
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OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE AUGUSTINIAN ORDER

TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR DE STUDIE VAN SINT AUGUSTINUS EN DE AUGUSTIJNENORDE

REVUE POUR L'ÉTUDE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN ET DE L'ORDRE DES AUGUSTINS

YEAR
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2010

INSTITUTUM HISTORICUM AUGUSTINIANUM LOVANII

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CONTENT – SOMMAIRE

L.S.

In January 2009, Prof. dr. Otto Wermelinger retired from the University of Fribourg, after a long and rich academic career. The importance of Prof. Wermelinger's contribution to Augustinian scholarship, and especially to the Pelagian controversy, is widely acknowledged, and the board of *Augustiniana* thought it appropriate to join in the tribute paid to him by colleagues and friends.

Through Prof. F. Mali, who holds the Chair for Patristics, Ancient Church History and Christian Oriental Languages at the University of Fribourg, we received the papers that were presented at O. Wermelinger's valedictory conference. We are delighted that we can offer these texts to our readers, and we thank Prof. Mali for his willingness to act as guest editor for these three articles.

We hope you will enjoy reading this issue of *Augustiniana*, which, apart from the tribute to Otto Wermelinger, contains an important new textual edition of *Sermo* 142, and an interesting article on Rufinus as an interpreter of Origen.

Gerd Van Riel

I.-S.

PELAGIUS AND AUGUSTINE: MORE THAN A DOCTRINAL CONTROVERSY

Every year, the *Swiss Group of Patristic Studies* (*Groupe Suisse d'Études patristiques* [GSEP] / *Schweizerische Patristische Arbeitsgemeinschaft* [SPAG]), in cooperation with the Doctoral Programme of the West-Swiss Universities (cf. www.unifr.ch/patr), organizes a one-day seminar dedicated to a particular theme in the field of Patristics and Ancient Christianity. On the occasion of Prof. Dr. Otto Wermelinger's (University of Fribourg) retirement, a conference on "Pelagius and Augustine" was held at Fribourg, November 29, 2008.

During his long academic career Otto Wermelinger has persistently worked on the Augustine-Pelagius controversy. O. Wermelinger's major contribution to the subject is his doctoral thesis, the importance of which is widely acclaimed up till today: "Rom und Pelagius: Die theologische Position der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432" (Stuttgart 1975). In order to pay homage to O. Wermelinger's lifelong academic interest, and to evaluate different directions that Pelagian research has taken since, the organizers have invited some of the most prominent students in the field, Mathijs Lamberigts (Leuven), Winrich Löhr (Heidelberg), Paul Mattei (Lyon) and Dorothea Weber (Vienna). The papers of the first three contributors are published here.

Since O. Wermelinger's monograph the Pelagian studies have seen several important publications, such as the article on Pelagius and Pelagianism in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* by F.G. Nuvolone and A. Solignac,[1] the Pelagian controversy's chronological study by Y.-M. Duval,[2] and the groundbreaking monograph of J.-M. Salamito[3] dealing with the social background of the Pelagius-Augustine debate. The time has come for a fresh look at the complex Pelagian question, including the impact of Pelagius' thought in the Gallic church, and for its reexamination on the background of the most recent research. Thus W. Löhr addresses influence of the actors' social background on the personal relationship between Pelagius and Augustine, P. Mattei

[1] F.G. Nuvolone, A. Solignac, Art. Pélage et pélagianisme, *DSp* 12/2 (Paris 1986) col. 2889-2942.

[2] Y.-M. Duval, Pélage en son temps: Données chronologiques nouvelles pour une présentation nouvelle, *Studia Patristica* 38, Leuven 2001, 95-118.

[3] J.-M. Salamito, Les virtuoses et la multitude: Aspects sociaux de la controverse entre Augustin et les pélagiens. Grenoble 2005.

claims "to shake off the old dogmatic patterns" cast upon Faustus of Riez, for a long time classified among the so-called Semipelagians, while M. Lamberigts investigates in detail the controversy between Julian of Eclanum, the first to have systematized the Pelagian thought, and Augustine, the argument of which is based on the appeal to the approved doctors of the Church.

By taking into consideration not only the initial controversy between the two protagonists, Pelagius and Augustine, but also investigating its impact on the writings of Julian of Eclanum and Faustus of Riez in the following decades, the contributions published here reflect the complexity of the Pelagian question.

I am mostly grateful to the Editorial Board of the Journal AUGUSTINIANA, and its Editor in Chief Gerd Van Riel, who have accepted to publish the articles in this most reputable review.

Prof. Dr. Franz Mali
Chair for Patristics, Ancient Church History
and Christian Oriental Languages
Faculty of Theology / University of Fribourg

AUGUSTINE'S USE OF TRADITION IN THE CONTROVERSY WITH JULIAN OF AECLANUM

Abstract

During the Second Pelagian Controversy, Julian of Aeclanum accused Augustine of having invented the doctrine of original sin. Julian considered this doctrine as a Manichaean, North African invention that threatened the orthodoxy of the Church and misled the faithful. Often, Julian complained about the fact that the discussion at stake had never been the subject of a council, consisting of erudite and well informed people.

In his reply, Augustine made ample use of his predecessors, both from the East and the West, in order to show that the doctrine he defended was in line with what had been taught by the Catholic Church always and everywhere throughout its history. Especially in the books I-I of his *Contra Iulianum* he tried to offer an extensive dossier in order to answer the objections made by Julian. Also in his other works against Julian, Augustine would appeal to his predecessors but he never did it in such a detailed way.

Augustine first and foremost emphasized the absolute priority of Scripture, the source of truth par excellence. The predecessors are described as faithful interpreters of Scripture and as people who have taught what they have learned in the Church: they are first children of the Church and then teachers in the same Church.

This article further offers a survey of the way in which Augustine presents his predecessors, showing Augustine's strategic choices, his motives, and his unequal familiarity with his predecessors. Augustine possesses less than basic knowledge about bishops such as Reticius of Autun, but shows to be well informed about people like Cyprian and Ambrose. Much attention is paid to the way in which Augustine tries to refute Julian's accusations by either referring to texts of his predecessors or their authority. Augustine stresses that these predecessors defend the same faith, at least with regard to the essentials of the truth. All are worthy to be members of the board of judges, Julian was asking for. They held their positions long before the outbreak of the controversy and they can in no way be accused of Manicheism. Indeed, some already held these positions before Manicheism came into existence. He regularly makes clear that these authorities were held in high esteem by Pelagius, the "father" of the heresy. Further, he repeats time and again that accusations against Augustine in fact should be read as accusations directed against his predecessors.

Finally, the article pays attention to the way Augustine replied to the critique that he misled the common people: the common people, better than

Julian, are familiar with the truth as taught by the Church. At the same time he warns the reader that these simple faithful can easily become victims of Pelagian tactics.

Augustine's use of tradition in the Pelagian controversy is a well studied subject and the literature on this topic is abundant.[1] Moreover, the Pelagian controversy is not the first situation where Augustine referred to tradition. In the debate with the Donatists, Augustine was confronted with the question whether the Catholic Church was still in line with tradition. It was a challenging question for his adversaries maintained that they were the legitimate heirs of Cyprian.[2]

However, it was especially in the debate with the Pelagians that Augustine was urged by his opponents to make ample use of his predecessors. In the beginning of the controversy, Augustine limited himself to Cyprian and Jerome.[3] When Augustine was confronted with the fact that Pelagius in his *De natura* not only made use of texts of Lactantius, Hilary of Poitiers, Chrysostom, Sixtus and Augustine

[1] See K.-H. LÜTCKE, *Auctoritas bei Augustin*, Stuttgart, 1968; ID., *Auctoritas*, in *AL* I, Basel, 1986-1994, 498-510; J.J. O'DONNELL, *The Authority of Augustine*, in *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991) 7-35, esp. pp. 7-13. For the Pelagian controversy in general: G. MÁRTIL, *La tradición en San Agustín a través de la controversia pelagiana*, Madrid, 1943; É. REBILLARD, *Augustin et ses autorités: l'élaboration de l'argument patristique au cours de la controverse pélagienne*, in *Studia Patristica* 38, Leuven, 2001, pp. 245-263. For a slightly changed version, see ID., *A New Style of Argument in Christian Polemic: Augustine and the Use of Patristic Citations*, in *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 8 (2000) 559-578. For the first period of the Pelagian controversy: H. REUTER, *Augustinische Studien*, Gotha, 1887, pp. 4-46; 163-230; P. BATIFFOL, *Le catholicisme de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1920, esp. pp. 473-508; F. HOFMAN, *Der Kirchenbegriff des Hl. Augustinus in seinen Grundlagen und in seiner Entwicklung*, Münster, 1978 (=1933), pp. 425-485; O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der Römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432* (Päpste und Papsttum, 7), Stuttgart, 1975, esp. pp. 264-278; G. MASCHIO, *L'argomentazione patristica di S. Agostino nella prima fase della controversia pelagiana (412-418)*, in *Augustinianum* 26 (1986) 459-479; É. REBILLARD, *Sociologie de la deviance et orthodoxie. Le cas de la controverse pélagienne sur la grace*, in S. ELM, É. REBILLARD & A. ROMANO (Eds.), *Orthodoxie, Christianisme, Histoire/Orthodoxy, Christianity, History* (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 270), Rome, 2000, pp. 221-240.

[2] S. LANCEL & J.S. ALEXANDER, *Donatistae*, in *AL* II, Basel, 1996-2002, 606-638 (with further literature); J.E. MERDINGER, *Rome and the African Church in the Time of Augustine*, New Haven & London, 1997, esp. part I; M.A. TILLEY, *Cyprian*, in A.D. FITZGERALD, *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, Grand Rapids, Michigan & Cambridge, UK, 1999, 262-264; S. LANCEL, *Saint Augustin*, Paris, 1999, pp. 388-403; REBILLARD, *Augustin et ses autorités*, pp. 247-249.

[3] *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* III,10-13, *CSEL* 60, pp. 135-140.

himself,[4] he evidently had to deal with his antagonist's use of tradition.

The controversy with Julian was the beginning of a new phase.[5] In the debate with Julian, Augustine had already appealed to Ambrose's *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,40. In *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, a reference to Cyprian appears for the first time in the debate. *In Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,20-31, Augustine presented a quite substantial dossier, mostly based on Cyprian and Ambrose, who both had a special place in Augustine's life and thinking.[6] *Contra Iulianum* I-II can be considered as a continuation and further elaboration of this dossier.[7] Indeed, one not only sees that the number of quotations from the works of Ambrose is growing, but several other authors will be used, both from the East and the West.

In this contribution I will concentrate on the way in which Augustine presented his *auctoritates* in the debate with Julian and how they functioned in his polemics.[8] I will not deal with the content of the texts quoted,[9] nor with the theological issues at stake in the

[4] See *De natura et gratia* 71-85, *CSEL* 60, pp. 286-293.

[5] For the second period of the Pelagian controversy, see F. Perago, *Il valore della tradizione nella polemica tra sant'Agostine e Giuliano di Eclano*, in *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia di Napoli* 10 (1962-1963) 143-160; E. Dassmann, *"Tam Ambrosius quam Cyprianus" (c. Iul. Imp. 4,112): Augustins Helfer im pelagianischen Streit*, in D. Papandreaou, W.A. Bienert & K. Schäferdiek (Eds.), *Oecumenica et patristica. Festschrift für Wilhelm Schneemelcher zum 75. Geburtstag*, Stuttgart, 1989, pp. 259-268. Needless to repeat that Augustine considered himself a man of the African Church, and had to be faithful to this tradition; see the still pertinent remarks of G. Bonner, *Les origines africaines de la doctrine sur la chute et le péché originel*, in *Augustinus* 12 (1967) 97-116 (reprint in id., *God's Decree and Man's Destiny. Studies on the Thought of Augustine of Hippo*, London, 1987, 97-116; cf. also R.J. De Simone, *Modern Research on the Sources of Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Original Sin*, in *Augustinian Studies* 11 (1980) 205-227, a very critical review of P.F. Beatrice, *Tradux peccati. Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale* (Studia Patristica Mediolanensia, 8), Milan, 1978.

[6] See the pertinent remarks of Dassmann, *"Tam Ambrosius quam Cyprianus"*, p. 259. To this, one should add that Cyprian lived before Manicheism came to Africa, Ambrose before Pelagianism appeared; see Rebillard, *Augustin et ses autorités*, pp. 259-261.

[7] *Contra Iulianum* I-II do not have an equivalent in *Ad Turbantium*; in this regard, see D. Weber, *Some Literary Aspects of the Debate between Julian of Eclanum and Augustine*, in *Studia Patristica* 43, Leuven, Paris & Dudley MA, 2006, pp. 289-302, p. 293.

[8] It will be evident that Augustine's appeal to the authorities of the past must be situated within a long Roman tradition of appealing to the past; see, in this regard, T.G. Ring, *Auctoritas bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Ambrosius* (Cassiciacum, 29), Würzburg, 1975, pp. 3-32.

[9] In this regard, see J. Lössl, *Intellectus gratiae. Die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins von Hippo* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 38), Leiden, New York & Cologne, 1997, pp. 332-346.

debate between Julian and Augustine. Indeed, such discussion would exceed the length of this article. Moreover, as far as I can see, the presentation of the *auctoritates* and the way in which they functioned in the polemics were never the subject of a systematic survey. First I will present Julian's complaints and critiques. Then I will offer a survey of the way in which Augustine presents the individual doctors. In a next step, I will examine how these Fathers function in Augustine's defense. Finally, I will offer some conclusions.

I. Julian's Complaints

By way of introduction it should be said that, according to Julian, the doctrine under discussion, an impious and stupid one, was accepted in nearly the entire West. This had happened without any consultation with a synod and through simple bishops, who remained in their own territories and had been forced to consent to it.[10] Indeed, Julian, for whom erudition was important,[11] quite often complained about the fact that his fraction was never given a fair process. He searched in vain for a council that would be able to treat in a correct and objective manner, without hatred, anger or friendship, the affair under discussion.[12] What was denied to Julian and his companions was the possibility to defend their case for the truth before *learned* judges,[13] people like John Chrysostom and Basil the

[10] For these complaints, see Julian, *Epistula ad Rufum*, frg. 27-28, *CCSL* 88, p. 340.

[11] With regard to his intellectual profile, see D. Weber, *Klassische Literatur im Dienst theologischer Polemik: Julian von Eclanum, Ad Florum*, in *Studia Patristica* 38, Leuven, 2001, pp. 503-509; J. Lössl, *Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Lebe, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überliefering* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 60), Leiden, Boston & Cologne, 2001, pp. 74-146, esp. pp. 101-126; M. Lamberigts, *The Italian Julian of Aeclanum about the African Augustine of Hippo*, in P.-Y. Fux, J.-M. Roessli, O. Wermelinger (Eds.), *Saint Augustin: africanité et universalité. Actes du colloque international Alger-Annaba, 1-7 avril 2001* (Paradosis, 45/1), Fribourg, 2003, pp. 83-93, esp. pp. 85-86.

[12] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 3a, *CCSL* 88, p. 341: "(De iudicibus) apud quos propterea (dicis) non potuisse uos agere causam uestram, quia nemo de rebus dubiis bene consultat, nisi qui ab odio, ira et amicitia uacuum pectus attulerit; quales non fuisse (dicis), qui de causa uestra iudicauerunt, quia prius eam coeperunt odisse quam nosse (...)"; cf. also frg. 3b, *CCSL* 88, p. 341.

[13] *Ad Florum* II,1, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 164: "Commode nobis cum ageretur, si (...) apud eruditos iudices negotium ueritatis tueri daretur facultas (...)"; cf. also II,37, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 189, where Julian, moved by mercy, asks for a trial by men, illustrious for their prudence. In his own argumentation, Julian opts for a legal and learned approach; see *Ad Florum* V,20, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 201. The learned people needed can

Great.[14] His group had to suffer envy because of truth.[15] In any case, he hoped that he and his friends would be no longer beaten by the shouting of the ignorant[16] and that the agreement of the populace should no longer contribute to his defamation. He complained about the great confusion that existed. He deplored that because of the huge number of stupid people, the guidance of reason is taken away from the Church so that popular belief 'steers the ship under full sail'.[17] In these times, little could be accomplished with the wise, while with the common folk whatever one liked, no matter how banal, was acceptable. By a decree of the seditious, approval of virtues was banned from the Church. Because of their refusal to admit error, Julian *cum suis* were discredited by the common people "who weigh the merit of an opinion by its success and judge that opinion to be more true which they see wins the flavor of the majority".[18] Bitterly, Julian remarked that it delighted people to defame whatever the lives of saints indicated in order that they might not be reproved by the examples of these famous men.[19] People love to talk about the weakness of nature and the flesh, subject to innate sins, in order to no longer attribute conversion to the free will of man.[20] Who holds a plea in favor of a good and just God, is of the opinion that human beings are able to convert from sin and can become splendid through their search for virtue, is accused of idle and heretical talk.[21] Therefore, the synod

be both Christians and secular; cf. I,69, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 76. With regard to Julian's position, see J.-M. SALAMITO, *Les virtuoses et la multitude. Aspects sociaux de la controverse entre Augustin et les pélagiens* (Collection Nomina), Genoble, 2005, pp. 208-212.

[14] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 308-312, *CCSL* 88, pp. 392-394.

[15] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 154, *CCSL* 88, p. 373. Julian considered his debate as a defense of the truth, now abandoned; cf. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 155, *CCSL* 88, p. 373.

[16] *Ad Florum* II,1, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 164.

[17] *Ad Florum* II,2, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 164-165.

[18] *Ad Florum* II,3, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 165-166: "(...) qui sententiae meritum de prosperitatibus ponderans eam veriorem aestimat, quam pluribus placere conspexerit." Already in *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 4, *CCSL* 88, Julian had argued that arguments should be pondered not numbered and that a mass of blind people could not contribute to the matter under debate.

[19] See *Ad Florum* II,5, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 166.

[20] *Ad Florum* II,6, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 167; see also VI,3, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 293-294 where it is said that people of the arena, circus, or the stage, because of their lustful desires, find excuses under the pretext of necessity.

[21] *Ad Florum* II,7, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 167. Julian clearly belonged to those who believed that qualities such as work performance, virtue, commitment, qualities that had made Rome great, would even in these Christian times inspire the Empire anew; see, in this regard, P. BROWN, *Pelagius and his Supporters. Aims and Environment*, in ID., *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, London, 1972, pp. 208-226.

desired should be organized in such a way that the uproar of the crowds was excluded.[22] In fact, by introducing terror – clearly a hint to the events of 418/419, resulting in the condemnation of the Pelagians[23] –, people could only extort blind assent from the fearful, but would never get the support from the wise, for terror in discussion proves a lack of rational support.[24] Julian claimed that he himself only found understanding with a few wise men.[25] What was needed was wisdom and the small group that reason, learning and liberty make eminent, and not officials, be they bishops, administrators, or prefects,[26] because the ambitions and worldliness of the flagitious ones would not disturb these wise men. Indirectly, Julian offered criteria that should be followed in order to qualify statements as true and

[22] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 6, *CCSL* 88, p. 341.

[23] For the details, see WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius*, pp. 196-209; M. LAMBERIGTS, *Co-operation Between Church and State in the Condemnation of the Pelagians*, in T.L. HETTEMA & A. VAN DER KOOIJ (Eds.), *Religious Polemics in Context* (Studies in Theology and Religion, 11), Assen, 2004, pp. 363-375 (with further literature).

[24] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 11, *CCSL* 88, p. 342.

[25] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 154, *CCSL* 88, p. 373: "(...) iactatis (...) de paucitate (uelut) prudentium quibus uos placere gaudetis."; cf. also frg. 271-272, *CCSL* 88, p. 387.

[26] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 6, *CCSL* 88, pp. 341-342; frg. 271a-b, *CCSL* 88, p. 387. In frg. 271b Julian seemed to have suggested that Augustine had roused hatred for Julian from the common dregs of workmen, sailors, bartenders, fishermen, cooks, butchers, youth dismissed from monasteries, and the ordinary run of clerics. According to SALAMITO, *Les virtuoses et la multitude*, p. 218-219, this might be an expression of Julian's "mépris social". É. REBILLARD, *Dogma Populare: Popular Belief in the Controversy between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum*, in *Augustinian Studies* 38 (2007) 175-187, p. 178 disagrees for he is of the opinion that the critique is directed against Augustine, not against these people. It is hard to decide who is right, given the really fragmentary character of the fragment. Personally, I would put the text within the broader context of what polemics are all about. In any case, the "dreg"-motive is well know in polemical literature since the time of Cicero; see I. OPELT, *Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur von Tertullian bis Augustin* (Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften, NF 2,63), Heidelberg, 1980, p. 235. As we will see further, Julian can be very positive about the thinking of the common folk. I also want to remember what was said by Gennadius, *De viris illustribus* 46: in a period of famine, Julian, out of mercy, took care of many in need, especially the noble people and the religious. Gennadius suggests that he did so because he wanted to adhere them to his heresy. It is hard to evaluate such statement, but it should be said that Julian exactly did what was expected from a bishop in need. Moreover, Julian explicitly requested mercy and human attitudes from the rich people towards the poor and their own slaves; see A. KESSLER, *Reichtumskritik und Pelagianismus. Die pelagianische Diatribe de divitiis: Situierung, Lesetext, Übersetzung, Kommentar* (Paradosis, 43), Freiburg, 1999, pp. 56-59. It is hard to describe such attitudes as a "mépris social".

sound: it should be confirmed by reason and Scripture and be celebrated by the erudition of holy men, who do not give their authority to the truth, but receive testimony and glory from their participation in it.[27]

Julian was of the opinion that the knowledge of Scripture was suited for only a few learned people.[28] Simple people, occupied by profane affairs, did not obtain the erudition needed and should limit themselves to the basics of faith.[29] However, Julian really appreciated simple people's faith for these people were careful enough *sola fide* to enter the Church of Christ. They embraced the faith and despised every authority and every group that tried to persuade them to the contrary.[30] Moreover, there was also a great concern for these people: because of them and his love for God he did not want to stop his battle with Augustine.[31]

Julian was convinced that his own position was supported by reason, all learning, all justices, all pieties and all sacred testimonies,

[27] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 313, *CCSL* 88, p. 394: "(...) hanc sanam et ueram esse sententiam, quam primo loco ratio, deinde scripturarum muniuit auctoritas, et quam sanctorum uirorum semper celebrauit eruditio, qui tamen ueritati auctoritatem non suo tribuere consensu, sed testimonium et gloriam de eius suscepere consortio (...)". It is interesting to see that Julian comes to this conclusion after having quoted from John Chrysostom and Pseudo-Basil (=Serapion of Thmuis). The common critique on Julian's rationalism is profoundly nuanced and put in historical perspective by J. Lössl, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 110-114; *Julian of Aeclanum's "Rationalist" Exegesis. Albert Bruckner Revisited*, in *Augustiniana* 53 (2003) 77-106 (with further literature), esp. pp. 87-94. For the traditional view, see, e.g., Salamito, *Les virtuoses et la multitude*, p. 210.

[28] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 156, *CCSL* 88, p. 373: "(...) difficilis paucisque conueniens eruditis sanctarum cognitio litterarum (...)"; cf. also frg. 159, *CCSL* 88, p. 373.

[29] Cf. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 158, *CCSL* 88, p. 373; see also *Ad Florum* II,14, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 172.

[30] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 158, *CCSL* 88, p. 373: "(...) sola tamen fide ad ecclesiam Christi peruenire curarunt, ne facile obscuris quaestionibus terreantur, sed credentes Deum uerum conditorem esse hominum, indubitanter quoque teneant quia pius est, quia uerax, quia iustus; atque hanc aestimationem de illa trinitate seruantes, quicquid audierint huic conuenire sententiae, amplexentur atque collaudent, nec hoc eis ulla uis argumentationis euellat, sed detestentur omnem auctoritatem atque omnem societatem contraria persuadere nitentem." See also the comments of Rebillard, *Dogma Populare*, pp. 179-180. Also Augustine is of the opinion that one can be able to adhere to the Christian faith without being an expert in Scripture; see *Contra Iulianum* VI,39, *PL* 44, 843. Therefore I think that the position of Salamito, *Les virtuoses et la multitude*, p. 221, that Julian had no sympathy for the common people should be nuanced, as he indirectly does on p. 223 (referring to *Ad Florum* II,11; see next note).

[31] *Ad Florum* II,11, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 170: "(...) primo benignitas, quam generi debemus humano, deinceps spes et fides, quam habemus in Deum (...)".

and that Augustine, with his doctrine, was most imprudent toward the learned, most contemptuous toward the saints, and most irreverent toward God.[32] Julian regularly complained about the fact that Augustine had stirred up the common folk against him,[33] and had run to it because Augustine wanted to avoid a man-to-man fight.[34] Instead of accepting a fair discussion on the basis of what is present in both philosophers and Catholic authors, Augustine riled-up the working folk and the common people against Julian.[35] He shouted with women, stable hands and tribunes and brought, with the help of Alypius, 80 or more well-fed horses to Italy,[36] but would never accept the views of learned people.[37] Every learned reader of my work, Julian claimed,

[32] *Ad Florum* I,13, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 171: "Nam si, ut et superior sermo patefecit et secuturus docebit, quicquid ratio est, quicquid eruditio, quicquid iustitia, quicquid pietas, quicquid testimoniorum sacrorum huic quod tuemur dogmati suffragatur, nihil aliud inimici nostri toto adipiscuntur conatu, quam ut doctis quibusque impudentissimi, sanctis contumacissimi, in Deum profanissimi comprobentur."

[33] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 251, *CSEL* 88, p. 385; frg. 255-256; *CCSL* 88, p. 385; frg. 314, *CCSL* 88, p. 394.

[34] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 253: "(Dicis quod) certaminis singularis oblitus in uulgus refugerim."

[35] *Ad Florum* I,41, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 30: "Equidem affatim mihi tam philosophantium quam eorum qui catholici fuerunt, quod quaerimus, scripta suppeditant; sed uereor, ne refrageris et, si philosophorum ego senatum aduocauero, tu continuo sellularios opifices omneque in nos uulgus accendas." According to SALAMITO, *Les virtuoses et la multitude*, pp. 219-220, this is a proof that Julian was "issu d'une prestigieuse famille italienne, nourri de culture classique, le jeune et brillant évêque d'Éclane, confronté à l'opposition populaire que suscitent contre lui les partisans d'Augustin, s'identifie en imagination à Cicéron en lutte, par sa seule éloquence, contre les bandes de Clodius." However, the accusations against Augustine are very serious and, at least from Julian's perspective, justify his critique. See also REBILLARD, *Dogma Popularе*, pp. 182-184.

[36] *Ad Florum* I,42, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 30: "Vociferans cum feminis cunctisque calonibus et tribunis, quibus octoginta aut amplius equos tota Africa saginatos collega tuus nuper adduxit Alypius (...)". In I,74, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 90, the following accusations can be found: outlays of money, bestowal of inheritances, the sending of horses, the uproar of people, and the corruption of the official powers. In III,35, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 374-375, these accusations are repeated and further specified: Augustine is accused of having upset the whole of Italy with great divisions. He has hired people to stir up rebellions at Rome, and sent horses (under the care of Alypius), collected throughout almost the whole of Africa but at the expense of the poor, to tribunes and centurions. The powers of the world have been bribed with the inheritences from matrons in order to stir up the furor of the public against Julian and his companions. Augustine has destroyed the rest in the churches. Finally he has stained the reign of the emperor with the impiety of persecutions. With regard to the complaint about persecutions, see also *Ad Florum* VI,2, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 293. It should be said that since the loss of Spain Africa had become the most important supplier of horses; cf. Y.-M. DUVAL, *Julien d'Éclane et Rufin d'Aquilée. Du concile de Rimini à la repression pélagienne. L'intervention imperial en matière religieuse*, in *RÉA* 24 (1978) 243-271, esp. p. 250.

[37] *Ad Florum* I,43, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 31.

understands that Augustine misuses the ignorance of his supporters, deceived by their common inference.[38] Julian was convinced that if the opportunity would have been given to discuss the matter among learned people, Augustine would have been squarely defeated.[39] Indeed, among prudent and pious people no one could be found who dared to state that with God as good creator of the human soul and body any sin could exist in babies.[40] He even suggested that Augustine could not find any defender in so great a multitude of his doctrine.[41] In any case, Julian hoped that in the course of time the storm would subside and that common folk, no longer able to win through their uproar, would finally be corrected by the authority of wise men.[42]

Further, Julian was upset by the way Augustine replied in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II to Julian's *Ad Turbantium*. According to Julian, his positions as explained in *Ad Turbantium*, were dramatically misinterpreted and falsely presented by Augustine.[43] Augustine was accused of a lack of gravity and a failure in the duty of writing, a crime among learned people.[44] Julian accused Augustine of having incited hatred against Julian by truncating Julian's work, a sign of Augustine's dishonesty and malice, who, by doing so, also roused the hearts of the common people against Julian![45] The way in which Augustine, on the basis of a summary, with *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II had replied to Julian's *Ad Turbantium* was qualified by Julian as

[38] *Ad Florum* II,36, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 188; for a similar critique, see II,46, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 195; IV,90, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 95.

[39] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 3a-b, *CCSL* 88, p. 341; frg. 6, *CCSL* 88, pp. 341-342; cf. also *Ad Florum* II,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 164. Time and again, Julian will repeat that no educated person would choose the side of Augustine; see, e.g., II,26, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 180.

[40] With regard to Julian's view on the goodness of creation, see M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum: A Plea for a Good Creator*, in *Augustiniana* 38 (1988) 5-24. In my view, Julian really wanted to be a Christian bishop and theological thinker. I do think one is unfair to Julian by describing him as a bishop philosopher; see SALAMITO, *Les virtuoses et la multitude*, p. 209.

[41] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 315, *CCSL* 88, p. 394: "(...) de tanta multitudine assertorem non potest inuenire."

[42] *Ad Florum* V,4, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 170: "Nec illud ergo desperare vel possumus uel debemus, quoniam processu temporum tempestas excitata considat et auctoritate sapientum uulgus ignauum quod nunc perstrepit corrigatur (...)".

[43] See Julian's vehement reactions in, e.g., *Ad Florum* IV,4, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 6; IV,90, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 94. Therefore, I think not all of what was said by Julian can be reduced to simply rhetorical talk; cf. LAMBERIGTS, *The Italian Julian of Aeclanum*, pp. 88; 92-93. With regard to the technical aspect of the way in which the excerptor of Julian's *Ad Turbantium* did his summary, see WEBER, *Some Literary Aspects of the Debate between Julian of Eclanum and Augustine*, pp. 297-299.

[44] *Ad Florum* I,19, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 16.

[45] *Ad Florum* I,19, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 16.

"the shamelessness of Numidia" for in the one and the same work Augustine dared to say that Julian was wrong and that Augustine had not read what Julian had written.[46] On the basis of a truncated summary of Julian's *Ad Turbantium*, Augustine claimed in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II that Julian had not dared to reply to his position that, according to the very ancient and firm rule of the Catholic faith, the baptism of children was needed for the remission of sin.[47] However, Julian, in his *Ad Turbantium*, had clearly emphasized the need of baptism for all human beings, including babies.[48] However, the idea that baptism for babies was due to the guilt of original sin did, according to Julian, not belong to the faith "antiquitus tradita atque fundata".[49] It was a doctrine inspired by the devil, formulated by Mani, celebrated by Marcion, Faustus, and Adimantus and all their disciples, and now introduced by the Punic disputer[50] Augustine in Italy.[51] Julian thus

[46] *Ad Florum* I,16, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 13-14. On this and the following accusations, see N. CIPRIANI, *La polemica antiafricana di Giuliano d'Eclano: artificio letterario o scontro di tradizione teologichi?*, in *Cristianesimo e specificità regionali nel Mediterraneo latino (sec. IV-VI)* (Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum, 46), Rome, pp. 147-180; D. WEBER, *"For What is so Monstruous as What the Punic Fellow Says?" Reflections on the Literary Background of Julian's Polemical Attacks on Augustine's Homeland*, in P.-Y. FUX, J.-M. ROESSLI, O. WERMELINGER (Eds.), *Saint Augustin: africanité et universalité. Actes du colloque international Alger-Annaba, 1-7 avril 2001* (Paradosis, 45/1), Fribourg, 2003, pp. 75-82, esp. pp. 79-81; cf also LAMBERIGTS, *The Italian Julian of Aeclanum about the African Augustine of Hippo*. This rhetorical and polemical motive is not very much taken into consideration by SALAMITO, *Les vertuoses et la multitude*, pp. 211-212.

[47] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,4, *CSEL* 42, p. 256.

[48] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 16, *CCSL* 88, pp. 344-345: "Nos igitur in tantum gratiam baptismatis omnibus utilem aetatibus confitemur, ut cunctos qui illam non necessariam etiam paruulis putant, aeterno feriamus anathemate. (...) Sed haec gratia non aduersatur iustitiae, quae maculas eluit iniquitatis; nec facit peccata, sed purgat, quae absoluit reos, non calumniatur innocuos. Christus enim, qui est sui operis redemptor, auget circa imaginem suam continua largitate beneficia; et quos fecerat condendo bonos, facit innouando adoptandoque meliores."

[49] In *Ad Florum* II,178, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 297, Julian drew a line from Augustine's *tradux peccati*-doctrine to Tertullian's *tradux animarum*-doctrine, a doctrine, Julian added, condemned. The link from one heresy to the other is clear!

[50] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 52, *CCSL* 88, p. 352; cf. also *Ad Florum* I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 36-38, where Julian sarcastically praises Augustine's intelligence and learning and calls him a very pious priest and very learned orator; see also III,154, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 458; IV,75, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 76. With regard to this well known rhetorical locus, see N. CIPRIANI, *Aspetti letterari dell'Ad Florum di Giuliano d'Eclano*, in *Augustinianum* 15 (1975) 125-167, p. 147.

[51] *Ad Florum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 55: "Non est haec fides antiquitus tradita atque fundata nisi in conciliis malignantium, inspirata a diabolo, prolata a Manicheo, celebrata a Marcione Fausto Adimanto omnibusque eorum satellitibus et nunc a te in Italiam, quod grauiter gemimus, eructata." See also V,9, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 177: "Non

suggested that the idea of original sin and the topics related to it – if there were sound judges, one should ask for Augustine's excommunication, for he gave up religion, erudition, and the common sense[52] – were an invention, opposed to the ancient Christian faith. Julian regularly complained about the Punic or Numidian theological invasion in Italy,[53] an invasion, as already mentioned, introduced by the Punic disputer and orator,[54] the bad philosopher,[55] the Aristotle of the Punic people,[56] the writer Augustine.[57] It was a debauchery by African robbers,[58] with Augustine as their leader, a leader revealing Manichean doctrinal perfidy.[59] Julian considered his debate as a war against the Numidians armed only with a small shield,[60] and it will be no surprise that the pagans referred to when speaking about natural virtues were all involved in the Punic wars[61]

hoc ea catholica fides credit antiquitus (...)". On Julian's arguments with regard to the Manichean character of Augustine's doctrine, see M. LAMBERIGTS, *Was Augustine a Manichaean? The Assessment of Julian of Aeclanum*, in J. VAN OORT, O. WERMELINGER & G. WURST (Eds.), *Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West. Proceedings of the Fribourg-Utrecht Symposium of the International Association of Manichaean Studies (IAMS)* (Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, 49), Leiden, Boston & Cologne, 2001, pp. 113-136.

[52] *Ad Florum* I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 38; in I,114, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 132, it is said that Augustine's view is against all learning and reason, and the law of God; in III,92, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 417-418, Julian criticizes the improper way of arguing of Augustine.

[53] See, e.g., *Ad Florum* VI,18, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 350. Both have a very negative connotation; see WEBER, *"For What is so Monstruous as What the Punic Fellow Says?"*, p. 79. For the topos as such, see CIPRIANI, *Aspetti letterari dell' Ad Florum di Giuliano d'Eclano*, p. 149; ID., *La polemica antiafricana di Giuliano d'Eclano*, p. 147.

[54] *Ad Florum* I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 37.

[55] *Ad Florum* V,11, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 180.

[56] *Ad Florum* III,199, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 498.

[57] *Ad Florum* I,73, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 89.

[58] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 51, *CCSL* 88, p. 352.

[59] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 78, *CCSL* 88, p. 360: "Perfecte itaque Manichaeus est, qui malum originale defendit."; *Ad Florum* III,21, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 363: "(...) Manicheorum reuelata perfidia (...); cf. also IV,23, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 24. In I,120, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 136 it is suggested that Augustine is even worse than Mani. Such approaches are very common in polemics; see OPELT, *Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur*, pp. 157ff.

[60] *Ad Florum* VI,6, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 298: "(...) ueniamus iam ad discussionem primorum hominum, quorum taxatione aciei nostrae Numida quasi caetratus occurrit." With regard to Julian's way of disputing, see J.H. BAXER, *Notes on the Latin of Julian of Eclanum*, in *ALMA* 21 (1954), 5-54, p. 10-11; LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, p. 107; LAMBERIGTS, *The Italian Julian*, pp. 84-88.

[61] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 106, *CCSL* 88, p. 364.

Further, in his *Ad Turbantium*, Julian had appealed to Eastern authors such as Chrysostom[62] and Serapion of Thmuis,[63] thereby putting the debate in a broader context.

In sum, according to Julian, the Church of his days was corrupted by a new, impious, stupid, Manichean doctrine, introduced by force, even though it was unacceptable to wise and learned people, to whom a qualified board of judges had been denied, while approval of the Manichean doctrine was obtained by force.

II. Augustine's Appeal to the Fathers: Some Introductory Remarks

Given the critique as formulated by Julian, it is obvious that Augustine considers it his task to resist Julian with the help of his predecessors in order that the Christian people would prefer their teaching over Julian's impious novelties.[64] Like Julian, Augustine is also a rhetor, that means that he uses all rhetorical techniques, being at his disposal.[65]

It should be restated that for Augustine Scripture's authority was still prevailing over tradition, for Scripture was and remained the first and most important norm.[66] According to Augustine, the Fathers

[62] See *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 311-312, *CCSL* 88, pp. 393-394. Julian quoted from a Latin translation of John Chrysostom's *Ad Neophytos* 6 (A. WENGER, *Jean Chrysostome. Huit catéchèses baptismales inédites* [SC, 50], Paris, 1957, pp. 151-167, here p. 154). With regard to the manuscript tradition and the problems related to a correct reading of the text, see J.-P. BOUHOT, *Version inédite du sermon "Ad Neophytos" de S. Jean Chrysostome, utilisée par S. Augustin*, in *RÉA* 17 (1971) 27-41. For a possible Greek influence on Julian's theology, see N. CIPRIANI, *Sulle fonti orientali della teologia di Giuliano d'Eclano*, in A.V. NAZZARRO (Ed.), *Giuliano d'Eclano e l'"Hirpinia Christiana"*, Naples, 2004, pp. 157-170, here pp. 158-162.

[63] Julian wrongly attributed the work of Serapion against the Manichees to Basil; see *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 310, *CCSL* 88, p. 393; cf. N. CIPRIANI, *L'autore dei testi pseudobasiliani riportati nel C. Iulianum (1,16-17) e la polemica agostiniana di Giuliano d'Eclano*, in *Congresso internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione (Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986)*. Atti I. Cronaca del Congresso. Sessioni generali. Sezione di studio I (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 24) Rome, 1987, pp. 439-449.

[64] *Contra Iulianum* II,1, *PL* 44, 671.

[65] D. WEBER, *Textkritische Spezifika aus Augustins Schriften gegen Julian von Eclanum*, in A. PRIMMER, K. SMOLAK & D. WEBER (Eds.), *Textsorten und Textkritik. Tagungsbeiträge* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, Bd. 693; Veröffentlichungen der Kommission zur Herausgabe des Corpus der lateinischen Kirchenväter, Heft 21), Wien, 2002, pp. 193-209, here pp. 194-195.

[66] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,20, *CSEL* 60, pp. 542-543: " (...) ad curam nostram existimo pertinere non solum scripturas sanctas canonicas aduersus

should be qualified as *diuinarum Scripturarum tractatores*,[67] for their commentaries were dealing with and inspired by Scriptural texts. At the same time, these Fathers discussed the Sacred Scriptures with great renown,[68] faithfully and remarkably.[69] What they taught, they had learned from the apostles.[70] These men, learned in the sacred writings, enjoy a brilliant reputation and are praised for the way in which they governed the Church.[71]

The faith of these *doctores* shows both a historical continuity and a geographical unanimity. With regard to the historical continuity, Augustine quotes in *Contra Iulianum* I,5-13, in chronological order, texts from Irenaeus, Cyprian, Reticius of Autun, Olympius of Barcelona, Hilary of Poitiers and Innocent I. With regard to the universality of what was believed, Eastern Fathers are added to the dossier, namely Gregory of Nazianz, Basil of Caesarea, John Chrysostom, and the Synod of Diospolis, for, in Augustine's view, a *consensio* exists between the Eastern and Western Fathers with regard to the doctrine of original sin and the topics related to it.[72]

eos testes adhibere, quod iam satis fecimus, uerum etiam de sanctorum litteris, qui eas ante nos fama celeberrima et ingenti gloria tractauerunt, aliqua documenta proferre, non quo canonicis libris a nobis ullius disputatoris aequetur auctoritas, tamquam omnino non sit quod melius seu uerius ab aliquo catholico quam ab alio itidem catholico sentiatur, sed ut admoneantur qui putant istos aliquid dicere, quemadmodum de his rebus ante noua istorum uaniloquia catholici antistites eloquia diuina secuti sint, et sciant a nobis rectam et antiquitus fundatam catholicam fidem aduersus recentem Pelagianorum hereticorum praesumptionem perniciemque defendi." Cf. also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, *CSEL* 42, p. 307; *Contra Iulianum* II,30, *PL* 44, 694; *Opus imperfectum* IV,112, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 122. See also MÁRTIL, *La tradición en San Agustín*, pp. 175-191; PERAGO, *Il valore della tradizione nella polemica tra sant' Agostino e Giuliano d'Eclano*, p. 143; MASCHIO, *L'argumentazione patristica di S. Agostino*, p. 477; A.-M. LA BONNARDIÈRE, *Le canon des Écritures*, in EAD. (Ed.), *Saint Augustin et la Bible* (La Bible de tous les temps, 3) Paris, 1986, pp. 287-301.

[67] Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, *CSEL* 42, p. 307; *Opus imperfectum* I,67, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 71 ("catholici intellectores apostoli"); II,178, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 299 ("catholici doctores secundum scripturas sanctas").

[68] *Contra Iulianum* II,1, *PL* 44, 671: "(...) Scripturas sanctas ingenti gloria tractaverunt (...)".

[69] *Contra Iulianum* II,19, *PL* 44, 686.

[70] *Contra Iulianum* II,30, *PL* 44, 694: "(...) ex apostolis ista didicerunt, et secundum apostolos ista docuerunt (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* I,67, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 71: "(...) catholicos intellectores apostoli (...)".

[71] *Contra Iulianum* III,1, *PL* 44, 701: "(...) tot tantorumque sanctorum, et in sacris Litteris eruditorum, et in Ecclesiae regimine tam clara memoria et laude pollentium (...)".

[72] With the exception of two texts from Ambrose, no new texts will be added to Augustine's dossier in *Opus imperfectum*.

III. Presentation of the Individual Doctores

By way of an introduction, it should be said that Augustine seldom mentions the names of his predecessors without appreciative epithet, neither as individuals, as we will see further, nor as group.[73] The doctors he invokes are giants, worthy of being followed, as Augustine claims to do: I teach what I have learned from these holy and learned men.[74] These men were brilliant in the Catholic Church because of their search for sound doctrine. Protected and stimulated by spiritual weapons they waged strenuous wars against the heretics. After having faithfully performed the labors of their ministry, they passed away in peace.[75] Quite regularly, when giving the list of his heroes, Augustine, in order to give the impression that he is not exhaustive, adds a phrase such as, "aliique quam plurimi" and the like in order to make clear to the reader that the positions he is defending are held by many others.[76]

a. The Latin Fathers

1. Irenaeus

Irenaeus is the oldest of the doctors, Augustine makes use of in his debate with Julian.[77] The bishop of Lyon, who lived *non longe a temporibus apostolorum*, is described as a *sanctus*[78] *antiquus homo Dei*.[79] Whenever Augustine presents the long(er) list of his doctors, Irenaeus, for evidently chronological reasons, is put in the first spot.[80]

[73] Cf. *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 697: "Propter quam catholicam ueritatem sancti ac beati et in diuinorum eloquiorum pertractatione clarissimi sacerdotes, Irenaeus, Cyprianus, Reticius, Olympius, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Innocentius, Ioannes, Basilius, quibus addo presbyterum, velis nolis, Hieronymum, ut omittam eos qui nondum dormierunt …".

[74] *Contra Iulianum* I,29-30, *PL* 44, 661-662.

[75] *Contra Iulianum* I,30, *PL* 44, 661-662: "In Ecclesia catholica doctrinae sanae studiis claruerunt; spiritualibus armis muniti et accincti strenua contra haereticos bella gesserunt; perfuncti fideliter suae dispensationis laboribus in pacis gremio dormierunt."

[76] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* II,33, *PL* 44, 696; VI,70, *PL* 44, 866; *Opus imperfectum* I,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 10; I,117, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 134.

[77] For Augustine's knowledge of Irenaeus' work, see B. Altaner, *Augustinus und Irenäus*, in id., *Kleine Patristische Schriften* (TU, 83), Berlin, 1967, pp. 194-203; G. Bartelink, *Die Beeinflußung Augustins durch die griechischen Patres*, in J. Den Boeft & J. van Oort (Eds.), *Augustiniana Traiectina. Communications présentées au Colloque International d'Utrecht (13-14 novembre 1986)* (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1987, pp. 9-24, p. 14 (with further literature).

[78] *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 662.

[79] *Contra Iulianum* I,5, *PL* 44, 644.

[80] *Contra Iulianum* II,33, *PL* 44, 697; II,37, *PL* 44, 700-701 (two times); III,32, *PL* 44, 719; IV,72, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 75; IV,73, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 75.

From Irenaeus' *Aduersus haereses*, only two texts are quoted in *Contra Iulianum* I,5.[81] In Augustine's further development of the tradition-argument, they will not really function.[82] Therefore, in my view, the function of Irenaeus in the list of the quoted Fathers seems to be limited to being a link between the apostles and the period immeadiately thereafter.

2. Cyprian

The second witness, the most victorious[83] Cyprian,[84] a holy man,[85] bishop,[86] outstanding doctor,[87] extraordinary soldier of Christ,[88] and blessed African martyr,[89] who shed his life for the most solidly

[81] *PL* 44, 644; the texts are quoted from Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, IV,2,7; V,19,1. Augustine used the Latin translation of this work; see B. ALTANER, *Augustinus und Irenäus*, p. 194; E. LUPIERI, *Agostino e Ireneo*, in *Vetera Christianorum* 15 (1978) 113-115.

[82] It is a bit strange to read in J. GROSS, *Enstehungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas* I (Geschichte des Erbsündendogmas), München-Basel, 1960, p. 86 that Augustine quoted Irenaeus as the first one because in antiquity an important role was given to the bishop of Lyon with regard to the dogma of original sin. First, I do not think that one can rightly speak of a dogma of original sin in Irenaeus. Secondly, as Augustine explicitly states, he is interested in this man because he lived not long after the time of the apostles. Finally, as already mentioned by ALTANER, *Augustinus und Irenäus*, pp. 194, one should recognize that Augustine did not use the best texts in order to substantiate his own position. But even the two texts quoted do not play any considerable role after *Contra Iulianum* I.

[83] *Contra Iulianum* II,6, *PL* 44, 676; II,25, *PL* 44, 690.

[84] Augustine already referred to Cyprian, *Epistula* 64, in *De peccatorum et remissione* III,10, *CSEL* 60, pp. 135-136. Only in 418, Augustine added new texts to his anti-pelagian dossier. With regard to Augustine's use of Cyprian in general, see A.A.R. BASTIAENSEN, *Augustin et ses prédécesseurs latins chrétiens*, in J. DEN BOEFT & J. VAN OORT (Eds.), *Augustiniana Traiectina. Communications présentées au Colloque International d'Utrecht (13-14 novembre 1986)* (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1987, pp. 25-57, pp. 34-36; E. DASSMANN, *Cyprianus*, in *AL* I, Basel, 1986-1994, 196-211; with regard to the appeal to Cyprian in the Pelagian controversy, see esp. pp. 208-209. In opposition to the appeal to Cyprian in the Donatist controversy it should be stressed that Augustine nowhere criticizes Cyprian during the Pelagian controversy; with regard to the differences between Cyprian and Augustine, see, among others, A. PANNIER, *Saint Augustin, Saint Cyprien: La postérité de deux ecclésiologies*, in *Saint Augustin.* Dossier conçu et dirigé par P. RANSON (Les dossiers H), Lausanne, 1988, pp. 237-247; M. LABROUSSE, *Le baptême des hérétiques d'après Cyprien, Optat et Augustin: influences et divergences*, in *RÉA* 42 (1996) 223-242.

[85] *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 662.

[86] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,24, *CSEL* 60, p. 548; *Contra Iulianum* I,6, *PL* 44, 655; *Opus imperfectum* I,106, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 125; VI,10, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 313.

[87] *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655; II,9, *PL* 44, 679.

[88] *Opus imperfectum* VI,6, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 299.

[89] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, *CSEL* 42, p. 308; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,21, *CSEL* 60, p. 544; IV,24, *CSEL* 60, p. 548; *Contra Iulianum* I,6,

grounded faith of the Church,[90] is of much more importance for Augustine, and this so for many reasons. He is a very renowned commentator on the divine words[91] in his speeches and writings, teaching in the Catholic, not the Manichean, Church.[92] He is called a memorable teacher of the truth in the churches.[93] He was a model; worthy of being imitated for this man fought throughout his life and doctrine for the truth of Christ and was victorious thanks to the grace of Christ.[94] He is famous not only in the churches of Africa and the West, but also in those of the East, and his writings are dispersed everywhere.[95] Augustine insists that Cyprian in his letters has shown how truly Christian and Catholic the faith is which we hold (*tenemus*). He was my teacher and, just like me, defended doctrine of original sin, Augustine claims.[96] It is this sound[97] faith, transmitted through the Sacred Scriptures from antiquity, handed down to Cyprian and transmitted by him,[98] which we must grasp and preserve today. Augustine has a very good reason to refer to Cyprian: Pelagius recognized the authority of Cyprian and wanted to imitate Cyprian's *Ad Quirinum* in his own *Liber testimoniorum*.[99] Throughout the discussion with Julian,

PL 44, 655; II,6, *PL* 44, 677; II,18, *PL* 44, 685; III,31, *PL* 44, 718. In *Opus imperfectum* I,50, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 44, Cyprian's martyrdom gets a special emphasis, because Julian had stated that nobody is willing to give his life for the God of Augustine. In his reply, Augustine states that Cyprian not only believed in the existence of original sin, but also gave his life for his faith.

[90] *Opus imperfectum* I,106, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 125.

[91] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,24, *CSEL* 60, p. 549; IV,28, *CSEL* 60, p. 558.

[92] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,27, *CSEL* 60, p. 554.

[93] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,26, *CSEL* 60, p. 552.

[94] Cf. *Contra Iulianum* II,25, *PL* 44, 691; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,26, *CSEL* 60, p. 552.

[95] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,21, *CSEL* 60, p. 543: "Beatissimum, corona etiam martyrii gloriosissimum Cyprianum nec Africanis atque occidentalibus tantum, uerum et orientalibus ecclesiis fama praedicante et scripta eius longe lateque diffundente notissimum (...)". In IV,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 568, Augustine explicitly mentions that he only quoted partially from both Ambrose and Cyprian, for otherwise his treatise would be too long.

[96] *Opus imperfectum* VI,21, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 363.

[97] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 569.

[98] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 568: "(...) Cyprianus (...) demonstretur, quam sit haec, quam tenemus, fides uera uereque christiana atque catholica, sicut per scripturas sanctas antiquitus tradita sic a patribus nostris et usque ad hoc tempus (...) retenta atque seruata et deinceps propitio Deo retinenda atque seruanda. Nam sic Cypriano et a Cypriano traditam haec atque huiusmodi ex eius litteris testimonia prolata testantur, sic autem usque ad tempora nostra seruatam (...)".

[99] See, e.g., *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,21, *CSEL* 60, p. 543; IV,25, *CSEL* 60, p. 552; See also F.-J. Thonnard, *Le témoignage de saint Cyprien*, in *BA* 23, Paris, 1974, pp. 824-825; A. De Veer, *Les relations de saint Augustin et de Pélage avec Albine, Pinien et Mélanie*, in *BA* 22, pp. 674-675.

Augustine quotes twenty four texts from the bishop of Carthage, taken from five works and one letter.[100] As a result, Cyprian becomes the second most important witness in the debate with Julian, Ambrose being the first. It should be noted that the Cyprian-dossier, is already complete in *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV.[101] However, one gets the impression that Augustine, in comparison to *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum*, less often refers to Cyprian in both *Contra Iulianum* and *Opus imperfectum*, probably because Julian was so negative with regard to the Punic people.

3. Reticius of Autun and Olympius of Barcelona

The next witnesses are Reticius of Autun[102] and Olympius of Barcelona.[103] Both bishops participated in the synod of Rome (313). In this synod, held because of the nascent Donatist controversy, with Melchiades[104] as president, Donatus, the father of the schism was condemned and Caecilian of Carthage absolved of wrongdoing.[105] Augustine's information about these bishops' individual data is rather limited: most often the praises they receive are common to all doctors in the lists as given by Augustine.[106] On a more individual level, the only thing Augustine knows about Olympius, a man of great glory in the Church and in Christ, is that he was a Spanish bishop.[107] Reticius is called a man of great authority,[108] a man of God:[109] given his expertise in the Donatist controversy, he deserves a place in the court, Julian was asking for. Further, both bishops function as chronological

[100] Augustine quotes from Cyprian, *De opere et eleemosynis* 1; 3 (two citations); 18; 22; *De mortalitate* 2; 4; 7; 26; *De oratione dominica* 10; 12 (2 citations); 14; 16;17;18; 22; 26; *Testimonia* III,4 (2 citations); III,54; *De bono patientiae* 3;11 (2 citations); 17; *Epistula* 64,2.4.5.

[101] See the pertinent remarks of DASSMANN, *Cyprianus*, 208. For a different opinion, see THONNARD, *Le témoignage de saint Cyprien*, p. 825.

[102] For Reticius, see, e.g., M. FIEDROWICZ, *Reticius*, in *LThK*^{3} 8, 1132.

[103] With regard to Augustine's use of Olympius, see V. MENOSA, *San Agustín y Olympio, Obispo de Barcelona*, in *Augustinus* 25 (1980) 17-21. In *Opus imperfectum*, Augustine will no longer appeal to Olympius.

[104] See Ch. PIETRI & L. PIETRI (dir.), *Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)* (Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire, 2), Vol. 2, Rome, 2000, p. 1513, s.v. *Miltiades*.

[105] Cf. *Contra Iulianum* I,7, *PL* 44, 644; *Opus imperfectum* I,55, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 52.

[106] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* II,33, *PL* 44, 697; II,37, *PL* 44, 700-701; III,32, *PL* 44, 719.

[107] *Contra Iulianum* I,8, *PL* 44, 644-645.

[108] *Contra Iulianum* I,7, *PL* 44, 644: Augustine bases his praise on the *gesta ecclesiastica* of the process in Rome.

[109] *Opus imperfectum* I,55, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 52.

links between Cyprian and Hilary.[110] From each of these bishops, one text is quoted.[111]

4. Hilary of Poitiers

With Hilary of Poitiers,[112] *episcopus Gallus*,[113] a holy[114] and blessed man,[115] worthy of veneration,[116] an important, well known, and extraordinary[117] Catholic doctor[118] of the Church, highly praised among Catholic bishops, outstanding for his knowledge and reputation, we have a *defensor acerrimus* of the Catholic Church against heretics.[119] It is evident that he is worthy of being a member of the court.[120] Within the list of doctors, Hilary is given a rather important place.[121] He is evidently present whenever Augustine offers a long list of all the doctors, but even in cases Augustine mentions only a few, Hilary quite regularly is on the list.[122] In this regard, one should

[110] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 662; II,33, *PL* 44, 697; II,37, *PL* 44, 700; III,32, *PL* 44, 719.

[111] Both writings are lost.

[112] On Augustine's use of Hilary in the Pelagian controversy, see H.C. BRENNECKE, *Hilarius*, in *AL* III,3/4, Basel, 2006, 341-348, esp. 344-346.

[113] *Contra Iulianum* I,9, *PL* 44, 645; I,22, *PL* 44, 655; *Opus imperfectum* II,33, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 186. In *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,7, *CSEL* 60, p. 520, Augustine wrongly attributed a text of Ambrosiaster on Rom. 5,12 to Hilary. In this regard, see A. de VEER, *Saint Augustin et l'Ambrosiaster*, in *BA*, 23, Paris, 1974, pp. 817-824. According to de Veer, the text, with attribution to Hilary, returns in *Opus imperfectum* II,33, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 186 and in II,164, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 285. In my view, in the first case, there is no evidence that Augustine really had in mind the Ambrosiaster text.

[114] *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 662; II,28, *PL* 44, 693; II,33, *PL* 44, 696.

[115] *Contra Iulianum* II,26, *PL* 44, 691; II, 29, *PL* 44, 693.

[116] *Contra Iulianum* II,8, *PL* 44, 678.

[117] *Contra Iulianum* II,28, *PL* 44, 693.

[118] *Opus imperfectum* I,71, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 83.

[119] *Contra Iulianum* I,9, *PL* 44, 645: "Ecclesiae catholicae aduersus haereticos acerrimum defensorem uenerandum quis ignoret Hilarium episcopum Gallum? (...) Hunc uirum tanta in episcopis catholicis laude praeclarum, tanta notitia famaque conspicuum (...)".

[120] *Opus imperfectum* II,37, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 189.

[121] For a different opinion, see O'DONNELL, *The Authority of Augustine*, p. 11.

[122] *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655 (mentioned together with the Roman Innocent, the Carthaginian Cyprian, the Cappadocian Basil, the Nasiancean Gregory and the Milanese Ambrose); II,30, *PL* 44, 693 (together with Cyprian, Gregory and Ambrose); II,33, *PL* 44, 696 (explicitly mentioned, together with Cyprian and Gregory in support of Ambrose); II, 35, *PL* 44, 698 (together with Gregory and Ambrose); VI,71, *PL* 44, 866 (together with Gregory and Ambrose); *Opus imperfectum* I,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 10 (together with Ambrose, Gregory, and Cyprian); I,52, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 47 (together with Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory, and John Chrysostom); I,59, *CSEL*

be reminded that Pelagius himself had quoted from Hilary in his *De natura*. By often mentioning the bishop of Poitiers, Augustine evidently wants to show that he is in line with this Hilary. Seven texts from Hilary are quoted.[123]

5. Ambrose of Milan

It will be no surprise that Ambrose is the one to whom Augustine most often appealed.[124] He is called a holy,[125] great,[126] and blessed man,[127] a man of God,[128] an excellent steward of God,[129] a lucid and clear river of eloquence,[130] steadfast in the Catholic faith,[131] and the

85,1, p. 56 (together with Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, and John Chrysostom); I,117, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 134 (together with Ambrose, Gregory, and Cyprian); II,33, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 186 (together with Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory); II,37, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 189 (together with Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, and John); IV,109, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 117.

[123] *Tractatus in Psalmum* 1,1; *Tractatus in Psalmum* 51,23; *Tractatus in Psalmum* 118,27; 118,175; 118,22; *Expositio in Iob;* the seventh text is a compilation of *De Trinitate* 10,24-25 and *In Matthaeum* 10,23-24. The commentary on Job is lost; cf. G. Folliet, *Le fragment d'Hilaire 'Quas Iob litteras'. Son interprétation d'après Hilaire, Pélage et Augustin*, in *Hilaire et son temps* (Actes du colloque de Poitiers [29 septembre-3 octobre 1968] à l'occasion du XVIe centenaire de la mort de saint Hilaire), Paris, 1969, pp. 149-158; cf. also J. Doignon, *Une formule-clé du fragment sur Job d'Hilaire de Poitiers, inspiré d'Origène et transmis par Augustin (Contra Iulianum* 2,8,27), in *Vigiliae Christianae* 35 (1981) 209-221. On the compilation of *De Trinitate* and *In Matthaeum*, see J. Doignon, *Testimonia d'Hilaire de Poitiers dans le 'Contra Iulianum' d'Augustin: Les texts, leur groupement, leur 'lecture'*, in *Revue bénédictine* 91 (1981) 7-19.

[124] With regard to the relation between Ambrose and Augustine, studies are abundant; see, e.g. Bastiaensen, *Augustin et ses prédécesseurs latins chrétiens*, pp. 30-34 (with further literature). On the epithets as given by Augustine to Ambrose, see B. Beyenka, *The Names of St. Ambrose in the Works of St. Augustine*, in *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974) 19-28; with regard to the topics under discussion, see G. Ferretti, *L'influsso di S. Ambrogio in S. Agostino*, Faenza, 1951, pp. 41-75; C. Basevi, *Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana dell' Incarnazione: l'influenza della cristologie di sant'Ambrogio*, in *Scripta Theologica* 7 (1975) 499-529.

[125] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,29, *CSEL* 60, p. 561; IV,30, *CSEL* 60, p. 562; IV,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 568; *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 662; II,4, *PL* 44, 674; II,10, *PL* 44, 680; II,19, *PL* 44, 686; II,23, *PL* 44, 689; II,24, *PL* 44, 690; III,2, *PL* 44, 702; *Opus imperfectum* I,115, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 133; VI,14, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 329.

[126] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,30, *CSEL* 60, p. 563.

[127] *Contra Iulianum* II,4, *PL* 44, 674; II,8, *PL* 44, 678; II,9, *PL* 44, 679; II,13, *PL* 44, 683; II,14, *PL* 44, 684; II,32, *PL* 44, 695; II,33, *PL* 44, 696; *Opus imperfectum* I,71, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 82; IV,108, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 116; VI,12, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 319.

[128] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,30, *CSEL* 60, p. 563.

[129] *Contra Iulianum* I,10, *PL* 44, 645.

[130] *Contra Iulianum* II,11, *PL* 44, 681.

[131] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,29, *CSEL* 60, p. 561; IV,30, *CSEL* 60, p. 563.

Catholic conquerer of heretics.[132] He understands Scripture,[133] is gifted with Christian wisdom,[134] worthy of being honored,[135] in sum, a memorable, Catholic doctor,[136] a *pontifex magnus*.[137] With the weight of his authority, Ambrose will destroy Julian.[138] For Augustine, Ambrose was his teacher,[139] and still is his solace,[140] whom he honors as a father for he gave Augustine his birth in Christ through the Gospel.[141] With some pride, Augustine mentions that he was baptized by the bishop of Milan.[142] Moreover, Augustine was an eyewitness of Ambrose's efforts to defend the faith and the Roman world rightly praises him for that.[143] He heard him speak and read his works.[144] Augustine emphasizes that he is minor to Ambrose but remains convinced that with regard to the doctrine of original sin, both hold the same opinion.[145]

Needless to say, Augustine explicitly mentions that Pelagius had praised Ambrose in his treatise *Pro libero arbitrio*. In this work, Pelagius had described Ambrose as the flower of the Latin authors. Furthermore, he had stressed that the faith and the interpretation of

[132] *Opus imperfectum* IV,50, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 56.

[133] *Opus imperfectum* I,135, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 151; V,25, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 219.

[134] *Opus imperfectum* I,71, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 83.

[135] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,30, *CSEL* 60, p. 561; *Contra Iulianum* I,11, *PL* 44, 647; II,14, *PL* 44, 683.

[136] *Contra Iulianum* II,15, *PL* 44, 684; *Opus imperfectum* IV,114, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 125; VI,6, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 299.

[137] *Opus imperfectum* II,8, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 168.

[138] *Contra Iulianum* II,5, *PL* 44, 675.

[139] *Contra Iulianum* II,21, *PL* 44, 688: "(...) Ambrosium, doctorem meum (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 38: "(...) Ambrosius doctor meus (...)"; V,25, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 219: "meumque doctorem"; V,41, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 243: "meus doctor".

[140] *Opus imperfectum* IV,109, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 117.

[141] *Contra Iulianum* I,10, *PL* 44, 645: "(...) quem ueneror ut patrem: in Christo enim Jesu per Euangelium ipse me genuit (...)".

[142] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,40, *CSEL* 42, p. 251: "(...) beatus Ambrosius Mediolanensis episcopus, cuius sacerdotali ministerio lauacrum regenerationis accepi (...)"; *Contra Iulianum* I,10, *PL* 44, 645; *Opus imperfectum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 57; VI,21, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 364.

[143] *Contra Iulianum* I,10, *PL* 44, 645: "Beatum loquor Ambrosium, cuius pro catholica fide gratiam, constantiam, labores, pericula, sive operibus sive sermonibus, et ipse sum expertus, et mecum non dubitat orbis praedicare Romanus."

[144] *Opus imperfectum* VI,21, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 364: "Meus est praeceptor Ambrosius, cuius non solum libros legi, sed uerba etiam loquentis audiui (...)".

[145] *Opus imperfectum* VI,21, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 364: "Longe sum quidem impar meritis eius: sed confiteor et profiteor me in hac causa nihil ab hoc meo praeceptore differre."; cf. also *Contra Iulianum* III,48, *PL* 44, 726: "hoc sentio, quod sentit Ambrosius" (with regard to lust).

Scripture of the bishop of Milan was so pure that even his enemies did not dare to criticize him on these two points: at least for Pelagius, Ambrose was an uncontested authority. It is precisely for that reason that Augustine already quotes from Ambrose in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,40. During the controversy with Julian, Augustine will, time and again, confront Julian with this attitude of Pelagius towards Ambrose,[146] and will add that Julian will never find a better judge than Ambrose.[147] The fact that Ambrose was an Italian also plays a role: Julian regarded the Punic Augustine with disdain but now will be confronted with an Italian and a Catholic.[148]

From Ambrose, fourty four texts, taken from twelve works, are quoted,[149] Ambrose thus being the most important witness for Augustine.

[146] See *De gratia Christi et peccato originali* I,47, *CSEL* 42, pp. 159-160. The fact that Pelagius highly esteemed Ambrose is quite often mentioned by Augustine; see also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,40, *CSEL* 42, p. 252; II,15, *CSEL* 42, p. 268; II,51, *CSEL* 42, pp. 307; II,52, *CSEL* 42, p. 308; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,29, *CSEL* 60, pp. 559-561; *Contra Iulianum* I,30, *PL* 44, 661; I,35, *PL* 44, 666 (Pelagius is called here Julian's bad doctor and teacher); I,44, *PL* 44, 671(Pelagius is, again, called a bad doctor); II,11, *PL* 44, 681; II,15, *PL* 44, 684 ("quod saepe dicendum est"); II,21, *PL* 44, 688; II,32, *PL* 44, 695; *Opus imperfectum* I,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 7; I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 39; I,52, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 47; I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 57; II,8, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 168 (Pelagius, excellently praising Ambrose, "pontifex magnus", is called here heresiarch); II,36, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 188-189; II,202, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 314; II,208, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 319; III,56, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 395; III,178, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 479; III,213, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 505; IV,10, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 15; IV,67, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 72; IV,89, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 93; IV,106, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 114; IV,118, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 130; VI,21, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 364. No wonder that Augustine exhorts Julian to imitate Ambrose, praised by Pelagius, instead of Pelagius himself; see *Contra Iulianum* I,11, *PL* 44, 646; *Opus imperfectum* I,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 7; I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 39; I,67, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 395; III,200, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 499.

[147] *Opus imperfectum* I,2, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 6-7: "Quem uero iudicem potes Ambrosio reperire meliorem?"; see M. Zelzer, *Quem vero iudicem potes Ambrosio reperire meliorem? (Aug., Op. imperf. I,2)*, in *Studia Patristica* 33, Leuven, 1997, pp. 280-285.

[148] *Opus imperfectum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 56-57.

[149] *De paradiso* 6,29.30; 10,47; 11,53; 11,54; 12,60; 13,67; 15,77; *Apologia prophetae David* I,11,56 (2 citations); 11,57 (2 citations); *Expositio in Lucam* 1,37; 2,56; 2,84; 4,67; 7,27; 7,73; 7,141-143; 7,234; *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 48,8; *De bono mortis* 11,49; *De fuga saeculi* 1-2; 3,15; 7,39; *De paenitentia* I,13; *De Noe* 3,7; *De Isaac uel anima* 7,60; 8,65; *De Tobia* 9,33; 23,88; Thanks to Augustine, we have 6 texts from *De sacramento regenerationis siue de philosophia* and 7 texts from *Expositio In Isaiam*, works that are otherwise lost.

6. Innocent, Bishop of Rome

Innocent, holy[150] bishop of Rome, also belongs to the court of judges, and this for good reasons.[151] Under Innocent, Julian became bishop of Aeclanum. Caelestius himself had expressed his agreement within the content of Innocent's letters to the Africans.[152] Pelagius was willing to be corrected by this man who held both the chair and faith of Peter.[153] Therefore, this man deserves the first rank in the court of judges.[154] The same bishop had, in the letters sent to Africa, followed the positions as held by the Apostolic See and the Roman Church from the very beginning and this along with the other churches: what else could he have done?, Augustine cries out.[155] His

[150] *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 663.

[151] Although Augustine clearly considers Innocent as being at the African side, the correct interpretation of Innocent's own positions on the topics under discussion is still matter of debate; see M. LAMBERIGTS, *Innocentius episcopus Romanus*, in *AL* III,3/4, Basel, 2006, 613-619 (with further literature). In any case, in the debate with Julian, Augustine prefers to refer to Innocent's attitude towards the controversy over the one of Zosimus, who, to say the least, was rather unstable in his subsequent positions. However, Augustine tries to explain Zosimus' attitude as benevolent because he still hoped for a conversion of Caelestius; see, e.g. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,5, *CSEL* 60, p. 465. With regard to the problematic character of this explanation, see M. LAMBERIGTS, *Augustine and Julian of Aeclanum on Zosimus*, in *Augustiniana* 42 (1992) 311-330.

[152] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,5, *CSEL* 60, p. 465: " (...) propter illud quod se papae Innocentii litteris consentire ipse responderat (...)"; cf. also II,6, *CSEL* 60, p. 466.

[153] Pelagius, *Libellus fidei* 14, *PL* 45, 1718: "In qua si minus perite aut parum caute aliquid forte positum est, emendari cupimus a te qui Petri et fidem et sedem tenes." Augustine stresses the fact that Innocent was bishop of Rome, the place of Peter's death; see *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,6, *CSEL* 60, p. 466; II,7, *CSEL* 60, p. 467; *Contra Iulianum* I,13, *PL* 44, 648.

[154] *Contra Iulianum* I,13, *PL* 44, 648: "Cum his etiam ipse considet, etsi posterior tempore, prior loco." On Augustine's position, see, among others, BATIFFOL, *Le catholicisme de saint Augustin*, p. 484; HOFMANN, *Der Kirchenbegriff des hl. Augustinus*, pp. 446-448; MÁRTIL, *La tradición en san Agustín*, pp. 210-212; ZUMKELLER, *Schriften gegen die Pelagianer* III, pp. 513-516; DE VEER, *Primauté du pape et collegialité*, in *BA* 23, pp. 748-753. Innocent was aware of this; cf. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius*, pp. 117-123. However, with one exception (*Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655), Augustine never puts Innocent on the first place in his list of giants; see, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* II,33, *PL* 44, 697; II,37, *PL* 44, 701; III,32, *PL* 44, 719. Quoted is from Innocent's letters to the Synod of Carthage (*Inter epistulas Augustini* 181,7), and Milev (*Inter epistulas Augustini* 182,4.5).

[155] *Contra Iulianum* I,13, *PL* 44, 648: "Quid enim potuit ille uir sanctus Africanis respondere conciliis, nisi quod antiquitus apostolica sedes et Romana cum caeteris tenet perseueranter Ecclesia?"; cf. also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,8, *CSEL* 60, p. 468.

letters had removed all doubt on the matter under discussion.[156] He had condemned Pelagius and Caelestius.[157] As a member of the Western Church, Julian should submit to the authority of this Western bishop.[158] In any case, it would have been better if Julian, from his youth onwards, had listened to Innocent so that he could have been rescued from Pelagian snares.[159]

7. Jerome

Although Jerome is only a priest, he deserves a place in the college of doctors.[160] He was a man learned in Greek and Latin, very familiar with the Hebrew language,[161] and contributed much to the development of Catholic education in the Latin language.[162] Jerome moved from the Western to the Eastern Church. He had read most of what was written before him about the teaching of the Church and this from both parts of the world. In the matter under discussion, he shares our position, so Augustine claims.[163] One gets the impression that Augustine's praise of the person Jerome is not completely in proportion with the use the bishop of Hippo makes of him. One has to wait until *Contra Iulianum* I,34 before one comes across the name of Jerome. Moreover, only one text of Jerome will be quoted, *In Ionam* III,5, a text which was, more substantially, already used in *De peccatorum*

[156] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,5, *CSEL* 60, p. 464; II,7-8, *CSEL* 60, pp. 467-468.

[157] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,5, *CSEL* 60, p. 465; *Contra Iulianum* II,36, *PL* 44, 699.

[158] *Contra Iulianum* I,14, *PL* 44, 648-649: "Non est ergo cur prouoces ad orientis antistites; quia et ipsi utique christiani sunt, et utriusque partis terrarum fides ista una est; quia et fides ista christiana est: et te certe occidentalis terra generauit, occidentalis regenerauit ecclesia."

[159] *Contra Iulianum* I,13, *PL* 44, 648.

[160] On Jerome and his contacts with Augustine, see A. Fürst, *Hieronymus*, in *AL* III,2-3, Basel, 2004-2006, 317-336 (with further literature); for his place in Augustine's tradition argument, see also De Simone, *Modern Research on the Sources of Saint Augustine's Doctrine of Original Sin*, pp. 224-227.

[161] *Contra Iulianum* I,34, *PL* 44, 665.

[162] *Contra Iulianum* II,36, *PL* 44, 699.

[163] *Contra Iulianum* I,34, *PL* 44, 665: "(...) ex occidentali ad orientalem transiens ecclesiam, in locis sanctis atque in litteris sacris, usque ad decrepitam uixit aetatem: omnesque uel pene omnes qui ante illum aliquid ex utraque parte orbis de doctrina ecclesiastica scripserant legit, nec aliam de hac re tenuit prompsitque sententiam." Also in II,33, *PL* 44, 697 (uelis nolis [meant is Julian]) and II,36, *PL* 44, 699, Augustine explicitly mentions the fact that Jerome is a priest. Cf. also Wermelinger, *Rom und Pelagius*, pp. 276-277.

meritis et remissione III,12.[164] Jerome's *Dialogus aduersus Pelagianos* is never referred to, although the bishop of Hippo is aware of its existence.[165]

In my opinion, Augustine is conscious of the fact that the presence of both Innocent and Jerome (the latter was considered by Pelagius as his rival)[166] in the court might be a problem for Julian. Indeed, the first had condemned Pelagius and Caelestius, the second, had defended in the East, the Catholic faith against Pelagius.[167] With regard to the first, Julian should reread what Pelagius said about this man. In the case of Jerome, Augustine states that he did not use Jerome's work against the Pelagians, but quoted from his writings, written at the time he was free of all bias.[168] But even then, one cannot say that Jerome gets a considerable place in Augustine's appeal to the Fathers. Further, as it becomes clear in *Opus imperfectum* IV,88, Jerome's positions in his *Dialogus aduersus Pelagianos* are a bit problematic. One might even suggest that Augustine, in a sense, is distancing himself from Jerome's positions with regard to Pelagianism. Indeed, in *Ad Florum* IV,88,[169] Julian referred to two passages of Jerome's *Dialogus*. In the first passage, Jerome remarked that in a gospel *iuxta Hebraeos*, which was written in the Chaldaic and Syriac language, but in Hebrew letters, it was said that the mother and brothers of Jesus invited him to go with them to John the Baptist in order to receive baptism for the remission of sin. Jesus wondered why he should do so, "Nisi forte hoc ipsum quod dixi, ignorantia est".[170] The conclusions as drawn by Julian are not present in this text of Jerome: Jerome did not speak of the presence of natural or voluntary sin in Christ, but, as we know, sins out of ignorance were considered by Augustine as signs of the existence of original sin, and this is not excluded by Jesus.[171] A much better argument

[164] *Contra Iulianum* I,34, *PL* 44, 665. See also Y.-M. DUVAL, *Saint Augustin et le Commentaire sur Jonas de saint Jérôme*, in *RÉA* 12 (1966) 9-40, esp. pp. 14-21.

[165] See DUVAL, *Saint Augustin*, p. 20.

[166] *Contra Iulianum* II,36, *PL* 44, 699: "(...) quod ei tanquam aemulo inuiderit."

[167] *Contra Iulianum* II,36, *PL* 44, 699: "Ex quibus papam Innocentium et presbyterum Hieronymum retrahere fortasse tentabis: istum, quia Pelagium Coelestiumque damnauit; illum, quia in oriente contra Pelagium catholicam fidem pia intentione defendit."

[168] *Contra Iulianum* II,36, *PL* 44, 700.

[169] *CSEL* 85,2, p. 90.

[170] Jerome, *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos* III,2, *CCSL* 80, p. 99.

[171] *Ad Florum* IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 90: "Verum his ut res postulabat impletis iuuat te uel mediocriter conuenire, qua fiducia tu, cum Hieronymi scripta collaudes, dicas in Christo non fuisse peccatum, cum ille in eo dialogo, quem sub nomine Attici

against Jerome's orthodoxy Julian finds in *Dialogus aduersus Pelagianos* II,17 where Atticus (the anti-Pelagian in the dialogue), on the basis of John 7,10, makes clear that the man Jesus is a liar: "Iterum se negauit, et fecit quod prius negauerat" and that this should be attributed "ad carnem".[172] In a no longer extant letter to Alexandria,[173] Augustine praised Jerome's work to the extent that he claimed that Pelagius, overwhelmed by the work's scriptural references, could no longer defend the existence of free choice. However, Julian continues, Pelagius did react to this work. Anyway, Julian claims, you (Augustine) are not in agreement with Scripture, but not even with the supporters of your doctrine. Julian is upset that Augustine could praise a man who was not afraid to blaspheme Christ to the point that he claimed that Christ had sinned![174] In any case, according to Julian, Jerome's view – Augustine is called here a servant (*assecla*) of Jerome – is contradicted by Ambrose for whom Christ was always free from any lie.[175]

Although Augustine knows Jerome's work, his first reaction is that Julian should have quoted these texts in order to see what was wrong with Jerome's view.[176] Next, he quotes a text from Ambrose, introducing it as following: "I, in fact, set before you the statement, not of Jerome, but of Ambrose, and not rephrased in my own words, but expressed in his words".[177] Further, two times, Augustine explicitly recognizes the possibility that Jerome might have said things which were not in line with the other illustrious teachers of the Catholic Church.[178] Finally, he admits that when anything displeases him in his own writings like in those of his friends, he will criticize it.[179]

et Critoboli mira [et] ut talem fidem decebat uenustate composuit, etiam quinti euangelii, quod a se translatum dicit, testimonio nitatur ostendere Christum non solum naturale, uerum etiam uoluntarium habuisse peccatum, propter quod se cognouerit Iohannis baptismate diluendum."

[172] Jerome, *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos* II,17, *CCSL* 80: "Iturum se negauit, et fecit quod prius negauerat: latrat Porphyrius, inconstantiae ac mutationis accusat, nesciens omnia scandala ad carnem esse referenda."

[173] See Y.-M. Duval, *Notes complémentaires. Lettre 4**, in *BA*, 46B, pp. 430-442, esp. pp. 434-435.

[174] *Ad Florum* IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 90-91.

[175] *Ad Florum* IV,121, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 137-138.

[176] *Opus imperfectum* IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 91.

[177] *Opus imperfectum* IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 91: "Ego sane non Hieronymi sed Ambrosii nec meis commemoratam, sed uerbis eius expressam sententiam tibi opposui (...)".

[178] *Opus imperfectum* IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 91; IV,89, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 93.

[179] *Opus imperfectum* IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 93: "(...) ac per hoc si quid mihi displicet, reprehendo in amici scriptis sicut in meis ...".

In any case, Augustine does not think that there is any validity in Julian's accusation Augustine being Jerome's servant,[180] but the fact remains, that Jerome gets a low profile in the debate with Julian.

b. The Greek Fathers

According to Augustine, there was no need for Julian to appeal to Eastern bishops, for the West was the land of his birth, the Western Church was also the church of his rebirth. Moreover, the Christian faith in both West and East is one.[181] In other words, Julian's appeal to the East will not change the situation. However, Augustine rethorically assures, Julian will have an Eastern bishop in his court of judges, and which one: Gregory of Nazianz!

1. Gregory of Nazianz

Gregory is introduced by Augustine as a man with a great name, excellent fame, and an illustrious bishop, whose speeches have rightly been translated in Latin.[182] Surprisingly, Augustine does not seem to be very familiar with the biography of Gregory. In *Contra Iulianum* I,19, Gregory, instead of Gregory of Nyssa, is called the brother of Basil: "tam insignes uiri ... et, sicut fertur, etiam carne germani". The *fertur* might suggest that Augustine's information is second-hand.[183] Further, Augustine clearly does not know when Gregory wrote his books. The work *De fuga sua*, written in 362, is placed in the period when Gregory was already bishop.[184] This unfamiliarity

[180] *Opus imperfectum* IV, 122, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 139. Augustine then repeats his argument: I need Jerome's text in order to interpret it or to reject it.

[181] *Contra Iulianum* I,14, *PL* 44, 648: "Non est ergo cur prouoces ad Orientis antistites; quia et ipsi utique christiani sunt, et utriusque partis terrarum fides ista una est; quia et fides ista christiana est: et te certe occidentalis terra generauit, occidentalis regeneravit ecclesia."

[182] *Contra Iulianum* I,15, *PL* 44, 649: "Sed non tibi deerit magni nominis et fama celeberrima illustris episcopus etiam de partibus Orientis, cuius eloquia ingentis merito gratiae, etiam in linguam latinam translata usquequaque claruerunt." Translator was Rufinus; see B. ALTANER, *Augustinus und Gregor von Nazianz, Gregor von Nyssa*, in ID., *Kleine Patristische Schriften* (TU, 83), Berlin, 1967, pp. 277-285, p. 279. Augustine only seems to know these works of Gregory that are translated by Rufinus; see P. COURCELLE, *Les lettres grecques en occident: de Macrobe à Cassiodore*, Paris, 1948, p. 189; cf. also B. BARTELINK, *Die Beinflußung Augustins durch die griechischen Patres*, p. 20, n. 57.

[183] *Contra Iulianum* I,19, *PL* 44, 652.

[184] *Opus imperfectum* I,69, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 77; for the date of his ordination, see J. BERNARDI (ed.), *Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 1-3* (SC, 247), Paris, 1978, p. 17.

with Gregory's life and work does not prevent Augustine from putting the *Graecus*,[185] *catholicus doctus doctor*[186] on his list of famous doctors, quite often as the first of the Eastern Fathers,[187] for his doctrine is in harmony with that of his brothers and co-doctors.[188] Julian would be better off listening to him than to Caelestius.[189] In the debate with Julian, Augustine quotes all in all six texts, taken from the *Apologia pro sua fuga* and five *Orationes*.[190]

Quite rhetorically, Augustine asks Julian if Gregory alone is not enough to demonstrate the authority of the Eastern bishops: he is a great man but Gregory was well aware that all he said he had learned "ex fide Christiana". He is famous and venerated by the faithful but only because they know that what he has taught is in accord with the rule of the truth.[191] In order to "satisfy" Julian, Augustine deliberately adds a second Eastern witness, Basil of Caesarea, an authority recognized by Julian himself.[192]

Another proof of Augustine's unfamiliarity with Gregory's work was already present in his *Ep.* 148,10.15, *CSEL* 44, pp. 340.345, where he referred to Gregory, *sanctus episcopus orientalis*, quoted from work he attributed to Gregory, while the text is found in Gregory of Elvira's *De fide orthodoxa contra Arianos*. See ALTANER, *Augustinus und Gregor von Nazianz, Gregor von Nyssa*, p. 278.

[185] *Opus imperfectum* II,33, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 186.

[186] *Opus imperfectum* I,53, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 50.

[187] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* II,33, *PL* 44, 697; II,37, *PL* 700-701 (2 times); III,32, *PL* 44, 719; *Opus imperfectum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 59; II,37, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 189; IV,72, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 75; IV,73, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 75.

[188] *Contra Iulianum* II,7, *PL* 44, 677.

[189] *Opus imperfectum* I,67, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 71.

[190] *Apologia pro sua fuga* 2,91; *Oratio* 17,5; 36,15; 38,4; 38,17; 41,14.

[191] *Contra Iulianum* I,16, *PL* 44, 650; "Est quidem tanta persona, ut neque ille hoc nisi ex fide christiana omnibus notissima diceret, nec illi eum tam clarum haberent atque uenerandum, nisi haec ab illo dicta ex regula notissimae ueritatis agnoscerent."

[192] *Contra Iulianum* I,16, *PL* 44, 650: "Sed si uis addimus huic et sanctum Basilium, imo uelis nolis addendus est, maxime quia et tu de libro eius, quem scripsit aduersus Manichaeos, in quarto uolumine huius operis tui aliquid putasti esse ponendum, quod ad causam peccati originalis per unum intrantis in mundum, et per omnes homines transeuntis omnino non pertinet." With regard to Augustine's use of the work of Basil, see ALTANER, *Augustinus und Basilius der Große*, in ID., *Kleine Patristische Schriften*, pp. 269-276; BARTELINK, *Augustin und die griechischen Patres*, pp. 19-20; ID., *Basilius*, in *AL* I, Basel, 1986/1994, 614-617 (with further literature), esp. 615-616. It is clear that Augustine only knows this pseudo-Basilian work through his reading of Julian; see LÖSSL, *Intellectus gratiae*, p. 336, n. 134, with further literature. With regard to the rhetorical aspect, see WEBER, *Some Literary Aspects of the Debate between Julian of Eclanum and Augustine*, p. 293.

2. Basil the Great

Given Julian's recognition of the authority of Basil (and Chrysostom),[193] Augustine himself wants to prove that, through the works of these men, he can refute Julian.[194] Like the other doctors Basil is called a holy, learned, and famous man, a Christian bishop.[195] Although translations are available, Augustine prefers to offer his own word by word translation from the Greek of a sermon of Basil on fasting in order to remain more faithful to the original text.[196] By quoting Basil he wants to make clear that if Julian had more carefully read this author, he would never have quoted a text from Basil that had nothing to do with the topic under discussion.[197] Apart from reinterpreting the texts as offered by Julian, Augustine will quote two texts from Basil himself, texts he knows through translation, but one of the two he wrongly attributes to Chrysostom.[198]

3. John Chrysostom

It is well known that John Chrysostom was highly esteemed, not only in the inner circle of Julian's family and friends, but also by Pelagius, who, in his debate with Augustine, had already referred to Chrysostom.[199] Further, Julian had referred to Chrysostom's *Oratio*

[193] *Contra Iulianum* I,35, *PL* 44, 666: "(...) sic et tu loquentibus tibi tot uenerabilibus uiris (...) episcopis Basilio et Ioanne, quos tu quoque in sanctis eruditis ueridica attestatione posuisti (...)".

[194] See *Contra Iulianum* VI,69, *PL* 44, 865.

[195] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* I,16, *PL* 44, 650 (sanctus); I,35, *PL* 44, 666 (Christian bishop); II,33, *PL* 44, 697 (one of the clarissimi sacerdotes); II,37, *PL* 44, 700 (one of the learned, earnest, holy, and sharp defenders of the faith).

[196] *Contra Iulianum* I,18, *PL* 44, 652: "Quod etsi reperi interpretatum, tamen propter diligentiorem ueri fidem, uerbum e uerbo malui transferre de Graeco."

[197] *Contra Iulianum* I,18, *PL* 44, 652; that the text quoted by Julian is not relevant for the dispute, is repeated in I,30, *PL* 44, 661.

[198] *Sermo I De ieiunio* 1,3-4; *Oratio* 13,2 (attributed to Chrysostom); cf. ALTANER, *Augustinus und Basilius der Große*, pp. 274-275.

[199] See *De natura et gratia* 76, *CSEL* 60, p. 291. With regard to the sympathy of the Pelagian milieus for Chrysostom, see BROWN, *Pelagius and his Supporters*, pp. 214-216. Anianus of Celada, regularly associated with Pelagius, translated quite a number of Chrysostom's works; see B. ALTANER, *Altlateinische Übersetzungen von Chrysostomusschriften*, in ID., *Kleine Patristische Schriften*, pp. 416-436, pp. 418ff.; cf. also BARTELINK, *Augustin und die griechischen Patres*, pp. 22-23. On Anianus, see Ch. BREUER-WINKLER, *Anianus*, in *LThK*^{3} 1, 677 (with further literature); Ch. PIETRI & L. PIETRI (Eds.), *Annianus*, in *Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)* (Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire, 2), Vol. 1, Rome, 1999, pp. 141-142. C. PIETRI, *Esquisse de conclusion. L'aristocratie chrétienne entre Jean de Constantinople et Augustin d'Hippone*, in Ch. KANNENGIESER (Ed.), *Jean Chrysostome et*

ad Neophytos as a support for his own position that baptism of infants was not needed for the remission of original sin. According to Julian, John denied that there existed original sin in newly born children.[200] It is Augustine's challenge to prove that this "friend" of the Pelagians held positions, similar to his own view,[201] and, indeed, in *Contra Iulianum* I, no other author receives so much attention as Chrysostom (ten lenghty chapters!). John must be member of the court, for the "young" Julian thought he had found in John's writings arguments against the views as held by so many and great colleagues of John.[202] Augustine explicitly states that if Julian would have been right, John's position could never have been preferred over that of so many great people with regard to a subject that the Christian faith and Catholic Church have never changed their opinions about. But, as one might expect, this eventuality is immediately excluded.[203] This position is substantiated with a whole series of texts taken from John's homily 10 on Romans in order to conclude that John is far from Julian's way of argumentation for he does not deviate from the Catholic way of thinking.[204]

Augustin (Actes du colloque de Chantilly, 22-24 septembre 1974) (Théologie historique, 35), Paris, 1975, pp. 283-305, pays much attention to the contacts between the different noble families in East and West, and their relations with both Chrysostom and Augustine. Augustine came rather late in contact with the writings of Chrysostom; see B. ALTANER, *Augustinus und Chrysostomus,* in ID., *Kleine Patristische Schriften*, pp. 302-311, esp. p. 303: "Wir gewinnen den Eindruck, daß Augustinus auch damals (414/415) noch keine Schriften des Konstantinopeler Bischofs kannte."; cf. also BARTELINK, *Augustin und die griechischen Patres,* pp. 22-23. On Chrysostom, Augustine and the Pelagian controversy, see F.-J. THONNARD, *Saint Jean Chrysostome et saint Augustin dans la controverse pélagienne*, in *Revue des Études byzantines* 25 (1967) 189-218; R. BRÄNDLE, *La ricezione di Giovanni Crisostomo nell' opera di Agostino*, in *Giovanni Crisostomo: Oriente e Occidente tra IV e V secolo. XXXIII Incontro di studiosi dell' antichità Cristiana. Roma, 6-8 maggio 2004* (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 93), Rome, 2005, pp. 885-895, esp. pp. 888-895; M. ZELZER, *Giovanni Crisostomo nella controversia tra Giuliano d'Eclano e Agostino*, in *Giovanni Crisostomo: Oriente e Occidente tra IV e V secolo*, pp. 927-932.

[200] Julianus, *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 312, *CCSL* 88, pp. 393-394.

[201] Augustine carefully reads the Greek original and presents then a "uerbum e uerbo" Latin translation of the text; see *Contra Iulianum* I,26, *PL* 44, 658.

[202] *Contra Iulianum* I,23, *PL* 44, 656: "Ecce etiam ipsum numero illi adiungo sanctorum. Ecce inter meos testes, uel inter nostros constituo iudices, quem putasti patronum tuum. (...) Ingredere, sancte Ioannes, ingredere, et conside cum fratribus tuis, a quibus te nulla ratio et nulla tentatio separauit. Opus est et tua, et maxime tua sententia: quoniam in tuis litteris iste iuuenis inuenisse se putat, unde tot tantorumque coepiscoporum tuorum se arbitratur percellere et euacuare sententias."

[203] *Contra Iulianum* I,23, *PL* 44, 656.

[204] *Contra Iulianum* I,28, *PL* 44, 660; I,30, *PL* 44, 661; cf. also I,33, *PL* 44, 663.

Just like the other members of Augustine's court of judges, John is called blessed and holy,[205] a bishop of excellent glory.[206] Learned in the Catholic faith and teaching,[207] he is its defender.[208] With regard to the interpretation of Rom. 5,12, he is said to stand more clearly than daylight in the truth of the Catholic faith.[209] With regard to the *fundamenta fidei*, Chrysostom holds the same ideas as the others.[210] Augustine quotes thirteen texts from six works, attributed to Chrysostom. However, three of the quotations are taken from works, wrongly attributed to Chrysostom.[211]

4. The Bishops at Diospolis

The last members of the court of judges are the fourteen bishops, present at the synod of Diospolis. At first sight, the incorporation of these bishops in the court might be a surprise, for indeed, Pelagius had been acquitted by them. However, Augustine offers a series of good reasons why these bishops deserve a seat in the court of judges. These Eastern bishops all "uno eodemque modo" believe that all human beings are subjected to the sin of the first man.[212] "Ore uno" they set Pelagius free because the latter had condemned those who state that children even without baptism can possess eternal life.[213] Augustine is convinced that he believes what they believe, holds what they hold, teaches what they teach and preaches what they preach.[214] They judged

[205] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655; I,23, *PL* 44, 656; I,27, *PL* 44, 658; I,28, *PL* 44, 660; I,29, *PL* 44, 661; II,17, *PL* 44, 685; II,18, *PL* 44, 685; *Opus imperfectum* VI,9, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 309; VI,26, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 390.

[206] *Opus imperfectum* VI,7, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 302.

[207] *Contra Iulianum* I,26, *PL* 44, 658.

[208] *Contra Iulianum* I,28, *PL* 44, 660: " (...) magno christianae fidei atque huius catholici dogmatis defensori (...)".

[209] *Contra Iulianum* I,27, *PL* 44, 658-659. Augustine seems to have the whole 10th homily of John on Romans at his disposal for he explicitly states: "Quod totum quia longum est huic opera intexere, pauca inde contingam."

[210] *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655.

[211] *Homiliae ad Neophytos in Genesim* 3,6; 3,21; 9,4; 9,14; *De Lazaro resuscitato*; *In triduanam resurrectionem; Epistula ad Olympiam* 10,3; *Homilia in Epistulam ad Romanos* 10,1;10,2; 10,3; *Oratio* 13,2. Augustine attributes Basil's *Oratio* 13, the pseudo-Chrysostom sermon on the ressurection, and (Pseudo)-Potamius of Lissabon's sermon *De Lazaro resuscitato* to Chrysostom; cf. ALTANER, *Augustinus und Johannes Chrysostomus*, pp. 309-310. On the questionable attribution of the sermon to Potamius, see ZELZER, *Giovanni Crisostomo nella controversia tra Giuliano d'Eclano e Agostino*, pp. 931-932.

[212] *Contra Iulianum* I,20, *PL* 44, 654.

[213] *Contra Iulianum* I,32, *PL* 44, 663.

[214] *Contra Iulianum* I,20, *PL* 44, 654: "... quod credunt credo, quod tenent teneo, quod docent doceo, quod praedicant praedico ...".

all together in one place and thus really functioned as an assembly.[215] Further, Augustine time and again stresses that Pelagius' acquittal was motivated by the fact that he, fearing a condemnation, condemned positions now under discussion. Augustine regularly suggests that Pelagius deceived the bishops at Diospolis,[216] who took Pelagius for being a Catholic, because they were only human, and understood Pelagius' comments "secundum catholicam fidem".[217] In any case, the documentation makes clear that Augustine does not really know that much about the individual profiles of these bishops.[218] The importance of these bishops' testimony is already modest in *Contra Iulianum*, and becomes marginal in the *Opus imperfectum*.[219]

The profile of the predecessors is clear: they are men of great faith, stay within a tradition, represent chronological and geographical coherence and continuity in doctrine, possess authority, know how to cope with heresies, and are worthy of belonging to the college of judges, for which Julian constantly had asked.[220]

IV. Application and Function of the Appeal to Predecessors

1. Julian is Searching for the Wrong Judges

According to Augustine, the type of judges Julian is searching for, are people who must be highly trained experts in the liberal arts and familiar with the philosophers of this world.[221] Julian is accused of promoting a few of the "philosophorum saecularium".[222] Julian's problem is that he wants to have learned judges in such a way that he

[215] *Contra Iulianum* I,19, *PL* 44, 652: "... quos uno loco simul inuentos in istum consessum introducere ualeamus ...".

[216] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,10, *CSEL* 60, p. 470. Augustine suggests that Pelagius had condemned the statement that one receives grace according to one's merits, but that in his later writings he would have repeated this position he first had condemned. Similar critiques one will find in *Contra Iulianum* I,19, *PL* 44, 653; *Opus imperfectum* IV,43, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 46. For an evaluation of Pelagius' attitude, see WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius*, pp. 78-87.

[217] *Contra Iulianum* I,19, *PL* 44, 651-652.

[218] Diospolis 11; 14; 17 (WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius*, pp. 296-297).

[219] This nuances Wermelinger's observation in *Rom und Pelagius*, p. 275: "Die anfängliche Zurückhaltung gegenüber Diospolis schwindet im augustinischen Schrifttum immer mehr". In fact, only Diospolis 11 and 14 will be quoted once in *Opus imperfectum*.

[220] *Contra Iulianum* II,8, *PL* 44, 678.

[221] *Opus imperfectum* II,1, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 164; cf. also *Contra Iulianum* III,2, *PL* 44, 702.

[222] *Opus imperfectum* II,4, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 166.

no longer wants to have Catholic Christian judges.[223] In this context it is interesting to note that Augustine, in the debate, in no way was impressed by the erudition of pagan philosophers, invokend by Julian: certainly they were wise and learned men, but not truly righteous for not living by faith in Christ.[224] By searching for dialecticians, Julian who, according to Augustine, wants to be seen as a clever, learned, and bad philosopher as well as a dialectician, Augustine ironically adds,[225] tries to avoid ecclesiastical judges.[226] What Julian missed, is the eyes of faith of great and important people such as Ambrose, Cyprian, and all the other doctors of the Church.[227] Julian misses a lack of believing carefullness. Not willing to be nourished by the grace of Christ, he is unable to come to those things which have been hidden from the wise and prudent and have been revealed to the little ones.[228]

Julian wants to award himself the palm of victory against the many bishops of God who, before Augustine, had learned and taught in the Church of Christ: the new heretic,[229] wants to pollute with novelties[230] this most strongly founded and ancient Catholic faith. He wants to attract people to the novelty of his error.[231] Typical of these heretics is that they obscure with their interpretations what has always has been clear.[232] Therefore, Augustine does not believe that reason, sound erudition, justice, piety, and Scripture support Julian's position.[233]

[223] *Opus imperfectum* II,1, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 164.

[224] *Contra Iulianum* IV,17, *PL* 44, 745.

[225] *Opus imperfectum* VI,18, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 351.

[226] *Opus imperfectum* II,36, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 188.

[227] *Opus imperfectum* II,73, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 217.

[228] *Contra Iulianum* II,3, *PL* 44, 673.

[229] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,22, *CSEL* 42, p. 235: "(...) noui haeretici (...)"; cf. also I,40, *CSEL* 42, p. 251; II,3, *CSEL* 42, p. 255; II,25, *CSEL* 42, p. 278. On the use of such accusations in polemics, see Opelt, *Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur*, p. 158. Quite evident that Julian was furious and upset when reading this accusation; cf. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 10, *CCSL* 88, p. 342. Julian lamented that by calling him a new heretic, Augustine was stirring up the common folk; frg. 251, *CCSL* 88, p. 385. However, Julian used the same strategy; cf. *supra*.

[230] *Contra Iulianum* III,1, *PL* 44, 701.

[231] *Contra Iulianum* I,4, *PL* 44, 643.

[232] *Opus imperfectum* I,22, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 18: "Nouit enim, quemadmodum soleant haec uerba apostolica quae praetermisit accipere catholicorum corda fidelium, quae uerba tam recta et tanta luce fulgentia tenebrosis et tortuosis interpretationibus noui haeretici obscurare et deprauare moliuntur."

[233] *Opus imperfectum* II,13, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 171.

2. *The Eruditi are at my Side*[234]

Augustine invokes his authorities in order to show that his doctrine is supported by all the doctors of the Church (although he can only present the position of a few of them),[235] for he is convinced that the doctrine of original sin is not his own invention but a doctrine, held by the Catholic faith from its very beginning.[236] Erudition is important for Augustine: as we have seen in the presentation of the individual judges of the court, Augustine regularly mentioned that they were learned doctors. These people cannot be reckoned to the group of common ranks of workmen, soldiers, school-boys, sailors, bartenders, fishermen, cooks and butchers, youths dismissed from monasteries, men from the ordinary run of clerics, people who cannot judge doctrines through the categories of Aristotle, in sum, the sorts of people Julian was complaining about. When Julian uses qualifications such as country folk and people of the theater, he must see that he is attributing these qualifications to people like Cyprian and Ambrose and so many learned writers, companions in God's kingdom of heaven.[237] Someone like Ambrose, Augustine insists, is not simply someone from the common folk whose ignorant masses Julian is looking down upon. Ambrose is a man to whom Julian in no sense is equal to in the worldly literature which Julian is so proud of: Ambrose is the person *par excellence* who meets the standards as requested by Julian.[238] Moreover, with regard to the quality of his ecclesiastical writings, one should simply read the praise of Pelagius![239]

[234] On the basis of what will be said in this section I have great problems with the so-called "plébéisme" of Augustine; cf. SALAMITO, *Les virtuoses et la multitude*, p. 240. Constantly Augustine will appeal to these doctors of faith in order to show that his views are supported by them. When one should count the texts related to the doctors with what one will find about the common folk, it will become clear who receives most weight and authority from Augustine.

[235] *Contra Iulianum* I,5, *PL* 44, 643.

[236] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,25, *CSEL* 42, p. 278.

[237] See *Contra Iulianum* II,37, *PL* 44, 700: "Numquid Irenaeus, et Cyprianus, et Reticius, et Olympius, et Hilarius, et Gregorius, et Basilius, et Ambrosius, et Ioannes, de plebeia faece sellulariorum, sicut Tulliane iocaris, in uestram inuidiam concitati sunt?"; *Opus imperfectum* II,14, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 172: "Vide sane, quemadmodum rurales et theatrales dicas Cyprianum et Ambrosium et tot eruditos in regno Dei scribas, socios eorum."

[238] *Opus imperfectum* II,1, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 164: "Talis hic erat Ambrosius, quem iudicem si non refugis, dubitare non debes iustissime te esse damnatum (...)".

[239] *Opus imperfectum* II,36, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 188-189: "Ambrosius est ille, non quicumque de uulgo, cuius imperitam multitudinem non ualentem de tuis disputationibus iudicare nimis alta ceruice et proterua fronte contemnis; Ambrosius est, inquam, cui nulla ex parte in ipsis litteris saecularibus, de quibus multum inflaris,

Because Julian requested a small group of learned people, Augustine regulary emphasizes that the judges he presents are indeed that small group of learned people requested.[240] These people meet the standards of reason, erudition and freedom, Julian asked for:[241] this board of doctors from Africa, Gaul, Italy, Greece[242] defends the catholic truth, and meets the standards asked for by Julian, for they are "bishops of the Church" and "men of sound minds".[243] They form the neutral and objective court of learned people that Julian wanted.[244] Living before the outbreak of the controversy, possessing a sound doctrine, they can judge the question under discussion without any party politics.[245] Julian could never find a synod of such high quality or better judges than these men.[246] Augustine will not neglect to mention that John Chrysostom and Basil, who were qualified by Julian himself as learned, belong to his court.[247]

They are learned representatives of what is also held by their colleagues and the *whole* Church of Christ[248] from its very beginning:

aequaris; in ecclesiasticis uero quis ille sit, audi uel lege Pelagium doctorem tuum (...)". See also *Opus imperfectum* II,8, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 168.

[240] See *Contra Iulianum* I,31, *PL* 44, 662: "Sed ecce, quo te introduxi, conuentus sanctorum istorum non est multitudo popularis: non solum filii, sed et patres Ecclesiae sunt."; II,36, *PL* 44, 699: "Verum quia te delectat, non numerare multitudinem, sed appendere paucitatem; exceptis iudicibus Palaestinis, qui haeresim uestram in absoluto Pelagio damnauerunt, quem timore compressum Pelagiana ipsa dogmata damnare coegerunt, decem episcopos iam defunctos et unum presbyterum tibi huius causae opposui iudices, qui de illa cum hic uiuerent iudicauerunt. Si uestra consideretur paucitas, multi sunt: si multitudo catholicorum episcoporum, perpauci sunt."

[241] *Contra Iulianum* II,37, *PL* 44, 700: "Isti episcopi sunt, docti, graues, sancti, ueritatis acerrimi defensores aduersus garrulas uanitates, in quorum ratione, eruditione, libertate, quae tria bona iudici tribuisti, non potes inuenire quod spernas."

[242] *Opus imperfectum* II,33, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 186.

[243] *Opus imperfectum* IV,119, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 133: "Quos antistites ecclesiarum cum uiros sani capitis dicas; (...) quae illi notissima consensione didicerunt atque docuerunt (...)".

[244] *Contra Iulianum* II,34, *PL* 44, 698: "(...) ad hanc tamen causam tales erant (...): nullas nobiscum uel uobiscum amicitias attenderunt, uel inimicitias exercuerunt; neque nobis neque uobis irati sunt, neque nos neque uos miserati sunt. (...). Nec nos nec uos eis noti fueramus, et eorum pro nobis latas contra uos sententias recitamus." See also WEBER, *Some Literary Aspects of the Debate between Julian of Eclanum and Augustine*, p. 294.

[245] *Contra Iulianum* III,42, *PL* 44, 723: "In qua uellem quidem egregios iudices non repudiares, quos tibi meis superioribus libris sana doctrina eruditos, sine ullo studio partium de hac causa sententias protulisse monstraui."

[246] Cf. also *Opus imperfectum* II,37, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 189.

[247] *Contra Iulianum* I,33, *PL* 44, 663: "Postremo sanctus episcopus Joannes (...) quam tu sicut sanctum eruditumque laudasti (...)"; I,35, *PL* 44, 666: "(...) et episcopis Basilio et Joanne, quos tu quoque in sanctis eruditis ueridica attestatione posuisti (...)".

[248] *Contra Iulianum* VI,11, *PL* 44, 828-829.

the Church's belief in original sin and the need of baptism for all, including babies, belongs to the very ancient, authoritative Catholic faith, is based upon Scripture, and very well known through the celebrations of the Church.[249] The defense of this very venerable faith of the Church belongs to the essence of the Catholic resistence against the Pelagians.[250]

These authorities did not live at the same time, but at different periods of time and in distant places, still holding the same, orthodox doctrine. They are gathered from the East and from the West, and their writings are still available.[251] They include men from the rising of the sun to its setting, some from the past, others nearer to our era, some already have passed away, others are still living.[252]

These men *taught what they had learned in the Church*:

> "They drank as milk and ate as food; they have served its milk and its food to little ones and to adults and have most clearly and bravely defended it against its enemies, including you who were not born then, though they are now showing you for what you are."[253]

In other words, these men were both children of the Church and fathers of the Church. They were nourished by the Church's truth, defended it, and are still continuing to defend it, through their books, against people like Julian. "It was trough the efforts of these men that

[249] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,26, *CSEL* 60, p. 519: "Sed hoc dico tam manifestum esse secundum scripturas sanctas originale peccatum atque hoc dimitti lauacro regenerationis in paruulis tanta fidei catholicae antiquitate atque auctoritate firmatum, tam clara ecclesiae celebritate notissimum (...)".

[250] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,29, *CSEL* 60, p. 559: "(...) catholicis, qui eis pro antiquissima et firmissima ecclesiae fide resistant (...)"; cf. also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,1, *CSEL* 42, pp. 211-212; II,15, *CSEL* 42, p. 268; *Opus imperfectum* III,61, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 400.

[251] *Contra Iulianum* II,37, *PL* 44, 700: "Si episcopalis synodus ex toto orbe congregaretur, mirum si tales possent illic facile tot sedere. Quia nec isti uno tempore fuerunt: sed fideles et multis excellentiores paucos dispensatores suos Deus per diuersas aetates temporum, locorumque distantias, sicut ei placet atque expedire iudicat, ipse dispensat. Hos itaque de aliis atque aliis temporibus atque regionibus ab oriente et occidente congregatos uides, non in locum quo nauigare cogantur homines, sed in librum qui nauigare possit ad homines."

[252] *Contra Iulianum* I,20, *PL* 44, 654: "(...) a solis ortu usque ad occasum tot ac tantos catholicae fidei doctores et defensores, antiquos et nostrae aetati contiguos, dormientes et manentes (...)"; cf. also *Opus imperfectum* IV,7, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 12.

[253] *Contra Iulianum* II, 37, *PL* 44, 700: "(...) quam in lacte suxerunt, quam in cibo sumpserunt, cuius lac et cibum paruis magnisque ministrauerunt, quam contra inimicos etiam uos tunc nondum natos, unde nunc reuelamini, apertissime ac fortissime defenderunt." For the translation, see R.J. Teske, *Answer to the Pelagians, II: Marriage and Desire, Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians, Answer to Julian* (The Works of Saint Augustine, I/24), New York, 1998, p. 335 (abbreviated as WSA I/24).

the Church, after the death of the apostles, was still able to grow, for these men planted, watered, built, shepherded and nourished the Church, which has taken fright at the profane words of your novelty (...)".[254]

Between these men there is a great consensus,[255] a consensus that cannot be called a "conspiratio perditorum".[256] As Catholic co-disciples and co-doctors, they believed that through one person sin came into the world and passed to all.[257] Their consensus with regard to original sin is very important for Augustine.[258] Augustine stresses that they were in agreement with each other, Scripture, and the Catholic faith.[259] Therefore, Augustine will never accept that Julian might try to separate one of Augustine's doctors from the rest of the group. In defense of his case, Julian had appealed to John Chrysostom,[260] and, incorrectly, to Basil.[261] With regard to the essentials of the faith, it is to be excluded that John, Julian's authority, held an opinion different to that of his colleagues like the Roman Innocent, the Carthaginian Cyprian, the Cappadocian Basil, the Nazianzean Gregory, or the Milanese Ambrose.[262] The one who dares to question the truth of 1 Cor. 15,21-22, is destroying what we believe *in Christum*, i.e., that Christ is the savior of children, that he is the sole savior, and that, without his flesh and blood, one cannot have life. According to Augustine, "Hoc sensit, hoc credidit, hoc didicit, hoc docuit et Joannes". Therefore, Augustine accuses Julian of transforming John's words into his own doctrine.[263] Augustine admits that these doctors

[254] *Contra Iulianum* II,37, *PL* 44, 700: "Talibus post apostolos sancta ecclesia plantatoribus, rigatoribus, aedificatoribus, pastoribus, nutritoribus creuit. Ideo profanas uoces uestrae nouitatis expauit (...)". The translation is taken from WSA I/24, p. 335.

[255] *Contra Iulianum* I,30, *PL* 44, 661; III,32, *PL* 44, 719; *Opus imperfectum* IV,119, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 133.

[256] *Contra Iulianum* I,34, *PL* 44, 665; cf. also VI,69, *PL* 44, 865: "(...) sanctorum et eruditorum Ecclesiae catholicae partum pius fidelisque consensus (...)". For Julian's complaint, see *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 313, *CCSL* 88, p. 394.

[257] *Opus imperfectum* I,126, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 139: "Sic quippe intellexit (Ambrosius) cum ceteris condiscipulis et condoctoribus suis sine ulla dubitatione catholicis (...)".

[258] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* III,32, *PL* 44, 719; *Opus imperfectum* I,52, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 48.

[259] *Opus imperfectum* IV,112, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 120.

[260] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 308, *CCSL* 88, p. 392; frg. 311-312, *CCSL* 88, pp. 393-394.

[261] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 309-310, *CCSL* 88, pp. 392-393.

[262] *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655; see REBILLARD, *Augustin et ses autorités*, pp. 260-261.

[263] *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655.

and defenders of the Catholic rule of faith can differ, without harming the integrity of the faith. Augustine is willing to accept that the *regulae catholicae defensores* can have different opinions about problems that do not belong to the essence of faith. He quite frankly admits that one doctor can be better and more faithful to the truth than another, but he will never accept that a person such as Chrysostom would ever deny that salvation without Christ was possible, for this has to do with the foundations of faith. If there are differences, they are to be situated on another level than the one that has to do with the foundations of faith.[264]

What these men learned and taught can in no way be described as stupid or impious, as was suggested by Julian with regard to Augustine's doctrine. Reversing Julian's critique, Augustine claims that through the mercy of the Lord who governs his Church mercifully, the Catholic faith has been so vigilant that neither the stupid, impious doctrine of the Pelagians nor that of the Manicheans was received.[265] Those who did so are saintly and educated men, Catholics, as is proved by their fame in the whole Church.[266] Reacting against Julian's complaints about coercion, Augustine replies that one cannot claim that people like Cyprian and Ambrose – *beatissimis et in fide catholica excellentissimis viris* – were forced to sign-off for they overthrew the heresy already before its existence with such a clarity that one can hardly find a clearer answer to these heretics. Augustine therefore is not convinced that a synod as requested by Julian is needed: it is quite rare to find heresies which needed a

[264] *Contra Iulianum* I,22, *PL* 44, 655: "Alia sunt, in quibus inter se aliquando etiam doctissimi atque optimi regulae catholicae defensores, salua fidei compage non consonant, et alius alio de una re melius aliquid dicit et uerius. Hoc autem unde nunc agimus, ad ipsa fidei pertinet fundamenta." Skilful debater as he was, Julian, *Ad Florum* IV,112, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 119 referred to Augustine's *De natura et gratia* 71ff. in order to show that when Pelagius appealed to Ambrose and Cyprian, Augustine had replied that he was not bound by the authority of these people. Augustine even had suggested that their eventually incorrect views were wiped out by progress toward the better life. Julian accused Augustine of staining the reputation of these men by associating them to his own case, although their positions could easily be explained through clear and benevolent argumentation. It should be said that Augustine's reply is not really convincing: I do not see why Julian through his statements might have refuted Pelagius' and his own heresy; see *Opus imperfectum* IV,112, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 119. In the text, Julian referred to, Augustine implicitly accepts the authority of the people Pelagius appealed to, but rejects Pelagius' arguments; see REBILLARD, *Augustin et ses autorités*, pp. 253-257.

[265] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,33, *CSEL* 60, p. 569.

[266] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,33, *CSEL* 60, p. 569: "Ecce sancti et docti uiri, fama totius ecclesiae contestante catholici (...)".

synod in order to be condemned.[267] Augustine does not see any reason why the Christian governers should doubt the ancient Catholic faith and give space and time to the Pelagians for an examination of it. They would be better off coercing the Pelagians![268]

Augustine even goes a step further. He accuses Julian of either not knowing the thoughts and the statements of these Catholic teachers, or if he did, it becomes clear that he tried to deceive those not familiar with these teachers.[269]

Like his predecessors such as Ambrose, Augustine, with his modest ability, tries to build up peoples by exhortation, entreatment, and correction, but, like Ambrose and all his great companions, he holds and states the same opinion about original sin.[270] It is to men like Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Basil, and John Chrysostom that Augustine wants to cling in the communion of faith, which he wants to defend against the idle words and calumnies of Julian: "Look to these catholic eyes and open your eyes!", Augustine cries out.[271] Ironically, he asks Julian whether he dares to say that, when people hear the Pelagians, they will set afire for virtue, but when they hear these great and good men, they will be broken by despair and refuse to long for perfection?[272] You, Augustine continues, honor the saints of God, the patriarchs, the prophets, apostles through the praise of nature, while these *lumina Ecclesiae* dishonor them by their blame of nature, for they claim that one must fight against the innate evil of concupiscence in order to maintain the good of chastity?[273] By God's grace, through conflict, this evil must be overcome and thereafter,

[267] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,34, *CSEL* 60, pp. 569-570.

[268] *Opus imperfectum* I,10, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 11: "Absit a christianis potestatibus terrenae rei publicae, ut de antiqua catholica fide dubitent et ob hoc oppugnatoribus eius locum et tempus examinis praebeant ac non potius in ea certi atque fundati talibus quales uos estis inimicis eius disciplinam coercitionis imponant."; cf. also II,103, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 235, where Augustine stated that once a heresy was condemned by bishops, the Christian civil power should coerce it, not examining it again.

[269] *Contra Iulianum* I,29, *PL* 44, 661.

[270] *Opus imperfectum* IV,119, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 133: "Et nos pro modulo nostro populos aedificamus hortando obsecrando arguendo, quod fecit Ambrosius; et tamen de originali peccato hoc sentimus et dicimus, quod sensit et dixit Ambrosius, nec solus, sed cum aliis magnis consortibus suis."; IV,122, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 141: "Illud scilicet originale peccatum, quod uos negatis cum Pelagio, nos uero cum Ambrosio confitemur."

[271] *Opus imperfectum* IV,73, CSEL 85,2, p. 76; cf. also IV,97, CSEL 85,2, p. 102.

[272] *Contra Iulianum* II,30, *PL* 44, 693.

[273] *Contra Iulianum* II,30, *PL* 44, 693; cf. also II,70, *PL* 44, 866.

through the last rebirth healed.[274] "Is the light called darkness", Augustine asks, "and the darkness light to the point that Pelagius, Caelestius, and Julian can see, while Hilary, Gregory, and Ambrose are blind?"[275] It will be evident that Julian must, or, at least, should deny this. Therefore, he must take into account the views of these men.[276] Because of the already mentioned request of Julian for few wise men, Augustine only mentions three persons here: Hilary, Gregory, and Ambrose. Indeed, Julian had suggested that if Augustine were forced to appear for judges, he would not know what to do or where to flee, since Augustine could not find anything with which to meet Julian's arguments. If Julian wants to weigh, he should weigh the views of these few men: "I do not want there be so many that it is a bother for you to count them, but they are not lightweight so that many disdain to weigh them".[277] In the presence of Hilary, Gregory, and Ambrose, Julian cannot say that Augustine is too weak to object to Julian. These few men, authorities in the matter, are sufficient to answer to Julian's accusations. Therefore, Augustine flees from the Pelagian darkness to the bright, Catholic lights of Hilary, Gregory, and Ambrose.[278]

If Julian concedes that what Augustine presented from the writings of Ambrose, Cyprian, or other Catholics against Julian is true, he must recognize original sin.[279] If he refuses to return to the true faith, he will be confronted with these standards of truth. Augustine appears to be surprised that Julian does not seem to be aware that the critique formulated against Augustine and his view on original sin, is also a critique against these many and great doctors of the Church, who lived excellent lives, defended the faith against the heresies of their times, and passed away before the coming of the Pelagian resistence to the doctrine of original sin:[280] slandering Augustine means slandering these men.[281] Julian is accused of attacking these lights of the city of God, people he would better follow instead of attacking,[282] for they could recognize that God was the creator of

[274] *Contra Iulianum* II,30, *PL* 44, 693-694.
[275] *Contra Iulianum* II,35, *PL* 44, 698.
[276] *Contra Iulianum* II,35, *PL* 44, 698-699.
[277] *Contra Iulianum* II,35, *PL* 44, 699. The translation is taken from WSA I/24, p. 333.
[278] *Contra Iulianum* II,35, *PL* 44, 698-699.
[279] *Opus imperfectum* IV,113, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 122.
[280] *Contra Iulianum* I,11, *PL* 44, 646; II,30, *PL* 44, 694.
[281] *Opus imperfectum* IV,73, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 75-76.
[282] *Contra Iulianum* I,11, *PL* 44, 647.

all what exists, they honored marriage, they proclaimed that in baptism, through Christ, all sins are forgiven, they believed in a just God, in human beings' capacity for virtue and perfection through God's grace, without therefore denying the doctrine of original sin.[283] Proclaiming the doctrine of original sin did not hinder these men in their attempts to live a chaste life, overcoming vice, to fight as exemplary soldiers of Christ, overcoming the works of the devil, not trusting in their own virtues.[284] Therefore, Augustine is convinced that Julian will never be able to live a better life than these men,[285] from whom he is deviating, by denying that Christ is also the redeemer of little children.[286] He invites Julian to be open to the teaching of these men in order to return to the truth.[287] Augustine hopes that Julian will be healed by the statements and the authority of these holy men.[288]

3. *Augustine's Faith is that of the Multitude, for it is Christian and Catholic*

Augustine accepts that his faith is also a *dogma populare*, because he and the faithful are the Church of he who is called Jesus, for he saves his people from their sins. To this Church belong not only people like Ambrose and Cyprian, but also Julian's father: they all did not create such people but found them.[289] However, it should be clear that Augustine cannot accept that depreciative language is used in order to ridicule the faith of the common people and their leaders, the bishops: they all taught what they had learned! Julian should realize that the multitude of Christians despises the new heresy,[290] for it cannot give a sufficient answer to the suffering of babies: only the doctrine of original sin and its acceptance can offer a valid

[283] *Contra Iulianum* II,19, *PL* 44, 686 (on the basis of texts of Ambrose); II,32, *PL* 44, 695; *Opus imperfectum* IV,117, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 129.

[284] *Contra Iulianum* II,24, *PL* 44, 690.

[285] *Opus imperfectum* I,70, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 79.

[286] *Opus imperfectum* I,118, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 135.

[287] *Contra Iulianum* II,14, *PL* 44, 684; II,15, *PL* 44, 684.

[288] *Contra Iulianum* II,37, *PL* 44, 700-701.

[289] *Opus imperfectum* II,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 165. One should not to much focus on the expression *dogma populare* as popular: Augustine considers this faith of the people to be the faith of the Church, its leaders and its believers. Faith is universal and is *found* by the faithful, not created by them. See the pertinent remarks of REBILLARD, *Dogma populare*, pp. 185-186.

[290] *Contra Iulianum* II,36, *PL* 44, 699: "(...) sed nec ego te ullius multitudinis numerositate perturbo; quamuis propitio Deo, de hac fide, cui contradicitis, catholica sanum sapiat etiam multitudo; in qua usquequaque plurimi, ubi possunt, quomodo possunt, sicut diuinitus adiuuantur, uana uestra argumenta confutant."

answer.[291] Furthermore, when Julian complains that Augustine is stirring up the common people against him, because Augustine had said that these new heretics denied that for babies rebirth through baptism was needed for the redemption from the power of the devil, Augustine wonders whether this is not a sign that this Catholic faith is so popular and firmly implanted in society that even ordinary people notice it.[292] Augustine is convinced that Julian, while detesting the common folk – this countless multitude of believers[293] –, does not realize that he will accomplish nothing with these people, for all, rich and poor, high and low, learned and unlearned, men and women[294] are firmly grounded in the truth and the antiquity of the Catholic faith,[295] knowing why mothers all over the world run to the Church in order to get their babies be baptized.[296] What the "learned" debater Julian did not see with all his "knowledge", is crystal clear to the common people![297]

In reaction to Julian's complaint that Augustine could only raise the murmuring of the people as an argument against Julian, Augustine also stresses that this murmuring rests upon the authority of so many doctors,[298] thus linking the doctors' authority and the faith of the common people.[299] Further, Augustine can claim that if Julian would have

[291] *Contra Iulianum* V,4, *PL* 44, 784.

[292] *Contra Iulianum* VI,22, *PL* 44, 835.

[293] *Opus imperfectum* VI,3, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 294.

[294] *Contra Iulianum* I,31, *PL* 44, 662: "Diuites et pauperes, excelsi atque infimi, docti et indocti, mares et feminae nouerunt quid cuique aetati in baptismate remittatur."

[295] *Contra Iulianum* VI,34, *PL* 44, 841: "Sed nimirum tua disputata considerans, nihil te talibus argumentis apud populum in catholicae fidei ueritate et antiquitate fundatum agere potuisse uel posse sensisti."; cf. also VI,36, *PL* 44, 842.

[296] *Contra Iulianum* I,31, *PL* 44, 662: "Vnde etiam matres quotidie toto orbe terrarum non ad Christum tantum, id est, ad unctum; sed ad Christum Iesum, id est, etiam saluatorem cum paruulis currunt." Texts such as the one quoted here make clear that Augustine, when speaking of the faith of the multitude, stresses the universality of their faith, not so much, as suggested by Salamito, the popular character of the faith; SALAMITO, pp. 211-212; pp. 226-232. See the pertinent critique of REBILLARD, *Dogma Populare*, pp. 181-182. On the use of liturgical rites as an argument in the Pelagian controversy, see J.-A. VINEL, *L'argument liturgique opposé par Saint Augustin aux Pélagiens*, in *Questions liturgiques* 68 (1987) 209-241, pp. 215-224.

[297] *Contra Iulianum* I,36, *PL* 44, 699; VI,22, *PL* 44, 835-836: "Necesse quippe fuerat, quidquid in paruulis suis ageret, quod attinet ad mysteria christiana, omnes nosse Christianos. (...) Antequam essem natus huic mundo, et antequam essem renatus Deo, multa catholica lumina uestras futuras tenebras redarguendo praeuenerunt (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* III,104, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 424: "O stulti haeretici noui."

[298] *Contra Iulianum* VI,69, *PL* 44, 865.

[299] *Contra Iulianum* I,31, *PL* 44, 662: "Sed ecce, quo te introduxi, conuentus sanctorum istorum non est multitudo popularis: non solum filii, sed et patres ecclesiae sunt."

come to the essence of the matter under discussion, it would have been clear not only to the learned but also to the ordinary Christian faithful that Julian is a new heretic.[300] Augustine is in no way impressed by Julian's boasting of small numbers and maintaining that Augustine's doctrine only pleases the majority,[301] especially when this majority is Catholic and disapproves the Pelagian heresy.[302]

Using an argument *ad hominem*, Augustine reminds Julian not to forget that it is these common folk that he himself has found in the Church.[303]

In passing it should be said that also Augustine himself, in *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum*, a work known to Julian, had suggested that the Pelagians, these new heretics, even after an explicit condemnation, still tried to tempt by their writings the hearts of the less cautious or less educated.[304] By interjecting the din of other questions, they hid their unbelief for humang beings who are more simple or slower or less learned in the Sacred Scriptures.[305] They terrify the weak and those less well trained in Sacred Scripture than they should be in confrontation with the Pelagians.[306] Also in *Contra Iulianum*, Augustine insists that protection of the faithful, especially of the weaker ones, is needed for those terrified by Julian's arguments and the less well trained in Sacred Scripture should they be confronted by Julian.[307] In other words, Augustine himself warns his readers to be careful with these misleaders of simple people.[308]

In passing and without further developing this, one should remind that the fact that only a few people are really intelligent and studious enough to require knowledge about the human and divine, while there is a great multitude of slow and lazy ones, for Augustine is a proof that our nature is indeed vitiated because of Adam's fall.[309]

[300] *Opus imperfectum* III,183, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 482.

[301] *Opus imperfectum* II,3, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 166.

[302] *Opus imperfectum* II,4, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 166.

[303] *Opus imperfectum* II,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 165.

[304] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,2, *CSEL* 60, p. 424: "Noui quippe heretici, inimici gratiae Dei, quae datur pusillis et magnis per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, etsi iam cauendi euidentius apertiore inprobatione monstrantur, non tamen quiescunt scriptis suis minus cautorum uel minus eruditorum corda temptare."

[305] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,24, *CSEL* 60, p. 516: "(...) inmittunt aliarum nebulas quaestionum, in quibus eorum apud homines simpliciores siue tardiores siue sanctis litteris minus eruditos inpietas delitiscat."

[306] *Contra Iulianum* II,1, *PL* 44, 672.

[307] *Contra Iulianum* II,2, *PL* 44, 672.

[308] When Julian is ridiculizing the common folk, Augustine not always reacts; see, e.g. *Contra Iulianum* V,2-3, *PL* 44, 783.

[309] See, e.g., *Opus imperfectum* V,1, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 166: "Nempe tanta raritas ingeniosorum et studiosorum, per quae duo ad humanarum diuinarumque rerum

4. Neither a Manichean nor a Punic Faith

Julian quite often accused Augustine of still being an *African Manichean*. He feared that the Catholic Church might be ravished by Manichean robbers from Africa, and he insisted with Turbantius that one should pray to God in order that He might save his Church.[310] According to Julian, Augustine's positions were not in line with the faith rooted in antiquity and handed down to the present time (cf. *supra*).

Time and again, Augustine refutes the accusation that his faith might be Manichean. He reminds Julian that such accusations are typical of heretics: the same procedure had been followed by Jovinian at the time.[311] It is no surprise that the new heretics give new names to Catholics (Augustine thinks here of the term *traducianus*). That already happened in the past.[312]

If this faith, as Julian suggested, is a *dogma populare*, it can never be Manichean, for their madness, like that of the Pelagians, is only present in a few and it does not attract many.[313] Julian must be aware that if the doctrine of original sin is a Manichean idea,[314] this is the doctrine that has been confessed and professed by the great men, who had learned this doctrine in Christ's Church at the time of their first formation and, once being bishop, continued to teach it in the Church of Christ. Julian should be aware that he is attacking many, great defenders and doctors of the Catholic Church![315] With regard to

scientiam peruenitur, et tanta multitudo tardorum et desidiosorum, satis indicat in quam partem suo tanquam pondere feratur ipsa natura, quam negatis esse uitiatam."

[310] See, e.g., *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 51, *CCSL* 88, p. 352.

[311] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,38, *CSEL* 42, p. 292: " Nec ego id dico, quod isti hoc sentiant; uerumtamen per Iouinianum catholicis Manicheos obicientem non esse hoc nouum noui haeretici recognoscant."; *Contra Iulianum* I,4, *PL* 44, 643; see REBILLARD, *Augustin et ses autorités*, p. 258.

[312] *Opus imperfectum* I,6, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 9.

[313] *Opus imperfectum* VI,2-3, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 293-294; see also II,2-3, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 165-166, with regard to the small number of the Manicheans. This topos is well kown in the Christian controversy literature; see OPELT, *Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur von Tertullian bis Augustin*, pp. 230-231.

[314] Within the discussion about the *dogma populare*, it is interesting to see that also Augustine complaints about the fact that Julian is disgracing Augustine's name among the "imperiti"; cf. *Contra Iulianum* II,1, *PL* 44, 671.

[315] *Contra Iulianum* I,12, *PL* 44, 648: "Sed qua confidentia id dicere audebis, homo qui dicis Manichaeum esse sensum, confiteri ex Adam trahere nascentes originale peccatum; quod isti confessi atque professi sunt quod in Christi Ecclesia suorum rudimentorum tempore didicerunt, quod Christi Ecclesiam suorum honorum tempore docuerunt (...)"; II,1, *PL* 44, 671: "(...) quot et quantis uiris, Ecclesiae sanctis clarisque doctoribus, Manichaeorum crimen impingas (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* I,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 2: "Post commemorationem quippe doctorum catholicorum quos

the councils of the wicked, Augustine asks Julian whether the latter dares to call the agreement of so many Catholics, teachers of the Church, standing in the ancient Catholic truth before him, a council of the wicked?[316] The faith of somebody like Ambrose is true, sound, rooted in antiquity, handed down to us and for all these reasons, Augustine adds, it is also my faith.[317] Accusing Augustine of Manicheism is also accusing his predecessors of Manicheism[318] or Traducianism.[319] Julian should know that all his slander not only hurls Augustine but also Augustine's predecessors and by doing so gives proof that he belongs with the new heretics.[320] Augustine continues: "I did not spit it out upon Italy. (...) Rather, I received the bath of rebirth from this bishop of Italy who preached and taught this faith."[321]

Manicheos facis – mihi sub hoc crimine obiciendo, quod illi in catholica ecclesia didicerunt atque docuerunt – (...)"; IV,113, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 113-114: "cur ergo me dicis, quod illum esse non dicis, cum hoc ille tanto ante dixerit, quod ego nunc dico, atque in hac sententia propter quam Manichaeum me dicis, mihi et illi sit causa communis? (...) cur in una eademque sententia, quam dicit ille, dico ego, non est Manicheus ille, sed ego?"; IV,120, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 134: "Prorsus si illum non dicis, nec me debes dicere; si autem me dicendum putas, et illum cogeris dicere, et illos omnes magnos ecclesiae claros que doctores, qui de peccato originali, propter quod me Manichaeum dicis, ea dicunt sine ulla obscuritate uel ambiguitate quae dico, ut in primo et secundo sex librorum meorum, quos contra quatuor tuos edidi, satis euidenter ostendi."; cf. also I,135, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 151; IV,119, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 133; IV,120, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 135.

[316] *Opus imperfectum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 56.

[317] *Opus imperfectum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 57: "Ecce non est eorum, sed est Ambrosii; quia vera est, quia sana est, quia ut dixi antiquitus tradita atque fundata est, haec et mea est." Cf. also I,109, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 129: "(...) Ambrosius utique, non ut Manicheus, quo nomine tales qualis ille fidei fuerat criminaris, sed ut catholicus intellexit Apostolum (...)"; I,115, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 133: "Hoc non dixit haereticus immundus Manicheus, sed catholicus sanctus Ambrosius."; cf. also I,52, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 47; IV,118, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 130: "Originale peccatum cum Ambrosio confitemur (...)". IV,50, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 56: "Nec Apollinarista nec Manicheus fuit, sed haereticorum catholicus expugnator Ambrosius (...)". Sometimes, Augustine quotes a text from one of his giants and rhetorically asks: is this man a Manichean?; see, e.g., *Opus imperfectum* I,123, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 137.

[318] *Opus imperfectum* VI,33, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 428-429; cf. also *Contra Iulianum* I,11, *PL* 44, 647; *Opus imperfectum* II,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 169.

[319] *Opus imperfectum* I,6, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 9.

[320] *Opus imperfectum* I,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 10; with regard to Cyprian and Ambrose, see already *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,24, *CSEL* 60, pp. 548-549; IV,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 569; cf. also *Contra Iulianum* II,4, *PL* 44, 674; II,11, *PL* 44, 681 (with regard to Ambrose); II,37, *PL* 44, 701; *Opus imperfectum* I,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 10; IV,109, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 117.

[321] *Opus imperfectum* I,59, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 57: "Non ego hanc in Italiam, quod uos gemere dicitis, eructaui, sed potius ab isto episcopo Italiae hanc praedicante et docente lauacrum regenerationis accepi."

If I am a disciple of Mani, then Ambrose is also one; but he is not",[322] for he held anti-Manichean positions.[323] If I, Augustine, am in line with Ambrose, why do you accuse me of Manicheism?[324] With his accusations, Julian makes of these many great men false defenders and doctors of the Catholic faith.[325] Some of them had never heard of Manicheism![326] It is monstrous and crazy to suggest that the Manichean error had already deceived Cyprian long before the name of Mani had even been heard in Roman territory.[327] But these men were, instead, standing in the oldest tradition of the Church.[328] Augustine himself does not need the help of Mani or Faustus, for his position is not only supported by the prophets and the apostles but also by his predecessors in the Church, very sound in faith, very sharp in mind, very rich in learning, and renowned in reputation.[329] Augustine stresses that he

[322] *Opus imperfectum* I,66, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 65: "Si enim ego hinc sum discipulus Manichei, hoc est et ille; non est autem hoc ille (...)"; IV,88, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 91: "Vbi cernis esse consequens, ut si ego propter hanc sententiam sum Manichaeus, sit et Ambrosius; quia uero ille non est, neminem faciat uel ostendat ista sententia Manichaeum."; cf. also I,48, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 39-40; II,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 165; II,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 169; II,21, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 176; II,31, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 185; II,164, p. 285; II,207, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 318: "Doctores catholici, non Manichei deceptores (...)"; II,208, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 319; IV,75, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 77; IV,113, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 113; IV,118, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 130; IV,122, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 141.

[323] *Contra Iulianum* I,44, *PL* 44, 671; *Opus imperfectum* IV,109, pp. 116-117.

[324] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,15, *CSEL* 42, pp. 267: "Si ergo illum Manicheum dicere non audetis, nos, cum in eadem causa eadem sententia fidem catholicam defendamus, cur dicitis Manicheos?"; see also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,33, *CSEL* 60, p. 569: "Vnde apparet istos doctores catholicos longe a Manicheorum sensibus alienos. Et tamen asserunt originale peccatum (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* IV,109, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 117: "Quod ergo credit Ambrosius, hoc et ego; quod autem Manicheus, nec ille nec ego. Quid est quod tu niteris me separare ab Ambrosio et coniungere Manicheo? (...) cur non ambos a Manicheis dignaris abiungere?"; cf. also IV,108, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 116. See also DASSMANN, *"Tam Ambrosius quam Cyprianus"*, p. 362.

[325] *Contra Iulianum* I,36, *PL* 44, 666.

[326] *Contra Iulianum* III,32, *PL* 44,719. In *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, *CSEL* 42, p. 308, Augustine explicitly refers here to Cyprian: "(...) numquid et gloriosissimae coronae Cyprianus dicetur ab aliquo non solum fuisse, sed vel esse potuisse Manicheus, cum prius iste sit passus, quam illa in orbe Romano pestis adparuit?"

[327] *Contra Iulianum* III,31, *PL* 44, 718.

[328] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, *CSEL* 42, p. 308.

[329] *Opus imperfectum* IV,72, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 74-75; cf. also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,51, *CSEL* 42, pp. 307-308 (with regard to Ambrose and Cyprian); *Opus imperfectum* I,6, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 9; IV,108, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 116. It is interesting to see that Julian's argumentation was very much in the same line. He also claimed that he was in line with Scripture, prophets, evangelists, apostles and catholic thinkers known for their "catholica sanitas", in his case John Chrysostom, Basil, and Theodore of Mopsuestia; see *Ad Florum* III,111, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 432.

stays in a continuous line:[330] before Augustine, there was Ambrose who was not a Manichee, before Ambrose there were Hilary and Gregory, who were certainly no Manichees, before them there were Cyprian and many others, who, again, were no Manichees.[331] Not without exaggeration he can speak of "meus est Cyprianus, meus est Hilarius, meus est Ambrosius, meus est Gregorius, meus est Basilius, meus est Iohannes Constantinopolitanus; hi omnes et alii socii eorum eadem sentientes, quos commemorare longum est, mei sunt".[332]

Using several times, like Julian, the metaphor of a fight, Augustine states that Ambrose's Catholic faith will defeat in the name and the power of Christ both the Manicheans and the Pelagians,[333] and I with him.[334] Therefore, both Mani and Julian, confronted with Scripture (John) and tradition (Ambrose), whould be better off silent.[335] It would be better for Julian to learn from Ambrose where the evil of carnal concupiscence is coming, in order not to help the Manichees, as he is doing now,[336] while slandering the Catholics.[337] The Catholic bishops, indeed, are able to give an adequate answer to the question where evil is coming from, an answer that Julian cannot give.[338]

In a passage, full of irony, Augustine wonders whether Ambrose, if he were still alive in those days, might come to realize that he was

[330] For the latter, to whom Gregory will be opposed, see *Opus imperfectum* I,69, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 76.

[331] *Opus imperfectum* I,117, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 134: "Ante me erat Ambrosius, qui non erat Manicheus, ante ipsum Hilarius, Gregorius, ante hos Cyprianus et ceteri, quos commemorare longum est, qui non erant Manichei."; cf. also I,9, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 10.

[332] See *Opus imperfectum* I,52, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 47-48.

[333] *Opus imperfectum* III,178, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 480; cf. also III,181, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 481; III,187, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 490: "(...) quoniam catholica fide in Christi nomine atque uirtute utrosque uincit Ambrosius."; II,213, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 504: "Non esse Ambrosium Manicheum, qui fidei catholicae inuictissimus et Manicheos prostrauit et uos (...)"; IV,112, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 120; see also V,5, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 173; V,41, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 243: "tuus destructor"; V,43, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 246-247; VI,8, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 305: "Quo telo ineuitabili et insuperabili ueritatis, et Manicheus obtruncatur, et tu."; VI,37, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 445; cf. already *Contra Iulianum* II,5, *PL* 44, 675.

[334] *Opus imperfectum* VI,14, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 334-335.

[335] *Opus imperfectum* IV,23, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 25.

[336] *Opus imperfectum* IV,28, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 28; IV,42, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 43; IV,50, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 56; IV,64, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 69; IV,70, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 74; V,20, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 202; VI,6, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 299; VI,8, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 304; VI,14, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 331ff. See also A. Trapè, *Un celebre testo de Sant'Agostino sull "Ignoranza e la difficoltà" (Retract. I,9,6) e l'"Opus imperfectum Contra Iulianum"*, in *Augustinus Magister* II, Paris, 1954, pp. 795-803.

[337] *Opus imperfectum* IV,56, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 62.

[338] *Opus imperfectum* VI,14, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 330-331.

a Manichee, while listening to Pelagius and hearing that the struggle between flesh and spirit was not, as he had taught, the result of Adam's transgression, something he would no longer dare to say "sub uobis magistris".[339] Obeying Julian, he would have forbidden the rites of exhortation and exsufflation and would have been expelled from the Catholic Church, together with Julian.[340] Evidently, this would never happen: if Ambrose were still alive, he would react even more vehemently and authoritatively than Augustine "pro catholica fide et pro Dei gratia uel aequitate".[341]

Since Julian called Augustine a Punic debater, Augustine not only will refer to Cyprian – he is the real Punic debater, not me, Augustine reacts[342] –, but also to the other doctors. Only one of the holy men comes from Africa, the others from elsewhere: if the Manicheans would have defiled the Church through these holy bishops of God and renowned doctors, which Church gave birth to Julian?[343] How can Julian accuse these men, who are on so many things in consensus with each other, of Manicheism?[344] Stop to accuse us of Manicheism in order not to injure the venerable martyr Cyprian,[345] who, together with his colleagues at the time, *prouisione diuina* through a counciliar decision already condemned the Pelagians who would come years later.[346] Long before the Manichean pestilence came to Africa, Cyprian already confessed the doctrine of original sin,[347] teaching what he had learned in the African Church.

However, instead of constantly accusing Augustine of Manicheism, he should better join Augustine in following Ambrose,[348] for he, with his colleagues, is standing, like Augustine, in the Catholic

[339] *Opus imperfectum* IV,114, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 123-124; similar procedure but now adapted to Julian in IV,120, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 135.

[340] *Opus imperfectum* IV,120, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 135.

[341] *Opus imperfectum* IV,114, *CSEL* 85,2, pp. 124-125.

[342] *Contra Iulianum* III,32, *PL* 44, 719.

[343] *Contra Iulianum* III,32, *PL* 44, 719.

[344] *Opus imperfectum* I,55, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 52: "Numquid Manicheus fuit iste Reticius?"

[345] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,21, *CSEL* 60, p. 544; cf. also IV,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 569.

[346] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,23, *CSEL* 60, p. 546; with regard to Augustine's respect for counciliar decisions, see H.-J. SIEBEN, *Die Konzilsidee der Alte Kirche*, Paderborn, 1979, pp. 68-102.

[347] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,24, *CSEL* 60, p. 549: "(...) antequam terras nostras uel tenuissimus odor Manicheae pestilentiae tetigisset (...)".

[348] *Opus imperfectum* V,30, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 229: "Desine ergo mihi magistrum apponere Manicheum, sed mecum potius sequere Ambrosium (...)".

truth.[349] Augustine cannot understand that Pelagius and Caelestius might have such a great influence on Julian that he dares to label these judges and defenders of the Catholic faith Manichees. Because of his denial of the doctrine of original sin, he is a stronger and mightier enemy of Christ's cross and God's grace than of people like Ambrose.[350] In any case, even if Julian might dare to call one of these men Manichees, he certainly will not dare to give this name to Christ.[351]

Just as Julian showed his Italian "nationalistic" feelings, Augustine does not fear to show that he is proud of his African background and his African predecessor Cyprian. When Julian suggested that the Catholic Church was ravished by the Manichean pirates from Africa,[352] Augustine reverses the accusation. He first stresses that Catholics react against Manichees, Donatists, and other heretics or enemies of the Christian and Catholic name in Africa.[353] He describes the Pelagian heresy as a *transmarina pestilentia*, a robbery against which he puts Cyprian, through whom he wants to defend the Catholic faith against the vain and profane novelty of the Pelagian error.[354] Indeed, it is Julian himself who spoke against the most ancient Catholic faith.[355] Using military vocabulary (like Julian), he claims that Julian constructs new machines and prepares new attacks against the walls of the most ancient truth. I am not, as you say, the Punic debater, but Cyprian who will punish you for your impious doctrine.[356]

[349] *Contra Iulianum* II,5, *PL* 44, 675: "(...) cum hoc dicere me uideas, quod ille dixit (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* IV,122, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 143: "Ego tamen in hac causa, in qua tibi de originali peccato multum uideor detestandus, et Manicheo potius coaequandus, cum Ambrosio sum, uelis nolis, quem Iouinianus Manicheum dicebat (...)"; see also VI,41, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 464 (with regard to the carnal concupiscence as result of the fall of the first man).

[350] *Opus imperfectum* II,56, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 395.

[351] Cf. *Contra Iulianum* I,13, *PL* 44, 648 (with regard to Innocent).

[352] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 51, *CCSL* 88, p. 352.

[353] *Contra Iulianum* III,31, *PL* 44, 718.

[354] *Contra Iulianum* III,31, *PL* 44, 718: "Contra uos autem, quia nobis estis pestilentia transmarina, Christo saluatore uincenda, ideo ne latrocinamur ex Africa, quia unum martyrem hinc opponimus Cyprianum, per quem probemus antiquam nos defendere fidem catholicam, contra uestri erroris uanam profanamque nouitatem?" On the use of the term pestilence as a polemical motive, see OPELT, *Die Polemik in der christlichen lateinischen Literatur*, p. 158.

[355] *Contra Iulianum* III,31, *PL* 44, 718-719: "(...) contra antiquissimam catholicam fidem (...)".

[356] *Contra Iulianum* III,32, *PL* 719: "Sed quantumlibet tergiuerseris, o haeresis Pelagiana, quae contra muros antiquissimae ueritatis nouas construis machinas, nouas moliris insidias: Poenus disputator, quod me contumeliose tuus defensor appellat; Poenus, inquam, disputator, non ego, sed Cyprianus Poenus, te hoc uulnere poenus immolat, et poenam scelerato ex dogmate sumit."; cf. also *Opus imperfectum* I,7,

Augustine does not believe that, as suggested by Julian, his faith is to be compared to a small Numidian shield (*caetra Numidica*). It is a genuinely complete shield of truth! With this shield, the Punic[357] Cyprian, an outstanding soldier of Christ, was already armed against the Pelagians. When Julian ironically called Augustine the most notable debater who, by the steps of his Punic dialectics, had destroyed judgment, Augustine will refer to Cyprian, a Punic person in whom Julian will not dare to mock Punic dialectics.[358] Julian should realize that, while barking against the Punic bishop and martyr Cyprian, he is attacking the most solidly grounded faith of the Church for which this martyr shed his blood.[359] Quite evidently, Julian's hinting at the Punic wars did not escape Augustine, but he was not really impressed by it. Because Julian was born in Apulia, he might think that he surpasses the Punic people, but he will never surpass them by his mind. Julian should better flee the punishments (*poena*) than the Punic (*Poenus*) people. Indeed, he will never escape the Punic opponents as long as he trusts in his own virtue, for the Punic Cyprian claimed that we must boast over nothing for nothing is ours.[360]

V. Conclusion

The complaints and accusations as formulated by Julian were serious ones: Augustine's doctrine was foolish, an innovation, supported by the common folk, inspired by Manicheism, missing any rational plausibility. It was an African doctrine, introduced by force in Italy and ruining the Church in the West. The promoter of this doctrine, Augustine, had misused the common folk to stir up a revolt against the intellectuals such as Julian and his companions.

Augustine, in his reply, gives priority to Scripture, but immediately adds that the doctors he appeals to are faithful to it and develop

CSEL 85,1, p. 9; VI,23, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 378. See also DASSMANN, *"Tam Ambrosius quam Cyprianus"*, p. 160.

[357] Augustine clearly distinguishes between his own Numidian background and the Punic Cyprian: "(...) non quidem Numida, sed tamen Poenus ille Cyprianus (...)"; *Opus imperfectum* VI,6, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 299.

[358] *Opus imperfectum* I,72, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 85.

[359] *Opus imperfectum* I,106, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 125.

[360] *Opus imperfectum* VI,18, *CSEL* 85,2, p. 353: "Non enim quia te Apulia genuit, ideo Poenos uincendos existimes gente, quos non potes mente. Poenas potius fuge, non Poenos: nam disputatores Poenos non potes fugere, quamdiu te delectat in tua uirtute confidere; et beatus enim Cyprianus Poenus fuit, qui dixit, in nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit."

their ideas in line with Scripture. The faith of these Fathers can be qualified as historically continuous and geographically unanimous. Augustine clearly motivates his choice of the judges: some function as guarantees of the historical continuity (Ireneus, Reticius, Olympius), many are familiar with heresies (Irenaeus, Cyprian, Reticius, Olympius, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, the bishops of Diospolis, Jerome), or are recognized as great authorities by Pelagius and Julian (Cyprian, Ambrose, Hilary, Basil, John Chrysostom). What binds them all is their unanimity with regard to the essentials of the faith. Although Augustine is proud on his African origin, and gives a considerable place to Cyprian because of the antiquity of his faith, for personal and strategic reasons he mostly invokes the Italian Ambrose, the compatriot of Julian, but spiritual father of Augustine. Quite a number of the judges of the court do not really function in Augustine's argumentation. One might think here of Ireneus and Olympius. But even the bishops of Diospolis, who set free Pelagius, receive less and less attention from Augustine. Others receive an introductory praise that is disproportionate with the factual use Augustine makes of them. This is clearly the case for Innocent and Jerome. With regard to Jerome, one can even think of a kind of distance from the side of Augustine. By inserting Basil and Chrysostom in his list of judges, Augustine clearly wants to prove that they stay at his side and that Julian uncorrectly appealed to them in defense of his own case. With regard to that Eastern tradition, it should be repeated that Augustine mainly is dependent on translations.

Although Augustine is of the opinion that Julian, with his desire for a court, consisting of a few, learned people, is looking for the wrong judges, he himself makes great efforts in order to show that his own court of judges, these few doctors, meet the standards as requested by Julian. In doing so, he pays much attention to prove the antiquity of the faith, its historical continuity, and its geographical universality: this sound faith is spread all over the world and held by the whole Church. Furthermore, Augustine endlessly repeats that his *eruditi* learned men taught what they had learned: they were children of the Church who became Fathers and contributed to the growth of the Church. Augustine emphasizes the great consensus between these Fathers, because they were inspired by and in agreement with Scripture and the Catholic faith. Therefore, they can share Julian's position with regard to the goodness of creation, marriage, God's justice, and still hold the doctrine of original sin. For all these reasons, their doctrine cannot be evaluated as stupid, impious. The accusation that it was introduced through force is meaningless.

Augustine stresses that Julian does, willingly or unwillingly, not know his dossier and that his condemnation is, from all angles, justified.

Julian's depreciation of the multitude is used by Augustine against Julian's pretensions: it is a proof of the strength of the doctrine, and the weakness of Julian's pretentions about his own intellectual capacities. Augustine takes care to stress the link between the multitude and their bishops. Morover, the multitude rejects the Pelagians because their doctrine is not able to give the right answers. Finally, if some of the common folk are weak and unfamiliar with Scripture, it is precisely for that reason that one should warn against the deceiver Julian! However, it should be said that Augustine's view of the multitude is not univocal.

At length, Augustine answers the accusation of still being an African Manichean. If this was so, one could not explain the success of the Catholic faith with the multitude. If this was the case, one should already qualify doctors, living long before Manicheism entered Africa, as Manichean. One might think here especially of Cyprian, who died as a martyr for his orthodox faith. Augustine repeats regularly that he has found this faith in Italy and that he is dependent upon doctors from all over the world. His weapons are Scripture and tradition. On the contrary, Julian, by his critique of the doctrine of original sin, is the real helper of the Manicheans.

Augustine also turns Julian's complaints about the African pestilence against the Pelagians: their heresy is a transmarine pestilence, but the Africans are well armed against these pretentious Italian invaders and attackers of the ancient faith.

In sum, Augustine uses all kinds of arguments in order to make clear that he and not Julian is the son, promoter and protector of the ancient, strongly-rooted, Christian, Catholic, orthodox truth.

M. LAMBERIGTS

AUGUSTINUS UND SEIN VERHÄLTNIS ZU PELAGIUS: EINE RELECTURE DER QUELLEN

Otto Wermelinger zur Emeritierung gewidmet

Abstract

The article analyses the asymmetrical relationship between Pelagius and Augustine by first reconstructing their correspondence and then focussing on the ancient concept of 'friendship' (*amicitia*): Augustine constructed Pelagius first as a friend, then as a heretic. Pelagius constructed Augustine as a friend before breaking off contact. Augustine used the concept of friendship in order to create space for a possible conversion of Pelagius. Pelagius wanted to claim Augustine as member of a network of 'friends'. The strategies of both Augustine and Pelagius failed: Neither could Augustine convert Pelagius, nor could Pelagius profit from being friend of the friends of Augustine. The ancient concept of 'friendship' was inadequate to deal with the conflicts created by the new discourse about heresy and orthodoxy.

Thema der nachfolgenden Ausführungen ist das persönliche Verhältnis zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius. Es soll analysiert werden, wie dieses Verhältnis im spätantiken Kontext von beiden Protagonisten verstanden und 'konstruiert' wurde, und wie es zerbrach. Das Verhältnis beider war, das kann man im historischen Rückblick festhalten — auf jeden Fall stark asymmetrisch. Augustinus wurde Pelagius schliesslich zum Schicksal, er zerstörte seine Reputation — was umgekehrt nicht zutrifft. Augustinus konstruierte nach und nach Pelagius als Ketzer — wie Pelagius Augustinus konstruierte, können wir nur aus den wenigen Hinweisen erschliessen, die Augustinus uns hinterlassen hat. Doch so, als von Augustinus konstruierter Ketzer blieb auch der Name des Pelagius der Nachwelt im Gedächtnis erhalten. Augustinus und Pelagius — posthum blieben sie für das kollektive theologische Gedächtnis der abendländischen Christenheit verbunden, überdauerten die Zeiten als theologische These und Antithese. Es gilt zu verstehen, warum, es gilt, die innere Dynamik der Beziehung zwischen diesen beiden spätantiken christlichen Theologen freizulegen. Zu diesem Zweck müssen wir das Dossier Augustinus / Pelagius noch einmal öffnen, müssen noch einmal eine genauere relecture der Quellen vornehmen, müssen die

Brüche, die Unstimmigkeiten, die Ambivalenzen registrieren. Das soll im Folgenden geschehen — es ist klar, daß im begrenzten Umfang dieses Aufsatzes das Thema nicht erschöpft werden kann. Und alles in allem werden meine Ausführungen nur einige Anmerkungen und Notizen — gelegentlich mit Fragezeichen versehen — zur großen und nicht überholten Monographie Otto Wermelingers, zu *Rom und Pelagius,* darstellen.

1. Die Darstellung in *De gestis Pelagii* 46

Das Dossier sei zunächst dort wieder geöffnet, wo sich Augustinus am ausführlichsten über sein Verhältnis zu Pelagius äußert, nämlich in seiner Schrift *De gestis Pelagii.*[1] *De gestis Pelagii* ist wahrscheinlich Ende 416 verfasst worden: Zuvor hatte Augustinus endlich von Kyrill von Alexandrien das Protokoll der Synode von Diospolis, die Pelagius im Dezember 415 freigesprochen hatte, erhalten. Erst seit der Auffindung der ep.4* (Divjak) wissen wir von Kyrills Rolle als Informant des Augustinus. Die von Otto Wermelinger schon in *Rom und Pelagius* geäußerte Vermutung, dass Augustinus das Protokoll jedenfalls nicht von Johannes von Jerusalem erlangte, den er darum gebeten hatte, wurde durch den späteren Fund bestätigt.[2] *De gestis Pelagii* ist die erste Schrift, in der Augustinus deutlich macht, daß aus seiner Sicht das Verhältnis zu Pelagius zerbrochen ist. Wermelinger hat die neue Qualität, welche die Konstruktion des Ketzer Pelagius in *De gestis Pelagii* erreicht, präzise bezeichnet, wenn er davon redet, dass *De gestis Pelagii* das Bild des Pelagius als eines sittlich hochstehenden Mannes zerstören will.[3]

[1] CSEL 42, 51-122. Vgl. die deutsche Übersetzung von Berthold Altaner in: Aurelius Augustinus. Schriften gegen die Pelagianer II, Würzburg 1964, 198-319.

[2] O.Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius (Päpste und Papsttum 7), Stuttgart 1975, 109. — Einige der folgenden Ausführungen entwickeln Überlegungen, die ich erstmals anlässlich der Rekonstruktion der Pelagiusschrift De natura skizzierte, s. W.Löhr, Pelagius' Schrift De natura: Rekonstruktion und Analyse, in: Recherches Augustiniennes 31, 1999, 235-94. Vgl. auch W.Löhr, Pelagius — Portrait of a Christian Teacher in Late Antiquity (The Alexander Souter Memorial Lectures on Late Antiquity 1), Aberdeen 2007; idem, Das Verhältnis zwischen Pelagius und Augustinus und das theologische Anliegen des Pelagius, in: V.H.Drecoll (Hrsg.), Augustinus Handbuch, Tübingen 2007, 190-7. — Zu Pelagius, vgl. auch Y.-M.Duval, Pélage en son temps: données chronologiques nouvelles pour une présentation nouvelle, in: Studia Patristica 38, Leuven 2001, 95-118.

[3] O.Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius, 110: „In De gest.Pel. wird das Pelagiusbild zerstört, wie es uns aus De pecc.mer. et rem. bekannt ist. Pelagius ist nicht mehr jener sittlich hochstehende Mann von hervorragend christlicher Lebenshaltung."

Nachdem Augustinus in den cc. 2 – 45 von *De gestis Pelagii* die Äußerungen des Pelagius auf der Synode von Diospolis aufgrund des vorliegenden Synodalprotokolls ausführlich kommentiert hat, führt er in den cc.45-59 Material an, dass den Verdacht erhärten soll, dass Pelagius und seiner Rechtgläubigkeit nicht zu trauen ist. In den cc. 60-65 bilanziert Augustinus das Urteil der Synode von Diospolis: Er führt auf, welche Lehren aufgrund dieses Urteils als bestätigt, und welche als verworfen festgestellt werden können. Im letzten Kapitel (c.66) berichtet Augustinus über den Überfall einiger Anhänger des Pelagius auf das Hieronymuskloster in Bethlehem. Der Vorfall datiert bereits in das Frühjahr 416,[4] Augustinus erwähnt ihn in *De gestis Pelagii*, um — wie ebenfalls bereits von Otto Wermelinger festgestellt wurde[5] — Pelagius anzuschwärzen.

Im Folgenden sei der Fokus auf cc. 46-53 von *De gestis Pelagii*, dem Kernstück von Augustinus' Versuch, die Reputation des Pelagius zu zerstören.

Hier gilt es zunächst zu notieren, dass für Augustinus nach seiner Darstellung in *De gestis Pelagii* die Überreichung der Pelagiusschrift *De natura* durch zwei Schüler des Pelagius einen Wendepunkt seiner Beziehung zu Pelagius markiert.

In c.46[6] berichtet Augustinus im Rückblick über die Zeit vor diesem Ereignis: Als Pelagius noch in Rom weilte, hatte der Bischof von Hippo Lobenswertes über ihn gehört. Später dann (*postea*) — aber offenbar noch während der Periode des Romaufenthalts — habe Augustinus das Gerücht erreicht, dass Pelagius sich gegen die Gnade Gottes ausgesprochen habe (*quod aduersus gratiam Dei disputaret*). Dies wurde Augustinus von Leuten erzählt, denen er vertrauen konnte. Wahrscheinlich spielt Augustinus hier auf eine Episode an, die er viele Jahre später, nämlich in *De dono perseuerantiae* 20,53[7] genauer erzählen wird: Augustinus war von einem anonymen afrikanischen Bischofskollegen erzählt worden, daß das von ihm zitierte Gebet des Augustinus in Conf. 10 (*Da quod iube et iube quod uis*)[8] von Pelagius heftig kritisiert worden war. Der Bischofskollege könnte nach der attraktiven Hypothese A.Solignacs Evodius von Uzalis gewesen sein.[9]

[4] Das wird durch Augustinus, sermo 348A,7 erwiesen, s. F.Dolbeau, Le sermon 348A de saint Augustin contre Pélage. Édition du texte intégral, in: Recherches Augustiniennes 28, 1995, 57 (Text), 47-8 (Diskussion).

[5] Otto Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius, 110.

[6] CSEL 42, 100-1.

[7] PL 45, 1026.

[8] Confessiones 10,40; 45; 60 (CCL 27, 176,2.9; 179,52; 188,3-4). Vgl. dazu C.Mayer, Augustinus Lexikon 2, Basel 1996-2002, 211-3.

[9] A.Solignac, Autour du De natura de Pélage, in: Valeurs dans le stoicisme. Du Portique à nos jours (Mélanges en l'honneur de M. le Doyen Spanneut), Lille 1993, 181f.

Trifft dies zu, ist die Episode ungefähr auf 404 / 405 nChr. zu datieren. Augustinus betont, dass er damals darauf wartete, schriftliches Material von Pelagius in die Hände zu bekommen, damit dieser sich nicht herausreden könnte, wenn Augustinus sich daran machte, ihn zu widerlegen.

Pelagius, so fährt Augustinus in *De gestis Pelagii* c.46 dann fort, ging in Hippo an Land, als Augustinus gerade nicht anwesend war. O.Perler hat wahrscheinlich gemacht, dass diese Landung des Pelagius auf den Herbst 410 zu datieren ist (Pelagius gehörte zu denen, die aus Rom vor den Goten geflohen waren); Augustinus nahm in dieser Zeit vielleicht einen Erholungsurlaub.[10] In Hippo, so Augustinus, habe Pelagius nicht gegen die Gnade Stellung genommen, und sei dann auch schneller als gedacht weitergereist. Im Frühjahr 411 weilte Augustinus in Karthago und war mit der Vorbereitung des Kolloquiums mit den Donatisten sehr beschäftigt (*occupatissimus fui*). Während dieser Zeit sah Augustinus Pelagius ein- oder zweimal (*postmodum eius faciem Carthagine quantum recolo, semel vel iterum uidi*). Was ist damit gemeint? Eine flüchtige Begegnung auf der Strasse? Wenn man Othmar Perler folgt, so hat Augustinus im Mai und Juni 411 mindestens dreimal in Karthago gepredigt[11] — vielleicht hat er Pelagius bei diesen Anlässen getroffen.

Jedenfalls blieb Pelagius auch in Karthago nur kurz und eilte von dort bald nach Übersee (*ad transmarinas*), d.h. nach Palästina, weiter — anders als die mit Pelagius befreundeten römischen Aristokraten Albina, Pinianus und Melania. Augustinus fährt fort:

> *„Interea per ora eorum qui eius discipuli ferebantur dogmata ista feruebant, ita ut Caelestius ad ecclesiasticum iudicium perueniret et reportaret dignam sua peruersitate sententiam."*[12]

Der Satz wird mit dem unbestimmten *interea* eingeleitet, dass wohl so zu verstehen ist, dass eine gewisse Gleichzeitigkeit der im folgenden Satz geschilderten Aktion mit den vorher beschriebenen Ereignissen ausgedrückt werden soll: Das Verbreiten bestimmter Lehren durch die Schüler des Pelagius geschah möglicherweise schon vor der eiligen Abreise des Pelagius nach Palästina, die Verurteilung des Caelestius durch eine Synode in Karthago im Winter 411/2 erst danach.

[10] So O.Perler, Les voyages de Saint Augustin, Paris 1969, 280-6.
[11] O.Perler, Les voyages de Saint Augustin, Paris 1969, 286-7, 290.
[12] CSEL 42, 100,20-3.

Augustinus war an der Aktion gegen Caelestius offenbar unbeteiligt. Er betont, daß er es zum damaligen Zeitpunkt für besser hielt, diese Menschen (d.h. Pelagius und seine Schüler) ohne Namensnennung anzugreifen, d.h. in Schriften und Predigten die Lehre, nicht Personen zu bekämpfen.

Soweit das c.46. Die Erzählung suggeriert das Bild eines Pelagius, der nicht zu greifen ist, der sich entzieht. Bemerkenswert ist, daß Augustinus angibt, daß er schon vor der Ankunft des Pelagius in Afrika nach Material suchte, aufgrund dessen er gegen ihn argumentieren könnte. Augustinus betont aber auch, daß er Pelagius persönlich schonen wollte.

De gestis Pelagii 46 präpariert die Szene für die cc.47-50, in denen Augustinus ausführlich auf Timasius und Jakobus eingeht, junge aristokratische Asketen und Schüler des Pelagius aus Rom, die Augustinus die Pelagiusschrift *De natura* übergeben hatten. In c.47 behandelt Augustinus zunächst diese Übergabe von *De natura*; er charakterisiert den Inhalt der Schrift und betont wiederum, daß er in *De natura et gratia* den Namen des Pelagius nicht erwähnt habe, um die *amicitia* mit ihm zu bewahren.

Augustinus fährt in seinem Bericht fort, indem er auf ein Anathema eingeht, dass Pelagius vor der Synode von Diospolis prononciert hatte:

„Anathematizo illos qui sic tenent aut aliquando tenuerunt."[13]

Augustinus kritisiert die von Pelagius für das Anathema gewählte Formulierung: Da Pelagius auch diejenigen verdammt, die in der Vergangenheit die Irrlehre vertreten haben, impliziere er ungerechterweise auch jene, die wie Timasius und Jakobus der Irrlehre mittlerweile entsagt haben. Ja, so meint Augustinus, da Pelagius es selber war, der in der Vergangenheit Timasius und Jakobus zur Irrlehre anleitete, dürfte er das Anathema womöglich gar nicht ernst gemeint haben. Wie wird er nun Timasius und Jakobus noch ins Angesicht blicken können?

Augustinus fährt in c.48 fort, indem er den Dankesbrief der beiden jungen Römer zitiert, den diese ihm nach der Lektüre von *De natura et gratia* geschrieben haben. Augustinus präsentiert Timasius und Jakobus als mögliche Vorbilder des Pelagius (c.49): Nicht nur haben sie sich vom Irrtum bekehrt, sondern sie äußerten in ihrem an Augustinus gerichteten Brief auch deutlich den Wunsch, daß auch

[13] CSEL 42, 101,17-8.

Pelagius von seinem Irrtum geheilt werden möge — während Pelagius sie in Diospolis mit einem Anathema verurteilt hatte![14]

Des Augustinus Kontrastierung des pelagischen Diospolisanathemas mit dem Dankesbrief der beiden Pelagiusschüler ist ein Stück effektiver Polemik. Augustinus will suggerieren, dass er und die beiden Pelagiusschüler Pelagius weiterhin wie einen Freund (*amicus*) behandeln: er bemerkt, dass auch die Schüler Pelagius nicht namentlich erwähnt wünschten, damit der Irrtum sterben könnte, während die Freundschaft weiterlebt (*ut uiuente amicitia error potius moreretur amicorum)*. Die polemische Strategie des Augustinus soll vergessen machen, dass es eigentlich Augustinus und die asketischen Pelagiusschüler Timasius und Jakobus waren, welche gegen die Konventionen einer Freundschaft in gröbster Weise verstiessen:

Timasius und Jakobus waren, so lässt Augustinus Hieronymus in ep.19*wissen, als Schüler Pelagius sehr eng verbunden.[15] Eben sie aber hatten an Pelagius durch die Auslieferung der unbetitelten und unautorisierten Schrift *De natura* zwecks Widerlegung einen Verrat begangen.[16] Pelagius hat sich auch in der Folgezeit nie öffentlich zu dieser Schrift bekannt. Als er 417 in einem an Innozenz von Rom adressierten Schreiben seine Werke aufzählt, erwähnt er *De natura* nicht. Offenbar beklagte er sich in diesem Schreiben auch über Werke, die ihm unkorrigiert gestohlen wurden;[17] er befand sich hier in guter Gesellschaft, waren doch zB Tertullian und Augustinus Opfer ähnlicher Diebstähle geworden.[18] Das, was Pelagius allenfalls

[14] CSEL 42,102-4.

[15] Augustinus, ep19*,3: „Erant autem auditores eius multumque carissimi." (BA 46B, 288/290).

[16] O.Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius, 39.

[17] Augustinus, De gratia Christia et de peccato originali II,2: „quod dicit inemendatos sibi fuisse subreptos." (CSEL 42, 125-6)

[18] Tertullian, Contra Marcionem 1,1 (hier geht der Diebstahl der Apostasie des Diebes voraus). Vgl. auch die Augustinus, ep. 11* (BA 46B, 184-229) geschilderte Räuberpistole: Auch hier wird die Intimität einer priszillianistischen Gruppe, die sich für apokryphe Literatur interessiert, durch einen Buchraub gesprengt, vgl. dazu W.Löhr, Religious Truth, Dissimulation, and Deception in Late Antique Christianity, in: K.Pollmann (ed.), Double Standards in the Ancient and Medieval World, Göttingen 2000, 293-5. Augustinus selbst war sehr empfindlich gegenüber Schülern, die seine Schriften ohne sein Wissen vorzeitig zirkulierten; als ihm solches bei der Abfassung von De trinitate zustiess, wollte er die Angelegenheit sogar in einem eigenen Büchlein behandeln; schließlich besann er sich aber eines Besseren, vgl. Augustinus, Retractationes 2,15,1. Über De natura sagt Augustinus in den Retractationes nur, dass es in seine Hände gelangt sei (2,42:„uenit...in manus meas"); für diese — im Fall von De natura verharmlosende — Formulierung, vgl. auch Retractationes 1,22; 2,53. Augustinus bleibt sich bewusst, dass Pelagius eine auf De natura basierende Argumentation anfechten kann, vgl. Augustinus, ep. 179,10 (CSEL 44, 697).

im vertrauten Schüler / Freundeszirkel zur Diskussion gestellt hatte, war öffentlich gemacht worden. Eine nähere Analyse der Pelagiusschrift *De natura* zeigt überdies, daß Pelagius in ihr Argumente austestet; häufig werden Einwände gegen die Position des Pelagius zitiert und widerlegt. Die Schrift macht den Eindruck, Debatten um die Position des Pelagius wiederzugeben oder auf solche Debatten vorzubereiten.

Den Verrat, dessen Augustinus Pelagius anklagt, hatten in Wirklichkeit in massiver Weise die Schüler des Pelagius an ihrem Lehrer begangen — unterstützt von Augustinus. Selbst wenn die konventionelle Verdammungsformel des Pelagius in Diospolis im Sinne einer Distanzierung von den Schülern zu verstehen sein sollte (was zu bezweifeln ist), wäre Pelagius dazu vollkommen berechtigt gewesen, war er doch zu diesem Zeitpunkt aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach bereits über deren Verrat / Abfall informiert.

Doch ist die Attacke des Augustinus gegen Pelagius damit noch nicht am Ziel. Pelagius hatte sich vor der Synode von Diospolis auf Testimonien von Freunden berufen, darunter auch ein kurzes Billet seitens des Augustinus, in dem dieser Pelagius als Freund zu adressieren scheint (Augustinus, ep.146[19]). Die Vorlage der Briefe vor der Synode (vgl. *De gestis Pelagii* 45[20]) sollte Pelagius als attestiertes Mitglied eines Netzwerkes von einflussreichen christlichen Freunden präsentieren, es sollte zeigen, dass er integriert war, und dass es Leute gab, die ihm vertrauten. J. den Boeft hat überzeugend dargelegt, daß das Vorweisen derartiger Empfehlungsbriefe durchaus im Einklang mit den gültigen Konventionen war.[21] Den Boeft meinte aber, daß die ep.146 nicht als ein derartiger Empfehlungsbrief gemeint war und daß das Verhalten des Pelagius auf der Synode deshalb einen schlimmen Fauxpas darstellte.[22] Zur Begründung zitiert Den Boeft als Parallele eine Rede Ciceros,[23] in dem dieser einen vergleichbaren Missbrauch eines Höflichkeitsbillets durch Marcus Antonius geisselt. Ob die Einschätzung den Boefts korrekt ist, ist schwer zu sagen, da Augustinus die Passage aus den Akten von Diospolis, welche die von Pelagius vorgewiesenen Testimonien betrifft, nicht wörtlich zitiert.

[19] Apud Augustinus, De gestis Pelagii 52 (CSEL 42, 105-6).
[20] CSEL 42, 99.
[21] J. den Boeft, Augustine's letter to Pelagius, in: J. den Boeft / J. van Oort, Augustiniana Traiectiana, Paris 1987, 73-87.
[22] J. den Boeft, Augustine's letter, 77.
[23] J. den Boeft, Augustine's letter 73 mit Verweis auf Cicero, Phil. 2,7-10.

In *De gestis Pelagii* will Augustinus jedenfalls auch in diesem Punkt die Reputation des Pelagius angreifen. Dazu bietet er eine Exegese seines Billets (51[24]): Die Anreden (*dominus, dilectissimus, desideratissimus*) sind laut Augustinus nicht als Indizien besonderer freundschaftlicher Wertschätzung zu lesen; vielmehr sind sie Höflichkeitsformeln, die er auch gegenüber Nichtchristen gebrauchen würde: Der Christ schuldet allen Menschen zur Erlangung des Heils eine *libera seruitus*. Pelagius wird als *desideratissimus* tituliert, weil Augustinus damit seinem Wunsch nach einer persönlichen Aussprache Ausdruck verleihen will, hatte er doch gehört, dass Pelagius gegen die Gnade argumentierte. Das Brieflein wird von Augustinus dahingehend paraphrasiert, daß er wünsche, daß Pelagius von Gott besonders die Güter erlange, die nach des Pelagius Meinung vom eigenen Willen (*arbitrium uoluntatis*) und der eigenen Kraft (*propria potestas*) abhängen (d.h. nicht die leiblichen Güter). Außerdem habe er als Antwort auf das Lob seiner Person durch Augustinus zum Ausdruck bringen wollen, dass er Pelagius um dessen Fürbitte ersuche, damit er auch wirklich der Vollkommene werde, als den Pelagius ihn rühmt. Damit wollte Augustinus Pelagius nur an die Wahrheit erinnern, daß die Gerechtigkeit nicht vom eigenen Wollen oder Laufen abhänge (vgl. Rö 9,16).[25]

2. Der Briefwechsel Augustinus – Pelagius

Die Darstellung seines persönlichen Verhältnisses zu Pelagius, die Augustinus in *De gestis Pelagii* präsentiert, ist zweifellos sehr selektiv. Wichtige Aspekte der Beziehung zwischen den beiden aus den Jahren 415/6 werden überhaupt nicht angesprochen.

a) So macht Augustinus in *De gestis Pelagii* keine Angaben darüber, wann und in welchem Kontext er das eben behandelte Brieflein an Pelagius verfasst hatte. Festzuhalten ist, dass die ep.146 eine Antwort des Augustinus auf einen Brief des Pelagius darstellt, der nicht überliefert ist.

[24] CSEL 42, 104-5.

[25] Y.-M. Duval, Augustin et les règles épistolaires, in: L.Nadjo / E.Gavoille (éd.), Epistulae antiquae II. Actes du IIe colloque international 'Le genre épistolaire antique et les prolongements européens' (Université François-Rabelais, Tours, 28-30 septembre 2000), Louvain-Paris 2002, 363 vergleicht die hier gebotene Exegese des Billets mit Augustinus, ep.23 und kommt zu dem Schluß, dass es sich nicht um eine nachträgliche Interpretation handelt; die hervorgehobenen Nuancen waren ursprünglich beabsichtigt.

Die Mehrheitsmeinung der Gelehrten wird durch R.F.Evans repräsentiert, der den Briefwechsel in die Jahre 412 / 413 datiert und meinte, Pelagius habe mit seinem Brief seine gute Ankunft in Jerusalem melden wollen.[26]

Am wahrscheinlichsten scheint mir die Datierung zu sein, die J. Koopmanns,[27] J. den Boeft[28] und zuletzt Y.-M.Duval [29] vertreten haben: Ihnen zufolge ist der Briefwechsel recht früh, d.h. in das Jahr 410/1 zu datieren, bald nach der Ankunft des Asketen in Afrika. Pelagius hatte in seinem Schreiben Augustinus offenbar Komplimente gemacht — dies passt ganz gut zu jemandem, der seine Ankunft beim Ortsbischof anzeigen will. Augustinus Antwort war dann lediglich — wie den Boeft es formuliert — „*a visiting card laying the basis for further contacts.*"[30]

In der Interpretation, die Augustinus der *visiting card* in *De gestis Pelagii* gibt, behauptete er — wie bereits erwähnt — dass die in ep.146 für Pelagius gebrauchte Anrede *desideratissimus* seinem, des Augustinus, Wunsch nach einer Unterredung über die Gnadenlehre Ausdruck verleihen sollte *(quoniam ualde cupiebam cum praesente aliquid colloqui, iam enim audieram contra gratiam, qua iustificamur, quando hinc aliqua commemoratio fieret, aperta eum contentione conari)*. Vielleicht ist diese nachträgliche Interpretation doch etwas übertrieben — jedenfalls würde man es Pelagius nachsehen müssen, wenn ihm dieser prägnante Sinn der Anrede im Jahr 410 verborgen geblieben wäre. Hätten übrigens R.F.Evans und andere mit ihrer eben erwähnten Datierung recht, so würde dieser Wunsch gegenüber dem Palästina weilenden Pelagius ausgedrückt — was nicht besonders glaubwürdig gewesen wäre. Die Situation dürfte so gewesen sein, daß Pelagius, wenn er 410 bei seiner Ankunft in Hippo ein Treffen mit Augustinus wünschte, nicht mehr tun konnte, als diesem

[26] R.F.Evans, Pelagius. Inquiries and Reappraisals, London 1968, 80; vgl. die Bibliographie zur Frage bei Y,-M.Duval, La La correspondance entre Augustin et Pélage, in: Revue des études augustiniennes 45 (1999), 374.

[27] J.Koopmans, Augustinus' first contact with Pelagius and the Dating of the Condemnation of Caelestius at Carthage, in: Vigiliae Christianae 8 (1954), 149-153.

[28] J. den Boeft, Augustine's Letter (s.o. Anm. 21).

[29] Y.-M.Duval, La correspondance (s.Anm.26), 363-384. — F.Dolbeau hat seinen Vorschlag, die ep.146 mit dem Brief zu identifizieren, den Augustinus im Frühjahr 415 an Pelagius schrieb und dem nach Palästina reisenden spanischen Priester Orosius mitgab (Dolbeau, Le sermon 348A, 45-6) unter dem Eindruck der Kritik von Y-M.Duval, La correspondance, 372-83 inzwischen revoziert (F.Dolbeau, Augustin et la prédication en Afrique, Collection des études augustiniennes 179, Paris 2005, 627).

[30] J. den Boeft, Augustine's letter (s.Anm. 21), 78.

seine Ankunft mit einem sehr höflichen und werbenden Billet mitzuteilen.[31] Die Initiative zu einer Unterredung musste nach Lage der Dinge von Augustinus als Ortsbischof kommen. Dieser war sich — das wird aus *De gestis Pelagii* deutlich — schon damals durchaus bewußt, daß der illustre Flüchtling mit ihm in der Gnadenlehre nicht übereinstimmte. Er wußte zu diesem Zeitpunkt — das hat Duval gegen den Boeft zurecht betont[32] — gewiß auch schon von der heftigen Reaktion des Pelagius auf den berühmten Satz aus Buch 10 der *Confessiones: Da quod iubes et iube quod uis* — von dem er erst im Jahr 427, in *De Dono perseuerantiae* 20,53 berichtet. Dennoch ist auffällig, dass Augustinus Pelagius nicht als Bischof gegenüber tritt (er redet ihn nicht als *filius* an), sondern ihn als Asketen (*seruus Dei*) — von gleich zu gleich behandelt — Augustinus war eben nicht nur Bischof, sondern auch Mönch.[33]

Die Schilderung des Augustinus in *De gestis Pelagii* hat einen geradezu entschuldigenden Unterton, wenn sie erklären will, wie es kommen konnte, daß eine ausführlichere Unterhaltung mit Pelagius unterblieb. Man kann aus dieser Schilderung schließen, daß Augustinus Pelagius zu einer derartigen Unterhaltung nicht eingeladen hat — eine negative Antwort seitens des Pelagius hätte Augustinus gewiss vermerkt. Man könnte sogar auf die Idee kommen, daß den Boefts' Charakterisierung der ep.146 („*a visiting card laying the basis for further contacts*") allzu optimistisch ist und dass der Bischof von Hippo den Asketen, von dessen Meinung zu seiner Gnadenlehre er wusste, eher sehr höflich auf Distanz halten wollen: Den Boeft selbst notiert, daß die ep.146 unter den erhaltenen Briefen Des Augustinus durch ihre völlige Inhaltslosigkeit hervorsticht; in anderen ähnlich knappen Schreiben fehle nie ein konkreter Bezug, eine prägnante Ankündigung.[34] Dass Augustinus 411 in Karthago angesichts des unmittelbar bevorstehenden Donatistenkolloquiums sehr beschäftigt war, ist allerdings glaubwürdig und darf nicht als billige Ausrede abgetan werden.

b) Die selektive Darstellung in *De gestis Pelagii* übergeht auch die Orosiusmission aus dem Jahr 415. Über den Orosius mitgegebenen Brief bemerkt Augustinus im Mai 416 im Rückblick:

[31] Y.-M.Duval, Augustin et les règles épistolaires (s. Anm. 25), 362 charakterisiert den verlorenen Pelagiusbrief an Augustinus folgendermassen: "Tout en l'informant de son arrivée à Hippone avec les siens, Pélage avait dû faire l'éloge de Augustinus, selon les règles épistolaires: chercher à susciter la sympathie du destinataire."

[32] Y.-M.Duval, La correspondance (s.Anm. 26), 381.

[33] Y.-M.Duval, La correspondance, 380.

[34] J. den Boeft, Augustine's letter (s.Anm.21), 77.

„Scripsi per eundem ad eundem Pelagium, non eum notans litteris meis, sed exhortans audiret a presbytero quod mandaui.“[35]

D.h. das erwähnte Brieflein sollte Orosius das entrée zu einer gründlichen und ernsthaften Aussprache mit Pelagius geben. Augustinus betont ausdrücklich, daß er in seinem Brief einen schriftlichen Tadel vermieden habe, die Kritik sollte also der mündlichen Unterredung mit Orosius überlassen werden. Dieses Vorgehen des Augustinus war nicht ungewöhnlich: Als er vom kaiserlichen Gesandten Darius für einen anderen Bischof etwas erreichen will, wird dieses Anliegen im erhaltenen Briefwechsel kaum erwähnt.[36] Stattdessen betonen die Briefpartner die gegenseitige Freude aneinander, den Genuss bei der wechselseitigen Lektüre von Briefen und Schriften. Dass heikle Fragen gerade nicht brieflich erörtert wurden, ist auch sonst bekannt.[37] Y.-M.Duval hat außerdem notiert, daß diese Zurückhaltung des Augustinus gut zur Einstellung des Bischofs im Frühjahr 415 passt, zu dem Zeitpunkt, als er mit der Abfassung von *De natura* beschäftigt war: Augustinus vermied es sowohl in *De natura et gratia* als auch in dem durch Orosius übermittelten Schreiben, Pelagius schriftlich und mit Namensnennung als Häretiker zu brandmarken.[38]

Dennoch hätte Pelagius einigen Grund gehabt, sich durch das Vorgehen des Augustinus düpiert zu fühlen: Auf der einen Seite hatte Augustinus Orosius u.a. aufgetragen, Pelagius als *amicus* in persönlicher Unterhaltung zu ermahnen. Auf der anderen Seite hat sich Orosius einige Zeit in Bethlehem bei dem Pelagiusgegner Hieronymus zu Studienzwecken aufgehalten.[39] Augustinus berichtet in s. 348A,6, daß Orosius eine schon sehr gespannte Situation in Jerusalem und Betlehem antraf;[40] dieser Eindruck des Orosius dürfte durch seinen Kontakt mit Hieronymus verstärkt worden sein.

Von der Aussprache zwischen Orosius und Pelagius ist nur ein Fragment überliefert: Orosius erklärte am 29.7.415 auf einer offiziö-

[35] Augustinus, Sermo 348A,6 (F.Dolbeau, Le sermon 348A, 56). Dolbeau datiert die Predigt, zusammen mit den Briefen 19* und 179 plausibel auf Mai / Juni 416; vgl. F.Dolbeau, Le sermon 348A, 50.

[36] Augustinus, epp. 229; 230. Vgl. dazu E.Rebillard, Augustinus et le rituel épistolaire de l'élite sociale et culturelle de son temps, in: É.Rebillard / C.Sotinel, L'évêque dans la cité du Ive au Ve siècle. Image et Autorité (Collection de l'école francaise de Rome 248), 138-9.

[37] É.Rebillard, Augustin et le ritual épistolaire, 139.

[38] Y.-M.Duval, La correspondance (s.Anm.26), 366.

[39] J.Villela, Biografía críticia di Orosio, in: Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 43 (2000), 104-6.

[40] Augustinus, Sermo 348A,6: „Verum autem presbyter locum ipsum ubi ille erat iam illius praedicationibus et fratrum dissensionibus perturbatissimum inuenit…“

sen Versammlung des griechischen und lateinischen Klerus in Jerusalem unter der Leitung von Bischof Johannes, daß Pelagius in einer persönlicher Unterredung mit ihm gesagt habe, der Mensch könne sündlos sein und die Gebote Gottes mit Leichtigkeit einhalten, wenn er es nur wolle.[41] Die Tatsache, daß Orosius auf besagter Versammlung als Ankläger des Pelagius auftrat, macht deutlich, dass seine Unterredung mit Pelagius ohne Klärung geblieben war. Orosius hatte auf dieser Versammlung erwähnt, daß er Augustinus in Afrika verlassen habe, als dieser gerade mit der Widerlegung der Schrift *De natura* des Pelagius beschäftigt war. Als Pelagius zur Versammlung zugelassen wurde und mit der Frage konfrontiert wurde, ob er die Lehrsätze, auf die Augustinus antworte, als die seinen anerkenne, antwortete er unwirsch: „Was habe ich mit Augustinus zu schaffen!"[42]

c) Wir wissen noch von mindestens zwei weiteren Briefen Des Augustinus an Pelagius, beide aus dem Frühsommer 416, die in *De gestis Pelagii* ebenfalls nicht erwähnt werden.

Zum einen bemerkt Augustinus im Mai 416 in der ep.19* an Hieronymus, daß er u.a. auch einen Brief an Pelagius verfasst habe (ep.19*,4). Augustinus hatte zuvor von Pelagius die sogenannte *chartula defensionis* (der vollständige Titel lautete vielleicht: *Defensio contra obiecta Gallorum*) zugesandt bekommen, d.h. eine apologetische Darstellung der Synode von Diospolis. Pelagius hatte dieses Dokument durch einen Diakon aus Hippo, einen gewissen Palatinus an Augustinus geschickt. Doch — so wird aus *Sermo* 348A klar — vermisste Augustinus bei dieser *chartula* das autorisierende Begleitschreiben des Pelagius — er fürchtete, daß Pelagius sich auf diese Weise die Möglichkeit offenhielt, die Autorschaft zu leugnen. Augustinus wollte lieber das bischöflich beglaubigte Protokoll abwarten.[43]

[41] Orosius, Liber apologeticus 4,4 (CSEL 5, 608,9-11). — Zu Orosius auf dem Jerusalemer Kolloquium, vgl. J.Villela, Biografía crítica di Orosio (s.Anm.39), 107-110.

[42] „Et quis est mihi Augustinus?" (Orosius, Liber Apologeticus 41 [CSEL 5, 607,18]).

[43] Augustinus, Sermo 348A,7 (F.Dolbeau, Le sermon 348A, 57): „Et mandauit diacono, ut mihi daret legendam eandem defensionem suam; litteras tamen suas mihi non misit. Vnde sollicitus sum, ne postea et hoc quod misit misisse neget. Disputare ergo inde nihil uolui, donec legeremus gesta ubi ecclesiastica et episcopalis contineri uidetur auctoritas." Es ist übrigens schon bemerkenswert, wie offenherzig Augustin in dieser Predigt die Gemeinde über seine Schwierigkeiten mit Pelagius in Kenntnis setzt. — Vgl. auch das zB im Briefwechsel Augustinus-Hieronymus auftretende Authentifizierungsproblem, Augustinus, ep. 68,1 (CSEL 34,2, 240-1).

Ob das in seiner Predigt artikulierte Misstrauen des Augustinus berechtigt war, muss offenbleiben. Augustinus bemerkt betreffs seines Briefes an Pelagius, dass obwohl dieser von Pelagius vermutlich mit Bitterkeit aufgenommen werden würde, er ihm dennoch vielleicht zum Heil gereichen werde.[44] D.h., der Ton hatte sich seit der Orosiusmission verschärft, das, was Augustinus im Jahr 415 noch ausdrücklich vermieden hatte — den schriftlichen Tadel — empfand er nun als notwendig. Die Reaktion des Pelagius auf diesen Brief ist nicht bekannt.

Zum anderen wird in der ep.177, einem von fünf afrikanischen Bischöfen (unter ihnen Aurelius von Karthago und Augustinus von Hippo) nach den Synoden von Karthago und Mileve im Herbst 416 verfassten Schreiben an Innozenz von Rom, erwähnt, daß einer der fünf Bischöfe, die Verteidigungsschrift des Pelagius beantwortete habe (ep.177,15[45]). Die Antwort ist der ep.177 offenbar beigelegt worden; Innozenz von Rom wird gebeten, diesen Brief an Pelagius zu übermitteln. M.E. kann es sich bei dem erwähnten Bischof nur um Augustinus handeln, der hier versucht, mit Unterstützung aus Rom Pelagius zu einem Einlenken zu bewegen. Vielleicht ist der hier erwähnte Brief mit dem in der ep.19*,4 erwähnten Schreiben mehr oder weniger identisch. Notierenswert ist auf jeden Fall, daß Augustinus sein in sermo 348A*,7 artikuliertes Misstrauen offenbar überwunden hatte: nunmehr ist er bereit, die Diospolisdarstellung des Pelagius zu attackieren, obwohl er die offiziellen Akten der Synode noch nicht gesehen hat.

d) Resümierend läßt sich feststellen, daß es eine Korrespondenz zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius gegeben hat, die Augustinus aber mit Ausnahme von ep.146 in *De gestis Pelagii* nicht darlegt und die er — oder seine Nachlassverwalter — auch nicht für überlieferungswürdig gehalten haben. Ein Überblick über diese Korrespondenz ergibt folgendes Bild:

Herbst / Winter 410/1: ep. A des Pelagius
Antwort: ep.146 des Augustinus

Frühjahr 415: ep. B des Augustinus durch Orosius (s. 348A,6)
keine Antwort des Pelagius

(Juli 415: Diözesankonvent in Jerusalem)

[44] Augustinus, ep.19*,4.
[45] CSEL 44, 684.

(Dezember 415 Synode von Diospolis)

(Frühjahr 416: Überfall auf das Hieronymuskloster in Bethlehem)

Frühjahr 416: Übersendung der *defensio* durch Pelagius / ohne Begleitschreiben

Mai 416 ep. C von Augustinus (vgl. ep.19*,4)

(Frühsommer 416: Synoden von Karthago und Mileve)

Sommer 416 ep.D (= ep.C?) von Augustinus über Innozenz von Rom als Antwort auf die *defensio* (vgl. ep.177,15)

(Ende 416 *De gestis Pelagii*)

(ca. Frühjahr 417: Unterredung des Pelagius mit Pinianus, Albina und Melania in Jerusalem

Es ist nicht ganz sicher, ob dieser Überblick vollständig ist, d.h. ob nicht noch mehr als diese fünf Briefe zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius gewechselt wurden.

Augustinus bemerkt in *Sermo* 348A (*Sermo contra Pelagium*), den er Ende Mai / Anfang Juni 416 in der Bischofskirche von Hippo predigte, daß er Pelagius als gleichsam einem Diener Gottes in vertrauter Weise zu schreiben pflege.[46] Das könnte so gedeutet werden, daß es weitere Briefe zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius gegeben hat, die Augustinus aber nicht überliefert hat. Allerdings kann man vermuten, daß etwaige (zusätzliche, unbekannte) Briefe wohl vor die Orosiusmission zu datieren sind: Aus s. 348A,6 folgt, daß Orosius im Frühjahr 416 aus Palästina nach Hippo zurückgekehrt ist; im Gepäck hatte er einen Brief des Hieronymus an Augustinus. Von einem Pelagiusbrief verlautet nichts.

Y.-M.Duval freilich will solche zusätzlichen, unbekannten Briefe gänzlich ausschliessen: Ihm zufolge ist die Formulierung aus s. 348A,6 bereits durch ep.146 sowie den Orosius mitgegebenen Brief gedeckt.[47] Doch paßt die Formulierung in s. 348A,6 wirklich auf die ep.146, besonders wenn man bedenkt, wie restriktiv Augustinus die in ihr enthaltenen Höflichkeitfloskeln in *De gestis Pelagii* 51 auslegt?

[46] Augustinus, Sermo 348A, 6 (F.Dolbeau, Le sermon 348 A, 56): „Solemus ei tamquam seruo Dei familiariter scribere ut ipse mihi."

[47] Y.-M.Duval, La correspondance (s. Anm.26), 371-2. Für Duvals These spricht, daß das Präsens solemus schlecht auf einen vergangenen Briefwechsel passt.

Was ergibt sich nun aus diesem Überblick für das Verhältnis zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius?

In *De gestis Pelagiis* 46[48] stellt Augustinus die Überreichung von *De natura* durch Timasius und Jakobus als einen gewissen Wendepunkt in seinem Verhältnis zu Pelagius dar. Dies ist durchaus glaubwürdig: Augustinus glaubte hier erstmals eine Pelagiusschrift in Händen zu halten, die eine Widerlegung erlaubte und lohnte: *De natura* ist „eine verdeckte Absage an die Augustinische Erbsündentheologie."[49] Auch sah sich durch *De natura* schon deshalb zu einer Reaktion genötigt, weil ein Zitat aus seiner Schrift *De libero arbitrio* als Testimonium angeführt wird. Schließlich nutzte — wie oben dargestellt — Augustinus gerade die Auslieferung von *De natura* als Möglichkeit, Pelagius als *amicus* anzusprechen.

Neben der Auslieferung der Pelagiusschrift darf man auch die Bedeutung der gescheiterten Orosiusmission im Jahr 415 nicht unterschätzen. Inwiefern sie von Augustinus geplant war, ist schwer zu sagen. Jedenfalls blieb sie erfolglos. Auf der Synode von Diospolis hat Pelagius durch Vorweisen der ep.146 Augustinus als *amicus* in Anspruch genommen. Seine Version der Synode von Diospolis, die *chartula defensionis*, hatte Pelagius Augustinus ohne begleitendes Anschreiben zugeschickt. In ep.19*,2 an Hieronymus bemerkt Augustinus, daß Pelagius in seiner *chartula* seine eigenen Lehren mit 'finsterer Schlauheit' (*latebrosa calliditate*) verändert habe, um den Freispruch zu erreichen. Obwohl Augustinus dies gegenüber Hieronymus als einen ersten Erfolg der Opposition gegen Pelagius darstellen will — Pelagius wage nicht mehr, seine Lehren offen zu vertreten — ist deutlich, dass sich der Ton gegenüber der höflichen Behandlung des Vorjahres verschärft hat. Augustinus versuchte dann im Frühsommer 416 zweimal, Pelagius durch einen Brief umzustimmen. Von einer Reaktion des Pelagius ist nichts bekannt.

Mit der Schrift *De gestis Pelagii* geht Augustinus nach den die Lehre des Pelagius verurteilenden Synoden von Karthago und Mileve zum persönlichen Angriff gegen Pelagius über. Ausschlaggebend war hier das Verhalten des Pelagius auf der Synode von Diospolis: Er hatte dort nicht öffentlich Fehler zugegeben und eine öffentliche Verdammung seiner eigenen Lehre vollzogen, sondern er hatte — so sah es Augustinus — sich mit doppeldeutigen Aussagen aus der Affäre gezogen und auf diese Weise den Freispruch erlangt.

[48] Vgl. Augustinus, ep. 186,1 (an Paulinus von Nola).

[49] O.Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius, 41.

3. Die Rolle der *amicitia*

Der Schlüsselbegriff für das Verhältnis zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius ist bereits mehrfach gefallen und muß jetzt noch ein wenig genauer beleuchtet werden: Freundschaft (*amicitia*). Dass diese *amicitia* hier nicht ein enges persönliches Verhältnis zwischen den beiden bezeichnen kann, ist klar: Augustinus kannte Pelagius kaum. Die Reaktion des Pelagius auf das Zitat aus *Confessiones* 10 war seitens des Pelagius heftig ausgefallen — Augustinus notiert, daß Pelagius mit dem anonymen Bischof und Informanten des Augustinus beinahe in einen Streit geraten wäre.[50]

Im 3.Buch von *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*[51] erwähnt Augustinus Pelagius an mehreren Stellen in sehr respektvollem Ton:[52] Er ist für ihn ein heiliger Mann mit einem beeindruckenden Lebenswandel;[53] er ist trefflich und rühmenswert und Augustinus betont, dass Pelagius die in seinem Römerbriefkommentar mitgeteilte Argumentation gegen die Erbsünde gerade nicht teile.[54] In *De natura et gratia* unternimmt Augustinus eine ausführlichere Charakterisierung des Pelagius: Nun zeichnet er ihn als einen Mann von großer Geisteskraft, der mit gut gemeintem, aber fehlgeleiteten Eifer die falsche Sache vertritt.[55] Öfters lobt er den Scharfsinn des Pelagius, der mit einzelnen Argumenten das Richtige trifft,[56] aber dennoch im Ganzen sich furchtbar täuscht.[57] Augustinus beschreibt seine eigene Rolle in diesem Verhältnis so, dass er hofft, den starken und flinken Geist eines Freundes wie Pelagius in die richtige Richtung zu lenken.[58]

[50] Augustinus, De dono perseuerantiae 20,53: „...et saepe dixi: Da quod iubes et iube quod uis. Quare mea uerba Pelagius Romae, cum a quodam fratre et coepiscopo meo fuissent eo praesente commemorata, ferre non potuit, et contradicens aliquanto commotius, pene cum eo qui illa commemorauerat, litigauit." (PL 45, 1026).

[51] Dieses 3.Buch wurde vermutlich Februar / März 412 verfasst, nachdem die ersten beiden Bücher schon an Marcellinus geschickt worden waren. Augustin verfasste diesen Anhang, als ihm der Römerbriefkommentar des Pelagius in die Hände kam; vgl. Aurelius Augustinus. Schriften gegen die Pelagianer Band, Würzburg 1971, 30-32 (A.Zumkeller).

[52] Vgl. A.Fürst, Augustinus-Hieronymus.Epistulae mutuae. Briefwechsel II (Fontes Christiani Bd. 41,2), 446 (Anm.786).

[53] Augustinus, De peccatorum meritis et remissione III,1 (CSEL 60,129).

[54] Augustinus, De peccatorum meritis et remissione III,5-6; III-18 (CSEL 60, 131-2;144).

[55] Augustinus, De natura et gratia I,1; VII,7 (CSEL 60, 233; 236-7).

[56] Augustinus, De natura et gratia VI,6; XXVII,30; XXXIV,38; XXXV,41; XLII,50: acute und acutissime sind die Stichworte. Für weitere Belege, vgl. Y.-M. Duval, La correspondance, 366 (Anm.15).

[57] Augustinus, De natura et gratia XXXIV,39 (CSEL 60, 262).

[58] Augustinus, De natura et gratia VI,6: "Nolo quod sequitur dicere, ne amicis nostris, quorum fortissima et celerrima ingenia non in peruersum, sed in directum currere uolumes, facere existimemur iniuriam." (CSEL 60, 236).

Wichtig ist, dass hiermit Augustinus zum ersten Mal sein Verhältnis zu Pelagius explizit als das einer *amicitia* entwirft. Nach spätantikem Verständnis können auch persönlich nicht bekannte Freunde der Freunde die eigenen Freunde werden.[59] Im Falle von Augustinus und Pelagius' hiess dies, dass Augustinus selbst die Übergabe der Pelagiusschrift *De natura* durch Timasius und Jakobus, die aristokratischen Schüler (und das hieß in diesem Falle auch: *amici*) des Pelagius, in eine Gelegenheit verwandelt, *amicus* sowohl des Pelagius als auch seiner Schüler zu werden. Die Schrift *De natura et gratia* zielte nicht nur (letztlich erfolgreich) auf die Bekehrung der *amici* Timasius und Jakobus, sondern darüber hinaus (letztlich erfolglos) auf die Bekehrung des *amicus* Pelagius. Auch waren alle vier, Augustinus, Pelagius, Timasius und Jakobus christliche Asketen, eine Gemeinsamkeit, die Augustinus im Hinblick auf Pelagius betont. Es ist klar, wie verwegen dieses Vorgehen Augustins, das einen gezielten Regelverstoss darstellte, war; Augustins bereitwilliges Eingehen auf den 'Verrat' der Schüler dürfte in den Augen des Pelagius wenig Vertrauen erweckend gewesen sein. Noch in den Schreiben des Frühsommers 416 hat Augustinus die Hoffnung noch nicht aufgegeben, dass Pelagius sich als *amicus* noch zurecht bringen (*corrigere*) lasse bzw bereits zurecht gebracht ist.[60] Augustinus hofft auch, dass Johannes von Jerusalem, dem gegenüber er Pelagius als *frater*[61] bezeichnet, ihm bei dieser Aufgabe hilft.[62] Auch in *De gestis Pelagii* beteuert Augustinus, dass er zwar seiner Rechtfertigung in Diospolis kritisch gegenüberstehe (er meint, Pelagius habe die Synode getäuscht), dennoch aber ihm alles Gute in Christus wünsche.[63] Gegenüber Paulinus von Nola, der ebenfalls mit Pelagius in brieflichem Kontakt stand,

[59] Vgl. dazu Y.-M.Duval, L'entrée en relations épistolaires d'Augustin d'Hippone et Pauline de Nole, in: L.Nadjo / E.Gavoille (éd.), Epistulae antiquae III. Actes du IIIe colloque international "L'épistolaire antique et ses prolongements européens" (Université Francois-Rabelais, Tours 25-27 septembre 2002), Louvain-Paris 2004, 399.

[60] Augustinus, ep. 177,3 (CSEL 44, 671); ep 19*,3: „...sicut amicum corrigi cupiebam". Vgl. sermo 348A, 5: „Nihil enim esset melius, nihil optabilius quam ut illi audientes quid secundum ecclesiae antiquissimum fundamentum praedicaretur, timerent praedicare errores suos et in silentio sanarentur, conuersi ad eum qui sanat omnes inuocantes nomen suum." (F.Dolbeau, Le sermon 348A, 55; für den §5 der Predigt vergleiche jetzt auch F.Dolbeau, Un second manuscrit du s. contra Pelagium d'Augustin [s.348A augmenté), in: Revue des études Augustiniennes 45, 1999, 359).

[61] Augustinus, ep.179,1 (CSEL 44, 691). Augustinus stellt mit feinsinniger Differenzierung Pelagius, seinen (des Augustinus) frater dem Bischof Johannes als dessen filius vor.

[62] Augustinus, ep. 179,5 (CSEL 44, 693-4).

[63] Augustinus, De gestis Pelagii 45 (CSEL 42, 99).

betont Augustinus im Sommer 417, er habe Pelagius einst wie einen Rechtgläubigen geliebt, nun aber liebe er ihn als einen, der von der feindseligen Meinung, die — wie es heißt (*dicitur*) — er gegenüber der Gnade Gottes hege, befreit werden solle.[64]

Der Berner Althistoriker Stefan Rebenich hat in jüngster Zeit einen aufschlussreichen Vortrag zum Thema *Freund und Feind bei Augustinus und in der christlichen Spätantike* publiziert. Obwohl Rebenich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius gar nicht näher eingeht — sein Beispiel ist die Korrespondenz zwischen Augustinus und Hieronymus — erlauben seine Beobachtungen zu Umformung des antiken Freundschaftsideals durch den christlichen Orthodoxie- und Häresiediskurs, den Charakter des amicitia-Verhältnisses zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius noch schärfer zu erfassen.[65]

Folgende Feststellungen sind aufgrund der Beobachtungen Rebenichs wichtig:

1. *Amicitia* bleibt auch in der Spätantike ein Leitbegriff für soziale Netzwerke und zwar sowohl in vertikaler als auch in horizontaler Hinsicht. Vertikal machte das Reden über *amicitia* die harsche Realität der Beziehung mächtiger Patrone zu ihren abhängigen Klienten akzeptabel. Horizontal konnte es „die Interaktion zwischen Personen gleichen oder annähernd gleichen Ranges“[66] bezeichnen. Rebenich weist daraufhin, daß es bei der Freundschaft zwischen gleichrangigen oder annähernd gleichrangigen Personen wesentlich darum ging, symbolisches Kapital anzusammeln und damit Einfluß zu akkumulieren; die durch *amicitia* definierte Beziehung beruhte auf Leistung- und Gegenleistung, war Zweckbündnis zur wechselseitigen Hilfe.[67]
2. Medium der *amicitia* war der Brief, der „über ein komplexes System von Boten und Reisenden im gesamten Gebiet des *Imperium Romanum* verteilt werden konnte und sozial wirksame Bündnisse begründete oder festigte.“[68] Die Briefe, die unter gleichrangigen Mitgliedern der Elite gewechselt wurden, waren also nie Privatbriefe; sie waren vor dem virtuellen oder tatsächlichen Publikum

[64] Augustinus, ep. 186,1 (CSEL 57,45)

[65] S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind bei Augustinus und in der christlichen Spätantike, in: T.Fuhrer (Hrsg.), Die christlich-philosophischen Diskurse der Spätantike: Texte, Personen, Institutionen, Stuttgart 2008, 11-31

[66] S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, 12.

[67] S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, 29.

[68] S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, ibidem.

eines größeren Leserkreises formuliert.[69] Die Briefkommunikation folgte dabei bestimmten Konventionen, die eingehalten werden musste, sollte die *amicitia* intakt bleiben.

3. Die entscheidend christliche Modifikation dieser horizontalen *amicitia*-Verhältnisse erfolgte durch den christlich-monotheistischen Orthodoxie / Häresiediskurs. Zumindest unter denjenigen Angehörigen der christlichen Elite, die entweder als Bischöfe oder als Asketen als intensive Christen gelten können, ist *amicitia* ohne Übereinstimmung in Glaubensfragen, ohne Orthodoxie nicht denkbar.[70]

Diese Feststellungen können helfen, auch die wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen Augustinus und Pelagius präziser zu beschreiben:

Augustinus behandelt Pelagius als *amicus* im von Rebenich beschriebenen Sinn. Das *amicitia* — Verhältnis hatte dabei durchaus eine gewisse Exklusivität: Für Augustinus war zB der Pelagiusschüler Caelestius kein *amicus* in diesem Sinn. Und: Augustinus betrachtete offenbar den Vater Julians von Eclanum als einen *amicus*, dessen Sohn aber wahrscheinlich nicht.

Die Definition des Pelagius als *amicus* erfolgt bei Augustinus exklusiv durch literarische Medien: So bemerkt Augustinus sowohl in ep.19*,3 als auch später in *De gestis Pelagii* 47, daß er in *De natura et gratia* Pelagius deshalb nicht als Häretiker gebrandmarkt habe, weil er das *amicitia*-Verhältnis zu Pelagius aufrechtzuerhalten wünschte. Bis zum Frühsommer 416 vermeidet Augustinus gegenüber Pelagius den brieflichen Tadel.

Die erste Phase des pelagianischen Streites wird wesentlich mit Traktaten und Briefen ausgefochten, die innerhalb von *amicitia* - Netzwerken zirkulieren: So sind die Augustinschriften *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* sowie *De spiritu et littera* an den Präfekten Marcellinus gerichtet, einen hochgestellten *amicus* des Augustinus, der gewiss mit einflussreichen Mitgliedern des römischen Netzwerkes um Pelagius in Kontakt stand.[71] *De natura et gratia* ist ursprünglich an Timasius und Jakobus adressiert, wird dann aber von Augustinus zusammen mit der Pelagiusschrift *De natura* weiterverbreitet. Dass

[69] S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, 15.

[70] S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, 30f.

[71] Ein anonymer Referent dieser Zeitschrift weist in diesem Zusammenhang auch auf den Umstand hin, dass im Jahre 413 sowohl Augustinus als auch Pelagius von Juliana aufgefordert werden, für ihre Tochter Demetrias eine Abhandlung über das asketische Leben zu verfassen.

Augustinus seiner Widerlegung jeweils die Pelagiusschrift beilegt ist doch wohl eine Abweichung von den Üblichkeiten antiker Ketzerpolemik. Diese Abweichung dürfte sich daraus erklären, dass Augustinus gegenüber den *amici* des Pelagius dem möglichen Verdacht der Verleumdung vorbeugen wollte. *De gestis Pelagii* war an Aurelius von Karthago gerichtet, aber ausdrücklich zur Weiterverbreitung bestimmt — sie leitet die literarische Aufkündigung der *amicitia* seitens des Augustinus ein. *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* ist an Albina, Pinianus und Melania gerichtet, also an das Netzwerk der *amici:* Die Schrift verfolgt mit zusätzlichen Argumenten die gleiche Linie wie *De gestis Pelagii.*

Es gibt Indizien, daß auch Pelagius das Verhältnis zu Augustinus als *amicitia* zu definieren wünschte. In diesem Sinne ist offenbar sein werbender Brief zu deuten, auf den Augustinus mit der ep.146 antwortet. In diesem Sinne ist vor allem natürlich die Tatsache zu deuten, daß er u.a. eben diese ep.146 auf der Synode von Diospolis als Testimonium eines *amicus* anführt, d.h. als Teil seines sozialen Kapitals einsetzt, um einen Freispruch zu erlangen. In diesem Sinne ist schließlich auch die Tatsache zu deuten, daß Pelagius noch im Frühjahr 417, als er sich in einem Brief an Innozenz von Rom bereits gerechtfertigt hatte, versuchte, daß *amicitia*-Netzwerk, das ihn mit Augustinus verband, in seinem Sinne zu aktivieren, um Augustinus umzustimmen: Er versuchte im Gespräch mit Pinianus, Albinus und Melania die von Augustinus gegen ihn erhobenen Vorwürfe auszuräumen.

Sowohl der antike, als auch der christianisierte spätantike amicitia — Begriff blieben unterbestimmt, wenn sie nur als Schlüsselelement einer networking —Strategie zum wechselseitigen Nutzen verstanden würden. Es ist gerade bezeichnend für das antike und auch spätantike *amicitia*- Konzept, daß seine konkrete soziale Funktion in eine durchaus ernstzunehmende philosophisch-idealistische Rhetorik eingebettet war. Das durch philosophische Vorgaben geprägte Freundschaftsideal stand dabei — wie besonders Alfons Fürst dargestellt hat — unausgeglichen neben der in der Antike durchaus auch wahrgenommenen, das Ideal oft konterkarierenden, Wirklichkeit von Freundschaft.[72]

Nach einer bei Cicero zu findenden Theorie der Freundschaft gründete sich die *amicitia* auf drei Elemente: Die Übereinstimmung hinsichtlich der göttlichen und menschlichen Dinge, das gegenseitige Wohlwollen, die *caritas*:

[72] A.Fürst, Streit unter Freunden. Ideal und Wirklichkeit in der Freundschaftslehre der Antike (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 85), Stuttgart u. Leipzig 1996.

„Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio."[73]

Augustinus rezipiert die ciceronianische Definition (*Contra Academicos* 3,6,13; vgl. ep. 258,1[74]), wobei er interessanterweise als Bezugspunkt der Übereinstimmung die menschlichen Dinge vor den göttlichen nennt — dies ist möglicherweise im Sinne eines (platonischen) Aufstiegs von den menschlichen Dingen zur göttlichen Transzendenz zu deuten.[75] Sowohl Cicero als auch Augustinus lehnen ein rein utilitaristisches *amicitia* - Konzept ausdrücklich ab, die *amicitia* bleibt dem Streben nach Weisheit untergeordnet. Freundschaft ist ohne *ueritas* nicht denkbar, Freunde müssen sich einander in aller Aufrichtigkeit die Wahrheit sagen können.[76]

Das von Asketen und Bischöfen des 4.Jahrhunderts neudefinierte christliche *amicitia* - Konzept schloss dann konsequenterweise auch die Übereinstimmung in theologischen Fragen, die gemeinsame Grundlage der Rechtgläubigkeit ein. Augustinus paraphrasiert Cicero, wenn er schreibt, daß es in menschlichen Dingen den vollen freundschaftlichen Konsens nicht geben könne, wenn er in Bezug auf die göttlichen Dinge fehle.[77] Wahre Freundschaft verbindet die Freunde dann aber nicht nur untereinander, sondern auch mit dem Herrn.[78]

Für Augustinus bedeutete diese christliche Profilierung des *amicitia* - Konzeptes — dies wird zB durch die Korrespondenz mit Hieronymus deutlich — dass *amicitia* den Raum bot, dem Freund in aller gebotenen und auch schonunglosen Offenheit aufzuzeigen, wo

[73] Cicero, Lael. 20; vgl. T. van Bavel, Cicero's ideal of friendship and Augustine, in: J.den Boeft / J. van Oort, Augustiniana Traiectina, Paris 1987, 59-72. — Zur Rezeption von Ciceros und Senecas Freundschaftsideal bei Augustinus, vgl. I.Hadot, Amicitia, in: Augustinus Lexikon 1, Basel 1986-1994, 288-9.

[74] CCL 29,42; CSEL 57, 605.

[75] M.Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron. I: Cicéron dans la formation et dans l'œuvre de Saint Augustin, Paris 1958, 270.; L.F.Pizzolato, L'amicizia in Sant'Agostino e il Laelius die Cicerone, in: Vigiliae Christianae 28 (1974), 205. — Für Konsens als Grundlage der Freundschaft, vgl. die Materialsammlung bei A.Fürst, Streit unter Freunden (s.Anm.72), 231-234. Ibidem, 138-182 findet sich eine Analyse des Laelius.

[76] Augustinus, ep. 73,4 (CSEL 34,2, 267); T. van Bavel, Cicerós ideal of friendship (s.Anm.73), 62-3; 67.

[77] Augustinus, ep. 258,2 (CSEL 57,607); S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, 20 (mit Anm.52).

[78] Augustinus, ep. 258,4 (CSEL 57, 608); L.F. Pizzolato, L'amicizia in Sant'Agostino (s.Anm.75), 210: die Dyas der klassischen Freundschaft wird durch den Christusbezug erweitert. Vgl. S.Rebenich, Freund und Feind, 20.

er irrt — und ihn so zurechtzubringen.[79] Für Augustinus ist letztlich nur der sein *amicus*, der im Falle des Irrtums sich von ihm kritisieren läßt, den Irrtum eingesteht und sich zur von Augustinus vertretenen Wahrheit bekehren läßt. Augustinus erwartet von Pelagius also eine veritable Konversion, ein offenes und klares Eingeständnis seines theologischen Irrtums — gegenüber Augustinus, gegenüber den Schülern des Pelagius, gegenüber der relevanten kirchlichen Öffentlichkeit. Augustinus sah Pelagius als den Kopf einer Bewegung und er hoffte, daß eine Bekehrung des Pelagius der Propaganda der Pelagiusanhänger in Afrika, Rom und anderswo ein Ende bereiten würde. Deshalb war Augustinus so enttäuscht, als er die *chartula defensionis* des Pelagius und später die Synodalakten von Diospolis las.

Warum behandelte Augustinus Pelagius als *amicus*? Die Tatsache, dass Pelagius Patrone in der christlichen Aristokratie Roms hatte, an denen auch dem Bischof von Hippo gelegen war (die *gens Valeria* und die *gens Anicia*), war für Augustinus natürlich nicht gleichgültig. Aber diese Tatsache darf man in ihrem Gewicht auch nicht überschätzen — Augustinus und seine afrikanischen Bischofskollegen hat sie letztlich nicht davon abgehalten, gegen Pelagius und seine Anhänger vorzugehen und für dieses Vorgehen auch den kaiserlichen Hof zu gewinnen. Das wesentliche Motiv war für Augustinus, dass ihm das *amicitia*- Konzept die Chance bot, Pelagius eine Konversion zu ermöglichen. Hier ist daran zu erinnern, wie stark die eigene Konversion des Augustinus in Mailand einem bestimmten sozialen Kontext, d.h. konkret einem Netzwerk von *amici*, in dem Bekehrungsgeschichten kursierten und diskutiert wurden, verpflichtet war.[80]

Daß Augustinus Pelagius zu einer veritablen Konversion einladen wollte, wird auch aus der Episode um die beiden römischen Pelagiusschüler Timasius und Jakobus deutlich. Ihre Bekehrung war für Augustinus ja ein Vorbild, dem Pelagius leider nicht gefolgt ist. Der Brief, den Timasius und Jakobus nach der Lektüre von *De natura et*

[79] Vgl. Augustinus, ep. 186,1 wo Augustinus seine anfängliche Schonung des Pelagius damit motiviert, dass er vermeiden wollte, dass Pelagius aus persönlicher Verletztheit zu einer Selbstkorrektur nicht mehr bereit sei. — Zu Kritik und Kritikfähigkeit als Charakteristikum wahrer Freundschaft, s. A.Fürst, Streit unter Freunden (s.Anm.72), 109-115 (Aristoteles); 172-176 (Cicero).

[80] S. jetzt W.Löhr, Konversion und Konversionserzählung. Beobachtungen zur Konstruktion des Religionswechsels in der Spätantike am Beispiel Augustins, in: C. Bonnet / S.Ribichini / D.Steuernagel, Religioni in Contatto nel Mediterraneo. Modelli die Diffusione e processi di interferenza, Mediterranea IV, 2007, 303-314. Zum philosophischen Freundschaftsideal und den durch Augustinus zuerst in Cassiciacum und später in Thagaste unternommenen Versuchen zu dessen Realisierung, vgl. I. Hadot, Amicitia (s.Anm.73), 290.

gratia an Augustinus geschrieben hatten (*De gestis Pelagii* 48), ist mehr als der Dank für eine überzeugende Belehrung: Die beiden loben Augustinus als Vermittler der erleuchtenden göttlichen Gnade, sie fühlen sich befähigt, nun auch anderen ihren Glauben zu eröffnen.[81]

4. Schluss

Augustinus mobilisierte das *amicitia* — Konzept, um ein tiefgehendes Dilemma zu bearbeiten oder doch zumindest abzumildern: Wie konnte er als Bischof die christliche Wahrheit verteidigen, ohne die christliche *caritas* zu verraten? Mit der Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas entstanden im 4.Jahrhundert ein neuer Typ von Wahrheit und ein neuer Typ von Wahrheitsanspruch. Dieser Wahrheitsanspruch war neu nicht nur im Bezug auf die nichtchristliche, sondern auch im Bezug auf die christliche Antike. Eine Möglichkeit der Bearbeitung der aus diesem Wahrheitsanspruch entstehenden Konflikte boten sicher die — recht rudimentären — Verfahren, die mit der Entwicklung der Synoden seit dem Anfang des 3.Jahrhunderts nach und nach erfunden und etabliert wurden. Die pelagianische Kontroverse ist auch in dieser Hinsicht eine wichtige Etappe — wie man nicht zuletzt aus Otto Wermelingers Monographie *Rom und Pelagius* lernen kann. Augustinus versucht aber vor und neben der synodalen Bearbeitung der 'Häresie' des Pelagius durch Verhandlung im Rahmen eines *amicitia* - Verhältnisses eine Klärung zu erreichen, um auf diese Weise christliche *caritas* üben zu können, ohne die *recta fides* und die *ueritas* verraten zu müssen. Die überlieferte pagane Freundschaftsethik ist für Augustinus dabei eine mögliche Form der *caritas*: Auch die christliche Nächstenliebe hat eine Geschichte.

Der Versuch des Augustinus scheiterte; er hatte das *amicitia* — Verhältnis und dessen impliziten und expliziten Verhaltenscodes überfordert. Pelagius liess sich nicht bekehren und schien eher darauf zu vertrauen, dass seine Zugehörigkeit zu einem Netzwerk von *amici* ihn retten könne. Das Scheitern des Augustinus in seinem Verhältnis zu Pelagius war dramatischer als der Dissens mit Hieronymus, mit dem der endgültige Bruch vermieden werden konnte. Das vergebliche Werben des Augustinus um Pelagius und Hieronymus hat Parallelen: Laut Éric Rebillard versucht der Bischof in seinen Briefen immer wieder, diejenige *amicitia,* die durch die Konventionen des brieflichen

[81] CSEL 42,102.

Austausches zwischen den Angehörigen der sozialen Elite konstituiert wurde, neu zu definieren. Die Neudefinition zielte auf eine *amicitia*, die durch den gemeinsamen Glauben und die gemeinsame Zugehörigkeit zur katholischen Kirche begründet wird, nicht durch die Zugehörigkeit zu einer sozialen Klasse mit bestimmten Bildungs- und Verhaltensidealen. Doch gelang diese Neudefinition der *amicitia* meist nicht; in den Augen seiner gebildeten Zeitgenossen hatte Augustinus verwertbares soziales Kapital eher als hochkompetenter und hochgebildeter offizieller Rhetor denn als Bischof seiner Kirche.[82] Rebillard schreibt resümierend:

> „Le résultat d'une analyse attentive aux interactions d'Augustin et de ses parténaires sociaux est une image beaucoup plus complexe de la participation d'Augustin au rituel épistolaire de l'élite sociale et culturelle de son temps. Elle souligne en particulier qu'en dépit des efforts d'Augustin pour instaurer des relations sur un autre mode — directeur spirituel plutôt que lettré, une amicitia fondée sur la commune appartenance à l'Église catholique plutôt qu'une solidarité de classe — il est parfois comme rattrapé par la réalité sociale. Ses correspondants voient d'autant plus en lui l'évêque qu'ils reconnaissent d'abord un des leurs."[83]

Der Versuch des Augustinus, Pelagius als *amicus* zu bekehren — so könnte man vielleicht in Aufnahme dieser Einschätzung Rebillards sagen — hatte angesichts der kirchlichen und sozialen Realität seiner Zeit etwas Utopisches. Aber wird nicht jeder Versuch, nur mit der Macht der Worte und Argumente, durch Kommunikation allein, andere Menschen zu erreichen und vielleicht sogar überzeugen, von einer oft ziemlich verwegenen Hoffnung getragen?

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[82] É.Rebillard, Augustin et le rituel épistolaire (s.Anm.36), 144.
[83] É.Rebillard, Augustin et le rituel épistolaire, 151

LE FANTÔME SEMI-PÉLAGIEN. LECTURE DU TRAITÉ *DE GRATIA* DE FAUSTE DE RIEZ

Abstract

From the beginning Faustus' views on grace have had a varied reception. They have been considered, now as fundamentally orthodox, then as roughly pelagian. Today, seen as a whole, the critics are more irenic. But temptations remain to endorse a non-historical, normative (that is to say, haunted by Augustine's great shade) theology, and the issue is still a bit shrouded in mist.

A reappraisal seems necessary. Consequently, this paper first puts the *De gratia* back in its context, both doctrinal (reactions among the African and Provençal monks faced with augustinian theories) and factual (short data regarding Faustus' biography). Then it gives an analysis of the treatise's contents. On these bases, a fresh scrutiny is set out concerning the themes and argumentations. The conclusion reads as follows:

> «Faustus was not a 'semipelagian'; his thought, notably about the antecedence and prevalence of grace, is consistent. It is time to stop discussion and to shake off old dogmatic patterns. However, at least in language, the bishop yields to inaccuracies that tend to obscure his purpose. Sometimes he also displays somewhat shy or stiff attitudes that cannot but deceive. Above all, one feature remains *prima facie* surprising: Faustus distinguishes between two economies of grace and asserts that original graces persist in the present economy (viz. the Redeemer's one) — in a way that does not shed clear light on the 'centrality' of Christ (viz. the incarnate Son, the Saviour through his death and resurrection). Yet, such a feature is not inorganic, nor is it ambiguous in substance, even though the wording may seem so. For it is totally in line with Faustus' global teaching, and it has to be understood within the common way of thinking in the patristic age.»

Introduction

L'enseignement de Fauste, évêque de Riez, sur la grâce, tel qu'il se dévoile dans le *De gratia*, a donné lieu, dès l'Antiquité, à des jugements contrastés. Pour les uns (les augustiniens), Fauste témoignerait d'un «semi-pélagianisme» confinant au pélagianisme *tout court*, et serait, en conséquence, tenu à tort pour un saint. Pour les autres (jésuites quelquefois — comme par hasard: je pense à Denis Petau et aux

Bollandistes), sa doctrine serait sans tache inexpiable et l'évêque de Riez n'aurait pas volé, si j'ose dire, son entrée au calendrier[1]...

Il n'est pas utile de détailler davantage ni de donner un aperçu de l'histoire des interprétations, des approbations et des condamnations. On trouvera cela dans un article de Carlo Tibiletti.[2]

L'objet de la présente communication est différent. Il ne s'agira pas de produire une sentence d'orthodoxie ou d'hérésie. On tentera, abstraction généralement faite des jugements d'autrefois, de comprendre dans l'histoire (en remettant Fauste dans son temps — dans le climat doctrinal de son temps), la logique, ou l'éventuel illogisme, des positions de l'évêque de Riez, et d'en pointer les tenants et aboutissants.[3]

On me permettra ici de dire le plaisir, et l'honneur, que j'ai à offrir cet essai, malgré ses imperfections, à un ami — à un savant qui, excellent connaisseur des controverses sur la grâce, sait bien qu'il n'est pas qu'une demeure — celle de saint Augustin, si grand soit-il — dans la maison du Père.

1. Le *De gratia.* Situation historique

Les Provençaux et la théologie d'Augustin[4]

Les ouvrages d'Augustin contre Pélage et Julien n'allèrent pas, on le sait, sans soulever des remous dans les milieux monastiques africains. La lettre, dont les moines d'Hadrumète eurent communication, adressée par Augustin au prêtre romain, futur pape, Xyste (*Ep. Aug.* 194) leur parut, en raison de son insistance sur la toute-puissance de la grâce, une dangereuse invite au découragement et à l'inaction morale. À l'objection faite par quelqu'un du groupe (si

[1] Jusqu'à la Révolution, l'évêque de Riez a bénéficié d'un culte local le 28 septembre. Il n'est pas au *Martyrologe romain*. Cf. WEIGEL **[2.23]**, p. 143-152.

[2] **[2.19]**. (Ici et dans les notes qui suivent les chiffres gras entre crochets renvoient à la numérotation de l'«Orientation bibliographique».)

[3] J'ai déjà abordé la question dans un article recensé par l'«Orientation bibliographique» (**[2.11]**): résumé d'un long exposé que j'ai donné à l'abbaye de Lérins, sur l'invitation du Père abbé et de toute la communauté, en février 2004, à l'occasion de la commémoration du XV[e] centenaire de l'implantation de la vie monastique dans l'île. L'exposé esquisse les solutions proposées ici. Il le fait parfois d'une manière peu claire, et se trouve déparé par deux ou trois erreurs factuelles. Je suis heureux d'avoir la possibilité de reprendre cette ébauche avec plus de précision.

[4] Je crois superflu de donner sur ce paragraphe, ainsi que sur la n. 11 — les faits, les hommes et les idées qui y sont évoqués —, toute indication bibliographique: voir quelques références indispensables dans l'article mentionné n. précédente, p. 20-21; cf. également **[2.2]**; **[2.16]**; **[2.20]**.

nous sommes prédestinés, que nous sert d'être corrigés? la réprimande fraternelle devient inutile), l'évêque d'Hippone répliqua par le *De correptione et gratia*, envoyé aux religieux concernés.

Quand les moines provençaux (marseillais et lériniens) lisent à leur tour ce traité, et qu'ils découvrent ses thèses, abruptes à leurs yeux, un vif émoi naît chez eux, malgré l'admiration qu'ils disent éprouver pour Augustin. Dans deux lettres à celui-ci (*inter Ep. Aug.* 225 et 226) Prosper et Hilaire, ses disciples, font état de ces inquiétudes. (La chronologie n'interdit pas de supposer que la *Collatio* XIII de Jean Cassien sur la grâce prend en ligne de mire la théologie d'Augustin; mais Cassien se garde de polémiquer.)

Augustin répond, en réaffirmant, avec toute la charité due à des frères qui détestent l'erreur pélagienne autant que lui, le bien-fondé de ses positions sur deux points litigieux (*De praedestinatione sanctorum* et *De dono perseuerantiae*, adressés à Prosper et Hilaire).

Après la mort d'Augustin se place l'activité de Prosper, laïc, issu d'une bonne famille d'Aquitaine et installé à Marseille. Les œuvres successives de Prosper témoignent d'une évolution dans le sens d'une atténuation de son augustinisme, des ouvrages des années 430 (ainsi le poème *De ingratis*, ou le *De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio contra Collatorem* — le «Conférencier»: entendons, Jean Cassien) au *De uocatione omnium gentium*. Quant aux Provençaux, ils demeurent en garde: à preuve les piques, même mouchetées, d'un Vincent de Lérins (*Commonitorium* 24.26).

Fauste de Riez: esquisse biographique[5]

Je me bornerai à rappeler quelques données, uniquement pour fixer les idées.

[5] Je n'ose écrire «esquisse *prosopographique*», même si j'essaie de rendre sensibles les incertitudes d'inductions que les articles des dictionnaires, trop souvent, se passent de l'un à l'autre avec confiance. Le guide reste en général WEIGEL **[2.23]**; il y a aussi, comme toujours, beaucoup à glaner dans TILLEMONT **[2.10]**, l'antipathie que le pieux port-royaliste nourrit envers un fauteur de «pélagianisme» n'obnubilant pas, quant aux faits, son érudite acribie. (La *Prosopographie chrétienne de la Gaule*, en préparation sous la direction de Mme L. PIETRI, fournira toutes nuances idoines.)- Les sources directes de la biographie de Fauste sont, outre ses propres œuvres, et notamment les lettres qu'il écrivit à Rurice de Limoges: (1) un poème de Sidoine Apollinaire (*Carmen* 16); (2) les lettres du même Sidoine, dont deux à Fauste; (3) deux lettres de Rurice, adressées pareillement à celui-ci (des lettres de Rurice à Fauste et de Fauste à Rurice, éd. récente par R. DEMEULENAERE, *CCL* 64, 1985). La notice de Gennade, *Vir. Ill.* 86 (éd. E. RICHARDSON, «Texte und Untersuchungen» 14, Leipzig 1896, p. 91), est importante pour cerner l'étendue de l'héritage littéraire de l'évêque de Riez (*infra*, n. 7).

Insulaire (né sans doute en Bretagne — Angleterre actuelle — vers 400), *Faustus* fut moine à Lérins de 424 à 433. Quand Maxime, abbé de Lérins, eut été élu évêque d'*Augusta Reiorum*, ou *Reii*, en Narbonnaise Seconde (act. Riez, dans les Alpes-de-Haute-Provence), Fauste devint à son tour abbé: il le resta de 433 à 457 environ, solidaire à ce titre des tendances théologiques et spirituelles du monastère, et défenseur de ses droits contre Théodore, évêque de Fréjus. Il succéda à Maxime comme évêque de Riez en 457, dit-on souvent (il assista du moins avec cette qualité, en 462, à un concile romain), et occupa ce siège jusqu'à sa mort, vers 490-495. Après la conquête de la Provence par le roi wisigoth Euric, il fut un temps exilé (476-485): depuis le cardinal Noris[6] on met en relation cet exil, dont Fauste lui-même fait état (*Ep.* 9), avec la politique anticatholique du monarque arien, lequel aurait été spécialement irrité contre l'évêque pour ses écrits sur la Trinité. Quoi qu'il en soit, la fin de la carrière de Fauste est à replacer dans l'histoire de l'installation des peuples germaniques sur les ruines de la domination romaine en Gaule et, plus généralement, en Occident.

Son œuvre se compose de deux traités (*De Spiritu sancto*, *De gratia*), de *Lettres* et de *Sermons* (dont la critique d'authenticité reste largement à faire: c'est l'épineuse question de la collection dite «d'Eusèbe Gallican»).[7]

L'affaire Lucidus

Fauste polémiqua contre un certain Lucidus, prêtre dans le sud de la Gaule.[8] Celui-ci avait sur la prédestination des idées rigoureu-

[6] Voir TILLEMONT **[2.10]**, p. 429. (WEIGEL **[2.23]**, p. 116, est sur ce point précis assez évasif.)- On soutient souvent que, en 475, Fauste eut part aux négociations entre Euric et l'éphémère empereur Julius Nepos (474-475; † 480) et à la conclusion du traité où le premier obtint l'Auvergne (ce n'est que par la suite, en 476, qu'il mit la main sur les pays entre mer et Durance). Sur ce traité et les événements subséquents, indications cursives d'A. CHASTAGNOL, *La fin du monde antique. De Stilicon à Justinien (V^e siècle et début VI^e)*, Paris 1976, p. 36s.; sur le rôle diplomatique exactement joué par Fauste, voir WEIGEL **[2.23]**, p. 113s. (exposé, spéc. p. 113, n. 49, plus nuancé que dans CHASTAGNOL sur la portée du traité et l'identité des contractants).

[7] Gennade mentionne un «*Aduersum Arianos et Macedonianos* paruum libellum», qu'il est impossible d'identifier à aucun traité ou lettre, ou morceau de traité ou lettre subsistant — pas même à l'opuscule *De ratione fidei*, d'authenticité au demeurant plus que douteuse (*CPL* 964).- La notice de Gennade, comme bien on pense, est fort louangeuse (sur certains sentiments de Gennade, voir cependant *infra*, n. 37). De leur côté Sidoine et Rurice ne tarissent pas d'éloges sur les vertus du maître lérinien et ses qualités de conducteur d'âmes.

[8] Malgré ce qui se lit souvent, il ne me paraît pas avéré que Lucidus fût prêtre de la propre Église de Fauste, Riez. Cf. WEIGEL **[2.23]**, p. 93, n. 1.

ses: il pourrait avoir affirmé que la prédestination à la réprobation provient d'un acte *délibéré* de la souveraineté divine.

Fauste essaya d'abord de ramener Lucidus par la persuasion, lui soumettant par lettre, sous forme d'anathématismes, une liste d'erreurs à rétracter (*Ep. Fausti* 1). Il échoua, et fit condamner les opinions du prêtre aux conciles d'Arles puis de Lyon (entre 470 et 475: les dates sont mal assurées). Dans un *Libellus* établi par Fauste (*Exemplar epistulae Lucidi presbyteri* = *Ep. Fausti* 2) Lucidus s'était soumis aux décisions d'Arles. Fauste rédigea contre lui le *De gratia*, au moins sous la forme que nous en avons, après le concile de Lyon, quelques nouvelles difficultés s'étant fait jour entre temps (voir *Ep. dedic.* du *De gratia* à Léonce d'Arles).[9]

Il est malaisé de cerner la portée exacte des idées de Lucidus, et leur rapport à Augustin. Lucidus était-il «prédestinatien», déduisant de la pensée augustinienne les conséquences exagérées qu'on a tenté de résumer ci-dessus, ou bien était-il augustinien fidèle? Augustin parle lui aussi, et à plusieurs reprises,[10] de la prédestination «ad aeternam mortem»; mais il y voit plutôt un acte *négatif*, Dieu choisissant de laisser aller à leur perte ceux qu'ils n'a pas *positivement* élus; et en tout état de cause il n'y a pas de prédestination «ad peccatum». Rien n'assure que Fauste ait eu conscience des éventuels *distinguos* à opérer entre Augustin et Lucidus ou que, s'il en eut conscience, il en ait tenu compte. Cela n'est pas sans intérêt pour identifier la cible ultime de sa polémique: ce pouvait être Augustin lui-même; les anathématismes de la lettre 1 paraissent bien viser des doctrines augustiniennes, en les condensant, il est vrai, sans les nuances et les précautions dont les entourait le docteur d'Hippone. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut juger aventureuse l'idée, énoncée pour la première fois au XVII[e] siècle par le jésuite Sirmond, faisant de Lucidus le représentant d'une secte prédestinatienne qui aurait alors sévi dans le sud de la Gaule.[11]

[9] L'articulation chronologique entre les deux conciles, les lettres de Fauste et son *De gratia* reste conjecturale. Voir exposé des difficultés et des solutions dans WEIGEL **[2.23]**, p. 94s. Récemment, E. LANA **[1.6]**, p. 12, a essayé de montrer que Fauste avait écrit une première mouture du *De gratia* après le concile d'Arles, et qu'il compléta ce premier jet après celui de Lyon; il accompagne cette conjecture de conclusions touchant la structure du traité: voir *infra*, n. 17.

[10] *An. et or.* 4, 16; *Ciu.* 15, 1, 1; *Enchir.* 100; *Peccat. merit.* 2, 26; *Tract. Io.* 43, 13; 48, 6; 90, 2.

[11] Il n'est pas besoin de poursuivre l'histoire des controverses relatives à la grâce jusqu'à leur dénouement dans l'Antiquité, au temps de Césaire d'Arles et du concile d'Orange — en attendant les nouvelles flambées au Moyen Âge (au IX[e] siècle, autour de Gottschalk d'Orbais) et à l'époque moderne (Réforme, jansénisme). Il suffira de

2. Le *De gratia.* Présentation littéraire

Visée du traité, d'après l'épître dédicatoire de Fauste à Léonce et le chapitre 1 du livre 1

L'épître dédicatoire est adressée à Léonce, évêque d'Arles, qui avait présidé le concile condamnant Lucidus. Fauste y déclare son intention d'écrire à la fois contre Pélage, dont la doctrine impie exalte l'orgueil humain au détriment de la grâce, et au sujet «de la prescience et de la prédestination».

Deux remarques importantes. D'une part, Fauste annonce que dans son traité l'attaque antipélagienne n'occupera qu'une place restreinte («blasphemias eius breui sermone praestringere et confutare necessarium iudicauimus[12]»), tandis qu'il parlera plus longuement du deuxième aspect («latius utcumque sermonem de praescientia et praedestinatione produximus»). D'autre part, il souligne que ladite attaque a pour dessein de faire en sorte que l'on départe bien ceux qui, comme lui, Fauste, ne négligent pas de prêcher l'effort humain (*labor*), mais en tant que réponse à la grâce, et les hétérodoxes, négateurs présomptueux de cette grâce. Notation subsidiaire: Fauste assure qu'il se contentera, le plus souvent, d'accumuler les textes scripturaires à l'appui de ses vues («testimoniorum uirtute contenti absque sublimitate sermonis lucem protulimus ueritatis»).

Le chapitre 1 du livre 1 essaie de ménager davantage l'équilibre. Fauste présente la vérité catholique, dont il se proclame le champion, en matière de grâce comme un équidistant refus du pélagianisme et

mentionner que, au début du VI[e] s., entrent en scène les moines scythes (natifs de «Scythie Mineure», actuelle Dobroudja — comme probablement, plus d'un siècle auparavant, Jean Cassien), infatigables dénicheurs d'hérésie (ils jouèrent un rôle analogue dans les controverses christologiques). Les Scythes lisent le *De gratia* de Fauste, en sont scandalisés et interviennent à Constantinople auprès de l'évêque africain Possessor. Celui-ci intervient à son tour auprès du Siège apostolique et s'attire du pape Hormisdas (514-523) la réponse que voici: le livre de Fauste n'est pas reçu, mais sa lecture n'est pas interdite, la doctrine de l'Église est dans les ouvrages d'Augustin à Prosper et Hilaire, mais surtout dans les *Capitula* de Célestin (431; en fait *Indiculus* compilé sous Xyste III [432-440] par le diacre, futur pape, Léon, ou par Prosper). Les Scythes, insatisfaits, en appellent aux évêques d'Afrique exilés en Sardaigne par le pouvoir vandale arien. Parmi ces exilés était Fulgence de Ruspe. Dans des écrits qu'il rédige au nom des Africains (*Ep.* 17 ou *Liber de incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi*; après le retour en Afrique: *Ep.* 15) ou dans ses œuvres personnelles (premier des trois livres *ad Monimum*; sept livres, aujourd'hui perdus, *Contra Faustum*; après le retour en Afrique: *De ueritate praedestinationis et gratiae Dei*), Fulgence se fait le propagandiste d'un augustinisme rigide.

[12] Dans tout ce travail, je cite le *De gratia* d'après l'éd. ENGELBRECHT, *CSEL* 21 **[1.2; 1.4]**.

des thèses «prédestinatiennes». Position centriste qu'il rapproche de la juste balance de la foi droite en matière christologique, à égal éloignement du nestorianisme (qui, comme Pélage, exalte trop l'humanité) et du monophysisme (qui, comme les prédestinatiens, donne à la divinité un rôle trop écrasant). L'idée, en général, que l'orthodoxie se situe entre deux excès hérétiques contraires n'est pas une invention de Fauste. On la trouve chez Augustin lui-même, dans la défense que fait celui-ci de sa propre doctrine sur la grâce (*Ep.* 215, 7-8[13]): et il n'est certes pas interdit de penser que Fauste se souvient ici d'Augustin. Mais, à la vérité, le thème est ancien: on lit par exemple chez Novatien et, pour partie à la suite de Novatien, chez Hilaire de Poitiers, que la juste croyance trinitaire (plus exactement la croyance en la «divinité» du Fils) rejette également l'unitarisme et l'adoptianisme (chez Novatien), le sabellianisme et le subordiatianisme arien (chez Hilaire);[14] Fauste devait savoir cela.

Sa structure

La structure et la stratégie du traité tout entier vérifient *in concreto*, à leur manière, le programme tracé dans la lettre préface et dans le premier chapitre.

Il n'est pas sans intérêt, peut-être, de rapporter ici la *capitulation* du traité (qui remonte peut-être à Fauste lui-même — encore qu'il se pose là un petit problème ecdotique, que nous retrouverons).[15]

CAPITULA LIBRI PRIMI

I. Quod Pelagii sensus, qui gratiam negauit, primo loco necesse sit destrui.
II. Contra obiectionem Pelagii qua dicit paruulos baptismo non egere.

[13] Cité par SMITH [**2.14bis**], p. 119.

[14] L'idée est même, déjà, dans Clément d'Alexandrie: voir toutes références utiles dans P. MATTEI, «De Novatien à Hilaire», in D. BERTRAND (dir.), *Dieu Trinité d'hier à demain avec Hilaire de Poitiers*, actes du colloque de Poitiers (15-17 novembre 2002), Paris 2010, p. 101-129, spéc. p. 108-109.129. Déjà Prosper rapprochait nestorianisme et pélagianisme comme d'égales, et coupables, revendications d'autonomie de l'homme face à Dieu: voir par exemple le petit poème «Epitaphion nestorianae et pelagianae haereseon», *PL* 51, col. 153-154.

[15] Je recopie les tables mises par ENGELBRECHT en tête de chaque livre (p. 5-6; 58). Les titres qu'il imprime en tête de chaque chapitre en diffèrent parfois quant au détail du texte, mais non pas quant à sa teneur, ou à l'essentiel du libellé.

III. Contra hoc, quod dicunt, quia per solam gratiam omnis homo sine ullo labore seruetur. Contra eum sensum, qui dicendo: unus ad mortem praedestinatus, alter ad uitam praedestinatus est, rebus ipsis spem intercludit orandi.
IV. Vbi legis opera destruuntur et gratiae commendantur.
V. De eo, quod ait: gratia dei sum, quod sum.
VI. Quomodo intellegendum sit: gratia, inquit, salui facti estis per fidem, et non ex uobis.
VII. Contra hoc, quod dicunt liberum arbitrium ex toto fuisse sublatum.
VIII. Qualiter infirmitas liberi arbitrii intellegenda sit.
IX. Quomodo intellegendum sit: non uolentis neque currentis, sed miserantis est dei, uel illud: non ueni uocare iustos, sed peccatores in paenitentiam.
X. Contra hoc, quod dicunt ad malum tantum arbitrium promptum esse homini, ad bonum prorsus non esse.
XI. Contra eum sensum, qui dicit, quod uas in contumeliam non possit assurgere, ut sit uas in honorem.
XII. Item uelle et nolle sicut ad malam ita etiam ad bonam partem hominis arbitrio fuisse commissum.
XIII. Vbi sibi gratia dei et uoluntas humana testimoniorum assertione sociantur et de paruulis inanis calumnia transeundo praestringitur.
XIV. Contra hoc, quod dicunt eos, qui post baptismum pereunt, in baptismum penitus non credidisse.
XV. De ruina angeli et habere sanctos angelos similitudinem dei contra quorundam persuasionem.
XVI. Christum pro omnibus mortuum.
XVII. Contra hoc, quod dicunt, quia dei uiolentia induret hominem, ne uenire ualeat ad salutem.
XVIII. Nullum uolente deo perire.

CAPITULA LIBRI SECUNDI

I. Contra hoc, quod nimie asserunt a deo induratum fuisse cor Pharaonis.
II. Quod praescientia dei nec ad iusta nec ad contraria humanas urgeat uoluntates.
III. Quod aliud sit praescire, aliud praedestinare.
IV. Contra hoc, quod dicunt: in istos misericors est, quos adquirit, in illos iustus est, quos relinquit, cum et circa malos misericors est et circa bonos etiam iustus appareat.
V. Contra hoc, quod dicunt: non tam uoluit quam non potuit saluus esse, qui periit, iuxta quod legimus: et non poterant credere.
VI. Quid sit, quod ait: cum enim nondum egissent aliquid boni aut mali.
VII. Quid sit, quod ait: ut propositum dei maneret.
VIII. Contra hoc, quod dicunt: totus periit Adam.
IX. Ad cuius imaginem et similitudinem primus homo sit conditus.

X. De hoc, quod naturae legem aut interisse dicant aut insitam non fuisse.
XI. Gentes deum naturaliter sapuisse.
XII. De Niniuitis.

Il semble, à première vue, difficile de discerner un plan strict entre les *capitula* (*a fortiori*, dans le détail de leur rédaction). Néanmoins, quelques lignes se dessinent.

Il est exact que, selon son programme, Fauste délaisse très vite (dès le chapitre 3 du livre 1) la polémique directe contre Pélage, pour s'en prendre à ceux qui minimisent, ou anéantissent, la liberté. Mais la volonté de se démarquer de Pélage subsiste, avec netteté et persévérance, dans le reste du traité: et cela aussi est conforme à la méthode, ou à l'état d'esprit, annoncés. Il est non moins exact, et les intitulés mêmes des *capitula*, à eux seuls, le suggèrent, que l'argumentation est scripturaire de bout en bout. Pour donner une définition globale de son projet, qui rende compte des particularités de l'ouvrage tout entier (de son orientation comme aussi bien de ses points faibles), je dirai qu'il s'agit pour Fauste de conduire une *controverse* sur la base de *discussions bibliques multipliées*.

La capitulation permet, en elle-même, d'avancer plusieurs autres choses. L'attaque contre ceux qui minimisent, ou anéantissent, la liberté, paraît se déployer d'une manière assez ordonnée, en 1, 3-13, montrant d'abord, semble-t-il, que ceux-ci, indûment, grossissent le rôle de la grâce (1, 3-6), puis qu'ils réduisent, non moins indûment, celui du libre arbitre (1, 7-13). L'extrême fin du livre 1 et le début du livre 2, au thème général qui règne dans la plus grande partie du livre 1 et qui était annoncé (l'homme reste libre), ajoutent un thème connexe, non évoqué dans les pages préliminaires: Dieu n'est pas l'auteur du mal, et sa bonté ne peut être révoquée en doute. Il semble que la fin du livre 2 (chapitre 9 et suivants), dans une espèce de «bouquet final» qui serait comme l'équivalent d'une *amplificatio* rhétorique, tente un essai plus précis de théorisation:[16] comment se représenter, sur le pied d'une réflexion «anthropologique» (touchant

[16] Réflexion similaire dans SMITH **[2.14bis]**, p. 98.- La référence aux recettes des rhéteurs a, dans mon esprit, une valeur surtout analogique: car, si l'on comprend bien les théoriciens (e.g. Cicéron, *Orator* 36, 127), l'*amplificatio*, particulièrement recommandée dans la péroraison, est bien un moyen d'élargir et d'élever le débat, mais en émouvant, non pas en instruisant. Parallèle plus pertinent, peut-être, avec la structure du *De Trinitate* de Novatien: dans un dernier effort dialectique, le développement final de ce traité (actuels chapitres 30-31) traite, sur un mode plus abstrait que précédemment, des relations du Père et du Fils.

l'état primitif de l'homme et les conséquences de la chute), que la liberté, dans l'état infralapsaire (l'expression n'est pas dans Fauste), ne soit pas annihilée, ni la grâce du tout perdue.[17]

Note sur l'état actuel du texte

Dans tout ce qui précède, j'ai suivi les subdivisions du *CSEL*: l'éditeur de Vienne, A. Engelbrecht, adopte en l'espèce la capitulation de l'unique *codex* sur lequel il se fonde (*P*, Paris BN latin 2166, saec. IX). Il faut savoir que l'édition de la *PL*, qui reprend celle d'une *Patrologie* publiée à Lyon en 1677,[18] est parfois assez fortement divergente. Le tableau qui suit dresse la liste de ces divergences.

CSEL	*PL*
Livre 1	
1, 1-3, 1ère partie	1, 1-3
1, 3, 2e partie («Contra eorum sensum, qui dicendo, etc.»)	1, 4
1, 4-14	1, 5-15
1, 15	N'est pas isolé en tant que chapitre
1, 16, 1ère partie («Contra hoc, quod dicunt, etc.»)	1, 16
1, 16, 2e partie («Contra hoc, quod euangelicam»)	1, 17
1, 17-18	1, 18-19

[17] Lana **[1.6]**, p. (12.)16-17, qui emprunte à Smith **[2.14]**, p. 61, l'opinion que la répartition en deux livres n'est pas due à Fauste, soutient que la structure des treize premiers chapitres est nette (c'est celle que je résume ci-dessus dans le texte), tandis que la suite formerait une accumulation invertébrée. Preuve, selon lui, d'une rédaction en deux temps, ou, dit autrement, trace textuelle de cette rédaction (cf. *supra*, n. 9): reprenant après le concile de Lyon un ensemble ordonné composé après le concile d'Arles, Fauste aurait ajouté une suite mal concertée de «*soluuntur obiecta*» et d'éclaircissements complémentaires. Il convient, en fait, de demeurer prudent. Car, s'il est vrai que la section 1, 1-13 est assez fermement charpentée dans ses grandes lignes, le détail, d'une part, en est plus confus, et, d'autre part, le reste du *De gratia*, j'ai essayé de le suggérer (texte correspondant à la note précédente), n'est pas inorganique: des regroupements s'y distinguent. Ce qui affaiblit, sinon l'hypothèse d'une rédaction en deux temps, du moins l'effort pour déceler clairement des rajouts dans le texte actuel.

[18] *Maxima Bibliotheca ueterum Patrum*, t. VIII, p. 523s. Cf. Weigel **[2.23]**, p. 156.

CSEL	*PL*
Livre 2	
2, 1-6	2, 1-6
2, 7 (titre de chapitre, sans texte)	N'existe pas en tant que chapitre
2, 8 (texte du chapitre lacunaire)	N'existe pas en tant que chapitre
2, 9-10 (1ère partie)	2, 7-8
2, 10, 2e partie («Contra hoc, quod dicunt, quia ante gratiae tempus agnitio unius dei gentibus concessa non fuerit»)	2, 9
2, 11	2, 10
2, 12	N'est pas isolé en tant que chapitre

Les modifications introduites par l'éditeur viennois s'expliquent pour partie par les lacunes qu'il croit devoir déceler dans le texte du *De gratia*: lacunes d'étendue variable, dont il serait sans doute bon de vérifier, au cas par cas, dans une nouvelle édition critique (je n'ai pas la place, évidemment, de le faire ici) le bien-fondé de la détection.[19]

Il reste, et ceci est très important, que c'est dans ces lacunes que doivent s'insérer deux des citations qu'un des moines scythes, Jean Maxence, fait du *De gratia* dans sa *Responsio aduersus epistulam Hormisdae*, la première extraite de *De gratia* 1, 15 (Jean écrit: 1, 14), la seconde, probablement, de 2, 11 (voir les références précises dans Engelbrecht, p. 96-97). Il paraît utile de rapporter dès à présent la seconde, qui, à la vérité, prend plutôt la forme, littérairement, d'une paraphrase ou d'une contraction (nous retrouverons plus loin la question de sa fidélité à la pensée de Fauste):

[19] La *CPL*, n° 961, donne la référence de quelques travaux philologiques qui permettent de corriger une édition de toute manière vieillie, et à refondre, et entre lesquels on relèvera surtout ceux du suédois A.G. Elg (pour l'essentiel, **[2.6; 2.7]**). Ajouter: R. Jacoby, «Was Handschriften lehren: Inedita zu Faustus *De gratia*», in *«Alvarium». Festschrift für Christian Gnilka*, hrg. von W. Blümer, R. Henke und M. Mülke, Münster 2002, p. 205-210. Ajouter aussi deux recensions de l'édition d'Engelbrecht: *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (Leipzig) 17, 1892, p. 130-132 (A. Jülicher); *Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie* (Berlin) 8, 1891, p. 1423s. (M. Petschenig). (Même si j'y renvoie à l'occasion, je n'ai pas repris dans l'«Orientation bibliographique»: la totalité des travaux référencés dans la *CPL*; l'article de Jacoby; les recensions ci-dessus.)

[Texte 1] «Vnde et in libr<i secundi capitul>o undecimo per naturalem uigorem absque gratiae adiutorio multos non solum ante aduentum domini, uerum etiam et ante legem litterae saluatos atque ad plenam cordis puritatem perfectamque iustitiam peruenisse, filios dei fieri meruisse impudenter et procaciter asseuerauit (*scil.* Faustus).[20]»

D'où au (chapitre 11 du livre II), cette assertion impudente et effrontée (de Fauste) que, par la force de la nature, sans l'aide de la grâce, beaucoup, non seulement avant la venue du Seigneur, mais encore avant la loi de la lettre aussi ont été sauvés et sont parvenus à la pleine pureté de cœur et à la justice parfaite, méritant de devenir fils de Dieu.

3. Le *De gratia.* Ses thèses: description, essai d'analyse critique

Description. Les affirmations fondamentales du traité: idée de base et conséquences; leurs racines; leurs implications

a) Affirmations fondamentales. Elles se ramènent à trois, et forment un tout ordonné. Car le traité repose sur une idée de base d'où Fauste tire deux conséquences corrélatives.

Le *De gratia*, dès son début — c'est l'idée de base —, pose, avec une égale force, la nécessité de la grâce et la nécessité pour l'homme d'agir. Les textes sont nombreux qui soutiennent cette double nécessité. Entre cent:

[Texte 2] «... cecidit (Pelagius), dum arbitrii libertatem integram praedicat et inlaesam, sicut illi, qui eam ex toto asserunt fuisse euacuatam. Hoc itaque loco gemini inter se conluctantur errores, quorum unus solam gratiam, alter solum laborem relicto tramite atque mensura ueritatis insinuat» (1, 1, p. 7, l. 5-10).

... (Pélage) est tombé, en proclamant que le libre arbitre est sans altération ni blessure, tout comme ceux qui assurent sa totale disparition. Ainsi, sur ce point, c'est deux erreurs jumelles qui se combattent: laissant la voie et la mesure de la vérité, l'une enseigne la grâce seule, et l'autre le seul effort (humain).

Jean Cassien et Augustin présentaient, comme en deux colonnes, des séries de textes scripturaires prouvant l'existence concomitante de la grâce et de la liberté: Fauste use du même procédé (1, 13).

[20] La correction qu'avait introduite ENGELBRECHT (p. 97-98) n'a pas été retenue par le dernier éditeur de la *Responsio* (F. GLORIE, *Maxentius et Ioannes Tomitanus. Opuscula*, *CCL* 85A, 1978, p. 151).

De cette nécessité conjointe de la grâce et de la liberté il découle (première conséquence) une hostilité à la notion de prédestination. Fauste voit dans cette notion un déterminisme blasphématoire à l'égard de Dieu (Dieu y apparaît comme l'auteur véritable du péché) et attentatoire à l'égard de l'homme (l'homme n'y est plus que comme un jouet aux mains de Dieu). Au concept de prédestination que, ainsi entendu, il refuse, l'évêque de Riez préfère de beaucoup celui de prescience — ou plutôt, il ne retient, au mieux, qu'une prédestination *post praeuisa merita*:

> **[Texte 3]** «Aliud est praescire, aliud praedestinare. Praescientia itaque gerenda praenoscit, postmodum praedestinatio retribuenda describit. Illa praeuidet merita, haec praeordinat praemia. Praescientia ad potentiam, praedestinatio ad iustitiam pertinet... Cum illa praenuntiauerit causam, tunc praenuntiat ista sententiam. A praescientia quae sunt nostra produntur, a praedestinatione quae <sua *Mattei*> sunt praeparantur. Ac sic nisi praescientia explorauerit, praedestinatio nil decernit» (2, 3, p. 63, l. 10s.).
>
> Une chose est de connaître à l'avance, une autre de prédestiner. Donc, la prescience connaît à l'avance les actes qui seront accomplis, et ensuite la prédestination détermine à l'avance les rétributions qui seront données. La première prévoit les mérites, la seconde préordonne les récompenses. La prescience a rapport à la puissance de Dieu, la prédestination à sa justice... Quand l'une a énoncé le cas, l'autre alors énonce la sentence. C'est par la prescience qu'est dévoilé ce qui tient à nous, par la prédestination qu'est préparé ce qui relève d'elle (?). Et ainsi, sans l'observation par la prescience, il n'y a pas de décret de la prédestination.[21]

[21] Une correction du texte s'impose. Déjà ELG **[2.7]**, p. 26-27, l'avait reconnu, et écrivait: «quae sunt <iudicis> praeparantur». J'avance, *pedetemptim*, une autre émendation. Du point de vue codicologique elle paraît plus économique, plus justifiable aussi (haplographie). Du point de vue stylistique elle procure, autant que celle d'ELG, une clausule excellente dans la prose du Provençal, respectant en tout cas le dichorée final (sur les clausules métriques et rythmiques chez Fauste, voir le même ELG **[2.6]**, p. 52-96); surtout, elle souligne mieux l'antithèse que laisse attendre *nostra*. Antithèse dont la vigueur apparemment simplificatrice est du reste à interpréter dans l'ensemble de la pensée de Fauste sur la conciliation de l'action humaine et de la grâce divine. De toute façon, quelle que soit, des deux, la correction adoptée, le sens global ne change pas: la prédestination prépare les récompenses qu'elle réserve aux bons. (Je ne sache pas que la présente correction, telle quelle, ait jamais été proposée dans aucun des autres travaux philologiques mentionnés, directement ou non, *supra*, n. 19. E. LANA **[1.6]**, p. 121 et n. 9 *ad loc.*, faute sans doute de connaître ELG, s'en tient au texte transmis: mais c'est au prix d'une interprétation obscure, et reposant sur une étrange, et irrecevable, traduction du verbe *praeparare*, compris comme signifiant «consolidare».)

Même dans le cas des saints Innocents, ajoute Fauste (*ibid.*), il n'est pas de prédestination *ante merita praeuisa*: le diable les a fait tuer, Dieu les a couronnés.[22] Et, selon lui, l'on ne saurait spéculer sur le cas, très obscur, des petits enfants morts sans baptême (1, 13).

Seconde conséquence: le corollaire du refus de la prédestination est le rejet de la notion d'élection. Ce rejet lui-même a deux visages.

D'une part, Fauste, visiblement contre Augustin, souligne avec énergie la volonté salvifique universelle de Dieu. On se souvient que, dans ce domaine, la pensée d'Augustin, et des augustiniens après lui, est incertaine, et, au mieux, ne parvient à préserver, de manière verbale, les assertions les plus nettes de l'Écriture qu'au prix de pénibles contorsions. Face à pareilles tergiversations Fauste était à son aise.

D'autre part, si, en vertu de la volonté salvifique universelle, tout homme est réellement appelé, tout homme aussi est responsable de son salut.

> **[Texte 4]** «Vide quam magnum opus et quam arduum perdendae et inueniendae animae etiam in hominis uoluntate constituit (cf. Lc 9, 24, cité juste auparavant), et propterea ita conclusit: 'Filius enim hominis uenturus est in gloria patris sui et tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera sua (Mt 16, 27)'. Aduerte quia, dum dicit 'secundum opera sua', salutem hominis non in praedestinatione factoris, sed in operatione famulantis largitor gratiae conlocauit» (1, 9, p. 29, l. 3-9).
>
> Vois: perdre sa vie et la trouver, quelle grande et rude entreprise! Et pourtant le Christ l'a fait dépendre aussi de la volonté de l'homme. D'où sa conclusion: «Car le Fils de l'homme doit venir dans la gloire de son Père, et alors il rendra à chacun selon ses œuvres». Observe que, en disant «selon ses œuvres», le dispensateur de la grâce a placé le salut de l'homme non pas dans la prédestination du Créateur, mais dans l'opération du serviteur.
>
> **[Texte 5]** «... hominis formator et rector bonae uoluntatis homini deputauit usum, sibi reseruauit effectum» (*ibid.*, p. 30, 4-6).
>
> ... le Créateur et Maître de l'homme a délégué à l'homme l'usage de la bonne volonté, mais s'en est réservé le résultat.

b) Racines morales et spirituelles des affirmations fondamentales.

Il ne s'agit pas seulement, comme on l'a suggéré plus haut, du refus de l'orgueil (pointe antipélagienne) et du «quiétisme fataliste» (perspective antiprédestinatienne). Ce refus, au demeurant, caractérise

[22] Je cite quasi *ad uerbum* TIXERONT **[2.21]**, p. 297.

bien une morale de type «monastique», où l'essentiel est un certain «activisme» ascétique, mais qui évite le piège de la présomption. Il s'agit surtout d'insister à la fois sur la bonté de Dieu et la dignité de l'homme, lequel s'approprie le bien que Dieu lui impartit.

c) Implications des affirmations fondamentales.

Exaltant la grâce, Fauste n'hésite pas à lui attribuer l'initiative, avant même tout mouvement de la volonté:

> **[Texte 6]** «... hoc ipsum incessabiliter asser(o) quod deo ipsam debeam uoluntatem, praesertim cum in omnibus eius motibus ad opus gratiae referam uel inchoationis initia uel consummationis extrema» (2, 10, p. 84, l. 11-14).
>
> ... j'atteste sans me lasser précisément que c'est à Dieu que je dois la volonté même, surtout parce que dans tous les mouvements de la volonté je rapporte à l'œuvre de la grâce soit les premiers commencements, soit les ultimes achèvements.

Mais cette ferme profession intervient au terme d'un passage où le théologien gaulois pointait avec vigueur le primat de la volonté, et elle est là, justement, pour prévenir le grief, porté contre Pélage, de présomption:

> **[Texte 7]** «Legimus in euangelio dicentem dominum: 'Quid tibi uis faciam? (Mc 10, 51)' et iterum: 'Vis sanus fieri? (Jn 5, 6)' Vides, quia non tribuitur munus salutis, nisi prius interrogetur desiderium uoluntatis. Sed et cum uenitur ad baptismum, prius accedentis uoluntas inquiritur, ut regenerationis gratia subsequatur. Et in centurione Cornelio (cf. Ac 10), quia praecessit uoluntas gratiam, ideo praeuenit et gratia regenerationem. Nihil hic, ut opinor, redolet praesumptionis, cum et hoc ipsum incessabiliter asseram, etc.» (*ibid.*, l. 3-11).
>
> Nous lisons dans l'évangile ce mot du Seigneur: «Que veux-tu que je fasse pour toi?», et celui-ci: «Veux-tu guérir?». Tu vois que le don du salut n'est pas accordé sans que soit d'abord interrogé le désir de la volonté. Et quand il y a baptême, on s'enquiert d'abord de la volonté du postulant, et la grâce de la régénération suit sur le champ. Chez le centurion Corneille, parce que la volonté a précédé la grâce, la grâce à son tour a précédé la régénération. Rien là, à mon avis, qui sente la présomption, puisque j'atteste sans me lasser précisément, etc.

En clair, d'après ces lignes, l'*initium fidei* et l'*initium bonae uoluntatis* (ces deux expressions ne se lisent pas expressément dans Fauste) sont aux mains de l'homme. Et l'on peut citer, dans la même veine:

[Texte 8] «Sicut... ad deum largitio remunerandi, ita ad hominem deuotio respicit inquirendi» (1, 6, p. 21, l. 25-26).

De même qu'à Dieu appartient la libéralité dans la rémunération, de même à l'homme le zèle dans la recherche.

Aussi bien, ce n'est pas seulement ici que Fauste se permet des formules malaisément conciliables entre elles — ou du moins de tonalité dissonante. On opposera:

. d'une part l'interprétation donnée de 1 Co 15, 10 («C'est par la grâce de Dieu que je suis ce que je suis, et sa grâce à mon égard n'a pas été stérile. Loin de là, j'ai travaillé plus qu'eux tous: oh! non pas moi, mais la grâce de Dieu qui est avec moi», trad. *BJ* 1998):

[Texte 9] «... primas partes soli gratiae pie subiectus adscripsit (*scil.* Apostolus), media quaeque labori magister oboedientiae deputauit, utrumque in consummatione moderatus gratiam laboremque coniunxit» (1, 5, p. 20, l. 4-6)

... pieusement soumis, (l'Apôtre) a attribué le premier rôle à la grâce; maître d'obéissance, il a imputé à l'effort (humain) tout ce qui est tâche intermédiaire; réglant avec mesure l'un et l'autre dans l'achèvement, il a conjoint grâce et effort.

(initiative de la grâce, collaboration subséquente de la liberté, achèvement par la collaboration de la grâce et de la liberté);

. d'autre part l'exégèse de Jn 6, 44 («Nul ne peut venir à moi si le Père qui m'a envoyé ne l'attire», trad. *BJ* 1998):

[Texte 10] «Numquid uelut insensibilis et inepta materies de loco ad locum mouendus est et trahendus? Sed adsistenti et uocanti domino famulus manum fidei, qua adtrahatur, extendit et dicit: 'Credo, domine, adiuua incredulitatem meam' (Mc 9, 23). Et ita se duo ista coniungunt, adtrahentis uirtus et oboedientis affectus, quomodo si aeger aliquis adsurgere conetur et facultas animum non sequatur et propterea sibi porrigi dexteram deprecetur. Clamat uoluntas, quia sola per se eleuari nescit infirmitas. Ita dominus inuitat uolentem, adtrahit desiderantem, erigit adnitentem» (1, 16, p. 52, l. 2-11).

Est-ce donc que, telle la matière dépourvue de sens et de raison, (l'homme) doit être mû et tiré de lieu à lieu? Mais au Seigneur qui se tient près de lui et l'appelle le serviteur tend la main de la foi par laquelle il puisse être attiré, et dit: «Je crois, Seigneur, mais viens en aide à mon incroyance». Et ainsi les deux se conjuguent: la force de celui qui attire et le mouvement de celui qui obéit, comme si un malade essayait de se dresser, que sa capacité ne réponde pas à son intention, et que, pour ce motif, il supplie qu'on lui tende la main. La volonté crie,

parce que la faiblesse sait que seule, par elle-même, elle ne se lève pas. Ainsi, le Seigneur invite qui veut, attire qui désire, élève qui s'efforce.

(appel divin et effort de la volonté — comme si l'un et l'autre avaient, à parité, l'initiative).

Parfois même, la grâce semble réduite à un simple secours extérieur. Ainsi dans la suite immédiate du texte précédent:

> **[Texte 11]** «Quid est autem adtrahere nisi praedicare, nisi scripturarum consolationibus excitare, increpationibus deterrere, desideranda proponere, intentare metuenda, iudicium comminari, praemium polliceri?» (*ibid.*, l. 11-14).
>
> Or, qu'est-ce qu'attirer sinon proclamer, stimuler par les consolations que renferment les Écritures, effrayer par leurs admonestations, présenter les biens à désirer, mettre sous les yeux les maux à redouter, menacer du jugement, promettre la récompense?

Tout cela sonne de manière cacophonique.[23] D'un côté, quelques formules sur une initiative divine absolue, qu'Augustin, semble-t-il, aurait pu approuver. De l'autre, des expressions sur la racine humaine de la bonne volonté, et même une présentation de la grâce comme extrinsèque, qui, pour les premières, cadrent avec la définition traditionnelle donnée du semi-pélagianisme et, pour la deuxième, paraît confiner au pélagianisme pur et simple. D'où, pour définitivement «catégoriser» Fauste, deux tentatives, ou tentations, contraires. Tentative, chez quelques-uns, d'imaginer Fauste en augustinien.[24] Mais tentative paradoxale, et même désespérée, Fauste ne pouvant,

[23] Au point que tel philologue du XIX^e^ siècle, travaillant sur le texte d'ENGELBRECHT, a cru devoir, ici ou là, corriger — jugeant par exemple interpolée, en 2, 10 **[Texte 6]**, la rallonge *praesertim cum*, etc. (W. BERGMANN, *Studien zu einer kritischen Sichtung der südgallischen Predigtliteratur des 5. und 6. Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig 1898 [réimpr. anast. Aalen 1972], p. 19-20). Ce type de critique conjecturale est évidemment arbitraire.

[24] C'est, en dernier lieu, la thèse de T.A. SMITH **[2.14; 2.14bis]**. Elle paraît intenable dans sa rigueur: voir M. DJUTH **[2.5]**, compte rendu du livre de SMITH. De fait, sans doute, Fauste, comme les autres Provençaux, admire (sans doute sincèrement) Augustin; à l'occasion, il le cite — non sans quelque malice d'ailleurs, pour tirer à lui son témoignage (ainsi 2, 9, p. 81, l. 21-23, transcrivant *Ciu.* 22, 24, 1); il partage son aversion envers Pélage. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il accepte la pensée augustinienne dans son intégralité, ni surtout dans sa visée globale, et qu'on soit fondé à le présenter comme cherchant à accréditer une réception de l'augustinisme. Il est notamment à remarquer que la notion de prédestination *ante praeuisa merita* est explicitement taxée de manichéisme (1, 6, p. 21, l. 1-2), dans la mesure où elle revient, pour Fauste, à rejeter sur Dieu la responsabilité du mal; or, Julien d'Éclane ne se privait pas de décocher contre Augustin la même calomnie (cf. Aug., *C. Iul. Op. Imp.* e.g. 4, 19).

dans la «meilleure» des hypothèses, apparaître que sous les espèces d'un augustinien dont la plume aurait parfois vacillé. Surtout, à l'inverse, chez d'autres, plus nombreux, tentation d'en faire un loup pélagien déguisé (mal, du reste) en brebis orthodoxe.[25] Mais accuser Fauste d'incohérence, ou chercher la cohérence dans on ne sait quelle duplicité, ne satisfait pas. Il convient reprendre l'enquête.

Essai d'analyse critique (1). Soubassements théoriques

La description ne suffit pas. Il faut tenter une analyse qui descende jusqu'aux soubassements théoriques. Les chapitres finals du livre 2, dont on a dit plus haut qu'ils pouvaient constituer un effort terminal d'approfondissement, offrent une bon champ d'expérimentation. Le *De gratia* 2, 9 porte sur l'état primitif de l'homme — la notion de l'homme créé «à l'image et à la ressemblance» (*ad imaginem et similitudinem*, Gn 1, 26).

Fauste y soutient que l'image comme la similitude ne sont pas en prévision de l'Incarnation à venir. Car (argument majeur) l'Incarnation s'est opérée dans l'humilité (la «forme d'esclave», cf. Ph 2, 9), et afin de réparer le péché; or, l'image ressemblante est relative à la «forme de Dieu»; donc, chez Adam au Paradis, il s'agit de l'image et de la similitude du Dieu Trinité, dans sa puissance et sa gloire:

> **[Texte 12]** «Imago... dei homo dicitur quia ei indulgenter ac dignanter inseruit ueritas iustitiam, ratio sapientiam, perennitas aeternitatem. De imagine dei est, quod intellegit, quod rectum sapit, quod inter malum et bonum iudicio examinante discriminat» (2, 9, p. 78-79, l. 28-30.1-2).
>
> L'homme... est dit «image de Dieu» car, par un effet de bonté et de condescendance, la vérité a mis en lui la justice, la raison a mis en lui la sagesse, la pérennité l'éternité. Il est à l'image de Dieu dans son intelligence, dans la droite raison, dans la distinction qu'il fait entre le bien et le mal, à la lumière de son jugement.

Cette nette distinction entre l'ordre de la création et l'ordre de l'Incarnation mérite qu'on la relève. Nous en mesurerons plus bas la portée.

[25] C'est aussi, en dernier lieu, la thèse de M. Djuth **[2.4]** (quelques références plus anciennes *infra*, n. 28). Elle aussi paraît intenable dans sa rigueur. Il est anachronique d'arguer que les idées de Fauste rejoignent celles de Pélage telles que la science moderne les dégage. Car aussi bien, l'important est que Fauste, comme Augustin, ait stigmatisé en Pélage un cauteleux contempteur de la grâce: il n'était pas censé savoir que Pélage n'était peut-être pas... pélagien.

La nature primitive de l'homme, l'image et similitude qui fut celle d'Adam en Éden, est décrite comme un don et une grâce: les forces accordées à l'homme sont une grâce, tout comme la loi de nature. Fauste parle expressément de «prima gratia, qua deo est honoratus (Adam)» (mots précédant immédiatement le texte cité ci-dessus, p. 78, l. 27-28; on notera d'ailleurs dans ce texte les mots qui disent le don: «indulgenter... inseruit»).

La chute n'est pas restée, néanmoins, sans conséquences. Mais Fauste en soupèse avec soin les effets. Le libre arbitre n'est pas anéanti, et l'homme, même déchu, garde des forces — ou, si l'on préfère, des restes de la grâce primitive. La similitude est perdue, mais l'image, quoique ternie, est conservée.

[Texte 13] «... post primi hominis praeuaricationem non mors arbitrii, sed infirmitas, nec impossibilitas, sed difficultas proposito labore successit» (2, 8, p. 76, l. 6-8).

... après la prévarication du premier homme, le libre arbitre est non pas mort, mais affaibli, il lui est non pas impossible, mais difficile, de faire l'effort proposé.

[Texte 14] «... Quantum... ad libertatem arbitrii et immortalitatem pertinet, imaginem dei licet a se et in se decoloratam etiam mali habere possunt, similitudinem nisi boni habere non possunt» (2, 9, p. 79, l. 26-29).

Touchant... le libre arbitre et l'immortalité, pour ce qui est de l'image de Dieu les méchants aussi peuvent l'avoir, quoique ternie en eux et par leur fait, mais la ressemblance, seuls les bons peuvent la posséder.

Entre la grâce primitive et la grâce de Jésus-Christ, il y a donc séparation. Mais, chez l'homme déchu, dès après la chute, la grâce de Jésus-Christ est nécessaire pour «activer» les restes de la grâce primitive:

[Texte 15] «... uel paucis adhuc exemplis praestringere nos oportet, quanti ante legem litterae erudiente lege naturae, quae prima, ut diximus, dei gratia est, uestibula salutis intrauerint per Christum ad ipsa uitae penetralia perducendi» (2, 9, p. 79-80, l. 31. 1-4).

... il nous faut encore saisir au moins par quelques exemples combien (d'hommes), antérieurement à la loi de la lettre, instruits par la loi naturelle qui est, comme nous l'avons dit, la grâce première de Dieu, ont pénétré dans le vestibule du salut d'où le Christ les conduirait jusqu'au cœur même de la vie.

C'est dans cette perspective qu'il faut comprendre certaines phrases souscrites par Lucidus, et qui rendent la pensée de Fauste:

> **[Texte 16]** «Adsero etiam per rationem et ordinem saeculorum alios lege gratiae, alios lege Moysi, alios lege naturae, quam deus in omnium cordibus scripsit, in spe aduentus Christi fuisse saluatos, nullos tamen ex initio mundi ab originali nexu nisi intercessione sacri sanguinis absolutos» (*Ep.* 2, p. 167, l. 18-22).
>
> J'affirme aussi que, selon l'économie et l'ordre des siècles, les uns ont été sauvés par la loi de la grâce, les autres par la Loi de Moïse, les autres par la loi de nature que Dieu a écrite dans les cœurs de tous, dans l'espérance de la venue du Christ; aucun cependant depuis le commencement du monde n'a été délié de l'entrave originelle que par l'intercession du sacré Sang.

Il subsiste dans l'homme tombé quelque chose de la grâce primitive — grâce prévenante par laquelle il aspire au salut; mais cette grâce primitive, ou plutôt les traces de cette grâce primitive sont portées à leur efficacité par la grâce de Jésus-Christ.[26] Détail capital: la nécessité de la grâce de Jésus-Christ vaut non seulement dans la phase présente de l'histoire du salut (*sub lege gratiae*: cas du païen qui se convertit), mais encore dans les phases précédentes, *sub lege Moysi* et *sub lege naturae*.

Une double question se pose alors: quelle définition exacte Fauste donne-t-il au juste de la «grâce» — spécialement de la «grâce primitive»? Comment, concrètement, dans les phases successives de l'histoire du salut, la grâce de Jésus-Christ intervient-elle?

Essai d'analyse critique (2). Questions disputées et diagnostic d'ensemble

a) Pour commencer, une mise au point, qui découle de ce qui précède, et «recentre» fermement le débat: autant que l'on voit, sous le regard de Fauste, comme sous celui du *Curé* de Bernanos, «tout est grâce».[27] Le grief de semi-pélagianisme «classique» est à écarter:

[26] Cependant, il n'est nullement impossible que, à l'occasion, la grâce prévenante soit celle de Jésus-Christ, qui convertit le pécheur: c'est sans doute, aux yeux de Fauste, ce qui advint à Paul, et c'est le sens qu'il convient de donner au texte, cité plus haut, de 1, 5, p. 20, l. 4-6 (pour autant l'usage que nous avons fait de ce texte, et qui n'allait qu'à montrer la prévalence de *toute* grâce, n'en est pas frappé de nullité). On se rappellera que Cassien (*Coll.* 13, 15.18) dit pareillement que, parfois, la grâce de Jésus-Christ appelle sans que l'on y ait songé (cas des Apôtres André et Pierre), ou même en entraînant malgré soi (cas, justement, de l'Apôtre Paul).

[27] Même si Fauste reproche à ses adversaires une *sententia* apparemment toute proche de cet aveu: «Totum, inquiunt, solius est gratiae» (1, 3, p. 14, l. 22).

l'*initium bonae uoluntatis* est bien un don divin, vestige de la grâce d'Adam. Fauste, *stricto sensu*, ne tombe pas sous le coup de la censure du concile d'Orange (529), lequel d'ailleurs ne le nomme pas, pas plus qu'il ne nomme quiconque. Et il n'est pas difficile de montrer que c'est lui qui, en l'occurrence, a pour lui la tradition ancienne, celle des Pères grecs, et d'un Tertullien — toutes gens pour qui le libre arbitre même est une grâce jamais révoquée par Dieu: position que la recherche la plus récente a fortement étayée.[28] (J'irai même plus loin: l'idée, évoquée en 2, 12 [p. 93, l. 29-31] que, par l'exercice de sa liberté, l'homme en quelque sorte s'approprie le salut, se l'assimile, et ne le reçoit pas comme un don qui lui demeure extrinsèque, était déjà dans Irénée, Tertullien et Novatien.[29])

Au passage, une réflexion incidente. On observera que, à se fier à la condamnation de la quatrième proposition janséniste, dans la bulle *Cum occasione* de 1653, Jansénius admettrait bien cet aspect du prétendu «semi-pélagianisme». Il aurait compris que les Provençaux ne refusaient pas que la grâce, peu ou prou, provoquât l'*initium fidei*. Cette quatrième proposition est ainsi libellée:

> «Semipelagiani admittebant praevenientis gratiae interioris necessitatem ad singulos actus, etiam ad initium fidei; et in hoc erant haeretici, quod vellent eam gratiam talem esse, cui posset humana voluntas resistere vel obtemperare.»
>
> Les semi-pélagiens admettaient la nécessité d'une grâce intérieure prévenante pour chacun des actes, même pour le commencement de la foi; et ils étaient hérétiques en ceci qu'ils voulaient que la grâce fût telle que la volonté humaine pût lui résister ou lui obéir.[30]

On le voit, l'accusation janséniste condamnée est autre: elle reprocherait aux «semi-pélagiens» d'avoir enseigné que l'on peut résister à la grâce. Ce qui reviendrait, de la part de l'*Augustinus*, à transposer le débat dans un contexte théologique tout différent: celui du départ, que ne fait pas Fauste, entre grâce efficace et grâce suffisante.[31]

[28] SIMONETTI **[2.13]**; TIBILETTI **[2.17]** (des chercheurs plus anciens leur avaient ouvert la voie). Opposer l'opinion plus traditionnelle, encore vigoureuse chez AMMAN **[2.2]** et chez VIARD **[2.22]** — dans CHÉNÉ **[2.3]** aussi.

[29] Sur ces trois auteurs touchant la présente idée, voir P. MATTEI, «L'anthropologie de Novatien. Affinités, perspectives et limites», *RÉAug* 38, 1992, p. 235-259, spéc. p. 252-253.

[30] Texte latin dans DENZINGER, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, n° 2004. Traduction PM.

[31] La présentation que je fais ici de la 4e proposition a des précurseurs: voir CHÉNÉ **[2.3]**, p. 567.

Sur quoi, tout n'est pas encore clarifié. Les questions énoncées ci-dessus continuent de se poser, qui relèvent de l'ordre du langage, ou des représentations. Touchant la nature de la grâce, ou, plus exactement, son régime d'exercice. Touchant le rapport exact entre grâce primitive et grâce de Jésus-Christ.

b) Touchant le régime d'exercice de la grâce.

La grâce primitive est signe extérieur: certaines formules maladroites, relevées plus haut, paraissent verser dans le pélagianisme le plus strict, en semblant réduire, on l'a dit, la grâce, même de Jésus-Christ, à un simple secours *ab extra*.[32] Mais le signe extérieur posé par Dieu ne saurait se séparer d'une grâce intérieure, inhérente à l'image primitive, laquelle se trouve maintenue, quoique ternie, après la chute.[33]

Là, il faut bien avouer que Fauste, comme déjà Cassien, s'exprime assez souvent de manière «naturaliste». Ces expressions restaient-elles judicieuses, après Augustin?[34] Il n'était pas difficile de caricaturer la position de Fauste; et l'on s'explique avec quelle apparence de vérité le moine scythe Jean Maxence, dans la pseudo-citation qu'il donne du morceau de *Grat.* 2, 11, a pu donner un coup de «pouce». En soi, cependant, ces expressions n'étaient pas illégitimes; elles étaient susceptibles d'une interprétation «bénigne», marquant nettement la distance, dans l'être, entre le Créateur et la créature. On peut supposer que, dans l'image, réside — d'une manière, il est vrai, ontologiquement mal définie — une vocation intérieure, une orientation vers Dieu.

Or, à ce point, le problème ressurgit, plus subtilement. Quand, obéissant à la «pente» de l'image, le païen «actionne», ou «actualise», sa liberté pour s'ouvrir à Dieu, met-il en œuvre une grâce intérieure et

[32] Voir 1, 16 cité plus haut **[Texte 11]**.

[33] Voir le couple *intrinsecus/extrinsecus*, en 2, 9, p. 82, l. 21: cf. TIBILETTI **[2.19]**, p. 574, rapportant les griefs portés à ce propos par Jean Maxence. (Serait-il incongru de soupçonner dans cette correspondance intérieur/extérieur un souvenir de la «sémiotique» et de la gnoséologie augustiniennes?)

[34] Fauste utilise 37 fois le substantif *natura* (sans compter l'adjectif *naturalis* et l'adverbe *naturaliter*). Parmi ces emplois, particulièrement frappants sont ceux où *natura* se trouve distingué de *gratia* (1, 2; 2, 7; 2, 9; 2, 10; pour l'idée, voir aussi *supra* **[Textes 8; 9; 10; 11]**). Même si Fauste, on le sait, nomme la «loi de nature», *expressis uerbis*, «grâce première» (**[Texte 15]**) et, en l'espèce justement, reste dans la ligne d'un Tertullien (TIBILETTI **[2.20]**, p. 516, renvoie au livre de S. OTTO, *«Natura» und «dispositio». Untersuchung zum Naturbegriff und zur Denkform Tertullians*, Munich 1960), cette distinction, dans sa brutalité, sonne de manière étrange.

salvatrice certes, mais paradoxalement inerte, ou latente, en tant qu'inhérente à l'image donnée jadis, si l'on veut, en Adam une fois pour toutes?[35] Sans doute serait-ce forcer la pensée de Fauste que d'imaginer la réponse suivante: il y a, dans le premier acte bon (dans le premier éveil à la foi), et action de la grâce et exercice de la liberté, conjointement, «sans confusion et sans séparation», pour adopter, par analogie, un langage ailleurs consacré; l'exercice de la liberté serait, *ipso facto*, action de la grâce; de fait, *a contrario*, lorsque le païen reste fermé, la faute en revient au seul mésusage de la liberté. Pour autant, si l'on refuse qu'il ait imaginé pareille réponse, Fauste ne vient pas échouer contre l'objection qu'Augustin en son temps adressait aux marseillais (e.g. *Praed.* 1, 2-2, 3): si l'homme se voyait impartir ne fût-ce qu'une étincelle d'initiative positive, la grâce ne serait plus la grâce, et c'est en dernier ressort entre les seules mains de l'homme qu'on remettrait le salut — retombant ainsi, malgré qu'on en ait, dans l'erreur de Pélage.[36] C'est Dieu qui, pour Fauste, a l'initiative absolue — Dieu qui ne cesse d'assiéger l'homme afin de le sauver, qui ne se lasse pas, comme déjà Cassien se le représentait (*Coll.* 13, 7), de l'entourer de sa sollicitude et de guetter la moindre lueur de résipiscence; rien de plus étranger à Fauste que l'idée, dessinée par Julien d'Éclane tel que le cite Augustin (*Iul.* 1, 78, 79), d'un «homme émancipé de Dieu» — *a Deo emancipatus homo*[36A]. Présence de Dieu effective et active, et grâce, répétons-le, nullement métaphorique, même si Fauste, dans le processus de conversion de l'impie, ne montre pas comment *in concreto* se concilient grâce et liberté, ne se souciant pas (comme Augustin, d'ailleurs) de mettre sur pied un schéma philosophico-théologique qui pût en général expliquer cette conciliation. Seulement, la sollicitude divine atteint tout homme sans exception. Le point de clivage avec Augustin se situe bien là: arc-bouté contre l'idée de prédestination, champion de la volonté salvifique universelle, convaincu que le péché, si mutilant qu'il soit, n'a pas entraîné, même s'agissant du salut, de ruine totale,

[35] Noter à cet égard l'emploi significatif du parfait (*inseruit*) en 2, 9 **[Texte 12]**.

[36] Cette idée d'Augustin est aussi, par exemple, un des thèmes recteurs du poème *De ingratis* de Prosper d'Aquitaine: à ses yeux le «semi-pélagianisme» n'est que du Pélage rebouilli.

[36A] Ou bien: «... émancipé *par* Dieu». Sur cette divergence de traduction, voir bref *status quaestionis* (avec bibliog. essentielle) par M. Ribreau, *Le* Contra Iulianum *de saint Augustin. Introduction générale; édition, traduction et commentaire du livre III* (thèse de doctorat préparée sous la dir. du Prof. V. Zarini, et soutenue devant l'Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne le 14 novembre 2009), p. 153-154. Pour importante qu'elle soit, la divergence n'a pas à nous retenir ici: il suffit que, dans l'un et l'autre cas, il s'agisse d'un homme «libéré» de Dieu.

Fauste refuse d'envisager la perspective de l'élection — plus exactement d'une *massa perdita* d'où la bénévolence divine tirerait un petit nombre d'élus.[37]

c) Touchant le rapport exact entre grâce primitive et grâce de Jésus-Christ.

En distinguant, comme il le fait, dans l'état infralapsaire, entre les deux ordres de grâce, Fauste paraît avoir du mal à rendre pleine justice à la centralité de Jésus-Christ. Et en accompagnant cette distinction de l'affirmation d'une coexistence des deux grâces distinctes, il semble peiner tout autant à pointer ce qui fait la spécificité, ou l'apport indispensable, de la grâce de Jésus-Christ — la nécessité, pour l'homme déchu, de l'aide de Jésus-Christ.[38] On touche sans doute à la difficulté majeure de la pensée du Provençal. Cette difficulté peut, à mon sens, au moins pour bonne part, se résoudre de la façon suivante.

[37] Il faut signaler un texte qui n'est pas dans le *De gratia*, mais dans la *Lettre* 5 (*CSEL* 21, 183-195, spéc. 184, l. 3-22). Répondant à la première des questions que lui avait posées par écrit son correspondant Paulinus (lettre conservée = *Ep. Fausti* 4, *éd. cit.*, p. 181-183, spéc. 181, l. 21), Fauste nie la valeur d'une conversion *in extremis*, où il ne dénonce qu'un «moque-Dieu», puisque le pécheur croit s'en tirer à bon compte, n'ayant plus le temps de mener une active pénitence. Cette réponse doit être appréciée avec équanimité. On se gardera d'une interprétation minimisante, qui ne voudrait y lire qu'une condamnation de la crainte servile — d'une démarche intéressée qui se résout au salut dans la seule perspective de l'enfer désormais béant. On évitera tout autant une exégèse rigoureuse, qui accuserait Fauste de ne voir décidément dans le retour du pécheur qu'un geste de la volonté humaine. En fait, historiquement, le passage doit sans doute se comprendre dans le cadre des difficultés que créait, alors, la lourde discipline de la pénitence canonique (sur ces difficultés, voir le livre classique de C. Vogel, *Le pécheur et la pénitence dans l'Église ancienne*, Paris 1966, p. 42.129-130; observer que Gennade, *Dogm.* 80 [*PL* 58, col. 998-999] condamne expressément, en la qualifiant de «novatienne», une opinion semblable à celle de Fauste — mais il ne nomme pas, en l'occurrence, celui-ci: à dessein?). Doctrinalement, le passage ne dit rien que n'enseigne le *De gratia*: sollicitude de Dieu qui ne cesse, jusqu'à la fin, d'offrir sa grâce, mais nécessité pour l'homme d'agir, et horreur, chez l'évêque de Riez, d'un «quiétisme» qui, paresseusement, prétend tout laisser faire à la puissance divine. Ce qui surprend ici, c'est plutôt, chez un directeur tant vanté par ses amis (*supra*, n. 7), la pauvreté psychologique et la sécheresse spirituelle touchant les angoisses et les efforts d'un mourant dans son agonie.

[38] Voir Koch **[2.9]**, p. 99-100; Simonetti **[2.13]**, 143-144; Smith **[2.14bis]**, p. 184.188. Selon Chéné **[2.3]**, p. 578s., l'*affectus credulitatis* (voir *infra*), ou l'*initium fidei* est un acte formé de foi-confiance; mais l'exposé de Chéné est vicié par le fait qu'il en reste encore à l'accusation classique de «semi-pélagianisme» (*supra*, n. 28).

Tout d'abord, les deux grâces ne sont pas, au fond, pour Fauste, hétérogènes. Car la grâce originelle passait par Jésus-Christ, en tant que Verbe par qui l'homme a été fait:

> **[Texte 17]** «... dominus noster Iesus Christus in primo tempore de suo meliora contulit, in secundo autem de nostro deteriora suscepit. Et propterea quando ex nihilo nos parauit, imaginem suam factor adposuit, quando uero nos perditos reparauit, formam serui restitutor adsumpsit, sicut ait apostolus: 'formam serui accipiens in similitudem hominum factus et habitu inuentus ut homo (Ph 2, 7)'» (2, 9, p. 77, l. 25-32).
>
> ... notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, dans un premier temps, nous a conféré de son bien à lui, mais, dans un second temps, il s'est chargé de nos maux à nous. Et pour cette raison, quand il nous tira du néant, le Créateur nous marqua de son image. Mais quand, alors que nous étions perdus, le Sauveur nous restaura, il prit la condition d'esclave, comme le dit l'Apôtre: «Prenant la forme d'esclave, fait à la ressemblance des hommes, et reconnu comme un homme à son comportement.»

Il n'est pas juste de prétendre que, aux yeux du lérinien, depuis la chute, subsistent des grâces qui ne devraient rien, en quelque façon, à Jésus-Christ: Jésus-Christ est l'unique Médiateur.

À l'inverse, reconnaissons que Fauste ne dégage pas cette assertion en termes exprès. Ce n'est qu'une déduction que je tire de son texte, en prolongeant les lignes — et même, d'un seul de ses textes, et bref, qui n'insiste pas. Du moins l'évêque de Riez eut-il, selon toute apparence, l'intuition de la continuité.

Ensuite, s'agissant du «chevauchement», ou de la «concurrence» des grâces, j'énoncerai l'hypothèse que voici. Je pose que, pour Fauste, la grâce de Jésus-Christ (Rédempteur) ne peut s'exprimer que dans l'adhésion de foi; il n'a aucune notion d'une foi implicite et n'estime pas qu'il puisse exister un salut hors de la foi — comprenons: hors de la foi explicite. Même, il semble bien que, lorsque, à la suite de l'*Épître aux Hébreux*, il évoque la *fides* des anciens (2, 9), il entende cette *fides* explicite non pas comme la croyance au Dieu créateur, mais, précisément, en Jésus-Christ à venir. Ou, dit autrement, les païens qui, avant la venue du Christ, se sont sauvés l'auraient été par une révélation anticipatrice, dans la foi. La réciproque de ces propositions est qu'aucune grâce latente ne peut être grâce de Jésus-Christ (Rédempteur). Reste à asseoir la crédibilité de mon hypothèse.

Elle fonde sa vraisemblance sur l'environnement de la pensée de Fauste. Celui-ci ne tranche pas sur le reste de la patristique: tous

les Pères (à mon avis, on peut être raisonnablement affirmatif sur ce point[39]) jugent qu'il n'y a de salut que dans la foi confessée. Notamment, Fauste n'est pas en l'occurrence éloigné d'Augustin: pour celui-ci, on ne l'ignore pas, Job ne fut sauvé que parce qu'il eut la révélation de Jésus-Christ.[40]

L'hypothèse fonde aussi sa vraisemblance sur ce qui apparaît comme la logique interne de la pensée de Fauste. Elle offre, semble-t-il, le seul principe qui explique pourquoi, dans le temps qu'il affirme l'existence d'une grâce primitive universelle, il se trouve *pari passu* conduit à distinguer deux grâces. Sa démarche intellectuelle en effet peut, je crois, se résumer sans arbitraire en un syllogisme dont notre hypothèse formerait la mineure:

- La grâce des commencements est universelle; elle est *du coup*, en sa caractéristique essentielle, latente, tous les hommes de tous les temps, d'évidence, n'en ayant pas, ou pas eu, conscience.
- *Or la grâce du Rédempteur est explicitement proposée et se traduit dans la foi vive.*
- Il faut donc distinguer deux grâces.

Le plus original chez Fauste, et dont, sauf erreur, aucun critique ne s'est avisé, consisterait en ceci que l'exigence même de la foi explicite imposerait à l'évêque de Riez, comme intraitable défenseur de l'idée d'une vocation au salut concrètement adressée à tous, de postuler le maintien, dans l'homme déchu, de quelque chose de la grâce primitive, et qui reste du domaine de l'inexprimé.

L'hypothèse dont je viens d'évoquer les divers aspects et d'asseoir la crédibilité rend compte de l'articulation des deux grâces. Sur sa base, pour harmoniser les divers textes (1, 6, p. 22, l. 5-26; 2, 9, p. 82, l. 1s. citant Rm 1, 18-23 — notamment le v. 20: «Ce qu'il a

[39] Même, sans doute, concernant Justin Martyr, dans son (unique!) *Apologie*. J'ai essayé de toucher quelque chose du problème en général dans «De Tertullien à Fulgence. L'ecclésiologie des Africains: lignes de crête», in M.-A. Vannier dir., *Les Pères et la naissance de l'ecclésiologie*, Paris 2009, p. 91-102 (= en substance, *Actes* du Colloque *L'Église et les Pères*, Metz 12 et 13 mars 2008). C'est au vrai tout le problème de l'adage «*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*». (Sur cet adage, il convient de renvoyer au livre, un peu irénique parfois, de B. Sesboüé, *Hors de l'Église, pas de salut. Histoire d'une formule et problèmes d'interprétation*, Paris 2004.)

[40] Cf. *Ciu.* 18, 47. L'exemple de Job, comme modèle de foi *ante aduentum I.C.*, est chez Fauste en 2, 10 (entre Abraham et Rahab).- Déjà, aux yeux de l'auteur des lettres attribuées à Ignace d'Antioche, les justes de l'Ancien Testament étaient des chrétiens *ante litteram*: *Magn.* 9, 2; *Philad.* 5, 2. Et l'on rapprochera Jn 8, 56: «Abraham, votre père, exulta à la pensée qu'il verrait mon jour». L'idée est fréquente chez Augustin, e.g. *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 15, 2.

d'invisible depuis la création du monde se laisse voir à l'intelligence à travers ses œuvres»), j'avancerai le schéma suivant:

- Muni intérieurement des restes de la grâce primitive, l'homme ouvre extérieurement les yeux sur la révélation que la création lui fait de Dieu (état de nature), ou se tourne vers la révélation positive (Loi de Moïse, christianisme).
- Cette «disposition de foi», *affectus credulitatis* (la *iunctura* figure à deux reprises dans le *De gratia*: 1, 6, p. 22, l. 25; 1, 14, p. 46, l. 32), s'accompagne *ipso facto* d'un appel à Dieu, et, non moins immédiatement, d'une réponse de grâce de la part du Dieu miséricordieux qui n'attendait que cet appel (seconde grâce).
- La seconde grâce, qui est la grâce de Jésus-Christ, intervient pour affermir l'*affectus* (conduire au baptême, en régime chrétien): grâce sanante, elle rend vigueur à l'homme blessé par le péché et désormais conscient de sa faiblesse.[41]
- Là-dessus, le croyant, revigoré, agit.

Fauste estime ainsi prendre au sérieux les ravages du péché originel sans pour autant anéantir l'œuvre du Dieu Créateur. Quand la grâce primitive prend conscience d'elle-même dans la foi, sans attendre, elle laisse la place à la grâce du Rédempteur. Il est vain de se demander si, *en droit*, Fauste l'imagine *suffisante* pour atteindre le salut; *de fait*, il la considère comme s'accomplissant *toujours* dans la grâce du Rédempteur…

Parce qu'il entend venger, contre la prédestination augustinienne, la notion de volonté salvifique universelle réelle, Fauste, restant dans la ligne des Grecs, et des Latins antérieurs à Augustin, envisage une grâce véritablement impartie à tous. Mais, parce que cette grâce ne se réalise pas en tous dans l'adhésion de foi, il admet qu'elle n'est pas la grâce de Jésus-Christ — spécifiquement: de Jésus-Christ Rédempteur. Toutefois, s'il a une conscience aiguë de la différence des deux grâces, il garde un sentiment non moins vif du «système» indissoluble et structuré qu'ensemble elles constituent.

Conclusion

S'il est permis d'utiliser sans plus dans la conclusion l'étiquette dont l'introduction se méfiait pour sa saveur normative, Fauste n'est pas «semi-pélagien»; sur la grâce, son antécédence et sa prévalence,

[41] Métaphore de l'homme infirme en 1, 16 cité plus haut **[Texte 10]**.

la pensée du maître de Lérins n'est pas incohérente. Il est temps de passer condamnation définitive, et de ne plus s'enfermer dans de vieux schémas hérésiologiques. Toutefois, l'évêque se laisse aller à quelques imprudences, ou du moins à quelques imprécisions de terminologie et même de conceptualisation, qui obscurcissent son propos — à quelques timidités ou raideurs aussi, qui ne sont pas sans décevoir.

Surtout une caractéristique ne laisse pas, au premier contact, de gêner: la distinction qu'il fait de deux économies de grâce, ou plus exactement la persistance, dans l'économie actuelle, qui est celle du Rédempteur, de grâces originelles — d'une manière qui, peu ou prou, ne met pas en pleine lumière la centralité de Jésus-Christ (répétons-le: du Verbe incarné et sauveur par sa mort et sa résurrection). Cependant, cette caractéristique n'est en rien inorganique, ni ambiguë, dans sa substance, sinon dans son expression la plus habituelle. Elle s'explique par la logique de la pensée de Fauste. Et elle doit se replacer dans la pensée commune de l'époque.[42]

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[42] On pardonnera à l'historien de sortir *in fine* du cercle étroit où le retient sa compétence, et, passant, pour quelques instants, l'habit du dogmaticien, de se demander si l'«autre tradition» dont Fauste se voulut le porte-parole, selon une expression utilisée par SOLIGNAC **[2.16]**, e.g. col. 563, reste de quelque intérêt dans une théologie renouvelée de la grâce — et au prix de quels prolongements. À cet égard, et sans revenir sur la prédestination, question ouverte, deux exigences fondamentales, seulement. (1°) Il est net que le christocentrisme de toute grâce, même primitive, doit être mieux affirmé (l'idée, plutôt, que, dès la toute première origine, l'homme est tendu entre le péché d'Adam et la Rédemption en Jésus-Christ): au fond, on retrouverait, par-delà Fauste, les accents d'un Irénée. (2°) Il est non moins net que, plus que Fauste ne le fait, il importe de souligner que grâce et liberté ne se situent pas sur le même plan de causalité. Et, brochant sur le tout, un sentiment, relatif à l'*éthos* de la pensée du lérinien, ou plus exactement à l'écho intellectuel, et existentiel, qu'elle peut encore susciter: il n'est pas naïf de regretter dans cette pensée (comme dans celle de tout son milieu d'idées: ainsi Cassien), malgré sa sincère piété, un moralisme qui n'éveille pas la même émotion que les pages, fussent-elles les plus rudes (les plus *désespérantes*? les plus sévères du moins), d'un Augustin: «il y manque (pour reprendre les mots de celui-ci: *Conf.* VII, XXI, 27) cet air de miséricorde et les larmes de la confession, le sacrifice offert à toi, l'esprit broyé, le cœur contrit et humilié, le salut du peuple, l'épouse et la cité, le gage de l'Esprit Saint, la coupe de notre rançon» (trad. L. DE MONDADON, rééd. Paris 1982, p. 187-188; toute la suite, si poignante, serait à citer)…

Orientation bibliographique

1. Éditions du *De gratia*. Éditions des lettres 1 et 2

De gratia
(*CPL* 961)
[1.1] *PL* 58, col. 783-836
[1.2] A. ENGELBRECHT, *CSEL* 21, 1891, p. 3-98.

Lettres 1 et 2
(*CPL* 963)
[1.3] *PL* 53, col. 681s. (en *PL* 58, col. 837, les deux lettres ne sont pas réimprimées; elles sont simplement mentionnées sous les n° 2 et 3, la lettre 1 étant l'épître dédicatoire du *De gratia* à Leontius d'Arles)
[1.4] *CSEL* 21, p. 163-168.

Pour mémoire: traductions du De gratia

Française

[1.5] Fauste de Riez (V^ème^ siècle), *De la grâce de Dieu et du libre arbitre. De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio*, traduction de H. MOLLET et J. BERTHON, Digne 1996.[43]

Italienne

[1.6] Fausto di Riez, *La grazia*, Introduzione, traduzione e note a cura di E. LANA, coll. «Testi Patristici», Rome 2004.

2. Études

[2.1] É. AMMAN, «Lucidus», *DTC* 9, 1 (1926), col. 1020-1024
[2.2] ID., «Semi-pélagiens», *ibid.* 14, 2 (1941), col. 1796-1850 (spéc. col. 1833-1840: «Fauste de Riez»)
[2.3] J. CHÉNÉ, «Que signifiaient 'initium fidei' et 'affectus credulitatis' pour les semipélagiens, *Recherches de Science Religieuse* (*RecSR*) 35, 1948, p. 566-588
[2.4] M(arianne) DJUTH, «Faustus of Riez: *Initium bonae voluntatis*», *Augustinian Studies* 21, 1990, p. 35-53

[43] Dans la version des textes que cite le présent travail, je m'inspire parfois de cette traduction.

[2.5] Ead., Compte rendu du livre de T.A. Smith cité ci-après, *Augustinian Studies* 22, 1991, p. 207-216
[2.6] A.G. Elg, *In Faustum Reiensem studia. Commentatio academica*, Uppsala 1937
[2.7] Id., «In Faustum Reiensem aduersaria», *Eranos. Acta Philologica Suecana* 42, 1944, p. 24-46
[2.8] F. Gori, «Fausto di Riez», in A. Di Berardino éd., *Patrologia*. Vol. IV. *Dal Concilio di Calcedonia (451) a Beda. I Padri latini*, Casale 1996, p. 254-259
[2.9] H. Koch, *Der heilige Faustus. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Monographie*, Stuttgart 1895
[2.10] S. Lenain de Tillemont, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histore de l'Église aux six premiers siècles*, t. 16, Paris 1712, p. 408-439 (Notes, p. 773-778)
[2.11] P. Mattei, «Augustin et les moines provençaux. Les controverses sur la grâce aux V^e^-VI^e^ siècles», in «Faire mémoire des origines», *Bulletin «Lérins»*, 378, 2004, p. 2-21
[2.12] S. Pricoco, *L'isola dei santi. Il cenobio di Lerino e le origini del monachesimo gallico*, Rome 1978
[2.13] M. Simonetti, «Il *De Gratia* di Fausto di Riez», *Studi Storico-Religiosi* (*SSR*) 1, 1977, p. 125-145
[2.14] T.A. Smith, *«De Gratia»: Faustus of Riez's Treatise on Grace and its Place in the History of Theology*, Notre Dame (Indiana) 1990[44]
[2.15] Id., «Fauste de Riez (env. 405-env. 490)», in A.F. Fitzgerald et M.-A. Vannier dir., *Saint Augustin. La Méditerranée et l'Europe. IV^e^-XXI^e^ siècle*, Paris 2005, p. 604-606[45]
[2.16] A. Solignac, «Semipélagiens», *DSp* 14 (1989), col. 556-568
[2.17] C. Tibiletti, «Libero arbitrio e grazia in Fausto di Riez», *Augustinianum* 19, 1979, p. 259-285
[2.18] Id., «La salvezza umana in Fausto di Riez», *Orpheus* n.s. 1, 1980, p. 371-390
[2.19] Id., «Fausto di Riez nei giudizi della critica», *Augustinianum* 21, 1981, p. 567-587

[44] Ce livre n'est peut-être pas à distinguer de la thèse du même auteur, soutenue à l'Université Notre Dame en 1988, et publiée, sous forme dactylographiée, à Ann Arbor (Michigan) en 1992: **[2.14bis]** *The «De gratia» of Faustus of Riez: A Study in the Reception of Augustinianism in Fifth-Century Gaul*. C'est cette thèse dactylographiée que j'utilise dans le présent travail.

[45] Dans cet article de synthèse, un petit *erratum*, p. 604, col. a: ce n'est bien sûr pas *Julien l'Apostat* qui en 475 conclut (directement ou non) un traité avec le roi wisigoth Euric, mais *Julius Nepos*! Voir *supra*, n. 6.

[2.20] Id., «Rassegna di studi e testi sui 'semipelagiani'», *Augustinianum* 25, 1-2 (*Miscellanea di studi agostiniani in onore di P. Agostino Trapè, OSA*), 1995, p. 507-522 (spéc. p. 514-521: «Fauste de Riez»)

[2.21] J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes dans l'Antiquité chrétienne*, t. III *La fin de l'âge patristique (430-800)*, 4e éd. Paris 1919, p. 274-312 (= chap. VIII: «Le semi-pélagianisme»; spéc. p. 293-297: «Fauste»)

[2.22] P. Viard, «Fauste de Riez», *DSp* 5 (1962), col. 113-118

[2.23] G. Weigel, *Faustus of Riez. An Historical Introduction*, Philadelphie 1938.

A MORE ORIGINAL VERSION OF *S.* 142 OF SAINT AUGUSTINE*

S. 142 and its editorial history

S. 142 is a homily on John 14:6 (Ego sum uia, ueritas et uita) with special attention to the virtue of humility and the gift of charity. Its complexity suggests that it was preached before a rather sophisticated congregation. According to François Dolbeau, the sermon belongs to the years 404-406 and was possibly preached somewhere in *Africa Proconsularis*, early in 404.[1] These suggestions were taken over in the dating lists of É. Rebillard (404) and R. Gryson (404-406). E. Hill has presented 413-417 as an alternative date, albeit in a rather hesitant way.[2]

The Maurist edition of *s.* 142 (*PL* 38, cc. 778-784) was based on two collections of sermons[3] that had both known a large diffusion in medieval Europe: the early medieval collection *De uerbis Domini* (*vd*), which constitutes the first part of a larger whole of homilies on the Gospels and the letters of the New Testament (*De uerbis Domini et Apostoli* = *vda*),[4] and the Arlesian *Quinquaginta homiliae* (*q*).[5] The former collection only offered the sermon's first five paragraphs dedicated to John 14:6 (*vd* title: *Item eiusdem de uerbis Domini in euangelio secundum Iohannem:* Ego sum uia, ueritas et uita),[6] whereas the latter contained the entire text edited by the Maurists (*q* title: *De eo quod scriptum est:* Ego sum uia, ueritas et uita [= §§1-5], *et de sequendo Christum, et de uera caritate* [= remaining paragraphs]).

In *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* (1928), André Wilmart published an enlarged version of *s.* 142 (*s.* Wilmart 11), which had

* I thank prof. Luc De Coninck, prof. Rita Beyers, dr. Anthony Dupont and dr. Tom Deneire for their comments on a first draft of this article.

[1] See F. Dolbeau (1996a), 290. There is no suggestion of a date in P.-P. Verbraken (1976), 88 + 195.

[2] See É. Rebillard (1999), 779; R. Gryson (2007), 239; E. Hill (1992), 413 + 423 n. 8.

[3] See C. Lambot (1969a), 108.

[4] For *vda*, see L. De Coninck (2006) (*vd*) and G. Partoens (2008), LXV-CLII (*De uerbis Apostoli*). Both publications offer further bibliography.

[5] For *q*, see L. De Coninck (2008), XXIX-XXXI (with further bibliography).

[6] In manuscript *Madrid Biblioteca Nacional 78 (A.8) (XII)*, the *vd* version of *s.* 142 is fused with *Io. eu. tr.* 71, 1-3 (ff. 181^{v}-182^{v}). The title of this new item is: *In natali sanctorum apostolorum Philippi et Iacobi.*

been preserved under the sermon's *vd* title on ff. 148ᵛ-152 of the exceptional *vd* codex *Vaticanus latinus 471 (XII)*, origin: *Bellevaux* (= *V*).[7] *S.* Wilmart 11 was re-edited in 1930 by G. Morin on the basis of *vd*, *q* and *V* (*Miscellanea Agostiniana* [= *MA*] 1, pp. 695-705). Morin divided the sermon into 14 paragraphs; the present article will continue to do so. Within Morin's numbering the additional fragment discovered by Wilmart occupies paragraphs 6b-10a (p. 699, l. 20-p. 702, l. 7 *utquid habebo omnia-sum contra tumorem*).

Together with *London Brit. Libr. Add. 10942 (XII med. or 3/4)*, origin: *La Charité (foundation of Bellevaux in the diocese of Besançon)* (*De uerbis Apostoli*), manuscript *V* (*vd*) represents the second redaction of an enlarged and adapted version of *vda* (*vda**). The first redaction of this version was produced at Lyon by the Carolingian deacon Florus and is represented by *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 2017 (XI ex.)*, origin and provenance: *Moissac* (*vd*), and *Dijon Bibl. Mun. 143 (XII in.)*, origin and provenance: *Cîteaux* (*vda*).[8] Since the latter manuscripts still contain the typical *vd* version of the sermon,[9] we may assume that the presence of *s.* Wilmart 11 in manuscript *V* is due to the second redactor of *vda**.[10] In a recent article, I have tried to show that this second redactor probably worked in the scriptorium of Cluny.[11] Others believe, however, that *both* redactions of *vda** are due to Florus of Lyon.[12]

According to Wilmart, manuscript *V* follows the *vd* text for the first five paragraphs (*MA* 1, p. 695, l. 1-p. 699, l. 6), while its text of §6a (p. 699, ll. 7-20 *non haec nos-in me habebis*) and 10b-14 (p. 702, l. 8-705, l. 24) is that of *q*.[13] Wilmart thus seemed to presuppose that *V* contains a reconstruction of *s.* 142 that is based on *vd* for §§1-5 and

[7] Voir M. Vattasso-P. Franchi de' Cavalieri (1902), 350-351 (description); A.-M. Turcan-Verkerk (2000), 102 + n. 406 (origin); G. Partoens (2007), *passim*.

[8] Bibliography on the London, Paris and Dijon manuscripts is given in G. Partoens (2007), 189-190. For Florus as the compiler of the first version of *vda** (a hypothesis that was first suggested by F. Dolbeau [1996b], 26 [nº 25] and A.-M. Turcan-Verkerk [1999], 183 n. 55), see G. Partoens (2007), 217-222.

[9] In both manuscripts, *s.* 142 has the typical *vd* ending ([…] *et cum ipso omnia possidebis*; §5). See *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat.* 2017, ff. 118-119; *Dijon Bibl. Mun.* 143, ff. 125ᵛ-126ᵛ.

[10] This is a correction of what I have suggested in G. Partoens (2007), 200 and 222 (above).

[11] See G. Partoens (2007), 222-226.

[12] This hypothesis was proposed by A.-M. Turcan-Verkerk (1999), 183-184. For an anonymous defence of this view, see the review of G. Partoens (2007) in *Medioevo Latino* 29 (2008), 630 (nº 6760).

[13] See A. Wilmart (1928), 284.

on *q* for §§6a + 10b-14. The same can be deduced from the critical apparatus of Morin's re-edition of the sermon: while the text of the *q* representatives strongly differs from that of *vd* and *V* for the first five paragraphs – e.g. *vd* and *V* contain many sentences and word sequences that are absent from *q* and *vice versa* – it does not differ in a substantial way from *V* for paragraphs 6a and 10b-14. Moreover, I will show below that for the Wilmart fragment (§§6b-10a) *V* depends on a third branch within the transmission of *s.* 142.

For several reasons, Wilmart considered the fragment he discovered authentic:[14] **(1)** The words *Veni ad me, si uis omnia possidere* at the beginning of his fragment (§6b; p. 699, l. 23) refer to the words *et ipsum tene in quo possis omnia possidere* above in §6a (l. 11). **(2)** Some phrases at the end of the added fragment (*regnum, quo non intratur nisi per iter angustum* [§10a; p. 702, ll. 4-5] and *dat calicem* [...] *contra tumorem* [l. 7]) are taken up again in the first lines of §10b (*per angustum me uocas: non possum intrare per angustum* [ll. 8-9] and *Sarcina uobis tumor uester est* [l. 10]). **(3)** Wilmart's fragment explicitly refers to paragraphs 1-6a: *Sed quia, ut diximus, fratres, tumore superbiae non redibamus* (§10a; p. 701, l. 31) ~ *Tumuerat autem superbia, et ipso tumore per angustum redire non poterat* (§5; p. 698, ll. 6-7); *dat calicem amarum, de quo paulo ante locutus sum, contra tumorem* (§10a; p. 702, l. 7) ~ *Bibat contra tumorem poculum amarum, sed salubre: bibat poculum humilitatis* (§5; p. 698, ll. 12-13). **(4)** The fragment contains several other (strong and less strong) references to §§1-6a: *Non ueniret ad te humilis, si tibi nollet innotescere* (§6b; p. 699, l. 27-p. 700, l. 1) + *humilis factus est, ut exaltaretur excelsus* (§10a; p. 701, ll. 32-33) ~ *Via Christus, humilis Christus, ueritas et uita Christus, excelsus et Deus* (§2; p. 695, ll. 18-19); *Quod* semetipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens, *donauit hoc tibi auerso a se, conuerso autem ad se seruauit tibi* Ego et Pater unum sumus (§6b; p. 700, ll. 12-14) ~ *qui conuersum liberat, punit auersum* (§4; p. 698, ll. 3-4); *do quod te erigat* (§9; p. 701, ll. 20-21) + *Ergo erigamur* (l. 26) ~ *Erigunt nos diuinae lectiones* (§1; p. 695, l. 3); *Praestitit indignis mortem suam, seruat dignis uitam suam* (§9; p. 701, ll. 29-30) ~ *Ecce quid tibi praestitum est impio: iam pio quid seruatur?* (§5; p. 699, ll. 2-3), etc.

The reason for the elimination of §§6b-10a from the *q* text was simple according to Wilmart: 'Estimant que le discours était assez long déjà, le compilateur des *Quinquaginta* [= Caesarius?] aura

[14] See A. WILMART (1928), 288-289.

retranché sommairement ce morceau; il est représenté, de fait, par deux courtes phrases, qui ne suffisent pas à cacher la déchirure.'[15] The sentences in question are: Nemo cognoscit Patrem nisi Filius. *Noli desperare: ueni ad Filium. Audi quod sequitur:* Et cui uoluerit Filius reuelare (*PL* 38, c. 782, ll. 4-6). These sentences were taken from the fragment that was left out (*MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 25-26), which suggests indeed that the situation in *q* is due to an intentional manipulation and not to the loss of some folia in the source used by the compiler of *q*.

In *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* (1991), François Dolbeau has demonstrated that *s.* 142 has to be identified with item X^6, 72 in Possidius' *Indiculum* (*Ex euangelio:* Ego sum uia et ueritas et uita) and that it was followed by a *post sermonem* on the burial of catechumens in a now lost manuscript from Lorsch (items 9a and b in the manuscript's description that is preserved on f. 17^{rv} of *Vat. Pal. lat. 1877 (IX)*, origin: *Lorsch*: *Ex eo quod dictum est:* Ego sum uia, ueritas et uita, *et cetera* [9a]. *Hic subiungitur de sepultura caticuminorum* [9b]). The carthusian codex *Mainz I 9 (XIV-XV)*, which has partly transmitted the collection that was present in the lost manuscript of Lorsch (ff.1-73 and 162-252), has not preserved the main part of *s.* 142, but still contains its *post sermonem* (Dolbeau 7).[16]

The actual *s.* 142 is thus a combination of *s.* Wilmart 11 and *s.* Dolbeau 7. In the present article, I will present an alternative and – in my view – more original version of *s.* Wilmart 11.

A new edition of *s.* 142, 6-10

Neither Wilmart in his 1928 article, nor Morin in his 1930 edition of *s.* Wilmart 11 have signalled that paragraphs 6b-10a are also present in two collections of Augustinian sermons that are much older than manuscript *V* and that – just like *q* – belong to the Arlesian collections, viz. the 'Collection de Lyon' and the 'Collection de Marmoutier'. Both collections are known through only one direct witness. The 'Collection de Lyon' has been preserved through a 7th-century codex that once belonged to the Cathedral Library of Lyon, where it was annotated by Florus[17] and used by the latter as a source for sev-

[15] See A. Wilmart (1928), 284.

[16] For *s.* Dolbeau 7 and the identification of *s.* 142 with *Ind.* X^6, 72, see F. Dolbeau (1996a), 297-303; (1996b), 20 (n° 15).

[17] See C. Charlier (1945), 78 + 83; (1947), 148. Further bibliography in G. Partoens (2007), 221 n. 93.

eral homiletical fragments in his *Expositio beati Pauli collecta ex libris sancti Augustini*[18] and for several items in the first redaction of *vda**.[19] The original codex can be recomposed on the basis of *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 788*, ff. 49-58^{v} + *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604*, ff. 1-33^{v} + *Paris Bibl. Nat. n.a.l. 1594*, ff. 1-42^{v} + *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604*, ff. 34-94^{v}. The 'Collection de Marmoutier', on the other hand, has been handed down through the folia 91-159^{v} of manuscript *Tours Bibl. Mun. 279 (IX ex.)* (= *M*).[20] *S.* 142 is found on ff. 67-74 of *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604* (= *L*) and on ff. 135-138^{v} of *M*.

Apart from some omissions in §§13-14, which are due to an editorial intervention (Caesarius of Arles?),[21] the Lyonese manuscript also presents three large omissions that are due to the loss of folia in this very manuscript. The first occurs between ff. 67^{v} and 68, and covers *MA* 1, p. 695, l. 18-p. 696, l. 21 *uia christus humilis-ostendit peccatum quod* (= loss of one folium). The others immediately precede and follow the folia containing the Wilmart fragment (ff. 70^{r}-72^{v}) and are due to the loss of respectively one and two folia: p. 698, l. 18-p. 699, l. 20 *portam dicentem ego-in me habebis* and p. 702, l. 8-p. 703, l. 26 *dicebas non possum-caritas non aemulatur*. It is most striking that the first words on the first line of f. 70^{r} coincide with the incipit of the Wilmart fragment (*utquid habebo omnia* [...]; p. 699, l. 20), while the last words on the last line of f. 72^{v} are identical with the explicit of the very same fragment ([...] *sum contra tumorem*; p. 702, l. 7).

Earlier research has demonstrated that the Lyonese representative of the 'Collection the Lyon' had lost several folia by the middle of the 9th century.[22] So it is quite possible that the three *lacunae* indicated above could already have been observed in the Carolingian period.[23] Be that as it may, the manuscript had lost the four folia of

[18] See C. Lambot (1961), 100; 287; 432; F. Dolbeau (1996a), 537.

[19] See G. Partoens (2007), 221-222.

[20] The most recent treatment of both Arlesian collections is L. De Coninck (2008), XXXII-XXXIV (with further bibliography).

[21] For these *lacunae*, see n. 35. For Caesarian traces in the 'Collection de Lyon', see L. De Coninck (2008), XXXII-XXXIII.

[22] See L. De Coninck (2008), XXXII (with further bibliography) as well as the *notice détaillée* concerning *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604* on http://florus.bm-lyon.fr/.

[23] To be clear: several passages in the extant text of *s.* 142 in *L* are demarcated by signs typical of Florus of Lyon (⌐ ... ¬ , K... F). None of these passages, however, is quoted in Florus' *Expositio beati Pauli collecta ex libris sancti Augustini*. Florus' only quotation of *s.* 142 figures in the section on Rom. 5 (verse 6) and is quoted at full length in the Maurist description of the *Expositio* (*PL* 119, cc. 289-290). This quotation (*MA* 1, p. 698, l. 25-p. 699, l. 6 *omnia mihi tradita-ipso omnia possidebis*) belongs to the part of the sermon's text that is covered by the *lacuna* that

s. 142 when it gave rise to a specific branch within the sermon's transmission. Several later homiliaries of German and Austrian origin offer *s.* 142 (with inclusion of the Wilmart fragment) under the same title as *L* (*de eo quod in Christo, qui uia est, omnia possideat christianus, si mitis sit et humilis corde*) and with the three *lacunae* that were caused in *L* by the loss of four folia, as well as with the editorial omissions that characterize §§13-14 in the Lyonese manuscript:[24] *Wolfenbüttel Herzog-August-Bibliothek Cod. Guelf. 237 (Helmst. 204) (1178-1191)*, origin and provenance: *monastery of Lamspringe* (ff. 109^{v}-112),[25] *Melk Stiftsbibliothek 432 (218) (XV)* (ff. 150-153)[26] and *Wien Österreichische Nationalbibliothek lat. 1495 (XV)* (ff. 92^{v}-94^{v})[27] / *lat. 4730 (XV)* (ff. 189/190-193/194).[28] Moreover, *s.* 142 is not the only item for which these manuscripts ultimately depend on *L*. The following overview, which compares the content of *L* with that of the medieval collection *De lapsu mundi* as well as with *Wolfenbüttel Herzog-August-Bibliothek Cod. Guelf. 237 (Helmst. 204)* (*Wo*) and *Wien Österreichische Nationalbibliothek lat. 4730 (XV)* (*Wi*)[29] suggests that the *L* version of *s.* 142 ended up in the German and Austrian homiliaries through the mediation of a collection that contained a group of *L* sermons that was very similar to, but not identical with the group of *L* sermons in *De lapsu mundi* as the latter is described by Pierre-Patrick Verbraken in his *Études critiques* (*la*):[30]

immediately precedes the Wilmart fragment (p. 698, l. 18-p. 699, l. 20 *portam dicentem ego-in me habebis*). This observation, however, does not necessarily imply that the *lacuna* in question is posterior to Florus' use of the manuscript, for the fragment quoted in the *Expositio* may have been borrowed from a *vd* source. It bears the title *ex sermone de uerbis euangelii*, coincides with the end of *s.* 142 in the *vd* collection and clearly offers the *vd* text as it is represented in Morin's critical apparatus.

[24] For these editorial omissions, see n. 35.

[25] See O. VON HEINEMANN (1963), 185 (n° 237: written at Lamspringe); R. KURZ (1979), 508-509 (n° 204 Helmst.).

[26] See *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum qui in bibliotheca monasterii Mellicensis O.S.B. seruantur*. Vol. I (Vindobonae 1889), 300-315; D. WEBER (1993), 199-201.

[27] See D. WEBER (1993), 353-355 (*lat. 1495*).

[28] See D. WEBER (1993), 409-410 (*lat. 4730*).

[29] A global comparison of *Melk Stiftsbibliothek 432 (218)*, *Wien Österreichische Nationalbibliothek lat. 1495*. and *Wi* shows that their *L* items stem from a common source. Since *Wi* has retained the largest number of *L* items, I have chosen it as representative of the three Austrian homiliaries in the above overview.

[30] For *De lapsu mundi* and its dependence on *L*, see P.-P. VERBRAKEN (1976), 230-231; L. DE CONINCK (2008), XLI-XLII.

all authentic sermons in *L*		***la***	***Wo***	***Wi***
Lyon BM 788	* ff. 49-54^{v} / lost part / 55-55^{v} *s.* 36, 2-9 + 11 The sermon was still complete when it was lent to (an ancestor of) *la*. See C. LAMBOT (1961), 432.	art. 2 *s.* 36 (complete)	ff. 96-98 *s.* 36 (complete)	–
	* ff. 55^{v}-58^{v} *s.* 82	–	–	–
Lyon BM 604	* ff. 1-3 *s.* 202	–	–	ff. 126-127^{v} *Wi* depends for this sermon on Alanus of Farfa, 1. 39. See D. WEBER (1993), 409.
	* ff. 3-7 *s.* 309	–	–	–
	* ff. 7-10 *s.* 348	art. 4	ff. 102-103	–
	* ff. 10-15^{v} / lost part / ff. 16-21 *s.* 60, 1-7 (ending in *qui tale consilium dedit*) + *s.* 389, 4-6	art. 1 *s.* 60, 1-7 (ending in *qui tale consilium dedit*) + *s.* 389, 4-6	ff. 92^{v}-96 *s.* 60, 1-7 (ending in *qui tale consilium dedit*) + *s.* 389, 4-6	ff. 212^{v}/213^{v}-218^{v}/219^{v} *s.* 60, 1-7 (ending in *qui tale consilium dedit*) + *s.* 389, 4-6
	* ff. 21-23^{v} / lost part / ff. 24-25 *s.* 347, 1-3 (ending in *paenitentiae dolore fleuerunt*) + *s.* 191, 2-4 (ending in *spiritali seruat amplexu*)	art. 25 *s.* 347, 1-3 (ending in *paenitentiae dolore fleuerunt*) + *s.* 191, 2-4 (ending in *spiritali seruat amplexu*)	ff. 100^{v}-102 *s.* 347, 1-3 (ending in *paenitentiae dolore fleuerunt*) + *s.* 191, 2-4 (ending in *spiritali seruat amplexu*)	ff. 57-59^{v} *s.* 347, 1-3 (ending in *paenitentiae dolore fleuerunt*) + *s.* 191, 2-4 (ending in *spiritali servat amplexu*)

all authentic sermons in *L*		*la*	*Wo*	*Wi*
Paris Bibl. Nat. n.a.l. 1594	* ff. 1-4^{v} *s.* 212	–	–	–
	* ff. 8^{v}-19^{v} *s.* 22	art. 6	ff. 89^{v}-92^{v}	–
	* ff. 20-28 *s.* 38	art. 3	ff. 98-100^{v}	–
	* ff. 28-31^{v} *s.* 74	–	–	–
	* ff. 32-42^{v} *s.* 341	art. 9	ff. 7-10^{v}	ff. 169-174^{v}
Lyon BM 604	* ff. 34-41^{v} / lost part / ff. 42-57^{v} *s.* 2. 1-9 (ending in *quia non est iustificatus*) + *s.* 9. 3-21	art. 5 *s.* 2. 1-9 (ending in *quia non est iustificatus*) + *s.* 9. 3-21	ff. 103-109^{v} *s.* 2. 1-9 (ending in *quia non est iustificatus*) + *s.* 9. 3-21	ff. 255/256-259/260 *s.* 2. 1-9 (ending two sentences earlier than in *L*: *defuit illi operandi tempus*)
	* ff. 57^{v}-67 *s.* 170	art. 7	ff. 86-89^{v}	ff. 184^{v}/185^{v}-189/190
	* ff. 67-68 / lost part / 68-69^{v} / lost part / 70-72^{v} / lost part / 73-74 *s.* Wilmart 11. 1 + 3-5 + 6-10 + 12-14	–	ff. 109^{v}-112 *s.* Wilmart 11. 1 + 3-5 + 6-10 + 12-14	ff. 189/190-193/194 *s.* Wilmart 11. 1 + 3-5 + 6-10 + 12-14
	* ff. 74-88 *s.* 361	–	–	–

Although the above observations concerning the position of the Wilmart fragment in *L* could be the result of a mere coincidence, they more likely imply that someone who possessed a *vd* version of §§1-5 and a *q* version of at least §§6-14 (i.e., without §§6b-10a), discovered that the mutilated manuscript *L* or one of its descendants offered a further fragment that had to be inserted somewhere between the last words on f. 69^{v} of *L* (§5; p. 698, l. 18: [...] *intrate per angustiam*) and the first words on f. 73 (§12; p. 703, l. 26: *quare non aemulatur* [...]). The latter alternative would imply that *L* or a descendant was

one of three sources that were used for a reconstruction of *s.* 142. This reconstruction may have been produced at an early date, but has come down to us in a rather late manuscript belonging to a very specific branch of *vda* (*V*). Moreover, if one sticks to Wilmart's conviction that the added fragment, which he discovered in *V*, belonged to a more original form of *s.* 142 than the form preserved in the Maurist edition – I believe with Morin[31] that there is no reason to doubt this – opting for the second alternative would mean that the fragment absent from *q* was probably even larger than the one published by Wilmart and Morin. Another implication would be that the position of the Wilmart fragment within *s.* 142 as offered by *V* does not necessarily coincide with the fragment's original position, for *L* and its descendants did/do not contain any precise information about the fragment's original position between the last words on f. 69^{v} of *L* and the first words on f. 73. The compiler of the version preserved in *V* could thus have decided by himself where to insert the fragment in what *vd* and *q* had preserved of the sermon's text between p. 698, l. 18 and p. 703, l. 26 of Morin's edition.

Previous research has concluded that for several of its items the 'Collection de Lyon' is closely related with the 'Collection de Marmoutier'. In these cases, the latter collection offers a text that is very similar to, but independent of that of the 7th-century codex from Lyon. Luc De Coninck puts it as follows: 'En plus du n° 12 [= *s.* 60], les n^{os} 9 (*serm.* 9), 10 (*serm.* 142), 14 (*serm.* 22) et 16 (*app.* 65), ainsi que le n° 17 (*app.* 144), réapparaissent dans *F* [= De Coninck's *siglum* for the representatives of the 'Collection de Lyon'] sous le même titre (qui est plus d'une fois typiquement césarien); pour autant qu'il existe des éditions critiques confrontant les deux témoins (éd. LAMBOT, 1961 [= *CCSL* 41], 100-101. 287), on constate que leurs textes sont à peu près identiques sans que le ms. tourangeau [= *M*] dépende de *F*.'[32] The close link between both collections is very clear in the case of *s.* 142. Manuscript *M* shares the following characteristics with *L* against *vd*, *q* and *V*: **(1)** The sermon bears the same title in *M* and *L*: *Incipit de eo quod in Christo, qui uia est, omnia possideat christianus, si mitis sit* [sit *om. M*] *et humilis corde* [fuerit *add. M*]. **(2)** Although their text of §§1-5 clearly belongs to the same tradition as the *q*

[31] See *MA* 1, p. 694: *Quae etsi in utraque recensione «De uerbis Domini» et «Quinquaginta homiliarum» desiderantur, prorsus et Augustinianas eas esse, et ad eundem sermonem pertinere, Andreas noster argumentis nihil dubii relinquentibus ostendit.*

[32] See L. DE CONINCK (2008), XXXIII.

sources quoted in the critical apparatus of Morin,[33] they also share variant readings and omissions that are encountered neither in *V* nor in the *vd* or *q* witnesses used by Morin.[34] (**3**) Paragraphs 13-14 (p. 704, l. 1-p. 705, l. 24) in *L* and *M* are an abbreviated version of the sermon's text as it is preserved in *q* and manuscript *V*.[35]

The greatest difference between *L* and *M* consists in the fact that the latter's text of *s.* 142 has not been affected by a loss of folia and thus seems to give a better idea of the situation in the youngest common source of both manuscripts. Now, if we look at the way in which the Wilmart fragment has been transmitted in *M*, the suggestions made above on the basis of the fragment's presence in *L* seem to be confirmed: not only is the fragment preceded and followed by a few unedited sentences that smoothly link it with its surrounding context (cf. below), but it also figures at a slightly different place within what *vd* and *q* have preserved of the sermon's text between p. 698, l. 18 and p. 703, l. 26 of Morin's edition.

What follows is an edition of the new, extended version of

[33] The *q* sources used by Morin were *Berlin Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Phillips 1677 (X)*, provenance: *Collège de Clermont*, ff. 55^{v}ff (= *P*) and *Vat. lat. 478 (XII in.)*, provenance: *San Pietro*, ff. 81^{v}-86^{v} (= *B*). Some striking similarities between *B P* and *L M* are: p. 695, ll. 21-22 ualde-ut *om. B P M* $^{a.c.}$, *def. L* || p. 696, l. 1 ad uitam *om. B P M* $^{a.c.}$, *def. L* || et ipsa] quia et superbia *B P M* $^{a.c.}$, *def. L* || l. 4 incolumis] fortis *B P M* $^{a.c.}$, *def. L* || ll. 6-7 quam-heu *om. B P M*, *def. L* || ll. 7-8 de-sentiendo *om. B P M*, *def. L* || l. 10 corruptionesque terrenas] corruptionemque terrenam *B P M*, *def. L* || accedere *om. B P M*, *def. L* || ll. 10-11 hoc est fornicari] fornicari est *B P M*, *def. L* || ll. 11-12 huic-consilium] *om. B P M* $^{a.c.}$ (uideamus nunc obiurgationis consilium *etiam post correctionem om. M*), *def. L*, *sequuntur in P M sententiae quae habentur in PL* 38, c. 779, ll. 8-12 || l. 13 confusionem] confessionem *B P M* $^{a.c.}$, *def. L* || l. 14 praesumptionem *om. B P M*, *def. L* || l. 22 et *om. B P L M* || l. 24 anima] *om. B P L M* || l. 25 sic *om. B P L M* || p. 697, l. 1 ideo *om. B P L M* || l. 6 deus] et amandus est deus *add. B P L M* || pro amore eius *om. B P L M* || l. 9 ergo] et *add. B P L M* || et quia *om. B P L M* || l. 14 orare] an pro illa *add. B P L M* || ll. 14/15 ignominia] aduersarius apparet inimicus apparet audi quod sequitur et uide utrum orare (putari *L M*) possit amicus *add. B P L M* || etc.

[34] p. 695, l. 8 ubi uis] ire ubi *add. L M* $^{a.c.}$ || ll. 14-15 quid^{2}-tunc *om. L M* $^{a.c.}$ || p. 697, l. 3 minus] minor *L M* || l. 5 minus^{1}] est *add. L M* || l. 18 et odit^{1} *ante* odit^{1} *L M* $^{a.c.}$ || l. 21 deus] hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam *add. L M* || l. 24 audi potius] potius audi *L M* || l. 28 est enim] enim est *L M* || p. 698, l. 1 faciem] qui *praem. L M* || ll. 2-3 quo^{2}-illo *om. L M* || l. 3 loco continetur] continetur loco *L M* || l. 6 superbia] homo *praem. L M* || l. 10 tumens] tumescens *L M* $^{a.c.}$ || l. 11 autem *om. L M*

[35] p. 704, ll. 10-11 quandoquidem-dicens] secundum illud *L M* || 12-14 et-me^{2}] et reliqua *L M* || l. 15 et-nonne] iam *L M* || ll. 17-18 potest-corde *om. L M* || l. 19 si-audi *om. L M* || ll. 22-28 his-ex *om. L M* || p. 704, l. 28-p. 705, l. 1 haec-passionis] omnia sua reliquerunt et *L M* || l. 1-15 cum-prodest *om. L M*

Wilmart's fragment within its changed surrounding context. The fragment is edited on the basis of *L*, *M* and *V*; the unedited sentences surrounding the fragment (printed in bold) are edited on the basis of *M*; the text that immediately precedes and follows the new sentences in §§6 and 10 (printed between brackets) is borrowed from Morin's edition. The critical apparatus is exhaustive, but does not mention insignificant variant readings. The Wilmart fragment (including the new sentences) now starts much earlier in §6 (after *MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 7-11 *non haec nos-possis omnia possidere* = ll. 1-5 of the new edition) and is immediately followed by 10 lines that still belonged to §6a in *V* and the editions of Wilmart and Morin (*MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 11-20 *ipse ergo medicus-in me habebis* = ll. 103-113 of the new edition). This means that, in the new edition, these 10 lines have shifted from §6 to §10.

Conspectus siglorum

L	*Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604 (VII)*, provenance: *Lyon Cathedral*, ff. 67-74
M	*Tours Bibl. Mun. 279 (IX ex.)*, provenance: *Marmoutier*, ff. 135-138^{v}
V	*Vaticanus latinus 471 (XII)*, origin: *Bellevaux*, ff. 148^{v}-152
Wilmart	*Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* 9 (1928), pp. 285-288
Morin	*Miscellanea Agostiniana* 1 (Roma 1930), pp. 695-705

6. {Non haec nos quasi ratiocinando dicimus. Ipsum audi apostolum dicentem: *Qui Filio proprio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donauit?* Auare, ecce habes omnia. Omnia quae amas ut impediaris a Christo, contemne et ipsum tene in quo possis omnia possidere.}
Forte nolis illud atque illud: quaecumque desiderantur terrena; iam non es auarus. Aliter tecum loquendum est. Est in te aliqua pietas; neglegere coepisti mundana; non credis posse sufficere tibi nisi Deum. « Vtquid habebo omnia », dicis, « si illum non habuero? » Recte dicis. Sed si et ipsum uis habere, audi quod sequitur. Cum enim dixisset: *Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo* – tamquam exhortans et dicens: « Veni ad me, si uis omnia possidere » – et ne tu diceres: « Nolo omnia, sed eum uolo qui fecit omnia », sequitur et dicit: *Nemo nouit Filium nisi Pater et nemo nouit Patrem nisi Filius* – noli desperare, audi cetera: *et cui uoluerit Filius reuelare*. « *Cui uoluerit*, inquit: mihi forte nolit. » Non ueniret ad te humilis, si tibi nollet innotescere excelsus.
Forte et hic dicis: « Etiam ipse mihi innotescit, Patrem uelim discere. » Patrem uis nosse? Audi uocem Philippi; prior nuntiauit

2–4 Rom. 8, 32 **11** Matth. 11, 27 **14–16** Matth. 11, 27

1–5 Non…possidere] *ex editione G. Morin* (*MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 7-11) **6–9** Forte…Deum] *ex M, def. L, om. V Wilmart Morin* **6** nolis] noles $M^{a.c.}$ **8** credis] credes $M^{a.c.}$ **9** habebo] habeo $L^{a.c.}$ **10** Sed] *om. V* **13** et] *del. M* **17** nollet] nolit *L*, nollit $M^{a.c.}$ **18** Etiam] si *add. V* | innotescit] innotescet $M^{p.c.}$, innotescat *V* | uelim] uellim *L M* **19** Philippi] Phylippi *M V* | nuntiauit] enuntiauit $M^{p.c.}$

hanc uocem et optime, ut decebat, sentiebat beatitudinem et ubique etiam sitiens, ubique sitiens remanebat: nusquam inueniebat unde satiaretur. Ait Domino sitiens: *Domine, ostende nobis Patrem et sufficit nobis*. Quid est *sufficit nobis*? Ibi requiescens amplius non requiram. Et Dominus: *Tanto tempore uobiscum sum et non cognouistis me? Philippe, qui me uidit, uidit et Patrem*. Hoc ergo opus est ut ostendat se Filius. Non enim minorem Patre inuenturus es Filium aut frustra dixit: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. Sed qui in se unum cum Patre, propter te tamen *semetipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens*. Quod *semetipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens*, donauit hoc tibi auerso a se; conuerso autem ad se seruauit tibi *Ego et Pater unum sumus*.

7. Et uide quomodo aperte hoc dicat: *Qui diligit me, mandata mea custodit et diligetur a Patre meo et ego diligam eum*. Suspendit nos, quasi quid daturus, quia diligit nos. Quomodo si tibi homo dicat: « Diligo te », non attendis nisi quid tibi donet, quid tibi praestet, quid possit in quo sit utilis. Ait ergo Dominus: *et ego diligam eum*. Quaere quid tibi daturus sit. Audi quod sequitur: *et ostendam ei me ipsum*. Quid est hoc, fratres? Videtis quo rapiat

22–23 Ioh. 14, 8 **24–25** Ioh. 14, 9 **27** Ioh. 10, 30 **28–30** Phil. 2, 7 **31** Ioh. 10, 30 **32–33** Ioh. 14, 21 **36–38** Ioh. 14, 21

20 et[1]...beatitudinem] *secutus sum interpunctionem codicis L* (et optime ut (ut *del. M*) dicebat; sentiebat (sitiebat $M^{p.c.}$) beatitudinem *M*, et optime, ut decebat. Sitiebat enim beatitudinem *V*) | ut] *del. M* | decebat] dicebat *M* | sentiebat] sitiebat $M^{p.c.}$ *V*, enim *add. V* **21** etiam] eam $M^{p.c.}$ *V* | sitiens[1]] quaerens *V* | sitiens[2]] $M^{e\ corr.}$ (*fortasse* sentiens $M^{a.c.}$) **25** cognouistis] cognouisti $M^{p.c.}$ | me[1]] $M^{e\ corr.}$ | Philippe] Phylippe *V* | uidit uidit] uidet uidet *V* **29–30** Quod...accipiens] *om. per homoeot. M* **32** quomodo] quam *V* **33** custodit] custodet $M^{a.c.}$ | et[1]] qui autem diligit me *V* **35** attendis] adtendes $M^{a.c.}$ **36** possit] prosit *V* | et] *om. M*

flamma caritatis. Visuri sumus aliquid et ipsum aliquid Verbum Dei est et ipsum aliquid Deus apud Deum, per quem facta sunt omnia. Munus enuntiatur, munus proponitur. Quanta hominum et quam uana laetitia! Feruet undique tumultus concursantium, indicantium sibi quasi magnum aliquid, excitantium se hortatione et nugatoriis blandimentis ire, uidere. Quo ire? Quid uidere? Quo corrupta anima pergat redeatque corruptior et indigna amplexu tamquam legitimi uiri sui, illuc itur, illuc curritur. Et proponit futuram quandam uisionem, futuram exspectationem Christus. Dicit: « *Ego diligam eum et ostendam* – non quod feci, non sinum altissimum abyssorum, non secreta terrarum, non uarietates herbarum, non multitudinem generum animalium, non postremo numerum siderum, non conuersiones astrorum, non dimensiones temporum. Vtquid enim haec uis uidere? Quae si uideres, certe magna essent: ego feci haec – *ostendam me ipsum illi.* »

8. « Sed quando istud erit », dicit aliquis, « quando ostendet? » Differt, non aufert. « Et in differendo quid agit? » Desiderio dilatat sinum animae. Magnum quiddam daturus est, fratres, et quid dico uel magnum? Si uel hoc dicendum est! Vide quanta dat impiis, quanta dat et donat indignis. Quare et ipsis? Quia *facit solem suum*

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48 Ioh. 14, 21 **53** Ioh. 14, 21 **58–59** Matth. 5, 45

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39 et…aliquid[2]] *del. M* **44** Quid] quod $M^{a.c.}$ **46** tamquam] tam *V* | curritur] curretur $M^{a.c.}$ | Et] *legere nequeo quod add. s. lin.* $M^{p.c.}$ **48** Dicit] enim *add. V* | Ego] *om. V* | ostendam] ei *add. V* **49** altissimum] *om. V* **50** multitudinem…animalium] *ita V*, (in $M^{a.c.}$) multitudinum genera animalium *L* $M^{a.c.}$, uim seminum non genera animalium $M^{p.c.}$ **53** essent] non *praem. V* | me] *om. L* $^{a.c.}$ **54** ostendet] ostendit *L* $M^{a.c.}$ **57** Si] quasi $M^{p.c.}$ | Vide] uidete $M^{p.c.}$ *V* | impiis] *iterat* $M^{a.c.}$ **58** quanta] et *praem. V* | dat et] *ita L*, dona et $M^{a.c.}$, *om.* $M^{p.c.}$ *V* | Quare] quae donat $M^{p.c.}$ | Quia] *del. M*

oriri super bonos et malos. Videte quemadmodum seruiat creatura blasphemis; ipsa naturalia dona circumspice. Habent salutem, habent integritatem sensuum, habent spiritum membra terrena uegetantem, habent perfunctionem aeris huius, uisionem lucis, rationabilem mentem, qua ceteris animantibus excellentiores sunt. Haec omnia diuitibus, pauperibus, bonis, malis tamquam diuitiae communes iacent. Aluntur omnes, illustrantur ista luce omnes, tamquam de publico uiuunt. Dat haec omnia. Hinc, fratres, cogitare non debemus quid seruet suis, quid praeparet fidelibus, ut uideant non uidentes et credentes? Credere antequam uideas, meritum est futurae uisionis. Exercetur ergo capacitas tua dilatione bonorum, ut aucto desiderio sis idoneus capere quod promittit et quod desideras.

9. Nam aliquid iam dedit: dedit enim pignus Spiritum suum. Quid est: « pignus dedit »? Tamquam dicens: « Ecce quia dabo aliquid, inde nunc do quod te erigat, quod inflammet caritatem, quod rapiat ad satietatem gustatum ». *Gustate et uidete quam suauis est Dominus*. Vnde gustastis, inde satiabimini. *Inebriabuntur*, inquit, *ab ubertate domus tuae* et reliqua. *Quoniam apud te est fons uitae et in lumine tuo uidebimus lumen*. Numquid aliud fons uitae et aliud lumen? Multis modis dicitur quod, quicquid dictum fuerit, non dicetur. Ergo erigamur, inflammemur, inardescamus,

74–75 Ps. 33, 9 **75–77** Ps. 35, 9-10

59 Videte] uide *V* **63** sunt] *non leg. L*, simus *M (ut uid.)* **64** Haec] $M^{e\ corr.}$ **66** tamquam] tam $L^{a.c.}$ | uiuunt] ui*uunt $L^{a.c.}$ | omnia] omnibus $M^{p.c.}$ **67** debemus] debe* *M* **67–68** ut…credentes] non uidentibus et credentibus ut uideant $M^{p.c.}$ **70** aucto] auto $M^{a.c.}$, aucta *V* **71–72** Quid est] *del. M* **74** gustatum] *ante* rapiat *V* **75** gustastis] gustatis *M* **76** et reliqua] *non leg. M* $^{a.c.}$, et torrente uoluptatis tue potabis eos $M^{p.c.}$ **78** dictum] dixum *M* **79** dicetur] dicitur $M^{p.c.}$ | inflammemur] $M^{e\ corr.}$

desideremus. Et si differimur, non auferemur. Teneamus tantum uiam: ibi erit satietas nostra, ibi erit fons uitae. Venit ipse fons uitae, indutus est carne, fecit ut desideremus. Praestitit indignis mortem suam, seruat dignis uitam suam.

10. Sed quia, ut diximus, fratres, tumore superbiae non redibamus, inde indignis praestitit mortem suam: humilis factus est, ut humiliaret superbos; humilis factus est, ut exaltaretur excelsus. Hoc egit, ut detumesceret morbus tuus. Tumentes uolebant intrare discipuli illi duo, qui per matrem – quia per se non audebant – rogauerunt. Vel ipsa uerecundia debuit monere quid peterent. Non audebant per se: anum matrem suam ueluti emeritae aetatis fecerunt loqui ad Dominum. Desiderabant regnum, quo non intratur nisi per iter angustum. Illi autem tumentes adhuc cupiditate honoris quanto se artius impellebant, tanto grauius uexabantur. Deprimit eos Dominus et dat calicem amarum, de quo paulo ante locutus sum, contra tumorem, **qui non permittit intrare per iter angustum. Ait eis: *Potestis bibere calicem?* Non dixit: « calicem amarum », « calicem tribulationis ». Si ista diceret, ante deterreret quam inuitaret. *Potestis*, inquit, *calicem bibere?* Iam auersabantur, horrebant. Quomodo inuitauit? Adiecit: « *quem***

96 Matth. 20, 22 **98–100** Matth. 20, 22

80 desideremus] desideramus $M^{a.c.}$ | si] *om.* $M^{a.c.}$ | auferemur] auferimur *M V* **81–82** Venit…uitae] *om. per homoeot. M* **86** humiliaret…ut] *om. per homoeot. V* **90** audebant] audebat $M^{a.c.}$ **91** regnum] regnuum $M^{a.c.}$ **92** honoris] honores $M^{a.c.}$ **93** Deprimit] depraemet *L*, deprimebat *M* **93–94** Deprimit eos] deprimebatos $M^{a.c.}$ *(ut uid.)* **95–103** qui…medicina] *ex M, def. L, om. V Wilmart Morin* **95** intrare per] *aliquid erasum est inter uerba* intrare *et* per *in codice M* **97** tribulationis] tribulationes $M^{a.c.}$ | diceret] dicerit $M^{a.c.}$ **99** auersabantur] uersabantur $M^{a.c.}$

ego bibiturus sum. **Vos certe in aliquo tumore estis aut in magno; ego in nullo. Tota et perfecta sanitas ubi nulla peccata. Et quanto perfectior sanitas, tanto solidior et certior medicina.** » {Ipse ergo medicus nihil tali indigens medicamento, tamen ut exhortaretur aegrotum, bibit quod opus non erat; tamquam alloquens recusantem et trepidum erigens bibit prior. « *Calicem* », inquit, « *quem ego bibiturus sum.* Qui in me non habeo quod ab illo calice sanetur, bibiturus sum tamen, ne tu dedigneris bibere, cui opus est ut bibas. »

Iam uidete, fratres, si amplius debet aegrotare genus humanum accepta tanta medicina. Iam humilis Deus et adhuc superbus homo. Audiat, discat! « *Omnia* », inquit, « *mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo.* Si desideras omnia, mecum habebis. Si desideras Patrem, per me habebis, in me habebis. »} {Dicebas: « Non possum; per angustum me uocas; non possum intrare per angustum. » « *Venite ad me* », inquit, « *omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis*. Sarcina uobis tumor uester est. *Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis et ego uos reficiam. Tollite iugum meum super uos et discite a me.* »}

105–106 Matth. 20, 22 **111** Matth. 11, 27 **114–117** Matth. 11, 28-29

103–113 Ipse…habebis] *ex editione G. Morin* (*MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 11-20)
113–117 Dicebas…me] *ex editione G. Morin* (*MA* 1, p.702, ll. 8-12)

The Wilmart fragment within its new context

I will now try to prove on the basis of a content analysis of §§5-10 that the text of *s.* 142 in the youngest common source of *L*, *M* and *V* did contain the sentences that I have added on the basis of codex *M*, and did offer the Wilmart fragment (including the additional lines) in the same position as the latter codex does. This analysis will distinguish by means of an asterisk the line numbering of the new edition from the numbering in the Morin text.

Paragraph 5 argues that a person who is swollen with pride cannot enter through the narrow gate of God's kingdom. In order to fulfil Christ's command *Intrate per angustam portam* (Mt. 7:13), he must reduce the swelling. He can achieve this by drinking the medicine of humility, which is a bitter, but wholesome draught: *Vnde autem detumescat? Accipiat humilitatis medicamentum. Bibat contra tumorem poculum amarum, sed salubre: bibat poculum humilitatis* (*MA* 1, p. 698, ll. 11-13). He should not have his heart set on the things of this world nor take pride in worldly pomp. The only way to get through the narrow gate of the kingdom is Christ, who called himself the way (*ego sum uia*: Mt. 14:6) and the door (*ego sum ianua*: John 10:7).

Augustine then introduces in the second person singular someone who, driven by worldly avarice, wants to possess everything. To this person he says – I paraphrase: "If you want to possess everything, you have to turn to Christ, who says: *Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo* (Mt. 11:27a). If you are to object that the latter verse says that the Father handed over everything to Christ and not to you, listen then to the words of the Apostle." (*Certe forte auaritia omnia uis possidere.* Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo, *inquit. Fortasse dicturus es: «Christo sunt tradita: numquid mihi?» Audi apostolum dicentem* [...]; ll. 24-27). The apostolic words hinted at are Rm. 5:6, according to which Christ died for the unholy, who did not deserve His love: Etenim Christus pro impiis mortuus est. If Christ's death was God's gift to the unholy — Augustine asks — what will be His gift to the pious? The answer runs: the possession of everything. If someone wants to have everything, he should not go about it in a greedy way, but try to achieve it in a godly way. In doing so, he will get hold of Him through whom all things were made, and with Him he will possess everything: *Quaero quid merebatur impius. «Damnari», respondes.* Christus *tamen* pro impiis mortuus est. *Ecce quid tibi praestitum est impio: iam pio quid seruatur? Quid praestitum est impio?* Christus pro impiis mortuus est. *Desiderabas autem omnia*

possidere. Noli per auaritiam: per pietatem hoc quaere; si enim ita quaesieris, possidebis. Tenebis enim eum per quem facta sunt omnia, et cum ipso omnia possidebis (p. 699, ll. 1-6).

At the beginning of paragraph 6 Augustine claims that Rm. 8:32 confirms the above argument against the opinion that, according to Mt. 11:27a, the Father gave everything only to the Son: *Non haec nos quasi ratiocinando dicimus. Ipsum audi apostolum dicentem:* Qui Filio proprio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donauit? (*ll. 1-4) This quotation of Rm. 8:32 is followed by a conclusion that repeats what is said in the previous paragraph: a greedy person who desires to possess everything, has to — paradoxically — condemn his worldly possessions and hold on to Christ, for in Christ he will find the fulfilment of his desire: *Auare, ecce habes omnia. Omnia quae amas ut impediaris a Christo, comtemne et ipsum tene in quo possis omnia possidere* (*ll. 4-5).

In the editions of Wilmart and Morin, these words are immediately followed by a reflexion on Christ the healer (*MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 11-20 *ipse ergo medicus-in me habebis*), which in the new edition appears only on *ll. 103-113. This passage first develops the theme of the *poculum humilitatis*, which was hinted at in §5 (p. 699, ll. 11-18 *ipse ergo medicus-adhuc superbus homo*), and subsequently returns to the argument concerning the possession of everything (p. 699, ll. 18-20 *audiat discat omnia-in me habebis*). In the editions of Wilmart and Morin, the Wilmart fragment then further develops the latter argument (p. 699, ll. 20ff. *utquid habebo omnia* [...]).

In the new version of *s.* Wilmart 11 the argument concerning the possession of everything is not interrupted by a reflexion on the theme of the *Christus medicus*. On the contrary, Augustine further develops the argument by giving it more complexity. After having spoken to a worldly *auarus*, who wants to possess everything and paradoxically can only find fulfilment of his desire by holding on to Christ, Augustine now turns to another second person singular, who is no *auarus* anymore, but has given up all worldly desires. The introduction of this new second person singular is marked by the same adverb (*forte*) as the introduction of the worldly *auarus* in §5 (*Forte nolis illud atque illud: quaecumque desiderantur terrena; iam non es auarus*; *ll. 6-7). To such a person, Augustine has to speak differently (*Aliter tecum loquendum est*; *l. 7), because for someone who believes that only God can fulfil his desire (*Est in te aliqua pietas; neglegere coepisti mundana; non credis posse sufficere tibi nisi Deum*; *ll. 7-9), the possession of everything — and here the Wilmart

fragment starts — is of no use, if he does not possess God himself (*«Vtquid habebo omnia», dicis, «si illum non habuero?»*; *ll. 9-10). Whereas the possession of everything, which could seduce an *auarus* to give up his worldly desires, was guaranteed in §5 and at the beginning of §6 by the combination of Mt. 11:27a, Rm. 5:6 and Rm. 8:32, the possession of God is now presented as the implicit promise of Mt. 11:27b: *Cum enim dixisset:* Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo — *tamquam exhortans et dicens: «Veni ad me, si uis omnia possidere» — et ne tu diceres: «Nolo omnia, sed eum uolo qui fecit omnia», sequitur et dicit:* Nemo nouit Filium nisi Pater et nemo nouit Patrem nisi Filius — *noli desperare, audi cetera:* et cui uoluerit Filius reuelare (*ll. 11-16).

Augustine subsequently argues that the one who knows the Son, also knows the Father (John 14:8-9; *ll. 18-26), and that the Son and the Father are one (John 10:30; *ll. 26-27). In spite of His being one with the Father, the Son emptied Himself and took on the form of a servant (Phil. 2:7; *ll. 27-30). This was the gift He made when man was turned away from Him; the contemplation of the unity of the Son and the Father will be His gift to those who return to Him (*ll. 30-31). This reflexion gives rise in §7 to an evocation of this future contemplation, which, in turn, leads to an explanation in §8 of why God postpones this future delight. Paragraph 9 states that man has received God's Spirit as a deposit, which enflames his desire while the unspeakable vision of God is still absent.

At the beginning of §10 Augustine returns to the *tumor* of pride spoken of in §5. Christ came down low in humility, the bishop claims, in order that the swelling, which prevented man's return to Him, might deflate (*Sed quia, ut diximus, fratres, tumore superbiae non redibamus, inde indignis praestitit mortem suam: humilis factus est, ut humiliaret superbos; humilis factus est, ut exaltaretur excelsus. Hoc egit, ut detumesceret morbus tuus*, *ll. 84-87). In this way Augustine reintroduces the *Christus medicus* theme, which in the new edition has not been hinted at since the mention of the *humilitatis medicamentum*, the *poculum amarum, sed salubre* and the *poculum humilitatis* in §5 (*MA* 1, p. 698, ll. 12-13). Another theme of §5 — the idea that swollen pride prevents us from entering the kingdom — is subsequently taken up in a paraphrase of Mt. 20:20-23. Zebedeus' two sons wanted to enter the kingdom, but pride prevented them from passing through its small entry. In an explicit reference to §5, the last sentence of the Wilmart fragment states that Christ healed both brothers by offering them a bitter cup against the swelling: *Desiderabant regnum, quo non intratur nisi per iter angustum. Illi autem tumentes*

adhuc cupiditate honoris quanto se artius impellebant, tanto grauius uexabantur. Deprimit eos Dominus et dat calicem amarum, de quo paulo ante locutus sum, contra tumorem, [...] (*ll. 91-96).

The last sentence of the Wilmart fragment not only hints at the *poculum amarum, sed salubre* of §5 and the expression *bibat poculum humilitatis* in the same paragraph, it is also a reminiscence of Christ's question to Zebedeus' sons in Mt. 20:22: *Potestis calicem bibere quem ego bibiturus sum?* In this way, it does not come as a surprise that the new sentences that the above edition adds to the Wilmart fragment and that carry the mark of Augustine's homiletic style, embroider further on this very question. Christ did not say — Augustine typically claims — that both brothers had to drink from a bitter cup (*Non dixit: «calicem amarum», «calicem tribulationis»*; *ll. 96-97). Such a statement would have repelled them (*Si ista diceret, ante deterreret quam inuitaret*; *ll. 97-98). The main clause of Christ's question already made them shiver (Potestis, *inquit,* calicem bibere? *Iam auersabantur, horrebant*; *ll. 98-99), but the added relative clause was meant to give them confidence (*Quomodo inuitauit? Adiecit:* quem ego bibiturus sum; *ll. 99-100).[36] Moreover, while they had to drink from the bitter cup as a medicine against the illness of pride, Christ was to drink from it in perfect health (*Vos certe in aliquo tumore estis aut in magno; ego in nullo. Tota et perfecta sanitas ubi nulla peccata. Et quanto perfectior sanitas, tanto solidior et certior medicina*; *ll. 100-103). The lines, which immediately precede the Wilmart fragment in the editions of Wilmart and Morin (*MA* 1, p. 699, ll. 11-20 *ipse ergo medicus-in me habebis*), but which immediately follow the new sentences that complete the fragment in our edition (*ll. 103-113), clearly presuppose the exposition on

[36] Clear parallels to the interpretation of Mt. 20:22 in *s.* Wilmart 11, 10 are *s.* 20A, 8 (*CCSL* 41, p. 272, ll. 121-135: *Sed timebas tu, o homo, contumelias humilitatis pati! Bibere calicem passionis amarissimum prodest tibi. Viscera tua tument, inflata habes praecordia. Bibe amaritudinem, ut teneas sanitatem. Bibit sanus medicus. Non uult bibere languens aegrotus? Hoc enim filiis Zebedei ait:* Potestis bibere calicem? *Non illis dixit: «Potestis bibere calicem contumeliarum, calicem fellis, calicem aceti, calicem amarissimum, calicem ueneno repletum, calicem omnium passionum?» Si haec diceret, terreret potius quam excitaret. Vbi communicatio, ibi consolatio. Quid dedignaris, serue? Calicem illum Dominus bibit. Quid dedignaris, aegrote? Medicus bibit. Quid dedignaris, languide? Sanus bibit.* Potestis bibere calicem quem ego bibiturus sum? *Tunc illi auidi altitudinis, nescientes quid possent, promittentes quod nondum haberent:* Possumus, *dixerunt*) and *s.* 329, 2 (*PL* 38, c. 1455). For the theme of the *medicus humilis* who first drank the 'cup of humility' in order to encourage those suffering from the illness of pride, see R. ARBESMANN (1954), 14-16 (with further Augustinian examples).

Zebedeus' sons: they explicitly quote the comforting relative clause of Mt. 20:22 and state that Christ, who did not need a medicine, drank it in order to persuade those who need(ed) to drink it, but were/ are reluctant to do so: *Ipse ergo medicus nihil tali indigens medicamento, tamen ut exhortaretur aegrotum, bibit quod opus non erat; tamquam alloquens recusantem et trepidum erigens bibit prior. «*Calicem*», inquit, «*quem ego bibiturus sum. *Qui in me non habeo quod ab illo calice sanetur, bibiturus sum tamen, ne tu dedigneris bibere, cui opus est ut bibas.»* (*ll. 103-108) Moreover, these lines are concluded by a new reference to Mt. 11:27a (*Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo*) (*ll. 109-113 *iam uidete fratres-in me habebis*), which is now smoothly continued by a quotation of Mt. 11, 28-29 (*ll. 113-117), which in the editions of Wilmart and Morin was separated from the reference to verse 27a by the long Wilmart fragment (*MA* 1, p. 702, ll. 8ff. *dicebas non possum* [...]).

The foregoing content analysis demonstrates that the new edition of §§6-10 is well structured and that, considered in the light of this new text, the sermon's argument in Wilmart's and Morin's editions is less clear, especially in §6. Together with what has been said above concerning the sermon's transmission, this observation sufficiently proves — I think — that the above edition of §§6-10 reflects the situation in the youngest common source of manuscripts *L*, *M* and *V*.

I am aware of the fact that *M* belongs to the so-called Arlesian collections and may thus offer us a (Caesarian?) adaptation of the original version of Augustine's *s.* 142. The same, however, goes for *L* and the Wilmart fragment in manuscript *V*. So even if *M* contains a (Caesarian?) adaptation of an unknown Augustinian original, we still need to acknowledge that of all extant witnesses, *M* offers the most original version of the Wilmart fragment and its surrounding context. Moreover, since there seems to be no reason to doubt the authenticity of the Wilmart fragment as a whole — no one has ever done so since its first publication in 1928[37] — the new sentences as well as the fragment's new position have every chance of being Augustinian too. Several typically Augustinian features in the new sentences support this conclusion: the image of the *calix tribulationis* (*l. 97),[38] the analysis of Mt. 20:22 (with inclusion of the formulas *non dixit* and *si*

[37] Compare G. Morin's words as quoted in n. 31.

[38] From the *Library of Latin Texts*, it seems that the expression *calix/calic* tribulationis/tribulationum* was first used by Augustine (*s.* 88, 7). For Augustine's use of the word *calix*, see also V. Saxer (1986-1994), 707-708.

ista diceret; *ll. 96-100),[39] the combination of parallelism and antithesis (*ll. 100-103), etc.

Conclusion

This article has presented a new critical edition of §§6-10 of saint Augustine's *s.* 142, which is based in the first place on the 'Collection de Marmoutier' (*M*). This collection presents the fragment that Wilmart added in 1928 to the Maurist edition, at a slightly different place than Wilmart's sole witness did, viz. *Vat. lat. 471* (*V*). Moreover, in *M* the fragment is preceded and followed by several authentic sentences that are lacking in *V* and have remained unedited until today. My acceptance of these supplementary lines was based on arguments drawn from the sermon's global transmission as well as from the content and structure of the sermon's paragraphs 5-10. I would like to stress at the end of this article that arguments such as these are absolutely necessary for the acceptance of additional lines discovered in *M*, since Cyril Lambot and Luc De Coninck have demonstrated in the introductions to their editions of *ss.* 70, 254 and 343 that *M* shows traces of intentional manipulation and has to be used with caution.[40]

The present article has also shed further light on the transmission of *s.* 142. The sermon was known in different forms during the early Middle Ages. It was transmitted with a *post sermonem* on the burial of catechumens (*s.* Dolbeau 7) within the so-called 'Collection de Lorsch', the history of which has been described in detail by François Dolbeau.[41] Without the *post sermonem*, it also circulated in several abbreviated forms: **(1)** the early medieval collection *De uerbis Domini* contained §§1-5; **(2)** the Arlesian *Quinquaginta homiliae* transmitted the whole without the fragment that was first published by Wilmart; **(3)** the acquainted Arlesian collections of Lyon and Marmoutier had preserved the latter fragment, but offered an abbreviated version of §§13-14.[42] Since the sole representative of the 'Collection

[39] Compare the parallels given in n. 36.

[40] See C. Lambot (1956), 24-25 (*s.* 343); (1969b), 57-60 (*s.* 254); L. De Coninck (2008), XXXIII and 467 (*s.* 70).

[41] See F. Dolbeau (1996b), 43-46.

[42] If the *Quinquaginta homiliae* and the collections of Lyon and Marmoutier were composed by Caesarius, as is often stated, one might presume that versions 2 and 3 of *s.* 142 constitute two separate branches, which ultimately depend on an identical Arlesian source, which contained a complete version of the sermon.

de Lyon' has lost several of the folia that originally contained *s.* 142 (*Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604*, ff. 67-74), the 'Collection de Marmoutier' has best preserved this third abbreviated version of the sermon.

In the 12th century at the latest — but it could have been much earlier — a reconstruction of *s.* 142 was made on the basis of a *De uerbis Domini* source (§§1-5) and a representative of the *Quinquaginta homiliae* (second half of the sermon without the Wilmart fragment). Its editor also inserted the text of the Wilmart fragment as it was preserved on the ff. 70-72v of *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604* or in one of its descendants, but he did this at a place that was slightly different from the fragment's position in the sermon's original form. If the reconstruction directly depends on *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604* and not on one of its descendants, it is quite probable that it was produced at Lyon, since *Lyon Bibl. Mun. 604* belonged without any doubt to the city's Cathedral Library from the 9th century at the latest. The reconstruction was subsequently included together with several other sermons in the second redaction of an adapted and enlarged version of *De uerbis Domini*. In this second redaction, which is preserved in the 12th-century codex *Vat. lat. 471*, it replaced the sermon's *De uerbis Domini* version of *s.* 142 (§§1-5), which was still present in the adaptation's first redaction. It still has to be determined when and where the second redaction was compiled: did it happen in Carolingian Lyon or at a later moment, e.g. in Cluny? In an article that will be published soon, I shall propose new arguments in favour of the latter alternative.

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RUFINUS AS AN INTERPRETER OF ORIGEN: ASCETIC AFFLICTION IN THE *COMMENTARII IN EPISTULAM AD ROMANOS*

Abstract

For over ninety years, the reliability of Rufinus as a translator has been the subject of much debate, but little consensus has emerged. This paper aims to evaluate Rufinus' reliability through a semantic and theological analysis of the theme of 'affliction' in his translation of Origen's *Commentary on Romans*. The article begins by outlining the *status quaestionis*. Next, it compares the meanings of affliction in Origen's Greek texts to those in Rufinus' Latin translation. The article then compares the soteriology in the Greek fragments of the *Commentary* to the soteriology in Rufinus' translation. These analyses suggest that the *Commentarii's* emphasis on asceticism in its concepts of affliction and salvation are due to Rufinus interpreting Origen's *Commentary* through his own early fifth-century monastic perspective. When understood in this way, Rufinus' translations can serve as a witness not only to Origen but also to Rufinus and to the reception of Origen by Western monastics at the beginning of the fifth century.

Introduction

At the end of the fourth century, a debate erupted between Jerome and Rufinus over the reliability of Rufinus' Latin translations of Origen's works. With the death of Rufinus and with increasing suspicions concerning Origen's orthodoxy, the debate ended—unresolved. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the debate re-emerged, largely because of Paul Koetschau's critical edition of *De Principiis*, which questioned the fidelity of Rufinus' translations. Subsequent scholarship has primarily evaluated Rufinus' translations by analysing his principles of translation and comparing his translations to extant Greek witnesses to the originals.

This article aims to supplement these two methods by evaluating Rufinus' reliability from another perspective. The approach adopted here evaluates Rufinus' reliability at the theological and semantic levels. The article's analyses focus on the theme of 'affliction' in Rufinus' translation of Origen's *Commentary on Romans* and in extant Greek texts of Origen.[1] Based on this research, the paper

[1] On the Greek *Commentary*, see Henry Chadwick, 'Rufinus and the Tura Papyrus of Origen's Commentary on Romans,' *JTS* 10 (1959): 10 – 42; Jean Scherer, *Le*

proposes that Rufinus' Latin translation contains evidence of a reinterpretation of Origen's concept of affliction. The article argues that when affliction (*tribulatione*) in Rufinus' translation (*Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos*) is compared to affliction (θλῖψις) in the extant Greek texts of Origen, the emerging concepts of affliction are remarkably different, and that these differences are due to Rufinus reinterpreting Origen's third-century emphasis on physical martyrdom into Rufinus' own early fifth-century monastic context. The result is a reinterpretation of affliction itself. Affliction no longer refers primarily to externally imposed suffering. Instead, affliction is redefined to consist of the self-imposed suffering that accompanies ascetic striving for salvation. This shift also introduced a change of emphasis in the vision of salvation itself, which further suggests that the theology of the *Commentarii* should be read as a witness to Rufinus' interpretation of Origen rather than as an exact record of Origen's original comments on Romans.[2] When understood in this way, the *Commentarii* provides us with another window into the relationship between Origen and Western monasticism at the beginning of the fifth century.[3]

The article will begin by outlining the *status quaestionis*, which will demonstrate the need for new approaches to evaluating Rufinus' reliability as a translator. It will then turn to the theme of affliction (θλῖψις and its inflected forms) in the Greek texts of Origen. This analysis will show that θλῖψις primarily refers to externally imposed afflictions rather than to self-imposed ascetic afflictions. Next, the paper will contrast this meaning with the primarily ascetic meaning of affliction (*tribulatio*) found in the Latin *Commentarii*. The article will then qualify its evaluation of Rufinus by considering the theme of asceticism in the Greek works of Origen. This section will indicate that Rufinus did not introduce a completely foreign theme into the

Commentaire d'Origène sur Rom. III. 5-V.7, d'après les extraits du Papyrus n 88748 du Musée du Caire et les fragments de la Philocalie et du Vaticanus graecus 762. Essai de reconstitution du texte et de la pensée des tomes V et VI du 'Commentaire sur l'Épître aux Romains' (Cairo: 1957): 85-121; Theresia Heither, trans., *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos: Liber primus, liber secundus* (Freiburg: 1990): 12-16; Thomas P. Scheck, trans., *Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1-5* (Washington, D.C.: 2001): 12-19.

[2] Rufinus' translation, however, also undoubtedly contains much that is entirely from Origen.

[3] Rufinus likely translated Origen's *Commentary on Romans* around 406 while residing in Aquileia or Rome. For Rufinus' biography, see Francis Xavier Murphy, *Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411): His Life and Works* (Washington, D.C.: 1945); and C. P. Hammond, 'The Last Ten Years of Rufinus' Life and the Date of His Move South from Aquileia' *JTS* 28 (1977): 372-429.

commentary. Instead, he gave new prominence to a previously minor theme. The final two sections will explore the *Commentarii's* soteriology. These sections will reveal that Rufinus' ascetic emphasis also affected the translation's vision of salvation.

The results of this study will offer a number of broader conclusions about the *Commentarii* and about Rufinus as a translator. First, these results will caution us against uncritically attributing the *Commentarii's* contents to Origen alone. Second, they will provide additional support to the theory that Rufinus sometimes attempted to translate texts not only into his audience's language but also into his audience's historical context and theological framework. Third, and more positively, this study will suggest that the *Commentarii* and other translations of Origen by Rufinus can serve as witnesses not only to Origen but also to Rufinus and to the reception of Origen in early fifth-century Western monasticism.

I. *Status Quaestionis*

Beginning with Paul Koetschau,[4] scholars have primarily used two methods to evaluate the reliability of Rufinus' translations: (1) the analysis of Rufinus' principles of translation;[5] (2) the comparison of Rufinus' translations to extant Greek texts of the same works. These methods have led to a spectrum of opinions on Rufinus' reliability. Koetschau concluded that Rufinus' translations are generally unreliable witnesses to Origen. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti,[6] following the evaluation by Gustave Bardy,[7] used these two methods to reach a different conclusion. They argued that Rufinus must be evaluated according to his stated intentions of clarifying obscurities, minimising repetitions, and removing unorthodox interpolations from Origen's writings. Although these aims often led Rufinus to paraphrase the work, when Rufinus' translation is compared to excerpts in the *Philocalia*, Rufinus' translation appears to contain a greater number of 'dangerous' opinions. From this assessment, Crouzel and Simonetti concluded that Rufinus' edition must be the more faithful translation.

[4] Paul Koetschau, *De Principiis*, vol. 5 of *Origenes Werke* (Leipzig: 1913).

[5] For Rufinus' principles of translation, see Ruf. *praef.* 2 to *princ.*; Ruf. *praef.* 2 to *comm. in. Rom.*; Ruf. *praef.* to GrNys. *Vita Greg.Thaumaturg.*

[6] Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, *Traité des principes. Tome 1, Livres 1 et 2* (Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1978): 23-26.

[7] Bardy, *Recherches sur l'Histoire de Texte et des Versions latines du De Principiis d'Origène* (Paris, 1923).

Two of the most helpful studies have used the second approach to identify Rufinus' translational tendencies.[8] M. Monica Wagner's work highlights Rufinus' principles of translation, but more importantly, it also shows how these principles shaped Rufinus' translation of Gregory Nazianzen's *Apologetica*. Wagner's study reveals that Rufinus sometimes paraphrased arguments, modified scripture references, and added corrections, mistakes, expansions, transitions, doublets, and changes of emphasis to the text. Sixty years later, Anna M. Silvas has demonstrated additional ways in which Rufinus modified his translations. Silvas argues that, for the sake of his Latin readers, Rufinus sometimes sharpened the scripture references, abridged and paraphrased the arguments, and explained, clarified, idiomised, enhanced, and embellished the language of the texts. Silvas' translational observations largely confirm those of Wagner, and both studies conclude that Rufinus' perceived freedom to adapt the texts for his audience often resulted in the creation of new Latinised 'versions' of the Greek originals.

Despite the considerable scholarship on Rufinus' reliability,[9] consensus has generally been reached on only two points. First, Rufinus' principles of translation reflect the standards of his times. Any evaluation of his translations must take these standards into account. Second, the fragmented and sometimes unreliable nature of the Greek texts makes it unwise to make absolute conclusions about Rufinus as a translator. Despite almost a century of scholarship since the publications of Koetschau and Bardy, both positive and negative assessments of Rufinus' translations remain tenable.[10] This suggests that new approaches are necessary if we are to reach firmer conclusions about the reliability of these translations. The present article therefore aims to supplement the established methods by offering a new approach, which uses the theme of affliction in the *Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos* to evaluate Rufinus' translation at the semantic and theological levels.

[8] M. Monica Wagner, *Rufinus the Translator: A Study of his Theory and his Practice of as Illustrated in his Version of the Apologetica of St Gregory Nazianzen* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945); Anna M. Silvas, *The Asketikon of St Basil the Great* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 102-29.

[9] See especially Bardy, *Recherches*; Crouzel and Simonetti, *Traité des principes*, 23-26; Wagner, *Rufinus the Translator*; Scherer, *Le Commentaire d'Origène sur Rom. III. 5-V.7*, 85-121; Heither, *Commentarii*, 12-16; Silvas, *The Asketikon*, 102-29; and Scheck, *Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5*, 12-19. See also the summaries in Alan Scott, *Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991): 168-172; and Rombs, 'The Status of Origen's De Principiis in English,' *Vigiliae Christianae* 61 (2007): 21-24.

[10] Compare, for example, the evaluations of Rufinus by Silvas and Rombs.

II. Affliction (Θλῖψις) in the Greek Texts of Origen

In the extant Greek texts of Origen, θλῖψις and its inflected forms primarily refer to afflictions that come upon individuals against their will.[11] These afflictions usually come from an external cause, such as an agent or circumstance.

In the *Exhortation to Martyrdom*, all twenty-four occurrences of θλῖψις refer to afflictions from externally imposed persecutions. Θλῖψις indicates general persecution (49), public mockery and the loss of property (44), and the possibility of martyrdom during the persecutions imposed by Maximin (1; 2; 41; 42). In *Contra Celsum* θλῖψις occurs nine times, and it refers to the justice of God (8.32), to the afflictions caused by Celsus' treatise (*praef* 3-4), to living as Christians in the hostile world (6.19; 6.20; 6.59; 8.14), and to enduring poverty, destitution, and nomadism for the sake of obedience to God (7.18). In the *Commentary on the Gospel of John* Origen only once discloses the specific cause of affliction (external persecutions, 10.35.229), but θλῖψις never appears to be self-imposed (1.26.176; 10.32.208; 28.24.217). In the *Homilies on Jeremiah* θλῖψις refers to humanity's bondage to the devil before Christ won freedom (14.11.13-14) and to pedagogical discipline from God (19.15.46). In the *Commentary on Matthew* the meaning of θλῖψις is less clear, but it appears to refer to the threat of evil (13.26.110) and to the persecution that sent John to Patmos (16.6.139). In the *Commentary on Ephesians* θλῖψις refers to the danger, opposition, and occasional destitution that Paul endured in Ephesus and Asia (14.16, 27, 35, 46; cf. 1 Cor. 15:32; 2 Cor. 1:8-10). In the *Fragments on Lamentations* θλῖψις is more ambiguous, but it again signifies externally imposed afflictions (*fr.* 59; 74). In the *Selections on Ezekiel* θλῖψις refers to the affliction that comes from the Father's pedagogical discipline and conviction (PG 13:784). In the *Philocalia* θλῖψις indicates the hardships Paul faced during his ministry (25.4), trials like those experienced by Job, which come from the devil and test faith (26.5), and the punishment of the unrighteous during the last judgement (21.5). The latter is also the meaning of θλῖψις in *On First Principles* (3.1.6).

[11] This assessment is based on a study of the 89 occurrences of θλῖψις (and its forms) in twelve of the authentic works of Origen preserved in Greek that contain forms of θλῖψις: *Cels.*, *comm. in Eph.*, *comm. in Mt. 10-17*, *fr. in Rom.*, *hom. 1-20 in Jer.*, *Jo.*, *mart.*, *or.*, *princ.*, *philoc.* The two remaining works (*schol. in Apoc.* and *exp. in Pr.*) contain 9 occurrences, many of which are ambiguous. Statistics are based on *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. Numbering and editions also follow TLG.

In *On Prayer* θλῖψις refers to Jonah's affliction in the whale (14.4), but it also refers to temptations that test faith (29.3; 30.1). When interpreting 'Deliver us from the evil one,' Origen introduces Psalm 33:20 (LXX): 'Many are the afflictions of the righteous, and He will deliver them from them all' (30.1). Origen insists that afflictions, like temptations, are a part of this life. Christians should therefore pray that they will not be conquered by these experiences. Here θλῖψις seems to refer to all afflictions that a Christian may experience for the sake of righteousness, including martyrdom, loss, want, alienation, and perhaps spiritual warfare and self-imposed ascetic striving against sin. Yet, Origen also notes that in the Hebrew scriptures affliction (θλῖψις, LXX) primarily expresses a circumstance that occurs independently of one's choice (30.1).

In the Greek fragments of the *Commentary on Romans*, θλῖψις indicates afflictions that distress 'the many' who have not learned from Christ the value of affliction (Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 228). Although Origen does not disclose the source of these afflictions, the context suggests that they result from external circumstances that are not self-imposed, such as persecution or loss. Those who have been taught by Christ, however, know that enduring these afflictions brings the virtue of patience (230). Θλῖψις also once refers to the affliction that comes from Christians governing themselves properly (232). Origen says the affliction of the saints consists of more than enduring hardships; it also requires that people curb their passions and govern themselves according to the Spirit. In this instance, θλῖψις is an ascetic affliction—it is essentially self-imposed by the individual because the individual has chosen to strive against sin, and this striving brings affliction. As noted, however, this meaning only occurs once. In these fragments, θλῖψις primarily refers to externally imposed afflictions.

To summarise, θλῖψις occurs eighty-nine times in the twelve works examined above. In nine instances it may refer to the afflictions that come from self-imposed asceticism—from governing oneself not according to evil passions but according to the Spirit. In eighty instances, however, it indicates afflictions that are not self-imposed and that usually result from an external source, such as circumstance or the actions of a particular agent. As something externally imposed, the affliction itself can consist of physical or emotional anguish. This is a significantly different emphasis than that which we find in Rufinus' translation.

III. Affliction (*Tribulatio*) in the Latin *Commentarii*

In the Latin *Commentarii*, the concept of affliction as an externally imposed experience occurs far less frequently. The *Commentarii* describes afflictions of this kind as 'neutral' (*medias*) afflictions, in that they present the soul with a choice of how it will respond to them (4.9.9).[12] If the soul rejects and despises God because of these afflictions, then it has responded in a way that is 'unrighteous,' and it deserves punishment or correction (4.9.8). In contrast to this, if the soul recognises that these neutral afflictions present it with an opportunity for promoting virtue, and if it chooses to endure these afflictions with faith, then these afflictions are no longer neutral but sanctifying.[13] Such afflictions become a means of righteousness and a complement to the second kind of affliction, which occurs much more frequently in the *Commentarii*: affliction that comes from ascetic striving for salvation.

As we observed above, in the extant Greek texts of Origen θλῖψις only occasionally refers to afflictions that result from intentionally governing oneself according to the standards of the Word and the Spirit. This secondary meaning of θλῖψις occurs much more often in the the Latin *Commentarii*. Indeed, compared to the Greek texts, Rufinus' translation appears to have inverted Origen's primary and secondary meanings of affliction. In the *Commentarii* affliction (*tribulatio*) usually indicates the self-imposed ascetic suffering that comes from the soul striving to govern its body and mind according to the moral pattern established by Christ. As we will see, the content of these afflictions is further described as the suffering that results from voluntarily embodying the death of Christ by mortifying sin for the sake of justification, perfection, and adoption.

The *Commentarii's* distinction between these two kinds of afflictions, which will hereafter be referred to as 'neutral' afflictions and 'ascetic' afflictions, is most clearly presented in its comments on Romans 5:3-5:

[12] References cite the book, chapter, and section numbers of Rufinus's *Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos* in Scheck, *Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5*, and *Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 6-10* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002), which correspond to the book and chapter numbers in PG 14. Hereafter *comm. in Rom.* refers to Rufinus's edition, and *fr. in Rom.* refers to the Greek fragments. All other abbreviations follow G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

[13] Rufinus has preserved Origen's distinction between μάστιξ (a 'scourge' or punishment) and θλῖψις ('affliction'). Reflecting on Psalm 31:10 (LXX), Origen concludes, '...Thus according to this neither the righteous is to be scourged, nor the sinner afflicted,' Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 230.17-20.

> We ought to accept as the afflictions (*tribulationes*) of the righteous then, not only those which come externally from matters which we have called above indifferent (*indifferentes*) and neutral (*medias*), for example, from losses or illnesses or any bodily torment; but also from the fact that while at rest they afflict (*affligunt*) and exhaust themselves by resting their own desires, by harnessing their lust, by keeping unbounded liberty in check, and by dashing to the ground everything else which is opposed to the good of self-control.[14] (4.9.9)

These comments introduce a distinction between neutral and ascetic afflictions, and they begin to describe the nature of self-imposed, ascetic afflictions. Ascetic afflictions primarily result from striving for self-control. As souls resist sin, they become weary from struggling in prayer, combating the flesh, and denying the pleasures of sin. This exercise of self-control is difficult but necessary. Without it Christians may be disqualified from salvation (cf. *praef.* 3; 6; 1 Cor. 9:27). Although rooted in scripture, both this warning about disqualification and the larger discussion of affliction are based on the presupposition that the human soul is self-governing.

The rational soul's ability to govern itself is an essential element in the soteriologies of Origen and Rufinus.[15] This freedom of the human soul justifies God's right to judge souls.[16] The *Commentarii's* exposition of Romans 6:16-18 attributes this concept of freedom to the Apostle Paul. 'So then, this is what the Apostle teaches in this

[14] *Tribulationes ergo iustorum non solum eas debemus accipere, quae extrinsecus ueniunt ex istis rebus, quas indifferentes uel medias supra diximus, id est uel damnis, uel languoribus, uel ex quolibet corporis cruciatu: sed et in eo, quod etiam in requie positi semet ipsos affligunt et atterunt, resistendo uoluntatibus suis, refrenando libidinem, coercendo licentiam, et omnia, quae ad bonum continentiae perinent...* All translations of Rufinus' *Commentarii* are from Scheck, *Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5*, and *Commentary on Romans, Books 6-10*, which are based on the critical edition *Origenes, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: Kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins*, Ed. C. P. Hammond Bammel. 3 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1990-98). The Latin quotations are from C. H. E., *Origenis opera omnia*, vol. 6, because Hammond Bammel's edition was unavailable for consultation. The translations of the Greek fragments are my own, done in consultation with the French translations in Scherer, *fr. in Rom.*

[15] On the rational soul's self-governance, see also *princ.* 3.1.6; 3.1.10; 3.1.19; 3.1.22; *fr. in Jo.* 43; *or.* 29.13. In two sections of *De Principiis* extant only in Latin, the rational soul operates in 'a world in which free will is continually tempted in order to gain virtue,' H. S. Benjamins, 'Origen's Concept of Free Will in Relationship to the Fight against Opposing Powers (*De Principiis* III.2-3),' *Studia Patristica* 26 (1993): 220.

[16] B. Darrell Jackson, 'Sources of Origen's Doctrine of Freedom,' *CH* 35 (1966): 13-14. Without freedom creatures cannot be held accountable for their actions. Freedom allows for divine righteousness and human responsibility.

passage: Each person has it within his own power and in the efficacy of his [free] will that he should become either a slave of sin or of righteousness' (6.3.3).[17] Just as there are two kinds of affliction, so there are also two paths in decision making (1.18.6; cf. *Didache* 1). The soul may travel the path leading to sin or the path leading to righteousness, but it will become enslaved to serving whichever path it chooses.

The *Commentarii* frequently describes these paths in the Pauline language of flesh and Spirit, which represent central theological categories in the *Commentarii*.[18] In the context of soteriology, these terms indicate the soul's journey either toward or away from union with God. The path of the Spirit represents the things of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and, to a lesser degree, the ministering spirits.[19] This path gradually leads to justification, perfection, and adoption as a child of God.[20] The path of the flesh is the antithesis of the Spirit. A soul that follows the flesh risks becoming corrupt, ignorant of God, devoid of its spirit, and consumed by the fires of hell (2.9.4; 7.5.10). As the rational agent in human beings, the soul is free to choose either path: 'the soul is a mean (*mediam*), as it were, between the flesh and the Spirit. And certainly, if it unites itself with the flesh to obey the desires of sin, it becomes one body with it; but if it unites itself with the Lord it becomes one spirit with him.' The soul is free to choose the things of the flesh or the Spirit, but it will be responsible for the consequences of its decision.[21] It is this self-governance that makes enduring ascetic afflictions possible. The soul can choose to follow the Spirit, but following the Spirit requires enduring the ascetic afflictions that result from striving against sin and the desires of the flesh.[22]

[17] *Hoc est ergo, quod in hoc loco Apostolus docet: quia unusquisque in mana sua hebet et in arbitrii potestate, ut aut peccati seruus sit, aut iustitiae.*

[18] On the subject of the flesh and the Spirit in the self-governance of the soul, see Maureen Beyer Moser, *Teacher of Holiness: The Holy Spirit in Origen's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2005): 55-68.

[19] Ibid., 44-51.

[20] On 'life in the Spirit,' see also *hom. in Gen.* 7.

[21] The doctrine of self-governance here does not appear to include any concept of the 'bondage of the will.' The soul, regardless of its spiritual height, retains its ability to turn to the things of God or the things of the flesh. Sin is not a power that renders the soul infinitely incapable of choosing the good, but is a habit that must be overcome. See G. Bostick, 'The Influence of Origen on Pelagius and Western Monasticism', in *Origeniana Septima*, ed. by W. A. Bienert and U. Kühneweg (Leuven, 1999): 388-89.

[22] Origen's views on materiality in his anthropology and soteriology are frequently ambiguous. On the one hand, he seems to conceive of the soul alone as being

This concept of affliction is remarkably different from the primary meaning of θλῖψις in the surviving Greek witnesses to Origen's works. As we observed, in the Greek works θλῖψις usually refers to afflictions that are caused by external agents or circumstances. In the *Commentarii*, however, *tribulatio* usually refers to afflictions that come from ascetic striving against sin. The concept of affliction as something self-imposed occurs throughout the *Commentarii*. This initially suggests that Rufinus reinterpreted θλῖψις according to the monastic tradition that he had inherited, in which the language of martyrdom and affliction was used to describe the internal spiritual struggles that accompany ascetic striving.

IV. Asceticism in the Greek Texts of Origen

It is important to qualify this initial evaluation by noting that, despite the sharp contrast between the concepts of affliction in the Greek witnesses to Origen's works and the Latin *Commentarii*, Origen was himself an ascetic theologian of sorts. In the Greek texts, Origen makes a modest number of ascetic remarks—remarks that call human beings to renounce sinful pleasures for the sake of training the body to be governed according to the Word. Origen warns that the

according to the image of God, and so the soul alone is that which will be redeemed and preserved in the resurrection (see Anders Lund Jacobsen, 'Genesis 1-3 as Source for the Anthropology of Origen,' *Vigiliae Christianae* 62 (2008): 213-232). On the other hand, his discussions of the resurrection at times suggest that even the saints will retain their bodies (see, for example, *comm. in Rom.* 5.9.12; *Cels.* 5.18-19; M. J. Edwards, 'Origen's Two Resurrections,' *JTS* NS 46 (1995): 502-518). Despite this disagreement, the Latin preserves *Commentarii* Paul's flesh-Spirit dualism, but it now understands this dualism through an ascetic lens, in which the soul must train the body to live according to the pattern of the Spirit and of salvation. In such a context it is not surprising that Paul's dualism has been sharpened. 'Flesh' no longer refers to that which is merely human (see John M. G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2005): 202-209). Instead, flesh refers to that which is proper to the 'kingdom' of sin (*comm. in Rom.* 6.1.4). The deeds of the flesh are therefore sinful and must be put to death (*comm. in Rom.* 6.14.5). This mortification of the flesh involves the body because the body is the arena in which the conflict between the flesh and the spirit takes place. The salvation of the soul is worked out in the body, and it is achieved by the soul ruling the body according to the Spirit. However, this emphasis on the soul does not mean that the material realm is evil. The emphasis on living according to the pattern of the resurrection suggests that when souls govern their bodies according to the Spirit, part of the material realm is by extension redeemed and patterned after the heavenly realm (cf. *comm. in Rom.* 4.7.8; 5.8.13; cf. *or.* 25.3; 26.1, 6). Although the body must obey the Spirit, it is the sinful flesh that is evil—not the body.

body is temporary (*princ.* 4.4.8; cf. 1.8.1; 2.8.3) and that the pleasures of the body can lead souls astray and prevent them from knowing God (*Cels.* 7.33; 8.22-23; *or.* 19.3; *Jo.* 6.11). He says that souls must therefore discipline and control their bodies so they will not be overcome by any temptation (πειρασμός) from the flesh or external circumstances (*Cels.* 8.22-23; *or.* 29.19) Souls must mortify sin, the flesh, and the deeds of the body so they can be made perfect, can 'live to God,' and can be united to him (*Comm. in Mt.* 14.3; *dial.* 168-174; *or.* 25.2).[23] Yet, throughout these exhortations, Origen teaches that these ascetic activities require divine grace. He insists that if humans possess even a little faith and resist sin to the best of their abilities, then the Word will rescue them and God will supply them with the strength they lack (*comm. in Mt.* 11.6; *or.* 29.19). Origen also teaches that the purity of heart necessary for knowing God can only be established by God himself (*Cels.* 7.33). Finally, Origen maintains that the mortification of sin requires unceasing prayer (*or.* 25.1-2; cf. *dial.* 168-174), requires the Spirit of God, who destroys sin (*Cels.* 8.22; *comm. in Mt.* 14.3), and requires the presence of Christ, who is righteousness (ibid., 12.24) and is able to transform those who submit to him (*Dial.* 140-152).[24]

This outline of Origen's ascetic remarks contributes to our evaluation of Rufinus in three ways. First, it indicates, on the one hand, that the ascetic ideals of self-denial, of self-discipline, and of self-governance according to a spiritual standard are not foreign to Origen's writings, but, on the other hand, that these ascetic ideals are also a relatively uncommon subject in Origen's works. From this, we can deduce that Origen's *Commentary on Romans* likely also contained ascetic statements and that these statements were probably infrequent. Second, this summary cautions us against too sharply separating asceticism from martyrdom. As we have observed, Origen described asceticism as part of the mature Christian life, in which Christ and the Spirit empower souls to live according to righteousness. However, Origen also described asceticism as training and preparation for enduring all temptations—including martyrdom.[25] Third, this summary shows that

[23] See also *princ.* 1.7.5, which describes the sun's desire for physical dissolution and spiritual union with Christ, and *princ.* 1.8.4, which indicates that souls can ascend to heaven because of virtue and can descend into bodies because of sin.

[24] The references above represent every clear example of ascetic protrepsis and paraenesis that I have identified in *Cels., comm. in Mt. 10-17, Jo, princ., or., dial.*

[25] See *or.* 29.19. Origen's references to the 'noble athlete' (γενναῖος ἀθλητής) and 'the athletes of piety' (τῶν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν) (*mart.* 1; 23) also imply bodily discipline and training.

Origen presented asceticism as an activity that is necessary for salvation and that is effected by divine grace. As we will see, this concept of the relationship between asceticism, grace, and salvation differs from that expressed in Rufinus' *Commentarii*. Together, these points qualify our evaluation of Rufinus by suggesting that Rufinus likely emphasised and elaborated on a theme that was already present, albeit infrequently, in the original text. In this way, Rufinus' asceticising of affliction does not represent a radical change of content, but rather a change of emphasis. Yet, as the third point alludes, the broader consequences of Rufinus' asceticising affected not only the concept of affliction but also the vision of salvation.

V. Justification

In the Greek fragments of the *Commentary on Romans*, Origen presents faith as the sole basis for justification. Condemnation is an earned punishment; justification is an unmerited gift of grace.[26] Origen also insists, however, that justifying faith cannot coexist with sin: 'And do not think that the faith that God reckons as righteousness is able to be in anyone while unrighteousness or any other vice exist in this [soul], and coexist with this faith… Clearly the one who believes that Jesus is the Christ does not sin, and the one who sins does not believe,' (Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 180.14-20). There are degrees of faith, but the gift of justification is only given to those whose faith mirrors Abraham's, which was 'mature' or 'complete' (τηλικοῦτος) (182.9-4.7). This faith transforms souls by turning them from the acts of sin to acts of love—and, where love is perfect, faith is complete (186.10-19; 214.1-4). Thus, as Rufinus's translation will also affirm, justification involves participating in the pattern of the resurrection life (222.3-13).

As we will see, however, when the Greek fragments are compared to Rufinus' translation, these fragments more clearly identify grace as the efficient cause of justification. Overcoming sin remains a necessary part of the Christian life, but justifying faith is attributed to grace (204.19-206.8). In the Greek fragments, Christians are justified by a faith that is mature and characterised by love. This justifying faith, however, is entirely a gift from God, and it is given because of

[26] See Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 148.3-6; 154.8-10; 166.1-6; 168.3-6; 168.11-14; 186.4-9.

God's grace and love alone. This vision of justification allows Origen to insist that justification is by faith rather than merit. But this vision also enables Origen to avoid the problem of what we might call 'cheap grace'—of Christians being 'justified' but never overcoming sin. For Origen, justification brings and involves personal transformation. Although Christians must mortify the desires of the flesh, the mortification of sin is not the basis of their justification. Human effort could never establish a faith sufficient for justification; therefore, justifying faith must be supplied by God.

The Latin *Commentarii* offers a noticeably different account of the relationship between faith, works, and justification. In the *Commentarii* justification brings the forgiveness of past sins and the capacity to avoid future sins. Christians require this divinely-empowered capacity because God will judge all people according to their actions.[27] Christians must therefore mortify sin so they can receive and preserve their justification.[28] The *Commentarii* warns that God will not reckon righteousness to those who are unrighteous (4.7.6).[29] Rather, the *Commentarii's* section on Romans 4:23-25 teaches that Christians must demonstrate their faith by living in accordance with justification, which is righteousness:

> For if we have been raised together with Christ, who is righteousness, if we walk in the newness of life, if we live in accordance with righteousness, then to us Christ has been raised for our justification. But if we have not yet laid aside the old man with his deeds, but we live in unrighteousness, I dare say that to us Christ has not yet been resurrected for justification nor has he been handed over on account of our sins. For if I believe this, how can I love that for which he endured death? If I believe these things, that he rose for my justification, how can unrighteousness be pleasing to me? Therefore Christ justifies

[27] D.H. Williams, 'Justification by Faith: a Patristic Doctrine,' *JEH* 57 (2006) 655.

[28] In the *Commentarii*, the thief on the cross was saved because in his death he rebuked the blasphemies of the other thief and 'had been planted together into the likeness of his [Christ's] death by his confession,' *comm. in Rom.* 5.9.7. In *princ.* 3.1.21, justification and condemnation are not eternally predestined according to God's will; instead, God justifies those whom he foreknows will freely choose to mortify sin for the sake of salvation.

[29] Joseph S. O'Leary, 'Grace', in *The Westminster Handbook to Origen*, ed. by John A. McGuckin (Louisville, KY, 2004): 116-117, observes that Origen has no notion of souls being 'simultaneously just and sinful' (*simul iustus ac peccator*); instead, justification accompanies faith that is expressed by moral perfection. To return to the thief, he was saved by his faith and the good works of his confession (*comm. in Rom.*3.9.3).

> only those who have received the new life in the pattern (*exemplo*) of his resurrection and who reject the old garments of unrighteousness and iniquity as if there were the cause of death.[30] (4.7.8)

These comments primarily describe justification as a state of being. Justification consists of a declaration of forgiveness, but it also includes a new way of living that is made possible by the death and resurrection of Christ. Justification is an ontological pattern possessed by participation. If people do not participate in the pattern of justification then they do not receive justification (5.9.2).[31] This pattern reflects Romans 6:11: believers must die to sin so they may live for God. Against those who may think that faith does not require holiness, the *Commentarii* asserts:

> If you believe that Christ has died to sin and lives to God, you also ought to be dead to sin and live to God. This is precisely what he declares with apostolic authority when he says, 'But if you have been resurrected with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. Set your minds on the things that are above, not on things that are on earth' (Col. 3:1-2). For those who do these things are showing themselves to be believers in him who raised our Lord Jesus from the dead; and to such persons faith will be reckoned as righteousness.[32] (4.7.5)

Here belief in Christ must be demonstrated by the mortification of sin.

[30] *Etenim si consurreximus cum Christo, qui est iustitia, et in nouitate uitae ambulamus, et secundum iustitiam uiuimus, surrexit nobis Christus ad iustificationem nostram. Si uero nondum deposuimus ueterem hominem cum actibus suis, sed in iniustitia uiuimus, audeo dicere, quod nondum nobis resurrexit Christus ad iustificationem, nec traditus est propter peccata nostra. Si enim hoc credo, quomodo illud amo, pro quo ille pertulit mortem? Si hoc credo, quod ille ad iustificationem meam surrexit, quomodo mihi iniustitia placet? Iustificat ergo eos Christus tantummodo, qui nouam uitam exemplo resurrectionis ipsius susceperunt, et uetusta iniustitiae atque iniquitatis indumenta uelut causam mortis abiiciunt.*

[31] Cf. *Jo.* 1.59. In *Jo.* 19.152 Origen insists that faith devoid of works is unbelief. Cf. James 2:20.

[32] *Et si creditis, quia Christus mortuus est peccato, et uiuit Deo, etiam uos mortui estote peccato, et uiuite Deo. Et hoc est, quod auctoritate Apostolica protestatur, et dicit: „si consurrexistis cum Christo, quae sursum sunt quaerite, ubi Christus est in dextra Dei sedens: quae sursum sunt sapite, non quae super terram:" quia qui haec agit, hic se ostendit credere in eum, qui suscitauit Iesum Dominum nostrum a mortuis: et huic uere fides reputatur ad iustitiam.* See also *hom. in Gen.* 3, where this mortification indicates reception of the New Covenant.

In the *Commentarii* the act of mortifying sin is presented as an ongoing, self-imposed ascetic affliction. We must 'receive within ourselves the cross of Christ, through which the body of sin is destroyed in such a way that our members which were enslaved to sin should no longer serve it but God' (5.9.2). This is demonstrated by souls overcoming anger and jealousy, restraining the lusts of the flesh, and in short, becoming dead to sin by altogether overcoming sin (6.1.6). The *Commentarii* teaches that the act of mortifying sin is described by First Corinthians 15:31 ('I die daily') and Second Corinthians 4:10 ('We always carry around the death of Jesus Christ in our body'). The act of dying to sin consists of ceaselessly resisting the sinful desires of the flesh.

By mortifying sin, believers are declared righteous and they receive justification.[33] The *Commentarii's* section on Romans 5.3-5 explains the value of such affliction:

> For whereas others are saddened during affliction (*tribulatione*), we boast in afflictions, having been strengthened by the power of his grace. For we have learned a new discipline by his instruction, namely that we should obtain the good of patience through afflictions, and when we possess this good of patience, we shall be judged as having approved character; and when we have been approved through the patience of many afflictions, we may hope for a future reward from God.[34] (4.9.1)

As people endure the affliction of dying with Christ, they begin to participate in the virtue of patience, and in time they will be approved. This idea is expanded on in the comments on Romans 8. Here it is argued that those who deny the flesh and serve the Spirit are completely in Christ, and thus they possess nothing worthy of condemnation (6.12.2). They are living sacrifices pleasing to God (9.1.3). Such people, having died with Christ, live with him according to the pattern of justification, and their faith, demonstrated by enduring these afflictions, is reckoned as righteousness (4.7.5).[35]

[33] Although mortifying sin is a prerequisite to justification, this mortification also requires grace. See *comm. in Rom.* 4.9.1; 6.9.6.

[34] *Caeteris etenim in tribulatione tristantibus, nos gratiae ipsius uirtute roborati, in tribulationibus gloriamur. Didicimus namque nouam ex eruditione ipsius disciplinam, ut per tribulationes bonum patientiae capiamus: habentes uero patientiae bonum probabiles iudicemur: et per patientiam multarum tribulationum probati, spem futurae a Deo renumerationis habeamus...*

[35] The *Commentary* describes baptism similarly: authentic baptism is demonstrated by mortifying sin with Christ. See *comm. in Rom.* 5.8.3.

VI. Perfection and Adoption

In the Greek fragments of Origen's commentary, grace inspires justifying faith, and this faith brings personal transformation. Souls who have received the gift of justifying faith practice acts of love, rather than sin,[36] and their faith is described as 'perfect' or 'complete' (τηλικοῦτος) (Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 182.9-4.7). Although Origen's comments on key passages in Romans related to Christian maturity, adoption, and transformation by the Holy Spirit are lost, Origen's association of justification with perfection suggests that he may have believed that other aspects of salvation, including adoption and the gift of the Holy Spirit, accompanied the gift of justifying faith. If justifying faith included knowing God as Father through the Holy Spirit (cf. Rom. 5:5), this filial relationship would provide the foundation for transformation.

Rufinus' translation separates justification from perfection, adoption, and reception through the Holy Spirit of the knowledge of God's love. Importantly, it also presents ascetic afflictions as the means by which Christians merit receiving these aspects of salvation. According to the *Commentarii*, ascetic striving and affliction leads to justification, but thereafter, this striving can also lead to adoption and to reception of the full grace of the Holy Spirit. This grace of the Holy Spirit completes the process of adoption by enabling the Christian to know and love God as Father.

The *Commentarii's* preface introduces the subject of Christian perfection, which it will attribute to ascetic striving and affliction. The preface uses perfection to explain the difficult content of Paul's letter to the Romans. It proposes that Romans is difficult to understand because 'the Apostle seems to have been more perfect in this letter than in the others' (*praef.* 3).[37] Perfection is 'twofold' (*duplicem*) (ibid.). First, it involves 'satisfying the virtues' (ibid.). Then it is completed 'when someone advances so far that he is not able to fall away or to look backwards' (ibid.).[38] Despite these distinctions, the *Commentarii* usually combines the two aspects so that perfection becomes a single concept. When conceived in this way, perfection refers to an

[36] (Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 186.10-19; 214.1-4).

[37] *Quod uidetur Apostolus in hac epistola perfectior fuisse, quam in caeteris.*

[38] *In quo ostendit duplicem esse perfectionem: unam, quae est in expletione uirtutum, secundum quam dicit, quod non sit perfectus; et alteram, cum ita quis proficit, ut decidere non possit, neque retrorsum adspicere, secundum quam dicebat: „quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus."* In the *Commentary*, Stephen exemplifies this state of perfect faith.

advanced state of Christian faith, in which the soul orders the body according to the Spirit and single-mindedly seeks God.[39] According to the *Commentarii*, we find evidence of Paul's spiritual state scattered throughout the apostle's letters. When compiled, this evidence reveals Paul's progressive maturation. In First Corinthians, Paul appears to waver, admitting, 'I punish my body and reduce it to slavery, so that after proclaiming to others I myself should not be rejected' (ibid., 3; 6; 1 Cor. 9:27). In Philippians he hopes he might attain 'the resurrection from the dead' but admits he has not already attained it or 'already become perfect' (*praef.* 3; Phil 3:11-12). In contrast, in Romans he writes in a way that is 'much more lofty and eminent' (*praef.* 6).[40]

According to the *Commentarii,* Romans 8 particularly reveals Paul's confidence before God. In Romans 8, Paul writes as one who has obtained salvation and has experienced the love of God. From these comparisons, the *Commentarii* concludes that Paul made significant spiritual progress during the years in which he wrote his letters. This maturity is the reason for the difficulty of his later letters, especially Romans. The *Commentarii* here seems to assume that spiritual maturity brings a deeper knowledge of God, who is ultimately ineffable. Therefore, as Paul matured, it became increasingly difficult for him to articulate his knowledge of the mysteries of God because this knowledge is beyond the limits of human language and comprehension. Note that in this argument perfection is the result of spiritual progress through ascetic striving and affliction. This argument presupposes that progress in virtue and relational knowledge of God is not only possible in the Christian life but is proper to it.

The *Commentarii* attempts to support this argument for Paul's progress by explaining the relationship between perfection and ascetic striving. Anticipating possible objectors, it asks: 'How then will it be demonstrated that he wrote Second Corinthians as an even more perfect man than he was when writing First Corinthians?' (*praef.* 4). The *Commentarii's* response is telling:

[39] The *Commentarii* later distinguishes between earthly and heavenly perfection. Those who share Paul's level of spiritual maturity are considered perfect compared to other human beings, but these people still lack 'the summit of heavenly perfection,' *comm. in Rom.* 10.10.3.

[40] *Sed in illis quidem iste eius fuerit profectus; quanto autem sublimior et eminentior sit ad Romanos scribens ex ipsius epistulae sermonibus colligamus, in qua dicit....* On the preface, see Caroline Bammel, 'Origen's Pauline Prefaces and the Chronology of his *Pauline Commentaries*', in *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. by Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995): 495-514.

> Without doubt this is shown by what is related in this letter when he says, 'We suffer affliction (*tribulationem*), but are not crushed (*angustiamur*); we are perplexed, but not driven to despair; we suffer persecution but are not forsaken; we are struck down, but not destroyed, always carrying around the death of Jesus in our body, so that the life of Jesus Christ may also be made visible in our body.' In him who was always carrying around the death of Jesus in his own body, certainly never did the flesh lust against the spirit, but rather the flesh had been subjected to him since it had been put to death in the likeness of Christ's death.[41] (*praef.* 4)

The *Commentarii* does not appeal to any other texts to demonstrate Paul's progress; rather, it finds Paul's description of suffering sufficient. From this we are left to ask what makes Paul's description in Second Corinthians 4:8-10 indicative of progress? The answer appears to come by way of contrast. In First Corinthians Paul beats his body in order to 'reduce it to slavery' and hopes he will not be rejected from salvation. The *Commentarii* interprets Paul's words as an indication of wavering (*praef.* 3); here the apostle yearns to overcome the desires of the flesh but has not yet completed the task. In Second Corinthians 4:8-10 Paul emphasises his perseverance in trials, which is interpreted as victory over the desires of the flesh. The Paul of Second Corinthians consistently resists sin, which indicates that the apostle has perfected the task he mentioned in First Corinthians. Paul has made progress because he endures the afflictions that come from resisting the flesh; in this way he has put the flesh to death and is 'always carrying around the death of Jesus in his own body' (*praef.* 4).[42] If this reading of the *Commentarii* is correct—that it interprets Paul's trials in Second Corinthians as the trials of resisting the flesh, and it sees Paul's perseverance in the afflictions from these trials as evidence of Paul's progress—then it follows that in the *Commentarii* the ascetic affliction of mortifying sin is a means to attaining perfection.

[41] *Ex his sine dubio, quae in ea scripta referuntur, cum dicit: „tribulationem patimur, sed non angustiamur: aporiamur, sed non exaporiamur: persecutionem patimur, sed non derelinquimur: deiiemur, sed non perimus: semper mortem Iesu in corpore nostro circumferentes, ut et uita Iesu in corpore nostro manifestetur." Qui ergo semper mortem Iesu in corpore suo circumferebat, nunquam utique in eo concupiscebat caro aduersus spiritum, sed erat ei subiecta, utpote mortificata ad similitudinem mortis Christi.*

[42] In *Jo.* 20.232-3 Origen presents the mortification of sin as an indication of perfection, but he does not suggest that mortification is the means by which individuals become perfect.

The *Commentarii's* remarks on Romans 2:8-9 and 5:3-5 confirm this interpretation and explain how ascetic affliction contributes to perfection. Its comments on Romans 2:8-9 attempt to explain the difference between the afflictions of the righteous and the unrighteous. These comments assert that there are two kinds of affliction. The first leads to 'anguish' (*angustia*): 'As for that affliction which is followed by anguish, this is not to be considered to be the same kind of affliction, concerning which the Apostle says, "Affliction produces perseverance (*patientiam*)"' (2.6.6; Rom. 5:3).[43] The second kind of affliction 'is not followed by anguish, as the Apostle himself says, "We suffer affliction but we are not in anguish." On the contrary, not only does that affliction of the saints contain no anguish, but it has breadth. For this is what the righteous man declares, "You enlarged me in affliction"' (2.6.6; Ps. 4:1).[44] If the first kind of affliction leads to anguish, the second leads to breadth, so that God may 'dwell in them' and 'walk about' (2.6.6).[45] The metaphor of contraction and expansion emphasises the spiritual end of each kind of affliction. 'Anguished' or 'constricted' souls govern themselves according to the desires of the flesh and therefore habitually sin. By failing to practice the virtues, they fail to participate in God, and because of this, in a sense they fail to exist (4.5.2). Alternatively, souls with 'breadth' and 'spacious rooms' govern themselves according to the things of the spirit.

By persevering through these ascetic afflictions, souls attain perseverance and proceed towards perfection, which consists of satisfying the virtues and developing an indelible faith (*praef.*3).[46] When souls reach this perfection, they receive the full grace of the Spirit, being adopted as children of God in such a way that the love of God is perceptibly shed abroad in their hearts.[47] Importantly, the *Commen-*

[43] *Tribulatio uero, quam subsequitur angustia, non est similis putanda illi tribulationi, de qua dicit Apostolus, quia „tribulatio patientiam operatur."*

[44] *Illa enim talis tribulatio angustiam non habet subsequentem, sicut et ipse Apostolus dicit: „tribulationem patimur, sed non angustiamur." Imo uero non solum nullam angustiam tribulatio illa sanctorum, sed latitudinem habet. Denique sic dicit iustus: „in tribulatione dilatasti me."*

[45] Scheck, *Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5*, 121 n.143, highlights this imagery, noting that *angustia* and στενοχωρία bear the double-meaning of 'anguish' and also 'constriction.'

[46] Origen and Rufinus likely understand the virtues as attributes of God. Those who participate in virtues participate in their source, which is Christ. See Maurice F. Wiles, The Divine Apostle (Cambridge, 1967): 114-15. See also Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification*, 150; Scheck, *Commentary on Romans, Books 1-5*, 54.

[47] *Hom. in Ex.* 5 emphasises the importance of striving for Christian perfection. Even if perfection is never reached, the act of striving may be sufficient for salvation.

tarii's remarks about Romans 8 emphasise that the initial stages in adoption are based on merit and received when souls are approved by God.[48] We are tutored by 'the spirits of slavery… until we come to the age when we merit receiving the Spirit of adoption of sons and become now a son' (7.2).[49] We are kept under the watch of these spirits until we 'should reach the legal age of the maturation of the soul, which anyone who has gone beyond the spirit of slavery, which he had received leading to fear, and by which he was being kept as a pedagogue, becomes worthy to receive the Spirit of adoption' (7.5.3).[50] The *Commentarii's* remarks on Romans 5:3-5 teach that this approval comes from perseverance: 'We have learned a new discipline by his instruction, namely that we should obtain the good of patience through afflictions, and when we possess this good of patience, we shall be judged as having approved character; and when we have been approved through the patience of many afflictions, we may hope for a future reward from God' (4.9.1).[51] Here ascetic striving and afflictions are the means by which souls merit adoptive sonship.

Related to this, ascetic striving is necessary for receiving adoption and for experiencing the love of God. When souls have persevered in ascetic affliction and striving to such a degree that they merit

[48] Similarly, in *princ.* 1.3.7 (Latin) and *Jo.* 13.143 (Greek), participation in the Holy Spirit is reserved for those desire to mortify sin and walk in newness of life. Before the gift of the Spirit, Christians are assisted by grace and the ministering spirits. On the concept of stages in adoption, see Peter Widdicombe, *The Fatherhood of God: From Origen to Athanasius*, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 93-94.

[49] *Usque quo ad id aetatis ueniat, quo spiritum adoptionis filiorum mereatur accipere, et sit iam filius ac dominus omnium.* The pneumatology in Rufinus' translation is not well supported by the Greek fragments because Origen's comments on pneumatological texts such as Romans 5:5; 8; and 15 are lost. In his preface to *De Principiis*, Rufinus admits to omitting or revising all unorthodox Trinitarian language because he believed these were heretical interpolations (Ruf. *praef.* 2 to *princ*; cf. Moser, *Teacher of Holiness*: 12, 19). Charles Kannengiesser, 'Écriture et théologie trinitaire d'Origène', in *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. by Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995): 351-64 has defended the Trinitarianism in Rufinus' translation of *princ.* and *Jo.*, arguing that Origen distinguished the person of the Son from the Father in order to combat Monarchianism, and the Spirit from other spirits to combat Valentinianism. There remains a need, however, for further critical comparisons of the pneumatology in Origen's Greek texts and Rufinus' Latin translations.

[50] *Usque quo ad legitimam aetatem animae perfectionis aduenerit, ubi quis iam supergressus spiritum seruitutis, quem acceperat in timore, a quo uelut paedagogo seruaretur, dignus efficiatur accipere adoptionis spiritum…* For more on the spirit of slavery, see Moser, *Teacher of Holiness*, 71-72.

[51] For the Latin, see n. 34. On θλῖψις leading to the virtue of ὑπομονή, see also Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 228.8-13; 230.14-17.

God's approval, they receive adoption. They also receive the virtue of hope, which is described as trust in a future reward from God (4.9.7). With this hope comes a new way of living for God.[52] Souls no longer serve God out of fear, but now, being confident that they have merited a reward from God, they begin to serve out of love.[53] To those who possess approved faith and sure hope, the Spirit gives the knowledge of God's love, which confirms one's adoption as a child of God. Influenced by First Corinthians 13, the *Commentarii* asserts: 'together with hope, [approved character] possesses the fullness of love' (4.9.7),[54] and that 'the love of God which is greater than everything follows faith and hope, and not only fills our mind but also abounds and is shed abroad into our hearts' (4.9.1).[55] This 'love of God' is God's love for human beings, given to the perfect (4.9.11-12). Having persevered in ascetic afflictions, merited approval, and received hope, the 'perfect' receive 'the highest and greatest gift of the Holy Spirit,' which is the knowledge of God's love for us, 'by which we are able to love God himself' (4.9.12).[56] Receiving from the fullness of the Spirit, souls experience the love of God poured into their hearts, which confirms their adoption and empowers them to love God (7.2.1; 4.9.11.).[57] According to the *Commentarii*, 'those who are perfect... now receive the Spirit of adoption once and for all, "by which" Spirit "we cry: Abba, Father!" For no one but a son cries out to a father' (7.2.1).[58] From Romans 5:3-5, the *Commentarii* concludes:

> From the fullness of the Spirit, the fullness of love is infused into the hearts of the saints in order to receive participation in the divine nature, as the Apostle Peter has taught, so that through this gift of the

[52] Cf. Scherer, *fr. in Rom.* 212.13-14, in which hope is an expression of spiritual progress.

[53] See *comm. in Rom.* 4.9.11, which teaches that the love of God is only given to those who 'no longer have the spirit of slavery' and in whom 'perfect love casts our fear.'

[54] *Simul enim cum spe et caritatis abundantiam tenet.* ... Brackets in Scheck's translation.

[55] *Fidem namque et spem consequitur caritas Dei, quae omnium maior est, et non solum replet mentem nostram, sed et abundat ac diffunditur in cordibus nostris...*

[56] *quod uelut summum et maximum donum sancti Spiritus... per hoc ipsum diligere possimus Deum, quod diligimur a Deo.*

[57] Cf. *or.* 22.3-5; 28.8; *hom. in Gen.* 7. 'Perfect' Christians experience the love of God because of their greater participation in the Spirit.

[58] *Sed quasi perfecti semel iam accepimus spiritum adoptionis, in „quo spiritu clamamus: Abba, Pater!" Neque enim patrem alius quis nisi filius uocat.* Cf. *fr. in Rom* 1.1-4 in K. Staab, 'Neue Fragmente aus dem Kommentar des Origenes zum Römerbrief,' *Biblische Zeitschrift* 18 (1928) 72-82.

> Holy Spirit, the word which the Lord said might be fulfilled, 'As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be one in us.' (Jn 17:21) This is, of course, to be sharers of the divine nature by the fullness of love furnished through the Holy Spirit.[59] (4.9.12; cf. 2 Peter 1:4)

For those believers who have persevered in ascetic afflictions, the Holy Spirit completes their adoption by pouring the love of God into their hearts, which gives them the knowledge of God as their Father.[60] The gift of God's love enables them to participate in his love, which is undoubtedly the highest virtue.[61] As souls begin to love God with the Holy Spirit's gift of love, they participate in the union of love shared between the Father and the Son, and in this way they participate in the divine nature, which is love.

The vision of salvation that emerges in the *Commentarii* certainly reflects aspects of Origen's soteriology,[62] but it also reflects its monastic translator. As we observed, the Greek fragments of Origen's commentary insist that justifying and perfect faith is truly a gift of grace alone. Although Rufinus' translation affirms that works of the Law contribute nothing to justification (3.9), the *Commentarii* also departs from Origen by emphasising the necessity of ascetic striving for justification, perfection, adoption.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to use a semantic and theological analysis of the theme of affliction in the *Commentarii in Epistulam ad*

[59] *Quod si et spiritus caritatis, et filius caritatis, et Deus caritas inuenitur, certum est, quod ex uno Paternae Deitatis fonte et Filius intelligendus est, et Spiritus sanctus, ex cuius abundantia etiam sanctorum cordibus ad participationem capiendam diuinae naturae, sicut Petrus Apostolus edocuit, abundantia caritatis infunditur: ut per istud sancti Spiritus donum compleatur ille sermo, quem Dominus dicit: „sicut tu, Pater in me, et ego in te, ut et isti in nobis unum sint: " diuinae scilicet naturae participes effecti, in abundantia caritatis per Spiritum sanctum ministratae.*

[60] See also the insightful analysis of Widdicombe, *The Fatherhood of God*, 99-103.

[61] On love as the primary means of union with God in Origen's theology, see Henri Crouzel, *Origène: et la 'connaissance mystique'* (Paris, 1961): 519-23. Crouzel argues that although Origen also presents knowledge as a source of union, Origen understands knowledge in the 'Hebrew' sense, which refers to the intuitive knowledge about another that is gained in a relationship of love.

[62] On Origen's soteriology, see Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 140-154; Widdicombe, *The Fatherhood of God*, 93-118.

Romanos to evaluate Rufinus' reliability as a translator. From this analysis, a sharp difference in meaning between 'affliction' (θλῖψις) in the Greek witnesses to Origen's works and 'affliction' (*tribulatione*) in Rufinus' Latin translation has emerged. In the Greek texts, affliction primarily refers to externally-imposed experiences of anguish. In Rufinus' translation, however, affliction usually refers to anguish that arises from self-imposed ascetic striving. The study has also revealed an important soteriological difference. The Greek fragments of Origen's *Commentary on Romans* emphasise the role of grace in justification. Justification is effected by mature, justifying faith, which is only possessed as an unmerited gift from God. In contrast, the Latin *Commentarii* tends to de-emphasise grace by presenting ascetic striving as the means by which one is justified, perfected, and adopted as a child of God.

Although the fragmented state of Origen's *Commentary on Romans* prohibits us from making an absolute judgement about Rufinus' reliability as a translator, three conclusions about Rufinus' translations present themselves. First, the significant difference between the concept of affliction in the Greek witnesses to Origen's works and in Rufinus' Latin translation indicates that we must approach Rufinus' translations with caution. As previous scholarship has demonstrated so well, Rufinus' principles of translation are not our own. Although Rufinus is at times remarkably faithful to the Greek texts, the differences of emphasis between the Latin *Commentarii* and the Greek witnesses to Origen suggests that, *pace* the argument of Crouzel and Simonetti, Rufinus sometimes introduced theological changes in order to adapt the texts to his own theological context.

Second, the ascetic character of these differences supports the proposal of Wagner and Silvas that Rufinus occasionally adapted his texts to make them applicable to his fifth-century Latin audience. Origen wrote during a period when persecution and martyrdom was a real possibility. By the time Rufinus translated his works, however, martyrdom was no longer a threat and the monastic movement of the fourth century had reinterpreted martyrdom, persecution, and affliction as spiritual experiences related to ascetic striving for salvation. It seems quite likely that the ascetic emphasis in the *Commentarii* therefore reflects Rufinus' desire to make Origen's commentary not only linguistically accessible to his audience but also spiritually relevant.

Third, Rufinus' changes suggest that his *Commentarii* can serve as a witness not only to Origen but also to Rufinus himself. The ascetic character of affliction and of salvation in the *Commentarii* likely owes more to Rufinus than Origen, and these concepts probably

reflect elements of Rufinus' own theology. From this we might deduce, for example, that Rufinus believed ascetic striving is necessary for justification. More broadly, Rufinus' changes can also tell us about the reception of Origen by early fifth-century Western monasticism. Rufinus' dedication to translating Origen's works into Latin shows that Rufinus' community valued Origen as a teacher. However, Rufinus' changes also reveal that even Rufinus himself—the great defender of Origen—believed Origen's works must be adapted in order to be of optimal benefit to Latin audiences. Accordingly, Rufinus' changes may also reveal elements of his audience's theological perspectives, for, as we observed, Rufinus appears to have translated the text not only into his readers' language but also into their historical context and theological framework.

To conclude, it seems reasonable to propose that the *Commentarii* should be read as a witness not only to Origen's interpretation of Romans but also to Rufinus' interpretation and appropriation of Origen. Rufinus' translation may have much to tell us about Western monasticism and its reception of Origen at the dawn of the fifth century.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Kenneth Michael Becker, *From the Treasure-House of Scripture. An Analysis of Scriptural Sources in De Imitatione Christi* [Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia. Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity 44]. Brepols, Turnhout 2002, 767 pp. + supplementary sheet (Notes for readers). ISBN 2-503-51386-7. € 120.

This book has collated the Scriptural references used in Thomas à Kempis' *De Imitatio Christi*, aiming at a comprehensive analysis of the exact use of the Vulgate in this work. The first part of this book, in essence his doctoral dissertation at the University of Wales, Lampeter, sketches the historical background of Thomas and the *Imitatio*. Chapter two expands on the content of the *Imitatio* and the historical context of the *Devotio Moderna*. Chapter three focuses on the use of Scripture in the Modern Devotion milieu. The author demonstrates that the meditative prayer centred on Scripture was at the very heart of this spirituality. Biblical passages were to be ruminated upon and memorised, so as to provide the individual with a mnemonic library that would serve the personal imitation of Christ. This memorisation technique, that allowed Thomas to steep his mind in Scripture, accounts for the vast number of Scriptural references in the *Imitatio*, both the literal and the creative combinations. Chapter four illustrates the central role of this Scriptural rumination by analysing Thomas' concept of *lectio divina*.

Chapter five, the longest, analyses the exact use of the Vulgate in the *Imitatio*, based on an easily consultable, verse by verse presentation of the *Imitatio* accompanied by the 3815 Vulgate texts, 1200 of which had not been identified in earlier editions. These quotations are divided into 50 categories varying from "single source quotations" up to "stylistic word plays" (pp. 136-8), through which the author examines how Thomas uses Scripture. Despite its ingenious structure, the intricate nature of this categorisation makes its analysis also difficult to read. Moreover, sometimes the correspondences between the texts rest on one parallel word, which on the one hand innovatively opens up perspectives into Thomas' creative way of quoting Scripture, but on the other, the basis for presuming interfaces seems to lack an objective guarantee and transparency. This might cause some statistical inaccuracies about the number of quoted Vulgate texts. An

excellent overview of some dubious examples can be found in the book review of Wim Janse, (reference below).

Although one has to keep in mind these possible slight inaccuracies, the analysis provides clear insights in Thomas' "working bible," his mental library most frequently used in the *Imitatio*, and his modification of passages in an ascetic direction. Dr. Becker's book will be a great manual for further research into different areas such as Thomas' spirituality and, as the author himself indicated as a *desideratum*, the theological ideas behind the modification of Scriptural passages in the *Imitatio*.

See also earlier reviews:

P. Detienne, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 125, no. 2 (2003), p. 345.

Wim Janse, in *Dutch Review of Church History* 84, no. 1 (2004), pp. 571-574.

Mary Carruthers, in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 55, no. 4 (2004), pp. 778-779.

Wanda Zemler-Cizewski, in *Speculum* 79, no. 4 (2004), pp. 1031-1032.

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Dittrich, Constance, Fischer, Norbert, Naab Erich (eds.), *Augustinus, ein Lehrer des Abendlandes. Einführung und Dokumente*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009 – VIII + 136p. ISSN/ISBN: 978-3-447-05923-7.

This volume is the catalogue of an exhibition on the reception of Augustine in the *Staats-und Seminarbibliothek der Katholischen Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt*. Six contributions precede the actual catalogue. Four articles sketch the reception history of Augustine from the fifth century until today and the contemporary research of Augustine: Karla Pollman, *In ecclesia praesens: zur Augustinrezeption im 5. und 6. Jahrhundert* (pp. 1-14); Norbert Fischer, *Zum heutigen Streit um Augustinus: sein Werk als Schatz, als Bürde und als Herausforderung des Denkens* (pp. 15-31); Cornelius Mayer, *Grundlagen der Augustinus-Forschung* (pp. 33-41); Oliver Motz, *Original*

und Originalität: zur digitalen Restauration des ältesten Bildnisses des heiligen Augustinus (pp. 77-81). Two articles link the topic of the reception and influence of Augustine with the exhibition and the library of Eichstätt: Klaus Walter Littger and Erich Naab, *Augustinus in Eichstätter Bibliotheken* (pp. 43-75); Constance Dittrich, *Augustinus und sein Nachwirken in den Exponaten der Ausstellung* (pp. 83-101). The catalogue (pp. 105-136) contains manuscripts and old printings from Eichstätt and important documents from other institutions: manuscripts of the *Sermones* Dolbeau (Mainz), autographs from Blondel (Leuven), letters from Rilke and Heidegger (*Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach*). This exhibition, catalogue and this volume present the influence of Augustine on Western thinking in general, and the particular manifestation and presence of this influence in the library of Eichstätt.

Anthony Dupont

SERMO MAI 10. EINE AUTHENTISCHE PREDIGT DES AUGUSTINUS?

Die kurze Predigt, Sermo Mai 10, hat seit ihrer ersten Edition nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit unter den Augustinusspezialisten gefunden. Während ihr erster Editor, Kardinal Angelo Mai,[1] sie für echt hielt, schied G. Morin, der im Zusammenhang mit der Edition der „Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti" eine kritische Sichtung aller unter dem Namen des Augustinus gedruckten Predigten vornahm, die Predigt – wie den überwiegenden Teil der mehr als 200 von Mai edierten Sermones – als unecht aus: einiges erinnere zwar an Augustinus, die Predigt sei jedoch ungeschickt aus verschiedenen Teilen zusammengesetzt (*Nonnulla quidem Augustinum sapiunt: sermo tamen ex laciniis imperite colligatis uidetur esse conflatus*).[2] Morins Urteil, die Predigt sei ein Cento, wurde ohne weitere Prüfung in patristische Standardwerke übernommen.[3] Lediglich F. Dolbeau äußerte Zweifel an der communis opinio: da die Themen sehr augustinisch seien und strukturelle Anomalien letztlich auf einen ungeschickten Kompilator zurückgehen könnten, sei es nicht auszuschließen, dass die Predigt echt ist.[4]

In der vorliegenden Untersuchung soll die Frage der Authentizität anhand einer quellenkritischen Untersuchung des Texts und einer Analyse der Handschrift, in der die Predigt überliefert ist, neu aufgerollt werden.

Inhalt

Thema der Predigt ist ein Vers aus Psalm 40: *ego dixi domine, miserere mei, sana animam meam, quoniam peccaui tibi* (Ps. 40, 5).

[1] A. Mai, Nova Patrum Bibliotheca 1, Roma 1852, 19-20. Nachdruck in PLS 2, 1123-1124.

[2] G. Morin, in: Sancti Augustini sermones post Maurinos reperti, Miscellanea Agostiniana 1 (=MiAg), Roma 1930, 727.

[3] CPPM I 1615: *cento antiquus*; R. Gryson, Répertoire général des auteurs ecclésiastiques latins de l'antiquité et du haut moyen âge, Tome I, Introduction. Répertoire des auteurs: A – H, Freiburg 2007, 306: ‚alter Cento aus verschiedenen Quellen ungeschickt zusammengestückelt'; A. Hamman in PLS 2, 882: *e fonte Augustiniano defluxit sermo hic*.

[4] F. Dolbeau, Sur deux sermonnaires latins, jadis conservés à Lorsch, RBen 107 (1997), 270–279 (277 Anm. 47). – In einer Besprechung seines Artikels (REAug 43 [1997], 403) bekräftigt Dolbeau seinen Verdacht, dass Sermo Mai 10 zu Unrecht als apokryph angesehen wird.

Die Seele konnte zwar durch ihre Sünden sich selbst verletzen, bedarf aber, um wieder gesund zu werden, der Heilung durch den Seelenarzt Christus, der vom Himmel herabstieg, um dem Menschen den Weg zum Himmel zu bereiten. Den fiktiven Einwand eines Zuhörers, er habe nichts, um den Arzt Christus zu bezahlen, entkräftet der Prediger mit dem Hinweis darauf, dass es jedem Menschen – unabhängig davon, ob er wie Zachäus einen großen Teil des Vermögens oder wie die arme Witwe nur zwei Münzen gibt, ob er nur einen Becher kaltes Wasser reicht oder wie der gute Schächer nichts anderes als guten Willen hat – möglich ist. Die Predigt endet mit einer Aufforderung zur Gewissenserforschung.

Quellenkritik

Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung, die Aufschluss darüber geben könnte, ob die Predigt zu Recht als Cento bezeichnet wird, ist bis heute ausgeblieben. Der einzige, der – zumindest punktuell – den Versuch unternahm, Quellen zu identifizieren, ist F. Dolbeau.[5] Dolbeau nennt zwei Stellen, aus denen der Abschnitt *ipse est medicus, ipse medicina: anima enim se ipsam uulnerare potuit, sanare non potuit* (Kap. 1) zusammengesetzt sei: sermo 380, 2: *ut ergo generis humani istum tumorem sanaret ipse medicus, ipse medicina, non solum medicamentum adhibens...*, und sermo 278, 1: *nam se ipsa uulnerare potuit, sanare non potuit*. Da sich aber die Übereinstimmungen jeweils auf nur wenige Wörter beschränken, ist keineswegs sicher, dass genau diese zwei Predigten als Quelle gedient haben. Die Themen kehren in sprachlich ähnlicher Form auch anderswo im Œeuvre des Augustinus wieder: Die Prädikation Christi als *medicus* und *medicina* begegnet fast wörtlich in doct. chr. I, 14, 7 (*sapientia dei ... ipsa medicus, ipsa medicina*), und das Motiv, dass die Seele zwar sich selbst verwunden kann, zur Heilung aber auf Christus angewiesen ist, ist bei Augustinus sehr häufig anzutreffen (z.B.: sermo 20, 1; 160, 7); auch miteinander verknüpft finden sich beide Themen in Augustins Predigten (z.B. sermo Dolbeau 30, 2).

Die deutlichsten Textübereinstimmungen mit Zitatcharakter finden sich gleich am Beginn der Predigt. Der Satz *anima quotiens peccauerit, totiens uulneratur* wirkt wie eine von biblischen Vorbildern geprägte Sentenz (vgl. Prv. 8, 36: *qui autem in me peccauerit laedet animam suam*; Ez. 18, 4: *anima quae peccauerit ipsa morietur*), ist aber wörtlich nur in Rufins 410 vollendeter Übersetzung von Origenes'

[5] Dolbeau (o. Anm. 4).

Homilien zu Numeri nachzuweisen (Orig. Num. hom. 8, 1 [GCS 29, 51, 25]): *anima quotiens peccat, totiens uulneratur.*[6] Nicht weniger deutlich ist die Übereinstimmung des folgenden *dignatus est dominus... descendere ad terras, ut hominem colonum terrae migraret ad caelos* mit Ps.-Aug. serm. Caillau II app. 22, 1: *caelorum et habitator et conditor habitauit in terris, ut homo colonus terrae migraret ad caelos.*[7] In beiden Fällen ist nicht sicher, welche Predigt von der anderen abhängt oder ob sie beide auf eine gemeinsame Quelle zurückgehen. Während im ersten Fall die Origenesübersetzung der primäre Text zu sein scheint, spricht im zweiten Beispiel die Simplifizierung des Texts (ungewöhnliches transitives *migrare*[8] ist in intransitives geändert) für die Priorität der Formulierung von Sermo Mai 10.

Während diese zwei Stellen keine Entsprechung im sicher authentischen Œuvre Augustins haben, finden sich im folgenden bis zur Mitte des 2. Kapitels zahlreiche Übereinstimmungen mit authentischen Texten. Wie die zwei von Dolbeau vorgebrachten Beispiele sind sie jedoch trotz sprachlicher Nähe nie als wörtliche Zitate zu klassifizieren. Die folgende Aufstellung listet nur die auffälligsten Übereinstimmungen auf.[9]

Kap.	Lateinischer Text	Locus similis
1, 3-4	*et cum ipse patria sit, uiam fecit ad patriam*	doct. chr. 1, 11, 9: *cum ergo ipsa sit patria, uiam se quoque nobis fecit ad patriam*

[6] Vgl. den davon abhängigen Sermo 108 des Caesarius von Arles (bes. Caes. Arel. serm. 108, 3, 18).

[7] Da Ps.-Aug. sermo Caillau II app. 22 (CPPM I 1430) in der alten afrikanischen Predigtsammlung „De paenitentia" gemeinsam mit einigen stark kürzenden Bearbeitungen echter Augustinustexte überliefert ist (Nr. 33/ Nr. 32-36), ist zu vermuten, dass die Predigt aus Afrika stammt. Sie enthält am Ende ein bisher nicht ausgewiesenes Stück aus Aug. sermo 352, 6. Möglicherweise gehen auch andere (aber sicher nicht alle!) Teile der Predigt auf echtes Material zurück. – Für die von P.-P. Verbraken (Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin, Steenbrugis 1976 [Instumenta patristica et mediaevalia 12], 201) erhobene Behauptung, die letzten Predigten der Sammlung seien von Caesarius hinzugefügt, fehlt jeder Beweis. Verbrakens Identifikation von Nr. 33 der Collectio De paenitentia mit Ps.-Max. sermo 45 = Hier. ep. supp. 25, einer kürzeren Rezension der Predigt, ist durch die zwei jüngeren, aber vollständigen Handschriften aus Cambrai und Cambridge zu widerlegen.

[8] Zur transitiven Verwendung von *migrare* vgl. Aug. serm. 38, 9 (CCL 41, 484, 202): *migra diuitias*; serm. 61, 11 (CCL 41 Aa, 273; 221): *migrandae sunt facultates*; serm. 113 (PL 38, 650, 39): *tunc erunt diuitiae, quando eas migraueris*; serm. 389, 4 (RBen 58, 48, 151): *si migranda sunt quae habemus, in eum locum, unde non ea perdamus*; sowie die Beispiele in ThLL VIII 938, 23-40.

[9] Siehe auch den Similienapparat in der Edition, S. 189-192.

Kap.	Lateinischer Text	Locus similis
1, 5-6	*sana medicum contempsit. Nunc rogat aegrota: si tamen rogat!*	in psalm. 70, 2 serm. 1, 58: *quem contempserunt sani, rogant aegroti. utinam saltem rogent!*
1, 7	*roget humilis, quem contempsit superba*	sermo Wilmart 11, 2 (= 142 auct.; MiAg 1, 696, 3): *discat* (sc. *anima*) *audire infirma illum quem contempsit incolumis*
1, 8-9	*accipe potionem psalmi huius et aperi os* (codd. *oculos*) *cordis et bibe quod audis* (+ Ps. 40, 5)	in psalm. 36 serm. 1, 3, 14: *bibat potionem psalmi huius.... accipe, bibe:... accommoda per aurem os cordis, et bibe quod audis* (+ Ps. 36, 1-2)
1, 9-10	*ne sis perstrepens uocibus et mutus moribus*	serm. 88, 12 (RBen 94, 86, 310): *ne forte simus strepentes uocibus et muti moribus*
1, 12	*quaesiuit te antequam eum quaereres*	in psalm. 138, 14, 36: *quia quaesiuit uos antequam quaereretis eum*
2, 1	*sed fortasse aliquis dicat: pauper sum, non habeo*	sermo Lambot 9 (= 299F; PLS 2, 791, 8): *nemo dicat: non habeo unde, pauper sum*
2, 4-6	*omnia membra fixa habebat* (sc. *latro*), *lingua sola ei restiterat, ut apostoli sententia impleretur: Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit in salutem.*	qu. Simpl. 1, 2, 19 (657): *latro ... qui defixis in cruce omnibus membris et habens libera haec duo* (sc. *os et cor*) *corde credidit ad iustitiam, ore confessus est ad salutem*; sermo 2, 9 (CCL 41, 16, 238): *et impletur sententia dicentis apostoli*

Die Reihe biblischer Exempla in Kapitel 2, mit der die Hörer der Predigt ermutigt werden, die Dienste des Seelenarztes Christus zu bezahlen (Spende der armen Witwe, Becher kaltes Wasser, guter Wille, Vermögen des Zachäus), findet sich bei keinem anderen Autor als Augustinus und späteren Autoren, die ihn zitieren.[10] In Sermo Mai 10 wird sie in zwei Punkten geringfügig modifiziert: Einerseits ist der sonst vorherrschende Aspekt, das Himmelreich durch karitative Unterstützung Bedürftiger zu erkaufen, ausgeblendet (oder einfach nicht erhalten), andererseits wird zur Illustration der *bona uoluntas* das Beispiel des guten Schächers (Luc. 23, 39-43) und nicht wie sonst der Vers Luc. 2, 14 herangezogen.

[10] Vgl. I. Schiller – D. Weber – C. Weidmann, Sechs neue Augustinuspredigten. Teil 2 mit Edition dreier Sermones zum Thema Almosen, WSt 122 (2009), 171-213 (191f.).

Während bis zur Mitte von Kapitel 2 die Themen und ihre sprachliche Ausführung typisch für Augustinus sind, ändern sich im Schlussteil Sprache und Stil grundlegend. Von der Aufforderung *Demus nummum sicut illa uidua omnem substantiam suam ad gazophylacium posuit* (2, 11-12) an widerspricht die Wortwahl dem Stil des Bischofs von Hippo. So verwendet Augustinus nie für die Erzählung von der armen Witwe den Singular *nummum* (gewöhnlich *nummi* oder *minuta*), den Begriff *substantia* oder die Junktur *ad gazophylacium ponere* (gewöhnlich *in gazophylacium mittere*). Das anschließende Zachäus-Exempel lässt sich in seiner sprachlichen und argumentativen Form nicht mit dem Usus bei Augustinus vereinbaren: Hätte Augustinus tatsächlich behaupten können, dass Zachäus durch Geld seine Sünden tilgt? Ebenso erscheinen die folgenden Ausführungen zu Zachäus vom Kontext nicht gefordert und unmotiviert, das abschließende Zitat aus Ps. 24, 15 hat keine Verknüpfung mit dem Text der Predigt und wirkt funktionslos.

Die quellenkritische Analyse führt zum Ergebnis, dass die Predigt mit Ausnahme des ersten Satzes und des ungeschickt wirkenden Schlussteils von einem intimen Kenner des Stils und der Gedankenwelt des Augustinus stammt. Auch die kohärente Gedankenführung verrät einen rhetorisch versierten Prediger. Er spricht seine Zuhörer direkt an, formuliert allfällige Einwände seines Auditoriums in einer fiktiven Gegenrede und widerlegt sie unter ausgiebiger Verwendung von Bezugnahmen auf die Heilige Schrift. Das Motiv 'Christus – medicus'[11] und die Reihe biblischer Exempla[12] sind stringent miteinander verknüpft, ohne dass am Übergang ein Bruch des Gedankenganges vorliegt. Darüber hinaus gewährleisten die Zitierung desselben Psalmverses und ein gemeinsames Motiv (für das Gebet ist die Übereinstimmung von *os* und *cor* erforderlich) die Zusammengehörigkeit

[11] R. E. Arbesmann, The concept of 'Christus medicus' in St. Augustine, Traditio 10 (1954), 1-28; P. C. J. Eijkenboom, Het Christus-Medicusmotief in de preken van Sint Augustinus, Nijmegen 1961; T. F. Martin, Paul the Patient. Christus Medicus and the "Stimulus Carnis" (2 Cor. 12:7). A Consideration of Augustine's Medicinal Christology, Augustinian Studies 32,2 (2001), 219-256 (mit umfangreichen Literaturangaben p. 222 Anm. 9); S. B. Griffith, Medical Imagery in the 'New' Sermons of Augustine, Studia Patristica 43 (2006), 107-112 (bes. 108. 111); A. Dupont, "Christus Medicus. De genezing van de mens door de arts Christus in de preken van Augustinus", in: B. Bruning (Hg.), Oorlog en Vrede. Augustinus in confrontatie met het heden, Leuven 2006, 71-99; Ph. Reichling, Christus als Arzt und Apotheker in der bildenden Kunst, in: W. Geerlings – A. Mügge (Hg.), Gesundheit – Geisteswissenschaftliche und Medizinische Aspekte, Berlin 2009, 81-142 (84-86).

[12] S. oben Anm. 10.

beider Teile.[13] Kaum ein Kompilator wäre in der Lage gewesen, ein so dichtes Netz an Augustinusbezügen zu knüpfen, ohne echtes Material zu benutzen. Da jedoch die nächsten Parallelen in so unterschiedlichen Texten zu finden sind und nie im Wortlaut identisch sind, kann kein Zweifel daran bestehen, dass der Hauptteil nicht aus verschiedenen Quellen zusammengesetzt ist, sondern aus einer einzigen echten, aber verlorenen Predigt des Augustinus übernommen ist.

Eine wichtige Rolle für die Beurteilung der Echtheit spielen auch der Wortlaut der Schriftzitate und die Art ihrer Verwendung. Da Ps. 40, 5 in der vorliegenden Predigt sowohl mit dem bei Augustinus als auch dem der Vulgata (iuxta LXX) identisch ist, sind aus diesem Vers keine Aufschlüsse über die Autorschaft zu gewinnen. Anders verhält es sich mit zwei wörtlichen Bibelzitaten: Der Vers 2 Cor. 12, 14: *non enim quaero quae uestra sunt, sed uos* wird (abgesehen von der Kommentierung beim Ambrosiaster) in lateinischer Patristik erstmals von Augustinus zitiert, in sermo 37 in ganz ähnlichem Kontext.[14] Das Zitat von Matth. 25, 40. 45 ist mit Matth. 10, 42 vermischt, indem *cum* (bzw. *quando* oder *quamdiu*) ... *fecistis* durch *qui dederit* und *fecit* durch *dedit* ersetzt wird. Eine ähnliche Fusion der zwei von Augustinus oft gemeinsam zitierten Bibelstellen[15] begegnet in c. Faust. 5, 10 (283, 21) und Io. ev. tr. 21, 7, 30: *cum uni ex minimis meis dedistis, mihi dedistis.*

Überlieferungskontext

Ein nicht weniger gewichtiges Argument für die Authentizität des Hauptteils von Sermo Mai 10 gibt der Überlieferungskontext an die Hand. Wichtigster Textzeuge ist die aus Bobbio stammende Handschrift Vat. lat. 5758, s. VII (an. cc. 630-640; = *B*), die Sermo Mai 10 auf pp. 98-100 überliefert und im Titel ausdrücklich Augustinus als Autor nennt: *incipit eiusdem* [sc. *Augustini*] *de psalmo XL*; aus dieser Handschrift wurde sie von Mai gemeinsam mit einigen anderen Predigten (Sermones Mai 1-26) erstmals ediert. Eine zweite Handschrift, der aus Oberitalien stammende Codex Paris, BN lat. 792,

[13] Vgl. auch die zweimalige Andeutung der Menschwerdung Christi mit Ps. 17, 10 in Kap. 1.

[14] Sermo 37, 20 (CCL 41, 465, 445). – Auch der an später Stelle des Zitats erfolgende Einschub *dicit apostolus* hat zahlreiche Parallelen bei Augustinus.

[15] Vgl. Sermo Lambot 4 (PLS 2, 766): *hoc ipse dixit: quando uni ex minimis meis fecistis mihi fecistis. Item alio loco dixit: quicumque uni ex discipulis meis dederit calicem aquae frigidae tantum in nomine discipuli, amen dico uobis, non perdet mercedem suam.*

s. XI, 62v2-63r1 (= *P*), ist eng mit dem vorigen verwandt, wenn nicht sogar eine direkte Abschrift, und kann bei der Analyse des Inhalts unberücksichtigt bleiben.[16]

Der Handschrift aus Bobbio sind auf den ersten Blättern (pp. 2-4) zwei Inhaltsverzeichnisse vorangestellt, nach denen man die Predigten in zwei Gruppen einteilt:[17] Den ersten Teil (A) bildet eine Serie von 21 Predigten (pp. 5-103: A1-A21), die im Inhaltsverzeichnis und im Explizit der letzten Predigt (*exp. tractatus sancti Augustini feliciter*) summarisch dem Augustinus zugeschrieben werden. Der zweite Teil (B) besteht aus 24 vorwiegend authentischen Predigten des Augustinus, von denen einige nur in dieser Handschrift enthalten sind (pp. 105-258: B1-B24). An sie schließt eine Appendix von sechs weiteren Predigten an (pp. 259-362: B25-B30), die in keinem Inhaltsverzeichnis aufgelistet sind.

Als Collectio Bobbiensis werden in der Augustinusforschung die 24 Predigten von Teil B verstanden.[18] Eine Analyse der Handschrift und ihres Inhalts zeigt jedoch, dass der Begriff zu Unrecht auf diese 24 Predigten eingeengt wird und dieser Sammlung zwei weitere Predigtgruppen zuzurechnen sind.

(a) Mehrere Gründe sprechen dafür, dass die sechs Predigten der Appendix (B25-B30) integrativer Bestandteil der Collectio Bobbiensis sind:

- Die Predigten der Appendix behandeln ähnliche Themen wie der vorangegangene Hauptteil.[19]
- Die Nummerierung der Titel (XXVI - XXX) setzt die der vorigen Predigten (I - XXIIII) fort. Wegen Blattverlusts (s.u.) fehlt die Nummer XXV. Dass sich auf den ausgefallenen Blättern weitere Predigten befanden, ist daher auszuschließen.
- Der Übergang vom Hauptteil zur Appendix ist durch zahlreiche Blattverluste und Blattvertauschungen beeinträchtigt: B19 und B20 sind am Ende bzw. Anfang wegen Blattausfalls (zwischen p. 230 und 231) unvollständig. Die Abfolge B22-B24 ist dadurch gestört, dass das Blatt mit dem Übergang von B22 auf B23 von seinem

[16] In der Pariser Handschrift finden sich folgende Übereinstimmungen mit den zwei Sammlungen (A, B) aus Vat. lat. 5758: 31v1-32r1 A18; 32r1-32v2 B15; 34r2-35r2 A2; 35r2-36r1 A3; 44v1-45v1 A5; 45v2-46v1 A4; 56r2-57r1 B16; 62r2-62v2 A19; 62v2-63r1 A20; 63r1-63v1 A21; 63v1-64r2 B5; 65r1-66r1 B6; 77v1-78r1 B19; 80v2 B10 (frg.).

[17] Zu Aufbau und Inhalt von Vat. lat. 5758 s. A. Reifferscheid, Bibliotheca patrum Latinorum Italica I, Wien 1870, 451-459; MiAg 1, 278-281; Lambot CCL 41, p. XII; Verbraken (o. Anm. 7) 203-204; CCL 41Aa, p. XXVII-XXIX. – CLA I 36.

[18] So Lambot (o. Anm. 17) p. XII und Verbraken (o. Anm. 7) 201-202 nach Morin (o. Anm. 2), 277-281. S. auch CCL 41 Aa, p. XXVII und 251.

[19] Morin (o. Anm. 2) 281: *eiusdem indolis*.

richtigen Platz (zwischen p. 248 und 249) an die aktuelle Stelle nach hinten (pp. 257-258) verschoben wurde. Der letzte Text, den man der Collectio Bobbiensis zurechnet, B24 (Sermo Denis 8 abbrev.), bricht unvollständig ab, weil das auf p. 256 richtigerweise folgende Blatt fehlt. Mit diesem Blatt muss auch der Anfang des ersten Texts der Appendix ausgefallen sein. Die Appendix endet ihrerseits durch Blattverlust mitten im Text einer Predigt (B30; p. 362).

- Die Lagenbündel sind am unteren Rand des letzten Blattes jeweils mit Kustoden versehen. Die fortlaufende Lagenzählung bezeugt die Zusammengehörigkeit der zwei Teile (p. 202: XIII; p. 218: XIIII; p. 230: XV; p. 244: XVI; p. 274: XVIII – Die Zahl XVII fehlt wegen Blattverlusts).
- Das Inhaltsverzeichnis (pp. 3-4), das als wichtigstes Argument für die Abgrenzung des Hauptteils von der Appendix genannt wird, ist fehlerhaft und unvollständig: Da der Beginn des Texts von B20 fehlt und die drei Predigten B20-B22 dasselbe Thema behandeln, werden im Inhaltsverzeichnis nur zwei Predigten jeweils unter dem Titel *de alleluia* aufgelistet und mit den Nummern XX und XXI versehen; die Nummer XXII fehlt. Es folgen in richtiger Reihenfolge (im Text des Hauptteils sind sie ja vertauscht; s.o.) die Titel zu den Nummern XXIII und XXIIII. Mit diesem Eintrag endet das Inhaltsverzeichnis am Ende von Seite 4. Das Inhaltsverzeichnis scheint unvollständig zu sein, wofür zwei gute Gründe anzuführen sind: Entweder hat der Schreiber wegen der Konfusion in der Handschrift die Erstellung des Inhaltsverzeichnisses an dieser Stelle abgebrochen[20] oder es ging nach p. 4 ein Blatt, auf dem die folgenden Titel verzeichnet waren, verloren.
- Eine beachtliche Zahl von Predigten des Hauptteils (B1-B24) und der Appendix (B25-B30) ist mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit in einem relativ engen Bereich des Indiculums (X^6. 151-168) nachweisbar.[21] Der Kompilator der Collectio Bobbiensis verfügte also wahrscheinlich über eine Vorlage, die mit dem im Indiculum beschriebenen Exemplar von Hippo näher verwandt war.[22]

[20] Auch ein von anderer Hand geschriebenes Inhaltsverzeichnis des ersten Teils (p. 104) ist unvollständig und bricht mitten im Titel von A15 ab.

[21] A. Wilmart (ed.), Operum s. Augustini elenchus a Possidio eiusdem discipulo Calamensi episcopo digestus, MiAg 2, Roma 1931, 149-233 (204-205).

[22] Am auffälligsten sind die Übereinstimmungen von Indic. X^6. 165-167 mit B3-B5 (Lambot, CCL 41, p. XII, hatte schon auf die übereinstimmende Serie B4-B5 hingewiesen) und von X^6. 157-160 mit den gekürzten Predigten B7-B9 und B11. Möglicherweise ist der zum Vergleich heranzuziehende Bereich des Indiculum bis X^6. 184 auszudehnen; eine sichere Identifikation ist allerdings wegen unspezifischer Titel und zahlreicher in Frage kommender Predigten kaum beweisbar: Möglich ist demnach die Identifikation von B12 mit X^6. 184; B15 mit X^6. 170; B16 mit X^6. 171; B24 mit X^6.

Indic.		Predigt	Bobbio
X⁶. 151: De decem plagis et decem praeceptis	=	sermo Frangipane 1 = sermo Mai 7 (= 8 auct.)	B29
X⁶. 152: De lectione euangelica die martyrum	?	sermo Mai 20 (= 64A)	B13
X⁶. 153: Ex euangelio Lucae et de actibus apostolorum			
X⁶. 154: De uersu psalmi centensimi quadragensimi tertii: deus canticum nouum cantabo tibi [in psalterio decem cordarum psallam tibi]			
X⁶. 155: De lectione Esaiae: domine quis credidit auditui nostro?			
X⁶. 156: Ex euangelio: qui amat animam suam perdet eam et cetera			
X⁶. 157: De natale sancti Iohannis tractatus duo	?	sermo Dolbeau 3 (= 293A auct.)	B7 (abbrev.; = sermo Mai 18)
X⁶. 158: De natale apostolorum Petri et Pauli	?	sermo Dolbeau 4 (= 299A auct.)	B11 (abbrev.; = sermo Mai 19)
X⁶. 159: Ex euangelio: Non potest filius a se facere quidquam nisi quod uiderit patrem facientem	=	sermo 126[23]	B9 (abbrev.)
X⁶. 160: Ex euangelio ubi centurio dominum rogat pro puero suo	=	sermo 62	B8 (abbrev.)
X⁶. 161: De adulescentium luxuria	???[24]	sermo 86	B28

178. Einige Predigten der Collectio Bobbiensis werden freilich mit Einträgen des Indiculum in Verbindung gebracht, die sich an anderer Stelle befinden: B1 mit Indic. X⁶. 17 (?); B2 mit X⁶. 91 (?); B10 (abbrev.) mit X⁶. 55; B25 mit X⁶. 50 (?). – Der in der Collectio Bobbiensis mehrmals verwendete Titel *De responsorio psalmi* (B4-B6; B17) steht in Analogie zu zahlreichen ähnlich lautenden Einträgen im Indiculum (Indic. X⁶. 26. 79. 80. 81. 90). – Bemerkenswert ist die relativ große Zahl von Predigten der Collectio Bobbiensis, die sich mit der Collectio Mainz-Lorsch (= M) decken: B7 exzerpiert M7; B9 exzerpiert M14; B11 exzerpiert M9; B28 = M3. Sermo 98 (= B26) fehlt in der Collectio Mainz-Lorsch, befand sich aber noch in der verlorenen Sammlung von Lorsch, und zwar an 13. Stelle. S. Verbraken (o. Anm. 7), 232-233; vgl. F. Dolbeau, Le sermonnaire Augustinien de Mayence (Mainz, Stadtbibliothek I 9): Analyse et histoire, RBen 106 (1996), 5-52 (45). –

[23] Die von Wilmart (o. Anm. 21), 225 und Lambot, RBen 69 (1959), 177 vorgenommene Identifizierung von Sermo 126 mit Indic. VIII. 11 ist auszuschließen, weil unter Indic. VIII. 11-12 (13?) die Serie Io. ev. tr. 20-21 (22?) [= serm. 126A-C] erfasst ist; s. C. Weidmann (ed.), Augustinus. Enarrationes in psalmos 1-32 (expos.), Wien 2003 (CSEL 93/1A), 12 Anm. 14; id., Vier unerkannte Predigten des Augustinus, REAug 56 (2010) (im Druck).

[24] In M und B trägt Sermo 86 den Titel *De auaritia et luxuria*, die Identifizierung mit dem Indiculum ist daher höchst spekulativ, weil sie einen Fehler des Verfassers des Indiculum oder eines Schreibers voraussetzt.

Indic.		Predigt	Bobbio
X⁶. 162: De tribus mortuis a domino resuscitatis	=	sermo 98	B26
X⁶. 163: De id quod scriptum est: quod oculus non uidit et cetera			
X⁶. 164: De die pentecosten per uigilias ex eo quod scriptum est: In principio fecit deus caelum et terram			
X⁶. 165: De caritate tractatus duo	~	sermo Mai 14 (= 350A)	B3
X⁶. 166: De uersu psalmi septuagensimi: Libera me de manu peccatoris et cetera	=	sermo Mai 15 (= 22A)	B4
X⁶. 167: De uersu psalmi septuagensimi quarti confitebimur tibi deus et cetera	=	sermo Mai 16 (= 23A)	B5
X⁶. 168: De uersu psalmi centensimi septimi decimi: confitemini domino quoniam bonus est	=	sermo Denis 9 (= 29A)	B22

Es gibt also keinen Grund, die sechs Texte der Appendix B von der Collectio Bobbiensis auszuschließen. Die Einengung auf 24 Predigten beruht einzig auf einem unvollständigen Inhaltsverzeichnis einer durch Blattvertauschung und -verlust in Unordnung geratenen Handschrift.

(b) Auch vom ersten Teil (A) sind einige Texte mit der Collectio Bobbiensis eng verwandt und deren ursprünglichem Bestand zuzurechnen: Die ersten 18 Predigten (A1-A18; pp. 5-95) tragen keinen individuellen Namen eines Autors; sie stammen zum größten Teil von Petrus Chrysologus und haben – abgesehen von der globalen Autorenzuweisung im Inhaltsverzeichnis – nichts mit Augustinus zu tun.[25] Von ihnen unterscheiden sich die letzten drei Predigten (A19-A21; pp. 95-103) deutlich: Sie kommentieren als einzige Texte von A einen Psalmvers (Ps. 36, 37; Ps. 40, 5 und Ps. 49, 3) und nennen im Titel ausdrücklich den Namen Augustins (*sancti Augustini sermo* bzw.

[25] D. De Bruyne, Nouveaux sermons de saint Pierre Chrysologue, JThS 29 (1928), 362-368; CPL 228. – Die Predigten A2-A4 werden im Inhaltsverzeichnis unter einem einzigen Titel (*II De natale domini et de eo quod fugit in Aegyptum*) zusammengefasst (Petr. Chrys. serm. 143. 140ter. 151). Dennoch ist unklar, warum nach dem Eintrag *XVIIII de psalmo XLVIIII* die Zahl der Predigten mit *fieri simul tract. XX* angegeben wird.

eiusdem), und das offensichtlich nicht zu Unrecht.[26] Sermo Mai 10, der sich in der Mitte dieser Kleingruppe befindet, enthält – wie gezeigt wurde – authentisches Material; die zwei ihn rahmenden Predigten sind jeweils aus dem entsprechenden Abschnitt der Enarrationes exzerpiert. In ihrer literarischen Form entsprechen sie den Enarrationesexzerpten von Teil B. Die folgende Aufstellung soll dies verdeutlichen:[27]

	pp.	Titel	Thema	Quelle
A19	95-98 (= sermo Mai 9)	incipit sancti Augustini sermo de psalmo XXXVI	Ps. 36, 37	praefatio[28] in psalm. 36 enarr. 1, 12, 32-36. 26-31 in psalm. 36 enarr. 3, 15, 2-4. 5-8. 13-15. 17 in psalm. 36 enarr. 3, 16, 5 in psalm. 36 enarr. 1, 12, 6-7. 11-23. 26 additamentum[29]
A21	100-103	incipit eiusdem de psalmo XLVIIII	Ps. 49, 3	in psalm. 49, 1, 1-10 in psalm. 37, 21, 14-15 sermo 9, 2, 36-37 in psalm. 37, 21, 15-17 in psalm. 49, 6, 3-19. 6, 22-7, 7. 17-22 additamentum[30]
B14	192-199	de titulo psalmi LXXXIII	Ps. 83, 1	in psalm. 83, 1, 1-2. 3-34 in psalm. 83, 2, 24-4, 11. 21-26
B17	212-217	de responsorio psalmi LXXXIII Beati qui habitant in domo tua et cetera	Ps. 83, 5	praefatio[31] in psalm. 83, 8, 7-47. 48-80 additamentum[32] in psalm. 26 enarr. 2, 8, 1-14. 38-45

[26] Morin (o. Anm. 2) 278 spricht zu Unrecht diesem Anhang die Authentizität ab: *nequaquam Hipponiensis episcopi uenam referre… certo certius inter apocryphos computandi sunt.*

[27] Die Zeilenzahl wird nach der Ausgabe im CCL 38-41 zitiert.

[28] *Ante paululum cantauimus fratres: Custodi innocentiam et uide aequitatem, quoniam sunt reliquiae homini pacifico. Si quod cantauimus, opera demonstremus, profecto erit nobis directio ipse dominus.*

[29] *Et uide directionem quoniam sunt reliquiae homini pacifico, praestante Christo domino nostro cui omnis est honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum amen exp.*

[30] *Emendemur ergo, fratres carissimi, et hunc ignem timentes corrigamur ut liberemur ab ipso in die illa qua nos manifestari nouimus per Christum dominum nostrum. Exp. tractatus sancti Augustini feliciter.*

[31] *Presentem psalmum simul nobiscum cantauit caritas uestra; adiuuate itaque me orationibus uestris et sit fructuosus auditus nec inanis redeat auditor qui intentus adfuit cum audiret. Respondimus enim* (cf. in psalm. 146, 1, 1. 4. 5-7).

[32] *Hanc unam amare debemus sicut in alio psalmo dicit: Unam peti a domino hanc requiram et ut inhabitem in domo domini omnes dies uitae meae* (Ps. 26, 4).

	pp.	Titel	Thema	Quelle
B20	230-237	explicit sermo de alleluia	Ps. 148, 1	in psalm. 148, 1, 24 (mut.) - 2, 32 additamentum[33] in psalm. 148, 4, 7-11. 18-39 additamentum[34] in psalm. 148, 5, 4-10 in psalm. 148, 2, 32-33
B30	340-362	de psalmo LXIII	Ps. 63	in psalm. 63, 1, 1-16, 13 (mut.)

Die Enarrationesexzerpte weisen – mit Ausnahme der bis zum Blattverlust vollständigen Erklärung von Psalm 63 (B30) – mehrere signifikante Gemeinsamkeiten auf. Sie haben die literarische Form einer Predigt. Wenn das Exzerpt nicht mit dem Beginn der originalen Augustinuspredigt zusammenfällt, wird eine kurze Einleitung, die die Predigtsituation simulieren soll, vorangestellt (A19; B17). In ähnlicher Weise wird, wenn der Originaltext ungeeignet ist, ein passender Predigtschluss eingefügt (A19; A21). Ansonsten beschränken sich die Zusätze auf wenige kurze Überleitungssätze (B17; B20). Ein gemeinsames Element beider Serien (A und B) liegt auch darin, dass die Reihenfolge der einzelnen Teile nicht immer der des Originals entspricht (A19; B20) und einige Exzerpte aus verschiedenen Quellen zusammengefügt sind (A21; B17).

Die genannten Exzerpttechniken beschränken sich nicht nur auf Texte, die aus den Enarrationes in Psalmos übernommen sind, sondern sind auch in anderen Predigten der Collectio Bobbiensis nachweisbar:

- **B6**: Sermo Mai 17 ist am Ende möglicherweise unvollständig und zeigt Spuren einer Überarbeitung.[35]
- **B7**: Sermo Mai 18 ist ein Exzerpt aus Sermo Dolbeau 3, lehnt sich jedoch in den ersten Worten an Sermo Dolbeau 4 an und fügt einen eigenen Schluss an.[36]
- **B8**: Exzerpt aus Sermo 62, 1. 3-7.[37]

[33] *Adsociati angelis in illa patria Hierusalem laudauimus* (*laudabimus* pc.) *deum. Modo autem quia ab illa ciuitate magna.*

[34] *Illam scilicet quae est in caelis quae est mater nostra sicut dicit apostolus* (cf. Gal. 4, 26).

[35] Lambot (o. Anm. 17) 230.

[36] F. Dolbeau, Vingt-six sermons au peuple d'Afrique, Paris 1996, 473f. 484-487. 490-492: Addit. (*hodierni diei festiuitas nota est auribus et cordibus et actibus uestris*; cf. serm. Dolbeau 4, 1, 1-2). ll. 9-41. 49-53. 56-62. 65-70. 146. 149-152. 174. addit. (*nunc tamen proficiamus in uerbo ut cum ipso maneamus in aeternum*). 180. 183-188. addit. (*non in ebrietatibus et comisationibus sicut dicit apostolus sed omnia quaecumque agitis omnia in nomine dei facite et deus pacis erit uobiscum*).

[37] CCL 41Aa, 291. 296-302: ll. 7-17. 49-67. 72-141.

- **B9**: Sermo 126, 1-6.[38]
- **B10**: Ein Exzerpt der ersten drei Kapitel von De utilitate ieiunii wird von einem Abschnitt des Schlusskapitels von Sermo 210 und einem kurzen Zusatz beendet.[39]
- **B11**: Sermo Mai 19 ist ein Exzerpt aus Sermo Dolbeau 4.[40]
- **B19**: Der Beginn von Sermo Mai 23 ist nach dem 11. Prolog des Pseudo-Fulgentius gestaltet.[41]
- **B24**: Von Sermo Denis 8 fehlt der Mittelteil. Die Fuge zwischen den beiden Randteilen ist mit einem vermutlich aus Sermo Mai 12 (B1) übernommenen Satz gekittet.[42]

Die drei Psalmenpredigten, die am Ende von Teil A überliefert sind (A19-A21), wurden allem Anschein nach vom selben Kompilator wie die Enarrationesexzerpte aus Teil B unter Verwendung authentischer Predigten Augustins erstellt. Auch wenn der handschriftliche Befund dies nicht bestätigt, spricht nichts gegen die Annahme, dass sie einer gemeinsamen Sammlung angehörten. Warum sie in der Handschrift aus Bobbio von den anderen Predigten getrennt sind, ist nicht mit Sicherheit zu entscheiden; möglicherweise schienen sie wegen thematischer Überschneidungen ungeeignet und wurden aus der Sammlung von Augustinuspredigten ausgeschieden:Beide Teile enthalten je eine Predigt zu Psalm 36[43] und je eine zu Psalm 40, 2.[44] Obwohl Sermo Mai 10 und Sermo Mai 17[45] dasselbe Thema behandeln ist dennoch auszuschließen, dass sie auf eine gemeinsame Quelle zurückgehen, weil sie das Zitat von Ps. 40, 5 jeweils wie ein Erstzitat

[38] RBen 69 (1959), 180f. 183-190: ll. 1-110.

[39] CCL 46, 227. 231-234: ll. 1-27. 37-92. 97-101 + PL 38, 1053: Sermo 210, 12, 2-12. Es folgt eine kurze Klausel: *ergo ieiunemus et oremus dominum Ihesum Christum qui uiuit et regnat in saeculo saeculorum amen.*

[40] Dolbeau (o. Anm. 36) 497. 511-512. 514-517: ll. 5-15. 19-22. 23-30. *addit* (*meritum Pauli iterum audiamus*). 83-87. 89-93. 94-108. 123-128. 153. 154-157.

[41] Dolbeau (o. Anm. 36) 497.

[42] MiAg 1, 35-38: Sermo Denis 8, 1, 1-2, 23. addit. (*quibus nihil prodest quia baptizantur quando in ecclesia catholica quae praedicta est futura per orbem terrarum, non sunt*). 4, 1-30. – Zum Additamentum vgl. Sermo Mai 12, 3: *non enim latere illam deus uoluit, ut nemo se excusaret: praedicta est futura per orbem terrarum, exhibita est toto orbi terrarum* (MiAg 1, 286, 30-31).

[43] A19 zu Ps. 36, 37 bzw. B3 zu Ps. 36, 2; vgl. das Explicit zu B3: *explicit sermo de amore dei et de caritate et de uersu psalmi XXXVI.*

[44] A20 bzw. B6. Psalm 40,5 wurde als Tagespsalm vor der Predigt *De urbis excidio* gesungen; S. M. Margoni-Kögler, Die Perikopen im Gottesdienst bei Augustinus. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der liturgischen Schriftlesung in der frühen Kirche, Wien 2010 (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 810), 209.

[45] Sermo Mai 17 (B6) schließt eine kleine Serie von Predigten zu einzelnen Psalmversen ab (B4 zu Ps. 70, 4; B5 zu Ps. 74, 2; B6 zu Ps. 40, 2).

einführen und – abgesehen vom selben Psalmvers – thematisch nur wenig gemeinsam haben.[46]

Abgesehen von den zwei erhaltenen Codices *B* und *P* ist die Predigt in einem Bibliotheksverzeichnis des 9. Jhs. aus Kloster Lorsch bezeugt. In einem heute verlorenen Sermonar wurden zwei der drei Psalmverskommentare (A20 und A21) gemeinsam, aber ohne andere Vertreter der Collectio Bobbiensis überliefert:[47]

II. Admonitio quantum sermo dei ualeat ad correctionem
III. Quotiens anima peccauerit, toties uulneratur

Nummer III ist mit Sicherheit mit Sermo Mai 10 (A20) zu identifizieren,[48] Nummer II, dessen Titel mit dem Incipit von Enarratio in Psalmum 49 übereinstimmt, mit dem in der Collectio Bobbiensis unmittelbar folgenden Exzerpt aus Enarratio 49 (A21), das mit denselben Worten beginnt.[49]

* * *

Da zahlreiche Predigten der Collectio Bobbiensis durch Vergleich mit unabhängigen Überlieferungssträngen als unvollständig erwiesen werden können, ist bei den Predigten, die wegen fehlender Parallelüberlieferung nicht verglichen werden können, Zweifel an ihrer Vollständigkeit angebracht.[50] Dieser schon von Morin für die

[46] Sermo Mai 17 steht dem entsprechenden Abschnitt aus den Enarrationes in Psalmos näher, weil in beiden Texten die Zuhörer aufgefordert werden, eigene Schuld nicht auf das Fatum oder den Teufel abzuwälzen.

[47] Zu diesem Sermonar s. Dolbeau (o. Anm. 4); A. Häse, Mittelalterliche Bücherverzeichnisse aus Kloster Lorsch. Einleitung, Edition und Kommentar, Wiesbaden 2003 (Beiträge zum Buch- und Bibliothekswesen 42), 136 (Ca 183).

[48] Dolbeau (o. Anm. 4) 271 und 277.

[49] Die Identifikation von Nummer II mit In psalm. 49 hatte schon F. Dolbeau in REAug 43 (1997), 403 und Francia 31/1 (2004), 302 vorgeschlagen.

[50] Relativ wenige Predigten der Collectio Bobbiensis können durch andere Traditionszweige als – nach Evidenz der Überlieferungslage – vollständig erwiesen werden: B12 (sermo 309); B15 (sermo 369); B16 (sermo 202); B22 (sermo Denis 9); B26 (sermo 98); B28 (sermo 86); B29 (sermo 8 auct.). Der Text dieser Predigten ist in der Collectio Bobbiensis oft von besserer Qualität als in anderen Handschriften; vgl. die Editionen von sermo 8 auct. (CCL 41, 79-99), sermo 369 (RBen 79 [1969], 124-128) und sermo Denis 9 (CCL 41, 378-380). Bei einigen noch nicht kritisch edierten Predigten wird der Vat. lat. 5758 wesentlich zur Verbesserung des Texts beitragen. In sermo 86 bestätigt B alle von Dolbeau (o. Anm. 22) 14 anhand der Sammlung Mainz-Lorsch vorgebrachten Korrekturen; weitere zwingende substantielle Textverbesserungen durch B sind: §8 (PL 38, 526, 59): ipsa *consilia* (edd.: *contraria*) *discute*; §9 (527, 14): *discute* (edd.: *dicat*) *etiam consequentia*; §11 (528, 11): *in hac infirmitate consentit* (edd.: *consistit*) *tibi dominus*; §13 (529, 8): *ne casus humanos commendans* (om. edd.) *uidear ominari* (edd.: *minari*; vgl. epist. 126, 4: *ne male nos ominari uideremur*).

anderen Sermones Mai geäußerte Verdacht[51] ist auch dem bisher nicht berücksichtigten Sermo Mai 10 entgegenzubringen und gründet auf folgenden Argumenten: Erstens impliziert der für eine Augustinuspredigt geringe Textumfang, dass die Predigt stark gekürzt ist.[52] Zweitens zeigen der für Augustinus untypische Beginn (*bene scitis, fratres*) und das anschließende Rufinzitat, dass der Beginn der Predigt unter Verwendung fremder Elemente erstellt wurde.[53] Entsprechend der (oben zu B7, B17 und B19) beobachteten Exzerpttechnik ist zu folgern, dass Sermo Mai 10 nicht den Beginn des (verlorenen) Originaltexts wiedergibt, sondern an einer späteren Stelle der Originalpredigt einsetzt. Drittens setzen einige Motive, die in der vorliegenden Fassung unvermittelt begegnen, voraus, dass sie im verlorenen Anfangsteil der Originalpredigt vorbereitet wurden.[54] Und zuletzt ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass der Schlussteil in der vorliegenden Form nicht von Augustinus stammen kann. Ob er vom Kompilator mit eigenen Worten formuliert wurde und in welchem Ausmaß augustinisches oder anderes fremdes Material eingearbeitet und umgestaltet wurde, ist nicht auszumachen. Der Hauptteil geht mit Sicherheit auf eine verlorene Predigt Augustins

[51] Morin (o. Anm. 2) 281.

[52] Die Kürze von Sermo Mai 10 scheint einen frühmittelalterlichen Benutzer der Handschrift aus Bobbio zu einer Glosse veranlasst zu haben: zwischen dem Titel und dem Text findet sich eine aus vier tironischen Noten bestehende Bemerkung: *bona et breuis* (p. 98). Ähnliche Notizen finden sich zur vorangehenden Predigt (A19; p. 95): *breuis et bona* und zu Sermo Mai 16 (B5; p. 134): *breuis et bona ubi dicit de humilitate et confessione*. Einige andere Stellen der Handschrift sind durch die Notiz *utilis* (p. 88) bzw. *utilis ad legendum* (p. 191. 211. 236. 277) markiert. – Für die Entzifferung der tironischen Noten und zahlreiche wertvolle Hinweise bin ich Martin Hellmann (München/Wertheim) zu großem Dank verpflichtet. Zu den tironischen Noten der zwei Bobbienser Augustinushandschriften Vat. lat. 5757 und 5758 s. M. Hellmann – C. Weidmann, Utilis ad legendum. Ironische Noten in zwei Augustinushandschriften aus Bobbio, Scriptorium 65 (2011), in Druck.

[53] Die Überleitung vom einleitenden Rufinzitat zum augustinischen Hauptteil mit *et tamen* erfolgt etwas abrupt; der Kontext des ersten Satzes ist vermutlich durch die Exzerpierung gestört (man beachte die lange Parataxe durch *et*). Dass dem Kompilator Rufins Übersetzungen der Homilien des Origenes zum Heptateuch bekannt waren, geht daraus hervor, dass er Rufins 8. Homilie zur Genesis in die Sammlung aufnahm (B19 = Sermo Mai 23). – Zum Beginn vgl. auch Sermo Mai 15 (B4): *omnis anima quae intenta cantat uoce*.

[54] Die erste Nennung des Psalms (1, 8: *psalmi huius*) und der armen Witwe (2, 11) überrascht den Leser von Sermo Mai 10. Beide Bibeltexte sind den Zuhörern der augustinischen Originalpredigt entweder aus dem verlorenen Anfangsteil oder aus dem Psalmengesang bzw. der Evangelienlesung bekannt; eine (verlorene) Predigt zur Evangelienperikope ist im Indic. X[6]. 86 (*de euangelio ubi dominus interrogat Iudaeos cuius dicerent Christum esse filium et de uidua illa quae misit duo minuta in gazofilacium*) genannt, kann aber kaum die Vorlage für Sermo Mai 10 gewesen sein. – Wenn das Wort *tineae* richtig überliefert ist (2, 15), ist der Sinn ebenfalls wegen der Kürzung verdunkelt.

zurück.[55] Er scheint zwar „aus einem Guss“ zu sein; dennoch sind auch hier Eingriffe eines Kompilators wie z.B. Kürzungen, Umstellungen oder Einfügungen anderer Textteile nicht auszuschließen.

Conspectus siglorum

B = Vat. lat. 5758, s. VII in., pp. 98-100
P = Paris, BN lat. 792, s. XI, ff. 62v2-63r1
Mai = A. Mai, Nova Patrum Bibliotheca 1, Romae 1852, 19-20
PLS = Patrologiae Latinae Supplementum 2, 1123-1124

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[55] Wenn diese Predigt je gefunden werden sollte, wäre sie hinter Sermo Mai 17 (= Sermo 16B) als Sermo 16C in das System von Verbraken (o. Anm. 17) einzuordnen.

DE PSALMO XL

1. Bene scitis, fratres, quoniam unaquaque anima quotiens peccauerit, totiens uulneratur, et tamen dignatus est dominus noster Iesus Christus inclinare caelos et descendere ad terras, ut hominem colonum terrae migraret ad caelos, et cum ipse patria sit, uiam fecit ad patriam, quia ipse est medicus, ipse medicina. Anima enim se ipsam uulnerare potuit, sanare non potuit, et quod peius, sana medicum contempsit. Nunc rogat aegrota; si tamen rogat, si tamen ut phrenetica agnoscit medicum suum! Roget humilis, quem contempsit superba! Si ergo *B 99*

1, 2–3 inclinare … terras] *cf.* Ps. 17, 10; Ps. 143, 5

1, 1–2 anima … uulneratur] *cf.* Orig. Num. hom. 8, 1 (GCS 29, 51, 25): anima quotiens peccat, totiens uulneratur (= Caes. Arel. serm. 108, 3, 18); *cf.* Prv. 8, 36: qui autem in me peccauerit laedet animam suam (= Aug. spec. 7 [54, 8]); Ez. 18, 4 (*cf.* 18, 20): anima quae peccauerit ipsa morietur **3** descendere] *cf.* serm. 87, 13 (PL 38, 537, 56): descendit omnipotens medicus | ut … caelos] *cf.* Ps.-Aug. serm. Caillau II app. 22, 1 (PLS 2, 1116, 34; *cf.* Max. serm. 45 [spur.], 3): caelorum et habitator et conditor habitauit in terris, ut homo colonus terrae migraret ad caelos **3–4** et[2] … patriam] *cf.* Aug. doct. chr. 1, 11, 9: cum ergo ipsa sit patria, uiam se quoque nobis fecit ad patriam; serm. 92 (PL 38, 573, 40): ipse est patria quo imus, ipse uia qua imus **4** quia … medicina] *cf.* doct. chr. 1, 14, 7; serm. 380, 2 (PL 39, 1676, 28): ut ergo generis humani istum tumorem sanaret ipse medicus, ipse medicina, non solum medicamentum adhibens **5** anima … potuit[2]] *cf.* serm. 278, 1 (PL 38, 1269, 16): nam se ipsa uulnerare potuit, sanare non potuit; serm. 20 (CC 41, 10): sicut enim ipsam carnem nostram percutere et uulnerare cum uolumus possumus, ut autem sanetur medicum quaerimus, nec ita nostra potestate sanamur ut nostra potestate sauciamur, ita et ad peccandum anima sibi ipsa sufficit, ad sanandum autem quod peccando laeserit dei medicinalem dexteram implorat (+ Ps. 40, 5) | quod peius] *cf.* in psalm. 48 serm. 1, 1, 20; Caes. Arel. serm. 17, 4, 12: nos uero, quod peius est, aliquotiens diligimus morbum et contemnimus medicum **5–6** sana … rogat[2]] *cf.* in psalm. 70 serm. 2, 1, 58: quem contempserunt sani, rogant aegroti. Utinam saltem rogent!; in psalm. 40, 6, 21: non audiuit sanus medici praeceptum, ut non caderet; audiat uel aegrotus, ut surgat **6–7** si[2] … suum] *cf.* in evang. Ioh. 17, 15, 27: medicum non agnoscentibus et tamquam in phrenesi mente perdita occidere uolentibus; serm. 87, 14 (PL 38, 538, 18): si necdum medicum agnoscimus, non in eum tamquam phrenetici saeuiamus, non ab eo tamquam lethargici auertamur; serm. 175, 3 (PL 38, 946, 25): agnoscis phreneticos, agnosce et medicum **6–7** ut phrenetica agnoscit] *cf.* c. Faust. 22, 69: ut iudex agnoscit **7** roget … superba] *cf.* serm. 142, 2 (MiAg 1, 696, 3): discat (*sc.* anima) audire infirma illum quem contempsit incolumis

tit. de ... XL] incipit eiusdem de psalmo XL *B*; feria III sermo beati Augustini *P*; de psalmo 40 *PLS* **1, 1** bene] XX *praem. B* | unaquaque] unaquaeque *P Mai PLS* **3** migraret] faceret migrare *P* **4** patria] -i- *sl. B* | ipse[3]] est *add. P* **6** contemsit *B Mai PLS* | ut] ui *Mai PLS* frenetica *P* **7** contemsit *B Mai PLS*

agnoscis aegritudinem tuam, accipe potionem psalmi huius et aperi *os cordis et bibe quod audis; concorda lingua cum corde tuo, ne sis perstrepens uocibus et mutus moribus. Dic ergo de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta: *Ego dixi, domine, miserere mei, sana animam meam, quoniam peccaui tibi.* Ille qui inclinauit caelos et descendit, quaesiuit te antequam eum quaereres, attulit tibi medicamentum carnem suam. Si solliciti in peregrinatione ambulamus, remedium salutis quaeramus.

2. Sed fortasse aliquis dicat: « Pauper sum. Non habeo quod medico offeram. » *Non enim quaero quae uestra sunt* dicit apostolus, *sed uos.* Si enim uiduam

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10 de … ficta] *cf.* 1 Tim. 1, 5 **11** Ps. 40, 5 **12** inclinauit … descendit] *cf.* Ps. 17, 10; Ps. 143, 5 **13** solliciti … ambulamus] *cf.* Mich. 6, 8 | peregrinatione ambulamus] *cf.* 2 Cor. 5, 6–7 **2, 2** 2 Cor. 12, 14 | uiduam] *cf.* Marc. 12, 41–44; Luc. 21, 1–4

8–9 accipe … audis] *cf.* in psalm. 36 serm. 1, 3, 14: qui ergo sic aegrotat, ut ista dicat in corde suo, bibat potionem psalmi huius. ... accipe, bibe: ipse tibi hanc, de quo ista murmuras, temperauit potionem; tantum ne recuses saluberrimum poculum; accommoda per aurem os cordis, et bibe quod audis (+ Ps. 36, 1–2) **9** concorda … tuo] *cf.* in psalm. 95, 11, 7: cantas mecum et non concordas mecum. Lingua tua sonat quod sonat mea, et cor tuum dissonat a corde meo; serm. 9, 4 (CC 41, 187): cum lingua tua discordas, mecum concorditer quomodo uiuere poteris?; serm. 256, 1 (PL 38, 1190, 49): concordent ergo prius in nobis ipsis lingua cum uita, os cum conscientia **9–10** ne … moribus] *cf.* serm. 88, 12 (RBen 94, 86, 310): hoc dico, fratres, ne forte simus strepentes uocibus et muti moribus; serm. Dolbeau 26, 1 (366, 3): ne sit lingua perstrepens corde muto **10** dic … corde] *cf.* Caes. Arel. serm. 59, 5, 1: dic ergo deuoto corde, quod dixi paulo ante: ego dixi domine miserere mei **12** quaesiuit … quaereres] *cf.* in psalm. 69, 6, 9: quos prior quaesisti antequam quaererent te; in psalm. 127, 8, 51: quando quaesiuit nos antequam quaereremus eum; in psalm. 138, 14, 36: quia quaesiuit uos antequam quaereretis eum, et inuenit uos ut inueniretis eum **13** medicamentum … suam] *cf.* in evang. Ioh. 3, 6, 12: hoc enim quod uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis medicamentum nobis factum est; serm. Dolbeau 23, 23 (614, 552): medicus quia uerbum, medicamentum quia uerbum caro factum; *cf.* Martin (supra adn. 11) 225. 256 **2, 1** pauper … habeo] *cf.* in psalm. 61, 16, 18: pauper sum, non habeo; serm. Lambot 9 (PLS 2, 791, 8): nemo dicat: non habeo unde, pauper sum; serm. Lambot 4 (PLS 2, 767, 1): nemo dicat: pauper sum **2** non … uos] *cf.* epist. 185, 9 (32, 23); serm. 37, 20 (CC 41, 444); c. Gaud. 1, 37, 50 | dicit apostolus] *cf.* serm. 46, 22 (CC 41, 566); serm. Mai 87, 3 (MiAg 1, 329, 13); serm. 367, 1 (PL 39, 1651, 14); serm. Dolbeau 21, 9 (287, 288)

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8 os (*cf. in psalm. 36 serm. 1, 3, 17*) *scripsi*; oculos *BPMai PLS* **9** linguam *P* **11** peccauit *B*(*ac.*) **12** inclina *P*(*in fine lineae*) **13** carnem] -e- *ex* a *B* **14** salutis *om. Mai PLS* **2, 1** offeram] afferam *fortasse melius* (*cf. 1, 12*: attulit; *serm. Lambot 4 [PLS 2, 767, 19]*: quid habes affer); *sed cf. in psalm. 50, 7, 5*: medicus est: offer mercedem

non potes imitari, saltem calicem aquae frigidae da; frigidam enim iussit medicus, ne de ligno causeris. Postremo imitare latronem: omnia membra fixa habebat, lingua sola ei restiterat, ut apostoli sententia impleretur: *Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit in salutem.* Modico membro confessus est et grandi uoluntate liberatus. Non dixit: *Ego dixi, domine*, sed dixit: *Meminto mei, domine.* Ergo ut meminerit nostri dominus, sit in nobis bona uoluntas. Demus potum aquae frigidae, quia dictum est: *Quicumque uni ex minimis meis dederit, mihi dedit: et qui non dederit uni ex minimis meis, mihi non dedit.* Demus nummum sicut illa uidua omnem substantiam suam ad gazophylacium

B 100

3 saltem … da] *cf.* Matth. 10, 42 4 latronem] *cf.* Luc. 23, 39–43 5–6 Rom. 10, 10 6 modico membro] *cf.* Iac. 3, 5 7–8 memento … domine] Luc. 23, 42 9–10 quicumque … dedit[2]] *cf.* Matth. 25, 40. 45; Matth. 10, 42; *cf. e.g.* serm. Lambot 4 (PLS 2, 766) 11 omnem … suam] *cf.* Luc. 8, 43; 1 Cor. 13, 3 (iuxta Aug.)

3 saltem … da] *cf.* in psalm. 49, 13, 9: sed non habes facultatem frangendi panem, non habes domum quo inducas, non habes uestem qua cooperias: da calicem aquae frigidae, mitte duo minuta in gazophylacium 3–4 frigidam … medicus] *cf.* in epist. Ioh. 6 (PL 35, 2024, 14): non enim non te exaudit medicus quando forte tu frigidam aquam petis et si prodest, statim dat; si non prodest, non dat 4 ne … causeris] *cf.* in psalm. 125, 12, 10: ideo dixit: calicem aquae frigidae, ne quis uel inde causaretur quod lignum non habuerit unde calefaceret aquam; serm. Lambot 1 (PLS 2, 747, 1): quid uilius calice aquae et hoc frigidae, ne uel ligna emere cogeretur?; serm. Lambot 5 (PLS 2, 776, 24): iam calix aquae frigidae quantum ualet quo nec lignum erogatum est ut ferueret?; serm. Lambot 4 (PLS 2, 767, 32): puto ideo addidit frigidae ne ligna te conturbarent; Caes. Arel. serm. 199, 3, 3: et quare frigidae dixit? ne forte se posset aliquis pauper de lignorum penuria excusare, aut certe diceret se uasculum ubi aquam calefaceret non habere; Hier. Matth. 1, 10 (PL 26, 69–70) = Beda in Marc. 3, 9, 434: frigidae, inquit, aquae non calidae ne et in calida paupertatis et penuriae lignorum occasio quaereretur 4–6 omnia … salutem] *cf.* qu. Simpl. 1, 2, 19 (CC 44, 49, 657; = Cassiod. in Rom. 10 [PL 68, 485, 11]): qua consummatione atque breuitate latro iustificatus est, qui defixis in cruce omnibus membris et habens libera haec duo (*sc.* os et cor) corde credidit ad iustitiam, ore confessus est ad salutem; in psalm. 39, 15, 22: erat ille confixus omnibus membris; ... corpus illud non uacabat ceteris membris, lingua uacabat et cor, corde credidit, ore confessus est; *cf.* Greg. mor. 18, 40, 96 (= Beda in Luc. 6, 23, 1683) 5–6 ut … salutem] *cf.* serm. 2, 9 (CC 41, 238): et impletur sententia dicentis apostoli: arbitramur iustificari hominem per fidem sine operibus legis. Latro qui cum domino crucifixus est corde credidit ad iustitiam, ore confessus est ad salutem; in psalm. 34 serm. 1, 14, 10; bapt. 4, 22, 29; ibid. 4, 23, 30; ibid. 4, 24, 31 6–7 confessus … liberatus] *cf.* serm. Denis 20, 6 (CC 41, 178): confessa est et liberata est 7 grandi uoluntate] *cf.* in psalm. 125, 11, 20: in Zacchaeo magna uoluntas, in Zacchaeo caritas magna

3 emitari *B* (*ac.*) 4 emitari *B* (*ac.*) 5 restiterat] -t[3] *sl. B* | impleretur … 6 iustitiam *mg. B* 9 potum] calicem *fortasse addendum* (*cf. Matth. 10, 42*) 11 sicut] sicuti *P* | gazofylacium *B*; gazophilacium *P*

posuit. Damnemus in quadruplo peccata nostra cum pecunia sicut et Zachaeus. Si non habemus et sumus parui, ut efficiamur magni, ascendamus in arborem sicut Zachaeus, ut Christum uideamus. Nemo enim uidet Christum, nisi lignum crucis ascenderit. Discutiamus conscientias nostras, ne quid ibi *uitii, ne ‹quid› irae et inuidiae inueniamus; accendamus lucernam uerbi, ne quid ibi perfidiae, ne quid confusionis reperiamus, ut uere et ex corde dicamus: *Quoniam tu euelles de laqueo pedes meos*. Per Christum dominum nostrum.

12 damnemus … Zachaeus] *cf.* Luc. 19, 8 **13–14** ascendamus … uideamus] *cf.* Luc. 19, 3*sq*. **16** accendamus … uerbi] *cf.* Ps. 118, 105 **16–17** accendamus … reperiamus] *cf.* Ps. 131, 17*sq*. **17–18** Ps. 24, 15

12 damnemus … Zachaeus] *cf.* Arnob. in Luc. 11, 215: nam adeo Zachaeus statura pusillus erat, qui fidem necdum habuerat; ideo nec Christum uidere poterat, nisi in arborem ascenderet, hoc est postquam crucis fide, per quam credentes exaltantur, merito credens medium quae possidebat donauit **14** lignum] *cf.* serm. 14, 2 (CC 41, 38); serm. Lambot 1 (PLS 2, 746, 31); serm. 174, 3 (PL 38, 941, 47) **15** discutiamus conscientias] *cf.* in psalm. 64, 7, 27: interrogemus conscientias nostras **15–17** discutiamus … reperiamus] *cf.* Leo serm. 39, 5 (CC 138A, 151): interna discutiat, uideat ne quid ibi discordiae inhaeserit, ne quid cupiditatis insederit **17** et … dicamus] *cf.* serm. Lambot 24, 10 (CC 41, 195) **17–18** quoniam … meos] *cf.* Caes. Arel. serm. 41, 5, 31

12 Zacheus *B* (Iaeceus *ac.*) *P* **13** arborem] arbore *P* (i *praem. ac.*) **14** sicuti *P* | Iaccheus *B* (Iaceus *ac.*) **15** quid[1]] quit *B* (*ac.*) | uitii ne quid *scripsi*; tineae (*cf. Matth. 6, 19sq.*) *B P edd* **16** quit *B* (*ac.*) **17** quit *B* (*ac.*) | repperiamus *B Mai PLS* **18** meos] meo *Mai* nostrum] cui est honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum amen *add. P*

AD CHRISTIANAM FIDEM PIGRIUS MOVEBATUR: (*CONF.* VII.XX(25)) ALYPIUS' MORE RELUCTANT MOVE TO THE CHRISTIAN FAITH (COMPARED TO AUGUSTINE)

(continuation and end)

Part 2. Between conversion and baptism

Abstract

This second part investigates Alypius' understanding of his conversion to the Catholic faith between his conversion moment and baptism. Alypius' contributions in the *Cassiciacum dialogues* – for instance, his defence of the sceptic position, and his belief in the *auctoritas Ciceronis* – suggest that he was still very much moving within the context of traditional Roman ideology, having not yet fully grasped the radical nature of Augustine's conversion. Alypius' rejection of the latter's Christian interpretation of *Fortuna*'s role (as *gratia Dei*) in man's life, and his resistance against including the name of Christ in their writings are further signs that he was reluctant to fully submit to the Catholic faith. Only towards the end of the Cassiciacum stay – presumably after having been further instructed by Augustine – Alypius seems to have become humble enough to do so, and to decide on baptism within the Catholic church.

The strong hold traditional ideology had on Augustine's friends, but also on himself, can be witnessed in how he tried to persuade his non-Catholic friends to follow his example. He thereby propagated his new Christian way of life as the final realization of an earlier failed attempt to live together in philosophy (*otium liberale*). Initially, he wanted to set up a kind of Christian philosophical community of likeminded friends in the intellectual milieu of Milan. This plan failed, mainly because of lack of (financial) resources, seeing that none of his friends (apart from Alypius, and later Evodius) could be persuaded to participate in it.

Introduction

In a previous article,[1] Alypius' commitment to the Catholic faith has been scrutinized up until his conversion moment in a garden in

[1] See *Augustiniana* 59(2009)1-2, 191-225. What follows is a short summary of its findings.

Milan. The agreement the two friends made involved moral reform – renouncing secular ambitions and embracing a life of continence – but also commitment to the Catholic Church, even though Alypius' faith was still weak. Both men decided there and then to become ascetic *christiani*, following the example of Antony and the two friends in the garden of Trier. When they informed Augustine's mother Monnica about what had happened, the emphasis was once more on the rupture with their worldly life, but Augustine must have made it also clear to her that he soon wished to receive baptism. He expressed this in a very personal manner, by way of referring to his mother's dream, which the reader encountered earlier on in book III of *Confessiones*.[2] Because of the highly personal character of this comment, nothing can (or ought to) be deduced with certainty from this regarding Alypius' adherence to the Catholic faith at his conversion moment. The provisional conclusion was that, at first, Alypius may not have fully shared Augustine's strong commitment to the Catholic faith, which included submission to baptism, even though the two friends "*jointly made a good resolution and affirmation of intention*"[3] at their conversion, and despite the fact that Alypius was baptized together with Augustine the following Easter.

This second part focuses on the fascinating period between Alypius' (and Augustine's) conversion moment and baptism (August 386 – April 387). With the information supplied in book IX of *Confessiones* and in the *Cassiciacum dialogues* evidence will be gathered to support the thesis that, after his conversion, Alypius still needed further instruction and guidance about the kind of (Christian) life they had actually entered upon, and the role of the Catholic faith within it.

Firstly, Alypius' conversion will be placed in its wider (social) context, by examining the reaction of other friends to their conversion. Secondly, we will take a closer look at the way in which Augustine presented his new way of life to a broader audience in the *Cassiciacum dialogues*, assuming that this may well have been similar to the way in which he had conveyed it to Alypius. Thirdly, in order to get a better idea of his religious and philosophical mind-set at the time, we will focus on some of the contributions Alypius made during the discussions held at Cassiciacum. Finally, we will return briefly to *Confessiones* to assess the information about Alypius' (eventual?) decision to receive baptism.

[2] *Conf.* III.xi(19-20).
[3] Conf. VIII.xii(29): "placitoque ac proposito bono [...] coniunctus est".

1. Informing and persuading his close family and friends

Augustine did not immediately go public with his radical plan to quit his teaching profession: worried about a negative response he decided to await the *uindemiales feriae* before handing in his resignation.[4] Even then he was glad to use his poor health as a legitimate pretext.[5] Initially, the two new converts, Augustine and Alypius, informed only their intimate circle of friends and relatives about their radical change in life.[6] We can deduce from Augustine's comment that even from them they met with considerable opposition:

> tu nobis a conualle plorationis ascendentibus et cantantibus canticum graduum dederas sagittas acutas et carbones uastatores aduersus linguam subdolam, uelut consulendo contradicentem et, sicut cibum adsolet, amando consumentem.[7]
> *to us who were climbing out of the valley of tears and singing a song of steps, you had given sharp arrows and destroying coals to answer any deceitful tongue, which in seemingly offering helpful advice actually opposes us, and in offering love devours us in the way people consume food.*

In all likelihood, his friends and relatives did not want him to throw away an already successful career now that even greater honours were within his reach: after all, they themselves would be the first to

[4] *Conf.* IX.v(13). This seems to be in contradiction with *Conf.* IX.iv(7)), where he said he was liberated from his profession with the arrival of the Vintage Vacation (22 August – 15 October). Here, I believe, Augustine means that once the term was over and the vacation started, he knew this would be the end of his teaching profession, without actually officially handing in his resignation, which, according to *Conf.* IX.v(13), happened only towards the end of the vacation.

[5] *Conf.* IX.ii(4); IX.v(13). *De academicis* I.i(3), *De beata vita* i(4), *De ordine* I.ii(5). This way, he would not have to deal with his students' (wealthy) parents, who must have been irritated because he suddenly abandoned his teaching responsibilities towards their sons, seemingly without a compelling reason. Note that it would indeed make sense that first, Augustine would (pretend to) wait and see whether his poor condition would not improve after this period of rest, before officially handing in his resignation on the grounds of ill-health at the end of the vacation.

[6] *Conf.* IX.ii(2): "consilium ergo nostrum erat coram te, coram hominibus autem nisi nostris non erat". ("*Our plan was formed with your knowledge but was not publicly known, except to our intimate circle*").

[7] *Conf.* IX.ii (2), and further (*Conf.* IX. iii(3)): "*They [i.e. the examples given by God's servants] set me on fire with such force that every breath of opposition from 'any deceitful tongue'* [ex lingua subdola] *had the power not to dampen my zeal but to inflame it the more*". Henry Chadwick (1998, p. 34) perceptively links these words to the famous pear theft episode, where Augustine is aware of the dangers of friendship: "o nimis inimica amicitia, seductio mentis inuestigabilis" "*Friendship can be a dangerous enemy, a seduction of the mind lying beyond any reach of investigation*" (*Conf.* II.x(17)).

profit from his further worldly success.[8] They also may have been uneasy about the fact that he had converted to his childhood religion: several of his friends were still sympathetic to Manichaeism, a religious sect which mocked the – in their eyes – naïveté of Catholic Christianity.[9] Augustine says nothing further about what must have been for him an unpleasant affair, but he does provide us with some details concerning the reaction of two close friends, who were also friends of Alypius: Verecundus and Nebridius. Their response can help us place Alypius' conversion within their (social) context.

Verecundus, a local grammar teacher, was very much taken aback by the news, and Augustine uses strong wording to describe his reaction: *macerabatur anxitudine*, meaning he was "*violently upset*", or "*chewed up with worry*".[10] Verecundus, although realizing he was about to lose the companionship of two close friends, felt himself unable to follow their example. He could not become a *christianus*, Augustine explains, because of his marital status, even though his wife was a baptized believer (*fidelis*):

> nondum christianus, coniuge fidei, ea ipsa tamen artiore prae ceteris compede ab itinere quod aggressi eramus retardabatur, nec christianum esse alio modo se uelle dicebat quam illo quo non poterat.[11]

[8] We find this indirectly expressed in *Soliloquies* (I.xi(18)) where Augustine admits he might pursue further worldly honours so that his friends may obtain them as well, if this was their pre-condition to join his philosophical project.

[9] Augustine's reading of David's psalms at Cassiciacum, in which his comments were directed very much against the Manichees must have been about the many Manichaean friends, who scorned his return to the "naïve" Catholic faith of his mother. That Augustine was concerned about these friends, and wanted to convert them is shown by his book *De uera religione* (390/391, written to convert Romanianus), *De utilitate credendi* (391/392 in order to convert Honoratus), and *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et De moribus Manichaeorum* (388/389). Nevertheless, I think that his friends' criticism must have been mainly about his intention to resign from office, also because Augustine may have emphasized this aspect of his conversion, taking into consideration the way he presented his conversion in the Cassiciacum dialogues (see further).

[10] *Conf.* IX.iii(5).

[11] Colin Starnes (1990, p. 268, n. 26) remarks: "Augustine does not make it clear if Verecundus was 'held back' by his wife because he wanted her, or she him". Serge Lancel (2002, p. 99) thinks that Augustine wrote this not without a touch of mischief, whereby Verecundus was using this impossibility for him to lead an ascetic life (as a Christian), as an excuse for not becoming a *christianus* at all. Possibly Verecundus' wife would have opposed the idea that her husband would abandon his teaching post to join Augustine's and Alypius' little community, even if this would have meant that he would become a *christianus*; she probably was one of those *mulierculae* who would have resented the group's earlier plans to live together a life in (philosophical)

He was not yet a Christian, while his wife was a baptized believer. Yet, fettered by her more than anything else, he was held back from the journey on which we had embarked. He used to say that he did not wish to be a Christian except in the way which was not open to him.

Verecundus kindly offered them the temporary use of his *rus Cassiciacum* as a place to start their new lives, a deed which should be considered an act of Roman *humanitas* rather than Christian charity, according to Colin Starnes.[12] A year or two later, he, too, became a baptized Christian, albeit only *in articulo mortis* (i.e. on his death bed) just like Augustine's father Patricius.[13]

Whereas Verecundus was greatly disturbed by the news, Nebridius was pleased about it.[14] In those days, the three friends Augustine, Alypius and Nebridius were living together in the same house.[15] Moreover, Nebridius was already leading an exemplary chaste life.[16] He had travelled all the way from Carthage to Milan, for the sole purpose of being with Augustine, so that together they could search for truth.[17] As will become clear when discussing the Cassiciacum retreat, the fact that Nebridius was an ardent searcher of truth, even more so than Alypius, must have made him particularly suitable to join Augustine's new way of life.[18] In Milan, he was careful not to

leisure (*Conf.* VI. xiv (24)) (see further). Whether Augustine himself would have been prepared to become a *christianus* while remaining within his teaching profession (as Victorinus did(!)) and marry his fiancée is highly questionable, even though this was the kind of life his mother Monnica had arranged for him.

[12] Colin Starnes 1990, p. 250. So also Marie Aquinas McNamara, *Friendship in saint Augustine* (Studia Friburgensia N.S. 20) (Fribourg: The university press, 1958), p. 80.

[13] Conf. IX.iii(5) and IX.ix(22).

[14] *Conf.* IX.iii(6): "angebatur ergo tunc ipse, Nebridius autem conlaetabatur".

[15] *Conf.* VI.x(17) and VIII.vi(13).

[16] *Conf.* IV.iii(6): "carissimus meus Nebridius, adulescens ualde bonus et ualde castus". He therefore did not face the insurmountable obstacle the married Verecundus was confronted with, nor did he have to go through the terrible struggle Augustine went through during his conversion crisis in order to embrace a chaste life.

[17] *Conf.* VI.x(17): "nullam ob aliam Mediolanium uenerat, nisi ut mecum uiueret in flagrantissimo studio ueritatis atque sapientiae". James J. O'Donnell (1992, II, p. 369-370) aptly remarks on *ueritatis atque sapientiae*: "The phrase both reports their aim and hints at the manner of its fulfilment. The friends search, both knowing and not knowing what it is they seek, not seeing the (to A[ugustine] of 397, ineluctable) epithets of Christ in these words".

[18] See *Conf.* VI.x(17): "beatae uitae inquisitor ardens et quaestionum difficillimarum scrutator acerrimus" (*"an ardent investigator of the happy life and a very gifted examiner of the most perplexing questions"*). The difference between Alypius and Nebridius is well brought out by Colin Starnes (1990, p. 156-157).

become too well known, so that enough leisure would remain at his disposal for the pursuit of wisdom. Only out of friendship did he take on the task of assisting Verecundus in his teaching job, but still

> uolebat habere liberum et quam multi posset horis feriatum ad quaerendum aliquid uel legendum uel audiendum de sapientia.[19]
> *he wanted to keep his mind free and to devote as many hours as possible to the pursuit of wisdom either by investigating some problem or by listening to conversation.*

Consequently, next to Alypius, Nebridius must have been the most likely to follow Augustine's example, and yet, however much Augustine hoped that his friend would join him, Nebridius in the end decided not to.[20]

In *Confessiones* (IX. iii(6)) Augustine focuses once more on the Christian aspect:

> quamuis enim et ipse nondum christianus in illam foueam perniciosissimi erroris inciderat ueritatis filii tui carnem phantasmata crederet, tamen inde emergens sic sibi erat, nondum imbutus ullis ecclesiae tuae sacramentis, sed inquisitor ardentissimus ueritatis.[21]
> *Even though he himself was not yet a Christian – he had fallen into that ditch of pernicious error, which taught him to believe that the flesh of Your Son, the Truth, was illusory – nevertheless, he was emerging from this to the attitude that, even though he was not yet initiated into any of the sacraments of your Church, he was an ardent seeker after truth.*

Augustine concedes that, like Verecundus, Nebridius was not (yet) a *christianus*. Even though Nebridius was the first to spot a weakness in the Manichaean belief system,[22] he still seems to have been influenced by some of its tenets in August 386, so that he could not

[19] *Conf.* VIII.vi(13). This in contrast to Augustine, whose many obligations greatly encroached upon his free time *Conf.* VI.xi(18).

[20] *Conf.* IX.iii(6). This reminds somewhat of Augustine's inner struggle: he, too, came close to embracing a chaste life, but at the same time remained in doubt almost to an unbearable suspense. Unlike Augustine, Nebridius' struggle ended in an anti-climax, since in the end he decided not to join them after all. The letters between these two men attest how greatly Augustine missed his friend at Cassiciacum. On their correspondence, see Georges Folliet (1987). John J. Gavigan (1946, p. 51) believes that "Nebridius was anxious to go along with the company, but he was prevented from doing so, for Verecundus had demanded of their common friendship that Nebridius should assist him in the teaching of grammar at Milan". This puts Verecundus in a bad light, but on the other hand, Nebridius probably left Milan only after Verecundus died.

[21] *Conf.* IX.iii(6).

[22] *Conf.* VII.ii(3).

believe the Catholic understanding of Christ to be true. In choosing his words carefully here, Augustine gives the reader the impression that his friend stood closer to becoming a *christianus* than he actually may have been at the time: Nebridius was already emerging from the erroneous belief "ueritatis filii tui carnem phantasmata crederet" ("*that the flesh of truth, your son, was illusory*"),[23] and despite the fact he was not even a catechumen,[24] "sed inquisitor ardentissimus ueritatis" ("*but he was an ardent seeker after truth*").

By first tightly linking veritas with filius tuus, i.e. Christ, and then to state that Nebridius was an ardent searcher of veritas, Augustine is suggesting that Nebridius was already an ardent searcher of Christ [*Who is truth*], and thus on the brink of becoming a *christianus*.[25] But because Augustine admits that Nebridius was not even a catechumen at the time, it is not at all certain that he was trying to find truth within the Catholic faith![26]

The fact that he decided NOT to follow Augustine and Alypius could arguably be an indication that he was not yet prepared to make this crucial equation between Christ and (incarnate) truth.[27] Moreover,

[23] This was the heresy of Docetism. Henry Chadwick does not sufficiently bring out in his translation the fact that Nebridius was still in the process of ridding himself of Manichaean beliefs.

[24] Seeing that thus far he had not received any "sacraments" (A catechumen was someone who had received the sacraments of the cross on the forehead and the tasting of salt).

[25] The fact that he puts *ueritas* before *filius tuus*, where one should expect this the other way around, only highlights this connection.

[26] Actually, there is no indication whatsoever that his attitude had changed since book VI, where Augustine introduced him as simply an ardent searcher of truth (without believing Christ to be incarnate truth) (*Conf.* VI.x(16)); James J. O'Donnell makes this link (1992, III, p. 83).

[27] However, we should not reject out of hand another plausible reason why Nebridius did not join Augustine and Alypius at Cassiciacum: perhaps he did not wish to disappoint his friend Verecundus, who counted on him to continue assisting him in his grammar teaching in Milan, seeing that Verecundus did not join Augustine. Serge Lancel (2002, p. 490, n. 5) thinks Nebridius' teaching duties in Verecundus' school to be his alibi for not being at Cassiciacum. Nevertheless, he points out that even during the 'grape harvest vacation' (22 August – 15 October), which must have been a free period for Nebridius as well, there is no indication that he stayed with Augustine and Alypius. In a footnote Serge Lancel states that this total absence of reference to Nebridius continues to be disturbing, while a query remains over the Augustinian chronology of this period in 386. Indeed, the exact time of certain events remains uncertain: when exactly did Augustine hand in his resignation, when did he set out for Cassiciacum, and precisely when did he inform Ambrose about his intention to receive baptism? To have a correct chronology of these events would considerably help our understanding of this crucial period in Augustine's life.

half a year later, when the small group returned to Milan, and Augustine and Alypius enrolled themselves as *competentes* to prepare for baptism, Nebridius could still not bring himself to become a *christianus*, let alone a *fidelis*.[28] Perhaps he did not want to commit himself too rashly to any religion, and instead preferred to rely solely on his faculty of reason, considering his penchant for philosophy.[29] Only sometime later Nebridius decided to become a *christianus* as well, and to receive baptism.[30]

The end result of Augustine soliciting his intimate circle of friends to join his new life at Cassiciacum proved to be utterly disappointing: no other friend was found prepared to follow Augustine's and Alypius' decision to become an ascetic *christianus*, neither did any of their friends follow them to Cassiciacum, or join the two in baptism the following Easter.[31]

[28] *Conf.* IX.iii(6); *Conf.* IX.vi(14).

[29] Augustine, once realizing that Manichaean teaching proved to be false, and that the Catholic faith became more feasible, remained for some time reluctant to believe that the Catholic faith was the true religion: "*Just as it commonly happens that a person who has experienced a bad physician is afraid of entrusting himself to a good one, so it was with the health of my soul. While it could not be healed except by believing, it was refusing to be healed for fear of believing what is false*" (*Conf.* VI. iv(6)). Nebridius (and other friends as well) may have adopted the very same attitude towards the Catholic faith for quite some time. Such an uncommitted position would have been bolstered by the academics' (pessimistic) view on the attainability of truth.

[30] This was already after Augustine with his small group of followers had returned to Africa in late 388, where they set up a little community in his own house in Thagaste (*Conf.* IX.iii(6): "quam non multo post conuersionem nostram et regenerationem per baptismum tuum ipsum etiam fidelem catholicum, castitate perfecta atque continentia tibi seruientem in Africa apud suos." ("*Not much later after my conversion and regeneration by your baptism, he too became a baptized Catholic believer…….*"). We have to be careful in interpreting Augustine's "non multo post conversionem nostram". It remains problematic what Augustine exactly means with 'non multo post'. Even if Nebridius received baptism a year later, this might still seem to Augustine in 399 'non multo post conuersionem nostram'. Nebridius seems to have returned to Africa shortly after Verecundus' death. However, he did not travel to Thagaste to live together with Augustine and Alypius, but instead he returned to his own house in Carthage, where also his mother and brother lived. Attempts of Nebridius to persuade Augustine to come to his house in Carthage and *vice versa* came to nothing. A few years later (in 390?) Nebridius died. The correspondence between these two shows that Nebridius' insatiable inquisitiveness often concerned purely philosophical matters, sometimes to the frustration of Augustine, who did not want to spend too much time on these less important topics.

[31] The only other person who became a member of the little community built around Augustine was the already baptized Evodius, who happened to be also from Thagaste. He joined them in Milan, after Augustine's and Alypius' baptism (*Conf.* IX.viii(17)).

What can the reactions of these friends tell us about Alypius' conversion? Firstly, in book IX of *Confessiones*, Augustine focuses on the Christian element of their new lives, which confirms the idea that becoming a *christianus* constituted an essential part of their conversion. Secondly, even though conversion to Christianity stood central in the description of the reaction of his friends, the issue of baptism was nowhere raised.[32]

Thirdly, the fact that no one of their common group of friends, not even Verecundus or Nebridius, could be persuaded to join the two in their decision, shows that Alypius' resolution to become an ascetic *christianus* together with Augustine (probably by becoming a catechumen) should therefore already be considered a significant step, regardless of the fact whether he was actually prepared to commit himself to baptism or not.[33]

2. *"Ergo aggredere mecum philosophiam"*[34]

The dialogues inform us of how Augustine wished to present his new life to his (other) friends at the time.[35] One dialogue in particular is of interest here, for it shows how he tried to convert a relative of Alypius to their new way of life:[36] indeed, in *De academicis* (or

[32] This is understandable: many of Augustine's friends had a Manichaean past and therefore were most likely considerably sceptical of, if not hostile to, the Catholic faith, and certainly to the idea of receiving baptism, which Manichees considered to be a superfluous and useless external act.

[33] The important role Monnica must have played in Augustine's return to the Catholic fold is hereby underscored. That Augustine greatly missed his friends is palpable in his *Soliloquies* (I.ix.16). He dearly wanted to have them with him at Cassiciacum, so that together they could search for truth. At the same time, he was troubled by the very fact that their absence upset him so much: it meant that his happiness still depended on them being with him, so he still had some way to go to enjoy that true and unperturbed happiness he longed for. See also *Epistula* 3 to Nebridius, and especially *Epistula* 2 addressed to Zenobius, in which he states that true philosophy teaches to be self-reliant, but he himself is not there yet, since he is longing for his friend Zenobius, and hopes he himself is desired by him in return. Yet, he keeps striving to love nothing which can be absent from him against his will.

[34] *De academicis* II.ii(3): "*Come with me then to philosophy*".

[35] For instance, in *De ordine*, he writes in the introduction to Zenobius: "[...] qualemque uitam nos uiuamus charissimi tui, et quem fructum de liberali otio carpamus, hi te libris satis, ut opinior, edocebunt" ("*what manner of life we, your dearest friends, are now leading, and what fruit we are gathering from a cultured leisure, these books will, I believe, sufficiently show you*").

[36] Indeed, even at Cassiciacum Augustine did not cease soliciting his friends to join the little community he had set up there.

Contra academicos) Augustine tried to woo no one less than his patron Romanianus, a very wealthy citizen from his hometown Thagaste, into joining his small community at Cassiciacum.[37] The way in which Augustine presented his patron with his new direction in life somehow has to resemble the way in which he had communicated his conversion to Alypius in that fateful garden of Milan, and also how they afterwards informed their intimate circle of friends about it.

In *Confessiones* Augustine wished to emphasize – for understandable reasons – the religious dimension of his new life.[38] This is the only comment he makes there about the Cassiciacum dialogues:

> ibi quid egerim in litteris iam quidem seruientibus tibi, sed adhuc superbiae scholam tamquam in pausatione anhelantibus, testantur libri disputati cum praesentibus et cum ipso me solo coram te.[39]
> *What I put there in writing attest my discussions with those present and with myself alone before You, and while these books were indeed now written in Your service, they still breathe heavily the spirit of the school of pride, as if at a respite.*

In *De academicis* Augustine tries to persuade Romanianus to join them by presenting their break as a stay in the *portus philosophiae*, the harbour of philosophy: "*Come with me then, to philosophy*", he writes.[40] Here, the Christian dimension seems to be overshadowed by the concept of a traditional *otium (philosophandi)*, making his conversion seem to have been to philosophy rather than to the Catholic faith of his devoted mother. In *De ordine* he labels his new mode of life an *otium liberale*, a traditional way of retirement of the Roman elite in which one devoted oneself to study.[41] Only in his

[37] Romanianus had to be in Milan, because of a lawsuit (*De academicis* II.ii(6)).

[38] That is why he devotes a considerable paragraph on describing how moved he was when reading the psalms at Cassiciacum, and why he remembers also how God came to his aid when he was in agony because of toothache (*Conf.* IX.iv(8-12)).

[39] *Conf.* IX.iv(7); see also *Retractationes* praef. 3: "nec ille sane praetereo quae catechumenus iam, licet relicta spe quam terrenam gerebam, sed adhuc saecularium litterarum inflatus consuetudine scripsi". ("*Certainly, I will not pass over the things I wrote while still a catechumen – although I had given up the earthly prospects which I used to cherish, but was still puffed up with the usages of secular literature*"). Important to keep in mind is that these are criticisms made much later: at the time Augustine clearly saw nothing wrong in it.

[40] *De academicis* II.ii(3): "ergo aggredere mecum philosophiam". On the metaphor of *portus philosophiae* and its classical antecedents, see J. Oroz 1968.

[41] Dennis E. Trout (1988, p. 136) rightly states: 'Augustine conceptualized and publicized his life at Cassiciacum as a life in *otium*'.

Retractationes the Christian dimension of Cassiciacum surfaces again: there, he describes his stay as a *christianae uitae otium*.[42]

The difference in flavour between the *Confessiones* and the dialogues can be explained by the different situation in which these works were written. At Cassiciacum Augustine was known as the up and coming African professor who suddenly resigned from his municipal chair of rhetoric at Milan (due to health problems) when he was not yet 32 years old; by the time he wrote *Confessiones* (ca. 398) he was, already for a few years, the Catholic bishop of North-African Hippo. Needless to say, these changes in life inevitably also affected his view on (his) life. We should further bear in mind that *Confessiones* was such a unique and intimate account of Augustine's winding path to the Christian faith, that even Alypius may have been surprised by some of the things he read in this work.[43] Of utmost importance is the fact that the two works deal with a different audience: *Confessiones* was written for Christians[44] to stir up their hearts towards God; the dialogues, on the other hand, were primarily written for a broader circle of educated friends and contacts in Milan, of whom only a few must have been *christiani*. We should hereby constantly keep in mind that Augustine's excellent rhetorical skills made it his second nature to adapt his words and style to the kind of audience he was addressing, in order to get his message across as effectively as possible.

In the dialogues, Augustine closely links his current retreat to what he regarded to be his first conversion, when he read Cicero's *Hortensius* at the age of eighteen.[45] The basic link between his earlier conversion to philosophy and the one to the Catholic faith in the garden of Milan is certainly not absent in *Confessiones*, seeing that his intellectual search for truth formed the thread of his Odyssean journey to Christianity. This also explains why he looks back on this first conversion to philosophy, when his conversion moment to the Catholic faith draws near:

> quoniam multi mei anni mecum effluxerant (forte duodecim anni) ex quo ab undeuicesimo anno aetatis meae, lecto Ciceronis *Hortensio*, excitatus eram studio sapientiae et differebam felicitate terrena ad eam inuestigandam uacare.

[42] *Retractationes* I.i(1).

[43] The fact that Alypius was still alive when Augustine wrote his *Confessiones*, and that he had been a close witness of Augustine's road to conversion is a strong argument in favour of the truthfulness of his account.

[44] See *Conf.* X.iv(4)-(5).

[45] *Conf.* III.iv(7); James J. O'Donnell (1992, II, p. 167) rightly remarks that Augustine read Cicero at the age of eighteen, not nineteen, since Augustine writes: "annum aetatis undeuicesimum" ("*In my nineteenth year*").

> *Many years of my life had passed by – about twelve – since in my nineteenth year I had read Cicero's Hortensius, and had been stirred to a zeal for wisdom. But although I came to despise earthly joy, I put off giving time to the quest for wisdom.*[46]

Augustine's conversion to the Catholic faith was thus closely tied to his (philosophical) search for wisdom.[47]

This does not mean that at Cassiciacum the Christian dimension was entirely lacking, far from it! The heated controversy over whether Augustine had converted to (Neo-)Platonism rather than to the Christian faith, although this question has now been settled, has highlighted some undeniably Christian elements within the dialogues. Although few in number, they are often to be found at crucial places.[48] Romanianus is not just being encouraged to abandon his worldly life, and to join their life in philosophy, he is also expected to become a *christianus*. In order to convince him of the Catholic truth, Augustine is even prepared to send him another work, a commitment he fulfilled some years later with his magisterial *De uera religione* (ca. 390).[49] This puts Augustine's understanding of philosophy firmly within the confines of the Catholic faith, so that he can indeed rightly claim in *Confessiones* that these dialogues were written in the service of God.[50] The least one can say, however, is that, as a *christianus*, Augustine did not share bishop Ambrose's reticence towards (classical) philosophy.[51]

David Alexander rightly claims that the basic mode of the Cassiciacum stay did not originally come from any Christian source.[52] This may seem surprising, seeing that the (conversion) stories which triggered Augustine's conversion were all deeply Christian and not linked to any form of philosophy or *otium liberale*.[53]

[46] *Conf.*VIII.vii(17).

[47] In *De academicis* Augustine has chosen the very same book, the *Hortensius*, as reading material in order to stimulate the interest of his two private pupils in *studia sapientiae*, apparently with some success (*De academicis*, I.i(4)). The importance of the *Hortensius* is also emphasized in *Soliloquies* (I.x(17)).

[48] In particular at the end of *De beata vita* and *De academicis*.

[49] *De academicis* II.iii(8).

[50] See *Conf.* IX.iv (7) and *Epistula* 15.1.

[51] See Paul R. Kolbet 2010, p. 92.

[52] David Alexander (2008, p. 48, also p. 49): "It seems clear that the fundamental mode of life exemplified at Cassiciacum was not primarily generated by the Church, or for that matter the Christian community".

[53] The exemplary eremitical life of Antony, the existing monasteries in Milan, and the conversion of the two uneducated(!) *agentes in rebus* to an ascetic life devoted to the Christian faith, none of these had philosophical overtones.

Instead, in his attempt to persuade Romanianus to join his small community at Cassiciacum, Augustine harks back to a specific mode of community life, one in which his patron had already shown some interest: in his second cover letter he presents his current stay as the final realization of their earlier (failed) attempt to set up a small philosophical community of friends in Milan.[54] The idea was to abandon their worldly life and to adopt a traditional lifestyle of carefree leisure, to devote themselves full-time to the pursuit of wisdom. The moment they wondered what their – to some, prospective – wives would think of such a project, their carefully thought out plan fell to pieces.[55] Whatever the roots may have been of this project, whether it was Ciceronian, Epicurean,[56] Pythagorean or even Manichaean,[57] it was not Christian.[58]

Augustine mentions this unsuccessful attempt also in *Confessiones*.[59] The earlier philosophical project would be made financially possible by piling together the resources of all members in one common chest.[60] Augustine, Alypius, Romanianus, Nebridius, Verecundus, and Zenobius, who were all interested in philosophy, almost certainly

[54] *De academicis* II.ii(4). Significantly, while we tend to look further into the future when assessing the Cassiciacum stay, (i.e. by comparing it with the community of Thagaste and of Hippo), Augustine himself looks back to the community they had tried to set up in Milan. Perhaps we should therefore give more weight to this particular project in our evaluation of Augustine's view of community life.

[55] That a wife would agree to this kind of life was not evident, Augustine makes clear in *Soliloquies* (I.xi.18): "Quamquam, si eius amplo patrimonio certum sit sustenari posse omnes, quos tecum in uno loco uiuere otiose cupis, ipsa etiam concorditer id sinente, [...]" ("*But what if it were certain that her [i.e. the wife's] great wealth could support all those whom you wish to have living peacefully with you in one place, while she herself would be in complete agreement with this*, [...]").

[56] An Epicurean influence may well have been more important than hitherto assumed, bearing in mind that at the time Augustine would have given this philosophical school the palm of victory, if only he did not believe in life after death (*Conf.* VI.xvi (26)).

[57] John J. O'Meara (1954, p. 141-142); but rejected by R.J. Halliburton (1962, p. 331); Pierre Courcelle (1950, 178f.); James J. O'Donnell, (1992, III, p. 379). Manichaean influence seems doubtful, even though many of his friends were still influenced at the time by this exotic religion.

[58] First of all, it is highly likely that none of the participants were Christians, and secondly, Augustine had not yet heard of a Christian form of community life. When he did, he became a *christianus*. That the kind of *otium philosophandi* of the Christian Manlius Theodorus may have inspired their project may well be possible, but the question here would be whether this *otium* had anything specifically Christian about it (about Manlius Theodorus as model, see Pierre Courcelle (1950, p. 334-335, p. 337)).

[59] *Conf.* VI.xiv (24).

[60] Note that this was a basic principle also of Augustine's first 'monastery' at Thagaste/Hippo. (See Possidius 5,1: "Factusque presbyter monasterium intra ecclesiam mox instituit et cum Dei seruis uiuere coepit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis Apostolis constitutam".

belonged to this group of circa ten friends.[61] Above all the taking part of the very wealthy Romanianus proved to be crucial for the financial feasibility of this plan.[62]

In stark contrast, the "ill-assorted company"[63] which Augustine took with him to Cassiciacum mainly consisted of (poor) family dependents, who were a financial burden to him.[64] Alypius turned out to be the only one of the original group of ten men who was prepared to follow Augustine.[65] The non-attendance of other friends almost inevitably made his enterprise difficult to finance. The use of Verecundus' country villa was very helpful, but it could only be a temporary solution.[66] Still in need of extra income, Augustine gave at Cassiciacum private tuition to Romanianus' son Licentius and to another pupil Trygetius.[67] In a way, Romanianus was thus already sponsoring their stay in return for the education of his son.[68] There was actually not much free time available at Cassiciacum to study wisdom, since much labour needed to be done on the estate, and also the two students needed to be taught literature.

Augustine's appeal to Romanianus in *De academicis*, while referring in his introductory letter to the financial support his patron had been prepared to give to this earlier philosophical project, and the hurry in which he sought to involve Romanianus into their new way

[61] Zenobius knew Verecundus and Romanianus (see *De ordine*), and also Alypius (see *Epistula* 2), so he almost certainly belonged to the small circle of friends, seeing that he was interested in philosophy. Hermegonianus, the addressee of the first letter was probably also a member of this group.

[62] *Conf.* VI.xiv (24); *De academicis* II.ii(4).

[63] Peter Brown 2000, p. 113.

[64] His mother Monnica, his son Adeodatus, his brother Navigius and his two nephews.

[65] André Mandouze surely must be wrong in claiming that the original group of friends must have been very similar to this Cassiciacum party, of whom only Alypius and Augustine were really interested in philosophy. See André Mandouze (1968, 193, n. 1), criticized by James J. O'Donnell (1992, II, p. 381). Surprisingly, some include in this Cassiciacum group Nebridius (see Henry Chadwick (2009, p. 33)), or even Evodius (see John J. O'Meara, (2001, p. 196)). Also stating that Augustine was there with his friends (plural) is misleading: only Alypius really belongs to this category, since the rest consisted of his family (dependents) and two private pupils.

[66] Probably in return they had to do some work on the estate.

[67] Thus also Gerald Bonner (1086b, p. 94): "Since Augustine was giving up his post as an official teacher of rhetoric, it was desirable that he should find some other way of supporting himself and his dependants, and it is very likely that the tuition of these two was a source of income".

[68] Dennis E. Trout (1988, p. 138): "The *otium honestum* of Cassiciacum [...] was only possible on the basis of personal wealth or patronage, and while it is impossible to assess Augustine's own resources, it is clear that he drew upon those of Verecundus, Romanianus, and others in the autumn of 386".

of life,[69] suggest that Augustine was hoping that his patron would provide the necessary financial support (and stability), so that they could afford to live together *in otio* pursuing (a now Christian) philosophy on a more permanent basis, and with much more time left to actually do philosophy.[70]

Publicizing his conversion to the Catholic faith as a conversion to Christian philosophy, whereby he ostensibly remained within the format of a traditional *otium liberale*, must have been for Augustine the most expedient way of presenting his new life to his friends, certainly if he wished to interest them into this new project. The "double footing" of the Cassiciacum stay – advertised as a traditional *otium liberale* (with all its elitist worldly connotations), while firmly tied to the Catholic faith – tried to combine at heart two conflicting ideologies.[71] This not only creates confusion for us when we attempt to label the Cassiciacum retreat,[72] it probably also made it puzzling for Augustine's friends as well, including Alypius, to be able to grasp what exactly they were trying to set up.[73]

[69] This is why the three books of *De academicis* were divided into two parts, whereby books II and III were sent afterwards. This explains the existence of a second cover letter at the beginning of book II: Augustine had already sent book I ahead to Romanianus, while the latter was still in Milan.

[70] As we will see later, Augustine regrets in *De academicis* that at Cassiciacum so little time was left to actually hold philosophical discussions, because work needed to be done on the estate, while also the two students needed to be taught. No doubt, this, too, may have been written to signal to Romanianus that more financial support was currently needed for them in order to be able to pursue philosophy without any other tasks encroaching upon their precious free time. Notice that the availability of spare time was of major importance to Augustine when still a professor (*Conf.* VI.xi(18)), while also Nebridius was careful to have as much free time as possible for his search of wisdom (*Conf.* VIII.vi(13)). It must have been frustrating for Augustine, now that he had given up his worldly life to "*give time to the quest for wisdom*", that still so many other obligations were preventing him from philosophizing.

[71] These two conflicting ideologies he would masterly elaborate upon in his *De civitate Dei*.

[72] David Alexander (2008, p. 50, n.132) states that using the term *monasterium* in connection with Cassiciacum is "premature and ambiguous", while one should even remain very cautious in applying it to the Thagastan community. See, e.g., R.J. Halliburton (1962, p. 329-340): "It would appear that it [i.e. the Thagastan retreat] is in its essentials a continuation of the retreat of Cassiciacum and not to be associated with the *monasterium* which, it is claimed by Paulinus of Nola, existed there in the year 394" (p. 339).

[73] A good example of this potential misconception for the participants, I believe, can be found in the poem of Licentius (the son of Romanianus) written several years later (ca. 395) about his Cassiciacum stay: the poem breathes classical sophistry, with the Cassiciacum stay portrayed as nothing else than a traditional *otium liberale*. Yet, Licentius claims at the end he is a *christianus*. Augustine is highly displeased in this letter with the worldly engagement of his former pupil, in which he still seems to be too traditionally Roman minded to be a true *christianus*. See Danuta Shanzer (1991).

Even so, Augustine was not ashamed to advertise a more humble version of dignified leisure, and this, I believe, happened under the impulse of his conversion to the Catholic faith. The level of education of some of the participants necessitated this anyway: whereas the two uneducated nephews only made a brief appearance in *De beata uita*, Augustine's illiterate mother Monnica played an important role in the philosophical discussions of both *De beata uita* and *De ordine*. At one time, Augustine even praises her for having conquered the pinnacle of philosophy, and this thanks to her Christian faith![74] Her involvement surely must have surprised Augustine's friends,[75] and one can see him at pains defending and justifying her partaking.[76] As Gillian Clark rightly states, Christianity was able to open up the elitist attitude of a Graeco-Roman philosophical *otium*, to take no longer into consideration gender, status or education.[77] And so, in *De ordine*, Augustine can only hope that, concerning his writings, some men would "*not disregard the lowliness of the doorway, and proceed to enter*".[78]

Despite the more humble features of his retreat, the fact remains that Augustine preferred to advertise his stay as a genuine *otium liberale*, and its continuation after Cassiciacum required some substantial resources, which for the moment, Augustine did not possess.

At the end of each dialogue we learn more about what Augustine's new way of life involved. Its scope was clearly not limited to the Cassiciacum stay, since he presented it as a programme for (the

[74] Monnica's role in the dialogues is elaborately discussed in the book of Catherine Conybeare (2006). See also Emilien Lamirande (1989). Also in *Confessiones* Augustine praises his mother when she stayed with them at Cassiciacum (*Conf.* IX.iv(8)). Augustine's high regard of his mother is certainly already noticeable in the early dialogues, so that her prominent role in *Confessiones* should not be regarded as some kind of strategy to make his faith more Catholic than it was (this against, for instance, Ragnar Holte's view (1994, p. 301): "When writing his *Confessions*, Augustine obviously finds it important that such a strong and faithful woman can give him a full Christian legitimation"). In *De beata vita* (ii(6)) she is introduced as "nostra mater, cuius meriti credo esse omne quod uiuo" ("*our mother, to whose merit, I believe, is due all that I am*"). What more praise can one heap on one's mother?

[75] No doubt, she could never have occupied such an important place in the original philosophical project: there, she would merely be considered a family dependent of Augustine (if she would have agreed to come along with Augustine).

[76] F.i. *De ordine* I.xi(31-32); *De beata uita* ii(10).

[77] Gillian Clark 2007, p. 160-161.

[78] *De ordine* I. xi (31): "contempta uilitate liminis". I believe here the Christian humility already rings through, a virtue of such tantamount importance to Augustine. For a recent study on the importance of *humilitas* to Augustine, see Baumann Notker (2009).

happy) life. In *De academicis* (III.xx(43)), he explains that he will follow the path of reason along (Neo-)Platonic lines, but at the same time he does not want to depart from the authority of Christ. He does not yet expect the two approaches to be at odds with each other, something which he later will have to retract.[79]

In *De beata uita*, the most religious one of the dialogues,[80] and the only one dedicated to someone whom we know for certain was a *christianus*[81], the happy life is defined in more religious terms (the perfect knowledge of God), whereby also God's assistance is required to come to truth and to know Him. Monnica concludes the discussion by quoting a verse of a hymn of bishop Ambrose: 'foue precantes, trinitas', adding that one attains the happy life by unwavering faith, eager hope, and ardent love.[82] Notice that in this "religious" dialogue Alypius was not present, and Monnica played a big part.[83]

Towards the end of *De ordine*, Augustine presented a more detailed programme of their new way of life, one with high moral demands, whereby training in the liberal disciplines was of great import.[84] Indeed, at the time, even though he acknowledged two paths to come to truth (reason and authority), Augustine was convinced that only someone sufficiently trained in the liberal arts could reach true happiness *in this life*.

> Qui autem sola auctoritate contenti bonis tantum moribus rectisque uotis constanter operam dederint, aut contemnentes, aut non ualentes disciplinis liberalibus atque optimis erudiri, beatos eos quidem, cum inter homines uiuunt, nescio quomodo appellem.[85]
>
> *But as to those who are content to follow authority alone, and who apply themselves constantly to right living and holy desires, whilst they make no account of the liberal and fine arts, or are incapable of being instructed in them, I know not how I could call them happy as long as they live among men.*

[79] *Retractationes* I.i(4): "contra quorum errores magnos defendenda est Christiana doctrina".

[80] This Augustine mentions in the introduction of *De beata uita* (i.(4): "disputationum mearum, quod mihi uidetur religiosius euasisse".

[81] But most likely not a *fidelis*.

[82] *De beata uita* v(35).

[83] It is very difficult to assess the relationship between Alypius and Monnica. Obviously this was far less intimate than between Augustine and his mother. A possible friction may have existed when Alypius tried to discourage Augustine from marrying, while Monnica was the main force behind arranging a marriage for her son. Also the fact that she was a Catholic, while Alypius was for quite some time a Manichaean may have weighed upon their relationship.

[84] For a brief discussion of this programme, see Peter Brown 2000, p. 113-6.

[85] *De ordine* II.ix(26).

This is one of the statements he later came to regret in his *Retractationes*,[86] but at the time Augustine was convinced of the importance of the *artes liberales*.[87] Such a view suits a traditional *otium liberale*, maybe even a Christian philosophical retreat, but it would be out of place in a monastery.

That he took this idea seriously is shown by his subsequent ambitious plan to write a series of textbooks on the liberal disciplines.[88] Taking on such an enormous project indicates that Augustine's plans went much further than the temporary Cassiciacum stay and his baptism.[89] When he returned to Thagaste in 388/9, he was still working on these study books, but in the end he abandoned the project, also because he came to realize that this was not the right way of

[86] *Retractationes* I. i (2): "uerum et in his libris displicet mihi [...] quod multum tribui liberalibus disciplinis, quas multi sancti multum nesciunt, quidam etiam qui sciunt eas sancti non sunt". "*I regret that in these books [...] I attributed a great deal to the liberal disciplines about which many saintly persons do not know much – some, in truth, know them and are not saintly*". In *Confessiones* V.vii Augustine writes: "[artium] quorum quidem ignarus posset ueritatem tenere pietatis, sed si manichaeus non esset" ("*Ignorance of the [liberal] arts is compatible with holding authentic piety, but not if one is a Manichee*").

[87] See Paul Kolbet (2010, p. 98-102) on the elitist aspect of this belief. A glimpse of this traditional elitist thinking can also be detected during Augustine's conversion crisis. The fact that two uncultured(!) men at Trier (see *Conf.*VIII.viii(19)) made the necessary sacrifices to capture heaven, might have been the crucial incentive for the highly cultured Augustine to finally do the same as well, i.e. to cut down the ties of worldly success and of any other physical delights in favour of an ascetic life, in his case, to devote himself to the search for wisdom. H.M. Gatt (1984, p. 20) perceptively comments: "We note that even here a touch of Augustine's pride emerges for 'they [i.e. the uncultured men] have gone before us'".

[88] *Retractationes* I.vi: "per idem tempus, quo Mediolani fui baptismum percepturus, etiam disciplinarum libros conatus sum scribere interrogans eos, qui mecum erant atque ab huiusmodi studiis non abhorrebant, per corporalia cupiens ad incorporalia quibusdam quasi passibus certis uel peruenire uel ducere.[...] sed eosdem sex libros iam baptizatus iamque ex Italia regressus in Africam scripsi; inchoaueram quippe tantummodo istam apud Mediolanum disciplinam".

[89] I have it therefore difficult with the following view expressed by Gustave Bardy (in *BA* 12, p. 565, n. 11): "Il semble qu'avant de devenir chrétien par le baptême, il tienne à mettre en ordre ces papiers, à ne rien laisser d'inachevé qui lui rappelle son ancienne vie. Il faut qu'une existence toute renouvelée puisse commencer pour lui dès le moment de sa regeneration. Les livres sur les disciplines libérales sont le témoignage de l'adieu au passé. Il fallait les écrire, ou du moins les entreprendre, puisqu'ils étaient en quelque sorte preparés. Mais ensuite on ne reviendra plus en arrière, pour s'en inquiéter et on les abandonnera à leur sort". The author does not take sufficiently into account the importance Augustine attached to the liberal disciplines at Cassiciacum, nor the fact that the programme Augustine laid out in *De ordine* looked well beyond the time of his Cassiciacum stay or his baptism: in the dialogues Augustine presented a programme to be followed for the rest of their lives.

serving God.[90] *De doctrina christiana* contains the final outcome of this original plan, and one can see in this impressive work just how far he had moved away from the great importance he once attached to the liberal arts.[91]

The fact that Augustine sought the attention of eminent learned men such as Manlius Theodorus and Zenobius, the respective dedicatees of *De beata uita* and *De ordine*, [92] and tried to involve them in his enterprise, shows that he was striving to chisel out a niche for himself and his little group within Milanese (Christian) intellectual society. Thus far, he did not seek to compromise his social position, nor did he want "to openly break ranks with the inherited conglomerate of elite values" as the hermit Antony had done.[93] We can conclude that in *De academicis* Augustine was hoping to persuade Romanianus, who was not (yet) a *christianus*, to join his small community, and to provide the financial means to lead a (Christian) leisured life at Milan in a more definite way, with more time available to pursue philosophy.

To conclude, according to the dialogues Augustine converted to a leisured life of (Christian) philosophy, and he propagated his current Cassiciacum stay to Romanianus as the final realization of an earlier plan to live together in philosophy with a small group of (educated!) friends near Milan, in the hope that his wealthy patron would join him. Thus far, the small circle staying with him consisted, next to Alypius, of Augustine's (uneducated) dependents and two private pupils.[95]

[90] David Alexander (p. 235, esp. n. 256) rightly points out that writing a series of study books on the liberal arts could hardly be part of the duties within a real *monasterium*.

[91] See Frederick van Fleteren (1995, p. 14-24).

[92] Dennis E. Trout (1988, p. 144, n. 29): "Among the various purposes served by the dialogues – displaying Augustine's literary talents, catching the eyes of important men (remember the *De pulchro et apto* addressed to the orator Hierius, Conf. 4,14) – one was to announce the way of life adopted by Augustine at Cassiciacum. Cf. *De ord.* 1.7(20)". Notice that no work was dedicated to Simplicianus, Ponticianus or Ambrose, even though they all played a pivotal role in Augustine's return to the Catholic faith.

[93] Dennis E. Trout (1988) is a useful article dealing with Augustine's attitude towards the traditions of aristocratic *otium honestum* or 'dignified leisure'.

[95] James J. O'Donnell (1992, III, p. 380) comments: "We should not lose sight of what his friends and associates would have noticed at the time: that the retreat to Cassiciacum in late 386 bore a strong resemblance to the project spoken of [...] in perhaps late 385, differing mainly in its impermanence; but even that impermanence may not have been obvious to those friends and associates. Cassiciacum may have seemed to others as a nucleus and a beginning of a reorganized project, now undertaken by a smaller cadre consisting entirely of unmarried men (but not excluding women: Monnica)".

Augustine did not yet want to compromise his social position, and he still wished to be seen as an academic teacher, this time not of rhetoric but of philosophy,[96] hence his ambitious project to publish a series of study books on the liberal disciplines. With the help of Romanianus and other friends he hoped to establish a more definite version of his philosophical retreat close to Milan.

Alypius may therefore well have thought that with Augustine deciding on embracing chastity, throwing overboard his marriage plans, and giving up his worldly life,[97] their dream to live together *in otio* could finally be realized.[98] That this was to happen within a Christian context was a novelty. The inspiring examples of Antony and the two men at Trier showed that the Catholic faith counted among its members some impressive holy men leading a perfect (moral) life. Within such a perspective it is more understandable that baptism may not have been immediately an issue, and that Alypius was not yet aware of how profoundly the Christian element would affect their original plan of living together in philosophy.

What then made Augustine and his little group of family and friends decide to return to Thagaste after he, Alypius and Adeodatus were baptized?[99] I believe it was his failure to involve Romanianus

[96] See Paul R. Kolbet (2010, p. 88-117); Robert Lane Fox (2006, p. 184-185) suspects Porphyrian influence in the connection between the study of the *artes liberales* and the mystical ascent of the soul, but already Varro had made this connection. He posits that "it gave him a much-needed programme for his imminent future. He could still be a teacher, but now he could teach the basic liberal arts (on which he then writes separate texts) as part of a religious and mystical training. By giving up *spes saeculi*, Augustine was potentially without a social context". On Augustine profiling himself as a teacher, see Laura Holt (1998). One should therefore not reject out of hand the possibility that Augustine was playing with the idea to set up some sort of private school near Milan, this time not of rhetoric, but of (Christian) philosophy, hence his plan to write academic textbooks on the disciplines.

[97] The *mulierculae* obstacle was thereby radically removed.

[98] Notice that, before, Alypius concurred with Augustine as they debated "*what manner of life ought to be adopted*" (*Conf.* VI.x(16)) "talis ille nunc inhaerebat mihi mecumque nutabat in consilio, quisnam esset tenendus uitae modus.").

[99] It has been suggested by Jörg Trelenberg (2009, p. 390 and p. 80) that Augustine was already thinking at Cassiciacum of returning to his *Heimat* in Africa, because occasionally he wrote from an African perspective, and seemed to have had already an African audience in mind (see *De ordine* I.iii(6): "quod in Italia etiam pecuniosis prope necesse est". ("Die hier bereits eindeutig über Italien hinausreichende Blickrichtung, in Verbindung gesetzt mit der später erfolgten eigenen Rückkehr nach Thagaste [...] kann als Indiz gewertet werden, dass Augustin bereits im November 386 – nicht erst im Sommer 387, wie *Conf.* 9,9,17 glauben machen will – an eine Rückkehr in seine Heimat denkt") (p. 80). However, most of his

and other friends into their project, and the fact that prominent men such as Manlius Theodorus and Zenobius did not respond in the way Augustine had hoped they would, that made it (also financially) impossible for him to continue leading the kind of leisured life he so much desired close to Milan.[100] In order to be able to afford the kind of independent *otium* they had enjoyed at Cassiciacum, the small group decided then to set up their community on Augustine's small estate in the backwater of Thagaste, so that Augustine and Alypius had to leave behind their former circle of (intellectual) friends at Milan.[101] This decision came at a price: we have seen that already at Cassiciacum much farm work needed to be done at the property, while his private pupils needed further instruction, so that often there was little time left to pursue philosophy.[102] In a letter from Nebridius, we learn

"Milanese" friends originally came from North-Africa, so that this already could explain the African perspective in some of his utterances in the dialogues. For instance, Augustine's foreign accent was being censured in Milan (*De ordine* II.xvii(45)). It was not unusual that the contingent of African ambitious educated men living in Milan formed their own little community there: Alypius, Verecundus, Nebridius, Ponticianus, Manlius Theodorus, Zenobius and also Evodius, all these were North-African men belonging to the same group of friends.

[100] So also Serge Lancel (2002, p. 115): "He probably also felt that his relationships with his Milanese friends, like Hermogenianus and Zenobius, on which he had at one point set great store, had come to a sudden end; and even with Manlius Theodorus, on whom he had placed too many hopes, and who had let him down. Moreover, quite simply, he had to earn a living. Who would subsidize him? [...] the hospitality of various friends, such as Verecundus, could not last indefinitely; and the eternal provider of funds, Romanianus, had crossed the sea". However, Serge Lancel also believes that Augustine simply wanted to break away from Milan, now that he had given up his worldly ambitions, as if Milan had no longer much to offer: surely the intellectual milieu, with men such as Manlius Theodorus and other Neoplatonic minded people, friends such as Nebridius and Verecundus, but also spiritual leaders such as Ambrose and Simplicianus could have helped Augustine in his search for wisdom.

[101] Augustine says that after they were baptized, they (including a new member: Evodius) sat together discussing what to do next, and they decided to return to Africa: "quaerebamus quisnam locus nos utilius haberet seruientes tibi; pariter remeabamus in Africam." ("*We looked for a place where we could be of most use in your service; all of us agreed on a move back to Africa*" (*Conf.* IX.viii(17)). He seems to gloss over the fact that because so many of his friends did not want to join him, and also others had let him down, he simply could not afford living *in otio* in Milan.

[102] See *De academicis* I.v(15); II.iv (10); III. ii(2). As Gerald Bonner (1986b, p. 93) perceptively remarks: "Men do not get up early to work in the fields simply to lend verisimilitude to an idyllic rural existence".

that at Thagaste Augustine had to perform many (curial?) services for his citizens, and this inevitably encroached upon the time available for contemplation.[103] More importantly, as so often in Augustine's life, the surrounding in which Augustine found himself had a great impact on his thinking.[104] One can imagine that his move back to Thagaste, far away from the highly intellectual Neo-Platonic (Christian) milieu at Milan, would have a considerable impact on his view of the ideal community life.

3. Alypius' mindset at Cassiciacum: some of his contributions

First of all, it should be noted that Alypius had been absent for quite some time from the dialogues: in *De academicis* he briefly appears at the beginning of the first book, only to reappear from the middle of the second book onwards. He does not feature at all in *De beata uita*, and he appears only in the second half of *De ordine*.[105] Nevertheless, Alypius' limited contributions can teach us something about his philosophical and religious position during that period. In *De academicis*, Alypius initially receives the role of arbiter in the discussion on the sceptic position, because he already had arranged a journey to Milan, which meant that he would have to leave during the discussion.

a) Alypius and the academic position

It gets more interesting when Alypius returns from the city and joins the debate in the second book, this time as a defender of the

[103] *Epistula* 5; for a recent discussion of these services Augustine had to perform for his citizens, see Claude Lepelley (2008).

[104] It is remarkable that many milestones in Augustine's thoughts coincided with a change of milieu: having moved to Carthage he became a Manichee, at Rome he adopted the more sceptic attitude of Cicero, moving to Milan led him to explore Neoplatonic thought, and eventually brought him to Christianity.

[105] This could help putting the dialogues in chronological order: Between book 1 and books 2 and 3 of *De academicis*, the discussions of *De beata uita* and *De ordine* may have taken place, that is if Alypius only went one time away. Possibly, this journey of Alypius (and Augustine's brother Navigius who went along) to Milan, could be linked to the arrangement of their earlier project at Milan to look after the practical matters of their retreat arrangement, so that the rest could spent more time in leisure. See also André Mandouze 1968, p. 125-126, n. 6, referring to the unpublished thesis of Josette Navarre-Domere, *Alypius de Thagaste, évêque africain*. As Jörg Trelenberg (2009, p. 81, n. 15) points out: "Es ist anzunehmen, dass nicht wenige Ideen der damaligen (in Bezug auf den Personenkreis teilweise identischen) Gruppe in Cassiciacum in ähnlicher Form verwirklicht wurden."

academic position. Here, Alypius expresses what he claims to be his honest belief concerning the academic position, so that one cannot simply assume this was said for the sake of the debate:

> addo etiam quod de academicis flagitabas, nec posse inueniri me putare, non solum inolita, quam semper fere animaduertisti opinione mea, sed etiam auctoritate magnorum excellentiorumque philosophorum; quibus nos praebere colla siue imbecillitas nostra, siue sagacitas ipsorum, ultra quam nihil iam inueniri posse credendum est, nescio quomodo compellit.[106]
>
> *I add, too – a point on which you were questioning me in connection with the Academics – that I think that it [i.e. truth] cannot be found, not only because of my ingrained conviction which you have observed in me practically from the start, but also on the authority of great and outstanding philosophers, to whose opinions we are somehow induced to submit, whether through our own mental impotence, or because of the keenness of their minds, which, we are forced to believe, cannot possibly be surpassed.*

Such a strong conviction over the unassailability of the academic position may be surprising, taking into account the (Neo-)Platonic philosophy and the Catholic idea that Christ is truth, but there is more: Alypius is willing to submit to an *auctoritas*, not of Christ, but of Cicero![107]

Alypius' respect for – and reliance on – *auctoritas Ciceronis* has been highlighted in Augustine Curley's study of *De academicis*.[108] During Alypius' absence, Augustine had convinced his pupils to question the authority of Cicero, even to free themselves from the yoke of authority all together.[109]

Alypius on the other hand very much remains within the boundaries of classical Roman philosophy, and initially, he is apparently not (yet) prepared to embrace Augustine's solution to break through the academic's sceptic position with the help of reason and Christian faith. Notice that, in the past, Cicero's recommendation to pursue philosophy had pushed Augustine away from his Catholic faith, into the arms of Manichaeism, and even after he rejected the tenets of this sect, he was still reluctant to accept the Catholic teachings, "*refusing to be healed for fear of believing what is false*".[110]

[106] *De academicis* II. xiii(30).
[107] Again in *De academicis* II.x.24: "ex auctoritate illa Tulliana".
[108] Augustine J. Curley 1996, p. 88-95.
[109] Augustine J. Curley 1996, p. 85-87.
[110] *Conf.* VI.iv (6): "ne falsa crederet, curare recusabat".

An important piece of information coming from *Confessiones* reveals something about Alypius' view of philosophy, and its relation to the Catholic faith. It also tells us something about the editing procedure of the dialogues:

> [...] quoque modo ipsum etiam Alypium, fratrem cordis mei, subegeris nomini unigeniti tui, domini et saluatoris nostri Iesu Christi, quod primo dedignabatur inseri litteris nostris.[111]
> *[...] how You subjected Alypius, too, my heart's brother, to the name of your only-begotten Son, our Lord and saviour Jesus Christ. For at first he was scornfully critical of inserting Christ's name.*

At first, Alypius did not want the name of Christ to appear in their philosophical dialogues at all! For someone who had just become a *christianus* this is quite an astonishing piece of information (especially if one assumed he was preparing for baptism).[112] One could argue that these were in essence philosophical writings, and that this dispute between Augustine and Alypius about the name of Christ merely concerned the style of the dialogues.[113] However, in his search of truth, twice Augustine had turned away from the writings of

[111] *Conf.* IX.iv(7).

[112] I find the interpretation of Tarmo Toom (*Thought clothed with sound: Augustine's Christological hermeneutics in De doctrina christiana* (*International theological studies; contributions of Baptist scholars* 4) (Bern: Lang 2002, p. 39 n.86) highly unlikely: "Alypius thought that it was improper for Augustine to mention Christ's name in his writings, because it would have been, in some sense, a lowering of the high name of the Son of God".

[113] For instance Goulven Madec (1986, p. 214): "parce qu'il estimait que les formules spécifiquement chrétiennes rompaient avec l'esthétique classique des Dialogues philosophiques". This is also Carol Harrison's view (2006b, p. 254-255): "We must also, of course, remember the genre of the dialogues, and in this sense Alypius' objections are quite understandable: they are philosophical dialogues following a definite Ciceronian model, in which it is not the absence of Christ's name which is surprising, but the fact that it occurs at all". Indeed, the aspect of style and literary form is an important one. The works of Cassiciacum were composed "within a tradition of cultivated leisure, [...] characterized by stylistic conventions admitting spontaneity and personal detail only of the most studied and self-conscious variety" (J. Matthews 1975, p. 221). However, Augustine was trying to anchor this traditional thinking within a new Christian context, and this Alypius seems to have resisted at first (perhaps he even failed to notice this!) when he did not want Christ's name to be included in their writings. Possibly, Alypius had the (purely) philosophical writings of Manlius Theodorus in mind, but Augustine was attempting something quite different with his dialogues. The fact that Manlius Theodorus was probably "only" a *christianus* and not a *fidelis* could help explain Alypius' reluctance to receive baptism himself: if the highly honoured Manlius Theodorus did not think it necessary to be baptized, why would he? After all, the pressure on Augustine to receive baptism came above all from his mother Monnica, who had no philosophical aspirations.

Cicero, simply because they lacked the name of Christ. Surely Augustine would not have considered the absence or presence of Christ's name to be a matter of mere style in his writings! Secondly, Augustine says he could not give himself wholeheartedly to the academic position, because their writings were without Christ's saving name, and this seems to have been the moment he decided to become a catechumen again in the Catholic Church, "mihi a parentibus commendata".[114] Unlike Augustine, the absence of Christ's name in Cicero's writings would certainly not have put off Alypius, so he could give himself more readily to the academics' teaching. What is more, unlike Augustine, he would not have felt the need to turn to the Catholic faith and its Church. Therefore, in *De academicis* Alypius approved of the academic position in a way Augustine could never have done.

Thirdly, the way in which Augustine describes this dispute between the two friends, points indirectly towards something else as well: the humility Alypius still needed to assume in order to become a true *christianus*, a humility necessary to submit (fully) to the Catholic faith and to the sacraments of its Church. This is already present in the Latin: "*subegeris* nomini tui [...] quod primo *dedignabatur* inseri litteris nostris."

This need to become humble was exactly the lesson which Augustine received when hearing the conversion story of Victorinus, and also his own conversion moment was an immensely humbling experience, exposing the weakness of his will power to the bone.

As it happens, Augustine (unconsciously?) links the passage about Alypius' resistance to include the name of Christ in their philosophical dialogues to the conversion story of Victorinus, and this through verbal repetition, for the passage continues:

> magis enim eas uolebat redolere gymnasiorum *cedros, quas iam contriuit dominus*, quam salubres herbas ecclesiasticas aduersas serpentibus.

The only other instance in *Confessiones* in which Augustine uses this Biblical imagery of "*cedars, which the Lord has felt down*" is in the Victorinus episode. There, the cedars embodied the pride of the pagans in contrast to the humility of true Christians. The only difference between these two "cedar" references is that in Alypius' case the cedars have already been felt by the Lord (... cedros, quas iam

[114] *Conf.* v.xiv(25): "Quibus tamen philosophis [i.e. academicis], quod sine salutare nomine Christi essent, curationem languoris animae meae committere omnino recusabam. Statui ergo tamdiu esse catechumenus in catholica ecclesia mihi a parentibus commendata, donec aliquid certi eluceret quo cursum dirigerem".

contriuit dominus), while in the case of the pagans the Lord had not yet felt the cedars ("ex cedris Libani, quas nondum contriverat dominus").[115] This nicely fits our thesis, that Alypius did indeed follow Augustine in becoming a *christianus*, but that he had not yet fully realized the repercussions of his conversion to the Catholic faith, since he still wanted the writings they produced at Cassiciacum to smell of these cedars.[116]

At the end of *De academicis*, after a lengthy exposé of Augustine's thoughts, Alypius is happy to claim defeat, and he says to his pupils:

> Quare iam, socii mei, expectationem uestram, qua me ad respondendum prouocabatis, certiore spe mecum ad discendum conuertite. Habemus ducem qui nos in ipsa ueritatis arcana, Deo iam monstrante, perducat.[117]
> *Accordingly, my friends, exchange your expectation by which you were inciting me to make a reply for a more certain hope: to learn with me. We now have a leader who may bring us to the sanctuaries of the truth, which God may now show us.*

Here we see Alypius accepting Augustine as his leader, who possesses the key towards wisdom, and showing his willingness to become his student as well. Augustine will have to take the lead in this new manner of life, and to set out its lines. Likewise, in the second book of *De ordine*, Augustine is again praised by Alypius:

> permagna, [...] uitae imago abs te ante oculos nostros, cum plene, tum breuiter constituta est: cui quamuis quotidianis praeceptis tuis inhiemus, tamen nos hodie cupidiores flagrantioresque reddidisti.[118]
> *A grand view of life, a succinct but complete view, has been placed before our eyes by you. And although we daily hang upon your teaching, yet today you have inflamed us with greater eagerness and zeal for that life.*

It is as if Alypius still needs to make his own Augustine's recent discoveries concerning truth, and their newly adopted way of life, which is now embedded in Christianity. Therefore, at Cassiciacum Augustine introduces his unique kind of philosophy not only to his

[115] *Conf.* VIII.ii(4): 'amicos enim suos reuerebatur offendere, superbos daemonicolas, quorum ex culmine Babylonicae dignitatis quasi ex cedris libani, quas nondum contriuerat dominus'.

[116] Therefore, only during the editing process Alypius was ready to submit and humble himself to (the name of) Christ, and this is further indication that submission to baptism was not part of the joint agreement at their conversion.

[117] *De academicis* III.xx(44).

two private pupils Licentius and Trygetius, but also to his dear friend Alypius!

b) Proteus imagery – becoming Augustine's true friend

Another passage worth looking into is where Alypius brings the figure of Proteus into the discussion:[119]

> suamque imaginem et quasi speculum quoddam in Proteo illo animaduerti oportere, qui traditur eo solere capi quo minime caperetur, inuestigatoresque eius numquam eumdem tenuisse, nisi indice alicuiusmodi numine. quod si adsit, et illam nobis ueritatem quae tantum curae est demonstrare dignetur, ego quoque uel ipsis inuitis, quod mimime reor, illos superatos esse confitebor.
>
> *The likeness and 'image' (so to speak) of the academics should be seen in Proteus. It is said that Proteus was typically captured by some means that barely captured him, and his pursuers never were sure they really had him except by the indication of some divine spirit. May that divine spirit be present, and may he deign to show us the truth that is of such importance to us! Then I'll also admit that the academics have been overcome, even if they don't agree, although I think they will.*

Alypius is convinced that the position of the academics cannot be dislodged that easily. He first compares the academics themselves with Proteus. When a persuasive argument is brought against them, this in itself can be used in support of their thesis: no consent ought to be given to this argument, for it only demonstrates that truth is relative. And so, the very means by which one believes one has captured the academics actually only strengthen their case. Just as was the case with Proteus, it would take a *numen* to indicate that he was captured. Then Alypius somewhat alters the meaning of Proteus as being now a symbol of truth itself, wishing there was such a spirit (*numen*) present which could reveal to them *truth*. If so, then he will gladly admit defeat (even if the academics would not do so).

According to Therese Fuhrer, Alypius' wish that a divinity would reveal itself (quod si adsit) is to be understood not as an *eventualis*, but as an *irrealis*.

> Erwähnung des Gottes… nicht als Eventualis, sondern als Irrealis zu verstehen", d.h. die Enthüllung der "Wahrheit" durch einen *numen* wird von ihm nicht als reale Möglichkeit erwogen, sondern bleibt

[118] *De ordine* II.x 28.
[119] *De academicis* III.v(11).

hypothetisch. Als offenbarungstheologische Aussage werden Alypius' Worte erst in Augustins Interpretation in §13 verstanden.[120]

Such a reading goes perhaps too far: Alypius simply leaves it in the middle whether such a *numen* will really present itself, and therefore this must be a *neutral* hypothetical statement: if a *numen* would deign to show us truth, then I will admit defeat.[121]

Augustine is keen to pick up the Proteus imagery symbolising truth,[122] and he lavishly praises Alypius for such a pious utterance. But whereas Alypius retains a neutral position, Augustine resolutely takes a more positive stance, modifying it into a more Christian statement: man can obtain truth, for a divine power, i.e. Christ, reveals to him this truth.[123]

Again Therese Furher:

> Alypius' kurzer Hinweis in 3, 5, 11 wird von Augustin aufgegriffen und uminterpretiert: Der Mensch kann zur Wahrheitserkenntnis gelangen, wenn eine göttliche Macht im die Wahrheit offenbart. Die Aussage wird damit von Augustin auch umgedeutet im Sinn einer positiven Antwort auf die in 3, 4, 10 gestellte Frage nach der Möglichkeit, als Mensch *sapientia* erlangen zu können.[124]

Augustine thus takes what Alypius has stated a step further, by giving it a more pronounced Christian meaning: truth is revealed through Christ, who Himself is truth.[125] Augustine can now say that

[120] Therese Fuhrer 1997, p. 275.

[121] I am grateful to prof. Gert Partoens for explaining to me the exact meaning of the Latin here.

[122] Actually, the equation of Proteus with truth rests on an unusual reading of Virgil's verse: uerum ubi correptum manibus uinclisque tenebis (*Georgics* IV.405), whereby *uerum* is not taken as an adversative particle parallel with *tum* in IV.406, but as a noun (Peter King 1995, p. 63, n.129).

[123] See also the comment made by John J. O'Meara 1951, p. 186-7, n. 10; Robert J. O'Connell, "The visage of philosophy at Cassiciacum", *Augustinian studies* 25(1994), 65-76 (p. 70-71), who links Proteus and this *numen* to the incarnation.

[124] Therese Fuhrer (1997, p. 277-8).

[125] Another intriguing, but admittedly less persuasive, interpretation would be that Alypius refers with this *numen* not to Christ, ... but to Augustine himself! That this idea is not too far-fetched can be shown by the way Licentius uses the Proteus-imagery eight years later in his poem (transmitted in *Epistula* 26), which refers to the Cassiciacum stay: in this poem Licentius is lying helpless before the intransigent works of Varro, who is compared to Proteus. Licentius must call upon an intercessory divinity, in this case not a nymph, but no one else than his former teacher Augustine. Licentius believes that once Augustine has sent him his *De musica*, the truth will be manifest (See Danuta Shanzer 1991, p. 133). The exuberant praise Alypius heaps upon Augustine at the end of *De academicis* and *De ordine*, while recognizing him as his leader would corroborate such an interpretation. After all, it is in the end

he and Alypius (finally?) agree in divine matters as well, so that (from now on?) Alypius can be truly called a friend of Augustine, quoting thereby Cicero's famous definition of friendship.[126] Actually, Augustine had first subtly modified Alypius' response to suit a more explicit Christian reading, taking Alypius' originally neutral stance to be a resolute affirmation that a *numen* really exists (namely Christ).

When Augustine makes clear to Alypius that he can only be his true friend if he also agrees with him in divine matters as well, i.e. if he accepts the Christian faith, then this could be considered in its most pejorative reading that Alypius is, through Augustine, being put under (social) pressure to conform to his Christian belief.[127]

Of particular relevance in this context is *Epistula* 258, a letter from Augustine to Marcianus, whom he calls *antiquissimus amicus*. This friendship dates back to the time that he was still seeking fortune and fame. Also here, Augustine refers to Cicero's definition of friendship, and he intersperses the letter, like the dialogues, with quotations from other classical writers as well, such as Virgil and Terence. Clearly, Marcianus was an educated man who could appreciate learned quotations. Augustine writes that, although in the past they agreed on human things, they could not be called true friends: true friendship only exists in Christ.[128] For that reason he is delighted to learn that Marcianus now also agrees in divine matters as well, i.e. he has

Augustine who refutes the academics, and reveals their hidden(!) truth. That the Proteus reference in *De academicis* proved to be an attractive topic is demonstrated by a poem of Godfrey of Saint Victor (12th c.), a canon of saint Augustine from the great Parisian house of his order. One stanza (lines 101 to 104) of his poem *Preconium Augustini* echoes the exchange between Alypius and Augustine on Proteus (See Edward A. Synan 1988, p. 277-283). Edward A. Synan concludes that according to Augustine in *De academicis* "the presence of divinity, necessary for the capture of Proteus-like truth, is the incarnate wisdom of the biblical God" (p. 282).

[126] *De academicis* III.vi(13): "Hoc ergo tertium bonum mihi accidit, quod non inuenio quanti aestimem. mecum enim familiarissimus amicus meus, non solum de probabilitate humanae uitae, uerum etiam de ipsa religione concordat, quod est ueri amici manifestissimum indicium, siquidem amicitia rectissime atque sanctissima definita est, rerum humanarum et diuinarum cum beneuolentia et caritate consensio". On Augustine's use of Cicero's definition of friendship, see, e.g., T.J. van Bavel (1987), John F. Monagle (1971).

[127] One wonders whether Augustine used the very same argument of friendship when he succeeded in converting his friends to Manichaeism.

[128] This is a recurring theme in Augustine's writings. See, for instance, also *Confessiones*, IV.iv(7), when he describes the friendship between him and another boy at his hometown Thagaste who died very young as "*less than a true friendship, which is not possible unless you bond together those who cleave to one another by the love which 'is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us'*" (*Rom.* 5:5).

become a *christianus*. However, in the letter Augustine is still exhorting his "wise and honoured friend" that he would be with Augustine in holding with tenacity the two commandments (*Love the Lord with all thy heart,... and thy neighbour as thyself*), so that their friendship will be genuine and everlasting, joining them not merely to each other, but also to the Lord Himself. Then he writes:

> Quod ut fiat, exhortor grauitatem et prudentiam tuam, ut iam etiam fidelium sacramenta percipias; decet enim aetatem et congruit, quantum credo, moribus tuis. [...] iam profecto sic uiuis ut sis dignus baptismo salutari remissionem praeteritorum accipere peccatorum. [...] tua sumere rescripta desidero et te nomen uel dedisse inter competentes uel daturum esse iam iamque cognoscere. (*Ep.* 258, CCL 57, p. 609, 5-6. 11-12; p. 610, 5-6).
> *That this may be so, I exhort you, my wise and honoured friend, to partake of the sacraments available to those in full communion, for this would become one of your age and be in conformity, in my opinion, with your moral conduct. [...] You certainly are living now in such a way as to be worthy of receiving through the saving rite of baptism the remission of your past sins [...] I long to receive a reply from you and to learn at any moment that you have entered your name among the candidates for baptism or are on the point of doing so.*

This may well have been similar to Alypius' situation at Cassiciacum. It is wonderful to discover that they now agree in divine matters as well, Alypius says, but Augustine probably also must have urged him to receive baptism together with him, so that their friendship will be genuine and everlasting, "*joining them not merely to each other, but also to the Lord Himself*".

c) Fortuna as diuinum auxilium

Finally, there is another aspect which demonstrates that Alypius was still thinking very much within the frame of Roman tradition, not realizing how fundamentally different the perspective had changed for Augustine by becoming a *christianus*: the understanding of the workings of *Fortuna*.[129] An important thread which runs throughout the

[129] The importance of *Fortuna* has been downplayed by Jan den Boeft in his lemma on *Fortuna* in the *Augustinus-Lexikon* (3.1/2, c. 56-58). Seeing that Augustine re-interpreted this pagan concept as *gratia Dei*, its significance should not be taken too lightly, even though the term only sporadically appears in Augustine's writings. Moreover, the multifaceted concept of *Fortuna* offers us a window of opportunity to compare and confront Roman traditional "ideology" with Augustine's Christian "ideology". See my unpublished thesis *Fortuna caeca: symptom of ideological failure in Roman society, and Augustine's Christian alternative* (University of Wales, Swansea, 2004).

dialogues (and as a matter of fact throughout Augustine's whole corpus) is that God's help is needed in order to become truly happy. This has become one of Augustine's most fundamental Christian insights. It had the most profound impact on his life, regardless of whether we connect it with his moral conversion, i.e. his adoption of a life of continence, or whether we look at it in a more intellectual context, in which Augustine realizes that the (Neo-)Platonic ideal is beyond his reach and recognizes within himself much more the psychological weak condition of Paul, rather than the self-controlled state of a Neo-Platonic sage.[130] Acknowledging that one cannot simply rely on oneself, but is in need of God's aid in order to reach the happy life will become the primary motivation and justification for Augustine to submit in the end to the sacramental rituals of his childhood religion. This realization that one needs God's help (read: *diuinum auxilium* but also *gratia Dei*[131]) becomes immediately clear in the first words of the dedicatory letter to Romanianus in *De academicis*. In this letter Augustine admits that *uirtus* in itself is not strong enough to reach the happy life, in this case the *portus philosophiae*, and that therefore *Fortuna*'s help is needed to get there:

> O utinam, Romaniane, hominem sibi aptum ita uicissim uirtus fortunae repugnanti posset auferre, ut ab ea sibi auferri neminem patitur! [...] sed quoniam ita comparatum est, [...] ut diuinum animum [...] nequaquam sapientiae portus accipiat [...] nisi eo illum ipsa (*sc.* fortuna), uel secunda, uel quasi aduersa perducat: nihil pro te nobis aliud quam uota restant [...].[132]
>
> *I wish, Romanianus, that Virtus, who never allows Fortuna to take anyone away from her, could, for her part, snatch from Fortuna, resist as she might, the man suited to her purpose.[...] The fact is that the divine spirit [...] can never reach the harbour of wisdom [...], unless Fortuna herself, good or bad – but only seeming so –, bring it thither: accordingly, we can do nothing for you but pray [...].*

This is, of course, a very un-Roman statement: at the heart of Roman ideology stands the maxim that one has to fight against the vicissitudes of *Fortuna* with one's own *uirtus*. Above all the Stoic Seneca insisted on making one's own this attitude.[133] Augustine has

[130] James J. O'Donnell 1992, II, p. 479.

[131] On *Fortuna* as *gratia Dei* in the dialogues, see Carol Harrison (2006a).

[132] *De academicis* I.i(1). For a good discussion of this passage and the dedicatory epistle as a whole, see Augustine J. Curley (1996, p. 39-42).

[133] See Gerda Bush (1961).

borrowed the imagery of a ship sailing on a rough sea to the port of philosophy from Cicero's *Tusculan disputations*.[134] According to Cicero, the disaster which befell his beloved *respublica* provided him with the leisure during which he could pick up a favourite time passing of his youth, namely the pursuit of philosophy.[135] He did not, however, believe this disaster to be therefore a good thing, he merely saw this one comfort arising from his current idleness, but there is no doubt that he would have preferred to be holding the rudder of the *respublica*. Secondly, Cicero insists that man has to become his own doctor: the idea of self-sufficiency and reliance on one's own *uirtus* in order to reach the happy life is essential to his beliefs, and it is also a basic principle of Roman traditional ideology in general.[136] Cicero cannot accept that one's happiness would depend on *Fortuna*.[137]

Augustine then describes his own life in terms of this imagery. We learn that, even though he knew where the happy life was to be found, he could not get there, because he was too entangled in the allurements of riches and honours. It required therefore a blow of *Fortuna* – in the form of his ill-health – to finally severe these fetters, and to be able to reach this blessed port. This "misfortune" he perceives to be the helping hand of God, who arranged the circumstances

[134] CICERO, *Tusculan disputations* v.ii(5): "Cuius in sinum cum a primis temporibus aetatis nostra uoluntas studiumque nos compulisset, his grauissimis casibus in eundem portum, ex quo eramus egressi, magna iactati tempestate confugimus".There exists also another source of this boat-imagery: Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, where Lucius after having been transformed into a donkey, is haunted and harassed by *Fortuna*. In the end, this blind *Fortuna* proved to be nothing else than (a seeing) Isis, who had been providentially guiding Lucius all along through his many miseries to his new blessed state. When Lucius gained back his human form, he converted to the Isis cult. One witnesses here the appeal of these Eastern religions in Roman society.

[135] CICERO, *Tusculan Disputations* I.i(1).

[136] CICERO, *Tusculan Disputations* III.iv(7): "est profecto animi medicina, philosophia, cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus atque uiribus, ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est" ("*Assuredly there is an art of healing the soul – I mean philosophy, whose aid must be south not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost endeavour, with all our resources and strength, to have the power to be ourselves our own physicians*").

[137] CICERO, *Tusculan Disputations* v.i(2): "[...] uirtutem ad beate uiuendum se ipsa esse contentam. [...] sin autem uirtus subiecta sub uarios incertosque casus famula fortunae est nec tantarum uirium est, ut se ipsa tueatur, uereor ne non tam uirtutis fiducia nitendum nobis ad spem beate uiuendi quam uota facienda uideantur". ("[...] *that virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy life.* [...] *If virtue, as being subject to such various and uncertain accidents, were but the slave of fortune, and were not of sufficient ability to support herself, I am afraid that it would seem desirable rather to offer up prayers, than to rely on our own confidence in virtue as the foundation for our hope of a happy life*").

in such a way that Augustine could finally do that what he was trying to achieve for some time.

In the second introductory letter of *De academicis* he would write to Romanianus:

> nullam mihi uideri prosperam Fortunam, nisi quae otium philosophandi daret; nullam beatam uitam, nisi qua in philosophia uiueretur.[138]
> *I did not consider any fortune to be good fortune save only that which would give leisure for philosophy, nor any way of life to be happy save only that wherein one lived, so to speak, in philosophy.*

The blow of *Fortuna* proved to be a stroke of luck, the same "luck" he believed had fallen upon Victorinus when he was forced to resign from his teaching post due to a decree of Julian, which banned Christians from teaching.[139]

The same kind of 'luck' can be seen at work in Augustine's description of his conversion moment in *Confessiones* as well: here, God ordered the events in such a way that Augustine would (want to) convert: chance events (the sudden chant of a child singing "*tolle, lege*" when in desperate need of guidance, followed by the random(!) opening of the codex of Paul's epistles) really proved to be no chance events after all, but they formed part of God's divine order, assisting those who (humbly) pray for Him to come to their aid.[140] Augustine believes that the same *auxilium diuinum* is currently at work in the life of Romanianus: the financial setback his patron recently received might well turn out to be this decisive blow of *Fortuna*, which really should be interpreted as a Godsend, because it could lead Romanianus to the *portus philosophiae* and the true happy life, leaving behind empty riches and honours.[141] Romanianus, too, is exhorted to pray together with Augustine for God's heavenly assistance.[142]

[138] *De academicis* II.i(4).

[139] *Conf.* VIII.v(10).

[140] The same goes up for Augustine's infatuation with sex: he first thought, under impulse of Alypius, that leading a chaste life depended on one's own resources. His conversion moment, made him experience and thus believe that God's help was needed in order for him to accomplish this. (See the vision of Lady Continence).

It is therefore intriguing that although both 'conversion accounts' appertain to two different experiences (his ill-health on the one hand, and Augustine's grace experience in the garden of Milan on the other hand), they both essentially arrive at the same conclusion: one should rely on God and not (solely) on one's own strength to reach the happy life.

[141] *De academicis* I.i(1-3).

[142] *De academicis* II.i(1-2)): "quotidianis uotis auras tibi prosperas orare non cesso. [...] multum autem me adiuuabis pro te deprecantem, si non nos exaudiri posse desperes, nitarisque nobiscum et tu non solum uotis, sed etiam uoluntate, atque illa

This is not the only example in the dialogues where chance events turn out to be a providential order guiding people to God and the happy life. In *De ordine*, a book which actually has this divine order as subject matter, we witness a (semi-)conversion of another participant: Licentius.[143] Here, Augustine 'reads' chance (co-)incidents as being part of an astoundingly intricate and magnificent order, which seems to bring about the conversion of Licentius not just to philosophy, but also to the Christian faith.[144] All these instances illustrate the fundamental principle that, because we are weak, we need God's help, and therefore we have to pray (and submit ourselves to Him) so that he may come to our aid. It is this humble submission to Christ, which is essential in becoming a *christianus*.

At the beginning of the third book Augustine introduces the discussion of *Fortuna* into the philosophical discussion proper, and Alypius' view can be considered a litmus test for his understanding of this need for God's help. Regretting that so little time was left that day to pursue philosophy, Augustine states that it is his conviction that in order to become wise we need the help of *Fortuna*: "ut autem sapiens fiat, plurimum necessariam esse fortunam".[145] This is completely in

tua naturali mentis altitudine" ("*I do not stop praying for favourable winds for you in my daily prayers [...] You will help me a great deal while I'm praying for you if you exert yourself with us, not only with your prayers but also with your will and the natural profundity of that mind of yours*". Also, as referred to before: *De academicis* I.i(1)) "nihil pro te nobis aliud quam uota restant" ("*Accordingly, we are left with nothing to do for you but pray*").

[143] On Licentius and his semi-conversion see Phillip Cary (1998, 141-163) (I cannot, however, agree with the author's claim that the events recounted in *De ordine* were of a fictional character); see also Jörg Trelenberg (2009, p. 409-415).

[144] First there is the irregular sound of water flowing at night which puzzles Augustine, and he tries to find the cause of this irregularity. Then there is the unexpected emergence of a mouse in the room next door where the boys are sleeping. Licentius tries to kill the mouse with a stick, and this makes Augustine realize that both his students are awake. He calls them in and a discussion arises in the middle of the night on the problem of evil and order, starting from the causes of the irregularity of the water flow. Licentius is very alert and suddenly he feels himself inspired and comes up with very insightful responses concerning the issue under discussion. Only when Licentius gives thanks to Christ for what he just has experienced Augustine is overjoyed: "et cum suspirio gratias Christo agebat. accepi ego haec, quid dicam, libenter." (*De ordine* I.viii(21)). Unfortunately, Licentius' "conversion" is not lasting, and soon he is again more preoccupied with his classical poetry than with the search for wisdom. The almost unbelievable coincidences which triggered the nightly debate led John J. O'Meara (1951) to consider the story to be fiction: "It is to be noted that the debate is supposed to have risen by accident. It was a too convenient accident!" (p. 174)

[145] *De academicis* III.ii(3); and even more reflecting the idea in the dedicatory letter: "ita quisquis ad sapientiae portum, et quasi firmissimum et quietissimum solum

line with the dedicatory letters, (which Alypius may not have yet read, since they were composed afterwards). Augustine probably also had a particular incident in mind. During his stay he had suffered from such a ferocious toothache that it became impossible for him to speak or to learn anything new.[146]

> dolore dentium tunc excruciabas me, et cum in tantum ingrauesceret ut non valerem loqui, ascendit in cor meum admonere omnes meos qui aderant ut deprecarentur te pro me, deum salutis omnimodae.
> *At that time you tortured me with toothache, and when it became so bad that I lost the power to speak, it came into my heart to beg all my friends present to pray for me to you, God of health of both soul and body.*

If this pain would have persisted, he no longer would have been able to philosophize and thus to become happy, but miraculously the pain disappeared. This is another, more vivid, illustration of the basic rule that we need (to humbly pray for) the help of God in order to become happy.[147]

In this discussion on the power of *Fortuna*, Alypius, however, does not agree with Augustine's position, and instead he holds on to a more traditional Roman concept of *Fortuna* and her relation to *uirtus*. Therese Fuhrer perceives an overall difference between the two friends' understanding of *Fortuna*, the concept which played

peruenire uoluerit [...] necessariam mihi uidetur ad id, quod concupiuit, habere fortunam" ("*it seems to me that whoever wishes to arrive at the most sure and most tranquil port of wisdom, must enjoy Fortuna's favour in order to arrive at that which he desires*").

[146] We have two testimonies of this incident: *Conf.* IX.iv(12) (quoted here), but also *Sol.* I.xii(21)).

[147] I believe that Augustine's continuous desire for riches and wealth, this time subordinated to the search for wisdom, seems to be part of this as well: considering Augustine's current financial difficulties in continuing to lead the kind of leisured life he had embarked upon, he may well have believed that God would help him in finding a solution for this: he would not desire these riches for their own sake, only to make possible his search of truth together with his friends (See *Soliloquies* I.xi(18): *R.*: "si tibi persuadeatur aliter cum multis carissimis tuis te in studio sapientiae non posse uiuere, nisi ampla res aliqua familiaris necessitates uestras sustinere possit, nonne desiderabis diuitias et optabis? *A.*: Adsentior". ("*Suppose you were convinced that you could not live the life of the pursuit of wisdom together with your many dear friends unless substantial private resources could meet your daily needs, would you not want and wish for wealth?*" A.: "*I would*"). That is why, I believe, he had high hopes that Romanianus would be "converted", because this would make it at the same time financially possible for him to enjoy his so much desired leisured life together with his friends, which would render him the happy life. In the end, Augustine had to fall back on his own modest resources in Thagaste in order to continue enjoying a life in leisure, and this without many of his former friends.

such an important role in Augustine's proselytizing strategy in *De academicis*:

> Es handelt sich vielmehr um einen Gedankenaustausch, wobei deutlich wird, dass Augustins *Fortuna*-Begriff grundsätzlich positiv geprägt ist (im Sinn eines *diuinum auxilium*), während Alypius sich an heidnischen Vorstellungen orientiert (*Fortuna* als unberechenbare Macht, die es zu bezwingen gilt).[148]

Alypius merely accepts the idea that *Fortuna*'s whimsical behaviour makes man realize that her goods are unreliable. It does not follow for him that *Fortuna* is benign, and even less so – a view which is anathema to a Roman philosopher – that man becomes dependent on her (favour) in order to become wise, and thus to be happy. Contrary to Augustine's opinion, he still seems to stick to the Ciceronian view that man's *uirtus* is strong enough to do without *Fortuna*'s assistance in order to become happy. Clearly, Alypius does not perceive *Fortuna* to be *auxilium christiani Dei*: he does not want to assign to *Fortuna* such an important and positive role, otherwise it would then depend on her whimsicality as to whether we would become happy or not.[149]

Augustine ends the discussion on this topic without the two sides really having arrived at a common position.[150] Alypius keeps holding on to a classical viewpoint, while Augustine has already exchanged his for the Christian idea of perceiving God's helping hand in events. Again, Alypius, although having become a *christianus*, still seems to adhere more to (the authority of) Cicero than to Christ.[151]

Note, however, that what Alypius says in *De ordine* after having praised Augustine for presenting his magnificent programme of life, could undermine this thesis:

> Nam nescio quomodo, quod utinam uel a nobis procul absit, animus humanus dum haec audiendo caelestia diuina ac prorsus uera esse proclamet, in appetendo aliter se gerit, ut mihi uerissimum uideatur aut diuinos homines, aut non sine diuina ope sic uiuere.[152]

[148] Therese Fuhrer 1997, p. 233.

[149] We already encounter here an idea that Augustine will develop later: it is in God's hands who will be saved.

[150] I disagree here with Therese Fuhrer (1997, p. 233), who believes that Augustine in the end agrees with Alypius, so that his initial complaint that their household duties were preventing them from holding further discussions is rejected. When Augustine ends the debate on *Fortuna*, he does so not because he agrees in the end with Alypius, but because he cannot immediately persuade Alypius to adopt his position.

[151] For a good summary of the discussion, see Augustine J. Curley (1996, p. 98-99).

[152] *De ordine* II.x(28).

Alypius cannot understand why so many people proclaiming the mentioned maxims for a happy life to be absolutely true, still behave differently in real life. Therefore, he thinks that those few who live accordingly are either divine or have divine assistance. Augustine subsequently tries to show that we ourselves cannot know what goes on inside other people, and that this *diuinum auxilium* actually fulfills its office of mercy in favour of all peoples, and more abundantly than many imagine.[153] Augustine further also praises Alypius, for whom these rules are easy to follow thanks to his admirable nature, that he has become an example to him for their practical content.[154] The question remains: is Alypius sufficiently aware that he himself needs God's helping hand (visible at times in the whimsicalities of *Fortuna*) in order to live by these maxims, and, in recognizing his weak condition, should humbly submit to the sacred rites of the Catholic Church?[155] This crucial question remains highly doubtful. In praising Pythagoras and his "almost divine teaching" later on[156] one still has the impression that Alypius' outlook on life is very traditionally Roman, not Christian,[157] while accepting Augustine as his spiritual and philosophical guide.

4. Alypius' (late) decision to be baptized together with Augustine

Only towards the end of their stay at Cassiciacum, Alypius seems to have adopted the humility expected of someone who wants to receive the holy sacrament of baptism. Indeed, the following

[153] *De ordine* II.x(28): "illud diuinum auxilium, latius quam nonnulli opiniantur officium clementiae suae per uniuersos populos agit".

[154] Augustine uses the phrase *deificari in otio* in a letter to Nebridius. Such an expression could easily be given a less 'Catholic' meaning, also by some of his friends. On the difficulties interpreting this expression, and its possible (Neo-)Platonic source, see f.i. Georges Folliet (1962); for Augustine's more general understanding of deification, see Gerald Bonner (1986), and for a critique of Georges Folliet's article, see Roland J. Teske (1992).

[155] In this passage, Augustine refers to the sacred rites into which they are being initiated. Even if this means that the whole group at Cassiciacum was being initiated into the baptismal rite of the Catholic Church, then clearly, this initiation does not necessarily entail that they all will be baptized at Easter, seeing that neither Licentius, nor Trygetius joined Augustine in baptism.

[156] *De ordine* II.xx(54).

[157] Vivien Bardet (1904, p. 143) comments: "Alype surtout a l'air d'être bien plus engoué des théories de Pythagore et des philosophes grecs qu'épris de la simplicité de l'Évangile".

passage of *Confessiones* makes sense if before Alypius had not been so keen on baptism:

> Inde ubi tempus aduenit quo me nomen dare oporteret, relicto rure Mediolanium remeauimus. placuit et Alypio renasci in te mecum.[158]
> *When the time came for me [i.e. Augustine] to give in my name for baptism, we left the country and returned to Milan. It pleased also Alypius to be reborn in You with me.*

Alypius demonstrated this required humility on his return to Milan in a manner most appropriate to his character:

> iam induto humilitate sacramentis tuis congrua et fortissimo domitori corporis, usque ad Italiam solum glaciale nudo pede obterendum insolito ausu.
> *He had already embraced the humility befitting your mysteries, and tamed his body to a tough discipline by asceticism of extraordinary boldness: he went barefoot on the icy soil of Italy.*

Such heroic demonstration of his outstanding (inborn) *uirtus* makes the humbleness he embraced questionable. Regardless of the fact that such extreme ascetic practice was sternly rebuked by the Church authorities,[159] Alypius' behaviour still reminds of the Manichaean show of continence, much admired by him, but condemned by Augustine for being no true virtue.[160] I think we are nevertheless justified in perceiving a change behind the initial "dedignabatur inseri nomen tuum litteris nostris", via "subegeris Alypium nomini unigeniti tui", to arrive at "iam induto humilitate sacramentis tuis congrua".[161] Probably, Alypius was, just as Victorinus, prepared to privately claim "iam sum christianus", but at first still reluctant to submit to the sacraments of the Church. If this was the case, then this shows how crucial Simplicianus' story of Victorinus' conversion actually must have been, even if it did not immediately have the sought after result on Augustine.

Geert VAN REYN
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[158] *Conf.* IX.vi(14); James J. O'Donnell (1992, III, p. 90) suggests that placuit et Alypio… "may record a further decision".

[159] James J. O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 105.

[160] *Conf.* VI.vii(12).

[161] It seems impossible that Alypius would "iam induto humilitate sacramentis tuis congrua" while he still "dedignabatur inseri nomen Christi litteris nostris".

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"PLOTINUS' DOCTRINE OF THE ΛΟΓΟΣ AS A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON AUGUSTINE'S EXEGESIS OF GENESIS"

One of the most commented passages in the *Confessiones* of Augustine is book VII, ix 13. In this part of his grand oeuvre, Augustine narrates that after having read a few Platonist treatises, he discovered there almost the same doctrine as in the prologue of the Gospel of John (1:1-5).[1] To explain Augustine's understanding of this comparison, several scholars have pointed out the similarities of Augustine's own doctrine of the Word of God *(Verbum Dei)* as Creator, with the hypostasis of the Intellect (Νοῦς) of Plotinus.[2] In my view, these

[1] VII. ix. 13: ..., *procurasti mihi per quendam hominem inmanissimo tyfo turgidum quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam uersos, et ibi legi non quidem his uerbis, sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum: hoc erat in principio apud deum; omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil; quod factum est in eo uita est, et uita erat lux hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non conprehenderunt; et quia hominis anima, quamuis testimonium perhibeat de lumine, non est tamen ipsa lumen, sed uerbum deus, ipse est lumen uerum, quod inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum; et quia in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognouit. quia uero in sua propria uenit et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius, non ibi legi. Les Confessions Livres I-VII, Bibliothèque Augustinienne. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin 13*; Texte de l'Édition de M. Skutella, Introduction et Notes par A. Solignac, Traduction de E. Tréhorel et G. Bouissou, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1962). (See also *CSEL* 33, *CCL* 27). "Through a man puffed up with monstrous pride, you brought under my eye some books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. There I read, not of course in these words, but with entirely the same sense and supported by numerous and varied reasons, 'In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him nothing was made. What was made is life in him; and the life was the light of men. And the light shone in the darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it.' Moreover, the soul of man, although it bears witness of the light, is,'not that light', but God the Word is himself 'the true light which illuminates every man coming into the world'. Further, 'he was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world did not know him.' But that, 'he came to his own and his own did not receive him; but as many as received him, to them he gave the power to become sons of God by believing in his name', that I did not read there (John I: 1-12)." (*Saint Augustine* Confessiones, translated with an introduction and notes by H. Chadwick, (Oxford: University Press, 2008).

[2] O. Perler, *Der Nus bei Plotin und das* Verbum *bei Augustinus als vorbildliche Ursache der Welt,* (Paderborn: Bonifazius-Druckerei, 1930), 23-25, 31, 47, 72-74.; É. Gilson, *Introduction a l'Étude de Saint Augustin*, 3e édition, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1969), 275, note 1, 261-263.; P. Brown, *La Vie de Saint*

scholars have failed to take the influence of the Plotinian Λόγος into serious consideration. I will show in this paper that numerous significant points of agreements can easily be detected between Augustine's doctrine of the *Verbum Dei* and the Plotinian Λόγος. On the basis of my conclusions, it is plausible to infer that the Plotinian Λόγος was a major influence for Augustine's creation doctrine. This will be the subject of my final evaluation.

Augustine and the Platonists

The text *Confessiones* VII. ix. 13, in which the prologue of the Gospel of John is compared to Platonism, provokes a number of interesting questions which have inspired many modern studies,[3] such as: how could Augustine claim that there are similarities between the Λόγος of John and Platonism in the first place? Do such similarities really exist? And what were the 'few Platonist treatises' which Augustine read just before his conversion to Christianity, which impelled him to compare Platonic concepts with John's Λόγος? Augustine doesn't provide us with any titles nor does he let us know which group of Platonists he was referring to in the passages.[4]

Augustin, (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 2001), 122. Translated to French by J. Marrou (original title: *Augustinus of Hippo, A Biography*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1967, 2000); M. Fattal, *Plotin chez Augustin suivi de Plotin face aux Gnostiques*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006), 83-88.; J. Brachtendorf, *Augustins* Confessiones (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 130-131.; J. M. Quinn, *A Companion to the Confessions of Augustine*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 360-366.

[3] Commentaries on this theme are too numerous to name here. In addition to the authors in note 2, I consulted the following studies for this research: P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*, (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1968); J. Pépin, "Augustin, *Quaestio De Ideis*, Les Affinités Plotiniennes", in: *From Athens to Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought, Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeaneau*, ed.: H.J. Westra, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 117-134.; J. J. O'Donnell, *Augustine Confessions*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), vol. II, 413-426; K. Ruhstorfer, „*Confessiones* 7; Die Platoniker und Paulus, Augustins neue Sicht auf das Denken, Wollen und Tun der Wahrheit", in: *Die* Confessiones *des Augustinus von Hippo: Einführung und Interpretationen zu den dreizehn Büchern*, eds.: M. Bettetini, N. Fischer, C. Mayer, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1998), 283-341.; A. Solignac, „Ce que Augustin dit avoir lu de Plotin", *BA* 13, 682-689.; G. Sterling, "Day One: Platonizing Exegetical Traditions of Genesis 1:1-5 in John and Jewish Authors", in: *Studia Philonica Annual* XVII, (2005), 118-140. All these authors deal with the influence of Platonism on various aspects of Augustine's teachings.

[4] Augustine does refer to Plotinus when mentioning 'the few Platonist books' but in a different context: *De Beata Vita* 1, 4-5: *Lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris...*, *CSEL* 29.

Concerning the question which Platonist texts Augustine had read, P. Henry demonstrated in 1938 that the *Enneads* by the Neo-Platonist Plotinus, was most certainly an important source for Augustine and especially the treatises *On Beauty* (I,6) and *On the three primary hypostases* (V,1), which he surely studied well. [5] Henry's conclusions find consensus among modern scholars. Since Henry, further research on this subject has been done so that many other treatises of the *Enneads* have come to be regarded as plausible sources for Augustine.[6]

The question of Augustine's intention of comparing John's prologue with Platonism in *Confessiones* VII, ix, 13 has been responded to by many scholars such as O. Perler (1931), É. Gilson (1969) and most recently, M. Fattal (2006).[7] Essentially it is their assumption that Augustine, while devising his exegesis of the creation story of Genesis, adopted a few key concepts of the Plotinian Νοῦς as inspiration for his doctrine of the Creator, the Word of God.

Now I will go deeper into this to clarify a few points of interest. Augustine spent practically his whole adult life striving to attain the 'correct interpretation' of Genesis. It was of utmost importance for him to place the Jewish creation story in Genesis into a Christian redemption framework.[8] As a logical point of departure for his exegesis, Augustine began with the prologue in the Gospel of John, the most extensive New Testament interpretation of the creation story in Genesis. There, the Word of God, the Λόγος, is the Son of God, from which all things were made; it is the divine Light that came into the world but wasn't recognized. Expressed more explicitly, Jesus Christ is the Λόγος, the Creator of the world. Augustine translated John's term Λόγος from Greek into Latin as *Verbum Dei*.

Now we will return to the conclusions of Perler, Gilson and others regarding the question what Augustine read in the Platonist texts which led him to claim affinities with the divine Λόγος of John's Gospel. My response to their conclusions was: if we are to compare Augustine's Word of God with a divine, creative force from the Plotinian cosmogony, why not the Λόγος?

[5] P. Henry, *La Vision d'Ostie. Sa place dans la vie et l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin*, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1938) (regarding the theme ecstasy and the ascent to God in *Confessiones* VII).

[6] Pépin (see note 3) provides a list of these treatises.

[7] See note 2.

[8] R.N. Hebb, "Augustine's exegesis *ad litteram*", *Augustinian Studies* 38: 2, (2007), 365-379.; E. Hill, *On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, The Literal Meaning of Genesis*. The Works of Augustine, A Translation for the 21st century, Part I vol. 13, (New York: New York City Press, 2000), 13-21.

Up until now I have not been able to locate any studies in which Augustine's *Verbum Dei* is set side-by-side the Plotinian Λόγος doctrine and particularly in reference to the question above.[9] The Plotinian Λόγος seems to me a better place to begin because of the relationship between Augustine's doctrine of the Word of God and John's Λόγος. John's Word could possibly have been influenced by the λόγος tradition in Greek philosophy and appears to some extent to resemble the Λόγος doctrine of the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria.[10] In Philo's exegesis of Genesis, a divine Λόγος is the Creator of the cosmos and intermediary between God and humanity in world history.[11] Philo clearly relied upon Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato for his creation interpretation. Just as Philo's Λόγος, the principle of the Λόγος of certain Middle Platonists (such as Timaeus of Locri, Alcinous and Numenius) also acts as mediator between the worlds of the divine and humans.[12] Even several of Augustine's predecessors (such as Justin, Clement and Origen) identified Christ with the Λόγος from Greek philosophy.[13] For this reason I find it of utmost relevance to investigate the question of whether Augustine's doctrine of the Word of God had undergone influence from the Greek philosophical λόγος tradition and particularly, from the notion of the Λόγος within Plotinus' cosmogony.

My strategy here is to investigate the differences and the similarities between Augustine's *Verbum Dei* and Plotinus' Λόγος. But in order to compare these two entities, it is necessary to first look into how both thinkers conceived the origin of the world and how they depicted the respective creative forces producing the universe. My investigation will begin with a short exposé of Augustine's creation doctrine and then a discussion of certain salient features of the *Verbum*

[9] Cf: A.P. Bos, *In de greep van de Titanen, Inleiding tot een hoofdstroming van de Griekse filosofie*, (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1991), 115-121. Bos shows how Augustine integrated Plotinus' Λόγος doctrine into his creation theory and why the rationality of the creation of the cosmos was of importance to Augustine's statements in *Confessiones* VII, ix, 13.

[10] Cf: C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 276-279.; A.P. Bos, "God as 'Father' and 'Maker' in Philo of Alexandria and its background in Aristotelian Thought", *Elenchos* 24, (2003), 211-332; idem, "Philo on God as *Archê geneseôs*", *Journal of Jewish Studies* 60, (2009), 32-47.

[11] E.g. *De Opificio Mundi 16*.

[12] See Sterling, 2005, 126.

[13] H.J. Vogt, "Sohn Gottes, Λόγος des Schöpfers, Verwertung hellenistischer Gedanken bei den Kirchenvätern", in: *Theologische Quartalschrift*, jrg. 154, (1974), 250-265.

Dei. After going into Plotinus' discussion of the emergence of the three hypostases: the One, the Intellect (Νοῦς) and the Soul, we will take a closer look at the functions of the Λόγος within his cosmogony before ultimately discussing the resemblances between the *Verbum* and the Λόγος.

Augustine's exegesis of Genesis

Augustine's interpretation of Genesis can be found in at least five different major works which he wrote within a period of thirty years.[14] For the sake of brevity, I aim to give merely an impression of his exegesis by describing -in the most simplified form possible- the main lines which are common to all his interpretations.[15] For this purpose, I chose to use here the three final books of *Confessiones*[16] and *De Genesi ad litteram libri XII*.[17] In addition, references will be made to the short essay *De Ideis*.[18] In these works many aspects of Augustine's exegesis, which will be referred to here, are more fully developed. Admittedly, Augustine's creation doctrine contains

[14] *De Genesi contra Manichaeos,* (388-389); *De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus,* (393-394); Books XI-XIII of *Confessiones,* (397-401); *De Genesi ad litteram libri XII*, (401-416), Book XI of *De Civitate Dei*, (approx. 416). (Hill, 2000, 13-14).

[15] The most complete overview of Augustine's creation doctrine in all its facets is C. Mayer's "*Creatio, Creator, creatura*" in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, ed.: Mayer, C. et al, vol. 2, (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1996-2000), 56-116. For other summaries of Augustine's creation doctrine: *Augustine through the Ages, An Encyclopedia,* ed.: A.D. Fitzgerald et al., (Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999): „*Creation*", R. Williams, 251-254, and "*Genesis accounts of Creation*", R.J. Teske, 379-381.; É. Gilson, 1969, 275-285.; S. Knuuttila, "Time and Creation in Augustine", *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine,* eds. E. Stump and N. Kretzmann, (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), 103-115.; S. MacCormack, "Augustine Reads Genesis", Saint Augustine's Lecture 2006, in: *Augustinian Studies* 39:1 (2008), 5-47.; M.A. Vannier, Creatio, Conversio, Formatio *chez Saint Augustin,* (Paradosis 31), (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1991).

[16] See note 1: Chadwick, 2008; Solignac, *BA* 13, *BA* 14; *CSEL* 33, *CCL* 27.

[17] *St. Augustine, the Literal Meaning of Genesis,* translated and annotated by J. H. Taylor, (New York: Newman Press, 1982); *La Genèse au sens littéral en douze livres* (I-VII), *BA* 48, 49; Traduction, Introduction et Notes par P. Agaësse et A. Solignac, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1972.); *CSEL* 28.

[18] No. 46 *De Diuersis Quaestionibus. CCL* 44A*; Saint Augustine Eighty-Three Different Questions,* translated by D. L. Mosher, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1982); *BA* 10: *Opuscules X. Mélanges Doctrinaux;* texte de l'Édition Bénédictine. Introductions, traduction et notes: G. Bardy, J.-A. Beckaert, J. Boutet, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1952), 123-129.

numerous complicated issues which are not possible to fully unravel in this succinct exposé.[19]

The Word of God and the creation of the world

Reflecting upon the world around us, Augustine summed up our corporeal existence by using only a few adjectives: the visible world can be characterized by its changeability which is a direct result of its sheer imperfection. The imperfection of the world, according to the bishop of Hippo, creates an inner tension in humans and a longing for the true, ultimate source of an unchanging, enduring nature. The realization that we are created by a perfect, immutable and eternal God, together with the proper knowledge of how our world came to be, are necessary steps for delivering ourselves from this tumultuous, earthly existence. We require this knowledge in order to fulfil these longings and to be able to unite ourselves with the highest form of existence.[20]

The church father no doubt pondered the lack of coherence in the notion of an eternal and immutable God which produced a world which is temporal and constantly in a state of flux. To resolve this discrepancy, a creative, divine entity is required which can manifest in both worlds. In Augustine's exegesis this entity is conceived when God the Father 'spoke' and thereby generated a Son, the Word of God.[21] God's Son, in turn, created the world by 'speaking' and materializing the eternal Ideas *(formae)* and reasons *(rationes aeternae)* which exist in His mind.[22] Augustine declared that the Son of God is a perfect image of his Father and like Him, is eternal, immutable, transcendent and perfect *(Verbum similitudinis)*.[23] God the Father and His Son are one and in unison, they created the world. But due to his role as intermediary[24] and to his immanence in the visible world, the Word is nonetheless unlike his Father. The problem of the ontological discrepancy between the eternal and immutable realm of the Creator and the temporal, changeable world of his creation still remains. In the following sections we will see Augustine's further attempt at the

[19] E.g., his interpretation of 'heaven' and 'earth' in Genesis 1 often lacks consistency.

[20] *Confessiones* XI.

[21] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* I. iv. 9; I. ii. 6; I. v. 11.

[22] Ibid, I. v. 11; I. ii. 6; I. v. 11; II. viii. 17. *Confessiones* XI. ix. 11; *De Ideis.*

[23] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim.* I. iv. 9; I. ii. 6.

[24] E.g.: *Confessiones* XI. ii. 4.

solution in his conception of the two phases of creation and his theory of *rationes*.[25]

The six days of creation

Augustine saw that the Creator was able to retain his infinite nature by creating within the eternal realm itself: within 'one moment' in eternity: *in ictu condendi*. In this way, Augustine could assert that the words "in the beginning" "*in principio*" from the first verse of Genesis,"In the beginning, God created heaven and earth."refer not to the initiation of time (as the ἀρχή of the Λόγος in John's Gospel), but to the creation principle itself, the origin of all things, the *Verbum Dei* or the ontological foundation of the universe.[26]

The bishop of Hippo emphasized that the notion of the completion of creation within six days was of an allegorical nature and should not be understood literally.[27] How then did the temporal, changing world which we know, come into existence? Augustine posited a creation in two phases. Our world first came into existence in the second phase.[28]

In the first phase of creation, the *prima conditio,*[29] God created heaven and earth, but not the visible heaven and earth which we are accustomed to perceiving with our corporeal senses. The 'heaven of the heavens' *(caelum caeli)* was the first product of creation, a realm of pure Light, intelligence and knowledge which is closest to God. This is the domicile of the Holy Trinity and of the angels: heavenly beings enlightened with God's Wisdom by the Word, having received formation.[30] This is also the origin of the human soul as well as the destination of saints after their death.[31]

Then the Word created the invisible 'earth' which is, in other words, 'intelligible matter'. Within matter, the four elements *(elementa mundi)* came into being which were impregnated with causal reason

[25] Cf: Agaësse and Solignac, 1972, 653-668.

[26] *Confessiones* XI. ix. 11.

[27] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim,* II; IV. xxxiii. 51; V. xxiii. 46. See note 8.

[28] Ibid, III-X.

[29] Ibid, V. v. xii-xvi.

[30] The beings of this reality are perfect creatures in respect to those with a carnal body on account of their 'formation' in the first creation phase, by means of the *Verbum*'s Illumination. Ibid, I. iv. 9-11; III. viii.

[31] Ibid, I. xvii. 32; *Confessiones* XII. ii. 3-iii. 4.

principles or *rationes causales*.[32] These principles contain the laws of development and outlines for every future living being in the visible world. This indicates that the creatures which are known to us in this world were 'pre-formed' primordially in the first creation phase: invisibly, potentially and causally.[33]

In the second creation phase, the *administratio*,[34] the rational principles unfold in the material world within the realm of time. In this way, all kinds of physical beings with souls come into existence and are still being produced. The creation in the second phase is largely carried out by seminal reasons or *rationes seminales*,[35] invisible, rational principles established in matter which develop and grow in the manner of seeds. They unfold in accordance with the eternal forms and eventually actualize all things in the visible world. The world is, according to Augustine, a reflection of forms and reason principles, models for the physical world, which exist in the intellect of the Creator.[36] The Ideas and the rational principles are the invisible building stones of the material world which become objective only in the second creation phase.

It was in this phase that God instigated the commencement of world history. However, the world is governed and maintained further by the *rationes causales,* in complete dependency of God's will. Nothing in this phase could come to life without first existing as an intelligible form in the *prima conditio*. The *rationes* assure the order, reasonability and stability of established species. Their impact in the *administratio* phase explains how God can 'rest' on the seventh day, while the initial creation act is perpetuated in cosmic history in the corporeal realm of existence. With his theory of the *rationes,* Augustine could ascertain the absolute dependency of the creation on God.[37]

We see here that the two moments of creation conform conveniently to the ontological oppositions mentioned earlier. For example, God, the *Verbum*, the Ideas and the *rationes aeternae* pertain to

[32] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* V. xiii. 29; VI. i-ii; XIV. xxv; I ii-iii; IV. ix.

[33] Ibid, VI. vi. x; IX. xvii, xxxii. Matter plays an important role in Augustine's exegesis of Genesis. The church father defends *creatio ex nihilo* (Cf: *Conf.* XII and XIII) but not the pre-existence of matter. Augustine's theory of matter, specifically how matter and form were brought together, is another example of a complicated issue which is presented here in the briefest terms. (Cf. note 19)

[34] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* V. iv, 10-11, viii. 23, ix. 24, xi. 27, etc.

[35] Ibid, I. v. 29; IV. xxxiii. 52; VI. x. 17; VI. xi. 19; V. vii.

[36] *De Ideis* (note 18)

[37] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* IV. xii. 22; VI. x.17-11,19; VI. xiv. 25-15, 26.

the first phase of creation which took place in the intelligible, eternal realm. The physical, visible world is subject to time and changeability and corresponds with the second creation phase. Viewing this system as a whole, God the Father and the *Verbum* are perfect, the intelligible realm is less perfect,[38] and the material realm of the cosmos is unquestionably deficient.

Augustine employs his theory of the *rationes* for resolving the ontological discrepancies between the eternal, divine realm and the sensible world of time. The *rationes causales* serve as a synthesis of the ontological dialectic.[39] Altogether, these creating reasons function on three levels of existence: that of the Creator (*rationes aeternae)* and in the two phases of creation: the first or intelligible phase (*rationes causales)* and the second or corporeal phase (*rationes seminales).*[40] On account of the co-existence of the Reasons and Ideas in the mind of the Creator, the *Verbum* was designated as the 'Form Principle' [41] and the 'Reason Principle'.[42] To summarize, the Word, the Ideas and the *rationes* are transcendent as well as immanent. According to Augustine, the world that the Creator made was of a rational nature and therefore comprehensible to the human mind; God and his Word are on the other hand, unfathomable.[43]

How does the creation of man fit into this exegesis? Augustine saw human beings as being composed of a body and a soul. The formation of the human body is narrated in Genesis 2:7.[44] In Augustine's exegesis of this passage, physical bodies are first created intelligibly by *rationes causales* and then, developed in matter ('dust') in the second phase of creation by *rationes seminales.*[45] We have already seen in his exegesis how the human soul was created at the same time as the angelic intelligence of the *caelum caeli* at the *prima conditio.*

[38] E.g.: the potential changeability of beings of the *caelum caeli*; or the human soul, both which are not eternal or immutable.

[39] Agaësse and Solignac, 1972, 599-603.

[40] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 5. xii. 28.

[41] *Confessiones* XIII. 10. 11; *De Ideis*; *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* II. viii. 17; V. xii. 28; V. xiii. 29; V. xv. 33; V. xvi. 34.

[42] Ibid, II. vi. 12 and 13; II. viii. 17; V. xii. 28; V. xiii. 29; VI, x, 17.

[43] Ibid, XIV. xxviii-15. XIV. xxiv; I. v. 11; II. vi. 14; IX. xvii. 32.

[44] The LORD God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being. (The bible translations above are the New Internationals Version. http://www.biblegateway.com.)

[45] As in the bodies of Adam and Eve. Cf: *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* VI; How the soul was united with the physical body was a problem which Augustine himself admitted to being incapable of giving an adequate explanation (*Epistulae* 137.3). See also his attempts to explain this process: Cf.: R. de Teske, "Soul", in: *Augustine through the Ages*, 809.; Agaësse and Solignac, 1972, *BA* 48 695-706.

Augustine also interpreted the verse Genesis 1:26, which states that man was created as an image of God, as a description of God's creation of the soul.[46] He explained that the image of God can only be located in the soul (and not the body) of humans and specifically in the highest part of the soul, the only region in the mind where knowledge of God can be attained.[47] The soul cannot become perfect until it is completely (in)formed, that is, until it attains the same divine knowledge which the beings of the *caelum caeli* possess. The potential to attain this knowledge and perfection exists intrinsically in the human soul as a direct result of the *Verbum*'s creation.[48]

The Creator: *Verbum Dei.*

Up until now we have seen that the eternal Ideas and the rational principles exist in their purest form in the *Verbum* and are therefore transcendent. Yet they are immanent in matter as well. In a parallel manner, the *Verbum* is transcendent and also manifests in the experiential world of humans. Augustine delineated the presence of the Word of God in the world in a number of ways. For example: the *Verbum* appears to persons in their soul as their Inner Teacher, whose education consists of the secrets of the origin of the world, in other words, knowledge of Himself, but also knowledge of the eternal Ideas, by which all things were made. The Word administers pure, spiritual knowledge *(uisio intellectualis)*, and true knowledge, because He himself is the ultimate Truth *(ueritas)* and Wisdom *(sapientia)*. To fathom this wisdom and attain insight required for faith, we must actively search for knowledge, by turning inward and focusing upon one's own mind.[49] Yet it is imperative that the soul be purified. By turning *(conuersio)* to God's Word and receiving his Enlightenment *(illuminatio)*, we can become more of an image of God the Father by imitating His Form *(formatio)* and Perfect Image. In this manner, we approach perfection which will enable us to fully unify with the Origin of our existence.[50]

[46] Then God said, "*Let us make man in our image, in our likeness...*"

[47] *De Ideis; De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* III. xx. 31; III. xxii. 34; V. xiii. 30.

[48] Ibid, III. xx. 30; IV. xxiii. 40; IV. xxv. 42.

[49] E.g.: *Confessiones* XI. ii. 9, *"You call us therefore, to understand the Word, God, who is with you."* (translation Chadwick); *Confessiones* XI. ix. 11; XII. viii. 10; XII. ix. 11, *De Magistro*; *De Ideis*.

[50] *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* I. iv. 9; I. v. 10; III. xx. 30. Cf. Vannier, 1991.

Christ and the notion of the Λόγος from Greek philosophy

We have seen that Augustine made various references to the Gospel of John, such as the Creator Word as 'Principle', as the origin of existence and as Light. We have also seen how Augustine used these ideas to expound his doctrine of the Inner Teacher and *illuminatio*, by identifying Christ with Wisdom and Truth. Yet how did Augustine deal with the Greek term Λόγος from John's Gospel? Before examining the Λόγος concept in Plotinus' cosmogony in the following section, I will now underline certain aspects of Augustine's creation doctrine which refer to the general meaning of the term λόγος from the ancient Greek language and philosophy.

The term λόγος in ancient Greek signifies, among other things, a 'story' or an 'account', and is therefore associated with speaking. In his interpretation of the creation story in Genesis, Augustine utilized the term 'speaking' as a motif in various ways. For example, the Word of God is a kind of expression or statement of the Father. By 'speaking', the Word itself created the material world with the eternal Ideas which reside in himself. The words which Christ spoke during his incarnation on earth as Jesus of Nazareth, which are accounted for in the Scriptures, also reflect the *Verbum*'s Λόγος activity. The language of the Word of God is identified with education, the provision of wisdom and true knowledge. By 'speaking', Christ illuminates the mutable human mind with immutable, eternal Light.

The significance of λόγος in the sense of 'reason' as in Greek philosophy is emphatically present in Augustine's creation exegesis, especially in his theory of *rationes*. In a short essay, he discusses the Latin translation of the Greek word Λόγος in the prologue of John's Gospel.[51] Augustine explains his choice of '*uerbum*' for its translation, although the correct translation, he says, is actually *ratio* or 'reason'. Does this statement in his essay indicate that Augustine was trying to avoid the association with the Divine Reason from Greek philosophy, for example from the Stoics or from Philo, or even with the Christ-Λόγος from earlier Christian thinkers?

This seems to me highly improbable. Because in another essay, *De Ideis*, he brings up once again the subject of the translation of λόγος, but this time in the context of his doctrine of the Ideas. The Latin translation of the Greek word ἰδέα, Augustine expounds, is *forma* or *species*. He reminds us that 'form' can also signify '*ratio*' (λόγος), because the meaning of the term *ratio* also includes rational

[51] *De Verbo*: essay 63, *De Diuersis Quaestionibus*, see note 18.

principles of knowledge and intelligibility which are inherent in the Ideas. *Ratio* (λόγος) and *forma* (ἰδέα) are then, in Augustine's point of view, synonymous. We have already seen a demonstration of these statements in the collaborative activities of the *rationes* and the Ideas in Augustine's creation doctrine and also in the references to the Creator as Reason Principle and Form Principle.

Augustine integrated the meaning of λόγος in the sense of 'rational thinking' into his redemption doctrine by stressing the importance of acquiring knowledge. Contemplation of the Ideas and gaining divine knowledge take place only in the highest and purest part of the human soul, the rational mind. These facts indicate to us, that even before we consider Plotinus' Λόγος doctrine, it is already clear that Augustine's doctrine of the *Verbum Dei* is permeated with influence from λόγος concepts from Greek philosophy.

Plotinus' view of the formation of the universe[52]

The origin of the world and all life in it is an hypostasis which Plotinus calls the One or the Good. This principle of absolute unity is so far removed from anything thinkable or recognizable that any description of it is impossible. It is a complete whole and totally transcendent. By means of expressing itself (Λόγος), the One gives birth to a new hypostasis, the Νοῦς or the Intellect.[53] The result of the coming to existence of this new entity is a duplicity. The One remains exactly as it is, but the new hypostasis is less perfect than the One. Once the Intellect comes into being, it longs to understand its source.

[52] *Plotinus with an English translation*, A. H. Armstrong (London: Harvard University Press, 1966-1988). Studies focused on the Plotinian Λόγος utilized for my research: P. Agaësse and A. Solignac, "Le *Logos* et les *Logoi* chez Plotin", *BA* 48, 654-657; A.H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1940, 1967); P. Boot, *Plotinus Over Voorzienigheid Enneade* III 2-3 [47-48] Inleiding, Commentaar, Essays, (dissertation), (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1984); M. Fattal, Logos *et Image chez Plotin*, (Paris, Montreal: L'Harmattan, 1998), "Beauté et métaphysique chez Plotin: le rôle du *logos* venu des dieux", in: Logos *et Langage chez Plotin et avant Plotin* sous la direction de Michel Fattal, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003), *Image, Mythe,* Logos *et Raison*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009), 35-62; R. Ferwerda, *Plotinus Enneaden, Porphyrius Over Het Leven van Plotinus*, vertaald uit het Grieks en ingeleid door R. Ferwerda, (Budel (the Netherlands): Uitgeverij Damon, 2005) [in particular the extensive introduction p. 13-101 and glossary p. 911-928.]; E. Früchtel, *Weltentwurf und* Logos. *Zur Metaphysik Plotins* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970); J.M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, (Cambridge, University Press, 1967).

[53] *Enneads* III. 2. 2.15, xx-xxv; V. I. 7. 44-46.

It then turns[54] to contemplate (θεωρεῖν) the Good. By means of this contemplation, it receives the fullness and abundance of the One and becomes pure Thought. The Intellect is, as the One, totally transcendent and exists exclusively in its own divine realm. From the One, it also receives the intelligible world (the Forms or the Ideas) which contains the models for producing life in the material world. For this reason, the Νοῦς is referred to as Being. The Νοῦς reproduces itself by expressing itself (Λόγος) and also divides itself into individual intellects (also referred to as Λόγοι).

Plotinus calls the Intellect a god: the demiurge.[55] By means of a creative expression (Λόγος), the Νοῦς produces a new hypostasis: the Soul. The Soul is an image of the Intellect but exists at a further distance away from the One than the Νοῦς which means that it is less perfect and more differentiated than its source. Just as the Νοῦς above, it turns to its origin, contemplates the Νοῦς, and in doing so receives its properties: Thought and Being. It also receives the individual intellects (as individual Λόγοι) and the forms or models of Being for the material world which it will realize at a later stage.

The Soul is now an image of the Intellect. However, these noetic properties remain only in the highest region of the Soul, which is subsequently called νοῦς. Following an expression (Λόγος), the Soul now produces two lower realms which will always belong to the domain of the total Soul. The realm just below the Νοῦς region is called the World Soul, which is responsible for creating the universe. It then splits itself into individual parts or souls. This came about by contemplation of its source (the Ideas) and expressing itself (Λόγος), whereby its activities became united with the universal Λόγος or Reason. The third realm of the Soul is called Nature, which creates matter and the corporeal world by reproducing itself further as well.

The visible world as we know it, is the fabrication of Nature and the Λόγος, the latter of which, at an earlier stage -in the realm of the Νοῦς- split itself up into individual Λόγοι. Now at the level of Nature, these are called Λόγοι σπερματικοί: germinative principles or creative and formative forces which carry internal laws of growth and development of physical and material structures. They also contain the characteristics of the various species of living beings with the capacity to reproduce. Λόγοι in matter are in themselves images of the eternal Ideas and are responsible for making the sense world a reflection of

[54] The Greek term ἐπιστροφή is the equivalent of the Latin: *conuersio.*
[55] *Enneads* V. 1; V. 9. 3; II. 9. 6.

the intelligible. Both Nature and the Λόγοι are involved with the creation of physical bodies which will house the individual souls. Human bodies are made by Nature contemplating, expressing itself and 'donating' the Λόγοι to matter, thereby (in)forming it.[56]

When treating the subject of the creation of human beings, it is useful to lend some extra attention to Plotinus' view of the relationship between the total Soul and the human soul for the benefit of our upcoming comparison. The tripartite nature of the hypostasis Soul is reflected in the human soul. The human soul is made up of thinking, emotional and desiring parts. The highest part of the human soul is an individual intellect (νοῦς). This νοῦς is exclusively involved with the intelligible realm and never passes outside of it. Just as the total Νοῦς, this part of the human soul comprehends intuitively and simultaneously. Pertaining to the individual νοῦς is an individual λόγος which possesses the capacity to reason (λογισμός), to think discursively (διάνοια) and to come to an understanding of things by logical reasoning, analysis and synthesis. The individual νοῦς is therefore called the rational soul. The lowest region of the human soul deals with emotional affects. It bears the capacity to perceive with the senses and also contains lust and apetites which are useful for vegetative growth and procreation. This part of the soul is named after its transcendent archetype: 'nature'.[57]

Within this process of creating new living beings, we see that the offspring on every level of existence are a result of contemplation (θεωρία) of its source in a higher realm. Θεωρία of beings above is also a way to unite oneself with the highest principle. This brings us to another aspect of Plotinus' philosophy. His cosmogony begins with a description of the development of entities and life coming into existence by a continuous extenuation and emanation from the One. But Plotinus also describes a development moving in the opposite direction: the ascension of the human soul back to the ultimate source, which is important to briefly treat here.

For Plotinus, the return of mankind to its source, the One or the Good, revolves around the subject of beauty. As we have already seen, the visible world is regarded by Plotinus as a mirror image of the higher intelligible world of the Ideas. Consequently, an object which

[56] Ibid, III. 8. 3; IV. 3. 13,15; IV. 4. 39; V. 9. 6. 11, 19; III. 2. 2. xx. Fattal, 2009, 38-45, note 32, 33 and 37. For a detailed study of the relationship between matter, form and seminal reasons in Plotinus, Cf: ibid, 2009, 51-56 and 1998, 35-38; and Plotinus' transformation of the Stoic theory of providential Universal Reason and seminal reasons, ibid, 1998, 30-31, note 1.

[57] *Enneads* IV. 8. 8.

we perceive with our senses is in one way or the other a reflection of a certain Idea existing in de Νοῦς. The ascension to the One then begins with an experience of sensory perception of physical beauty. Eventually one realizes that the beautiful physical phenomenon we perceive is not true beauty at all, but a manifestation of a universal character. The experience of beauty evoked by sense perception is then transformed and raised to an intellectual realization of truth. To ascend a step higher, one turns inward to the deepest recesses of the soul, discovering the source of beauty in oneself. Looking upwards to the higher regions of one's own νοῦς, the intellect, the beauty of all eternal forms are beheld (θεωρία). However, to reach this level, a rigorous purification of the soul is required as well as the abandonment of the world of the physical senses.

The Idea 'Beauty' receives special treatment by Plotinus, because of its elevated status compared to the other intelligible Ideas. 'Beauty' derives not only from the Intellect but from the One. The ultimate step of the ascension to the Good is the most difficult. One has to surpass the intellect and leave the realm of thought behind. The aim is to unify oneself with the highest principle, however this entails waiting until the One reveals itself. Whenever this happens, one participates in the infinite, undetermined and absolute unity of the Good, an experience which is accompanied by ecstasy, comparable to the feeling of being joined with one's beloved, or more intensely, that one has become pure love.[58]

Comparison: Νοῦς-*Verbum*

It is possible to go on extensively about the numerous similarities and differences between Augustine's creation doctrine and Plotinus' cosmogony. But instead, I will only point out a few general resemblances here. To begin with, both Plotinus and Augustine follow the Platonic line of thought, that the visible world is a reflection of the intelligible Ideas. Both thinkers claim that the visible world appeared as a result of a joining together of matter and form. A human being is composed of a body and soul, both of which developed separately before coming together. The soul has both higher and lower levels, of which the highest part is purely rational. Plotinus' Νοῦς is the demiurge of our world and Augustine's Creator is the *Verbum*. Plotinus'

[58] Ibid, V. 5. 8: V. 9. 2; I. 6. 8-9; VI. 7. 31-33.

Νοῦς is the source and location of the intelligible forms just as Augustine's *Verbum*.

The last two similarities bring us back to the issue concerning Augustine's comparison of John's prologue and Platonism in *Confessiones* VII, ix, 13, which I referred to in the introduction. The main question was, what did Augustine have in mind when he claimed that the two had so much in common? In the introduction I mentioned certain scholars (see note 2) who pointed to the similarities between the Plotinian Νοῦς and Augustine's *Verbum Dei* to illustrate their answer. Now we will look at the arguments which Perler used to justify this.

Perler demonstrates that both Plotinus' Νοῦς and Augustine's *Verbum* represent the *vorbildliche Ursache* or exemplary cause of the corporeal world. The Νοῦς is the 'Word', or Λόγος of the One, just as Augustine's *Verbum* is God the Father's Word. The Νοῦς and the *Verbum* are both, in particular, the source of the Forms and also of Light and Enlightenment. Both Plotinus and Augustine claim that the harmony of the world demands supernatural wisdom as its cause. The *Verbum*, as the Νοῦς, is a reasoning Creator who carries out a rational plan in creating the world.[59]

Perler's findings are unquestionably correct. But the problem with Perler and the other scholars who find the Νοῦς-*Verbum* similarities to be the most significant, is that not one of them takes the similarities between Augustine's *Verbum* and Plotinus' Λόγος into consideration. And why not? Their justification is that Plotinus' Λόγος is not a hypostasis and therefore deviates too far from the *Verbum* to be eligible for a serious comparison. It is only the Νοῦς, they assume, with sufficient related features. We can check this statement by taking a closer look at Plotinus' Λόγος doctrine.

Plotinus' doctrine of the Λόγος

In my sketch of Plotinus' cosmogony we came across different aspects of the Λόγος which are useful to review here. For example, the Λόγος was in regard to all three hypostases an 'expression' which was always accompanied by a creative process or a reproduction of the hypostases themselves. The first appearance of the Λόγος took place in the realm of the Νοῦς which is a 'Λόγος' of the One. By contemplating its source, the Νοῦς received the intelligible world. The

[59] Perler, 1931, 23-24, 31, 47, 72-74.

Νοῦς divided itself into individual intellects, each intellect comprising an individual Λόγος. When the Νοῦς expressed itself and the Soul came into being, the Soul turned to contemplate its origin. When the highest part of the Soul became an intellect, it expressed itself (Λόγος) in the same way. This was the second level in which the Λόγος functions, the region of the Soul. We saw in Plotinus' cosmogony that the World Soul eventually became the World Λόγος and subsequently divided itself up into individual souls. These individual souls contained intellects which are λόγοι originally from the total Νοῦς. At the lowest region of the Soul (Nature), form and matter were brought together to make bodies for the individual souls. This was the third level of the Λόγος' activity where the visible world was fabricated by Λόγοι σπερματικοί. [60]

In summary, we have seen that the Λόγος is not only a creative expression, it is also an entity which divided itself into individual parts just as the Intellect and the Soul had done and functioned on three levels of existence: at the level of the Νοῦς, of the Soul and of the visible world.[61] The Λόγος is transcendent as well as immanent. In its transcendent existence, it emanated originally from the One and delivered the intelligible forms from the Νοῦς to the Soul. In the sense world, the incorporeal Λόγοι, which are images of the eternal Ideas, are immanent in matter. The Λόγος and the Soul were both in part responsible for producing the corporeal world and were both called a 'maker' by Plotinus. Plotinus also specified that the Λόγος is identical to the forms and subsequently is a form principle. The Λόγος serves as representative of the Intellect in the lower realms of existence.[62]

Now we may elaborate on the nature of the Λόγος. Besides being a creative and formative principle, its foremost function is as a principle of reason and order.[63] Within the creation process, the Λόγος provides the cosmos and the intelligible world with a rational foundation in compliance with set laws. In this way, it fulfills an important providential function in the world. Altogether, the Λόγος is the structure, the plan and the plot. It is also the origin of the reasoning facility in the human mind: every human being possesses an individual λόγος

[60] *Enneads* III. 2. 2. 20; III. 7.; V. 9. 6.11 and 19; Cf: Agaësse-Solignac, 1972, 654-657.

[61] *Enneads* III. 2. 2. 15-40; III. 3. 5. 10; III. 3. 4. 20, 25-30.

[62] Ibid, III. 2. 11 and 15; V. 9. 6. / III.2.xx-xxx; III.3.4. See Aristotle as the source for equating the Λόγος with 'idea' εἶδος, Cf: Fattal, 1998, 32-33.

[63] *Enneads* II. 7. 3; III. 3. 4. 5-10; III. 8. 8. 13-16; VI. 9. 5.

which is a reflection of the Λόγος at the highest, transcendent level. It provides the human intellect with its mental structure which it needs to process and assimilate the images entering the perception organs and imagination. The reasoning facility resides in the highest region of the human soul, as we have already seen.[64] As we shall read in the next section, the Λόγος is associated with providence and contemplation and plays a distinct role in the return to the One. With these aspects of the Λόγος in mind, we are ready to proceed to a comparison with Augustine's *Verbum*.

Comparison: Λόγος-*Verbum*

There are at least six points of agreement between the Plotinian Λόγος and Augustine's *Verbum* which are candidates for discussion here.[65]

1) As a 'Word of God' and a 'Son of God'

Up until now I have employed forms of the verb 'to express' to describe the activity of Plotinus' Λόγος in its utterance (ἐν προφορᾷ): the Intellect was an expression or utterance of the One, the Soul an utterance of the Intellect, the World Soul-Universal Reason an utterance of the Intellect-Soul. As mentioned earlier, Plotinus refers to the Intellect as the demiurge or a god. Taking this into consideration and also the fact that the term λόγος can just as well be translated as 'word', it would be justified calling Plotinus' Λόγος a 'Word of God'. The following quote illustrates the 'Λόγος-Word' relationship between the Intellect and the Soul, and how the Λόγος or an 'expressed thought' or 'word' coming forth from the Intellect, brought the World-Soul–Universal Λόγος, as well as all of life, into existence.

> *Enneads* V.I.3.7-9*:* Soul…is…an image of Intellect; just as a thought in its utterance (LZ: Λόγος) is an image of the thought in soul, so soul itself is the expressed thought (LZ: Λόγος) of Intellect, and its

[64] Ibid, IV. 3. 16, 7; III. 2. 2, 3; III. 3. 4.

[65] Where it is possible I have included relevant quotes to illustrate the comparisons. Other discussion points however are more suited for a conceptual analyse. The quotes serve to underline conceptual similarities. I do not intend to make textual comparisons between the passages here. Material used for these comparisons, unless otherwise indicated, is derived from the introductory exposés.

whole activity, and the life which it sends out to establish another reality;...[66]

We could equally regard Augustine's *Verbum* as an 'expression' of God the Father.

> *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 1.2.6: For the Word of God, true God in the bosom of God and the only Son of God, is co-eternal with the Father; and yet through his utterance of God in the eternal Word, creation has been brought about in time.[67]

No less than Augustine's *Verbum*, the Λόγος is also a 'Son of God'. The Intellect as demiurge assumes a paternal relationship to everything which comes into existence after itself. The first entity which emerges from the Νοῦς is the Λόγος, followed by the Soul, which unites with both the Νοῦς and the Λόγος. This relationship is depicted in the quote below.

> *Enneads* V.I.7.44-46: And the offspring (LZ: Λόγος) of Intellect is a rational form and an existing being, that which thinks discursively; it is this which moves round the Intellect and is light and trace of Intellect and dependent on it, united to it on one side and so filled with it and enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, but on the other side, in touch with the things which came after it...[68]

A significant resemblance worthy of mention here is that the Plotinian Νοῦς and Augustine's God the Father, from where both the *Verbum* and the Λόγος emerged, are regarded as the source of all Being. Both the *Verbum* and the Λόγος are intimately associated with these entities. An important difference is however, that the *Verbum* and God the Father are equal in their essence and perfection. The Λόγος, which is not a hypostasis, cannot be equal to the Intellect or any other hypostasis in Plotinus' world view. However, as mentioned

[66] ἡ ψυχή....εἰκών τίς ἐστι νοῦ· οἷον λόγος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω τοι καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια καὶ ἣν προῖεται ζωὴν εἰς ἄλλου ὑπόστασιν· The English translations of the quotes from the *Enneads* are of Armstrong (see note 52). The Greek passages: edition Henry and Schwyzer.

[67] The English translations of the quotes here from this book are from Taylor (note 17). ...*quia uerbum Dei, Deus apud Deum, filius unicus Dei, patri coaeternus est, quamuis Deo haec in aeterno uerbo dicente creatura temporalis facta sit.* (*BA* 48). See also note 21.

[68] Νοῦ δὲ γέννημα λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ διανοούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον καὶ νοῦ φῶς καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου, κατὰ θάτερα μὲν συνηγμένον ἐκείνῳ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀποπιμπλάμενον καὶ ἀπολαῦον καὶ μεταλαμβάνον αὐτοῦ καὶ νοοῦν, κατὰ θάτερα δὲ ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν μετ' αὐτό. The One is also called the father of the Νοῦς and of the Λόγος (πατὴρ λόγου). *Enneads* VI. 8. 14. 35-40; VI. 8. 15. 30-38.

earlier, Plotinus does refer to the Λόγος as the representative of the Intellect and the intelligible world.

2) As rational principle

The term 'rational principle' recalls not only the active force in the three realms of existence of Plotinus' Λόγος, the Λόγοι and the Λόγοι σπερματικοί but also Augustine's *rationes aeternae causales,* and *seminales* which provide order and stability in the world. As the origin of rational principles, with which His creation is permeated, the Word is, like the Λόγος, designated as 'Reason Principle'.

> *De Ideis* 2:...the ideas are certain original and principal forms of things, i.e., reasons, fixed and unchangeable,...being thus eternal... are contained in the Divine Intelligence.[69]

The *Verbum Dei* is the primary, rational principle element in creation. Exactly the same can be said of Plotinus' Λόγος.

> *Enneads* III.2.14-15: The rational principle (LZ: Λόγος), then, is the origin, and all things are reason, both those which are brought into being according to principle and those which, in their coming to birth, are altogether arranged in common order.[70]

3) As creation and form principle

Despite the many differences between the cosmogonies in which the *Logos* and *Verbum Dei* function, we can nonetheless find many remarkable similarities between the two entities, such as the fact that both are referred to as form principles and creators. The Λόγος has a productive function as 'expression' when the Νοῦς and the Soul come into being and also reproduces itself within the realm of the Soul by breaking itself up into individual λόγοι. Plotinus described the Λόγος as 'the maker' of the world and as we saw in the quote above, as the origin of all things.[71] The Λόγος delivers the eternal forms of

[69] The translations of *De Ideis* are from Mosher (note 18). *Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, uel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles,..., ac per hoc aeternae ac semper modo sese habentes,..quae in diuina intelligentia continentur.* (*BA* 10). See also note 42.

[70] Ἀρχὴ οὖν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος καὶ τὰ γινόμενα κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ συντατόμενα ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει πάντως οὕτως. See note 63.

[71] See notes 56 and 62.

being from the Intellect to the World Soul and Nature and is entirely associated with the forms and intelligible world.

> *Enneads* III.2.2.36: It is the intelligible universe that is nothing but rational principle, and there could not be another which is nothing but rational principle;...[72]

The *Verbum* is in Augustine's exegesis the 'Form Principle' because He is the origin of the eternals Forms, and also due to his Formation and Illumination of human souls.

> *Gn ad lit* 2.8.17...they (LZ: the angels) simply recognize what they interiorly know more perfectly in the Word of God Himself, who illumines them and imparts to them a life of wisdom. ...The form (*ratio*) therefore, according to which a creature is created, exists first in the Word of God before the actual creation of the work itself. So also the knowledge of this form is produced first in the intellectual creatures not yet darkened by sin, and then the work is created.[73]

Just as Plotinus' Ideas are synonymous to the Λόγοι, Augustine affirmed that the *rationes* were to be considered one and the same as the *formae*, and that they together are the foundations of the visible world. Parallel to Plotinus' Λόγοι and Ideas, Augustine's *rationes* and *formae* are essentially two different concepts, each with its own functions, yet are almost impossible to separate from one another.

4) As mediators on three levels of existence

In Plotinus' and Augustine's world views, there is a clear separation between the intelligible world and the sensible world. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, a construction of the universe of this kind requires an entity which is able to communicate with both of these worlds and is transcendent as well as immanent. In Augustine's creation doctrine, this is the *Verbum Dei*. In Plotinus' cosmogony, this is the Λόγος *par excellence*. It is important to underline this fact because it appears at first sight that the most powerful creator in Plotinus' cosmogony is the Νοῦς. However, the Intellect is not involved in any direct way with the creation of the material world.

[72] Ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοητὸς μόνον λόγος, καὶ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄλλος μόνον λόγος.

[73] *...,quae melius nouerunt interius in ipso Dei uerbo, a quo inluminantur, ut sapienter uiuant, cum sit in eis lux, quae primo facta est, si lucem spiritalem in illo die factam intelligimus...Quemadmodum ergo ratio, qua creatura conditur, prior est in uerbo Dei quam ipsa creatura, quae conditur,...*(*BA* 48). See also notes 36, 41 and 50.

Only the Λόγος manifests throughout all levels of reality in Plotinus' system: in the Intellect, the Soul and matter. Seen in this way, the Λόγος corresponds to the Augustine's *Verbum* more precisely than the Νοῦς. This important fact was completely ignored by Perler and the other mentioned scholars (note 2).

We also saw in Plotinus' cosmogony that the Λόγος and the Λόγοι exercize their most significant powers on three levels: of the Νοῦς, the Soul and the material world. This corresponds neatly with Augustine's three levels of existence in which the *Verbum* and the *rationes* are at work.[74] To recapitulate, these were: the realm of the *Verbum Dei* and then at the two 'moments' of creation, respectively at the intelligible and the physical level. The three levels of the *rationes* and the Λόγοι as invisible, intelligible creation principles are in the systems of both thinkers almost identical. In Plotinus' view, the Λόγοι deliver the *intelligibilia* from the Νοῦς to the various realms of the Soul and ultimately to unformed matter. They also serve as an agent (μεταξύ) between the eternal, transcendent and divine realm of the Intellect, the Soul and the visible cosmos. In this role they assure the communication between the different levels of reality.[75] Augustine's *rationes* fulfill approximately the same mediatory function as the Λόγος and the λόγοι. The *rationes causales*, for example, mediate between their trancendent source, the *Verbum* and the corporeal world. Augustine also described the *Verbum Dei* as mediator between God and humans.[76] This last point brings us to another difference between the *Verbum* and the Λόγος: the *Verbum* suffices in Augustine's system as the one and only mediator. His intervention is direct and immediate as opposed to Plotinus' transcendent Λόγος which requires λόγοι in order to act upon the lower regions of existence.

The *rationes seminales* and *causales* in Augustine's creation doctrine are in essence the same as Plotinus' Λόγοι σπερματικοί: they contain the forms, they bring life and human bodies into the

[74] See notes 40 (Augustine) and 61 (Plotinus).

[75] E.g.: *Enneads* II. 9. 1. 33 and II. 9. 1. 57-63. / The Soul shares with the Λόγος some of the same functions in the Plotinian cosmogony, for example as maker of the world and also as mediator of the forms from the Intellect to the individual souls. However, in *Enneads* III. 2. 2. the Λόγος is indicated as the most important intermediary and almost achieves the status of a hypostasis. In the second and third treatises of this book, Plotinus states that the individual souls are governed by the Λόγος, the ruler of the visible world. In summary, in these treatises of book III, the Λόγος holds a much more influential status than the Soul as creator of the world. (Ibid, III. 8. 3.)

[76] See note 24.

visible world and assure that vegetative growth takes place according to the laws of structural development. Augustine does not however employ a 'World Soul' or a soul of any kind, in the way Plotinus does to assist the *rationes* with the creation of human beings. In addition to this, Augustine's *rationes* act only in strict dependance on God's will, contrary to the Plotinian Λόγοι.

Nonetheless, it is evident here that Augustine made use of Plotinus' Λόγος and the Λόγοι doctrine to structure and underpin his exegese of Genesis and his doctrine of the *Verbum Dei* and *rationes*. Both the Λόγος and the *Verbum Dei* are directly involved with the coming into being of the corporeal world in similar ways and as I will illustrate in the following points, both are also responsible for the further continuation of the world, as well as for the return of humans to their divine source.

5) As Providence

The last two points of agreement involve aspects of the Λόγος which I have not yet introduced and will now elaborate on. For the next point we turn to book III, treatises 2 and 3 of the *Enneads* where Plotinus equates the Λόγος with the term πρόνοια 'providence'. Providence is understood as the maintenance of the rational, ordered and hierarchical structure of the cosmos. It is also understood as the effectuation of harmony between opposing forces among individual beings (λόγοι) and the establishment of moral order in the world. The Λόγος operates in these ways as the representative of the Νοῦς – as its ἐνέργεια – in the visible world.[77]

> *Enneads* III.3.4.5-10: For he (LZ: man) is not only what he was made but has another free principle, which is not outside providence or the rational principle of the whole; for those higher principles are not separated from these here but the better illuminate the worse, and this is perfect providence; and there is one rational principle which is creative and another which connects the better principles with the things which have come into being, and those higher principles are providence which act from above,... [78]

[77] *Enneads* III. 2. 20-30; III. 3. 4.

[78] Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὃ πεποίηταί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ἐλευθέραν οὐκ ἔξω τῆς προνοίας οὖσαν οὐδὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὅλου· οὐ γὰρ ἀπήρτηται ἐκεῖνα τούτων, ἀλλ' ἐπιλάμπει τὰ κρείττω τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἡ τελεία πρόνοια τοῦτο· καὶ λόγος ὁ μὲν ποιητικός, ὁ δὲ συνάπτων τὰ κρείττω τοῖς γενομένοις, κἀκεῖνα πρόνοια ἡ ἄνωθεν, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄνω,....

In the passage above, Plotinus intertwines the creator Λόγος as rational principle not only with providence but also with illumination. These functions essentially entail a transfer of properties from the divine realms to the experiential world of humans. These characteristics can easily be associated in *a general fashion* with certain features of Augustine's *Verbum*. For example, in his role as mediator between the Father and the world, and in particular in the role of Illuminator, He brings divine knowledge from above to human minds below. We can also consider his deliverance of mankind as providence, including the manner in which the Word of God fulfills the human spirit, because in these ways, the *Verbum,* as the Λόγος, advances harmony and moral order in the world. Additionally, parallel to the providential Λόγος and λόγοι, the *Verbum* and the *rationes* also govern and maintain the rational order and structure of the world.[79]

We should not lose sight of major differences between the divinities in Augustine's and Plotinus' doctrines: such as the fact that Plotinus' Λόγος (including the other hypostases) is not a 'person' of any kind as the *Verbum*. The Λόγος is divine but not a god. It is merely a divine function. As Augustine himself mentioned in *Confessiones* VII, ix.13, it is unthinkable for a Platonist divinity to incarnate on earth as a human redeemer.

6) In contemplation of the Ideas and ascending to the highest Principle

For this last point we will focus on how an individual makes his way back to the creator source and on the roles Augustine's *Verbum Dei* and Plotinus' Λόγος both play in this process. We recall from the introduction that Plotinus' view of returning to the One begins with the experience of physical beauty.[80] This involves an elevation from physical perception, to an inward experience of the intellect where universal truths are realized and then continues beyond. The Λόγος plays an indispensable part here, due to the obligatory passing through the regions of discursive reasoning, science and contemplation.[81] The goal here however is to surpass the contemplation of the Ideas. The

[79] See note 50.

[80] See note 58.

[81] Plotinus associates the Λόγος with contemplation of that which is higher than itself. The Λόγος was produced from a state of contemplation and likewise produces by this means. Ibid, II. 7. 3; III. 8. 3. 5-10; III. 8. 4. 5-10; III. 8. 7. 1-5, 19-24; III. 8. 8. 13-16; VI. 7. 36.1-10. Cf: Boot, 1984, 376-377.

Λόγος itself serves as a signpost pointing to the loftier regions of the Good, beyond rationality. As mentioned above, the Λόγος as form principle relays the eternal forms from higher to lower levels in the creative process of emanation from the One. Thus, in the reverse direction, returning to the One, the forms -especially the Idea Beauty- are drawn back to their source by the impulse of the Λόγος.[82]

We can discover parallel services of the Λόγος in Augustine's *Verbum*, in his teaching of illumination, particularly as expressed in his essay *De Ideis*.

> *De Ideis* 46. 2: Now among the things which have been created by God, the rational soul is the most excellent of all, and it is closest to God when it is pure. And in the measure that it has clung to him in love...and illumined by him with light, intelligible light, the soul discerns – not with physical eyes, but with its own highest part – in which lies excellence, i.e., with its intelligence – those reasons whose vision brings to it full blessedness. These *rationes*, as was said, may be called ideas, or forms or species, or reasons; and while it is the privilege of many to name them what they wish, it is the privilege of very few to see them in their reality.[83]

In this passage, Augustine indicates that a believer can contemplate the Ideas in the highest region of her or his soul, which is of rational disposition and closest to God. This psychical region is illuminated when it turns to the *Verbum*, the Divine Intellect and source of Ideas. Augustine expounds that the only path to God the Father is through the Son.[84] Yet an active, preliminary quest for divine knowledge is prerequisite for faith and for comprehending God's revelations.[85]

Therefore both the *Verbum* and the Λόγος are intensely involved in the ascent to the highest principle, in collaboration with the intellectual activity of the seeker. Their contributions to the ascent

[82] *Enneads* I. 6. 2. 27-28; I. 6. 6. 14-15; III. 8. 6, 35-40; III. 8. 8; VI. 7. 36. 1-10; VI. 8. 14. 30; VI. 8. 15-30; VI. 9. 4. 13-14. Cf: Fattal, 1998, 14-22, and 2003, 301-303.

[83] *Sed anima rationalis inter eas res quae sunt a Deo conditae, omnia superat; et Deo proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit,...in tantum ab eo lumine illo intelligibili perfusa quodam modo et illustrata cernit, non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principale, quo excellit, id est per intelligentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum uisione fit beatissima. Quas rationes, ut dictum est, siue ideas, siue formas, siue species, siue rationes licet uocare, et multis conceditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis uidere quod uerum est.* (*BA* 10).

[84] E.g. see notes 24 and 50.

[85] See notes 49 and 50.

are essential for passing through to the highest state. The general differences between these two theologies have already been discussed. Yet there are a few other differences to mention: for example, Augustine's stress on the necessity of grace concerning the *Verbum*'s illumination which is absent in Plotinus' philosophy. Augustine and Plotinus also differ in attitude as to how a person can return to the divine source. Plotinus tends to advocate the ascent to the One solely by merit of one's personal efforts, while Augustine emphasizes dependency on the *Verbum Dei*. Once again we must confirm here that Augustine's *Verbum* is more personally involved with individuals than the Λόγος of Plotinus.

Evaluation

In the beginning of my paper, I showed how Augustine made use of the Λόγος principle from Greek philosophy to articulate his doctrine of the Creator and the creation. Later, in my six points of comparison, we saw how the Plotinian Λόγος as a divine principle was deeply involved in the creation process, in its continuation and in the provision of the cosmos, in many similar ways as Augustine's *Verbum Dei*. The two entities are both an expression generated from a higher principle, a divine Word, a Son of God. Both are the creators of a rationally constructed material universe, the sources of creative reason principles by which the visible world was made and of which it became a reflection. Augustine's system of reason principles bears such close similarities to Plotinus' system of λόγοι that a dependence is practically undeniable. Both the *Verbum* and the Λόγος represent higher principles (God the Father, the Intellect) which are unable to manifest in matter or physical substance due to their absolute transcendence. Lastly, both the *Verbum* and the Λόγος are instrumental in pointing the way back to the source of life, a 'journey' which entails ascending to the highest principle.

Let us return briefly to the questions from my introduction. The first was: which Platonist concepts did Augustine depict in his description of the Platonist texts in *Confessiones* VII, ix, 13, which convinced him that there were similarities to be found in the prologue of John's Gospel? Taking again the conclusions of the researchers into consideration who claimed that it was the Plotinian Νοῦς which Augustine was referring to (see note 2) and who underlined that Augustine borrowed these aspects of the Νοῦς to formulate his Creator doctrine and exegesis of Genesis, we can now see that these statements require

correction. We can surely affirm that Plotinus' Intellect resembles the *Verbum* in certain ways. But it is not only the Plotinian Νοῦς which influenced the Augustine's *Verbum Dei* doctrine. For example, it is not the Νοῦς, but the Λόγος which created the visible world. It is only the Λόγος and not the Νοῦς which shares the *Verbum*'s double character of transcendence and immanence. The passages in *Confessiones* do reflect Plotinus' Νοῦς to some extent, but to a greater extent his Λόγος principle.

Returning to the question concerning which Platonist books Augustine read: the studies of Henry and those after him who established Augustine's dependence on certain treatises of the *Enneads* (see notes 5 and 6) allow us to infer that Plotinus' Λόγος was most likely the source for the Λόγος influence in Augustine's creation doctrine. It would now be useful to determine which books of the *Enneads* Augustine studied which reflect the influence of the Λόγος on his *Verbum Dei* doctrine. Unfortunately this paper did not allow the space to treat this question. This issue deserves further attention in the future. In any case, studies on Augustine's doctrines of the creation and the Word of God should regard the Plotinian Λόγος doctrine as one of Augustine's most significant extra-biblical sources.[86]

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USING MUSIC WELL: REASSESSING PERCEPTION IN AUGUSTINE'S DE MUSICA

Augustine's treatise On Music (*De musica*) is one of the earliest examples of interdisciplinary engagement between Christian theology and music, but has received relatively little scholarly attention.[1] This is partially explained by the judgment that *De musica*'s treatment of both disciplines, while rigorous, is conventional and uninspired. As Jamie James writes in a popular history of the 'Music of the Spheres', *De musica* 'is not studied much nowadays, even by Augustinian specialists. The common wisdom about the work is that it is tedious and derivative'.[2] While James is certainly right that much of *De musica*'s dense prose draws on other musical and theological sources, it would be surprising if nothing new had been generated in the process. In this paper, we will attempt to identify unique features in Augustine's account through comparison with both Classical theories of musical perception and his earlier theological works. We will then turn to modern interpretations of *De musica*, using our conclusions to determine whether any unique features may have been consistently overlooked.

Physical and Rational in Grades of Virtue

Before considering *De musica*'s relationship to Classical music theory, we must place it within the context of Augustine's own theological development. While it is possible to approach this task in a number of ways, we will look specifically at his discussion of the grades of virtue in *De quantitate animae*, since this closely parallels the theological ascent, and its ethical conclusions, in *De musica*'s sixth book.[3]

Augustine inherits his understanding of virtue from Plotinus, who identifies a distinction between those virtues that can be directly

[1] There is, for example, no complete critical translation into English (although there is a translation from *Patrologia Latina* 32 by R. Catesby Taliaferro in *The Fathers of the Church* 4, 169–384 [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1947]).

[2] Jamie James, The Music of the Spheres (New York: Copernicus, 1991), 71.

[3] An alternate but related approach is to examine De musica in relation to Augustine's treatment of the passions. See, e.g., G. Van Riel, 'Mens inmota mota manet. Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine's Theory of the Passions', Augustiniana 54 (2004), 507–31.

perceived in God – the source of all virtue – and those made necessary for our contemplation of God by our embodied existence. Escaping from evil requires 'attaining likeness to God', which involves 'becoming just and holy, living by wisdom, the entire nature grounded in virtue'.[4] God is identified with virtue, and yet 'we are met by the doubt whether even in this Divine-Being all virtues find place – moral balance, for example; or fortitude where there can be no danger since nothing is alien; where there can be nothing alluring whose lack could induce the desire of possession'.[5] Plotinus's solution is to divide virtue into two grades: the civic or ethical virtues, which follow from our limited, embodied existence; and the purificatory or cathartic virtues, through which we attain likeness to God. Each level contains the virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage and justice, but directed towards different ends: either our embodied activity, or our rational ascent to virtue's divine source. Charles Brittain explains the distinction between these two grades of virtue in relation to temperance, which 'is defined as the ethical virtue constituted by imposing measure and limit on the emotions, and as the cathartic virtue constituted by not sharing in "the body's" emotions or by turning inside towards intellect'.[6]

The problem, as Brittain's example demonstrates, is that the two grades of virtue often conflict: while the cathartic virtues involve a disassociation from the physical, the ethical virtues require active engagement with our bodies so as to regulate our emotions. Moreover, although cathartic virtues are superior to their ethical counterparts, they cannot exist independently: mastery of the ethical is required for engagement with the cathartic. This leaves two logical possibilities. Either we sometimes act in accordance with the lower, rather than the higher, grade of virtue (what Brittain calls the 'single-operation' option); or we are somehow able to act in both grades simultaneously (the 'multiple-operation' thesis).[7] Choosing the single-operation hypothesis leads to a moral quandary, since if the cathartic virtues are superior to ethical virtues it is unclear why we should ever choose to act in accordance with the latter. Plotinus, in advocating a single-operation view, seems to suggest that for the sage the cathartic virtues may include attention to the virtuous activity of the body, but only

[4] Plotinus *Enn.* 1.2.1; trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Charles Brittain, 'Attention Deficit in Plotinus and Augustine', Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 28: 223–263 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 224.
[7] Ibid., 225.

insofar as the body is an independent moral entity and such action does not contribute to the good of the sage as intellect.[8]

From a Christian perspective, such a radical dissociation between the cathartic and ethical is problematic, not the least because 'it faces an obvious textual problem in the case of "charity" (which alone endures "forever" according to Paul in 1 Corinthians 13)'.[9] As a consequence, ethical virtues cannot simply be stepping stones to higher forms of activity, but must have their own value and continuing relevance. Augustine departs from Plotinus and opts for a multiple-operation approach to virtue, which allows him to affirm our activity within both grades without requiring that we attend to the lower virtues instead of the higher, or else countenance a complete division between the rational and the physical. In circumventing this moral dilemma, however, the multiple-operation thesis raises its own psychological quandary: how is it that we are able to act in both grades simultaneously? In *De quantitate animae*, Augustine identifies seven different levels of activities within the soul: those related to [i] physical sustenance, [ii] non-rational thought (e.g., perception), [iii] reason, [iv-v] purification, and [vi-vii] contemplation.[10] Levels [i-iii] and [iv-vii] correspond to the domains of ethical and cathartic virtue, respectively, with reason functioning as the lynchpin between the two grades. Reason is not a level of cathartic virtue per se, since all humans are capable of rational action as it relates to physical experience. Even so, reason itself is not physical, and forms the basis for the intellectual levels of purification and contemplation.

After identifying the seven activities of the soul, Augustine then considers how these different levels interact. 'It looks like it is possible', he writes, 'that [the soul] should act at all these [levels] simultaneously, but that it seems to itself only to act [at the level at] which it acts with difficulty or at any rate with fear. For it acts in this case more attentively than in the others'.[11] Augustine argues that the soul

[8] 'Once the man is a Proficient, the means of happiness, the way to good, are within, for nothing is good that lies outside him. Anything he desires further than this he seeks as a necessity, and not for himself but for a subordinate, for the body bound to him, to which since it has life he must minister the needs of life, not needs, however, to the true man of this degree' (Plotinus *Enn.* 1.4.4).

[9] Brittain, 'Attention Deficit in Plotinus and Augustine', 248.

[10] *De quant. an.* §70–81. Levels [iv] and [vi] are activities resulting in the perfected activity of [v] and [vii].

[11] Quaerimus quippe de animae potentia, et fieri potest ut haec omnia simul agat, sed id solum sibi agere uideatur quod agit cum difficultate, aut certe cum timore. Agit enim hoc multo quam cetera attentior. *Ibid.*, 79.

is capable of acting on multiple levels at once, but also maintains it can only attend to one level at a time. The level occupying the soul's attention is the one that causes the most difficulty (fear); or, as in some manuscripts, that which requires the most love.[12] Augustine's multiple-operation theory, then, is of a peculiar kind: while he affirms the ability of our soul to act on multiple levels at once, he also seems to indicate that our consciousness or attention follows something more akin to the single-operation theory, since it can only focus on a single level at a time. By layering conscious single-operation on top of unconscious multiple-operation, Augustine is able to preserve the connection between body and mind, with conscious actions in the body forming a basis for the unconscious activity of the soul's higher levels.

What it does not resolve, however, is the moral problem with the single-operation theory: why would we ever choose to attend to the lower levels of virtue? In *De quantitate animae*, Augustine suggests that in the activity of the lower, ethical virtues we must 'understand that God is acting through us': that, like in Plotinus, actions in the lower grades of virtue are prescribed by the higher levels (in this case, by God), but not for the sake of the person's own ethical virtue.[13] Thus, we do not ever have to choose to act within the lower grades because the higher levels dictate actions that affect others in ethical terms without building up our own ethical virtue. This solution, while theoretically possible, does not seem to describe our actual experience. When we act ethically, we are not semi-conscious conduits of divine will, but instead turn our attention away from cathartic contemplation of God towards matters of ethical virtue; we are, in fact, distracted from the higher levels by the lower. As a consequence, Augustine abandons this idea in later discussions of virtue, suggesting that although undistracted contemplation will be a feature of our spiritual, resurrection bodies, it does not characterise our current, imperfect state.[14]

Even if the perfect multiple-operation of virtue is impossible in our pre-Resurrection bodies, it nevertheless exists as an ideal model for the relationship between contemplation and ethical action: a standard to which we should aspire, despite the fact that its consistent achievement is, in practice, beyond our current ability. When interacting with the physical world, then, we should strive to be guided by that which is revealed to us by God through contemplation, rather than attending

[12] Brittain, 'Attention Deficit in Plotinus and Augustine', 253–6.

[13] *De quant. an.*, 79.

[14] See, e.g. *Retract.* 1.11.2; Brittain, 'Attention Deficit in Plotinus and Augustine', 260–3.

directly to the physical stimulus. In this way, we can ensure that we act in accordance with the divine will, without seeking to build up ourselves. The physical world thus becomes beneficial to our spiritual development by allowing us the opportunity to serve God through the service of others.

Music in Classical Thought

It is precisely this dynamic between contemplation, the physical world, and spiritual development that we find in Augustine's treatment of music in *De musica*. Music is a particularly interesting case of the relationship between physical and spiritual virtue because it is itself a form of rationality. Tradition credits Pythagoras with the discovery that strings with lengths related according to a particular set of whole number ratios produce harmonic intervals.[15] If one string is twice as long as another, for example, the two will sound an octave apart, while strings in a relation of three to two will sound a perfect fifth, and four to three produces a perfect fourth. Not only do whole number ratios with a first term one greater than the second (i.e., 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, etc.) create musically pleasing intervals, but the complexity of such ratios is inversely correlated with their musical consonance. So, for example, an octave (2:1) is perceived as more consonant than a perfect fifth (3:2), which is in turn more pleasing than a perfect fourth (4:3). It is difficult to underestimate the importance of this discovery in the history of Western thought: for the first time, an observable, sensible property of the natural world could be precisely predicted using numbers.[16] While we no longer give credence to many of the Pythagoreans' numerological beliefs, the idea that the universe is fundamentally mathematical continues to guide scientific thought.

Music's ability to provide a sensible connection between the structure of nature and rational thought ensured its importance, on a theoretical level, within Classical and Medieval education. Although reason is not necessarily subject to perception in either Pythagorean or Platonic thought – sensory information being insufficient to disprove rational conclusions – music is significant precisely because our sensory judgments of harmony and beauty seem to correlate exactly with

[15] See, for example, the account of this discovery in Nicomachus of Gerasa's *Manual of Harmony* (5.27–28).

[16] D. P. Walker notes that the mathematical study of astronomy predates the discovery of musical ratios, but rightly emphasises the importance of music in establishing the numeracy of the earthly as well as celestial spheres. *Studies in Musical Science in the Late Renaissance* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 7.

reasoned expectations. As a consequence, the relationship between music and reason remains even if we were to privilege our sensory reflections over rational conclusions. Ptolemy does precisely this in his *Harmonics*, demonstrating that if we apply the ratios of 2:1, 3:2, and 4:3 to lengths of string at constant tension, we do, in fact, hear musically pleasing intervals.[17] In music, the distinction between sense and reason is blurred: music is literally rational – i.e., composed of ratios – and thus sensibly demonstrates the very structures of reason. Taking this conclusion a step further, music allows direct interaction, on a human scale, with the forces that move the universe. The natural world is enchanted – filled with song – and this music of the world can be discerned through rational reflection: 'Music [in Classical thought] was not simply an object in a magical world, but the rational agent of enchantment itself'.[18]

Because music is itself rational it is capable of affecting the soul directly, not simply through physical means. Aristides Quintilianus describes this process, writing that 'the soul is a certain harmonia and harmonia exists through numbers. Of course, since harmonia in music is composed through the same proportions, when the similar proportions are moved the similar passions are also moved at the same time'.[19] Aristides portrays the soul as a musical instrument, which resonates with the harmonic structure of musical sound. Because of its inherent rationality, music not only acts on the passions, but also influences the soul on a rational level:

> For while all education induces either through passion, such as education from the nomoi, or through persuasion, such as that in associations, music prevails by both means, enslaving the hearer by word and melos, and, by varied changes both of sound and forms, drawing him on by the connection of the things expressed.[20]

Music acts on our passions, but it also acts through rational 'persuasion', which is more akin to coercion than reasoned argument, since it is by this means that music 'prevails', 'enslaving the hearer'. There is thus a decidedly deterministic element in Aristides's account

[17] For a discussion of Ptolemy's scientific investigation of music, see Andrew Barker, *Scientific Method in Ptolemy's Harmonics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[18] Daniel K. L. Chua, 'Vincenzo Galilei, modernity and the division of nature', in Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding, 17–29 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22.

[19] Aristid. Quint. *Peri mousikēs*, 2.17, 86; trans. Thomas J. Mathiesen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

[20] Ibid., 2.6, 59.

of musical perception: music's rational character allows it not simply to distract our rationality, but to actually 'prevail' over it.

This coercive quality is not generally seen to be problematic in Classical accounts of music, where it is often employed as a method healing and described in medical terms. Boethius – the chief Medieval authority on music – transmits the legend of 'Terpander and Arion of Methymna [who] saved the citizens of Lesbos and Ionia from very serious illness through the assistance of song',[21] and recounts how even in routine tasks, music could be of assistance: 'Upon awakening, [the Pythagoreans] purged their stupor and confusion of sleep with certain other modes, for they knew that the whole structure of our soul and body has been joined by means of musical coalescence'.[22] Plato, however, worries about the improper use of music's power over the soul. He allows only two modes in his perfect republic – one for war and inspiration (Dorian) and the other to be used in times of peace (Phrygian) – and warns against the dangers of melodic innovation: 'For any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be prohibited'.[23] Regardless of whether we ought to embrace music's beneficial potential or remain wary of its coercive power, there is agreement that music is particularly capable of prevailing over the soul's activity.

The idea that music is able to actively shape our thought, on a rational as well as physical level, remains a defining feature of musical theory throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. Boethius comments that, 'When rhythms and modes reach an intellect through the ears, they doubtless affect and reshape that mind according to their particular character'; clearly echoing the relationship between musical ratios and the activity of the soul expressed by Aristides.[24] As late as the sixteenth century, John Calvin worries about music's coercive potential: 'It is true that every evil word (as Saint Paul says) perverts good morals, but when the melody is with it it pierces the heart that much more strongly and enters into it'.[25] The belief that music holds a natural power over its listeners remains current into the Renaissance, finding expression in Marsilio Ficino's magic-filled Platonic Theology, and in more traditional works of music theory like the Musica practica of Bartolomé Ramos, which argues for musical reforms on the basis that 'without a doubt, music

[21] Boethius *De inst. mus.*, 1.1.185.
[22] *Ibid.*, 1.1.186.
[23] Pl. *Resp.*, 424; trans. Benjamin Jowett.
[24] Boethius *De inst. mus.*, 1.1.180.
[25] Charles Garside, Jr., 'The Origins of Calvin's Theology of Music,' *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 69, no. 4 (1979): 33.

has immense effect upon and mighty power over the human soul, whether to calm or rouse it. If in our time music does not work so many miracles, it is to be attributed not to the art, whose perfection exceeds that of Nature, but to those who use the art badly'.[26]

In both Classical and Medieval accounts, then, we find an emphasis on the ability of music's rational character to directly influence both thoughts and actions. The language used is often explicitly coercive: music 'enslaves', 'prevails', 'pierces', 'reshapes'. This view of music presents Augustine with a difficult theological problem. Music's apparent power to determine thought and prevent virtuous action remains incompatible not only with the sovereignty of the soul over the body, but also with our ability to respond freely to God's grace – remaining focused on contemplation and not succumbing to musical distraction. At the same time, however, because musical harmonies 'are a creation of divine providence, as they are beautiful in their own kind', they cannot be dismissed as insidious temptations: as things simply to be avoided.[27] The challenge for Augustine, then, is to determine how we can avoid any misplaced love for musical harmonies, 'Not by throwing them away as a burden, nor by embracing them as something well anchored, but by using them well'.[28]

Process of Musical Perception

Augustine's theological concerns about music are most obvious in *De musica*'s sixth book, where the theoretical concepts of metre and verse discussed in the previous five books are used as the basis for a reflective ascent to divine knowledge.[29] Augustine chooses to discuss musical harmonies and proportions through an analysis of rhythm,

[26] Quoted in Edward E. Lowinsky, 'Music of the Renaissance as Viewed by Renaissance Musicians' in *Music in the Culture of the Renaissance and Other Essays*, ed. Bonnie J. Blackburn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 97.

[27] quicumque de nostra quoque poenali mortalitate numeri facti sunt, non eos abdicemus a fabricatione diuinae prouidentiae, cum sint in genere suo pulchri. *De mus.* 6.14.46; trans. Martin Jacobsson, *Aurelius Augustinus De musica liber VI: A Critical Edition with a Translation and an Introduction* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiskell, 2002).

[28] Neque amplectendo quasi fundatos sed bene utendo carebimus. *Ibid.*

[29] There has been some debate over both the period of composition and the relationship of the first five books to the sixth. Martin Jacobsson argues that there is some evidence to date book six towards the end of the 387–409 window of composition (x–xxvii), and a letter from Augustine to Memorius, Bishop of Capua, suggests that Augustine felt this final book to be superior to, and to some extent separable from, the others (*Ep.* 101).

which he deems more accessible than pitch: 'Since the pervasive influence of rhythm is more easily studied in speech, and an analysis of it leads by gradually mounting steps to the highest secrets of truth... I wrote six books on rhythm'.[30] At the beginning of book six, he takes pains to emphasise that intellectual analysis is not necessary for those with faith, whom he urges 'not to descend to these things';[31] a point he reiterates in his final conclusion to the work: 'These things have been written for much weaker persons than those who, following the authority of the two testaments, venerate and worship the one supreme God... for they are purified not through the brilliance of human arguments but through the most powerful and burning fire of love'.[32]

Having decided, however, to take the difficult path of reason, Augustine launches into the dialogue of his ascent from music to contemplation of God. First, we must understand how we listen to and understand the music we hear. Thus, the master asks,

> When we pronounce the verse *Deus creator omnium*, where do you think that these four iambs, of which it consists, and the twelve time-units are; that is to say, should we say that these rhythms are merely in the sound which is heard, or also in the hearer's sense, which belongs to the ears, or also in the activity of the pronouncing person, or, since the verse is well well known, also in our memory?[33]

Augustine initially identifies four different components of music making, all of which the student agrees must contain 'rhythms' or, literally, 'numbers' (*numeros*): the actual sound, its creation, our perception, and our memory. The first two are relatively straightforward: ratios are present in the actual sound as it is transmitted to our hearing,

[30] Verum quia in omnibus rerum motibus, quid numeri ualeant, facilius consideratur in uocibus ea que consideratio quibusdam quasi gradatis itineribus nititur ad superna intima ueritatis ... conscripsi de solo rhythmo sex libros. *Ep.* 101; translated by Wilfrid Parsons in *The Fathers of the Church* 18 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1953), 146.

[31] Ne ad ista descendant et. *De mus.* 6.1.1.

[32] Sermonem autem hunc nostrum mandatum litteris si qui legunt, sciant multo infirmioribus haec esse scripta, quam sunt illi qui unius summi Dei consubstantialem et incommutabilem trinitatem, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia duorum testamentorum auctoritatem secuti uenerantur et colunt eam credendo, sperando et diligendo. ... Hi enim non scintillantibus humanis ratiocinationibus, sed ualidissimo et flagrantissimo charitatis igne purgantur. *Ibid.* 6.17.59.

[33] Cum istum uersum pronuntiamus, Deus creator omnium, istos quatuor iambos quibus constat, et tempora duodecim ubinam esse arbitreris, id est, in sono tantum qui auditur, an etiam in sensu audientis qui ad aures pertinet, an in actu etiam pronuntiantis, an quia notus uersus est, in memoria quoque nostra hos numeros esse fatendum est? *Ibid.* 6.2.2.

and in the musician's performance. Proportions are also present throughout the process of musical perception, which Augustine will proceed to elaborate in the subsequent discussion. Memory is included because of the temporal nature of musical ratios. We must remember the proportions of past sounds in order to perceive complete rhythmic patterns; we can only know the rhythmic position of an individual syllable through our memory of the syllables that have already been heard.

Probing these relationships, the master and student then seek to determine which numbers can exist independently. Those in sounds can exist without someone to hear them, and we can also create rhythms (e.g., our pulse and breathing) that do not require perception or memory. The numbers present in memory, on the other hand, can exist without the others – we can remember a song without having to hear it – but 'they would not be committed to memory unless heard or thought about, and therefore, although they remain when the other cease to exist, they are imprinted by the others as by forerunners'.[34] What about the numbers by which we perceive? At first glance, hearing would seem to be dependent on having something to hear; but this becomes less obvious with additional reflection, for in hearing we measure the consonance or dissonance of the sounds, and 'this power of approving and disapproving is not created in my ears when I hear a sound'.[35] Augustine responds by distinguishing two sets of numbers within the process of perception, one that reacts to the sounds we hear, and another that judges whether these sounds are pleasing. Instead of a single set of 'perceptual numbers', the process of musical perception involves two independent sets of proportions: those present in our hearing, and those by which we judge the ratios we hear. These latter, 'judicial numbers' are superior to the former because they 'could not judge the others unless [they] were superior to them', and it is from these numbers that Augustine will continue his ascent.[36]

At the moment, however, there is a problem: by splitting perception into two different parts, one describing the body's sense of hearing and the other referring to the soul's capacity to judge, we seem to have made the soul subject to the body; something that is, according to Augustine, 'completely absurd' (*perabsurdum*, *De mus.* 6.5.8). Logically, therefore, it must be the case that 'when we hear, the

[34] Sed tamen nisi auditi, uel cogitati, non mandarentur memoriae: et ideo quanquam illis desinentibus maneant, iisdem tamen praecedentibus imprimuntur. *Ibid.* 6.3.4.

[35] Non enim tunc fit in auribus meis, cum sonum audio, haec uis adprobandi et inprobandi. *Ibid.* 6.2.3.

[36] Non enim de illis posset, nisi excelleret, iudicare. *Ibid.* 6.4.6.

rhythms are not created in the soul by the rhythms we know exist in the sounds'.[37] It is important to note that this contradicts Aristides's statement that 'the soul is moved naturally by music'; that it 'prevails' over and 'enslaves' the listener. On the contrary, Augustine insists that the soul is not subject to the body or anything that is perceived through it, even the rational harmonies of music. This leads his speculations, however, into uncharted territory; a fact confirmed by the hesitancy with which he resolves to 'try, to the extent that God will deign to help me, to guess and expound what is concealed here'.[38] His subsequent solution is worth quoting at length:

> I think that the soul produces something out of the body and acts in it as in something that is subject to its dominion by God's will, and that it does this sometimes with ease, sometimes with difficulty, depending on how much the corporeal nature yields to it, depending on its merits. Therefore, whatever corporeal things are brought into our body or brought to it from the outside, these things produce something not in the soul but in the body itself, something that either opposes or agrees with the activity of the soul. And therefore, when the soul resists what is opposing it and only with difficulty pushes the matter that is subject to it into the paths of its activity... it is said to have sensation, and this is what we call pain or labour. However, when that which is introduced or is contiguous to it does agree with it... it is perceived with pleasure.[39]

Unpacking this logic, we find that instead of being acted on by the body, the soul acts in the body while the body receives rhythms through hearing. To the extent that these two movements agree, we feel pleasure; insofar as they disagree, we feel pain. The soul, as the

[37] Non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his, quos in sonis cognoscimus. *Ibid.* 6.4.6.

[38] Conabor quidem, quantum Deus adiuuare dignabitur, quidnam ibi lateat coniectare atque disserere. *Ibid.* 6.5.8.

[39] nec ab isto quidquam illam pati arbitror, sed facere de illo et in illo tanquam subiecto diuinitus dominationi suae: aliquando tamen cum facilitate, aliquando cum difficultate operari, quanto pro eius meritis magis minusue illi cedit natura corporea. Corporalia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi eius aut aduersetur, aut congruat. Ideoque cum renititur aduersanti, et materiam sibi subiectam in operis sui uias difficulter impingit, fit attentior ex difficultate in actionem; quae difficultas propter attentionem, cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur, et hoc uocatur dolor aut labor. Cum autem congruit quod infertur, aut adiacet, facile totum id uel ex eo quantum opus est, in sui operis itinera traducit. Et ista eius actio qua suum corpus conuenienti extrinsecus corpori adiungit, quoniam propter quiddam aduentitium attentius agitur, non latet; sed propter conuenientiam, cum uoluptate sentitur. *Ibid.* 6.5.9.

seat of rationality, moves the body according to what it expects or desires, which is proper proportion and pure ratio. If we think in terms of intervals, the soul expects to hear a fifth with a ratio of 3:2; if the pitches are out of tune with each other, our senses are in conflict with our expectations, and we experience pain. The senses report, the soul predicts, and the result is feeling. Brian Brennan highlights the dependence of this view on Varro's theory of the emotions, in which the soul seeks the harmonious balance of its parts: 'When something material happens in the body there is a consciousness of disturbance in the balance. When music strikes the ear it sets up just such a bodily disturbance'.[40] Yet while Augustine is clearly drawing on such ideas, his application of them to music remains novel. This is indicated not only by the hesitancy with which he proffers his solution, but also by a perceptible difference in character between this approach and Classical accounts of music's coercive power. Instead of allowing the rationality of musical forms to influence the movement of the soul directly, Augustine argues that the sensory numbers travel into the body and are compared with the responding numbers – the expectations for the music that we have independently reached. Musical perception is thus a process in which our reason moves towards, but is never controlled by, the information provided by our senses. The mind judges the sensory numbers rather than being overcome by them.

This judgment Augustine divides into two stages. The first is the comparison between sensory and responding numbers that causes either pleasure or pain, feelings he ascribes to 'sensual' numbers. Because this judgment is automatic and temporal, such numbers cannot represent the highest form. Moreover, their judgment remains potentially subjective, for it depends on the expectations generated by our soul. If we are familiar with the sounds and styles of serialism, we are not surprised (and therefore pained) by atonal music. Music lacks any inherent power to colour our reactions. Yet perhaps the music of Pierre Boulez should cause us pain! This type of normative judgment is beyond the scope of the subjective, temporal sensual numbers, and so Augustine posits another level by which we judge our immediate emotional reactions. These 'judicial' numbers not only make timeless, objective judgments of beauty, but also help us to identify mistakes at other levels of perceptual process. We are able to recognise when an instrument plays a wrong note because it jarringly disagrees with our

[40] Brian Brennan, 'Augustine's *De musica*', *Vigiliae Christianae* 42, 267–81 (1988), 273–4.

expectations for the performance. Viewed from another perspective, we are able to recognise the true form of the composition, and the beauty present in it, despite the imperfection of the performance. Augustine, who defines musical beauty as 'a kind of equality and equally measured intervals',[41] recognises the ability of flawed performances to nevertheless point towards the perfection they lack: 'Equality charms the soul with the rhythms of temporal spaces, whether any two short syllables that it has heard are really equal'.[42] Moreover, despite the fallen nature of the corporeal world, 'To the extent that they [rhythms] imitate equality, we cannot deny that they are beautiful in their own kind and order'.[43]

Musical Understanding and Grades of Virtue

To say that our sensory judgments are sometimes wrong we must have knowledge of a transcendent Truth; as Augustine writes,

> The mind would certainly not look anywhere for the equality that we found in the sensible rhythms, not certain and permanent but yet shadowy and transient, unless this equality were known from somewhere.... So from where should we believe that the soul is given what is eternal and unchangeable, if not from the one, eternal and unchangeable God?[44]

It is contemplation of God's perfection that allows us to accurately judge the music we hear; knowledge of objective truth comes from divine illumination. Right musical understanding is thus inextricably linked to virtuous action, and specifically, to the state of contemplation. As we have seen, such a state is difficult to maintain: in listening to music, we can become distracted from the 'contemplation of things eternal... by anxious desire for sensual pleasure'.[45] Our

[41] Num aliud praeter parilitatem quamdam et aequaliter dimensa interualla? *De mus.* 6.10.26.

[42] Cum eam in spatiorum temporalium numeri aequalitas mulceat, utrum duae syllabae breues quascumque audierit uere sint aequales. *Ibid.* 6.10.28.

[43] In quantum imitantur, pulchra esse in genere suo et in ordine suo negare non possumus. *Ibid.* 6.10.28

[44] Aequalitatem illam, quam in sensibilibus numeris non reperiebamus certam et manentem sed tamen adumbratam et praetereuntem agnoscebamus, nusquam profecto adpeteret animus, nisi alicubi nota esset... Vnde ergo credendum est animae tribui quod aeternum est et incommutabile nisi ab uno aeterno et incommutabili Deo? *Ibid.* 6.12.34, 36.

[45] Amor igitur agendi aduersus succedentes passiones corporis sui, auertit animam a contemplatione aeternorum, sensibilis uoluptatis cura eius auocans intentionem: hoc autem agit occursoribus numeris. *Ibid.* 6.13.39.

inability to remain fixated on the true beauty of God is ultimately caused by pride, 'Through which vice the soul chose to imitate God rather than to serve him'.[46] We do not want to acknowledge that we are subject to higher numbers and powers, so we busy ourselves with judging those things beneath us. The practical effect of ignoring God is that the highest numbers we can exercise when perceiving music and ratio are the sensual numbers, reducing music to mere feeling. By severing the connection with ultimate truth, however, we are actually left incapable of exercising correct judgment at any level, and 'the just consequence is that those who through their pride wished to surpass the others are not able to rule even over their own parts and bodies'.[47]

Our understanding of *De musica* comes alive when its account of musical perception is viewed alongside an analysis of the grades of virtue; and, in particular, the multiple-operation theory developed in *De quantitate animae*. By fixing our attention on God through contemplation we are able to judge music correctly, acting within the lower levels of virtue – reason and perception – to neutralise any imbalance caused by music's imperfection. In contemplation, God provides the understanding necessary to participate in lower levels of activity without allowing them to overcome us, or causing our pride in judgment to distract our attention from the divine. This is, of course, an ideal account. As Augustine acknowledges, pride does distract from contemplation by encouraging us to view judgments of musical beauty as autonomous. In so doing, however, we are not only pulled down the hierarchy of virtuous action, but in fact loose all ability to judge. The soul actively resists being influenced by the physical through the production of its own expectations, which can then be compared with the motions of the body. Yet how can we generate such expectations on our own? Without divine illumination to guide our judgments there is no way to ensure even a modicum of correlation between the activities of the soul and those of the body. The interaction between body and soul is thus left to degenerate into cacophony: we are 'not able to rule even over their own parts and bodies'.

If pride is the cause of our alienation from God, even in our appreciation of music, then the antidote to this separation is 'that we should love our God and Lord with all our heart and with all our soul and with all our mind and love our neighbour as ourselves'. In practical

[46] Quo uitio Deum imitari quam Deo seruire maluit anima. *Ibid.* 6.13.40.

[47] Iure autem secutum est, ut quae superbia caeteris excellere cupierunt, nec suis partibus atque corporibus sine difficultate et doloribus imperent. *Ibid.* 6.13.41.

terms, this means we must 'direct all these movements [of the soul] and rhythms of our human activity to this end'.[48] When we use rhythms for our own ends, determined by pride, we become enslaved to them, for we lack the capacity to judge objectively. It is through love of God and neighbour, then, that we may actually gain control over our perceptions and emotions, and no longer be subject to them. This process of reorientation, 'Whereby the soul with the help of its God and Lord draws itself away from the love of an inferior beauty by fighting down and killing its own habit', in turn promotes in us the virtues of temperance, fortitude, and justice.[49] Just as we can allow music and number to pull our gaze away from God, we can also use the music present throughout the world to aide our spiritual ascent.

It is at this point that the multiple operation of different grades of virtue becomes particularly interesting, because it not only explains how we can act ethically while remaining focused on the divine, but also indicates how such ethical action can be used to enhance cathartic contemplation; in Christian terms, how the love of neighbour contributes to the love of God without simply being a step along a virtuous ascent. Right judgments of music – made possible by divine illumination through contemplation – are able to neutralise distracting musical imperfections, removing music's potentially negative effects. Yet we are not left entirely unaffected by music: the activity of the soul, producing expectations of harmony and comparing these with the numbers of our hearing, does not return us to the status quo ante. Instead, it generates an emotional reaction in the sensual numbers: pain, to the extent that the music deviates from our expectations, and pleasure in the harmony of sound and expectation. Any pain, however, is quickly converted into pleasure as we contemplate how the music ought to be. Music, rightly judged through the multiple operation of virtues, not only directs us towards contemplation, but uses emotion to reinforce the integration of the ethical and cathartic. It is in this sense, then, that activity within the physical world can be used to strengthen our relationship with God rather than simply distracting from contemplation of the divine. We are not called to denounce

[48] Ad hunc igitur finem si omnes illos humanae actionis motus, numeros que referamus, sine dubitatione mundabimur. *Ibid.* 6.14.43.

[49] Sed haec actio qua sese anima, opitulante Deo et Domino suo, ab amore inferioris pulchritudinis extrahit, debellans atque interficiens aduersus se militantem consuetudinem suam, ea uictoria triumphatura in semetipsa de potestatibus aeris huius, quibus inuidentibus et praepedire cupientibus, euolat ad suam stabilitatem et firmamentum deum; nonne tibi uidetur ea esse uirtus quae temperantia dicitur? *Ibid.* 6.15.50. These are precisely those central virtues identified by Plotinus (*Enn.* 1.2.1).

musical harmonies, or their capacity to imitate true beauty. Rather, we must 'use them well', responding to the music in a way that maintains our attention on the contemplation of God, and thus allows musical harmonies to strengthen the integration of the different grades of virtue rather than distracting from that which is higher.

A Unique Account of Musical Perception

For theologians, *De musica* provides an illuminating application of Augustine's theory of virtue to a particular type of physical distraction; moreover, one that – as a form of rationality – has the potential to be particularly insidious. Yet its importance chiefly lies in the novel use of a multiple-operation approach to the understanding of musical perception. Although Augustine is, at times, wary of the power of music to distract (for example, his famous discussion of music in *Confessiones* 10.33), the coercive, deterministic language of Aristides and, later, Boethius, is noticeably absent from *De musica*.[50] Instead, the emphasis is placed on our ability to act in accordance with cathartic virtues despite music's potential to distract. This freedom of right action is preserved by Augustine's hesitantly offered account of musical perception, which describes the soul as acting within the body alongside the numbers of our hearing; producing an emotional response through the interaction between body and soul.

That is not to say that such a positive outcome is assured, or even likely. It is for this reason that Augustine 'vacillate[s] between the peril of pleasure and the value the [musical] experience': music retains the tantalising potential to move him 'more than the thing which is sung'.[51] Just as it is easy to be distracted from contemplation of God by our ethical activities, the sensual beauty of music can draw

[50] This is noticed by composer Paul Hindemith, who cannot identify what differentiates *De musica* from other Classical sources but nevertheless senses a divergence between these, 'In which the power of music, its ethos, is brought into action upon our mind,' and the Augustinian approach, where 'our mind absorbs music and transforms it into moral strength' (Hindemith, *A Composer's World* [Mainz: Schott Musik International, 1952], 11).

[51] ita fluctuo inter periculum uoluptatis et experimentum salubritatis magisque adducor non quidem inretractabilem sententiam proferens cantandi consuetudinem approbare in ecclesia, ut per oblectamenta aurium infirmior animus in affectum pietatis adsurgat. Tamen cum mihi accidit, ut me amplius cantus quam res quae canitur, moueat, poenaliter me peccare confiteor et tunc mallem non audire cantantem. *Conf.* 10.33.50.

our attention away from the source of all beauty and equality. What is again different, however, is that Augustine maintains the possibility that music might have a positive influence, and preserves the element of human choice in determining how it will be used. Music may be distracting, but we can choose to focus on its theological significance rather than remaining transfixed by its sensual charms.

Interestingly, the significance of *De musica* has largely gone unnoticed, both in terms of its relevance for discussions of virtue and its divergence from other Classical texts on music. In most cases, this can be attributed to a misreading of the critical passage on musical perception (6.5.9).[52] Instead of noting the interaction between judgment – which remains autonomous – and the numbers of hearing, both Medieval and contemporary commentators have read Augustine's account in traditional terms as describing the progressive refinement of sensory information. In his *Journey of the Mind to God*, for example, Bonaventure gives a concise summary of the ascent in *De musica*'s sixth book, but describes the process of perception in a completely linear manner, ignoring the predictive nature of the reacting numbers: '[Augustine] declares that there are numbers in bodies and specifically in sounds and voices, and these he calls "sounding numbers." Secondly, there are numbers which are drawn from these and which are received into the sense faculty, and these he calls "reacting numbers."'[53] Bonaventure overlooks the opposition Augustine establishes between our perceptions and our expectations, reading *De musica* as simply reflecting the Classical tradition rather than subtly but significantly altering it.

Modern commentator Bruce Bubacz, on the other hand, does recognise that Augustine's logic 'rules out… a simple look-and-see model of perception – a simple empiricism', but then proceeds to explain perception once again as a matter of refinement, in which sensory data alters our mental expectations.[54] Drawing on *De Trinitate*, he explains that perception involves the mind 'imposing a structure on the manifold of experience, testing that structure, and modifying it'.[55] The mind must 'consider the random elements of experience,

[52] Although not all: Brennan correctly analyses Augustine's account, but fails to link it to his discussions of virtue (Brennan, 'Augustine's *De musica*', 273–4).

[53] Bonaventure *It. ment. Deum*, 2.10; trans. Philotheus Boehner (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1993); emphasis added.

[54] Bruce Bubacz, *St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1981), 111.

[55] *Ibid.*, 117.

structure them, and construct a picture of the physical world'.[56] If we look at the passage of *De Trinitate* that Bubacz quotes, however, we find the same account of perception as *De musica*:

> The images of corporeal things... which we draw in through the bodily sense... whether it contradicts the reality or by chance agrees with it, are approved or disapproved within ourselves by rules that are wholly different, which remain unchangeably above our mind when we rightly approve or disapprove of anything.[57]

The mind does not 'structure' the sensory information, successively refining the image and discriminating its features, but judges it. Only though such an autonomous form of judgment, which in imposing structure on our perceptions is not in any way responsible to them, can Augustine preserve the multiple operation of contemplation and perception.

Bubacz's attempt to have reason refine, rather than judge, sensory data may reflect a modern tendency to view perception in cognitive terms. Similarly, Steven Guthrie specifically identifies a parallel between Augustine's theory of musical perception and cognitive psychology: in both models there is 'sense announcing and reason discovering'.[58] In a cognitive model of perception, information travels exclusively up a series of hierarchical levels, so that notes are distinguished from each other before being stitched together into melody, polyphony, and piece. Higher-level judgments of style, rhythm, key, meter, etc, can only be made once the raw sensory data has been processed to a sufficient level; we cannot identify a melody without first processing each note for pitch, duration, and timbre. This is the modern equivalent, then, of Bonaventure's interpretation, with sensory information moving directly up an analytical hierarchy. While a cognitive model might thus be appropriate for the Medieval tradition, it does not describe the process of judgment in *De musica*.

What these examples of modern interpretation show is that Augustine's technical prose and the strength of the Classical tradition of music theory have together led many to overlook the subtle but significant change he makes to the process of musical perception.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Vnde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas... aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, uel approbare apud nosmetipsos, uel improbare conuincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. *De Trin.*, 9.6.10; quoted by Bubacz, *Ibid.*, 116.

[58] Steven Guthrie, *Carmen universitatis: a theological study of music and measure* (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Andrews, 2000), 239.

Although music is inherently rational, and thus a special case, it does not gain through this rationality a coercive power over our actions. Instead, the theory of perception Augustine developed in earlier works like *De quantitate animae* continues to apply.[59] While theologically *De musica* echoes earlier ideas, in so doing it deviates from Classical theories of musical perception and their emphasis on the determining effects of musical proportions. Thus, although *De musica* does not offer a unique account of perception per se, it does present an innovative theory of musical perception.

By following a 'multiple-operation' understanding of virtue – in which attention on the higher levels of virtue allows us to interact with the physical world without becoming distracted by it – Augustine is able to formulate a much more sophisticated understanding of music's positive role within the process of spiritual formation than is found in other Classical and Medieval authors: one that emphasises our judgment of musical harmonies instead of their coercive powers of distraction. In this way, Augustine preserves the possibility that, instead of prescribing human actions, music might always be 'used well': as a means of directing our thoughts towards the divine source of truth and beauty.[60] His innovative treatment of music thus has interesting implications for theological understandings of music, while belying the claim that De musica is simply derivative and unworthy of scholarly attention.

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[59] Brittain notes that *De musica* follows *De quantitate animae*, but does not identify this as a departure from tradition.
[60] *De mus.* 6.14.46.

ANGESICHT UND GESTALT JESU IN DER VITA CHRISTI DES MICHAEL VON MASSA († 1337)

„Du bist der Schönste von allen Menschen" (Ps 45, 3)

Walter Baier († 1994) hat festgestellt, dass Ludolf von Sachsen den *Libellus de uita Jesu Christi* des Michael von Massa ganz übernommen und in sein umfangreiches Werk *Vita Christi* eingearbeitet hat.[1] Diese Entdeckung rief zwar anfangs einige ablehnende Reaktionen hervor, wurde aber inzwischen von den meisten Wissenschaftlern akzeptiert.[2] Der früh verstorbene W. Baier äußerte den Wunsch, die Werke Michaels und Ludolfs in kritischen Editionen vorzulegen. Diese seien angebracht, da der Text beider Autoren eine breite Wirkung erzielte und für verschiedene Disziplinen von Bedeutung sei.

Michaels Schrift hat nicht nur als selbständiges Werk Verbreitung gefunden und seine Wirkung ausgeübt, sondern auch in der Verschmelzung mit Ludolfs Leben Jesu eine große Leserschaft gefunden. Die Texte haben Erneuerungen in der Kirche angestoßen und dienten zahlreichen Menschen als geistliche Lektüre und Betrachtungshilfe.[3]

Diese Gründe veranlassen mich, eine kritische Edition des *Libellus de uita Jesu Christi* des Michael von Massa durchzuführen.

Leben und Werk des Michael von Massa (um 1290-1337)

Michael von Massa gehört nicht zu den Spitzenvertretern der Augustinerschule, ist aber den bedeutenderen Lehrern zuzurechnen. Aus seinem Leben sind einige Angaben bekannt, von seinen Werken kamen verschiedene auf uns.

[1] W. Baier, *Untersuchungen zu den Passionsbetrachtungen in der „Vita Christi" des Ludolf von Sachsen. Ein quellenkritischer Beitrag zu Leben und Werk Ludolfs von Sachsen und zur Geschichte der Passionstheologie* (Acar 44/ 1-3), Salzburg 1977.

[2] W. Baier, *Michael von Massa OESA (+ 1337). Autor einer Vita Christi. Kritik der Diskussion über ihre Zuordnung zur Vita Christi des Kartäusers Ludolf von Sachsen († 1378)*, in: *Traditio Augustiniana. Studien über Augustinus und seine Rezeption, FS Eckermann* (Cassiciacum XLVI), hrsg. von A. Zumkeller/ A. Krümmel, Würzburg 1994, 495-524; K.-E. Geith, *Lateinische und deutschsprachige Leben Jesu-Texte. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung*, in: JOWG 12 (2000), 273-289.

[3] Ich habe meine Transskription des Ms. UB Leipzig 800 mit der VC Ludolfs verglichen und komme zu dem gleichen Ergebnis wie W. Baier, dass das Leben Jesu Michaels für Ludolf die unmittelbare Quelle war. Siehe W. Baier, *Untersuchungen* 2, 355.

Michael wurde um 1290, spätestens 1294 in Siena geboren. Er stammt aus der Familie der Beccucci, die von Massa Marittima in der Toskana nach Siena übersiedelte. Nach Massa, dem Ursprungsort seiner Familie, erhielt Michael den Beinamen de Massa. Er trat im Konvent von Siena dem Augustinerorden bei und absolvierte wahrscheinlich in ihm sein Grundstudium. Danach setzte er sein Studium seit 1312 in Paris fort. Von 1319 bis 1321 war er *baccalaureus biblicus* an der Pariser Universität. Im Studienjahr 1320/21, spätestens 1321/22 hielt er als *baccalaureus sententiarius* seine Vorlesungen über die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus.[4]

Bis zu seinem Tod im Jahre 1337 blieben ihm noch 15 Jahre, die in etwa der Zeitrahmen sind, der nötig war, dass Michael sein überliefertes literarisches Werk ausführen konnte. Aus seinen Schriften ragt die Sentenzenlesung Michaels hervor. Zwei der Bücher sind als Abbreviation auf uns gekommen. An dem Text ist bemerkenswert, dass er sich dem Schulhaupt Aegidius Romanus anschloss, aber die Verteidigung des Aegidius kritisierte, wie sie sein etwa gleichaltriger Mitbruder Gerhard von Siena durchgeführt hatte.

Michael neigte der Via moderna zu und übernahm deshalb nicht alle Überlegungen, die Gerhard angestellt hatte, setzte sich aber auch kritisch mit Wilhelm von Ockham auseinander.

Außerdem sind von ihm Kommentare zu verschiedenen Büchern der Hl. Schrift des Alten und Neuen Testaments überliefert.

Handschriftlich weit verbreitet waren Michaels Passionstraktate. Es sind dies die Schriften *Angeli pacis* (Is 33, 7), *Historia passionis* oder *Extendit manum* (Gen 22, 10) und *Rogatus fui*. Größere Aufmerksamkeit fand in der jüngsten Zeit der *Libellus de uita domini nostri Jesu Christi secundum textum euangelistarum*.

Michaels Bedeutung liegt nicht im akademischen Bereich der Kommentierung der Sentenzen oder philosophischer Schriften des Aristoteles, sondern in der Frömmigkeitstheologie. Die Tatsache, dass er den Magistergrad in Paris nicht erlangte, obwohl er in verschiedenen Handschriften als Magister bezeichnet wird, hat zwar zu

[4] Diese Berechnung ergibt sich aus den Statuten der Pariser Universität, nach denen sich Michael richten musste. Nach diesem Maßstab muss der Bewerber sieben Jahre studiert und dann als Bibelbakkalar zwei Jahre das gesamte Alte und Neue Testament kommentiert haben, um zur Sentenzenlesung zugelassen zu werden. Um diese Aufgabe wahrnehmen zu können, musste Michael 25 Jahre alt sein. Siehe T. A. Kemper, *Die Kreuzigung Christi. Motivgeschichtliche Studien zu lateinischen und deutschen Passionstraktaten des Spätmittelalters* (Münchener Texte und Untersuchungen zur deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 131), Tübingen 2006, 120-129.

der Überlegung geführt, es könnte ihm bewusst der Weg zur Erlangung dieses Titels blockiert worden sein, aber Beweise können für diese Hypothese nicht erbracht werden. Spekulationen führen in dieser Frage nicht weiter, sondern auf Abwege, wie die Überlegung W. Baiers zeigt, der meinte, Michael habe im norddeutschen Raum eine Lehrtätigkeit ausgeübt.

Die geplante Edition wird sich mit den Verbindungen des *Libellus* zu den anderen Schriften Michaels wie auch zu der *Vita Christi* des Ludolf von Sachsen beschäftigen.

Michael de Massa wird in der Handschrift UB Leipzig 800 als Verfasser des *Libellus de uita domini nostri Jesu Christi* ausdrücklich angegeben. Wann er das Büchlein verfasste, ist leider nicht vermerkt. Für die Abfassungszeit ist man deshalb auf Vermutungen angewiesen.

Nimmt man an, dass die Schrift nicht vor 1326 entstanden ist, da Michael zu dieser Zeit noch in seiner theologischen Ausbildung stand, kann man sie auf die Jahre 1330/35 datieren.

Im Juni 1332 vertrat Michael als Definitor die Ordensprovinz Siena auf dem Generalkapitel von Venedig.

Michael starb bereits am 10. Mai 1337. Der Sterbeort ist wahrscheinlich Paris.

Für die geplante Edition von Michaels Büchlein über das Leben Jesu habe ich die Handschrift Leipzig UB, Cod. 800, fol. 1r-100r transskribiert. Dabei fiel mir auf, dass Michael häufig von der äußeren Erscheinung Jesu spricht, von seinem Körper und seinem Gesicht, von der Freude, die sie bei ihrer Betrachtung auslösen, und von dem Schmerz, den sie infolge der zugefügten Leiden beim Betrachtenden hervorrufen. Diese Beobachtung regte mein Interesse an und veranlasste mich, den vorliegenden Beitrag über das Antlitz und die körperliche Gestalt Jesu in der Vita Christi Michaels zu schreiben.

Ein Bild von Jesus gesehen mit den geistigen Augen

Im *Libellus* steht die Feststellung Michaels, dass er in seinem Leben Jesu auch Auskunft über das Erscheinungsbild Jesu geben wolle, dazu aber eigentlich nicht in der Lage sei. Denn er selbst hatte ihn natürlich nicht gesehen. Deshalb richtete er in seiner schwierigen Lage an Christus die Frage:

Warum sah ich meinen Herrn nicht in körperlicher Gestalt?

Er wusste, dass er seine Frage selbst beantworten musste, und tat es mit dieser an Christus gewandten Bitte:

> *Gib mir wenigstens die Gnade, dass ich dich mit den geistigen Augen hier auf dem Wege sehe und schließlich einmal in der Heimat von Angesicht zu Angesicht.*[5]

In der Bitte Michaels werden nicht nur das Diesseits und das Jenseits als die zwei Bereiche benannt, in denen sich das Sehen Jesu zuträgt und geschehen kann, sondern auch die Organe angesprochen, die ein Bild von Jesus vermitteln. Während der Pilgerschaft hat das geistige Auge die Aufgabe, ein Jesusbild zu formen, um sich selbst daran zu erfreuen und um es dann dem Betrachtenden beschreibend darbieten zu können. In der ewigen Heimat ist eine direkte Gegenüberstellung des Erwählten mit Jesus zu erwarten.

Michael suchte sich das Antlitz Jesu mit Hilfe alt- und neutestamentlicher Angaben, aber auch mittels der Schilderung, welche die *Annalen, die bei den Römern existieren*, zu vergegenwärtigen. Er war sich dabei bewusst, dass diese Angaben nicht das wahre Aussehen Jesu wiedergaben, erblickte aber in ihnen Hinweise und Anhaltspunkte für eine geistige Betrachtung Jesu. Durch das Einwirken der Gnade erhoffte er sich die notwendigen Auswirkungen des Bildes auf den Betrachter und Anregungen zur Verwirklichung des durch die Schau Erkannten.[6]

[5] *Cur te in carnis effigie non uidi, dominum meum? Quem et si non uidi corporalibus oculis, saltem per gratiam tuam te uideam mentalibus hic in uia et tandem in patria facie ad faciem.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 6r)

[6] Bereits Aegidius Romanus hatte einen *Hymnus ad faciem Saluatoris* verfasst, ed. bei F. J. Mone, *Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters I*, Freiburg i. Br. 1853, 155 -156:

Salue sancta facies
nostri redemptoris,
in qua nitet species
diuini splendoris,
impressa panniculo
niuei candoris
dataque Veronicae
signum ob amoris.

Salve decus saeculi,
speculum sanctorum,
quod uidere cupiunt
spiritus caelorum:
nos ab omni macula
purga uitiorum
atque nos consortio
iunge beatorum.

Salue nostra gloria
in hac uita dura,
labili et fragili
cito transitura;
nos perduc ad patriam,
o felix figura,
ad uidendam faciem,
quae est Christi pura.

Esto nobis quaesumus
tutum adiuuamen,
dulce refrigerium
atque consolamen,
nobis ut non noceat
hostile grauamen,
sed fruamur requie
omnis dicat, amen.

Eine Personenbeschreibung Jesu nach den *Annalen*

Vor Michael hatten sich mit der von ihm gestellten Frage nach dem Aussehen Jesu bereits *mystische Kreise* beschäftigt. Sie erarbeiteten eine Personalbeschreibung Jesu, die in der abendländischen Mönchsliteratur des 13. oder angehenden 14. Jahrhunderts verbreitet wurde. Als Fundort aus früher Zeit wurden die *Libri Annales apud Romanos exsistentes* genannt.

Der kirchliche Humanismus des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts griff die Angabe auf, bearbeitete sie, schrieb sie einem römischen Senator Lentulus in Judäa zu und machte sie als *Lentulusbrief* bekannt.

Michael übernahm wohl als erster aus dieser Literatur die Personalbeschreibung Jesu und fügte sie in sein *Leben Jesu* ein. Als Fundort nennt er die *Annalen, die bei den Römern existieren.* Noch vor Ludof von Sachsen, den Ernst von Dobschütz als Erstverwender dieser Stelle aus den *Annalen* annahm, kommt sie bei Michael von Massa vor.[7]

Auf Grund der von Michael an Christus gerichteten Bitte, seinem geistigen Auge sein Bild zu zeigen, ist nicht anzunehmen, dass Michael die Personenbeschreibung Jesu als bare Münze nahm. Er betrachtete sie als eine Unterstützung für das Sehen Jesu *mit den geistigen Augen hier auf den Wegen.* Deshalb und, um auch denen zu helfen, die sich schwer taten, ein Jesusbild mit den geistigen Augen zu formen, übernahm er den Text in seine Abhandlung über das Leben Jesu.

Bei Michael wie auch bei Ludolf ist dies der Wortlaut des Textes:

> *Wir lesen in den Annalenbüchern, die bei den Römern vorhanden sind, dass Jesus Christus, der von den Heiden als Prophet der Wahrheit bezeichnet wurde, von schlanker Gestalt, mittlerer Größe und ansehnlicher Erscheinung war. Sein Aussehen war ehrwürdig, so dass die Anschauenden ihn lieben oder fürchten konnten. Sein Haar war von der Form einer völlig reifen Haselnuss und reichte bis zu den Ohren. Von den Ohren abwärts war es gekräuselt, etwas dunkel über seine Schultern wallend und nach der Sitte der Nazarener in der Mitte gescheitelt. Seine Stirn war offen und sehr heiter, sein Gesicht ohne Runzeln und Flecken, von einem leichten Rot überzogen. Nase und Mund waren so geformt, dass nichts daran zu tadeln war. Er hatte*

[7] W. Baier, *Untersuchungen zu den Passionsbetrachtungen in der Vita Christi des Ludolf von Sachsen. Ein quellenkritischer Beitrag zu Leben und Werk Ludolfs und zur Geschichte der Passionstheologie* Bd. 2 (Analecta Cartusiana 44), Salzburg 1977, 212-213.

einen dichten und mannhaften Bart in der gleichen Farbe wie die Haare. Dieser war nicht lang, aber in der Mitte geteilt, und bot einen einfachen und reifen Anblick. Seine Augen waren dunkelblau, lebhaft und klar. Im Tadel war er furchtbar, in der Ermahnung freundlich, liebenswürdig und heiter unter Wahrung der Würde. Manchmal weinte, niemals lachte er. Sein Körper war wohlgeformt und straff, Hände und Arme erfreuten das Auge. Im Gespräch war er ernst, vernünftig, kurz und bescheiden. Deshalb wird mit Recht im Psalm 45, 3 von ihm gesagt: ‚Du bist der Schönste von allen Menschen.[8]

Die Personenbeschreibung, die das Annalenbuch von Jesus bot, blieb nicht ohne Einfluss auf Michaels Jesusbild. Er griff aber vor allem den Psalmvers 45, 3 von der Schönheit Jesu auf und brachte ihn wie einen *cantus firmus* in seinen Darlegungen zur Geltung. Selbst wenn Michael auf den gegeißelten und gekreuzigten Leib Jesu blickt, stellt er die Schönheit seines Leibes als unauslöschliche Grundierung heraus.[9]

Das Gesicht des Jesuskindes

Im Titel seiner Abhandlung nennt Michael als Quelle für sein *Leben Jesu* die Evangelisten. Er bezieht sich auf ihre Berichte in den Evangelien, greift einzelne Ereignisse auf und verwendet sie für seine Darstellung.

Da Michaels Darlegung chronologisch angeordnet ist, bietet sich ihm als erste Gelegenheit zur Formung eines Jesusbildes der

[8] *Legimus in libris Annalibus apud Romanos exsistentibus, quod Jesus Christus, qui dictus fuit a gentibus propheta ueritatis, staturae fuit procerae, longitudinis mediocris et spectabilis, uultum habens uenerabilem, quem possent intuentes diligere uel formidare. Capillos habens ad modum nucis auelanae permaturae fere usque ad aures. Ab auribus continuos crispos aliquantulum caeruleos ad humeros uentilantes discurrere, habens in medio capitis iuxta morem Nazarenorum frontem planam et serenissimam cum facie sine ruga et sine macula, quam rubor moderate uentilat.*

Cur te in carnis effigie non uidi, dominum meum? Quem et si non uidi corporalibus oculis, saltem per gratiam tuam te uideam mentalibus hic in uia et tandem in patria facie ad faciem, qui es super omnia benedictus.

Nasi prorsus et oris nulla fuit reprehensio. Barbam habens copiosam et puberem capillis concolorem non longam, sed in mento bifurcatam, aspectu simplicem et maturam. Oculis glaucis et uariis et claris exsistentibus. In increpatione erat terribilis, in admonitione blandus et amabilis, hilaris seruata grauitate. Aliquando fleuit, sed numquam risit. In statuam corporis propagatus et rectus, manus et brachia uisui delectabilia, in colloquio grauis, rationabilis, ratus et modestus et ideo merito secundum psalmum dicitur: Speciosus forma prae filiis hominum. (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 5v-6r)

[9] MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 72v, 82v.

Evangelienbericht von der Geburt Jesu. An ihm interessiert ihn das Gesicht des Jesuskindes. Es ist aber nicht so sehr das konkrete Aussehen des Kindes, sondern eher die Wirkung, die von dem Gesicht des menschgewordenen Sohnes Gottes ausging und ausgehen soll.

Die Betrachtung des Jesuskindes lässt Michael zuerst durch die himmlischen Heerscharen durchführen. Er schildert, dass nach der Menschwerdung Jesu der ganze himmlische Hofstaat in Freude ausbrach und Gott Vater für die Menschwerdung seines Sohnes dankte. Die Engelchöre kamen nach ihren Ordnungen gestaffelt zur Krippe, *um das Gesicht des Herrn ihres Gottes zu sehen.*[10] Der Anblick des Kindes war für sie eine unerhörte Neuigkeit. Seine Menschwerdung löste Freude und ehrfürchtige Anbetung aus. Sie wollten ihren Herrn sehen, der sich so demütig auf Erden befand.[11]

Für das Recht, diese Gedanken entwickeln zu können, stützt sich Michael auf Hebr 1, 6, wo es heißt: *Wenn er aber den Erstgeborenen wieder in die Welt einführt, sagt er: Alle Engel Gottes sollen sich vor ihm niederwerfen.*

An die Schilderung des Verlangens der Himmelsbewohner, das Angesicht des Jesuskindes sehen zu wollen, schließt Michael die Aufforderung an den Betrachter der Perikope von der Geburt an, auch er solle zum Kind in der Krippe gehen, es verehren und anbeten. Er soll die Mutter Maria bitten, sie möge ihm das Kind reichen. So kann er es in seinen Armen ganz aus der Nähe sehen. Dabei soll er sein Gesicht liebevoll und ehrfürchtig betrachten, es küssen und sich an ihm zuversichtlich erfreuen.[12]

Denn diese innigen Berührungen sind dem Betrachtenden nicht deshalb erlaubt, weil es sich um ein kleines, hilfloses Kind handelt, sondern weil der Sohn Gottes Menschenkind wurde. Er kam auf die Erde, um uns Sünder zu erlösen, um mit uns demütig zu verkehren und sich uns schließlich als Speise zum ewigen Leben zu überlassen.

Der Betrachtende soll sich das Gesicht des Jesuskindes einprägen. Sein Bild bleibt im Betrachtenden haften, wenn er das Jesuskind

[10] *Venerunt omnes, quotquot ibi erant, successiue per ordines suos uidere faciem domini dei sui, et adorauerunt eum cum omni reuerentia.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 14r)

[11] *Quin uisitasset dominum suum sic humiliter constitutum in terra.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 14r)

[12] *Roga dominam, ut eum tibi porrigat uel permittat accipere. Accipias ergo eum et inter brachia tua retine, intuearis faciem eius diligenter ac reuerenter, osculare et delectare in eo confidenter.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 14v)

nicht nur einmal anschaut, sondern immer wieder zur Krippe zurückkehrt. Bei der Betrachtung des Kindes darf die Ehrerbietung und Furcht nicht fehlen, da es sich um das Gesicht des Gottessohnes handelt.

Für die Begegnung mit dem Kind, speziell für das Anschauen seines Gesichtes soll der Betrachtende bedenken, dass ihm eine große Gnade zuteil wird. Das Gnadenhafte wird darin deutlich, dass sogar die Engel danach verlangen, das Angesicht des Herrn sehen zu wollen. (1 Petr 1, 12) Dieses Verlangen ist nicht verwunderlich, da es das Gesicht des Schönsten der Menschenkinder ist (Ps 45, 3). Sein Anblick gibt dem Betrachtenden Gelegenheit, dass er das Gesicht mit Freude anschaut, sich einprägt und sich als Ziel seines Lebens vor Augen hält und immer wieder vergegenwärtigt.

Das Betrachten von Jesu Angesicht ist für Michael bedeutsam. Er hat es an den Engeln aufgezeigt, die Jesu Angesicht sehen wollten. Er hält es für wichtig, dass der Glaubende sich bewusst macht, dass der Sohn Gottes ihn auf seinem Weg mit einem menschlichen Angesicht, beginnend mit dem Gesicht eines Kindes, begleitet. Er darf auch seinen Weg in der Zuversicht gehen, dass er das Angesicht Jesu einmal direkt sehen kann.

Jesu Schönheit und Beredsamkeit

Bis zu seinem öffentlichen Wirken spricht Michael wenig über das Angesicht Christi. Bei der Schilderung der Betreuung des Kindes Jesus durch Maria und Joseph verweist er gelegentlich darauf, dass sie das Jesuskind anschauten, anlächelten und um seine körperliche Entwicklung besorgt waren

Erst der Auftritt Jesu in der Synagoge von Nazareth veranlasst Michael, über das Aussehen Jesu wieder zu sprechen.

In der Nazarether Synagoge legte Jesus die Jesajastelle 61, 1-2 aus, in der es heißt, dass der göttliche Geist ihn gesalbt hat und aussendet, das Evangelium den Armen zu verkünden. Nach der Verlesung des Abschnittes sagt Jesus von sich, in seiner Verkündigung habe sich dieses prophetische Wort vor den Ohren der Zuhörer erfüllt (Lk 4,18-19).

Die Szene veranlasste Michael zu einigen Aussagen über das Aussehen Jesu. Michael macht deutlich, wie sich Jesus den Zuhörern vorstellte: In der Synagoge übernahm er demütig das Amt des Lektors. Mit sehr freundlichem und gefälligem Gesichtsausdruck las er die Hl. Schrift vor und legte sie aus. Bei der Aussage, dass sich in

Jesus die Ankündigung der Schriftstelle erfüllt habe, waren alle Augen wegen der Wirksamkeit der Worte und seines demütigen und geziemenden Gesichtsausdruckes auf ihn gerichtet. Michael vermerkt, dass Jesus sehr schön und dazu auch sehr beredt war.[13]

Für beide Eigenschaften Jesu verweist er wieder auf den Psalmvers: *Du bist der Schönste von allen Menschen.* Er zitiert auch den weitergehenden Text: *Anmut ist ausgegossen über deine Lippen.* (Ps 45,3)

Auch die Belehrung der Jünger über ein tugendhaftes und vollkommenes Leben (Mt 7, 13-14) veranlasst Michael zu einigen Aussagen über das Aussehen Jesu.

Dem Betrachter der Szene der Unterweisung gibt Michael einige Hinweise, über die er nachdenken soll. Er soll Jesus anschauen, wie er bei der Bergpredigt demütig auf der Erde sitzt. Jesus ist nicht von seinen Jüngern abgesondert, sondern von ihnen umgeben. Er hält sich unter ihnen gleichsam wie einer von ihnen auf. Er spricht liebenswürdig, gütig und wirksam zu ihnen, um sie zum tugendhaften Handeln hinzuführen.

Schaut man auf die Wirkung, welche die Worte Jesu bei den Jüngern hervorrufen, so sieht man, dass sie ehrfürchtig, demütig und mit ganzer Anspannung des Geistes auf ihn schauen, seinen wunderbaren Worten lauschen und sie dem Gedächtnis anvertrauen. Mit großer Freude genießen sie sowohl seine Worte wie seinen Anblick[14].

Die Reaktion der Jünger auf die Worte und das Verhalten Jesu soll sich der Betrachtende vergegenwärtigen. Sie soll für ihn ein Vorbild der Freude sein.

Auch soll der Betrachtende Jesus so anschauen, als ob er ihn aktuell sprechen sähe. Er soll sich der Jüngergruppe mit der Erwartung nähern, dass er vom Herrn selbst zum Verweilen aufgefordert wird.

[13] *Conspice ergo eum, quomodo humiliter suscipiens lectoris officium, benignissimo et placito uultu legit inter eos et exposuit scripturam, et quomodo humiliter incoepit se manifestare, dum dicit: Hodie impleta est scriptura, quasi diceret: Ego sum ille, de quo loquitur. Et ora omnium erant in eum intenta propter efficaciam uerborum et aspectum humilem et decorum. Fuit enim pulcherrimus, fuit etiam eloquentissimus et de utroque sic ei per prophetam dictum fuerat: Speciosus forma prae filiis hominum, diffusa est gratia in labiis tuis.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, 31r)

[14] *Conspice igitur et considera dominum Jesum humiliter in terra sedentem super illo monte et discipulos circa eum, quomodo stat inter eos quasi unus ex eis et quomodo affectuose, benigne et efficaciter loquitur eis inducens eos ad dictos actus uirtutum. Conspice etiam discipulos, quomodo reuerenter, humiliter et cum tota mentis intentione aspiciunt in eum et auscultant illa uerba mirifica et ea memoriae commendant, et iucunditate magna fruuntur tam in uerbis quam in aspectu.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 36r)

Dann soll er als Hörer der Predigt Jesu sich an der Lieblichkeit seines Anblicks und der Eindringlichkeit seiner Worte erfreuen.[15]

Die für den Betrachtenden aufgezeigte Haltung hebt Michael am Apostel Johannes hervor, der Jesus besonders verbunden war. Seine vertraute Beziehung zu Jesus zeigt sich darin, dass der Lieblingsjünger seinen geliebten Meister aufmerksam und liebend anblickte und alle seine Worte sammelte[16].

Leiden und Schönheit Jesu

Für Jesus war die Zeit von seiner Gefangennahme bis zu seinem Kreuzestod der schwierigste und grausamste Abschnitt seines irdischen Lebens.

Wie beurteilt Michael das Aussehen Jesu während dieser Zeit, was sagt er über sein Angesicht und seine Gestalt in der Leidenszeit?

Als Stationen der Betrachtung des Angesichts und des Körpers sollen die Geißelung Jesu, das Tragen des Kreuzes zum Kreuzigungsort Golgota und sein Tod am Kreuze herausgehoben werden.

Für die Geißelung zogen die Soldaten Jesus die Kleider aus und banden ihn an eine Säule. Jesus stand nackt da vor den Soldaten und Leuten, die sich zu dieser Strafaktion versammelt hatten. Den Anwesenden bot sich ein ungewöhnliches Bild. Vor ihnen stand kein gebrochener und ausgelaugter Mensch, sondern ein schöner und schamhafter junger Mann. Mit dem Psalmisten nennt ihn Michael den schönsten von allen Menschen (Ps 45,3).[17]

Die harte und schmerzhafte Geißelung hinterließ an seinem ganz unschuldigen, zarten, reinen und schönen Leib die blutigen Spuren der Tortur. Sein ganz reiner Leib war von seinem Blut rot gefärbt. In diesem Zustand traf auf Jesus die Beschreibung des Propheten Jesaja (53, 2.4) vom Gottesknecht zu: *Er hatte keine schöne und edle*

[15] *In hac autem consideratione iucundaris et tu aspiciendo, ac si eum uideres loquentem, et appropinquando eis, si forte uocatus fueris in morando ibidem, ut dominus tibi dabit.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 36r)

[16] *Inter alios autem conspice Iohannem eidem familiarius cohaerentem, qualiter attente et diligenter aspicit hunc dilectum suum et tenerius miseratus omnia uerba eius recolligit. Ipse enim solummodo ea describens tradidit nobis.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 63v)

[17] *Cum ergo iussit flagellari eum, spoliatur uestibus dominus, ad columnam ligatur, durissime et immanissime flagellatur et undique uerberibus cruciatur. Erat nudus coram omnibus, elegans iuuenis et uerecundus, speciosus forma prae filiis hominum.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 72v)

Gestalt, so dass wir ihn anschauen mochten. Und *Wir meinten, er sei von Gott geschlagen, von ihm getroffen und gebeugt.*[18]

Der Betrachtende soll sich den Leib Jesu nach der Geißelung mit Blut überströmt und mit Striemen und Wunden bedeckt vorstellen. Durch die grausame Tortur wurde die strahlende Schönheit seines Leibes in diesen bemitleidenswerten Zustand versetzt.[19]

Der zerstörerische Eingriff, der an Jesu Leib vorgenommen wurde, gehört auch zum Bild von Jesus. In ihm erkennt der Betrachtende die armselige Menschlichkeit Jesu, in die Menschen ihn versetzten. In seinem Angesicht wird der erlittene Schmerz sichtbar. Er bietet den Anblick eines Schmerzensmannes, von dem seine Schönheit genommen ist. Jesus zeigt sich als geschlagener und geschundener Mensch.

Auf diesen soll sich der Betrachtende konzentrieren. Führt er sich ihn so vor Augen, dann steht er zunächst als der Gegeißelte vor seinem geistigen Auge, der gerade von der Geißelsäule losgebunden wurde.[20]

Er sieht dann nicht mehr den feinen, sehr vornehmen, ganz unschuldigen und liebenswerten jungen Mann, sondern den ganz und gar gegeißelten, mit Blut und Wunden bedeckten Schmerzensmann. Seine Kleidungsstücke liegen verstreut umher; er sucht sie von der Erde aufzulesen. Mit schamhaftem und rotem Gesicht will er seine Blöße vor seinen Spöttern bedecken. Ihren Mienen liest er ab, dass er von den Gaffern als krank und von Gott verlassen angesehen und jeglicher Hilfe beraubt betrachtet wird. Aus dem Bild der Schönheit ist eine Gestalt der Verwüstung und des Jammers geworden.[21]

Der Betrachtende soll Jesus auch in diesem Zustand aufmerksam anschauen, um von Mitgefühl und Mitleid durchdrungen zu

[18] *Fluit undique regius sanguinis de omnibus partibus corporis eius. Corpus candidissimum sanguine eius roseo rubricatur…Tunc impletum est, quod ait Isaias propheta dicens: Vidimus, inquit, eum et non erat ei aspectus et reputauimus eum quasi leprosum et humiliatum a deo.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 72v)

[19] *Sic igitur eum diligenter considera per longam moram, et si hic ei non compateris, cor lapideum reputa te habere.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 72v)

[20] *Soluto autem domino a columna ducunt eum sic nudum, sic flagellatum per domum perscrutando pro pannis suis, qui sparsim proiecti per domum fuerant ab exspoliatoribus.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 73r)

[21] *Auerte autem parumper oculos a diuinitate et eum hominem considera et uidebis: Iuvenem elegantem, nobilissimum et innocentissimum et amantissimum, totum autem flagellatum et sanguine liuoribusque respersum, pannos suos undique sparsim proiectos, de terra recolligere et cum quadam uerecundia et rubore se nudatum coram illis ipsum semper irridentibus reuestire, ac si foret omnium infimus, derelictus a deo et omni auxilio destitutus.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 74r)

werden.[22] Er soll sich aber auch sein von Schmerzen geprägtes Antlitz einprägen. In ihm erkennt er den Menschen Jesus, an dem in dieser Situation nichts Göttliches wahrzunehmen ist.

Er soll so zu der Erkenntnis kommen, dass zum menschgewordenen Sohn Gottes auch das schmerzhafte Angesicht Christi gehört. Es ist für das geistige Auge des Betrachtenden dann hilfreich, wenn er sich in Not und Bedrängnis befindet und Jesus als einen im Leid erfahrenen Begleiter an seiner Seite weiß.

Aber auch bei diesem Anblick Jesu darf der Betrachtende nicht vergessen, dass mit dem geschundenen Menschen Jesus weiterhin seine Gottheit verbunden ist. In dieser Situation ist es für den nachdenkenden Betrachter angebracht, dass er mit dem Schmerzensmann die unermessliche Ewigkeit und unbegreifliche und herrscherliche Majestät Jesu bedenkt und verbindet. Diese hat Jesus zwar verlassen, ist Fleisch geworden, hat sich gebeugt und demütig zur Erde geneigt, er hat sie aber nicht aufgegeben. Die Vorstellung vom Schmerzensmann ruft den Eindruck hervor, Jesus sei der verächtlichste Mensch, ja sogar ein gekaufter Sklave, welcher der Herrschaft und Willkür der Käufer ausgeliefert ist und von ihnen für eine Ausschweifung getadelt und hart gezüchtigt wird. Aber auch als Gemarterter bleibt er der Gottessohn.[23]

Wer den gemarterten Jesus betrachtet und seine Gottheit liebevoll bedenkt, kann nur in Bewunderung vor seiner Demut stehen und darum bitten, es möge ihm die Gnade geschenkt werden, dass er in Augenblicken des Schmerzes und der Bedrängnis und Verzweiflung Jesus nachahmen kann und seinen Beistand erfährt.[24]

Kreuzigung

Der Betrachtende soll sich in geistiger Schau mit Jesus auf den Weg zum Kalvarienberg begeben und sich sein Verhalten lebendig vergegenwärtigen. Er soll auf die Einzelheiten achten, die gegen Jesus durchgeführt werden, und auf das bedacht sein, was Jesus selbst

[22] *Intuere ergo illum diligenter, ac pietate et compassione mouearis.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 74r)

[23] *Redeas postea ad diuinitatem, et considera illam immensam aeternitatem et incomprehensibilem ac imperatoriam maiestatem incarnatam se flectentem et humiliter ad terram inclinantem, pannos recolligentem et se cum reuerentia et rubore similiter reuestientem, ac si esset homo uilissimus, immo quidam seruus emptitius sub illorum dominio constitutus et ab eis pro aliquo excessu correptus et castigatus.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 74v-75r)

sagt und tut. Daraus kann er auf den Gesichtsausdruck schließen, mit dem Jesus seinen schweren Gang bis zum Kalvarienberg durchführte.[25]

Am Kreuzigungsort wird Jesus noch einmal entkleidet und seiner Kleider beraubt. Der Betrachtende soll sich den gewaltsamen Vorgang als „Aufruhr der Schamhaftigkeit" und der Bloßstellung bei Jesus vorstellen. Er wird dem Wind und der Kälte nackt ausgesetzt. Er steht schutzlos wie ein Schauobjekt vor der ganzen gaffenden Menge.[26]

Zum dritten Mal werden unter größtem Schmerz durch das gewaltsame Entfernen der am Körper klebenden Kleider die durch Schläge zugefügten Wunden aufgerissen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit wurde nicht nur das bei der Geißelung ausgetretene Blut, das seinen Körper bedeckte, sichtbar, sondern es zeigte sich auch sein schön geformter Körper.

Trotz Peinigung und Blutspuren hatte sein Körper seine Schönheit nicht verloren. Dieser wurde auch in der Kreuzigung sichtbar.[27]

Das Angesicht des toten Christus

Für Michael ist auch das Angesicht des toten Christus bedeutsam. Es ist kostbar und das eines schönen Menschen, ja es übertrifft das Aussehen aller Menschen, auch wenn es mit Speichel bedeckt ist und mit Backenstreichen unter Verspottungen verletzt wurde. Denn sein Angesicht ist das des menschgewordenen Sohnes Gottes. Dies gilt auch von dem des toten Christus.[28]

Sein Angesicht strahlt für denjenigen, der das über den Tod hinausgehende Leben Jesu betrachtet, Hoheit aus. Er weiß im Glauben, dass das tote Angesicht Jesu nicht im Tode bleibt, sondern zur

[24] *Intuere igitur nunc eum diligenter, et humilitatem suam admirare et imitare.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 74v)

[25] *His autem toto mentis intuitu te praesentem exhibeas et intuere diligenter singula quae fiunt contra dominum tuum, et etiam quae dicuntur et fiunt ab ipso et per ipsum.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 75v)

[26] *Spoliatur itaque suis uestibus ad pudoris amulum, et ut uentis et frigore nudus exponatur. Et nudatus est coram tota multitudine.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 75v)

[27] *Et tunc tertia uice et cum maximo dolore renouantur fracturae propter pannos ad carnem applicatos et fortiter haerentes propter sanguinem flagellationis. Et tunc apparuit corpus eius tam eleganter figuratum, totum cruciatum, sic ac cruentatum.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 75v)

[28] *Quid plura? Pro te carnem et animam posuit, ut corpus et spiritum sibi uendicaret totum toto se corporauit.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 83r)

Auferstehung gelangt ist. Dadurch erleuchtet das Gesicht des toten Jesus das Gesicht des Betrachtenden. Ist es aber in dieser Erkenntnis bereits erleuchtet, wird es durch die Betrachtung Jesu in seiner Hoffnung auf die eigene Vollendung bestärkt.

Für die Beschreibung, die von der Wirkung des Gesichtes des toten Christus ausgeht, zieht Michael 1 Sam 1,18 heran. An dieser Stelle heißt es über Hanna, die Mutter Samuels, nachdem ihr ein Wort der Zuversicht gesagt worden war, dass sie *kein trauriges Gesicht mehr hatte*. Dieser Ausdruck soll sich auch dem Betrachtenden mitteilen, der sich das Angesicht des toten Jesus vergegenwärtigt, der nicht im Tode blieb.[29]

Die Sehnsucht der Väter nach dem verherrlichten Leib Christi

Im Glaubensbekenntnis, auf das sich Michael stützt, heißt es von Jesus, dass er zu den Vätern hinabstieg. Sein Kommen zu ihnen und sein Verweilen bei ihnen hatte auf sie eine große Auswirkung. Michael urteilt, dass Jesu Kommen ihre Herrlichkeit bewirkte. Er begründet diese Wirkung mit dem Satz, dass das Sehen Gottes die vollkommene Herrlichkeit ist.[30]

Als Christus dann von den Vätern schied, um seinen Körper aufzuerwecken und ihn an sich zu nehmen, baten ihn die Angehörigen im Reich des Todes, er möge schnell zu ihnen zurückkehren, damit sie auch seinen verherrlichten Leib sehen könnten.[31]

Vom Antlitz Christi und seinem Leib im Zwischenzustand zwischen Tod und Auferstehung geht Herrlichkeit aus, die auch auf die im Reich des Todes Anwesenden überstrahlt.

Der Betrachtende soll die Hoffnung bedenken, die auch für ihn von diesem Ereignis ausgeht. Ebenso soll er seine Sehnsucht auf den verherrlichten Christus ausrichten, auf sein Antlitz und seinen Leib.

[29] *Sed pretiosa illa facies speciosi, forma prae filiis hominum sputis illita est, afflicta colaphis, addita illusionibus. Quare hoc? Ut facies tua illuminaretur, illuminata confirmaretur et diceretur de te: Vultus eius non sunt in diuersa mutati.* (MMVC, MS. 800, fol. 82v)

[30] *Et stetit cum eis, et tunc fuerunt in gloria. Nam uisio dei perfecta gloria est.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 84v)

[31] *Dixit eis, quia tempus esset, ut iret ad excitandum et ad reassumendum corpus suum. Qui omnes procidentes adorauerunt, rogauerunt, ut cito rediret, quia gloriosissimum corpus suum uidere plurimum affectabant.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 84v-85r)

Der Auferstandene und seine Mutter Maria

Michael führt eine Erscheinung des Auferstandenen an, von der in den Evangelien nichts überliefert ist. Dass er sie dennoch in sein Leben Jesu aufnahm, nachdem er alle kanonischen Auferstehungsberichte aufgezählt hat, ist für ihn eine Frage der Schicklichkeit. Er hält es für angebracht, dass Jesus nach seiner Auferstehung zuerst seiner Mutter erscheint, die mit ihm am meisten gelitten hat. Michael hält dies für eine fromme Glaubensüberzeugung (*quia sic pium est credere*), von der auch eine Legende berichtet.[32]

Nach dieser Erzählung erschien Jesus seiner Mutter beim Gebet in ganz weißen Gewändern, einem Zeichen seiner glorreichen Auferstehung. Als besondere Neuheit bei dieser Erscheinung wird aber auf sein Angesicht verwiesen. Aus ihm strahlt Heiterkeit, die der glorreiche und freudig gestimmte Bräutigam Jesus verbreitet.[33]

Auf das unerwartete Kommen reagiert Maria mit einem Kniefall, mit Anbetung und Umarmung unter Freudentränen. Sie erinnert sich dabei an die Wunden, mit denen Jesu Körper bedeckt war. Beim Betrachten des Körpers muss sie aber mit Erstaunen feststellen, dass an ihm keine Spuren der Leiden zu beobachten sind.[34]

Jesus führt voll Freude und Liebe mit seiner Mutter ein Gespräch, bei dem er ihr mitteilt, wie er sein Volk aus der Unterwelt befreite und was er sonst während der drei Tage der Grabesruhe tat.[35]

Die Anschauung des Angesichts Christi in der Vollendung

Die Betrachtung des Angesichts Jesu hier auf der Erde ist auf seine vollendete Anschauung in der Herrlichkeit ausgerichtet. In seinem jetzigen Leben kann sich der Betrachtende davon durch den Blick

[32] *De hac apparitione nihil habetur in euangelio. Sed ideo ipsam posui et ante alias praemisi, quia sic pium est credere, ut in quadam legenda continetur.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 85r)

[33] *Domina igitur orante et lacrimas dulciter emittente ecce subito uenit dominus Iesus in albissimis uestibus gloriosae resurrectionis, et nouitas suo uultu sereno, sponsus gloriosus et gaudens.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 85r)

[34] *At illa adorans et surgens cum lacrimis prae gaudio eum amplexatur. Postea considerantibus eis pariter, diligenter et curiose intuebatur eundem, et in uultu et cicatrices manuum et per totum quaerens, si omnis dolor ab eo discessit.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 85r)

[35] *Stant igitur et colloquuntur simul gaudentes et Pascha ducentes delectabiliter et amanter. Et narrat ei dominus Iesus, qualiter populum suum liberauit de inferno, et quae fecit in illo triduo. Ecce igitur nunc magnum Pascha.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 85r)

auf den auferstandenen Herrn eine Vorstellung verschaffen.[36] Zur Anschauung des verherrlichten Angesichts kann er nur über die Schwelle des Todes gelangen.

Durch die Sehnsucht nach dem verherrlichten Antlitz Christi kann er aber den Wunsch in sich lebendig halten, Christus in seiner Verherrlichung und sein Antlitz im verherrlichten Zustand einmal sehen zu wollen.[37] Diesen Wunsch bringen zahlreiche Sehnsuchtsworte der Psalmen nachdrücklich zum Ausdruck und unterstützen den Betrachtenden in seinem Bemühen, das Antlitz Christi in seiner Herrlichkeit sehen zu wollen.

Solche Sehnsuchtsworte könnten etwa sein: *Mein Herz denkt an dein Wort: ‚Sucht mein Angesicht!' Dein Angesicht, Herr, will ich suchen.* (Ps 27, 8). Sie nennen auch die Voraussetzungen für die Erfüllung der Bitte. Der Beter soll *reine Hände und ein lauteres Herz* haben (Ps 24, 4). Für dieses Bemühen ist er auf den Beistand Gottes angewiesen (Ps 27, 9). Wenn Gott an seiner Seite ist, darf er gewiss sein, *zu schauen die Güte des Herrn im Land der Lebenden* (Ps 27, 13), und ans Ziel seiner Sehnsucht, der Anschauung des verherrlichten Christus, zu gelangen. Die Anschauung des Antlitzes Christi in seiner Vollendung ist dann für ihn das vollendete Leben.

Zusammenfassung

Der Blick auf das Antlitz und den Körper Jesu Christi eröffnet einen ergreifenden Zugang zum Leben Jesu. Michael von Massa bot ihn den Lesern seines Jesusbuches an und lud sie zur Betrachtung der Person und des Erlösungswerkes Jesu ein.

Die Betrachtung Jesu soll in zweifacher Weise geschehen, einmal durch das Anschauen der von Michael vorgestellten Person Jesu in seiner körperlichen Erscheinung, dann durch das Nachdenken über das Gesehene und aus der Hl. Schrift in diesem Zusammenhang Gehörte.

Die Beschreibung der Person Jesu nahm in der Augustinerschule wohl als Erster Aegidius Romanus (+ 1316) vor. Er hatte

[36] *Stat ergo dominus Iesus cum discipulis suis per aliquam morulam, loquens de regno dei et ipsi cum eo laetitia magna audientes illa uerba excelsa et aspicientes faciem eius plenam gaudio et decore.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 89v-90r) *Ipse uero eleuatis manibus sereno uultu gaudens triumphaliter ferebatur in caelum.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 93v)

[37] *Ad dominum quoque aspicientes et eum semper in corde retinentes pugnemus uiriliter.* (MMVC, Ms. 800, fol. 96r)

bereits vor Michael in seinem *Hymnus ad faciem Saluatoris* eine Beschreibung des Gesichtes Jesu geboten (Siehe Anm. 6). Die literarischen Darlegungen der beiden Augustiner unterscheiden sich jedoch von einander. So nahm Aegidius als Vorlage für seine Beschreibung des Gesichtes Jesu ein Schweißtuch der Veronika; er ging also vom leidenden Heiland aus. Der Lentulusbrief dagegen, auf den sich Michael bezog, bot das Bild eines vollendeten, gesunden Mannes. Die beiden Augustiner waren zwar von unterschiedlichen Vorlagen ausgegangen, wollten aber beide ein Bild von Jesus vermitteln, das dem Betrachter der Evangelientexte einen Anhaltspunkt vom wirklich existierenden Jesus anbieten wollte, auf das er sich beziehen konnte.

Die Darlegungen Michaels zum Angesicht und zur körperlichen Erscheinung Jesu, stehen im Zusammenhang mit den Glaubensaussagen von der Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes, dem Sühneleiden Jesu für die Sünden der Menschen und der Auferstehung Jesu zum Leben bei Gott seinem Vater.

Das Gesicht und der Körper Jesu werden nicht isoliert oder wie ein künstlerisch erstelltes Bild oder als Kunstobjekte gesehen, sondern haben Bedeutung für die persönliche Gottesbeziehung der gläubigen Betrachter.

Für sie leuchtet im Angesicht Jesu, auch in dem des gequälten und toten Jesus, seine Gottheit auf. Wer sich in dieses Angesicht betrachtend vertieft, wird dem Worte Jesu in der Hl. Schrift als lebendigem begegnen. Es spricht ihm die Mahnungen, Warnungen und Verheißungen zu, die sie als Botschaft Jesu enthalten.

Ähnlich verhält es sich mit dem durch Leiden gequälten und entstellten Körper Jesu. Wer sich betrachtend mit dem Leiden Jesu beschäftigt, soll es aus der Überzeugung heraus tun, dass auch in den Stunden der Geißelung, Dornenkrönung und Kreuzigung Jesus von der Gottheit umfangen war. Wird der Betrachtende selber von Krankheiten und Leiden gequält, dann nehme er sich Jesus zum Vorbild und hoffe darauf, dass Gott auch ihn trägt und nicht fallen lässt, sondern wie Jesus aus aller Not befreit.

Die Betrachtung des Gesichtes und Körpers Jesu, also des ganzen Gottmenschen, verbindet den Betrachtenden mit Jesus. Sie überwindet die zeitliche und räumliche Distanz zwischen Jesus und ihm und führt ihn zu den Höhe- und Tiefpunkten des Lebens Jesu. Sie macht ihn vertraut mit seiner Person und zeigt ihm, dass sein eigenes Leben Parallelen zum Leben Jesu aufweist. Aus der Ähnlichkeit seines Lebens mit dem Leben Jesu und aus dem Bemühen, ihm ähnlich zu werden, kann der Betrachtende die Hoffnung schöpfen, dass er auch

an der Vollendung Jesu Anteil erhält, an seiner strahlenden Helle, in der Michael den auferstandenen Herrn darstellt.[38]

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[38] Ich widme den Aufsatz jenen Mitbrüdern der deutschen Augustinerprovinz voll Dankbarkeit, die in ihren Exerzitienvorträgen zu Beginn meines klösterlichen Lebens die Bitte mit der Bekräftigung aussprachen: *Lass mich dein Angesicht suchen! Dein Angesicht will ich suchen.*

BOOK REVIEWS

Sancti Aurelii Augustini Contra Arrianos Opera, cura et studio Pierre-Marie Hombert, [*Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina* LXXXVII A]. Brepols Publishers, Turnhout 2009, 800pp. ISBN: 978-2-503-00873-8.

This volume offers a critical edition of some of Augustine's works against Arrianism, specifically of the *Contra Sermonem Arrianorum* – accompanied by the *Sermo Arrianorum Anonymus* to which it forms a counterpart – on the one hand and the *Conlatio cum Maximino* – in which Augustine's contribution is in fact less prominent than that of the Arrian bishop – and *Contra Maximinum Libri Duo* on the other hand. The edition was furnished by Pierre-Marie Hombert, who has already left his mark on the field of Augustinian studies through his *Gloria Gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce*, *Collection des Études Augustiniennes*, *Série Antiquité* 148 (Paris, 1996) and *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*, *Collection des études Augustiniennes*, *Série Antiquité* 163 (Paris, 2000). The current edition was published by Brepols Publishers as the second part in the *Scripta Arriana Latina*, a subdivision of *Corpus Christianorum*'s *Series Latina*. The position of the volume in the *Scripta Arriana Latina* instead of the *Aurelii Augustini Opera* is striking, but harmonious with the classification of these texts among the Arrian works in the *Clavis Patrum Latinorum*. In his 'avant-propos', which aims to contextualize the anti-Arrian works under discussion and to establish the editorial principles underlying the edition, Hombert stresses the importance of the works contained in this volume even though they are not considered part of Augustine's 'grands ouvrages' and have consequently been largely neglected by modern editors. He especially emphasizes their role in the development of Augustine's Trinitarian reflections and the fact that they provide unique testimonies to both Arrian and anti-Arrian views at the time. Subsequently Hombert sketches the editorial history of the works via the early modern editions of Augustine's *Opera Omnia* to contemporary editions such as Max Josef Suda's edition of the *Sermo Arrianorum* and the *Contra Sermonem Arrianorum* in CSEL XCII (2000). He applauds the recent contribution of C. Weidmann in *Wiener Studien* 199 (2006) and also refers to some textual remarks made by F. Klein in 1896 concerning the *Conlatio cum Maximino* and Roger Gryson's comments on the work in his 1980 critical edition of Maximinus'

texts, which explicitly excluded Augustine's writings on the controversy. The 'avant-propos' ends with a list of all known manuscripts that contain one or more of the edited texts, a list which is also inserted separately on a leaflet at the front of the volume. In the main body of the volume, each of the two sets of texts receives an elaborate introduction. All the relevant manuscripts are described thoroughly with mention of approximate date, origin and provenance, physical characteristics and further information on the content and quality of the text. Hombert also hints at attested but no longer extant manuscripts, earlier editions of the texts and the indirect tradition. Subsequently the manuscript tradition is delved into in greater detail, resulting in an impressive stemma which is printed in its entirety on folded pages at the back of the volume. Then follows the actual edition, preceded by a *conspectus siglorum* and accompanied by three apparatuses, providing scriptural quotations, sources and variant readings. A few critical remarks on the text follow each individual edition. Four sections are inserted after the editions: a bibliography, an appendix listing all changes made with regard to the Maurist edition – a part which adds significantly to the positioning of the volume within the critical tradition of Augustine's anti-Arian Works –, an index of all scriptural passages quoted and an index of all authors and works referred to.

Shari BOODTS

Andrea Bizzozero, *Il mistero pasquale di Gesù Cristo e l'esistenza credente nei Sermones di Agostino* [Patrologia – Beiträge zum Studium der Kirchenväter 23]. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Bern/Bruxelles/New York/Oxford/Wien 2010, 520 pp. ISBN: 978-3-631-59522-0.

The present elaborate monograph is the publication of the author's doctoral dissertation (obtained at the Theology faculty of Lugano). This book is situated within the recent rise of scientific interest in Augustine's sermons. More specifically the author studies the centrality of the Easter mystery in Augustine's ca. 580 preserved *sermones ad populum*. This centrality is both descriptive-speculative-Christological – the Easter event is the *crux* of the theology developed in the *sermones* (systematic theology) –, and normative-anthropological-moral since it is according to Augustine's preaching the basis and even the task of Christian life (pastoral theology). This centrality of the Paschal mystery is double because of the specific genre of

Augustine's sermons: they are at the same time theological reflections and pastoral exhortations, in which Augustine at the same time looks for the truth and proclaims and applies it.

The introduction offers a concise *status quaestionis* of Augustine's *sermones ad populum* and his reflections on Easter. The first chapter sketches the characteristics of Augustine's preaching in general: his interpretation and praxis of the pastoral office as proclamation of the divine word (with reference to *De doctrina Christiana* IV).

The book is divided into three parts. The first part deals with Augustine's thematisation of Christ's passion, death and descent into hell. Bizzozero shows how Augustine preaches on human mortality and death: the difference between the first and second death, the second death as punishment for sin and grace as God's response to this mortality (ch. 2). Subsequently, different aspects of Augustine's preaching on Christ's death are discussed: Christ's death on the cross as his free choice (ch. 3), Oldtestamentical prefigurations of Christ's passion (typology and allegory, ch. 4), Augustine's *theologia crucis* (ch. 5), his understanding of Christ's cross as a sacrifice and ransom price for the salvation of mankind's sin (related to the Eucharistic sacrifice) (ch. 6), the redemptive power of Christ's death (ch. 7), Christ as the *fons uitae* that kills death (*mors mortis*) (ch. 8), Christ as the physician and his cross as the medicine of humility for our sinful disease (ch. 9), the Christological and soteriological dimensions of Christ's descent into hell (ch. 10).

The second part studies how the topics of Christ's resurrection, ascension and Pentecost feature in Augustine's *sermones ad populum*. Christ's resurrection is related both to his divine (ch. 11) and his human/physical nature (ch. 12), and has soteriological implications (ch. 13). Augustine deals with both aspects of Christ's resurrection (Christ as the resurrected Lord and his bodily resurrection), by giving Biblical testimonies (ch. 11: disciples of Emmaus, good thief, Mary Magdalena; ch. 12: the apostles, Thomas in particular), and by fighting against heterodox tenets which deny them (ch. 11: Photinians, Arians; ch. 12: Docetists, Manicheans, Apollinarists, pagan philosophers). Christ's resurrection is the promise, *causa* and *exemplum* of human resurrection and justification of sinners (ch. 13). Subsequently the liturgical feasts and eschatological-paschal events of Ascension (ch. 14) and Pentecost (ch. 15) are dealt with. The feast of Pentecost, celebrating that the H. Spirit guarantees ecclesial unity, furnished Augustine a special occasion to tackle the schismatic Donatists, and to elaborate on pneumatological images (the Spirit as *digitus Dei* and *uinum nouus*). This part closes with an overview of Augustine's exegesis of the 'Easter number' forty and fifty (ch. 16).

The third part relates the *sermones*' Easter Christology – investigated in the first two parts of the monograph – with the life of every believer. Augustine understands the life of every Christian as standing in a fundamental relation with the Easter mystery: the last judgement (ch. 17), the stage in between death and resurrection (ch. 18), the resurrection of mankind (with a special attention for Augustine's martyrology, ch. 19). Moreover, the Easter mystery is the source (ch. 20) and fundamental goal of the life of all the faithful (ch. 21). Christ is the source for happiness and hope, for the real, genuine and lasting heavenly life, which is according to Augustine well illustrated by the exemplary lives of Felicitas and Perpetua (ch. 20). The life of Christians is directed at participation in the divine life (ch. 21). Christian life is both a battle against sin and a hopeful pilgrimage and wakening – helped by Christ – (ch. 22), in which *caritas* is the core, a new love that urges Christians to give alms and to look for and to give forgiveness (ch. 23). The book is complemented with an extensive bibliography (pp. 437-476), and indices on biblical books, bibliographic sources and subjects (pp. 477-510).

Bizzozero's focus on the Easter mystery in Augustine's *sermones* helps to understand the continuity in his thinking and preaching. In this context, a valuable asset for the continuation for this project would be to introduce some chronological data in this study. Admittedly, it is very difficult to date Augustine's *sermones*. Many of these dates (and sometimes even the possibility to date them) are much debated. However not questioned is the observation that for certain clearly datable *sermones* the content stands in direct relation with the particular moment in Augustine's life they were preached, especially when he was involved in a controversy (mainly the Donatist and Pelagian controversies). As such the chronology of the *sermones* is not without importance for the topic under discussion in this monograph, e.g. at the core of the Pelagian controversy, and in *sermones* preached at that time, is the relation between the unique and absolute grace of Christ's cross and resurrection (Christology) and the human effort and liberty to lead an ethical life (ethics, anthropology, pastoral theology).

This monograph illustrates the inner coherence within the diversity of Augustine's *sermones*, and shows that for Augustine doctrine and praxis always go hand in hand. The book demonstrates a thorough knowledge of the – Easter – content of the *sermones* and the scientific literature devoted to it.

Anthony DUPONT

Fabio Gasti, Marino Neri (eds.), *Agostino a scuola: letteratura e didattica. Atti della Giornata di studio di Pavia (13 novembre 2008)* [Testi e studi di cultura classica 43]. ETS, Pisa 2009, 190p. ISSN/ISBN: 978-884672384-0.

This volume gathers the proceedings of a colloquium held at the University of Pavia (13/11/2008), which studied the possibilities and opportunities of introducing the study of Augustine into the curriculum of the courses in Latin Literature in (Italian) high schools. The first four contributions offer four different points of departure to teach Augustine to high school students. Several 'pluri-disciplinary' questions were posed at this juncture, firstly at the level of Augustine: how did cultural, literary, philosophical, historical, theological and intellectual elements interact in Augustine, what was the mutual relationship between literature and didactics in late Antiquity; secondly on the level of the contemporary relevance of Augustine and on pedagogic tools to teach about the writings and thinking of the bishop of Hippo: how to study the content, the Christian tradition and the linguistical, stylistic and rhetorical specificity of Augustine's writings, and this in comparison with the great classical (pagan) authors, whose pedagogical methodology should be applied to pursue this. Paola Francesca Moretti discusses the double usefulness of the first nine books of Augustine's *Confessiones* in teaching about this Church father: Augustine's description of his own experiences as student and teacher, and the prose he deployed in this writing. Domenico Devoti discusses the possibility of teaching about Augustine as the founding father of Christian rhetoric, especially by reading *De cathechizandis rudibus* and *De doctrina Christiana*. Fabio Gasti proposes teaching about Augustine's concept of *conuersio* as a literary concept, as the latter can be found in *Confessiones* 8, *epistula* 27 of Augustine to Paulinus of Nola and the latter's *epistula* 3 to Augustine. Sergio Audano suggests studying Augustine's perception of Brutus (in *De ciuitate Dei* 3, 16; 5, 18) as holding the middle way between Livius' and Virgil's interpretation, and as such to use as a starting point for reflecting on Augustine's thinking on (Christian) democracy. The four subsequent concise contributions are concrete witnesses of high school teachers teaching on Augustine: Anna Turra focuses on the interiorisation dynamics in the *Confessiones*, Sabina Depaoli on Augustine as a paradigm in the history of philosophy, Martino Menghi on the comparison between Augustine and Seneca, Gianluca Vandone on Augustine as the point of convergence of classical and Christian tradition. This volume presents a useful tool for teaching on Augustine in high

schools, and the didactic value of which is enhanced by the many citations (indicated in an index of quotations at the end of the monograph) and examples.

Anthony DUPONT

Cornelius Petrus Mayer (ed.), Alexander Eisgrub, Guntram Förster (collab.), *Augustinus – Ethik und Politik. Zwei Würzburger Augustinus-Studientage: "Aspekte der Ethik bei Augustinus" (11. Juni 2005), "Augustinus und die Politik" (24. Juni 2006)* [Cassiciacum 39/4; Res et Signa 4]. Augustinus-Verl., Würzburg 2009, 312 p. ISSN/ISBN: 978-3-429-04174-8.

The present volume gathers the proceedings of two interdisciplinary colloquia organised by the *ZAF* and the Würzburg University (*Aspekte der Ethik bei Augustinus*, June 11 2005; *Augustinus und die Politik*, June 24 2006) and is edited by the president of this renowned institute of Augustine research, prof. dr. Cornelius Petrus Mayer. He opens the first part with a study of Augustine's theocentric ethics. Bernard Heininger situates Augustine's thinking on how to relate ethically to the fellow man within the Biblical and Early Christian reflections on the concept of love. Friedemann Buddensiek discusses Augustine's perception of *beatitudo*. The three final contributions introduce the perspective of grace in Augustine's ethics. Michael Erler shows the significance of Augustine's doctrine of grace for his interpretation of human ethical efforts and this in comparison with how Platonism of his time perceived this. Norbert Fischer sketches the development and evolution in Augustine's thinking on human free will. Volker Henning Drecoll describes the contemporary relevance of Augustine's doctrine of grace. The second part studies the sources, the background, the core and the reception of elements of Augustine's political thinking. Michael Erler elaborates on the relation between Augustine's thinking on the *terrena ciuitas* and Sophistic and Epicurean political theories. Bernard Heininger investigates traces of 'political theology' in the Gospel of Mark. Adolf Martin Ritter gives an overview of early Christian thinking on the relationship between Church and state, from the New Testament until the bishop of Hippo. Robert Dodaro demonstrates that Augustine in *epistula* 153 (to Macedonius) developed the first theory of Christian political conscience. Jürgen Miethke studies the late medieval reception of Augustine's political thinking, i.c. regarding the secular claims of the popes.

Each contribution ends with a useful bibliography and the volume as a whole does so with a name and a source index.

Anthony DUPONT

Johannes Hellebrand (ed.), *Augustinus als Richter* [Cassiciacum. Forschungen über Augustinus und den Augustinerorden 39/5; Res et Signa; 5]. Augustinus-Verlag bei echter, Würzburg 2009, 189 p. ISSN/ISBN: 978-3-429-04172-4.

This volume gathers (and if necessary, translated into German) some of the most important recent studies on Augustine's office as a judge, of his *audientia episcopalis*. Johannes Hellebrand opens with a *status quaestionis*. Agustino Pugliese sketches the historical context of the *audientia episcopalis*, Augustine's juridical training and reflections on being a judge, and his own pursuance of his judicial office. Cornelius Petrus Mayer, the president of the *ZAF* to whose 80th birthday this volume is dedicated, offers an indepth study (by carefully reading the sources) of how Augustine legitimates justice and the judicial system. Kauko K. Raikas elaborates on how Augustine perceived the relation between the civil state and the Church within this judicial context. Eva-Maria Kuhn describes how Augustine tranlated his ideas on divine justice into concrete administration of justice and jurisdiction. The book is complemented with the Latin texts of the Divjak Letters relevant for this topic (*epistulae 1**, *7**, *8**, *9**, *10**, *14**, *24**), two lemmas from the *Augustinus-lexikon*: *Audientia episcopalis*, by Charles Munier, and *Iudex* by Kauko K. Raikas and indices. As such, this book offers a complete and well-documented outline of Augustine's functioning as a judge, a topic that in the past did not find much attention in the scientific research on Augustine.

Anthony DUPONT

Louise Bourdua, Anne Dunlop (eds.), *Art and the Augustinian order in early Renaissance Italy* [Church, faith and culture in the medieval West]. Ashgate, Aldershot 2007, XIV, 231 pp. – ill. ISSN/ISBN: 978-0-7546-5655-5.

The 'mendicant thesis' claims that there exists a mutual relationship between evolutions in art at the transition from Middle Ages

to Renaissance and the rise of mendicant orders (Franciscans, Dominicans, Carmelites, Servites and Augustinians), influencing visual art with their own forms of spirituality and apostolate. They embraced poverty, and opted for an urban religious life. This topic is well studied, except in relation to the Augustinian Hermits. This volume mediates this negligence in art history by studying the attitude of the Augustinian Hermits towards art in Italy during what can be considered as the constitutive period for this order (during the two centuries following 1256, the *Magna Unio* of the O.E.S.A., gathering several hermits in Italy in one religious order). The introduction explains the 'mendicant thesis' and sketches the history of the Augustinian Hermits and Augustine's (who the Augustinians claimed to be their founding father) reflections on art. Ten well documented contributions give a (chronologically ordered) overview of how the Augustinians were patrons of visual art in the first two centuries of the history of their order in North Italy, the region where there history began. Each contribution starts with a concrete piece of art (the choice for a specific habit, Augustine's tomb in Pavia, the panel of Agostino Novello by Simone Martini, the Cappellone of San Nicola at Tolentino, Augustinian choir frescoes in Padua, St. Anthony abbot fresco in Montalcino, the cult of Monica in Florence and Veneto, the fresco of Augustine's ecstasy before the Trinity by Ottaviano Nelli at Gubbio, Raphael's presentation of Nicholas of Tolentino) and takes this as point of departure to reflect on the 'mendicant thesis', on Augustine's and the Augustinians' image theory, on the existence and nature of 'Augustinian art'.

Anthony DUPONT

Manfred Svensson, *Theorie und Praxis bei Augustin: eine Verhältnisbestimmung*. Alber, München 2009, 255 p. ISBN: 978-3-495-48360-2.

Svensson offers an overview of Augustine's practical philosophy and the development ("eine langsame, aber tiefe und kohärente Entwicklung", p. 224) in his thinking on the relation between theory and praxis, evolving from a concept of *sapientia* as a unified form of knowing (including practical and contemplative components) to differentiating *sapientia* from *scientia*, an evolution influenced by a deepening of his understanding of Christianity and by a growing knowledge of the Scriptures which he interpreted in a philosophical

way. The central thesis of this monograph, a dissertation (München, 2007) revised for publication, is that the latter distinction is not identical to the Aristotelian schema of *sophia* and *phronêsis*, that Augustine's concept of *scientia* even resembles the Aristotelian notion of *phronêsis* (rather than *epistêmê*), and thus is a form of practical reason. Augustine's solution of the 'theory-praxis problem' is by the author considered as a middle position between Plato and Aristotle. After a *status quaestions* on the research on this topic, the author describes Augustine's thinking on practical philosophy from three angles, with two movements in each chapter: firstly the philosophical, antique positions (Plato, Aristotle and Stoa) and secondly Augustine's stance. The first chapter discusses the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge/reason, dealing with Augustine's vision on the history of philosophy in *De ciuitate Dei*, his classification of the sciences (dialectics, arithmetics, ethics, philosophy; esp., in *De ordine* and *De doctrina christiana*), the significance of *sapientia* and *scientia*. Subsequently the relation between God, cosmos and human praxis is studied: the topics of human *medietas* and man as *imago Dei*, the distinction between *uti* and *frui* (parallel to the distinction *scientia-sapientia*), the right order in human actions. Thirdly the evolution in Augustine's reflection on the ways of living and their relation to *beatitudo*; and on the relation between active and contemplative life, is presented as parallel to the development in his thinking on *sapientia* and *scientia*. This monograph illustrates in a well structured and clear argumented way the inner coherence and the developing continuity in Augustine's thinking.

Anthony DUPONT

Josef Pilvousek, Josef Römelt (hg.), *Die Bibliothek des Amplonius Rating de Berka und ihre verborgene Schätze. Anmerkungen zur Wiederentdeckung "Erfurter" Augustinus-Pedigten* [Erfurter Theologische Schriften 39]. Echter, Würzburg 2010, 110 pp. ISBN: 9783429032494.

In the summer of 2007 six new sermons of Augustine of Hippo were discovered in the *Bibliotheca Amploniana*, the rare books collection of the Library of Erfurt University (Gemany). The discovery occurred as part of the systematic catologising of manuscripts containing texts of Augustine in libraries of Eastern Germany and Berlin. The critical edition of these texts is being carried out by an Austrian team

of scholars: Isabella Schiller (who made the initial discovery), Clemens Weidmann and Dorothea Weber. Meanwhile the texts are finding their way into mainstream scholarship on Augustine and will soon be added to the material usually surveyed in thematic research on topics such as the poor in Late Antiquity, early Christian liturgy or the martyr cult. The first aim of the book under review, however, is not to contribute to the body of scholarship on these sermons. Rather it seeks to provide in 7 essays a larger readership with a background into the collection of the Bibliotheca Amploniana and the discovery of these sermons. The first three contributions deal with the Amploniana: B. Pfeil introduces Amplonius and the way the collection came about and developed (11-21); T. Bouillon presents the manuscripts in the collection that contain text by Augustine and the importance of the *doctor gratiae* in the intellectual universum of Amplonius and his time (21-27); J. Pilvousek sketches the history of the University and the *Collegium Porta Caelis* as the context in which Amplonius lived and worked and his library was developed (27-37). The pièce de résistance 37-67) is a contribution by the three philologists who edited the texts: they present the research project that led to the discovery, the discovery itself, the content of the new sermons and include the Latin texts with German translation and brief commentary of *sermo* Erfurt 5 (a sermon on the resurrection). The volume concludes with a brief discussion by K. Brodersen over findings of new Latin, pre-christian texts (67-75) and more general portrayals of Augustine by J. Rüpke (75-81) and J. Hofmann (81-109). The book reminds us that systematic research in rare book collections by specialists pays off and results in new findings. It may be hoped that this book about the finding of the *sermones* Erfurt together with the revised version of Schum's catalogue of the *Amploniana* results in more intensive scholarly attention to the *Amploniana*.

Johan LEEMANS

Thomas P. Scheck, *Origen and the History of Justification. The Legacy of Origen's Commentary on Romans*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN 2008, xi + 297 pp., including bibliography and index. ISBN: 9780268041281.

This book, which is a version of the author's 2004 University of Iowa doctoral dissertation, is an attempt to document and discuss the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* in the West of what is easily one of the most

important New Testament commentaries ever composed: Origen of Alexandria's commentary on Paul's Letter to the Romans, or, to be more precise, the reception history of the condensation and translation of that mid-third century commentary into Latin as it was performed by Rufinus of Aquileia during the first decade of the fifth-century (cf. p. 5). Even the casual student of Historical Theology will immediately sense many of the difficulties inherent in such a task: as a scholar, Scheck is clearly no coward!

After a brief introduction, the book discusses (the Latin) Origen's views on justification in detail (Chapter 1). Chapters 2-6 each discuss the reception of Origen's commentary in general and of his views on justification in particular by a handful of the West's most interesting – if not always its most important – commentators and exegetes. Scheck dedicates chapters respectively to: Pelagius, Augustine, William of St. Thierry, Erasmus, and Luther/Melanchthon, before Chapter 7 addresses "Post-Reformation Controversies," a phrase by which Scheck means late 16th-century Protestants and Jansenism. Chapter 7 is then followed by a very brief (less than 3-page) conclusion. The notes, bibliography, appendix and index take up just over seventy pages.

Looking at the book's introduction more closely, the reader immediately realizes what he can expect: while he is certain to learn much about how Rufinus of Aquileia's "Latin Origen" read and exegeted *Romans*, he will also be exposed to a method of connecting the dots between that exegesis and (Scheck's digest of) the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church of the 20th-century. Not without import is the fact that the latter is done by showing that the "errors," both of the Protestant Reformation in general and of the Reformed exegesis of Luther and Melanchthon in particular – to say nothing of the extremist views of Cornelius Jansen – were actually rooted in a wrong-headed rejection of Origen and an equally misguided, or even disingenuous, misappropriation of Augustine (cf. p. 8 and p. 10).

Although not quite the longest, the book's best chapter is Chapter 1. After a brief review of some of the relevant scholarship (cf. pp. 14-20), Scheck helpfully discusses the theological and ecclesiastical context in which much of Origen's exegesis was done (cf. pp. 20-29), before settling in to summarize both Origen's general attitude toward *Romans* (cf. pp. 30-32) and Origen's views on both the significance of justification and the means by which it is obtained (cf. pp. 32-53). According to Scheck, Origen presumed both freedom and responsibility on the part of those seeking justification, just as the great Alexandrian also had no qualms whatsoever in highlighting the necessary role played by merit, i.e., by "human contributions," in

obtaining justification and, by extension, salvation. In fact, according to Scheck, Origen's emphasis on both of these can be easily explained by noting the presence of "the deterministic heresies against which he [was] fighting" (cf. p. 52). Although far from being unquestionable, these conclusions are neither unreasonable nor unsupportable.

Just after this, however, an otherwise good chapter is marred as elements of the book's methodology become clearly visible in its nine-page excursus (cf. pp. 53-62). Under the guise of discussing "modern assessments" of Origen's views on grace, Scheck wants to show how Origen's views on justification are much more closely aligned with the teachings of "the Church" than is often assumed. The excursus' opening sentence,[1] by capitalizing the word "church," by using the words "understanding" and "teaching" in the singular, and by employing such formulations as "less precise," comes perilously close to implying that, for Scheck, the church always has been a monolithic institution that never wavered (either internally or externally) with respect to what it should teach and believe regarding justification. Scheck makes it seems as if the church has always possessed the pure and fully-formed doctrine of justification somewhere within it and as if the only challenge all along has been to focus on those voices that, whether they knew it or not, were in possession of that complete formulation.

In this same vein, even a perfectly impartial historian of western theology (if such a creature could be shown to exist!) would probably be quick to raise questions about the theologians and exegetes that this book has chosen to analyze. Beyond the fact that book leaps over the (almost) 700 years between the death of Augustine and the *floruit* of William of St. Thierry, i.e., between 430 and ca. 1120-1145, in the space of one page (cf. pp. 104-105), important questions to ask here include: Why was William of St. Thierry chosen as the representative of "a medieval Augustinian" theologian at all (cf. p.106)? Does not Thomas Aquinas, who clearly had much to say about justification and who could not have avoided at least the indirect influence of Origen, deserve more than a single and clearly *en passant* mention in this context (cf. p. 105)?[2] Moreover, even if one is unwilling to question

[1] Cf. p.53: "With regard to the Church's understanding of divine grace, scholars generally concede that the teaching of the Fathers before the fifth century, especially the Greek Fathers, is less precise than that of the Fathers who lived after the Pelagian and the semi-Pelagian controversies."

[2] Note that while Aquinas does appear in the book's index, he is only to be found under "Thomas, St." (cf. p. 297). He neither appears nor is there a cross-reference to him in the section dedicated to items beginning with the letter "A" (cf. p. 293).

the (highly questionable) assertion that William was "perhaps [the 12th-century's] most outstanding theologian," the chapter dedicated to him makes no overt effort – beyond the aforementioned quote, which comes from L. Bouyer's 1958 book on the heritage of the Cistercians and not, as one might expect, from an acknowledged survey or handbook dedicated to the whole of medieval theology – to explain or to demonstrate that, in fact, William's Origen-incorporating work(s) actually made an impact on those who followed. In other words, even if William knew, respected and consciously attempted to further the "correct" approach to *Romans* via a "correct" reading of Origen's commentary, among whom and to what degree did his opinions on these topics have an impact on the western tradition? The reader is left to wonder. And, although similar questions need not be raised over the choice to analyze the works of exegetes like Erasmus, Luther/Melanchthon and Jansenius, since their respective influences on the later tradition is clear, methodological concerns similar to those mentioned above are raised when, for example, we are repeatedly told that Erasmus was a good exegete because he only wanted to retrieve "the patristic consensus" (cf. p. 156 *et passim*), when we encounter the unqualified claim that biblical commentaries can safely be assumed to be more free from bias than "polemical tracts" (cf. p. 136), and when the positions of Luther/Melanchthon are sweepingly dismissed because they themselves have somehow or somewhere once and for all "arrogantly dismissed ancient Christian exegesis" (cf. p. 139).

In sum, this book's several positive features allow this reviewer to recommend it, provided that several of its significant deficiencies are also kept in mind. First, this book is to be applauded for its boldness: any study courageous enough to attempt to survey a doctrine as controversial as justification in the western tradition and which makes that attempt via largely self-contained analyses of some of the West's major theological thinkers and writers is bound – almost by definition – to be a contribution to the field. Second, this book provides a service for scholars by assembling such a significant portion of the essential primary evidence for the crucial issue of justification into one volume. Third, while not discussed in detail in the foregoing, this book is written in a style that is at once clear, concise and accessible – and, given that this work's first incarnation was as a doctoral dissertation, this is no mean feat.

At the same time, when viewed comprehensively, this book strikes this reviewer as being a bit out of balance. Firstly, as noted above, to dedicate just one twenty-three page chapter to the entire medieval period and to do that via a figure that no one regards as the

period's most important or most influential in a work that purports to survey such a large swath of history is, at best, mystifying. Secondly, this book's apparent presumptions about both the history of the development of doctrine, the history of the Roman Catholic tradition and, specifically, about how these two exceedingly large and complex themes overlap, mar both its methodology and bring into question more than a few of its conclusions. It is surprising to see how the author's overall scientific and historical-critical attitude is at times jeopardized by his apparent endorsement of views regarding the development of doctrine in history, of revelation, and of ecclesiology that were rightly relegated to the margins many decades ago. Thirdly, the potential reader (and purchaser) of this book should keep in mind that it – often at some of the most crucial junctures – seemingly relies upon secondary sources that are out of date and, sometimes, are seemingly outside the mainstream of contemporary scholarship. On this last point, let it suffice to note the frequency with which sometimes crucial points are made, supported or challenged using obscure or sectarian works from the 1950's or the 1960's (cf. the "Notes" and the "Bibliography" on pp. 225-288).

Scheck is a competent scholar; and his book is well worth reading. However, if one happens to be in search of a book that will comprehensively cover either the West's centuries-old debates on justification or the complex impact that was surely made in the West by the Latin version of Origen's *Romans* commentary, one would do well to keep the words *caveat lector!* firmly in mind.

Jonathan YATES

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