




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
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CONTENT – SOMMAIRE

Allan FITZGERALD, In memoriam Thomas F. Martin	7-9
Shari BOODTS, Mon TORFS, Gert PARTOENS, Augustine's Sermon 169: A Systematic Treatise on Phil. 3, 3-16. Exegetical Context, Date and Critical Edition	11-44
Wu TIANYUE, Augustine on Involuntary Sin: A Philosophical Defense	45-78
Walter DUNPHY, Rufinus the Syrian: Myth and Reality . . .	79-157
Andrew E. LARSEN, The Condemnation of John Kedington	159-172
M. BILAGHER, G. DE BOO, P. VAN GEEST, The Procrustean bed of the <i>ordo</i> . Comments on Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, <i>L'ordre caché. La notion de l'ordre chez saint Augustin</i>	173-182
Anthony DUPONT, Book Review Drecoll, Augustin Handbuch	183-186

IN MEMORIAM THOMAS F. MARTIN, OSA

Thomas Frank Martin was born in Chicago, Illinois on December 28, 1943. After finishing elementary school at Saint Symphorosa School, he went to Saint Rita High School, his first contact with the Augustinian Friars. A few months after graduation he joined the Chicago Province of the Order of Saint Augustine (September 3, 1961).

Sixty-five years later, when he returned to his Father's house (February 20, 2009), barely seven months after beginning treatment for cancer, the memory of what he had become in the intervening years – a faithful Augustinian, a delightful teacher, an avid reader, a recognized scholar, a good friend – made us happy to have known him and sad that his stay with us was so short. That quiet intensity and loving outreach to others was still there, even in the last days. The warm, human presence that we had come to know welcomed the many who came to visit.

Restlessly curious, Tom was often into some new adventure of spirit. His theological studies, which began at Tolentine College (1966-1968) and continued at the Catholic Theological Union in Chicago (1968-1971) led to a Masters in Theology that was granted by DePaul University. He was ordained an Augustinian priest on December 20, 1969 and began his teaching career at Mendel Catholic High School (1969-1978). Even though teaching in a high school is usually more than enough for most, Tom wanted something more; so he earned a Masters in Religious Education at Loyola University, Chicago (1975).

In 1978, he was asked to participate in the theological formation of the newest members of the Augustinian Province of Chicago (1978-1982). Once again, he stretched his spirit by following the Creighton University program in Spirituality, obtaining a Masters degree (1982). Chosen as secretary of his Province in 1983, he was asked only a year later to move to Rome as sub-secretary the the Order (1984-1990). To his experience of teaching and his interest in spirituality was thus added a time to see Augustinian life in an international way. He edited the newsletter of the Order and participated in various international commissions. Once again, his experience was not a matter of limited service. In the years that followed, he would be invited to address Augustinians throughout the world.

Returning to Chicago in 1990, he returned to the theological formation of young Augustinians. He again saw his work as an occasion to expand his horizons, beginning doctoral studies that year at Garrett Evangelical Theological Seminary-Northwestern University in Chicago.

He completed his doctoral thesis in 1994, obtaining a PhD in Early Christian Studies. Published with the title, '*Rhetoric and Exegesis in Augustine's Interpretation of Romans 7:24-25A*' that work gave clear focus to the rest of his academic life, the study of Augustine and especially on Augustine's reading of Paul. In 2003, he was named the founding Director of the Augustinian Institute at Villanova University.

As an assistant professor in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at Villanova University (1995-2009), he specialized in teaching Early Christianity and Saint Augustine. But a good teacher never limits his efforts to the classroom, and Tom was a good teacher – even in teaching the one class he never wanted to teach: how to live one's dying. That seven-month course had no list of students and required only that one be present. The final grade, however, will be assigned later – by the real teacher.

While at Villanova University, Thomas made a significant contribution to the university as a center for Augustine studies. He oversaw the continuation of the annual Saint Augustine Lecture which will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year. In 1997 he began an annual intensive summer seminar entitled 'In Dialogue with Augustine,' in which two scholars present and discuss particular aspects of Augustine's thought and writings. As director of the Augustinian Institute, he inaugurated a triennial series of conferences entitled 'Reconsiderations' (in 2003 and 2006) in which eminent scholars from various countries present papers on St. Augustine in a way that fostered exchange among them. The third 'Reconsiderations' that he planned will be held in September, 2009.

He also initiated a lecture series on the Augustinian Tradition which dealt with topics related to the Augustinian Order. He was also involved in an effort to make the Augustine bibliography, begun and overseen by Fr. Tarsicius van Bavel, freely accessible on the web. That project involved the cooperation of the Augustinian Historical Institute of Louvain, the Patristic Institute in Rome and Villanova University.

His book on Augustinian Spirituality (*Our Restless Heart: The Augustinian Tradition*. 2003) was another indicator of his ever-expanding interest and competency. Spirituality became more than the movement of the heart alone; as an Augustinian he was able to show how important the intellectual dimension of spirituality was to Augustine and to Augustinians. Between 2002 and 2006, he gave workshops on Augustinian spirituality and on interiority all over the world: Durban, South Africa; Rome, Italy; Jos, Nigeria; Manila, Philippines; Inchon, South Korea and Kochi, India.

His contribution to a more formal study of Augustine can be found in the many articles in journals, encyclopedias, or other special

studies. His work tended to focus on the spirituality of Augustine and Augustine's interpretation of St. Paul. Fascinated by the way that Augustine read Paul, he was at work on more than one article until late into January. The manuscript for a brief biography of St. Augustine was being revised at the time of his death. That revision process will be completed and published in the near future.

Thomas' congenial and welcoming demeanor continued, even to the day before the Lord welcomed him home. May he rest in the peace of Christ and may the conversation with Saint Augustine – a conversation begun some 50 years ago – continue.

Allan D. FITZGERALD
Augustinian Studies
Villanova University

Augustinianum
Rome

Only a few Augustinian sermons comment upon one or more verses of Phil. 3, 3-16 because they were preceded by a reading of the pericope (or a part of it), viz. sermon 130 A, which P.-M. Hombert has dated to 413,¹ and sermons 169-170. Numbers 130 A and 170 were probably preached during a celebration of the Eucharist. Both sermons were preceded not only by an apostolic reading taken from Phil. 3, but also by the *lectio* of a psalm and an almost identical pericope taken from chapter 6 of the Gospel of John.²

serm. 130 A:	Phil. 3, 3-9	Ps. 84	Jn. 6, 27-36
serm. 170:	Phil. 3, 6-16	Ps. 142	Jn. 6, 39

The difference between Augustine's treatment of the Pauline passage in these sermons is that the former sermon primarily focuses on the preceding Johannine reading and only deals with Phil. 3, 9 in

¹ We thank prof. dr. Luc De Coninck (KU Leuven) for his correction of a first version of the critical edition.

² See P.-M. Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustiniennes* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 163, Paris 2000) 517-540.

According to liturgists, the North African Church reserved the gospel reading for occasions including the celebration of the Eucharist. See M. Kilduff, *Evangelium 3. L'e. dans la proclamation liturgique*, in *Augustinus Lectorem 2* (Basil 1996, 1997) 4148-1150 (esp. 1149 n. 20: "Il n'existe pas de témoignages pour la proclamation de l'évangélisme dans la liturgie des heures africaines").

For further details, see *Augustin d'Hippone. Vingt-six sermons au peuple* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 161, Paris 1996) 151-152.

AUGUSTINE'S SERMON 169: A SYSTEMATIC TREATISE ON PHIL. 3, 3-16 || EXEGETICAL CONTEXT, DATE AND CRITICAL EDITION*

1. Exegetical Context: Augustine's Homiletical Use of Phil. 3, 3-16

This article presents a new critical edition of sermon 169, a homily which consists exclusively of a systematic exegesis of Phil. 3, 3-16. Apart from this sermon, only three other passages in the vast Augustinian corpus systematically deal with this Pauline pericope:

<i>pecc. mer.</i> 2, 13, 20	Phil. 3, 6-16
<i>serm.</i> 170	Phil. 3, 6-16
<i>c. pelag.</i> 3, 7, 19-22	Phil. 3, 2-19

Only a few Augustinian sermons comment upon one or more verses of Phil. 3, 3-16 because they were preceded by a reading of the pericope (or a part of it), viz. sermon 130 A, which P.-M. Hombert has dated to 415,¹ and sermons 169-170. Numbers 130 A and 170 were probably preached during a celebration of the Eucharist. Both sermons were preceded not only by an apostolic reading taken from Phil. 3, but also by the *lectio* of a psalm and an almost identical pericope taken from chapter 6 of the Gospel of John:²

<i>serm.</i> 130 A:	Phil. 3,...-9	Ps. 84	Jn. 6,... 27-36... ³
<i>serm.</i> 170:	Phil. 3, 6-16	Ps. 142	Jn. 6,... 39...

The difference between Augustine's treatment of the Pauline passage in these sermons is that the former sermon primarily focuses on the preceding Johannine reading and only deals with Phil. 3, 9 in

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¹ See P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustiniennne* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 163, Paris 2000) 527-540.

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³ For further details, see *Augustin d'Hippone. Vingt-six sermons au peuple d'Afrique* – ed. F. Dolbeau (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 147, Paris 1996) 151-152.

its concluding paragraphs,⁴ whereas the latter homily offers an extensive exegesis of Phil. 3, 6-16 that is supported by a few quotations taken from the other preceding *lectiones* (Ps. 142, 1-2 and Jn. 6, 39).

The liturgical setting of sermon 169 was probably different from that of sermons 130 A and 170. There is no proof that this sermon was preceded by the reading of an evangelical pericope. Moreover the sermon also differs from the other two homilies from a formal point of view. The following outline of the sermon's structure shows that we are dealing with a systematic line-by-line commentary of Phil. 3, 3-16. The sermon therefore formally resembles the homilies 153-156, which offer an equally systematic and thorough line-by-line commentary of Rom. 7, 5-8, 17 and which do not seem to have been preached during a celebration of the Eucharist. It should also be said that sermon 169 is by far the most thorough and systematic treatment of Phil. 3 in the whole of Augustine's extant works, even more thorough and systematic than the one offered in *c. pelag.* 3, 7, 19-22.

Serm. 169	Phil. 3	
§§1-2	v. 3	<i>Nos enim sumus circumcisio, qui Spiritui Dei seruimus</i>
§§3-4a		<i>et gloriamur in Christo Iesu et non in carne fidentes.</i>
§4b	v. 4	<i>Quamquam ego habeam fiduciam et in carne. Si quis alius in carne putat se habere fiduciam, magis ego:</i>
§5a	v. 5	<i>circumcisione octauī diei, ex genere Israel, tribu Benjamin, Hebraeus ex Hebraeis, secundum legem phariseus,</i>
§5b	v. 6	<i>secundum aemulationem persequens ecclesiam,</i>
§6a		<i>secundum iustitiam quae in lege est, qua fuerim sine querela.</i>
§§6b-7a	vv. 7-8	<i>Quae mihi lucra fuerunt, haec propter Christum damna esse duxi. Verumtamen et arbitror omnia damna esse propter eminentem scientiam Christi Iesu Domini nostri, propter quem arbitror omnia non solum detrimenta esse, uerum et stercora existimaui esse, ut Christum lucrificerem</i>
§§7b-11	v. 9	<i>et inueniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est, sed eam quae per fidem est Christi, quae est ex Deo, iustitia in fide,</i>
§§12-13a	v. 10	<i>ad agnoscendum eum et uirtutem resurrectionis eius</i>
§§13b-15		<i>et communicationem passionum eius,</i>
§16a		<i>conformatus morti ipsius,</i>

⁴ See *serm.* 130 A, 10-11.

Serm. 169	Phil. 3	
§16b	vv. 11-12	<i>si quo modo occurram in resurrectione mortuorum. Non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim: sequor autem si apprehendam, in quo et apprehensus sum a Christo Iesu.</i>
§§16c-18a	vv. 13-14	<i>Fratres, ego me non arbitror apprehendisse. Vnum autem. Quae retro oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extensus, secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae uocationis Dei in Christo Iesu.</i>
§18b	vv. 15-16	<i>Quotquot ergo perfecti, hoc sapiamus. Et si quid aliter sapitis, id quoque uobis Deus reuelabit. Verumtamen in quod peruenimus, in eo ambulemus.</i>

The remaining homiletic references to one or more verses of Phil. 3, 3-16 were not inspired by a preceding reading of even a part of the pericope and are quoted simply to support the exegesis of other biblical verses or the treatment of broad theological issues. The references of this kind are listed in the following overview:

Phil. 3, 3
in psalm. 125, 2

Phil. 3, 5-6
in psalm. 147, 25

Phil. 3, 5
serm. 122, 6
serm. 279, 1 + 5
serm. 360, 1
in psalm. 67, 12
in psalm. 77, 23

Phil. 3, 8-9
serm. 54, 4

Phil. 9-10
in psalm. 65, 6

Phil. 3, 9
in psalm. 38, 8
in psalm. 124, 6
in psalm. 142, 5
in psalm. 118, serm. 22, 2
in psalm. 118, serm. 25, 6

Phil. 3, 10
in psalm. 67, 44
in psalm. 150, 4

Phil. 3, 12-15
serm. 306 B, 2
in psalm. 38, 14

Phil. 3, 12-14
serm. 91, 6
serm. 154, 4
in psalm. 38, 6 + 8
in psalm. 39, 3
in psalm. 69, 8
in epist. Ioh. 4, 6

Phil. 3, 12-13
serm. 142, 14

Phil. 3, 12
in psalm. 142, 6

Phil. 3, 13-15
in psalm. 130, 14

Phil. 3, 13-14
serm. 96, 10
serm. 105, 7
serm. 215, 1
serm. 255, 6
serm. 260 C, 7
serm. 261, 3
serm. 341, 13
serm. 362, 4
in psalm. 72, 5
in psalm. 80, 14
in psalm. 83, 4
in psalm. 118, serm. 2, 2
in psalm. 149, 8

Phil. 3, 13
serm. 16 A, 10-11
serm. 284, 4
in psalm. 9, 4
in psalm. 57, 10
in psalm. 65, 22
in psalm. 89, 5
in psalm. 113, serm. 1, 7
in Ioh. euang. 9, 3

Phil. 3, 14
in psalm. 118, serm. 11, 2
in psalm. 118, serm. 30, 5

Phil. 3, 15-16
in Ioh. euang. 45, 7
in Ioh. euang. 53, 7
in Ioh. euang. 98, 7

Phil. 3, 15
in Ioh. euang. 5, 16

Phil. 3, 16
serm. 104, 5
serm. 277, 18
in psalm. 118, serm. 2, 2

As this overview shows, Augustine had a predilection for verses 9 and 12-14, which is not surprising because the bishop saw them as major biblical proof for two of his main theological convictions: (1) Verse 9 is thought to oppose the justice which one attains by fulfilling the precepts of the Law on one's own forces – Paul speaks about *meam iustitiam* – and the justice through the faith in Christ, which is a divine gift. (2) Verses 12-14 are interpreted as a confession on behalf of the Apostle that even *sub gratia* he had not yet reached perfection and that perfection in this life consisted in the recognition of one's imperfection. Although Augustine's use of Phil. 3, 9 and 12-14 is not restricted to sermons dating from 411 and later, it seems to have intensified during the period of the pelagian controversy,⁵ especially the use of verses 12-14, which the bishop often quoted from *pecc. mer.* onwards in order to refute the *impeccantia* doctrine.⁶

2. Date

According to the title as it has been preserved in the ancient Sessorian collection [see below], sermon 169 was preached in Carthage in the so-called *Mensa Cypriani* (*Sermo ad mensam sancti martyris Cypriani*). This basilica, which had been erected on the very spot where the third century bishop was thought to have died a martyr's death, seems to have been one of Augustine's favourite places for preaching during his stays in the capital of Africa Proconsularis.⁷

A. Kunzelmann considers sermons 169 and 170 as among Augustine's anti-pelagian sermons and has dated them to 416 and 417 respectively.⁸ These datings have been accepted in the authoritative repertoria of Verbraken, Rebillard and Gryson.⁹ In her *Recherches de chronologie*

⁵ See P.-M. HOMBERT *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* [n. 1] 533-534 (Phil. 3, 9) and 614 (Phil. 3, 12-14).

⁶ See *pecc. mer.* 2, 13, 20.

⁷ See L. ENNABLI, *Carthage. Une métropole chrétienne du IV^e à la fin du VII^e siècle* (*Études d'antiquités africaines*, Paris 1997) 24-26, n° 9; S. LANCEL, *Carthago*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1 (1986-1994) 759-771 (esp. 769).

⁸ See A. KUNZELMANN, *Die Chronologie der Sermones des heiligen Augustinus*, in *Studi Agostiniani* (*Miscellanea Agostiniana* 2, Roma 1931) 417-520 (esp. 471).

⁹ See P.-P. VERBRACKEN, *Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin* (*Instrumenta patristica* 12, Steenbrugis 1976) 95; É. REBILLARD, *Sermones*, in A.D. FITZGERALD, *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* – ed. A.D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids [Mich.] 1999) 773-792 (esp. 780); R. GRYSO, *Répertoire général des auteurs ecclésiastiques latins de l'Antiquité et du Haut Moyen Âge. I. Introduction. Répertoire des auteurs: A-H* (*Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel* 1.1⁵, Freiburg 2007⁵) 240.

augustinienne, A.-M. La Bonnardière, however, was inclined to situate sermon 169 around 420 on the basis of some resemblances between this homily and *c. pelag.*¹⁰ O. Perler, J.-L. Maier and A. Verwilghen considered both Kunzelmann's and La Bonnardière's hypothesis as possible,¹¹ whereas F. Dolbeau returned to the former's dating because of two formal parallels between sermons 169 and 348 A augm., which was surely preached in 416.¹² Dolbeau's suggestion was accepted in turn by P.-M. Hombert in his *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*.¹³

In a separate, forthcoming¹⁴ publication, we will argue that, in spite of the authoritative support, Kunzelmann's dating of sermons 169 and 170 is highly questionable. We will also propose to date sermon 169 to one of Augustine's Carthaginian stays of 416-419, 421 or 424. We will even join A.-M. La Bonnardière in suggesting that the homily originated in the same context as *c. pelag.*, with which it shares several specific features. This hypothesis would imply that the two most thorough and systematic treatments of Phil. 3, 3-16 in Augustine's extant works both date from around 420.

3. Edition

3.1. Transmission

The transmission of sermon 169 seems to have been restricted almost exclusively to some of the medieval sermon collections identified by C. Lambot and P.-P. Verbraken. Its presence in the surviving 'recueils mixtes' is rather limited.¹⁵ The sermon's difficult and

¹⁰ See A.-M. LA BONNARDIÈRE, *Recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1965) 84-87.

¹¹ See O. PERLER – J.-L. MAIER, *Les voyages de saint Augustin* (Paris 1969) 334; A. VERWILGHEN, *Christologie et spiritualité selon saint Augustin. L'hymne aux Philippiens* (Théologie historique 72, Paris 1985) 126.

¹² See F. DOLBEAU, *Augustin et la prédication en Afrique. Recherches sur divers sermons authentiques, apocryphes ou anonymes* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 179, Paris 2005) 254-255.


¹³ See P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* [n. 1] 370 n. 18.

¹⁴ See G. PARTOENS, *Augustine's sermon 169: correction of two misinterpretations and proposition of a new date* (to be published in the proceedings of *Ministerium sermonis. An international colloquium on saint Augustine's Sermones ad populum* [Leuven-Turnhout, May 29-31, 2008]).

¹⁵ For the collections, see *Sancti Aurelii Augustini sermones de Vetere Testamento* – ed. C. LAMBOT (Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina 41, Turnholti 1961) VII-XXXV; P.-P. VERBRAKEN, *Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin* [n. 9] 197-234. We know of only two 'recueils mixtes' containing sermon 169: *Porrentruy Bibliothèque cantonale jurassienne fonds ancien ms. 26 (1513-1515)* origin:

often obscure character probably explains this limited transmission through the 'receuils mixtes'.

A first collection that transmitted sermon 169 is the ancient Sessorian collection, of which we have used the two principal direct witnesses ($S^{1,2}$). Manuscript N contains, apart from sermons belonging to the ancient Campanian collection, several articles borrowed from the Sessorian collection, including sermon 169. The early medieval collection *De uerbis Apostoli*, which is the second part of a larger whole called *De uerbis Domini et Apostoli*, has also borrowed our sermon from a lost exemplar of the Sessorian collection. Our selection of seven *De uerbis Apostoli* witnesses (V^{1-7}) was partly based on the study of the transmission of this collection which has been published in the introduction to the edition of sermons 151-156 in volume 41 Ba of the *Series Latina* of the *Corpus Christianorum*. As was shown in that very same volume, the genealogical relationships of N , $S^{1,2}$ and V^{1-7} can be represented as follows:¹⁶



A fourth collection containing sermon 169 is the *Collectorium* of Robert de' Bardi, chancellor of the Sorbonne from 1336 to 1349 (*Valencia Bibl. Univ.* 607 (40) (XIV) origin: *France*). The sermon occurs in this collection's fourth part, which mainly consists of sermons borrowed from *De uerbis Domini et Apostoli* and, more specifically, from the corrected manuscript *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat.* 14292

Low Countries (ff. 281-283^v: shortened version) and the winter homiliary *Zürich Zentralbibliothek ms. Rheinau 19* (XII^{1/4}) (pp. 142-148).

¹⁶ The composition of N , $S^{1,2}$ and *De uerbis Apostoli* have been amply studied in G. PARTOENS, *La collection de sermons augustinien De uerbis Apostoli. Introduction et liste des manuscrits les plus anciens*, in *Revue bénédictine* 111 (2001) 317-352 (esp. 329-338); *Sancti Aurelii Augustini sermones in epistolas apostolicas. I* – ed. G. PARTOENS (*Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina* 41 Ba, Turnhout 2008) LXXIX-LXXXVI.

(xii) origin and provenance: *Paris St.-Victor*.¹⁷ For this reason, we have not taken into consideration the *Collectorium*'s rather late testimony for our edition of sermon 169.

The *Expositio beati Pauli collecta ex libris sancti Augustini* of Florus Lugdunensis (middle of the ninth century) offers five fragments taken from sermon 169 (*flor*¹⁻⁵). They have been extracted from a relative of the eleventh century manuscript V⁵, which contains a rearranged and enlarged *De uerbis Apostoli* version that existed already in the ninth century and was produced, in all probability, by Florus himself or at least by someone from his entourage.¹⁸

3.2. Editorial Principles

The text of sermon 169 has been reconstructed according to the traditional stemmatic method, which means that preference was given to variants attested to by *N* V¹⁻⁷ (against *S*^{1.2}) and *N* *S*^{1.2} (against V¹⁻⁷). Since the 'Sessorian' sermons text transmitted by *N* seems to be the result of an intentional manipulation to increase these texts' readability,¹⁹ we have followed in principle the testimony of *S*^{1.2} V¹⁻⁷ (σ) in case these witnesses were contradicted by *N*. On one occasion, however, we considered it necessary to correct the testimony of *S*^{1.2} V¹⁻⁷ based on a reading contained in *N* (72-73 sed...est).

The punctuation is ours and aims at clarifying Augustine's often toilsome and sometimes even obscure way of arguing. The orthography has equally been adapted to modern conventions. Apart from insignificant orthographical variants, which we have homogenised, the critical apparatus is exhaustive. A second apparatus identifies all biblical quotations.

3.3. *Conspectus siglorum*²⁰

N *Napoli Bibl. Naz. Vienn. lat. 14* (xi) provenance: *Napoli San Severino*, ff. 59^v-64

¹⁷ See *Sancti Aurelii Augustini sermones in epistolas apostolicas* [n. 16] CXXVI-CXXVII (with further bibliography).

¹⁸ See G. PARTOENS, *Une version augmentée de la collection médiévale de sermons augustinien* *De uerbis Domini et Apostoli et son importance pour la transmission de l'œuvre homilétique de l'évêque d'Hippone*, in *Recherches Augustiniennes et Patristiques* 35 (2007) 189-237 (esp. 207-217); *Sancti Aurelii Augustini sermones in epistolas apostolicas* [n. 16] CXLII-CLI.

¹⁹ See *Sancti Aurelii Augustini sermones in epistolas apostolicas* [n. 16] LXXXII n. 51 (with further bibliography).

²⁰ For bibliographical information on these manuscripts, see *Sancti Aurelii Augustini sermones in epistolas apostolicas* [n. 16] LXV-LXIX and XCVIII-CIV.

- S¹ *Roma Bibl. Naz. Vitt. Em. 1357 (VIII² / IX) origin: Campania provenance: Nonantola, Roma Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, Philipps Collection, Chester Beatty Collection, ff. 113^v-124^v*
- S² *Monte Cassino 11 (ca. 1080) origin: Monte Cassino, pp. 162-169*
- V¹ *München Bayerische Staatsbibl. Clm 14171 (IX^{3/4}) origin: Soissons St-Médard provenance: Regensburg St-Emmeran, ff. 189-196*
- V² *Orléans Bibl. Mun. 164 (141) (IX^{2/2}) origin: St-Denis provenance: Fleury St-Benoît, pp. 273-280*
- V³ *Vat. lat. 474 (IX) origin: Tours (?) provenance: Dijon St-Bénigne (?), St-Vivant-sous-Vergy, la bibliothèque romaine du cardinal Jean Jouffroy, ff. 129^v-134^v*
- V⁴ *Brussel Koninklijke Bibliotheek Ms. 308 (cat.1096) (XIV-XV) provenance: Oudergem Rood Klooster, ff. 142-146*
- V⁵ *Dijon Bibl. Mun. 143 (110) (XII^{1/2}) origin and provenance: Cîteaux, ff. 201^v-206*
- V⁶ *Douai Bibl. Mun. 251 (XII^{2/2}) origin and provenance: Marchiennes, ff. 88^v-94*
- V⁷ *Valenciennes Bibl. Mun. 157 (149) (ca. 1155) origin and provenance: St-Amand-en-Pévèle, ff. 174^v-179^v*
- flor¹ *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96 (IX med.) written by Mannon of St-Oyen, provenance: St-Oyen (St-Claude, Jura), f. 20 (ll. 339-356 ergon; Rom. 5, 5; ex sermone de uerbis euangelii XII [sic])*
- flor² *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96, ff. 66-66^v (ll. 194-275 gentes-peccatores; Rom. 9, 30-32; ex sermone de uerbis apostoli)*
- flor³ *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96, f. 205^v (ll. 57-65 gratia-damnes; Eph. 2, 8-9; ex sermone de uerbis apostoli)*
- flor⁴ *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96, f. 223 (ll. 29-37 cuidam-fecit; Phil. 2, 6-7a; ex sermone de uerbis apostoli)*
- flor⁵ *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96, ff. 227-229^v (ll. 7-447 audistis-uiam; Phil. 3, 3a; ex sermone de eadem lectione)*
- am *Plura ac diuersa diui Aurelii Augustini sermonum opera, III: Liber sermonum de uerbis Apostoli quorundamque aliorum, Basilee: per magistrum Johannem de Amerbach, 1494, ff. d5^vss.*
- maur *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi operum tomus quintus, continens sermones ad populum [...] Opera et studio monachorum ordinis S. Benedicti, à Congregatione S. Mauri, Parisiis, 1683 = Patrologia Latina 38, cc. 916-925*

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**Sermo ad mensam sancti martyris Cypriani
de lectione apostoli:**

Nos enim sumus circumcisio, qui Spiritui Dei seruimus

1. Ad apostolicam lectionem aures et animum intendat sanctitas uestra
5 adiuuando nos affectu apud Dominum Deum nostrum, ut ea quae illic
nobis reuelare dignatur, ad uos apte atque salubriter proferre possimus.
Ergo cum legeretur, audistis dicentem apostolum Paulum: *Nos enim
sumus circumcisio, qui Spiritui Dei seruimus*. Scio plerosque codices
habere: *qui spiritu Deo seruimus*. Quantum autem inspicere potuimus,
10 plures graeci hoc habent: *qui Spiritui Dei seruimus*. Sed non ibi quaestio
est. Manifestum est enim utrumque et congruum regulae ueritatis, quia et
Spiritui Dei seruimus et non carne, sed spiritu Deo seruimus. Carne enim
seruit Deo qui de rebus carnalibus sperat se placere Deo. Cum uero et
ipsa caro ad bona opera spiritui subditur, spiritu seruimus Deo, quia

7–10 Phil. 3, 3

1 Sermo] incipit sermo eiusdem *S*¹, item sermo eiusdem *S*² **1–2** Sermo...
apostoli] *inscriptio quam tradiderunt codices S* **1–3** Sermo...seruimus] sermo
sancti augustini episcopi *N*, incipit eiusdem nonus decimus de uerbis apostoli in
epistula ad philippenses *V*⁶ **1** martyris] martyri *S*² **2** de lectione] dectione *S*¹ *a.c.*
3 Nos] incipit LXXVIII item eiusdem de uerbis apostoli *praem.* *V*¹, item LXXXI
incipit eiusdem de uerbis apostoli *praem.* *V*², item eiusdem de uerbis apostoli
praem. *V*^{3-5.7}, non *V*⁵ | Nos...seruimus] *pars inscriptionis quam tradiderunt*
codices V^{1-5.7} | Spiritui] spiritu *V*² | Dei] deo *V*² *p.c.* | seruimus] et cetera
add. *V*^{1-3.5} **4** Ad] *om.* *am* | aures] aure *V*¹ *p.c.* *am* | animum] animam *V*¹ *a.c.* *2*
a.c. *3.6.7*, anima *V*¹ *p.c.*, animo *am* | intendat...uestra] uestra intendat sanctitas
V^{4.7}, sanctitas uestra intendat *V*⁶ | sanctitas] caritas *V*⁵ **5** adiuuando] adiuuandi
*V*² *p.c.* | affectu] uestro *add.* *maur* | illic] ille *maur* **6** dignatur] dignetur
am | uos] uas *V*² *a.c.* | apte] aperte *V*⁵ **7** audistis] *inc. flor*⁵ (Phil. 3, 3a;
inscriptio: ex sermone de eadem lectione) **8** qui] quis *V*³ *a.c.* | Spiritui] spiritu
V^{1.2.3} *a.c.* | Dei] deo *V*² *p.c.*, d* *V*³ **8–9** Scio...seruimus] *om.* *V*² **10** plures]
codices *add.* *V*² *p.c.* | hoc] *om.* *V*² *p.c.* | hoc habent] *inu.* *S*² | habent] habeat
*flor*⁵ *a.c.* | Spiritui] spiritu *V*^{1.2} *p.c.* *3 a.c.* | Sed] *om. flor*⁵ *a.c.* **11** enim] *om.* *V*²
12 Spiritui] spiritu *V*^{2.3} *a.c.* | et] *om.* *V*¹ | sed] si *V*¹ | Deo] *om.* *V*³ *a.c.* **13** se]
om. *V*² **14** seruimus Deo] *inu.* *V*^{4.7} | quia] qui *V*⁶

- 15 carnem domamus, ut spiritus obtemperet Deo. Spiritus enim regit, caro regitur; nec spiritus bene regit, si non regatur.
2. Cum ergo ait: *Nos sumus circumcisio*, uidete quid uoluerit intellegi in illa circumcissione, quae in umbra data est significante, quae remota est luce ueniente. Cur autem non dixerit: 'Nos habemus circumcisionem',
- 20 sed: *Nos sumus circumcisio*, sic accipite hoc uoluisse dicere apostolum: 'Nos sumus iustitia.' Circumcisio enim iustitia est. Magis enim commendat quod dicit, dicendo nos esse iustitiam quam dicendo nos esse iustos, ita tamen ut cum iustitiam dicit esse, iustos intellegamus. Non enim illa incommutabilis iustitia cuius participes facti sumus, sed
- 25 quemadmodum dicitur: 'Magna ibi iuuentus est' pro multis iuuenibus, sic dicitur 'iustitia' ut intellegantur iusti. Audite hoc ipsum euidentius eodem dicente apostolo: *ut nos*, inquit, *simus iustitia Dei in ipso*. *Nos simus iustitia*: non nostra, sed *Dei*; ab illo accepta, non a nobis assumpta; impertita, non usurpata; donata, non rapta. Cuidam enim rapina erat esse
- 30 aequalis Deo et quoniam quaesiuit rapinam, inuenit ruinam. Dominus autem noster Iesus Christus *cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo*. Cui enim aequalitas Dei natura erat,

17 Phil. 3, 3 20 Phil. 3, 3 27–28 II Cor. 5, 21 31–34 Phil. 2, 6–7

15 carnem] ipsam *praem. N* | spiritus] *om. N* | spiritus...Deo] obtemperet deo spiritus *S* | regit] regitur *V²* 17 Nos] *n* V² a.c.* | circumcisio] circum* *V¹* | intellegi] intelligere *V⁴* 18 data] dicta *V³* 19 luce] duce *S* | dixerit] dixit *S² V^{2.3}* | circumcisionem] circumcissione *S²* 20 dicere apostolum] *inu. am maur* 21 enim²] autem *V⁴ maur* 22 commendat] commendet *V¹ a.c.* | quod] cum *am* | quam] tamquam *S¹ a.c. V^{1.2.4.6}, *quam V³ a.c.* | nos²] non *V¹ a.c.* | esse²] ei *praem. S V⁴*, ea *praem. V⁷ a.c.* 23 iustos¹] iustus *V¹ a.c. (ut uid.)* | ita] sic *V⁵ flor⁵* | iustitiam] iustitia *S²* | dicit] dici *S¹ a.c.* 24 enim] *om. V²* | illa] est haec *praem. N, om. S¹ a.c.*, in *praem. V²*, sumus *praem. maur* | iustitia] iusti *praem. flor⁵* 27 dicente] dicentem *S²* | inquit simus] *inu. V⁴* | iustitia] iustiae *V¹ a.c.*, iustitiae *V¹ p.c. 3 a.c. flor⁵* | Nos] *om. V⁵ a.c. flor⁵* | simus²] sumus *V^{2.3} a.c. 4* 28 iustitia] iustia *V¹ a.c.* | assumpta] sumpta *V⁷* 29 donata...rapta] *om. S* | Cuidam] *inc. flor⁴* (Phil. 2, 6–7a; *inscriptio*: ex sermone de uerbis apostoli) 29–37 Cuidam...fecit] *om. flor⁵* 29 esse] se *add. V⁶* 30 aequalis] aequalem *V^{6.7}* | Deo] dei *am* 30–32 et...Deo] *om. V³ a.c.* 30 quoniam] quando *V^{1.2}* | quaesiuit] quaesiui *S¹ a.c.* | rapinam] rapinem *maur* 31 rapinam] rapina *S¹* 32 Cui] cum *S¹* | aequalitas] aqualitas *V¹ a.c.*

70 rapina non erat. *Sed tamen semetipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens: ut nos essemus iustitia Dei in ipso.* Si enim ille paupertatem
 35 uitaret, nos paupertate non careremus. *Pauper enim ille factus est, cum diues esset, ut illius paupertate, sicut scriptum est, nos ditaremur.* Diuitiae illius quid nos facturae sunt cuius paupertas nos diuites fecit?
 15 Apostolus ergo non tibi negauit circumcisionem, sed exposuit: lucem praetendit, umbram remouit.
 40 **3.** *Nos sumus, inquit, circumcisio, qui spiritu Deo seruimus et gloriamur in Christo Iesu et non in carne fidentes.* Respexit quosdam in carne fidentes: ipsi erant qui de carnis circumcisione gloriabantur. De quibus
 30 alio loco dicit: *quorum Deus uenter et gloria in pudendis eorum.* Intellege tu circumcisionem et esto circumcisio; intellege et esto: *Intellectus enim bonus, sed omnibus qui faciunt eum.* Non utique frustra octauo die iussus est infans circumcidi, nisi quia petra qua circumcidimur Christus erat. Cultellis enim petrinis circumcisis est populus, *petra autem erat*
 15 *Christus.* Quare ergo octauo die? Quia in hebdomadibus idem primus qui octauus. Completis enim septem diebus reditur ad primum. Finitur
 45 septimus, Dominus sepultus; reditur ad primum, Dominus resuscitatus.

34 II Cor. 5, 21 35–36 II Cor. 8, 9 40–41 Phil. 3, 3 43 Phil. 3, 19 44–45 Ps. 110, 10 45–46 cfr Gen. 17, 12 et Leu. 12, 3 47 cfr Ios. 5, 2 47–48 I Cor. 10, 4

33 Sed] se V² a.c. 34 ipso] ipsum S² 34–35 ille... uitaret] illa paupertate inuitaret V² 34 paupertatem] partatem flor⁴ a.c. 35 ille... est] factus est ille V⁷ 36 sicut] iterat V³ a.c. 37 nos¹] no* S² a.c. | fecit] facit V flor⁴ am maur, fin. flor⁴ 40 inquit] om. S² 41 Iesu] om. S² a.c. | fidentes] fiduciam habentes flor⁵ 41–42 Respexit... fidentes] om. S¹ a.c. 42 fidentes] edentes V^{2,3} a.c. | ipsi erant] post gloriabantur N | erant] erat S² a.c. 43 dicit] om. V¹ a.c. | uenter] est add. N V^{4,7} am maur | Intellege] intellegit flor⁵ a.c. 44 enim] om. V³ a.c. 45 bonus] uonus S¹ a.c. | eum] ea V¹ a.c. (ut uid.) | Non utique] neque S² 46 circumcidimur] circumcidimus V³ a.c. | erat] est N, om. V¹ p.c. 47 Cultellis] cultelnis V¹ a.c. | petra] non leg. quod add. V³ a.c. 48 hebdomadibus] hebdomadibus V³ a.c. | idem] id V² a.c., id* V³ a.c. | primus] est praem. V¹ p.c. | qui] et add. am 49 Finitur] finitus S V^{1,2} a.c. 3 a.c. am 49–50 Finitur... sepultus] finito enim septimo quo dominus est sepultus N 50 primum] primus S¹ | Dominus resuscitatus] quo dominus est resuscitatus N | resuscitatus] resuscitus am

- Domini enim resurrectio promisit nobis aeternum diem et consecrauit nobis dominicum diem. Qui uocatur dominicus ipse uidetur proprie ad Dominum pertinere, quia eo die Dominus resurrexit. Reddita est petra, circumcidantur qui uolunt dicere: *Nos enim sumus circumcisio*. —
- 55 *Traditus est enim propter peccata nostra et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram*. Iustificatio tua — circumcisio tua — non est a te: *Gratia salui facti estis per fidem et hoc non ex uobis, sed Dei donum est: non ex operibus*. Ne forte dicas: 'Promerui et ideo accepi.' Non putes te promerendo accepisse, qui non promerereris, nisi accepisses. Gratia
- 60 praecessit meritum tuum: non gratia ex merito, sed meritum ex gratia. Nam si gratia ex merito, emisti, non gratis accepisti. *Pro nihilo*, inquit, *saluos facies eos*. Quid est *Pro nihilo saluos facies*? Nihil in eis inuenis unde salues et tamen saluas. Gratis das, gratis saluas. Omnia merita
- 65 praecedis, ut dona tua consequantur merita mea. Prorsus gratis das, gratis saluas, qui nihil inuenis unde salues et multum inuenis unde damnes.
4. *Nos ergo*, inquit, *sumus circumcisio, qui Spiritui Dei seruimus et gloriamur in Christo Iesu — qui gloriatur, in Domino gloriatur — et non in carne fidentes*. Et quid est 'fidere in carne'? Audite, inquit. *Quamquam ego*, inquit, *habeam fiduciam et in carne*. *Si quis alius in carne putat se*

54 Phil. 3, 3 54–56 Rom. 4, 25 57–58 Eph. 2, 8-9 61–62 Ps. 55, 8
66–67 Phil. 3, 3 67 I Cor. 1, 31 67–68 Phil. 3, 3 68–70 Phil. 3, 4

51 resurrectio] resuscitatio V flor⁵ am maur | promisit] praemisit am | aeternum] aeternam flor⁵ 52 dominicum] domicum V³ a.c. | Qui] d V³ | proprie] propriae V¹ 54 circumcidantur] iterat V¹ a.c. | enim] om. V⁷ 55 resurrexit] resurrexi maur 56 nostram] om. V⁴ | Iustificatio] iustifi*catio V³ a.c. 56–65 non...damnes] om. flor⁵ 56 a] ad V¹ 57 Gratia] inc. flor³ (Eph. 2, 8-9; inscriptio: ex sermone de uerbis apostoli) | fidem] fide V⁵ p.c. | donum est] om. V³ a.c. 58 ideo] ide V¹ a.c. | putes te] poteste V¹ a.c. 59 promerendo] promerende V¹ a.c. | promerereris] promereris S V^{1.2} a.c. 3 a.c. 4.5.6 a.c. 7 flor³ (fortasse ex archetypo), promerereris am 60 merito] meritam uel meritum V¹ a.c. 61 gratia] gratiam V² | emisti] emisisti S² 62 eos] illos am | facies²] eos add. N V^{5.6} flor³ maur | Nihil] nil V^{2.3} | in eis] iterat V¹ a.c. 63 saluas¹] salues V¹ a.c. 64 mea] tua am | gratis²] gatis am 65 salues] saluas V⁶ | damnes] damnas V³, fin. flor³ 66 Spiritui] spiritu V^{1.2} a.c. 67 gloriatur] gloriemur V³ a.c. 68 inquit] om. N V^{5.7} p.c. flor⁵ 69 inquit] om. V⁶ 69–70 in²...fiduciam] uidetur confidere in carne flor⁵

70 *habere fiduciam, magis ego.* Ne arbitremini me, inquit, hoc contemnere
 quod non habeo. Quid magnum est, si homo abiectus, plebeius, ignobilis,
 contemnat nobilitatem? Sed si aliquis homo magnus, potens, nobilis
 contemnat nobilitatem, hoc magnum est et tunc veram exhibet
 humilitatem. *Quamquam ego,* inquit, *habeam fiduciam et in carne.* Ideo
 75 uos, inquit, doceo contemnere, quoniam uidetis me habere quod
 contemniam: *Si quis alius in carne putat se habere fiduciam, magis ego.*

5. Et audi in carne fiduciam. *Circumcisione octauae diei,* id est: non
 proselytus, non advena ad populum Dei, non maior circumcisis, sed a
 parentibus natus Iudaeus habeo circumcisionem octauae diei. *Ex genere*
 80 *Israel, tribu Benjamin, Hebraeus ex Hebraeis, secundum legem*
pharisaeus. Primarii quidam erant et quasi ad nobilitatem Iudaicam
 segregati, non contemptibili plebi commixti qui dicebantur pharisaei.
 Nam dicitur hoc uerbum quasi segregationem interpretari, quomodo in
 Latina lingua dicitur egregius quasi a grege separatus. Fuerunt autem
 85 Israelitae, id est ex genere Israel, etiam illi qui separati fuerant a templo.
 Remansit autem ad templum tribus Iuda et tribus Benjamin. Tribus Leui
 in sacerdotibus, tribus Iuda regia et tribus Benjamin: hoc solum

74–76 Phil. 3, 4 77 Phil. 3, 5 79–81 Phil. 3, 5 84–90 III Reg. 12

70 magis ego] *inu. N flor⁵ | me] om. V^{1-5.7} flor⁵ | me inquit] inu. am
 maur | me... hoc] inquit hoc me V⁶ | contemnere] contem*ere V³ a.c.,
 condemnare am 71 est] om. V⁴ | abiectus] sit praem. V² p.c. | plebeius]
 plebius V¹, plebs eius V² 72 contemnat] contempnet flor⁵ 72–73 Sed... est] *ita*
N, om. S V flor⁵ am maur 73 veram exhibet] inu. am maur | exhibet] exhibeat
S V flor⁵ am maur 74 et] om. N 75 uos] prorsus praem. V¹ | uos inquit] inu.
V⁴ | quoniam] quando V¹ 77 Circumcisione] habeo inquit circumcisionem N,
circumcisis V⁵ p.c. flor⁵ | octauae] octauo V⁵ p.c., octaua flor⁵ | diei] die V^{2.5} p.c.
flor⁵, dei V³ a.c. 77–79 id... diei] om. V¹ 78 advena] om. V⁴ 79 octauae] octauo
V³ a.c. 80 Israel] israhel N S V³ | tribu] de praem. N V^{2.3.5.6} flor⁵ am
maur | Hebraeus... Hebraeis] om. V^{4.7} 82 plebi] plebe V¹ a.c. 83 uerbum] V² e
corr. | segregationem] segregatione N | quomodo] quoquo modo V³ a.c.
 84 lingua] *om. am | a] om. V³ a.c. | separatus] separatus V³ a.c. 85 Israelitae]*
israhelitae N S V^{1.2.4.5} flor⁵ | id est] om. N | est] om. am | Israel] israhel N S
V^{1.3.4} | fuerant] fuerint V¹ a.c., fuerunt V^{2.3} 86 ad] a V¹ a.c. flor⁵ | Benjamin] et
 87 hoc solum] *he sole N**

remanserat ad Ierusalem et ad templum Dei, quando facta est illa
 separatio in seruo Salomonis. Non ergo leuiter accipiat is quod ait 'tribus
 90 Benjamin': inhaerens Iudae, non recedens a templo. *Hebraeus ex
 Hebraeis, secundum legem phariseus, secundum aemulationem
 95 persequens ecclesiam*. Inter merita sua commemorat quod fuerit
 persecutor. *Secundum aemulationem*, inquit. Qua aemulatione? Non
 eram, inquit, piger Iudaeus: quidquid erat quod legi meae aduersarium
 95 uideretur, impatienter ferebam, acriter insequabar. Haec apud Iudaeos
 nobilitas, sed apud Christum quaeritur humilitas. Ideo ibi iste Saulus, hic
 Paulus. Saulus a Saule nomen deriuatur. Quis fuerit Saul, nostis: ipsius
 electa est statura procera. Sic eum describit scriptura: quod supereminens
 100 esset de omnibus, quando electus est, ut ungueretur in regem. Non fuit sic
 Paulus, sed factus Paulus. Paulus enim paruus, ideo Paulus modicus. Ergo
secundum aemulationem, inquit, *persequens ecclesiam*. Hinc intellegant
 homines qualis apud Iudaeos fuerim, qui Christi ecclesiam persequabar
 aemulatione traditionum paternarum.

90–93 Phil. 3, 5–6 97–99 cfr I Reg. 9, 2 100–101 Phil. 3, 6 102–103 cfr
 Gal. 1, 13–14

88 remanserat] remanserant *N*, remansit *V*¹⁻³ *am maur* | ad¹] in
am | Ierusalem] hierusalem *N* *S*¹ *V*^{1.2} *flor*⁵ *am*, iherusalem *V*^{5.6} | facta] faccta
*V*³ *a.c.* | illa] illic *V*⁵ *flor*⁵ 88–89 illa separatio] *inu. am maur* 89 Salomonis]
salamonis *V*³ *a.c. flor*⁵ | tribus] de tribu *N*, *non leg. V*², tribu* *V*³ *a.c.*, tribu *V*³ *p.c.*
*V*⁴ *flor*⁵ *maur* 91 aemulationem] hemulationem *flor*⁵ 92 ecclesiam] dei *add.*
*flor*⁵ *am* 93 aemulationem] hemulationem *flor*⁵ | Qua aemulatione] quam
 aemulationem *V*²⁻⁷ *flor*⁵ *maur* (hemulationem *flor*⁵) 94 piger] pi*ger *V*¹
a.c. | legi meae] legitime *V*⁴ | aduersarium] *V*² *e corr.* 95 uideretur] uidetur *V*^{1.2}
a.c. 3 a.c., uidebatur *am* 96 Christum] deum *V*¹ | Saulus] salus *V*¹ *a.c. 2 a.c.* 97 a]
 enim *praem. N* | deriuatur] diriuatur *S*² *V*^{1.2} *a.c. 3.5-7* *flor*⁵ *am* | Quis] qui *V*¹ *a.c.*
2-7 *flor*⁵ *am maur* | fuerit] fuerat *V*³ *a.c.* 97–98 ipsius... procera] ipse statura
 procerus *V*¹ *in marg.* (uaria lectio) 98 procera] proceris *V*¹⁻³ *am maur* | eum]
 enim *V*^{4.7} 99 de] *om. N* *V*³ *p.c. 5* *flor*⁵ *maur* | est] *om. V*³ *a.c.* | regem] rege *S*
 100 Paulus¹] saulus *V*^{4.7} *am* | factus] de saulo *praem. N*, est *add.*
*V*⁴ | modicus] medicus *V*³ *a.c.* 101 aemulationem] hemulationem *flor*⁵
 102 qualis] *non leg. V*², *om. V*³ *a.c.* | persequabar] persequeba* *V*¹ *a.c. 2 a.c.*
 103 aemulatione] aemulationem *V*³ *a.c.*, emulationi *V*^{4.7}, hemulatione
*flor*⁵ | paternarum] paterna *S*² *a.c.*

6. Addit: *secundum iustitiam quae in lege est, qua fuerim sine querela.*
 105 Nouit caritas uestra dictos esse sine querela ambulasse in omnibus
 iustificationibus Domini Zachariam et Elisabeth. *In omnibus*, inquit
 scriptura, *iustificationibus Domini ambulasse sine querela.* Ecce hoc erat
 et Paulus noster, quando Saulus erat. In lege sine querela ambulabat et
 quod in eo fuit sine querela, hoc de illo faciebat magnam querelam. Quid
 110 ergo putamus, fratres? Esse sine querela secundum iustitiam quae in lege
 est, malum est? Si malum est secundum iustitiam quae in lege est, esse
 sine querela, ergo aliquid mali est lex? Sed habemus eundem apostolum
 dicentem: *Itaque lex quidem sancta et mandatum sanctum et iustum et*
bonum. Si lex sancta et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum,
 115 secundum iustitiam quae est ex lege sancta, conuersari sine querela
 quomodo potest non esse bonum? Quomodo potest non esse sanctum? An
 forte sanctum est? Audiamus ipsum apostolum; uidete quid dicat: *Quae*
mihi lucra fuerunt, haec propter Christum damna esse duxi. Damna sua
 dicit et inter damna sua computat quod in iustitia quae est in lege, fuerit
 120 sine querela. *Verumtamen*, inquit, *et arbitror omnia damna esse propter*

104 Phil. 3, 6 106–107 Luc. 1, 6 113–114 Rom. 7, 12 117–125 Phil. 3,
 7–8 142 Phil. 3, 8 142–145 cfr Phil. 3, 6–8 145–146 Phil. 3, 8–9 154–155 cfr Phil. 3, 6 155–157 Phil. 3, 9

104 Addit] ad*dit V³ a.c. | in...est] est in lege flor⁵ maur | qua] qui N, quae
 S², non leg. V², conuersatus V³ p.c. 5 p.c. flor⁵ | fuerim] om. flor⁵ 105 Nouit] no
 V³ a.c., nouitas V¹ a.c. | ambulasse] et praem. N 106 Elisabeth] helisabeth N S¹
 V^{1.3.5}, elyzabeth V⁴, elizabeth V⁷ maur, helizabet am 107 ambulasse] ambulantes
 N V⁵ flor⁵ maur 108 et¹] om. S | noster] no* V¹ a.c. 109 eo] ea V¹
 110 putamus fratres] inu. V⁴ | in] ex flor⁵ a.c. 111 malum¹] hoc praem. V², esse
 praem. am | Si...est³] om. V³ a.c. 112 mali] malum V⁴ | eundem] endem S²
 a.c. 114 iustum] ius*tum V³ a.c. 115 est...lege] ex lege est V² | conuersari]
 conuersaris V⁴ am 116 non²] om. V² 117 sanctum] non praem. V⁷, non add.
 am | Audiamus] audiam V² | uidete] om. am | Quae] sed praem. flor⁵
 117–118 Quae...duxi] sed quae mihi fuerunt lucra haec arbitratus sum propter
 christum detrimenta flor⁵ 118 fuerunt] erunt V³ a.c. | Christum] om. V³
 a.c. | duxi] dixi V¹ 119 iustitia] iustitia V³ a.c. | est...lege] in lege est V⁶
 120 inquit] om. N | et] non leg. V² | et arbitror] existimo flor⁵ | arbitror]
 abitor V³ a.c. | damna] detrimentum flor⁵

eminentem scientiam Christi Iesu Domini nostri. Attendo, inquit, laudes meas, comparo eminentiae Domini nostri Iesu Christi. Illud sitio, hoc contemno. Parum est hoc: propter quem arbitror, inquit, omnia non solum detrimenta esse, uerum et stercora existimaui esse, ut Christum
 125 *lucrificarem.*

7. Quaestio maior exorta est: si secundum iustitiam quae in lege est, uersabaris sine querela et hoc in detrimentis tuis, in damnis, in stercoribus computas, ut Christum lucrificas, ergo iustitia illa a Christo prohibebat? Obsecro te, expone hoc paululum. Deo potius dicamus, illuminet et nos a
 130 quo et ipse illuminatus est qui epistolam istam scribit nobis non atramento, sed Spiritu Dei uiui. Videtis, carissimi, quam sit arduum, quam difficile intellegere hoc: cum constet legem sanctam esse et mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum constetque omnino inter fideles catholicos – ita ut nemo dissentiat nisi qui non uult esse catholicus – hanc
 135 legem non datam nisi a Domino Deo nostro, secundum istam iustitiam quae in lege est, conuersari sine querela impedimentum fuisse apostolo ne ueniret ad Christum, nec eum uenisse ad Christum, nisi hoc quod fuit secundum iustitiam quae in lege est sine querela, inter damna et

132–133 cfr Rom. 7, 12

121 eminentem] eminente V¹ | Christi Iesu] inu. V⁷ flor⁵ | Christi... nostri] domini nostri ihesu christi V⁴ | Attendo] attendite S¹ a.c. | laudes] lades S¹ a.c.
 122 sitio] scio V¹ 123–125 arbitror...lucrificarem] omnia detrimentum feci et arbitror ut stercora ut christum lucrificam flor⁵ 125 lucrificarem] luci faciam N, lucrificarem V² 126 exorta] exhorta N | est¹] o paule add. maur | secundum] non leg. quod add. V³ a.c. 127 damnis] et add. V² p.c.
 128 prohibebat] prohibebatur V¹ 129 Obsecro te] obserote V¹ | paululum] paulum flor⁵ | illuminet] ut praem. V^{1-3,6} am maur | et] om. S² a.c. V⁴ 130 et] om. V⁴ maur | et ipse] inu. V⁷ a.c., ipse V⁷ p.c. | epistolam] per praem. V¹ | istam] ipsam V^{2,3} | scribit] inscriuit S¹ a.c., inscribit S¹ p.c. 2, scripsit V flor⁵ ammaur 132 cum] cu V¹ 132–133 constet...bonum] om. V³ a.c.
 132 sanctam esse] inu. V^{4,7} 133 sanctum] esse praem. V⁷ 134 catholicos] et praem. S² a.c. 135 istam] om. N 136 impedimentum] impedimento S² | apostolo] apostoli V^{1,2,3} a.c. am 137 uenisse] uenisset V³ (ut uid.) 137–138 fuit secundum] fuisset ad V⁴ 138 inter] quae praem. S^{1,2} p.c.

detrimenta et stercora computasset. Sequamur ergo et accedamus
 140 aliquantum, ne forte in ipsis uerbis apostoli elucescat nobis aliquid unde
 ista remoueat et soluat obscuritas. *Detrimenta*, inquit, *credidi haec*
omnia et stercora existimaui, ut Christum lucrifaciam. Intendite, obsecro.
 Damna, detrimenta, stercora ista existimaui, in quibus etiam illud
 145 commemoro quod fuerim sine querela secundum iustitiam quae in lege
 est. *Existimaui ergo haec omnia detrimenta et stercora, ut Christum*
lucrifaciam et inueniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege
est. Qui praeuenitis intellectu expositionem, arbitramini uos tamquam
 ueloces in uia cum tardioribus ambulare. Celeritas aliquantulum
 reprimatur, ne comes tardior deseratur. *Vt Christum*, inquit, *lucrifaciam et*
 150 *inueniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est*. Si *meam*
 dixerat, quare addidit *ex lege*? Si enim ex lege est, quomodo tua est?
 Numquid tu tibi imposuisti legem? Deus legem dedit, Deus legem
 imposuit, Deus te legi suae obtemperare praecepit. Lex si non te doceret
 quemadmodum uiuere deberes, quomodo posses habere iustitiam sine
 155 querela secundum legem? Si secundum legem habes, quomodo dicis: *non*
habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est, sed eam quae est per fidem
Christi, quae est a Deo?

141–142 Phil. 3, 8 142–145 cfr Phil. 3, 6–8 145–147 Phil. 3, 8–9 149–150
 Phil. 3, 8–9 154–155 cfr Phil. 3, 6 155–157 Phil. 3, 9

139 et stercora] estercora *V*¹ a.c. | computasset] computasse *S*² | Sequamur]
 sequamus *V*³ a.c. 140 aliquantum] aliquantulum *V*⁴ | in] om. *V*⁵ 141 haec] et
*V*² 142 et] ut *V*^{2.3} 142–143 ut...existimaui] om. *V*³ a.c. 142 lucrifaciam]
 lucrificerem *V*^{1.3} p.c. am, lucrificarem *V*² 142–143 Intendite...existimaui] om.
*flor*⁵ 143 stercora ista] inu. *V*² 145 Existimaui] estimaui *V*⁶ | ergo] om.
*V*² | omnia] om. am 147–150 Qui...est] om. *flor*⁵ 147 praeuenitis]
 praeuenistis *V*²⁻⁷ am maur, preuenisti *V*¹ | arbitramini] arbitram*ni *V*¹
 a.c. | uos] u* *V*¹ 148 aliquantulum] aliquantum *V*¹⁻³ am maur 149 ne comes]
 necoms *V*² | comes] com*es *S*¹ a.c. | inquit] om. *V*² 150 inueniar] om.
*V*² | lege] *V*⁶ e corr. 151 est¹] esset *V*¹ | quomodo] et praem. *V*³ 153 te¹...
 suae] legi suae te am maur | legi] legis *V*¹ a.c. 154 uiuere deberes] uiueres
*S*² | posses] possis *V*¹, om. *V*^{2.6} | habere] haberes *V*^{2.6} 154–155 sine querela]
 om. *V*^{4.7} 155 querela] querelam *S*² 156 eam] illam *flor*⁵ 156–157 est²...Deo]
 ex fide est ihesu christi quae ex deo est iustitia in fide *flor*⁵ 157 Christi] ihesu
 praem. *S*²

8. Iam ergo dicam ut potero: reuelet melius qui uos possidet, donet et intellectum et effectum. Donabit enim effectum, si donauit affectum. Hoc
 160 est enim quod uolo dicere: lege Dei proposita – ipsa enim dixit: *Non concupisces* – lege ergo Dei proposita – exceptis illis carnalibus sacramentis quae fuerant umbrae futurorum – lege Dei proposita quisquis timuerit et suis uiribus eam implere se posse putauerit et fecerit quod iubet lex, non amando iustitiam, sed timendo poenam, fuit quidem
 165 secundum iustitiam quae in lege est, homo sine querela. Non furatur, non adulterat, non dicit falsum testimonium, non facit homicidium, non concupiscit rem proximi sui. Potest hoc, potest fortassis: unde? Timore poenae. Quamquam qui timore poenae non concupiscit, puto quia concupiscit. Terrore ingenti armorum atque telorum et circumdantis
 170 forsitan multitudinis uel obuam euntis etiam leo reuocatur a praeda et tamen leo uenit, leo redit: praedam non rapuit, non malitiam posuit. Si talis es, adhuc iustitia est; qua iustitia tua tibi consulis ne torquearis. Quid magnum est poenam timere? Quis eam non timet? Quis latro, quis sceleratus, quis nefarius? Sed hoc interest inter timorem tuum
 175 timoremque latronis quod latro timet leges hominum et ideo facit latrocinium, quia sperat se fallere leges hominum; tu autem eius leges

160–161 Rom. 7, 7 165 cfr Phil. 3, 6 165–167 cfr Ex. 20, 13–17

158 et] *om.* V^{4.7} 159 effectum¹] affectum V^{2.3} p.c. 4.5.7 flor⁵ maur | effectum²] affectum V^{2.3} a.c. | donauit] donabit S² V⁴ am maur, donauerit V^{2.6} | affectum] effectum V¹ a.c. 3, intellectum V², uel intellectum V^{6sup.l.} 160–162 ipsa... proposita] *om.* flor⁵ 161 Dei] *om.* V⁷ 162 fuerant] fuerunt V^{1-3.5.6} am maur | umbrae] umbra V² 163 timuerit] temuerit V¹ a.c., tumuerit V^{4.6} | eam implere] *inu.* V^{4.7} | se] *om.* V⁴ 164 iubet lex] *inu.* am maur | timendo] tantummodo am | poenam] poena V¹ p.c. | fuit] fit N V^{5.7} flor⁵ 165 in] ex V flor⁵ am maur | Non] *om.* V¹ 169 telorum] telarum V² a.c. 3 a.c. 170 obuam] obuia V¹ 171 leo uenit] *om.* V⁴ 172 es] esset V², *om.* V^{4.5} flor⁵ | iustitia¹] tua add. N | est] *om.* V² | qua] quare N, quia V^{1.4.5} a.c. | tua] *om.* V flor⁵ am maur | tibi consulis] consulis V² a.c., *inu.* V² p.c. 173 poenam] ponam flor⁵ a.c. | timere] non praem. am 174 sceleratus] celeratus V¹ a.c. 175 leges] lege V¹ a.c. | facit] leges hominum add. V² a.c. (ut uid.) 176 quia] qua V³ a.c. | se] *se S¹ a.c. 176–177 leges¹...fallere¹] *om.* V³ a.c. 176 tu] et praem. V¹ | eius leges] *inu.* V⁴ flor⁵ am maur | leges²] legem S² V⁴ p.c. 7

times, eius poenam times quem fallere non potes. Nam si fallere posses,
 quid non fecisses? Ergo et concupiscentiam tuam malam non amor tollit,
 sed timor premit. Ad ouile uenit lupo, latratu canum et clamore pastorum
 180 ab ouili reuersus est lupo: ipse est tamen lupo, in ouem uertatur. Facit
 enim et hoc Dominus, sed ipsa est iustitia eius, non tua. Nam quamdiu
 habes tuam, potes timere poenam, non amare iustitiam. Ergo, fratres mei,
 habet delicias suas iniquitas et iustitia non habet? Delectat malum et non
 delectat bonum? Delectat omnino, sed: *Dominus dabit suauitatem et terra*
 185 *nostra dabit fructum suum*. Ille nisi prior det suauitatem, terra nostra non
 habebit nisi sterilitatem. Hanc ergo iustitiam concupiuit apostolus,
 delectatus est; memor fuit Dei et delectatus est; concupiuit anima eius et
 aestuauit in atria Domini et uiluerunt omnia quae pro magno habebat:
 facta sunt damna, detrimenta, stercora.
 190 9. Hinc enim erat et illud quod ecclesiam persequabatur secundum
 aemulationem paternarum traditionum. Inde erat quia suam iustitiam
 constituebat, non iustitiam Dei quaerebat. Videte enim quia inde
 persequabatur ecclesiam. *Quid ergo dicemus?* – ait alio loco ipse
 apostolus – *Quia gentes quae non sectabantur iustitiam, apprehenderunt*

184–185 Ps. 84, 13 187 cfr Ps. 76, 4 187–188 cfr Ps. 83, 3 189 cfr Phil. 3,
 7–8 190–191 cfr Gal. 1, 14 193–205 Rom. 9, 30–32

177 eius] *om. N^{a.c.}* | eius...times²] *om. V¹ a.c.* 178 concupiscentiam]
 concupiscentiam *am* 179 latratu] latrato *V¹ a.c. 2 a.c. 3 a.c.* | pastorum] postorum
S¹ a.c. 180 ouili] ouile *S V^{1.2.3} a.c.* | reuersus] repulsus *V⁵ flor⁵* | lupo¹] *om.*
N | ipse...lupo²] tamen ipse lupo est *N*, ipse tamen semper est lupo
maur | est²] *om. V^{2.4} am* | in] lupo *praem. N* | uertatur] uertantur *V¹ a.c. 3*
a.c. 181 enim] *om. N* | ipsa] et *praem. V²* | iustitia eius] *inu. V⁷* 182 habes]
*ha*s V¹* 183 iniquitas] iniquita* *V³ a.c.* 184 Delectat] delectet
V¹ | suauitatem] benignitatem *V⁴* 185 det] des *S²* | terra] et *praem flor⁵ a.c.*
 186 habebit] dabit *S² a.c. am* | sterilitatem] sterelita* *V¹*, sterelitatem *V² a.c. 3 a.c.*
 188 aestuauit] estauit *V³ a.c.* 189 detrimenta] et detrimenta et *V² a.c.* 190 erat]
 errat *S²* 191 paternarum] suarum *add. N* | quia] quae *V¹ a.c.* 192 non] nono *V¹*
a.c. | quaerebat] querabat *V³ a.c.* 193–252 Quid...iacere] *om. flor⁵*
 193 dicemus] dicimus *V am* 193–194 alio...apostolus] ipse apostolus alio loco
V¹ 193 ipse] quo *praem. S¹ a.c.* 194 gentes] *inc. flor²* (Rom. 9, 30–32;
inscriptio: ex sermone de uerbis apostoli)

- 195 *iustitiam*. Sed quam? *Iustitiam autem quae ex fide est*. Gentes autem quae non sectabantur *iustitiam* quae in lege est, quasi propriam suam, quae fit de timore poenae, non de amore iustitiae – quia non sectabantur *iustitiam*, apprehenderunt *iustitiam*: *iustitiam autem quae ex fide est*. Israel autem, inquit, *persequens legem iustitiae, in legem non peruenit*.
- 200 *Quare? Quia non ex fide*. Quid est *Quia non ex fide*? Non sperauit in Deo, non illam petiuit a Deo, non credidit in eum qui *iustificat impium*, non fuit similis publicano oculos in terram deicienti, pectus suum percutienti et dicenti: *Domine, propitius esto mihi peccatori*. Ergo *persequens legem iustitiae, in legem non peruenit*. *Quare? Quia non ex fide, sed quasi ex operibus*. Offenderunt in lapidem *offensionis*. Ecce unde Saulus persequabatur ecclesiam. Quando enim persequabatur ecclesiam, in lapidem *offensionis* offendebat. Christus humilis in terra iacebat; in caelis quidem et ipse erat leuata illo carne sua a mortuis resuscitata, sed nisi et in terra Christus iaceret, non ipsi Saulo clamaret:
- 205 *Quid me persequeris?* Ergo ille iacebat, quia humilitatem praeferebat; ille offendebat, quia non uidebat. Et totum hoc non uidere unde erat? De tumore superbiae. Quid est ‘de tumore superbiae’? Quasi de iustitia sua. Ex lege quidem, sed sua. Quid est ‘ex lege’? Quia in mandatis legis. Quid

201 Rom. 4, 5 202–203 Luc. 18, 13 210 Act. 9, 4; 26, 14

195 *Iustitiam*] *iustitia* S | *autem*¹] *eam* V² | *autem*²] *om. flor*² 196 in] *ex* V^{4.7} *am maur* | *quae*²] *qui* S | *fit*] *sit* V² 197 *timore*] *more* V^{2 a.c.} | *amore*] *timore* V^{4.7} 198 *apprehenderunt iustitiam*] *om. S* | *iustitiam*²] *iustitia* V¹ | *iustitiam*³] *iustitia* S 199 *Israel*] *israhel* N S V^{1.3-5} | *inquit*] *om. V*^{1 a.c.}, *quid* V^{2.3 a.c.} | *legem*²] *lege* S, *iustitiae add. V*^{2.6} *am maur* | *non*] *om. V*^{2 a.c.} 201 *Deo*¹] *deum* V *flor*² *am maur* | *Deo*²] *domino* V^{1 a.c.} 202–203 *non...* *peccatori*] *om. flor*² 202 *oculos*] *oculis* V^{1 a.c.} | *pectus*] *petus* S^{2 a.c.} 204 *legem*²] *iustitiae add. am maur* 205 *Offenderunt*] *offendere* V³, *enim add. maur* 205–207 *Ecce...offendebat*] *om. flor*² 206–207 *Quando...ecclesiam*] *om. am* 208 *leuata*] *leu*ta* V^{2 a.c.} | *illo*] *illa* V⁴ | *carne*] *a praem. am* | *carne sua*] *carnem suam* S 209 *ipsi*] *ipse* V¹⁻⁴ *maur, om. flor*² 210 *quia*] *qua* V^{1 a.c.} | *humilitatem*] *piam add. am* | *praeferebat*] *perferebat am* 211 *offendebat*] *offerebat* V^{3 a.c.} 212 *Quid...superbiae*²] *om. S* 212–233 *Quid...Deo*] *om. flor*² 213 *Quid*¹] *qui* V^{3 a.c.} | *legis*] *om. V*^{4.7} 213–214 *Quid est*²] *quidem* V^{3 a.c.}

est 'sua'? Tamquam uiribus suis. Amor deerat, amor iustitiae, amor
 215 caritatis Christi. Et unde illi amor? Solus possidebat timor, sed caritati
 uenturae locum in corde seruabat. Cum saeuiret et erectus, iactabundus,
 glorians apud ipsos Iudaeos quod secundum aemulationem paternarum
 traditionum persequeretur ecclesiam – cum sibi uideretur excelsus,
 audiuit desuper uocem Domini nostri Iesu Christi iam in caelo sedentis et
 220 adhuc humilitatem commendantis: *Saule, inquit, Saule, quid me*
persequeris? Durum est tibi aduersus stimulum calces mittere. Possem te
 dimittere – tu enim uexareris punctionibus meis, non ego frangerer
 calcibus tuis – sed non te dimitto: saeuis et misereor. *Quid me*
persequeris? Non enim timeo te ne iterum crucifigas me, sed uolo
 225 agnoscas me, ne occidas non me, sed te.

10. Horruit ergo apostolo percusso et prostrato, erecto et instructo –
 factum enim est in illo: *Ego percutiam et ego sanabo.* Non enim ait:
 'Sanabo et percutiam', sed: *percutiam et sanabo.* Percutiam te, dabo tibi
 me. Sic prostratus horruit iustitiam suam, in qua erat certe sine querela,
 230 laudabilis, magnus, quasi gloriosus apud Iudaeos: detrimenta existimauit,
 damna credidit, stercora deputauit, *ut inueniretur in illo non habens suam*
iustitiam, quae ex lege est, sed eam quae per fidem est Christi, quae est,

217–218 cfr Gal. 1, 14 220–224 Act. 26, 14 227–229 Deut. 32, 39
 230–231 cfr Phil. 3, 7–8 231–233 Phil. 3, 9

214 sua] de *praem. am maur* | uiribus] de *praem. V¹⁻³ am maur* 215 Christi]
 dei V⁴ | illi] ille V⁴ | Solus] quem *praem. N*, solum V² a.c. (*ut uid.*), eum *add.*
 V² p.c. 6, illum *add.* V³ p.c. *maur* | sed] *om. am* 216 in corde] *om. V^{4.7}* | et] *om.*
 V^{2.3} p.c. 4–6 *maur* 217 quod] quos N S¹ V^{1.3} a.c. 4 (*fortasse ex archetypo*), apud
praem. N, om. V³ p.c. 219 audiuit] V³ e corr. | desuper uocem] *inu. V⁵*
 221 Durum] du* V² a.c. | calces mittere] calcitrare V⁴ | Possem] possim V^{1.3}
am 221–222 te dimittere] *mittere V² 223 saeuis et] saeuisset V³ a.c., saeuis sed
 V³ p.c. | misereor] miseor S¹ a.c. 224 timeo te] *inu. V²* | ne] *om. S¹ a.c., non*
leg. V² a.c., ut V² p.c. 226 Horruit] occurrit V¹ a.c. | ergo] iustitiam suam *add.*
 N | apostolo ... instructo] apostolus percussus et prostratus erectus et instructus
 N V² p.c. 6 *am maur* 227 enim] *om. V²* | enim est] *inu. V^{4.7} am* 228 sanabo]
 sana S¹ a.c., ego *praem. V⁶* | dabo] et *praem. V^{4.7} am maur* 229 prostratus] sic
 erectus *add. N* | suam] *iterat V¹ a.c.* 229–230 sine ... laudabilis] laudabilis sine
 querela V⁶ 230 quasi ... Iudaeos] apud iudeos quasi gloriosus V¹ | detrimenta]
 haec omnia *add. in marg. V²* 232 iustitiam] *om. V¹ a.c.* | per fidem] ex fide V⁴

inquit, *ex Deo*. Illi autem qui offenderunt in lapidem offensionis: quid de illis dicit ipse apostolus? *Quia non*, inquit, *ex fide, sed tamquam ex operibus*. Quasi ipsi quasi sua iustitia offenderunt in lapidem offensionis, sicut scriptum est: *'Ecce pono in Sion lapidem offensionis et petram scandali, et qui crediderit in eum, non confundetur.'* Qui enim crediderit in eum, non habebit suam iustitiam, quae ex lege est, quamvis sit bona lex; sed implebit ipsam legem non sua iustitia, sed data ex Deo. Ita enim non confundetur. *Caritas enim legis plenitudo*. Et unde ista *caritas diffusa est in cordibus nostris*? Non utique a nobis, *sed per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis*. Offenderunt ergo illi in lapidem offensionis et petram scandali et ait de illis: *Fratres, bona uoluntas quidem cordis mei et deprecatio ad Deum pro ipsis in salutem*. Deprecatur apostolus pro non credentibus, ut credant; pro auersis, ut conuertantur. Videtis quia nec ipsa conuersio sine Dei adiutorio. *Deprecatio*, inquit, *ad Deum pro illis in salutem*. *Testimonium enim perhibeo quia zelum Dei habent*. Sic habebat et ipse: zelum Dei habebat. Sed quomodo ipse habebat? Quomodo habebat? *Sed non secundum scientiam*. Quid est hoc: *non secundum*

234–237 Rom. 9, 32–33 240 Rom. 13, 10 240–242 Rom. 5, 5 243–244 Rom. 10, 1 246–247 Rom. 10, 1 247–250 Rom. 10, 2–3

233–236 quid... offensionis] *om.* V¹ 234 ipse] *om.* S² a.c. | Quia] qui *am* | tamquam] quam S 235 Quasi] quia V²⁻⁷ *am* maur | Quasi... quasi] hoc est quasi ipsi N 236 Sion] syon N V⁴⁻⁷ flor² *am* | petram] petra S² 237 eum] eo V² | crediderit²] credide* V² a.c. 238 suam iustitiam] *inu.* V⁷ | quamvis sit] quam iussit V⁵ a.c. 239 lex] sit *praem.* V¹ a.c. | implebit] impleuit S V¹ 240 enim] est *add.* maur | legis plenitudo] *inu.* V⁷, plenitudo est legis *am* | ista caritas] *inu.* V⁷ 243 uoluntas quidem] *inu.* V⁴ 244 deprecatio] fit *add.* V² p.c. | Deum] dominum V¹⁻³ *am* | ipsis] fit *add.* N, illis V⁷ *am* maur 245 pro] rogat *praem.* V² p.c. | auersis] aduersis V¹ a.c.⁷ 246 conuersio] est *add.* V⁶ | Dei] fit *add.* N | Deum] fit *add.* V² p.c. | illis] fit *add.* N, ipsis V^{2.6} | in] ad maur 247 enim] *om.* S² a.c. V³ | perhibeo] illis *add.* V² p.c. | Sic] sicut V¹ 247–248 Sic... habebat¹] *om.* V² 248 Dei] *om.* V⁴ | habebat¹] habet V¹ a.c., et ipse zelum dei habebat ipse *add.* V⁴, et ipse zelum dei habebat *add.* V⁷ 248–249 Sed... habebat] *om.* flor² 248 ipse²] *om.* V⁴ a.c. 5 a.c. | ipse habebat] *inu.* V⁷, *om.* *am* | habebat²] dicat N 248–249 Quomodo habebat] *om.* N V¹ 249 habebat] illi habebant V^{2.6} *maur*, habebatur V³ a.c. | hoc] *om.* V² p.c., ergo V⁷ | non²] *om.* S

250 *scientiam? Ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere.*
Vnde iste correctus: *non habens meam iustitiam.* Illi suam uolunt
constituere, adhuc eos delectat in stercore iacere. Ego non habeo meam
iustitiam, *sed eam quae est per fidem Christi, iustitiam ex Deo: iustitiam,*
inquam, ex Deo, qui iustificat impium.

255 **11.** Tolle te, tolle, inquam, te a te; nisi enim tuleris te a te, impedis te: si
tu te aedificas, ruinam aedificas. *Nisi Dominus aedificauerit domum, in*
uanum laborauerunt qui aedificant eam. Noli ergo uelle habere tuam
iustitiam. Certe ex lege est, nempe ex lege est; certe Deus dedit legem et
quia iustitia ex lege est, non sit tua. Apostolus Paulus loquitur; mihi
260 amantes iustitiam suam non calumnientur. Ecce ubi illum habes: aperi,
lege, audi, uide. Tuam iustitiam noli habere: stercora illam deputat
apostolus, quamuis sit ex lege, tamen quia sua. *Ignorantes enim Dei*
iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti.
Noli putare, quia christianus uocaris, ideo te non posse offendere in

251 Phil. 3, 9 251–252 cfr Rom. 10, 3 252–254 Phil. 3, 9 254 Rom. 4, 5
256–257 Ps. 126, 1 261–262 cfr Phil. 3, 8–9 262–263 Rom. 10, 3
264–265 Rom. 9, 32

251 non] inquit *praem.* V^{1-3} am maur | meam] ait *praem.* N, inquit *praem.*
 $V^{5.6}$ | iustitiam] iustitia S^2 | Illi] illis V^3 a.c. | suam uolunt] inu. V^4 am maur
252 adhuc...iacere] om. *flor*² | iacere] iacens am 253 iustitiam¹] quae ex lege
est add. N | per] ex *flor*² a.c. | iustitiam²] iustitia S 254 inquam] inquit
N | qui] quae S^2 255 inquam te] inquit V^2 p.c., inu. V^6 | te²] in *praem.*
 V^1 | a te¹] om. $V^{2.4}$ | nisi...te⁵] om. S V *flor*² am maur 256 tu] om. S^2
a.c. | te] non leg. V^2 a.c. | aedificauerit] aedificaberit S^2 a.c. 256–257 in
uanum] inuanunt V^3 a.c. 257 laborauerunt] laborant V^2 257–258 tuam iustitiam]
inu. am maur 258–262 Certe...sua] om. *flor*² 258 lege¹] le *flor*⁵
a.c. | nempe...est²] om. *flor*⁵ | Deus] dominus V^7 259–260 mihi amantes]
mitantes V^2 , imitantes V^3 a.c., minantes am 260 amantes] autem V^1
260–261 Ecce...uide] om. *flor*⁵ 260 illum] illam V^2 p.c. 261 audi uide] inu.
 $V^{2.3}$ | stercora] estercora V^1 | illam] illa S $V^{1.6}$ 261–262 deputat apostolus]
inu. V^4 262 quamuis sit] quam iussit V^5 | tamen...sua] et inueniar inquit in
illo non habens meam iustitiam quae ex lege est quamuis ex lege *praem.* V^3 p.c.,
non leg. V^5 a.c., et inueniar inquit in illo non habens meam iustitiam quae ex lege
est quamuis sit ex lege V^5 p.c. 262–276 tamen...sequatur] om. *flor*⁵ 262 sua]
suam am maur 263 iustitiam] iustiam *flor*² 264 putare] putarr V^1

265 *lapidem offensionis. Cuius gratiae derogas, in ipsum offendis. Minus est offendere Christum pendentem quam in caelo sedentem. Iustitia sit, sed ex gratia sit, a Deo tibi sit, tua non sit. Sacerdotes tui, inquit, induantur iustitiam. Vestis accipitur, non cum capillis nascitur: pecora de suo uestiuntur. Hanc praedicat apostolus Paulus: a Deo tibi sit. Geme ut*
 270 *impetres, plora ut impetres, crede ut impetres. Qui inuocauerit nomen Domini, saluus erit. An putatis sic dictum esse: Qui inuocauerit nomen Domini, saluus erit, quasi a febre aut a peste aut a podagra aut aliquo corporis dolore? Non sic, sed saluus erit: iustus erit. Quia non est opus*
 275 *sanis medicus, sed male habentibus. Exposuit cum dixit: Non ueni uocare iustos, sed peccatores.*

12. Videte ergo quid sequatur: *et inueniar*, inquit, *in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est* – quamuis ex lege, tamen meam – *sed eam quae est per fidem Christi* – quae impetrat a Deo – *quae est ex Deo, iustitia in fide, ad agnoscendum eum et uirtutem resurrectionis eius.*
 280 Aliquid magnum est agnoscere uirtutem resurrectionis Christi. Hoc putatis esse magnum quia carnem suam resuscitauit? Ipsam dixit uirtutem

267–268 Ps. 131, 16 **270–273** Ioel 2, 32 **273–275** Matth. 9, 12–13
276–279 Phil. 3, 9–10

265 gratiae derogas] gratiam denegas V⁵ flor² **266** offendere Christum] inu. V^{4.7} | Christum] in praem. V⁵ flor² | pendentem] patientem V², in cruce praem. am maur **267** tua non] inu. V⁴ am maur **268** iustitiam] iustitia S V² am | non] nam V¹ **268–269** pecora... uestiuntur] om. flor² **269** Paulus] om. V¹ | ut] om. V² a.c. **270** Qui] inquit add. V⁶ maur **270–272** Qui... peste] V⁵ in ras. **271** erit] eris N **271–272** An... erit] om. flor² **271** sic] si V² a.c., ita V⁵ in ras. **272** quasi] quia maur | febre] fabre V³ a.c. | podagra] podegra flor² a.c. | aliquo] ab praem. N V⁵ p.c. **273** corporis dolore] inu. am maur | sic] si* V¹ a.c. | iustus] hoc est praem. N, intus flor² **273–274** opus sanis] inu. V⁴ **274** Exposuit] hoc dominus add. N, hoc add. V⁶ | ueni] ueui maur **275** peccatores] fin. flor² **276** Videte] uide N | quid] quod V⁵ | sequatur] sequitur V am maur | inueniar] inuenia S¹ a.c., inueniat V³ a.c. **277** iustitiam] iustiam V¹ **278** impetrat] impetratur V^{2.6} maur | est... Deo²] ex deo est V⁴ | ex Deo] om. V¹ a.c. **279** iustitia] iustitiam am maur | ad] om. flor⁵ a.c. | agnoscendum] ignoscendum S², cognoscendum V am maur | eum] illum flor⁵ **279–280** eius... Christi] christi hoc putatis aliquid magnum est agnoscere uirtutum resurrectionis Christi V³ a.c. **281** quia] quae V¹, qui V³ a.c., quid V⁴

resurrectionis eius? Nonne erit etiam nostra in fine saeculi resurrectio? Nonne et nostrum corruptibile hoc induetur incorruptionem et mortale hoc induetur immortalitatem? Nonne quomodo ipse *resurrexit a mortuis* 285 *et iam non moritur et mors ei ultra non dominabitur*, sic et nos – mirabilius, ut ita dicam? Nam illius caro non uidit corruptionem, nostra de cinere reparatur. Magnum est quidem quia praecessit in exemplo et dedit nobis quid speraremus. Sed non hoc est solum: ille qui de iustitia loquebatur non sua, sed illa quae ex Deo est, et ibi nominauit uirtutem 290 resurrectionis Christi: agnosce ibi iustificationem tuam. Ex illius enim resurrectione iustificamur, tamquam a petra circumcidimur. Propterea inde coepit: *Nos sumus circumcisio*. Vnde circumcisio? A petra. Qua petra? Christo. Quomodo? Octauo die: quomodo resurrexit dominico die.

295 13. Hanc ergo, fratres mei, iustificationem et habeamus in quantum habemus, et augeamus in quantum minores sumus, et perficiamus cum illuc uenerimus ubi dicitur: *Vbi est, mors, uictoria tua? Vbi est, mors,*

283–284 cfr I Cor. 15, 53 284–285 Rom. 6, 9 288–290 cfr Phil. 3, 9–10
290–294 cfr huius sermonis paragraphum tertium 292 Phil. 3, 3 297–298 I Cor. 15, 55

282 nostra] nostram *S*², nam *V*^{1.3} a.c. | resurrectio] est *add.* *V*² a.c.
283 corruptibile] corruptibile *S*¹ a.c. | corruptibile hoc] *inu.* *V*^{4.7} | induetur] induet *V*^{2.6} *am maur* | incorruptionem] incorruptione *N*
283–284 incorruptionem... induetur] *om.* *V*¹ a.c. *flor*⁵ 284 induetur] induet *V*^{2.6} *am maur* | immortalitatem] immortalitate *N* 285 dominabitur] dominatur *V*³ a.c. 286 non uidit] inuidit *V*¹ a.c. | corruptionem] non *praem.* *V*¹ a.c. | nostra] nam *V*¹ a.c. 286–287 nostra...reparatur] *om.* *V*² 287 reparatur] reparabitur *N* | exemplo] exemplum *V*¹ a.c. 288 speraremus] sperarems *S*¹ a.c. | ille] enim *add.* *N*, illi *V*^{5.7} *flor*⁵ *maur*, in illo *V*², uel in illo *V*⁶ *sup. l.* | iustitia] eius *praem.* *V*⁶ 289 ex] de *V*⁷ | et] etiam *N* | ibi] tibi *S*, uel ubi *V*⁶ *sup. l.* 290 agnosce] dicens ad agnoscendum eum et uirtutem resurrectionis eius agnosce ergo et tu *N* 291 circumcidimur] circumcidamur *V*^{1.2.3} p.c. 4–6 *flor*⁵ *am maur*, circum*cidamus *V*³ a.c. 292 coepit] apostolus cum dixit *add.* *N* | sumus] inquit *add.* *V*⁵ | Qua] quia *V*² 293 Christo] christus *V*² a.c. | Quomodo] quando *N* | resurrexit] enim *add.* *N*, dominus *add.* *V*^{4.7} *maur* 295 iustificationem] instificationem *am* 296 et²] ut *N* | perficiamus] perficiamur *N*, proficiamus *V*³ a.c. 297 illuc] illic *V*⁶ | dicitur] dicitur *V*^{1.3} a.c. *am* | Vbi¹... tua] *om.* *V*³ a.c. | uictoria] *toria *V*² a.c. | tua] tu* *V*¹

285 *aculeus tuus?* Sed totum ex Deo: non tamen quasi dormientes, non quasi
 ut non conemur, non quasi ut non uelimus. Sine uoluntate tua non erit in
 300 te iustitia Dei. Voluntas quidem non est nisi tua, iustitia non est nisi Dei.
 Esse potest iustitia Dei sine uoluntate tua, sed in te esse non potest praeter
 uoluntatem tuam. Demonstratum est quid agere debeas; iussit lex: 'Non
 290 facias illud, non illud; fac hoc atque illud.' Demonstratum est tibi, iussum
 est tibi, apertum est tibi. Est cor: intellexisti quid facias; roga ut facias, si
 305 cognoscis uirtutem resurrectionis Christi. *Traditus est enim propter
 delicta nostra et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram.* Quid est
propter iustificationem nostram? Vt iustificet nos, ut iustos faciat nos.
 Eris opus Dei, non solum quia homo es, sed etiam quia iustus es. Melius
 est enim iustum esse quam hominem esse. Si hominem te fecit Deus et
 310 iustum tu te facis, melius aliquid facis quam fecit Deus. Sed sine te fecit
 te Deus. Non enim adhibuisti aliquem consensum, ut te faceret Deus.
 Quomodo consentiebas qui non eras? Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te
 iustificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, iustificat uolentem. Tamen ipse
 iustificat; ne sit iustitia tua, ne redeas ad damna, ad detrimenta et stercora:
 315 inuenire in illo non habens iustitiam tuam, *quae ex lege est, sed iustitiam*

305 cfr Phil. 3, 10 305–307 Rom. 4, 25 314–315 cfr Phil. 3, 7–8 315–317
 Phil. 3, 9–10

298 *aculeus*] *stimulus* V² | *totum*] *hoc add.* N 298–302 non¹...*debeas*] *om.*
*flor*⁵ 299 non¹] *om.* V⁶ a.c. 300 *iustitia*²] *est add.* V¹ a.c. 301 *Dei*] *om.* V¹
 a.c. | *tua*] V⁶ e corr. | *in...esse*] *inter se* S¹ | *praeter*] *propter* V¹ a.c., nisi per
am 302 *tuam*] *dei* V⁷ | *iussit*] *non sit* N S (*fortasse ex archetypo*) 303 *facias*]
*facia** S² a.c. | *Demonstratum*] *demonstratum* V¹ | *iussum*] *reuelatum est tibi*
praem. N 303–304 *iussum...tibi*¹] *om.* S 303–304 *iussum...cor*] *om.* *flor*⁵
 304 *apertum...tibi*²] *om.* S¹ a.c. | *est*²] *om.* V^{2.5} | *tibi*²] *om.* V^{4.7} | *Est*] *om.* N
 V³ p.c.⁶ *am*, si tibi *praem.* V^{4.7} *maur* | si] sic S V⁶ 305 *cognoscis*] *intellexisti*
 V^{4.7} | *enim*] *om.* V⁴ 306–307 *Quid...nostram*] *om.* V^{1.2.3} a.c. *am* 307 *ut*] *et*
 V^{4.7} *am* | *iustos*] *iustus* S² | *faciat*] *faciet* V³ a.c. 308 *quia*²] *qui* V³
 a.c. | *quia*²...*es*²] V² e corr. | *Melius*] *melior* S V^{1.2} a.c.³ 309 *est*] *om.* V²
 a.c. | *enim*] *om.* V⁴ | *quam*] *te add.* *maur* | *hominem*¹] *tantum add.* V²
 p.c. | Si] sed S² 310 *tu*] *om.* V⁶ 311 *te*¹] *om.* V^{1.2} a.c.³ a.c. *am* (*deus te pro te*
deus V² p.c.) | *adhibuisti*] *habuisti* V¹ | *consensum*] *consensu* S², *sensum* V⁵
a.c. *flor*⁵ | *te faceret*] *inu.* V⁴ 312 *Quomodo...eras*] *om.* *flor*⁵ | *Qui*] *quia am*
 314 *ne*²...*stercora*] *om.* *flor*⁵ | *et*] *ad* V⁴ 315 *tuam*] *om.* S

per fidem Christi, quæ est ex Deo, iustitia ex fide, ad agnoscendum eum et uirtutem resurrectionis eius et communicationem passionum eius. Et ipsa uirtus tua erit: communicatio passionum Christi uirtus tua erit.

14. Quid autem erit in communicationibus passionum Christi, si caritas
 320 non erit? Nonne inueniuntur torti latrones in tanta fortitudine corporum, ut quidam eorum non solum conscios prodere noluerint, sed nec omnia sua confiteri dignati sint? Inter cruciatus, inter tormenta, effossis lateribus et paene perditis membris, manserit animus in obstinatione nequissima? Vide ergo quid amabant. Facere tamen ista sine magno amore non
 325 poterant. Sed non sic amator Dei: Deus non amatur nisi de Deo. Amauit ille nescio quid aliud de carne sicut homo. Quodlibet amauit – socios suos amauerit, conscientiam scelerum amauerit, gloriam in facinoribus amauerit – quodlibet amauerit, multum amauit qui torqueri potuit, deficere non potuit. Si ergo ille non potuit tanta perferre sine amore, nec
 330 tu poteris communicare Christi passionibus sine amore.

15. Sed quaero quo amore. Non sit cupiditas, sed sit caritas. Si enim, inquit, *tradidero corpus meum, ut ardeam et caritatem non habeam, nihil mihi prodest*. Vt prosit tibi communicatio passionum Christi, caritas adsit.

319–320 cfr Phil. 3, 10 330 cfr Phil. 3, 10 331–333 I Cor. 13, 3 333 cfr Phil. 3, 10

316 est] *om. S¹ flor⁵ a.c.* | iustitia] iustitiam V^{2.7} *am maur* | agnoscendum] cognoscendum V *am maur* 317 communicationem] societatem flor⁵ | passionum] passionis S² 321 noluerint] uoluerint V^{4.7} | omnia] nomina V³ p.c. ⁵ flor⁵ *maur* 322 sint] sunt S V^{1.3} a.c. *am* | Inter] et *praem.* N, sed *praem.* V⁷ p.c. | cruciatus] cruciatos V¹ p.c. ³ a.c. | effossis] et fossis N 323 membris] me*bris V³ a.c. | manserit] et *praem.* V² 324 Vide ergo] uidero N | ergo] rogo S 325 amator] amatur N V², amor V¹ a.c. ³ p.c., amore V³ a.c., uel amatur V⁶ sup. l. | Dei] deus N V², uel deus V⁶ sup. l. 326 Quodlibet] qui *praem. am* | amauit] amabit V¹ p.c., amauerit V^{2.6} *am maur* 326–328 socios... amauerit²] *om. V²* 327 conscientiam... amauerit²] *om. V⁵ a.c. flor⁵, post gloriam in facinoribus amauerit V⁵ p.c.* 328 quodlibet amauerit] *om. N* 328–329 qui... potuit²] *iterat V^{1.3.5} p.c. am maur* (illa post ille bis add. V¹ a.c.) 329 nec] ne V⁵ 329–330 nec... amore] *iterat V² a.c.* 331 sit²] *om. V⁵ a.c. flor⁵* 332 inquit] *om. V⁴* | caritatem] caritatem V¹ a.c. | habeam] habuero V⁴ 333 prodest] prodst S¹ a.c. | caritas adsit] *inu. V^{2.3}*

Vnde tibi caritas? O mendicissima infirmitas, unde tibi caritas Dei? Vis
 335 ostendo tibi unde sit tibi? Ipsum interroga horrearium dominicum. Si
 enim in te fuerit caritas Dei, communicabis Christi passionibus et uerus
 eris martyr. In quo caritas coronatur, ipse erit uerus martyr. Vnde ergo
 tibi? *Habemus thesaurum istum in uasis fictilibus*, ait ipse apostolus, *ut*
 340 *eminetia uirtutis sit Dei et non in nobis*. Ergo unde tibi caritas, nisi quia
diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis?
 Ecce ad quod geme. Contemne spiritum tuum, accipe Spiritum Dei. Non
 timeat spiritus tuus ne cum in te coeperit habitare Spiritus Dei, angustias
 patiatur in corpore tuo. Cum habitare in corpore tuo coeperit Spiritus Dei,
 non inde excludet spiritum tuum: noli timere. Si diuitem aliquem hospitio
 345 suscipias, pateris angustias; ubi maneat tu non inuenis, ubi illi lectus
 paretur, ubi coniunx, ubi filii, ubi familia. 'Quid ago?', inquis. 'Quo eo?
 Quo migrabo?' Suscipe diuitem Spiritum Dei: dilataberis, non
 angustaberis. *Dilatasti gressus meos subter me*. Dic, dic, hospiti tuo

336 cfr Phil. 3, 10 338–339 II Cor. 4, 7 340 Rom. 5, 5 348–349 Ps. 17, 37

334 O mendicissima] omnes ditissima V¹ | mendicissima] mendacissima
 S² | Dei] om. V⁶ a.c. 335 ostendo] ostendam S² | horrearium] horreorum V¹
 a.c., horreareum V⁴ 336 Christi passionibus] inu. V^{4.6} 337 eris martyr] non leg.
 V² | eris...uerus] om. V⁵ a.c. | martyr¹] om. V¹ am, om. V³ a.c. 338 tibi] om.
 V⁴ | thesaurum] thesaurium V¹ a.c. 339 uirtutis] uirtus V¹ p.c. | uirtutis sit]
 inu. V⁴ | sit] om. S² a.c., sits V¹ a.c. | sit Dei] inu. V^{6.7} am | in] ex N V⁷ flor⁵
 am maur | Ergo] inc. flor¹ (Rom. 5, 5; inscriptio: ex sermone de uerbis
 euangelii XII [sic]) 341 accipe] et praem. V⁶ 341–356 Non...nos] om. flor⁵
 342 timeat] te praem. N S V^{1.3.4.7} a.c. am (ex archetypo) | in...coeperit] coeperit
 in te am maur | te] toe V¹ a.c. 342–343 angustias...coeperit] om. S¹ a.c.
 343 in²...coeperit] ceperit in corpore tuo V⁷ | in²...Dei] ceperit spiritus dei in
 corpore tuo V⁴ | Spiritus Dei] om. S¹ 344 excludet] excludit S V⁵ a.c. 7
 flor¹ | noli nolite V² | noli timere] ante non N | diuitem] d praem. V³
 a.c. | hospitio] aspicio V³ a.c. 344–345 hospitio suscipias] V⁶ e corr.
 345 suscipias] suscipies V¹ 345–347 ubi...migrabo] om. flor¹ 345 illi] illic V²
 p.c., ille V³ a.c. 5 a.c. 346 ubi filii] om. V⁵ a.c. | familia] recipiantur add.
 N | ago] ergo am 348 angustaberis] angustaberis S² V¹ a.c. 4.7 | meos] tuos
 maur | subter] subter V^{1.3.6.7} am | Dic dic] dic dices S, dicis V^{2.3} p.c. maur, dic
 dicis V³ a.c. 4.7 am, dic V⁶ 348–349 Dic...me] om. V¹ 348 hospiti] hospitio
 S² | hospiti tuo] om. V^{4.7}

dicturus es: *'Dilatasti gressus meos subter me. Quando non hic eras,*
 350 *angustias patiebar; implesti cellam meam et non me exclusisti, sed*
angustiam meam.' Cum enim dicit: *caritas Dei diffusa est, ipsa diffusio*
latitudinem significat. Non ergo timeas angustias, recipe hospitem istum
et non sit hospes quasi de transeuntibus. Non enim debet dare
 355 *discedendo: ueniens habitet in te et dedit. Ipsius esto, non te deserat, non*
inde migret; tene illum omnino et dic illi: Domine Deus noster, posside
nos.

16. Ergo ad hoc, inquit, habeam iustitiam quae ex Deo est: *ad*
agnoscendum eum et uirtutem resurrectionis eius et communionem
passionum eius, conformatus morti ipsius. – Consepulti enim sumus,
 360 *inquit, Christo per baptismum in mortem, ut quemadmodum Christus*
resurrexit a mortuis, sic et nos in nouitate uitae ambulemus. Morere, ut
uiuas; sepelire, ut resurgas. Cum enim sepultus fueris et resurrexeris, tunc
uerum erit 'Sursum cor'. Sapuit quod dixi. Numquid iste saperet sermo,
nisi esset in uobis interna dulcedo? Conformatus, inquit, morti ipsius, si

351 Rom. 5, 5 355–356 Is. 26, 13 secundum LXX 357–359 Phil. 3, 10
 359–361 Rom. 6, 4 364–365 Phil. 3, 10–11

349 dicturus es] *om. am* | subter] *subtus V^{2.6.7}* | non hic] *inu. S² V^{2.6}*
 350 me] *mea V⁵* 351 dicit] *dicis V¹ a.c.* 352 recipe] *o add. V¹* | istum] *iustum*
flor¹ a.c. 353 hospes] *iste add. N* | debet] *habet V^{4.7} flor¹ am maur* | dare] *se*
praem. V² p.c. 354 ueniens] *uenienti N S (ex archetypo)* | dedit] *debet V¹⁻³ am*
 355 omnino] *animo V⁷* | noster] *om. am* 356 nos] *fin. flor¹* 357 habeam]
habeamus V¹⁻⁶ am maur | ex...est] *est ex deo V^{4.5.7} flor⁵* | est] *om. S V¹*
 358 agnoscendum] *cognoscendum V flor⁵ am maur* | communionem]
communio S V⁶ p.c. am, communicationis V¹⁻³, communicationem V⁵ p.c. maur,
communio V⁶ a.c., uel -catio V⁶ sup. l. 359 conformatus] *confortatus S V¹,*
conformati V³ p.c. S p.c. am maur, confortati V^{2.3} a.c., confirmatus V⁴, uel
configuratus V⁷ sup. l., configuratus flor⁵ | ipsius] *eius flor⁵* 359–360 sumus
 360 inquit] *inu. am maur* 360 inquit] *apostolus add. V² p.c.* | Christo] *cum praem.*
V^{1-3.5} p.c. am maur | mortem] *morte V^{1.2.4.7} am, mort* V³* | ut] *om. V³*
a.c. | Christus] *om. V²* 361 resurrexit] *surrexit S¹ V^{1.3-6} flor⁵ am maur*
 362 enim] *om. V^{4.7}* 363 uerum] *uere V²* | Sursum] *tuum praem. V²*
p.c. | Sapuit] *haec cor pauli propter add. V² p.c.* 363–364 Sapuit...ipsius] *om.*
flor⁵ 363 dixi] *dixit V²* | iste] *ista V³* | saperet] *uobis add. V² p.c.* | saperet
 sermo] *inu. am maur* 364 Conformatus] *confirmatus S V^{1.4}, confirmati*
V³ | morti] *morte S* | si] *sic V¹*

- 365 *quo modo occurram in resurrectione mortuorum*. De iustitia loquebatur, iustitia quae est ex fide Christi, iustitia quae a Deo est, et sic cuncta exsecutus est. Et cum iustitiam quaereret dicens: *ut inueniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est, sed iustitiam quae est ex fide Christi, quae est ex Deo*, dicit modo: *si quo modo occurram in resurrectione mortuorum*. Quare dixisti: *si quo modo occurram? Non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim: sequor autem si apprehendam, in quo et apprehensus sum a Christo Iesu*. Praeuenit me iustitia ipsius, sequatur illum mea. Tunc autem sequetur mea, si non sit mea. *Si quo modo occurram. Non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim*. Coeperunt mirari qui hoc audiebant dicentem apostolum: *Non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim*. Quid est quod nondum acceperat? Fidem habebat, uirtutem habebat, spem habebat, caritate flagrabat, uirtutes operabatur, inuictissime praedicabat, omnes persecutiones tolerabat, in omnibus patiens, amans ecclesiam, sollicitudinem omnium ecclesiarum corde gestans: quid nondum acceperat? *Non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim*. Quid est quod dicis? Dicis et miramur; dicis et stupemus. Nouimus enim quae audiamus: quid dicis? *Fratres*, ait. Quid est quod dicis? Quid dicis? *Ego me non arbitror apprehendisse*.

367–369 Phil. 3, 9 369–381 Phil. 3, 11–12 382–386 Phil. 3, 13

365 occurram] occurrat V² a.c., occurramus V² p.c. flor⁵ a.c. | in] ad flor⁵ | resurrectione] resurrectionem N V⁵ flor⁵ am maur | mortuorum] quae est ex mortuis flor⁵ 365–370 De... mortuorum] om. V¹ 366 est¹... fide] ex fide est V⁴ | a] ex V³ 367 exsecutus] exsecutus flor⁵ | Et] om. S² a.c. 368 quae¹... iustitiam²] om. S¹ a.c. | est²... fide] ex fide est V⁴ 369 quo modo] quomo V³ a.c. 370 resurrectione] resurrectionem N V^{3.5} am maur | si] sic V¹ | quo modo] quomo flor⁵ a.c. 371 quia] quod flor⁵ | si] quo modo add. V^{2.6} maur 372 apprehendam] comprehendam flor⁵ | apprehensus] comprehensus flor⁵ 373 sequetur] illum praem. N, sequatur S¹ V flor⁵ am 374 Non] nisi am 375–376 Coeperunt... sim] om. V⁴, iterat flor⁵ a.c. 375 mirari] om. S¹ a.c. 376 acceperim] ceperim am | iam²] om. am 377 spem habebat] om. V³ a.c. | caritate] caritatem V¹ 379 sollicitudinem] sollicitudine S 380 corde] om. am | quid] quod V⁵ a.c. | nondum] non S² a.c. 382 stupemus] tupemus V² a.c. | quae] quem V^{3.5} flor⁵, quid am maur | audiamus] audimus V² 383 Quid¹... dicis²] om. flor⁵ | quod] quid S¹ V¹ | quod dicis] om. V^{5.6} | Quid dicis] om. N V², om. V³ a.c. | apprehendisse] comprehendisse flor⁵

385 Nolite, inquit, in me falli: plus me ipse noui quam uos. Si nescio quid
 mihi desit, nescio quid adsit. *Ego me ipsum non arbitror apprehendisse.*
Vnum autem. Hoc me non arbitror apprehendisse: *unum.* Multa habeo et
 unum nondum apprehendi. *Vnam petii a Domino, hanc requiram.* Quid
 petisti, quid requiris? *Vt inhabitem in domo Domini per omnes dies uitae*
 390 *meae.* Vtquid? *Et contempler delectationem Domini.* Ipsum est unum
 quod dicebat nondum apprehendisse apostolus, et quantum illi deerat, in
 tantum perfectus nondum erat.
 17. Meministis, fratres mei, euangelicae illius lectionis ubi duae sorores
 Dominum susceperunt: Martha et Maria. Certe recolitis: Martha in multo
 ministerio conuersabatur et occupata erat circa curam domus, quippe
 395 Dominum hospitio receperat et discipulos eius. Satagebat omni cura
 religiosissima, ne sancti apud eam ullam paterentur iniuriam. Cum ergo
 esset occupata circa multum ministerium, Maria soror eius sedebat ad
 pedes Domini et uerbum eius audiebat. Illa in labore stomachabunda
 quod illam uideret sedentem et de suis laboribus nihil curantem,
 400 interpellauit Dominum: 'Placet', inquit, 'tibi, Domine, quod soror mea
 deseruit me et ecce tantum in ministerio laboro?' Et Dominus: '*Martha,*
Martha, circa multum es occupata; porro unum est necessarium. Maria

387–389 Ps. 26, 4 392–393 cfr Luc. 10, 38–42 400–401 cfr Luc. 10, 40
 401–409 Luc. 10, 41–42

384 Si] *om. N* | Si nescio] sine scio *V⁵ a.c.*, scio *V⁷ p.c. flor⁵* 385 nescio...adsit]
om. S¹ a.c. | quid] quia *S¹ p.c. 2* | adsit] sit *S¹ p.c. 2*, absit *V²* | apprehendisse]
 comprahendisse *S¹ a.c.* 386 Vnum...apprehendisse] *om. V¹* | me non] *inu.*
am maur | unum] *om. V¹⁻³ am maur* 387 nondum] non *flor⁵ a.c.* 388 quid] aut
praem. maur | domo] domum *V⁴* | per] prae *S* 389 Et] ut *V flor⁵ am maur*
 390 quod] se *add. V³ p.c. 5 flor⁵ maur* | dicebat] se *add. V² p.c.* | nondum] se
add. N S² V⁷ | apprehendisse] apprehendisse *am* 391 perfectus nondum]
 perfectumondum *S¹ a.c.*, *inu. am maur* 392–415 Meministis...contemplabor]
om. flor⁵ 393 Martha²...multo] in multo martha *V¹ a.c.* 394 domus] domum
V^{2,3} a.c. (ut uid.), domi *am* | quippe] quia *add. N* 395 receperat] coeperat *V³ a.c.*
 397 circa] *om. S²* 398 uerbum...audiebat] audiebat uerbum eius *S²* | audiebat]
om. S¹ | Illa in] illam *V³ a.c.* 399 sedentem] sede* *V³ a.c.* 400 tibi] *om. V^{4,7}*
 401 et] *om. S²* | ecce] ego *add. V² p.c.* | tantum] ego *add. N* | in] *om. V³*
a.c. | ministerio] misterio *V³ a.c.*, ministerium *V³ p.c.* 402 circa] *om. V²*

363 *meliozem partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea.* Tu bonam, sed ista
 meliozem. Tu bonam – bonum est enim conuersari in obsequio sanctorum
 405 – sed ista meliozem. Denique quod tu elegisti, transit. Ministras
 esurientibus, ministras sitientibus, ministras lectulos dormituri, praebes
 domum habitare uolentibus: omnia ista transeunt. Erit tempus ubi nemo
 esuriat, nemo sitiatur, nemo dormiat. Ergo cura tua auferetur a te. *Maria*
meliozem partem elegit, quae non auferetur ab ea. Non auferetur:
 410 contemplari elegit, Verbo uiuere elegit. Qualis erit uita de Verbo sine
 uerbo? Modo ista uiuebat de Verbo, sed sonante uerbo. Erit uita de
 Verbo, nullo sonante uerbo. Ipsum Verbum uita est. *Similes ei erimus,*
quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est. Ipsa erat una ut contemplaretur
 delectationem Domini. Hoc in saeculi huius nocte non possumus. *Mane*
 415 *astabo tibi et contemplabor.* Ergo: ego, inquit, me non arbitror
 apprehendisse. Vnum autem.
 18. Quid ergo facio? *Quae retro oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extentus,*
secundum intentionem sequor – adhuc sequor – *ad palmam supernae*
uocationis Dei in Christo Iesu. Adhuc sequor, adhuc proficio, adhuc
 420 ambulo, adhuc in uia sum, adhuc me extendo: nondum perueni. Ergo si et
 tu ambulas, si te extendis, si ea quae uentura sunt cogitas, obliuiscere

412–413 I Ioh. 3, 2 413–414 cfr Ps. 26, 4 414–415 Ps. 5, 5 415–419 Phil.
 3, 13–14

403 Tu bonam] tubanam V¹ a.c. | bonam] bona S 404 meliozem] meli*rem V³
 a.c. | Tu bonam] om. V^{4,7} 405 tu] om. am 406 ministras¹] minis V³ a.c.
 408 esuriat] esurit am 409 partem elegit] inu. am maur 409–410 quae...
 elegit¹] om. V¹ 409 ab ea] om. V³ a.c. 410 contemplari] contemplare S V^{2,3}
 a.c. | uiuere] uitae V¹ 410–411 uita... uerbo¹] ui* *** *bo S¹ a.c. 411 Modo...
 uerbo²] ante ipsum uerbum uita est N | uiuebat] ui*bat S¹ a.c. | sonante]
 sonate S² a.c. | uita] unam S² 412 sonante] sanante V¹ 412–413 Similes... est]
 post delectationem domini V⁴ 413 erat] erit am | contemplaretur]
 contempletur am 415 contemplabor] te add. N 417 facio] faciam V⁴
 417–418 Quae... sequor¹] quae quidem retro sunt obliuiscens ad ea uero quae
 sunt in priora extendens me ad destinatum persequor flor⁵ 417 oblitus] ea quae
 retro sunt oblitus add. N 418 intentionem] intentione V¹ 418–419 adhuc...
 sequor] om. V² 418 palmam] brauium flor⁵ 420 uia] ua S¹ a.c. | si et] inu. V⁶
 420–421 si... tu] et tu si N 421 obliuiscere] obliuiscera S¹ a.c.

praeterita, noli in ea respicere, ne ibi remaneas ubi respexeris. *Mementote uxoris Loth.* – *Quotquot ergo perfecti, hoc sapiamus.* Dixerat: ‘Non sum perfectus’, et dicit: *Quotquot perfecti, hoc sapiamus; ego me non arbitror apprehendisse.* Non quia iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim, et dicit: *Quotquot perfecti, hoc sapiamus.* Perfecti et non perfecti: perfecti uiatores, nondum perfecti possessores. Et ut noueris perfectos uiatores dicat – qui iam in uia ambulant, perfecti uiatores sunt – ut scias uiatores eum dixisse, non habitatores, non possessores, audi quod sequitur:

425 *Quotquot ergo perfecti, hoc sapiamus. Et si quid aliter sapitis* – ne forte subrepat uobis quia uos aliquid estis. *Qui autem se ipsum putat esse aliquid, cum nihil sit, se ipsum seducit et qui se putat aliquid scire, necdum scit quemadmodum oportet scire* – ergo: *Et si quid aliter sapitis, quasi paruuli, id quoque uobis Deus reuelabit. Verumtamen in quod*

430 *peruenimus, in eo ambulemus.* Vt reuelet nobis Deus et quod aliter sapimus, in quo peruenimus, non in eo remaneamus, sed in eo ambulemus. Videtis quia uiatores sumus. Dicitis: ‘Quid est ambulare?’

422–423 Luc. 17, 32 (cfr Gen. 19, 26) 423–424 Phil. 3, 15 424–425 Phil. 3, 12–13 426–435 Phil. 3, 15–16 431–432 Gal. 6, 3 432–433 I Cor. 8, 2

422 Mementote] inquit dominus *add.* V² p.c., memento V⁷ 423 Loth] lot N *maur*, lo* S¹ | Quotquot] quodquod V¹, quicumque *flor*⁵ | ergo] *om.* V⁶ | perfecti] ait *add.* N | sapiamus] sentimus *flor*⁵ a.c., sentiamus *flor*⁵ p.c. 424 Quotquot] quodquod V¹ | ego] ergo V² a.c. | me] *om.* am | non] nisi am 425 iam²] *om.* V⁴ 426 Quotquot] quodquod V¹ | non] nondum S² 427 noueris] noueritis am *maur*, quod *add.* am *maur* 428 dicat] dici V^{3.5.7} *flor*⁵ | qui] adqui S¹ a.c., quia V¹ a.c. *flor*⁵ | ambulant] ambulat N V² a.c. 428–429 uiatores eum] *inu.* V⁶ 430 Quotquot] quodquod V¹, autem *add.* V⁴ | sapitis] et hoc uobis deus reuelabit *add.* *flor*⁵ 431 subrepat] subripit S¹, subripiat S², subrepiat V^{1.3.4.5} a.c. *flor*⁵ 433 necdum] nondum am | oportet] oporteat am | scire] eum *praem.* V⁷ | aliter] aliquid am 434 paruuli] paruulis am | uobis Deus] *inu.* V⁵ *flor*⁵ | reuelabit] reuelauit N S¹ a.c. V^{2.4.6} | in quod] ad quod V³ in marg. (*uaria lectio*) *flor*⁵ | quod] quo V am *maur* 435 in... ambulemus] ut idem sapiamus et in eadem permaneamus regula *flor*⁵ 435–437 Vt... ambulemus] *om.* N 436 in¹] et *praem.* V⁷ | in quo] meo V⁴ | quo] eo S V^{1.2} a.c. 3 a.c., illud V² p.c. | remaneamus] remanemus S² a.c. V³ a.c. 437 quia... sumus] quid est ambulare V^{4.7} | Quid est] quidem S² | est] *om.* V³ a.c.

Breuiteo dico: proficere, ne forte non intellegatis et pigrius ambuletis. Proficite, fratres mei, discutite uos semper sine dolo, sine adulatione, sine palpatione. Non enim aliquis est intus tecum cui erubescas et iactes te. Est ibi, sed cui placet humilitas: ipse te probet. Proba et te ipsum tu ipse. Semper tibi displiceat quod es, si uis peruenire ad quod nondum es. Nam ubi tibi placuisti, ibi remansisti. Si autem dixeris: 'Sufficit', et peristi. Semper adde, semper ambula, semper profice. Noli in uia remanere, noli retro redire, noli deuiare: remanet qui non proficit, retro redit qui ad ea reuoluitur unde iam abscesserat, deuiat qui apostatat. Melius uel claudus in uia quam cursor praeter uiam. Conuersi ad Dominum ...

438 intellegatis] intellatis *V¹ a.c.* | ambuletis] ambulemus *flor⁵* **439** Proficite] proficit *S² p.c.* **440** aliquis] aliquid *V¹ a.c.* **441** Est] adesto *V² p.c.* | ibi] *ibi *S² a.c.*, tibi *V² am* | te probet] inu. *S²* | Proba... te²] probate *N* | tu] et *praem. N*, te *V² a.c.* **442** displiceat] displiceas *am* | es si] esse *V¹* | quod²] id *praem. maur* **443** et] *om. V² p.c., om. V⁷* **445** qui²] quia *S²*, non *leg. V² a.c.* **446** abscesserat] accesserat *S¹ V⁴*, accerserat *V¹ a.c.*, recesserat *S² V¹ p.c. 2.3 a.c.* ⁶ | apostatat] apostatatur *N* | Melius] melior *V⁶* | uel] *om. N*, non *leg. V²*, it *maur* | claudus] claudus *V⁵ a.c. (ut uid.)* **447** uia] ambulat *add. V² p.c.* | uiam] uia *S*, fin. *flor⁵* | Conuersi... Dominum] *om. S² V² am*

AUGUSTINE ON INVOLUNTARY SIN: A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE

I. The concept of 'involuntary sin' in Augustinian scholarship

It is widely accepted that there is an apparent discrepancy between Book I and Book III of Augustine's *De libero arbitrio*, which is prominently reflected in his account of moral responsibility of evil-doings.¹ In the first book of *De libero arbitrio*, traditionally dated to 388², Augustine argues that an act is culpable only if it is voluntary.³

¹ The discordance between the first and the last book of *De libero arbitrio* is traditionally interpreted as the confrontation between early and old Augustine. See for instance, Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (A New Edition with an Epilogue)*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 2000, 146-57; James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1992, 86-87; William S. Babcock, 'Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency', *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 16 (1988): 28-55, esp. 34-41; Philip Cary, *Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul*, (New York: Oxford University Press) 2008, 36-41. However, this discrepancy thesis has been countered by recent scholarship. See for instance, Josef Lössl, 'Wege der Argumentation in Augustinus' *de libero arbitrio*', *Theologie und Philosophie* 70 (1995): 221-254. Most recently, Simon Harrison follows Goulven Madec and De Captiani to argue for the unity of this work. See id. *Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio*, (Oxford: Clarendon) 2006, 28-62. Harrison masterfully establishes the intimate textual relation in three books, especially the textual correspondence between Book I and Book III (60). The discrepancy between Book I and Book III can be thereby interpreted as an argumentative strategy rather than a gap between early and late Augustine. Nevertheless, Harrison does not pay enough attention to the qualification concerning the power of *uoluntas* in Book III, which will prove to be crucial for an appropriate understanding of *uoluntas* in Augustine's mature thought. For another recent effort to establish the unity of this work, see Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2006, 198-236.

² For the dates of *De libero arbitrio* and other earlier writings by Augustine, see G. Madec, *Introduction aux 'Révisions' et à la Lecture des Oeuvres de Saint Augustin*, Paris: Institut d'Étude Augustiniennes, 1996. It deserves notice that this traditional dating is mainly based upon the assumption that in *Retractiones* Augustine has offered a chronicle catalogue of his works. However, this method has recently been called into question by Pierre-Marie Hombert in his excellent work, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie Augustinienne* (Paris: Études augustiniennes), 2000, esp. a summary at pages 2-5. It is a pity that Hombert's superb research on Augustinian chronology did not treat his early works before the *Confessiones*. Here I follow the traditional dating merely to introduce Alflatt's influential work on the development of the concept of involuntary sin in Augustine's earlier works.

³ See for instance, *lib. arb.* (The abbreviations of Augustine's works are cited from A. D. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company) 1999,

Furthermore, the voluntary nature of sin is based on the facility of the will to abstain from evil-doing.⁴ In Book III, which is conventionally believed to be finished in 395, Augustine comes to realize the effects of Adam's Fall, claiming that

So we apply the word 'sin' not only to that which is properly (*proprie*) called sin, that is, what is committed knowingly and with free will (*libera uoluntate et sciente*), but also to all that follows as the necessary punishments (*supplicium*) of that first sin.⁵

In his influential study on the notion of involuntary sin in Augustine's moral philosophy, Malcolm E. Alflatt identifies this clarification as an explicit inclusion of involuntary acts in the definition of sin.⁶

Hereafter, Alflatt recognizes a radical change in Augustine's position concerning the moral responsibility for that which is involuntary. He believes that Augustine's earlier identification of sin with voluntary evil is maintained until the writing of *De duabus animabus* of 391/2.⁷ On the other hand, the recognition of involuntary sin can be found in *De fide et symbolo*, preached on December 3rd, 393.⁸ However, the only book written by Augustine between these two works is

xxxv-xlii) I, 1, 1. 'Vnde si dubitas, illud attende quod supra dictum est, malefacta iustitia Dei uindicari. Non enim iuste uindicarentur, nisi fierent uoluntate.' Ibid. I, 11, 21. 'nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat quam propria uoluntas et liberum arbitrium.'

⁴ *lib. arb.* I, 13, 29. 'Ex quo conficitur ut, quisquis recte honesteque uult uiuere, si id se uelle prae fugacibus bonis uelit, adsequatur tantam rem tanta facilitate, ut nihil aliud ei quam ipsum uelle sit habere quod uoluit.'

⁵ *lib. arb.* III, 19, 54. '...sic non solum peccatum illud dicimus quod proprie peccatum uocatur – libera enim uoluntate et ab sciente committitur – sed etiam illud quod iam de huius supplicio consequatur necesse est.' The English translation is quoted with slight modification from John H.S. Burleigh, *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 1953.

⁶ Malcolm E. Alflatt, 'The Development of the Idea of Involuntary Sin in St. Augustine', *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 20 (1974): 113-134, at 117. Cf. also Babcock 1988; Wetzel 1992, 96; Timothy Chappell *Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom. Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia* (New York: St. Martin's) 1995, 136-9; Cary 2008, 40-41.

⁷ In *De duabus animabus* 11, 15, Augustine offers a well-known definition of sin in terms of the will and its freedom to do otherwise. 'Voluntas retinendi uel consequendi quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere.'

⁸ *f. et symb.* 10, 23. 'Anima uero cum carnalia bona adhuc appetit, caro nominatur. Pars enim eius quaedam resistit spiritui, non natura, sed consuetudine peccatorum. Vnde dicitur, *Mente serui legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati*. Quae consuetudo in naturam uersa est secundum generationem mortalem peccato primi hominis. Ideoque scriptum est, *Et nos aliquando fuimus naturaliter filii irae*, id est uindictae, per quam factum est ut seruimus legi peccati.' Cited in Alflatt 1974, 118.

Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum, which is reasonably focused in Alflatt's article.⁹

According to Alflatt's interpretation, in the beginning of his debate with the Manichaen Fortunatus, Augustine sticks to the assertion that, 'anyone who does not sin willingly (*uoluntate*), does not sin.'¹⁰ The free decision of the will is taken as a necessary definitional component of sin.¹¹

In Alflatt's view, it is Fortunatus' appeal to a number of crucial Pauline texts, such as Rom. 7:23-25; 8:7; Gal 5: 17, which force Augustine to acknowledge the necessitating force of the sinful habit that we inherited from Adam and Eve.¹² First, Augustine stresses that the full freedom of decision only belonged to Adam. Then he claims that Adam's original free agency had perished with the first voluntary sin, 'But after he voluntarily sinned, we who have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity (*in necessitatem*).'¹³ Augustine argues that our minds could be taken captive by the habit that is initiated by our free decision. However, once the habit is formed, 'the soul is so implicated that afterwards it cannot conquer what by sinning it has fashioned for itself.'¹⁴

In his research into Augustine's reflections on moral agency, William Babcock qualifies Alflatt's dramatic account, which narrowly

⁹ For the dates of these earlier writings by Augustine, see note 2.

¹⁰ *c. Fort.* 20. '...qui non uoluntate peccat, non peccat.' The English translation is mine.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, '... si manifestum est, peccatum non esse ubi non est liberum uoluntatis arbitrium...', cited in Alflatt 1974, 127.

¹² *Cf. c. Fort.* 21, 'Nam dictum est ab Apostolo, quod *prudencia carnis inimica sit Deo: legi enim Dei non est subiecta; nec enim potest. Patet ergo his rebus, quod anima bona, factione illius quae legi Dei non est subiecta, peccare uidetur, non sua sponte. Namque idem sequitur, quod caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, et spiritus aduersus carnem; ut non quaecumque uultis, illa faciat. Dicit iterum; Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captiuum me ducentem in lege peccati et mortis. Ergo miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius, nisi gratia Dei per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo?*'

¹³ *c. Fort.* 22. 'Postquam autem ipse libera uoluntate peccauit, nos in necessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stirpe descendimus.' The English translation of this work is slightly modified from that in the series *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church* (Oxford; repr.: Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1994)

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, '... eadem ipsa sua consuetudine sic implicatur (sc. anima), ut postea uincere non possit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est.' In this public debate with Fortunatus, Augustine does not clarify how Adam's voluntary sin could be translated into the involuntary sins of his descendants. As noted earlier, this problem is addressed in the account of the Fall in Book III of *De libero arbitrio*.

locates Augustine's first recognition of involuntary sin in the debate with Fortunatus. He argues that Augustine had already noticed the penal character of sin and the difficulty of abstaining from sinful habits in Book I of *De libero arbitrio* and *De duabus animabus*.¹⁵ In *De duabus animabus* 10, 12, Augustine calls attention to the fact that the decision of the will can place an agent under compulsive conditions but cannot thereby be excused of the agent's subsequent wrongdoing.¹⁶ Babcock underscores that Augustine acknowledges the obstructive influence of carnal habits on our willing at the end of *De duabus animabus*, which led the Manichaeans to believe mistakenly in the existence of an evil soul in human beings.¹⁷ This emphasis on the role of *De duabus animabus* in the development of Augustine's idea of involuntary sin is further elaborated on in James Wetzel's book on Augustine's moral philosophy.¹⁸

The sharpest criticism of Alflatt's study comes from Robert O'Connell, who throws in question Alflatt's reading of *De libero arbitrio* III, 18, 50-19, 54 as a clear recognition of involuntary sin.¹⁹ According to O'Connell's textual analysis, in paragraph 54 as cited

¹⁵ See for instance, *lib. arb.* I, 11, 22 and *duab. an.* 13, 19. For comments on these passages, see Babcock 1988, 38.

¹⁶ In this passage, Augustine comments in details on the four cases of an agent writing disgraceful words. First, he takes into consideration an obvious case: one's hand is used during the sleep. Obviously, the sleeper will not be held guilty for this wrongdoing because he is not conscious of what he is 'doing' and is employed as an instrument. In the second case, the agent is conscious but his other members are bound and in constraint. Augustine insists that this person could be exempt from sin as well, if he is unwilling to commit the act of writing disgraceful words. It seems that in these first two cases, the agent is excused from punishment because he is either ignorant or unable to resist what he is forced to do. In the third case, the agent is asleep while the evil act takes place. However, he knew in advance that his hand would be employed for a malicious end during sleep. To prevent being awakened during the blameworthy action, he drank a lot before going to sleep. It is evident that the agent is unconscious at the crucial moment of action. Nevertheless, this unconsciousness could not prove his innocence because it results from a free decision of the will, which the agent made consciously and willingly. Likewise, in the fourth case, the agent is bound willingly (*uolens*) in chains. He is rightly judged to have sinned, although he is really unable to resist this evil act when it happens.

¹⁷ Cf. *duab. an.* 13, 19. 'Ideo contingit, ut cum ad meliora conantibus nobis consuetudo facta cum carne et peccata nostra quodam modo militare contra nos, et difficultatem nobis facere coeperint, nonnulli stulti aliud genus animarum, quod non sit ex Deo, superstitione obtusissima suspicentur.' Cited in Babcock 1988, 39.

¹⁸ Cf. Wetzel 1992, 90-98.

¹⁹ See O'Connell 1991, esp. 25-27. O'Connell argues that Alflatt was misled by John Burleigh's inaccurate English translation to believe that all actions impeded by ignorance and difficulty are of necessity and sinful. For more details, check *infra* note 66.

earlier, Augustine does not extend the definition of sin to unwilling evildoings, but rather notes that the application of the term *peccatum* to the effects of sin is an improper use and should be justified.²⁰ As O'Connell argues, Augustine justifies this improper use by appealing to our solidarity with Adam and Eve. From our original ancestors, we inherited ignorance (*ignorantia*) and difficulty (*difficultas*)²¹, not as natural but as penal conditions of this life. For we all committed sins in the persons of Adam and Eve. Ignorance and difficulty are the deserved punishments for the sin that we ourselves committed voluntarily in Adam and Eve. In this sense, the penal conditions of human life are the effects of voluntary sin not only of the first human beings, but also of ourselves. O'Connell insists that in Augustine's account of fallen agency, the sinner and the bearer-of-punishment must be the same person.²²

According to O'Connell's interpretation, we are born as mortals into these punitive conditions just as the agent in those cases of *De duabus animabus* 10, 12, who willingly accepted being unconscious or bound before doing a disgraceful thing under external compulsion.²³ There, the actions accomplished under this kind of compulsion are deemed voluntary and culpable for the complicity at the outset.²⁴ In short, these actions are '*uoluntaria in causa*'. Likewise, fallen people are rightly reproached for wrongful acts under the obstructive influence of ignorance and difficulty, because these involuntary conditions are punishments for their voluntary sin in the past when they were all in Adam.²⁵

²⁰ Ibid., 32-35.

²¹ Augustine formulated our initial state as ignorance and infirmity for the first time in the third book of *De libero arbitrio* of 395. In Augustine's terms, we are born 'with the blindness of ignorance and the tortures of difficulty.' See *lib. arb.* III, 19, 53. '...ut cum ignorantiae caecitate et difficultatis cruciatibus nasceremur...' This is not to deny that an awareness of the effects of original sin can be found in his earlier works before this date. Cf. M. Verschoren, 'The Appearance of the Concept Concupiscentia in Augustine's Early Antimanichaean Writings (388-391)', *Augustiniana* 52 (2002): 199-240. For a more recent presentation of Augustine's understanding of the Fall and its influences on his earliest works, see C. Harrison 2006, 168-197.

²² O'Connell 1991, 30.

²³ For details of this passage, see note 16.

²⁴ As William Babcock rightly comments, we can be justly held responsible for forced actions simply because the initiating decision, which renders us complicit, is under the control of our will. Babcock believes that the emphasis on the initiating will and its effects prepares the way for Augustine to recognize involuntary sins. See Babcock 1988, 38.

²⁵ Ibid., 35. O'Connell also takes this identity in Adam as a vestige of Plotinian conception of the fall of the soul. See note infra 33. Alflatt also supports the conception

It deserves notice that Alflatt himself does address this insight in his second article on 'involuntary sin', which is unjustly disregarded in O'Connell's criticism. Following Guy de Broglie's reading of *De correptione et gratia*, Alflatt also argues that the notion of our solidarity in Adam is crucial to Augustine's understanding of moral responsibility for the compulsive conditions that we suffer as a burden from birth.²⁶ Alflatt gives a close examination of involuntary sin in the baptized in Augustine's later works and comes to his conclusion, which is not far from O'Connell's reading of *De libero arbitrio* III:

Because all men were in Adam, **the will** of every individual shares in the responsibility for his first wrong choice, and thus can be held guilty for the consequences of that choice – even those consequences which occur in the individual after his own guilt has been removed in baptism, and which occur even though he has not willed them.²⁷

Both Alflatt and O'Connell are right to detect our moral responsibility for the inborn ignorance (*ignorantia*) and impotence (*difficultas*) that plunged Adam's descendents into necessity. However, according to their interpretations, Augustine's defense of moral agency seems to rely exclusively on the theological hypothesis that 'we are radically identical with Adam and Eve'.²⁸ They even implicitly assume that the first evil will of Adam and Eve is precisely our own will. We all committed a severe sin even before birth and therefore involuntarily suffer an innate powerlessness of the will as the righteous punishment.

In more recent studies, it is further argued that this point eventually paves way for Augustine's mature conception of irresistible grace.²⁹ The inborn perversity of our wills signifies the loss of freedom

of 'uoluntarium in causa' but refuses to apply it to the wrongful acts under the influence of ignorance and difficulty. See Alflatt 1974, 116.

²⁶ Cf. G. de Broglie, 'Pour une meilleure intelligence du *De Correptione et Gratia*', *Augustinus Magister* (Congrès International Augustinien, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1954), 3, 317-37, Cited in M. Alflatt, 'The Responsibility for Involuntary Sin in Saint Augustine', *Recherches Augustiniennes* 10 (1975): 171-186, at 181. For the sources of the notion of our solidarity in Adam, Alflatt mentions *ciu. Dei* XIII, 14; *nat. et gr.* 4, 4-5, 5; *ench.* 50; *nup. et conc.* II, 5, 15. See *ibid.*, 180-1.

²⁷ Alflatt 1975, 185, the emphasis is added.

²⁸ O'Connell 1991, 35. Cf. also Alflatt 1975, 180-185.

²⁹ See for instance, Drecoll 1999, 187-199; *id.* 'Gratia', in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, vol. 3 ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe & Co.) 2004, 182-242; Josef Lössl 1995; *id.* 'Augustine on the Will', in *The Will and Human Action. From Antiquity to the Present Day* eds. T. Pink and M. Stone (London: Routledge), 2004, 53-77; Donato Ogliaari, *Gratia et certamen: The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the So-called Semipelagians*, (Louvain: Peeters) 2003, 250-255; Cary 2008, esp. 43.

of will (*libertas uoluntati*) to do right in this world, even though this does not take away our free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) to do more evil.³⁰ Accordingly, unless our will being cured by the pre-destined grace of God, the guilt of our involuntary sin will not be forgiven. In light of this, the will of a fallen person by itself does not possess any facility of abstaining from evildoings, which Augustine has explicitly recognized in the first book of *De libero arbitrio*. Therefore, in his revision of his earlier responses to Simplicianus, which is written one year later than the completion of *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine concedes, 'I labored for the free decision of human will, but the grace of God won out.'³¹

It is evident now that the solidarity or identity of the human race with Adam is undeniably central to Augustine's theological justification of his doctrine of original sin and divine grace. To clarify the relationship of our soul to that of our first ancestors, Augustine devotes much effort to investigate the mysterious origin of human souls.³² Augustine's theory on the origin of the soul is a controversial issue, which goes beyond the scope of this essay.³³ It suffices here to note

³⁰ See for instance, *c. ep. Pel II*, 5, 9. '*...peccato Adae arbitrium liberum de hominum natura perisse non dicimus, sed ad peccandum ualere in hominibus subditis diabolo; ad bene autem pieque uiuendum non ualere, nisi ipsa uoluntas hominis Dei gratia fuerit liberata et ad omne bonum actionis, sermonis, cogitationis adiuta.*' For classical treatments of the relationship between *libertas* and *liberum arbitrium*, see Maurice Huftier, 'Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 33 (1966): 187-281. Christopher Kirwan *Augustine* (London/New York: Routledge), 1989, 82-88; Wetzel 1992, 220-1. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see my article 'Augustine on *Liberum Arbitrium*' (in Chinese), in *Zhongwai Renwen Jingshen Yanjiu* 2 (2009), 112-125.

³¹ *retr.* II, 1, 1. 'In cuius quaestionis solutione laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia.' Cf. also *prae. sanc.* 4, 8.

³² Cf. *lib. arb.* 20, 56-58; *Gn. litt.* X; *ep.* 190; *an. et org.* etc.

³³ For an influential account of Augustine's reflections on the origin of human souls, see Robert O'Connell, *The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's Later Works*, (New York: Fordham University Press), 1987. O'Connell insists that a Plotinian theory of the pre-existence of the soul underlies Augustine's reflections on the origin and nature of the soul. Even though Augustine did clearly exclude the hypothesis that souls had done neither good nor evil before birth in his later comments on Romans 9:11, O'Connell argued that the Plotinian thesis could still be identified in Augustine's insistence upon our solidarity with Adam, which is the sole foundation for Augustine's account for original sin in *De libero arbitrio* III. For criticism of O'Connell's extraordinary interest in the theory of the pre-existence of soul in Augustine's writings, see Gerald O'Daly, 'Did St. Augustine Ever Believe in the Soul's Pre-Existence?' *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974), 227-35; id. 'Augustine on the Origin of Souls,' in H.-D. Blume (hrsg.), *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie* (Münster) 1983, 184-91; John M. Rist *Augustine, Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1994, 317-320; and more recently in Ronnie J. Rombs, *Saint*

that Augustine never articulates a definite opinion on this crucial question, which underlies our identification with Adam and Eve.³⁴ In addition, Augustine never claims that we are held responsible for original sin, which is essentially involuntary, as a result of the free decision of our own will.³⁵ Furthermore, it is difficult for us to believe by our own experience that we once had a will in Adam and Eve before birth. To summarize, at least from a philosophical point of view, it is not evident that these inborn conditions of *ignorantia* and *difficultas* result from one's own decision of the will in the past, which is completely inaccessible to oneself.

The precedent studies on 'involuntary sin' are preoccupied with Augustine's theological arguments for our identity with Adam and Eve. This is simply because, I believe, they never took it seriously, how we can be held responsible for that which is not a result of our voluntary decision at all, not even an effect of free choice in the past. This negligence is in accordance with their simplistic understanding of Augustinian *uoluntas*. They fail to understand that the *uoluntas* of a fallen agent is never an absolute and indifferent power to make a choice. As a result, they rightly notice the essential association of responsibility with *uoluntas*, but are unable to envisage that the moral responsibility based on the freedom of *uoluntas* can have nothing to do with the choice of will.³⁶

In the following discussion, I endeavor to reconstruct Augustine's reflections on the moral responsibility for our innate qualities,

Augustine and the Fall of the Soul: Beyond O'Connell and His Critics, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press), 2006.

³⁴ See for instance, *ep.* 190, 1, 2. 'De qua re antequam aliquid admoneam sinceritatem tuam, scire te uolo in tam multis opusculis meis numquam me fuisse ausum de hac quaestione (sc. de origine animae) definitam proferre sententiam, et impudenter referre in litteras ad alios informandos, quod apud me non fuerit explicatum.'

³⁵ Cf. for instance, *c. Iul. imp.* I, 57. 'Sic autem aliena sunt originalia peccata propter nullum in eis nostrae uoluntatis arbitrium, ut tamen propter originis contagium esse inueniantur et nostra.'

³⁶ For the distinction between the freedom of the will and free choice, see note 30. Alflatt believes that our responsibility for moral acts is grounded on the intention of the will. An act is sinful just because the underlying intention is perverse or this act is a result of one's intention in the past. It is implicitly presupposed that the will is free to adopt a good or an evil intention. See Alflatt 1975, 178ff. At the beginning of his account of moral agency in Augustine's writings, Babcock assumes that two conditions are indispensable for attributions of moral responsibility. First the moral agent in question should be able to do otherwise than what he has actually done. This is the principle of alternative. Second, 'the person must, himself or herself, determine which alternative is realized, acting or not acting, acting in this way or acting in that way.' According to Babcock, these two conditions are met by the freedom of the will, especially in Augustine's early writings. Cf. *id.* 1988, esp. 28-9. O'Connell also maintains that if our inborn conditions are not consequences of our free choice in

which can necessitate wrongful actions against the free decision of the will. The philosophical perspective of Augustine's insights has been veiled by their theological contexts, especially those concerning original sin and divine grace, and therefore is unfairly ignored by the recent scholarship on involuntary sin. As a result, it was widely believed that Augustine lost his philosophical insights into the freedom of the will in his theological debates on original sin and divine predestination, especially in his bitter controversy with the Pelagians. In this account, this paper attempts to show that Augustine's later position on involuntary sins is also **philosophically** defensible. In his theological reflection on our solidarity in Adam and the justice of predestined grace, Augustine attained a more realistic understanding of the will, which is also intelligible in a philosophical context. Certainly, this is not to suggest that one can appropriately comprehend Augustine's notion of *uoluntas* without knowing his doctrines of original sin and victorious grace.³⁷ It simply intends to reveal that Augustine's later profound understanding of *uoluntas* offers a more reasonable defense of our moral responsibility for the innate difficulty of the will. To justify this account, one needs not commit to our mysterious identity in Adam or the essential dependence of human will upon the prevenient grace.

II. *Consuetudo* and moral responsibility

Before moving on to the difficult problem of our responsibility for inherited *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, I want to deal with the moral responsibility for wrongful actions necessitated by our formed habit (*consuetudo*), especially the carnal habit (*consuetudo carnalis*).

The responsibility for one's own habit was a familiar topic in the Ancient world.³⁸ Even the enthusiastic defenders of free will, such as

Adam and Eve, wrongful acts committed under their influence will not be conceived of as sinful actions. See id. 1991, esp. 35.

³⁷ The literature on Augustine's theology of grace and original sin is tremendous. Recent important monographs include Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Gloria Gratiae: Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (Paris: Institut d'études augustinienes) 1996; Josef Lössl, *Intellectus gratiae: die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins von Hippo* (Leiden: Brill), 1997; Drecoll 1999; Ogliari 2003; C. Harrison 2006; Cary 2008.

³⁸ Following earlier studies, Fitzgerald points out that Augustine's conception of *consuetudo* is deeply influenced by his predecessors, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, and Cicero. See Fitzgerald 1999, 409. For detailed treatment of the sources of Augustinian *consuetudo*, see J. Prendville, 'The Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of St. Augustine,' *Traditio* 28 (1972): 29-99, esp. 45ff.; 82.

Julian of Eclanum, also acknowledged the compulsive force of habit as a result produced by the will itself.³⁹ In Augustine's writings, *consuetudo* (*carnalis*) refers above all to the excessive and ungovernable tendency or addiction of the soul towards temporal things or carnal pleasures, which becomes habitual after being repeated without encountering resistance from the rational mind.⁴⁰ This tendency is blameworthy because it blocks either our contemplation on the eternal truth or our enjoyment of spiritual delight.⁴¹ As Prendville emphatically points out in his excellent account of Augustinian *consuetudo*, though this habitual inclination is frequently associated with the weakness of flesh (*caro*), 'the ultimate seat of habit is in the conscious part of Man, so that he can exercise some kind of responsibility over the origin and eradication of his habits'.⁴²

In one of his sermons, Augustine distinguishes four stages of the progression from simple pleasure to determinate habit: (1) the titillation of pleasure in heart, followed by (2) consent; then (3) deed,

³⁹ See for instance, *c. Iul. imp.* IV, 103, (2). Aug: Nam et ille qui dicit: *Non quod uolo ago*, certe secundum uos (sc. Iulianum) necessitate consuetudinis premitur; hanc autem necessitatem, ne liberum auferatis arbitrium, eum sibi uoluntate fecisse contenditis et tale aliquid in natura humana factum esse non creditis, ut ex uoluntate primi hominis, de quo est origo humani generis, fieret necessitas peccati originalis in posteris.

⁴⁰ As Fitzgerald rightly observes, 'habit is often construed in a negative way, even if the goal of Augustine's use and analysis of the term is not: 'id ergo agit spiritus in domanda carne, ut soluat malae consuetudinis quasi pacta peruersa et fiat pax consuetudinis bonae.' (*doc. Chr.* I, 24, 25) See, id. 1999, 409. For further references of *consuetudo* in Augustine's corpus, see Prendville 1972.

⁴¹ Cf. for instance *conf.* VII, 1, 1-2; VII, 17, 23. For a detailed discussion on the context of the latter occasion of *consuetudo*, see James Wetzel, 'The Question of *Consuetudo Carnalis* in Confessions 7.17.23', *Augustinian Studies* 31(2000): 165-171.

⁴² Prendville 1972, 71. Prendville's conclusion is based on Augustine's introduction of the word '*animae*' in his expression *consuetudo facta cum carne* in *c. Fort.* 22. 'Sed quemadmodum illa nix calore resoluitur, et desinit nix esse, ut possit calefcere: sic illa carnis prudentia, id est, consuetudo facta cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra illuminata, et ad arbitrium diuinae legis totum hominem sibi Deus subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam.' He also mentions that in another passage from *De fide et symbolo*, Augustine definitely refers to the term *caro* in this context as the blameworthy disposition of the soul. Cf. *f. et symb.* 10, 23. 'Anima uero cum carnalia bona adhuc appetit, caro nominatur. Pars enim eius quaedam resistit spiritui non natura, sed consuetudine peccatorum, unde dicitur *mente seruio legi Dei, carne legi peccati*.' See also *mus.* VI, 11, 33. 'Haec autem animae consuetudo facta cum carne, propter carnalem affectionem, in Scripturis diuinis caro nominatur.' All these passages are cited from Prendville 1972, 70-1. For another analysis of *caro* in Augustine's conception of *concupiscentia carnis*, see my article, 'Did Augustine Lose the Philosophical Battle in the Debate with Julian of Eclanum on *Concupiscentia Carnis* and *Voluntas*?' in *Augustiniana* 57 (2007): 185-208, esp. 190-2.

then (4) habit.⁴³ Unsurprisingly, no step in the genesis of *consuetudo* can take place without the involvement of the will. First, any kind of pleasure, even the initial pleasure of cognition (*cogitationis delectatio*), cannot come into being without the approval of the will.⁴⁴ Consent is undoubtedly an explicit act of the will. Furthermore, without the motivational function of the will, a decision of the mind will never be transformed into an overt act.

In his analysis of *duae uoluntates* in *Confessiones* VIII, Augustine offers a masterful depiction of *consuetudo* as a consequence of the disposition of the will:

The consequence of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity... The new will, which was beginning to be within me a will to serve you freely and to enjoy you, God, the only sure source of pleasure, was not yet strong enough to conquer my prior will, which had been strengthened by its antiquity.⁴⁵

Here the will interacts with the compulsive force of habit. On the one hand, the formation of habit originates from and depends on the disposition of the will, which can transform a rational being into a slave to lust (*libido*). In his response to Julian, Augustine clearly stresses that a habit is the fruit of the will (*fructus*) and is acquired only by the will.⁴⁶ On the other hand, a habit manifests its power by strengthening or even necessitating the preceding submission of the will to lust. In Augustine's own case, the direct effect of this compulsive force is the self-division of the will and the impotence of the will to embrace the Christian faith unreservedly. In one passage of his early works, Augustine even reduces the diversity of the acts of the will

⁴³ S. 98, 6. 'prima est enim quasi titilatio delectationis in corde; secunda, consensio; tertium, factum; quarta, consuetudo.' Cited from Fitzgerald 1999, 409.

⁴⁴ Cf. *trin.* XII, 12, 17. For detailed comments on this text, see my article, 'Rethinking Augustine's Adaptation of 'First Movements' of Affection,' forthcoming.

⁴⁵ *conf.* VIII, 5, 10. 'Quippe ex uoluntate peruersa facta est libido, et dum seruatur libidini, facta est consuetudo, et dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas.... Voluntas autem noua quae mihi esse coeperat, ut te gratis colerem fruique te uellem, deus, sola certa iucunditas, nondum erat idonea ad superandam priorem uetustate roboratam.' The translation is quoted with modification from *Confessions*, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1991.

⁴⁶ *c. Iul. imp.* IV, 103, (3). 'Nonne conditionem suam <sua> conditione perdit (sc. peccatum), ut per uim consuetudinis fiat sine uoluntate, cum consuetudo non facta sit nisi uoluntate? Nonne rei huius natura fructibus suis negatur? Quandoquidem consuetudo fructus est uoluntatis, quoniam ex uoluntate gignitur, quae tamen id quod agit negat se agere uoluntate.'

(*uoluntates* in plural) to the diversity of habits.⁴⁷ In other words, the freedom of the will to make its own decision is diminished or limited by the presence of *consuetudo*. The impediment of *consuetudo* paralyzes the faculty of the will until the latter is rid of this disease with the aid of divine providence.

Nevertheless, we are rightly held responsible for the decision of the will under the shadow of *consuetudo* for two reasons.

First, through the mediation of *consuetudo*, the faculty of the will feels the effects of its past decisions. Here, Augustine explicitly takes the historicity and facticity of human agency into account. The agent of a concrete act at a certain moment is not 'the man without a past'.⁴⁸ The continuity of life and personal identity are presupposed in the practice of attributing moral responsibility. When the problem of moral agency is concerned, what matters is primarily one's voluntary decisions in the past. Borrowing an expression from Alflatt and O'Connell, we can claim that the wrongful acts necessitated by *consuetudo* are *uoluntaria in causa*.

More importantly, the decision of the will is also free from any internal compulsion, including *consuetudo* in the form of an older will. The *consuetudo* defines the condition of the faculty of the will but cannot force the will to attain a new disposition. In Augustine's account of two wills at war in *Confessiones*, The will under the shadow of *consuetudo* cannot command the mind to attain a wholehearted love of God. On the other hand, *consuetudo* in the form of an older will towards blameworthy lust cannot command the will to desert its partial love for God either.⁴⁹ In the later discussion on the responsibility for original sin, it will be manifest that this freedom of the will justifies our responsibility for our moral actions under involuntary conditions of the mind.

The first condition for the attribution of moral responsibility for *consuetudo* has been well stressed by earlier studies. According to this interpretation, the freedom of the will to do otherwise in the acquisition of *consuetudo* is assumed as the genuine ground for responsibility.⁵⁰ It is presupposed that the will possess absolute control over its

⁴⁷ *diu. qu.* 40. 'Ex diuersis uisis diuersus appetitus animarum, ex diuerso appetitu diuersus adipiscendi successus, ex diuerso successu diuersa consuetudo, ex diuersa consuetudine diuersa est uoluntas.' This *quaestio* is entitled 'cum animarum natura una sit, unde hominum diuersae uoluntates?'

⁴⁸ The phrase is borrowed from Aki Kaurismäki's namesake film. It is about the adventure of a man who awakens after a brutal mugging with no memory of his former life.

⁴⁹ Cf. *conf.* VIII, 8, 20.

⁵⁰ For instance, in his comments on the well-known passage from *Confessiones* VIII, 5, 10, Prendville emphasizes that Augustinian *consuetudo* is brought into being

choice before acquiring a sinful habit, though this freedom can be diminished after the formation of the habit. That we are responsible for *consuetudo* can be justified simply because its origin is a voluntary decision of the will as a two way power.

However, Augustine maintains that the freedom of the will to choose between good and evil only belonged to Adam, Eve, and the Devil before their fall.⁵¹ After being expelled from the Garden of Eden, human beings were irrevocably plunged into necessity (*necessitas*). In the third book of *De libero arbitrio*, this necessity is unquestionably identified with *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, the two penal conditions that define the existence of every individual life in this world.⁵² It is evident that the cloud of necessity hangs over the formation of *consuetudo* in a fallen agent.

As Prendville incisively points out, Augustine is quite aware of the essential relationship of *consuetudo* to original sin and its effects. In his earlier exegesis of St. Paul written in 394/5, Augustine first relates the self-formed habit to the innate inclination to evil.⁵³ He undeniably interprets *consuetudo* as an intensification of *concupiscentia* in his reply to Simplicianus of 396:

If it is asked: whence it is that in his flesh dwelleth no good thing, which means that sin dwells there? From where, if not from his inherited mortality and from his addiction to (sensual) pleasure? The former is the penalty of original sin, the latter of repeated sinning. We are born into this life with the former, and add to the latter as we live. These two things, nature and habit (*consuetudo*) conjoined, render cupidity (*cupiditas*) strong and unconquerable. This is what he calls sin which, he says, dwells in his flesh, obtaining a certain domination and kingdom, so to speak there.⁵⁴

by a free act of his own, because 'at any moment in the making of his habit, the process could have been stopped.' See id. 1972, 59. Prendville does notice the mysterious relationship of *consuetudo* as a personal sin to *concupiscentia carnis* as the original sin, which is implied in *Confessiones* but further elaborated on in the work *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*. However, he does not take the essential independence of the will into account and therefore fails to elucidate convincingly our responsibility for these two sins that can take effect against the decision of our will. See also note 36 for the emphasis on the principle of alternative as the foundation of moral responsibility in other studies on moral agency.

⁵¹ Cf. for instance, c. *Fort.* 22; *lib. arb.* III, 18, 52.

⁵² See note 21.

⁵³ The exegeses in question are *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola apostoli ad romanos* and *Expositio epistolae ad Galatas*. Cf. Prendville 1972, 74-77.

⁵⁴ *Simpl.* I, 1, 10. 'Quod si quaesierit aliquis: Vnde hoc est, quod dicit habitare in carne sua non utique bonum, id est peccatum? – Vnde nisi ex traduce mortalitatis et adsiduitate uoluptatis? Illud est ex poena originalis peccati, hoc ex poena frequentati peccati; cum illo in hanc uitam nascimur, hoc uiuendo addimus. Quae duo scilicet

He who is not yet under grace does not do the good he wills. He does the evil which he does not will, being overcome by *concupiscentia*, not simply because of the bondage of mortality (*vinculum mortalitatis*), but also because that the *concupiscentia* is strengthened by the weight of habit (*moles consuetudinis*).⁵⁵

A post-lapsarian agent is conquered by the inclination to evil and therefore loses the freedom to accomplish righteous acts, first due to mortality, as the punishment for his or her original sin, and then because of the self-afflicted habit, which intensifies the evil inclination.⁵⁶

The reference to original sin and *concupiscentia* as its penalty is also implied without further elaboration in Book VIII of *Confessiones*.⁵⁷ However, the older will in the form of *consuetudo* is nothing but a powerful manifestation of the inherent infirmity of the will, which first reveals itself in *concupiscentia carnis*.⁵⁸ As Solignac brilliantly

tanquam natura et consuetudo coniuncta robustissimam faciunt et inuictissimam cupiditatem, quod uocat peccatum, et dicit habitare in carne sua, id est dominatum quendam et quasi regnum obtinere.' The translation of *Ad Simplicianum* is cited with slight modification from John H.S. Burleigh, *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 1953.

⁵⁵ Ibid., I, 1, 11. 'Non enim quod uult facit bonum qui nondum est sub gratia; sed quod non uult malum, hoc agit superante concupiscentia, non solum uinculo mortalitatis sed mole consuetudinis roborata.' I retranslated this passage to follow the original more literally.

⁵⁶ For Augustine's frequent references to *mortalitas*, see Prendville 1972, 78ff.

⁵⁷ Cf. *conf.* VIII, 10, 22. Augustine insists that he no longer approved of the older will, which was strengthened by the habit to prefer lust over the love of God. 'Et ideo non iam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius Adam.' See Prendville 1972, 60. For a recent account of the conception of original sin in *Confessiones*, see Paul Rigby, *Original Sin in Augustine's Confessions*, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press), 1987. For comments on this text, see esp. 72-3. A more general survey of Augustine's notion of original sin can be found in Jesse Couenhoven, 'Augustine's Doctrine of Original Sin', *Augustinian Studies*, 36 (2005) 359-396.

⁵⁸ In this principally anti-Manichaean context, Augustine does not relate the *consuetudo* as the illness of the mind to original sin in the form of *concupiscentia carnis*; but it is not difficult to establish such a relation. First of all, Augustine's irresolution was definitely solved by the divine aid that removed his past sins. Moreover, the past sins in question cannot be voluntary sins with an explicit approval of the mind or *uoluntas*, for he mentions earlier in Book VIII of *Confessiones* that he does not approve the older will but rather suffers it involuntarily. See *conf.* VIII, 5, 11. 'Sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro concupisceret aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, ego quidem in utroque, sed magis ego in eo, quod in me approbavam, quam in eo, quod in me improbavam. Ibi enim magis iam non ego, quia ex magna parte id **patiebar inuitus quam faciebam uolens**.' The emphasis is mine.

formulates in his comments on this text, '*la consuetudo n'est pas autre chose que la ratification personnelle de la concupiscence*.'⁵⁹

Certainly, Augustine further elaborated on and justified the reduction of *consuetudo* to man's inherited inclination to sin in his later works, especially in his responses to Julian, which is the focus of Prendville's article.⁶⁰ While, the foregoing textual testimonies suffice to demonstrate that by the mere appeal to the voluntary origin of *consuetudo*, they cannot account for the culpability of sinful habits. The interpretation of '*uoluntarium in causa*' relies heavily on a naïve misconception of *uoluntas* as a two way power to choose between good and evil, which comes from nowhere and is not subject to any kind of necessity, at least before the formation of a carnal habit. However, for a post-lapsarian agent, having such an absolute power of the will is simply a seemingly beautiful myth.⁶¹ This illusion distorts the reality of the human will conditioned by the existential condition of the self on the one hand, and the essence of the human will as a psychological dynamism that moves essentially towards the good on the other. In his criticism of Julian's conception of *liberum arbitrium*, Augustine astutely points out that an absolute power of choice with no preceding cause deprives a rational being of authorship over its own choice and therefore the responsibility for the evil disposition of the will.⁶²

In Augustine's moral psychology, the culpability of so-called involuntary sin is grounded on a more profound and solid understanding of *uoluntas* and moral agency, which above all justifies our responsibility for the initial state of human nature. This initial state, as the effect of original sin, manifests itself first and foremost in *concupiscentia carnis*, the innate tendency of the soul to evil, which lies beneath the formation of *consuetudo*.

⁵⁹ Cf. Aimé Solignac, 'La psychologie augustinienne de la volonté', *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 14 (Paris: Desclée; De Brouwer), 1962, 541.

⁶⁰ Cf. for instance, *c. Iul.* VI, 18, 55; *C. Iul. imp.* I, 105; IV, 103; V, 64; VI, 12. See Prendville 1972, esp. 96ff. As Prendville acknowledges in the footnote, the analogy between *consuetudo* and *concupiscentia* has been noticed by Joseph Mausbach. Cf. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus* 1-2, 2nd edition (Freiburg: Herder) 1929, II, 220-1.

⁶¹ I defend this claim in the article, 'Augustine on *liberum arbitrium*,' see note 30.

⁶² *C. Iul. imp.* V, 56, (2), 'Cum uero de illo exorta est (sc. uoluntas), de natura exorta est, quia homo natura est, et quia potuit etiam nolle quod uoluit, de libero arbitrio eius exorta est, quod et ipsum, sicut fateris, pertinet ad naturam. Si ergo et uoluntas in homine uel in eius libero arbitrio de nihilo exorta est, quis eam fecit? ... Cur ergo propter illam damnatur homo, quo non uolente exorta est in illo uoluntas mala, cuius erat tantum capax, non efficax? Si autem, ut iure damnetur, eo uolente in illo exorta est, cur eius ipsius uoluntatem de illo exortam negas, quo uolente exortam esse et quo nisi uolente exoriri non potuisset non negas?'

III. *Concupiscentia* and moral responsibility

As repeated in foregoing discussions, Augustine formulates the effects of original sin on the human race as *ignorantia* and *difficultas*, or *caecitas* and *infirmetas*. I shall focus the attention particularly on *difficultas* or *infirmetas* (*uoluntatis*), which has been revealed to be a synonym of *concupiscentia*.⁶³

First, *ignorantia* is above all an intellectual defect that leads to disgraceful errors, though it also 'hinders the will from being moved to do a good deed or to refrain from an evil deed'.⁶⁴ In comparison with *concupiscentia*'s intimate relationship with the infirmity of the will, the impeding effect of *ignorantia* on the faculty of will is relatively external and indirect. Moreover, it has been well established that *concupiscentia* is a graver disease of the mind than *ignorantia*.⁶⁵ Accordingly, as an inborn inclination to evil, *concupiscentia* is more difficult to surmount when the faculty of will lies beneath the necessity of sin. Therefore, if we can establish the freedom of will and moral agency in such a compulsive situation, a similar conclusion can be easily reached in the case of *ignorantia*.

Augustine never doubts that we should be held culpable for wrongful acts committed under the necessity of sin, whether *ignorantia*

⁶³ In *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine mentions *consuetudo carnalis* (carnal habit), *concupiscentia carnis*, *libido* (lust), and *pars (animae) tardior atque carnalis* (the slower, carnal part of the soul) to explicate the opposition and resistance that the soul experiences in *difficultas*, see *lib. arb.* III, 18, 52; III, 19, 53; III, 22, 65. For explicit identification of *difficultas* with *concupiscentia carnis*, see for example, *pecc. mer.* II, 2, 2-4, 4; *spir. et litt.* 34, 51. See Bonner 1986-1994b; Dodaro 1989, 346-7; Rist 1994, 102, 135-6, 320-7.

⁶⁴ *pecc. mer.* II, 17, 26. 'Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est, siue quia latet an iustum sit siue quia non delectat. Tanto enim quidque uehementius uolumus, quanto certius quam bonum sit nouimus eoque delectamur ardentius. Ignorantia igitur et infirmetas uitia sunt, quae inpediunt uoluntatem, ne moueatur ad faciendum opus bonum uel ab opere malo abstinendum.' Unless otherwise noted, all the following English translations of Augustine's anti-Pelagian works are cited with moderate modification from Roland Teske's superb rendition, published in the series *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, ed. J. E. Rotelle (New York: New City Press), I/23-26.

⁶⁵ *c. Iul.* VI, 16, 50. 'Ex hoc autem concupiscentia peior est quam ignorantia, quia ignorantia sine concupiscentia minus peccat; concupiscentia uero sine ignorantia grauius peccat. Et nescire malum, non semper est malum: concupiscere autem malum, semper est malum. Bonum quoque ipsum utiliter aliquando ignoratur, ut opportune sciatur: nullo autem modo fieri potest, ut carnali concupiscentia bonum hominis concupiscatur: quandoquidem nec ipsa proles libidine corporis, sed uoluntate animi concupiscitur, quamuis non sine libidine corporis seminetur.'

or *concupiscentia*. In his first introduction to the concepts *ignorantia* and *difficultas* in the third book of *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine claims

Yet even certain acts done through ignorance (*per ignorantiam*) are blamed and judged to need correction... There are acts done by necessity (*necessitate*) that are to be blamed where the man willed to act rightly and could not.⁶⁶

To justify blame in the latter case, Augustine appeals to some of his favorite verses from the Epistles of St. Paul such as Rom 7:18-19 and Gal 5:17.⁶⁷ In the latter, Paul refers to the conflict between spiritual and carnal concupiscence. In one of his last contributions, Augustine recognizes *concupiscentia carnis* or the infirmity of the will as both a punishment and a sin.⁶⁸ He insists that wrongful acts necessitated by *concupiscentia carnis* are also sins that should be absolved:

After all, the spirit wills not to have the concupiscence of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), but cannot be free from it at present. For this reason the spirit still groans in itself, awaiting the adoption, the redemption of its body, when it will have its flesh in such a way that it can no longer sin (*non posse peccare*). Now, therefore, the spirit not

⁶⁶ *lib. arb.* III, 18, 51. 'Et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam inprobantur, et corrigenda iudicantur... Sunt etiam necessitate facta improbanda, ubi uult homo recte facere, et non potest.' The translation is slightly modified from Anna S. Benjamin's rendition, which comes closer to the original than that of Burleigh in this case. Burleigh's version runs, 'Nevertheless, some things are done in ignorance which are held to be wrong and worthy of correction... Wrong things are done by necessity when a man wills to do right and has not the power.' As mentioned earlier, O'Connell argues that Burleigh's inaccurate translation of these sentences misled Alflatt to recognize 'involuntary sins' in Augustine's thought. O'Connell is right to emphasize that Augustine here simply talks about wrongful acts rather than genuine sins. These acts can be called sins only in an improper way, in O'Connell's opinion, in that the involuntary conditions of moral ignorance and difficulty are consequences of the agent's earlier voluntary deeds. Cf. O'Connell 1991, 25ff. Nevertheless, it is evident that a fallen agent can be held responsible (*improbari*) for these wrongdoings, though not in the same way as for a genuine voluntary sin as committed by Adam and Eve. Furthermore, it will be manifest in later analyses that in Augustine's late writings, even these two properties of human nature are identified definitely as sins (*peccata*) and therefore should be punished if not forgiven. Therefore, it is not completely groundless to call the wrongdoings necessitated by our initial state involuntary sins. What is more pressing is to account for their blameworthiness in a way that demonstrates they are substantially distinct from voluntary sin in their full sense.

⁶⁷ *lib. arb.* III, 18, 51. 'nam unde sunt illae uoces: *Non enim quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago*; et illud: *Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non inuenio* (Rom 7:18-19); et illud: *Caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, spiritus autem aduersus carnem: haec enim inuicem aduersantur; ut non ea quae uultis faciat* (Gal 5:17).

⁶⁸ See for instance, *C. lul. imp.* I, 47; I, 101; VI, 17.

only can sin after baptism, but is at times **drawn** to (*trahi*) consent by concupiscence of the flesh, even though it struggles valiantly against it, and it commits some sins (*peccata*), even though slight ones (*uenialia*). We always have reason to say in this life, *Forgive us our debts*.⁶⁹

Here, Augustine depicts *concupiscentia carnis* as an inherited burden that cannot be removed by any individual in this life, even one who has been inspired by grace with a spiritual longing for the good. However, the necessity of its presence is not in conflict with our responsibility for wrongful actions caused by its actuality. In this passage, these wrongdoings are indeed identified as venial sins.

Rather, even *concupiscentia carnis* itself is treated here as an evil that should be condemned. First, it can deprive the spirit of peace simply by its presence. Moreover, by grabbing (*trahere*) the consent of the will, it can easily transform from an inborn defect into an evident blameworthy disposition of the soul, though not necessarily into an evil deed (*opus malum*).⁷⁰ In light of this, even spiritual and virtuous people cannot be sinless in this world and therefore should be rebuked (*corripiti*) for the actuality (*actus*) of *concupiscentia* in this life as a vestige of their original sin.⁷¹

It is evident now that Augustine remains steadfast in the culpability of evil actions under the necessity of sin, especially under *concupiscentia carnis*. However, his philosophical arguments for justifying this belief change in accordance with his understanding of the compulsive force of *concupiscentia carnis* and its essential relation to *uoluntas*. A glimpse into the development of his thought from *De libero arbitrio* III to *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* will help us determine

⁶⁹ *c. Iul. imp.* I, 101, (3). 'Vult enim et istam carnis concupiscentiam non habere, sed non potest nunc, propter quod adhuc in se ipso ingemescit adoptionem expectans redemptionem corporis sui, ubi sic habeat carnem, ut iam peccare non possit. Nunc ergo non solum potest peccare post baptismum, uerum etiam, quia et bene reluctans concupiscentiae carnis aliquando ab ea **trahitur** ad consensionem et quamuis uenialia, tamen aliqua peccata committit, habet, cur semper hic dicat: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra*.' The emphasis is mine.

⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, II, 221, (1). '...sed peccatum, sine quo nemo nascitur, creuit uoluntatis accessu originali concupiscentia **trahente** peccantis assensum.' The emphasis is added. Cf. also *ibid.*, IV, 61. 'Concupiscentia carnis mala est et quando ei non consentitur ad malum; ipsa est enim qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, etiamsi aduersus eam concupiscente spiritu non perficiat quod conatur, id est opus malum.'

⁷¹ For the importance of rebuke and correction of original sin, see *corr. et gr.* 6, 9. 'An uero ideo prauitas ista corripienda non est in homine, quia non eius propria qui corripitur, sed communis est omnibus? Imo uero corripiatur et in singulis, quod est omnium. Non enim propterea cuiusquam non est, quod ab ea nullus immunis est.'

whether Augustine ever supplies us with a compelling account of the moral responsibility for 'involuntary sins' in his constant meditations on original sin and its effects. The point here is not to establish a precise chronology of the conception of involuntary sin (*concupiscentia* in this context) in Augustine's later works, not even the continuity or discontinuity of Augustine's theology, but rather to examine in a philosophical way how Augustine deals with this issue in different theological and historical contexts.⁷² What matters here are the philosophical insights in his account of our responsibility for this inborn quality.

As clarified in earlier analyses, the *difficultas* in Book III of *De libero arbitrio* refers to the opposition and resistance that the soul experiences in willing and accomplishing a righteous act.⁷³ We noticed as well that this moral difficulty is often associated though not explicitly identified with *concupiscentia* in this text.⁷⁴ However, at this relatively early stage of thought, Augustine does not regard the necessitating force of *concupiscentia* as an inherent weakness of the will. For this reason, he believes that the presence of such an iniquity does not completely eradicate the capacity of the will to pursue the good. Even though deprived of the ability to attain beatitude merely by the decision of the will, a fallen agent still possesses the power to strive for excellence by praying for aid from divine providence in order that the *difficultas* can be conquered. Therefore, one is rightly held responsible for his further wrongdoings because such an agent has failed to make any progress by neglecting to use this inherent power.

These points provide Augustine with a philosophical account of our responsibility for moral actions under the yoke of sin near the closing of *De libero arbitrio*, where *ignorantia* and *difficultas* are treated as natural rather than penal conditions of human nature.

Natural ignorance and natural impotence are not reckoned to the soul as guilt. The guilt arises because it does not eagerly pursue knowledge, and does not give adequate attention to acquiring facility in doing right.⁷⁵

⁷² For recent efforts to reconstruct the development of Augustine's reflections on original sin and divine grace, especially in their essential relation to the freedom of human will, see Hombert 1996; id. 2000; Lössl 1997; Drecoll 1999; 2004; Cary 2008.

⁷³ Cf. *lib. arb.* III, 18, 52. 'ex difficultate cruciatus affligit... et resistente atque torquente dolore carnis uinculi...'

⁷⁴ See note 63.

⁷⁵ *lib. arb.* III, 22, 64. 'Non enim quod naturaliter nescit et naturaliter non potest, hoc animae deputatur in reatum; sed quod scire non studuit, et quod dignam facilitati comparandae ad recte faciendum operam non dedit.'

Later on, moral difficulty is envisaged as a conflict between the sublime part of the soul and the carnal part, without denying the soul's capacity to attain a correct judgment concerning the good and to seek help from divine grace.⁷⁶ Therefore, even though unable to attain the good merely by willing it, the descendants of Adam can refrain from sinning by appealing to divine assistance. The power to pursue the good is persistent in post-lapsarian agents, though fatally diminished by the first voluntary sin. Accordingly, wrongful actions in this life are not **directly** necessitated by ignorance and difficulty, but rather result from the voluntary failure of the will to employ its innate power. In short, due to this immanent power, the actions under consideration are not involuntary sins, nor simply voluntary in origin, but definitely based on voluntary decisions.

Two points are worth noting here. One is that *concupiscentia* or *difficultas* as a natural condition of human race is believed to be sinless. The other point is that this natural condition impedes but does not necessitate the decision of the will. In other words, the presence of *difficultas* as punishment for our sin in Adam does not change the voluntariness of our moral actions in this life. Therefore, the moral responsibility at stake is simply the culpability of our voluntary sins, for the faculty of the will never loses the power to advance and make its own choice rather than being drawn down involuntarily by innate moral difficulty.

Some scholars, for instance William Babcock, have identified the restricted power or freedom of the will as the vestige of the absolute ability to do otherwise, by which Augustine 'carves out a narrow and yet crucial area of moral agency within the great impairments that afflict human beings after the first human sin.'⁷⁷ This solution to fallen agency, as Babcock himself concedes immediately, is 'fragile and unstable', for from the theological point of view, it proves to be less compelling than the interpretation of our initial conditions as punishment for our own sin in Adam.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Ibid. III, 22, 65. 'Et quod agnoscens quid sibi agendum sit non continuo ualeat implere, hoc quoque nondum accepit. Praecessit enim pars quaedam eius sublimior ad sentiendum recte facti bonum: sed quaedam tardior atque carnalis non consequenter in sententiam ducitur; ut ex ipsa difficultate admoneatur eundem implorare adiutorem perfectionis suae quem inchoationis sentit auctorem; ut ex hoc ei fiat carior dum non suis uiribus, sed cuius bonitate habet ut sit, eius misericordia subleuatur ut beata sit.'

⁷⁷ William S. Babcock, 'Sin, Penalty and the Responsibility of the Soul: A problem in Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio* III', *Studia Patristica* 27 (1993): 225-230, at 230.

⁷⁸ Babcock 1993, 230.

However, this is only a superficial explanation for Augustine's later rejection of this solution, which still relies heavily on the presumption that our moral agency can be established merely on the ability to do otherwise. In his later writings, Augustine abandons this presumption primarily because it fails to account for the real enslaved state of the will before being liberated by grace. Nevertheless, this theological insight concerning the reality of the human will is also grounded on his careful observations on the faculty of will and its freedom which goes beyond the scope of freedom to do otherwise.

It is well known that Augustine coined the phrase *peccatum originale* in his exegesis of Romans in *Ad Simplicianum* of 396.⁷⁹ Commentators have pointed out, however, that Augustine develops his mature doctrine of original sin in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum* of 412, his first polemic writing against the Pelagians.⁸⁰ There Augustine refers to the term *peccatum originale* as the sin of infants inherited from Adam.⁸¹ Original sin exerts its effect first and foremost in the disobedience of *concupiscentia carnis*, especially in the case of sexuality.⁸² In this work,

⁷⁹ *Simpl.* I, 1, 10. Cited in note 51. For references to other important expressions of original sin, such as *peccata originalia* and *peccatum naturale*, see Athanase Sage, 'Le péché originel dans la pensée de saint Augustin, de 412 à 430', *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 15 (1969): 75-112, at 76-81.

⁸⁰ As noted in Rigby's entry of 'Original Sin' in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, it was generally accepted before 1967 that Augustine already reached a full-grown interpretation of original sin and grace in *Ad Simplicianum*. In his classic article of 1967, Athanase Sage first argued that the Pelagian controversy gave Augustine the opportunity to develop a doctrine of original sin that profoundly influenced the Christian tradition ('Péché originel: Naissance d'un dogme', *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 13 (1967): 211-48). In recent studies, some Augustinian scholars have proposed earlier dates of this doctrine, for instance, in *De Genesi ad litteram* (TeSelle *Augustine the Theologian*, (New York: Herder and Herder), 1970, 265); in *Ad Simplicianum* (W. Babcock, 'Augustine and Paul: The Case of Romans IX,' *Studia Patristica* 16 (1985): 473-79; T.G. Ring, *Ad Simplicianum, zwei Bücher über verschiedene Fragen*, (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag), 1991); in *Confessiones* (Rigby 1987). For more recent approaches, see note 72. It is beyond the scope of the current study to determine the exact date of the birth of the doctrine of original sin. The main concern here is the responsibility for *concupiscentia* as an effect of original sin. Augustine's insights into *concupiscentia carnis* as the infirmity of the will is elaborated on in his bitter debates with the Pelagians. On this account, I follow Sage's influential viewpoint.

⁸¹ *pecc. mer.* I, 9, 9. 'Hinc enim etiam in paruulis nolunt credere per baptismum solui originale peccatum, quod in nascentibus nullum esse omnino contendunt.'

⁸² *Ibid.*, I, 29, 57. 'Bonum ergo coniugii non est feruor concupiscentiae, sed quidam licitus et honestus illo feruore utendi modus propagandae proli, non explendae libidini accommodatus. Voluntas ista, non uoluptas illa nuptialis est. Quod igitur in membris corporis mortis huius inoboedienter mouetur totumque animum in se deiectionem conatur

Augustine makes a subtle distinction between the presence and the guilt (*reatus*) of *concupiscentia*.

Concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), then, remains in the members of the body of this death as the law of sin. It is present in the little ones at birth, though its guilt (*reatus*) is removed when little ones are baptized. It remains for the combat that is life, but it does not punish with damnation those who die before engaging in that combat. It holds unbaptized little ones enmeshed in guilt and draws them to damnation, like children of anger, even if they die as little ones. But in the case of baptized adults who have the use of reason (*ratio*), whenever the mind consents (*consentire*) to that same concupiscence in order to sin, it is due to one's own will.⁸³

On the one hand, *concupiscentia* is certainly recognized as a sin that should be condemned unless its guilt is forgiven by divine grace via the sacrament of baptism. This sin is also clearly distinguished from our personal sins, for the little ones commit no sins by means of their own will before reaching the age of reason. Their inborn ignorance and weakness prevent them from doing so.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Augustine believes that the infants who die before baptism will be held guilty for this inherited evil, since the human race has entirely sinned in Adam and should be liberated from the necessity of sin and death.⁸⁵

adtrahere et neque cum mens uoluerit exsurgit neque cum mens uoluerit conquiescit, hoc est malum peccati, cum quo nascitur omnis homo.' (For the subtle relationship between *concupiscentia* and sexuality, see my article, 'Did Augustine Lose the Philosophical Battle in the Debate with Julian of Eclanum on *Concupiscentia Carnis* and *Voluntas*?' in *Augustiniana* 57 (2007): 185-208, esp. 188-196.) However, this is not to indicate that Augustine neglects our sin of ignorance in this work. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 36, 67. There, the darkness of ignorance is singled out as a sin of infants.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 4. 'Concupiscentia igitur tamquam lex peccati manens in membris corporis mortis huius cum paruulis nascitur, in paruulis baptizatis a reatu soluitur, ad agonem relinquitur, ante agonem mortuos nulla damnatione persequitur; paruulos non baptizatos reos innectit et tamquam irae filios, etiamsi paruuli moriantur, ad condemnationem trahit. In grandibus autem baptizatis, in quibus iam ratione utentibus quidquid eidem concupiscentiae mens ad peccandum consensit, propriae uoluntatis est;'

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 35, 65. 'An uero et hoc quaesituri et de hoc disputaturi et tempus ad hoc impensuri sumus, ut probemus atque doceamus, quomodo per propriam uoluntatem, sine qua nullum uitae propriae potest esse peccatum, nihil mali commiserint infantes, qui propter hoc uocantur ab omnibus innocentes? Nonne tanta infirmitas animi et corporis, tanta rerum ignorantia, tam nulla omnino praecepti capacitas, nullus uel naturalis uel conscriptae legis sensus aut motus, nullus in alterutram partem rationis usus, hoc multo testatiore silentio quam sermo noster proclamat atque indicat? Valeat aliquid ad se ipsam persuadendam ipsa euidencia; nam nusquam sic non inuenio quod dicam, quam ubi res, de qua dicitur, manifestior est quam omne quod dicitur.'

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 10, 11ff; I, 16, 21ff.

On the other hand, the effect of *concupiscentia* in this text is explicitly associated with the impotence of the will. As mentioned in an earlier analysis of a passage from this work, Augustine identifies *ignorantia* and *infirmetas* as two defects (*uitia*) that hinder the will to pursue the good or to refrain from doing evil.⁸⁶ This *infirmetas* or moral difficulty manifests itself in the illicit inclination (*appetitus*) for self-sufficiency that can result in a definite affection of pride, which is based on the consent of the will:

To be inflated with pride, of course, is due to the human being's own will, not to God's activity, for God neither compels nor helps one towards this. There first arises in the human will (*in uoluntate hominis*) an inclination (*appetitus*) towards its own power so that one becomes disobedient through pride. And if this inclination did not exist, nothing would have been difficult, and one could have refused to be disobedient, when one wanted to. But there resulted from the punishment that was just and deserved such a defect that it was now difficult to be obedient to righteousness.⁸⁷

Though it is difficult to resist the temptation originating from this illicit inclination, Augustine insists that baptized adults consent to it by an illicit turn of the will (*inlicita uoluntatis inclinatio*).⁸⁸ In other words, the will of a baptized adult retains the power to refuse tempting suggestions from *concupiscentia carnis*.

It seems that Augustine here simply makes a certain qualification of his earlier defense of fallen agency in *De libero arbitrio* III. The novel element is baptism, which symbolizes the rebirth of human beings by divine providence. In accordance with his emphasis on the necessity of baptism for infants, Augustine underscores that the baptized are able to fight against, though not eradicate, the inherited evil of *concupiscentia* when they are capable of rational thinking. Hence, the baptized are rightly held guilty for their illicit attraction to desires

⁸⁶ Ibid., II, 17, 26. 'Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est, siue quia latet an iustum sit siue quia non delectat. Tanto enim quidque uehementius uolumus, quanto certius quam bonum sit nouimus eoque delectamur ardentius. Ignorantia igitur et infirmetas uitia sunt, quae impediunt uoluntatem, ne moueatur ad faciendum opus bonum uel ab opere malo abstinendum.'

⁸⁷ Ibid., II, 19, 33. 'Extolli quippe in superbiam propriae uoluntatis est hominum, non operis Dei; neque enim ad hoc eos compellit aut adiuvat Deus. Praecedat ergo in uoluntate hominis appetitus quidam propriae potestatis, ut fiat inoboediens per superbiam. Hic autem adpetitus etiam si non esset, nihil molestum esset, et cum hoc uoluit homo, sine difficultate noluisset; secutum est autem ex debita iusta poena tale uitium, ut iam molestum esset oboedire iustitiae.'

⁸⁸ Ibid., II, 4, 4. 'Si ergo his desideriis concupiscentiae carnis inlicita uoluntatis inclinatione consensimus, ad hoc sanandum dicimus: *dimitte nobis debita nostra*.'

stemming from *concupiscentia carnis*, but not for the presence of *concupiscentia carnis* itself, because the sacrament of baptism has remitted its culpability. In other words, though remaining after baptism, *concupiscentia carnis* is no longer a compulsive condition that necessitates us to sinful actions by seizing the consent of our will.⁸⁹

However, the introduction of baptism only makes things more complicated. First, Augustine implicitly assumes that the ability to fight efficiently with carnal desire only belongs to the baptized. From a theological perspective, it is obviously unacceptable for the old Bishop of Hippo that an unbaptized person could overcome his or her innate weakness of the will without divine providence, especially in the form of baptism. It follows that the guilt of *concupiscentia carnis* forgiven by baptism refers to the necessity of sin in this context.⁹⁰ It means that the unbaptized commit sins of necessity because their minds are reigned by this sinful inclination. If moral responsibility grounds itself **solely** on the power of the will to refrain from illicit temptations, as is presupposed both in *De libero arbitrio* III and *De peccatorum meritis*, then it will be difficult to account for the sinful doings of the unbaptized under the yoke of *concupiscentia carnis*. In this text, Augustine comes to realize the compulsive force of this inherited evil dwelling in our mortal nature but does not yet offer a plausible account of its culpability other than by appealing to our solidarity in Adam.⁹¹ He has not attained a philosophical interpretation of the sins necessitated by the internal conditions of the mind.

In his later response to Pelagius' *De natura*, Augustine does address the problem of our responsibility for evil actions originating from the inborn injury, i.e., the original sin:

'Moreover, how could persons be responsible to God for the guilt of that sin which they do not recognize as their own (*suum*)? For it is not theirs,' he (sc. Pelagius) says, 'if it is necessary. Or, if it is theirs, then

⁸⁹ *pecc. mer.*, II, 28, 45. 'Haec autem lex peccati, quod etiam peccatum appellat Apostolus, cum dicit: *Non ergo regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum desideriis eius*, non sic manet in membris eorum, qui ex aqua et spiritu renati sunt, tamquam non sit eius facta remissio, ubi omnino plena et perfecta fit remissio peccatorum omnibus inimicitiis interfectis, quibus separabamur a Deo, sed manet in uetustate carnis tamquam superatum et peremptum, si non illicitis consensionibus quodam modo reuiuiscat et in regnum proprium dominationemque reuocetur.'

⁹⁰ Augustine uses 'the law of sin' or 'the condemnation of sin' to denote this persistent and dominating evil in our nature. See for instance, *ibid.*, I, 16, 21. 'Ex hac igitur inoboedientia carnis, ex hac lege peccati et mortis quisquis carnaliter generatur, regenerari spiritaliter opus habet, ut non solum ad regnum Dei perducatur, uerum etiam a peccati damnatione liberetur.' See also II, 28, 45, cited above.

⁹¹ Cf. *pecc. mer.*, I, 9, 9-10, 11.

it is voluntary (*uoluntarium*), and if it is voluntary, it can be avoided.⁹² We reply: It is certainly theirs, but the defect (*uitium*) that leads them to commit it has not been completely healed. Its growth has come from an abuse of their healthy state. Now, as a result of this defect, they are in poor shape and commit many sins either out of weakness (*infirmittas*) or out of blindness (*caecitas*). Hence, they should pray that they may be healed and live thereafter in continuous good health. They should not be filled with pride, as though human beings could be healed by the same power by which they become defected (*uitiatus*).⁹²

According to Augustine's report, Pelagius associates our moral responsibility exclusively with the voluntariness of our actions, which grounds itself on our ability to do otherwise. In his reply, Augustine merely claims that we are also rightly held responsible for sins caused by our innate disease of the mind because it is our own defect that should be healed. This inborn defect gets fixed in our mind by the abuse of our rational nature, though this result seems to be inevitable for those people without aid from grace. However, in this text, Augustine does not make much effort to explain why this inherited evil is our own defect and not an excuse for our sins committed of necessity.

In *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* of 415, a polemic work against Caelestius' *Definitiones*, Augustine goes one step farther to identify the presence of *concupiscentia carnis* as a sin, even in righteous people who can withhold their consent from the desires that stem from this innate evil inclination of the soul:

But when they do not allow sin to reign in their mortal bodies so as to obey its desires (*desiderium*) and do not offer their members to sin as weapons of wickedness, there is indeed sin (*peccatum*) in their members, but it does not reign, because its desires are not obeyed.⁹³

This sin maintains its actuality by arousing the desire to commit sinful acts. Augustine emphatically points out that unlike personal

⁹² *nat. et gr.* 30, 34. '...dicit 'deinde quomodo deo pro illius peccati reatu subditus esse poterit, quod suum non esse cognouerit? Suum enim non est', inquit, 'si necessarium est. Aut si suum est, uoluntarium est; et si uoluntarium est, uitari potest.' Nos respondemus: Suum est omnino, sed uitium quo committitur nondum omni ex parte sanatum est; quod quidem ut inolescet, de non recte usa sanitate descendit; ex quo uitio iam male ualens uel infirmitate uel caecitate plura committit pro quo supplicandum est, ut sanetur et deinceps in perpetua sanitate uiuatur, non superbiendum, quasi homo eadem potestate sanetur qua potestate uitatus est.'

⁹³ *perf. iust.* 11, 28. 'Cum uero non sinit regnare peccatum in suo mortali corpore ad oboediendum desideris eius nec exhibet membra sua arma iniquitatis peccato (Rom. 6:12-3), inest quidem peccatum in membris eius, sed non regnat, quia non oboeditur desideris eius.'

sins, our heart or our conscience does not reproach (*reprehendere*) this sin, because it simply dwells in our nature and it is not transformed into an overtly wrong act.⁹⁴ Moreover, it is not in our power to eradicate these desires of sin in this life.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, to name this inborn defect a sin (*peccatum*) implies that the baptized are still held responsible for its persistence, though not in the same way as they are for sins based on the consent and obedience of the will.⁹⁶ Therefore, Augustine needs to clarify not only the sins of the unbaptized under the compulsive reign of *concupiscentia carnis*, but also the culpable actions of Christians that originate in their innate defect. This task is not completed until his polemic works against Julian of Eclanum⁹⁷, when Augustine reaches a more profound understanding of *concupiscentia carnis* and its relationship to the will.⁹⁸

Augustine sets out to clarify the exact meaning of the sin of *concupiscentia carnis* from the very beginning of his controversy with Julian:

Concupiscence itself, after all, is not now a sin in those who have been reborn, provided they do not consent to it for acts that are forbidden

⁹⁴ Ibid., 'Sed iam non ipse operatur illud, sed id quod in illo habitat peccatum. Ideo non eum reprehendit cor eius in omni uita eius...'

⁹⁵ Ibid., 'quod ut omnino ibi non sit (sc. *peccatum in membris*), *adiacet ei uelle, sed perficere bonum non adiacet.*'

⁹⁶ Ibid., 'Ita nec in uita sua, id est in fide sua a corde suo reprehenditur et sine peccato non esse conuincitur.'

⁹⁷ For a general account of the thought of Julian of Eclanum, see Josef Lössl, *Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung* (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill) 2001. For Julian's conception of *concupiscentia* and grace, see Mathijs Lamberigts, 'Julian von Aeclanum und seine Sicht der Gnade: Eine Alternative?' in Meyer et al.(eds.), *Gnade – Freiheit – Rechtfertigung: augustinische Topoi und ihre Wirkungsgeschichte: Internationales Kolloquium zum 1650. Geburtstag Augustins vom 25. bis 27. November 2004 im Erbacher Hof zu Mainz*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008; id. 'The Philosophical and Theological Background of Julian of Aeclanum's Concept of Concupiscence', in Meyer et al.(eds.), *Die christlich-philosophischen Diskurse der Spätantike: Texte, Personen, Institutionen*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008.

⁹⁸ See notes 89-90 for other references of identifying the presence of *concupiscentia carnis* in the baptized as *peccatum* or *peccati lex*. Obviously, this identification comes from the influence of St. Paul's Epistles, especially Rom 5:16-18; 6:12. It deserves notice that Augustine more frequently addresses it as a remaining defect (*uitium*) that does no harm (*non obesse*). See for instance, *gr. et pecc. or.* II, 39, 44. 'Obsess ista carnis concupiscentia, etiam tantummodo quod inesset, nisi peccatorum remissio sic prodesset ut quae in eis est, et nato et renato, nato quidem et inesse et obesse, renato autem inesse quidem, sed non obesse possit... Manet quippe in prole, ita ut ream faciat, originis uitium, etiam si in parente reatus eiusdem uitii remissione ablatus est peccatorum, donec omne uitium, cui consentiendo peccatur, regeneratione nouissima consumatur...' See also *ibid.*, I, 19, 20; II, 33, 38. For earlier references in his debates with the Pelagians, see notes 83, 88.

and the mind, remaining sovereign, does not hand over the members to it to carry out those acts... It is called sin by a figure of speech (*modo quodam loquendi*), because it was produced by sin and leads to sin, if it is victorious.⁹⁹

Concupiscentia carnis is called a sin only in a metaphorical sense because it is both a punishment for one's original sin – the daughter of sin – on the one hand, and a cause of one's further sins – the mother of many sins – on the other hand.¹⁰⁰ It remains as an innate weakness (*nostra infirmitas*), a bad quality (*mala qualitas*), or a disease (*languor*) that should be healed.¹⁰¹ It is not counted as a sin that deserves reproach from the heart as shown earlier.

Nevertheless, *concupiscentia carnis* maintains its actuality (*aliquid agere*) by striking us with evil and turbulent desires (*desideria mala et turpia*), which remind us of the insuperable imperfection of this life.¹⁰² Obviously, the desires stemming from *concupiscentia carnis* are not morally neutral. By definition, they are perverted inclinations that conflict with the spiritual longing of the mind, though not brought into completion by the assent of the will yet.¹⁰³ In his later arguments against Julian, Augustine makes it clear that *concupiscentia carnis* is called a sin precisely for this innate disobedience against the dominion of the mind:

In the same way, *concupiscentia carnis* against which the good spirit has its own desires is a sin (*peccatum*) because it involves disobedience against the rule of the mind. It is a punishment of sin (*poena peccati*), because it is retribution that the disobedient deserve, and it is the

⁹⁹ *nupt. et conc.* I, 23, 25. 'Nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis, quando illi ad illicita opera non consentitur, atque ut ea perpetrent a regina mente membra non dantur... Sed quia modo quodam loquendi peccatum uocatur, quod et peccato facta est et peccatum, si uicerit, facit...'

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 24, 27. '...concupiscentia carnis tamquam filia peccati et, quando illi ad turpia consentitur, etiam peccatorum matre multorum...'

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, I, 25, 28. 'Quamuis autem reatu suo iam soluto, manet tamen, donec sanetur omnis infirmitas nostra, proficiente renouatione interioris hominis de die in diem, cum exterior induerit incorruptionem; non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor.'

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, I, 27, 30. 'Agit enim aliquid concupiscentia carnis et quando ei non exhibetur uel cordis adsensus, ubi regnet, uel membra uelut arma quibus inpleatur quod iubet. Agit autem quid nisi ipsa desideria mala et turpia?'

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, I, 29, 32. 'Quando autem sunt (sc. desideria) quidem, sed non eis oboeditur, nec malum perficitur, quia non eis oboeditur, nec bonum, quia sunt, sed fit ex aliqua parte bonum, quia concupiscentiae malae non consentitur, et ex aliqua parte remanet malum, quia uel concupiscitur.' For the definition of *concupiscentia carnis* and the conflict between spirit and carnal concupiscence, see my article on *concupiscentia*, Wu 2007.

cause of sin (*causa peccati*) by reason of the failure of one who consents or the infection of one who is born.¹⁰⁴

However, *concupiscentia carnis* is not an act of the will, but rather the innate infirmity suffered by the will in this life from the beginning. In baptized Christians, especially in those who live a continent life vigorously fighting against this inborn inclination, *concupiscentia carnis* does remain, but without the explicit consent of the will. However, if the presence of *concupiscentia carnis* is not only a punishment for our original sin, but a sin in-and-of itself even after its guilt is forgiven, we should demonstrate that it is not only an evil, but an evil for which we are rightly held responsible, though not necessarily guilty of. Therefore it should be demonstrated how the baptized can be held responsible for such an inherited tendency of the soul that is no longer assented to by the consent of the will and further sinful deeds.

Augustine is quite sensitive to the issue at stake, i.e. what happens to moral responsibility when the consent of the will is absent, for the verb *captiuare* implies the enslaved state of the apostle with respect to innate evil, which is no longer accompanied by his assent.¹⁰⁵ In his interpretation, Augustine underscores that the presence of *concupiscentia carnis* is due to our own defective nature:

That is, he meant that *it holds me captive* by the flesh, not by the mind, by its impulse (*motione*), not by his consent, and thus *it holds me captive*, not because some foreign nature (*natura aliena*) is present in the flesh, but because our own nature is present here.¹⁰⁶

Concupiscentia carnis is ascribed to our own nature just because *caro* is an indispensable part of our nature in this life. However, this fact by itself cannot prove that this natural defect is a sin, for no one would call blindness or deafness a sin.

To illuminate the moral agency in *concupiscentia carnis* itself, Augustine draws attention to the particularity of this disease. As argued earlier, what we have lost due to this disease of the soul is nothing

¹⁰⁴ *c. Iul.* V, 3, 8. 'Ita concupiscentia carnis, aduersus quam bonus concupiscit spiritus, et peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis; et poena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inobedientis; et causa peccati est, defectione consentientis uel contagione nascentis.'

¹⁰⁵ *c. ep. Pel.* I, 10, 20. 'Sed quod dixit *captiuantem me* potest mouere, si nulla consensio est.'

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, '... ut *'captiuantem me'* dixerit *'carne'*, non mente, *'motione'*, non consensione, et ideo *'captiuantem me'*, quia et in ipsa carne non est aliena natura, sed nostra.'

other than the capacity of the will to love the good. Therefore, it is not morally neutral as a bodily disease or defect is. Furthermore, I have revealed elsewhere that the act (*actus*) of *concupiscentia carnis* already involves an implicit approval of the will by stirring turbulent desires (*desideria*).¹⁰⁷ If this were not the case, then the soul would not be affected by this bad quality latent in our nature. For this reason, a virtuous person can refuse temptation by an explicit decision of the will. However, he is not able to eradicate the minimal consent entailed in the actuality of *concupiscentia carnis*. Augustine's interpretation of its presence in dreams of holy people confirms the existence of the will's minimum assent in this life.

What does it (sc. *concupiscentia*) in those whom it forces to be on guard and to fight against itself? And if it should steal from them the slightest consent (*ullus assensus*), even in sleep, they groan when they have awakened and say, *How my soul is filled with illusions* (Ps 38:8). For when dreams deceive the sleeping senses, even chaste souls somehow fall into such shameful consent. If the Most High held such consent against them, who would live in chastity?¹⁰⁸

Obviously, this *assensus* is not based on the decision of the will that would be condemned by God. Rather, it is an involuntary approval of the will in an unconscious state. Likewise, the presence of *concupiscentia* itself already contains such an involuntary assent of the will, for no desire can be aroused without the intention of the will. This involuntary presence of the will indicates that the *concupiscentia* is precisely the infirmity of the will itself. Our heart does not reproach its mere presence because we commit no further sin by consenting to it. However, the saints groan on account of it because it displays the imperfection not of a foreign nature, but of their own nature, not of another psychological faculty, but of the faculty of the will itself. For this reason, Augustine later highlights that original sin and its effect should be censured in all cases, both in the unbaptized and the baptized.¹⁰⁹ In his final interpretation of this innate sin in response to

¹⁰⁷ See my article on *concupiscentia* mentioned earlier in note 42 and 'Rethinking Augustine's Adaptation of 'First Movements' of Affection,' forthcoming.

¹⁰⁸ c. *Iul.* IV, 2, 10. 'Et si quando ab eis ullum uel in somnis furatur assensum, cum euigilauerint, gemere et inter gemitus dicere, *Quomodo impleta est anima mea illusionibus?* Quia cum sopitos deludunt somnia sensus, nescio quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur assensus.'

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *corr. et gr.* 6, 9, 'Immo uero corripitur et in singulis, quod est omnium. Non enim propterea cuiusquam non est, quod ab ea nullus immunis est. Peccata quidem ista originalia ideo dicuntur aliena, quod ea singuli de parentibus trahunt: sed non sine causa dicuntur et nostra, quia in illo uno omnes, sicut dicit Apostolus, peccauerunt.

Julian, he identifies it as a non-voluntary sin (*peccatum non uoluntarium*).¹¹⁰ It is not a voluntary sin because it can occur without the consent of the will. Nevertheless, it is a sin because it is an evil and the actuality of this evil essentially involves the involuntary assent of the will.

In his controversy with Julian, Augustine also deals with the problem of the responsibility of unbaptized adults for the evil actions they perform out of ignorance and infirmity.

It is not true, then, as some claim that we say and as this fellow (sc. ulian) also dares to write, that we hold that 'all are forced (*cogi*),' as if against their will (*inuiti*), 'into sin by the necessity (*necessitas*) of their flesh.' Rather, if they are already at that age at which they can make the decision (*arbitrium*) of their own mind, they are held in sin by their own will (*sua uoluntate*) and are hurled down from sin to sin by their own will. Nor does the one who persuades and deceives them aim at anything else for them but that they commit sin by their own will, whether out of ignorance of the truth or out of delight in iniquity or out of both of these evils, namely, blindness and weakness. But this will which is free for evil actions (*libera in malis*) because it takes delight in evil is not free for good actions (*in bonis*), because it has not been set free (*liberata*).¹¹¹

Here, Augustine makes it clear that the inherited necessity of sin cannot compel anyone into sin against one's will. As descendants of Adam, we are plunged into necessity (*in necessitatem*). However, this does not signify that our further evildoings under the yoke of this necessity are not acts of will. Obviously, they are not counted as voluntary actions because the faculty of the will is free to do otherwise. Augustine undoubtedly claims that the will that has not been set free, like that of the unbaptized, is not free to accomplish righteous actions by its own efforts. In other words,

Corripiatur ergo origo damnabilis, ut ex dolore correptionis uoluntas regenerationis oriatur.

¹¹⁰ *c. Iul. imp.* IV, 93. 'Cur non attendis esse peccatum etiam non uoluntarium, certe in illo qui dicit, quacumque causa hoc dicat: *Si autem quod nolo ego hoc facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum?*'

¹¹¹ *c. ep. Pel.*, I, 3, 7. 'Non itaque, sicut dicunt nos quidam dicere et iste audet insuper scribere, 'omnes in peccatum' uelut inuiti 'carnis suae necessitate coguntur', sed si iam in ea aetate sunt ut propriae mentis utantur arbitrio, et in peccato sua uoluntate retinentur, et a peccato in peccatum sua uoluntate committant uel ignorantia ueritatis uel delectatione iniquitatis uel utroque malo et caecitatis et infirmitatis. Sed haec uoluntas, quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est, quia liberata non est.'

without extra aid, the will of the unbaptized necessarily consents to the evil desires that stem from its innate defect. This inevitable consent is still identified as a disposition of the will because the will finds delight in blameworthy desires and nothing can compel it to do so.

Here, we encounter again the relationship between necessity and will, and the subtle distinction between necessity and compulsion. Two significant points were reached in earlier arguments. First, Augustine's analysis of *duae uoluntates* has established that the will is essentially independent from any kind of compulsion, whether external or internal. The necessity of *consuetudo* cannot force the will to take on a malicious disposition.¹¹² Second, in his criticism of Julian's definition of *liberum arbitrium* as a two way power free from any kind of necessity, Augustine displays his insights into the presence of necessity in the faculty of will. He lists the necessity of habit, the ignorance of the good, and the necessity of affection, which even Julian himself cannot deny.¹¹³

Now, I advance to Augustine's arguments for the compatibility of *uoluntas* with *necessitas*, which are more solidly elaborated on in his last response to Julian, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*.

First, Augustine points out that we can have a volition towards that which occurs necessarily, such as a will to die. For instance, Paul desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ.¹¹⁴ This is a will of a necessity (*uoluntas necessitatis*).

Second, there is also a necessity of the will (*necessitas uoluntatis*), 'by which it is necessary that we will to live happily'.¹¹⁵ From the fact that beatitude is a predictable object of the will common to all, we cannot infer that we are **compelled** to take it as the ultimate end of our will. It is absurd to say that one intends one's happiness

¹¹² See notes 42, 54-55.

¹¹³ *c. Iul. imp.* I, 105, '...si enim necessitas nulla peccandi est, ut omittam uim mali eius, quod originaliter trahitur, hoc enim nullum esse uos uultis, quid patiebatur, quaeso, qui secundum uestrum sensum tanta mole malae consuetudinis premebatur, ut diceret: *Non quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod nolo malum hoc ago?*'.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 103, (1) 'Cum enim sit moriendi necessitas, quis neget quod possit esse et uoluntas? Vnde ait apostolus *concupiscentiam* se habere *dissolui et esse cum Christo* (Phil 1:23). Cum ergo uult mori quem necesse est mori, simul sunt necessitas et uoluntas, quod tu (sc. Julianus) fieri posse uana uoluntate, nulla necessitate negaueras.'

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 93. 'Cur non attendis esse etiam necessitatem, qua necesse est uelimus beate uiuere, et clausis oculis sic alteri alteram opponis, quasi uoluntas necessitatis aut necessitas uoluntatis esse non possit?'

unwillingly, and even more absurd that one can become happy against one's will.¹¹⁶

Moreover, a necessity can be produced by the will without necessity and remain even without the will.¹¹⁷ As demonstrated before, the necessity of habit is an illuminating example of this kind of necessity. Augustine believes that *concupiscentia carnis* also belongs to this category; for it is both a result of original sin committed by the will of the first human beings and a necessity of sin which belongs to no one's will.¹¹⁸ The presence of this necessity evidently deprives a fallen agent of the ability to refrain from sinning by its own efforts. However, the freedom to make a decision independently from any compulsion is never removed from the faculty of the will. Therefore, even under the compulsive force of *concupiscentia carnis*, the will is still free to make its own decisions, though unable to attain a righteous disposition before its original sin has been forgiven. Moreover, Augustine stresses that this necessity of sin can remain in the baptized together with the will towards righteousness, which further confirms that necessity does not destroy the freedom of the will.¹¹⁹

Bearing this delicate relationship between necessity and the will in mind, I return to the problem of responsibility. It is evident now that even the unbaptized are not compelled by their initial conditions to sin, though unable to change their state by themselves. The necessity of sin cannot be identified with the coercion to sin. The latter is self-contradictory. For sin cannot come into being without the will and the faculty of will is unable to coexist with coercion. Therefore, the evil

¹¹⁶ Augustine insists that even when God foreknows that one is to be happy and therefore one is necessarily going to be happy, this necessity does not mean that beatitude is not an object of the will. See *lib. arb.* III, 3, 7. 'Nam et de beatitudine quod dixisti, non abs te ipso beatum fieri, ita dixisti, quasi hoc ego negauerim: sed dico, cum futurus es beatus, non te inuitum, sed uolentem futurum. Cum igitur praescius sit Deus futurae beatitudinis tuae – nec aliter aliquid fieri possit quam ille praesciuit, alioquin nulla praescientia est –, non tamen ex eo cogimur sentire, quod absurdissimum est et longe a ueritate seclusum, non te uolentem beatum futurum.'

¹¹⁷ *c. Iul. imp.* IV, 103, (2). '...et est iam necessitas etiam sine uoluntate, quam fecit uoluntas sine necessitate. Nam et ille qui dicit: *Non quod uolo ago*, certe secundum uos necessitate consuetudinis premitur; hanc autem necessitatem, ne liberum auferatis arbitrium, eum sibi uoluntate fecisse contenditis...'

¹¹⁸ Certainly, as stressed earlier, how this necessity, as punishment inflicted on the first couple, was transmitted to their descendents is not the concern here. What concerns me here is primarily how we can justify culpability for those actions subject to this necessity of sin.

¹¹⁹ *c. Iul. imp.* IV, 103, (4). '...profecto in homine mole consuetudinis presso simul esse possunt et iustitiae uoluntas et peccati necessitas, quoniam *uelle adiacet mihi* professio est uoluntatis, *perficere autem bonum non inuenio* confessio est necessitatis.'

actions of an unbaptized adult are both a necessary result of their *concupiscentia* and voluntary acts based on the decision of the will. In light of this, in both the baptized and the unbaptized, wrongful acts under the necessity of sin cannot be appropriately called 'involuntary sins'. In both cases, they are based on the free decision of the will, which is essentially exempt from any kind of compulsion. They are voluntary sins not in the sense that they are brought into being by choices of the will that could have been otherwise, but in that they result from unforced decisions of the will that are intimate to the state of the self. The only difference brought about by baptism or divine grace is simply that the baptized are endowed with the ability to will the good and to refrain from sinning. They enjoy greater freedom not in the sense that they are able to choose between good and evil but in that they are closer to the attainment of the good by this ability that comes from divine providence.

IV. Conclusion

It is evident now that the involuntary involvement of the will in the actuality of *concupiscentia carnis* helps Augustine clarify our limited responsibility for this innate defect of the will. By appealing to his peculiar conception of the freedom of the will, Augustine also establishes our responsibility for evildeeds under the necessity of sin, even though they can be unavoidable in a number of cases. Therefore, even if the infirmity and blindness of the mind are not penal but natural conditions of the human race, we can still establish our moral **responsibility** in this mortal life. The only thing that we cannot attain by purely philosophical arguments is the **culpability** of *concupiscentia carnis* of infants before being forgiven by baptism. We are held responsible for the pure presence of *concupiscentia carnis* in the way that we are responsible for involuntary consent in dreams, but not as we are for deeds based on the explicit consent of the will. To justify our guilt for the inborn weakness of the will, we have to locate Augustine's reflections on *concupiscentia carnis* in its original theological contexts. By recognizing *concupiscentia* as a sin, Augustine shows that we are not only reasonably blamed but justly punished for its involuntary presence in our life, unless our guilt has been forgiven by the prevenient grace. Nonetheless, while this **culpability** is significant for Augustine's theological arguments for the necessity of baptism for infants and the necessity of predestined grace, it is not indispensable for the philosophical account of moral responsibility as reconstructed from his theological arguments.

In sum, a shrewd understanding of *uoluntas* and its freedom allows Augustine to develop a better explication of our responsibility for the innate weakness of our human condition than that of *uoluntarium in causa*.¹²⁰

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RUFINUS THE SYRIAN: MYTH AND REALITY¹

The title already announces the conclusion of this study: Rufinus the Syrian is a myth! But like all myths, that of the Syrian has some basis in reality; and like all myths it has a pervasive influence, and is difficult to dispel. In the following pages I shall examine how the conviction has emerged that Rufinus the Syrian in fact existed, and I hope to show that the conviction is based on a mistaken interpretation of the facts. Facts, however, are facts, and to suggest that the Syrian never existed is by no means to imply that he is simply the product of somebody's creative imagination, although (as we shall see) some degree of imagination may have played a part in constructing his *persona*. I have questioned long ago the main evidence – that of Marius Mercator² on which the existence of the Syrian is based –, but with little apparent success,³ because he still remains entrenched in our histories.⁴ That I return to the subject again is partly because I remain convinced that in essence that earlier contribution was correct, but mainly because a re-consideration both of the evidence, and in particular of the interpretation of that evidence, leads to an ever more cogent conclusion that the case for the existence of the Syrian is fundamentally flawed. A more important reason to return to the question lies in the consequence of removing the Syrian from the picture. The contention that Mercator referred to the Aquileian will require that we re-read Rufinus of Aquileia not only to show that he is a possible candidate, but also to note how much of an influence he could have had in early Pelagian circles. Since both sides of the coin – the Syrian 'myth' and the 'Pelagian' Aquileian – go against the grain in current accounts, some details will necessarily have to be teased out at length, whereas

¹ The following is a much expanded version of a 'Short Communication' given at The Fifteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, August 2007, under the title 'The Identity of Rufinus the Syrian.'

² W. Dunphy, 'Marius Mercator on Rufinus the Syrian: Was Schwartz Mistaken?' *Augustinianum*, 32 (1992), pp. 279–88.

³ Thus, in a review of developments in studies on Pelagian history, Y.-M. Duval could claim in 1999 that 'almost everybody is agreed' as to the identity of Rufinus: 'Pélage en son temps: Données chronologiques nouvelles pour une présentation nouvelle,' in *Studia Patristica* 38, Leuven 2001, pp. 95–118 (here p. 99).

⁴ H. Chadwick, *The Church in Ancient Society: From Galilee to Gregory the Great*, Oxford 2001, pp. 439, 449–450, offers two (not fully consistent) accounts of the Syrian. V.H. Drecoll, *Augustin Handbuch*, Tübingen 2007, p. 179, begins his account of the Pelagian conflict with a *de rigueur* mention of Rufinus the Syrian, while admitting that we know little about the man.

at some other points the reader of the following may also baulk at the lack of more cogent argument.

Suspensions

The 'biography' of Rufinus is brief. Mercator's account tells us that he was of Syrian origin. He was influenced⁵ by the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia, which he brought with him to Rome in the time of Pope Anastasius (c.400). Because of some 'difficulties' encountered with the Pope, he refrained from promulgating his views personally but did so through Pelagius and Caelestius who became his disciples. For reference purposes I give the necessary essentials of the text: *Quaestio contra catholicam fidem apud nonnullos Syrorum et praecipue in Cilicia a Theodoro (...) iamdudum mota (...). hanc ineptam (...) quaestionem sub sanctae recordationis Anastasio (...) Rufinus quondam natione Syrus Romam primum inuexit (...), Pelagium gente Brittanum monachum tunc decepit (...). huic Pelagio adhaesit Caelestius, nobilis natu quidem et illius temporis auditorialis scholasticus (...).*⁶ We next hear of him – if it is the same Rufinus! – from another source, when in 411 Caelestius, in his 'trial' at Carthage, referred to 'the holy priest Rufinus' as his authority for the opinion that there is no such thing as *tradux peccati*.⁷ That is all!⁸

There is, of course, much more in our modern accounts of Rufinus. He is identified as the priest Rufinus, a member of the community in Bethlehem whom Jerome sent via Rome to Milan about the same time when Mercator's Rufinus traveled to Rome.⁹ A *Liber de*

⁵ The connection is not at all clear. It seems to reflect Mercator's own attitude to Theodore at the time of writing, else we must posit an otherwise unknown pre-Pelagian debate in the East concerning the consequences of the sin of Adam.

⁶ Marius Mercator, *Commonitorium I*, ACO I,v,1, pp. 5-6. An Italian translation of the anti-Pelagian memoranda is given by S. Prete, *I Memoriali Antipelagiani*, Siena 1960. A German translation of Mercator's full dossier is in C. Konoppa, *Die Werke des Marius Mercator*, Berlin 2005.

⁷ Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, II,3,3, CSEL 42, p. 168, in a citation from the minutes of the meeting. I have examined the events at length in my study: 'A Lost Year: Pelagianism in Carthage, 411 A.D.,' *Augustinianum* 45(2005), pp. 389-466.

⁸ The scant indications available are collated in C. Pietri, L. Pietri (ed.), *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, Rome 2000, pp. 1941-42 (s.v. 'Rufinus 6').

⁹ Jerome, *Ep.* 81,2, CSEL 55, p. 107; *Apologia contra Rufinum* III,24, CCSL 79, p. 96. P. Lardet, *L'Apologie de Jérôme contre Rufin: un commentaire*, Leiden 1993, pp. 321-22, lists opinions on the identification, but refrains from drawing his own

Fide, which is attributed in a MS to Rufinus (of Palestine), is generally put under the name of the Syrian.¹⁰ It contains Pelagian teaching, particularly a denial of *tradux peccati*, that is very close to that of an otherwise unidentified book which Augustine refuted in his first anti-Pelagian writing (411), *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*. The connection with Caelestius' 'holy priest Rufinus' and further with Mercator's Syrian is considered to be obvious. A further step is taken to consolidate the picture with the probable identification of the author of the *Liber* with the hitherto unidentified translator of a major portion of the Vulgate New Testament. That translation, it is maintained, is first detected in Pelagian writings, and is also used in the *Liber*. It would seem logical that the translator be found in Pelagian circles, and that the Syrian, as author of the *Liber* and as a former member of Jerome's community, should continue the work left unfinished by Jerome.¹¹

Many question marks could and should be added to the brief sketch just given. It is not very clear, for instance, how a Syrian, particularly a Syrian with even remote sympathy for Theodore of Mopsuestia, could become a member of Jerome's community. To the best of our knowledge, the Rufinus sent by Jerome to the West was a Latin. That the *Liber de Fide* was in circulation before 411 is possible, but by no means an established fact. Much less established is its attribution to Rufinus the Syrian. That the *Liber* can be taken as a very early, or even the earliest witness to use of the Vulgate is open to doubt, but it is a problem that I hope to examine elsewhere. Should there be a case to be made for identifying the continuator of the translation of the Vulgate in Pelagian circles, he succeeded well in avoiding all trace of Pelagianism in his translation.¹² This is important, because strangely none of the biblical texts bandied about in the controversy, and which he supposedly translated, were 'tampered with' in any Pelagian sense in the translation.

conclusion. The *Prosopographie* ('Rufinus 5' p. 1941) accepts the identification as being possible, but at 'Rufinus 6' rejects it!

¹⁰ For a modern edition see M.W. Miller, *Rufini Presbyteri Liber de Fide*, Washington 1964. Earlier editions are in PL 21,1123-54 (Sirmond); PL 48,451-488 (Garnier). We shall meet it again later.

¹¹ The clearest presentation of the case is made by B. Fischer, 'Das Neue Testament in lateinischer Sprache,' in K. Aland, (ed.), *Die alten Übersetzungen des Neuen Testaments, die Kirchenväterzitate und Lektionare*, Berlin 1972, pp. 1-92 (see esp. p. 74).

¹² D. de Bruyne, 'Étude sur les origines de notre texte Latin de Saint Paul,' in *Revue Biblique*, 12 (1915), pp. 358-92, vainly attempted to attribute the translation to Pelagius himself, while admitting from the outset the non-Pelagian character of the translation.

If the sketchy 'biography' of the Syrian is basically correct, we are confronted with a phenomenon that is passing strange, even if it would not be a unique case in history. It means that through the first decade of the fifth century there were two persons with considerable influence in Roman Christian circles (irrespective of whether or not they resided in the city) who not only shared the same name, but also lived uncannily parallel lives: Rufinus the Syrian and Rufinus of Aquileia.¹³ The following outline may serve to draw attention to a malaise that underlies any ready acceptance of the existence of the Syrian. Both the Aquileian and the Syrian came to Rome from the East just before the turn of the century. They were both proficient in Latin and Greek. They both – whether personally in the case of the Aquileian, or through his disciples in the case of the Syrian – enjoyed the patronage the Anicii. They both introduced to Rome teachings that would subsequently be condemned as being heretical. They both met with the disapproval of Pope Anastasius. They both refrained from publishing their theological opinions under their own names. They both had a formative influence on the Pelagians – Mercator is explicit on this with reference to the Syrian; Jerome indicates the translations of Rufinus of Aquileia as being at the root of the Pelagian error. A direct result of that influence emerged in Pelagius' Expositions on the Pauline letters.¹⁴ Finally, they both exited the stage of history at about the same time in 410/411. At least we can date the death of Rufinus of Aquileia to around this time; of the Syrian, other than the (possible) reference made to him by Caelestius in 411, we hear no more.

It is not impossible, of course, that two different individuals are being referred to here. Rufinus was, after all, very common as a name.

¹³ I omit the others listed under the same name (cf. Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 39, n. 23), in particular Rufinus of Rome to whom Jerome addressed *Ep.* 74. For the Aquileian the essential work of reference remains F.X. Murphy, *Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411). His Life and Works*, Washington 1945. The sources for a *Vita Rufini (Aquilensis)* are collected s.v. '(Tyrannius) Rufinus 3' in *Prosopographie* (see n. 8 above) pp. 1925-40. For more recent studies see H. Drobner, 'Tirannio Rufino di Concordia (Aquileia): Bibliografia,' *Augustinianum*, 40 (2000), pp. 461-517, and *ibid.* 'Rufinus, Tyrannius' (with updates) on the internet edition of *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon* (www.bautz-de/bbkl).

¹⁴ Mercator 'casually' tells us that *after* Pelagius came under the influence of Rufinus the Syrian he then had the audacity (unlike Rufinus) to publish a Commentary on Paul. Rufinus of Aquileia was chided by his contemporaries for not publishing his translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans under his own name. In modern scholarship it has been established Pelagius used the Origen-Rufinus Commentary. From the following it will emerge that Mercator had told us this long ago!

Nevertheless, when presented in outline the parallels noted above cannot but give rise to the *suspicion* that we may be confronted here by the same individual appearing in our sources under two different names, however we attempt to explain some serious difficulties encountered if we attempt to reduce them to one person. That suspicion will only be strengthened when we look more closely into the arguments offered to establish the identity of the Syrian, and strengthened even more when we examine the sources themselves that serve as a basis for those arguments. Both the sources and the arguments are open to question.

Where is the Syrian?

A major obstacle to accepting the existence of Rufinus the Syrian is paradoxically his *absence* both from the Pelagian controversy itself and from contemporary (or later) ancient accounts of it. Assuming that Mercator and Caelestius refer to the same Rufinus, we are not only confined to these two solitary references, but also confronted with what would amount to a conspiracy of silence on his name in all the other sources. Even the reference by Caelestius, we should recall, is transmitted to us by Augustine, who sees no need to identify this Rufinus. Later in the same writing, in a rebuff of Caelestius' claim that the matter under debate was a *quaestio disputata et disputanda* (and presumably that his opinion was also held by others), Augustine writes: *huius peruersitatis [Pelagius et Caelestius] auctores uel perhibentur uel etiam probantur uel certe, si auctores non sunt, sed hoc ab aliis didicerunt, assertores tamen atque doctores*.¹⁵ We might include the Syrian among the *alii*, but it is strange that, despite his having the account of Carthage under his eyes at this time, Augustine passes over the mention of Rufinus without comment. To say that his name does not appear in *Ep.* 190 because he was dead¹⁶ is not sufficient. Mercator, a decade or more later, has no qualms about naming him. When

¹⁵ *De gratia Christi*, II,23,26, CSEL 42, pp. 184-85 (in similar terms in *Ep.* 190,6,22, CSEL 57, p. 157, from the same period). In 416 when he learned of Diospolis he named Pelagius: *princeps est auctor huius perniciosi dogmatis* (*Sermo Dolbeau* 30 [*Serm.*348A],6). For the reading (not *est et*) cf. G. Partoens, 'Quelques remarques de critique textuelle sur le sermon 348A augmenté de Saint Augustin (Dolbeau 30),' *Augustiniana* 50 (2000), pp. 175-95 (here p. 182). The African bishops in their letters to Pope Innocent follow suit: Pelagius and Caelestius are the *auctores* (*Epp.*175,1; 176,4).

¹⁶ Thus W. Thiele, *Epistulae Catholicae* [VL 26/1], Freiburg 1969, 'Einleitung' p. 101*.

Pelagius himself saw fit to quote in his 'Expositions' the opinion of those who were opposed to *tradux peccati*,¹⁷ he did not quote his 'teacher' the Syrian, but his own disciple Caelestius.¹⁸ We will search in vain through all the ancient sources for any mention of a Syrian. There is, of course, a clear reference to Rufinus as the source of Pelagianism, but that is Jerome's attempt to 'blame it all' on Rufinus of Aquileia,¹⁹ and in modern scholarship the identification of the Syrian with the Aquileian is roundly excluded. This identification was the substance of my earlier attempt at a solution in which I revived an opinion that was advanced very summarily by Schwartz.²⁰ A. de Veer²¹ found Schwartz's suggestion to be too '*tortueuse*' and could conclude a comprehensive note on the identity of Rufinus by saying that Garnier's solution remains the most plausible.²² Thirty years later the question has been again examined at some length by C. Konoppa, who in conclusion gives the 'most likely' solution – it is essentially the *opinio communis* that goes back to Garnier.²³

Between c.430 when Mercator wrote his *Commonitoria* at the time of the Council of Ephesus, and 1673 when Garnier published the *Collectio Palatina*, the Syrian remained unknown. An objection will perhaps be raised to that statement with the reminder that the *Liber de Fide* was known, but that objection will not suffice. The

¹⁷ *De peccatorum meritis*, III,2,2, (p. 129): *Hi autem, inquit, qui contra traducem peccati sunt, ita illam impugnare nituntur...* (= Pelagius, in *Rom.* 5,15, ed. Souter, p. 46). Attention is rarely given to the fact that this is the only *in extenso* citation of any 'author' in the Expositions.

¹⁸ [Ambrosius Iunior], '*Praedestinatus*,' I,88 (CCSL 25B, p. 52) (referring to Pelagius in his Expositions): *tangens Caelestium, qui contra traducem peccati primus scripsit...*

¹⁹ R.F. Evans, 'Pelagius and the Revival of the Origenist Controversy,' in *Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals*, New York 1968, pp. 6-25, made a strong case for not dismissing Jerome's evaluation.

²⁰ E. Schwartz in the *Praefatio* to his edition of the *Collectio Palatina*, ACO I,v,1, p.XI. He offered only a few references to Jerome as being Mercator's source. Scholars, he opined, simply did not notice that the Aquileian was intended because it seemed too incredible (*incredibile videtur*).

²¹ 'Le prêtre Rufinus,' BA 22, *La Crise Pélagienne II*, Paris 1975, pp. 704-711 (here p. 706). O. Wermelinger, *Rom und Pelagius*, Stuttgart 1975, p. 12, merely lists Schwartz 'with forerunners who held the same view,' and states that their identification of Rufinus of Aquileia as the person in question can be 'easily' discounted. In the same vein see B.R. Rees, *Pelagius: a Reluctant Heretic*, Woodbridge 1988, pp. 9-10. To equate Schwartz's position with the pre-Garnier view is not quite accurate, because the 'pre-Garnierians' did not have to contend with Mercator's evidence. When that evidence came to light, as we shall see, they then readily (at least initially) interpreted it as a reference to the Aquileian.

²² Reprinted in PL 48, 261-66. We shall examine that solution at length below.

²³ Konoppa, *Mercator*, pp. 94-98.

only surviving copy of the *Liber* was made c.600, possibly in northern Italy.²⁴ Another copy (later, but of unknown date and provenance) still existed in the 17th century, but is now lost.²⁵ Other than those, the *Liber* had no MS tradition. We should be wary, however, of concluding from this brief appearance of the *Liber* in history that 'knowledge' of the Syrian also survived. It is too easily assumed that the evidence of the colophon of the surviving MS, in which the author is identified as *Rufinus presbyter*, proves that this is a work by the Syrian. The text of the colophon (f.61r) is: *Exp(licit) Rufini pr(es)b(yster)i prouinciae palestinae / liber de fide translatus de graeco / in latinum sermonem. Amen.* This is very ambiguous. It is highly unlikely that anybody would have been identified as 'a/the priest of the Province of Palestine,' and I find it equally unlikely (though not impossible) that 'Province of Palestine' was used to identify any individual. Since the colophon continues with the claim that this is a translation from Greek I suggest that the text states that this is 'A Book of (the) Faith of the Province of Palestine.'²⁶

We can, however, bypass this problem, leaving it as a possible ambiguity, and still maintain that the MS tells us nothing about the existence of the Syrian. A gloss on the MS that is probably contemporary with the transcription of the text tells us *why* the copy was made. It was understood to be an anti-Arian tract by *Rufinus presbyter*, but the glossator warned against its concealed Pelagian content and recommended that it be removed from the codex. He also rejected its attribution to *Rufinus*, and identified the author as being Pelagius himself!²⁷ In so doing he left us in little doubt about his understanding of the identity of the writer to which it was falsely ascribed – Rufinus of Aquileia. This is confirmed by John the Deacon at about the same time (precise dates are again uncertain), who quoted excerpts from the *Liber* in his *Expositum in Heptateuchum*, and introduced them simply as *in libro de fide Rufini*.²⁸ When John also quoted from

²⁴ For the dates cf. Miller, pp. 46-47.

²⁵ See n. 37 below.

²⁶ In the concluding section of this study further evidence will be offered to support this suggestion.

²⁷ The text of the gloss is given by Miller, p. 36 (also in PLS I,1099). The recommendation that the *Liber* be removed from the collection suggests a time when the codex itself (as codex) was still incomplete. A later gloss at the conclusion (reproduced in Miller, p. 50) identifies the 'true' author as *Rufin[us] catholic[us]*.

²⁸ Miller, pp. 33-35. John's mistaken reference to a second book by Rufinus leads us again to the Aquileian. See my note: 'Rufinus the Syrian's 'Books', *Augustinianum* 23 (1983), pp. 523-29.

Rufinus of Aquileia's *De benedictionibus patriarcharum* he confined himself again to the simple reference *Rufini*.²⁹ At the time, therefore, when the *Liber* made a fleeting appearance in history, despite the reference to *Provincia Palestina* in the colophon of the MS – there is no incipit or other introductory matter – it was considered to be a work by Rufinus of Aquileia.

Before we turn to the Syrian's 'resurrection' a few background notes should be made. As we have seen, the only explicit mention of Rufinus the Syrian is made by Marius Mercator. Mercator's *Com-monitorium*, in turn, only survives in the *Collectio Palatina*, and this *Collectio*, in its turn, is only to be found in one codex. The repetition of 'only' must attract attention, and we shall have occasion to return to this strange phenomenon again. Mercator's name, but little else about him, was known from the works of Augustine.³⁰ But if the Syrian (with Mercator's writings) remained unknown, the Medievals were in no doubt as to the identity of the teacher of Caelestius. In the writings of Jerome the source of Pelagianism lay in the translations of Rufinus of Aquileia, and together with that information the Medievals were also armed with a 'Papal censure' of the Aquileian in the so-called *Decretum Gelasianum* attributed to Pope Gelasius.³¹ The fact that 'Pope' Gelasius was based on a garbled reading of Jerome's information was not an issue. It was Papal! At the beginning of the 17th century, to condense almost a millennium in one voice, Bellarmine could write: *Ruffinus Presbyter Aquileiensis... merito notatur erroris a Gelasio Papa*.³² It is furthermore important to keep in mind, when we examine the re-emergence of Rufinus the Syrian, not only this traditional and authority-based suspicion with regard to the Aquileian, but also, and even especially, the attitude of the age towards Jerome.³³

²⁹ Paris BNF lat. 12,309, ff.72v, 94r.

³⁰ At least from *De Octo Dulcitii Quaest.* 3,2, CCSL 44A, p. 275, and the *Indiculus* by Possidius (PL 46,9). The extent to which Augustine's *Ep.* 93 to Mercator was known must remain uncertain. It was only first included in the corpus of letters in the Maurist edition. I omit Jerome's mention of Mercator (*Ep.* 154). This letter was not widely known, and was only added to his collection a century ago.

³¹ E. von Dobschütz (ed.), *Decretum Gelasianum [de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis]*, TU 38/4, Leipzig 1912, pp. 44-45. Rufinus (*uir religiosissimus*) is not in fact listed among the authors to be rejected, but it is noted that Jerome *eum in aliquibus de arbitrii libertate notauit, illa sentimus quae praedictum beatum Hieronymum sentire cognoscimus*.

³² R. Bellarmine, *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis, Opera Omnia* XII, p. 392. I cite from the edition of the *Opera* by J. Fèvre (Paris 1891). The first edition appeared in 1613.

³³ See the admirable account given by E.F. Rice, *Saint Jerome in the Renaissance*, Baltimore, 1985.

While both sides, in the Confessional divide after the Reformation, haggled – between and among themselves – over the interpretation and ‘ownership’ of Augustine, Jerome, who gave the Church its Vulgate Bible, was a bastion of Tridentine Roman orthodoxy. The suggestion that the ‘Father of Pelagianism’ could be somebody other than Rufinus of Aquileia, whom Jerome had pointedly singled out for that role, might (and would) require that attitudes towards Jerome be re-dimensioned,³⁴ and that would inevitably cast a shadow on the splendour of the *Doctor Maximus*.

Enter Garnier

When Jacques Sirmond first published the text of the *Liber de fide* in 1650³⁵ he refrained from offering any name for its author. In a note on the final colophon (quoted above) he maintained that this should be retained as the missing *Inscriptio* to the book, and from here he took the title of the book and the name of the author *ne libro nomen deesset*.³⁶ In the brief introductory note ‘to the reader’ (*Lectori*) he drew attention to the fact that John the Deacon had attributed the work to *Rufinus presbyter*, and that in the two MSS (*in binis exemplaribus*) Sirmond had seen in Corbie, an annotator had rejected this attribution and proposed Pelagius as the author.³⁷ Sirmond excluded both Pelagius and Rufinus (of Aquileia) from consideration, the latter because the

³⁴ For a brief (at times benign) account of the ‘reception’ of Rufinus through the ages see F.X. Murphy, *Rufinus*, (n. 13 above) pp.ix-xvi, 223-25. The account needs revision and updating. A history of ‘Rufinus in history’ (especially as found in the MSS) remains to be written.

³⁵ J. Sirmond, *Rufini presbyteri provinciae Palaestinae Liber de Fide*, Paris 1650. This, without the [*Praefatio*] *lector*, is reprinted (from Vallarsi’s edition of the works of Rufinus) in PL 21,1123-54.

³⁶ PL 21,1153-54. In this same note he deduces from the evidence of John the Deacon (see n. 28 above): *libros de fide sub Rufini nomine duos saltem fuisse*. The running header in the *editio princeps* (and in reprints in his *Opera Varia*) is *De Fide Liber I*, implying the existence of *Liber II*! In PL 21 it is simply *Liber de Fide*, although the references in the notes to a second book remain.

³⁷ I have argued elsewhere that when he established the text for publication Sirmond used the lost MS, since all the MS variants he offers agree with the readings found in the surviving *Codex Petropolitanus*. Cf. W. Dunphy, ‘The Lost Manuscript of Pseudo-Rufinus: *De Fide*,’ *Augustinianum* 40 (2000), pp. 89-103. At that time I was not aware that in the *editio princeps* the variants (given as footnotes in later editions and PL) appeared in a final page under the title: *Omissa vel Variantia ex altero exemplari*. This unnumbered page seems to have been added after the text had been prepared for print.

Liber de Fide is so violently anti-Origenist that it could not have been written by Rufinus. There is no question of Rufinus the Syrian here – nor could there have been, because at the time of the publication of the *Liber*, the possible existence of the Syrian was still unknown.³⁸ In a note to c.38 (*Quod liberi non pro parentibus puniantur...*) Sirmond is not unaware of the difficulty involved in excluding Rufinus (of Aquileia!) as author, because the text here launches into a denial of *tradux peccati*, and according to accepted opinion in Sirmond's day Caelestius at Carthage had invoked the authority of the Aquileian on this issue.³⁹ He concludes the note, however, by maintaining that the anti-Origenism of the *Liber* is sufficient to reject the Aquileian as author. In the first reprint of Sirmond's text – to be distinguished from Garnier's 'corrected' re-edition, to which we will give our attention presently – it appears as: *Anonymi cuiusdam, qui sub nomine Ruffini Praesbyteri a Iac. Sirmondo editus est, liber de fide*.⁴⁰

The year 1673, when Jean Garnier published his edition of the *Codex Palatinus* 234,⁴¹ was not a time when one would enter lightly into the field of Pelagian history. Mention of a few items must suffice here to conjure up the atmosphere of the times. The controverted *Augustinus* by C. Jansen (*Jansenius*) had been (posthumously) published in 1640. Some works of Augustine that are greatly important to a full appreciation of the Pelagian debate (e.g. *De Gestis Pelagii* and *Contra Iulianum op. imperf.*) had only been re-discovered and published earlier in the century. Attempts to publish a new 'definitive' edition of the corpus of Augustine's writings were meeting with considerable difficulty and the complete (Maurist) edition would not begin

³⁸ A question mark should be added here because Holsten, before his death in 1661, had taken notes from the *Cod. Pal.* and rumours of it provoked lively interest (cf. Schoenemann in PL 48,51). The earliest date I can find is 1655 (ACO p.V), but it is not to be ruled out that rumours about the MS were in circulation earlier, and that Sirmond may have been informed of some of MS's contents.

³⁹ PL 21,1143-44. The note is followed by a 'rectification' of Sirmond by Vallarsi who explains that Caelestius referred to a different Rufinus: *puta Syrum illum, quem narrat Marius Mercator...* Nevertheless Vallarsi remains cautious: *Nec ignoramus quae de ipso [= Rufino Syro(?)] disputant eruditi. Sed Aquileiensis apud Pamachium non fuerit*. The reference of *de ipso* is not entirely clear.

⁴⁰ M. de la Bigne, *Maxima Bibliotheca veterum Patrum* 27/2, Lyon 1677, col. 528-543. It continued in that ever-expanding collection until the appearance of Migne's *Patrologia*.

⁴¹ J. Garnier, *Marii Mercatoris S. Augustino aequalis opera quaecumque extant...*, Paris 1673. Schwartz, little impressed by Garnier's work as editor, notes (p.VII) that the volume was laden *magna notarum farragine et uasta dissertationum mole...*! An edition of *Comm.II* (on Caelestius) had been published in Paris by P. Labbe in 1671.

to appear until 1679.⁴² H. de Noris had been working for some time on his *Historia Pelagiana* that would appear in 1673, the same year as Garnier's publication.⁴³ That too would see a history of controversy.⁴⁴ Since Mercator's writings offered new historical information on Pelagianism it is not surprising that they should have aroused interest and their publication even involved some intrigue.⁴⁵

One chapter of Garnier's many studies that accompany his edition of the writings of Mercator is entitled: *De Rufino quem Coelestius pro magistro agnovit*.⁴⁶ In an extended commentary on Mercator's account of the history of Pelagianism he thus launches directly into an identification of Mercator's Syrian as 'the holy priest Rufinus' named by Caelestius. But before he lists his arguments Garnier shows himself to be aware that he is treading on thin ice. He raises the question of the identity of Rufinus, he says, because of the widespread and deeply rooted opinion – based on good authority! – that Caelestius had referred to Rufinus of Aquileia.⁴⁷ This Rufinus was *notissimus* throughout the whole Church because of his friendship with Melania; because of the books he published; because of his enmity towards *sanctus Hieronymus*; and last, but not least, because of his obstinate defense of Origenism. Garnier admits that it will be difficult

⁴² For an appreciation of the difficulties encountered cf. G. Folliet, 'L'édition des *Opera insigniora S. Augustini c. Pelagianos* publiée à Rome en 1652 et censurée par le Saint-Office,' *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 39 (1993), pp. 425-39. A comprehensive account of the on-going work of publication during the century is given by J.-L. Quantin, 'L'Augustin du XVII^e siècle? Questions de corpus et de canon,' in L. Devillairs (ed.), *Augustin au XVII^e siècle*, Firenze 2007, pp. 3-77.

⁴³ Souter, I, p. 13, noting that Noris consulted the MS of Mercator during the preparation of his *Historia*, also draws attention to the fact that Noris had completed the work by mid-1672.

⁴⁴ Noris, while retaining the connection between Rufinus and the Pelagians, nevertheless maintained that Rufinus did not end his days as a heretic (cf. I, p. 14). (The edition to hand was published in Padua, 1708). Writing almost a century later (1762) J. Stilling introduced his biography of Jerome by roundly denouncing attempts – Tilliemo is singled out in particular – to re-instate Rufinus (cf. AASS 48, *Sept. VIII*, p. 418). Note here that Stilling is primarily concerned with protecting the image of Jerome!

⁴⁵ Cf. Schoenemann, PL 48,51-52, Schwartz, *Praefatio*, pp.V-VII, Souter (I, pp. 13-14), for some interesting notes on the belaboured first appearance in print of Mercator's writings. The 'mountain' of c.3,500 Palatine codices had only been transferred from Heidelberg in 1623.

⁴⁶ PL 48,261-66.

⁴⁷ The passage (PL 48,261D) deserves to be quoted: *Insedit animis multorum opinio, invaluitque, partim tempore, partim auctoritate, sive opinantium, qui magni viri, sive Patrum, quorum testimonia proferuntur in speciem manifesta, Rufinum quem Coelestius dixit se audivisse, eundem esse cum Aquilensi presbytero...* In the preface to the volume (PL 48,27) we read: *refellitur popularis opinio de Rufino Aquileiensi*.

to eradicate this long-established opinion, but he offers his arguments with all due deference (*nisi admodum timide*) for the consideration of scholars.⁴⁸

A series of nine arguments is then offered, which I summarize here in the order in which they are given by Garnier. (In the following ‘*’ introduces Garnier’s ‘*quod non*’ with regard to the Aquileian.)

1. Mercator refers to a Syrian. *We know from his contemporaries that the other Rufinus was Italian (cf. Palladius), and from the region of Aquileia (cf. Jerome).
2. When Mercator writes *quidam natione Syrus*, he implies that this Rufinus was evidently little known. *The Aquileian, on the other hand, was known throughout the world because of his erudition, his *sanctitas*, and his association with Melania the Elder.
3. The Syrian came to Rome during the Pontificate of Anastasius. *The Aquileian came during the reign of Siricius.
4. Caelestius tells us that (‘his’) Rufinus stayed in the home of Pam-machius, the admirer of Jerome. *This would be unthinkable in the case of the Aquileian, Jerome’s arch-enemy.
5. Rufinus was in Rome when Caelestius met him. *The Aquileian had left Rome, did not even return there when summoned by Pope Anastasius, and remained in Aquileia until the barbarians invaded that region.
6. Jerome accused the Aquileian on the question of ‘*apatheia*’ and sinlessness; no mention was made his denying *tradux peccati* which was denied by the other Rufinus. *As an Origenist, in fact, the Aquileian would have done worse than his namesake – he would have upheld the blasphemy of a sin of the pre-existent soul.
7. Paulinus of Milan raised no objection to Caelestius’s reference to the authority of Rufinus. *Had this been a reference to the Aquileian, Paulinus would have known (and used) the fact that Rufinus of Aquileia had been condemned in both Rome and Milan.
8. Caelestius clearly (*satis aperte*) referred to somebody still living, otherwise he would have added something like *beatae recordationis* to his name instead of simply calling him *sanctus* Rufinus. *The Aquileian, however, had died a year or two earlier in Sicily.

⁴⁸ Note that Garnier is only concerned here with the identity of the Rufinus mentioned in the account of Carthage. He is careful to retain the *disrepute* of the Aquileian, which will in fact be central to his argument.

9. Caelestius spoke of a priest in good standing in the Church (*sanc-tus presbyter*). *Pope Anastasius, in his letter to John of Jerusalem, had excommunicated the Aquileian.

Having thus, to his satisfaction, excluded Rufinus of Aquileia from consideration in the notice given by Caelestius, Garnier goes on to attempt to piece together the strands of information on which a 'biography' of the Syrian can be built. Before he takes the plunge, however, and identifies the Pelagian Rufinus of Syria as the emissary of Jerome, he makes a last attempt at self-defense: *Fatebor rugens me nihil habere quod vehementer affirmare velim, propter inveteratum de Aquileiensi praeiudicium*.⁴⁹ His main evidence, of necessity, is the *Liber de Fide* only recently brought to light by Sirmond. An annotated edition of the *Liber* is included in a collection of the various Pelagian *libelli* that were written at the time of the controversy,⁵⁰ and in Garnier's introduction to it another abbreviated account of the Syrian is offered, this time with more attention given to the role of Julian as the presumed translator of the *Liber*. Garnier notes points of contact between the *Liber* and the *Libellus fidei* attributed by Garnier to Julian of Aeclanum,⁵¹ and confidently dates the 'translation' to c.417. With equal confidence he maintains that the whole book (including its 'Pelagian' section!) in its original Greek form can be dated between 370 and 400, i.e., prior to the Syrian's dispute with Pope Anastasius.⁵²

Writing with the conviction (and for readers more or less equally convinced) that Rufinus of Aquileia was an excommunicated heretic, arguments nn. 7 and 9 would have a certain value within Garnier's terms of reference at that time. In fact, Garnier felt so assured on this point that he had no qualms about 'doctoring' his edition of the letter of Anastasius (also found in the *Collectio Palatina*) in such a manner as to make it clear that the Pope had not only condemned Origenism, but had also specifically condemned Rufinus in person – something

⁴⁹ PL 48,262D.

⁵⁰ Garnier's 'edition' of the *Liber de Fide* is reprinted in PL 48,451-488 (Garnier's preface at col.449-450). Apart from (unnecessarily) re-ordering some sections of the text his main editorial contribution was to include in the text most of Sirmond's MS variants, and to tacitly 'correct' some of the text. By ranking it among the other Pelagian apologetic *libelli* Garnier gives a false impression of the character of the writing. A further unfortunate result is that the *Liber* is frequently and mistakenly (and confusingly) referred to as the *Libellus fidei* of Rufinus.

⁵¹ PL 48,508-26.

⁵² PL 48,450. A discussion of the nature and origin of the *Liber de Fide* must be left to a different forum. Some preliminary notes are given in the concluding section below.

that Anastasius did not do.⁵³ To base anything, however, on the fact that Paulinus of Milan did not object to the introduction of the authority of (the condemned/excommunicated) Rufinus goes beyond the limits of the evidence, because only a snippet of the debate in Carthage has been preserved for us. Furthermore, even at the time Garnier wrote, Noris (to offer one example) was raising some doubts about the disrepute into which the Aquileian had been consigned by history.⁵⁴ Noris accepted the fact that Rufinus had subscribed to the heterodox views of Origen that were rejected in the time of Pope Anastasius, but with a list Rufinus' friends and admirers Noris argued that the Aquileian must have been reconciled to the Church by Pope Innocent, and as proof offered the text of the so-called *Fides Rufini* from the (still unpublished) *Collectio Palatina*.⁵⁵ While nobody, nowadays, would give credence to an argument based on the assertion that Rufinus was either condemned as a heretic, or excommunicated,⁵⁶ this assertion nevertheless plays an important part in Garnier's cumulative argument to which credence is in fact given. There is also a further inherent flaw in Garnier's own logic at this point, because in n. 2 he had argued that Rufinus of Aquileia (unlike the Syrian) was renowned in ancient times *ob eruditionis famam, opinionem sanctitatis et Melaniae consortium*. To this fame (in the same n. 2) Garnier opposes the relative obscurity of the Syrian, while the reasons offered for the Aquileian's *fama* (especially his repute for *sanctitas*!) are left without comment.

Here too (n. 2) Garnier's argument runs into a further difficulty, because in order to maintain the separate identity of the relatively unknown Syrian he tacitly emends *quondam* in the MS to

⁵³ He claims (PL 48,236n) that there is a lacuna in the MS(S) which he restores with the aid of Jerome's *Ep.* 130. Coustant vigorously rejects the restoration (PL 20,72n). Schwartz (p. 4) passes it over in silence.

⁵⁴ See n. 44 above. The alacrity with which De Pin and Tillemont (for references see Murphy, pp.xi-xii) would accept Garnier's discovery of the Syrian (but not his condemnation of the Aquileian!) suggests that Noris was giving voice to a growing re-evaluation of the Aquileian. See n. 136 below for a hint of this already in Trithemius.

⁵⁵ *Historia Pelagiana*, I, pp. 14-15. Garnier (PL 48,241-42) rejects any connection of the *Fides* with the Aquileian, and suggests that the connection in the title be referred to the priest who was sent by Jerome to Milan. Its presence at this point in the *Collectio Palatina* is due, he thinks, to an *imperitus librarius*!

⁵⁶ Cf. Murphy, pp. 127-37 for an account of what happened in Rome and Milan. The 'authority' of the *Decretum Gelasianum* in the question has also been removed since the time of Garnier.

⁵⁷ The MS's *quondam* is retained by Baluze (cf. PL 48,111) and Schwartz (who does not even note Garnier's 'correction'). In modern times, Wermelinger (*Rom und Pelagius*, p. 12, n. 40) can write that the MS 'must' be corrected! This 'insignificant' *quondam* will become very significant later in the present study.

quidam.⁵⁷ If, for the moment, we allow the possibility that the Aquileian *might* have denied *tradux peccati* – and on this we will have much more to say – it is more likely that a lawyer of Caelestius' acumen⁵⁸ would have invoked the authority of somebody who was *notissimus* rather than base his case on the opinion of some unknown Syrian cleric. But even if we exclude the Aquileian, the surety with which Caelestius claims that the authority of this one priest should be sufficient argues against the suggestion that this priest was little known.

To claim in n. 8 that use the honorific *sanctus*, along with omission of any suggestion of his death, is indicative of Rufinus being alive when Caelestius referred to him, is singularly unconvincing. The very text on which Garnier bases his argument should have put him on his guard, because Caelestius informed the assembly that Rufinus stayed in the home of *sanctus* Pammachius. While (according to Garnier) they were well aware of the death of the Aquileian, apparently Caelestius and his audience had not been informed of the death of the senator. Pammachius, also, would surely have deserved some form of posthumous honorific of the kind expected here by Garnier.⁵⁹ Curiously, a modern commentator can use the term *sanctus* as indicative of the fact that the Rufinus referred to by Caelestius was in fact dead!⁶⁰ Use of the word *sanctus* here, or failure to use *beatae recordationis*, offers no basis on which to determine whether the person was currently living or dead.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Mercator refers to him as *auditorialis scholasticus* (*Comm.I*, ACO I.v.1, p. 6). On *auditorialis scholasticus* see M. Stein, 'Bemerkungen zu Iulianus von Aeclanum,' *JAC* 43 (2000), pp. 122–25. This 'title' may have had derogatory overtones. Use of it by Julian (*Aug. Cont. Iul.* 2,10,37; 6,11,34) in a list of 'common' professions and trades suggests that it does not simply mean 'student' but somebody already engaged in his profession, and there is no reason to think that Mercator was not referring to Caelestius as such. In the page of Cicero to which Julian referred (*De Officiis* I,42,150), the position of 'magistrate' is in fact one deserving respect! J.-M. Salamito (n. 153 below) is not convincing when (p. 117) he prefers 'student' as the meaning intended by Julian. Konoppa, *Mercator*, p. 107, underlines its negative connotation.

⁵⁹ PL 48,282 Garnier dates the trial of Caelestius to 412. It is now agreed that this was 411. The precise date of the death of Rufinus of Aquileia (410? or perhaps even 412?) is still debated. Cf. Y.-M. Duval, 'Rufin d'Aquilée émule de Jérôme de Stridon,' in S. Crogiez-Pétréquin (ed.), *Dieu(x) et Hommes*, Rouen 2005, pp. 163–185 (here p. 185, n. 109). Murphy, *Rufinus*, pp. 218, 235, gives 410, but strangely puts 411 in the study's title!

⁶⁰ Cf. H. I. Marrou, 'Les attaches orientales du Pélagianisme,' in *Patristique et Humanisme*, Paris 1976, pp. 331–44 (here p. 333).

⁶¹ I. Kessler, *Reichtumskritik und Pelagianismus*, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1999, p. 33, rejecting Marrou, offers a few telling examples of *sanctus* referring to the living. I am not fully convinced, however, with his suggestion that the term might carry a connotation of an ascetic background for Rufinus.

Remaining for the moment on matters of history, we must note that Garnier's case is without foundation when he maintains (n. 5) that Caelestius cannot have heard Rufinus of Aquileia in Rome because the latter was in Aquileia during the time concerned. Garnier himself does not offer a *specific* date either for the return south of the Aquileian, or for Caelestius' departure from Rome.⁶² Apart from associating the latter with the general exodus that took place ahead of Alaric's threat to the city, we do not know when exactly Caelestius left Rome, but it has been established with reasonable certainty that Rufinus left Aquileia earlier than 407.⁶³ While precise dates in either case may be still in debate, from the point of view of chronology there was ample time for the two to meet in Rome. Whether or not such a meeting could have taken place in the home of Pammachius is a problem to which greater attention will be given below.

When Garnier at n. 3 draws attention to the chronological impossibility of identifying the two Rufinus' in earlier years he would seem to be on safe ground, yet again his argument is wanting. The Aquileian had indeed come to Rome during the Pontificate of Siricius and had left before Anastasius became Pope. Therefore, Mercator's Rufinus, who arrived in the time of Anastasius, must refer (according to Garnier, and almost everybody else) to a different Rufinus. Nevertheless, although Garnier had Jerome's account of the origins of Pelagianism (as an offshoot of Origenism) before his eyes, and uses it specifically in his arguments – as we shall see again in the next paragraph – he failed to notice that Jerome, when he wrote about it to Demetrius (*Ep.* 130), had purposely displaced the history of the Origenist dispute into the Pontificate of Anastasius. Garnier even depends on Jerome's information both here (n. 3) and in his repeated insistence on the condemnation of Rufinus by Anastasius (nn. 7,9). This might have led him (and others) to notice that, irrespective of the absence of Rufinus of Aquileia from Rome, and irrespective of the inaccuracy of Jerome's version, it was in fact during the time of Anastasius that the debate over Origen 'began' in Rome, because earlier Siricius had refused to recognize that it was a problem.⁶⁴

Jerome's contribution to the debate is central to n. 6, but Garnier's use of it borders on the inept, even when judged in terms of the

⁶² PL 48,280C: Caelestius left Rome in 408 or 409; PL 48,262B: Rufinus did not leave Aquileia *priusquam barbari patriam vastarent*.

⁶³ For the date see C.P. Hammond, 'The Last Ten Years of Rufinus' Life and the Date of his Move South from Aquileia,' in *Journal of Theological Studies*, 28 (1977), pp. 372–429. (At p. 421 she allows for a date 'as early as 403 or 404.')

⁶⁴ On the complicated history of the dispute see P. Laurence, 'Marcella, Jérôme et Origène' in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 42 (1996), pp. 267–93. The account, however, makes Pammachius more culpable than I would accept.

knowledge that was available to him. It is true that Jerome attacked the Pelagians with respect to their teaching on '*apatheia*', a teaching that was not far removed from the Origenism to be found in the translations done by Rufinus translations. Jerome wrote on the basis of the evidence currently available to him in Palestine of what the Pelagians were teaching, and he was as yet unaware of the developments in Africa, in which the problem of *tradux peccati* took centre stage. When apprised of the African condemnation of Caelestius,⁶⁵ Jerome readily subscribed to it, despite the difficulties this raised for his own teaching on the creationist origin of the soul. Insofar as Jerome did not accuse the Aquileian of denying *tradux peccati*, whereas Caelestius claimed that 'his' Rufinus did make such a denial, Garnier's distinguishing here between two different persons seems again to be persuasive. When, however, he then expands on the *probable* opinion of the Aquileian on the status of the soul, Garnier leads us to the point where his own argument crumbles. As an Origenist (Garnier continues) the Aquileian would not only have affirmed the pre-existence of the soul, and would have posited the sinful fall of the pre-existing soul. Here Garnier draws a conclusion concerning Rufinus of Aquileia on a subject on which the same Rufinus resolutely refused to decide, precisely because he found himself barred from reaching the conclusion that Garnier suggests he would have reached. We will return later to an examination of the writings of Rufinus to attempt to understand what his thought on the question *might* have been,⁶⁶ but it is unnecessary in the present context to search there, because Caelestius did not offer any writing by Rufinus to bolster his case. The evidence used at Carthage (insofar as we know) was based on what Caelestius *heard* Rufinus deny, not on anything that the latter had written on the subject. Caelestius, we may recall, was reputed to have been the first to commit to writing a rejection of *tradux peccati*.⁶⁷ If we are to exclude the Aquileian from consideration here it will not be sufficient to do so because no explicit rejection of *tradux peccati* can be found in his surviving writings and translations. We must establish from his existing works that he *would not* have denied it. As we shall see, however, the evidence clearly points in the opposite direction, namely, that he *would* have denied it.

⁶⁵ Jerome probably depended on Orosius' account. More detail on the matter is not germane to the present discussion.

⁶⁶ It will be argued below that there is adequate evidence to show that Rufinus of Aquileia would not have countenanced the imputation of *peccatum alieni*, and consequently would logically have excluded *tradux peccati*.

⁶⁷ See nn. 17, 18 above.

Sanctus Pammachius

Whoever the Rufinus referred to by Caelestius was, he expressed his rejection of *tradux peccati* in the home of Pammachius where he was a guest: *sanctus presbyter Rufinus, Romae qui mansit cum sancto Pammachio*.⁶⁸ Strangely, throughout the traditional understanding that identified this Rufinus with the Aquileian, this item of information does not seem to have created a problem, but since it was first (to my knowledge) used by Garnier, down to the present, it has become a staple component of the argument: Rufinus of Aquileia *could not* have been a welcome guest in the home of Pammachius.⁶⁹ The assertion deserves closer examination. As the long-standing friend, promoter, and protector of Jerome, and the person in Rome who played a central role (*apparently* on Jerome's side) in the debate concerning Origen, Pammachius would not be readily seen as the host of Jerome's arch-rival Rufinus. The bases for the conclusion, however, are not as convincing as they might seem at first sight, and as a conclusion it may in fact do a grave injustice to Pammachius.

Pammachius,⁷⁰ who died in 410, had been a person to reckon with in Africa where he held estates (and had possibly been proconsul),⁷¹ and to drop in his name, even after his death, would be calculated to elicit some respect. Pammachius had also been the doyen of the Christian Roman aristocrats, the first senator (whom we know of) to have discreetly donned ascetical garb, an exemplary figure in the

⁶⁸ *De Gratia Christi* II,3,3, CSEL 42, p. 168.

⁶⁹ Thus in a Maurist note to this text in PL 44,387, following a list of possible candidates, we read with reference to the Aquileian: *Certe vix, ac ne vix quidam credi potest, aut Romam ivisse pontifice Anastasio, aut ibi cum Pammachio mansisse*. To list the names of those who repeat almost *ad litteram* this argument would almost amount to a recitation of the litany of studies of Pelagian history. Suffice it to say that I do not recall having found any account in which it is disputed. Rather than his 'private' home, the reference could conceivably be to the *xenodochium* established by Pammachius, where all would have been welcome – but that is an unnecessary quibble.

⁷⁰ See the entry in *Prosopographie chrétienne* (n. 8 above), pp. 1576–81. S. Rebenich, *Hieronymus und sein Kreis*, Stuttgart 1992, can mention Pammachius frequently, but is surprisingly brief in his characterization of the senator (pp. 199–201). Our very limited knowledge of Pammachius is due almost entirely to the pen of Jerome, and much of that in contexts of controversy, when of necessity Jerome would enlist any name of consequence on his own side.

⁷¹ The title may have been honorary, but if real, a precise year and location cannot be offered, according to the notice in A.M.H. Jones, *et al.*, (ed.), *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, vol.I, Cambridge 1971, p. 663.

exercise of charity (of the substantial kind that mattered), and most of all a defender of Christian orthodoxy in the struggle over Origenism a decade before this event in Carthage. Caelestius, *nobilis natu*, could (rightly or not) consider himself to be a representative member of the Roman nobility then present in unusual numbers in Carthage, a miscellaneous group who would have known Pammachius well. A person of their rank was being accused of nothing less serious than heresy by a 'mere' deacon of Milan, on a subject that was – at least in Roman circles⁷² – undefined and open to discussion, before a 'mere' provincial bishop, while the bishop of Rome had seen no need to take a stance on the question in debate! This, clearly, is a very broad and general summary of a complex situation, but it may help to draw our attention to the importance of this name, Pammachius, introduced by Caelestius in an almost gratuitous manner. For Garnier's case, of course, the appearance of Pammachius' name definitely excludes the Aquileian from being considered the teacher of Caelestius, given the senator's resolute antipathy towards Jerome's opponent.

It is evident that in the Origenist debate he played a prominent role on the anti-Origen (and anti-Rufinus) side.⁷³ The goading of his cousin Marcella may have played a part in his being involved,⁷⁴ but we must also acknowledge his personal interest in the affair. He requested Jerome to make a 'correct' translation of Origen's controversial *De Principiis*, a translation which he promptly suppressed, because he was horrified (according to Jerome!) when he saw the extent of the heterodoxy of the writing – although he did allow some friends to see it.⁷⁵ Pammachius also refused to forward a letter (*Ep.* 81) from Jerome to Rufinus, for the unconvincing reason (given by Jerome!) that Pammachius and his friends considered Rufinus to be

⁷² There is room for greater clarification on the extent and nature of the 'discussions' in these circles before the events of 411 in Africa. In E.D. Lavender's *The Development of Pelagius' Thought within a late fifth century Ascetic Movement in Rome*, Ann Arbor, 1992, opposition to Pelagianism is too easily equated with Africa's reaction.

⁷³ For details of the controversy see especially E.A. Clark, *The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate*, Princeton 1992. It is significant that the study ends (as it must) by being a study of Pelagianism. A question that must arise is, Where were the Pelagians during the Origenist controversy?

⁷⁴ See Laurence, 'Marcella' (n. 64 above). In *Ep.* 127,9-10, CSEL 56, pp. 152-53, Jerome speaks of repeated visits by Marcella to both Siricius and Anastasius in her efforts to have Origenism condemned.

⁷⁵ One wonders if Pammachius' real reasons for quashing the translation lay only in its literal presentation of the full extent of the errors of Origen. We shall return to this presently.

inimical to Jerome.⁷⁶ That letter (again according to Jerome!) was supposedly conciliatory, but it nevertheless put the onus of repairing the rift on Rufinus. Such a self-righteous attitude on Jerome's part could hardly be calculated to contribute to any attempt at pacification, and is a more likely explanation for their failure to forward the letter. In the closing pages of his *Apologia (contra Hieronymum)* Rufinus himself voiced his dismay that Pammachius did not bring his difficulties with the translation of *De Principiis* to Rufinus' personal attention, but he maintained due protocol and respect in any reference to the senator.⁷⁷

It will be noted that in the account above I have purposely accentuated the fact that our information comes from Jerome. Pammachius and Jerome had been acquainted since their schooldays (according to Jerome!) in the school of Donatus. We should not overplay that card, and Jerome only brings it up when it seems useful.⁷⁸ In the unspecified troubles that resulted in the effective banishment of Jerome from Rome in 385 there had been no Pammachius or *gens Furia* to defend and protect Jerome.⁷⁹ In the dispute over Jovinian in the early 390s Pammachius comes to the fore as a clear opponent of Jovinian. But the reasons behind Pammachius' request for clarifications of certain passages of *Contra Iovinianum*, should be attended to. This request is too easily interpreted as Pammachius merely voicing the objections of other readers to Jerome's perceived condemnation of marriage in that writing, but the long public *Apologia* (*Ep.* 48), with the accompanying personal letters to Pammachius and Domnio (*Epp.* 49-50), betray Jerome's awareness that his correspondents also were disturbed by his dim appreciation of marriage, and probably concurred in no small degree with the criticisms they reported from Rome.⁸⁰

With the emergence of the Origenist dispute we are again in difficulty as regards the part played by Pammachius in that debate.

⁷⁶ *Apologia contra Rufinum* I,12, CCSL 79, p. 12; again at III,38, p. 106.

⁷⁷ In *Contra Hieronymum* I,1 Pammachius is referred to as *nobilissimus*, and in II,48 speaks (via Apronianus) to *sanctus uir ille* (= Pammachius) (CCSL 20, pp. 37,116).

⁷⁸ In *Ep.* 49,1, CSEL 54 p. 351, Jerome refers to Pammachius as *condiscipulus*. J.N.D. Kelly, *Jerome. His Life, Writings, and Controversies*, London 1975, p. 19, portrays them as friends from their time together at grammar school.

⁷⁹ Pammachius, of course, may not have been in Rome at the time.

⁸⁰ The social and theological complexity of the debate is fully discussed by Y.-M. Duval, *L'Affaire Jovinien*, Rome 2003, (esp. pp. 248-50 on the reaction of Jerome's correspondents).

In general presentations of the history of events, Pammachius is simply portrayed as the agent and defender of orthodoxy (represented by Jerome) against the Origenist heresy (disseminated in Rufinus' translations). As mentioned above, Rufinus complained about the unfairness shown by Jerome's Roman friends in his own regard, but as regards Pammachius' personal motives we only know what has been recorded in the biased version of Jerome. There is little evidence to conclude that Pammachius was personally in any way a – much less *the* – ringleader in what Kelly refers to as 'chicanery' being perpetrated among Jerome's supporters in Rome.⁸¹ Pammachius was not Jerome's only source of information from Rome, nor was he the only (and certainly not the most active) promoter of Jerome's cause. The same must be said when we speak of opposition to Rufinus in the capital.

The case of Jerome's translation of *De Principiis* merits some comment. Where the Greek original is extant it is generally agreed that Rufinus' version – within the parameters he set himself of approximating the thought of Origen to the orthodoxy of Rufinus' own day; suppressing also what he thought (correctly or not) to be interpolations; and following the accepted translation techniques of the time – is not to be readily dismissed as a travesty of the original.⁸² Jerome, by contrast with Rufinus, who approached the translation with (self-confessed) diffidence,⁸³ rushed off a translation of that extensive work with almost prodigious speed.⁸⁴ The result, with its claim to being a literal translation, was not likely to have been a masterpiece either of literature or of translation. Pammachius, who knew Greek, and could not be written off as an amateur in questions of theology, would not have missed either of these points. In a translation undertaken in the heat of debate the equanimity of the translator may rightly be questioned. The very purpose of the new translation, namely to 'show up'

⁸¹ Kelly, *Jerome*, p. 240. I would demur when E. TeSelle tells us that Pammachius 'decided to intensify the conflict' over Origen. E. TeSelle, 'Rufinus the Syrian, Caecilius, Pelagius: Explorations in the Prehistory of the Pelagian Controversy,' *Augustinian Studies*, 3 (1972), pp. 61-95 (here p. 70).

⁸² The intricacy of this problem, to which we will return briefly later, emerges clearly in N. Pace's study (see n. 151 below). Here his chapter (pp. 162-96) on a comparison between the two translators' handling of doctrinally 'dangerous' passages is of particular relevance. Rufinus in his two *praefationes* explains why he thinks that the received text of *Peri Archon* should be emended (CCSL 20, pp. 246-48).

⁸³ In the *Praefatio* I,2 (CCSL 20, p. 245) he claims to have refused repeatedly until finally persuaded by Macharius.

⁸⁴ Kelly, *Jerome*, p. 237: 'in the winter months of 398/9.' Kelly, in these pages, is indulgent towards Jerome.

both the theological dangers of *De Principiis* and the distortions of Rufinus' version, could only result in the perceived heterodoxy of the original being necessarily (however subtly) underlined.⁸⁵ At the same time, indeed, Jerome's version served to justify the contention (maintained all along from the beginning by Rufinus!) that in its unadulterated state the original Greek text of Origen's work should not be made available without 'corrections' to Latin readers. Pammachius' suppression of the literal translation was in effect an expression of agreement with Rufinus! His action fits only with difficulty into any strategy on the part of Pammachius to denigrate Rufinus, and the motive attributed to him by Jerome – viz. Pammachius being horrified by the extent of Origen's heresy in the writing – bears all the stamp of being an expression more of Jerome's own *horror* with regard to Origenism than that of the senator.

We must not lose sight of Pammachius' senatorial colleague Apronianus, Rufinus' voice in Rome, who was currently, during the height of the controversy, receiving a steady flow of translations (of Basil, Gregory, and others). These gave a different account of Origen – and of Rufinus! – from that which Pammachius might get from Jerome. It was Apronianus who forwarded to Rufinus the letter of Jerome to Pammachius (*Ep.* 84). Rufinus' *Apologia* was addressed to Apronianus, and, while it is an answer to Jerome's letter, in the conclusion he specifically asked Apronianus to draw Pammachius' attention to the facts of the case. In the course of his discussion, Rufinus berated the behaviour of 'some' who had circulated inaccurate versions of (stolen!) drafts of his incompleting translation of *De Principiis*, adding – by the way! – that if this had happened in the public secular forum, the legal consequences would be serious (*Apol.* I, 19). It is unlikely that such an aside would have escaped Pammachius' notice. The polite, but forceful reprimand directed at the senator in Rufinus' closing paragraphs demanded that Pammachius reconsider. Although

⁸⁵ While noting that Jerome 'took great pains' over the translation, Kelly also adds (*loc. cit.*) that he 'subtly highlight[ed], here and there, some of Origen's objectionable statements.' Two important details need to be recalled here: a) We have only a few fragments of the original Greek text; b) our knowledge of Jerome's version depends on a few fragments that Jerome *himself* preserved for us, and (see Kelly, *loc. cit.*) there are but 'rare cases where [the Latin fragments] overlap with surviving fragments of the original Greek.'! This limited evidence hardly tells the whole story. In the evaluation of H. Crouzel, Jerome's translation was as tendentious as it was literal. See H. Crouzel, M. Simonetti, *Origène: Traité des Principes* I (SChr 252), Paris 1978, Introduction pp. 28–29.

Apologia contra Rufinum I, 12, CCSL 79, p. 12; again at III, 38 (p. 106)

the full force of Jerome's counter-attack was still to come, it is significant, I think, that Pammachius' direct involvement in the affair should end after the publication of Rufinus' *Apologia*.⁸⁶

Pammachius, after all, was a Roman senator, who had to live by the social and political rules of the City and meet expectations that Jerome in distant Bethlehem might disregard. After the Origenist debate and until his death in 410 Pammachius will be the dedicatee of a number of commentaries by Jerome, in the prefaces to which Jerome will repeatedly call on Pammachius to defend him from his detractors, but do these dedications allow us to assume that Pammachius was assiduously continuing to commission works from Jerome in these years? In the preface to the translation of Joshua in 404 we learn that Jerome has resurrected his work on translating the Old Testament from Hebrew, dedicating it to Eustochium. Paula, recently deceased, is mentioned also in the preface, giving the impression that she was also the intended recipient. But Jerome adds, almost by way of postscript, that he has returned to the task 'particularly because the admired and holy Pammachius insists on this in letters (*litteris flagitet*).'⁸⁷ There is no need to cast doubt on this, but there is also no reason to be specific about the date or force of Pammachius' insistence. Commentaries on three of the Minor Prophets (Hosea, Joel, Amos) will be dedicated to Pammachius in 406, as will the Commentary on Daniel in 407. It should be noted, however, that the former were originally intended for Paula before her death, and the latter had been undertaken at the request of Rufinus' friend Paulinus of Nola (with whom Jerome's relations had now for some reason turned sour). The revised dedications tell us much about Jerome and his need to maintain the support of people with influence in Rome in these years, but we should be hesitant in drawing conclusions from them about Pammachius' attitudes or behaviour in his immediate social surroundings in the capital.⁸⁸ After the abrupt end imposed on the fight between Jerome and Rufinus,

⁸⁶ Looking back on the events over a decade later, and at a time (413) when he was taking note of the re-emergence of Origenism in the teaching of Pelagius, Jerome would single out Marcella alone as having been the champion of orthodoxy. (Cf. *Ep.* 127,10, CSEL 56, p. 153.) Is this mere oversight?

⁸⁷ R. Weber, *et al.*, (ed.), *Biblia Sacra Vulgata*, Stuttgart 1975, pp. 285-86. If it is to be understood literally, one might easily surmise that Pammachius thought it safer that Jerome occupy himself with biblical translation and commentary to avoid getting involved in controversy. But see also the following note.

⁸⁸ Political implications of some of Jerome's exegesis in his Commentary on Daniel were probably a source of great embarrassment to Pammachius. Cf. É. Demougeot, 'Saint Jérôme, les Oracles Sibyllins et Stilicon,' *Revue des Études Anciennes*, 54(1952), pp. 83-92.

Pammachius fades from the picture in our knowledge of Roman society in these years, perhaps simply due to advancing age. We do not know how or why the end to bickering between the two *literati* was engineered. I have suggested above that Apronianus may have played a part in bringing Rufinus' side of the case to Pammachius notice. Avita, wife of Apronianus, was the niece of Melania the Elder (who was also related to Pammachius), and the presence in Rome of this long-time patroness of Rufinus surely had some influence on the developments.⁸⁹ That lady was also engaged – perhaps the main reason for her return – in sorting out the legal and social difficulties encountered by Melania the Younger and Pinianus in their efforts to dispose of their properties.⁹⁰ Mention of these names also inevitably brings the name of Rufinus of Aquileia (and Pelagius!) to mind.

The political-religious climate had changed greatly in Rome in the years in consideration. The anti-Origenist battle took the unexpected turn of becoming an 'anti-anti-Origenist' struggle when the Romans rallied to the defense of John Chrysostom against the machinations of Theophilus of Alexandria under whose umbrella Jerome had been campaigning. Rome no longer had much interest in the whining of Jerome in Bethlehem.⁹¹ An unusual event that does not find much echo in the theological histories of these years should also be recalled. From the end of 403 and for about six months, the Emperor Honorius resided in Rome. He would do so again in 407/8.⁹² His presence alone might be expected to impose a show of social unity on the part of the Christian aristocrats, leaving the rivalries of a few years earlier off the agenda. In fact we find that Honorius, Pope Innocent, and the Roman aristocracy, were now united in their defense of John

⁸⁹ She returned probably in 400, but we do not know how long she stayed in the environs of Rome. In 406(?) she visited Augustine, presumably on her way back to the East.

⁹⁰ See J. Curran, *Pagan City and Christian Capital*, Oxford (2000), pp. 269-98, for an enlightening account of the social (and legal!) problems facing Roman aristocrats who dallied with the ideals of Christian asceticism in these years. (Here cf. also p. 314.)

⁹¹ By the time Jerome sent his last translation of Theophilus' letters (the Paschal letter for 404) the readers for whom it was intended had already become openly anti-Theophilus. See Ch. Pietri, *Roma Christiana*, Rome 1976, pp. 1288-94.

⁹² See Pietri, *Roma Christiana*, pp. 912, 1318. Melania the Younger needed an imperial edict from Honorius, obtained through the influence of Serena (wife of Stilicho), in order to legally dispose of her property. On the complications involved see Curran, *Pagan City*, pp. 298-306. Melania the Elder (noted above) played some part. We have noted Stilicho in another connection above n. 88, where Pammachius must be distanced from Jerome.

Chrysostom. These same aristocrats were also the supporters of Rufinus of Aquileia.⁹³ At the same time Rufinus, who returned to (the environs of?) Rome in 405 or even earlier,⁹⁴ continued unimpeded with his translating of Origen, evidently for a receptive readership, and without interference from the now reigning Pope Innocent (on whose attitude Jerome is mute in these years).⁹⁵ Was the statesman Pammachius untouched by this change? In his attitude toward Rufinus did he stubbornly stay on the fringe of the aristocratic society, defending the bygone anti-Origenism of Jerome by keeping Rufinus at a distance – if, that is, he ever fully endorsed the ostracizing of Rufinus? In these years Palladius, whose admiration for Rufinus was equaled by his dislike of Jerome, visited Rome and found Pammachius to be a perfect and exemplary Christian gentleman; he mentions Pammachius together with Macharius, who ‘started the fire’ when he initially convinced Rufinus to translate Origen’s *Peri Archon*.⁹⁶ This is not trivial, because according to the received opinion concerning Pammachius in these years, the senator’s name should not find a place in Palladius’ list. Melania the Younger and her husband Pinianus were also remembered with high esteem by Palladius, but the existence of Marcella, the Roman lady who above all others (according to Jerome!) should deserve a mention in a catalogue of exemplary ascetics, cannot be detected even by allusion in the *Historia Lausiaca*. But Pammachius is listed there, and from the end of the dispute over Origen until his death, other than the continued mention of him by Jerome that was noted above, this is the sole reference to Pammachius that is left to us for these years. It is only when the Roman scene is read through

⁹³ I only mention in passing here the introduction of the influence of Chrysostom’s writings in Roman circles, where Pelagius himself and the nascent Pelagian movement show the first evidence for that influence. See Ch. Pietri, ‘Esquisse de Conclusion’ in C. Kannengiesser (ed.), *Jean Chrysostome et Augustin*, Paris 1975, pp. 283–305 (esp. pp. 300–303); Y.-M. Duval, ‘Le date du ‘De Natura’ de Pélage,’ in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 36 (1990), pp. 257–83. E. TeSelle, ‘Rufinus the Syrian,’ offers some concrete evidence from Chrysostom. This should also be extended to include further Antiochene (and other) influence on theology in Rome at the time. See Marrou, ‘Les attaches,’ for Theodore. We shall have occasion to return to this later.

⁹⁴ See n. 63 above.

⁹⁵ Jerome will only ‘discover’ Innocent when it suits him later in his letter to Demetrias (*Ep.* 130,16, CSEL 56, p. 196). On Jerome and Pope Innocent see G.D. Dunn, ‘Anastasius I and Innocent I: Reconsidering the Evidence of Jerome,’ *Vigiliae Christianae* 61(2007), pp. 30–41.

⁹⁶ *Historia Lausiaca* 62, (ed. Bartelink), Verona 1974, p. 268. In any study of the ‘affair’ of Chrysostom, E.D. Hunt, ‘Palladius of Helenopolis: A Party and its Supporters in the Church of the Late Fourth Century,’ *Journal of Theological Studies*, 24 (1973), pp. 456–80 is essential reading.

the eyes of Jerome in Bethlehem that we can maintain that Rufinus of Aquileia would continue to be a *persona non grata* in the eyes of Pammachius.⁹⁷

If I have delayed inordinately on the question of Pammachius it is because Caelestius' reference to the 'home of Pammachius' has become central to establishing the identity of the Syrian. That Caelestius himself (*nobilis natu*) should have been a visitor there would not be surprising. When Caelestius first appears on the historical stage in Carthage 411, he is introduced as one of that elusive group referred to as 'disciples of Pelagius'.⁹⁸ Pelagius was in the entourage of the Anicii, and as a disciple of Pelagius we can certainly locate Caelestius also in the circles of the Anicii, whether or not his own ranking in the nobility would already allow us to posit this.⁹⁹ Rufinus of Aquileia embarked on his final journey in the company of the Anicii, ending his days on one of their estates in Sicily. It is this Rufinus whose translations were being read by Pelagius and his disciples, and were sought after by many other avid Roman readers. It seems to me to be very unrealistic to think that it was not this same Rufinus who was the 'teacher' of Caelestius, and that the introduction of another Rufinus on the basis that the Aquileian could not have been a guest of Pammachius is gratuitous.¹⁰⁰ It is a conclusion that neglects the realities of the social context in Rome in the first decade of the fifth century, imposing on it entrenched attitudes that are specific to Jerome and his more fanatical supporters, among whom there is no reason to count Pammachius. It is also a conclusion that has gained cogency by the sheer momentum of repetition.

⁹⁷ The Roman setting in these years, as seen from the point of view of Rufinus, is well presented by A. Grappone, *Omellie Origeniane nella Traduzione di Rufino*, Rome 2007, pp. 26-55 ('I destinatari delle traduzioni').

⁹⁸ *De Gestis Pelagii*, 22.46, CSEL 42, p. 100. The denomination merits closer study. It is concealed in Jerome's jibe in *Ep.* 133.12, CSEL 56, p. 259: *rides atque laetaris, quod alii tuo (= Pelagii) nomine, alii Christi appellentur*. Pelagius' Expositions, according to Mercator (*Comm.II*, ACO p. 66), were circulated among those *de quorum amicitia praesumebat*. What form did this closed(?) 'circle of friends' or 'disciples' who were 'quasi-monks' (*uelut monachi*) take?

⁹⁹ Cf. P. Laurence, 'Proba, Juliana et Démétrias,' *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 48(2002), pp. 131-163. At p. 157 he does not rule out contact between the Anicii and Caelestius, but we are confined to inference. In their later attempts to defend Pelagius, it does not emerge from Augustine's answer in *De Gratia Christi* that the Anicii were particularly (if at all) concerned about the fate of Caelestius.

¹⁰⁰ The only viable objection I can think of is that Caelestius says that he 'stayed' (*mansit*) in the home of Pammachius. Would the Aquileian not have stayed with Apronianus, or the Anicii, or (cf. Grappone, p. 47) in the monastery at Pinetum? In the last analysis we simply cannot say where he might have stayed.

Quondam natione Syrus

The winning, and apparently unassailable argument in Garnier's case is the evidence of Mercator who identifies Rufinus as 'a former Syrian.' In my earlier study I argued (with Schwartz) that Mercator was in fact relying on Jerome's account, according to which Pelagianism was introduced to the West by Rufinus of Aquileia. Jerome had also identified the heresy as being widespread in Syria. It would not necessarily seem unusual, then, if Mercator should simply connect Rufinus with Syria. He goes further than that, however, when he also gives a Syrian origin to Rufinus (*natione Syrus*). By so doing, he apparently had somebody else in mind, because it was known (and Mercator himself surely knew) that the well-known Rufinus was originally from the region of Aquileia. Yet if we accept that Mercator is correct we are faced with a host of difficulties, most notably the fact that nobody else in antiquity seems to have known about the Syrian's existence. As a result of a ready acceptance of Mercator's version, scholarship since the time of Garnier has been attempting to hold together a puzzle, the pieces of which do not fit easily together. In addition, building on the assumption that the foundations are solidly based, the stature of the Syrian has grown steadily from being an elusive little-known priest who held questionable opinions on the existence of *tradux peccati*, to becoming a major contributor to Western Christian culture with his translation of an important part of Vulgate Bible.

Both solutions – a) Mercator (for some unclear reason) called the Aquileian a Syrian; or b) the Syrian really existed – presuppose that a more fundamental question has been asked and answered, and yet it is a question that (to my knowledge) nobody has ever asked. Did Mercator in fact refer to Rufinus as *quondam natione Syrus*? To even raise the question will court immediate rejection because the Syrian has become so much a part of the landscape in studies in the history of Pelagianism that he is almost indispensable. Just as Garnier, when he presented his case for the identity of the Syrian, had to grapple with an *inveterata opinio* concerning Rufinus of Aquileia as being the teacher of Caelestius, so too by raising this question I must confront an equally *inveterata opinio* concerning Rufinus the Syrian that took its origin in Garnier's solution to the enigma.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ A comment by Souter (l.p. 17) on Garnier's solution to a troublesome passage in Mercator's quotation from Pelagius will not be out of place here: 'The industry which Garnier displayed gained a signal reward: his opinion remained practically

An examination of Mercator's historical account in order to draw attention to the limitations of his accuracy would take us too far afield. Konoppa repeatedly (*Marius Mercator*, pp. 46, 93, 103...) assures us that he is 'generally well-informed' and worthy of reliance, but in fact when it comes to detail that appreciation must be tempered greatly, and her assurances conceal the fact that in the details Mercator is not reliable. With that in mind, we may legitimately question the accuracy of his information in this comment on Rufinus. It is strange, to say the least, that in *Comm. II* concerning Caelestius he should omit this detail concerning the Syrian, because to associate Caelestius with the then (when Mercator wrote) suspect theology of Theodore would surely make Mercator's presentation all the more cogent. True, *Comm. II* was written prior to *Comm. I* (on Julian), but in its present form it serves as an appendix to the invective against Julian, and one might expect Mercator to have added any additional incriminating information concerning the pre-history of Pelagianism. However, he evidently did not see the need to make such a change, and we are confined to this note in *Comm. I* on the beginning of Pelagian history in the West: *Rufinus quondam natione Syrus Romam primus inuexit...* Quite apart from the troublesome word *Syrus*, editors and commentators have had difficulty with *quondam natione*; some wish to emend it to *quidam natione*;¹⁰² or (if the manuscript reading is retained) it may be possible to disregard the irregularity and to 'think around it' by suggesting that Rufinus was indeed born in Syria but then moved on to Palestine (and later to Italy); or again, a more simple solution might lie in the idea that Mercator is more interested in presenting theological affiliations rather than dwelling on geographical details.¹⁰³ A further solution might lie in translating *quondam* as

undisputed for two centuries.' The mistake on the 'Syrian's' second book had an even longer period of survival (see n. 28 above).

¹⁰² See n. 57 above. S. Prete (*Memoriali* p. 16) simply omits it. Kessler (*Reich-tumskritik*, p. 33) quotes the text from Schwartz (with *quondam*) in a note, but writes *qu[i]dam* in his own account. Konoppa (*Mercator*, p. 86) is evasive, writing: '[Diese...Thematik] hat einst Rufinus, ab Geburt Syrer, als erster nach Rom hineingebracht...'

¹⁰³ Variants on these solutions prevail. See Wermelinger, *Rom und Pelagius*, p. 12. Noris was clearly at a loss to explain how Rufinus of Aquileia could be fitted into Mercator's version. At p. 4 we read that Rufinus came to Rome *ex Syria*, and because of his long stay in the East, *Syrus vulgo habebatur*. Fully aware that the Aquileian had studied with Didymus, Noris must also explain (p. 5) how Rufinus *also* learned from Theodore, but at this point he gives up: *num eundem [Theodorum] sacra loca visitantem, vel adhuc Presbyterum Antiochia catechesim exponentem audiens, vel eiusdem tantum libros legens, in medio relinquo.*

‘the late’ Rufinus, merely indicating that he was dead.¹⁰⁴ Yet another possibility might be – but this seems remote – to accept the text as it stands and, disregarding the niceties of word order, read *quondam* as a modifier of the verb *inuexit* (‘Rufinus some time ago – he was of Syrian nationality – first introduced [this heresy] to Rome.’)¹⁰⁵ All these efforts are concerned with the words *quondam natione*, leaving untouched the reference to *Syrus*.

Perhaps, however, the difficulty lies not with *quondam*, but with the words *natione Syrus*. The argument to be presented below concerning *natione Syrus* can equally apply to the word *quondam*, because I will argue that the text is indeed corrupt, and accordingly I should agree that a correction to *quidam* can be justified. Nevertheless, from Mercator’s usage it seems to me that *quondam* is to be retained, and if the argument offered below is correct its retention will in fact be necessary. He uses *quondam* with reference to both Nestorius as the former Patriarch of Constantinople (pp. 23, 28), and to Theodore, the former bishop of Mopsuestia (pp. 5, 23, 28).¹⁰⁶ Given that at the time Mercator wrote Theodore was dead, but Nestorius was still very much alive, Marrou’s case for translating *quondam* here as ‘the late Rufinus’ rests on a very tenuous basis.

One might be tempted to simply eliminate (with Prete) the offending *quondam*, or indeed the entire phrase, as a gloss! However, if *quondam* alone be considered the addition it would be difficult to explain why a glossator should supply it, and if he did, why did he not give us the more acceptable *quidam*? To excise the entire phrase as being a later gloss would leave a dangling mention of an unidentified Rufinus – something that is not normal to Mercator’s usage. He regularly identifies in some form or other the persons who appear in his account. We have just seen above two cases of this – Nestorius and Theodore. Pelagius is referred to as *gente Brittanu[s]*, but also as *monachu[s]* (p. 5).¹⁰⁷ Caelestius, when he joined Pelagius, was *nobilis natu quidem et illius temporis auditorialis scholasticus*

¹⁰⁴ So Marrou, ‘Les attaches orientales,’ p. 461, basing his interpretation on Mercator’s reference to Theodore, but see below on Nestorius.

¹⁰⁵ Konoppa in her translation (n. 102 above) seems to go in this direction. She does not discuss the textual problem involved here.

¹⁰⁶ Julian, for all his loathsomeness in Mercator’s opinion, still holds a title – he is *ex episcopus* (p. 23)!

¹⁰⁷ The need to specify his place of origin may come from Augustine, *Ep.* 186,1,1, CSEL 57, p. 45 (*Pelagium... Britonem... seruum Dei*) who used it to distinguish him from another *Pelagius Terenti* (var. *Tarenti*) (otherwise unknown to us).

(p. 6).¹⁰⁸ If Valerius, Turbantius, and Florus appear without identification (p. 6), it is because the names appear as part of the titles of books – they are not introduced into the text by Mercator himself. What is also common in all the identifications, with the exception of Rufinus, is that we know something of the status of each person mentioned – (*quondam/ex/illo tempore*) *episcopus, monachus, auditorialis scholasticus*. This arouses the suspicion that *natione Syrus* is not the original form in which Mercator referred to Rufinus, but that it is the result of an error in the transmission of the text. Like the others, Rufinus was introduced as *quondam* ‘something,’ and like the others, ‘something’ referred to an office or a status, but not to his place of origin.

Codex Palatinus Latinus 234

That any text, ancient or modern, may possibly be corrupted whether by scribal error or choice, by typographical error or the insidious intervention of a PC’s self-correction feature, is a presupposition that we normally and tacitly take for granted. For the most part errors can readily be detected and emended, and the cause of the error explained. But, as a reading of any critical edition of an ancient text shows, there remain cases where editors are reduced to conjecture, or where a scribal error has gone unnoticed. This text of Mercator, in my opinion, is an example of this last mentioned in textual problems. The scrutiny to which the re-discovered ‘new’ letters of Augustine have been, and continue to be subjected in recent decades may serve to illustrate the delicate task involved in establishing the original text. In the case of the text of these letters, words and phrases are added, deleted, or emended at what might seem to be editorial whim, were it not for the fact that we possess a whole library of authentic writings of Augustine against which to judge and emend the readings of the manuscripts.¹⁰⁹ We are not so

¹⁰⁸ In *Comm. II* (p. 66) Mercator grudgingly admits that Caelestius was also admitted to the priesthood in Ephesus *per obreptionem*, but he refuses to use the title *Caelestius presbyter*. Nestorius thus addresses Caelestius in his letter (p. 65), but Mercator omits the title from his introduction to the letter! Only Pope Zosimus, apparently, in his early openness to hearing the Pelagian case, recognized for a time the ordination. See s.v. ‘Caelestius’ in *Prosopographie* (n. 8 above), p. 316. Attention is given throughout to the presence or absence of his title.

¹⁰⁹ See the second edition of the ‘Divjak letters’ in J. Divjak (ed.), *Saint Augustin. Lettres I*-29**, BA 46B, Paris (1987), which incorporates many *corrigenda* offered by scholars to the *editio princeps* in CSEL 88. In the same connection mention may also be made of the ‘Dolbeau Sermons’ added (from a single manuscript in many cases) to the corpus of Augustine’s works.

fortunate when dealing with the text of Mercator, although (as will be seen below) there are places where the MS readings can be checked against other witnesses.

The writings of Marius Mercator, contained in the *Collectio Palatina*, survive in a single Vatican manuscript, *Codex Palatinus Latinus* 234.¹¹⁰ It probably belonged to the abbey of Lorsch,¹¹¹ and from the script it is dated to the early ninth century.¹¹² I have already noted that apart from a very few references to Mercator in the works of Augustine and Jerome, Mercator and his writings were unknown through the Middle Ages. When his writings were rediscovered in the 17th century, after not a little intrigue and in delicate circumstances¹¹³ full editions were published by J. Garnier (1673) and S. Baluze (1684), both of which are severely criticized by E. Schwartz in the introduction (p.VII) to his edition that appeared in the years 1924-26.¹¹⁴ The text, therefore, of Mercator's works, written in the early fifth century in the environs of Constantinople, and included in a dossier of texts collected by Latin-speaking monks in the East a century or so

¹¹⁰ A second (lost) MS (*Cod. Bellovacensis*) existed in Beauvais, but it is considered to have been a copy of *Cod. Pal.* (Schwartz, ACO, p.V; Glorie [n. 115 below], CCSL 85A, p. 180). In its present form the Vatican codex is a combination of two earlier codices, the second being a copy of Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*.

¹¹¹ Cf. B. Bischoff, *Die Abtei Lorsch im Spiegel ihrer Handschriften*, Lorsch 1989, p. 89. (This is a separate and expanded version of a study that appeared in F. Knöpp [ed.], *Die Reichsabtei Lorsch*, II, Darmstadt 1977, pp. 7-128.) The library that was transported from Heidelberg to Rome in 1623 also contained codices that originally belonged in collections other than that of Lorsch (*ibid.* p. 29). At the end of each of the originally separate codices (fol.114v, and 271v) there is a later librarian's note identifying both as *Codex de monasterio S(an)c(t)i Nazarii* (= Lorsch). Bischoff's hesitation on the matter is perplexing. It is partly due to the fact that he mistakenly attributed the signature of the scribe (see the following note) to the second part of the codex.

¹¹² Bischoff, *loc. cit.*, refers to the script as being typical of the early ninth century 'school of Verona.' While this may identify the scribe's style, it does not necessarily identify the place where he worked. In fact we know from fol.114v that it was transcribed by a certain *clericus* Flotbert on the orders of Gerward. This latter was librarian to Louis the Pious, and was somehow connected to Lorsch. A. Siegmund, *Die Überlieferung des griechischen christlichen Literatur*, München (1949), draws attention (p. 147) to the spate of collections of conciliar documents witnessed to in MSS of the sixth and ninth centuries. The *Collectio Palatina* originated in the first of these periods, and perhaps it survived as a result of the second.

¹¹³ See above on Garnier's edition.

¹¹⁴ Schwartz (ACO I,v,1, pp.V-VII) gives an account of the belaboured first appearance of Mercator's works in print. See also Konoppa, *Mercator*, pp. 53-55, who adds details on later reprints. Her gratuitous comment (p. 53, n. 163) on the difficulties of using the Vatican library refer to another age! The profuse gratitude expressed by Schwartz (p.XVII) to Pope Pius XI, for his support of the publication of ACO during most difficult times, should not be overlooked.

later,¹¹⁵ survives only in this *codex unicus* that was copied (in the environs of Lorsch?) some 400 years still later. Other than its 'migration' into the *Collectio Palatina*, we do not know anything about the *iter* of the text itself in the intervening four centuries between its original composition by Mercator and its transcription into the surviving *Codex Palatinus*.¹¹⁶ However, since the collection contains excerpts from texts that had a separate transmission, and hence can be verified at those places, it must be admitted that the text as it survives did not fair badly. This can be said on the basis of the fact that the writings of Mercator contained in the *Collectio* include sizeable excerpts from the writings of Julian that are paralleled in Augustine's writings, and a long extract from Pelagius's Expositions that played an important part in Souter's attempt to identify this work in the manuscripts.¹¹⁷ But from these quotations also we can evaluate the extent to which the text in the *Collectio* is corrupt. It is not possible to say at what stage errors crept into the text, but given the fact that the scribes of *Cod. Pal.* were reasonably careful in their work one may suppose that the more glaring errors belong to an earlier stage, or (in some cases, perhaps) that the scribes were working from a poor copy which they attempted to make more legible – if not always more intelligible – in the present codex. Some aberrations in the surviving text were probably caused by the cryptic character of pre-caroline cursive scripts in which the text was transmitted, and which the scribes were unable to decipher. In sum, the text of Mercator that we read today, is a text that owes a great deal to the expertise, and not infrequently to the sheer ingenuity of its modern editor(s).¹¹⁸

Many readings in the *Cod. Pal.* are obviously in need of emendation, as a glance through the *apparatus criticus* in Schwartz's edition

¹¹⁵ For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding this, see the *Prolegomena* (pp. XXIII-XLI) by Fr. Glorie, in CCSL 85A (*Maxentii... Opuscula*), esp. pp. XXXVIII-XXXIX.

¹¹⁶ Schwartz (p.I) thinks that two scribes contributed to the MS, and has high praise for their diligence – but that diligence seems to include their reproducing faithfully the errors of their exemplar, unless we attribute to them the errors offered below!

¹¹⁷ Souter I, pp. 41-48. Unfortunately in the case of the extract from Pelagius, Mercator evidently retranslated what he had earlier published in a Greek version, and hence there are considerable verbal differences between the text he offers and that known from other sources. The omission of a sentence missing in Mercator's text is explained by Souter (I, p. 45) as 'a scribal error at some stage or other' of the transmission (emphasis added). O. Wermelinger, 'Das Pelagiusdossier in der *Tractoria* des Zosimus,' *Freib.Zeit.Ph.Th.* 26 (1979), pp. 336-68, suggests (p. 343) that Mercator's text of Pelagius (taken from the *Tractoria*?) was already altered.

¹¹⁸ Some portions of the *Collectio Palatina* have been re-edited in CCSL 85A, pp. 183-234 (see n. 115 above), where some of Schwartz's emendations are rejected. Schwartz himself does not report all the readings of his predecessors.

will readily show.¹¹⁹ Some are banal 'errors' endemic to manuscripts of the medieval period, such as the interchange or confusion of a/ae, b/u(v), e/i, etc., and these are collected by Schwartz in his introduction (pp.I-V).¹²⁰ Others are the result of 'normal' scribal oversights due to homeoteleuton, dittography, etc., or are due to a mistaken reading of abbreviations or suspensions in the exemplar. Two categories of error, however, deserve particular attention here. The first is where the surviving text is simply illiterate and has demanded that Schwartz (and other editors) 'invent' a correct reading. The second, and more important for us, is where the text offers words or phrases that are perfectly intelligible in themselves, but are meaningless in their contexts, or even distort the meaning, and must be discarded and/or replaced.

The following is but a minimal selection of troublesome readings from the *Cod. Pal.* – with the corrections or conjectures of the editor(s) given in parentheses – that offers some idea of the condition of the text as it survives. For the sake of brevity I give only the page number of *ACO*, since the line will be readily retrievable from the *apparatus*. (To avoid confusion I have reverted editorial comments made by Schwartz from italic to Roman type.)

P.5: *mamsistenti* (*Mampsistenti*); p. 6: *caelestinus* (*Caelestius*); *ualer-inium* (*Valerium*); *matris utero eruditus* (*matris utero editus* – correctly at p. 66); p. 7: *ut cum* (*anticum*); p. 8 *condicionis origo* (Schwartz: 'lacunam statui e.g. supplendo natura non est condicionis'); p. 9: *atabus* (*Atabulus*); p. 10 *immode ista* (*immodesta*); p. 11: *amicitias* (*amicitiae es*); p. 13: *si haeret* (*sic haberet*); p. 14: *ut crescens* (*et crescentes*); p. 15: *euanissimum* (*te uanissimum*); p. 17: *paruum* (*prauum*); p. 18: *chirofum* (*chirografum* = Col.2.14); *sihe ho* (*sine hoc*); p. 19: *teneam* (edd: *te nectam*; *te ducam*; *tendam*); *sentias* (*sententias*); p. 22: *iudicane* (*iudicantes* = 2Cor.5.14 VL [Vg = *aestimantes*]); p. 23: *fragorum* (fort. recte? Schwarz coni. *tractatorum*); *uelt huncunde* (*uel tunc unde*); *silere* (*si legere*); p. 24: *inenaturaliter* (*inenarrabiliter*); *particeps geniti* (Schwarz coni. *particepsque filii*); p. 25: *scelentissima* (*scelestissima*); p. 26: *aud(+ii)et se iam* (*audi Esaia*); p. 28: *ac horismate* (*a chrismate*); p. 29 *mala edunt* (*me laedunt*); p. 32: *incommutabilem eam* (*incommutabilitatem*); p. 34: *iniusta defensio* (*in iusta defensione*); *mortua* (*orta*); p. 35: (Schwartz: 'haec ex ceteris locis corrigere nolui; potest enim Marius alia ex male descripto exemplari sumpsisse, alia uertendo corrupisse'); p. 37: *perimento* (*experimento*); *audita sunt* (*auiditas*); p. 38: *similiter*

¹¹⁹ I confine my attention in the following to the writings of Mercator.

¹²⁰ As a result, of course, the lack of unnecessary 'clutter' in the *apparatus* can give a false impression of the real extent to which the text has been emended.

(*simpliciter*); *ligatio* (*litatio*); p. 41: *putat hunc* (*puta tunc*); p. 42: *existente* (*existentem ante*); p. 43: *accendens* (*attendens*); p. 44: *eis solentiae* (*ei insolentiae*); p. 47: *proprietaem* (*pro pietate*); *diuinitatis* (*natiuitatis*); p. 50: *hac ratione* (*ac rationes*); p. 51: *sybillabe* (*syllabae*); p. 53: *cassibilitatis* (*passibilitatis*); *eloquentiorio iohannes* (*eloquentior Iohanne*); *supercibum* (*supercilium*); p. 54: *tercilinia* (*sterquilinia*); *sic adopta* (*sicut opto*); p. 57: *sed paro* (*separo*); p. 58: *seuus ininterpres* (*scaeuus interpres*); *capesibilis* (<in>*capessibilis*); p. 59: *diuinitisque* (*dignitatisque*); *inoperationem* (*in se operationem*); p. 60: *eclanensium* (*Eclanensi cum*); *letandos* (*lactandos*); *memorationephensiensi* (*memorato in Ephensiensi*); p. 61: *simulatae sepulturam* (*stimulatae sepultura*); p. 63: (Schwartz ad ll.18-22: 'locus obscurus'); p. 64: *intendebat* (*ille ostendebat*); p. 65: *dionesi* (*Dionysii*); p. 66: *septem paribus* (edd: *exemplaribus*; *insertis partibus*); *et stantius* (*instantius*); p. 69: *Liuaniam* (leg. *Iulianam*?); *aetate quali* (*et aequali*).

Taken from only a limited portion of the MS the examples given here should suffice to put us on our guard against a too ready dependence on its evidence. Comment may be permitted on a few readings. Schwartz emends MS *mamsisteni* (also p. 23 *mansisteni*) to *Mampsisteni*. Beginning with Garnier it is normally emended to *Mopsuesteni*. Marrou accepts the correction to *Mopsuesteni* but lets his concern for detail run amok when he allows the possibility that a town called *Mampsis* in the Negev (being excavated at the time he wrote) may be referred to here.¹²¹ The correction of the Caelestius' name is obviously required, but if we did not have the help of *Comm.II* (p. 66: *editus*) the information that 'by a fault of nature, from his mother's womb he was [*eunuchus*] *eruditus*,' might have given rise to some interesting speculation!¹²² The addressee of the letter by Pelagius to Livanian (p. 69: another scribal error?) is not otherwise known. Schwartz retains the reading *Liuaniam*, but includes in the *apparatus* the conjectural emendation to *Iulianam*, and seems disposed to accept this in the introduction (p.XI, where, however, he also suggests that the MS should be emended to *Libaniam*).¹²³

¹²¹ Marrou, 'Les attaches orientales,' p. 462n. Baluze (PL 48,109) notes that the orthography varies in MSS. The form is not specific to *Cod. Pal.* (cf. *Maxentii... opuscula*, CCSL 85A, *app.crit.*, pp. 14,20,22,24, in a MS from the same period – and perhaps the same circles).

¹²² Coming within the passage to which so much attention has been given, the double error concerning Caelestius might have alerted readers to greater care in reading the text. It is not noted in PL 48.

¹²³ Garnier (PL 48, 102-103; 597-98) notes the suggested emendations of the name to *Iuliana* or *Melania*, but leaves the question open. It is listed as n. 754 (*Ep. Ad*

In a note above (n. 116) I referred to Schwartz's praise for the scribe(s) of *Pal.lat.234*. It was, he says, written *nitidis et pulcris literis*. The *diligentia* of the scribes is attested to by their transcription of Greek passages: *ut nullis aut paruis tantum egeant correcturis*. Even in the orthography [*non*] *multum peccauer[unt]*. This evaluation of the text contrasts sharply with that of Cardinal Hieronymus Casanata who checked the same MS at the request of Baluze, and in 1678 wrote in reply:¹²⁴ *Barbaris ac truncis vocibus scatet hic codex. Et quamvis facile potuisssem ex ingenio illas vel supplere vel emendare, ex industria tamen omisi...* The *Cod. Pal.* could serve well as a textbook to illustrate every possible kind of scribal error! Faced with such a variety of errors in the text as exemplified above, I would include *quondam natione Syrus* as belonging to the last category of error mentioned already, namely, words that are fully meaningful in themselves, but require emendation. Allowance being made for the anomaly of *quondam*, the phrase is quite intelligible, and it has consequently passed the scrutiny of editors and historians alike, and been read as the text written by Mercator, but in its textual and historical context it has created no end of bother. Without *quondam*, we would have no syntactical or other difficulty with *Rufinus natione Syrus*,¹²⁵ but the enigma of the historical identity of the Syrian would still remain, and perforce we have to 'create' a history in which he can be accommodated. Unfortunately, the resulting 'history' appears to be compellingly correct!

Rufinus quondam monachus!

As mentioned already, when he identifies people Mercator usually offers some form of a title or status for them, and from that I take my lead. In Jerome's anti-Pelagian writings Rufinus, the channel of Origenism to Pelagianism, is often passed over anonymously, or reference to him can only be detected behind one or other of Jerome's favourite uncomplimentary pseudonyms. We find the name Rufinus in the same prologue in which Syria is singled out as a den of heresy, but

Liuaniam) in the *Clavis. Prete, Memoriali*, p. 72, Nuvolone, *Dict. Spir.* XII/2, col. 2899, Konoppa, Mercator, pp. 365, 367, retain the reading *Livianiam*.

¹²⁴ Quoted by Schoenemann (PL 48,61), from the preface by Baluze (PL 48,45).

¹²⁵ Jerome, e.g., refers both to Luke the Evangelist (*Praef. In Matth.*, CSEL 77, p. 2), and to Malchion the Monk (*Vita Malchi*, 2 (PL 23,56) as *natione Syrus*.

without the courtesy of his being given any title.¹²⁶ In the earlier dispute concerning Origen, Jerome refrained from giving the name of his *aduersarius*.¹²⁷ However, while they were still friends, and before Rufinus became *presbyter*,¹²⁸ we find a reference to Rufinus that is of interest. In Jerome's continuation of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius for the year 377, Rufinus, Bonosus and Florentinus are mentioned with respect as *insignes monachi*.¹²⁹ The sole surviving letter written by Jerome to Rufinus from before the time of their dispute is *Ep.* 3, written from Chalcis, in which Jerome describes his wandering through the region of Syria (including Cilicia, which the would-be ascetic found to be unbearably hot!) in search of a suitable location in which to settle as a monk. From it we learn that Rufinus had already become a *monachus*, but to Jerome's evident dismay he had opted to reside in Egypt.¹³⁰

This, I suggest, is the Rufinus originally referred to by Mercator: (*hanc quaestionem*) *Rufinus quondam +monachus+ Romam*

¹²⁶ *Dial. adu. Pel.* I, *prol.* 1-2, CCSL 80, pp. 3-4. In *Ep.* 133,3, CSEL 56, p. 246, Rufinus (without title) is also berated. He appears under the name 'Grunnius' in *Comm. Hier.* IV, *prol.*, CCSL 74, p. 174.

¹²⁷ Jerome's *Ep.* 81, written during their dispute, was transmitted (to judge from Hilberg's limited apparatus, CSEL 55 p. 106) with the brusque address *Ad Rufinum* and lacks any prefatory pleasantries. In the letter which forms *Contra Rufinum* III, 1 (CCSL 79 p. 73) Jerome deigns to refer to Rufinus as *prudencia tua*. Some MSS include *presbyter* in the address, and this is retained by Lardet (p. 73, see also p. 116). Note that in the same letter (*par.* 2, p. 74) all Rufinus' 'titles' are (sardonically) listed: (*te*) *vetustissime monachorum, bone presbyter, imitator Christi!* See also III.12 p. 84: *Credidi christiano, credidi monacho.*

¹²⁸ We do not know exactly when he was ordained. Palladius (*Hist. Laus.*, 46,5, ed. Bartelinck p. 224) says that Rufinus 'later' became a priest, i.e., sometime after he joined Melania in Jerusalem. While Palladius does not refer to Rufinus with the Greek term *monachos*, in the context he is clearly referring to Rufinus as such. It is in fact as monk, not as priest, that Rufinus qualifies for inclusion in Palladius's catalogue. In 395 Epiphanius refers to him as a priest (Jerome, *Ep.* 51,2 and 6, CSEL 54 pp. 399, 406; quoted by Jerome in *Contra Rufinum* III,23, CCSL 79 p. 95). In his *Apologia ad Anastasium* (n. 8) Rufinus includes Jerusalem with Rome, Alexandria, and Aquileia as witnesses to the faith he holds (CCSL 20 p. 28). The probability is that he was ordained by John of Jerusalem. John is also presented as guarantor of his orthodoxy in the prologue to his translation of Pamphilus' Defense of Origen (CCSL 20 p. 28). See Murphy, *Rufinus of Aquileia*, pp. 55-56.

¹²⁹ GCS 47 p. 278. Jerome finished this writing in 381.

¹³⁰ *Ep.* 3 (CSEL 54, p. 12). Martianay and Vallarsi give it the address *Ad Ruff(inum) monachum*, but we do not know on what MS authority. Hilberg offers one 12th cent. MS with this address. In *Ep.* 3,2 (p. 14), 4,2 (p. 20), 5,2 (pp. 21-22) Rufinus is addressed or referred to by Jerome as *frater*. *Ep.* 3 also mentions Bonosus, and readers of *Ep.* 3 would probably have copies of the following *Epp.* 4-5 to Florentinus. This is the trio of *insignes monachi* mentioned in the *Chronicon* (see above).

primus inuexit...¹³¹ At that time, when he returned to the West, Rufinus was already a priest, and would have been known as such by Caecilius and others in Rome who held him in high regard;¹³² and it is also as *presbyter* that he would be remembered generally in history; but he had been *quondam monachus*. It is open to conjecture what the word *monachus* may have looked like in the script of the exemplar from which the surviving *Codex Palatinus* was copied, and the following is only offered as a tentative hypothesis.¹³³ An end-line division of *mo/nachus* or *monac/hus*, and the frequent interchange of c/t (also in *Cod. Pal.*), would readily lend to confusion on the part of the scribe. As a result *quo(n)da(m)mo* was 'corrected' to *quondam*, *nac/nat* was expanded to *natione*, and the remaining enigmatic *hus* (a cursive 'h' being read as 'Syr'?) has become *Syrus* to identify *Rufinus quondam* with the region from which, we have just been informed by Mercator in the same text, the heresy originated. As a solution to the problem of the identity of Rufinus the Syrian this will appear all too far-fetched to merit consideration, and for its naiveté it will be laughed out of court. Yet in a text where the *apparatus criticus* is witness to a series of editorial corrections, conjectures, and not infrequent resignation by the editor(s) to desperation with the note: *locus incertus*; and in the face of a few words that raise not insignificant historical difficulties, but can be emended without any undue paleographical contortions, it is a solution that I offer for serious consideration.

It identifies correctly a Rufinus who was once known and referred to as an *insignis monachus*, but later became better known as *presbyter*. The title *Rufinus monachus* did not disappear entirely from history, although the traces of it are scant. Erasmus, no friend of Rufinus, gives him no title in the *Vita Hieronymi*, preferring to refer to him as *Calumniator*, but in a rare *lapsus* he could write: *Ruffinus... monachus et ipse*.¹³⁴ A fifteenth century Italian translation (in manuscript) of Jerome's *Apologia* refers to *Rufino monacho* in the title.¹³⁵

¹³¹ I add *cruces* to note the difficulty in the text.

¹³² The contribution Rufinus made to the new heresy may even explain in part Mercator's avoiding the title *presbyter*.

¹³³ See W.M. Lindsay (and D. Bains), *Notae Latinae*, Cambridge 1915 (repr. Hildesheim 1963), pp. 431-32. For *monachus*, *monasterium*, he offers 'a few out of many' examples to show '[h]ow capriciously Christian scribes symbolize these recurrent words.' The contortions to which 'h' was subjected in cursive scripts are myriad.

¹³⁴ *Hieronymi Stridonensi Vita*, ll.404-405, in W.K. Ferguson (ed.), *Erasmi Opuscula*, The Hague 1933, p. 148. At p. 134n Ferguson collects references to Rufinus in the *Vita*.

¹³⁵ Cf. P. Lardet, CCSL 79 (*Hieronymus: Contra Rufinum*), pp. 291*, 310*. At p. 274* reference is given to a post(?) -1475 marginal note which incorrectly identifies Jerome's *Apol.III* as '*Ad Rusticum (leg. Rufinum?) monachum*.'

The notice by J. Trithemius¹³⁶ is of no little interest. As in the *Decretum Gelasianum*, the writings of Rufinus are placed among the Apocrypha, but the reason is: *propterea quod in sanctissimum uirum Hieronymum scripserit inuectiuas epistolas*. Trithemius then adds: *Sed postea in concordiam dilectionis fraternae redeuntes, facta sunt opuscula Rufini autentica (sic!) in quantum Hieronymi dictis non fuerint contraria*. This note by Trithemius on the renewed friendship between Rufinus and Jerome has all the appearance of being a fiction of his fertile imagination, but he may also be reflecting some current 'revision' of the dispute, especially when he goes on to claim that the *opuscula* of Rufinus were now considered to be 'authentic' and not contrary to Jerome's writings. It will be many moons before the writings of Rufinus the monk of Aquileia will be unfettered from the shackles of Jerome's censure! I refer to Trithemius here, however, more because he introduces this author as: *Rufinus monachus et Aquilegiensis (sic!) ecclesiae presbyter*. Noris in his *Historia* introduces the mentor of Pelagius as *Rufinus Monachus Aquilejensis*, and suggests (p. 5) that Rufinus was ordained *ad titulum monasterii*.¹³⁷ J. Martianay (1706) also gives *Rufinu[s] monachu[s]* in the title of the *Apologia* (Lardet, p. 1, app.), but I have not been able to identify his authority for this. These few notices are offered (without any claim to being exhaustive) to draw attention to the existence (persistence?) of the use of the title *monachus* with reference to Rufinus.

When Jerome warned Demetrias in *Ep.* 130 of the new heresy that was making its appearance, he was clearly referring to Pelagianism; but when he identified it as the same pestilence of heresy that had once been imported into Rome in the time of Anastasius, the reference can only be to Origenism (despite his adjustment of the chronology). The heresy was rampant in Syria, according to Jerome in the introduction to his *Dialogus*, who sees fit to name Evagrius, Rufinus (of Aquileia), and Palladius – all Origenists! – along with an assortment of other heretics who attempted to introduce the subversive notion of 'apatheia' into Christianity. Rufinus (of Aquileia), in his translations of Origen and Evagrius, is identified by Jerome as the

¹³⁶ *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, in *Opera Historica*, Frankfurt (1601), pp. 214-15.

¹³⁷ Noris, in his account of *Rufinus monachus*, notes the fact that at the Council of Chalcedon it was thought necessary to include a canon on the subject (can. 6: *Nullum absolute ordinari debere presbyterum... nisi specialiter ecclesiae ciuitatis... aut monasterii*), implying that such an irregularity had been developing at the time. To predate the use of *Ad titulum monasterii* into the time of Rufinus seems unwarranted.

main culprit in the introduction of this heresy to the West. Jerome, however, does not in fact say that Rufinus brought the heresy from Syria – nor, for that matter, does Mercator. Both only say that the heresy was widespread in Syria, and that Rufinus introduced it to Rome in the time of Pope Anastasius. Mercator decries the fact that Rufinus did not ‘publish’ his heresy (*per se proferre non ausus*); Jerome laments the pervasive influence of his translations. History tells us that the Origenist controversy in Rome ‘broke out’ during the pontificate of Anastasius and was sparked by a translation done by Rufinus of Aquileia. That translation, *De Principiis*, raised a furore over some of its theological content and over Rufinus’ handling of the original, but the controversy did not deter Rufinus from continuing to translate, nor Romans from reading his translations. This is attested to by Jerome, by his own prefatory dedications, and not least – but most important for this study – by the fact that his translations were used by the early Pelagians.

It is worth recalling at this point (something that Jerome would probably prefer not to recall!¹³⁸) that one of Rufinus’ first contributions as a translator when he returned to the West was to make available a Latin version of the *Regula* of Basil.¹³⁹ We shall return again below to the importance of this translation. I mention it here because attention to the dispute over Origen has tended to overshadow the seminal and ongoing role Rufinus played in promoting the monastic ideal in the West at the beginning of the fifth century. It would be a very unrealistic reading of the social conditions in which Rufinus moved to conclude that the monastic ideal he promoted was confined to the cloister, or that this translation did not have a wider influence. By this time he was known as *Rufinus presbyter*, but it is historically correct

¹³⁸ See Kelly, *Jerome*, p. 228, on Rufinus’s translation; and pp. 280–81, on Jerome’s later translation of the Rule of Pachomius. The Rules had very different origins; equally diverse were the intended readers of the translations. Kelly offers cogent reasons for Jerome’s disregard of Rufinus’s translation of Basil’s *Regula*, but it is unlikely that he was unaware of its existence. At least he knew about the Greek version, but in his *De viris illustribus* CXVI, PL 23,747, he glosses over the ‘*asketikon*’ (sic!) with a bare mention. He wrote to Demetrias in *Ep.* 130,17, CSEL 56, p. 197: *Solet inter plerosque esse certamen, Utrum solitaria, an cum multis vita melior sit*. This looks very like an allusion to *Regula Basilii* 3 (Longer Rule 7) where that specific question is discussed.

¹³⁹ Kelly (*Jerome*, p. 228) follows Murphy (*Rufinus*, p. 91) in saying that Rufinus combined and selected from Basil’s two Rules. It is more probable that he translated an existing composite collection. See the brief note by K. Zelzer in the *Prolegomena* to his edition, pp. IX–X, and now A.M. Silvas, *The Asketikon*, p. 102. (See below for details.)

to say that he was also *quondam monachus*. That a baffled scribe, transcribing a text that offered *quo(n)da(m)mo/nac/hus* (with any of the syllable divisions, or peculiarities of script suggested above), produced the reading *quondam nat(ione) S(yr)us*, is far from being impossible. While this can be no more than a conjecture, it is not one that has been arrived at – nor is it being presented here – on any whim of convenience.

Rufinus Pelagianus?

There is no question about the fact that the influence of somebody called Rufinus lies at the beginning of the Pelagian debate.¹⁴⁰ But to dismiss the ‘existence’ of the Syrian as an overlooked scribal error can only appear to be too simplistic; particularly if in doing so we foist *tout court* the responsibility for Pelagianism on the Aquileian. In his attempt to identify the author of the *Liber de Fide*, Altaner, as a point of departure, took it as having been adequately established by Fontanini that Rufinus of Aquileia ‘had nothing to do with Pelagianism.’¹⁴¹ However, the arguments offered by Fontanini (PL 21,275-79) to which Altaner referred, were only concerned with showing a) that the *Liber de Fide* cannot be attributed to the Aquileian, and b) that it is impossible to think that in Mercator’s day Rufinus of Aquileia would be referred to as a Syrian. He also makes the suggestion (col.277) that ‘Syrian’ or ‘Palestinian’ may have been chosen specifically to avoid confusion with the Aquileian.¹⁴² The strength of Fontanini’s argument may be appreciated from a statement (col.271) found in his preceding discussion of the authorship of the *Libellus fidei* and the *Liber de Fide*: *Absit, ut nostrum [Rufinum]... ad impias haereticorum partes unquam transfugisse credamus*. Perish the thought that Rufinus of Aquileia be considered a heretic!

The clear distinctions between heresy and orthodoxy that would emerge from the Pelagian debate cannot be backdated into the life of Rufinus. Indeed, history tells us that apart from the formulation of some very specific anathemas, the borderline between heresy and

¹⁴⁰ In the following I expand on some ideas published in ‘Unexplored Paths Relating to the Outbreak of the Pelagian Debate,’ in *Nanzan Journal of Theological Studies*, 30 (2007), pp. 27-54.

¹⁴¹ Altaner, *art. cit.* p. 434.

¹⁴² A variant on this, I must confess, was my own conclusion in my earlier attempt to solve the riddle of the Syrian.

orthodoxy in questions related to Pelagianism was never clearly drawn, and the accusation 'Pelagian!' has not only resurfaced down the centuries, but continues today. It is not without reason that much Pelagian literature has survived through the centuries under the names of its chief adversaries, Augustine and Jerome, and the attribution of individual writings remains a *crux* of Pelagian scholarship.¹⁴³ There is all the more reason, then, to refrain from imposing on its precursors the categories of what would later be considered to be heresy.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, this should not preclude our searching into the more immediate sources from which the Pelagians drew their inspiration. The translations made available by Rufinus were among those sources, but on this topic we are confronted by a surprising lack of interest on the part of modern scholarship, and this is due in great part to the 'existence' of the Syrian. The situation can be summed up as follows: Since Caesarius identified his source as Mercator's Syrian, and the Syrian's *Liber de Fide* can be dated to roughly the time in question, and furthermore Augustine in *De peccatorum meritis* refuted this *Liber*, there is no case for implicating Rufinus of Aquileia as a direct source of Pelagianism, and consequently there is no need to examine his translations as a possible seed-bed for incipient Pelagianism. Concomitant with this is a much greater lack: With the exception of a few very limited studies that we will mention presently, no comprehensive effort has been made to extract from his translations the theological anthropology specific to Rufinus, and to present it in a systematic way.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ When B.R. Rees published a translation of a fairly comprehensive selection of writings in *The Letters of Pelagius and his Followers*, (Woodbridge, 1991), he seems to have been unaware of the fact that *De Vita Christiana*, generally attributed to Pelagius, had appeared in translation as the first tract in *Treatises on Various Subjects* (by Augustine!): *Fathers of the Church*, vol. 16, pp. 9-43, Washington 1952. The translator (M.S. Muldowney) notes its 'Pelagian character' in the introduction (pp. 3-5.)

¹⁴⁴ Despite its age the following can still be read with profit: J. von Kuhn, 'Der vorgebliche Pelagianismus der vor-augustinischen Väter,' *Theol.Quart.* 35(1853), pp. 433-72. An updated 'reprint' would be welcome.

¹⁴⁵ C. Moreschini draws attention to this lacuna in 'La traduzione di Rufino delle Omelie di Basilio: motivo e scopo di una scelta,' in C. Moreschini/G. Menestrina (ed.), *La traduzione dei testi religiosi*, Brescia (1995), pp. 127-47. Fr. Thelamon's article 'Rufin d'Aquilée' in *Dict.Spir.* XIII, Paris 1988, col.1107-1117, fails us on this point. Older studies abound, and, with on-going new editions of his translations, there is a plethora of recent studies of his translation technique. See, e.g., C. Lo Cicero, 'Come romanizzare Basilio: Ancora sul *Vertere* di Rufino,' *Riv.fil. ed istruz.classica*, 130 (2002), pp. 40-75; A. Silvas, 'Rufinus' Translation Techniques in the *Regula Basilii*,' in *Antichthon* 37 (2003), pp. 71-93. Much can be gleaned from these to build up a picture of the thought of Rufinus, but the tree on which to hang the fruit has yet to be grown.

By way of introduction into the difficulties encountered in reading Rufinus' translations, I offer as an example this short statement from the translation of *De principiis* (III,1,6^{fin.}): *Alioquin contrarium esset dari nobis mandata ex quorum vel observatione salvemur, vel praevaricatione damnemur, si observandi ea facultas in nobis non est.* This, according to the commentators, is a 'banal' 'recapitulation' 'characteristic' of Rufinus, that 'adds nothing' to the argument just made by Origen.¹⁴⁶ Trivial though it may be, the addition nevertheless betrays Rufinus' concern to underline an idea – the equivalent to our adding emphasis to a text. At the beginning of III,1,6 we read: 'That it is our own task to live a good life, and that God asks this of us *not as his work* nor as a thing (...) from somebody else, nor (...) fate....'¹⁴⁷ Here the emphasized phrase is omitted by Rufinus – out of prudence, according to Simonetti and Crouzel,¹⁴⁸ lest God be seen as impinging upon our liberty to choose right living. While both commentators offer adequate evidence for Origen's insistence elsewhere on the need for Grace, the reason offered for the omission of the phrase by Rufinus at this point is open to question. It is certainly important in establishing the text of Origen to identify the omissions, additions, and changes due to Rufinus, but to what extent have the consequences of this for understanding the thought of Rufinus himself been explored? J. Rist¹⁴⁹ pointed out the shifting philosophical context in which Rufinus' version is to be read, but his lead has found little following in studies.¹⁵⁰ N. Pace,¹⁵¹ proposing (p. 3) 'to follow on and extend' the approach of

¹⁴⁶ The terms are taken in turn from H. Görgemanns/H. Karpp, *Origenes: Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien*, Darmstadt 1985², p. 481; M. Simonetti, *I Principi di Origene*, Torino 1968, p. 372; G.W. Butterworth, *Origen on First Principles*, London 1936, (repr. London 1973), p. 166; H. Crouzel/(M. Simonetti), *Origène: Traité des Principes [IV Commentaire]*, *SC* 269, Paris 1980, p. 22. It is a good example of the malaise of studies of Rufinus. Much of what is original to, or underlined by Rufinus, is reduced to 'explicative addition' or 'common amplification' and gets lost in 'translation technique.'

¹⁴⁷ Trans. from Butterworth, pp. 163–64. Unless specified, as here, any translations offered in the following are my own.

¹⁴⁸ Simonetti, p. 370; Crouzel, p. 22. The punctuation of Crouzel's comment needs correction; otherwise he confusingly suggests that Rufinus' prudence was spurred (in 398!) by the Pelagian appearance of the original! The resulting Latin in *De Principiis* (omitting 'not at his [= God's] work') is patent of Pelagian interpretation.

¹⁴⁹ J.M. Rist, 'The Greek and Latin Texts of the Discussion on Free Will in *'De Principiis'*,' in H. Crouzel, *et al.* (ed.), *Origeniana*, Bari 1975, pp. 97–111.

¹⁵⁰ Silvas (see below) plays down the cultural differences between East and West more than I would accept. 'Words' (quite apart from how they are used) have a different resonance when translated. Even within a language the meanings of 'words' differ greatly according to the culture in which they are used.

¹⁵¹ *Ricerche sulla traduzione di Rufino del 'De principiis' di Origene*, Firenze 1990. In his conclusion (p. 202) he can note that there is an 'inexplicable silence' in

Rist, goes into minute and invaluable detail in his analysis of Rufinus' translation. Yet it can only help us partially in building up the framework of the translator's thinking. When discussing (pp. 72-73) the striking omission by Rufinus of two references to 'divine assistance being 'by far in excess' of our human contribution' to our salvation, Pace concludes that the omission is due to a problem in translating the Greek encountered by Rufinus. This is not entirely convincing; but I have greater difficulty with Pace's rejection of the possibility that the omission was motivated by the emergence of Pelagianism – which according to Pace would only make its effects felt a decade later. This is unrealistic. Pelagianism did not suddenly appear in a void, and our task is to be alert to evidence for its 'pre-history' in the years before it emerged into a full-blown debate.

The translations by Rufinus of *De principiis*, and of other ascetic-moral writings done around the turn of the century were intended for a cultured (aristocratic) Roman Christian laity¹⁵² who were eager to gain access to the spiritual writings of the East. If our histories are correct, it was precisely in these circles, and at this time, that Pelagius was beginning to make a name for himself in these same circles. How Pelagius could transpose Christian values into a social ethos in which Roman aristocrats would find themselves comfortable, while retaining all the traditional Roman values to which they were born, has been well presented by J.-M. Salamito.¹⁵³ It astounds, however, that he can underline Pelagius' discovery(?) of a novel optimistic evaluation of human nature, without any mention of the *concurrent* contribution being made by Rufinus in his translations with regard to Christian anthropology – a contribution to which we know Pelagius was indebted.¹⁵⁴ In the following pages

contemporary studies on certain aspects of the translation, but without being very specific as to what aspects he intends.

¹⁵² A. de Vogüé, *Histoire littéraire du mouvement monastique, tom.III(1): Le monachisme latin*, Paris 1996, pp. 247-385, gives a thorough presentation of Rufinus's translations of the Eastern ascetics and their lives. It is, however, a history of the monastic movement written *ab intra*, with little attention given to the questions raised in the present study. At pp. 52-53 (introducing the translation of *De Principiis*), and again pp. 294-301 (in a short presentation of the translations to which we will turn our attention presently) we are given a brief introduction to the 'non-monastic' Roman 'ascetics.' These remain very marginal to de Vogüé's interest.

¹⁵³ J.-M. Salamito, *Les Virtuoses et la Multitude. Aspects sociaux de la controverse entre Augustin et les Pélagiens*, Grenoble (2005).

¹⁵⁴ Fleeting reference is made to a homily by Basil (p. 33) and to the Sentences of Sextus (pp. 119, 121), but we are told nothing of the context of these writings

I do not presume to do more than scratch the surface of largely unfathomed waters. They will have served their purpose if, by way of correction or rejection, more capable scholars will take a fresh look at the evidence.

When Pelagius found the Sentences of 'Pope' Sixtus to be congenial reading he may have thought that he was consulting a writing graced with the authority of a martyred Pope, but he read those Sentences in the translation by Rufinus. R.E. Evans¹⁵⁵ has shown how 'Pelagian' that work had become by the time it left the desk of Rufinus. That desk may have been somewhere in the region of Aquileia, but the translation was intended to meet a request from his Roman friends Apronianus (to whom it is dedicated in the Preface) and his wife Avita. She should find the collection of Sentences eminently useful, because *unius uersus sententia ad totius possit perfectionem uitae sufficere*.¹⁵⁶ For the same couple, and perhaps his last task in Rome in late 398, Rufinus had translated Origen's Homilies on Psalms 36-38. In these 'moral' homilies they would find everything (*tota*) that pertained *ad emendationem uel profectionem morum*.¹⁵⁷ At about the same time as the translation of the Sentences, Rufinus sent a selection of sermons by Gregory of Nazianz to Apronianus, so that his departure from Rome might not be the occasion for Apronianus to interrupt the studies (*a consuetis studiis*) they had been doing together.¹⁵⁸ His translation of homilies by Basil (also for Apronianus) belonged to the same 'project' of study. True, he notes that these homilies are not weighed down with *dogmatum question[es]*, and this may betray an avoidance on his part of currently sensitive debates and controverted writers like Origen, but we should not overplay this aspect at the expense of forgetting that he also saw the collection as something that would suffice *instituere... animos ad bonam uitam*.¹⁵⁹ These translations alone, and their dedications, should serve

within a possible 'strategy' by Rufinus to disseminate Eastern asceticism. In any case, Rufinus is left out of consideration.

¹⁵⁵ 'Pelagius and the Sentences of Sextus,' in *Pelagius* (n. 19 above), pp. 43-65.

¹⁵⁶ *Praef. in Sexti Sententias*, CCSL 20, p. 259. Two of the earliest MSS (one lost) expanded the title to include: *De vita hominis perfecta*. It is also the form of title given in a catalogue in Lorsch. Cf. P.-M. Bogaert, 'La préface de Rufin aux Sentences de Sexte et a une oeuvre inconnue,' in *Revue Bénédictine* 82 (1972), pp. 26-46 (here pp. 35-36). There is good reason to think, pace Bogaert, that this reference in the Lorsch catalogue is to the *Collectio Palatina*!

¹⁵⁷ *Prol. in Explan. Origenis...* CCSL 20, p. 251.

¹⁵⁸ *Praef. in Greg. Naz. Orat.*, *ibid.*, p. 255.

¹⁵⁹ *Praef. in Omelias S. Bas.*, *ibid.*, p. 237. On the collection see C. Moreschini (n. 145 above).

as a reminder that the departure of Rufinus from Rome does not mean that he was simply 'absent' (physically) from the City. While the merits and demerits of his translation, and his own orthodoxy, may have been the subject of debate, he continued to be very much present as a spiritual director to his Roman friends by means of his translations.

A translation of singular importance for the history of Pelagianism would soon appear – his abridged version of Origen's Commentary on Romans. Since the studies of Smith,¹⁶⁰ and Bohlin,¹⁶¹ the fact that Pelagius made use of this translation has been established in Pelagian studies, but here again it is important to remember that it was in the version by Rufinus that Pelagius read the Commentary.¹⁶² To overlook, as Bohlin explicitly does,¹⁶³ the contribution of Rufinus, even perhaps in such minor details as his choice of language, is to overlook what Evans and others (see above) have drawn attention to in other translations. Furthermore, any conclusions we draw from a search for the influence of the translation of the Commentary on Pelagius' Expositions must of necessity take into account the nature of the translation by Rufinus. Apart from giving attention to characteristics of his translation technique, we must also keep in mind that in his version the original fifteen books are drastically reduced to ten. This gives us some indication of the extent of his omissions – if they are all his, because Rufinus' copy of the original does not seem to have been complete – but except for rare passages preserved in the original Greek, we are ignorant of what, where, and why sections were actually omitted.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ A.J. Smith, 'The Commentary of Pelagius on 'Romans' Compared with that of Origen-Rufinus,' *Journal of Theological Studies*, 20 (1918), pp. 127-77.

¹⁶¹ T. Bohlin, *Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis*, Uppsala 1957.

¹⁶² It is of no little interest that Pelagius even had access to the translation, because there is some evidence that Rufinus may not have actually 'published' it before his death, or at least, that it was only available in limited circulation. Augustine also seems to have had access to it (privately from Melania the Younger?). Cf. C.P. Bammel, 'Rufinus' Translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans and the Pelagian Controversy,' *Antichità Altoadriatiche* 39 (1992), pp. 131-42; and 'Augustine, Origen and the Exegesis of St. Paul,' *Augustinianum* 32 (1992), pp. 341-68. (Both are reprinted in *Tradition and Exegesis in Early Christian Writers*, Aldershot 1995.)

¹⁶³ Bohlin (p. 87) maintains that it is unnecessary to distinguish between what is what is 'origenistisch' and what is 'rufinisch' – on this he is correctly criticized by Evans (cf. n. 155 above). The study by G. Bobstock, 'The Influence of Origen on Pelagius and Western Monasticism,' in *Origeniana Septima*, (Bibliotheca Eph. Theol. Lov. 137), Leuven 1999, pp. 381-96, also fails to make this important distinction.

¹⁶⁴ A discussion of Rufinus' method in his translation is presented at length by C. P. Hammond Bammel, *Der Römerbrieftext des Rufin und seine Origenes-Übersetzung*,

In one study in which she compares the Latin and Greek texts, C.P. Hammond Bammel seems to go out of her way to underline the fact that Rufinus completed his translation *before* the emergence of Pelagianism.¹⁶⁵ She notes: 'His [*scil.* Rufinus] own attitude *may perhaps have been somewhat inclined towards a kind of Pelagian legalism*, but the commentary he translated was a rich treasury of arguments, which could readily provide material both for the Pelagian and for the anti-Pelagian side of the controversy.'¹⁶⁶ Rather than write 'the commentary he translated' here, I would echo the complaint made by the contemporaries of Rufinus, and suggest that Bammel should have written 'his commentary.' This same statement by Bammel is quoted by N. Pace to show that Rufinus, not only when he translated *De Principiis* 'about' a decade earlier, but also now in the abbreviated translation of the Commentary of Romans, was *not* influenced by the concerns that would become the focus of the (future) Pelagian debate. When exactly the Pelagians began to 'campaign' for a re-evaluation of the inherent moral power of human nature may be impossible to determine – as noted already above – and it would be unrealistic to attempt to pin-point this to any given year, but instead of attempting to read Rufinus while making a conscious effort to exclude the presence in his writings of a *later* debate, we must approach his translations bearing in mind that the Pelagian problematic was already a *contemporary* debate in Rome in the first decade of the fifth century. Emphasis has been placed here on both the time and the place. Too often, in studies, the temporal and geographical *continuity* of the debate over Origen in the West and the subsequent(?) Pelagian debate are presented in such a manner as to miss their *contiguity*.¹⁶⁷

We are frequently directed towards the emergent interest in, and influence of Antiochene anthropology among the early Pelagians. John

Freiburg 1985, pp. 43-58. At pp. 58-104 she discusses the problem of how (in)complete his Greek exemplar may have been.

¹⁶⁵ 'Philocalia IX, Jerome, Epistle 121, and Origen's Exposition of Romans VII,' in *Journal of Theological Studies* 32 (1981), pp. 50-81. She notes that Rufinus omits or plays down Paul's references to himself as being weak or a sinner (pp. 69f, and 74 n. 6). Is this prompted by reverence for the Apostle, or by his appreciation of the power inherent in human nature?

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 72. The contorted phrase, to which I added emphasis, can only mean the opposite to what it purports to say! See Pace, *Ricerche*, pp. 72-73 for the following.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. P. Grech, 'Justification by Faith in Origen's Commentary on Romans,' in *Augustinianum* 36 (1996), pp. 337-59. I can endorse his intrigue (p. 338) at the fact that the translation was undertaken 'during the early stages of the Pelagian controversy.' (Emphasis added.) I would have reserves, however, about his conclusion (p. 359) that Origen[-Rufinus] 'is certainly not Pelagian in his doctrine about Adam's sin.'

Chrysostom becomes the main focus of attention here, perhaps simply because we can document Pelagian use of his writings, but the sources are probably more extensive. The more sober approach of John and the 'school' of Antioch to the human condition did not come laden with the ballast of an Origenist cosmology, and while we trace its developing influence on the West, we can safely maintain a clear divide between the Roman Pelagian 'Antiochenes,' and the Greek Antiochene 'Pelagians.'¹⁶⁸ It would be a great error, however, to think that the Pelagian movement 'took off' with their discovery of the theology and anthropology of the writers of Antioch. Undoubtedly they found much there to support their case, but Pelagius and his supporters already had sufficient sources in the translations being made available by Rufinus.¹⁶⁹ It is an understatement to say that we know that they read them! But it needs to be repeated and underlined because there seems to be a kind of taboo – the 'inexplicable silence' referred to by Pace (n. 151 above)? – operative in admitting its implications. If the Pelagians read what Rufinus was currently translating, they did so precisely because they found there what they agreed with. It is a different matter to suggest that Rufinus would agree with the more extreme conclusions that were drawn and *later* (after Rufinus' death) defended by his Pelagian readers, but the bases on which those conclusions were established already existed in the sources they used – and to which they appealed for authority – sources that included the translations made by Rufinus.¹⁷⁰

Regula 'Rufini'?

On his return from the East in 397 one of the first contributions that Rufinus made to the Latin theological library of the day was a

¹⁶⁸ See n. 144 above, and the pertinent comments in R.C. Hill, 'A Pelagian Commentator on the Psalms,' *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 63 (1998), pp. 263-271. The commentator referred to is John Chrysostom.

¹⁶⁹ Grech, *art. cit.*, offers as one of his conclusions (p. 359) that Origen[-Rufinus] 'comes close to the Pelagians in his anthropological optimism.' Would it not also be true to say that they found their anthropological optimism in Origen-Rufinus?

¹⁷⁰ It is interesting to note how the anti-Pelagian William of St. Thierry in the twelfth century would almost systematically 'correct' or rephrase 'Origen's' Commentary where he found it to be open to Pelagian interpretation. Long before, Cassiodorus (equally alert to Pelagianism) had nothing but praise for Origen! Cf. T.P. Scheck, *Origen and the History of Justification*, Notre Dame (Indiana) 2008, pp. 104-28.

translation, mentioned already above, of Basil's *Regula*.¹⁷¹ To pass over the *Regula*, however, as a mere work of translation is to miss a major element of its significance.¹⁷² In his preface Rufinus expresses his hope that through his efforts, undertaken at the request of the abbot Ursacius of Pinetum, Basil's monastic rule may become available to monasteries throughout the West.¹⁷³ Despite its origin as a manual for daily life in an ascetic Christian community, and the apparently restricted 'group' for which the translation was intended by Rufinus, this was a rule for Christian living as such. In Basil's understanding, the terms 'Christian life' and 'monastic life' were interchangeable.¹⁷⁴ So too in Rufinus we should expect that ideals towards which the few who embraced the monastic life were striving, and the means at their disposal in their efforts, were the same as the ideals and means Rufinus presented to the Christians 'in the world' to whom he became spiritual director in Rome.¹⁷⁵ In his study of the beginnings of western monasticism, R. Lorenz draws attention to the influence of the introduction of the monastic ideal, with specific reference to the translation of Basil's Rule, on Latin Christian thought at the beginning of the fifth century.¹⁷⁶ In the *Regula*, Lorenz notes, humankind is presented as having an *anima naturaliter pelagiana*. To use terminology that would

¹⁷¹ *Basili Regula*, CSEL 86, (ed. K. Zelzer). The earlier edition by L. Holsten is reprinted in PL 103,483-554. To be highly commended are the introduction and notes by U. Neri to the Italian translation of Basil's rules by M. B. Artioli: *Opere Ascetiche di Basilio di Cesarea*, Turin 1980. I underline, however, that my interest here is in the Latin end-product of Rufinus' efforts.

¹⁷² A.M. Silvas, *The Asketikon of St Basil the Great*, Oxford 2005, (= Silvas below) offers a splendid translation of the Greek and Latin versions (with commentary). In the introductory matter (pp. 102-29) she studies the translation by Rufinus under the title: 'Rufinus, Witness of the Small *Asketikon*.' As the title of the chapter implies, she is interested more in identifying the Greek text lying behind the translation, than in a consideration of the idea that in translation the *Regula* took on a (Latin!) life of its own. This comes out more cogently in her earlier study: 'Edessa to Cassino: The Passage of Basil's *Asketikon* to the West,' in *Vigiliae Christianae* 56(2002), pp. 247-59.

¹⁷³ *Praefatio* 11 (ed. Zelzer, p. 4): *tui (scil. Ursacii) sit officii etiam aliis monasteriis exemplaria praebere*. It is likely that Rufinus and Melania (the Elder) followed this rule in their monasteries on the Mount of Olives (cf. Silvas p. 483, following a suggestion proposed by J. Gribomont).

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Neri (n. 171 above), pp. 42-45. Silvas in a note (p. 153) writes: 'to Basil, the imperatives of the baptismal life and the Christian ascetic life are effectively coterminous.'

¹⁷⁵ In this sense the *Regula* could serve well as a prologue to Salamito's study (n. 153 above).

¹⁷⁶ Cf. R. Lorenz, 'Die Anfänge des abendländischen Mönchtums im 4. Jahrhundert,' *Zeit.Kirch.Gesch.* 77 (1986), pp. 1-61 (here pp. 36-38).

be more familiar to us from a (very slightly) later date, *gratia* is essentially 'what we are in our created state' when born. The Law, as an *adiutorium gratiae*, calls up the natural *posse* that we possess. While stopping short of suggesting that Pelagius may have depended on Basil's Rule, Lorenz nevertheless concludes that the *Regula* may be seen as a 'Typus' of the outlook of *pre*-Pelagian (monks') thinking. Given both the spatial and temporal contiguity involved here – spatial, in the highly literate and theologically aware circle(s) of Roman Christians, and temporal, within the short span of a decade – this conclusion by Lorenz is over-cautious. When examining the cultural milieu of the aristocrats who form the backdrop to the unfolding drama of Pelagianism, P. Brown can readily draw on Lorenz's study to back-up his account. Brown does not confine his interest here to cloistered ascetics, but to the wider Roman audience among whom the influence of Rufinus was pervasive.¹⁷⁷

Much of Basil's *Regula* is of little interest to the daily life of the Christian in the street. There are solutions to petty (and not so petty!) problems of community living, where the rule of thumb offered can be simply described as the use of (good!) common sense. Various enigmatic terms and phrases from the Bible are explained, and apparent contradictions in the Biblical text are resolved. These, however, are incidents in the lives of those who are intent on *conversatio perfecta*¹⁷⁸ according to the Gospels. The *Prologus* sets the stage for what follows in the *Regula*. It is incumbent upon (*necesse est*) the teacher/superior to be ready and willing at all times to teach how one can become a *perfectus homo Dei* (cf. 2Tim 3,17).¹⁷⁹ Equally, the disciple is admonished (with Ps 1,2) to meditate on the law of God, day and night. This might well be considered impractical in the lives of 'ordinary' Christians, but already a motif of *perfectio* has been introduced and is being proposed as an ideal for everybody. Basil goes on to remind the reader that everybody will be judged according to their personal performance, based on their knowledge of the divine will, *ante tribunal Christi*, an event that may beset us at any day or hour. The prospect of the terrible day of judgement, when all must render account, recurs throughout the *Regula*.

¹⁷⁷ P. Brown, 'The Patrons of Pelagius: The Roman Aristocracy between East and West,' repr. in *Religion and Society in the Age of St. Augustine*, London 1972, pp. 208-26 (here p. 219). On the crucial question of original sin, however, the Aquileian is upstaged by his namesake, Rufinus the Syrian in his study.

¹⁷⁸ *Prol.5* (ed. Zelzer, p. 5). *Conversatio* might adequately render the Greek *politeia* here, but Rufinus adds *perfecta*.

¹⁷⁹ *Prol.5* (Rufinus strengthens the original to *perfectus et consummatus*).

The opening pages¹⁸⁰ of the *Regula* in Rufinus' version are programmatic. Having established briefly with the words of the Gospel (Matt 22,36-39) that all the commandments are reduced ultimately to love of God (*Resp.I*), the question arises how this is in fact possible (*Inter.II*). The answer becomes a long discourse on the human condition.¹⁸¹ Were this *Responsio II* to have circulated independently and anonymously in Latin (without our knowledge of its origin and true location) I hazard the suggestion that we would list its author among the *Anonymi Pelagiani*! Admiring readers of Basil will loudly denounce such a suggestion, but the Roman Christian reader in c.400 did not have access to the whole of Basil's 'programme' and could not know where some of the ideas and ideals presented in the *Regula* might (and did) lead to in the very near future.¹⁸² We must read the (Latin) *Regula* not with a fear of turning (the Greek) Basil into a 'Pelagian,' but with the eyes of late fourth-century Roman Christians who were fighting a battle against (Pagan) fatalism on the one hand, and (Christian) laxism on the other. Both 'enemies' had succumbed to the malady of accepting that sin was inevitable in the human condition. The *Regula* of Basil-Rufinus offered an accessible antidote for both.

The following is no more than a drastically reduced précis of this *Responsio* that may serve to give some impression of the trend of its teaching – and, indeed, of the whole *Regula*. The fundamental command, and all the other laws which devolve from it, can be obeyed because humanity, as created, has it in its power to do so: *omnium mandatorum quae a Deo accepimus virtutes in nobismetipsis insitas gerimus*. We received a command to love (*diligere*) God, but at the same time *dilectionis virtutem in ipsa statim prima conditione a Deo anima sibi insitam gerit*. There can be no difficulty involved; nor is anything new or alien expected of us. We should not be proud if we

¹⁸⁰ *Reg.Bas.* (ed. Zelzer, pp. 8-25). See Silvas, pp. 160-80, for an 'interlaced' presentation in translation of the Greek and Latin, through which one must pick one's way carefully in order to discern the Latin version.

¹⁸¹ Although Rufinus translated for a particular monastic community, I cannot agree with M. Dunn, *The Emergence of Monasticism*, Oxford 2003, when she writes (pp. 69-70) that Rufinus 'transformed Basil's introductory discourse to a group of Christians living in the world into one directed to a monastic community.' I would propose quite the opposite conclusion.

¹⁸² The presentation of Basil's spirituality by A. Holmes, *A Life Pleasing to God*, Kalamazoo 2000, may be taken as representative of the malaise encountered here. At pp. 132-36 ('Excursus: Basil and Original Sin') we are offered texts from other writings to show that Basil's teaching does indeed include a notion of our solidarity in the sin of Adam, in an attempt to show that Basil's thought is not contrary to what would subsequently become Western orthodoxy.

succeed, and think we are doing anything of our own, other than using what *ab ipso [Deo] in natura nostrae creationis accepimus*.¹⁸³ Our attention is directed (with expansive rhetoric) to the wonders of the gifts of creation, at the summit of which is the gift of rationality to humanity, and within this great gift lies our ability to know even the Creator of the universe. Undoubtedly, all of this munificence should lead us to love the *Genitor* in return – if not, even the mute beasts in their respect for their masters (Is. 1,3) would put us to shame. Even after the fall into sin and death the Creator continued to take care of humanity. He gave the law *in adiutorium*; He set angels to guard us; He sent the prophets to warn us; He even gave His son up to death in order to recall us to life. Who could not be disposed to love in return a *Largitor* of such largesse? The same argumentation applies to the second commandment to love one's neighbour.¹⁸⁴ It is natural! Humanity is defined as being a *humanum animal et communicabile*, not *agreste aliquod ac ferum*.¹⁸⁵ To need and love another is part of our nature because *Dominus harum in nobis virtutum semina seminavit*. If He gave us the seeds, He surely expects to see the fruit. Proof that we really love God, is made explicit in the love we show towards our neighbour. This teaching is made clear with a shower of scriptural proof-texts in which we are commanded to exercise charity.

There is a glaring equivocation in this account of human nature. Whereas mention is made of the delights of Paradise (that were lost), and note is duly made of the sorry fact that the creature so highly gifted fell into sin, and through sin into death, there is no intimation here that there exists any essential differentiation between a pre- and post-lapsarian human condition, except that physical death is a *de facto* reality in the latter. Adam is not mentioned, nor is there any suggestion that his sin had any moral consequence on his posterity. The person who is commanded to love God and neighbour, and has the inherent ability to fulfill these commands, is intrinsically in the same condition as Adam (unnamed) was before the Fall. Further reading of

¹⁸³ The phrase *in natura nostrae creationis* is an addition by Rufinus. Cf. Silvas p. 172.

¹⁸⁴ Although they are treated as a separate topics in the 'Longer Responses' the two commands form a unity in the version offered by Rufinus. Cf. Silvas p. 172.

¹⁸⁵ Rufinus evidently had difficulty with the terminology here. His choice of *ferum* ('wild') as the opposite of *communicabile* ('social') may seem strange, but if he had remained close to the Greek he would have had to write something like *solitarium*, or even *monasticum*! Basil's use of '*monastikos*' is not yet in the technical sense of 'monastic' but already in Rufinus (e.g. *Prol.*) *monachus/monasterium* take on their later more restricted and usual meanings. See Neri, p. 232n; Silvas p. 172n.

the works of Basil would certainly give a more nuanced account of the human condition, but here we are reading the preamble to a 'manual' on authentic Christian living as it was presented to his Western readership by Rufinus. In it he tells the reader that it is possible to keep *all* the commandments because humankind has the capacity *naturaliter*, now as it was *ab initio*, to do so. In good Stoic tradition we are told that we can (and should!) cultivate all the virtues, and conversely that all vices should (and can!) be rooted out. Much of what appears to be evil in our nature is nothing more than (bad) habit (*mos*) that takes on the appearance of being a second nature. When the apostle tells us to be imitators of God (Eph 5,1s) we should not be deterred: *Numquam autem praeciperet hoc iustus et clemens deus nisi utique etiam possibilitatem nobis donasset. Inesse enim hoc naturae nostrae ostenditur...*¹⁸⁶

This is Basil – but it is also Rufinus. It is not to my purpose here to pick our way through the Latin text in order to note additions or omissions by Rufinus, nor to discuss where Rufinus' version is to be placed in the complex development and tradition of Basil's *Asketikon*. In essence Rufinus retains the thought of Basil, even when he reworks some phrasing or words, and it is this resulting product that was read by Latin readers. In it they were confronted with a demanding programme for Christian living, but at the same time they were reminded that nothing beyond the possible is demanded: When a *just* God gave *just* commandments, with the same *justice* he gave to human nature the possibility of keeping his commands. This was the same teaching that Rufinus found, and underlined, in Origen's *De Principiis*.¹⁸⁷ The optimistic, but at the same time demanding, account of human nature that these translations offer will be summarized not very many years later – by Augustine! – in these terms: *Sunt enim quidam tantum praesumentes de libero humanae uoluntatis arbitrio, ut ad non peccandum nec adiuvandos nos diuinitus opinentur semel ipsi naturae nostrae concessio liberae uoluntatis arbitrio*.¹⁸⁸ The focus of attention, however, has moved from what we have been given in nature to what an over-insistence on that gift in nature may imply for our understanding of a need for any further divine assistance. In historical terms, between the translations by Rufinus mentioned above, and the complaint of

¹⁸⁶ *Inter.CLVI* (ed. Zelzer, p. 181) = SR 176 (Silvas p. 370).

¹⁸⁷ See at n. 146 above. He may have been working on the translations at the same time (397/98). Rist (*art. cit.* p. 99) begins his study with the assertion that Rufinus 'goes out of his way to describe God as not merely just but just as judge.'

¹⁸⁸ *De pecc. mer.* II,1,1, CSEL 60, p. 72.

Augustine just quoted, lies the event that almost pin-points the 'start' of Pelagianism – the violent reaction of Pelagius to Augustine's prayer *Da quod iubes et iube quod uis*, which Pelagius understood as being a prayer that undermined free will.¹⁸⁹ When Augustine turns in *De peccatorum meritis II* to discuss the opinions of those who defend the power of free will, one (perhaps the only) written source at his disposal can be attributed to Caelestius. The subsequent debate would revolve around the condition in which each individual is born (under the sway of Adam's sin?), and the God-given power that is inherent in nature (limited, and in need of Grace?), but the point of departure had been established in an optimistic understanding of human nature *in se* which some Latin Christians had discovered through the translations of Rufinus of Aquileia.

Tradux animi/peccati

In the paragraphs above I have only skimmed stones over the surface of a lake of placid waters that have been left largely untouched from the point of view of my search. Space, however, does not permit here that we enter further into an examination of the thought of Rufinus on the subject of the human condition since my purpose is primarily to show that the Rufinus whose name appears in history at the beginning of the Pelagian debate is to be identified as Rufinus of Aquileia. Such an attempt to 'eliminate' the Syrian encounters a fundamental difficulty, and it lies in both of the sources on which the real existence of *Rufinus quondam natione Syrus* depends. Mercator (at least generally) and Caelestius (very specifically) both present Rufinus as somebody who denied *tradux peccati*. Against this, there is no evidence from his extant writings or translations to maintain that Rufinus of Aquileia made such an explicit denial. It is legitimate to ask, however, if he *might* have denied it, or, to put it in other words, if his expressed opinions on related topics that were in discussion in his day would not allow for, or even exclude his acceptance of the idea of sin being transmitted.

The problem of *tradux peccati* was intimately bound up with that of the origin of the soul. In his first rebuttal of the Pelagians in *De peccatorum meritis*, Augustine was careful to concentrate on the existence of the sinful condition in which humans are *de facto* born,

¹⁸⁹ *De dono perseverantiae* 20,53, PL 45,1026.

and only in a concluding note mentioned, in a convoluted paragraph-length sentence, that the problem of the soul was a *magna quaestio* requiring a solution – a solution that Augustine did not have.¹⁹⁰ Shortly afterwards, and under pressure to decide on the problem of the soul, Augustine discussed this matter in a long letter (*Ep.* 166) to Jerome, the object of which was to coax Jerome to explain how creationism could be reconciled with the need for Baptism. Among the arguments quoted (from Caelestius) by Pelagius in his Expositions, one is based specifically on an understanding of the origin of the soul: ‘... ‘if the soul does not exist by transmission, but the flesh alone, then only the flesh carries the transmission of sin and it alone deserves punishment.’ Thus, declaring it to be unjust that a soul which is born today, not from the lump of Adam, bears so ancient a sin belonging to another, they say that on no account should it be granted that God, who forgives a person his own sins, imputes to him another’s.’¹⁹¹ Caelestius, then, sometime during the first decade of the century (presumably in Rome) had denied both *tradux animi*, and *tradux peccati*, and had invoked the concept of justice, both human and divine, to underpin his argument. A few years later in Carthage (411) the same Caelestius would introduce ‘the holy priest Rufinus’ as his authority for casting doubt on the notion of *tradux peccati*.

It is true that Rufinus of Aquileia does not explicitly deny *tradux peccati* in any of his writings. Caelestius, however, merely claimed that he *heard* Rufinus, among others, make the denial, and the difference between what Rufinus said in private and what he committed to writing is not to be dismissed as unimportant. With regard to his opinion on the origin of the soul, this was a point on which Jerome would berate Rufinus – his silence.¹⁹² This attack by Jerome is directed in particular against Rufinus’s *Apologia ad Anastasium*, because in that writing Rufinus listed various opinions then current concerning the origin of the soul, but (Rufinus continued) *usque ad praesens certi et definiti aliquid de hac quaestione non teneo*.¹⁹³ The ugly details of the history of the feud between the two does not belong here – we have already touched on some of it when

¹⁹⁰ De pecc. mer. II,36,59, CSEL 60, pp. 127–28. We have met above in the *Regula ‘Rufini’* the centrality of the concept of divine *iustitia* in Basil-Rufinus’ insistence on our innate human ability to keep all the commandments.

¹⁹¹ Rom 1.15 (ed. Souter p. 47); translation by T. de Bruyn, *Pelagius’ Commentary on St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans*, Oxford (1993), p. 94.

¹⁹² *Adu. Ruf.* 3,30 (CCSL 79, p. 101): *cur disputantium libertatem angusto fine concludas et, cum mendacia protuleris, de ueritate taces?*

¹⁹³ *Apol. ad Anast.* 6, CCSL 20, p. 27. A decade (and more) later the same thought would be penned repeatedly by Augustine!

considering the position of Pammachius – but within it we catch glimpses of the concerns with which Rufinus was struggling in his attempts to understand the origin of the soul. Our direct source, however, is Jerome, and due caution must be exercised when we read what he reports.

In Jerome's summary of the heresy that had made a brief unsuccessful appearance in Rome in the time of Anastasius, and was still a threat to reckoned with, he offers Demetrias an outline of some of 'their' arguments: *solent... iustitiam dei quaerere: 'cur illa anima in illa est nata prouincia?' [Q]uid causae extitit, ut alii de Christianis nascantur parentibus, alii inter feras et seuiissimas nationes, ubi nulla dei notitia est? [P]utasne, frustra infans paruulus et qui uix matrem risu et uultus hilaritate cognoscat, qui nec boni aliquid fecit nec mali, daemone corripitur, morbo opprimitur regio et ea sustinet, quae uidemus inpios homines non sustinere et sustinere deo seruientes? sin autem iudicia, inquit, domini uera, iustificata in semet ipsis et nihil apud deum iniustum est, ipsa ratione compellimur, ut credamus animas fuisse in caelestibus et propter quaedam antiqua peccata damnatas in corporibus humanis et, ut ita loquamur, sepultas nosque in ualle lacrimarum poenas luere peccatorum...*¹⁹⁴ About a decade earlier (404), in a letter of condolence written to Eustochium after the death of Paula, he had reported the arguments of some unnamed heretic who had been pestering Paula. Among them we read: *probare cupiebat rationales creaturas ob quaedam uitia et antiqua peccata in corpora esse delapsas et pro diuersitate ac meritis peccatorum tali uel tali condicione generari, ut uel corporum sanitate gauderent et parentum diuitiis ac nobilitate uel in morbidas carnes et domos inopum uenientes poenas pristinatorum luerent delictorum et praesenti saeculo atque corpore quasi carceri clauderentur.*¹⁹⁵

These are clearly arguments used to support the Origenist theory of the pre-existence of the soul that were in circulation in the early fifth century. At stake was not so much the *de facto* origin of the soul itself, which on the basis of any theory can be ultimately attributed to the divinity, but the need to uphold divine justice within the framework of whatever theory was adopted. The inequalities, into which infants are born, logically require that we conclude (*ipsa ratione compellimur*) to the existence of some personal sin in a pre-existent state before physical birth; otherwise we would call into question the justice of God.¹⁹⁶ There is no

¹⁹⁴ Ep. 130,16, CSEL 56, pp. 196-97. Apart from mention of Popes Anastasius and Innocent, names are studiously avoided.

¹⁹⁵ Ep. 108,23, CSEL 55, pp. 339-40.

¹⁹⁶ Augustine (*De pecc. mer.* I,22,31, CSEL 60, p. 29) dismisses those (Origenists?) who invent *fabulas improbables* in order to defend *iustitiam Dei*.

implication in these arguments, however, that the inequalities evident in the human condition might lead or 'compel' *ratio* to find the causal source of these inequalities in the ancient and original sin of Adam.

While we can neither prove nor presume that Rufinus would have agreed with the logical rigour of this argumentation, Jerome has no hesitation about naming him as a proponent of this Origenist theory on the origin of the soul, and in his curt answer to Marcellinus (who asked him for an explanation) he refers his correspondent to his rebuttal of Rufinus on the question of the soul in his *Contra Rufinum*.¹⁹⁷ In that writing Jerome presents Rufinus as raising the same objection to Jerome's own preferred theory of creationism: *ubi est iustitia Dei, ut de adulterio incestuque nascentibus animas largiatur?*¹⁹⁸ Jerome goes on to remind Rufinus of a work by Didymus written specifically to answer Rufinus's question: *quare moriantur infantes, cum propter peccata corpora acceperint?* If Rufinus shared with his Origenist contemporaries such concern about preserving the justice of God in the face of the reality of the inequalities of life, and posed this as a major hurdle encountered by Jerome's facile affirmation that it is Church teaching (*illud ecclesiasticum*) that: *Cotidie Deus operatur animas et in corpore eas mittit nascentium*, it seems reasonable to deduce that Rufinus would not have accepted readily the idea of *tradux peccati*. Such a solution would run counter to the very notion of justice.¹⁹⁹ The same concern for maintaining divine justice, as we have seen, lay at the foundation of Caelestius' argument against *tradux peccati*.²⁰⁰

A short study by C.P. Bammel entitled 'Rufinus' Translation of Origen's Commentary on Romans and the Pelagian Controversy,'²⁰¹ would appear to categorically contradict the suggestion being made

¹⁹⁷ *Ep.* 126. Addressed to Marcellinus in Africa, the letter must be dated to 411 or very soon after.

¹⁹⁸ *Cont. Ruf.* 3,28 CCSL 79, p. 100. This third book replies to a lost letter from Rufinus, the traces of which are collected in an appendix by C. Lardet in CCSL 79, pp. 252-56.

¹⁹⁹ Jerome was not unaware of the difficulty. He refers thus to the creationist theory: *quam nos [sequimur], simplices et fatui homines, qui non intellegimus quod, si ita sit, iniustus a nobis arguatur Deus.* (3,30, p. 101). But he (*simplex et fatuus!*) does not attempt to resolve the problem. It is to be noted that when Jerome berates the feigned(?) ignorance of Rufinus on all three theories, he implies that Rufinus continued to countenance the possibility of the soul's pre-existence.

²⁰⁰ See at n. 191 above.

²⁰¹ See n. 162 above. The primary and limited concern of the following pages, it needs to be repeated, is not to read Origen, but to read Rufinus' translation of Origen (= Or-Ruf below; references are to the chapter/verse of *Ep.Rom.*).

here concerning the thought of Rufinus. In it she asks the very pertinent question (pp. 132, 138): '... where would Rufinus have stood in relation to the issues debated in the Pelagian controversy?' While allowing it to be probable (p. 138) that Rufinus 'was aware of the points under discussion,' the benign tenor of her attitude to Rufinus is set from the outset (p. 131): 'We may regard Rufinus as fortunate to have escaped the polemics of the following years.' Again, in her concluding remarks (p. 141), she can write that Rufinus 'deliberately... provided a contribution to [the assertion of free will].' On the question of original sin, however, Bammel insists (p. 138) that the translation of the Commentary on Romans 'was clearly opposed to Pelagian views.' We shall return presently to this claim, but it should be noted here that the conclusions of her study (at pp. 139-40) rest in no small part on the assertion that the 'earliest surviving writing to put forward characteristically Pelagian ideas' is the work of the other Rufinus – Rufinus the Syrian's *Liber de Fide*! One is left with the impression that, given the Syrian's existence, and the assumed certainty concerning the dating of the *Liber*, it becomes almost unnecessary to even consider the position of the Aquileian on these questions.

One of the great merit's of Bammel's study is that she draws our attention to the extent to which Augustine himself, in his first reply to the Pelagians, seems to have used the translation by Rufinus. There he would have read, with approval, that Christ, who was born *ex nulla uiri contagione*, had the nature of our body, but was in no way tainted with the pollution of sin *quae ex concupiscentiae motu conceptis traditur*.²⁰² That infants are born in sin is also affirmed at Rom 6,6²⁰³ – a passage to which we shall return below. But the Commentary on Rom 5.12-14 (*per unum hominem...*) is disconcertingly ambivalent,²⁰⁴ and Or-Ruf even offers alternative possible explanations. While keeping in mind that Rufinus may have omitted much, we should, however briefly, take

²⁰² Or-Ruf: *Comm.Rom.* 8,3 (ed. Bammel p. 525). Cf. here her related study on 'Augustine, Origen' (also n. 162 above). In another study (in same collection, no. XII: 'Adam in Origen' – original in R. Williams (ed.) *The Making of Orthodoxy*, Cambridge 1989, pp. 62-93) Bammel reviews the thought of Origen insofar as it can be reconstructed. There (pp. 81-82) she writes: '...it remains an open question whether it is because of its own previous fall or because of the taint of birth in succession from Adam (or rather it is probably for both reasons) that the soul is already polluted on arrival in this life and requires purification.' In the light of this conclusion I am not sure how she then comes to assert ('Rufinus' Translation' p. 138, in text above) that Origen-Rufinus is clearly opposed to *tradux peccati*.

²⁰³ *Comm.Rom.* 6,5-6 (ed. Bammel, p. 440).

²⁰⁴ In 'Adam in Origen' p. 92, n. 88, Bammel remarks that Rufinus abbreviates this section 'particularly heavily.'

note of some of the ideas that he retained.²⁰⁵ When Paul says that 'sin entered' the world, Or-Ruf underlines (p. 374) the use of the verb *intrauit* as signifying 'enter' or the (temporal) 'beginning' of sin being committed. As its consequence, sin brought on *mors*. The death referred to here is the death of the soul,²⁰⁶ as is explained (p. 371: *sine dubio!*) by a quotation from Ezek 18,4: *anima quae peccat ipsa morietur*. Physical death is but a shadow of this death of the soul.²⁰⁷ By contrast with the entry/beginning of sin, Paul writes that death²⁰⁸ *pertransiit* over all humans, i.e., it 'touched' all, but in the case of some its influence was/is temporary. The reason why *omnes homines* are subject to this death is stated definitively (p. 372: *absoluta sententia*) by Paul: *in quo omnes inquit peccauerunt*. No exception is allowed, and Or-Ruf must go to some pains to show how this text can be applied to a list of persons (Abel, Enos, Enoc, Mathusalam, Noe, Abraham) who are otherwise praised in the Bible for their rectitude. With a certain amount of ingenuity, Or-Ruf can argue from the biblical account that their rectitude was a condition subsequent to that of being somehow less than righteous. Even Abel is included because he brought his offering to God *post dies... et post Cain*. Why did he not do so *statim*, and before Cain?²⁰⁹

Or-Ruf does not have the difficulty of solving the problem of how all sinned 'in Adam' because the Pauline text *in quo* is not understood as referring to Adam.²¹⁰ Almost perversely, Or-Ruf even introduces (p. 368) the idea of all humanity being 'in Adam' when Adam

²⁰⁵ *Comm.Rom.* 5,12-14 (ed. Bammel, pp. 358-91). Specific page references are given in the text above. The length of the commentary at this point should serve as a warning in itself that it is very complex, but the very fact that he retained so much is indicative of his concern with the problems involved.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Augustine's expansion (*De pecc. mer.* I,2,2, CSEL 60, p. 3) on the first charge brought against Caelestius: 'That Adam would die *necessitate naturae*.' 'They' interpret *morte moriemini* not as referring to physical death, but *ad mortem animae*. However, reference is not made to Ezek 18.

²⁰⁷ The reality (*mors animae*) implies of necessity that it have a shadow (*mors corporis*), but the commentary at this point (p. 371) does not make it specific that physical death is a punitive consequence of sin. Christ went to the netherworld, we are told in another context (p. 386), to release the *sancti* who were held in *infernum* not as a punishment, but *moriendi condicione*. Logically, this implies that physical death is part of the human condition, irrespective of the presence or absence of personal sin.

²⁰⁸ That *mors* is in the text as the subject of *pertransiit* (absent in most contemporary texts on the Bible) is discussed at length in C.P. Hammond Bammel, *Der Römerbrieftext des Rufin und seine Origenes-Übersetzung*, Freiburg 1985, pp. 333-34.

²⁰⁹ The same words (*post dies*) will be used again immediately after, but from a different perspective (p. 385 – cf. the following comments here on *paterna institutio*).

²¹⁰ Cf. Hammond Bammel, *Römerbrieftext*, pp. 335-36.

was in paradise and sinned, and Adam was subjected to the consequences of his sin. Biblical authority is invoked: we read (Heb 7.9-10) that Levi was *in lumbis patris*, and again Paul declares (1Cor 15.22): *in Adam omnes moriuntur*. But in the context this idea is introduced to explain why Paul has everything begin with Adam, when in fact Adam was not the first to actually commit sin. Adam, here, is the person *ex quo omnes mortales originem ducunt*. His human posterity refers itself back to Adam (not to Eve, who was prior in committing sin) as its *auctor*. When that posterity shares in the sin and punishment of the *auctor*, it is because individually *omnes peccauerunt*. Adam was the first to open the way for the entry of sin into the world (p. 383). His descendents sin(ned) *in similitudine praeuaricationis*. What ‘in the likeness’ means prompts a number of attempts at an explanation.²¹¹ Of particular note is that which is offered as the easier (p. 384: *simpliciter*) solution. All who are born: *sunt non solum filii peccatorum sed et discipuli*. It is in this sense that even Abel, in the first days/years of his life was less than perfect, because (p. 385): *paternae praeuaricationis institutionibus tenebatur*. The statement is annoying in its ambiguity, if not also its obscurity. By what was Abel ‘held’ – the *institutio*, or the *praeuaricatio*? Does the *paterna praeuaricatio* of Adam have its effect upon Abel through *institutio* alone, or does it have more profound implications stemming from the very fact that Adam, the instructor, was also a *praeuaricator*? It would seem that birth from parents who committed sin is insufficient in itself to explain the condition of their offspring, without adding the note that children are also disciples of their parents, but does discipleship dispense with the further (and prior?) influence of the paternal sin? Ready answers are not forthcoming, but the fact that Or-Ruf introduces as a necessary condition the personal involvement of being a disciple of one’s (sinful) parents, and even includes Abel in this condition, suggest the direction of the thought. Personal responsibility for sin is a fundamental concern when we attempt to explain the human condition.

The above presentation touches only some aspects, and in a very limited portion, of a complex Commentary. In addition to this, it must also be repeated that we are dealing with what is already an abridged version by Rufinus. In overall terms, the role of Adam in human

²¹¹ Included in these attempts there is also consideration given to the fact that in some MSS the reading was that death also reigned over those who did *not* sin (*qui non peccauerunt*). This problem is solved by the idea noted in n. 207 above: these *sancti* died *moriendi condicione*.

'sinfulness' is reduced to his being the father of the human race, and almost coincidentally the first sin is attributed to him in his role as *primogenitor* (rather than to Eve or the serpent). If his posterity all became sinners, it was because all *de facto* committed sin. Death, as a result of Adam's sin, is clearly defined as *mors animae*. At the same time, however, we are *fili peccatorum*, and even the righteous are subject to the physical *moriendi condicio*. The question may be asked: is there something 'un-whole' in the human condition itself that each individual inherits at birth?

Per baptismi sacramentum remissio

We referred above to a text where Or-Ruf, according to Bammel, speaks clearly of 'the pollution of sin, which is transmitted to those conceived by the impulse of concupiscence.'²¹² The context of the discussion, however, warns us against drawing over-hasty conclusions from this text. It belongs in an examination of Rom 8,3-9 (*Nam quod impossibile erat legis...*) in which it is shown that full compliance with the law is impossible *secundum litteram*, but through the advent of Christ this becomes possible to those who live *secundum spiritum*. Central to the development of this argument is Paul's statement that God sent His Son *in similitudine carnis peccati*. Here *similitudo* is explained by reference to Christ's birth from the virgin Mary: Christ has the same human nature as all others, except for the pollution of sin *quae ex concupiscentiae motu conceptis traditur*. This certainly can only imply some notion of a transmission of 'sin' through normal human procreation. However, before we conclude that this was the understanding of Origen and/or Rufinus, we should read further. The text continues with a long exposition in which *lex* in the passage under consideration is understood as *lex Mosei*, and then we read: *Potest sane et secundum aliam expositionem... de lege mentis intellegi*.²¹³ This alternative exposition is very brief, and in it we are not given any detailed explanation of how Christ differs from other humans by being *in similitudine carnis peccati*. At the conclusion the reader is invited to select whichever of the two explanations is found to be the better, without a suggestion

²¹² See at nn. 202, 203 above.

²¹³ Ed. Bammel p. 530. The difference in length between the alternative explanations (seven pages against one in Bammel's text) suggests that the second has been greatly abbreviated by Rufinus. See Hammond Bammel, *Römerbrieftext*, pp. 361-62.

being offered by Or-Ruf as to which is to be preferred. If Rufinus retained the fuller text of the former, this may suggest that he preferred it; but equally it could be argued that he reduced the second exposition – if he reduced it – simply because he found it too complicated! But the fact that the choice of alternate explanations is given by Origen, and retained by Rufinus does not permit us to assume that the one in which a notion of transmitted sin is countenanced is to be preferred as indicating the final thought of either the author or the translator.

The possibility that Origen (and Rufinus) *could* countenance the idea of sin being transmitted by human procreation emerges more clearly elsewhere. In the same Commentary on Romans 6.6 (pp. 437-440) the meaning of *corpus peccati* is discussed. Here again two possibilities are offered. Perhaps *corpus peccati* is to be understood in the same sense as Paul uses the word *corpus* elsewhere (1Cor 12,27): *vos estis corpus Christi*. In this case *corpus* can be taken to refer to the manner of our living, whether as befitting members of the Church or not. Alternatively, *corpus peccati* refers to the physical body that is born in sin. It was for this reason that in the Old Testament offerings were made for new-born infants, a practice that continues in the New Dispensation, as seen when *ecclesia ab apostolis traditionem suscepit etiam paruulis baptismum dare*. We shall return presently in more detail to this argument, but it may be noted that at the conclusion of the discussion the choice is left to the reader: *Quae autem e duabus expositio sensui conueniat apostolico aut si neutra probet qui legit*.

This leeway given to the reader in the conclusion is a frequent feature of Origen's commentaries and is not to be interpreted as Or-Ruf offering any easy way out of a thorny problem. In fact we find reference to the practice of infant baptism elsewhere in Origen's works: *Hom. Lev. VIII,3* (PG 12,496), and *Hom. Luc.14,5* (PG 13,2835 = PL 26,298A). Since the latter is a translation by Jerome there is no reason to doubt that the reference to infant baptism is original to Origen. As translations, the relative dating is *Hom. Luc.* (389/90), *Hom. Lev.* (403/4), *Comm. Rom.* (405/6). In *Hom. Luc.* the fact of infant baptism *in remissionem peccatorum* is merely mentioned. It can (says Origen) raise the question as to what sin(s) this applies to, and in answer we are given the authority of scripture which teaches both that *nemo mundus a sorde [est]...* (Job 14.4LXX), and also *nisi enim quis renatus fuerit...* (Jn 3,3). Infants, accordingly, are baptized because *per baptismi sacramentum nativitatis sordes deponuntur*. Ecclesiastical or apostolic tradition is not introduced here by way of justification of the

practice,²¹⁴ nor does Origen discuss or resolve a difficulty in his own presentation at this point. He refers his audience back to his earlier explanation of *sordes* – but in that explanation, in fact, he had concluded that the *sordes nativitatis* did not refer to *peccatum*! We are thus left without an explanation of what the *sordes* are. The second text, *Hom. Lev.*, is an examination of the law in Lev.12.2 which declares that the woman who conceives and gives birth is unclean for seven days. Origen writes (PG 12,495): *Ego in talibus nihil audeo dicere, sentio tamen occulta in his quaedam mysteria contineri ...* He goes on to collect a series of scriptural texts, which repeat in one form or another, the idea that there is ‘pollution’ involved in human birth. To these he adds (12,496) the fact that infants are baptized *secundum Ecclesiae observantiam* – if there were no need for *remissio* *indulgentia*, he concludes, the grace of baptism would as a result appear to be superfluous. Without, however, attempting to resolve the problem of what the object of *remissio* may be, he then turns his attention to an examination of the spiritual sense.

By comparison with these two homilies, in the Commentary on Romans the subject is considered at greater length and with greater subtlety. The context, as already noted above, is a discussion of the meaning of *corpus peccati*, and Or-Ruf is examining the possibility (as an alternative!) that this may refer to the physical body. He notes the law in Leviticus on making offerings for the newborn *pro peccato*. In the same manner as he did above in *Hom. Lev.* (*nihil audeo dicere*), in his conclusion he leaves the reader to accept or reject his explanation, because he finds himself confronted with something mysterious, but a mystery revealed to the biblical authors. Paul’s statements were made *per ineffabilem Dei sapientiam quae data est ei arcanum nescio quid intuens et reconditum*. When he spoke, David, like Paul, was *eodem spiritu secretorum caelestium gnarus*. Of Jeremiah we are told that he also was *similis mysterii per Dei spiritum conscius*. In the same Spirit the Church baptizes infants in a tradition received from the Apostles.²¹⁵ They (the Apostles) were the ones *quibus mysteriorum secreta commissa sunt diuinorum*. Accordingly they knew *quia essent*

²¹⁴ Jerome’s translation is not strictly literal, but had he found a reference to ancient tradition here it is highly unlikely that he would have omitted it. On his translation cf. Kelly, *Jerome*, p. 143.

²¹⁵ Note that Augustine, presenting the scriptural proof for the need for (infant) baptism in *De pecc. mer.* I,26,39–29,54, subtly changes the order of the canon to make his case more ‘historically’ authoritative and probative: Gospels (= Jesus), Peter, John, Paul, Revelation, Acts, with the Old Testament added in summary.

in omnibus genuinae sordes peccati, that must be cleansed *per aquam et spiritum* (cf. Jn 3,5). But the problem is shrouded in mystery, and a solution is not attempted in Or-Ruf.

One may well ask – and it is the purpose of our quest – what Rufinus thought on this subject when he translated the Commentary in c.405/6. That the problem was shrouded in mystery was surely something with which he would concur. Like Origen he would not proffer any final solution. Nevertheless, on the assumption that here Rufinus is reasonably close to the original, there are some elements in the presentation of the problem in Or-Ruf that may give us an inkling of the direction of Rufinus' thought. When it is allowed that infant baptism implies the presence of *genuinae sordes peccati*, we are forcefully reminded that this by no means opens the way to the doctrine of *metempsychosis*,²¹⁶ because the soul did not sin *in alio corpore*. By the same logic we might infer that the notion of the individual soul sinning *in Adam* should also be excluded, but such a conclusion, while not impossible,²¹⁷ risks reading more into the text of Rufinus than is actually there. Nevertheless, he does insist (against the idea of metempsychosis) that infants are born in sin *pro hoc ipso quod in corpore peccati et corpore mortis atque humilitatis effecta est [anima]*. The term *humilitas* here must attract attention. Wherever possible throughout the discussion Or-Ruf juxtaposes *corpus peccati* with *corpus mortis* and/or *corpus humilitatis*. In fact the discussion is brought to a close with Ps 43,26: *quia humiliasti in pulverem animam nostram*. As an explanation of the meaning of *corpus peccati* this is suspiciously close to being a (veiled) nod in the direction of a preference for the theory of the soul's humiliation and fall! However, in the immediate context here the discussion centres on *corpus peccati* being a reference to our physical body transmitted through human generation. In human history this began with the generation of Cain, which in fact took place *post peccatum*. A new beginning is effected in Christ because he, by a new generation, *non ex semine uiri concept[us] est*.²¹⁸ Here we seem to be confronted by an explicit affirmation of *tradux peccati*, but we cannot draw that conclusion because throughout Or-Ruf retreats

²¹⁶ As an error, this teaching was a problem in the time of Origen rather than one of immediate concern for Rufinus, but if we read it merely as a rejection of the 'transmigration' of souls we may be missing the point. It is also a rejection of the possibility of committing sin *in alio corpore*, and this was very much a problem in Rufinus' time.

²¹⁷ See above on the meaning of *in lumbis patris*, where this is almost reduced to being no more than a figure of speech.

²¹⁸ Bammel in her edition here (p. 438app.) draws attention to Augustine, *De pecc. mer.* II,24,38, CSEL 60, p. 111.

behind the authority of the prophets and the Apostle and their being privy to a knowledge of a mystery into which we cannot penetrate. The only conclusion to be drawn is that Or-Ruf accepts that there is sin in infants, – else infant baptism would be superfluous (*Hom. Lev.*) – but what that sin is, or whence it derives, are shrouded in mystery.

It is unfortunate that these texts concerning infant baptism in Rufinus' translation are rarely read in the historical context in which he translated them. We cannot, perhaps, be sure if he undertook the task of translation already while he was in Aquileia, or whether he had already moved south at the time, but the criticisms he rejects in his prefaces to the work show him to be concerned with his critics in Rome. Given that the Commentary on Romans was greatly reduced, why did he not excise this particularly difficult discussion on the sinfulness of infants? It surely betrays his continuing concern with understanding the condition in which infants are born, shown earlier in his opting for a pre-existence of the soul as the only possible solution. But rather than adopting any alternative solution on the question of the soul, or specifically affirming *tradux peccati* in the condition of infants, he leaves the former open to discussion, and in the latter he admits (with Origen?) to the presence of an *arcanum nescio quid*. While this is not an explicit denial of *tradux peccati*, it is tantamount to being so, and it is certainly not any endorsement of the idea. He also retains in his translation (*Hom. Lev.*) an endorsement of the practice of infant baptism *in remissionem peccatorum*, even if he cannot explain what sin(s) is/are remitted. About the same time in Rome, a certain Caelestius would both exclude *tradux animi*, and equally deny *tradux peccati*. The 'first' Pelagians with whom Augustine will soon be concerned were arguing that the death that entered the world through the sin of Adam was the death of the soul (= Or-Ruf).²¹⁹ They accept that infants must be baptized, 'terrified' (*terrentur*) by the Lord's words: *nisi quis natus...* (= Or-Ruf).²²⁰ For whatever reason, any reference to the authority of Church tradition is absent from Jerome's translation of the Homily on Luke, but in the two texts translated by Rufinus in c.403-6 it is present. Infants (so Or-Ruf) are baptized for the remission of sin in a Church tradition that goes back to the Apostles, although the nature of that sin is a mystery. If (not knowing what sin is remitted) we ask why infants are baptized, the only ultimate justification for it lies in that tradition. Before very long, when

²¹⁹ *De pecc. mer.* I,2,2, CSEL 60, pp. 3-4.

²²⁰ *De pecc. mer.* I,20,26, CSEL 60, p. 26, but they restrict it to referring to entry into the Kingdom.

pressed on the subject, the same solution will be resorted to by Caecilius in his *Libellus fidei*. Infants are baptized for the remission of sins, he declares, *secundum regulam uniuersalis Ecclesia et secundum Euangelii sententiam*.²²¹

If a summary of the all too brief and selective account given above may be attempted, it is as follows. There are certainly texts where Or-Ruf proposes the notion of a transmitted sin, but the Commentary is singularly hesitant in being any way explicit on the 'means' of that transmission. Wherever it seems to be clearly posited that Adam's sin is transmitted to his posterity through human procreation we find that such a concept is presented as one possible explanation that the reader is free to accept, but Or-Ruf does not necessarily endorse. There are two explicit cases where Or-Ruf seems to me to clearly shy away from the notion of *tradux peccati*. The one is the case of Abel – 'Just' and without sin, by all accounts, and still he was subject to the sin of his father; this subjection, however, derives from Abel's learning from the *disciplina* of his sinful parent and being remiss in a delay in making his offering, thus shifting the onus of Abel's condition onto himself. The other is the case of infants who are baptized *in remissionem peccatorum*. Or-Ruf can only bow to the authority of Church tradition on this matter, and insist on the presence of a mystery, the secrets of which were known only to the Apostles. A solution 'to hand' in the notion of infants being born as sinners *per traducem peccati* (*Adae*), is simply not taken into consideration.

Rufinus the Author

In his own original writings, Rufinus offers little to help us understand how he explained the origin of sin and death, or whether or not he accepted the idea of a transmitted sin. His polemical writings are too concerned with the techniques of, and motives for, translation, to allow room for much discussion of ideas, and the subjects being debated do not directly touch on the present problem.²²² Even in his *Apologia ad Anastasium* he limits himself to a simple declaration of his faith, and to listing various opinions on the origin of the

²²¹ Cited by Augustine. *De Grat. Christi*, 2,5,5, CSEL 42, p. 169.

²²² In *Contra Hier.* I,28, CCSL 20, p. 62, he gives a resume of the problem of the 'Fall of the Soul', but it is in order to show what Jerome had said in his commentary on Ephesians. Rufinus does not elaborate on his own views. F. X. Murphy, *Sources of the Moral Teaching of Rufinus of Aquileia*, StPat. VI, TU 81 (1962) pp. 147–54, gives an overview of Rufinus's thought, especially in *De Ben. Patriarcharum*, but does not confront the question raised here.

soul. We might expect some fuller discussion of the question of sin in his *Expositio Symboli*, but we will see presently that he pays little attention to the subject. In his summary of Origenism in the *Expositio*, he makes no mention whatever of the much debated problem of the origin of the soul, and when he rejects Origenism in the same work, he does so in terms that sum up the whole malaise of the crisis in the West; for, according to Rufinus, it is not at all certain that Origenists even exist, though some people fancifully think that they do.²²³ In the opening chapters of his *Apologia contra Hieronymum* he defends his orthodoxy, particularly on the question of the resurrection of the body. There he makes a declaration which we should not pass over unnoticed: *ea quae de Deo dicuntur, ad fidem pertinent; quae uero de creaturis disputantur, ad rationem.*²²⁴ The same distinction will be invoked in his own defense by Caelestius (*discipulus Rufini?*) in Rome: *fides* is involved in matters *a Trinitate unius deitatis usque ad resurrectionem... mortuorum*. Other matters are *praeter fidem quaestiones*.²²⁵

Rufinus, in *Exp.Symb.*, is at best reticent and noncommittal in any statements he makes about the sin of Adam and its consequences. By the power of the resurrection, we are told, the fall of Adam is repaired and (the human body) is brought on high.²²⁶ Does he mean by this that Adam lost a prior physical immortality, or lost access to a blessed eternal life? We would need to delve at length into Rufinus' thought before we can pin down *protoplasti lapsum* to any specific meaning. While he does state, in Pauline terms,²²⁷ that death entered

²²³ *Exp.Symb.* 37, CCSL 20, p. 173: *si qui illi sunt...* The *Expositio* dates from c.404, when Rufinus had already returned to his work of translating Origen. His main source was the Catechetical Homilies of Cyril of Jerusalem. The points of contact are noted by both Kelly and Simonetti in their commentaries: J.N.D. Kelly, *Rufinus: A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed*, London 1955; M. Simonetti, *Rufino: Spiegazione del Credo*, Rome 1978. (Simonetti's translation and notes, with the CCSL text, are also in *Rufino di Concordia: Scritti Vari*, Rome 2000, pp. 98-173.)

²²⁴ *Contra Hier.* I,15, CCSL 20, p. 48.

²²⁵ Caelestius in his *Libellus* to Zosimus, referred to by Augustine, *De pecc. orig.* 23,26, CSEL 42, p. 185. He had already resorted to the distinction in Carthage 411 (*ibid.* 3,4, p. 169): *quaestionis res [est] ista, non haeresis*.

²²⁶ *Exp.Symb.* 27, CCSL 20, p. 162: *in ea protoplasti lapsum resurrectionis virtute reparatum (...) in altissimis [carnem] conlocavit*. Kelly's expansive translation of this (p. 63) is indicative of how condensed the thought is: '(human flesh) which had been brought to death by the first man's sin, and restored it by the power of His resurrection.' Simonetti also translates *lapsum* with the Italian 'peccato' (*Spiegazione*, p. 83).

²²⁷ *Exp.Symb.* 23 (p. 159): *Solus est enim qui peccatum non fecit et abstulit peccatum mundi. Si enim potuit per unum hominem mors introire, quanto magis per unum hominem, qui et Deus erat, potuit uita restitui?*

through one man, and accordingly it was fitting that (new) life should be given through one man, it is left ambiguous what he means here by death – that of the body, or spiritual death? – since the new life that is given is eternal life. If he means spiritual death, then physical death as such should be considered to be natural to our human condition. One is led to believe that Rufinus inclined toward this latter view when he explains that we should accept the reality of death willingly, following the example given to us by Christ.²²⁸ What had become ‘unnatural’ about death of the body is the fact that we live in fear of it. Again, in his discussion of the change brought about by the final resurrection of the dead, he argues that there is no reason why God, who changed soil into a living physical body (*corpus animale*), cannot also change this present body into a spiritual body (*corpus spiritale*).²²⁹ He then adds, with reference to that body formed from dust: *et haec est natura corporis nostri*, which suggests that he saw no real difference between the body of Adam as originally created by God and the human body as it now exists, both requiring further transformation into a spiritual body.

Only fleeting reference is made to the sin of Adam. The whole world, Rufinus writes with reference to the account in Genesis,²³⁰ was punished because of that sin, but he does not expand on the thought. Before, however, we understand this as being a clear reference to a punishment meted out on humanity, we should take note that the ‘world’ to which he refers is the physical environment (*terra*) of Adam. Even when he speaks of Eve as *fons peccati et mortis* – in antithesis to the blood and water flowing from the side of Christ, which are *fons redemptionis et vitae* – we should not conclude that the sin of which he speaks is one in which the human race as a whole is a guilty partaker.²³¹ Rather, he seems to intend that Eve’s sin was but the starting point in the history of human sinning.²³² This becomes clearer when we turn to Rufinus’ understanding of redemption. Although the effects of Christ’s death have profound consequences for the human race, in fact these consequences are presented as a secondary result of the

²²⁸ *Exp.Symb.* 13 (p. 150): *Nos vero, hoc est humanum genus, [Christus] edocet primo omnium usque ad mortem resistere aduersum peccatum et libenter interitum pro pietate suscipere.*

²²⁹ *Exp.Symb.* 45 (p. 181).

²³⁰ *Exp.Symb.* 20 (p. 157): *oportebat eum [scil. Christum]... etiam terrae male dicta purgare, quae peccante protoplasto, sententiam praeuaricationis acceperat...*

²³¹ *Exp.Symb.* 21 (p. 158).

²³² We have met the same notion of ‘starting point’ above in the Commentary on Romans, but with reference to the entry (*intrauit*) of sin into the world through Adam.

Incarnation. By the Incarnation, God concealed himself in man in order to deceive the devil and so rob him of his power.²³³ The devil held humankind in his grip because through his *teaching* humans had learned disobedience to God and obedience to himself.²³⁴ At this point Rufinus betrays his real understanding of mankind's sin, when he goes on to say: *et hinc aduersum nos peccatorum chirographa scripta sunt, quia, ut propheta dicit, peccatis nostris uenumdati sumus (Is 50.1). Pretium namque animae suae unusquisque consequitur, cum concupiscentiae satisfecerit.*²³⁵ It was by such personal acquiescence to the devil that each person (*unusquisque*) was held in the devil's sway until Christ came to deprive the devil of his dominion. Christ's death, then, was directed primarily against the devil and his tyranny, from which, once broken, mankind is now freed. Furthermore, Rufinus related this to the individual's sins, not to the deletion of a primordial sin. This is made all the clearer when he says that the direct meaning of Christ's death for the individual lies in the example²³⁶ it gives us: we are taught to resist sin up to death, to accept death willingly, and to re-learn obedience to God from the example of Christ.²³⁷

Later in the same work Rufinus addresses a pagan criticism of the notion of *remissio peccatorum*. It is objected that a crime once committed cannot be undone, and that the criminal remains always a criminal and guilty. Rufinus retorts that just as we would not object if a king were to show *liberalitas*, equally we should not question divine generosity.²³⁸ He can also, however, reject the criticism by turning *ad*

²³³ *Exp.Symb.* 14 (p. 152). Cf. *Ben. Patr.* I,6, CCSL 20, p. 194: *mors Christi oppressio et triumphus daemonum fuit.*

²³⁴ *Exp.Symb.* 13 (p. 150). Note through here his insistence on teaching. Abel, as we have seen in *Comm.Rom.* was both a son and a disciple of Adam.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ Cf. *Ben.Pat.* I,8 (p. 196): *Dei Verbum... populum suum coniungit et sociat ei conuersationi, quam ipse exegit in carne, ut imitatione ipsius... efficiatur cum illo et filius Dei coheres Christi.*

²³⁷ *Exp.Symb.* 13 (p. 150). By drawing attention to Rufinus' insistence on our personal response to Christ, I do not imply that he denied any objective value in the Redemption. Christ died not only to defeat our external enemy, nor merely to give us an example, but also: *pro nobis, id est pro peccatis nostris, corruptioni traditum* (*Exp.Symb.* 17, p. 154). It is the direction of his thought, in which Rufinus continually places emphasis on personal involvement in sin and salvation from sin, that is the focus of my attention here.

²³⁸ *Exp.Symb.* 38 (p. 174). Both Kelly (*Rufinus*, p. 148) and Simonetti (*Spiegazione*, p. 105) note Rufinus' underlining of the role of the will, against gnostic and pagan determinism. We should not forget the corollary to this: an emphasis on the role of the will as being also an essential component in all sin would raise a serious question against the idea of sin being transmitted.

ipsius naturae testimonium. Crime, he argues, lies not in the nature of the act committed but in the will that perpetrated the crime, and this *uoluntas* can subsequently be changed for the better. He seems to admit here some concept of an 'Original Sin' that deformed the human will and of a redemption that reformed it when he says: *sicut mala uoluntas, auctore malo daemone, peccato me et morti fecit obnoxium: ita in bonum uoluntas mutata, auctore bono Deo, innocentiae me reddit et uitae*.²³⁹ The antithesis presented here between devil/sin/death and God/innocence/life suggests that he is thinking of the overall Fall of mankind into sinfulness and death, *auctore daemone*, and its subsequent restoration to innocence and life, *auctore Deo*. Nevertheless, he presents this in very individual and personal terms (*me fecit – me reddit*); and, as we have seen already, the devil is *auctor* because mankind acquiesced to his teaching. In the context of an argument that sin lies in the will rather than in the subsequent act, while Rufinus admits a role for the promptings we receive from either side when we make a decision for good or evil, the individual *uoluntas* is the immediate cause of individual actions. To ask for greater clarity here on the origin of *mala uoluntas*, or on how God acts so that the *uoluntas* is *in bonum mutata* is to introduce into the context a problem with which Rufinus is not immediately concerned.

Rufinus magister

It would be wrong to think that the not-impartial attention given above to the writings and translations of Rufinus of Aquileia was intended as a form of witch-hunt from which it would clearly emerge that he was a Pelagian – even the 'Father' of Pelagianism. It was undertaken because of a number of difficulties that beset the current status of studies of early Pelagianism. History tells us that there was a person named Rufinus whose influence was of fundamental import at the beginnings of Pelagianism. Since the seventeenth century this Rufinus has been identified as Rufinus the Syrian, a person whose existence, I have argued, depends on a trivial scribal error. Because of the Syrian's presumed existence, however, the attention of scholars has been deflected away from an examination of the writings of the Rufinus on whose authority the early Pelagians made their case. But when I say that he was their authority, some clarifications need to be made. It is hardly necessary to offer proof that Rufinus of Aquileia

²³⁹ *Exp.Symb.* 38 (p. 174); cf. *Apol. Anast.* 5, CCSL 20, p. 26.

was a personality to be reckoned with in Roman Christian circles at the beginning of the fifth century. This was not merely due to the fact that he was good at Greek! Certainly, his proficiency in that language resulted in his Latin contemporaries gaining access to a library of theology that would perhaps never have been opened to them. There were, indeed, others engaged in translating, but none so prolific as Rufinus;²⁴⁰ and not only his contemporaries, but the whole of Western theology later would be indebted to him.²⁴¹ The *Opera Omnia Rufini* are not to be confined to one slim volume, but should be a multi-volume collection that includes his translations.²⁴² He was overshadowed in subsequent history by appreciation of the stature of Jerome (that could not countenance anything of value in a critical voice),²⁴³ by a mistaken interpretation of a supposed condemnation by Pope Anastasius, by the apocryphal papal condemnation attributed to Pope Gelasius, by his own reluctance to 'promote' himself,²⁴⁴ and not least by his perceived association with both Origenism and Pelagianism. Rufinus the translator apart, Rufinus himself was also a man with not a little prestige. He was a pioneer among Western ascetics, and introduced the West to a concept and form of asceticism that 'made sense' of the Gospel command to be perfect – it was reasonable and possible. He was admired by, and moved about in the highest levels of aristocratic Roman Christians. He was also – a factor not to be omitted – a priest! The Pelagians could look for 'authoritative' direction to a person such as this.

²⁴⁰ By comparison Jerome's translations (omitting the Vulgate) are few, but to say this is to overlook the fact that in his commentaries Jerome was to a great extent transmitting the commentaries of others on whom he (openly or tacitly) depended.

²⁴¹ The vast review by H. de Lubac, *Exégèse Médiévale: Les quatre sens de l'Écriture*, Paris (1959), leaves its reader amazed by the extent of Origen's influence. Of necessity, de Lubac frequently refers to Rufinus (as translator), but the medieval authors normally bypass mention of Rufinus. From a preliminary survey of the manuscript tradition of the translations I get the same impression – the name of the translator is more often omitted than retained by the scribes.

²⁴² B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, Notre Dame (Indiana) 1964 (but the preface [third edition] is dated 1982!), can equate (p. 14) the history of Origenist influence with the history of western exegesis. She mentions Rufinus once (p. 13) in passing, as the translator of Origen, and once more (p. 16) with reference to his name being given to the only surviving manuscript of Julian's Commentary on the Minor Prophets.

²⁴³ According to de Lubac (I, p. 252) the few ('quelques-unes') medieval writers who express criticism of the person of Origen himself (and with him Rufinus is sometimes mentioned), do so in the context of praising Jerome.

²⁴⁴ Many of his translations are prefaced by a few pithy lines of dedication that are hardly more than a show of deference to protocol. Some translations lack prefaces, perhaps because they were simply handed over directly to his friends for whom they were intended.

When confronted by Paulinus of Milan at Carthage, Caelestius offered as his authority the name of Rufinus the holy priest, and on being pressed for more names he retorted: *Non tibi sufficit unus sacerdos?*²⁴⁵

The authority of Rufinus also lay in another area, and this was precisely in his role as translator. He translated the Greek writings of people who enjoyed authority for various reasons: 'Pope Clement,' 'Pope' Xystus, Eusebius, Basil, Gregory of Nazianz, Evagrius, – even, and especially, Origen.²⁴⁶ By making the writings of such lights from the East available in Latin, and under their own names, Rufinus added their authority to his own. Perhaps one should also say the inverse: he added his own authority to theirs! Rufinus' translations were in effect a teacher's reading-list for his disciples. Jerome's worried complaints about the translations done by Rufinus and their (evil!) influence are not to be brushed aside as idle rhetoric. Whether or not we agree with Jerome, he is eloquent witness to the influence of Rufinus.

One can readily agree with the sentiment implied in Bammel's words (noted above) when she wrote that Rufinus was spared the polemics of the following years. There is a sense, however, in which we can also regret that he did not live to see those polemics, and perhaps either set the record straight on the question of his own thought, or temper the more ardent of his admiring readers where they pushed beyond limits ideas found in his translations. The purpose of the foray into his writings made in the preceding pages above has not been to see how much of a 'Pelagian' he was, but rather to see how a Pelagian could read his works, and find there so much that would fit clearly into a Pelagian 'system' of thought. This is not to suggest that Rufinus would have agreed with the conclusions the Pelagians reached, much less to imply that he was a Pelagian *ante litteram* or even the 'proto'-Pelagian. Such would be tantamount to expecting answers from him to questions that had not been asked. The translations done by Rufinus were judged against earlier established orthodoxy, on which point he was himself very ready to 'correct' the text of Origen; or they were judged against the standard of a consensus on some subjects that was beginning to emerge during the debate over Origen, where Rufinus maintained a prudent agnosticism. Jerome might dismiss this as

²⁴⁵ *De pecc. orig.* 3,3, CSEL 42, p. 168. Cf. Augustine's lament in *Gest. Pel.* 35,61, CSEL 42, p. 116: (the new heresy has been introduced) *non ab episcopis seu presbyteris uel quibusque clericis, sed a quibusdam ueluti monachis* ... This should effectively exclude Rufinus, but as we have seen earlier, Augustine draws a clear line between what the Pelagians claim to have learned from others, and what they promote.

²⁴⁶ The absence of John Chrysostom from the list may be due to simple lack of time; or (more likely?) because other's were already engaged on the task.

culpable *ignorantia* but few other contemporaries would share that view. We should allow him the benefit of the same prudence. The way in which some readers of Rufinus' translations, namely the Pelagians, misused individual texts from the Bible was countered by Jerome: *totum legant!*²⁴⁷ Augustine in his refutation of the so-called *Definitiones* of Caelestius expressed his dismay at the way in which the latter's tactic resulted in no more than making the Bible contradict itself.²⁴⁸ Rufinus had translated thus from Origen: *Sed qui fideliter et integre sacrorum uoluminum colligit sensum, debet ostendere, quomodo ea, quae uidentur esse contraria, non sunt uere contraria.*²⁴⁹ Had he lived, this might have been his rebuke to some of his readers.

Liber de Fide (Rufini?)

The present study cannot be brought to a close without considering, however summarily, the problem raised by a writing that is central to any account of Rufinus the Syrian and the beginnings of Pelagianism, namely, the *Liber de Fide*.²⁵⁰ Its centrality rests on a number of factors already mentioned, but which I repeat here. It is attributed in the only surviving manuscript to *Rufin[us] presbyter (Provinciae Palaestinae)*,²⁵¹ who has been identified as the Rufinus to whom Caelestius referred to at Carthage. It is considered to be the *liber unius eorum* which Augustine refuted in his first anti-Pelagian work, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, written in 411.²⁵² It offers a strongly worded refutation of Origen and his followers; defends the creationist theory of the soul's origin; and boldly attacks those *imperiti* who would uphold the notion of a sin being transmitted from Adam. If the presumed identity

²⁴⁷ Cf. Jerome, *Dial. adu. Pel.* I,5, CCSL 80, p. 9: *Lege totum Psalterium, omnes sanctorum uoces*

²⁴⁸ *De perf. iust.* 12,29, CSEL 42, p. 28: *diuina eloquia in lite dimisit ...*

²⁴⁹ *Comm.Rom.* 3,21-24 (ed. Bammel, p. 229).

²⁵⁰ Most of the essential references have been given above. In this 'introductory postscript' documentation on a subject that requires a much more thorough examination is minimal.

²⁵¹ I have raised my suspicions earlier about the translation of the colophon. It is worth insisting that while Sirmond retained the text of the colophon (as above, he did not attribute it to Rufinus of Aquileia. Garnier gave it the title: *Libellus fidei a Rufino Palaestinae provinciae presbytero scriptus*. In Vallarsi/Migne it is among the *pseudo-Rufiniana*. Miller in the title omitted *provinciae Palaestinae*, but clearly (p. 7) understood the reference as identifying Rufinus. In many on-line library catalogues the *Liber* and/or Sirmond's edition is listed under the Aquileian.

²⁵² Cf. R. Gryson, *Répertoire générale*, Freiburg 2007, vol.II, p. 766 (s.v. PS-RUF f).

of the author, and its presence in Augustine's writing, are both correct then clearly (irrespective of Mercator's 'information') there must be a Rufinus other than the Aquileian at the source of the Pelagian debate. As I have maintained elsewhere,²⁵³ the argument that Augustine knew the *Liber de Fide*, or even extracts from it, cannot be defended. The one specific text where contact can be established is a non-polemical paraphrase of a Pauline statement,²⁵⁴ whereas Augustine (or his source) does not quote in *De pecc. mer.* any specific 'Pelagian' statement directly from the *Liber de Fide*. Points of close similarity in ideas expressed, both in the *Liber* and in statements refuted by Augustine, are not wanting, but scholars have had to resign themselves to simply noting them as similarities, whereas the differences posit the conclusion that the source used by Augustine must lie elsewhere. It is known that a book (or books) by Caelestius was/were in circulation, and that Augustine read at least one writing by Caelestius. It is here that we must search for the source of contacts, but the connection between the *Liber de Fide* and Caelestius' book(s) remains unclear, mainly because of a dearth of writings that can be clearly attributed to Caelestius.

Garnier (PL 48,264,450) proposed that the *Liber* was written while 'Rufinus' was in the cloister in Bethlehem, and that in its present form it was translated by Julian in the time of Zosimus. Miller (pp. 9-10), closely following Altaner, gives a date sometime between 413 and 428,²⁵⁵ the *terminus post quem* being Augustine's *De pecc. mer.* (c.412) or his *Sermo* 294 (413).²⁵⁶ Given the fact that the *Liber de Fide* gives no hint that Pelagianism had already been condemned, it might be concluded that it must pre-date 411. Against this, however, lies the fact that still into 418 the Pelagians maintained that there had been no condemnation. Caelestius would make his case with Zosimus (and Zosimus was inclined to agree) that the supposed condemnation in 411 had no legal standing. The Synod of Diospolis had effectively – at least in the understanding of the Pelagians – over-ruled the

²⁵³ See 'A Lost Year,' pp. 416-20.

²⁵⁴ *Liber de Fide* c.40 = *De pecc. mer.* I,18,23. In the *Liber* the quotation is followed immediately by the example of Cornelius (Acts 10,44-48), which would surely have been examined by Augustine had he known it at this time. If my suggestion in the following on the date of the *Liber* has any validity, I would advance the possibility that in this very anti-Augustinian section of the *Liber*, the author is using *De pecc. mer.* and quoting Augustine against Augustine, not vice-versa.

²⁵⁵ Both Garnier and Miller shrug off the difficulty of locating a 'hidden-heretic' in Jerome's monastery in Bethlehem. Secrecy is not as easy in a cloister as they would seem to imply!

²⁵⁶ In 'A Lost Year,' I argue that both of these should be dated to 411.

Africans and acquitted Pelagius (and the Pelagians) of heresy. If there is any indication for a date for the *Liber de Fide* it lies possibly (see further below) in the contacts pointed out already by Garnier between the *Liber* and the *Libellus fidei* (PL 48,509-26) that is thought to belong to the time when the debate returned to Rome in 417-418 after the 'Pelagian victory' at Diospolis. Because of these contacts, and because of the possibility that Julian of Aeclanum may have been the author of the *Libellus fidei*, Garnier went further and argued that the *Liber* in its present form was translated by Julian at this time.

Such a dating might also account for the presence of *Provincia Palestina* in the colophon of the MS. In the Pelagian debate, reference to the Province of Palestine played a very significant part in Pelagian propaganda after the Synod of Diospolis, not merely because it exonerated Pelagius, but also because this was a decision taken by a Synod of bishops of the Province of Palestine. Following their 'victory' at the Synod of Diospolis, the Pelagians seem to have initiated a propaganda campaign touting the decision, and broadcasting a version of the Acts of the Synod.²⁵⁷ Even Pope Innocent received a copy *a nescio quibus laicis*.²⁵⁸ The importance of Diospolis for both parties in the dispute lay in the fact that it was a *provincial* synod of bishops, thereby having an authority far beyond the decision of any individual bishop or of any *ad hoc* gathering of bishops such as the 'trial' of Caelestius (411) seems to have been. In his examination of the *Gesta* of that synod, Augustine went to great lengths to distinguish between what was, and what was not, explicitly accepted at Diospolis, because this was a decision taken *ab episcopis quattuordecim prouinciae Palaestinae*.²⁵⁹ It is in this historical context (417/18) that we might find a place for a pseudonymous 'translation' making its appearance. As

²⁵⁷ [Aug.] *Ep.* 177,2, CSEL 44, p. 670: *in Oriente, ubi degit [Pelagius], gesta ecclesiastica facta esse iactantur, quibus putatur esse purgatus*. Augustine wrote (in vain) to John of Jerusalem requesting a copy of the authentic *Acta* (*Ep.* 179). He finally obtained some version, not from John but from Cyril of Alexandria (cf. *Ep.* 4* [Div-jak]).

²⁵⁸ [Inter Aug.] *Ep.* 183,3, CSEL 44, p. 727. There is strong evidence which suggests that the only Latin *Acta* in circulation were of Pelagian provenance. See my art. 'The Acts of the Synod of Diospolis,' in *Academia* (Nanzan), 67 (1968), pp. 185-228.

²⁵⁹ *De Gestis* 1,1, CSEL 42, p. 51. In their letters to Pope Innocent ([Aug.] *Epp.* 175-177) the Africans confine themselves to a general reference: '*in Oriente*.' Apart from a very few biblical quotations containing the name *Palaestina*, Augustine only uses the name to identify the *ecclesiasticum/episcopale iudicium* that took place *in Oriente* (at Diospolis)! The list of writings alone is indicative: *De gestis*; *Epp.* 186, 194; *De pecc. orig.*; *Cont. Iul.*; *De grat. lib. arb.*; *De praed. sanct.*; *De haer.*; *Cont. Iul. op. imp.* Note in *De pecc. orig.* 8,9 and 14,15: ... *de gestis quibus [Pelagius] gloriatur*.

I maintained earlier above, the colophon of the MS of the *Liber* makes little sense if we read its reference to *Provincia Palestina* as an identification of Rufinus, whereas it is also possible to read it as 'the faith of the Province of Palestine' (*Provinciae Palaestinae Liber de Fide*). In the later post-Diospolis phase of the debate this would make more sense.

As regards the attribution of the *Liber de Fide* to 'Rufinus' the 'Syrian' I can only rest my case. At the time the text was copied, and again when it was rediscovered by Sirmond, the name 'Rufinus' was regarded as a spurious reference to Rufinus of Aquileia, and the evidence for the existence of a Syrian of that name does not stand up to examination. The misleading colophon, however, may turn to some advantage: *Explicit Rufini presbyteri provinciae Palaestinae Liber de Fide, translatus de Graeco in Latinum sermonem*. This claim that the *Liber* is a translation by a certain priest Rufinus would certainly lend credence to the idea that it be attributed (as a translation) to Rufinus of Aquileia, ranking it with the many other translations, including many 'concerning the faith,' for which he was well known. It would also give the added aura to the *Liber* of being Greek in origin, and not only Greek, but from the Province of Palestine: *Provinciae Palaestinae Liber de Fide*. With such a title and under the 'authority' of a translator of the caliber of Rufinus (of Aquileia), an approximate date for the falsification is ready to hand.

The *Liber de Fide* is an enigmatic piece of writing, and I can do no more than draw attention here to a few of the enigmas, reserving to a different forum a more thorough discussion of the question.²⁶⁰ Despite Miller's praise for the author and his work,²⁶¹ it is clearly a composite work, the sources and layers of which have yet to be unraveled. It is my *personal* impression that the writing as we know it is a draft that was never brought to completion, nor intended for publication in its present form.²⁶² In studies of Pelagianism we are blithely referred to 'the *Liber de Fide* of Rufinus the Syrian' as if it were a

²⁶⁰ At the time of writing I am aware that a long overdue account of Rufinus the Syrian (and the *Liber*?) by the late Prof. Y.-M. Duval is 'about' to be published.

²⁶¹ Miller, p. 15: 'except for a few obscure places [the *Liber*] presents a clear, logical exposition...' The language is 'faithful to the best late literary tradition.' Rufinus' rhetoric 'evidences his familiarity with the best rhetorical tradition of his age.' While Garnier passed no judgement on the author's prose, he thought the 'appendix' (cc.52-61) could (= should?) be discarded! PL48,450D: *Fidem edimus et nos, immo et appendicem, etsi potuisset omitti*.

²⁶² Already in c.2 we are confronted with an intrusive (and inadequate) non-biblical attempt to 'define' *simplex et incompositus*, an attempt that seems to have been abandoned.

straight-forward 'Book on the Faith' written by some individual (Rufinus). The references, however, are usually to a limited portion of the work, either to its anti-Origenism (cc.16-28) or to its 'anti-Augustinian' Pelagianism (esp. cc.39-41, 48²⁶³), without account being taken of how or why these sections even belong in the book. Where its anti-Arian arguments belong in *that* debate is far from being clarified.²⁶⁴ When Origenism is refuted, it is in terms that generally agree with anti-Origenist arguments from the turn of the fifth century, yet in his (few) quotations from Origen, 'Rufinus' – contemporary though he be to the dispute at that time – seems to be totally independent of other sources known to us.²⁶⁵

I have drawn attention in my study of the beginning of the Pelagian dispute²⁶⁶ to the fact that 'Rufinus' uses Heb 12,9 (*pater spirituum*) to prove the creationist origin of the soul, in an interpretation that elsewhere is only found in Cassian, a contact that is difficult to explain. This short compact argument for creationism as it is presented by 'Rufinus' in c.28 seems to have escaped attention in studies of the development of the theory of creationism.²⁶⁷ In his dossier of proof-texts 'Rufinus' includes Job 10,8 and takes the occasion to inform us that the same words are found in Ps 118,73. We might be tempted to eliminate this gratuitous comment as a gloss, but it repeats *ad litteram* (in translation) a comment on the same verse of Job found in Theodoret.²⁶⁸ Equally enigmatic is the exegesis of Matt.1.25 (*et non*

²⁶³ On any reading the Pelagian conclusion to c.48 (*Unde infantes...*), rejecting the idea that infants are baptized for the remission of sin, is secondary to the original context at this point. In a writing laden with biblical texts, as an introduction of biblical proof *secundum beatum Paulum* is only found here and in (the equally Pelagian!) c.40 (where uniquely in the *Liber*, Paul is referred to but not in fact cited). The same(?) 'Rufinus' at c.15 can forcefully remind the Arians and Eunomians of their belief: *per baptismam remissionem (vel indulgentiam) peccatorum*. He sees no need at that point to except infants.

²⁶⁴ The commentary in Miller is very wanting on the questions asked here.

²⁶⁵ See the notes to *De Principiis* I,7,2; 75; II,9,1 in H. Crouzel/M. Simonetti, *Origène: Traité des Principes*, SC 253, Paris 1978, pp. 107, 111, 212.

²⁶⁶ 'A Lost Year,' p. 420.

²⁶⁷ Cf. R. Hennings, 'Disputatio de origine animae (CPL 623,37) – or the victory of creatianism (*sic!*) in the fifth century,' *Stud.Pat.* 29 (1997), pp. 260-68; G. Sfameni Gasparro, *Origene e la tradizione origeniana in Occidente*, Rome 1998, pp. 107-22 (on the same *Disputatio/Dialogus*); E. Clark, *Origenist Controversy*, (n. 73 above), pp. 204-205 (surprisingly unnoticed in a discussion of 'Rufinus the Syrian'), and p. 243 (on the *Disputatio*). Clark's evident wonder (p. 205) at what 'Rufinus' does not criticize in Origen would be readily dissipated had she noted that the *Liber* is composite. The 'not anti-Origenist' discussion of the resurrection (in c.51) belongs to the 'area' of the 'Budapest' Anonymous (see below).

²⁶⁸ *Quaest. Gen. XIX* (from Theodore?) PG 80,103.

cognovit eam donec peperit filium suum) given by 'Rufinus' at c.43: *id est, non noverat certius quod ipsa erat virgo quae Christum paritura praedicta est...* On the assumption that the *Liber* belongs to the early fifth century (in Latin circles?) we should expect 'Rufinus' to reflect the understanding of this text that had been 'defined' by Jerome in the debate with Helvidius. In the same c.43, in fact, the following is affirmed of Mary: *virgo concepit – virgo permanens peperit – (permansit) virgo post partum*. The explanation, however, of *non cognovit eam* as being a reference to Joseph's 'not understanding' that Mary was the virgin predicted by the prophet is not part of main-stream exegesis of the period. Epiphanius offers a version that is close to this,²⁶⁹ but the only place where I have found this verse explained as it is by 'Rufinus' is very much off the beaten track in a work of equally obscure origin, the anonymous *Opus imperfectum in Mattheum*.²⁷⁰

There is further contemporary literature that has been left unquarried. If somebody wishes to attempt to 'locate' the *Liber de Fide*, he or she would be advised to look closely at both the Anonymous Commentary on Paul found in a Budapest manuscript, and the Pseudo-Jerome interpolations in the Expositions by Pelagius.²⁷¹ Contacts between the *Liber* and both these anonymous writings are more than casual. Frede noted this, but he was over-hasty in his rejection of 'Rufinus' as the possible author of the Anonymous Commentary.²⁷² In part this may have been the result of his understanding of the *Liber* as being the work of one author, but his conclusion was also based too readily on a limited comparison of the exegesis of some specific biblical texts found in both writings. There are further elements of contact between the works that make a re-reading of the evidence necessary. To offer but one example: 'Rufinus' (*Liber de Fide* cc.5-12, 61) makes almost indiscriminate use of the psychological analogy to

²⁶⁹ Epiphanius, *Panarion*, Haer.LXXVIII, PG 42,728B, 731D. His use of the text, however, differs greatly from that in the *Liber*.

²⁷⁰ *Opus Imperf. in Matt. Hom.I*, PG 56,635. This explanation is included (on the authority of John Chrysostom!) in the *Catena Aurea* (*ad loc.*) by Thomas Aquinas. F.W. Schlatter, 'The Author of the *Opus Imperfectum in Matthaum*' in *Vig.Christ.* 42(1988), pp. 364-75 argues for the Pelagian Annianus of Celada as the author. The possible Pelagian connection of this writing is not my concern here, but the reference is given to underline the obscurities that beset a study of the *Liber de Fide*.

²⁷¹ H.J. Frede, *Ein neuer Paulustext und Kommentar*, Freiburg 1973 (I: *Untersuchungen*); 1974 (II: *Die Texte*). Vol.II contains a new edition of Pseudo-Jerome, originally published by A. Souter as vol.III (Cambridge 1931) of his edition of the Expositions by Pelagius.

²⁷² Cf. Frede, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 252-55. His exclusion of 'Rufinus' may have contributed to a failure to explore the relationships.

'explain' the Trinity, using the terms *mens/sensus-sermo/verbum-sapientia*.²⁷³ At Rom19b (on Rom 1.20) the Anonymous offers the gloss: *Simul et mens trinitatis demonstrat imaginem in quo generat insitum sibi verbum et inseparabilem habet sibi ex nato verbo sapientiam*.²⁷⁴ As a possible source Theophilus (of Antioch!) or Irenaeus may be suggested (but they retain '*Theos*' as the first member), but who else among Latin authors uses this particular triad?²⁷⁵ A more immediate question, however, comes to mind: Is it mere chance that such an uncommon analogy should appear in these two coeval anonymous Latin writings? Contacts between the two in language, exegesis, and thought, can be multiplied far beyond those noted by Frede, and they can be extended to include contacts with Pseudo-Jerome. But the very mention of this last author should act as a warning that the waters on which the *Liber de Fide* floats are very murky and they will be navigated at risk!

'Much ado about nothing!'

This sub-heading could well describe the content of this study! It is all concerned with a very slight scribal error in one manuscript. However, that error – if it is an error! – has created a history of Pelagianism that has wandered unwittingly off course for over three centuries. That history somehow lived with the uncomfortable conclusion that the source of Pelagianism should be found in such an unlikely place as the monastery of Jerome in Bethlehem. It has not, however, been a wandering in vain, particularly in the past half-century when more attention was given to the connections between Pelagian thought and the theological anthropology of the 'school' of Antioch. When the 'Budapest Anonymous' came to light, he was seen as new proof of the influence of the theology of Antioch on the early Pelagians. This further confirmed the pivotal role played by Mercator's mysterious 'Syrian' – if only we could identify him!

²⁷³ The author (translating, or depending on a Greek source?) vacillates in his use of the terms *mens/sensus* and *sermo/verbum*.

²⁷⁴ Frede, *Die Texte*, p. 25. See also Eph.13 (on Eph.4.23) p. 242. We are not referred to 'Rufinus' at either point by Frede.

²⁷⁵ I confess that I have not found any other. In the exhaustive(?) list of triadic variants given by E. Schadel, *Bibliotheca Trinitariorum*, Berlin (1986), pp. 180-96, this triad is not to be found. In Greek sources the discussion of '*eikōn*' in Theodoret (*Quaest. Gen.* XX, PG 80,108), using '*nous*', '*logos*' and '*pneuma*', is closer to 'Rufinus' than that found in Theophilus or Irenaeus. Perhaps even closer is the analogy of 'soul-rationality(*sapientia*?)'-word' outlined by Theodore in *Hom.Cat.* III,14 (ed. Ton-neau/Devreese, p. 73).

In the meantime, the possible role of another 'holy priest Rufinus' has been totally upstaged. This is Rufinus of Aquileia, and it has been the main concern of this study to show that when the Pelagians invoked the authority of Rufinus, they were referring to the Aquileian. I hope that I have not resurrected an earlier mistaken opinion that condemned this Rufinus as the *author* of Pelagianism. My intention has been to draw attention to the presence in his writings and translations of ideas that could be (and were) taken up and consolidated by the first Pelagians. Most of what is contained in his translations can be traced back to the original authors, but too little attention has been given to the mediating role played by Rufinus the translator – be it in his choice of writings to be translated, or in what he decided to retain or excise, or even in his choice of language – between those original authors and the readers of his translations. We cannot say whether or not he would have sided with his readers/disciples in the controversy, simmering in his own lifetime, which would begin to engulf Western Christendom precisely at the time he died. Perhaps, with Hammond-Bammel (n. 166 above) we should stop there and be content with the idea that Rufinus 'may perhaps have been somewhat inclined' towards 'a kind of' Pelagian way of thinking. This, however, should not deter us from reading his translations, not only with the intention of rediscovering there what Origen really said, but also with eyes open to what they offered as sources for Pelagius and his disciples, who read them almost as they were coming from the translator's pen. In our search for the sources of early Pelagianism we seem to have almost systematically overlooked a whole library.

Summary: The evidence for the existence of Rufinus the Syrian is essentially a solitary mention by Marius Mercator. On the basis of this a 'profile' of the Syrian has been established, and a case has been built up to prove that Mercator could not refer to Rufinus of Aquileia. Mercator's evidence is found in only one, very unreliable manuscript in which the reading *quondam natione Syrus* can (and should) readily be rejected as a scribal error. The arguments advanced to establish the identity of the Syrian are examined to show that they are misguided. In the second part of the study, evidence is offered from the writings (mainly the translations) of Rufinus of Aquileia to show that he was the authority to whom the early Pelagians turned.

¹⁵ Oxford, Angoulême, and Armagh (Oxford, 1981).

¹⁶ *Manuale Academicum*, ed. Henry Anstey (London, 1907).

¹⁷ For a survey of the theory of dominium, see Janet Coleman, 'The Theory of Property,' in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought*, ed. J. H. Burns, pp. 607–48.

¹⁸ 'Columella, Property,' p. 614.

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THE CONDEMNATION OF JOHN KEDINGTON, OSA

One of the best-known incidents in this history of the English Austin Friars is the conflict that developed in the mid-1350s between the Austin Friars on the one hand and Archbishop Richard FitzRalph on the other. The details of FitzRalph's attack on the mendicant orders in general and the Austins in particular are well-known, especially thanks to Katherine Walsh's study of FitzRalph.¹ But one facet of this conflict has received little scholarly attention. In 1358, the University of Oxford condemned a certain 'Friar John' for making two propositions about the property rights and tithes of parish priests in the course of an academic debate.² This incident has rarely been connected to the dispute between FitzRalph and the Austins. But it is now clear that the Friar John in question was in fact the Austin Friar John Kedington. Kedington's condemnation throws substantial light on how the conflict between FitzRalph and the Austins played out at Oxford.

Archbishop FitzRalph and the Debate over *Dominium*

Before we explore Kedington's condemnation, it is necessary to first discuss the wider debate over *dominion* that was occurring in the mid-fourteenth century. The theory of dominion addresses the rightful ownership of property, but also has strong implications for the right to exercise all forms of authority, and has consequently been discussed both by legal theorists interested in property issues and political theorists interested in just government and the relationship of Church and State.³ Dominion became an important issue for the mendicant vow of poverty, especially for the Franciscans, for whom poverty was, at least in theory, a foundational concept. Innocent IV agreed to accept dominion over all Franciscan property, leaving the friars with only simple *usus*, use of the property, but many found this to be a violation of the spirit of the Franciscan Rule.⁴ This led to the

¹ Katherine Walsh, *A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate: Richard Fitzralph in Oxford, Avignon, and Armagh*, (Oxford, 1981).

² *Munimenta Academica*, ed. Henry Anstey, (London 1868), 1:208-11.

³ For a survey of the theory of *dominium*, see Janet Coleman, 'Property and Poverty,' in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350-c.1450*, ed. J.H. Burns, pp. 607-48.

⁴ Coleman, 'Property,' p. 634.

eruption of the Poverty Controversy, a heated debate about whether Christ and the Apostles had owned their own clothing, but which had much deeper implications for mendicant privileges and property. In the late 13th century, the Augustinian Giles of Rome asserted that proper dominion belongs only to those who are in a state of grace, and consequently the highest exercise of sovereignty and property rights belongs to the Pope.⁵

In the 1350s, a debate over *dominium* erupted between Archbishop Richard FitzRalph of Armagh and the Austin friars.⁶ FitzRalph circulated his *De pauperie salvatoris*, first privately at Oxford and then publicly, in which he accused the mendicant orders of abusing their vows of poverty and humility and usurping the pastoral function of the secular clergy. Drawing on the Aegidian position, FitzRalph suggested that only those clergy of sound living had a right to the lordship of their temporalities or to the privileges of their order.⁷ Since the mendicant orders had sinfully abused their privileges, including their confessional privileges, FitzRalph concluded that they had lost their dominion over those privileges.⁸ He also rejected the notion that Christ and the Apostles had practiced absolute poverty, and therefore denied that the mendicant practice of poverty was truly justified.⁹ FitzRalph was challenging the mendicant distinction between the ownership and the use of property, as well as their exercise of their privileges, so that he was exploring both elements of *dominium* as it applied to the mendicants.

FitzRalph attacked the mendicant orders openly in a series of sermons he preached, first in Coventry and more substantially in London, Dodington (near Oxford), and Oxford in 1356 and 1357.¹⁰ The friars, led by the Augustinians, responded by accusing him of erroneous teaching, and brought charges of heresy against him at the Papal curia

⁵ John B. Morrall, *Political Thought in Medieval Times*, (London, 1958, repr. Toronto, 1980), p. 87-8; Walsh, *Fourteenth Century School*, pp. 380-81; Graham McAleer, 'Giles of Rome on Political Authority,' in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999), pp. 21-36.

⁶ Aubrey Gwynn, *The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif*, (Oxford, 1940), pp. 80-9. See also Walsh, *Fourteenth-Century Scholar*, pp. 349-451; Edith Wilks Dolnikowski, 'FitzRalph and Wyclif on the Mendicants,' in *Michigan Academician* 19 (1987), pp. 87-100; Christopher Ocker, *Johannes Klenkok: A Friar's Life, c.1310-1374*, (Philadelphia, 1993), pp. 33-8; and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, *Books Under Suspicion: Censorship and Tolerance of Revelatory Writing in Late Medieval England*, (Notre Dame, 2006), p. 135-9.

⁷ See Gwynn, *Austin Friars*, pp. 59-73, and Walsh, *Fourteenth Century School*, pp. 377-86.

⁸ Walsh, *Fourteenth-Century Scholar*, pp. 402-3.

⁹ Walsh, *Fourteenth Century Scholar*, pp. 395-7.

¹⁰ Walsh, *Fourteenth-Century Scholar*, pp. 409-21.

in Avignon. FitzRalph retaliated by attacking the worldliness and wealth of the friars. By the end of March 1357, the friars had enlisted the aid of King Edward III, and FitzRalph went to Avignon to carry on the debate. In 1360, FitzRalph died before the charges against him (and by extension the charges he had raised against the mendicants) could be resolved. As a consequence, while the dispute cooled down somewhat, the issues involved continued to surface at Paris and Oxford for some time.

Dominion and problems with confessional practice were not the only issues FitzRalph raised. FitzRalph also complained about tithe-evasion. This was a particular problem in large towns, where wealthy merchants used a variety of strategies to avoid paying tithes to their parish church and their diocese, and FitzRalph preached a number of sermons against this practice in Dublin, Drogheda, and London.¹¹ While this was chiefly an offense by the laity, FitzRalph accused the friars of granting easy absolution to tithe-evaders, and he suggested that the friars were leading the laity astray by encouraging the offense.¹² On February 26th, 1357, he made this charge in a sermon delivered in London.

This debate was by no means confined to London. FitzRalph was in the vicinity of Oxford in October 1356, where he preached against the mendicants at Dodington, and he circulated *De pauperie salvatoris* in Oxford at that time, and may even have formally debated the issues at the university.¹³ FitzRalph accused the friars of recruiting children by means of gifts and confession, and this charge underlay the university's decree on 1358 that the mendicants were not to recruit from among students.¹⁴ By the end of 1357, Geoffrey Hardeby, the junior Augustinian regent master at Oxford for 1357-9, had debated the topic of dominium, probably with one of FitzRalph's supporters, and was responding to FitzRalph with the *De vita evangelica*, in which Hardeby asserted that lordship was independent of the merit of the holder.¹⁵ In 1357, John Kedington was the senior Augustinian regent master, and he too responded to FitzRalph. But unlike Hardeby, FitzRalph's response provoked a condemnation.

¹¹ Walsh, *Fourteenth-Century Scholar*, pp. 298, 314-15, 322-24, 416.

¹² Walsh, *Fourteenth-Century Scholar*, pp. 334, 346, 416; Francis Cotter, *The Friars Minor in Ireland from their Arrival to 1400*, (St. Bonaventure, 1994), pp. 112-13.

¹³ Walsh, *Fourteenth Century Scholar*. pp. 411-5.

¹⁴ Dolnikowski, 'FitzRalph,' pp. 91-2

¹⁵ Although Hardeby wrote *De vita evangelica* during this period, he did not publish it until 1385, contrary to the conventional dating of the work; see Benedict Hackett, *William Flete, O.S.A., and Catherine of Siena*, (Villanova, 1992), pp. 27-32.

John Kedington

The condemnation of John Kedington has frequently been noticed in passing, but has attracted almost no direct study, because the record of the condemnation does not provide enough information to directly connect 'Friar John' with John Kedington.¹⁶ The record refers to him as 'frater Johannes' and then leaves a blank, and then says 'doctor' followed by a second blank.¹⁷ The record also notes that John made his revocation in the presence and by the agreement of the principal of his convent and the other doctors, and the priors of 'the said order', but it doesn't actually say what order was involved.

But other evidence makes clear that Friar John was in fact John Kedington, the Austin regent master for 1357.¹⁸ In that year, Kedington was removed from office, a decision that he appealed to the Court of Arches without the permission of his prior. The only surviving records for Kedington's removal are a letter from the Austin Friars of Oxford about the matter and a record of the expenses incurred by the Chancellor and Proctors, who had to travel to London to deal with the case.¹⁹ The events of Kedington's case fit perfectly with the known facts in Friar John's case. Both were mendicant regent masters in theology in 1357, both got into trouble with the university, both appealed to authorities outside the university, and both involved the university in considerable legal expense. Aubrey Gwynn noticed Kedington's case, but thought that Kedington had been removed from office to make room for the incoming master Geoffrey Hardeby and made his appeal to protest his

¹⁶ Among those who have noted the case in passing are Walsh, *A Fourteenth-Century Scholar*, pp. 436-7; Margaret Aston, 'Caim's Castles: Poverty, Politics, and Disendowment,' in *The Church, Politics, and Patronage in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Barrie Dobson, (New York, 1984), pp. 45-81 at p. 50; William J. Courtenay, 'Academic Freedom in Medieval Universities', in *Church History*, 58 (1989), 168-181; Jeremy Catto, 'Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford 1356-1430,' in *The History of the University of Oxford*, ed. J.I. Catto and Ralph Evans, (Oxford: 1992), 2:186-219, at p. 183; Ocker, *Klenkok*, p. 35; and Kerby-Fulton, *Books Under Suspicion*, pp. 134-43.

¹⁷ A marginal note in a later hand reads 'Jo: Wyclif', and a second hand has written, '*non accedo Wiclifus enim 'frater' non erat, sed coram impugnator, si quis alius, acerrimus.*'

¹⁸ Andrew E. Larsen, 'The Oxford 'School of Heretics': the Unexamined Case of Friar John,' in *Vivarium* 23 (1999), pp. 168-77.

¹⁹ *Mediaeval Archives of the University of Oxford*, ed. H.E. Salter, vol. 1-2, (Oxford, 1920-21), 1:171-5, 179.

²⁰ Gwynn, *Austin Friars*, pp. 90-1. Ocker speculates that Kedington was suspended because he was one of the 'Wax Doctors'; Ocker, *Klenkok*, p. 34.

removal.²⁰ However, nothing in those documents says why Kedington was removed, and the close fit between the two cases makes it clear that they are the same incident. By combining the fragmentary records of Friar John's condemnation with the records of Kedington's appeal to the Court of Arches, we can reconstruct Kedington's case in considerable detail, and a remarkable set of events emerges.

The Events Leading up to the Condemnation

On October 16th, 1356 FitzRalph preached his first sermon at Dodington, in which he explored issues related to mendicancy and dominion. Another sermon followed at Dodington on the 18th, and he preached a third sermon there on November 1st. Some time before December 18th, his *Defensio curatorum* was circulating in Oxford.²¹

Early in the winter term of 1357 John Kedington presided over a theology debate involving *dominium* in some form, and during his resolution of the issue (the 'determination' of the debate) he declared that the mendicant orders had a greater right to tithes than rectors of churches did. He seems to have claimed that the founder or patron of a church had the right to transfer tithes to the mendicants if the patron felt that priest of the church exhibited bad morals.²² In doing this, he was essentially taking FitzRalph's argument and turning it back against him, asserting that the mendicants were living a more virtuous life than parish priests did. He also said that the king had the right to deprive ecclesiastics of their livings 'for bad and disorderly living', again presumably using FitzRalph's arguments.²³ The record also says that he called Oxford a '*gymnasium haereticorum*'. Kedington was clearly a man of strong convictions, and he must have used the determination to launch an aggressive attack on the anti-mendicant party at Oxford, denouncing them as heretics (and perhaps as the 'evil-living' seculars who deserved to lose their tithes).

Word of his statements clearly spread, and someone at the university initiated a condemnation proceeding. Normally, in a formal condemnation proceeding for heresy at Paris, a friar's order had the

²¹ Walsh, *Fourteenth-century scholar*, pp. 411-14.

²² That at least is Hothum's version of what Kedington had said, as reported in a letter to Archbishop FitzRalph. See note 34 below.

²³ 'rex a clericis et viris ecclesiasticis male et inordinate viventibus absque injuria possessiones posset auferre', *Munimenta*, p. 209.

first responsibility to investigate the matter, and the university normally only stepped in if this did not happen.²⁴ A similar procedure operated at Oxford, since in 1323, William of Ockham was investigated by the Franciscan Provincial Chapter, but there is no evidence that the Austins investigated or took any action against Kedington.²⁵ Instead, it was Chancellor Hothum and his proctors for 1357, John Joskin and Alexander of Feribrigg, who took action, removing Kedington from his office as regent master.

At the time, there was only one clear precedent (so far as we know) for the condemnation of a scholar for academic heresy by the university of Oxford. In 1315, the entire theology faculty (naturally led by the chancellor, who was almost always a theology master) condemned a set of propositions by an unnamed Franciscan.²⁶ In this case, there was at least one, and probably two, formal meetings on the issue. A list of propositions was drawn up and then examined by the masters, who unanimously agreed that the articles were inappropriate.²⁷ The masters then issued a formal condemnation.

But in 1357, this process was not followed. Although a list of the condemned propositions was drawn up at some point, there is no mention made of a committee investigating Kedington or a meeting that ruled on the orthodoxy of the list. While it would be unusual for the chancellor and proctors to have proceeded without formally consulting the rest of the theology faculty, it would not have been an overextension of the chancellor's legal authority to act on his own. It seems that the chancellor and the proctors took official action against Kedington because his order had failed to. However, it is extremely important to note that nowhere in the surviving documents is Kedington accused of heresy, suspicion of heresy, or any other grade of error. He was simply ordered to retract his statements. By what authority the chancellor issued such an order is hard to say, and the whole process followed in this case is highly irregular (at least in comparison with other known condemnations at Oxford). In his appeal, Kedington emphasized that he had not been legitimately cited or formally convicted of anything.

²⁴ William J. Courtenay, 'The Articles Condemned at Oxford Austin Friars in 1315,' in *Via Augustini: Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation*, ed. H. A. Oberman and F. A. James (Leiden, 1991), 5-18, at pp. 9-10.

²⁵ Girard Etzkorn, 'Ockham at a Provincial Chapter: 1323. A Prelude to Avignon', in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 83 (1990), pp. 537-556.

²⁶ Courtenay, 'Articles Condemned,' passim.

²⁷ The surviving document in the case refers to them as both erroneous (*erronei*) and heretical (*haereticos*), so the committee's exact verdict is unclear.

Removing Kedington from office was an extreme step. In a typical case, the accused would have been instructed to recant his propositions, but assuming he did so, nothing worse would happen to him. The fact that Kedington was removed can only mean that the chancellor ordered him to recant his propositions, and that Kedington refused to obey. Kedington's refusal to recant might have been based in an assertion that his position was correct and therefore should not have been condemned, or it might have been based on the fact that he was not being accused of heresy or error, and was therefore not obliged to make a revocation.

Kedington's Appeal

In November of 1357, Kedington appealed his case to the Court of St Mary Arches in London, the metropolitan court for the province of Canterbury.²⁸ University regulations required that he appeal the chancellor's decision to the Congregation of Regent Masters, and from there to the Full Congregation before he pursue an appeal to an authority outside the University. But the appeal was technically a tutorial appeal, which could be made by any person and did not require following the regular hierarchy of courts, so it is likely that Kedington did not follow the university's appeals process but went directly to the metropolitan court.²⁹ Kedington made his appeal against the orders of Prior John, the head of the Austin house at Oxford, who later testified (along with William, the Prior Provincial of their Order), that Kedington had been forbidden to appeal.

A tutorial appeal was actually two separate appeals. The appellant appealed directly to the papal court for resolution of the case, and appealed to the Court of Arches to order a one-year stay of the action being appealed.³⁰ Thus Kedington appealed the university's action to the papal court, and asked the Court of Arches to forestall his suspension from regency until he had obtained a papal ruling on the matter. Normally, the matter was handled by the archbishop's Official, who presided over the court, but in this case Richard de Plessy, the

²⁸ For the Court of St Mary Arches, see *The Medieval Court of Arches*, ed. F. Donald Logan, (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. xiii-xlvi. Our knowledge of this phase of the matter derives entirely from a letter written by the Augustinian prior provincial and prior local for Oxford. This letter, which contains the text of the Court of Arches' inhibition, is found in *Med. Arch.*, pp. 171-75.

²⁹ *Medieval Court*, p. xxxix.

³⁰ *Medieval Court*, pp. xxxix-xl, xliii-xliv.

archdeacon of Colchester and dean of St Mary Arches in London, who was the commissary for the archbishop's Official, accepted Kedington's appeal (technically termed a 'libel') and issued an inhibition, a temporary stay of action and citation for the inhibited official to appear.

According to de Plessy's inhibition, which seems to be based on Kedington's libel, Kedington was a legitimate doctor of theology who had lectured praiseworthily until the university officials removed him without cause. Plessy's letter emphasizes at considerable length that the action had been taken without due process and without legitimate cause.³¹ Although this may be an exaggeration on Kedington's part to strengthen his case, it appears to be broadly accurate. Kedington had, so far as we can see, done nothing to merit actual removal from his office, except to say something that offended the non-mendicants at the university. This also strengthens the impression that the chancellor acted without the regent masters, which was at least a violation of general precedent, if not the actual law.

This appeal started a legal struggle that involved the university in considerable legal expense.³² This expense is partially reflected in an account book for the university from the 1357-58 academic year, which includes the expenses of the chancellor and proctors when they went to London to deal with the matter.³³ Hothum was cited to appear at the court of Arches and he went there in January of 1358, along with both his proctors; Richard, abbot of Lowth Park; John of Lancaster; and other clerics. Hothum brought with him a letter from William, the Augustinian Prior Provincial, and Prior John, who insisted that Kedington's case had no merit and that they had forbidden the appeal.

Four months later, the matter had still not been resolved. In March of 1358, John of Hothum wrote to Archbishop FitzRalph at Avignon, asking him to help the university with the problem by informing the pope of what Kedington had done.³⁴ He told FitzRalph that the bearer of the letter would explain all the details. Presumably Hothum had sent a representative to the curia to argue against

³¹ 'non legitime citatum, non convictum, nec confessum, cause cognitione et iuris ordine in ea parte de iure requisitis penitus pretermisiss, absque causa rationabili seu legitimia quacumque, ab officio doctoratus seu magisterii huiusmodi exercicio, cura, statu et honore sic regendi, docendi et legendi...', *Med. Arch.*, p. 173.

³² 'totam Universitatem indebite vexavi, improvide appellando, dominis et magnatibus querelando, et aliis multiplicibus expensis gravando', *Munimenta*, p. 210.

³³ *Med. Arch.*, pp. 179-82.

³⁴ The letter is to be found in Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, MS 64, fo. 126r; see Walsh, *Fourteenth Century Scholar*, pp. 436-7; Aston, 'Caim's Castles,' pp. 50-51 and n. 24.

Kedington's appeal; he must have hoped that FitzRalph would be a strong advocate for the university, since the archbishop was already struggling with the Augustinians. The problem for Hothum was that he was unable to compel Kedington to make a public revocation because the friar had powerful protectors, whom he only describes as 'magnates of the kingdom' (*magnatibus de regno*).

Who these magnates were we can only guess, but they were clearly powerful nobles who liked Kedington's ideas because they enhanced secular authority over their churches. The most likely candidate is Humphrey de Bohun, the sixth earl of Hereford. De Bohun was the most prominent patron of the Austins in England in the 1350s, having donated money to help them rebuild their church in London; when he died in 1361, he made arrangements to be buried there, and left 200 marks for prayers and masses for his soul.³⁵ His nephew, William of Monkland, was a member of the order. Kedington must have appealed to de Bohun or another patron of the order as he got deeper into his appeal; such support may have discouraged the Court of Arches from issuing a final verdict in the matter.

The appeal cannot have dragged out much longer than June of 1358, since John was being punished by July, and with John having been forbidden to pursue the matter, the Court of Arches probably rendered its final verdict in April or May. The Court of Arches must have ultimately denied Kedington's appeal, which meant that the temporary stay on Kedington's suspension was lifted. This ruling did not prevent Kedington from pursuing his appeal to the papal curia, but his academic punishment would proceed as ordered. There is no evidence to show if Archbishop Islip was himself involved in this verdict, or if his Official at the Court of Arches made the decision.

An additional complicating factor here is that Kedington's appeal was in violation of royal law. In 1355, Edward III had explicitly forbidden appeals from the chancellor's court to the papal curia.³⁶ There is no clear indication that the Crown became involved in the case, but royal pressure would certainly explain why Kedington's appeal to the Court of Arches was ultimately rejected.

The Punishment

Kedington's punishment was overseen by the proctors of the university for 1358-59, William Denby and Richard Toulworth. The

³⁵ Gwynn, *English Austin Friars*, pp. 108-13.

³⁶ *Med. Arch.*, 1:349; Kibre, *Scholarly Privileges*, p. 309.

judgment was made in the presence of, and with the permission of, Kedington's principal, other doctors, presumably of theology, and the Augustinian priors. It would appear, then, that Denby, Toulworth, and probably Hothum determined the sentence in consultation with the others mentioned. The reference to Kedington's principal is puzzling, since the Augustinians do not appear to have employed an official with that title, but it is probably a reference to John, the prior of the Oxford convent.

The elements of John's punishment need to be considered, because they are unusual within English universities. Kedington was forced to publicly read a statement of apology written for him and to pay a fine of 100 shillings, and he was barred from ever lecturing in theology again without the permission of the chancellor, the proctors, and all the doctors of theology. John's recantation is the first recorded recantation at Oxford. The same year an unidentified Dominican was forced to read an apology for having insulted the arts students during a sermon.³⁷ It is plausible that the unidentified Franciscan whose propositions were condemned in 1315 had been forced to read a recantation, and recantation had been standard in condemnations at Paris for some time, so the recantation was entirely typical of such matters. The document explicitly notes that John was to read the recantation exactly as it had been written for him, without any changes, additions or deletions.³⁸

As already noted, John was never explicitly accused of heresy, undoubtedly because the statements he made were the source of considerable controversy at the time and FitzRalph's case was awaiting a decision at Avignon. The overall impression, however, is that John was treated as if he *were* a heretic, and his retraction reads like a recantation of heresy. In it, he is forced to retract the opinions he expressed about tithes and the deprivation of ecclesiastics and to affirm the contrary, and to promise never to hold those opinions again, either publicly or privately.³⁹

³⁷ *Munimenta*, pp. 211.

³⁸ 'quod legeret palam et publice revocationem infrascripta, nec addendo, nec diminuendo, nec aliqua verba [erasure] ddo in publico in ecclesia Beatae Mariae Virginis Oxoniae', *Munimenta*, p. 209.

³⁹ 'Reverendi domini a[d]stantes et singuli, in determinatione quadam, termino hyemali ultimo praeterito facta, materias aliquas determinando tractavi odiosas quam plurimis et displicentes, et praecipue matris nostrae Universitatis nimium offensivas, de quo dolens et anxius fui tempore non modico, verum pro meo posse satisfacere cupiens, in hac parte de mandato ejusdem Universitatis venerabilis dicam in scripto; Imprimis, quod istam matrem nostram Universitatem venerabilem scio Catholicam esse, in doctrina sana fundatam et sanae fidei protectricem; Item, doctores reverendos ejusdem esse catholicos viros dico et affirmo; Item, quod praedictam matrem

The other punishments, however, are less common. The fine of 100 shillings is extremely heavy by the standards of university offenses, and may have been imposed to help the university make up for the expenses involved in the appeal. According to the record of expenses, Hothum's trip to London cost 126 shillings total, although the record notes that other business was conducted on this trip, so the fine roughly corresponds to the university's travel expenses. The fine is certainly a non-standard punishment, with no parallel in any other case involving academic debate, although imposing a fine was justified by the rules governing unjust appeals.⁴⁰ John, being a friar, would not have been able to pay such a fine, and it would have fallen to his order to make good the payment (or perhaps his noble supporters helped him). No other case of academic condemnation at Oxford involved such a punishment.

The restriction on Kedington's teaching activity is likewise unprecedented. It amounted to a revocation of Kedington's teaching license. Although we cannot be certain, it appears that this punishment ruined John's academic career, since he is not mentioned in any other surviving document from the university. It is possible that Kedington, like Richard Knapwell before him, left Oxford for the papal curia to plead his case. If so, he was presumably unsuccessful. In February of 1392, an Augustinian named John of Kedyngton was given permission

nostram et reverendos doctores et magistros, et praecipue dominum Cancellarium et Procuratores pluries offendi, humiliter quo possum ab eisdem veniam peto una voce; et quia totam Universitatem indebite vexavi, improvide appellando, dominis et magistris querelando, et aliis multiplicibus expensis gravando, ideo ire ad satisfactionem offero juxta vires; Item quia plures valentes me reportaverunt in determinatione praedicta dixisse, asseruisse, et determinasse, quod quicumque domini temporales pro suo libito absque auctoritate Ecclesiae possunt aliqua temporalia Deo et ecclesiis donata auferre ab eisdem et perpetuo revocare; Item, quod decimae Ecclesiae magis sunt debite fratribus mendicantibus quam rectoribus et curatis; Idcirco praedictas quaestiones de temporalibus et decimis erroneas et falsas esse dico, earumque contradictorias fateor esse veras, et illas quaestiones affirmativas, et earum quamlibet, tamquam minus catholicas ex nunc et in perpetuum detestor, nec eas vel earum aliquam de caetero aliquo modo sustinebo tacite vel expresse.' *Mun. Ac.*, pp. 210-1.

⁴⁰ Unjust appeals had been a problem for the university as far back as c. 1300, when the university had been forced to increase the penalties for making unjust appeals. Unjust appellants were divided into three categories based on their net worth, and a scale of fines was established that increased with the appellant's wealth. The wealthiest offenders were fined 10 shillings. Even given inflation, John's fine was vastly in excess of standard fines. In the late 15th century, fines for appeals normally amounted to 2s. or 3s.4d. See *Munimenta*, p. 73-6, as well as Hastings Rashdall, *Universities*, 3:136-7, and *Med. Arch.*, 2:281. It is worth noting that the Crown passed a statute forbidding appeals from the chancellor's court to the archbishop's just a few years after this case.

by his order to travel to the Holy Land, and in June of the same year, he was assigned a room at the Augustinian house at Grimsby.⁴¹ Assuming this is the same man as the Oxford scholar, he apparently led a long but undistinguished life.

John's punishment was fairly severe, about as severe as the university could reasonably make against someone who was not actually a heretic (although it stops short of banishment from Oxford, the most severe penalty the chancellor could impose), and its severity requires some explanation. In addition to causing it a substantial expense, John had insulted the university by calling it a school of heretics, and the university clearly considered the insult a very serious matter. The first two items in John's recantation amount to statements that the University and the masters are orthodox Catholics, preceding the more technical propositions, and this order presumably reflects some sense of the relative seriousness of Kedington's offenses.

Kathryn Kerby-Fulton suggests that it was this insult that triggered the attempt to condemn Kedington, arguing that it raised fears that Kedington was a Joachite.⁴² She also suggests that it was this odor of Joachism that caused Kedington's supporters to back away from him. However, this is probably reading too much into the case. While Kerby-Fulton makes a strong case that Joachism was a greater factor in English intellectual circles than has previously been acknowledged, the only evidence of Joachism in this case is that John's insult was 'the kind of insult traded in the debates over the heterodoxy of Franciscan Spirituals.' Furthermore, the letter that Hothum and the regent masters sent to FitzRalph mentions Kedington's two other statements, but omits the insult. If the insult had been the thing that triggered the entire condemnation, it would certainly have been mentioned. At best, John's insult should be seen as an aggravating factor, but it may well explain the general over-reaction that Hothum demonstrated in this case.

The mendicants are likely to have supported, or at least not strongly objected to John's arguments, so the impetus for his punishment must have come from the secular masters. His suggestion that the mendicant lifestyle was superior to the secular lifestyle was certainly offensive, and his argument that mendicants deserved the tithes of churches more than the rectors did was a direct threat to the seculars, many of whom held benefices on the parish level, and most of whom

⁴¹ Francis Roth, *Sources for a History of the English Austin Friars*, (Louvain, 1961, repr. from *Augustiniana* 8-11), pp. 249-50.

⁴² Kerby-Fulton, *Books*, p. 137.

undoubtedly hoped for higher benefices later on. It is also worth noting that Archbishop Islip, himself a secular, is known to have favored the secular clergy against the friars on at least one other occasion, and this may have played a factor in the decision to deny Kedington's appeal.⁴³ Additionally, Kedington's assertion about tithes must have seemed to some seculars as confirmation of FitzRalph's charge that the friars were actively encouraging tithe-evasion. Finally, the strength of the anger Kedington aroused can be judged by the fact that no condemnation had taken place at Oxford for more than 40 years, despite the lively intellectual life that characterized Oxford in the early- to mid-13th century.

Given the atmosphere of hostility to the mendicants, the intensity of the complaints against them, and the controversy swirling around the Augustinians and Archbishop FitzRalph, it is unsurprising that Kedington was treated so harshly for what was hardly a major offense. This context also helps to explain why his superiors decided to forbid his appeal and wrote a letter undermining his case. They were under a good deal of pressure at Oxford, and Kedington's actions had evidently embarrassed them. Kedington clearly became a lightning rod for anti-mendicant tensions at Oxford, tensions strong enough that normal classroom protections were ignored and the mechanism of academic condemnation was invoked even though Kedington was not accused of formal error or heresy.

Kedington and FitzRalph

Kedington's case shines a light on how FitzRalph's attacks on the mendicants were received at Oxford. It demonstrates that Geoffrey Hardeby was not the only Austin friar at Oxford to find FitzRalph's preaching offensive. While Hardeby wrote his *De vita evangelica* against FitzRalph, but did not publish it at the time, Kedington was openly opposing FitzRalph's teachings in the classroom, and he resisted the university's efforts to silence him for several months. Given that his order took no action against him for several months after the determination, we might imagine that the Oxford

⁴³ He limited the rights of friars to hear confession and discharge pastoral functions, owing to a concern for secular clergy. See Wilkins, *Concilia*, 3:64, and 'Simon Islip', in *DNB*, 10:512. He also established Canterbury College for secular students at Oxford; Emden, *BRUO*, 2:1008.

Austins at least tacitly supported Kedington. The outcome of Kedington's case may have influenced Harbely's decision to not publish *De vita evangelica*; he may have decided it was not prudent to do so, or his superiors may have pressured him to keep it private to avoid further embarrassment to the order.

This case also shows us how popular FitzRalph's attacks were at Oxford. Chancellor Hothum's actions were irregular and unprecedented, and he was able to persevere in his condemnation in the face of what must have been substantial opposition from the magnates who were supporting Kedington. Kedington's superiors ordered him to desist from his tutorial appeal and swore, against the evidence, that his appeal had no merit. This is surely evidence that the Austins were under considerable pressure at Oxford to disown Kedington and that Hothum's actions were popular with the secular students.

Nor was this a purely internal matter for the university. What began as a complaint over a politically-charged determination spilled into the Court of Arches and then to the Papal Curia. Some within the English nobility embraced Kedington, and the university became sufficiently concerned that it sought out FitzRalph's assistance, although how FitzRalph responded to Hothum's letter is unfortunately unknown.

How FitzRalph reacted to Hothum's letter is not the only outstanding question in Kedington's case. It would be very helpful to know more about who was supporting Kedington, because it would help us to gauge how far outside of Oxford the matter spread. Knowing more about how the case was handled at the Court of Arches, and the extent to which Archbishop Islip became involved, would also help us understand the political elements of this case. Knowing whether Kedington's appeal reached the Papal Court would allow us to see whether his case influenced FitzRalph's cause. For the moment, though, in the absence of further documents related to this case, we must be content with the broad outlines of the matter. Kedington's condemnation was clearly an important and very complicated case, arguably one of the most important academic condemnations that ever happened at Oxford, and one that helps us gain a better view of the affairs of the English Austin friars in the mid-fourteenth century.

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454

THE PROCRUSTEAN BED OF THE *ORDO*.¹¹
 COMMENTS ON ANNE-ISABELLE
 BOUTON-TOUBOULIC, *L'ORDRE CACHÉ*:
 LA NOTION DE L'ORDRE CHEZ SAINT AUGUSTIN¹¹

I

Throughout his working life, Augustine shared the insight of the classical philosophers that a reflection on the notion of *ordo* was very important. Although he defined the term *ordo* in his early work *De ordine* as 'that by which all things created by God are guided' (*ord.* I. 28), the same text shows that the term did not have a definite meaning. As early as 386-7, he used *ordo* for 'sequence', 'causal connection' between two events, or 'order of ranking'. *Ord.* I.1. demonstrates that *ordo* also implied and evoked a sense of coherence: a coherence in which everything has its own place and meaning and into which human beings may be integrated and into which they may know they have been incorporated. It is the first pole of Augustine's thinking about *ordo*. At the end of *De ordine*, he reveals the second: the world is intelligible (*intelligibilis*) and the intelligibility of those parts of it that seem ugly at first sight, derives from the ordering of the whole beauty and perfection. The integration of mankind into the order and intelligibility of the world do not, however, mean that human beings will ever know the cause of the *ordo* here on earth (*ord.* II.51). The intelligibility of the order, in which men can partake through study and a proper order of life, is but a taste of the definitive insight into the coherence of everything and everyone in the last things.

Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic's extensive and impressive study *L'ordre caché. La notion de l'ordre chez saint Augustin*. Paris, 2004 (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes – Série Antiquité* 174) shows, among other things, that tension continued to exist between these two poles in Augustine's thinking for the entire duration of his life. No such extensive examination of Augustine's notion of order has ever been published before. The book fills a void. Some research

¹ This text is the result of a seminar on Augustine, given by Prof Paul van Geest in the Research Master programme of the Faculty of Theology at the VU University Amsterdam in 2006 and 2007. One of the works discussed during the seminar was Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'ordre caché. La notion de l'ordre chez saint Augustin*. Paris, 2004, 700 pp. (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes – Série Antiquité* 174).

has been done into the socio-cultural aspects of the concept of order in a number of specific writings of Augustine, for example by S. Budzik and M. Ruokanen. But up to now no comprehensive study existed of all the aspects of meaning in the notion of *ordo* as it appears in Augustine's entire oeuvre.²

The source material for this study consists of all of Augustine's writings. Nevertheless, Bouton-Touboullic's extensive book does not address developments in the denotation of the concept of *ordo*.³ Rather, *L'ordre caché* is organised thematically, so as to demonstrate the unity in Augustine's idea of order and simultaneously to show his originality. Firstly, the author has examined order as it manifests itself in creation and has attempted to answer the question as to whether the order of nature is autonomous of the Creator or dependent upon him. Subsequently, she has addressed the issue of how order underlies God's plan of salvation, which accomplished the restoration of order when man's free will proved to contain the seeds of order's polar opposite. Does redemption mean a restoration of the original order, or does Augustine think that a new order is introduced after the effects of original sin took their course? Finally, she has investigated the normative value of *ordo* for thinking, willing and acting human beings: the practical and existential dimensions of the order.

It is one of the great merits of the book that Bouton-Touboullic has not limited herself to passages in which Augustine explicitly speaks of *ordo*. On the contrary, she has analysed not only terms related to 'ordo' in their context ('unitas', 'concordia', 'contextio' etc.), but also equivalent terms ('amor', 'pondus') and even opposite terms ('distinctio'), in order to obtain understanding of the depth and breadth of Augustine's concept of *ordo*. It is typical for the method employed by the author that she has interpreted the meanings of *ordo*, *ordinare* and *ordinatio* (or related words) as they were current in Augustine's time in the light of Greek, Latin, pagan and early Christian sources or source terms such as *τάξις* and *κοσμος*. The aim of this is to bring Augustine's own understanding of *ordo* to light more clearly (cf. p. 20). Moreover, Bouton-Touboullic has not only examined the notion of *ordo*. She has also engaged Augustine's assumption in her

² S. Budzik, *Doctor pacis. Theologie des Friedens bei Augustinus*. Innsbruck-Wien, 1988 (*Innsbrucker theologische Studien* 24) or M. Ruokanen, *Theology of Social Life in Augustine's De civitate Dei* (Göttingen 1993). 29-76 (*Forschung zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 53).

³ Unlike J. Rief, *Der Ordobegriff des jungen Augustinus*. Paderborn, 1962, who analysed the works up to 391.

book that order is a reality which presupposes faith and which convinces men – through their experience of disorder – that the *ordo* will remain *occultus*, even when they – through *tenere ordinem* – obtain a certain amount of insight into the order behind everything and everyone. Finally, she has argued along the lines of R. Markus's *Saeculum. History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* (Cambridge 1970), that Augustine marks the shift from a spatial-cosmic concept of *ordo* to a more biblically-based concept in which the temporal dimension of order is preeminent. Before formulating some comments on this book, we will first address its contents.

II

As has been seen, the first part of the book deals with the order which underlies God's act of creation and which is unfolded in this act. It sketches Augustine's thoughts about God as absolute and immutable Being, as the Good, as the *essendi causa*, *essendi actor* and *summa essentia* who creates *ex nihilo*, in order to show that these thoughts reflect Augustine's Platonic views. These are characterised by the assumption that creatures participate in the One, Good and Beautiful, without, however, detracting from the absolute transcendence of the One, which participates in the things it establishes. The measure in which a creature participates in this One Good determines its position on the 'scale of being'. The more material (un-spiritual) and transient the creature, the more it gravitates towards 'non-being'. On the basis of several proof texts from *diu. quest.* 83. 46 and *uer. rel.* the author argues plausibly that, for Augustine, *creatio* and *ordinatio* – the creating and ordering of all things in hierarchical relations (cf. *ciu.* 12.2) – are united in one single act. Nature is dignified if everything within it is ordered according to the place that corresponds to each thing's essence (cf. p. 46). In her concern for comprehensiveness, Bouton-Touboulc appears now and then to have lost sight of her theme. Thus in her treatment of Augustine's views on *ordo* she dwells a little too extensively on his argument that creation was *ex nihilo* because, according to him, it was impossible that matter could be co-eternal with God. This is also the case for the sections in which she discusses the argument that God did not create out of his own corporality (*formans corpus de corpore* cf. p. 56), or in which she demonstrates from Augustine's sources that *Sap.* 11:18 ('qui fecit mundum de materia informi') does not contradict *creatio ex nihilo* (cf. p. 52, 59, 61). It is true that these issues have some connection with Augustine's views

about *ordo*. It is precisely the organic interconnectedness of everything in Augustine's brilliant thinking that makes it difficult for researchers to remain faithful to their own specific research question. The latter is, of course, nonetheless desirable.

Bouton-Touboullic's description – on the basis especially of *Gen. c. man.* and *Gen. lib. imp.* – of Augustine's idea of the divine *ordinatio* is more to the point. She describes the contrast between the *distinctio* of matters on the basis of their changeable form on the one hand and the related *digestio* through which the world was brought into being on the other. Her analysis of the passages in the *Confessiones* in which Augustine describes matter as formed and ordered in time is persuasive, as is her explanation that the order of time consequently follows the order of causes in creation. A little verbose is her exposition (cf. p. 104) of Augustine's concept – based on Plotinus and Cicero's idea of the *apta compositio* – that the ordered interconnection (*ordinata contextio*) of beautiful and less beautiful parts *gradibus quibusdam* and every part *pro suo moduo aptum* contributes to the resplendence of the texture as a whole. She observes that Augustine defeated Manichaean dualism in this manner, for example in *De Genesi ad Manicheos*. But unfortunately she has not attempted a critical assessment of the postulated 'model of harmony' included in this concept.

Her subsequent description of Augustine's view of the human soul as *quiddam medium* is clear and persuasive. It is set against the background of the idea that creatures – in accordance with their essence – partake of God's *simplicitas* and *aequalitas* to the extent to which they participate in the *ordo*, which is directed towards it and derived from it. Connected on the one hand with the immutable divine *rationes*, which are not bound by space and time, the human soul, on the other hand, also permeates the lower, material body as *uitalis intentio*. On the basis of its predisposition, the human soul is therefore able – Platonically – to perfect itself to the extent of directing itself towards the spiritual which is above it. It can also degenerate to the extent of inclining towards the material (p. 114-129). This part of the book succeeds best in affirming that for Augustine *ordo* is inherent to creation. If man directs his *pondus voluntatis et amoris* towards the proper objects, he contributes to the maintaining of the *ordo universitatis* by keeping the *ordo proprius* in interior balance (p. 155f.).

At the end of the first part, Bouton-Touboullic addresses Augustine's conviction that divine action remains operative in the world after the creation in the *vis occulta* or in the *interior motus occultissimus* which underlies the *cursus naturae*. In an exception to her rule of systematic rather than chronological analysis, she also deals with the

developments in Augustine's thinking about the world-soul. Whereas the younger Augustine was much attached to the idea that there is a material *pneuma* that is inherent to the world, the older Augustine eventually doubted the existence of a world-soul very much (cf. 202). Precisely this excellent study of Augustine's notion of the world-soul prompts the reader to think that it might have been better to deal chronologically with key passages in which Augustine discusses *ordo* or specific aspects of it. The *developments* in his thinking about the issue would then have been made clearer.

The second part of the book is devoted to the relation between fixed order and freedom. For Augustine the *ordo providentiae* is connected with the *ordo naturae* (cf. p. 229-232, 239, 251), but paradoxically, because it encompasses all good things and all evil things. It is clear from this part that Augustine as he became older emphasised more strongly that the way in which human *peruersitas* and *inconstantia* are foreseen by God exceeds all understanding. Nevertheless, Bouton-Touboullic's extensive paraphrase of Augustine's *sermo de providentia dei* demonstrates that he was determined – by analogy with creation – to uphold that there was a miraculous interconnection between the beautiful and the good on the one hand and the ugly and the bad on the other, even in the *secretissimum maiestatis arbitrium* (p. 224, 228, 242). From 386 until well after 410, Augustine also appears to have held the view that the *peruersa*, disorder and punishment had a purpose because they could be derived from an inscrutable *ordinata contextio* which arose from God. Evil, if used *convenienter* and not as a goal in itself, was necessary in order to establish balance and harmony (cf. p. 263, 285, 288). The reason why the *ordinata contextio* of everything in creation and history provides for the killing of one animal by another or for the freedom of human beings to decide whether or not to abide by the normative *summa lex* or *summa ordo*, is unfathomable to Augustine. This reason belongs to the mysteries of the *pulchritudo temporalis* (296, 298, 299).

Equally clear is the author's subsequent description of Augustine's thinking about original sin: disorder assumes the figure of sin. With sin an alienation occurs from the *ordo naturalis*, which by nature orientates man to God. Neglect of their proper place in the order through love of things lesser than God, and a concomitant incorrect use of things in nature and the world, caused an ontological degradation among the first human beings. Henceforth the original harmony between body and soul had disappeared (p. 311). Bouton-Touboullic demonstrates very well that this was the reason, according to Augustine, that mankind became the *massa damnata*, a *massa peccati indistincte* (p. 353). Mankind has inherited the sin and the

concomitant guilt (Ambrose did not believe that man also inherited the guilt). Human beings are also determined by original sin in their individual actions. Augustine accounts for pain, suffering and mortality – the *connexio miseriarum*, which, according to him, flowed from the loss of original harmony, and which, he believed, had also been foreseen by God – by interpreting them as contributions to the restoration of *ordo*. *Tenere ordinem*, which man did not succeed in accomplishing, became *ordine teneri* (p. 331) in an *occultus poenalis ordo*. At the end of the second part the author stresses that for Augustine both grace and free will were necessary – in that order – to regain the liberty that is necessary even merely to desire the good. Bouton-Touboullic is right in saying at the end of the second part of her book that for Augustine, God's prescience of all this does not mean that he is also its *causa efficiens*. Augustine was at pains to show that God's *prescientia* and the autonomy of free will are in harmony with each other and are not mutually exclusive (cf. *Ciu.* V. 9.4). She has also persuasively demonstrated in this part that the Church Father refused to deny God's prescience in spite of the *connexio miseriarum*, because that would imply that something in creation or history was unforeseen and therefore *inordinatum*. And that is a thought which Augustine is unwilling to accept, in spite of the unfathomable nature of order.

Bouton-Touboullic begins the third part of her book by placing the development of Augustine's thinking on grace and predestination in the context of his thinking on *ordo* and its inscrutability. She observes that, after the Fall, a new order was established in individual human beings through grace, which allowed man to transcend the consequences of original sin and even to will what is good. It is well-known that Augustine did not believe that everyone would receive this grace. Bouton-Touboullic shows, however, that, according to Augustine, the reason why Jacob was, and Esau was not predestined to receive that grace which is necessary for justification through faith, is unknowable here on earth – that is, the reason why God distinguishes between human beings even before they have had the opportunity to act is incomprehensible. This does not mean that God is unjust, but that the human understanding of justice is incapable of describing divine justice adequately (cf. for example p. 422). On the basis of *De dono perseuerantiae* Bouton-Touboullic shows saliently and convincingly that for Augustine grace realises an order that is inaccessible in this life. It is an *occultus ordo*, which must not therefore be considered unjust and the existence of which must not therefore be denied (p. 424).

The author would have done well to emphasise a little more strongly in this part that Augustine shows himself a mystagogue more than what we would call a systematic theologian. The fact that God is represented as simultaneously *iustum et occultum* can be explained more plausibly in the light of Augustine's own explicitly acknowledged mystagogical effort to guard people who see things in this way from becoming proud (cf. p. 425). On the basis of proof texts already referred to (i.e. *diu. quaest.* 68, cf. p. 397 and 542), Bouton-Touboullic demonstrates again that both the evil and the good in the *ordinatio* derive their meaning from their utility (*utilitas*) for the good. The evil accentuates the good; it stoically puts good people to the test, it frightens them, it exhorts them or corrects them (p. 452-460). Bouton-Touboullic could have paraphrased Augustine's opinion on this divine pedagogy a little more succinctly. Her analysis would also have benefited from a chronological reading of the texts, because Augustine's own development would have become clear. Moreover, she should have elaborated further on the impasse in which Augustine found himself on account of the presence of evil and bad things in creation. Augustine asserted ever more clearly that evil, the vessel of wrath, the inhabitant of Babylon all served the *communis utilitas*. At the same time he also believed that the goodness of the entire order transcended the particular good and evil elements within it. This means that evil, without losing its badness, nonetheless lacks autonomous reality and is, eventually, integrated in some ineffable way into a good order. Bouton-Touboullic could have expanded on how this came to be in Augustine's thinking. Such explanation is also absent in her reflection on Augustine's ideas about the *ordo temporum*, which he regarded as a *magnum carmen* with a temporal beauty. An opportunity for elaboration does present itself, because in the *magnum carmen* all good and bad parts are eventually absorbed into a *mundus in melius renovatus*, in which the *pulchritudo* is no longer *temporalis*... (p. 514-515).

Finally, in the third and last section of the third part of her book, Bouton-Touboullic explains that, according to Augustine, man's *tenere ordinem* converges with the consciousness of universal *ordo*. *Conuersio* incorporates the recognition of one's own place in the order. For Augustine the *ordo naturae* is like an *admonitio*, in which respect for the ontological status of each being is part of the recognition of their proper place in the *ordo*. Bouton-Touboullic does not tire of repeating that the *artes liberales* (cf. p. 522, 539, 540, 541, 557) and the *ordo studiorum* produce knowledge of this order. The *ordo uiuendi* and *ordo eruditionis* merge in this process and also direct man to God. She describes this process of orientation too much in terms of the neo-Platonic ascent (*gradatim*) from the sensible to the intelligible world.

She also overemphasises the fact that this gradual ascent amounts to a Plotinian return from the exteriority-multiplicity in matter to the interior, where the *leges pulchritudinis*, order in itself (*memoria intellectum voluntas*) and the ontologically congenital *vox (visio) ordinis* and *vestigia trinitatis* may be discerned (p. 530). All of this is at the expense of an exploration of Augustine's Christology. The author very briefly mentions the humility of God in Christ as *antidotum* against the excessive sense of one's own importance: pride. Her treatment of the incarnation is also too short: it is only mentioned as the realisation of the doctrines of the philosophers ('Par elle, [l'incarnation, pvg], le Christ réalise le triple enseignement de la philosophie (physique, morale, logique) et guérit également l'âme en la délivrant de la triple concupiscence', p. 549).

The concluding discussions in this part about the *ordo amoris* and the *ordo pacis* are, however, more satisfactory. Concerning the former, Bouton-Touboulie clearly asserts that Augustine's *dilectio ordinata* is characterised by the commensurability between love and its object or subject (571). This *dilectio* consequently also means that things and human beings are loved to the extent in which they provide a perspective of God. The good use of things that are not worthy of love can be of service to the loving of something higher. Bouton-Touboulie gives an excellent analysis of this connection, which Augustine himself made in his explanation of the distinction between *uti* and *frui* in *De doctrina christiana*, as of the relation between the love of God and the love of one's neighbour. The *ordinata dilectio* presupposes that man is loved for the sake of God and God for his own sake. The fact that Augustine regards love of God as the first in the order of the commandments (*ordo praecipiendi*) and love of one's neighbour as the first in the order of practise (*ordo faciendi*, p. 582) shows that there is no contradiction between both. As regards the *ordo pacis*, the author makes it clear that *ordo* and *pax* are synonymous for Augustine when it comes to the last things. She bases her argument primarily on *De ciuitate Dei* when she asserts that temporal peace becomes manifest even in the present when things are used properly and in several domains: security, health, community of like minds. She also correctly observes that for Augustine individual order and peace interconnect with social order and peace. On the individual level, a right *temperatura* is required and a *consensio* and *concordia* between body and soul. Social peace is related to this and thus amounts to more than simple, Ciceronian consensus. The exaltedness of a nation is determined, according to Augustine, by the objects of that nation's love. The *ciuitas bene ordinata* can become a prefiguration of Jerusalem if this love is directed towards the right goals (p. 625), if the *compositio uoluntatum* is the prelude to

fruitio dei. But it is true of this also that if a perverse intention is concealed behind the lawful actions of a *potestas ordinata*, the order behind it is *occultus*, although nonetheless always in conformity with the Eternal law. Touboullic has again succeeded very well in making clear that the hidden nature of the *ordo* does not mean that it does not exist.

III

As has been said in the introduction, Bouton-Touboullic's impressive study fills a void. An extensive and thorough study of Augustine's notion of order of this kind has not been published before. Never before has the analysis of texts on this subject been carried out so meticulously. The author excellently clarifies the layered nature of Augustine's concept of *ordo* and how organically his ideas about *ordo* are connected with his thoughts about creation and redemption; about the development of the world and of the individual. And these thoughts are themselves all mutually interwoven with each other. Precisely in the light of the sources used she succeeds in painting an outstanding picture of the depth and breadth of his ideas about *ordo* and equivalent concepts. An important strength of the book is that she has succeeded in making it clear that the unknowable nature of the order does not mean that it does not exist. As Augustine became older he appears to have used the word *ordo* less and less in his writings and teaching. We may deduce from this that, as a negative theologian, he had come to consider 'order' an inadequate word to describe the order (sic) in and from God, and therefore preferred not to speak at all.

In her instructive journey Bouton-Touboullic sometimes approaches her subject too thematically and systematically. As has been said, it would have been better if she had chosen to select those passages that were representative of Augustine's teaching in a particular period. She could then have discussed these nodal points in his work chronologically. Taking the chronology into account when reading key passages from Augustine's writings helps to discern developments and emphases and allows discovery of the coherence and development of trains of thought.⁴ This course of action would have

⁴ Cf. P. van Geest, 'Omnis scriptura legi debet eo spiritu quo facta est... On the hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and Albert Deblaere' in: R. Faesen (ed.), *Albert Deblaere, S.J. (1916-1994). Essays on mystical literature-Essais sur la littérature mystique-Saggi sulla letteratura mistica* (Louvain 2004), 427-442 (*Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium* 177).

prevented repetition (cf. p. 292 and 298 on free will; 137-139 and 1298 on the perfect order etc. etc.). The author frequently has to revisit texts because they are being discussed from a different angle and require a new explanation in the context of her systematic approach. The answers to these new questions do not always add much to the answers previously given to earlier and comparable questions. If she had used a chronological approach she would not have been obliged to force passages from Augustine's writings onto the Procrustean bed of her systematic triptych. This would not only have obviated repetitions. It would also have been possible to address questions that Augustine himself posed about the *ordo* during different periods of his life more clearly, especially in the light of the sources used so masterfully as a frame of reference by Bouton-Touboulic.

As has been said, Bouton-Touboulic's treatment of the relation between Christ, the incarnation and the *ordo sanandi* is a little too hasty (cf. p. 538). Precisely in the passages that mention this connection, her discussion of Christ is more philosophical and does not do full justice to the Christological developments in Augustine's work; developments that are also connected to his thinking on *ordo*. This objection raises another. She has paid scant attention to the relevant secondary literature. Consultation of the abovementioned studies by Budzik and Ruokanen would have considerably sharpened and deepened her analysis of the *ordo pacis*, because both works take the relation between the *ordo pacis* and the figure of Christ as a point of departure. Both argue cogently that Christ plays a crucial role in the *ordo pacis* in the present as well as in the future.⁵

Making these comments, however, has taken too much space already. In spite of these imperfections, Bouton-Touboulic's systematic approach has – and at times beautifully – revealed the insights that befell Augustine in his thinking about the relations between God and *ordo*. Anyone seeking to understand Augustine's notion of the *ordo* as a *medietas* in which dichotomies between good and evil in creation, history and salvation history are harmonised will ignore this book at their peril.

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⁵ Cf. Ruokanen, 1992, p. 129; Budzik, 1988, p. 81.

DRECOLL, Volker Henning (ed.), *Augustin Handbuch*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, ISBN 9783161482687//9783161482694, xix, 799 p.

Mohr Siebeck complemented its serial of reference works and handbooks on important theological figures (cf. Selderhuis, H. J., *Calvin Handbuch*, 2008; Beutel, A., *Luther Handbuch*, 2005) with an 800 page, comprehensive introduction to Augustine's thinking and writing, and a *status quaestionis* of the scholarship on Augustine. Volker Henning Drecoll gathered approximately 40 experts on Augustine. Together they elaborately sketch different perspectives on Augustine's life and context, different aspects of his works and thoughts, different approaches within the study and reception of the bishop of Hippo. The handbook's leading principle is the attempt to place Augustine and his thinking within his historical, intellectual, biographical context. A compliment to this handbook is the amount of book reviews it already received (Buda, D., *Revista Teologica* 18 (2008) 383-387; Eguiarte, E., *Mayeutica* 33 (2007) 237-238; Fleischer, D., *Kirchliches Amtsblatt der Evangelischen Kirche von Westfalen* 13 (2007) 446-447; Fuchs, G., *Theologie und Glaube* 98 (2008) 204-205; Raffelt, A., [Http://ifb.bsz-bw.de](http://ifb.bsz-bw.de) (10/10/08); Ribreau, M., *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 53 (2007) 375-376; Steinmetz, F. J., *Theologie und Philosophie* 83 (2008) 126-129; Van Fleteren, F., *Augustinian Studies* 39 (2008) 139-140). The handbook consists of four main parts: orientation, person, work, influence.

The first part (pp. 1-18) gives an overview of the manuscript tradition and editions (D. Weber), of the research tools and research institutions (A. Grote), and of the present state of the *Augustinforschung* (V. Drecoll).

The second part (pp. 19-247) situates Augustine within his context. The biographical context consists of a geographical setting, namely the North-African Province of the *Imperium Romanum* (K. Vössing), Rome and Milan during 383-388 (M. Wallraff) and an outline of important biographical data about Augustine (J. Rexer and V. Drecoll). Subsequently the intellectual context, the different traditions that influenced Augustine, tenets that determined the theological and philosophical framework of his time, are indicated: classical Latin literature and rhetoric (W. Hübner), academic scepticism (T. Fuhrer), Latin Middle-Platonism and Neo-Platonism (V. Drecoll), North-African and Italian Manichaeism around 375 (G. Wurst), North-African theology before Augustine (Tertullian, Cyprian) (K. Greschat), Donatism until 390 (P. Bright), Western ascetics in the fourth century (K. Greschat), the Latin Bible text in the fourth century and exegesis

of Paul (Victorinus, Ambrosiaster) (E. Schulz-Flügel), Western Trinitarian controversy until Ambrose (H. Brennecke), Augustine's Milanese conversion and Ambrose as Augustine's baptizer (V. Drecoll). Augustine's intellectual biography has to be placed against this background. The several key moments in Augustine's intellectual development are described: Augustine as rhetorician before 386 (J. Trelenberg), Augustine as Manichean (G. Wurst), his conversion in Milan (V. Drecoll), his stay in Cassiciacum (T. Fuhrer), his controversy with Manicheans (G. Wurst), Donatists (P. Bright), Pelagians (V. Drecoll, W. Löhr), Julian of Aeclanum (J. Lössl), pagans (R. Dodaro) and Arians (H. Brennecke), and Augustine's relation with the Jews (T. Raveaux). The biographical part is concluded with a portrait of Augustine as bishop: as visitor and judge (D. Doyle), as liturgical minister (V. Drecoll), as ascetic and monk (R. Dodaro), as preacher (G. Partoens). In this chapter, E. Schulz-Flügel also highlights Augustine's text-critical dealings with the Bible.

The third part (pp. 249-556), on Augustine's work, starts with a chronological overview of Augustine's writings (V. Drecoll). In chronological order, Augustine's writings are discussed: early writings (T. Fuhrer), commentaries on Genesis (D. Weber), early exegesis of Paul (P. Frederiksen), *Confessiones* (P. Frederiksen), anti-Manichean writings (G. Wurst), anti-Donatist writings (P. Bright), *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum* (V. Drecoll), *De spiritu et littera* (V. Drecoll), *De natura et gratia* (W. Löhr), *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (J. Lössl), *De correptione et gratia* (J. Lössl), *De praedestinatione sanctorum et de dono perseuerantiae* (J. Lössl), *De ciuitate dei* (J. van Oort), *De trinitate* (J. Brachtendorf), *De doctrina christiana* (G. Lettieri), writings connected to Augustine's preaching (G. Partoens), and his letters (W. Löhr). The content of Augustine's thinking is summarized in central themes within his writings: the concept of God and *fruitio dei* (J. Kreuzer), Christ as *exemplum* (W. Geerlings), *Christus humilis* (V. Drecoll), Trinity (V. Drecoll), hermeneutical questions (A. Hoffmann), creation (L. Seelbach), anthropology (C. Horn), grace (V. Drecoll), sin (W. Löhr), ecclesiology and sacramentology (P. Bright), formation and education (B. Studer), ethics (P. van Geest), eschatology (H. Häring). V. Drecoll rounds this part off with a reflection on the basic intuitions of Augustine's thinking.

The fourth part (pp. 558-665) examines some elements of the reception history and influence of Augustine: discussion in fifth century Gaul until 529 (U. Heil), *Regula Augustini* (U. Köpf), Gottschalk (R. Rieger), Anselm (R. Rieger), Abelard (J. Doutre), Peter Lombard

(R. Rieger), thirteenth century universities (U. Köpf), Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham (V. Leppin), Augustinianism in the late middle ages (U. Köpf), Luther (A. Beutel), Calvin (A. Lane), Remonstrant controversy (A. Bieber-Wallmann) and Catholic Augustinianism from Baius until Jansenius (G. Lettieri)

Every subdivision ends with a short international and up-to-date bibliography. A complete bibliography of primary (pp. 649-698) and secondary sources (pp. 699-734) is to be found in the back of the book. The handbook contains a chronological (pp. 253-261) and alphabetical (pp. 649-656) survey of Augustine's writings. Together with the elaborated indices (authors, persons and subjects) they make the handbook into a useful research tool. Primary and secondary literature are balanced. The contributions contain many references to Augustine's writings and citations of Augustine.

The book's greatest strength is that several Augustine scholars synthesise their specific expertise on Augustine. This guarantees the quality and scientific foundation of the book's content. Therefore one knows simultaneously not to look for 'original' material, new scientific insights regarding the *Augustinusforschung* in this book – this is to be found in previous publications of these authors – nor does it open new discussions. But this is not the scope of a handbook. Content wise it is difficult to make any serious critical remarks, because all authors are specialists. Since every chapter gives a synthesis and libraries are filled with studies on Augustine, it is unavoidable that that some topics are not sufficiently covered, such as the question whether Augustine was a mystic and his possible influences on later mystics, his significance for contemporary theology and philosophy, the contemporary discussions on Augustine's opinions on sexuality, women, war and peace, religious diversity. Augustine's writings as a source of spirituality and as inspiration for religious life (cf. p. 565) perhaps could have received some more attention. Also the iconographic history of Augustine could have been an interesting addition to the fourth part. Nevertheless, restrictions are due to the handbook genre.

This impressive compilation of contributions offers a profound and extensive overview of the context, content and study of Augustine. No serious research library can do without this book. With its own approach and methodology, it can take its own place beside two other Augustine reference works *Augustine Through the Ages* (Fitzgerald, A. D.) and *Augustinus-Lexikon* (Mayer, C. P.). It gives an excellent introduction for the layman in Augustine, is at the same time a consultation reference work for all who study patristics and Augustine, and is even a useful handbook for teachers in patristics. For this

reason I only can express the hope that it will be translated into other international languages in the near future.

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IN MEMORIAM THOMAS GERHARD RING OSA*

Am 27. Juli 2009 verstarb Pater Dr. Thomas Gerhard Ring OSA. Mit ihm verliert die Augustinus-Forschung einen ausgewiesenen Kenner der Gnadenlehre des Bischofs von Hippo. Der Verstorbene erfuhr nicht nur große Anerkennung als Gelehrter, sondern war auch ein engagierter Pädagoge und geschätzter Seelsorger.

Geboren wurde Thomas Ring am 7. Juli 1936 in der donau-schwäbischen Gemeinde Budakeszi in Ungarn. 1946 kam er infolge der Ausweisung der Ungarndeutschen nach Herbholzheim an der Jagst, wo er zunächst die deutsche Sprache erlernen musste. Seit 1951 besuchte er das vom Augustinerorden geleitete Gymnasium in Münnerstadt. In diesen Jahren bin ich dem damaligen Klosterschüler Thomas Ring zum ersten Mal begegnet. Ich wurde als Student der Theologie in den Semesterferien aus Würzburg nach Münnerstadt abkommandiert, um dort einigen Schülern Unterricht zu erteilen, die sich zur Aufnahme in die 5. oder 6. Klasse des Gymnasiums anschickten. Lebhaft erinnere ich mich an eine Geschichtsstunde, auf die ich mich vorbereitet hatte. Der Schüler Thomas Ring jedoch stellte mein Wissen in den Schatten. 1955 – er besuchte bereits die Unterprima – lud ich ihn zu meiner Primiz ein. Er selbst legte 1957 die einfache und 1960 die feierliche Profess ab. Nach Abschluss seiner theologischen Studien an der Universität Würzburg empfing er 1962 die Diakonweihe und wurde im darauffolgenden Jahr zum Priester geweiht. Von 1963 bis 1965 wirkte Pater Gerhard als Präfekt in dem Klosterseminar St. Augustin in Würzburg, das ich seinerzeit leitete. Mit großem Eifer verhalf er den ihm Anvertrauten zu schulischen Erfolgen, speziell in Latein und Griechisch.

Seine gediegenen Kenntnisse in den antiken Sprachen kamen ihm als Theologen zugute. Er wurde 1965 zur Promotion freigestellt und wählte für seine Dissertation eine Untersuchung des augustini-schen Autoritätsbegriffes, eines zentralen Themas im Denken des Kirchenvaters Augustinus. Obgleich schon in seinen Stoff vertieft, kam ihm der evangelische Theologe Karl-Heinrich Lütcke mit der Dissertation „*Auctoritas*“ bei Augustinus (Stuttgart 1968) zuvor. Nun sah

* Eine ausführlichere Würdigung der Leistungen von Thomas Gerhard Ring habe ich 2006 in einem Beitrag zur *Festschrift für Dr. G. Ring OSA zum 70. Geburtstag* veröffentlicht (*Augustiniana* 56 [2006] 211-221). Die nachstehenden Gedanken fußen im Wesentlichen auf diesem Beitrag; für die redaktionelle Bearbeitung danke ich meinem Mitarbeiter im Zentrum für Augustinus-Forschung (ZAF), Dipl.-Theol. Guntram Förster.

P. Gerhard sich gezwungen, sein Thema einzugrenzen. Es lautete: *Auctoritas bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Ambrosius*. Die Promotion mit dem Prädikat ‚summa cum laude‘ erfolgte 1972 und die Dissertation erschien 1975 im Augustinus-Verlag in Würzburg.

Nach seiner Promotion leitete er beinahe ein Jahrzehnt lang das bereits erwähnte Studienseminar der Augustiner in Würzburg, ehe er 1981 erneut für die Wissenschaft freigestellt wurde. Dabei blieb ihm sein pastorales Engagement stets ein Herzensanliegen: in der Würzburger Augustinerkirche, über Jahre im Bürgerspital, in der Hueberspflege und als Beichtvater bei den Klausurschwestern des Karmels Himmelspforten.

P. Gerhard wurde trotz des Missgeschicks mit dem anvisierten Promotionsthema ein ausgewiesener Kenner der Theologie Augustins. Als Mitglied des *Augustinus-Instituts* wandte er sich vorzüglich der Übersetzung und Kommentierung der Gnadenschriften des Bischofs von Hippo zu. Rasch entdeckte er die Defizite in der von der Deutschen Augustinerordensprovinz in Auftrag gegebenen Edition der Reihe *Sankt Augustinus · Der Lehrer der Gnade*. Deren ursprünglich auf 7 Bände geplante lateinisch-deutsche Gesamtausgabe beschränkte sich nämlich lediglich auf die Schriften der antipelagianischen Epoche des Kirchenvaters.

Thomas Gerhard Ring hatte erkannt, dass die geplante Edition einer Übersetzung und Kommentierung der Gnadenschriften des Kirchenvaters Augustinus ohne die Miteinbeziehung der Paulus-Kommentare aus der Mitte der 390er Jahre historisch betrachtet ein Torso bleiben musste, zumal erst diese genügend Licht auf das Werden und damit auch auf die Eigenart der augustinischen Gnadenlehre werfen. Mit einem Eifer sondergleichen ergänzte er die noch unabgeschlossene Reihe *Sankt Augustin · Lehrer der Gnade* durch drei weitere Bände, die er mit dem Titel versah: *Schriften über die Gnade: Prolegomena I-III*. Sie erschienen in chronologischer Reihe im Augustinus-Verlag Würzburg: Bd. 1 (1989): *Auslegung einiger Fragen aus dem Brief an die Römer*, Bd. 3 (1991): *An Simplicianus zwei Bücher über verschiedene Fragen* und Bd. 2 (1997): *Die Auslegung des Briefes an die Galater; Die unvollendete Auslegung des Briefes an die Römer und Dreiundachtzig verschiedene Fragen (Fragen 66-68)*.

Darüber hinaus weisen ihn zahlreiche wissenschaftliche Beiträge in Fachzeitschriften und insbesondere eine ganze Reihe von Artikeln für das *Augustinus-Lexikon* (*Duas epistulas Pelagianorum (Contra -); Electio; Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio; Expositio epistulae ad Galatas; Expositio epistulae Iacobi ad duodecim tribus; Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos;*

Initium fidei) als profunden Kenner der Gnadenlehre des Kirchenvaters aus. Mit der *Festschrift für Dr. G. Ring OSA zum 70. Geburtstag* (hrsg. von J. Lam Cong Quy), Leuven 2006 = *Augustiniana* 56 (2006) Fasc. 3-4 erwies ihm die Fachwelt die gebührende Anerkennung. Sein wissenschaftliches Lebensziel, die Vollendung der Reihe *Augustinus · Lehrer der Gnade* durch die Herausgabe der noch fehlenden Bände zu Julian, durfte er nicht mehr erleben.

Thomas Gerhard Ring hat sich speziell mit der von Augustinus selbst als Meilenstein für die Entwicklung seiner Gnadenlehre eingeschätzten Schrift *An Simplician* einen Namen in der Fachwelt gemacht (siehe die bereits erwähnten *Schriften zur Gnade: Prolegomena*, Bd. 3). Es lohnt sich, bei dieser Edition zu verweilen, zumal die Meriten des verstorbenen Gelehrten nicht zuletzt in der Einleitung, Übertragung und Erläuterung der Antworten Augustins auf die Fragen Simplicians bezüglich des Römerbriefes gipfeln dürften. Allein schon deren Umfang – rund 400 Seiten – übertrifft meines Wissens alle bisher vorliegenden Übersetzungen und Auslegungen in moderne Sprachen. Der Übersetzung mit dem Text der Edition des *Corpus Christianorum* von A. Mutzenbecher (54-175) geht eine Einleitung (25-53) voraus, die sowohl über den Anlass der Abfassung wie auch über die Bedeutung der Schrift *Ad Simplicianum* im Gesamtwerk des Kirchenvaters gründlich informiert. Die Erläuterungen dazu – sie umfassen 200 Seiten – lassen kaum einen Aspekt der von Augustin darin zur Sprache gebrachten Probleme außer Acht. Im Hinblick auf die wichtigen hermeneutischen Aspekte des Werkes sind die angehängten Verzeichnisse, allem voran das der Bibelzitate (377-381), aber auch die der Personen (382-392) sowie der Sach- bzw. Stichwörter (393-399) hilf- und aufschlussreich.

Auf dem Sterbebild von P. Gerhard steht das folgende Gebet des hl. Augustinus: „Wenn ich mit dir vereint sein werde, mit meinem ganzen Wesen, dann wird kein Schmerz und keine Mühsal mich bedrücken. Dann wird mein Leben wahres Leben sein, ganz erfüllt von dir“ (*Confessiones* 10,39). Möge ihm diese Fülle des Lebens zuteil geworden sein.

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"AD CHRISTIANAM FIDEM PIGRIUS MOVEBATUR" (CONF. VII.XX (25)) | ALYPIUS' MORE RELUCTANT MOVE TO THE CHRISTIAN FAITH (COMPARED TO AUGUSTINE)

Introduction

In *Epistola* 3 Paulinus of Nola asked his new acquaintance Alypius to send him *suam historiam*, curious as he was about "qui genus, unde sis domi",¹ how his conversion to the Catholic faith had come about, and whether he, too, had been instructed and baptized by the great Ambrose of Milan. If this small-scale *vita Alypii* would have come down to us, it would have nicely complemented the conversion story of Augustine in *Confessiones*, since the spiritual Odyssey of Augustine and Alypius "weaved in and out in a kind of antiphony".² Their journey culminated in their shared conversion experience in a garden in Milan (at the end of July or beginning of August 386), and some eight months later in their joint baptism at the hands of bishop Ambrose of Milan.³ Imagine being able to read an account of the famous garden scene from the perspective of the closest witness of Augustine's conversion! Unfortunately, Alypius – torn between his love for Paulinus and his own modesty – asked his friend Augustine to fulfil this task instead. And so it happened that in *Epistola* 27 Augustine promised Paulinus of Nola, "cito ergo [...] totum Alypium inseram praecordiis tuis".⁴ A *vita Alypii* written by Augustine would still have been of great value. How would he have presented his own role in Alypius' conversion? What providential plan would he have discerned in his friend's journey towards the Catholic faith? Augustine wrote further that if his courier⁵ had not been in such a hurry, he would have managed to include the "spiritual biography" of his closest friend in the very same letter.⁶ Whether he ever fulfilled his

¹ PAULINUS OF NOLA, *Ep.* 3.4; this is a quote from VIRGIL (*Aeneid* VIII, 114).

² Words used by Colin Starnes, *Augustine's conversion: a guide to the argument of Confessions I-IX* (Waterloo (Ont.): Wilfrid Laurier University, 1990), p. 156.

³ During the Easter Vigil in the night of 23-24 April 387 AD.

⁴ AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 27.5: "I will quickly introduce the whole of Alypius into your heart".

⁵ The courier happened to be Romanianus, a relative of Alypius, and Augustine's former patron.

⁶ AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 27.5: "quod iam fecissem iamque illum legeres, nisi profectio fratris inprovisa repente placuisset". This shows that the projected *vita Alypii* could not have been very long.

promise later on, we do not know. If he did, the *vita Alypii* has thus far not come down to us. Luckily, Augustine did provide some details concerning Alypius' life in his own "spiritual biography". A large section of book VI of *Confessiones* is devoted to his best friend, and it contains some of the material Paulinus had asked for. Alypius further appears in one paragraph of book VII (about his misconception of the Catholics' understanding of Christ), in book VIII (because of their joint conversion moment in the garden), and in book IX (with some valuable information on Alypius' attitude between conversion and baptism). For the interesting period between conversion and baptism, another useful source has come down to us. Alypius decided to follow Augustine to Cassiciacum together with Augustine's relatives (mother, son, brother and two nephews), and two of his students (Licentius, who was a son of Romanianus, and Trygetius). There, they spent the autumn and winter (October 386 – end of February 387) *in otio*, far away from the hustle and bustle of public life. Stenographers recorded word for word the series of (philosophical) conversations held there. Augustine subsequently edited this raw material, and published the adapted conversations as philosophical dialogues in the style of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*. Alypius made appearances in two of these so-called Cassiciacum dialogues (*De academicis* and *De ordine*), and here we perhaps come closest to hearing his authentic voice.⁷

All this material can help us to reconstruct the conversion story of Alypius, which – through circumstances – has not come down to us. Surprisingly perhaps, as far as I am aware, the only extensive study of Alypius' life already dates from 1904. It was written by Vivien Bardet, and appeared in four parts in *Revue augustinienne*.⁸ It is symptomatic that in reference works, such as the *Augustinus Lexikon* and Mandouze's *Prosopographie*, most attention goes towards Alypius the bishop, detailing the diplomatic journeys he made, and the important role he played at Augustine's side in the Donatist and Pelagian controversy in which he could bring to bear his legal expertise.⁹ There are

⁷ In *De academicis* and *De ordine*, but not in *De beata vita* and *Soliloquies*.

⁸ Vivien Bardet, "Un ami de saint Augustin: Alypius", *Revue augustinienne* 4 (1904), 1. Jeunesse et conversion: 52-62 (11 p.), 2. Cassiciacum: 134-145 (12 p.), 3. Le moine – l'évêque: 228-243 (16 p.), 4. Dernières luttes: 333-349 (17 p.).

⁹ Erich Feldmann (i-iii), Alfred Schindler (iv), Otto Wermelinger (v), *Augustinus Lexikon*, art. "Alypius", col. 245-267. i. *Alypius until his conversion* (4 col.), ii. *at Cassiciacum* (2 col.), iii. *until bishop of Thagaste* (1,5 col.), iv. *between 400 and 412* (3,5 col.); v. *between 412-430*: (8,5 col.). This means: 6 cols. devoted to Alypius from his youth until Cassiciacum, and almost 14 cols. devoted to the time after that; "Alypius" in André Mandouze, *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 1: Afrique (303-533)* (Paris: CNRS, 1982), p. 53-65: Alypius' life until baptism: 3 p., against

also articles written on specific topics of Alypius' life, for instance, his birth year (A. Sizoo), and his (wrongly) presumed phase of Apollinarianism (Robert J. O'Connell), to which I will return.¹⁰ Why Alypius' conversion story received so little attention is probably because one too easily pictured him as being "*l'ombre d'Augustin*", assuming that he almost always blindly followed Augustine's spiritual lead.¹¹ The following statement of Ragnar Holte concerning Alypius' road to the Catholic faith is therefore no exception: "Alypius was a close witness to the whole process of his friend's conversion and followed him in all decisions, giving the same devoted and uncritical response as always".¹²

It is certainly not my intention to attempt here a full-blown reconstruction of the lost(?) *vita Alypii*. Instead, I will focus on a particular claim made about Alypius' conversion. The lack of scholarly interest in Alypius' spiritual journey may have made it easier for an Augustine scholar to breath new life into an old controversy. In his three-volume commentary of *Confessiones*, the North-American classicist James O'Donnell made the following bold statement concerning Alypius' mindset at Cassiciacum:

His is the attitude that many attribute to Augustine at Cassiciacum: he sees in Christianity a useful type of philosophy, but his principal allegiance is to philosophy. [...] This is an arresting suggestion of a limited conversion on Alypius' part as late as November 386.¹³

The contention that in a Milanese garden Augustine did not so much convert to the faith of his mother as to a life devoted to Neoplatonic philosophy has been in the past the cause of an intellectual storm.¹⁴ It has long since been convincingly refuted, and, with it, the

Alypius' life as bishop: 9 p. Thus two to three times more space has been devoted to his life as a bishop.

¹⁰ Alypius appears also in studies of Augustine dealing with, for instance, the theme of friendship (see: Marie Aquinas McNamara, *Friendship in saint Augustine* (Studia Friburgensia N.S. 20) (Fribourg: University press, 1958).

¹¹ There is one exception: in 1970 Maurice Testard wrote an article dealing with Alypius' conversion moment, which has thus far not received the attention it deserves, and to which I will return shortly. The expression "*l'ombre d'Augustin*" has been taken from this article.

¹² Ragnar Holte, "Monica, 'the philosopher'", *Augustinus* 39 (1999), 293-316 (p. 298).

¹³ James O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessiones* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 3 vols, III, p. 90.

¹⁴ For a good summary of the debate, see Goulven Madec, *Petites études augustinienes* (Paris: Études augustinienes, 1994).

historicity of the conversion story in *Confessiones* has been restored. There is therefore no need to plead the case all over again, all the more because, more recently, Carol Harrison has persuasively argued once more against this thesis.¹⁵ Coincidentally, in her book she happens to refer to James O'Donnell's challenging statement quoted above, not to comment on the claim made about Alypius, but to remark that the many who still believe that in 386 AD Augustine converted to Neoplatonic philosophy are simply wrong.¹⁶ James O'Donnell has thus produced a kind of spin-off of an already dead controversy: what has been wrongly claimed about Augustine in the past he now declares to be true regarding his best friend Alypius. In his more recent book, he also claims that Alypius' overall attitude towards the Christian faith differed considerably from Augustine's:

Alypius had a decidedly untheological approach to Christianity. This is hard to see behind the veils of piety Augustine and Augustine's readers are always ready to cover him with, but already in the *Confessions* Alypius' religion has a different flavour.¹⁷

In a review of this publication, Frederik van Fleteren criticized James O'Donnell's provocative attitude, and he posited that only someone with sufficient historical, philosophical, theological and psychological knowledge can come to a correct assessment of Augustine's life and work.¹⁸ No doubt, the audacious statement concerning Alypius' limited allegiance to the Catholic faith at Cassiciacum is exposed to the same kind of criticism. However, as we will see, the quotation from *Confessiones* in the title of this article is but one of the surprising remarks Augustine made in this work about Alypius' attitude towards the Catholic faith. They do not permit us to dismiss James O'Donnell's claim out of hand, and they make clear that Alypius was not simply "*l'ombre d'Augustin*".

The contention that, unlike Augustine, Alypius experienced but a limited religious conversion in the garden in Milan will be examined in two stages: the conversion moment itself, which will be discussed in the present article, and Alypius' attitude between conversion and baptism, which will be discussed in a forthcoming, second article.¹⁹

¹⁵ Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's early theology: an argument for continuity* (Oxford: Oxford university, 2006).

¹⁶ Carol Harrison 2006, p. 255.

¹⁷ James O'Donnell, *Augustine: a new biography* (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), p. 105.

¹⁸ Frederik van Fleteren, *Augustinian Studies* 36 (2005) 2, 447-452.

¹⁹ In this second article use will be made of the Cassiciacum dialogues, book ix of *Confessiones*, and the letters written during this period between conversion and baptism.

Part I: ALYPIUS' CONVERSION MOMENT (end of July/August 386 AD)²⁰

The short paragraph in book VIII of *Confessiones* in which Augustine recounts Alypius' conversion experience in a garden in Milan is a good place to start. James O'Donnell perceives a difference here between the two friends: "It is not so certain as we have always assumed that the garden scene had exactly the same place in the lives of Augustine and Alypius".²¹ He seems, however, to have overlooked an article of Maurice Testard written in 1970, titled: "Observations sur la conversion d'Augustin et d'Alypius au jardin de Milan".²² It is, as far as I am aware, the most detailed study of Alypius' conversion moment, and it insists that, although the conversions of the two men converge in a garden in Milan, they started off differently, and also afterwards they followed independent roads.²³ The author persuasively argues that despite the closeness and unity of the two men, their joint conversion moment showed an important difference: whereas Augustine came to adopt Alypius' high moral standard in life (i.e. by embracing continence), Alypius was in turn finally persuaded to embrace Augustine's religious faith.²⁴ Maurice Testard believes that even after his conversion, Alypius was still limping behind for some time when it came to commitment to the Catholic faith.²⁵ I will return to this thesis later.

1. The immediate cause: the story of Ponticianus and Augustine's conversion

Usually, when in biographies of Augustine one arrives at the conversion moment, large sections of this famous episode are quoted nearly literally from *Confessiones*, without much further comment:

²⁰ "PART II: ALYPIUS BETWEEN CONVERSION AND BAPTISM (Oct. 386 – Early March 387)" will be treated in the forthcoming article referred to above.

²¹ James O'Donnell 1992, II, p. 467.

²² This article was published in *Forschungen zur römischen Literatur. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Karl Büchner* (ed. Walter Wimmel) vol. 2 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1970), p. 266-273. The argumentation in Maurice Testard's article is persuasive and I will make use of several of its findings, providing some further evidence in support of his thesis, but I will also stipulate where I think he is not entirely right.

²³ Maurice Testard 1970, p. 272; see also p. 270, where he talks of "deux crises différentes" and describes the two friends in the garden of Milan as "étrangers spirituellement l'un à l'autre".

²⁴ Although I agree with many points made in this article, I think it is necessary to nuance this particular claim of Maurice Testard, as will become clear further on in this article.

²⁵ Maurice Testard 1970, p. 272.

one seems to want to let the text speak for itself at such a sacrosanct moment, as if the words themselves have become sacred.²⁶ However, from a scholarly point of view, the text – in particular the paragraph dealing with Alypius' conversion – raises many questions, as it excels in elusiveness.

We pick up the thread at the moment Augustine and Alypius receive a visit from Ponticianus, a North-African who held a high position in the emperor's household, and who was also a baptized member of the Catholic Church.²⁷ Unknowingly(?), he would provide the two friends with information which would trigger their conversion. Both Alypius and Augustine reacted with great surprise and wonder when they heard Ponticianus dwelling on the Egyptian hermit Antony and his amazing feats, all done "in fide recta et catholica ecclesia".²⁸ He further mentioned the flocks of holy men in Christian monasteries, and their "mores suaveolentiae tuae"²⁹. He told them that there existed a monastery just outside the city of Milan, led by bishop Ambrose. Yet, Augustine and Alypius had never heard of these things! Then Ponticianus recalled how two friends hit upon the *vita Antonii* during their walk in a garden at Trier. Inspired by this book, one of them decided there and then to abandon his worldly life (which meant resigning from his post at the court, and breaking off the engagement with his fiancée), and to become an *amicus Dei*. His companion decided to follow his friend's example, and, being in a similar situation, he, too, resigned from his post and broke off the engagement with his fiancée.

As soon as Ponticianus left, both friends reacted quite differently to what they just had heard. Only Augustine was greatly upset by these stories. He began to rave at a perplexed Alypius about the pathetic lives *they both* were currently living: "Quid patimur? [...]"

²⁶ For instance, Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: a biography* (new ed.) (London: Faber and Faber, 2000); Serge Lancel, *Saint Augustine* (transl. by Antonia Nevill) (London: SCM, 2002); Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and controversies* (rev. ed.) (Norwich: The Canterbury Press Norwich, 1986).

²⁷ *Conf.* VIII.vi.14–15.

²⁸ *Conf.* VI.vii(11)–x(16): "in orthodox faith and in the Catholic Church"; for *Confessiones* the Latin text is used of James J. O'Donnell, *Augustine: Confessions*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) vol. I, and the translation is usually from Henry Chadwick (*Saint Augustine: Confessions*, (Oxford: OUP, 1991)), but sometimes also based on R.S. Pine-Coffin's translation published in the *Penguin Classics* series (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1961), and W. Watts' translation in the *Loeb classical library* (London: Heinemann, 1968 [= 1912]).

²⁹ "their manner of life well pleasing to you".

an quia praecesserunt pudet sequi et non pudet nec saltem sequi?"³⁰ During his crisis, Augustine is very specific about Alypius' whereabouts. At first it did not disturb him that his friend, who was worried about him after such a violent outburst, followed him when he ran into the garden. But when tears started welling up, Augustine once more walked away from his friend, seeking total solitude in the back of the garden.³¹ Alypius, understanding his friend's need for privacy, decided not to follow him, but to silently await the outcome of this crisis at the front of the garden. Maurice TESTARD appositely remarks that even when somewhat later Augustine came back to where his friend was seated, it was not to talk to him, but only to pick up the booklet of Paul's epistles lying on the gaming table nearby.³² It shows how self-absorbed Augustine was during those crucial moments of his excruciating inner struggle. It also reveals something else important: his conversion moment was a purely private event, in which not even his closest friend Alypius played the slightest role. Only when his conversion to the Catholic faith had come about,³³ did Augustine finally turn to Alypius. He then calmly explained to his friend what had happened: "tranquillo iam vultu indicavi Alypio".

2. Alypius' conversion account (*Conf.* viii.xii(30))

We now arrive at the short paragraph which deals specifically with Alypius' conversion. First, it should be noted that when Augustine recounts the conversion story of the two friends at Trier more than a decade after having heard it from Simplicianus, he well remembers the defensive attitude the first man adopted towards his friend after his conversion: "te si piget imitari, noli adversari".³⁴ When the two friends bump into their other two colleagues, among whom Ponticianus, "petiverunt ne sibi molesti essent si adiungi recusarent".³⁵ This, I believe, is a further indication of how personal Augustine's decision

³⁰ *Conf.* viii.viii.19: "What is wrong with us? [...] Is it because they have led the way that we are ashamed to follow? Is it not worse to hold back?"

³¹ This is an important departure from the conversion story of the two friends at Trier.

³² Maurice Testard 1970, p. 269.

³³ Inspired by a child's voice chanting "tolle, lege", he performed the "sortes Paulinae", and hit upon verse *Rom.* 13.13, which finally united his divided will behind his holy intention.

³⁴ *Conf.* viii.vi(15): "If you will not follow my lead, do not stand in my way".

³⁵ *Conf.* viii.vi(15): "They asked their friends, if they would not join them, at least not to obstruct them". The two friends congratulated them on their decision, but did not follow them.

must have been, and it signals how he himself may have expected opposition even from his (closest) friends. When he returned to Alypius, he probably was not at all sure how his friend was going to react; for all he knew, Alypius might even try to dissuade him from going through with his newly chosen direction in life.³⁶

This was Alypius' response:³⁷

at ille quid in se ageretur (quod ego nesciebam) sic indicavit:
But what went on inside himself (which I did not know), he showed as follows:

During Augustine's personal crisis something must have been going on inside Alypius, too. Of this, Augustine had been unaware.³⁸ The reader inevitably wonders: what then went on inside Alypius, especially after having enjoyed the privilege of reading such an intimate and detailed account of Augustine's inner struggle. However, the only thing Augustine has to say about this is that his friend disclosed his inner thoughts in the following manner ("sic indicavit"):

petit videre quid legissem.
He asked to see what I had read.

Alypius asked Augustine to hand him the codex of Paul's epistles, so that he could read for himself Augustine's oracular text. Are we meant to infer from this request that Alypius went through a comparable crisis, was struggling with the same issues, and expected to arrive at the same conclusion by performing in turn sortilege with Paul's epistles ("*sortes Paulinae*")?

ostendi, et attendit etiam ultra quem ego legeram. et ignorabam quid sequeretur. sequebatur vero "*infirmum autem in fide recipite*".
I showed him, and he noticed a passage following that which I had read. I did not know how the text went on; but the continuation was: "But him that is weak in faith, receive".

³⁶ When Augustine and Alypius afterwards confided to some of their intimate friends what they had decided upon, they actually were being discouraged by them from going through with it. See *Conf.* IX.ii(2), in which Augustine uses quite strong wording: "[...] linguam subdolum, velut consulendo contradicentem et, sicut cibum adsolet, amando consumentem" ("*a cunning tongue, which in pretending to offer helpful advice actually speak against us and which in offering love devours us in the way people consume food*").

³⁷ *Conf.* VIII.xiii(29).

³⁸ This is of course perfectly understandable, taking into account Augustine's self-preoccupation during his crisis.

Significantly, Alypius does not wish to obtain the same *sors* as Augustine, which could have been an option. Instead, he preferred to read further from where Augustine had stopped. Earlier on, Augustine had specifically mentioned that he himself did not want to continue reading when hitting upon the text of *Rom.* 13: 13-14, simply because there was no need to do so.³⁹ The verse "non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudiciis, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis"⁴⁰ already proved to be compelling enough for him. Probably, Alypius thought Augustine's oracle text to be less relevant to his own situation. He preferred to receive his personal *sors*, uniquely appropriate to himself, and this he found in the (half-)line immediately following Augustine's verse: "infirmum autem in fide recipite". In a sense, Alypius' decision to read further can be seen as an expression of the particular kind of relationship that existed between the two friends: Alypius followed Augustine (i.e. he, too, wished to rely on sortilege, using Paul's epistles), but at the same time he retained his independence by wanting to receive his own *sors*.

Augustine continues:

quod ille ad se rettulit mihi que aperuit.

which he applied to himself, and made clear to me.

The crucial question here is: in what way did Alypius apply this verse to himself? Commentators sometimes ignore the difficulty the text poses here, finding it unnecessary to explore its ambiguous meaning, so typical of oracles.⁴¹ If one were to draw a parallel with Augustine's conversion moment, one would assume that Alypius is here commanded to receive the person weak in faith: an oracular text usually tells you what you should do. In Augustine's case this was "induite" and "ne feceritis", and, here, the command is "recipite". One could read in it a (providential) instruction for Alypius as the future leader of his congregation as bishop of Thagaste. But this cannot have been the way this *sors* was interpreted in the garden: neither Augustine

³⁹ *Conf.* VIII.xii(29): "nec ultra volui legere, nec opus erat" ("I neither wished nor needed to read any further"). Note that this comment somewhat reduces the miraculous aspect of the sortilege: it seems that if Augustine would not have found something persuasive in the first passage he read, he would have continued reading until he hit upon something which would 'do the trick', i.e. until he found a line which would gather his divided will completely behind the "better" (*melius*) course in life.

⁴⁰ *Conf.* VIII.xii(29): "Not in revelling and drunkenness, not in lust and wantonness, not in quarrels and rivalries. Rather, put on the Lord Jesus Christ; and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts".

⁴¹ Gerald Bonner 1986, p. 91; Serge Lancel 2002, p. 97.

nor Alypius had any intention of becoming bishop, even though they both had received their episcopal ordination nine years later.⁴² James O'Donnell suggests that (also) Augustine was "infirmus",⁴³ but could Alypius really have felt admonished to receive an Augustine (still) weak in faith? This seems highly unlikely. Surely, in applying this text to himself, Alypius identified himself with the "infirmus", the one who is weak in faith.⁴⁴ Who then is commanded to do the receiving? One could conjecture that the Catholic Church in general is meant here.⁴⁵ Most likely, however, Alypius considered this oracular text to be a kind of addendum to Augustine's oracle.⁴⁶ According to this interpretation, it is Augustine who is admonished to receive an Alypius who is (still) weak in faith. This indicates that Alypius' faith in the *catholica ecclesia* was not (yet) strong. The next sentence seems to confirm such a reading:

sed tali admonitione firmatus est.

But by such admonition he was strengthened.

The choice of the word "firmatus" indeed recalls the "infirmus" of the oracular text "*infirmum autem in fide recipite*", with both thus referring to Alypius. Again, we have to decide how we are to understand this "firmatus". It does not necessarily mean that the "infirmus in fide" has suddenly become "firmus in fide". More likely, after having read his *sors*, Alypius felt strengthened in his decision to join Augustine, knowing that even someone whose faith was (still) weak would nevertheless be welcome to join the new way of life Augustine had chosen. In other words, James O'Donnell's shrewd observation may well be correct: "His [i.e. Alypius'] verse [...] was not a text about the strengthening of faith but about the place of the shaky-footed one inside the community".⁴⁷

⁴² Alypius became bishop of his hometown Thagaste towards the end of 394 AD, while Augustine was ordained priest in Hippo in 391 AD, and elevated there to the episcopacy possibly in the summer of 395.

⁴³ James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 70.

⁴⁴ See also Anton van Hooff, "Confessiones 8: die Dialektik der Umkehr", in Norbert Fischer & Cornelius Mayer (eds), *Die Confessiones des Augustinus van Hippo: Einführung und Interpretationen zu den dreizehn Büchern* (Forschungen zur europäischen Geistesgeschichte 1) (Freiburg: Herder, 1998), p. 343-388 (p. 380).

⁴⁵ Carl G. Vaught sees Augustine's *sors* admonishing Augustine to put off the lusts of the flesh and put on Christ; but with Alypius' *sors* he switches to the more anonymous "Paul's readers" who are now being admonished to accept the ones who are weak in faith (Carl G. Vaught, *Encounters with God in Augustine's Confessions: books VII-IX* (New York: State University of New York, 2004), p. 100).

⁴⁶ In this sense, although Augustine said he had no need to read further, Alypius did so for him.

⁴⁷ James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 105.

Carl Vaught, who devotes some attention to Alypius' conversion in his study of books VI-VIII of *Confessiones*, emphasizes the importance of the teacher-student relationship in the lives of the two friends:

The conversion of Alypius is derivative on the experience of Augustine. This is appropriate; for throughout the *Confessions*, Augustine has been the teacher and Alypius the pupil.⁴⁸

Indeed, Alypius was Augustine's former student. According to A. Sizoo,⁴⁹ Alypius may well have been nine years younger than Augustine, so that, according to this estimation, Augustine was thirty-one, and Alypius probably just twenty-two years old at their conversion moment.⁵⁰

Dagmar Kiesel sees the identification of Alypius with the *infirmus* as a logical expression of this important element in their friendship:

Das Verhalten des Alypius und seine Deutung von Röm 14,1 explizieren deutlich das Verhältnis der beiden Freunde als eine Lehrer-Schüler-Beziehung, wobei offensichtlich ist, dass Alypius nicht von Augustin in die Rolle des zu Belehrenden gedrängt wird, sondern sich aus eigener Initiative heraus der Autorität des Freundes unterordnet.⁵¹

Colin Starnes' fine study on the first nine books of *Confessiones* brings out well the reciprocity in the special relationship between the two men, wherein Alypius was in awe of Augustine's wisdom and goodness, while Augustine admired Alypius' solid virtue and strength of will.⁵² He found the correct equilibrium by recognizing Alypius' individual voice, while confirming his inclination to follow Augustine:

Alypius was converted at the same time and in the same way *according to his own particular nature*. That is, Alypius, who found it easy to do the good once he knew what it was, was content to follow August-

⁴⁸ Carl G. Vaught 2004, p. 101.

⁴⁹ A. Sizoo, "The year of Alypius' birth", *Vigiliae Christianae* 2 (1948) 2, 106-108.

⁵⁰ Vivien Bardet ("Un ami d'Augustin: Saint Alype: 1. Jeunesse et conversion" *Revue augustinienne* 4 (1904), 52-62 (p. 53)) believes the age difference to be not more than four or five years; Erich Feldmann writes: "Al[ypius] [...] wurde wie A[ugustinus], nur wenige Jahre später, in Thagaste geboren" (art. "Alypius", *Augustinus Lexikon*, col. 245). A. Sizoo is the only one who has gathered all possible evidence concerning the year of birth of Alypius, and I cannot see a conclusive reason to reject his calculation, even though some of the evidence from *Confessiones* remains susceptible to a different reading.

⁵¹ Dagmar Kiesel, *Lieben im Irdischen: Freundschaft, Frauen und Familie bei Augustin* (Symposium 130) (Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2008), p. 100-101.

⁵² This was also what Augustine said about it in *Conf.* vi.vii(11).

tine, trusting that he could safely follow if his friend had concluded that Christianity was the true and proper course. [*Italics are mine*]⁵³

Even in Alypius' unique *sors*, there is thus the connotation of following Augustine's lead. Having clarified this interpretational problem concerning Alypius' biblical *sors*, another already awaits the reader in the next sentence. One would expect Augustine to specify the commitment both friends jointly made, and this would then be the culmination – and logical conclusion – of their joint conversion experience. Yet, the closing line of Alypius' conversion moment reads:

placitoque ac proposito bono congruentissimo suis moribus, quibus a me in melius iam olim valde longue distabat, sine ulla turbulenta cunctatione coniunctus est.

Then he attached himself to the good resolution and purpose, which was most agreeable to his disposition, wherein he did always very far differ from me, to the better, without any turbulent delaying.

With this surprisingly vague formulation of their joint agreement Alypius' conversion story has come to an end. Why does the author of *Confessiones* wish to remain so elusive here? What exactly does this resolution contain to which they both subscribed? Before answering these questions, we will look first at the actual concluding lines of book VIII. The reason for adding this extra paragraph becomes immediately clear: it brings a most prominent figure of Augustine's road to salvation into the lime-light, forming a fitting closure for his conversion story (but not really for that of Alypius):

inde ad matrem ingredimur, indicamus: gaudet. narramus quemadmodum gestum sit: exultat et triumphat et benedicebat tibi, qui potens es ultra quam petimus et intellegimus facere, quia tanto amplius sibi a te concessum de me videbat quam petere solebat miserabilibus flebilibusque gemitibus.⁵⁴

From there we went in to my mother, and told her. She was filled with joy. We told her how it happened. She exulted, feeling it to be a triumph, and glorified you 'who are powerful to do more than we ask or think'. She saw that you had granted her far more than she used to ask in her unhappy and tearful lamentations.

What Augustine and Alypius said to Monnica must be in line with the joint agreement they just had made, and also with what Augus-

⁵³ Colin Stames 1990, p. 236. Notice that this small paragraph is the only thing he has to say about the section on Alypius' conversion, which shows once more that Alypius' conversion story is not given much attention in commentary books on *Confessiones*.

⁵⁴ *Conf.* VIII.xii(30).

tine had told Alypius straight after his conversion. James O'Donnell attempts to answer this question: "What did they tell Monnica? Perhaps, even probably, that *they* had decided to take baptism eight or nine months hence, but more definitely that *A[ugustine]* had chosen to change his ways".⁵⁵ However, it will be argued that in fact the opposite is more likely to be true: probably, *only Augustine* had decided to take baptism eight or nine months hence, but more definitely, *they both* [Augustine and Alypius] had chosen to change their ways. The concluding lines of book VIII read:

convertisti enim me ad te, ut nec uxorem quaererem nec aliquam spem saeculi huius, stans in ea regula fidei in qua me ante tot annos ei revelaveras, et convertisti luctum eius in gaudium multo uberius quam oluerat, et multo carius atque castius quam de nepotibus carnis meae requirebat.

You converted me to yourself, so that I no longer desired a wife or placed any hope in this world, but stood firmly upon the rule of faith, where you had revealed me to her so many years before. And you turned her sadness into rejoicing, into joy far fuller than her dearest wish, far sweeter and more chaste than any she had hoped to find in children begotten of my flesh.

At last, in the final passage of book VIII, Augustine specifies what *his* conversion was about:⁵⁶ embracing a life of continence, and abandoning his worldly ambitions. The immediate consequences of this resolution were at least as dramatic for him as they had been for the two friends in Trier: he, too, had to resign from his worldly position and break off the engagement with his (now eleven year old) fiancée. On top of that, he also had to dismiss the (second) concubine he had recently procured to continue gratifying his sexual lust after the first one was sent back to Africa.⁵⁷ The text, however, also articulates the religious aspect of his conversion, the element which was hardly – if at all – present in the vague formulation of their joint agreement: only now Augustine sees himself standing upon that rule of faith, where his mother had revealed him to be so many years before in a dream.⁵⁸ According to Carl Vaught, this piece of information rules out too Neoplatonic an interpretation of Augustine's conversion.⁵⁹ Monnica's exultant reaction is another strong indication that her only

⁵⁵ James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 70.

⁵⁶ After all, *Confessiones* is the spiritual biography of Augustine.

⁵⁷ James O'Donnell (1992, III, p. 70) comments: "The second concubine was apparently bundled off (to receive much less sympathy from history than the first)".

⁵⁸ Referring to the episode of *Conf.* III.xi(19).

⁵⁹ Carl G. Vaught 2004, p. 101.

wish in life had come true: she finally saw her son becoming a *christianus catholicus*.⁶⁰ But there is more: a year before, she was convinced that Augustine would become a *fidelis catholicus* during her lifetime,⁶¹ and recently she had found her son becoming more and more prepared to consider such a step.⁶²

A closer look at Augustine's use of terms such as *christianus*, *catechumenus* and *fidelis* is fitting here. Both *catechumenus* and *fidelis* have something to do with ritual and sacramental membership of, and commitment to, the Church. A *catechumenus* was someone who had received the "sacraments"⁶³ of the Cross on the forehead and the tasting of salt, and perhaps some instruction (*catechesis*). From that moment on, if he truly believed and accepted the doctrines of the Church, he was considered to be a *christianus*.⁶⁴ Those who also received the sacrament of baptism were called *fideles*, and they became full members of the *catholica ecclesia*. It was not exceptional that *catechumeni* postponed their baptism:⁶⁵ they often delayed it as long as

⁶⁰ *Conf.* IX.x(26): "unum erat propter quod in hac vita aliquantum immorari cupiebam, ut te christianum catholicum viderem priusquam morerer".

⁶¹ *Conf.* VI.i(1): "Respondet mihi credere se in Christo quod priusquam de hac vita emigraret me visura esset fidelem catholicum". "*She replied to me that she had faith in Christ that before she departed this life, she would see me a baptized Catholic believer*". She said this when she was about 51 years old. She would live another three years. Within a year of Augustine's baptism, she died.

⁶² *Conf.* VI.xiii(23): "quo me iam coniugatum baptismus salutaris ablueret, quo me in dies gaudebat aptari et vota sua ac promissa tua in mea fide compleri animadvertibat" ("*Her hope was that once married I would be washed in the saving water of baptism. Every day she rejoiced to find me more prepared to consider it, and she saw her vows and your promises fulfilled in my faith*").

⁶³ For the notion that also the rituals of the catechumenate (applying the sign of the Cross on one's forehead and receiving the salt) were regarded as "sacraments", see James J. O'Donnell 1992, II, p. 67: "The catechumenate represented sacramental [...] admission to the Christian community, but not full membership", referring hereby to Augustine's *De baptismo contra donatistas* 4.21.28: "catechumeni sacramentum". See also William Harmless, *Augustine and the Catechumenate* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1995), p. 150-151 (p. 150): "Augustine considered the salt a 'sacrament' which, in some sense, 'preserved' and 'seasoned' the candidate". The fact that Nebridius was not yet initiated into any of the sacraments ("nondum imbutus ullis ecclesiae tuae sacramentis" (*Conf.* IX.iii(6)), surely must mean that he even had not yet received the "sacraments" of the catechumenate, i.e. the sign of the Cross and the tasting of salt).

⁶⁴ William Harmless, *Augustine and the catechumenate* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1995), p. 150-151; see also Henry Chadwick, *Saint Augustine: Confessions* (Oxford World's Classics) (Oxford: OUP, 1998), p. 13, n. 19: "Catechumens were entitled to bear the name 'Christian' but not that of the 'faithful' (*fidelis*)".

⁶⁵ William Harmless 1995, p. 47-48, 59-61.

possible, to benefit the most from the remission of all past sins.⁶⁶ Indicative is that in several instances Augustine combines the terms *christianus* and *fidelis*: Verecundus (at first *nondum christianus*, but on his deathbed he was *christianus et fidelis factus*), and Ponticianus (*christianus quippe et fidelis erat*). There is further Verecundus' wife (*fidelis*) and Nebridius (first *nondum christianus*, later *fidelis catholicus*). From this it can be deduced that a *christianus* is not necessarily already a *fidelis*, i.e. a baptized member of the Church, because otherwise Augustine would not always mention this separately. In the case of Manlius Theodorus, since Augustine only refers to him as a *christianus*, without mentioning "the tell-tale *fidelis*", one could reasonably assume that he was an unbaptized *christianus* of the Catholic Church.⁶⁷

Taking into consideration that Monnica was convinced that her son would become a *fidelis catholicus* before she died, and the fact that she triumphed at hearing what had happened in the garden, it is highly likely that at his conversion Augustine also decided to receive baptism, and this very soon. This is, after all, also what his biblical *sors* admonished him to do: "induite domine Iesum Christum" not only reveals that this was a conversion to *fides catholica*, and not just to (mere) *philosophia*:⁶⁸ it can also be interpreted as a call to baptism.⁶⁹ This is confirmed by the fact that sometime in October 386 AD, not long after he resigned from office, Augustine made known in a letter to bishop Ambrose his wish to receive this holy sacrament, asking him what would be suitable for him to read as preparation.⁷⁰ His Cassiciacum stay should therefore be understood as a time of preparation for baptism, even if he did lay aside quite quickly the reading Ambrose recommended to him (i.e. the prophet Isaiah).⁷¹ Augustine

⁶⁶ See David C. Alexander, *Augustine's early theology of the church: emergence and implications, 386-391* (Patristic studies 9) (New York: Lang, 2008) p. 67 (n. 47), and James O'Donnell 1992, p. 21.

⁶⁷ James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 420. Theodorus will be important in the second article, because to him *De beata vita* was dedicated.

⁶⁸ Carl G. Vaught 2004, pp. 98-99.

⁶⁹ James O'Donnell (1992, III, p. 61) makes clear there is a baptismal link in this verse (via *Gal. 3:27-28*): "Baptism, a ritual that comes with a new white garment, is the moment of that investiture [i.e. of putting on the Lord Jesus Christ]. James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 69: "Does the present text suggest a baptismal garment? Brown, *Body and Society*, 439, n. 43, says that Amb[rose] equates baptism with 'putting on Christ'. See also Carl G. Vaught 2004, p. 98-99.

⁷⁰ *Conf. IX.v(13)*.

⁷¹ *Conf. IX.v(13)*. I therefore cannot agree with James O'Donnell's suggestion that Augustine's decision to receive baptism in the garden was provisional, and that even

was then baptized at Easter Vigil the following year (24-25 April AD 387).

3. Alypius' decision at his conversion

Can we now simply assume that Alypius decided there and then to become an ascetic *christianus* as well, and that he also wished to receive baptism along with Augustine the following Easter – which in fact he did! – and that this was already implicit in their joint agreement? This question will be treated in two parts: first the moral aspect of Alypius' conversion will be dealt with, and then the religious aspect.

3.1. The moral dimension of Alypius' conversion

There is no doubt that in the vague wording of their joint resolution Augustine was referring to Alypius' greater natural virtue, and that leading an ascetic life was going to be an essential part of their new direction in life. Throughout his life, embracing continence had been for Augustine *the* most difficult thing to do, and not surprisingly it proved to be for him the ultimate hurdle during his birth pangs towards his new life.⁷² The vision of Lady Continence epitomizes the central place this virtue occupied in Augustine's conversion crisis.⁷³

Can we assume that this decision to lead a celibate life was as difficult and central for Alypius as it was for Augustine? The fact that Augustine tells us that Alypius joined Augustine's decision "*sine ulla turbulenta cunctatione*" suggests that the morally solid and self-con-

the letter to Ambrose was not a definite commitment. One of his arguments is that the peculiar character of the Cassiciacum dialogues are a sign of this "neither-fish-nor-fowl" state of Augustine's mind and commitment at the time (James O' Donnell 1992, I, p. xxviii). He sees the Cassiciacum stay as a time in which Augustine first wanted "to test his resolve" (James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 70 and 104), something which I cannot agree with. I believe that the peculiar nature of the Cassiciacum dialogues says much more about the religious commitment of his companions and of the addressees of these dialogues than Augustine's.

⁷² *Conf.* VIII.ii(2): "*mihi autem displicebat quod agebam in saeculo [...] sed adhuc tenaciter conligabar ex femina*" ("*My secular activity I held in disgust [...] but I was still firmly tied by woman*"). Only the chain of sexual lust thus remained a (serious) problem.

⁷³ She asks Augustine: "*quid in te stas et non stas? proice te in eum!*" ("*Why do you try to stand on your own strength, and fail? Cast yourself upon him*"). (*Conf.* VIII.xi(27))

trolled Alypius had less problems with committing himself to this "better" way of life.⁷⁴ From early on, Alypius had led a chaste life, and he could not understand why Augustine did not do likewise.⁷⁵ Despite having been won over in the end by Augustine in wanting to experience the delights of sexual pleasure and to seek a wife – to find out why exactly Augustine could not live without it –,⁷⁶ as far as we know, Alypius had still not forfeited his chastity.⁷⁷ Even if there were some psychological ties with concupiscence to cut loose, these could never have been that strong. Notice that, in any case, embracing a chaste life had less practical consequences for Alypius: unlike Augustine (and unlike the two friends at Trier) he had no fiancée to take into consideration, neither was there a concubine to "bundle off".

Perhaps Alypius had more difficulties in giving up his worldly ambition. His profession must have been for him an excellent platform to demonstrate his admirable virtuous behaviour.⁷⁸ His parents had, just as Augustine's parents, great expectations for their son.⁷⁹ Alypius himself appears to have been at times less enthusiastic to practise law.⁸⁰ In Milan, he stood behind the project of leading a life of contemplation with a group of friends.⁸¹ The immediate consequences for abandoning a worldly career in AD 386 were also less dramatic for him, seeing that he was unemployed at the time.⁸² One

⁷⁴ See Maurice Testard 1970, p. 269: "La conversion d'Alypius ne connut ni trouble ni hésitation, à l'inverse de celle d'Augustin". The apostle Paul recommended chastity as "melius", although he did not forbid his followers to marry (*Conf.* VIII.ii (2)).

⁷⁵ *Conf.* VI.xii(22).

⁷⁶ *Conf.* VI.xii(22).

⁷⁷ Colin Starnes claims that at the time Alypius "became tied to lust he deplored in Augustine", and further, "by a thoughtless flirting with a danger he did not have to face, he himself was caught by the same lust which held Augustine. Alypius was to remain in these "sweet snares" (VI, xii, 21) until his conversion" (pp. 158-159). But Augustine clearly states that Alypius, through his curiosity, perhaps (*fortasse*!) would have fallen in the same bondage (*Conf.* VI.xii(22)). This, in fact, proves that he did not. Also Maurice Testard (1970) is convinced that Alypius was still leading a chaste life at the time of his conversion.

⁷⁸ *Conf.* VI.x(16).

⁷⁹ *Conf.* VI.viii(13).

⁸⁰ *Conf.* VI.x(16).

⁸¹ *Conf.* VI.xiv(24).

⁸² *Conf.* VIII.vi(13). We only need to recall how difficult it was for Augustine to actually hand in his resignation: he gladly seized upon his worsening health problems to resign on grounds of illness, so as not to upset the (wealthy) parents of his students (*Conf.* IX.ii(4)); see also the introductory letter of *De beata vita* and *De academicis* book I.

also has to take into account the (financial) dependents of these men. Not only did Augustine have his (second) concubine and his son Adeodatus to support, several relatives and friends travelled to Milan, expecting to profit from Augustine's rise in society.⁸³ His family had invested greatly in his education and worldly career.⁸⁴ Just at a time when everything had been put in place to reap even greater rewards through arranging a career marriage, Augustine took the radical step of abandoning his worldly career. Needless to say, this had serious consequences for those who financially depended on him, and Augustine must have known this would cause great upheaval among them.⁸⁵

Alypius, on the other hand, came from a much wealthier Thagastan family than Augustine.⁸⁶ One can imagine that the young Alypius, having no immediate dependents to look after, probably found it easier to let go of his worldly ambitions. Nevertheless, how strongly Alypius was tied to his ambition for worldly success remains hard to determine, also because Augustine gives us no further details in the small paragraph on Alypius' conversion. The fact remains that he made the decision "*sine ulla turbulenta cunctatione*", and that he did join Augustine at Cassiciacum, even though he was not always present there.⁸⁷

⁸³ Claude Lepelley, "Un aspect de la conversion d'Augustin: la rupture avec ses ambitions sociales et politiques", *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 88 (1987), p. 243.

⁸⁴ For a good discussion of Augustine's breaking with his worldly ambitions, see Claude Lepelley 1987, 229-246.

⁸⁵ Augustine's decision to become an ascetic *christianus* must have been very upsetting for his intimate circle: their own worldly ambitions received a serious blow, while they also may have resisted Augustine's conversion to the Catholic faith, because of their lingering(?) Manichaean sympathies.

⁸⁶ *Conf.* vi.vii(11).

⁸⁷ He had to be in Milan for an unspecified reason. This does not necessarily mean that he had difficulties in letting go of his worldly ambitions. Maybe he was one of the two "*chargés d'affaires*", foreseen in their earlier plans for a philosophical retreat, which never took off because of the "*mulierculae*" (James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 84). Notice further that Alypius was the only one of Augustine's friends who was prepared to follow him to Cassiciacum: Verecundus and Nebridius could not bring themselves to do so. According to Therese Fuhrer, Alypius' journeys to Milan show that he has not completely given up his professional activities (Therese Fuhrer, "Augustin in Mailand", in: *Die christlich-philosophischen diskurse der Spätantike: Texte, Personen, Instituten* (Akte der Tagung vom 22.-25. Februar 2006 am Zentrum für Antike und Moderne der Albert Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg) (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008), pp. 63-79 (p. 73).

3.2. *Alypius' commitment to the catholica ecclesia: becoming a christianus*

What about the religious aspect of Alypius' conversion? It is significant that his *sors* centred on faith, and not on moral issues such as continence or worldly ambition, while in the joint agreement the emphasis was precisely on moral change. As argued before, Alypius probably found it easier than Augustine to convert to a strict ascetic life, partly through his particular situation (he was unemployed, had no dependents, no fiancée, and was wealthier), partly through his innate abilities (he may well have been leading a chaste life already). His main problem seems to have been to live such an admirable life *within the catholica ecclesia*. A short history of Alypius' attitude towards the Catholic faith is needed here, and since this was tightly bound to Augustine's turbulent journey towards the Catholic faith, a summary of this will be given first.

3.2.1. Augustine's religious journey towards the Catholic faith

Already at birth Augustine was made a catechumenus,⁸⁸ and considered a *christianus* (*catholicus*). When as a boy he became seriously ill, he begged his mother to receive baptism, but Monnica refused, worried as she was about the many (sexual) temptations he still would have to face while growing up.⁸⁹ At university in Carthage, he was completely taken in by the search for wisdom after having read the *Hortensius*, Cicero's protreptic to philosophy. Because this work lacked the name of Christ, he turned to the Bible but was appalled by its crudity. Soon, he found himself enthralled by the Manichaeans, who promised truth through reason, and not through authority. He now considered himself no longer a *christianus catholicus*: from a "hearer" in Catholic Christianity, he had become a "hearer" in Manichaean Christianity, much to the horror of his mother Monnica.⁹⁰ More than a decade later, at the end of 384, disappointed as he was by Manichaean teaching, he decided to abandon this sect altogether and instead he adopted to some degree the sceptic position advocated by Cicero. Once again, he could not give his heart completely to this philosophy, since Christ was not mentioned in these writings.⁹¹ He therefore decided to remain a

⁸⁸ See AUGUSTINE, *De utilitate credendi* I.2.

⁸⁹ *Conf.* I.xi(17).

⁹⁰ William Harmless 1995, p. 80.

⁹¹ The same problem occurred after having read Cicero's *Hortensius* (*Conf.* III.iv(8)).

catechumenus in the Catholic Church, although he was still reluctant to commit himself to the Catholic faith, and he adopted a waiting position instead.⁹² This first step towards a return to the Catholic fold, Augustine may well have kept to himself, because many of his friends were still influenced by Manichaean beliefs, and thus disdainful of the Catholic faith. When Monnica somewhat later joined her son in Milan, Augustine could tell her that he was no longer a member of the Manichaean sect, but that he did not yet consider himself to be a *christianus*.⁹³ Seeing that this was after he had informed us that he had decided to remain a *catechumenus*, there existed thus also what we would call a sceptic or a politic *catechumenus*: a *catechumenus* who does not consider himself a *christianus*, because he does not yet believe.⁹⁴ After his enthusiastic encounter with Neoplatonic philosophy, he turned to the Bible, in particular to Paul's epistles, and there he finally discovered truth in all its glory.⁹⁵ However, he still could not bring himself to submit to the authority of the *catholica ecclesia*. That is why it is only at his conversion in the garden in Milan that Augustine finally became a *christianus* (*catholicus*). As argued before, Augustine's conversion was more radical than that: he decided there and then to become a strict ascetic *fidelis* within the *catholica ecclesia*.

3.2.2 Alypius' spiritual journey up to his conversion (compared to Augustine)

It is likely that Alypius also received the "sacrament" of a *catechumenus* at a very young age.⁹⁶ Later, during his student years at Carthage, he converted to Manichaeism through the proselytising efforts of his teacher Augustine.⁹⁷ What attracted Alypius to this eccen-

⁹² *Conf.* v.xiv(25).

⁹³ *Conf.* vi.i(1): "cum indicassem non me quidem iam esse manichaeum, sed neque catholicum christianum [...]".

⁹⁴ See Carl G. Vaught, *Encounters with God in Augustine's Confessions: books VII-IX* (p. 34-36) on what it means to become a Christian, stating that, although Augustine made a *notional* commitment to Christianity after having read the Neoplatonic books, it was only at his conversion that he made an *existential* commitment to it.

⁹⁵ The finest description of this moment can be found in *De academicis* II. ii(5-6).

⁹⁶ This is also the position of Vivien Bardet (1904, p. 53). The text quoted above of *De academicis* II.ii (5) suggests that Romanianus had been a *catechumenus* in his childhood, and the chance is therefore likely that Alypius had been, too. Also the fact that Augustine explicitly mentions that in AD 387 Nebridius had not yet received any sacraments (*Conf.* ix.iii(6): "nondum imbutus ullis ecclesiae tuae sacramentis"), leads us to assume that his other intimate friend Alypius had received the "sacrament" of a *catechumenus* in his childhood.

⁹⁷ *Conf.* vi.vii(12).

tric religion was probably not so much their promise to come to the truth via reason instead of through mere authority,⁹⁸ but the elects' demonstration of a strict chastity and a rigorous way of life.⁹⁹ We do not know when exactly Alypius broke with the Manichaean religion. Notice that many of Augustine's friends held on to Manichaean beliefs,¹⁰⁰ even after Augustine's conversion to the Catholic faith, so that we should not too easily assume that Alypius soon followed Augustine in his decision to abandon this religion.¹⁰¹ Like Augustine, Alypius felt attracted to the philosophy of the sceptics.¹⁰² When Augustine tells us that, despite the appeal of scepticism, he wished to remain a *catechumenus*, and actually stood increasingly open to the possibility of finding truth in the Catholic Church,¹⁰³ it is but the question whether Alypius followed him in this. Augustine does not mention his friend in this passage, and it is hard to believe that he would not inform his readers if his "heart's brother" would have felt the same towards the Catholic Church. It again shows how personal Augustine's rapprochement of the *fides catholica* was. The first time Alypius is actually described as a *catechumenus* is during his stay at Cassiciacum, in the winter of 386-387 AD.¹⁰⁴ This led André Mandouze to assume that it was only at his conversion that Alypius decided to become a *catechumenus* (again).¹⁰⁵

An even stronger case can be made than this *argumentum e silentio* for assuming that Alypius did not follow Augustine in the lat-

⁹⁸ This had been Augustine's main motivation to join the Manichaeans.

⁹⁹ *Conf.* vi.vii(11). This has been pointed out by Colin Starnes (1990, p. 156). See also AUGUSTINE, *De moribus ecclesiae et de moribus manichaeorum* I.i(2) in which he states that their show of their so-called chaste life and admirable self-control was one of the most important means for them to recruit new followers.

¹⁰⁰ The greatest evidence for this is Augustine's comment on the Psalm he sang at Cassiciacum. There, he deeply regretted that many of his friends were still influenced by Manichaeism, and he dearly wished they would join him in his newly found life (as a *christianus catholicus*) (*Conf.* ix.iv(8)-(11)).

¹⁰¹ For instance, Henry Chadwick (*Augustine* (Past Master's series) (Oxford: OUP, 1986), p. 25) believes that in 386 Alypius was still shedding Manichaean beliefs.

¹⁰² Alypius' attitude towards scepticism will be explored further in the forthcoming second article, in which *De academics* will be discussed.

¹⁰³ Before his final break with Manichaeism, Augustine admits: "praesertim desperantem in ecclesia tua [...] posse invenire verum" ("In particular I had no hope that truth could be found in your Church") (*Conf.* v.x(19)).

¹⁰⁴ *Conf.* ix.iv(8).

¹⁰⁵ "Dans le jardin de Milan, A[lypius] est témoin de la "conversion" d'Augustine et s'associe à sa décision de mener une vie ascétique. Désormais catéchumène comme Augustine, A[lypius] fait partie du groupe associé à la retraite de celui-ci à Cassiciacum" [Italics are mine] ("Alypius" in: André Mandouze, *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 1: Afrique (303-533)* (Paris: CNRS, 1982), p. 53-65 (p. 54).

ter's warming to the Catholic Church. The quotation of *Confessiones* mentioned in the title of this article tells us that Alypius' move to the *catholica ecclesia* was slower, more reluctant ("pigrius") than Augustine's. It comes from a paragraph – the only one of book VII in which Alypius is mentioned – which has been problematic for two reasons. Firstly, there has been a misunderstanding about the reason for this slowness, which Robert O'Connell tried to stamp out in his article "Alypius' 'Apollinarianism' at Milan (*Conf.* VII, 25)".¹⁰⁶ Alypius resented the Catholic faith not because his view of Christ came close to Apollinarianism. Actually, his own idea about Christ must have been not that much different from Augustine's heretical Photinian view. The reason he moved slower than Augustine to the Catholic faith was that, unlike Augustine, Alypius believed that *the Catholic Christians* held a conception of Christ, which he later found out to be that of the heretical Apollinarianists:

Alypius autem deum carne indutum ita putabat credi a Catholicis, ut praeter deum et carnem non esset in Christo anima, mentemque hominis non existimabat in eo praedicari.¹⁰⁷

Alypius, on the other hand, thought Catholics believed him [i.e. Christ] to be God clothed in flesh in the sense that in Christ there was only God and flesh. He did not think they held him to possess a human soul.

Since Christ acted and behaved in the Bible as someone endowed with a human mind, he himself could not subscribe to such a view, and therefore, Alypius "ad ipsam christianam fidem pigrius movebatur".¹⁰⁸

The second problem concerns the length of the time in which Alypius held this wrong view of the Catholic Christology, which

¹⁰⁶ *Revue des études augustinienes* 13 (1967) 3-4, 209-210.

¹⁰⁷ *Conf.* VII.xix(25).

¹⁰⁸ "Alypius' approach to the Christian faith itself was more reluctant". That Robert O'Connell was unsuccessful in laying to rest once and for all this confusion about Alypius, is demonstrated by Carol Harrison's – otherwise fine – book *Rethinking Augustine's early theology*, in which she writes (p. 254): "He [i.e. Augustine] and Alypius had their Christology wrong: he verged on Photinianism (a sort of adoptionism which included the virgin birth) and Alypius held views dangerously close to what they later realized was Apollinarianism". See also her book *Christian truth and fractured humanity* (Christian theology in context) (Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 31, in which she wrongly translates *Conf.* VII.xix (25): "He [i.e. Alypius] held that in Christ there was only God and flesh", while it should be: "He believed that they [i.e. the Catholics] held that in Christ there was only God and flesh".

prevented him from hoping to find truth within the *catholica ecclesia*.¹⁰⁹ We are only given a surprisingly relative indication of time: Alypius realized his mistake *before* Augustine discovered that his own view on Christology was that of the Photinian heresy.¹¹⁰ Notice that this does not necessarily mean that Alypius arrived at a correct Christology before Augustine did. Needless to say, Augustine's Christology has already been the subject of several studies, but their findings are not conclusive concerning the exact time Augustine came to a right understanding of Christ.¹¹¹ The later we date this event, the longer the period may have been during which Alypius resented the Catholic faith, because of "their" unacceptable ideas concerning Christ's nature.¹¹² Although the exact moment of when Alypius discovered his mistake is hard to establish, and notwithstanding the fact that it is also difficult to evaluate the consequences of this discovery for him,¹¹³ certain is that for quite some time Alypius must have been put off by the Catholic faith, while Augustine, who saw his own (wrong) Christology confirmed by what he thought was the Church's teaching, more easily warmed to it.

¹⁰⁹ "Quand donc Alypius fut-il éclairé? Nous manquons d'éléments pour le préciser." Goulven Madec, "Une lecture de *Confessiones* VII, ix, 13-xxi, 27 (Notes critiques à propos d'une thèse de Robert J. O'Connell)", *Revue des études augustinienne*s 16(1970)1-2, 79-137 (p. 122).

¹¹⁰ *Conf.* VII.xix(25): "ego autem aliquanto posterius didicisse me fateor, in eo, quod verbum factum est, quomodo Catholica veritas a Photini falsitate dirimatur".

¹¹¹ See the excellent study of Tars van Bavel, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin: l'humanité et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint Augustin* (Paradoxis: Études de littérature et de théologie ancienne 10) (Fribourg, Éditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1954), p. 5-12; William Mallard, "The incarnation in Augustine's conversion", *Recherches augustinienne*s 15(1980), 80-98.

¹¹² See also Goulven Madec 1970, 79-137 (esp. 112-115 on Augustine's Photinism). R.M. Price's article "Augustine, *Confessiones* VII: autobiography or apologetic?" in *Studia Patristica* 43 (14th Int. Conference, Oxford, 2003) (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), p. 221-225 illustrates just how widely people differ about the dating of the period. The author argues that the apologetic purpose of this paragraph on their incorrect Christology is more important than the autobiographical one, whereby he believes that Augustine's error of Photinianism must already have been corrected even before he encountered the Neoplatonists.

¹¹³ Precisely because of the lack of information about Alypius' spiritual journey, translators render the Latin text "sed postea haereticorum Apollinaristarum hunc errorem esse cognoscens, Catholicae fidei conlaetatus et contemperatus est" with different nuances: "But later when he knew that this was the error of the Apollinarian heretics, he was glad to conform to the Catholic faith" (Henry Chadwick 1998, p. 129) sounds rather different than, for instance, "But understanding afterwards, that this was the error of the Apollinarian heretics, he was pleased with the Catholic faith and better disposed to it" (Carl G. Vaught 2004, p. 60). In the first translation it seems that once Alypius realized his error, he very happily embraced the Catholic faith, while in the second, this only meant a step closer towards accepting the Catholic faith.

When Augustine discovered Neoplatonism, a philosophy in which he was admonished to turn within himself,¹¹⁴ his search for truth almost certainly became even more private. From holding joint discussions on philosophical topics with his friends (Alypius and Nebridius) à la Cicero's disputations,¹¹⁵ Augustine started to probe his inner self. The question is again how far Alypius followed Augustine in this. Did Alypius, too, begin to investigate his innermost being? We should take into account that Alypius was never as fanatically captivated by philosophy as Augustine or Nebridius, that other close friend of Augustine and ardent searcher of the truth.¹¹⁶ Colin Starnes rightly remarks:

Although [...] the two [i.e. Augustine and Alypius] were like twins in spirit, [...] there is no evidence that he [i.e. Alypius] ever came to the philosophical knowledge of God.¹¹⁷

As pointed out before, Alypius does not figure at all in the "Neoplatonic" book VII, apart from the paragraph dealing with Christology.¹¹⁸ It is therefore reasonable to have reservations about the following statement made by Heinrich Lesaar concerning the two friends:

Alles, was in den Mailänder Jahren in Augustins Seele vorgeing, seine platonisch-plotinischen Erlebnisse, die Eindrücke, die *Monnikas* schlichte Frömmigkeit hinterliess, den gewaltigen Eindruck, den der grosse Mailänder Bischof Ambrosius durch sein machtvollendes Wirken auf der Lehrkanzel und als Kirchenfürst machte, – all das erlebte Alypius in engster Fühlung mit seinem 'Herzensbruder' mit. Vor Alypius hatte Augustin kein Geheimnis. Ihm vertraute er an, was sein Innerstes bewegte und aufwühlte.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ *Conf.* VII.x(16): "et inde admonitus redire ad memet ipsum, intravi in intima mea" ("And being hence admonished to return to myself, I entered even into my innermost being"). Also in the prologue to book II of *De academicis* this period of (philosophical) introspection was considered an important step (*De academicis* II. ii(5): "Prorsus totus in me cursim redibam" ("Swiftly did I begin to return entirely to myself"). Translations of *De academicis* are usually taken from John O'Meara, *St. Augustine: Against the Academics* (Ancient Christian writers 12) (New York: Newman press, 1951).

¹¹⁵ *Conf.* VI.xvi(26).

¹¹⁶ *Conf.* VI.x(17). Nebridius' inquisitiveness in philosophical matters also emerges from his correspondence with Augustine between 387 and 391 (AUGUSTINE, *Epistulae* 3-14).

¹¹⁷ Colin STARNES 1990, p. 156. Of the two close friends of Augustine, it was Nebridius who more closely resembled Augustine in his passion for the rational search of truth (p. 157).

¹¹⁸ Vivien Bardet's assumption that they read Victorinus' translation of Plato together (I, p. 59), and that they both arrived at the region of the intelligibles, finds no support in the text of *Confessiones*.

¹¹⁹ Heinrich Hubert Lesaar, "Alypius", in *Miscellanea augustiniana: een gedenkboek samengesteld uit verhandelingen over s. Augustinus bij de viering van*

The following shows that at least part of Augustine's inner struggle remained hidden from even his closest friends. Even though he states in book VI, "et ingemui et locutus sum cum amicis, qui mecum erant, multos dolores insaniarum nostrarum",¹²⁰ he writes somewhat later,

et cum in silentio fortiter quaererem, magnae voces erant ad misericordiam tuam tacitae contritiones animi mei. tu sciebas quid patiebar, et nullus hominum. quantum enim erat quod inde digerebatur per linguam meam in aures familiarissimorum meorum! numquid totus tumultus animae meae, cui nec tempora nec os meum sufficiebat, sonabat eis?¹²¹

Likewise, in his *Soliloquies* Augustine pointed out that much of Alypius' soul remained hidden from him, and that he did not know Alypius that well, even though they were close friends.¹²²

Next, there is Augustine's marked turn to Paul's epistles after having absorbed Neoplatonic philosophy.¹²³ We do not know how much Alypius was involved in his friend's (renewed?) study of Scripture either. It is perhaps meaningful that later, when Ponticianus showed his surprise at seeing Paul's epistles lying on the table, Augustine declared "[...]illis me scripturis curam maximam impendere"

zijn zalig overlijden over 15 eeuwen (Rotterdam: Augustijnen der Nederlandse provincie, 1930), p. 220-232 (p. 226).

¹²⁰ *Conf.* VI.vi(9): "I groaned and spoke with my friends accompanying me about the many sufferings that result from our follies".

¹²¹ *Conf.* VII.vii(11): "As in silence I vigorously pursued my quest, inarticulate sufferings of my heart were loudly pleading for your mercy. You knew what I endured; no human being knew. How little of it my tongue could put into words for the ears of my closest friends! Neither the time nor my powers of speech were sufficient to tell them of the full tumult of my soul".

¹²² *Soliloquies* I.iii(8). Next to the philosophical disputations he held with a small group at Cassiciacum (*De academicis*, *De beata vita*, and *De ordine*), his inner probing produced this dialogue. *Soliloquies*, a word coined by Augustine, consisted of the unusual dialogue between a person and his own *ratio*. This is further evidence of Augustine's great need to turn within himself and to privately probe his inner self.

¹²³ That this turning to Paul's epistles and the Catholic teaching was an important step is clear from *Confessiones* (VII. xxi(27)) as well as from the preem to book II of *De academicis*. Important in *De academicis* is that towards Romanianus, who was his patron and a relative of Alypius, and possibly still sympathetic towards Manichaeism, Augustine seems quite embarrassed and almost apologetic about his decision to reach back to the Catholic faith of his childhood: "Respexi tamen, confiteor, quasi de itinere in illam religionem, quae pueris nobis insita est, et medullitus implicata" ("But I looked back, I confess, as if from a journey, to that religion which is implanted in us in our childhood") (*De academicis* II.ii (5)). This turn to his childhood religion must have been no obvious step to take for some of his friends.

¹²⁴ *Conf.* VIII.vi(14).

("those scriptures were the subject of deep study to me"), even though Alypius was there with him.¹²⁴ Most likely, Augustine continued his introspection, this time with the help of Paul's writings, and in these texts he encountered a picture of the human condition much more in line with his own restless soul than the lofty image of the calm, Plotinian sage propagated by Neoplatonism.¹²⁵ It should be noted that for the Manichaeans, Paul was an important writer,¹²⁶ so that the study of his epistles would not *an sich* have been considered a move towards the Catholic faith.

Finally, there is the conversion moment itself. I believe we can safely assume that, along with Augustine, Alypius decided to become a *christianus*, and not just a mere (politic) *catechumenus*, even though his faith was still weak. But it seems indeed possible if not highly likely, that Alypius became a *christianus* without thinking it necessary to immediately commit himself to receiving baptism. He certainly was not under the kind of pressure Augustine experienced from his mother Monnica to become a *fidelis catholicus*.¹²⁷ When in October AD 386 Augustine notified bishop Ambrose of his wish to receive baptism,¹²⁸ there is again no mention of Alypius. This decision, too, seems to have been wholly personal. So, even though Augustine states that at Cassiciacum, he was a *catechumenus* together with the *catechumenus* Alypius, ("catechumenus in villa cum catechumeno Alypio")¹²⁹ he may well have been glossing over an important difference between the two friends at the time: the *catechumenus* Augustine was preparing himself for baptism at Easter, while the (only recently made?) *catechumenus* Alypius may still have been doubting as to whether he should put himself forward for baptism. Furthermore, the text "*placuit et Alypio renasci in te mecum*",¹³⁰ stated when it was time for Augus-

¹²⁵ This is well pointed out by James O'Donnell (1992, II, p. 479).

¹²⁶ See John O'Meara, *The young Augustine: the growth of st. Augustine's mind up to his conversion* (2nd rev. edition) (New York: Alba house, 2000), p. 155-160 (esp. p. 155): "To the Manichees the Epistles of the Apostle Paul represented the best and purest part of the Christian Scriptures"; Peter Brown 2000, p. 97: "The African Manichees had appealed constantly to Paul as the prophet of Mani *par excellence*".

¹²⁷ Five days before Monnica passed away, she told Augustine: "nulla re iam delector in hac vita. [...] unum erat propter quod in hac vita aliquantum immorari cupiebam, ut te christianum catholicum viderem priusquam morerer". ("I now find no pleasure in this life [...] the one reason why I wanted to stay longer in this life was my desire to see you a Catholic Christian before I die") (Conf. IX.x(26)).

¹²⁸ Conf. IX.vi(13).

¹²⁹ Conf. IX.iv(8).

¹³⁰ Conf. IX.v(13).

tine to return to Milan to hand in his name for baptism, seems to imply that, Alypius indeed made this weighty decision only towards the end of his Cassiciacum stay. This passage elicited the following comment from James O'Donnell:

Was Alypius less enthusiastic at first? The first sentence here suggests that it was A[ugustine]'s decision to take baptism that came first and determined the group's plans.¹³¹

After this brief outline of Alypius' spiritual journey, it has become clear that an important element is what Alypius understood by "becoming a christianus catholicus" at the time of his conversion, assuming that this step formed part of their joint agreement. Precisely the question of what it means to be a *christianus* was treated extensively by Augustine at the beginning of book VIII, where he presented another conversion story.

3.3. *The conversion story of Victorinus: the difference between a christianus and a [Neoplatonic] philosopher sympathetic to the Christian faith*

There is a conversion story in *Confessiones* which explicitly deals with an issue which stands at the heart of this article. It explains the difference between a true *christianus* and a (Neoplatonic) philosopher who privately acknowledges the truth of the Christian faith, but who does not think it necessary to submit himself to the Catholic Church and to seek baptism: the conversion story of Victorinus, told by the old priest Simplicianus, at the beginning of book VIII.¹³² Important is that only Augustine heard this story, since he alone paid a visit to the old priest Simplicianus, hoping that he could help him with his personal problems, seeing that Ambrose had no time for him.¹³³ Augustine already had come to view his secular activity with disgust, and he believed the nub of the problem to be that he was still firmly tied by women. Augustine further describes his situation as "et inveneram iam bonam margaritam, et venditis omnibus quae haberem emenda

¹³¹ James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 105. Actually, James O'Donnell contradicts himself here, because, as noted before, earlier on he assumed that both Augustine and Alypius decided on baptism at their conversion in the garden of Milan (James O'Donnell 1992, III, p. 70). Further, the idea that Augustine's decision determined the group's plans is an exaggeration, seeing that of this group only Alypius and Augustine's son Adeodatus joined him in baptism.

¹³² *Conf.* VIII.ii(3)-v(11).

¹³³ *Conf.* VI.ii(3).

erat, et dubitabam".¹³⁴ Surprisingly, Simplicianus' story of Victorinus does not seem to deal with Augustine's particular problem of breaking the chains of sexual desire and rescuing him from the slavery of worldly affairs. Instead, the old priest is keen to explain to him the difference between a Neoplatonic philosopher who privately claims to be a *christianus*, and a true *christianus*, and this is quite a different issue.¹³⁵ Here the sacraments – becoming "sacramentally" a member of the Church – stood central, regardless of whether one wished to marry or not.¹³⁶ In the story, Victorinus was finally prepared to face the full weight of his pagan friends' hostility, when he decided to become truly a *christianus* and to receive the sacraments of the Church, i.e. to seek baptism. While his former friends gnashed their teeth, the Christian community was ecstatic about welcoming such a high-profile new member into their midst.

Apparently Simplicianus thought Augustine still needed to learn the lesson that it is not enough to consider oneself merely privately a *christianus*: one also has to formally (and publicly) commit and submit oneself to Christ and the *catholica ecclesia*, which entailed becoming part of the ecclesiastical community and receiving baptism. Simplicianus had good reason to think that, just like Victorinus, Augustine would shrink from openly proclaiming his Catholic allegiance, even though he had privately become sympathetic towards it: in particular

¹³⁴ *Conf.* VIII.i(2): "I had discovered the good pearl, but to buy it I had to sell all that I had, and I hesitated".

¹³⁵ We do not need to look for forced interpretations, as James O'Donnell (1992, III, p. 7) does, when he tries to find common ground between Augustine's sexual lust and Victorinus' fear of his pagan friends, which he both describes as "native disinclinations". The answer may be simple: when in telling his life story Augustine mentioned his "wandering in errors" (i.e. his Manichaean period) and his interest in (Neo)platonist books, Simplicianus may have interrupted him here, already thinking that he knew what Augustine's problem was: he congratulated him for not having fallen for other philosophies, and then started telling the story of Victorinus' conversion, to exhort him to the humility of Christ. (*Conf.* VIII.ii(3)). For a former Manichaean turning a Neoplatonic philosopher with Christian interests, it seems likely that full commitment to the Catholic Church (i.e. baptism) was going to be a key problem, and not so much continence. The story of Ponticianus centred much more on the issue of continence and on an ascetic life, and not so much on baptism.

¹³⁶ This has been also noted by Gerald Bonner, "Augustine's 'conversion': historical fact or literary device?", *Augustinus* 38 (1993), 103-119 (p. 111): "In the meantime, Augustine had his conference with Simplicianus and had learned of the humility of Victorinus, who had accepted baptism without any concessions being made to his social standing and dignity [...] however committed the mind may be, the sacraments are essential for making a Christian." Initially, Victorinus demonstrated the attitude of a pagan philosopher, who was above religious rituals.

his Manichaean past made him potentially "allergic" to the sacraments of the Catholic Church.¹³⁷ Many of his friends were still influenced by Manichaean ideas, and Augustine himself had been barking against the Catholic faith when he was a proselytising member of the sect. For him, to out himself as a *christianus catholicus* must have met with disbelief and resentment from his friends. Also from a philosopher's point of view it must have been humiliating to join the Catholic Church, since a philosopher wishes to arrive at wisdom by relying on the faculty of reason, and not by having to submit oneself unconditionally to the authority of the Church.¹³⁸ Philosophers who privately may acknowledge the truth of the Catholic faith while refusing to submit to its sacraments must have been a real problem at the time, hence Ambrose's (now lost) treatise, titled *De sacramento regenerationis sive de philosophia*.¹³⁹

Anyhow, when Simplicianus finished his story, Augustine says he was on fire to imitate the heroic decision of Victorinus,¹⁴⁰ which must mean that he, too, wished to seek baptism and risk receiving the full weight of his old (Manichaean) and Neoplatonic friends, who must have been almost as opposed to this step as Victorinus' pagan friends were to his holy decision. Only later, as a kind of anecdote, did Simplicianus add that, when Victorinus was forced to choose between Christianity and his profession as a teacher of rhetoric, due to a decree of emperor Julian, he bravely resigned from office.¹⁴¹ No doubt, Simplicianus told this story solely with the intent of showing how steadfast and heroic Victorinus remained in his faith, and he had no intention whatsoever to try and persuade Augustine to give up his worldly profession. After all, once baptized Victorinus happily continued to

¹³⁷ Note that Augustine himself refers to this in *Conf.* IX. iv(8): "[quod] illa sacramenta, illa medicamenta nescirent et insani essent adversus antidotum quo sani esse potuissent" ("they [i.e. the Manichaeans] are ignorant of those sacraments, those remedies, and madly hostile to the antidote which could have cured them").

¹³⁸ Within this context, Augustine's *De utilitate credendi* and *De vera religione* can teach us something about the kind of opposition Augustine must have faced from his friends when he decided to convert to the religion of his mother.

¹³⁹ James O'Donnell (1992, I, p. xxxviii-xxxix) writes about its content: "Paraphrased, that would be 'On Baptism; or Concerning Philosophy'. The argument is straightforward enough: the way of the philosophers is not the true way, it is not enough to know the truth, one must have in addition sacramental membership in the Christian Church".

¹⁴⁰ *Conf.* VIII.v(10).

¹⁴¹ Important here is the chronological order: First Simplicianus tells of Victorinus' baptism, then Augustine says he was eager to imitate this famous Roman teacher of rhetoric, and only then does the old priest tell of Victorinus' brave resignation.

lecture on rhetoric, and did not even think about giving up his profession until Julian's decree forced him to if he wished to remain a *christianus*.¹⁴² Augustine's reaction to this anecdote – if he openly showed it – surely must have surprised Simplicianus: “non mihi fortior quam felicius visus est, quia invenit occasionem vacandi tibi, cui rei ego suspirabam”.¹⁴³

The fact that Augustine learned this lesson before his conversion is another strong argument in favour of the idea that Augustine really converted to the Catholic faith, and did not (merely) become a “Christian” Neoplatonic philosopher. Also for this reason one can assume that in the garden of Milan Augustine was already fully committed to receiving baptism next Easter.

However, we now need to find out how much of this lesson regarding becoming a *christianus* Augustine may have passed on to Alypius before his conversion. Nothing about this is known. With this we return once more to the question: if in the garden of Milan Alypius decided to follow Augustine into a life of celibacy and a renunciation of a worldly life, and if he accepted becoming a *christianus*, even though he was weak in faith, can we really be sure that this was not along the lines of Victorinus' private claim in the story “iam christianus sum”?¹⁴⁴ More precisely, did their joint agreement include the intent of receiving the sacrament of baptism in the near future, and to become a “full member” of the Church? If Alypius' commitment was less Christ-centred than Augustine's and did not yet imply a readiness to receive baptism, this could explain the elusiveness about Alypius' conversion and the vagueness of their joint agreement: both conversions entailed a commitment to become a strict ascetic *christianus*, but the two friends may have differed over what “becoming a *christianus*” stood for.

¹⁴² This shows that continence and abandoning worldly ambition was not Simplicianus' greatest concern.

¹⁴³ *Conf.* VIII.v(10): *I felt that he was not so much courageous as fortunate to find occasion for dedicating all his time to You. I sighed after such freedom...*. Such a “fortunate” occasion would present itself also to Augustine when his health problems (breathing difficulties) worsened (See also *De beata vita* i(4) and *De academicis* i.i(3)).

¹⁴⁴ James O'Donnell (1992, III, p. 21) comments: “In the fourth century there was a distinct alternative for men like Victorinus: ‘associate membership’ in the church, marked by admission to the catechumenate and deferred baptism”. Alypius may well have been someone who thinks that when one worships God as a *catechumenus* and lives an upright, even ascetic, life, what need is there for baptism?

3.4. *Converting a pagan virtus to a Christian virtus: Self-reliance versus submission to God*

To conclude this first part, a central idea in Maurice Testard's article will be picked up because it deals with an – in Augustine's eyes – essential aspect of what it means to be a *christianus*. According to Maurice Testard, the conversion was not just about Augustine being finally persuaded by Alypius that to live a communal philosophical life *in otio* would be impossible once married,¹⁴⁵ and that therefore strict continence was a *conditio sine qua non* for their ideal way of living. Augustine himself soon came to realize that a combination of marriage and philosophy, which in the past he had claimed to be workable,¹⁴⁶ was not good for him after all. In his attempts to achieve the (Neoplatonic) ascent to God he felt that it was his sexual lust which weighed him down again into inferior things, and which made him unstable.¹⁴⁷ At their conversion, Maurice Testard emphasizes the fact that Alypius, too, had to give in to Augustine, since he followed him in embracing the Catholic faith. He puts his finger on Alypius' problem when he states, "la vertu d'Alypius n'était pas douteuse; elle n'était pas chrétienne".¹⁴⁸

What we understand under a Christian *virtus* as opposed to a pagan (or even a Manichaeian) *virtus* becomes therefore an important issue. For some time Augustine thought that chastity depended on one's own resources, which he knew he himself did not possess.¹⁴⁹ This was most likely Alypius' view also, and perhaps he even encouraged Augustine into thinking like this, because of the moral strength he displayed and which Augustine admired so much.¹⁵⁰ Augustine's personal crisis in the garden made it crystal clear to him that this virtue does not depend on one's own resources, but that God's help is required to achieve it. This was in his case a profound experience, because of the depth of his crisis. At the heart of his conversion, letting go of concupiscence and embracing continence was intrinsically tied up with casting himself upon Jesus Christ in faith, and to stop relying on himself.¹⁵¹ The whole event was also an immensely hum-

¹⁴⁵ *Conf.* VI.xii(21).

¹⁴⁶ *Conf.* VI.xi(19).

¹⁴⁷ *Conf.* VII.xvii(23); *Conf.* VIII.ii(2).

¹⁴⁸ Maurice Testard 1970, p. 271.

¹⁴⁹ *Conf.* VI.xi(20): "propriarum virium credebam esse continentiam, quarum mihi non eram conscius" ("I believed continence to be achieved by personal resources which I was not aware of possessing").

¹⁵⁰ Maurice Testard 1970, p. 267.

¹⁵¹ The truth that one has to cast oneself upon God has been brought home through the vision of Lady Continence ("an vero isti et istae in se ipsis possunt ac non in

bling experience: being confronted with one's own weakness (of the will) to such a degree must have made it in the end easier for Augustine to renounce his self-determination, and to humbly submit himself to Christ. This idea of self-reliance versus reliance on God is crucial to understanding Augustine's conversion to the Catholic faith, in which humility occupied such a central place.¹⁵² It marked out the difference between a "self-conceited" Neoplatonic philosopher and a humble *christianus*, and this appears to be also the crucial lesson in Victorinus' conversion story.¹⁵³

In *Confessiones* Augustine repeatedly refers to this required humility. Another aspect of this readiness to humble oneself and to submit to Christ, was to pray for help: "nec iam ingemescebam orando ut subvenires mihi".¹⁵⁴ When emphasizing the difference between the Christian faith and Neoplatonism he states: "non habent illae paginae vultum pietatis huius, lacrimas confessionis, sacrificium tuum, spiritum contribulatum, cor contritum et humiliatum".¹⁵⁵

domino deo suo?" ("Do you think them capable of achieving this by their own resources and not by the Lord their God?") *Conf.* VIII.xi(27)). See also *Conf.* VI.xi(20), in which he says, referring to Scripture, "neminem posse esse continentem nisi tu dederis. utique dares, si gemitu interno pulsarem aures tuas et fida solida in te iactarem curam meam" ("no one can be continent unless you grant it. You would surely have granted it if my inward groaning had struck your ears and with firm faith I had cast my care on you").

¹⁵² On the centrality of humility versus pride in Augustine's conversion, see, for instance, David C. Alexander 2008, p. 67-79, in which the story of Victorinus exemplifies this thesis. Peter Brown's biography on Augustine is particularly strong in bringing out this tension between self-reliance and casting oneself upon God.

¹⁵³ "ut me exhortaretur ad humilitatem Christi sapientibus absconditam et revelatam parvulis Victorinum ipsum recordatus est" ("To exhort me to the humility of Christ hidden from the wise and revealed to babes he recalled his memory of Victorinus himself") and "non erubuerit esse puer Christi tui et infans fons tui, subiecto collo ad humilitatis iugum et edomita fronte ad crucis opprobrium" ("Yet, he was not ashamed to bow his head to the yoke of humility and to submit his forehead to the reproach of the Cross"). (*Conf.* VIII. ii(3)). This idea is repeatedly referred to especially on the subject of the Neoplatonists: "non enim tenebam deum meum Iesum, humilis humilem [...] ne fiducia sui progredierentur longius, sed potius infirmarentur" ("To possess my God, the humble Jesus, I was not yet humble enough [...] They [i.e. the Neoplatonists] are no longer to place confidence in themselves, but rather to become weak...") (*Conf.* VII.xviii(24)). Augustine also introduces his encounter with the books of the Neoplatonists as a lesson in humility from God: "et primo volens ostendere mihi quam resistas superbis, humilibus autem dat gratiam" ("First you wanted to show me how you resist the proud and give grace to the humble") (*Conf.* VII.ix(13)).

¹⁵⁴ *Conf.* VI.ii(3). "I had not yet come to groan in prayer that you might come to my aid".

¹⁵⁵ *Conf.* VII.xxi(27): "Those pages [of the Neoplatonic books] do not contain the face of devotion, tears of confession, your sacrifice, a troubled spirit, a contrite and humble heart".

Such tears of confession and a contrite and humble heart were overwhelmingly present at his conversion. His crisis was about surrendering his autonomy, as he himself states at the start of book IX: "et hoc erat totum, nolle quod volebam et velle quod volebas".¹⁵⁶ Also Peter Brown stresses this crucial difference between the self-determination of the [Neoplatonic] philosopher and the humility of the christianus, who is prepared to stop relying on himself, and instead chooses to rely on God and seek his aid.¹⁵⁷

Taking into account that Augustine's intense confrontation with his own weakness, which was an exceptionally humbling experience, must have helped him to submit to Christ, and to decide on baptism within the *catholica ecclesia*, can we simply assume that this was also Alypius' experience and conclusion at his conversion? This is unlikely, since he had such an outstanding natural ability for virtuous behaviour and self-control, and this he displayed also at this conversion, since he made this commitment "sine ulla turbulenta cunctatione". Someone with such admirable qualities surely would have found it much more difficult to acknowledge that he should not just rely on himself but should cast himself upon God instead.¹⁵⁸ Remarkable is that within the small *vita Alypii* of book VI, Augustine mainly focused on those episodes from Alypius' life which illustrate that even someone who is endowed with a great solid virtue, should not rely on himself, but always on God, otherwise it will all go terribly wrong. For instance, after having recounted Alypius' "fall" into the pleasures of the gladiatorial games, Augustine states, "et inde tamen manu validissima et misericordissima aruisti eum tu, et docuisti non sui habere sed tui fiduciam, sed longe postea".¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ *Conf.* IX.i(1): "The nub of the problem was to reject my own will and to desire yours. [...] Thereby I submitted my neck to your easy yoke and my shoulders to your light burden".

¹⁵⁷ Peter Brown (2000, p. 95-96) on the moment Augustine turned to the Bible after reading the Neoplatonic books: "The issue was one of spiritual autonomy: to what extent could a man be expected to work out his own salvation by his own power alone? [...] Thus, in the summer of 386, Augustine refused, for the last time in his life, to resist the temptations of complete spiritual autonomy".

¹⁵⁸ See also Anton van Hooff 1998, p. 381: "Wie Augustinus muß auch er [i.e. Alypius] zum Glauben kommen, um diesen Weg als unmögliche Möglichkeit schätzen zu lernen, ihn nicht selbstbehauptend durchzuführen, sondern als Gabe Gottes zu empfangen".

¹⁵⁹ *Conf.* VI.viii(13): "From this you delivered him by your most strong and merciful hand, and you taught him to put his confidence not in himself but in You. But that was much later". We need to ask ourselves: How much later?

(Provisional) conclusion

When Ponticianus confronted Alypius with the story of Antony, and the latter's "heroic resistance to the almost overwhelming diabolical assailments against his chastity",¹⁶⁰ this probably had the same effect on him as the austere Manichaean elects and their demonstration of ascetic discipline and chastity had on him in the past.¹⁶¹ It may well have been above all this excellence in *virtus* demonstrated within the Catholic fold by Antony and by the monks at Milan which suddenly made the Catholic Church a much more appealing alternative to him (and most likely also to Augustine).¹⁶²

We can safely assume that at his conversion in the garden of Milan, Alypius had decided to become an ascetic *christianus* just like Augustine. He would be the only one of Augustine's friends to do so at the time. But it seems that in becoming a *christianus*, unlike Augustine, Alypius had not yet let go of his self-reliance, and was not yet ready to humble himself and to submit himself to the yoke of Christ and to the Catholic faith by receiving baptism. After all, *his sors* did not contain an exhortation of the kind of Augustine's "induite dominum Iesum Christum", which alluded to baptism; on the contrary: his oracle text, "infirmum vero in fide recipite", seemed to allow for a less committed place within the *catholica ecclesia*. Neither did the conversion story of the two friends at Trier refer explicitly to baptism, unlike the conversion story of Victorinus, which only Augustine heard. Most likely, no (emotional) pressure was exerted on him from

¹⁶⁰ John O'Meara 2000, p. 175.

¹⁶¹ According to Augustine (*Conf.* vi.vii(12)), this display of the Manichaeans' continence was a false virtue (only a semblance of true continence), precisely because it was not accompanied with the necessary humility and reliance on God.

¹⁶² In this context, Augustine's early work (390 AD) *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum* must have been music to the ears of Alypius, because it demonstrated and promoted the superiority of the Catholic morals in comparison with those of the Manichaeans. Indicative is that Augustine especially calls on the example of the Eastern hermits and the monasteries to illustrate the excellent virtuous behaviour of Catholic Christians. It demonstrates that hearing from Ponticianus of the existence of holy men in monasteries and hermits living such excellent virtuous lives within the *catholica ecclesia* must have had a big impact: it presented Augustine as well as Alypius with a way of life which met their high moral demands and this within the Catholic community. Before that, Augustine admitted that he was confused, since he saw in the Church married as well as unmarried believers, which was a marked difference from Manichaeism, and which gave the impression that the Manichaeans followed the highest principles (*Conf.* viii.i(i)) and were morally superior to the Catholic Church.

his mother to become a *fidelis*, while Augustine emphasized the predominant role Monnica played in his return to the Catholic fold. Furthermore, the way in which Alypius embraced chastity (if he not already had done so) and renounced his worldly ambition "sine ulla turbulentia cunctatione",¹⁶³ which is so much in contrast with Augustine's excruciating struggle, still reminds very much of the young Alypius, who, when admonished about the circus games, "excussit animum forti temperantia, et resiliuerunt omnes circensium sordes ab eo".¹⁶⁴ There are thus several indications that submission to Christ and acknowledging the need for baptism within the *catholica ecclesia* was something Alypius still had to learn, so that only towards the end of the Cassiciacum stay, he came to realize that humility and surrender to God (and to the *catholica ecclesia*) was essential for their new way of life. In a forthcoming article, this tentative conclusion will be further explored by looking into Alypius' religious mind-set between conversion and baptism, and this mainly on the basis of the Cassiciacum dialogues and book IX of *Confessiones*.

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In diesem Artikel wollen wir untersuchen, welche Rolle die Inkarnation bei der *conversio* Augustinus spielte und darüber hinaus wie Augustinus diese im Verlauf seines Lebens weiterentwickelt hat. Ausschließlich die Frage nach den Heilsfunktionen der Menschwerdung Christi.

Terminologie

Augustinus hat insgesamt 124mal das Wort „*incarnatio*“ verwendet. Die „*incarnatio*“ bedeutet nach Augustinus den Vorgang, dass Gott sich mit dem Menschen uniert hat. Über die sprachliche Vielfalt dieses Vorgangs genügt es, wenn wir auf die von T. van Bavel in seiner

¹⁶³ *Conf.* VIII.xii(30).

¹⁶⁴ *Conf.* VI.vii(12): "[...] he roused up his mind with a well resolved moderation; and all those filths of the circensian pastimes flew off from him".

DIE MENSCHWERDUNG DES GOTTESSOHNES – II CHRISTLICHE IDENTITÄTSFINDUNG SOWIE IHRE THEOLOGISCH-GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN KONSEQUENZEN NACH AUGUSTINUS VON HIPPO

In memoriam T. J. van Bavel OSA

Einführung

Wie die gesamte patristische Theologie so war auch Augustinus davon überzeugt, dass die Heilsgeschichte Gottes in der Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes eine unumkehrbare Wende darstellte¹. Joseph Ratzinger sprach in diesem Zusammenhang auch von einer Wende, die Gott aus Liebe zu den Menschen gegen sich selbst vollzog. Die Reflexionen des Bischofs von Hippo über die Menschheit Jesu Christi gewinnen jedoch eine eigene Ausprägung. Diese sind mitunter Ausflüsse seiner eigenen Lebensgeschichte. Schließlich hat gerade die Einsicht in die Menschwerdung des „deus humilis“ – eine Junktur, die ausschließlich bei Augustinus zu finden ist – wesentlich zu seiner „Bekehrung“ beigetragen.

In diesem Artikel wollen wir untersuchen, welche Rolle die Inkarnation bei der *conversio* Augustins spielte und darüber hinaus wie Augustinus diese im Verlauf seines Lebens weiterentwickelt hat, einschließlich die Frage nach den Heilsfunktionen der Menschwerdung Christi.

Terminologie

Augustinus hat insgesamt 124mal das Wort „*incarnatio*“ verwendet. Die „*incarnatio*“ bedeutet nach Augustinus den Vorgang, dass Gott sich mit dem Menschen unierte hat. Über die sprachliche Vielfalt dieses Vorgangs genügt es, wenn wir auf die von T. van Bavel in seiner

¹ Vgl. A. GRILLMEIER, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche: 1. Von der Apostolischen Zeit bis zum Konzil von Chalcedon (451)*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 1979.

Doktorarbeit aufgelisteten Formulierungen hinweisen². Augustinus verwendete das Substantiv „*incarnatio*“ insgesamt 15mal im Nominativ, nur einmal im Dativ, 52mal im Akkusativ, 17mal im Ablativ und 39mal im Genitiv, den Augustinus meistens den Begriffen wie „*fides*“, „*dispensatio*“, „*aduentus*“, „*exemplum*“, „*evangelium*“, „*humilitas*“ und zuletzt dem „*sacramentum*“ nachstellte, wobei die Junktur „*fides/fidem/fide incarnationis*“ am häufigsten (20mal) vorkam. Hingegen hat Augustinus den Akkusativ oft mit den Zeitpräpositionen „*ante*“ bzw. „*post*“ verbunden. Hinzu bezeichnete Augustinus mit „*per incarnationem Christi*“ zugleich die Erfüllung der Heilszusage³. In der gleichen Weise bedeutet dieselbe Konstruktion auch, dass „*adiutorium gratiae, quae tamen per incarnationem unigeniti eius reuelata atque donata est*“⁴.

Diese Statistik belegt eindeutig die theologische Präferenz Augustins. Die häufige Verwendung des Genitivs und des Akkusativs hebt die Bedeutung Jesu Christi hervor (39mal den Genitiv) als auch das Objekt (59mal den Akkusativ) der Heilsgeschichte⁵. Durch seine gnadenhafte Menschwerdung ist Jesus Christus der Begründer des Glaubens und zugleich der Grund des Glaubens selbst. Die Inkarnation geschieht also zum Wohle der ganzen Menschheit. Die von Augustinus hierzu benutzten Verben unterstreichen diese These: „*assumere*“, „*consumere*“, „*suscipere*“, „*recipere*“, „*induere*“, „*facere*“, „*nascere*“, „*procedere*“, „*vestire*“, „*generare*“, „*incarnare*“, „*habere*“, „*apparere*“, „*copulare*“, „*venire*“, „*gerere*“, „*gestare*“, „*portare*“, „*agere*“, „*accedere*“, „*coniungere*“, „*iungere*“, „*coaptare*“, „*conformare*“, „*misceri*“, „*unire*“, „*unum fieri*“, „*cohaerere*“. Erstaunlich ist jedoch seine Zurückhaltung gegenüber den für die platonische Philosophie wichtigen Begriff der „*participatio*“⁶. Dies hängt wohl damit zusammen, dass Augustinus in der antipelagianischen Kontroverse die Einigung der beiden Naturen in der Person Jesus Christus als das Ergebnis der Gnade auffasste⁷. Die inkarnatorische Gnade kann deshalb theologisch auch so zusammengefasst werden: „*suscipiens quod non est*“.

² J. T. v. BAVEL, *Recherches sur la Christologie de saint Augustin. L'human et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint Augustin*, Fribourg, 1954, pp. 42-44.

³ Vgl. *ciu.* XVII, 2 (CCL 48, 553, 42/44): „*alteram promissionem reuelato nouo testamento per incarnationem Christi fuerat impleturus*“.

⁴ *ep.* CLXXVII, 16 (CSEL 44, 685, 8sq.).

⁵ Besonders die Verbindung mit den Zeitpräpositionen „*ante*“ und „*post*“ soll diese Aussage unterstreichen.

⁶ T. J. van BAVEL, *Recherches*, p. 43: „*il évite néanmoins ce term pour l'Incarnation*“.

⁷ T. J. van BAVEL, *Recherches*, pp. 37-41.

Dieses terminologische Reichtum zeigt zunächst die geistliche Wirkungen und Konsequenzen der Menschwerdung Gottes für die Gläubigen. Zumindest bei Augustinus bewirkt diese die Annahme des christlichen Glaubens.

Die *incarnatio* Gottes und Augustins *conversio* (386/7)

Die erste geistliche Frucht der „*incarnatio*“ manifestiert sich in der Konversion Augustins. Es gibt kaum eine Person in der Kirche des Altertums, die der Nachwelt mehr als Augustinus an Persönlichem hinterlassen hat. Zwar sind die *Confessiones* keine Autobiographie im traditionellen Sinne. Augustinus beabsichtigte mit seinen Bekenntnissen auch andere Ziele⁸. Aber vieles lässt sich dennoch aus diesem zur Weltliteratur⁹ zählenden Werk herauslesen. Schließlich bietet die Abfassung der „Bekenntnisse“ (ca. um 400) dem Bischof von Hippo den geeigneten Rahmen, der ihn erlaubt auf seinen mit vielen Fehlern gepflasterten Lebensweg zurückzublicken und Gott für die ihm erwiesene Gnade zu danken.

Ein für Augustinus folgenreiches Irrtum war seine falsche Gottesvorstellung, da diese ihn lange Zeit von der Quelle des Heils abgehalten hatte. Freilich, Augustinus war ein Christ und als solcher bereits mit den hierfür vorgesehenen Riten eines Katechumenen versehen worden. Aber er war noch kein frommer („*pious*“) Christ, weil er vor allem die kirchliche Lehre vom inkarnierten Gott intellektuell

⁸ Vgl. E. FELDMANN, *Confessiones*, in *AL*, Vol. 1, 1157 f.: „Die Analyse der biographisch-intellektuellen Situation A.s zur Zeit der Abfassung der *conf.* erlaubt die These, daß A. mit den *conf.* keine Autobiographie, sondern einen christlichen Protreptikos zu schreiben beabsichtigte“; Id., *Der Einfluß des Hortensius und des Manichäismus auf das Denken des jungen Augustinus von 373*, Diss. Universität Münster, 1975, p. 156: „Augustinus schreibt mit seinem Leben und durch sein Leben anscheinend so etwas wie einen theologischen Protreptikos, durch den er seine Leser aus allen von ihm selbst durchwanderten Lebensformen und Denkentwürfen herauszureißen (*excitare*) und in das Leben des von ihm in seinen Bekenntnissen verherrlichten *deus* hineinzureißen sucht“; H. d. NORONHA GALVAO, *Die existenzielle Gotteserkenntnis bei Augustin. Eine hermeneutische Lektüre der Confessiones* (Sammlung Horizonte, Einsiedeln, 1981, p. 15.

⁹ *Des heiligen Augustinus Bekenntnisse*, übertr. und engl. von H. SCHIEL, Freiburg, 1959, p. XXI: „Das Christentum hat in den ersten vier Jahrhunderten – von der apostolischen Zeit abgesehen – nur ein einziges Buch hervorgebracht, das seiner literarischen Form und dem menschlichen Gehalt nach in eigentlichen und engsten Sinn Weltliteratur ist: die „*Confessiones*“ des heiligen Augustinus“.

noch nicht begreifen konnte¹⁰. Dann wurde Augustinus zuerst Manichäer, Akademiker und schließlich Neuplatoniker. Trotz der philosophisch-theologischen Unterschiede lehnten sie gemeinsam die Geburt Gottes bzw. eines absoluten transzendenten Wesens ab. Nach ihnen bestand die Erlösung vor allem in der Loslösung bzw. Trennung des Geistigen von als minderwertig eingestuften Materiellen. Eine Vereinigung dieser Gegensätze würde gerade die Erlösung widersprechen. Erlösung war daher Loslösung.

Als Christ und als Taufbewerber kannte Augustinus durch die Taufkatechese wohl den Menschen Jesus Christus und er wusste auch um die Lehre der Auferstehung der Seele, die auch die damaligen Philosophen für erstrebenswert hielten. Aber Augustins frühere Denkstruktur ließ keine andere Vorstellung über Christus zu als eben die eines Weisen, der aufgrund der Exzellenz seiner *ratio* und seiner vollkommeneren Teilhabe („perfectiore participatione“) an der göttlichen Weisheit alle übrigen Menschen überragte¹¹. Der Christus im Glauben des Augustinus vor seiner Taufe war also nicht der menschengewordene Gott („non persona ueritatis“)¹². Entsprechend seiner Vertrautheit mit der philosophischen Idee des von allen menschlichen Gemütsbewegungen immunen Weisen sah er in Christus nicht mehr als einen Weisheitslehrer¹³. Als solcher blieb seine Seele freilich gegenüber der menschlichen Not und den menschlichen Verfehlungen apathisch. Diese Sicht hielt er später für unvereinbar mit der Lehre von der Inkarn-

¹⁰ Vgl. G. MADEC, *Christus*, in *AL*, Vol. 1, 847: „A. a toujours été chrétien. Sa <conversion> n'a pas consisté en un passage du paganisme, de l'incroyance ou de l'indifférence religieuse, à la foi chrétienne; ce fut une <évolution>, au début de laquelle il était un chrétien <catechumenus>, et au terme de laquelle il décidait de devenir un <fidelis>“.

¹¹ *conf.* VII, 25 (CCL 27, 108, 1/6). Vgl. P. COURCELLE, *Saint Augustin „photien“ à Milan* (*Conf.* VII, 19, 25), in *Ricerche di storia religiosa* 1 (1954), pp. 63-71; A. SOLIGNAC, *La christologie d'Augustin au temps de sa conversion*, in *BA* 13: Note complémentaire 27, p. 696; R. O'CONNELL, *Alypius' <Apollinarism> at Milan*, in *REAug* 13 (1967) 3-4, pp. 209-210.

¹² Ab 400 verwendete Augustinus den Begriff der „Persona“ hauptsächlich, um die metaphysische Dimension der Einheit zwischen Mensch und Gott in Jesus Christus zu beschreiben. Vgl. H. R. DROBNER, *Die Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus*, Leiden, 1986, pp. 161f.: „zum metaphysischen Einheitsbegriff... Um das Jahr 400 ist Augustinus soweit... Die zuvor verwendete exegetische Person-Terminologie (*personam sapientiae agere/gerere/habere/sustinere*), die allerdings auch bereits eine Identität ausdrückte, ist zum seinsmäßigen Einheitsbegriff geworden“.

¹³ Vgl. *Io. eu. tr.* LX, 3 (CCL 36, 479, 1sq.): „argumenta philosophorum, qui negant in sapientem cadere perturbationes animorum“; *ciu.* IX, 4 (CCL 47, 251, 11sq.).

nation. Denn Gott sandte gerade aus Mitleid zu den sündigen Menschen sein Sohn in die Welt, um diese zu erlösen. Das Leid der Menschen ist deshalb der Hauptgrund für die Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes. Ein allein von der *ratio* dominierter Christus wäre nicht bis zum Äußersten gegangen und seine Liebe zu den sündigen Menschen hätte nicht am Kreuz enden müssen. So aber wäre Jesus Christus nicht der Mittler und Heilsbringer¹⁴. Die Manichäer haben die Menschwerdung Gottes abgelehnt. Gott kann unmöglich den Tod auf sich nehmen. Mit der Ablehnung konnten sie keine Einheit herstellen, eine Einheit, die Augustins Denken von damals sehr beschäftigte. Die manichäische Annahme zweier verschiedenen Naturen mit unterschiedlichen bzw. gegensätzlichen Willen kann nicht zur Lösung des Widerstreits zwischen Geist und Leib führen. Aber Augustinus interessierte sich gerade sehr für die Möglichkeit einer Einheit dieser beiden Scheinbar widersprechenden Seiten. Die Platoniker haben in Jesus Christus den vergöttlichten Mittler (Logos) der Weisheit gesehen, jedoch nicht den „*deus humilis*“. Für Augustinus genügte weder die manichäische Esoterik noch die Vergeistigung der Seele. Diese Positionen können daher keine reale Erlösung erwirken; und zwar deshalb nicht, weil sie der Geschichte keinerlei Bedeutung zuerkannten. Gerade Augustins Kampf für eine reale Einheit zwischen Geist und Leib zeigt jedoch die Wichtigkeit der Menschwerdung Gottes. Für Augustinus ist *conuersio* darum *incarnatio*, insofern letztere identitätsstiftend ist und so das Ziel der *conuersio* darstellt. Augustins Bekehrung ist also inkarnatorisch.

Augustinus ließ sich in der Osternacht vom 23./24. April 387 zusammen mit seinem Sohn Adeodatus in der Mailänder Basilika vom damaligen Bischof Ambrosius taufen. Es ist hier zu fragen, ob mit diesem Datum eine veränderte theologische Einsicht bei Augustinus eingetreten war? Nach den Berichten der *Confessiones* war die paulinische Stelle Röm 13, 13f.: „Nicht in Gelagen und Zechereien, nicht in Schlafkammern und Unzucht, nicht in Haß und Hader, sondern ziehet den Herrn Jesus Christus an, und pflegt das Fleisch nicht zur Erregung eurer Lüste“ entscheidend für die Bekehrung Augustins¹⁵. Unstrittig fasste er „das Anziehen des Herrn Jesus Christus“ als eine neue Lebensform auf. Wie er diese konkret sich vorstellte, können wir aus

¹⁴ Vgl. A. ZUMKELLER, *Affectus (passio, perturbatio)*, in *AL*, Vol. 1, 174: „Das Ziel dieses erzieherischen und belehrenden Wollens, mit dem Christus die menschlichen Affekte in sich zuließ, sieht A. im ewigen Heil der Menschheit: «*cuius nos et perturbatio tranquillat, et infirmitas firmat*» (Io. eu. tr. LX, 5)“.

¹⁵ *conf.* VIII, 29 (CCL 27, 131, 33/36).

einer Stelle aus dem achten Kapitel des achten Buches der *Confessiones* eruieren. Dort beschrieb Augustinus seine unmittelbare Lage vor der Bekehrung: „Und jetzt in jenem großen Aufruhr im Innern meines Hauses, den ich aus aller Kraft entfacht mit meiner Seele in unserm Schlafgemach, in meinem Herzen, stürm ich verstörten Angesichts und Geistes zu Alypius und rufe: Was lassen wir da über uns ergehen? Was ist das? Hast du es gehört? Die Ungelehrten stehen auf und reißen den Himmel an sich, und wir mit unserer Bildung ohne Herz, sieh doch, wir wälzen uns in Fleisch und Blut! Vielleicht weil sie vorangegangen, schämen wir uns, ihnen nachzufolgen, statt uns zu schämen, daß wir ihnen nicht zum wenigsten doch folgten?“¹⁶. Eine „Seele im Schlafgemach“, „Bildung ohne Herz“ und das „wälzen in Fleisch und Blut“ sind Steigerungen einer negativen Erfahrung (Selbstentfremdung „foris a me“¹⁷) und zeigen gleichzeitig den scharfen Gegensatz zwischen der „superbia“ (Stolz) und der „humilitas“ (Demut) auf. Die Bekehrung Augustins war deshalb auch eine „imitatio humilitatis“ bzw. ein sich Unterwerfen unter dem „iugum humilitatis“. Gerade im achten Buch der *Confessiones* erwähnte Augustinus in diesem Zusammenhang verschiedene Persönlichkeiten, die ihre Nacken unter dem Kreuz Jesu Christi sich beugten. Diese Vorbilder dienten jedoch dem zukünftigen Bischof von Hippo auch zur Beschreibung seiner eigenen Erlebnissen und Wünschen. In Marius Victorinus, dem großen Philosophen, sah Augustinus einen Mann, der ebenso wie er ein Liebhaber der Wahrheit war. Doch hatte Victorinus ihm Eines voraus: er fand in der Menschwerdung und im Kreuz Jesu Christi den einzigen wirklichen Zugang zur Wahrheit, die nur den einzigen Gott zu dienen wünscht: „er errötete jetzt nicht, ein Kind deines Sohnes Jesu Christi zu sein und ein Säugling seines Gedankenquells zu werden, seinen Nacken zu beugen unter das Joch der Demut und gebändigt seine Stirn zu senken unter die Schmach des Kreuzes“¹⁸. Augustinus hat also bei Victorinus philosophische Antworten auf die Glückseligkeitsproblematik gefunden, die er noch vergeblich nach der Lesung des Werkes

¹⁶ *conf.* VIII, 19 (CCL 27, 125, 1/7): „tum in illa grandi rixa interioris domus meae, quam fortiter excitaueram cum anima mea in cubiculo nostro, corde meo, tam uultu quam mente turbatus inuado Alypium, exclamo: quid patimur? quid est hoc? quid audisti? surgunt indocti et caelum rapiunt, et nos cum doctrinis nostris sine corde ecce ubi uolutamur in carne et sanguine! an quia praecesserunt, pudet sequi et non pudet nec saltem sequi?“

¹⁷ *conf.* VI, 1 (CCL 27, 73, 4).

¹⁸ *conf.* VIII, 3 (CCL 27, 115, 25/27): „non erubuerit esse puer Christi tui et infans fontis tui subiecto collo ad humilitatis iugum et edomita fronte ad crucis opprobrium“.

„Hortensius“ von Cicero gesucht hatte. Victorius war also die Antwort auf die bedrückende Aufforderung des Hortensius. Augustinus sah nun, dass es durchaus möglich war, dass die Philosophie unter der Regie Christi zum Hafen der Glückseligkeit gelangen konnte¹⁹. Damit wurde die von Augustinus so sehr gewünschte Sicherheit des Wissens Genüge getan. Aber Augustinus blieb nicht dabei. Ein Wissen ist dann nur sicher, wenn es auch gewollt ist. Denn man kann ja vieles Wissen, ohne dass man sich danach ausrichtet. In diesem Zusammenhang brachte Augustinus nun seinen Landsmann und Regierungsbeamter Ponticianus ins Spiel. Ponticianus repräsentierte darüber hinaus die Schattenseite der Verlockung weltlicher Macht, die Augustinus zum Gefangener machte. Die Erzählung des Anachoreten Antonius durch Ponticianus erweckte in Augustinus den Eindruck, dass Gott auch den Einfachen und Unwissenden für sich gewinnen kann. Wenn Augustinus also von sich sagte, dass er den Ägypter Antonius bis dato nicht gekannt hatte, dann hatte diese Aussage eine gewaltige Sprengkraft. Schließlich war Ägypten ein Spiegelbild eines überragenden Wissenszentrums und ein Land des Exils. Aber Gott hat sich den Einfachen gezeigt und Antonius folgte Gott in die Wüste hinaus. Die Wüste aber ist das Bild der Leere des Nicht-Vorhandenseins vom Wissen. Wenn Augustinus also von sich gab, dass er den Antonius nicht kannte, dann hat er die Tatsache eigentlich umgedreht. Er ist der wirklich Unwissende, obwohl er meinte, viel zu wissen. Auch er musste wie Antonius in die Wüste gehen und dort leer bzw. demütigt werden. Durch die Antonius Erzählung des Ponticianus wurde Augustinus nun in seiner Unwissenheit getroffen und die Bastion seines Stolzes wurde durchbrochen. So ging es nunmehr für Augustinus nicht mehr allein um die Sicherung des Wissens, sondern vielmehr auch um eine Stabilisierung seines Lebens, die jedoch nur durch die Bereitschaft zur „*imitatio ad humilitatem Christi*“ gewährleistet werden kann: „Mein Wunsch war es, nicht deiner gewisser, sondern in dir fester zu sein“²⁰. Nun war Augustinus bereit, die „*angustias*“, die er noch zuvor ängstlich und unsicher zu vermeiden versuchte, auf sich zu nehmen und diese zu durchlaufen, da Jesus Christus auch diesen Weg siegreich zu Ende gegangen war: „Der Heiland, der selbst der Weg ist, gefiel ihm; aber durch die enge Pforte zu wandeln scheute ich mich“²¹. Wie Gott sich

¹⁹ *beata u. I* (CCL 29, 65, 1sq.): „ad philosophiae portum, e quo iam in beatae uitae regionem solumque proceditur“.

²⁰ *conf. VIII, 1* (CCL 27, 113, 11): „nec certior de te, sed stabilior in te esse cupiebam“.

²¹ *ibid.* (CCL 27, 113, 13sq.): „et placebat uia ipse saluator et ire per eius angustias adhuc pigebat“.

verdemütigt hat, um Mensch zu werden, damit die Menschen sich zu ihm erheben können, so sollte Augustinus gleichfalls in Demut die Taufe annehmen und so Heil werden. Damit hat nun das Drama seiner Selbst für diesen Augenblick ein Ende gefunden: Die Einheit der Naturen im Gottmenschen Jesus Christus erwies sich für Augustinus als die höchste Gnadengabe, die den in sich widerstreitenden Mensch auch zur Einheit zwischen Geist und Leib führen wird. Die Richtigkeit der Stelle aus Röm 7, 24 wurde Augustinus nun deutlich vor Augen gestellt.

Augustinus verstand nun seine Taufe als ein Bekenntnis zum demütigen Gott²². Die Inkarnation ist ein Akt der Verdemütigung Gottes²³. Somit wurde Christus für Augustinus zum Fundament einer demütigen Liebe. Dem Zweifel nahe fragte der suchende Augustinus: „Denn wo war jene Liebe, auferbaut auf dem Grund der Demut, der Christus ist“²⁴. Letztlich konnte für Augustinus gemäß der Lehre des Völkerapostels Paulus die Erlösung nur durch die Person Jesus Christus garantiert werden²⁵. Deshalb hat er auch sehr häufig auf die paulinische Stelle Röm 7, 24-25²⁶ zurückgegriffen, wobei er diese zugleich als eine Antwort auf die Stelle Röm 5, 12²⁷ verwendete.

Halten wir also fest: Das zentrale Motiv der Bekehrung des Augustinus, wie er diese zur Zeit der Abfassung der *Confessions*, also ca. 400, retrospektiv sah, war die identitätsstiftende Inkarnation Gottes. Seine in den *Confessiones* geschilderte Entscheidung zur Taufe ging Hand in Hand mit der Annahme der katholischen Lehrformel einer vollständigen Vereinigung zwischen Gott und Menschen in der Person Jesus Christus.

²² *conf.* VII, 24 (CCL 27, 108, 8): „deum meum Iesum humilis humilem“.

²³ Vgl. O. SCHAFFNER, *Christliche Demut. Des hl. Augustinus Lehre von der Humilitas*, Würzburg, 1959, p. 107: „In seiner manichäischen und neuplatonischen Zeit hätte das Augustinus nicht verstehen können, aber je mehr der christliche Glaube ihm aufging und ihn erfaßte, desto tiefer drang er ein in dieses Mysterium. In Christus steht ihm die Humilitas Dei sichtbar vor Augen: Gottes Hoheit in menschlicher Niedrigkeit und das nicht aus Notwendigkeit, sondern aus freier Liebe zum gefallenem Geschöpf, das zu retten galt“.

²⁴ *conf.* VII, 26 (CCL 27, 110, 13sq.): „ubi enim erat illa aedificans caritas a fundamento humilitatis, quod est Christus Iesus?“.

²⁵ Vgl. P.-M. HOMBERT, *Gloria Gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce*, Paris, 1996, p. 43: „En découvrant avoir été libéré comme miraculeusement, Augustin se fit de plus en plus humble. Sa délivrance lui ouvrit définitivement les yeux du coeur sur le mystère du Christ, Verbe incarné, sauveur par une miséricorde qui laisse l'homme débiteur“.

²⁶ Augustinus hat insgesamt 164mal diese paulinische Stelle herangezogen.

²⁷ Im *Corpus Augustinianum* kommt dieses Zitat 174mal vor.

Zwischen der Taufe und der Abfassungszeit der *Confessiones* jedoch liegt eine Zeitspanne von beinahe 15 Jahren. Der Verfasser der *Confessiones* schrieb hier bereits als anerkannter Theologe des lateinischen Westen. Im folgenden wollen wir versuchen, die Evolution des augustinischen Christus-Glaubens innerhalb dieses Zeitabschnitts zu eruieren²⁸.

Die „incarnatio“ in den Schriften des Augustinus

Nach CAG² hat Augustinus 154mal den Wortstamm von „incarnare“ in seinen Werken benutzt. Zum ersten Mal erscheint diesen in *exp. prop. Rm* 56 (CSEL 84, 31, 2), das der Neupriester Augustinus im Jahre 394/395 verfasst hat. Die meiste Verwendung dieses Fachtermini findet sich jedoch in den Schriften nach 400, also in seiner Bischofszeit. In den Frühdialogen fehlt dieser theologische Fachbegriff. Parallel dazu wurde dort auch der Name „Christus“ nur minimal erwähnt. Augustinus hat zwischen 387-388 nur siebenmal diesen Namen benutzt. Davon kommt dieser allein sechsmal in *ord.* vor. Jedoch würde man völlig der Absicht des Augustinus verfehlen, wenn angenommen wird, die Menschwerdung Jesu Christi spiele in dieser Periode keine Rolle. Augustinus hat zwar den theologischen Fachbegriff „incarnatio“ vor 390 noch nicht verwendet, obwohl er diese sicherlich bei der Taufkatechese in Mailand gekannt haben musste. Schließlich kommt dieses Wort im Mailänder Glaubenssymbolum vor, das ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der Liturgie und der Katechese bildete.

Während die griechischen Väter bereits über die entsprechenden technischen Ausdrücke zur Bezeichnung der Menschwerdung Gottes (ἐνανθρώπησις, ἐνσάρκωσις)²⁹ verfügten, trat die lateinische Ent-

²⁸ E. DÖNT, *Aufbau und Glaubwürdigkeit der Konfessionen und die Cassiciacumgespräche des Augustinus*, in *WSt* 82 (1969), pp. 181-197, sieht im theologischen Programm der *Confessiones* eine Weiterentwicklung der in *Cassiciacum* noch offenen theologischen Problemen.

²⁹ G. W. H. LAMPE (ed.), *A Patristic greek Lexicon*, Oxford, 1961, 462-463. 481. 1224. Es gibt dazu keine Entsprechungen in der antiken paganen Literatur. Lediglich HELIODORUS, *Aethiopica*, 2, 31, 1 (R. M. RATTENBURY – T. W. LUMB – J. MAILLON, Paris, 1935-1943) verwendete den Begriff ἐνανθρώπησασα, wobei dieser mit der ψυχή in Verbindung gebracht wurde. Beim Begriff „incarnatio“ handelt es also um einen Neologismus, der ausschließlich von den christlichen Schriftstellern verwendet wurde. C. MOHRMANN, *Sondersprache des hl. Augustinus* (Latinitas Christianorum Primaeva, Fasc. III), 1. Teil, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1965², p. 72 zählt dieses Wort zu den „unmittelbaren Christianismen“.

sprechung des Verbuns „incarnare“ zum ersten Mal bei Novatianus auf, d. h. erst in der Mitte des dritten Jahrhunderts³⁰. Im Winter 358/359 hat Hilarius von Poitiers auf Bitte des gallischen und britischen Episkopats hin das Glaubensbekenntnis von Nizäa³¹ ins Lateinische übersetzt, indem er die beiden griechischen Wörter σαρκωθέντα und ἐνανθρωπήσαντα mit „incarnatus est et homo factus est“ übersetzte. Das Nicaenum sanktionierte so diesen Begriff für den lateinischen Westen.

Wenn der bekehrte Augustinus in seinen Fröhdialogen keinen Gebrauch von dieser Fachterminologie machte, dann hing es wohl damit zusammen, dass seine christologische Lehre zu dieser Zeit noch unfertig war³², obwohl er die spirituelle Dimension der Menschwerdung Gottes wohl richtig erahnt hatte. Stattdessen benutzte er die für diese Lebensperiode typischen Verben „procedere“³³ und „gignere“³⁴. Ferner sprach er auch davon, dass der Sohn Gottes „ad nos uenit et a patre deo missus“³⁵ – eine Stelle, die Augustinus aus dem Prolog des Johannes Evangeliums entlehnte. Darüber hinaus findet man für diese Zeit auch die Verben „assumere“³⁶ und „declinare“³⁷. Den Hervorgang aus dem Vater verstand Augustinus in dieser Frühperiode als einen Zeugungsakt der Wahrheit durch das höchste Maß (modus). Der Sohn wurde darum auch als „summi dei uirtus et sapientia“³⁸ bezeichnet, da der Modus immer schon die Wahrheit inkludiert. Dieser Befund passt auch in die gesamte Denkstruktur Augustins dieser Zeit. Schließlich verfolgen die Dialoge das Ziel der „beatitudo“. Da diese aus-

³⁰ Vgl. NOVATIANUS, *De Trinitate* XXIV, 7, 138 (CCL IV, 59, 41sq.): „principaliter autem filium esse verbum dei incarnatum per illum spiritum“. Vgl. den Befund von C. MOHRMANN, *Sondersprache des hl. Augustinus* (Latinitas Christianorum Primaeva, Fasc. III), 1. Teil, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1965², p. 119, meint aber, dass der Substantiv „incarnatio“ bzw. das Verbum „incarnari“ erstmals bei Filastrius (330-397) festgestellt worden ist.

³¹ H. DENZINGER, *Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, hrsg. von P. HÜNERMANN, Freiburg i. Br., 1991³⁷, p. 62-64.

³² Vgl. E. FELDMANN, *Der Einfluß*, p. 117.

³³ *beata u.* XXXIV (CCL 29, 84, 254/257. 260sq.): „etiam hoc enim dictum est: ego sum ueritas. ueritas autem ut sit, fit per aliquem summum modum, a quo procedit et in quem se perfecta conuertit. ipsi autem summo modo nullus alius modus inponitur... ut igitur ueritas modo gignitur, ita modus ueritate cognoscitur“.

³⁴ *sol. I*, 4 (CSEL 89, 7, 19): „nihil redundat, ubi qui gignit et quem gignit unum est“.

³⁵ *ord. I*, 29 (CSEL 63, 140, 16sq.): „ad nos uenit et a patre deo missum esse“.

³⁶ *mus. VI*, 7 (PL 32, 1166, 56).

³⁷ *Acad. III*, 42 (CCL 29, 60, 16).

³⁸ *Acad. II*, 1 (CCL 29, 18, 26): „summi dei uirtutem atque sapientiam“.

schließlich in der Unsterblichkeit liegt – denn dort existiert als unabdingbares Kriterium der Glückseligkeit kein Mangel und wo kein Mangel ist, dort ist auch das richtige Maß vorhanden – benötigt der sterbliche Mensch Hilfe, um ans Ziel gelangen zu können. Der Hervorgang des Sohnes hat die Funktion der Offenbarung der höchsten und seligen Wahrheit zu erfüllen. Darum ermahnte Augustinus seinen Lesern, dass sie sich nicht „a Christi auctoritate“ entfernen sollten³⁹.

Als Zusammenfassung können wir für diese Periode zwei Texten ausfindig machen, welche die augustinische Denkstruktur charakteristisch beschreiben. Der erste Text ist entnommen aus „de musica“: „quam plagam summa dei sapientia, mirabili et ineffabili sacramento dignata est assumere, cum hominem sine peccato, non sine peccatoris conditione suscepit. nam et nasci humanitus, et pati et mori uoluit. nihil horum merito, sed excellentissima bonitate“⁴⁰. Die Bereitschaft Gottes, den Mensch in einer unaussprechlichen Weise anzunehmen und in seinem Sohn Jesus Christus für die in der Sünden sich befindenden Menschen zu leiden, ist das Resultat der freien Güte Gottes („excellentissima bonitate“). Und der zweite Text stammt aus *Acad.* III, 42 (CCL 29, 60, 10/19): „non enim est ista huius mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed alterius intelligibilis, cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblitas numquam ista ratio subtilissima reuocaret, nisi summus deus populari quadam clementia diuini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque summitteret, cuius non solum praeceptis sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semet ipsas et respicere patriam etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent“. Augustinus machte an dieser Stelle deutlich, dass die Menschen nur durch die Menschwerdung Gottes („declinaret“) zur Abkehr von den „multiformibus erroris tenebris... et... sordibus“ dieser Welt bewegen und die Seelen durch Lehre („praeceptis“) und

³⁹ *Acad.* III, 43 (CCL 29, 61, 18sq.): „mihi ergo certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere“. Dazu T. G. RING, *Auctoritas bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Ambrosius*, Würzburg, 1975, pp. 222. 224: „auctoritas ist daher nie von der Persönlichkeit ihres Inhabers zu lösen... Bei Augustin fand die Idee von der göttlichen auctoritas tiefere Begründung und reichere Ausdeutung. Er bezeichnete mit der Wendung auch den göttlichen Befehl und die Autorisierung durch Gott, doch verwendete er sie meist im Blick auf die Person Jesu Christi. In ihm hat sich nach Augustin die auctoritas Gottes in vollkommener Weise geoffenbart, er ist die göttliche auctoritas schlechthin... Für eine auctoritas ist aber auch der helfende Wille unerlässlich; dieser besteht in der clementia Gottes, die sich in der humilitas Christi offenbart. In dem sich Gott im menschengewordenen Logos zum Menschen herabneigt, erweist sich seine Macht als eine hilfreiche, die das Wohl des Menschen zum Ziel hat“.

⁴⁰ *mus.* VI, 7 (PL 32, 1166, 55/60).

Taten („factis“) zur Rückkehr anregen konnten, und zwar „sine disputationem concertatione“. An der Zentralität der Menschwerdung der Weisheit Gottes lässt sich nach den aufgeführten Stellen nicht mehr abstreiten. Schließlich geht es auch in den u. a. auch antimanichäisch konzipierten Dialogen darum, ein Bollwerk gegen die heidnisch-philosophische⁴¹ und manichäische Leugnung der Menschwerdung Christi aufzustellen⁴². Dennoch blieb die augustinische Reflexion über die Inkarnation Gottes während dieser Frühzeit noch unterentwickelt. Seine Christologie ging nicht über eine Verweisungsfunktion hinaus⁴³.

Ab 390 hat Augustinus jedoch eindeutige Fortschritte in seinem Denken über die Inkarnation erzielt. In seinem antimanichäischen Werk *mor.* I, 19, 36 (CSEL 90, 40, 13/18)⁴⁴ verwendete er die Wörter „suscipere“ und „sacramentum“ in Verbindung mit dem Gegensatzpaar „alter Mensch – neuer Mensch“ zur Qualifizierung der Art und Funktion der Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes: „dicit ergo Paulus radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem, per quam etiam lex uetus primum hominem lapsum significat. monet Paulus, ut exuamus nos ueterem hominem et induamus nouum. uult autem intellegi Adam qui peccauit ueterem hominem, illum autem quem suscepit in sacramento dei filius ad nos liberandos“ („Paulus sagt also, dass die Begierlichkeit der Ursprung allen Übels sei. Nach dem AT bewirkte diese auch den Fall des ersten Menschen. Darum ermahnt uns Paulus, dass wir den alten Mensch ausziehen und den neuen Mensch anziehen sollen. Es soll heißen, dass der alte Mensch Adam sei, der gesündigt hat, und dass der neue Mensch derjenige sei, den der Sohn Gottes auf geheimnisvoller Weise angenommen hat, um uns zu befreien“). Ein-

⁴¹ Vgl. G. MADEC, *Le Christ des païens d'après le „De consensu euangelistarum“ de saint Augustin*, in *RechAug.* 26 (1993), pp. 3-67.

⁴² Vgl. C. P. MAYER, *Die Zeichen in der geistigen Entwicklung und in der Theologie Augustins. II: Die antimanichäische Epoche*, Würzburg, p. 82: „Dem Kenner entgeht es nicht, daß bereits die Frühdialoge gegen die Manichäer konzipiert sind“. So hat Augustinus sein Werk *Acad.* einem gewissen Romanianus, der durch Augustinus Manichäer wurde und den Augustinus nun zur Annahme der christlich katholischen Religion zu bewegen versuchte, gewidmet.

⁴³ Vgl. C. P. MAYER, *Die Zeichen der geistigen Entwicklung und in der Theologie Augustins. II. Teil: Die antimanichäische Epoche*, Würzburg, 1974, p. 202: „Bis dahin erscheint allerdings die Funktion des menschengewordenen Christus schon immer unter dem Aspekt der Verweisung. Das Ziel der Menschwerdung wird der Heimführung der einer materiellen Welt verfallenen Seelen gesehen. Zu diesem Zweck mußte Gott seine auctoritas bis zur Fleischwerdung beugen und sich dem humanum unterwerfen“.

⁴⁴ J. K. COYLE, *Augustine's „De moribus ecclesiae catholicae“*. A Study of the Work, its Composition and its Sources, 1975, p. 73.

deutig wurde hier bereits auf die negative Rolle Adams in der Heilsgeschichte hingewiesen. Der Einfluss des Völkerapostels Paulus ist hier nicht zu verleugnen⁴⁵. Es wird angenommen, dass Augustinus schon vor seiner Bekehrung, d. h. schon während seiner manichäischen Zeit, mit den Schriften des Völkerapostels Paulus in Berührung kam⁴⁶. Eine intensive Beschäftigung mit ihnen geschah jedoch erst in der zweiten Hälfte seines priesterlichen Dienstes⁴⁷. Mit der Festigung der paulinischen Theologie und die daraus resultierende Schärfe und Dichte der Gnadenlehre, wie Augustinus diese in der Auslegung des Röm 9 in *ad Simplicianum* I, 2 von 397⁴⁸ entwickelt hatte, trat zugleich die Dringlichkeit der Menschwerdung Gottes in Jesus Christus zur Rettung der den Sünden verfallenen Menschen noch mehr in den Vordergrund. Deshalb erscheint die Junktur „fides incarnationis“⁴⁹ häufig in den Schriften nach 410. Gegen die pelagianische Christologie, welche die „incarnatio Christi“ lediglich als eine „iustitiae forma non prima, sed maxima“⁵⁰ sah, wurde die *fides* an die Menschwerdung Gottes bei Augustinus zu einem nicht mehr wegzudenkenden Fachbegriff innerhalb seiner Gnadenlehre und zum unverzichtbaren Instrument der Erlösung („necessaria fides incarnationis“)⁵¹ durch Gott, wobei der Anfang des Glaubens bereits auf einen Gnadenakt zurückzuführen ist⁵². Der Glaube hält somit fest, dass Jesus Christus derjenige ist, „qui uenit in similitudine carnis peccati, ut euacuaret corpus peccati“⁵³. Durch den

⁴⁵ Vgl. dazu J. v. d. LOF, *Die Autorität des Apostels Paulus nach Augustin*, in *Aug(L)* 30 (1980), pp. 10-28.

⁴⁶ Vgl. L. C. FERRARI, *Augustine's „Discovery“ of Paul* (Confessions 7.21.27), in *AugStud* 22 (1991), pp. 37-61; M. G. MARA, *Agostino e la polemica antimanichea: il ruolo di Paolo e del suo epistolario*, in *Aug(R)* 32 (1992), pp. 119-143.

⁴⁷ Siehe V. H. DRECOLL, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, Tübingen, 1999, pp. 144f.

⁴⁸ Siehe V. H. DRECOLL, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, Tübingen, 1999, pp. 218-250.

⁴⁹ *z. B. gr. et pecc. or.* II, 28. 31. 32. 37 (CSEL 42, 187. 191. 14. 19/20. 28); *c. Iul imp.* II, 188 (CSEL 85/1, 306, 11); *ep. CLVII*, 14 (CSEL 44, 461, 12. 16); *ep. XCC*, 8 (CSEL 57, 143, 16); *s. CCLXIV*, 5 (PL 38, 1216, 58sq.).

⁵⁰ *c. Iul. imp.* II, 188 (CSEL 85/1, 306, 3sq.).

⁵¹ *s. CCLXIV*, 5 (PL 38, 1217, 15).

⁵² Vgl. D. MARAFIOTI, *Il problema dell' „Initium Fidei“ in sant'Agostino fino al 397*, in *Aug(R)* 21 (1981), pp. 541-565; J. OROZ RETA, *La gracia inicial o el „Initium fidei“ según san Agustín*, in F. VAN FLETEREN – J. C. SCHNAUBELT – J. REINO (eds.), *Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine, Mystic and Mystagogue*, New York 1994, pp. 231-249; T. G. RING, *Der Anfang des Glaubens: Verdienst oder Gnade?*, in *Aug(L)* 54 (2004) (= *Mélanges offerts à T.J. van Bavel à l'occasion de son 80e anniversaire*, Leuven 2004), pp. 177-202.

⁵³ *pecc. mer.* II, 48 (CSEL 60, 118, 23sq.).

Glauben hat sich der Sünder bereits zu einem spirituellen Menschen entwickelt, da er der in den Versuchungen wohnenden Sünde nicht mehr seine Zustimmung gibt. Die Auferstehung des Menschen hat somit hier bereits begonnen, obwohl die leibliche Auferstehung noch aussteht. Denn in diesem *homo spiritalis* hat bereits der Geist des Glaubens, „hoc est incarnationis Christi“ zu regieren angefangen⁵⁴. Diese „fides incarnationis“ wirkt aber auch rückwirkend, so dass die „antiqui iusti“ des AT aufgrund dieser „fides futura“ gerechtfertigt und zu „membris Christi“ gezählt wurden⁵⁵.

Der innere Grund der Menschwerdung Christi.

Augustinus war sich bewusst, dass der innertrinitarische Hervorgang des Wortes dem menschlichen Denken stets ein Geheimnis bleiben wird. Er versuchte daher lediglich darzulegen, dass die Zeugung des Wortes eine trinitarische Pluralität erforderte. Die Menschwerdung Gottes setzte nach Augustinus innertrinitarische Prozessionen voraus. Dies wiederum würde bedeuten, dass das Wesen Gottes nicht monistisch ist; denn Gott ist wesentlich trinitarisch. Deshalb beabsichtigte Augustinus in *De Trinitate* nicht primär, die Einheit in Gott zu beweisen als vielmehr die Gleichheit („aequalitas“) der drei göttlichen Personen aufzuzeigen⁵⁶. Da Gott wesentlich trinitarisch ist, ist der Vater in Bezug auf sich selbst schon immer der Sendende, während der Sohn wesentlich schon immer sendbar ist. Da in Gott alle göttlichen Personen gleich sind, entsprechen sie sich auch willentlich. Darum konnte Augustinus auch von Christus sagen, dass dieser, in der gleichen Weise wie der Vater und der Hl. Geist, sich selbst gesandt hat, insofern er in gleicher Weise Gott ist. Entscheidend für die augustini-sche Theologie war aber die Art und Weise, wie Gott Mensch wurde. Sehr häufig hat Augustinus diesen Vorgang mit den reflexiven Verben wie „se exinanire“, „se humiliare“ oder „se humilis uenire“ beschrie-

⁵⁴ ep. CLVII, 14 (CSEL 44, 462, 9/11): „non diceret eundem spiritum fidei [2 Cor 4,13] nisi admonens etiam antiquos iustos ipsum habuisse spiritum fidei, hoc est incarnationis Christi“.

⁵⁵ gr. et pecc. or. II, 31 (CSEL 42, 191, 20sq.)

⁵⁶ Anders W. GEERLINGS, *Christus Exemplum*, pp. 33.50.51: „Der besondere Nachdruck, den Augustin hier wie in der Trinitätslehre auf den Begriff der Einheit Gottes legt,... Augustins Trinitätslehre nimmt – anders als die der nachnizänische Orthodoxie des Ostens – ihren Ausgangspunkt beim Gedanken der Einheit Gottes... Leitend bei der Ausbildung dieser Trinitätslehre ist für Augustin, wie bereits erwähnt, der Gedanke der Einheit Gottes“. Der Autor sieht seine Meinung in der mangelnden Vertrautheit Augustins mit dem Begriff „Person“ gerechtfertigt.

ben. In der Patristik war man zwar gewohnt, dass dieses Herabkommen des Gottessohnes von den Vätern in „antithetischer Weise“ (z. B. der Zeitlose, Unsichtbare, Unbegreifliche, Leidensunfähige wurde sichtbar und leidensfähig“) beschrieben wurde, so bei Ignatius v. Antiochien⁵⁷, bei Irenäus⁵⁸ oder bei Tertullian⁵⁹. Lediglich bei Augustinus wurde die Annahme des Menschen durch den Sohn Gottes als einen Akt der Demut aufgefasst. Die „humilitas Iesu Christi“ ist also der Oberbegriff für die ganze Heilsgeschichte⁶⁰.

Die soteriologischen Funktionen der Incarnatio Iesu Christi

Während die Menschwerdung Jesu Christi im Gegensatz zum Leiden Jesu Christi in der Theologie des Völkerapostels Paulus keine große Bedeutung spielte, hat Augustinus der Inkarnation Jesu Christi eine wichtige Rolle zugewiesen. Zunächst beobachtete der Bischof von Hippo, dass es innerhalb der synoptischen Evangelien Unstimmigkeiten gab. So liest man im Evangelium des Lukas und Matthäus jeweils eine andere Version bzgl. der Genealogie Jesu Christi. Diese Unstimmigkeit nahmen die Manichäer als einen willkommenen Anlass auf, um auf die Unverzulässigkeit bzw. Korruptheit der Hl. Schrift hinzuweisen. Die Unstimmigkeit des Evangeliums unterstreicht die Richtigkeit ihrer Ablehnung der Menschwerdung Gottes. Augustinus dagegen widerlegte diese Behauptung mit der Erklärung, dass der Unterschied zwischen Lukas und Matthäus in der unterschiedlichen Heilsperspektive liegt. Deshalb widersprachen Lukas und Matthäus sich nicht, so Augustinus weiter. Wenn Matthäus jedoch die Genealogie abwärts („itaque ille descendens significans ad portanda peccata, generationes enumerat“) zählt, also beginnend mit Abraham, und Lukas aber aufwärts („iste autem ascendens significans purgationem peccatorum – non utique suorum, sed nostrorum – ascendens generationes enumerat“)⁶¹, d.h. mit Jesus Christus als Ausgangspunkt, dann wollte ersterer die Heilsgeschichte von oben und letzterer von unter her

⁵⁷ IGNATIUS V. ANTIOCHIEN, *ep. Polyc* III, 3 (*The Apostolic Fathers* II, ed. J. B. LIGHTFOOT, pp. 343 f.).

⁵⁸ IRENÄUS V. LYON, *adv. haer.* VI, 20, 4 (ed. W. W. HARVEY II, p. 216).

⁵⁹ TERTULLIAN, *de carne Christi* V (PL 2, 805-808).

⁶⁰ *diu. qu.* LXIX, 9 (CCL 44A, 193, 199sq.): „sed per humilitatem salui fiunt credentes in eum“; id. LXXX, 2 (CCL 44A, 233, 29/31): „pro nobis dilectionem humilitatis dei qui esse humiliaverit, et quosque humiliaverit exprimens, uerbum carnemque nominavit“.

⁶¹ s. LI, 31 (RB 91, 43, 800/803).

betrachten. Beide haben daher stets die Heilsgeschichte vor Augen. Augustinus war fest davon überzeugt, dass das Evangelium die Menschwerdung Gottes gelehrt hatte. Daran darf man nicht im Geringsten zweifeln. Schließlich kann es ohne die *incarnatio* kein Heil für die Menschen geben.

Im nachfolgenden wollen wir kurz die verschiedenen Heilsfunktionen der Menschwerdung Jesu Christi beschreiben.

Jesus Christus als *mediator Dei et hominum*

Wenn man die wichtigste Funktion der Inkarnation herausstellen will, dann kann man diese in der Mittlerschaft Jesu Christi sehen. Für Augustinus können weder die Engeln noch der Teufel Mittler zwischen Gott und die Menschen sein. Erstere sind rein geistige Wesen und letzterer kann zusätzlich die Gestalt eines Menschen annehmen. Jedoch ist dieser nur Mittler eines zweifachen Todes, nämlich der des Leibes und der Seele. Darum hat der Satan mit den Menschen auch die Unglückseligkeit gemeinsam. Sowohl die Engeln als auch der Teufel befinden sich nicht in der Mitte. Ein Mittler muss daher dem göttlichen und dem menschlichen Bereich gleichermaßen angehören können. So wird deutlich, dass nur Jesus Christus durch die Inkarnation zum „mediator Dei et hominis“ wurde. Hierin liegt die Heilsmöglichkeit für die Menschen überhaupt: „propter incarnationem uerbi Dei, quae pro salute nostra reparanda facta est ut mediator Dei et hominum esset homo Christus Iesus“⁶². Auf die Frage, warum Gott Mensch werden musste, da Gott doch auch allein durch sein Machtwort die Welt befreien könnte, wies Augustinus auf die vollkommene Liebe Gottes für die Welt hin. Und diese Liebe bewegt Gott, so dass er freiwillig Mensch wurde. Nicht also hat es Gott an Möglichkeiten gefehlt, sondern er wollte durch die freiwillige Annahme der „forma serui“ die sündigen Menschen wieder zu „imago Dei“ werden lassen. Für Augustinus kann es außer der Mittlerschaft Jesu Christi daher kein anderes Heil geben⁶³. In diesem Sinne ist der Hl. Geist nicht *media-*

⁶² *trin.* I, 14 (CCL 50, 44, 5/7).

⁶³ *trin.* XIII, 23 (CCL 50, 414, 39/46): „qui enim uictus est homo tantum erat, et ideo uictus est quia superbe deus esse cupiebat; qui autem uicit et homo et deus erat, et ideo sic uicit natus ex uirgine quia deus humiliter, non quomodo alios sanctos regebat illum hominem, sed gerebat. Haec tanta dei dona et si qua alia sunt quae de hac re nobis et quaerere nunc et disserere longum est nisi uerbum caro [Io 1,14] fieret, nulla essent“.

tor, da er nicht Mensch wurde“⁶⁴, obwohl es Häretiker gibt, die Jesus Christus für den Hl. Geist hielten. Nur weil das Wort Gottes Mensch wurde, kann er den der Sünde verfallenden Menschen die Auferstehung der Seele und des Leibes bringen. Der Leib muss am Ende nicht mehr von der Seele zertrennt werden, sondern jener wird am Ende der Tage mit der Seele verwandelt zum „homo spiritualis“, den Augustinus als ein großes Gnadengeschenk betrachtete. Darin sah er die Lösung für den inneren Widerstreit zwischen Geist und Leib, der Augustinus von frühester Zeit an beschäftigt hatte: „So entsteht der geistliche Mensch, der alles richtet, selbst aber von niemand gerichtet wird, der Gott, seinen Herrn, «von ganzem Herzen, von ganzer Seele und von ganzen Gemüte» liebt und auch seinen Nächsten nicht fleischlich, sondern wie sich selbst liebt. Sich selbst aber liebt er geistlich, wenn er mit all dem, was in ihm lebt, Gott liebt“⁶⁵.

Die Menschwerdung und die Gnadenlehre

Augustinus sah also die Inkarnation nicht losgelöst von der von Gott planmäßig zur Ausführung gebrachten zeitlichen „dispensatio ad salutem nostram“⁶⁶. Freilich gibt es verschiedenen „modi“ und Dichte dieser οἰκονομία. Für Augustinus erreichte die Fülle dieser *dispensatio temporalis* in der Herabkunft des Gottessohnes. Die Vereinigung der beiden Naturen betrachtete Augustinus als ein Moment der von Gott den Menschen geschenkten höchsten Gnade⁶⁷, da Gott hier selbst direkt in den Verlauf der Geschichte eingriff, und zwar ohne eine Verwendung anderer Vermittlungsfiguren⁶⁸. Da die Inkarnation also ein zeitliches Heilsgeschehen war, wobei die Menschwerdung zugleich auch dessen Fülle⁶⁹ war, konnte Augustinus auch diese mit der emphatischen Junktur *fides incarnationis temporalis*⁷⁰ gleichsetzen, bewirkt

⁶⁴ *trin* III, 3: „talis non factus est“.

⁶⁵ *uera rel.* XXIV (CCL 32, 202, 22/27): „ita fit homo spiritualis omnia iudicans, ut ipse a nemine iudicetur, diligens dominum deum suum in toto corde, in tota anima, in tota mente et diligens proximum suum non carnaliter, sed tamquam se ipsum. se autem spiritualiter diligit, qui ex toto quod in eo uiuit deum diligit“.

⁶⁶ *ibid.* CX (CCL 32, 257, 61).

⁶⁷ J. LAM CONG QUY, *Die Menschheit Jesu Christi in den Werken des Augustinus, Bischof von Hippo*, Roma, 2007; *id.*, *Incarnatio*, in *AL*, Vol. 3, Basel, 2004ssq., col. 564-568.

⁶⁸ H. MÜLLER – K.-H. SCHWARTE, *Dispensatio*, in *AL*, Vol. 2, Basel, 1996-2002, col.487-498.

⁶⁹ J. LAM CONG QUY, *Hodie*, in *AL*, Vol. 3, Basel, 2004ssq., col. 377-379.

⁷⁰ *qu. eu.* I, 28 (CCL 44B, 23, 23).

der Glaube an die Menschwerdung Gottes doch die Rechtfertigung des Menschen. Wie sah diese enge Beziehung von *dispensatio temporalis* und *fides incarnationis temporalis* konkret aus? Zunächst machte Augustinus eine Unterscheidung zwischen dem *regnum in aeternum* und dem *regnum in tempore* bzw. *nunc*. Ersteres „erit sine fine“, wo „pace perpetua perfruemur“. Da die Menschen jedoch in der Zeit verstrickt sind, ist es unablässig, dass Christus nicht nur *in aeternum* mit seinem Vater herrscht, sondern dass er hier und jetzt („nunc“) schon regieren muss: „... Dementsprechend regiert jetzt der Herr durch die Heilsveranstaltung seines Geheimnisses der Menschwerdung und des Leidens. Als Wort Gottes hat sein Königtum weder ein Ende, einen Anfang noch eine Unterbrechung. Als Mensch jedoch beginnt er in den Gläubigen durch den Glauben an seiner Menschwerdung zu herrschen“⁷¹. Durch den Glauben an seiner Menschwerdung hat Christus also in den Gläubigen zu herrschen angefangen. Nach Augustinus konnte dieses nur erfolgen, wenn Jesus Christus den Stolz der Menschen durch die Demut seiner Menschwerdung bricht. Nur in der demütigen Annahme des Glaubens kann das Heil erreicht werden: „hinc autem euacuauit omnem principatum et omnem potestatem et uirtutem, dum non per claritatem eius, sed per humilitatem salui fiunt credentes in eum“⁷². Die Inkarnation hat nicht etwa den ewigen Plan der *dispensatio* oder gar den Inhalt des Glaubens geändert, sondern sie hat *nominell* und *expliciter* den Glauben ausgerichtet. Für Augustinus bewirkt diesen Glauben an die Menschwerdung damit auch das *meritum fidei*⁷³, das in der Mitauferstehung der in Jesus Christus Verstorbenen sich verwirklichen soll. So werden alle Menschen nicht nur zu *filii dei*, sondern auch zu Miterben Christi. In diesem Sinne hat Paulus auch gelehrt, dass Christus „primogenitus dicitur cum adiunctione fratrum“. Darum konnte Augustinus die *susceptio hominis* auch als *dispensationem incarnationis* auffassen, „per quam non naturaliter filios in adoptionem filiorum uocare dignatus est“⁷⁴. Diese durch die Menschwerdung Christi erfolgte Berufungsgnade durchbricht sozusagen die enge Heilsauffassung des AT und wird anschließend auf allen

⁷¹ *diu. qu.* LXIX, 9 (CCL 44A, 192, 191/196): „secundum quid regnet nunc dominus dispensatione sacramenti sui per incarnationem atque passionem. nam secundum id, quod uerbum dei est, tam sine fine quam sine initio et sine intermissione est regnum eius; secundum id autem quod uerbum caro factum est, coepit regnare in credentibus per fidem incarnationis suae“.

⁷² *ibid.* (CCL 44A, 192, 197/200).

⁷³ *qu. eu.* I, 28 (CCL 44B, 23, 8/10): „id est per meritum fidei, qua creditur filius dei et natus homo et passus propter nos“.

⁷⁴ *exp. prop. Rm.* LVI (CSEL 84, 31, 3sq.).

Menschen übertragen, insofern alle nun zum Heil berufen sind („uocati sunt“). Die endgültige *resurrectio mortuorum* jedoch wird nur den Auserwählten („electi“) gewährt und zwar „secundum propositum“ Gottes: „Wenn es in der Tat vor ihm noch keine Auferstehung gibt, damit niemand mehr zu sterben bräuchte, so gibt es nach ihm die Auferstehung vieler Heiligen, die er ohne Scheu auch Brüder nannte und zwar wegen der gemeinsame Teilhabe an der Menschennatur“⁷⁵. Aber die Inkarnation hat den Weg für die *resurrectio* geebnet.

Wir fassen zusammen: Gott ist also der eigentliche Initiator des Glaubens („initium fidei“), der aber in der Inkarnation, in der Passion und zuletzt in der Auferstehung Jesu Christi sich vollendet.

Den Zusammenhang zwischen der Inkarnation Christi und der Gnade steht somit seit der Abfassung von *exp. prop. Rm.* bereits fest und bleibt auch in den späteren Debatten mit den Pelagianern weitestgehend unverändert: „propter incarnationem uerbi Dei, quae pro salute nostra reparanda facta est ut mediator Dei et hominum esset homo Christus Iesus [1 Tim 2, 5]...“⁷⁶.

Die Menschwerdung und die Schau Gottes

Die gegenseitige Bindung von Menschwerdung und Gnade, wie diese vor allem um ca. 400 erfolgt war, ermöglichte eine sehr konkrete Beschreibung der Gnadenwirkung und verhinderte zugleich eine leere und nutzlose spekulative Betrachtungsweise derselben. Damit richtete Augustinus eine konkrete Speerspitze gegen die platonischen und manichäischen kosmischen Vorstellungen von der Gnade⁷⁷. Die seligmachende Schau Gottes verwirklichte sich bei Augustinus nur durch die individuelle *humanitas Iesu Christi*, las der Kirchenvater doch im NT die Stelle, nach der man nur durch Jesus Christus zum Vater kommen könne. Die Erleuchtung geschah daher nicht durch

⁷⁵ *ibid.* (CSEL 84, 31, 8/11): „resurrectio enim mortuorum, ut iam non moriantur, ante illum nulla, post illum autem multorum sanctorum est, quos fratres non confunditur appellare propter ipsam communicationem humanitatis“.

⁷⁶ *trin.* I, 14 (CCL 50, 44, 5/7).

⁷⁷ In *f. et symb.* VIII warnte Augustinus seinen Lesern vor solche Leute, die aus Furcht vor einer möglichen Vermischung und die dadurch entstehende Kontamination der Reinheit Gottes eine Menschwerdung desselben ablehnten. Dagegen verwies Augustinus stets die historische Realität der Inkarnation. Zum Beweis nannte Augustinus z. B. die Person des Pontius Pilatus.

irgendwelche Illumination eines unbestimmten Lichts in der Seele der Menschen, sondern diese konnte nur durch die Betrachtung der ganzen *humanitas Iesu Christi* erfolgen. So hat Augustinus nicht selten die ihm eigentümliche Redenwendung „per hominem Christum ad deum Christum“ benutzt, so z. B. in der Predigt 261, 1 (SPM 1, 92, 16sq.): „per hominem Christum tendis ad deum Christum“. Ähnlich lesen wir in der *sermo* 293, 7: „sed totus deus et totus homo: deus liberator, homo mediator; ut per illum ad illum, non per alium, nec non ad illum; sed per id quod in illo nos sumus, ad illum per quem facti sumus“⁷⁸. So war die *humilitas Iesu Christi* für Augustinus „uia ad patriam“. Die *communicatio humanitatis Iesu Christi* bereitete die Gläubigen für die definitive Schau Gottes vor, wenn Jesus Christus am Ende der Tage selbst sein Reich, das er durch den Glauben in den Herzen der Menschen errichtet hatte, seinem Vater übergeben wird, wo er gemeinsam mit ihm herrschen wird⁷⁹. Durch die Menschheit Jesu Christi sehen wir Gott zunächst noch durch ein Spiegelbild, aber dann werden wir ihn vollends „facie ad faciem“ erblicken können. Deshalb zitierte Augustinus aus dem NT am meisten die paulinische Stelle 1 Kor 13, 12⁸⁰. Dort wird das Leben vollkommen sein, weil der Mensch dort Gott allein genießen wird. Dort wird man die *summa beatitudo* finden, weil dort *iustitia, pax et gaudium* ist. Dort wird man keinerlei Mangel erleiden. Ja, man wird sicher sein können, dass wir dort Christus ähnlich sein werden.

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⁷⁸ s. CCXCIII, 7 (PL 38, 1332, 47/50).

⁷⁹ J. LAM CONG QUY, *Die Menschheit Jesu Christi und die Gottesschau in Augustins Werk De Trinitate*, in *Aug(L)* 54 (2004), pp. 417-430.

⁸⁰ Insgesamt 105mal kommt diese Stelle dort vor.

THE SENTENCES COMMENTARY OF GERARD OF SIENA, O.E.S.A.: MANUSCRIPTS AND QUESTIONS

Gerard of Siena belongs to the second generation of Augustinian theologians, which included John of Lana of Bologna, Dionysius of Borgo San Sepolcro, and Henry of Friemar the Younger.¹ In his ground-breaking 1956 article on fourteenth-century Augustinian theologians, Damasus Trapp began his account with this generation, skipping over the immediate followers of Giles of Rome, such as James of Viterbo, Henry of Friemar the Elder, Augustine of Ancona and Prosper of Reggio Emilia.² Trapp was selective, examining in succession Dionysius of Borgo, Gerard of Siena, and Michael of Massa, while mentioning others, such as Alexander of San Elpidio, William of Cremona, John of Lana, and James of Pamiers, all of whom figured

¹ Mentioned here and in the following sentence are only those with a sufficient theological œuvre (*Sentences* commentaries and/or quodlibetal or disputed questions), out of a larger group whose opinions are cited or survive in fragments in the collections of others, such as that of Prosper of Reggio Emilia. On Gerard, see D. A. Perini, *Bibliographia Augustiniana*, vol. III (Firenze, 1935), pp. 187-189, which includes references to the older literature; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. II (Paris, 1935), pp. 97-98; D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore," *Augustiniana*, 6 (1956), 146-274, at 160-63, 172-73; D. Pacetti, "Un trattato sulle usure e le restituzione di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, falsamente attribuito a Fr. Gerardo da Siena," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 46 (1953), 448-457; F. Casado, "Gerardo de Sena, ¿representante de ideas agustinianas?" *La Ciudad de Dios*, 166 (1954), 401-411; R. Auber, "Gérard de Sienne," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, XX (1984), cols. 799-801 (biography based on Trapp); J. P. H. Clark, "Authorship in Ms. Balliol College, Oxford, 63," *Analecta Augustiniana* (henceforth cited as AA), 54 (1991), 81-114; O. Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury, according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350* (Leiden, 1992), pp. 549-560; A. Zumkeller, *Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. E. Rotelle (Villanova, PA, 1996), pp. 35-36, 72-73 (translated and revised from Zumkeller, "Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophische-theologische Lehre," AA, 27 (1964), 167-262); C. Schabel, "Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. I, ed. G. R. Evans (Leiden-Boston-Köln, 2002), 221-265, at 249-252; G. Ceccarelli, "'Whatever' Economics: Economic Thought in *Quodlibeta*," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel (Leiden-Boston, 2006), pp. 475-505, at 493-494; C. Schabel and W. J. Courtenay, "Augustinian *Quodlibeta* after Giles of Rome," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel (Leiden-Boston, 2007), pp. 545-568, at 557-562; W. J. Courtenay, "Balliol 63 and Parisian Theology around 1320," in *Vivarium*, 47 (2009), 375-406.

² Trapp, "Augustinian Theology," 160-63, 172-73.

in his narrative. For Trapp Gerard was a theologian of the mid-1320s who, like Dionysius earlier, adhered closely to the views of Giles of Rome, criticized the opinions of Peter Auriol, James of Viterbo, and Alexander of San Elpidio, and was attacked in turn by Michael of Massa, who interested Trapp more. Unlike his treatment of Dionysius of Borgo, Michael of Massa and many of the others discussed in that article, however, Trapp never wrote a separate article on Gerard. The main purpose of the present article is to provide an up-to-date list of manuscripts of Gerard's *Sentences* commentary, a list of those he cited, and a full list of questions.

The picture of Gerard presented by Trapp is the one that has been repeated in subsequent literature. Gerard played a central role in Trapp's narrative of the development of the Augustinian School in the early fourteenth century. Despite the numerous mandates within the Order to adhere to and defend the teaching of Giles of Rome, the Augustinian Hermits, just as with Dominican adherence to Thomas, experienced doctrinal currents that moved in a different direction on various issues, beyond positions associated with the principal doctor of the order. Among those who went beyond Giles, labeled by Trapp as "ultra-Aegidians," Trapp placed James of Viterbo (*sententiarius* c. 1288, DTh 1293) and Alexander of San Elpidio (*sententiarius* 1299-1300; DTh c. 1304). This supposedly led in the next generation to a conflict between those who, in the intensification of debate brought on by the approaches and opinions of John Duns Scotus, Durand of St. Pourçain and Peter Auriol, wished to remain faithful to the teachings of Thomas and Giles, and those who wished to move in a different and newer direction. Among the Augustinian *antiqui* who wished to follow Giles, Trapp placed Dionysius of Borgo and Gerard of Siena. Among the Augustinian *moderni*, or at least those among them he labeled Ultra-Aegidians, Trapp placed James of Viterbo, Alexander of San Elpidio, and Michael of Massa.

In Trapp's narrative this division took on a political dimension in the mid 1320s that enflamed academic rivalry between two Augustinian bachelors of theology from the region of Siena: Gerard of Siena and Michael of Massa. Trapp described Massa as a protégé of Alexander of San Elpidio, who was Prior General from 1312 until his appointment in 1326 as bishop of Melfi. Supposedly it was Alexander who aided in the appointment of Massa as *sententiarius* at Paris for 1325-26. The new Prior General, William of Cremona, allegedly supported closer adherence to Giles and consequently favored Gerard of Siena, who was promoted to the doctorate in the latter half of 1329, while Michael of Massa languished as a mere bachelor of theology until his death in 1337.

As dramatic as this narrative is, its evidential foundation is weak. Although we have a literal *Sentences* commentary by James of Viterbo on all four books along with numerous quodlibetal questions, we have no surviving *Sentences* commentary from either Alexander of San Elpidio or William of Cremona, and only three and a half quodlibetal questions from Alexander and two from William, along with citations to their opinions in Gerard of Siena and others.³ Certainly for William of Cremona that is too little to place him in any particular school or current of thought. And until the citations of Alexander of San Elpidio are assembled and analyzed, which has not yet been done, it is premature to place him as well. Particular difficulties are caused by Trapp's failure to spell out precisely what he meant by "ultra-Aegidian" other than a different approach than that taken by those who wished to follow Giles more closely. Furthermore, as pointed out elsewhere, the role Alexander of San Elpidio supposedly played in the career of Michael of Massa is undercut by the fact that Massa's citation of the opinion of the current Prior General of the Order appears to be a reference to William of Cremona, not to Alexander, as Trapp thought.⁴ And while Trapp dated Gerard's baccalaureate at Paris around 1325, possibly on the grounds that a four-year waiting period between reading the *Sentences* and receiving the license was stipulated in the statutes of the faculty of theology at Paris, a closer examination of the manuscripts of Gerard's questions on the first book of the *Sentences* places his baccalaureate in 1319-1321, not in the middle of the third decade.⁵ This, in turn, affects the supposed parallel between

³ There is only one opinion of William of Cremona cited and rejected by Gerard of Siena (Prol., q. 2, a. 2, on the subject of a science and metaphysics), but opinions of Alexander are cited by Gerard and numerous other Augustinians: Prosper of Reggio Emilia, Dionysius of Borgo, Gerard of Siena, an anonymous Augustinian bachelor in Balliol 63, Michael of Massa, Thomas of Strasbourg, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, and John Hiltalinger of Basel, although several of these later fourteenth-century theologians are simply recycling earlier citations.

⁴ See W. J. Courtenay, "The *Quaestiones in Sententias* of Michael de Massa, OESA. A Redating," *Augustiniana*, 45 (1995), 191-207, at 197-200.

⁵ Gdansk, Biblioteka Gdańska Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Mar. F 199, f. 171r: "Explicit lectura primi libri sententiarum edita a fratre Gerrando (!) de Senis sacre pagine baccellario ordinis sancti Augustini anno domini M^oCCC^oXVIII." Lectures on book I were usually completed in January, which means this date would correspond to 1320 according to the modern calendar. Vat. lat. 4291, f. 79ra: "Explicit lectura primi libri sententiarum edita a fratre Gerardo de Senis, sacre pagine baccellario, ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti augustini. Deo gratias. Anno domini millesimo CCC vicesimo primo." This latter manuscript itself dates after 1329, since on f. 80vb in the same hand as the scribe of the text: "Explicit lectura primi libri sententiarum edita a fratre Gerardo de Senis, sacre pagine baccellario ordinis fratrum eremitarum sancti Augustini. Deo gratias. Nunc magister in theologia."

his biography and that of Michael of Massa that was central to Trapp's narrative.

Gerard's baccalaureate coincides with a particularly active period in the faculty of theology at Paris. Peter Auriol had read the *Sentences* in 1316-1318 and was regent master in 1318-1320. Dionysius of Borgo San Sepolcro read in the following year, 1317-1318 or 1319. In 1318-1319 Henry of Friemar the Younger, O.E.S.A., and Landulph Caracciolo, O.F.M., read the *Sentences*, and those reading in the same year or years as Gerard of Siena were Francis of Marchia, O.F.M., John Baconthorpe, O.Carm., and in the following year (1320-1321) Francis of Meyronnes, O.F.M., and Pierre Roger, O.S.B., the future Pope Clement VI. Although Gerard does not cite his immediate *socii*, he does refer to contemporary theologians active at Paris at the same time as himself or in the previous decade. In fact Gerard's questions on books I and II of the *Sentences* are among the richest sources describing and reacting to the opinions of early fourteenth-century Parisian doctors on a wide array of theological and philosophical topics of interest around 1320, including especially those of Peter Auriol. And thanks to recent work, it appears that Oxford, Balliol College 63 contains a version of certain questions that date back to their original oral presentation, before Gerard undertook the process of editing them for publication.⁶

Almost a decade separates the baccalaureate from the doctoral inception of Gerard of Siena. This was not unusual for Augustinians in this period. A similar hiatus between the baccalaureate and doctorate is evident in the careers of Gregory of Lucca, Augustine of Ancona, John Pagnotta, and John of Rome,⁷ which means one does not have to hypothesize a conspiracy to explain why Michael of Massa was still only a bachelor of theology at the time of his death in 1337. Some of that time Gerard spent preparing his questions for circulation in *ordinatio* form.⁸ While he may have given his lectures in the order I, IV, II, and III, which was common at the time, he was intending to publish them

⁶ Clark, "Authorship," and Courtenay, "Balliol 63".

⁷ Zumkeller, *Theology and History*, p. 15. Pagnotta, who incepted in 1317, was appointed to read the *Sentences* at Paris by the General Chapter at Bologna in 1306 and thus read in 1306-1307 or soon thereafter; AA, 3 (1909), 55; AA, 5 (1913), 205. John of Rome was appointed next in line at the same time but did not incept until 1319; AA, 3 (1909), 54-55; AA, 5 (1913), 205-206.

⁸ Even though the term 'edita' is used, the dates in Gdansk Mar. F 199 and Vat. lat. 4291, 1319 and 1321 respectively, refer to Gerard's reading of the *Sentences*, not to the date of the manuscript or to his completion of the editing process; see above, note 5.

in the traditional order: I, II, III, and IV. He completed the editing of all his questions on book I, but he only got as far as distinction 9 on book II. The only manuscript containing questions from books III and IV, albeit in a pre-edited version, is Oxford, Balliol College 63. The remaining portion of his questions on book II and all of those on books III and IV were never edited for circulation.

Gerard was still a bachelor of theology when he was present at a meeting on March 25, 1327, at which the new Prior General of the Order, William of Cremona, named masters Lanfranc of Milan and Gerard of Bergamo as procurators for the Order in its negotiations with the canons of San Pietro in Ciel d'Oro in Pavia on access to that church and the tomb of St. Augustine.⁹ He was still only a bachelor when he served as definitor for the province of Siena at the General Chapter at Paris in June 1329.¹⁰ During the following academic year, 1329-1330, he became regent master at Paris, presumably having been licensed in the autumn of 1329.¹¹ He was referred to as master when he took part in the General Chapter at Venice in June 1332.¹² The date for his death is given as 1336.

Gerard continued to be cited by Augustinians in the fourteenth century, but not by everyone, and not necessarily favorably. He was cited by Michael of Massa, Thomas of Strasbourg, Alfonsus Vargas, and John Hiltalinger. His fame increased in the fifteenth century, perhaps as a more conservative or traditional theology became dominant in many circles. Gerard's *Questiones in Sententias* was made a textbook in theology for the *studia generalia* of the Augustinian Order at the General Chapter at Pamiers in 1465.¹³ That may explain why several manuscripts of Gerard's *In primum librum Sententiarum* were copied soon thereafter: Angelica 551, Chicago 22, and Siena G.IV.10.

⁹ Perini, *Bibl. August.* III, p. 187.

¹⁰ AA, 4 (1911), p. 81: "frater Girardus de Senis bachelarius diffinitor provincie Senensis".

¹¹ *Livre II des Contrats du Grand Couvent de Paris de l'Ordre des Frères Hermite de S. Augustin* (Paris, Arch. Nat., S/3640), f. 5v, summarizing a document of May 26, 1330 included in Livre I (now lost), ff. 34-35: "F[rère] Andre de Perusio maistre en Théologie de l'ordre saint Augustin, le 26 may 1330 obtient de la faculté de théologie de Paris seize Regents estants assembler a saint Mathurin, F[rère] Gerard de Sienne estant regent de ce cours, que leur bacheleurs Augustines peuvent lire leur sentences sans este obliger de lire un cours de philosophie."; *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols., ed. H. Denifle and É. Châtelain (Paris, 1889-1897), vol. II, p. 339, # 904.

¹² Perini, *Bibl. August.*, III, p. 187.

¹³ AA, 7 (1917-1918), 110.

What is needed is a full study of Gerard, particularly in the context of debates in the period of 1318-1322. Gerard was among the earliest critics of Peter Auriol at Paris alongside Thomas Wylton and others, an equally strong opponent of Durand of St. Pourçain, and one of the major voices in debates at Paris around 1320. As such he is deserving of the in-depth review of his life and works that has been accorded to other Augustinian theologians. The first section of this article will survey the manuscripts, most of which I have examined personally. This will be followed by a list of those cited and a full list of questions for books I and II, along with the chance survival of a few questions from books III and IV. That section will also contain within each question the structure of the article as rubricated in the margins or text of the manuscripts, which will provide a better guide to those cited and the context in which they were being cited.

I. The Manuscripts of Gerard's Commentary on the *Sentences*

Berlin, Staatsbibl., Theol. Fol. 35 (Rose 482), ff. 1ra-179vb [book I], ff. 180ra-180vb [*tabula questionum*], dated 1444 at London.¹⁴

Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, ms. 38, ff. 1ra-76vb [book I, incomplete: through dist. 12, art. 1], 14th cent.¹⁵

Bordeaux, Bibl. mun., ms. 161 (761), ff. 1ra-251vb [book I, incomplete]¹⁶

Chicago, Univ. Library (Regenstein), ms. 22, ff. 1ra-146vb [book I], ff. 147ra-148ra [*tabula questionum*], dated 1466-1469 at Padua.¹⁷

¹⁴ Paper manuscript; f. 180vb: "finitus est iste liber london. in anglia anno 1444 in die francisci per fratrum matheum de prussya." Discription in V. Rose, *Verzeichniss der Lateinischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*, Bd. 2: *Die Handschriften der Kurfürstlichen Bibliothek und der Kurfürstlichen Lande, erste Abteilung* (Berlin, 1901), p. 338.

¹⁵ Parchment manuscript of the 14th century, in *littera parisiensis*, according to *I Codici del Collegio di Spagna di Bologna*, ed. D. Maffei et al. (Milan 1992), pp. 50-51.

¹⁶ Paper manuscript of the late 14th or early 15th century, according to *Catalogue Générale des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques de France. Départements*, vol. 23: *Bordeaux*, ed. C. Couderc (Paris, 1894), pp. 87-88.

¹⁷ E. J. Goodspeed, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Libraries of the University of Chicago* (Chicago, 1912), pp. 20-23. In the course of identifying fly-leaf pages from the earlier binding of Ms. 22 for an address to the Modern Language Association, E. K. Rand collected information on the Bordeaux, Padua, Siena, and Toulouse manuscripts of Gerard's work; his unpublished notes for that lecture are held in Special Collections at the University of Chicago Library.

- Coimbra, Bibl. Univ. 727, ff. 1ra-186vb [book I], ff. 186vb-187vb [tabula questionum]¹⁸
- Gdansk, Biblioteka Gdańska Polskiej Akademii Nauk (formerly Stadtbibliothek), Mar. F 199, ff. 1ra-169vb [book I], ff. 170r-171r [tabula questionum], dated 1319.¹⁹
- Napoli, Bibl. Naz., VII.C.6, ff. 15ra-62vb [book I, incomplete: prologue to dist. 13, quest. 1, art. 3]²⁰
- Napoli, Bibl. Naz., VII.C.8, ff. 7ra-203vb [book I], ff. 1r-5r, 204r-209v [tabula questionum in an early modern hand]²¹
- Oxford, Balliol College 55, ff. 1r-339v [principal sermon and book I], ff. 339v-341r [tabula questionum, incomplete]²²
- Oxford, Balliol College 63, ff. 60ra-66rb [book I, Prol. q. 2, a. 3 & 4; Prol. q. 3, a. 1-4; Prol. q. 4, a. 1 & 3; Prol. q. 5, a. 1 & 6; dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3; dist. 1, q. 3, a. 2 & 3; dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2 & 3; dist. 3, q. 1, a. 1; dist. 3, q. 2, a. 2 & 4; dist. 3, q. 3, a. 4; and a question from book III], ff. 87va-88ra [two questions from book III and two questions from book IV]²³

¹⁸ Noted by V. Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller* (Firenze-Quaracchi, 1954), 33. I am grateful to José Meirinhos of the University of Porto for providing the information on this manuscript, incorrectly identified in the Coimbre catalogue.

¹⁹ Parchment manuscript of the 14th century, according to *Katalog der Danziger Stadtbibliothek*, Vol. V (Danzig, 1921): Otto Günther, ed., *Die Handschriften der Kirchenbibliothek von St. Marien in Danzig*, pt. 5, pp. 187-188. On f. 171r: "Explicit lectura primi libri sententiarum edita a fratre Gerrando (!) de Senis sacre pagine baccalario ordinis sancti Augustini anno domini M^oCCC^oXVIII." If Gerard completed his lectures in January, as would be normal, this date would correspond to 1320 according to the modern calendar. Adolar Zumkeller, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken* (Würzburg, 1966), p. 117, doubted the accuracy of this *explicit* because Gerard was still only a bachelor of theology in 1327 and did not incept until 1329 or 1330. But, as already noted, such a long period as a formed bachelor was not unusual among the Augustinians in this period.

²⁰ Parchment manuscript of the 14th century, double column, in a careful but small hand, without marginal identifications of authors cited; no colored rubrication; space left for initials, but not filled in.

²¹ Paper manuscript of the 15th century, rubricated in alternating red and blue.

²² Parchment manuscript, two-column format and in a careful large hand, bequeathed to Balliol College along with other manuscripts by William Gray, bishop of Ely, after his death in 1478. Thought by R.A.B. Mynors, *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College Oxford* (Oxford 1963), p. 38, to be mid-15th century ("probably written in the Rhineland, during the donor's sojourn in Cologne, A.D. 1442-4"), but it looks more like a mid-to-late 14th century French hand (not German), possibly acquired by Gray while at Padua or elsewhere in Italy after 1444. It appears to be the only manuscript that contains Gerard's principal sermon given before lecturing on book I of the *Sentences*.

²³ For details, see Clark, "Authorship," and Courtenay, "Balliol 63," cited above in note 1.

Padova, Bibl. Univ. 2229, ff. 1ra-160rb [book I], ff. 160rb-161va [*tabula questionum*], 14th cent.²⁴

Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. nouv. acq. 1431, ff. 15ra-175rb [book II, but only through dist. 6, quest. 1, art. 7], ff. 175rb-176rb [*tabula questionum*], 15th cent.²⁵

Perugia, Bibl. Comunale 87 (B 31), ff. 1ra-132vb [book I], 14th cent.²⁶

Rome, Bibl. Angelica 89 (A.8.1), ff. 1ra-197rb [book I], 197rb-198vb [*tabula questionum*], 15th cent.²⁷

Rome, Bibl. Angelica 101 (A.8.13), ff. 1ra-237rb [book I], 237va-239va [*tabula questionum*], with possessor notes on 239v & 240r, late 14th or 15th cent.²⁸

²⁴ Parchment manuscript of the fourteenth century, but written after 1324, since Thomas is cited as 'beatus Thomas' or 'sanctus Thomas'. Double column, rubricated in red and blue, with citations in red in the text. Text faded at beginning and end due to moisture damage. No indication of original provenance or date, nor of author and title of work, except for title of *tabula* on f. 160rb: "Articuli super proemio primi libri sententiarum." Last folio is a palimpsest.

²⁵ The last question is complete and ends on 175rb with: "cum aliis angelis cadentibus non appetit nec appetere potuit per se et directe equalitatem dei." The index of question titles begins immediately on 175rb and lists only those in this manuscript.

²⁶ According to A. Bellucii in Mazzatinti, *Inventari dei Manoscritti delle Biblioteche d'Italia*, vol. 5 (1895), p. 77, it is a parchment manuscript of the 14th century, double column, in a small but legible hand of two scribes; rubricated in red and blue, with opinions identified in the margins.

²⁷ Paper manuscript, double-column format in a small Italian hand.

²⁸ Double-column format on paper, with illuminated initials and some marginal notes in a 16th or 17th century hand. Manuscript dated by Henricus Narducci, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum praeter Graecos et Orientales in Bibliotheca Angelica, olim coenobii sancti Augustini de urbe*, vol. I (Rome, 1893), p. 34, as late 14th cent., but more likely 15th cent. On f. 239va: "Explicit lectura primi libri sententiarum edita fratre Gerardo de Senis sacre pagine bacallario ordinis fratrum hermitarum sancti Augustini. Deo tribuatur honor, laus et gratiarum actio. Hic propter sue doctrine excellentiam mortuus magistratus fuit." This last phrase may be the source from which an early owner of the manuscript, Ambrosius de Cora, believed Gerard died while still a bachelor of theology and was given the title of master by the Order after his death. Ambrosius mentioned the story in his *Chronica*, but Perini, *Bibl. August.* III, p. 187, who repeated the story, acknowledged that Gerard was a master of theology before his death, as did Trapp, "Augustinian Theology," pp. 172-73. At the bottom of f. 239vb are three statements of ownership, all struck through and therefore difficult to read. The earliest reads: "Iste liber est ad usum fratris Ambrosii de Cora, quem emit Parisius dum ibi erat in lectoria." The one immediately above it reads: "Iste liber est fratris Angeli de Cortoio, quem emit Bononi dum ibi predicator? ___ die? octobris? quinque 1446." And the one immediately above that reads: "Iste liber est fratris Pauli de Nepe, quem emit Senis dum ibi erat lector a magistro Angelo de Cortoio, tunc provinciali, octo ducatis largi. 1453 15 julii." According to a note at the end of Siena G.IV. 10, Angelo de Cortoio was still regent at Siena when he died there on June 25, 1467. L. Zdekauer, *Lo studio di Siena nel Rinascimento* (Milan, 1894), assuming that "Fratris Angeli de Cortonio, sacre theologie et divinitatis magistri sublimissimi" in a document of 1364 (p. 144) was the same person mentioned in the *explicit* in Siena

Rome, Bibl. Angelica 338 (C. 8. 6), ff. 1ra-212rb [book I], 212va-213vb [*tabula questionum*, incomplete], 14th cent.

Rome, Bibl. Angelica 551 (F.3.3), ff. 1ra-279vb [book I], 280ra-289ra [*tabula questionum*], dated 1469.²⁹

Rome, Bibl. Angelica 625 (Q.1.12), ff. 1ra-157rb [book II, through dist. 9, art. 9], 15th cent.³⁰

Rome, Bibl. Angelica 920 (R.4.9), ff. 1r-385v [book II, through dist. 9, art. 9], 386r-388v [*tabula questionum*] 17th cent. (1638)³¹

G.IV.10, suggested (p. 146) that the date of his death in the Siena manuscript should be corrected to 1367. The problem with that solution, however, is that Siena G.IV.10 is a fifteenth-century manuscript, and the person who paid for its production, Ugolino de Cortoio, was a student of Angelo, who provided the money and who thus belongs to the mid-fifteenth century. Angelo is presumably identical with the magister Angelus de Cortonio mentioned in *Iuliani de Salem O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus 1451-1459*, ed. D. Gionta (Roma, 1994), pp. 340, 342-43, 346, 351, 359 and in the records of the General Chapter of the Augustinian Order at Pamiers in 1465, when he was designated as third in sequence to be lector at Siena [AA, 7 (1917-1918), 114]. The date of that appointment is consistent with his having died at Siena in 1367 while lector. This also means that Ugolino de Cortoio cannot be Hugolino Zefferini of Cortona, who died in 1367 according to D. Gutiérrez, *The Augustinians in the Middle Ages, 1357-1517* (Villanova, 1983), p. 111, if Zefferini's dates are correct. I am grateful to Karl Gersbach for bringing the Salem register to my attention.

²⁹ This is a double-column luxury edition, 15th cent., on high quality paper, in a clear gothic hand similar to *littera parisiensis*; without marginalia, although a few references to cited opinions are inserted in red in the text. Folio 1r illuminated with crest of Nicolaus Machinensis, bishop of Modruš. On f. 279vb: "Explicit lectura primi libri Sententiarum edita a fratre Gerardo de Senis sacre pagine baccalario, ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini. Scriptum per me Hugonem Leck de Hollandia, Traiecten. dioc., ad instantiam reverendissimi domini N[icolai] episcopi Modrusien. civitatis Asculique gubernatoris anno domini M.CCCC.lxix. decima octave die mensis octobris in die sancti Luce."

³⁰ Parchment ms, probably 15th cent., although catalogue dates it to the 14th cent., from the O.E.S.A. convent in Rimini. Text ends on f. 157ra with dist. 9, art. 9, whose explicit is: "Et per consequens apparet ex omnibus istis quid sit dicendum quantum ad istum articulum. Restat ergo videndum.x." [meaning dist. 10]. Folios 158r-225v was originally a separate manuscript containing on ff. 158ra-208vb Gerard's *Quodlibeta*, with *tabula questionum* on ff. 208vb-209ra; and on ff. 209ra-225ra Gerard's *Tractatus de usuris et de prescriptionibus*, with a list of those questions on f. 225rb. On f. 1r at top: "Ex conventus s[ancti] Joan[nis] Evang[elistae] de Arim[ini] ad usu[m] f[ratris] Sanctis Arim[inensis], sed a magistro Angelo Vancio Arimini Romam missum pro biblioteca s[anctorum] p[atrum] n[ost]rorum Augustini. 1638." This corresponds to a note on f. 1r of Rome, Angelica 920: "Hic liber est Mag[istri] Angeli Vancii Arimini Augustiniani, quem postea anno d[omini] 1638, Romam ipse misit pro Bibliotheca S. P. N. Augustini, impressione dignum." Santos of Rimini may be identical with the Augustinian friar of that name who helped prepare Gerard's questions on book I of the *Sentences* for the Padua edition of 1598: "In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, nunc primum opera Fr. Sanctis [Guicciardii] Ariminensis in lucem editae."

³¹ Also from the Augustinian convent in Rimini. It is a copy of Angelica 625, prepared by or for Angelo Vancio in 1638, before the latter sent Angelica 625 to the convent in Rome.

- Rome, Bibl. Angelica 1088 (S.1.12), ff. 1ra-158vb [book I], 158vb-159vb [*tabula questionum*], 14th cent.³²
- Rome, Bibl. Angelica 1089 (S.1.13), ff. 1ra-136ra [book I], 137ra-vb [*tabula questionum*, incomplete], 14th cent.³³
- Siena, Bibl. Comunale G.IV.10, ff. 1r-144v [book I], 15th cent.³⁴
- Toulouse, Bibl. mun. 251 (III.51), ff. 1ra-133v [book I], 14th cent.³⁵
- Tübingen, Universitätsbibl. Mc. 129, ff. 1r-112v [Prologue], dated 1449.³⁶
- Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Vat. lat. 959, ff. 1ra-166va [book II, through dist. 9, art. 9], 14th cent.
- Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Vat. lat. 4291, ff. 1ra-79ra [book I, incomplete: dist. 8, quest. 3, art. 2 through dist. 48], ff. 79ra-80vb [*tabula questionum*], 14th cent.³⁷
- Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Vat. lat. 10452, ff. 9ra-18vb [book I, fragment: dist. 11, quest. 2, art. 2 through dist. 14, quest. 1, art. 2]
- Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Chig. B.VII.117, ff. 1ra-156r [book I], ff. 156v-157v [*tabula questionum*]

Friedrich Stegmüller listed several other manuscripts that have not been located, possibly as a result of error.³⁸ He listed a manuscript

³² Large formal parchment manuscript, almost certainly 15th century; same explicit as ms. 1089. Like ms. 338, and unlike 1089, ms. 1088 is sparsely rubricated in its last few questions.

³³ Large formal parchment manuscript of late 14th, or more likely 15th century, undated; double column with wide margins; rubricated in margin and text; f. 1r decorated. Explicit of question on dist. 48: "... cupio dissolvi et essentia cum Christo, cui Christo cum suo patre et spiritu sancto sit honor et gloria in secula seculorum, et istius libri benedictus sit possessor. AMEN." Water damaged on beginning and ending folios. Format and spelling 'Auriolus' as 'Oriolus' are similar to the Chicago ms.

³⁴ Paper manuscript, which, according to the hand-written catalogue, concludes, f. 144: "Iste liber est fratris Ugolini de Cortoio, O.S.A., quem ego feci scribere de quibusdam pecuniis dimissis mihi ab egregio sacrarum literarum doctori et preceptori meo magistro Angelo de Cortoio, quem obiit A.D. 1467, die 25 mensis junii, tunc regente Senis."

³⁵ Parchment manuscript of the 14th century.

³⁶ Paper manuscript, single-column format, containing only the prologue questions. I am grateful to Karl Ubl for consulting the manuscript in person.

³⁷ Parchment manuscript in *littera parisiensis*, acquired at Paris by Augustine of Trent, O.E.S.A., who loaned the early quires of the manuscript to Gerard of Padua, O.E.S.A., who did not return them. Vat. lat. 4291, f. 80vb: "Ista lectura est fratris Augustini de Tridento studentis parisius ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini. Principium huius lecture concessi est religio viro fratri Gerardo de Padua, lectori; qui potest recuperare eam recuperet." More important is the colophon on f. 79ra: "Explicit lectura primi libri sententiarum edita a fratre Gerardo de Senis, sacre pagine bacellario, ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti augustini. Deo gratias. Anno domini millesimo CCC vicesimo primo [1321]."

³⁸ F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, vol. I (Würzburg, 1947), pp. 115-116, #255.

from the Ricketts library in Chicago, ms 185 (C I), but the manuscripts from that private collection were sold or dispersed after the death of Mr. Ricketts, and the libraries that possess Ricketts' manuscripts today, such as the Lilly Library at the University of Indiana, do not have possession of or knowledge about that particular manuscript.³⁹ It is possible that it may resurface in the future.

Stegmüller's listing of Orléans, Bibl. mun. 161, is in error. It was not among the manuscripts of Gerard's *In primum librum Sententiarum* listed by Perini.⁴⁰ Orléans 161 is a ninth- or tenth-century copy of Augustine's *Homilies on the Gospel of John*, with some additional tenth-century pieces related to that work. Nothing in the manuscript is later than the tenth century. It is, of course, possible that only the number is incorrect, but a search through the catalogue of manuscripts at Orléans did not reveal any that held or looked as if they might hold all or even portions of Gerard's work.⁴¹

As for Stegmüller's listing of Oxford, Bodleian Libr. 217, presumably containing Gerard's questions on book I of the *Sentences*, Stegmüller probably derived his information from Perini, who described it as "Oxoniensi Cod. 217". Stegmüller interpreted this to mean Bodleian 217, but Gerard's *Questiones* are not found under that number, nor in any other manuscript in that series in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. A search through manuscripts in Oxford colleges with the number 217 also did not locate the manuscript Perini mentioned. Again, it is possible that this manuscript will be located in the future.

As Trapp already noted, the Padua edition of 1598 is not a reliable guide to Gerard's questions of book I, as initially disseminated. Changes have been made in the text, and although Trapp did not notice or mention it, sources cited are sometimes attributed incorrectly. For example, in the Prologue, quest. 5, a. 1, a position attributed in the manuscripts to Peter Auriol is identified in the Padua edition as belonging to Landulph of Caracciolo. Similarly, in Prologue, quest. 5, a. 4, a position identified in the manuscripts as that of Godfrey of Fontaines is attributed to Landulph of Caracciolo in the Padua edition. The printed edition also cites Bonaventure and Simon of Tournai even though these authors are not cited in the manuscripts. Moreover, the wording of passages in the text sometimes differs between the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century manuscripts, and differs again in the

³⁹ I am grateful to David Pavelich of Special Collections at the University of Chicago Library for helping with this search, and to Becky Cape of the Lilly Library for providing this information.

⁴⁰ Perini, *Bibl. August.* III, pp. 187-88.

⁴¹ *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France. Départements*, vol. 12: Orléans, ed. Ch. Cuissard (Paris, 1889).

Padua edition. Consequently, when citing Gerard's work as initially edited and disseminated by Gerard, it is best to use a fourteenth-century manuscript, among which Padua, Univ. 2229, Rome, Angelica 338, and Vatican, Chigi B.VII.117, are particularly good.

The location of opinions of contemporary and earlier scholastic authors cited by Gerard of Siena is provided in the list of questions below, drawn from the rubricated identifications and comments inset into the text or occasionally in the margin. These insets, usually in red, are in the third person and provide a subject heading for each section of a question (called 'articles' in Gerard's structure). In Balliol 63, which contains selected questions from what is probably the earliest version of Gerard's work, authors are named in the text or identified in the margin. In the other manuscripts, which contain the text as edited by Gerard for circulation, even in the earliest of these manuscripts, scholastic authors are cited in the text as "quidam" or a similar pronoun and identified by name in a rubricated inset. If, as Trapp maintained, citations move from the margin into the text in the course of the fourteenth century, the use of insets is already there by 1320.⁴²

To provide an overview of scholastic authors cited by Gerard in his questions on books I and II of the *Sentences*, the following list is included. The form used by Gerard is given brackets, along with the book or books of Gerard's commentary in which they are cited. Although Gerard cites Aristotle, Augustine, Avicenna, and the Commentator [Averroes], the only other pre-thirteenth-century author he mentions is Joachim of Fiore in his attack on the Master of the *Sentences*. Gerard principally opposes the opinions of Auriol, Scotus, Thomas, Henry of Ghent, Durand, Godfrey of Fontaines, James of Viterbo, and Herveus Natalis (in order of frequency), while he favors and defends the arguments of Giles of Rome, whom he sometimes links with Thomas.

Alexander of St. Elpidio de Marchia, O.E.S.A. [Alexander de Marchia; I and II]

Durand of St. Pourçain, O.P. [Durandus; I and II]

Gerard of Bologna, O.Carm. [Carmelita, Gerardus de Carmello; I and II]

Giles of Rome, O.E.S.A. [Egidius; I and II]

Godfrey of Fontaines [Godefredus; I and II]

⁴² D. Trapp, "Hiltalinger's Augustinian Quotations," *Augustiniana*, 4 (1954), 412-449, at 420-21; "Augustinian Theology," 152-55.

Henry of Ghent [Henricus de Gandavo; I and II]
 Henry of Harclay [Henricus Anglicus; I]
 Hervéus Natalis, O.P. [Herveus; I and II]
 James of Viterbo, O.E.S.A. [Jacobus de Viterbio; I and II]
 John Duns Scotus, O.F.M. [Scotus; I and II]
 John of Pouilly [Johannes de Puliaco; I and II]
 Peter Auriol, O.F.M. [Auriolus, Oriolus; I and II]
 Peter of Auvergne [Petrus de Alvernia; I]
 Prepositinus of Cremona [Prepositinus; I and II]
 Robert Cowton, O.F.M. [Coton; I]
 Robert Grosseteste [Lincolniensis; I]
 Thomas Aquinas, O.P. [Thomas, or frater Thomas; I and II]
 William of Cremona, O.E.S.A. [Guillelmus Cremonensis; I]
 William of Ware, O.F.M. [Guarro; I and II]

II. Gerard of Siena, Prologue & Sent. I, dist. 1-48⁴³

A = Rome, Bibl. Angelica 338; C = Chicago, Univ. Libr. 22

◊ = rubricated citations and section titles inserted into the text⁴⁴

Prologus, quest. 1: Utrum cognitio divine veritatis acquisita in theologia possit haberi per scientias a philosophis adinventas. [A 1ra; C 1ra]

art. 1: Utrum omnes scientie speculative intendant unam veritatem. [A 1ra; C 1ra] <Movet dubium contra dictam; movet dubium; instantia contra solutionem; solutio instantie; prima conclusio; secunda conclusio; nota quod de significando non est scientia>

art. 2: Utrum veritas considerata a theologo contineatur sub veritate considerata a metaphysico. [A 3vb; C 3ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; instantia contra dictam; nota queritur non sunt nisi tres scientie [*in margin* reales]; responsio ad questionem; contra Thomam>

⁴³ The wording of the titles of the articles follows that of the text, which differs slightly from the title announced at the beginning of the question or as given in the *tabula questionum*.

⁴⁴ Citations and section titles have also been confirmed in Vatican, Chigi B.VII.117, but to save space the foliation for that manuscript has not been included in the list of questions. In those few instances where a citation in Angelica 338 differs from that found in either the Vatican or Chicago manuscripts (for example, 'Henricus' where 'Herveus' is intended), preference has been given to Angelica, which is earlier than Chicago and found to be more reliable than Chigi.

- art. 3: Utrum de eadem veritate possit considerare theologus et metaphysicus sine etiam quecumque alie scientie diverse, stante diversitate scientiarum. [A 5rb; C 4ra] <Opinio Thome; contra Thomam; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- quest. 2: Utrum veritas theologie contineatur sub obiecto adequato nostre potentie intellective. [A 6vb; C 4vb]
- art. 1: Utrum obiectum adequatum nostri intellectus sit quidditas rei materialis. [A 7ra; C 5ra] <Opinio Thome; contra Thomam; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2: Utrum subiectum metaphysice sit equalis ambitus cum obiecto nostre potentie intellective. [A 8va; C 6ra] <Opinio Guillelmi Cremonensis; contra Guillelmum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3: Utrum deus sub absoluta ratione deitatis sit infinitus, et utrum sub tali ratione sit subiectum in theologia. [A 10ra; C 6vb] <Henricus, quodl. 12, q. 1; opinio domini Egidii; opinio Thome in prima parte; Scotus in scripto; contra Scotum; Henricus, quodl. 12, q. 1; ad rationes Thome; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; ad rationes Thome; contra Scotum>
- art. 4: Utrum veritas quam scimus de deo per theologiam contineatur sub obiecto nostri intellectus. [A 12rb; C 8ra] <Opinio Scoti supra, 3 distinctione in scripto; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; Scotus; contra Scotum; Henricus in summa, q. 3 ar[ticuli] 4, in solutione primi argumenti; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- quest. 3: Utrum cognitio veritatis theologie habeat tantam certitudinem quantum habet cognitio veritatis scientiarum humanitatis inventarum. [A 13vb; C 9ra]
- art. 1: Utrum articuli fidei sint principia istius scientie. [A 13vb; C 9rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2: Utrum certitudo veritatis in ista scientia dependeat a superiori scientia sicut a subalternante. [A 14vb; C 9vb] <Opinio Thome, parte prima, q. 1, a. 1; contra Thomam; instantia contra dicta; Auriolus; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; opinio Egidii>
- art. 3: Utrum certitudo veritatis in ista scientia addat aliquid super certitudinem fidei ratione cuius certitudinis faciat adhesionem fidei firmiorem. [A 16ra; C 10vb] <Auriolus; contra Auriolum; quid

sibi videtur dicendum; Durandus; Auriolus; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 4: Utrum ista scientia habeat tantam certitudinem quantam habent alie scientie humanitus adinvente. [A 17va; C 11vb] <Opinio Guarronis; contra Guarronem; Scotus, libro 3, d. 44; contra Scotum; opinio Henrici de Gandavo; opinio Godfredi; contra Godfredum; movet dubium contra seipsum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

quest. 4: Utrum cognitio veritatis theologicæ compaciatur secum enigma fidei et evidentiam scientie. [A 19ra; C 12va]

art. 1: Utrum fides habeat oppositionem ad scientiam ratione sui enigmatis vel quocumque alio modo. [A 19rb; C 12vb] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; movet instantias contra se; solutio rationum alterius opinionis>

art. 2: Utrum stante lumine fidei sit dare aliud lumen in quo veritates theologicæ scientificæ videantur et cognoscantur. [A 20vb; C 13va] <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum>

art. 3: Utrum deus possit dare viatori scientiam abstractivam de veritate sue essentie que simul staret cum fide, ita quod non traheret viatorem extra statum vie. [A 21vb; C 14rb] <Opinio Scoti in quolibet et in tertio sententiarum; Auriolus contra Scotum⁴⁵; dictum Aurioli de intuitiva et abstractiva; contra Auriolum; primum inconueniens; secundum inconueniens; tertium inconueniens; contra secundum punctum; contra descriptionem Aurioli de intuitive et abstractiva; Herveus contra Scotum; contra Herveum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; opinio Scoti; descriptio intuitive et abstractive secundum propriam opinionem; responsio argumenta>

quest. 5: Utrum cognitio veritatis theologicæ sit finis istius scientie, vel utrum habeat aliquem alium finem. [A 25ra; C 16rb]

art. 1: *title*: Utrum distinctio inter speculativum et practicum sumatur ex obiecto. *text*: Utrum distinctio speculativi a practico sumatur ab obiecto. [A 25rb; C 16rb] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; primus defectus *through* quintus defectus; ponit speculativum et practicum non esse essentielles differentias scientie; Auriolus; contra Auriolum; opinio Godfredi; contra Godfredum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

⁴⁵ Chicago adds: "libro, d. 3, a. 2"

- art. 2: Utrum finis theologie sit speculatio veritatis. [A 29a; C 18vb] <Opinio Henrici; Contra Henricum>
- art. 3: Utrum finis theologie sit praxis vel operatio quod idem est, ac per consequens utrum sit dicenda practica. [A 29vb; C 19ra] <Scotus et plures alii; contra Scotum; Auriolus; contra Auriolum>
- art. 4: Utrum complectatur ambos istos fines, scilicet praxim et speculationem, ac per consequens utrum possit denominari utroque modo, scilicet practica et speculativa. [A 31ra; C19va] <Opinio Thome; contra Thomam; Godfredus; contra Godfredum>
- art. 5: Utrum dilectio sit simpliciter et principaliter finis theologie. [A 31vb; C 20ra] <Opinio Egidii; impugnaciones que fiunt contra Egidium ab aliis; Auriolus; Guarro; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; ad rationes factas contra Egidium>
- art. 6: Utrum talis dilectio debeat reduci ad speculationem vel ad praxim, vel sit collocanda in quodam tertio genere distinctum ab ipsis, et per consequens Utrum sit denominanda dilectiva sive affectiva. [A 33ra; C 21ra] <Egidius; dubitationes contra Egidium; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; Godfredus; solutio ad rationes contrarium contra Egidium>
- Dist. 1, quest. 1: Utrum fruitio sit essentialiter unus actus. [A 34va; C 22ra]
- art. 1: Utrum fruitio sit omnium personarum. [A 34va; C 22ra]
- art. 2: Utrum fruitio sit actus intellectus et voluntatis. [A 35ra; C 22rb] <Modus ponendi Thome in prima secunde, q. xi, ar. 1; contra istum modum ponendi; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3: Utrum fruitio aggreget amorem et dilectionem. [A 35va; C 22vb] <Modus dicendi quorundam; contra istum modum dicendi; quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio quorundam; improbatio solutionis; solutio propria; solutio argumentorum>
- quest. 2: Utrum obiectum fruitionis ordinate et proprie dicte sit unum tantum. [A 36va; C 23va]
- art. 1: Utrum obiectum fruitionis ordinate possit esse aliquod bonum creatum. [A 36vb; C 23vb] <Opinio Avicen.; contra Avicen.>
- art. 2: Utrum voluntas fruatur summo bono immediate vel mediante aliquo alio. [A 37rb; C 24ra] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3: Utrum summum bonum habeat plures rationes fruibiles. [A 38va; C 24vb] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur; solutio argumentorum; solutio Scoti; improbatio dicte solutionis; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

quest. 3: Utrum obiectum fruitionis obiciat se intellectui ad videndum vel cognoscendum eadem ratione sub qua se obicit voluntati ad fruendum. [A 41rb; C 26va]

art. 1: Utrum intellectus et voluntas sint potentie eque immateriales et abstracte. [A 41rb; C 26va]

art. 2: Utrum distinctio actuum sit a potentiis vel ab obiectis. [A 41vb; C 26vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum obiectum fruitionis obiciat se voluntati ad fruendum et intellectui ad videndum sub eadem ratione. [A 42va; C 27rb] <Opinio communis; improbatio opinionis; improbatio secunde opinionis; Opinio Godfredi; improbatio dicte opinionis; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; dubitationes et responsiones>

quest. 4: Utrum obiectum fruitionis possit movere voluntatem ad actum fruendi non movendo intellectum ad actum videndi. [A 44va; C 28va]

art. 1: Utrum fantasia sic habeat essentialem ordinem ad intellectum, sicut intellectus ad voluntatem. [A 44va; C 28vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum iste ordo, qui est in essentia actum intellectus et voluntatis, sit ita essentialis, quod actus voluntatis supponat actum intellectus, quasi sit de intrinseca ratione sui obiecti, puta: Utrum fruitio ita supponat visionem quam sit de intrinseca ratione obiecti fruibilis. [A 45ra; C 29ra] <Opinio quorundam; opinio Henrici; [contra Henricum]; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum de Viterbio; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum in fruitione beata obiectum fruibile possit movere unam istarum potentiarum ad actum suum sine alia. [A 45va; C 29rb] <Opinio Egidii; improbatio Godfredi; opinio Godofredi; improbatio Godefredi contra Egidium; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; solutio Godfredi>

quest. 5: Utrum uti sit necessario distinctus actus ab ipso frui. [A 47va; C 30va]

art. 1: Utrum uti et frui sint actus eiusdem potentie. [A 47vb; C 30vb] <Opinio Thome; expositio Durandi; contra Thomam; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum uti et frui sint idem actus. [A 48ra; C 31ra]

art. 3: Utrum omnia que sunt citra deum sint utilia. [A 48va; C 31vb]

Dist. 2, quest. 1: *Utrum sit tantum unus deus.* [A 48va; C 31rb]

art. 1: *Utrum sit dare unum principium summe malum per cuius participationem omnia alia mala sint mala.* [A 48vb; C 31va]

art. 2: *Utrum principio summe bono quod est deus repugnet plurificari ex ea ratione qua ens independens.* [A 49ra; C 31vb] <Opinio Guarronis; contra Guarronem>

art. 3: *Utrum repugnet sibi plurificari ratione sue perfectionis.* [A 49va; C 32ra] <Instantia contra rationem; remotio instantie; Scotus; contra Scotum>

art. 4: *Utrum repugnet esse plures deos ratione perfectionis et ordinis universi.* [A 50vb; C 33ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; instantia contra rationes; solutio instantie; instantia contra rationem; solutio instantie>

quest. 2: *Utrum cum unitate divine essentie stet pluralitas perfectionum attributalium.* [A 52ra; C 34ra]

art. 1: *Utrum perfectiones attributales acceptas per suas proprias et intrinsecas rationes realiter sint distincte.* [A 52rb; C 34ra] <Modus dicendi Henrici; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum.⁴⁶>

art. 2: *Utrum pluralitas istarum perfectionum sit in deo realiter circumscripta omni operatione intellectus.* [A 53ra; C 34va] <Opinio Scoti; improbatio que fit contra istam opinionem;⁴⁷ solutio rationum que fiunt contra Scotum; solutio prime rationis; solutio secunde rationis; solutio tertie rationis; solutio 4; solutio 5; improbatio solutionum;⁴⁸ contra Scotum; solutio ad rationes Scoti>

art. 3: *Utrum ista distinctio attributorum secundum rationem sit concepta et sumpta ab intra vel ab extra.* [A 56rb; C 37rb] <Opinio Henrici de Gandavo; contra Henricum; opinio magistri Alexandri de Marchia, primo quodl., q.2; contra Alexandrum;⁴⁹ opinio Godfredi; contra Godfredum; opinio fratris Thome et fratris Egidii; quid sibi videtur dicendum; movet dubia contra dicta; solutio rationum principalium>

⁴⁶ Chicago adds: "opinio Orioli"

⁴⁷ Chicago adds: "ratio Aura."

⁴⁸ Chicago adds: "solutio Got."

⁴⁹ Only in Chicago. Angelica 338, in text, reads: "ista opinio satis mihi placeret si ego possem capere"

quest. 3: Utrum cum unitate essentie stet pluralitas personarum. [A 59va; C 39vb]

art. 1: Utrum suppositum et natura in rebus creatis ita sint⁵⁰ adequata quod unum non possit plurificari sine altero. [A 59vb; C 39vb]

art. 2: Utrum divina supposita vel divine persone distinguantur realiter, ita quod sint plures res. [A 60ra; C 40rb]

art. 3: Utrum ista realis pluralitas personarum repugnet unitati trinitatis.⁵¹ [A 60rb; C 40rb] <[Scotus in] scriptis; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes principales>

Dist. 3, quest. 1: Utrum deus cognoscatur a nobis aliquo communi conceptu cum creaturis. [A 61vb; C 41va]

art. 1: Utrum ratio entis dicta de deo et creaturis sit una communis ratio. [A 62ra; C 41va] <Scotus in scripto super d. 3 et super 8; contra Scotum>

art. 2: Utrum, dato quod ens non habeat aliquam unam rationem determinatam secundum quam dicatur univoce, habeat unum communem conceptum. [A 63ra; C 42va] <Opinio Petri Aureoli; contra Auriolum>

art. 3: Utrum ens in sua latitudine habeat plures rationes et plures conceptus. [A 64ra; C 43ra] <Opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; modus Cotonis; contra Cottonem; contra Jacobum de Viterbio et contra opinionem communem>

art. 4: Utrum deus concipiatur a nobis in aliquo conceptu commune cum creaturis. [A 64va; C 43va]

quest. 2: Utrum deus sit primum cognitum ab intellectu nostro. [A 66rb; C 44vb]

art. 1: Utrum deus sit a nobis primo cognitum. [A 66va; C 45ra] <Henricus de Gandavo in summa q. 7 ar[ticuli] 24 [mss: 30]>

art. 2: Utrum cognoscamus de deo in via quid est. [A 57rb; C 45va] <Opinio Egidii; rationes que fiunt contra Egidium; confirmatio conclusionis Egidii et quid sibi videtur dicendum⁵²>

art. 3: Utrum deum esse sit per se notum. [A 68ra; C 46ra] <Opinio Thome in prima parte; contra Thomam; opinio Henrici in

⁵⁰ Vat. Chigi, f. 42rb, and 1598 edition have 'sit'.

⁵¹ Padua Univ. 2229, f. 46rb, and Chicago 22, 40rb, read: "Utrum talis pluralitas personarum repugnet unitati divine essentie".

⁵² "Contra Godefredum" in Balliol 63 and in margin of Angelica 338.

summa, q. 2 ar[ticuli] 22; contra Henricum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio fratris Egidii; declaratio opinionis Egidii et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 4: Utrum deum esse possit demonstrari. [A 69rb; C 47ra] <Opinio Henrici de Gandavo in summa q. 4 articuli 22; contra Henricum; opinio Egidii; declaratio opinionis Egidii et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

quest. 3: Utrum, dato quod primum cognitum ab intellectu nostro non sit deus, utrum sit aliquod universale. [A 69vb; C 47rb]

art. 1: Utrum primum cognitum ab intellectu nostro sit aliqua species specialissima in mente et abstracta ab individuís. [A 780ra; C 47va] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; solutio ad rationes opinionis>

art. 2: Utrum de ratione universalis sit esse abstractum ab hic et nunc. [A 70ra; C 47vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum universale sit ens rationis vel ens reale. [A 71va; C 48va] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 4: Utrum primum cognitum ab intellectu nostro sit aliquod universale. [A 72va; C 49rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

quest. 4: Utrum trinitas personarum in deo representetur in creatura tam per vestigium quam per ymaginem. [A 73va; C 50ra]

art. 1: In quo differat representatio trinitatis per vestigium ab ea que est per ymaginem. [A 73va; C 50ra] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum partes vestigii sint distincte inter se realiter vel sola ratione. [A 74va; C 50va] <Scotus; contra Scotum; opinio Petri Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum partes imaginis sint in anima realiter distincte. [A 75rb; C 51ra] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; Godofredus; contra Godfredum>

art. 4: Utrum per ymaginem que est in anima nostra possit demonstrari trinitas personarum. [A 77rb; C 52va] <Auriolus; contra Auriolum>

Dist. 4, quest. 1: Utrum in divinis sit vera generatio. [A 77vb; C 52vb]

art. 1: Utrum vera generatio secundum quod reperitur in creaturis sit vera actio de genere actionis. [A 77vb; C 52vb] <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; opinio propria>

- art. 2: Quot conditiones sunt necessario requisite ad veram generationem.⁵³ [A 78rb; C 53rb]
- art. 3: Utrum in divinis sit vera generatio que sit de genere actionis. [A 78vb; C 53va] <Scotus; quid sibi videtur dicendum; Egidius; contra probationem aliorum⁵⁴>
- Dist. 5, quest. 1: Utrum divina essentia sit generans. [A 81rb; C 54va]
- art. 1: Utrum actus, qui debetur supposito hic in creaturis, possit attribui ipsi forme. [A 81rb; C 54va]
- art. 2: Utrum duobus existentibus idem possit aliquid attribui uni quod non attribuat alteri. [A 81vb; C 54vb] <Opinio quorundam; improbatio quam facit Egidius; quid sibi videtur dicendum; remotio duorum dubiorum>
- art. 3: Utrum actus generationis possit attribui essentie divine eam denominando ita quod dicatur generationis. [A 82ra; C 55vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; prima dubitatio contra dictam; solutio; contra solutionem; solutio Scoti; contra solutionem Scoti; solvit ipse; opinio Henrici in summa, q. 3 articuli 58 [mss: 54]; contra solutionem Henrici; solvit ipse alio modo; solutio ad argumenta principalia>
- quest. 2: Utrum divina essentia sit formalis terminus generationis. [A 83ra; C 56rb]
- art. 1: Utrum divina essentia generetur aliquomodo sive per se sive per accidens. [A 83ra; C 56va] <Controversia que fuit inter Magistrum et abba Johachum; opinio quorundum; contra dictam opinionem et quid sibi videtur dicendum; instantia contra solutionem>
- art. 2: Utrum divina essentia sit formalis terminus generationis. [A 84ra; C 57ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; remotio dubitationum>
- quest. 3: Utrum divina essentia sit subiectum generationis. [A 85ra; C 57va]
- art. 1: Primo est videndum que et quod sunt de ratione subiecti. [A 85ra; C 57vb]

⁵³ The manuscripts add "secundum quod de ea determinat Philosophus," which in the edition reads "secundum mentem Aristotelis".

⁵⁴ Chicago adds: "solutio ad argumenta contra Durandi".

art. 2: Utrum subiectum [generationis] et terminus possint coincidere in idem re. [A 85rb; C 57vb] <Dubitatio contra dictam; solutio dubitationis>

art. 3: Utrum divina essentia sit subiectum generationis. [A 85vb; C 58rb] <Opinio Henrici in summa sua, q. 3 articuli 58 [mss: 14]; contra Henricum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum et quid sibi videtur dicendum; dubitationes>

quest. 4, art. 1: Utrum filius generetur de substantia patris. [A 88va; C 60rb] <Ratio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 6, quest. 1: Utrum pater generet filium naturali necessitate. [A 89rb; C 60vb]

art. 1: Utrum generare in patre sit ita naturale quod precedat intelligere et velle. [A 89va; C 61ra] <Opinio Scoti et plurium aliorum; contra Scotum et alios qui videntur tenere dictam opinionem; opinio aliorum opposita; improbatio istius opinionis; quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationem duarum opinionum precedentium; solutio rationum secunde opinionis>

art. 2: Utrum in deo sit aliquis modus necessitatis respectu istius actus. [A 92ra; C 62vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum secundum conclusionem>

quest. 2: Utrum pater generet filium voluntate. [A 92rb; C 63ra]

art. 1: Utrum pater generet filium volens. [A 92vb; C 63rb] <Opinio quorundam; contra prefatam opinionem; solutio ad rationes prefate opiniones>

art. 2: Utrum voluntas concurret in generatione filii in ratione principii. [C 63rb; announced, but not a separate article in Angelica 338]

Dist. 7, quest. 1: Utrum potentia generandi in deo sit aliquid absolutum. [A 93va; C 64ra]

art. 1: Primo videndum est designatio nominis 'potentia'. [A 93va; C 64ra] <Auriolus; contra Auriolum et quid sibi videtur dicendum; Scotus; contra Scotum; frater Egidius; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum potentia generandi sit in deo patre. [A 94va; C 64va] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum, et quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>

art. 3: *Utrum talis potentia dicat aliquid absolutum*. [A 96ra; C 65va]
 <Opinio antiqua quorundam; Scotus contra istam opinionem;
 contra Scotum quod rationes sue non concludant; alie rationes
 quas facit ipse contra opinionem prefatam; opinio Thome in
 quolibet [de potentia dei]; Durandus; contra opinionem
 Thome; opinio Henrici in summa, q. 4 articuli 39; Scotus con-
 tra Henricum; solutio rationum Scoti quas facit contra Hen-
 ricum; contra Henricum alie rationes quas facit ipse; opinio
 Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis
 Egidii; solutio ad rationes aliarum opinionum; solutio Scoti;
 contra solutionem Scoti; solutio Durandi; contra solutionem
 Durandi; ad rationes secunde opinionis; ad rationes tertie opin-
 ionis; ad rationes quarte opinionis; ad rationes quinte opinio-
 nis>

Dist. 8, quest. 1: *Utrum in deo sit aliqua realis compositio*. [A 100ra;
 C 68rb]

art. 1: *Utrum sit compositus ex materia et forma*. [A 100rb; C 68rb]
 <Ymaginatio plurium; contra dictam ymaginationem et quid
 sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: *Utrum sit compositus ex partibus quantitativis*. [A 101rb;
 C 69ra] <Dubitatio; una responsio; solutio Commentatoris;
 instantia Thome contra Commentatorem; alia solutio Thome;
 contra Thomam>

art. 3: *Utrum componatur alicui sicut substantia accidenti*. [A 102rb;
 C 69va]

art. 4: *Utrum componatur cum aliquo sicut motor cum mobili*. [A 102va;
 C 69vb] <Opinio plurium; contra dictam opinionem et quid sibi
 videtur dicendum>

art. 5: *Utrum deus componatur cum universo*. [A 103va; C 70rb]

quest. 2: *Utrum in deo sit aliqua compositio secundum rationem*. [A 104ra;
 C 70vb]

art. 1: *Utrum compositio generis et differentie sit in intellectu intelli-
 gente vel in re intellecta*. [A 104rb; C 70vb] <Opinio plurium;
 contra dictam opinionem; opinio alia; contra istam opinionem;
 quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: *Utrum repugnet deo quod de ipso habeamus duos conceptus,
 unum confusum, alterum determinatum*. [A 106va; C 72rb]
 <Opinio quorundam; procedit contra dictam opinionem tenendo
 viam communem; instantia contra probationem; Scotus; contra

- Scotum; alia instantia; solutio aliorum; contra dictam solutionem; solutio quam dat ipse>
- art. 3: Utrum circa deum possimus componere veram enunciationem. [A 108rb; C 73rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 4: Utrum possimus componere circa deum verum ordinem syllogisticum. [A 108vb; C 73vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- quest. 3: Utrum anima sit ita simplex quod possit esse in toto corpore et in suis partibus sine aliqua sui extensione et divisione. [A 109rb; c 74ra]
- art. 1: Utrum quolibet substantia corporalis animata vel inanimata habeat esse corporeum in genere substantie per suam formam substantialem. [A 109rb; C 74ra] <Opinio Avicen.; contra Avicen.; quid sibi videtur dicendum iuxta intentionem Commentatoris; modus dicendi plurium qui non possunt vitare difficultatem de extensione anime intellective; modus dicendi proprius secundum quem vitat difficultatem de extensione anime intellective; prima dubitatio contra dictam; solutio>
- art. 2: Utrum quolibet alia anima ab anima intellectiva extendatur cum corpore. [A 111rb; C 75va] <Opinio Thome; contra opinionem Thome; quid sibi videtur dicendum; ratio Egidii; impugnatio quorundam contra Egidium; declaratio rationis Egidii; solutio rationum que fiebant contra Egidium; prima dubitatio contra dictam; solutio; solutio ad rationes que erant pro opinio Thome>
- art. 3: Utrum anima intellectiva sit ita simplex quod nullo modo extendatur in corpore. [A 113ra; C 76vb] <Opinio Girardi de Carmello; contra Girardum de Carmello; quid sibi videtur dicendum; responsio ad rationes alterius opinionis>
- Dist. 9, quest. 1: Utrum generatio in divinis distinguat filium a patre. [A 114ra; C 77va]
- art. 1: Utrum generatio in divinis sit assimilativa vel distinctiva, et si utrumque illorum sibi competat, utrum prius sibi competat assimilare quam distinguere, vel econtrario. [A 114ra; C 77vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2: Utrum filius per generationem sic distinguatur a patre quod sit alius ab eo, quasi specificè vel quasi numeraliter. [A 114rb; C 78ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; rationes aliorum contra dictam conclusionem; rationes quorundam ad dictas rationes ac etiam earum in probationes; quid sibi videtur dicendum ad dictas rationes>

- quest. 2: Utrum sit aliquis ordo inter patrem et filium in divinis.
[A 115va; C 78vb]
- art. 1: Utrum inter patrem et filium sit aliquis ordo. [A 115va; C 78vb]
- art. 2: Utrum, concesso tali ordine, sit necessarium concedere quod pater sit prior filio. [A 115vb; C 79ra:] <Opinio Scoti cum rationibus eorum qui eam sequuntur; contra dictam opinionem et quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Dist. 10, quest. 1: Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat per modum voluntatis. [A 118ra; C 80va]
- art. 1: Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat ut amor per modum voluntatis. [A 118ra; C 80vb] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio communis; Scotus declarat opinionem communem; contra Scotum; Henricus declarat opinionem communem; contra Henricum; Egidii declarantis opinionem communem; Durandus contra Egidium; declaratio et confirmatio opinionis Egidii; Auriolus contra dicta; ratio Aurioli; contra Auriolum>
- art. 2: Utrum, concesso tali modo procedendi, possimus salvare quod divina natura communicetur spiritui sancto. [A 121rb; C 83ra] <Henricus ubi supra; contra Henricum; Scotus ubi supra; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3: Utrum possimus salvare quod productio sancti spiritus sit necessaria, non obstante quod ipsius principium est voluntas. [A 121vb; C 83va] <Henricus ibidem; contra Henricum; Scotus; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; primum dubium; secundum dubium>
- Dist. 11, quest. 1: Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a filio. [A 122rb; C 84ra]
- art. 1: Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a filio. [A 122va; C 84ra] <Ratio Egidii; impugnatio quam facit Auriolus; contra impugnationem Aurioli; impugnatio prefate rationis; remotio prefate rationis>
- art. 2: Utrum, concesso quod procederet a filio, distingueretur ab eo duplici relatione. [A 124ra; C 85ra] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Henrici, quodl. 5, q. 9; contra Henricum>
- quest. 2: Utrum, si spiritus sanctus non procedat a filio, distinguitur ab eo. [A 125va; C 86ra]
- art. 1: Utrum sit per se et essentielle, in primo modo dicendi per se, ipsi sancto spiritui, quod procedat a filio. [A 125va; C 86rb]

<Opinio plurium; contra dictam opinionem, et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum eodem modo sit essenziale et per se filium spirare spiritum sanctum, vel sit hoc ei quasi adventitium et accidentale. [A 126rb; C 86va] <Petrus Auriolus; contra Petrum Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>

art. 3: text: Utrum spiritus sanctus distingueretur a filio, dato quod ab eo non procederet. [A 127ra; C 87rb] <Opinio quarundam contra Egidium; opinio Thome in prima parte, quest. 36, art. 2, et Egidius in primo lib., 11 dist., et God[efredus], 3 quodl.; ponit rationes eorum sustentando eas contra impugnationes; opinio Henrici, quodl. 5, q. 9, et Scoti; Henricus; Auriolus; contra Auriolum et quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>

Dist. 12, quest. 1: Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a patre et filio. [A 129vb; C 89rb]

art. 1: Utrum concordia et mutuitas amoris sit de intrinseca ratione voluntatis, prout est principium productivum spiritus sancti. [A 130ra; C 89va] <Opinio Henrici; Scotus contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum contra opinionem Henrici; quid sibi videtur dicendum contra opinionem Scoti; postmittit aliqua ad id quod intendit dicere; quid sibi videtur dicendum ad principale quesitum; solutio ad rationes Henrici et Scoti>

art. 2: Utrum, hoc concesso, sequatur quod pater et filius spirent spiritum sanctum in quantum plures vel in quantum unum. [A 132vb; C 91rb] <Opinio Henrici; opinio Scoti; contra Henricum; contra Scotum; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

art. 3: Utrum ex hoc ulterius sequatur quod sint plures spiratores. [A 133rb; C 91vb] <Thomas in prima parte; Scotus concordans cum Thoma in questione; contra conclusionem Thome et Scoti; contra modum ponendi Scoti specialiter; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

Dist. 13, quest. 1: Utrum processio spiritus sancti et generatio filii sint processiones distincte realiter et alterius rationis. [A 134ra; C 92rb]

art. 1: Utrum processio spiritus sancti et generatio filii distinguantur ex terminis. [A 134ra; C 92rb] <Opinio quorundam; instantie facte ab aliis contra dictam opinionem; contra dictas instantias>

- art. 2: Utrum prefate processiones distinguantur ex suis principiis. [A 134vb; C 92vb] <Opinio Henrici, quodl. 5, q. 1,⁵⁵ contra Henricum>
- art. 3: Utrum dicte processiones distinguantur seipsis. [A 135ra; C 93ra] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum>
- art. 4: Utrum dicte processiones distinguantur penes supposita producta a quibus sunt, vel penes supposita producta in quibus existunt, vel quocumque alio modo. [A 136ra; C 93va] <Opinio Thome; contra Thomam; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; solvit quedam dubia ex quorum solutione apparet quid sibi videtur dicendum de distinctione intellectus et voluntatis in deo; responsio ad motiva aliarum opinionum>
- Dist. 14, quest. 1: Utrum sit gemina processio spiritus sancti, scilicet eterna et temporalis. [A 137vb; C 94vb]
- art. 1: Utrum spiritus sanctus procedat temporaliter. [A 137vb; C 94vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum secundum communem viam.>
- art. 2: Utrum in tali processione temporali donetur ipsemet spiritus sanctus vel solum donum sue gratie. [A 138rb; C 95rb] <tenet communem viam>
- art. 3: Utrum in collatione talium donorum sic geminetur processio spiritus sancti quod sint due processiones distincte per quas spiritus sanctus acquirat duo distincta esse. [A 138va; C 95rb] <Opinio communis; contra opinionem communem; quid sibi videtur decendum>
- Dist. 15, quest. 1: Utrum missio sit communis toti trinitati. [A 139ra; C 95va]
- art. 1: Quid sit missio et quomodo ponenda etiam in divinis est videntum. [A 139ra; C 95vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum iuxta communem viam>
- art. 2: Utrum missio sit quid essenziale vel quid notionale. [A 139rb; C 95vb]
- art. 3: Utrum quilibet persona mittat seipsam. [A 139va; C 96ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum non obstantibus modis dicendi aliorum>

⁵⁵ Angelica 338 has only "opinio Henrici, q. 1," while Chicago 22 has "opinio Henrici, q[uodl.] 5, q. 1," which corresponds to Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VI, q. 1.

art. 4: Utrum missio filii separetur a missione spiritus sancti. [A 139va; C 96rb]

Dist. 16, quest. 1: Utrum in divinis sit dare missionem visibilem. [A 140ra; C 96rb]

art. 1: Quid sit missio visibilis, et quale differat visibilis missio spiritus sancti a filii missione. [A 140ra; C 96rb]

art. 2: Utrum missio visibilis spiritus sancti debuerit fieri quocumque tempore et quibuscumque personis. [A 140rb; C 96va]

art. 3: Utrum ille species in quibus spiritus sanctus apparuit super christum et super apostolos fuerint vere res. [A 140va; C 96vb]

Dist. 17, quest. 1: Utrum caritas sit habitus creatus in anima necessarius ad eliciendum actum meritorium et ad dandum esse gratuitum. [A 140vb; C 97ra]

art. 1: Utrum opinio Magistri de spiritu sancto sit sustinenda. [A 141ra; C 97ra] <Modus dicendi domini Egidii; Durandus contra Egidium; contra Durandum et pro Egidio; responsiones Thome, secunda secunde, q. 23, ar. 2>

art. 2: Utrum actus dilectionis meritorius possit elici a voluntate sine habitu caritatis creato. [A 141vb; C 97va] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; Durandus; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum esse gratuitum, quod videtur esse actus primus, possit haberi sine habitu caritatis creato. [A 143ra; C 98va] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Thome, prima secunde, q. 110, ar. 1; Auriolus; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

quest. 2: Utrum caritas possit augeri. [A 144rb; C 99va]

art. 1: Utrum caritas augeatur per extentionem unius gradus perfectioris de potentia alterius [gradus] imperfectioris. [A 144vb; C 99vb] <Opinio Henrici, 12 quodl., q. 6 [mss: 4]; contra Henricum>

art. 2: Utrum [caritas] augeatur per inductionem gradus posterioris et corruptionem prioris. [A 145ra; C 100ra] <Opinio Godefredi; contra Godefredum>

art. 3: Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem alicuius gradus, qui sit caritas addita ad gradum precedentem. [A 145vb; C 100va] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum>

art. 4: Utrum caritas augeatur per aliquem gradum vel realitatem, que sit tamen caritas. [A 146va; C 101ra] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum>

- art. 5: Utrum caritas augeatur per aliquam realitatem, que sit eius pars materialis. [A 147va; C 101vb] <Opinio Guarronis; contra Guarronem>
- art. 6: Utrum caritas augeatur per aliquam realitatem, que sit eius gradus individualis. [A 148ra; C 102ra] <Opinio quorundam; contra dictam opinionem>
- art. 7: Utrum [caritas] augeatur in sua essentia. [A 148va; C 102rb] <Opinio communis; contra opinionem communem; opinio Thome, secunda secunde; contra modum ponendi Thome; contra Durandum; solutio ad rationes que erant pro contraria parte>
- art. 8: Utrum caritas augeatur per aliquem modum quantitativum intrinsecum sue essentie. [A 149vb; C 103rb] <Opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum de Viterbio>
- art. 9: Utrum caritas augeatur secundum esse, quod dat subiecto. [A 150rb; C 103vb] <Opinio Egidii cum suo modo ponendi et cum suis rationibus; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; inconvenientia que inducuntur a quibusdam contra fundamentum opinionis Egidii; responsio ad illa inconvenientia que inducuntur contra Egidium; opinio de modis quos ponit Egidius; rationes que fiunt specialiter contra conclusionem fratris Egidii; solutio ad rationes>
- art. 10: Utrum caritas possit augeri in infinitum. [A 152rb; C 105rb] <Opinio Thome in scripto et in secundo sententiarum; contra opinionem Thome; opinio Egidii; instantia quem quidam faciunt contra Egidium; dubia contra conclusionem principalem questionis; solutio que datur communiter ad illud dubium; instantia contra solutionem; solvit ipse alterius; solutio communis; solvit ille alterius>
- art. 11: Utrum caritas possit minui. [A 154ra; C 106va] <Opinio Godefredi et Petri de Alvernia; rationes alie quas superaddit pro ista opinione; contra Godefredum et Petrum de Alvernia; opinio contraria in qua plures concordant; confirmat conclusionem per alias rationes; solutio ad rationes alterius>
- Dist. 18, quest. 1: Utrum illud quod significatur nomine 'doni' in divinis sit quid essenziale. [A 155va; C 107va]
- art. 1: Utrum nomen 'doni' significet quid essenziale. [A 155vb; C 107vb] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; modus dicendi Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>
- art. 2: Utrum illud quod significatur per istud nomen conveniat solum spiritui sancto. [A 156rb; C 108ra] <Durandus; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 19, quest. 1: Utrum divine persone sint equales. [A 156vb; C 108rb]

art. 1: Utrum divine persone sint equales. [A 156vb; C 108va] <Responsio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum ad primum dubium; remotio secundi dubii; remotio tertii dubii; responsio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum ad quartum dubium>

art. 2: Utrum una divina persona sit in alia. [A 157vb; C 109rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Henrici in summa; contra Henricum; opinio Thome et Egidii; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum divine persone sint partes essentielles vel integrales unius essentie. [A 159vb; C 110va] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; Durandus; contra Durandum et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

quest. 2: Utrum sit dare aliquam veritatem preter veritatem divinam. [A 160va; C 111rb]

art. 1: Utrum veritas sit formaliter in rebus secundum esse quod habent extra animam. [A 161ra; C 111va] <Opinio Thome in prima parte; quid sibi videtur dicendum; dubitatio contra dictam; solutio dubitationis>

art. 2: Utrum veritas sit formaliter in intellectu. [A 161va; C 112ra] <Opinio Egidii in primo sententiarum et in 4 quodlibet; Godefredus, secundo quodlibet; impugnatio quam facit Durandus; declaratio Egidii; solutio ad rationes Durandi>

art. 3: Utrum veritas sit formaliter in rebus secundum esse cognitum et abstractum quod habunt. [A 162ra; C 112rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 4: Utrum veritas sit formaliter aliquid consequens vel derelictum circa res intellectas ex nostro modo intelligendi eas. [A 163ra; C 113ra] <Opinio Henrici et Durandi; contra Henricum et Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; dubitationes contra dictam; solutio prime dubitationis; solutio secundi dubitationis; solutio tertii dubitationis; probat hic quod enunciatio non dicat aliquam naturam positivam; conclusio istius articuli; conclusio totius principalis questionis>

Dist. 20, quest. 1: Utrum filius sit equalis patri in potentia. [A 164vb; C 114rb]

art. 1: Utrum posse generare contineatur sub omnipotentia patris. [A 164vb; C 114va] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio

Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Thome in prima parte; contra Thomam; opinio Egidii in primo suo; Scotus contra Egidium; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; solutio ad rationes Scoti quas faciebat contra Egidium>
 art. 2: Utrum contineatur sub omnipotentia filii. [A 166ra; C 115rb] <Opinio Egidii; Scotus contra Egidium; Auriolus contra Egidium; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; solutio ad rationes Scoti quas facit contra Egidium; solutio ad rationes Aurioli que erant contra Egidium>

Dist. 21, quest. 1: Utrum dictio exclusiva addita patri excludat filium vel econverso. [A 166vb; C 115vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 22, quest. 1: Utrum deus possit a nobis viatoribus nominari aliquo nomine significante suam essentiam. [A 167va; C 116rb]

art. 1: Utrum possimus nominare deum aliquo nomine imo significante suam essentiam. [A 167va; C 116rb] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; responsio ad motiva Scoti; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Henrici in summa; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; ponit unam distinctionem cum duabus conclusionibus; conclusio totius articuli>

art. 2: Utrum possimus deum nominare pluribus nominibus que non sint synonyma. [A 169rb; C 117va] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 23, quest. 1:

art. 1: Utrum nomen 'persone' vel quodcumque aliud nomen vel ponatur ad significandum intentionem rei intellecte vel ipsam rem intellectam. [A 170ra; C 118ra] <Auriolus; contra Auriolum;⁵⁶ quid sibi videtur dicendum; dubium contra se et solvit; solutio primi dubii; solutio secundi; solutio tertii; conclusio principalis cum quatuor rationibus>

art. 2: Utrum prima intentio et secunda cadant super ea[n]dem rem intellectam. [A 171ra; C 118vb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum nomen 'persone' sit nomen prime vel secunde intentionis. [A 172ra; C 119rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Henrici in summa; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum >

⁵⁶ Chicago 22 has 'Durandus' and 'contra Durandum'.

Dist. 24, quest. 1:

art. 1: Utrum in deo sit unitas. [A 172vb; C 120ra]

art. 2: Utrum unitas in deo vel in quocumque alio ente dicat privativum vel aliquid positivum. [A 173ra; C 120rb] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum et quid sibi videtur dicendum; ponit unam distinctionem de prima conclusione ex qua postea solvit rationes contrarie opinionis; solvit ad rationes Scoti; ex hiis que dicta sunt arguit contra opinionem Avicen. de uno quod convertitur cum ente>

art. 3: Utrum unum, quod est principium numeri, sit idem cum uno quod convertitur cum ente. [A 174ra; C 120vb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; solutio ad rationes opinionis; contra dictam opinionem; opinio Thome; Herveus et Durandus declarantes opinionem Thome; contra opinionem Thome et contra Herveum et Durandum sustentantes dictam opinionem; opinio Egidii; rationes quas faciunt Durandus et Herveus contra Egidium; declaratio opinionis Egidii; confirmatio prime conclusionis; confirmatio secunde conclusionis; confirmatio tertie conclusionis; solutio ad rationes Hervei et Durandi contra Egidium>

quest. 2: Utrum in deo sit aliquis numerus. [A 176va; C 122vb]

art. 1: Utrum numerus quod est multitudo transcendens sit in deo. [A 176va; C 122vb] <Opinio Thome in prima parte, quest. 30, art. 3; contra Thomam; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; dubitatio utilis>

Dist. 25, quest. 1: Utrum plurificetur in divinis cum dico '3 personas'. [A 177rb; C 123ra]

art. 1: Utrum illud quod significatur nomine 'persone' sive in divinis sive in creaturis sit aliquod commune abstrahibile ab eis. [A 177rb; C 123rb] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum nomen 'persone' significet determinate substantiam vel relationem. [A 177vb; C 123va] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Hervei; contra Herveum; opinio Thome in prima parte, q. 30, ar. 4; contra Thomam; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; dubitatio contra opinionem; solutio eiusdem>

Dist. 26, quest. 1: Utrum divine persone habeant aliquas proprietates per quas constituentur in esse personali et distinguantur ab invicem. [A 178vb; C 124rb]

- art. 1: Utrum divine persone habeant aliquas proprietates per quas constituentur in suo esse personali et ab invicem distinguantur. [A 178vb; C 124rb] <Opinio Prepositini; contra Prepositinum>
- art. 2: Utrum tales proprietates per quas constituuntur et distinguuntur sint aliqui modi absoluti. [A 179rb; C 124va] <Opinio Lincolniensis. [text: quedam opinio antiqua]; contra opinionem Lincolniensem; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>
- art. 3: Utrum dicte proprietates sint relative. [A 180ra; C 125ra] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Thome in prima parte, q. 40, ar. 2, in solutione ultimi argumenti; contra Thomam; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 4: Utrum cum tribus suppositis relativis possit stare aliquod suppositum absolutum. [A 180vb; C 125va] <Opinio quedam antiqua; impugnatio dicte opinionis, que sit a pluribus; quid sibi videtur dicendum contra dictam opinionem>
- Dist. 27, quest. 1: Utrum verbum mentis nostre habeat aliquam similitudinem cum verbo increato. [A 181rb; C 126ra]
- art. 1: Utrum verbum mentis nostre sit ipsamet res intellecta. [A 181va; C 126rb] <Opinio Petri de Alvernia; contra Petrum de Alvernia; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum>
- art. 2: Utrum verbum mentis nostre sit aliquid inherens intellectui existens in eo subjective, sicut species vel sicut actus vel sicut conceptus formatus per actum. [A 182ra; C 126va] <Opinio quorundam; contra dictam opinionem; opinio Godefredi; opinio Scoti; contra Godfredum et Scotum; opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; opinio Thome et Egidii; intellectus opinionis quam dat Herveus et plures alii; contra intellectum quem dat Herveus et plures alii ad prefatam opinionem; quid sibi videtur dicendum quantum ad opinionem Thome et Egidii, premittendo quedam ad intellectum dicte opinionis; ponit quatuor conclusiones, quarum due superius sunt probate; probatio tertie conclusionis; probatio quarti conclusionis>
- art. 3: Utrum verbum in divinis dicatur tantum notionaliter. [A 183vb; C 127vb] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum>
- Dist. 28, quest. 1: Utrum innascibilitas in divinis dicat aliquam rationem positivam. [A 184va; C 128rb]
- art. 1: Utrum innascibilitas in divinis dicat aliquam rationem positivam. [A 184va; C 128rb] <Opinio quorundam; contra dictam opinionem>

art. 2: Utrum illa ratio que importatur nomine 'innascibilitatis' fundetur super essentiam vel super aliquam personam. [A 184vb; C 128va] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Hervei; contra Herveum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum innascibilitas sit proprietas constitutiva persone patris. [A 185va; C 129ra] <Opinio quorundam; contra istam opinionem et confirmationem opinionis communis>

Dist. 29, quest. 1: Utrum hoc nomen 'principium' dicatur secundum unam rationem de principio divinarum personarum et de principio creaturarum. [A 185vb; C 129rb]

art. 1: Utrum hoc nomen 'principium' dicatur de principio divinarum personarum et principio creaturarum secundum unam rationem. [A 186ra; C 129rb] <Opinio Henrici anglici; contra Henricum anglicum; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Egidii quam sequuntur [mss: sequitur] Scotus et plures alii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

art. 2: Utrum principium filii, quod est generatio activa [A: actio], et principium spiritus sancti, quod est activa spiratio, realiter distinguantur. [A 186vb; C 129vb] <Opinio quorundam; contra dictam opinionem; modus dicendi contra Thomam; Egidius contra Thomam; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

Dist. 30, quest. 1: Utrum tales relationes dicte de deo ex tempore sint reales. [A 187va; C 130rb]

art. 1: Utrum relationes dicte de deo temporaliter sint reales. [A 187vb; C 130va] <Opinio Jacobi de Viterbio in quodlibet de predicamentis, q. 14; contra Jacobum de Viterbio; opinio communis; Durandus; contra Durandum; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Henrici, quodl. [I]X, q. 1; contra Henricum; opinio Thome in prima parte et in scripto; expositio dicte opinionis quam facit Herveus; contra opinionem Thome et expositionem Hervei; opinio fratris Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum, dato quod relationes dei ad creaturam non sint reales, sint in deo secundum rationem. [A 189va; C 131va] <Opinio Henrici, quodl. 9, [q. 1]; contra Henricum; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio ubi supra; contra Jacobum de Viterbio; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 31, quest. 1: Utrum equalitas et similitudo sint nomina relationum realium. [A 189vb; C 131vb]

- art. 1: Utrum ydemptitas sit relatio rationis. [A 189vb; C 132ra] <Opinio quorundam; contra dictam opinionem>
- art. 2: Utrum similitudo et equalitas in creaturis fundentur super unitate specifica. [A 190rb; C 132rb] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3: Utrum similitudo et equalitas sint relationes reales in deo vel dicatur solum privative. [A 190va; C 132va] <Opinio Jacobi de Viterbio quam etiam sequitur Scotus; contra Jacobum et contra Scotum; opinio Egidii; Durandus contra Egidium; contra Durandum et solutio ad rationes quas facit; confirmatio conclusionis principalis quam tenet Egidius; solutio ad rationes opinionis>

Dist. 32, quest. 1: Utrum pater et filius se diligant spiritu sancto. [A 191rb; C 133ra]⁵⁷ <Opinio quorundam, contra dictam opinionem; opinio Aurioli, contra Auriolum; opinio Thome et expositio Hervei; contra Herveum; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; solutio secundi dubii dat Egidius; Herveus contra Egidium; confirmatio vie Egidii; solutio tertii dubii et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 33, quest. 1: Utrum proprietates relative sint idem quod essentia. [A 192rb; C 133va]

- art. 1: Utrum aliqua relatio sit in creaturis que sit verum ens reale. [A 192rb; C 133vb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum et quid sibi videtur ad istum articulum; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>
- art. 2: Utrum talis relatio, que supponatur esse vera res extra animam, sit realiter distincta a suo fundamento vel sit idem realiter cum eo. [A 193va; C 134va] <Opinio Godefredi et Scoti et aliorum; contra Godefredum et Scotum; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum; opinio Thome et Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Thome et Egidii; expositio istius opinionis sicut sibi videtur>
- art. 3: Utrum, stante ydemptitate reali inter relationem et fundamentum, possit sustineri quod relatio constituat distinctum predica-

⁵⁷ The printed edition lists three articles here: art. 1: In qua habitudine constituitur ablatus cum dicitur 'pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto'; art. 2: Utrum diligere accipiat in proposito essentialiter vel notionaliter; art. 3: Utrum magis concedenda sit ista 'pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto' quam ista 'pater sapit se, vel intelligit se, verbo'. In the manuscripts it is all one question.

- mentum a suo fundamento. [A 194vb; C 135va] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; prima conclusio istius articuli>
- quest. 2: Utrum proprietates personales sint relationes reales distincte aliquo modo ab essentia. [A 195rb; C 136ra]
- art. 1: Utrum proprietates personales sint relationes reales. [A 195va; C 136ra] <Dubia contra conclusionem; solutio ad prefata dubia; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; opinio Egidii>
- art. 2: Utrum dicte proprietates relative sint distincte ab essentia realiter. [A 195vb; C 136rb] <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum>
- art. 3: Utrum inter essentiam et proprietates relativas sit aliqua non-ydemptitas quantum ad earum proprias rationes formales. [A 196rb; C 136vb] <Opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; opinio Scoti; contra Jacobum et contra Scotum; contra Scotum specialiter tria inconvenientia; expositio quam quidam faciunt de opinione Scoti; contra dictam expositionem>
- art. 4: Utrum inter essentiam et proprietates relativas sit aliqua non-ydemptitas secundum proprias earum unitates et indivisiones. [A 197rb; C 137rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum>
- art. 5: Utrum inter essentiam et proprietates relativas sit ponenda necessario aliqua distinctio rationis. [A 198ra; C 137vb] <Opinio Thome; opinio Hervei; contra Herveum; quid sibi videtur [dicendum] et premititur ibi duos modis ydemptitatis; ex duplici ydemptitate concludit dupliciter distinctionem rationis; ostendit quod est una distinctio rationis que equivalet distinctioni reali; dubia contra conclusionem; solutio ad dubium; solutio ad rationes Durandi; solutio ad rationes Jacobi; solutio ad rationes Scoti>
- quest. 3: Utrum proprietates relative sint idem quod origines. [A 200ra; C 139rb]
- art. 1: Utrum proprietates relative sint idem quod origines. [A 200rb; C 139rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2: Utrum dicte proprietates constituent personas inquantum origines vel inquantum proprietates relative. [A 200vb; C 139va] <[Opinio] Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur [dicendum]>
- art. 3: Utrum abstractis proprietatibus relativis per intellectum remaneant persone constitute. [A 201rb; C 140ra]

Dist. 34, quest. 1: *Utrum persona sit ita simplex sicut essentia.* [A 201rb; C 140ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum iuxta illud quod dixit in precedentibus>

Dist. 35, quest. 1:

art. 1: *Utrum deus habeat scientiam de hiis que sunt extra se.* [A 201vb; C 140rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur [dicendum]>

art. 2: *Utrum cognoscat ea que sunt extra se distincte.* [A 202vb; C 141ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: *Utrum cognoscat singularia.* [A 203ra; C 141rb] <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Thome; contra Thomam; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

Dist. 36, quest.: *Utrum in deo sint ydee.* [A 203vb; C 141vb]

art. 1: *Utrum in deo sint ydee.* [A 204ra; C 141vb] <Opinio Scoti et Petri de Alvernia; contra Scotum et Petrum de Alvernia; opinio Johanni de Puliaco; contra Johannem de Puliaco; opinio Thome et Egidii; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: *Utrum inter ydeas sit aliqua distinctio.* [A 204va; C 142rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: *Utrum ydee in deo sint principium cognoscendi vel operandi.* [A 204vb; C 142va] <Opinio Thome; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

Dist. 37, quest.: *Utrum deus sit ubique.* [A 205ra; C 142va]

art. 1: *Utrum deus sit ubique.* [A 205ra; C 142va] <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: *Utrum convenienter assignentur illi tres modi essendi generales qui deo attribuuntur, videlicet per essentiam, presentiam, et potentiam.* [A 205rb; C 142vb] <quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 38, quest.: *Utrum futura contingentia in divina essentia immutabiliter represententur.* [A 205vb; C 143ra]

art. 1: *Utrum futura contingentia in divina essentia immutabiliter represententur.* [A 205vb; C 143ra] <Opinio quorundam; improbatio quam facit Scotus; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: *Utrum futura contingentia in divina essentia immutabiliter representata sint divino intellectui presentia.* [A 206rb; C 143rb]

<Opinio Gothofredi; contra dictam opinionem; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Thome et Egidii; impugnatio que fit ab aliis contra istam opinionem; confirmatio opinionis Thome et Egidii; dubitatio contra conclusionem; solutio dubitationis>

Dist. 39, quest.: Utrum divina providentia ad omnia se extendat. [A 207rb; C 143vb]

art. 1: Utrum divina providentia ad omnia se extendat. [A 207rb; C 143vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum divina providentia sit idem quod fatum. [A 207va; C 144rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 40, quest.: Utrum deo conveniat aliquos predestinare et aliquos reprobari. [A 207vb; C 144rb]

art. 1: Utrum deo conveniat aliquos predestinare et aliquos reprobari. [A 207vb; C 144rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum predestinatus necessario et infallibiliter salvetur et reprobatus necessario et infallibiliter damnetur. [A 208rb; C 144va] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 41, quest.: Utrum sit aliquod meritum predestinationis et reprobationis, et ideo quero: Utrum predestinatio habeat aliquam causam. [A 208va; C 144vb]

art. 1: Utrum possit reddi ex parte nostra aliqua causa ipsius predestinationis. [A 208va; C 144vb]

art. 2: Utrum predestinatio possit haberi per nostra bona opera vel per preces sanctorum. [A 209rb; C 145ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 42, quest.: Utrum in deo sit potentia. [A 209rb; C 145rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 43, quest.: Utrum deus sit omnipotens. [A 209vb; C 145rb]

art. 1: Utrum deus sit omnipotens. [A 209vb; C 145rb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum deus secundum suam omnipotentiam agat ex necessitate nature. [A 210ra; C 145va] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3: Utrum agat ex necessitate iustitie. [A 210rb; C 145va] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 44, quest.: Utrum deus possit facere universum melius quam fecit. [A 210va; C 145vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 45, quest.: Utrum divina voluntas convenienter distinguatur in voluntatem signi et beneplaciti. [A 210vb; C 146ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 46, quest.: Utrum voluntas dei sit ita efficax quod semper necessario impleatur. [A 211ra; C 146ra] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Dist. 47, quest.: Utrum illud quod sit contra voluntatem dei uno modo sit secundum eius voluntatem alio modo. [A 211va; C 146rb]

art. 1: Utrum illud quod sit contra voluntatem dei antecedentem obsequatur voluntati consequenti. [A 211va; C 146rb] <Opinio plurium; contra istam opinionem; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2: Utrum illud quod est contra voluntatem dei quocumque modo possit cadere sub precepto. [A 211vb; C 146va] <Opinio Egidii; Herveus⁵⁸ contra Egidium; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>

Dist. 48, quest.: Utrum voluntas nostra debeat esse conformis voluntati divine. [A 212ra; C 146vb] <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

III. Gerard of Siena, Sent. II, dist. 1-9⁵⁹

A = Rome, Bibl. Angelica 625; P = Paris, BN, nouv. acq. lat. 1431;

V = Vat. lat. 959⁶⁰

<> = rubricated citations and section titles inserted into the text

Sent II, dist. 1, quest. 1 [A 1ra; P 15ra; V 1ra]: Circa primam distinctionem secundi libri in qua agitur de creaturarum productione in generali quero primo: Utrum universitas creature habet

⁵⁸ 'Henricus' in Angelica 1089.

⁵⁹ Again, the wording of the titles of the articles follows that of the text, which differs slightly from the title announced at the beginning of the question or as given in the *tabula questionum* in the manuscripts.

⁶⁰ It is possible that Vat. lat. 959 is a copy of Angelica 625 or a similar manuscript, since some remarks that are in the margin in Angelica 625 are in the text in Vat. lat. 959.

aliquod necesse esse ex se formaliter in quo a deo creante non dependeat.

- art. 1 [A 1rb; P 15 rb; V 1rb]: Utrum universitas creature ante actum sue creationis habuerit ex se formaliter esse intelligibile obiectivum per quod divine intelligentie obiceretur. <Opinio Aurioli, contra Auriolum; communis opinio; contra communem opinionem; quid sibi videtur dicendum; prima conclusio; secunda conclusio; tertia conclusio; quarta conclusio; quinta conclusio; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio communis; quomodo discordat ab opinione communi et ab opinione Aurioli>
- art. 2 [A 5vb; P 22rb; V 6ra]: Utrum universitas creature ante actum sue creationis habuerit ex se formaliter aliquod esse cognoscibile possibile terminativum ad quod respectus divine potentie productive terminaretur. <Opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; Alexander de Marchia [San Elpidio]; contra Jacobum et Alexandrum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3 [A 8va; P 25vb; V 9ra]: Utrum universitas creature ante actum sue creationis habuerit in se formaliter verum esse essentie constitutivum per quod in determinato genere et determinata specie constitueretur. <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Sent. II, dist. 1, q. 2 [A 9va; P 27ra; V 10rb]: Supposito quod universitas creature nullum habet esse in quo a deo creante non dependeat, utrum dependeat ab eo in aliquo genere vere causalitatis.
- art. 1 [A 10ra; P 27vb; V 10vb]: Utrum universitas creature dependeat a deo sicut a vera causa finali amata et desiderata. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2 [A 10vb; P 29ra; V 11vb]: Utrum dependentia a deo sicut a causa finali sit idem quod inclinatio ipsius in deum, et ex hoc ipso utrum deus sit causa finalis creature quod terminus dicte sue inclinationis. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3 [A 12rb; P 31ra; V 13va]: Utrum universitas creature dependeat a deo sicut a vera causa efficiente. <Opinio Durandi, Carmelite et Johannis de Puliaco, Aurioli et plurium aliorum; Herveus contra Gerardum carmelitam et contra omnes qui tenent prefatam opinionem; contra Aureolum et Gerardum carmelitam; contra Herveum;⁶¹ quid sibi videtur dicendum>

⁶¹ Chicago: 'Henricum'.

art. 4 [A 15va; P 36ra; V 17va]: Utrum universitas creature dependeat a deo sicut a vera causa formali mensurante et in esse conservante. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 5 [A 16va; P 37rb; V 18va]: Utrum sit eadem dependentia qua universitas creature dependet a deo sicut a vera causa efficiente et qua dependet ab eodem sicut a vera forma conservante.

Sent. II, dist. 1, q. 3 [A 17ra; P 38ra; V 19ra]: Supposito ex precedentibus quod universitas creature a deo dependeat sicut a causa efficiente et conservante secundum viam philosophorum, utrum possit demonstrari quod fuerit producta ab eterno vel ex tempore.

art. 1 [A 17rb; P 38va; V 19va]: Utrum sint aliquae rationes Aristotelis vel Commentatoris ad probandum universalis creature eternitatem ita efficaces, quod non appareat earum solutio huiusmodi in puris naturalibus constituto vel utrum omnes tales rationes ex puris naturalibus possint solvi. <Opinio Aristotelis et Commentatoris; quid sibi videtur dicendum; ad rationes Aristotelis et Commentatoris>

art. 2 [A 20rb; P 42rb; V 22va]: Utrum repugnet universitati creature quod sit eterna ratione infiniti temporis preteriti. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum et quid sibi videtur dicendum; ad rationes contrarie opinionis>

art. 3 [A 21vb; P 44rb; V 24rb]: Utrum repugnet universitati creature quod sit eterna ex eo quod producta a deo in diversitate substantie. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 4 [A 23rb; P 46va; V 26ra]: Utrum universitati creature repugnet quod sit eterna ex eo quod producta a deo libere et contingenter. <Contra Henricum [et] plures alii; Auriolus contra Henricum, tenens opinionem contrariam; contra Auriolum; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 5 [A 24rb; P 47va; V 26vb]: Utrum repugnet universitati creature quod sit ab eterno ex eo quod producta de nihilo, sive quod idem est, utrum productio de nihilo, que a theologis appellatur creatio, fuerit possibilis ab eterno. <Auriolus; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Sent. II, dist. 1, q. 4 [A 25rb; P 48vb; V 27vb]: Utrum creatio secundum quod nominat productionem de nihilo fuerit possibilis ex tempore.

art. 1 [A 25va; P 49va; V 28ra]: Utrum creatio sive productio de nihilo includat repugnantiam contradictionis propter quam

- videatur non fuisse possibilis ex tempore. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2 [A 27ra; P 51rb; V 29va]: Utrum possibilitas creationis arguat necessario in re creata realem differentiam inter esse et essentiam.⁶² <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Henrici de Gandavo; contra Henricum; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum de Viterbio; opinio Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>
- art. 3 [A 29vb; P 54va; V 32va]: Utrum possibilitas creationis arguat quod necessario creantem virtutem infiniti vigoris. <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum >
- art. 4 [A 31rb; P 56va; V 34ra]: Utrum deum esse infinite virtutis in vigore sit possibile demonstrari per aliquam viam que non procedat, supposita possibilitate creationis vel quibusdam aliis que sunt fidei, et utrum Aristoteles hoc demonstraverit in 8 physicorum. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Sent. II, dist. 1, q. 5 [A 33ra; P 58vb; V 36ra]: Utrum creatio sit extra deum aliqua res de aliquo determinato genere.
- art. 1 [A 33va; P 59rb; V 36rb]: Utrum creatio sit vera actio de genere actionis. <Contra Thomam; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2 [A 34va; P 60va; V 37va]: Utrum actio transiens de genere actionis sit in agente, ac per consequens, utrum creatio actio sit in deo creante. <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>
- art. 3 [A 37ra; P 63rb; V 39vb]: Utrum vera actio transiens de genere actionis semper fundetur in motu, ac per consequens, utrum creatio ex hoc ipso quod est actio de genere actionis ad extra necessario sit quedam mutatio. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum>
- art. 4 [A 38rb; P 64vb; V 41rb]: Utrum actio et passio prout faciunt distincta genera sint unus motus, ac per consequens, utrum creatio actio et creatio passio sint una mutatio vel unus actus. <[Opinio] Gothefredi et plurium aliorum; contra Gothofredum; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 5 [A 39vb; P 66va; V 42vb]: Utrum creatio sit idem realiter unus actus quod creatura, vel utrum addat aliquid super rem creatam. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

⁶² Article edited by David Gutiérrez, "Magistri Gerardi Senensis O.E.S.A. († 1336) articulus de reali distinctione inter esse et essentiam," *Analecta Augustiniana*, 21 (1947), 266-281.

- art. 6 [A 41va; P 69ra; V 44va]: Utrum creatio sit idem quod conservatio. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum; alia opinio antiqua plurium; contra istam opinionem; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta; conclusio quinta; conclusio sexta; solutio ad rationes Aurioli>
- Sent. II, dist. 2, q. 1 [A 43vb; P 71vb; V 46vb]: Utrum angeli fuerint creati sub aliqua durationis mensura.
- art. 1 [A 44va; P 72va; V 47va]: Utrum angeli in sui creatione acceperint aliquam durationem propter quam sit necessario ponenda aliqua durationis mensura preter tempus. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2 [A 45va; P 73vb; V 48va]: Utrum tempus sit idem quod motus. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes precedentes>
- art. 3 [A 47rb; P 75vb; V 50ra]: Utrum tempus sit successio motus. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 4 [A 48ra; P 77rb; V 50vb]: Utrum tempus sit numerus motus. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Oriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 5 [A 49rb; P 78va; V 52ra]: Utrum tempus sit numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. <quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 6 [A 50vb; P 80rb; V 53va]: Utrum tempus sit numerus in rerum natura circumscripto actu anime numerantis. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; prima dubitatio; secunda dubitatio; solutio ad secundam dubitationem>
- art. 7 [A 52rb; P 81vb; V 55ra]: Utrum tempus sit numerus numeratus. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 8 [A 53rb; P 83ra; V 56ra]: Utrum tempus sit numerus fundatus in solo motu primi mobilis. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio fratris Jacobi de Viterbio [mss: Egidii de Viterbio]; contra Jacobum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 9 [A 55vb; P 85vb; V 58vb]: Utrum tempus sit mensura omnium temporalium immediate per seipsum vel mediante suo 'nunc'. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 10 [A 56va; P 86vb; V 59va]: Utrum 'nunc' temporis sequatur ita mutatum esse sicut tempus sequitur motum. <Opinio Egidii; contra Egidium; declaratio opinionis Egidii et quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>

- art. 11 [A 59rb; P 89vb; V 62va]: Utrum sit unum 'nunc' in toto tempore. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Sent. II, dist. 2, q. 2 [A 60vb; P 91rb; V 64ra]: Utrum [evum] habeat aliquam similitudinem cum tempore sive etiam cum ipso 'quando' quod derelinquitur ex tempore.
- art. 1 [A 61ra; P 91vb; V 64va]: Utrum in evo sit aliqua successio per quam ad modum temporis se habeat in seipso difformiter. <Opinio antiqua cum apprehensionibus; contra prefatam opinionem; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; secunda conclusio; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>
- art. 2 [A 63rb; P 94vb; V 67ra]: Utrum evum ad modum temporis sit idem cum suo fundamento realiter. <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum>
- art. 3 [A 64rb; P 96ra; V 68ra]: Utrum evum ad modum temporis habeat proprium 'nunc' temporis a quo distinguatur realiter. <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; ad questionem; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia>
- art. 4 [A 66va; P 98vb; V 70vb]: Utrum evum ad modum ipsius 'quando' agebatur, contineatur et claudatur sub aliqua mensura terminabitur. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; declarat quid sit ipsi; ponit duos intellectus de isto articulo et iuxta primum intellectum ponit unam conclusionem; iuxta secundum intellectum ponit secundam conclusionem>
- art. 5 [A 68ra; P 100va; V 72rb]: Utrum sicut quando in quandalibus, ita evum in eviternis multiplicetur realiter. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Thome et Gothofredi et plurium aliorum; contra Thomam et Gothofredum et plures aliorum; opinio Henrici; opinio fratris Egidii; confirmatio opinionis fratris Egidii; ad rationes que consueverunt fieri contra Egidium>
- art. 6 [A 71ra; P 103vb; V 75va]: Utrum sicut evum mensurat esse angelorum, ita oporteat ponere necessario aliquod tempus quod mensuret eorum operationes conformiter. <Opinio quorundam; contra dictam opinionem; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 7 [A 72ra; P 104vb; V 76va]: Utrum tempus quod mensurat operationes angelorum sit continuum vel discretum distinctum a tempore nostro totaliter. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

Sent. II, dist. 2, q. 3 [A 72vb; P 105vb; V 77rb]: *Utrum locus sit res de aliquo determinato genere.*

art. 1 [A 73ra; P 106ra; V 77rb]: *Utrum locus secundum suum formale sit positio. <Contra Auriolum>*

art. 2 [A 73vb; P 107va; V 78rb]: *Utrum locus secundum suum formale sit ordo secundum determinatam distantiam vel propinquitatem ad totum celum. <Opinio que videtur esse communis; contra prefatam opinionem que videtur esse communis; quid sibi videtur dicendum; prima conclusio; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta>*

art. 3 [A 75rb; P 108vb; V 79vb]: *Utrum locus secundum suum formale sit qualitas locati conservativa. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>*

art. 4 [A 75vb; P 109rb; V 80rb]: *Utrum locus secundum suum formale sit quantitas locati circumscriptiva. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>*

art. 5 [A 76va; P 110rb; V 81rb]: *Utrum locus secundum suum formale sit distincta species quantitatis a superficie. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>*

Sent. II, dist. 2, q. 4 [A 77va; P 111rb; V 82rb]: *Utrum [angeli] fuerint creati in aliquo loco.*

art. 1 [A 78va; P 112rb; V 83rb]: *Utrum angelus sit in loco diffinitive. <Opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>*

art. 2 [A 80ra; P 113vb; V 84vb]: *Utrum angelus sit diffinitive in loco ratione sue essentie. <Opinio antiqua quorundam; contra opinionem prefatam et quid sibi videtur dicendum>*

art. 3 [A 80vb; P 114vb; V 85va]: *Utrum angelus sit diffinitive in loco ratione sue operationis. <Opinio multorum; contra dictam opinionem; Auriolus sequens dictam opinionem; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; removet unam dubitationem>*

art. 4 [A 82ra; P 116ra; V 86vb]: *Utrum angelus sit diffinitive in loco ratione alicuius virtutis quantitative. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>*

art. 5 [A 82vb; P 116vb; V 87va]: *Utrum unus angelus possit esse simul in diversis locis. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>*

art. 6 [A 83ra; P 117rb; V 88ra]: *Utrum plures angeli possint simul esse in eodem loco. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>*

- art. 7 [A 84ra; P 118rb; V 89ra]: Utrum angelus possit moveri localiter. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 8 [A 84vb; P 119ra; V 89vb]: Utrum angelus quando movetur localiter moveatur motu continuo. <Opinio Thome in prima parte; contra opinionem Thome; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 9 [A 85vb; P 120ra; V 90vb]: Utrum angelus quando movetur localiter moveatur motu discontinuo sive discreto qui componitur ex mutatis esse indivisibilibus. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 10 [A 86rb; P 120va; V 91rb]: Utrum angelus possit moveri localiter de extremo ad extremum non transeundo per medium. <Opinio Thome in prima parte; contra opinionem Thome; quid sibi videtur dicendum; opinio fratris Egidii in primo sententiarum; declaratio et confirmatio opinionis fratris Egidii>
- art. 11 [A 87vb; P 121vb; V 92rb]: Utrum angelus moveatur de loco ad locum in instanti. <Opinio Guarronis; contra Guarronem; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 12 [A 89ra; P 122vb; V 93va]: Utrum pluribus instantibus motus angelici correspondeat unum instans temporis nostri. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum premissa una distinctione; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>

Sent. II, dist. 2, q. 5 [A 90vb; P 124vb; V 95va]: Utrum celum empireum sit locus appropriatus angelis et hominibus beatis.

- art. 1 [A 91rb; P 125rb; V 96ra]: Utrum propter locationem angelorum et aliorum beatorum celum empireum necessario sit in rerum potentia ponendum. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2 [A 91vb; P 126ra; V 96va]: Utrum celum empireum sit corpus alterius generis et alterius nature ab omnibus corporibus naturalibus. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; Auriolus; contra Auriolum>
- art. 3 [A 93ra; P 127ra; V 97vb]: Utrum celum empireum sit lucidius aliis corporibus celestibus. <Responsio Durandi et Petri Aurioli; contra Durandum et Auriolum; responsio fratris Egidii; confirmatio illius vie tamquam tangit frater Egidius; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>
- art. 4 [A 93vb; P 128ra; V 98va]: Utrum celum empireum influat in illa inferiora quemadmodum alia celestia corpora. <Opinio Thome; contra opinionem Thome; opinio fratris Egidii; confirmatio opinionis fratris Egidii>

Sent. II, dist. 3, q. 1 [A 94va; P 128vb; V 99rb]: Utrum natura angelica sit ita simpliciter quod careat omni compositione reali.

- art. 1 [A 94vb; P 129ra; V 99vb]: Utrum substantia angeli sit composita ex pluribus principiis quorum alterum sit purum possibile in genere intelligibilium. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum premissa una de distinctione; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta; conclusio quinta; conclusio sexta; responsio ad rationes et fundamenta alterius opinionis>
- art. 2 [A 98va; P 132vb; V 103rb]: Utrum substantia angeli sit composita ex pluribus principiis quorum alterum sit materia prima, que est purum possibile non solum in genere substantialium [P: sensibile] sed etiam in toto genere entium. <Opinio antiqua plurium; contra opinionem prefatam et quid sibi videtur dicendum; rationes Durandi ad oppositam conclusionem; contra rationes Durandi>
- art. 3 [A 100rb; P 134va; V 104vb]: Utrum in substantia angeli esset composita ex pluribus principiis quorum alterum esset materia prima, que est purum possibile in genere substantialium [P: sensibile], et in toto genere entium sequeretur quod dicta substantia angeli esset corporea. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Sent. II, dist. 3, q. 2 [A 101rb; P 135vb; V 106ra]: Utrum substantia spiritualis angelica sit ita simplex quod careat compositione secundum rationem generis.
- art. 1 [A 102ra; P 136rb; V 106vb]: Utrum substantia spiritualis angelica sit in genere. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 2 [A 103va; P 137vb; V 108ra]: Utrum substantia spiritualis angelica sit in eodem genere cum substantia corporali. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3 [A 103vb; P 138ra; V 108rb]: Utrum genus substantie secundum quod est substantie corporali et spirituali sit genus naturale vel logicum vel quoddam aliud genus. <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; opinio Gothofredi; contra Gothofredum; opinio fratris Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum; opinio fratris Egidii; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta>
- art. 4 [A 106ra; P 140ra; V 110rb]: Utrum genus substantie spiritualis angelice habet differentiam cum qua possit componi, que sumatur ab eadem simplici realitate cum dicto genere. <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Gothofredi; contra Gothofredum; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum; opinio fratris Egidii; Gothofredus contra Egidium; solutio rationum que fiunt contra Egidium; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

- tur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; solutio ad responsiones aliorum opinionum>
- art. 5 [A 110va; P 144ra; V 114rb]: Utrum compositio generis cum differentia que sit per actum rationis circa substantiam spirituales angelicas sit in ipso actu rationis vel in ipsa substantia spirituali angelica cui actus rationis dictam compositionem attribuit. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; prima conclusio iuxta primam acceptionem; secunda conclusio iuxta secundam acceptionem; due conclusiones iuxta tertiam acceptionem; prima conclusio iuxta tertiam acceptionem; secunda conclusio iuxta tertiam acceptionem; dubia contra dicta; solutio ad dubia>
- art. 6 [A 112va; P 146ra; V 116ra]: Utrum differentia cum qua componitur genus substantie spiritualis debeat poni in recta linea predicamentali sicut species, et per consequens, utrum predicetur in quid sicut species. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; due conclusiones iuxta primam acceptionem; prima conclusio iuxta primam acceptionem; secunda conclusio iuxta primam acceptionem; due conclusiones circa secundam acceptionem; prima conclusio iuxta secundam acceptionem; secunda conclusio iuxta secundam acceptionem>
- art. 7 [A 113vb; P 147rb; V 117rb]: Utrum in substantiis spiritualibus descendatur a genere in nobiliorem speciem per compositionem et aggregationem plurium differentiarum quemadmodum in substantiis corporalibus. <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Sent. II, dist. 3, q. 3 [A 115rb; P 148va; V 118va]: Utrum angelus naturali cognitione cognoscat seipsum et ea que sunt creata cum ipso.
- art. 1 [A 115vb; P 149ra; V 119ra]: Utrum angelus semper se intelligat.
- art. 2 [A 116vb; P 149vb; V 119vb]: Utrum quando angelus se intelligit idem actus sit in eo intelligendi cum sua substantia que intelligitur. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 3 [A 118rb; P 150vb; V 120vb]: Utrum quando angelus intelligit seipsum ille actus intelligendi causetur a sua substantia mediante aliqua specie intelligibili. <Opinio communis; contra opinionem communem; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 4 [A 118vb; P 151rb; V 121va]: Utrum actus intelligendi quo angelus intelligit seipsum causetur immediate a sua essentia. <Contra opinionem communem et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 5 [A 119va; P 152ra; V 122ra]: Utrum idem sint in angelo intellectus et quod intelligitur quando angelus intelligit res materiales. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; responsio ad primum dubium; responsio ad secundum dubium>

art. 6 [A 120vb; P 153rb; V 123ra]: Utrum idem sint in angelo intellectus et quod intelligitur quando angelus intelligit res immateriales. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; responsio ad quesitum iuxta primum intellectum; responsio ad quesitum iuxta secundum intellectum; probatio primi modi idemnitatis; probatio secundi modi idemnitatis; probatio tertii modi idemnitatis>

Sent. II, dist. 4 [A 122rb; P 155ra; V 124vb]: Utrum omnes angeli fuerint creati in statu eodem vel consimili quantum ad beatitudinem et gratiam sive etiam quantum ad aliam perfectionem.

art. 1 [A 122vb; P 155va; V 125rb]: Utrum omnes angeli generaliter vel saltem aliqui specialiter fuerint creati beati. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta>

art. 2 [A 124ra; P 156vb; V 126va]: Utrum omnes angeli vel saltem aliqui specialiter fuerint creati in gratia. <Durandus sequens opinionem Thome; contra Durandum et opinionem quam sequitur; opinio quam tenet frater Egidius; tenet et ipse eandem conclusionem et confirmat eam dupliciter>

art. 3 [A 125rb; P 158ra; V 127vb]: Utrum boni angeli potuerunt prescire suam finalem beatitudinem. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum iuxta conclusionem suam>

art. 4 [A 125vb; P 158vb; V 128rb]: Utrum mali angeli potuerunt prescire suam finalem miseriam. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum iuxta conclusionem suam>

Sent. II, dist. 5, q. 1 [A 126va; P 159rb; V 129ra]: Utrum aliqui angeli potuerint se a deo divertere per peccatum.

art. 1 [A 126vb; P 159vb; V 129va]: Utrum in angelis potuerit esse peccatum. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2 [A 127rb; P 160rb; V 129vb]: Utrum peccatum malorum angelorum habuerit ortum ex errore vel ignorantia vel ex aliqua alia causa. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; dubitatio contra tertiam conclusionem; solutio>

art. 3 [A 128vb; P 161va; V 131rb]: Utrum mali angeli qui peccaverunt potuerunt peccare in primo instanti sue creationis. <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

- art. 4 [A 129rb; P 162rb; V 131vb]: Utrum causa quare angelus peccans non potuit peccare in primo instanti sue creationis sit accipienda ex parte angeli peccantis. <opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 5 [A 130rb; P 163ra; V 132vb]: Utrum causa quare angelus peccans non potuit peccare in primo instanti sue creationis sit accipienda ex parte dei creantis. <Opinio Thome; contra opinionem Thome; quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 6 [A 130vb; P 163va; V 133rb]: Utrum causa quare angelus non potuit peccare in primo instanti sue creationis sit accipienda ex parte illius primi instantis. <Opinio communis plurium; contra communem opinionem plurium; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta; conclusio quinta; conclusio sexta>
- Sent. II, dist. 5, q. 2 [A 131vb; P 165ra; V 134va]: Utrum boni angeli in sui conversione ad deum receperunt gratiam.
- art. 1 [A 132ra; P 165rb; V 134vb]: Utrum in bonis angelis [actus] conversionis ad deum precessit aliqua dispositio ad gratiam. <Opinio Thome; contra opinionem Thome; opinio fratris Egidii; declaratio et confirmatio opinionis Egidii>
- art. 2 [A 133rb; P 166vb; V 136rb]: Utrum boni angeli receperunt gratiam ante actum sue conversionis in deum. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; tertia conclusio>
- art. 3 [A 133vb; P 167rb; V 136vb]: Utrum boni angeli per gratiam meruerint gloriam. <Facit tres rationes pro conclusione comuni que ab omnibus credentur>
- art. 4 [A 134ra; P 167vb; V 137rb]: Utrum boni angeli meruerunt gloriam vel ultimam suam beatitudinem per unum solum actum. <Facit etiam hic tres rationes>
- art. 5 [A 134rb; P 168ra; V 137va]: Utrum in bonis angelis meritum precesserit premium. <Opinio Magistri sententiarum ac etiam Prepositini; rationes que fiunt communiter contra opinionem Magistri sententiarum et Prepositini; addit tria alia inconvenientia contra dictam opinionem Magistri; opinio Thome in prima parte; confirmatio quam fecit Durandus; contra opinionem Thome et contra Durandum qui eam sequitur; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; opinio antiqua quam recitat Magister in littera; contra dictam opinionem; opinio quam tenet frater Egidius; quid sibi videtur dicendum pro declaratione et confirmatione dicte opinionis quam tenet frater Egidius; concludit hic

conclusionem principalem confirmando eam per quatuor rationes; solutio ad rationes contrarie opinionis>

Sent. II, dist. 6 [A 136vb; P 170vb; V 140ra]: Utrum inter angelos cadentes fuerit aliquis primus.

art. 1 [A 137rb; P 171rb; V 140va]: Utrum inter angelos cadentes fuerit aliquis primus cuius occasione alii peccando ceciderint. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 2 [A 137vb; P 171vb; V 141ra]: Utrum primus angelus inter cadentes fuerit de supremo ordine. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 3 [A 138ra; P 172ra; V 141rb]: Utrum de quolibet ordine angelorum aliqui ceciderint.

art. 4 [A 138rb; P 172rb; V 141va]: Utrum primus angelus inter cadentes una cum aliis angelis cadentibus peccaverit peccato superbie. <Opinio communis quam tenet Thomas; Scotus contra opinionem communem; Auriolus concordans opinionem Scoti contra opinionem communem; contra Petrum et Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum pro communi opinione quam sustinet; solutio ad rationes Scoti>

art. 5 [A 140ra; P 174ra; V 143rb]: Utrum primus angelus inter cadentes una cum aliis angelis cadentibus appetierit dei equalitatem per se et directe. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum; opinio Scoti; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum secundum opinionem communem, quam sustinet>

art. 6 [A 141va; V 145ra]: Utrum omnes angeli cadentes fuerint uniformes in appetendo dei equalitatem per accidens et indirecte. <Ponit tres modos quibus mali angeli potuerunt uniformiter [appetere] dei equalitatem [secundum] communem [opinionem]; contra opinionem communem; quid sibi videtur dicendum; reducit totum quod intendit de isto articulo ad duas conclusiones>

art. 7 [A 142va; V 146ra]: Utrum inter angelos cadentes sit ordo prelationis.

Sent. II, dist. 7, quest. 1 [A 142vb; V 146rb]: Utrum angeli beati ita sint confirmati in bono quod non possint peccare.

art. 1 [A 143ra; V 146va]: Utrum angeli beati ita sint confirmati in bono quod non possint peccare.

art. 2 [A 143ra; V 146vb]: Utrum non posse peccare in angelis beatitudinis proveniat ex aperta visione summi boni. <Opinio

- Thome [*mss*: Scoti] in prima parte; contra Thomam [*mss*: Scotum]; opinio Durandi; contra Durandum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>
- art. 3 [A 143vb; V 147va]: Utrum non posse peccare in angelis beatis proveniat ex satietate appetitus. <Modus Thome et plurium aliorum; contra modum prefatum; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda>
- art. 4 [A 144rb; V 148ra]: Utrum non posse peccare in angelis beatis proveniat ex immutabilitate fruitionis. <Opinio fratris Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii>
- Sent. II, dist. 7, quest. 2 [A 144vb; V 148vb]: Utrum mali angeli sint ita obstinati in malicia quod penitere non possint.
- art. 1 [A 145ra; V 149ra]: Utrum mali angeli vel demones sint ita obstinati in malicia quod penitere non possint.
- art. 2 [A 145rb; V 149rb]: Utrum obstinatio demonum habet ortum ab aliquo ortu habitu a deo infuso. <Opinio Jacobi; contra opinionem Jacobi; solutio ad rationes alterius opinionis>
- art. 3 [A 146ra; V 150rb]: Utrum obstinatio demonum habet ortum ab aliqua causa naturali intrinseca. <Opinio Thome; contra opinionem Thome; opinio Henrici viii quodlibet, [q. 10?]; contra Henricum; opinio fratris Egidii; confirmatio opinionis Egidii et quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- art. 4 [A 147rb; V 151vb]: Utrum obstinatio demonum habet ortum ab ipso deo subtrahente suam influentiam. <Opinio fratris Egidii; declaratio et confirmatio opinionis fratris Egidii et quid sibi videtur dicendum>
- Sent. II, dist. 8 [A 147vb; V 152vb]: Utrum angeli possint assumere corpora.
- art. 1 [A 148ra; V 153ra]: Utrum angeli sive boni sive mali possint assumere corpora. <Colligit quid sibi videtur dicendum in isto articulo sub quinque conclusionibus>
- art. 2 [A 148va; V 153vb]: Utrum angeli in corporibus assumptis possint exercere opera vite.
- art. 3 [A 148vb; V 154rb]: Utrum angeli mali possint in corporibus assumptis vel non assumptis ludificare sensus. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta>
- art. 4 [A 149vb; V 155va]: Utrum angeli boni vel mali moveant corpora assumpta vel quecumque alia corpora per solum intellec-

tum et voluntatem. <Opinio plurium; contra opinionem prefatam; opinio magis communis; contra dictam opinionem magis communem; responsio Durandi sustentis opinionem communem; contra responsionem Durandi; opinio Jacobi de Viterbio; contra Jacobum de Viterbio; quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; solutio ad rationes Jacobi>

Sent. II, dist. 9 [A 151va; V 158rb]: Utrum inter ordines angelorum sit distinctio secundum naturam vel solum secundum officia.

art. 1 [A 152ra; V 159ra]: Utrum distinctio inter ordines angelorum sit secundum gradus específicos quos in sui natura a sue creationis principio habuerunt vel solum secundum diversitatem officiorum. <Quid sibi videtur dicendum; conclusio prima; conclusio secunda; conclusio tertia; conclusio quarta>

art. 2 [A 152vb; V 160ra]: Utrum natura specifica in angelis sive in aliis entibus materialibus habeat propriam et realem unitatem distinctam ab unitate numerali. <Opinio Scoti; contra opinionem Scoti; quid sibi videtur dicendum; solutio ad rationes Scoti>

art. 3 [A 154ra; V 161vb]: Utrum unitas nature specificè extra intellectum sit unitas alicuius indifferentie. <Opinio Scoti; Auriolus contra Scotum; contra Auriolum; contra Scotum; quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 4 [A 154va; V 162va]: Utrum natura specifica extra intellectum sit ex seipsa individua. <Opinio Aurioli; contra Auriolum et quid sibi videtur dicendum>

art. 5 [A 154vb; V 162vb]: Utrum natura specifica contrahatur ad esse individuale per aliquid privativum. <Opinio Henrici; contra Henricum>

art. 6 [A 155ra; V 163ra]: Utrum principium individuationis per quod natura specifica in entibus materialibus contrahitur ad esse individuale sit materia. <Opinio illorum qui volunt sequi Thomam; contra opinionem illorum qui sequuntur Thomam>

art. 7 [A 155va; V 164ra]: Utrum principium individuationis per quod natura specifica in entibus materialibus contrahitur ad esse individuale sit forma. <Opinio Gothofredi; contra Gothofredum>

art. 8 [A 155vb; V 164va]: Utrum principium individuationis per quod natura specifica in entibus materialibus contrahitur ad esse individuale sit quantitas. <Opinio fratris Egidii; Scotus contra Egidium; confirmatio opinionis Egidii; solutio ad rationes Scoti>

art. 9 [A 157ra; V 166ra]: Utrum individuum principium individuationis per quod natura specifica in quibuscumque entibus contrahitur ad esse individuale sit aliquis gradus individuationis. <Opinio Scoti; contra Scotum et quid sibi videtur dicendum>
text ends [A 157rb; V 166va]: Et per consequens apparet ex omnibus istis quid sit dicendum quantum ad istum articulum. Restat ergo videndum [art. *or* dist.].x.

IV. Gerard of Siena, *Questiones in libros III & IV Sententiarum*
 (Oxford, Balliol College 63)

Balliol 63, ff. 65vb-66rb: "Utrum sola persona filii sine aliis personis potuerit incarnari."

Balliol 63, ff. 87va-88ra: "Questio Gerardi in principio tertii."

ff. 87va-87vb: "Utrum una persona possit incarnari absque hoc quod alia incarnetur." Cf. previous question.

f. 87vb: "Utrum fuit necesse Christum pati pro redemptione generis humani."

ff. 88ra [Gerard of Siena?], *Sent.* IV:

f. 88ra: "Utrum corpus Christi possit esse sub sacramento altaris sine sui mutatione."

f. 88ra: "Utrum anima beata appetat reuniri corpori."

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DER PROLOG ZUM SENTENZENKOMMENTAR DES AUGUSTINUS TRIUMPHUS*

Bei den Kennern des Mittelalters ist Augustinus Triumphus hauptsächlich als Vertreter des politischen Augustinismus bekannt. Man verweist dafür auf sein Werk *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica*, in dem er die Oberhoheit der päpstlichen über die kaiserliche Macht verteidigt.¹ Sein schriftstellerischer Nachlaß umfaßt aber noch zahlreiche andere Werke. Nach seiner Grabinschrift sind es 36. Sie behandeln recht unterschiedliche Thematiken: publizistisch-moralische wie der *Tractatus contra divinatores et somniatores*, eine Zusammenstellung von Zitaten in den *Flores beati Augustini seu Milleloquium ex scriptis S. Augustini*, eine Auswahl von Sentenzen des heiligen Augustinus unter Stichworten zusammengestellt, bis hin zum Sentenzenkommentar.² Das zuletzt erwähnte Werk ist übrigens am wenigsten bekannt. Es ist bislang nur in drei Beiträgen analysiert worden. Sie enthalten zugleich die Editionen von einzelnen Quästionen.³

* Dieser Beitrag war zuerst am 9. Dezember 2009. als Lectio Aegidiana in der Forschungsstelle mittelalterliche Augustinerschule Biographie- und Zeitgeschichte präsentiert. Ich möchte mich hier nochmals bei Prof. Willigis Eckermann für die Einladung, hilfreichen Bemerkungen und historische sowie sprachliche Korrekturen meines Textes bedanken.

¹ Siehe dazu M. WILKS, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages. The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists*, Cambridge 1963. Für die Biographie des Augustinus' vgl. B. MINISTERI, *De Augustini de Ancona O.E.S.A. (†1328) vita et operibus*, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 22 (1951/52) 7-56, 148-262. Für generelle Informationen und bibliographische Hinweise vgl. A. DE MEIJER, *Bibliographie historique de l'Ordre de Saint Augustin 1945-1975*, in: *Augustiniana* 26 (1976) 39-340, 163-164 (für die Kontinuation siehe: <http://www.augustiniana.net/fr/index.htm>) und W. ECKERMANN, s.v. Augustinus Triumphus, in: TRE, Bd. 4, Berlin – New York 1979, 742-744.

² Augustinus Triumphus (OESA † 2. IV. 1328) wurde 1270/73 in Ancona geboren. Er hielt als Augustiner nach 1300 seine Sentenzenvorlesung in Paris. Der Sentenzenkommentar ist nur in einem Manuskript erhalten: Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale, 296. Das Manuskript ist von J.-P. Bouchot und J.-F. Genest beschrieben: *La Bibliothèque de l'Abbaye de Clairvaux du XII^e au XVIII^e siècles. t. II: Les manuscrits conservés. Première partie. Manuscrits bibliques, patristiques et théologiques*, Paris – Turnhout 1997, 640-641. In dem Kolophon dieses Manuskripts, das nur das 1. Buch des Kommentars enthält, liest man, daß die Kopierung am 1. Juni 1303 beendet war.

³ M. SCHMAUS, *Die Gotteslehre des Augustinus Triumphus nach seinem Sentenzenkommentar*, in: *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Festschrift Martin Grabmann* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband 3.2), Münster 1935, 896-953. E. RANDI, *Talpe ed extraterrestri: Un inedito di Agostino Trionfo di Ancona sulla pluralità dei mondi*, in: *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 44/2 (1989) 311-326. M. OLSZEWSKI, *Augustine of Ancona on the subject of theology*, in: *Acta Mediaevalia* 20 (2005) 371-398.

I. Die vier Ursachen der Theologie

Im Rahmen dieses Beitrags möchte ich seine Sicht der Theologie darstellen, die er im Prolog zu seinem Sentenzenkommentar vortrug.

Bevor ich das Thema angehe, werde ich zum besseren Verständnis meiner Ausführungen einige Informationen zum historischen und theologischen Kontext, in dem Augustinus Triumphus wissenschaftlich tätig war, vorausschicken.

Sein Sentenzenkommentar entstand Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts in Paris. Zu dieser Zeit war die Seinestadt der Schauplatz einer bereits einige Jahrzehnte dauernden Diskussion, die mehrere Etappen über eine Reihe von Fragen zur Natur der Theologie durchlaufen hatte.⁴ Am wichtigsten und am regsten diskutiert waren die Fragen nach dem Objekt und dem Ziel der Theologie. Die Theologen stritten darüber, ob die Theologie eine spekulative oder eine praktische Wissenschaft sei, welcher wissenschaftliche Status ihr zustehe, wie notwendig sie sei, welche Würde sie innehave und in welcher Beziehung sie zum Glauben stehe, der als eine Auswirkung der Gnade zu verstehen ist. Ferner wurde auch die Frage der Subalternation, d. h. der Unterordnung der Theologie unter die natürlichen Wissenschaften oder umgekehrt ihre Vorrangstellung den letzteren gegenüber besprochen. All diese Themen tauchen auch im *Prolog* des Augustinus Triumphus zu seinem Sentenzenkommentar auf.

In der 2. Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts versuchten alle wichtigen scholastischen Theologen alle oder manche von diesen Fragen zu beantworten. Die interessantesten und auch von den Zeitgenossen am meisten gelesenen Lösungen stammen von Bonaventura, Thomas von Aquin, Heinrich von Gent, Gottfried von Fontaines und, *last but not least*, Aegidius Romanus. Die späteren Autoren schufen ihre Sichtweisen von der Natur der Theologie im Dialog mit den Entwürfen dieser Theologen.

⁴ Manche, darunter berühmte Mediävisten schrieben über diese Diskussion, man muß aber wenigstens die folgenden Werke erwähnen: M.-D. CHENU, *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle*, Paris 1943; M. GRABMANN, *Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift *In Boethium De Trinitate**. Im Zusammenhang der Scholastik des 13. und beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts dargestellt (Thomistische Studien 4), Freiburg in der Schweiz 1948; U. KÖPF, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert* (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 49), Tübingen 1974; Ch. TROTTMANN, *Théologie et noétique au XIII^e siècle. À la recherche d'un statut* (Études de philosophie médiévale 78) Paris 1999 und A. OLIVA, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la *sacra doctrina*. Avec l'édition du Prologue de son commentaire des *Sentences**, Paris 2006.

Dies trifft auch auf Augustinus Triumphus zu. Die Bindung an die Vorgänger, sei es durch Polemik, sei es durch schöpferische Anregung und Uminterpretierung, ist in der Scholastik um die Wende zum 14. Jahrhundert so stark, daß der Versuch, die Position eines Autors zu verstehen, die Kenntnis der von ihm gelesenen Werke voraussetzt. Man kann davon ausgehen, daß er sie als positiven Ausgangspunkt oder als Gegenstand der Kritik benutzte.

Mit allen erwähnten Autoren setzte sich Augustinus Triumphus auf verschiedene Weise und in unterschiedlichem Umfang auseinander. Dies gilt insbesondere für Aegidius Romanus. Denn seine Lehre war 1287 vom Augustinerorden zur offiziellen Ordensdoktrin erklärt worden.⁵ Diese Entscheidung war auch für die Pariser Vorlesungen des Augustinus Triumphus verbindlich. Er nahm deshalb dessen Sentenzenkommentar zur Grundlage für seine Ausführungen.

Unter Berücksichtigung der soeben dargestellten spezifischen Situation des theologischen Schaffens um die Wende zum 14. Jahrhundert halte ich es für notwendig, den historischen und polemischen Kontext der Vorlesung zum Sentenzenprolog von Augustinus Triumphus aufzuzeigen.

Mein Beitrag orientiert sich an der inneren Struktur des Sentenzenkommentars unseres Autors. Sie ist durch die Aristotelische Vierteilung der Ursachen in final-, formal-, material- und Wirkursache bestimmt. Zugleich möchte ich darstellen, wie Augustinus Triumphus den Zweck, den Gegenstand, die Form und den Autor der Theologie auffaßte. Es ist an dieser Stelle bemerkenswert, daß das auf Vierteilung gestützte Schema eng mit der Tradition der Theologie des 13. Jahrhunderts zusammenhängt. Auch Bonaventura und Aegidius Romanus verwendeten es.

I.1. Contemplatio – das Ziel der Theologie

In der 1. Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts dominierte unter den Theologen – insbesondere meine ich hier den heiligen Bonaventura⁶, da seine Einführung zum Sentenzenkommentar ein Ausdruck der damals herrschenden *opinio communis* war – die Überzeugung, daß die Theologie

⁵ A. ZUMKELLER, Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre. Übersicht nach dem heutigen Stand der Forschung, in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964) 169–171.

⁶ Bonaventura, *Liber primus Sententiarum*, prooem., 3, corp., studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi 1882: *Opera omnia* I, 13b. Vgl. auch Alexander de Hales, *Summa theologica*, I pars, qu. 1. mem. 1, cap. 1. corp., studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi 1924: I, 2b.

eine Wissenschaft ist, die in sich zwei Funktionen, die theoretische und praktische, vereinigt. Sie stellt fest, was man über Gott aussagen kann, und macht deutlich, wie sich die Welt und der Mensch zu ihm verhalten sollen. Dies bedeutet, daß die Theologie dem Menschen ein gewisses theoretisches Wissen vermittelt und zugleich darüber belehrt, wie man handeln soll, um sich moralisch zu vervollkommen und die Seligkeit zu erlangen. Dieser Aspekt macht aus ihr eine höchst praktische Wissenschaft. Außerdem behaupteten die Theologen einstimmig, daß die theoretische Funktion der praktischen untergeordnet ist.

Die Theologen jener Zeit waren sich allerdings über die Frage nicht einig, ob die Theologie von vornherein als praktische Wissenschaft bezeichnet werden kann. Sie waren sich bewußt, daß der Mensch außerstande ist, mit eigenen Kräften und mit den von der philosophischen Ethik empfohlenen natürlichen Mitteln die Seligkeit zu erlangen. Sie betonten, daß es dazu der über die natürliche Ordnung hinausgehenden Gnade bedarf. Angesichts der Tatsache, daß Aristoteles den Begriff der praktischen Wissenschaft zu seiner Klassifikation der philosophischen Wissenschaften verwendete, hatte dieser nämlich starke philosophische Konnotationen. Daher neigten die Diskussionsteilnehmer vielmehr dazu, die Theologie als affektive Wissenschaft zu bezeichnen, d.h. als eine, die in der Ordnung der praktischen Handlungen des Menschen die Gabe der Gnade in der Form der Liebe (*cari-tas*) zu berücksichtigen habe, welche die Seligkeit ermöglicht.

Diese Entscheidung stieß auf die Kritik des Thomas von Aquin.⁷ Nach ihm ist der Gegenstand der Theologie Gott, auf den der Mensch keinen Zugriff hat, auf den er nicht einwirken kann, während die Definition des Gegenstandes der praktischen Wissenschaft voraussetze, der Mensch vermöge auf einen solchen Gegenstand einzuwirken; folglich sei die Theologie grundsätzlich keine praktische Wissenschaft, weil der Mensch nicht auf Gott einwirken kann. Dieser Gedankengang führte Thomas zu der These, daß die Theologie eine in viel größerem Grade theoretische als praktische Wissenschaft sei. Er sah natürlich im Hinblick auf die Gebote auch die praktische Seite der Theologie. Er stellte sie aber zurück. Die Theologie bleibt praktisch, weil sie auch diejenigen Dinge umfaßt, die sich auf Gott beziehen, beispielsweise die Gebote, die selbstverständlich praktisch sind.

Die Lösung des Thomas setzt voraus, daß sich die Aristotelische Einteilung der Wissenschaften in theoretische und praktische nicht eindeutig auf die Theologie anwenden läßt. Eine ähnliche Posi-

⁷ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, qu. 1, art. 4, Taurini – Roma 1974, 4b.

tion vertrat auch Gottfried von Fontaines.⁸ Stärker als Thomas betonte er das Gleichgewicht zwischen der praktischen und theoretischen Funktion in der Theologie, indem er behauptete, daß ihr Gegenstand sowohl die unreduzierbar praktischen als auch die unreduzierbar theoretischen Inhalte umfaßt. Er tat dies auf Kosten der Einheit der Theologie, indem sie in der Tat in zwei parallele Wissenschaften mit zwei parallelen Gegenständen zerfiel. Ihre Einheit und ihren stärker theoretischen als praktischen Charakter erlangt sie erst in der Perspektive ihres endgültigen Ziels, d.h. in der als *visio Dei* verstandenen Vollendung.

Unter den Autoren, die unmittelbar nach Thomas wirkten, erarbeiteten Aegidius Romanus und Heinrich von Gent die bedeutendsten Positionen. Der erstere⁹ betonte, daß die Theologie eine übernatürliche Wissenschaft sei; daher könne man an Hand der Aristotelischen Kategorien – ‚praktisch‘ vs. ‚theoretisch‘ – ihr Wesen nicht erfassen und wiedergeben, weil jene allein für die Beschreibung von Naturwissenschaften maßgeblich seien. Daher behauptet Aegidius, sich auf die Autorität des hl. Augustinus berufend, daß die Theologie eine affektive Wissenschaft sei, weil ihr Ziel in der *caritas* bestehe. Allerdings widersetze sich die Affektivität der Praxis so wie sich das Übernatürliche dem Natürlichen widersetzt.

Heinrich von Gent¹⁰ spitzt den Theorieanspruch der Theologie noch stärker zu. Er behauptet nämlich, sie sei nur eine theoretische Wissenschaft, weil sie Gott ursprünglich und primär, die Handlungen dagegen nur sekundär behandle.

In einem Artikel, der der Antwort auf die Frage nach dem theoretischen bzw. praktischen Charakter der Theologie gewidmet ist, und der den *Prolog* eröffnet, spricht Augustinus Triumphus über die Zweckursache (*causa finalis*) der Theologie.

Er führt zunächst die Positionen von Thomas, Gottfried, Heinrich und Aegidius an, um an ihnen Mängel aufzuweisen. Gottfried irre, wenn

⁸ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet XIII et XIV de Godefrido de Fontaines*, XIII, 1, ed. J. HOFFMANS (Philosophes Belges, 5/3-4), Louvain 1935, 169–184. Siehe dazu P. TIHON, *Foi et théologie selon Godefrido de Fontaines* (Museum Lessianum, section théologique, 61), Paris – Bruges 1966, 208–228.

⁹ Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., qu. 4, art. unicus, Venetiis 1521, fol. 7N-8C. Für ausführlichen Deutung der These des Aegidius siehe P. PRASSEL, *Das Theologieverständnis des Aegidius Romanus O.E.S.A (1243/7-1316)* (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XXIII: Theologie), Frankfurt am Main – Bern 1983, 69–79 und M. SCHRAMA, *Theologia affectiva*. Traces of monastic theology in the theological prolegomena of Giles of Rome, in: *Bijdragen* 57 (1996) 381–404.

¹⁰ Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariam*, art. 8, qu. 3, Parisiis 1521 (Nachdruck St. Bonaventure 1953), fol. 65R–66Z.

er behauptet, daß irgendeine Wissenschaft im gleichen Grade theoretisch wie praktisch sein könne. Die Position Heinrichs setze wiederum voraus, daß das Ziel der Theologie – das Wissen von Gott – auch von einem durch und durch unmoralischen Menschen in vollkommenem Grade erworben werden könne.

Aegidius nimmt an, daß das Hauptziel der Theologie die Liebe – *caritas* – ist. Diesem Ziel sind in der Theologie sowohl sittliche Unterweisungen als auch theoretische Betrachtungen unterordnet. Wenn jedoch der Mensch die *caritas* durch eigene Handlungen nicht erlangen kann, dann kann man die Theologie nicht als praktische Wissenschaft bestimmen. Schließlich setze Aegidius voraus, daß die Liebe (*caritas*) eine Fertigkeit sei, welche die Einteilung in einen theoretischen und einen praktischen Bereich transzendiere, und darum die Theologie als eine affektive Wissenschaft bestimmt sein müsse.¹¹

Unmittelbar nach der Vorstellung der Position des Aegidius wendet Augustinus Triumphus gegen sie ein. Sein Einwand hat einen formalen Charakter. Augustinus weist darauf hin, daß Aegidius fälschlicherweise voraussetzt, der übernatürliche Ursprung der Liebe – sie begründet nach seiner Ansicht den affektiven Charakter der Theologie – bewirke, daß die Theologie die Einteilung der Wissenschaften in theoretische und praktische Disziplinen sprengt. In Wirklichkeit aber fallen alle Fertigkeiten unter ein und dieselbe Einteilung. Seine Stellungnahme deute also letzten Endes die ausschließliche Praxisbezogenheit der Theologie an, da die Liebe, ähnlich wie der Glaube, eine praktische Fertigkeit ist.¹²

Augustinus Triumphus schlägt dagegen vor, die Theologie als kontemplative Wissenschaft einzustufen. Mit seiner Position will er erreichen, daß die Theologie einerseits das beibehält, was für sie

¹¹ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 1, qu. 1, (Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale 296), fol. 4ra-vb.

¹² Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 1, qu. 1, fol. 4vb-5ra: „Sed nec istud dictum nostrum intellectum quietare, quia non magis est abstracta ista scientia, quam sit lumen fidei, cui innititur tamquam principio, et quam sit ipsa caritas, a qua, ut dicunt, denominatur tamquam a fine. Sed fides et caritas non trahuntur extra praedicamentum virtutum naturalium ex hoc, quod sunt habitus nobis supernaturaliter infusi. Sunt enim fides et caritas in genere qualitatis, sicut aliae virtutes naturales. Ergo similiter ista doctrina, quantumcumque habeat pro principio ipsam fidem et pro fine habeat caritatem, non trahetur extra genus scientiae practicae vel speculativae, sed collocabitur sub negotio practico vel speculativo, sub quibus collocantur omnes scientiae humanitus acquisitae; sicut fides et caritas, quantumcumque sint virtutes supernaturales, in eodem praedicamento reponuntur, in quo sunt virtutes naturaliter acquisitae.“

wesentlich ist und was ihre Natur angemessen zum Ausdruck bringt, nämlich die von Bonaventura, Thomas und Gottfried betonte Rolle der Theologie als eine zugleich theoretische und praktische Wissenschaft, sowie die für Aegidius wichtige Verknüpfung der Theologie mit dem, was übernatürlich ist und sie von den Wissenschaften unterscheidet, die mit Hilfe der natürlichen Vernunft erworben werden. Diese Thesen waren in den zuvor referierten Meinungen stets mit Schwierigkeiten verbunden: die Doppelfunktion der Theologie stellte in Frage ihre Einheit und ihr affektiver Charakter bestimmte sie zwangsläufig zu einer praktischen Wissenschaft. Diesen Schwierigkeiten soll bei Augustinus die Theologie als kontemplative Wissenschaft, die jedoch die beiden Aspekte ihrer Natur bewahrt, entgegen.

In seiner Begründung beginnt er mit der Definition der Kontemplation. Diese sei ein Akt, der die intellektuelle Spekulation und die Entfaltung des Gefühls in eins setze, da der Mensch, der in der Kontemplation ihren Gegenstand erkennt, diesen auch zu lieben anfängt. Diese These, gestützt auf die Autorität der Kirchenväter, ist typisch für die mittelalterliche Theologie.¹³

Weiter formuliert Augustinus Triumphus drei Argumente, die sie stützen sollen. Erstens, sei Gott das Ziel der Theologie. Dieses Ziel könne man nur dann erreichen, wenn man Wissen und Lieben in eins setze, was gerade durch die Kontemplation gesichert werde. Zweitens, müsse der Mensch, um den Zustand der Kontemplation zu erreichen, die spekulativen Inhalte durch die Liebe ergänzen. Das dritte Argument geht von dem Unterschied zwischen natürlichen Wissenschaften und der übernatürlichen Theologie aus. Die theoretischen natürlichen

¹³ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 1, qu. 1, fol. 5ra: „Viso ergo nullum istorum modorum perfecte intellectum quietare, volumus illum modum ponere, quem magis credimus esse verum et consonum dictis sanctorum, dicendo hanc scientiam nec esse principaliter speculativam et practicam, ut dicebat primus modus; nec principaliter speculativam et ex consequenti practicam, ut dicebat modus secundus; nec simpliciter affectivam, ut dicebat modus tertius; sed esse simpliciter contemplativam. Primo tamen est intelligendum, quid nomine contemplationis intelligimus, nam nomine contemplationis intelligimus non solum intellectus speculationem, qua aliquid cognoscitur pure speculative, sed etiam intelligimus affectus inflammationem, qua inflammatione illud, quod cognoscitur, vehementer diligitur. Quod autem per contemplationem non pura notitia vel speculatio intellectus intelligatur, patet per verbum Gregorii super illo verbo *Ezechielis* I „quattuor facies uni et quattuor pennae uni“, ubi ait, „quod per faciem nisi notitia et quod <per> pennam nisi volatus exprimitur. Et subdit quod facies itaque ad notitiam pertinet, penna vero ad contemplationem“. Si ergo contemplatio distinguitur a notitia vel a speculatione, oportet, quod nomine contemplationis importetur speculatio non quaecumque, sed talis, quae sit illuminativa et inflammativa.“ *Ezech* 1, 6 und Gregorius Magnus, *Homiliae in Hiezechielem prophetam*, III, 1: CCL 142, 33, 3–7.

Wissenschaften beschränken sich auf einen rein erkenntnismäßigen Akt der Spekulation, der ausschließlich vom Intellekt vorgenommen werde. Die praktische natürliche Wissenschaft müsse dagegen über den Intellekt hinausgehen und das Handeln umfassen, das bereits in den Bereich des Willens gehöre. Schließlich könne also keine natürliche Wissenschaft zugleich theoretisch und praktisch sein, weil Theorie und Praxis zu verschiedenen Bereichen gehören, die jeweils durch den Intellekt und den Willen bestimmt sind. Anders verhalte es sich mit der Theologie. Ihr einziger Akt ist die Kontemplation. Sie umfaßt sowohl den Intellekt als auch den Willen, die eine Gabe der göttlichen Macht darstellen.¹⁴

¹⁴ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prolog., pars 1, qu. 1, fol. 5r-5rb: „Prima ratio sic ostenditur. Nam finis istius scientiae est ipse Deus, sed Deus non potest speculari nec cognosci ut finis nisi per dilectionem et amorem. Quamvis enim aliqua cognitione pure speculativa ipse possit cognosci sine caritate, ut in quantum est principium et causa entium et actus purus vel motor primus, cognitione tamen, qua aliquis praefigit sibi eum tamquam finem, sine dilectione esse non potest. Nec etiam potest diligere sine cognitione, quia secundum beatum Augustinum non diligitur nisi cognitum. Et quia sub ista ratione Deus est finis in ista scientia, in quantum quilibet per hanc doctrinam proponit sibi ipsum Deum tamquam suum finem, cum hoc non possit esse per cognitionem pure speculativam, sed per speculationem inflammativam et dilectivam, oportet quod finis istius scientiae dicatur contemplatio Dei, cuius contemplatio dicit speculationem non qualemcumque, sed inflammativam et accensivam. Et per consequens ista scientia contemplativa debet nominari. Haec autem ratio tangitur per beatum Augustinum I *De Trinitate*, 8 capitulo, ubi vult quod „finis omnium actionum nostrarum est contemplatio Dei“. Augustinus, *In Iohannis Euangelium tractatus* 96, 4: CCL 36, 571, 9-10: „non enim diligitur quod penitus ignoratur“ und *De Trinitate* I, 8, 17: CCL 50, 50, 80-81: „haec enim nobis contemplatio promittitur actionum omnium finis.“

Secundo hoc patet ex parte modi perveniendi ad hunc finem. Nam modus contemplandi ipsum Deum in hac vita et illa, quae dicitur de Deo in ista scientia, non potest esse pure speculativus. Quia – cum illa sint improporcionabilia nostro intellectui, nisi intellectus captivaretur in obsequium Christi, nullo modo assentiret eis, sed <pura> {ms: pure} speculatio non habet intellectum captivare – oportet igitur esse speculationem talem, quae sit inflammativa et illuminativa; et hoc nomine contemplationis intelligimus, ut dictum est.

Tertio hoc idem ostenditur ex parte istius scientiae, ut differt ab aliis scientiis humanis. Nam habitus scientiae humanae per se est speculativus solum et actus procedens ex tali habitu directe et per se solum debet dici speculatio. Si autem intellectus non sistit in tali actu, sed intendat actionem vel operationem transeuntem in exteriorem materiam, hoc est, prout intellectus convertitur ad voluntatem et prout extensione fit practicus. Nam sicut secundum doctrinam Philosophi intellectus directe intelligit universale, per extensionem autem et unionem ad sensum intelligit particulare, ut patet ex III *De anima* {III, 4, 429b seqq.}, ita directe intellectus fertur in speculationem. Si autem progrediatur in actionem, hoc est, prout unit se voluntati. Unde huius operatio ab utraque potentia progreditur formaliter, quia quod speculationis est ibi, formaliter est ab intellectu, quod vero est ibi actionis, formaliter est a voluntate. Et quia impossibile est duos actus formaliter distinctos et sub rationibus formalibus

Die Hauptidee der von Augustinus Triumphus vorgelegten Lösung ist klar: die Theologie muß auf eine logisch korrekte Weise die theoretische und die praktische Funktion mit einander verbinden. Zugleich muß ihr übernatürlicher Charakter als ihr Spezifisches berücksichtigt werden. Diese zwei Gesichtspunkte bilden in der Stellungnahme des Augustinus Triumphus einen unveräußerlichen Bestandteil. Nach Augustinus Triumphus kann man die erstere in Übereinstimmung mit Bonaventura und Thomas und die letztere in Anlehnung an Aegidius Romanus verteidigen und überzeugend begründen, wenn man die Theologie als *contemplatio* auffaßt. Die Begründung des Augustinus Triumphus lautet, daß die Kontemplation ein Geisteszustand ist, der seine Quelle in Gottes Gnade hat, und der das Volitive mit dem Intellektuellen verbindet. Auf diese Weise läßt die Kontemplation die Theologie gleichrangig die theoretische und die praktische Funktion erfüllen, ohne daß ihre innere Einheit beeinträchtigt wird.

1.2. *Deus magister* – Wirkursache der Theologie

Keiner der scholastischen Theologen stellte grundsätzlich die These in Frage, daß Gott der einzig wirkliche Lehrer der Theologie ist. Die Menschen oder Engel, die als Lehrer bezeichnet werden, üben diese Tätigkeit nur behelfsmäßig aus. Sie sind lediglich Werkzeuge der göttlichen Offenbarung. Die geltende Lösung wird auch von Augustinus Triumphus akzeptiert.

Offen bleibt jedoch die Frage, auf welche Art und Weise Gott den Menschen die Theologie vermittelt.

Eine charakteristische, der gängigen Meinung zuwiderlaufende Konzeption der Theologievermittlung an den Theologen, wurde von Heinrich von Gent vorgelegt.¹⁵ Er behauptete nämlich, daß ausgebil-

respicientes obiectum esse unum actum. Ideo impossibile est eos habere rationem unius finis. Finis ergo scientiae humanae – vel dicetur speculatio vel operatio – nec potest esse unius finis utriusque scientiae humanae, videlicet practicae et speculativae, cum formaliter speculatio sit ab intellectu et dilectio vel actio formaliter sit a voluntate. Et duo actus formaliter distincti non possunt esse aequae principaliter intenti tamquam unus finis. Sed in hac divina scientia non est sic, quia habitus scientiae istius est a Deo inspiratus et infusus ipsi intellectui creato. Ideo cum sit formaliter in intellectu speculativo et illuminativo eius, formaliter procedit in intellectum verum. Quia, ut dictum est, talis habitus est a Deo infusus, qui est ignis consumens, ideo effective habet inflammare voluntatem. Et quia unus actus est, qui formaliter illuminat et effective inflamat, ideo non est inconveniens quod contemplatio Dei, quae utrumque istorum complectitur, non sub ratione distincta formali, sed unum formaliter et aliud effective habeat rationem unius finis.“

¹⁵ Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 13: *De modo addiscendi theologiam*, qu. 2–7, fol. 91T–95N.

dete Theologen die Glaubenslehre auf eine vollkommeneren Weise erkennen als gewöhnliche, einfache, ungebildete Gläubige. Heinrich behauptet dies, weil er der Ansicht ist, daß die Theologen von Gott ein besonderes Licht erhalten haben, das andere nicht empfangen. Die entscheidende Begründung für die Existenz jenes besonderen theologischen Lichtes liegt in der Ausdifferenzierung des Wissens über Gott. Die einen, und zwar die gebildeten Theologen, erkennen die Glaubensinhalte klarer als die weniger theologisch gebildeten Gläubigen. Dies wäre nicht möglich, wenn den Theologen nur das allgemeine Glaubenslicht zugänglich wäre. Das in allen Gläubigen gegenwärtige Licht bekommt man im Augenblick der Taufe. Das Wissen über solche Begriffe wie Gott, Dreifaltigkeit oder über die mit diesen Begriffen zusammenhängenden Inhalte, formuliert in den Glaubensartikeln, sei dagegen ein Effekt des höheren theologischen Lichts. Dieses theologische Licht ist etwas Mittleres zwischen dem Licht des Glaubens und der *visio beatifica*, die den Seligen eigen ist. Das Gottschauen im Himmel ist die klarste und offenbarste Form des Wissens über Gott.

Die Position Heinrichs von Gent zog schwer annehmbare Konsequenzen nach sich, weil sie einen eigentümlichen Elitarismus voraussetzte: Die Theologen als Empfänger eines besonderen Lichts, das eine Form der göttlichen Gnade war, schienen dadurch der Seligkeit näher zu sein als gewöhnliche Gläubige. Andererseits ist aber bekannt – und von der alltäglichen Erfahrung bestätigt –, daß die Theologie an der Universität genau so wie andere Wissenschaften unterrichtet wird, und daß die Fortschritte in dieser Wissenschaft nicht immer mit der moralischen Vervollkommenung der Studenten oder gar der Professoren einhergehen. So verletzte Heinrichs Position die für das Christentum fundamentale Überzeugung von der Gleichheit der Gläubigen vor Gott und von der Undurchdringlichkeit der Wirkung von Gottes Gnade. Deshalb stieß sie auch auf harte Polemik. Einer der Kritiker war Augustinus Triumphus, der diese Frage für die wichtigste zur Bestimmung der Wirkursache (*causa efficiens*) der Theologie hielt.

Die Überlegungen des Augustinus Triumphus haben in dieser Frage einen rein kritischen Charakter. Die ihnen gewidmeten Ausführungen machen deutlich, daß das Wissen über Gott, bei einem einfachen Gläubigen anders ist als bei einem gebildeten Theologen. Sie unterscheiden sich aber nicht im Glaubenslicht. Für beide ist es dasselbe Licht, das ihnen denselben Grad an Gewißheit verleiht. Auch stützten sich der einfache Gläubige und der Theologe auf die gleichen Prämissen, aus denen sie ihre Schlußfolgerungen ziehen. Sie erkennen Gott deshalb mit derselben Gewißheit. Mit einer analogen Situation haben wir es in den natürlichen Wissenschaften zu tun: Wir

können nicht kraft des Lichtes der natürlichen Vernunft die Schlußfolgerungen aus philosophischen Gedankengängen mit größerer Gewißheit als deren Prämissen erkennen. Die bloße Verwendung einer logisch korrekten, syllogistischen Form der Schlußfolgerung mache die Gewißheit der Schlüsse nicht höher als die der Prämissen.¹⁶

Außerdem ist das Licht des Glaubens, mit dem Gott die Menschen beschenkt, aus der Sicht des göttlichen Spenders absolut hell und klar und für alle gleich. Die Unterschiede im theologischen Wissen ergeben sich also nicht aus dem unterschiedlichen Licht, sondern aus der Annahme durch den Empfänger. Der eine nimmt es voller, der

¹⁶ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 2, qu. 1, fol. 7va-vb: „Prima ratio sic patet: Nam tota certitudo conclusionum est ex certitudine principiorum, quia tunc scire opinamur unumquodque, cum cognoscimus causas et principia eius, ut dicitur I *Physicorum* {I, 1, 184a 10–12}. Si ergo aliqua concludimus ex articulis fidei vel si unum articulum contradicimus ex alio, tota certitudo praedictarum conclusionum erit ex certitudine principiorum et quia principia fidei non cognoscimus nisi in lumine fidei et inquantum sunt a Deo revelata, non cognoscimus ipsas cognitiones, quae eliciuntur ex praedictis principiis in praedicto lumine, immo cum maior sit certitudo principiorum quam conclusionum, non poterit aliqua conclusio certitudinem aliquam habere, quae non reducat in certitudinem principiorum cognitorum lumine fidei. Nam si probamus Filium distingui a Patre, et Spiritum Sanctum ab utroque per rem relatam, non absolutam, hoc est, quia praesupponimus Deum esse unum in essentia et trinum in personis. Tota igitur certitudo istius conclusionis dependebit ex illo principio, quod quidem non probamus, sed supponimus per lumen fidei. Nec est ibi aliqualis cognitio vel certitudo speculationis praeter cognitionem fidei et si est ibi aliqua speculatio, hoc est inquantum arguendo procedimus ex tali principio ad talem conclusionem. Numquam tamen sumus certi de ista conclusione, quod in divinis sit distinctio per relata, nisi quatenus credimus sub lumine fidei Deum esse unum in substantia et trinum in personis. Secus autem est in principiis naturaliter cognitis. Quia conclusiones scientificas cognoscimus per principia, quae sunt nobis nota naturaliter et in lumine naturali, ideo in talibus est vera certitudo speculationis et cognitio propter quid. Sed si praedicta principia, quae sunt nobis naturaliter cognita, ut ‚de quolibet esse vel non esse‘ et ‚omne totum est maius sua parte‘ excederent nostrum intellectum, et non haberemus certitudinem de eis, nisi quia a Deo dictum est ita esse, tunc nullam aliam certitudinem haberemus de conclusionibus, quae concluderentur ex praedictis principiis, nisi quia talia essent a Deo revelata. Non igitur cognoscimus Deum in hac vita nisi cognitione fidei, nec in alio lumine nisi in lumine fidei.

Secunda ratio sic ostenditur. Nam in naturali cognitione non ponimus nisi unum lumen intellectus agentis, in quo cognoscuntur principia et conclusiones naturales. Nam si conclusiones cognoscuntur clariori modo, ut sunt elicitedae ex principiis, quam prout in principiis continentur, antequam ex eis deducantur, hoc est, prout magis explicantur deductae ex principiis per syllogismum demonstrativum quam in principiis existentes, in eodem tamen lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur principia etiam huiusmodi conclusiones. Multo ergo fortius non erit aliud lumen supernaturale, in quo cognoscuntur articuli fidei, et conclusiones, quae deducuntur ex eis. Maxime cum nulla certitudo competat praedictis conclusionibus, nisi illa, quae competit praedictis articulis, quae magis est adhaesionis quam speculationis. Adhaesimus namque ipsis articulis solum, quia sunt a Deo revelati.“

andere nur teilweise auf. Außerdem kann sich die menschliche Natur, die sich auf ihrer irdischen Wanderschaft (*in via*) befindet, nicht dermaßen über den Glauben erheben, daß sie sich die Inhalte der Offenbarung als Wissen aneignet. Dies wäre ein Sprung von einem Licht zum anderen, der auch die Änderung der Gewißheit unseres Wissens über Gott zur Folge hätte. Er vollzieht sich erst bei den Seligen, die Gott von Angesicht zu Angesicht schauen, ihn also mit größerer Gewißheit als die Menschen im Diesseits erkennen. Sie verfügen dann über ein neues Licht, über das Licht der Herrlichkeit der Erlösung.¹⁷

Am Ende seiner Polemik gegen Heinrich verweist Augustinus Triumphus, dem Beispiel seiner Zeitgenossen folgend, auf eine zusätzliche Schwierigkeit. Er macht geltend, daß die Vertreter dieser Meinung sich über die Heilige Schrift erheben und für sich ein Wissen reklamieren, das sie nicht besitzen. Wenn, so schließt Augustinus Triumphus, die Existenz des theologischen Lichts Wahrheit wäre, sollten die Theologen, die sich in dessen Besitz glauben seinetwegen klarer und überzeugender als andere sein. Da es aber nicht der Fall ist, spricht es gegen die Prämissen dieser Position.¹⁸

¹⁷ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 2, qu. 1, fol. 7vb–8ra: „Tertia ratio sic declaratur: Nam licet lumen fidei ex parte Dei infundentis sit limpidum et clarum, ut tamen recipitur in nobis adhuc in statu viae, ex naturalibus obscure et aenigmaticè ipsum recipimus. Dicemus ergo, quod modus intelligendi omnium viatorum est obscurus et aenigmaticus non tamen praedictus modus est <aequalis> {ms: punctalis}, quia unus viator clarius intelligit quam alius etiam articulos fidei et illa, quae sunt annexa articulis, inquantum per aliquas similitudines et manuductiones creaturarum clariore modo intelligit illa, quae sunt nobis a Deo revelata, et illa, quae per fidem cognoscimus [quam unus alius]. Numquam tamen ista claritas tanta est, quod faciat nos recedere a cognitione aenigmatica fidei; et quod faciat nos scire de ipsis articulis fidei quid rei secundum intellectum essentialem aggenerantem certam cognitionem per causam intrinsecam et dicentem propter quid, quia isto modo cognoscunt Deum et illa, quae dicuntur de ipso, ipsi beati et ipsi comprehensores, qui ex aperta visione, quam habent de Deo, demonstrative sciunt, quod nos credimus.“

¹⁸ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 2, qu. 1, fol. 7vb–8ra: „Procedit ergo ista positio ex falsa imaginatione, cum per hoc, quod unus viator intelligit clarius quam alius ipsa credibilia, ponat ea simpliciter esse scita, quod patet falsum esse. Nec per hoc est commendare Sacram Scripturam, sed magis est ipsam vilificare. Nam sicut si viator dicat se esse comprehensorem se ipsum vilificat, quia dicit se habere, quod non habet. Sic si aliquis Sacrae Scripturae doctor dicat se cognoscere Deum per divinam Scripturam alio lumine quam per lumen fidei, praedictam Scripturam vilificat, quia dicit sibi convenire, quod non convenit. Oportet namque praedictum lumen ponentes habere doctrinam clarioribus clariorem et tradere ipsam ordinationibus ordinationem, cum tamen ipsi magis obscure et magis inordinate scientiam tradant quam illi, qui solum per lumen fidei dicunt se Deum in hac praesenti vita cognoscere.“

1.3. *Scientia* – eine Form der Theologie

Während des ganzen 13. Jahrhunderts diskutierten die scholastischen Theologen über die Wissenschaftlichkeit ihrer Disziplin. In der anfänglichen Periode meinten Autoren wie Alexander von Hales oder Bonaventura¹⁹, daß die Theologie zwar als Wissenschaft bezeichnet werden könne, aber eher als Weisheit bezeichnet werden solle. Es läßt sich jedoch während der ganzen ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts die wachsende Tendenz beobachten, die Theologie doch als Wissenschaft zu erklären. Als Höhepunkt dieses Prozesses gilt zumeist die Konzeption des Thomas von Aquin²⁰, der die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie aus der sogenannten Subalternationstheorie herleitete. Gemäß dieser Theorie, die aus der Wissenstheorie des Aristoteles geschlußfolgert wurde, legitimiere eine Wissenschaft entweder ihre Grundprinzipien selbst oder sie entnehme sie einer Wissenschaft höheren Ranges. Im letzteren Falle komme das Verhältnis der Subalternation vor: Eine Wissenschaft subalterniere eine andere, wenn sie jene mit Prinzipien versorge; eine subalternierte Wissenschaft sei daher eine solche, die ihre Prinzipien aus einer ranghöheren Wissenschaft bezieht. Ein solches Verhältnis komme beispielsweise dann vor, wenn sich die Metaphysik die Naturphilosophie subalterniert. Die Theologie brauche gewiß nicht ihre Prinzipien zu beweisen, da sie in der Offenbarung gegeben seien, die den Gegenstand des Glaubens, nicht des Wissens darstelle. Dennoch gebe es solche Arten von Wissen, etwa das Wissen der Seligen oder das Selbstwissen Gottes, in denen die Prinzipien der irdischen Theologie selbstverständlich seien. Also könne man die Theologie als eine vom Selbstwissen Gottes subalternierte Wissenschaft bezeichnen sowie als Wissenschaft in dem Sinne, der von Aristoteles diesem Terminus zugeschrieben wurde.

Eine ähnliche Argumentation zugunsten der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie besagt, daß es für ihre Wissenschaftlichkeit genüge, wenn die Theologie ihre Schlußfolgerungen an Hand von korrekt verfaßten Syllogismen beweise.²¹

Beide Argumentationstypen hält Augustinus Triumphus für unzureichend. Nach seiner Meinung sei mit ihnen eher bewiesen, daß die Theologie keine Wissenschaft im exakten Sinne sei; denn das

¹⁹ Bonaventura, *Liber primus Sententiarum*, prooem., 3, corp.: I, 13b; Alexander de Hales, *Summa theologica*, I pars, qu. 1, mem. 1, cap. 1: I, 2b.

²⁰ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, qu. 1, art. 2: 3b.

²¹ Ganz ähnlich bei Peter von Auvergne, *Quodlibet XIII*, qu. 1; vgl. J. LECLERCQ, La théologie comme science d'après la littérature quodlibétique, in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 11 (1939) 351-374, 354-357.

menschliche Wissen müsse, um einen wissenschaftlichen Charakter zu haben, sich auf die sinnliche Erfahrung stützen. Dies gelte sowohl für die subalternierte als auch für die subalternierende Wissenschaft. Wenn also die Prinzipien oder Prämissen einer Wissenschaft vom Standpunkt des Menschen aus nicht offenkundig bewiesen seien, werden ihre Schlußfolgerungen oder die ihr subalternierten Inhalte ebenfalls nicht offenkundig sein und somit keine Wissenschaft im exakten Sinne darstellen.²²

Augustinus Triumphus macht deshalb den Vorschlag, man solle die Theologie als Weisheit verstehen. Damit würde man der Argumentation des heiligen Augustinus folgen, der behauptete, daß die Weisheit den göttlichen, die Wissenschaft dagegen den menschlichen Dingen gelte.²³ Man würde auch dem Aristoteles zustimmen, nach dessen Meinung die Weisheit ihre eigenen Prinzipien legitimiere. Aber auch dieser Vorschlag ist für Augustinus Triumphus nicht akzeptabel. Denn im exakten Aristotelischen Sinn muß die Weisheit durch denselben Gewißheitsgrad wie die Wissenschaft gekennzeichnet sein, was die Theologie – versteht man sie nach dem heiligen Augustinus als Wissen von göttlichen Dingen oder nach Aristoteles als Disziplin, die ihre eigenen Prinzipien unter Beweis stellt – nicht erfüllt.²⁴

²² Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 3, qu. 1, fol. 10va: „Dicemus enim quantum ad primam rationem verum esse, quod quaedam est scientia praesupponens principia per se nota in eadem scientia. Quaedam autem praesupponit principia in scientia superiori. Quaelibet tamen istarum habet certitudinem speculationis. Nam scientia subalternans liquide speculatur sua principia, sicut ‚totum esse maius sua parte‘ et cetera talia, quae ad sensum sunt manifesta. Similiter scientia subalternata praesupponit talia principia, quae sunt per se nota in scientia inventa ab homine. Et quia ab homine non invenitur scientia nisi via memoriae, sensus et experientiae, ideo semper praesupponuntur principia in utraque scientia esse nota sensui. Propter quod utraque cognitio potest proprie scientia appellari. Sed principia istius doctrinae nec sunt nota in hac doctrina, nec in aliqua doctrina ab homine inventa, ideo non erit proprie scientia quantum ad cognitionem viatorum, sed quantum ad cognitionem comprehensorum.

Similiter alia ratio non concludit, quia non potest esse maior certitudo in conclusionibus quam in principiis. Et quia principia istius scientiae non sunt per se nota in cognitione viatorum, ut dictum est, ideo nec conclusiones, quae ex talibus principiis concluduntur cognitionem scientificam, quae proprie scientia appelletur, habere non poterunt.”

²³ Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, 3: CCL 50, 423,54 – 424,56: „ista definitio diuidenda est ut rerum diuinarum scientia sapientia proprie nuncupatur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat.“

²⁴ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 3, qu. 1, fol. 10vb: „Sed istud dictum non videtur sufficere, quia sicut ista doctrina non proprie dicitur scientia, quia est de divinis magis quam de humanis et quia non habet certitudinem illam speculationis, quae ad scientiam humanam requiritur, ita potest dici, quod non proprie dicatur sapientia eo modo, quo metaphysica sapientia appellatur, quia non habet certitudinem illam de rebus divinis, quae ad sapientiam humanam requiritur.

Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie sei noch mit der folgenden Argumentation zu retten: Auch wenn die Kenntnis von Inhalten, die der Gegenstand des Glaubens allein seien, keine Wissenschaft im exakten Sinne darstelle, so beweise doch die natürliche Vernunft manche Glaubensinhalte in der natürlichen Theologie. Also könne man den Teil der Theologie, der sich mit der natürlichen Theologie deckt, als völlig wissenschaftlich anerkennen. Augustinus Triumphus bemerkt jedoch, daß diese zwei Arten von Theologie, d. h. die geoffenbarte und die natürliche keine Einheit darstellen, weil die erstere alles als von Gott geoffenbart überlege, was die letztere nicht tue.

Die kritischen Überlegungen führen Augustinus Triumphus zu eigenen Schlussfolgerungen.

Fragt man nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie hinsichtlich des Gegenstandes und der Wissensquelle, so ist die Theologie für Augustinus Triumphus sowohl Wissenschaft als auch Weisheit. Hier schließt er sich dem heiligen Augustinus an, nach dessen Ausführungen sich die Theologie mit menschlichen wie göttlichen Angelegenheiten beschäftigt. Außerdem sei ihr Lehrer Christus, der den Menschen sowohl Weisheit wie Wissenschaft vermittele.

Untersucht man die Vorgehensweise der Theologie, so kann man weder von Wissenschaft noch von Weisheit sprechen. Die Art der Überlegung geht in dieser Weise vor. Zuerst erscheint das natürliche Licht. Ihm schließt sich das Licht des Glaubens an, welches das erstere nicht beseitigt, sondern vervollkommenet, wie die Gnade die Natur. So werden die natürliche Weisheit und die natürliche Wissenschaft mittels des Lichtes des Glaubens etwas Höheres. Zu dessen Beschreibung bedient sich Augustinus Triumphus eines Wortes des Johannes von Damaskus. Er bezeichnet das Vorgehen als eine Über-Wissenschaft und Über-Weisheit. Er gesteht aber ein, daß die so verstandene Theologie keine Wissenschaft und Weisheit im exakten Sinne sind. Ihre Erhabenheit, die von ihr vermittelte Vornehmheit und Gewißheit seien unverkennbar, aber sie sind von einer anderen Art als die von der Metaphysik des Aristoteles oder überhaupt von der gesamten Philosophie geforderte Wissenschaftlichkeit.²⁵

Immo cum scire omnia per certitudinem speculationis sit propria conditio sapientiae, ut patet ex I *Metaphysicae* {I, 2, 982a 8–17}. Ex quo ista doctrina non habet de divinis nisi certitudinem adhaesionis, videtur, quod nec scientia, nec sapientia proprie possit appellari; sicut scita numquam sunt proprie credita. Et si debet nominari aliquo istorum, magis deberet nominari scientia quam sapientia eo, quod de rebus humanis, de quibus est scientia, potest haberi certitudo speculationis, sed de rebus divinis saltem eo modo, quo tractantur in hac doctrina, non nisi certitudo adhaesionis habetur.“

²⁵ Augustinus de Ancona, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., pars 3, qu. 1, fol. 11ra–11rb: „Viso ergo, quomodo diversimode diversi loquuntur de hac materia, volumus

1.4. *Deus revelator* – der Gegenstand der Theologie

Die Überlegungen zum Gegenstand der Theologie hatten zu dem Zeitpunkt, als sie von Augustinus Triumphus aufgenommen wurden, bereits eine reiche Geschichte. Es wird sowohl auf Gott wie auf die sich durch Christus vollziehende Erlösung des Menschen verwiesen. In der *Summa theologica* Alexanders von Hales²⁶ lesen wir, daß der Gegenstand der Theologie einen komplexen, sich in der Formel „göttliche Substanz von Christus im Heilswerk erkennbar“ widerspiegelnden Charakter habe. Eine solche Definition des Gegenstands der Theologie soll eine Synthese unterschiedlichster Bezeichnungen (meist patristischer Provenienz) dessen, was der Interessenbereich des Theologen umfaßt, und zwar sowohl Gott als die sich durch Christus vollziehende Erlösung des Menschen. Bei Autoren aus der Zeit nach Alexander macht sich freilich die Tendenz bemerkbar, den Gegenstand der Theologie zu vereinheitlichen. Sie zeichnet sich stark bei Thomas von Aquin²⁷ ab, der eindeutig behauptet, der Gegenstand der Theologie

illum modum ponere, qui magis nobis rationabilis videtur. Sciendum est ergo <quod> hanc doctrinam possumus tripliciter considerare. Primo – quantum ad ipsas res consideratas; secundo – quantum ad modum considerandi; tertio – quantum ad docentem sive inspirantem ipsam. Res autem, quae in hac doctrina considerantur, sunt in duplici genere, quia quaedam sunt divinae et quaedam sunt humanae. Cognitio ergo istius doctrinae quantum ad res consideratas in ipsa proprie potest dici sapientia et proprie potest dici scientia, quia cognitio rerum divinarum proprie vocatur sapientia, humanarum vero proprie vocatur scientia secundum Augustinum XIV *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1.

Quantum vero ad modum considerandi haec doctrina non proprie dicitur sapientia, nec proprie dicitur scientia eo modo, quo cognitio humana scientia et sapientia appellatur, sed nobiliori et excellentiori modo dicitur sapientia et certiori modo dicitur scientia. Nam cognitio humana – sive sit de divinis, sive de humanis – semper innititur lumini rationis. Si ergo huic lumini addatur lumen divinum, cui innitatur cognitio tam de rebus divinis quam de humanis, talis cognitio erit altior et certior cognitione naturali. Nam cum lumen fidei non tollat lumen naturale, sed perficiat ipsum, sicut gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit, oportet, quod ratio naturalis et lumen naturale subserviat lumini fidei, ideo II {ms: prima} *ad Corinthios*, X {5}, scribitur: ‚in captivitate redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi‘. Cognitio ergo rerum divinarum, quae innititur lumini fidei, non dicitur sapientia, sicut metaphysica, quae est cognitio divinarum acquisita per lumen rationis, sed dicitur esse super hanc sapientiam; et cognitio rerum humanarum, quae innititur eidem lumini fidei, non dicitur scientia sicut cognitio inventa per lumen naturale, sed dicitur super hanc scientiam, ut sicut secundum Damascenum {*De fide orthodoxa* I, 8, 1: ed. E. M. BUYTAERT, 29, 20–21} Deus non dicitur proprie sciens, sed supersciens; nec sapiens, sed supersapiens, sic cognitio istius doctrinae, quae omnia considerat tam res divinas quam humanas, non proprie dicitur scientia, sed superscientia, nec sapientia, sed supersapientia, loquendo de sapientia et scientia, ut dicunt cognitionem per naturalem rationem inventam.“

²⁶ Alexander de Hales, *Summa theologica*, I pars, qu. 1. mem. 1, cap. 3: I, 6a.

²⁷ Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, qu. 1, art. 7, corp.: 6b.

sei Gott; alles andere gehöre in ihren Bereich nur insofern, als es sich auf Ihn beziehe. Die These des Thomas, stark aber sehr sparsam formuliert, provozierte spätere Autoren zu weiteren Diskussionen. Wieder haben in ihnen Heinrich von Gent und Aegidius Romanus die Hauptrollen gespielt.

In seinem Sentenzenkommentar hält Aegidius²⁸ die These des Aquinaten aufrecht, Gott sei der Gegenstand der Theologie, er behauptet aber zugleich, er könne in ihr nicht *absolute*, d.h. wie er als solcher oder an und für sich existiert, betrachtet werden, sondern müsse unter dem besonderen Begriff des Erlösers gesehen werden. Die Theologie sei nach Aegidius eine besondere Wissenschaft, sie müsse daher Gott über einen besonderen Begriff betrachten, um sich von der Metaphysik zu unterscheiden, die als allgemeine Wissenschaft Gott auf eine allgemeine Art und Weise betrachtet. Ein solcher Begriff, durch dessen Vermittlung wir in der Theologie den Zugang zu Gott haben, sei der Erlöser. Gott sei also der Gegenstand der Theologie als derjenige, der dem Menschen Erlösung bringe.

Der Position des Aegidius widersprachen Heinrich von Gent und Gottfried von Fontaines. Das Gegenargument Heinrichs²⁹ lautet, daß Gott *absolute*, d.h. an und für sich der Gegenstand der Theologie sei. Er begründete seine Meinung damit, daß das Ziel der Theologie die Erkenntnis Gottes sei und daß jede Wissenschaft nach der Erkenntnis ihres Gegenstandes strebe. Gott werde in der Theologie zuerst unvollkommen erkannt, je mehr von seinen Attributen jedoch erkannt werden, desto vollkommener werde das Wissen über Ihn. Außerdem machte Heinrich darauf aufmerksam, daß der Erlöser, von Aegidius als Begriff vorgeschlagen, unter dem wir Gott in der Theologie erkennen, in der Tat eines der Attribute sei; wenn wir also die These von Aegidius anerkennen, vermengen wir den Gegenstand der Theologie mit den ihm zugeschriebenen Prädikaten. In eine ähnliche Richtung ging auch die Kritik, die Gottfried von Fontaines³⁰ an Aegidius übte; er nämlich stellte fest, daß Aegidius' Behauptung sich faktisch auf die These zurückführen lasse, die Erlösung und nicht Gott sei der Gegenstand der Theologie.

²⁸ Aegidius Romanus, *Super primo Sententiarum opus*, prol., qu. 1, art. 3, corp., fol. 3C-P. Siehe auch P. PRASSEL, Das Theologieverständnis des Ägidius Romanus O.E.S.A (1243/7-1316), 30-40.

²⁹ Henricus de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariam*, art. 19, qu. 1, fol. 114A-117X.

³⁰ Godefridus de Fontibus, *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, Quodlibetum I*, 5, ed. M. DE WULF, A. PELZER (Philosophes Belges 2), Louvain 1904, 9-17. Vgl. dazu P. THON, Foi et théologie selon Godefroid de Fontaines, 203-206.

Heinrichs Polemik rief wiederum die Antwort von Aegidius³¹ hervor, der darauf verwies, daß die Position des ersteren die Unendlichkeit des menschlichen Wissens voraussetze: Wenn Gott unendlich sei, könne er als solcher nur durch ein unendliches Wissen erkannt werden. Das menschliche Wissen sei dagegen, wie alles Erschaffene, endlich. Daher vermöge die Theologie nicht, Gott *absolute* zu erkennen. Die Darlegung von Aegidius bewog Heinrich³² zur Antwort, in der er zu beweisen versuchte, es sei dem Menschen möglich, Gottes Unendlichkeit zu erkennen. Der Streit, ob wir Gott *absolute*, oder über einen besonderen Begriff erkennen, initiiert durch die Interpretation der These des Thomas von Aquin durch Aegidius und Heinrich, wurde bis zum Ende des Mittelalters geführt, wobei die meisten Augustinischen Theologen die These ihres Meisters konsequent verteidigten.

Selbstverständlich hat sich auch Augustinus Triumphus zu dieser Frage geäußert. Wie man von vornherein vermuten konnte, blieb seine Position im engen Zusammenhang mit dem Streit zwischen Aegidius und Heinrich. So beginnt Augustinus Triumphus seine Überlegungen mit der Analyse der Position, derzufolge Gott als solcher der Gegenstand der Theologie sei. Die komplexe, mehrsträngige und aus mehreren Etappen bestehende Argumentation des Augustinus Triumphus kann man wie folgt zusammenfassen: 1. Gott sei als solcher der Gegenstand seines Selbstwissens, weil er sein Wesen, so wie es an und für sich ist, zusammen mit dessen Unendlichkeit, kenne. 2. Ein solches Wissen sei dem Menschen unzugänglich, denn es setze die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis von Gottes Unendlichkeit voraus. 3. Die Argumente Heinrichs von Gent, (in dessen Schriften aus der zweiten Phase der Polemik gegen Aegidius formuliert), denen zufolge die endliche Erkenntnis des unendlichen Gottes möglich sei, seien irrtümlich. Wie man nämlich diese Frage auch immer formuliert, lasse sie sich schließlich auf die folgende Disjunktion zurückführen: Entweder erkenne der Mensch die Unendlichkeit Gottes oder er erkenne sie nicht. Der erstere Fall sei faktisch unmöglich, mit dem letzteren sei selbst Heinrich nicht einverstanden. 4. Die von Augustinus Triumphus vorgelegten Kritiken zeigen auch, daß sich die Wissenschaften nicht nur hinsichtlich des sie erkennenden Subjekts und des von ihnen

³¹ Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibet II*, 3, Lovanii 1646, 127a-133b.

³² Henrici de Gandavo *Quodlibet XII*, 1, ed. J. DECORTE: *Opera omnia* 16, 4-13. Die Analyse der ganzen Diskussion zwischen Aegidius und Heinrich ist in den folgenden Texten ausgeführt: P. NASH, Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology, in: *Medieval Studies* 18 (1956) 61-92 und C. LUNA, Una nuova questione di Egidio Romano „De subiecto theologiae“, in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 37 (1990) 397-439, 38 (1991) 129-173.

behandelten Gegenstandes, sondern auch hinsichtlich der Art und Weise, wie sie sich mit diesem Gegenstand beschäftigen, unterscheiden müssen. Diese Behauptung ist besonders wichtig im Falle, wo man die dem Menschen zugängliche Theologie von dem Selbstwissen Gottes zu unterscheiden hat, denn Gott kenne sich selbst als solchen, *absolute*, also auf eine unendliche Art und Weise; der Mensch erkenne dagegen Gott auf eine endliche, d.h. durch einen bestimmten Begriff beschränkte Weise.³³

Bisher werden die grundsätzlichen Erkenntnisse des Aegidius Triumphus durch die Hauptthesen von Augustinus Triumphus bestätigt. Der Unterschied macht sich bemerkbar, wenn es zu der Frage kommt, durch welchen Begriff die menschliche Erkenntnis Gottes in der Theologie vermittelt werde. Augustinus Triumphus behauptet, der Gegenstand der Theologie sei der sich dem Menschen selbst offenbarende Gott (*ut inspirator et revelator*). Im Verlauf der weiteren Begründung der Wahl von Offenbarung als des Begriffs, durch den Gott in der Theologie gegenwärtig sei, weist Augustinus nach, daß der Gegenstand einer Wissenschaft in ihr *prima facie* erkannt werden und im proportionalen Verhältnis zu den Vermögen des ihn erkennenden Subjekts stehen müsse. Es sei Gott als Offenbarer, der beide Bedingungen erfülle, denn die Offenbarung sei die erste Quelle des Wissens über Gott und im proportionalen Verhältnis zu den Fähigkeiten des menschlichen Intellekts bleibe. Darüber hinaus müsse die Theologie genetisch mit dem Glauben verbunden sein – und die Glaubensartikel seien dem Menschen ja geoffenbart worden. Außerdem müsse jede Behauptung einer Wissenschaft in ihr durch denselben Begriff bekannt sein, durch dessen Vermittlung ihr Hauptgegenstand betrachtet werde, und so geschehe es eben in der Theologie, deren alle Inhalte ja geoffenbart worden seien.³⁴

³³ Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura super primo Sententiarum. Prologus, Pars 4*, qu. 1: *Utrum Deus inquantum Deus sit in hac scientia subiectum*, fol. 13ra–15va, vgl. fol. 13ra–14vb; auch in: M. OLSZEWSKI, Augustine of Ancona on the subject of theology, in: *Acta Mediaevalia* 20 (2005) 384–398, vgl. 388–393.

³⁴ Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura super primo Sententiarum. Prologus, Pars 4*, qu. 1, fol. 14vb–15ra: 393–395: „Declarato igitur Deum inquantum Deus non esse subiectum in ista scientia volumus ostendere, quod Deus inquantum inspirator et revelator istius doctrinae in ipsa debet poni subiectum. Hoc autem possumus quantum ad praesens quattuor rationibus probare.

Prima ratio sic declaratur. Nam subiectum debet poni in scientia secundum modum illum, secundum quem est primo cognitum in illa scientia et secundum quem offert se intellectui cognoscentis, quia sic se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam. Obiectum autem potentiae est illud, in quod primo potentia fertur. Sed Deus est cognitus in hac doctrina primo secundum quod inspirator et revelator eius. Nam licet secundum Damascenum primo libro „cognitio existendi Deum sit ab ipso

Die Überlegungen Augustinus' enden mit einer Bemerkung, die seine Einstellung zur Konzeption von Aegidius erklärt. Augustinus behauptet ausweichend, er wage nicht die Theorie von Aegidius zu analysieren, da ihm die dazu notwendigen intellektuellen Fähigkeiten abgehen, verweist aber zugleich darauf, Aegidius' These schließe es nicht aus, daß Gott unter andern Begriffen der Gegenstand der Theologie sein könne.³⁵ In Wirklichkeit unterscheiden sich aber die Konzeptionen beider augustinischer Theologen grundsätzlich. Aegidius zeigt die Spezifik vom Verständnis Gottes in der Theologie, indem er deren gegenständlichen Umfang beschränkt; der Gegenstand der Theologie seien ihm zufolge Inhalte die unmittelbar mit der Erlösung zusammenhängen. Auf diese Art und Weise versucht Aegidius die Idee der engen Verknüpfung von Gott und Erlösung in der Theologie, die charakteristisch für die Theologen vom Anfang des Jahrhunderts war, wieder zu beleben. Augustinus Triumphus hingegen, vermutlich von

omnibus naturaliter inserta' {I, 1, 2: ed. E. M. BUYTAERT, 12, 22–23}, in hac tamen cognitione supernaturali Deus non cognoscitur a nobis, nisi ut est praedictae cognitionis inspirator et revelator, ergo sub ista conditione Deus in hac doctrina debet poni subiectum.

Secunda ratio sic patet. Nam sicut obiectum debet esse proportionatum potentiae, sic subiectum debet esse proportionatum scientiae eo, quod actus activorum semper debent recipi in subiecto proportionato et disposito. Sed Deus inquantum Deus est improporcionabilis nostro intellectui ad cognoscendum, quia hoc modo solum proportionabilis est suo intellectui, qui sicut est infinitus, ita ipse secundum quod Deus et sub ratione infinita potest se sibi ipsi repraesentare. Ergo in nostra scientia ipse Deus erit subiectum ut inspirator et revelator cognitionis sui ipsius, quia secundum hoc conformabit se et coaptabit se intellectui cuicumque creaturae secundum proportionem et capacitatem recipientium.

Tertia ratio sic manifestatur. Nam cum tota ista scientia contineatur in principiis et in articulis fidei, oportet, quod sicut Deus est subiectum articulorum fidei et principiorum istius scientiae, sic sit subiectum in tota ista scientia, sed Deus est subiectum articulorum et principiorum istius doctrinae, ut est inspirator et revelator ipsorum, quia aliter praedicta principia non sunt magis cognita, nisi ut sunt a Deo inspirata. Ergo sub ista conditione Deus erit subiectum in tota doctrina ista.

Quarta ratio sic ostenditur. Nam sub illa ratione subiectum debet poni in scientia, secundum quam considerantur omnia, quae dicuntur et ponuntur in scientia. Sed omnia, quae considerantur in hac doctrina sive sint simpliciter credibilia, sive sint per humanam rationem investigabilia, considerantur sub una ratione formali obiecti, ut inquantum sunt divinitus revelata et divinitus inspirata. Ergo sub hac conditione formali Deus in hac doctrina debet poni subiectum.“

³⁵ Augustinus de Ancona, *Lectura super primo Sententiarum. Prologus, Pars 4*, qu. 1, fol. 15ra–b: 396: „Illam autem positionem, quae ponit Deum ut redemptorem et glorificatorem in hac scientia esse subiectum non reprobamus, tum quia illa positio non negat, quod sub alia conditione Deus non possit esse hic subiectum, sed solum negat, quod Deus inquantum Deus non deberet poni in praedicta scientia subiectum, in quo cum eis convenimus; tum quia illa est opinio doctorum ordinis nostri; tum quia ad ipsam reprobandam noster intellectus non attingit.“

den Kritiken Heinrichs und Gottfrieds beeinflusst, verlegt die Beschränkung der Erkenntnis Gottes in den Bereich der Methode, durch die das theologische Wissen erlangt wird. So gelingt es ihm, die deutliche Fundierung der spekulativen Theologie in der Offenbarung.

II. Zusammenfassung

Augustinus Triumphus entwickelt – wie das auf Grund einer allgemeinen Charakteristik der theologischen Literatur jener Zeit zu erwarten war – seine Sicht der Theologie im Dialog mit den vorausgegangenen und den zeitgenössischen Theologen. Seine wichtigsten intellektuellen Partner sind Thomas von Aquin, Heinrich von Gent und Aegidius von Rom, was auch schon die Anzahl der Bezugnahmen in seinem *Prolog* bestätigt. Durch deren Vermittlung spielen hauptsächlich noch die Vertreter der franziskanischen *opinio communis* eine Rolle. Das Verhältnis des Augustinus Triumphus zu Aegidius unterscheidet sich zu dem von Thomas von Aquin und Heinrich von Gent. Mit den letzteren diskutiert er direkt, indem er seine Position in der Auseinandersetzung mit ihnen erarbeitet. Mit Aegidius streitet er schweigend und implizit: Er kritisiert ihn nicht unmittelbar, sondern stellt alternative Lösungen dar, die von den Lösungen des Meisters abweichen und von den Zeitgenossen durchaus als Kritik verstanden wurden.

Die polemische Verwicklung verursacht, daß im Text von Augustinus Triumphus die kritischen Partien über die positiven überwiegen und vermittelt den Eindruck, daß er vor allem ein geschickter Polemiker war. Es bleibt doch die Frage, ob es Augustinus Triumphus gelungen ist, außer der Widerlegung der Konzeption Heinrichs von Gent und der anspielungsreichen Polemik gegen Aegidius auch etwas Originelles zu schaffen. Die Frage ist um so mehr begründet, als es in der intellektuellen Auseinandersetzung um die Wende zum 14. Jahrhundert, als Augustinus Triumphus als Theologe tätig war, sehr viele konkurrierende Entwürfe der Theologie gab, die das Feld der präsentierbaren Lösungen einengten.

Eine Antwort auf diese Frage wird mittels seiner Hauptthesen gegeben. Augustinus Triumphus nennt die Kontemplation als Ziel der Theologie. Er läßt keinen Zweifel daran, daß zwischen dem Glauben des Theologen und dem des einfachen Gläubigen kein Unterschied besteht. Die Theologie ist für ihn eine Wissenschaft im eingeschränkten Sinne. Ihr Gegenstand ist Gott als Offenbarer. Die erste und die letzte These stellen originelle Ideen des Augustinus Triumphus dar;

alle Thesen zusammen vermitteln das Bild der Theologie als einer Disziplin, die die gesamte Existenz des Menschen umfaßt und deren verschiedene Aspekte vereinigt, weil sie auf die vor allem durch die Vermittlung der Bibel zugängliche Offenbarung gestützt ist. Es scheint mir also, daß es Augustinus Triumphus gelungen ist, eine verglichen mit den Entwürfen anderer mittelalterlicher Theologen recht originelle Sicht der Theologie zu erarbeiten, die auch für den heutigen Rezipienten von intellektueller Attraktivität sein kann.

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L'ORTHODOXIE THOMISTE AU SECOURS DE L'AUGUSTINISME JANSÉNISANT

((La publication des 10^e et 11^e volumes de l'édition
bénédictine des œuvres de saint Augustin

22

Nulle pensée théologique n'a davantage imprégné le catholicisme de l'âge classique que celle de saint Augustin¹. Au firmament de la catholicité, la constellation augustinienne a brillé d'un intense éclat après la conclusion du concile de Trente; elle a sans cesse été le point de repère à l'aide duquel s'orientaient les innombrables auteurs soucieux de terminer une querelle de la grâce dont le questionnement avait été singulièrement revivifié après l'installation en Chrétienté des protestantismes luthérien et calviniste². Au prédestinarianisme aggravé des théologiens réformés, les pères tridentins avaient répondu par le quatrième canon du décret *de iustificatione* promulgué le 13 janvier 1547 en la sixième session du concile: «Si quelqu'un dit que le libre arbitre mû et excité de Dieu, en donnant son consentement à Dieu, qui l'excite et qui l'appelle, ne coopère en rien à se préparer et à se

¹ Sur saint Augustin à l'époque moderne, outre le maître livre d'H. DE LUBAC, *Augustinisme et théologie moderne*, Paris, 2008 (1965), voir *Augustinus in der Neuzeit. Colloque de la Herzog August Bibliothek de Wolfenbüttel, 14-17 octobre 1996*, dir. K. FLASCH et D. DE COURCELLES, Turnhout, 1998, et *Augustin au XVII^e siècle. Actes du Colloque organisé par Carlo Ossola au Collège de France les 30 septembre et 1^{er} octobre 2004*, éd. L. DEVILLAIRS, Florence, 2007, notamment J.-L. QUANTIN, «L'Augustin du XVII^e siècle? Questions de corpus et de canon», pp. 3-77. Consulter ensuite P. STELLA, «Augustinisme et orthodoxie, des Congrégations de Auxiliis à la Bulle *Vineam Domini*», *XVII^e Siècle*, 135, 1982, pp. 169-189; B. NEVEU, «Le statut théologique de saint Augustin au XVII^e siècle», *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin. Communications présentées au colloque des 19 et 20 avril 1990*, Collection des Études augustinienes, série Antiquité, 127, Paris, 1990, pp. 15-28, repris dans ID., *Érudition et religion aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, préf. M. FUMAROLI, Paris, 1994, pp. 473-490; L. KOLAKOWSKI, *God owes us nothing. A brief remark on Pascal's religion and on the spirit of jansenism*, Chicago, 1995, *Dieu ne nous doit rien. Brève remarque sur la religion de Pascal et l'esprit du jansénisme*, trad. française, Paris, 1997, en particulier «Pourquoi l'Église catholique a-t-elle condamné l'enseignement de saint Augustin?», pp. 9-148; J.-L. QUANTIN, *Le catholicisme classique et les Pères de l'Église. Un retour aux sources (1669-1715)*, Paris, 1999, en particulier «Augustin, docteur de la grâce», pp. 126-138; et L. THIROUIN, «À la recherche du vrai saint Augustin», *Les écoles de pensée religieuse à l'époque moderne. Actes de la Journée d'Études de Lyon (14 janvier 2006)*, éd. Y. KRUMENACKER et L. THIROUIN, *Chrétiens et Sociétés, Documents et Mémoires*, 5, 2006, pp. 25-64.

² Pour une mise en perspective synthétique et récente, voir B. QUILLIET, *L'acharnement théologique. Histoire de la grâce en Occident, III^e-XX^e siècle*, Paris, 2007.

mettre en état d'obtenir la grâce de la justification, et qu'il ne peut refuser son consentement, s'il le veut, mais qu'il est comme quelque chose d'inanimé, sans rien faire, et purement passif: qu'il soit anathème³.» Respectueux du récent donné conciliaire, le jésuite espagnol Luis de Molina (1535-1600), développant des intuitions qu'il a trouvées chez son maître et confrère portugais Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), publie en 1588 sa célèbre *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis*⁴, où était affirmée l'idée d'une grâce suffisante généralement conférée aux hommes et dont la suffisance⁵, aboutissant à une pleine efficacité en vertu du consentement du libre arbitre, était évaluée *post merita praevisa* par Dieu grâce à l'exercice d'une science moyenne, *scientia media*, qui lui donnait connaissance des futurs contingents⁶. Défendue par la Compagnie de Jésus, la doctrine moliniste n'en est pas moins rapidement suspecte de pélagianisme ou, au moins, de semi-pélagianisme⁷, et s'attire la très vive hostilité de l'ordre de Saint-Domi-

³ DENZINGER-SCHÖNMETZER, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, 36^e éd., Fribourg-en-Brisgau-Rome, 1976, n. 1554, p. 378: «*Si quis dixerit liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque uocanti, quo ad obtinendam iustificationis gratiam se disponat ac praearet, neque posse dissentire si uelit, sed uelut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere mereque passiuè se habere: anathema sit.*»

⁴ L. DE MOLINA, *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, diuina praescientia, prouidentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione ad nonnullos primae partis D. Thomae articulos*, Lisbonne, 1588. Sur Molina et le molinisme, voir W. HENTRICH, *Gregor von Valencia und der Molinismus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Prämolinismus mit Benützung ungedruckter Quellen*, Innsbruck, 1928; E. VANSTEENBERGHE, art. «Molinisme», *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* [DThC], x/2, Paris, 1929, coll. 2094-2187; W. LURZ, *Adam Tanner und die Gnadenstreitigkeiten des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Molinismus*, Breslau, 1932; Fr. STEGMÜLLER, *Geschichte des Molinismus*, vol. 1, *Neue Molinaschriften*, Münster, 1935; et plus récemment S. K. KNEBEL, «Scientia media. Ein diskursarchäologischer Leitfaden durch das 17. Jahrhundert», *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, 34, 1991, pp. 262-294; L. RENAULT, art. «Bañezianisme-molinisme-baianisme», *Dictionnaire critique de théologie*, dir. J.-Y. LACOSTE, Paris, 1998, pp. 133-136; *Die scholastische Theologie im Zeitalter der Gnadenstreitigkeiten*, vol. 1, *Neue Texte von Diego Paez (†1582), Diego del Mármol (†1664) und Gregor von Valencia (†1603)*, éd. U. L. LEHNER, Nordhausen, 2007.

⁵ Sur la notion théologique et philosophique de suffisance, voir M.-D. CHENU, «Sufficiens. Notes de lexicographie philosophique médiévale», *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* [RSPTh], xxii/2, 1933, pp. 251-259.

⁶ Sur les enjeux philosophiques de la question de la science moyenne, voir W. L. CRAIG, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suárez*, Leyde, 1988. Consulter aussi l'étude classique d'A. BONET, *La filosofía de la libertad en las controversias teológicas del siglo XVI y primera mitad del XVII*, Barcelona, 1932.

⁷ Sur le terme de semi-pélagianisme, voir la courte mais précieuse étude de M. JACQUIN, «À quelle date apparaît le terme *semipélagien* ?», *RSPTh*, i/3, 1907, pp. 506-508.

nique. Protecteurs attirés des enseignements de saint Thomas d'Aquin et de ses disciples, les dominicains, emmenés par leur confrère espagnol Domingo Báñez (1528-1604)⁸, entendaient s'en tenir au plus strict thomisme *de gratia*, pourtant défini de fraîche date, et préserver un système qui maintint intangiblement l'idée d'une grâce efficace par elle-même et la thèse de la prédestination gratuite, soit *ante merita praeuisa*⁹. S'ils admettaient, non sans restriction, l'existence d'une grâce suffisante, les thomistes affirmaient aussi la nécessité d'une *gratia se ipsa efficax* pour la réalisation de chaque acte de piété, *ad omnes et singulos pietatis actus*, secours dont la nature était celle d'une pré-motion, ou prédétermination¹⁰, physique¹¹ – et non pas morale –, notion par quoi ils caractérisaient, en respectant l'axiome thomasien

⁸ Sur Báñez, voir J. A. GARCÍA CUADRADO, «La obra filosófica y teológica de Domingo Báñez (1528-1604)», *Anuario de historia de la Iglesia*, 7, 1998, pp. 209-227, et ID., *Domingo Báñez (1528-1604). Introducción a su obra filosófica y teológica*, Pampelune, 1999. Consulter aussi les travaux classiques de V. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, «Actuación del Maestro Domingo Báñez en la Universidad de Salamanca», *La Ciencia Tomista* [CT], 25, 1922, pp. 64-78 et pp. 208-240, 26, 1922, pp. 63-73 et pp. 199-223, 27, 1923, pp. 40-51 et pp. 361-374, et 28, 1923, pp. 36-47; ID., «Báñez y Felipe II», CT, 35, 1927, pp. 1-29; ID., «El Maestro Fray Domingo Báñez y la Inquisición española», CT, 37, 1928, pp. 289-309, et 38, 1928, pp. 35-58 et pp. 171-186; ID., «El Maestro Domingo Báñez», CT, 47, 1933, pp. 26-39 et pp. 162-179; et ID., *Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia. Textos y documentos*, Madrid, 1968. Voir également V. D. CARRO, «De Pedro de Soto a Domingo Báñez», CT, 37, 1928, pp. 145-178.

⁹ Sur la fortune du thomisme à l'époque moderne, consulter R. CESSARIO, *Thomism and the Thomists*, Milan, 1998, *Le thomisme et les thomistes*, trad. française, Paris, 1999, et D. BERGER, *Thomismus. Grosse Leitmotive der Thomistischen Synthese und ihre Aktualität für die Gegenwart*, Cologne, 2001. Voir aussi les mises au point de J. SCHMUTZ, «Bulletin de scolastique moderne (I)», *Revue thomiste* [RThom], C/2, 2000, pp. 270-341, et ID., «Bellum scholasticum. Thomisme et antithomisme dans les débats doctrinaux modernes», RThom, CVIII/1, 2008, pp. 131-182. Consulter aussi Ph. LÉCRIVAIN, «La Somme théologique de Thomas d'Aquin aux XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles», *Recherches de science religieuse*, XCI/3, 2003, pp. 397-427, et S. DE FRANCESCHI, «Thomisme et thomistes dans le débat théologique à l'âge classique. Jalons historiques pour une caractérisation doctrinale», *Les écoles de pensée religieuse à l'époque moderne...*, pp. 65-109.

¹⁰ Sur la notion thomasienne de prédétermination, voir Y.-M. CONGAR, «Prædeterminare et Prædeterminatio chez saint Thomas», *RSPTh*, XXIII/3, 1934, pp. 363-371.

¹¹ Pour une présentation synthétique du débat théologique autour de la notion de pré-motion physique, voir R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, art. «Prémotion physique», *DThC*, XIII/1, Paris, 1936, coll. 31-77; ID., art. «Thomisme», *DThC*, XV/1, Paris, 1946, coll. 823-1023; et A. MICHEL, art. «Science de Dieu», *DThC*, XIV/2, Paris, 1941, coll. 1598-1620. Consulter aussi G. BARZAGHI, «Analisi teoretica del concetto di premozione fisica secondo i principi di S. Tommaso d'Aquino», *Divus Thomas*, XCVI/1, 1993, pp. 195-206, et, naturellement, l'étude désormais classique de B. LONERGAN, *Grace and Freedom. Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Londres-New York, 1971 (1941).

qui faisait de Dieu la cause première, l'intervention divine permettant à la volonté humaine de passer de l'acte premier, soit la simple puissance, à l'acte second, soit l'action même.

On sait que, saisi par les deux partis, le magistère romain a refusé de trancher entre eux au terme des Congrégations de *auxiliis* (1598-1607), spécialement réunies à Rome sur ordre du pape Clément VIII pour permettre aux dominicains et aux jésuites de s'accorder au cours de débats contradictoires¹². Indécision qui a nourri une immense frustration parmi les théologiens catholiques, logiquement placés devant la nécessité d'un retour aux textes fondateurs de saint Augustin pour éclaircir une discussion dont le Saint-Siège avait formellement interdit la poursuite. En rédigeant son litigieux *Augustinus*, finalement publié à Louvain en 1640, Corneille Jansen (1585-1638)¹³, évêque d'Ypres plus connu sous le nom latinisé de Jansénius, espérait brosser le très exact portrait de la doctrine du glorieux évêque d'Hippone¹⁴. Ouvertement antimoliniste, récusant la validité théologique des concepts de *gratia sufficiens* et de *scientia media*, refusant l'idée qu'il pût y avoir prédestination *post merita praevisa*, le prélat niait qu'il y eût, *in statu naturæ lapsæ*, de secours suffisants autres que les seuls efficaces, et il accusait à son tour les jésuites de vouloir restaurer en catholicité les erreurs du pélagianisme.

Face à un ouvrage qui ne laissait debout aucun des fondements doctrinaux sur lesquels il appuyait sa défense, le parti moliniste a vite réagi et obtenu du magistère qu'il condamnât l'*Augustinus*¹⁵. Souscrite

¹² Pour une histoire des Congrégations de *auxiliis*, consulter R. DE SCORRAILLE, *François Suarez, de la Compagnie de Jésus, d'après ses lettres, ses autres écrits inédits, et un grand nombre de documents nouveaux*, 2 vol., Paris, 1912-1913, et X.-M. LE BACHELET, *Prédestination et grâce efficace. Controverses dans la Compagnie de Jésus au temps d'Aquaviva (1610-1613)*, 2 vol., Louvain, 1931. Voir aussi P. BROGGIO, «*Ordini religiosi tra cattedra e dispute teologiche: note per una lettura socio-politica della controversia de auxiliis (1582-1614)*», *Religione, conflittualità e cultura. Il clero regolare nell'Europa d'antico regime*, éd. M. C. GIANNINI, Cheiron. *Materiali e strumenti di aggiornamento storiografico*, XXII/43-44, 2005, pp. 53-86; ID., *La teologia e la politica. Controversie dottrinali, Curia romana e Monarchia spagnola tra Cinque e Seicento*, Florence, 2009; et M. FORLIVESI, «*Gli scotisti secenteschi di fronte al dibattito tra bañeziani e molinisti: un'introduzione e una nota*», *Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale*, éd. S. PERFETTI, Pise, 2008, pp. 243-285.

¹³ Pour une introduction à l'histoire de la querelle janséniste, consulter l'ouvrage classique de L. COGNET, *Le jansénisme*, Paris, 1961. Sur Jansénius, voir J. ORCIBAL, *Jansénius d'Ypres (1585-1638)*, Paris, 1989.

¹⁴ C. JANSÉNIUS, *Augustinus, seu Doctrina S. Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate, ægritudine, medicina, adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses*, 3 vol., Louvain, 1640.

¹⁵ Sur les proscriptions successives de l'*Augustinus* et de sa doctrine, voir l'article fondamental de B. NEVEU, «*Juge suprême et docteur infailible: le pontificat*

le 6 mars 1642 par Urbain VIII, mais fulminée seulement le 19 juin 1643, la Bulle *In eminenti* proscrivait le livre du défunt évêque d'Ypres pour avoir été imprimé en contravention avec les interdictions émises par Paul V, qui avait imposé silence aux protagonistes de la querelle de la grâce après la clôture des Congrégations *de auxiliis*. Le 31 mai 1653, le pape Innocent X publiait la Bulle *Cum occasione* par quoi il censurait cinq propositions dont chacun savait qu'elles étaient censément extraites du livre de Jansénius, sans que le pontife eût toutefois pris la peine de le préciser explicitement. Maladroite ambiguïté que venait lever la Bulle *Ad sanctam Beati Petri sedem*, souscrite par Alexandre VII le 16 octobre 1656. L'orthodoxie catholique de la doctrine jansénienne était formellement, et irrémédiablement, mise en cause par la plus haute autorité magistérielle de la communauté ecclésiale.

Pour essayer tant bien que mal d'effacer les flétrissures qui leur étaient successivement infligées, les défenseurs de la mémoire de Jansénius, rapidement désignés sous le nom de jansénistes, ont dû chercher des alliés en catholicité et ont cru pouvoir les trouver parmi les dominicains, irréductibles adversaires du molinisme. En gages de bonne volonté, les adeptes du jansénisme ont fini par consentir à de menus accommodements de leur doctrine, acceptant progressivement, et non sans douleur, de se réduire aux enseignements délivrés par les thomistes espagnols Diego Álvarez (1550-1635) et Tomás de Lemos (1550-1629)¹⁶, les deux champions de l'ordre de Saint-Dominique lors des Congrégations *de auxiliis*¹⁷. Définitivement entériné au cours de

romain de la Bulle *In eminenti* (1643) à la Bulle *Auctorem fidei* (1794)», *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome, Moyen Âge-Temps modernes*, xciii/1, 1981, pp. 215-275, repris dans ID., *Érudition et religion aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles...*, pp. 385-450.

¹⁶ Sur Lemos, voir R. HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍN, «Tomás de Lemos y su interpretación agustiniana de la eficacia de los divinos auxilios», *Augustinus*, xxvi/101-102, 1981, pp. 97-138. Voir aussi les travaux de C. CREVOLA, «La interpretación dada a San Agustín en las disputas de auxiliis», *Archivo teológico granadino* [ATG], 13, 1950, pp. 5-171, et ID., «Concurso divino y predeterminación física según San Agustín en las disputas de auxiliis», *ATG*, 14, 1951, pp. 41-127.

¹⁷ Sur les rapports entre thomisme et jansénisme, voir J. MESNARD, «Thomisme espagnol et jansénisme français», *L'âge d'or de l'influence espagnole. La France et l'Espagne à l'époque d'Anne d'Autriche, 1615-1666, Actes du Colloque de Bordeaux, 25-28 janvier 1990*, éd. Ch. MAZOUER, Mont-de-Marsan, 1991, pp. 415-425, et G. FERREYROLLES, «Les citations de saint Thomas dans les *Écrits sur la grâce*», *Pascal, auteur spirituel*, éd. D. DESCOTES, Paris, 2006, pp. 143-159. On se permet également de renvoyer à S. DE FRANCESCHI, «Le thomisme au secours du jansénisme dans la querelle de la grâce. Vrais et faux thomistes au temps de la Bulle *Vnigenitus* (1713)», *RThom*, cvii/3, 2007, pp. 375-418; ID., «Les premiers jansénistes face à la doctrine thomiste. Jansénisme et thomisme à la veille de la campagne des *Provinciales*», *La campagne des Provinciales. Actes du colloque de Paris, 19-21 septembre 2007, Chroniques de Port-Royal*, 58, 2008, pp. 307-322; ID., «La doctrine thomiste

la campagne des *Provinciales* (1656-1657)¹⁸, le déport philothomiste des disciples de Jansénius n'a fait que se confirmer jusqu'à la fin du XVII^e siècle, brillamment illustré par l'œuvre de l'oratorien Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719), le successeur d'Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) à la tête du parti janséniste. Quant aux dominicains, ils ont préféré se tenir constamment sur la défensive, mais ils n'ont pu éviter d'être occasionnellement soupçonnés de sympathies jansénistes. Les jésuites n'ont d'ailleurs pas manqué de se saisir d'un si opportun prétexte pour tenter de discréditer des théologiens qui s'opposaient à eux sans relâche depuis plusieurs décennies. Inlassable confrontation polémique dont les péripéties qui ont entouré la publication, au tournant des XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles, des 10^e et 11^e volumes de l'édition bénédictine des œuvres de saint Augustin illustrent la partisane intensité: la controverse qui s'est alors déroulée a montré que chacun entendait fermement camper sur ses positions.

1. Les difficultés de l'entreprise augustinienne des bénédictins

Obsédés par le désir de l'emporter sur leurs adversaires, les molinistes ont fini par trouver du jansénisme partout et jusqu'aux endroits les plus imprévisibles. Leur attention s'est en particulier portée sur l'entreprise éditoriale des bénédictins de Saint-Maur, qui, à partir de 1679, publient une nouvelle édition des œuvres de saint

au péril du jansénisme. L'affaire du dominicain français Jean-Pierre Viou (1736-1743)», *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée*, cxx/1, 2008, pp. 133-167; ID., «Thomisme et jansénisme dans la querelle de la grâce (I). Les conséquences des cinq Articles de 1663 sur le débat autour du jansénisme», *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique [BLE]*, cx/1, 2009, pp. 3-30; ID., «Thomisme et jansénisme dans la querelle de la grâce (II). Le spectre des cinq Articles de 1663 au temps de l'antijansénisme triomphant», *BLE*, cx/2, 2009, pp. 179-206; ID., «Le jansénisme face à la tentation thomiste. Antoine Arnauld et le thomisme de *gratia* après les cinq Articles de 1663», *RThom*, cix/1, 2009, pp. 5-54; et ID., *Entre saint Augustin et saint Thomas. Les jansénistes et le refuge thomiste (1653-1663): à propos des 1^{re}, 2^e et 18^e Provinciales*, préf. G. FERREYROLLES, Paris, 2009.

¹⁸ Sur la campagne des *Provinciales*, voir E. D. JAMES, «The Problem of Sufficient Grace and the Lettres Provinciales», *French Studies*, xxi/3, 1967, pp. 205-219; J. PLAINEMAISSON, «Blaise Pascal et la grâce suffisante des thomistes dans les *Provinciales*», *RThom*, lxxx/4, 1981, pp. 575-585, repris dans ID., *Blaise Pascal polémiste*, Clermont-Ferrand, 2003, pp. 57-69; ID., «Pourquoi les *Provinciales* ou une guerre perdue d'avance», *Revue historique*, cclxxxvii/1, 1992, pp. 61-88, repris dans ID., *Blaise Pascal polémiste...*, pp. 27-56; et la magistrale étude d'O. JOUSLIN, *La campagne des Provinciales de Pascal. Étude d'un dialogue polémique*, 2 vol., Clermont-Ferrand, 2007.

Augustin¹⁹ – ils entendaient remédier aux défauts de la leçon proposée par Érasme (1528-1529)²⁰, et surtout aux lacunes de celle des lovanistes (1576-1577), pourtant plus fiable²¹. La catholicité de la foi des mauristes de l'abbaye parisienne de Saint-Germain-des-Prés, puisqu'il s'agissait d'eux, était hors de soupçon. Le chapitre général de 1654 avait formellement interdit de lire, sans expresse permission écrite du supérieur, l'*Augustinus* de Jansénius; celui de 1660 avait fait publier la Bulle *Ad sanctam Beati Petri sedem* dans chaque monastère de la congrégation. Pureté de doctrine illustrée par la sainte et érudite figure du célèbre Jean Mabillon (1632-1707)²². La première initiative d'une nouvelle édition des *opera omnia* de l'évêque d'Hippone, après celle de Louvain, était venue du pape Sixte Quint (1585-1590), peu satisfait du travail des lovanistes, mais le pontife était mort avant que l'entreprise ne fût parvenue à son terme. L'idée de relancer le projet sixtin est suggérée aux mauristes par Antoine Arnauld, lorsqu'au temps de la Paix de l'Église, le docteur travaille à la rédaction de *La perpétuité de la foy de l'Église catholique* (1669)²³. S'étant rendu à Saint-

¹⁹ *Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera post Louaniensium theologorum recensionem castigata denuo ad manuscriptos codices Gallicanos, Vaticanos, Belgicos etc. necnon ad editiones antiquiores et insigniores, opera et studio monachorum Ordinis S. Benedicti e Congregatione S. Mauri*, 11 vol., Paris, 1679-1700. Voir A.-M.-P. INGOLD, *Histoire de l'édition bénédictine de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1903. Consulter aussi Y. CHAUSSY, *Les bénédictins de Saint-Maur*, vol. 1, *Aperçu historique sur la Congrégation*, Paris, 1989, «Autour de l'édition de saint Augustin», pp. 89-95, et ID., «Les mauristes et l'édition de saint Augustin», *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin...*, pp. 29-35.

²⁰ *Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi omnia opera summa uigilantia repurgata a mendis innumeris*, 10 vol., Bâle, 1528-1529. Sur l'apport érasmien aux études augustiniennes, voir Ch. BÉNÉ, *Érasme et saint Augustin, ou Influence de saint Augustin sur l'humanisme d'Érasme*, Genève, 1969.

²¹ *Opera D. Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi et doctoris præcipui, tomis decem comprehensa, per theologos Louanienses ex manuscriptis codicibus multo labore emendata, et ab innumeris erroribus uindicata, illustrata præterea eruditissimis censuris et locupletata multis hominibus et aliquot epistolis eiusdem B. Augustini, antea non editis*, 10 t. en 7 vol., Anvers, 1576-1577. Sur l'édition lovaniste, voir L. CEYSSENS, «Le Saint Augustin du XVII^e siècle: l'édition de Louvain (1577)», *XVII^e Siècle*, 135, 1982, pp. 103-120.

²² Sur Mabillon, la bibliographie est évidemment très abondante. Voir en premier lieu la biographie classique d'H. LECLERCQ, *Mabillon*, 2 vol., Paris, 1953-1957, repris dans *Dom Jean Mabillon, moine et historien*, éd. D.-O. HUREL, Paris, 2007. Plus récemment, consulter *Érudition et commerce épistolaire: Jean Mabillon et la tradition monastique*, éd. D.-O. HUREL, Paris, 2003. Sur les activités éditoriales des mauristes, voir D.-O. HUREL, «Les mauristes, éditeurs des Pères de l'Église au XVII^e siècle», *Les Pères de l'Église au XVII^e siècle. Actes du Colloque de Lyon (2-5 octobre 1991)*, dir. E. BURY et B. MEUNIER, Paris, 1993, pp. 117-134.

²³ A. ARNAULD, *La perpétuité de la foy de l'Église catholique touchant l'eucharistie défendue contre le livre du sieur Claude, ministre de Charenton*, 2 vol., Paris, 1669.

Germain-des-Prés pour y consulter un manuscrit de saint Augustin, Arnauld avait vivement encouragé le prieur du monastère, Dom Victor Tixier (1617-1701), à lancer ses confrères dans une publication amendée et corrigée des œuvres du Docteur de la Grâce²⁴. Intéressé, Dom Tixier prend accord avec l'un de ses assistants, Dom Claude Martin (1619-1696). Le supérieur général, Dom Bernard Audebert (1600-1675), est rapidement gagné au projet. Seul un assistant de Dom Tixier, Dom Benoît Brachet (1610-1687), manifeste des réticences que viennent appuyer, lors d'une réunion en 1670, les arguments développés par Dom Vincent Marsolles (1616-1681), qui craint qu'une telle entreprise ne fasse rapidement soupçonner les mauristes de jansénisme. Le principe d'une nouvelle édition de saint Augustin n'en est pas moins adopté. Pour éviter les polémiques, le projet initial prévoit prudemment de n'entrer dans aucun parti théologique et de donner purement et simplement le texte de saint Augustin sans autres notes que textuelles et critiques. À la direction de l'ouvrage est placé Dom François Delfau (1637-1676), érudit réputé, qui s'adjoint aussitôt Dom Robert Guérard (1641-1715). Les deux bénédictins se mettent au travail et obtiennent l'assistance du cardinal Giovanni Bona (1609-1674), qui leur fait parvenir les matériaux méticuleusement réunis par les jésuites Manuel de Sá (1530-1596) et Jerónimo de Torres (1527-1611), en leur temps chargés par Sixte Quint de réfléchir à une nouvelle édition de saint Augustin pour remplacer la lovaniste. La communication des documents romains était un gage d'orthodoxie; le fait n'a pourtant jamais été invoqué par la suite²⁵. Le travail était très avancé quand Dom Delfau et Dom Guérard sont soudainement exilés par lettres de cachet, sans doute réclamées pour riposter à la récente parution de la première partie de *L'abbé commendataire* (1673), ouvrage polémique de Dom Delfau. Pour remplacer ses deux confrères, désormais empêchés de poursuivre l'entreprise, Dom Marsolles, devenu supérieur général, désigne Dom Thomas Blampin (1641-1710), à qui sont adjoints Dom Pierre Coustant (1654-1721), Dom Claude Guesnié (1647-1722), Dom Simon Bougis (1630-1714), Dom Edmond Martène (1654-1739), Dom Robert Morel (1653-1731) et Dom Jean Gelé (1645-1725)²⁶. L'ouvrage progresse vite, et son impression, chez

²⁴ Sur les rapports entre jansénistes et bénédictins, voir *L'ordre de Saint-Benoît et Port-Royal. Actes du Colloque de Paris (19-21 septembre 2002)*, *Chroniques de Port-Royal*, 52, 2003, en particulier D.-O. HUREL, «Jansénisme et générations dans la Congrégation de Saint-Maur», pp. 137-158.

²⁵ Voir G. SPINELLI, «Contributi dall'Italia all'edizione maurina delle opere di sant'Agostino», *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin...*, pp. 103-121.

²⁶ Voir P. GASNAULT, «Les artisans de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin», *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin...*, pp. 37-69.

François Muguet à Paris, commence le 5 octobre 1677. Dom Mabillon a été chargé de rédiger la dédicace de l'ouvrage à Louis XIV. Le premier volume paraît au début de l'année 1680. Les mauristes pouvaient être satisfaits de l'état d'avancement de leur entreprise éditoriale.

Le projet augustinien des bénédictins n'est naturellement pas passé inaperçu et a suscité les acerbes critiques du P. Jean Garnier (1612-1681), jésuite et ardent moliniste, professeur de théologie au collège parisien de Clermont. Deux capucins, les PP. Charles-Joseph de Troyes (†1685) et Esprit d'Eaubonne, ont aussi réagi après la parution des premiers volumes des mauristes. Le 14 août 1681, dans une lettre à Jacques Boileau (1635-1716), le P. d'Eaubonne accuse les bénédictins d'avoir altéré le texte et la doctrine de saint Augustin: «Il s'est trouvé quelqu'un d'érudition et de bon sens qui dit qu'il est fâcheux qu'après que MM. de Port-Royal nous ont changé le Nouveau Testament, les PP. Bénédictins changent saint Augustin. Il n'y a plus après cela qu'à nous faire changer de religion, mais avant que nous en changions, on fera changer saint Augustin non seulement de dogmes, mais aussi de profession. Car bientôt ce saint ne sera plus religieux, et ne l'aura jamais été. Mais laissons-là ceux qui veulent changer saint Augustin et la religion comme ils ont fait le Nouveau Testament²⁷.» Ulcérés, les deux capucins en appellent à l'arbitrage de l'antijanséniste archevêque de Paris, François de Harlay de Champvallon (1625-1695). Aux mauristes, ils reprochent notamment d'avoir adopté, dans leur 6^e volume paru en 1685, une lecture fautive du fameux passage de l'*Enchiridion* où saint Augustin affirme que les justes peuvent être sauvés s'ils le veulent, *possent salui esse si uellent*²⁸ – les bénédictins avaient préféré lire *uellet*, ce qui signifiait que le salut procédait seulement de la volonté de Dieu. Interprétation contre laquelle s'était élevé en 1681 le P. Charles-Joseph de Troyes dans une dissertation de son *Commentarius brevis et continuus in libros D. Augustini contra Pelagianos*²⁹. Prévenus des manœuvres que l'on ourdissait à leur rencontre, les mauristes délèguent Blampin et Mabillon pour défendre leur cause devant l'archevêque de Paris, qui finit par recevoir leurs excuses. Dom

²⁷ Cité dans A.-M.-P. INGOLD, *Histoire de l'édition...*, p. 45.

²⁸ AUGUSTIN, *Enchiridion de fide, spe et charitate liber unus*, c. XXIV, §95: «*Nec utique Deus iniuste noliit saluos fieri, cum possent esse si uellent.*»

²⁹ Ch.-J. DE TROYES, *Commentarius brevis et continuus in libros D. Augustini contra Pelagianos Adrumetinos, et primo in librum De gratia et libero arbitrio, deinde in librum De correptione et gratia, ubi et obiter inseritur aliqua dissertatio de quodam celebri loco Enchiridii, in quo multimode probatur Augustinum dixisse quod Reprobi possent salui esse si uellent, non uero Reprobi possent salui esse si uellet Deus*, Paris, 1681. Sur les critiques de Charles-Joseph de Troyes, voir J.-R. ARMOGATHE, «Arnauld traducteur», *Teorie e pratiche della traduzione nell'ambito del movimento Port-Royaliste*, Pise, 1998, pp. 9-30.

Blampin n'en accepte pas moins de faire tirer pour quelques amis des feuilles où l'on trouve le litigieux *uellet*³⁰. En dépit des obstacles, les bénédictins poursuivent leur travail. Le 10^e volume des *opera omnia* de saint Augustin, entièrement consacrés aux écrits antipélagiens, paraît en 1690. Les ennemis des mauristes dénoncent aussitôt l'insigne maladresse de Dom Blampin, qui, à l'instigation de conseillers malicieux ou inconséquents, a jugé utile de faire insérer – dans certains exemplaires uniquement –, en tête du *De correptione et gratia*, une *Analytica synopsis* qu'Arnauld en avait dressée lorsqu'en 1644, il en avait publié une traduction³¹. Indigné, M^{gr} de Harlay convoque Dom Claude Boistard, supérieur général des bénédictins depuis 1687, qui prétend que la chose s'est faite à son insu. Dom Blampin doit comparaître à son tour pour s'expliquer devant l'archevêque de Paris. Le jésuite François de La Chaize (1624-1709), confesseur du roi, réclamait l'exil de l'audacieux mauriste, mais M^{gr} de Harlay refuse une sanction si humiliante. Pour fuir les querelles qu'on lui suscitait sans aucune cesse, Dom Blampin demande en 1693 à être envoyé dans un autre monastère; il est alors nommé prieur de Saint-Nicaise de Reims, où il demeure six ans, poursuivant inlassablement, mais désormais à distance, le travail commencé.

La querelle autour de l'édition bénédictine s'assoupit pendant plusieurs années avant de renaître en 1699, dans le contexte de la condamnation du quiétisme et de la censure des *Maximes des Saints* (1697) de Fénelon par le Bref *Cum alias ad apostolatus* du 12 mars 1699. À la fin de l'année 1698 circule à Paris un pamphlet intitulé *Lettre de l'abbé D*** aux RR. PP. Bénédictins*³². L'auteur anonyme, qui se présente comme un abbé allemand, accuse les mauristes de favoriser le jansénisme dans le 10^e volume de leur édition des œuvres de saint Augustin. La paternité de l'ouvrage a été immédiatement attribuée aux jésuites, et l'on a soupçonné les PP. Gabriel Daniel (1649-1728), Barthélemy Germon (1663-1718) et Dominique Bouhours (1628-1702), avant de nommer, plus vraisemblablement, le

³⁰ Sur la querelle du *uellet*, voir J.-L. QUANTIN, *Le catholicisme classique et les Pères de l'Église...*, «L'empreinte de l'augustinisme», pp. 267-279.

³¹ A. ARNAULD, *Traduction du livre de saint Augustin De la correction et de la grâce avec des sommaires de la doctrine contenuë en chaque chapitre*, Paris, 1644. L'*Analytica synopsis doctrinae libri S. Augustini De correptione et gratia* est placée avant le texte latin de saint Augustin, qui précède la traduction d'Arnauld; elle a été reprise dans ID., *Œuvres*, éd. G. DU PAC DE BELLEGARDE et J. HAUTEFAGE, 43 t. en 38 vol., Paris-Lausanne, 1775-1783, t. XI, 1777, pp. 649-657.

³² [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre de l'abbé D*** aux RR. PP. Bénédictins de la Congrégation de Saint-Maur sur le dernier tome de leur édition de saint Augustin*, s. l., 1699.

P. Jean-Baptiste Langlois (1663-1706). La *Lettre de l'abbé D**** attaquait frontalement le travail éditorial des bénédictins au motif qu'il rejoignait les positions jansénistes en sous-entendant qu'il n'y avait pas de grâce suffisante: «Vous osez, mes Pères, dans une note qu'on trouve au commencement du traité *De la correction et de la grâce*, avancer que ce livre présente aux yeux toute l'économie de la grâce divine. Le croyez-vous, mes Pères, qu'un livre, où selon vous, on parle seulement de la grâce efficace, et où il n'est fait nulle mention de la suffisante, présente aux yeux toute l'économie de la grâce divine? Et quelle différence trouvez-vous entre faire cette proposition et soutenir formellement ou conséquemment les nouvelles erreurs³³?» Le P. Langlois ne manquait pas de relever avec la plus vibrante indignation la présence, dans nombre d'exemplaires du fameux 10^e volume, de l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Antoine Arnauld – il n'hésitait pas à dire que les mauristes avaient formé leur doctrine à la lecture d'un texte si litigieux: «Il est constant que l'abrégé prétendu que M. Arnauld a donné du livre *De la correction et de la grâce*, cet abrégé qui, au lieu de la doctrine de saint Augustin, renferme le plus outré jansénisme, a été l'ouvrage chéri sur lequel vous avez toujours eû les yeux attachés pour en tirer vos réflexions sur le libre arbitre et sur la grâce³⁴.» Les bénédictins avaient affaire à forte partie; on ne leur pardonnait pas leur récente passion augustinienne à une époque où les jésuites espéraient triompher du jansénisme.

Inquiets, les mauristes se mettent en quête d'appuis politiques pour se préserver des attaques du parti moliniste. Ils se tournent vers Bossuet et lui députent Dom Mabillon lui-même afin de plaider leur cause. Dans une lettre à son neveu Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1664-1743) du 9 février 1699, l'évêque de Meaux note impavide: «On s'avise, après dix ans, d'accuser de jansénisme l'édition bénédictine de saint Augustin à cause des notes, des lettres majuscules et des renvois. Certaines gens voudroient bien faire une diversion au quiétisme en réveillant la querelle du jansénisme, mais on ne prendra pas le change³⁵.» Lors d'un entretien avec Bossuet, Louis XIV lui-même a fait savoir qu'il désapprouvait les attaques dont les bénédictins faisaient l'objet. Entre-temps, la nouvelle s'est répandue que l'imprimeur Muguet vendait des exemplaires du 10^e volume des œuvres de saint Augustin comprenant l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Arnauld. Alerté, le nouvel archevêque de Paris, Louis-Antoine de Noailles (1651-1729),

³³ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre de l'abbé D****..., p. 29.

³⁴ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre de l'abbé D****..., p. 66.

³⁵ Cité dans A.-M.-P. INGOLD, *Histoire de l'édition*..., p. 62.

connu pour ses sympathies jansénistes, fait enquêter. La polémique est définitivement lancée lorsque le P. Langlois publie anonymement sa *Lettre d'un abbé commendataire aux RR. PP. Bénédictins* (1699)³⁶, suivie d'une *Lettre d'un bénédictin non réformé aux RR. PP. Bénédictins* (1699)³⁷, d'abord attribuées à son confrère Gabriel Daniel, comme l'avait d'ailleurs été la *Lettre de l'abbé D****. Le P. Langlois cherchait à obtenir des mauristes qu'ils descendissent à leur tour dans l'arène et répondissent à ses incessantes accusations de jansénisme.

Violamment mis en cause, les bénédictins décident de répliquer à leurs adversaires. Le premier à réagir est Dom François Lamy (1636-1711), qui fait paraître en février 1699 sa *Lettre d'un théologien à un de ses amis*³⁸. Lui emboîte le pas Dom Denis de Sainte-Marthe (1650-1725), qui publie ses *Réflexions sur la lettre d'un abbé d'Allemagne* (1699)³⁹, à quoi le P. Langlois répond aussitôt par son *Mémoire d'un docteur en théologie* (1699)⁴⁰. La plus puissante réplique des mauristes est sans conteste venue de Rome, où l'illustre Dom Bernard de Montfaucon (1655-1741) fait paraître ses *Vindiciæ editionis Sancti Augustini* (1699)⁴¹. L'ouvrage a un immense retentissement. Pour contrarier les desseins querelleurs du P. Langlois et de son *Mémoire d'un docteur en théologie*, les bénédictins décident le 13 août 1699 d'insérer, dans le 11^e et dernier volume de leur édition de saint Augustin, une préface générale que Dom Mabillon est chargé de rédiger. Dès le 22 août, un premier jet est couché sur le papier dont le texte est communiqué au théologien Jacques-Joseph Duguet (1649-1733), qui, après avoir été janséniste, a pris ses distances avec Port-Royal et qui réclame à Mabillon des modifications. Le projet de préface est ensuite adressé pour relecture à Jacques Boileau, à Bossuet, puis à Charles-Maurice Le Tellier (1642-1710), archevêque de Reims, qui font part d'exigences peu significatives. Peu auparavant avait été mis en circu-

³⁶ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre d'un abbé commendataire aux RR. PP. Bénédictins de la Congrégation de Saint-Maur*, s. l., 1699.

³⁷ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre d'un bénédictin non réformé aux RR. PP. Bénédictins de la Congrégation de Saint-Maur*, s. l., 1699.

³⁸ [Fr. LAMY], *Lettre d'un théologien à un de ses amis sur un libelle qui a pour titre Lettre de l'abbé *** aux RR. PP. Bénédictins de la Congrégation de Saint-Maur sur le dernier tome de leur édition de saint Augustin*, s. l., 1699.

³⁹ [D. DE SAINTE-MARTHE], *Réflexions sur la lettre d'un abbé d'Allemagne aux RR. PP. Bénédictins de la Congrégation de Saint-Maur sur le dernier tome de leur édition de saint Augustin*, [Rouen], 1699.

⁴⁰ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Mémoire d'un docteur en théologie adressé à M^{grs} les prélats de France sur la réponse d'un théologien des PP. Bénédictins à la lettre de l'abbé allemand*, s. l., 1699.

⁴¹ [B. DE MONTFAUCON], *Vindiciæ editionis Sancti Augustini a Benedictinis adornatæ aduersus epistolam Abbatís Germani*, Rome, 1699.

lation un nouveau pamphlet du P. Langlois intitulé *La conduite qu'ont tenue les PP. Bénédictins* (1699)⁴². De leur côté, les mauristes ne relâchent pas leur effort polémique, et Dom de Sainte-Marthe publie une *Lettre à un docteur de Sorbonne* (1699) dirigée contre le *Mémoire d'un docteur en théologie* du P. Langlois⁴³. Lui font écho ses confrères Dom René Massuet (1666-1716), dans sa *Lettre d'un ecclésiastique* (1699)⁴⁴, et Dom François Lamy, dans une *Plainte de l'apologiste des Bénédictins* (1699)⁴⁵. Excédés, les jésuites se plaignent auprès du roi, et le 11 novembre 1699, sur ordre de Louis XIV, le nouveau chancelier de France, Louis Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain (1643-1727), écrit à M^{gr} de Noailles pour lui demander de convoquer le provincial des jésuites, le P. Jean Dez (1643-1712), et le supérieur général des bénédictins, Dom Boistard, afin de les mettre en demeure de cesser leurs querelles. Dès le 15 novembre, le P. Dez fait part à ses confrères de la volonté du roi; la circulaire de Dom Boistard date, quant à elle, du 17 novembre. Non sans visibles réticences, les deux familles acceptaient de faire taire leur discorde.

Il restait encore à résoudre le délicat problème de la préface générale à mettre en tête du 11^e volume en préparation. Le 10 novembre, Dom Mabillon avait rendu visite à M^{gr} Le Tellier, de passage à Paris; chez l'archevêque de Reims, il avait croisé Bossuet, qui lui avait dit n'être plus satisfait de son texte et lui avait transmis remarques et corrections à reporter⁴⁶. D'où un nécessaire remaniement qui a coûté, semble-t-il, beaucoup de peine à Mabillon – on rapporte que le bénédictin en a pleuré de découragement. Une fois connue la volonté royale que terme fût mis à la polémique, Dom Mabillon s'est demandé s'il fallait persister dans l'intention de produire sa préface générale au début du 11^e volume des œuvres de saint Augustin. Il soumet ses doutes à M^{gr} Le Tellier, qui s'obstine à vouloir que le texte de Mabillon soit publié, mais sous une forme atténuée et simplifiée: le mauriste

⁴² [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *La conduite qu'ont tenue les PP. Bénédictins depuis qu'on a attaqué leur édition de saint Augustin*, s. l., 1699.

⁴³ [D. DE SAINTE-MARTHE], *Lettre à un docteur de Sorbonne touchant le mémoire d'un docteur en théologie adressé à M^{grs} les prélats de France contre les bénédictins*, s. l., 1699.

⁴⁴ [R. MASSUET], *Lettre d'un ecclésiastique au R. P. E. L. J. sur celle qu'il a écrite aux RR. PP. Bénédictins de la Congrégation de Saint-Maur touchant le dernier tome de leur édition de saint Augustin*, Osnabruck [Rouen], 1699.

⁴⁵ [FR. LAMY], *Plainte de l'apologiste des Bénédictins à M^{grs} les prélats de France*, s. l., 1699.

⁴⁶ Voir A.-M.-P. INGOLD, *Bossuet et le jansénisme. Notices historiques*, Paris, 1904 (1897), appendice v, «Bossuet et l'édition bénédictine de saint Augustin», pp. 152-217.

doit derechef revoir sa copie, tandis que les annotations de Bossuet ne sont finalement pas retenues pour être trop ouvertement antimolinistes. Au début de l'année 1700 paraît enfin le 11^e et dernier volume de l'édition bénédictine des *opera omnia* de saint Augustin. Le 19 avril 1700, le pape Clément XI adresse un bref de congratulation à Dom Boistard pour remercier les mauristes de leur entreprise éditoriale, et le 2 juin suivant, un décret du Saint-Office, publié à Rome cinq jours plus tard, condamne la *Lettre de l'abbé D****, la *Lettre d'un bénédictin non réformé* et la *Lettre d'un abbé commendataire*. Les mauristes pouvaient savourer leur indéniable triomphe sur la mouvance moliniste.

On n'entend pas ici rendre compte de l'ensemble des enjeux théologiques qui ont contraint l'élaboration de la préface générale rédigée par Dom Mabillon. On se borne à souligner qu'elle n'a satisfait ni les jansénistes, ni, évidemment, les jésuites, ni même certains mauristes, comme François Gesvres (1662-1705), qui publie en 1700 une *Defensio Arnaldina* pour justifier l'orthodoxie de l'*Analytica synopsis*⁴⁷. Quand paraît le 11^e volume de l'édition bénédictine de saint Augustin, qui contient la *præfatio generalis* de Mabillon, Pasquier Quesnel fait aussitôt connaître son ressentiment. Le mauriste avait relevé que ses confrères, dans leurs annotations, n'avaient jamais eu l'intention de critiquer l'idée d'une grâce intérieure privée d'effet, *effectu suo carens*, telle que l'École de saint Thomas l'avait adoptée en suivant saint Augustin⁴⁸. À quoi Pasquier Quesnel rétorque que Mabillon en est venu à se rallier aux thèses molinistes en les confondant avec un thomisme de *gratia sufficienti* mal compris: «Quand on dit absolument que la grâce suffisante *effectu suo caret*, c'est admettre ces grâces de pure possibilité des Molinistes, et l'attribuer à l'École de saint Thomas contre toute vérité. Car une grâce *quæ nunquam caret effectu proximo ad quem ex intentione Dei datur*, comme l'École de saint Thomas la soutient, ne peut être appelée une grâce *quæ absolute effectu suo caret*⁴⁹.» Dans sa préface, Mabillon était pourtant sans ambiguïté, affirmant clairement que les mauristes admettaient avec saint Augustin de petites grâces, *minores gratiæ*, et suffisantes *in sensu thomistico*, chez les saints comme

⁴⁷ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina, siue Analytica synopsis libri De correctione et gratia, quæ ab Arnaldo Doctore Sorbonico edita est an. 1644, ab omnibus reprehensorum uindicta calumniis*, Anvers, 1700.

⁴⁸ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini operum editionem præfatio generalis*, dans *Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera...*, t. XI, Paris, 1700, pp. VI-VII: «*Hæc enim et alia huiusmodi quæ gratiæ efficaci maxime conueniunt dicta sunt absque detrimento alterius ueræ et interioris gratiæ, sed effectu suo carentis, qualem post S. Augustinum Schola Thomistarum propugnat.*»

⁴⁹ Cité dans A.-M.-P. INGOLD, *Histoire de l'édition...*, p. 126.

chez les pécheurs⁵⁰. Déclaration dont ne se satisfait pas Quesnel, qui estime derechef que Mabillon a rejoint le camp des molinistes : « Les propositions indéfinies en matière dogmatique sont censées universelles. Ainsi c'est encore reconnaître une grâce suffisante universellement dans tous les hommes de dire que *et in sanctis et in peccatoribus cum sancto Antistite minores gratias easque thomistico sensu sufficientes admittimus*. Ces paroles, *thomistico sensu sufficientes*, sont une précaution inutile et renversent tout l'avantage qu'on en peut tirer dès là qu'on a déclaré que les grâces suffisantes qu'on admet avec cette École sont celles qui sont privées de leur effet, *effectu suo carentes*⁵¹. » Partisan acharné d'un ralliement du jansénisme aux thèses de l'École de saint Thomas, Quesnel soutenait que les mauristes n'avaient qu'apparemment réduit leurs positions à celles du thomisme.

2. La mise en cause de l'augustinisme thomiste des mauristes

La stratégie bénédictine d'un repli sous la protection du système thomiste, peut-être inspirée du discours janséniste, a pu exaspérer des esprits acquis au molinisme. Dans les considérations que lui inspire la préface générale de Mabillon, Fénelon formule des objections qui reflètent à la fois son antijansénisme viscéral et sa discrète mais réelle méfiance à l'égard du thomisme⁵². Il est également possible que l'archevêque de Cambrai soit animé d'un fort ressentiment à l'encontre des bénédictins parce qu'ils s'étaient opposés à lui dans l'affaire des *Maximes des Saints*⁵³. Au demeurant, Fénelon ne condamne pas globalement la *præfatio generalis* de Mabillon. Nombre d'affirmations lui sont parfaitement convenues. Ainsi relève-t-il positivement que les mauristes reconnaissent que saint Augustin a admis l'existence de grâces suffisantes⁵⁴. De fait Mabillon avait-il écrit dans sa préface

⁵⁰ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. VII : « *In sanctis et in peccatoribus, cum sancto Antistite, minores gratias easque Thomistico sensu sufficientes admittimus.* »

⁵¹ Cité dans A.-M.-P. INGOLD, *Histoire de l'édition...*, p. 126.

⁵² Sur Fénelon et le thomisme, voir S. DE FRANCESCHI, « Fénelon et la définition du vrai thomisme. De la condamnation du *Cas de conscience* (1704) à la Bulle *Vnigenitus* (1713) », *RSPHTh*, XCII/1, 2008, pp. 33-76, et ID., « Fénelon et la recherche du vrai thomisme. Le débat sur l'antithomisme fénelonien (1725-1726) », *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, CIII/3-4, 2008, pp. 839-886.

⁵³ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione Patrum Benedictinorum in nouissimam Sancti Augustini operum editionem epistola ad ****, Œuvres, t. XV, Paris, 1823, pp. 81-109.

⁵⁴ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 81 : « *Patres Benedictini fatentur Augustinum docuisse quod dentur gratiæ sufficientes.* »

générale que l'inspiration de Dieu pouvait être tantôt efficace, tantôt inefficace⁵⁵. Davantage, le mauriste avait pris la peine de préciser qu'il concevait la notion thomiste de *gratia sufficiens* en conformité avec les enseignements augustinien⁵⁶. Pour Fénelon, il ne faut pas douter que Mabillon ait voulu signifier qu'à chaque fois que saint Augustin soutient que la grâce n'est pas donnée à chacun, le saint évêque d'Hippone l'ait entendu de la seule *gratia efficax*, de laquelle seule il disputait avec ses adversaires – la grâce suffisante n'était pas en cause⁵⁷. Le prélat semblait prêt à pardonner aux bénédictins leur augustinisme outrancier puisqu'ils avaient pris la précaution de l'accorder avec les thèses thomistes.

Le point n'était pourtant pas si essentiel qu'il dût valoir aux mauristes une constante indulgence. Avec effroi, Fénelon note qu'en marge du *De natura et gratia*, les bénédictins ont osé écrire que la nécessité n'était pas incompatible avec la liberté de l'arbitre⁵⁸. Pour le prélat cambrésien, la phrase rappelle irrésistiblement les thèses de Baius et de Jansénius⁵⁹. Autre indice de foi douteuse: les mauristes ne cessent de gloser, dès qu'ils le peuvent, la grâce efficace selon saint Augustin, mais quand l'évêque d'Hippone évoque visiblement une grâce *tantum sufficiens*, ils s'abstiennent soigneusement d'annoter le passage, comme pour en indiquer l'insignifiance⁶⁰. Autrement dit, la

⁵⁵ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. VI: «*Notauimus ab Augustino gratiam dici inspirationem dilectionis. Quis uero ita esse neget, cum omnis gratia tendat ad dilectionem? Dei inspiratio alia efficax, alia inefficax.*»

⁵⁶ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. VI: «*Ceterum, ut solam gratiam uictricem et actuosam uocabulis istis, quæ proprie gratia est, hoc loco et similibus designarit Augustinus, falso quis inde colligeret locum non relinqui ullis aliis adiutoris qualia sunt inefficacia et sensu Thomistarum sufficientia. Huius generis gratias haud dubie agnoscit Sanctus Præsul nosque cum ipso ueras et proprie dictas profiteamur.*»

⁵⁷ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 82: «*Sic declarant [PP. Benedictini] Augustinum, quotiescumque dicit gratiam non omnibus dari, hoc tantum intellexisse de perfectissima omnium gratia, de qua sola disputabat, scilicet uictrice et maxima, quam aduersarii negabant, salua semper alia gratia, nempe sufficienti. Certe hæc confessio, modo sincera sit et modo hæc gratia sufficiens uere sufficiat, omnes difficultates amputat.*»

⁵⁸ *Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera...*, t. X, *Opuscula polemica contra Pelagianos*, Paris, 1690, *De natura et gratia contra Pelagium*, c. XLVI, coll. 150: «*Necessitas non pugnat cum arbitrio uoluntatis.*»

⁵⁹ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 88: «*Crederes audire Baium aut Jansenium rediuium. Multæ aliæ notæ sunt eiusdem farinae.*»

⁶⁰ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 88: «*Præterea auctores illi non tantum in eo quod dixerunt sunt damnandi, sed etiam in eo quod non dixerunt et quod dicere debuerant. Vbi cumque gratiæ apparet efficacis uel umbra, notas multiplicant ut gratiæ efficacissimæ sono aures lectoris obdurescant. Contra uero, in omnibus locis ubi Augustinus gratiam sufficientem uel directe docet, uel ex suis principiis indirecte adstruit, ab omni nota sese cauillouse abstinant.*»

conformité thomiste de l'augustinisme des bénédictins était sujette à caution, et par là contestable leur orthodoxie augustinienne. Du reste, quand ils évoquaient la grâce efficace, les éditeurs bénédictins se contentaient de l'appeler purement et simplement *gratia Christi*, comme si, dans l'état de nature déchue, il n'y avait selon eux d'autre grâce que l'efficace par elle-même⁶¹. Méticuleusement guidé, le lecteur n'avait plus d'autre choix que de se faire adepte d'un système prétendument augustinien qui reposait sur l'affirmation de la nécessité et de l'invincibilité de la *gratia efficax*⁶². Fénelon s'emportait contre l'audace de commentateurs qui ne respectaient pas plus la lettre des textes de saint Augustin que les constitutions du Saint-Siège pour récuser les fondements théologiques légitimes de l'idée de grâce suffisante⁶³. L'archevêque de Cambrai revenait plus précisément sur le contenu de la préface générale de Mabillon. Il rappelait qu'y était déclaré que les bénédictins s'en étaient tenus aux *ipsissima uerba* de saint Augustin, et naturellement à leur signification propre, pour confectionner leurs notes marginales⁶⁴. D'où le fait, précisait Mabillon, que là où ils avaient recouru au terme de *gratia* dans leurs sommaires et leurs annotations, ils avaient toujours entendu signifier ce que saint Augustin désignait sous les vocables de *gratia Christi* ou de *gratia propria dicta*, soit la *gratia uictrix et efficiens*, ou encore grâce efficace⁶⁵. Considération de quoi Fénelon ne faisait pas grand cas; à l'en croire, de tenir que l'évêque d'Hippone n'avait pas admis d'autre grâce

⁶¹ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 88: «*Insuper, quotiescumque de gratia efficacæ agitur, illam uocant simpliciter et absolute gratiam Christi, quasi in statu naturæ lapsæ nulla esset uera gratia interior et propriæ dicta præter hanc quam claustrum gratiam per se efficacem.*»

⁶² FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, pp. 88-89: «*His artibus lector sensim sese assuefacit ad hoc systema quod uocant Augustinianum, ita ut nullam gratiam Christi in Augustini libris inueniat præter efficacem. Hoc est uenenum quod lector incautus propinat in legendo textu cum illis notis.*»

⁶³ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 89: «*Licuitne gratiam efficacem ut solam, ueram et propriæ dictam gratiam Christi incessanter inculcare, et gratiam sufficientem amandare, aut silentio suppressere ut quid putidum et indignum quod reperiatur in Augustino? Hac uia pontificiæ bullæ deridentur.*»

⁶⁴ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. v: «*Nemini obscurum esse debet nos, in edendo Augustino, sic in eius doctrinam intendisse animum ut eius uerba et sententias sincere ac genuinè repræsentaremus. Atque, ut ad singula ueniamus, in contexendis marginalibus summiis ipsissima passim uerba Augustini, et quidem Augustiniano sensu, adhibere curauimus.*»

⁶⁵ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. v: «*Hinc est quod ubi gratiæ nomine in illis summiis usi sumus, id intellectum uolumus ipso contextus sensu et Augustini, qui gratiæ Christi et gratiæ propriæ dictæ nomine, maxime post exortum Pelagii errorem, gratiam ueram et interiorem, qualem iste negabat, in primis uero illam quæ uictrix est et efficiens, designare solet.*»

que l'efficace revenait à commettre un contresens gravissime d'interprétation⁶⁶. Pour l'archevêque de Cambrai, il fallait croire que les pieux mauristes s'étaient égarés en se laissant séduire par les lubies doctrinales des jansénistes.

D'approuver le travail éditorial des bénédictins, il ne pouvait conséquemment être question. Non sans perfidie, Fénelon met en relief la singulière dilection que Dom Blampin et ses assistants manifestent à l'égard du *De correptione et gratia*, un texte insatiablement cité par les défenseurs de Jansénius, qui le considèrent comme le traité augustinien le plus complet sur le sujet, combien délicat, de la grâce. Dans sa préface générale, Mabillon n'avait pas esquivé la question polémique de l'insertion, dans certains exemplaires du 10^e volume de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin, de l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Antoine Arnauld. Le bénédictin affirmait publiquement qu'il s'était agi de l'initiative personnelle de l'un de ses confrères, qui avait voulu complaire aux amicales instances qui lui en avaient été faites; il clamait haut et fort que le prieur et le supérieur général n'avaient jamais été mis au courant d'une intention si peu conforme au projet éditorial qui avait présidé à l'entreprise augustinienne des mauristes; il se gardait toutefois de prononcer un jugement sur l'orthodoxie du texte d'Antoine Arnauld, qui n'était évidemment pas nommé⁶⁷. De quoi Fénelon concluait que les mauristes ne pouvaient s'empêcher d'admirer l'*Analytica synopsis* et, conséquemment, de soutenir les thèses jansénistes⁶⁸. L'opuscule d'Arnauld avait pour but de montrer qu'il n'y avait d'autre secours *in statu naturæ lapsæ* que le célèbre *adiutorium quo* – notion par laquelle l'évêque d'Hippone avait désigné la grâce

⁶⁶ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 90: «Sic insinuant gratiæ Christi nomine intelligendam esse gratiam uictricem, non tantum in Augustini locutionibus, sed etiam in sincero ac genuino Augustiniano sensu. At uero falsissimum est hunc esse sincerum et genuinum Augustini sensum, scilicet ut nulla uera Christi gratia unquam assignetur præter illam quæ ex sua natura efficax est ad suum actum producendum.»

⁶⁷ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. VI: «Vbi et obiter illud profitemur opusculi eiusdem [De correptione et gratia] Analyticam synopsis in sciis Præpositis nostris publicatam, in quo flagitantium illam quorundam uoluntati morem gerere se posse arbitratus est unus e nostris, cum tamen nec illi, nec nobis, consilium fuisset particulam istam uniuerso operi præmittere, a cuius proposito alienam esse et ad id quod agebatur minime pertinentem non inuiti agnoscimus. Neque enim commentarios aut analyticas summas edere animus fuit in opera Sancti Doctoris [Augustini]. Ceterum de prædictæ analyseos, quæ cum auctoritate olim prodierat, utilitate, pretio, fide ad nos dicere non adinet.»

⁶⁸ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 98: «Hinc patet ipsos [Benedictinos], etiam dum metu coguntur animum dissimulare, ab illius operis aperta laude sese abstinere non posse. Atqui hoc opus Jansenianum dogma mordicus sustinet.»

efficace⁶⁹ –, et les bénédictins avaient clairement rallié la position du premier des jansénistes⁷⁰. Pour l'archevêque de Cambrai, il était évident que l'entreprise éditoriale des mauristes favorisait sournoisement le jansénisme.

Les bénédictins, s'indignant le prélat cambrésien, prétendaient s'abriter derrière la doctrine thomiste, mais leur thomisme n'était en réalité qu'affectation maladroite. Revenant sur les propos de Mabillon selon quoi les mauristes reconnaissent l'existence de grâces suffisantes *in sensu thomistico* chez les saints comme chez les pécheurs et tiennent pour erreur d'affirmer qu'outre la grâce efficace, aucune place n'est laissée à d'autres *adiutoria* qui soient *inefficacia* et *sensu Thomistarum sufficientia*⁷¹, Fénelon relève que les bénédictins refusent visiblement d'avouer qu'il y ait des grâces *uere sufficientes* ou *simpliciter sufficientes*: il leur faut toujours préciser qu'ils ne les évoquent que selon une conception thomiste qu'ils se gardent de préciser; autrement dit, ils ne croient pas qu'il y ait *in statu naturæ lapsæ* de grâce véritablement suffisante autre que l'efficace⁷². À suivre Fénelon, le point était essentiel, et péremptoire: pour les mauristes, les thomistes n'étaient catholiques qu'en vertu du *sensus thomisticus* qu'ils invoquaient en leur faveur; or les adeptes de l'École de saint Thomas admettaient sans peine qu'il y avait des grâces *uere sufficientes* et que leur suffisance plénière était un dogme de foi⁷³. D'où la conclusion de l'archevêque de Cambrai: les bénédictins ne pouvaient certainement pas accorder leur acceptation des thèses développées par l'*Analytica synopsis* avec leur prétendu ralliement au thomisme⁷⁴. Fénelon le

⁶⁹ AUGUSTIN, *De correptione et gratia*, c. XII, §34: «*Ipsa adiutoria distinguenda sunt: aliud est adiutorium sine quo aliquid non fit, et aliud est adiutorium quo aliquid fit.*»

⁷⁰ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, pp. 98-99: «*Ad hoc enim omnes neruos contendit [opusculum Arnaldi] ut ex Augustino demonstret nullum in præsentī statu dari auxilium præter illud quod uocatur quo. Ac proinde editores, etiam in apologetica Præfatione, ubi Jansenismum abiurare uidentur, Jansenianæ sectæ antesignanum, magistri sui systema stabilientem, laudant.*»

⁷¹ Voir *supra*, n. 50 et n. 56.

⁷² FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 99: «*Non dicunt uere sufficientia, nec simpliciter et sine addito sufficientia. Hæc declaratio perspicua, candida, simplex et plena eos nimis grauaret. Addunt quid relatiuum ad sensum Thomisticum, quo decisionem præcisam effugere possint.*»

⁷³ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 99: «*At ueniamus ad punctum essentiale et peremptorium. Creduntne Benedictini uerum esse hunc sensum Thomisticum quo solo Thomistæ ut Catholici in Ecclesia creduntur? Sentiantne has gratias esse uere sufficientes eamque sufficientiam esse dogma de fide, ut uero Thomistæ hoc expressissime docuerunt?*»

⁷⁴ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 99: «*Certe qui tanto cum zelo laudant Analyticam Arnaldi Synopsim non possunt serio amplecti sensum Thomisticum.*»

rappelle vigoureusement: selon l'opuscule d'Antoine Arnauld, il n'y a, dans l'état de nature déchue, d'autre secours que l'*auxilium quo*, soit la grâce efficace; l'*auxilium sine quo non*, soit la grâce suffisante, n'est qu'un *adiutorium uersatile* placé entre les mains du libre arbitre, qui en dispose à son gré, et il n'a été conféré qu'*in statu naturæ integræ*⁷⁵. D'où il s'ensuit qu'aucune grâce n'a été octroyée pour les actes surnaturels qui ne sont pas effectués⁷⁶. Fénelon n'estimait pas que les mauristes pussent s'abriter derrière la spécieuse équivoque, à laquelle avaient communément recours les thomistes dévoyés, qui consistait à soutenir que l'*auxilium quo* conféré pour un acte *minor* était *auxilium sine quo non ad maiorem actum*: de l'admettre impliquait que les bénédictins reconnussent qu'était octroyé *in statu naturæ lapsæ* un véritable *adiutorium sine quo non*, soit une *gratia uersatilis*, ce qui était en contradiction directe avec le système qu'ils adoptaient⁷⁷. Si l'on suivait rigoureusement les prescriptions doctrinales des bénédictins, une grâce efficace *respectu minoris actus* ne pouvait être suffisante *respectu maioris actus*, et les mauristes devaient avouer qu'ils niaient franchement qu'il y eût dans l'état de nature déchue un authentique *auxilium sine quo non*; pour eux, le juste privé d'*adiutorium quo* était entièrement dépourvu de l'assistance de la grâce, et le pécheur qui n'observait pas les commandements de Dieu n'avait assurément pas bénéficié du secours divin nécessaire à leur observance⁷⁸. À en croire le prélat cambrésien, l'augustinisme mauriste était de pure obédience janséniste.

⁷⁵ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, pp. 99-100: «Secundum illam Analysim, nullum in statu naturæ lapsæ datur auxilium nisi auxilium quo ad singulos actus supernaturales. Auxilium uero sine quo non est gratia uersatilis in manu liberi arbitrii quæ dari non potuit nisi in statu naturæ integræ.»

⁷⁶ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 100: «Vnde euidentissime sequitur nullam dari ueram gratiam ad singulos actus supernaturales qui non emittuntur.»

⁷⁷ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 100: «Neque dicant editores auxilium illud, quod est quo respectu unius minoris actus, esse sine quo non, siue tribuere proximum posse, respectu alius actus maioris. Si hoc esset, daretur in statu naturæ lapsæ uerum auxilium sine quo non, siue gratia, ut aiunt, uersatilis, quod totum illorum systema funditus euerteret.»

⁷⁸ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 100: «Igitur auxilium quod est quo respectu minoris actus non potest esse, in illorum [Benedictinorum] systemate, auxilium sine quo non respectu maioris actus. Vnde rigorose et absque ulla exceptione coguntur pronuntiare quod nullum detur auxilium sine quo non ad ullum omnino actum in statu naturæ lapsæ, ita ut qui non habet auxilium quo ad unum præcise actum, hic et nunc perseuerantiæ necessarium, nullum omnino habeat auxilium gratiæ Christi præcise ad illum actum, ac proinde sequitur quod quicumque non implet præceptum urgens, nullum hic et nunc habet auxilium uere sufficiens erga hunc actum præcepti urgentis.»

Le refuge protecteur du thomisme était refusé aux bénédictins, qui avaient cru faire montre d'habileté en reprenant à leur compte la tactique vainement empruntée par les disciples de Jansénius depuis plusieurs décennies. Les mauristes, poursuivait Fénelon, estiment s'être justifiés en déclarant qu'ils admettent une grâce suffisante *in sensu thomistico*, mais les purs thomistes sont là pour les détromper qui affirment que la *gratia sufficiens* est pleinement suffisante et que sa suffisance est *de fide credenda*⁷⁹ – thèse dont les fidèles disciples de l'Aquinate faisaient un critère d'orthodoxe catholicité face aux erreurs luthériennes et calvinistes, ainsi que Fénelon se faisait fort de le montrer à partir des principes mêmes des thomistes⁸⁰. L'École de saint Thomas, rappelait l'archevêque de Cambrai, enseigne invariablement qu'*in statu naturæ lapsæ* est octroyé à l'homme un véritable *auxilium sine quo non*, soit un secours pleinement suffisant qui confère une puissance prochaine, *potestas proxima*, et complète, nécessaire pour agir puisqu'elle apporte le pouvoir de faire quelque chose, sans toutefois comporter le passage à l'acte lui-même⁸¹. Que le substrat philosophique sur quoi reposait le thomisme pût être erroné, Fénelon n'entendait pas en examiner la possibilité. Il lui suffisait de relever que les thomistes restaient indéfectiblement attachés à leurs positions proprement théologiques et qu'ils étaient disposés à abandonner leurs principes philosophiques s'il s'avérait qu'ils fussent incompatibles avec la foi catholique⁸². L'archevêque de Cambrai n'hésite pas à renvoyer les mauristes à la lecture du Docteur Angélique, qui fait résider l'essence

⁷⁹ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, pp. 100-101: «*Quid ad hoc respondent editores nostri, qui Analyticam synopsis admirantur? Dicunt gratiam hanc esse sufficientem sensu Thomistico. Veri Thomistæ serio credunt hanc esse uere sufficientem, et credunt hanc ueram sufficientiam ad ueram fidem pertinere.*»

⁸⁰ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 101: «*Vnde se ipsos non credunt Catholicos, nisi prout hanc gratiæ sufficientiam, uera fide et intima conscientia, contra Lutheranos et Calvinistas profitentur. Facillimum esset id demonstrare ex ipsis Scholæ Thomisticæ principibus.*»

⁸¹ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 101: «*Vnde hæc Schola palam et aperte docet dari in statu naturæ lapsæ auxilium uerum et proprie dictum sine quo non, seu uere sufficiens et dans potentiam proximè completam in genere meræ potentiæ ad singulos actus erga quos præceptum urget.*»

⁸² FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 101: «*Vtrum Thomistæ in hoc sibi ipsis cohæreant, ipsi uiderint. Principium philosophicum illius Scholæ potest esse falsum: hic iam locus non est hanc quæstionem discutere. At saltem conclusio theologica huius Scholæ catholica est, dum ueram ac plenam gratiæ sufficientiam, non tantum ore confitentur, sed corde credunt. Conclusionem suam theologicam suo principio philosophico, ut debent, omnino præferunt; et ad saluandam hanc fidei conclusionem sincere parati essent suum principium abiurare si cum illa conclusione incompatible foret.*»

de la liberté dans le fait que l'arbitre se détermine lui-même à agir sous la motion de la grâce⁸³, et Fénelon s'étonne qu'ils puissent se prétendre thomistes alors qu'ils contreviennent sans vergogne à la doctrine de saint Thomas⁸⁴. Les bénédictins avaient également dû lire les textes de Diego Álvarez: ils y pouvaient trouver l'expression du pur thomisme auquel s'était rallié l'ensemble des thomistes, y compris les plus récents et jusqu'au P. Jean Nicolai (1594-1673)⁸⁵, pourtant dénoncé comme philomoliniste par les jansénistes au temps de la campagne des *Provinciales*⁸⁶. Le thomisme alvariste avouait indéniablement l'existence de grâces véritablement suffisantes.

L'objectif de la démonstration fénelonienne était de prouver que les mauristes n'avaient pas plus le droit de se présenter comme thomistes que les disciples de Jansénius. Au demeurant, on ne pouvait attendre d'auteurs qui approuvaient sans frémir l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Arnauld qu'ils soutinssent une autre doctrine que celle qui niait l'existence d'un *auxilium sine quo non* dans l'état de nature déchue⁸⁷. Pour Fénelon, les bénédictins n'avaient plus qu'à proclamer leur accord avec les railleries adressées aux thomistes par Pascal, dans la deuxième *Provinciale*, sur le sujet de la grâce suffisante. Les mauristes avaient adopté une conception si restreinte de la *gratia sufficiens* qu'ils en faisaient une grâce véritablement insuffisante et qu'ils

⁸³ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 101: «*Quod si quis dubitet an quæ dico uera sint, legat diligenter textum Doctoris Angelici; uidebit quod hæc est essentia libertatis ut causa secunda, positus omnibus necessariis ad agendum, se ipsam determinet et sub ipsius gratiæ motione contingenter operetur.*»

⁸⁴ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 101: «*Vnde mirabitur quod aliqui audeant sese Thomistas appellare, dum sancto Thomæ aperte contradicunt.*»

⁸⁵ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, pp. 101-102: «*Legat etiam Aluaresium, qui in disputatione de auxiliis, ex nomine totius Thomisticæ Scholæ, Jesuitas impugnabat. Hic certe plus quam cæteri omnes Thomistæ audiendus est, nam facit coram Sede Apostolica authenticam Thomisticæ doctrinæ expositionem. Non solum ipse, sed et duriores alii, ueram gratiæ sufficientiam et ueram potentiam, completam et proximè expeditam admittunt ut dogma fidei, quo solo discrepant a Protestantibus. Sic recentiores etiam usque ad patrem Nicolai.*»

⁸⁶ Sur le P. Nicolai, voir M.-M. GORCE, «Nicolai et les jansénistes ou la grâce actuelle suffisante», *RThom*, 36^e année, n. s., t. XIV, 67, juillet-novembre 1931, pp. 761-775, et 37^e année, n. s., t. XV, 71, mai-juin 1932, pp. 452-504, et J.-R. ARMOGATHE, *La nature du monde. Science nouvelle et exégèse au XVII^e siècle*, Paris, 2007, «Le temps de la grâce: Jansénius et Nicolai», pp. 207-212.

⁸⁷ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 102: «*At contra editores nostri, qui etiam in apologia Analyticam synopsis aperte laudant et sectantur, tenentur negare omne omnino auxilium sine quo non in statu naturæ lapsæ; ac proinde oportet, iuxta ipsos, quod homo qui hic et nunc non habet auxilium quo, seu efficax præcise ad actum præcepti urgentis, nullum habeat hic et nunc reale auxilium gratiæ quod sit uere sufficiens ad illum præcise actum faciendum.*»

s'écartaient finalement du pur thomisme en prétendant néanmoins certifier leur catholicité par un déguisement thomiste qui ne devait abuser personne⁸⁸. En admettant, disaient-ils dans leur préface générale, une grâce suffisante, ils n'en admettaient qu'une ridicule qu'ils tenaient en réalité pour une parfaite ineptie⁸⁹ – ainsi, commente Fénelon, n'étaient-ils d'accord avec les thomistes que sur la forme, car, sur le fond, ils récusaient manifestement l'idée d'une grâce pleinement suffisante. Comme Luther et comme Calvin, ils s'accordaient avec les principes philosophiques de l'École de saint Thomas, mais ils en rejetaient la conclusion théologique, qui était seule *de fide credenda*⁹⁰. Du reste, point n'était besoin d'aller chercher loin l'origine des intimes convictions doctrinales des bénédictins. Fénelon en appelait au témoignage de Mabillon lui-même, qui, dans sa préface générale, avait expliqué la manière dont les éditeurs de saint Augustin avaient dressé leurs sommaires et leurs notes marginales: ils n'avaient le plus souvent que rédigé une phrase synthétique. Ainsi, lorsque saint Augustin se demandait pourquoi Dieu ne concédait pas à chacun ni même toujours aux saints la *delectatio uictrix*, avaient-ils porté en marge: «Pourquoi la grâce n'est-elle pas donnée à tous et n'est-elle pas toujours donnée aux saints⁹¹?» Sur quoi Fénelon mettait le lecteur en garde: les auteurs des *marginalia* de l'édition bénédictine de saint Augustin avaient franchement avoué le goût qui les portait vers l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Arnauld; ils n'avaient pas craint d'affirmer que la nécessité n'était pas incompatible avec la liberté de l'arbitre⁹². Loin d'être, comme ils le

⁸⁸ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, pp. 102-103: «*Hæc est illa ridicula gratia uere insufficientis sufficientia, quam solam in professione fidei proponunt ad sese purgandos coram tota Ecclesia catholica. Hanc ridiculam esse in Thomistis credunt, eoque tamen pallio comædorum se tegi uolunt ut Catholici habeantur.*»

⁸⁹ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 103: «*Idem est quam si dicerent: Admittimus gratiam, quæ sufficiens est in sententia Thomistarum, cuius sufficientiam uere insufficientiam ut ridiculam exhibemus. Hanc admittimus ut sufficientem, in sensu qui in mente nostra sensus non est, sed manifestum delirium.*»

⁹⁰ FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 103: «*Sic, et non aliter, cum Thomistis consentiunt: sic sunt Catholici, deridentes doctrinam gratiæ sufficientis, ui cuius solius Catholici appellari possunt. Consentunt cum Thomistis in principio philosophico, in quo et Lutherus et Caluinus consentiunt; uerum in conclusione, quæ est de fide, quantum abest ut cum Thomistis consentiant! Imo illos derident.*»

⁹¹ J. MABILLON, *In nouissimam Sancti Augustini...*, p. VII: «*Cum Sanctus Doctor inquit cur uictricem delectationem non omnibus, uel non semper sanctis det Deus, breuiori forte compendio sententiam in margine sic expressimus: Gratia cur non omnibus uel non semper sanctis detur.*»

⁹² FÉNELON, *De generali præfatione...*, p. 108: «*Fatentur ergo breuiori forte compendio sententiam suam exprimi; sed aduerte, quæso, quinam sint qui adeo breuiter sententiam suam exprimunt. Hi sunt qui dicunt quod Analysis Arnaldina cum auctoritate olim prodierit, utilitate, pretio, fide, etc. Hi sunt qui in marginali nota absque*

disaient, de purs thomistes, ils se révélaient assurément d'authentiques jansénistes.

3. La justification bénédictine du philothomisme janséniste

La critique fénelonienne reflétait certes les hantises du parti moliniste, elle révélait aussi la tactique adoptée par les bénédictins de Saint-Maur pour préserver leur travail éditorial des attaques des jésuites: couvrir leurs thèses augustinienes du manteau protecteur du thomisme. Les mauristes ne s'en sont pas tenus là. Dans sa *Defensio Arnaldina* (1700), Dom François Gesvres entreprenait, de manière curieusement janséniste, de démontrer la parfaite et orthodoxe conformité thomiste de l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Antoine Arnauld. Le bénédictin commençait par souligner le fait que la question de la grâce suffisante ne divisait les théologiens que sur la forme: sur le fond, ils étaient communément d'accord; le nom seul pouvait être matière à dispute. Davantage, les jansénistes étaient plus proches des thomistes, dont la catholicité était indubitable, que ne l'étaient les antijansénistes; les molinistes n'avaient en commun avec l'École de saint Thomas que le vocable de *gratia sufficiens*; si les défenseurs de Jansénius révoquaient en doute la légitimité du terme, ils n'avaient au contraire jamais mis en cause l'existence du secours divin dont il s'agissait⁹³. Revenant sur la définition d'un *adiutorium sufficiens*, Dom Gesvres note qu'il est communément admis qu'un secours est suffisant qui confère le pouvoir de poser un acte de bien – de quoi chacun tombait d'accord, même si les thomistes l'entendaient d'une manière, et d'une autre les molinistes⁹⁴. Les disciples de saint Thomas, poursuit Dom

ullo temperamento posuerunt: Necessitas non pugnat cum arbitrio uoluntatis. O terribile effatum! O indignum et scandalosum axioma!»

⁹³ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina*..., I. II, 1^{re} partie, *De gratia sufficiente et efficaci*, p. 479: «Jamque inter doctores conuenit totam hanc quaestionem de gratia sufficiente magis in uocabulo quam in re positam uideri, ac multo magis eos qui Janseniani nominabantur cum Thomistis, quorum sine ulla controuersia catholica est opinio, semper conuenisse quam nostros Antijansenistas. Nam isti solum uocis sonum communem habebant et habent cum Schola Thomistica: illi, rem integram tenentes, de solo nomine pugnauerunt.»

⁹⁴ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina*..., I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, *De notione gratiae sufficientis uocabuli Thomistica*, pp. 493-494: «Auxilium sufficiens generatim dicitur id quo possumus bonum aliquod agere: auxilium ad orandum sufficiens, id quo possumus orare, auxilium sufficiens ad fidem, ad amorem Dei, ad perseuerantiam, id quo possumus credere, Deum amare, uel perseuerare in bono. Atque est hæc notio generalis in qua facile conueniunt omnes. Sed quam aliter Thomistæ, aliter scientiæ mediæ defensores interpretantur.»

Gesvres, tiennent pour *sufficiens* un *auxilium* qui comprend le seul nécessaire pour agir sans inclure la prémotion physique qui résulte du décret absolu de Dieu⁹⁵. De quoi les molinistes refusaient de convenir sans marquer clairement qu'ils s'écartaient du véritable thomisme.

Dans la mesure où la doctrine thomiste jouissait du prestige d'une inébranlable orthodoxie catholique, il était en effet difficile d'avouer qu'on ne la respectait pas entièrement. Le jésuite Michel Le Tellier (1643-1719)⁹⁶, implacable apôtre du molinisme, avait été confronté au problème dans son *Histoire des cinq Propositions de Jansénius* (1699) publiée sous le pseudonyme d'Hilaire Dumas. La description qu'il donnait du système thomiste de *gratia* était pour le moins discutable: «Selon les Thomistes, dès là qu'on ne résiste point à cette grâce qu'ils nomment *excitante* et *prévenante*, elle ne manque jamais, par un effet de la bonté de Dieu, d'être suivie de la grâce efficace, qui fait infailliblement vouloir et accomplir le bien. De sorte que, dans leur pensée, la grâce prévenante donne immédiatement et par elle-même le pouvoir, non pas à la vérité d'accomplir la bonne œuvre ou de vaincre la tentation, mais de s'attirer la grâce efficace nécessaire pour cela qui, par elle-même, en donne le pouvoir prochain ou immédiat et complet⁹⁷.» Telle était, à en croire le P. Le Tellier, la doctrine «commune et constante» des thomistes. Or, en faisant de la grâce suffisante entendue *more thomistico* une simple *gratia excitans* ou *præue-niens* qui permît de se voir conférer, pourvu que l'on y consentît, la grâce efficace nécessaire *ad bene agendum*, le jésuite tendait à attirer le système thomiste du côté du molinisme – ce que les jansénistes devaient naturellement relever, et le P. Le Tellier en était conscient: «Il est assez visible que c'est attribuer à la grâce excitante ou prévenante une suffisance très réelle et qui donne un pouvoir très véritable de faire le bien qu'on ne fait pas. Mais, pour M. Arnauld, on sçait déjà que selon lui, une grâce de cette nature seroit une grâce *Molinienne* qui n'auroit alors nul effet et à laquelle tantost on consentiroit, et tantost on ne consentiroit pas, ce qu'il regarde comme une pure chimère dans

⁹⁵ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 494: «*Nam quod Thomistæ mære sufficiens appellant, id omnia quæ ad agendum necessaria sunt minime complectitur, hoc est non includit decretum absolutum Dei uel præmotionem physicam quam omnes ad orandum, ad credendum, ad omnia pietatis opera, quam, uno uerbo, ut gratia sufficienti bene utamur, omnino necessariam esse existimant.*»

⁹⁶ Sur le P. Le Tellier, voir L. CEYSSENS, «Autour de l'*Vnigenitus*. Le P. Michel Le Tellier (1643-1719)», *Augustiniana*, 34, 1984, pp. 263-330, repris dans ID. et J. A. G. TANS, *Autour de l'*Vnigenitus*. Recherches sur la genèse de la Constitution*, Louvain, 1987, pp. 333-400.

⁹⁷ [M. LE TELLIER], *Histoire des cinq Propositions de Jansénius*, 2 vol., Liège, 1700, t. I, pp. 332-333.

l'état présent⁹⁸.» Décédé en 1694, Antoine Arnauld n'était plus là pour répliquer au jésuite, mais Dom Gesvres s'en est complaisamment chargé. Le discours du P. Le Tellier ne l'a absolument pas convaincu. Le jésuite est accusé, et non sans raison, d'avoir rendu molinistes les thomistes⁹⁹. Dom Gesvres est manifestement exaspéré par l'attitude des jésuites, qui reprochent aux disciples de saint Thomas tantôt de verser dans le pur calvinisme, ainsi que le P. Hernando de La Bastida avait pu le soutenir contre Tomás de Lemos et Diego Álvarez au temps des *Congrégations de auxiliis*, tantôt de rejoindre le camp du molinisme¹⁰⁰. Quand en effet, rappelle Dom Gesvres, les jésuites combattent le thomisme, ils l'accusent de se rapprocher du calvinisme en annihilant la liberté de l'arbitre¹⁰¹; quand au contraire, à l'instar du P. Le Tellier, ils cherchent à s'allier aux dominicains pour mener une lutte commune contre les jansénistes, ils font semblant de confondre la doctrine thomiste avec les thèses mitigées, mais d'inspiration clairement moliniste, du docteur Alphonse Le Moyne (1590-1659), qui avait fait les frais de la vindicte de Pascal et d'Arnauld au temps de la campagne des *Provinciales*¹⁰². Dom Gesvres s'indignait de voir que l'on se jouait sans la moindre vergogne des thomistes en les faisant passer si facilement d'un extrême à l'autre qu'ils finissaient par devenir des marionnettes asservies aux désirs des jésuites¹⁰³. Il n'était pas vraisemblable que les dominicains soutinssent des thèses aussi ductiles.

⁹⁸ [M. LE TELLIER], *Histoire des cinq Propositions...*, t. I, p. 333.

⁹⁹ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 497: «Anonymus et recens historiæ Jansenianæ scriptor, ut imperitis persuadeat Arnaldum re abiecta nudum et uacuum gratiæ sufficientis admisisse nomen, notionem sufficientis auxilii Thomistis attribuit plane Molinisticam.»

¹⁰⁰ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 497: «Ea est Antijansenianorum plerorumque ratio et uere Circæa uis ut euentus humanos opinionisque hominum possint disponere pro arbitrio et conuertere cum lubet.»

¹⁰¹ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, pp. 497-498: «Cum enim aduersus Thomistas disputant [Jesuitæ], gratia sufficiens Thomistica manifestam antilogiam includit, solo nomine sufficit, re ipsa non sufficit, cum ea nemo bene utatur nisi decretum absolutum et prædeterminans antecessit accedatque physica quedam motio. Quam opinionem plurimi, cum nihil humanæ libertati relinquere, tum perparum differre a Caluiniana definiunt.»

¹⁰² [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 498: «Jam uero nouus Antijansenianus Thomistas e Caluinianis subito et inusitato miraculo Molinianos facit, eorumque opinionem cum Moynia confundit siue, quod idem ferme est, cum Molinistica.»

¹⁰³ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 498: «Sic Thomistas facilitate incredibili uertunt in contrarias species, eosque modo in theatra Caluiniana deportant, modo reuehunt in Molinistica, cum id exigit ratio causæ et temporis, ut Thomistas non ob aliud quam ut Molinistarum nutui et arbitrio seruiant factos esse diceret.»

Soucieux de prouver que les thomistes étaient bien plus proches des jansénistes que des molinistes, le bénédictin en appelait au témoignage d'Antoine Arnauld lui-même. Dans sa *Dissertatio theologica* de 1656, l'intransigent docteur avait rappelé qu'il ne révoquait pas en doute l'existence d'une grâce suffisante; il demandait seulement aux dominicains de préciser, à chaque fois qu'ils recouraient au concept de *gratia sufficiens*, qu'ils l'entendaient *in sensu thomistico*, et non *more molinistarum*¹⁰⁴. Dans sa *Defensio Arnaldina*, Dom Gesvres remarque que le vocable de grâce suffisante est commun à Arnauld et aux thomistes. Il reste toutefois à examiner la question de savoir si l'homme à qui a été conféré l'*adiutorium sufficiens* peut en user convenablement sans qu'il y ait de décret absolu et antécédent, ni de motion physique de Dieu¹⁰⁵. Dans l'affirmative, les dominicains devenaient logiquement molinistes, et l'on comprenait mal pourquoi ils avaient tant débattu avec les jésuites lors des Congrégations *de auxiliis*; dans la négative, au contraire, ils s'accordaient pleinement avec Arnauld, et les molinistes devaient renoncer à vouloir s'en faire des appuis¹⁰⁶. Dom Gesvres renvoyait ses lecteurs aux textes d'Álvarez et de Lemos: à les parcourir, on ne pouvait douter que les dominicains ne convinssent pleinement avec Antoine Arnauld sur le point de la grâce suffisante¹⁰⁷. Davantage, les thomistes ne pouvaient être en désaccord avec Arnauld sans abandonner les principes mêmes sur quoi reposait leur système théo-

¹⁰⁴ A. ARNAULD, *Dissertatio theologica in qua Augustiniana propositio Defuit Petro gratia sine qua nihil possumus totius Traditionis auctoritate confirmatur, a Scholæ contentione seiungitur, cum uariis Thomisticæ Scholæ sententiis conciliatur, et a peruulgata de præceptorum impossibilitate calumnia purgatur*, s. 1., 1656, 3^e partie, art. x, p. 17: «Ergo cum Thomistis numquam de illa uoce litigabimus; rogabimus tantum, dum apud imperitos uerba facient, ut uel ab illa uoce abstineant, uel saltem admoneant illam a se usurpari in eo significato qui a Moliniano longe diiunctus sit. Ita nullum mihi cum ipsis certamen est, nec de nomine, quia non reiicio, nec de sensu, quia sensum illius uocis Thomisticum admitto.»

¹⁰⁵ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 505: «Cum locutio communis Arnaldo sit cum Thomistis, hoc unum examinandum est an qui ita loquuntur hominem auxiliis sufficientibus instructum iisdem bene aliquando uti sentiant sine decreto Dei antecedente et absoluto uel motione physica.»

¹⁰⁶ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 505: «Quod si affirmant, Thomistas ad castra Moliniana transisse confitebimur, eosque gratiam prædeterminantem suis hostibus prodidisse. Sin id negant apertissime, uel si ex eorum principiis consequens est ut negauerint, Schola Thomistica tota re dissentit a Moliniana et cum Arnaldo penitus consentit.»

¹⁰⁷ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, pp. 529-530: «De Aluaresii et Lemosii sententia paulo latius disserui, quod utriusque auctoritas maximi sit apud Thomistas omnes ponderis. Quantum uero Aluares ab Anonymi sensu dissentiat, quam in omnibus conueniat cum Arnaldo de notione sufficientis auxilii Thomistica, nihil necesse est pluribus ostendere. Res per seipsam iam patet.»

logique¹⁰⁸. Après cinq décennies de proclamations philothomistes, les jansénistes avaient réussi à convaincre au moins un bénédictin.

Pour conforter sa démonstration, le mauriste en venait à énumérer les quatre fondements doctrinaux du thomisme. Les disciples de l'École de saint Thomas tiennent d'abord unanimement que la science divine des choses futures est infailliblement certaine parce qu'elle se fonde sur un décret divin antécédent et absolu¹⁰⁹; elle devenait inévitablement incertaine si l'on supprimait l'inamissible hypothèse d'un *decretum Dei absolutum*¹¹⁰; or, si l'on suivait la caractérisation que le P. Le Tellier proposait de la grâce suffisante, force était de conclure que la *scientia Dei* n'était plus assurée d'une infaillible *cognitio rerum futurarum*, puisqu'il dépendait du libre arbitre, et non plus du décret absolu de Dieu, que telle ou telle chose advînt¹¹¹; le jésuite avait donc sciemment déformé la pure doctrine thomiste dans le but malhonnête de prouver, contre l'évidence, qu'Arnauld s'était écarté du thomisme sur la question de la grâce suffisante. Les dominicains unanimes affirment ensuite – deuxième principe – que Dieu est cause première, *causa prima*, *primum liberum*, *primum mouens* et *primum determinans*. De quoi ils tirent la conclusion qu'il ne peut arriver qu'une volonté se meuve sans qu'elle ait été auparavant prémue de Dieu, qu'il ne peut arriver qu'elle se détermine sans qu'elle ait été

¹⁰⁸ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, pp. 539-540: «*Addo Thomistam de sufficientis auxilii notione ab Arnaldo dissentire non posse nisi certissima et constantissima Scholæ Thomisticæ principia penitus abiiciat. Hoc est, qui gratiam sufficientem talem esse ait ut sine ullo decreto absoluto et præmotione physica, uoluntas ei aliquando assentiat, aliquando repugnet, et assentiendo gratiam per se efficacem semper obtineat, is Thomistarum scita funditus euertit nec Thomista esse potest.*»

¹⁰⁹ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 540: «*Primum principium, quod Schola Thomistica semper uindicauit et asseruit, illud est, idemque certissimum apud Thomistas omnes, diuinam rei cuiusque futuræ, ut actionum liberarum omnium, scientiam in decretis antecedentibus et absolutis omnino niti, et ideo certam esse, quia singulas ab æterno definiuit [Deus], singula quoque peccata permittere constituit, et gratiam negare sine qua non uiuantur.*»

¹¹⁰ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, pp. 540-541: «*Cum enim uoluntas Dei sit per sese efficax, ergo futurum est quicquid facere uel permittere decreuit; et eo modo futurum est quo facere uel permittere constituit. Ergo certissima quoque est quæ tota ex his decretis pendet rerum futurarum cognitio: incerta contra et errori obnoxia, si decreta absoluta remoueantur. Hæc constant apud Thomistas omnes.*»

¹¹¹ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 541: «*Jam uero si gratia sufficiens ea est quam Anonymus Thomistis attribuit, hoc est si pro solo arbitrii nutu, sine ullo antecedente Dei decreto et motione physica, sterilis modo est, modo efficax, siue, ut planius dicam, si gratiam per se efficacem modo obtinet, modo non obtinet, principium Thomisticum funditus ruit, nec Deus res fortuito uel libere futuras certo uidet.*»

auparavant prédéterminée de Dieu, qu'il ne peut arriver qu'elle veuille sans que Dieu ait auparavant décidé qu'elle voulût¹¹². Doctrine naturellement incompatible avec le système que le P. Le Tellier attribuait faussement aux thomistes, puisqu'il ne comprenait pas l'intervention d'un décret divin absolu et prédéterminant.

La question de la prédestination gratuite à la gloire, également épineuse, devait permettre de définir le troisième principe fondateur du thomisme. Les dominicains prétendent à l'unanimité que ne parviennent *ad gloriam* que les seuls justes dont Dieu, par un décret gratuit de sa volonté – rendu donc *ante praevisa merita* –, a posé l'élection¹¹³. Thèse que l'on mettait forcément en cause si l'on réduisait le thomisme à la présentation qu'en avait faite le P. Le Tellier¹¹⁴. Pour préserver l'infailibilité du *decretum Dei*, il fallait ensuite recourir à la théorie moliniste de la science moyenne, par quoi Dieu avait connaissance des futurs contingents, mais on ne pouvait plus parler de prédestination *gratuita*, puisque l'on était alors prédestiné *post merita praevisa*, soit après la divine *præsensio* du consentement de la volonté à la grâce suffisante¹¹⁵. Enfin, quatrième et dernier fondement doctrinal du thomisme, les dominicains maintiennent qu'il ne se peut faire que de deux personnes secourues de grâces égales, l'une consente et l'autre résiste¹¹⁶. Or le système décrit par le P. Le Tellier laissait place à une possibilité que les thomistes rejetaient unanimement. Dom Gesvres

¹¹² [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 544: «*Ex quo concludunt [Thomistæ] fieri non posse ut uoluntas creata prius seipsa moueat quam a Deo pramoueat, prius se determinet quam a Deo determinetur, prius denique uelit aliquid quam Deus id eam uelle constituerit.*»

¹¹³ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 545: «*Quid fiet de prædestinatione gratuita? Thomistæ eos omnes et solos ad gloriam peruenire uolunt quos Deus, singulari beneficio, nulla habita ratione meritorum, designauit et quibus æternam beatitudinem, merita quoque futura, gratis præparauit.*»

¹¹⁴ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 545: «*Principium hoc penitus abiiciant necesse est si gratia sufficiens, quæ pluribus reprobis datur, talis sit ut ei aliquando sine ulla prædeterminatione physica uoluntas assentiatur, assentientemque lege perpetua sequatur gratia per se efficax.*»

¹¹⁵ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, p. 546: «*Nulla erit ergo qualis ab eisdem admittitur prædestinatio gratuita. Molinistæ quidem, gratiam pro tempore et loco congruentem solis electis dari concedentes, negant se quidquam gratiæ prædestinationi detrudere. At effugium hoc Thomistis minime patet, qui et principium, hoc est gratiam congruam, reiiciunt et, principio dato, negant prædestinationem gratuitam esse quod in gratia congruente Moliniana consensus futuri præ-sensio contineatur.*»

¹¹⁶ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. II, pp. 546-547: «*Principium quoque est Thomistarum uindicatum in Congregationibus de Auxiliis, accerrimeque et antea et deinceps defensum ab omnibus: fieri non posse ut e duobus qui æqualiter uocantur, alter consentiat, alter dissentiat.*»

avait finalement prouvé que la version que le jésuite donnait du thomisme était particulièrement infidèle.

Le bénédictin mettait en garde contre les confusions de termes de quoi les molinistes jouaient pour abuser les théologiens incompetents. Dom Gesvres note que de même que le mot *sufficiens* a deux significations différentes selon qu'il est utilisé par un jésuite ou par un dominicain, de même en va-t-il du vocable *posse*: pour les thomistes, il désigne une nue-puissance d'action qui est encore privée d'actualisation, puisque, pour passer à l'acte, il faut en outre qu'intervienne une prémotion physique; pour les molinistes, au contraire, il signifie un plein pouvoir d'agir auquel il ne manque rien pour produire une action¹¹⁷. Revenant sur la célèbre distinction faite par saint Augustin, dans son *De correptione et gratia*, entre l'*auxilium quo* et l'*auxilium sine quo non*, Dom Gesvres se demande si le second doit être compris comme une grâce suffisante *in sensu thomistico* ou *more molinistarum*, autrement dit s'il comprend *omnia ad agendum necessaria*. Il relève que, dans l'état de nature innocente, Adam et les anges ont effectivement bénéficié, d'après l'évêque d'Hippone, d'un *adiutorium sine quo non* dont l'effet était celui de la grâce suffisante telle que la conçoivent les molinistes¹¹⁸. Les jésuites pouvaient se prévaloir de l'approbation de saint Augustin pour justifier une partie de leur système; *in statu naturæ lapsæ*, il en allait bien sûr autrement, et les molinistes n'étaient fondés à invoquer aucun patronage augustinien.

Afin de faire justice des accusations qui avaient été émises à l'encontre du travail éditorial des mauristes, il était encore nécessaire d'élucider la gravité doctrinale de l'imprudente insertion de l'*Analytica synopsis* qu'Antoine Arnauld avait faite du *De correptione et gratia*. Dans sa *Lettre de l'abbé D****, le P. Langlois avait particulièrement dénoncé sept propositions contenues dans le litigieux opuscule. Sur la première, selon quoi la grâce n'est pas autre chose que l'inspiration de l'amour de Dieu avec laquelle les hommes accomplissent les

¹¹⁷ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. III, *De notione gratiæ sufficientis Moliniana*, p. 572: «*Nam posse Thomisticum est nuda rei agendæ potestas, quæ omni actione caret, dum accesserit aliud ad actionem plane necessarium. Posse Lessianum siue Molinisticum, ut uulgo nominatur, est plenissima rei agendæ potestas cui nihil omnino desit quæque, cæteris omnibus sublatis, et eadem manens, aliquando agat, aliquando non agat, pro solo uoluntatis nutu.*»

¹¹⁸ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. IV, *De gratia hominis innocentis et Angelorum iuxta Augustinum*, pp. 591-592: «*Auxilium sine quo Augustinianum plenissimam potestatem contulit homini integro et Angelis, non Thomisticam. Nam auxilium sine quo perseuerandi potestatem contulit homini innocenti quam minime tribueret iam eidem lapso.*»

préceptes divins par la charité¹¹⁹, Dom Gesvres n'avait rien à dire, encore qu'il ne comprît pas ce que le jésuite lui trouvait de répréhensible. Sur la seconde, en revanche, qui affirmait que «Dieu, par la grâce, nous fait vouloir et nous fait agir, d'où il s'ensuit que celui qui ne veut pas et qui n'agit point n'a pas reçu la grâce»¹²⁰, il y avait assurément matière à commentaire. Le P. Langlois insistait sur le fait que les mauristes avaient rédigé leurs notes marginales en ayant constamment à l'esprit la phrase d'Antoine Arnauld: «Si vous supposez cette proposition, mes Pères, vous avez dû faire vos notes telles qu'elles sont»¹²¹. Pour le jésuite, Arnauld récusait franchement le bien-fondé théologique de la notion de grâce suffisante. Or, maintient Dom Gesvres, la deuxième proposition dénoncée est parfaitement conforme aux enseignements de l'École de saint Thomas – de la proscrire revenait à censurer le thomisme *de gratia sufficiente*¹²²; bien plus, le P. Langlois contrevenait aussi aux propres thèses de saint Augustin¹²³. Il n'en fallait sans doute pas davantage pour disqualifier un auteur moliniste d'aussi mauvaise foi.

Paradoxalement, un mauriste se mettait à défendre l'orthodoxe augustinisme d'un texte communément tenu pour janséniste, et il le faisait en recourant massivement à des justifications thomistes. Quant à la troisième proposition dénoncée, par laquelle Arnauld affirmait que «si saint Augustin avait admis cette grâce suffisante que quelques nouveaux théologiens prétendent être donnée sans exemption à tous ceux qui tombent dans le péché, il n'eût eu qu'un mot à dire pour résoudre la difficulté, mais il prend une route toute contraire»¹²⁴, le P. Langlois

¹¹⁹ A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis doctrinae libri S. Augustini De correptione et gratia*, dans ID., *Œuvres*, éd. citée, t. XI, p. 650: «*Quod gratia ista nihil sit aliud quam inspiratio dilectionis per quam homines praecepta Dei ex charitate faciant.*»

¹²⁰ A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis...*, p. 650: «*Quod per gratiam Deus in nobis operetur uelle et operari, unde consequens est eum gratiam non accepisse qui nec uult, nec operatur.*»

¹²¹ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre de l'abbé D***...*, p. 68.

¹²² [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. VIII, pp. 644-645: «*Sed quam infelix sit hominis indocti coniectura, facillimum est ostendere. Nam ut in rigido uerborum sensu inhaeremus, propositionem posse integra saluaque Thomistarum sententia damnari nego, qui gratiam proprie sufficientem nullam agnoscunt quae rei agendae uoluntatem saltem imperfectam non inspiret nec largiatur. Ita apud eos qui nec uult, nec operatur, is nullam omnino gratiam, siue sufficientem, qua bonum uelle incipimus, siue efficacem, qua plene uolumus et agimus, accepit. Sic Abbas propositione Arnaldi damnata damnat simul Scholam Thomisticam.*»

¹²³ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. VIII, p. 646: «*Temeraria et praecipiti censura, non modo Scholam Thomisticam, Abbas, uerum etiam Augustinum ipsum, confixit.*»

¹²⁴ A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis...*, p. 651: «*Si Sanctus Augustinus sufficientem illam gratiam agnosceret quam omnibus omnino lapsis hominibus dari contendunt*

rétorquait que l'évêque d'Hippone avait par avance coupé court aux objections en écrivant de l'homme, dans son *De correptione et gratia*, qu'il pouvait persévérer s'il le voulait¹²⁵. De quoi Dom Gesvres refuse de se payer. À l'en croire, la *gratia sufficiens* critiquée par Arnauld n'était autre que celle des molinistes. Si de la récuser suffisait pour réprouver le janséniste, il fallait condamner avec lui l'ensemble des thomistes et la part majeure des théologiens catholiques¹²⁶. La grâce suffisante entendue *more molinistarum* n'avait, selon saint Augustin lui-même, été concédée qu'au premier Adam et aux anges, *in statu innocentiae*, et si de l'exclure de l'état de nature déchue devait être preuve de jansénisme avéré, alors le glorieux évêque d'Hippone avait été un janséniste avant la lettre, et avec lui les thomistes¹²⁷. Du reste, précise Dom Gesvres, dans son *Apologie pour les Saints Pères* (1651), Arnauld avait clairement marqué que le sentiment des disciples de saint Augustin sur la matière des grâces suffisante et efficace était très proche de celui de l'École de saint Thomas¹²⁸. Du *perseuerares si uelles* de saint Augustin, le P. Langlois estimait qu'il prouvait que le Docteur de la

theologi quidam recentiores, uno uerbulo ex hoc se laqueo expediret, concedendo scilicet propositionem et assumptionem negando, eo quod nullus sit qui necessariam ad faciendum præceptum gratiam non acceperit, et qui proinde iuste non corripitur si non fecerit. Sed contraria prorsus uia progreditur Augustinus.»

¹²⁵ AUGUSTIN, *De correptione et gratia*, c. VII, §11: «*Perseuerares si uelles.*»

¹²⁶ [FR. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. IX, p. 651: «*Verba quæ confixit Abbas non aliud gratiæ sufficientis genus designant quam Lessianum et Molinisticum, siue id quod ita sufficit ut omnia prorsus quæ ad agendum necessaria sunt complectatur. Sin hoc reiicere crimen est, crimen Arnaldo cum Thomistis omnibus ac plerisque Ecclesiæ Catholicæ theologis commune esse non ignorat Abbas.*»

¹²⁷ [FR. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. IX, p. 652: «*Si gratiam sufficientem Lessianam, qualis in Adamo et in Angelis fuit, a nostro statu penitus excludere Jansenianum est, et Augustinus Jansenianus fuerit, et iam Thomistæ omnes Janseniani sint, qui eam non modo a statu nostro prorsus excludunt, uerum etiam a statu primi hominis et Angelorum, et Janseniana denique sit theologorum pars maior.*»

¹²⁸ A. ARNAULD, *Apologie pour les Saints Pères de l'Église, défenseurs de la grâce de Jésus-Christ, contre les erreurs qui leur sont imposées dans la traduction du Traicté de la vocation des Gentils attribué à saint Prosper et dans les réflexions du traducteur, dans le livre de M. Morel, docteur de Sorbonne, intitulé Les véritables sentimens de saint Augustin et de l'Église, et dans les écrits de M. Le Moine, docteur de Sorbonne et professeur en théologie, dictéz en 1647 et 1650*, Paris, 1651, 4^e et 5^e points, art. 1, p. 843: «*Le sentiment des disciples de saint Augustin, tel qu'il a esté expliqué par les doctes et admirables censures de Louvain et de Douai, n'est point une opinion, mais la pure doctrine des saints Pères, et n'est aussi différent de celle des disciples de saint Thomas en ce qui regarde la grâce de Jésus-Christ qu'en ce que s'attachant davantage au langage de ces saints docteurs, ils ne reconnoissent point aucune grâce pour suffisante que celle qui l'est véritablement et qui peut avoir son effect sans le secours d'aucune autre grâce, telle qu'est maintenant la seule grâce efficace du Sauveur.*»

Grâce avait admis l'existence d'une *gratia sufficiens*, mais Dom Gesvres n'était, quant à lui, pas certain qu'il se fût agi de la grâce suffisante conçue *more molinistarum*: au contraire, l'œuvre entière de saint Augustin refusait de faire de la grâce divine le jouet d'un libre arbitre qui fût libre de lui donner, ou non, son consentement¹²⁹. Pour le bénédictin, il n'était pas permis d'en douter: le fameux passage du *De correptione et gratia* ne posait en aucun cas l'existence de la *gratia plenissime sufficiens* typique du molinisme¹³⁰, et même, qu'il posât celle de la grâce suffisante des thomistes n'allait vraiment pas de soi¹³¹. Il n'était donc pas possible de révoquer en doute la légitimité doctrinale de la troisième proposition dénoncée par le P. Langlois, et surtout pas d'ailleurs en arguant d'un prétendu respect des enseignements augustiniens.

Il s'agissait en définitive de s'abriter derrière l'orthodoxie thomiste pour préserver l'entreprise éditoriale des mauristes des attaques de la Compagnie de Jésus. Sur la quatrième proposition d'Arnauld dénoncée par le P. Langlois, selon laquelle «Saint Augustin assure qu'on reprend avec justice ceux qui ne persévèrent pas, parce que c'est à cause de leur mauvaise volonté qu'ils ne persévèrent pas, et s'ils ne reçoivent pas de Dieu la persévérance, cela vient de ce que le don de la grâce divine ne les a pas séparés de cette masse de perdition dont Adam est l'auteur»¹³², thèse qui, d'après le jésuite, contenait le germe nocif du jansénisme et avait servi de fondement à nombre d'annotations des bénédictins, Dom Gesvres assure qu'il est impossible d'indiquer à son sujet aucun désaccord entre Arnauld et les adeptes de l'École de saint Thomas¹³³. De la cinquième proposition incriminée

¹²⁹ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. IX, p. 659: «*Moliniana ego concludi posse nego. Neque enim gratia sufficiens ad perseuerandum Moliniana ex loco obiecto concludi potest quam Augustinus in eodem libro palam et aperte reiecit.*»

¹³⁰ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. IX, p. 665: «*Gratiam plenissime sufficientem ex Augustini sententia concludi non posse iam probavi, nisi Augustinus in eodem libro secum ipse pugnare dicatur.*»

¹³¹ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. IX, p. 666: «*Ex Augustini sententia, perseuerares si uelles, gratiam sufficientem qualem paulo ante explicui, hoc est Thomisticam, concludi necessario non posse facile conficio.*»

¹³² A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis...*, p. 652: «*Iuste tamen corripitur contendit Sanctus Augustinus qui non perseuerant, quia mala sua uoluntate non perseuerant. Quod autem perseuerantiam a Deo non accipiant, inde prouenire quia non sunt ab illa perditionis massa quæ facta est per Adam diuinæ gratiæ largitate discreti.*»

¹³³ [Fr. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, I. II, 1^{re} partie, c. X, p. 710: «*Venio iam ad Thomistas, qui nihil in ea re ab Arnaldo dissentiunt, aut si quid dissentiunt, tota in uerbis, non in re est dissensio.*»

par Jean-Baptiste Langlois et qui affirmait que «les saints à présent n'ont pas, comme l'avait Adam, une grâce qui dépende de leur libre arbitre, mais une grâce qui soumet leur libre arbitre»¹³⁴, à propos de quoi le jésuite s'emportait contre les mauristes¹³⁵, Dom Gesvres n'hésite pas non plus à soutenir qu'Arnauld s'y conforme au pur thomisme: de le censurer impliquait derechef que l'on condamnât avec lui les disciples de saint Thomas¹³⁶. D'après le mauriste, les thomistes enseignaient unanimement que la grâce de persévérance octroyée aux élus était efficace par elle-même et agissait souverainement sur l'arbitre humain¹³⁷; de surcroît, il était impossible de trouver chez les adeptes de l'Aquinate la notion d'une grâce qui fût soumise au libre arbitre¹³⁸. Touchant la sixième proposition condamnée par le P. Langlois et qui portait que la grâce divine mouvait la volonté *indeclinabiliter* et *insuperabiliter*¹³⁹, Dom Gesvres se bornait à répéter que les thomistes unanimes ne cessaient de rappeler les deux adverbess, caractéristiques de la pensée augustinienne, pour conforter leur doctrine de la grâce efficace par elle-même¹⁴⁰. Quant à la septième et dernière proposition pro-

¹³⁴ A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis...*, p. 656: «*Sanctis talem gratiam dari non quæ ex eorum libero dependeat arbitrio, sed quæ illorum liberum sibi subiiciat arbitrium.*»

¹³⁵ [J.-B. LANGLOIS], *Lettre de l'abbé D***...*, p. 69: «Puisque vous faites tant d'estime du livre qui contient cette proposition, on ne doit plus être surpris que vous ayez pris tant de mesures pour cacher la grâce suffisante que saint Augustin trouve dans nôtre état.»

¹³⁶ [FR. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. XI, pp. 736-737: «*Cum Arnaldus gratiam Sanctis perseuerantibus seu prædestinatis ad perseuerandum concessam per se efficacem esse docet, nihil reuera statuit aliud quam quod et a Thomistis et ab illustrioribus theologis statuitur, hoc est ab iis omnibus qui gratiam per se efficacem ad perseuerandum necessariam esse sentiunt: neque enim aliam isti prædestinatis seu perseuerantibus dari ad perseuerandum arbitrantur. Rei ergo sunt omnes Arnaldini sceleris.*»

¹³⁷ [FR. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. XI, p. 737: «*Cum Arnaldus gratiam prædestinatis datam ad perseuerandum talem esse ait ut sibi subiiciat liberum arbitrium, non libero arbitrio subiiciatur, nihil quoque a Thomistis dissentit, qui gratiam perseuerantiæ, ut omnem per se efficacem libero arbitrio plene dominari confitentur, subiici negant.*»

¹³⁸ [FR. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. XI, p. 738: «*Confitentur enim gratiam apud Thomistas nullam existere quæ libero arbitrio subiecta dici proprie possit.*»

¹³⁹ A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis...*, p. 656: «*Quia enim primi hominis uoluntas sana erat, perseuerandi commissum est arbitrium. Nunc uero postquam sub dominantis concupiscentiæ iugo captiua uoluntas iacet, subuentum est illius infirmitati ut diuina gratia indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter ageretur.*»

¹⁴⁰ [FR. GESVRES], *Defensio Arnaldina...*, l. II, 1^{re} partie, c. XII, pp. 744-745: «*Addo Thomistas omnes, qui Augustini uoces insuperabiliter, indeclinabiliter, inuictissime, ab Abbate Germanico confixas crebro commemorant ad constituendam gratiæ per se efficacis uim ac potentiam.*»

scrite par le sourcilieux jésuite et d'après laquelle les mérites des saints n'étaient, *in statu naturæ lapsæ*, que les propres mérites de la grâce¹⁴¹, le bénédictin réitérait sa démonstration: les jansénistes ne soutenaient pas autre chose que la plus authentique doctrine thomiste.

Après plus d'un siècle de péripéties, la querelle de la grâce demeurait aussi irrésolue en catholicité qu'elle l'était au lendemain de la conclusion des Congrégations *de auxiliis*. Acharnés à obtenir la canonisation du molinisme, les jésuites poursuivaient de leur vindicte l'ensemble des sensibilités doctrinales qui ne convenaient pas avec eux. Acharnement qui les a conduits à s'en prendre aux bénédictins et à leur entreprise d'éditer les œuvres complètes de saint Augustin. Il est vrai qu'en incluant dans le 10^e volume de l'édition mauriste l'*Analytica synopsis* d'Arnauld, Dom Blampin avait commis une erreur tactique lourde de conséquences polémiques. Une fois de plus se confirmait le rôle essentiel joué par la référence au traité *De correptione et gratia* sur quoi Georges Folliet avait naguère attiré l'attention¹⁴². À Antoine Arnauld, ainsi que l'a montré Jean-Robert Armogathe, le P. Charles-Joseph de Troyes avait en définitive reproché d'avoir «durci et transformé la doctrine d'Augustin sous prétexte d'en donner une présentation résumée et analytique»¹⁴³. Dans la deuxième de ses *Trois lettres* (1685), l'oratorien Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) renvoyait d'ailleurs son lecteur aux ouvrages du terrible capucin, plus fidèles à saint Augustin que ne l'était l'*Analytica synopsis*: «Les savans commentaires du R. P. Charles-Joseph [de Troyes] sont un peu plus augustinien que l'analyse que M. Arnauld a faite du livre *De la correction et de la grâce*»¹⁴⁴. En réalité, il n'importait plus aux mauristes en 1700 de savoir si Arnauld avait respecté la lettre du *De correptione et gratia* en composant son opuscule synthétique; il leur suffisait de noter que l'*Analytica synopsis* restait conforme aux grands principes théologiques qui composaient le corps de doctrine du thomisme *in materia*

¹⁴¹ A. ARNAULD, *Analytica synopsis*..., pp. 656-657: «Non quod Sancti nunc merita non habeant, sed merita gratiæ, non liberi arbitrii, id est illis per gratiam liberum sibi subiicientem arbitrium collata. At primus homo merita habuisset, sicut et habuerunt Angeli sancti, non peculiariter gratiæ sed liberi arbitrii, quia profecta a libero arbitrio a gratia quidem adiuto, sed a gratia potentiam, non actum et uoluntatem ipsam tribuente.»

¹⁴² G. FOLLIET, «Les méthodes d'édition aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles à partir des éditions successives du *De correptione et gratia*», *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin*..., pp. 71-102.

¹⁴³ J.-R. ARMOGATHE, «Arnauld traducteur», art. cité, p. 21.

¹⁴⁴ N. MALEBRANCHE, *Trois lettres de l'auteur de La recherche de la vérité touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse au livre des vraies et fausses idées*, Rotterdam, 1685, 2^e lettre, p. 192.

gratiæ et prædestinationis. En quoi les bénédictins reprenaient une stratégie longuement éprouvée par les jansénistes et participaient d'un mouvement doctrinal qui, au sein du catholicisme, qu'il fût ou non jansénisant pourvu qu'il refusât le molinisme, tendait à attester l'orthodoxe validité des enseignements de saint Augustin, que la proscription romaine des cinq Propositions avait parfois semblé mettre en cause, par un recours systématique à l'autorité de saint Thomas d'Aquin et de ses disciples. Il n'était pas certain que la tactique fût de nature à disculper les mauristes. En mettant en avant une justification thomiste de leur augustinisme trop excessif pour apaiser les craintes des molinistes, ils ne faisaient que paraître se rapprocher davantage encore des jansénistes.

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BOOK REVIEW

LUIGI GIOIA, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate*. Oxford Theological Monographs, Oxford University Press 2008 ISBN 978-0-19-955346-4, xvi+330pp, £ 65,-

I Literature and theoretical framework

Augustine's *De Trinitate* is, although its *Wirkungsgeschichte* might suggest otherwise, a personal account of his theological exploration on the question how man knows God and how God makes himself known to mankind. Therefore, it is very welcome that Luigi Gioia provides the reader with 'a modest [...] and sympathetic descriptive analysis thoroughly committed to accounting for the whole of the treatise, on the presupposition of its unity and its coherence.' In his introduction Gioia explains that – far from being a handbook of systematic theology – Augustine's *De Trinitate* aims to introduce his reader 'in the practice of knowledge of God.' (3)

Luigi Gioia in this monograph studies *De Trinitate* with the method of close-reading. He states that, in order to approach this epistemological question as a function of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is necessary 'to explore connections between the doctrine of the Trinity and other theological areas such as Christology, soteriology, doctrine of the Holy Spirit, doctrine of revelation, and doctrine of the image of God.' This reveals the wideness of the scope of Gioia's research-project, and also his systematic theological stance. The latter is also reflected in Gioia's departure from 'highly representative 20th century critics' on Augustinian Trinitarian theology of Karl Rahner and Karl Barth. Luigi Gioia also aims for a refutation of Olivier du Roy's reading of *De Trinitate*. Du Roy criticizes Augustine's Trinitarian theology for a tension between its anagogic Platonic approach of the soul's ascent returning to the One, and the development of Augustine's doctrine on creation in an Anti-Manicheistic context.¹ Consequentially, du Roy's position reduces the role of faith in Augustine's discourse to an 'authoritative spun towards interiority through moral purification on humility, where the anagogical mode takes over.' In his discussion on Augustine and

¹ O. du Roy, *L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon St. Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391* (Paris, 1966).

modernity Gioia highlights Augustine's anthropological turn of theology and adopts Rowan William's missionary interpretation of *De Trinitate*. The implication of this position is that Gioia observes the Augustinian self as a dynamic self in movement.² The epistemological mission of the mind is therefore to learn to see on it as acted upon by God. Gioia clarifies this notion of theological epistemology in reference to Lewis Ayres' study of exercitation in incarnation. This exercise satisfies mankind's need 'to undergo a certain *exercitatio*.' This leads Lewis Ayres to a reading of books 4-14 as an *exercitatio mentis* through Christology. Ayres defines *exercitatio mentis* as 'a training in modes of thinking increasingly interior, and increasingly free from images, a gradual intellectual movement from the material to the immaterial, fundamentally Neoplatonic in character.'³ Located within the life of the body of Christ, this notion of *exercitatio mentis* leads Gioia to the insight that theological epistemology is a function of soteriology, as God can only be known through the love of God. Consequentially, the starting point of Gioia's investigation of *De Trinitate* is the consciousness of the actuality of God's salvation in the loving knowledge of faith.

II Outline of discourse

For his analysis of *De Trinitate*, Luigi Gioia chooses for 'a combination of sequential account of the way the overall argument unfolds from one book to the next, together with an analytical account of each line of enquiry.'⁽²⁴⁾ Within this analysis, Gioia discerns two levels. The first level concerns Augustine's exposition of the mystery of the Trinity. The second level involves the issue of knowledge of God. Even though Gioia does not explicitly recognize this, the first level seems to be dominated by the power of Augustine's rhetorical skills.

² The fact that this monography was based on Luigi Gioia's earlier dissertation on the same subject, may be due to the exclusion of Richard Sorabji's interpretation of the so called *cogito* arguments in *De Trinitate* X.10.16 in his *status quaestionis*. Sorabji observes coincidences between Avicenna's Flying Man and Augustine's concept of non-bodily self and self-knowledge. Sorabji points to Porphyry as a possible source. R. Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death*. (Oxford, 2006), 212-29.

³ L. Ayres, 'The Christological Context of the *De Trinitate* XIII' in: *Augustinian Studies* 29 (1998), 111-39, esp. 114, referring to J. Cavadini, 'The Structure and Intention of Augustine's *De Trinitate*' in: *Theological Studies* 23 (1992), 103-23.

In the analysis of the first half of *De Trinitate*, Gioia stresses the anti-Arian character of these books and explains how scriptural exegesis is concentrated on the traditional anti-Arian interpretation of the Christological hymn from the letter to the Philippians. Augustine concludes that the traditional hermeneutical rule to attribute actions *in forma Dei* to the Father and actions *in forma servi* to the man Jesus is not satisfactory for his purposes. For that reason Augustine starts to reformulate this hermeneutical rule. What seemed subordination now indicates direction: *de Deo* or *a Deo* *ex Deo*. This enables Augustine to analyse the Old Testament theophanies and the *missiones* in book 2 and 3 as occasions where God uses creation to reveal his will. Gioia's interpretation of book 4 gives him the opportunity to explain his principle of the inseparability of soteriology and revelation. With regard to this tenet, the roles of the Trinitarian persons in economy correspond to their identity in the inner Trinity.

Gioia reads Augustine's analysis of ontological categories in book 5-7 in an anti-Arian context. As book 1-4 focuses on unity in the economy of salvation, Gioia investigates whether this corresponds with Augustine's concern to deal with consubstantiality in book 5-7. Gioia's conclusion is that the unfolding of the mystery of the Trinity was Augustine's main point. As Gioia observes, the analysis of Augustine's discourse in *De Trinitate* is a complex matter. This is caused by its *nexus* of different lines and layers of argumentation and its concern to unfold the Trinitarian mystery in a way that benefits the reader. Hence, Luigi Gioia decides to carry out his analysis in hierarchical order instead of a linear order. The effect is that the exposition on Christ as a mediator in book 4 illustrates the epistemological principle of identification of reconciliation and revelation. (Chapter 4: Christ, Salvation and Knowledge of God) But before being able to evaluate priority and necessity of Christ as a mediator, Gioia explores Augustine's attitude to philosophy in chapter 3: Augustine and philosophers. This involves Augustine's opposition between *scientia* and *sapientia*, the philosophical concept of happiness, philosopher's claim of the possibility to gather knowledge of God without mediator, and an outline of the evolution of Augustine's attitude towards philosophy, especially to (neo) platonic philosophy. Chapter 5 discusses Augustine's development of doctrine on divine action in revelation: Trinity and Revelation. Gioia underlines the importance of God's invisibility in soteriology and the indispensable character of faith in epistemology. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit in its function to envisage the transition from economic to immanent Trinity is the subject matter of chapter 6: the

Holy Spirit and the inner life of the Trinity. Luigi Gioia scrutinizes Augustine's doctrine of the Holy Spirit under the aspects of Christology, unity and the order of the Trinity. This will lead in chapter 7 to the examination of Augustine's use of logical and ontological categories in his doctrine of Trinity. Gioia concludes that Augustine reflects on the substantial unity of the Trinity as a dynamic unity of love, rather than in metaphysical categories. The latter do not have a descriptive or explanatory function in Augustine's discourse.

Hence, Luigi Gioia in chapter 8 (Love and knowledge of God) studies the conversion of the knowing subject in its enquiry to God, as God can only be known in loving him. Gioia elaborates in chapter 9 (Knowledge and its paradoxes) on the books 9-11 of *De Trinitate* on knowledge from the senses and on intellectual knowledge. Gioia observes that Augustine's illumination theory is to a large extent metaphorical. It illustrates our ability to define and to judge that which we know from the senses. (193) The paradoxes of knowledge described by Gioia refer to the paradox of craving for knowledge which presupposes knowledge-before-knowledge and, furthermore, to the possibility to see a form of i.e. justice above our selves in truth itself. This is illustrated with the metaphor of illumination.

Before reaching the final and main topic of the book – the image of God – Luigi Gioia recaptures the theme of Augustine's ideal of philosophy in chapter 10. In a discussion on book 4 and 12-14, the notion of 'philosophizing with Christ which restores *dilectio* and heals pride' is elaborated on as a philosophy which becomes worship in the acknowledgement of the 'dependence on God at the root of the possibility of knowing.' (231) The theme of the image of God is discussed in chapter 12 with help of an excursus on the historical genesis of Augustine's doctrine of creation in *De div. quest.* 51 and *De vera religione*. The triad being, life and knowledge from *De div. quest.* is originated in Marius Victorinus. In this closing chapter Luigi Gioia first discusses the image-exemplar aspect of Trinity, which stresses the analogical role of the image. Secondly, he treats the relational dynamism of Augustine's concept of *imago Dei*. This highlights the image's relation of origin and of end. The investigation of the *imago Dei* is continued with a report of the roots of this doctrine in his doctrine of creation, its dependence on Plato's theory of participation and its kinship to Plotinus and Marius Victorinus. Gioia closes this chapter with an elaboration on the problem of the postlapsarian status of the image, its relationship to the Trinity itself, the distinction between a created image and a renewed image, and, finally, the epistemological function of the *imago Dei*.

III Evaluation and reflection

Luigi Gioia's courage to choose the complete *De Trinitate* in its unity and coherence as the *objectum materiale* of this monograph is praiseworthy. His research strategy, close-reading subsequently followed by analysis on two different levels, is a solid strategy. The analysis concerns the level of the unfolding of the mystery of the Trinity and a deeper level of the epistemological question on knowledge of God: theology. Luigi Gioia's analysis is often directed at the doctrinal implications of Augustine's discourse in terms of functions in revelation, reconciliation, etc.. This makes this book attractive for contemporary systematic theologians.

A consequence of the method of close-reading is the inclusion of larger quotations of Augustine's text, in translation and the Latin text in footnotes. Although Luigi Gioia avoids a paraphrase or *lectio continua* of Augustine's text by a thematic and hierarchical analysis of the texts, sometimes the analysis of the sequential argumentations are lengthy and redundant. A positive side-effect of the extensive treatment and quotation is that the reader can follow the discourse of *De Trinitate* in Gioia's book without text-edition. This makes his monograph attractive for a larger scholarly theological public.

Another side effect of Gioia's style is that the inclusion of Augustine's highly complex discourse in the argumentation of Gioia's book makes it hard to elaborate simultaneously on two different analytical levels. Although Luigi Gioia mentions the level of the exposition of the mystery of the Trinity and locates it as an outer layer especially in book 1-3 of *De Trinitate*, the focus of his research remains on the inner layer, the theological epistemology. Gioia locates the development of this inner layer from book 4 onwards. Gioia's analysis shows that these layers are intertwined and not easy to separate.

As Gioia has observed in his chapter on Christ, Salvation and Knowledge of God, God captures our faith in Him to lead us in his truth, because He wants to make Himself known in this same faith. (76) However, in his reference to Lewis Ayres' studies on *De Trinitate* and the incarnation as an *exercitatio mentis*, the question how faith – initiated by God – and *exercitatio mentis* relate, remains unasked and untreated.

Gioia's analysis of the impact of philosophers on Augustine could have won depth and contrast with an extensive close-reading of primary texts of philosophical authors. This affects chapter 3 about Augustine and philosophers where Luigi Gioia discusses Augustine's dependence on stoic philosophy and Platonism. Close-reading of primary texts might

have clarified the discussion of the *imago Deo* and its complex relationship to Marius Victorinus and Plotinus in chapter 11.

Luigi Gioia extensively elaborates on love and faith as theological concepts. However, the ethical aspects of living according to these (theological) virtues remain relatively unexplored in his discourse. Since, according to Augustine, *temporalia* only can have their proper function when correctly used in the light of faith, faith as a virtue and gift illuminates the correct use of *temporalia*. For this reason, the dynamics of theological virtues, such as love and faith reveal simultaneously the initiative of God in descending movement and the ascending movement of the human soul to the realm of eternity in faith. This dynamics of virtue supports the pedagogical notion of *exercitatio mentis*, which aims to relate the temporal dimension of life to the realm of eternity.

From what has been observed above, it is clear that Luigi Gioia has realized a praiseworthy reading of Augustine's *De Trinitate* departing from its unity and coherence. This will show itself of interest for a wide scope of theologians. It also became clear that a monograph with an *objectum materiale* of this size and complexity unavoidably leaves aspects unexplored or underexposed. Having said this, we are left with the question whether this monograph contains what its title aims at: The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's *De Trinitate*. In his conclusion Luigi Gioia affirms that 'the principle of unity and coherence of works dealing with Christian doctrine should always be looked for in the *conexio mysteriorum* first', which means that they should be approached 'in a distinctive Christian way', 'looking away from ourselves and concentrating on Christ's salvation, his Holy Spirit, and the Fathers invisibility, their equal divinity and their consubstantiality, i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity and its corollary represented by the doctrine of revelation.' (302) Luigi Gioia in this monograph offers an appealing reading of *De Trinitate* which respects this hermeneutical principle.

A complex work such as *De Trinitate* with its fusion of prayer and reflection admits more than one specific method of reading. Gioia's thematically reading offers an accessible and intelligent reading of Augustine's *De Trinitate*, which makes the book once again relevant for contemporary theological reflection on the mystery of the Trinity.

Martin CLAES

CONTENT 2009 – SOMMAIRE 2009

Allan FITZGERALD, In memoriam Thomas F. Martin OSA . . .	7-9
Shari BOODTS, Mon TORFS, Gert PARTOENS, Augustine's Sermon 169: A Systematic Treatise on Phil. 3, 3-16.	
Exegetical Context, Date and Critical Edition	11-44
Wu TIANYUE, Augustine on Involuntary Sin: A Philosophical Defense	45-78
Walter DUNPHY, Rufinus the Syrian: Myth and Reality . .	79-157
Andrew E. LARSEN, The Condemnation of John Kedington	159-172
M. BILAGHER, G. DE BOO, P. VAN GEEST, The Procrustean bed of the <i>ordo</i> . Comments on Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, <i>L'ordre caché. La notion de l'ordre chez saint Augustin</i>	173-182
Anthony DUPONT, Book Review Drecoll, <i>Augustin Handbuch</i>	183-186
C.P. MAYER, In memoriam Thomas Gerhard Ring OSA . .	187-189
G. VAN REYN, "Ad Christianam Fidem Pigrius Movebatur" (Conf. VII.XX (25)): Alypius' more reluctant move to the Christian faith (compared to Augustine)	191-225
J. LAM CONG QUY, Die Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes – christliche Identitätsfindung sowie ihre theologisch-gesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen nach Augustinus von Hippo	227-246
W.J. COURTENAY, The <i>Sentences</i> Commentary of Gerard of Siena, O.E.S.A.: Manuscripts and Questions	247-300
M. OLSZEWSKI, Der Prolog zum Sentenzenkommentar des Augustinus Triumphus	301-322
S.H. DE FRANCESCHI, L'Orthodoxie Thomiste au secours de l'Augustinisme Jansénisant	323-358
Martin CLAES, Book Review Gioia, <i>Theological Epistemology</i>	359-364
Content 2009 – Sommaire 2009	365

