans non
cognoscit ipsa particularia, sed tantum sistit in cognitione universa-
2065 lium¹⁵³, scientia autem subalternata talia in propria forma cognoscit.
Sed beati per eorum scientiam cognoscunt omnia particularia multo
melius, quam nos cognoscamus. Ergo videtur, quod nostra scientia
non subalternetur scientiae eorum.

2055 recipiat] *corr. ex recognoscat.*

¹⁵³ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 79a 5–6: AL IV, 1–4, 300, 22–24.

IN CONTRARIUM est, quia in hoc videtur differe scientia subalternata
 2070 <a> subalternante, ut principia, quae non sunt scita in scientia subal-
 ternata, sint evidenter cognita in scientia subalternante. Sed talis
 condicio reperitur in ista scientia respectu scientiae beatorum. Ergo
 videtur, <quod> haec doctrina subalternetur illi.

RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod ad intellectum istius quaestionis sunt tria
 2075 per ordinem declaranda. Nam primo ostendetur positionem illorum,
 qui dicunt hanc scientiam non subalternari scientiae beatorum, sed
 solum scientiae divinae, esse irrationabilem et ex ignorantia naturae
 subalternationis procedere. Secundo distinguuntur modi subalternatio-
 nis. Tertio ex distinctione illa declarabitur, quod haec doctrina subal-
 2080 ternatur scientiae Dei, scientiae beatorum et aliquo modo scientiae
 humanitus 115vbl acquisitae.

<I>

Propter primum sciendum, quod aliqui doctores¹⁵⁴ dicunt hanc non
 subalternari scientiae beatorum, quia eorum scientia non dicit causam
 2085 et *propter quid* eius, quod nostra scientia dicit *quia*. Dicunt enim nos-
 tram scientiam non differre a cognitione ipsorum per dicere *propter*
quid et *quia*, sed solum per videre clare et aenigmatice, et per “ambu-
 lare per fidem et per speciem”¹⁵⁵. Volunt tamen, quod subalternetur
 scientiae divinae tam scientia nostra quam scientia beatorum, non
 2090 tamen aliquo illorum quattuor modorum subalternationis, quos Philo-
 sophus ponit I *Posteriorum*¹⁵⁶, sed modo quodam contrario illis. Nam
 unus modus subalternationis ibi traditus est, quando scientia conside-
 rans obiectum simpliciter subalternat sibi scientiam considerantem
 ipsum obiectum determinatum, sicut geometria, quae considerat
 2095 lineam simpliciter, subalternat sibi perspectivam considerantem lineam
 determinatam ad visum. Modus autem, quo divina scientia subalternat
 sibi scientiam beatorum et viatorum, est contrarius isti. Quia scientia
 divina considerat obiectum determinatum infinite comprehensum, ideo

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 7, qu. 5, corp. et ad 1: fol. 53B–54G.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. II Cor. 5, 7.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 78b 33sqq.: AL IV, 1–4, 300, 8sqq.

subalternat sibi scientiam nostram et beatorum considerantem ipsum
 2100 simpliciter comprehensum.

Sed ista positio quantum ad utrumque dictum irrationabilis
 apparet, tum quia nostra scientia non subalternatur scientiae beatorum
 ex eo, quod illa non dicit *propter quid* eius, quod nostra scientia scit
 2105 *quia*, <tum quia> ex ignorantia naturae subalternationis procedit, quia
 quod scientia subalternans dicat causam et *propter quid* alicuius rei
 eius, quod scientia subalternata de illa re dicit solum *quia*, hoc pro
 tanto est, quia illa res habet causam, unde potest demonstrari. Sed si
 illa res non haberet causam, per quam demonstraretur, sed ipsa esset
 causa omnium, tunc sufficeret illam rem solum per suam essentiam
 2110 cognoscere ad hoc, quod cognitio illa subalternaret sibi scientiam
 aliam, quae praedictam rem non per essentiam cognosceret, sed solum
 haberet eius cognitionem, quia esset sibi ab alio revelata. Et sic est in
 scientia nostra et beatorum, quia principia fidei in nostra scientia sunt
 solum credita, in eorum autem scientia sunt evidenter cognita. Sicut
 2115 ergo scientia, quae procedit ex principiis creditis et dictis sibi ab alio,
 subalternatur scientiae, quae procedit ex principiis simpliciter notis, ita
 haec doctrina subalternatur scientiae beatorum. Modus autem subal-
 ternationis per dicere *quia* et *propter quid* reperitur solum in scientiis
 humanis habentibus ortum ex sensibilibus, quorum sunt causae, per
 2120 quas possunt demonstrari.

Similiter secundum dictum, quod nostra scientia et beatorum
 subalternetur scientiae divinae ex eo, quod divina scientia considerat
 obiectum determinatum infinite comprehensum, nostra autem scientia
 considerat illud obiectum simpliciter, veritatem non habet, immo
 2125 magis est econtrario, quia, ut supra dicebatur¹⁵⁷, Deus considerat se
 ipsum simpliciter inquantum Deus, nos autem cognoscimus eum
 sub aliqua ratione contracta et determinata, ut inquantum est praedic-
 tae cognitionis inspirator et revelator. Sicut ergo perspectiva subalter-
 natur geometriae, quia geometria considerat lineam simpliciter inquan-
 2130 tum linea, perspectiva autem considerat lineam sub ratione contracta

2103 scit] *corr. ex sit.*

¹⁵⁷ Qu. praecedenti, corp., pars II, l. 1782-1783.

et determinata ut inquantum visualis, ita secundum praedictum modum scientia nostra et beatorum subalternatur scientiae Dei.

<II>

Declarato igitur istorum positionem esse irrationalem distinguendi
 2135 sunt nunc modi subalternationis. Possumus ergo quantum ad praesens
 quinque modos subalternationis distinguere nobis ad propositum
 deservientes. Quorum primus est, quando una scientia ordinatur ab
 alia, tunc scientia, quae ordinatur, subalternatur ei, a qua ordinatur. Et
 iste modus continet sub se modum illum subalternationis positum a
 2140 Philosopho I *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit, quod ideo metaphysica est prin-
 cipalis scientia scientiarum, omnes autem aliae sunt subservientes,
 quia considerat optimum in natura tota¹⁵⁸.

Secundus modus est, quando principia in una scientia sunt nota,
 in alia autem sunt solum credita: tunc scientia, in qua principia sunt
 2145 solum credita>, subalternatur illi, in qua sunt principia per se nota et
 evidenter cognita. Et iste modus continet sub se illum modum subal-
 ternationis I *Posteriorum*, ubi dicit, quod scientia subalternans scit
 causam et *propter quid* eius, quod scientia subalternata scit solum
*quia*¹⁵⁹.

2150 Tertius modus est, quando una scientia considerat subiectum
 simpliciter, alia vero considerat illud subiectum per modum contrac-
 tum et per rationem specialem: tunc scientia, quae considerat subiec-
 tum illud secundum modum contractum, subalternatur illi, quae consi-
 derat illud subiectum simpliciter, sicut dicimus, quod perspectiva
 2155 considerans lineam sub ratione speciali, ut visualis est, subalternatur
 geometriae, quae considerat lineam, ut linea est.

Quartus modus est, quando una scientia non secundum se tota,
 sed secundum aliquam sui partem praesupponit principia in alia scien-
 tia declarata: tunc talis scientia dicitur subalternari illi, a qua huius-
 2160 modi principia praesupponit, sicut Philosophus ponit exemplum I *Pos-*

2144-2145 <tunc ... credita>] *suppl.*, cf. *explanationes primi et tertii modi subalter-*
nationis. 2153 quae] *corr. ex qui*.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 982b 5-7: AL XXV, 15, 115 - 16, 118.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 78b 33sqq.: AL IV, 1-4, 300, 8sqq.

teriorum, quod naturalis philosophia subalternatur perspectivae non simpliciter, sed quantum ad illam partem, quae est de iride¹⁶⁰; nam in multis quantum ad illa, quae spectant ad iridem vel ad arcum caelestem, naturalis dicit *quia*, de quibus dicit perspectivus causam et *propter quid*.

Quintus modus est, quando illa scientia, quae de aliquo subiecto determinat modo grosso et sensibili, subalternatur illi, quae de illo subiecto determinat modo intelligibili et subtili, sicut in eodem libro per Philosophum ponitur exemplum, quod navalis astrologia subalternatur astrologiae speculativae et mathematicae¹⁶¹. Nam de serenitate et tempestate temporis determinat 116rbl astrologia mathematica modo subtili et intelligibili, quia secundum situm et concursum astrorum, de quibus determinat astrologia navalis modo grosso et sensibili, quia solum secundum apparentias et signa quaedam sensibilia.

<III>

Distinctis ergo modis subalternationis possumus dicere, quod omnibus istis quinque modis scientia nostra et beatorum subalternatur divinae scientiae. Nostra vero scientia solum quattuor modis subalternatur scientiae beatorum, sed scientiae humanitus acquisitae nostra scientia divinitus inspirata subalternatur solum uno modo.

Primum autem sic patet. Nam scientia nostra et beatorum subalternatur divinae scientiae quantum ad primum. Nam si scientia divina natura est libera, omnis autem natura humana est multipliciter serva, ut Philosophus dicit I *Metaphysicae*¹⁶², oportet, quod sola divina sapientia sit libera, omnis autem creaturae cognitio sit ancilla et subserviens sibi.

Si vero principia scientiae, quam habemus de Deo, sibi ipsi sunt evidentissime cognita, a nobis autem sunt solum credita, quia ab ipso revelata, oportet nostram scientiam suae scientiae subalternari quantum ad modum secundum.

2170 serenitate] *corr. ex serenitatem* 2173 sensibili] *et add. ms, om.*

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 79a 11–12: AL IV, 1–4, 300, 28–30.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 78b 30: AL IV, 1–4, 300, 18.

¹⁶² Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, I, 2, 982b 29–30: AL XXV, 3.2, 16, 134–135.

Si autem ipse per suam scientiam cognoscit se ipsum inquantum Deus et sub ratione absoluta, nos autem cognoscimus ipsum secundum modum contractum et secundum rationem specialem, subalternabitur nostra scientia suae scientiae quantum ad modum tertium.

2195 Si vero in nostra scientia, quam habemus de Deo, continentur aliqua per nostram rationem investigabilia, ut Deum esse actum purum et causam omnium entium et cetera talia, aliqua vero, quae nos prae-
supponimus esse evidenter cognita in scientia sua, ut Deum esse trinum
et unum et alia huiusmodi, oportet saltem secundum istam partem nos-
2200 tram scientiam suae scientiae subalternari quantum ad modum quartum.

Sed si ipse uno verbo intelligibili, simplicissimo et sibi coae-
terno se et omnia alia intelligit, nos autem per nostram scientiam
cognoscimus modo sensibili et grosso, subalternabitur nostra scientia
quantum ad modum quintum suae scientiae.

2205 Quattuor autem modis nostra scientia subalternatur scientiae beatorum. Nam cum ipsi sint in statu libertatis, nos autem in statu servitutis; amplius cum principia fidei sint eis evidenter cognita, a nobis autem sint solum credita et aenigmatice et obscure intellecta; ulterius cum secundum illam partem, secundum quam nos considera-
2210 mus in hac scientia aliqua simpliciter credibilia, quae in scientia beatorum sunt evidenter cognita, cum etiam illa, quae ipsi intelligunt modo subtili et intelligibili, nos modo grosso et sensibili cognoscamus, oportet secundum omnes istos quattuor modos nostram scientiam eorum scientiae subalternari. Verum quia secundum eundem modum
2215 contractionis [16va] et sub speciali ratione ipsi et nos Deum cognoscimus, ideo quantum ad istum modum nostra scientia ipsorum scientiae non subalternatur.

Sed scientiae humanitus acquisitae haec doctrina potest dici, quod subalternetur solum uno modo. Nam cum multa contineantur in
2220 ista scientia, de quibus scientiae humanitus acquisitae dicunt causam et *propter quid*, ista autem doctrina de praedictis dicat solum *quia*, ut quia sunt divinitus inspirata, poterit haec doctrina quantum ad istam partem scientiae humanitus inventae subalternari.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod sufficit principia, quae in scientia
2225 subalternata sunt solum credita, in scientia subalternante esse eviden-

ter cognita ad hoc, ut illa scientia subalternetur illi. Quod autem scientia subalternans dicat *propter quid* eius, quod scientia subalternata dicit *quia*, hoc est per accidens, ut inquantum talia reperiuntur in scientiis humanis, quae sunt de rebus, quantum per se sunt causae.

2230 AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod licet principia istius scientiae sint immediate a Deo revelata, sunt tamen in scientia beatorum evidenter cognita. Et hoc sufficit <ad hoc>, quod ista scientia dicatur illi subalternari.

2235 AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod tam scientia beatorum quam nostra sequitur modum divinae sapientiae, cum utraque sit ab ipso Deo inspirata. Ideo sicut illa cognoscit particularia in propria forma, sic per hanc possunt praedicta singularia in propria forma cognosci.

<Quaestio 3>

2240 Tertio quaeritur, utrum haec doctrina subalternet sibi omnes scientias humanas

ET VIDETUR quod non, quia nulla scientia humana accipit principia ab ista scientia. Sed omnis scientia subalternata recipit principia a subalternante. Ergo nulla scientia humana subalternatur isti.

2245 <2.> Praeterea. De multis tractat ista scientia, de quibus dicit solum *quia*. Et de praedictis scientiae humanitatis inventae dicunt causam et *propter quid*. Ergo haec doctrina non subalternabit sibi scientias humanas, sed potius subalternabitur eis.

2250 IN CONTRARIUM est, quia tunc scientia est sub scientia, quando lumen est sub lumine. Sed lumen naturale, cui innituntur scientiae humanae, est sub lumine divino, cui innititur haec doctrina. Ergo videtur, quod scientiae humanae sint sub ista et subalternentur sibi.

2255 RESPONDEO. Dicendum, quod ad intellectum istius quaestionis primo videndum est, quae sunt illa, quae faciunt difficultatem in quaesito, secundo, illae difficultates solventur, tertio, ex hoc declarabitur, quod secundum aliquos modos scientiae humanae subalternentur isti.

2254 solventur] *corr. ex solvetur.*

<I>

Sunt autem tria, quae videntur facere difficultatem in proposito. Primum est, quia cum scientia subalternans descendat in subalternatam, si haec doctrina subalternaret sibi omnes scientias humanas, tunc esset descensus a genere in genus, cum ista scientia genere differat a scientiis humanis 116vbl acquisitis, quod est contra Philosophum I *Posteriorum* in illo capitulo¹⁶³. Non est igitur ex alio genere descendentem demonstrare.

Secundum est, quia cum scientia subalternata recipiat principia a subalternante, si haec doctrina subalternaret sibi scientias humanas, oporteret ipsam tradere principia omnibus scientiis praedictis, quod est falsum, quia nulla scientia humana ab ista recipit sua principia.

Tertium est, quia cum scientia subalternans sit universalior subalternatis et consideret solum universaliter illa, quae scientiae subalternatae cognoscunt particulariter in propria forma, <si haec doctrina subalternaret sibi scientias humanas, oporteret ipsam tradere cognitionem de entibus solum universalem et non posset ea cognoscere in propria forma>.

<II>

Istae autem difficultates sic solvuntur.

Nam dato quod ista scientia subalternet sibi scientias humanas, non tamen sequitur, quod sit descensus de genere in genus, quia cum consideret optimum in toto genere entium, habet assumere in obsequium suum omnes alias scientias multo fortius quam metaphysica, cum etiam ipsa metaphysica sit subserviens et ancillans respectu eius. Nec oportet, quod tradat principia aliis scientiis, quia haec doctrina est habita per revelationem, aliae vero sunt inventae in lumine naturali intellectus agentis, ideo non recipiunt scientiae humanae principia ab ista, sed magis ab ipsa metaphysica, quae tradit cognitionem talium secundum rationis modum.

Similiter non oportet hanc doctrinam tradere cognitionem de entibus solum universalem, quia cum sequatur modum divinae cogni-

2270-2273 <si ... forma>] suppl. iuxta textum solutionis huius argumenti.

¹⁶³ Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 78b 33sqq.: AL IV, 1-4, 300, 8sqq.

tionis, potest omnia in propria forma cognoscere multo melius quam scientiae humanitas acquisitae.

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<III>

Ex hoc ergo possumus dicere, quod secundum triplicem modum haec doctrina subalternat sibi scientias humanas.

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Primo, quia ista sola est divina, omnes autem scientiae sunt ancillae et subservientes sibi. Et si secundum istum modum scientiae humanae subalternarentur metaphysicae, multo fortius secundum praedictum modum scientiae humanae debent huic scientiae subalternari. Unde *Proverbiorum*, IX, scribitur, quod divina sapientia "misit ancillas suas", hoc est misit scientias humanas, "ut vocarent ad arcem et ad moenia civitatis"¹⁶⁴. Debent enim vocari scientiae philosophicae ad munitionem istius scientiae, quae dicitur civitas et castrorum acies ordinata, nam recipit munitionem et fortitudinem ista scientia non solum ex divina auctoritate, sed etiam ex his, quae philosophi ductu rationis dixerunt et ex humana veritate. Unde Damascenus IV libro, 9 capitulo, dicit, quod "si ab his philosophis, «qui foris sunt»,¹⁶⁵ fructificare aliquod utile poterimus, non eiectibile est. Sed purum aurum coacervantes, contaminatum autem refutantes assumamus sermones optimos. Deos autem derisibiles et fabulas alienas canibus proiciamus", et subdit, quod "plurimam enim ex ipsis adversus ipsos fortitudinem habere poterimus"¹⁶⁶. 117ra

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Secundo, quia ista scientia considerat modo subtili, quia modo revelativo, illa, quae considerant scientiae humanae modo grosso, quia modo humano et sensibili. Propter quod si secundum istum modum navalis astrologia subalternatur astrologiae mathematicae, multo fortius secundum talem modum scientiae humanae debent huic subalternari. Nec est iste modus omnino aequivocus, sed est aliququaliter analogus, quia lumen naturale, cui innituntur scientiae humanae, est in

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2303 adversus ipsos] ad ipsos *add. ms, iter.*

¹⁶⁴ Prov. 9, 3.

¹⁶⁵ I Tim. 3, 7.

¹⁶⁶ Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, IV, 9, 2: ed. BUYTAERT, 337, 41–46.

aliquali analogia ad lumen divinum, cui innititur haec scientia. Ideo sicut istud lumen est sub illo, ita scientiae humanae debent esse sub ista.

2320 Tertio, quia haec doctrina est simplicior et formalior omnibus, cum sit in ipso Deo, qui est "actus purus, cui non admiscetur aliquid de potentia"¹⁶⁷. Omnes autem scientiae humanae sunt materiales et sensibiles respectu eius, quia aut sunt de sensibilibus, aut de his, quae sunt in sensibilibus, aut de his, quae habent sensibilia partem sui, ideo
2325 si secundum talem modum steriometria subalternatur geometriae, ut dicitur I *Posteriorum*¹⁶⁸, quae est sensibilis et materialis respectu eius, multo magis secundum praedictum modum scientiae humanae debent isti doctrinae subalternari.

2330 ARGUMENTA autem soluta sunt in corpore quaestionis.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 136 (255); Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, X, com. 7: ed. Iunctina, t. VIII, fol. 257A-B.

¹⁶⁸ Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 13, 78b 30: AL IV, 1-4, 300, 15.

THE EARLIEST PHASE OF THE JANSENIST CONTROVERSY AMONG THE FLEMISH CAPUCHINS ||

Part I:¹

Hildebrand's interpretation and the case of Eugenius of Bruges*

Abstract

The last and most thorough treatment of the Jansenist controversy among the Capuchins of the Flandro-Belgian Province was published in 1951/1957 by Hildebrand of Hooglede (O.F.M.Cap.). The present article, which consists of two parts and is based on a large selection of unedited or previously neglected documents, assesses Hildebrand's methodology and (some of his) conclusions.

The first part shows that Hildebrand's account of the controversy depends to a high extent on the apologetic discourse that was used by one of the parties involved in the controversy and that is best illustrated by the *Compendiosa et historica enarratio miserrimi status Prouvinciae Flandro-Belgicae fratrum Minorum Capucinatorum* by Michael of Oudenbosch and Angelus of Antwerp (1700). In addition, it is shown that by using a purely formal definition of Jansenism, Hildebrand managed to deny the existence of any 'real' Jansenist among his predecessors of the 17th and 18th centuries. A detailed analysis of some works by Eugenius of Bruges (1680s) proves that the use of this purely formal definition has lead to historically untenable conclusions.

The article's second part (which will appear in the next issue of this journal) will examine a claim by Silvester of Hasselt in his *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio fidelis et sincera* (1700), according to which Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch and especially Fulgentius of Maaseik were the first to propagate Jansenius' teaching within the Flandro-Belgian Province. It is shown against Hildebrand that the anti-Jansenist decree that was issued by Provincial Patricius of Hazebroek in 1668, had indeed been provoked by Fulgentius of Maaseik's theological course at Antwerp during the years 1665-1668. Just like his disciple Eugenius was to do in the 1680s, Fulgentius championed the doctrines presented in the *Augustinus*, the consequence being that Silvester of Hasselt and other anti-Jansenists, who were convinced that Jansenius' book was rightly condemned by Innocent X and Alexander VII, did have

* I thank Ernest Persoons, Toon Van Houdt, Michel Van Meerbeeck and Anthony Dupont for their comments on a first draft of this article. In what follows, the 10 volumes of the *De Kapucijnen in de Nederlanden en het prinsbisdom Luik* by Hildebrand of Hooglede (Antwerpen 1945-1956) will be referred to as Hildebrand I, II, III, etc.

serious theological (and not only personal or political) motives for accusing him of having been a Jansenist heretic.

1. Introduction¹

On 1 August 1641, the Roman Inquisition issued a decree which prohibited Cornelius Jansenius' *Augustinus* together with several Jesuit theses against this work. Following on this decree, which was not carried out in the Spanish Low Countries,² Joannes Jansenius, nephew of Cornelius, collected through a private inquiry the testimony of 56 persons in favour of the work of his uncle.³ One of these testimonies was written by the Provincial of the Flemish Capuchins Cassianus of Geldern (1641-1644),⁴ who claimed that in the *Augustinus* a candle was lit that should not be covered with a vessel, but put on a candlestick in order that everyone who entered might see the light (as it is said in Lk. 8:16:

¹ For a general synthesis of the Capuchin position towards Jansenism, see *Jansenismus*, in: *Lexicon Capuccinum. Promptuarium historico-bibliographicum Ordinis fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum (1525-1950)* (Romae 1951) cc. 789-790; Melchior a Pobladora, *Historia generalis Ordinis fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum. Pars secunda (1619-1761). II* (Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina. Sectio historica 9, Romae 1948) pp. 246-262; *Pars tertia (1761-1940)* (Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina. Sectio historica 10, Romae 1951) pp. 557-561; P. Carlini, *Francesco Maria Casini (1648-1719). Un restauratore dell'oratoria Italiana* (Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina 25, Roma 1969) pp. 225-242; P. Stella, *Gli ordini religiosi e il giansenismo nell'Italia del '700. Il caso dei Cappuccini*, in: G. Ingegneri, *I Cappuccini nell'Umbria del Settecento* (Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina 82, Roma 2008) pp. 7-43. For the Jansenist controversy in the Flandro-Belgian Province, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 333-556 (1951); *Les Capucins en Belgique et au Nord de la France. Synthèse historique illustrée* (Anvers 1957) pp. 42-57.

² See J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme*, in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 8.1 (Paris 1924) cc. 318-529 (esp. c. 451); L. Ceyssens, *Sources relatives aux débuts du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme. 1640-1643* (Bibliothèque de la Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 31, Louvain 1957) pp. XXXI-XXXIII (on the decree of 1 August 1641) and 171-175 (n° 169; edition of the decree); *Het theologisch denken en het Jansenisme. 1640-1730*, in: *Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden. VIII. Nieuwe tijd* (Haarlem 1979) pp. 418-438 (esp. p. 423); *Que penser finalement de l'histoire du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme?*, in: *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 88 (1993) pp. 108-129 (esp. p. 116); L. Cognet, *Le jansénisme (Que sais-je? 960)*, Paris 1961 p. 36; M. Lamberigts, *Il giansenismo nei Paesi Bassi meridionali nel XVII secolo*, in: L. Vaccaro, *Storia religiosa di Belgio, Olanda e Lussemburgo. I* (Europa Ricerche 6, Milano 2000) pp. 281-314 (esp. p. 290).

³ See L. Ceyssens, *L'enquête officielle faite en 1644 dans les diocèses des Pays-Bas sur le scandale causé par l'«Augustinus» de Corneille Jansénius. La part qu'y prirent les Franciscains*, in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 48 (1950) pp. 68-160 (esp. pp. 70-73 and 141-146); *Les Capucins belges et l'enquête de 1644 sur le scandale causé par l'«Augustinus» de Corneille Jansénius*, in: *Collectanea Franciscana* 21 (1951) pp. 186-210 (esp. pp. 186-190).

⁴ See Hildebrand VI, p. 559 (n°s 26-28).

Nemo autem lucernam accendens operit eam uaso aut subtus lectum ponit, sed supra candelabrum ponit, ut intrantes uideant lumen) and those who still remained outside might enter. This candle, Cassianus stated, had been lit with the light of Saint Augustine's teaching:⁵

*R^{mus} D. Cornelius Jansenius, Episcopus Iprensis, in Augustino suo, in quo agit de haeresi Pelagiana, de statu naturae innocentis, lapsae, purae, reparaetae, de liberi arbitrii natura, de nutricis omnium gratiae diuinae uiribus, lucernam accenderat non ex proprio, sed ex ipsius theologorum omnium magistri S. Augustini lumine; qui unde lumen hauserit, luce meridiana clarius est. Vnde iure merito omnes pii et qui aequi ueritatis aestimatores sincerique amatores sunt et lumen in admirabili illo D. Jansenii opere clarissime uident, anhelant, optant, orant, obsecrant ut lucerna haec, tam feliciter indefesso labore accensa, non in abscondito et sub modio ponatur, sed super candelabrum, ut qui hactenus non ingressi, ingrediantur et lumen uideant. Hoc ego infra-scriptus opto, anhelō, oro, obsecro, qui aliud fateri non possum quam doctrinam D. Cornelii Jansenii esse doctrinam S. Augustini; quae a sanctis orthodoxa, caelestis, apostolica, euangelica, defaecatissima, saluberrima et indubitata [...] habetur et habita olim fuit.*⁶

The decree of 1 August 1641 was followed on 6 March 1642 by the bull *In eminenti*, which would be published in the Spanish Low Countries in 1651. Through this bull, Urbanus VIII confirmed the earlier bulls of Pius V and Gregory XIII against Michael Baius (*Ex omnibus afflictionibus* [1567] and *Prouisionis nostrae* [1579]), the decrees of 1611 and 1625 against the publication without the explicit authorisation of the Roman Inquisition of works *de Auxiliis*, as well as the decree of 1641. In addition, Jansenius' *Augustinus* was explicitly condemned for having caused scandal because of its defence of several propositions that had already been prohibited by the earlier bulls against Baius.⁷ In 1644, an official enquiry took place in several dioceses of the Spanish Low Countries concerning the scandal the *Augustinus* had caused according to the bull.⁸ Among the statements that were collected during

⁵ Compare Mt. 5:15; Mk. 4:21; Lk. 11:33.

⁶ See L. Ceyssens, *Les Capucins belges et l'enquête de 1644* [n. 3] pp. 189-190 (n° I); Hildebrand VI, pp. 340-341.

⁷ See J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2], c. 452; L. Ceyssens, *La première bulle contre Jansénius. Sources relatives à son histoire (1644-1653)*. I. (1644-1649) (*Bibliothèque de l'Institut historique belge de Rome* 9, Bruxelles-Rome 1961) pp. VI-IX; *Het theologisch denken* [n. 2] pp. 423-426; *Que penser finalement* [n. 2] pp. 116-119; L. Cognet, *Le jansénisme* [n. 2] pp. 36-37; M. Lamberigts, *Il giansenismo* [n. 2] pp. 290-291.

⁸ See L. Ceyssens, *L'enquête officielle faite en 1644* [n. 3] *passim*; *Het theologisch denken* [n. 2] p. 425; *Que penser finalement* [n. 2] pp. 118-119; M. Lamberigts, *Il giansenismo* [n. 2] pp. 291-292.

this enquiry, several were written by Cassianus of Geldern and other Capuchin friars, most of them claiming that the *Augustinus* contained the doctrine of the bishop of Hippo and had not caused scandal.⁹ A nice example of such a testimony in favour of Jansenius was written by Marcellinus of Helmont, former *Sacrae Theologiae lector* and then Guardian of the convent at Kortrijk.¹⁰ Marcellinus claimed that, as long as the Holy See did not decide otherwise, he would continue to consider the *Augustinus* a monument of erudition and orthodox thinking that deserved to be printed in gilded letters. Stronger still, Jansenius himself deserved the honour of being remembered through the erection of a statue.¹¹ Six years earlier, in a letter of 1638, the same Marcellinus, who had been a disciple of Fromondus, one of the posthumous editors of the *Augustinus*, had already expressed his regret at the death of Jansenius († 6 May 1638) as well as his hope that Fromondus would succeed to the latter as bishop of Ypres.¹²

It should be mentioned also that Cassianus of Geldern's commitment to the cause of the *Augustinus* was not limited to his testimonies for the enquiries of 1641 and 1644. According to a letter that was written in Rome on 16 September 1643 by an anonymous Oratorian priest, Cassianus had presented 400 *approbationes* of Jansenius' book to Cardinal Protector Antonio Barberini during his stay in the City at the occasion of the General Chapter of May 1643.¹³

In spite of this early Capuchin support for Jansenius, a decree was issued by Minister General Fortunatus of Cadore (1650-1656) and

⁹ See L. Ceyssens, *Les Capucins belges et l'enquête de 1644* [n. 3] *passim*; Marcellien et Héliodore de Barea en face du jansénisme, in: *Collectanea Franciscana* 27 (1957) pp. 82-87; Hildebrand VI, pp. 341-343.

¹⁰ See Hildebrand V, p. 265; VIII, p. 534 (n° 20).

¹¹ See L. Ceyssens, *Les Capucins belges et l'enquête de 1644* [n. 3] pp. 206-207 (n° XVI): *His omnibus consideratis et attentis, quam diu aliud per Sedem Apostolicam non declaretur, censeo librum R^{mi} D. Jansenii Episcopi Iprensis, intitulum Augustinus, esse opus admirandum, elaboratissimum, doctissimum, piissimum, doctrinam coelestem quae tamquam noua lux in tenebris lucet; ac proinde esse cedro dignum, aureis typis (ut ita loquor) merito mandandum; tale tandem esse opus pro quo Deo gratiae sint agenda; et auctori ipsi, intuitu D. Augustini, in aeternae memoriae monumentum statua sit erigenda; tantum abest ut eius memoria per exhumationem corporis (ut sparsum dicitur) sit oblitteranda.*

¹² See *Archivum Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 8733; Hildebrand VI, p. 345; P. Marcellinus Bogaerts van Helmond (1594-1656), in: *Neerlandia Franciscana* 2 (1919) pp. 85-93 (esp. pp. 91-92) = Hildebrand, *Miscellanea*. II (Leuven 2000) pp. 1005-1013 (esp. pp. 1011-1012).

¹³ See L. Ceyssens, *Sources relatives aux débuts du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme* [n. 2] p. 537 (n° 532): [...] *Prouincialis Capuccinorum, uir perquam eruditus, qui librum Jansenii approbavit et quadringentorum religiosorum approbationes attulit e Belgio et Cardinali Barberino exhibuit.*

his Definitors General at the General Chapter of June 1650, in which Capuchin friars were prohibited to hold or teach the doctrine of Jansenius' *Augustinus*¹⁴ and this out of respect for the constitutions and decrees of Urbanus VIII (the decree of 1641 and the bull *In eminenti*) and those of his successor Innocent X.¹⁵ Moreover, after Innocent X had promulgated a new bull against Jansenius on 31 Mai 1653 (*Cum occasione*),¹⁶ in which he condemned five propositions that were said to express opinions advocated by the *Augustinus*,¹⁷ the Capuchin

¹⁴ See *Analecta Ordinis Minorum Capuccinorum* 6 (1890) pp. 342-343 (n° 117): *Vt reuerentiam et obedientiam Sedi Apostolicae in omni occurrentia profiteamur, inhaerentes constitutionibus et decretis Urbani VIII fel. rec. et SS^{mi} Domini Innocentii X: mandamus nostris omnibus, maxime lectoribus et concionatoribus, ut doctrinam in libro Jansenii Yprensii Episcopi, cui titulus est Augustinus, traditam, a S. Sede Apostolica damnatam et circumscriptam, tueri ac docere non praesumant; qui secus fecerint, praeter poenas in ipsis constitutionibus Apostolicis inflictas, si sint Superiores, officio suo, si lectores, facultate legendi, si praedicatores, concionandi potestate priuentur, et aliis poenis subjaceant arbitrio Superiorum infligendis. Datum Romae, die 25 Junii 1650.* Other editions of the decree are *Lettre d'un Capucin de Flandres* [see n. 23] pp. 3-4 and L. Ceyssens, *La première bulle contre Jansénisme. Sources relatives à son histoire (1644-1653). II. (1650-1653)* (Bibliothèque de l'Institut historique belge de Rome 10, Bruxelles-Rome 1962) p. 47 (n° 886). A handwritten copy of the decree is *Archium Capucinum Belgii* I, 1288.

¹⁵ Since the decree of Fortunatus of Cadore dates from 1650, it does not refer here to Innocent's bull *Cum occasione* (1653). However, Innocent confirmed his predecessor's measures against the *Augustinus* in several official documents that predate 1650. See, e.g., J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] c. 454; L. Ceyssens, *La première bulle contre Jansénisme. I* [n. 7] pp. 193-199 (nos 193-203) and 203-204 (n° 208).

¹⁶ For an overview of the facts leading up to the promulgation of *Cum occasione*, see J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2], cc. 474-476; L. Ceyssens, *Het theologisch denken* [n. 2] p. 426; *Que penser finalement* [n. 2] pp. 119-121; L. Cognet, *Le jansénisme* [n. 2] pp. 48-61; M. Lamberigts, *Il giansenismo* [n. 2] pp. 292-295.

¹⁷ That the propositions express opinions defended by the *Augustinus*, is claimed by the words that open and close the bull: *Cum occasione impressionis libri, cui titulus: Augustinus Cornelii Jansenii, Episcopi Yprensii, inter alias ejus opiniones orta fuerit, praesertim in Galiis, controuersia super quinque ex illis, [...] Non intendentes tamen per hanc declarationem & definitionem super praedictis quinque propositionibus factam approbare ullatenus alias opiniones, quae continentur in praedicto libro Cornelii Jansenii* (text borrowed from Carolus du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de nouis erroribus, qui ab initio duodecimi saeculi post Incarnationem Verbi, usque ad annum 1735 in Ecclesia proscripti sunt & notati. III* [Lutetiae Parisiorum 1736] pp. 261-262). For a partial edition of *Cum occasione*, see H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* (Freiburg im Breisgau [...] Wien 2001³⁹) nos 2001-2007. The claim of *Cum occasione* is contested by L. Ceyssens, *Que penser finalement* [n. 2] p. 121: 'A tout examinateur sérieux il n'aurait fallu qu'un quart d'heure pour se convaincre que la première proposition est entièrement inauthentique, et que l'attribution à Jansénisme est insoutenable et injuste, les quatre autres restant fort douteuses.' Compare also L. Ceyssens, *L'authenticité des cinq propositions condamnées de Jansénisme*, in: *Antonianum* 55 (1980) pp. 368-424. According to other researchers, the five propositions – the first,

decree of 1650 was reaffirmed and enlarged with a reference to *Cum occasione* at the General Chapter of June 1656. This new decree, which was signed by Minister General Simplicianus of Milan (1656-1662) and his Definitors General, prohibited Capuchin friars not only to adhere to the propositions that had been condemned by Innocent X, but also to interpret them ([...] *ne quis propositiones dicti Jansenii a fel. rec. D. Innocentii [sic] Papa X tanquam haereticas damnatas quomodolibet tuere [sic] nec etiam interpretare [sic] praesumant [sic]* [...]). The latter specification probably referred to the strategy of some of Jansenius' followers, who claimed that the five propositions could each have different meanings and that the meanings condemned by *Cum occasione* did not reflect the teaching of the *Augustinus*. This was the position of, among others, Antoine Arnauld,¹⁸ whose teaching was explicitly condemned at the very end of the Capuchin decree of 1656: [...] *sicut neque doctrinam Arnaldi et Arnaldistarum, itidem damnatam [...]*.¹⁹ The same strategy was to be condemned on 16 October of the same year by Pope Alexander VII in the bull *Ad*

which is the only that occurs (almost) literally in the *Augustinus* (tom. 3, lib. 3, cap. 13), as well as the other four – can all be interpreted in a sense that reflects the teachings of Jansenius. These authors also claim that this was the sense in which the propositions were condemned by *Cum occasione* and later bulls. See, e.g., the detailed analysis of J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2], cc. 476-494 and the claims of L. Kolakowski, *God owes us nothing. A Brief Remark on Pascal's Religion and on the Spirit of Jansenism* (Chicago-London 1995) p. 30 ('[...] both the popes and the Jesuits [...] were right in the matter-of-fact questions: the five propositions quite accurately summed up the sense of *Augustinus*; the Jansenists were right in their claim that *Augustinus* was perfectly faithful to its title'); G. Lettieri, *Il metodo della grazia. Pascal e l'ermeneutica giansenista di Agostino* (Roma 1999) p. 179; A. Richardt, *Le jansénisme. De Jansénius à la mort de Louis XIV* (Paris 2002) pp. 75-79.

¹⁸ See L. Cognet, *Le jansénisme* [n. 2] p. 64 ([...] il concluait que, si le pape avait justement condamné les Cinq propositions au sens hérétique, ce sens n'était nullement celui de Jansénius [...]); L. Kolakowski, *God owes us nothing* [n. 17] pp. 9-30. For the different possible meanings of the five propositions, see also G. Lettieri, *Il metodo della grazia* [n. 17] pp. 179-187 (on the so-called *Ecrit à trois colonnes*); P. Sellier, *Qu'est-ce que le jansénisme (1640-1713)?*, in: *Port-Royal et la littérature. II. Le siècle de saint Augustin, La Rochefoucauld, Mme de Lafayette, Sacy, Racine* (Paris 2000) pp. 43-76 (esp. pp. 67-71).

¹⁹ See *Analecta Ordinis Minorum Capuccinorum* 7 (1891) pp. 50-51 (n° 121), where the quotation of the decree of 1650 is followed by the following sentences: *Praedictum decretum emanatum et subscriptum ab A. R. P. Generali et Deffinitoribus Capituli Generalis anno quo supra, infrascripti Adm. RR. PP. Generalis et Deffinitores praesentis Capituli celebrati in eodem loco quo supra, die 3 Junii anni 1656 confirmarunt; addentes ulterius, ne quis propositiones dicti Jansenii a fel. rec. D. Innocentii [sic] Papa X tanquam haereticas damnatas, quomodolibet tuere [sic] nec etiam interpretare [sic] praesumant [sic]: sicut neque doctrinam Arnaldi et Arnaldistarum, itidem damnatam, sub poenis, quibus ut supra.*

sacram, which intended to safeguard the decisions of *Cum occasione* against some *iniquitatis filii*, who claimed that the five propositions could not be found in the *Augustinus* ([...] *praedictas quinque propositiones, uel in libro praedicto ejusdem Cornelii Jansenii non reperiri, sed fictas & pro arbitrio compositas esse* [...]) or at least had not been condemned in the sense intended by Jansenius (*uel non in sensu ab eodem intento damnatas fuisse*).²⁰ For this reason, Alexander defined in *Ad sacram* that the five propositions had not only been extracted from the *Augustinus*, but had also been condemned in the sense intended by Jansenius: *praeinsertam Innocentii praedecessoris nostri constitutionem, declarationem & definitionem harum seriè confirmamus, approbamus & innouamus, & quinque illas propositiones ex libro praememorati Cornelii Jansenii Episcopi Yprensis, cui titulus: Augustinus, excerptas ac in sensu ab eodem Cornelio intento damnatas fuisse declaramus & definimus*.²¹ Both the Capuchin decree of 1656 and the papal bulls against Jansenius do not seem to have been proclaimed immediately in the convents of the Flandro-Belgian Province. For as late as January/February 1658, Simplicianus of Milan still had to insist in two letters to Provincial Valentinus of Leuven that the bulls and the decree had to be proclaimed in all convents.²²

According to several sources, some of which will be investigated below, the decrees issued at the General Chapters of 1650 and 1656 did not have the intended effect, especially not in the Flandro-Belgian Province.²³ During the second half of the 17th and the first half of the

²⁰ *Cum autem, sicut accepimus, nonnulli iniquitatis filii praedictas quinque propositiones, uel in libro praedicto ejusdem Cornelii Jansenii non reperiri, sed fictas & pro arbitrio compositas esse, uel non in sensu ab eodem intento damnatas fuisse asserere magno cum Christi fidelium scandalo non reformident, [...]* (text borrowed from Carolus du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum* [n. 17] p. 281; compare H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2010).

²¹ Text borrowed from Carolus du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum* [n. 17] p. 281; compare H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n°s 2011-2012.

²² See *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 4853 (2 January 1658; regarding the papal bulls): [...] *his praesentibus RPV. iniungimus ut omni diligentia & sollicitudine curet in sua Prouincia doctrinam Jansenisticam totaliter ubique radicitus abscindi nec ab ullo directe uel indirecte scriptis aut uerbis, seu colloquiis teneri, doceri aut insinuari permittat, aut ullo modo patiat, bullasque ab Illustrissimo Domino Intermittio missas, si non adhuc publicauerit, quam primum publicari satagat, ne illi ob id aliqua conquerendi ansa praebeat; I, 4855 (24 February 1658; regarding the decree): [...] *decretum quantocyus fuit publicandum, ne [...] ob dilata remedia uirus Jansenisticum fere maiorem partem, et etiam ex nobilioribus & relligiosis, inficeret & corrumperet; Hildebrand VI, p. 351.**

²³ The first decree was contested as early as 2 March 1651 in the so-called *Lettre d'un Capucin de Flandres*, a pamphlet of 4 pages (*Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* III, 3006 is a copy of *Paris Bibl. Nat. D. 3731* [and not *D. 3791*]). This letter,

18th centuries, many Flemish Capuchins, including even some of their Superiors, were accused by fellow brothers of fostering Jansenist sympathies and even of spreading the ideas of the bishop of Ypres. In July 1668, these accusations lead to the promulgation by the Provincial *Definitorium* of a decree that prohibited the teaching of several suspected propositions, including the five propositions condemned by Innocent X as well as several propositions condemned in the bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* against Michael Baius (a critical edition of this decree as well as an analysis of its historical context will be offered below in §§5.1 and 5.3). Moreover, upset by the accusations, the Roman authorities repeatedly intervened in the government of the Flandro-Belgian Province, the most important of these interventions being the promulgation by Minister General Stephanus of Cesena of an enlarged version of the decree of 1668 (22 January 1674)²⁴, the visitations of the Province by the Austrian Definitor General Ildefonsus of Carlshoven (June–September 1682) and the Ex-provincial of Aragon Arsenius of Fuentes (1686–1687),²⁵ the (unsuccessful) promulgation by Minister General Bernardinus of Arezzo of Molina's views on divine grace and predestination (28 June 1691),²⁶ the imposed government of Definitor General Juvenalis of Nonsberg (1695–1697),²⁷ the appointment by the Roman authorities of (part of) the Flemish Superiors from

which was extensively quoted in the *Mémoires [...] sur l'histoire ecclésiastique du XVII^e siècle* of Godefroi Hermant (ed. A. Gazier, vol. 1 [Paris 1905] pp. 528–529) and the *Rémontrance aux Pères Jésuites, touchant un libelle, qu'ils ont fait courir dans Paris*, etc. of Antoine Arnauld (December 1651; *Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld* 29 [Paris 1779] pp. 503–504), claimed that the decree of 1650 had not been issued by the General Chapter, but only by a restricted group of individuals consisting of Minister General Fortunatus of Cadore and his Definitors General. According to the anonymous author, the decree not only repudiated Jansenius' doctrines, but also implied a condemnation of the bishop of Hippo in favour of Molinism. Hildebrand VI, p. 348 rightly states that the anonymous Capuchin can not have been a member of the Flandro-Belgian Province. According to L. Willaert, *Bibliotheca Janseniana Belgica*. I. *Années 1476–1679* (Namur-Paris 1949) p. 208 (n° 2676) and L. Ceyssens, *Les progrès de l'antijansénisme aux Pays-Bas (1647–1656)*, in: *Jansenistica minora*. VII (Malines 1962) n° 54, pp. 106–107, it was written by Guillaume Le Roy, Jansenist abbot of the Cistercian abbey of Haute-Fontaine and acquaintance of Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole. This attribution can already be found in the 18th-century versions of Louis Moréri's *Le grand dictionnaire historique* (e.g., vol. 6 [Paris 1725] p. 219).

²⁴ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 356–358.

²⁵ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 379–383 (Ildefonsus of Carlshoven) and 397–412 (Arsenius of Fuentes).

²⁶ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 433–434.

²⁷ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 439–441.

1695 onwards,²⁸ the abolition by Clement XI of the *discreti* (28 August 1702),²⁹ etc.

2. Hildebrand's view of the Jansenist controversy in the Flandro-Belgian Province

The most thorough treatment of the Jansenist crisis within the Flandro-Belgian Province can be read in the 6th volume of *De Kapucijnen in de Nederlanden en het prinsbisdom Luik* by Hildebrand of Hooglede, archivist of the Flemish Capuchins in the years 1913-1958.³⁰ A synthesis of this extensive treatment was given by the same author in *Les Capucins en Belgique et au Nord de la France*. Although these texts were published in respectively 1951 and 1957,³¹ their interpretation of the crisis is still authoritative.³²

In Hildebrand's account, the words 'Jansenist' and 'Janse-nism' refer to someone who/a movement that refused to condemn the five propositions prohibited by *Cum occasione*. I will use the terms mostly to refer to someone who/a movement that claimed that Jansenius' *Augustinus* adequately presented Saint Augustine's purely Catholic teaching on divine grace and predestination. Only very few people could be called 'Jansenist' in Hildebrand's sense, but there existed many of the second type, even if the latter would have preferred to be called 'Augustinians' rather than 'Jansenists'. For the terms 'Jansenist' and 'Jansenism' properly belong to anti-Jansenist discourse rather than to the self-presentation of Jansenius'

²⁸ See Hildebrand's extremely complex chapters 7-11 (vol. VI, pp. 427-512).

²⁹ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 456-458. The *discreti* were reintroduced by Minister General Michael Angelus of Ragusa in 1717 (pp. 524-526). At the end of the above synthesis, it should be mentioned that no Capuchin is mentioned in the list of members of the Secret Society for the accusation of Jansenism that was founded at Louvain around 1680. This society counted, however, many Friars Minor amongst its members. See L. Ceyssens, *Een geheim genootschap ter bestrijding van het Jansenisme in België*, in: id., *Jansenistica. Studiën in verband met de geschiedenis van het Janse-nisme*. I (Mechelen 1950) pp. 343-397 (esp. 363-366).

³⁰ Hildebrand of Hooglede was the religious name of Julius Raes. See J. P. Tytgat, *Raes, Julius*, in: *Nationaal biografisch woordenboek*. VII (Brussel 1977) cc. 775-780.

³¹ See n. 1.

³² Compare the commentary by Mariano da Alatri in Philippus a Firenze, *Itinera Ministri Generalis Bernardini ab Arezzo (1691-1698)*. III. *Per Flandriam et Germaniam*. In lucem edidit Marianus ab Alatri (*Monumenta historica Ordinis Minorum Capuccinorum* 13, Romae 1970) p. 49 n. 79; G. Tireliren, *Antwerpen en de Kapucijnen* (Herentals 2006) pp. 44-45.

advocates.³³ So, when I will argue against Hildebrand that the Flemish Capuchins did count Jansenists amongst their number, I mean that some of them championed the doctrines presented in the *Augustinus* and that, by consequence, their anti-Jansenist fellow brothers, who were convinced that the *Augustinus* was rightly condemned by Innocent X and Alexander VII, did have theological (and not only personal or political) motives for accusing them of being Jansenist heretics.

Hildebrand sketched a picture of a Province that was highly divided by a controversy in which – paradoxically – theological and moral convictions only played a marginal role. According to the Capuchin scholar, his predecessors of the 17th and 18th centuries never counted Jansenists amongst their number. His main argument consisted in the thesis that all Flemish Capuchins condemned the five propositions ascribed to the *Augustinus* by Innocent X and Alexander VII, combined with a statement by Innocent XII in a breve of 6 February 1694, which prohibited stigmatizing as a Jansenist anyone who condemned the five propositions.³⁴

‘Un texte romain de 1694 affirme que quiconque rejette ces propositions ne peut pas être accusé de Jansénisme. De même celui qui prête le serment prescrit par le pape Alexandre VII, comme le font tous les Capucins, ne peut plus être suspecté. [...] Si on prend comme critère le rejet des propositions condamnées, on ne trouve chez les Capucins

³³ See L. Kolakowski, *God owes us nothing* [n. 17] p. 4 and *passim*; P. Sellier, *Qu'est-ce que le jansénisme (1640-1713)?* [n. 18] pp. 54-71.

³⁴ Hildebrand refers to the following words of the breve of 6 February 1694: *Quare praecipimus ut quemadmodum ii qui ad iuramentum adigendi sunt, illud praestare debent sincere absque ulla distinctione, restrictione seu expositione, damnando eas propositiones ex libro Jansenii excerptas in sensu obuiio, quem ipsamet propositionum uerba prae se ferunt, prout sensum illum damnarunt Summi Pontifices, praedecessores nostri, damnatumque haberi uoluerunt a Christi fidelibus, ita per Fraternitates Vestras ab iis qui formulario praescripto subscribent ac iuramentum praestabunt, praeter formulam ipsam traditam uerbaque in constitutione Apostolica praescripta quidquid aliud uel minimum declarationis, interpretationis, aut explicationis, uerbo uel scripto, non exigatur, [...]. Demum ad extinguenda theologorum jampridem inter sese excitata dissidia, Fraternitatibus Vestris, quantum in Domino possumus, praesentibus nostris mandatis injungimus ne ulla ratione quemquam uaga ista accusatione & inuidioso nomine Jansenismi traduci aut nuncupari sinatis, nisi prius suspectum esse legitime constiterit aliquam ex his propositionibus docuisse aut tenuisse, [...]* (text borrowed from *Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld* 24 [Paris 1779] pp. 363-364). For more information on the breve, which interests us here only for the use Hildebrand has made of it, see L. Ceysens, *Innocent XII et le jansénisme*, in: *Antonianum* 67 (1992) pp. 39-66 (esp. pp. 58-59); *L'accueil des documents romains relatifs au formulaire malinois (1694)*, in: *Augustiniana* 45 (1995) pp. 247-283 (esp. 248-251).

belges qu'un seul janséniste authentique, le P. Joseph d'Ath, mort dans son erreur à Namur en 1725.³⁵

By means of a narrow and purely formal definition of a Jansenist as someone who does not reject the five propositions – I call this a purely formal definition, since it does not take into account the meaning in which the propositions were rejected by individual Capuchins – Hildebrand was able to exclude from the number of the Jansenists all Capuchins who condemned the five propositions, even those who took the defence of the *Augustinus* by claiming either that the propositions were not present in Jansenius' work or that their condemned meaning did not correspond with the bishop's Augustinian and – at least in their view – purely Catholic views on divine grace and predestination. We will see below that the Flemish Capuchins did count such advocates of Jansenius amongst their number. The most famous of them was Eugenius of Bruges (1634-1692), who according to Hildebrand's own extensive description was a radical opponent of the Jesuits with strong sympathies for the bishop of Ypres.³⁶ Hildebrand did not consider Eugenius a Jansenist for the sole reason that – at least according to the archivist³⁷ – Eugenius did not accept the five propositions. Even the fact that Eugenius took the defence of Jansenius by claiming that the condemnation of the five propositions did not affect the doctrines contained in the *Augustinus*, did not turn him into a Jansenist: 'Le trop fameux tribun Eugène de Bruges, homme déséquilibré, ennemi des Jésuites, n'était au fond pas janséniste. Il rejetait les propositions condamnées, mais prétendait que Jansénius n'avait jamais enseigné ces théories.'³⁸

³⁵ See Hildebrand, *Les Capucins* [n. 1] pp. 45-47. Compare Hildebrand VI, p. 337: 'In een Romeinse tekst van 6 Februari 1694 zegt men uitdrukkelijk, dat niemand voor Jansenist mag worden gescholden, zo hij deze vijf proposities verwierpt. Op 21 April 1706 liet Clemens XI eveneens aan de Internuntius Grimaldi weten, dat al wie de eed van Alexander VII aflegde, niet meer van Jansenisme mocht worden verdacht. Alle Kapucijnen waren blij, aldus hun rechtgelovigheid te mogen belijden. / Als men alzo goed voor ogen houdt, wat men eigenlijk onder Jansenisme moet verstaan, dan vindt men er bij de Walen één aanhanger van, nl. Joseph van Aat. Bij de Vlamingen was er geen enkele.' For Joseph of Ath, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 526-528.

³⁶ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 413-426.

³⁷ For this restriction, see §3 of this article.

³⁸ See Hildebrand, *Les Capucins* [n. 1] p. 47. Compare Hildebrand VI, p. 337: '[...] zelfs de beruchte Eugenius van Brugge <is> geen Jansenist geweest. De Leuvense leraar bewonderde hij wel, [...]. Doch nooit heeft men hem verweten dat hij de vijf proposities aanvaardde en voor eigen rekening nam. Uit zijn schriften bleek eerder het tegenovergestelde. Hij verwierp deze stellingen, doch was er van overtuigd, dat Jansenius ze nooit had geleerd.'

In the next paragraph, I will readjust Hildebrand's characterization of Eugenius as someone who rejected the five propositions. The words just quoted may suffice, however, to illustrate how Hildebrand managed to deny the influence of Jansenism on the theological thinking of his 17th- and 18th-century predecessors by means of a rather narrow and purely formal definition of Jansenism (being a Jansenist = not condemning the five propositions). Moreover, Hildebrand denied that the rigorist stance that many Capuchins took on moral issues, was a token of Jansenist influence. According to him, it simply was a natural reaction against laxist doctrines promoted by Jesuits and other theologians:

'Le Jansénisme devint un état d'âme, une tendance générale dans les conceptions et la manière d'agir de ses adeptes. Théoriquement, ceux-ci se montraient très sévères et prétendaient réagir contre la morale des Jésuites et autres théologiens laxistes. Plusieurs Capucins manifestèrent également de l'aversion pour l'illustre Compagnie. Il était d'ailleurs inévitable, que plus d'un religieux (subissant inconsciemment l'influence du milieu, tout imprégné de la funeste erreur, dans lequel il vivait), ait professé des opinions risquées. [...]'³⁹

How to explain then the measures taken by the Roman authorities, if the Flemish Capuchins did not count any Jansenist amongst their number? Hildebrand's answer to this question was plain and simple:

'[...] Des tendances dangereuses se manifestèrent parfois; mais le plus grand mal fut causé par l'activité néfaste de quelques religieux ambitieux, se posant en inquisiteurs sans mandat. Les plus notoires furent au début le P. Fulgence de Nieuport et plus tard son homonyme de Bruxelles. / Induits en erreur par de continuelles intrigues, les supérieurs majeurs à Rome crurent de bonne foi toute la province infectée, sauf leurs correspondants occasionnels, [...]'⁴⁰

Both Fulgentii mentioned in this quotation occupied important positions within the Flandro-Belgian Province during the second half

³⁹ See Hildebrand, *Les Capucins* [n. 1] pp. 47-48. Compare Hildebrand VI, p. 338.

⁴⁰ See Hildebrand, *Les Capucins* [n. 1] p. 48. Compare Hildebrand VI, p. 336: 'Er waren er die verdachte stellingen voorhielden, te beginnen met Augustinus van 's-Hertogenbosch. Anderen, vooral Fulgentius van Nieuwpoort en zijn naamgenoot van Brussel, hebben nog veel méér kwaad gestookt door hun overdreven ketterjagerij, die overal dwalingen en mistoestanden meende te zien. Ze hebben veel vijandschap in de Provincie ontketend; en door hun onverantwoorde aanklachten te Rome maatregelen verkregen, die oneindig veel kwaad hebben gedaan en die enkele eierzuchtige elementen een welgekomen gelegenheid gaven, om zich op te werken...'.

of the 17th century and at the beginning of the 18th. The most important for my present argument is Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort (ca. 1628-1690), who had been *Sacrae Theologiae lector* in Ghent (1666-1668) and Brussels (1668-1669)⁴¹ before becoming Provincial Definitor in the years 1674-1687.⁴² Several documents have been preserved in which Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort tried to convince his Roman Superiors of the fact that the Flandro-Belgian Province had been infected by the venom of Jansenism, the most important being a long and detailed list of accusations which he compiled in 1685 and directed against 25 Flemish fellow brothers,⁴³ including prominent figures such as Joannes of Landen (Provincial in 1675-1678 and 1681-1684)⁴⁴ and Michael of Oudenbosch (Provincial in 1678-1681, 1684-1687 and 1690-1695).⁴⁵ The list, which will be referred to below as *FN*,⁴⁶ also included several fragments on Laurentius Neesen, president of the archepiscopal seminary at Mechelen and author of several theological handbooks, which were used by some Capuchin *lectores* for the preparation of their theological *dictata*.⁴⁷ Fulgentius' extensive list, of

⁴¹ See Hildebrand VII, p. 305 (n° 2118); VIII, p. 534 (n° 41).

⁴² See Hildebrand VI, pp. 561-562 (nos 49-56). Fulgentius of Brussels (1655-1721) was Provincial Definitor in the years 1697-1701 / 1711-1717 and Provincial in 1701-1705. See Hildebrand VI, p. 562 (nos 62-64 + 66); VII, p. 303 (n° 2109).

⁴³ Aegidius of Antwerp, Alexander of Ghent, Andreas of Peer, Angelus of Antwerp, Augustinus of Geldern, Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch, Basilianus of Bruges, Bonaventura of Brussels, Bonaventura of Geraardsbergen, Dominicus of Ghent, Eugenius of Bruges, Felix of Bergues, Fidelis of Maastricht, Franciscus of Bruges, Franciscus of Weert, Fulgentius of Maaseik, Hubertus of Sint-Truiden, Joannes of Landen, Juniperus of Dendermonde, Michael of Oudenbosch, Norbertus of Bree, Norbertus of Hasselt, Reginaldus of Oudenaarde, Serenus of Brussels, Serenus of Sint-Truiden.

⁴⁴ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 561-562 (nos 50-51 and 54-55); *FN*, cap. III (*De attritione et contritione atque confessione*), nos 31-32; IV (*De summo pontifice*), n° 7; V (*In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij*), n° 17.

⁴⁵ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 561-562 (nos 52-53, 56 and 59-60); *FN*, cap. III (*De attritione et contritione atque confessione*), n° 27; V (*In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij*), n° 18; VI (*De ueneratione sanctorum ac sacrarum imaginum*), n° 10; VII (*In materia indulgentiarum*), n° 1.

⁴⁶ For Fulgentius as author of *FN*, see pp. 25 and 30 of this document. For the date of *FN*, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 389-391, according to whom Fulgentius compiled the document, in order to present it at the General Chapter of 1685.

⁴⁷ For Laurentius Neesen and a list of his theological handbooks, see É. Amann, *Neesen Laurent*, in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 9.1 (Paris 1931) cc. 60-62. For the use of Neesen by Capuchin *lectores*, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 368, 372, 379 and 387. The file G.22.13.2 *Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: propositiones edoctae/prouisiones Superiorum. 1668-1717* in the Roman *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.* contains several documents against Neesen that will play no further role in the present article.

which one copy has been preserved in the Roman *Archivum Generale O.F.M.Cap.* (G.22.13.2 Prou. Flandro-Belgica. *De Jansenismo: propositiones edoctae/prouisiones Superiorum. 1668-1717*) presented in eight thematic chapters the suspicious doctrines and propositions which each of the accused individuals was said to have sustained:

- I. *In materia de gratia et libero arbitrio* (33 fragm.);
- II. *De charitate et relatione operum in Deum* (17 fragm.);
- III. *De attritione et contritione atque confessione* (50 fragm.);
- IV. *De Summo Pontifice* (20 fragm.);
- V. *In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij* (19 fragm.);
- VI. *De ueneratione sanctorum ac sacrarum imaginum* (12 fragm.);
- VII. *In materia indulgentiarum* (2 fragm.);
- VIII. *In materia ignorantiae et probabilitatis* (8 fragm.).

Since Fulgentius' list of accusations did not fit in with his apologetic framework, Hildebrand strongly minimized the relevance of the document by stressing that it only mentioned 25 names on a total of 600, that the propositions ascribed to individual Capuchins had been quoted out of their original context, and that some doctrines hinted at were part of a general spiritual climate and not typical of Jansenism, etc.⁴⁸

Hildebrand was not the first to present the above version of the Jansenist controversy within the Flandro-Belgian Province. According to Melchior of Pobladora in his *Historia generalis Ordinis fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum* (1948), many Flemish Capuchins had been accused of adhering to the teaching of Jansenius, but only one of them could be considered a Jansenist, viz. Eugenius of Bruges.⁴⁹ Following the authority of the *Epitome historica* by the Capuchin scholar Hierotheus of Koblenz (1750), Melchior of Pobladora simply claimed that all other accusations had been false: *confuso namque tempore amat innocens cum nocente confundi*.⁵⁰ More important for the present

⁴⁸ See Hildebrand VI, p. 390.

⁴⁹ See Melchior a Pobladora, *Historia generalis Ordinis fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum. Pars secunda (1619-1761)*. II [n. 1] p. 254.

⁵⁰ See Hierotheus Confluentinus, *Epitome Historica, in qua ab anno 1208. usque ad annum 1525. res Franciscanae generatim, dein uero solae Minorum Capuccinorum usque ad annum 1747. in serie chronologica positae fideliter repraesentantur* (Heidelbergae 1750) p. 456: *Aduertendum tamen ea in tempestate tam saecularibus clericis quam regularium institutorum alumni, etiam Belgicis nostris confratribus, affluxisse id mali quod uiri caeteroquin conscientiosi ac timorati nimis temere quandoque ac praecipitanter ceu Jansenistae fuerint traducti, proclamati, denunciati, quin et praeualente maleuolentia uel malitia a suis praebeendis, ab officiis, gradibusque*

argument are some texts by which Flemish Capuchins of the late 17th and early 18th centuries tried to convince the General authorities in Rome that their interventions in Flemish affairs were unjustified, since the Province had never been infected by the venom of Jansenism. According to these texts, the real problem was not the presence of heretic friars amongst their number – such friars simply did not exist – but the blind fanaticism of witch hunters such as Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort. The best example of such a document is the so-called *Compendiosa et historica enarratio miserrimi status Prouvinciae Flandro-Belgicae fratrum Minorum Capucinatorum*, that was presented by Michael of Oudenbosch (Provincial in 1678-1681, 1684-1687 and 1690-1695)⁵¹ and Angelus of Antwerp (Provincial Definitor in 1692-1695)⁵² to the Brussels Internuncio Giovanni Battista Bussi on 9 August 1700.⁵³ This document, of which two copies have been preserved in the *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.* (G.22.13.2 *Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: II^{us} et III^{us} recursus ad S. Sedem. 1701-1702*) and one in the Provincial archives at Luzern, contains already most elements of Hildebrand's account of the Jansenist controversy. A few quotations, taken from the document's beginning and edited on the basis of the first copy preserved in the above mentioned file of the *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.*,⁵⁴ may suffice to prove this:

In Prouincia nostra Flandro-Belgica jam a multis annis quaedam turbae excitatae fuere a quodam P. Fulgentio Neoportano S. Theologiae lectore, dum alium P. lectorem taxauit de doctrina non sana. Verum Superiores nostri diuersis temporibus existentes, omni diligentia possibili adhibita, nihil unquam jure damnandum inuenire potuerunt; quod etiam duo Commissarii Generales, propter doctrinam expresse missi, (post diligens examen) clare declararunt. Primus R. A. P. Ildephonsus Austriacus, Definitor Generalis et Exprouincialis Austriae, declarauit se nullam damnatam doctrinam in Prouincia reperisse [...]. Secundus R. P. Arsenius a Fontibus, Hispanus, dixit in pleno Capitulo, postquam impenderat tredecim menses audiendis fratribus et omnibus in particulari examinandis, omnia esse problematica de quibus Prouincia taxabatur [...]. Quibus non obstantibus, cum R. P. Bernardinus ab

dejecti; confuso namque tempore amat innocens cum nocente confundi. Compare also Melchior a Pobladura, *Cappuccini*, in: *Dizionario degli istituti di perfezione* 2 (Roma 1975) cc. 203-252 (esp. cc. 229-230).

⁵¹ See n. 45.

⁵² See Hildebrand VI, p. 562 (n° 60); VII, pp. 65-66 (n° 346).

⁵³ For the historical context of this document, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 452-454.

⁵⁴ I have not checked the Luzern copy (mentioned by Hildebrand VI, p. 453 n. 2). A partial edition of the document can be found in Philippus a Firenze, *Itinera Ministri Generalis Bernardini ab Arezzo (1691-1698)* [n. 32] pp. 394-401.

Aretio a.º 1691 foret in Ministrum Generalem Ordinis nostri electus, una cum Definitione Generali fecit decretum aliquod in quo Prouinciae nostrae praescribitur doctrina omnino contraria illi quam semper professus fuerat, et adimitur Prouinciae libertas constituendi lectores. [...] et in decreto [...] continetur doctrina plane Molinistica [...], quod decretum, cum ad Sacram Congregationem delatum esset, ab ea suppressum et cassatum fuit et deleri curauit ex registro Ordinis nostri, et consequenter reuocatum a Reu.^{mo} P. Generali antequam fuerit in Prouincia nostra promulgatum [...]. Et hinc originem sumpsit omne malum, sub quo usque nunc gemit et oppressa jacet Prouincia nostra. (f. 1^{rv})

Turning to the problem of the five propositions, one finds that also in this respect Hildebrand fell back on the apologetic discourse of some 17th- and 18th-century predecessors, who deduced the Province's purity in matters of doctrine from the simple fact that everyone condemned the five propositions. An important example of this position is an anonymous pamphlet that was written on 13 Mai 1687 by a confidant of the then Provincial Michael of Oudenbosch, the main author of the just quoted *Compendiosa et historica enarratio* of 1700.⁵⁵ The pamphlet, entitled *Admodum Reuerendis in Christo Patribus, Ministro Prouinciali, Definitoribus, Guardianis, Magistris nouitiorum, lectoribus ac caeteris de Ordine fratrum Minorum Capucinatorum Prouinciae Flandro-Belgicae religiosis*, aimed to answer the question as to why the Roman Superiors had sent Ildefonsus of Carlshoven (1682) and Arsenius of Fuentes (1686-1687) as Commissioners General to Flanders.⁵⁶ Since all members of the Province were orthodox, the anonymous author could think of no other reason than the false accusations that had been launched by Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort against Superiors, Guardians, lecturers and preachers.⁵⁷ In order to

⁵⁵ I have consulted a copy preserved in the Maurits Sabbebibliotheek (273.719/89) in Louvain. Hildebrand VI, p. 407-408 mentions the document, but dates it in mid-1686. According to him, the anonymous author may have been Eugenius of Bruges or Reginaldus of Oudenaarde.

⁵⁶ For the visitations of Ildefonsus of Carlshoven and Arsenius of Fuentes, see n. 25.

⁵⁷ See f. 1^{rv}: *Quod unus e Germania ab aliquot annis & alter modo ex Hispania Commissarius Generalis in Belgium missi fuerint, qui de uestra doctrina ac fide inquirerent, norunt omnes & obstupuerunt non intelligentes unde uestra fides, quam integram intemeratamque esse hactenus existimarunt, in aliquam suspicionem uenerit. / Inde nata libido sciendi quae unius & alterius hujusmodi extraordinariae Commissionis causa subsit: in quonam fides uestra deficere insimuletur & qui sint qui uos accusant. / Id penitus inquirentes tandem intelleximus graues in uos institutas esse accusationes: nempe quod apud uos nulla amplius uirtus christiana; nulla regularis disciplina uigeat; sed praeualeat fraus, potentia, uis &c. Quod omnes Superiores,*

prove this, he quoted a letter of Fulgentius to Definitor General Carolus of Macerata (9 February 1684)⁵⁸ as well as a letter of the anti-Jansenist canon Frans Van de Venne to Fulgentius (14 April 1684).⁵⁹ The latter's allegations were false, the anonymous author contended, for all Flemish Capuchins had condemned the five propositions and had always remained faithful to the *inconcussa sancti Augustini dogmata*:

Nostis quid sit macula ista Jansenistica; nostis quod eo nomine intelligatur haeretica quinque propositionum doctrina, quam non modo Apostolica Sedes, sed & tota Ecclesia jure merito damnauit ac damnat: nostis quid discriminis sit inter eam doctrinam, seu potius haeresin, & inconcussa Sancti Augustini dogmata, quae a uobis teneri ac propugnari sicut uestra religione ac pietate dignum est, ita ab illis deficere & haeticas sententias sequi & docere uestra fide prorsus foret indignum. (f. 3^{rv})

We will see below that there existed several Flemish Capuchins who condemned the five propositions, but contended at the same time that their condemnation did not affect the *Augustinus* of Jansenius, since the latter offered an adequate interpretation of the teachings of the bishop of Hippo. For the anti-Jansenist Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort, this argument in itself was a reason for branding these friars as heretics in chapter V of *FN* (*In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij*). For others, the above definition of the *macula Jansenistica* made it possible to consider the supporters of this argument as orthodox and to deny the presence of Jansenists within the Flandro-Belgian Province.

It would lead us too far to present all other texts that offer a version of the facts that is comparable to that of the *Compendiosa et*

Majores, Guardiani, Magistri nouitiorum, lectores ac concionatores sint nouatores seminantes pessima zizania, quae suffocauerunt omne fere semen sanae, antiquae & auitae doctrinae; ac sint pessimae haereseos, scilicet Jansenisticae, labe infecti. Denique quod apud uos malum illud tam grande euaserit, uenenumque istud in uestra Prouincia ita serpat & tantas radices agat, diuisis, suppressis ablegatisque iis qui bonum promouere ac malo huic mederi poterant, ut ne ipsum quidem Capitulum Generale zizania haec eradicare jam ualeat. *Haec & alia horrenda in uos jactari audiuiimus & indoluimus: quae absit ut uera credamus, qui ne quidem crederemus ab ullo hominum ea in uos esse jactata, nisi epistolae, quarum originalia in manus Reuerendi Admodum Patris Ministri Prouincialis peruenerunt, nobis exhibitae fuissent, quae enormes istas accusationes continent & qui sint qui negotia ista Vobis & toti Ordini uestro facessunt, expressis nominibus indicant.*

⁵⁸ See ff. 1^v-2^r. Compare *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 5136 (handwritten copy) and Hildebrand VI, p. 388 (context of the letter).

⁵⁹ See ff. 2^v-3^r. See Hildebrand VI, pp. 388 and 398-401 (context of the letter).

historica enarratio and the anonymous pamphlet of 1687. It should be clear, however, that Hildebrand's interpretation of the Jansenist controversy within the Flandro-Belgian Province goes back to an apologetic account of the facts that was part of the controversy itself.

However, not all accounts of the controversy branded Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort as a witch hunter, whose blind fanaticism had invented an internal threat that in reality had never existed. E.g., when the *Compendiosa et historica enarratio* by Michael of Oudenbosch and Angelus of Antwerp was sent by the Brussels Internuncio Bussi to Silvester of Hasselt – an anti-Jansenist who had been appointed Provincial by Innocent XII for the years 1697-1701⁶⁰ – the latter reacted on 1 September 1700 with an extensive and detailed reply, entitled *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio fidelis et sincera, facta a Ministro Prouinciali fratrum Minorum Capucinatorum Prouincię Flandro-Belgicę*, in which he tried to weaken his adversaries' most important arguments. Two copies of this document have been preserved in the same file of the *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.* as the *Compendiosa et historica enarratio*. The first part of Silvester's account is directed against the conviction that Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort was the real cause of all troubles. Instead, the Provincial claimed that the controversy had started with the activities of two genuine Jansenists, viz. Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch and Fulgentius of Maaseik. The following fragment has been edited on the basis of the first copy in the above mentioned file of the *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.*:

Fuerunt quidem in Prouincia nostra Flandro-Belgica difficultates uanę excitatę occasione doctrine, sed illarum auctor et fautor [...] non fuit P. Fulgentius Neoportanus iam defunctus, at primo causerunt illas et excitarunt eius nostrique aduersarij, quorum antesignanus fuit P. Augustinus Buscoducensis [...]. Tandem ille P. Augustinus inter alios ad suum sensum abduxit P. Fulgentium Mosęcanum [...]. Exemplo SS. Patrum contra hereticas quasque aut in fide periculosas aut schismaticas nouitates inuictissime sese opponentium stetit hic catholicus et apostolicus uir (et quidem de mandato sui Generalis) pro domo Dei: unde numquam satis laudandus de sua erga constitutiones Apostolicas et P. Generalis uoluntatem obseruantia, adeoque non calumniandus ut auctor et fautor turbarum, utpote ex nouis dogmatibus pullulantium, quas sedare conatus fuit uir tantopere meritis de Prouincia, in qua fuit per sexennium lector, inde ultimo anno sui

⁶⁰ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 441-442; 562 (n° 62). For the text of the papal decree, see *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 5228.

cursus theologici assumptus Magister nouitiorum et Guardianus Louanij, item Guardianus Gandau, Antuerpię, Brugis, Mechlinię, nec non Definitor Prouincię per annos quatuordecim, bis Custos Romam ad Capitulum Generale, in summa ęstimatione apud Episcopos etc. (f. 1^v)

It is true that both the *Compendiosa et historica enarratio* and the *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio* each offer a biased account of the controversy. Moreover, Hildebrand was certainly right, when he claimed that many accusations against so-called Jansenists had been motivated by personal ambitions. In spite of these considerations, it should be admitted, however, that the claims of Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort and Silvester of Hasselt were not unfounded either. For, if one defines a Jansenist as someone who was convinced that the *Augustinus* of Jansenius contained an adequate interpretation of Augustine's orthodox teaching on divine grace and that, by consequence, the work could not have been affected by the condemnation of the five propositions, the Flemish Capuchins counted several genuine Jansenists amongst their number.⁶¹ I will show this in what follows by means of an analysis of our sources concerning Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch (§4), Fulgentius of Maaseik (§5) and Eugenius of Bruges (§3). In the case of Augustinus, these sources are all of anti-Jansenist origin (mostly *FN* and the *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio*), but for Fulgentius of Maaseik and Eugenius of Bruges, we have also documents that were not composed by their adversaries. Several of these documents have been neglected in Hildebrand's account of the controversy.

3. Eugenius of Bruges

Eugenius of Bruges was born Thomas de Gheldere in 1634 and took the habit in 1657. He was tonsured two years later in Mechelen and ordained priest in Antwerp in 1664. After a tempestuous career as a confessor and a preacher, which has been described in detail by

⁶¹ Compare the position of L. Ceyssens, *De Carmelitarum Belgicorum actione antijansenistica iuxta chartas P. Seraphini a Jesu Maria (1668-1688)*, in: *Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum* 17 (1952) pp. 3-120 (esp. p. 3 n. 1) with regard to the discalced Carmelites (against an apologetic article of Marie-Joseph du Sacré-Cœur: *Les carmes déchaussés n'ont jamais versé dans le jansénisme*, in: *Études carmélitaines* 5 [1920] pp. 195-248 + 6 [1921] pp. 1-45).

Hildebrand and will not occupy us here,⁶² he died in the convent of Brussels in 1692.⁶³ Eugenius was the author of several tracts against Molinism and the Jesuit Order (*Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph. Dienende tot waerschauwinge van alle wel-hebbende ouders* [ca. 1685],⁶⁴ *Molinomachia inter Capucinos Prouvinciae Flandro-Belgicae per Jesuitas & Jesuiticos excitata* [written in 1687, but never published], *Vltima uox zelatricis Innocentiae indigna patientis siue libellus supplex ad Innocentium XI. Summum Pontificem* [1689]).⁶⁵ In this paragraph, I will focus on two documents that will inform us about Eugenius' position in regard to the *Augustinus* of Jansenius and the successive papal condemnations of the five propositions.

The documents in question are the anti-Jesuit tract *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph*, which was written in Dutch, but also contained passages in French and Latin, and a letter to the Flemish Augustinian Michel Van Hecke (24 December 1686),⁶⁶ who had been asked as counsellor at the Holy Office to judge *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* because of his knowledge of Dutch. In the letter, which afterwards was included in the apologetic *Vltima uox*,⁶⁷ Eugenius responded to the charge of being a Jansenist heretic, which Van Hecke had uttered shortly before in a letter to Eugenius

⁶² See Hildebrand VI, pp. 413-426. Other general publications on Eugenius are J.-N. Paquot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire littéraire des dix-sept provinces des Pays-Bas, de la Principauté de Liège, et de quelques contrées voisines*. XVIII (Louvain 1770) pp. 116-123; J. A. de Chalmot, *Biographisch woordenboek der Nederlanden*. V (Amsterdam 1799) pp. 26-31; J. de Mersseman, *Brugis (Le père Eugène de)*, in: *Biographie des hommes remarquables de la Flandre Occidentale*. III (Bruges 1847) pp. 112-115; C.-F.-A. Piron, *Algemeene levensbeschryving der mannen en vrouwen van België*. II (Mechelen 1862) pp. 27-28; A. Vander Meersch, *Eugène de Bruges*, in: *Biographie nationale publiée par l'Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique*. VI (Bruxelles 1878) cc. 731-733; L. Ceyssens, *Eugène de Bruges*, in: *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*. 15 (Paris 1963) cc. 1360-1361.

⁶³ See Hildebrand VII, p. 247 (n° 1703).

⁶⁴ Tot Havre de Grace, by de fameuse Maets van 't Walleken [fictitious editor], 124 + 17 pp.

⁶⁵ *Coloniae*, apud H. Joannis Hamel [fictitious editor], 1689, 119 pp. This work, which can be consulted on Google books, was officially condemned by a decree of the Holy Office on 12 July 1689. See J. M. De Bujanda, *Index librorum prohibitorum 1600-1966 (Index des livres interdits* 11, Montréal-Genève 2002) p. 331. For a critical review of the *Vltima uox*, see H. Basnage de Beauval, *Histoire des ouvrages des savans*, May 1689, pp. 253-255.

⁶⁶ For a discussion of the date of this letter, see Hildebrand VI, p. 419 n. 5. For Michel Van Hecke, see L. Ceyssens, *Le P. Michel Van Hecke à Rome (1670-1687)*, in: *Augustiniana* 49 (1999) pp. 367-377.

⁶⁷ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 27-62.

(16 November 1686).⁶⁸ In both the anti-Jesuit tract and the letter to Van Hecke, the Capuchin friar defended his conviction that the condemnation of the five propositions by Innocent X did not affect the *Augustinus* of Jansenius.

Before dealing with the content of both texts, I would like to draw attention to a problem concerning the way in which *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* has come down to us. We know from several sources that the printing of this work was not finished when the whole stock was confiscated by the civilian authorities, which probably explains why the work is so rare today. Hildebrand admits that he never saw a copy of it,⁶⁹ but the work was kept in manuscript form in the pre-war library of the University of Louvain (*Opuscula Soc<ieta>tis* K 13³),⁷⁰ while printed copies have been preserved in the University library of Maastricht (*SJ B IV 77*) and the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris (*E- 10428 (4)*). More copies must have circulated: the Flemish Provincial Michael of Oudenbosch synthesized the work in a letter he sent to Rome in 1685/1686,⁷¹ the Roman counsellor Van Hecke read the work in 1686, and an anonymous sympathizer published a short pamphlet on *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* in the same year (*Epistola ministri Hollandi ad uirum nobilem Bruxellis*).⁷² The Maastricht and Paris copies of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* do not contain the work in its entirety. For we know from the *Epistola ministri Hollandi* and Eugenius' *Vltima uox* that the work originally contained three parts,⁷³ while it is said at the end of both copies that the work's first part has almost been reached.⁷⁴ According to A. De Backer-C. Sommervogel, the above mentioned manuscript in the pre-war library of the University

⁶⁸ For the context of Eugenius' letter to Van Hecke, see *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 26-27; Hildebrand VI, p. 419.

⁶⁹ See Hildebrand VI, p. 416.

⁷⁰ See A. De Backer-C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*. XI (Paris 1932) cc. 115-116 (n° 784).

⁷¹ See *Archium generale O.F.M.Cap., G.22.11. Dimissiones, processus*, 1683-1925; Hildebrand VI, p. 416.

⁷² See *Epistola ministri Hollandi ad uirum nobilem Bruxellis*, s.l., s.d. [end of document: 25 Septembris 1686]. I consulted a copy preserved in the seminary of Bruges (W-10.750). The pamphlet was extensively reviewed in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* of November 1686 (pp. 1264-1278). The *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* can be consulted on Google books.

⁷³ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 17 ([...] *circa causam libelli a me compositi & in tres partes diuisi* [...]); *Epistola ministri Hollandi* [n. 72] p. 2 (*Legi, perlegi, & relegi illos libellos, quorum tertius mutilus, nec possum illorum lectione satiari* [...]).

⁷⁴ See p. 105. On 3 August 1686, only one of the three parts could be consulted in Rome. The other two arrived on 14 September. See Hildebrand VI, p. 418.

of Louvain contained a copy of the work's third part, which apparently was never printed: 'En face de ce titre de depart, on lit: "P. Eugenii de Geldere Capucini Brugensis Pars 3^a nondum impressa".'⁷⁵ Further research will maybe uncover copies that contain the other parts of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph*; at this moment, however, the content of these parts is only accessible through what is said about them in the *Epistola ministri Hollandi* and the *Vltima uox*.

According to a Latin passage near to the end of the preserved copies of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph*, Innocent X condemned the five propositions without sufficient indication of the precise meaning in which he disapproved of them. If the Popes had specified this meaning, the argument goes, it would have been possible to check if this meaning corresponded with the teaching of Jansenius. However, since Innocent did not do this and none of the five propositions literally occurs in the *Augustinus*, Eugenius wonders on which basis Alexander VII had been able to condemn the propositions *in sensu Jansenii*. This would have been possible only on the basis of a knowledge that is normally reserved for God alone, viz. that of Jansenius' innermost thoughts:

*Si isti tam laudati a Jesuitis Pontifices damnassent aliquem sensum particularem istarum propositionum, illico constitisset an ille sensus conuenisset cum sensu Ianssenij; sed cum hoc non fecerint & illae damnatae propositiones, pro ut jacent, non inueniantur in libro Ianssenij, merito dubitatur unde constiterit Alexandro VII. de sensu a Ianssenio intento, cum non soleat Ecclesia de internis judicare.*⁷⁶

Contrary to what he contends at the end of the first part of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph*, Eugenius admits in his letter to Van Hecke that at least the first proposition (*Aliqua Dei praecepta hominibus iustis uolentibus et conantibus, secundum praesentes quas habent uires, sunt impossibilia; deest quoque illis gratia qua possibilia fiant*)⁷⁷ can be read in the *Augustinus*, viz. in chapter 13 of the 3rd book *De gratia Saluatoris*.⁷⁸ To this, he adds that the other four

⁷⁵ See n. 70.

⁷⁶ See *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* [n. 64] p. 110.

⁷⁷ See H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2001.

⁷⁸ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 35 and *passim*. For the presence of the first proposition in the *Augustinus*, see Cornelii Iansenii *Episcopi Iprensis Augustinus*. tom. 3 (Louanii 1640) c. 334: *Haec igitur omnia plenissime planissimeque demonstrant, nihil esse in sancti August. doctrina certius ac fundatius, quam esse praecepta quaedam, quae hominibus non tantum infidelibus, excoecatis, obduratis, sed fidelibus quoque & iustis, uolentibus, conantibus secundum praesentes quas habea<nt> uires, sunt impossibilia; deesse quoque gratiam, qua fiant possibilia.*

propositions, which are not literally present in Jansenius' work, all depend on the first.⁷⁹ This, however, does not mean that the *Augustinus* fell subject to the condemnation of the five propositions by Innocent X. Eugenius' main arguments in favour of this claim are the following.

The part of the letter to Van Hecke that focuses on Jansenius' understanding of the first proposition,⁸⁰ starts by quoting the counsellor's paraphrase of what he considers to be the condemned, Jansenist meaning of the first proposition:

[...] *juxta autem Jansenium & primos ejus discipulos Fromundum, Sinnichium & alios qui adhuc ambulant, Deus talibus justis, ex se uolentibus et conantibus, saepe, dum uult, gratiam omnem negat et datam subtrahit adeoque subtractione gratiae aperit ostium quo deprauata uoluntas in peccatum ruat, ut impie quidam de Deo loquitur. Hunc peruersum sensum Jansenii damnarunt Pontifices & omnis Catholica Ecclesia juste damnatum credit. Et qui non credit, damnatus est Jansenista.*⁸¹

In reply to this paraphrase, Eugenius first ironically exclaims that he is happy to have been informed finally about the exact meaning in which the first proposition has been condemned.⁸² However, so he continues, the meaning given by Van Hecke is not that of the first proposition in the *Augustinus*, which can be determined by simply reading the already mentioned chapter 13:⁸³

Quomodo enim Jansenius affirmet Deum negare omnem justis uolentibus & conantibus gratiam, qui in ipsis de facto & habitualement, quia justis, & actualement, quia conantes & uolentes – licet ad imperfecte tantum & non tam fortiter uolendum & conandum ut praeceptum effectiue impleatur uel tentatio superetur – agnoscit? Quomodo Jansenius dicat Deum jam datam gratiam subtrahere, cum eo casu nec uellent nec conarentur [...]? Quomodo denique Jansenius <dicat> Deum per talem subtractionem gratiae ostium aperire quo deprauata uoluntas

⁷⁹ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 32 ([...] *I. propositio, a qua caeterae, etiam fatentibus Jesuitis, dependent [...]*) and 45 ([...] *I. propositio, a qua caeterae dependent [...]*).

⁸⁰ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 45-59.

⁸¹ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 45.

⁸² See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 45: *Benedictus Deus! Quod tandem aliquando sciamus praecisum sensum Jansenii in quo proprie damnata est I. propositio, a qua caeterae dependent.*

⁸³ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 45-46: *Sed quando lego & relego & totas ingenii uires exerceo in perscrutando & penitus inuestigando illo praedicto cap. 13., ex quo ista propositio eruta est, ut ubi ejus sensus praecipue & unice deberet agnosci, ne hilum quidem talis sensus inuenio, sed plane contrarium.*

*in peccatum ruat, quod non esset aliud quam facere Deum causam, etiam positivam peccati?*⁸⁴

After a long and rather tortuous argumentation full of references to the works of Augustine, Eugenius ends his treatment of the first proposition with the following particularly clear description of what he considers to be the proposition's *sensus Jansenii* or orthodox sense:

*Reducatur ergo tota quaestio ad hunc casum metaphysicum: ponantur duo justī, seu etiam justissimi, circumdati tamen infirmitate sua, qui per gratiam actualem conentur & uelint, promittant, immo jurent seruare omnia mandata Dei et tentationes superare. Superueniat illis aliqua occasio enormiter alliciens ad peccandum uel offeratur actus plane heroicus mandatorum Dei, u.g. mori pro fide. [...] Certum est in isto illorum duorum casu, ad talem tentationem superandam uel opus praecepti adimplendum, illos ulteriori actuali et forti et omnino efficaci gratia indigere. Quaeritur ergo an hanc ulteriorem efficacem per se gratiam Deus teneatur dare. Si dicas quod ad hoc teneatur, illa gratia jam non erit gratia, utpote non gratis danda, unde nec gratia proprie nuncupanda [...]. Si dicatur quod Deus non teneatur illam dare, restat an non possit secundum beneplacitum suum uel, ut Ap. dicit, pro bona uoluntate [cf. Phil. 2:13], uni illam dare et alteri non dare et numquid non illa gratia sic data uel non data discernet istos duos? Numquid non necessitate infallibilitatis alter stabit & alter cadet? Alter praeceptum adimplebit, alter non adimplebit? Iste autem stabit uel adimplebit per uoluntatem suam, sed ulteriori gratia efficaci adiutam; ille cadet uel non adimplebit, itidem per uoluntatem suam, non spoliata gratia habituali uel etiam actuali, quam antea habuerat, per ipsummet Deum (uti Vestra Pat. aliquos blasphemare affirmat), sed abstractam & illectam a grauiori concupiscentia, cui superandae illa par non erat. Deum autem illum adiuuare, illum non adiuuare, apertissime declarat August., idque facere secundum beneplacitum suum, et causam illius discretionis ad arcanum ejus judicium semper justum et uerum, quoniam justificatum in semetipsum, pertinere [...].*⁸⁵

Since the first proposition in the sense of Jansenius states that a just man who thanks to God's actual grace wills and tries to fulfil His commandments, is not able to fulfil them if he is not given a further and stronger actual grace that makes him infallibly conquer the current assaults of concupiscence, the proposition can be considered to contradict the Molinist concept of sufficient grace that is given to

⁸⁴ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 45

⁸⁵ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 57-59. This description of the meaning of the first proposition corresponds with the description of Jansenius' meaning of the first proposition by J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] c. 481.

everyone and is rendered efficient by an autonomous consent of the individual human will. This is stressed by Eugenius at several occasions: *Per illam quippe propositionem ejusdemque apud Augustinum indubitata fundamenta nihil aliud intendit Jansenius quam debellare superbam gratiam sufficientem Molinisticam, omnibus semper et ubique communem [...]*.⁸⁶

In the third part of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph*, which has not been preserved in the Maastricht and Paris copy of the work, but has been partly synthesized in the *Epistola ministri Hollandi* and the *Vltima uox*,⁸⁷ Eugenius argued that the Roman Church had implicitly accepted the Catholicity of the first proposition in the sense of Jansenius when it inserted the following prayer for the feast of Saint Patrick (17 March) into the Roman Missal in 1684: *Deus, qui ad praedicandam gentibus gloriam tuam beatum Patritium confessorem tuum atque pontificem mittere dignatus es, eius meritis & intercessionem concede ut quae nobis agenda praecipis, te miserante adimplere possimus, per D. N. J. C.*⁸⁸ On the basis of the *Lex orandi, lex credendi* principle, which Saint Augustine himself had often recourse to,⁸⁹ Eugenius concluded that by inserting this prayer into the Missal, the Catholic Church admitted – in perfect agreement with the first proposition in the sense of Jansenius – that even the most pious believers sometimes lack the efficient grace that is necessary for the accomplishment of God's commandments and that the Molinist doctrine of sufficient grace was to be rejected as an offspring of Pelagianism:

Hic non inuitantur nec coguntur ad orandum infideles, obdurati & excaecati, sed omnes ecclesiastici, monachi, religiosi, moniales, maxime fideles, uolentes, conantes, immo & ad perfectionem spiritualem anhelantes. Et hi omnes jubentur orare & rogare & petere ut Deus, meritis et intercessionem beati Patritii, ipsis concedat gratiam, ut quae agenda idem ipse Deus praecipit, id est, praecepta Dei, ipso eodem miserante, ipso, inquam, qui cujus uult miseretur, & quem uult indurat

⁸⁶ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 46 (compare pp. 48-49).

⁸⁷ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 35 ([...] *sicut in 3. parte meorum opusculorum ad oculum, ut puto, & inuictissime probauit*).

⁸⁸ The argument is synthesized in *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 34-40; *Epistola ministri Hollandi* [n. 72] pp. 9-11; *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, November 1686, pp. 1272-1273.

⁸⁹ The principle was explicitly formulated for the first time by Prosper of Aquitaine (*auct. de grat.* 8 [PL 51, 209 C]), but its implicit use in anti-heretical texts is much older. See B. Studer, *Liturgy and the Fathers*, in: A. J. Chupungco, *Introduction to the Liturgy (Handbook for Liturgical Studies 1, Collegeville [Minn.] 1997)* pp. 53-79 (esp. pp. 60-63 [with examples from the works of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Basil the Great and Augustine]).

[Rm. 9:18], *adimplere possint. / Ex quo luce clarius euadit, quod aliqua Dei praecepta, aliquibus justis, quidni & omnibus [...] aliquibus temporibus & occasionibus tentationum, secundum praesentes quas habent uires, sint adimplerione impossibilia; quodque de facto gratia omnimodo illis desit qua adimplerione actiua omni loco, casu, tempore & constitutione possibilia fiant. / Et hic est ipsissimus sensus Ecclesiae Dei & S. Augustini defensoris gratiae, quem Jesuitae Jansenisticum & haereticum declamant, quia nempe sufficientem eorum gratiam Molinisticam – ad tales effectus semper, ubique & in quacumque occasione omnibus quantumcumque obduratis & excaecatis praesentem – tanquam Pelagianam respuit, rejicit & condemnat.*⁹⁰

In his letter to Van Hecke, Eugenius defended this interpretation of the prayer in very strong words against the Roman counsellor's criticism.⁹¹

*Ad haec respondeo [...] quod ista Oratio de S. Patritio apertissime primam Jansenii propositionem in sensu Catholico (sicut & ipse illam scripsit) continet, ad illum quippe sensum per singulas partes, aduocata in subsidium tota S. Augustini doctrina, propositionem illam praedicto l. 3 de gratia Saluat. c. 13 perspicuitate mirabili determinauit Jansenius [...].*⁹²

⁹⁰ See *Epistola ministri Hollandi* [n. 72] p. 10. Compare *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 39-40: *Ex his autem deduco quoad orationem istam de S. Patritio. I. quod per illam petamus aliquid quod de facto non habemus [...] Deduco 2. quod fateamur gratiam illam, quam poscimus quia non habemus, non nisi Deo miserante dari, sicut & iudicante, juste denegari, quippe qui [...] cuius uult miseretur, & quem uult indurat [Rm. 9:18]. Deduco 3., cum in eadem oratione petatur possibilitas, cum effectu scilicet, adimplendi quae nobis agenda praecipit Deus, quod hoc ipso fateamur nos illam non habere &, nisi obtineamus miserante Deo contentum illud orationis nostrae, illa quae Deus praecipit, nobis esse adimplerione actiua positue impossibilia. Alias frustra iusti & sancti gement, quasi illam gratiam non haberent; frustra peterent, si iam haberent; nec peccarent (iuxta nostram notionem efficacis per se gratiae) dum eam haberent.*

⁹¹ Van Hecke had strongly condemned it. See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 34-35: *Eximia P.V. dicit [...] Gloriaris in Oratione noua de S. Patricio, quasi sit confessio 1. propositionis in sensu D. Augustini & Jansenii intellectae. Sed errauit a uero sensu Augustini quisquis [...].*

⁹² See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] p. 35. The Jesuit and anti-Jansenist writer Jacques de la Fontaine considered this passage as one of the most clear expressions of Eugenius' Jansenist sympathies in the *Vltima uox*. See Cornelius a Cranebergh [= Jacques de la Fontaine], *Fraus quinque articulorum a pseudo-Augustini discipulis primum Alexandro VII. nunc iterum Alexandro VIII. obtrusorum, siue eorum cum Augustino Iprensi conuenientia demonstrata* (Coloniae 1690) p. 45 and Didacus de Oropega [= Jacques de la Fontaine], *Secunda pars difficultatum* (s.l., s.d. [= Leuven 1692]) p. 60. For both pseudonyms, see J. A. G. Tans., *Lexicon pseudonymorum Jansenisticorum. Répertoire de noms d'emprunt employés au cours de l'histoire du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme* (Leuven 1989) pp. 62 and 160.

We may thus conclude that even if he accepted the condemnation of the five propositions by Innocent X, Eugenius denied on the basis of an analysis of chapter 13 of book 3 *De gratia Salvatoris* that the first proposition could have been condemned *in sensu Jansenii*, as pretended by Alexander VII. Eugenius was convinced that Jansenius' meaning of the first proposition, 'on which the other four all depend', was Augustinian and, by consequence, perfectly Catholic. This conviction explains why Eugenius was able to accept the bull *Cum occasione*, but affirmed at the same time that the five propositions had been a powerful weapon in Jansenius' struggle against Molinism. This emerges from a story transmitted by Paquot, but attested to in older sources, which tells that in a Lenten sermon pronounced in Louvain in 1679, Eugenius praised Jansenius as a new David, who had chosen from the limpid stream of Saint Augustine's writings five polished stones in order to slay the Goliath of Molinism.⁹³

Although Eugenius claimed to have a deep respect for papal authority,⁹⁴ he was convinced at the same time that the Pope was fallible in questions of historical facts.⁹⁵ Alexander VII, e.g., had been

⁹³ Hildebrand VI, p. 413-414 + p. 414 n. 1 borrowed the story from M. Paquot, *Mémoires* [n. 62] p. 116. Paquot himself took it from Jacques de la Fontaine, who in two virulent texts against Eugenius' *Vltima uox* tells us that he had been present at Eugenius' sermon of 1679: *Hic uir est Iansenianae haereseos praedicator feruidus, factionis intrepidus defensor. Hunc non ita pridem Louanii summo accademicorum concursu & applausu contra sensa & mores anti-Iansenistarum coram ipse audiui pro concione debacchantem? Hoc eum inter caetera effutiisse memini, fuisse illustrem in Ecclesia Episcopum (Iansenium designabat) qui ut superbum uictoris gratiae impugnatores (Molinam) prosterneret, se comparauerat ab ineunte aetate, et ut styllum acueret se contulerat in Galliam, ac dein quinque limpidissimos lapides uelut alterum Dauidem sibi selegisse ex torrente Augustiniano quibus superbum Goliathum (Molinam) dejiceret. Nolle meo testimonio hominem in crimen uocare, nisi suis scriptis et typo editis infamem se probasset omnibus Iansenistam.* See Cornelius a Cranebergh [= Jacques de la Fontaine], *Fraus quinque articulorum* [n. 92] p. 45. Compare Didacus de Oropega [= Jacques de la Fontaine], *Secunda pars difficultatum* [n. 92] pp. 58-59.

⁹⁴ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65], p. 29: *Certe numquam ego inueni nec legi in aliquibus scriptis Jansenii uel eius praetensorum discipulorum quod fuerit accusator uel docuerit accusare Summos Pontifices, sed bene quod tam ille quam hi impense illos uenerentur, zelose ament ac strenue defendant tamquam ueros ac summos Christi Domini in terris Vicarios.*

⁹⁵ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65], pp. 29-30: *Quod autem Pontifices non sint exempti a deceptionibus hominum fraudulentorum, tota ecclesiastica historia et quotidiana experientia clamant. [...] An autem Summi Pontifices in causa Jansenii fuerint reuera decepti, facti quaestio est, quae ex deceptorum confessione uel ex aliis exterioribus probationibus mere dependet.* These words are followed by a long exposition on the errors of Urbanus VIII, Innocent X and Alexander VII with regard to Jansenius' *Augustinus* (pp. 30-34).

mistaken when he defined that the five propositions had been condemned *in sensu Jansenii*.⁹⁶ Worse still: Eugenius was convinced that the Pope had been deliberately deceived. For Alexander once told to Van Hecke's fellow Augustinian Christianus Lupus that he had read the five propositions literally on one and the same page of the *Augustinus*.⁹⁷ According to Eugenius, this manifestly erroneous declaration proved that the Pope had been deceived by the Jesuits, who had given him a falsified version of Jansenius' book.⁹⁸

Eugenius' conviction that Alexander VII was mistaken in defining that the five propositions had been condemned *in sensu Jansenii*, explains why the Maastricht and Paris copies of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* end in an appeal to Pope Innocent XI (1676-1689), who is asked, not to abolish the condemnation of the five propositions, but to declare – against the mistaken Alexander VII – that Jansenius' *Augustinus* was not affected by *Cum occasione*. Just as Innocent XI had corrected Alexander's mistake in the affair concerning the *Aduersus quorundam expostulationes contra nonnullas Jesuitarum opiniones morales* by Amadaeus Guimenius (pseudonym for the Jesuit author Mateo de Moya),⁹⁹ just so he had to correct his predecessor's errors regarding the *Augustinus* of Jansenius:

Sicut Alexander VII. per Jesuitas deceptus declarauit propositiones Amadaei Guimenij esse regulas actionum moralium & grauissimum

⁹⁶ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 31-32: *Quod Alexander VII. fuerit deceptus, ex eo constat quod liber Jansenii nunquam Romae rite fuerit examinatus & quod I. propositio, a qua caeterae, etiam fatentibus Jesuitis, dependent, quae sola in ipsius Augustino in propriis terminis est inuenibilis, desumpta ex c. 13. l. 3. de gratia Saluatoris, secundum indubitata principia doctrinae Augustinianae ab Ecclesia consecratae, ad quam juxta omnes suas particulas ibidem expresse reducitur, sit catholicissima, juxta declarationem Emin. Cardinalis de S. Clemente, Journal de S. Amore parte 4. c. 11. & etiam juxta judicium sanctissimorum pariter ac doctissimorum uirorum tam ex clero quam omnibus religiosis ordinibus.*

⁹⁷ For this (probably invented) anecdote, see also L. Ceyssens, *Chrétien Lupus. Sa période janséniste (1640-1660)*, in: *Augustiniana* 16 (1966) pp. 264-312 (esp. pp. 299-300; with further literature).

⁹⁸ See *Vltima uox* [n. 65], p. 33: *Apposui autem quod audiuerim ex uiro fide dignissimo [...] qui idipsum mihi referebat ex proprio ore Eximii Patris V. Lupi attestantis quod Alexander VII. ipsi protestatus fuerat illas ipsas 5. propositiones totidem uerbis se legisse in praedicto Jansenii libro in una et eadem pagina; quod certe sine apertissima deceptione & istius libri falsificatione omnino fuit impossibile.*

⁹⁹ This work of Amadaeus Guimenius was published in 1661 and censured by the Sorbonne on 3 February 1665. Since the latter censure also condemned Guimenius' views concerning the Pope's infallibility in matters of Faith and morals, the censure itself was abolished by Alexander VII on 25 June 1665. However, Guimenius' book was condemned by Innocent XI on 16 September 1680. Eugenius considers this condemnation a rectification by Innocent XI of a mistake made by his predecessor, but it

*scriptorum autoritate & perpetuo catholicorum usu niti, quas tamen Innocentius XI. melius informatus definiuit esse pestes morum, perniciosam illarum doctrinam & damnabilem illarum lectionem, usum & praxim, quid obstat quod econtra, licet idem Alexander VII. per eosdem Jesuitas deceptus definiuerit V. damnatas propositiones in damnato sensu apud Ianssenium in ejus libro qui dicitur AUGUSTINUS inueniri, Innocentius XI. uel alius quilibet Pontifex melius informatus declaret eundem librum nihil continere nisi purissimam S. Augustini doctrinam ab Ecclesia approbatam.*¹⁰⁰

In light of the above analysis, Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort seems to have been rather lenient towards Eugenius, since his list of accusations (*FN*) contains only a few short and rather allusive passages in which he accuses his fellow brother of questioning the Pope's infallibility¹⁰¹ and of adhering to Jansenius' doctrine of efficient grace.¹⁰² The other passages on Eugenius in *FN* fall outside our present interest and concern his critical stance towards the cult of the Holy Virgin,¹⁰³ miracles, the scapular,¹⁰⁴ religious confraternities,¹⁰⁵ the conduct of secular and regular clerics ('*Judas fuerit de Societate Jesu*')¹⁰⁶ as well

should be mentioned that Guimenius' book was put on the index during Alexander VII's own pontificate (10 April 1666). See É. Amann, *Laxisme*, in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 9.1 (Paris 1926) cc. 37-86 (esp. cc. 54-58); A. Fonck, *Moya* (*Mathieu de*), in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 10.2 (Paris 1929) cc. 2515-2516.

¹⁰⁰ See *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* [n. 64] pp. 123-124. The same argument is developed in *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 31-33. In the letter mentioned in n. 71, Michael of Oudenbosch, Provincial of the Flandro-Belgian Province in the years 1684-1687, considered these words the most objectionable passage in *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* (ff. 1^v-2).

¹⁰¹ See *FN*, cap. IV (*De Summo Pontifice*), n^{os} 10 and 18: *P. Eugenius Brugensis Brugis in culina. 'Pontifex tam bene falli potest quam aliquis alius.'* Hanc Flandrice protulit a triennio [= 1682] adstante R. P. Alexandro Gandensi [also accused by Fulgentius: *FN*, cap. V, n^o 15 and cap. VI, n^o 4] *cum duobus alijs, quam etiam tunc audiuit f. Conradus Teneramundanus ibidem coquus. Loquebantur autem illi inter se de quibusdam propositionibus a Pontifice damnatis. / P. Eugenius Brugensis. 'Pontifex est fallibilis.'* Hanc ipsum saepius audiuit sustinentem P. Lucas Alostanus modo Hasseleti Guardianus et multa alia, prout constat ex ejus ad me litteris datis 15 Augusti 1682.

¹⁰² See *FN*, cap. I (*In materia de gratia et libero arbitrio*), n^{os} 28-29: *P. Eugenius Brugensis in concione Louanii. 'Gratia non datur semper nobis ubi opus est. Sine ea tamen non ualemus superare tentationes neque ullum opus bonum facere.'* / *Idem. Dixit pridem Pat. Liuius Menenensi hypocondriaco ac desperabundo: 'Non habes gratiam.'*

¹⁰³ See *FN*, cap. VI (*De ueneratione sanctorum ac sacrarum imaginum*), n^o 1.

¹⁰⁴ See *FN*, cap. VI, n^o 2. See also cap. V, n^o 1 (*Quoad Bullam Sabbatinam [...]: non credo*).

¹⁰⁵ See *FN*, cap. VI, n^{os} 2 and 6.

¹⁰⁶ See *FN*, cap. VI, n^{os} 2, 6 and 7.

as his interest in the *Causa Janseniana siue fictitia haeresis* by the French Jansenist Pierre Nicole.¹⁰⁷ Most interesting, on the other hand, is Fulgentius' claim that Eugenius made several portraits of the bishop of Ypres and distributed them within and outside Capuchin convents. He is also said to have produced some portraits of Jansenius and one of Saint-Cyran for the *pedagogium Falconis* in Louvain.¹⁰⁸

By using a purely formal definition of Jansenism, Hildebrand had been able to deny the presence of any Jansenist among his Flemish predecessors of the 17th and early 18th centuries. Even Eugenius of Bruges was no Jansenist according to this definition. The above analysis of *Den verleyden ende wegh-gevoerden Joseph* and the letter to Van Hecke has shown, however, that Eugenius' condemnation of the five propositions was only conditional, for he accepted them if they were interpreted *in sensu Jansenii*, and that he can be considered to have been a genuine Jansenist if a less formal meaning is ascribed to the term. For Eugenius was convinced that Jansenius' *Augustinus* offered an adequate presentation of the Augustinian – and in his view Catholic – doctrine of divine grace, and he defended the work against Alexander VII by stressing that the Pope was fallible in questions of fact. The characterization of Eugenius as a Jansenist is also justified by biographical details (his praise of Jansenius as a new David; the distribution of painted portraits of the bishop of Ypres). Revealing in this respect are also the following words of the French Jansenist Charles Lemaître in his *Relation de mon voyage de Flandre, de Hollande et de Zélande fait en mil six cent quatre vint et un*, in which Eugenius presents himself as a partisan of Port Royal in matters of divine grace and penance:

<A Bruges> nous poursuivîmes ensemble notre voyage aux Capucins ou j'eus la satisfaction d'entretenir avant et après la messe le bon Pere Eugene qui s'informa de moy de tout ce qui se passoit en France touchant le monastère de Port royal dont il avoit une estime bien

¹⁰⁷ See FN, cap. V (*In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij*), n° 3. Fulgentius is referring to *Causa Janseniana, siue fictitia haeresis, sex disquisitionibus a Paulo Irenaeo [= Pierre Nicole] theologice, historice explicata et explosa* (Coloniae [apud Petrum Marteau: fictitious editor] 1682).

¹⁰⁸ See FN, cap. VI, n° 12: *P. Eugenius Brugensis. Imaginem Jansenij a se depictam uarijs, tam extra quam intra religionem, dono dedit. Item imagines ejusdem et abbatis de St. Cyran regenti Pedagogii Falconensis Louanij, unde patet quanti illos faciat*. For Eugenius' pictorial talent, see also the letter of Antoninus of Antwerp quoted in n. 139; C. Lemaître, *Relation de mon voyage de Flandre, de Hollande et de Zélande fait en mil six cent quatre vint et un*. Texte établi et annoté par G. Van de Louw (*Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 213, Paris 1978) p. 358; Hildebrand VI, p. 415.

*particulière, aussi bien de tous ceux, qui étoient liez d'amitié et de sentimens avec ce monastère auxquels il me témoigna qu'il compatissoit, d'autant plus qu'il avoit sa part dans la persécution qui luy étoit commune avec eux pour les mesmes veritez de la grace et de la pénitence qu'il soutenoit; [...]*¹⁰⁹

To be continued

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¹⁰⁹ See C. Lemaître, *Relation de mon voyage* [n. 108] p. 357. Compare [C. Lemaître], *Voyage anonyme et inédit d'un janséniste en Hollande et en Flandre en 1681. Étude historique d'après un manuscrit de la Bibliothèque du Havre par C. Fierville* (Paris 1889) p. 37.

“EXQUISITE AND PRECIOUS VESSELS”: DOCTRINA IN BOOK I OF AUGUSTINE’S *CONFESSIONS*¹

Abstract

In this essay I argue that Book I of the *Confessions* demonstrates Augustine’s valuation of the liberal arts according to the register of “use.” The classical *doctrina* in which Augustine was schooled is understood in the *Confessions* to be marked by pride (*doctrina superbiae*) and signified by the veils that cloak the entrances of the academies; this *doctrina*’s “use” is self-aggrandizement. By contrast, Augustine finds the teaching of humility signified in the humility of a child; the *doctrina humilitatis* finds its “use” in the praise of God. Still, in recounting his own childhood, Augustine seems eager to present himself familiar with the classical tradition and a cultural *savoir faire*. I argue, however, that when considered under the auspices of “use” Augustine’s quotations of Virgil, references to Cicero and Plato, and allusions to Terence and Seneca do not entail he himself falls prey to *doctrina superbiae*, but rather this display of familiarity with the classical canon underscores my argument that Augustine values the liberal arts according to their “use.” Augustine takes no umbrage with classical learning per se, but models appropriate “use” with intricate Latin rhetorical flourishes while weaving the story of his life into Virgil’s *Aeneid*. In modeling appropriate “use” of the liberal arts Augustine demonstrates how they can be used as “exquisite and precious vessels” intended for the praise of God or, conversely, can be filled with the “wine of error.”

The reader of contemporary autobiographies is left rather perplexed reading Book One of the *Confessions*. There is no mention of Augustine’s childhood years at home; instead he immediately launches into an account of his time at school. Indeed, his schooling is the dominant motif of the first book of the *Confessions*. This article will demonstrate that in recalling his early education, Augustine delineates two antithetical accounts of *doctrina*, each with its own guiding principles, signs and goals. The classical *doctrina* in which Augustine was reared is marked by pride (*superbia*), and its goal is worldly success. This *doctrina*, I will argue, is signified by the veils that cloak the entrances of the academies. Augustine contrasts this *doctrina* with the teaching of humility (*doctrina humilitatis*); its goal is rest in God and

¹ I would like to thank Prof. Lewis Ayres for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

is signified by the humility of a child. The *Confessions* do not use these terms of binary opposition (*doctrina humilitatis* and *doctrina superbiae*). Nevertheless, my argument is that such terminology is a helpful heuristic device to elucidate Augustine's account of education. Further, the terms are textually tethered in the sense that education, pride and humility are dominant motifs of the *Confessions*. This article will proceed in two steps. First, I will expand on these two antithetical accounts of *doctrina* running through Book One of the *Confessions*; and second, I will consider how Augustine understands classical learning to function positively in the *doctrina humilitatis*.²

I am building on existing scholarship of Augustine's relation to the liberal arts and applying this scholarship to an interpretation of Book One of the *Confessions*. That the contrast between *superbia* and *humilitas* is a dominant motif in the *Confessions* is well established in authoritative commentaries such as James O'Donnell's three-volume commentary,³ Pierre Courcelle's magisterial *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*,⁴ and Aime Solignac's introduction to the *Confessions* in the *Bibliothèque Augustinienne*.⁵ It is not necessary for us to revisit their analyses of the dominance of the themes of pride and humility in the *Confessions*. Similarly, I am relying especially on the scholarship of Henri-Irénée Marrou,⁶ Olivier du Roy⁷ and, more recently, Mark Vessey and Karla Pollmann's edited book of conference papers⁸ for understanding Augustine's valuation of the liberal arts.⁹

² *Superbia* is a dominant motif in the *Confessions*, as it is in many of Augustine's writings. Maurice Testard has offered a detailed textual analysis of the *Confessions* in terms of *superbia*: "Le 'superbia' dans les Confessions de saint Augustin," in *Homo Spiritualis*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Würzburg: Augustinus, 1987), pp. 136-69. A search in the *Library of Latin Texts* reveals 44 uses of the term *superbus* and its lexical families; this is contrasted with the 34 uses of various lexical forms of *humilis* and *humilitas*.

³ James O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).

⁴ Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin* (Paris: de Boccard, 1950).

⁵ Aimé Solignac, *Bibliothèque Augustinienne: Œuvres de saint Augustin*, vol 14: *Les Confessions: VIII-XIII* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962).

⁶ Henri-Irénée Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris: De Boccard, 1938).

⁷ Olivier Du Roy, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1966).

⁸ Karla Pollmann and Mark Vessey, ed. *Augustine and the disciplines: from Cassiciacum to Confessions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁹ Wolfgang Hübner, "Disciplina," *AugLex* (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1986-); Cornelius Mayer, "Doctrina," *AugLex*; Maximilian Fussl and David Pingree, "Disciplinae liberales," *AugLex* all provide a great overview and foundation for the argument I am building.

What I am proposing as a "new" reading, then, is that in the contrast between *superbia* and *humilitas* in Book One of the *Confessions* we are presented with two contrasting accounts of education. By looking at the way in which Augustine links pride and humility with *doctrina* (and I will argue that Augustine's use of the term "signs" (*signa*) warrants precisely such a linkage), we can shed new light on his account of the "use" of the liberal arts. Thus, my conclusions regarding Augustine's valuation of the liberal arts according to the register of "use" do not differ from those of Isabelle Bochet and Pierre-Marie Hombert¹⁰ and other standard accounts, but rather lend textual support from *Confessions* One to their arguments that praise (*laus*) and confession (*confessio*) are the appropriate "use" of the liberal arts.

The Humility of Faith

Throughout the first book of the *Confessions* there is a sustained binary opposition between pride and humility that illuminates the discourse on education. This serves to set the stage for Augustine's own journey in the purgation of pride, which does not find its denouement until Book Nine. In constructing the foundation for his account of education, Augustine counsels humility as a *sine qua non* for education. Pride hampers the efforts of education. This explains the emphasis that we will see on infancy in Book One. The opening lines of the *Confessions* initiate a contrast between God and the proud; these lines open with an encomium to God, whose greatness is contrasted with the feebleness of humanity: "You are great, Lord and highly to be praised."¹¹ The greatness of God is set in opposition to the smallness of the human person. Twice in the first paragraph Augustine repeats the phrase "a piece of your creation" (*portio creaturae tuae*): "Man, a little piece of your creation desires to praise you."¹² The mortality and sin of the human person are the reason why God resists the proud (*superbis*).¹³

¹⁰ Isabelle Bochet, "Le 'juste usage' de la culture," *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 11 (1997), 528-546; Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Gloria Gratiae, Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1996).

¹¹ *Conf.* I.1.1 (CCSL 27.1). Aurelius Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). In this article I will quote Chadwick's translation of the *Confessions*, and for the Latin text I rely on *Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*, 27 (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1981).

¹² *Conf.* I.1.1 (CCSL 27.1).

¹³ *Conf.* I.1.1 (CCSL 27.1).

"Nevertheless, to praise you is the desire of man."¹⁴ The proud disdain the created order of affection, which is the praise of God (*tu excitas ut laudare te delectet*), and find no rest (*requies*) because their aim is self-praise rather than the praise of God.¹⁵ Thus, already in the opening paragraph Augustine has set up the leitmotif of the first book by suggesting a contrast between the proud, typified by their mortality and sin, and God, who resists them. Humility, we will discover, is the requisite disposition to receive education.

Augustine prays, "Grant me, Lord, to know and understand" (*Da mihi, domine, scire et intellegere*).¹⁶ Knowing and understanding is placed within the mindset of a humble calling on and praising of God, which, as Augustine reiterates later on, presupposes faith. The curriculum that Augustine will mold for his *doctrina*, the "knowing and understanding," necessitates the groundwork of the *humilitas* of belief in the incarnation. Thus, at the outset of the *Confessions*, before giving his account of education, Augustine links "knowing and understanding" with the humility of faith and prayer and, ultimately, the humility of the incarnation:

In seeking him they find him, and in finding they will praise him. Lord, I would seek you, calling upon you – and calling upon you is an act of believing in you. You have been preached to us. My faith, Lord, calls upon you. It is your gift to me. You breathed it into me by the humanity of your Son.¹⁷

James O'Donnell explains that in this opening paragraph of the *Confessions* there is a progression from preaching (*praedicare*) to believing in (*credere*) and ending in calling upon (*inuocare*) God. This schema is mirrored by another movement: seeking (*requirere* and *quaerere*) finds its fulfillment in finding (*inuenire*) and praising (*laudare*).¹⁸ In the first paragraphs of the *Confessions*, Augustine has prepared the foundation for an exposition of the *doctrina humilitatis*.

¹⁴ *Conf.* 1.1.1 (CCSL 27.1). The term "nevertheless" (*et tamen*) is a literary device that Augustine frequently employs. O'Donnell points out that it occurs 59 times in the *Confessions* and 12 times in the first book alone, to express a reality in the midst of an apparent contradiction and paradox. James O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions*, vol 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p. 12.

¹⁵ "[O]ur heart is restless until it rests in you" is not only the most well known line of the *Confessions*, but is also a recurring motif. Already in the first book Augustine asks, "Who will enable me to find rest in you?" *Conf.* I.5.5 (CCSL 27.3). We discover that the *inquietum* of the human heart is only resolved by a humble submission to the *ordo* of God. Cf. George Lawless, "Interior Peace in the 'Confessions,'" *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 26 (1980), 54.

¹⁶ *Conf.* I.1.1 (CCSL 27.1).

¹⁷ *Conf.* I.1.1 (CCSL 27.1).

¹⁸ O'Donnell, *Confessions Commentary*, p. 17.

The desire to know and understand is fulfilled as gift; the *doctrina* that Augustine will develop is a search predicated on the *humilitas* of faith that finds its *requies* in praise.

Augustine admits that knowledge of his infancy is based on trust, for it is a period in his life of which he has no memory: "For I do not remember" (*non enim ego memini*).¹⁹ The dialectic of memory and trust runs parallel to that of learning and faith; the frailty of memory necessitates trust.²⁰ The perennial Augustinian theme of faith taking the place of knowledge is articulated in a unique way in Augustine's infancy narrative. Augustine has no recollection that as a baby he smiled in his sleep, but he believes it from what he is told and acknowledges that our experience indicates that this is what infants do.²¹ This epistemological triad of memory, trust, and experience is reiterated in the next paragraph, where Augustine claims ignorance on the origin of the soul: "Was I anywhere, or any sort of person? I have no one able to tell me that – neither my father nor my mother nor the experience of others nor my own memory."²²

Augustine's reflection on his infancy underscores the *humilitas* of faith and trust that are preambles necessary to proceed to the knowing (*scire*) and understanding (*intelligere*) of *doctrina* with which he initiated his discussion. Augustine praises (*laudem*) God for his beginnings that he himself does not remember (*quae non memini*) but must rather take on the experience of others and on the testimony of weak women.²³ But Augustine also bemoans the sin of his infancy, which, despite not remembering it from his own youth, he can witness in any tiny child.²⁴ And so, for a third time he repeats the epistemological triad that necessitates *humilitas*: "This period of my life, Lord, I do not remember having lived, but I have believed what others have told

¹⁹ *Conf.* I.6.7 (CCSL 27.4).

²⁰ It has been pointed out by Pierre Courcelle that a leitmotif of Augustine's narrative is that he does not remember his infancy: "Augustin prend soin de souligner qu'il ne se rappelle ni sa vie antérieure à sa venue sur terre, ni sa vie dans le sein de sa mère, ni le lait qu'il but nouveau-né, ni ses premiers sourires, ni ses premiers pleurs. Sur tous ces points, il est réduit à reconstituer sa vie par conjecture, en contrôlant les racontars des témoins de son enfance par l'observation directe des bébés." Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin* (Paris: De Boccard, 1950), pp. 32-33.

²¹ *Conf.* I.6.8 (CCSL 27.4). (*hoc enim de me mihi indicatum est et credidi.*)

²² *Conf.* I.6.9 (CCSL 27.5).

²³ *Conf.* I.6.10 (CCSL 27.5). *auctoritatibus etiam muliercularum multa de se credere*. The diminutive *muliercula* serves to underscore the *humilitas* requisite to accept the divine *doctrina*.

²⁴ *quis me commemorat? an quilibet tantillus nunc paruulus, in quo uideo quod non memini de me? Conf.* I.7.11 (CCSL 27.6).

me and have assumed how I behaved from observing other infants."²⁵ Thus, prior to giving an explicit account of education Augustine has, in the infancy narrative, laid the necessary groundwork. *Doctrina* comes by way of memory, belief and experience, which Augustine acknowledges requires much faith (*multum fida*).²⁶

The *Confessions* are often noted for their rather austere outlook on babies and criticized for their menacing descriptions of infants' contorted will and depravity. Who can forget Augustine's description of a baby "pale with jealousy and bitterness" glaring at his brother who is sharing his mother's milk?²⁷ O'Donnell remarks,

For [Augustine] an infant is a small adult, lacking various powers but experiencing the world just as an adult would. He cannot speak or make his *indignatio* efficacious, but he is capable of all the emotions and the velleities that arise from them. Such a view of the infant is eminently compatible with a doctrine of infant baptism, but is philosophically problematic.²⁸

Certainly Augustine's theology of original sin and baptism appears in the first book of the *Confessions*.²⁹ However, if we consider his description of an infant in the context of *doctrina*, a different emphasis comes to the fore. His portrayal of an infant as "almost an Epicurean,"³⁰ who "knew nothing more than how to suck and to be quietened by bodily delights,"³¹ is intended, I would argue, to highlight

²⁵ *Conf.* I.7.12 (CCSL 27.7).

²⁶ *Conf.* I.7.12 (CCSL 27.7).

²⁷ *Conf.* I.7.11 (CCSL 27.6).

²⁸ O'Donnell, *Confessions Commentary*, p. 44.

²⁹ Augustine's doctrine of original sin evolves substantially from his presentation in 397. Athanase Sage has traced the development of Augustine's understanding of original sin in three stages. First, his early work up till the *Confessions*, then in the works dating from 397-411, especially the commentaries on Genesis, and finally, Augustine's writings against the Pelagians later in life. Although a very helpful survey, Sage's work does not interact with the *Confessions* in much detail except to note that Augustine's description of infant behavior represents "la manifestation d'un péché proprement dit." Athanase Sage, "Péché originel: Naissance d'un dogme," *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 13 (1967), 224. Cf. P. Rigby, *Original Sin in Augustine's 'Confessions'* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987). A superb article by Margaret R. Miles considers Augustine's infancy narrative as foreshadowing later concupiscence; the grasping avarice that is never satisfied and the desire for control expressed through sex, power, and possessions. Augustine's anxiety and *inquietum* cannot be resolved while he is possessed by disordered desires; only in the *ordo* of God does he find "rest." Margaret R. Miles, "Infancy, Parenting, and Nourishment in Augustine's *Confessions*," *The Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 50 (1982), 349-364.

³⁰ O'Donnell, *Confessions Commentary*, p. 36.

³¹ *Conf.* I.6.7 (CCSL 27.4).

less the degenerate *nature* of the child than the necessary role of *paid-eia*. Augustine is less beholden to a certain theological agenda regarding original sin than he is consciously trying to situate his account of infancy within dominant Latin philosophical themes of development and maturation. The infancy narrative begins with stating that he does "not know whence I came to be in this mortal life or, as I may call it, this living death."³² Some commentators see here a barely veiled reference to Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 3.869: "*mortalem uitam mors cum immortalis ademit*." Similarly, in his description of infant behavior Augustine follows Cicero, who had tried to understand human nature by analyzing an infant (*De finibus* 5.55). Lastly, Augustine notes the tendency of infants to strike their parents and caretakers in an attempt "to do as much injury as possible."³³ This is perhaps an allusion to Seneca's *De constantia sapientis* 11.2, in which the Stoic philosopher also notes that babies will hit their mother in anger. The peppering of his infancy narrative with references and allusions to the classical canon is in keeping with Augustine's understanding of the "use" of the liberal arts in *doctrina*, which I will argue is a theme that runs through Book One of the *Confessions*. The emphasis thus lies not on the child's depravity, but on his immaturity. The infant is content with "bodily delights" because he is as yet unaware of the "gifts you bestow both inwardly in the mind and outwardly in body."³⁴ The child still awaits education; his mind is as yet unformed.

Up to this point we have seen the humility of faith that Augustine understands to be necessary for education; the acceptance in trust, as a gift, of what is taught is proper to infants. This is not yet an account of *doctrina* per se, but is a foundational preamble thereto. In the next section of the first half of this paper we see the movement from infancy to boyhood that is marked by the ability to use and interpret signs. It is only in the ability to apply signs that Augustine begins to speak of *doctrina*.

Signa as Doctrina

The stress on immaturity and subsequent growth in *doctrina* is illustrated by recounting the infant's desire to communicate through "signs": "So I threw my limbs about and uttered sounds, signs

³² *Conf.* I.6.7 (CCSL 27.4).

³³ *Conf.* I.7.11 (CCSL 27.6).

³⁴ *Conf.* I.6.7 (CCSL 27.4).

resembling my wishes, the small number of signs of which I was capable but such signs as lay in my power to use: for there was no real resemblance."³⁵ *Signa* are inextricably interwoven with Augustine's account of *doctrina*. The term *infans* refers to a person who cannot yet speak and by extension cannot yet remember. It is peculiar to *infantes* that their *signa* are ineffective. Not only does an infant have recourse to only very few signs, but those few signs also fail to communicate: "[F]or there was no real resemblance."³⁶ For this reason Augustine does not speak of *doctrina* in reference to infants. The process of maturation in *doctrina* is growth in the knowledge of signs, and so Augustine will write that at the "last stage of my infant speechlessness I was searching out signs by which I made my thoughts known to others."³⁷

When Augustine "emerged from infancy to boyhood" he was "no longer a baby incapable of speech but already a boy with power to talk. This I remember."³⁸ The link between memory and speech is reiterated: it is the ability to speak that marks the entrance into boyhood, and as a lack of memory was proper to infants, so memory is within the purview of boyhood. Augustine recounts the learning process by which he matured in the knowledge of signs. Although he had no "formal teaching" (*ordine doctrinae*) in the Latin language, he "gradually gathered the meaning of words"³⁹: "I learned to articulate my wishes by training my mouth to use these signs. In this way I communicated the signs of my wishes to those around me."⁴⁰ The initial presentation of his ineffective attempts as an infant to communicate his wishes by signs is juxtaposed by the way he describes his successful attempts as a boy. In both cases, Augustine describes himself as making sounds and body movements to bend the will of those entrusted with his care.⁴¹ In the first case he remained frustrated; unable to participate in human society he was left to weep in frustration by himself – he was not yet ready for *doctrina*. As a boy, however, he was able

³⁵ Conf. I.6.8 (CCSL 27.4). *itaque iactabam membra et uoces, signa similia uoluntatibus meis, pauca quae poteram, qualia poteram: non enim erant uere similia.*

³⁶ Conf. I.6.8 (CCSL 27.4). *non enim erant uere similia.*

³⁷ Conf. I.6.10 (CCSL 27.5).

³⁸ Conf. I.8.13 (CCSL 27.7).

³⁹ Conf. I.8.13 (CCSL 27.7).

⁴⁰ Conf. I.8.13 (CCSL 27.7). *crebro audita quarum rerum signa essent paulatim conllegebam measque iam uoluntates edomito in eis signis ore per haec enuntiabam. sic cum his inter quos eram uoluntatum enuntiandarum signa communicau.*

⁴¹ *iactabam membra et uoces*; Conf. I.6.8 (CCSL 27.4). *cum gemitibus et uocibus uariis et uariis membrorum motibus*; Conf. I.8.13 (CCSL 27.7).

to communicate by signs and "entered more deeply into the stormy society of human life."⁴² Augustine uses the precise term *doctrina* only in reference to his boyhood education. Everything else up to this point was propedeutic. It is in boyhood that one can use signs and, therefore, begin education.

We now see more clearly the relation of *signa* to *doctrina*. Maturation in *paideia* is marked by the ability to effectively use and interpret *signa*. At this point in the *Confessions*, Augustine contrasts the *signa* employed in classical *doctrina*, which is characterized by *superbia*, with the *doctrina* of Christ, which is distinguished by *humilitas*. Our first point of reference is Augustine recalling the rite whereby he was signed with the cross when near death from an illness:

When I was still a boy, I had heard about eternal life promised to us through the humility of our Lord God (*humilitatem domini dei*), coming down to our pride (*ad superbiam nostram*), and I was already signed with the sign of the cross (*signabar iam signo crucis*) and seasoned with salt from the time I came from my mother's womb.⁴³

The *signum crucis* attests to the humility by which Christ stoops to conquer human pride.⁴⁴ It also serves to further underscore the contrast between the *doctrina superbiae* and the *doctrina humilitatis*, each known by their own *signa*.⁴⁵

The next instance of *signa* occurs in Augustine's discussion of the *doctrina* he received in literature. Behind the curtains that hung in front of the academy, great pride was lurking.⁴⁶ Indeed, these "veils" hanging in front of the doors of the schools of literature "do not signify

⁴² *Conf.* I.8.13 (CCSL 27.8).

⁴³ *Conf.* I.11.17 (CCSL 27.9).

⁴⁴ Chapter 6 of Pierre-Marie Hombert's *Gloria Gratiae* is a study in the paradox of Christ's glory through the humility of the incarnation in Augustine's thought. Similarly, see T. J. Van Bavel, "L'Humanité du Christ comme *lac paruulorum* et comme *uia* dans la spiritualité de saint Augustin," *Augustiniana* 7 (1957), 245-81. Also, Brian E. Daley, "A Humble Mediator: the Distinctive Elements in St. Augustine's Christology," *Word and Spirit* 9 (1987), 100-17. The latter essay is an excellent summary of Augustine's Christology as a humble descent. Lastly, see I. W. A. Jamieson, "Augustine's *Confessiones*: The Structure of Humility," *Augustiniana* 24 (1974), 234-46. The overarching theme of "humilitas" in Augustine's thought is well articulated by Cornelius Mayer, "Humiliatio, humilitas," *AugLex*.

⁴⁵ Maurice Testard remarks, "On notera en outre l'art du rhéteur, qui n'est point gratuité, mais qui fait valoir, avec l'alliance de mots 'descendentis ad superbiam', le paradoxe déconcertant de l'humilité du Dieu incarné qui s'abaisse à la rencontre de l'orgueil humain." Testard, "Le '*superbia*' dans les *Confessions*," 141.

⁴⁶ The "veils" were probably intended as door entrances that were guarded by an usher who would ensure that only those were admitted who had paid their fees.

(*significant*) the prestige of élite teaching so much as the covering up of error.”⁴⁷ In Augustine’s account, the veils (*uela*) are the *signa* of the pride that classical education fosters. A stark contrast marks the *doctrina* of Christ. Augustine recalls the Gospel scene in which the children are brought to Jesus. Christ welcomes them and blesses them. Augustine writes, “So you, our king, have taken the small physical size of a child as a [sign] of humility (*humilitatis ergo signum*)”⁴⁸ The child, who is usually the subject of education, here functions as the *signum* of the *doctrina humilitatis*. And so, the scene of Jesus calling the children to himself serves as a mirror account of what occurred to Augustine as a boy receiving the sign of the cross (*signum crucis*) – “the humility of our Lord God, coming down to our pride.”⁴⁹ The two *doctrinae*, that of pride and that of humility, are identified by their respective *signa* of the veil and the child. Christ calls the latter to himself and indeed came with humility to Augustine as a child with the *signum crucis* to conquer pride (*superbiam nostram*).

The *doctrina humilitatis* has a pedagogical method that corresponds to that of the *doctrina superbiae*. Augustine recounts his fear of being caned at school for not learning his lessons, since as a boy he preferred playing over studying. Indeed, Augustine had “no love for reading books and hated being forced to study them”⁵⁰: “I learned nothing unless compelled.”⁵¹ These disciplinary experiences as a schoolboy make for a literary devise concerning the *doctrina* of Christ, which likewise does not come easily. The human will is recalcitrant and stubborn and prefers the *amor ludendi*.⁵² Augustine writes, “By your laws we are disciplined, from the canes of schoolmasters to the ordeals of martyrs. Your laws have the power to temper bitter experiences in a constructive way.”⁵³ Thus, Augustine prays not to be crushed under the Lord’s discipline (*disciplina tua*), but that the discipline given by God (*tu disciplinam dabas mihi*) may rather be turned to good use.⁵⁴ The *disciplina* of Augustine’s classical education provides a literary analogue to the *doctrina* of Christ and his *disciplina*.

⁴⁷ Conf. I.13.22 (CCSL 27.12).

⁴⁸ Conf. I.19.30 (CCSL 27.17). *humilitatis ergo signum in statura pueritiae, rex noster, probasti, cum aisti, ‘talium est regnum caelorum’*. Conf. I.19.30 (CCSL 27.17).

⁴⁹ Conf. I.11.17 (CCSL 27.9).

⁵⁰ Conf. I.12.19 (CCSL 27.10).

⁵¹ Conf. I.12.19 (CCSL 27.11).

⁵² The phrase *delectabat ludere* occurs in Conf. I.10.15 (CCSL 27.9) and *amor ludendi* in Conf. I.10.16 (CCSL 27.9) and Conf. I.19.30 (CCSL 27.16).

⁵³ Conf. I.14.23 (CCSL 27.13).

⁵⁴ Conf. I.15.24 (CCSL 27.13).

The Positive "Use" of the Liberal Arts

Book One of the *Confessions* presents us with a puzzle. Augustine expresses his disdain for classical education. The *doctrina superbiae* is marked by the *signum* of veils that hide its error, and the goal of classical education is worldly success and human praise. Strangely, this withering critique is interjected with quotations from Virgil's *Aeneid* and filled with oblique references to Cicero's orations, dialogues of Plato, the playwright Terence, and Seneca's philosophy. What do we make of what seems a rather blatant inconsistency? It is as if in his very denunciation of classical education, Augustine is eager to represent himself as possessing *savoir faire* in the literary tradition, a genuine heir of classical *doctrina*, a man of the greatest eloquence and learning.⁵⁵

Augustine's critique of classical education in 397 is not directed at the study of the liberal arts per se, however, but at their ill *use*. When such education is sought after for self-praise in the service of *superbia*, one is "swept along by vanities."⁵⁶ *Laudare* and *inuocare*, on the other hand, are the proper *telos* of *doctrina*. This principle is embodied in Augustine's prayer, "Turn to your service whatever may be of use in what I learnt in boyhood. May I dedicate to you my power to speak and write and read and count."⁵⁷ The difficulty with classical education lies, for Augustine, in the fact that the prevailing *ratio* for this *doctrina* is worldly success. Augustine was sent to school to learn to speak eloquently, that he might flourish in the world (*saeculo florere*), receiving human honors and guileful wealth.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the liberal arts taught in the *doctrina superbiae* are treasures that can be well used: "For later I was able to make good use of letters, whatever might be the intention of my adult guardians in wanting me to learn them."⁵⁹ Augustine writes,

⁵⁵ Cf. *An. quant.* 33.70: *uir eloquentissimus ac doctissimus*.

⁵⁶ *Conf.* I.18.28 (CCSL 27.15).

⁵⁷ *Conf.* I.15.24 (CCSL 27.13).

⁵⁸ *Conf.* I.9.14 (CCSL 27.8): *honorem hominum et falsas diuitias famulantibus*. Augustine's father, Patricius, proved to be especially devoted to Augustine's education and exceedingly generous with his resources thereto. However, his support for his son's education was misplaced: "At that time everybody was full of praise for my father because he spent money on his son beyond the means of his estate, when that was necessary to finance an education entailing a long journey. Many citizens of far greater wealth did nothing of the kind for their children. But this same father did not care what character before you I was developing, or how chaste I was so long as I possessed a cultured tongue." *Conf.* II.3.5 (CCSL 27.20).

⁵⁹ *Conf.* I.10.16 (CCSL 27.9).

They gave no consideration to the use that I might make of the things they forced me to learn. The objective they had in view was merely to satisfy the appetite for wealth and for glory, though the appetite is insatiable, the wealth is in reality destitution of spirit, and the glory something to be ashamed of. But you ... used the error of all who pressed me to learn to turn out to my advantage So by making use of those who were failing to do anything morally right you did good to me.⁶⁰

Augustine's presentation in Book One of the *Confessions* regarding the value of the *liberales disciplinae* is a literary expression of themes that he articulates with theological clarity in other concurrent works such as *De doctrina Christiana*, where he gives his well-known justification for "plundering the Egyptians" to describe the Christian use of classical learning.⁶¹ Despite the polemical rhetoric against the classical *disciplinae* in much of the *Confessions*, O'Donnell is correct when he writes, "[T]here is no reason to think that these ideas about the liberal disciplines were in any essential way incompatible with the practice and belief of Christianity in [Augustine's] time."⁶² A close reading of Augustine's critique of the liberal arts in the first book of the *Confessions* affirms this judgment. Despite his demurral, Augustine continued to hold the *liberales disciplinae* in high repute and accorded them great value. My argument for Augustine's valuation of the liberal arts in Book One fits in with the broader consensus in scholarship that Augustine judges the arts according to the register of "use." Pierre-Marie Hombert's study of the teleology of Augustine's theology has made clear that the recurring theme in the African bishop's oeuvre is the glory and praise of God.⁶³ My reading of Book One supports Hombert's overall thesis. The purpose of God's

⁶⁰ *Conf.* I.12.19 (CCSL 27.11).

⁶¹ *De doctrina Christiana* 40.60. Augustine writes that not only have the Platonists "said things which are indeed true and well accommodated to our faith ... but also the liberal disciplines [are] suited to the uses of truth, and some most useful precepts concerning morals. Even some truths concerning the worship of one God are discovered among them. These are, as it were, their gold and silver, which they did not institute themselves but dug up from certain mines of divine Providence." Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, trans. D. W. Robertson (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 75. For Augustine's valuation of the liberal arts in *De doctrina christiana* see the excellent overview in the commentary by Isabelle Bochet and Goulven Madec, *La doctrine chrétienne, De doctrina christiana* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne 11/2; Paris: Institut des Études Augustiniennes, 1997), pp. 528-46.

⁶² O'Donnell, *Confessions Commentary*, p. 271.

⁶³ Hombert, *Gloria Gratiae* (see fn. 10).

glory and praise is the standard by which Augustine values the "use" of the liberal arts in the first book of the *Confessions*.

To be sure, the exact value that Augustine accorded the liberal arts did evolve with time. Prior to his baptism, during his retreat at Cassiciacum, the liberal arts played a particularly exalted role in his mind. *Contra Academicos*, *De beata uita*, *De ordine*, and the *Soliloquia* express a confidence that study in the *liberales disciplinae* can bring about spiritual growth and enlightenment.⁶⁴ Upon becoming a "man of the Church" (*uir ecclesiasticus*) at his ordination, Augustine tempered his earlier zeal for the *liberales disciplinae*. There was no decisive break with the arts; rather, ecclesial affairs occupied all his time, and the leisure of Cassiciacum had ended. Further, Augustine knew people such as his mother Monica, who, having no *disciplinae*, nevertheless ascended to a knowledge of the incorporeal nature of God.⁶⁵ The necessity of the *liberales disciplinae* became increasingly attenuated for Augustine as he became a bishop.⁶⁶ They were *useful* only insofar as they helped to interpret Scripture. As bishop, Augustine began to show increasing reluctance to interact with pagan literature on account of the pride that lurks in the *liberales disciplinae*. In fact, of his writings at Cassiciacum Augustine would later say, "But they still breathe the spirit of the school of pride, as if they were at the last gasp."⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Augustine's project of the *disciplinarum libri* is outlined in *De ordine* written in 387. Augustine explains in the *Retractationes* that he intended to create an encyclopedic work following Varro's model for the study of the liberal arts (*retr.* 1.6). Although Augustine only ever wrote volumes on grammar and music, he writes in *Retractationes* 1.3 that the *ordo studiorum* is intended to guide reason in its movement from temporal corporeal knowledge toward eternal incorporeal knowledge. Already in *De musica* book six Augustine argues that the liberal arts are anagogical in character; their use is the drawing up of the mind to God. Cf. Jean Doignon, "Grandeur et décadence de l'*eruditio* aux yeux d'Augustin du *De ordine* au *De musica*," in *Interiorità e intenzionalità in S. Agostino*, ed. L. Alici (Roma: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1990), pp. 21-33.

⁶⁵ *Ord.* II.17.45.

⁶⁶ As priest and bishop, Augustine began to question whether the katharsis offered by the arts could really offer the knowledge of God and the soul that he had been so ardently seeking. Frederick Van Fleteren suggests that upon studying the epistles of St. Paul, Augustine came to a deeper appreciation of the role of grace in divine disclosure and came to see that true knowledge of God was not found in the *liberales disciplinae* but was reserved for the beatific vision. Frederick Van Fleteren, "Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal Arts," in *De doctrina christiana: A Classic of Western Culture*, ed. Duane Arnold and Pamela Bright (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. 19. See also the discussion by Michael P. Foley, "St. Augustine, the University, and the So-Called Liberal Arts," in *The Idea of the American University* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), pp. 129-39.

⁶⁷ *Conf.* IX.4.7 (CCSL 27.136).

While *De ordine* suggests that the “reasonable lies” of the poets might be tolerated on account of their philosophical truth,⁶⁸ Augustine later explicitly retracts this opinion.⁶⁹ Indeed, that the stories told by the poets were not true began to trouble Augustine immensely, as we read in his autobiography.⁷⁰ In the *Confessions*, stories about the “wanderings of Aeneas” are dismissed as “error” covered up.⁷¹ Augustine denounces “people who sell or buy a literary education,” because questions concerning the historical truth of the narrative are circumvented in the process.⁷² “Empty fables” (*illa inania*) were chosen over “useful studies,” complains Augustine, as he recounts with remorse how “delightful was the vain spectacle of the wooden horse full of armed soldiers and the burning of Troy and the very ghost of Creusa.”⁷³ In addition to protesting their historical falsehood, Augustine remonstrates against the moral turpitude to which the accounts give license. Homer’s stories of the gods give “divine sanction to vicious acts,”⁷⁴ and the playwright Terence refers to “Jupiter as a model for his own fornication.”⁷⁵

Already early in his ecclesiastical career, Augustine hesitated to “baptize” pagan literature on account both of its mendacious historicity and its moral baseness. Sabine MacCormack argues convincingly that after becoming rooted in the life of the Church, Augustine took on a new set of authorities and exemplars. Where previously he emulated the style of Cicero, Virgil, and other Latin authors, he now looked to the “men of the Church.”⁷⁶ The writings of the *ecclesiastici uiri*, which were now to be imitated in Christian rhetoric, were marked by their humble style (*sermo humilis*).⁷⁷

This use of rhetoric was fundamentally different: it was not the preserve of the cultural élite, but intended for all. Robert Kaster expresses this well, “[T]he style of the Christian message [was] humble

⁶⁸ *Ord.* II.14.42.

⁶⁹ *Retr.* I.3.2.

⁷⁰ Cf. Sabine MacCormack’s careful tracing of the evolution of Augustine’s thought on this matter: *The Shadows of Poetry: Virgil in the Mind of Augustine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 53-73.

⁷¹ *Conf.* I.13.22 (CCSL 27.12).

⁷² *Conf.* I.13.22 (CCSL 27.12).

⁷³ *Conf.* I.13.22 (CCSL 27.12).

⁷⁴ *Conf.* I.16.25 (CCSL 27.14).

⁷⁵ *Conf.* I.16.26 (CCSL 27.14).

⁷⁶ In *De doctrina christiana* II.40.61, Augustine refers to Cyprian, Lactantius, Victorinus, Optatus and Hilary as the “men of the Church” to be emulated.

⁷⁷ Cf. Erich Auerbach, “Sermo humilis,” *Romanische Forschungen* 64 (1952), 304-64.

in its descent from the shimmering, timeless standards of classical correctness and adornment down to a language intent on making the Truth plain and immediate to a heterogeneous congregation."⁷⁸ The *superbia* of the learned was unmasked through Augustine's homiletic mode. The shift in understanding the *use* of rhetoric is expressed in the first book of the *Confessions*, where he recounts having to exegete a passage from the beginning of the *Aeneid*, in which Juno voices her anger and frustration over the Trojans' impending success in Italy.⁷⁹ Augustine writes about the assignment: "The speaker who received highest praise (*ille dicebat laudabilius*) was the one who had regard to the dignity of the imaginary character, who most effectively expressed feelings of anger and sorrow, and who clothed these thoughts in appropriate language."⁸⁰ This pedagogical method, perhaps referencing that espoused by Quintilian,⁸¹ fosters the flaunting of rhetorical style and suavity, thus lending itself to the *disciplinae superbiae*, insists Augustine. Despite the fact that his "recitation was acclaimed beyond many others of my age group," Augustine at once dismisses the entire exercise as "smoke and wind"⁸² because its *use* ended in self-praise rather than praise of God:

Was there no other subject on which my talent and tongue (*ingenium et lingua mea*) might be exercised? Your praises, Lord, your praises (*laudes tuae, domine, laudes tuae*) expressed through your scriptures would have upheld the tender vine of my heart, and it would not have been snatched away by empty trifles.⁸³

⁷⁸ Robert A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 83. Cf. Wilhelm Blümer, "Eloquentia," *AugLex*. Augustine's maturing account of the "use" of rhetoric and the perennial tension between the "humble style" of Christian kerygma and the classical rhetorical tradition is well presented in E. T. Flood, "Augustine and the classical tradition of rhetoric," *History of Education* 11 (1982), 237-250; O. Costas, "Influential Factors in the Rhetoric of Augustine," *Foundations* 16 (1973), 208-221; Maurice Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1958). The dialectic between the classical rhetorical culture and Christian presentation of the faith is obviously most directly addressed by Augustine himself in *De doctrina christiana*. Cf. David Foster, "Eloquentia nostra: (DDC IV.VI,10): A Study of the Place of Classical Rhetoric in Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* Book Four," *Augustinianum* 36 (1996), 459-494; and Goulven Madec, "L'Idéal de l'orateur chrétien," *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 11/2 (1997), 581-90.

⁷⁹ Concerning this passage that he had to exegete Augustine remarks, "I had understood that Juno never said this." *Conf.* I.17.27 (CCSL 27.15). Here again Augustine demonstrates his intent to safeguard the historical nature of truth and his hesitancy to embrace a canon composed of fables.

⁸⁰ *Conf.* I.17.27 (CCSL 27.15).

⁸¹ Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, 10.5.2.

⁸² *Conf.* I.17.27 (CCSL 27.15).

⁸³ *Conf.* I.17.27 (CCSL 27.15).

The classical canon that was upheld to Augustine for his imitation (*imitandi proponebantur*) is contrasted here with the unadorned elegance of Scripture.⁸⁴ The difference lies less in style than in *use*: the one is used to “praise and congratulate themselves (*laudati gloriabantur*)”⁸⁵; the other is used to praise the Lord. Michael Roberts correctly notes, “Ultimately Augustine’s objection was not to the style itself but to the ends it served.”⁸⁶ When God is praised rather than self, classical learning finds its proper use.

Modeling the “Use” of the Liberal Arts

Augustine’s critique of the *liberales disciplinae* and their accompanying rhetoric, I have suggested, is directed at the ill-use of the rhetoric, which ends not in *confessio* and *laus* but in pride and worldly success. In the first book of the *Confessions* Augustine offers a model in his own writing of how the liberal arts might function positively. His remarks regarding a quotation from *Eunuch* are paradigmatic for his overall thought: “I bring no charge against the words which are like exquisite and precious vessels, but the wine of error is poured into them for us by drunken teachers. If we failed to drink we were caned and could not appeal to any sober judge.”⁸⁷ The marvelously composed style of this sentence underscores Augustine’s principle. He clearly values the intricate, classical rhetorical and literary devices as “exquisite and precious,” because we see their masterful use in this very sentence. A developing linguistic trope is presented: Augustine employs *adiectio* to expand the simile of the “precious vessels” into a grand metaphor (*transmutatio*) of a raucous scene of “drunken teachers” (*ebrii doctores*)—a case of situational irony—forcing students, helpless without any “sober judge” (*iudices sobrii*), to drink. The elegant prose reinforces Augustine’s point: he takes no umbrage to *eloquentia* and *rhetorica* — as his developed conceit clearly

⁸⁴ Kaster writes, “Augustine shows that the traditional standards of correct speech refer to a man-made order and so strips them of their veneer of permanence.” Kaster, *Guardians of Language*, p. 84.

⁸⁵ *Conf.* I.18.28 (CCSL 27.15).

⁸⁶ Michael Roberts, *The Jeweled Style, Poetry and Poetics in Late Antiquity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 129.

⁸⁷ *Conf.* I.16.26 (CCSL 27.15). *non accuso uerba quasi uasa electa atque pretiosa, sed unum erroris quod in eis nobis propinabatur ab ebriis doctoribus, et nisi biberemus caedebamur, nec appellare ad aliquem iudicem sobrium licebat* (CCSL 27.14-15).

demonstrates – but to the abuse of language for the “wine of error” (*uinum erroris*).

This principle of the use of the liberal arts is operative throughout the narrative of the first book of the *Confessions* and is clear especially in Augustine’s interaction with Virgil’s *Aeneid*. With a homophonic wordplay Augustine compares himself to Aeneas, the hero of Rome’s epic poem, who “wandered” from Troy to Italy to found the city he was destined to build: “I was later forced to learn about the wanderings of some legendary fellow named Aeneas (forgetful of my own wanderings).”⁸⁸ Like the Latin hero, Augustine “wandered” far from God – in moral and philosophical *errores*; like the Latin hero, Augustine “wandered” all over the Mediterranean in search of *requies*; and like the Latin hero, Augustine watched a woman on the shores of Carthage pleading for him to stay while he set sail to Rome.⁸⁹

Augustine recalls his emotional response as a boy to the *Aeneid*, weeping as he read of Dido killing herself on account of her lost love:

In reading this, O God my life, I myself was meanwhile dying by my alienation from you and my miserable condition in that respect brought no tear to my eyes. What is more pitiable than a wretch without pity for himself who weeps over the death of Dido dying for love of Aeneas, but not weeping over himself dying for his lack of love for you, my God.⁹⁰

The story of Dido’s demise is used by Augustine as an image of his own contorted love. Like Dido, Augustine was dying and alienated; yet, worse than she, he was unaware of his spiritual death, as he states in a wordplay (*miserius misero non miserante*). Both were dying on account of love twisted in on itself in alienation. Augustine notes the irony that he wept on her account – reading a story without historical

⁸⁸ *Conf.* I.13.20 (CCSL 27.11). O’Donnell notes the dominance of the word *errores* in the *Confessions*, which is contrasted with *peregrinatio*. The *Library of Latin Texts* indicates lexical forms of the word *errores* appear 28 times. O’Donnell, *Confessions Commentary*, p. 77.

⁸⁹ Augustine snuck out one night while his mother Monica stayed in Carthage, “praying and weeping.” “The wind blew and filled our sails and the shore was lost to our sight. There, when morning came, she was crazed with grief, and with recriminations and groans she filled your ears.” *Conf.* V.8.15 (CCSL 27.65). This account mirrors that of Dido’s grief. Aeneas, enticed as he was by the sound of the west wind blowing through the sails, deferred his mission no longer and left Dido enraged beyond sense on the shores of Carthage. MacCormack suggests some of these parallels in *Shadows of Poetry*, pp. 96–97. Cf. Camille Bennett, “The Conversion of Virgil: The *Aeneid* in Augustine’s *Confessions*,” *Revue des études augustinienes* 34 (1988), 47–69.

⁹⁰ *Conf.* I.13.20–21 (CCSL 27.11).

truth – while oblivious to his own misplaced love, alienation and spiritual death.⁹¹

By placing himself in the characters of both Aeneas and Dido, Augustine tempers his dismissive posture to the classical canon. Although he claims to “much prefer to forget the wanderings of Aeneas” and the “empty fables” of Virgil,⁹² he is all the while skillfully weaving Virgil’s epic into his own narrative with adroit rhetorical and stylistic grace. In his own writing Augustine demonstrates the principle that the *liberales disciplinae* ought to be used “like exquisite and precious vessels” in the service of the *doctrina humilitatis* that ends in confession and praise.

Conclusion

In summary, I have presented a reading of Book One of the *Confessions* as two competing accounts of *doctrina*. The first, the *doctrina superbiae* in which Augustine was schooled, seeks its own praise and glory; its goal is worldly ambition and success. The *doctrina humilitatis*, on the other hand, is ordered to praise God, to confess Him, and, finally, to seek rest in Him. Augustine situates his discussion regarding *doctrina* immediately after his acclaim of the greatness of God; to know and understand (*scire et intellegere*) Him who is infinitely beyond the mortality and sin of the human person requires the humility of faith. Augustine’s infancy narrative accentuates this requisite humility that is propaedeutic to education. Augustine is at pains to emphasize the epistemological triad of memory, trust, and experience necessary even to know about himself as a baby, and most certainly to know God.

The relation of *signa* to *doctrina* is established after the infancy narrative. As a baby, Augustine’s limited signs were ineffective; it was not until he was boy that he was capable of communicating by signs and so ready for *doctrina*. The *signum crucis* by which he was marked as a boy denotes for Augustine the humility of the Lord coming down to human pride. And so the “child” becomes not only the subject of the *doctrina humilitatis*, but also the chosen sign thereof. Here Augustine refers to Jesus’ calling the children to himself. The *signum* of the child who represents *doctrina humilitatis* is contrasted

⁹¹ Augustine thus compares Dido both to his mother, Monica, standing on the shore of Carthage, and to himself dying on account of alienation from love.

⁹² *Conf.* I.13.22 (CCSL 27.12).

with the *signum* of the *uela*, representing *doctrina superbiae*, which hang in front of the literature schools and cloaked the pride therein.

Classical learning seems *prima facie* to be dismissed on account of its pride, in the first book of the *Confessions*. Indeed, Augustine is quick to dismiss his study in literature as a pursuit of vanity and falsehood. At the same time, however, we see him eager to demonstrate his familiarity with this disparaged *doctrina*; he quotes poets and philosophers and even identifies himself with the characters of the *Aeneid*. I have suggested an interpretation of *Confessions* One as presenting binary accounts of education. This new interpretation of educational themes in Book One as two contrasting *doctrinae* helps elucidate what seems initially a blatant inconsistency; it is the "use" of the liberal arts that endows them with worth. Further, Augustine offers us an exemplary model in his own narrative of the "use" of the classical canon.

In this study I have limited myself to considering *doctrina* in Book One of the *Confessions*. However, these conclusions have bearing on Augustine's autobiography as a whole. There are many angles from which one can fruitfully engage educational motifs in the *Confessions*. Augustine's own life, too, is here presented as that of a student and teacher and, more importantly for our thesis, we find in his life portrait someone devoted to discovering truth through growth in humility. Maturation in *doctrina humilitatis* is a journey that takes Augustine to the Manicheans, the Platonists, and finally, the Catholic Church. Throughout the *Confessions* Augustine demonstrates that his past learning is not abandoned but transfigured to serve the Catholic faith. Michael Roberts summarizes the African bishop's stance well: "Augustine consistently assesses the value of secular learning against the principle of *utilitas*."⁹³ The value accorded the *liberales disciplinae* lies, for Augustine, in their use: when classical *doctrina* is puffed up with pride to serve worldly ambition, the vessels become filled with *uinum erroris*, but when employed in *doctrina humilitatis* for praise and confession, the *liberales disciplinae* are as "treasures of the Egyptians" to be plundered or "exquisite and precious vessels" that can be filled with good teaching.

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⁹³ Michael Roberts, *The Jeweled Style, Poetry and Poetics in Late Antiquity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 127.

THE THEME OF ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE IN *CONFESSIONS* BOOK 7 CHAPTERS 14-20

Abstract

In a recent article ("Saint Augustine's Milan Vision Reconstructed", *Augustiniana* 58 [2008], 151-180) I argued that in *Confessiones* 7.10.16 Augustine uses the argument from dependence (which demonstrates that all beings are dependent upon Being Itself), in order to overcome his previous materialistic understanding of God. In this article I argue that a close analysis of *Confessiones* 7.11.17-7.20.26 confirms this interpretation.

In his work *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion* Brian Dobell notes that book 7 chapters 11-16 of the *Confessions* have been almost completely neglected by scholars.¹ More specifically, most scholars claim that Augustine describes an ascent to Truth based on the argument from judgment² in book 7 chapters 10, 17, and 20 but they neglect to give a systematic analysis of chapters 11-16, the six chapters which fall between these passages, and so do not establish whether these passages verify their interpretation.³ In a recent article I argue

¹ See B. DOBELL, *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 138: "The first ascent is described in one paragraph (7.10.16), and the second ascent in another (7.17.23). Between these two paragraphs Augustine spends fully six paragraphs recounting his reflections upon the nature of being (7.11.17), the relationship between being and goodness (7.12.18), the nature of good and evil (7.12.18-7.13.19), the nature of the true and the false (7.15.21) and the nature of sin (7.16.22). For the most part, scholars seem to regard these six paragraphs as filler, if their almost complete neglect in the literature is any indication (a neglect that is all the more conspicuous given the attention lavished upon the ascents themselves)." As Dobell himself observes, O'Donnell makes note of this fact as well. Moreover, Dobell notes that both O'Connell and Du Roy also attempt to bring structure to these paragraphs; see J. O'DONNELL, *Augustine: Confessions*. Vol. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 448; O. DUROY, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*, (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1966), pp. 82-8; R. O'CONNELL, "Where the Difference Still Lies," *Augustinian Studies*, 21 (1990), p. 143 and p. 152, n. 9.

² See E. GILSON, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, Trans. L.E.M. Lynch, (London: Gollancz, 1961), pp. 16-17.

³ Courcelle was the first to emphasize these passages. O'Donnell gives the best summation of Courcelle's interpretation: "This paragraph contains the first of two (by some counts: three) accounts of what Courcelle defined as 'vaines tentatives d'extases plotiniennes'... Courcelle's views are most concisely presented at *Recherches*, 160-164, where he presents three passages – 7.10.16 (a), 7.17.23 (b), and 7.20.26 (c) – in parallel columns, marking seven stages, which he identifies: (1) reading the *platoniorum libri* (ac), (2) searching for truth and finding above himself (abc), (3) ascent

that *Confessions* book 7 chapter 10 cannot be understood to be the description of an ascent to Truth based on the argument from judgment or as a mystical experience based on such an argument.⁴ Instead, the passage describes Augustine's use of the argument from dependence, an argument which shows that all created being is dependent upon uncreated Being. In other words, the essential knowledge Augustine intends to communicate to the reader in book 7 chapter 10 is that rational knowledge of God as He Who Is is reached through knowledge of one's ontological dependence. In the following, it will be argued that review of the six chapters which follow chapter 10 confirms this reading, for chapters 14-16 describe Augustine's defeat of materialism via the argument from dependence. It will also be shown that chapter 20 substantiates this reading. These passages function as a summation of Augustine's intellectual conversion recorded in book 7 chapters 10-12.

1. Confessions Book 7 Chapter 10

Analysis of *Confessions* book 7 chapters 9, 10, and 11 demonstrates that they cannot be understood to describe an ascent to Truth based on the argument from judgment, or as a mystical vision based on such an argument. This, however, does not mean that Augustine's vision was not mystical. The argument here is that whatever the nature of Augustine's vision, mystical or non-mystical, it was built upon a specific form of rational argument, namely the argument from dependence. The reason for this is that all three chapters describe what

by degrees (b), (4) Rom. 1:20 (bc), (5) sense of certainty but incapacity (abc), (6) 'faiblesse' (abc), and Rom. 1:20 (a). This schema highlights the parallels among these paragraphs, but imposes a structure that should not be understood as originating with Augustine." See, J. O'DONNELL, *Augustine: Confessions*, vol. 2, pp. 434-435 and P. COURCELLE, *Recherches sur les 'Confessions' de Saint Augustin* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950), 63. Courcelle, Cary, Van Fleteren, O'Connell, O'Donnell, and Dobell all hold that Augustine makes an ascent to Truth based on the argument from judgment in book 7 chapters 10 and 17; see, *Recherches*, pp. 59-63; P. CARY "Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine's Life", *A Reader's Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, ed. K. Paffenroth, & P. Kennedy (Westminster: John Knox Press, 2003), pp. 115-126; F. VAN FLETEREN, 'Augustine's Ascent of the Soul in Book VII of the Confessions: a Reconsideration,' *Augustinian Studies*, 5, pp. 29-73; R. O'CONNELL, *Images of Conversion in Augustine's Confessions* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), p. 142; O'DONNELL (1992); *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion*, pp. 129-137.

⁴ J. PALETTA, "The *Ordo sapientiae*: Augustine's Program for Philosophical Study in His Early Works," *Augustiniana*, 61 (2011), pp. 55-74.

Augustine saw with the language of ontological dependence. Therefore, the chapter must describe Augustine's use of this argument. Moreover, Augustine clearly uses this conceptual structure to overcome the problem of materialism.

In a previous article⁵ I argued that *Confessions* book 7 chapter 10 cannot be read as the description of a purely mystical vision due to Augustine's use of *Acts* 17:28 (in chapter 9) and *Romans* 1:20 (in chapter 10), for both passages signify for Augustine the mind's ability to attain rational knowledge of God.⁶ Consequently, it appears that Augustine's vision is based on the argument from judgment. According to this argument God is defined as that which is greater than one's mind, and Truth, because it is eternal and because one judges according to its standards (standards such as "the inferior is subject to the superior" and "the incorruptible is higher than the corruptible") is greater than one's mind, and therefore God is Truth. Further, Truth is immutable, and what is immutable simply *is*, and, as a result, God can be understood as He Who Is. This argument emphasizes the primacy of Truth over Existence because it is necessary to first have knowledge of God as Truth before one can have knowledge of his essential identity as He Who Is.

But it is not possible for the vision passage to be an account of a rational argument for God's existence based on the argument from judgement due to Augustine's use of the verb *facere* in the description of his vision. In the vision passage Augustine says that the immutable light that he saw was superior because it *made* him and that he was inferior because he was *made* by it (*superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea*). Here then Augustine relates that he saw that he was dependent upon God for his very being for God makes one. The argument from judgment, however, reveals the knowledge

⁵ J. PALETTA, "Saint Augustine's Milan Vision Reconstructed," *Augustiniana*, 58 (2008), 175-179.

⁶ See Augustine's commentary on *Romans* 1:20 (which reads *Inuisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur*) in *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos* 3.3: Quod autem dixit: Reuelatur ira Dei de caelo super omnem impietatem et cetera, ait et Salomon de sapientibus mundi: Si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent aestimare saeculum, quomodo ipsius mundi Dominum et Creatorem non facilius inuenerunt? (*Wisdom* 13:9) Sed quos arguit Salomon, non cognouerunt per creaturam Creatorem; quos autem arguit Apostolus, cognouerunt, sed gratias non egerunt et dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt et ad colenda simulacra deciderunt. Nam sapientes gentium quod inuenirent Creatorem, manifeste idem Apostolus, cum Atheniensibus loqueretur, ostendit. Cum enim dixisset: Quia in ipso uiuimus et mouemur et sumus, addidit: Sicut et quidam secundum uos dixerunt (*Acts* 17:28). Hac autem intentione prius arguit impietatem gentium, ut ex hac probet etiam ad gratiam posse pertinere conuersos. Iniustum est enim ut poenam subeant impietatis, et praemium fidei non accipiant.

presupposed in one's value judgments and *not* the source of one's being (as the verb *facere* designates), and so it cannot be the argument used in chapter 10.⁷ Instead Augustine uses the argument from dependence.⁸ Chapters 9 and 11, the chapters which precede and follow chapter 10, confirm this reading. Chapter 9 foreshadows the use of the argument because it refers to *Acts* 17:28, in which Paul says "in Him [the Creator] we live and move and have our being," and chapter 11 relates that Augustine saw *other* things below God (*cetera infra te*) which *are* because of him (*esse quidem quoniam abs te sunt*). All three chapters deal with the same theme: rational knowledge of God as He Who Is achieved through reflection on creation's ontological dependence. Because all three chapters are defined by the theme of ontological dependence, and because there are no other arguments for God's nature based on this structure, the argument from dependence must be the source of Augustine's knowledge in the vision passage.⁹

⁷ That Augustine uses the verb *facere* to indicate a given created thing's ontological dependence in the argument from dependence is clear from *Confessions* 11.4.6 and *De Civitate Dei*: 8.6, but the verb is not used in *De Libero Arbitrio* 2.15 or in *Confessions* 7.17.23 where Augustine argues for nature of God as Truth via the argument from judgement.

⁸ Eugene Portalie cites the classic expression of this argument in his work *A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine*. See, E. PORTALIE, *A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine*, Trans. R.J. Bastian (Westport: Greenwood, 1975), pp. 125-126. Olivier Du Roy notes that in the final passages of the *De Immortalitate Animae* Augustine uses a second argument for God's existence which is based on the soul's ontological dependence (although I believe that he reconstructs it incorrectly). See, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité*, pp. 184-185, 191-192, and (most importantly) 193-194. Etienne Gilson also sees a second form of argument for God's existence used by Augustine, but has certain technical reservations which are based on his commitment to Thomism. See E. GILSON, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, Trans. L.E.M. Lynch (London: Gollancz, 1961), pp. 19-20, and (again, more importantly) fns. 35 and 36 on p. 19. Gerard Esser also believes that Augustine argues for the existence of God through a version of the argument from dependence. More specifically, he holds that Augustine argues for the existence of God by recognizing the contingent perfections of created things, but he claims that the argument is incomplete because Augustine does not explicitly state an important premise which is necessary to make the argument valid. See, G. ESSER, "The Augustinian Proof for God's Existence and the Thomistic Fourth Way," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 28 (1954) pp. 194-211. The use of the verb *facere* is the essential distinguishing characteristics common to all arguments identified by these authors. See my "Saint Augustine's Milan Vision Reconstructed," pp. 161-162. In contrast, Cary gives a very straightforward defense of the argument from judgment, and, consequently, does not see Augustine's use of *facere* to be central to Augustine's philosophical point of departure. See *A Reader's companion*, pp. 115-126.

⁹ Augustine may not be giving the reader an reproduction of the chronological order of the arguments in book 10, but instead the insight that communicates God's essential nature. In other words, perhaps there is no account of the chronological

In a second article I argue that this reading is confirmed through analysis of Augustine's early dialogs. In *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine* Augustine makes a distinction between Truth and that upon which Truth depends, and in both dialogs knowledge of that upon which Truth depends is categorized as a higher form of knowledge.¹⁰ In *De Beata Vita* 4.34 Truth is described as the highest object of the mind, the source of happiness, and that through which one arrives at the supreme measure.¹¹ In *De Ordine* 2.9.26 Augustine describes an educational program which young men must be trained in in order to love God, and in this program he makes a distinction between (1) knowledge which demonstrates that the soul either *is* Truth or is *in* Truth (an ambiguous form of knowledge based on the argument from judgment) and (2) knowledge which shows the source of all things (including Truth), a form of knowledge which clearly entails a relationship of ontological dependence.¹² The former distinction occupies the third level of knowledge in what Augustine calls the *ordo sapientiae* while the latter occupies the fourth and highest level.¹³ The final level is the highest form of knowledge because it concerns knowledge of God as the source of all things.¹⁴

Moreover, analysis of *De Immortalitate Animae* establishes the theoretical foundation for the distinction between Truth and that upon which Truth depends made in *De Beata Vita* and *De Ordine*. Here again the argument from judgment yields an ambiguous form of knowledge for Augustine says that it establishes that "the mind either is a subject with the true in it as in a subject" or that "the Truth is a subject with the mind in it as in a subject,"¹⁵ an ambiguity he explicitly states

progression of his mind, but instead a "fast-forward", a skipping over and movement to his most essential insight, the argument from dependence.

¹⁰ J. PALETTA, "Saint Augustine's Milan Vision Reconstructed," pp.151-180.

¹¹ *De Beata Vita* 4.34: Veritas autem ut sit, fit per aliquem summum modum, a quo procedit, et in quem se perfecta conuertit. Ipsi autem summo modo nullus alius modus imponitur: si enim summus modus per summum modum modus est, per seipsum modus est

¹² *De Ordine* 2.9.26: tum demum discet et quanta ratione praedita sint ea ipsa quae secutus est ante rationem, et quid sit ipsa ratio quam post auctoritatis cunabula firmus et idoneus iam sequitur atque comprehendit et [1] quid intellectus, in quo uniuersa sunt, uel ipse potius uniuersa, et [2] quid praeter uniuersa uniuersorum principium. See also, *De Ordine* 2.19.51: Cum autem se composuerit et ordinauerit ac concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audebit iam Deum uidere, atque ipsum fontem unde manat omne uerum ipsumque Patrem Veritatis.

¹³ *De Ordine* 2.9.26

¹⁴ *De Ordine* 2.9.26

¹⁵ *De Immortalitate Animae* 6.11: Quare ista coniunctio intuentis animi, et eius ueri quod intuetur, aut ita est ut subiectum sit animus, uerum autem illud in subiecto; aut contra subiectum uerum, et in subiecto animus.

is based on the original problem found in *De Ordine* concerning whether the soul *is* Truth or is *in* Truth. But in this dialogue (the *De Immortalitate Animae*) Augustine stops using the qualification which holds that the mind either is a subject with the true in it as in a subject or vice versa after he introduces the argument from dependence. That is to say, Augustine overcomes the ambiguous form of knowledge arrived at via the argument from judgment and arrives at definitive knowledge concerning the nature of the soul and God in *De Immortalitate Animae* because this argument establishes that God is the supreme maker and the soul is an object made, that God is uncreated Being and the soul created being. Augustine can now see that the soul and God are two distinct substances (because God is the source of the soul).¹⁶

In the previous two articles presented above analysis focused on identifying the theme of ontological dependence, but the specific problems that the argument solves for Augustine were not addressed, and so it is this issue which will now be taken up. In the beginning of chapter 10 Augustine recalls that he saw an immutable light (*lucem incommutabilem*) which was higher than his mind (*supra mentem meam*).¹⁷ He says that this light was unlike the type of light that would have filled everything with its magnitude (*totumque occuparet magnitudine*).¹⁸ He calls it utterly different (*aliud valde*), transcendent (*supra*), and superior (*superior*).¹⁹ Augustine then specifically defines what he saw as truth (*ueritatem*) and eternity (*aeternitatem*).²⁰ This set of terms is intended to impress upon the reader that what Augustine saw was totally beyond the nature of material things. Finally, in the concluding lines of his reflection he tells the reader, "And I said:

¹⁶ *De Immortalitate Animae* 12.19: Ex qua si habet animus idipsum quod est (non enim aliunde hoc habere potest, qui ex se non habet, nisi ab illa re quae illo ipso est animo praestantior), nulla res est qua id amittat, quia nulla res ei rei est contraria qua id habet; et propterea esse non desinit. I translate this, "If the mind has its essence from that itself which *is* (for since it does not have it from itself it cannot have it otherwise than from that thing which is superior to the mind itself); then there is nothing by which it may lose its being."

¹⁷ *Confessiones* 7.10.16: Intraui et uidi qualicumque oculo animae meae supra eundem oculum animae meae, supra mentem meam lucem incommutabilem...

¹⁸ *Confessiones* 7.10.16: ...non hanc uulgarem et conspicuam omni carni nec quasi ex eodem genere grandior erat, tamquam si ista multo multoque clarius claresceret totumque occuparet magnitudine.

¹⁹ *Confessiones* 7.10.16: Non hoc illa erat, sed aliud, aliud ualde ab istis omnibus. Nec ita erat supra mentem meam, sicut oleum super aquam nec sicut caelum super terram, sed superior, quia ipsa fecit me, et ego inferior, quia factus ab ea.

²⁰ *Confessiones* 7.10.16: Qui nouit ueritatem, nouit eam, et qui nouit eam, nouit aeternitatem. Caritas nouit eam. O aeterna ueritas et uera caritas et cara aeternitas!

'Surely, truth cannot be nothing, when it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?' And you cried from far way: 'Now, I Am Who Am.'"²¹ Knowledge of God as He Who Is overcomes materialism. Here the phrase "not diffused in infinite space" (*neque per infinita locorum spatia diffusa est*) is intended to remind the reader of book 7 chapter 1 where he recalls, after abandoning Manichaeism, that he still imagined God to penetrate infinite space. There he says, "I conceived even you, life of my life, as a large being, permeating infinite space on every side, penetrating the entire mass of the world."²² This reference (in chapter 10) links the two passages and makes it clear that Augustine is referring to the problem of materialism. Again, what is important to note about Augustine's description of his experience is that he is not just trying to show that the argument from dependence arrives at knowledge of God as He Who Is, and that this knowledge moves one beyond materialism. What is equally important to his project are the terms he uses, such as Immutability, Truth, and Eternity, to highlight the distinction between the nature of the immaterial and the nature of the material. In other words, in book 7 chapter 10 he recounts here the full range of terms which distinguish the material order from the immaterial order, even though the distinction is fundamentally grounded in the argument from dependence and its conclusion that God is He Who Is.

Although it is not a formal demonstration, Augustine then gives a slightly more detailed description of how he overcame materialism in book 7 chapter 11, for here he gives a summary of the argument from dependence. More specifically, this paragraph establishes that created things are and are not, that they receive being from God (*esse quidem quoniam abs te sunt*), and that only God truly Is because he remains unchangeably (*Id enim uere est quod incommutabiliter manet*).²³ Here again one can see that Augustine intends to emphasize the contingency of creation.

In chapter 12 the relationship between being and goodness is explored in order to refute the idea that evil is a substance. Augustine

²¹ *Confessiones* 7.10.16: et dixi: "Numquid nihil est veritas, quoniam neque per finita neque per infinita locorum spatia diffusa est?". Et clamasti de longinquo: "Immo uero ego sum qui sum". English translations are taken from Chadwick; see H. Chadwick, *St. Augustine's Confessions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

²² *Confessiones* 7.1.2: Ita etiam te, uita uitae meae, grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi molem.

²³ *Confessiones* 7.11.17: Et inspexi cetera infra te et uidi nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse: esse quidem, quoniam abs te sunt, non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt. Id enim uere est, quod incommutabiliter manet.

begins this chapter by recalling that it was clear to him that all corruptible things are good.²⁴ He then noticed that both supreme goods and things which are not completely good cannot be corrupted: the former is incorruptible by definition while the latter does not exist. That is, because everything is created good, evil is merely the privation of the good which all things naturally have. It follows that if something was totally evil, totally corrupted, it would no longer be, and therefore pure evil does not exist.

Augustine then notices that created things aren't equally good, and that their inequality is justified because together they form an even greater good – the harmony of the lower and the higher. He notes that there are parts of the universe which are thought to be evil because they appear to be in conflict with the order of things, and that these parts are commonly associated with the earth. There is, however, no contradiction, says Augustine, in the existence of these elements because the earth is a part of the lower half of the created world and together with the higher (the heavenly bodies) create the even greater good of a graded harmony. As a result of this understanding, says Augustine, one should not be displeased with creation.

2. Confessions Chapter 7 books 14-20

In this section it will be shown that chapters 14-16 and chapter 20 are condensed summaries of Augustine's intellectual conversion recorded in book 7 chapter 10, and that they serve to introduce a new topic, the problem of enjoyment.

In chapter 14 Augustine describes his movement from materialism to Platonism:

'There is no health' (Ps. 37:4,8) in those who are displeased by an element in your creation, just as there was none in me when I was displeased by many things you had made. Because my soul did not dare to say that my god displeased me, it refused to attribute to you whatever was displeasing. Hence it came to adopt the opinion that there are two substances. But it found no rest and spoke a strange language. Returning from this deviation, it created for itself a god pervading all places in infinite space. It imagined this god to be you and installed him at its heart. It again became the temple of its own idol, an abomination to you. But afterwards you calmed my head without my realizing it, and 'shut my eyes that they should not see vanity' (Ps. 118:37). I relaxed a little and my mad folly was put to sleep. I

²⁴ *Confessiones* 7.12.18.

woke up in you and saw you to be infinite in another sense, and this way of seeing you did not come from the flesh.²⁵

In the above Augustine begins by associating displeasure with the created order with the theology of the Manichees. He reports that, because he was unwilling to hold that God was the cause of evil, he came to believe that there must be two eternal ungenerated substances – one good and one evil. This understanding, however, still left his mind restless, and so he adopted the Christian understanding of God, but still conceived of him as a substance extended in infinite space (*Deum per infinita spatia locorum omnium*), again, a reference to his materialistic conception of God referenced in book 7 chapters 1 and 10. Finally, he realized that this position was also false, and “woke up” to see that God was “infinite in another sense” (*infinitum aliter*). So in this chapter Augustine reminds the reader of the fact that the *libri Platoniorum* allowed him to overcome his understanding of God as a being extended in infinite space.

Chapter 15 constitutes the continuation of this intellectual history, for it repeats what Augustine did after gaining the knowledge that God is He Who Is. Here Augustine reports that he turned to other things and saw that they *are* because of God:²⁶

I turned my gaze on other things. I saw that to you they owe their existence, and that in you all things are finite, not in the sense that the space they occupy is bounded but in the sense that you hold all things in your hand by your Truth, and so all things are true insofar as they have being, and the term falsehood applies only when something is thought to have being which does not. And I saw that each thing is harmonious not only with its place but with its time, and that you alone are eternal and did not first begin to work after innumerable periods of time, for all periods of time both past and future neither pass away nor come except by your working and remaining.²⁷

²⁵ *Confessiones* 7.14.20: *Non est sanitas eis, quibus displicet aliquid creaturae tuae, sicut mihi non erat, cum displicerent multa, quae fecisti. Et quia non audebat anima mea, ut ei displiceret Deus meus, nolebat esse tuum quicquid ei displicebat. Et inde ierat in opinionem duarum substantiarum et non requiescebat et aliena loquebatur. Et inde rediens fecerat sibi Deum per infinita spatia locorum omnium et eum putauerat esse te et eum collocauerat in corde suo et facta erat rursus templum idoli sui abominandum tibi. Sed posteaquam fouisti caput nescientis et clausisti oculos meos, ne uiderent uanitatem, cessauit de me paululum, et consopita est insania mea; et euigilaui in te et uidi te infinitum aliter, et uisus iste non a carne trahebatur.*

²⁶ This reading is confirmed by the parallel between *inspexi cetera* in book 11 and *respexi alia* in book 15 found in the opening lines of each.

²⁷ *Confessiones* 7.15.21: *Et respexi alia et uidi tibi debere quia sunt et in te cuncta finita, sed aliter, non quasi in loco, sed quia tu es omnitenens manu ueritate, et omnia uera sunt, in quantum sunt, nec quidquam est falsitas, nisi cum putatur esse quod non*

Dobell argues that this passage relates Augustine's understanding of the "nature of the true and the false," but even more dominant here is the theme of ontological dependence.²⁸ Augustine tells the reader that he came to understand that God was beyond space and time because he sustains created things in space and time. More specifically, in the first half of the second line above he says, "I saw that to You they owe their existence, and that in You all things are finite, not in the sense that the space they occupy is bounded but in the sense that You hold all things in your hand by your Truth." Things are finite not because they are limited in space by their shape but because they owe their existence (*uidi tibi debere quia sunt*) to their Creator. It is the creature's ontological dependence (which is ultimately established by the argument from dependence) which solves the problem of materialism, knowledge which clearly parallels the nature of the knowledge which Augustine describes in chapters 10 and 11. In the second half of the second line which follows this insight Augustine then comments: "So all things are true insofar as they have being, and the term 'falsehood' applies only when something is thought to have being which does not." Just as things receive their being from God so too do they receive their truth, for truth presupposes being. Finally, in the line following this one he explains that God's creative act sustains creatures not only in space but also in time: "And I saw that each thing is harmonious not only with its place but with its time, and that you alone are eternal and did not first begin to work after innumerable periods of time, for all periods of time both past and future neither pass away nor come except by your working and remaining." Creation comes and goes in time through God's working (*operante*) and remaining (*manente*), and so change in time is dependent upon God's eternal creative activity. Here again the theme of ontological dependence dominates. Finally, it should be noted that Augustine says here that Truth is the source of being, and so it may seem that here he is referring to the use of the argument from judgment.²⁹ But this is not possible because here he does not introduce an argument which establishes the *necessity* of this relationship – the necessity

est. Et uidi, quia non solum locis sua quaeque suis conueniunt sed etiam temporibus et quia tu, qui solus aeternus es, non post innumerabilia spatia temporum coepisti operari, quia omnia spatia temporum, et quae praeterierunt et quae praeteribunt, nec abirent nec uenirent nisi te operante et manente.

²⁸ Augustine's *Intellectual Conversion*, p. 38.

²⁹ This seems to be Cary's understanding. See *A Reader's Companion*, p. 115.

of Truth as the source of being. The reason for this is that Augustine does not have such an argument: his formal argument which establishes the necessity of concluding that created beings are brought into being by the Creator moves from the contingency of beings to Being itself. Moreover, as this passage indicates, being and truth are convertible and so the general statement that Truth is the source of being is a true one.

In chapter 16 Augustine continues his intellectual history while transitioning into a new problem.³⁰ He states that he was not surprised to see that the unhealthy perceive what is good for them as something bad, for they are used to an unhealthy diet.³¹ This is the problem of enjoyment, the inability of a damaged faculty to enjoy the true object that it loves and needs, an analogy which is meant to apply to the damaged will and its inability to take pleasure in the highest Good. The wicked are unable to appreciate the good order that God establishes in creation because they are so accustomed to their own disordered view of it, and so he says here that they reject the goodness of lower things in the order of nature, things like the earth, snakes, and worms. Augustine says that only when they come to understand that all creation is good can they truly be part of creation's higher order. This chapter clearly parallels chapter 12 where Augustine explains that one should not be displeased with creation because the harmony of the lower and the higher forms a greater good. So chapters 14-16 are a review of Augustine's intellectual conversion for the sake of the introduction to a new problem, the problem of enjoyment.

In chapter 17, Augustine continues his reflection on the problem of enjoyment. He states that he was astonished to find that he loved God but that he was still unable to be firm in the enjoyment of him. He recalls that the beauty of his Creator "lifted him up and away" from the material world, but that he was immediately pulled back from him by the "weight" of his sexual habit. At this point Augustine then gives a description of an ascent to God:

In the course of this inquiry why I made such value judgements as I was making, I found the unchangeable and authentic eternity of truth to transcend my mutable mind. And so step by step I ascended from bodies to the soul which perceives through the body, and from there to its inward force; to which bodily senses report external sensations, this being as high as the beasts go. From there again I ascended to the

³⁰ *Confessiones* 7.16.22.

³¹ For example, a man who is sick may believe that the bread which is good for him is bad due to his unhealthy palate.

power of reasoning to which is to be attributed the power of judging the deliverances of the bodily senses. This power, which in myself I found to be mutable; raised itself to the level of its own intelligence, and led my thinking out of the ruts of habit. It withdrew itself from the contradictory swarms of imaginative fantasies, so as to discover the light by which it was flooded. At that point it had no hesitation in declaring that the unchangeable is preferable to the changeable, and that on this ground it can know the unchangeable; since, unless it could some how know this; there would be no certainty in preferring it to the mutable. So in the flash of a trembling glance it attained to that which is.³²

Courcelle argues that this ascent is another version of the one found in chapter 10. But this ascent is not the same type as the one recorded in chapter 10 because the experience described here is based on the argument from judgement. Here Augustine says that he knew his mind to be mutable, and also that the immutable is superior to the mutable. As a result, he concludes that he must know the immutable (*unde nosset ipsum incommutabile*) or there would be no certainty in his judgment that the immutable is superior to the mutable (i.e. what is known with certainty must exist).³³ But as has been demonstrated earlier, Augustine describes a relationship of ontological dependence in chapter 10, a relationship which is not used in the argument from judgment, and consequently it must be the case that in chapter 17 Augustine introduces a new argument. In short, the argument shows that one knows God because one must know him in order to make certain types of judgments. This argument does not show that all created being is dependent upon uncreated Being. Further, it should also be noted that it cannot be the case that the knowledge of Truth is a

³² *Confessiones* 7.17.23: hoc ergo quaerens, unde iudicarem, cum ita iudicarem, inueneram incommutabilem et ueram ueritatis aeternitatem supra mentem meam commutabilem. Atque ita gradatim a corporibus ad sentientem per corpus animam atque inde ad eius interiorem uim, cui sensus corporis exteriora nuntiaret, et quousque possunt bestiae, atque inde rursus ad ratiocinantem potentiam, ad quam refertur iudicandum, quod sumitur a sensibus corporis; quae se quoque in me comperiens mutabilem erexit se ad intelligentiam suam et abduxit *cogitationem a consuetudine*, subtrahens se contradicentibus turbis phantasmatum, ut inueniret quo lumine aspergeretur, cum sine ulla dubitatione clamaret incommutabile praeferendum esse mutabili, unde nosset ipsum incommutabile (quod nisi aliquo modo nosset, nullo modo illud mutabili certa praeponeret) et peruenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus. Tunc uero *inuisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta* consexpi, sed aciem figere non eualui et repercussa infirmitate redditus solitis non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem, quae comedere nondum possem.

³³ The argument recorded in 7.17 differs slightly from standard versions of such arguments, for example, *De Libero Arbitrio*.

secondary (i.e. not primary) effect of Augustine's argument in book 7.17 due to the fact that he concludes the chapter with the statement that he had attained That Which Is (*id quod est*). In this argument knowledge of Truth is always the immediate conclusion, while knowledge of God as Being is secondary. The reason for this is that this argument clearly works on the epistemological plane: its objective is to show that the mind has access to certain knowledge (i.e. Truth) and that certain knowledge fulfills the criteria of divinity. This reading is supported by Augustine's summation of the argument in the opening line of the paragraph. It will be important to keep this point in mind in order to understand the relationship between this chapter and chapter 18. Augustine concludes the chapter by saying, "But I did not possess the strength to keep my vision fixed," and also "I carried with me only a loving memory and a desire for that of which I had the aroma but which I had not yet the capacity to eat." Scholars usually see here the opposition of the partially mystical and the fully mystical (i.e. the record of a partial mystical vision that will be made perfect at Ostia), but, as it will be demonstrated, Augustine actually intends to oppose rational and faith knowledge in regard to the problem of enjoyment.

That Augustine is now comparing scientific knowledge reached via the argument from judgement with faith knowledge is confirmed by the continuation of the theme in chapter 18. Chapter 18 begins as follows:

I sought a way to obtain strength enough to enjoy you, but I did not find it until I embraced "the mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus" (I Timothy 2:5), "who is above all things, God blessed for ever" (Romans 9:5). He called and said "I am the way and the truth and the life" (John 14:6). The food which I was too weak to accept he mingled with flesh, in that "The Word was made flesh" (John 1:14), so that our infant condition might come to such milk from your wisdom by which you created all things.³⁴

In the above Augustine intends to show that only Christ gave him the power to enjoy God because only Christ is God and man. More specifically, Christ, because he is man *and* Truth, enables other

³⁴ *Confessiones* 7.18.24: Et quaerebam uiam comparandi roboris, quod esset idoneum ad fruendum te, nec inueniebam, donec amplecterer mediatorem Dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula, uocantem et dicentem: Ego sum uia et ueritas et uita, et cibum, cui capiendo inualidus eram, miscentem carni, quoniam Verbum caro factum est, ut infantiae nostrae lactesceret sapientia tua, per quam creasti omnia.

men to enter into relationship with Truth. The argument from Truth presented in the preceding chapter is meant to find an immediate parallel in this one: in the former Augustine says that he discovered that unchangeable and eternal Truth transcended his mind (*inueneram incommutabilem et ueram ueritatis aeternitatem*: 7.17.23) and here he says that one knows that Christ is God because he called himself Truth (*Ego sum ueritas*). Clearly then Augustine saves the use of the argument from Truth until book 17 (i.e. he does not use it in chapter 10) in order to establish that Christ is God incarnate, for the nature of God revealed at the conclusion of the Platonic argument from judgment is identical to the nature of Christ described in John 14:6. In other words, the argument from dependence is not suitable for making this connection because the immediate conclusion of the argument from dependence is not that God is Truth, and so Augustine needs the argument from judgment in order to link Platonism with Christ's self-designation. Moreover, this argument helps to solve the problem of enjoyment insofar as it helps to illuminate Christ's nature. According to Augustine, Truth is mixed with flesh so that the soul, in its weakened state, can be empowered to enjoy it. When he says that he was not stable in the enjoyment of God Augustine is not comparing imperfect mystical experience with perfect mystical experience but faith-knowledge of Truth (knowledge based on belief in God incarnate) to rational knowledge of Truth. Moreover, there seems to be allusions here to the Eucharist, and if this is the case it would strongly support this thesis that the opposition is between rational and faith-knowledge.³⁵

The next chapter, chapter 19, concerns Augustine's understanding of Christ's nature at the time of his intellectual conversion. Concerning this he says that at the time just following his intellectual conversion he understood Christ to be the wisest of all men but not Divinity incarnate.

In chapter 20 of book 7 Augustine gives another summary of his understanding of the books of the Platonists:

[I] turned my attention to your 'invisible nature understood through the things that are made' (Rom. 1:20). But from the disappointment I suffered I perceived that the darkness of my soul would not allow me to contemplate these sublimities. Yet I was certain that you are infinite without being infinitely diffused through finite space. I was sure that you truly are, and are always the same that you never become other

³⁵ For example, he refers to embracing Christ, to food mingled with flesh, and to Christ as building "a humble home of the human body." Dobell makes this observation as well; see *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion*, p. 226.

or different in any part or by any movement of position, whereas all other things derive from you, as is proved by the fact that they exist. Of these conceptions I was certain but to enjoy you I was too weak.³⁶

The above clearly mirrors book 7 chapters 10-11. Augustine begins by reflecting on his Platonic experience, informing the reader that he had attained rational knowledge of his Creator by quoting *Romans* 1:20. He then refers to his overcoming of materialism, for he says that he came to believe that God was not diffused through infinite space (*nec tamen per locos finitos infinitosue diffundi*), a third reference to *Confessions* 7.1. He then goes on to recall the knowledge he gained by reading the *libri Platoniorum*: the knowledge that God exists, that He is unchanging, and that all things come from God which is proved by the fact that they exist (*ex te esse omnia...quia sunt*). Here again the theme of ontological dependence is listed as one of his essential insights and not the mind's ability to make value judgements. Since Augustine prefaces his recollection with a reference to *Romans* 1:20 (which signifies for him rational knowledge), and because he says that he had come to know that all things come from God because they are, one must read him as referring here to the argument from dependence. Augustine does not emphasize the fact that he came to knowledge of God as Truth through reflection on his ability to make judgments concerning the qualities of created things (as he does in chapter 17) but instead focuses on the fact that he came to know that God is by reflecting on their ontological dependence. Also, here too one can see that Augustine is still addressing the problem of enjoyment: he had achieved certainty regarding the nature of God, and God's relationship to Creation, but he still did not have the ability to take true pleasure in what he had discovered.³⁷

³⁶ *Confessiones* 7.20.26: quid per tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer, certus esse te et infinitum esse nec tamen per locos finitos infinitosue diffundi et uere te esse, qui semper idem ipse esses, ex nulla parte nulloque motu alter aut aliter, cetera uero ex te esse omnia, hoc solo firmissimo documento, quia sunt, certus quidem in istis eram, nimis tamen infirmus ad fruendum te.

³⁷ Augustine concludes with his thoughts on the pride that this new knowledge had produced in him. The final chapter of book 7 concerns how he began to study the writing of Paul, how upon reading them he could now see the harmony between Platonic philosophy and the Christian religion, and how true salvation is attained only through belief in Christ.

Conclusion

In *Confessions* 7.10 Augustine overcomes the problem of materialism via the argument from dependence and its conclusion that God is He Who Is. In order to clearly emphasize God's nature as immaterial Augustine uses a variety of terms, such as Truth, Immutability, and Eternity, which are convertible with Being. In chapter 11 Augustine gives his conclusions clearer expression, explaining that God is the source of that which both is and is not, and, therefore is That Which Truly Is. In chapter 12 he addresses the problem of evil, arguing that whatever is is good, and that evil refers only to the degree to which good things are corrupted. It is the definition of God as Immutable Being which solves both the problem of materialism and the problem of evil. Materialism is not overcome for Augustine through the use of the argument from judgment and its conclusion that God is Truth.

A close analysis of chapters 14-20 confirms this interpretation. Chapters 14-16 clearly constitute a short summary of chapters 10-12. In chapter 10 Augustine says that God is not diffused through infinite space (*neque per infinita locorum spatia diffusa est*) because, as He Who Is, he is the maker of created things (*superior quia ipsa fecit me*), and this idea is then reexpressed in slightly more detail in chapter 11 where he says that things have their being through God (*esse quidem quoniam abs te sunt*). Similarly, in chapters 14-16 Augustine says that he conceived of God as diffused in infinite space (*Deum per infinita spatia locorum omnium*), but then rejected this notion because he understood God to be infinite in the sense that he is *not* bounded by space, for things which are bounded by space owe their very being to God (*uidi tibi debere qui sunt*) while things changing in time come and go only through God's working and remaining (*nisi te operante et manente*). In both these chapters the next conclusion is that all creation is good because the unity of the higher and lower creates a more perfect harmony. So in each there is (1) a reference to God as extended in infinite space, (2) a reference to the defeat of materialism through knowledge of creation's ontological dependence, and (3) the claim that the harmony of the lower and the higher form a greater good.

At the conclusion of chapter 16 Augustine claims that there are certain people who do not enjoy the goodness of creation because their wills are not pure enough, and so it was argued that this review of Augustine's intellectual history is intended to introduce the problem of enjoyment. This problem, the inability of the corrupt will to enjoy the Good, is then immediately developed in the chapter 17, for here

Augustine addresses the fact that he himself was not stable in the enjoyment of God. The argument from judgement is then used to illustrate the fleeting nature of rational knowledge because, although it achieves knowledge of God as Truth, this chapter too concludes with Augustine's complaint that it does not yield stability. Finally, in chapter 18 Christianity is introduced as the solution to the problem of enjoyment. Christ gives one the power to enjoy the Truth because Christ *is* the Truth mingled with flesh. The argument from judgement is saved in order to help solve the problem of enjoyment because it helps to illuminate the precise meaning of John 14:6 (*ego sum ueritas*). In chapter 20 one can see a second summation of the knowledge he received from the Platonists, for one can see a reference to the overturning of materialism via knowledge of creation's ontological dependence. Here there are clear similarities between book 7 chapters 10-12 and book 7 chapters 14-16. So analysis of chapters 14-16 and 20 confirms that in book 7 chapter 10 Augustine describes knowledge attained through the argument from dependence.

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THE EARLIEST PHASE OF THE JANSENIST CONTROVERSY AMONG THE FLEMISH CAPUCHINS

p 2:
Part II:

the cases of Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch and
Fulgentius of Maaseik*

Abstract

The last and most thorough treatment of the Jansenist controversy among the Capuchins of the Flandro-Belgian Province was published in 1951/1957 by Hildebrand of Hooglede (O.F.M.Cap.). The present article, which consists of two parts and is based on a large selection of unedited or previously neglected documents, assesses Hildebrand's methodology and (some of his) conclusions.

The first part (which was published in the previous issue of this journal) showed that Hildebrand's account of the controversy depends to a high extent on the apologetic discourse that was used by one of the parties involved in the controversy and that is best illustrated by the *Compendiosa et historica enarratio miserrimi status Prouvinciae Flandro-Belgicae fratrum Minorum Capucinatorum* by Michael of Oudenbosch and Angelus of Antwerp (1700). In addition, it was shown that by using a purely formal definition of Jansenism, Hildebrand managed to deny the existence of any 'real' Jansenist among his predecessors of the 17th and 18th centuries. A detailed analysis of some works by Eugenius of Bruges (1680s) proved that the use of this purely formal definition has lead to historically untenable conclusions.

The article's second part now examines a claim by Silvester of Hasselt in his *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio fidelis et sincera* (1700), according to which Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch and especially Fulgentius of Maaseik were the first to propagate Jansenius' teaching within the Flandro-Belgian Province. It is shown against Hildebrand that the anti-Jansenist decree that was issued by Provincial Patricius of Hazebroek in 1668, had indeed been provoked by Fulgentius of Maaseik's theological course at Antwerp during the years 1665-1668. Just like his disciple Eugenius was to do in the 1680s, Fulgentius championed the doctrines presented in the *Augustinus*, the consequence being that Silvester of Hasselt and other anti-Jansenists, who were convinced that Jansenius' book was rightly condemned by Innocent X and Alexander VII, did have serious theological (and not only personal or political) motives for accusing him of having been a Jansenist heretic.

4. Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch

Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch was born Walram Loemel in 1609/1610 and took the habit in 1629. He was ordained priest in 1636 and died in the convent of Maastricht in 1688.¹¹⁰ According to the above quoted fragment from Silvester of Hasselt's *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio*, Augustinus was the first Jansenist in the Flandro-Belgian Province (see *Augustiniana* 61 [2011] pp. 172-173). This picture is confirmed by other sources, though it should be mentioned that, just like the text of Silvester, they all expound an anti-Jansenist point of view.

According to a document written in 1657 by the anti-Jansenist Franciscus Vlemincx and edited by L. Ceyssens after the publication of Hildebrand's account of the controversy, Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch had signed in 1654 a document *in fauorem doctrinae Jansenii* together with 300 other persons.¹¹¹ Through the Brussels Internuncio Girolamo Di Vecchi, the declaration of Vlemincx reached the Cardinal Secretary of State Giulio Rospigliosi, who subsequently ordered Di Vecchi to make the necessary inquiries about the persons mentioned in the document. According to Ceyssens, this investigation explains why Augustinus was expelled shortly after from the Spanish

* I thank Ernest Persoons, Toon Van Houdt, Michel Van Meerbeeck and Anthony Dupont for their comments on a first draft of this article. In what follows, the 10 volumes of the *De Kapucijnen in de Nederlanden en het prinsbisdom Luik* by Hildebrand of Hooglede (Antwerpen 1945-1956) will be referred to as Hildebrand I, II, III, etc.

¹¹⁰ See Hildebrand VII, pp. 98-99 (n° 578a).

¹¹¹ See Arch. Vat., *Nunziatura di Fiandra* 41, f. 443. Dutch translation: L. Ceyssens, *Jansenistische strubbelingen in Asse rond 1650-1660*, in: *Eigen schoon en de Brabander* 45 (1962) pp. 418-430. Latin edition: L. Ceyssens, *La fin de la première période du jansénisme. Sources des années 1654-1660. II. (1657-1660)* (Bibliothèque de l'Institut historique belge de Rome 13, Bruxelles-Rome 1965) p. 168 (n° 772): *Hac 3^a Septembris 1657, comparuit Franciscus Wingaerde, incola Ascanus, qui declarauit quod circiter a tribus annis post publicatam constitutionem Sanctissimi Domini Innocentii X contra doctrinam Cornelii Jansenii Episcopi Iprensensis quidam Pater Capucinus, nomine Augustinus, natus in Campinia in Maioratu Siluaeducensi, domi suae pernoctauerit et mane in ecclesia officium legerit et diu manserit in sacristia cum pastore dicti loci, D. Theodoro Hubraken, et quod ipse deponens interrogauerit dictum Patrem Augustinum ubi tandiu fuisset? Qui respondebat se occupatum fuisse in sacristia cum praedicto pastore et quod ibidem signare debuisset quandam chartam, in qua habebantur plures signaturae diuersarum personarum ascendentium bene ad trecentas personas, quae omnes signauerant in fauorem doctrinae Jansenii, paratae eam doctrinam defendere, sicut et ipse Pater asserebat quod paratus erat se igni tradere pro ueritate dictae doctrinae, et illam chartam hic a dicto Capucino signatam sibi seruabat pastor praedictus, quem ipse deponens scit semper stetisse pro defensione Jansenii.*

Low Countries.¹¹² Earlier, Hildebrand had related this expulsion with the fact that Augustinus had spread Pascal's *Provincial letters* among his friends.¹¹³ In this, Hildebrand was following Silvester of Hasselt, whose account tells us nonetheless much more concerning Augustinus' supposed Jansenist sympathies than Hildebrand does:

[...] eius [= Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort] nostrique aduersarij, quorum antesignanus fuit P. Augustinus Buscoducensis, qui sub annum 1656. infames istas litteras Prouinciales, erroribus Jansenianis scatentes, et postmodum a S. Sede damnatas, tanta partialitate distribuit tantumque strepitum causauit, ut ideo dicatur ex mandato Reuerendissimi tunc Domini Internuntij dimissus extra ditiones Regis Catholici; quamuis postea intercessione P. Constantini Bruxellensis¹¹⁴ sub emendationis promisso, licentia eiusdem Illustrissimi Domini Internuntij reuersus, nec tamen emendatus; utpote coram PP. Marcello Menenensi¹¹⁵ et Antonino Antuerpiensi¹¹⁶ non ueritus dicere (ut postea Mechliniae in pleno Definitorio repetijt et confessus est) quod haberet omnem suam notitiam et scientiam ac doctrinam de libertate et gratia ex Augustino Jansenii, libro toties haereseos conuicto et damnato; imo interrogatus de bullis Innocentij X. et Alexandri VII contra Jansenium editis, non ueritus illas, etsi absolutas, facere condicionales: interrogatus enim a P. Antonino Mechliniensis conuentus uicario ob rationes quomodo illas acceptet, respondit intrepide: 'Si uere habeantur illae propositiones in Jansenio et si uere in sensu ab ipso intento sint damnatae, illas [sc. bullas] accepto'; adeo suam fidem faciens conditionalem [...]. (f. 1')

Antoninus of Antwerp, who is mentioned twice in this quotation, tells us an almost identical story at the end of a long letter which he wrote in 1683 on some Jansenist propositions that had been spread by *lectores* who used the works of Laurentius Neesen for the preparation of their theological courses (*Doghmata ex plurimis aliqua quae manant per Prouinciam nostram ex libris R. D. Laurentij Neesen, qui non sine oppositione*¹¹⁷ *jam ab annis octo*¹¹⁸ *nobis praelecti fuerunt et*

¹¹² See L. Ceyssens, *Jansenistische strubbelingen* [n. 111] p. 430. See also L. Ceyssens, *De Capucijnen van en te Asse*, in: *Ascania* 9 (1966) pp. 36-41 (esp. p. 38).

¹¹³ See Hildebrand VI, p. 352.

¹¹⁴ See Hildebrand V, p. 66; VII, p. 194 (n° 1284).

¹¹⁵ See Hildebrand VII, p. 461 (n° 3278).

¹¹⁶ See Hildebrand VII, p. 76 (n° 423).

¹¹⁷ For the anti-Jansenist opposition against the works of Neesen, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 368, 372 and 387.

¹¹⁸ Neesen's first handbook (*Theologia moralis Christiana de actibus humanis*) appeared at Mechelen in 1675. See É. Amann, *Neesen Laurent* [n. 47] c. 61.

adhuc hodie praeleguntur, non obstante etiamnum eorum grauissima inhibitione):

Primus et causa totius mali V. P. Augustinus predicator et jubilarius Busceducensis. Iste ita feruet et excedit pro suo Jansenio, cui uacauit annis amplius .40., ut non uereatur dicere – ego audiui¹¹⁹ – quod omnem suam scientiam de gratia quam habet, debeat Jansenio. Et quod ex ipso didicerit quomodo debeat orare, antea dicit: ‘Non debebam orare pro gratia sufficiente, quia illam semper ad manum credebam.’ Hic bonus Pater ab annis .25. de mandato Illustrissimi Internuntij Bruxellis resedentis pulsus est extra terras Regis nostri Catholici. Ego uidi abeuntem. Alia ratio inueniri non poterat quam quod excesserat in lectione et distributione quarumdam infamium epistolarum aduersus PP. Jesuitas, quas deinde damnauit Alexander 7. ut scatentes erroribus Jansenianis. Annis aliquot post praefatus P. Augustinus intercessionem R. P. Guardiani¹²⁰ et hac lege ut se emendaret, permissus est redire. Sed emendatus in peius: nam deinde semper conatus fuit lectores (expertus loquor)¹²¹ trahere in suum spiritum et sensum. Et sic ante annos .20. V. P. Fulgentium Masecanum lectorem tunc Antuerpiae, cuius qualitates dignosci merentur. (ff. 5^v-6^r)

The facts related by Silvester and Antoninus are also attested to in *FN* (see *Augustiniana* 61 [2011] pp. 166-168). In this list, Augustinus’ confession that he adhered to the teaching of Jansenius, is linked with a quotation from a homily which he held in the neighbourhood of Mechelen on the feast of Saint Andrew in 1684. Unlike Saint Andrew, Augustinus is told to have said, he himself would not be able to keep up the Faith under torture, since he had not yet received the necessary *gratia efficax*. According to Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort, this declaration implied that Augustinus subscribed to the first of the five propositions condemned by Innocent X and Alexander VII. This was only natural, the accuser added, since Augustinus once affirmed that not only his knowledge about grace and free will, but also his religious zeal had been inspired by Jansenius’ *Augustinus*.¹²² Moreover, the Capuchin

¹¹⁹ Compare the fragment from *FN* that is quoted in n. 123.

¹²⁰ Viz. Constantinus of Brussels, who was Guardian of the convent in Brussels in 1658-1661 (see Hildebrand V, p. 66). The intervention of Constantinus is also mentioned in the previous fragment.

¹²¹ Antoninus was *Sacrae Theologiae lector* at Mechelen in 1667-1671: Hildebrand VIII, p. 534 (n° 43).

¹²² According to Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort, Augustinus’ position with regard to divine grace was also manifest in the following thesis regarding the difference between the Holy Virgin and a sinner (*FN*, cap. I [In materia de gratia et libero arbitrio], n° 27): P. August. Buscod. ‘Sola gratia distinguit inter Diuam Virginem et hominem pessimum.’ Hanc sustinuit P. August. Buscoduc. contra P. Norbertum

friar was said to have plainly uttered around 1680: *Ego sum Jansenista*.¹²³

Fulgentius' list of accusations also contains information regarding Augustinus' attitude towards the condemnation of the five propositions. According to the list, Augustinus declared in 1681 in Mechelen in the presence of his Guardian that he condemned the propositions *in sensu Pontificis*, but not *in sensu Jansenii*.¹²⁴ The difference between a condemnable and an orthodox meaning of the five propositions is also made in the following fragment on a certain Norbertus of Hasselt, who is said to have adhered to the position of Augustinus and the *doctores Louanienses*:¹²⁵

'P. Norbert. Hasselens. Antuerpiae. 'P. Augustinus Buscoducens. et doctores Louanienses intelligunt bene aliter propositiones Jansenij. Et ego quoad 2^{am} propositionem etiam illam non sic teneo. Imo Cardinalis De Bona dixit: Vtinam essent plures tales isti Jansenij in Ecclesia.' Haec a quadriennio dixit P. Francisco Buscoducensi, dum inter se loquerentur de doctrina damnata Jansenij, prout hic postea deposuit coram Diffinitione, sed R. P. Michael etiam pro tunc Prouincialis omnia fere excusauit.¹²⁶

Lyran. tanquam assertam a D. Guilielmo Huygens, addens sese aliquando praedicasse: 'quod si maximus peccator accepisset tantam gratiam quantam accepit B. Maria Deipara, [quod] esset aequae sanctus atque illa.' Satis conformiter ad sua principia de gratia (for Guilielmus Huygens, see R. Aubert, 2. Huygens (Guillaume), in: *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques* 25 [Paris 1995] cc. 487-488). According to FN, Augustinus also warned against exaggerated devotion towards the Holy Virgin. See FN, cap. VI (*De ueneratione sanctorum ac sacrarum imaginum*).

¹²³ See FN, cap. I (*In materia de gratia et libero arbitrio*), n° 30: P. August. Buscod. Extant apud me quatuor diuersorum litterae de hoc dicto. Praedicauit in festo S^{ti} Andreae 1684 in quodam pago Wallem prope Mechliniam haec uerba: 'S. Andreas debuit habuisse magnam gratiam ad spernenda ista tormenta. Si autem ego constitutus essem inter Turcas et subeundum esset martyrium, negarem fidem meam, quia mihi deest gratia efficax.' An hoc differat a 1^a. propositione Jansenij? Neque mirum. Dixit enim aliquando PP. Marcello Menenensi et Antonino Antuerpiensi 'quod omnem suam scientiam de gratia et libertate, imo et deuotionem haeserit ex Augustino Jansenij', prout ipsi sancte testantur. Quod amplius est, iam a quinque annis dixit disertè D. Du Thot consiliario regio Mechlin.: 'Ego sum Jansenista', prout iste mihi et P. Leonardo socio meo narrauit. [...]

¹²⁴ See FN, cap. V (*In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij*), n° 2: P. Augustinus Buscoduc. Maechlin. 1682. Cum ille P. Felicissimo Antuerpiensi ibidem tunc Guardiano diceret 'sibi suisque sufficere quod suae sententiae non essent condemnatae', replicuit P. Felicissim. 5^a propositiones Jansenii satis aperte esse condemnatas in sensu auctoris, ad quod respondit P. Augustin. 'se illas condemnare in sensu Pontificis'; numquam uere uoluit dicere se illas condemnare in sensu Jansenij.

¹²⁵ See Hildebrand VII, p. 506 (n° 3640).

¹²⁶ See FN, cap. V, n° 9.

The last sentence of this fragment also incriminates Michael of Oudenbosch, who was Provincial of the Flandro-Belgian Province during the years 1678-1681, 1684-1687 and 1690-1695,¹²⁷ and who was accused of fostering Jansenist sympathies at other places in *FN*.¹²⁸ The same insinuating association of Augustinus and Michael of Oudenbosch is made in two other fragments of *FN*. In a first fragment, Fulgentius accuses Augustinus of having received and spread Jansenist publications during his stay in the convent of Lier in 1674, when Michael was that very convent's Guardian.¹²⁹ Augustinus had used these publications for the preparation of some homilies he pronounced in the neighbouring nunnery of Nazareth:

*P. Augustin. Buscoduc. Lyrae ab 11 annis. Ille Pater habitans Lyrae sub moderno R. P. Prouinciali ibidem Guardiano saepius recepit Bruxellis fasciculos libellorum noui sensus, ut uocant, pro quibus tum per syndicam, tum per aliam deuotam dictam 'Domicella Thas' iubebat solui pecunias, dicens illos esse pro sorore sua, cum essent ut plurimum linguae Latinae. Illos porro libellos distribuebat pastoribus suae doctrinae sectarijs. Quin imo eosdem perlegebat uel ex eisdem praedicabat e cathedra ad monachas in Nazareth prope Lynam, prout quidam laicus mihi scripsit, qui haec eadem uidit et audiuit.*¹³⁰

According to a second fragment, Augustinus had claimed shortly before the compilation of *FN* that initially he had only few disciples among the Flemish Capuchins, but that their number had been increasing ever since and by the mid 1680s even included the entire *Definitorium* to the exception of one member,¹³¹ the latter probably being Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort, who belonged to the Provincial *Definitorium* from 1674 until 1687.¹³²

¹²⁷ See n. 45.

¹²⁸ See n. 45.

¹²⁹ See Hildebrand V, p. 105.

¹³⁰ See *FN*, cap. V, n° 8; Hildebrand VI, p. 367 n. 2. *FN* contains still other accusations at the address of Augustinus, which I have not taken into account here: cap. II (*De charitate et relatione operum in Deum*), n°s 13 and 14; cap. III (*De attritione et contritione atque confessione*), n°s 14, 15, 20 and 50; cap. IV (*De Summo Pontifice*), n° 15.

¹³¹ See *FN*, cap. I (*In materia de gratia et libero arbitrio*), n° 30 [see also n. 123]: [...] *Addebat etiam 'quod ab initio pauci fuerint suae doctrinae sectarij in nostra Prouincia, sed quod modo multi sunt, etiam tota Diffinitio, excepto uno.'*

¹³² See n. 42.

5. Fulgentius of Maaseik

Fulgentius of Maaseik (secular name: Petrus Vos) was born in 1627, took the habit in 1647 and died in Maaseik in 1705.¹³³ He was *philosophiae lector* in Antwerp during the years 1663-1665 and *Sacrae Theologiae lector* in the same city during the years 1665-1668.¹³⁴ According to Silvester of Hasselt's *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio*, Fulgentius had been strongly influenced by the thought of Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch, but it was mainly through Fulgentius' theological teaching that Jansenist views first spread throughout the Flandro-Belgian Province. This, in turn, had provoked the first anti-Jansenist actions of his peer and namesake of Nieuwpoort.¹³⁵ Moreover, at the end of his theological course in 1668, several friars had opposed his teaching in the convent of Brussels, the result being that the provincial *Definitorium* issued a decree that prohibited the teaching of several Jansenist propositions:

Tandem ille P. Augustinus inter alios ad suum sensum abduxit P. Fulgentium Moscanum, qui sub annum 1665 in conuentu nostro Antuerpiensi S. T. lector publice in scholis nostris prelegit et disseminauit dogmata eiusmodi noua et uisa non sana, quibus est turbata Prouincia, cuius mali principio obuiare conatus fuit P. Fulgentius Neoportanus, affectans manutenere Prouinciam in sua pristina constitutionum Apostolicarum sincera obseruantia. [...] Cum enim finito cursu theologico P. Fulgentij Moscani in conuentu nostro Bruxellensi anno 1668. contra doctrinam ab ipso traditam nonnulli sese opposuissent, Definitorium nostrum uidens ex doctrina eiusmodi Prouinciam turbare, debuit expresso decreto monere lectorem et studiosos, ut non docerent aut tenerent certos damnatos Jansenismos expressos in decreto quod incipit Propter justas causas. (f. 1^v)

In spite of all this, Fulgentius of Maaseik was reappointed *philosophiae lector* in 1668, a function he exercised in the convent

¹³³ See Hildebrand VII, p. 304 (n° 2114).

¹³⁴ See Hildebrand VIII, p. 534 (n° 40).

¹³⁵ The early lives of both Fulgentii ran almost parallel. Fulgentius of Maaseik (°1927) took the habit in 1647 and was *lector* in the years 1663-1670 (1663-1665 [philosophy, Antwerp]; 1665-1668 [theology, Antwerp]; 1668-1670 [philosophy, Ghent]). Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort (°1628) took the habit in 1651 and was *lector* in the years 1663-1669 (1663-1666 [philosophy, Mechelen]; 1666-1668 [theology, Ghent]; 1668-1669 [theology, Brussels]). See Hildebrand VII, pp. 304 (n° 2114) and 305 (n° 2118); VIII, p. 534 (n°s 40-41 and 45).

of Ghent until 1670.¹³⁶ At the end of this philosophical course, however, he was not appointed *Sacrae Theologiae lector*. Instead, he became Guardian of the convent at Hasselt,¹³⁷ where, according to a fragment in *FN*, he came into conflict with the convent's confessors because of his rigorist views on the sacrament of penance. As a consequence, Fulgentius was deposed at the Intermediate Chapter of 1671.¹³⁸

Other anti-Jansenist sources, such as the already mentioned *Dogmata ex plurimis aliqua quae manant per Prouinciam nostram ex libris R. D. Laurentij Neesen* by Antoninus of Antwerp (18 April 1683), offer a comparable sketch of Fulgentius and his role in the diffusion of Jansenist views throughout the Flandro-Belgian Province. To this sketch, Antoninus also adds a short list of Fulgentius of Maaseik's most zealous disciples: Franciscus of Weert, Eugenius of Bruges, Reginaldus of Oudenaarde and Hubertus of Sint-Truiden.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ See Hildebrand VIII, p. 534 (n° 45).

¹³⁷ See *FN*, cap. 3 (*De attritione et contritione atque confessione*), n° 28: *Exemplo sit P. Fulgentius Masecan., qui priuatus suo lectoratu secundo ab annis 14. ob suos excessus in materia doctrinae et honoris gratia factus Guardianus Hasseleti [...]*.

¹³⁸ See the continuation of the fragment quoted in the previous note: [...] *ibidem dixit coram fratribus 'quod ex mille confessionibus uix una ualeret et ex centum confessariis uix unus saluaretur.'* Vnde factum fuit quod confessarii nollent amplius excipere confessiones in illo conuentu et R.^{di} Pat. compulsi fuerint ipsum Capitulo intermedio subsequente deponere a Guardianatu. Sed modo habetur a nostris tamquam apostolus. Compare also Hildebrand V, p. 398; VI, 366; *Acta Capitularia (Archium Capucinatorum Belgii III, 1006, p. 651)*.

¹³⁹ See *Dogmata ex plurimis* etc. (in the file *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap. G.22.13.2. Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: propositiones edoctae, prouisiones superiorum. 1668-1717*), f. 6r: *Nam deinde <Augustinus Buscoduncensis> semper conatus fuit lectores (expertus loquor) trahere in suum spiritum et sensum. Et sic ante annos .20. traxit V. P. Fulgentium Masecanum lectorem tunc Antuerpiae, cuius qualitates dignosci merentur. / V. P. iste Fulgentius est qui ante annos .16. publice in nostris scholis prelegit et uehementer inculcauit has doctrinas tam nouas, suspectas et male olentes. Adeo in istis excessit ut eius studio theologico jam absoluto et examine facto, RR. Patres debuerint monere et alios lectores per decretum, quod et ego accepi, ne teneant uel doceant uarios Jansenismos et baianismos ibi specificatos et per Pontifices saepius damnatos. / Discipuli uero huius lectoris magis feruentes et zelosi pro doctrina sui magistri sunt V. P. Franciscus Weertensis nunc Guardianus Masecae, P. Eugenius Brugiensis concionator (hic solebat pingere imagines Jansenij et dare extraneis; propter excessus in suis concionibus fuerunt saepius depositae quaerelae, etiam a PP. J. Societatis, contra quos, ut sibi et doctrinis suis maxime aduersarios, semper inuehitur, tantis passionibus ut ausus fuerit, occulto quidem nomine, illos describere ut Pelagianos in nupera sua quadragesima habita Louanij). Est et P. Reginaldus Aldenardensis (qui ita ardet pro istis doctrinis ut correspondentiam teneat per litteras cum famoso illo Arnaldo Gallo Jansenistarum principe et coriphæo; saepius fuit etiam per patres correctus, sed nihilo melior); item P. Hubertus Trudonensis. Compare also *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii I, 1374, pp. 1-2* and*

In a report on the situation in the Flandro-Belgian Province, which he submitted at the General Chapter of 1698 (*Status Prouincię Flandro-Belgię, signanter quoad Capucinos etc. coram R. A. P. Generali ac Definitoribus Generalibus representatus per f. Juuenalem Ananiensem Exdefinitorum Generalem in Capitulo Generali a° 1698*), the Tyrolean Juvenalis of Nonsberg, who governed the Province as *Commissarius Generalis* during the years 1695-1697,¹⁴⁰ mentioned that Fulgentius was still among the living in 1698, albeit in a mentally deplorable state. He had been removed from the convent in Maastricht in 1696, since it was feared that he would take refuge in Holland or even commit suicide by drowning himself in a pit. All this had happened, according to Juvenalis, in punishment for the central role which Fulgentius had played together with his spiritual mentor Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch in the spreading of Jansenist teachings among the Flemish Capuchins.¹⁴¹

5.1. The anti-Jansenist decree of 1668

The anti-Jansenist decree referred to by Silvester of Hasselt was issued in the convent of Brussels by the Provincial Patricius of Hazebroek and his entire *Definitorium* at the Intermediate Chapter of July 1668. It has been preserved in several documents, the most important being the *Acta Capitularia* of the Flandro-Belgian Province (*Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* III, 1006, pp. 636-637). Next to these *Acta*, there are copies in the *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* and the *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.* in Rome.¹⁴² The following edition of the decree

Hildebrand VI, p. 354, who only mention Franciscus of Weert, Eugenius of Bruges and Reginaldus of Oudenaarde as Fulgentius' major disciples.

¹⁴⁰ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 439-441.

¹⁴¹ See Hildebrand VI, pp. 440-441; *Status Prouincię Flandro-Belgię etc.* (in: G.22.13.2 Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: propositiones edoctae/prouisiones Superiorum. 1668-1717), f. 1^r: [...] inueni prouinciam istam [...] nunc a 36 annis circiter occasione quorundam placitorum doctrinalium Vniuersitatis Louanensis per quemdam P. Augustinum Syluëducensem, deinde per alium Fulgentium Mosëcanum (qui ultimus ut lector ea docere inter Capucinos cepit) mirum in modum conuulsam, diuulsam ac in partes miserabiliter conscissam fuisse. Et signanter notandum est quod ille P. Fulgentius Mosëcanus, qui talia primo docuit, in hunc diem superstes, at fere ad delirium redactus, ne ad Hollandos fugeret, ut quidam suspicabantur, aut ex capitis perplexitate se in puteum præcipitaret, ut alij pie cauebant, a loco Trajectensi ante biennium mutari debuerit, quod in penam delicti euenisse credo.

¹⁴² See the documents referred at in nn. 156 and 160 as well as the second text discussed in §5.3. Next to these, see also the following document in *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap.* G.22.13.2. Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: propositiones edoctae,

is based on the *Acta Capitularia*, in which the decree is presented as the last decision taken at the Intermediate Chapter of July 1668 (pp. 633-637).

Postea propter iustas causas iudicarunt Reuerendi Patres expedire ut admonerentur Venerandi Patres lectores et studiosi nostri ne quis doceat uel teneat haec sequentia:

1. Quod ad peccandum uel bene agendum non requiratur libertas a necessitate, sed sufficiat a coactione in statu naturae lapsae, quia damnata est talis propositio ab Innocentio X. tamquam heretica¹⁴³. Hinc nemo doceat uel teneat quod homo necessario peccet uel necessario bonum agat, aut non possit dissentire gratiae Dei si uelit, aut non possit euitare peccatum si uelit, quia est expresse contra Tridentinum¹⁴⁴. Et recordentur quod similiter sequentes propositiones damnatae sint a Summis Pontificibus:
 - *Quod uoluntarie fit, etiamsi necessitate fiat, libere tamen fit*¹⁴⁵ et *Sola uiolentia repugnat hominis libertati naturali*¹⁴⁶.
 - *Interiori gratiae in statu naturae lapsae numquam resistitur*: ut heretica ab Innocentio X^o¹⁴⁷. Similiter haec ut falsa et heretica: *Semipelagiani in hoc erant heretici quod uellent eam gratiam* (scilicet necessariam ad singulos actus, etiam ad initium fidei) *talem esse cui uoluntas humana posset resistere uel obtemperare*¹⁴⁸.
- Vnde patet esse secundum sanam doctrinam hominem posse gratiae Dei resistere uel obtemperare.¹⁴⁹

prouisiones superiorum. 1668-1717: Prouisiones factae a Superioribus Prouinciae Capucinatorum Flandro-Belgicae circa sequentes propositiones. anno. 1668.

¹⁴³ Cf. 3rd of the 5 propositions condemned in *Cum occasione* (Innocent X; 1653); H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2003. For the condemnation as heretica, see *Cum occasione*, censura, prop. 3 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2006).

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Sess. 6 de iustificatione, can. 4 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1554).

¹⁴⁵ 39th of the 79 propositions condemned in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (Pius V; 1567); H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1939.

¹⁴⁶ 66th proposition condemned in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1966.

¹⁴⁷ 2nd proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2002. For the condemnation as heretica, see *Cum occasione*, censura, prop. 2 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2006).

¹⁴⁸ 4th proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2004. For the condemnation as falsa et heretica, see *Cum occasione*, censura, prop. 4 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2006).

¹⁴⁹ The first prohibition regards the third proposition condemned in *Cum occasione* as well as the principles on which the latter proposition was based, viz. the doctrine of the *delectatio uictrix* and the identification of what is free with what is done voluntarily (see the synthesis in J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] cc. 490-491). In the wake of the third proposition of *Cum occasione*, five other propositions involving

- 2.° Nemo teneat hanc propositionem: *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata, similiter nec istam: et philosophorum uirtutes sunt uitia*, quia utraque est damnata; unde nec contorqueat ad alienos sensus¹⁵⁰.
- 3.° Non teneat aut doceat quis saltem in publico quod Pontificis iudicium fallibile sit extra concilium uniuersale.
- 4.° Nemo teneat seu doceat crude siue sine debita explicatione: 'Christus non est mortuus uel non fudit sanguinem pro omnibus hominibus', propter propositionem hanc damnatam ut falsam, temerariam et scandalosam, imo et balsphemam et hereticam: *Semipelagianum est dicere Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse*.¹⁵¹
5. Nemo doceat uel teneat quod Deus positue uelit (et non solum negative) multos paruulos non fieri saluos et directe uelit exclusos et quod Deus ordinet causas secundas non libere agentes in interitum puerorum antequam sint baptisati, ad quorum interitum sequitur damnatio, et quidem quod Deus illud sic ordinet in illum finem ut impediat quo minus ad salutem necessaria perueniant.¹⁵²
- 6.° Tandem nullus dicat *aliqua Dei praecepta esse hominibus iustis uolentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes quas habent uires, impossibilia. Et deest quoque ipsis gratia qua possibilia fiant*¹⁵³, quia damnata fuit ab Innocentio decimo. Sic enim ait: *temerariam, impiam, blasphemam, anathemate damnatam et hereticam declaramus et ut talem damnamus*.¹⁵⁴

Ita factum de consilio et assensu Reuerendorum Patrum Diffinitorum Joannis Landensis, Constantini Bruxellensis, Felicissimi Duacensis et Francisci Bellioliensis. Subsignatum f. Patritius Minister Prouincialis indignus.¹⁵⁵

the same principles are prohibited as well (*homo necessario peccet* etc. and the propositions identified in the four preceding notes). All six propositions are condemned as being contradictory to the fourth canon of the sixth session of the Council of Trent. The first prohibition comprises these six propositions in all preserved copies of the decree, except in *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1374, p. 1, where the first prohibition has been split up into five separate prohibitions (the 4th proposition of *Cum occasione* has been eliminated from the version of the decree preserved in *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1374, p. 1), which together with the remaining five form a series of ten instead of six prohibitions. See also Hildebrand VI, p. 353 n. 1.

¹⁵⁰ 25th proposition condemned in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1925.

¹⁵¹ 5th proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2005. For the condemnation as *falsam, temerariam et scandalosam, imo et balsphemam et hereticam*, see *Cum occasione*, censura, prop. 5 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2006).

¹⁵² Compare Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 3, cap. 20. For more details, see n. 211 of this article.

¹⁵³ 1st proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2001.

¹⁵⁴ *Cum occasione*, censura, prop. 1 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2006).

¹⁵⁵ Patricius of Hazebroek led the Flandro-Belgian Province together with Joannes of Landen, Constantinus of Brussels, Felicissimus of Douai and Franciscus of Bailleul in the years 1666-1669. See Hildebrand VI, p. 561 (n° 45). All six prohibitions of

The version of the decree in the *Acta Capitularia* only focuses on the condemned propositions and does not mention the name of Fulgentius of Maaseik. This is not the case, however, in other copies of the decree, which explicitly link it with Fulgentius' teaching. The latter documents mostly date from the 1680s/1690s and aimed at proving that Jansenist teaching had been circulating among the Flemish Capuchins since more than a decade and that severe measures had to be taken in order to prevent their further spread: (a) According to *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1374, which dates from 1693¹⁵⁶ and offers an overview of several anti-Jansenist measures taken in the Flandro-Belgian Province, the provincial Definitors had discovered during the final exams of Fulgentius' *studium*, which took place in the convent of Brussels at the occasion of the Intermediate Chapter of 1668,¹⁵⁷ that some of the *lector*'s students adhered to suspected propositions.¹⁵⁸ The same document tells us that the decree was sent to all *lectores* of the Flandro-Belgian Province in order to avoid further troubles, but remained partially ineffective, since several of Fulgentius' disciples (Reginaldus of Oudenaarde, Eugenius of Bruges and Franciscus of Weert) continued to spread their teacher's beliefs from the pulpit.¹⁵⁹ (b) In a document from the

1668 were almost literally integrated in the more comprehensive anti-Jansenist decree that was issued on 22 January 1674 by Minister General Stephanus of Cesena during his visitation of the Flandro-Belgian Province (see nos 3/4 [prohibition 1], 9 [prohibition 2], 10 [prohibition 3], 8 [prohibition 4], 6 [prohibition 5] and 2 [prohibition 6]). For the decree of Stephanus, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 357-359. After 1674, Rome repeatedly insisted on the strict observance of Stephanus' decree: Hildebrand VI, pp. 382 (1682), 386-387 (1683), 392 + 394-396 (1685) and 398 + 412 (1686-1687). For Flemish resistance against the decree, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 382 (1682), 392-396 (1685) and 404-405 (1678).

¹⁵⁶ See *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1374, p. 2: [...] *Franciscus Weertensis Guardianus Traiecti hoc anno 1693 publice communicans cum Jansenistis* [...]. Franciscus of Weert was Guardian of the convent at Maastricht in 1692-1695 (see Hildebrand V, p. 382).

¹⁵⁷ Since candidates were in principle examined by the entire *Definitorium*, the exams often coincided with an official meeting of the provincial Definitors. See Hildebrand VIII, p. 524.

¹⁵⁸ Compare the title of the decree in *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1374, p. 1: *Decretum RR. Patrum Patritij Haesbruckani et Diffinitorium conditum Bruxellis 1668 in Capitulo intermedio ex certa notitia quam ibi acceperant per examen studij P. Fulgentij Masecani Theologij lectoris quorundam doctorum Louaniensium discipuli fidelis, contra excessus in materia doctrine*.

¹⁵⁹ The text of the decree is followed by the following words in *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1374, pp. 1-2: *Illud decretum sic factum missum fuit ad omnes Prouincię lectores et jussum obseruari, sed precipue studiosis istis, et ista conditione facti sunt concionatores, quorum principales fuerunt Pr Reginaldus Aldenardensis, qui, prout ex actis scriptis et concionibus constat, publice cum scandalo totius*

early 1680s, which I will edit below in section 5.3. and which presents the decree together with another important text from 1668, it is said that Fulgentius was interrogated by the provincial *Definitorium* immediately before the final exams of 1668 and that the *Definitorium* had been obliged to issue the decree, since Fulgentius manifestly adhered to Baianist, Jansenist and even Calvinist doctrines. However, in the opinion of the anonymous compiler of the document (Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort?), the *Definitorium* had been too compliant, the result being that the decree was not in proportion to the gravity of the problem posed by Fulgentius' teachings: *tunc ex obligatione officij et conscientia compulsi fuere condere decretum [...], quamquam in eo remissius egerint, cum aduersus huiusmodi proscriptos errores omni efficacia procedere oporteat nec dissimulare*. These words possibly refer to the fact that the decree had not explicitly mentioned Fulgentius' name, that no measures seem to have been taken against the *lector* personally and that some of the prohibitions had been formulated in a way that seemed to ask for further problems: 3.^o *Non teneat aut doceat quis saltem in publico quod [...]*, 4.^o *Nemo teneat seu doceat crude siue sine debita explanatione [...]*. (c) The two preserved copies of Silvester of Hasselt's *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio* (1700) are both provided with a long list of *probationes*, in which the decree is quoted in second place (*Litt. B*). Again, the quotation of the decree serves to illustrate the impact of Fulgentius' teaching on the minds of his fellow brothers.¹⁶⁰ In first place (*Litt. A*) are quoted the per-

prouincię Jansenistarum partem defendit ideoque per R. P. Arsenium de Fontibus Commissarium Generalem Bruxellis poena carceris fuit mulctatus, et P^r Eugenius Brugensis, qui per suos 5 libellos famosos a se compositos et editos declaratus est Romę apertus Jansenista. At illi nunc duo obierunt. Etiam M. V. P. Franciscus Weertensis Guardianus Traiecti hoc anno 1693 publice communicans cum Jansenistis et antimonachus, quod omnibus constat, et passim habetur pro uno ex primariis nostris nouatoribus. / Nota hic primo quam infecta ab illo anno 1668 fuerit prouincia, ut RR. PP., uidentes bullas Urbani 8, Innocentij X et Aleandri 7 iam non sufficere, coacti fuerint damnatas in Luthero, Caluino, Baio et Jansenio hereses et errores iterum et de nouo suis subditis strictissime prohibere. / Nota 2^o quod multi ex illis prefatis studiosis, sic admoniti et correcti, adut concionatores dispersi per prouinciam non se emendarint, sed sua preconcepta dogmata adeo feruenter disseminarint – non sine Superiorum contemptu et publico scandalo – ut R^mus P^r Stephanus a Cesena Generalis six annis post – nempe a^o 1674 uisitata tota prouincia et celebrato Capitulo – debuerit prouidere per rigorissimum decretum tenoris ut sequitur: [...]. Compare the document entitled *Dogmata ex plurimis aliqua quae manant per prouinciam nostram ex libris R. D. Laurentij Neesen etc.*, f. 6^r (quoted in n. 139).

¹⁶⁰ See the following documents in *Archium Generale O.F.M.Cap. G.22.13.2. Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: II^{us} et III^{us} recursus ad S. Sedem*.

sonal testimonies of Felicissimus of Antwerp and Silvester himself, which state that Fulgentius personally upheld (most of) the propositions mentioned in the decree.¹⁶¹

According to Hildebrand, who aimed at minimizing the influence of Jansenist thought on the Flemish Capuchins, it is nowhere said that Fulgentius of Maaseik actually taught all propositions prohibited by the decree of 1668. In his view, the decree had only been issued at the occasion of the final exams of Fulgentius' *studium*.¹⁶² This claim, however, seems to overlook two important texts that, together with *FN* (5.2.), offer us a sketch of the *lector*'s teaching that corresponds in many aspects with the propositions prohibited by the decree: a list of 18 suspected *propositiones* ascribed to Fulgentius, each followed by an apologetic *responsio* by the *lector* himself (5.3.), and a sympathizing synthesis by Eugenius of Bruges of his master's teaching concerning divine grace (5.4.).

5.2. The testimony of Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort (*FN*)

Apart from the already mentioned statement about the *lector*'s rigorism with regard to the sacrament of penance,¹⁶³ all fragments regarding Fulgentius in *FN* concern the five propositions and the question of papal (in)fallibility. They stem from two sources: Fulgentius' *dictata theologica* and a so-called *Apologia pro doctrina*, which

1701-1702: *Ad enarrationem compendiosam et historicam responsio fidelis et sincera* etc. (version 1, f. 1^v; version 2, f. 1^v) and *Probationes contentorum in responsione ad compendiosam et historicam enarrationem* (version 1, f. 1^{rv}; version 2, f. 1^{rv}).

¹⁶¹ See *Probationes contentorum in responsione ad compendiosam et historicam enarrationem* (version 1, f. 1^r [basis of following text]; version 2, f. 1^r): *Ego infrascriptus attestor quod P. Paulus Teneramundanus praedicator Capucinus et quondam discipulus P. Fulgentij Mosecani S. T. lectoris (cuius doctrinae ille P. Paulus sese multum et diu opposuerat) mihi dixerit in mense Decembri anno 1683. quod iste P. Fulgentius omnes propositiones a RR. PP. Bruxellis 22. Julij anno 1668. prohibitas docuerit et tenuerit, excepta forte illa de paruulis, et quod maxime uenenum propinauerit explicando. Ita est. Erat signatum: f. Felicissimus Antuerpiensis Capucinus indignus. // Ego infrascriptus attestor quod P. Reginaldus Aldenardensis Prouinciae nostrae Flandro-Belgicae ff. Minorum Capucinatorum concionator defunctus, quondam discipulus P. Fulgentij Mosaecani mihi Antuerpiae studentem circa annum 1681. dixerit quod praefatus P. Fulgentius docuerit plures propositiones a Superioribus nostris suppressis. Datum in conuentu Bruxellensi 17. Augusti 1700. Erat signatum: f. Silvester Hasselensis Minister Prouincialis Commissarius Generalis indignus.*

¹⁶² See Hildebrand VI, p. 353: 'Deze beslissing werd genomen ter gelegenheid van Fulgentius' onderwijs; doch nergens wordt gezegd, dat hij al deze veroordeelde leringen voorstond.'

¹⁶³ See n. 138.

must have counted several pages,¹⁶⁴ but has not been preserved to our knowledge.

According to a first fragment, Fulgentius of Maaseik sustained in his *dictata* that Jansenius' *Augustinus* had nothing in common with the 5 propositions ascribed to him by Alexander VII or, more precisely, that the bishop of Ypres did not understand the propositions *in sensu damnato*. Moreover, the *lector* is said to have adduced 5 passages from the *Augustinus* which contradicted the five propositions in the condemned sense, a strategy that had already been tried by Antoine Arnauld in his *Quinque propositiones ab Innocentio X damnatae et propositiones Jansenii Ypresensis Episcopi damnatis contrariae* (1654), which he published in reply to the *Cauilli Jansenianorum* of François Annat (1654).¹⁶⁵

*P. Fulgent. Masecan. in dictat. suis theologicis. Ostendit ibi 'quod Jansenius Ipresensis in sua doctrina nihil habeat commune cum 5^e propositionibus ipsi per Alexand. 7^{um} adscriptis et damnatis, nec eas intellexerit in sensu damnato.' Ad hoc probandum adducit 5^e. loca ex Jansenio quae uidentur contrarium dicere. P. Antonin. Antwerp. et P. Francisc. Buscoduc. dederunt in scriptis sese illa in dictatis ejus legisse. Sed numquid iste non est dicendus Jansenista?*¹⁶⁶

According to two other fragments, the *Apologia pro doctrina* stated that the five propositions had been erroneously ascribed to Jansenius¹⁶⁷ and that those attributed to Baius in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*

¹⁶⁴ See the title of FN, cap. IV (*De Summo Pontifice*), n° 2: *In Apolog. p. doctrina P. Fulgent. Masec. pag. 12. parag. notandum*. The fragment is quoted in its entirety at the end of this paragraph.

¹⁶⁵ See *Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld* 19 (Paris 1778) p. 228-229; L. Cognet, *Le jansénisme* [n. 2] p. 64 (on Arnauld's writings of 1654 against Annat): 'En ce qui concerne la présence des propositions dans l'*Augustinus*, il établissait péremptoirement le fait déjà connu des spécialistes: seule la première s'y trouvait textuellement, à quelques mots près; les autres ne pouvaient, en toute hypothèse, être présentées que comme des résumés de la pensée de Jansénius. Arnauld s'efforce de montrer ensuite que la première proposition se trouve dans un contexte qui la rend entièrement orthodoxe [compare the position of Eugenius of Bruges described in the first part of this article], et que les passages allégués par le P. Annat pour attribuer à Jansénius les quatre autres correspondent entièrement à la doctrine de saint Augustin; en corollaire, il lui est facile de tirer du texte complexe de l'*Augustinus* cinq phrases, reproduites celles-là *ad uerbum*, nettement contraires aux propositions condamnées. D'où il concluait que, si le pape avait justement condamné les Cinq propositions au sens hérétique, ce sens n'était nullement celui de Jansénius [...].'

¹⁶⁶ See FN, cap. V (*In materia decretorum ac bullarum necnon Baij ac Jansenij*), n° 3.

¹⁶⁷ See FN, cap. V, n° 6: *Apolog. pro doctrina P. Fulgentij masecan. § notandum bene. 'Quinque propositiones famosae ordinarie imputatae Rdiss.^{mo} Corn. Jansenio*

(1567) were only heretical *in sensu Caluini ac Lutheri*. Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort concluded from this that his namesake of Maaseik did not accept the end of the latter bull, in which it was explicitly said that the propositions in question were condemned *in sensu ab autore seu authoribus intento*:

Ibidem [in the *Apologia pro doctrina*]. 'Recte prohibentur propositiones Baianae aut saltem Baio imputatae, sed in sensu Caluini ac Lutheri sumptae, qui liberum arbitrium quasi totaliter destruunt.' Sed damnatae sunt in sensu ab autore seu authoribus intento, uti habet bulla Pij 5.ⁱ in terminis.¹⁶⁸

The last sentence of this fragment, which was added by Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort as a comment on the quotation from the *Apologia pro doctrina*, refers to the famous ending of *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*, which Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort clearly punctuated as most anti-Jansenists used to do, viz. with a comma after *possent* and not after *intento*: *Quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas, quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent, in rigore et proprio uerborum sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas, erroneas [...] damnamus.*¹⁶⁹

Whereas the above fragment on Alexander VII's mistake concerning the presence of the five propositions in the work of Jansenius implies that the Pope is fallible in questions of fact, two other fragments, one containing a quotation from the *dictata*, the other a sentence from the *Apologia pro doctrina*, go a step further. According to the former, the *dictata* explicitly affirmed the Pope's fallibility in questions of Faith and morals:

Idem ibidem [= in *dictatis theologicis*] *consequitur*. *Asseritur ibidem* 'Pontificis fallibilitas in materia fidei et morum, etiam quando loquitur ex cathedra.' *Ex quo ibi infertur*: 'Dato quod Pontifex ut talis damnet aliquam conclusionem tamquam haereticam uel dicat aliquem doctorem sensisse haereticæ, non sequitur certo conclusionem illam esse haereticam uel autorem istum haereticæ sensisse.'¹⁷⁰

Ipremsium Episcopo falsissime ipsi imputantur, ut ostendit et ad oculum demonstrat quidam liber Gallicus, cujus breuissimum compendium curiosis ueritatis amicis facile procurari et accommodari potest, si habere desiderent.' Ecce uti procurant, legunt, laudant atque distribuunt libros prohibitos, conscriptos in defensionem Jansenij.

¹⁶⁸ See FN, cap. V, n° 7.

¹⁶⁹ For this punctuation, that was preferred by anti-Jansenist authors, see H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1980 n. 1 as well as n. 237 of this article.

¹⁷⁰ See FN, cap. V, n° 4.

According to the second fragment, the *Apologia pro doctrina* claimed that Christ had promised the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church, but not to individual Popes, as is shown by the fact that several of them had been heretics:

In Apolog. p. doctrina P. Fulgent. Masec. pag. 12. parag. notandum. 'Dominus Jesus Christus infallibilem Spiritus s.^{ti} assistentiam promisit Ecclesiae, contra quam portae inferi non praeualebunt, non autem Pontificibus singulis, cum aliquos ex illis constet fuisse haereticos.' Allegat autem auctoritatem doctorum aliquot Louaniensium ac Parisiensium necnon Gersonis.¹⁷¹ Sed si bene legisset iste apologista controuersias Syluij¹⁷², aliter deberet sentire et loqui.¹⁷³

We may thus conclude that, according to *FN*, the *dictata* as well as the *Apologia pro doctrina* did not restrict their denial of papal infallibility to questions of historical facts alone.¹⁷⁴ This would imply that Fulgentius subscribed to the position that was prohibited by the third prohibition of the decree of 1668. With regard to prohibitions 1, 4 and 6, which all concerned propositions condemned by *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567) and *Cum occasione* (1653), *FN* suggests that Fulgentius accepted the condemnation of these propositions, without however admitting that they had been condemned in the sense of Baius or Jansenius.

¹⁷¹ For Gerson and the conciliarist tradition, see F. Oakley, *The conciliarist tradition. Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church 1300-1870* (Oxford 2003) pp. 60-110.

¹⁷² Reference to the *Libri VI de praecipuis fidei nostrae orthodoxae controuersiis cum nostris haereticis* (1638) of the Douai theologian Franciscus Syluius (1581-1649) and, more precisely, to lib. IV, quaest. II, art. 8, where Syluius advocates the Popes's infallibility in matters of Faith *siue cum generali concilio, siue sine illo*: [...] *fide certa est Romani Pontificis iudicium in rebus fidei determinandis esse infallibile, ita ut quando ex cathedra definit, siue quando ut Pontifex proponit Ecclesiae quidpiam fide credendum, nullo casu possit errare, siue cum generali concilio definiat, siue sine illo* (quoted according to *Opus F. Syluii* [...] *tomus quintus* [Anuerpiae 1714] p. 313). It should be noted that the works of Syluius had been recommended to the *lectores* at the Provincial Chapter of May 1677. Compare Hildebrand VI, p. 368; *Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 1399; III, 1006, p. 688: *Quoniam autem plerique petiuerunt nominari aliquos theologos quos legere et in praxi tuto sequi poterunt, aestimant Reuerendissimi Patres Diffinitionis tales esse sanctos Patres, Summam diui Thomae, Resolutiones et Commentaria Syluii in Summam diui Thomae, Siluestrum, Wiggers, Nauarrum, Bonacinam, Binsfeldium cum annotationibus Syluii, quamuis nec damnemus nec censuremus alios.*

¹⁷³ See *FN*, cap. IV (*De summo pontifice*), n° 2.

¹⁷⁴ Against Hildebrand VI, p. 353 n. 3, who claims – precisely with regard to the two fragments quoted above: *FN*, cap. IV, n° 2 and cap. V, n° 4 – that Fulgentius of Maaseik only rejected papal infallibility *in factis historicis*: 'Er zal wel sprake zijn van de onfeilbaarheid "in factis historicis".'

5.3. *The list of 18 propositiones and responsiones*

Two documents preserved in the file *Archivum Generale O.F.M.Cap. G.22.13.2. Prou. Flandro-Belgica. De Jansenismo: propositiones edoctae, prouisiones Superiorum. 1668-1717* contain a list of 18 suspected *propositiones* that are ascribed to Fulgentius of Maaseik and of which each is followed by an apologetic *responsio* by the *lector* himself. According to the title of one of both documents, Fulgentius had been presented with the 18 *propositiones* just before the final exam of his *studium* at the convent of Brussels in 1668: *Propositiones seu doctrinae quas V. P. Fulgentius Masecanus Sacrae Theologiæ lector a 16 annis tradidit suis discipulis, eiusdem responsiones ad singulas dum illae ipsi exhiberentur a RR. PP. Prouinciali et Diffinitoribus immediate ante examen sui studij Bruxellis*. In both documents, the list is part of a larger whole that was compiled with anti-Jansenist intentions during the 1680s. This, however, does not alter the fact that the list itself – and especially the series of *responsiones* – allows us to have a close look at some of Fulgentius' thoughts.

A first document (*Q*) was compiled in Rome after 2 September 1683, when the *Specimina moralis Christianae et moralis diabolicae* of the Bogard *lector* Gilles Gabrielis¹⁷⁵ were condemned for the second time ([...] *cuius liber dictus Specimina moralis Christianae et diabolicae [...] bis hic Romae est damnatus [...]*).¹⁷⁶ The document counts 4 pages written by a single hand and sheds further light on the circumstances in which the list of 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* came into being, as well as on its relation with the *Apologia pro doctrina* mentioned in *FN*. In the following edition, the list itself has been skipped, since it will be edited below on the basis of the second document, which pays much more attention to the content of the *propositiones* and *responsiones* than the first.

In nomine Domini. Amen.

Propositiones partim edoctae, partim dictae a religiosis nostrae Prouinciae Capucinorum Flandro-Belgicae, quae causa fuere dissensionum,urbationum et scandalorum eorum quae modo adhuc in eadem perseuerant.

¹⁷⁵ See L. Ceysens, *Gilles Gabrielis à Rome (1679-1683). Épisode de la lutte entre rigorisme et laxisme*, in: *Antonianum* 34 (1959) pp. 73-110; *Gabrielis (Gilles)*, in: *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques* 19 (Paris 1981) cc. 580-582.

¹⁷⁶ See J. M. De Bujanda, *Index librorum prohibitorum* [n. 65] pp. 366-367.

Praecipuus uero horum author fuit P. Augustinus Buscoducensis, qui ob suas exorbitantias in materia doctrinae aliquando a D. Internuntio Apostolico fuit ablegatus e ditionibus Regis Catholici (de quo uaria assignabimus suis respectue locis specimina) quique infecit P. Fulgentium Maseicanum lectorem eiusque studiosos, contra quos hae sequentes propositiones ad Diffinitionem Prouincialem anno .1668. delatae fuerunt et ab eadem datae, ad quas respondit prout ad singulas patebit ex subunctis.

[...] ¹⁷⁷

Occasione huius doctrinae et contra ipsam ediderunt RR. PP. Prouincialis et Diffinitores decretum .21. Julij ¹⁷⁸. 1668. quod incipit: *Propter justas causas* etc. Sed nec lector, nec discipuli eius destitire a suis praeconceptis dogmatibus, sed clamauerunt illa esse Louaniensium et ab iisdem approbari. Imo uero confecerunt Apologiam pro defensione suae causae et doctrinae, in qua pagina I.^a haec uerba habentur: 'R. P. Patritius tunc Prouincialis tradidit illico P. Fulgentio Masecano cartam in duas compilatam columnas, quarum una continebat puncta ipsius doctrinae tanquam intollerandae et haereticae accusatoria, altera reservata erat pro ipsius defensorio responso. Hanc autem ut accepit, Venerabilem P. Gabrielis PP. Bogardorum Bruxellis insignissimum et fundatissimum lectorem adiit ac desuper consultauit. Qui candide confessus est 18. illas accusatorias obiectiones – demptis calumnijs – esse ipsissimam nudam et crudam rei theologicae ueritatem, quam ante ingressum religionis ipsemet per aliquot annos continuos Louanij ex ore doctorum ac lectione bonorum authorum perceperat, ac idcirco pro tali agnoscendam, sustinendam ac defendendam esse, licet duriusculè ab aduersa parte expressam. Iuxta huius aliorumque uirorum consilium fecit P. Fulgentius Masecanus, ut ex ipsius totidem patet responsis.'

Vbi notandum I^o. quod ille et illi aestimauerint semper, laudauerint et consultauerint praefatum P. Gabrielis aliosque eiusdem farinae et doctrinae, uirum nimirum cuius liber dictus *Specimina moralis Christianae et diabolicae* (quem tanti fecerunt et commendarunt) bis hic Romae est damnatus. Notandum .2^o. quod P. Fulgentius Masecanus illum super propositionibus sibi obiectis consultauerit, antequam ad singulas respondisset et ex illis quatuor ¹⁷⁹ negasset, et quod ille responderit illas esse ipsissimam nudam et crudam rei theologicae ueritatem etc., et quod deponit suas responsiones formauerit iuxta huius aliorumque consilium. Vnde patet quod illas sic docuerit prout jacebant, ¹⁸⁰ et quod de istorum consilio aliquas negauerit, alias uero exposuerit ad euadendam inuidiam propositionum erronearum aut damnatarum. Imo P. Paulus Teneramundanus, qui fuit ex eodem studio, adhuc

¹⁷⁷ The list of 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* has been skipped here.

¹⁷⁸ Junij Q (cf. n. 239).

¹⁷⁹ quatur Q.

¹⁸⁰ It is not clear to me how the sentence *patet quod illas sic docuerit prout jacebant* naturally follows from what preceeds (as it is suggested by the relative adverb *unde*).

pridem dixit P. Felicissimo Antuerpiensi quod easdem propositiones docuisset, prout erant ei obiectae, nisi forsitan excipiendo illam de paruulis.¹⁸¹

The above edition allows us to reconstruct in greater detail what happened in Brussels during the Intermediate Chapter of 1668. When Fulgentius of Maaseik was accused of having acquainted his students with some dubious teachings of Jansenius, the Provincial Patricius of Hazebroek immediately presented a sheet of paper to his *lector*, on which the latter had to write down a reply to the 18 suspected propositions that were ascribed to him. Fulgentius did this, however, only after having consulted Gilles Gabrielis, a Bogard *lector* who was often accused of fostering rigorist and Jansenist sympathies.¹⁸² The latter claimed that, apart from a few calumnies, the 18 propositions reflected, albeit in a rather harsh wording, the perfectly orthodox teaching he had received at the University of Louvain. This claim, it is said, inspired Fulgentius' reply and we will see below that his *responsiones* indeed rejected a few propositions as slanderous, but accepted most of them as orthodox (whether or not in a modified version). It was for this reason that Patricius of Hazebroek and his Definitors issued the six prohibitions which I have edited above. The *Apologia pro doctrina* was compiled by Fulgentius and his disciples only after these measures had been taken.

The second document containing the 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* counts 8 pages and has been written by a single hand, to the exception of the last two lines, which have been added by a second writer, who declares that he had handed over the list of propositions and replies to the Austrian Definitor General Ildefonsus of Carlshoven, when the latter visited the Flandro-Belgian Province as *Commissarius Generalis* in June-September 1682 (*Propositiones hasce omnes cum earundem refutationibus tradidi R. A. P. Ildefonso*).¹⁸³ The document consists of the following three sections:

* pp. 1-5: the list of 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* (title: *Propositiones seu doctrinae quas V. P. Fulgentius Masecanus Sacrae Theologiae lector a 16 annis tradidit suis discipulis, eiusdem responsiones ad singulas dum illae ipsi exhiberentur a RR. PP. Prouinciali et Diffinitoribus immediate ante examen sui studii Bruxellis*).

¹⁸¹ For this testimony of Paulus of Dendermonde and Felicissimus of Antwerp as its mediator, see the first quotation in n. 161.

¹⁸² See L. Ceysens, *Gilles Gabrielis à Rome* [n. 175]; *Gabrielis (Gilles)* [n. 175].

¹⁸³ For the visitation by Ildefonsus, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 379-383.

* pp. 5-7: four considerations concerning the list of propositions and replies by the anonymous anti-Jansenist compiler of the whole document: *Ecce propositiones et responsiones P. Fulgentij Masecani, super quibus (cum eas exscripserim precise pro ut habeo in transumpto ad me misso) nota primo [...]. Nota 2° [...]. Nota 3° [...]. Nota 4° [...].*

* pp. 7-8: a copy of the decree of 1668: *Decretum quod RR. PP. Prouincialis et Diffinitores fecerunt 21 Julij 1668 contra prefatas doctrinas et explicationes V. P. Fulgentij Masecani.*

The text written by the first hand ends in the formula *Actum Bruxellis in Capitulo intermedio de consensu RR. PP. Diffinitorum 21 Julij 1668 / Erat subscriptum / f. Patritius Minister Prouincialis indignus*, which has led a Roman archivist to conclude that the tripartite document was compiled during the provincialate of Patricius of Hazebroek (3 September 1666-13 September 1669).¹⁸⁴ This conclusion, however, is contradicted by the title of the first section, which says that Fulgentius of Maaseik taught the listed propositions *a 16 annis*. Since Fulgentius was *Sacrae Theologiae lector* from 1665 until 1668,¹⁸⁵ the whole consisting of three sections must have been produced in the years 1681-1684, when a compiler linked the list and the decree of 1668 by means of four reflexions on the list's content. The compiler must have been an anti-Jansenist (Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort?), since his reflections on the *propositiones* and *responsiones* heavily criticize Fulgentius' views as 'Calvinist, or Jansenist, or at least Baianist' (*fere omnes illas propositiones sapere uel Caluinismum, uel Jansenismum, uel ad minus Baianismum*) and present the decree of 1668 as a justified reaction against Fulgentius' views (*aliquas etiam aperte contrariari Concilio Tridentino, qua propter etiam RR. PP. tunc ex obligatione officij et conscientia compulsi fuere condere decretum quod infra*). If all this is correct, the closing formula at the end of the document (*Actum Bruxellis [...] f. Patritius Minister Prouincialis indignus*) only relates to the third section (the decree) and not to the whole, which seems to be confirmed by the fact that other copies of the decree of 1668 end in the same formula.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ For these dates, see Hildebrand VI, p. 561 (n° 45). In the right upper corner of p. 1, a later hand has dated the whole document to 21 June 1668. This suggestion was taken over by the historian Fredegandus of Antwerp in his handwritten notes that are preserved in *Archium Capucinarum Belgii* III, 1068, sectio VI.15.192, p. 14v: 'Ms. latin non paginé de 8 pages – copie – signée par le P. Patrice min. Prov. – Fut soumis au Visit. gén. P. Ildephonse.' (my italics)

¹⁸⁵ See n. 134.

¹⁸⁶ Compare the above edition of the decree on the basis of the *Acta Capitularia* as well as some of the witnesses of the decree mentioned in n. 142.

In the following edition of the second document containing the 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* (R),¹⁸⁷ I have adapted the punctuation to modern standards (except in the case of the long quotation from *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* in *Nota 4°* [see n. 237]). The footnotes do not aim at exhaustivity, but only offer a first contextualization of parts of the document. They may suffice, however, to demonstrate the high extent to which Fulgentius' views depended on the teaching of Augustine as it was interpreted by Jansenius.

Jesus

Propositiones seu doctrinae quas V. P. Fulgentius Masecanus Sacrae Theologiæ lector a 16 annis tradidit suis discipulis, eiusdem responsiones ad singulas dum illae ipsi exhiberentur a RR. PP. Prouinciali et Diffinitoribus immediate ante examen sui studij Bruxellis.

1a propositio. Liberum est quod aduertente ratione a uoluntate uel ad imperium uoluntatis incoacte fit coinciditque cum uoluntario perfecto, quod est illud quod fit a principio intrinseco cum perfecta cognitione finis¹⁸⁸. Itaque nulla indifferentia requiritur qua homo hic et nunc stantibus iisdem prærequisitis possit non peccare, ad hoc ut libere peccet¹⁸⁹, sed satis est quod aduertat deliberate se malum facere, licet hic et nunc non possit aliter facere. **Responsio.** Liberum est etc. Hanc liberi definitionem, quæ Louaniensium est, existimo esse bonam. Itaque non requiritur illa philosophica indifferentia, qua homo qui peccat sic est indifferens ut stantibus omnibus prærequisitis possit non peccare, id est laudabiliter peccatum euitare, actualiter et in sensu composito,

¹⁸⁷ The first document containing the list of *propositiones* and *responsiones* (Q) offers a rather corrupted version of the text. Some interesting variant readings are: *prop. 3* sola³] uiolentia *add. Q* | *prop. 5* actionis] uirtuosae *add. Q* | *prop. 8* sanctificante] justificante *Q* | *prop. 10* saluare] liberare et *praem. Q* | *resp. 10* medium] remedium *Q* | dicere] et quod oppositum non nisi imprudens iudicabit *add. Q* | *prop. 14* parum] parui *Q*

¹⁸⁸ Fulgentius has integrated the Thomistic concept of the *uoluntarium perfectum* (I^a-II^aae q. 6 a. 2 co.: [...] *ad rationem uoluntarii requiritur quod principium actus sit intra cum aliqua cognitione finis. Est autem duplex cognitio finis, perfecta scilicet et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis et proportio eius quod ordinatur ad finem ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturae. [...] Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur uoluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet apprehenso fine aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem, moueri in finem uel non moueri*) in a Jansenist denial of the Molinist *libertas indifferentiae*.

¹⁸⁹ Rejection of the Molinist claim *Illud agens liberum dicitur quod, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere* (see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Prédestination*, in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 12.2 [Paris 1935] cc. 2809-3022 [esp. cc. 2968-2969]). Compare also Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 7, cap. 11 (*Error pelagianus est requiri ad libertatem indifferentiam ad bonum et malum*).

ad hoc ut libere peccet (sic ut aliquando uerum sit dicere: 'Homo peccat et positus omnibus pręrequisitis non peccat'), sed non tantum satis est, uerum etiam aliquando superfluum quod aduertat deliberate se malum facere formaliter (id est ut aduertat ad¹⁹⁰ malitiam actus), licet hic et nunc non possit peccatum laudabiliter euitare in sensu composito, ita scilicet ut aliquando fiat quod sic euitet.

2a propositio. Verba Concilij Tridentini quibus ad propositum dicit quod hominis arbitrium cooperetur assentiendo Deo excitanti et possit dissentire si uelit¹⁹¹, non sunt sic accipienda quasi homo posset stante influxu gratię efficacis dissentire, sed hoc modo, scilicet quod eandem gratiam, postmodum interueniente tentatione diabolica aut concupiscentia ualidiore insurgente, abijcere possit.

Resp. Verba Concilij Tridentini etc. non sunt sic accipienda quasi homo posset stante influxu gratię efficacis dissentire actualiter et in sensu composito, uidelicet respectu illius effectus ad quem proxime ex Dei intentione datur (sic ut uerum sit aliquando dicere: 'Stat influxus gratię efficacis et homo non operatur bonum'), sed hoc modo, scilicet quod eandem gratiam, postmodum interueniente tentatione diabolica aut concupiscentia ualidiore insurgente, abijcere possit actualiter et in sensu composito, id est ut sepe fiat quod illam abijciat.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ ad ad R

¹⁹¹ Cf. Sess. 6 de iustificatione, can. 4 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1554).

¹⁹² Note the structural parallel between *resp.* 1 and 2. It is stressed that the freedom of the human will is not abolished by the fact that a sinner necessarily sins when he sins (*resp.* 1) and that God's efficient grace never fails to produce the effect for which it has been given (*resp.* 2). For the distinction between *posse in sensu diuiso* and *posse in sensu composito*, on which both *responsiones* are based, see J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] cc. 426-427; P. Sellier, *Pascal et Saint Augustin (Bibliothèque de l'évolution de l'humanité 12, Paris 1995 [= 1970])* p. 332. For *prop.* and *resp.* 2, see especially Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 8, cap. 4 (*Conciliatio gratiae Christi quam Augustinus docuit, cum libero arbitrio iuxta principia scholasticorum*): *Et ipsa Scriptura sacra de renato ex Deo loquens*: Qui natus est ex Deo peccatum non facit &c. et non potest peccare [1 John 3:9]. *Sicut ergo in sensu composito uerae sunt huiusmodi phrases quibus uoluntas acta per diuinam gratiam dicitur non posse resistere Deo, non posse dissentire ab eo quod per eam uult operari Deus, non posse declinari, non posse superari, ita e contrario in sensu diuiso uerae sunt quibus dicitur posse declinari, posse superari, posse dissentire. Eodem igitur modo locus Concilij Tridentini quo dicit quod liberum arbitrium à Deo motum & excitatum possit dissentire si uelit [Sess. 6 de iustificatione, can. 4; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1554], itemque quod inspirationem recipiens illam & abijcere potest [Sess. 6 de iustificatione, cap. 5; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1525], non difficulter ab eis & a nobis solui potest. Concilium enim in sensu diuiso, inquit, loquitur, quo significatur ita hominem recipere Dei inspirationem & motionem & excitationem istius delectationis aut praedeterminationis (addo, si libet, etiam actuale ipsius uoluntatis consensionem ac motum) ut nihil auferat ejus uoluntati potestatem dissentendi, si uelit, quamuis actualis dissensus cum illis pręsuppositis componi nequeat. Potestas enim dissentendi non repugnat isti excitationi aut delectationi aut praedeterminationi aut ipsi etiam consensui actuali uoluntatis, sed tantum dissensus actualis; quemadmodum cum paries albus uere dicitur esse posse niger, non hoc significatur quod albedine permanente simul in eo nigredo reperiri possit, sed quod simul cum albedine sit in eo potentia ut fiat niger.*

3a prop. *Condemnatio horum duorum articulorum a tribus Pontificibus*¹⁹³: *Quod uoluntarie fit, etiamsi necessitate fiat, libere tamen fit*¹⁹⁴, item: *Sola uiolentia repugnat libertati hominis naturali*¹⁹⁵, nihil contra præallegatam liberi coincidentis cum uoluntario perfecto definitionem, cum probabilius sit quod prima sententia, pro ut in bulla damnatur, accipienda sit uniuersaliter (ut sensus sit: 'Omne quod uoluntarie etc.'), sed negata indifferentia ad oppositum¹⁹⁶; datur ad saluationem bullę manifesta instantia in pueris, item in motibus uoluntatis primo primis etc.¹⁹⁷ Quantum ad secundam: *Sola uiolentia* etc., non sola, sed et indeliberatio repugnat libertati¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹³ Pius V: *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^{os} 1901-1980); Gregory XIII: *Prouisionis Nostrae* (1579); Urbanus VIII: *In eminenti* (1642).

¹⁹⁴ 39th of the 79 propositions condemned in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (Pius V; 1567); H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^o 1939.

¹⁹⁵ 66th proposition condemned in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^o 1966.

¹⁹⁶ In *prop.* and *resp.* 1 and 2, Fulgentius rejects the Molinist conviction that human freedom implies an *indifferentia* that makes man capable at any moment to chose autonomously whether he will perform a (bad/good) act or not. The *indifferentia* referred to in *prop.* 3, on the other hand, is a kind of indifference that was also recognized by Jansenius. It was the latter's conviction that post-lapsarian man was subject to a struggle between two opposite delectations – a *delectatio coelestis* and a *delectatio terrena* – and that he *necessarily* consented at any moment with the delectation that currently had the upper hand. For Jansenius, this necessity did not exclude human liberty, for it implied that the human will was not determined by blind, deterministic mechanisms. This conviction is expressed in Jansenius' *indifferentia* concept: 'La liberté humaine actuelle n'est que l'exemption d'une nécessité volontaire immuable. Durant toute notre vie, il y a conflit entre les deux délectations qui peuvent successivement triompher, suivant la prédominance de l'une ou de l'autre, dans la volonté qui consent toujours et nécessairement à la délectation la plus forte; par suite, la volonté de l'homme ici-bas n'est point fixée et confirmée dans un état, comme celle des bienheureux dans le bien et celle des damnés dans le mal. Elle peut changer, ou, plus exactement, elle peut être changée. En cela consiste son indifférence et cela est la condition suffisante pour qu'il puisse mériter ou démeriter.' (J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] c. 487) Fulgentius subscribes to the papal condemnation of the proposition *Quod uoluntarie fit, etiamsi necessitate fiat, libere tamen fit*, if the proposition is applied to every act of the will (*prima sententia, pro ut in bulla damnatur, accipienda sit uniuersaliter* [...]) and simultaneously presupposes the denial of the *indifferentia* that has just been described ([...] *sed negata indifferentia ad oppositum*). In that case, the human freedom spoken of by the proposition (*libere tamen fit*) would be reconcilable with a blind, deterministic necessity that does not involve the *indifferentia* that Jansenius saw as a sufficient condition for post-lapsarian man to merit or demerit.

¹⁹⁷ If the 39th proposition of *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* is given a universal meaning ([...] *ut sensus sit: 'Omne quod uoluntarie etc.'*), the proposition implies that even acts of the will that are not accompanied by a *perfecta cognitione finis* (e.g. acts of little children or the indeliberate movements of the will [*motus uoluntatis primo primi*]) are free. Fulgentius rejects the proposition, if it is interpreted in this universal sense, and thus sees no contradiction between the proposition's condemnation in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* and his own definition of the *liberum* in *prop.* and *resp.* 1.

¹⁹⁸ Compare Fulgentius' interpretation of the condemned meaning of both propositions with Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 6, cap. 36 (*Explicantur propositiones*

Resp. Explicationes horum duorum articulorum non uidentur mihi incongruę. Notant hic aliqui doctores in bulla Baiana propositiones multas non aliqua speciali censura esse censuratas, seu tamquam hereticas aut scandalosas aut piarum aurium offensus etc. nec posse omnes ut hereticas condemnari, cum aliquę ex ijs habeantur apud S. Augustinum.

4a prop. Damnatio huius articuli omnem huius questionis altercationem tollens¹⁹⁹, ut quondam aiebat Innocentius X contra Jansenium: *Ad merendum et demerendum in statu nature lapsę non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione, parum curatur*²⁰⁰.

Resp. Damnatio huius articuli: *Ad merendum uel demerendum* etc. multum curatur et aliud calomniöse dicitur.

5a prop. Scripturę illę Deuteronomij: *Mandatum quod ego præcipio tibi hodie, non est supra te, sed iuxta te, ut facias illud*²⁰¹, item: *Testes inuoco cęlum et terram, quod proposuerim uobis uitam et mortem; elige ut uiuas*²⁰², non aliud fere continent quam exhortationes et incitamenta ad bonum et auocamenta a malo. Quibus ut locus sit, non est necesse quod homo possit idem facere et omittere stantibus ijsdem prærequisitis, sed satis est quod actionis²⁰³ ęque capax sit, cum gratia Dei, ac uitiosę. Quo posito non est inutile eum moneri et increpari, cum hę admonitiones sepe proxime uel remote suppeditent ea quibus tam ad bonum exercendum quam a malo abstinendum indiget.

6a prop. Scriptura illa de Eccli 15: *Reliquit Deus hominem in manu consilij sui; ante eum uita et mors, bonum et malum; quod uoluerit, dabitur illi*²⁰⁴, de homine solum ante lapsum intelligenda est.

Resp. ad 5 et 6 propositionem. Explicationes scripturarum Deuteronomij et Ecclesiastici non uidentur mihi etiam incongruę. Pro posteriori citatur D. Thomas, S. Augustinus et Louanienses.²⁰⁵

ex bulla Pij quinti: Quod uoluntarie fit etc. et Sola uiolentia etc.): Constat enim huiusmodi improuisos uoluntatis motus esse uoluntarios & sine uiolentia ex uoluntate fluere, nec tamen etiam illo sensu esse liberos. Deest illis quippe id quod præcipuum est, quia non sunt in hominis potestate, non sumus eorum Domini, fiunt sine plena rationis aduertentia, profluunt inuita repugnanteque uoluntate; quae singula essentialiter repugnant libertati. Amplius ergo sine dubio requiritur, quam esse uoluntarium & sine uiolentia, ut sit liberum. Hoc Pontifices stabilire uoluerunt, ne tales spontanei necessarij motus liberi putarentur [...].

¹⁹⁹ tollentis R

²⁰⁰ 3rd of the 5 propositions condemned in *Cum occasione* (Innocent X; 1653);

H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2003.

²⁰¹ Deut. 30:11 and 14.

²⁰² Deut. 30:19.

²⁰³ Actionis standing for *actionis bonae*. Cf. *infra* (Nota primo aliquas mendas esse commissas [...]). See also n. 187.

²⁰⁴ Eccli. 15:14 and 18.

²⁰⁵ Augustine and Thomas did not restrict Eccli. 15:14 and 18 to Adam's state *ante lapsum*. Compare, e.g., Aug., *gr. et lib. arb.* 2, 3, where the verses are quoted as biblical proof for the existence of human free will in general. The exegesis proposed

7a Justi non habent auxilium gratiæ semper ad manum, qua dici possint, si uoluerint, in iustitia perseuerare; et Deus iuste ipsis potest rogantibus pro maiori auxilio in ualida tentatione exurgente denegare et subtrahere gratiam, qua negata et subtracta necessario, uere tamen peccant.

Resp. Existimo quod omnes justi non habeant auxilium gratiæ semper ad manum, qua dici possint, si uoluerint, in iustitia perseuerare actualiter (sic ut ipsum perseuerare dependeat ex mero beneplacito ipsorum liberi arbitrii cum gratia perfecte sufficienti, quæ illis semper adest et quam possunt reddere efficacem, dum uolunt). Ad 2am partem: quod Deus iuste possit ipsis rogantibus, remisse et non sicut oportet, pro maiori auxilio in ualida tentatione exurgente denegare gratiam efficacem, qua negata ineuitabiliter, uere tamen peccabunt.

8a prop. Verba Concilij Tridentini (quæ contraria huic assertioni uidentur, dum ait: *Si quis dixerit iustificatum uel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia perseuerare posse uel cum eo non posse, anathema sit*²⁰⁶): *Deus namque semel sua gratia iustificatos non deserit, nisi primo deseratur*²⁰⁷, hoc

by Fulgentius was defended, however, in the pseudo-Augustinian *Hypomnesticon*: *Quid est autem, Et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui, nisi: Dimisit eum in possibilitate liberi arbitrii sui? In manu enim possibilitas intellegitur. Ipsa est prima gratia, qua primus homo stare potuisset, si seruare Domini mandata uoluisset. Hac ergo per inoboedientiam desolatus, Deo iudice iusto, factus est serpenti, id est diabolo, cui maluit oboedire quam Deo, captiuus* (Responsio 3, 2; J. E. Chisholm, *The Pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon against the Pelagians and Celestians*. I [Paradosis 20, Fribourg 1967] pp. 155-156 and II [Paradosis 21, Fribourg 1980] pp. 119-120, ll. 30-35). It is also implied in Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 9, cap. 25: [...] *non esse jam liberum arbitrium in eo statu in quo, quando condebatur ab auctore suo, institutum fuit [...]. Nam quamuis uerissimum sit aequum esse ut creaturae rationalis felicitas & infelicitas, bonum ac malum ab ipsius proprio arbitrio suspendatur & ante eum posita uita & morte, bono & malo, quod placuerit ei detur illi, postquam jam tamen in manu consilii sui positus alterutrius partis electionem semel fecit, non est aequum ut in istam iterum boni ac mali indifferentiam reuocetur, sed potius ut istius electionis bonitatem aut malitiam praemium aut supplicium consequatur. Nam hoc est ipsissimum illud quod scriptura tangit, dum dicit: quod placuerit ei dabitur illi, uita scilicet, aut mors, bonum aut malum, quibus nihil aliud significatur quam praemium aut poena istius electionis quam manus consilii in quo homo ab initio constitutus est, propria sua libertate fecit. Est autem proprium praemium electionis bonae & malae ut arbitrium in eo quod sibi delegit utrimque firmetur atque hoc ei stabiliter diligendum detur quod sibi diligendum eligendumque iudicauit*. It should be noted that the exegesis of Eccli. 15:14 and 18 proposed by Fulgentius is explicitly rejected in the *Theologia uniuersa ad usum Sacrae Theologiae candidatorum* of the Capuchin friar Thomas a Charnes (originally published in 1751): *Eccli 15. Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui [...] Eo loci, uera exprimitur libertas a necessitate, etiam simplici et uoluntaria; atqui hic locus non debet restringi ad Adam ante lapsum, ut restringitur a Caluino [...]* (quoted from the Augsburg edition of 1780, vol. 4, p. 79).

²⁰⁶ Sess. 6 de iustificatione, can. 22 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1572).

²⁰⁷ Sess. 6 de iustificatione, cap. 11 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1537).

sensu accipienda sunt, scilicet quod Deus neminem priuet sua gratia sanctificante et habituali, nisi homo prius peccarit; ex quo non conuincitur quod Deus non possit prius gratiam suam actualem subtrahere, qua subtracta homo necessario peccat, Deum derelinquit et gratia justificante priuatur.

Resp. Explicatio uerborum Concilij Tridentini: *Si quis* etc. non uidetur mihi omnino incongrua, licet forte melior explicatio dari possit.

9a prop. Ista ab Innocentio damnata opinio predictæ²⁰⁸ conformis: *Aliqua Dei præcepta hominibus justis uolentibus et conantibus secundum præsentis quas habent uires, sunt impossibilia: deest quoque ipsis gratia qua possibilia fiant*²⁰⁹, ad instar prioris nihili fit.

Resp. Ista ab Innocentio damnata etc. *Aliqua Dei præcepta* etc. ad instar prioris magni fit et ab alijs calumnia nobis infertur.

10a Verba illa D. Augustini quibus ait: *Multos paruulorum non fieri saluos, non quia ipsi nolunt, sed quia Deus non uult*²¹⁰, in sensu positiuo, non negativo sunt accipienda, ac si dicat: 'Multos paruulorum perire, non quia ipsi (quippe incapaces) uoluerunt libere perire, sed quia Deus ipsos positue et directe uult exclusos, ordinans ad eum finem sic causas secundas, ut impediunt quo minus ad salutis necessaria perueniant.'²¹¹ Vnde uerba illa: *Christus*

²⁰⁸ See *prop.* and *resp.* 4.

²⁰⁹ 1st proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2001.

²¹⁰ Cf. *ep.* 217 (*ad Vitalem*), 6, 19.

²¹¹ In *ep.* 217, 6, 19, Augustine rejects the use of 1 Tim. 2:4 (*Deus omnes homines uult saluos fieri*) as an argument in favour of the claim that 'all human beings would receive grace if those to whom it is not given would not reject it by their own will.' This claim is mistaken, Augustine says, since children 'who do not have a will opposed to it', also die without baptism, even when 'their parents desire it and hasten to it'. Reason why they do not receive grace, is not that they would reject it by their own will if it were given to them, but simply that God does not want to give it to them: *Quo modo dicitur omnes homines eam fuisse accepturos, si non illi quibus non datur, eam sua uoluntate respuerent, quoniam Deus uult omnes homines saluos fieri, cum multis non detur paruulis et sine illa plerique moriantur, qui non habent contrariam uoluntatem, et aliquando cupientibus festinantibusque parentibus, ministris quoque uolentibus ac paratis, Deo nolente non detur, cum repente, antequam detur, expirat, pro quo, ut acciperet, currebatur? Vnde manifestum est eos qui huic resistunt tam perspicuae ueritati, non intellegere omnino qua locutione sit dictum quod omnes homines uult Deus saluos fieri, cum tam multi salui non fiant, non quia ipsi, sed quia Deus non uult, quod sine ulla caligine manifestatur in paruulis.* According to Jansenius in a chapter on the right interpretation of 1 Tim. 2:4, Augustine claims in *ep.* 217, 6, 19 (and other passages) not only that God does not have the will to save all children, but also that He does not want to save certain children in spite of the efforts of their parents to bring them to baptism and this because He has excluded them from the Kingdom: *Haec igitur considerans Augustinus non solum negat habere Deum istam omnium paruulorum saluandorum uoluntatem, sed etiam saepius exsertis uerbis docet, hominibus uolentibus quosdam paruulos saluos facere, nolle Deum ut salui fiant, quos iusto iudicio à regni sui felicitate secluit* (Augustinus, tom. 3, lib. 3,

*pro omnibus mortuus est*²¹² etc. *Deus uult omnes homines saluos fieri*²¹³ hoc aut simili modo intelligenda sunt: *pro omnibus*, id est pro aliquibus ex omni genere hominum, uel *pro omnibus*, id est pro omnibus qui salui fiunt, uel rursus *pro omnibus*, id est quantum ad sufficientiam sitam in eo quod mors in se tanti ualoris sit quod pro omnibus omnino saluandis satis esset, si fuisset omnibus applicata uel per eam omnes uoluisset saluare²¹⁴; quę interpretationes an non repugnent huic damnato ab Innocentio articulo: *Semipelagianum esse dicere Christum pro omnibus hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse*²¹⁵, prudens iudicet.

Resp. Existimo posse dici quod pueri morientes sine baptismo non habeant proprie medium sufficiens ad salutem (1) et quod Deus ordinet causas 2^{as} non libere agentes in interitum puerorum, antequam sint baptisati, ad quorum interitum sequitur damnatio propter peccatum originale.

Explicationes hae²¹⁶ uerborum S. Scripturę existimo quod non tantum prudentes, sed etiam uiri sancti iudicent non esse incongruas aut repugnare huic damnatę ab Innocentio X.: *Semipelagianum est dicere*.

11a prop. Gratia status naturę integrę a statu naturę lapsę in eo distinguitur quod illa dabat posse, nostra autem absolute semper facere, adeoque omnis gratia nostra est efficax, nec est admittenda diuisio gratię in sufficientem et efficacem pro moderno statu²¹⁷.

Resp. Gratia status naturę lapsę uidetur mihi quod sit semper efficax ad eum finem ad quem proxime datur ex Dei intentione, licet non sit semper efficax ad eum finem ad quem ex natura sua tendit²¹⁸; nec admittendum puto pro

cap. 20). Compare the paraphrase by J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] c. 398: '[...] Dieu ne veut pas à la lettre sauver tous les hommes. Saint Augustin dit même que Dieu ne veut pas sauver certains enfants, malgré les efforts des hommes qui voudraient les sauver et cela, parce que, par un juste jugement, il les a exclus positivement de son royaume.' (my italics) Following Jansenius, Fulgentius interprets ep. 217, 6, 19 as implying that God has positively excluded certain new born children from His Kingdom.

²¹² 2 Cor. 5:15.

²¹³ 1 Tim. 2:4.

²¹⁴ For these interpretations, see Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 3, capp. 20-21 (*Exponitur locus Apostoli: Deus omnes homines uult saluos fieri etc. + Quomodo Christus sit redemptor omnium, pro omnibus crucifixus & mortuus*); J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] cc. 397-399; L. Cognet, *Le jansénisme* [n. 2] pp. 55-56.

²¹⁵ 5th proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2005.

²¹⁶ *Has* would have been preferable. Cf. *infra* (*Nota primo aliquas mendas esse commissas [...]*).

²¹⁷ See Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 3, cap. 1 (*Tangitur natura adiutorii sufficientis & ostenditur nullum dari post lapsum quin simul efficax sit. Hoc enim repugnat multis principiis Augustini & Ecclesiae*).

²¹⁸ Compare A. Arnauld, *Vera S. Thomae de gratia sufficiente et efficaci doctrina dilucide explanata*, art. 23, n° 5, in: *Œuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld* 20 (Paris 1778) p. 74: *Etsi auxilium omne Dei mouentis semper efficax sit alicujus*

moderno statu diuisionem gratiæ in sufficientem et efficacem (sufficientem scilicet complete et perfecte, qua scilicet liberum arbitrium sic expeditum est, ut ex mero ipsius arbitrio pendeat quod actus ponatur uel non).

12a prop. Verba illa Actorum (et similia, tum Veteris tum Noui Testamenti) quibus S. Stephanus aiebat Judæis: *Dura ceruice et incircumcisis cordibus uos semper Spiritui sancto resistitis*²¹⁹, item illa Prouerbiorum: *Vocaui et renuistis, extendi manum meam et non fuit qui aspiceret*²²⁰, tantum de externa uocatione externisque gratiæ oblationibus sunt accipienda.

Resp. Verba Actorum etc. possunt etiam de internis gratiæ oblationibus intelligi.

13a prop. Per illa uerba Isaiæ 5 ubi conqueritur Dominus dicens: *Quid est quod debui ultra facere uineę mee et non feci? An quod exspectaui ut faceret uuas, fecit autem labruscas?*²²¹ solum uult Deus quod tam multa beneficia, item signa externa populo suo²²² exhibuisset, tam patienter ipsos sustinuisset et longanimitate cum eis processisset, ut humano modo loquendi nihil amplius quis facere posse uideatur, ut quis animum alicuius sibi rebellem lucraretur; non quod reuera Deus uelit quod omnia necessaria absolute eis subministrasset quibus bonum facere et instar optime uineę in dulces fructus pullularet iustitię.²²³

Resp. Ad uerba Isaiæ non habeo quod contradicam illorum explicationi.

14a prop. Damnatio huius articuli ab Innocentio X: *Interiori gratiæ in statu naturę lapsę numquam resistitur*²²⁴, per quam omnis in contrarium suspicio funditus sublata apparet, parum momenti reputatur.

Resp. Damnatio huius articuli etc. magni momenti reputatur.

effectus, ejus nempe ad quem efficiendum diuina uoluntate destinatur, ut fatentur omnes S. Thomæ discipuli; ei tamen interdum resistitur, respectu alterius effectus ad quem ex natura sua refertur. Vt cum peccatorem Deus ad pie uiuendum excitat, efficit quidem semper illa gratia ut secundum mensuram donationis Christi aliquam habeat ille peccator pie uiuendi uoluntatem, qua ratione gratia illa efficax est. Sed non semper tanta est illa uoluntas, etiam per gratiam inspirata, ut resistentem sibi peccati delectationem superet & ad piam uitam peccatorem reipsa perducatur, qua ratione illi resistitur.

²¹⁹ Acts 7:51.

²²⁰ Prov. 1:24.

²²¹ Is. 5:4.

²²² The Jews.

²²³ Fulgentius rejects the exegesis of Is. 5:4 according to which God gave to the Jews everything that is necessary for conversion. For, if God had given them everything that is necessary for conversion, they would also have received the grace that infallibly brings about conversion. For this reason, Fulgentius proposes an alternative interpretation, according to which God's claim in Is. 5:4 is considered a hyperbole: God just wanted to say that He did so much for the Jews that, speaking in human terms, nobody seems to be able to do more in order to win over a reluctant mind.

²²⁴ 2nd proposition condemned in *Cum occasione*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 2002.

15a prop. *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata*; nec contrariatur huic damnatę propositioni: *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et uirtutes philosophorum sunt uitia*²²⁵.

16a prop. Quia salua manet bulla in bonis uolitionibus et desiderijs quę ante conuersionem Spiritus²²⁶ infidelibus immittere solet.

Resp. ad 15. et 16. prop. Existimo quod omnia opera perfecte infidelium sint peccata, quia non referuntur in Deum, ad quem omnia opera ex p̄cepto referri debent; per perfecte infideles intelligo illos qui nondum diuinitus incipiunt illuminari²²⁷.

17a prop. Pontificis iudicium non solum in ijs quę sunt facti, sed et alias extra concilium generale est fallibile.

Resp. Pontificis iudicium in ijs quę sunt facti, existimo esse fallibile; in ijs quę sunt iuris, extra concilium generale, dum ex cathedra loquitur, teneo esse infallibile, licet hoc non uideatur esse de fide²²⁸.

18a prop. Indulgentię non uidentur prodesse nisi ijs qui parati sunt, quantum in ipsis est, diuinę iustitię satisfacere, cum non appareat nisi amor proprius, qui non est modus conueniens relaxationem obtinendi.

Resp. Indulgentię etiam prosunt ijs qui parati non sunt, quantum in ipsis est, diuinę iustitię satisfacere, licet Altisiodorensis, Paludanus et Caietanus apud Estium teneant contrarium²²⁹. Existimo tamen illos non tam amplas indulgentias lucrari quam istos qui parati sunt, quantum in ipsis est, diuinę iustitię satisfacere.

²²⁵ 25th proposition condemned in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1925.

²²⁶ *Spiritus sanctus*. Cf. *infra* (Nota primo aliquas mendas esse commissas [...]).

²²⁷ See n. 268.

²²⁸ The addition *licet hoc non uideatur esse de fide* may be compared with the words *saltem in publico* in prohibition 3 of the decree of 1668: *Non teneat aut doceat quis saltem in publico quod Pontificis iudicium fallibile sit extra concilium uniuersale*. Both Fulgentius and the decree express their adhesion to the doctrine of papal infallibility in questions of Faith and morals, but avoid presenting it as a dogma. Compare also the opinion formulated by Arsenius of Fuentes at the end of his visitation of the Flandro-Belgian Province (Hildebrand VI, p. 412).

²²⁹ See Willem Hesselszoon van Est, *In quartum librum Sententiarum commentaria*. Tomus IV (Parisiis 1638 [first edition: 1615]) p. 292: *Porro praeter haec nonnulli putant indulgentiarum thesaurum nec illis prodesse qui quamuis in gratia constituti, negligunt tamen per seipsos satisfacere, sed iis duntaxat qui solliciti sunt ut integre in hac uita satisfaciunt pro peccatis, atque ob id aut imponi sibi petunt satisfactiones condignas, aut saltem eas sponte assumunt, easdemque implere curant. Caeterum qui quam minimam petunt sibi poenitentiam imponi, & praeter eam, quam minimam esse sciunt, non curant amplius de satisfaciendo, sed magis post hanc uitam contenti sunt luere in purgatorio, existimantes sibi sufficere, si euadant infernum: non esse cur tales sperent sibi per indulgentias subueniendum. Ita sentit & docet Caietanus tract. 10. de suscipientibus indulgentias, post Altisiodorensem & Paludanum.*

Ecce propositiones et responsiones P. Fulgentij Masecani, super quibus (cum eas exscripserim precise pro ut habeo in transumpto ad me misso) nota primo aliquas mendas esse commissas uel primo scribendo uel in transcribendo. Propositione enim 5 desiderari uidetur absolute li *bona*, ut sensus sit: *sed satis est quod actionis bonę eque capax sit, cum gratia Dei, ac uitiosę*. Item propositione 8: *nisi primo deseratur*; sic habet textus Concilij: *nisi ab eis prius deseratur*²³⁰. Item in responsione ad quęstionem seu propositionem 10: li *explicationes hę uerborum* debet ad constructionem sic uerti: *explicationes has uerborum*. Item in 16 propositione: ad li *Spiritus* addendum uidetur *sanctus*, u.g. *Spiritus sanctus*.

Nota 2° P. Fulgentium non nisi tres propositiones absolute negare, reliquas uero explicare seu potius torquere iuxta suam opinionem et sola sua existimatione seu electione ductus, dicendo fere ubique: 'mihi uidetur', 'existimo', aut quid simile, et non nisi semel allegando D. Thomam, bis terue D. Augustinum, et subinde suos DD. Louanienses, qui licet ipsum plurimi faciant atque extollant tamquam unum e præcipuis suis inter Capucinos sectarijs, consulti tamen a R. P. Joanne Landensi²³¹ super prædictis propositionibus ac responsionibus responderunt illas nimis esse crudas nec sese ita audere docere. Cum autem omnes istę propositiones uel ex eius dictatis uel saltem doctrina in schola tradita fuerint extractę et (uti quidem arbitror) a P. Paulo Tenere-mundano (qui fere solus inter studiosos illis aduersabatur)²³², credendum est illas a P. Fulgentio fuisse traditas pro ut iacent,²³³ et non pro ut ab ipso fuerunt negatę uel explicatę, quia alioquin tantummodo debuisset RR. Patri-bus exhibere sua dictata ad sui purgationem et ex ijs demonstrare oppositam doctrinam. Absit uero ut hoc faceret; quinimo, postea dicere non est ueritus doctores Louanienses non eo modo fuisse locutos de suis propositionibus ac responsionibus quo R. P. Joannes eos referebat locutos.

Nota 3° fere omnes illas propositiones sapere uel Caluinismum, uel Janse-nismum, uel ad minus Baianismum; aliquas etiam aperte contrariari Concilio Tridentino, qua propter etiam RR. PP. tunc ex obligatione officij et consci-entia compulsi fuere condere decretum quod infra subiungetur, quamquam in eo remissius egerint, cum aduersus huiusmodi proscriptos errores omni effi-cacia procedere oporteat nec dissimulare, eo quod experientia a seculis constet talibus imbutos uel numquam uel rarissime huiusmodi decreta curare et a cęptis suis erroribus respiscere et resilire, sed e contra illos uel negare, uel

²³⁰ *Sess. 6 de iustificatione*, cap. 11 (H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1537).

²³¹ For Joannes of Landen, see n. 44.

²³² For the testimony of Paulus of Dendermonde, see n. 161.

²³³ Compare the words *patet quod illas sic docuerit prout jacebant* in the first document containing the 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* (see n. 180). Apparently, it had not been possible for Patricius and his Definitors to consult Fulgentius' *dictata* themselves.

defendere, uel subdole et ambigue explicare aut interpretari, et interim alijs instillare, pro ut et hic a nostris factitatum fuit.

Nota 4° P. Fulgentium impegissem tum in bullam Pij 5., Gregorij 13. atque Urbani 8. contra Baium²³⁴, tum in bullam Alexandri 7ⁱ contra Jansenium²³⁵, in quarum prima hæc formaliter habentur: *quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas, quamquam nonnullæ aliquo pacto sustineri possent, in rigore et proprio uerborum sensu ab assertoribus intento, hereticas, erroneas, suspectas, temerarias, scandalosas, et in pias aures offensionem immittentes*²³⁶, respectiue, ac quæcumque super ijs uerbo, scriptoque emissa, presentium auctoritate damnamus, circumscribimus, et abolemus; deque eisdem et similibus posthæc quoquo pacto loquendi, scribendi, et disputandi facultatem quibuscumque interdiciamus. Qui secus fecerint, ipsos omnibus dignitatibus, gradibus, honoribus, beneficijs, et officijs perpetuo priuamus, ac etiam inhabiles ad quæcumque decernimus. Vinculo quoque anathematis eo ipso innodamus, a quo nullus Romano Pontifice inferior ualeat eos, excepto mortis articulo, liberare²³⁷. Hæc habet bulla a B. Pio 5 primo emanata et a Gregorio 13 postea ac tandem ab Urbano 8 confirmata ac renouata. Bulla autem Alexandri 7ⁱ contra librum Cornelij Jansenij, qui Augustinus intitulatur, sic habet in fine: *ac eundem librum sepe dicti Cornelij Jansenij, cui titulus Augustinus, omnesque alios tam manu scriptos quam typis editos et si quos forsan imposterum edi contigerit, in quibus eius Cornelij Jansenij doctrina ut supra damnata defenditur uel astringitur, uel defendetur uel astringitur, damnamus itidem atque prohibemus, mandantes omnibus Christi fidelibus ne predictam doctrinam teneant, predicent, doceant, uerbo uel scripto exponant uel interpretentur, publice uel priuatim, palam uel occulte imprimant, sub penis et censuris contra hereticos in iure expressis ipso facto absque alia declaratione incurrendis*²³⁸. Sic bulla Alexandri 7.ⁱ

²³⁴ Pius V: *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^{os} 1901-1980); Gregory XIII: *Prouisionis Nostræ* (1579); Urbanus VIII: *In eminenti* (1642).

²³⁵ Alexander VII: *Ad sacram* (1656; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^{os} 2010-2012); *Regiminis Apostolici* (1665; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^o 2020). For the full text of both documents, see Carolus du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* [n. 17] pp. 281-282 and 314-316.

²³⁶ immittentes R

²³⁷ See *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (*Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 48 [1953] p. 775). I have retained the punctuation of R for the whole quotation. In the first sentence, R has a comma after both *possent* and *intento*, the most important evidently being that after *possent*. For the problem of the so-called *comma Pianum*, see H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n^o 1980 n. 1; T. Quaghebeur, "Sed illud intactum reliquerit". Une virgule mal biffée: le comma pianum, la bulle *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* du St-Office et la lecture du cardinal de Lugo, in: *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 98 (2003) pp. 61-79 (with further bibliography).

²³⁸ See *Ad sacram* (Carolus du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* [n. 17] p. 281).

**Decretum quod RR. PP. Prouincialis et Diffinitores fecerunt 21 Julij²³⁹
1668 contra præfatas doctrinas et explicationes V. P. Fulgentij Mascani²⁴⁰**

Propter justas causas iudicarunt RR. PP. Minister Prouincialis et Diffinitores huius Prouincię Flandro Belgicę expedire ut admoneantur V. Patres concionatores, lectores et studiosi ne quis teneat uel doceat sequentes propositiones: [...]²⁴¹

Actum Bruxellis in Capitulo intermedio de consensu RR. PP. Diffinitorum 21 Julij²⁴² 1668

Erat subscriptum

f. Patritius Minister Prouincialis indignus

[Propositiones hasce omnes cum earundem refutationibus tradidi R. A. P. Ildefonso]²⁴³

Comparing the above statements of Fulgentius of Maaseik with the decree of 1668, one may conclude that the latter – pace Hildebrand – did regard essential aspects of the *lector*'s theological thinking, even if the latter was prepared to condemn (a certain interpretation of) the propositions that were prohibited in the decree.

Prohibition 1 and 6: According to the compiler of the above document, only three of the *propositiones* ascribed to Fulgentius were completely and unambiguously rejected by the *responsiones* (*Nota 2° P. Fulgentium non nisi tres propositiones absolute negare*).²⁴⁴ These probably are *prop.* 4, 9 and 14, which deny the importance of the condemnation of 3 propositions in *Cum occasione*. The propositions in question were equally prohibited in the decree of 1668:

Prop. 4	<i>Ad merendum et demerendum</i> etc.	<i>Cum occasione</i> prop. 3	prohibition 1 of 1668
Prop. 9	<i>Aliqua Dei praecepta</i> etc.	<i>Cum occasione</i> prop. 1	prohibition 6 of 1668 ²⁴⁵
Prop. 14	<i>Interiori gratiae</i> etc.	<i>Cum occasione</i> prop. 2	prohibition 1 of 1668

²³⁹ Junij R (cf. n. 178)

²⁴⁰ mascani R

²⁴¹ At this place, the document offers a copy of the 6 prohibitions of 1668, which I have edited above on the basis of the *Acta Capitularia* of the Flandro-Belgian Province.

²⁴² Junij R

²⁴³ This line was added by a later hand.

²⁴⁴ According to the first document containing the 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones*, Fulgentius' replies denied four of the propositions. See n. 179.

²⁴⁵ The words *Ista [...] damnata opinio* in *prop.* and *resp.* 9 can be interpreted as a dominant participle construction, meaning the same as the words *damnatio huius articuli* in *prop.* and *resp.* 4 and 14.

In each case, Fulgentius' *responsio* states that, contrary to what is said in the proposition, the condemnation in question did have its importance. In this sense, one could be tempted to conclude that (part of) the prohibitions 1 and 6 of the decree of 1668 did not affect Fulgentius' teaching. However, these three *responsiones* are limited to a lapidary affirmation of the importance of the condemnations in question, but do not offer any further specification with regard to what Fulgentius thought to be the sense in which each of these propositions had been condemned by Innocent X. Moreover, if one considers – as the *Definitorium* of 1668 probably did – the three condemned propositions to be the expression of Jansenius' doctrines of the absolute necessity of God's efficient grace for Adam's descendants to obey God's precepts (*Aliqua Dei praecepta* etc.) and the irresistibility of efficient grace (*Interiori gratiae* etc.), as well as of his conviction that the necessity by which one either sins or fulfils God's commandments, does not abolish the freedom of the human will (*Ad merendum et demerendum* etc.),²⁴⁶ their prohibition by the decree of 1668 did affect Fulgentius' teaching, for all three doctrines are implied in some of the *propositiones* et *responsiones* edited above (necessity does not abolish freedom: *prop.* and *resp.* 1, 2, 7 and 8; absolute necessity of God's efficient grace: *prop.* and *resp.* 11; irresistibility of efficient grace: *prop.* and *resp.* 2). The presence of these doctrines also explains Fulgentius' criticism of the Molinist concept of sufficient grace in *prop.* and *resp.* 7 and 11.

According to *prop.* and *resp.* 3, Fulgentius also condemned the two propositions from *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* that were forbidden by prohibition 1 in the decree (*Quod uoluntarie fit, etiamsi necessitate fiat, libere tamen fit* and *Sola uiolentia expugnat hominis libertati naturali*). However, Fulgentius condemned both propositions in a sense that does not contradict his own claim in *prop.* and *resp.* 1 and 2 that human freedom is not abolished by the fact that fallen man necessarily sins when he sins and that he can not resist God's efficient grace.

We may thus conclude that if the propositions affected by prohibitions 1 and 6 of the decree are interpreted as expressing some key doctrines of Jansenius, their prohibition did affect the teaching of Fulgentius, even if the *lector* condemned these propositions himself. The latter can be explained by the hypothesis that Fulgentius did not interpret the condemned propositions in a way that affected his views on

²⁴⁶ For these interpretations of the first three propositions condemned in *Cum occasione*, see J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] cc. 479-491.

human freedom and efficient grace. This is certain for the two propositions from *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (see *prop.* and *resp.* 3) and highly probable for the propositions from *Cum occasione*, since – at least if we may give credit to *FN* – Fulgentius claimed that the condemnation of the five propositions by Innocent X did not affect Janse-
nius' *Augustinus*.

Prohibition 2: According to *prop.* 15, Fulgentius subscribed to the proposition forbidden by prohibition 2 of the decree (*Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum uirtutes sunt uitia*). The reply to *prop.* 15 and 16 shows, however, that Fulgentius only subscribed to this proposition if the *infideles* in question are interpreted as being complete infidels (*perfecte infideles*) and, by consequence, do not include those unbelievers who have already received a first, elementary illumination from the Holy Spirit. For this reason, *prop.* 16 states that the condemnation of the sentence *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata* in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* is pertinent, since its universal character (*omnia opera infidelium* etc.) is contradicted by the fact that the acts of *imperfecte infideles* are not necessarily sins. This means that Fulgentius adhered to an attenuated version of the proposition *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata: Existimo quod omnia opera perfecte infidelium sint peccata*. This version, however, still excluded the possibility of good acts committed by people who had not been illuminated, either fully (as *fideles*) or elementarily (as *imperfecte infideles*), by the Holy Spirit. Moreover, Fulgentius does not seem to have felt the need of modifying his position regarding the sentence *uirtutes philosophorum sunt uitia*. We may thus conclude that, if the second prohibition of 1668 was issued on the basis of the conviction that without grace fallen man can still accomplish morally good acts, even if the latter do not lead to eternal life,²⁴⁷ the second prohibition directly reacted against the teaching of Fulgentius, even if the latter rejected the proposition *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata* in its universal sense.

Prohibition 3: We saw above that, according to *FN*, Fulgentius' *dictata* and the *Apologia pro doctrina* both claimed that the Pope's judgment is fallible not only in questions of fact, but also in questions of Faith and morals. The *lector* is ascribed the same opinion in *prop.* 17, but he contradicts it in the corresponding reply: *in ijs quę sunt iuris, extra concilium generale, dum ex cathedra loquitur, teneo esse infallibile [...]*. This contradiction, however, is immediately followed

²⁴⁷ For this position, see J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] c. 360.

by a further qualification: [...] *licet hoc non uideatur esse de fide*. We may thus conclude that prohibition 3 of 1668 was directed against the position which Fulgentius advocated according to *FN* in his *dictata* and the *Apologia pro doctrina*, and that the *lector's* denial of this position in the list of *propositiones* and *responsiones* is explicitly presented as not being a point of Faith.

Prohibition 4: If prohibition 4 of 1668 was directed against the denial that Christ died for all mankind – and I see no reason to suppose it was not – it can be considered a reaction against Fulgentius. On the basis of three very specific interpretations of the words *pro omnibus* in 2 Cor. 5:15 (*Christus pro omnibus mortuus est*), which he probably knew from Jansenius' *Augustinus* (*pro omnibus* meaning 'for some out of all classes of mankind', 'for all who are saved' or 'for all human beings in the sense that the power of Christ's resurrection would suffice to save all mankind if He wanted it'),²⁴⁸ Fulgentius was even able to neutralize the latter verse as well as 1 Tim. 2:4 (*Deus uult omnes homines saluos fieri*) as biblical proof in favour of the belief that Christ did die for all mankind.

Fulgentius' words regarding the fifth proposition of *Cum occasione* remain somewhat ambiguous: *Explicationes hae* [= the proposed interpretations 2 Cor. 5:15 and 1 Tim. 2:4] *uerborum S. Scripturę existimo quod non tantum prudentes, sed etiam uiri sancti iudicent non esse incongruas aut repugnare huic damnatę ab Innocentio X. <sententiaę>*: Semipelagianum est dicere <Christum pro omnibus hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse> (*rep.* 10). (a) If one considers the words *huic damnatę ab Innocentio X. <sententiaę>* an example of the dominant participle construction,²⁴⁹ Fulgentius says that his interpretation of 2 Cor. 5:15 and 1 Tim. 2:4 is in accordance with Innocent's condemnation of the fifth proposition. In that case, he probably accepts the condemnation by projecting the above three interpretations of *pro omnibus* on to the words *pro omnibus hominibus* in the condemned proposition. According to that interpretation, the thesis *dicere Christum pro omnibus hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse* can impossibly be Semi-Pelagian, which implies that the fifth proposition in its entirety is false, even for a disciple of Jansenius.²⁵⁰ (b) If one does not

²⁴⁸ See n. 214.

²⁴⁹ Compare my interpretation of the words *Ista [...] damnata opinio in prop.* and *resp.* 9 in n. 245.

²⁵⁰ For this interpretive strategy, see also P. Sellier, *Qu'est-ce que le jansénisme (1640-1713)?* [n. 18] p. 70: 'Nous disposons déjà de toutes les nuances nécessaires pour comprendre comment les augustinien pouvaient condamner la cinquième Proposition: "Il est sémi-pélagien de dire que Jésus-Christ est mort et a répandu son sang pour tous

consider the words *huic damnate ab Innocentio X. <sententiae>* an example of the dominant participle construction, Fulgentius simply states at the end of both *prop.* and *resp.* 10 that he upholds the fifth proposition in spite of its condemnation by Innocent X.

Prohibition 5: The doctrine affected by the fifth prohibition of 1668 can be read in the *Augustinus* of Jansenius²⁵¹ and is defended without any reserve in *prop.* and *resp.* 10.²⁵²

5.4. *Eugenius of Bruges on Fulgentius' teaching on divine grace*

In June-September 1682, Definitor General Ildefonsus of Carlshoven visited the Flandro-Belgian Province as *Commissarius Generalis* by order of Minister General Bernardus of Porto Maurizio († 1684), in order to verify to what degree the anti-Jansenist decree of Stephanus of Cesena (1674) was being observed.²⁵³ On 28 July, he received in the convent of Bruges a charge against Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort and Marcellus of Menen, who were accused by Eugenius of Bruges of having caused troubles within the Flandro-Belgian Province through their false charges against fellow Capuchins. A copy of this charge was integrated by Eugenius himself in a later charge against Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort and Marcellus of Menen, which he addressed on 18 August 1683 to the Cardinals of the Holy Office.²⁵⁴ This later charge has been preserved in two copies in the *Archivum Generale O.F.M.Cap. (G.22.11. Dimissiones, processus. 1683-1925)*.²⁵⁵

In the charge of 28 July 1682, Eugenius makes the same claim as Michael of Oudenbosch was to make in 1700 and Hildebrand in the 20th century, viz. that the charges by Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort lacked all justification. He illustrates this by referring to the case of Fulgentius of Maaseik, from whom Eugenius had received his theological

les hommes sans exception." Pour eux, affirmer que le Christ est mort pour tous sans exception pouvait en effet avoir un sens catholique, précisé par Augustin, Prosper et beaucoup d'autres, dont l'auteur de l'*Apologie pour les saint Pères* [= Antoine Arnauld]: soit quant à la suffisance de la Rédemption, soit parce que le Christ a sauvé la nature humaine. Une fois de plus la rédaction de la condamnation demeurerait imprécise.'

²⁵¹ See n. 211.

²⁵² Against what is suggested in the already quoted testimony of Paulus of Denendermonde. See n. 161.

²⁵³ For this visitation, see Hildebrand VI, pp. 379-383.

²⁵⁴ For the charges of 28 July 1682 and 18 August 1683, see Hildebrand VI, p. 415.

²⁵⁵ It is said at the bottom of both documents that a copy of the charge was sent to the Cardinal Conprotector Giacomo Rospigliosi on 16 March 1684 (and not in 1687, as suggested by Hildebrand VI, p. 415 n. 2).

formation. It had been at the instigation of Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort, Eugenius says, that Patricius of Hazebroek and his entire *Definitorium* interrogated Fulgentius of Maaseik in 1668 (Eugenius mistakenly says 1667) with regard to 18 suspected propositions. Without mentioning that an anti-Jansenist decree had been issued almost immediately after this interrogation, Eugenius stresses that no measures had been taken against Fulgentius of Maaseik himself. This was only normal, he says, since Fulgentius of Maaseik was a faithful disciple of Augustine and, by consequence, could impossibly have been a heretic.²⁵⁶ Eugenius subsequently proves this by offering a synthesis of his master's views on divine grace, which is larded with explicit references to the works of the bishop of Hippo. This synthesis (together with the introduction to the charge of 28 July 1682) is edited below on the basis of both copies of Eugenius' charge of 18 August 1683 (A = doc. 1, ff. 1-1^v; B = doc. 2, ff. 1-3^r).²⁵⁷ In both copies, most quotations from the Bible and the works of Augustine are identified by means of marginal notes, the visibility of which emphasizes the orthodoxy of Fulgentius' views. I have integrated all marginal notes in the text, but preserved their visibility by using the bold typeface. Next to these notes, the footnotes identify quotations that Eugenius has left without explicit identification. The division in paragraphs is mine.

[...]

Hac die 28. Julij 1682. in conuentu nostro Brugensi ego Fr. Eugenius Brugen-
sis sacerdos Capucinus propono coram uobis, R. ad.^m P. Ildephonse Austriace
Diffinitor ac Commissarij Generalis, per specialem commissionem R. ad.^m P.
Bernardi a Portu Mauritio Ministri Generalis Ordinis Capucinatorum²⁵⁸ iudex
nobis delegate, contra RR. PP. Fulgentium Neoportanum et Marcellum Mene-
nensem, Prouinciae Flandro-Belgicae Diffinitores, non animo calumniandi, sed
Prouinciam meam ac præcipuos eius et integerrimos doctrina et pietate uiros a
nota hereseos ac infamibus calumnijs uindicandi, quod iidem ipsi sint qui iam-
dudum eandem Prouinciam sub pretextibus plane chymericis perturbauerint ac
etiamnum perturbare non desinant, quod sub pœna talionis probare polliceor

²⁵⁶ In a document of 1669 (*Archium Capucinatorum Belgii* I, 4930) on the virtues of Justinus of Brussels († 1655; Hildebrand VII, p. 416, n° 2939), Fulgentius highly praises Justinus' love for the teachings of Augustine.

²⁵⁷ There are some striking parallels between Eugenius' synthesis of Fulgentius of Maaseik's teaching and the exposition of his own Augustinian convictions in the letter to Van Hecke that we have discussed above in paragraph 3. See *Vltima uox* [n. 65] pp. 45-59.

²⁵⁸ Bernardus of Porto Maurizio was Minister General of the Capuchin Order during the years 1678-1684.

atque hanc litem prosequi usque in finem; et peto ut secundum jura et canones supradicti patres ut perturbatores publicae quietis ac factiosi puniantur.

2. Vt ueritas in hac causa magis innotescat, sciendum est perturbationem hanc, quae Prouinciam nostram miserrime dilacerat atque in partes scindit, per eundem P. Fulgentium iamdudum coeptam esse, scilicet ab anno 1667., quando se quoad doctrinam formaliter opposuit Ven. P. Fulgentio Masecano lectori. Cuius potissimum opera etiam factum ut per R. P. Patritium Hasbroucanum Prouincialem proponerentur 18. propositiones quibus idem lector iubebatur respondere, quarum aliquae uidebantur expressis terminis conceptae, ut eundem incautum illaquearent. Ipso autem simplici responsione ad singulas se faciliter extricante idem P. Fulgentius Neoportanus non cessauit doctrinam praefati lectoris omnibus modis hucusque persequi sub omnino friuolis ac plerumque falsis allegationibus. Vt autem innotescat tam odiosa facta doctrina, illam paucis uerbis proponam.

3. Hec docet: quod *per unum hominem peccatum intrauit in hunc mundum et per peccatum mors*, quae in omnes homines pertransijt, in quo omnes peccauerunt [Rom. 5.12.]. Item quod reatu peccati originalis per regenerationis lauacrum sublato eiusdem reliquiae tamquam pœnae remaneant, scilicet ignorantia in intellectu et concupiscentia in uoluntate: illa per legem et doctrinam potest auferri, hæc autem non nisi gratia medicinali superari potest. Interrogante enim apostolo, qui accepit *ministerium uerbi a Domino Jesu testificari euangelium gratiae Dei* [Act. 20.24.]: *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius* (scilicet captiuante eum in lege peccati)? [Rom. 7.24.], ipsemet respondet: *Gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum*²⁵⁹. Cui adstipulatur fidelis eius discipulus, ipsius Ecclesiae in materia gratiae defensor irrefragabilis S. Augustinus dicens: *A concupiscentiae dominatu non liberat nisi 'gratia Dei per Jesum C. D. N.'*²⁶⁰ *dono Spiritus S.^{ti} per quem 'diffusa charitas in cordibus nostris'*²⁶¹ *uincit concupiscentias carnales, ne consentiamus eis ad male faciendum, sed potius bona faciamus* [l. 1. retract. c. 23.]²⁶². Hanc autem medicinalem Christi Saluatoris gratiam se scire dicit idem²⁶³ S. Doctor *ad singulos actus dari* [e. 107 ad Vital.]²⁶⁴, ex quo elici posse uidetur nullum actum esse indifferentem in indiuiduo²⁶⁵.

²⁵⁹ Rm. 7:25.

²⁶⁰ Rm. 7:25.

²⁶¹ Rm. 5:5.

²⁶² Aug., retr. 1, 23, 1.

²⁶³ dicit om. B

²⁶⁴ Aug., ep. 217 (ad Vitalem), 2, 4 (before the Maurist edition of Augustine's letters, the present ep. 217 bore the number 107; see PL 33, c. 978, n. a). This letter is quoted also in prop. and resp. 10 (cf. supra).

²⁶⁵ Compare Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I^a II^{ae}, q. 18, a. 9, co. (*Vtrum aliquis actus sit indifferens secundum indiuiduum*): [...] *necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberatiua ratione procedentem, in indiuiduo consideratum, bonum esse uel malum*. The Thomistic thesis is based here on Augustinian principles: individual deliberate acts can not be neutral, since they are the effect of either divine grace (good) or concupiscence (bad).

4. Et quod Ecclesia de Spiritu S.¹⁰ uere canat: *Sine tuo numine nihil est in homine, nihil est innoxium*²⁶⁶, non tamen inde recte inferas *omnia opera infidelium esse peccata*²⁶⁷, quia actus indeliberati, item omnia opera ad Christianismum disponentia (quae gratiae per 2. Concilium Arausicanum ascribuntur [2. Conc. Araus. c. 25. in fin.])²⁶⁸ non possunt esse peccata. Virtutes autem philosophorum non sunt proprie uitia, sed ab ipsis philoso-

²⁶⁶ Verses 16-18 of the medieval sequence *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, which the Catholic Church sang at Pentecost since 1570. See G. M. Dreves-C. Blume, *Ein Jahrtausend Lateinischer Hymnendichtung. II. Hymnen unbekannter Verfasser* (Leipzig 1909) p. 160; P. W. Tax, *Zur Verfasserschaft und Entstehungszeit der Pfingstsequenz 'Veni, Sancte Spiritus'*, in: *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur* 135 (2006) pp. 13-20.

²⁶⁷ 25th proposition condemned by Pius V in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567); H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1925. It is the 15th proposition ascribed to Fulgentius in 1668.

²⁶⁸ The text probably refers here to deliberate acts of the *imperfecte infideles*, whom Fulgentius implicitly hints at in his reply to prop. 15 and 16: *Existimo quod omnia opera perfecte infidelium sint peccata, quia non referuntur in Deum, ad quem omnia opera ex praecepto referri debent; per perfecte infideles intelligo illos qui nondum diuinitus incipiunt illuminari*. The *imperfecte infideles* can be identified with more precision thanks to Eugenius' marginal reference to the end of the 25th – and last – canon of the second Council of Orange (529). Eugenius does not seem to refer to the 25th canon itself, but to the *definitio fidei* that immediately follows it and ends in a reference to the gift of Faith which makes people strive for baptism and which God also gave to the good robber of Lk. 23:43, to the centurion Cornelius in Acts 10:3 and to the tax-collector Zachaeus in Lk. 19:6: *Hoc etiam salubriter profitemur et credimus, quod in omni opere bono non nos incipimus et postea per Dei misericordiam adiuuamur, sed ipse nobis nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat, ut et baptismi sacramenta fideliter requiramus et post baptismum cum ipsius adiutorio ea quae sibi sunt placita, implere possimus. Vnde manifestissime credendum est quod et illius latronis quem Dominus ad paradysum patriam reuocauit et Cornilii centurionis, ad quem angelus Domini missus est, et Zacchei, qui ipsum Dominum suscipere meruit, illa tam admirabilis fides non fuerit de natura, sed diuinae gratiae largitate donata* (CCSL 148 A, p. 63, ll. 213-223). Compare Jansenius' remarks on the centurion Cornelius in his discussion of the *opera infidelium* (Augustinus, tom. 2, lib. 4, cap. 5: *Sancti Augustini loca explicantur, quibus asserere uidetur opera moraliter bona in infidelibus*; J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] c. 361): *Nunc soluenda sunt nonnulla Augustini testimonia, ex quibus probari putant, in infidelibus esse posse nonnulla opera uere bona. In primis proferunt Augustini loca de Cornelio centurione, quibus libro de praedestinatione sanctorum cap. septimo, & libro primo de baptismo capite septimo, & libro quarto capite uigesimo primo (error enim in citationes irrepsit) eleemosynas Cornelii, antequam in Christum crederet, & iustitiam appellat, & donum Dei esse dicit. At certe impium est dona Dei inter peccata deputare [Bellarminus, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, lib. 5, cap. 9]. At certe ista nimis est somnolenta Augustini lectio, ut ex huiusmodi locis probetur sine fide fieri posse opera nonnulla bona. Testatur enim Augustinus in ipso illo loco de Praedestinatione sanctorum qui citatur, & in alijs pluribus, Cornelium nullo modo fuisse infidelem, sed fide iam diuinitus infusa in Deum credidisse, & ex ea fide orasse Deum, in quem crediderat, & eleemosynas erogasse, quamuis in Christum Iesum sibi non annunciatum necdum credidisset.*

phis in se ipsis de illis et non in Domino gloriantibus uitiantur. *Possunt enim aliqua bona fieri non bene facientibus a quibus fiunt*²⁶⁹, et de talibus operibus non in Domino gloriari solus impius negat esse peccatum [I. 4. con. Iulia. c. 3.]²⁷⁰.

5. Hanc uero Christi gratiam ad singulos christianę uirtutis actus necessariam dicit idem gratiæ doctor Augustinus: se scire *non omnibus hominibus dari et quibus datur, misericordia Dei gratuita dari; quibus autem non datur, iusto iudicio Dei non dari* [e. 107 ad Vital.]²⁷¹. Vnde satis evidens est gratiam sufficientem, quam omnibus hominibus, etiam obduratis et excecatis, generaliter dari – imo dari debere – aliqui²⁷² tam pertinaciter sustinent et pro sententia²⁷³ ipsius Ecclesię mundo obtrudere conantur, non esse gratiam illam quam tanquam ueram Christi gratiam tam operose contra hęreticos defendit D. Augustinus.

6. Cum autem idem dicat uoluntatem nostram non posse *in medio ita consistere, ut nec bona nec mala sit* [I. de pecc. mer. et remiss. c. 18.]²⁷⁴, nihil autem esse bonam uoluntatem quam charitatem [de grat. Christ. c. 21.]²⁷⁵, et *inspirationem dilectionis, ut cognita per legem sancto amore faciamus, proprie gratiam esse* [lib. 4. ad Bonif. c. 5]²⁷⁶, quid mirum igitur quod ad salutarem attritionem (ad quam omnes et bonam uoluntatem et gratiam necessariam esse contendunt) charitatem aliquam requiramus²⁷⁷, non autem per-

²⁶⁹ Aug., c. Iulian. 4, 3, 22. Compare Jansenius, *Augustinus*, tom. 2, lib. 4, capp. 2/6-11/16; J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] cc. 359- 364; P. Sellier, *Pascal et saint Augustin* [n. 192] pp. 260-265.

²⁷⁰ Aug., c. Iulian. 4, 3, 30.

²⁷¹ Compare Aug., ep. 217, 5, 16 (*sententiae* 4-6). For the number 107 in Eugenius' marginal note, see n. 264.

²⁷² Viz. the partisans of Molinism.

²⁷³ *sentiam B*

²⁷⁴ Aug., *pecc. mer.* 2, 18, 30.

²⁷⁵ Compare Aug., *grat. pecc.* 1, 21, 22.

²⁷⁶ 15 B. See Aug., c. Pel. 4, 5, 11.

²⁷⁷ According to the Council of Trent, the *attritio* which stems from the fear of future punishment, prepares the penitent for the forgiveness of sins in the sacrament of penance, if together with the hope for forgiveness it excludes the will to sin. This *attritio* is called a *contritio imperfecta*, for it is considered a gift of God that makes the penitent approach justification: *Illam uero contritionem imperfectam, quae attritio dicitur, quoniam uel ex turpitudinis peccati consideratione uel ex gehennae et poenarum metu communiter concipitur, si uoluntatem peccandi excludat cum spe ueniae, declarat non solum non facere hominem hypocritam et magis peccatorem, uerum etiam donum Dei esse et Spiritus sancti impulsu, non adhuc quidem inhabitantis, sed tantum mouentis, quo poenitens adiutus uiam sibi ad iustitiam parat. Et quamuis sine sacramento poenitentiae per se ad iustificationem perducere peccatorem nequeat, tamen eum ad Dei gratiam in sacramento poenitentiae impetrandam disponit* (Sess. 14 de sacramento poenitentiae, cap. 4; H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion* [n. 17] n° 1678). Fulgentius calls this *attritio/contritio imperfecta* an *attritio salutaris*, which is not limited to fear for future punishment, but also includes a *bona uoluntas* that depends on a divinely given *imperfecta caritas*. Compare Jansenius' interpretation of the *contritio imperfecta/attritio* in *Augustinus*, tom. 3, lib. 5, capp.

fectam, sed imperfectam²⁷⁸? Numquid enim (ut bene dicit Augustinus) *mox ut nascitur charitas, iam prorsus perfecta est? Vt perficiatur, nascitur; cum fuerit nata, nutritur; cum fuerit nutrita, roboratur; cum fuerit roborata, perficitur* [tract. 1. in epis. Joan. circa med.].²⁷⁹

7. Dicimus præterea ignorantiam juris naturae, quamvis a tanto, non tamen a toto excusare²⁸⁰, quia iuxta eundem Augustinum *in ijs qui intelligere noluerunt, sine dubitatione peccatum est; in ijs autem qui non potuerunt, pena peccati. Ergo in utrisque non est iusta excusatio, sed iusta damnatio* [e. 105. ad Sixt.].²⁸¹ Alias enim ista ignorantia non esset pena peccati, sed eiusdem potius singulare beneficium; nec amplius suspirare deberemus ad Dominum: *Illumina tenebras meas* [ps. 17. 29.], sed potius: 'Illas adauge', directe contra orationem Ecclesiastici: *ne adincrescant ignorantiae meae et multiplicentur delicta mea et peccata mea abundant* [eccl. 23.3.].²⁸²; imo nec docere ignorantes amplius inter opera spiritualis misericordiae computari deberet, sed potius pro summa habendum esset iniuria, cum per illud homines peccati delicijs absque reatu frui impedirentur.

26-27/34-35; J. Carreyre, *Jansénius* [n. 2] cc. 410-411; P. Sellier, *Pascal et saint Augustin* [n. 192] pp. 321-327, esp. p. 323: 'Selon lui [= Jansenius], l'attrition définie à Trente est une véritable contrition, car elle inclut un certain amour de Dieu, si faible soit-il; en effet une attrition simplement servile ne saurait engendrer le ferme propos de ne plus pécher.'

²⁷⁸ Fulgentius' concept of an *imperfecta caritas* probably goes back to Aug., *gr. et lib. arb.* 17, 33, where Augustine defines the *caritas imperfecta* as a gift of divine grace that makes one will to fulfil the law, but does not yet give the strength to actually fulfil it. This *parua et imperfecta caritas* makes possible a *bona uoluntas* that is only *parua et inualida*: *Qui ergo uult facere Dei mandatum et non potest, iam quidem habet uoluntatem bonam, sed adhuc paruam et inualidam; poterit autem, cum magnam habuerit et robustam. Quando enim martyres magna illa mandata fecerunt, magna utique uoluntate, hoc est, magna caritate fecerunt [...]. Ipsam caritatem apostolus Petrus nondum habuit, quando timore Dominum ter negauit. Timor enim non est in caritate, sicut ait Ioannes euangelista in epistola sua, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem* [1 Ioh. 4, 18]. *Et tamen quamuis parua et imperfecta, non deerat, quando dicebat Domino: Animam meam pro te ponam* [Ioh. 13, 37]: *putabat enim se posse, quod se uelle sentiebat. Et quis istam etsi paruam dare coeperat caritatem, nisi ille qui praeparat uoluntatem et cooperando perficit quod operando incipit?*

²⁷⁹ Eugenius' marginal reference is slightly mistaken: he is quoting Aug., *ep. Io. tr.* 5, 4 and not *ep. Io. tr.* 1.

²⁸⁰ Thomistic thesis (cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.*, lib. 2, d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, co.: *ignorantia uniuersalis* [= *ignorantia iuris*] *excusat peccatum sequens non ex toto, sed a tanto*), which Fulgentius bases on a purely Augustinian argumentation. The same Augustinian argumentation is developed by Jansenius in *Augustinus*, tom. 2, lib. 2, capp. 2-6 (especially cc. 4-5). Compare J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme* [n. 2] cc. 351-353; P. Sellier, *Pascal et saint Augustin* [n. 192] pp. 265-268.

²⁸¹ Aug., *ep.* 194 (*ad Sixtum*), 6, 27 (before the Maurist edition of Augustine's letters, the present *ep.* 194 bore the number 105; see *PL* 33, c. 874, n. a).

²⁸² Eccli. 23:3.

8. Contra tam apertas D. Augustini sententias aliqui se uidentur opponere, quas tamen tantus Ecclesiae Doctor dicit ad fidem catholicam pertinere. *Imo in causa duorum hominum* (Adae scilicet et Christi), *quorum per unum uenundati sumus sub peccato, per alterum redimimur a peccatis*, asserit *proprie fidem christianam consistere* [de pecc. orig. c. 24.]²⁸³.

[...]

In the above description of Fulgentius' teaching, nothing is said concerning the irresistibility of God's efficient grace (prohibition 1 in the decree of 1668), papal (in)fallibility (prohibition 3), God's positive will to damn certain children (prohibition 5) or the question concerning the fulfillability of God's commandments (prohibition 6). However, it is clear from Eugenius' text that Fulgentius supported the doctrines that were forbidden by prohibitions 2 and 4.

Prohibition 2: In §4 of Eugenius' account, Fulgentius explicitly rejects the propositions condemned by the second prohibition (*Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum uirtutes sunt uitia*), but implicitly supports them in a restricted sense, that must have been equally unacceptable for the Superiors who issued the decree of 1668. Fulgentius condemns the sentence *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata* in its most universal application, since some *opera infidelium*, he believes, can impossibly be sins, viz. the unbelievers' indeliberate acts (compare *prop.* and *resp.* 3) as well as acts that some of them perform under the influence of divine grace (compare the reply to *prop.* 15 and 16).²⁸⁴ However, since deliberate acts are said to be either good or bad (§§3 and 6) and the former can only be performed under the guidance of divine grace (§§3 and 5), deliberate acts of infidels who totally lack the gift of Faith must clearly be considered sins (compare the reply to *prop.* 15 and 16: *Existimo quod omnia opera perfecte infidelium sint peccata* [...]; *per perfecte infideles intelligo illos qui nondum diuinitus incipiunt illuminari*). With regard to the sentence *philosophorum uirtutes sunt uitia*, Fulgentius accepts its condemnation in §4 on the condition that it means that the virtues of the philosophers are vices in themselves (*proprie*). He adds, however, that the virtues of the philosophers indeed become vices, when exercised by someone who puts pride in his own forces and does not believe that real virtue is a gratuitous gift of God. Fulgentius thus seems to have denied in the case of both sentences the possibility of

²⁸³ Aug., *gr. et pecc. or.* 2, 24, 28.

²⁸⁴ See n. 268.

good acts performed by people who totally lack the Christian Faith, whereas prohibition 2 of 1668 to all probability meant to safeguard this very possibility.

Prohibition 4: Eugenius' portrait makes Fulgentius claim that the form of grace that is necessary for every single act of Christian virtue (§5: *Hanc [...] Christi gratiam ad singulos christianę uirtutis actus necessariam [...]*), is not given to all (§5: [...] *non omnibus hominibus dari*). Fulgentius thus denied that God gives his saving grace to everyone (compare *prop.* and *resp.* 10) against the conviction that must have been at the base of prohibition 4 of 1668.

At the end of our analysis of Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort's testimony concerning the teaching of his namesake of Maaseik (5.2.), the 18 *propositiones* and *responsiones* of 1668 (5.3.) and Eugenius' synthesis of his master's Augustinian doctrine of divine grace (5.4.), we may safely assume – I think – that Fulgentius of Maaseik's teaching had caused the promulgation of the decree of 1668 and that the *lector* championed the doctrines implied in the propositions forbidden by the decree's six prohibitions, even if he was prepared to condemn a certain interpretation of the propositions in question.

6. Conclusion

During the years following on the publication of the *Augustinus* (1640), several Flemish Capuchins – among others the Provincial Casianus of Geldern (1641-1644) – were prepared to testify to the orthodoxy of Jansenius' book. They considered the work to offer an adequate interpretation of the teachings of the bishop of Hippo. This conviction persisted among the Flemish Capuchins after the condemnation of the *Augustinus* by *Cum occasione* (1653) and *Ad sacram* (1656) as well as by two decrees of the Order's General *Definitorium* (1650/1656). In the present article, I have tried to illustrate this persistence on the basis of an analysis of some texts written by Fulgentius of Maaseik, *Sacrae Theologiae lector* at Antwerp during the years 1665-1668, and his disciple Eugenius of Bruges, who published several tracts against Molinism and the Jesuit Order during the 1680's. From the point of view of Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort and other anti-Jansenists, who were convinced that the *Augustinus* had been rightly condemned by Innocent X and Alexander VII, authors such as these had to be considered Jansenist heretics, although they would have preferred to be called 'Augustinians' themselves. Even if Hildebrand was right in claiming that Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort and his companions tried to enhance their personal position

within the Order by accusing fellow brothers such as Fulgentius of Maaseik and Eugenius of Bruges, this does not alter the fact that the latter advocated the doctrines of Jansenius and by doing this offered a theological occasion for protest to those who championed Alexander VII's claim that the five propositions condemned by Innocent X in *Cum occasione* perfectly rendered the teaching of Jansenius.

Hildebrand's claim that there never was a genuine Jansenist among the Flemish Capuchins and that the accusations of Fulgentius of Nieuwpoort and others only were a means of self-promotion, was based on a narrow and purely formal definition of the word 'Jansenist', according to which being a Jansenist equals not condemning the five propositions. Through this definition Hildebrand turned Jansenism into a phantom, since most of Jansenius' followers – including Fulgentius of Maaseik and Eugenius of Bruges – were prepared to condemn the five propositions, but simultaneously sustained that their condemned sense did not reflect the teaching of the *Augustinus*. Anxiously trying to exclude the influence of Jansenism on his predecessors of the 17th and 18th centuries, Hildebrand thus paradoxically fell back on a strategy that in a way was already deployed by Jansenius' followers themselves. It was also the strategy by means of which some 17th-century Flemish Superiors – especially the Provincial Michael of Oudenbosch (1678-1681, 1684-1687 and 1690-1695) – tried to prove the impertinence of several anti-Jansenist measures that had been imposed by the Roman authorities on the Flandro-Belgian Province.

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**COMMENDACIONES AUGUSTINI:
TEXTSAMMLUNGEN ZUM LOB DES
AUGUSTINUS AUS DEM UMFELD DES
AUGUSTINEREREMITENORDENS.**

MIT EINER EDITION VON PSEUDEPIGRAPHIA*

Abstract

A number of late medieval manuscripts related to the Order of the Augustinian Hermits contain so-called *Commendaciones Augustini*. These are compilations of excerpts from different texts, in which the Order's patron Augustine receives praise. Beside pieces from authentic works one finds in these *Commendaciones* a major group of texts which claim to be excerpts from letters, sermons, or longer works written by persons related to Augustine or his late antique environment (like, for example, Possidius or Orosius); in these spurious excerpts the bishop of Hippo is praised in an absurdly excessive way. The pseudepigrapha seem to stem from a similar (or, at least partly, even from the same) background as the core group of the so-called *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* and the *Epistolae spuriae* which were critically edited by F. Römer in 1971/2. In the present article the sources and the transmission of some compilations of *Commendaciones Augustini* are examined (I.); content and language of the pseudepigraphic pieces are discussed (II.); finally, a critical edition of these curious texts is given (III.).

Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Leben und mit dem literarischen Œuvre des Augustinus erreichte im Schrifttum der Augustinereremiten des 14. Jh. einen neuen Höhepunkt. Echte und für echt gehaltene Texte des Ordenspatrons wurden gesammelt und intensiv studiert; es entstanden zahlreiche Werke zur Biographie und zur Lehre des Kirchenvaters sowie Florilegien aus seinen Schriften.¹ Darüber hinaus

* Die vorliegende Arbeit hätte nicht geschrieben werden können ohne die Unterstützung von Dorothea Weber, die mir das von ihr gesammelte Material zu den *Commendaciones* großzügig zugänglich gemacht hat, und Clemens Weidmann, dessen Ratschläge den Text der Edition sehr bereichert haben. Bedanken möchte ich mich weiters bei Thomas Falmagne für Auskünfte zum *Liber florigerus* sowie bei den beiden anonymen Gutachter(inne)n für wertvolle Hinweise.

¹ Die wichtigste im Folgenden benutzte moderne Literatur in chronologischer Reihenfolge: R. Arbesmann/W. Hümpfner, *Jordani de Saxonia Liber Vitasfratrum*, New York 1943; R. Arbesmann, *The 'Vita Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi' in Cod. Laurent. Plut. 90 sup. 48, Traditio 18 (1962), 319–355*; F. Römer, *A Late Medieval Collection of Epistles ascribed to Saint Augustine, AugSt 2 (1971), 115–154* und 3 (1972), 147–189; F. Römer, *Notes on the Composition of some Pseudo-Augustinian*

wurden aber auch Predigten und Briefe unter dem Namen des Augustinus produziert bzw. zu umfangreichen Sammlungen vereinigt, die mehr über seine Person und sein Wirken berichten sollten, als den antiken Quellen zu entnehmen war. Dies geschah teilweise in der Absicht, den Bischof von Hippo als ersten Augustinereremiten bzw. den Orden als direkt von ihm eingesetzt darzustellen, damit die Verbindung zu dem Patron möglichst eng und die eigene Position möglichst prominent erscheine.²

Der Verherrlichung des Ordenspatrons dienten auch Sammlungen von Äußerungen anerkannter Autoritäten, die Augustinus rühmen. In derartige *Commendaciones Augustini* flossen v.a. Exzerpte aus jenen Briefen ein, die von Zeitgenossen an Augustinus gerichtet wurden und innerhalb von dessen umfangreichem Briefcorpus überliefert sind; nach Möglichkeit wurde aber jede positive Erwähnung des Augustinus bei einem Autor der Spätantike oder des Mittelalters aufgenommen. Sammlungen von *Commendaciones* kursierten eigenständig, einzelne Stücke wurden in Predigten eingebaut oder flossen in

Letters, StP 14 (1976), 487–495; B. Rano, Las dos primeras obras conocidas sobre el origen de la Orden Agustini, AnAug 45 (1982), 331–376; D. Weber, *Commendaciones Sancti Augustini*: Zu einer Sammlung spätmittelalterlicher Pseudepigrapha, in: J. K. Kroupa (Ed.), Septuaginta Paulo Spunar oblata, Prag 2000, 435–440; E. L. Saak, High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation 1292–1524, Leiden 2002; E. L. Saak, On the Origins of the OESA: Some Notes on the *Sermones ad fratres suos in eremo*, Augustiniana 57 (2007), 89–149; L. J. Dorfbauer, ...*talis compilatio magis sit utilis quam subtilis*. Das Milleloquium veritatis Augustini des Bartholomäus von Urbino und der Hieronymianus des Johannes Andrae, WSt 123 (2010), 209–239.

² Erkennbar sind diese Tendenzen in den *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* (PL 40, 1235–1358) sowie in jenen *Epistulae spuriae*, die Römer 1971/72 (Anm. 1) ediert hat. Zum historischen Hintergrund vgl. Saak 2007 (Anm. 1), 91–97; B. Rano, San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden. Regla, Monasterio de Tagaste y Sermones ad fratres in eremo, La Ciudad de Dios 200 (1987), 649–727; K. Walsh, Wie ein Bettelorden zu (s)einem Gründer kam. Fingierte Traditionen um die Entstehung der Augustiner-Eremiten, in: Fälschungen im Mittelalter 5: Fingierte Briefe. Frömmigkeit und Fälschung. Realienfälschung, Hannover 1988, 585–610; A. Frazier, A Layman's Life of St. Augustine in Late Medieval Italy: Patronage and Polemic, Traditio 65 (2010), 231–286 (243–259). Der Augustinereremit Jordan von Quedlinburg hat scheinbar als erster in der 1. Hälfte des 14. Jh. die *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* als »historische Quellen« ausgewertet. Zu diesem Corpus vgl. Rano, 710–720; Walsh, 596–604; Saak 2007 (Anm. 1), 109–146; K. Elm, *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. Pseudoaugustinische Lebensregeln für Eremiten und Kanoniker, in: G. Melville/A. Müller, Regula Sancti Augustini. Normative Grundlage differenter Verbände im Mittelalter, Paring 2002, 515–537. Die *Epistulae spuriae* wurden laut Römer 1976 (Anm. 1), 487 »hardly before the beginning of the 14th century« verfasst: Sie benutzen einige der *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* und versuchen passagenweise ebenfalls, Augustinus als ersten Augustinereremiten zu präsentieren (491–495).

Heiligenleben ein, wo sie neben der eigentlichen *vita*, der *translatio*, sowie der Berichte über die durch den Heiligen erwirkten *miracula* geradezu einen festen Bestandteil bildeten.³

Wie aber im Spätmittelalter genuine Werke und Pseudoaugustiniana oft unkritisch nebeneinander gelesen wurden, so flossen auch in die *Commendaciones* zahlreiche dubiose Produkte ein. Eine Gruppe dieser Texte gibt sich als Exzerpte aus Briefen, Predigten und Abhandlungen, welche in der Hauptsache von Persönlichkeiten verfasst worden sein sollen, die man mit Augustinus und dessen spätantikem Umfeld in Verbindung bringt. Kennzeichnend für diese Texte ist ihr sehr dürftiger Inhalt – es handelt sich um Lob des Augustinus, das in seinem Überschwang auf den modernen Leser ungewollt lächerlich wirkt – sowie ihr rhetorischer Stil, der im Großen und Ganzen gleichmäßig erscheint, ob nun »Paulinus« an »Valerius« schreibt oder ob ein Ausschnitt aus einem angeblichen Werk des »Cyprianus« über die Sakramente vorliegt. Die Sprache weist diese Texte als mittelalterliche Produkte aus und erinnert stark an die *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* bzw. an die *Epistulae spuriae* (vgl. o. Anm. 2) – Corpora, aus denen einzelne Exzerpte in die *Commendaciones* aufgenommen wurden.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung einschlägiger Textsammlungen soll einen Einblick in die literarische Kultur von Autoren des Augustinereremitenordens im Spätmittelalter geben und einige kuriose Pseudoepigraphe zugänglich machen. Zuerst werden wichtige Textzeugen für *Commendaciones Augustini* vorgestellt und im Hinblick auf ihre Quellen miteinander verglichen (I); danach wird auf Sprache und Inhalt der pseudoepigraphischen *Commendaciones* eingegangen (II); abschließend werden diese in einer kritischen Edition vorgelegt (III).

³ Vgl. Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 334f.; E. Colledge, James of Voragine's »Legenda sancti Augustini« and its Sources, *Augustiniana* 35 (1985), 281–314 (305). Dies war nicht auf Augustinus oder die Augustinereremiten beschränkt: Auch der *Hieronymianus* des Johannes Andreae († 1348) bietet eine Biographie des Hieronymus, Wunderberichte und *Commendaciones*; vgl. Dorfbauer (Anm. 1), 214–217. Bereits in der Augustinus-Vita der *Legenda aurea* des Jacobus de Voragine († 1298) finden sich entsprechende Exzerpte eingearbeitet, die später in *Commendaciones* von Augustinereremiten auftauchen, namentlich die unten aufgelisteten Stücke a2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 17, 26, 28, 33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 51, 53, 54 sowie d12 und 34: Die *Legenda aurea* ist somit offenbar eine Quelle der *Commendaciones* gewesen (dazu unten mehr). Die Stücke a2 und 41 stellt Jacobus de Voragine außerdem seinem *Tractatus super libros sancti Augustini* voran, welcher auf interessante Weise Biographie und Werkverzeichnis des Kirchenvaters miteinander verbindet. Viel Material zu *Sermones de Augustino*, die von Augustinereremiten verfasst wurden, bietet B. Rano, *San Agustín y su Orden en algunos Sermones de Agustinos del primer Siglo (1244–1344)*, *AnAug* 53 (1990), 7–93.

I. Die Quellen

1) *Das Milleloquium veritatis Augustini des Bartholomäus von Urbino*

Bei diesem Werk handelt es sich um ein sehr umfangreiches Augustinusflorileg. Bartholomäus von Urbino († 1350), Augustinereremit und seit 1347 Bischof seiner Heimatgemeinde, hat es 1343/44 Papst Clemens VI. gewidmet.⁴ Dem eigentlichen Florileg vorangestellt hat Bartholomäus eine umfangreiche Sammlung von *Elogia Augustini* (Mill.).⁵

Benutzt wird im Folgenden der Erstdruck, der für diesen Teil keine Seitenzählung aufweist:

Milleloquium veritatis Augustini, Lyon 1555

Da der Text dieses Drucks äußerst unzuverlässig ist, wurde er anhand folgender Hs. kontrolliert und gegebenenfalls korrigiert:

Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibl. CCl. 23, an. 1401, 4r²–7v²

Wo zwischen Druck und Hs. unterschieden wird, erscheint der Druck als **mill. 1**, die Hs. als **mill. 2**. Bei Zitaten von Mill. wird im Folgenden die Nummer des Exzerpts nach der Reihenfolge sowie das betreffende Folium nach mill. 2 angegeben.

2) *Die Collectanea Augustiniana des Jordan von Quedlinburg*

Jordan († 1370/80) bekleidete innerhalb des Augustinereremitenordens wichtige Ämter und war ein äußerst produktiver Prediger und Autor. Als *Collectanea* bezeichnet man eine Sammlung von Texten in einer Handschrift, die Jordan (kaum vor 1331) eigenhändig geschrieben und 1343 den Augustinereremiten von Paris geschenkt hat⁶:

Paris, Arsenal 251, s. XIV¹

⁴ Zum *Milleloquium* vgl. Dorfbauer (Anm. 1), wo weiterführende Literatur genannt ist.

⁵ Der Terminus *Elogia Augustini* hat sich für diesen Teil des *Milleloquium* eingebürgert; die Angabe *patres...qui beatum Augustinum...commendant* in mill. 2, 1v¹ verweist allerdings auf den Titel *Commendacio(nes) Augustini*, den man in anderen Textzeugen findet.

⁶ Vgl. Arbesmann/Hümpfner (Anm. 1), xxiv–xxix; Saak 2002 (Anm. 1), 218–232 und 774–780. Die *Collectanea* umfassen u.a. eine *Vita Augustini*, eine *Annotatio temporum Augustini*, sowie 23 *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. Teile dieses Sammelwerks (darunter auch einige wenige *Commendaciones*) wurden gedruckt von J. Hommey, *Supplementum patrum*, Paris 1686, 569–656 (635–637). Saak 2002, 775 zeigt, dass die Hs. Paris, BNF lat. 5338, s. XV, 1r–108v eine Abschrift von Jordans Autograph Paris, Arsenal 251 darstellt. Sie enthält demnach ebenfalls die *Commendacio*, kann aber in der vorliegenden Arbeit vernachlässigt werden.

Neben zahlreichen anderen mit dem Ordenspatron in Verbindung stehenden Texten (vgl. u. Anm. 6) bietet diese Hs. auf den Folien 72v²–81v² eine lange *Commendacio sancti Augustini ex diversis auctoritatibus doctorum* (**Iord.**).

Im Zuge meiner Recherchen bin ich auf drei Hss. aus dem 15. Jh. gestoßen, die bislang unbekannte Kopien von Jordans *Commendacio* enthalten.⁷

Heverlee, Abdij van Park ms. 25, s. XV, 123r–129r

Liège, Bibl. du Séminaire 6 F 22, an. 1478, 171r–182v

Liège, Bibl. Univ. 3258, s. XV, 212r–226r

Diese Codices werden im Folgenden nicht weiter berücksichtigt, weil ihre Sammlungen von *Commendaciones* mit Iord. identisch sind (vgl. auch o. Anm. 6 zu Paris, BNF lat. 5338).

3) Textsammlungen nach dem 14. Jahrhundert

Es handelt sich um Codices, die einen teilweise recht unterschiedlichen Inhalt aufweisen; hier interessieren nur die *Commendaciones Augustini*.⁸ Einige dieser Hss. stammen nachweislich aus dem Umkreis des Augustinereremitenordens, bei anderen ist dies wahrscheinlich.

Brünn, Univ. bibl. A 87 (IV.Z.e.11), an. 1433, 1r–2v und
24v–30r

B⁹

Brüssel, Bibl. roy. 846-57, an. 1503–9, 32rv

Br₁

Brüssel, Bibl. roy. 2088-98, an. 1535/6, 4r–8r

Br₂

Brüssel, Bibl. roy. 14042-52, s. XV, 53rv

Br₃

Florenz, Bibl. Laur. Plut. 90 sup. 48, an. 1470, 11rv

Laur.¹⁰

⁷ Auf Liège, Bibl. du Séminaire 6 F 22 hat bereits Weber (Anm. 1), 436, Anm. 7 aufmerksam gemacht, allerdings ohne Hinweis auf die Verbindung zu Jordan.

⁸ Die folgende Auflistung ist schwerlich vollständig: Wahrscheinlich existieren noch mehr späte Hss., die einschlägige Texte darbieten. Auf B, M und S hat bereits Weber (Anm. 1), 436, Anm. 7 hingewiesen. Keine *Commendaciones* findet man in den ebd. genannten Hss. München, Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm. 5884 und 18175 sowie in London, Brit. Lib. Harley 2561, die einen ähnlichen Inhalt aufweist. Für freundliche Auskunft danke ich Wolfgang-Valentin Ikas (München) und Justin Clegg (London).

⁹ Geschrieben von dem Augustinereremiten Simon von Brünn († 1448); vgl. A. Zumkeller, Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken, Würzburg 1966, 357 (nr. 776); P. Spunar, Repertorium auctorum Bohemorum pro vectum idearum post universitatem Pragensem conditam illustrans 2, Warschau/Prag 1995, 193f.

¹⁰ Ausführlich zu dieser Hs. und ihrem Inhalt Arbesmann (Anm. 1).

München, Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 23757, s. XV, 241r¹–248r² M¹¹
 Salzburg, Bibl. der Erzabtei St. Peter b XI 7, an. 1456,
 326r¹–333v¹ S

Zusammengefasst werden B, Br₁, Br₂, Br₃, M und S in der folgenden Diskussion als Σ ; Laur. nimmt eine Sonderstellung ein, weil die Hs. lediglich vier Exzerpte darbietet und textlich einer anderen Tradition angehört als die übrigen genannten Zeugen.

Zuerst werden die in den genannten *Commendaciones*-Sammlungen zu findenden Exzerpte aufgelistet und identifiziert. Hier bietet sich eine Vierteilung des Materials an: In a) werden ausgehend von Mill. all jene Exzerpte identifiziert, die in Mill. – und meist auch in Iord. – vorhanden sind (Iord. hat fast alle Texte, die in Mill. sind, nicht aber umgekehrt); in b) werden jene Exzerpte aus bereits gedruckten Texten in Iord. nachgetragen, die nicht in Mill. stehen; in c) werden die wenigen Exzerpte aus bereits gedruckten Texten angeführt, die in Σ , nicht aber in Mill. und Iord. zu finden sind; schließlich werden in d) die bisher größtenteils ungedruckten Pseudepigrapha aus Mill., Iord. und Σ in der Reihenfolge angegeben, in der sie in Abschnitt III ediert sind. Da sich in Mill. kaum Pseudepigrapha befinden, in Iord. aber sehr viele, wird jeweils ausdrücklich vermerkt, wenn ein Text in Iord. nicht vorhanden ist (Iord. --). In den Fußnoten gebe ich alle weiteren Belege einzelner Exzerpte in Werken von Augustinereremiten an, die mir bekannt geworden sind.

a) EXZERPTE IM MILLELOQUIUM (UND BEI JORDAN)

- 1) Isaias propheta: „Ubi literatus...alti sermonis« (= Is. 33,18f.); Mill. nr. 1 (4r²); Iord. --
- 2) Prosper in libro de vita contemplativa: »Augustinus episcopus...sum secutus« (= Iul. Pom. vit. cont. PL 59, 516c–517a); Mill. nr. 2 (4v¹); Iord. 74r¹
- 3) Longinianus in epistola: »Beatus sum...esse duxisti« (= Aug. epist. 234,1);¹² Mill. nr. 3 (4v¹); Iord. 77r¹; Br₂ 7v

¹¹ Ich habe M nicht persönlich eingesehen und bin Wolfgang-Valentin Ikas (Bayer. Staatsbibl.) für Informationen zu Dank verpflichtet. M ist aufs Engste mit S verwandt: In beiden Codices ist die selbe Auswahl an Exzerpten in der selben Reihenfolge zu finden, auf das letzte Stück folgt jeweils der selbe Text (Inc.: *Sequitur pulchrum notabile de creatione rerum...*). Höchstwahrscheinlich ist eine Hs. eine Kopie der anderen.

¹² Das Exzerpt ist in Iord. etwas länger als in Mill., da nach dem ersten Satz des Briefes auch der vorletzte in leicht abgewandelter Form zu lesen ist (>sanctis scriptis...informare digneris« 234,3).

- 4) Nebridius in epistola: »Epistolas tuas...me docere« (= Aug. epist. 6,1);¹³ Mill. nr. 4 (4v¹); Iord. 77r¹
- 5) Macedonius in epistola: »Explicui libros...adhuc requirant« (= Aug. epist. 154,2);¹⁴ Mill. nr. 5 (4v¹); Iord. 77r; Br2 7v
- 6) Volusianus in epistola: »Accepisti vir...summa tueatur« (= Aug. epist. 135,2);¹⁵ Mill. nr. 6 (4v¹); Iord. 76v²; Br2 7v
- 7) Paulinus in epistola: »Expone mihi hoc...caritatis Christi« (= Aug. epist. 121,18); Mill. nr. 7 (4v²); Iord. --
- 8) Hieronymus in epistola: »Absit a me...aliena non carpere« (= Aug. epist. 68,2);¹⁶ Mill. nr. 8 (4v²); Iord. 73r²
- 9) Hieronymus in epistola: »Duobus libellis...mea defendere« (= Aug. epist. 172,1);¹⁷ Mill. nr. 8,1 (4v²); Iord. 73r¹
- 10) Gregorius papa ad Innocentium: »Quod expositionem sancti Iob...fur-furem non quaeratis« (= Greg. epist. 10,16); Mill. nr. 9 (4v²); Iord. 73v²; Br2 4r
- 11) Quodvultdeus in epistola: »Panem Afrum...patienti non deneges« (= Aug. epist. 223,3); Mill. nr. 10 (4v²); Iord. --
- 12) Anselmus in prologo Monologion: »Nihil potui invenire...dictis cohaereat« (= Ans. Mon. prol. p. 8,8 Schmitt); Mill. nr. 11 (4v²); Iord. 80v¹; Br2 4v
- 13) Beda in libro de temporibus: »Omnibus his integram...suis libris inse-ruit« (= PL 90,295b);¹⁸ Mill. nr. 12 (4v²); Iord. 80r²; Br2 5v
- 14) Boethius in prologo libri de trinitate: »Vobis tamen illud...fructus attu-lerint« (= Boeth. trin. praef. 29–32 Moerschini); Mill. nr. 13 (4v²); Iord. 80v¹; Br2 6r

¹³ Der letzte Satz von Mill. fehlt bei Iord.

¹⁴ Iord. hat etwas weniger Text von 154,2; dafür ist der Anfang des Briefs (154,1) vorhanden. Vgl. b5.

¹⁵ Der Text von Iord. ist kürzer als der von Mill. Das Exzerpt wird auch im 1322 in Paris gehaltenen *Sermo de beato Augustino* des Nicholas von Alessandria benutzt; vgl. Rano (Anm. 1), 357. Ebenso in einem *Sermo de Augustino* des Heinrich von Friemar, welcher es mit dem Gregor-Exzerpt a10 kombiniert; vgl. Rano (Anm. 3), 27. Schließlich im *Sermo de Augustino* des Hermann von Schildesche; vgl. Rano (Anm. 3), 69.

¹⁶ Iord. fügt zwei Sätze aus Aug. epist. 102,2 und 3 hinzu.

¹⁷ Der Text erscheint bei Iord. etwas gekürzt. Das Exzerpt wird auch im *Sermo de beato Augustino* des Nicholas von Alessandria angeführt; vgl. Rano (Anm. 1), 356.

¹⁸ Der Text ist gegenüber der PL deutlich umgeformt.

- 15) Gennadius de viris illustribus: »Augustinus Afer...catholicus tamen remansit« (= Genn. PL 58,1079a–1080a); Mill. nr. 14 (4v²); Iord. 80v¹; Br₂ 5v
- 16) Prosper in epistola: »Beatitudini tuae...inreparationem superbis« (= Aug. epist. 225,1–9 mit vielen Auslassungen); Mill. nr. 15 (5r¹); Iord. 74r¹
- 17) Hieronymus in libro de XII doctoribus: »Augustinus episcopus...nobiscum bene agetur« (= Ps. Hier. PL 23,724a);¹⁹ Mill. nr. 16 (5r¹); Iord. 73r; Br₂ 4r
- 18) Fratres eremitae de monte Pisano: »Gratias deo persolvimus...ut soles refice« (= Ps. Aug. cogn. ver. vit. PL 40, 1007);²⁰ Mill. nr. 17 (5r²); Iord. 79v¹
- 19) Consentius in epistola: »Tu tamen vir...videre valeamus« (= Aug. epist. 119,2 und 6);²¹ Mill. nr. 18 (5r²); Iord. 79v¹; Br₂ 7r
- 20) Audax in epistola: »Augustinus sectator iustitiae...de stipite pendens« (= Aug. epist. 260); Mill. nr. 19 (5r²); Iord. 78v²; Br₂ 5r
- 21) Quodvultdeus in epistola: »Cum pro certo noverim...exquirentibus veritatem« (= Aug. epist. 221,1 und 4); Mill. nr. 20 (5r²); Iord. 79r²
- 22) Paulinus in epistola: »Augustini doctrina...et ore inflammatum« (= Aug. epist. 32,4 und 5); Mill. nr. 21 (5v¹); Iord. --
- 23) Alipius in libro III contra Academicos: »Quid huius sermonis lepore...deo iam monstrante perducatur« (= Aug. c. Acad. 3,20); Mill. nr. 22 (5v¹); Iord. 77r²
- 24) Hilarius in epistula: »Nolo sanctitas tua...uberibus nutriebar« (= Aug. epist. 226,10); Mill. nr. 23 (5v¹); Iord. 79r¹
- 25) Licentius metrice in epistola: »Ante sub Aegeo...tua dona magister« (= Aug. epist. 26,7,92–102);²² Mill. nr. 24 (5v²); Iord. 75r²
- 26) Cassiodorus in prologo super Psalterium: »Tunc ad Augustini...claritate radiat« (= Cass. exp. psal. praef. 10–26 CC 97); Mill. nr. 25 (5v²); Iord. 79r¹; Br₂ 6v
- 27) Policratus libro 2: »Narrationis autorem magnum...prolabi possit ad falsa« (= Ioh. Sal. Pol. 2,17 und 2,22 sowie 7,2);²³ Mill. nr. 26 (5v²); Iord. 79v²

¹⁹ Der Text ist bei Iord. kürzer.

²⁰ Zum angeblichen Aufenthalt des Augustinus auf dem Mons Pisanus in der Tradition der Augustinereremiten vgl. Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 343f.

²¹ Iord. hat nur das Stück aus 119,6.

²² Iord. bringt die Verse 75–78 und 140–148.

²³ Das Stück aus 7,2 steht in Iord. vor den beiden anderen Exzerpten (79v¹) und wird »Damascenus« zugeschrieben; vgl. u. Anm. 64.

28) Possidonius eius compiler historiae (= d25 und d25a der Pseudepigrapha);²⁴ Mill. nr. 27 (5v²)

29) Alanus: »Prodigus in sensu...brevitate coarctat« (= Alan. Anticlaud. 3,235–237; PL 210, 513c);²⁵ Mill. nr. 28 (6r¹); Iord. --

30) Hieronymus in libro contra Pelagianos: »Scripsit dudum vir sanctus... occupata sunt meliora« (= Hier. dial. c. Pelag. 3,19); Mill. nr. 29 (6r¹); Iord. 73r²

31) Isidorus in libro VI Etimologiarum et Hugo in Didascalicon: »De nostris apud Graecos... sed nec legere occurat« (= Isid. orig. 6,7,1–3; Hugo Did. 4,14); Mill. nr. 30 und 31 (6r¹); Iord. 78v²; Laur. nr. 3²⁶

32) Haymo in commentario super II ad Corinthios: »Secundum beatum Augustinum...omnes doctores excellit« (= PL 117,661b); Mill. nr. 32 (6r¹); Iord. 79v²; Br2 6r

33) Remigius ibidem: »Sicut sol in lumine...alios diffundunt« (= d33 der Pseudepigrapha); Mill. nr. 33 (6r¹); Iord. 81v¹

34) Vincentius in speculo historiali: »Arcadii et Honorii temporibus... numero non comprehensis« (= Vinc. spec. hist. 18,53²⁷); Mill. nr. 34 (6r²); Iord. 79v²; Br2 6v

²⁴ Zu diesem Stück vgl. o. Anm. 3 und u. Anm. 27. Es findet sich eingearbeitet in einen Text *De obitu atque commendatione S. Augustini*, gedruckt bei B. Rembolt, D. Aurelii Augustini sermonum opera, Paris 1516, 34rv. In Mill. folgen auf a28 einige weitere Verse des »Possidonius«. Diese finden sich auch bei Iord. als *versus Possidonii*, 76v² sowie in Laur. nr. 3, wo als Quellenangabe zu lesen ist: *Quidam catholicus doctor quasi cum eo loqueretur versificans sic ait*. Sie werden üblicherweise Isidor zugeschrieben; vgl. PL 83,1109A und Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 350f. Laur. könnte auf eine Passage aus dem *Sermo de beato Augustino* des Nicholas von Alessandria zurückgehen, der ebenfalls einen anonymen *doctor catholicus* als Urheber jener Sentenz anführt; vgl. Rano (Anm. 1), 356.

²⁵ Die Verse werden bei Alan nicht über Augustinus, sondern über Symmachus gesagt.

²⁶ Der Text von Iord. ist etwas kürzer, außerdem ohne Verweis auf Hugo. Vgl. auch Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 349f.

²⁷ Dies entspricht p. 712 des Drucks von Douai, 1624. Das *Speculum historiale* war für kompilatorisch arbeitende Autoren wie Bartholomäus und Jordan eine Fundgrube: Es bietet eine Biographie und ein Werkverzeichnis des Augustinus (p. 670–672 sowie 712–714), ein kleines Florileg *de mutuis epistolis Hieronymi et Augustini* (p. 689f.: Aug. epist. 75,1; 81; 40,3; 28,3; diese Sammlung war freilich für rühmende *Commendaciones* weniger brauchbar, weil Vinzenz gerade solche Passagen auswählt, in denen die Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den beiden Kirchenvätern deutlich werden), sowie ein ausführliches, thematisch geordnetes Florileg aus diversen Werken des Augustinus (p. 714–731). Im Zuge seiner Darstellung bringt Vinzenz einige Exzerpte, die auch in Mill. bzw. in Iord. vorhanden sind: Es handelt sich um a53 und um die Geschichte von Augustinus und seiner Schwester a51 (beide p. 672), außerdem um die – zum Lob des Heiligen, mithin als *Commendaciones* vorgebrachten – Exzerpte a15, 17 und 2 (p. 712). Im Anschluss an diese drei Stücke hat Vinzenz einen ausführlicheren

- 35) Dacius episcopus Mediolanensis primo libro capitulo X suae chronicae: »Eodem tempore contigit... confortati sunt«²⁸; Mill. nr. 35 (6r²); Iord. 79v²
- 36) Severus in epistula: »Viscera tua, viscera pinguia...et fidele ministerium« (= Aug. epist. 109,1f.);²⁹ Mill. nr. 36 (6v¹); Iord. 75v¹; Br₂ 5v
- 37) Paulinus ad Romanianum: »Non tantum hoc scripsimus...coepiscopus Augustinus est« (= Aug. epist. 32,2);³⁰ Mill. nr. 37 (6v¹); Iord. 75r¹
- 38) Bernardus super cantica: »Augustinus...malleus haereticorum« (= Bern. cant. 80,7); Mill. nr. 38 (6v¹); Iord. 81r¹; Br₁ 32v; Br₂ 5r; Br₃ 52v
- 39) Paulinus ad Augustinum: »O vere sal terrae...sermonis enubilas« (= Aug. epist. 25,1);³¹ Mill. nr. 39 (6v¹); Iord. 74v²
- 40) Hieronymus ad Augustinum: »Omni quidem tempore...beatissime papa« (= Aug. epist. 195); Mill. nr. 40 (6v¹); Iord. 73r¹
- 41) Cassiodorus libro de institutione divinarum locutionum: »Doctor eximius...palma certaminum« (= Cass. inst. 1,22); Mill. nr. 41 (6v²); Iord. 79r²; Laur. nr. 1³²
- 42) Iulianus episcopus ad praefectum urbis Romae: »Augustinus velut flamma...prostravit omnes adversarios« (= d26 der Pseudepigrapha); Mill. nr. 42 (6v²); Iord. --
- 43) Hilarius ad Amaturnum diaconum: »Doctor excellentissimus...superavit haereticos« (= nr. 23 der Pseudepigrapha);³³ Mill. nr. 43 (6v²); Iord. 79r¹
- 44) Eusebius Cremonensis...scribit quod sanctus Hieronymus in obitu suo... (= Ps. Eus. PL 22,267); Mill. nr. 44 (6v²); Iord. 73v¹

Text von a28; als Urheber wird im Druck schlicht *Author* angegeben: Vielleicht stammt dieser Text von Vinzenz selbst. Die genannten Exzerpte legen nahe, dass das *Speculum historiale* in die Quellen von Mill. und Iord. eingeflossen ist (dazu später mehr).

²⁸ Das verlorene Werk des Dacius wurde im 11. Jh. bei der Erstellung der *Historia Mediolanensis* des Landulf verwertet (das o.g. Exzerpt ebendort PL 147,832b–833b). Zur Benutzung durch Jordan vgl. R. Arbesmann, *Jordanus of Saxony's Vita S. Augustini, the Source for John Capgrave's Life of St. Augustine*, *Traditio* 1 (1943), 341–353 (346f.).

²⁹ Iord. bietet etwas mehr Text als Mill. Das Exzerpt auch im *Sermo de Augustino* des Hermann von Schildesche; vgl. Rano (Anm. 3), 66.

³⁰ Sowohl Mill. als auch Iord. fügen bei der Quellenangabe hinzu: *Et habetur in decretis VII quaestione prima*. Diese Angabe ist korrekt (decr. Grat. 2,7,1).

³¹ Iord. erweitert das Exzerpt aus dem Brief um eine Passage aus 25,2. Es wird auch im *Sermo de beato Augustino* des Nicholas von Alessandria angeführt; vgl. Rano (Anm. 1), 359. Ebenso bei Hermann von Schildesche; vgl. Rano (Anm. 3), 66.

³² In Laur. erstreckt sich das Exzerpt bis zu den Worten *vix datur attingere*; vgl. Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 349. Das Exzerpt wird auch im *Sermo de beato Augustino* des Nicholas von Alessandria angeführt; vgl. Rano (Anm. 1), 358f.

³³ Einen deutlich längeren Text dieser Fälschung bieten S und M (vgl. die Edition).

- 45) Eugeppius abbas in prologo libri de floribus paradysi: »Inter magnos et egregios... lambendo decerpsi« (= Eug. exc. praef. 1,15–2,18 Knöll); Mill. nr. 45 (6v²); Iord. 80v¹; Br2 7r
- 46) Gregorius respondit nuntio praelatorum Hispaniae: »Augustinum de quo quaeris... dignitate eminens« (vgl. PL 75,510b); Mill. nr. 46 (7r¹); Iord. 73v²
- 47) Hieronymus ad Augustinum: »Vale...dignitate parens« (= Aug. epist. 72,5);³⁴ Mill. nr. 47 (7r¹); Iord. 73r²
- 48) Orosius in principio suae chronicae: »Praeceptis tuis parui...libens feci« (= Oros. 1 praef. 1); Mill. nr. 48 (7r¹); Iord. 77r²
- 49) Nebridius ad Augustinum: »Nullusne est tibi...nimum amaris« (= Aug. epist. 5);³⁵ Mill. nr. 49 (7r¹); Iord. 77r¹
- 50) Bonifacius ad Augustinum: »Scio quod veniae...medico causam« (= epist. app. 7; PL 33,1096);³⁶ Mill. nr. 50 (7r¹); Iord. 78r
- 51) Gregorius in registro et habetur in decretis: »Legitur quod beatus Augustinus...nobis instructio« (= Greg. epist. 9,111; decr. Grat. 1,81,25); Mill. nr. 51 (7r¹); Iord. 73v²
- 52) Caelestinus papa in epistola decretali: »Augustinum sanctissimae recordationis...fuit et honori« (= PL 50,530a–b); Mill. nr. 52 (7r¹); Iord. 79v¹; Br2 6r
- 53) Hugo de animae claustris: »Fateor, de pretiosa veste erubescio« (= Aug. s. 356,13 und PL 176,897a); Mill. nr. 53 (7r²); Iord. --
- 54) In antiqua praefatione quae dicitur Ambrosiana: »Et in omni loco et tempore...per Christum dominum nostrum« (vgl. Rano, Anm. 3, 53f. sowie Colledge, Anm. 3, 304–306); Mill. nr. 54 (7r²); Iord. 73v¹
- 55) Bonifacius comes ad Augustinum: »Grave nobis imminet bellum...sidera terreat« (= epist. app. 12; PL 33,1098); Mill. nr. 55 (7r²); Iord. --; Br2 7v
- 56) Bonifacius ad Augustinum: »Numquam divinitas preces...temporis condonentur« (= epist. app. 16; PL 33,1098); Mill. nr. 55,1 (7r²); Iord. --
- 57) Valentinus monachus ad Augustinum: »Ora piissime pater...portus secura consistat« (= Aug. epist. 216,6); Mill. nr. 56 (7r²); Iord. 80r²
- 58) Possidonius in epithaphium eius posuit hos versus: »Vivere post...nempe mea est« (= Possid. 31,8); Mill. nr. 57 (7r²); Iord. --; Laur. nr. 4³⁷

³⁴ Iord. bringt deutlich mehr Text als Mill., und zwar aus 72,4.

³⁵ Das Exzerpt erscheint in Iord. gegenüber Mill. deutlich gekürzt.

³⁶ Der Text ist in Iord. etwas kürzer als in Mill.

³⁷ Vgl. dazu auch Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 351.

- 59) Sydonius in libro IV epistularum: »Nemo affirmat ut...Ambrosius perseverat« (= Apoll. Sid. epist. 4,3,6f.);³⁸ Mill. nr. 58 (7v¹); Iord. 81r²
- 60) Petrus Damianus in quodam sermone: »Multa novimus in laudem...quibuscumque hominibus« (= Petr. Dam. s. 25);³⁹ Mill. nr. 59 (7v¹); Iord. 81r²
- 61) Richardus (de Sancto Victore): »Gaudeamus fratres...lingua laborasti« (= d20 der Pseudepigrapha); Mill. nr. 60 (7v¹); Iord. 81r¹
- 62) Compiler. Mill. nr. 61 (7v²); Iord. -- Ein Schlusswort des Bartholomäus von Urbino.

b) EXZERPTTE AUS BEREITS GEDRUCKTEN TEXTEN BEI JORDAN, DIE NICHT IM MILLELOQUIUM VORHANDEN SIND

- 1) Beatus Ambrosius in quodam sermone loquens de conversione Augustini (cf. s. fr. er. 27; PL 40,1282);⁴⁰ Iord. 73v¹
- 2) Beatus Cyrillus Hierosolimitanus episcopus ad Augustinum (= epist. app. 19; PL 33,1128); Iord. 73v²
- 3) Paulinus ad Augustinum: »Utinam hoc nobis munus...et desiderabilis« (= Aug. epist. 30,3); Iord. 74v²
- 4) Marcellinus vir insignis ad Augustinum: »Omnia quae a te dicuntur...ut placeret emeruit« (= Aug. epist. 136,1); Iord. 76v²
- 5) Macedonius ad Augustinum: »Miro modo afficior...an facundiae iocunditatem« (= Aug. epist. 154,1 und 2);⁴¹ Iord. 77r¹
- 6) Versus. Iord. (81v2). Vier die *Commendacio* abschließende Hexameter (dazu gleich mehr).

³⁸ Der Text in Iord. ist etwas kürzer als in Mill.

³⁹ Es handelt sich um eine Predigt zum Ruhm des heiligen Johannes, welche durch Streichung von Namen und Umformung ganzer Sätze adaptiert wurde.

⁴⁰ Vgl. auch den pseudoambrosianischen *Sermo de baptismo et conversione S. Augustini*, den die Mauriner nicht in ihre Edition aufgenommen haben: Gedruckt wurde er als *Sermo sancti Ambrosii episcopi factus postquam baptizatus et novis vestibus indutus fuit Augustinus* bei Rembolt (Anm. 24), 1r. Rembolt bietet außerdem: Das Exzerpt b1 innerhalb eines Texts *Ex Antonio archiepiscopo Florentino de habitu et conversione S. Augustini* (34v); viele *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*; einige diesen nahestehende Pseudepigrapha, namentlich *De vita, conversatione ac morte sancte Monice matris beati Augustini* (33v–34r); *Relatio Calixti de conversione, perseverantia et quibusdam dictis S. Augustini* (34r); *Ex Sigeberto in epistola ad Macedonium de ortu, conversione et vita S. Augustini* (34r; zu dieser Epistel vgl. Rano [Anm. 2], 718 und Saak 2007 [Anm. 1], 95, Anm. 17); *De obitu atque commendatione S. Augustini* (34rv); *De translatione corporis S. Augustini de Sardinia ad Papiam* (34v); *Oratio de passione domini nostri Iesu Christi quam S. Augustinus fertur edidisse* (34v). Zum *Sermo de baptismo et conversione S. Augustini* vgl. G. Morin, L'auteur du Te Deum, RBen 7 (1890), 151–159 (153f.); Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 340f.; Rano (Anm. 1), 338f. und 366f.

⁴¹ Vgl. nr. a5.

c) BEREITS GEDRUCKTE TEXTE IN DEN HSS. DES 15. JH.

- 1) Cassiodorus in libro de institutione divinarum scripturarum⁴² M (245v²); S (331r¹)
- 2) Hieronymus ad Augustinum: »Contra flantes...«⁴³ M (245v²); S (331r²)
- 3) Augustinus in libro de bono consciencie fatetur... (= PL 184, 527f.) M (247v¹); S (332v²)
- 4) Augustinus in sermone de filio prodigo (cf. s. fr. in er. 27, PL 40, 1280–1282;) M (247v¹); S (333r¹)
- 5) Augustinus in sermone de cena domini (= s. fr. in er. 28, PL 40, 1286) M (247v²); S (333r¹)
- 6) Augustinus in sermone de communi vita clericorum (= Aug. s. 355; PL 40, 1569f.)⁴⁴ M (248r¹); S (333r²)
- 7) Ambrosius aperte fatetur in libro de baptismo et conversione sancti Augustini... (cf. s. fr. in er. 27, PL 40, 1280ff)⁴⁵ B --; Br₁ --; M (248r²); S (333v¹)

d) BISHER UNGEDRUCKTE PSEUDEPIGRAPHIA

- 1) »Augustinus est alter magnus Abraham...« Iord. --; B (24v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (326r¹); M (241r¹)
- 2) „O vere beata dei civitas, quam honorat...« Iord. --; B (24v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (326r¹); M (241r¹)
- 3) Sanctus Basilius episcopus in sermone de vita et moribus Augustini: »Celebraturi sumus hodie, fratres...« Iord. (75v¹); B (24v); Br₁ (32v²); Br₂ (4v); Br₃ (53r); S (326r²); M (241r²)
- 4) Basilius in alio sermone: »Et quis est iste qui domus dei appellatur...« Iord. --; B (25v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (327r¹); M (242r¹)
- 5) Octavianus dux Campanie ad Augustinum: »Beati predicantur et dicuntur omnes...« Iord. (78v¹); B (25v); Br₁ --; Br₂ (7v); Br₃ --; S (327r¹); M (242r²)
- 5a) Responsio Augustini: »Dum infra me ipsum meas considero...« Iord. --; B (26r); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (327v¹); M (242v¹)

⁴² Dies ist eine Verquickung von a41 und a26.

⁴³ Ein Auszug aus a40.

⁴⁴ Dieser Sermo wurde von Jordan gerne benutzt; vgl. das Register bei Arbesmann/Hümpfner (Anm. 1), 512; Saak 2002 (Anm. 1), 794. Er ging in die *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* ein (s. fr. er. 52; PL 40,1336); vgl. Saak 2007 (Anm. 1), 110.

⁴⁵ Vgl. außerdem o. Anm. 40.

- 6) Anastasius ad Macedonium: »Si diligenter considero et attendo...« Iord. (77v²); B (26r); Br₁ (33v¹); Br₂ --; Br₃ (53v); S (327v¹); M (243r¹)
- 7) Anastasius ad Nectarium: »Tanta erat excellencia et sublimitas...« Iord. (77v²); B (27r); Br₁ (32r²); Br₂ (7r); Br₃ 53r; S (328r²); M (243v¹)
- 8) Anastasius ad sanctum Augustinum: »Intercede pro nobis...« Iord. --; B (27r); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (328r²); M (243v¹)
- 9) Anastasius ad Orosium: »Gaudeat gloriosus pater Augustinus...« Iord. (77v¹); B (27v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (328v¹); M (243v²)
- 10) Richardus in libro contra hereticos: »O palma perseverancie erecta...« Iord. (81r¹); B (27v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (328v¹); M (243v²)
- 11) Possidonius episcopus Calamensis ad Poncianum episcopum: »Augustinus doctor beatissimus...« Iord. (76r¹); B (27v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (328v²); M (243v²)
- 12) Possidonius ad Paulinum dyaconem: »Si petis a me, quod...« Iord. (76v¹); B (28r); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (329r¹); M (244r¹)
- 13) Sanctus Valerius episcopus ad Nectarium: »Ut puto, care frater...« Iord. (74v¹); B (28r); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (329r²); M (244r²)
- 14) Valerius episcopus ad Paulinum: »Obstupesco, Pauline frater, considerans...« Iord. (74v¹); B (28v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (329v¹); M (244v¹)
- 15) Paulinus ad sanctum Valerium: »Super omnes ecclesiarum doctores...« Iord. (75r¹); B (28v); Br₁ --; Br₂ (4v); Br₃ --; S (329v¹); M (244v¹)
- 16) Paulinus ad Macedonium: »Nuper vidimus, frater...« Iord. (74v²); B (28v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (329v²); M (244v¹)
- 17) Paulinus ad Augustinum: »O infinite caritatis ignis...« Iord. --; B (28v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (329v²); M (244v²)
- 18) Macedonius ad Augustinum: »Sanctissime pater Augustine, quid referem...« Iord. --; B (29r); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (330r¹); M (244v²)
- 19) Orosius ad Augustinum: »Salve, beatissime pater ecclesiarum...« Iord. --; B (29r); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (330r²); M (245r¹)
- 19a) Nota quod illi de Carthagine...⁴⁶ Iord. --; B (29v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 20) Richardus de Sancto Victore in sermone de sancto Augustino: »Gaudeamus, fratres, et letemur...«⁴⁷ Iord. (81r¹); Mill. nr. 60 (7v¹); B (29v); Br₁ --; Br₂ (5r); Br₃ --; S (330v¹); M (245r²)

⁴⁶ Dieser Text ist weitgehend identisch mit epist. sp. 41,23–27 bei Römer 1972 (Anm. 1).

⁴⁷ Iord. und Mill. bieten einen deutlich kürzeren Text als die späteren Zeugen.

- 21) Paulinus ad Augustinum: »Illumina vultum tuum super me...« Iord. --; B (29v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (330v²); M (245v¹)
- 22) Prosper in tractatu de laudibus Augustini: »Beatissimus Augustinus dominus et caput...«⁴⁸ Iord. (79r²); B --; Br₁ (32r²); Br₂ (4r); Br₃ (53r); S (331r¹); M (246r¹)
- 23) Hylarius episcopus ad Amatium dyaconem: »Doctor excellentissimus Augustinus...«⁴⁹ Iord. (79r¹); Mill. nr. 43 (6v²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ (4r); Br₃ --; S (331r²); M (246r²)
- 24) Possidonius ad Macedonium: »Augustinus vir totius prudencie...« Iord. (76r²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (331v¹); M (246r²)
- 25) Possidonius compiler historie⁵⁰ Br₂ (4v)
- 26) Iulianus episcopus ad prefectum urbis Rome⁵¹ Br₂ (6v)
- 27) Cyprianus ad beatum Damasum: »Augustinus mitis et humilis...« Iord. (78r¹); B --; Br₁ (32r²); Br₂ --; Br₃ (53r); S --; M --
- 28) Cyprianus in prologo libri de sacramentis: »Silere deberet unusquisque...« Iord. (78r²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 29) Donatus ad Marcellum: »Augustinus doctor inclitus in medio...« Iord. (78r²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 30) Aquilius comes ad Augustinum: »Quemadmodum universa terra desiderabat...« Iord. (78v²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 31) Richardus super Iohannem in prologo: »Augustinus virtutum omnium forma...« Iord. (81r²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 32) Calcedonius in tractatu de sacramentis: »Sanctus Augustinus, virtutum caterva...« Iord. (81r²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 33) Beatus Remigius: »Sicut sol in lumine excedit omnes planetas...« Iord. (81v¹); Mill. nr. 33 (6r¹); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ (5r); Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 34) Remigius Ieronimum et quosdam alios doctores commemorans... Iord. (81v²); B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S --; M --
- 35) Eusebius in cronica sua quare beatissimus pater noster Augustinus nominatur Aurelius; Iord. --; B (1v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (332r¹); M (246v²)
- 36) De corde sancti Augustini; Iord. --; B (1v); Br₁ --; Br₂ --; Br₃ --; S (332r²); M (247r¹)

⁴⁸ Der Text in S und M ist deutlich kürzer als der in Iord.

⁴⁹ S und M bieten einen deutlich längeren Text als Iord. und Mill.

⁵⁰ Dieser Text findet sich auch in Mill.; vgl. a28.

⁵¹ Dieser Text findet sich auch in Mill.; vgl. a42.

37) Albertus Magnus; Iord. --; B --; Br₁ (32r¹); Br₂ (5v); Br₃ (53r); S --; M --

38) Avicenna medicus⁵²; Iord. --; B --; Br₁ --; Br₂ (8r); Br₃ --; S --; M --

Dass einerseits Mill. und Iord., andererseits die Hss. von Σ enger miteinander verwandt sind, ist offensichtlich: Nur Mill. und Iord. bieten eine große Anzahl von weitgehend den selben Exzerpten aus genuinen Werken, während solche in Σ fast ganz fehlen. Allerdings enthält Iord. auch viele Pseudepigrapha, die in Mill. nicht vorhanden sind, dafür aber in Σ aufscheinen. Was die Auswahl der Pseudepigrapha betrifft, bilden die Hss. von Σ eine relativ geschlossene Gruppe; der Wortlaut der einzelnen Texte bindet einerseits B, S und M, andererseits Br₁ und Br₃ aneinander. Der Wortlaut jener Pseudepigrapha, die sowohl in Iord. als auch in Mill. vorhanden sind, untermauert die engere Verbindung, die zwischen diesen beiden älteren Sammlungen besteht.

J. Hommey hat gesehen, dass Mill. und Iord. teilweise die gleichen Exzerpte darbieten, dass Iord. allerdings mehr Exzerpte hat, und dass die Reihenfolge eine jeweils andere ist; zur Frage der Abhängigkeit hat er sich nicht geäußert.⁵³ R. Arbesmann hat mehrmals – aber stets ohne Begründung – behauptet, Mill. sei die Quelle von Iord. gewesen, die Jordan um einige Exzerpte angereichert habe.⁵⁴ Ohne einen genauen Vergleich der beiden Sammlungen kann man von vornherein weder ausschließen, dass Mill. die Quelle von Iord., noch

⁵² Dieser Text findet sich, teilweise in einer etwas längeren Form, auch in den Hss. Berlin, Staatsbibl. ms. Magdeb. 13, s. XV (an. 1459/60), 133r²; München, Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 28824, s. XV (an. ca. 1479), 204v; München, Univ. bibl. 4° 120, s. XV (an. 1460), 22r; Prag, Knih. J. Dobrovského ms. b 56 (89), s. XV, 1r; Vatikan, Vat. Lat. 5108, s. XV. Vgl. M. Th. D'Alverny, *Survivance et renaissance d'Avicenne à Venise et à Padoue*, in: A. Pertusi (Ed.), *Venezia e l'Oriente fra Tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento*, Venezia 1966, 75–102 (84f. zu Vat. Lat. 5108); Chr. Gastgeber, *Avicennas Brief an Augustinus. Zur »Christianisierung« heidnischer Literatur*, Biblos 44 (1995), 13–31 (13–18 zu München, Univ. bibl. 4° 120).

⁵³ Vgl. Hommey (Anm. 6), 634f.

⁵⁴ Arbesmann (Anm. 28), 344, Anm. 27: »The *Commendatio* is taken from the *Milleloquium S. Augustini* of Bartholomew of Urbino and enriched with new additions.« So auch Arbesmann/Hümpfner (Anm. 1), xxiv und R. Arbesmann, *The 'Malleus' Metaphor in Medieval Characterization*, *Traditio* 3 (1945), 389–392 (389). Arbesmann war sich seiner Sache vielleicht deshalb so gewiss, weil aus Jordans Predigtsammlung *Sermones Dan de sanctis* Kenntnis des *Milleloquium* hervorgeht (ich habe den Druck von J. R. Grüninger, Straßburg 1484 eingesehen); vgl. s. 129: ...ut patet in principio *Milleloquii*, mit Bezug auf die *Elogia*. Jordans Predigten sind aber nach seinen *Collectanea* entstanden, und es ist möglich, dass er das *Milleloquium* zu einem deutlich späteren Zeitpunkt kennengelernt hat.

dass umgekehrt Iord. die Quelle von Mill. gewesen sein könnte, noch dass beide Sammlungen auf die selben Quellen zurückgehen. Die beiden Augustinereremiten Bartholomäus von Urbino und Jordan von Quedlinburg könnten miteinander bekannt gewesen sein, da beide vor 1321 in Paris studierten, und da Jordan sich eine Zeitlang in Bologna aufhielt, wo Bartholomäus am *Milleloquium* arbeitete. Mill. und Iord. wurden annähernd gleichzeitig fertiggestellt, und die Vorarbeiten beider Autoren müssen geraume Zeit in Anspruch genommen haben: In dieser Zeit hätte einer dem anderen sein Werk (oder Teile davon) zugänglich machen können.⁵⁵ Vor allem aber ist aufgrund der Ausbildung der beiden Männer innerhalb des Ordens davon auszugehen, dass sie in vielen Fällen Kenntnis von den selben Texten hatten.

Weder in Mill. noch in Iord. wird eine direkte Abhängigkeit vom jeweils anderen Werk bzw. von irgendeiner älteren Exzerptsammlung angegeben. Bartholomäus sagt über die in seine *Elogia* aufgenommenen Autoritäten: *Sic annotantur patres sancti et doctores orthodoxi, qui beatum Augustinum doctrina sua excellenti magnifice et mirabiliter commendant in tractatibus, dictis et epistulis suis* (mill. 2, 1v¹). Jordan schreibt als Einleitung zu seiner *Commendacio*: *Libet in fine opusculi magnifica eiusdem gloriosissimi patris et doctoris eximii laudum subicere preconia, quae ex plurimorum venerandorum atque precipuorum doctorum auctoritatibus ac nonnullorum preclarissimorum virorum dictis et scriptis autenticis*⁵⁶ *sunt congesta*

⁵⁵ Vgl. Arbesmann/Hümpfner (Anm. 1), xvi; Saak 2002 (Anm. 1), 243–245; Dorfbauer (Anm. 1), 228f. und 233f. Zu Jordans Quellen meinen Arbesmann/Hümpfner allgemein: »Jordanus derived most of his knowledge of the Fathers not directly from their works but from the anthologies, *summae*, and collections of laws, which were numerous at that time« (l). Nachweislich vertraut war Jordan seit seiner Studienzeit in Paris mit dem *Manipulus florum* des Thomas von Irland († ca. 1329), also mit einem der populärsten Florilegien des späteren Mittelalters; vgl. Arbesmann/Hümpfner, 171. Bedenkt man, dass ungefähr zur selben Zeit auch Bartholomäus von Urbino in Paris studierte, sowie die Tatsache, dass Johannes Andreae, ein Freund des Bartholomäus und selbst Kompilator des *Hieronymianus*, das Werk des Thomas ebenfalls benutzte, dann drängt sich die Vermutung auf, dass nicht nur Jordan, sondern auch Bartholomäus Gebrauch vom *Manipulus florum* gemacht haben kann. Für die Kompilation von *Commendaciones Augustini* war dieses Florileg freilich weniger hilfreich, da es nicht an der Person des Augustinus (oder eines anderen Autors) interessiert ist, sondern Exzerpte verschiedener *auctoritates* zu alphabetisch gereihten Stichwörtern (*adulatio, avaritia, deus...*) zusammenstellt; vgl. R. H. Rouse/M. A. Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia, and Sermons. Studies on the Manipulus florum of Thomas of Ireland*, Toronto 1979.

⁵⁶ Die »Authentizität« der benutzten Texte war für Jordan von entscheidender Bedeutung, wie Passagen aus seinem *Liber Vitasfratrum* (vgl. Arbesmann/Hümpfner, Anm. 1, 45f.: *qualiter...vixerint quidve egerint, in scripto autentico non inveni; unde de hoc aliquid scribere non curavi*) und aus seiner *Vita Augustini* (vgl. Saak 2002,

(72v²). Beide Autoren vermitteln den Eindruck, als hätten sie ihre jeweilige Sammlung aus den verschiedenen Originalwerken zusammengestellt. Freilich war es seit der Antike beim Zitieren von Autoritäten gang und gäbe, seine unmittelbare Quelle – v.a. wenn es sich dabei um wenig prominente Werke wie Florilegien handelte – nicht anzugeben, sondern den Anschein zu erwecken, man habe alles im Original gelesen.

Nicht beweiskräftig in der Frage der Abhängigkeit sind jene Hexameter, welche Iord. abschließen (b6). Sie lauten:

*Cuncti doctores laudes referunt et honores
presulis Aurelii summi velud archimagistri.
Sic Augustinum, lector, cognosce vocatum,
hunc dum sacra fides suscepit fonte renatum.*⁵⁷

Zwar liest man auch in Mill. vor den *Elogia* die folgenden, eindeutig verwandten Verse (mill.2 4r⁴):

*Prologus in verbis exhaustis fonte beato*⁵⁸
*presulis Aurelii salientis gurgite sacro.
Sic Augustinum, lector, cognosce vocatum,
hunc dum sacra fides suscepit fonte renatum.*

Doch hat Bartholomäus diese offenbar aus dem *Liber florigerus*, einem Augustinusflorileg des 13. Jh., übernommen und

Anm. 1, 781,4f.: *nichil huic operi inserendum censui, quod non ipsius propriis dictis aut aliorum autenticis scriptis confirmetur*) belegen. Somit ist klar, dass Jordan die zahlreichen Pseudepigrapha seiner *Commendacio* ebenso für echt hielt wie die *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. Hier ist anzumerken, dass Bartholomäus von Urbino jenen »Grundbestand« der *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, den Jordan benutzt hat, anscheinend nicht kannte: In seine *Elogia Augustini* hat er keine Exzerpte aufgenommen, und auch sonst sind im *Milleloquium* keine entsprechenden Übernahmen festzustellen; vgl. V. A. Fitzpatrick, Bartholomaeus of Urbino: The Sermons Embraced in his *Milleloquium S. Augustini*, Diss. Washington 1954, 58. Dies ist umso auffälliger, als auch Robert de Bardis mehrere *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* in sein *Collectorium* von Augustinus-Predigten aufgenommen hat, welches Bartholomäus ausgewertet haben könnte; vgl. Fitzpatrick, 20 bzw. 60–63 und allgemein G. Pozzi, Robert de' Bardi e S. Agostino, IMU 1 (1958), 139–153. Zum Verhältnis von Jordan zum *Collectorium* Saak 2007 (Anm. 1), 140–144.

⁵⁷ Bei Hommey (Anm. 6), 637 erscheint der erste Vers in der Form *Cunctas doctores laudes referunt et honores*. Dass Hommey den Text Jordans an zahlreichen Stellen eigenmächtig abändert, merkt bereits Saak 2002 (Anm. 1), 775, Anm. 5 an.

⁵⁸ Die wichtige Hs. Paris, BNF lat. 2119 bietet laut B. M. Peebles, The Verse Embellishments of the 'Milleloquium Sancti Augustini', *Traditio* 10 (1954), 555–566 (557) die metrisch fehlerhafte Form *Prologus in verbis exhaustis sancti augustini fonte beato*. In den alten Drucken des *Milleloquium* erscheint dieser Vers in der Form *lam bibe iam sancti Augustini fonte beato*.

adaptiert.⁵⁹ Der *Liber florigerus* war im späteren Mittelalter ziemlich populär. Er kann beiden Autoren bekannt gewesen sein: Ob Jordan die Verse aus dem *Milleloquium*, aus dem *Liber florigerus* oder aus einer allfälligen Zwischenquelle adaptiert hat, muss vorerst offen bleiben.⁶⁰ Nur ein Vergleich der *Commendaciones* in Mill. und in Iord. führt in der Frage der Abhängigkeit weiter.

In Mill. wird das eröffnende Isaiaszitat a1 *Ubi litteratus? Ubi verba legis ponderans? Ubi doctor parvulorum? Populum insipientem non videbis, populum autem alti sermonis* als Ausgangspunkt genommen, um die einzelnen *Elogia* insgesamt 13 auf Augustinus bezogenen Aussagen zuzuordnen:

1. *Quia litteratus fuit*: a2–5
2. *Quia fuit verba legis ponderans*: a6–21
3. *Quia doctor fuit parvulorum*: a22–37
4. *Quia vero non vidit populum insipientem quem non convicerit*: a38–45
5. *Quia vero vidit populum alti sermonis*: a46–48
6. *Quia caritate fervens*: a49
7. *Quia aequitate corrigens*: a50
8. *Quia honestate nitens*: a51–52
9. *Quia in paupertate degens*: a53
10. *Quia sanctitate praepollens*: a54
11. *Quia in passionibus patiens*: a55–57
12. *Quia in veritate docens*: a58–59
13. *Quia omnium virtutum praemio in aeterna felicitate gaudens*: a60–62

Offensichtlich sollte einerseits die Isaiasspassage, andererseits die Persönlichkeit des Augustinus möglichst gut abgedeckt werden. Die Aufteilung der einzelnen Exzerpte ist sehr unausgewogen: Vielleicht stehen die meisten Stücke unter den ersten fünf Rubriken, weil deren Autorität durch Isaias größer schien. In vielen Fällen wird aus dem Inhalt eines Exzerpts nicht klar, warum das Stück ausgerechnet

⁵⁹ Vgl. Peebles (Anm. 58), 561–563. Zum *Liber florigerus* Th. Falmagne, *Le Liber Florigerus: Recherches sur l'attribution d'un florilège augustinien du XIII^e siècle* (avant 1260), REAug 45 (1999), 139–181. Allgemein zu Augustinus-Florilegien E. Dekkers, *Quelques notes sur des florilèges augustinieniens anciens et médiévaux*, Augustiniana 40 (1990), 27–44.

⁶⁰ Jordan ändert die ersten beiden Verse ab, da diese im *Liber florigerus* und im *Milleloquium* vor der einleitenden Partie stehen (*Prologus in verbis...*), bei ihm aber nach der *Commendacio*. Die einzige Abweichung von Mill. zum *Liber florigerus* ist *gurgite sacro* statt *gurgite lato*, wodurch der Reim ursprünglich noch deutlicher zur Geltung gekommen ist. Bei der Adaption Jordans ging dieser in den beiden Anfangsversen völlig verloren, sodass seine Version formal ungleichmäßig erscheint.

dieser bestimmten Rubrik zugeordnet ist; eine Methodik bei der Anordnung der Exzerpte innerhalb der einzelnen Rubriken ist ebenfalls nicht erkennbar. Insgesamt erinnert das Vorgehen des Bartholomäus – nicht in Details, aber im Grundsätzlichen – an jene Einteilungen, denen folgend Jordan in Predigten auf Augustinus (vgl. u. Anm. 100) und Nicholaus de Alessandria in einem 1322 in Paris gehaltenem *Sermo de beato Augustino* (vgl. Rano, Anm. 1, 345–363) Lob für ihren Ordenspatron vorbringen. Dass es sich um eine Technik handelt, die in der 1. Hälfte des 14. Jh. öfters von Autoren des Augustinereremitenordens in *Sermones de Augustino* eingesetzt wurde, bestätigen jene Textproben, die B. Rano (Anm. 3) zusammengestellt hat.

Die Einteilung von Iord. knüpft nicht an diese Tradition an, erscheint aber im Vergleich zu Mill. systematischer: Jordan fasst Exzerpte aus einzelnen Autoren, welche bei Bartholomäus über die ganze Sammlung verstreut sind, zusammen und zeigt sich bestrebt, eine chronologisch einigermaßen korrekte Abfolge herzustellen bzw. der Autorität der einzelnen Namen Rechnung zu tragen. Zuerst bringt er Exzerpte aus Werken der Kirchenväter Hieronymus (72v²–73v¹), Ambrosius (73v¹) und Gregor (73v²); darauf folgen solche von spätantiken Persönlichkeiten: Cyrillus (73v²), Prosper (74r¹–74v¹), Valerius (74v¹), Paulinus (74v²–75r²), Licentius (75r²), Severus (75v¹), Basilius (75v¹–76r¹), Possidonius (76r¹–76v²), Volusianus (76v²), Marcellinus (76v²), Longinianus (77r¹), Nebridius (77r¹), Macedonius (77r¹), Orosius (77r²), Alypius (77r²), Anastasius (77v), Cyprrianus (78r), Bonifatius (78r²), Donatus (78r²), Octavianus (78v¹), Aquilius (78v²), Audax (78v²), Isidor (78v²), Hilarius (79r¹), Cassiodor (79r¹), Quodvultdeus (79r²), Consentius (79v¹); nach einem Stück aus dem pseudoaugustinischen *Liber de cognitione verae vitae* (79r¹) bringt Jordan schließlich Exzerpte aus Werken von Autoren, die hauptsächlich dem Mittelalter zuzurechnen sind: Caelestin (79r¹), Damascenus/Policratus (79v), Haymo (79v²), Vincentius (79v²), Dacius (79v²–80r¹), Iulianus (80r²), Valentinus (80r²), Beda (80r²), Boethius (80v¹), Anselm (80v¹), Gennadius (80v¹), Eugipp (80v), Bernhard (81r¹), Hugo (81r¹), Richard (81r¹), Calcedonius (81r²), Sidonius (81r²), Petrus Damianus (81r²), Remigius (81v).

Iord. kann schwerlich die Quelle für Mill. gewesen sein: Da Iord. so gut wie alle Texte hat, die in Mill. vorhanden sind, in Mill. aber viele Texte fehlen, die in Iord. vorliegen, hätte Bartholomäus eine bestehende Exzerptsammlung stark gekürzt, was *per se* unwahrscheinlich ist. Im höchsten Grade auffällig ist es aber, dass dieser Kürzung fast ausschließlich die in Iord. vorliegenden Pseudepigrapha zum Opfer gefallen wären. Dass Bartholomäus diese Texte in seinem Ordnungssystem nicht untergebracht hätte, erscheint wenig glaubhaft.

Wollte man gar annehmen, er habe sie alle bewusst ausgeschieden, da er – anders als Jordan – ihren dubiosen Charakter erkannt habe, würde man seine (zweifelloso vorhandene) kritische Urteilskraft überschätzen. Außerdem hätte Bartholomäus bei einer Übernahme aus Iord. die bestehende Zusammenfassung nach einzelnen Autoren und die grob chronologische Ordnung zugunsten einer wenig systematisch wirkenden neuen Reihung aufgelöst. Es ist somit davon auszugehen, dass entweder Mill. die Quelle für Iord. gewesen ist, die Jordan erweitert und systematisiert hätte (wie R. Arbesmann glaubte), oder dass beide Sammlungen unabhängig voneinander Zugriff auf weitgehend die selben Quellen gehabt haben.

J. Hommey hat angemerkt, dass Iord. manchmal mehr Exzerpte aus einem bestimmten Autor bietet als Mill. (vgl. o. Anm. 53), und wie die Auflistung zeigt, trifft dies auch umgekehrt zu: vgl. a7, 11, 22, 58. Außerdem überschneidet sich die Menge an ausgewähltem Text, den ein bestimmtes Exzerpt darbietet, nicht immer genau: vgl. a3–6, 8, 9, 17, 19, 25, 27, 31, 36, 39, 47, 49, 50, 59. Geht man diese Stücke durch, so stellt sich heraus dass Mill. und Iord. nur von solchen Autoren mehr genuine Exzerpte bzw. einen teils längeren, teils kürzeren Ausschnitt aus dem selben Werk bieten, wo es sich um einen Text handelt, der in das Briefcorpus des Augustinus eingegangen ist. Da es aber insgesamt so viele Überschneidungen gibt, können Mill. und Iord. unmöglich völlig selbständig ihre jeweilige Auswahl zusammengestellt haben.

Wie gesagt, ist Mill. nicht abhängig von Iord. Falls umgekehrt Iord. aus Mill. geschöpft wäre, hätte Jordan nicht nur einige der in Mill. zu findenden Exzerpte gekürzt oder ganz weggelassen, er hätte vor allem immer wieder Exzerpte anhand des Originals kontrolliert und erweitert bzw. einen anderen Abschnitt aus demselben Brief ausgewählt: vgl. a3, 5, 8, 25, 36, 39, 47; b5. Dies ist extrem unwahrscheinlich. Somit ist davon auszugehen, dass beiden Kompilatoren die selbe Quelle (Q^a) zur Verfügung gestanden ist, welche eine Auswahl von Briefen aus dem augustinischen Corpus dargeboten hat.⁶¹ Bartholomäus

⁶¹ Vorhanden sind in Mill. und/oder Iord. Teile von Aug. epist. 5, 6, 25, 26, 30, 32, 68, 72, 102, 109, 119, 121, 135, 136, 154, 172, 195, 216, 221, 223, 225, 226, 234, 260, außerdem von den nicht genuinen epp. app. 7, 12, 16 und 19. Auffällig ist die Präsenz von epp. 221/223 sowie von 225/226: A. Goldbacher, *Augustini epistolae* 5, Wien 1923 (CSEL 58), LXXI legt dar, dass epp. 221/223 fast ausschließlich gemeinsam mit dem Werk *De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum* überliefert sind (im Spätmittelalter tauchen sie aber innerhalb von Briefsammlungen auf, etwa in den Hss. Vatikan, Vat. lat. 495 und 499, beide s. XV); epp. 225/226 (= *De praedestinatione sanctorum*) erscheinen nicht in Sammlungen von Augustinusbriefen (LXXII): Erst seit der Edition von L. F. Reinhart (Frankfurt 1668) sind epp. 221/223 und 225/226 fest ins augustinische Briefcorpus aufgenommen (vgl. Goldbacher, LXXXIV f.).

und Jordan haben unabhängig voneinander diese Quelle ausgewertet und konnten deshalb einmal mehr, einmal weniger Text bzw. einen ganz anderen Abschnitt aus ein- und demselben Brief bieten. Ob Q^a viel mehr Briefe umfasst hat als jene, aus denen Exzerpte in Mill. und Iord. vorhanden sind, ist schwer zu sagen. Plausibel scheint die Annahme, dass bereits eine bewusste Auswahl vorlag: Es mag sich um eine Kollektion von jenen Briefen bzw. von Exzerpten aus jenen Briefen aus dem augustinischen Corpus gehandelt haben, in denen Lob für den Bischof von Hippo zu finden ist.

Was jene in Mill. und in Iord. vorhandenen Exzerpte betrifft, die aus bekannten Werken stammen, welche nicht zum Briefcorpus des Augustinus gehören, so ist deren Text bis auf drei Ausnahmen⁶² sowohl der Länge als auch dem Wortlaut nach identisch: vgl. a2, 10, 12–15, 17, 18, 23, 26–28, 30–32, 34, 35, 38, 41, 44–46, 48, 51, 52, 54, 59, 60. Auffällig ist dies zumal bei Exzerpten wie a60, die umfangreich und gegenüber dem Original stark verändert sind. Außerdem finden sich in Iord. und in Mill. durchgehend die selben falschen Autoren- bzw. Werkzuweisungen: Prosper gilt als Verfasser von *De vita contemplativa*; Auszüge aus dem *Policraticus* des Johannes von Salisbury werden »Policratus« zugeschrieben; Possidius heißt „Possidonius«; Eugipp soll einen *Liber de floribus paradysi* verfasst haben.⁶³ Da Iord.

Vergleicht man den Text von epist. 225 bei Mill./Iord. mit dem Original, so fällt auf, dass das Exzerpt auffällig gekürzt ist, und dass Mill./Iord. genau die selben Kürzungen aufweisen, während die jeweilige Textmenge der übrigen Briefexzerpte in Mill. und Iord. oft stark von einander abweicht. Offenbar lagen epp. 225/226 nicht als Brief(exzerpt)e in Q^a vor, sondern als Exzerpt aus dem selbständig überlieferten Werk *De praedestinatione sanctorum* in der noch zu besprechenden Quelle Q^b. Analoges gilt für epp. 221/223. Thomas Falmagne hat überprüft, ob die o.g. Briefe im *Liber florigerus* (vgl. o. bei Anm. 59) enthalten sind: Dort findet sich aber nur ein kurzes Exzerpt aus epist. 26, das mit Mill. bzw. Iord. nicht übereinstimmt. Inwieweit die Arbeit des Augustinereremiten Gregor von Rimini († 1358), der sich lange Zeit in Paris und Bologna aufhielt und eine umfassende Sammlung von Augustinus-Briefen zusammenstellte, seine Zeitgenossen und Ordensbrüder Jordan und Bartholomäus beeinflusst haben mag, bleibt zu untersuchen. In der Hs. Vatikan, Rossi 259 (an. 1345) liegt das Ergebnis von Gregors Bemühungen vor, eine Sammlung von 251 augustinischen Briefen + einige Nachträge und ein Register. Vgl. dazu R. Maurer, Strukturelle Untersuchungen zu den augustinischen Briefkorpora, Diss. Wien 1991, 444–454.

⁶² In a27, 31 und 59 bietet Iord. jeweils etwas weniger Text als Mill.

⁶³ Die Zuweisung von *De vita contemplativa* an Prosper findet sich seit dem 8. Jh.; vgl. M. Schanz/C. Hosius/G. Krüger, Geschichte der römischen Literatur 4/2, München 1920, 556. Einige spätmittelalterliche Belege für »Policratus« statt *Policraticus* notiert R. Sabbadini, Le scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli XIV e XV. Nuove ricerche, Firenze 1914 (ND 1996), 226. Die Form »Possidonius« statt »Possidius« erscheint bis ins 16. Jh. in gedruckten Ausgaben; vgl. M. Pellegrino, Intorno al testo della vita di S.

nicht die Quelle von Mill. gewesen ist, bleiben zwei Möglichkeiten: Entweder übernahm Iord. die betreffenden Exzerpte aus Mill. oder beide lag die selbe Quelle vor.

Am Stärksten für die Annahme einer gemeinsamen Quelle spricht die Überlegung, dass Jordan auch die zuvor behandelten Augustinusbriefe bequem unverändert oder gekürzt hätte übernehmen können, wenn ihm Mill. ohnehin bekannt gewesen wäre. Lehnt man die Existenz der oben postulierten Quelle Q^a ab und nimmt an, dass Jordan den Text dieser Briefe tatsächlich aus Mill. gekannt, ihn aber immer wieder anhand des Originals kontrolliert bzw. erweitert, sowie seine *Commendacio* insgesamt um einige zusätzliche Exzerpte ergänzt habe – warum hat er dann die nicht aus dem augustinischen Briefcorpus stammenden Exzerpte nur übernommen bzw. in drei Fällen (vgl. o. Anm. 62) gekürzt übernommen? Dass ihm die Augustinusbriefe zugänglich gewesen sind, alle anderen Werke aber nicht, sodass er hier in keinem einzigen Fall einen längeren bzw. anderen Text als Bartholomäus hätte bieten können, ist unglaublich. Gegen eine Übernahme aus Mill. sprechen zudem gewisse Details: Z.B. stehen in Mill. die drei Sätze aus dem *Policraticus* des Johannes von Salisbury a27 als Texte des »Policratus« in jener Reihenfolge, in der man sie bei durchgehender Lektüre des Werks exzerpieren würde: 2,17; 2,22; 7,2. In Iord. kommt zuerst das Exzerpt aus 7,2, darauf folgen 2,17 und 2,22; während die letzten beiden Sätze wie in Mill. »Policratus« zugeschrieben sind, wird als Urheber des ersten »Damascenus« angegeben. Wie dieser Fehler bei einer Übernahme aus Mill. zustande gekommen sein sollte, ist unklar.⁶⁴ Außerdem

Agostino scritta da Possidio, REAug 2 (1956), 195–229 (195f.) sowie u. Anm. 88. Zu Eugipp vgl. Dorfbauer (Anm. 1), 232–234.

⁶⁴ In Iord. sieht der Name aus wie »Damasse(n)us«, in der Kopie Liège, Bibl. du Séminaire 6 F 22 steht eindeutig »Damascenus« (180r), d.h. Johannes Damascenus, dessen Schriften seit dem Hochmittelalter zumindest auszugsweise in lateinischer Übersetzung greifbar waren. Der Fehler könnte auf die *Flores paradysi c* in der Pariser Handschrift BNF lat. 15982 zurückgehen; diese wurde von den Studenten der Sorbonne am Beginn des 14. Jh. eifrig benutzt und hat den Kompilator des *Manipulus florum*, Thomas von Irland, zu einem ähnlichen Versehen verleitet: Auf den Folien 132v² bis 133v² von BNF lat. 15982 finden sich Exzerpte aus dem *Policraticus*, eingeleitet durch die Worte *Item ex libro qui dicitur Polycraticon Iohannis de curialium nugis et vestigiis philosophorum*. Thomas hat diesen »Johannes« mit Johannes Chrysostomus identifiziert, da Exzerpte aus dessen Werken direkt vorangehen und die Seitenüberschrift »Johannes (132v) Crisostomus (133r)« fälschlich weitergeführt ist. Exzerpte aus dem *Policraticus* erscheinen demzufolge im *Manipulus florum* stets unter dem Namen »(Johannes) Chrysostomus«; vgl. Rouse/Rouse (Anm. 54), 145f. Es ist denkbar, dass Jordan (oder eher seine unmittelbare Quelle) die selbe Pariser Handschrift gekannt hat – dann wäre in diesem Fall aus jenem »Johannes«, Verfasser des *Policraticus*, »(Johannes) Damascenus« geworden.

erscheinen Exzerpte, die nicht aus Augustinus-Briefen stammen, in Mill. und in Iord. immer wieder zu den selben Kleingruppen zusammengefasst, wobei allerdings die Abfolge der einzelnen Exzerpte anders ist: vgl. a12–15, 32–35 sowie 59–60.

Die einfachste Erklärung scheint, dass die betreffenden Exzerpte aus einer gemeinsamen Quelle (Q^b) stammen, in welcher *Commendaciones Augustini* aus Werken spätantiker und mittelalterlicher Autoren zusammengestellt waren.⁶⁵ Diese Exzerpte sind wohl knapper gewesen als die Texte der Briefe in Q^a, sodass Bartholomäus und Jordan sie entweder unverändert übernahmen oder geringfügig kürzten. Die Annahme liegt nahe, dass Q^a und Q^b bereits handschriftlich gemeinsam tradiert waren, als Bartholomäus und Jordan die beiden Quellen auswerteten. Es könnte sich um eine ältere Sammlung von *Commendaciones Augustini* gehandelt haben, welche in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jh. innerhalb des Augustinereremitenordens zirkulierte. Aus einer derartigen Sammlung schöpften auch spätere Handschriften wie Laur., wo mit a28, 31, 41 und 58 vier Exzerpte vorhanden sind, die man in ähnlicher Form in Mill. bzw. in Iord. vorfindet⁶⁶, sowie andere Augustinereremiten der 1. Hälfte des 14. Jh. wie Nicholas de Alessandria (vgl. o. zu a6, 9, 39 und 41 sowie zu d12), Heinrich von Friemar (vgl. o. zu a6) oder Hermann von Schildesche (vgl. o. zu a6, 36, 39 und 54). In den Quellen von Jordan und von Bartholomäus waren aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach die *Legenda aurea* des Jacobus de Voragine (vgl. o. Anm. 3) sowie das *Speculum historiale* des Vinzenz von Beauvais (vgl. o. Anm. 27) ausgewertet.

An Sondergut von Mill. bleiben a1, 28, 29, 42, 53, 58 und 62. Bartholomäus kann diese Stücke selbständig hinzugefügt haben. Sie könnten aber – abgesehen von a62, das sicherlich eigene Zutat ist – ebensogut in Q^a bzw. Q^b vorgelegen und von Jordan nicht aufgenommen worden sein.⁶⁷ Dasselbe gilt umgekehrt für die nur in Iord. zu findenden Stücke b1 und 2. Schließlich bieten sowohl Mill. als auch Iord. die Pseudepigrapha a33, 43 und 61 (= d33, 23 und 20). Diese müssen demnach bereits in Q^a bzw. Q^b vorhanden gewesen sein,

⁶⁵ Der späteste aufgenommene Autor ist Vinzenz von Beauvais mit dem *Speculum historiale* (a34). Zwischen dem Todesjahr des Vinzenz (ca. 1264) und dem Beginn des 14. Jh. ist Q^b zusammengestellt worden.

⁶⁶ Dass Laur. nicht direkt aus Mill. oder Iord. geflossen ist, zeigen mehrere Details; vgl. o. Anm. 24 und 32.


⁶⁷ Man kann nicht völlig ausschließen, dass die eigenwillige Ordnung der Exzerpte in Mill. bereits aus der Quelle übernommen wurde, wo dann a1 auf jeden Fall vorhanden gewesen wäre; in diesem Fall hätte Jordan bewusst umgestellt und a1 nicht übernehmen können.

sofern man nicht eine dritte gemeinsame Quelle postulieren will, wozu kein dringender Anlass besteht.

Dagegen entstammen die zahlreichen Pseudepigrapha von Iord., die nicht in Mill. vorhanden sind, nämlich d3, 5–7, 9–16, 22, 24, 27–32, 34, teilweise einer Quelle Q^{pa} , die nur Jordan zugänglich war – darin d28–32 und 34 –, teilweise einer Quelle Q^{pb} , die auch in Σ eingeflossen ist – darin d3, 5–7, 9–16, 22, 24, 27 –, wobei die Texte im Lauf der Überlieferung teilweise umgeformt bzw. erweitert wurden (vgl. d3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 16), sodass mit mehreren Zwischenstufen auf dem Weg von Q^{pb} zu Σ gerechnet werden muss.⁶⁸

Die wenigen genuine Texte in Σ , die nicht in Mill. oder in Iord. zu finden sind, also c1–3 und 6, gehen letztlich wohl auf ähnliche Quellen wie Q^a oder Q^b zurück. Ansonsten findet man Exzerpte aus den *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* (c4 und 5), aus den *Epistulae spuriae* (ein Teil von d8 sowie d19a), sowie neue Pseudepigrapha: d1, 2, 4, 5a, 8, 17–19, 21, 35, 36. Bei letzteren Stücken gewinnt man teilweise den Eindruck, als würde Σ erweitern, was aus älteren Sammlungen, wie Jordan sie benutzt hat, übernommen wurde: So wirken einzelne Passagen von d1 und 2 wie Centonen aus anderen Pseudepigrapha und dienen als Einleitung zu den *Commendaciones*; d5a ist ein Antwortbrief des »Augustinus« an einen „Octavianus«, den man aus d5 kennt; die »historiographischen« Texte d35 und 36 ergänzen die *Commendaciones* der angeblichen Zeitgenossen und runden die Sammlung ab.

Das Verhältnis von Mill., Iord. und Σ zu den erschlossenen Quellen Q^a , Q^b , Q^{pa} und Q^{pb} lässt sich graphisch darstellen. Es handelt sich um ein Modell, das mögliches Sondergut, welches in die jeweiligen Hss. eingeflossen sein kann, nicht berücksichtigt; punktierte Linien zeigen an, dass mehrere Zwischenstufen vorauszusetzen sind, wobei es zu teilweise starken Eingriffen in die Texte gekommen ist:



⁶⁸ Freilich könnten die Pseudepigrapha von Q^{pa} und Q^{pb} – nicht anders als die Exzerpte von Q^a und Q^b – gemeinsam tradiert worden sein; aus dieser Sammlung wären dann nur Auszüge in Σ eingeflossen.

II. Sprache und Inhalt der pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones*

F. Römer konstatierte, die Sprache der *Epistulae spuriae* zeichne sich ebenso wie jene der *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* durch »late vocabulary«, »serious offences against school grammar« und »primitively schematic rhetorics« aus.⁶⁹ Das Urteil über die Sprache der pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* kann nicht günstiger ausfallen. Weil deren Eigenheiten schon bei oberflächlicher Lektüre ins Auge springen, seien hier nur einige besonders auffällige Punkte herausgegriffen:

Vor dem Mittelalter nicht belegt sind etwa die Wörter *totaliter* (»völlig«; *ecclesiam dei totaliter illustravit* 3), *eructator* (»Aussprecher«; *eructator divinorum eloquiorum* 24), sowie *hastiludium* (»Turnier«; *bella et hastiludia* 35).

Sowohl in den pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* wie auch in den *Epistulae spuriae* wird die Wendung *si petis a me* in der Bedeutung »wenn du mich fragst« verwendet: *Si petis a me, quot librorum volumina ... pater noster Augustinus Aurelius ... conscripsit...* (12) ~ *Si petis a me ... utrum Adam concupivit et voluit esse sicut deus...* (epist. sp. 23,1f.) ~ *Si petis a me ... quae sit vita melior...* (epist. sp. 25,1) ~ *Si petis a me ... quomodo maius sit gaudium in caelo...* (epist. sp. 30,1) ~ *Si petis a me, utrum in divitiis permanendo salvari possis...* (epist. sp. 35,1). Teilweise tritt *suus* an die Stelle von *eius*: ...*omnes alii lumen vere sapientie a fonte sue [i. e. Augustini] doctrine hauriunt...* (33). An manchen Passagen erscheint der Indikativ in abhängigen Fragesätzen; dazu kommt ein freier Umgang mit der Zeitenfolge: *Quod si vidissemus, fratres, quanto fervore bonos diligebat, quanta caritate malos reprehendebat, quanto desiderio captivos redimebat, vere nos dixisse puto...* (3).

Das zweifellos auffälligste an der Sprache der pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* ist aber der weitgehend unklassische Stil, welcher in einer Rhetorik voller Parallelismen, Reimen und Aufzählungen schwelgt – eine weitere Gemeinsamkeit mit den *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* und den *Epistulae spuriae*.⁷⁰ Einige signifikante Beispiele sind: *O vere beata dei civitas, quam honorat civitatis catholice dux et rector, quam decorat militantis ecclesie lux et doctor, quam dulcorat unitatis heremitice nux et decor* (2); *Gaudeat gloriosus pater Augustinus, doctor sancte matris ecclesie! Gaudeat ille magnus pater et magister,*

⁶⁹ Römer 1976 (Anm. 1), 490.

⁷⁰ Vgl. Römer 1976 (Anm. 1), 490f., Anm. 5 mit Beispielen zu den »long, uniform periods« dieser Texte. Es wäre zu untersuchen, ob manche der pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* adaptierte Exzerpte aus spätmittelalterlichen Predigten, möglicherweise von Autoren des Augustinereremitenordens, darstellen könnten.

splendor perfectorum fidelium! Gaudeat illa meridies, plenitudo fervorum, columpna et fundamentum sancte matris ecclesie! Gaudeat in excelsis ille wulnerator dyaboli et susceptor animarum Christi! Gaudeat artificiosus repertor divine sapientie, columpna mundi, pater venerabilis, genus sapientie et archa novi veterisque testamenti (9); Augustinus doctor beatissimus, ubique magnus, ubique fortis, ubique mirabilis, ubique singularis, ubique omni sanctitate copiosus, ubique astutus in sensu, ubique longanimis in spe (11).

Wie eingangs erwähnt, erscheint der Stil der diversen angeblichen Autoren durchwegs sehr ähnlich. Dazu kommt eine Reihe von fixen Wendungen und Ideen, die immer wieder auftauchen:

<i>Augustini Aurelii, qui vere norma et speculum extitit in natura</i> (3; »Basilus« angeblich in einer Predigt) ⁷¹	<i>...doctor doctorum, qui virtutum norma et speculum extitit in natura</i> (4; »Basilus« angeblich in einer anderen Predigt)	<i>Augustinus virtutum omnium forma et speculum exstitit in natura</i> (31; »Richardus« angeblich im Prolog eines Johanneskommentars)
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<i>Augustinus ... volans quasi aquila super omnia montium cacumina</i>	<i>O pater Augustine, aquila grandis altius prospiciens...</i>	<i>...quemadmodum aquila super omnia volatilia volat ... sic magnus doctor Augustinus super omnes ascendit et volavit</i>	<i>Augustinus ... aquila magnifica...</i>	<i>...fuit super omnes doctores velud aquila super aves sublimatus...</i>
(1; ohne Verfasserangabe)	(5; »Octavianus« angeblich in einem Brief an »Augustinus«) ⁷²	(15; »Paulinus« angeblich in einem Brief an »Valerius«)	(20c; »Richardus« angeblich in einer Predigt)	(31; »Richardus« angeblich im Prolog eines Johanneskommentars)

⁷¹ Vgl. auch folgende Passage aus einem *Sermo de Augustino* des Hermann von Schildesche: [Augustinus] *fit norma omnium fidelium ... norma clericorum et studentium ... forma religiosorum et regularium...* (Rano, Anm. 3, 52). Außerdem den Beginn der bei Rembolt (Anm. 24) gedruckten *Relatio Calixti de conversione, perseverantia et quibusdam dictis S. Augustini* (34r): *Magnus ille doctor et egregius Augustinus, qui vere fuit norma et speculum in natura...*Schließlich einen Satz aus dem Schlussteil der *Vita Augustini* des Jordan von Quedlinburg (Saak 2002, Anm. 1, 810): *...illius vita sit forma et norma omnium religiosorum et clericorum. Ipse quippe est decus et forma huius nostre professionis, ipse speculum et regula nostre religionis.* Letzteres hat Jordan wörtlich aus der *Vita Augustini* des Prämonstratenserabts Philipp von Harveng († 1183) übernommen; vgl. Saak 2002 (Anm. 1), 179–183 (181, Anm. 60).

⁷² Mehr zu diesem Text des »Octavianus« bei Weber (Anm. 1), 438f.

<i>Augustinus est alter magnus Abraham ... alter Ioseph magnus ... alter Moyses ... alter magnus Helyas ... alter magnus Yosias ... alter magnus Mathatias ... alter magnus baptista ... alter Iob magnus ... alter Petrus ... alter magnus Paulus ... alter Iohannes ewangelista...</i> (1; ohne Verfasserangabe)	<i>Ecce ergo velud alter Helias ... velud alter Ioseph ... velud alter Thobias ... velud alter Enoch...</i> (3; »Basilius« angeblich in einer Predigt)	<i>Ipse est alter Moyses ... est alter Aaron ... est alter Ihesus Nave ... est alter Caleph ... est alter Samuel ... est alter Nathan ... est alter David ... est alter Salomon ... est alter Ezechias ... est alter Helias ... est alter Enoch ... est alter Ioseph ... est alter Symon...</i> (6; »Anastasius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Macedonius«)
<i>Ecce Augustinus Aurelius margarita celestis...</i> (3; »Basilius« angeblich in einer Predigt)	<i>Sancte pater Augustine ... fecit te ... margaritam celestem...</i> (8; »Anastasius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Augustinus«)	<i>Augustinus ... gemmarum margarita insignium...</i> (27; »Cyprian« angeblich in einem Brief an »Damasus«)
<i>Ave, o beate beatorum Augustine ... wulnerator dyaboli</i> (8; »Anastasius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Augustinus«)	<i>Gaudeat in excelsis ille wulnerator dyaboli...</i> (9; »Anastasius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Orosius«)	
<i>Augustinus ... gracia urbanitatis, incendium caritatis. Augustinus rose formositas, violarum amenitas et lilium convalium</i> (24; »Possidonius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Macedonius«)	<i>Augustinus ... gratia urbanitatis et incendium caritatis ... Augustinus rosarum formositas, violarum amenitas et lilium convallium</i> (27; »Cyprian« angeblich in einem Brief an »Damasus«)	
<i>Tu, Augustine, non archam coaptando, sed libros componendo universum mundum periclitantem cum labore, fame et siti liberasti</i> (19; »Orosius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Augustinus«)	<i>Hic velud alter Noe non archam fabricando, sed libros componendo mundum universum periclitantem ab hereticis liberavit</i> (22; »Prosper« angeblich in einer Predigt)	
<i>Nam tanta dictando privatim tantaque in ecclesia diversisque locis disputando conscripsit, ut vix cuiquam studiosorum diebus ac noctibus non solum scribere ea, sed nec legere posse occurrat. Mentitur ergo, qui totum se dicit legisse Augustinum</i>	<i>Huius enim librorum, tractatum et epistolarum numerus plus quam ad mille triginta, ut dictum est, extenditur, ut merito illud ei dictum conveniat: Mentitur qui te totum legisse fatetur</i>	

(12; »Possidonius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Paulinus«) ⁷³	(25; »Possidonius«)
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Es scheint klar, dass diese Texte nicht von so vielen unterschiedlichen Autoren stammen, wie sie vorgeben. Zwar wurden vielleicht nicht alle von ein- und demselben Urheber geschaffen; sehr viele unterschiedliche Verfasser stehen aber kaum hinter ihnen.

Weiters fallen verbale Parallelen bzw. Übernahmen aus den *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* und aus den *Epistulae spuriae* auf.

[Augustinus:] ...desidero ita vos componere, ut in vobis macula neque ruga possit ante tribunal iusti iudicis apparere. Animabus enim vestris non solum ornamenta, sed etiam medicamenta desidero providere. Studeo enim dissuta consuere, conscissa sarcire, vulnerata curare, abluere sordida, reparare perdita, et ea, quae sunt integra, spiritualibus margaritis ornare. Ego enim margaritas de paradisi patria vobis donare cupiens nullam mercedem in saeculo opto recipere, nisi quod quae vobis insinuare intendo et patienter audire et cum dei adiutorio secundum vires opera adimplere semper studeatis (s. fr. er. 1; PL 40, 1235)	[Augustinus] ecclesiam dei totaliter illustravit, ita ut nulla in ea macula neque ruga deinceps poterit apparere. Animabus enim nostris non solum ornamenta, sed et medicamenta voluit providere. Studuit enim sanctissimus Augustinus nostra dissuta consuere, nostra conscissa sarcire, nostra vulnera curare, nostra sordida abluere, nostra perdita reperare, et ea, quae sunt integra, spiritualibus margaritis ornare. Spiritales enim margaritas de paradisi patria nobis attulit, dum annis quadraginta et amplius totam dei ecclesiam doctrina sua decoravit. Nullamque mercedem ex hoc optare voluit nisi ut suam sanctam doctrinam studeamus audire et ea, quae bona sunt, secundum vires studeamus operibus adimplere (3; »Basilii« angeblich in einer Predigt)
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Gaude, o anima sancta, sancta conscientia decorate... (s. fr. er. 10; PL 40, 1252)	Gaude et tu, o sanctissima anima, quae hodie suscepta es ab angelis... (20; »Richardus de Sancto Victore« angeblich in einer Predigt)
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⁷³ Mehr zu diesen Texten des »Possidonius« bei Pellegrino (Anm. 63), 202; Rano (Anm. 1), 356f.; Weber (Anm. 1), 437; Saak 2007 (Anm. 1), 145. Zu ergänzen wäre folgender Abschnitt aus Jordans *Vitasfratrum*: *Unde tot scripsit libros [Augustinus], quot vix homo in vita sua sufficeret ad legendum, cum ipse sufficeret ad scribendum, ut dicit Possidonius* (Arbesmann/ Hümpfner, Anm. 1, 235).

<i>Exspectamus enim te veraciter verum pastorem et patrem, veram gloriam Ierusalem et laetitiam Israel, verum ornamentum saeculi, margaritam caelestem, veram arcam foederis, columnam et virgam Moysi, ut respicientes in te tamquam in speculum salvari per te aperte possimus</i> (epist. sp. 41, 23-26; Der »Klerus von Hippo« an »Augustinus«)	<i>...fecit te ... gloriam Ierusalem, ornamentum seculi, margaritam celestem, archam Noe et leticiam Israel ...</i> (8; »Anastasius« angeblich in einem Brief an »Augustinus«)	<i>Nota, quod illi de Carthagine non habebant doctorem, qui doceret eos in fide. Miserunt igitur epistolam ad Augustinum dicentes: „Exspectamus te verum pastorem et patrem ut angelum dei, ut respicientes in te tamquam in speculum salvari per te aperte possimus“</i> (19a)⁷⁴
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Epist. sp. 54, ein angeblicher Brief des »Macedonius« an »Augustinus«, ist nicht mehr als ein hochrhetorischer, aber inhaltsleerer Lobeshymnus auf den Bischof von Hippo; auch wenn es nicht allzu viele wörtliche Übereinstimmungen⁷⁵ gibt, entspricht sein Tenor völlig dem der pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones*. Angesichts des übertriebenen und unablässig vorgetragenen Lobes in diesen Texten erscheint es bemerkenswert, dass »Augustinus« in 5a solche *adulatio* ausdrücklich zurückweist – wie es auch in zwei der *Epistulae spuriae* der Fall ist:

<i>Moderate ergo laudare debemus bene operantes, non superflue, quia omnis laus vituperium est replicata frequenter. Haec est enim adulatorum condicio</i>	<i>O adulator, amicus in obsequio, sed hostis in animo, comptus in verbo, sed turpis in facto, laetus in laetis et prosperis, sed fragilis ad adversa, inflatus ad obsequia, sed anxius ad obprobria, immoderatus ad gaudia, sed facilis ad humana et difficilis ad honesta...</i>	<i>...dico et tibi et ceteris vere adulantibus: Vere amici dolosi vos estis, qui subplantatis intimum amicum vestrum in fumo et ebrietate! Bene utique me tantum laudare fecissent, si amici in foro me vendere debuissent. Hanc laudis presumptionem supplico ut deponas...</i>
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⁷⁴ Man beachte, wie der Text von epist. sp. 41 in den beiden Texten der *Commendaciones* sorgfältig aufgeteilt erscheint.

⁷⁵ Vgl. etwa *pater et maritus orphanorum viduarumque ~ pater orphanorum et iudex viduarum* (3); *O luminare magnum et lux in tenebris lucens... o stella matutina ceteris clarior et soli similior... O perfecta aurora descendens super orbem terrarum... ~ Augustinus stella micans, calliginis et erroris ignara, solaris prima luminis; stella syderibus aliis lucidior splendore caritatis, aurora diem preferens velud syderis matutini, qui obscura fulgoribus peccatorum corda purificas* (27).

(epist. sp. 4, 35-37; »Augustinus« an »Bonifatius«)	(epist. sp. 14, 57-59; »Augustinus« an »Fabianus«)	(5a; »Augustinus« an »Octavianus«) ⁷⁶
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Stellenweise zeigen sich klare Parallelen zu Texten von Autoren aus dem Augustinereremitenorden im frühen 14. Jh.:

<i>Per Noe ... Augustinus intellegitur, qui ... humanum genus ab hereticis liberavit</i> (Init. ord. herem.; Rano, Anm. 1, 345)	<i>[Augustinus] velud alter Noe ... mundum universum periclitantem ab hereticis liberavit</i> (22)
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<i>...doctorum, inter quos iste gloriosus pater optinet principatum</i> (Nich. Ales. s. de Aug.; Rano, Anm. 1, 355)	<i>Super omnes ecclesiarum doctores Augustinus principatum in divinorum misteriorum profunditate obtinet</i> (15)
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<i>...aquila grandis, doctor videlicet Augustinus, volavit ad altitudinem sacre scripture...</i> (Mig. Mas. s. de Aug.; Rano, Anm. 3, 35)	<i>O pater Augustine, aquila grandis altius prospiciens...</i> (5)
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<i>laudat cum angelis, tripudiat cum arcangelis, miratur cum virginibus ... cum tronis se dignum iudicat ... cum cherubin cognoscit archana ... cum seraphim ardet</i> (Herm. Schil. s. de Aug.; Rano, Anm. 3, 73)	<i>cum angelis volat, cum archangelis cantat, cum Seraphim ardet, cum Cherubim lucet, cum Thronis sedet, cum Virtutibus mirabilia operator ... illic gloriosus apostolorum chorus tripudiat</i> (3)
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Bei all dem Lob, das Augustinus gespendet wird, erscheinen die pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* recht faktenarm: Man liest, dass der Bischof von Hippo mehr als 40 Jahre lang der Kirche gedient habe (...*annis quadraginta et amplius totam dei ecclesiam doctrina sua decoravit* 3); dass er seine Taufe aufgeschoben habe, um in der weltlichen Philosophie Erkenntnis zu finden, woraufhin Gott ihm Zahnschmerzen geschickt habe, sodass er sich – von seiner Mutter

⁷⁶ Auch am Ende der bei Rembolt (Anm. 24) gedruckten *Relatio Calixti de conversione, perseverantia et quibusdam dictis S. Augustini* (34r) verbittet sich »Augustinus«: *Nolite, obsecro, laudare me, sed orate, ut valeamus usque ad mortem perseverare*. Vgl. außerdem den *Sermo de beato Augustino* des Nicholas von Alessandria bei Rano (Anm. 1), 357 sowie Heinrich von Friemar bei Rano (Anm. 3), 27. Der Ursprung dieser Passagen liegt wohl in Aug. conf. 10,37,61: *Contristor aliquando laudibus meis, cum vel ea laudantur in me, in quibus mihi ipse displiceo, vel etiam bona minora et levia pluris aestimantur, quam aestimanda sunt*.

bewogen – letztlich doch habe taufen lassen (*Qui, dum esset catechumenus, baptismum differebat invenire cupiens rationem iuxta inanem philosophiam, utrum aliqua ratio fidei nostre preberet experimentum ... dominus ... percussit eum grandi dolore dencium, ut eciam usum loquendi amitteret: Tunc circumstantibus scripsit, ut omnes secum genua flecterent. Tandem matris lacrimarum effusa copia sanatus est et ad baptismum currens efficitur domus sapientie 4*)⁷⁷; dass er seine überarbeiteten *Adnotationes in Iob* dem *dux Campaniae et comes Octavianus* zukommen lassen wollte (*Exposicionem vero libri sancti Iob actute videre volumus et una cum fratribus meis apponere et minuire intendimus, si opus fuerit, deinde ad tuam sinceram caritatem transmittere, cum valemus 5a*)⁷⁸; dass er die *artes liberales* ohne fremde Hilfe verstanden und seine Sünden in Büchern – gemeint sind die *Confessiones* – bekannt habe, außerdem gegen viele Häresien aufgetreten sei (*Quis umquam audivit hominem per se ipsum omnes artes liberales capientem?*⁷⁹ *Quis umquam audivit propria peccata publice in libellis dimittentem? Quis umquam audivit contra Sabellianos, Manicheos, Arrianos atque alios hereticos tam gloriose triumphantem?* 11); dass er die Gläubigen vor der Häresie des *Fortunatus* bewahrt habe (*Benedictus igitur deus, qui nos infirmos et imbecilles per doctrinam sui sancti sacerdotis sanavit et de Fortunati erroribus liberavit*⁸⁰ 13). Dass Augustinus der produktivste und bedeutendste unter den patristischen Autoren gewesen sei, ist allgemeiner Tenor der *Commendaciones* und wird in einigen Stücken offen ausgesprochen (vgl. 12; 15; 22; 25; 28; 33; 34).

Etwas reicher fließen die »historischen« Angaben in dem angeblichen Exzerpt aus der *Chronik* des »Eusebius« (35), welches nur in späteren Handschriften der *Commendaciones* zu finden ist und

⁷⁷ Vgl. Aug. conf. 9,4,12: *Dolore dentium tunc excruciabas me, et cum in tantum ingravesceret, ut non valerem loqui, ascendit in cor meum admonere omnes meos qui aderant, ut deprecarentur te pro me, deum salutis omnimodae. Et scripsi hoc in cera et dedi, ut eis legeretur. Mox ut genua supplici affectu fiximus, fugit dolor ille (...) Et gaudens in fide laudavi nomen tuum, et ea fides me securum esse non sinebat de praeteritis peccatis meis, quae mihi per baptismum tuum remissa nondum erant.*

⁷⁸ Dazu Weber (Anm. 1), 438f. Die Sache mag anknüpfend an das authentische Gregor-Exzerpt a10 erfunden worden sein: *Papa Gregorius ad Innocentium praefectum Africae: „Quod expositionem sancti Iob vobis transmitti voluistis ... beati Augustini compatriotae vestrae opuscula legite...“.*

⁷⁹ Vgl. Aug. conf. 4,16,30: *Et quid mihi proderat, quod omnes libros artium quas liberales vocant tunc nequissimus malarum cupiditatum servus per me ipsum legi et intellexi, quoscumque legere potui?*

⁸⁰ Der Manichäer *Fortunatus* hat auch in Jordans *Vita Augustini* eine exponierte Rolle als Widersacher des Augustinus; vgl. Saak 2002 (Anm. 1), 798.

– ebenso wie 36, 37 und 38⁸¹ – offenbar nicht zum Urbestand dieser Sammlungen gehört. In diesem Stück ist das mittelalterliche Kolorit besonders auffällig: Augustinus' Vater Patricius sei ein Ritter gewesen, den Aurelius, der König von Karthago, an seinen Hof geholt habe (*Aurelius rex Carthaginensis pro Patricio milite strenuissimo destinavit*), damit er die Adeligen zum Herrscher vorlasse und Kriege, Turniere und Bankette organisiere (...*omnes nobiles ad regem precipere, bella et hastiludia et convivia ordinare*). König Aurelius habe den jungen Augustinus schließlich aus Zuneigung adoptiert und ihm seinen Namen übertragen (*Dum autem rex Aurelius videret puerum Augustinum in curia sua pulchrum, ingeniosum et cunctis virtutibus ornatum, adoptavit sibi eum in filium et nomen ei suum tunc imposuit dicens: 'Aurelius vocaberis eo, quod auro purissimo similis.'*).

Es ist fraglich, ob irgendeiner der in den pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* genannten Autorennamen und Werktitel ernst genommen werden sollte. Zum größten Teil sind anscheinend selbstverfasste Texte bzw. adaptierte Exzerpte als Abschnitte aus originalen Werken ausgegeben worden, welche bestimmten Namen zugewiesen sind, die man mehrheitlich mit Augustinus in Verbindung bringt.⁸² Nur wenige Stücke mögen aus authentischen Texten exzerpiert sein, die zu identifizieren nicht gelungen ist (am ehesten 20, 33, 34, 37). Zu vielen der genannten Namen lassen sich Parallelen aus den *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* bzw. aus den *Epistulae spuriae*⁸³ anführen:

*) »Sanctus Basilius episcopus« soll einen *Sermo de vita et moribus Augustini* (3) sowie einen *Sermo qui incipit »Sapientia edificavit*

⁸¹ Diese Texte sind teilweise in spätmittelalterlichen Hss. überliefert, ohne in Sammlungen von *Commendaciones* eingegliedert zu sein: Zu 36 (~ BHL 801: *Vita de corde S. Augustini*) vgl. etwa die Angaben bei D. Weber, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des heiligen Augustinus 6/1. Österreich. Werkverzeichnis, Wien 1993, 198; I. Schiller, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des heiligen Augustinus 10/1. Ostdeutschland und Berlin. Werkverzeichnis, Wien 2009, 186f. Zu »Eusebius« als historische Quelle von Augustinereremiten vgl. R. Arbesmann, The Edition of the *Vita S. Augustini* in Boston Public Library MS 1483, REAug 11 (1965), 43–54 (49). Zu 38 (*Epistula Avicennae*) vgl. o. Anm. 52.

⁸² Römer 1971 (Anm. 1), 118 und 1976 (Anm. 1), 489f. vermutet, hinter den Verweisen auf »Cyprianus« in den *Epistulae spuriae* stünde »some exegetical compendium of the Bible« bzw. ein »theological compendium of biblical exegesis«. Auszuschließen ist dies nicht, doch glaube ich eher, dass die entsprechenden Angaben frei erfunden sind.

⁸³ Hier sei vermerkt, dass sich einige der obskuren Namen von Briefpartnern des »Augustinus« aus den *Epistulae spuriae* sowohl in s. fr. er. 21 (PL 40,1268) als auch – davon abgeleitet – in Jordans *Vita Augustini* (Saak 2002, Anm. 1, 792) unter jenen zwölf Freunden wiederfinden, mit denen der Bischof von Hippo ein Kloster in Africa gegründet haben soll, namentlich Anastasius, Fabianus, Severus, Dorotheus und Cyrillus.

sibi domum et in ea construxit columpnas vii; miscuit in ea vinum et posuit in ea mensam etc»⁸⁴ (4) verfasst haben. Gemeint ist wohl der griechische Kirchenvater Basilius von Caesarea.⁸⁵ Jordan von Quedlinburg kannte ihn als älteren Zeitgenossen des Augustinus, dessen Regel neben jener des Bischofs von Hippo und jener des Benedikt die älteste und bedeutendste sei (vgl. Arbesmann/ Hümpfner, Anm. 1, 331–333), und war der Meinung, ihm eine unter dem Namen des Augustinus überlieferte Regel zuweisen zu können (vgl. Arbesmann/ Hümpfner, Anm. 1, 170). Im anonymen *Initium sive processus ordinis heremitarum S. Augustini* erscheint Basilius prominent neben Augustinus (vgl. Rano, Anm. 1, 345).

*) »Octavianus dux Campaniae et comes« soll mit Augustinus im Briefverkehr gestanden haben (5; 5a). Ob der von Augustinus in epist. 175 genannte Teilnehmer eines Konzils namens Octavianus gemeint ist, muss offen bleiben.⁸⁶ In zwei Briefen der *Epistulae spuriae* (7; 42) wird »Octavianus imperator« genannt.

*) »Anastasius« schreibt an »Macedonius« (6), an »Nectarius« (7), an »Augustinus« (8) und an »Orosius« (9). Man kennt den Namen »Anastasius« als Adressat von Aug. epist. 145.⁸⁷ In den pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones* gemeint ist sicherlich jener »Anastasius«, mit dem Augustinus laut s. fr. er. 21 ein Kloster in Africa gegründet haben soll (vgl. o. Anm. 83), und der in Jordan von Quedlinburgs *Vita Augustini* zu den *carissimi amici* des Bischofs von Hippo gerechnet wird (Saak 2002, Anm. 1, 794). Er wird erwähnt in s. fr. er. 5 (PL 40,1243); an ihn gerichtet ist epist. sp. 35, von ihm epist. sp. 41.

*) »Richardus« soll einen *Liber contra haereticos* verfasst haben (10); wahrscheinlich ist die selbe Person gemeint wie mit »Richardus de Sancto Victore«, Verfasser eines angeblichen *Sermo de sancto Augustino* (20), sowie »Richardus«, Verfasser eines angeblichen Johanneskommentars (31). Zu denken ist an den Augustinerchorherren Richard von St. Victor († 1173), von dem keine derartigen Werke bekannt sind: Im anonymen *Initium sive processus ordinis heremitarum S. Augustini* wird er als *doctor praeclarus* unter seinen Ordensbrüdern hervorgehoben (vgl. Rano, Anm. 1, 343); im *Sermo de Augustino* eines anonymen Augustinereremiten

⁸⁴ Vgl. Prov. 9,1f.

⁸⁵ Vorsichtig Weber (Anm. 1), 436, Anm. 13: »Freilich ist auch die Möglichkeit in Betracht zu ziehen, daß ein mittelalterlicher Prediger dieses Namens gemeint ist.«

⁸⁶ Vgl. Weber (Anm. 1), 438.

⁸⁷ Vgl. Weber (Anm. 1), 436.

wird aus seinem Kommentar zur Apokalypse zitiert (vgl. Rano, Anm. 3, 76). Die *Epistulae spuriae* bieten einen Brief des »Augustinus« an »Richardus presbyter« (45).

*) »Possidonius episcopus Calamensis« schreibt an „Poncianus episcopus« (11), an „Paulinus diacon« (12) und an »Macedonius« (24 *de laude Augustini*); außerdem soll er eine *Historia* des Augustinus (25; 25a) verfasst haben. Gemeint ist der Biograph des Augustinus, Possidius von Calama, der von Autoren des Augustinereremitenordens eifrig gelesen wurde.⁸⁸ Ein originales Exzerpt aus Possidius ist in die *Elogia* im *Milleloquium* des Bartholomäus von Urbino aufgenommen: a58.

*) »Valerius episcopus« schreibt an »Nectarius« (13) und an »Paulinus« (14); »Paulinus« schreibt auch ihm (15). Gemeint ist Valerius, der Vorgänger des Augustinus als Bischof von Hippo.⁸⁹ In s. 355 (PL 39,1570) gibt Augustinus an, Valerius *beatae memoriae senex* habe ihm einst einen Garten zur Klostergründung zur Verfügung gestellt: Dieser Text floss in die *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* ein (vgl. o. Anm. 44), und Valerius erlangte bei Autoren des Augustinereremitenordens eine gewaltige Prominenz. Vgl. etwa s. fr. er. 4 (PL 40, 1242), 5 (PL 40,1243) und 21 (PL 40,1263f.); epist. sp. 23 und 41; die Berichte in Jordans *Vita Augustini* (Saak 2002, Anm. 1,794–801) und *Liber Vitasfratrum* (Arbesmann/ Hümpfner, Anm. 1, 42; 339; 418); Nicholas de Alessandria (Rano, Anm. 1, 368); Augustinus de Ancona (Rano, Anm. 3, 16); Heinrich von Friemar (Rano, Anm. 3, 26).

*) »Paulinus« schreibt an »Valerius« (15), an »Macedonius« (16) und an »Augustinus« (17; 21). Gemeint ist wohl die selbe Person, die Briefe von »Possidonius« (12) und von »Valerius« (14) erhalten haben soll. Da er in 12 als »Paulinus diacon« bezeichnet wird, darf man in ihm Paulinus von Mailand sehen, der diesen Titel getragen hat.⁹⁰ Dieser bewegte sich nach 397 eine Zeitlang im nordafrikanischen Umfeld des Augustinus, auf dessen Anregung hin er seine Ambrosius-Biographie verfasste. Offenbar meint »Paulinus« aber gleichzeitig Paulinus von Nola, der mit

⁸⁸ In Br2 steht ausdrücklich *Possidonius Calamensis episcopus* (4v). Zur Schreibung »Possidonius« vgl. o. Anm. 63 sowie Römer 1971 (Anm. 1), 127, Anm. 18. Jordan von Quedlinburg, Bartholomäus von Urbino, Nicholas de Alessandria und Hermann von Schildesche gebrauchen diese Form anscheinend durchwegs.

⁸⁹ An ihn gerichtet Aug. epist. 21.

⁹⁰ Vgl. Weber (Anm. 1), 437. Br2 identifiziert den Verfasser von 15 als *Paulinus Nolanus episcopus* (4v). Zur Zuverlässigkeit der Angaben in Br2 vgl. u. Anm. 92, 93 und 97.

Augustinus in Briefkontakt gestanden ist: Einige entsprechende Exzerpte sind in die *Elogia* des Bartholomäus bzw. in die *Commendacio* Jordans aufgenommen: a7, 22, 39; b3. Vor allem ist 21 wenig mehr als ein Cento aus adaptierten Exzerpten zweier authentischer Briefe des Paulinus von Nola (epist. 50,18; 4,1f.). An »Paulinus« gerichtet ist außerdem epist. sp. 23 sowie ein Abschnitt von epist. sp. 27.

*) »Macedonius« schreibt an »Augustinus« (18); er erhält Briefe von »Anastasius« (6), »Paulinus« (16) und »Possidonius« (24). Ein Macedonius stand in regem Briefkontakt mit Augustinus.⁹¹ Exzerpte aus diesen Briefen sind in Bartholomäus' *Elogia* bzw. in Jordans *Commendacio* eingegangen: a5; b5. Von »Macedonius« stammt außerdem epist. sp. 54, an ihn gerichtet epist. sp. 50 und 53.

*) »Orosius« schreibt an »Augustinus« (19); er selbst erhält einen Brief von »Anastasius« (9). Gemeint ist Paulus Orosius, dessen Verbundenheit zu Augustinus bekannt war. Ein originales Exzerpt aus Orosius ist in die *Elogia* des Bartholomäus von Urbino bzw. in die *Commendacio* Jordans aufgenommen: a48.

*) »Prosper« soll einen *Sermo de laudibus Augustini* (22) verfasst haben.⁹² Gemeint ist wohl Prosper von Aquitanien, dessen Nähe zu Augustinus in vielen seiner Werke zum Ausdruck kommt. In die *Elogia* des Bartholomäus bzw. in die *Commendacio* Jordans sind unter seinem Namen zwei Exzerpte aus authentischen Texten aufgenommen, wovon eines allerdings aus Iulianus Pomerius' *De vita contemplativa* stammt (vgl. dazu o. Anm. 63): a2 und 16.

*) »Hilarius episcopus« schreibt an »Amatus« (23).⁹³ Hilarius kennt man als Adressat von Aug. epist. 157 und 178. Ein originales Exzerpt aus einem Brief des Hilarius an Augustinus ist in die *Elogia* des Bartholomäus von Urbino aufgenommen: a24. Ein Briefwechsel zwischen »Hilarius« und »Augustinus« findet sich in den *Epistulae spuriae* (I; II): Es handelt sich um kurze Exzerpte aus Aug. epist. 156 und 157, die so ausgewählt wurden, dass allein die Bitte an

⁹¹ Vgl. Weber (Anm. 1), 437.

⁹² Br2 identifiziert diesen Prosper als *Prosper Reginensis ecclesie presul* (4r), womit der Augustinereremit Prosper von Reggio († 1332/3) gemeint sein dürfte. Von diesem ist aber kein entsprechender Text bekannt, und Br2 tendiert dazu, Namen willkürlich mit bekannten Persönlichkeiten zu identifizieren; vgl. o. Anm. 90 und u. Anm. 93.

⁹³ Br2 identifiziert diesen Hilarius als *Hylarius Pictaviensis ecclesie episcopus* (4r), d.h. Hilarius von Poitiers, was chronologisch keinen Sinn ergibt; vgl. o. Anm. 92 und u. Anm. 97.

Augustinus um Belehrung stehen blieb. »Amatus« lässt sich mit keiner bekannten Persönlichkeit zwingend verbinden; vielleicht ist jener Amandus gemeint, an den mehrere Briefe des Paulinus von Nola gerichtet sind (epist. 9, 12, 15, 21, 36).

*) »Iulianus episcopus« schreibt an den Stadtpräfekten von Rom (26). Dies mag herausgesponnen sein aus Aug. nupt. conc. 2,2,2, wo zu lesen steht, dass Bischof Julian von Aeclanum einen Brief nach Rom geschickt habe. An einen »Iulianus comes« gerichtet ist epist. sp. 39.

*) »Cyprianus« schreibt an »Damasus« (27) und soll einen *Liber de sacramentis* verfasst haben (28). Gemeint sind offenbar der berühmte Bischof Cyprian von Karthago⁹⁴ und der nicht weniger prominente Bischof von Rom Damasus. »Cyprian« wird in den *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* (25, PL 40,1276; 28, PL 40,1284) und in den *Epistulae spuriae* (6; 25; 34) als »source of most queer statements«⁹⁵ herangezogen. Diese Prominenz rührt zweifellos von der Tatsache her, dass Cyprian, der *compatriota* des Augustinus (s. fr. er. 25, PL 40,1276; vgl. auch 38 »Avicenna« an »Augustinus«: *Apparuisti, compatriota noster...*), als Märtyrer und Schriftsteller weithin bekannt war.

*) »Donatus« schreibt an »Marcellus« (29). Beide Namen tauchen in den Werken des Augustinus öfters auf und können in den *Commendaciones* kaum an konkreten Persönlichkeiten festgemacht werden. Jedenfalls sind »Donatus (presbyter / episcopus)« und »Marcellus« als Briefpartner des Augustinus in den *Epistulae spuriae* stark vertreten (Donatus: 34; 48; 52; Marcellus: 3).

*) »Aquilus comes« schreibt an »Augustinus« (30). »Aquilus« lässt sich anscheinend mit keiner bekannten Persönlichkeit plausibel verbinden.

*) »Calcedonius« soll einen *Tractatus de sacramentis* verfasst haben (32). Es ist unklar, ob dies die selbe Person meinen könnte wie der in 12 genannte »Calcidorus«. Jedenfalls war dem bzw. den Verfasser(n) der *Commendaciones* kaum bewusst, dass sich hinter dem verballhornten Namen der antike Gelehrte Didymos

⁹⁴ Die historische Ungereimtheit hat bereits ein Leser von Jordans *Commendacio* gesehen. Am unteren Folienrand von Paris, Arsenal 251, 78r wurde in einer spätmittelalterlichen Hand notiert: *Non sunt iste Cyprianus ille magnus doctor Carthaginensis de quo ipse meminit in 5 Confessionum et in De doctrina Christiana quia iam obierat*. Zweifel eines Lesers lassen sich auch einer Glosse am Ende von epist. sp. 46 entnehmen: *Utrum tamen hanc epistolam scripserit Augustinus tempore sui erroris, ignoro. Tamen peritius scripta est*.

⁹⁵ Römer 1976 (Anm. 1), 489f.

Chalkenteros verbirgt.⁹⁶ Es fällt auf, dass der angebliche *Tractatus de sacramentis* des »Calcedonius« das selbe Thema wie der *Liber de sacramentis* des »Cyprianus« (28) behandelt haben soll.

*) »Remigius« (33; 34) soll wohl mit Remigius von Auxerre († ca. 908) identifiziert werden, in dessen Werken sich die entsprechenden Exzerpte nicht haben finden lassen.⁹⁷ Es ist unklar, warum er in den *Commendaciones* auftaucht.

*) »Albertus Magnus Ratisponensis episcopus« (37) ist der gleichnamige Dominikaner († 1280). Hier gilt wie bei »Remigius«: Das Zitat hat sich in den Werken Alberts nicht finden lassen und die Aufnahme dieser Person in die *Commendaciones* erscheint rätselhaft.

*) »Avicenna medicus« schreibt an »Augustinus« (38). Avicenna († 1037) fand zweifellos Aufnahme in die *Commendaciones*, weil er dem Verfasser (zu Unrecht) als *compatriota* des Augustinus galt (vgl. o. bei Cyprian). Anscheinend sollte demonstriert werden, dass der große Augustinus sogar diesen prominenten Nichtchristen bekehren könnte. Man beachte, dass Avicenna in epist. sp. 42 von »Augustinus« genannt wird.

*) Als Adressaten von Briefen, die selbst nicht als Autoren vertreten sind, bleiben »Nectarius episcopus« (7; 13) und »Poncianus episcopus« (11). Nectarius kennt man aus Briefen des Augustinus.⁹⁸ Er taucht auffällig häufig in den *Epistulae spuriae* auf (10; 33; 41; 51; 55)⁹⁹. »Poncianus episcopus« ist der in den *Confessiones* mehrmals erwähnte Landsmann des Augustinus Ponticianus (8,6,14; 8,6,15; 8,7,16; 8,7,18). Jordan von Quedlinburg nennt diese Person – wie vor ihm Jacobus de Voragine in seiner Augustinus-Vita – stets »Poncianus« und berichtet in seinem *Liber Vitasfratrum*, offenbar anknüpfend an s. fr. er. 21 (PL 40,1269) und 22 (PL 40,1272), er sei später Bischof geworden (Arbesmann/ Hümpfner, Anm. 1, 80); noch mehr über »Poncianus« weiß er in seiner *Vita Augustini* zu erzählen (Saak 2002, Anm. 1,786f. und 791). Auch Nicolaus de Alessandria und Hermann von Schildesche kennen diese Person als »Poncianus« (vgl. Rano, Anm. 1, 366; Rano, Anm. 3, 42).

⁹⁶ Vgl. Arbesmann (Anm. 1), 350; Weber (Anm. 1), 437.

⁹⁷ Laut Br2 stammt 33 von *Remigius episcopus* (5r). Remigius von Auxerre war aber niemals Bischof, und Br2 dürfte hier wie auch sonst bloß raten; vgl. o. Anm. 92 und 93. Das Exzerpt 33 war auch dem Augustinereremiten Heinrich von Friemar († 1340) als von Remigius stammend bekannt; vgl. Rano (Anm. 3), 25, 28 und 30.

⁹⁸ Vgl. Weber (Anm. 1), 436.

⁹⁹ In vielen Hss. erscheint der Name als »Neptarius«.

Aufgrund der Überlieferungsverhältnisse der pseudepigraphischen *Commendaciones Augustini*, ihres Inhalts im Allgemeinen und einzelner Parallelen im Konkreten ist nicht daran zu zweifeln, dass diese Texte in einem vergleichbaren, wenn nicht im gleichen Umfeld produziert bzw. gesammelt worden sind wie die *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* und die *Epistulae spuriae*: Die Verbindung zum Augustiner-eremitenorden erscheint klar.¹⁰⁰ Mindestens jene Stücke, die in Jordans vor 1343 zusammengestellte *Collectanea* bzw. in das vor 1343/4 abgeschlossene *Milleloquium* des Bartholomäus aufgenommen sind, müssen früher entstanden sein als »um die Wende des 14. zum 15. Jahrhundert«¹⁰¹. Allerdings wirken sie im Vergleich zu den älteren Texten der *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*¹⁰² und zu manchen der *Epistulae spuriae* eher sekundär: Sie werden kaum längere Zeit vor dem ersten Drittel des 14. Jh. produziert worden sein.

III. Edition

Für die Edition wurden den Texten, die in unterschiedlicher Auswahl und Reihenfolge überliefert sind, Nummern zugewiesen; dem Apparat ist zu entnehmen, welche Überlieferungsträger das jeweilige Stück enthalten. Der Text gewisser Abschnitte unterscheidet sich in einzelnen Codices stark: Er galt offenbar keineswegs als unanastbar. Bei der Entscheidung zwischen Varianten wurde meist den älteren Zeugen, insbesondere Iord., gefolgt. Wenig bedeutende Varianten (vor allem orthographische) in einzelnen Codices sind nicht vollständig im Apparat dokumentiert.

Eine moderne Interpunktion wurde der leichteren Lesbarkeit halber durchgeführt. Die Orthographie richtet sich dagegen nach den älteren Handschriften: Sie weicht stark von »klassischen« Normen ab und zeichnet wahrscheinlich ein einigermaßen getreues Abbild der Gepflogenheiten der mittelalterlichen Verfasser. Im Apparat wird neben den üblichen Abkürzungen die Angabe *uv.* (*ut videtur*) verwen-

¹⁰⁰ Jordan von Quedlinburg greift in seinen Predigten auf Augustinus s. 129–149 und 151 der Sammlung *Sermones Dan de sanctis* (vgl. o. Anm. 54) ausgiebig auf die *Commendaciones* zurück; auch in dem ebenda als s. 150 abgedruckten *Sermo de Sancto Augustino*, angeblich 1352 von Fernandus de Hispania in Avignon gehalten (zu Fernandus vgl. Rano [Anm. 2], 724–726), werden sie benutzt. Die Sache ist weiter zu untersuchen.

¹⁰¹ So der Datierungsvorschlag von Weber (Anm. 1), 440.

¹⁰² Zur unterschiedlichen Entstehungszeit dieser Predigten vgl. Saak 2007 (Anm. 1), 110–140.

[*Commendaciones sancti Augustini*]

(1) Augustinus est alter magnus Abraham *pater multarum gentium*. Augustinus est alter Ioseph magnus scripture sacre pabulum prebens universo mundo. Augustinus est alter Moyses loquens cum deo. Augustinus est alter magnus Helyas retorquens animos populorum ab omni iniquitate. Augustinus est alter magnus Yosias abhominacionem gentium dissipans. Augustinus est alter magnus Mathathias planta paterne legis. Augustinus est alter magnus baptista predicans *viam veritatis*. Augustinus est alter Iob *magnus inter omnes orientales*. Augustinus est alter Petrus curam gerens omnium agnorum Christi. Augustinus est alter magnus Paulus lumen et doctor universi orbis. Augustinus est alter Iohannes ewangelista volans quasi aquila super omnia montium cacumina.

(2) O vere beata dei civitas, quam honorat civitatis catholice dux et rector, quam decorat militantis ecclesie lux et doctor, quam dulcorat unitatis heremitice nux et decor. O vere beata civitas, quam sustentat lapis angularis duplex edificium ordinum dum fundat, apis divinalis suplex orificium hominum dum fecundat, fenix regularis simplex sacrificium virginum dum emundat. O vere felix civitas, que meruisti talem presulem salutaris

1, 1–2, 8 Augustinus ... scismaticis] cf. Nich. Ales. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 45, 1982, 361-3) 10–11 Augustinus ... cacumina] cf. Ps. Hier. epist. de XII doct. (PL 23, 724A) 'Augustinus episcopus volans per montium cacumina quasi aquila' 2, 4 apis divinalis] cf. Aug. epist. 109, 1 'o vere artificiosa apis dei' 5 fenix regularis] cf. Mig. Mas. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 53, 1990, 35) 'phenix ista mirabilis est Augustinus doctor'

1, 1 Gen. 17, 4 7 Ps. 118, 30 8 Iob 1, 3

1 *tit.*: commendacio sancti augustini ex diversis auctoritatibus doctorum *Iord.*; incipiunt commendaciones sancti augustini diversorum doctorum *B*; incipiunt commendaciones sanctissimi patris nostri et patroni augustini diversorum doctorum et tantum quantum reperi in exemplari scripsi *S*; laudes et preconia sancti aurelii augustini ypponensis episcopi *β*; preconiale augustini *Br*₂

1 Augustinus ... 2, 8 scismaticis] *adest in α* | Abraham] et *add. S* 2 pabulum sacre scripture *tr. S* 6 planta] plantator *proposuit Cl. Weidmann* 8 orientales] iob primus (*uv.*) *add. B* 2, 1 beata *pc. B* | dei *sl. B* 2 quam¹ ... 3 decor] quam dulcorat...decor, quam decorat...doctor *tr. B (pc.)*

sacrificii pro catholicis, talem pugilem officii singularis ab hereticis, talem vigilem solsticii singularis in scismaticis.

(3) *Sanctus Basilius episcopus in sermone quem fecit de vita et moribus sancti Augustini*

Celebraturi sumus hodie, fratres, natalem sancti Augustini, apud quem fuit fons vite et in cuius lumine et splendore tota ecclesia hodie radiatur.

- 5 Ecce hodie magnum spectaculum positum est ante oculos mentis nostre illius magni Augustini Aurelii, qui vere norma et speculum extitit in natura. Ecce pater orphanorum et iudex viduarum, qui peccatores convertit et conversis vitam eternam promittit. Ecce magnificus Augustinus Aurelius doctor, qui pigros hortatur, afflictos consolatur, docuit studiosos,
- 10 instruxit ignaros, adiuvit dimicantes, liberavit oppressos, fugavit hereticos, sanavit infirmantes. Ecce magnum *vas electionis*, qui nomen Christi portavit coram regibus et principibus et filiis Israel semper predicando, et fornax caritatis, quem nichil separat a caritate Christi. Ecce Augustinus Aurelius margarita celestis, archa Noe et antique legis sanctitatisque
- 15 exemplum. Ecce fervens emulator caritatis peritusque imitator dei, quem nichil separat a caritate Christi. Quod si vidissemus, fratres, quanto fervore bonos diligebat, quanta caritate malos reprehendebat, quanto deside-

3, 5 magnum ... nostre] *cf.* Aug. s. 301 (PL 38, 1380) 'magnum spectaculum positum est ante oculos fidei nostrae'

3, 3–4 apud ... vite] *cf.* Ps. 35, 10 11–12 vas ... Israel] *cf.* Act. 9, 15 13 separat ... Christi] *cf.* Rom. 8, 35 16 separat ... Christi] *cf.* Rom. 8, 35

7 ab ... 8 singularis *om. S*

3, 1 sanctus ... 16 Christi] *adest in* β | sanctus ... 20 operatur] *adest in* Br_2
 sanctus ... 48 coronatur] *adest in* $Iord. \alpha$ 3 celebraturi ... 12 et³] ecce magnificus
 augustinus aurelius Br_2 | hodie sumus *tr. S* | sanctissimi β 4 hodie tota ecclesia *tr. \alpha*
 hodie] scilicet *uv. Br_1*; simul Br_3 5 spectaculum magnum *tr. \alpha* 6 aurelii (arioli β)
 augustini *tr. \alpha\beta* | vera β | et speculum *om. \beta* 7 et] pius β 8 promisit $\alpha\beta$ | Aurelius ...
 9 pigros] fideles β 9 qui] sine labore *add. B* | docuit ... 13 ecce] hic est β 11 infir-
 mantes] egrotos α 12 predicando] et ululando *uv. add. B* | et³ ... 14 Aurelius] ecce
 hic est S ; hic est augustinus B 13 ecce ... 15 exemplum *om. Br_2* 14 Aurelius *om.*
 Br_3 | et *om. \alpha* 15 ecce ... 16 Christi *om. Iord. Br_2* | fervens emulator] forma β | peri-
 tusque imitator dei *om. \beta* | quam Br_1 16 fratres *om. S*

rio captivos redimebat, vere nos dixisse puto: Ecce homo, qui cum angelis volat, cum archangelis cantat, cum Seraphim ardet, cum Cherubim lucet, cum Thronis sedet, cum Virtutibus mirabilia operatur. Ecce ergo velud alter Helias amplius in mirabilibus; ecce velud alter Ioseph *firmandum gentis rector populi princeps fratrum suorum*; ecce velud alter Thobias, qui esurientes pascebat, nudis vestimenta prebebat, captivos redimebat, mortuos sepeliebat; ecce velud alter Enoch amplius spiritu et virtute et translatus in paradysum. Iste est ille doctor doctorum, qui clericos apostolica vita ditavit, coniugatos exemplis ornavit, virgines disciplina sublimavit, viduas elemosinis et oracionibus decoravit, pauperes et orphanos sua doctrina confortavit, infirmantes roboravit, vacillantes confirmavit, cecos illuminavit et hereses extirpavit et ecclesiam dei totaliter illustravit, ita ut nulla in ea macula neque ruga deinceps poterit apparere. Animabus enim nostris non solum ornamenta, sed et medicamenta voluit providere. Studuit enim sanctissimus Augustinus nostra **dissuta consue-* 20
re, nostra conscissa sarcire, nostra vulnera curare, nostra sordida abluere,
nostra perdita reperare, et ea, que sunt integra, spiritualibus margaritis
ornare. Spiritales enim margaritas de paradisi patria nobis attulit, dum 25
annis quadraginta et amplius totam dei ecclesiam doctrina sua decoravit.
Nullamque mercedem ex hoc optare voluit, nisi ut suam sanctam doctrin-
am studeamus audire et ea, que bona sunt, secundum vires studeamus
operibus adimplere. Hoc enim in vita sua semper voluit post baptismum
et optavit. Nos vero, fratres, ad illum preces fundamus, cuius anima Sera- 30
phim ardere videmus. 35

18–20 angelis ... operatur] *cf.* Herm. Schil. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 53, 1990, 73) 'laudat cum angelis, tripudiat cum arcangelis, miratur cum virginibus ... cum thronis se dignum iudicat ... cum cherubin cognoscit archana ... cum seraphim ardet'
 30–39 nulla ... adimplere] *cf.* s. fr. er. 1 (PL 40, 1235)

21 amplius ... mirabilibus] *cf.* Sir. 48, 4 21–22 Sir. 49, 17 24–25 Enoch ... paradysum] *cf.* Sir. 44, 16 30 nulla ... apparere] *cf.* Eph. 5, 27

18 ecce] hic *add. a* 19 cum Cherubim lucet *om. Iord. Br₂* 20 ecce ... 25 paradysum] et *infra Iord.* 26 dotavit *a* 27 elemosinas *uv. S* | pauperes ... 29 *et² om. Iord.* 29 totamque ecclesiam sua doctrina illuminavit *Iord.* 30 ita ... 40 optavit] et *infra in fine sermonis concludit Iord.* 32 *dissuta scripsi* (*cf.* s. fr. er. 1, PL 40, 1235); *diruta codd.*
 36 quadraginta] *xl B* 39 baptismum *S* qui *codex semper habet bapt-*

phica a sanctis angelis hodierna die meruit eternaliter sublimari, ut de sua felicitate securus adhuc de filiorum salute sollicitus semper pro nostris intercedere non desistat. Ad tantam felicitatem, fratres, totis viribus properemus, ut videre possimus regem regum *procedentem* a patre *tamquam*
 45 *sponsus de thalamo suo*. Ibi enim, fratres, angelorum chorus exultat, illic prophetarum ordo congaudet, illic gloriosus apostolorum chorus tripudiat, illic martirum exercitus candidat vernat et rutilat, illic confessorum fortitudo letatur, illuc virginum et viduarum turba coronatur.

(4) *Basilius sic inquit in alio sermone, qui incipit "Sapientia edificavit sibi domum et in ea construxit columpnas vii; miscuit in ea vinum et posuit in ea mensam etc"*

Et quis est iste, qui domus dei appellatur, nisi ille doctor doctorum, qui
 5 virtutum norma et speculum extitit in natura? Quis est hic – et laudabimus eum – nisi ille, qui fecit mirabilia in vita sua, nisi ille magnus Augustinus Aurelius, cui post apostolos dominus tantam gratiam donare dignatus est, ut in omnem terram audiatur sonus eius et in fines orbis terre verba eius. Qui, dum esset cathecuminus, baptismum differebat invenire cupiens
 10 rationem iuxta inanem philosophiam, utrum aliqua ratio fidei nostre preberet experimentum. Sed volens dominus Augustinum pauperem erigere de stercore et ponere cum principibus, ut solium glorie teneret, percussit eum grandi dolore dencium, ut eciam usum loquendi amitteret: Tunc circumstantibus scripsit, ut omnes secum genua flecterent. Tandem
 15 matris lacrimarum effusa copia sanatus est et ad baptismum currens efficitur domus sapientie. Hec Basilius.

4, 9–16 qui ... sapientie] cf. Aug. conf. 9, 4, 12

44–45 Ps. 18, 6 4, 1–3 Prov. 9, 1–2 8 in¹ ... eius²] cf. Ps. 18, 5 11–12 pauperem ... principibus] cf. Ps. 112, 7–9

41 hodierna die meruit] meruit hodie α | ut ... 48 coronatur] ad hanc gloriam sine mora volumus ut salutare et videre possimus illum patrem aurelium augustinum qui profunda fluviorum scrutatus est et cuncta abscondita super cunctos produxit in lucem. Hec ille α

4, 1 Basilius ... 16 Basilius] adest in α 5 extitit] excitat S 6 aurelius augustinus tr. S 7 dominus om. S 11 preberet] probaret proposuit Cl. Weidmann 15 copia effusa tr. S 16 Basilius] ille S

(5) *Octavianus dux Campanie in epistola ad Augustinum*

Beati predicantur et dicuntur omnes, qui te audiunt, sancte pater Augustine, et qui *tua amicitia decorantur*. Beatus, qui te audit et intelligit *et in lege* et doctrina tua *meditatur die ac nocte!* Beatus, qui te vigilando expectat et qui te in foro predicando magnificat! Beatus, qui tuam doctrinam amplectitur, quoniam eam sequendo vitam eternam meretur! Beatus vere est et vere beatissimus, qui te beatum fecit et super plebem suam principem te constituit et inter homines vitam angelicam ducere iussit, *ut inter homines esses dux populi, princeps Egypti, defensor fidei, turris fortitudinis* Syon, martyr desiderio, *speculum sine macula, doctor gentium*, aput quem gentes thesauros sapientie noverunt esse reconditos. O luculentissime sancte fidei edificator et omnium sapientium magnificus emendator, in cuius lingua omnes sermones fidei, in cuius corde omnis sapientia, quam spiritu sapientie sine sudore inplevit ille virtutum omnium artifex, qui est splendor lucis eterne et dei maiestatis ymago. Ipse est enim, qui omnia innovat et *apostolos et prophetas instituit; quem petisti frangere surditatem tuam, et ecce per eum datus est tibi sensus et spiritus sapientie

5, 10 martyr desiderio] cf. Henr. Friem. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 53, 1990, 31) 'unde de ipso canitur: martyr desiderio'

5, 3 Sir. 48, 11 3-4 Ps. 1, 2 8-9 1 Par. 17, 7 9 Gen. 42, 6 9-10 Ps. 60, 4 10 Sap. 7, 26 | 1 Tim. 2, 7 15 splendor ... ymago] cf. Sap. 7, 26 17 datus ... sapientie] cf. Sap. 7, 7

5, 1 Octavianus ... 22 dissolvis] *adest in Iord. a Br₂ | dux*] et comes *add. α* 2 beati ... 11 reconditos *om. Br₂* 4 *lege et om. α* | beatus ... 5 magnificat *om. Iord.* 6 sequendo] amplectendo astringendo *α* | meretur] amplectitur *α* *qui codices add.* beata mater que te portavit cuius laus non deficiat in ore tuo cuius memoria in benedictione cuius lacrimae in exultatione metent cuius labor sine labore orando lacrimando obsecrando predicando eundo et redeundo annos viginti duos et amplius deo fertiliter attulit fructum centesimum 9 dux esses *tr. α* | fidei turris] xxii B | beatissimus] sanctissimus S 12 fidei] chatolice *add. Br₂* 13 omnes ... fidei] ignea sancti spiritus igne plenissime inflammata omnes sermones fidei *Br₂ | in² om. α* | cor omni *α* 14 quam ... sine] et omnibus operibus sciencie et discipline sine tuo labore et *α* | quam ... 22 dissolvis] divina sed et humana patenter reconduntur *Br₂ | replevit α* 15 splendor] candor *α* | qui² ... 16 instituit *om. Iord.* 16 apostolos *scripsi*; amicos *codd.* | quem] cui *α* | frangere] ut frangeret *α*

et doctrina discipline, et vere doctor eximius doces sobrietatem et prudentiam, iusticiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nil estimatur in hac miserrima
 20 vita. O pater Augustine, *aquila grandis* altius prospiciens et *leo fortissimus*, qui versucias sermonum et argumentorum super cunctos philosophos dissolvis!

(5a) *Responsio Augustini ad eundem*

Dilecto filio et quem diligo in veritate Octaviano Campanie duci et comiti Augustinus episcopus salutem.

Dum infra me ipsum meas considero qualitates, quibus vermiculis et
 5 pullicibus nullatenus resistere valeo, *adtendens, que loqueris de me ipso, confundor et dico et tibi et ceteris vere adulantibus: Vere amici dolosi vos estis, qui *subplantatis intimum amicum vestrum in fumo et ebrietate! Bene utique me tantum laudare fecissent, si amici in foro me vendere debuissent. Hanc laudis presumptionem supplico ut deponas nec angelis
 10 me comparare deinceps presummas nec beatum nec in aliquo me laudare

20 Augustine aquila] cf. Mig. Mas. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 53, 1990, 35) 'aquila grandis doctor videlicet Augustinus' 5a, 4–11 dum ... pervenero] cf. Aug. conf. 10, 37, 61 4–5 vermiculis ... pullicibus] cf. Hier. epist. 73, 5 'nos vermiculi et pulices' 9 hanc ... deponas] cf. Aug. epist. 137, 3 'hanc de me opinionem facile praesumptam quaeso deponas'

20 Ezech. 17, 3 20–21 Prov. 30, 30

18 et² ... doces] ut velud eximius doctor α | et³ om. Iord. 19 quibus ... 20 vita] et infra Iord. 20 Augustine] qui ut add. Iord. | alta α | prospicis Iord. | fortissimus] fortitudinis α 21 philosophantes α 22 dissolvis] quid miraris si fidelium turba circumdaris et aput seniores veneraris ut cunctorum paterfamilias et in conspectu regum et potentum sublimaris quid miraris si mirabilis predicaris cum te homines audientes et videntes manum ori imponunt propterea sancte pater iam habes immortalitatem eternam et memoriam quoniam docuisti populos et omnium gencium naciones nos autem ingenio pauperes alte scire volentes ad te doctorum patrem confugimus ut exposicionem sancti iob quam nuper pater edidisti ut audivimus ad romanorum partes transmittere non graveris ora pro nobis tu qui in deo quiescis add. α

5a, 1 responsio ... 14 peccatore] adest in α 4 infra] intra proposuit Cl. Weidmann vermiculis] vinculis uv. S 5 adtendens coniecit Cl. Weidmann; adtendem codd. 6 et² om. S 7 subplantatis scripsi; subplantare codd. | post ebrietate lacunam suspicatur Cl. Weidmann 10 deinceps me comparare tr. S

animadvertas, quousque ad salutis portum pervenero. Expositionem vero libri sancti Iob actute videre volumus et una cum fratribus meis apponere et minuere intendimus, si opus fuerit, deinde ad tuam sinceram caritatem transmittere, cum valemus. Pax tecum et ora pro me peccatore.

(6) *Anastasius in epistola XIX ad Macedonium*

Si diligenter considero et attendo, magnifice domine comes, vitam et condiciones beatissimi Augustini, certe per omnes fideles dici potest, quod ipse est alter Moyses, quem deus *glorificavit in conspectu regum* et excelsum fecit illum; ipse est alter Aaron, quem coronavit *corona aurea* 5 *super mitram eius expressa signo sanctitatis, gloria honoris et opus fortitudinis*; ipse est alter Ihesus Nave *maximus in salutem electorum dei* et magnus atque terribilis ut acies castrorum in pugnando hostes et fidei inimicos; ipse est alter Caleph, qui destruxit *murmur malicie* et in senectute perfectus et gloriosus permansit; ipse est alter Samuel, qui *renovavit imperium et in lege domini ampliavit servorum dei congregacionem*; ipse est alter Nathan propheta, qui *cum leonibus lusit* et cum eis permansit quasi cum agnis; ipse est alter David, qui *occidit Gygantem* et Golyam interfecit et Phylisteos debellavit; ipse est alter Salomon princeps pacis et plenus iusticia et sapiencia; ipse est alter Ezechias, qui *munivit civitatem* 10 *et in medium puteos aquarum construxit*; ipse est alter Helias ampliatus in mirabilibus et qui in diebus suis non pertimuit principes et in morte mirabilia operatus est; ipse est alter Enoch filius $\dagger ei \dagger$ in spiritu et virtute; ipse est alter Ioseph *firmamentum gentis, rector populi, princeps fratrum suo-* 15

6, 4 Sir. 45, 3 5–7 Sir. 45, 14 7 Sir. 46, 2 9 Sir. 46, 9 10–11 Sir. 46, 16 11 Sir. 46, 17 12–13 Sir. 47, 3 14–15 Salomon ... sapiencia] cf. Sir. 47, 15–16 15–16 Sir. 48, 19 16–17 ampliatus in mirabilibus] cf. Sir. 48, 4 18 Enoch ... virtute] cf. Sir. 44, 16 19–20 Sir. 49, 17

11 expositionem ... 14 valemus] cf. *supra* additamentum ad 5, 22, quod exstat in α 12 sancti] beati S | actute] *haud scio an actutum* 13 incendimus S

6, 1 Anastasius ... 23 dei] *adest in Iord.* $\alpha \beta$ | Macedonium] comitem *add.* α 2 et attendo *om.* β | vitam et *om.* β 3 beati Br_3 5 coronavit] deus ornavit β | aurea *om.* β 6 expressam α | sanctitatis ... fortitudinis] etc usque ad fortitudinis α | gloria Br_3 ; glorie *rell.* 7 ipse ... 10 permansit *om.* β | electorum] ecclesiarum *Iord.* β 8 in expugnando S ; in expugnando B | inimicos fidei *tr.* α 11 in lege] legem β | ipse ... 18 virtute *om.* β 12 lusit] vixit *Iord.* β 13 occidit *om.* α 16 medio *Iord.* β | in mirabilibus et *om.* *Iord.* 18 Enoch ... 19 alter *om.* α | ei] *fortasse eius vel dei*

- 20 *rum, cuius ossa mirabilia operata sunt; ipse est alter Symon Onie sacerdos magnus, qui in vita sua suffulsit domum et in diebus suis corroboravit templum, qui quasi stella matutina in medio nebule et quasi luna plena in diebus suis lucet et quasi sol refulgens sic refulsit in templo dei.*

(7) *Anastasius in epistola ad Nectarium episcopum*

- Tanta erat excellencia et sublimitas sanctitatis patris Augustini, quod omnem dei servorum vitam culpabilem et reprehensibilem apparere faciebat. Studeamus, amice, omnibus virtutibus prepollere, ut ipsum imitari
5 valeamus. Amen.

(8) *Anastasius in quadam epistola, quam scripsit ad sanctum Augustinum*

- Intercede pro nobis, sancte pater Augustine, apud Christum dominum nostrum, qui te de tenebris vocavit in admirabile lumen suum et fecit te
signaculum perfecte similitudinis, plenum sapientia, perfectum decore,
5 gloriam Ierusalem, ornamentum seculi, margaritam celestem, archam Noe et leticiam Israel. Ave, o beate beatorum Augustine, qui es divine lucis amator, splendor sancte ecclesie, piscator et doctor rationabilium piscium, palmitis fructus, vulnerator dyaboli! Ave, o sol orbis terrarum cuncta illuminans, os dei lingua ignita sapientiam promens, fons sanctus
10 sanctitatem emanans, qui mare inebriasti, gressibus sanctificasti, qui terram purpuream tua sapientia fecisti. Ave, pater sanctissime, et memor sis Anastasii filii tui! Amen.

8, 5–6 gloriam ... Israel] cf. epist. sp. 41, 23–26 (F. Römer, AugSt 3, 1972, 162)

20–22 Sir. 50, 1–2 22–23 Sir. 50, 6–7 8, 4 Ezech. 28, 12 5–6 gloriam ... Israel] Idt. 15, 10

20 cuius ... sunt om. Iord. | cuius ... 23 dei om. β 22 quasi¹ ... 23 refulsit] eciam suffulsit α 23 dei] beatus igitur qui in istis conversatur donis vitam igitur tanti patris observa si perfecte vivere queris add. α

7, 1 Anastasius ... 5 amen] adest in Iord. α β Br₂ 2 patris om. β | quod ... 5 amen] ut omnium servorum dei vita sue sanctitati comparata culpabilis appareret β 3 omnem vitam servorum tr. α 4 studeamus ... 5 amen om. Br₂ | omnibus om. S; virtutibus omnibus tr. B | imitari ... 5 valeamus] gloriose possimus sequi S; sequi gracie (uv.) possimus B

8, 1 Anastasius ... 12 amen] adest in α 2 sancte] beate S | dominum nostrum iesum christum S 6 et om. S

(9) *Anastasius in epistola XXIX ad Orosium*

Gaudeat gloriosus pater Augustinus, doctor sancte matris ecclesie! Gaudeat ille magnus pater et magister, splendor perfectorum fidelium! Gaudeat illa merities, plenitudo fervorum, columpna et fundamentum sancte matris ecclesie! Gaudeat in excelsis ille vulnerator dyaboli et susceptor animarum Christi! Gaudeat artificiosus repertor divine sapiencie, columpna mundi, pater venerabilis, genus sapiencie et archa novi veterisque testamenti! Veniant ergo ad tantum patrem sapientes et insipientes, veniant grammatici et dyalectici, veniant Aristotilici et Platonici, veniant medici et Peripatetici, veniant omnes Christi fideles ad laudandum Augustinum, patrem venerabilem, splendorem sancte matris ecclesie, in bello potentem, in certamine victorem! Ipse est enim angelus pacis, Michael princeps, Seraphim ardens, Ioseph castus, Abraham fidelis, Sampson fortissimus, Iob patientissimus, Abel iustissimus, columpna et virga Moysi, Helye virtus et David perfeccio, Iohannis penitencia, Petri obediencia et Pauli audacia. Gaude, Orosi frater, et instrue tuos de doctrina patris Augustini!

(10) *Richardus in libro contra hereticos capitulo III commemorans de Augustino*

O palma perseverancie erecta generans saluberrimos dactilos! O patriarcharum nobilitas! O prophetarum perspicacitas! O apostolorum simplicitas! O martirum aviditas! O confessorum sublimitas! Quis digne poterit te laudare et commendare, meritis extollere et glorificare preconiiis?

9, 1 Anastasius ... 17 Augustini] *adest in Iord. α* 3 pater et magister] magister et *α* 4 fervoris *B* | sancte matris ecclesie] ecclesie katholice *α* 5 ille *om. α* 6 repertor] rethor *Iord.* 7 et *om. α* | novi et veteris *S* 8 ergo] igitur *α* 10 Peripatetici] apotetici *α* fideles christi *tr. α* 15 et *om. α* 16 et¹ *om. α* | gaude] ergo *add. S* 17 Augustini *om. α*

10, 1 Richardus ... 6 preconiiis] *adest in Iord. α* 6 et¹] te *α* | preconiiis glorificare *tr. α* qui *codd. add.* da igitur o sanctissime pater verbum in ore lumen in corde ut valeam nomen tuum digne enarrare fratribus meis

(11) *Possidonius episcopus Calamensis de beato Augustino ad Poncianum episcopum in epistola XLIII*

Augustinus doctor beatissimus, ubique magnus, ubique fortis, ubique mirabilis, ubique singularis, ubique omni sanctitate copiosus, ubique
 5 astutus in sensu, ubique longanimis in spe! Quis umquam audivit hominem per se ipsum omnes artes liberales capientem? Quis umquam audivit propria peccata publice in libellis dimittentem? Quis umquam audivit contra Sabellianos, Manicheos, Arrianos atque alios hereticos tam gloriose triumphantem?

10 *Et infra*

O mira protectio Christianorum, o *splendor eterne lucis*! Unde tibi tantus erat thesaurus sapientie, quo sic hereticos et fidei adversantes confunderes? Tanti igitur patroni memoria, tanti doctoris insignia non recedant a corde.

(12) *Possidonius ad Paulinum dyaconem*

Si petis a me, *quot librorum volumina diversis personarum statibus pater noster Augustinus Aurelius gloriose conscripsit, nichil aliud tibi et ceteris respondere audeo, nisi quod *ascendit super Cherubin et volavit super*
 5 *pennas ventorum*.

Et infra

Cupis scire, Pauline frater, magnitudinem, latitudinem, sublimitatem et profundum intellectus sanctissimi Augustini. Ausculta, obsecro te, paulis-

11, 5–6 quis ... capientem] cf. Aug. conf. 4, 16, 30

11, 11 Sap. 7, 26 12, 4–5 Ps. 17, 11

11, 1 Possidonius ... 14 corde] *adest in Iord.* α | Ponciam S 4 mirabilis ... singularis tr. α 5 audivit post liberales tr. α 7 publice om. α 8 Sabellianos om. α | alios hereticos] sabellianos α 11 erat tantus tr. α 12 et om. α | adversantes] sancte rebelles α 13 patronis α 14 corde] quoniam non tantum volentibus iuste vivere sed eciam christo non credentibus eius vita et memoria est exemplum et doctrina. Hec ille *add.* α 12, 1 Possidonius ... 16 Augustinum] *adest in Iord.* α | dyaconem] in libro epistolarum epistula XIII *add.* α 2 me] Pauline *add.* α | quot *scripsi*; quod *codd.* | pater ... 3 noster om. S 3 et] cum *Iord.* 6 et *infra*] idem ibidem epistola XXXI ad eundem α 7 cupis] namque *add.* α 8 profundum] *malim* profunditatem | sancti α | te om. S

per: Fertur itaque, quod Marcus Terencius apud Latinos innumerabiles scripsit libros; aput Grecos Calcidorus miris attollitur laudibus. De nostris itaque Origenes sex milia libros legitur scripsisse. Horum denique studium omnium Augustinus sciencia et ingenio vicit: Nam tanta dictando privatim tantaque in ecclesia diversisque locis disputando conscripsit, ut vix cuiquam studiosorum diebus ac noctibus non solum scribere ea, sed nec legere posse occurrat. Mentitur ergo, qui totum se dicit legisse Augustinum.

(13) *Sanctus Valerius episcopus in epistola ad Nectarium*

Ut puto, care frater Nectarie, nisi deus suis fidelibus sanctum patrem Augustinum Fortunati tempore concessisset et donasset, *sanctificatio* nostra *desolata* fuisset, *dies festi conversi* fuissent in luctum, *sabbata* nostra in *obprobrium*, *honores* et sublimitas nostra conversa fuisset in *nichilum* et merorem. Benedictus igitur deus, qui nos infirmos et imbecilles per doctrinam sui sancti sacerdotis sanavit et de Fortunati erroribus liberavit.

12, 9–15 fertur ... occurrat] cf. Isid. orig. 6, 7, 1-3 9–16 fertur ... Augustinum] cf. M. Pellegrino, REAug 2, 1956, 202 15–16 mentitur ... Augustinum] cf. Isid. vers. bibl. (PL 83, 1109A)

13, 3–6 1 Macc. 1, 41

9 refertur α | fertur ... 16 Augustinum] adest in Nich. (= Nicolai de Alessandria Sermo de beato Augustino, ed. B. Rano, AnAug 45, 1982, 356) | itaque] enim Iord. marois tetencius S; Varro add. Nich. 10 Calcidorus] caltubrus S | extollitur α 11 itaque] etiam Iord. | Origenes] apud grecos add. Nich. | legitur libros tr. Nich.; legitur scripsisse libros tr. α | denique] itaque Iord.; om. α | omne studium Nich. 12 miro ingenio et sciencia Nich.; ingenio et sciencia sua α | vicit] vilificavit Nich. privatim dictando tr. Nich. 13 -que om. α 14 ea] libros eius Nich. 15 legere posse] legendo nosse quidem (quidem om. Nich.) Nich. α | occurrit Nich. | ergo] igitur α; om. Nich. | te totum legisse fatetur Nich.; augustinum se legisse fatetur α 13, 1 sanctus ... 8 liberavit] adest in Iord. α 2 deus] dominus α 3 fortunato α sanctificatio] fructificatio α 4 festi] nostri add. α 5 honores] fidei in nichilum et secundum gloriam nostram multiplicata fuisset ignominia add. α 6 nichilum et om. α imbecilles et infirmos tr. α | imbecilles] sicut add. Iord. 7 sacerdotis] doctoris α

(14) *Valerius episcopus ad Paulinum in epistola nona*

Obstupesco, Pauline frater, considerans, quod non sit natus aliquis in templo sancte matris ecclesie, cuius Augustinus noster magnus pater et magister vocari non possit: Sapientes igitur et insipientes omnes debitores eius sancti sumus. Refero tamen gratias omnium bonorum largitori, qui dignatus fuit nos iacentes relevare, nos mortuos suscitare, nos cecos et ignorantes illuminare per merita et documenta sancti patris Augustini.

(15) *Paulinus in prima epistola ad sanctum Valerium*

Super omnes ecclesiarum doctores Augustinus principatum in divinorum misteriorum profunditate obtinet, et quemadmodum aquila super omnia volatilia volat et sicut sol super omnia lucencia lucet, sic magnus doctor Augustinus super omnes ascendit et volavit. Nam ceteri doctores pauca de divinitatis potencia dixerunt, Augustinus autem sublimius volans omnia reseravit. Ideo non immerito angelus non natura, sed gracia per nos nuncupatur.

(16) *Paulinus ad Macedonium epistola XII*

Nuper vidimus, frater amande, venerabilem patrem Augustinum Aurelium divino amore inflammatum quasi Seraphim. Quem coniunctum sancte et individue trinitati per contemplacionem nullatenus dubitamus, admirantes super hiis, que loquebatur, alta voce clamantes: *Beatus venter, qui te portavit*, et *benedictus fructus*, quem deus fidelibus donavit, et benedictus sermo oris tui!

16, 5–6 Luc. 11, 27 6 Luc. 1, 42

14, 1 Valerius ... 7 Augustini] *adest in Iord. α* 2 natus] status *α fortasse melius templo] campo α* 5 sancti] *fortasse sanctitatis* | largitori omnium bonorum *tr. B* 6 revelare *S* 7 sanctissimi *α*

15, 1 Paulinus ... 8 nuncupatur] *adest in Iord. α Br₂* 2 super ... 4 et *om. Br₂* | primum et principatum *α* 3 profunditatem *α* 4 omnia *om. α* 5 et volavit *om. α* 6 dixerunt potencia *tr. α* | sublimius] subtilius *Iord. Br₂* | omnia] nobis eam *Iord.* | omnia reseravit *om. α*

16, 1 Paulinus ... 7 tui] *adest in Iord. α* 2 vidimus] *audivimus α* | Aurelium *om. S* 3 convinctum *uv. B* 4 et *om. Iord.* | dubitamus] et *add. α* 5 admirantes] et considerantes *add. α* | alta] altera *α* | clamantes] clamavimus *α* | venter *it. S* 6 deus *om. α* 7 tui] sui *B*; qui super cunctos fideles cunctos solidavit beatus qui assistunt ei et qui in suis versantur donis omni tempore et qui suam doctrinam posuerunt in corde suo sapiens erit et firmabitur in deo et non flectetur etc usque deus noster *add. α*

(17) *Paulinus in epistola IX ad Augustinum episcopum*

O infinite caritatis ignis per divinam contemplacionem ante faciem divine magestatis semper ardens! O dulcedo amoris et amor dulcedinis, Augustine, ecclesiarum dux et pater, accede ad nos, quia iam in tantum prevaluerunt hereticorum tenebrose insidie, quod vix verum a falso cognoscitur! 5 Ideo opus habet ecclesia lumine tue lucerne, ut repleantur oculi ineffabili tui presencia, ut evelles et dissipes malos et edifies et plantes filios, quos peperisti in visceribus caritatis.

(18) *Macedonius in epistola ad Augustinum*

Sanctissime pater Augustine, quid referem de te, cum omnia ligata tu solvis, cum omnia soluta tu reseras, cum omnia adversa tu mitigas, cum omnia devia tu revocas, cum omnia confusa tu lucidas? O Augustine, pater mirabilis, tu lucidior auro, tu splendidior sole, tu misericordie pater, 5 tu magister virtutum, tu reos solvis, tu respicis delinquentes, tu lapsos relevas, tu recreas desperatos, tu magister et pater es omnium pupillorum! Hec enim sunt, pater, que nobis orphanis et desolatis relinquis: Fidem firmam, virtutem robustam, caritatem perfectam, diligenciam in ammi(ni)stracione, vigiliam in laboribus, in veritate constanciam, blandimenta despiciere, terrenorum affluenciam devitare, carnis incentiva reprimere et crucem Christi assidue in mente portare. Hec sunt enim vestigia et documenta, que tua corporali presencia relinquis. 10

(19) *Orosius in epistola ad sanctum Augustinum*

Salve, beatissime pater ecclesiarum Augustine, qui es magister meus carus et doctor meus magnus, adiutor meus optimus, medicus meus potentissimus et sacerdos meus in eternum! Tu dux meus ad patriam, tu, pater Augustine, dulcedo mea sancta, tu sapiencia mea clara, tu simplicitas mea pura, tu refugium meum et *spes mea ab uberibus matris mee*! 5 Obsecro te tantum, pater Augustine, ut non sit molestum reverencie tue, si te ultra humanum modum laudavero. Nam Abel obtulit sacrificium et inde laudatur; sed si sacrificium, quod digne Christo obtulisti, advertatur

19, 6 Ps. 21, 10

17, 1 Paulinus ... 8 caritatis] *adest in α* 2 o *om. B* 6 ut *om. B* | tui ineffabili *tr. B*

18, 1 Macedonius ... 13 relinquis] *adest in α* 7 revelas *S* 9 amministracione *scripsi*; amministracione *codd.* 11 deprimere *S*

19, 1 Orosius ... 17 nulla] *adest in S* | Orosius ... 19a, 4 possimus] *adest in B*
6 meum *it. S*; *om. B*

- 10 in medium, quintum celum a terra superius apparebit. Noe tamen in archa legitur universum servasse; tu, Augustine, non archam coaptando, sed libros componendo universum mundum periclitantem cum labore, fame et siti liberasti. Abraham *nominatur, qui ad dei preceptum propriam cognationem dereliquit; tu, Augustine, non solum patriam reliquisti, sed te
15 ipsum pro fide ad martirium preperasti. Stupent omnes super Iob, stupescunt omnes super te, pater Augustine. Que lingua tuis laudibus invenitur digna †quasi dicat nulla†

(19a) Nota, quod illi de Carthagine non habebant doctorem, qui doceret eos in fide. Miserunt igitur epistolam ad Augustinum dicentes: Expectamus te verum pastorem et patrem ut angelum dei, ut respicientes in te tamquam in speculum salvari per te aperte possimus.

- (20) *Richardus de Sancto Victore in sermone de sancto Augustino*
Gaudeamus, fratres, et letemur in eo, qui hodie thesaurum sapientie vocavit ad celum! Gaude et tu, o sanctissima anima, que hodie suscepta es ab angelis, locata cum archangelis, magnificata a prophetis, honorata ab
5 apostolis, invitata a martiribus, adnumerata confessoribus, venerata a virginibus, et tota trinitas exclamavit mane nobiscum in eternum hodie!

(20a) *Idem* Cui poterimus te equiparare, o Augustine, (...) et doctor ecclesiarum? In te enim reperitur duodecim patriarcharum nobilitas, duodecim prophetarum perspicacitas, duodecim apostolorum simplicitas, duodecim

19a, 1–4 nota ... possimus] cf. epist. sp. 41, 23–27 (F. Römer, AugSt 3, 1972, 162)

10 legitur in archa universum tr. S 13 nominatur scripsi dubitanter; nurantur uv. B; unarantur uv. S; honoratur vel veneratur proposuit Cl. Weidmann 17 quasi ... nulla] corrupta videntur

20, 1 Richardus ... 6 virginibus] adest in Iord. Mill. Br₂ | Richardus ... 20c, 6 norma] adest in α 2 gaudeamus] omnes add. α | gaudeamus ... 3 celum om. Br₂ | sapientie] sapientiarum α 3 et om. Br₂ | et tu om. α | que ... 6 hodie] ab angelis suscepta, locata cum archangelis, a prophetis magnificata, ab apostolis honorata, equiparata martyribus, confessoribus et virginibus virtutum meritis dignissime associata; in quorum omnium laudibus manu et lingua laborasti Br₂ | es om. S 4 collocata α 5 invitata a] et mill. 2; om. Iord. mill. 1 | adnumerata] et Iord. mill. 2; om. mill. 1 | venerata a] atque Iord. Mill. 6 virginibus] paradysi add. Iord. Mill. | et ... hodie] in quorum omnium laudibus manu atque lingua laborasti Iord. Mill. | hodie om. S | hodie ... 20a, 1 poterimus] non distinguit S 20a, 1 lacunam indicavi; sed fortasse et delendum est

articulorum stabilitas. Gaude ergo, pater, quoniam super homines es sublimatus, super alios exaltatus!

(20b) *Idem* Gloriosa lux et dux heremitarum, exul tenebrarum, consors apostolorum, corona martirum, gemma confessorum, ornatus sanctarum virginum! Scientia tu Cherubim, vox celi, lingua Christi, et ab eo hodie assumi meruisti.

(20c) *Idem* Augustinus est ille primus angelus, qui sua tuba nos incitat ad bellum contra seviciam tyrannorum. Hic est secundus angelus, qui nos convocat contra perfidiam hereticorum. Hic est tercius angelus, qui nos excitat contra mendacem scienciam philosophorum. Augustinus, deita(tis) tuba et vox catholica, vox Christi et celica vita linguaue, seraphica stella non erratica, aquila magnifica, situla aquatica et divinorum norma.

(21) *Paulinus in epistola ad Augustinum XXIII*

Illumina vultum tuum super me per lucernam verbi tui, sanctissime domine et beatissime frater Augustine, *unanime magister in fide veritatis et susceptor meus in visceribus caritatis, ut te satagente illuminata lucerna domus fidei acquiratur, propalentur latibula scripturarum, evertantur hereses, convertantur devii ac dragma decima tuis sanctis radiis reparetur. O vere *sal terre*, quo precordia nostra, ne possint errore seculi evanescere, condiuntur! O *lucerna digne super candelabrum ecclesie posita*, que late catholicis urbibus de septiformi lychno *oleo leticie* lumen effundens densissimas hereticorum caligines discutis et lucem veritatis a confusione tenebrarum splendore clarifici sermonis enubilas! Vide, o frater amabilis, quanto te stupore admiror, quam magno te amplector amore, quia cottidiano conloquio tuarum litterarum fruor et oris tui spiritu vescor. Os tuum fistulam aque vive merito dixerim et venam eterni fontis, cuius desiderio *sitivit in te anima mea* et ubertate tui fluminis cor meum inebriari concu-

21, 2–4 illumina ... caritatis] cf. Paul. Nol. epist. 50, 18

6–17 o ... plenam] cf.

Paul. Nol. epist. 4, 1–2

21, 2 illumina ... me] cf. Ps. 66, 2

4–6 illuminata ... reparetur] cf. Luc. 15, 8

7 Matt. 5, 13 8 Matt. 5, 15 9 Ps. 44, 8 15 Ps. 62, 2 | ubertate ... inebriari] cf. Ps. 35, 9

20c, 4 deitatis *scripsi*; deitate B (ac.); deita *rell.*

21, 1 Paulinus ... 17 etc] *adest in α* | XXXIII S 3 et¹ om. β | *unanime scripsi* (cf. Paul. Nol. epist. 50, 18); et humane *codd.* 7 errore] errare S 8 condidiuntur B

10 pivit. Ideo queso prome de armario tuo scienciam sanctam puram et omni
 2 veritate plenam etc.

(22) *Prosper in quodam tractatu seu sermone quem fecit de laudibus Augustini dicit*

Beatissimus Augustinus dominus est et caput omnium doctorum. Nam
 sicut lux inter corpora habet primum locum, sic et hic inter omnes docto-
 5 res optinet principatum. Hic est sanctissimus Augustinus, qui tamquam
sapiens architector ecclesie fundamentum post sanctissimos apostolos
 construxit et reparavit. Et sicut rex David pro defensione civitatis Ierusa-
 lem in monte Syon altissimam turrin ac fortissimam edificare fecit, sic
 rex regum in civitate sua Ierusalem turrin sapiencie et sciencie edificavit
 10 Augustinum, ut esset hereticorum pavor, bellatorum metus, malorum
 baculus, paganorum gladius, Christianorum protectio.

Et infra

O magne et admirabilis pater Augustine, o fons profunde sapiencie! Ipse
 continue die ac nocte legendo, disputando, scribendo, predicando, vigi-
 15 lando, ieiunando, carnem macerando curam gerebat omnium ecclesiarum.

Et infra

Hic velud alter Noe non archam fabricando, sed libros componendo mun-
 dum universum periclitantem ab hereticis liberavit.

Et infra

20 Hic est, qui Christum dei *filium salvatorem nostrum in carne vidit et tan-
 gere ac eius pedes lavare meruit et eum audire dulciter dicentem sibi:
 Magne Augustine, filium dei in carne hodie videre meruisti. In qua nimi-
 rum visitacione et apparicione ipse Christus tocius ecclesie sue catholice
 curam sibi commisit. Hec Prosper.

22, 17–18 Noe ... liberavit] cf. Init. ord. herem. (B. Rano, AnAug 45, 1982, 345) 'per
 Noe ... Augustinus intellegitur, qui ... humanum genus ab hereticis liberavit'

22, 6 1 Cor. 3, 10

22, 1 Prosper ... 7 reparavit] adest in β S Br₂ | Prosper ... 24 Prosper] adest in Iord.
 3 beatissimus ... caput] augustinus sanctissimus caput est β | est om. Iord. Br₁ 4 pri-
 mum habet tr. S; habet om. Iord. | locum primum tr. β Br₂ | et hic] revera S; om. β
 doctores] augustinus β ; augustinus add. S 5 principatum] et sequitur add. S | est]
 enim add. Br₂ | beatissimus S 6 sapiens] fidelis S | fundamentum ecclesiae tr. S
 beatissimos Br₃ 9 sua] s. l. Iord. 20 filium scripsi; filii codd.

(23) *Hylarius episcopus ad Amatam dyaconem de beato Augustino*

Doctor excellentissimus Augustinus, defensor fidei nostre, in divina meditatione semper assiduus, metu mortis intrepidus, destruxit sacrilegos atque superavit hereticos.

(24) *Possidonius in epistula ad Macedonium de laude beati Augustini*

Augustinus vir tocius prudencie, in sermone verax, in iudicio iustus, in consilio providus, in commisso fidelis, in paupertate humilis, in castitate fortis, (in) pauperibus compaciens, in omni sua actione compositus. Augustinus homo celestis et ymago deitatis. Augustinus pater patrum, 5
doctor doctorum, abissus sapience, fistula altisona, predicator veritatis, norma honestatis, presul bonitatis, gracia urbanitatis, incendium caritatis. Augustinus rose formositas, violarum amenitas et *lilium convalium*; Augustinus *scutum fidei*, minister Christi, eructator divinorum eloquiorum et inquisitor predicatorum, pater pupillorum et iudex viduarum, con- 10
fortator debiliu, inimicus hereticorum, pater diligens et pastor optimus. Quid igitur tibi plus narrare potero de Augustino? Augustinus par angelis in fervore, par prophetis in divinorum revelacione, par apostolis in predi-
cacione, par martiribus in desiderando passionem, par confessoribus in disciplinarum doctione et par virginibus in continencie conservacione. 15
Quid ergo tue nobilitati de Augustino narrare potero? Si cuncta corporis

24, 8 Cant. 2, 1 9 Eph. 6, 16

23, 1 Hylarius ... 4 hereticos] *adest in Iord. S Br₂ Mill.* | amantum *S* 2 Augustinus defensor *om. Iord.* | nostre defensor fidei *tr. Br₂* | in ... 3 intrepidus *om. S* | in ... 4 hereticos *om. Mill.* | semper meditatione *tr. Br₂* 3 metu] *autem add. Br₂* | sacrilegos destruxit atque hereticos superavit *tr. Br₂* 4 hereticos] evertit philosophos prostravit omnes adversarios ubi nunc (*uv.*) commenta pellagii errores sabellii procacitas manichei impietas arrii scisma donati prorsus abierunt retrorsum fabricatoris errorum nam paganos impugnavit hereticos reprobavit pelagianos prostravit celestianos conturbavit sabellianos dissipavit sacrilegos destruxit philosophos delusit scismaticos conclusit manicheos persequabatur donatistas preliabatur marcyonistas agrediebatur abharcebat (*uv.*) iulicanum (*uv.*) reprimebat parmenianum abiciebat petulanum donatum confundit fortunatum repulit adamantum exclusit secundinum expulit gaudencium extrusit et felicem compulit sic universaliter omnes errores hereticorum confutavit *add. S*

24, 1 Possidonius ... 19 illuminatorem] *adest in Iord. S* 3 providens *S* 4 in *addidit Cl. Weidmann* 5 patrum] *et add. S* 7 incendium caritatis *om. S* 10 predicatorum] hereticorum *S* 11 hereticorum] infidelium *add. S* 15 et *om. S* 16 mei corporis *tr. S*

mei membra verterentur in linguas, adhuc non essem dignus vel sufficiens ad laudandum tantum patrem et doctorem et tantum fidei relucentis illuminatorem.

(25) *Possidonius eius compiler historie*

Augustinus, sapientie lumen prefulgidum, propugnaculum veritatis et fidei tutamentum, omnes ecclesie doctores tam ingenio quam scientia vicit incomparabiliter florens tam virtutum exemplis quam affluentia doctrinarum. Etenim tanta scripsit, ut non solum ab aliquo toto vite sue tempore scribi, sed ne quidem possint lectione percurri. Huius enim librorum, tractatum et epistolarum numerus plus quam ad mille triginta, ut dictum est, extenditur, ut merito illud ei dictum conveniat: Mentitur qui te totum legisse fatetur.

(25a) *Versus Possidonii:*

Augustine, tonas divini fulmine verbi.

(26) *Iulianus episcopus ad prefectum urbis Rome*

Augustinus velut flamma splendida charitatis, homo acutus, in omni veritate serenus, contradicentium catervas redarguendo superavit: Percussit hereticos, prostravit omnes adversarios.

25, 2–25a, 2 Augustinus ... verbi] cf. M. Pellegrino, REAug 2, 1956, 202 8–9 mentitur ... fatetur] cf. Isid. vers. bibl. (PL 83, 1109A)

17 vel] et S 18 relucentis om. S

25, 1 Possidonius ... 5 doctrinarum] adest in Mill. Br₂ | Possidonius ... 9 fatetur] adest in Vinc. (= Vincentii Bellovacensis Speculum historiale, Douai 1624, p. 712) 2 sapientie om. Br₂ | propugnaculum ... 3 tutamentum om. Br₂ | et fidei tutamentum om. Mill. 4 incomparabilis Mill. | exemplis sanctarum virtutum Br₂ | quam] moribus Mill. | influentia Mill. 25a, 1 versus ... 2 verbi] adest in Mill. Iord. 2 fulmine] flamine mill. 2

26, 1 Iulianus ... 4 adversarios] adest in Mill. Br₂ | Rome] romanae mill. 2 2 splendida] splendidi mill. 2; gemine add. Br₂ | acutus] ingenio add. Br₂ 3 serenus om. Br₂ mill. 1 4 prostravit omnes adversarios] et omnes ecclesie dei adversarios verbis et scriptis viriliter prostravit Br₂

(27) *Cyprianus in epistola ad beatum Damasum*

Augustinus mitis et humilis doctrinarum vehiculus, honestus et mansuetus paupertatis amator et norma bonitatis, presul ab omnibus amatus et desideratus. Augustinus gratia plenus, videntibus et audientibus affabilis et amenus. Augustinus nominis sui fama gloriosus, Augustinus omnium 5 virtutum imitator, odor balsami, gratia urbanitatis et incendium caritatis, gemmarum margarita insignium. Augustinus lapis eburneus, ortus irriguus, flos redolens et decor purpureus. Augustinus rosarum formositas, violarum amenitas et *lilium convallium*. Miserorum consolacium, aurum nitidum et electrum nulla parte deficiens et flos doctorum. Augustinus 10 stella micans, calliginis et erroris ignara, solaris prima luminis; stella syderibus aliis lucidior splendore caritatis, aurora diem preferens velud syderis matutini, qui obscura fulgoribus peccatorum corda purifica[n]s. Augustinus fidei Christiane oraculum et tuba resonans, quia in omnem terram exivit sonus eius. Congaudete mecum et congratulamini, fratres 15 dilectissimi, de tanto patre et doctore, de tanto duce et pastore, de tanto fidei relucentis illuminatore.

(28) *Cyprianus in prologo libri de sacramentis*

Silere deberet unusquisque ecclesiarum doctor, ubi mellifluum os Augustini aperitur.

(29) *Donatus in epistola ad Marcellum*

Augustinus doctor inclitus in medio dominice aciei fulget, splendore inmarcessibilis glorie splendet, in exultatione iocunditatis insaciabilis perhenniter gaudet.

27, 4 gratia plenus] cf. Luc. 1, 28 9 Cant. 2, 1 14–15 in ... eius] cf. Ps. 18, 5

27, 1 Cyprianus ... 17 illuminatore] adest in Iord. β; non sunt iste cyprianus ille magnus doctor carthaginiensis de quo ipse meminit in 5 confessionum et in de doctrina christiana quia iam obierat add. manus posterior in Iord. marg. 2 vehiculum β

3 et¹ ... 4 plenus om. β 5 Augustinus¹ ... 6 imitator] norma bonitatis gracia plenus omnium virtutum unitator (imitator Br₃) precipuus β 6 gratia urbanitatis et] et honestatis β | caritatis incendium tr. Br₃ 7 insignium ... eburneus om. β 8 et om. Br₃ Augustinus om. Br₃ 9 et ... consolacium om. β 10 et¹ ... 17 illuminatore] in nulla parte deficiens β 13 purificas scripsi; purificans Iord.; sed fortasse qui delendum est

28, 1 Cyprianus ... 3 aperitur] adest in Iord.

29, 1 Donatus ... 4 gaudet] adest in Iord.

(30) *Aquilius comes in epistola ad Augustinum*

Quemadmodum *universa terra desiderabat* sapientissimi Salomonis faciem intueri, ita et nos, et tanto plus, quanto Salomone deitatis secreta penetrasti. O utinam prestaret nobis gratiam, ut in carne faciem tuam,
 5 sanctissime pater et doctor Augustine, videre possemus!

(31) *Richardus super Iohannem in prologo*

Augustinus virtutum omnium forma et speculum exstitit in natura: Fuit intelligencie pane cibatus et aqua sapiencie velud alter Iohannes potatus; fuit super omnes doctores velud aquila super aves sublimatus in tantum,
 5 ut in omnem terram audiretur sonus eius.

(32) *Calcedonius in tractatu de sacramentis*

Sanctus Augustinus, virtutum caterva, excellentissime inter sanctos effultus circa sancte fidei defensionem, pro qua totus ardebat, sic prevaluit et profecit, quod contra nequissimorum hereticorum hostes intrepida mente
 5 ferventique spiritu continuum certamen exerceret.

(33) *Beatus Remigius*

Sicut sol in lumine excedit omnes planetas, ita Augustinus omnes excessit doctores in sacras exponendo scripturas. Alii doctores comparantur stellis, ipse Augustinus comparatur soli, quia sicut stelle lumen a sole recipiunt, ita omnes alii lumen vere sapiencie a fonte sue doctrine hauriunt,
 5 ipsumque deinde in alios diffundunt.

33, 2–6 sicut ... diffundunt] cf. Henr. Friem. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 53, 1990, 25; 28; 30)

30, 2 *universa ... desiderabat*] 3 Reg. 10, 24 31, 5 in ... eius] cf. Ps. 18, 5

30, 1 *Aquilius ... 5 possemus*] *adest in Iord.*

31, 1 *Richardus ... 5 eius*] *adest in Iord.*

32, 1 *Calcedonius ... 5 exerceret*] *adest in Iord.* 4 *hereticorum hostes*] *haud scio an sanum*

33, 1 *beatus ... 6 diffundunt*] *adest in Mill. Iord. Br₂* 2 *sicut ... 3 doctores¹ om. Br₂* excellit *Iord.* 3 *doctores¹ om. Mill.* 4 *ipse Augustinus*] *augustinus autem Br₂; om. Iord.* | *comparatur om. Br₂* 6 *ipsum quoque lumen divinum Br₂* | *demum Iord.*

(34) *Remigius Ieronimum et quosdam alios doctores commemorans sic concludit*

Hos omnes Augustinus ingenio et sciencia sua vicit.

(35) *Nota Eusebium in cronica sua: Quare beatissimus pater noster Augustinus nominatur Aurelius. Dicit enim sic in forma*

Sanctus Augustinus natus fuit apud civitatem Tagatensem anno domini CCCetc ex patre Patricio milite pagano et matre Monica a puericia christianissima. Dum autem Augustinus esset annorum undecim, Aurelius rex Carthaginensis pro Patricio milite strenuissimo destinavit. Quo accersito fecit eum civem Carthaginensem et instituit eum de numero curialium. Curiales autem dicebantur eo, quod quinque semper essent in mensa regia, ad quos etiam pertinebat omnes nobiles ad regem precipere, bella et hastiludia et convivia ordinare. Dum autem rex Aurelius videret puerum Augustinum in curia sua pulchrum, ingeniosum et cunctis virtutibus ornatum, adoptavit sibi eum in filium et nomen ei suum tunc imposuit dicens: 'Aurelius vocaberis eo, quod auro purissimo similis.' Quod nomen Augustino remansit temporibus vite sue. †Cum† igitur, qui vitam Augustini legis, scias, quod dum legitur beatus Augustinus, ex provincia Affricana civitate Tagatensi dicere potes, quia ibi natus est, vel Carthaginensi, quia ibi pater Augustini civis factus est et ibidem vixit cum uxore sua annis LXIX et mortuus est plenus dierum. Quem uxor sua cum lacrimis et oracionibus et elemosinis in fine luctata est deo. Etc.

(36) *Nota de corde sancti Augustini nostri patris et patroni*

Sanctus Gwibertus archiepiscopus, sicut in ipsius vita reperitur, beatum Augustinum in maxima devocione habens deum exorabat, ut aliquam porciunculam quamque de reliquys sanctissimi presulis et egregii doctoris Augustini accipere mere(re)tur. Quadam autem die, dum circa horam primam sanctus Gwibertus in sua capella pia sua fudisset precamina ad deum, ante altare subito obdormivit et ecce vidit in sompnis angelum de mirabili claritate fulgentem ad altare procedentem et cristallinum recepta-

36, 1–31 Nota ... etc] cf. An. Boll. 5, 1886, 352-3 (BHL 801)

34, 1 Remigius ... 3 vicit] adest in Iord.

35, 1 nota ... 19 etc] adest in α 4 CCC B | ex om. S 5 xi B 6 Patricio] pagano add. B 14 cum] corruptum videtur

36, 1 Nota ... 31 etc] adest in α 5 mereretur scripsi; meretur codd. 7 de] fortasse dei

- culum mire pulchritudinis habens pedem aureum gemmis preciosissimis
 10 adornatum in manibus gestantem. Quod cum super altare reverenter lo-
 casset, conversus episcopo dixit: Gwiberte, dormis? Et ille: Quis es, do-
 mine? Qui respondit: Ego sum angelus, qui beato Augustino quondam
 Yponensi episcopo ad custodiam fueram deputatus; cum autem ex hoc
 seculo migrasset, precipiente altissimo cor eius sustuli et incorruptum
 15 servavi. Prescivit enim deus, cui illud dare vellet; nec corrumpi debuit,
 quod magestatis dei capax fuit, quod tam dulciter, fideliter et subtiliter de
 sancta trinitate sensit, scripsit et docuit. Exsurge ergo et tolle munus
 20 eximium tibi a deo destinatum. Conserva nobile depositum tue sanctitati
 creditum. Hiis dictis episcopus evigilavit, et sicut in sompnis viderat,
 crudum et recens super altare in cristallo reperit, sicque gracias agens
 miraculum publicavit. Cum ergo populus catervatim ad tam grande spec-
 25 taculum conflueret, precepit episcopus clero, ut pro graciaram accione
 ‘Te deum laudamus’ inciperent. Mira res, cum versiculum ‘Sanctus sanc-
 tus sanctus dominus deus Sabaoth’ canerent, cor in cristallo *se movere
 cepit et os quasi ad laudandum apperiebat, quasi diceret ‘O sancta trinitas,
 30 quam libenter te dictando, predicando, canendo, scribendo [te] laudarem,
 si in corpore meo viverem!’ Quo viso clerus et populus deo laudes cla-
 maverunt et beatum Augustinum dignis preconiiis extulerunt. Singulis
 quoque annis in festo sancte trinitatis, cum missa canitur, et cor super
 altare ponitur: Mox omnibus intuentibus se movere incipit hinc inde sicut
 piscis. Etc.

(37) *Albertus Magnus Ratisponensis episcopus*

Doctor egregius beatissimus Augustinus, ecce qualem sanctitate predota-
 tus sortem sprexit mundialem, veritate radiatus lucem vidit divinalem,
 dignitate sublimatus sedem scandit triumphalem.

24–31 cor ... piscis] cf. Herm. Schil. s. de Aug. (B. Rano, AnAug 53, 1990, 64) ‘cor
 carneum beati Augustini longo tempore post mortem eius nominata sancta trinitate vel
 expansiones liberas eius vel levitates motus habere sit inventum, immo quasi intellec-
 tuales, exultando et applaudendo sancte trinitati’

19 viderat] fortasse cor addendum est 24 se movere scripsi; sermonem codd. 26 te²
 seclusi

37, 1 Albertus ... 4 triumphalem] adest in β Br₂ 2 egregius] sollemnis (magnus ac.)
 Br₂ | beatus Br₃ | ecce qualem om. β 3 sordem Br₁

(38) *Avicenna medicus*

Apparuisti, compatriota noster, homo admirabilis, in universa terra, altissimi ingenii, subtilissimi intellectus, divinarum humanarumque rerum sciencia et sapiencia peritissimus! Dicam, quid de te sencio: Pareat Socrates, pareat Plato, pareat Aristotiles, pareant mundi sapientes; tu enim tantam possides sapienciam, quanta menti humane tribui posset. Epistolas tuas michi salutaria documenta sonantes interim perlegam. Video, quod ad sectam crucifixi, quem dei filium predicas, me trahere cupis: Non puto me tecum errare posse. Sepe michi scribe! Quid prima causa sublimis dei velit, expectabo.

38, 1–10 Avicenna ... expectabo] cf. M. Th. D'Alverny, *Survivance et renaissance d'Avicenne à Venise et à Padoue*, 1966, 84–5; Chr. Gastgeber, *Biblos* 44, 1995, 15

38, 1 Avicenna ... 10 expectabo] *adest in Br₂ m* (= München Univ.bibl. 4° 120, fol. 22r) 3 humanarum divinarumque sciencia sapiencia *m* 4 senciam *m* | pereat...pereat...pereat *proposuit Cl. Weidmann* 5 Aristotiles] et *add. m* 6 humane menti *tr. m* | epistolas ... 10 expectabo *om. Br₂*

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REVIEWS

Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of the Souls. Revising a Classical Ideal*, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity Series 17, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2010, ISBN 13:9780268033217, XVIII, 342 p.

In this book, Paul Kolbet studies one of the major aspects of Augustine's homiletical practice: his never-ending concern to provide guidance for the souls of the people who were entrusted to his pastoral care as a priest and later as bishop of Hippo. Paul Kolbet in this book argues that Augustine's concept of pastoral care was rooted in the classical tradition of *cura animarum* in which sophists presented themselves as physicians using psychagogic techniques as their medicines and instruments. Psychagogy in this study refers to "to those philosophically articulated traditions of therapy – common in Hellenistic literature – pertaining to how a mature person leads the less mature to perceive and internalize wisdom for themselves" (p. 8).

The first part of the book surveys the variety of forms of psychagogy in classical tradition: Plato and the sophist Dio. Kolbet highlights the roots of rhetoric in sophistry and points to the dependency of both Plato and Augustine on this tradition. Paul Kolbet concludes this overview of the classical and rhetorical roots of Augustine's reflection on the *cura animarum* with a description of the Hellenistic refinements that changed the practice of psychagogy. The book mainly focuses on the Hellenistic exegesis of Plato's dialogues (second sophistry) and on the rather detailed advises on guidance of the soul which emerge from the written works of Seneca. Despite the rejection of poetry as a pedagogic instrument by Plato and other philosophical schools, Paul Kolbet correctly signalizes the significance of (epic) poetry in formation as an introductory exercise into philosophy.

The second and main part of the book is devoted to the study of Augustine's revising and recontextualisation of the classical concept of therapy. Kolbet takes the chronology of Augustine's biography as a lead. Starting with an exploration of social and intellectual influences which might have influenced Augustine in his choice for a career as an orator, Paul Kolbet deliberates on the influence of the bishop Ambrose on the young ambitious Augustine. Here again, the author stresses the psychagogic function of sermons in liturgy. They "brought him into a process of gradual conversion where the convictions informing his life

decisions at the time were first brought to mind with clarity and then whittled away" (p. 76). It helped Augustine to overcome his resistance to the stylistic simplicity of Scripture and revealed to him how to cope with an imperfect world which he discovers being an image and not reality itself.

The fourth chapter describes Augustine's process of Christianizing the classical concept of therapy. Kolbet's analysis of Augustine's concept of Christian philosophy and the cure of the soul focuses on two aspects: the social acceptable tradition of *otium liberale* which formed the background of Augustine's retreat at Cassiciacum and on Augustine's concern with words in their psychagogic function. In what follows Paul Kolbet extensively quotes from *De beata vita*, *De ordine*, *Contra academicos*, *Soliloquia* and *De musica*. A close reading offers the reader a rich insight in discussions and pedagogical situations where Augustine shows his genius as a teacher and writer.

The subject of the next chapter is Augustine's catechumenate and the immediately following post-baptismal period. It is studied in the same way by close-reading mainly Ambrose and Augustine's *De animae quantitate*, *De genesi adversus Manicheos*, *De magistro*, and *De vera religione*. It is in this period that Augustine moved back to Africa and founded his community in Thagaste. Kolbet points out that Augustine's concern is to make clear that in his opinion "the Church in its liturgy and Scripture taught the truth about the soul authoritatively" (p. 108). Kolbet observes that Augustine's questions in these period remained largely the same as during the retreat at Cassiciacum. New literary genres emerged: the rule for his community and commentaries on Scripture. Paul Kolbet concludes this chapter stating that five years after his conversion, Augustine "had both permanently abandoned his teaching of secular rhetoric and thoroughly revised the very traditions he used to teach by systematically integrating them into a particularly Christian understanding of the universe" (p. 117).

Chapter five inquires for the new context for classical therapy. Kolbet considered that Augustine's priesthood showed him the limits of his previous skills and it provided him with the impetus to recontextualize the fruits of his retreat in Cassiciacum. In order to gain insight in this process, Paul Kolbet quotes extensively from the anti-Manichean *De utilitate credendi* which leads to the conclusion that the Manichean spiritual direction "falls short of therapeutic imperatives established since classical antiquity" (p. 128). A second aspect of the recontextualisation of the heritage of Cassiciacum after his ordination is Augustine's controversies over the cure of the soul with (stoic) philosophers, but also with Pelagius. Augustine's *Confessiones*, *De*

civitate Dei and Pelagius' letters to Demetrias are the *obiectum materiale* for this inquiry. It leads the author to the conclusion that Augustine was more focused on the embedding of humanity in flawed (ecclesial) communities as a source of weakness than with individual sin.

The next chapter (six) concerns signs eliciting love as a hermeneutical criterion coming from Scripture itself. In order to understand and interpret the Bible, human language and human guidance are necessary. Augustine provides his reader with his knowledge on signs and hermeneutics in *De doctrina Christiana*, which is, together with *De catechizandis rudibus* studied in this chapter. Paul Kolbet points out that Augustine in *De doctrina Christiana* becomes increasingly conscious of the limits of human guidance. The divine Word itself cures whoever studies Scripture. Its study exercises the soul of the student to discover the quality of signification inherent in all material things. Augustine seems to be more pragmatic in the application of hermeneutical criteria in *De catechizandis rudibus*. In this work Augustine advises to teach in the format of a narration and to stay close to the Scriptural text, for God's love cures the pride of those who tend to reject the humble style of the Bible.

The last part of the book concentrates on Augustine's homiletical practice. In chapter seven Kolbet studies the continuity of Augustine's preaching with the classical rhetorical tradition in the analysis of several sermons from the fictive perspective of the orator Apuleius who enjoyed a similar popularity as the bishop of Hippo. Kolbet states that Augustine in his sermons used familiar material from the psychagogic tradition, such as the *Christus medicus* metaphor. These and other rhetorical devices were part of Augustine's critical skills that enabled him to build and educate the Christian identity of his flock. Augustine's preaching was intended to involve his audience in a reflective process, a common exercise in scriptural interpretation in which the Word cures human weaknesses. Once the illnesses are cured, Augustine continues to constructive guidance in order to strengthen and to stimulate an ascent of the soul of his audience in his sermon.

The book closes with a chapter on therapy and society. Paul Kolbet highlights that Augustine as an orator and author participates in the classical tradition of formation of the soul by reason and eloquence. Kolbet states that the sermons have a special psychagogic function in extending the text of Scripture and to exhort the audience to follow its lead. In the final conclusion Paul Kolbet reminds us that in the West platonic ideas were often transmitted in their Augustinian form. Similarly, Augustine revised the classical psychagogic tradition

because he felt this tradition lacked the means to realize its highest ideals. Augustine, on his turn, helped his flock in Hippo to find a Christian attitude that "would enable them to participate in corrupt society without being defined by it" (p. 208).

This book provides the reader with a rich insight in the classical roots of Augustine's rhetorical psychagogy. Kolbet's analysis of the relevance of Plato and sophists for Augustine's practice of cure of the soul shows that Martha Nussbaum missed an opportunity to understand the nature of the relationship between early Christian theology and classical view on cure of the soul, when she dismissed the Platonic ascent of the soul because it would limit political action and this-worldly striving.

Kolbet's working definition of psychagogy (p. 8), however, seems to limit the concept of cure of the soul to human guidance where Augustine extends his therapy to a synergy between the divine Word and a human preacher or spiritual director. It is therefore a missed opportunity that Kolbet did not explicitly re-evaluate his working definition in his conclusion.

In part two of the book, Paul Kolbet quotes extensively from Augustine's texts. This offers the reader a view on the many-faceted rhetorical talent of Augustine as a young orator and as an aged bishop. The picture that is emerging from his reading of these texts shows the importance of the metaphor of cure and therapy for Augustine. It exposes also his capacity to transform the heritage of classical culture.

The wide range of primary texts read by Paul Kolbet shows Augustine's creativity, but simultaneously complicates the analysis because of the differences between the literary genres of the texts used as *objectum materiale* of this research project. The sermons Kolbet promises to focus on in his book, are discussed without extensive reflection on their oral character and analyzed in the same way as (the majority of) the texts discussed, such as the Cassiciacum dialogues. The latter were apparently designed as written texts.

Kolbet's reading of Augustine's texts opens the treasury of Augustine's rhetoric. His extensive quotes show also to the reader who is not familiar with his oeuvre the importance of the classical psychagogic tradition for early Christian theologians such as Augustine. Although this book contains almost hundred pages of endnotes with references to a rich variety of primary and secondary literature, quotations of the Latin text often are limited, which sometimes is a temptation for the impatient and curious scholarly reader.

Paul Kolbet shows in this book that Augustine's texts have the potential to initiate a transforming psychagogic process, which does

not negate the weaknesses of the human soul, but rather integrates them in a universal hermeneutics of love and charity.

Martin CLAES

Giulio D'Onofrio, *Vera Philosophia: Studies in Late Antique, Early Medieval and Renaissance Christian Thought*, Nutrix 1, English text by John Gavin, Brepols, Turnhout, 2008, ISBN 978-2-503-52546-4, 406 p.

The book is based on a collection of reworked and revised articles and studies written by the author in the last twenty years and dealing, as he explains, with the origins and constitutive conditions of Christian philosophical-theological thought in Late Antiquity, early Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Postfatio, p. 357). It is a good overview and analysis of these periods without completely neglecting the High Middle Ages either. However, this period is mentioned just in passing. Had it had a separate chapter on that, the book would have been more unitary. The main characters, whose views and works seem to influence, according to D'Onofrio, numerous later authors and trends, are Cicero and the authors also providing the two suggestive mottos of the book: Augustine (*vera philosophia* is the *studium vel amore sapientiae* – *Contra Iulianum* IV.14.72) and John Scot Eriugena (*vera philosophia* is *vera religio* – *De praedestinatione* 1.1). Other relevant authors are especially Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury and Nicholas of Cusa.

The first chapter of the book deals with what D'Onofrio calls 'converted thought' and starts from a few ideas of Cicero and of the Stoics, later to be either adopted or criticized by Augustine. It is the most complex chapter offering not only the theoretical premises of the book, but also concrete examples for these theoretical premises in late antique philosophy. The rest of the book relies on this chapter and often refers back to it. Thus, while having virtue as its main topic, late antique philosophy seems to answer questions regarding both individual happiness or ethical norms and social life and its laws. In Cicero's view, philosophy is defined as *vitae dux*, responsible for the formation of human beings, their education, their capacity of distinguishing between good and evil and also having a consolatory component at the same time. Moreover, philosophy is described not only as a formative discipline for human beings, but also as mediating humans' relationship with the divine – it is *scientia divinarum*

humanarumque rerum (pp. 11-12). A significant difference is made here in this sense between the Stoic *ars iudicandi*, which is dialectics, and the *ars inveniendi*, which is topics, the *topoi* being the schematizations that assure the coherence between discourse and reality. The distinction in Cicero, following Panaetius, between the perfectly right actions (*katorthomata*) of the perfect wise and virtuous person and the 'appropriate' or reasonable actions (*kathekonta*) that can be also performed by the imperfect, less wise persons and defined by D'Onofrio, following Cicero, as *officia* or practical duties (p. 19), is used to explain the problems of probabilism and dialectic in philosophy, the distance of logic from reality.

Numerous examples are offered by the author in this sense in order to prove that the Stoics' purported correspondence between the interior logos and the natural order actually became their most persistent enemy precisely because it implied a coherent, necessary, but never fully verifiable truth (p. 27). And here the Academic substitution of the Stoic criterion of evidence with that of probability is preferred. Cicero's *De fato* is also discussed in as much as it concentrates on the opportunity to separate the ontological truth from the laws of logic (p. 29). The distinction between the logical and ontological level is mentioned to support Cicero's admission of the absolute incomprehensibility of the truth on the part of humans and of the impossibility for philosophy to define totality in an exhaustive form. In spite of that, the search for truth, even if inexhaustible, must be pursued methodically and completely in order to reach the best possible formulation, a conception of the truth formulated by Cicero that, according to D'Onofrio, had a strong impact on the Roman culture of the following centuries (even when criticized) (pp. 30-31).

For instance, as part of what D'Onofrio calls the Christian colonization of classical philosophy (p. 43), Cicero's theme of the *dis-sensio philosophorum* was later used as an argument in defence of faith and Christian doctrine, perceived as self-founded and self-verified through its embedding within the concept of the divine Logos, thus offering a perfect triangulation among divine intelligence, the created order and its logical-scientific reconstruction on the part of humans (pp. 37, 42-43). In a similar manner, D'Onofrio points out that the Neoplatonic rebirth of philosophical realism, to be found in the intuition of the original chain that connects, in the perfection of the *ordo idearum*, the complexity of the *ordo rerum* to the complexity of the *ordo verborum*, influenced Augustine quite substantially (p. 44). On the basis of such Neoplatonic views, Augustine criticized Cicero's *Contra Academicos* for two main errors in which the searcher for the

truth might find himself: the contempt for knowledge (as in Carneades and Cicero) and the presumption of the truth (as in the other schools of Antiquity). To that Augustine adds that, since only sages aspire to happiness (*beatitudo*), one should ask the question whether the end of wisdom is indeed the *inquisitio veritatis* (the search as such), as the academic probabilists want, or rather the *inventio veritatis*, which would have to emerge from the conclusions of the search (pp. 48-49).

For Augustine, the *verum invenire* acts only as a point of departure, as the probable hope of being able to reach the truth. In this sense Augustine displays, according to D'Onofrio, only a moderate probabilism, which admits, in agreement with Carneades, that every form of knowledge is probable, but also, in disagreement with Carneades, that the very possibility of finding the truth is also probable (p. 55). While the academic criterion of probability as taught by Cicero refers to the 'probable' or 'verisimilar' as to that which allows for the orienting of the self in action without relying upon cognitive assent since to know the final nature of their actions exceeds the capacity of humans (p. 52), Augustine emphasizes the necessity to work out a complete and definitive conversion of the investigative stance which was particular to classical philosophy. He does not seek a logical foundation for faith, but he must find a reason for conversion (p. 59) since the truth (*veritas*) cannot be anything else but divine (pp. 62-63). Thus, all the philosophies embraced by Augustine (Stoic, Neoplatonic, Cicero's eclecticism) have as an end the 'converted philosophy', the Christian philosophy or the *certissima scientia*, the one that overcomes the *dissensiones philosophorum* (pp. 69, 73).

The second chapter, referring to the 'garment of philosophy', treats about Boethius, considered to be the last of the ancient philosophers and the first of the new, himself influenced by the Stoics, Neoplatonics and Cicero and also by the Neopythagoreans and Aristotle (pp. 79-81). The main point of the discussion here is the issue of *sapientia* (the perfect knowledge) – *scientia* (progressive maturation) – *philosophia* (the stage of perfecting the cognitive human capacities which bears *scientia* to *sapientia*) (pp. 84-85). In this sense, D'Onofrio maintains that, in 'appropriating' the truth of the philosophers, Christian intellectuals found in Augustine's thought a way of giving life to a systematic rational philosophy by grafting onto it the Neoplatonic program of restoring the comprehensibility of a cosmos which is assumed to be ordered according to laws of a divine and universal reason. In such a context, Boethius' speculative contribution must be seen as grafting itself on the same problematic of the 'overturning' of the Ciceronian critical reason that other Christian thinkers (Augustine

included) brought about (pp. 83-84). Thus, according to D'Onofrio, Boethius considers the inner powers of the soul to be innate principles of cognitive activity, despite his Aristotelian conviction that their strength is sustained and put into movement by the occasional addition of the senses (p. 116). According to the Boethian doctrine of knowledge as explained by D'Onofrio, the super-rational intelligence is capable of directly intuiting in an all-comprehensive view the authentic perfection of the truth and it is the form possessed in a constant and inalienable way only by the divinity. The direct contemplation of reality cannot exist, except as a form of knowledge which is divine in itself. Intelligent creatures are themselves able to participate in this knowledge, but only partially and episodically (pp. 123-4). Consequently, one reaches *sapientia*, the object of philosophy (which is *studium sapientiae*) through an ascending perfection of the human cognitive capacities by the contribution of various *scientiae*, which pursue with single, limited and diverse steps the complex reconstruction of an object that is in itself 'absolute' and penetrable only by a view which is superior to that of discursive reason (by being intuitive and totalizing) (p. 131).

Furthermore, D'Onofrio explains that human contemplation of the absolute is not only possible as an end for philosophy (as conceived by Boethius), but it is also the constitutive presupposition of the *sapientia*, towards which it tends, as in the Neoplatonic tradition. Moreover, in accordance with Christian hermeneutics and with the teaching of Augustine, the truth, in itself irremediably unknown for humans, was integrally unveiled to them by the Revelation (p. 135). In spite of that, theology is still a philosophical discipline for Boethius as well as for the ancient philosophers, being defined as the peak of the hierarchy of the human sciences. Moreover, in the Christian era, it has an even more privileged position due to the Revelation, which exalts philosophy to a level above the natural capacities of knowledge and still nearer the realization of the *sapientia* itself (p. 136). Thus, one can find in Boethius, according to D'Onofrio, the Platonic cognitive methodology that guides the dianoetic-discursive reason of the sciences to the point of raising itself, according to its own possibilities, up to the noetic intellect (p. 142).

The third chapter, referring to the theological mission of the sage, concentrates on John Scot Eriugena and his importance for the future of theology/philosophy not only in the Carolingian times and, generally, in the early Middle Ages, but also much later, up to the Renaissance. Here D'Onofrio refers to the Carolingian times as the period when the concept of *translatio studiorum* (from Ancient Greece

to scholastic Europe) became an important issue that developed in parallel with that of the *translatio imperii*. For instance, he observes that Thomas of Ireland, referring to the origins of the University of Paris mentions John Scot Eriugena among the four legendary founders of the university and as an example of the *translatio studiorum* due to his translation into Latin of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite (p. 149). Alcuin is often mentioned as well and also as an example of the function of the sage within the *translatio studiorum* / *translatio imperii* (pp. 151-52).

However, beyond the importance he ascribes to the Carolingian scholars, D'Onofrio also points out the great influence of Augustine himself in the early medieval period. Under this influence, theology is described as both *vera sapientia* and *vera philosophia* in the early Middle Ages and it is also stated that all theoretical knowledge, which investigates the real nature of things beyond the sensible appearances, can only be a form of theological knowledge (p. 153). Regarding the theological method in the Carolingian age, D'Onofrio emphasizes the unity and the rules of the theological method concentrating on *lectio*, *traditio*, *ratio* – scriptural exegesis, ecclesiastical and patristic heritage, and the systematization of it (pp. 152-54) and also the influence of the liberal arts (p. 158) and especially of dialectics (in Martianus Capella's division) in Eriugena's *De predestinatione* and *Periphyseon* (pp. 162-168). John Scot seems to have been extremely important, according to D'Onofrio, also due to the fact that he tried to combine the complete recovery of being and One advanced by the Greek fathers with the historical and systematic perspective of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. D'Onofrio insists that both the philosophical and the theological Middle Ages begin at this point.

The fourth chapter is dedicated primarily to Anselm of Canterbury and to the 'divine logic' he represents, in D'Onofrio's view. The chapter is a detailed and comprehensive presentation of medieval logics, which will be but briefly summarized here through the two ways asserted by Anselm: the *ratio fidei*, the affirmative way of the *Monologion*, under the influence of Augustine (pp. 231-36), and the negative way of the *Proslogion* (pp. 237-247). Moreover, D'Onofrio insists that, in the *Monologion*, Anselm maintains the respect for Christian dogma as the final criterion for the verification of the correctness of all mental procedures (p. 226) and the idea that theological knowledge is truly a rational illustration of the faith without ever presuming to be able to formulate a judgment upon its truthfulness (p. 231).

The fifth and last chapter, the 'Renaissance of the *vera philosophia*' concentrates again on the cognitive ascent of the soul assured by

the successive contribution of multiple faculties and disciplines, which are capable, through a progressive climb, of perceiving ever better the founding presence of the divine in the known object (p. 268). The influence of Nicholas of Cusa is often pointed out as well as the influence of the Platonic or Neoplatonic gnoseology of Eriugena in Nicholas of Cusa (p. 284). The book seems to come now full circle and the numerous assumptions and theoretical premises in the first chapter seem to find their accomplishment in Renaissance philosophy even if the synthesis offered here by D'Onofrio may sometimes lack depth due to the very diverse and complex material. However, the hierarchization of the cognitive activities, already to be observed in Anselm while describing the ascending stages of the human spirit from the sphere of corporeity to the contemplation of invisible realities and, furthermore to the direct intuition of the divine, reachable by means of the highest cognitive (non-discursive intellectual-noetic) grade (p. 285), seems to be for D'Onofrio one of the main characteristics of Renaissance thought and the way it is discussed in the last chapter adds to the consistence of the book.

Other medieval tendencies, related to earlier, late antique and early medieval models, to be perpetuated in the Renaissance philosophy and theology, are also pointed out in this last chapter, conceived as a synthesis of all these tendencies. For instance, a serious change from the thirteenth century onwards, generated by the massive influx of Aristotelian gnoseological realism into the Christian West in the works of John of Salisbury, Alan of Lille, Honorius Augustodunensis, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Isaac of Stella, Bonaventure, etc. is studied by D'Onofrio together with its effects in the Renaissance (pp. 292-297). In fact, he notes that the thirteenth century witnessed the first attempts to work out a synthesis between the two psychological nomenclatures – Platonic-Augustinian and Aristotelian (p. 297) towards an 'overturning' of the relationship between subject and object of knowledge leading to a phenomenological orientation of knowledge towards resolving the philosophical disagreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism. Nicholas of Cusa, for instance, initiated a new perspective which brought into discussion the objectivity of scientific knowledge, which was the very basis of the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy in all its actualizations and variations (pp. 301-302).

Thus, D'Onofrio points out the existence of a humanistic reform of theology. As the first centuries of the Christian era had contributed to the unmasking of the vanity of ancient thinkers' hope to formulate incontrovertible truths, in the years that witnessed the

gradual failure of the irenic promises of the councils of Constance, Basle and Ferrara-Florence-Rome, the echo of unjustifiable *disensiones theologorum* had also arisen (alongside those of the *disensiones philosophorum*) and they referred primarily to the incapacity to find theoretical accord regarding the fundamental themes of the revealed message (pp. 319-20). And here, Barlaam of Calabria, as a theologian opposed to the Thomistic method, is credited by D'Onofrio with the recovery of the mystical-negative orientation recommended by the Greek fathers and also by Eriugena (pp. 322-24). Furthermore, while briefly mentioning Ficino, Pico, Aegidius of Viterbo or Agostino Steuco (p. 326), D'Onofrio refers to the return of the humanists to the ancient sages and to the Fathers of the Church while pursuing the so-called 'concordistic' synthesis of the Renaissance thought – the humanists restoring theology to its authentic nature as a fecund and constant pursuit of a knowledge which will never be fully reduced to the doctrinal fulfillment of earthly science (reform both of its original and practical ends and of the adequate means to realize these ends) (pp. 328-9). However, although D'Onofrio seems to master here all these complex issues, one would expect maybe a more in depth study of the Aristotelian tradition and of the ways it contributed to or rather impeded such a 'concordistic' synthesis.

Finally, D'Onofrio maintains that the possible reunification of all philosophies or philosophical theologies within the higher unity of noetic knowledge becomes in the thought of many Renaissance theologians an acceptance of the idea that even the various historical religions were attempts of approaching the divine on the part of natural human intelligence. Each religion might therefore be considered as a form of evidence for at least partial manifestations of the truth. The consequence of the acceptance of the human incapacity for achieving a single and univocal form of knowledge is the possibility of a significant opening to inter-religious concordism, for D'Onofrio, in partial agreement with Nicholas of Cusa, the author he quotes most here and who was referring to a so-called *concordantia catholica*, the search for universal concord among human minds, the peace of faith or irenicism (p. 330). With that, the very complex book by Giulio D'Onofrio comes again full circle while noting a return of the philosophical probabilism discussed at the beginning in relation to the late antique authors and a strong emphasis on 'the truths of tolerance' (p. 336).

Diana STANCIU

Michael Margoni-Kögler, *Die Perikopen im Gottesdienst bei Augustinus. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der liturgischen Schriftlesung in der frühen Kirche*, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte 810 – Veröffentlichungen der Kommission zur Herausgabe des Corpus der lateinischen Kirchenväter 29, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 2010, ISBN 978-3-7001-6550-7, 665 p.

Comme il l'indique dans son introduction, M. Margoni-Kögler s'inscrit, avec ce livre, dans le domaine de recherche qu'il appelle la "Perikopenforschung" et qui vise à déterminer les péricopes scripturaires lues lors des différents services de l'année religieuse, le responsable de ce choix et la raison pour laquelle on a opté pour une péricope spécifique. Pour ce qui est de la liturgie nord-africaine de l'antiquité tardive, Margoni-Kögler remarque qu'il y a un grand manque de sources directes sur les textes lus. Dès lors, les indications que l'œuvre homilétique d'Augustin – identifiée par Margoni-Kögler aux *Sermones ad populum*, *Tractatus in Iohannis euangelium*, *Tractatus in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos* et *Enarrationes in Psalmos* – peut nous fournir, à côté des données limitées qu'on peut trouver dans les décisions des conciles des 4^{ième}-6^{ième} siècles, sont indispensables pour la constitution d'une image des lectures liturgiques dans l'Afrique du Nord du cinquième siècle. Dans ce livre, M. Margoni-Kögler se consacre donc entièrement à cette œuvre homilétique d'Augustin et aux indications qu'elle fournit sur les péricopes scripturaires lues, tout en tenant compte du fait qu'il est dangereux de faire une généralisation de ce qu'on constate pour Augustin au reste de la liturgie nord-africaine du cinquième siècle.

L'ouvrage présent a été structuré de manière très claire. Aux premières pages, nous trouvons une table de matières très détaillée qui facilite la consultation du volume assez élaboré. Tous les titres et sous-titres y sont indiqués. Ces titres sont à leur tour bien choisis, en ce sens qu'ils nous informent sur la partie de l'œuvre homilétique d'Augustin traitée dans ce qui suit (à l'exception des *Tractatus in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos* dont le traitement ne ressort pas immédiatement de l'étude de la table de matières). La table de matières est suivie d'une préface, qui précède à son tour la première grande partie du livre, à savoir l'introduction. Dans cette introduction, l'auteur nous informe d'abord sur les points de départ et le but de sa recherche, comme nous les avons paraphrasés plus haut, pour passer ensuite à un aperçu de la littérature disponible sur la liturgie nord-africaine en générale et sur la

liturgie augustinienne en particulier. Il donne des remarques critiques pour chaque ouvrage cité et indique qu'il ne s'agit que des ouvrages majeurs et que les petits ouvrages sont traités dans le corps du livre. La partie introductive se termine par une justification de la structure, des sources et de la méthode adoptées dans le livre. La structure est présentée comme étant déterminée par les sources étudiées. Ces sources sont issues de l'œuvre homilétique d'Augustin et consistent en les premiers 54 *Tractatus in Iohannis euangelium*, les 10 *Tractatus in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos*, les *Enarrationes in Psalmos* qui ont réellement été prêchées et les *Sermones ad populum* considérés comme étant authentiques. La méthode est décrite de manière limitée, puisque le deuxième chapitre y est entièrement dédié. Au début de ce deuxième chapitre, l'auteur montre quels types d'indications l'on peut utiliser dans la recherche. Il distingue entre indications explicites – et remarque immédiatement qu'on peut discuter sur ce qu'on considère comme indications explicites – et signes implicites, comme la fréquence de certains versets, le commentaire explicite, la convenance de versets à la situation de prononciation ou l'utilisation des mêmes versets dans des sermons thématiquement liés. Ensuite, il donne un survol des méthodes utilisées par ses prédécesseurs pour passer enfin aux principes de base de sa propre étude. Il indique qu'il se base sur les indications explicites et implicites, qu'il tient compte de la possibilité d'une utilisation illustrative de versets bibliques (qui n'appartiennent donc pas nécessairement à une lecture réelle), qu'une étude comparative à l'intérieur de l'œuvre d'Augustin pourrait fournir des informations sur le rôle de certaines citations dans un sermon, qu'il veut se distancier d'arguments de type chronologique et qu'il attache de l'importance au type de contexte liturgique dans lequel les sermons ont été prononcés. Après les deux chapitres introductifs, Margoni-Kögler analyse l'œuvre homilétique d'Augustin en 7 chapitres, commençant par les *Sermones ad populum* (qui sont traités dans l'ordre adopté par les Mauristes), continuant par les *Enarrationes in Psalmos* et par les *Tractatus in Iohannis euangelium* et terminant par une partie portant sur les sermons prononcés "im Kontext von Ost und West". Les *Tractatus in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos* sont traités en passant. A chaque fois, M. Margoni-Kögler décrit d'abord ses remarques les plus importantes sur les homélies en question, pour insérer ensuite une table récapitulative, fournissant pour chaque sermon décrit les lectures précédentes, ainsi que quelques remarques sur l'occasion à laquelle le sermon est prononcé où sur le contexte des citations scripturaires. Dans le chapitre sur les *Sermones de Scripturis*, M. Margoni-Kögler dévie un peu de ce principe structurant, en

attachant surtout de l'importance à ces tables récapitulatives et en fournissant les descriptions supplémentaires sous forme de notes. Comme il s'agit dans le cas de ces sermons d'un corpus énorme, ce changement de présentation rend les informations plus accessibles au lecteur. Dans un dernier chapitre, l'auteur conclue par une relativisation des conclusions qu'il a faites dans les tables à la fin des chapitres précédents. Il indique que le corpus reste limité, puisque relativement peu de sermons ont été conservés. En plus, il s'avère très difficile de conclure à un corpus certain de textes scripturaux lus à base des données disponibles (sauf dans le cas des sermons prononcés lors de fêtes fixes de l'année liturgique). Aux dernières pages du livre, nous trouvons une bibliographie très élaborée contenant une liste des abréviations utilisées, une liste de littérature primaire et une liste de littérature secondaire. Finalement, M. Margoni-Kögler a inséré un index des péripécies bibliques et un index des ouvrages d'Augustin, qui facilitent de nouveau la consultation du livre.

Nous pouvons conclure en disant que grâce à sa grande accessibilité et à son exhaustivité, cet ouvrage constitue une aide très utile pour tous ceux qui étudient l'œuvre homilétique d'Augustin.

Alicia EELLEN

Sancti Aurelii Augustini Sermones in Epistolas Apostolicas. Id est Sermones CLI-CLVI secundum ordinem vylgatvm inserto etiam uno sermone post mavrinos reperto, recensuit Gert Partoens, secundum praefationis capvt conscripsit Josef Lössl, Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina XLI Ba, Brepols, Turnhout, 2008, ISBN 978-2-503-00417-4, CXCVII, 195 p.

Le volume CCSL XLI Ba nous fournit une édition critique des sermons 151-156 de saint Augustin. Ce volume est réalisé par G. Partoens, avec un chapitre introductif par J. Lössl. Il est publié en 2008 chez Brepols Publishers à Turnhout. L'édition des sermons 151-156 (les sermons qui portent sur Rom. 7,5-8,17) constitue une suite aux recherches effectuées par Lambot et Verbraken sur les *Sermones ad populum*, dont la série 151-156 fait partie. Elle est précédée de plusieurs chapitres introductifs qui offrent des informations supplémentaires sur plusieurs aspects liés au travail éditorial. Les deux premiers chapitres traitent la datation des sermons. Dans un premier chapitre, G. Partoens rappelle l'ordre probable de leur articulation et il passe ensuite à la datation plus spécifique. Il nous présente un survol critique

des études menées sur ce sujet dans le passé, comme celles de A.-M. la Bonnardière, de F. Dolbeau et de P.-M. Hombert. Il conclue le chapitre en décrivant sa propre position vis-à-vis de l'argumentation existante. Dans le deuxième chapitre, J. Lössl rappelle tout d'abord brièvement les indications externes qui ont été étudiées pour dater les sermons (voir le premier chapitre). Puis, il passe aux arguments relevés du contenu même des sermons, ainsi que du contenu d'autres œuvres d'Augustin. J. Lössl établit d'abord le cadre historique dans lequel il faut situer les sermons. Ensuite, il passe à la description générale du contenu de chacun des sermons. Il termine le chapitre en étudiant les éléments du contenu que les sermons ont en commun avec d'autres œuvres d'Augustin. Dans un troisième chapitre, G. Partoens étudie la manière dont Augustin traite les versets Rom. 7,5-8,17 dans ses sermons. L'étude du traitement de ces versets le mène à l'hypothèse que les sermons 153-155 constituent une clarification de ce qu'Augustin avait prêché de manière moins systématique dans les sermons 151-152. Le quatrième chapitre présente un survol des sources directes des sermons. Nous trouvons une énumération des manuscrits étudiés dans ce quatrième chapitre, suivie d'une étude des relations généalogiques qui existent entre ces manuscrits. Plus spécifiquement, G. Partoens attache beaucoup d'importance aux éléments inhérents aux sermons qui peuvent nous apprendre plus sur la structure interne des différentes collections et sur les relations entre ces collections. Des chapitres sur les sermons 151-156 on passe à un cadre plus large dans le chapitre cinq. Ce chapitre porte sur toute la collection *De uerbis Apostoli* et sur la manière dont cette collection a été transmise dans les manuscrits jusqu'au douzième siècle. Dans ce chapitre, G. Partoens va à la recherche de la composition originelle de la collection *De uerbis Apostoli* et de l'origine de la collection *De uerbis Domini et Apostoli*. Il décrit la manière dont Verbraken a classifié les témoins de *De uerbis Domini et Apostoli* et les problèmes méthodologiques auxquels ce dernier était confronté. Ensuite, il passe à une vue d'ensemble des plus anciens témoins pour *De uerbis Apostoli*, suivie d'une description élaborée des relations généalogiques qui existent entre les manuscrits V_a^{1-6} et V_b^{1-27} . Il utilise des appareils de fautes typiques dans les sermons 151-156 et il avance une nouvelle hypothèse sur la classification interne de *De uerbis Apostoli*. Le chapitre se termine par une brève description des sources qui ont été utilisées pour les éditions d'Amerbach-Dodon et des Mauristes. Dans un dernier chapitre, G. Partoens présente les grandes lignes de la tradition indirecte la plus ancienne des sermons 151-156 en attachant beaucoup d'importance au sermon 177 de Césaire d'Arles et aux commentaires médiévaux de

Paul. Les chapitres introductifs sont suivis par une bibliographie, qui est suivie à son tour par l'édition même des textes. Ensuite, nous trouvons les textes des sermons 151-156 (sauf de 154A, qui est édité dans un appendice), qui sont accompagnés de trois apparats: un appa- rat qui décrit la tradition manuscrite utilisée pour reconstituer le texte, un appa- rat qui indique les citations bibliques et un dernier appa- rat qui mentionne les variantes. Dans le texte même, les citations bibliques sont indiquées en italique. Les textes des différents sermons sont suivis d'un passage sur l'interprétation syntaxique dans lequel G. Partoens justifie le choix qu'il a fait pour certaines parties compli- quées ou difficiles du texte. A la fin du volume, nous trouvons encore un *Index Locorum Sacrae Scripturae* et une table des matières.

Alicia EELEN

Tarmo Toom, *Thought Clothed With Sound. Augustine's Christologi- cal Hermeneutics in De doctrina Christiana*, International Theo- logical Studies. Contributions of Baptist Scholars 4, Peter Lang, Bern, 2002, ISBN 3-906769-07-0, 277 p.

As the Author states from the very beginning, the goal of his work is to study, in *De doctrina Christiana* (=doc. chr.), "the relation- ship between biblical hermeneutics and Christology (...) from an epis- temological perspective" (p. 15). A goal which is often reiterated and summerized in sentences like the following: "The present study focuses on Augustine's Christological epistemology as a context for assessing hermeneutics in *De doctrina Christiana*, and its goal is to demonstrate that Augustine's hermeneutical theory is ultimately a Christological theory" (p. 80).

Augustine's *doc. chr.* is a treatise about Holy Scripture and the rules (*praecepta*) of its interpretation. More precisely, it deals with the *modus inveniendi*, the way of discovering the things which are to be understood (corresponding to the first three books of *doc. chr.*), and with the *modus proferendi*, the way of teaching what has been learned (corresponding to the fourth and last book of *doc. chr.*). The Author concentrates on the first three books, which are strictly about interpre- tation, and approaches them in the light of Augustine's epistemologi- cal quests and Christological convictions which hinge upon the "most basic Sign", the man Jesus Christ (see pp. 39ff). Christ is, in fact, at the root of Augustine's "preunderstanding". It is on Christ, the Wis- dom of God, through whom the world was created and through whom

the latter can be understood, that the signification theory of *doc. chr.* is ultimately constructed.

The analysis of the first three books of *doc. chr.* – made by Toom from an epistemological perspective which is focused on the “Christological theory” underlying Augustine’s biblical hermeneutics (see pp. 65ff) – is not limited to the content of this particular treatise. In point of fact, Toom’s investigation embraces other augustinian works, especially the *Contra Academicos* and the *De magistro*, where the themes of epistemology, Christology, language and exegesis were already present and interrelated. Besides, he does not forget to put Augustine’s hermeneutical construction in the wider context of the ancient linguistic and philosophical “universes” (Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Epicureans, Philo of Alexandria, Plotinus, Latin Rhetorical Schools) (pp. 111ff).

Toom analyses book one of *doc. chr.*, which shows the movement from *res* to *signa* (the comprehension of the *res* leads to the knowledge of that which is signified), and books two and three, which deal with the inverted movement from *signa* to *res* (the scriptural interpretation infers from signs that which is signified). On the one hand – Augustine argues – the *res* must be sought, against the background of the *uti/frui* scheme, in the light of the *regula fidei* and of the double commandment of love (*caritas*), viz. in the Church, where the right context is provided (see pp. 105ff). On the other hand, the *signa*, namely the linguistic signs of which human language is made up, represent the visible mediation of God talking to mankind through Scripture, although these signs are “ultimately inadequate for speaking about the Infinite” (p. 162). Hence the necessity for the *scientia signorum* of distinguishing the various *signa data* within Scripture: *ignota*, *ambigua*, *translata* (see chapters 4 and 5). Again, these signs must be understood in the light of God’s self-revelation, namely the incarnate Christ, the humble Mediator between God and men, the one who – being the “very first sign” – is the only possible way for ultimately knowing God.

That Augustine’s theory of interpretation is essentially a Christological theory can be inferred also by the fundamental Christological analogy found in *doc. chr.* 1,13 (see pp. 226ff), based on the analogy between thinking and speaking (the inner and the expressed word distinction) on one part, and God uttering his Word on the other. This analogy, understood in the light of the Christian exegete’s preunderstanding (*uti/frui* scheme, *regula fidei* and *caritas*), is what makes possible a correct comprehension of Scripture. When that happens, in fact, “the signifying links in the chain of signification are not multiplied

arbitrarily. Rather, they are clustered around one sign, the humanity of Christ (...) The incarnated Word leaves no gap between the sign and the signified, for Christ signifies himself" (p. 240). Thanks to his humanity, Christ is the "signifier", and thanks to his divinity, He is the "signified". In other words, He is both the *via* and the *patria* (cf. *doc. chr.* 1,11,11), and because of that He constitutes "the transcendental possibility for the scriptures to linguistically signify the spiritual realities" (p. 241).

Toom's reconstruction of the theological/Christological approach adopted by Augustine in his theory of biblical hermeneutics is convincing. We cannot but agree with him that Christology appears to be the key to the correct understanding of *doc. chr.* We would simply add that this scope was already clear in Augustine's mind even before drawing his hermeneutical *praecepta*. Not only would the immediate precursors of *doc. chr.* (*Contra Academicos* and *De magistro*) hint at that (let us think of Augustine's "illumination theory"), but the Bishop of Hippo's very biographical *parcours* – of which the Milanese "conversion" signs a point of no return – explains the centrality of Christ the Saviour in his life, thought and work.

Donato OGLIARI

Paul van Geest, *The Incomprehensibility of God: Augustine as a Negative Theologian*, Late Antique History and Religion 4, Peeters, Leuven-Paris-Walpole MA, 2011, ISBN 978-90-429-2473-4, XII, 262 p.

In this book Paul van Geest traces throughout Augustine's corpus the recurring emphasis to be found within it on the mystery of God. Taking a chronological approach, the book examines works which "contain passages representative of Augustine's discourse about God during a certain period", and more specifically, "passages in which Augustine himself made *the way of speaking about God* an object of reflection" (p. 18). In reading Augustine as 'negative theologian' van Geest responds to a widespread reception of Augustine as a 'positive' theologian who developed and provided for later Christian tradition precise and definite ways of speaking about the God of salvation and all that that entailed doctrinally speaking. He thus contributes to a small but growing literature on Augustine's 'negative discourse about God' (p. 9), bringing the latter into the limelight by showing how an awareness of God's unknowability pervades Augustine's

works, being sharpened at key junctures within his theological development. One of his aims in doing so is to demonstrate the relevance of Augustine to a contemporary culture which holds in suspicion religious discourse that is too robust or dogmatic, preferring an emphasis on the inadequacy of any one conceptualisation in the face of pluriform religious experience. If a rediscovery of apophysis within Christianity can speak to this post-Christian religiosity, then Augustine is a key resource, argues van Geest (pp. ix-x, 8-9).

In this review, rather than giving a blow-by-blow account of the book (whose structure is not so much where the interest lies), I will bring out what I see as its key results. In particular, I will highlight four important insights that are articulated within the book, after which I will invite further possible, fruitful developments of these insights.

1. Van Geest offers an analysis of *In epistolam Johannis ad Parthos* which displays Augustine's development of the *via amoris* (found already in *De doctrina christiana*) in complementary relation with the *via negationis* (Chapter 5). He shows that, for Augustine, the way to 'seeing' God, by contrast with bodily sight, is love. The implication, by extension, is that God can be 'known' while his cognitive unknowability remains intact. Van Geest shows how the link between the two *viae* is intensified insofar as love is, for Augustine, as incomprehensible as God himself (p. 105).

2. In his analysis of *De diversis questionibus ad Simplicianum* van Geest draws attention to the fact that one of Augustine's aims was 'the formation of people'. In particular, "Augustine's appeal to God's inscrutability was part of his endeavour to advocate humility and uncertainty as salutary attitudes to life" (pp. 66-67). This brings out a side to Augustine's doctrine of predestination which is often overlooked: its directedness to the continual undercutting of pride, and more generally its pastoral motivation. Van Geest returns to the Augustinian note of humility in his treatment of Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings (Chapter 10), where again Augustine harnesses an acknowledgment of the inscrutability of God's judgments for the inculcation of humility – and at one point accuses Julian of lacking it (p. 207). Such an emphasis fleshes out, in one particular way, the *via amoris*, thereby developing the insight that knowledge of God is to be had not conceptually in the abstract, but concretely in the action of humble love (see p. 222).

3. The way of humility is drawn out further and more specifically in relation to the incarnation: for Christ is, quintessentially, the 'humble doctor' (p. 188). Van Geest draws out the implications of this in his exposition of *sermo* 117, in which Augustine answers the

question of how human beings can approach God if God is incomprehensible. The answer lies in the incarnation: if the Word cannot be grasped in divine form, then it must be listened to in human form. And this means following the way of the incarnation, which is the way of humility (pp. 186-188). Van Geest has already drawn attention to the presence of this motif in *De Trinitate* (p. 150). In each case, 'grasping' the mystery of God is linked, not with cognitive straining, but with a transformed way of life.

4. Finally, these insights are drawn together in van Geest's insistence that the genre of Augustine's writings must be taken into account when appraising them. He makes this point specifically in relation to *Ad Simplicianum* (p. 65), but it is a point which bears generalisation. In particular, it might allow for a more sustained acknowledgment of Augustine's pastoral aims: that his theological constructions are not intended merely as part of an abstract edifice of truth, but (in many cases) for the drawing of his audience into deeper encounter with the unknowable God. Van Geest thus speaks of Augustine as a 'mystagogue' (e.g. p. 65).

These four interconnected insights are rich and compelling, and might be taken as an invitation to pursue the following avenues of development in future book projects.

1. Van Geest claims in relation to the *via amoris* that "[a]lthough [love] was the ultimate moment of knowledge, Augustine denied...that love makes God's being completely comprehensible" (p. 107). And in discussing the way of humility he refers to "a humility which stemmed from the insight that humankind cannot fathom much of God's being and activity" (p. 208). These phrases might be taken to suggest that God's incomprehensibility is a matter of degree, and that knowing God is still essentially a matter of cognition. But might the *via amoris* be interpreted rather as suggesting that knowledge of God, as a matter of love, is less a cognitive matter than a relational or participatory one (which does not involve God's being reduced to an object of cognition)? This reading would cohere well with the apophatic spirit of van Geest's interpretation of Augustine insofar as it holds inseparably together an affirmation and a denial: on the one hand God is said to be unknowable (cognitively), and on the other hand God is said to be knowable (by love). More pithily still, God is said to be 'non-cognitively knowable'. If cognition is taken to be definitive of human knowledge, then we have here an oxymoron, pointing to God's transcendence of the human distinction between knowledge and lack of knowledge. To sum up: love knows God in God's incomprehensibility.

2. Van Geest remarks on how apophatic theology became conflated in the West with negative theology (p. 37), while making clear that originally it was rooted in the belief (as articulated by Pseudo-Dionysius) that all language fails – both affirmative and negative (p. 36). In his analysis of Augustine, van Geest seems at times to assume the conflation. However, his conclusions might be given even more reach if the Pseudo-Dionysian account were held to more precisely. Specifically, on this account the potential apophasis in Augustine could be widened from his overtly negative speech to any form of speech which displays language's failure to grasp God. And given that the *via amoris* contains an implicit critique of cognitive attempts to grasp God, this will extend to any form of speech which contributes to the knowledge of God through humble love, a knowledge which preserves intact the incomprehensibility of God. An analysis of these different forms of speech in Augustine (ranging from his pastoral to his polemical works) would be an excellent agenda for a further study.¹

3. Van Geest claims that "the measure in which Augustine emphasized God's incomprehensibility appears to have depended on the measure in which he believed that the unity of the church was at peril" (p. 192); and further (with reference to the Pelagian controversy), that "too great an emphasis on God's incomprehensibility would have made Augustine vulnerable" (p. 198). This was a time when certainty not reticence was needed, van Geests suggests. While he goes on to show that an apophatic tenor is still present in Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings, he retains an implicit opposition between polemical certainty and apophatic reticence. In keeping with van Geest's above insights, could it be argued that this opposition is not necessary? Might polemic be a genre in which a certain kind of clarity can serve to debunk accounts of God which have precisely undermined God's incomprehensibility? In this way Augustine's robust discourse might be understood to be precisely in aid of reasserting God's incomprehensibility and indeed pinpointing it very specifically (e.g. in the inscrutable judgments by which he bestows grace upon some and not others). Thus clarity can be seen to be in direct, not inverse, proportion to mystery. Such a conclusion would nicely consolidate van Geest's overall thesis. As he shows, Augustine's anti-Pelagian emphasis on grace is constantly directed

¹ In 'A Performative Reading of Augustine's Doctrine of Predestination', forthcoming in *Studia Patristica* (2011), I explore in this vein the pastoral impetus of Augustine's works against the so-called 'Semi-Pelagians' (and in particular of *De dono perseverantiae*), showing how the doctrine of predestination is taught so as to foster prayer and humility.

towards the inculcation of humility (p. 206). As such, it is also thoroughly in keeping with the apophatic recognition that God is not known by cognition but on the way of humility.

Van Geest's study of the apophatic tenor of Augustine's writings thoroughly succeeds in redressing the assumption that his robust and clear development of doctrine necessarily implies a robust and clear knowledge of God from which it follows that God is perfectly humanly comprehensible. What I have suggested above are various ways in which van Geest's interpretation of Augustine might be pursued further – and I hope will be – in future monographs.

Susannah TICCITI

Short Notices

Jason David BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma, I: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E.*, Divinations. Rereading Late Ancient Religion, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2009, ISBN 978-0-8122-4210-2, 408 p.

Jason BeDuhn plans to describe Augustine's lifelong entanglement with Manichaeism in a three-volume series of monographs under the title *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma*. BeDuhn sets out to show that Augustine's life and thinking from the point of view of his dealings with the Manichaean doctrine is not a history of sudden changes or ruptures, but is on the contrary continuous, as a process of a lifelong conversion. The first volume studies the episode of Augustine's first contact with, adherence to, disappointment and gradual rupture with Manichaeism, and his subsequent conversion to Catholic/Nicene Christianity, more or less the period of his life described in his *Confessiones*. BeDuhn attempts to historical-critically reconstruct this period in Augustine's Manichaean involvement, making abstraction of Augustine's later – somewhat ideologically coloured – account of it. As such, *conuersio* – the way in which Augustine understood and experienced this – is a central focus of research in this monograph. BeDuhn has made an elaborate and well substantiated beginning of an intriguing aspect of Augustine's life, proving that he not only knows both the sources and the scientific research of them but also that he is a didactic and compelling narrator.

Anthony DUPONT

Luis Marín de Sant Martín, *Los Agustinos. Orígenes y espiritualidad*, Studia augustiniana historica 16, Institutum historicum Augustinianum, Roma, 2009, ISBN 978-90-5573-915-8, 311 p.

The last decades the history of the Order of the Augustinians, its spirituality and its relation to the person of Augustine of Hippo were the subject of extensive research and of several kinds of publications. All this converges in the present study, which offers a well considered overview, with a lot – sometimes very detailed – information. The author succeeded to bring together all the material in a well-balanced presentation, which is a great merit. The book consists of four parts: I. The continuation of Augustinian religious life after the death of Augustine. II. The mendicant orders. III. The Augustinians. IV. The spirituality of the Order of Augustinians. The fourth part is, besides descriptive, a draft for the future of this Order. Attached are Augustine's *Rule for Community Life*, a list of General Chapters and of Priors General, a list of Augustinian saints and beatified Augustinians, and a name index. The book is a well got-up and easy to read publication of the Augustinian Institute in Rome (libri@osacuria.org).

Wim SLEDDENS

Edward Morgan, *The Incarnation of the Word: the Theology of Language of Augustine of Hippo*, Clark, London, 2010, ISBN 978-0-567-03382-6, 191 p.

Morgan studies the relation between God and humanity as mediated by language, human speech act and sociality in Augustine. The author argues that the mediation by language, speech and sociality stands central in Augustine's vision on (the study and preaching of) Scripture and the identity of the human person *vis-à-vis* God. Morgan explores Augustine's theology of language in three key texts. *De doctrina christiana* I reveals that all reading (of Scripture) is shaped by an eschatological concern: the desire to understand how God speaks and has spoken to humanity and how humanity should respond to God's speech act, the eschatological orientation of the human mind to conversation with God. *De doctrina christiana* II and III learn how Scripture has to be read for this end, how the biblical signs should be examined. *De doctrina christiana* IV indicates that preaching – by making God present to the human mind and stimulating its search for God – enables this eschatological conversation. The narrative and

exemplary speech act of confession in the *Confessiones* indicate that conversion towards (conversation with) God proceeds within the context of sociality. These themes find a climax in *De Trinitate*, in which (via the analogy of human speech and incarnation of the Word of God) human speech is understood as a basis of interchange between God and the human person: the language of the human person of Christ embodies the bridge between the divine and human. This monograph offers an original analysis, in a very systematic and focussed way, of three of Augustine's most important writings and is a significant contribution to the research of Augustine's vision on linguistic and social mediation.

Anthony DUPONT

Gabriele Ferlisi, *I Salmi delle lodi pregati con Sant'Agostino*, Ancora, Milano, 2009, ISBN 978-88-514-0700-1, 287 p.

The author uses Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* to offer a help to reflect and to meditate on the Psalms prayed during the lauds (morning prayer) in the Catholic breviary. The book is structured as the breviary: the Psalms prayed day by day during a cycle of four weeks. The author begins each reflection by a short synthesis of the content and intent of each discussed Psalm and the main line in Augustine's reading of it. Subsequently the *enarratio* devoted to the Psalm in question is quoted, structured by the author with clarifying subtitles. The reflection is concluded with the possible significance and message of this Psalm for Christian life. The book is complemented with an index and an elaborate table of contents.

Anthony DUPONT

Noëlle-Laetitia Perret, *Les traductions françaises du De regimine principum de Gilles de Rome: parcours matériel, culturel et intellectuel d'un discours sur l'éducation*, Education and Society in the Middle ages and Renaissance 39, Brill, Leiden, 2011, ISBN 9789004206199.2011, XVIII, 465 p.-[8] p.

The present monograph illustrates and substantiates that the (medieval) tradition and both material and intellectual-cultural transmission of ideas and texts is a creative process. Perret presents a study

of seven different old French translations of *De regimine principis* (1279), written by Giles of Rome (1247-1316), dedicated to Philippe le Bel, as a handbook for political and ethical life. The first part gives an overview of these seven identified translations, studies the specific historical context and possible motivations of their production, and their intended audiences (nobility and upper class bourgeoisie). As such, Perret reconstructs the transmission history and circulation of Giles of Rome's tractate. These translations were however not restricted to mere translations, and included also adaptation, recontextualisation, re-appropriation, abbreviation, augmentation. Subsequently, the author focuses on the second part of *De regimine principis*, which deals with education. Giles of Rome synthesised and recontextualised previous theories and practices regarding education, especially he attempted to reconcile Aristotelism and Augustinianism. The seven translators actually followed the same pattern, and adapted the content of his educational ideas to the needs of their proper times. The third part of the monograph offers a catalogue of the 42 manuscripts, and their history, used for this scholarly and well documented study.

Anthony DUPONT

AUGUSTINIANA 61

CONTENT – SOMMAIRE

W. ECKERMANN, In Erinnerung an P. Dr. Dr. Adolar Zumkeller OSA (1915-2011)	7
D. MOORE, Truth and Image in Augustinian Epistemology	11
N. ADKIN, <i>Labor tam utilis</i> : Sallust in Augustine on the Vulgate.	49
J. PALETTA, The <i>Ordo Sapientiae</i> : Augustine's Program for Philosophical Study in his Early Works	55
M. OLSZEWSKI, Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona. <i>In primum Sententiarum</i>	75
G. PARTOENS, The earliest phase of the Jansenist controversy among the Flemish Capuchins. Part I: Hildebrand's interpretation and the case of Eugenius of Bruges...	155
Gerald P. BOERSMA, "Exquisite and Precious Vessels": <i>Doctrina</i> in Book I of Augustine's <i>Confessions</i>	187
J. PALETTA, The theme of Ontological Dependence in <i>Con- fessions</i> Book 7 Chapters 14-20	207
G. PARTOENS, The earliest phase of the Jansenist controversy among the Flemish Capuchins. Part II: the cases of Augustinus of 's Hertogenbosch and Fulgentius of Maaseik	225
L.J. DORFBAUER, <i>Commendaciones Augustini</i> : textsamm- lungen zum Lob des Augustinus aus dem Umfeld des Augustinereremitenordens. Mit einer Edition von Pseudepigrapha	271
BOOK REVIEWS	335

