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

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2007

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DID AUGUSTINE LOSE THE PHILOSOPHICAL BATTLE IN THE DEBATE WITH JULIAN OF ECLANUM ON *CONCUPISCENTIA CARNIS* AND *VOLUNTAS*?[1]

I. Introduction

Concupiscentia carnis (carnal concupiscence or carnal desire)[2] is one of the most significant themes that occupied the mind of the old bishop of Hippo, especially in his bitter debates with Julian of Eclanum, the most vehement antagonist in his old age.[3] Right at the beginning of *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* of 418-421 that initiated their controversy, Augustine claims that his purpose is to distinguish "the goodness of marriage from the evil of *concupiscentia carnis*, on account of which a human being who is born through it contracts original

[1] This article originates from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Carlos Steel. I have benefited from his valuable comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Professor Gerd Van Riel for his incisive comments which saved me from many mistakes. I also learned a lot from Professor Martin Stone in the discussion on the relevant chapter in my dissertation. An earlier draft of this article has been presented at the Doctors and Post-doctors Meeting of De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at Leuven, Belgium. I would like to express my deep gratitude for the comments from David Butorac and Dr. Marco Forlivesi among other participants of that meeting. I am also indebted to the helpful comments from my friend, Dr. Dongqi Xia in China. Last but not the least, special thanks are due to Professor Mathijs Lamberigts for his kindness of permitting me to cite from his article on Julian of Eclanum that is coming to be published by Freiburg University.

[2] In this paper, *Concupiscentia carnis* will be left in its original form in order to avoid the strong sexual connotation of the English expressions like carnal desire or carnal concupiscence, which will be revealed problematic to render Augustine's original reflections on *concupiscentia*.

[3] PETER BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (A New Edition with an Epilogue)*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 2000, 374. For a superb presentation of the theological and philosophical context of Julian's conception of *concupiscentia*, see MATHIJS LAMBERIGTS, "The Philosophical and Theological Background of Julian of Aeclanum's Concept of Concupiscence" (forthcoming). For the significance of this topic in the Pelagian controversy, see GERALD BONNER *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies* (third edition) (Norwich: Canterbury Press) 2002, 374ff. and JOSEF LÖSSL *Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung* (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill) 2001, 250-318. For a general account of Augustine's controversy with Julian, see MATHIJS LAMBERIGTS, "Recent Research into Pelagianism with Particular Emphasis on the Role of Julian of Aeclanum", *Augustiniana* 52 (2002):175-198.

sin".[4] In book XIV of *De ciuitate Dei,* which was composed almost during the same period, Augustine's account of Adam's sin and its punishment revolves around *concupiscentia carnis* and its effects.[5] This theme is further developed to the length of a book in his later work *Contra Julianum.*[6] However, this did not stop Julian and Augustine from quibbling over this issue tediously in the last work of the older bishop, who was prevented by death to bring it to completion.[7] In modern scholarship *concupiscentia carnis* also ranks among the most interpreted or over-interpreted terms in Augustinian studies.[8] Due to this somewhat misleading term, Augustine has been frequently accused by his unsympathetic commentators of a pessimistic view regarding sex and marriage, which profoundly influenced the Christian tradition for centuries. This assumption has been rightly questioned in recent years and the richness of Augustine's insights into sexuality

[4] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (later as *nupt. et conc*), I, 1, 1 (CSEL 42). "Intentio igitur huius libri haec est, ut, quantum nos Dominus adiuuare dignatur, carnalis concupiscentiae malum, propter quod homo, qui per illam nascitur, trahit originale peccatum, discernamus a bonitate nuptiarum." For the English translation of Augustine's anti-Pelagian works, I cites with slight moderation from the superb rendition by ROLAND TESKE in the series of The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. J. E. Rotelle (New York: New City Press, 1990- , later as **WSA**). See also *Retractationes* (*retr.*). II, 53, 80.

[5] For the dating of this book, see *Bibliothèque Augustinienne*, Oeuvres de Saint Augustin (Paris: Desclée; De Brouwer, 1949-) 33, 29, "Le livre XIV, de son côté, est signalé dans le *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* qui date des environs de 420 et pourrait être un peu postérieur." See also PETER BROWN 2000, 283 and GERARD O'DALY, *Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide* (Oxford: Clarendon), 1999, 34-35. For the theme of this book, cf. O'DALY 1999, 153.

[6] That is the Book IV of this polemical work written in 421-422, which is a line-by-line refutation of Julian's work of *Ad Turbantium.* The latter now only exists in fragments.

[7] In this unfinished work *Contra Julianum opus imperfectum* (*c. Jul. imp.* six books), Augustine always cites Julian's work *Ad Florum* completely in its original form before criticizing it. Due to this unusual effort, six books out of eight of Julian's text have been completely preserved.

[8] For specific research on the term of *concupiscentia*, see the classic article of FRANÇOIS-JOSEPH THONNARD, "La notion de concupiscence en philosophie augustinienne", *Recherches Augustiniennes* 3 (1965): 59-105. Also see GERALD BONNER, "*Libido* and *concupiscentia* in St. Augustine", *Studia Patristica* 6 (1962): 303-314; id. "Concupiscentia", in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe & Co. 1986-) 1: 1113-1122; UGO BIANCHI, "Augustine on Concupiscence", *Studia Patristica* 22: 202-212; J.T. BEANE, *The Development of the notion of concupiscence in Saint Augustine. A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame*, (Notre Dame, Indiana) 1993; PETER BURNELL, "Concupiscence and Moral Freedom in Augustine and before Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 26 (1995): 49-63, and MARLEEN VERSCHOREN, "The Appearance of the Concept Concupiscentia in Augustine's Early Antimanichaean Writings (388-391)", *Augustiniana* 52 (2002): 199-240.

has been brought into scene.[9] Nevertheless, it is still believed that Augustine's interpretation of sexual lust is too closely connected with his problematic conception of original sin and has little independent value from a philosophical point of view. By contrast, Julian's more refined naturalistic conception of concupiscence has found more favor with scholars of history of philosophy. This position is well represented in Richard Sorabji's recent work *Emotion and Peace of Mind,* which offers a clear and vivid depiction of emotion in late ancient thought. Its main theme is the fate of the Stoic philosophy of emotion in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. This fine exposition ends with a comparative study of Augustine and Julian on lust and the will, where Sorabji asserts,

> "Augustine's case against lust centred on the idea of the will. I believe Julian won the philosophical argument and showed that Augustine's objections failed. But he lost the political battle."[10]

The political battle, or the history of reception, is not our concern here.[11] In this study, I will examine Sorabji's evaluation of this debate in detail to see if Augustine's account of sexual lust and its relation to the will is philosophically indefensible. First we shall take a closer look at Augustine's notion of *concupiscentia carnis*. Then Augustine's reflections on sexual lust and its essential relation to the

[9] For recent studies dealing with Augustine's viewpoint on sexuality, cf. PETER BROWN "Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century A.D.: Augustine and Julian of Eclanum", in Tria Corda: Scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano, ed. by E. Gabba, (Como: Edizioni New Press), 1983, 49-70; id. The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press), 1988, 387-447; ELIZABETH CLARK, "Adam's Only Companion: Augustine and the Early Christian Debate on Marriage", Recherches Augustiniennes 21 (1986): 139-162; ea. "Sex, Shame, and Rhetoric: Engendering Early Christian Ethics", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 59 (1992): 221-45 DAVID HUNTER, "Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine's Teaching on Sex, Marriage and Celibacy" Augustinian Studies 25 (1994): 153-177; LAMBERIGTS, "A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality", in Augustine and His Critics, ed. by Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge), 2000, 176-197, and JOHN C. CAVADINI "Feeling Right: Augustine on the Passions and Sexual Desire", in Augustinian Studies 36/1 (2005): 195-217.

[10] RICHARD SORABJI *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2000, 400; 416.

[11] In his review to Sorabji's book, Peter Brown provides a masterly account of Augustine's so-called victory in the political battle. Brown locates Augustine's thoughts in their cultural and social contexts and convincingly clarified that Augustine's insights into sexuality did not dominate the subsequent periods as Sorabji implicitly indicates. It deserves notice that Brown does not question Sorabji's judgment regarding the philosophical battle. Brown's review can be found in *Philosophical Books*, 43 (2002): 185-208.

will are to be examined by analyzing some key passages. After this careful reading of the text, we will treat in details Sorabji's criticism which is in favor of Julian's conception of the will and lust.

II. Augustine's concept of *concupiscentia carnis*.

In Augustine's writings, the terms referring to sexual lust are *libido* and *concupiscentia carnis*, sometimes simply *concupiscentia*. Libido is a classical word which can be used as a general name of all desires (*cupiditates*); however, *concupiscentia* is a biblical term which translates the Greek word *epithumia*.[12] For the latter, Augustine often refers to the Johannine triad of *concupiscentia* in 1 John 2:15-16. "*Nolite diligere mundum: quia omnia quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi.*" ("Do not love the world, for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life.")[13] In contrast to the other two spiritual disorders, *concupiscentia carnis* seems closely connected with sensual pleasure. Moreover, when the object of the lust or the concupiscence is not specified, it refers to the lust that arouses our sexual organs.[14] In that case, *libido* and *concupiscentia* can be virtually interchanged.[15]

Nevertheless, it should be stressed from the outset that *concupiscentia carnis* cannot be identified with sexual lust. This point is even emphasized by his adversary Julian in his own exegesis of Johaninne triple *concupiscentia*:

> "This *concupiscentia carnis*, of course, contains absolutely no reference to the sex organs. I shall say, then, that by this term the apostle John strikes at ears thirsting for various songs; I shall say that by this term he chastises the palate of gluttons; I shall say that he blames the

[12] BONNER 1986-1994b, 1114.

[13] The rendition of this verse is cited from HENRY CHADWICK's translation of *confessions*. It is first quoted by AUGUSTINE in *De musica*. VI, 14, 44, cf. VERSCHOREN 2002, 221. See also, *De uera religione* 3, 4; 38, 70-71; 55, 107; *Confessiones*. X, 30, 41ff. For a good survey of Augustine's discussion about this verse, check JAMES O'DONNELL, *Augustine: Confessions*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1992, iii. 203-208.

[14] *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, 16, (CCL 48) "tamen cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis excitantur."

[15] See for instance, *nupt. et conc.* II, 7, 17, "sed inter tot nomina bonarum rerum, id est corporum, sexuum, coniunctionum, libidinem uel concupiscentiam carnis iste non nominat (Julian)." Cf. Bonner 1962, 303-314.

noses who die amid scents, and ultimately everything except what you think."[16]

Here Julian aims to argue that Augustine's condemnation of sexual desire as *concupiscentia carnis* is without scriptural foundation. In the response to this accusation, Augustine confirms definitely that he never restricts this biblical term to a sexual connotation.

"You say this, as if we say that *concupiscentia carnis* surges up only into the pleasure of the genital organs. This concupiscence is, of course, recognized in whichever sense of the body the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit. And because, if the spirit does not have stronger desires opposed to it, it drags one off to evil actions, it is proved to be an evil."[17]

[16] *c. Jul. imp.* IV, 28 (CSEL 85/2) Jul. "Hac quippe concupiscentia carnis nullum absolute genitalium tenetur indicium. Dicam ergo aures hoc uocabulo uariorum sitientes carminum uerberari, dicam castigari a sancto Iohanne helluonum palatum, dicam culpari immorientes odoribus nares, totum postremo praeter id quod tu arbitraris."

[17] ibid. "Ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam uoluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare. prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum concupiscit ipsa cognoscitur, et quoniam si non aduersus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat, ad mala pertrahit, malum esse conuincitur."

[18] For the concupiscence of spirit and of wisdom, see *nupt. et conc.* II, 10, 23, "in concupiscentiae autem nomine aliquando gloriandum est, quia est et concupiscentia spiritus aduersus carnem, est et concupiscentia sapientiae." See also *ciu. Dei* XIV, 7; *c. Jul.* VI, 16, 50; This positive conception of the concupiscentia has already occurred in AUGUSTINE's early anti-Manichaean work *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum*, I, 17, 32. Cf. VERSCHOREN 2002, 210. For *concupiscentia naturalis*, it needs to be emphasized that Julian uses this term to refer to "a means necessary for the sexes", however, Augustine conceives it as the universal desire toward happiness. See *C. Jul. imp.* IV, 67 Julian: "Igitur quia concupiscentia naturalis nec pudoris opprobrio potuit coargui et conditoris sui dignitate defensa est, ad hoc solum, ut non quasi magnum bonum, quippe quod sit hominibus pecoribusque commune, sed quasi necessarium sexibus instrumentum ..." Augustine: "Cur enim non dicis concupiscentia carnis, sed dicis 'concupiscentia naturalis'? nonne concupiscentia beatitudinis concupiscentia est naturalis? Cur ambigue loqueris?" For the illuminating distinction between *concupiscentia carnis* and *concupiscentia nuptarum*, see *ep.* 6*, 5 (BA 46B) "Ex hoc errore concupiscentiam nuptiarum, hoc est concupiscentiam pudicitiae coniugalis, concupiscentiam legitime propagandae prolis, concupiscentiam uinculi socialis, quo uterque inter se sexus obstringitur, non discernunt a concupiscentia carnis, quae licitis atque illicitis indifferenter ardescit et per concupiscentiam nuptiarum, quae hac bene utitur, frenatur ab illicitis et ad sola licita relaxatur, contra cuius impetum repugnantem legi mentis omnis castitas pugnat et coniugatorum, ut ea bene utantur, et continentium uirginumque sanctarum, ut ea melius et gloriosius non utantur. Hanc ergo concupiscentiam carnis, in qua est solum desiderium concumbendi, non discernentes a concupiscentia nuptiarum, in qua est officium generandi, impudentissime laudant, de qua primi homines erubuerunt, quando foliis ficulneis illa membra texerunt quae ante peccatum pudenda non fuerant; nudi quippe erant et non confundebantur, ut intellegamus istum motum, de quo confusi sunt, in natura humana cum morte fuisse conceptum." Cf. BONNER 1982; BROWN, 1983, 50-51.

It is evident here that *concupiscentia carnis* can be applied to nearly all kinds of sensual pleasure. Furthermore, in contrast to the blameworthy *concupiscentia carnis*, Augustine also acknowledges some laudable forms of *concupiscentia*, such as *concupiscentia spiritualis*, *concupiscentia sapientiae*, *concupiscentia naturalis*, *concupiscenita nuptiarum*.[18] In Book XIV of *De ciuitate Dei*, Augustine enumerates many different kinds of blameworthy *libido* (equivalent to *concupiscentia*) which are evidently beyond the region of sex: libido for vengeance (anger), libido for money (avarice), libido for victory at any price (obstinacy), libido for glory (vanity), libido for mastery, etc.[19] Therefore there is a more profound disorder that justifies the condemnation of *concupiscenia carnis* in sexual activities. It is blameworthy not because of its recurrent connection with sexual activities but its essential opposition to *spiritus*, the spiritual dimension of human beings. Here we can easily detect the influence from Saint Paul's conception of the fight between flesh and spirit, "*caro enim concupiscit aduersus spiritum* (flesh lusts against the spirit)". This theological background underlies Augustine's categorization of this lust as a moral evil. What matters in our philosophical analysis of this biblical term, however, is the exact denotation of this theological conception of flesh (*caro*), especially its subtle relation to the body (*corpus*).

First it should be emphasized that the flesh under consideration is not the substance of the body, which essentially belongs to the human nature.[20] This point is explicitly confirmed in Augustine's exegesis of *caro* in Rom 7: 18:

> "Here he called the flesh (*caro*) that in which there is found the morbid affection of the flesh (*morbidus quidam carnis adfectus*), not the structure of the body (*corporis conformatio*) whose members are not to be offered as weapons to sin, that is, to that concupiscence which holds captive this carnal part of us (*hoc carnale nostrum*). For, with regard to the very substance and nature of the body (*ad ipsam corporalem substantiam atque naturam*) in the faithful, whether married or living in continence, it is already the temple of god."[21]

[19] *ciu. Dei,* XIV, 15. "Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactatia nuncupatur....Quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi..."

[20] For AUGUSTINE's emphasis on the body as an integral partner of the soul, see *De beata uita* 2, 7; *De ordine* II, 19, 50; *mor.* I, 4, 6; *conf.* X, 6, 9; *Sermones* 150, 4-5 etc.

[21] *nupt. et conc.* I, 31, 35 "Carnem autem nunc appelauit, ubi est morbidus quidam carnis adfectus, non ipsam corporis conformationem, cuius membra non adhibenda sunt arma peccato, id est eidem ipsi concupiscentiae, quae hoc carnale nostrum

In this text, the dignity of the body is unambiguously distinguished from the blameworthy *caro*. The latter is recognized as a symbol of the region where a disordered affection (*adfectus*) manifests itself. Evidently it is this unhealthy inclination of the flesh that enslaves the body as an instrument for the fulfillment of a sinful end. Nevertheless, what remains obscure in this distinction is whether this perverted affection is only the corruption of the body or the defect of the whole human nature. For, it is quite tempting to reduce Augustine's subtle distinction into the substantial dualism by interpreting *caro* as the flawed body, the origin of all sinful lusts in opposition to the purity of the soul or spirit. In other words, it still needs to be explicated why the distinction in question is not only a play with terms.

Augustine responds to this possible criticism by stressing that the flesh as a morbid affection is primarily a defect of the soul. For no affection can be felt without the participation of the soul. In Augustine's ontological hierarchy, the soul possesses an absolute superiority over the body and therefore cannot be passively affected by the body.[22] The bodily affection always presupposes the active participation of the soul.

> "It is certainly as true and trustworthy as can be, the text that runs: *The flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh* (Gal 5: 17); but still everyone, I think, would agree, educated and uneducated, that the flesh cannot lust (*concupiscere*) after anything without the soul (*anima*). And thus the cause of *concupiscentia carnis* is not to be found in the soul alone, but much less in the flesh alone. It arises, after all, from both; from the soul, that is, because without it no pleasure (*dilectatio*) can be felt, and from the flesh because without it there cannot be felt any specifically carnal pleasure."[23]

captiuum tenet. Nam quantum ad ipsam corporalem substantiam atque naturam, in uiris fidelibus, siue coniugatis siue continentibus, iam templum Dei est." See also *ciu. Dei* XIV, 2. The differentiation between *caro* and *corpus* can be traced back to his early work *De fide et symbol* 10, 24, though in a different context concerning of the resurrection of the flesh.

[22] See for instance *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, 16, 33 (CSEL 28). "Nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in spiritu." This point is well summarized by ETIENNE GILSON, "*Le corps ne peut pas agir en aucune manière sur l'âme, le supérieur*". See ETIENNE GILSON *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* 4ed. (Paris: Vrin) 1949, 76.

[23] *Gn. litt.* X, 12, 20 "Verissime quippe ac ueracissime scriptum est: *Caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, et spiritus aduersus carnem*: sed tamen carnem sine anima concupiscere nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. Ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. Ex utroque enim fit: ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio nulla sentitur; ex carne autem, quod sine illa carnalis delectatio non sentitur. " I rendered *dilectatio* as "pleasure" instead of "enjoyment" as is found in Hill's translation. (WSA I/13)

In this exegesis the tension between flesh and spirit is not treated as a substantial division between body and soul, but rather as an opposition between different manners of pursuing pleasure. The pleasure is called carnal not because it originates from the body or the flesh only, but because the soul perceives such a disturbing pleasure from the urge of the flesh and with the flesh in contrast to the spiritual longing that only originates from the spirit.[24] In Augustine's terms, "we say that the flesh lusts because the soul lusts in a carnal manner (*carnaliter*)."[25]

Now *concupiscentia carnis* is revealed as the perverted manner of the soul's disposition. In book XIV of *De ciuitate Dei*, by appealing to scriptural testimonies, Augustine takes one step further to interpret *caro* as a special reference to man and consequently *concupiscentia carnis* as the sinful desire to live according to man than according to God.[26] As is well known, this refers definitely to "*amor sui*" which serves as the foundation for the earthly city in contrast to "*amor Dei*" for the city of God.[27]

III. Augustine on sexual lust and the impotence of the will

Bearing this conception of carnal concupiscence in mind, we advance to Augustine's phenomenological description of sexual lust in *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, 16.

> "This lust triumphs not only over the whole body, and not only outwardly, but inwardly also. When the affection (*affectio*) of the mind is united or mixed with the appetite of the flesh (*appetitus carnis*), it convulses the whole man, so that there follows a pleasure greater than any other: a bodily pleasure (*corporis uoluptas*) so great that, at that moment of time when he achieves his climax, the alertness and, so to speak, vigilance of a man's thought (*uigilia cogitationis*) is almost entirely overwhelmed. .....For the parts created for this purpose (to beget children) would then be the servants of his mind even in the task of procreation, just as his other members serve it in the various tasks distributed to them. They would act at the approval of his will (*nutus uoluntatis*), and not because incited by the urging of lust.

[24] Ibid. "carnem itaque concupiscentem aduersus spiritum dicit apostolus carnalem procul dubio delectationem, quam de carne et cum carne spiritus habet aduersus delectationem, quam solus habet."

[25] *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*. 8, 19 (CSEL 42) "Non enim caro sine anima concupiscit, quamuis caro concupiscere dicatur, quia carnaliter anima concupiscit."

[26] *ciu. Dei* XIV, 3-4.

[27] See *ciu. Dei*, XIV, 28.

> "But not even those who love this kind of pleasure are moved either to marital intercourse or to impure vice only when they so wish. Sometimes the urge arises unwanted; sometimes, on the other hand, it forsakes the eager lover, and concupiscence grows cold in the body even while burning in the mind. Thus strangely, then, does lust refuse to serve not only the will to beget (*generandi uoluntas*), but even the lust for lewd enjoyment. Although it is for the most part wholly opposed to the mind's control, it is not seldom divided against itself: it arouses the mind, but it does not follow through what it has begun and arouse the body also."[28]

In this vivid depiction, three characteristics of the sexual lust can be instantly identified: First is the violent power of lust that definitely changes the status not only of the body but also of the mind, even to such a degree that the intellectual faculty of the mind can be obstructed by this sensual force. Second is the rebellion of the bodily members, i.e. sexual organs against the control of the will. Last but not the least, is that the concupiscence as an uncontrollable power, disobeys not only the command of the will, but even the lust itself, the lust for wallowing in the sensual pleasure.

What grounds these features of lust is obviously their disobedience. This disobedience has already been mentioned together with other kinds of emotional turbulence, such as grief and pain in *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, 15, where they are claimed as the punishment for the first couple's failure to abide by God's commandment. "To state it briefly, then: in the punishment of that sin, what is the retribution for disobedience if not disobedience itself?"[29] It deserves notice again

[28] *ciu.Dei,* XIV, 16 "Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus nec solum extrinsecus, uerum etiam intrinsecus uindicat totumque commouet hominem animi simul affectu cum carnis appetitu coniuncto atque permixto, ut ea uoluptas sequatur, qua maior in corporis uoluptatibus nulla est; ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad eius peruenitur extremum, paene omnis acies et quasi uigilia cogitationis obruatur. ...ut etiam in hoc serenade prolis officio sic eius menti ea, quae ad hoc opus create sunt, quem ad modum cetera suis quaeque operibus distribute membra seruirent, nutu uoluntatis acta, non aestu libidinis incitata? Sed neque ipsi amatores huius uoluptatis siue ad concubitus coniugales siue ad inmunditias flagitiorum cum uoluerint commouentur; sed aliquando inportunus est ille motus poscente nullo, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferueat, friget in corpore; atque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi uoluntati, uerum etiam lasciuiendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti aduersetur, nonnumquam et aduersus se ipsa diuiditur commotoque animo in commouendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur." I cited Dyson's translation with some changes to emphasize some crucial psychological terms, and also for the sake of consistency. See *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. and trans. by R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998.

[29] *Ibid.* XIV, 15 "Denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia retributa est?"

that various forms of *libido* are enumerated in this chapter and sexual lust is not singled out as the sole consequence of the first sin.[30] Nevertheless, in the context of the first sin committed by Adam and Eve, Augustine has good reason to focus on the sexual lust, for it is written in Genesis 3:7: "The eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves aprons." There must be something new in their bodies recognized by their eyes. However, this novelty that disturbed their eyes or souls could not be the body itself, though it occurred externally there. For the body had been in its nudity before their transgression as it is explicitly written in Genesis: "And they were naked, and were not ashamed."[31] Moreover, the body in its natural status as created by God should not embarrass the soul, which had lived a blessed life in harmonious relation to the body. In Augustine's eyes, what changed after the Fall of human beings is the force that drives or motivates the original blameless movement of the bodily members. In Augustine's terms, it is a new stirring of their flesh. This new urge is named 'lust' (*libido*), as it inflamed the flesh regardless of the decision of will.[32] In the meantime, Augustine recognizes the act of covering themselves as a natural expression of their embarrassment and shame after becoming aware of their nudity. This feeling of shame makes the lust involved in sexuality distinct from other turbulent emotions, such as anger.[33]

> "Again, chastity (*verecundia*) does not conceal the acts of anger and the words and deeds associated with the other affections (*affectiones*) in the same way that it conceals the acts of lust (*opera libidinis*) which are performed by the sexual organs. But is this not simply because, in the case of the other passions, the body's members are not set in motion by the passions themselves, but by the will, after it has consented to the passions? For the will has mastery over the use of such members. For no one who utters a word in anger, or, indeed, strikes another, could do so if his tongue or hand were not in some way set in motion by the will (*uoluntate*); and those members are set in motion by the same will even when there is no anger. But the sexual organs have somehow fallen so completely under the sway of lust that they

[30] Cf. note 19.

[31] Genesis 2: 25 "Nudi errant, et non confundebantur." Cited from *ciu. Dei* XIV, 17.

[32] *ciu. Dei* XIV, 17, "Quod itaque aduersus damnatam culpa inoboedientiae uoluntatem libido inoboedenter mouebat, uerecundia pudenter tegebat."

[33] For a detailed discussion of AUGUSTINE's conception of shame (*pudor*) in *De ciuitate Dei*, see my article, "Shame in the Context of Sin: Augustine on the Feeling of Shame in *De ciuitate Dei*", *Les Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, 74 (2007), 1. (forthcoming)

> have no power of movement at all if this passion is absent, and unless it has either arisen of its own accord or been aroused by another. It is this that makes us ashamed; it is this that causes us to avoid the eye of onlookers, blushing."[34]

What is at issue here is clearly the role of the will. In the case of anger, the will keeps its full control over the body. It functions as the decisive factor of bodily movements such as uttering words, striking others etc, which are closely connected with the expression of emotions or passions.[35] In stark contrast to this, even when we have a strong will to have a child, this will by itself cannot control the necessary movement of sexual organs for its fulfillment. This bodily movement is dominated solely by lust or carnal concupiscence, which has no respect for the authority of the will. Here the impotence of the will is stressed as the essential characteristic of acts of *libido* (*opera libidinis)*. The will has to defend its dignity by concealing the shameful parts of the body. This defensive reaction also confirms the original powerlessness of the mind in the face of lust. For if the will was strong enough to control the sexual lust, it would have no need to conceal our natural body.

In Augustine's eyes, the impotence of the will only happened upon Adam and Eve after their fall. And this fact reveals the fundamental change of their mental state. Throughout his life, Augustine insists that *libido* or *concupiscentia carnis* does not exist in Paradise or at least is obedient to the will before the Fall, even though we cannot prove it by our experience.[36] In Paradise, the soul lived in perfect

[34] *ciu. Dei.* XIV, 19, "Quod autem irae opera aliarumque affectionum in quibusque dictis atque factis non sic abscondit uerecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? Nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. At uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa uel ultro uel excitata surrexerit. Hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo deuitat."

[35] For the terminology of emotion in AUGUSTINE's writings, see *ciu. Dei* IX, 4, "... his animi motibus, quae Graeci πάθη, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam affectiones uel affectus, quidam uero, sicut iste (sc. Apuleius) de Graeco expressius, passiones uocant." Cf. Ibid., VIII, 17; XIV, 5; *conf.*, X, 21ff. See also GERARD J.P. O'DALY's and ADOLAR ZUMKELLER's excellent essay on these terms, "Affectus (passio, perturbatio)" **AugLex** 1: 166-180, esp. 166-7.

[36] *Ciu. Dei* XIV, 24. ÉMILE SCHMITT, as referred by Sorabji 2000, has distinguished 3 stages in the evolution of Augustine's viewpoint concerning the existence of *concupiscentia carnis* in Paradise before their eating the forbidden fruits. 1. In *De Genesi*

harmony with the body. There was not the rebellion of the sexual lust, not even other kinds of affections of the soul, such as desire (*cupiditas*), fear (*timor*), sadness (*tristitia*) and empty joy (*inaniter laetum*).[37] The sovereignty of the will is so ubiquitous that even sleep did not come upon them against their will (*inuitus*).[38] This idealistic depiction of Paradise makes it quite natural for Augustine to believe that the genital organs were impelled by the same approval of the will (*nutus uoluntati*) as other bodily members.[39] It was due to the loss of the power of the will that Adam and Eve experienced the embarrassment for the first time. From then on, the disobedient sexual lust became the most reprehensible affection of the soul.

IV. The disobedience to the will and the blameworthiness of *libido*

Now we return to Julian's and Sorabji's severe criticisms of Augustine's condemnation of sexual lust. Both of them believe that sexual lust is a natural affection (*affectio naturalis*), which should not be distinguished from other affections, either of the body such as hunger, or of the soul such as anger.[40]

Augustine's condemnation of sexual lust, Sorabji argues, is philosophically based upon its disobedience to the will, which manifests itself in two different manners. First is the phenomenon that the male's sexual organs are solely aroused by the lust, not under the control of

contra Manichaeos of 388-9, Augustine rejects the idea of procreation in Paradise. (*Gn. adu. Man.* II, 21, 32); 2. in *De Genesi ad litteram*, published in 416 and in *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, written in 418-20. Augustine recognizes the purpose of procreation for the bodies of Adam and Eve but the sexual movements must have been following the approval of the will. (*Gn. litt.* IX, 10, 16-18*; ciu. Dei* XIV, 24 etc.) 3. In letter 6* of probably 420, Augustine concedes the possibility of *concupiscentia carnis* by adding an "if", namely if it did exist in Paradise, it should have been under the control of the will. (*Ep.* 6*, 8; *c. Jul.* IV, 11, 57) See SCHMITT 1983; SORABJI 2000, 406-409. For a recent study on the original status of human beings, see Bouton-touboulic, "Origines de l'homme, origins des homes chez saint Augustin" in *Vita Latina* 172: 41-525. 2005.

[37] *Ciu. Dei* XIV, 26 "Sicut in paradise nullus aestus aut frigus, sic in eius habitatore nulla ex cupiditate uel timore accidebat bonae uoluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum."

[38] Ibid. "Non lassitude fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat inuitum."

[39] Ibid. "In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo, sed eo uoluntatis nutu mouerentur membra illa quo cetera, et sine ardoris inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris.

[40] See for instance *c. Jul.* V, 5, 2; *c. Jul. imp.* I, 71*;* IV, 29; IV, 67.

the will.[41] The other is that this sensual pleasure can obstruct the intellectual faculty of the soul. Both points have been mentioned earlier in our analysis of the passage from *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, 16.[42] As to the first point, Sorabji claims that Augustine fails to notice that the physical reactions in other emotions are also involuntary, and can be disobedient to the command of the will as well. These reactions are interpreted by the Stoics as 'first movements' of the soul that should be distinguished from the genuine affective expressions based upon the consent of the mind. As was argued earlier in Sorabji's book, Augustine's failure to appreciate this Stoic idea made his distinction between sexual lust and other emotions, e.g. in *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, 19, philosophically untenable.[43] Accordingly the condemnation of lust solely for its disobedience to the will is only a theological prejudice, not competent from a philosophical view of point. For Augustine's second complaint against lust, Sorabji simply dismisses them as "symptoms of the central fact of its disobedience to the will".[44]

In addition to this criticism mainly based upon a Stoic theory of emotion, Sorabji calls into question the idea that the lust is bad because it is not under the control of the will. He argues instead that this opposition presupposes the will's judgment of lust as bad, not vice versa. The lust is regarded as a moral evil not primarily for its disobedience but for some further reasons that ground the evaluation of the will. Furthermore, these reasons are revealed by Sorabji to be subjective, only belonging to Augustine's own history, not universally applicable to every case.[45] Lastly, Sorabji refers to Augustine's explanation of sexual dreams to show that lust is not in any case evil just because of its resistance to the will. It could be the illegal object of sexual lust, namely, someone other than one's legal partner that makes it reprehensible.[46]

[41] e.g. *ciu. Dei* XIV, 16ff; *c. Jul.* IV, 11, 57; IV, 13, 62; V, 5, 20. Brown rightly points out that Sorabji was misled by recent feminist literature to believe that Augustine's reflection on sexuality is essentially a male view. See BROWN 2002, 199ff. For Augustine's discussion of the presence of *concupiscentia carnis* in women, see for instance, *c. Jul.* IV, 13, 62.

[42] See note 27.

[43] SORABJI 2000, 372-384. chapter 24 "First Movements in Augustine: Adaptation and Misunderstanding", esp. 380-383. For a criticism of Sorabji's argument and an analytical presentation of Augustine's thoughts on the will and the preliminary emotional movements, see my article, "Augustine on the Will and First Movements of emotion" (forthcoming).

[44] Ibid. 405.

[45] Ibid. 412-413.

[46] Ibid. 2000, 415.

To defend Augustine's position against Sorabji's criticism, it is useful to recapitulate the most significant points we have reached at the beginning of our analysis: First, the implication of *concupiscentia carnis* is much broader than sexual lust; second, the pejorative connotation of this term has no indispensable reference to sexuality though they are frequently related to each other. We have to say that Sorabji's implicit identification of *libido* or *concupiscentia carnis* with sexual lust distorts Augustine's reflections from the right beginning. What matters in Augustine's conception of *concupiscentia carnis* is a general disorder inherent in the soul, which goes definitely beyond the realm of sexuality. It is for certain that in his discussions, *concupiscentia carnis* manifests itself primarily and mostly in sexual activities. In addition, Augustine does believe that the original sin is transmitted through this deformed manner of sexuality that is necessary for procreation.[47] However, these cannot justify the confusion of the inherited *concupiscentia carnis* with the sexual lust. For the latter is only an illustrative form of this general disorder.

The second point that should be questioned is Sorabji's claim that Augustine's denunciation of sexual lust is based upon its disobedience to the will. In the discussion regarding the meaning of *caro*, we have clarified that Augustine identifies *concupiscentia carnis* as a moral evil because it tempts us to live according to the needs of the flesh rather than the longing of the spirit. It is blameworthy because it deprives the human person of his or her spiritual value and degrades him or her into the level of animals. We know that *libido* also exists in animals but is not an evil since it does not resist reason there[48]. In short, what makes *concupiscentia carnis* problematic is the menace of this disposition to the spiritual dimension of human personality. In light of this, it should be more appropriate to interpret the disobedience to the will as a significant sign rather than as the ground for the moral badness of sexual lust.

Moreover, this disobedience can serve as a good indicator only when the will in question is a good will. This point is implied in Augustine's emphasis upon the absence of sexual lust and other turbulent emotions in Paradise: "Just as there was no extreme of heat or cold in Paradise, so there arose in him who dwelt there no desire or fear to hinder his good will (*bona uoluntas*)."[49] It is not pointless that

[47] Cf. SAGE "Le péché originel dans la pensée de saint Augustin, de 412 à 430", *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 15 (1969): 75-112; HUNTER 1994, 167-170.

[48] *c. Jul.* IV, 5, 35 (PL 44) "Haec autem libido ideo malum non est in belluis, quoniam non repugnat rationi, qua carent."

[49] *ciu. Dei* XIV, 26. Cf. cited in note 36.

the righteousness of the will is overtly indicated here. For instance, if the movements of sexual organs fail to obey the command of the will to commit adultery, this disobedience is obviously not reprehensible at all. In this case, we can imagine that Augustine would still treat the sexual lust as a typical form of *concupiscentia carnis* that is blameworthy. For it inclines one to enjoy temporal things in this mortal world, which will weigh down one's dignity as a spiritual being. The failure of sexual lust in this particular case does not signify that this morbid disposition of the soul has been fully eradicated. However, the will to have illicit sex is more reprehensible even though it was not fulfilled because of the resistance from lust or *concupiscentia carnis*. For this disposition of the soul is based upon a voluntary decision that discloses the maliciousness of the soul, however, lust or *concupiscentia carnis* is just a spontaneous motion that falls upon the soul, preceding and exceeding the command of the autonomous will.[50] If the lawful sex with one's partner for the purpose of procreation is a good use of this inherited evil of *concupiscentia carnis*, an adulterer makes a greater evil from this innate evil. In both cases this inherited feature of the soul remains in opposition to the command of the will.[51] This distinction makes it evident that for Augustine the disobedience to the will itself does not serve as the grounding reason for the badness of sexual lust.

Finally, *concupiscentia carnis* is not only resistant to the command of the will, but even to the "lust for lewd enjoyment (*lasciuiendi libido*)".[52] If the disobedience could be counted as the essential ground for the condemnation of a desire or lust, the division within the lust itself would be more convincing!

To conclude, overlooking the Pauline tension between *caro* and *spiritus* in Augustine's conception of *concupiscentia carnis*, Sorabji fails to recognize that there is a more profound disorder than the disobedience to the will or the personal experiences that justify Augustine's denunciation of sexual lust.

[50] *c. Jul. imp.* III, 187. "Si enim talis esset ista concupiscentia, quae carnali suo motu nec praecederet nec excederet hominis uoluntatem, sed eius simper sequeretur arbitrium, profecto nec Manicheus, quid in ea iuste reprehenderet, inueniret nec eam quispiam nostrum in paradise coniugatos habere non potuisse contenderet nec Ambrosius de praeuaricatione primi hominis eam traxisse nos diceret, quia concupiscere contra spiritum non uideret."

[51] c. *Jul.* IV, 7, 39 "Aliud quippe est malo bene uti, quod iam inerat; et aliud est malum perpetrare, quod non erat: illud enim est de malo tracto ex parentibus uoluntarium bonum facere; hoc uero malum a parentibus tractum aliis malis iam propriis et uoluntariis aggerare."

[52] *ciu. Dei* XIV, 16, see note 27. Cf. also *c. Jul.* III, 13, 26.

V. Sexual lust and other affection of the soul

Sorabji's general criticism uproots Augustine's viewpoint on sexual lust from its theological contexts concerning the opposition between flesh and spirit, between self-love and love of God. In the following discussion, I want to demonstrate that this blind-spot also taints his concrete arguments against Augustine, especially his firm refutation of Augustine's distinction between sexual lust and other affections. As mentioned earlier, Sorabji's discussions are centered on the Stoic conception of pre-passion (*propatheia*) or 'first movements' (*primus motus*) of the mind. In Stoic psychology, unlike the full-blown emotion that is based upon the consent of the will, this pre-passion is involuntary and natural. Sorabji believes that this conception is adapted and misinterpreted by Augustine in his discussions of affections.[53] A fuller treatment of the 'first movements' in Augustine's theory of affection deserves another study. Here I will restrict our discussion to the problem whether the uncontrollable movements of genital organs can be identified with the involuntary 'first movements'.

The most relevant passage has been cited earlier in section III.[54] In that context, the impotence of the will in face of genital movements, is juxtaposed with the control of the will over the bodily members in voicing the emotion of anger by uttering words, striking one's fist etc. Sorabji accuses that Augustine does not compare like with like. For the reactions of genital organs should be treated as the first movements for the fulfillment of sexual lust, however, the movements commanded by the will in the case of anger are already explicit expressions of the emotion. Following Seneca's suggestion, Sorabji conceives the male movements as an example of first movements just like physical reactions of reddening or bristling in the case of anger.[55] These initial physical shocks are believed to be directly produced by the appearance of good or bad and have no essential relation to one's morality.[56]

Here we just focus our discussion on the case of genital organs' movements. It has been stressed earlier that *concupiscentia carnis* is primarily a perverted manner of the soul's disposition. For Augustine,

[53] Sorabji 2000, 372-384.

[54] *Ciu. Dei* XIV, 16, see note 28.

[55] Seneca, *De ira*, II, 3, 2. "Nam si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem umoris obsceni altumue suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus." Cf. Sorabji 2000, 66-75 for an excellent exposition of first movements in Seneca's thoughts.

[56] Cf. Sorabji 2000, 73.

this statement can be applied to sexual lust as a particular form of *concupiscentia carnis*. Therefore the phenomenon of sexual irritation is not simply a physiological fact, but an external and determinate movement prompted by a hidden and indeterminate psychic force. What is more important, this force is not morally neutral for Augustine, because it opposes to our spiritual dimension. This position is definitely distanced from Julian's essentially physiological view of sexuality as driven by *calor genitalis* (the heat of genitals).[57]

As mentioned earlier, Augustine never believes that the body can have a direct effect upon the soul without the active involvement of the soul. Sexual lust is no exception. For this reason, in his distinction between sexual lust and other affections in *De ciuitate Dei* XIV, 16, Augustine must have implicitly granted that the soul is involved in the movements of genital organs, even though in an involuntary way. For these movements cannot occur without being preceded by a suggestion in the soul. In Augustine's philosophy of psychology, this suggestion is no longer a purely mental impression that intrudes into the mind regardless of the disposition of the will. In Augustine's exegesis of Genesis, It is explicitly identified with the dangerous temptation from the serpent in Augustine's exegesis of Genesis.[58] A careful reading of the relevant texts will reveal that Augustine recognizes a 'pleasure of cognition' (*cogitationis delectatio*) in this temptation.[59] This pleasure is already a response of the soul to the initial mental impression. In order to feel this pleasure, the soul is affected in the sense that a hidden assent of the will has been granted to the suggestion from the mental impression. For Augustine, it is this implicit pleasure that underlies the genital movements and other initial affective reactions of the mind. As mentioned earlier, Augustine believes that in the pre-lapsarian state, human beings were able to control even this hidden and implicit consent of the will. Therefore, *concupiscentia carnis* is not an incurable disease of the mind, but an immanent weakness of the soul in this mortal life that should be overcome by the divine

[57] JULIAN apud *c. Jul.* IV, 2, 7 "Si calor genitalis coniugalis honestatis minister ab immoderatis procursibus tam studio fidelium, quam doni uirtute retinetur, nec exstinguitur per gratiam, sed frenatur: probabilis est in genere suo et in modo suo, et solis accusatur excessibus" PETER BROWN has rightly commented, "Augustine's notion of *concupiscentia carnis*" and Julian's *calor genitalis* belong to two entirely different worlds." See PETER BROWN 1983, 63. Julian's idea of *calor genitalis* is probably influenced by the Stoic notion of 'vital fire' (*ignis uitalis*). For the literature regarding this, check Lamberigts forthcoming.

[58] Cf. *Gn. adu. Man.* II, 14, 21; *De sermone domini in monte.* I, 12, 34; *De Trinitate.* XII, 12, 17

[59] *Trin.* XII, 12, 17.

grace in the life to come. What underlies these theological statements is Augustine's realistic sensitivity to the innate impotence of human nature and his optimistic belief that this infirmity can be remedied. Sorabji rightly recognizes the change of standpoint from Stoic's prepassion to Augustine's temptation but interprets it simply as a distortion resulting from some Christian prejudices.[60] He neglects Augustine's profound understanding of human nature, especially the health and infirmity of human will that lies behind the so-called theological prejudice.

Certainly we have to concede that in the text under discussion Augustine fails to emphasize that in the emotion of anger there is also such an involuntary manifestation of the affected soul, which is treated by Seneca and his contemporary commentator as a simple reaction without the involvement of genuine emotions. In other occasions, Augustine does reflect on this involuntary reaction, both physical and mental, as an evidence of the sinful affection of the soul.[61] This uncontrolled reaction is common to all passions as a disturbing agitation falling upon the soul. Even under such concession, Augustine's insistence on the particularity of sexual lust can be defended as follows: the affection concerning our sexuality is open only to the involuntary manner of expression and cannot be fulfilled in the absence of this uncontrollable affective response to sensual stimulations; however, other emotions can find another more controllable way to express themselves. Although in the initial phase of their formation, these emotions appear as involuntary reactions, both mental and physical, such as pallor, falling tears, deep sighing etc. their completion does not presuppose the presence of these involuntary movements. It will be made more explicit in the analysis of the relation between shame-feeling and *concupiscentia carnis*, how this particularity makes sexual lust more shameful than other affections, though the latter can be more evil and more compulsive.[62]

VI. *Libido* and hunger, thirst, digestion

In his criticism of Augustine's objection to sexual lust, Sorabji also appeals to Julian's comparison of lust to hunger, thirst, digestion, and sleep, to argue that sexual lust cannot be singled out from these

[60] Sorabji believes that this change originates from Origen and culminates in Augustine. See id. 2000, 346-51.

[61] e.g. *trin* XII, 12, 17; *ciu. Dei* XIV, 4-6.

[62] See my article on shame. Wu 2007 (forthcoming).

bodily needs. Julian is believed to have made a significant differentiation between the command (*imperium*) and the consent (*consensus*) of the will.[63] Sorabji argues with Julian that hunger, thirst, and digestion, as well as genital movements, "do not require the command, but only the consent of the will".[64]

First it should be mentioned that this distinction has been reported by Augustine as inconsistent in Julian's argumentation[65], which is unjustly ignored in Sorabji's account. In some cases, Julian declares that genital members also obey the command of the mind; in other contexts, he insists that they "are not moved by the command of the mind, but rather await its consent"[66]. This inconsistency at least shows the ambiguity of Julian's conception of sexual lust in its relation to the will, and the difficulty of maintaining such an artificial distinction. Certainly it can be explained as if the genital members obey the command of the will in the normal condition as not "prevented either by illness or by lack of control", and become rebellious only under some morbid conditions.[67] Even granting that the disobedience of these genital movements to the command of the will is only occasional, Augustine might still argue that it is this exception that reveals the genuine nature of sexuality. For this occasional disobedience implies that there must be some independent force distinct from the will, which underlies the genital movements. Here Augustine can defend his position by stressing that these bodily movements and their driving force precede the explicit consent of the will, which is also conceded by Julian in his phrase "*await* its consent" (*expectare consensum*, my italics). The difference lies in Augustine's emphasis that these pre-consensual movements reflect the condition of the will as well, though in an implicit way. In this context, Augustine comments on one example from Cicero's *De consiliis suis* as cited by Julian that sexual arousal can be influenced by music as follows:

[63] Julian apud *c. Jul.* V, 5, 20-22.

[64] Ibid. V, 5, 20. "hoc genus motus in his habendum putasti, quae multa in nostro corpore ordine suo ac dispensatione secreta, uoluntatis non imperium, sed consensum requirunt". See SORABJI 2000, 409.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid. V, 5, 22. "Non moueri haec ad animi imperium, sed potius exspectare consensum".

[67] Ibid. V, 5, 20. "ubi primum dixisti: 'Cum uentum fuerit ut filii seminentur, ad uoluntatis prorsus nutum membra in hoc opus creata famulari; et nisi eorum impedimenta, aut de infirmitate, aut de immoderatione proueniant, seruire animi imperio'; postea uero, 'hoc genus motus in his habendum putasti, quae multa in nostro corpore ordine suo ac dispensatione secreta, uoluntatis non imperium, sed consensum requirunt'".

> "You see, then, that my statement was quite appropriate that this desire which the other senses serve is in a sense their master so that it lets them be aroused for its activity or quiet down from its turmoil. I said this, after all, because, as you yourself admit, 'we consent to it rather than command it.' For the fact that 'it is aroused by other stimuli or is broken and quieted down by a melody,' as you go on to say, would certainly not be the case, if it obeyed the human will."[68]

In other words, the command of the will, both for Augustine and for Julian, cannot be accepted as the direct driving force at issue. For Julian, it is a physiological force of *calor genitalis,* for Augustine, *libido* or *concupiscentia carnis*, which primarily belongs to the soul. However, in Julian's differentiation between the command and the consent of the will, this more profound divergence between Augustine and Julian on the driving force for the genital movements is ignored and concealed. For this reason, this distinction does not touch the central point of their controversy, namely the impotence of the will in confrontation with the sexual urge.

Secondly, Julian's appeal to the comparison of lust with other bodily needs cannot invalidate Augustine's condemnation of lust either. It is argued that hunger and thirst also occur with no respect to the command of the will like sexual lust, but we do not blame these natural appetites. As is rightly emphasized by Sorabji, hunger and thirst in this comparison should be thought of "not merely as needs of the body, but as actual wants".[69] This is a significant clarification in response to Augustine's argument against Julian:

> "You should not, in any case, compare this lust (*libido*) to hunger or other of our discomforts. None of us, after all, are hungry or thirsty or digest food when we will to do so. These are needs (*indigentia*) of a body that must be refreshed or relieved, and we must attend to them so that the body does not suffer injury or die. But does the body suffer injury or die if we do not give our assent (*assensus*) to lust? Distinguish, then, the evils which we endure with patience from those evils which we rein in with continence."[70]

[68] Ibid. V, 5, 23 "Vides ergo quam congruentius ego dixerim, sui iuris hanc esse quodam modo, cui seruitur ab aliis sensibus, ut in opus suum dignetur assurgere, uel a sua commotione requiescere. Hoc enim ego ideo dixi, quia, sicut ipse confessus es, „consentitur ei potius quam imperatur". Nam, et quod „aliis concitatur stimulis, uel modulamine frangitur et sedatur", sicut ipse prosequeris, profecto non fieret, si seruiret hominis uoluntati."

[69] Sorabji 2000, 409.

[70] *C. Jul.* V, 5, 22. "Nec tamen ideo debes istam libidinem fami uel aliis molestiis nostris comparare. Quod enim nemo cum uult esurit, aut sitit, aut digerit; indigentiae sunt istae reficiendi uel exonerandi corporis, quibus subueniendum est, ne laedatur, aut

It is quite evident that for Augustine the bodily discomforts or bodily needs are not reprehensible because they are necessary for our existence in this world. Although sexual lust is also required for the procreation, it does involve the unruly disposition of the soul to treasure the mortal things more than one's immortal life. This makes sexual lust distinguished from hunger and thirst as bodily needs, which can be explained as a pure physiological phenomenon and be satisfied by obtaining the needed material.

In place of lust and hunger or lust and thirst as bodily needs, Sorabji proposes other two comparisons: 1. of the genital movements with the salivation and the subsequent digestion; 2. of lust and the desire to eat and drink.[71] The result is taken for granted that in either case sexual lust is just like other bodily desires, which makes Augustine's condemnation of sexuality unsustainable.

For the first comparison, Augustine would say that both are bodily movements and should be free of reprehension. As is emphasized previously, Augustine never blames the body and its motion in general. For instance, the genital movements obeying the command of the will as believed to exist in Paradise before the Fall are certainly without any evil. Augustine insists that he only condemns the sexual arousal urged by *concupiscentia carnis* which threatens the spiritual value of human beings.[72] In short, what makes sexuality problematic for Augustine is its driving force, not the motion itself.

In the text interrogated by Sorabji, Augustine does simply dismiss hunger or thirst as pure bodily needs; however, he is not blind to the distinction between bodily needs and sensual desire or lust (*sentiendi libido*). In *Contra Julianum* IV, 14, 67, Augustine clearly distinguishes hunger or thirst from the love of food:

> "When nature, then, demands in some way some sustenance which is lacking, this is not called desire (*libido*), but hunger or thirst. but when the need has been satisfied and the love of food (*amor edendi*) entices the mind further, then there is desire, then there is an evil to which one must not yield, but resist."[73]

occidat: numquid autem laeditur aut occidit corpus, si libidini non adhibeatur assensus? Discerne ergo mala quae per patientiam sustinemus, ab eis malis quae per continentiam refrenamus."

[71] Sorabji 2000, 409.

[72] *c. Jul.* IV, 13, 62 "Numquam uero ego motum genitalium reprehendi generaliter, quod tu dicis: „dedicative"; sed illum motum reprehendi, quem facit concupiscentia, qua *caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum*"

[73] Ibid. IV, 14, 67. "Cum ergo natura quodam modo poscit supplementa quae desunt, non uocatur libido, sed fames aut sitis: cum uero suppleta necessitate amor

This love of food is recognized as a form of sensual desire, which is blameworthy because it is in opposition to one's spiritual longing: (text 5.3)

> "But sensual desire (*sentiendi libido*), with which we are now dealing, is what drives us to have sensations out of a love of carnal pleasure, whether we consent with our mind or fight against it. It is opposed to the love of wisdom; it is an enemy of the virtues. With respect to the part of it involved in the union of the two sexes, marriage makes good use of this evil, when the spouses procreate children by it and do nothing on account of it."[74]

Obviously, this sensual desire is only another name of *concupiscentia carnis*. Here sexual lust is mentioned explicitly as a particular form of sensual desire. In the same way, if sexual lust is blamed for its opposition to the spirit, so is the love of food as a perverted desire toward worldly things. If the desire to eat or drink in the Sorabji's second comparison can be identified with this love of food or drink, it is evident that for Augustine both are reprehensible. Certainly it might be argued that the desire to eat can be a neutral disposition toward the sustenance, not an *amor edendi* which inclines the mind for carnal pleasure. However Augustine would not recognize such a distinction, because he would not accept a disposition or an affection of the soul as something neutral. A desire is either good when the object is justifiable or bad when it is unlawful. What is significant for Augustine is that the good should be preferred to the evil. Therefore if a desire is indifferent to its object, it is certainly an evil.[75] Accordingly the so-called desire to eat is either only a need for necessary nutrition or a pure greed. If the former, it is blameless and distinguished from sexual lust as shown above; if the latter, both this disordered love and sexual lust are culpable.

edendi animum sollicitat, iam libido est, iam malum est, cui cedendum non est, sed resistendum." Obviously in this text *libido* is used as a general term of all kinds of desire.

[74] Ibid. IV, 14, 65. "Libido autem sentiendi est, de qua nunc agimus, quae nos ad sentiendum, siue consentientes mente, siue repugnantes, appetitu carnalis uoluptatis impellit. Haec est contraria dilectioni sapientiae, haec uirtutibus inimica. Hoc malo, quantum attinet ad eius eam partem qua sibi sexus uterque miscetur, bene utuntur nuptiae, cum coniuges procreant filios per illam, nihilque faciunt propter illam."

[75] Ibid. IV, 2, 7. "Quod autem ipsa concupiscentia facit, siue ad licitum siue ad illicitum indifferenter ardescere, utique malum est." This sentence is certainly located in the context of AUGUSTINE's rebuttal of Julian's *calor genitalis*, however, this principle can be applied to all kinds of lust or concupiscence. This is also evident in his careful use of more general word *concupiscentia* instead of *concupiscentia carnis*.

Thus far, we have emphasized the similarity of sexual lust to other sensual desires in response to Julian and Sorabji's criticisms. It should be stressed that even with regard to thirst and hunger, the particularity of sexual desire can still be defended as follows: the movements of salivation and digestion can move on its own way when the desire to eat or drink is absent, however, the genital movements cannot be aroused without the preceding lust. Both are not under the control of the will, but only the latter is exclusively dominated by *libido* or *concupiscentia carnis*. Therefore the latter cannot be treated as a purely physiological phenomenon, because it essentially involves the perverted disposition of the soul.

The foregoing arguments have clarified the similarity and dissimilarity of sexual lust both to other affections like anger, and to other bodily needs like hunger. By appealing to a theological conception of *concupiscentia carnis*, Augustine presents a more complicated and more polished image of sexuality quite different from Sorabji's depiction. The sexual desire is condemned as a moral evil for its opposition to the spiritual dimension of human beings, which is common to all *concupiscentia carnis*. On the other hand, this kind of lust is singled out for the reason that the concupiscence involved in sexuality is so indispensable to its manifestation in the body that the sexual movements can never be treated as neutral physical reactions like salivation and digestion. Here, the lust as an importunate psychic power usurps the control of the will over the body. The impotence of the will is here recognized as the particularity of the sexual lust, though not as the ground for its blameworthiness.

VII. Conclusion

It is not difficult to recognize that Augustine's subtle treatment of sexual lust primarily as a psychic and moral phenomenon originates from the scriptural tradition, especially from Augustine's lifelong reading of Paul's letters.[76] However as has been displayed before, this conception of *libido* is also well established within his metaphysics of soul and body, which stresses the active involvement of the soul. Moreover, it is integrated intimately in his whole system of moral psychology centered on the function of the will. Therefore if Augustine's basic conception of the tension between *caro* and *spiritus*, between

[76] Cf. THONNARD 1965, 68-79 on the relation between will and *concupiscentia* and 79-95 on its moral significance.

carnal infatuation and spiritual longing can be accepted as a standpoint, his condemnation of lust and other turbulent affections, as argued above, would be well established within the framework of his philosophical psychology.[77] To conclude, I do not think that Augustine lost the philosophical battle in his bitter debates with Julian of Eclanum. First, he offers a coherent philosophical account of sexual lust and its relation to the will. Furthermore, this interpretation takes into account the particularity of sexuality in human life and handles it in a masterly way by employing theological conceptions creatively in a philosophical manner. In this original reference of sexual lust to the innate infirmity of human nature, Augustine reveals some important characteristics of sexuality that have been neglected in the popular conception of libido as a neutral inclination of mind.

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[77] In the incisive comments on an earlier draft of this paper, professor Carlos Steel rightly emphasized that Augustine's position can be easily located in the Platonic tradition that lays a strong stress upon the tension between sensual lust and intellectual longing. This point of view is also held by SIMO KNUUTTILA, see id. *Emotion in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2004, 156-7. On the other hand, Augustine never questions the Stoic conception of emotion as the consent or dissent of the will. The actual identification of Augustine's interpretation of sexual lust in particular or his theory of emotion in general is beyond the scope of this contribution. For recent account of Augustine's theory of emotions, see also O'DALY 1986-1994; JOHANNES BRACHTENDORF, "Cicero and Augustine on the Passions" *Revue des études augustiniennes* 43 (1997) 289-308; EMMANUEL BERMON, "La théorie des passions chez saint Augustin", in *Les passions antiques et médiévales* (éd. par B. Besnier/P.F. Moreau/L. Renault = Théories et critiques des passions 1), Paris 2003, 173-197; GERD VAN RIEL "Mens inmota mota manet: Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine's Theory of the Passions", *Augustiniana* 54 (2004), 507-531. It is quite interesting to notice that Julian's conception of concupiscence also shows an eclectic character. See Lössl 2001, 101; LAMBERIGTS (forthcoming).

SERMO 90A (DOLBEAU 11, MAINZ 40)[1] SELF-LOVE AS THE BEGINNING OF LOVE FOR NEIGHBOUR AND GOD

1. Difficult to date

O. Perler, P.-P. Verbraken and M. Pellegrino did not know *sermo* 90A when they composed their chronology of Augustine's *sermones*. C. Lambot thinks Augustine preached the sermon with number 120 in Possidius' Index at the beginning of July 397, not long after June 29 (the feast of the apostles Peter and Paul) in Carthage.[2] F. Dolbeau identified that specific sermon with *sermo* 90A. Dolbeau found no internal proof to affirm or to deny the hypothetical dating by Lambot. Dolbeau, however, observes a number of details in *sermo* 90A that are compatible with Lambot's hypothesis. These internal details reveal that the sermon should be placed in a summer during the first years of Augustine's episcopate.[3] T. J. van Bavel and I. Bochet date *sermo* 90A around 397, close to the composition of the first book of *De doctrina christiana*.[4] E. Rebillard situates the sermon in the

A word of gratitude for prof. dr. Raymond Canning, who was so kind to carefully read a draft of this article and to help me with his suggestions.

[1] DOLBEAU, F., *Sermons inédits de saint Augustin prêchés en 397 (2e série)*, Revue Bénédictine 102/1-2 (1992) 44-74, pp. 63-74.

ROTELLE, J. E. (ed.), HILL, E. (trans., notes), *Sermons III/11, Newly Discovered Sermons* (The Works of Saint Augustine, A translation for the 21st Century, III/11), New City Press, Hyde Park/New York 1997, pp. 77-86.

[2] LAMBOT, C., *Un "ieiunium quinquagesimae" en Afrique au IVe siècle et date de quelques sermons de saint Augustin*, Revue Bénédictine 47 (1935) 114-121, p. 116.

[3] DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, pp. 64-65.

F. Dolbeau found two textual parallels confirming the date of 397: *epistula* 40, 10 from Augustine to Jerome (ca. 397) and *Confessiones* IV, xii, 18 (ca. 397). F. Dolbeau thinks this sermon could be located in the summer, because of *sermo* 90A, 7: "in ista rerum temporalium indigentia". This sentence could reveal that Africa was in a period of shortage, and such a period is typical for the beginning of the summer, when old supplies are exhausted and the new harvests are not yet in the commercial circuit. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, p. 65.

[4] VAN BAVEL, T. J., *"Natural" and "Spiritual" relationships in Augustine*, Augustiniana 46 (1996) 197-242, pp. 220-221. BOCHET, I., §4. *Frui-Uti*, in MOREAU, M. (introd., trad.), BOCHET, I., MADEC, G. (annot., notes compl.), *La doctrine chrétienne – De doctrina christiana* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne – Œuvres de Saint Augustin 11/2), Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1997, pp. 449-463, pp. 459-462.

Carthaginian summer of 397.[5] E. Hill summarizes the dating of Lambot and Dolbeau.[6]

P.-M. Hombert, using the method of scriptural parallels, dates *sermo* 90A around the years 397 and 398.[7] He does not talk about the possible location where the sermon was delivered. If we follow the hypothesis that the sermon was preached in Carthage, the year 398 is not possible. Perler notes that the year 398 was to turbulent to travel, because of the rebellion of Gildo, the *comes Africae*, against emperor Honorius at the end of 397 and the subsequent repression of that rebellion in 398.[8]

Hombert's dating of *sermo* 90A can be used as a case study to evaluate his methodology and analysis. In *sermo* 90A – given the title *De dilectione Dei et proximi* – Augustine investigates the relation between love for God, love for the neighbour and self-love. Hombert acknowledges at the beginning of his evaluation of *sermo* 90A that this topic of the relationship between love for God, love for neighbour and self-love is not really an "original" topic in Augustine's writings, that it is not a *hapax*. The commandment to right love is a topic that remains central during the whole of Augustine's life, in his thinking and writing. So it is no surprise that Hombert found a lot of parallels regarding the (double or triple) love commandment throughout the *corpus* of Augustine's writings.

Hombert files parallel clusters of biblical citations, similar use of Scripture and similar metaphors in an objective way. His study, however, is almost completely restricted to parallel texts that sustain his hypothesis that the sermon belongs to the period 397-398. There are also other points of comparison that could indicate a later date. Hombert handles those parallels that could contradict the hypothesis of 397-398 with a lot of care. Because of the huge quantity of later parallels, the parallels of the period 397-398 may only be considered as interesting observations, at the most as suggestive indications, but not as complete proof. Because of the many and diverse parallels, the method of parallels can almost not be used as criterion to give the

[5] REBILLARD, E., *Sermones*, in FITZGERALD, A. D. (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids/ Cambridge 1999, 773-792, p. 777.

[6] ROTELLE, HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 85: n. 1.

[7] HOMBERT, P.-M., *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes – Série Antiquité 163), Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris 2000, pp. 399-416.

[8] PERLER, O., *Les voyages de Saint Augustin*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1969, pp. 222-223.

sermon an early date. The analysis of the content of the sermon could perhaps provide some clarity.

Hombert indicates *Sermo de disciplina christiana* as the most important source of parallels. The possible date of *Sermo de disciplina christiana* is however not univocal. *Sermo de disciplina christiana* is either to be dated around Augustine's ordination as bishop or should be situated at the beginning of the Pelagian controversy. Hombert prefers the first option. He argues this on the basis of a possible parallel between *Sermo de disciplina christiana* and the *Liber regularum* of Tyconius, a work used by Augustine in composing the beginning of his *De doctrina christiana* (396/397). As such, Hombert's dating of *sermo* 90A has got a weakness: the date of *Sermo de disciplina christiana* is not sure and it is precisely this unsure date he uses to date *sermo* 90A. Hombert indicates *De doctrina christiana* I as the second important source of parallels. I however think he does not completely realize the value of *De doctrina christiana* to date *sermo* 90A. An investigation of possible parallels regarding the content and points of convergence between *sermo* 90A and *De doctrina christiana* is probably more valuable than only a research of formal similarities.

2. R. Canning

An analysis of the content of *sermo* 90A, in an attempt to date the sermon, should be submitted to R. Canning. The text edition of the Dolbeau *sermons*, however, was not yet available to him when he performed his research *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*.[9] Canning investigated thematically (and in a lesser degree chronologically) the relation between love for God, love for neighbour and self-love in the complete *oeuvre* of Augustine. Canning discusses with P. Agaësse, J. Brechtken, J. Burnaby, D. Dideberg, R. Holte, G. Hultgren, A. Nygren, O. O'Donovan and T. J. van Bavel[10] about

[9] CANNING, R., *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Augustinian Historical Institute, Heverlee/Leuven 1993.

[10] AGAËSSE, P., *Fruitio Dei I: La "fruitio" augustinienne*, Dictionnaire de Spiritualité (1964) 1547-1552. BRECHTKEN, J., *Fruitio und Agape. Der Liebesgedanke bei Augustin*, Theologie und Glaube 59 (1969) 446-463. BRECHTKEN, J., *Augustine Doctor Caritatis: Sein Liebesbegriff im Widerspruch von Eigennutz und selbstloser Güte im Rahmen der antiken Gluckseligkeits-Ethik* (Monographien zur Philosophischen Forschung), Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1975. BURNABY, J., *Amor Dei – A study of the Religion of St. Augustine*, Hodder & Stoughton, London 1947. BURNABY, J., *Amor in St. Augustine*, in KEGLEY, C.W. (ed), *The Philosophy and Theology of Anders Nygren*, Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale 1970. DIDEBERG, D., *Caritas:*

the meaning of Augustine's concept of love. Canning tries to find the answer to several questions. Does Augustine consider love to God as so more important than love for the neighbour that this last love is a subordinate form of love? Can both forms of love be separated? Can love for God be independent, unrelated to love for neighbour? Are these two different forms of love, with their own action radius? Canning shows that for Augustine a distinction does not immediately imply a separation. There are a lot of texts in which Augustine writes that God and Christ are present in the human neighbour and that they have to be found in the neighbour. Love for neighbour and love for God are the same.

The fact that Augustine considers love for the neighbour as a phase in spiritual life, that it is a virtuous action preparing contemplation, that it is followed by a reward from God, that it is a pair of wings to reach God does not imply that love for the neighbour is only and solely a (instrumental) preparation to the love for God. That is not the case since Augustine also writes that love for the neighbour makes God present, is an *imitatio Christi* and (also) continues in the eternal life. Canning thinks there is a dialectical relationship between love for God and love for the neighbour. Love for God comes first in the *ordo praecipiendi*, and love for the neighbour has got the first place in the *ordo faciendi*. Canning emphasizes the deep unity between love for the neighbour and love for God in the thinking of Augustine. Both forms of love are intrinsically connected in several ways. God, who has to be loved by man, commands man to love his neighbour. Love for God can and should be expressed in the daily praxis. Nobody can love the neighbour as he loves himself unless he loves God. That specific connection between these three forms of love is the subject of *sermo* 90A.

G. Schlabach evaluates the research of Canning.[11] From the one hand, he praises it and regards it as a standard reference work about

Prolégomènes à une étude de la théologie augustinienne de la charité, in ZUMKELLER, A. (ed.), *Signum Pietatis: Festgabe für Cornelius Petrus Mayer OSA* (Cassiciacum 40), Augustinus-Verlag, Würzburg 1989, pp. 369-382. HOLTE, R., *Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne*, Institut des Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1962. HULTREN, G., *Le Commandement d'amour chez Augustin – Interprétation Philosophique et Théologique d'après les Ecrits de la période 386-400*, Vrin, Paris 1939. NYGREN, A., *Eros et Agapè – La notion chrétienne de l'amour et ses transformations*, JUNDT, P. (vert.), Aubier, Paris 1944. O'DONOVAN, O., *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London 1980. O'DONOVAN, O., *Usus and fruitio in Augustine – De doctrina christiana I*, The Journal of Theological Studies 33 (1982) 361-397. VAN BAVEL, T. J., *Fruitio, delectatio and voluptas in Augustine*, Augustinus 37 (1993) 499-510.

[11] SCHLABACH, G., review of: CANNING, R., *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Augustinian Studies 26 (1995) 155-158.

Augustine's multidimensional doctrine of Christian love. From the other hand he criticizes Cannings methodology. He thinks Canning was to systematic. Canning considers the elaborate *oeuvre* of Augustine, spread out over many years, too explicitly as one consequent whole. Doing this, Canning neglected the different phases, evolutions in Augustine and the different functions he had (as a theologian at his desk, as pastor at the pulpit, as a bishop on his episcopal see). A. Davids and G.-M. De Durand agree with this comment of a lack of a chronological analysis.[12] This neglect of chronology in Augustine's thinking and writing makes it difficult to use Cannings study to date *sermo* 90A. Canning's book, however, can be very instructive for an analysis of the content of *sermo* 90A.

Despite the fact Canning does not investigate *sermo* 90A, his study offers an instrument to compare the specific treatment of the double/triple love commandment in *sermo* 90A with the elaboration of that theme in the whole of Augustine's thinking and writing and the relevant secondary literature about this subject. *Sermo* 90A develops the thought that love for the neighbour presupposes self love, and that self love presupposes love for God. This topic is dealt with in the chapter *Augustine's radical use of Ps. 10.6: God or iniquity*[13], about the relationship between self-love and love for God and the chapter *Why one commandment can indicate both and why one cannot be kept without the other*[14] about the unity between love for God and love for the neighbour.

3. Content of *sermo* 90A

Augustine clearly indicates in *sermo* 90A the two liturgical readings of that day: Mt. 22, 37-40 and Rom. 13, 8-10.[15] One can summarize this sermon as an explanation of these two readings. The purpose of the sermon is to show in which way the two readings are

[12] DAVIDS, A., review of: CANNING, R., *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Tijdschrift voor Theologie 34/4 (1994) 446. DE DURAND, G.-M., review of: CANNING, R., *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 79/1 (1995) 103-105.

[13] CANNING, *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour*, pp. 135-141.

[14] CANNING, *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour*, pp. 273-284.

[15] *Sermo* 90A, 1: In hac quae modo recitata est euangelica lectione, [...]. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, p. 66.
Sermo 90A, 4: [...] apostolus Paulus, si aduertistis cum etiam eius epistula legeretur, [...]. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2è série)*, p. 67.

coherent with each other. The commandment of total love for the neighbour (Rom. 13, 8-10) and the commandment of total love for God (Mt. 22, 37-38) do not seem to form a contradiction.[16] Augustine presents his audience with an apparent problem which he solves during his sermon. By giving the sermon the form of a search for a solution to an urgent problem, *sermo* 90A is given a strong dynamism, a coherent structure. Augustine even enhances that dynamism by addressing his audience in person,[17] and by taking care of the stylistic elements of the sermon.[18]

The man asking Jesus: "What is the greatest commandment in the Law?"[19] saw Jesus with the eyes of the flesh and not with the eyes of faith.[20] We, however, have to ask that same question as people of faith who are "sincerely out to learn from Him"[21], but we receive the same answer. Jesus responds to the question with the two commandments that concisely summarize the whole law of God.[22] As such, the Lord fulfils the prophesy: "Verbum enim adbreuians et consummans faciet dominus super terram."[23] The Lord is filled with *misericordia*. Just as He showed us his greatness in the abridged ('adbreuians') form of a human body, He also "enclosed the length and breadth of the law in a short precept"[24]. The abridged form of that body gives us the complete Son of God. The abridged form of those two commandments presents the whole law of God. That summary of the law is necessary, because: "The law, after all, contains many commandments; it is like an endless forest, sprouting commandments on every page. And who could fulfill what nobody could possibly keep in mind?"[25]

[16] Augustine refers to the commandment to love God, neighbour and yourself 18 times with the word *mandatum* (in *sermo* 90A, 1; 2; 3; 4; 9; 13), *praeceptum* 10 times (in *sermo* 90A, 2; 4; 7; 8; 12; 13) and twice with *regula* (in *sermo* 90A, 7).

[17] *Sermo* 90A, 7: Non te interrogo, ipse te interroga. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2[e] série)*, p. 70.

[18] Augustine takes care of the style of his sermon, by giving examples from the animal world (*sermo* 90A, 6), and the concrete (and probably popular) examples of a charioteer (*sermo* 90A, 8) and a bull fighter (*sermo* 90A, 11), and also by parallelisms as: *Sermo* 90A, 1: Dicamus autem non temptantis astu, sed discentis adfectu. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2[e] série)*, p. 66. *Sermo* 90A, 14: Quod lex imperat, fides impetrat. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2[e] série)*, p. 73.

[19] Mt. 22, 36.

[20] *Sermo* 90A, 1.

[21] HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 77.

[22] *Sermo* 90A, 2.

[23] Is. 10, 23 / Rom. 9, 28. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2[e] série)*, p. 66. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, p. 406.

[24] HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 77.

[25] *Sermo* 90A, 2. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, pp. 77-78.
Multa enim sunt legis praecepta, et tamquam silua incomprehensibilis per omnes paginas pullulat mandatorum. Et quis posset implere quae nemo sufficit animo retinere.

"*You shall love*, he says, *the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul and with your whole mind* [Deut. 6, 5]. *This is the first and great commandment. But the second*, he says, *is like this one: You shall love your neighbour as yourself* [Lev. 19, 8]. *On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the Prophets.*" Mt. 22, 37-40 (Lc. 10, 27) summarizes the whole law. "Hold onto these roots and you have the whole tree in your hands."[26]

"What better, what shorter thing could you be told" than Mt. 22, 37.[27] Do this, and be reassured of eternal life. There is, however, an apparent problem. How can a person fulfil each one of the two precepts of the love commandment while at the same time leaving room for the other? How can fulfilment of the two be balanced? The double problem – the apparent twofold contradiction – Augustine sees, can be summarized in two points:

If you love God completely, what is still left to love yourself? If there is nothing left to love yourself, how can you fulfil the second commandment that orders to love your neighbour as yourself?[28]

Paul seems to put the emphasis in Rom. 13, 8-10 completely on love for the neighbour. Paul includes everything in the love for the neighbour. But if you completely love your neighbour, what is left to love God?[29]

DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 66.
For the metaphor *silua incomprehensibilis*, see HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 406-407.

[26] HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 78.
Sermo 90A, 3: *Diliges*, inquit, *dominum deum tuum in toto corde tuo et in tota anima tua et in tota mente tua. Hoc est primum et magnum mandatum. Secundum autem*, inquit, *simile est huic. Diliges proximum tuum tamquam teipsum. In his duobus mandatis uniuersa lex pendet et prophetae*. Quid te extendebas per ramorum diffusionem? Radices has tene, et tota arbor in manu est. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, pp. 66-67.

[27] *Sermo* 90A, 4. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 78.

[28] *Sermo* 90A, 4: Si enim dominum deum tuum in toto corde, tota anima, tota mente dilexeris, nihil tibi relinquis unde teipsum diligere possis. [...] Si autem nihil remanebit unde diligas teipsum, in secundo praecepto quomodo *diliges proximum tamquam teipsum*? DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 67.

[29] *Sermo* 90A, 4: Porro autem apostolus Paulus, si aduertistis cum etiam eius epistula legeretur, implere legem dicit eum hominem qui dilexerit proximum, non adiungens mandatum primum et magnum, ut quisque toto corde, anima, mente diligat deum. Sic enim ait: *Nam non adulterabis, non homicidium facies, non concupisces, et si quod aliud est mandatum, in hoc sermone recapitulatur: diliges proximum tuum tamquam teipsum. Dilectio proximi malum non operatur. Plenitudo autem legis caritas* [Rom. 13, 9-10]. Hic dicit: *qui diligit proximum, legem impleuit* [Rom. 13, 8]. Et si tria quaedam praecepta diceret: *Non adulterabis, non homicidium facies, non concupisces* [Rom. 13, 9], putaremus in dilectione proximi haec sola tria praecepta retineri. Cum uero adiunxit et ait: *si quod est aliud mandatum* [Rom. 13, 9], totum proximi

Augustine aims to solve this problem. Being human, we are far away from God. That is for Augustine the reason to start his research with investigating love for the neighbour. Everybody has neighbours. Even more, one has to reach out to one's neighbour in order to love God. This is implied by the warning of 1Jn. 4, 20: "O man, *if you do not love the brother whom you can see, how will you be able to love the God whom you cannot see*?"[30] "So it gives us a rule to follow: let us start from our neighbour, in order to arrive at God."[31]

As a first step of his investigation of love for neighbour, Augustine observes that the ordinary natural love is not sufficient.[32] Birds too long for birds of their own kind. Animals sharing the same stable like to follow each other when travelling and dislike being separated from their fellow stable inhabitants. People love their children just as tigers love their cubs.[33] That form of love, that humans share with animals,

dilectione conclusit. Quid hic restat ad dilectionem dei? DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, pp. 67-68.
Rom. 13, 8b: HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, p. 404.
Rom. 13, 9: HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 401-404.

[30] *Sermo* 90A, 5.

[31] *Sermo* 90A, 5. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 79.
Praescriptum est ergo nobis: a proximo incipiamus, ut ad deum perueniamus. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 68.

[32] *Sermo* 90A, 6.

[33] Augustine refers here, somewhat unclear, to spontaneous love for very close neighbours and relatives. Augustine clarifies this in the next paragraph. *Sermo* 90A, 7: *Diliges proximum tuum tamquam teipsum.* Iam non dico: filium, coniugem, uicinum amicum, uicinum notum *diliges tamquam teipsum*. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 69.
In this context of Augustine's vision of love for close neighbours, see the recent study of T. J. van Bavel. Van Bavel investigates how Augustine perceives the relation between "You shall love your neighbour as yourself (Mt. 22, 39)" and "If anyone comes to me, and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple (Lk. 14, 26)." Van Bavel gives a chronological overview of Augustine's view on spiritual relations and physical, natural relations. Van Bavel points out that Augustine does not deny the (restricted) goodness of the physical or natural relations. Augustine's preference, however, is the spiritual. Augustine became more nuanced through the years and looked for more support in the Scriptures. Augustine considers natural love as a moral obligation. That natural love, however, should be surpassed by loving other people in God and in Christ. Van Bavel's chronological-thematical analysis situates *sermo* 90A amongst the writings from 396 to 400. Regarding the relation between natural and spiritual relations, van Bavel refers to *Sermo* 90A, 6. Human self-love is not only the (natural) love animals have, but above all the (spiritual) love for neighbour and God. VAN BAVEL, *"Natural" and "Spiritual" relationships in Augustine*, pp. 220-221. In this context, one also has to take into consideration that Augustine approaches the natural and physical, though it is inferior to the spiritual, quite optimistically when compared with his contemporaries. Jerome and Jovinian for example perceive marriage (and sexuality) as something harmful and negative, while Augustine (cf. *De*

does not constitute the typical human love. Man is different from animals. According to Gn. 1, 26-28 man has authority over animals.[34] And even more, man is created to the image of God.[35] What does constitute the love of man for man?

To analyse the meaning of "love your neighbour as yourself", Augustine tries first to understand the exact nature of self-love.[36] Self-love does not mean the desire to eat, or not to be poor or sick, or not to suffer pain. Ps. 11, 5 (10, 6) brings clarification: "*For whoever loves iniquity hates his own soul.*"[37] Augustine's explanation of this

bono conjugali) thinks it has intrinsic values. Cf. LAMBERIGTS, M., *A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality*, in DODARO, R., LAWLESS, G. (eds.), *Augustine and his Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner*, Routledge, London/New York 2000, pp. 176-197.

[34] For Gn. 1, 26b in Augustine, see: HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 413-415.

[35] Augustine understands the terminology of *imago Dei* as referring to the human soul. This topic is present throughout his whole oeuvre. He especially elaborates it in *De Trinitate*. Augustine considers the *imago Dei*, the likeness of man to God, not as something static but rather as dynamic. It is a task for man to resemble God more and more. In this sense, human life is a pilgrimage from the unequal to the equal. That resemblance with God is the true home of man (*Confessiones* VII, X, 16. CCL 27 p. 103). However far man proceeds on this journey, man always stays Gods *impar imago*. *Sermo* 90A, 5: Despite not being equal to God and being far away from God, God's *misericordia* brings man closer to God. Only Christ is God's equal *par imago* (*De Trinitate* VII, VI, 12. CCL 50 p. 267, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 49,2. CCL 38 p. 576). Our equality with God is enhanced by love and love brings us closer to Him, despite the fact we will never become what He is (*De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manichaeorum* I, XI, 18. CSEL 90 pp. 21-22). Man resembles God. Resemblance does not imply being identical with the original. Only Christ is identical with the original. Man can only (attempt to) approach the original. In heaven, *imago* reaches perfection in the vision of God. Here on earth, we see God only through a mirror, as an enigma. We will see Him face to face in heaven (*De Trinitate* XV, XXIII, 44. CCL 50A p. 522). There is an evolution in Augustine's thinking on *imago Dei*. In his earlier writing *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustine was convinced that man lost the image of God in losing paradise. Later, in discussion with the Pelagians, he thinks that *imago Dei* is part of human nature and as a result is never lost. *Sermo* 90A does not deal with this topic. CLARK, M. T., *Image Doctrine*, in FITZGERALD, *Augustine through the Ages*, 440-442. SULLIVAN, J. E., *The Image of God. The Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence*, The Priory Press, Dubuque 1963.

[36] *Sermo* 90A, 7.

The content of *Sermo* 90 A, 7 is parallel with *De doctrina christiana* I regarding self-love and love for one's own body:

– *Sermo* 90 A, 7: Quis enim est, inquis, qui non diligat seipsum? DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 69.

– *De doctrina christiana* I, xxiv, 24, 48: Nemo ergo se odit [...] neque corpus suum quisquam odit. (CSEL 80, 20)

Cf. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, p. 415.

[37] *Sermo* 90A, 7. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 80.

"Qui enim diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam." DOLBEAU, Sermons inédits (2^e série), p. 70.

verse can be paraphrased as follows: If you want that live goes bad for somebody else so that you could thrive, you love *iniquitas*. In that case, you hate your own soul. If you hate your own soul, I do not entrust your neighbour to you to love as yourself. A first conclusion is thus that self-love is necessary for love of neighbour.

Regarding love for neighbour, Augustine shows his flock that natural love is not enough and that self-love is a condition. Thirdly, Augustine observes that you want to bring the person you love to the object you love yourself.[38] You want for example to urge everybody to love your favourite charioteer. So, if you love *iniquitas*, you also direct the person you love to that *iniquitas*.[39] Furthermore, you want to aim your beloved one to your love object but at the same time you do not want this to happen at your own cost. You want the neighbour you love to possess as much as you do, but you do not want him to become rich at your own expense. That is why you should not love something that is reduced by giving it away. That is why you should bring your neighbour to that sort of capital that is not reduced by the amount of shareholders. Bring your neighbour to that specific good that belongs to everybody. As long as you do not love that good, you will never love your neighbour as yourself.[40]

That irreducible good of and for everybody is God.[41] Only when you start to love God, you love yourself. Loving God has no limitations. "For loving God, the sky is the limit, which means there's no limit. So love with whole heart, with whole soul, with whole mind. What more have you got, after all, to love your God with, than your whole self?"[42] Augustine immediately reassures his listeners that this complete love does not imply that man will perish by leaving nothing

For parallel use of Ps. 11, 5 (10, 6) in Augustine, see HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 404-405.

[38] *Sermo* 90A, 8.

[39] For the topic of orientating the other to what one loves oneself, see: HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 407-408.

[40] *Sermo* 90A, 8.

[41] *Sermo* 90A, 9.

[42] *Sermo* 90A, 9. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 81.
Amandi deum modus est sine modo. Ama ergo *ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente*, quia plus non habes. Quid enim habes plus, unde diligas deum tuum, quam totum tuum? DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, p. 71.
In his short commentary on *sermo* 90A S. Lancel emphasizes that Augustine says in §9 that the love for God should be without limitations, without moderation. The same thought is formulated in a letter from Severus of Milevis to Augustine (ca. 396): In quo iam nullus nobis amandi modus imponitur, quando ipse modus est sine modo amare. (*Ep.* 109, 2. CSEL 34[2] p. 637.) LANCEL, S., *Saint Augustin*, Fayard, Paris 1999, pp. 282-284.

to love himself. "You won't perish, because by loving God with your whole self, you will be in a place where you can't perish. Rather, if you lower your love down from there to yourself, you won't be in Him, but in yourself; so that's when you will perish, because you will be in a place of perishing."[43] A second conclusion is thus that self-love includes love for God.

With an allusion to the biblical story of the prodigal son, Augustine supports his thesis that placing yourself in God does not imply losing yourself but is actually finding yourself again.[44] The preference of the prodigal son for his own company led him far away from his father. He fell away from his father and as such from himself. The prodigal son had first to come back to himself.[45] After that return to himself, he decided to not remain in himself but to turn back to his father.

Augustine has solved the problem. "Love God with all you've got... in this way alone will you love yourself. In this way alone can you love your neighbour as yourself."[46] You have to urge your neighbour also toward this complete love for God.[47] Augustine illustrates this with a comparison. You have to exhort your neighbour to the right form of love, just as you have to wake your neighbour to see a bullfighter. Once awake, he will be grateful to you.[48]

"So then it was necessary for those two commandments (*praecepta*) to be put before us, because if you love your neighbour, you don't love him unless you first love God. When you love God, after

A. Gabillon uses this parallel between *sermo* 90A and *epistula* 109 to argue an earlier date of that letter (and even of the books X and XI of the *Confessiones*) around 398-399. GABILLON, A., *Redatation de la lettre 109 de Severus de Milev*, in MADEC, G. (ed.), *Augustin Prédicateur (395-411). Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (5-7 septembre 1996)*, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1996, pp. 431-437.

[43] *Sermo* 90A, 9. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, pp. 81-82.

[44] *Sermo* 90A, 10.

[45] Those people are told: Redite, praeuaricatores, ad cor [Is. 46, 8]. *Sermo* 90A, 10. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, p. 71. Cf. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, p. 408.

[46] *Sermo* 90A, 11. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 83.
Ama deum totus, *ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua*: sic solum, sic diliges teipsum. Hoc modo solo diligis proximum tamquam teipsum. Ad eum enim rapis, de quo erubescere non possis. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, p. 72.

[47] "Quant au rapport entre l'amour du prochain et l'amour de soi, il est abordé aux §7-11 où Augustin développe l'idée suivante: pour accomplir le commandement: *Tu aimeras le prochain comme toi-même*, il faut d'abord s'aimer soi-même. Et s'aimer soi-même, c'est aimer le bien et la justice, car *Qui aime l'iniquité, hait son âme* (Ps. 10, 6) et c'est choisir pour soi le meilleur. Bref, c'est aimer Dieu. Qui ne s'aime pas de cette manière, aura un amour faussé à l'égard d'autrui. Aime le prochain comme soi-même, ce sera donc aussi l'entraîner vers Dieu, lui faire aimer Dieu." HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 404-405.

[48] *Sermo* 90A, 11.

all, you don't love iniquity (*iniquitas*), and so you don't hate your own soul by loving iniquity (*iniquitas*)."[49] If you do not love *iniquitas*, you love *caritas* and there you love God. "Deus caritas est."[50] If you love, love that from which (*unde*) you love and you love God. That from which you love is *caritas* and God is *caritas*.[51]

One *praeceptum* would actually have been sufficient: you will love your neighbour as yourself. To avoid a wrong love of the neighbour by the wrong self-love, the Lord wanted to give self-love form in love for God. Only self-love based on God leads to good love for the neighbour. Only in this form, the Lord entrusted you with your neighbour to love him as you love yourself.[52] If you understand why the Lord gave two *praecepta*, one *praeceptum* actually is enough.[53] The first and second *praeceptum* are inseparable connected: "[...] this second one follows the first. [...] the first [...] pulls the second after it. You can't have the second without the first. So then, carry out just one of them, you there cudgeling your brains over two. You can't carry out one except in two."[54] The choice for love for the neighbour will

[49] *Sermo* 90A, 12. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 83.

[50] 1Joh. 4, 16. *Sermo* 90A, 12. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 72.

[51] *Sermo* 90A, 12: Si ergo diligis, dilige unde diligis, et deum diligis. Non audisti? *Qui enim diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam.* Si diligis, dilige et hoc ipsum unde diligis, et deum diligis. Unde enim diligis, *caritas est.* Diligis caritate, dilige caritatem, et dilexisti deum, quoniam *deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in deo manet.* DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 72.
Hill translated the construction with *unde* in a different way: "If you love, love too the very thing you love with, and you are loving God. What you love with, you see, is charity. ..." HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 83.

[52] *Sermo* 90A, 12: Debuerunt ergo duo praecepta commendari. Nam sufficeret unum: *Diliges proximum tamquam teipsum*, sed ne erraret homo in diligendo proximo, quia errabat in diligendo seipso, uoluit dominus in dilectione dei informare dilectionem tuam, qua diligas teipsum; et tunc tibi commisit proximum, quem diligeres tamquam teipsum. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, pp. 72-73.
Augustine repeats this in *sermo* 90A, 13: Iam ergo si placet, sufficiat tibi et praeceptum apostoli unum. Iam intellexisti duo, sufficit et unum. Nam antequam intellegas duo, unum non sufficit. Incipis enim male diligere teipsum, et male diligis eum quem diligis tamquam teipsum. Nec dicendum est: male diligis, sed: non diligis. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 73.

[53] *Sermo* 90A, 13. See footnote 52.

[54] *Sermo* 90A, 13. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 84.
Non potes hoc habere sine illo, hoc secundum sequitur primum. Sit primum et trahit secundum. Non potest secundum esse sine primo. Imple ergo unum, qui cogitabas de duobus. Non potes unum implere, nisi in duobus. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 73.
T. J. van Bavel argues that Augustine's thinking on the apparent problem that Paul sometimes only speaks about the commandment to love the neighbour (because this love also includes love to God and self love) is a turning point in the evolution of Augustine's thinking on love for the neighbour. That turning point can be reduced

not be genuine unless God is loved also. The choice for love for God will not be authentic unless the neighbour is included.[55]

After solving the opening problem, Augustine ends his sermon with his vision on Christian morals.[56] It is possible you do not commit adultery or murder, not out of love for justice, but because of fear for punishment. In that case you may not have committed murder, but in your heart, you will be found guilty. You do not kill because you do not dare, not because you love not-killing. "Let real action happen inside you, where the one who can reward you can see you.[57] That is the place where you have to fight, where you must win! That, after all, is where you have the spectator that counts."[58]

"But you don't yet have any love; groan and sigh, believe, ask for it, obtain it. What you are told to do, what the law commands, faith obtains. And if you already have what it obtains for you, well, what do you have that you have not received? [1 Cor. 4, 7]"[59] By concluding that

to Augustine's commentaries on Paul of 394. Because of the presence of that subject here in *sermo* 90A, van Bavel suspects that the date of 397 can be confirmed. VAN BAVEL, *"Natural" and "Spiritual" relationships in Augustine*, p. 216; pp. 220-221.

[55] *Sermo* 90A, 13: Elige quam uis dilectionem. Dilectionem proximi eligis: non erit uera, nisi deus diligatur. Dilectionem dei eligis: non erit uera, nisi proximus subaudiatur. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 73.

[56] *Sermo* 90A, 13.

[57] *Sermo* 90A, 10: Returning to oneself is necessary to turn back to God.
Sermo 90A, 12: You have to look for God in your heart, and not with your eyes.
Sermo 90A, 13: God judges the heart. Let the moral action take place within you, where the one that can reward you can see you.
Sermo 90A, 12-13 expresses Augustine's preference for the spiritual above the physical/material. As already noticed, T. J. van Bavel could with the help of Augustine's thinking on natural and spiritual relations suggest that *sermo* 90A probably is preached in 397.
Sermo 90A, 11-12 is an example of Augustine's thinking on interiorisation, a subject he elaborated explicitly in his *Confessiones*. God surpasses man. He can however not be found outside man. God is above man, but is to be found within man. *Confessiones* III, VI, 11: Tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo meo. (CCL 27, p. 33.) This is the core of Augustine's teaching of interiority. God can be discovered by a gradual and internal search (by reason). This move to interiorisation can serve as an additional hint in our dating of *sermo* 90A. The *Confessiones* are generally dated between 397 and 401, and probably very close to 397. Cf. CARY, Ph., *Interiority*, in FITZGERALD, *Augustine through the Ages*, 451-456.

[58] *Sermo* 90A, 13. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 84.
Intus sit quod agis, ibi sit, ubi uidet qui coronat; ibi pugna, ibi uince: ibi enim habes qui spectat te. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 73.
The moral understanding of *pugnare* and *vincere* is close to the theme of the moral battle (in imitation of the *martyres*) in martyrs sermons.

[59] *Sermo* 90A, 14. HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 84.
Sed nondum habes dilectionem: geme, crede, pete, impetra. Quod iubetur, quod lex imperat, fides impetrat. Si enim iam habes quod impetrat, *quid enim habes quod non accepisti* [1 Cor. 4, 7]? DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 73.

faith receives what the law orders and that everthing we have we have received, Augustine reminds his listeners at the end of his sermon of the centrality of grace within the Christian life and specifically in fulfilling the love commandment. That is what we have to ask when we do not have it. That what we have received when we have it is *caritas*.

Augustine quotes Ps. 103, 2-4 (102, 2-4) to summarize concisely the history of salvation.[60] Those verses indicate according to Augustine that we receive *caritas* in baptism. The *misericordia* of the Lord forgives us our sins, heals our ills[61], rescues our live from decay and awards us with our crowns.[62] "Be just, and you will be satisfied with God. There is [...] nothing [...] that can satisfy you, except God, [...]."[63] We have to be fervent in doing the works of *misericordia* and in loving our neighbour, so we may earn it to experience the judgment with *misericordia*.[64]

"Quod lex imperat, fides impetrat." For parallels of this sentence in Augustine's oeuvre, see HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 408-410. P.-M. Hombert only finds one early parallel. He discovers 12 parallels from after 412. A sentence with such a content and the convergence of 12 parallels within the pelagian controversy is normally sufficient for Hombert to situate a *sermo* in an anti-pelagian context. This one category of twelve anti-pelagian parallels does not annul here the other categories of early parallels.

The verse "*quid enim habes quod non accepisti* [1Cor. 4, 7]" is used by Augustine for the first time in *De diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I, II, 9 (CCL 44, p. 34) (ca. 396). In his explanation of Rom. 9, 14-15, Augustine points out that neither *misericordia* of God neither our own belief are results of own merit but are gifts of God.

[60] *Sermo* 90A, 14.

For Augustine's use of Ps. 102, 2-4 (103, 2-4), see: HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches*, pp. 411-413.

[61] Speaking about "sanare languoribus" is an implicit reference to the *medicus* motive. See: ARBESMANN, R., *Christ the "Medicus humilis" in St. Augustine*, in *Augustinus Magister. Congrès International Augustinien, Paris 21-24 Septembre 1954*, Vol. II, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1955, pp. 623-629. ARBESMANN, R., *The Concept of "Christus Medicus" in St. Augustine*, Traditio 10 (1954) 1-28: DUPONT, A., *Christus Medicus. De genezing van de mens door de arts Christus in de preken van Augustinus*, in BRUNING, B. (red.), *Oorlog en Vrede. Augustinus in confrontatie met het heden*, Augustijns Historisch Instituut, Leuven 2006, 71-99. EIJKENBOOM, P. C. J., *Het Christus-Medicus-Motief in de preken van Sint Augustinus*, Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., Assen 1960. MARTIN, Th., *Paul the Patient. "Christus Medicus" and the "Stimulus Carnis" (2 Cor 12, 7): A consideration of Augustine's Medicinal Christology*, Augustinian Studies 32/2 (2001) 219-256.

[62] In addition to footnote 58, the theme of the crown and coronation by Christ has a place in the exhortation to the moral battle of Christian life, present especially in the martyrs sermons.

[63] HILL, *Sermons III/11*, p. 85.

[64] Speaking about the divine Last Judgment in *sermo* 90A, 14 Augustine says: Difficile est ut ille in te non inueniat quod puniat. (DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2e série)*, p. 74.) Apparently it is "difficult" for God to find something in man he would not punish. Augustine, however, does not claim that this is "impossible". This can perhaps offer a small indication that *sermo* 90A should be situated before the

4. Evaluation of *sermo* 90A

The last two paragraphs (*sermo* 90A, 13-14) seem at first sight to end with a content slightly different from the general subject of the *sermo*. Until *sermo* 90A, 13 Augustine reflects the meaning of the three forms of love. Short reflections on Christian morals, grace and history of salvation start in *sermo* 90A, 13. These reflections do not constitute a break with the previous part of his sermon. Having suggested the solution for the original problem in relation to love in *Sermo* 90A, 11-12, Augustine can now apply this solution. He does not change of topic, but considers some consequences and implications of the same topic. To love God and neighbour means training oneself in Christian morals and looking for justice. That love is also mutual. God's love for humankind is expressed in Augustine's summary of the history of salvation: forgiving, healing, saving, giving eternal life.

Augustine explicitly and elaborately explains that to love God and neighbour are actually the only way to love one self. That exposition on the true nature of self-love should already be sufficient to bring his audience to love for God and neighbour. As *pastor* Augustine certainly knew the human weakness of his flock. That is why, besides the intrinsic and positive motivation of the nature of self-love, he also gives a rather external and negative motivation. Augustine warns for the Last Judgment. Love your neighbour and yourself, because you will be judged! The fact that Augustine's reflection on the nature of love ends with a warning, illustrates the pastoral quality of his *sermones* and the thoughts he develops there. Mind you, he does not start with the threat of the Judgment. The better part of his *sermo* is an explanation regarding the nature of love, and he would do the same in his systematic treatments of that subject, such as for example in parts of *De doctrina christiana*, *De Trinitate*, *De civitate Dei*, his tractates on the gospel and letter of John. Only at the end, and then very briefly, the argument of the Last Judgment comes up.

Another very remarkable topic out of the concluding paragraph is the introduction of the thought of grace. "Quod lex imperat, fides impetrat." "*Quid enim habes quod non accepisti*? [1 Cor. 4, 7]"[65] As already indicated, those two sentences are according to P.-M. Hombert not sufficient enough to situate *sermo* 90A in the Pelagian period. Because Hombert's argument is not completely convincing, some further reflection is required.

Pelagian controversy. Augustine will in that controversy rather state that it is impossible for God to find nothing punishable in man, since there is always something to punish in man: original sin.

[65] *Sermo* 90A, 14. DOLBEAU, *Sermons inédits (2^e série)*, p. 73.

1 Cor. 4, 7 which, along with 2 Cor. 3, 6, is an important topic of discussion in the Pelagian controversy is quoted in *sermo* 90A. If this sermon belongs in the Pelagian period, it is rather strange that, among a range of quotations from the Bible (including quotations from Paul)[66], it does not deal with the fifth, seventh or ninth chapter of the Letter to the Romans. Moreover, the fact that 1 Cor. 4, 7 is cited does not in itself exclude an early date. There is a consensus amongst Augustine scholars that Augustine's later ideas about grace, as they were elaborated during the Pelagian controversy, are already present in his early thinking.[67] As such, the topic of grace is already present in Augustine's preaching (long) before 412. The quote of 1 Cor. 4, 7 in *sermo* 90A can be an example of this evolution in continuity, that should be further investigated.

The strongest argument to refrain from situating *sermo* 90A's careful treatment of grace in the context of the Pelagian controversy is the absence of the word *gratia* itself. Independently of which position one takes in the discussion about a possible shift or continuity in Augustine's concept of grace, one must accept the fact that Augustine

[66] The scriptural quotes in *sermo* 90A:
Sermo 90A, 1: Mt. 22, 36.
Sermo 90A, 2: Is. 10, 23 LXX.
Sermo 90A, 3: Mt. 22, 37-40.
Sermo 90A, 4: Mt. 22, 37-40; Rom. 13, 8-10.
Sermo 90A, 5: 1Joh. 4, 20.
Sermo 90A, 6: Gn. 1, 26-28.
Sermo 90A, 7: Ps. 78, 6-7 (77, 6-7); Mt. 22, 39; Ps. 11, 5 (10, 6).
Sermo 90A, 8: –.
Sermo 90A, 9: Mt. 22, 37.
Sermo 90A, 10: Lc. 15, 12; Lc. 15, 17-18; Is. 46, 8.
Sermo 90A, 11: 2Tm. 4, 2; Mt. 22, 37.
Sermo 90A, 12: 1Joh. 4, 16.
Sermo 90A, 13: Rom. 13, 9-10.
Sermo 90A, 14: 1Cor. 4, 7; Ps. 103, 2-4 (102, 2-4); James 2, 13; Ps. 103, 5 (102, 5).

[67] BURNS, J. P., *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Études Augustiniennes – Série Antiquité 82), Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1980. DRECOLL, V. H., *Die Enstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins* (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 109), Peeters, Tübingen 1999. HOMBERT, P.-M., *Augustin, prédicateur de la grâce au début de son épiscopat*, in MADEC, G. (ed.), *Augustin Prédicateur (395-411). Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (5-7 septembre 1996)*, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1996, pp. 217-245. MAYER, C., *Augustinus – Doctor Gratiae. Das Werden der augustinischen Gnadenlehre von den Frühschriften bis zur Abfassung der "Confessiones"*, in FISCHER, N. (ed.), *Freiheit und Gnade in Augustins "Confessiones" : Der Sprung in lebendige Leben*, Schönigh, Paderborn 2003, pp. 37-49. RING, Th. G., *Bruch oder Entwicklung im Gnadenbegriff Augustins? Kritische Bemerkungen zu K. Flasch, Logik der Schreckens*, Augustiniana 44/1-2 (1994) 31-113.

explicitly uses the word *gratia* in the Pelagian period but does not use it in *sermo* 90A. There he speaks twelve times of *misericordia* and uses this term precisely in contexts in which in his anti-Pelagian writings he will clearly use the word *gratia*.[68] Parallel to the use of *misericordia* in *sermo* 90A, Augustine indicates with that word the graceful action of God in his life (and conversion) in the first six books of the *Confessiones*.[69] Just as in *sermo* 90A, so too in the *Confessiones* Gods *misericordia* punishes human beings (with mercy), forgives, converts and brings them back to Him, comforts and heals them. It is remarkable that the word *gratia* in the *Confessiones* as a whole appears only 43 times, while *misericordia* can be found there 58 times. Precisely in relation to the forgiveness of sins and redemption, Augustine will in reaction to Pelagius assert that this is only possible through *gratia* (*Christi*). Pelagius is accused of denying the existence of *gratia Dei*. Central to the Pelagian controversy is the question of the meaning and the content of *gratia*.[70] This specific need to explain the concept of *gratia* is not yet present in 397. To summarize: the presence of the topic of grace does not exclude an early date. The absence of the word *gratia* rather confirms this early – pre-Pelagian – date.

Mt. 22, 37-40 and Rom. 13, 8-10 play a decisive part both in *De doctrina christiana* I and in *sermo* 90A. *Sermo* 90A reconciles both pericopes. *De doctrina christiana* I shows with these same pericopes that love is the highest teaching of Scripture. I. Bochet lists the similarities and differences between both treatments of the commandment to love God and the neighbour.[71]

There are parallel elements in both of the treatments of Mt. 22, 37-40 and Rom. 13, 8-10. "Qui enim diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam. (Ps. 11, 5/10, 6)" is the criterion for true self-love. The best way to love oneself is by loving God, the highest good, preserving mankind from decay. Love for God is a complete love, without any limitations. Loving one's neighbour means desiring that our neighbour loves God together with us.

[68] *Sermo* 90A, 2: God, out of His *misericordia*, summarized himself in a human form and the whole law in two commandments.
Sermo 90A, 5: Despite not resembling God and being far away from God, Gods *misericordia* brings man close to Him.
Sermo 90A, 14: The *misericordia* of the Lord forgives, heals, redeems and crowns. That is why man has to attempt to perform *misericordia*.
DRECOLL, *Die Enstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, pp. 147-164, pp. 211-218. Cf. BURNS, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace*.

[69] DRECOLL, *Die Enstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, pp. 270-275.

[70] DUVAL, *La date du « De natura » de Pélage*, pp. 271-273.

[71] BOCHET, §4. *Frui-Uti*, pp. 459-462.

De doctrina christiana I and *sermo* 90A are different regarding perspective and sequence of the presentation of the love precepts. *De doctrina christiana* I is more conceptual and systematic, while *sermo* 90A is more concrete and gives preference to praxis. *De doctrina christiana* I, based on the ontological order, starts from the love for God to reach love for neighbour and self-love, directing all love to God. In *sermo* 90A, Augustine takes love for neighbour as the starting-point in which self-love acts as the point of convergence between love for God and love for neighbour. Self-love is necessary for real love for neighbour. True self-love presupposes love for God. *De doctrina christiana* I is written from the *telos*: the fruitive love for God and neighbour as the aim of the human existence. The other way round, *sermo* 90A emphasizes the origin of human love: God is *caritas* by which we love Him and our neighbour. That *caritas* is given to man by God. "En bref, les deux textes sont complémentaires, tout comme les deux préceptes de l'amour sont indissociables."[72]

Apart from the motivation to reconcile the two liturgical readings, *sermo* 90A gives no concrete information about place and date of preaching. The link with the *Confessiones* – the call to interiorise and *misericordia* as grace – and the parallel in aim and subject with *De doctrina christiana* I suggest a date around 397. The difficult and theological technical subject of the sermon could indicate Augustine addressed an audience with a rather high level of education. Augustine perhaps addresses with *sermo* 90A the same group of people as *De doctrina christiana* I: those involved in the study of the Bible and the activity of preaching. From the other side, the use of examples, the strong structure and the threat of the Last Judgment could also suggest a more general audience.

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[72] BOCHET, §4. *Frui-Uti*, p. 462.

ZEIT IM BILD – AUGUSTIN UND MONNICA

„Ich bitte euch nur um eines, dass ihr am Altar des Herrn an mich denkt, wo immer ihr seid." (conf. 9,11,27). Diesen letzten Wunsch seiner Mutter Monnica griff Augustin in und mit seinen Confessiones auf. In ihnen spiegelt sich sein inneres Leben sowie dessen Verflechtung mit dem seiner Mutter wider. Er schuf ihr – und zugleich sich selbst – ein literarisches Denkmal, das an unzähligen Orten bewundert und verehrt werden sollte. „So werde ihr überreich gewährt, was sie als letztes von mir verlangt hat, mit Hilfe dieser meiner Bekenntnisse, mehr noch durch das Gebet der vielen anderen als durch meines." (conf. 9,13,37)

Augustin zeichnete das literarisch stilisierte Bild einer vorbildlichen, nahezu vollkommenen christlichen Frau, dank derer das Christentum zu seiner „Mutterreligion" hatte werden können. Bei ihr erkannte er Eigenschaften, die sie immerhin mit Maria, der Mutter Jesu, gemeinsam hatte. Monnica sei demnach von Herzen gläubig (conf. 2,3,6), die Magd Gottes (conf. 5,9,18), rein (conf. 3,11,20), keusch und bescheiden (conf. 5,9,17) sowie gehorsam gewesen (conf. 9,9,19). Gott habe sie erhört (conf. 5,9,17) und sie habe sich gewünscht, dass er für Augustin zu einem Vater werde (conf. 1,11,17). Gottverbunden und fürsorglich habe sich die gute Christin Monnica nach Kräften dafür eingesetzt, dass auch ihr Sohn zum Glauben komme. So habe er die Liebe zum Namen Jesu Christi bereits mit der Muttermilch aufgenommen (conf. 3,4,8).

Die Schilderung von Monnicas Bemühungen um ihren Sohn, ihre endlosen Gebete und Tränenströme, ihre unerschütterliche Gläubigkeit sowie die ihr u.a. vom Mailänder Bischof Ambrosius entgegengebrachte Wertschätzung waren für Augustin ausgesprochen bedeutsam. Musste dieser sich nach mancher Verirrung – wie etwa seiner einstigen Zugehörigkeit zu den Manichäern – trotz seines Bischofsamtes erst mühsam das Vertrauen seiner Zuhörer und Leser verdienen, so war Monnicas Frömmigkeit über jeden Zweifel erhaben und vermochte selbst hartnäckige Kritiker für seine Person einzunehmen. Wie nämlich hätte der Sohn einer solch heiligen Frau dauerhaft vom rechten Weg abkommen können? Dass dies undenkbar sei, wurde Monnica ausdrücklich von bischöflicher Seite versichert: „Unmöglich geht ein Sohn so vieler Tränen verloren." (conf. 3,12,21)

Mit den Confessiones, die Monnica wie keine andere Schrift porträtieren, legte Augustin den Grundstein, auf dem die spätere Verehrung Monnicas als Heilige und als Patronin christlicher Mütter aufbauen

Abb. 1. Ary Scheffer, *Augustine and Monnica, his mother, in Ostia*, 1855. Musée du Louvre, Paris.

sollte, und festigte auf diese Art und Weise in einem die Basis seines eigenen Ruhmes.

Wirkung und Nachwirkung dieser mit symbiotischen Zügen versehenen Mutter-Sohn-Beziehung bündeln sich wie unter einem Brennglas in Augustins Ausspruch: „Ihr Leben und mein Leben waren zu einem Leben geworden." (conf. 9,12,30)

Durch einen Traum seiner Mutter war Augustin schon frühzeitig über sein zu erwartendes Geschick in Kenntnis gesetzt: „Wo sie sei, dort sei auch ich." (conf. 3,11,19) Monnica, die sich große Sorgen um ihren Sohn machte, als dieser sehr zu ihrem Leidwesen den Manichäern anhing, hatte geträumt, dass sie selbst bekümmert auf einem hölzernen Richtscheit stünde. Ein strahlender junger Mann sei auf sie zugekommen, habe sie geheißen, sich nicht weiter um Augustin zu sorgen, sondern sich aufmerksam umzuschauen. Indem sie dieser Aufforderung nachgekommen sei, habe sie ihren Sohn auf demselben Richtscheit neben sich erblickt. (conf. 3,11,19) Unmissverständlich legte Monnica Augustin diesen Traum aus. Es sei nicht etwa gemeint, dass sie sich nun ebenfalls den Manichäern zuwenden würde: „Nein! Mir wurde nämlich nicht gesagt: Wo er, dort auch du, sondern: Wo du, dort auch er." (conf. 3,11,20)

Welche Formen und Ausformungen die Interpretation dieser Innigkeit einmal annehmen könnte, hätte sich Augustin sicherlich nicht im Entferntesten träumen lassen. Denn in jenem Maße, in dem jede Zeit die ihr eigenen Interpretationsmaßstäbe zu Rate zieht, wandeln sich die wertschätzenden Einsichten bzw. die ein- und abschätzenden Wertungen bezüglich Augustins Schilderungen. War er sich einst in seiner Schrift De dono perseverantiae sicher, dass er sowohl sein Heil als auch seine Rettung den ehrlichen Tränen seiner Mutter verdanke (perseu. 20,53), verweisen uns heutzutage psychoanalytische Deutungen auf vermeintlich anomale Motivationen. Kligerman, der Monnicas häufigem Weinen vor Augustin eine erotische Komponente beimisst, glaubt zum Beispiel, ihre vermeintlich inzestuösen Wünsche enttarnt zu haben.

Interpreten, die in früheren Jahrhunderten gelebt hatten, waren solche Mutmaßungen nicht in den Sinn gekommen, so dass sie andere, nämlich religiöse Schwerpunkte setzten. Eine detaillierte, sich über Jahrhunderte hin erstreckende Analyse der Augustin und seiner Mutter entgegengebrachten Verehrung stellt zweifelsohne ein lohnenswertes Unterfangen dar, würde aber den Rahmen dieses Beitrages sprengen. Monnica wird im Folgenden stets in Verbindung mit Augustin betrachtet. Aus diesem Grund stehen nicht originäre Monnicazyklen wie die Predigtbilder von Botticini in Florenz (**Abb. 2**) im Mittelpunkt der

Abb. 2. Francesco Botticini, *Monnica creates the Order of the Augustinian Nuns*, 15th century. Santo Spirito, Firenze.

Betrachtung, sondern es soll anhand einzelner künstlerischer Augustinuszyklen die posthume Interpretation von Monnicas körperlicher und geistiger Mutterschaft exemplarisch veranschaulicht werden.

Bis zur Anfertigung solcher Zyklen und zur diesbezüglichen Thematisierung Monnicas war es jedoch ein weiter Weg. Als im 12. Jahrhundert der Pilger Walter von Arrouaise nach Ostia kam und einen Teil von Monnicas Leichnam mit nach Nordfrankreich nahm, war Augustins Mutter noch eine Heilige unter vielen. Der Kult um Monnica entwickelte sich um das 13. Jahrhundert und ein Fest zu ihren Ehren begann sich auszubreiten. Am 9. April 1430 wurden dann die übrigen, bisher noch in Ostia, dem Ort der Beisetzung, verbliebenen Teile von Monnicas Leichnam im Rahmen eines offiziellen Aktes der katholischen Kirche nach Rom überführt und auf Veranlassung von Martin V. im Kloster von «Sant'Agostino» wiederbestattet. Zuvor war der steinerne Sarkophag geöffnet worden und unbeschreibliche Wohlgerüche sollen herausgeströmt sein. Bald wurden Monnicas Reliquien zu einem beliebten Pilgerziel, da man ihnen Heilungskräfte nachsagte. Schriften aus dem 15. Jahrhundert sprachen Monnica

erstaunliche Fähigkeiten zu, von denen ihr Sohn zu Lebzeiten noch nichts geahnt hatte. Die Begeisterung für Reliquien von Monnicas Leichnam war enorm. In Windeseile waren ihre Körperglieder über die ganze Welt verstreut. Damit Mutter und Sohn einander auch im Tode nahe seien, wurde eine von Monnicas Rippen nach Pavia, dem letzten Ruheort Augustins, gesandt.

Wohl hatte der intensive Kult um Monnica seinen Ausgang im Italien der Renaissance genommen, aber er dehnte sich schnell auf andere Länder und deren katholische Bevölkerung aus. Vor allem katholische Mütter verehrten Monnica seit dem 16. Jahrhundert in zunehmendem Maße. Eine Bestattung in nächster Nähe zu Monnicas Leichnam galt als sehr ehrstrebenswert.

Am 1. Mai 1850 wurde in Paris eine Vereinigung christlicher Mütter gegründet, die es sich unter Berufung auf Monnica zur Aufgabe machten, für ihre Söhne zu beten. Diese Organisation wuchs rasant. 1854 war es schon zu Vereinigungen in weiteren französischen Städten aber auch in Belgien und England gekommen. Seit 1855 breiteten sich diese sogar in Konstantinopel, Jerusalem, Sydney, St. Petersburg und zahlreichen anderen Städten weltweit aus.

Einem Zufall ist es zu verdanken, dass 1945 neben der Kirche «Santa Aurea» in Ostia ein Mamorbruchstück, bei dem es sich um einen Teil der Original-Grabschrift von Monnicas Grabplatte handelte (**Abb. 3**), zum Vorschein kam. Seit seinem Fund ist auch dieses Textstück zum Gegenstand der Augustinforschung geworden. Die Inschrift würdigt Monnica als keuscheste Gebärerin eines Sohnes, lobt Augustins Verdienste und erklärt abschließend Monnicas Glückseligkeit als in eben diesem Nachkommen begründet. Während Monnicas persönliche Konturen somit auf ihrer eigenen Grabplatte sehr dürftig umrissen sind, machten sich spätere Zeitalter die unterschiedlichsten Vorstellungen und Bilder von ihr.

Obwohl es – wie gesagt – auch originäre Monnicazyklen gibt, überwiegen doch ihre Darstellungen innerhalb der häufiger anzutreffenden Augustinuszyklen. Solche künstlerischen Illustrationen der Vita eines Heiligen bzw. einer Heiligen lassen in einem größeren Ausmaß als Einzelbildnisse Rückschlüsse auf die Frömmigkeit einer Epoche zu. Sie trugen in einer Zeit, in der die Mehrheit der Gläubigen weder lesen noch schreiben konnten, erheblich zur Volkserziehung bei. Entsprechend galt es, den die Heiligkeit unterstreichenden Vorbildcharakter möglichst nachhaltig zu betonen. Begebenheiten, die in diesem Sinne kontraproduktiv erschienen, wurden ausgeblendet. Erst ab dem 17. Jahrhundert wurde etwa Augustins jungendlicher Birnendiebstahl (conf. 2,4,9) abgebildet. Monnicas jugendlicher Weindiebstahl (conf.



Abb. 3. Gravestone from Monnica's tomb in Ostia, 4th century.

9,8,18) erwies sich ebenfalls unter volkspädagogischen Gesichtspunkten als ungeeignetes Motiv.

Meist liegen den dargestellten Szenen historische Begebenheiten sowie literarische Quellen aus Augustins Feder zugrunde, z.B. die Hochzeit von Monnica und Patricius (conf. 9,9,19; 9,13,37; vor 354 n. Chr. in Thagaste); Augustins Geburt (z.B. conf. 1,6,7; November 354 n. Chr. in Thagaste); Monnicas Traum (conf. 3,11,19f.; ca. 373 n. Chr. in Thagaste); Monnicas tröstliche Unterredung mit einem Bischof (conf. 3,12,21; ca. 373 n. Chr. in Thagaste); Monnicas Gebet in der Kapelle des heiligen Cyprians sowie Augustins Flucht vor ihr (conf. 5,8,15; ca. 383 n. Chr. in Karthago); Monnicas Reise nach Mailand (conf. 6,1,1; 385 n. Chr. von Thagaste nach Mailand); Monnicas Treffen mit Bischof Ambrosius (conf. 6,1,1; 385 n. Chr. in Mailand);

Augustins Mitteilung seiner Bekehrung an Monnica (conf. 8,12,30; 386 n. Chr. in Mailand); Augustins Taufe (conf. 9,6,14; 387 n. Chr. in Mailand); Augustins und Monnicas Vision in Ostia (conf. 9,10,23-26; 387 n. Chr. in Ostia); Monnicas Tod (conf. 9,11,28; 387 n. Chr. in Ostia); Monnicas Bestattung (conf. 9,12,31f.; 387 n. Chr. in Ostia). Darüber hinaus lassen sich legendenhafte Motive ausmachen, so etwa wenn Maria Monnica einen Gürtel als in die Zukunft deutenden Hinweis auf den Augustinerorden reicht.

Erstmals wurde Augustins Leben im 14. Jahrhundert in Form eines Zyklus festgehalten. Es handelt sich um einen Glasmalereizyklus im Erfurter Augustinerkloster. Von Frankreich her war der im 13. Jahrhundert aufgekommene Brauch, dem Hauptheiligen einer Kirche einen narrativen Scheibenzyklus zu widmen, übernommen worden. Monnicas entscheidender Einfluss auf die Entwicklung ihres Sohnes wird durch ihre Anwesenheit in entscheidenden Lebenssituationen hervorgehoben. Wenn Monnica Augustin etwa zur Schule begleitet, verdeutlicht dies nicht zuletzt ihren Wunsch, dass Augustin die wissenschaftliche Gelehrsamkeit zu Gott hinführen möge (vgl. conf. 2,3,8). Darüber hinaus fand sie in Erfurt in weiteren Motiven künstlerisch Erwähnung: Monnicas Traum; Monnicas tröstliche Unterredung mit einem Bischof; Augustin schifft sich zum Kummer seiner Mutter heimlich nach Rom ein; Augustins Taufe.

Weitere Augustinuszyklen aus dem 14. Jahrhundert, die Monnica ebenfalls darstellen, sind die Fresken in «Notre-Dame du Bourg» in Rabastens, die Fresken in der «Chiesa degli Eremitani» in Padua, die Basreliefs von Augustins Grabmal in «San Pietro in Ciel d'oro» in Pavia, die Fresken in der «Chiesa Sant'Agostino» in Gubbio, die Gemälde in der Vatikanischen Pinakothek.

Auf den Fresken in «Notre-Dame du Bourg» in Rabastens **(Abb. 4)** tritt Monnica nur im Kontext ihres Todes in Erscheinung. Hinter ihrem Leichnam steht ein Engel. Da Engeldarstellungen im 14. Jahrhundert in der französischen Kunst höchst verbreitet waren, ist in diesem Engel noch kein speziell auf Monnica bezogenes ikonographisches Detail zu vermuten. Das Motiv von Monnicas Tod begegnet hier zum ersten Mal und wiederholt sich andernorts. Obwohl auch die Taufe Gegenstand des Augustinuszyklus in Rabastens ist, wurde Monnica in diesem Kontext nicht abgebildet.

In der «Chiesa degli Eremitani» in Padua zeigen die Fresken des Malers Guariento Monnica ins Gebet vertieft. Hinter ihr befinden sich mehrere Frauen, so dass ihr Vorbildcharakter betont wird. Ferner ist sie bei der Taufe ihres Sohnes zugegen (conf. 9,6,14), wobei ein Heiligenschein Aufschluss über die Identität der Beterin gibt.

Abb. 4. *Monnica's burial*, 14th century.
Notre-Dame du Bourg, Rabastens.

Die Basreliefs von Augustins Grabmal in «San Pietro in Ciel d'oro» in Pavia **(Abb. 5)** zieren das dreistöckige Mamormonument mit einem bedeutenden Augustinuszyklus, der zugleich als einziger in Stein gehauen worden ist. Zugeschrieben wird dieses Werk Schülern von Giovanni Balduccio. Monnica lauscht gemeinsam mit Augustin und dessen Freund Alypius der Predigt des Ambrosius (vgl. z.B. conf. 6,1,1; 6,4,6). Wiederum wohnt sie als heilige Beterin der Taufe bei (conf. 9,6,14). Ihre Bestattung (conf. 9,12,31f.) ist in Form eines

Abb. 5. *Monnica's burial*, relief on Augustine's sarcophagus, about 1365. Basilica di San Pietro in Ciel d'Oro, Pavia.

Leichenzugs abgebildet, dessen Ziel eine große Kirche mit weit geöffneter Eingangstür ist, was auf ihren letzten Wunsch anspielen mag: „Ich bitte euch nur um eines, dass ihr am Altar des Herrn an mich denkt, wo immer ihr seid." (conf. 9,11,27)

Ein besonders eindrückliches Zeugnis der narrativen Ikonographie des 14. Jahrhunderts stellt der großangelegte Freskenzyklus in der «Chiesa Sant'Agostino» in Gubbio des Malers Ottaviano Nelli dar. Jene Szenen, in denen Monnica Augustin zur Schule begleitet bzw. in denen Monnica träumt und von einem Bischof getröstet wird, bilden eine Art Prolog zu Augustins weiterem künstlerisch inszeniertem Leben, in welchem Monnica konstant von Bedeutung bleibt. So besucht sie gemeinsam mit Augustin und Alypius den Gottesdienst des Ambrosius und ist bei der alles entscheidenden Bekehrungsszene im Mailänder Garten sowie bei Augustins Taufe anwesend. Monnicas Tod (conf. 9,11,28) wurde aufgegriffen und war fortan ein fester Bestandteil der Lebenszyklen. An ihrem Sterbebett steht Augustin erstmals in Mönchstracht gekleidet, was darauf hinweist, dass Monnicas

Wünsche nun in Erfüllung gegangen waren. Die Innigkeit der maßgeblich auf Gottverbundenheit basierenden Mutter-Sohn-Beziehung wird dadurch hervorgehoben, dass Augustin den Kopf seiner Mutter mit der rechten Hand stützt, während seine Linke ihr ein Kruzifix vor Augen hält.

Vier kleine, auf Holz gemalte Tafeln in der Vatikanischen Pinakothek wurden vermutlich von einem Schüler Salimbénis angefertigt. Sie leiten zu den Zyklen des 15. Jahrhunderts über, da sie zwar zu Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts entstanden sind, aber noch ganz im Geiste des 14. Jahrhunderts verharren. Augustins Leben wird in vier Schlüsselszenen zusammengefasst. Zwei dieser Szenen zeigen ihn gemeinsam mit Monnica. Sie begleitet ihren Sohn sowohl zur Schule als auch zur Taufe und hebt sich durch die dunkle Farbe ihrer Kleidung stets von den anderen dargestellten Personen ab.

Als Zwischenbilanz kann festgehalten werden, dass sich im 14. Jahrhundert die anschließend immer wieder aufgegriffenen Grundmotive der Augustinuszyklen, besonders im Glasmalereizyklus des Erfurter Augustinerklosters, dem Vorbildcharakter zukommt, herauskristallisierten. Monnicas zentrale Bedeutung für Augustin trat deutlich zum Vorschein, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf ihrer Rolle als Mutter und als Beterin lag und etwa die Vision von Ostia noch nicht dargestellt wurde. Spätestens Anfang des 15. Jahrhunderts waren Augustinuszyklen nicht nur bekannt, sondern auch schon etabliert.

Nachdem einige Themen der künstlerisch gestalteten Augustinuszyklen kurz aufgezeigt worden sind, sollen angesichts der Vielzahl der folgenden Zyklen, nur noch einzelne Motive beispielhaft ein Licht auf die jeweilige Epoche werfen.

Im Laufe des 15. Jahrhunderts dehnte sich die augustinische Ikonographie geographisch sogar bis nach Jerusalem aus, wo sich etwa ein Augustinuszyklus des Holländers Jan van Scorel findet (**Abb. 6**). Zudem stellte sich inhaltlich eine Erweiterung des Spektrums ein. Neben die Confessiones als künstlerische Text- und Inspirationsbasis treten – um nur die bekanntesten Quellen zu erwähnen – vermehrt die «Vita Augustini» des Possidius und die «Legenda aurea» des Jacobus de Voragine.

Lag die Beeinflussung der neu entstandenen Augustinuszyklen durch diejenigen des vorherigen Jahrhunderts auf der Hand, so gesellten sich nun Variationen und Ergänzungen zu den feststehenden Grundmotiven. Jacques Legrand, ein Augustinereremit, stellte sogar ein schriftliches Programm über Augustins Leben und Ordensregel zusammen, das in achtundvierzig Sequenzen eine mögliche künstlerische Umsetzung skizziert. Die «pia mater» Monncia nimmt eine wichtige

Abb. 6. Jan van Scorel (attrib.), *Augustine's consecration as bishop*, about 1520. St. Stephen's Church, Jerusalem.

Rolle ein, doch es fällt auf, dass die Vision von Ostia keinerlei Erwähnung findet. In die Tat umgesetzt wurde Legrands Programm aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach nicht.

Aus den Jahren zwischen 1430 und 1440 stammen die Miniaturen der «Historia Augustini» des Kupferstichkabinetts in Berlin (**Abb. 7**). Sie geben eine ausführliche Lebensgeschichte Augustins wieder, die ein gänzlich unvoreingenommener Betrachter spontan mit



Abb. 7. *Historia Augustini*, ms. 78 A 19a, fol. 2r. Kupferstichkabinett, Berlin.

einen Comic assoziieren könnte. Augustin erscheint in einem sehr persönlich-anekdotenhaften Licht, ebenso Monnica. Viele neue Motive, von denen hier die folgenden stellvertretend genannt seien, kommen zum Vorschein: Der Heide Augustin und die Christin Monnica beten jeweils zu ihren Gottheiten; die Hochzeit von Patricius und Monnica (conf. 9,9,19; 9,13,37); Augustins Geburt (conf. 1,6,7); Patricius füttert Augustin; Augustin verlangt als Kind nach der Taufe (conf. 1,11,17); der durch Monnica bekehrte Augustin verlangt nach der Taufe; Tod und Bestattung des Patricius; Monnica verteilt Almosen an Arme (conf. 5,9,17) und betet zu den Heiligen (z.B. conf 5,8,15); Monnica segelt nach Mailand und trifft Augustin (conf. 6,1,1); Augustin und Alypius berichten Monnica von der Bekehrung (conf 8,12,30); Augustin zieht mit Monnica und Adeodatus aufs Land (vgl. z.B. conf. 9,4,8), um ein gottgefälliges Leben zu führen; Monnica dient allen Brüdern wie ihren Kindern; die Vision von Ostia; Monnicas Tod und Beisetzung u.v.m.

Auf die Fresken der «Chiesa Sant'Agostino» in San Gimignano von Benozzo Gozzoli (**Abb. 8**), die mittlerweile so manchen Buchdeckel zieren, braucht hier aufgrund ihres großen Bekanntheitsgrades nicht eigens detailliert eingegangen werden. Sie sind auf das Jahr 1465 datiert und stellen Augustins geistige Entwicklung samt dem Monnica zukommenden Einfluss dar. Allgemein stand Monnicas Engagement für ihren Sohn nach wie vor außer Frage. Auf ihre Sorgen und ihre tränenreiche Trauer wird durch die Gemälde auf Holz des sogenannten „Meisters von Uttenheim" im Kloster Neustift verwiesen. Weinend und mit gesenktem Haupt scheint sie seiner Bekehrung den geistlichen Weg zu ebnen.

Das 16. Jahrhundert sowie die Folgezeit hatten sich mit der Reformation auseinander zu setzen. Hinsichtlich der künstlerischen Beschäftigung mit Heiligen blieb diese Umwälzung nicht ohne Folgen, so dass sich hier eine klare Zäsur konstatieren lässt. Die Vorstellungen über das, was bildlich darzustellen sei, wandelten sich. Im Protestantismus reichte die Haltung von einem strikten Verbot bildlicher Darstellungen im Kirchenraum bis zur Duldung solch religiöser Kunstwerke. Martin Luther selbst nahm sowohl an der Verehrung von Gnadenbildern als auch am Reliquienkult Anstoß. Die Heiligenikonographie verlor im protestantischen Raum an Boden.

Die Katholische Reform hingegen, die im Tridentinum ihre eigenen Grundlagen erneut zu definieren bemüht war, rechtfertigte die künstlerisch-religiöse Unterweisung durch Heilige. Vor allem Visionen, Martyrien und die Aufnahme von Heiligen in die Gemeinschaft der himmlischen Heerscharen erwiesen sich als sehr geschätzte Motive.

Abb. 8. Benozzo Gozzoli, *Monnica praying waves farewell to Augustine*, 1464-1465. Chiesa di Sant'Agostino, San Gimignano.

Mit solchen Szenen sollten Heilige als «exempla virtutis» vor Augen gestellt werden, um Gläubige zum tugendhaften Nacheifern zu animieren. Besonders die Marienverehrung zeichnete sich fortan als wesentlicher Schwerpunkt im Katholizismus ab, der sich in der Kunst ebenfalls widerspiegelte. Das neue Leitbild manifestiert sich auch in der künstlerischen Auseinandersetzung mit Monnica und Augustin.

Tendenziell lässt sich feststellen, dass in dieser Zeit Einzeldarstellungen an Beliebtheit gewannen, wohingegen die Zahl der Augustinuszyklen überschaubar blieb. Ferner verlor Augustins Kindheit an Bedeutung, während seine Religiosität im 17. Jahrhundert eine spezielle Veranschaulichung erfuhr.

Die in Paris aufbewahrten Kupferstiche des Italieners Marius Kartarius bilden einen Augustinuszyklus (**Abb. 9**), der Augustins Kindheit gänzlich ausblendet. Zehn kleine Tafeln setzen eigene Akzente, wobei Augustin hauptsächlich betend in Erscheinung tritt. Monnica begegnet als Ordensstifterin unter deren Abbildung Worte aus 1 Tim 5,5 erläuternd angefügt sind «Quae uere uidua est et desolata speret in Deum». Dieses Motiv, das nicht aus den Confessiones entnommen wurde, hebt Monnicas Bedeutung als Schirmherrin der Gläubigen hervor. Monnica hat einen Heiligenschein. Ihre Füße sind nackt, die Arme unter dem Mantel sind weit ausgebreitet, so dass vier betende und teilweise zu ihr aufschauende Nonnen unter diesem Mantel Zuflucht finden können. Alle fünf Frauen geben sich durch ihre Kleidung als dem Augustinerorden zugehörig zu erkennen.

Recht bekannt wurden die Gravuren von Bolswert (**Abb. 10**), die 1624 in Paris entstanden und Augustins Lebensgeschichte wiedergeben. Den Anfang macht die Szene im Mailänder Garten, die Monnica in gewohnter Weise zeigt. Aufschlussreich ist die Darstellung von Augustins Einkleidung in geistliche Tracht. Im Hintergrund sieht man Augustin und Monnica am Fenster in Ostia sitzen. Die Vision wird demnach in direktem Zusammenhang mit Augustins Entscheidung zum geistlichen Leben verstanden. Rufen wir uns Monnicas freudig lebenssatte Worte in Erinnerung, die sie kurz nach der Vision von Ostia gesprochen haben soll: „Eines gab es, weshalb ich mich noch eine Weile in diesem Leben aufhalten wollte: Ich wollte dich als katholischen Christen sehen, bevor ich sterbe. Mein Gott hat mir dies überreich gewährt… .“ (conf. 9,10,26)

In Ingoldstadt schuf 1631 der gefeierte Graveur Johann Wandereisen aus Nürnberg zweiundzwanzig Gravuren, die auf jene, bereits im 15. Jahrhundert gebräuchlichen Motive aus dem Leben Augustins zurückgriffen. Es finden sich aber auch Neuerungen, wie die Gestaltung des Birnendiebstahls (conf 2,4,9f.). Monnicas Bedeutung wird

Abb. 9. Marius Kartarius. *Monique, fondatrice de l'Ordre* (below to the left). 16e siècle. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.

von Wandereisen nicht einfach übergangen oder nur beiläufig dargestellt, wie dies in vielfacher Weise bei anderen Zyklen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts der Fall ist. Monnica und Patricius begleiten Augustin zur Schule; im Anschluss an die heimliche Abreise ihres Sohnes nach

Abb. 10. Schelte A. Bolswert, *La mort de Monique à Ostia*, in: *Iconographia magni patris aurelii Augustini*, pl. 7, Paris, 1624. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.

Rom trauert Monnica; sie wird durch den Bischof getröstet; sie teilt mit Augustin die Vision von Ostia und stirbt schließlich.

Jean Mariette, ein Schüler von Le Brun, illustrierte die französische Übersetzung der Confessiones von Goibaud du Bois, die 1686 in Paris erschien und nicht weniger als dreiundzwanzig Auflagen zwischen 1686 und 1839 erlebte. Erstmalig findet sich hier eine Vita Augustini, die den Text der Confessiones ausführlich Buch für Buch bebildert. Zu den gewohnten Motiven treten solche, wie Monnicas Gebet bei der Gedenkstätte des Heiligen Cyprian (conf. 5,8,15).

Achtunddreißig Tafeln des peruanischen Künstlers Basilio Pacheco, die sich im Augustinereremitenkloster von Lima befinden (**Abb. 11**), wurden zwischen 1644 und 1646 geschaffen. Pachecos Augustinuszyklus enthält neue Motive. Z.B. wird die Abstammung von Patricius und von Monnica thematisiert. Besonderes Interesse hinsichtlich der Monnica zuteil werdenden Verehrung ruft eine Tafel

Abb. 11. Basilio Pacheco, *Naissance d'Augustin*, 1644-1646, Lima.

hervor, auf welcher die Jungfrau Maria Monnica voraussagt, dass diese den augustinischen schwarzen Habit mit einem Ledergürtel tragen werde. Rechts auf diesem Bild erkennt man Augustin, der von Karthago nach Thagaste zurückkehrt. Monnica, die sich am Eingang ihres Hauses befindet, um Augustin zur Begrüßung zu umarmen, wird von ihren beiden in der Inschrift namentlich genannten Töchtern, Perpetua und Felicitas, begleitet. Diese Namensgebung greift vermutlich die Verehrung der beiden zu Augustins Lebzeiten äußerst beliebten Märtyrerinnen Perpetua und Felicitas auf und unterstreicht gleichzeitig die Heiligkeit von Augustins Familie. Ob Augustins Schwestern tatsächlich Perpetua und Felicitas hießen bzw. ob er überhaupt zwei Schwestern hatte, ist historisch – in Ermangelung eindeutiger Belege – mit einem großen Fragezeichen zu versehen.

Die Fresken des Kreuzganges in der Kirche «San Agostino» im italienischen Pietrasanta von Adolfo Petrazzi (1579-1665), einem Schüler von Salimbéni und von Pietro Sorri, setzen ebenfalls neue Akzente. So bittet Monnica etwa in einer einzigartigen Eingangszene Christus und die Jungfrau Maria um einen Nachkommen. Die Erfüllung



Abb. 12. Josef-Sebastian & Johann-Baptist Klauber, *Vita Augustini*, 1758, pl. LXI. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.

dieses Wunsches ist auf demselben Bild zu betrachten, da der Knabe Augustin rechts als Schüler erscheint. Außerdem wird Monnica auf einer weiteren Darstellung Augustins Seelenheil durch einen Engel prophezeit.

Im 18. Jh. büßt Monnica ihren privilegierten Platz in der künstlerischen Umsetzung des Lebens ihres Sohnes ein. Eine Ausnahme bilden hier die Gravuren der Brüder Josef-Sebastian und Johann-Baptist Klauber aus dem Jahr 1758, die in der Nationalbibliothek von Madrid aufbewahrt werden (**Abb. 12**). Monnicas Einfluss auf Augustins geistige und geistliche Entwicklung wird hier in aller Deutlichkeit betont, indem etwa dargestellt wird, wie das Kind Augustin den Namen Jesu von seiner Mutter lernt (conf. 3,4,8), was ein neuartiges Motiv der augustinischen Ikonographie bedeutet. Unter anderem ist Ciceros Hortensius Gegenstand des mütterlichen Unterrichts. Der Hintergrund dieser Darstellung ist der Folgende: Nach Augustins Bekehrung nahm Monnica an einer ansonsten ausschließlich aus Männern bestehenden Gesprächsrunde in Cassiciacum teil. Ihr Sohn lobte sie für ihre Redebeiträge, verglich sie gar mit Cicero und erwähnte sie in einem Atemzug mit dem Hortensius, also jenem Werk, dem zentrale Bedeutung für Augustins „Bekehrung zur Philosophie" zukam (beata u. 1.10). Nicht die mütterliche Sorge, nicht die unzähligen Tränen, sondern Monnicas intellektuelle Fähigkeit, ihre geistig-geistliche Vorbildfunktion werden künstlerisch betont. Monnica wird nun als gottnahe Philosophin gesehen, von der sich Augustin selbst nach eigenen Angaben gerne belehren ließ, so dass er nicht ohne Stolz gefragt habe: „Wie sollte ich selbst da nicht mit Freuden dein Schüler werden wollen?" (ord. 1.11.32)

Seit dem 19. Jahrhundert beschäftigt sich weniger die Kunst als vielmehr die Wissenschaft mit Leben und Werk Augustins. Vereinzelt gibt es allerdings noch Illustrationen der Vita Augustini wie etwa die modern gestalteten Kirchenfenster der Kapelle «Saint-Augustin» der Kirche «Notre-Dame de Dinan» in der Betragne. Jüngst ließ sich der in Würzburg lebende Künstler Wladimir Petrichev von den Confessiones zu einem Bilderzyklus inspirieren, der anlässlich der Jubiläumsfeier von Augustins 1650sten Geburtstags kommentiert und veröffentlicht wurde.

Das Interesse an Monnica und Augustin erweist sich als zeitlos, wenngleich sich jede Zeit sprichwörtlich ihr eigenes Bild macht. Mutter und Sohn finden oft in einem Atemzug Erwähnung und bilden in der Vorstellung vieler Christen eine sich gegenseitig ergänzende Einheit. Wohl auch in diesem Bewusstsein wurden 2004 Augustins Gebeine eine Woche lang in der römischen Kirche «Sant'Agostino»,

Abb. 13. Fernando Alvarez de Sotomayor, *Ecstasy in Ostia*, 1912. Colegio Valdeluz, Madrid.

dem letzten Ruheort von Monnicas sterblichen Überresten, ausgestellt. So bewahrheitete sich Augustins Zusammenfassung von Monnicas Traum – in einer wohl für beide Heilige ungeahnten Dimension – gegenwärtig aufs Neue: „Wo sie sei, dort sei auch ich." (conf. 3,11,19)

Larissa SEELBACH

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JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG'S *TRACTATUS VIRTUTUM ET VITIORUM* (*OPUS POSTILLARUM*, SERMONS 439-41)

The Augustinian hermit Jordan of Quedlinburg (ca. 1300-1370/80) – also called Jordan of Saxony and hence often confounded with the Dominican friar of that name († 1237) – is known as a prolific author of hagiographical, exegetical, spiritual, and homiletic works. His most important writings date from the last decades of his life: his *Liber Vitasfratrum* appeared in 1357, while he completed his three major collections of sermons (which together comprise some eleven hundred items) only after 1365.[1]

Jordan was particularly successful as a preacher. Despite their huge number, his sermons were widely divulged in Latin as well as in German and Dutch translations. This article focuses on one particular text of Jordan which circulated separately as a *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum* but which he also incorporated as sermons 439 to 441 into his first homiletic collection, the *Opus postillarum*.[2] Although each of

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[1] For surveys of Jordan's life and works, see Adolar ZUMKELLER, "Jourdain de Saxe", in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique*, 17 vols (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932-95), VIII, 1420-30; ID., "Jordan von Quedlinburg (Jordanus de Saxonia)", in *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters: Verfasserlexikon*, 2nd ed., 11 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977-), IV, 853-61; Eric L. SAAK, *High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformaton, 1292-1524* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 243-65 and *passim*. See also Cyril L. SMETANA, *Life of Saint Augustine by John Capgrave, Edited from British Library Additional MS 36704 together with Jordanus of Saxony's Vita s. Augustine* [!] *from Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 251* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2001); Giordano DI QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Ior: Registrum sermonum: Tabula contentorum secundum ordinem alphabeti*, ed. by Nadia Bray and Loris Sturlese (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2004). For the date of 1365, see Jordan OF SAXONY, *Liber Vitasfratrum*, ed. by Rudolphus Arbesmann and Winfridus Hümpfner (New York: Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service, 1943), xix. For a survey of Augustinian preaching in the Later Middle Ages, concentrating on 15th-century Italy, see Carlo DELCORNO, "La predicazione agostiniana (sec. XIII-XV)", in Mario MATTEI et al., *Gli agostiniani a Venezia e la Chiesa di Santo Stefano* (Venice, 1997), 87-108.

[2] The treatise appears separately in four known manuscripts; see Adolar ZUMKELLER, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken*, Cassiciacum 20 (Würzburg: Augustinus, 1966), no. 654, mentioning MSS Basel, UB A.IV.14, ff. 123^{r}-125^{r}, and Rome, Angelica 1444, ff. 154-161; Morton W. BLOOMFIELD et al., *Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices,*

these three sermons take their point of departure in the Biblical theme *Redde quod debes* (Matt. 18:28), it is clear from Jordan's preface that he did not so much consider his work as a series of sermons in the proper sense, but rather as a treatise composed for the instruction of other preachers. Jordan's explicit intention was to bring the main theological and philosophical teachings about the principal virtues and vices together in a concise and practical survey, so that preachers could easily pick them up and offer elementary moral instruction to their flocks.

Jordan's treatise has thus far been neglected in scholarly literature. It is my aim to present an analysis of the text and to demonstrate how notably in the sections on the virtues, Jordan develops a strategy to reconcile philosophical ethics with moral theology in such a way as to form a coherent set of views suitable for homiletic purposes.

The preface of the *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*, which I will quote from the printed *Opus postillarum*, contains a clear statement on the purpose of the work. Introducing the theme *Redde quod debes*, Jordan declares that the fullness of Christian religion consists in giving everyone his due. Justice, which by definition involves *reddere unicuique quod suum est*, therefore comprises every possible good and excludes any possible evil. By giving everyone his due, we actually observe all virtues, avoid all vices, and fulfil all our religious duties.[3] But it is only by knowing all the virtues that we realize what exactly we owe to whom; conversely, only by knowing all the vices can we avoid anything undue. Therefore,

> in order to elaborate further on the said theme, I have thought it useful to insert here a small treatise extracted from the moral writings of

1100-1500 AD (Cambridge MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1979), no. 5117, add MSS Gdansk, Biblioteka Gdańska Polskiej Akademii Nauk 1965, ff. 9-32, and Pamplona, Cabildo 58 (incomplete). The section on the vices (sermon 441) survives separately in MS Tours, BM 405, f. 141-145; see BLOOMFIELD et al., *Incipits*, no. 5116. The unfoliated *Opus postillarum* (Strasbourg: Georg Husner, 1483) presents the three sermons together under the title *Alia deductio eiusdem thematis* [i.e., *Redde quod debes*] *continens tractatum virtutum et viciorum*; the preceding sermons 436-38 deal with the same theme.

[3] *Opus postillarum* sermo 439A: "In hoc igitur quod vnicuique debitum suum reddimus, omnem iusticiam implemus secundum quod iusticia includit in se omne bonum et excludit omne malum secundum Augustinum, vt ex superioribus patet. Que quidem iusticia attenditur in reddendo vnicuique quod suum est, per quod omnis virtus impletur et omne vicium cauetur" (spelling respected, punctuation adapted). See also Jordan OF SAXONY, *Liber Vitasfratrum*, pp. xxxiv-xxxv, where the preface is quoted in its entirety.

> theologians as well as philosophers concerning the virtues and vices, by which we may learn all the better what we should give to everybody in matters of virtue and what we must avoid in matters of vice in order not to incur the debt of punishment, the more so as it often happens in sermons that some virtues or vices, which in such moments cannot be explained in every detail, require a succinct discussion. Seen from this viewpoint, an exposition on these matters is highly useful for interested preachers.[4]

Jordan's argument is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, it confirms the view of Eric Saak that Jordan in his homiletic work tends to equate virtue with justice and sin with debt.[5] Giving everyone his due, the central precept of Christian religion, is the essence of justice which thus becomes the central moral virtue; accordingly, sin consists in the failure to give everyone his due, and hence in debt. Significantly, in Jordan's native German the term *Schuld* refers to debt as well as to guilt; in his Latin, the term *debitum* seems to carry a similar double connotation. Second, Jordan's immediate concerns in the preface appear to be intellectual rather than pastoral: he addresses himself to preachers with an interest in study (*studiosi predicantes*) and offers them theoretical instruction in the virtues and vices. Of course, his lessons eventually serve pastoral ends, but what Jordan proposes is primarily an explanation of current moral doctrine, not only from a theological but also from a philosophical perspective. Apparently Jordan thought even philosophical ethics relevant in a homiletic context despite its apparent lack of a religious dimension. His aim of summarizing existent teachings is consistent with the opinion expressed in his preface that nearly everything worthwile concerning the evangelical truth has already been said, and that it is up to Jordan's generation to bring in the harvest.[6]

[4] Ibid.: "pro pleniori deductione thematis prenotati vtile duxi tam de theologorum quam philosophorum moralibus scriptis de virtutibus et viciis tractatulum breuem hic inserere quod [*lege* quo] discamus lucidius quod de virtutibus cuilibet sit reddendum et quod de viciis sit cauendum ne pene debita contrahamus, presertim quia in sermonibus sepe occurrit materia de virtutibus vel vitiis aliquibus pro tempore tractanda, que illis in locis non possunt singula explicari. Ex qua etiam consideratione noticia talium studiosis predicantibus est summopere oportuna".

[5] Eric L. SAAK, "Pelagian-Anti-Pelagian Preaching: Predestination, Grace and Good Works in the Sermons of Jordan of Quedlinburg OESA († 1380)", *Augustiniana*, 52 (2002), 311-34, pp. 321-22.

[6] See *Opus postillarum* Prol. 1: "[...] nec a modo superest aliud nisi colligere fructus. Ita enim relucet hodie veritas evangelica vt pene iam nihil noui a modernis doctoribus dicere valeat". Yet, "Nec tamen adhuc diuina sapientia distillare cessat et pluere intellectibus studiosorum" (ibid.).

The main body of Jordan's *Tractatus* seems indeed a traditional product at first sight. Jordan subsequently discusses the seven principal virtues (the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity combined with the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance) and the seven deadly sins according to Gregory the Great's classification, with pride as the mother vice giving birth to vainglory, envy, wrath, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust.[7] Expositions on the principal virtues and the capital vices were customary in the Later Middle Ages, especially in popularizing theological genres such as compendia and pastoral handbooks.[8] Jordan's approach is more complicated, however, in that he does not adopt the scheme of seven principal virtues from the outset. Having discussed the three theological virtues, which because of their divine origin prevail over all others,[9] Jordan turns not to the cardinal but to the "human" virtues. By these he understands the intellectual and moral virtues introduced in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which, following Jordan's own counting, are seventeen in number. In order to reduce this number, Jordan first excludes five intellectual virtues from his discussion in order to concentrate on the eleven moral virtues plus prudence. Then Jordan subsumes these twelve virtues under the scheme of the four cardinal virtues which from that point determine the structure of his exposition.

Although the Platonic quartet of the cardinal virtues is in fact alien to Aristotle's system, it should be noted that many theologians active before Jordan's time, and even many commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* including the four most influential ones (Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Gerald of Odo, and John Buridan), already tried to bring Aristotle's classification of the virtues in accordance with

[7] For classifications of the virtues and vices in the Middle Ages, see Richard G. NEWHAUSER, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental, 68 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993); for the scheme of the seven deadly sins, see Carla CASAGRANDE and Silvana VECCHIO, *I sette vizi capitali: Storia dei peccati nel medioevo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2000); French translation by Pierre-Emmanuel DAUZAT: *Histoire des péchés capitaux au moyen âge* (Paris: Aubier, 2003).

[8] Many of these works are listed in Morton W. BLOOMFIELD et al., *Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices, 1100-1500 AD* (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1979). For an update of this work, see Richard G. NEWHAUSER and István P. BEJCZY, *A Supplement to Morton Bloomfield et al., Incipits of Latin Works on the Virtues and Vices*, Instrumenta patristica et mediaevalia (Turnhout: Brepols; in preparation).

[9] See *Opus postillarum* sermo 439B: "inter omnes virtutes supremum locum obtinent virtutes theologice".

the fourfold scheme.[10] In his treatise, Jordan actually takes recourse to the theory which his confrere Giles of Rome († 1316), expanding on the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas, developed in his *De regimine principum*. Jordan's treatment of his sources is worth analyzing in detail. Discussing the status of prudence, which Aristotle included among the intellectual virtues, Jordan argues in accordance with Giles and Aquinas (neither of whom he mentions by name) that prudence holds an intermediate position between the intellectual and moral virtues. Prudence may actually be included among the moral virtues, adds Jordan, because of its subject matter, which is human acts, and because it requires the rightness of the appetite (that is, the intention to do good). Jordan borrowed these latter arguments, which are absent from the text of Giles, directly from Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* and moreover interlarded them with a quotation from the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*.[11] After that, Jordan cites with approval the view of Aristotle that one cannot be prudent without being good;[12] the same citation appears in *De regimine principum*, which is doubtless Jordan's source. Jordan concludes that prudence pertains to the moral virtues, because it is their directive principle and guarantees their interconnection. This conclusion has no parallel in either *De regimine principum* or the *Summa theologiae*, although it is compatible with the views of Aquinas. I suspect that Jordan adapted it from John Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*; Buridan was not only the most influential commentator of this work, but also the one most inclined to interpret prudence as a moral virtue.[13]

[10] See István P. BEJCZY, "The Cardinal Virtues in Medieval Commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1250-1350", in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500*, ed. by István P. BEJCZY (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

[11] The quotation appears in *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval* ii.91, ed. by Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), where it is referred to Aristotle, *Physica* ii.9 (200a); however, Aristotle's text offers no literal parallel. Hamesse points to Thomas AQUINAS, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio* 2.15 (273), ed. by M. Maggiòlo (Turin: Marietti, 1954), p. 135, as the probable source of inspiration; see also Thomas AQUINAS, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* vi.4, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1882-), XLVII, p. 346: "Manifestum est enim quod principia operabilium sunt fines cuius gratia fiunt operabilia, qui ita se habent in operabilibus sicut principia in demonstrabilibus, ut habetur in II Physicorum".

[12] Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Ethica nicomachea* vi.13, trans. by Robert GROSSETESTE (recensio recognita), ed. by René A. Gauthier, *Aristoteles Latinus*, XXVI.i.3.4 (Leiden: Brill; Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1972), p. 491: "inpossibile prudentem esse non entem bonum".

[13] See BEJCZY, "The Cardinal Virtues in Medieval Commentaries". The text I used is John BURIDAN, *[Questiones] super decem libros Ethicorum* (Paris: Ponset le Preux, 1513; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968).

A detailed comparison of Jordan's text with his probable sources can make the parallels apparent:

Jordan of Saxony, *Opus postillarum*, sermo 439F	**Jordan's probable sources**
Virtutes autem medie inter intellectuales et morales sunt que existunt in intellectu pratico, vt prudentia et alie virtutes sibi annexe, de quibus infra patebit. Prudentia enim secundum commentatorem media est inter virtutes intellectuales et morales. Anumerari tamen potest cum moralibus,	Virtutes autem mediae inter intellectuales et morales sunt virtutes existentes in intellectu practico, ut prudentia et aliae virtutes sibi annexae. Prudentia autem, secundum commentatorem super libris Ethicorum, media est inter virtutes morales et intellectuales. Computari tamen potest cum virtutibus moralibus, (Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* I.ii.2, pp. 46-47)
quia licet secundum essentiam suam sit virtus intellectualis, conuenit tamen cum virtutibus moralibus secundum materiam suam que sunt ipsa agibilia, puta actus humani,	prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.lviii.3 ad 1)
in quibus ita se habet finis sicut principia in speculabilibus, vt dicitur.vij. Ethycorum.	Finis in operabilibus est sicut principium in speculabilibus. (*Auctoritates Aristotelis* ii.91)
Vnde ad prudentiam requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Appetitus autem sit rectus per virtutem moralem.	Et ideo ad prudentiam… requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus rectus. (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.lvii.4)
Ideo dicitur .vj. Ethycorum quod impossibile est prudentem esse non entem bonum.	Inde est ergo quod dicitur 6 Ethic. quod impossibile est prudentem esse non existentem bonum. (Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* I.ii.2, p. 47)
Ex quo patet quod prudentia ad virtutes morales pertinet, imo ipsa est directiua omnium virtutum moralium et in ipsa omnes morales virtutes sibi inuicem connectuntur.	[prudentia] concedi potest moralis secundum connexionem, quia moralibus necessario connexa; potest etiam concedi moralis directiue, quia dirigit omnes virtutes morales in suis operationibus. (John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 6 q. 9, f. 125va)

From this analysis it becomes clear that Jordan is anything but a naive compiler of contemporary moral theories. Just in order to present prudence as a moral virtue, he selects passages from four different theological and philosophical sources and combines them to form a unified, cogent argument. His plea for a moral understanding of prudence is definitely stronger than what is found in Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* and more convincing in its compactness than the arguments shattered throughout the *Summa* of Aquinas. Moreover, he makes his basically anti-Aristotelian plea under constant use of Aristotle's own authority in a way no scholastic author could improve. What Jordan offers to his audience of preachers is hence no elementary instruction in moral thought but, in this case at least, a personal rearrangement of current doctrine.

Having added prudence to Aristotle's list of moral virtues, Jordan sets out to subsume these virtues under the scheme of the four cardinal virtues, taking again his point of departure in Giles of Rome. Following Aquinas, Giles taught that prudence resides in the intellect, justice in the will or the intellectual appetite, and Aristotle's ten remaining moral virtues in the two sensual appetites: emotion (*irascibilitas*) and desire (*concupiscibilitas*). The irascible appetite is the seat of *fortitudo*, *mansuetudo*, *magnanimitas*, and *magnificentia*, the concupiscent appetite of *temperantia*, *liberalitas*, *philotimia* or *honoris amativa* (the term coined by Giles for Aristotle's unnamed virtue of aspiring after moderate honour), *veritas*, *affabilitas*, and *eutrapelia*.[14] Jordan accepts this division, but ignores Giles's claim that fortitude and temperance are the main virtues of the irascible and concupiscent appetites to which the remaining moral virtues are affiliated as *virtutes annexae*. Instead, Jordan gives four reasons as to why the cardinal virtues are the principal moral virtues. We can verify that Jordan adapted these reasons from the widely diffused *Summa de virtutibus* of the Dominican friar William Peraldus, again without naming his source.[15] Although he presents the reasons in a different order and introduces double names for each of them, his dependence on Peraldus is too obvious to ignore:

[14] Giles OF ROME, *De regimine principum* I.ii.2-3 (Rome: Luigi Zanetti, 1607; repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1967), pp. 50-56.

[15] For the vast diffusion of this work, see Michiel VERWEIJ, "The Manuscript Transmission of the *Summa de virtutibus* by Guillielmus Peraldus: A Preliminary Survey of the Manuscripts", *Medioevo* 31 (2006), 103-297. I quote the work from the *Summae virtutum ac vitiorum*, 2 vols. (Lyon: Beringen, 1554).

Jordan of Saxony, *Opus postillarum*, sermo 439F	**William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* III.i.1**
Inter omnes autem virtutes morales sunt quattuor principales que dicuntur cardinales. Tum propter earum primitatem et preeminentiam quam habent respectu aliarum virtutum moralium; cardines enim dicuntur prime celi et terre vel maris. Celi quidem unde Deut. .xxx. dicitur: *Si ad cardines celi fueris dissipatus*; terre vero .j. Regum .ij.: *Domini enim sunt cardines terre*; maris etiam, unde Iob .xxxvi.: *Cardines quoque maris operiet*. Sic etiam he quattuor virtutes sunt prime omnium aliarum.	quatuor de causis possumus intelligere eas dici cardinales… (p. 281a). Tertio, propter preeminentiam quam habent respectu caeterarum virtutum. Cardines enim dicuntur primae partes caeli uel terrae uel maris. Deuteron. 30: *Si ad cardines caeli fueris dissipatus, inde retrahet te Deus*. 1 Regum 2: *Domini enim sunt cardines terre*. Iob 36: *Cardines quoque maris operiet*. Sic uirtutes istae primae sunt respectu aliarum uirtutum (p. 281b).
Tum propter sustentationem et innitentiam: sicut enim hostium cardini innititur, sic tota conuersatio bona circa has quattuor virtutes principaliter versatur.	Secundo, quia sicut ostium cardini innititur, sic tota conuersatio bona his quatuor uirtutibus innititur (p. 281b).
Tum propter stabilitatem et permanentiam: licet enim hostium versatur in cardine, cardo tamen super stabilis manet. Sic licet ea circa que huiusmodi virtutes versantur sint mutabilia, scilicet ea quibus vtendum est, vel etiam variabilia, vt actus humani; ipse tamen virtutes stabiles sunt.	Primo, propter stabilitatem. Cardo stabilis manet, licet ostium in eo uertatur… Sic he quatuor uirtutes stabiles sunt, licet ea quae uersantur, scilicet ea quibus utendum est, sunt mutabilia (p. 281a).
Tum propter principalitatem et sufficientiam, nam omnes alie virtutes morales ad has aliquo modo reducuntur et sufficientissime sub eis, vt sequitur, collocantur.	Quarto, propter principalitatem. Cetere enim uirtutes ad has aliquo modo recucuntur (pp. 281b-282a).

After asserting the pre-eminence of the cardinal virtues, Jordan does not immediately explain how the other moral virtues are comprised under them; his remaining observations on the human virtues in general (for which Giles of Rome serves again as his principal source) concern their relation with the passions and with good dispositions which are no virtues. Jordan's classification of the human virtues is only apparent from the chapters on the individual cardinal virtues which fill the remainder of his treatise up to the section on the

vices. Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* no longer plays a role in these chapters. Each of them starts with various definitions of the virtue in question copied in majority from Peraldus and continues with the subdivisions of the same virtue according to the *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas (in the chapters on the theological virtues, Jordan likewise uses Peraldus and Aquinas, though much more sparingly).[16] In the *Summa*, Aquinas not only subsumed all Aristotelian virtues under the cardinal quartet, but also a great variety of other virtues hailed by Christian tradition, which all recur in Jordan's text. Eventually, then, the *Summa theologiae* determines Jordan's perspective; starting his treatise with Aristotle's division of the human virtues, he gradually subdues these virtues under Aquinas's moral theology.

I have discussed Jordan's dealings with the Aristotelian virtues at length because these virtues put a challenge to the arrangement of his treatise as well as to its contents. The significance of the theological virtues and the deadly sins in the context of preaching and religion is obvious, since these are concepts of Christian origin with a direct relevance for the economy of salvation. The significance of what Jordan calls the "human" virtues is less obvious, especially since he accentuates their non-Christian, Aristotelian provenance. Although Jordan does not make specific doctrinal statements, I take it that he viewed the human virtues as being naturally acquirable, without the intervention of grace. Nowhere in his treatise does Jordan subscribe to the view that the moral virtues can be directly infused by God, a view which anyhow was far from universally accepted in fourteenth-century theology.[17] What, then, was the relevance of the human virtues for the final destination of man, which constituted the principal frame of reference for Jordan's intended audience? Many theologians contemporary to Jordan believed that virtues, or virtuous actions, which originated in human nature could be ordered to the final destination of man through the influence of charity and grace. But Jordan's main authorities, William Peraldus and Thomas Aquinas, left the problem

[16] The chapters on faith and hope start with definitions that go back in majority to Peraldus; there is no detectible influence from Aquinas. The beginning of the chapter on charity is based on Thomas AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I.II.xxvi.3. The chapter on the theological virtues in general has no direct parallels in either Peraldus or Aquinas.

[17] See Odon LOTTIN, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, 6 vols (Gembloux: Duculot, Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1942-60), III, 459-535, and IV, 739-807; Bonnie KENT, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

untouched; actually, scholars do not even agree as to whether the cardinal virtues appear in Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* as natural or supernatural virtues.[18]

Even if Jordan does not explain in so many words how human virtues relate to religious ends, I think it possible to infer his view from the chapter on justice, which for Jordan is the central concept of his treatise. Not only is justice one of the cardinal virtues, but it also stands for morality in general, as we have seen. Not for nothing is the chapter on justice the largest chapter on any individual virtue or vice in Jordan's treatise. Moreover, it forms the beginning of a new sermon in the *Opus postillarum*: sermon 439 comprises the preface of the treatise and the chapters on the theological virtues, the human virtues in general, and prudence, while sermon 440 includes the chapters on justice, fortitude, and temperance. One might rather have expected Jordan to have devoted one sermon to the theological and another to the human virtues. Starting a new sermon with justice, however, permitted him to reassume the Biblical theme *Redde quod debes* and to explain in detail its relation to the virtue of justice.

Jordan begins his exposition with the observation that although the theme *Redde quod debes* refers to all virtues, it antonomastically applies to justice in particular, since justice precisely consists in giving everyone his due; the biblical theme therefore offers a suitable starting-point for a discussion of justice.[19] Thereupon, Jordan explains that justice can be understood in several ways. He distinguishes three meanings of justice which all derive from Peraldus's *Summa de virtutibus*. Peraldus distinguished the same three meanings, but the second and third ones have changed places in Jordan's text:

[18] See KENT, *Virtues of the Will*, 32.

[19] *Opus postillarum* sermo 440A: "*Redde quod debes*. Quamuis hoc thema omnes virtutes complectatur, specialiter autem antonomasice iusticie ascribitur, ad quam pertinet proprie reddere vnicuique quod suum est. Quapropter de iusticia tractari volenti optime conuenit proponere idem verbum, *Redde quod debes*. Hoc enim faciendo omnis iusticia adimpletur".

Jordan of Saxony, *Opus postillarum*, sermo 440A	**William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* III.v.1**
Quandoque enim sumitur valde large quasi pro bonitate, sicut ad Heb. .j.: *Dilexisti iusticiam*, Glossa: *id est omne bonum*. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus duas esse partes iusticie, scilicet declinare a malo et facere bonum. Et sic iusticia distinguitur contra peccatum. Sicut amplius dicit Ro.: *Aliquando nos fuisse seruos peccati, nunc vero seruos iusticie*. Sic etiam sumitur cum dicimus impium iustificari. Et quod dicitur *Fulgebunt iusti* etc. Et ita in similibus locis Scripture. **Et sic accipitur hic in proposito nostro.**	Iusticia quandoque ualde large sumitur, scilicet pro bonitate. Secundum hoc dicit Augustinus duas partes esse iustitiae, scilicet declinare a malo et facere bonum. Et super illud Heb. 1: *Dilexisti iustitiam*, dicit Glossa: *omne bonum*. Sic sumitur Mat. 13: *Fulgebunt iusti sicut sol in regno patris eorum*. Sic etiam sumitur quum dicimus impium iustificari.
Quandoque vero sumitur pro inflictione penarum, sicut dicimus iudicem facere iusticiam malefactori. Et sic videtur esse opposita pietati et misericordie. Et sic intelligitur cum dicit Bernardus: *Nullum nomen Dei est quod non sonet aut iusticiam aut pietatem*.	Quandoque autem sumitur strictius, prout attenditur in inflictione poenarum. Sic uidetur iustitia esse opposita pietati uel misericordie. Sic sumit hoc nomen iustitia[e] Bernardus dicens: *Nullum nomen Dei est quod non sonet aut iustitiam aut pietatem*.
Quandoque autem sumitur pro virtute reddente vnicuique quod suum est. Et sic continet sub se pietatem et alias virtutes que hic sub ea collocantur. **Et sic est virtus cardinalis.**	Quandoque etiam sumitur nomen iustitiae minus large, scilicet pro uirtute reddente unicuique quod suum est, et sic sub iustitia pietas uidetur contineri.

Jordan declares justice in the first, biblical sense – in which it coincides more or less with goodness and moral probity – to be his proper subject. When speaking of justice in a large sense, as including every good and excluding every evil, Jordan therefore apparently means biblical justice. This type of justice differs from justice as a cardinal virtue, which is defined as giving everyone his due.[20] Justice

[20] For a parallel for this double understanding of justice see the Dominican preacher Hugh OF PRATO († 1322), *Sermo 2 in Dominica 5 post Pentecosten*, in *Concionum de tempore*, ed. Guillaume van Oonsel, 2 vols (Antwerp: Bellerus, 1617), pars aestivalis, p. 191: justice exists as "virtus specialis, per quam vnicuique redditur quod suum est, et hic non accipitur sic", and as "virtus generalis, ad quam omnes virtutes reduci possunt, quia omnia opera virtutum sunt iusta. Cuius ratio est, quia in omni opere virtutum homo subijcitur Deo, quod est valde iustum… Et ideo omne bonum ad iustitiam reducitur, et omne malum ad iniustitiam, et sic accipitur iustitia hic".

as a cardinal virtue is, however, Jordan's specific subject at this point in his treatise; it is, after all, the cardinal virtues on which his exposition focusses (in the preceding chapter, Jordan introduces three meanings of prudence in order to accept the one which corresponds, in his view, to the notion of prudence as a cardinal virtue).[21]

In fact, Jordan's understanding of the cardinal virtue of justice has a remarkably secular ring about it. First, he quotes the well-known definitions of justice introduced in Cicero's *De inventione* (a habit of the mind which attributes to everyone his dignity, preserving a regard to the general welfare) and in Roman law (a fixed will to give everyone his right). Thereupon, Jordan presents a definition derived, so he claims, from Book Five of Aristotle's *Ethics* and which may be translated as follows: "Justice is a habit which makes those who have it choose and act in accordance with equality in distributions and in directions, that is, in exchanges". In reality, this last definition stems from an anonymous Greek commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* which Robert Grosseteste translated into Latin together with the Aristotelian text itself. According to Jordan, all other definitions of justice as a cardinal virtue can be reduced to it.[22] Hence, in case of justice as a cardinal virtue, giving everyone his due apparently means fulfilling one's earthly obligations to one's fellow human beings. But how does this secular conception of justice relate to its biblical understanding, which for Jordan comes first?

[21] See *Opus postillarum* sermo 439H: "Prudentia dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim sumitur pro apparenti prudentia… Quandoque vero sumitur large… Quandoque vero sumitur stricte pro virtute perficiente intellectum practicum. Et sic accipiamus eam hic prout videlicet ponitur virtus cardinalis." Cf. William PERALDUS, *Summa de virtutibus* III.ii.1, pp. 284b-286a.

[22] Ibid.: "Iusticia autem vt est virtus cardinalis describitur a Tullio primo Rhetorice sue sic: *Iusticia est habitus animi communi vtilitate conseruata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem*. Describitur etiam secundum iurisperitos et etiam secundum Tullium sic: *Iusticia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum vnicuique tribuens*. Secundum Arestotilem autem, sicut colligitur ex quinto Ethycorum, sic diffinitur: *Iusticia est habitus a quo habentes ipsum fiunt et electiui et operatiui eius quod est equale in distributionibus et directionibus, id est commutationibus*. Ad hanc autem ultimam diffinitionem, si bene attendatur, omnes alie reduci possunt". Thomas AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* II.II.lxviii.1, *Opera*, IX, pp. 9-10, approaches the juridical definition to Aristotle: "Et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea quam Philosophus ponit, in V. *Ethic.*, dicens quod iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis dicitur operativus secundum electionem iusti". For the Greek commentary, see *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica nicomachea commentaria*, ed. by Gustav HEYLBUT, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 20 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), p. 228. Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* v.8 (409), ed. by Wilhelm Kübel, 2 vols, *Opera omnia* (Münster, 1952-), XIV, p. 347, quoted the definition as "Iustitia est habitus, a quo operativi et electivi fiunt eius quod in distributionibus et directionibus, aequalis".

In order to provide an answer, it should be noted that Jordan subsumes all three understandings of justice distinguished in his treatise under justice of the divine law (*iusticia iuris diuini*), a concept to which the theme *Redde quod debes* refers. By justice of the divine law Jordan cannot mean divine justice, for he leaves no doubt that the subject of all three types of justice is the human being rather than God.[23] Justice of the divine law comprises three forms of *human* justice, including justice as a cardinal vitue which in Jordan's view is concerned with the distribution and exchange of earthly goods. It seems fair to interpret *iusticia iuris diuini* as justice to be observed by human beings in spiritual as well as temporal affairs on the basis of God's precepts. This interpretation accords with the usual emphasis in Jordan's preaching on justice as following the divine law and doing good works, both of which are ways for Jordan to conform gradually to Christ and to earn heaven.[24] This would suggest, however, that even in its Aristotelian understanding the cardinal virtue of justice can only be properly observed by Christians. It would moreover suggest that the cardinal virtue of justice has a salvific effect, which is only possible through grace. To what extent are Jordan's "human" virtues really human, then?

Jordan does not give a direct answer, but inserts in his chapter a revealing comparison between the Aristotelian concept of legal justice and his own concept of justice of the divine law. In Aristotle's *Ethics*, legal justice stands for all virtue, as Jordan points out correctly. Explaining the name of the concept, Jordan argues that legal justice "orders everything to the common good, which is the end and aim of the human law, in the same way as justice of the divine law, which I mentioned before, orders everything to God, who is the end and aim of our law".[25] Apparently morality exists on two levels for Jordan,

[23] *Opus postillarum* sermo 440A: "Et omnes has acceptiones in se complectitur iusticia thematis nostri que potest dici iusticia iuris diuini. Nam hec iusticia facit homines declinare a malo et facere bonum quantum ad primam acceptionem. Item facit homines infligere penam, tam sibi pro peccatis suis quam aliis pro eorum forefactis quantum sui interest, ita quod nullum malum remaneat impunitum. Et hoc quantum ad secundam acceptionem. Item facit hominem reddere vnicuique quod suum est quantum ad tertiam acceptionem. Quid autem sit illud quod vnicuique debetur sufficienter patet ex diccis et dicendis".

[24] See Eric L. SAAK, "*Quilibet christianus*: Saints in Society in the Sermons of Jordan of Quedlinburg, OESA", in *Models of Holiness in Medieval Sermons: Proceedings of the International Symposium (Kalamazoo, 4-7 May 1995)*, ed. by Beverly M. Kienzle et al. (Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM, 1995), 317-38, esp. p. 336; id., "Pelagian-Anti-Pelagian Preaching", esp. p. 332.

[25] *Opus postillarum* sermo 440A: "[iusticia legalis] omnia refert in bonum communem, quod est finis et intentio legis humane, sicut iusticia iuris diuini, de qua supra

one natural, the other supernatural. On both levels justice exists as an overarching virtue: legal justice comprises all virtues on a natural level and directs their operations to the natural end of the common good, while justice of the divine law comprises all virtues on a supernatural level and directs their operations to the supernatural good which is God himself. It would seem, then, that Jordan assigns to *iusticia iuris diuini* the role which many contemporary theologians reserved for charity: the capacity to order the actions of the moral virtues which are human in origin to the celestial destination of man. In fact, Jordan already approaches justice and charity at the very beginning of his preface. He corroborates his opening statement that giving everyone his due makes up the fullness of Christian religion with quotations from Paul, who in Rom. 13 not only said: "Render to all men their dues", but added: "Owe nothing to anyone, except to love one another; for the one who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law" (Rom 13: 7-8).[26] At the highest level of morality, justice and charity coincide.

Saving the four cardinal virtues and relating these virtues to religious morality were two of the main problems of virtue ethics in the Later Middle Ages. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, which enjoyed an undisputed authority in academic moral discourse, defied both the scheme of the cardinal virtues, which it simply ignores, and the religious conception of morality, since virtues appear in Aristotle's work as naturally acquirable qualities which guide the human being in the practical concerns of the active life. In his *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*, which pretends merely to summarize current moral theories, Jordan proposed solutions for both problems. Taking up the Aristotelian challenge, which as a pastoral author he was under no obligation to do, Jordan started his discussion of the human virtues with Aristotle's classification of six intellectual and eleven moral virtues. The first thing he did was leave the intellectual virtues aside but retain prudence as a moral instead of an intellectual virtue, a step justified by a careful combination of passages from several authorities (Giles of Rome, Thomas

memoraui, omnia refert in Deum qui est finis et intentio legis nostre". Cf. Thomas AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* II.II.lxviii.6, *Opera*, IX, p. 14: "Sicut enim caritas potest dici virtus generalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum divinum, ita etiam iustitia legalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum commune".

[26] Ibid. sermo 439A: "*Redde quod debes*, quia complementum christiane religionis consistit in reddendo debitum vnicuique, dicente apostolo Ro. xiij.: *Reddite omnibus debita*. Et subdit: *Nemini quicquam debeatis nisi vt inuicem diligans. Qui enim diligit proximum, legem impleuit*".

Aquinas, the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, and probably John Buridan). Next, he subsumed Aristotle's list of moral virtues, extended with prudence, under the scheme of the cardinal virtues, following Giles of Rome and William Peraldus, and modeled his analysis of the individual cardinal virtues on Peraldus and Aquinas, the most important authorities in the fields of pastoral and theological moral thought, respectively. But Jordan's most original contribution lies in his conception of justice. Following his treatise, Aristotle's legal justice orders all virtues to the common good on a natural level, but is herself guided by justice of the divine law, which orders all virtues to the supernatural good and in this sense not only resembles to, but actually coincides with, charity. In the course of his exposition, Jordan thus reshapes Aristotle's classification of the virtues in such a way as to subdue it under the scheme of the cardinal virtues as well as under Christian religion. The philosophical perspective gradually gives way to religion; the Aristotelian element remains recognizable as such, but does not present a challenge any longer thanks to its subjugation to biblical justice.

Taken at face value, the *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum* seems little more than a relatively simple compilation of moral theory; naturally, the text had to make such an impression in order to serve its purpose. But behind Jordan's compilation is much creative rearrangement. The theory of the human virtues which he made fit for divulgation from the pulpit was in important respects his own.

István P. BEJCZY

ON THE ORIGINS OF THE OESA: SOME NOTES ON THE *SERMONES AD FRATRES SUOS IN EREMO*

History, fiction, and fact are often difficult to distinguish. In the course of time, they blend into one another, with the result that a new history is created. Such was the fate of the origins of the Order of Hermits of Saint Augustine (*Ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini*, OESA; today, OSA). In less than 100 years from the bull of Pope Alexander IV, *Licet ecclesiae catholicae* of 9 April 1256, which brought together various eremitical groups in the Great Union to form the OESA, the historical account of the OESA's foundation had been transformed, and a new image of Augustine had been created. Rather than the monastic bishop of Hippo, as he had been known throughout the Middle Ages and on into the early fourteenth century, Augustine was restyled the hermit founder of his Order of Hermits. Central to this new image of Augustine were Augustine's *Sermones ad fratres suos in eremo*. These sermons, however, are a forgery. Yet the origins of this forgery are an enigma, and most likely will remain so. This is all the more unfortunate since these sermons became intricately and intimately connected with the late medieval understandings not only of the origins of the OESA, but also of Augustine himself, serving as the source of fierce controversy and debate from the mid-fourteenth century to the eve of the Reformation, when eventually the *causa Augustiniana* was itself transformed from concerning the authenticity of Augustine's heritage to the orthodoxy of his theology and how it was being taught in Wittenberg. The medieval understandings of Augustine and the origins of the OESA are no longer accepted as history, and have not been for quite sometime. Yet we must come to grips with the fact that our own understandings are not all that different when it comes down to it, in terms of processes, from those of our medieval ancestors. Understanding is historically conditioned, and our own "historically affected consciousness" is as "playful" as was that of the later Middle Ages.[1] It is thus that I offer here some notes on the origins of the OESA, and on the late medieval understandings and creations thereof, in hope of contributing to the on-going attempt to define and understand ourselves in coming to a more historical understanding of the historical record.[2]

[1] HANS-GEORG GADAMER, *Truth and Method*, 2nd revised edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York, 1993).

[2] See also my forthcoming study, *Augustinus Noster. Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages*, *SMRT* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers).

One often reads that the legends concerning Augustine as the founding father of the hermits were by the early fourteenth century already long-standing oral tradition. Yet even Balbino Rano, OSA, claimed that there is no evidence that members of the OESA considered themselves to have been members of an Order established by Augustine before 1308. This, for Rano, was a *terminus post quem*, not a *terminus a quo*.[3] Appeals to "oral tradition" are rather convenient. Eschewing textual evidence, they explain how "legends" came to be without having to give any documentation. Yet with the transition from "oral tradition" to textual tradition, we are confronted with the problem of the uniformity and coherence of the preceeding "oral tradition", especially when the textual tradition evidences a lack of uniformity and a lack of coherence. Moreover, we close our eyes to the process of creation, to the process of myth-making. Appeals to an oral tradition of what "must have been" simply deflect the issue of literary fiction. The "fiction" was already there in the supposed "oral tradition". This, though, is a travesty of historical method and approach, and not only obscures, but also denies the creative processes of image "correction", which at times, if not always, slips into the realm of image "creation".[4] The late medieval Augustine was a created Augustine. For the historian, the most exciting aspect thereof is the analysis of the creation itself, without appeals to a posited "oral tradition" that can explain, and explain away, the newness and excitement of the fictions themselves. It was only in the aftermath of 1327 – when Pope John XXII granted the petition of William of Cremona, the Prior General of the OESA, that the Hermits should have custody of Augustine's

I presented an early version of some of what here follows on the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* in a lecture at Villanova University, hosted by the Augustinian Institute in their lecture series, Lectures in the Augustinian Tradition, under the title: "Creating Augustine: The *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* and the *Collectanea Sancti Augustini* of Jordan of Quedlinburg." I would like to thank Father Thomas Martin, O.S.A. for the invitation, and Father Martin as well, together with Father Karl Gersbach, O.S.A., for their comments on my paper. The section below on the origins of the OESA was privately published in the Newsletter of the Australian Augustinians, and is available on their website, AUGNET. I would like to thank Father Michael Endicott, O.S.A. for that opportunity and for his comments on my work and his support thereof. Without the help, support, and encouragement of Father Gersbach and Father Martijn Schrama, O.S.A., this present work would never have seen the light of day. In addition, I am most grateful to Kristi Palmer, Librarian of the IUPUI University Library, who acquired for me the microfilms needed to complete this project, and to the Department of History and the School of Liberal Arts of IUPUI which provided the funding.

[3] Balbino Rano, O.S.A., *The Order of Saint Augustine* (Rome, 1975), 20-21.

[4] On the issue of "image correction" and "image creation" see my forthcoming study, *Augustinus Noster*.

body in Pavia – that Augustine was created anew as the founding father of the OESA.[5]

I. The New Augustine

In a fresco in Santa Maria della Misericordia in Bologna, we find an image of Augustine giving his Rule to four hermits. One of the hermits has been identified as Martin Luther. Luther visited Santa Maria della Misericordia on his trip to Rome in 1510 to oppose the proposed union of the observant and conventual branches of the German Augustinians under Johannes von Staupitz. The depictions of the four hermits had shortly thereafter been painted over, only to have been restored in 1931.[6] Here we find Luther a devoted adherent to the

[5] See E.L. SAAK, "The Creation of Augustinian Identity in the Later Middle Ages," *Augustiniana* 49 (1999), 109-164, 251-286.

[6] "Lorenzo Costa assieme a Giacomo Francia affrescò in Santa Maria della Misericordia a Bologna un sant'Agostino in trono che affida la sua regola a quattro discepoli che gli stanno intorno, fra i quali si è voluto riconoscere Martin Lutero. I quattro discepoli rappresentati sono attenti e compunti nell'espressione del viso, consci della responsabilità che si stanno assumendo. Agostino sotto il manto vescovile e la mitra in testa indossa il saio scuro dei monaci agostiniani. La scena si svolge in una camera che si affaccia con due finestra su un panorama agreste semplice ma di grande serenità. L'affresco si trova su un pilastro fra due cappelle nella chiesa della Misericordia. Questa chiesa fu acquistata per mille lire dagli Agostiniani della Congregazione di Lombardia nel 1473 dai monaci Olivetani, che l'avevano lasciata venti anni prima per ritornare a S. Michele in Bosco. La chiesa era in condizioni disastrose, tuttavia la stima di cui godevano gli Agostiniani fece sì che si muovesse la solidarietà del Comune e delle famiglie facoltose di Bologna. L'edificio e il convento ritornarono così al primitivo splendore. In particolare la potente famiglia dei Bentivoglio, che era legata all'altra chiesa agostiniana di S. Giacomo, dove aveva la cappella di famiglia, non mancò di dirottarvi i suoi migliori artisti come il Francia e il Costa. L'affresco è dunque databile attorno al 1510. Questa data corrisponde all'anno in cui Martin Lutero (che dal 1501 al 1505 aveva soggiornato ad Erfurt), in viaggio per Roma, si fermò con il confratello che l'accompagnava, nel convento della Misericordia. Dicono i suoi biografi che lo accolse un inverno gelido e con molta neve. Che uno dei frati ritratti sia proprio Lutero non è scritto da alcuna parte, ma vari indizi lo fanno credere. Innanzitutto il significato dell'affresco è chiaro: Agostino è il grande dottore della Chiesa e fondatore dell'Ordine. Ai suoi piedi vi sono quattro personaggi che a quel tempo sono considerati i più rappresentativi del suo pensiero e della sua scuola. Martin Lutero non era ancora eretico e la sua fama può avere acceso la fantasia del priore o del committente. D'altra il confronto tra le immagini del giovane Lutero e l'affresco mostra somiglianze sorprendenti. E' interessante osservare che non molto tempo dopo, quando ormai Lutero era diventato eretico, il priore, che sapeva molto bene chi fosse quel frate raffigurato ai piedi di Agostino, fece dare una mano di bianco sulla parte inferiore dell'affresco, cancellando tutti e quattro i personaggi. Quetsa operazione non avrebbe avuto senso se non per nascondere qualcosa di scomodo. Solo nel 1931 un

OESA and to his Order's primacy as the true sons of Augustine.[7] This image is in keeping with Luther's own marginal notes of 1509/1510 on Augustine's *De vera religione*, where Luther cites Augustine's *De vita et moribus clericorum*, and lashes out against Jacob Wimpfeling for denying the authenticity of these sermons and Augustine's monastic life.[8] The two sermons in question, as the editors of the *Weimar Ausgabe* of Luther's works noted, were part of the pseudo-Augustinian *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. Luther's defense of their authenticity is nevertheless not without merit. Though these two sermons were part of the pseudo-Augustinian collection, they are actually genuine sermons of Augustine and circulated separately as sermons 355 and 356 under the title Luther cites.[9]

When Luther joined the OESA in 1505, the image of the "new Augustine" was already well established, as can be seen in codex 78A 19a of the *Kupferstichkabinett* in Berlin, which contains an illustrated Life of St. Augustine, known as the *Historia Augustini*.[10] Composed between 1430 and 1440 in central Germany, the *Historia* consists of

primo sommario restauro di pulitura aveva evidenziato la presenza dei quattro frati. Costa dipinse anche una pala con Agostino in San Giovanni in Monte sempre a Bologna nel 1497, per la cappella di Iacopo Chedini. Agostino vi è raffigurato con la Madonna, Giovanni e altri santi. Secondo Vasari Francesco Francia dipinse il santo anche su una tavola per la cappella Bentivoglio in San Giacomo Maggiore a Bologna. Fu eseguita per Giovanni II Bentivoglio, signore di Bologna nel 1499 e raffigura la Vergine fra Floriano, Agostino, Giovanni Evangelista e Sebastiano. Un'altra sua opera si trova alla Pinacoteca di Bologna, un tempo fuor della porta in Strada Castiglione della Misericordia." Associazione Storico-Culturale S. Agostino (hereafter cited as: ASCSA), http://www.cassiciaco.it/ITA/001ago/pittori/costa.htm. The website of the Associazione is a rich and wonderful resource. It is, among other things, in effect a virtual research library for Augustinian studies.

[7] The OESA referred to themselves as the "true sons of Augustine" at least since NICHOLAS OF ALESSANDRIA: "Sed nos sumus filii immediate ab eo [*scil.* Augustino] geniti, ideo plane portamus signum ipsius, scilicet habitum quo usus fuit statim post conversionem. Numquam enim ultra mare talis habitus visus est qualem portant Canonici regulares, sed omnes religiosi induuntur de nigro et super latam tunicam corigia cinguntur." NICHOLAS DE ALESSANDRIA, *Sermo de beato Augustino*, ed. Balbino Rano, in *idem*, "Los dos Primeras Obras Conocidas sobre el Origen de la Orden Augustiniana," *Analecta Augustiniana* 45 (1982): 352-376; 363.

[8] *D. Martini Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 61 vols. (Weimar, 1883-1999), 9.12,7-18. For Wimpfeling, see note 19 below.

[9] For the sermons, see C. LAMBOT, ed. *Sermones selecti sancti Augustini*. Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia (Utrecht, 1950), 124-131.

[10] The *Historia Augustini* has been pubished by the Courcelles in their work, *Iconographie de Saint Augustin. Les Cycles du XV^e Siècle* (Paris, 1969). For their discussion of the *Historia*, see pages 29-64; for the work itself, see plates II-XXXV. It is also available at ASCSA, http://www.cassiciaco.it/ITA/001ago/Historia/histor.htm (hereafter cited as *HA*).

123 scenes from Augustine's life. In thirty-nine of those scenes, numbers 39 to 78, we find a very precise emplotment of Augustine's progress from his baptism to his foundation of a monastery within the episcopal compound in Hippo after having been ordained a bishop. This episcopal monastery was Augustine's third monastic foundation. After his baptism (scene 39), Augustine was dressed in the habit of a hermit by Bishop Ambrose (scene 40). Thereafter, together with Monica, Augustine, dressed as a hermit with tonsure, went to stay with Simplicianus and his hermits (scene 41). After Monica persuaded her son to return to Africa (scene 42), Monica and Augustine take their leave of Simplicianus (scene 43), yet before departure, Simplicianus gives Augustine a number of his hermits to accompany him to Africa (scene 44). On their journey, Augustine and his group of hermits visit the Tuscan hermits (scene 47). After the death of Monica (scene 50), upon reaching Africa (51), Augustine is found teaching his hermits (scene 52) and preaching in Hippo (scene 53). He then meets Bishop Valerius (scene 54), who grants him land to establish a monastery (scene 55), which Augustine then does, together with his hermits (scene 56), and then gives his hermits his Rule (scene 57). After having been ordained a priest (scene 71), Augustine builds another monastery and once again gives his hermits his rule (scene 74). Three scenes later, Augustine is ordained bishop, and in scene 78, is shown establishing his third monastic foundation, this one within the episcopal compound. The artist is very clear: Augustine founded his Order of Hermits in Hippo, after having returned from Milan, together with a group of hermits received from Simplicianus, and for these hermits he composed his Rule. In the antepenultimate scene, long after Augustine's death, Pope John XXII is portrayed as telling the Hermits: "We deem it worthy that the father is given to his sons, the head to his members, the master to his students, and the commander to his soldiers,"[11] a text taken directly from John's Bull *Veneranda Sanctorum* of 1327,[12] granting the Hermits co-custody with the Canons of Augustine's tomb in San Pietro in Ciel d'Oro in Pavia. According to at least

[11] "Dignum estimamus ut pater filiis, caput suis membris, magister suis discipulis, dux suis militibus commendatur." J.-P. COURCELLE, *Iconographie de Saint Augustin*, plate XXXV; ASCSA, *HA*, 121.

[12] "...quatenus inibi tanquam membra suo capiti, filii patri, magistro discipuli, duci milites, coherentes Deo et ipsi Sancto, auctoritate fulti apostolica, precordialius iubiletis, ubi et Praeceptoris vestri, Patris, Ducis, et Capitis Augustini noveritis reliquias fore sepultas." John XXII, *Veneranda sanctorum*, 20 January 1327, in R. Maiocchi and N. Casacca, eds., *Codex Diplomaticus Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini Papiae*, vol. 1 (Pavia, 1905), 14-15.

one author/artist, this was the true and genuine history of Augustine and his hermits.[13]

In the *Historia Augustini*, we find a representation of Augustine that is in keeping with what I have elsewhere referred to as the "Myth of Augustine".[14] Moreover, the emplotment of the *Historia Augustini* was in the mid-fifteenth century a timely one. Controversy over possession of Augustine between the Hermits and the Augustinian Canons had been raging off and on since John XXII's proclamation in favor of the Hermits in 1327. It was heating up once again, beginning in 1474. At issue was how Augustine should be portrayed on the new cathedral being built in Milan, namely, as a Hermit or as a Canon. Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, interceded and chose the Hermits, which fueled the debate over whether Augustine had first founded his Order of Hermits or his Order of Canons. Both sides produced a new wave of polemical works arguing their case.[15] In 1481,

[13] The *Historia Augustini* bears a very close relationship to another text edited by the Courcelles, *Vita Sancti Augustini Imaginibus Adornata*, Études Augustiniennes (Paris, 1964). This text is extant in Boston Public Library, MS med. 77 (the Courcelles give the older signature: MS 1483), and JEANNE COURCELLE noted: "Au point de vue de l'iconographie augustinienne, c'est le document le plus complet de la vie de saint Augustin." *Ibid.*, 11. For a comparison of the *Vita* with the *Historia Augustini*, see my forthcoming study, *Augustinus Noster*.

[14] The "Myth of Augustine" is a term I have employed to refer to the re-creation of Augustine as the eremitical founder of the OESA. This process began after John XXII's *Veneranda sanctorum* of 1327. Members of the OESA, in the ensuing conflict with the Canons as to which order was the original *Ordo Sancti Augustini*, re-wrote Augustine's biography to prove that he had first founded his Order of Hermits, before having established his Order of Canons. We can see this development in the Anonymous Florentine's *Initium sive Processus Ordinis Heremitarum Sancti Augustini* dated 1330, in Nicolas of Alessandria's *Sermo de beato Augustino* of 1332, in Henry of Friemar's *Tractatus de origine et progressu Ordinis Fratrum Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* of 1334, and then in Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Collectanea Sancti Augustini* of 1343 and his *Liber Vitasfratrum* of 1358; see E.L. Saak, *High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform Between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524*, *SMRT* 89 (Leiden, 2002), 160-234; and *idem*, "The Creation of Augustinian Identity in the Later Middle Ages," *Augustiniana* 49 (1999), 109-164, 251-286. Klaus Schreiner has taken exception somewhat to my use of the term "myth", writing: "Zur Debatte stehen nicht Formen und Funktionen der Traditionsbildung. Es geht nicht um die Erfindung dessen, was Eric Leland Saak nicht gerade glücklich als 'augustinischen Mythos' (Augustinian myth), als einen von 'Mythenbildern' (mythmakers) ausgedachten 'Mythos der Ursprünge und Gründungen' (myth of origins and foundations) bezeichnet hat." Schreiner, "Ein Herz und eine Seele. Eine urchristliche Lebensform und ihre Institutionalisierung im augustinisch geprägten Mönchtum des hohen und späten Mittelalters," in *Regula Sancti Augustini. Normative Grundlage differenter Verbände im Mittelalter*, ed. Gert Melville and Anne Müller (Paring, 2002), 1-47; 2. See also Schreiner's booklet, *"Nimm, lies." Augustinus als Vorbild (exemplar) und Regel (regula) Klösterlicher Buch-und Lesekultur im späten Mittelalter* (Paring, 1998).

Ambrosius de Cora, Prior General of the Hermits, published his *Defensorium Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*, in which he argued forcefully for the Hermits' position. Ambrosius included as evidence a number of sermons of Augustine that proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that Augustine not only had founded his Order of Hermits first, but had also preferred his Hermits as the best form of religious life.[16] In response, the Augustinian Canon Eusebius Conradus wrote a rebuttal, published together with selected works of Augustine in Venice in 1484. Conradus argued that these sermons were not genuine, and therefore they could not support the cause of the Hermits.[17] The debate became heated enough that Pope Sixtus IV intervened and prohibited

[15] KASPAR ELM, "*Augustinus Canonicus-Augustinus Eremita*: A Quattrocento Cause Célèbre, in Timothy Verdon and John Henderson, eds., *Christianity and the Renaissance. Image and Religious Imagination in the Quattrocento* (New York, 1990), 83-107.

[16] "Quod autem epistolas negetis esse scriptas ad heremitas, aut illas esse Augustini, id negare non potestis extant enim non solum epistole, sed etiam sermones dignissimi ad heremitas ab Augustino ecclesie doctore sine dubio editi ...Tertia veritas est quod fratres ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini soli vere sunt fratres sancti Augustini non obstante quod multi alii imitentur regulam suam, et quod ordo iste precessit omnes alios ordines preter ordinem sancti Basilii." Ambrosius de Cora, *Defensorium Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* (Rome, 1481 [without foliation or pagination]).

[17] Eusebius Conradus, *Annotatio brevissime in errorem scribentium sanctum Augustinum fuisse heremita*, in Augustinus, *Opuscula* (Venice, 1484). The edition is without pagination or foliation. It is also available online at: http://inkunabeln.ub.uni-koeln.de/vdibProduction/ on the website of the Verteilte Digitale Inkunabelbibliothek, a joint project of the University and City Library of Cologne and the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel. The online version is paginated and it is to the pagination of the digitalized version that I refer. Here one finds Conradus's work on pages 545B-551A. Conradus writes: "Premonstrabo igitur prima cornua ista que sunt conclusiones septem [semptem *cod.*] christiane veritati contrarie quas frater Paulus Bergomensis ordinis heremitarum in suo libello descripsit quasque frater Ambrosius eiusdem ordinis generalis in septem reduxit in scriptis et illas imitatur et predicat quas ego etiam veritates septem appellabo per antiphrasin propterea quod in illis nihil veritatis comperi potest." *Ibid.*, p. 546B; "Quod ille scripture que sunt sermones ad heremitas et epistola Sigisberti et si que alie sint que dicunt Augustinum fecisse duas regulas eo tempore et eo loco et eo anno domini dictis supra. Ille scripture sunt false et ideo nec in ceteris que dicuntur fides danda est sed ut mendacia sunt respuenda." *Ibid.*, p. 548A; "Sequitur ex dictis alia conclusio falsa qua introducitur Augustinus in sermonibus ad heremitas falso illi attributis." *Ibid.*, p. 548B; "Septima veritas est: Sermones qui intitulantur sancti Augustini ad heremitas vere sunt compositi a beato Augustino. Contra: ista conclusio est falsa contra doctrinam catholicam." *Ibid.*, p. 550A. Conradus's arguments were not based on a sophisticated knowledge of Augustine, nor on a detailed examination of the *Sermones* themselves. Indeed, his own erudition regarding Augustine's works is questioned when he followed his response to Ambrosius with the pseudo-Augustinian, *De spiritu et anima*, presented as an authentic work of Augustine; *ibid.*, p. 551B-571B.

all further discussion of the matter.[18] The papal pronouncement, however, did little to quell the furies, and in 1505, the humanist Jacob Wimpfeling argued that Augustine had lived neither as a Hermit nor as a Canon, but was a secular priest and bishop.[19] Though Wimpfeling's position was the most common image of Augustine in the later Middle Ages, namely, the image of Augustine as bishop and father of the church, the bitter feud between the Hermits and the Canons had become a "late medieval *cause célèbre*."[20]

Yet even before the appearance of the *Sermones*, there were three texts in which we first find the re-creation of Augustine as the founder of the Hermits: the Anonymous Florentine's *Initium sive Processus Ordinis Heremitarum Sancti Augustini*, Nicolas of Alessandria's *Sermo de beato Augustino*, and Henry of Friemar's *Tractatus de origine et progressu Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*.[21] The first of these was written c. 1330. Nicolas gave his sermon in Paris in 1332, and it is clear that he knew the *Initium*. Henry composed his *Tractatus* in 1334, and it is most likely that he had a copy of Nicolas' sermon on his desk. Moreover, we find more and more embellishment from the *Initium* to Nicolas, and from Nicolas to Henry, yet they all agreed that Augustine had first founded his Order in Italy.[22] There is

[18] ELM, "*Augustinus Canonicus-Augustinus Eremita*," 86.

[19] JACOBUS WIMPFELING, *De integritate* (Strassburg, 1505), c. 31. On 31 July 1505, Thomas Wolf wrote to Wimpfeling offering his undying support for his position that Augustine had never been a monk in the face of the harsh critique Wimpfeling's *De integritate* received: "Mirari satis non possum, Wympfelinge amicissime, quorundam monachorum audaciam, qui te veluti hereticum criminari contendunt, quod in tuo De integritate libello quaedam in medium adducis, quibus conicere suspicarique licet divum Augustinum nec cuculla indutum nec professione fuisse monachum." Thomas Wolf to Jacobus Wimpfeling, *Jacobi Wimfelingi Opera Selecta* III/1: *Epistolae*/Jakob Wimpfeling, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 1, n. 185, ed. Otto Herding and Dieter Mertens (Munich, 1990), 495-496.

[20] ELM, "*Augustinus Canonicus-Augustinus Eremita*."

[21] ANONYMUS FLORENTINUS, *Initium sive Processus Ordinis Heremitarum Sancti Augustini*, ed. Balbino Rano, in "Los dos Primeras Obra Conocidas," 331-351; NICOLAS DE ALESSANDRIA, *Sermo de beato Augustino*, ed. Balbino Rano, in "Los dos Primeras Obra Conocidas," 352-376; HENRICUS DE FRIEMARIA, *Tractatus de origine et progressu Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*, ed. Rudolph Arbesmann, *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 90-145. One should also mention in this context the anonymous *Vita Aurelii Augustini* contained in Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, MS Plut. 90 sup. 48, the same manuscript that contains the *Initium* and Nicolas's *Sermo*. Rano dates the text to between 1322 and 1331, though an earlier date within this period seems more likely. While there are eremitical interpolations, there is nothing in this text to indicate that it played any part in defending the Hermits against the Canons, and there is evidence that speaks against it doing so. See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 189-194.

[22] SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 209-218; see also *idem*, "The Creation of Augustinian Identity in the Later Middle Ages," *Augustiniana* 49 (1999), 109-164, 251-286.

no evidence, prior to these texts, that the legends they relate were already in existence. Henry's account is the most comprehensive, even though both Nicolas and the Anonymous Florentine are more original in re-creating Augustine's foundation of the OESA. Sometime after Henry's treatise, however, a new source was discovered that offered conclusive proof of the Hermits' case against the Canons: the words of Augustine himself, as contained in his sermons to his hermits. Herein we find an emplotment of Augustine's life that countered the accounts of the Anonymous Florentine, Nicolas, and Henry, and that found artistic expression in the *Historia Augustini*.[23] Though the versions of Henry and his confreres remained, the contradicting account found in the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* became the point of contention. Either way, in the later Middle Ages, Augustine was a newly created saint, Augustine was a myth. And consequently, so too were the origins of the OESA.

The *Sermones ad fratres in heremo*, as a collection, were themselves a creation of the early fourteenth century.[24] Yet before turning to the question of the origins of these sermons, which had such an influence on the religious life of the later Middle Ages, we first need to re-examine the historical evidence for the origins of the OESA, for only then will we have a foundation upon which to judge the myth-making that occurred in the aftermath of 1327; or in other words, before turning to the myth, what was the history?

II. The Origins of the OESA

In 1956, it was clear: the OESA had been established by the Great Union, evidenced by Pope Alexander IV's bull *Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae*.[25] Yet in several studies spanning the decades of the 1970s to the 1990s, Balbino Rano shed much new light on the origins of the

[23] The emplotment of the *Historia Augustini* follows that of JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG's *Vita Sancti Augustini*, which was based upon the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. For an edition of Jordan's *Vita*, see SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 774-810. The Boston manuscript of the *Vita Sancti Augustini Imaginibus Adornata* included texts explicating the scene portrayed. The author based his text primarily on the *Confessions*, Possidius's *Vita Sancti Augustini*, JORDAN's *Vita*, and the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. I will be detailing these relationships in my forthcoming study, *Augustinus Noster*.

[24] See below.

[25] See *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), the commemorative volume of the 700th anniversary of the Great Union, which still contains foundational articles for all research on the Augustinian tradition in the later Middle Ages.

OESA and its early traditions.[26] One of the results of his work was that the origins of the OESA should be seen as having been established in 1244: "The Order," Rano asserted, "came into being in March 1244 through the uniting of several hermit groups, as decreed by two bulls of Innocent IV, *Incumbit nobis* and *Praesentium nobis*, both issued on the same day, December 16, 1243."[27] As a result of Rano's work, an increasingly common school of opinion in the Order today sees its foundation as beginning with the "Little Union", the union of the Tuscan Hermits in 1244. In that context, the Great Union, then, is considered to have been a continuation of the unification of the Augustinian Hermits, and though it represents new departures, it stands in the tradition of the ongoing development of the OESA that had been begun in 1244.[28] In effect, the significance of *Licet ecclesiae catholicae* has been relegated to being of secondary importance.[29]

Does such a presentation, though, fit with the historical record? The late medieval Augustinians had to prove their historicity not only with respect to the conflict with the Canons, but also in light of the prohibition of new orders issued at the Third Lateran Council of 1215, which was repeated in 1274 at the Second Council of Lyon. The newly created OESA had to assert that their origins could be dated before the prohibition, and thus they endeavored to show that the Order could be traced all the way back to Augustine himself. Though the importance of Innocent IV and the "Little Union" did not go unnoticed, and the

[26] Balbino Rano, O.S.A., *The Order of Saint Augustine*; *idem*, "Los dos Primeras Obras Conocidas sobre el Origen de la Orden Augustiniana," *Analecta Augustiniana* 45 (1982): 331-376; *idem*, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden. Regla, Monasterio de Tagaste y Sermones ad fratres in eremo," in *San Agustin en el XVI Centenario de su Conversion 386/87-1987, La Ciudad de Dios, Revista Agustiniana CC* (El Escorial, 1987), 649-727; *idem*, "San Agustin y su Orden Algunos Sermones de Agustinos del Primer Siglo (1244-1344), *Analecta Augustiniana* 53 (1990), 7-93; *Augustinian Origins, Charisma, and Spirituality* (Villanova, 1995).

[27] Balbino Rano, *The Order of St. Augustine*, 2. The date of March 1244 refers to the first General Chapter of the new Order. For the early history of the OESA, see also David Gutiérrez, *The Augustinians in the Middle Ages, 1256-1356* (Villanova, 1984), and most of all, Mario Mattei, "Pre-Istoria Agostiniana," in *Omnia religione moventur. Culti, carismi ed istituzioni ecclesiastiche. Studi in Onore di Cosimo Damiano Fonseca*, ed. Pierantonio Piatti and Raffaela Tortorelli (Congedo, 2006), 103-128. Mattei's work is most thorough, yet the early history of the Order, that is the history of the various groups that came to comprise the OESA, is still very much in need of investigation.

[28] See, for example, the history of the Order as presented on OSANET: http://www.osanet.org/whoweare/en/default.asp?page=history&language=en&section=who.

[29] *Cf.* Alberic de Meijer and Ralph Kuiters, "*Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae*," *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 9-36.

fourteenth-century Augustinian friar, Jordan of Quedlinburg, argued that Alexander IV had completed the union of Augustine's dispersed heirs that had been begun by his predecessor, Pope Innocent,[30] in the created "Myth of Augustine" the fourteenth-century Augustinians portrayed Augustine himself as having effected the Great Union.[31] Yet for modern scholars, there is no such need to prove the antiquity of the Order, and the re-dating of the Order's foundation from 1256 to 1244 is simply a matter of the historical record. The question that must be asked, therefore, is to what extent does the "Little Union" of 1244 indeed represent the foundation of the OESA? To answer this question, we must return to the historical evidence.

Though the late medieval members of the OESA viewed themselves as standing in a continuous line of succession from Augustine's first monastic foundation,[32] there is little evidence indeed as to what happened to Augustine's monastic community after its dispersion resulting from the raids of the Vandals. The earliest reference we have is the bull of Gregory VIII, *Apostolica nobis licet*, dated December 1187, which granted privileges and indulgences to "the beloved sons, Prior, and brothers of the Order of St. Augustine in the hermitage (*in eremo*) of St. James of Aquaviva near Pisa."[33] In the early thirteenth

[30] "Unde beatus Augustinus, volens dispersionsem suae Religionis congregari, succedenti ei in Sede apostolica, scilicet domino Alexandro papae IV, in visione apparuit, grandis quidem capite, sed membris exilis. Ex qua visione velut divino oraculo papa comminitus unionem per praedecessorem suum dominum Innocentium inchoatam consummavit." JORDANUS DE QUEDLINBURG (de Saxonia), *Liber Vitas-fratrum* 1,14, ed. Winfridus Hümpfner and Rudolph Arbesmann, Cassiciacum 1 (New York, 1943), 47.80-85 (hereafter cited as *VF*). Here we find not only Jordan's recognition of Innocent's role in the creation of the OESA, but also the most developed version of the "myth of Augustine", or at least a central aspect thereof; for the "myth of Augustine," see note 7 above.

[31] See E.L. SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 160-234; 279-284; see also note 14 above and note 54 below.

[32] Though the late medieval Augustinians created a history for Augustine's own monasticism, there is no question that Augustine himself lived a monastic life; see ADOLAR ZUMKELLER, *Das Mönchtum des heiligen Augustinus*, Cassiciacum XI (Würzburg, 1968).

[33] "Dilectis filiis Priori (et fratribus) Ordinis (S.) Augustirti in eremo Sancti (Jacobi) Aquaviva prope Liburnam Pi(sa... nae) D(iocesis) deg(entibus), Salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. (In) Apost(olicae Sedis administratione) Nobis, licet imbecillibus (viribus) collat(a) (decet), ut honestis pet(entium) deside(riis) (cum solita benignitate provideamus). Exhibita siquidem Nobis (iusta) vest(ra) peti(ti)o, dilectissimi (Prior et fratres), in qua... [sequitur pars particularis, quae coniecturis restauranda non est]... (vobis) indul(gentiam unius anni) et quadraginta dierum annuatim (in ann)i(versario dedicationis ecclesiae vestrae) S. Jacobi (indulgemus), (item facultatem) Christi fidelium confessiones audiendi, prae(terea) (in) coemeteria (fideles) sepeliendi quotquot in caemeteriis atque ecclesiis... sepulturam. Nos vestr(is) (pre)cibus inclinati... dictam ecclesiam. Datum Pisis..." BENIGNUS VAN LUIJK, OSA, ed., *Bullarium*

century we find the papacy taking heremitical groups in Italy under its protection, though without designating them as the Order of St. Augustine or even as following Augustine's Rule.[34] A variant of the official

Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini. Periodus formationis, 1187-1256 (Würzburg, 1964), n. 1; online at: http://www.tiscali.it/ghirardacci/bullarium/bullarium.htm. This is the monastery that Nicolas of Alessandria and Henry of Freimar claimed St. Francis "joined" before founding his own order; see SAAK, *High Way*, 214-215. There were, certainly, groups living according to Augustine's Rule previous to 1187. The Augustinian Canons followed Augustine's Rule, as did later the Dominicans. The question here is not the earliest evidence we have for the influence of Augustine's Rule, but rather the origins of an Order of Augustine. The historicity of the Rule itself is not without its problems. Though Luc Verheijen's exhaustive work on the textual traditions of the Rule most persuasively, if not conclusively, proves the authenticity of the Rule, modern scholars have not always taken note; see LUC VERHEIJEN, *La Règle de saint Augustin*. Vol. 1: *Tradition manuscrite*, vol. 2: *Recherches historiques* (Paris, 1967); and idem, *Nouvelle Approche de la Règle de saint Augustin* (Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1980).; see also GEORGE LAWLESS, *Augustine and his Monastic Rule* (Oxford, 1987). In a standard survey of medieval intellectual history, Marcia Colish could still claim that Augustine's Rule was originally a letter to nuns; see M. COLISH, *Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition, 400-1499* (New Haven, 1997), 52. Augustine's own monastic life has only rarely entered into portrayals and interpretations of Augustine, or medieval Augustinian monasticism for that matter. The best treatment of Augustine's own monastic life is still ZUMKELLER's, *Das Mönchtum des heiligen Augustinus*. Yet a century ago, Ernst Troeltsch argued that Augustine's own monastic life was the first expression of a "Christian cultural ethic." See TROELTSCH, *Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter. Im Anschluss an die Schrift "De Civitate Dei,"* (Berlin, 1915); and SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 6-7.

[34] We see this, for example, in the bull, *Iustis petentium*, of Innocent III, dated 18 October 1205: "Dilectis filiis fratri L. eremitae et fratribus eius de radice Montis Nevoniensis, Salutem etc. Iustis petentium desideriis dignum est Nos facilem praebere assensum, et vota, quae a rationis tramite non discordant effectu prosequente complere. Quapropter dilecti in Domino filii devotionem, quam erga B. Petrum et Nos ipsos habere noscimini, attendentes personas vestras cum omnibus bonis tam ecclesiasticis quam mundanis, quae in praesenti rationabiliter possidetis aut in futurum iustis modis, praestante Domino, poteritis adipisci, sub B. Petri et nostra, felicis recordationis Innocentii Papae praedecessoris nostri vestigiis inhaerentes, protectione suscipimus. Specialiter autem possessiones, quas nobilis mulier Italia et filii eius eidem eremo in eleemosynam concesserunt aut eas iuste et pacifice possidetis, vobis et per vos domui vestrae auctoritate Apostolica confirmamus et praesentis scripti patrocinio communimus. Nulli ergo omnino etc. Datum Laterani VIII Kalendas Aprilis, Pontificatus nostri anno septimo." VAN LUIJK, *Bullarium*, n. 2. This bull was reissued by Honorius III on 18 October 1217, addressed "Dilectis filiis Oberto priori et fratribus Eremi de Morimundo, Salutem etc." *Ibid.*, n. 8. Similar privileges and protection were extended to the Hermits of Brettino, which became part of the Great Union establishing the OESA in 1256, though again without mention of AUGUSTINE: "Dilectis filiis Priori et Fratribus Ecclesiae Eremi de Brictinis, Salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. Sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia devotos et humiles filios ex assuetae pietatis officio propensius diligere consuevit, et ne pravorum hominum molestiis agitentur, eos tanquam pia mater suae protectionis munimine confovere. Ea propter, dilecti in Domino filii, vestris iustis postulationibus grato concurrentes assensu, personas vestras et locum, in quo divino estis obsequio mancipati, cum omnibus bonis, quae in

title of the Order, given by Pope Alexander IV in the Great Union of 1256, is found already in 1228 in the bull of Gregory IX, *Conquesti sunt*, addressed to the Archdeacon of Aretino concerning the rights and privileges of "the prior and brothers of the hermits of Rosia, of the Order of St. Augustine."[35] In December of the same year, Gregory IX granted the request of a group of hermits in the diocesis of Brettino to live according to the Rule of St. Augustine, absolving them from the observance of their previous order. What is significant here is that Gregory acknowledges that these hermits founded a "new Order", based on the Rule of Augustine.[36] Seven years later, on 13

praesentiarum rationabiliter possidetis aut in futurum honestis modis (dante Domino) poterit adipisci, sub Beati Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus. Specialiter autem ecclesiam S. Blasii de Brictinis cum pertinentiis suis, possessiones et alia bona vestra sicut ea omnia iuste ac pacifice possidetis, vobis et per vos eidem ecclesiae vestrae auctoritate apostolica confirmamus et praesentis scripti patrocinio communimus. Nulli ergo omnino hominum liceat hanc paginam nostrae protectionis et confirmationis infringere vel ei ausu temerario contraire. Si quis autem hoc attentare praesumpserit indignationem Omnipotentis Dei et Beatorum Petri et Pauli Apostolorum eius se noverit incursurum. Datum Laterani VI Kalendas Decembris, Pontificatus nostri anno primo." Gregory IX, *Sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia*, dated 26 November 1217. *Ibid.*, n. 11.

[35] "Dilecto filio archidiacono Aretino, Salutem etc. Conquesti sunt Nobis prior et fratres heremitarum de Rosia, Ordinis S. Augustini, quod de Radicundula, de Radi de Montanea, de Mantiano et de Sancto Quirico de Toni universitates hominum. Rusticucius de Rosia, Mercatante et Brachius, filii quondam Baldizoni de Monte Chiani, fratres laici Volterranae et Senensis dioecesum super terris, domibus, vineis, oliveriis, possessionibus et rebus aliis iniuriantur eisdem. Ideoque discretioni tuae per apostolica scripta mandamus, quatenus, patribus convocatis, audias causam et, appellatione remota, debito fine decidas, faciens quod decreveris per censuram ecclesiasticam firmiter observare, proviso ne in universitates praedictas excommunicationis vel interdicti sententias proferas, nisi a Nobis super hoc mandatum receperis specialem. Testes autem qui fuerint nominati, si de gratia, odio vel amore subtraxerint, censura simili appellatione cessante compellas verum testimonium perhibere. Datum apud Urbem Veterem Nonis Martii, Pontificatus nostri anno primo." GREGORY IX, *Conquesti sunt*, dated 7 March 1228. *Ibid.*, n. 14.

[36] "Dilectis filiis Fratribus Eremi de Brisctinis Fanensis Dioecesis et aliis Fratribus Eremo ipsi subiectis, Salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. Cum olim, sicut intellexeimus, motu proprio quendam novum Ordinem inveneritis et ad ipsius observantiam vos duxeritis astringendos, quia tandem illo relicto, cum non esset de Ordinibus approbatis, Beati Augustini regulam recepistis eamque cupitis in perpetuum irrefrangabiliter observare, Nos vestris supplicationibus inclinati vos ab observantia praedicti Ordinis absolventes, a vobis perpetuis temporibus inviolabiliter observari concedimus regulam memoratam. Nulli ergo etc. Datum Perusii VI Idus Decembris, Pontificatus nostri anno secundo." GREGORY IX, *Cum olim sicut intelleximus*, dated 8 December 1228. *Ibid.*, n. 15. The previous Rule that had been followed was most likely the Rule of St. Benedict. On 28 March 1244, Innocent IV released the Tuscan Hermits from obedience to the Rule of St. Benedict, placing them under the Rule of St. Augustine: "Dilectis filiis Prior et fratribus heremitis in Tuscia Ordinis S. Augustini, Salutem etc. Cum a Nobis petitur, quod iustum est et honestum, tam vigor acquitatis, quam ordo

March 1235, Innocent issued his bull *Quae omnium conditoris*, confirming the constitutions of the new order.[37] On 24 September 1243, Innocent further granted the Hermits of Brettino the rights to hear confessions and preach, and stipulated that within three months of the death of their prior general, a new prior general must be elected. Innocent referred to their Order as a *pia religio*, and recognized the offices of visitators, definitors, prior generals, and the existence of General Chapters, or in other words, much the same structure that soon was to be had by the OESA.[38] Rano claimed that Innocent had granted such

exigit rationis, ut id per sollicitudinem officii nostri ad debitum perducatur effectum. Exhibita siquidem Nobis vestra petitio continebat, quod cum Regulam B. Augustini vobis concedendam duxerimus, ut a vobis et successoribus vestris perpetuis futuris temporibus observetur, ac per dilectum filium nostrum Richardum S. Angeli Diaconum Cardinalem a promissione, quam de observando Ordine S. Benedicti vel quocumque alio feceratis de speciali mandato nostro sitis penitus absoluti, Nos absoltitionem ipsam ratam et gratam habentes, illam auctoritate Apostolica confirmamus et praesentis scripti patrocinio communimus. Nulli ergo omnino etc. Datum Laterani V. Kal. Aprilis Pont. nostri anno primo." Innocent IV, *Cum a nobis*, dated 28 March 1244. *Ibid.*, n. 36.

[37] "Dilectis filiis Priori et Fratribus Eremi de Brictinis Fanensis Dioecesis, Salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. 1. Quae omnium Conditoris honorem et profectum continent animarum amore praecipuo diligentes, eo quod quidquid in desiderio praeter illa geritur apud Dei sapientiam pro nihilo reputetur, dignum fore providimus, ut in iis, quae intuitu salutis aeternae cupitis, Nos favorabiles ad Redemptoris gloriam habeatis. 2. Sane praesentata Nobis vestra petitio continebat, quod vos vitia carnis cupientes extinguere, ut succedente virtutum gratia possitis perennis vitae bravium obtinere, deliberatione provida statuistis, ut semper in communi refectorio comedentes, a festo Exaltationis Sanctae Crucis usque ad festum Resurrectionis Dominicae, praeterquam in diebus Dominicis (exceptis positis minutis in necessitate fratribus) ieiunetis; bis in die reliquo tempore comesturi, praeterquam in quarta et sexta feria ac temporibus aliis ab Ecclesia constitutis, nisi prior, qui pro tempore fuerit, aliter cum fratribus duxerit dispensandum. 3. Debiles quoque ac iter agentes ad observantiam dicti ieiunii minime teneantur, praeterquam in sexta feria Quadragesimae S. Martini et temporibus aliis per Ecclesiam constitutis. 4. Insuper fratres, quorum unusquisque cultellum habeat non acutum, ab esu carnium et condimento sanguinis [*melius* sagiminis], praeter infirmos, penitus abstinebunt. 5. Caseum et ova tribus diebus in hebdomada comesturi, exceptis Quadragesima Sancti Martini ac Septuagesima et solemnibus ieiuniis per Ecclesiam constitutis, in quibus nec iter agentes caseum et ova comedant, licet illis vescendi singulis aliis temporibus liberam habeant facultatem. 6. Statuistis praeterea ut a vobis annis singulis celebretur Capitulum generale, in quo diffinitores a Priore et visitatoribus eligantur. Ipsi vero diffinitores cum visitatoribus anni praeteriti, corrigendi et reformandi tam in capite quam in membris, quae correctionis et reformationis officio noverint indigere, liberam habeant potestatem. 7. Item quod visitatores etiam ordinentur, qui omnia loca fratrum visitent, corrigant et reforment, prout secundum Deum et Beati Augustini Regulam, secundum quam statuistis Domino in perpetuum famulari, viderint expedire. 8. Ceterum humiliter attendentes quod Regnum Dei non in pretiosa veste consistit et quod induit paupertatis habitum Conditor singulorum, laudabiliter statuistis, ut fratres vestri Ordinis de colore seu valore vestium minime contendentes semper in eis vilitatem observent, et quattuor tuni-

privileges to the unified Tuscan Hermits in his bull *Vota devotorum* of 23 March 1244, thus establishing the sequence: first the foundation charter, then the first General Chapter, and then the granting of the privileges to preach and hear confessions.[39] Yet the text of *Vota devotorum* is the same text as that of Innocent's bull of the same title issued 24 September 1243 with the only exception being that the later bull is addressed "To the beloved sons, Prior, and brother hermits in Tuscany of the Order of St. Augustine,"[40] whereas the former is addressed "To the beloved Prior and brothers of Brettino."[41] Moreover, just two and one half months before the supposed "foundation charter" of the OESA, Innocent issued a charter of privileges to the Hermits of Brettino, establishing their right to follow the Rule of St. Augustine and exempting them from lay or ecclesiastical interference.[42]

cis, una cuculla et duobus scapulariis sint contenti; item quilibet frater cingatur desuper ampla corrigia non consuta et illa contentus existat; item quod non utantur lineis indumentis, nec extra eremum possessiones, praeter hortum et silvam, habere praesumant. Super habendis caligiis, calceis et similibus prior secundum suum arbitrium potestatem habeat disponendi. 9. Item quod nullus in mensa fratrum recipiatur, nisi religiosus extiterit vel constitutus in aliqua praelatura. Quare Nobis humiliter supplicastis, ut statutum huiusmodi apostolico dignaremur munimine roborare. 10. Nos igitur vestris iustis precibus inclinati statutum ipsum auctoritate Apostolica confirmamus et praesentis scripti patrocinio communimus, iure dioecesanorum episcoporum in omnibus semper salvo. 11. Nulli ergo etc." Datum Perusii III Idus Martii, Pontificatus nostri anno octavo." *Ibid.*, n. 19.

[38] "Dilectis priori et fratribus de Brictinis, Fanensis dioecesis. 1. Vota devotorum Ecclesiae, quae fructum salutis aeternae continere perspicimus, quo potiora sunt omnibus, libenter ad effectus deduci gratiam procuramus. Hinc est quod Nos vestris piis desideriis annuentes ut de licentia et assensu diocoesanorum ac rectorum parochialium ecclesiarum fratres sacerdotes Ordinis vestri recurrentium ad ipsos confessiones audire ac eis paenitentiam intingere salutarem necnon ut illi ex eisdem, quibus virtutum Dominus contulit scientiam praedicationis et gratiam, possint populis proponere verbum Dei vobis auctoritate praesentium concedimus facultatem. 2. Caeterum, quia per Nos providi cupitis quod vestra pia Religio digna spiritualibus proficere incrementis sibi pro tempore oportune commodum provisionis acceleret et diutina dispendia vacationis ignoret, statuimus, ut obeunte te, fili prior, vel tuorum quolibet successorum, visitatores qui a Priore ac diffinitoribus vestri Ordinis annuatim in generali capitulo statuuntur, convocatis universis et singulis prioribus locorum ad heremum vestram spectantium, ab eis per electionem canonicam et concordem de priore faciant providi, ita ut ultra tres menses heremus ipsa priore non vacet. Ad quod si forte iustum impedimentum in causa non fuit, dicti priores et fratres ab eisdem visitatoribus per censuram ecclesiasticam, appellatione postposita, compellantur. Nulli ergo etc. Datum Anagniae VIII Kalendas Octobris, Pontificatus nostri anno primo." *Ibid.* n. 27.

[39] RANO, *The Order*, 3.

[40] "Dilectis filiis Priori et fratribus eremitis in Tuscia Ordinis S. Augustini, Salutem etc," VAN LUIJK, *Bullarium*, n. 34.

[41] See note 38 above.

[42] See VAN LUIJK, *Bullarium*, n. 28.

So what are we to make of all this? If the foundation charter of the OESA was Innocent IV's bull *Incumbit nobis* of 16 December 1243, there has to be some legitimation, some evidence that *Incumbit nobis* was different from previous bulls. Why would not *Cum olim intelleximus* of Gregory IX (December 1228) recognizing the Hermits of Brettino as a "new order" following the Rule of St. Augustine serve just as well, especially in light of the later constitutions and privileges? Rano dates the foundation of the OESA to 1244 based on *Incumbit nobis* as the Order's foundation charter, but *Incumbit nobis* does not go as far as does *Licet ecclesiae*. True, it united the Tuscan Hermits, with the exception of the Williamites, and that is not without significance.[43] *Incumbit nobis* also placed the Tuscan Hermits under the protection and guidance of Cardinal Richard Annibaldi, and Annibaldi has been seen as the major force behind of Great Union of 1256.[44] The question, though, is whether such a move represents the foundation of a new order such as the OESA. Though the united Tuscan Hermits had houses outside of Italy "in places beyond the Alps,"[45] it was only after the Great Union of 1256 that the OESA became a truly international Order with a centralized administration governing all houses of Augustinian hermits. *Incumbit nobis* was not as comprehensive as was *Licet ecclesiae*, but then why not go back to *Cum olim intelleximus*? The influence of Cardinal Annibaldi is certainly a factor to consider, but is it sufficient to claim that therefore the origins of the Great Union are to be found with his protectorate of the Tuscan Hermits? Rano argued that the term *Ordo St. Augustini* was originally virtually synonymous with *Regula St. Augustini*, distinguishing those followers as the *ordo canonicus* from the *ordo monasticus*, as were the Benedictines, and it is not without significance in this light that several papal bulls specifically relieve the addressed eremitical groups from adherence to the Rule of St. Benedict to follow the Rule of St. Augustine. Yet *Incumbit nobis* is addressed: "To all the hermit sons constituted in Tuscany, with the exception of the Williamites,"[46] whereas

[43] For the Williamites, see KASPAR ELM, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Wilhelmitenordens* (Cologne, 1962).

[44] See SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 44-48. See also FRANCIS ROTH, O.S.A., "Cardinal Richard Annibaldi. First Protector of the Augustinian Order (1243-1276)," *Augustiniana* 2 (1952), 26-60, 108-149, 230-247; 3 (1953), 21-34, 283-313; 4 (1954), 5-24.

[45] See INNOCENT IV's bull *Religiosam vitam eligentibus* of 31 May 1253: "Dilectis filiis Priori et fratribus eremitis in ultramontanis partibus constitutis, tam praesentibus quam futuris, regularem vitam professis, in perpetuum." VAN LUIK, *Bullarium*, n. 104.

[46] "Dilectis filiis universis Eremitis, exceptis Fratribus S. Guilelmi, per Tusciam constitutis, Salutem etc." INNOCENT IV, *Incumbit nobis*, 16 December 1234. *Bullarium*, n. 32.

Licet ecclesiae is explicit that it is forming all hermits therein mentioned into "one profession and regular observance of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine."[47] The title itself is a new departure: in previous bulls, the various groups of Italian hermits were designated as the "hermits of brother John the Good, of the Order of St. Augustine," or as the "hermits of Brettino, of the Order of St. Augustine," or as "the brother hermits of Rosia, of the Order of St. Augustine." *Incumbit nobis* states that all the hermits in Tuscany should assume "the one Rule and order of St. Augustine,"[48] yet does not establish a new Order or title.[49] The first reference we have to the *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti*

[47] "Propterea dudum a Nobis mandatum Apostolicum emanavit ut de singulis domibus vestris, quarum quaedam Sancti Guillelmi, quaedam Sancti Augustini Ordinum, nonnullae autem fratris Johannis Boni, aliquae vero de Fabali, aliae vero de Brictinis censebantur, et apud homines ambiguis interdum nuncupationibus vaccillabant, duo fratres cum pleno mandato ad nostram mitterentur praesentiam, quod nostra circa vos salubriter ordinaret dispositio recepturi. Cumque fratres huiusmodi ad Sedem Apostolicam accessissent coram dilecto filio nostro Riccardo S. Angeli diacono cardinali, quem negotio unionis vestrae perficiendo deputavimus vice nostra, sufficientia ad id exhibuere mandata, et in Generali Capitulo vestro in Urbe celebriter congregato, nomine omnium a quibus fuerant destinati et de communi Capituli eiusdem assensu, vos et domos vestras in unam Ordinis observantiam et vivendi formulam uniformem redigi, unumque ex eis ovile fieri Generalis Prioris praesidentia gubernandum unanimiter consenserunt, petentes ut, per gratiam unionis et conformitatis huiusmodi, eis iuxta conceptum votum paupertatis spontanee perpetua possessionum terrestrium abdicatio remaneret et ipsis baculos vel ferulas deferendi imposita necessitas tolleretur, collata in cardinalem eundem providendi vobis ea vice de Generali Priori totius Ordinis nihilominus potestate. Porro idem cardinalis, nostri auctoritate mandati vivo ad eum sermone directi necnon et concordi eorundem fratrum ac praedicti Capituli consensione suffultus, universas domos et congregationes vestras in unam Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini professionem et regularem observantiam perpetuo counivit sub Generalis cura Prioris, canonice instituendi pro tempore prae aliis Provincialibus necnon et conventualibus singularum domorum prioribus, regulariter gubernandas, et, ut novam ovilis Dominici unionem universalis capitis unitas consummaret, te, dilecte fili frater Lanfrance, in Generalem Ordinis eiusdem Priorem et patrem, Spiritus Sancti gratia invocata, praefecit ac etiam, prout a Nobis specialiter in mandatis acceperat, confirmavit; vos universos et successores vestros a baculis vel ferulis deportandis et quod non cogamini ad recipiendas possessiones aliquas vel habendas, decernens perpetuo liberos et exemptos." ALEXANDER IV, *Licet ecclesiae* 3, 9 April 1256. *Ibid.*, n. 163.

[48] "Nos nolentes vos sine pastore sicut oves errantes post gregum vestigia evagari universitati vestrae per Apostolica scripta mandamus, quatenus in unum vos regulare propositum conformantes, Regulam Beati Augustini et Ordinem assumatis ac secundum eum profiteamini de caetero vos victuros; salvis observantiis seu constitutionibus faciendis a vobis, dummodo eiusdem Ordinis non obvient institutis." INNOCENT IV, *Incumbit nobis*, 16 December 1243. *Ibid.*, n. 32.

[49] That it was a union of various eremitical groups there is no question. The issue here is that the designation *Ordo Sancti Augustini* was a reference to the *ordo canonicus*, as RANO pointed out. As such it had been in use since at least 1187 (see above, n. 11), and was applied as well to the Hermits of John the Good and the Hermits of

Augustini is in the bull *Dilecti filii, priores et fratres* of Innocent IV, dated 3 August 1252.[50] Yet Innocent did not consistently use the title *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*, and most often used "the Order of St. Augustine" as a designation of a particular group of hermits.[51] Moreover, on 14 April 1253, Innocent wrote "to all priors and brothers of the Order of Hermits," concerning their profession and habit, giving the responsibility for insuring uniformity to the prior general, Lanfranc of Milan, who would soon become the first prior general of the OESA.[52] Lanfranc was a member of the Bonites (the Hermits of

Brettino. No new title is given the union in 1244, and it is only with *Licet Ecclesiae* that there is a new *ordo*, comprised of the unification of various eremitical groups, all of which were, at least previous to 1256, of the Order of St. Augustine. There is no evidence in the papal bulls previous to *Licet Ecclesiae* to claim that the unification of the Tuscan Hermits in 1244 was a "pre union, union"; the line could also be seen as running from the Bonites to *Licet Ecclesiae*. The privileges granted to the Tuscan Hermits in the bull *Religiosam vitam eligentibus* of Innocent IV, dated 26 April 1244 (*Bullarium*, n. 46) are virtually identical to those granted the Hermits of Brettino in *Quoties a nobis petitur* of 1 October 1243 (*Bullarium*, n. 28). The same privileges were granted to the Hermits of Brettino on 3 November 1245 (*Bullarium*, n. 55) and to the Bonites on 26 April 1246 (*Bullarium*, n. 56). There is no evidence to privilege the Tuscan Hermits as the group of Augustinian Hermits that led to the Great Union. Only a thorough study, however, of the pre *Licet Ecclesiae* history of Augustinian eremitical monasticism can shed definitive light on the question as to the origins of the OESA.

[50] "Venerabilibus fratribus universis Archiepiscopis et Episcopis praesentes litteras inspecturis, Salutem etc. Dilecti filii Priores et fratres Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini Nobis humiliter supplicarunt, ut eis construendi ecclesias et domos in terris, maneriis et possessionibus, quae sibi a Christi fidelibus conferuntur, ac audiendi et celebrandi divina officia in eisdem ecclesiis et recipiendi ecclesiastica sacramenta licentiam de benignitate solita largiremur; vobis igitur qui locorum dioecesani existitis in hac parte deferre volentes, universitati vestrae per Apostolica scripta mandamus, quatenus eis concedatis licentiam postulatam sine iuris praeiudicio alieni. Datum Perusii III Nonas Augusti, Pont. nostri anno decimo." *Ibid.*, n. 97. See also *ibid.*, n. 101.

[51] Thus, for example, the usual form of address can be seen in Innocent's bull *Quia ex apostolici cura* of 19 April 1244: "Dilectis filiis Priori et fratribus Eremitarum Ord. S. Aug. in Tuscia, Salutem etc." *Ibid.*, n. 43.

[52] INNOCENT IV, *Admonet Nos cura*, dated 14 April 1253. *Ibid.*, n. 102. The form of profession here established was essentially identical to the form of profession of the OESA: "Fratres etiam, qui de caetero in Ordine vestro debuerint profiteri, eidem Priori Generali vel certo eius nuntio profiteantur hoc modo: Ego N. facio professionem et promitto obedientiam Deo et B. Mariae Virgini et tibi Priori Generali Ordinis Eremitarum tuisque successoribus usque ad mortem secundum Regulam B. Augustini et Constitutiones Fratrum istius Ordinis." *Ibid.* Mattei argued that Alexander IV had wanted Philip of Parrana, the Prior General of the Tuscan Hermits to be the new Prior General of the OESA, but that Philip had declined, so that the choice came to Lanfranc. Mattei, "Pre-Istoria Agostiniana," 109-110. Mattei notes that this is known from a work written after 1322, and he cites Rano as his source. The text in question is the Anonymous Florentine's *Initium*; RANO, "Las dos primeras obras conocidas," 345. This is the only known text that reports Alexander's preference for Philip. The

John the Good), and here Innocent addressed the Bonites simply as the Order of Hermits. The first form of profession later used by the OESA was established for the Bonites. The Bonites, the Tuscan Hermits, and the Hermits of Brettino were still three very distinct orders, even if all three individually could be referred to as the Order of Hermits, or as the Hermits of the Order of St. Augustine, and even if Cardinal Annibaldi had a special relationship to the Tuscan Hermits. In all bulls previous to *Licet ecclesiae* the term *Ordo St. Augustini* seems indeed to refer to the "way of life" expressed in the Rule of St. Augustine, as Rano indicated. The primary designation is the designation of the group itself, the brothers of John the Good, the Hermits of Brettino, etc., which are then further designated as "of the Order of St. Augustine." And the same can be said of the "Little Union." With *Licet ecclesiae*, a new use comes to the fore: the Order of St. Augustine is no longer simply a designation for a particular group's way of life, but is the Order that is being established, one Order and one profession, of the Hermits of St. Augustine.[53] The possessives should not go

Anonymous Florentine states such in the midst of relating the first known account of Augustine appearing to Alexander in a vision, on account of which Alexander brought about the Great Union: "Insuper tempore Allesandri pape IIII erat prior predicti Ordinis frater Phylippus de Parrana, supernorum amator et lampas luminis virtutum. Cuius tempore predictus papa Alexander ab amore beati Augustini, ei in visione magnus capite et parvus membris apparens, primo anno sui pontificatus predictum Ordinem tam in personis quam in gratiis augmentavit, huic Ordini brictones, fabarios, iambonitas, atque guglielmitas iungendo, gratias numquam similes alicui religioni traditas [condonando], ut in suis privilegiis contenetur, predictum fratrem Phyllipum volens, ut antea erat, priorem dicti Ordinis preficere, qui obmissis huius rei gratia multis lacrimis fere recusare obtinuit. Et tunc fratrem Lanfrachum de Mediolano, virum prudentem, eis priorem instituit generalem, ut per se suosque, fideles a vitiis et a peccatis franchos faceret, quod plene usque in hodiernum diem faciunt ..." Anon. Flor. *Initium* (ed. Rano, 344-345). It is here too that we find the idea that the Williamites and the Hermits of Brettino were joined to the Tuscan Hermits, a position against which I am arguing here, and for which there is no evidence aside from the *Initium*. The Anonymous Florentine was most desirous to prove Augustine's connection to the Tuscan Hermits, for whom he wrote his Rule in Centumcellis and who formed the first foundation of the OESA. It would only be natural that the Prior General of the Tuscan Hermits would become the first Prior General of the OESA in this light. Especially since this account includes the first textual evidence of Augustine's appearing to Alexander in a vision as the catalyst for the Great Union, Alexander's desire for Philip of Parrano to be the first Prior General must be interpreted in the same vein. This is not a piece of historical evidence; it is mythography. There is more actual historical evidence of Alexander's close relationship to Lanfranc already before the Great Union than there is to any desire of Alexander's to have the new Order led by Philip.

[53] Alexander first used the title *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* in his bull *Hiis quae pro animarum* of 31 July 1255 (Van Luijk, *Bullarium*, n. 152), but thereafter returned to the former usage, such as in his bull *Pacis vestrae* of 13 August 1255: "Dilectis filiis... Priori Generali et universis prioribus atque fratribus Eremitarum Ord. B. Augustini." *Ibid.*, n. 154.

unnoted: the Hermits in question are no longer the Hermits of John the Good, or the Hermits of Rosia, or of Brettino; now, for the first time, they are the Hermits of St. Augustine, which form one Order. It is only with *Licet ecclesiae* that we have a social group designated as being "of Augustine", namely, the hermits of Augustine's Order. If one wants to look into the history preceding the Great Union for the origins of the Order, developments with respect to the Tuscan Hermits have no greater claim than do those regarding the Hermits of Brettino or the Hermits of John the Good. While it is certainly important to point to antecedent developments, of which *Incumbit nobis* is one among others, the OESA only came into being with *Licet ecclesiae*.

If the OESA should be seen as having been established by *Licet ecclesiae* and the Great Union of 1256, rather then the "Little Union" of 1244, we still must ask what difference does this make? On the one hand we can only answer that it makes no real difference at all. Whether modern scholars see the OESA as having been established in 1244 or in 1256 does not impinge upon the historical development of the Order thereafter, nor on the Order's contemporary identity. Members of the Order are still the "sons of Augustine". Yet on the other hand, getting the history "right" is not a secondary concern. In returning the Great Union to its historical significance, while not discounting the importance of the "Little Union", we can begin to realize anew that what happened in early April of 1256 was something new, a new departure, and a new creation. Such was recognized as well by the early fourteenth-century Augustinian "mythifiers", though they went one step beyond and sought to provide a connection between the foundation of the Order in 1256, and Augustine's original establishment of his Order of Hermits, in which tradition the members of the OESA in the fourteenth century still stood.[54] Central to the endeavor of "reclaiming" Augustine were the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*.

[54] The connection was made by claiming that Augustine was in effect responsible for the Great Union. In the *Initium*, the earliest text including such an account, we read: "... predictus papa Alexander ab amore beati Augustini, ei in visione magnus capite et parvus membris apparens, primo anno sui pontificatus predictum Ordinem tam in personis quam in gratiis augmentavit, huic Ordinis brictones, fabarios, imabonitas, atque guglielmitas iugendo, gratias numquam similes alicui religioni traditas [condonando] ..." *Initium* (ed. Rano, 345). This account would be repeated and embellished by NICHOLAS OF ALESSANDRIA in his *Sermo de beato Augustino* of 1332, by HENRY OF FRIEMAR in his *Tractatus de origine et progressu ordinis heremitarum sancti Augustini* of 1334, and by JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*; see SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 200-217, 280.

III. The *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*

The *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* are known today, when they are known at all, as present in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, which presents the text of the *Sermones* as published in 1685 by the Maurists.[55] The Maurists included a prefatory warning of the spurious nature of the sermons, which is reproduced in Migne.[56] Further, they mention that they based their edition on the autograph of the *Collectanea Sancti Augustini* of Jordan of Quedlinburg, with which they collated at least two other manuscripts.[57] Jordan's *Collectanea*, which he donated to the library of his Order's *studium* in Paris in 1343, has often been seen as the first collection of the *Sermones*. In Migne, the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* consist of seventy-six sermons. The extent to which the Maurists based their edition on Jordan, however, must be questioned when one takes note of the fact that in his *Collectanea* Jordan included only twenty-three *Sermones ad fratres suos in eremo*. Jordan included thirty-five texts under the general rubric *Sermones Sancti Augustini*.[58] In addition to the twenty-three labeled *Sermones ad fratres suos in heremo*, are six sermons designated as *ad presbyteros suos*, and six *ad populum*.[59] Included in the Maurist edition are two of the six *sermones Sancti Augustini ad presbyteros suos*, and four of the six *sermones Sancti Augustini ad populum*.[60] The Maurists followed the Froben edition of Augustine's sermons, done by Erasmus in 1528/29. The Amerbach edition of Augustine's sermons of 1495 was the first

[55] *PL* 40, 1233-1358.

[56] *PL* 40, 1234-5.

[57] *PL* 40, 1235. I am currently preparing a critical edition of Jordan's *Collectanea Sancti Augustini*, the autograph of which is extant in Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 251 (hereafter cited as Jor. *Coll.*). Paris, BnF MS lat. 5338 contains a fifteenth-century copy of the *Collectanea*; see SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 775-776. For a preliminary edition of JORDAN's *Vita Sancti Augustini*, see *ibid.*, 774-810.

[58] For the Tabula of Jordan's *Collectanea*, see SAAK, "The Creation of Augustinian Identity," 253-254.

[59] Two of the texts Jordan includes under the general rubric of *sermones ad presbyteros suos* are not sermons. The first is titled: *De tribus constitutionibus Augustini super proprietate clericorum*, and the second: *Quod tibi liceat habere proprium, ex libro de vita clericorum*; Jor. *Coll.*, fol. 39^{ra-b}.

[60] The sermons Jordan included as *sermones ad presbyteros* are numbers 5 and 38 in MIGNE; Jordan's *sermones ad populum* are numbers 43, 44, and 76 in MIGNE; The sermon *ad populum, De ieiunio et oratione* is listed in Migne's collection under *Sermones suppositicii*, PL 39,1886-7. In the Tabula of Jordan's autograph, only the first 23 *sermones ad fratres in eremo* are numbered. In the text itself, thereafter the numbering continues but not consecutively and not consistantly. This in itself indicates that Jordan was copying these sermons from another numbered collection, or collections.

edition to contain all seventy-six sermons.[61] Between 1343 and 1495, therefore, the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* not only grew from twenty-three sermons to seventy-six, but also incorporated sermons that Jordan had explicitly excluded from the collection, namely, Jordan's *sermones Augustini ad presbyteros suos* and *ad populum* became *sermones ad fratres in eremo*. Moreover, sermons number 27 and 28 of Jordan's collection, designated as sermons *ad presbyteros suos*, are included by the Maurists' in their collection, but these two sermons are in fact genuine sermons of Augustine, numbers 355 and 356, or as sermons 52 and 53 of Migne's collection of the *sermones ad fratres in eremo*. The problem we face, therefore, is not only the origin of these sermons, but also the development of the collection itself. Whereas in 1943, Rudolf Arbesmann noted a list of 23 extant manuscripts of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, though admitting this was incomplete,[62] in 2002 Kaspar Elm could identify 424 extant manuscripts, based on the Vienna project cataloging the manscripts of Augustine's works.[63] Moreover, as Elm notes, the Vienna project is only two-thirds complete, and does not take into account translations or early printed editions. Thus, Elm concludes, the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* had a greater impact than did even Augustine's Rule itself, extant according to Verheijen in 274 manuscripts.[64] In this light, what we are dealing with is not some quaint and curious oddity of a rather obscure religious order, but with a major text influencing the religious life as such of late medieval and Renaissance Europe.

Until quite recently it had been assumed that the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* were the work of a single forger. In 1943, in rejecting the perhaps natural assumption that either Jordan himself was the author of these sermons or another Augustinian Hermit had been to defend the OESA in the context of the debate with the Canons, Arbesmann argued: "For two thirds of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, comprising all those collected and used by Jordanus... we find

[61] KARL GERSBACH, O.S.A. is currently working on the printing tradition of the *sermones* and he informed me that the list of seventy-six sermons first appears in Amerbach's edition of Augustine's sermons of 1495, and that the Maurists followed the Froben edition of Erasmus, which included the *Sermones* as spurious.

[62] *VF*, XXV.

[63] KASPAR ELM, "*Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. Pseudoaugustinische Lebensregeln für Eremiten und Kanoniker," in *Regula Sancti Augustini. Normative Grundlage differenter Verbände im Mittelalter*, ed. Gert Melville and Anne Müller, Publikationen der Akademie der Augustiner-Chorherren von Windesheim 3 (Paring, 2002), 515-37; 534.

[64] *Ibid.*, 535. On Augustine's Rule, see LUC VERHEIJEN, *La Règle de saint Augustin*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967).

that the author is not an Augustinian Hermit but a Benedictine monk who lived long before the time when such a falsification would have served the suspected purpose. A special study of this question will soon appear."[65] Such a study, however, never did appear, unless Arbesmann was referring to the article of J-P. Bonnes, published in 1945/46, on the sermons of Geoffrey Babion, in which he argued that the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, based on textual parallels and borrowings, were no later than the twelfth century.[66] Nevertheless, the obscurity of the sermons' origins has simply continued, with varying dates proposed as definitive, ranging from the twelfth century to the fourteenth.

In the late 1980s, Balbino Rano and Katherine Walsh presented persuasive evidence for dating the origins of the sermons to the fourteenth century.[67] Walsh's argument was that had the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* been extant, they surely would have been used by the anonymous Florentine, Nicholas of Alessandria, and Henry of Friemar for their portrayals of the Order's Augustinian origins.[68] While an argument "from silence" can never be completely convincing, it is in this case rather persuasive when one takes into account that these authors were vigorously looking for ways to prove the Hermits' case against the Canons, and were certainly drawing upon and embellishing each others' work. Thus, it is first with the anonymous Florentine that we find an association between the original OESA and St. Francis; the assertion that Augustine had first founded his Order of Hermits in Italy before bringing them back to Africa; an account of Augustine appearing in a vision to Pope Alexander IV, which therefore acted as the catalyst of the Great Union of 1256; and a notable argument against the priority of the Canons. All of this lore was then further embellished and strengthened in Nicolas' account, who added the designation of Simplicianus as a hermit, and further still in Henry's.[69] If any of these authors had known of the sermons, they surely would have used them. If, therefore, we can accept this argument as persuasive, it means that

[65] *VF*, xxix.

[66] J.-P. Bonnes, "Un des plus grands prédicateurs du XII[e] siècle: Geoffroy du Loroux dit Geoffroy Babion," *Revue Bénédictine*, 56 (1945-46), 174-215.

[67] Balbino Rano, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden. Regla, Monasterio de Tagaste y Sermones ad fratres in eremo," *La Ciudad de Dios* 200 (1987), 649-727; Katherine Walsh, "Wie ein Bettelorden zu (s)einem Gründer kam. Fingierte Traditionen um die Entstehung der Augustiner-Eremiten," in *Fälschungen im Mittelalter*, 6 vols., Monumenta Germaniae Historica Schriften 33 (Hanover, 1988-1990), 5:585-610.

[68] Walsh, "Wie ein Bettelorden," 596-7.

[69] Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 194-218.

the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* originated sometime between 1334 and 1343.

In this light, Walsh highlighted the central importance of the chancellor of Paris, Robert de Bardis, for the origins of the *sermones*.[70] Arbesmann had noted that two fifteenth-century manuscripts of the *sermones*, one from Berlin and one from Danzig, mention that the sermons were found in Paris by de Bardis.[71] Arbesmann further mentioned the Vatican and Paris manuscripts of de Bardis' collection of Augustine's sermons, claiming that either he had copied from Jordan, or they had both copied from a common source.[72] Walsh, however, inverted the relationship. She showed that the Vatican manuscript did not date from the fifteenth century, as mistakenly noted in the catalogue, but was a fourteenth-century manuscript and was de Bardis' personal copy, dating to the period of his chancellorship, that is, from 1336 to 1349. Moreover, the Vatican manuscript had numerous sermons added in the margins. "Every entry," Walsh explained, "that would later become part of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, is found unsystematically and haphazardly in the manuscript, as much in the main text as in the margins, namely, as the collector had come across them."[73] Thus, Walsh concludes, for de Bardis there was no "standard" collection and he did not designate the sermons as *ad fratres in eremo*. The title, according to Walsh, can most appropriately be considered to have originated with Jordan.[74]

Balbino Rano has gone beyond the argument from silence to present a case that the author of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* knew and used the works of the Anonymous Florentine, Nicholas of Alessandria, and Henry of Friemar.[75] Rano's two major pieces of textual evidence concern the phrase, *Instigante autem pia matre*, and *Et sic perveni in Africam pia matre defuncta, et aedificavi, ut videtis, monasterium, in quo nunc sumus, in solitudine a gentibus segregatum*, from sermon 21. The textual parallels between these passages and Nicholas of Alessandria's *Sermo de beato Augustino* and Henry of Friemar's *Tractatus*, are such that a direct textual relationship exists.[76]

[70] WALSH, "Wie ein Bettelorden," 598-600.

[71] *VF*, xxvii.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] "Jede Eintragungen, die später als Teile der Sermones ad fratres in eremo erkannt werden sollten, finden sich unsystematisch und willkürlich verteilt, sowohl im Haupttext wie auch am Rand, also wie sie dem Sammler untergekommen waren." WALSH, "Wie ein Bettelorden," 599.

[74] *Ibid.*, 600.

[75] RANO, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden," 711-14.

[76] *Ibid.*, 711-712.

Moreover, not mentioned by Rano, in sermon 21 we find: *Et placuit deo centarium numerum fratrum mihi donare illuminans corda nostra non solum sanctissimos patres solitarios imitari, sed etiam in hac solitudine more apostolorum omnia communiter possidere, nos servare et postea docere et per me vobis precipere voluit.*[77] The reference to Augustine having been given one hundred brothers was referring to the "tradition" that Augustine wrote his Rule, and thus founded his first monastic community, in Centumcellis. This assertion, however, is first found in the *Sermo de beato Augustino* of Nicholas of Alessandria.[78] The author of the *Initium* mentioned Centumcellis, but claimed that this was only one possibility for Augustine's first monastic foundation, and that the precise location cannot be determined.[79] The *Initium* is the first extant textual reference to Centumcellis, and Nicholas's *Sermo* is the first text that definitively names Centumcellis as the location of Augustine's first monastery.[80] There is no evidence that the author of

[77] JOR., *Coll.*, fol. 26[rb].

[78] "Dicti autem heremite in prefata heremo inter Romam et Viterbium in tantum numero et merito satis cito creverunt, quod ibidem C cellas construxerunt iuxta locum qui Centum cellis dicitur et habitatores illius regionis in dicta heremo ecclesiam in honorem Sancte Trinitatis ipsis fratribus edificarunt et ibi in processu temporis fuit primus locus Ordinis heremitarum sancti Augustini." Nicholas de Alessandria, *Sermo de sancto Augustino* (ed. Rano, 365).

[79] *Initium* (ed. Rano, 338-9).

[80] The legend that Augustine had first founded his order of hermits in Centumcellis is not as such without evidence. Though there is no documentation of Augustine's foundation, there was a group of hermits in Centumcellis in the monastery of the Holy Trinity, which later tradition had Augustine establishing. In the bull, *Pium est*, dated 16 December 1243, that is, the same date as the "foundation charter" of the OESA (see above), Innocent IV places the hermits of Centumcellis under the care of Richard Annibaldi: "Richardo S. Mariae in Cosmedin Diacono Cardinali, Apostolicae Sedis Legato. Pium est et etiam laude dignum, ut viros religiosos, qui relictis omnibus serviunt soli Deo, dignis attollamus favoribus et foveamus consiliis opportunis, ut nostri suffulti subsidio possint liberius Domino famulari. Cum igitur sicut dilecti filii prior et fratres heremi S. Trinitatis de Centumcellis Nobis exponere curaverint eorum facultates adeo sint tenues et exiles, quod ipsi, relicto sanctae contemplationis otio, coguntur necessaria mendicare. Nobis humiliter supplicaverunt, ut quietius et liberius possint impendere Domino famulatum, ecclesiam S. Severae penitus derelictam, quae iuris et proprietatis Ecclesiae Romanae existit, eis de benignitate Sedis Apostolicae concedere curaremus. De tua igitur circumspectione plenam in Domino fiduciam obtinentes mandamus quatenus, inquisita super praemissis plenius utilitati, si rem inveneris ita esse, concedas eisdem priori et fratribus ac per ipsos eorum Ordini in perpetuum supradictam ecclesiam. Si expedire videris vice nostra contradicere etc. Datum Laterani XVII Kal. Januarii, Pontificatus nostri anno primo." VAN LUIJK, *Bullarium*, n. 31. The following year, in *Iustis petentium*, dated 30 March 1244, Innocent IV takes the hermits of Centumcellis under the protection of the holy see: "Dilectis filiis Priori et fratribus eremi S. Trinitatis de Centumcellis, Salutem etc. Iustis petentium desideriis dignum est Nos facilem praebere consensum et vota, quae

the *Initium* or Nicholas knew the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and yet the textual parallels indicate that there is a textual relationship. The one hundred brothers Augustine was given in his first monastery in sermon 21 is an attempt to preserve the Centumcellis image, though places the first foundation in the outskirts of Hippo. It seems highly likely that the author of sermon 21 knew Nicholas' *Sermo*. Thus Rano dates the collection, though no definitive answer can be given, between 1347 and 1357.[81] Such a late dating, however, is rather unlikely given Jordan's *Collectanea*.[82]

a rationis tramite non discordant, effectu consequente complere. Eapropter, dilecti filii in Domino, vestris iustis postulationibus grato concurrentes assensu personas vestras et heremum S. Trinitatis in qua divino vacatis obsequio cum omnibus bonis tam ecclesiasticis quam mundanis, quae in praesenti rationabiliter possidetis aut in futurum iustis modis, praestante Domino, poteritis adipisci, sub B. Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus. Specialiter autem ruralem ecclesiam S. Severae, quam ad Romanam Ecclesiam, ut asseratis, immediate spectantem dilectus filius noster R(ichardus) S. Mariae in Cosmedin Diac. Card. de mandato nostro. considerata tenuitate facultarum vestrarum, vobis contulit intuitu pietatis, prout in eisdem Cardinalis litteris plenius dicere contineri, vobis et eidem eremo per vos auctoritate Apostolica confirmamus et praesentis scripti patrocinio communimus. Nulli ergo etc. Datum Laterani III Kal. Aprilis Pont. nostri anno primo." *Ibid.*, n. 38. There is no mention here of the union of the Tuscan Hermits; *cf.* supra. On Centumcellis, see ENNIO BRUNORI, "L'Eremo della Trinità 'de Centumcellis'," in Joseph C. Schnaubelt, Frederick Van Fleteren, and George Radan, eds., *Augustine in Iconography. History and Legend. Collectanea Augustiniana* 4 (New York/Washington/Baltimore/Boston/Bern/Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna/Paris, 2003), 223-268. Brunori lists two other documents testifying to Centumcellis. The first is the *Vita Guillelmi* by Albert of Siena, dated between 1157 and 1181 by Brunori, and the second is a sermon of Peter Comester, that had been attributed to Augustine, dated before 1178. Both texts explicitly claim that Augustine had founded his Order of Hermits in Centumcellis. If both of these texts were genuine, it would give evidence of an early date of the legend of Augustine having founded his Order in Centumcellis, that is, previous to the 1330s. Unfortunately, the legitimacy of neither text can be upheld. The text of the *Vita Guillelmi* Brunori cites (see BRUNORI, Appendix I, pp. 244-247) is that published by Michaelis Angelus Carolis in 1582. Michael was himself a member of the OESA. The passages that give proof of Augustine having founded the Williamites in Centumcellis are interpolations. There is no evidence that the early Williamites traced their foundation to Augustine, nor that Centumcellis was a location for the Williamites. The Hermits of the holy Trinity at Centumcellis, placed under the guardianship of Richard Annibaldi, were not the Williamites. Moreover, the Williamites followed the Rule of St. William. Though originally part of the Great Union of 1256 establishing the OESA, the Williamites succeeded from the union in 1266. See ELM, *Beiträge*, 108-119. The second text Brunori offers as evidence is a sermon attributed to Augustine, which Brunori claims was authored by Peter Comester. Brunori cites BALBINO RANO's article, "San Agustin y los origenes de su orden," 650-651 = [2]-[3]; BRUNORI, endnote 4, p. 239. The reference is actually found in Rano's article on page 683 [35], in footnote 139. Here Rano states that the sermon in question (*sermo* 39, *PL* 198,1813-1817), may have been composed by Comester, but in any case, was interpollated by Ambrosius de Cora, the Prior General of the OESA who published his *Defensorium Ordinis*

Rano, as had scholars previously, assumed that there was a single forger and/or compiler of the collection. Most recently, however, Kaspar Elm has argued that not only can we not assume there was a "standard" collection of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, but also that we need to realize that these sermons could very well have been written by different authors at different times.[83] Simply put, Elm's argument not only makes sense, it also corresponds to the evidence. Elm has pointed to the twelfth-century controversies between the newly emerging Augustinian Canons and secular priests as having provided the model for the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, for in this context too there were forged texts ascribed to Augustine.[84] Yet what he did not mention, is that at least one of the sermons Jordan included in his *Collectanea*, the unnumbered *sermo ad populum De penitentia*, listed as the thirty-third text of the collection, is extant in manuscript 474B of the Bibliotheque d'la Arsenal in Paris, and dates from the twelfth century. In other words, in Jordan's collection of *Sermones Sancti Augustini* there are two authentic sermons of Augustine, and at least one pseudo-Augustinian sermon from the twelfth century, even if other of the sermons in the collection date from the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The sermon *De penitentia*, however, was not included in the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* by the Maurists, and neither was the sermon immediately preceding it in Jordan's collection, which has been attributed to Caesarius of Arles.[85] In point of fact, there was not a single forger. Was there, however, a single collector who provided the source of the transmission?

Eremitarum Sancti Augustini in 1481: "... pero hay que anadir que la referencia que se encuentra en este sermón sobre la Regla dada por San Agustín en el Monte Pisano es una int[e]rpolación y tergiversación; este sermón en su texto verdadero na trae nada del Monte Pisano; trae la interpolación y tergiversación A. Massari de Cori." RANO, "San Agustin y los originenes de su orden," 683, n. 139. In other words, the explicit references to Augustine having founded his Order of Hermits in Centumcellis came not from Peter Comester, if he was indeed the author of the sermon, but from Ambrosius de Cora in the later fifteenth century. Brunori's article is, nevertheless, with these caveats, a useful guide to the tradition of Centumcellis as the first foundation of the OESA.

[81] RANO, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden," 714.

[82] The date of 1343 has been assumed as the date of the donation, since Jordan made a visitation to Paris for the prior general in 1343. There is, however, no concrete evidence that Jordan did indeed present his *Collectanea* to the house in Paris in 1343, though he is clear in his prologue that he is giving his work to his brothers in Paris.

[83] KASPAR ELM, "Pseudoaugustinische Lebensregeln," 528-9.

[84] *Ibid.*, 528-34.

[85] G. MORIN, *Sancti Caesarii Arelatensis Sermones* (MARETIOLI, 1937), 551-556; as cited by ARBESMANN, VF, xxix.

Though Walsh, Rano, and Elm have furthered our understanding of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, at least by complicating the matter significantly, what has not been noted is that of the twenty-three *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* of Jordan's collection, only two are found in the Vatican manuscript of de Bardis, numbers 19 and 20. Sermon 19 of Jordan's collection, *De vigilia nativitatis Domini*, is found in the margin beginning on folio 51^{rb}. Sermon 20 of Jordan's collection, *De nativitate Domini*, is found in the text beginning on folio 67^{vb}. In both cases de Bardis designated these sermons as *ad heremitas*. Moreover, on folio 290va we find a sermon added in the margin on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and here too de Bardis noted that it is a sermon *ad heremitas*. This sermon is not present in Jordan's collection, nor in that of the Maurists. Jordan was not the source for de Bardis, and the Vatican manuscript of de Bardis' collection, Vat. Lat. 479, was not the source for Jordan, nor does it seem that they shared a common source.[86]

The relationship between de Bardis' collection of Augustine's sermons, Jordan's *Collectanea*, and the textual tradition of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* is yet to be determined. Such an endeavor could very well be made infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, when we note, as did neither Walsh nor anyone else, with one exception,[87] that the Vatican manuscript of de Bardis' collection is incomplete. Vat. Lat. 479 is a very large manuscript, consisting of 325 folia containing over 300 sermons attributed to Augustine. In the preface to the work, de Bardis explains that he has organized his collection of Augustine's sermons, which he had found in various monasteries and old books, into five parts. The first concerns the deeds and saints of the Old Testament; the second, the sollemnities and saints of the New Testament; the third, the words and writings of the Old Testament; the fourth, the words and writings of the New Testament; and the fifth, the ornaments of and impediments to the Church and the final ends of the good and the evil.[88] Vat. Lat. 479, however, only contains the first two

[86] The Paris manuscript of de Bardis' collection, BnF lat. 2030, mentioned by ARBESMAN, is actually a copy of the Vatican MS, Vat. lat. 479. See below for more on de BARDIS's *Collectorium* and its textual tradition.

[87] See below.

[88] "Incipit Collectorium sermonum sancti Augustini … invenit monasteriis ac veteribus codicibus in quibus erant inordinate pro magna parte dispersi …habet autem collectorium ultimo quinque partes principales: In prima parte collecti sunt sermones de quibusdam gestis et sanctis veteris testamenti. In secunda de sollempnitatibus et sanctis novi testamenti. In tertia de verbis et scriptis veteris testamenti. In quarta de verbis et scriptis novi testamenti. In quinta de ornamentis et impedimentis ecclesiastici fidelium et de retributionibus ultimis bonorum et malorum." ROBERTUS DE BARDIS,

parts. It could be that de Bardis did indeed have a set collection of *sermones ad heremitas* that paralleled Jordan's collection, with the exception of the sermon on the Assumption, but that he organized his work differently, placing them throughout the five parts rather than keeping them all together. Not only the Danzig and the Berlin manuscripts from the fifteenth century mentioned by Arbesmann, but numerous other fifteenth-century manuscripts and at least two fourteenth-century manuscripts include the explicit that these were sermons found in Paris by Robert de Bardis.[89] Moreover, in each case the collection contains the same sermons found in Jordan's *Collectanea*, only two of which are present in Vat. Lat. 479, and do not include de Bardis' sermon on the assumption.

We will return to de Bardis' *Collectorium* shortly, but for now what we can say for certain is that at least one of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* originated in the twelfth century; that Jordan did not use Robert de Bardis as the source of his collection; that independent of Jordan at least three of the sermons had been designated *ad heremitas*; that two authentic sermons of Augustine were part of the "original" collection; that there was a tradition established early on in the transmission that the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* had been found in Paris by Robert de Bardis; and that Jordan's *Collectanea* was not the source of the early transmission, though it stands as a witness to the early transmission. To see in more detail how this was so, we need to turn, at least momentarily, from the question of the dating and authorship of the *Sermones* to the early textual traditions.

IV. The Earliest Textual Traditions of the *Sermones*

In analyzing the textual traditions of the *Sermones*, I can, leaving de Bardis' collection aside for the time being, point to at least five

Collectorium sermonum sancti Augustini, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 479, fol. 1ra.

[89] For example: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1264 [fourteenth century], fol. 123; Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Codex Vindobonensis Palatinus 3466 [fourteenth century], fol.147; Vienna, Schottenklosterbibliothek, Codex Scotensis-Vindobonensis 132 [fourteenth/fifteenth century], fol. 80ra. G. Morin has pointed to Toulouse MS 169, dated to the fourteenth century, which claims that the sermons *ad fratres in eremo* were found in the abbey of Saint-Denis, written by a Father Johannes, a priest in the church of Saints Gervasius and Prothasius in the time of King Pipin, and then made their way to the papal library in Avignon. G. Morin, "Notes d'ancienne littérature ecclésiastique," *Revue Bénédictine* 13 (1896), 346-347; as cited by Rano, "San Agustin y los origines de su orden," 715.

distinct textual traditions, which can be determined based on an analysis of various fourteenth-century manuscripts, detailing which sermons they include and in which order. As can be seen in Table I, I have compared Jordan's collection with ten other manuscripts, seven of which are dated to the fourteenth century. The first column is simply a numerical sequence of the order of texts, from one to thirty-five. The thirty-five texts designated as *Sermones Augustini* in Jordan's *Collectanea* are listed in the second column, with the numeration given as present in Jordan's autograph. The third column then gives the numbering of the sermons present in Jordan's autograph as they appear in Migne. The remaining columns present the order of sermons of the respective manuscripts, listed according to Jordan's numbering. Thus, for example, the first text given in Jordan's autograph is numbered *sermo primus* in the autograph, whereas the first text present in manuscript *I*, labeled therein as *sermo primus*, is the same sermon Jordan numbers *sermo vicesimus primus*, though this is the second such numbered sermon in Jordan's collection. The first sermon in Jordan's collection is the same sermon as the first numbered sermon of Migne. The first sermon labeled as such in *I*, therefore, is the same sermon as the thirtieth text in Jordan's collection and is listed in Migne as sermon 43. On occasion, for sake of clarity, I have included the numeration given in the manuscript in question in parenthesis after the number of the given sermon according to Jordan's collection (which then corresponds to the sequential ordering of texts in the first column).

Table 1: *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*: Order of Sermons

Sigla Codicum

J	Jordani de Quedlinburg, *Collectanea Sancti Augustini*, Paris, Bib. de l'Arsenal, 251
PL	*Patrologia Latina*
A	Vienna, NB Vind. Pal. 3466 (14th cent.)
B	Berlin, StB, theol. Lat. qu. 45 (15th cent.)
C	Vienna, NB Vind. Pal. 4410 (1370)
D	Vienna, NB Vind. Pal. 4800 (14th cent.)
E	Vienna, Schottenkloster, 132(182) (14th/15th cent.)
F	Innsbruck, UB Cod. 591 (14th cent.)
G	Klosterneuberg, Stiftsbib. Cod. 387 (14th cent.)
H	Klosterneuberg, Stiftsbib. Cod. 789 (14th cent.)
I	Cologne, Domsbib., Cod. 1082 (15th cent.)
K	Berlin, StB, theol.lat.fol. 23 (15th cent.)

	J	*PL*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*H*	*I*	*K*
1	1*	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	21^2	1
2	2*	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	26*	2
3	3*	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	18	3
4	4*+	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	29	4
5	5*	6	5	26(5)	5	5	5	5	5	5	13	5
6	6*	7	6	5(6)	6	23	6	6	6	6	14	6
7	7	8	7	6(7)	7	6	7	7	7	7	15	7
8	8	9	8	7(8)	8	7	8	8	8	8	16	8
9	9	10	9	8(9)	9	8	9	9	9	9	17	10(10)
10	10	11	10	9(10)	10	9	10	10	10	10	19	11(11)
11	11	12	11	10(11)	11	10	11	11	11	12	20	12(12)
12	12	13	12	11(12)	12	11	12	12	12	11	21	21^2(13)
13	13*+	14	13	12(13)	21^2	12	21^2	13	13	13	22	26(14)
14	14	15	14	13(14)	26	21^2	26	14	14	14	1	18(15)
15	15	16	15	14(15)	18	26*	18	15	15	15	2	29(10)
16	16*	17	16	15(16)	29	18^+	29	16	16	16	3	13(17)
17	17	18	17	16(17)	13	De contritione cordis	13	17	17	17	4	14(18)
18	18*	26	19(18)	17(18)	14	29	14	18	19	19	5	15(19)
19	19	19	20(19)	18(19)	15	13	15	19	20	20	6	16(20)
20	20	20	21(20)	19(20)	16	14	16	20	21	21	7	17(22)
21	21*+	21	22(21)	20(21)	17	15	17	21	22	22	8	19(23)
22	22*	22	21^2(22)	21(22)	19	16	19	22	21^2	21^2	9	20(24)
23	23*	54	26(23)	22(23)	20	17	20	26*	26	26	10	21(24)
24	26*+	5	18(24)	De ieiunio(24)	21	19	21		18	18	11	22(25)
25	27	52/*355*	29(25)	33(25)	22	20	22		29	29	12	
26	28	53/*356*		34(26)		22^2						
27	De tribus const. super proprietate clericorum			18(27)		21						
28	Ex lib. s. Aug. de vita cler.			(28) de filio prodigo		22						
29	30	38		(29)de cena domini		28,27						
30	21^2	43		21_2(30)								
31	29	44		29(31)								
32	22^2			(32)de s. Monica								
33	De penitentia			27(33)								
34	De ieiunio et orationis	(73 s.)		28(34/29)								
35	De cogitationibus	76										

Sermons 1 to 23 are designated by Jordan as the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and are sequentially numbered as well in Jordan's text. These then are followed by *sermones Augustini ad presbyteros Hipponensis*. The first sermon, *De obedientia*, is numbered 26. At first one might consider this a simple scribal error, writing in Roman numerals 26 for 24, but the numbering "difficulty" continues. Jordan followed the twenty-fourth sermon of his collection, numbered by him as sermon 26, with sermon 27 and sermon 28, the two genuine sermons of Augustine. He then inserted a brief text with a separate rubric, *De tribus constitutionibus Augustini super proprietate clericorum*, which remained unnumbered, and this was followed by another, designated as *Ex libro sancti Augustini de vita clericorum*. The next sermon is then given the number 30. In Jordan's *Tabula* prefacing his collection, after this sermon was to come *sermones ad populum*, a designation one does not find in the text itself. In the text, the sermons are numbered, but in the *Tabula*, only sermons 1-23, the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, are numbered. In any case, the sermon in the text that follows the sermon explicitly numbered 30, is explicitly numbered 21. Here again one must suspect scribal error, simply omitting a Roman numeral ten. However, Jordan's second sermon 21 included in his collection is followed then by sermon 29, and then by the second sermon in Jordan's collection numbered 22. The last three sermons are not numbered by Jordan. Even allowing for scribal error, we have to conclude that either Jordan had some pretty serious problems with counting, or, he was copying from some other numbered collection, or collections, of sermons. Do the other fourteenth-century manuscripts shed any light on this?

The simple answer is that they do not, or at least not really, or not as much as we might like. Of the ten manuscripts presented in Table 1, manusripts *A*, and *C* through *G* are dated to the fourteenth century, with *B*, *I* and *K* being fifteenth-century manuscripts. In each case, however, the sermons are numbered sequentially, though *K* too has various numeration in the later sermons. Thus manuscripts *A*,*D*,*F*,*G*,*H*, include twenty-five sermons, numbered sequentially, as the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*; manuscript *F*, twenty-three; *D*, twenty-nine; and *B*, thirty-four, and again, all numbered sequentially. This lets us see that *A*, *C*, *E*, *G*, *H*, *I*, and *K* formed a single group, including the same sermons, albeit in different order. The differing order of the sermons in these manuscripts, however, is done by groups, which I have summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*: Order of Sermons

A Serm. 1-12	B Serm. 13-17	Γ Serm. 19-22	Δ Serm. 21^2, 26, 18, 29
MSS			
A		α, β, γ, δ	
B		(α, β, γ) +	
C		α, δ, β, γ	
D		(α, δ, β, γ) +	
E		α, δ, β, γ	
F		(α, β, γ) +	
G		α, β, γ, δ	
H		α, β, γ, δ	
I		δ, β, γ, α	
K		α, δ, β, γ	
+ these mss contain additional sermons to the groupings here given.			

In these ten manuscripts one can identify four groups of sermons, namely, using the numbering of Jordan's collection, sermons 1-12; sermons 13-17; sermons 19-22; and then sermons 21^2,26,18, and 29. *A*, *G*, and *H* present the sermons in this order; *C*, *E*, and *K* begin with the *alpha* group, followed by the *delta* group, then the *beta* group, and end with the *gamma* group; *I* begins with the *delta* group, followed by *beta* and *gamma*, and concludes with the *alpha* group. This variation in arrangement could very well be accounted for by the arrangment of the quires being copied; or in other words, that *A*,*C*,*E*,*G*,*H*,*K* and *I* represent a specific textual tradition of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, with the variation in ordering attributed to the variation in the order of the quires. This group includes sermons 1-22 of Jordan's collection of *sermones ad fratres in eremo*, together with one sermon, number 26 of Jordan's collection *ad presbyteros*, and two, numbers 21^2 and 29, designated by Jordan in his *Tabula* as *ad populum*. In all these manuscripts, all these sermons, once again, are numbered sequentially and titled *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, with one exception: in *I* the second sermon of the collection, which is Jordan's number 26, is explicitly designated as *ad presbyteros dei*. The same sermon is noted as such in manuscripts *B*, *D*, and *F*. *F* presents the sermons in the closest order to that of Jordan, listing in order numbers 1-22, but then rather than concluding with sermon 23 of Jordan's collection, has Jordan's number 26 as the twenty-third sermon of the collection, which is then explicitly noted as *ad presbyteros*. *F*, therefore, represents another identifiable textual tradition, and the same can be said of *B* and *D*.

D has twenty-nine *sermones ad fratres in eremo*, though sermon 15 in *D* is Jordan's sermon 26, and *D* explicitly notes that it is *ad presbyteros*. *D* then follows with sermon 18 of Jordan's collection, which *D* then again designates as *ad heremitas*. *B* is yet another matter. Arbesman claimed that *B* "most closely approaches that of Jordanus's collection."[90] That indeed seems to be the case. *B* follows Jordan's numbering of sermons 1-22, though with one exception. *B* inserted Jordan's sermon 26 between sermons 4 and 5, whereas Jordan included sermon 26 as the first sermon *ad presbyteros*, directly following sermon 23 and the explicit for the *sermones ad fratres suos in heremo*. With sermon 26 factored out for the moment, both Jordan and *B* included the same *sermones ad fratres in eremo*, with the only exception being Jordan's sermon 23. *F* too follows *B* in this ordering, maintaining sermons 1-22, and then, like Jordan, "appending" sermon 26, but like *B*, omitting sermon 23. The insertion of sermon 26 in *B* between Jordan's sermons 4 and 5 is not without reason. The rubric of sermon 26 as present in *B* states: *De obedientia sermo beati Augustini ad presbyteros suos quando reversus fuit a fratribus in heremo habitantibus, quando Fortunatus presbyter Manicheus venit Yponem*.[91] In the conclusion of Jordan's sermon 4, Augustine states that he must leave his hermits and return to Hipppo to debate Fortunatus.[92] The beginning of sermon 5 then announces to his hermits his victory over Fortunatus.[93] In the *Collectanea*, sermon 26 is the first sermon *ad presbyteros suos*, yet no mention is made there in the rubric of Fortunatus. Sermon 26 is one of the explicitly eremitical sermons, namely, one that could only have been composed after 1327.[94] Towards the end of the sermon, Augustine addresses his priests and explains that

[90] *VF*, xxvii.

[91] Berlin, StB theol. qu. 45, fol. 170^{r}.

[92] "Supplico vobis fratres ut non turbemini de mea recussu, decreveram enim diu inter vos consolari et vobiscum habitare usque ad festum dominice ascensionis. Sed adversarius noster Fortunatus ad partes pervenit et ideo redire Hipponem omnino compellor, cupiens illum videre et cum illo pariter disputare. Ipse enim toto affectu dissipare conatur filios quos peperi in visceribus caritatis. State pro me fratres et nolite deficere, ut Fortunatum, sicut publice sancte fidei insidiatur, ita et nos ipsum cum suis dei gratia coadiuvante publice superare et convertere ad viam veritatis possimus." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 4, fol. 7^{vb}-8ra.

[93] "Fratres carissimi, annuntio vobis gaudium magnum quoniam Fortunatum manicheorum presbyter dei gratia superavimus, et obstinatus in suo sensu velut alter filius perditionis a plebe nostra recessit confusus. Post cuius recessum baptizavi fere sexaginta paganos, qui sibi aliqualiter adherebant et ecce modo reversus sum ad nos, cupiens perficere opus quod incepi." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 5, fol. 8ra.

[94] See below.

he had desired to return to them to debate Fortunatus.[95] It thus makes perfect sense to include this sermon between the one in which Augustine announces to his hermits that he must leave them to debate Fortunatus, and the following sermon in Jordan's collection, in which Augustine announces his victory over Fortunatus. *B* has thirty-four sermons, and Jordan has thirty-five, albeit two are not as such sermons, and are noted as such in Jordan's rubric, though they are included in the general category of sermons *ad presbyteros suos*. *B* also includes two sermons not found in Jordan's collection, number 28 in *B*, *de filio prodigo*, and sermon 32 in *B*, *de sancta Monica*. It is also significant to note that sermons 33 and 34 in *B* correspond to Jordan's sermons 27 and 28, which are the two authentic sermons of Augustine, numbers 355 and 356. Yet in the explicit of sermon 34 in *B*, we find the notation: *Explicit de vita et moribus clericorum sermo 29*.[96] Although the second sermon *de vita et moribus clericorum* is listed in *B* as sermon 34, in the explicit it designates it as sermon 29. A parallel is seen in *D*, which includes Jordan's sermons 27 and 28, namely the *de vita et moribus clericorum*, as a single sermon to conclude the collection designated as sermon 29. It seems that *B* was aware of the fact that there was a collection of the *sermones ad fratres suos in heremo* circulating that concluded with sermon 29, being the *de vita et moribus clericorum*. *D* dates from the fourteenth century, and thus early on there was a tradition of the *Sermones* that contained twenty-nine sermons, concluding with the *de vita et moribus clericorum*. Moreover, *B* most likely used a manuscript in the textual tradition of *D*, otherwise, there is no explanation for *B* listing the last sermon in the collection as *sermo* 34 and then in the *explicit* claiming it was *sermo* 29.

[95] "Cur ergo murmuratis? Cur de mea absentia dolorem habere ostenditis? Facite que placita sunt mihi et tunc ubicumque fuero vobiscum ero usque ad consummationem seculi. Decreveram enim cum eisdem rusticanis meis in caritate humiliter habitare usque ad festum sancte ascensionis domini. Nec ad vos redire optabam quousque vos emendatos esse cognovereo. Sed quoniam Fortunatum adversarium ad partes occulte velut lupum pervenisse iam sentio ideo compulsus reversus sum ad vos, cupiens illum videre et cum eo pariter disputare et illum concultare domino auxiliante qui totis viribus dissipare conatur et iugulare filios quod peperi in visceribus caritatis. Orate igitur et nos vobiscum orare, volumus desinentes de mea absentia amplius litigare. Orate et nolite deficere ut Fortunatum manicheorum presbyterum sicut publice sancte fidei christiane insidiatur, ita et nos cum suis dei gratia coadiuvante publice eum superare possimus. Orate sine intermissione ut manere digne possitis invocatione clericorum qua per gratiam vocati estis, ut dum vocabimini ad mercedem in die novissimo non sicut ficus absque fructu maledicamini et succidamini et in ignem mittamini tamquam destructores legis terram occupantes et pereuntes in iniquitatibus vestris." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 26, fol. 32^{va-b}.

[96] Berlin, StB, MS theol. lat.qu. 45, fol. 233^{v}.

What we have here is five distinct textual traditions of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, namely, 1.) that of Jordan; 2.) that of *A*,*C*,*E*,*G*,*H*,*I* and *K*; 3.) that of *D*; 4.) that of *B* and 5.) that of *F*, though *F* could represent an early collection which was used by *B* and *D* but with the inclusion of additional sermons. While only *B* and *D* contain sermons that are not to be found in Jordan's collection, none of them can have derived from Jordan, nor served as the source for Jordan.

There is some indication, however slight and/or speculative, to suggest that there was an "original" core collection. *F* contains twenty-three sermons, Jordan's numbers 1-22 and then number 26, the first of Jordan's sermons *ad presbyteros*, which too is designated as such in *B* and *D*. Jordan designates sermons 1-23 as the *sermones ad fratres in eremo*. If *F* represented the "original core" collection, namely, one that Jordan too had access to, then he would have realized that there were twenty-three sermons in the collection, but that the one, sermon 23 in *F* and sermon 5 in *B*, was actually *ad presbyteros*. From another collection, Jordan could have then gotten at least some of the other sermons he included. I have already mentioned that Jordan has two sermons numbered as 21 and two numbered as 22. Number 23 of Jordan's collection is the "odd man out", so to speak. Of these eight manuscripts, only *D* includes Jordan's sermon 23, but does so as the sixth sermon of the collection, between numbers 5 and 6. *D*, in fact, includes Jordan's sermons, in addition to 23, numbers 22^2, and 27 and 28 together as the last sermon of the collection, numbered 29, none of which are present in the other manuscripts, which the exception of *B*, which though omitts Jordan's sermon 23. If we were to factor these four sermons out of *D*, the result would be a collection of twenty-five sermons, the same twenty-five sermons included in the other collections, arranged as in *C*, namely, as the *alpha* group followed by *delta* and *beta*, and ending with *gamma*, with one exception. *D* begins with sermon 2 of Jordan's collection, continues with sermon 3, and then skips to sermon 4; or in other words, in *D*'s own numeration, we find sermon 1, followed by 2, followed then by 4, that is, the third sermon of the collection is explicitly numbered *sermo quartus* in *D*. It could very well be that *D* used at least two sources, namely, the "core collection" of 25 sermons, and then another source or sources for sermons 22^2, 23, and 27/28 of Jordan's collection, as well as for the sermon *De contritione cordis*, found neither in Jordan's collection nor in that of the Maurists. Yet with *F* as a witness, we can actually hypothesize two "core collections", namely, an "original" core collection of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* consisting of twenty-two sermons, and the "secondary" core collection which then included these twenty-

two, that is sermons 1-22, and 26 of Jordan's collection, as well as sermons 21^2 and 29 of Jordan's collection for a total of twenty-five sermons. It could also be that Jordan as well had multiple sources for his collection, namely, the "core collection" of twenty-two sermons and then another source or sources for the remaining sermons of his collection. This scenario could as well explain the difficulty in numbering. In the "core collection", namely, sermons 1-22 of Jordan's collection together with sermon 26, Jordan would have known that the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* consisted of twenty-three sermons, but that the last sermon of the collection was designated *ad presbyteros*. Had Jordan had available to him another numbered collection, he could have then used it for his collection, substituting a numbered 23 to complete the 23 *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, followed then by sermon 26 *ad presbyteros*. This could then explain the repetition of sermons numbered 21 and 22, namely, Jordan's 21^2 and 22^2 were so numbered in Jordan's numbered source, followed by 23, which he then used to replace the one *sermo ad fratres in eremo* that was actually *ad presbyteros*. And yet, sermon 26 is also a bit odd. *F* includes it as the last of the sermons, *B* "inserts" it between sermons 4 and 5, and the other manuscripts include it in the *delta* group, namely, sermons 21^2, 26, 18, and 29 of Jordan's collection. In all the manuscripts, including Jordan's collection, sermons 1-22 are rather stable, with the only variation in order being based on the grouping of the *alpha*, *beta*, and *gamma* groups, and the omission of sermon 18, except in *B* and *F*. The "original" core collection thus appears to have been sermons 1-22, which then in *F* were expanded to include sermon 26 of Jordan's collection whereas in the other manuscripts were expanded by the *delta* group and the transposition of sermon 18, and then in *B*, were expanded by sermons approximating, though not equating, those of Jordan's collection. Thus there could have been three core collections: the primary core collection of sermons 1-22; the secondary core collection represented by *B* and *F*,[97] which Jordan also used; and then finally the tertiary core collection of the *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*, and *delta* grouping.

In any case, this is further proof that manuscripts *A-K* could not have been derived from Jordan's collection, nor could have Jordan's collection been derived from *A-K*. Moreover, if we assume that the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* as a collection grew over time, then Jordan's collection of twenty-three *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* combined with four *ad presbyteros* and six *ad populum* represents an

[97] That is, "factoring out" the other sermons included in *B* that are not in *F*.

expansion of the tradition from the twenty-three sermons of *F*, the twenty-five sermons of *A*,*C*,*E*,*G*,*H*,*I* and *K*, and the twenty-nine sermons of *D*, though approximating the thirty-four sermons of *B*, even if *B* included sermons not found in Jordan. That the collection was expanding is indicated as well by Jordan himself, for in his *Liber Vitas-fratrum*, Jordan cited three *sermones ad fratres in eremo* not included in his *Collectanea*, numbers 27, 28 and 60 of the Migne edition.[98] Jordan, in any case, was not the first to give the collection its title, since Robert de Bardis knew sermons 19 and 20 of Jordan's collection as sermons *ad heremitas*. The same applies to the designation *ad presbyteros*. By Jordan's time there were already *sermones Sancti Augustini ad fratres suos in heremo* and *sermones Sancti Augustini ad presbyteros* circulating which at some point coalesced into a collection of twenty-two or twenty-three sermons, which then became expanded to thirty-three sermons by 1343 and to seventy-six sermons by 1495. If Robert de Bardis did indeed discover these sermons in Paris, he did so as an on-going investigation and he was not alone. Jordan too states in the prologue to his *Collectanea* that these sermons were found in Paris and in Avignon at the papal curia and sent to him.[99] If we cannot identify the original forger of these sermons, or the contents of the original forgery, it does seem most likely that we can locate the forgery in Paris and date it between 1334 and 1343, with it being highly likely that an earlier date during this period is more likely than a later, given the textual tradition already available to Jordan by 1343.

Moreover, we have indications that there was an original "core" set of sermons, or rather three "core" sets, as I have just discussed. Yet in the scheme I have presented, sermons 18 and 26 present a problem. How does one account for the transposition of sermon 18 from the

[98] *VF*, xxix.

[99] "Quia iuxta dictum sapientis ad locum unde ereunt flumina revertunt ut iterum fluant. Hinc est quod ego frater Jordanus de Saxonia dictus de Quedelingburg inter scolares Parisiensis minimus, quosdam sermones beatissimi patris nostri ac doctoris eximii Augustini cum quibusdam aliis tractatibus seu opusculis vel legendis de vita et gestis eiusdem sancti patris ac sue pie matris sancte Monice, atque de translationibus eorum prout ad me fide digna assertione ac fideli communicatione, unde quaque exemplaria devenerunt, quibusdam quidem de Parisius, quibusdam vero de Curia Romana, nonnullis quoque de antiquis et approbatis monasteriis ad me perductis, in unum volumen collegi. Ipsumque ad locum Parisiensem mare utique copiosum, unde omnia scientiarum flumina exire dinoscuntur destinare sathegi. Quatenus exinde fluat iterum per ordinem universum, obsecrans in visceribus caritatis, ut quicumque fratrum de studio conventus nostri Parisiensis, cui hunc librum in libraria eiusdem conventus ad communem utilitatem pondendum pro munusculo caritatis donare decrevi, in eo legerit vel eum forsitan transcibi fecerit, oret pro donantis anima, ut Augustini meritis celi fruatur gaudiis. Amen." Jor. *Coll.*, *Prol.*, fol. 1^{vb}.

"core" of sermons 1-22, to the "core" of the *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*, *delta* group? When we approach the question of the "original core" from this perspective, it seems very odd that someone at some time would have removed sermon 18 from the seqential ordering to include it in the *delta* group. Further, *D* stands as a problem as well, with its inclusion of the sermon *de contritione cordis* not found in the other collections, including Jordan's and that of de Bardis in Vat. Lat. 479, and the same can be said for *B*, which includes sermons *de ieiunio, de filio prodigo*, *de cena domini*, and *de sancta Monica*, the first three of which are also present in Migne as sermons 23, 27, and 28, of which then 27 and 28 were later cited by Jordan in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*. Vat. Lat. 479 adds another problematic piece, namely, the sermon on the assumption of Mary designated as *ad heremitas*, though not found in Jordan or the other collections. What are we to make of this if, as I have been doing, we take Jordan's *Collectanea*, de Bardis' collection, and manuscripts *A-K* as all valid witnesses to the "original" collection?

First I should reiterate that there is good reason for doing so, since none of these collections could have been derived directly from the others, namely, that is, Jordan's collection, de Bardis' collection, manuscripts *A*,*C*,*E*,*G*,*H*,*I* and *K* as a group, and then manuscripts *D* and *F*. There is no evidence, and a good deal of evidence to the contrary, to claim that any of these traditions represent the *Urtext*. Yet we do get a glimpse of what might have been the original core. I have already suggested three core collections. The common denominator so to speak, are the sermons of the *alpha*, *beta*, and *gamma* groups. To this core group we then have the "eratical" sermons, namely, sermons 18, 23, 26, 21^2, 22^2, 27, 28, and 29, together with those in *D* and in de Bardis's collections not found in others, followed then as well by sermon 30 of Jordan's collection and the three unnumbered *sermones ad populum*. With the exception of sermons 18 and 26, all these other sermons can be seen as "additions" to the "core collection". Sermons 18 and 26 are the problem. If we posit sermons 18 and 26 as a "later addition" to the core collection, then they circulated within the *delta* group, with the exception of *B*. How, then, are we to understand Jordan's collection, *B*, and *F*? If, however, Jordan's collection, *B*, and *F* represent the "original core", how are we to understand the grouping of sermon 18 with *delta*? To me it makes more sense to posit sermons 18 and 26 having been added to a "core collection" inserted between sermons 17 and 19, while then sermon 23 or 26 was added at the end, or as in *B* between sermons 4 and 5, than it does to posit sermon 18 extracted from the core collection and then grouped with *delta*. In other words, was sermon 18 "origianally" an "eratic" sermon that was

added to the "stable" core", or, was it originally part of the "stable core" that then became displaced? Either is possible, but the former seems to me the more likely. If that is the case, then we can revise the original core collection, or collections. As a hypothesis, I would posit *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma* as the original "core collection", with the other sermons, the eratical ones, being "later" additions thereto. In that case, then, the only complication is why did Jordan, or the tradition his *Collectanea* represents, *B*, and *F* insert sermon 18 in what had been a sequential listing of twenty-one sermons? And then why did *J*, *B* and *F* further add sermon 26?

The last question is perhaps the easiest to get around, if not solve. Simply put, the *J* tradition "discovered" sermon 23 and the *F* tradition discovered sermon 26, before any others were added. They likewise discovered sermon 18, and inserted sermon 18 into the previous sequence. The traditions of manuscripts *A*,*B*,*C*,*E*,*G*,*H*, and *I* then "discovered" the *delta* group, adding it onto the original "core". *D* then discovered sermon 23, which it inserted into the *alpha* group, and the sermon *de contritione cordis* which it inserted into the *delta* group, whereas *B* "discovered" the sermons *de ieiunio*, *de filio prodigo*, *in cena domini*, and *de sancta Monica*. *D* then also discovered sermon 22[2] which it inserted into the *gamma* group, and then the two authentic sermons of Augustine, numbers 27 and 28. What this would imply, therefore, was that there was an "original" forgery of sermons of the *alpha*, *beta*, and *gamma* groups, hereafter referred to as the "core", to which then later sermons became attached as they were found or forged, including the authentic sermons of Augustine, and at least the one pseudo-Augustinian sermon of the twelfth century *De penitentia*, present in *J* alone. Further, it would mean that the four textual traditions I pointed to earlier, namely, that of *J*, the *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*, *delta* group, *F*, and *D*, are actually four phases of the collection's expansion and development from the "core collection". This "evolutionary" model, I would argue, better "presevers the phenomena" than have previous accounts based by and large on Jordan and the Maurists, but this is as far as I can go at present with respect to the development and origins of the collection as such.

V. The Thematic Core

Yet there may be additional evidence still when we turn from the development of the collection to its contents. If Jordan cannot be said to have been the author of these sermons, and if he can no longer

be said to have given the collection its title, he was, nevertheless, the first to use these sermons to defend his Order, basing his newly constructed *Vita Sancti Augustini*, present in his *Collectanea*, upon them.[100] In doing so, Jordan contributed to a new image of Augustine as the founding father of his Order of Hermits, presenting conclusive evidence against the case of the Canons.[101]

As I mentioned previously, Katherine Walsh argued that while Jordan was not the original forger, he was the one to give the collection its title. Yet de Bardis, whose collection was contemporaneous to Jordan's, if not earlier according to Walsh, designated three sermons *ad heremitas*, only two of which are found in Jordan's collection. Therefore, assuming Walsh is correct that de Bardis could not have been using Jordan as his source, de Bardis gives proof that there were sermons circulating designated as *ad heremitas* previous to Jordan, and thus Jordan cannot be said to have given the title to the work. Yet the formulation, *ad fratres suos in eremo* is not found previous to Jordan. It is most likely that the "core collection" already designated the sermons as *ad heremitas*, as did de Bardis, while Jordan then rephrased it to *ad fratres suos in eremo* while preserving the "original" title in his explicit to sermon 23, which states: *Expliciunt sermones Augustini ad heremitas*.[102] This supposition is given additional weight when we note that manuscripts *A-K* give no uniform title to the collection. Most frequently we find: *Sermones Sancti Augustini ad fratres suos heremitas*, though we also come across the variations *ad fratres suos de eremo*[103], *Sermones beati Augustini ad heremitas suos fratres suos de vita heremitica seu solitaria*[104], *ad fratres in heremo*[105], and *ad fratres suos heremitas in heremo Yponensis*.[106] In *B* we see the designation after sermon 23 as in *B*: *Explicit libellus sancti Augustini episcopi de vita solitaria et heremitica sic enim intitulatum inveniende antiqua littera*, followed then by the rubric: *Sermo sanctissimi Augustini episcopi*

[100] For an edition of JORDAN's *Vita Sancti Augustini*, see SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 774-810.

[101] See my forthcoming study, *Augustinus Noster*.

[102] Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 23, fol. 30^{rb}.

[103] Cologne, Domsbibliothek, cod. 1082 (15th cent.), fol. 2^{v}.

[104] Vienna, NB Vind. Pal.3466 (14th cent.), fol. 104^{r}; explicit: Expliciunt sermones beati Augustini episcopi ad fratres suos heremitas quos quidam magister parisius dicitur invenisse." *Ibid.*, fol. 147^{r}.

[105] Vienna, Schottenkloster 132 (182) (14th/15th cent.), fol. 64va; explicit: "Expliciunt sermones reverendissimi patris Augustini ad fratres in heremo, inventi Parisius a domino Rupto de Bardis." *Ibid.*, fol. 80ra.

[106] Innsbruck, UB cod. 591 (14th cent.), fol. 1^{r} (*in marg.*).

ad fratres suos in heremo de ieiunio, xxiiii,[107] giving here recognition that there were "originally" twenty-three sermons *ad fratres suos in eremo*, which though by the fifteenth century had expanded. I do not mean to be making a mountain out of a mole hill, but the point is, even with respect to the title there is no uniformity in the early traditions, which has some pertinence for the question of how did sermons Jordan designated *ad presbyteros* and *ad populum* end up being *ad fratres suos in heremo*?

The simple answer is, or could be, knowing very well that in such matters there is never truly a "simple" answer, that the title is descriptive, more than interpretive. In thirteen of the thirty-three sermons included in Jordan's collection, Augustine – and here I mean the pseudo-Augustine and/or the created Augustine – explicitly states, in one way or another, that he is addressing his brothers *in eremo*. These I have marked in Table I with an asteriks. Thus in the first sermon, we read: "And therefore, most beloved brothers, living together with you in this hermitage in the name of our God, it is pleasing to feel as one according to the apostolic life and to possess all things in common."[108] Sermon 1 is a compilation of sorts, constructed for the most part, from the *Regula* and the *Ordo Monasterii*. Yet it is not difficult to see how one could easily designate this sermon as being *ad fratres suos in eremo*, and the examples are easily multiplied. Sermon 1 begins: *Fratres mei et letitia cordis mei*, which is a formulation found as well in sermons 9, 10, 12, 14, and 22. We also find the salutations *fratres dilectissimi*, *fratres carissimi*, and *fratres mei*. When we get to sermon 26 in Jordan's collection, the first of the *sermones ad presbyteros suos*, we read: *In omnibus operibus vestris sacerdotes dei dilectissimi*; in other words, it is clear from the text itself that "Augustine" is addressing his priests. In this sermon Augustine makes a clear distinction between his "priests" or "clerics", and his "brothers". In other words, one gets the impression that when Augustine is addressing his "brothers", he is referring to his "hermits". From the text itself, once again, it is clear in sermon 26 that Augustine is giving his sermon *ad presbyteros*, as noted by Jordan as well as by *B*, *D*, *F*, and *I*. The problem is, however, that for the other sermons included by Jordan in the group *ad presbyteros suos*, as well as those *ad populum*, we find the salutation *fratres karissimi* or *fratres mei*. Only sermon 26 is clearly addressed *ad presbyteros suos*, whereas for the other sermons there is nothing in the texts themselves to indicate where or how they

[107] Berlin, StB, theol. lat. qu. 45 (15th cent.), fol. 204r.
[108] Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 1, fol. 3rb.

should be grouped. It could very well be that the association of *fratres* with *heremitae in eremo* led to the inclusion of sermons Jordan grouped as either *ad presbyteros* or *ad populum* with those *ad fratres suos in eremo*.

Jordan included within his category of *sermones ad presbyteros*, in addition to sermon 26 which is clearly designated as such, the two genuine sermons of Augustine, *de communi vita clericorum*, and sermon 30, *de legendo sacram scripturam*. It is clear from the text of sermons 27 and 28 that Augustine was addressing his priests as bishop within the episcopal residence. Moreover, sermons 27 and 28 circulated independently as a separate work of Augustine, which Jordan's *Tabula* indicates as well when he designates sermon 27 as *de communi vita clericorum, sermo primus*, and sermon 28 as *sermo secundus*, as does *B*, and when in *D* these two sermons, albeit inverted in order, appear as a single sermon, numbered 29, though not designated as *ad presbyteros*. Sermon 30, however, used the salutation *fratres mei*, and gives no indication that Augustine is explicitly addressing his priests. How, then, did it become part of the *sermones ad presbyteros* in Jordan's collection, especially when we note that sermon 30 is not present in the collections of *A-K*? The only answer that I can think of, is that sermon 30 came to Jordan together with sermons 26, 27 and 28, which he then appended to the collection he already had, and since sermon 26 is explicitly *ad presbyteros*, this provided Jordan with a group designation. Such an explanation is based on the positing of the core collection, and thus we need to return to the issue of dating and origins.

Above I discussed Rano's argument and evidence that the *sermones*, or at least some of them, used the works of the Anonymous Florentine, Nicolas of Alessandria, and Henry of Friemar. The evidence Rano brings is from sermon 21. Yet there is additional internal evidence of a fourteenth-century dating. Sermon 13, *de iustitia*, concludes with an condemnation of and admonition against living *in spiritu libertatis*, in the free spirit.[109] This is a term that refers to the "heresy" of the "free spirit", which as Robert Lerner has demonstrated, came into being as a term at the Council of Vienne.[110] Therefore, sermon 13 could

[109] "Et ideo si in nostra congregatione aliquem talem invenerimus, quod deus avertat, qui sic iustitiam calcare voluerit, non tenendus est sed expellendus est, tamquam vivere volens in spiritu libertatis sue a quibus tamen liberet nos deus sicut hactenus fecit per gratiam ut nostra sancta et immaculata religio de bono in melius semper augmentetur, per Iesum Christum salvatorem nostrum, Amen." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 13, fol. 17^{ra-b}.

[110] Robert Lerner, *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1972).

not have been composed prior to 1312. Jordan himself wrote a now lost treatise against the "Free Spirits", but the textual variants between Jordan's collection and that of manuscripts *A-K* preclude the assertion of Jordan as the author. Yet this gives us additional positive evidence for dating the collection, or at least some of the sermons thereof, to the fourteenth century. Given the fragmented textual traditions of the collections, it could have been that at least some of the *sermones ad fratres in eremo* were indeed extant prior to 1334, even though Henry of Friemar, Nicolas of Alessandria, and the anonymous Florentine had no knowledge of them. Sermon 13, in any case, could not have been written prior to 1312. Yet sermon 13 is one of four sermons that give indications of a later date. Of the thirteen sermons that give explicit mention of being addressed *ad fratres in eremo*, there are four, numbers 4, 13, 21, and 26, that seem could only have been composed after 1327. These I have marked in Table I with a plus sign. I have already mentioned 1327 as the date of the origin of the heated controversy between the Augustinian Hermits and the Augustinian Canons over which order was the genuine *ordo sancti Augustini*, initiated by Pope John XXII's granting the Hermits joint custody of Augustine's tomb in Pavia. Whereas there are thirteen sermons in Jordan's collection that explicitly refer to *fratres in eremo*, only these four give explicit evidence for the priority of the Hermits.

In sermon 4, *de prudentia*, the author includes a passage based on the authentic sermon 355. In sermon 355, the chronology is one where Augustine came to Hippo to found a monastery, but was first ordained priest, and then Valerius gave him the garden for the monastery, and then, after becoming bishop, Augustine founded a monastery of presbyters within the episcopal residence.[111] The issue of

[111] "Quaerebam ubi constituerem monasterium, ut uiuerem cum fratribus meis...Veni ad istam ciuitatem [*scil.* Hipponem] propter uidendum amicum, quem putabam me lucrari posse deo, ut nobiscum esset in monasterio; quasi securus, quia locus habebat episcopum. Apprehensus, presbyter factus sum, et per hunc gradum ad episcopatum perueni. Non adtuli aliquid, non ueni ad hanc eclesiam, nisi cum his indumentis quibus illo tempore uestiebar. Et quia hoc disponebam, esse in monasterio cum fratribus, cognito instituto et uoluntate mea, beatae memorae senex Valerius dedit mihi hortum illum, in quo est nunc monasterium. Coepi boni propositi fratres colligere, compauperes meos, nihil habentes, sicut habebam, et imitantes me." Augustinus, *sermo* 355, *De moribus clericorum, sermo primus* (ed. Lambot, 125,1-24). *Cf.*: "Ergo fratres mei dilectissimi quorum vita ut puto sancta est, ut multi ex vobis viderunt et audierunt, Veni ad civitatem Hipponensem et secure perveni quia episcopus erat sanctus homo ille Valerius, Non enim credebam episcopari. Ideo secure perveni cum carissimis amicis meis, Evodio, Simplicio, Nebridio, et Alipio nil mecum divitiarum portas et dei gratia me coadiuvante, favoratus non modicum a predicto sene Valerio in heremo segregata a gentibus multo labore fatigatus, edificare cepi monas-

when and where Augustine founded his first monastery, and for whom he wrote his rule was the issue of contention between the Hermits and the Canons, with the Hermits trying to show that Augustine founded his order before he was ordained, making the distinction between *fratres mei* and *presbyteros*. The author of the *Initium*, Nicholas of Alessandria, and Henry of Friemar all claimed that Augustine had first founded his order in Italy. In sermon 4 the location of Augustine's first monastery is Hippo. According to the sermon, Augustine came to Hippo with his friends Evodius, Simplicius, Nebridius, and Alipius, and with them established a monastery. Valerius gave Augustine a place *in heremo*, and there Augustine founded his first monastery. Thereafter, the text is clear, Augustine was conscripted to be ordained as a priest bishop (*episcopus presbyter*) and then once again established a monastery. Augustine's *hortus*, in sermon 4 became *in heremo* and there is a clear temporal distinction between Augustine founding his monastery and then, only later, being ordained. This same passage, further developed and elaborated, is found as well in sermons 13 and 26. In sermon 26 Augustine is addressing his presbyters, and makes it very clear that he also lives with his *fratribus in eremo*.[112]

terium et cum longiori anxietate congregavi in unum servos dei per nemora habitantes. Et sic vobiscum pariter vivere cepi secundum regulam apostolicam, omnia communia habentes et nichil in proprio possidentes. Deinde placuit ei qui me segregavit ex utero matris mee, michi dicere, ascende superius, et cum magna molestia factus sum episcopus presbyter. Et quoniam vobiscum hic esse non poteram, in domo episcopi presbyteros mecum habere volui et cum eisdem pariter vivere cepi." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 4, fol. 7^{va-b}. Here we see the "re-writing" of Augustine's account. Augustine could be read as have already established a monastery since he was visiting a friend "ut nobiscum esset in monasterio," but this must be read in light of the above passage: "Quaerebam ubi constituerem monasterium," so that at the time of Augustine's visit to Hippo, while he planned to establish a monastery, and hoped his friend would join him, he had not yet done so until Valerius gave him the garden in which to do so. In *sermo* 4, the account is much more precise and the details are filled in, even as it was based upon an authentic sermon of Augustine.

[112] "Ego autem sacerdotes dei altissimi, ut multi vestrum viderunt et audire potuerunt veni ad hanc civitatem cum carissimis meis amicis, Evodio. Simplicio, Alipio et Nebridio et Anastasio. Securus denique veni, quia sciebam presulari sanctum senem Valerium. Propterea securus accessi non ut haberem in vos potestatem, sed ut abiectus essem in domo domini, omnibus diebus vite mee non ut ministrari deberem, sed ministrare et pacifice vivere optabam in solitudine. Nichilque divitiarum mecum attuli, sed dei gratia me coadiuvante favoratus etiam a sancto sene eipscopo Valerio monasterium in heremo agentibus segregatum multo labore fatigatus edificavi et cum longiori anxietate servos dei per nemora habitantes in unum congregavi et cum eis pariter vivere cepi secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam. Omnia communiter habentes et possidentes, viventes in vigiliis et orationibus ultra id quod explicare possumus. Quorum fama ad aures sancti episcopi Valerii pervenit et placuit sibi in heremo nos visitare et stetit diebus tredecim ibi, donans mihi hortum

Moreover, the *fratres* are to be an example for the priests, since they live a more religious life. Sermon 26 presents Augustine admonishing his priests over their jealousy of the hermits, part of which concerned the issue of how much time Augustine was spending with his hermits compared to his time with his priests, or in other words, the extent to which Augustine properly belonged with his hermits or with his canons.[113] Here we see the same conflict that was raging after 1327, and indeed, it appears to me that it is impossible for this sermon to have been composed previous to 1327.

The same cannot, however, be said for sermons 4, 13, and 21, namely, while it is clear that in sermons 4, 13, and 21, Augustine first established his hermits before his presbyters, that is, his canons, these three sermons do not, in and of themselves, explicitly present the conflict with the canons. We can date sermon 4 to after 1312, but then can we say that sermons 4, 13, and 21 should also be dated after 1327 as sermon 26? There is certainly plenty of textual parallels to group these four sermons together, and therefore, to assign a date to them all of after 1327. However, it is possible that the author of sermon 26 was drawing upon sermons 4, 13, and 21, rather than all four sermons having been composed by the same author at the same time. What distinguishes sermons 4, 13, and 21 from sermon 26, is that while it is

amenitatibus plenum in planitie positum. Et quia agentibus erat segregatus, libenter illum suscepi ut edificarem etiam monasterium fratrum quos tales inveneram, quales invenire desideravi. Quo edificato placuit ei qui me segregavit de utero matris mee et vocavit me per gratiam suam mihi dicere, *amice ascende superius*. Et sic cum molestia et grandi anxietate factus sum episcopus presbyter. Et quia cum fratribus meis ut hactenus faceram semper corpore habitare non poteram, propterea infra domum episcopi vos clericos habere volui et mox vobiscum secundum formam apostolicam vivere cepi. Placuit vobis omnibus unum in deo sentire et omnia communiter possidere. Hoc autem facere voluistis non coacte sed sponte, usque ad mortem vivere sine proprio profiteri voluistis." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 26, fol. 31^{ra-b}.

[113] "Igitur sacerdotes, cavete ne deficiatis in temptationibus, cavete ne rebelles mihi sitis publice vel occulte, sitis mihi fideles, sitis mihi et obedientes. Et si vobis grave est et molestum, egredimini foras, pergite ad fratres meos et discite ab eis, quia mites sunt et humiles corde, pauperes spiritu et filii obedientie. Egredimini foras et quid estis et quid ipsi sunt considerare vos volo. Nunquid et vos tales quales et ipsi sunt? O utinam tales essetis sicut et ipsi sunt! Vos enim voratores et ipsi summe sobrietatis, vos discursores civitatis et ipsi visus hominum fugiunt. Vos inpudici et ipsi casti. Vos derisores et ipsi ferventissimi oratores. Vos pellibus cuniculorum vel variorum ornati iam estis et ipsi ovino habito colore nigerrimo, asperrimoque induti sunt, preter ea que intrinsecus sunt. Vos delicate pasci summe curatis, carnes varias et ipsi postquam herenum intraverunt nunquam sumpserunt carnes. Vos vina electa inebriantia queritis et ipsi pusillum aque recipiunt. Vos balteis militum mundo apperere desideratis et ipsi zonis camelorum renibus succincti more Helye et Iohannis decorati sunt." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 26, fol. 32^{rb}.

explicitly clear in 4, 13, and 21 that Augustine first established his hermits, and only after having become bishop did he establish his canons, there is no explicit conflict presented. As I have already mentioned, in sermon 4 we find Augustine having come to Hippo together with his friends Evodius, Nebridius, Simplicius, and Alipius.[114] In sermon 21 we find a further list of names. Here Augustine is explaining how he came to found his hermits in Africa. It is clear that Hippo is the location of Augustine's first monastery, but there is a tie with Italy. Before Augustine left Milan, he went to Simplicianus and asked him for some brothers whom he could take with him to establish a monastery in Africa. Simplicianus gave him twelve: Anastasius, Fabianus, Severus, Nicolaus, Dortheus, Yssac, Nycostratus, Paulus, Cyrillus, Stephanus, Iacobus, and Vitalis. These, together with his friends Evodius, Alipius, and Ponticianus, traveled with Augustine from Milan to Thagaste.[115] In sermon 26, then, we find that Augustine came to Hippo to found a monastery with his friends Evodius, Simplicius, Alipius, Nebridius, and Anastasius, a list that includes Anastasius from sermon 21, with the list of sermon 4.[116] In other words, we have three differing accounts: sermon 4 has Augustine coming to Hippo with Evodius, Simplicius, Nebridius, and Alipius; sermon 26 has Augustine coming to Hippo with Evodius, Simplicius, Nebridius, Alipius, and Anastasius; sermon 21 lists Anastasius as one of the 12 *fratres* Augustine received from Simplicianus, and then together with these twelve and Evodius, Alipius, and Ponticianus, Augustine founded his monastery in Africa. Are we not, therefore, dealing with three separate authors? The author of each of these sermons is trying to be as precise and concrete as possible, giving names of the original group of Augustine's *fratres*. Why, one must ask, would a forger, who is

[114] See above, note 112.

[115] "Et pia matre me instigante apud Mediolanum ut ad patriam remearem, cupiens etiam eos habere in visceribus caritatis et cum eis pariter vivere ad virum Simplicianum illum qui a iuventute sua deo devotissime vixerat in omni caritate perrexi deprecans cum fletu et gemitu ut mihi quosdam de suis servos dei donaret et donavit michi eos paterne. Quare donavit mihi eos paterne? Quia sciebat me velle monasterium in Africa edificare. Est assumptis mecum Anastasio, Fabiano, Severo, Nycolao, Dortheo, Ysaac, Nycostrato, Paulo, Cyrillo, Stephano, Iacobo et Vitali pauperculo, quia pecunie sacculum apud Mediolanum invenit et non rapuit de quo iam sermonem perfecimus, quia invenit et non rapuit, nec potest aurum abire voluit. Hiis mecum assumptis comitari cupiebam cum carissimis meis amicis Evodio, Alipio et Ponticiano, qui diu mecum fuerant et cum ceteris duodecim quoque nuper assumpseram illos quorum famam etiam sanctus pater mihi descripserat et sic perveni in Africa pia matre defuncta et edificavi ut videtis monasterium in quo nunc sumus in solitudine agentibus segregatum." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 21, fol. 26^{ra-b}.

[116] See above, note 113.

trying to present a consistant, historical account, give different versions? Sermon 21 omits Simplicianus, while presenting by far the most extensive list. Sermon 26 follows the account of sermon 4, but includes Anastasius from sermon 21. Sermon 21, moreover, is not based on the authentic sermon 355, as are sermons 4 and 26. It seems that the author of sermon 26 is trying to bring the two accounts of sermons 4 and 21 together, by including Simplicius from sermon 4 and Anastasius from Sermon 21. Moreover, sermon 26 directly asociates itself with sermon 4 by concluding with Augustine explaining to his presbyters that the reason he had returned to them from his *fratribus in eremo* is because he wants to debate Fortunatus, which gives then manuscript *B* legitimation for including Jordan's sermon 26 between Jordan's sermons 4 and 5. Sermon 4 concludes with Augustine telling his *fratres in eremo* that he must leave them to return to Hippo in order to debate and refute Fortunatus. Sermon 5 then begins with an account of how Augustine championed over Fortunatus. If we can date sermon 4 to after 1312, then the same date applies to sermon 5 and 26, and to sermon 3 as well, for sermon 4 takes as its point of departure the theme of sermon 3, namely silence, in stating: "Most beloved brothers, not only should you keep silence in the hermitage, but also sieze upon prudence."[117] In this light, I would argue that sermons 3, 4, 5, and 13 can all be dated to after 1312, and came from the same author, that sermon 21 was most likely composed by a different author, and that sermon 26 was composed either by the author of sermons 3-5, and 13, or by another author, but not the author of sermon 21, though the author of sermon 26 knew sermon 21. What, then, if anything, does this have to tell us about the composition of the collection?

Well, first it underscores the fact that there were multiple authors for the original collection, and here I mean Jordan's collection or any of the others as well. Jordan's collection includes sermon 22[2] from Caesarius of Arles, and the sermon *de penitentia*, which may be from Caesarius, but certainly dates no later than the twelfth century. Sermon 26 was certainly written after 1327 and sermons 3,4,5, and 13 were written after 1312, though could have been written after 1327 as well, but were not written by the same author as the author of sermon 21, which seems to have been composed only after 1334, based on the textual parallels to the Anonymous Florentine, Nicolas of Alexandria, and Henry of Friemar, which then would apply to sermon 26 as well, since I have argued that the author of sermon 26 knew sermon 21. Yet

[117] "Fratres karissimi, non solum silentium debetis tenere in heremo, sed etiam prudentiam rapere." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 4, fol. 6^{rb}.

there is more. Looking at the collection thematically, we can identify a progression of Augustine's biography. Sermon 4 is placed in or around the year 395, namely, Augustine's debate with Fortunatus, as is sermon 26. Sermon 22, however, is cast in the last year of Augustine's life, as his very last farewell. Sermon 22, *De oratione*, begins with Augustine saying: "My brothers and the joy of my heart, the time has come for me to return to him who sent me to you, but do not be sad." Sermon 1, *de margaritis regularis institutionis*, has Augustine addressing his *fratres* and teaching them how to live the apostolic life, drawn from the *Regula* and the *Ordo Monasterii*, which places the sermon in Augustine's biography before his having been ordained. In other words, the collection begins with the beginning of Augustine's foundation of his order of hermits and continues through his ordination to priest and bishop, extending to his death in sermon 22. I have already suggested that based on an analysis of the "core collection", that the original "core" collection was the *alpha*, *beta*, and *gamma* groups, or sermons 1-12, 13-17, and 19-22. This "core collection" is then supported thematically by the development of Augustine's biography within the sermons. We are still, however, left with the problem of sermons 18, 23, and 26. If the core collection ended with sermon 22, why did Jordan, or any one else for that matter, then continue with sermons 23 and 26, and how did sermon 18 get into the picture? I have already suggested that sermons 23, 26, and 18 were "eratic" sermons, namely, sermons composed after the original core collection. This is suggested by the analysis of manuscripts A-K, and it is supported as well by the Maurist collection. What we find with the Maurists is that the core collection of the *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma* grouping is maintained, with the exception of sermon 5. Sermons 18 and 26, then are inserted between *beta* and *gamma*, and we must remember that sermons 18 and 26 form half of *delta*, though in *delta* the order is reversed. Keeping 18 and 26 together makes sense thematically, because both sermons deal with "grumblings", with 18 being *de murmuratoribus et penis inferni* and 26 *de obedientia*, in which Augustine rebukes the *murmuratores* among his priests who are complaining about the *fratres*. Sermon 23 is also titled *de obedientia*, and in *D*, is inserted between sermons 5 and 6, the latter of which is also *de obedientia*. In other words, there is evidence of thematic groupings, which then begs the question how did sermon 18 become inserted between *beta* and *gamma* in Jordan's collection, in *F*, and, together with sermon 26, by the Maurists? Again, we can only speculate, but the insertion of sermon 18 does make sense. As the collection progresses thematically, we find it beginning with Augustine's establishing his

hermits, before moving on to preach on the monastic virtues and vices, namely, peace, silence, prudence, mercy, obedience, perseverence, anger and hate, the purity of conscience and hope, on tears and penitence, on humility and pride, on fortitude, on justice, against the wisdom of the world, on the value of remembering the last judgement, on how leisure is to be avoided, and on envy. This sequence then prepares one for the Christmas vigil and Christmas, the themes of sermons 19 and 20, which had already been prepared in the first sermon when Augustine exhorts his dearest brothers to be born again in order to have Christ re-formed in them to love God and then their neighbor, since these are the precepts that are first and foremost given to us, a word for word citation of the opening lines of the *Ordo Monasterii*.[118] There is a thematic and theological continuity in the progression of the sermons, which is then continued with sermon 21 on the three types of monks and on poverty, and then sermon 22, Augustine's farewell address on prayer. In other words, Augustine begins by exhorting his *fratres* to the heremetical life and establishing them therein, then continues to show them how actually to live it, what virtues must be cultivated and what avoided, before rhapsodizing on the birth of Christ, which would then allow one to be reformed, namely, to be the *frater* one is meant to be, and closes with his salutation and exhortation to continue on the path by remaining constantly in prayer. There is not only a chronological sequence in the core collection, but also a theological and religious one. Sermon 18, *de murmuratoribus et penis inferni*, fits in very well as the final preparation for the nativity. Could it have been inserted elsewhere? Certainly, but it does make the most sense for it to appear in the sequence in the place that it does in Jordan's collection and in *B* and *F*.

Yet what about sermon 23? For some reason Jordan continued his collection, after the core collection, with sermon 23, which thematically makes no sense, since Augustine had died shortly after giving sermon 22. Of the manuscripts here analyzed, only *D* included sermon 23 in the collection, and here sermon 23 is inserted between sermons 5 and 6, or in other words, together with sermon 6 on obedience, since sermon 23 is also on obedience. *F* follows sermon 22 with sermon 26, which again, is on obedience. Now I hope it is beginning to become clear, if it hasn't been already, the legitimacy for my call-

[118] "Sed ante omnia fratres carissimi quos iterum parturio, donec reformetur in vobis Christus, diligatur deus, deinde proximus, quia ista precepta sunt principaliter vobis data." Jor. *Coll.*, *sermo* 1, fol. 3^{ra-b}; *cf.*: "Ante omnia, fratres carissimi, diligatur deus, deinde et proximus, quia ista sunt praecepta principaliter nobis data." *Ordo Monasterii* 1 (ed. Verheijen, 148, 1-2).

ing these sermons "eratic". In the various collections, they become inserted in various places. Sermon 23 is sermon 54 in the Maurist collection. In the core collection there are occasional textual links between the sermons indicating a sequential order, such as sermon 3 beginning with a reference to sermon 2 as the preceding one, or sermon 5 reporting back on the debate with Fortunatus that had been announced in sermon 4, and such as sermon 10 explicitly stating that it follows directly after sermon 9, and there is in addition the thematic progression. With the "eratic" sermons, however, no such links can be found, though we do find attempts to tie in with the core, such as sermon 26 basing itself on sermons 4 and 21.

In this light, a pattern is beginning to become clear. There was a core collection of *Sermones ad fratres suos in eremo*, consisting of the *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma* grouping. To this original core were later added other sermons, so that by Jordan's time, what had been a collection of twenty-one sermons had grown to a collection of thirty-three. The earliest additions to be made were the sermons of the *delta* group, and of these sermons 26 and 18 circulated independently as well. Of the core collection, thirteen of the twenty-one sermons are explicitly heremitical, and sermons 3, 4, 5, and 13 can be dated post 1312. There is suggestive textual evidence to claim that sermons 4, 21, and 26 were written by different authors, and sermon 26 can definitively be dated post 1327 and most likely post 1334. With regard to Jordan's collection, sermon 22[2] is a sermon of Caesarius of Arles, and the sermon *de penitentia* dates no later than the twelfth century. The assumption that there was a single forger, can no longer be asserted, nor that the forgery is to be dated to the twelfth, thirteenth, or fourteenth century: it was all of the above. The core collection as such did not come into being until after 1312, which provides the *terminus post quem* for sermons 3, 4, 5, 13, and 21. It is highly likely that the other eremetical sermons are to be dated accordingly, but there is no specific proof for doing so. Only sermons 21 and 26 can be definitively dated post 1327, and most likely post 1334, though it is likely that sermons 3, 4, 5, and 13 were as well. When we compare Jordan's collection with other fourteenth-century collections, it becomes clear that Jordan's collection represents at least a fourth stage of development, namely, the core collection after sermons of the *delta* group were added, then after sermon 23 joined the group, and then finally the rest. In other words, Jordan's *Collectanea* does not offer us the earliest collection, or even the earliest titled collection, of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. It does, however, offer us the first example of how the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* were used. Jordan based his biography of

Augustine on the *Confessions*, the previous *Vitae* of Possidius, Philip of Harvengt, and the *Legenda Aurea*, and the *Sermones*. Here Jordan cited sermons 4, 13, 16, 21, 22, 26, 27, and 28. Jordan cited the *Sermones* 20 times in his *Vita*, with the largest number of citations being to sermon 26, with six, followed by sermon 21, with 5. Jordan used the *Sermones* as proof of the historical origins of the OESA as having been founded by Augustine himself prior to any association with the canons.[119] Even if we cannot place the origins of the *Sermones* in the context of the controversies between the Hermits and the Canons, except for sermon 26, and perhaps sermon 21 based on its post-1334 dating, they certainly were conscripted for such, even though de Bardis gives us proof that religious polemic was not the only context in which the *Sermones* were created and/or used, as do actually all of the manuscripts I have mentioned, aside from Jordan's, since none of them are of an Augustinian provenance. Whereas for the Benedictines at Aachen, from whence comes manuscript *I*, and for the Schottenkloster of Vienna, from which we have *F*, the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* were a valued articulation of Augustinian monasticism in its most general form, for the Augustinian Hermits, they offered conclusive evidence of their own Order's priority and primacy.

VI. The *Collectorium Sermonum Sancti Augustini* of Robert de Bardis

Robert de Bardis's *Collectorium Sermonum Sancti Augustini* seemingly calls into question the "neat" textual history I have presented above. Arbesmann, Walsh, Rano, and Elm all pointed to the

[119] This dating then too has significance for the dating of Jordan's *Collectanea*, at least in its final state. Arbesmann had claimed that Jordan began work on his *Collectanea* as early as 1319-1321, while he was studying in Paris. I have disputed such an early date and have argued that the final version of the *Collectanea* is to be dated in the 1330s, most likely after 1334; see Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 220-226. Jordan began his work with the *sermones*. If the *sermones* did not exist prior to 1334, then Jordan's *Collectanea* must be dated after the time of the "core collection"; 1343 is the *terminus ante quem*, when Jordan gave his *Collectanea* to his Order's house in Paris. What we are dealing with here is thus a relatively short space of time. Sometime after 1334 the core collection of the *sermones ad fratres in eremo* was constructed, and perhaps other "eratic" sermons as well, and then sometime thereafter, but previous to 1343, Jordan not only discovered these sermons, but also included them in his *Collectanea* and used them as the basis for his composition of his *Vita Sancti Augustini*. During these nine years, i.e., from 1334 to 1343, much was going on, and precisely what and/or how will still most likely remain a mystery.

importance of de Bardis. In this context, two manuscripts have been mentioned, Vat. lat. 479 and Paris, BnF lat. 2030. Above I have already noted that Vat. lat. 479 is incomplete, containing only the first two of the five parts mentioned by de Bardis as comprising his *Collectorium*. Paris, BnF lat. 2030 is a fifteenth-century copy of Vat. lat. 479, and as such, the sermons extant in Vat. lat. 479 in the margins are present in the text of Paris, BnF lat. 2030. In Vat. lat. 479 only two sermons in Jordan's collection are present, and there is an additional sermon, designated as *ad heremitas*, not to be found in Jordan's collection.[120] Already in 1958, Giovanni Pozzi pointed out that Vat. lat. 479 is incomplete, containing only the first two parts of the five parts of Robert de Bardis's *Collectorium*; the remaining three parts, as Pozzi detailed, are extant in Valencia, UB MS 481; Valencia UB MS 481 is the continuation of Vat. lat. 479,[121] or in other words, if Vat. lat. 479 was the personal copy of de Bardis, Valencia UB, MS 481 was so as well. Neither Walsh, nor Elm, nor Rano, discussed this manuscript, and neither did Arbesmann, though he can be excused due to the war.[122] The importance hereof is that Valencia UB, MS 481 contains the "original" collection of de Bardis, and preserves parts three through five of his organization of Augustine's sermons. In part five, we find a concluding section containing the *Sermones ad fratres suos heremitas*.[123]

At first, there seems to be virtually no relationship between de Bardis's collection, that of Jordan, or that of the other ten manuscripts surveyed above:

[120] ROBERT DE BARDIS, *Collectorium sermonum sancti Augustini*, Vatican City, Bib. Apost., MS Vat. lat. 479, fol. 51^{rb}, fol. 67^{vb}, fol. 290va.

[121] GIOVANNI POZZI, "Roberto de' Bardi e S. Agostino" in *Italia Medioevale e Umanistica* I (1958): 139-153. See also idem, "Il Vat. Lat. 479 ed altri Codici annotati da Roberto de' Bardi," in *Miscellanea del Centra di Studi Medioevali* 2 (1958): 125-165; idem, "La Tabula di Jean de Fayf al Collectorium di Roberto de' Bardi," in *Miscellanea Gilles Gérard Meerseman*, Italia Sacra 15 (Padua, 1970), 257-311.

[122] ARBESMAN published his account of the *Sermones ad fratres in heremo* as present in Jordan's *Collectanea*, in his introduction to the critical edition of Jordan's *Liber Vitasfratrum*, published in 1943. Arbesman, thus, was also writing previous to Pozzi.

[123] Valencia, UB MS 481, p. 581A-615A. The manuscript is paginated, not foliated, in a modern hand.

Table III

Sermones ad heremitas: Order of Sermons
Robert de Bardis, *Collectorium Sermonum Sancti Augustini*, Valencia, UB MS 481

de Bardis, *Collectorium*	Jordan, *Collectanea*	*PL*
Sermo 1 De tribus generibus monachorum et de sancta paupertate ad fratres suos heremitas	21	21
Sermo 2 De disciplina et modo vivendi eorum in heremo	1	1
Sermo 3 De obedientia	6	7
Sermo 4 De obedientia	Deest	34
Sermo 5 De obedientia	15	5
Sermo 6 De pace	2	2
Semo 7 De conscientie puritate et spe	9	10
Sermo 8 De oratione et lacrimis	22	22
Sermo 9 De lacrima et compunctione	10	11
Sermo 10 De fortitudine	12	13
Sermo 11 De perseverantia	7	8
Sermo 12 De iusticia et iudicio	13	14
Sermo 13 De misericordia	5	6
Sermo 14 De silencio	3	3
Sermo 15 De perseverancia prudentia	4	4
Sermo 16 Ad utilitatem vigilarum et labore utili contra otiositatem [check]	16	17
Sermo 17	11	12

De humilitate et superbia		
Sermo 18 De invidia	17	18
Sermo 19 Contra murmuratores et detractatores	18	26
Sermo 20 Contra iram	8	9
Sermo 21 Ad simplices quod non debent sapere plusquam oportet	14	15
Sermo 22 De obedientia ad presbyteros suos	26	5
Sermo 23 ad iudices: Rogatus a nobis o iudices licet cum Fortunato	Deest	35
Robert de Bardis, *Collectorium*, Pars Prima et secunda, Vat. Lat. 479; Paris, BnF lat. 2030		
De vigilia nativitatis Domini	19	
De nativitate Christi	20	
De assumptione beate virginis Mariae	deest	

Here we find what is indeed apparently a haphazard collection. De Bardis's order of sermons bears no similarity to the others, and he includes three sermons not found in the other collections, that is, de Bardis's sermon 4, sermon 23, and then the sermon on the assumption in part two of the *Collectorium*. And yet, upon further analysis, de Bardis included the same sermons, albeit in radically different order, as did Jordan and manuscript *F*, namely, in Jordan's numbering, sermons 1-22 and then sermon 26. This would seem, therefore, to give additional evidence of the "core" collection. With regard to the unique ordering, Valencia UB MS 481 sheds some light. The scribe included a note prefacing the sermons:

> Here follow certain sermons of blessed Augustine to his own hermit brothers, which specially concern the solitary and eremitical life, which the collector wanted to separate from each other, although in keeping with the subject matter, some of them were able to be placed and ordered otherwise, and this was done to make it easier to find how Augustine first came to the city of Hippo, and how thereafter he built

a monastery and lived with his brothers in the hermitage, and then how he was made bishop of the same city.[124]

There is, though, no explanation as to which sermons were "reordered" or the basis for doing so, nor why de Bardis wanted the sermons to be separated *ab invicem*. Yet this could also be referring to the sermons found in parts I and II of the *Collectorium*, which include Jordan's numbers 19 and 20. It could very well have been that de Bardis used as his source the "core" collection of sermons 1-22, with the appended 26 and then additional sermons, but then wanted to given them a new order within his grand collection of Augustine's sermons as such. In any case, de Bardis's *Collectorium* was not the original collection and there is no evidence that indicates that he had found these sermons as a collection in Paris, as the textual tradition claimed, unless he had first discovered the core collection and then "deconstructed it" for his *Collectorium*. Based on the *Collectorium*, there is no possibility that it as such could have served as the basis for the collection of Jordan or of any of the other collections discussed above. It is an independent witness to the earliest textual traditions of the *Sermones* and the earliest collection thereof, namely what I have termed the "core" collection. We have to go "behind" de Bardis's *Collectorium*, just as we have to go "behind" Jordan's *Collectanea*, to find the origins of the "original" collection, and in part composition, of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. That, however, may never be possible.

VII. The *Sermones* and the *Religio Augustini*

At some point between 1334 and 1343, someone gathered together sermons ascribed to Augustine, some of which were written after 1312, and some after 1334, though others date back to the twelfth century. Shortly thereafter, numerous other sermons became attached to the collection, which included even earlier sermons, such as those of Cesarius de Arles, and two authentic sermons of Augustine. It was a pious fraud, though one often based on the authentic words of Augustine. The core collection of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* was soon

124 "Hic subsequuntur quidam sermones beati Augustini ad fratres suos heremitas qui specialiter concernunt solitariam et heremiticam vitam, quos voluit collector ab invicem separare, licet secundum materiam aliqui eorum possent alibi et aliter ordinari et poni, et hoc factum est, ut facilius inveni possit quomodo ipse Augustinus venit primo ad civitatem Ypponensem, et quomodo postea construxit monasterium et habitavit cum fratribus suis in heremo, deinde quomodo factus est predicte civitatis episcopus." Robert de Bardis, *Collectorium*, Valencia, UB MS 481, p. 581A. Pozzi also mentioned this note; Pozzi, 144-145.

to play a fundamental role in the religious life of late medieval Europe, and beyond. While scholars may reject the words of these sermons as being authentic, there is much therein that articulates the genuine *mens Augustini*, as Maarten de Kroon sugested in 1972 with respect to the corpus of Pseudo-Augustinian writings.[125] The words were the fiction, but was the doctrine? In his *Sermo de beato Augustino*, Nicolas of Alessandria was perhaps the first to point to this distinction when he claimed that Augustine wrote so much that there was no way possible for him to have himself physically written it all. Some of his works were taken down by scribes, and thus cannot be said to be his *expresis verbis*, but nevertheless, even if not written explicitly by him, should still be considered his works.[126] This was the sentiment behind the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, to recover, even if by creation, the teachings of Augustine, which were as controversial in the fourteenth century, as they would be in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and has they had been already in the fourth and fifth centuries. Most likely, we will never know who was originally responsible for the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and we may never know precisely how and why the collection came into being. Their author, compiler, and forger cannot have been Jordan himself, nor Robert de Bardis, nor the anonymous author of the *Initium*, Nicholas of Alessandria, or Henry of Friemar, since Jordan's collection represents a fourth generation collection, and since the *Initium*, Nicolas, and Henry, the very authors who were most responsible for the creation of the Myth of Augustine, created accounts of Augustine's biography contradicted by the *Sermones*. Whereas sermon 26 was certainly composed after 1327 and the breakout of the controversy between the canons and the hermits and most

[125] See M. DE KROON, "Pseudo-Augustin im Mittelalter. Entwurf eines Forschungsberichts," *Augustiniana* 22 (1972), 511-530.

[126] "Fertur itaque quod Marcus Terentius Varro apud latinos innumerabiles scripsit libros. Apud grecos Calicidorum miris attolitur laudibus. De nostris itaque Origenes apud grecos sex milia legitur libros scripsisse. Horum denique omne studium Augustinus miro ingenio et sciencia vilificat. Nam tanta privatim dictando tantque in ecclesiae diversisque locis disputando conscripsit, ut vix cuiquam studiosorum diebus ac noctibus, non solum scribere libros eius, sed nec legendo nosse occurrit. Ideo dicit quod doctor katholicus: 'Mentitur qui te totum legisse fatetur.' Hec ille. Ex hoc potest solvi dubium commune quomodo potuit tanta scribere, quia forte multa quam communiter loquendo vel predicando vel disputando dicebat, alii reportabant et ipse approbabat. Omnia tamn dicebantur opera Augustini." NICOLAS DE ALESSANDRIA, *Sermo de beato Augustino* (ed. Rano, 356-357). Nicolas cites Possidius as his source. Rano notes that such a text is not found in Possidius, and suggests Isidor of Seville or possibly Hugh of St. Victor as the source; *ibid.*, 356, n. 135. The last eulogy, "Mentitur qui te totum legisse fatetur," is also possibly from Isidor, and there is a precedent for this passage in the Anonymous Florentine's *Vita Sancti Augustini*; *ibid.*, n. 137.

likely is to be dated post 1334, since it presupposes sermon 21, which based on textual evidence post-dates the works of the earliest historians of the Order, and while sermons 4 and 13 may very well have had the same temporal origins, all the other sermons of the collection could have been composed previously, though the *terminus post quem* for sermons 3, 4, 5, and 13 can be determined to have been 1312. Nevertheless, from at least 1292 on, when Giles of Rome became the Prior General of the OESA, if not from its very beginnings in 1256, the OESA was well aware of the need to assert its historical primacy. It is this broader, more general context, rather than the specific controversy beginning in 1327, which itself was a part of the on-going endeavor, that provides the historical context for the origins of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. As first stated by Augustinus of Ancona in 1326, Augustine's religion was the highest form of Christian perfection, for Augustine embodied, in himself, in his rule, and in his order, the most perfect life.[127] As such, Augustine's hermits held a place of primacy within the history of Christianity itself, yet Augustine was not just the founder of his Order of hermits, and then of his canons: he was the origin of religion itself in the west, and the *sapiens architector ecclessie*, as Jordan called him.[128] The creative process was not simply that of creating a new biography of Augustine, as did Jordan, nor that of creating the documentation to prove the Hermits' case; the creative process was to re-create Augustine ever anew in all facets of the Christian life in general, and in the religious life in specific. It was this creative process that produced the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* as an original creation and collection, which then grew far beyond its original bounds, reaching all the way back to the fourth and fifth century, and extending into the fourteenth century and beyond. It was the creative process that had at its base the exhortation of Augustine himself, addressed to his *fratres* in sermon 355, to be, in the words of Paul, my imitators, just as I imitate Christ.[129] Behind the fabrication, behind the fiction, we find the fact and the history of the authentic creative impulse of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*: the *religio Augustini*.

[127] See SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 146-156.

[128] See SAAK, "Quilibet Christianus: Saints in Society in the Sermons of Jordan of Quedlinburg, OESA," in *Models of Holiness in Medieval Sermons*, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, Texts et Études du Moyen Âge 5, ed. Beverly Mayne Kienzle, with Edith Wilks Dolnikowski, Rosemary Drage Hale, Darleen Pryds, and Anne T. Thayer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1996), 320-321, 336-338.

[129] AUGUSTINUS, *sermo* 355, *De moribus clericorum, sermo primus* (ed. Lambott, 124,5-8).

VIII. On Origins

Origins are our fascination, our fixation. Once we determine the origin of something, we think we have come up with that which explains "everything". And yet finding the origin of almost anything is deceptively difficult. Some historical phenomena do indeed have an identifiable origin, or at least they seem to. Christianity began with Jesus of Nazareth, or at least cannot have begun previous to Jesus of Nazareth. Yet the Christian movement in Jesus' day, if we can even label anything as such, was far different from the Christian movement of Paul, or the Christian movement after the establishment of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, or the Christian movement after the Christianization of Rome, or the Christian movement after the rise of papal monarchy, or the Christian movement after the Reformation, or even the Christian movement after the rise of the radical Christian Right. When, therefore, did "Christianity" begin? And what, afterall, do those beginnings tell us about Christianity in any particular cultural-political context? And yet to understand Christianity historically, do we not need to go back and see the origins of Christianity in the Judaism of the first, second, or third-century BCE? And then could we not trace its origins back to the emergence of monotheism? Or theologically speaking, do we not have to go back to creation? All of a sudden, identifying the origin(s) of Christianity becomes ever so complex, determined by what one means by Christianity in the first place. The origins seem to loose their concrete historical existence and become based upon interpretation. The origins of Christianity have only a most ephemeral relationship to Jesus of Nazareth. The origins of Christianity are first and foremost not so much a problem of history, as they are a problem of hermeneutics. So much for explanation.

Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of the origins of the OESA. 9 April 1256 is a mark of demarcation: a new institution was established known as the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine. Yet do we not find the origins of the Great Union, or in other words, the origins of the origins, in the "Little Union" of 1244, or in the development of the Hermits of Brettino, or the Bonites? But then should we not look for the origins in the even earlier development of medieval eremiticism? Or even in the tradition of Augustinian monasticism that can be said to have had its origins in Augustine's own monastic community? In a very real way, and not only as a *reductio ad absurdam*, or as a perpetuation of a myth, Augustine *was* the origin of the OESA.

We all have our myths. We all have our stories of our origins, where we came from and how we have come to be who we are. Such

memory, such understanding, is part and parcel of our identity. Debunking the myths of the past, and those of the present, is a fundamental responsibility of the historian, and yet for those long dead and gone, for those who cannot reflect on their own debunked myths, what value does such debunking have? Certainly there is the issue of historical "accuracy", wanting here to avoid altogether the issue of historical "truth", which is central for our own understanding of the past. Yet Jordan of Quedlinburg, for example, is no longer around for us to debate and attempt to prove to him that his emplotment of Augustine's biography was just plain wrong. Jordan's understanding of his Order's origins may be different from our own, and might not hold up to the scrutiny of history, but it was *his* understanding and thus a central, foundational component of his identity. As Mircea Eliade reminded us, virtually all stories of origins are mythic.[130] Debunking those myths is just the beginning, and in terms of coming to historical understanding, is not even the most important endeavor of the historian, which is to do history, and to see the origins of those myths and how they emerged and how they functioned, and what impact they made. For the late medieval Augustinian Hermits, the Great Union of 1256 was a major point of development, but perhaps as significant was Pope John XXII's granting the OESA custody of Augustine's body in Pavia.[131] Only thereafter did the Hermits create a new identity for themselves as the true sons of their father Augustine. It was this identity that was to have such an impact on the religio-cultural life of Europe for the rest of the Middle Ages and beyond. The *Sermones ad fratres suos in eremo*, aside from the two genuine sermons of Augustine, were a forgery. If there is validity in the old proverb that "truth is stranger than fiction," there is also validity in the statement that often fiction has a far greater historical impact than did or does truth. This forgery, in any case, had a greater impact on the later Middle Ages than did the truth, for it gave the true sons of Augustine their identity by revealing to them the origins of their Order. In so many ways, the origins of the OESA, at least in terms of its identity as comprised of the true sons of their father Augustine, are to be found not in 1256, nor in 1244, but

[130] MIRCEA ELIADE, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, 1957); *idem*, *Myth and Reality* (New York, 1963).

[131] In both the *Historia Augustini* and the Boston *Vita*, the emplotment moves from Augustine's "final resting place" in Pavia, to William of Cremona's petition for custody of Augustine's body, and John XXII's granting thereof. While they both include scenes of Augustine having visited the Tuscan Hermits (*Historia*, ASCA, *HA*, 47; *Vita*, 47, ed. Courcelles, 106-107), there is no representation of either the Little Union or the Great Union.

in the two decades after 1327, during which time a forgery was produced, an indentity created, and a new understanding formed. This new understanding and identity were to have long-lasting impact on Europe as it metamorphized from medieval to early modern. And thus, for all our debunking, and for all our historical acumen, the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* remain a fascination, while their origins are still, and most likely will always remain, an enigma.

Eric SAAK

EINE FAST 200JÄHRIGE KONTROVERSE UM DIE ZUORDNUNG DER WERKE DOMENICO CAVALCAS

Wer sich mit der Forschung zu Leben und Werk des Augustiners Simon Fidati von Cascia (ca.1295-1348) beschäftigt, wird früher oder später auf die Schriften des Augustiners Giacinto della Torre (1747-1814) stoßen. Er verwendete für seine Schrift, mit der er eine langandauernde Kontroverse auslöste, das Pseudonym Giambatista Moriondo. Seine Schriften bereiten dem Leser, der sich mit ihnen näher befaßt, nicht nur Freude, sondern auch mancherlei Beschwerden, da sie mehr Fragen aufwerfen als sie Antworten geben.

Die Schwierigkeiten entstanden dadurch, dass Moriondo die Werke Cavalcas (ca.1270-1342) zum größten Teil für Simon Fidati als ihren Verfasser oder Übersetzer beanspruchte. Die Ausführungen Moriondos blieben nicht unwidersprochen. Es antwortete ihm der Dominikaner Giovanni Battista Audiffredi (1714-1794). Damit war eine Kontroverse eröffnet, die sich über zwei Jahrhunderte hinzog.

In diesem Beitrag soll aufgezeigt werden, warum die Kontroverse dargestellt wird, welche Personen an ihr beteiligt waren, und welche verschlungenen Wege sie genommen hat.

1. Eine von Giacinto della Torre benutzte Handschrift

Bei meinen Bemühungen, die Handschriften des Traktats *L'ordine della vita cristiana* des Simon Fidati von Cascia zu finden und zusammenzustellen, stieß ich in der Bibliotheca Ambrosiana auf einen Codex, der neben dem Werk Simons auch die Schrift *Tratato de le molte stultitie* des Domenico Cavalca enthält. Es ist die Handschrift &. 246 Sup.

Als ich die Handschrift nach der Vorschrift der Bibliothek in weißen Handschuhen einsah, war mir in dieser ungewöhnlichen Aufmachung ganz feierlich zu Mute. Bei der Durchsicht ahnte ich aber nicht, dass die Feierlichkeit nicht nur von den Handschuhen ausging, sondern auch von der Handschrift selbst. Denn ich hatte es mit einem wiedergefundenen Schatz zu tun, der mich zu einem längeren Studium und dann zu diesem Beitrag veranlasste.

Zunächst seien einige Bemerkungen zu dem Codex vorausgeschickt.

In dem Codex &. 246 findet sich Simons Werk *L'ordine della vita cristiana* mit der Angabe seines Namens. Daneben steht aber auch ein Traktat ohne Nennung eines Autors. Aus anderen Quellen wußte ich, dass es sich um ein Werk des Dominikaners Domenico Cavalca handelt. Frühere Bibliographen, vor allem aus dem Augustinerorden, hatten diese Kenntnis nicht und nannten Simon als Autor auch dieses Traktates. Sie schlossen wahrscheinlich aus der ersten Autorangabe, dass es sich bei dem zweiten anonymen Traktat um das Werk desselben Autors handeln müsse.

Ich wollte mich eigentlich nicht intensiver in die strittigen Fragen hineinvertiefen, da sie zu Gunsten Cavalcas entschieden waren[1] und ich mit der Edition der zweifellos echten Werke Simons hinreichend zu tun hatte.

Deshalb nahm ich in Mailand die Handschriftenbeschreibung vor, kollationierte einige Seiten des Simontraktates und erfreute mich an den Versen Cavalcas, die ich zum ersten Mal lesen konnte.

Die Bedeutung der Handschrift wurde mir erst bewußt, als ich die Mailänder Kollationsergebnisse mit dem von Moriondo herausgegebenen Traktat Simons nach meiner Rückkehr ins Augustinus-Institut in Würzburg verglich. Ich stellte fest, dass der Handschriftentext nicht nur mit dem gedruckten Text übereinstimmte, sondern dass der Druck auch eine charakteristische Textanordnung der Handschrift übernommen hatte. Diese Tatsachen weckten in mir die Vermutung, dass die Mailänder Handschrift die von Moriondo verwendete handschriftliche Vorlage für seine Edition des in Volgare verfaßten Traktats *L'ordine della vita cristiana* war.

Meine Annahme wurde durch die Herkunft der Handschrift untermauert. Sie stammte nämlich nicht aus einem Mailänder Augustinerkloster, sondern aus dem Kloster SS. Agostino e Cristoforo in Turin. Es gehörte zur Lombardischen Kongregation des Augustinerordens und war das Kloster, in das Giacinto della Torre eingetreten und durch das er Mitglied dieser Kongregation geworden war.

Als ich zu diesen Erkenntnissen kam, war ich von der Materie bereits gefesselt. Denn es ging um nichts geringeres als um eine Handschrift, die mit einer langen Kontroverse in Verbindung stand, von Moriondo benutzt wurde und vielleicht das Vermächtnis eines Erzbischofs war, der sein Amt in schwieriger Zeit ausgeübt hatte.

Die Identifizierung machte mich auf einen Augustiner neugierig, der unter dem Pseudonym Giambatista Moriondo den Traktat

[1] „La questione si può dire risolta a favore del frate domenicano, soprattutto dopo l'intervento del Volpi, e basterà accennarvi." (C. DELCORNO, in: DBI 22, 577-586, bes. 578).

Simon Fidatis publiziert hatte, mit seiner Inanspruchnahme der Werke Cavalcas für Simon Fidati eine lange Kontroverse ausgelöst hatte und als Erzbischof von Turin gestorben war.

Die Kontroverse ließ mich nach ihrem Anlaß fragen, weckte mein Interesse an den beteiligten Personen und ihren Absichten und veranlaßte mich, ihre Argumente herauszuarbeiten.

Ich fragte mich, ob es sich bei der Kontroverse um eine Prestigefrage zwischen zwei Orden, den Augustinern und den Dominikanern, handelte oder ob es nicht auch um inhaltliche, methodische Fragen ging. Auf diese sich aufdrängenden Fragen wollte ich eine Antwort finden. Die Ergebnisse lege ich hiermit vor.

2. Giacinto Vincenzo della Torre alias Giambatista Moriondo und seine Abhandlung über Simon Fidati

Unter dem Namen Giambatista Moriondo finden sich in den einschlägigen Lexika keine Einträge, da es sich um ein Pseudonym handelt. Der richtige Name Moriondos lautet Giacinto della Torre.[2] Er findet in den Lexika und Nachschlagewerken Berücksichtigung.[3] Die Simonschrift ist allerdings unter dem Pseudonym Giambatista Moriondo veröffentlicht.

Es ist müßig, über die Frage zu spekulieren, warum der Verfasser sich eines Pseudonyms bediente.[4] Vielleicht ist dies die plausibelste Antwort: Er tat es, weil er ahnte, dass seine Schrift eine Auseinandersetzung auslösen würde, die ihn in aller Schärfe treffen und an seinen weiteren Plänen hindern könnte. Vor dieser wollte er sich durch das Verbergen seines richtigen Namens schützen.

[2] Art. G. PEJRONE, DELLA TORRE, GIACINTO VINCENZO, in: DBI XXXVII (1989) 552-555.

[3] D. A. PERINI, Bibliographia Augustiniana cum notis biographicis. Scriptores Itali II (D-M), Florenz1931, 21-22.

[4] In dem Nachschlagewerk von G. MELZI, Dizionario di opere anonime e pseudonime findet sich unter dem Namen G. Moriondo kein Eintrag. In einer Fußnote seines eigenen Werkes Ordine della vita cristiana, Turin 1779, 127 (2. Teil) macht Moriondo auf seinen wirklichen Namen aufmerksam. Er verweist auf ein Buch in der Bibliothek des Konventes S. Maria Incoronata mit den Traktaten Cavalcas. Dessen Name sei aber durchgestrichen worden. Darüber stehe der Name Simon de Cassia. MORIONDO fährt dann fort: „Allato poi al titolo in margine continuano le sequenti: Questo se la usurpato questo libro, che e l'ha composto el Beato Simon de Cassia dell'Ordine di S. Augustino Eremitano si come si trova negli soi exemplari vecchi scritti a mano. Il dotto Padre Della Torre, che di questo autunno in Milano ha cogli occhi propri il libro esaminato, me ne favorì cortesemente la soprascritta memoria, la quale siccome accurata, e distinta mi piacque or quì recare per maggiore autenticazione di quello, che già ne dissi nella seconda parte del mio Discorso di Preliminare."

Giacinto della Torre (1747-1814) ist nicht nur für die Simonforschung von Bedeutung, sondern auch und vor allem für die Kirchengeschichte Italiens des 18. und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts. Aber sowohl im wissenschaftlichen wie im kirchlichen Bereich wird er kritisiert. In beiden ist er eine umstrittene Persönlichkeit.

3. Der Beginn der Kontroverse um die Werke Domenico Cavalcas

Der Auslöser der Kontroverse war Giacinto della Torre, der unter dem Pseudonym Giambatista Moriondo die Edition *Ordine della Vita cristiana* des seligen Simon von Cascia vorlegte und damit verbunden eine Biographie und Beschreibung seiner Werke veröffentlichte, in der er die meisten Werke Cavalcas für Simon reklamierte.

Die Antwort auf diese Herausforderung des Jahres 1779 ließ nicht lange auf sich warten. Sie erfolgte ein Jahr später durch den Dominikaner Giovanni Battista Audiffredi. Er bediente sich ebenfalls eines Pseudonyms, nämlich des Namens Giulio Cesare Bottone da Monte Torraggio.[5] Seine Gegenschrift hat folgenden Titel: *Saggio di Osservazioni di Giulio Cesare Bottone da Monte Toraggio sopra il Discorso premesso all'Ordine della Vita Cristiana del B. Simone da Cascia stampato in Torino l'anno 1779. Nel quale si pretende provare, che la massima parte delle Opere, che vanno sotto il nome del P. Domenico Cavalca da Vico Pisano siano del detto Beato e confutazione di un tale divisamento,* Cosmopoli [Roma] 1780.

Giacinto antwortete auf diese Schrift nicht. Er hatte, wie er in seiner Veröffentlichung mitteilt, seine Auffassung begründet dargelegt und war nicht bereit, davon abzuweichen. Er schreibt zu dieser seiner Haltung: Er sei höchst zufrieden, wenn seine Auffassung dem Leser gefalle. Sei dieser nicht mit ihr einverstanden, dann solle er seiner Überzeugung folgen. Er wolle jedenfalls nicht mit ihm streiten.[6]

Giacinto wollte zwar mit niemandem in der Zuweisungsfrage streiten, aber einige Gelehrte waren anderer Meinung und fühlten sich von Moriondo herausgefordert. Doch zunächst wurde die Kontroverse nicht fortgeführt, nachdem beide Seiten ihren Standpunkt dargelegt hatten.

[5] G. MELZI, Dizionario di opere anonime e pseudonime di scrittori Italiani o come che sia aventi relazione all'Italia, I (A-G), Mailand 1848, 145.

[6] G. MORIONDO, Discorso sopra la vita e le opere, Torino 1779, 96. „Tale si è il parer mio intorno all'autore di quelle opere. Se al lettore discreto piacerà, io ne sarò pago, e soddisfatto. Nel rimanente non pretendo di voler contendere con alcuno, perchè lo segua."

Diese vorläufige Ruhe ist nicht weiter verwunderlich, da die Argumente des Dominikaners Domenico Audiffredi auf alle von Moriondo vorgebrachten Argumente eingingen und sie durch Angaben aus der Chronik des Konventes der hl. Catharina von Pisa und den Angaben der Manuskripte widerlegten.

Außerdem zog mit der Französischen Revolution (1789-1794) der Beginn einer Umwälzung großen Stils in Europa auf, welche die Kontroverse erst einmal in den Hintergrund drängte.

Aber auch diese Zeit ging vorüber und ließ, wie viele andere Fragen, so auch die in der Kontroverse aufgeworfenen ungelöst zurück.

4. Die an der Kontroverse beteiligten Personen

Zur Beantwortung der vorgebrachten Fragen werden die an der Kontroverse beteiligten Personen vorgestellt und charakterisiert, ihre Argumente dargestellt und gewichtet.

4.1 Der Florentiner Giovanni Gaetano Bottari (1689-1775)

Bereits bei der Herausgabe der Werke Cavalcas durch Giovanni Gaetano Bottari kündigte sich die Kontroverse an. Er kannte die Zuweisungen der Augustinerbibliographen von verschiedenen Werken Cavalcas an Simon Fidati, hielt sie aber aufgrund äußerer und innerer Kriterien für verfehlt.[7]

Stand Giovanni Gaetano Bottari ein solches Urteil zu? Verfügte er über die nötigen Kenntnisse? Welche Bedeutung hatte er im 18. Jahrhundert?

Ein Blick in sein Leben kann darüber Auskunft geben.

[7] G. G. Bottari (Hrsg.), Disciplina degli Spirituali col Trattato delle trenta Stoltizie di Fr. Domenico Cavalca dell'Ordine de'Predicatori, Roma 1757, pag. XXIII-XXIV: „Il P. Torelli negli Annali Agostiniani (tom. 5, pag. 588) e il P. Graziani nell'Anastasis Augustiniana pag. 165 e il P. Antonino Possevino De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis (tom. 3) attribuiscono al B. Simone da Cascia queste opere De disciplina spiritualium, et De stultitiis; ma come presero sbaglio nell'attribuire allo stesso B. Simone lo Specchio di Croce, e il Trattato Della Pazienza, così senza fallo avranno sbagliato nell'attribuirgli questi due. Oltre che molto diversa è la maniera del pensare, e del trattare queste materie nell'uno, e nell'altro autore; il che mi viene assicurato anche dal detto P. Fineschi, che sopra amendue ha fatto molto studio… ha avuto tutto l'agio di farne un critico, ed esatto confronto."

4.1.1 Studium und Karriere

Bottari spielte in der wissenschaftlichen Welt des 18. Jahrhunderts in Italien eine bedeutende Rolle, die er sich durch sein Studium, die Entwicklung seiner Anlagen und seine Position in der wissenschaftlichen Welt erworben hatte.

Sein Geburtsort ist Florenz. Er erblickte in der Arnostadt am 15. Januar 1689 das Licht der Welt. Schon früh zeigte sich, dass er ein aufgeweckter Junge war. Bereits mit zehn Jahren nahm er das Studium der Beredsamkeit und der lateinischen Sprache auf. Von 1704-1708 studierte er bei den Dominikanern von San Marco in Florenz Theologie, wo die Werke des hl. Thomas kommentiert wurden. Im Selbststudium setzte er seine Studien fort. Für das Erlernen der griechischen Sprache bediente er sich allerdings eines Lehrers.

Zu einem nicht näher angebbaren Zeitpunkt wählte er den Klerikerstand. Ab dem 20. August 1716 gehörte er an der Universität zu den Theologen. In dieser Zeit leitete er auch die großherzogliche Druckerei. 1718 stand er in den Diensten der Corsini in Florenz. 1720 erhielt er den Posten eines Synodalexaminators. Als solcher hatte er die Prüfungen bei Pfarrexamen in der Diözese Florenz abzunehmen.

Da er sich in den intellektuellen Kreisen den Ruf eines hervorragenden Linguisten und Kenners der toskanischen Literatur erworben hatte, betraute ihn die Accademia della Crusca mit der Vorbereitung einer Neuauflage des *Vocabolario* des Toskanischen Dialekts. Das Wörterbuch erschien in sechs Bänden in Florenz von 1729 bis 1737.

Nachdem Bottari zum Mitglied der Akademie gewählt worden war, hielt er von 1725 an Vorlesungen über Boccaccios *Decamerone*. In ihnen versuchte er, Boccaccio vom Vorwurf der Obszönität und Irreligiosität zu befreien.

Von 1725-1730 widmete er sich dem Studium und der Herausgabe von Florentiner Autoren, interessierte sich aber auch für jansenistische Literatur. Bei einem Romaufenthalt von 1725-1726 suchte er tieferen Einblick in die theologischen Kontroversen über die Gnade zu bekommen.

4.1.2 Tätigkeit in Rom

1730 wurde Bottari durch Papst Clemens XII. (1730-1740) nach Rom berufen. Den Papst verband seine familiäre Beziehung mit Florenz. Vor seiner Papstwahl hieß er Lorenzo Corsini, war also Mitglied

der florentinischen Adelsfamilie der Corsini. Von ihm wurde Bottari berufen und erhielt mit seiner Berufung ein Kanonikat und den Lehrstuhl für Kirchengeschichte und Kontroverstheologie an der Sapienza (1731). Seinen festen Wohnsitz nahm er im Palazzo Corsini. Dadurch wurde er vertraut mit den weitgespannten Kontakten der vornehmen Florentiner Familie (Kardinal Neri Corsini) und hatte eine geräumige Wohnung, die für Zusammenkünfte geeignet war. Er nutzte sie zu diesem Zweck und gründete einen Zirkel von Intellektuellen, den sogenannten *Burchiello*, dessen Mittelpunkt er wurde. Dieser gewann an Bedeutung, als Bottari 1735 vom Papst den Auftrag erhielt, dessen Privatbibliothek aufzubauen.

Seit 1730 ist bei Bottari eine Abneigung gegen die Jesuiten festzustellen, die er für die Krise in den theologischen Studien und das Nachlassen der Moral verantwortlich machte. Bottari setzte sich für das Studium der Kirchenväter und der Konzilien ein, die für ihn die Quellen der Wahrheit waren. In die gleiche Richtung weist die Betonung der Geschichte der frühen Kirche. Sie ist für ihn Beispiel und Norm der gegenwärtigen Kirche.

1735 wurde Bottari zum päpstlichen Privatkaplan und Erzpriester von S. Maria in Cosmedin ernannt und erhielt den Auftrag, eine Neuauflage des archäologischen Werkes *Roma sotterranea* zu erstellen. Die Publikation erfolgte in drei Bänden von 1737 bis 1754 (Rom I, 1737; II 1747; III 1754).[8]

4.1.3 Die Herausgabe der Werke Cavalcas

Neben diesen umfangreichen Tätigkeiten gab Bottari die Werke Domenico Cavalcas heraus. Von dessen Werken erschien 1738 in Rom *Lo specchio di croce*. Es folgte 1740 in Rom *Fior di virtù*, nachdem er 1739 zum zweiten Custoden der Vatikanischen Bibliothek ernannt worden war und auf jede Lehrtätigkeit verzichtet hatte.

[8] Giovanni Battista De Rossi, La Roma sotterranea cristiana I, Rom 1864; Nachdruck Frankfurt a. M. 1966, cap. XI (S. 56-62, bes. 58) gibt ein vernichtendes Urteil über die Vorgehensweise Bottaris ab. Er schreibt: „Il Bottari, che non scendeva sotterra a vedere coi suoi occhi le pitture che doveva interpretare" – come non consultava le opere sulle quali sentenziava poi inappellabilmente – preferendo con giudizii inesatti l'opera del Boldetti al testo del dottissimo e venerando Bosio chiamato il Colombo della Roma sotterranea, fu tratto a gravissimi errori contrarii ai veri interessi della scienza e che portarono la più grande confusione „nello studio dell'arte cristiana e del simbolismo primitivo." Der Einschub stammt in der Formulierung von N. Mattioli, Fra Giovanni da Salerno (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 231.

Nach dem Tode von Papst Clemens XII. im Jahre 1740 nahm Bottari als Konklavist von Kardinal Neri Corsini im gleichen Jahr am Konklave teil. Als neuer Papst wurde Benedikt XIV. (1740-1758) gewählt. Er hieß vorher Prospero Lambertini und war mit Bottari bekannt. Der Papst schätzte ihn und ernannte ihn zum Mitglied von drei Akademien. Es waren dies die Akademie für Kirchengeschichte, für die Konzilien und für das Altertum. 1741 erhielt er das Kanonikat von S. Maria in Trastevere. Während des Pontifikats von Benedikt XIV. erlangte Bottari seine größte Bekanntheit als Gelehrter.

Während dieser Zeit publizierte er von den Werken Cavalcas die folgenden: *Pungilingua*, Rom 1751 und *Frutti di lingua*, Rom 1754.

4.1.4 Die jansenistischen Neigungen Bottaris

Zwischen 1740 und 1758 ist bei Bottari ein verstärkter Antijesuitismus und ein Philojansenismus festzustellen. Er wird zu einem Anhänger der strengen Augustinerschule (*delectatio relative victrix*, verneint die Möglichkeit des *status naturae purae*, verneint die Effektivität der gratia sufficiens, der hinreichenden Gnade). Seit 1749 sammelte er im Palazzo Corsini gleichgesinnte Gelehrte aus dem Welt- und Ordensklerus um sich, die ebenfalls diese Auffassung vertraten, und sich den Namen *circolo dell'Archetto* gaben.

Bottari hielt eine innerkirchliche Reform für dringend erforderlich. Für ihn bestand sie in der Zurückweisung des Molinismus. Um 1756 erblickte er im Molinismus und in der Gesellschaft Jesu sogar den Antichristen, der die Wahrheit bekämpft.

Bottari gehörte zu den Protagonisten für die Verbreitung jansenistischen Gedankengutes in Italien. Er übersetzte jansenistische Schriften und führte sie nach Italien ein. Damit wurde vor allem die Bibliotheca Corsiniana ausgestattet.

Großen Wert legte Bottari auf die Übersetzung und Verbreitung der Hl. Schrift in der Volkssprache. Er wollte dadurch die Kenntnis der wahren Lehre fördern. Sein reformerisches Bestreben war nicht von der Aufklärung inspiriert, sondern von dem Bemühen um die Wiederherstellung und Verbreitung der gesunden Lehre (*sana doctrina*). Dieses Ziel wollte er auch durch die Vertreibung der Gesellschaft Jesu aus Portugal erreichen, ein Unterfangen, das er mit dem Gelehrtenzirkel *Archetto* unterstützte, und durch die Herausgabe des Katechismus des jansenistischen Theologen Francois-Philippe Mésenguy (1677-1763) in italienischer Übersetzung (1758-1761), von dem sowohl das

Original indiziert war, wie die Übersetzung Bottaris von 1761. Dies hinderte Bottari jedoch nicht daran, das Buch weiterhin zu verkaufen. Zu einem öffentlichen Widerstand gegen den Hl. Stuhl kam es bei Bottari jedoch nicht.

Nach dem Tod seiner einflußreichen Freunde (Passionei, Orsi, Tamburini und Spinelli) ging Bottari auf dem eingeschlagenen Weg weiter.

Mittels des energischen Einsatzes von Kardinal Corsini gelang es, Bottari zum ersten Kustoden der Vatikanischen Bibliothek zu ernennen. Die Beförderung stand ihm zwar rechtmäßig nach dem Tod seines Vorgängers Assemani zu, man suchte sie aber zu verhindern.

Solange es ihm physisch möglich war, betätigte sich Bottari seelsorglich, indem er Beichte hörte und Katechismusunterricht erteilte.

Halb gelähmt und fast stumm starb Bottari am 4. Juni 1775. Sein Grab fand er in der Kirche S. Maria in Trastevere.

4.1.5 Die Arbeitsschwerpunkte Bottaris

Bottari hatte verschiedene Arbeitsschwerpunkte. Hier interessiert der des Philologen des Volgare der Toskana und des Editors der Werke Cavalcas.

Bottari führte keine kritische Edition der Werke Cavalcas durch, sondern benutzte die schon vorhandenen Ausgaben und suchte sie mit Hilfe von Codices zu verbessern. Auf diese Weise machte er ein breiteres Publikum mit dem Werk des Dominikaners bekannt. Für die Edition des *Specchio di Croce* zog er zwei Codices heran.[9] Für die anderen Werke Cavalcas stützte er sich auf die Editionen des 15. Jahrhunderts und auf Codices.

In der Einleitung zum Traktat *Disciplina degli Spirituali* bringt Bottari auch ein inneres Kriterium vor, um die Zuweisungsfrage der Werke Cavalcas zu klären. Er schreibt, dass die Art des Denkens und der Behandlung des Stoffes bei Cavalca und Simon Fidati unterschiedlich ist. In diesem Urteil fühlt sich Bottari durch den Florentiner Dominikaner P. Fineschi bestärkt. Von ihm schreibt er, dass dieser beide Autoren intensiv studierte und einen kritischen und genauen Vergleich zwischen ihnen anstellte. Für die Zuweisung der Werke Cavalcas verließ sich Bottari also nicht nur auf sein eigenes Urteil, sondern zog auch das eines anderen Experten, das des P. Fineschi

[9] Enciclopedia Italiana 13 (1971) 416.

heran, der Bibliothekar von Santa Maria Novella in Florenz war und über philologische Kenntnisse verfügte.

Mit Bottari hatten die Werke Cavalcas einen angesehenen und ausgewiesenen Editor. Er war Mitglied der Accademia della Crusca, gehörte verschiedenen päpstlichen Akademien an, war zunächst zweiter, dann erster Custos der Vatikanischen Bibliothek, zudem Bibliothekar der Corsiniana und scharte in zwei Zirkeln, zuerst in dem *Burchiello* und danach in dem *Archetto,* Gelehrte um sich. Sein Bemühen galt der toskanischen Literatur *del buon secolo*. Es war gekoppelt mit seinem reformerischen Bestreben, die gesunde Lehre (*sana doctrina*) durch Rückgriff auf die Kirchenväter und das Beispiel der frühen Kirche wieder zur Geltung zu bringen. Seine editorischen Arbeiten von Schriften im Volgare, vor allem diejenigen Cavalcas, müssen hier eingereiht werden. Seine handlichen Editionen der Werke und Übersetzungen Cavalcas gehören zu seinem Bemühen um die Verbreitung der gesunden Lehre bei den einfachen Christen.

Leider beschäftigte er sich nicht näher mit Simons Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana*, der ebenfalls in Volgare abgefaßt ist und ein glänzendes Zeugnis der Literatur des *buon secolo* darstellt.

Mit Blick auf die Kontroverse ist kritisch anzumerken, dass Bottari sich keinen hinreichenden Überblick über die Handschriftenlage verschaffte und das Werk Simon Fidatis wohl kaum selbst studierte.

4.2 Der Augustiner Giacinto della Torre (1747-1814)

Der von Bottari vorgenommenen Zuweisung widersprach der Augustiner Giacinto della Torre. In seiner Argumentation ging er nicht auf die von Bottari vorgebrachten Einzelpunkte ein, sondern reklamierte alle Schriften Cavalcas für Simon Fidati. Mit diesem Vorgehen löste er die Kontroverse über die Werke Cavalcas aus. Ob Giacinto seinen literarischen Kontrahenten Bottari jemals persönlich kennen lernte, ist nicht bekannt. Es war auch nicht notwendig, da es um Bücher, nicht aber um Personen ging.

4.2.1 Giacintos Ausbildung und seine Beschäftigung mit Simon

Wer war Giacinto della Torre? Wie kam es zu seinem Interesse an Simon Fidati?

Das Leben Giacintos ist gut erforscht.[10] Wird aber ein besonderer Lebensabschnitt herausgegriffen, wie seine Beschäftigung mit dem Leben und Werk Simons, dann werden die Nachrichten spärlich. Die Defizite sollen weitere Untersuchungen anregen und fördern, die hier aber nicht geleistet werden können.

Giacinto wurde am 15. März 1747 in Saluzzo im Piemont als Sohn des Filippo dei Conti di Lucerna e Valle und der Teresa Vittoria Melano di Portula geboren. Seine zutiefst christlich geprägte Erziehung war seiner vornehmen Herkunft angemessen. Er durchlebte eine ruhige und geordnete Jugend.

Ein wichtiger Abschnitt im Leben Giacintos begann im Jahre 1762. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt trat er bei den Augustinern in Turin ins Noviziat ein und legte am 16. November 1763 die Profeß ab. Sein Profeßkloster war SS. Agostino e Cristoforo. Es gehörte zur Lombardischen Kongregation, die sich als Reformzweig des Augustinerordens gebildet hatte, um ein regeltreues Leben als selbständige Einheit innerhalb des Ordens zu führen.[11]

Die Studien führte Giacinto an verschiedenen Orten Italiens durch. Er schloß sie in Rom und Bologna ab. Am 10. März 1770 empfing er die Priesterweihe in Bologna.

Er erlangte nicht nur den theologischen Doktorgrad am 4. Juni 1771 an der Universität Turin, sondern war auch ein exzellenter Kenner der italienischen Literatur.[12]

Im Augustinerkonvent von Cremona wurde er zum Leiter des Studiums bestellt und wirkte als Lektor der Philosophie und Theologie. Er schrieb hier das Werk *Elogia virorum pietate illustrium, qui saeculo XVIII floruerunt in Italia et insulis adiacentibus*. Es wurde aber nicht veröffentlicht.

[10] Siehe dazu Art. G. Pejrone, Della Torre, Giacinto Vincenzo, in: DBI XXXVII (1989) 552-555; A. C. de Romanis, Giacinto della Torre O. S. A. Arcivescovo di Torino (1747-1814), in: Bollettino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 117-119; 136-140; XI (1935) 40-46; 67-70; 100-103; 148-152; XII (1935)14-17.

[11] Donato Calvi, Delle memorie istoriche della Congr. Osser. di Lombardia dell'Ord. Erem. di S. Agostino. Parte prima. In cui s'hanno la vita, et gloriose attioni de suoi primi tre Santi Institutori, con l'origine della medesima Congregatione, serie di tutti li Capitoli et Vicarii Generali della stessa, loro meriti, dottrina et qualità, con la nota de gl'altri publici Ministri, Milano 1669. Ein weiterführender zweiter Teil ist nicht erschienen.

[12] Seine Doktorarbeit wurde veröffentlicht: Joannes Baptista Moriondus, Ad sacrae facultatis pro-doctoratum in regio Taurinensi Atheneo. Anno MDCCLXXI. die IV. Junii hora V. pomeridiana. Augustae Taurinorum. In ihr hat sich Moriondo mit folgenden zwei Themen auseinandergesetzt: De actionibus humanis (S. 3-12) und De Verbo homine facto (S. 13-19).

Das Amt des Studienleiters hatte Giacinto auch im Konvent von Turin inne, wo er zugleich Prior wurde und ihm zusätzlich die Aufgabe des Synodalexaminators übertragen war.[13]

Nach seiner Rückkehr nach Turin 1778 wurde Giacinto zu den Unterredungen der Akademie Sampaolina zugelassen. Zum ersten Band der Akademieschrift *Piemiontesi illustri* schrieb Giacinto einen Beitrag über *Giovanbattista Costa agostiniano vicario generale della Congregazione di Genova,* Turin 1781. Zum dritten Band schrieb er ein *Elogio di Girolamo Negri agostiniano vicario Generale della Congregazione di Lombardia,* Turin 1783.

Von seiner Ausbildung und Neigung her war die Ordensgeschichte für Giacinto ein besonderes Betätigungsfeld. Er suchte die Verbindung zu Girolamo Tiraboschi (1731-1794), der an seiner Literaturgeschichte arbeitete, um ihm seine Dienste anzubieten. Mit ihm trat er in brieflichen Kontakt. Es kam zu einer Zusammenarbeit an der *Storia della Letteratura Italiana.* Giacinto wurde sein freier Mitarbeiter und schrieb Beiträge über die Augustiner.[14]

Im Zuge seiner diesbezüglichen augustinischen Studien oder bereits vorher wurde Giacinto auf die Veröffentlichungen Bottaris (1689-1775) aufmerksam[15], der zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits seine handliche Ausgabe der Werke des Dominikaners Domenico Cavalca veröffentlicht (1738-1764) hatte. Unter ihnen befanden sich auch Schriften, die von den Literaturhistorikern aus dem Augustinerorden und von anderen dem Simon Fidati zugeschrieben wurden.[16] Bei seinen historischen Studien fiel Giacinto diese Diskrepanz zwischen Bottaris Zuschreibungen und den Angaben der Bibliographen auf.[17]

[13] D. A. Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana. Cum notis biographicis. Scriptores Itali, Vol. II, Florenz 1931, 21.

[14] A. C. de Romanis, Giacinto della Torre, in: Bolletino Sorico Agostiniano X (1934) 116.

[15] Moriondo nennt ihn einen „rinomatissimo letterato di questo secolo" (G. Moriondo, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1779, 59).

[16] Moriondo schreibt verwundert über Bottari: „Il quale li sette elegantissimi Trattati di pietà, e di divozione, che diede alle stampe di Roma in sette distinti volumi in ottavo, e che gli antichi Scrittori attribuiscono al B. Simone, tutti egli pose sotto il nome del P. Cavalca dell'Ordine de'Predicatori. Ed io volenterissimamente me ne passerei così senza nè rifiutare, nè concedere un tale assunto, se la fatica, che ho impresa di porre in qualche luce alla meglio le opere di questo Beato mel permettesse, ovvero non avessi a temere di eludere l'aspettazione del cortese Lettore, il quale a questo punto spinoso, ed intralciato piucchè mai, avrà già tosto fisso l'occhio per vederne l'uscita." (G. Moriondo, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1779, 59).

[17] Moriondo nennt zwei Gründe für seinen Widerspruch gegen die Zuweisungen Bottaris: „Ma volgendo poi l'occhio alle diverse testificazioni degli antichi storici, e di più considerando le ragioni, che in difesa di sua opinione ne apporta or quà, or là nelle sue prefazioni, rimasi non poco dubbioso." (G. Moriondo, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1779, 59).

Deshalb untersuchte er die Frage der bibliographischen Überlieferung der Werke Simons.

Er wollte aufgrund der Aussagen der Bibliographen herausfinden, welche Werke Simon und welche Cavalca zum Verfasser haben. Die von ihm erarbeiteten Ergebnisse legte er in einer Studie nieder, in der er zu dem Resultat kam, dass alle Werke, die von Bottari dem Domenico Cavalca zugeschrieben werden, dem Simon Fidati zuzurechnen sind. Eine Ausnahme bilden die Übersetzungen der Dialoge des hl. Gregor ins Volgare, die Cavalca durchgeführt hatte.

Im Jahre 1778 schloß Giacinto della Torre seine Studien ab, die im darauf folgenden Jahre in der Stamperia Reale erschienen. Giacinto verwendete das Pseudonym Giambatista Moriondo. Der Titel des Werkes lautet: *Ordine della vita cristiana del B. Simone da Cascia Eremitano di S. Agostino con discorso sopra la vita, e le opere di questo beato, in Torino 1779.*

Das Werk enthält eine historische Abhandlung über das Leben und die Schriften Simons sowie die Edition von Simons *L'ordine della vita cristiana,* weiter einen kleineren Beitrag Simons, mit dem Titel *Regola ovvero Dottrina di Frate Simone da Cassa Frate Romitano di santo Agostino ad una sua figliuola in Cristo da Roma, e gentil donna* und zwei Briefe, nämlich *Lettera di Madonna Cella di Firenze a Fr. Simone da Cascia, e di lui risposta.*

Eine Antwort auf die Ausführungen Moriondos zur Zuschreibung verschiedener Werke an Simon Fidati erfolgte ein Jahr später durch den Dominikaner Giovanni Battista Audiffredi unter dem Pseudonym Giulio Cesare Bottone da Monte Torraggio. Er widersprach ihm in allen Punkten und forderte die Werke für den wahren Autor Cavalca.

4.2.2 Die Hauptpunkte der Argumentation Giacintos zu Gunsten Simons

Welches sind die Hauptpunkte, die Giacinto zu Gunsten Simons vorbringt?

Sein erstes Argument bezieht er aus den Angaben der Literaturhistoriker.

Bei seinen Studien stellte Giacinto della Torre fest, dass die Schriften, die Bottari Cavalca zuschrieb, von den Literaturhistorikern aus dem Augustinerorden und von anderen fast einhellig dem Simon zugewiesen werden.[18] Giacinto selbst verweist darauf, dass dieses

[18] „Ma, oltrechè troppo torto farebbesi agli scrittori tutti da me sopra riferiti col credere, che siano iti alla cieca l'un dopo l'altro, assai chiaro parmi aver dimostrato, che la testimonianza de' più antichi porta seco tali contrassegni di verità, e non sospetta

Argument jedoch mit Vorsicht gebraucht werden muß, da es nicht auf die Anzahl der Zeugen ankommt, sondern auf die Glaubwürdigkeit des ersten, der die Nachricht veröffentlicht hat.[19]

Als erster stellte der Augustinergeneral Ambrogio Massari da Cori, auch Coriolanus genannt (General: 1476-1485), eine Werkliste Simons zusammen. Er wird von Moriondo als glaubwürdiger Zeuge angesehen, da er der General des Augustinerordens war und sich auf glaubwürdige Zeugen beziehen konnte.[20]

Für ein zweites Argument beruft sich Moriondo auf die Einleitungen, die Bottari seinen Editionen vorausschickt. Er stellt Divergenzen in der Argumentation Bottaris fest, die bei Moriondo Zweifel an dessen Zuweisungen hervorriefen.[21] Sie veranlaßten ihn dazu, der einhelligen Tradition der Bibliographen mehr zu vertrauen als den Argumenten Bottaris.[22]

Ein drittes Argument bezieht sich auf die von Bottari vorgebrachten Hauptzeugnisse für die Autorschaft Cavalcas. Er äußert seine Reserve sowohl gegenüber den Mitteilungen der Chronik des Klosters der Hl. Katharina in Pisa[23] als auch gegenüber den Zuschreibungen an Cavalca, die sich in den Handschriften finden. Moriondo vermutet, dass der Name Cavalcas von unwissenden Schreibern oder aus irgend einem nicht mehr ersichtlichen Grund eingefügt wurde.[24]

credenza, quanta si possa in sì fatte rimote cose maggiore desiderare." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 68).

[19] „Acconsentirò anch'io al Baronio, che la verità dell'istoria non dal numero degli scrittori, ma di qual fede sia degno il primo, che l'ha divolgata, abbiasi da apprezzare." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 68).

[20] „La più antica, che siami avvenuto di trovare, si è quella del P. Ambrogio Coriolano, o Corano, come egli stesso diversamente si appella, Generale dell'Ordine degli Agostiniani. Egli però nella sua Cronica degli Scrittori di sua Religione, aggiunta per appendice ad altro libro in difesa della sua Regola." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 61-62).

[21] „Primieramente fa duopo osservare, che il prelodato Signore non tenne sempre intorno all'autore di quelle opere il medesimo uniforme linguaggio, avendo dapprima creduto, che e quanto alla lingua fossero del Cavalca, mostrandone ne' primi quattro volumi tal confidenza, quasi che tutti ne avessero uguale certezza ad avere." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 60).

[22] „Se mal non m'appongo, e maggiori, e più accreditate testimonianze non si possono desiderare di quelle, che il B. Simone da Cascia senza dubbiezza, e limitazione delle indicate opere fanno autore assoluto." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 61).

[23] „Nè solo posteriore si fu F. Domenico da Peccioli al Cavalca, ma ho dubbio, che neppure molto informato egli si fosse delle produzioni di quegli stessi suoi Religiosi, di cui prese a descrivere le onorevoli letterarie fatiche." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1779, 85).

[24] G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 82-83. „Non altro io sono d'avviso, se non che il nome del Cavalca si fu o per ignoranza, o per altro motivo

Es werden von Moriondo auch zwei Theorien angeführt, welche die Zuweisung der Traktate an Simon und Cavalca erklären wollen. Ihre Autoren sind Domenico Maria Manni (1690-1788) und Giovanni Gaetano Bottari selbst (1689-1775).[25]

Die erste besagt, dass Simon den Text in Latein verfaßte und Cavalca ihn ins Italienische übersetzte. Da es für diese Hypothese weder eine lateinische Vorlage noch sonstige Hinweise gibt, wird sie von Moriondo abgelehnt.[26]

Zur Erklärung der zweifachen Zuweisung machte Manni den Vorschlag, den auch Bottari favorisierte, dass zwischen Simon und Cavalca ein Treffen stattgefunden habe, bei dem sie die Werke konzipierten. Dazu meint Moriondo, dass für ein solches Unternehmen nicht nur ein Treffen, sondern verschiedene Zusammenkünfte erforderlich gewesen wären. Dafür liegen ebenfalls keine Hinweise vor.[27] Deshalb bleibt Moriondo bei seiner Auffassung, dass Simon der alleinige Autor der Traktate ist.[28]

Moriondo gesteht zu, dass Cavalca die Übersetzung der Apostelgeschichte und des Briefes des hl. Hieronymus an Eustochium durchgeführt hat.[29] Er steht jedoch den übrigen Ausführungen Bottaris sehr kritisch gegenüber.

insussistente a me ignoto da trascrittori buonamente intruso." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 78).

[25] „Quindi, avutone dubbio ne'posteriori, s'appigliò a dire, che il beato Simone ne fosse l'autor vero, ed il Cavalca il traduttore in Toscano. All'esame pertanto di queste due opinioni si ravvolge il mio ragionamento. Perciocchè quella terza, che il Manni propose alla sfuggita, di pensare; cioè, che due autori per casuale incontro abbiano le stesse opere in una istessa lingua composto, quantunque da ommettersi non sia, pure non essendo stata da veruno seguitata, e tanto meno dal Bottari, che non può averla ignorata, non la reputo tale da doversi annoverare tra quelle, che formar debbono l'oggetto di questa mia ricerca." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 60).

[26] „Perciocchè primieramente osservo, che di essa non si ritrova in antico scrittore traccia alcuna, o vestigio, e neppure venne mai a cognizione d'alcuno, che vi sia in qualche luogo verun codice Latino, non dico già nelle librerie d'Italia (sebbene eziandio in queste); ma pure ne'forestieri paesi, ove altrive n'ha delle opere latine del B. Simone." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 87).

[27] „E sono persuaso, che chiunque alcun poco vi rifletterà, per le strane conseguenze, che ne verrebbero, riputerà questa sentenza fra tutte la più improbabile, ed inconsistente." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 95).

[28] „Epperò tutta, e solo al B. Simone debbeai riservare la gloria di queste, e delle altre tutte nobilissime composizioni." (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 94).

[29] G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana, Torino 1797, 95-96.

4.2.3 Die weitere Karriere Giacintos

Im Jahr des Beginns der Französischen Revolution 1789 änderte sich auch für Giacinto della Torre viel in seiner Lebensführung. Denn von diesem Jahr an wurde er in verantwortungsvolle Ämter berufen, zunächst in das des Oberen seiner Kongregation und dann des Erzbischofs bzw. Bischofs in verschiedenen Diözesen.

Sein Aufstieg begann am 2. November 1789. An diesem Tag wurde er zum Generalvikar (*Vicario/Commissario Generale*) der Lombardischen Kongregation gewählt.[30] Für die Durchführung historischer Arbeiten blieb in diesem Amt kaum Zeit. Denn es war seine Aufgabe, sich um das Wohl seiner Mitbrüder zu kümmern und den Bestand der Kongregation zu sichern.

Das Leitungsamt in der Kongregation bekleidete Giacinto allerdings nur fünf Monate. Dann wurde er durch König Vittorio Amedeo III. auf den Erzbischofsstuhl von Sassari auf Sardinien berufen. Der Hl. Stuhl ernannte ihn am 29. März 1790 zum Erzbischof dieses Bistums. Die Bischofsweihe fand am 2. Mai 1790 in Turin statt.[31]

Giacinto della Torre wirkte segensreich in der Pastoral und war auch aufgeschlossen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Insel. Er setzte sich für Strukturmaßnahmen ein, indem er den Straßenbau förderte und dadurch zur Erschließung der Insel beitrug.[32]

In Ruhe konnte der Erzbischof seiner Arbeit allerdings nicht sehr lange nachkommen. Denn es kam zu politischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Sassari und Cagliari, der anderen größeren Insel- und Bischofsstadt. In dieser bekleidete der Bruder der Mutter Giacintos della Torre das bischöfliche Amt. Streitpunkt zwischen den beiden Städten und ihren Einwohnern war die Güterverteilung, der herrschende Feudalismus, die Sonderrechte der Adeligen und der Kirche. Die Bewohner wollten es nicht mehr hinnehmen, dass sich Grund und Boden in den Händen von nur wenigen Großgrundbesitzern befand und sie nicht an der Ausübung von Rechten beteiligt wurden.

Der Erzbischof Giacinto konnte sich aus diesem Streit nicht heraushalten, da er ein Teil des feudalen Systems war. Er ergriff Partei und stellte sich auf die Seite der Feudalherren. Es kam zum Kampf zwischen den beiden Städten, der mit Blutvergießen verbunden war.

[30] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 116.

[31] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 116.

[32] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 116.

Giacinto della Torre suchte ihn dadurch zu beenden, dass er sich als Geisel stellte. Nach Verhandlungen schlossen die beiden Parteien eine Übereinkunft, die zur Befreiung Giacintos della Torre führte.[33]

Aus der durch die politischen Auseinandersetzungen schwierigen Situation wurde Giacinto della Torre durch seine Ernennung zum Bischof von Acqui im Piemont befreit. Die Ernennung erfolgte durch Carlo Emanuele IV. am 14. Juni 1797. Der Hl. Stuhl bestätigte die Ernennung am 24. Juli des gleichen Jahres. Acqui war keine leichte Diözese. Giacinto della Torre gewann aber das Vertrauen seiner Diözesanen und seines Klerus. Es kam zu einer fruchtbaren Zusammenarbeit.[34]

Ein weiterer Schritt in seiner geistlichen Karriere war für Giacinto della Torre seine Ernennung zum Erzbischof von Turin im Mai 1805 durch Erlaß des Kaisers Napoleon,[35] der am 18. 5. 1804 zum Kaiser der Franzosen proklamiert worden war. Die maliziöse Aussage, Giacinto della Torre sei aufgrund seines *spirito di adulazione* (Geistes der Schmeichelei) zum Erzbischof von Turin ernannt worden, ist unzutreffend. Die Feststellung ist eher eine parteiische Deutung als eine historische Wahrheit.[36] Am 26. Juni desselben Jahres wurde die Ernennung vom Hl. Stuhl bestätigt.[37] Die Aussage von der Neigung zur Schmeichelei bezieht sich wohl auf zwei Ansprachen, die Giacinto einmal bei den Beisetzungsfeierlichkeiten der Maria Antonia Ferdinanda, Infantin von Spanien und Königin von Sardinien, 1785 hielt und 1796 bei der Bestattung von Vittorio Amedeo III., König von Sardinien.[38] Diese waren dem beurteilenden Historiker wohl zu wohlwollend.

Als Erzbischof von Turin hatte Giacinto della Torre ein schwieriges Amt inne. Er hatte die Interessen seiner Diözese und diejenigen der Kirche zu wahren, aber auch den Erwartungen des Kaisers, so weit es möglich war, entgegen zu kommen.

Den Wünschen des Kaisers fügte er sich zum ersten Mal vor großer Kulisse bei der Hochzeit Napoleons mit Marie-Luise von Österreich am 1.-2. April 1810. An ihr nahm der Turiner Erzbischof teil,

[33] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 116-117.

[34] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 117-119.

[35] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 139-140.

[36] Art. DELLA TORRE, GIACINTO VINCENZO, in: DBI 37 (1989) 552-555, bes. 554.

[37] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano X (1934) 140.

[38] DBI XXXVII (1989) 553.

nachdem ihre kirchliche Zulässigkeit festgestellt worden war.[39] Kritikern gegenüber begründete er seine umstrittene Teilnahme mit dem Hinweis auf den Papst, welcher der Zeremonie ebenfalls nicht fern geblieben war, und den Interessen seiner Diözese.[40]

Vor einer weiteren wichtigen Entscheidung stand der Erzbischof, als die Aufforderung an ihn erging, am Nationalkonzil von Paris teilzunehmen, das am 17. Juni 1811 begann. Er entschied sich zur Teilnahme. Auf ihm übte er die Funktion eines Sekretärs aus[41]. Es gelang Napoleon mit Hilfe des Nationalkonzils jedoch nicht, eine französische Nationalkirche zu gründen.[42]

Seine Anwesenheit auf dem Konzil benutzte Giacinto dazu, die Freilassung Pius VII. (1800-1823) zu fordern, der zunächst in Fontainebleau und dann in Savona von allen Ratgebern getrennt durch Napoleon bis 1814 gefangen gehalten wurde.[43] Nach dem Sturz Napoleons kehrte Pius VII. nach Rom zurück.

Nach der Rückkehr Giacintos della Torre vom Nationalkonzil in seine Diözese führte der Erzbischof die begonnene Neuordnung fort und ergriff oder förderte neue Initiativen.

Nach einem bewegten Leben starb er am 8. April 1814 in seiner Bischofsstadt Turin.[44] Auf seinem Grabstein stehen folgende Worte, die er selbst diktiert hatte:

> Hic resurrectionem expectant exuviae
> Hyacinthi a Turre Archiepiscopi Taurinensis.
> Orate pro eo.
> 1814.[45]

Übersetzt heißt die Grabinschrift: Hier erwarten die Überreste des Giacinto della Torre, des Erzbischofs von Turin, die Auferstehung. Betet für ihn. 1814.

[39] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bollettino Storico Agostiniano XI (1935) 148.

[40] Siehe dazu: Die Geschichte des Christentums. Religion, Politik, Kultur. Bd. 10: Aufklärung, Revolution, Restauration (1750-1830), Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2000, 642-643.

[41] Die Geschichte des Christentums, 644-646.

[42] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bollettino Storico Agostiniano XI (1935) 149.

[43] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bolletino Storico Agostiniano XI (1935) 150-152.

[44] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bollettino Storico Agostiniano XII (1935) 15.

[45] A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE, in: Bollettino Storico Agostiniano XII (1935) 15.

Beim Blick auf die bewegte Lebensgeschichte Giacintos della Torre stellt sich die Frage, ob er sich noch einmal mit den von ihm behandelten Fragen zur Autorschaft Simons beschäftigen konnte. Man muß wohl davon ausgehen, dass dies nicht mehr geschah. Er hat jedoch durch seine Kontroverse dazu beigetragen, dass Simon und seine Werke nicht in Vergessenheit gerieten. Die von ihm benutzte Handschrift für die Herausgabe des Traktates ist auf Wegen, die nicht mehr zurückverfolgt werden können, auf uns gekommen. Sie ist ein wichtiges Vermächtnis.

Seine Intervention zeigt auch, dass Simons Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana* in den Bibliotheken der Lombardischen Kongregation verbreitet war und das Interesse des einen oder anderen Lesers fand.

4.3 Giovanni Battista Audiffredi (1714-1794)

Den Schlußfolgerungen Moriondos zur Autorschaft Simons für bestimmte Traktate widersprach der Dominikaner Giovanni Battista Audiffredi unter dem Pseudonym Giulio Cesare Bottone da Monte Torraggio[46] mit einer sehr fundierten und kenntnisreichen Schrift.

4.3.1 Daten aus seinem Leben

Zum Leben und Wirken Audiffredis müssen wenige Angaben genügen.[47] Er wurde am 2. Februar 1714 zu Saorgio bei Nizza an der Var geboren. In den Dominikanerorden trat er ein, „als sein Alter es gestattete". Er überragte seine Mitstudenten nicht nur durch seine Kenntnisse in Griechisch und Latein, sondern auch in Mathematik. Als er wider aller Erwarten zum Bibliothekar an der dem Orden gehörenden Bibliotheca Casanatense in Rom ernannt wurde, befand er sich noch in jugendlichem Alter.[48]

[46] G. MELZI, Dizionario di opere anonime e pseudonime di scrittori Italiani o come che sia aventi relazione all'Italia, I (A-G), Mailand 1848, 145.

[47] Sie sind den Angaben entnommen, die sich in der Vorrede zu Audiffredis Werk Specimen historico-criticum editionum italicarum saeculi XV., in quo praeter editiones ab Orlandio, Mettario, Denisio, Laerio, et a nonnullis bibliographis recentioribus hactenus relatas plurimae aliae recensentur omnesque plenius uberiusque describuntur: Non paucae contra eorundem sententiam elucidantur: Varia item ad historiam typographicam et bibliographicam spectantia interseruntur: Authore R. P. M. Fr. Jo. Bapt. Audiffredi Ord. Praed. Casanatensi Bibliothecae Praefecto. Accedunt indices IV. locupletissimi, Romae in Typographio Palearinano 1794, befinden.

[48] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, VII.

An Audiffredi wird die Verrichtung seiner religiösen Pflichten und sein Arbeitseifer gerühmt. Es heißt wörtlich: „Als er in den Sitz der Weisheit (Bibliothek) aufgenommen war, ließ er keinen Tag vorübergehen, ohne ihn ganz, nachdem er seinem religiösen Obliegenheiten Genüge getan hatte, zum Lesen oder Schreiben zu verwenden."[49] Als Früchte dieser Arbeit werden astronomische Beobachtungen, wie etwa die folgende genannt: *1753 Mercurius in sole visus. Observatio habita Romae in aedibus Sanctae Mariae supra Minervam VI. Maii eiusdem anni.*[50] Außerdem wird ein vierbändiger Bibliothekskatalog der Casanatense und der *Saggio di osservazioni*, der hier besonders interessiert, genannt.[51]

An dem bibliographischen Nachschlagewerk, das kurz nach dem Tode Audiffredis erschien – er starb am 3. Juli 1794 in Rom – wird hervorgehoben, dass es aufgrund von Gelehrsamkeit, Urteilskraft und Genauigkeit erarbeitet wurde, die man nur von Audiffredi erwarten konnte.[52] Aufgrund seines Alters hatte er sich zwar gegen die Abfassung gewehrt, da er aber „freundlich und gütig war", fügte er sich den Bitten.[53] Mit seinem Katalog verfolgte er die Absicht, Italien als ein Land herauszustellen, das allen anderen Regionen in Europa vorzuziehen ist, sowohl durch die Vielzahl, wie durch die Vorzüglichkeit, die Schönheit und die Mannigfaltigkeit der Editionen, die es im XV. Jahrhundert hervorbrachte.[54]

Für seine Erwiderung auf Giacintos Schrift verfügte er damit über eine ausgezeichnete Bibliothek und eine gründliche Kenntnis der Materie.

4.3.2 Die Argumente Audiffredis

In seiner Argumentation zu Gunsten Cavalcas hebt Audiffredi einen augenfälligen Unterschied zwischen Simon und Cavalca hervor. Er verweist darauf, dass Cavalca die Väter und anderen Autoren ausdrücklich nennt. Bei Simon dagegen sind weder Väter noch mittelalterliche Autoren expressis verbis zitiert, während bei Cavalca bei den Zitaten auch ihre Verfasser stehen.[55] Dies ist ein wichtiges Unter-

[49] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, VII-VIII.
[50] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, VIII.
[51] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, VIII.
[52] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, VIII.
[53] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, IX.
[54] J. B. AUDIFFREDI, Specimen historico-criticum, IX.
[55] J. C. BOTTONE, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 9. Er vermerkt auch, dass er sich mit Simons De gestis beschäftigt habe und keine Väterangaben fand: „La

scheidungsmerkmal, durch das die beiden Autoren erkannt werden können.

Moriondo legt großen Wert auf die ununterbrochene Reihe der Literaturhistoriker, die Simon die Werke Cavalcas zuschreiben. Dieses Argument erschüttert Bottone durch den Hinweis, der Augustinergeneral Ambrogio da Cori sei nicht die maßgebliche Autorität, für die Moriondo ihn ausgebe. Er habe vielmehr durch seine Verteidigungsschrift des Ordens, in der er die Ordensschriftsteller aufführt, das Durcheinander verursacht.[56] Ihm sei es in erster Linie auf die Verteidigung des Augustinerordens angekommen. Um dies zu erreichen, verwies Ambrogio da Cori auf die Bedeutung der Theologen des Ordens und ihre Publikationen. Dabei litt die wissenschaftliche Genauigkeit, denn er hatte die Werke, die er aufführte, zum größten Teil nicht vor Augen.[57]

Auf seine ungenauen Ausführungen bezogen sich die nachfolgenden Bibliographen direkt oder indirekt. Deshalb haben die von Moriondo angeführten Zeugen keine Bedeutung, da sie sich nicht auf eigene Studien über die Werke Simons bezogen, sondern auf die Mitteilungen des Augustinergenerals Ambrogio da Cori.

Wesentlich zuverlässiger als die Angaben Ambrogios da Cori sind diejenigen der Chronik des Dominikanerkonventes der hl. Katharina in Pisa, die von Domenico da Peccioli nach dem Tode Cavalcas begonnen wurde. Ähnliche Mitteilungen zu den Werken Cavalcas finden sich auch in den *Annales Conventus S. Catharinae de Pisis*. Diese Dokumente suchte Moriondo abzuwerten, ohne dass seine Argumente überzeugen. Das älteste Zeugnis zu den von Cavalca hinterlassenen Schriften ist das der Chronik.[58]

Die von Moriondo gegebene Erklärung zum häufigen Vorkommen von Autoren aus dem Dominikanerorden, besonders von Thomas von Aquin, ist nicht überzeugend. Denn es kommt kaum vor, dass ein Abschreiber sich so gut im Werk des hl. Thomas auskennt, dass er aus ihm zitieren kann. Da ist es schon wahrscheinlicher, dass der Dominikaner Domenico Cavalca diese Passagen beim Abfassen des Traktats selbst eingefügt hat.[59]

medesima pure osservasi nella di lui opera Latina De gestis salvatoris, in cui indarno mi sono affaticato per ritrovarvi allegato un S. Agostino, un S. Girolamo, un S. Gregorio etc. al contrario di quello, che accade nelle opere del P. Cavalca."

[56] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 11: „E da cui senza meno ha avuto origine l'errore del Signor Moriondo."

[57] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 32: „Perchè la maggior parte dell'opere da essi attribuite al B. Simone, da loro non sono state vedute."

[58] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 79-80.

[59] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 54.

Moriondo führt die Edition des Sebastian Broilus (Ammiani) *Trattato delle trenta Stoltitie* an, die von diesem dem Simon Fidati zugeschrieben wurde.[60] Broilo hatte die Absicht, zwei weitere Traktate zu veröffentlichen, die er ebenfalls dem Simon zurechnete. Moriondo schließt daraus, dass Broilo diese Traktate als von Simon stammend vorlagen. Die Schwäche dieses Argumentes durchschaute Bottone. Er argumentiert mit Verweis auf Handschriften, in denen Traktate Cavalcas zusammen mit Simons Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana* vorkommen. Der Traktat Simons ist als Werk Simons gekennzeichnet, während die Traktate Cavalcas keine Autorangabe aufweisen. So kam es, dass alle Traktate Simon zugeschrieben wurden, obwohl nur einer ihn ausdrücklich als Autor bezeichnet. Diese aus der Einsichtnahme in die Handschriften sich ergebende Beobachtung machte Bottone. Er schloß daraus, dass die anonymen Traktate nicht Simon, sondern Cavalca zuzurechnen sind, und reklamierte sie für ihn.[61]

Die Arbeit Bottones erhält dadurch besondere Durchschlagskraft, dass er die Editionen der Werke Cavalcas und die Handschriften der einzelnen Traktate aufführt. Durch diese Werklisten ist die Diskussion auf ein solides Fundament gestellt. Man muß sich nicht mehr mit den Angaben von Bibliographen begnügen, sondern hat das Zeugnis der Handschriften und frühen Drucke vor Augen.[62]

Auf die Ausführungen Bottones antwortete Moriondo nicht mehr. Er tat gut daran, denn es wäre ihm kaum möglich gewesen, die von Bottone vorgebrachten Argumente zu widerlegen. Denn dieser hatte die frühen Drucke und Handschriften auf seiner Seite[63]. Gegen sie vermochte ein noch so lückenloses und glänzendes Zeugnis der Bibliographen nichts auszurichten. So war es klug, dass sich Moriondo an die Devise hielt, die er bereits in seinem Diskurs über die Werke Simons angekündigt hatte. Sie lautete, dass er von seinen Darlegungen überzeugt sei, die Auseinandersetzung hasse und jedem das Recht auf eine eigene Meinung zugestehe. Aufgrund dieser Haltung antwortete Moriondo nicht mehr auf die Ausführungen Bottones, ohne sich aller-

[60] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 87.
[61] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 87.
[62] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780, 89-114.
[63] G. C. Bottone, Saggio di Osservazioni, Cosmopoli 1780. Die nachfolgenden Seitenangaben beziehen sich auf die Schrift Bottones. In ihr werden anonyme Ausgaben angeführt (89-93), Editionen unter dem Namen Cavalcas (93-105) und Handschriften der Traktate mit seinem Namen (106-114), die Übersetzung des Dialogs des hl. Gregors (114-117), Gedichte (117) Übersetzung der Apostelgeschichte und des Briefes des hl. Hieronymus an Eustochium (118-124), Beobachtungen zur Sprache Cavalcas und Simons in drei Codices (125-135).

dings von ihnen überzeugen zu lassen. Er blieb bei seiner Sicht der Aufteilung der Werke Cavalcas.[64]

Im 18. Jahrhundert ruhte nach diesem Schlagabtausch die Kontroverse um die Werkaufteilung zwischen Cavalca und Simon. Sie war mehr durch die politischen Ereignisse herbeigeführt als durch die Argumente. So war es nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis die Verteidiger der Autorschaft Simons mit neuen Argumenten auf den Plan traten.

4.4 Die Wiederaufnahme der Kontroverse durch Nicola Mattioli (1855-1904)

Die Kontroverse war aber mit dem Schweigen Moriondos nicht beigelegt. Sie schwelte weiter und wurde durch den Augustiner und bekannten Simonforscher Nicola Mattioli nach mehr als hundert Jahren wieder aufgegriffen und fortgeführt.

4.4.1 Zur Person Nicola Mattiolis

Nicola Mattioli wurde am 14. September 1836 in Matelica geboren. 1854 trat er in den Augustinerorden ein und legte am 19. März 1855 die ewige Profeß ab. Zum Priester wurde er am 18. April 1859 geweiht. Nach Abschluß seiner Studien wurde er 1862 zum Lector der Philosophie ernannt. Aus Gesundheitsgründen verzichtete er auf das Lehramt. Er widmete sich ganz der Verkündigung und wurde ein gesuchter Prediger.[65]

1876 erwarb er nach voraufgegangenem Examen den Magistergrad.

1885 wurde er nach Rom an das Kolleg des Augustinerordens, Santa Monica, berufen und lehrte mehrere Jahre an einer höheren Schule. Der Bio-bibliograph David Aurelius Perini war einer seiner Schüler. Er beschreibt ihn als einen Mann von kleiner Gestalt, der aber gut aussah. Er erlebte ihn als guten Lehrer, der sich dem Studium der

[64] G. MORIONDO, Discorso sopra la vita e le opere, Torino 1779, 96: „Tale si è il parer mio intorno all'autore di quelle opere. Se al lettore discreto piacerà, io ne sarò pago, e soddisfatto. Nel rimanente non pretendo di voler contendere con alcuno, perchè lo segua."Auf diese Stelle bin ich aufmerksam geworden durch A. C. DE ROMANIS, GIACINTO DELLA TORRE O.S.A., ARCIVESCOVO DI TORINO (1747-1814), in: Bollettino storico Agostiniano XII (1935) 14-17, bes. 16.

[65] D. A. PERINI, Bibliographia Augustiniana. Cum notis biographicis. Scriptores Itali, Florenz 1931, 198.

Literatur widmete. Neben den Büchern liebte er die Einsamkeit. Mit wachem Geist sprach er wissend, korrekt, mit Lob und höflich.[66]

1889 wurde er Sekretär des Ordens der Augustiner. Das Generalkapitel von 1895 wählte ihn zum dritten Generalassistenten. 1898 berief ihn Leo XIII. zum Berater der Ablaßkongregation.

1901 wurde Mattioli Prior des Konventes Sant' Agostino in Rom, wo er am 3. Januar 1904 an einem Schlaganfall starb.[67]

Mattioli widmete sich dem Studium italienischer und lateinischer Schriften von Autoren aus dem Augustinerorden.

In diesem Zusammenhang sind seine Studien über Simon Fidati von Cascia hervorzuheben. Durch die Edition seiner Briefe und seines Traktates *L'ordine della vita cristiana* und einiger kleinerer Schriften Simons hat er die Forschung über diesen Augustiner auf ein solides Fundament gestellt. Da Mattioli die Briefe Simons und die Biographie des Johannes von Salerno, des Schülers Simons über letzteren kannte, erhielt die Kontroverse um die Zuweisung der Werke Cavalcas einige neue Akzente.

Mattioli gab eine Publikationsreihe heraus, welcher er den Namen *Antologia Agostiniana* gab. Der I. Band behandelt Aegidius Romanus, der II. das Leben und die edierten und unedierten Werke Simons von Cascia, der III. Johannes von Salerno und seine unedierten Schriften in Volgare sowie eine vergleichende Studie jener Schriften, die Cavalca zugewiesen werden, der IV. die Evangelien des seligen Simon von Cascia, die von seinem Schüler Johannes von Salerno ins Volgare übertragen worden waren.[68]

4.4.2 Der Beitrag Mattiolis

Mattioli hatte für die Simonforschung neue Materialien zugänglich gemacht. Das *Epistularium* Simons veröffentlichte er erstmalig aufgrund der ihm bekannten Handschriften.[69] Dann wandte er sich den von Simon in Volgare verfaßten Werken zu. Hier galt seine Aufmerksamkeit vor allem dem Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana*.[70]

[66] D. A. Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana. Cum notis biographicis. Scriptores Itali, Florenz 1931, 199.

[67] Analecta Augustiniana I (1905-1906), Rom 1906, 19-20.

[68] D. A. Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana. Cum notis biographicis. Scriptores Itali, Florenz 1931, 199.

[69] Epistolarium Fr. Symonis de Cassia, in: N. Mattioli, Il beato Simone Fidati da Cascia. I suoi scritti editi ed inediti (Antologia Agostiniana II), Rom 1898, 259-499.

[70] Simone da Cascia, L'ordine della vita cristiana delle sentenze de' Santi Padri, in: N. Mattioli, Il beato Simone Fidati da Cascia. I suoi scritti editi ed inediti (Antologia Agostiniana II), Rom 1898, 125-223.

4.4.2.1 Giovanni da Salerno als Übersetzer von *De gestis domini salvatoris* ins Volgare

Mattioli klärte auch die Rolle des Giovanni da Salerno als Übersetzer eines Teiles des Evangelienkommentars Simons vom Lateinischen ins Volgare und edierte das Werk.[71] Er war also gut gerüstet, um helleres Licht in die Kontroverse Cavalca-Simon zu bringen.

Von den umstrittenen Traktaten meint Mattioli, dass sie sich in ihrer Substanz an die Spiritualen richten. Deshalb hält er es nicht für verwunderlich, dass sie Simon zugeschrieben wurden.[72] Er selbst schreibt sie Simon nicht direkt zu, sondern hält es für wahrscheinlich, dass die umstrittenen Traktate von Giovanni da Salerno zu Lebzeiten Simons verfaßt wurden.[73] Seine Begründung lautet, dass Simon und Giovanni da Salerno miteinander vertraut waren, in den Grundsätzen übereinstimmten, zur Schule des Angelo Clareno gehörten und von der Grundstimmung der Spiritualen durchdrungen waren, die auch die umstrittenen Traktate atmen.[74]

4.4.2.2 Zuschreibung der kontroversen Werke an Giovanni da Salerno

In seiner Ausgabe der in Volgare verfaßten Werke des Giovanni da Salerno führt Mattioli auch einen Vergleich zwischen den Traktaten Cavalcas und denjenigen des Giovanni da Salerno durch.[75] Er zieht auch Simons Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana* zum Vergleich heran.[76]

Sein Ergebnis lautet, dass weder Simon noch Cavalca die Autoren der kontroversen Schriften sein können.[77] Damit scheidet er Simon als direkten Verfasser der Traktate aus.

Für Mattioli ist auch Cavalca nicht ihr Verfasser, sondern Giovanni da Salerno. Er begründet seine Annahme mit dem bibliographischen

[71] N. Mattioli, Gli evangelii del B. Simone da Cascia esposti in Volgare dal suo discepolo Fra Giovanni da Salerno. Dilucidati con Prefazione e Glossario (Antologia Agostiniana IV), Rom 1902.

[72] N. Mattioli, Gli evangelii del B. Simone da Cascia, Rom 1902, XXVI.

[73] N. Mattioli, Gli evangelii del B. Simone da Cascia, Rom 1902, XVIII.

[74] N. Mattioli, Gli evangelii del. B. Simone da Cascia, Rom 1902, XXVI.

[75] N. Mattioli, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite con uno studio comparativo di altre attribuite al P. Cavalca (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, XVIII-XX.

[76] N. Mattioli, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 271.

[77] N. Mattioli, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 275.

Argument[78] und dem Inhalt der von ihm entdeckten und publizierten Briefe Simons.[79]

Mattioli stellt die Hypothese auf, dass die Schriften von Simon zwar inspiriert wurden, dass ihr Verfasser aber Giovanni da Salerno ist. Er ist der einzige Verfasser der kontroversen Schriften. Es handelt sich auch nicht um Übersetzungen von lateinischen Traktaten ins Volgare, sondern um Schriften, die im Volgare verfaßt wurden.[80]

Die Hypothese Mattiolis beendet die Kontroverse nicht, sondern verlagert sie nur. Es stehen nicht mehr Simon und Cavalca in der Diskussion, sondern Cavalca und Johannes von Salerno, der Schüler Simons.

Damit ist jedenfalls die Annahme bedeutungslos geworden, dass Simon die Traktate zuerst in Latein verfaßte und Cavalca sie ins Volgare übertrug.[81] Nach Mattioli verfaßte Giovanni da Salerno die kontroversen Traktate aufgrund seiner langen Beziehung zu Simon in seinem Geiste für die einfachen Gläubigen.

Aufgrund der engen Beziehung, in der Simon und Giovanni zu den Spiritualen standen, wird die Niederschrift der beiden Traktate *Disciplina degli spirituali* und *Le XXX Stoltezze che si commettono nelle spirituali battaglie* von Mattioli noch zu Lebzeiten Simons angesetzt.[82]

Mattioli kommt nach der Überprüfung der Lösungen, die vorgebracht wurden, auch deshalb zu dem Ergebnis, dass die umstrittenen Traktate nicht von Simon stammen können, weil sich in den Traktaten Zitate finden, deren Verfasser namentlich genannt werden. Dies geschieht in den Werken Simons nicht. Zieht man jedoch die Übersetzung des Giovanni da Salerno heran, dann stellt man fest, dass sich in ihr namentlich gekennzeichnete Zitate finden. Diese Beobachtung trug für Mattioli zu der Aussage bei, dass Giovanni da Salerno der Verfasser der kontroversen Traktate ist.

Das von Mattioli vorgetragene Ergebnis war ein Teilrückzug aus dem von Moriondo beanspruchten Gebiet. Er hatte alle Werke

[78] N. MATTIOLI, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 170-185.

[79] N. MATTIOLI, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 266-267.

[80] N. MATTIOLI, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 318-319.

[81] N. MATTIOLI, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 254-255.

[82] N. MATTIOLI, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 318.

Cavalcas für Simon Fidati beansprucht.[83] Es war nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, bis man Giovanni Battista Audiffredi Recht geben mußte. Denn die von Mattioli vorgeschlagene Lösung, mit Simon als geistigem Inspirator und Giovanni da Salerno als Verfasser der kontroversen Traktate, war eine Hypothese vorgelegt, welche die Tradition der Handschriften und Drucke gegen sich hatte, und deshalb ohne Gewicht blieb.

4.5 Beendigung der Kontroverse durch Guglielmo Volpi

Die Haltlosigkeit der These, Giovanni da Salerno sei der Autor der Traktate Cavalcas, wurde von G. Volpi erkannt, da es keine handschriftliche Grundlage dafür gab. Er beschäftigte sich mit der Kontroverse und beendete sie, indem er überzeugend nachwies, dass die Traktate von Cavalca stammen.

4.5.1 Guglielmo Volpi

Guglielmo Volpi war Accademico della Crusca. Er schreibt, dass es sich am Beginn der Kontroverse um Eifersucht zwischen einem Angehörigen des Augustinerordens und einem des Dominikanerordens handelte. Einigen Mitdiskutanten unterstellt er Lokalpatriotismus.[84] Diese Motive mögen die Debatte angestoßen und begleitet haben. Aber es ging auch um das Bemühen, die wahre Autorschaft herauszufinden. Gewisse persönliche Interessen begleiten wohl alle Untersuchungen. Auch bei Volpi klingen sie an, wenn er von den Schriften Domenico Cavalcas schreibt, dass *sie fast ein Symbol der Anmut der alten toskanischen Redeweise*[85] sind. Deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, wenn er die Versuche, die Werke Cavalcas dem Simon von Cascia oder dem Giovanni da Salerno zuzuweisen, als einen Großangriff auf den Toskanischen Dialekt entrüstet zurückweist.[86]

[83] N. Mattioli, Fra Giovanni da Salerno, Le sue opere volgari inedite (Antologia Agostiniana III), Rom 1901, 266.

[84] „Gli scritti del P. Della Torre e del P. Audiffredi, come gli altri più recenti, hanno a comune un difetto: che ci si sente più o meno l'Agostiniano o il Domenicano geloso delle tradizioni del proprio ordine o il figlio di un'antica terra che vuole mettere in maggior luce le glorie paesane." (G. Volpi, La questione del Cavalca, in: Archivio Storico Italiano, Quinta serie, XXXVI (1905), Florenz 1905, 302-318, bes. 304.

[85] G. Volpi, Storia letteraria d'Italia scritta da una Società di Professori. Il Trecento, Mailand ² 1912, 320.

[86] „E così si son visti tentativi di assegnare a un agostiniano di Cascia dell'Umbria, a fra Simone Fidati, e poi anche a uno di Salerno, a fra Giovanni, la preziosa eredità delle sue opere." (G. Volpi, Storia Letteraria, Mailand ² 1912, 320).

4.5.2 Die Argumente Guglielmo Volpis

Volpi suchte die anstehende Frage auf ihre entscheidenden Punkte zurückzuführen. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Frage eigentlich keine Existenzberechtigung hat.[87]

Ein erstes Argument Volpis gegen die Autorschaft Simons oder Giovannis lautet, dass man keine Handschriften vorweisen kann mit den kontroversen Traktaten oder Übersetzungen, die Simon oder Giovanni als Autoren ausweisen.[88]

Weiter kommen in den Traktaten Querverweise auf andere eigene Schriften Cavalcas vor oder auf die durchgeführten Übersetzungen der Väterviten und des Dialogs des hl. Gregor.[89] Es wird eine fest umrissene Gruppe von Schriften zitiert, die Cavalca zugeschrieben werden. Verweise auf Schriften Simons kommen aber nicht vor. Es finden sich in den Schriften Simons auch keine Hinweise auf die Traktate Cavalcas. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass es sich um zwei unterschiedliche Autoren handelt.[90]

Die Meinung Volpis, dass es bei der Offensichtlichkeit der Überlieferung eigentlich keine Zweifel an der Autorschaft Cavalcas geben durfte und darf, wurde zur vorherrschenden Anschauung. Sie ist in dem Satz zusammengefaßt: Die kritischen Forscher sind sich heute darüber einig, dass alle kontroversen Werke dem Dominikaner Cavalca zuzuweisen sind.[91]

4.5.3 Neuere Einzeluntersuchungen

Damit stimmt auch die Forschung überein, die sich in jüngerer Zeit mit Einzelaspekten am Werk Cavalcas beschäftigte. Die Kontroverse faßte Renzo Lotti zusammen und beurteilte sie als religiöse Disputation, die den literarkritischen Boden verließ und zu einer Polemik zwischen den Augustinern und Dominikanern wurde.[92] Sein Fazit lautet, dass mit der Intervention von G. Volpi die Kontroverse ein Ende fand. Die Autorschaft Cavalcas wird auch durch A. Zacchi unterstrichen, der auf die spezielle Beichtformel der Dominikaner verweist,

[87] „Mi è resultato, che la questione veramente non aveva ragion d'essere." (G. Volpi, La questione del Cavalca, Florenz 1905, 304.

[88] G. Volpi, Storia letteraria, Mailand [2] 1912, 320.

[89] G. Volpi, Storia Letteraria, Mailand [2] 1912, 320-321.

[90] G. Volpi, La questione del Cavalca, Florenz 1905, 317.

[91] I. Colosio, Art. Cavalca (Dominique), in: Dictionnaire de Spiritualité II, 1, Paris 1953, 373-374, bes. 374.

[92] R. Lotti, Contributi su Domenico Cavalca, Amsterdam 1987, 30-34.

die weder Simon von Cascia noch Giovanni von Salerno verwenden würden. Damit scheiden diese beiden Augustiner als Autoren aus und es bleibt Domenico Cavalca als einziger und wahrer Autor übrig.[93]

Dieses Ergebnis hätte man auch ohne den langen Weg, den die Kontroverse gegangen ist, erzielen können. Hätte man jedoch auf sie verzichtet, dann wären andere Ergebnisse der Simonforschung nicht erzielt und Studien zu Cavalca nicht durchgeführt worden.

5. Verbleibende inhaltliche Fragen

Mit dem Abschluß der Kontroverse um die Autorschaft der Werke Cavalcas stellen sich die Fragen nach dem Inhalt dieser Werke.

Bisher wurde die Abhängigkeit der Werke Cavalcas von lateinischen Vorlagen bearbeitet und ihre Bedeutung für das toskanische Volgare herausgestellt. Die theologischen Inhalte wurden kaum gewürdigt, obwohl die Traktate ihretwegen verfaßt wurden.

Es sollte auch die Frage geklärt werden, die von dem Benediktiner G. Dufner im Rahmen seiner Arbeit über die Dialoge Gregors des Großen, in die er auch die Traktate Cavalcas einbezog, aufgeworfen wurde. Sein Urteil über die Traktate Cavalcas lautet, dass er sie nur mit einigem Zögern als eigenständige Werke Cavalcas bezeichnen könne, weil sich unter den Werken Cavalcas einige befinden, „die zum Teil beinahe als Übersetzungen oder wenigstens als Adaptationen angesprochen werden können." Nach seinem Dafürhalten treten in *Trenta stoltizie* und *Disciplina degli Spirituali* enge Zusammenhänge mit den lateinischen Werken des Simone da Cascia hervor"[94].

Die hier angedeutete Spur muß weiter verfolgt werden. G. Dufner schreibt leider nicht, welchen lateinischen Text Simon Fidatis von Cascia er im Auge hatte, als er seine Beobachtung machte.

Nachdem die Autorschaft der Traktate geklärt ist, sollte auch der Frage nachgegangen werden, was die Zuschreibung *secondo frate Simone da Chascia* in einer Handschrift des Traktats *Disciplina delli Spirituali* der Nationalbibliothek in Rom bedeutet.[95] Führt man sich diese Angabe vor Augen, dann ist die Aussage G. Volpis nicht mehr

[93] R. Lotti, Contributi su Domenico Cavalca, Amsterdam 1987, 34; A. Zacchi, Di Fra Domenico Cavalca e delle sue opere, in: Il Rosario. Memorie Domenicane XXXVII, 1920, 272-281, 308-320, 431-439, bes. 279; Fra Domenico Cavalca e le sue opere, Firenze 1921.

[94] G. Dufner, Die Dialoge Gregors des Großen im Wandel der Zeiten und Sprachen, Padova 1968, 92-93.

[95] Rom, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale 102, Ms. S. Pantaleo 9, f. 152vb.

zutreffend, es gebe keine Handschrift der Traktate Cavalcas, in denen der Name Simons auftaucht.[96] Die römische Handschrift spricht jedenfalls von einem Werk, das im Geiste Simons (*secondo*) verfaßt wurde.

6. Das Verdienst Moriondos für die Simonforschung

Nachdem die Hauptthese Moriondos widerlegt ist und die Traktate nicht Simon, sondern Cavalca zugeschrieben werden müssen, stellt sich die Frage, was die Bemühungen Giacintos della Torre (Moriondo) und die von ihm ausgelöste Kontroverse für die Simonforschung erbracht haben.

Durch die Identifizierung der Handschrift &. 246 Sup. der Bibliotheca Ambrosiana als Handschrift, die Giacinto della Torre für seine Edition benutzt hat, entsteht eine konkrete Verbindung zwischen der heutigen Simonforschung und derjenigen Giacintos (Moriondos). Es ist ein Glücksfall, dass die Handschrift in den Wirren der Zeit nicht verloren ging und heute das Entstehen der Kontroverse vor Augen führen kann.

Giacinto della Torre (G. Moriondo) gebührt in der Simonforschung ein ehrendes Andenken. Durch seine Untersuchungen und seine Streitschrift machte er das Werk Simons im 18. Jahrhundert bekannt und bewirkte, dass es bis in die Neuzeit in der Diskussion blieb. Sein Beitrag über Simon und seine Edition des Traktates *L'ordine della vita cristiana* waren wohl aus der Liebe zu seinem Orden entsprungen, verfolgten aber sicher nicht die Absicht, einen literarischen Dauerstreit zwischen Augustinern und Dominikanern hinsichtlich der Werke Cavalcas zu entfachen.

Es ist Giacinto anzukreiden, dass er sich zu stark auf die Literaturhistoriker stützte und den Angaben der Handschriften zu wenig Gewicht beimaß. Diesen Fehler zeigte die Erwiderung des Dominikaners Giovanni Battista Audiffredi in aller Deutlichkeit auf. Es dauerte dann eine quälend lange Zeit, bis die augustinischen Erforscher Simons und andere die offensichtlich gegen sie sprechenden Ergebnisse akzeptierten und die Traktate als Schriften Cavalcas anerkannten.

Aus Bemerkungen in der Simonbiographie Giacintos geht hervor, dass Simons Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana* in der Lombardischen Kongregation in den Konventsbibliotheken von Crema und Turin verbreitet war. Im Konvent von Santa Maria del Popolo in Rom

[96] G. Volpi, Storia Letteraria, Mailand [2] 1912, 320 und G. Volpi, La questione del Cavalca, Florenz 1905, 315.

wurde er sogar als Tischlektüre im Refektorium neben den Soliloquien des hl. Augustinus verwendet.[97] Simons Werk war also bekannt und wurde benutzt.

Mit seiner Studie und Edition wollte Moriondo die Bedeutung des Werkes Simons wahrscheinlich auch für seine eigenen Mitbrüder hervorheben. Dies Bestreben könnte seine Arbeit mitveranlaßt haben.

Das Andenken Simons wurde in der Lombardischen Kongregation jedenfalls in Ehren gehalten. Die Bibliothek des Augustinerklosters S. Maria Incoronata in Mailand zeigt es. In der verbauten, vor einigen Jahren wieder aufgefundenen und restaurierten humanistischen Bibliothek findet sich nämlich auch ein Deckenfresko, das laut Aufschrift Simon von Cascia darstellt und ihn als einen durch Wissen und Heiligkeit hervorragenden geistlichen Theologen bezeichnet.[98] Er wird in einem Reigen mit anderen Mitgliedern der Augustinerschule dargestellt.

Giacinto della Torre erlebte das Abrücken von seinen Thesen und schließlich ihre Verwerfung nicht mehr. Er mußte auch nicht mehr erleben, dass die Lombardische Kongregation, in die er als junger Mann eingetreten war, im Jahre 1815 ihr Ende fand. Er war etwa ein Jahr tot, als sie sich als selbständige Einheit auflöste. Ihr Generalvikar Giuseppe Mascheroni beantragte wegen des Verlustes an Mitgliedern und Klöstern die volle Wiedereingliederung in den Augustinerorden. Dem Antrag entsprach die Kongregation für Bischöfe und Ordensleute in Rom mit Reskript vom 15. September 1815.[99]

Die Abhandlung Moriondos geriet im Augustinerorden nicht in Vergessenheit. An sie knüpfte N. Mattioli im 19. Jahrhundert an und leistete durch die Publikation der Briefe und anderer Schriften Simons einen wichtigen Beitrag in der Simonforschung. Mattioli verabschiedete

[97] Nel da me sopra indicato inventaro del 1480 della libreria del Convento di S. Maria del Popolo si nota, che vi era un codice MS. in carta semplice, in cui v'erano Soliloquia S. P. Augustini, et Tractatus de Vita Christiana B. Simonis de Cassia; ma siccome era destinato, come scrive il P. Verani, con altre opere spirituali pro lectione Refectorii, et personarum devotarum: non è meraviglia, se sia consunto, e più non esista (G. MORIONDO, Ordine della vita cristiana del B. Simone da Cascia con discorso sopra la vita, e le opere di questo beato, In Torino 1779,105).

[98] M. L. GATTI PERER, Umanesimo a Milano. L'osservanza agostiniana all'Incoronata, Mailand 1980, 19-28. Zur Bedeutung der Bibliothek schreibt die Autorin (S. 28): „La Biblioteca dell'Incoronata potrebbe costituire, qualora recuperata nella struttura e funzione originaria, una delle ormai rare testimonianze in Italia di Biblioteche umanistiche, l'unica ora esistente per quanto riguarda Milano." Die Aufschrift lautet: Symon (de) Cassia sci(enti)a / et s(an)c(t)itate insignis / sp(irit)ual(is) theolog(us).

[99] J. GAVIGAN, Die Augustiner von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart (Geschichte des Augustinerordens IV), Würzburg 1988, 27; Analecta Augustiniana XIII (1929-1930),Rom 1929, 350-351.

sich von der Annahme, dass Simon der Verfasser der Werke Cavalcas war. Zur Rettung dieser Schriften als augustinisches Erbe führte er Giovanni da Salerno ein. Auch diese Position mußte geräumt werden, da sie von den Handschriften nicht gedeckt wird.

Die Kontroverse hat als Ergebnis erbracht, dass die in toskanischem Volgare abgefaßten Traktate von Cavalca stammen. Simon hat seinen Evangelienkommentar nur in Latein geschrieben, einige kleinere Schriften in Volgare. Der in Volgare überlieferte Evangelienkommentar stammt nicht von Simon, sondern von Giovanni da Salerno. Er wurde von ihm auf der lateinischen Grundlage von *De gestis domini salvatoris* Simons erarbeitet.

Unter neuen Fragestellungen findet das Werk[100] und die Lehre[101] des umbrischen Augustiners Simon Fidati auch noch im 21. Jahrhundert wissenschaftliches Interesse.

Willigis ECKERMANN, OSA

[100] SIMON FIDATI DE CASSIA OESA, De gestis domini salvatoris, Vol. I-VII, ed. W. Eckermann OSA, coop.aliis (Cassiciacum, Suppl.bd. 12-18), Würzburg 1998-2003; SIMON FIDATI DE CASSIA OESA, L'ordine della vita cristiana, Tractatus de vita christiana, Epistulae, Laude, Opuscula; JOHANNES DE SALERNO OESA; Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia, ed. W. Eckermann OSA (Cassiciacum, Suppl. bd. 19), Würzburg 2006.

[101] C. M. OSER-GROTE/ A. E. J. GROTE (Hrsg.), SIMON FIDATI VON CASCIA OESA. Augustinische Theologie und Philosophie im späten Mittelalter (Cassiciacum 52), Würzburg 2006.

GREGORIO DA RIMINI A CONFRONTO CON AGOSTINO D'IPPONA

Sommario. Nel secondo quarto del secolo XIV l'assoluto predominio del *Doctor Catholicus* è testimoniato dall'ampia e profonda conoscenza del *corpus* agostiniano. Oltrechè nell'ampiezza e nella corposità delle citazioni anche lunghe e di prima mano, tale conoscenza si manifesta (1) nella vasta fioritura di commenti alle opere agostiniane soprattutto ad Oxford al di fuori dell'Ordine Eremitano[1]; (2) nel trattamento storico-critico dei testi dei Padri, delle *auctoritates* teologiche e filosofiche, degli autori scolastici coevi specialmente a Parigi all'interno dell'Ordine Eremitano.[2]

Alla metà degli anni '40 all'Università di Parigi, Gregorio da Rimini,[3] fortemente polemico con l'eresia pelagiana e aperto alla *via*

[1] Tale fioritura si concentra tra il 1325 ed il 1335 con i commenti di Giovanni Baconthorpe sul *De civitate Dei* e sul *De Trinitate*, di Riccardo Fitz-Ralph sul *De Trinitate*, di Tommaso Waleys sul *De civitate Dei*, di Giovanni Ridevall sul *De civitate* e sulle *Confessione*. È curioso che proprio i membri dell'Ordine degli Eremiti di S. Agostino non partecipano a questa fioritura; cf. W. J. COURTENAY, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century*, Princeton 1987, pp. 319-320; *Augustinism at Oxford in the Fourteenth Century*, «Augustiniana», 30 (1980), pp. 65-66. Anche a Parigi non mancano commenti ad Agostino come quelli di Francesco di Meyronnes O.F.M; cf. F. FIORENTINO, *Francesco di Meyronnes. Libertà e contingenza nel pensiero tardomedievale*, Roma 2006, pp. 9-19.

[2] O. GRASSI, *L'agostinismo trecentesco*, in *Storia della teologia nel Medioevo*, III *La teologia delle scuole*, Casal Monferrato 1996, p. 610.

[3] Secondo il mandato dell'Ordine Eremitano di S. Agostino, nel 1323 Gregorio da Rimini ad un'età, compresa tra i diciotto ed i trentaquattro anni, si immatricolò alla Facoltà delle Arti dell'Università di Parigi dove studiò per sei anni. Dopo aver insegnato negli studi principali di Bologna, di Padova e di Perugia, entrato in contatto con le *subtilitates anglicae*, Gregorio fece ritorno a Parigi nel 1341 per preparare la lettura del primo e del secondo libro delle *Sententiae* di Pietro Lombardo, che da bacelliere in teologia commentò con successo nel 1343-1344. L'anno successivo, fu nominato *magister regens* in teologia da Papa Clemente IV; nel 1346, revisionata e pubblicata la sua lettura, Rimini riprese ad insegnare negli studi provinciali dell'Italia settentrionale fino al 1357, quando a Monpelliers fu eletto ministro generale dalla dieta dei ministri provinciali in seguito alla morte di Tommaso di Strasburgo; l'anno seguente, anche il percorso esistenziale di Gregorio s'interruppe a Vienna. Cf «Clemens VI ad cancellarium ecclesiae Paris., alias ejus vicesgerentem, ut Gregorio de Arimino, Ordinis fratrum Eremitarum sancti Augustini, in sacra pagina baccalareo Parisiensi, qui jam XXII anni elapsi, in studio laboravit, sex videlicet annos continuos Parisiis, ac postmodum inde ad natale solum rediens Bononiae, Paduae et Perusii cathedram tenuit principalem, et jam sunt anni quatuor, quod ad legendas Sententias rediit Parisios, quarum lecturam ibidem commendabiliter consummavit, cosideratione Gocii tituli Sanctae Priscae presbyteri cardinalis pro eodem Gregorio supplicantis, si ipsum per magistrorum studii Paris. in dicta scientia testimonium ad hoc sufficientem

moderna, riscopre l'insegnamento dell'Ipponate, sia a proposito dei tipici temi dell'etica medievale, ossia della prescienza divina, della predestinazione, della grazia, del libero arbitrio e del peccato, che in merito a questioni filosofico-matematiche, apparentemente poco frequentate dalla fonte di riferimento.

Ciò appare pienamente nella *Lectura in primum et secundum librum Sententiarum*[4]. Infatti, la conoscenza, che Gregorio ha su Agostino, é ampia e massiccia; essa é attestata non solo dalle specifiche sezioni del testo rimigino, segnalate dagli editori critici con i debiti titoletti, ma anche da precise e prolungate sequenze di citazioni; quest'ultime, una volta recensite e collazionate – come ho fatto –, sono in grado di esplicitare una mera interpretazione rimigina di uno o di più aspetti dell'insegnamento agostiniano.

Qui espongo i risultati della mia recensione e collazione, per scoprire quanto, come e quale Agostino sia conosciuto da Gregorio. Quest'operazione é di particolare importanza, perchè Gregorio é il grande mediatore tardo-medievale dell'Ipponate verso l'Età della Riforma, prima dell'edizione a stampa del *corpus Augustinianum*.

A partire dalla distinzione 23 fino alla fine del secondo libro della *Lectura* sentenziaria, il predominio dell'Ipponate diviene prati-

esse repererit, infra unius mensis spatium magistralem cathedram et honorem ac docendi licentiam concedat in scientia memorata, ipsumque ad omnes gratias ab olim illis concessas ibidem, qui consueverunt hactenus in rigorosis expeditionibus magistrari, prout moris est, admittat.» H. DENIFLE, A. CHATELAIN, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris 1891, 1, n. 1097; II, 557.

[4] Conservata in sette edizioni a stampa ed in cinquanta testimoni manoscritti, l'opera capitale di Gregorio da Rimini, ossia il suo commento alle *Sententiae* di Pietro Lombardo (cioè al manuale di teologia dell'epoca), ha subito una sorte simile a quella del nominalismo. L'edizione principale è costituita dalla stampa parigina del 1482, mentre l'edizione maggiore fu eseguita nel 1522 da Ludovico Antonio di Giunta, nativo di Firenze, stampatore di Venezia, che quattro anni prima aveva incaricato Agostino di Monfalcone O.S.A di riscontrare sui codici la precedente edizione veneziana del 1503; Ludovico decise di colmare le numerose lacune scoperte, le quali furono riedite due mesi dopo l'uscita dell'edizione giuntina da Amedeo Scoto, lo stampatore della precedente edizione, come aggiunte; tali aggiunte furono raccolte in trentasette fogli. L'edizione giuntina, probabilmente derivata dallo stesso esemplare parigino perduto, è stata ristampata dal *Franciscan Istitute St. Bonaventure* nel 1955, prima dell'edizione critica del 1979-1984 ad opera di D. Trapp, V. Marcolino e di altri. Essi hanno cercato di restituire un testo il più possibile autentico, nonostante l'assenza sia dell'autografo che dell'apografo. In base alla bontà dei mss., gli editori hanno privilegiato un testimone per ogni tradizione come ms. guida, per poi procedere alla collazione ed all'emendazione. Nei primi due libri editi del commento sentenziario Rimini si riferisce al terzo ed al quarto il commento dei quali non sembra essere stato mai redatto. Quando in seguito si rimanderà ai marginali dell'edizione giuntina del 1522, designata mediante la lettera «λ», con i rispettivi numeri di foglio, si starà pensando alle annotazioni, relative alle autorità e probabilmente risalenti all'esemplare parigino perduto.

camente assoluto e le sezioni testuali, dedicate all'esegesi del pensiero agostiniano, si moltiplicano a dismisura, assorbendo la gran parte della speculazione di Rimini. Perciò, intendo strutturare il mio articolo secondo i principali nodi concettuali e la loro disposizione, cosiccom'essi emergono in successione dal secondo libro di Gregorio, connettendo di volta in volta le sezioni del primo libro. Ecco l'ordine della mia esposizione: – il valore morale dell'agire umano (*In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28); – il peccato originale (*In Sent.* II, dist. 29); – la dannazione dei neonati morti senza battesimo (*In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33; *In Sent.* I, dist. 40-41); – il peccato proprio (*In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37); – la causalità divina del peccato (*Ibidem*); – l'intenzione dell'azione morale (*In Sent.* II, dist. 38-44)

Il valore morale dell'agire umano

La questione della moralità degli atti buoni è molto agitata nel secolo XIV soprattutto in rapporto alle buone opere degli *infideles*, al punto che Pietro Aureolo segnalava una *altercatio inter doctores*; essi solitamente preferivano negare la necessità del fine ultimo per l'atto moralmente buono o distinguere tra gli atti perfettamente virtuosi e gli atti imperfettamente virtuosi a seconda della presenza o dell'assenza del fine. Aureolo sembrava collocarsi nella prima classe di dottori, classificando l'atto secondo diverse bontà che sussistono indipendentemente e qualificano l'atto morale: 1) l'atto moralmente buono, intrinsecamente considerato nella sua moralità; 2) l'atto moralmente buono, imperfettamente virtuoso, ad esempio un'opera di misericordia, l'osservanza d'una legge naturale, che tragga la propria moralità esclusivamente dal fine prossimo come oggetto immediato; 3) l'atto perfettamente buono, che sia compiuto non solo in riferimento all'oggetto esterno, ma anche in vista del fine ultimo e di tutte le circostanze concomitanti; 4) l'atto meritorio che aggiunga alla volontà del fine ultimo la discesa della grazia santificante la quale rende tale atto grato a Dio e meritevole della vita eterna.[5]

[5] «Actus moralis inducitur quattuor bonitatibus. Primo, virtute naturali vel entitatis, et hoc sumitur in ordine ad extraneitatem. Secunda bonitas est ex obiecto et haec vocatur bonitas, quia specialem vel substantialem habet bonitatem ex obiecto. Tertia bonitas respectu circumstantiarum bonarum, quarum principalis est finis, potest etiam talibus spoliari. Quarta, bonitas gratuita vel accepta, quia esto quod omnia alia insint, adhuc nisi esset gratia infusa, non esset actus gratuitus. Ultimo autem potest spoliari remanentibus primis.» Petrus Aureoli, *Commentarius in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. Romae 1606, III, dist. 23, q. 4, art. 1, fol. 502.

Il fine rimane la circostanza principale come parte formale, mentre l'oggetto esterno rappresenta la parte materiale dell'atto.[6] Nonostante l'unicità del fine ultimo, le azioni rettamente fatte acquistano una speciale bontà dai fini propri;[7] l'omissione del fine ultimo non implica necessariamente la mancanza della bontà morale.[8]

Durando da S. Porciano che sosteneva l'intrinseca efficacia proporzionata degli atti morali,[9] combinava la moralità degli atti umani con il campo epistemico di applicazione, per cui gli atti, dotati d'una bontà morale, ben determinata dal fine prossimo, ed inquadrabili nel campo filosofico, non richiedono assolutamente la volontà del fine ultimo;[10] la presenza del fine ultimo, suggerita dalla fede, occorre in campo teologico per l'atto meritorio dell'uomo;[11] egli si rivela in grado d'agire secondo i dettami della retta ragione senza indirizzare implicitamente od esplicitamente le proprie azioni nella direzione del fine ultimo.

Tommaso da Strasburgo, seguendo l'Aquinate, riteneva che l'atto è buono moralmente o cattivo a seconda che il fine proposto sia conforme o meno alla retta ragione.[12] Ma, la virtuosità delle buone opere degli *infideles* in relazione al fine ultimo era negata sia da Durando che esclude la discesa della grazia nell'infedele,[13] sia da Pietro

[6] «Quantum ad actum aliqua concurrunt quo et quod, actus ille mensuratur magis ex eo, quod est quo, quam ex eo quod est quod sed ad actum finis concurrit ut quo et formale, ea vero, quae sunt ad finem, concurrunt ut quod et materiale.» *Ibidem*, dist. 23, q. 4, art. 1, fol. 502.

[7] «Licet sit unus finis ultimus respectu omnium electionum, tamen omnes electiones in speciali appropriant sibi proprios fines: in qualibet enim recta electio speciale bonum et a talibus finibus accipitur specificatio illarum electionum.» IDEM, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38, q. 2, fol. 305-306.

[8] «Nec in tali actu videtur esse malitia, nec defectus bonitatis alicuius moralis.» *Ibidem*, dist. 31, q. 1, fol. 313.

[9] «Actus nostri possunt considerari tripliciter: Uno modo secundum esse naturae. Alio modo secundum esse moris quo sunt boni vel mali moraliter, tertio modo secundum esse meritorium [...] et secundum quemlibet istorum modorum actus similes habent eandem efficaciam sibi proportionatam.» DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In Petri Lombardi Sententias theologicas Commentariorum*, ed. Venetiis 1571, I, dist. 17, q. 5, fol. 56.

[10] «Dicendum est quod intentio recta de ultimo fine non requiritur ad omnem bonitatem actus, sed solum ad meritorium; ad moralem autem bonitatem sufficit intentio recta de proximo fine.» IDEM, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38, q. 4, fol. 194.

[11] «Est bonitas meritoria vitae aeternae quam considerat solus theologus et est bonitas pure moralis quam considerat philosophus [...] In viatoribus sola fides dirigit ad ultimum finem quod est necessarium ad actionem meritoriam, non autem ad actum moraliter bonum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38, q. 4, fol. 191.

[12] J. SHANNON, *Good Works and Predestination according to Thomas of Strasburg*, Balthimora 1947, pp. 23 ss.

[13] «Dicendum est intentio recta de ultimo fine non requiritur ad omnem bonitatem actus sed solum ad meritorium.» DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In Sent.* II, dist. 42, q. 1, art. 1, fol. 199.

secondo il quale l'atto perfettamente virtuoso richiede un impulso speciale dello Spirito Santo e gli *infideles* non possono volere il fine ultimo.[14]

Quanto a Gregorio che considera come scappatoie le posizioni di Durando e di Aureolo,[15] il gioco incrociato tra le opposte autorità agostiniane diviene più evidente e massiccio nel terzo articolo della prima questione della distinzione 26-28 del secondo libro sentenziario; qui Rimini presenta diversi argomenti, agostinianamente fondati a sfavore e successivamente neutralizzati con altrettanti contro-argomenti che sono altrettanto agostinianamente confermati.

In primo luogo, anche gli infedeli che vivono secondo la legge naturale, sono reputati capaci di compiere delle buone opere, degne della lode dei cristiani[16] secondo la norma della giustizia, seppure non meritevoli della vita eterna.[17] Talvolta Agostino sembra aver trascurato il carattere meritevole del bene.[18] Si risponde che i beni, compiuti dagli

[14] «Actum ergo virtuosum primo modo potest utique homo ex puris naturalibus sed non complere, ut allegatum est supra per Philosophum 2 Ethicorum quod nullus umquam perfecte attingit meritum virtutis, sed divina voluntas dictat multas circumstantias alias debere in esse actui, quas non sumus sufficientes excogitare nec pro eis habendis orare ex nobis et ideo illas impossibile est nos attingere sine speciali impulsu Spiritus Sancti movente.» PETRUS AUREOLI, *In Sent.* II, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 2, fol. 276F.

[15] cf. G. SCHIAVELLA, *Il peccato originale negli scritti di Gregorio da Rimini*, «Augustiniana», 8 (1958), pp. 444-464.

[16] «Auctoritatibus etiam Augustini idem probatur: 'Primo quidem ipse in De spiritu et littera, super illo verbo Apostoli Ad Romanos 2 'Dum enim gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter quae sunt legis faciunt', dicit quod ab ipsis infidelibus 'quaedam facta intelligimus vel novimus vel audivimus quae secundum iustitiae regulae non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam merito recteque laudare'. Et paulo post: 'Sicut non impediunt, inquit, ad vitam aeternam iustum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non dicitur, sic ad salutem aeternam non prosunt impio aliqua bona opera, sine quibus difficillime vita cuiuslibet pessimi hominis invenitur'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *Lectura in primum et secundum Sententiarum*, ed. A. D. Trapp, V. Marcolino et alii, Berlin-New York 1979-1984, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 18-26; VI, 68; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De spiritu et littera*, 27-28, 48-49; PL 44 229-230; *Rm.* 2, 14.

[17] «Ex quibus patet quod secundum ipsum ab impiis seu infidelibus fiunt quaedam bona opera recte laudabilia secundum regulam iustitiae, et per consequens bona opera moraliter, licet illa non sint meritoria vitae aeternae. Et de talibus bonis, scilicet meritoriis, intelligit Augustinus, ubicumque dicit quod sine gratia non possumus bonum facere.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 27-31; VI, 68.

[18] «Quod evidenter probari videtur ex eo quod quarto libro Contra Iulianum capitulo 19 post longam disputationem, qua probare nisus est infidelibus nulla esse opera bona, exponens se dicit sic: 'Scito nos illud bonum hominum dicere, illam voluntatem bonam, illud opus bonum, sine Dei gratia quae datur per unum mediatorem Dei et hominum, nemini posse conferri; per quod solum homo potest ad aeternum Dei donum regnumque perduci. Omnia proinde cetera, quae videntur inter homines habere aliquid laudis, videntur tibi virtutes verae, videantur opera bona. Quid ad me pertinet?'

infedeli, si mostrano tali solo rispetto al compito eseguito, non rispetto alla circostanza che consiste nella gloria dell'uomo e non di Dio;[19] il bene morale può trasformarsi in male morale in quanto bene, compiuto male con il peccato.[20] Invece, solo le azioni che sono giudicate buone sia rispetto al compito o, – al modo di Guglielmo d'Ockham[21] e di Adamo da Wodeham[22] – al genere, sia nei confronti delle circostanze (*ubi, quando, sicut, cuius est gratia agendum*), si dicono beni morali,[23] degni di lode[24] e non di biasimo.[25]

Sebbene non sia difficile reperire degli uomini, che, come i pagani, citati da Agostino, conducano una vita retta, ricevendo la stima dei genitori e dei vicini, ciò non significa che tali uomini compiano il bene per il fine supremo che è Dio,[26] così da conseguire dei beni non

– quasi dicat: de aliis bonis quam de meritoriis non est cura mei sermonis.« *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 32-6; VI, 68-69; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3, 33; PL 44 755.

[19] «Ad auctoritatem primam Augustini dicendum quod operum, quae dicuntur bona, quaedam dicuntur bona, quia sunt bona ex officio seu ex genere tantum, non autem ex circumstantiis. Sic Augustinus quarto libro Contra Iulianum capitulo 13 ait: 'Possunt aliqua bona fieri non bene facientibus, a quibus fiunt. Bonum est enim ut subveniatur periclitanti homini, praesertim innocenti; sed ille qui hoc facit, si amando gloriam hominum magis quam Dei facit, non bene bonum facit'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 15-21; VI, 79; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3, 22; PL 44 749.

[20] «Et similiter infra capitulo 18 dicit 'ipsa bona opera, quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed ipsius qui bene utitur malis; ipsorum autem esse peccata, quibus et bona male faciunt'. Constat autem quod talia quae non bene fiunt et sunt peccata facientibus, etsi si sint bona ex officio et ex genere, non tamen sunt bona moraliter, ad sensum in quo praesens quaestio versatur.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 21-26; VI, 79; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3, 32; PL 44 754.

[21] GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum. Reportatio*, ed. R. Wood – G. Gal, in *Guillelmi de Ockham Opera theologica*, New York 1984, q. 12, art. 4, n. 16-6; VI, 402-404.

[22] ADAM DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum*, ed. R. Wood, New York 1990, dist. 17, q. 1, art. 1, n. 11-23; III 204.

[23] «Quaedam vero dicuntur bona, quia sunt bona ex officio, seu iuxta modum loquendi modernorum bona ex genere, et etiam bona ex circumstantiis, quae videlicet fiunt propter quod et quaemadmodum fieri debent. Et talia appello in proposito 'bona moraliter'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 27-2; VI, 79-80.

[24] «Similiter quaedam dicuntur recta et laudabilia, quia sunt bona primo modo; quaedam, quia sunt bona etiam secundo modo.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 3-4; VI, 80.

[25] «Econtra etiam quaedam dicuntur vituperabilia, quia non sunt bona etiam primo modo; quaedam, quia non sunt bona secundo modo, etiamsi sint bona primo modo.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 5-7; VI, 80.

[26] «Nunc ad propositum dico quod sine bonis et recte factis ac laudibilibus primo modo acceptis intelligit Augustinus difficillime cuiuslibet etiam pessimi hominis vitam duci. Difficillime enim inveniretur homo, qui numquam veneratus fuerit parentes, nec

meritevoli, come aveva esplicato l'Ipponate, sottoposto all'intervento esegetico di Rimini.[27] Stando all'esemplicazione classicheggiante del *Doctor Catholicus*, Fabrizio è punito meno di Catilina, non perché egli abbia compiuto un minor numero di beni, ma perché si è allontanato meno dalla retta ragione; i non-credenti, dai quali la legge divina non è estirpata e nei quali quest'ultima può essere ripristinata dalla grazia,[28] peccano, non tanto perché non compiano dei beni o compiano dei mali, quanto perché essi credono d'agire senza l'aiuto divino.[29] In altre parole, a prescindere dal proprio credo religioso, ogni essere umano si mostra potenzialmente disposto a ricevere gratuitamente la retta ragione, anche qualora egli non l'abbia mai ricevuta o l'abbia rinnegata. La differenza tra l'uomo che crede nel Dio di Mosè, d'Isacco e di Giacobbe, e colui il quale non crede in questo, pur credendo in un altro dio, non consiste nel numero più o meno ampio dei beni compiuti – senza assegnare la qualifica di moralità a tali beni –, ma nella norma che i credenti seguono, e nello scopo che essi perseguono nella specifica situazione corrente.

umquam misertus propinquorum suorum, nec umquam dixerit verum, et sic de aliis, quae ex genere bona sunt. Sed non difficillime reperirentur multi, qui numquam aliquod talium fecerint propter eum finem ultimate, propter quem debuerunt utpote propter Deum. Immo inter infideles vix aliquis reperiretur qui aliquod talium fecerit eo fine quo debuit.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 8-16; VI, 80.

[27] «Quapropter Augustinus statim post primam partem auctoritatis allegatae arguendo addit: 'Quamquam si discutiatur quo fine fiant, vix invenitur quam iustitiae debitam laudem defensionemve mereantur'. Et ideo, cum Augustinus dicit infideles agere aliqua bona vel laudabilia, intelligit de bonis primo modo tantum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 16-20; VI, 80; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De spiritu et littera*, 27, 48; PL 44 230.

[28] «Unde statim ipse subdit: 'Sicut ipsa imago Dei renovatur in corde credentium per testamentum novum, quam non penitus impietas aboleverat, nam remanserat id quod anima hominis nisi rationalis esse non potest, ita etiam ibi', scilicet in corde non credentium, 'lex Dei non ex omni parte deiecta per iniustitiam profecto scribitur renovata per gratiam'. Ex quibus patet auctoritatem illam Augustini nullatenus esse contra.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 32-37; VI, 80; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De spiritu et littera*, 28, 48; PL 44 230.

[29] «Quod etiam manifeste patet ex eo quod libro 4 Contra Iulianum capitulo 15 de infidelibus, qui visi sunt singulariter inter ceteros veras habere virtutes, dicit quod 'naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt, scriptum habentes in cordibus opus legis' hactenus, ut aliis non fecerent quod perpeti nolent, hoc tamen peccantes quod homines sine fide non ad eum finem ista opera retulerunt, ad quem referre debuerunt. Minus enim Fabricius quam Catilina punietur, non quia iste bonus, sed quia ille magis malus; et minus impius quam Catilina Fabricius, non veras virtutes habendo, sed a veris virtutibus non plurimum deviando'. Si tamen aliquid taliter factum scilicet debito fine et aliis debitis circumstantiis reperiatur ab infidelibus, dicendum est eos id fecisse non sine speciali audiutorio Dei. Nec oppositum dicit Augustinus, immo propositum magis ibidem.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 21-32; VI, 80; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3, 25; PL 44 751; *Rm.* 2, 14-15.

Nonostante la comune origine divina, il principio della retta ragione permette di giudicare in assoluto del valore morale dell'atto che ci si accinge ad operare, mentre quello della circostanza declina la norma generale nella situazione concretamente particolare ed astrae da essa il fine supremo in vista del quale si opera l'atto moralmente buono o cattivo. Perciò, il valore morale di un'azione non dipende dalla valutazione intellettuale con la quale il credente giudica naturalmente tale azione, ma dalla sequela della retta ragione e dal perseguimento del fine ultimo, laddove tale ragione e tale fine sono soprannaturalmente partecipati al credente.[30] La rettitudine secondo la quale la volontà si orienta verso il fine ultimo, suppone la conoscenza di Dio come ente supremo e bene infinitamente grande che deve essere obbedito ed amato sopra ogni cosa. La prospettiva teocentrica determina la rettificazione, ossia il corretto orientamento della ragione e della volontà dell'uomo, proteso al raggiungimento del sommo bene attraverso i beni intermedi;[31] la rettitudine formale viene ad implicare la significatività morale degli atti umani.

Chi volesse costruire un buon edificio, senza seguire la retta ragione e/o senza perseguire il fine supremo, starebbe operando un bene estrinseco ed improprio. Il costruttore, rispettoso della retta ragione, ma consapevole di agire indipendemtemente da Dio, compirebbe un'azione non moralmente buona e quindi, per l'utrumlibetalità del valore morale, malvagia. Questa sembra essere la corretta interpretazione di Agostino. Affermando la moralità dei beni dei non-credenti, moralmente cattivi e peccaminosi, a dispetto di ogni interprete assennato, l'Ipponate si auto-contraddirebbe;[32] le sue parole, addotte per l'opinione contraria, confermano più che infirmare la risposta,

[30] Mentre Gabriel Biel tenterà di mediare la posizione di Aureolo con quella di Rimini, la tradizione agostiniana aderirà all'insegnamento rimigino; cf. G. SCHIAVELLA, *L'atto morale e il fine ultimo nella polemica tra Gregorio da Rimini ed i suoi avversari*, «Augustinianum», 1 (1961), pp. 56-57.

[31] J. WOREK, *El amor de Dios en la actividad moral cristiana segun Gregorio de Rimini y sua vicisitudes en epocas posteriores*, «Rivista Augustiniana de Espiritualidad», 9 (1968), p. 262.

[32] «Nec etiam quod ulterius dicitur probat talem glossam de intentione Augustini. Quod patet: 'Tum quia, cum frequenter in praecedentibus proxime capitulis Augustinus dixerit talia infidelium opera, quae virtuosa et laudabilia videntur, vere esse peccata et punienda, nulli dubium esse potest quin intellexerit ipsa non esse moraliter bona, sed esse vitiosa et mala moraliter. Si autem, ubi allegatur, vellet concedere illa esse moraliter bona, quamvis non meritoria, patenter contradiceret sibi ipsi; quod nullus sanae mentis concederet.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 1-8; VI, 81;

intendendo per azione buona il bene morale, cioè ciò che è buono sia rispetto al genere che alle circostanze della virtuosità.[33]

In secondo luogo, quando l'Ipponate sembra aver paventato che noi possiamo amare naturalmente le cose spirituali e per tal amore conseguire l'ottimo,[34] egli, impegnato a rispondere ai manichei, aveva inteso dire che, una volta sanata la natura viziosa, l'uomo può agire moralmente bene solo per la grazia divina.[35] Precisando che senza il soccorso divino l'uomo può volere e scegliere di compiere il male morale in virtù del suo libero arbitrio,[36] della facoltà di scelta, della

[33] «Tum quia, si subtiliter considerentur verba allegata pro parte opposita, magis confirmatur propositum quam infirmetur. Dicit enim ipse se de illo loqui bono 'per quod homo potest ad aeternum Dei donum regnumque perduci' sive, quod idem valet, bonum quod est a Deo praemiabile praemio vitae aeternae. Constat autem tale esse omne bonum quod est vere bonum moraliter, ut in proposito accipio, scilicet quod est bonum ex genere et omnibus circumstantiis requisitis ad hoc quod actus sit vere virtuosus. Quilibet enim talis actus, si fieret ab homine habente gratiam gratum facientem et in tali gratia postmodum decedente, utique aeternae vitae praemio praemiaretur. Igitur quilibet est tali praemio praemiabilis, licet, cum fit a non habente praedictam gratiam, nequaquam ad tale praemium acceptetur. Cum ergo tale bonum dicat Augustinus non fieri ab infideli nec fieri posse sine speciali auxilio Dei, quamvis alia bona ex genere tantum fieri possint, manifeste nostrum propositum ex illo eiusdem dicto confirmatur.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 9-22; VI, 81.

[34] «Secundo, idem in De duabus animabus, circa finem, ait: 'Propterea enim corporea diligendo peccamus, quia spiritualia diligere et iustitia iubemur et natura possumus, et tunc in nostro genere optimi et beatissimi sumus'. Hic adverte quod dicit nos natura posse diligere spiritualia, qua dilectione optimi sumus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 7-11; VI, 69; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De duabus animabus*, 13, 20; PL 42 109.

[35] «Ad secundam auctoritatem eiusdem respondendum est iuxta responsionem quam ipsemet dat 1 Retractionum capitulo 15. Recolens enim verba praedicta inquit: 'Potest quaeri, cur 'natura', et non gratia, 'possumus' dixerim; sed contra Manichaeos de natura quaestio versabatur. Et utique id agit gratia ut sanata natura, quod vitiata non potest, possit per eum qui 'venit quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat' '. Ex quo apparet eum utique intelligere quod per naturam possumus, sed non per solam naturam.' «GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 23-29; VI, 81; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Retractationum Libri II*, 1, 15, 8; CCSL ed. A. Mutzenbecher, Turnholti 1984, LVII 151-171, 50-51; PL 32 611; *Lc.* 19, 10. Rimini appare annullare lo spazio cronologico-esistenziale tra l'Agostino giovane e quello maturo.

[36] «Per idem respondendum est ad aliam Contra Fortunatum, et ad aliam Contra Felicem, et similiter ad ultimam ex libro Ad Simplicianum, cuius sensum per eadem verba ipsemet exponit libro 2 Retractationum capitulo 1. Ad illud, quod arguitur ex eo quod Augustinus dicit frequenter 'nihil esse tam in potestate quam velle etc.', dicendum non solum esse in nostra potestate male velle sed etiam bene velle, sed differenter. Nam absque speciali Dei audiutorio male velle possumus, bene autem velle nisi illo specialiter adiuvante non possumus, sicut patet per Augustinum in De correctione et gratia et in De verbis Apostoli et in De praedestinatione divina, ut superius in prima ratione pro prima conclusione est allegatum. Nec tamen, quia per solum liberum arbitrium nonnisi male velle possumus, ideo nobis datum est ut male velimus, sed potius, quia Deo iuvante per liberum arbitrium bene velle possumus, datum nobis est ut illo

capacità di volere che deriva da Dio,[37] Gregorio tende ad interpretare il giovane Agostino anti-manicheo con quello maturo delle sentenze ritrattate.

In ultimo luogo, l'uomo fa ciò che vuole, ciò che sceglie liberamente di fare,[38] così da scegliere di compiere il bene od il male.[39] Poiché egli possiede la facoltà di volere una certa cosa, per quanto non abbia quella di poter valutare di farla,[40] in virtù del libero arbitrio e della facoltà di scelta l'uomo può compiere il bene, oltrechè il male.[41]

praesentante bene velimus eiusque imploremus auxilium, sine quo nihil bene velle possumus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 36-12; VI, 81-82; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Retractationes*, 2, 1, 2; CCSL LVII 28-50, 90-91; PL 36 630.

[37] «Ad tertium dicendum etiam secundum expositionem eiusdem libro I Retractationum capitulo 22: 'In potestate, inquit, hominis est mutare voluntatem, sed ea potestas nulla est nisi a Deo detur, de quo dictum est: 'Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri'. Cum enim hoc sit in potestate quod, cum volumus, facimus, nihil tam in potestate quam ipsa voluntas; sed 'praeparatur voluntas a Domino'. Eo modo ergo dat potestatem'. Haec Augustinus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 30-35; VI, 81; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Retractationes*, 1, 22, 4; CCSL LVII 55-71, 65-66; PL 32 620.

[38] «Quarto, Contra Fortunatum: 'Hinc, inquit, est praemium, quia propria voluntate recta facimus'. Et infra: 'Si ergo imperatum est nobis ut facimus arborem aut bonam aut malam, nostrum est elicere quid velimus'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 15-17; VI, 69; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Fortunatum*, 21-22; PL 42 122-125; *Mt.* 12, 13.

[39] «Quinto, Contra Felicem Manichaeum libro 2, paulo post principium: 'Habet', inquit Augustinus, 'unusquisque in voluntate aut elicere quae bona sunt et esse arbor bona, aut eligere quae mala sunt et esse arbor mala'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 18-20; VI, 69; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Felicem*, 2, 4; PL 42 538.

[40] «Sexto, idem Ad Simplicianum libro 2 quaestione 1: 'Quamvis sit in potestate cuiuscumque quid velit, non est tamen in cuiuscumque potestate quid possit vel facere cuiquam vel a quocumque pati'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 21-23; VI, 69; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, 2, 1, 4; CCSL ed. A. Mutzenbecher, Turnholti 1970, XLIV 123-175, 62-64; PL 40 131.

[41] «In multis etiam locis librorum De libero arbitrio et Retractationum dicit quod nihil est tam in potestate nostra quam ipsum velle. Sed non est dicendum quod solum malum velle sit in nostra potestate, alioquin libertas arbitrii nonnisi ad malum data nobis esse videretur; quod non est dicendum. Igitur et bonum velle est in nostra potestate et per consequens ex nobis possumus bene velle.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 24-29; VI, 69; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De libero arbitrio*, 1, 12, 26; 3, 3, 7-8; CCSL ed. W. M. Green, Turnholti 1970, XXIX 52-71, 228; PL 32 1235; 1274; 1275; *Retractationes*, 1, 9, 3; 1, 22, 4; CCSL LVII 32-91, 24-26; PL 32 595-596, 620.

Il peccato originale

Antecedentemente alla discesa terrena, lo stesso Adamo in quanto primo essere umano non era perfettamente in grado di compiere un atto buono con le sole sue forze naturali senza l'influenza generale[42] che Dio esercita sull'essere e sull'operare dell'uomo così da permettergli d'essere ed, una volta acquisito l'essere, d'operare.[43] Come aveva creduto Agostino che aveva commentato il *Genesi*, noi siamo, viviamo ed agiamo grazie alla disposizione con la quale Dio, sommamente sapiente, ha ordinato il mondo creato im modo sublime;[44] per cui, qualora l'opera della reggenza ed il moto della sapienza divina mediante il quale ogni natura sussiste e permane nel suo genere, agendo e vegetando, cessassero, ogni creatura finirebbe d'essere[45] e perderebbe ogni forma d'attività.[46] Prima del peccato originale, stante

[42] «Hoc praemisso pono conclusiones tres: Prima est quod primis homo, id est Adam, ante suum lapsum non fuit sufficiens per suas vires sine auxilio generalis influentiae Dei agere aliquem bonum actum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 18-20; VI, 116.

[43] «Haec conclusio communiter a catholicis doctoribus conceditur, et ideo pro eius probatione sufficiat pro nunc auctoritas Apostoli Actum 17 dicentis: 'In ipso', scilicet Deo, 'vidimus, movemur et sumus', per quam docemur quod nos non possumus sine ipso vivere, id est vitae operationes exercere, nec moveri nec etiam esse, sed ad quodlibet horum nobis est necessaria influentia eius. Quapropter si ipse non influeret ad esse nostrum, nos non essemus; et si influeret ad esse et non ad operari, sic utique essemus quod nihil tamen operaremur, sicut contingit de igne in respectu ad tres pueros in camino ignis existentes, ut legitur Danielis 3.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 21-29; VI, 116; cf. *Act.* 17, 28; *Dn.* 3, 19 ss.

[44] «Confirmatur istud per auctoritatem Augustini 4 Super Genesim capitulo 14 de parvis, exponentis praedicta Apostoli verba sic: 'Cum enim aliud simus quam ipse, non ob aliud in illo sumus, nisi quia id operatur, et hoc est opus eius quo 'continet omnia' et quo eius sapientiae pertendit 'a fine usque in finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter', per quam dispositionem 'in illo vivimus, movemur et sumus'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 30-4; VI, 116-117; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 4, 12, 23; PL 34 305.

[45] «Unde colligitur quod, si hoc opus suum a rebus subtraxerit, nec vivemus nec movebimur nec erimus. Claret igitur nec uno quidem die cessasse Deum ab opere regendi quae creavit, ne motus suos naturales, quibus aguntur atque vegetantur ut omnino naturae sint et in eo quod sunt pro suo quaeque genere maneant, illico amitterent, et esse aliquid omnino desineret, si eis subtraherentur motus ille sapientiae Dei quod 'disponit omnia suaviter'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 4-10; VI, 117.

[46] «Hoc autem opus et hic motus est quem vocamus 'influentiam generalem', quo subtracto utique, ut ait, ceterae res perderent motus suos. Nec potest dici hoc dictum habuisse veritatem tantum post hominis lapsum, cum etiam de ipsis angelis sanctis, qui numquam peccaverunt nec illius alterius peccati reatu obstricti sunt, idem dicat infra libro 9 capitulo 23.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 11-15; VI, 117; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 9, 9, 15; PL 34 398.

l'influenza generale, Adamo che viveva nella grazia, poteva compiere un atto moralmente buono per il suo libero arbitrio e per le sue forze naturali senza l'aiuto speciale di Dio;[47] questa possibilità dipendeva dalla *salus* incolpevole della volontà del 'protoplasto' – secondo una fonte pseudo-agostiniana. Quest'ultima è annoverata da Gregorio come agostiniana[48] ed interpreta la Sacra Scrittura, laddove si afferma la consegna dei precetti divini nelle mani della prima creatura, intendendo la donazione della possibilità del libero arbitrio a tale creatura.[49]

In virtù di tale possibilità Adamo bastava a se stesso per scegliere di stare o di non stare nella condizione paradisiaca, rispettando o non rispettando i precetti divini, ossia; egli poteva scegliere autonomamente di compiere il bene o il male.[50] Ma, neppure Adamo era perfettamente in grado di compiere un atto moralmente buono senza il soccorso speciale di Dio.[51]

[47] «Tertia conclusio est quod Adam ante peccatum per liberum arbitrium et vires naturales suas ac audiutorium gratiae superadditum, quod habebat simul cum generali Dei influentia, potuit absque alio speciali auxilio Dei agere actum moraliter bonum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 12-15; VI, 130.

[48] «Probatur primo auctoritate Augustini Hypomnosticon responsione 3 in principio, ubi recitans unum errorem Pelagii ait: 'Iterum' dicunt 'posse hominem per liberum arbitrium per se sibi sufficientem implere quod velit ' '; et post contra hoc inquit sic: 'Respondemus: Neminem posse per se sibi, id est per liberum arbitrium, sufficere implere quod velit recte dicimus, nisi protoplastum solum potuisse, cum voluntas liberi arbitrii fuisset sana eidem ante culpam'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 16-22; VI, 130; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 3, 1, 1; PL 45 1621.

[49] «Et paulo post probans istud auctoritate Scripturae ait: 'Nam, ut calcatius liberum arbitrium cum possibilitatis bono, quod valeret implere quod voluisset, Adam factum intelligas, audi quid dicat Scriptura sancta Ecclesiastico libro: 'Deus, inquit, ab initio fecit hominem et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui, adiecit mandata et praecepta etc'. Quid est autem 'reliquit illum in manu consilii sui', nisi dimissit illum in impossibilitate arbitrii sui? 'In manu' enim possibilitas intelligitur. Ipsa est prima gratia, qua primus homo stare potuisset, si ervare Domini mandata voluisset'. Haec Augustinus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 22-29; VI, 130; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 3, 2, 2; PL 45 1621; *Eccli.* 15, 14-15.

[50] «Ex his verbis patet secundum Augustinum quod Adam per liberum arbitrium taliter dotatum, qualiter habebat ante culpam, scilicet cum bono possibilitatis seu gratia illa prima, sufficiebat sibi implere quod vellet; ceterorum vero neminem sibi sufficere. Per quod patet eum loqui de sufficientia ad bonum; nam ad malum etiam alii sibi sufficiunt. Hoc etiam patet ex eo quod dicit Adam per liberum arbitrium cum bono possibilitatis potuisse stare, si voluisset servare mandata. Per quod etiam innuitur quod potuisset servare mandata. Igitur potuit agere bonum actum moraliter. Si vero sibi sufficebat ad hoc, igitur non indigebat alio auxilio speciali.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 30-3; VI, 130-131.

[51] «Secunda conclusio est quod Adam ante lapsum non fuit per suas vires naturales praecise, etiam cum Dei generali influentia, sufficiens ad agendum aliquem actum moraliter bonum seu vere virtuosum; quinimmo ultra praedicta fuit sibi necessarium aliud Dei auxilium speciale.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 18-21; VI, 117.

Sull'autorità di Fulgenzio di Ruspe e del Concilio milevitano, con il peccato di Adamo, ogni ess ere umano, generato da un uomo, da una donna e sottoposto all'empietà, diviene suscettibile della morte[52] ed acquista il peccato originale che va espiato nel battesimo con l'acqua della rigenerazione.[53] Tale peccato ch'è nociuto all'intero genere umano,[54] è la colpa, la pena della colpa e la causa della colpa,[55] alla quale la pena è assegnata.[56]

L'uomo in quanto tale si lega intimamente alla condizione della finitezza e della caducità, reiterando indefinitivamente la trasgressione di Adamo al precetto divino. Tale trasgressione, commessa una volta dal primo essere umano, struttura originariamente la stessa dinamica dell'agire umano, fondativamente rivolto a commettere il bene od il male secondo l'etica della responsabilità. In essa, stabilite alcune

[52] «Ista quaestio supponit trahere originale peccatum, deinde quaerit, an sit culpa vel poena. Circa suppositum non est dubitandum dicente Augustino De fide ad Petrum capitulo 26: 'Firmissime tene et nullatenus debites omnem hominem, qui per concubitum viri et mulieris concipitur, cum originali peccato impietati subditum, morti subiectum et ob hoc natura irae filium nasci, de qua dicit Apostolus: 'Erramus enim et nos natura filii irae.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 1, n. 9-15; VI, 175; cf. FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 26, 69; CCSL ed. J. Fraipont, Turnholti 1968, XCIA 1235-1239, 733; PL 40 774.

[53] «De hoc etiam est determinatio concilii Milevitani superius allegati, in cuius tertio capitulo scribitur sic: 'Quicumque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat aut dicit in remissionem quidam peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati quod lavacro regenerationis expietur, unde sit consequens ut in eis forma baptismatis 'in remissionem peccatorum' non vera sed falsa intelligatur, anathema sit. Quoniam non aliter intelligendum est quod ait Apostolus: 'Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnibus hominibus mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt', nisi quemadmodum ecclesia catholica ubique diffusa semper intellexit. Propter enim hanc regulam fidei etiam parvuli, qui nihil peccatorum a semetipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo in peccatorum remissionem veraciter baptizantur, ut in eis per regenerationem mundetur quod generatione traxerunt'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 1, n. 20-32; VI, 175.

[54] «Prima conclusio ponitur a Magistro in distinctione 30, et pluribus sanctorum auctoritatibus probat. Et praeter eas alia Augustini adduci potest qui in Hypomnosticon responsione 2 ait: 'Peccatum Adae non solum ipsum, sed omne nocuit genus humanum, cum eius damnationem simul et culpam suscipimus'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 1, art. 1, n. 12-16; VI, 176; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 2, 4, 4; PL 42 1620.

[55] «Quantum ad primum pono tres conclusiones: Prima est quod peccatum originale est culpa. Secunda, quod est poena culpae. Tertia, quod est etiam causa culpae.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 1, art. 1, n. 8-10; VI, 176.

[56] «Probatur etiam ratione sic: Homini pro peccato originali iuste poena tribuitur; ergo peccatum originale est culpa. Consequentia patet, quia poena nonnisi culpae debetur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus 3 De libero arbitrio capitulo 39: 'Omnis poena si iusta est, peccati poena est et supplicium nominatur'; et ibi peccatum proprie pro culpa ponit.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 1, art. 1, n. 17-21; VI, 176; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De libero arbitrio*, 3, 18, 51; CCSL XXIX 12-40, 305; PL 32 1296.

norme inderogabili, la trasgressione ad uno o a più di esse denota la devianza del comportamento erroneo dell'agente mortale, nel quale insorge una colpa, un peccato, sanzionato attraverso una pena.[57] In seguito al peccato originale ed alla conseguente caduta, Adamo[58] e con lui ogni essere umano, decaduto nello stato presente, non può compiere alcun bene morale senza il soccorso speciale di Dio, stante la sua influenza generale;[59] al modo di Alberto Magno,[60] l'uomo diviene ignorante delle ragioni del *velle* o del *nole* un atto, ossia delle circostanze della sua virtuosità.[61] Come aveva comprovato il Dottor Cattolico che commenta la Scrittura, occorre accogliere lo spirito della sapienza e la grazia gratificante, per agire e valutare rettamente le condizioni della vita morale,[62] laddove la rettitudine della comprensione non si riferisce al fine prossimo, ma a quello ultimo che è Dio.[63]

[57] La corrispondenza tra colpa e pena si regge sull'imputabilità dell'atto malvagio al rispettivo agente libero. Se quest'ultimo non fosse libero, ossia qualora, date le condizioni dell'agire, non potesse non agire o agire diversamente, la sua azione non gli potrebbe essere ascritta e di conseguenza egli non sarebbe suscettibile di premi o di punizioni.

[58] «Quantum ad secundum articulum pono principaliter unam conclusionem tantum, videlicet quod Adam post suum lapsum non potuit per suas vires naturales absque speciali auxilio Dei facere aliquem actum moraliter bonum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, n. 25-27; VI, 132.

[59] «Ex hac conclusione ego infero conclusionem per me alias positam etiam supra distintione 26, videlicet quod homo in praesenti statu, Dei etiam generali influentia stante, non potest sine speciali Dei auxilio agere actum aliquem moraliter bonum, loquendo de actu moraliter bono ut tunc fuit expositum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 7-11; VI, 122.

[60] IDEM, *In libros Sententiarum*, ed. Venetiis 1522, in mg. fol. 106B: Albertus praedicator(um).

[61] «Ex hac conclusione infero duas alias propter collationem habitam cum quodam venerabili magistro. Quarum prima est quod ex peccato primi parentis quilibet homo naturali usu nascens contrahit ignorantiam agendorum, ita quod nullus sine speciali auxilio Dei potest in his quae ad moralem vitam pertinent sufficienter cognoscere quid volendum vel nolendum. 'Sufficienter' autem dico illum cognoscere qui non solum cognoscit aliquid esse agendum vel nolendum, sed etiam novit propter quid et quemadmodum est agendum vel nolendum secundum omnes circumstantias requisitas ad hoc quod actus sit bonus moraliter et vere virtuosus, et de tali sufficientia notitiae sum in superioribus locutus semper circa istam materiam.» IDEM, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, n. 17-26; VI, 135.

[62] «Ad hoc iste magister dixit duo: Primum, quod, si ista auctoritas sumatur, ut capio, concluditur quod nullus carens gratia gratum faciente potest agere actum bonum moraliter; quod est contra dicta mea alia in probatione primae conclusionis meae, quam ibi posui. Quod autem illud sequatur, patet, quia nullus carens gratia gratum faciente habet spiritum sapientiae et consilii, cum illa sint dona Spiritus Sancti, quae non habentur sine gratia gratum faciente, ut dicunt doctores et Scriptura Sacra Sapientiae 1: 'Spiritus Sanctus disciplinae effugiet fictum'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, n. 7-14; VI, 142; cf. *Sap.* 1, 5.

[63] «Secundo respondet ad auctoritatem dicens quod, cum dicitur 'nemo recte sapit etc.', intelligendum est de rectitudine quae inest actui ex attinctione finis simpliciter

Solo il bene va desiderato e compiuto, mentre il male va *nolitum* ed evitato. Tuttavia, io non posso stabilire autonomamente se l'azione che mi accingo a fare sia buona o malvagia, non sono in grado di giudicare della moralità della mia azione che si esplica in senso utrumlibetale nel buono o nel cattivo senza alcun residuo o sovrapposizione etico-teologico. Non riuscendo a discernere il bene dal male morale, non so da me stesso cosa vada voluto e cosa vada noluto, e di conseguenza ignoro cosa vada compiuto e cosa vada evitato. In definitiva, per il carattere utrumlibetale della moralità, io che non sono in grado di compiere alcun'azione buona o malvagia, mi rivelo incapace d'agire, non posso agire senza il soccorso della grazia[64] di Dio[65] che in questo caso non interviene in generale, ma in speciale, concorrendo con l'uomo, instabile ed impotente nello stato presente, non tanto all'agevolazione od all'ottimizzazione dell'atto moralmente buono quanto alla stessa sua produzione.[66]

ultimati, quae non potest esse nisi Spiritu Sancto gratiam infundente et faciente una cum tali caritate in actu immediatum ordinem ad finem simpliciter ultimatum. Non loquitur autem Augustinus de rectitudine quae potest esse in actu ex attinctione finis propinqui et immediati, sicut est recte militare 'ad debellandum superbos' et 'ad pacificandum subiectos', quae potest esse in homine dona Spiritus Sancti non habent, sicut patet de Nabuchodonosor debellante Tyrum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, n. 15-23; VI, 142; cf. *Ez.* 26, 28.

[64] Rimini con il termine 'grazia' non intende solo la grazia che rende grati, ma anche quella data gratuitamente con cui Dio aiuta universalmente l'uomo a volere il bene, a muovere la volontà a compiere il bene od in qualsiasi altro modo speciale; cf. «Ex his infero corollarie quod nemo potest mereri primam gratiam de condigno nec etiam de congruo, contra aliquorum sententiam modernorum. Nomine autem gratiae non solum significo gratiam gratum facientem, sed etiam gratis datam, et universaliter quodcumque Dei speciale adiutorium ad bene operandum, sive adiuvet aliquod donum creatum infundendo sive immediate per se ipsum movendo voluntatem ad bene volendum sive quocumque alio modo speciali iuvet hominem.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 2-8; VI, 32; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. C. Balic, in *Opera omnia*, Civitas Vaticana 1960, dist. 28, q. 1, n. 140-175; VIII, 300-302; ROBERTUS HOLCOT, *Super libro Sapientiae*, ed. Hagenau 1494, cap. 8, lec. 116, fol. 2rb-vbB.

[65] Non a caso i credenti implorano il soccorso divino con la preghiera per il compimento delle azioni sia buone che cattive; cf. «Tertia suppositio est quod tam pro vitandis actibus vitiosis quam pro virtuosis agendis fideles orando divinum implorant auxilium et, cum illos vitaverint et istos egerint, Deo gratis reddunt; nec eorum orationes nec gratiarum actiones superfluae sunt aut fictae.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 28-31; VI, 25.

[66] L'uomo, instabile ed impotente nello stato presente, ha bisogno del soccorso speciale della grazia divina non solo per compiere meglio o più facilmente, ma proprio per compiere un atto moralmente buono che cada sotto i precetti divini; cf. «Quarta suppositio est quod quilibet homo in statu praesenti infirmus et impotens est ad quemlibet bonum actum cadentem sub divino praecepto, ita quod non solum ad melius vel facilius agendum, sed simpliciter ad agendum indiget propter suam infirmitatem speciali auxilio gratiae Dei, in tantum quod nullum actum eiusmodi potest agere non adiutus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 8-12; VI, 26.

Per il peccato dei primi progenitori la facoltà naturale, umana dell'*usus concettus* di volere il bene passa dall'atto alla potenza;[67] senza il soccorso speciale di Dio l'uomo non può evitare ogni peccato;[68] molti giusti hanno dovuto implorare il soccorso di Dio verso il quale essi hanno dovuto riconoscere la gratitudine per le vittorie conseguite.[69] La scena del mondo si apre al male.

Il nome '*male*'[70] può essere adoperato in funzione aggettivale – nel primo modo – o sostantivale – nel secondo modo – come sinonimo del nome astratto 'malvagità' dal quale vari nomi concreti derivano,[71] secondo diverse significazioni analogiche.[72] Il male, sempli-

[67] «Secunda conclusio, quam infero ex praedicta conclusione principali huius articuli, est quod ex peccato primorum parentum quilibet homo naturali usu conceptus contrahit impotentiam bene volendi et bene agendi moraliter, ad hunc scilicet sensum quod ipse non potest sine speciali auxilio Dei aliquid bene moraliter velle vel agere, etiam si sufficienter cognoscat quid et qualiter aliquid est agendum vel volendum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, n. 32-5; VI, 153-154.

[68] «Secunda conclusio est quod non quodlibet peccatum homo existens in gratia potest sine alio Dei auxilio speciali vitare.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 8-9; VI, 104.

[69] «Probatur, quia non quamlibet tentationem potest sine speciali auxilio superare, igitur etc. Probatur assumptum, quia, si quamlibet, igitur in nulla quantacumque tentatione positi viri iusti deberent auxilium implorare, neque de alicuius victoria deberent se magis quam prius Deo obligatos cognoscere et tamquam de novo munere illi gratias agere. Consequentia patet ex dictis supra.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 10-15; VI, 104.

[70] «In dissolutione huius quaestionis tres erunt articuli: Nam primo videbitur, utrum malum sit aliqua entitas et an sit aliqua efficiens causa mali. Secundo videbitur, utrum peccatum sit entitas aliqua et quomodo peccatum sit malum. Tertio videbitur illud quod quaeritur principaliter.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, n. 4-7; VI, 220.

[71] «Quantum ad primum articulum praemitto quod malum potest dupliciter accipi: Uno modo pro eo quod denominatur malum, sicut dicimus hominem malum et angelum malum et aurum malum, et sic de aliis; alio modo pro eo unde primo aliquid denominatur seu est malum primo modo. Primo modo cum loquimur de malo, hoc nomen malum sumitur adiective. Cum autem loquimur secundo modo, sumitur substantive et est synonymum huic nomini 'malitia', quod evidentius retinet formam nominum abstractorum et principalium, a quibus concreta et quae vocantur sumpta derivantur.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 1, n. 10-17; VI, 220.

[72] «Item aliqua denominatur mala diversimode secundum quod diversam analogiam habent ad malum secundo modo acceptum, quemadmodum etiam secundum diversam analogiam ad sanitatem aliqua diversis significationibus denominantur sana, ut declaratur 4 Metaphysicae, et similiter est de his quae infirma vel aegra dicuntur. Quaedam enim sic denominantur, quia subiecta sunt aegritudinis, ad bonum intellectum, quo privationibus deputamus subiecta; quaedam, quia causae sunt aegritudinis, quaedam aliter, et quaedam aliter. Sic est etiam de malis, ut patebit in sequentibus, ex quibus etiam praedicta distinctio declarabitur.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 1, n. 18-21; VI, 220; cf. ARISTOTELES LATINUS, *Metaphysica*, rec. trans. a Guillelmo de Moerbeke, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden 1995, III, 2, 1003 a 33 – b 4.

cemente considerato nel secondo modo, consiste in una privazione o un difetto del rispettivo bene, residente in un'entità, mentre il male, assunto nel primo modo, corrisponde ad un'entità, efficientemente causata.[73]

La dannazione dei neonati morti senza battesimo

Mentre gli eletti sono preordinati alla vita eterna, sia gli adulti che muoiono nei propri peccati, sia i neonati che periscono nel solo peccato originale si rivelano preordinati alla pena eterna. I bambini non battezzati si mostrano condannati e preconosciuti da Dio come tali.[74] Gregorio crede d'interpretare l'autentica autorità agostiniana; in realtà si sta appoggiando ad una fonte pseudo-agostiniana.[75]

[73] «Hoc praemisso pono conclusiones ad articulum istum: Quarum prima est quod malitia seu malum, unde primo aliquid denominatur malum, quod vocari potest per se malum seu iuxta Anselmum De casu diaboli capitulo 20 potest dici 'malum simpliciter' vel 'malum simplex', non est aliqua entitas, sed pura privatio seu defectus boni debiti. Secunda conclusio est eodem modo sumendo malum quod, quamvis malum non sit aliqua entitas, quodlibet tamen est in aliqua entitate. Tertia conclusio est de malo accepto primo modo, scilicet pro eo quod denominatur malum quod iuxta Anselmum 'non simpliciter' dicitur 'malum, sed malum aliquid est', quod aliquod malum entitas non tamen omne. Ex quibus consequenter patebit quod alicuius mali est aliqua causa per se efficiens, et alicuius non.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 1, n. 28-5; VI, 220-221; cf. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *De casu diaboli*, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, 20; n. 27-30; I 265.

[74] «Secundo sic: Cuilibet homini Deus ab aeterno praeordinavit vel praescivit regnum aeternum vel poenam aeternam; igitur quilibet homo fuit ab aeterno praedestinatus vel reprobatus. Consequentia patet. Antecedens autem ponit Augustinus in libro, qui intitulatur Dispositio de praedestinatione contra Pelagianos, et ex intentione probat per verbum Salvatoris allegatum ad oppositum quaestionis et expresse dicit quod omnibus perituris sive cum peccatis propriis ut adulti sive cum originali tantum ut pueri morituris praeordinata est aeterna poena, electis vero omnibus regnum aeternum. Unde, introducta illa auctoritate cum pluribus aliis Sacrae Scripturae concludit sic: 'Tenenda est igitur inconcusse huius disputationis regula, quae divinis testimoniis claruit, peccatores in malis propriis antequam essent in mundo, praescitos esse tantum, non praedestinatos; poenam autem eis esse praedestinatam secundum quod praesciti sunt.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* I, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 1, n. 14-26; III, 324; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 6, 6, 8; PL 45 1661-1662; *Mt.* 19, 18; 25, 31-34; 25, 41.

[75] PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 6, 6, 9; PL 45 1662.

Sebbene Dio possa apparire iniquo nel far sì che i neonati, pur non avendo peccato, sopportino la morte,[76] essi, *moriuntur* non per l'*actio*, ma per l'*uterina conceptio*.[77]

Talvolta, il teologo eremitano si appoggia alle autorità più prestigiose per fondare le opinioni più originali. In questo caso, per quanto il puntello teoretico d'appoggio possa apparire infondato ed inautentico a dispetto dell'acribia filologica di Rimini, esso serve parimenti all'ignaro Gregorio per fondare la sua opinione originale che in epoca moderna gli varrà l'appellativo di *tortor infantium*. I neonati, non rinati con l'acqua e con lo Spirito Santo, divengono suscettibili della pena preordinata; essi, pur non essendo imputabili di alcun bene o di alcun male che non hanno avuto il tempo di compiere con le proprie volontà, sono stati tratti alla nascita ed hanno trascorso i primi giorni di vita nel peccato infernale dal quale non sono stati purificati.[78] In virtù delle Sacre Scritture e dei santi, Gregorio che sa di contraddire il senso comune, inferisce dal caso della condanna dei bambini non battezzati le sue conclusioni magistrali. Nessuno è predestinato per il proprio libero arbitrio, preconosciuto da Dio, o per l'assenza d'un ostacolo attuale o abituale della grazia alla fine dei tempi, ma per la grazia misericordiosa di Dio, cosiccome nessuno è condannato per il cattivo uso del libero arbitrio o per la presenza d'un ostacolo alla grazia.[79]

[76] «Item Augustinus in Hypomnosticon responsione 5: 'Dic, inquit, mihi, si peccatum parvulus nullum carnaliter attraxit natus, cur brevis dierum sorte mortis astringitur? Quia ubi peccatum non est, utique mors esse non debet. Dictum est enim: 'Per peccatum mors'. Ac per hoc secundum errorem vestrum iniquus est Deus, ut mori parvulum patiatur non habentem peccatum, per quod possit vita privari'. » GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 1, art. 1, n. 25-30; VI, 176; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 5, 1, 2; PL 45 1649; *Rm.* 5, 12.

[77] «Et infra: 'Haec est fides nostra. Fatemur incunctanter peccatum in parvulis et per peccatum mortem pertransisse; quibus dum contingerit mori, propter peccatum, quod in eis non actione sed uterina conceptione pertransiit, moriuntur. Non enim morerentur, nisi caeno peccati necarentur'. Hic manifeste patet quod propter peccatum, quod 'non actione sed conceptione' parvulus habet, quod quidem vocamus originale, poenam recepit mortis.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 1, art. 1, n. 30-5; VI, 176-177; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 5, 2, 4; PL 45 1650.

[78] «Parvulos quoque non renatos ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto praedestinatae poenae esse obnoxios, qui praesciti sunt non in propriis voluntatibus, quorum nulla est vel bona vel mala, nisi tantum in Adae peccato, quod traxere nascentes et in hoc manentes solverunt tempus vitae praesentis'. Et post subdit: 'Qui vero secundum propositum Dei vivunt, praescitos esse et praedestinatos electione gratuitae gratiae eius et regnum eius coelorum esse praedestinatum sine dubitatione dicendum est'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* I, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 1, n. 26-32; III, 324.

[79] «Mihi autem videtur quod ex dictis Scripturae et sanctorum sequuntur quinque conclusiones, cum quarum omnium veritate non stat veritas alicuius modi dicendi de praedictis. Harum prima est quod nullus est praedestinatus propter bonum usum liberi arbitrii, quem Deus praescivit eum habiturum, qualitercumque consideretur bonitas

Mentre l'autorità autenticamente agostiniana (apertamente richiamata in funzione antipelagiana per negare la premiabilità delle buone opere),[80] stabilisce il presupposto generale della tesi della gratuità dell'agire divino, il caso speciale della condanna dei neonati non battezzati corrobora la particolare conclusione negativa, mostrando l'indipendenza tra la preordinazione positiva o negativa con cui Dio predestina o condanna un essere umano, ed il valore buono o cattivo del libero arbitrio secondo il quale tale essere umano agisce. Pur non potendo adoperare il proprio libero arbitrio, i bambini appena nati si rivelano dannati non per le opere che non hanno compiuto, o per il libero arbitrio che non hanno esercitato. Contro Pietro Aureolo, essi non possono essere condannati in base al cattivo uso del libero arbitrio che avrebbero esercitato da grandi, giacchè a causa della loro morte tale cattivo uso non è futuro, ossia non sarà in senso ontologicamente forte.[81] Dinanzi al tribunale di Cristo saremo giudicati per ciò

eius. Secunda, quod nullus est praedestinatus, quia praescitus fore finaliter sine obice habituali et actuali gratiae. Tertia, quod quemcumque Deus praedestinavit, gratis, tantummodo et misericorditer praedestinavit. Quarta, quod nullus est reprobatus propter malum usum liberi arbitrii quem illum Deus praevidit habiturum. Quinta, quod nullus est reprobatus, quia praevisus fore finaliter cum obice gratiae.» *Ibidem*, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 17-26; III, 326.

[80] «Sed ista responsio nulla omnino est; unde arguo contra eam iuxta intentionem Augustini in De praedestinatione sanctorum, ubi eam in propria forma refellit primo sic: Nullus praemiabitur a Deo propter merita, quae nec eius nec alterius sunt, fuerunt aut erunt; igitur nec propter talia quisquam fuit praedestinatus. Sed merita, quae pueri habuissent, si vixissent, nec eorum nec alterius sunt aut fuerunt aut erunt, ut patet; igitur etc. Prima consequentia patet; et antecedens cuilibet habenti rationem est notum, quoniam talia merita non sunt ulla merita, nec etiam praemianda, cum omnino sint nulla. Unde Augustinus hanc responsionem admirans: 'Unde hoc talibus, inquit, viris in mentem venerit, nescio, ut futura, quae non sunt futura, puniantur aut honorentur merita parvulorum'. Et infra: 'Quia hominum, inquit, futura, quae non sunt futura, procul dubio nulla sunt merita, et hoc videre facillimum est, ideo nec Pelagiani hoc dicere potuerunt, et multo magis nec isti dicere debuerunt'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 8-21; III, 327.

[81] «Prima conclusio deducitur primo sic: Aliqui praedestinati fuerunt non habituri ullum bonum usum liberi arbitrii; igitur nullus fuit praedestinatus propter talem usum. Consequentia patet, quia, si uni proposuit dare vitam aeternam sine bono usu liberi arbitrii futuro, sequitur quod alteri non proposuit dare propter talem usum futurum, sed libere et gratis aut propter aliam causam. Antecedens patet de pueris baptizatis morientibus in aetate infantili. Et per hoc argumentum dicit Augustinus maxime convinci quoscumque astruentes homines fuisse praedestinatos ex futuris operibus, et eodem modo ex futuro usu liberi arbitrii. Ad hoc tamen conati sunt aliqui respondere dicentes quod, licet parvuli tales non fuerunt praedestinati propter usum bonum liberi arbitrii, quem habituri fuerunt, fuerunt tamen praedestinati propter eum, quem habituri fuissent, si ad aetatem debitam pervenissent.» *Ibidem*, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 28-7; III, 326-327; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 13, 25; PL 44 978-979.

che abbiamo compiuto nella vita terrena, non per ciò che avremmo compiuto, qualora fossimo vissuti.[82]

Come aveva spiegato S. Agostino che, tuttavia, si era riferito al caso positivo della predestinazione degli eletti,[83] ammettendo che quest'ultimi fossero giudicati per i meriti, conseguiti durante l'arco di vita che essi avrebbero trascorso nel caso in cui non fossero morti, si dimentica che in tale ipotetico arco di vita essi avrebbero potuto mutare proposito, volgendosi al male.[84] Dunque, la tesi della condanna dei neonati, morti senza battesimo deriva dallo specifico retroterra culturale agostiniano ed anti-pelagiano, tipico della sensibilità di Gregorio da Rimini, di Tommaso Bradwardine[85] e dell'agostinismo trecentesco. Ma, mentre il caso positivo della predestinazione degli eletti è sancito dalle autorità agostiniane, quello negativo della condanna dei dannati e conseguentemente dei non battezzati, pur radicato nella dottrina agostiniana della preordinazione gratuita, è fondato nelle autorità pseudo-agostiniane che Rimini reputa autentiche.

L'inclusione dell'*Hypomnosticon* nel *corpus* agostiniano era comunemente accettata al punto che un immaginario oppositore della teoria della dannazione dei bambini non battezzati non avrebbe confutato l'autenticità della fonte patristica, ma l'assurdità dell'opinione rimigina. Il teologo eremitano riunisce i due tipi di autorità, residenti a suo avviso nell'unico *corpus* agostiniano.

Egli inferisce: 1) agostinianamente Dio dall'eternità predestina per grazia e non per il buon uso che l'uomo fa del libero arbitrio, o per il merito che l'uomo acquisisce per le sue buone opere terrene;

[82] «Praeterea, ut ait Augustinus ibidem, "'Apostolus limitem fixit, quem transgredi non debeat hominis incauta suspicatio. Ait enim 'Omnes astabimus ante tribunal Christi, ut ferat unusquisque secundum ea quae per corpus gessit'", id est eo tempore quod in corpore vixit, "'sive bonum sive malum gessit', inquit, non adiunxit 'vel gessurus fuit'". Est igitur determinatio Apostoli quod praecise secundum ea, quae fecit quis, merita et simili modo secundum eum usum, quem habuit praecise, dum vixit, praemiabitur. Non igitur secundum eum, quem, si vixisset, habiturus fuisset. Et certe hanc determinationem Apostuli transgredi aliud asserendo non licet.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* I, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 22-30; III, 327; AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 12, 24; PL 44 977; *Cor.* II 5, 10.

[83] AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 14, 19; PL 44 981; *Sap.* 4, 11.

[84] «Praeterea, arguit Augustinus: 'Si iudicarentur, inquit, homines pro meritis suae vitae, quae non habuerunt morte praeventi, sed habituri essent, si viverent, nihil prodesset ei, qui 'raptus est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum'', sicut scribitur Sapientiae 4.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* I, dist. 40-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 31-2; III, 327-328.

[85] H. A. OBERMAN, *I maestri della Riforma. La formazione di un nuovo clima intellettuale in Europa*, tr. A. Prandi, Bologna 1982, p. 111.

2) pseudo-agostinianamente chiunque non sia stato battezzato così da riscattare il peccato originale, pur non avendo commesso alcun bene o alcun male, diviene colpevole d'una pena eterna. Dunque, chi, come i neonati non battezzati, muore con il solo peccato originale,[86] al modo di Pietro Lombardo,[87] è dannato e punito non sensibilmente, ma spiritualmente da Dio che genera in lui la tristezza della mancata visione beatifica.[88]

La leggerezza di questa pena è confermata dalle Sacre Scritture[89] e dall'autentico Agostino,[90] che è chiamato in causa per convalidare un aspetto secondario della teoria.

Gregorio non esita a sottolineare che (l'inautentico) Agostino, riconducibile al *De fide ad Petrum* di Fulgenzio di Ruspe (ca. 477 – ca. 533), sembra aver creduto l'opposto. In questo caso, poichè la materia della discussione non consiste nella possibilità, ma nel genere della pena, inflitta ai neonati che sono morti senza essere battezzati, l'opposto rispetto all'opinione rimigina non è rappresentato dall'assenza della pena in assoluto, ma dalla presenza d'una pena sensibile. A giudizio di Rimini, (il fulgenziano) Agostino sembra aver sostenuto

[86] «Tertio quaero, utrum decedentes cum solo originali puniantur aliqua poena sensus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 17-18; VI, 209.

[87] PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, editio tertia, ed. I. Brady, Grottaferrata 1971-1981, II, dist. 33, cap. 2, 5, n. 9-17; I 520.

[88] «Respondeo. Opinio Magistri Sententiarum est ad partem negativam. Unde in 33 distinctione huius Secundi ait: 'Pro originali, quod a parentibus trahitur, parvuli damnabuntur, pro eo nullam aliam ignis materialis vel conscientiae vermis poenam sensuri, nisi quod Dei visione carebunt in perpetuum'. Hic patet manifeste quod asserit eos tantummodo poena damni puniri, nequaquam autem poena sensus. Et quantum ad hoc cum eo concordant omnes moderni doctores, quorum scripta circa materiam istam perlegi, licet aliqui concedant eos praeter poenam praedictam damni pati poenam tristitiae, quae causatur in eis ex eo quod considerant se perpetuo Dei visione carituros.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 8-16; VI, 210.

[89] «Tertio, ad idem videtur esse quaedam decretalis Extra de baptismo et eius effectu, capitulo 'Maiores', in qua sic scribitur: 'Poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei; actualis vero poena peccati, Gehennae perpetuae cruciatus'. Cum igitur hic utrique generi peccati propriam poenam assignet, videtur quod cruciatus Gehennae, qui poena sensibilis dicitur, non sit poena peccati originalis. Haec sunt in quibus sustentatur praedicta sententia.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 23-29; VI, 210; cf. *Extravagantes*. 3, 42, 3; ed. Ae. Friedberg, in *Corpus iuris canonici*, Graz 1955, II, col. 646.

[90] «Probatur autem primum illud dictum in quo conveniunt, ratione facta ad primam partem quaestionis. Arguitur etiam ex auctoritate Augustini Enchiridion capitulo 101 dicentis: 'Mitissima sane omnium poena erit eorum qui post peccatum originale, quod traxerunt, nullum insuper addiderunt'. Hoc autem non est verum, ut dicitur, si ipsi etiam poenam sensibilem paterentur.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 17-22; VI, 210; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Enchiridion*, 23, 93; CCSL ed. M. P. J. van den Hout – E. Evans – I. B. Bauer – R. Vander Plaetse – S. D. Ruegg – M. V. O'Reilly – C. Beukers, Turnholti 1969, XLVI 131-137, 99; PL 40 275.

la punizione di tali bambini con la pena eterna del fuoco infernale.[91] Come prima una fonte pseudo-agostiniana era utilizzata per rinforzare la tesi radicale della dannazione dei neonati non battezzati, così ora un'altra fonte pseudo-agostiniana è introdotta per specificare la pena ignea di tali dannati. Le due fonti pseudo-agostiniane condizionano marcatamente la struttura e la direzione della speculazione rimigina, in modo tale da rappresentarne due nodi cruciali alla luce dei quali l'autentico insegnamento dell'Ipponate è orientato.

Tuttavia, Rimini discorda dalla seconda autorità spurea e si sofferma sull'evidenziazione della retta interpretazione del senso dell'opinione che egli reputa genuinamente agostiniana, originando una specifica sezione del testo, debitamente contrassegnata con il titoletto appropriato dagli editori critici.

In primo luogo, (il fulgenziaano) Agostino aveva ecceduto nell'allontanarsi dal parere degli eretici che avevano negato ogni colpa e di conseguenza ogni pena nei bambini;[92] è erroneo e falso ritenere che Agostino, esimio estirpatore degli errori e veritiero difensore della fede, intento ad escludere ogni errore, abbia detto che la punizione dei bambini con la pena del fuoco vada creduta, senza verificare la concordanza di questo parere con la fede;[93] per cui, come aveva affermato Fulgenzio (tramandato sotto le spoglie di Agostino), ciò che importa non è parlare contro una particolare opinione, ma tramandare

[91] «Mihi autem salvos semper meliori iudicio apparet quod oppositum senserit beatus Augustinus. Quod patet primo ex illa auctoritate eius, ad hoc communiter allegata, De fide ad Petrum: 'Firmissime, inquit, tene et nullatenus dubites non solum homines iam ratione utentes, verum etiam parvulos qui, sive in uteris matrum vivere incipiunt et ibi moriuntur sive iam de matribus nati sunt, sine sacramento sacri baptismatis, quod datur in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, de hoc saeculo transeunt, ignis aeterni supplicio puniendos. Quia etsi peccatum propriae actionis nullum habuerunt, originalis tamen peccati damnationem carnali conceptione traxerunt'. Constat autem quod supplicium ignis aeterni poena illa est inferni, quae dicitur poena sensus et de qua praesens quaestio quaerit.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 2-12; VI, 211; cf. FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 27, 70; CCSL XCIA 1247-1255, 753; PL 40 774.

[92] «Respondetur ad hanc auctoritatem dupliciter: Primo, quod Augustinus hic locutus est excessive, ut se maxime elongaret a sententia haereticorum, qui in parvulis negabant omnem culpam et per consequens omnem poenam. Ideo multum, inquiunt, attendendum est, contra quos sancti locuuntur, ut habeatur eorum intentio.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 14-18; VI, 211.

[93] «Sed haec responsio nullatenus potest stare: Primo quidem, quia, cum falsitas falsitate excludi non debeat nec ubi fides vera defenditur, sit dicendus error vel falsa sententia asserenda, non est putandum quod Augustinus, eximius exstirpator errorum et veridicus fidei defensator, propter quemcumque excludendum errorem dixisset 'firmiter' esse credendum pueros ignis supplicio puniendos, si hoc falsum aut non rectae fidei consonum extimasset.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 19-24; VI, 211.

i capisaldi della fede cattolica che ogni credente deve difendere con perseveranza e con pazienza contro ogni eretico.[94] Nessun teologo deve figurarsi che vi sia il falso tra le regole, enunciate dall'Agostino fulgenziano, come accadrebbe, se si assumesse la verità dell'opinione della pena ignea;[95] ma, ove non si trovi qualcosa, che sia stato determinato dalla Chiesa o predicato nelle Sacre Scritture, tali regole sono spesso dette *excessive* e non vanno ritenute in quanto erronee.[96]

Dunque, anche l'autorità agostiniana – in realtà pseudo-agostiniana – non è considerata assoluta; anch'essa contiene degli errori o delle esagerazioni e risulta sottoposta alle determinazioni della Chiesa ed alla predicazione delle Sacre Scritture. L'errore filologico di Gregorio e dei suoi contemporanei lascia trasparire una complessa dinamica esegetica nella quale, eccettuate alcune citazioni puramente agostiniane, una citazione spurea è interpretata alla luce di un'altra citazione spurea dello stesso autore pseudo-agostiniano. Sebbene Gregorio creda d'interpretare Agostino con Agostino, in realtà egli commenta Fulgenzio di Ruspe in massima parte con Fulgenzio di Ruspe ed in minima parte con il vero Agostino.

Dato il primato della Chiesa, delle Sacre Scritture e l'errore filologico, rispetto alla prospettiva rimigina resta da salvaguardare l'integrità e la coerenza interna del pensiero dell'esimio estirpatore degli errori e difensore della fede cattolica, ricorrendo all'argomento dell'apologia e dell'esagerazione:

[94] «Secundo, quia in illo libro Augustinus contra nullum errorem specialiter loquitur, sed communiter totius fidei catholicae canones tradit, cuilibet praemittens 'Firmiter tene et nullatenus dubites' et de omnibus in ultimo capitulo dicti libri ait: 'Haec quadraginta capitula ad regulam verae fidei firmissime pertinentia fideliter crede, fortiter tene, veraciter patienterque defende. Et si quem contraria his dogmatizare cognoveris, tamquam pestem fuge et tamquam haereticum abice. Ita enim ista, quae posuimus, fidei catholicae congruunt, ut, si quis non solum omnibus sed etiam singulis voluerit contraire, in eo quod singulis horum contumaciter repugnat et his contraria docere non dubitet, haereticus et fidei Christianae inimicus atque ex hoc omnibus catholicis anathematizandus appareat'. Haec Augustinus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 25-35; VI, 211; cf. FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 44, 87; CCSL XCIA, 1445-1454, 760; PL 40 777-778.

[95] «Non debet autem cadere in mentem alicuius theologi quod inter tales regulas fidei Augustinus posuisset aliquid falsum secundum significationem quam primo facit communiter apud omnes, sicut in proposito sequeretur, si data responsio est vera.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 35-3; VI, 211-212.

[96] «Confirmatur, quia, cum huius regulae oppositum nullibi inveniatur ab ecclesia determinatum nec in Sacra Scriptura praedicatum, qua potestate tu dicis eum hic fuisse non proprie et vere, sed excessive locutum, dicet alius similiter in aliis regulis, ibidem per eum positis, fuisse locutum excessive et non ut sonant illas tenendas esse. Sed sic dicendo non est dubium intuendi diligenter quod in multos quis laberetur errores.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 4-9; VI, 212.

La seconda proposta d'interpretazione persevera nell'equivoco tra il vero ed il falso Agostino. Quantunque comunemente si risponda che Agostino aveva teso a denotare con l'espressione «supplizio del fuoco eterno» una pena generica, non una specifica pena sensibile,[97] egli non aveva tramandato alcuna regola della fede cattolica in modo metaforico e improprio, perchè nel terzo capitolo del *De fide ad Petrum* – in realtà fulgenziano – l'Ipponate aveva sscritto la stessa pena a varie classi di dannati che muoiono nei propri crimini, quali bambini, demoni ed adulteri.[98] Se si neutralizzasse il senso corporale della pena ignea, ciò varrebbe anche per il diavolo e per gli altri che la patiscono sensibilmente.[99]

In realtà, lo (Pseudo-)Agostino dell'*Hypomnosticon* aveva sostenuto il parere della pena spirituale, affermando contro Pelagio che i bambini, morti senza battesimo, pur non entrando nel regno dei cieli, hanno la vita eterna con la sola pena di non essere in patria,[100] perchè

[97] «Ideo secundo et communius respondetur aliter, scilicet quod Augustinus ibi nomine ignis generaliter omnem poenam significavit. Unde per 'ignis aeterni supplicium' aeternam poenam intelligit, poenam autem non sensu sed damni.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 10-13; VI, 212.

[98] «Sed haec responsio etiam non videtur posse stare: Tum quia non est verisimile quod fidei regulas sub metaphoris tradidisset, et maxime non unam solam; quaelibet autem alia ibi tradita proprie accipienda esse videretur. Tum quia in eodem libro capitulo 3 simul et similiter exprimit poenam talium puerorum et daemonum et adultorum damnatorum in criminibus morientium. Unde ait: 'Qualitas malae vitae ab infidelitate incipit, quae ab originalis peccati reatu initium summit. In quo quisquis ita vivere incipit, ut ante finiat vitam quam ab eius obligatione solvatur, si unius diei vel unius horae spatio anima illa vixit in corpore, necesse est eam cum eodem corpore interminabilia Gehennae supplicia sustinere, ubi diabolus cum angelis suis in aeternum arsurus est'. Et sequitur: 'Ubi cum eo etiam fornicari, idolis servientes etc., si ante huius vitae terminum a viis suis malis conversi non fuerint, aeternis ignibus comburentur'. Cum igitur nullus per supplicia Gehennae, ubi diabolus est arsurus, aut per ignes, quibus comburentur alii damnati, intelligat communiter poenam quamlibet, sed determinate poenam ignis infernalis sensibilem, non videtur secundum mentem Augustini incedi, si per supplicia Gehaennae inferenda pueris talibus poena damni tantummodo intelligatur.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 14-31; VI, 212; cf. FULGENTIUS RUSPENSIS, *De fide ad Petrum*, 3, 36; CCSL XCIA 702-735, 724; PL 40 764-765.

[99] «Confirmatur, quia pariter alius dicere posset quod ex illis verbis non posset haberi quod diabolus aut alii patiantur poena sensus; quod nullus diceret. Et patet assumptum, quia similiter de omnibus loquitur Augustinus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 32-34; VI, 212.

[100] «Secundo principaliter ostenditur Agustinum fuisse praedictae sententiae ex eo quod in Hypomnosticon responsione 5 – contra Pelagium dicentem quod infantes decedentes sine sacramento baptismatis non intrant regnum coelorum, habent tamen vitam aeternam absque omni poena, ac sola accepta quod non sunt in patria – ex textu Evangelii probat quod, si tales non obtinent regnum coelorum, ut fatebatur Pelagius, et verum est, consequens est ut mittantur cruciandi in ignem aeternum.» *Ibidem*, dist.

ogni defunto non-battezzato è espulso dal regno dei cieli in quanto luogo dei credenti battezzati. Tali neonati si trovano nell'Inferno[101] dove coloro, che sono estranei a Cristo, espiano gli eterni supplizi. Oltre l'Inferno ed il Paradiso, non esiste alcun altro luogo, paventato da Pelagio, nel quale i bambini come estranei a Cristo possono gratuitamente vivere nella stabilità e nella gloria. A destra il regno del Padre in quanto luogo della stabilità dei credenti, dei giusti ed a sinistra il regno del diavolo e dei suoi angeli in quanto luogo della pena ignea degli increduli, degli iniqui comprendono l'intero mondo ultraterreno, utrumlibetalmente strutturato.[102] Data la stretta dualità dell'oltre-mondo,[103] anche qualora tali bambini si trovino nell'Inferno, la

30-33, q. 3, n. 2-8; VI, 213; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 5, 1, 1; PL 45 1647.

[101] «Et tunc arguit: 'Qui ergo baptizatus non est, in his quae sunt regni coelorum non potest reperiri. Et si non ibi, quia vere non ibi, putasne, Pelagiane, iam sentis ubi?' Quasi dicat: Aperte videre debes quod reperitur in Gehenna.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 23-26; VI, 213; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 5, 5, 10; PL 45 1654.

[102] «Unde ait sic: 'Primum enim locum fides catholicorum regnum credit esse coelorum; unde non baptizatus excipitur. Secundum Gehennae, ubi omnis apostata vel a fide Christi alienus aeterna supplicia experietur. Tertium penitus ignoramus, immo nec esse in Scripturis Sanctis inveniemus. Finge, Pelagiane, locum ex officina perversi dogmatis tui, ubi alieni a Christi gratia vitam requiei et gloriae possidere parvuli possunt. Dextera iusti sedentis iudicis et sinistra regnum est et Gehenna, vita et mors, iusti sunt et iniqui. In dextera igitur iusti sunt constituti, in sinistra operarii iniquitatis; in regno requies baptizatorum, in Gehenna poena incredulorum: Vita ad laetitiam gloriae, mors ad fletum et stridorem dentium. Iusti in regno Patris simul cum Christo, iniqui in igne aeterno parato diabolo et angelis eius'. Et immediate subdit quod ista non significant divisiones multorum locorum, sed duorum tantum: Scilicet regni coelorum quo referuntur dextera, vita, iusti, gloria etc.; et Gehennae quo referuntur sinistra, iniustitia et quaelibet mala tormenta, 'ubi, inquit, mors quae secunda dicitur non finitura sed cruciatu durabilis erit'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 8-23; VI, 213; cf. PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 5, 5, 10; PL 45 1654.

[103] «Tertio, in sermone De baptismo parvulorum contra Pelagianos, et est 13 in de verbis Apostoli, ex eodem fundamento praemisso idem concludit: 'Venturus est, inquit, Dominus et iudicaturus de vivis et mortuis, sicut Evangelium loquitur, duas partes facturus est, dexteram et sinistram. Sinistris dicturus: 'Ite in ignem aeternum qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius'; dextris dicturus: 'Venite benedicti Patris mei, percipite regnum quod paratum est vobis ab origine mundi'. Hac regnum nominat, hac cum diabolo damnationem. Nullus relictus est medius locus, ubi ponere queas infantes'. Et subdit: 'Si ergo dextera erit et sinistra et nullum medium locum in Evnagelio novimus, qui non in dextera, procul dubio in sinistra. Ergo qui non in regnum, procul dubio in ignem aeternum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 2-12; VI, 214; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Sermo* 294, 3, 3; PL 38 1337; *Mt.* 24-25, 41-34.

pena che essi espiano non va considerata sensibile;[104] essi riescono immuni dalla pena sensibile.[105]

Tuttavia, a causa della divergenza delle opinioni specifiche e dell'imperfetta comprovabilità della propria tesi con le autorità del falso Agostino e di Gregorio Magno, Rimini, non scorgendo quale corno della questione sia stato determinato dalla Chiesa, reputa terrificante negare l'autorità dei santi, insicuro contraddire l'opinione comune ed il consenso dei maestri, così da non preferire alcuno dei due corni e da lasciare al lettore il compito di dirimere la questione.[106]

Il peccato proprio

Il peccato in quanto complesso significabile[107] attuale può essere accettato propriamente come ciò in base a cui si dice che qualcuno pecchi, e impropriamente o almeno meno propriamente come ciò chè è implicato dal peccato, assunto nel primo modo, ad esempio come un'entità il cui agente è peccatore, o come una negazione od una non-entità non facendo la quale si pecca.[108] Il peccato non coincide perfettamente con la trasgressione d'una proibizione imperativa, perchè

[104] «Ex his patet manifeste propositum: Tum quia primo dicit quod alienus a fide Christi supplicia experietur aeterna, experientia autem supplicii sine cruciatu et poena sensus non intelligitur. Tum quia quilibet secundum eum vel in regno coelorum vel in Gehenna per quam mors secunda cruciatu semper durabilis et ubi fletus et stridor dentium, ubi concludit esse infantes non baptizatos.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 27-32; VI, 213.

[105] «Si dicatur quod infantes huiusmodi utique erunt in igne infernali, non tamen patientur ab illo, hoc in consequentibus excludere videtur ex verbo Christi, quo quid per regnum et quid per ignem aeternum intelligere declaravit.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 13-16; VI, 214.

[106] «Auctoritatem vero Magistri negaret qui teneret hanc viam nec eam praeponderaret auctoritatibus Augustini atque Gregorii. Quia tamen huius quaestionis non vidi partem aliquam expresse determinatam ab ecclesia et tremendum mihi videtur negare auctoritatem sanctorum, econtra etiam non est tutum contraire communi opinioni et consensioni magistrorum nostrorum, idcirco neutri parti alteram praeferens diiudicationem earum lectori relinquo.» *Ibidem*, dist. 30-33, q. 3, n. 15-20; VI, 218.

[107] «Ex dictis sequuntur tria corollaria. Unum est quod, proprie ut supra loquendo de peccato, peccatum non est aliquid incomplexe significabile, sed complexe tantum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 2, n. 30-32; VI, 235.

[108] «Quantum ad secundum articulum dico quod peccatum actuale potest dupliciter accipi: Uno modo proprie, pro eo scilicet ex quo primo denominatur quis peccans. Alio modo improprie vel saltem minus proprie, scilicet pro aliquo implicato in eo ex quo primo denominatur quis peccans, utpote pro entitate aliqua quam faciendo quis peccat vel pro negatione seu non esse entitatis alicuius quam non faciendo quis peccat.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 2, n. 31-36; VI, 233.

molte cose proibite non sono peccati,[109] nonostante che ogni peccato venga punito in questa vita.[110]

Intendendo il peccato nel secondo modo, l'uomo può fare molte cose che Dio non può ordinargli di fare o di non fare, come fornicare o asternersi dal fornicare, sia 'fornicare' che 'asternersi dal fornicare' rappresentano dei significati complessi, espressi all'infinito con un solo vocabolo con il quale si suole comprendere la denotazione di varie azioni in generale.[111]

Amesso il peccato attuale come ciò che l'uomo compie od omette di compiere contro la retta ragione,[112] quest'ultima, comune a tutti gli esseri umani coincide con la norma prossima di moralità oggettiva e disvela all'uomo ciò che è buono e ciò che è cattivo in relazione al fine ultimo; la retta ragione emana universalmente dalla legge eterna di Dio la cui ragione s'identifica con la norma suprema, in modo tale che ciò che contrasta con la legge o con la ragione divine, si oppone al dettato d'ogni altra ragione retta in quanto rettificata alla legge suprema. Non la divinità, ma la rettitudine definisce il peccato come tale. Affinchè un certo atto malvagio sia ritenuto nella qualità di peccato, non occorre semplicemente che esso si opponga a Dio, ma si richiede che esso contravvenga al dettato della retta ragione, umana, angelica o divina che sia. Il peccato si configura come tale in quanto contrario alla ragione, non perchè quest'ultima sia divina, ma perchè essa è retta.[113] A dispetto del volontarismo ockhamistico, se per

[109] «Secundum corollarium est quod multa ex se sunt peccata et non praecise quia prohibita. Quinimmo posito quod non forent prohibita, adhuc taliter agens peccaret. Et loquor hic de prohibitione stricte scilicet imperativa, qua superior inferiori imperat non facere hoc vel illud.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 2, n. 28-31; VI, 237.

[110] «Ex ista conclusione et eius probationibus sequitur quod nullum peccatum hominis remanet penitus impunitum in vita ista, sed pro quolibet portat poenam qui peccat.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 2, n. 6-8; VI, 256.

[111] «Tertium corollarium est quod multa potest homo facere, quae Deus non potest illi praecipere ut faciat. Non accipio autem hic 'facere' proprie, ut videlicet idem est quod entitatem aliquam producere, sed improprie, quemadmodum aliquem, ex eo quod potest fornicari vel potest abstinere a fornicatione aut aliud aliquid complexe significabile mediante infinitivo alicuius verbi, dicimus posse aliquid 'facere', quamvis nullum talium proprie dici possit fieri. Sic tamen est mos loquendi, ut omnia talia isto uno generali vocabulo comprehendamus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 2, n. 13-20; VI, 243.

[112] *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, n. 19-26; VI. 237; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De libero arbitrio*, III, 1, 2; PL 32 1271; III, 15, 43; PL 32 1292; III, 16, 46; PL 32 1293; *Contra Faustum*, 22, 27; PL 42 418.

[113] «Si quaeratur, cur potius dico absolute 'contra rectam rationem' quam contracte 'contra rationem divinam', respondeo: Ne putetur peccatum esse praecise contra rationem divinam et non contra quamlibet rectam rationem de eodem; aut aestimetur aliquid esse peccatum, non quia est contra rationem divinam inquantum est

assurdo Dio – o la ragione divina – non si desse o errasse, un atto contrario alla retta ragione, umana o angelica, costituirebbe egualmente peccato.[114]

L'espropriazione del criterio ultimo di definizione della malvagia azione umana come peccato a Dio non comporta la concentrazione di tale definizione nella ragione umana. Una volta che la retta ragione divina non si desse o errasse, la retta ragione umana non diverebbe una norma autonoma, ma l'autentica relazione delle rettificazioni normative apparirebbe nella sua flagranza. Una volta stabilita la relazione tra il valore morale delle azioni umane ed il dettato della retta ragione, l'assenza o l'erroneità della retta ragione divina evidenzierebbe la conformità della retta ragione umana non con se stessa o con la ragione angelica, ma con la legge eterna, distinta dalla legge rivelata ed inscritta nella natura. Contraddicendo la legge eterna, l'uomo pecca, perchè egli destabilizza l'ordine naturale, conservato dalla legge eterna; tale ordine, manifestato da precise leggi naturali, è suscitato dalla stessa coerenza che lega il Creatore a se stesso nel suo agire assolutamente libero ed onnipotente.

Perciò, anche qualora la retta ragione divina venisse meno o fosse erronea, la retta ragione umana non si autonomizzerebbe, ma muterebbe semplicemente il suo criterio di conformità, dal momento che essa cesserebbe di adeguarsi alla legge rivelata ed inizierebbe a rettificarsi alla legge eterna in quanto manifestazione creaturale della ragione divina.[115] Non importa a quale retta ragione, umana, angelica

recta, sed quia est contra eam inquantum est divina.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, n. 17-21; VI, 235.

[114] «Nam, si per impossibile ratio divina sive Deus ipse non esset aut ratio illa esset errans, adhuc, si quis ageret contra rectam rationem angelicam vel humanam aut illam aliquam, si qua esset, peccaret. Et si nulla penitus esset ratio recta, adhuc, si quis ageret contra illud quod agendum esse dicaret ratio aliqua recta, si aliqua esset, peccaret. Et ideo in ponendo conclusionem dixi 'peccatum esse agere contra rectam rationem' seu 'contra id quod agendum esset secundum rectam rationem'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, n. 22-28; VI, 235.

[115] «Huic descriptioni convertibilis est et consona descriptio Augustini, qui 22 Contra Faustum definiens peccatum ait: 'Peccatum est factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem'. Moxque quid per aeternam legem intelligat exponens: 'Lex vero aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei ordinem naturalem conversari iubens, perturbari vetens'. Tantum ergo valet quod ait 'contra aeternam legem' quantum si dicatur 'contra divinam rationem etc'. Cum ergo divina ratio utique rectissima semper sit, omne quod est contra aeternam legem est contra rectam rationem. Et quicquid est contra aliquam rectam rationem, est et contra quamlibet rectam rationem de eodem, nam circa idem quaelibet ratio recta cuilibet rationi rectae consonat et nulla alicui adversatur sicut nec veritas veritati. Sequitur quod quicquid est contra rectam rationem est contra aeternam legem, ac per hoc secundum Augustinum recte dicatur peccatum esse factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra rectam rationem,

o divina, ci si riferisca per definire una malvagia azione umana come peccato, ma ciò che importa è che tale retta ragione, qualsiasi essa sia, si adegui in definitiva all'ordine della natura, espresso dalla legge eterna. Tanto le ragioni create quanto quella increata sono tenute a riconoscere il criterio universale della moralità oggettiva nella legge eterna dell'ordine naturale; quest'ultima, pur stabilita eternamente da Dio, in virtù della coerenza metafisica del Creatore a se stesso, si mostra scevra d'ogni rischio di annichilazione o di fallibilità anche nell'assurdo caso di annichilazione o di fallibilità del Creatore stesso. Dio produce razionalmente l'ordine naturale che per assurdo valica la mutabilità o l'erroneità di Dio stesso.

Il Dottor Acuto introduce il suo originale argomento *per impossibile,* non tanto per sancire il ruolo della retta ragione come unico criterio di regolazione dell'agire morale, quanto per mostrare la peculiarità ed il primato della legge eterna in quanto portato normativo dell'ordine naturale al quale ogni retta ragione deve adeguarsi. Supposta tale adeguazione, ogni retta ragione diviene capace di giudicare la peccaminosità d'un certo atto morale, a prescindere dalla proibizione imperativa ed a svantaggio dell'opinione di Tommaso d'Aquino e di Egidio Romano che identificavano il peccato con la proibizione.[116] Se è vero che molti peccati sono proibiti, essi non sono tali in quanto oggetti di proibizione. Il peccato è tale in quanto contrario alla retta ragione, anche se esso non viene imperativamente proibito.[117]

id est, ut post patebit, facere vel dicere vel concupiscere, quae omnia sub vocabulo 'agendi' comprehenduntur, contra rectam rationem.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, n. 1-16; VI, 235; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Faustum* 22, 7; PL 42 418.

[116] Se è vero che Gregorio condivide con Egidio il rifiuto di un'etica rigidamente razionalistica, riferendo il peccato alla discordanza dalla retta ragione, non alla trasgressione d'un precetto, Rimini accetta le nuove tendenze in atto che egli stesso contribuisce a sviluppare; cf. F.-B. STAMMKOTTER, *Der Konflikt zwischen aristotelischen und augustinischer Ethik bei Aegidius von Rom und Gregor von Rimini*, «Analecta Augustiniana», 59 (1996), pp. 291-311.

[117] «Modo ad propositum dico quod omne peccatum, loquendo de prohibitione primo modo, est a Deo prohibitum. Et si aliquid non esset, stante divina lege quae Deus est, prohibitum, ipsum non esset peccatum. Nam omne peccatum aeterna lex censet saltem indicative esse non agendum; et si de aliquo non sic censeret, illud non esset contra rectam rationem, et per consequens nec peccatum. Dico etiam quod aliqua peccata impossibile est non esse prohibita a Deo, sic loquendo de prohibitione. Nam de aliquibus impossibile est quin sint contra legem aeternam, sicut odire Deum, alteri iniuriari etc., quae secundum se mala sunt. Sicut enim impossibile est non esse verum, Deum non esse odiendum et nemini esse iniurandum, sic impossibile est quin summa veritas, lex aeterna, censeat quod Deus non est odiendus et quod nemini est iniuriandum, ac per hoc impossibile est quod odire Deum vel iniuriari proximo non sit aeterna lege prohibitum; et idem iudicium est de ceteris quae secundum se iniusta sunt.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, n. 12-25; VI, 242.

Diversamente dal parere di Guglielmo d'Alnwick, gli atti morali esteriori, come l'adulterio o l'omicidio, che procedono da una malvagia volontà, sono peccati in quanto volontariamente compiuti contro la retta ragione.[118]

Distinguendosi da Gabriel Biel,[119] Gregorio perviene a negare l'esclusiva facoltà umana di resistere o d'evitare il peccato senza il soccorso speciale di Dio.[120] Gregorio respinge sia l'opinione di Duns Scoto[121] e di Durando da S. Porciano,[122] che assegnavano all'uomo la facoltà intrinseca d'evitare o di non commettere il peccato, sia la tesi di Tommaso d'Aquino,[123] d'Enrico da Gand[124] e di Pietro Aureolo,[125] che limitavano la causalità divina all'influenza speciale.[126] Gregorio

[118] L. D. DAVIS, *The moral act and love of God according to Gregory of Rimini*, «New Scholasticism», 62 (1988), p. 70.

[119] Mentre Gregorio crede nella necessità del soccorso divino, Gabriel Biel, ponendo in secondo piano il peccato originale, accentuerà i tratti di una concezione etica autonoma); cf. C. P. BURGER, *Der Augustinschüler gegen die modernen Pelagianer: Das 'auxilium speciale dei' in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini*, in *Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, ed. H.A. Oberman, Berlin 1981, pp. 195-240.

[120] «Circa primum articulum, quia quidam dixerunt quod homo per liberum arbitrium absque alio auxilio Dei speciali potest vitare omne peccatum, ad hunc sensum videlicet quod in potestate habet se praeservare ab omni peccato et nullum penitus committere, alii vero dixerunt quod non est in potestate hominis quin aliquod peccatum committat neque potest sine speciali Dei gratia et audiutorio se ab omni peccato sservare immunem seu omnia peccata collective vitare, quodlibet tamen peccatum secundum se homo potest per liberum suum arbitrium absque alio auxilio Dei speciali praeter influentiam generalem vitare, idcirco in articulo isto pono duas conclusiones: Prima est quod non est possibile homini in statu presenti absque speciali audiutorio Dei vitare omne peccatum, contra primam opinionem. Secunda, quod non quodlibet peccatum suum potest homo aliquis in praesenti statu aut potuit propria virtute sine speciali auxilio Dei vitare. Et in utraque conclusione loquor de nomine non-Deo ac potente propria voluntate peccare.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 1, n. 25-10; VI, 88-89.

[121] IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 28, q. 1, n. 140-175; VIII, 300-302.

[122] DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *In Sent.* II, dist. 28, q. 3, fol. 179.

[123] THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae* in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera omnia*, iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M., cura et studio Fratrum eiusdem Ordinis, Romae 1888, II, pars 1, q. 109, art. 8; VII 303AB.

[124] HENRICUS DE GANDAVO, *Quodlibet* V, ed. Pariisiis 1518, q. 20, fol. 195vT-197vC.

[125] PETRUS AUREOLI, *In Sent.* II, dist. 28, q. 1, art. 2, fol. 276bDF.

[126] Con l'espressione 'adiutorium generale' Gregorio denota l'influenza con la quale Dio concausa gratuitamente l'agire della creatura in generale in modo diretto o mediante un dono; cf. «Quantum ad primum articulum praemitto iuxta commune dictum quod audiutorium Dei dupliciter potest capi: Uno modo pro audiutorio generalis influentiae, quo scilicet dicit adiuvare generaliter omne agens creatum in omni sua actione. Alio modo pro audiutorio assistentiae seu influentiae specialis, quo specialiter aliqua agentia iuvat et non omnia, et ad aliquas actiones et non ad omnes; quod

discerne tra la grazia abituale e quella attuale;[127] nessun giusto, dotato della grazia santificante, può evitare la tentazione colpevole[128] e quindi il peccato[129] senza l'aiuto speciale di Dio.[130] Mentre con il soccorso speciale di Dio l'uomo vince, senza di esso è lui ad essere vinto.[131]

etiam consuevit vocari audiutorium gratiae, extendendo nomen gratiae ad omnem eius gratuitam et specialem opitulationem, sive ipse immediate per se ipsum sive mediante aliquo dono suo opituletur ad agendum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 8-16; VI, 116. Tale influenza generale consiste nell'opera e nel moto, con i quali Dio permette ad ogni creatura di sussistere e di permanere nella propria natura, vegetando ed agendo; cf. «Hoc autem opus et hic motus est quem vocamus 'influentiam generalem', quo subtracto utique, ut ait, ceterae res perderent motus suos. Nec potest dici hoc dictum habuisse veritatem tantum post hominis lapsum, cum etiam de ipsis angelis sanctis, qui numquam peccaverunt nec illius alterius peccati reatu obstrincti sunt, idem dicat infra libro 9 capitulo 23.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, n. 11-15; VI, 117; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 9, 9, 15; PL 34 398.

[127] Mentre la grazia attuale non si mostra sufficiente al merito dell'uomo giusto, la grazia abituale, santificante, *faciens gratum* o *charitas infusa* è la radice del merito e della produzione dell'atto meritorio, il principio di scelta dell'atto meritorio insieme alla volontà; tale grazia corrisponde ad una forma sovrannaturale con la quale Dio informa estrinsecamente l'uomo e secondo la quale l'uomo opera formalmente; cf. J. A. WOREK, *Supernaturalitas obiectiva justificationis atque gratiae habitualis apud Gregorium Ariminensem*, «Augustiniana», 15 (1965), pp. 419-434.

[128] «Probatur sic: Nemo, etiam existens in gratia, potest sine Dei alio speciali auxilio omnem noxiam tentationem vitare aut omni tentationi noxiae resistere; igitur nullus talis potest sine Dei speciali auxilio vitare omne peccatum. Prima pars antecedentis clara est et eam fatentur propheticae et apostolicae voces. Secunda etiam patet, quia alia sanctis viris non esset opus orare, quod eos orare docuit Christus, scilicet 'ne nos inducas in tentationem'. Quod quisquis dixerit, ait Augustinus in De perfectione iustitiae, ut praeallegatum est, 'ab auribus omnium removendum et ore omnium anathematizandum esse non dubito'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 6-14; VI, 102; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De perfectione iustitiae*, 21, 44; PL 44 318.

[129] «Quantum ad secundum articulum pono duas conclusiones similes. Prima est quod nullus iustus seu habens habitualem gratiam gratum facientem potest sine auxilio Dei alio speciali vitare omne peccatum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 3-5; VI, 102.

[130] «Praeterea, si hoc non esset necessarium, cur sanctus David tanta instantia exorabat: 'Auditor meus esto; ne derelinquas neque dispicias me, Deus salutaris mensu', et alii sancti ac ecclesia tota iustorum cotidie pro eodem ad Deum supplices preces fundit?» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 14-17; VI, 102; cf. *Ps.* 26, 9.

[131] «Falsitas vero consequentis quantum ad primam partem patet eo quod, ut praeallegatum est ex rescripto Innocenti Ad Cartaginense concilium, 'Neccesse est ut quo auxiliante vincimus, eo iterum non adiuvante vincamur'. Ac per hoc etiam post praeteritas victorias iustorum de peccatis insuper venientibus tentationibus habent iterum eius auxilium implorare.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 16-20; VI, 104; cf. INNOCENTIUS, *Epistula* 29, 6; PL 20 587A; AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 181, 7; PL 33 782.

Sull'autorità di Agostino[132] e del Concilio milevitano[133] che aveva condannato l'eresia di Pelagio e di Celeste,[134] senza il soccorso divino l'uomo, insufficiente a volere il bene nello stato presente – almeno quanto il diavolo[135] non può superare o resistere all'atto moralmente cattivo o alla tentazione;[136] dinanzi ad essa la volontà del libero arbitrio non vale affatto.[137] Ma, mentre la causazione dell'atto buono implica il concorso della causalità divina, quella dell'atto cattivo dipende dalla sola causalità dell'uomo che può compiere autonomamente solo il male;[138] a differenza del bene in quanto effetto della concausazione divina, il male consiste in una mera produzione che l'uomo opera con il peccato per il cattivo uso del libero arbitrio. Prima d'esporre le varie citazioni d'Isidoro, del Venerabile Beda, di Gregorio Magno, di Anselmo, di Ugo da S. Vittore, di Pietro Lombardo, di Roberto Grossatesta e di Tommaso d'Aquino, il teologo eremitano

[132] «Hoc patet, quoniam, cum in episcopali Palaestino iudicio fuisset inter cetera obiectum Pelagio, 'Eum dicere 'victoriam tentationum nobis non ex Dei audiutorio esse sed ex libero arbitrio' ', hoc tamquam catholicae veritati manifeste contrarium anathematizare compulsus est.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 2-6; VI, 25.

[133] «Alias ipse nonnisi anathematizatus exisset, sicut refert Augustinus in epistula Ad Paulinum Nolanum episcopum: 'Unde', sicut ibidem scribit, 'consequens fit ut quicumque sequitur illius episcopalis iudicii auctoritatem et ipsius Pelagii confessionem, haec tenere debeat quae semper tenuit catholica ecclesia'. Et inter illa hoc quod ad propositum facit enumerans, ut 'fateatur, inquit, quando contra tentationes concupiscentiasque illicitas dimicamus, quamvis et illic habeamus propriam voluntatem, non tamen ex illa sed adiutorio Dei nostram provenire victoriam'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 6-13; VI, 25.

[134] «Et hoc totum etiam habetur in epistula Aurelii Cartaginensis episcopi quam destinavit ad conprovinciales episcopos de damnatione Pelagii et Coelestii.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 14-16; VI, 25; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 186, 10, 34; PL 33 829.

[135] «Sexta suppositio est quod homo in statu praesenti non est ex se sufficientior ad habendum bonum velle quam diabolus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 13-14; VI, 28.

[136] «Secunda, quod nullus tentatus ad aliquod vitium seu actum aliquem moraliter malum potest huiusmodi tentationem absque Dei auxilio superare.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 1-2; VI, 25; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 186, 9, 32 et 23; PL 33 827-828.

[137] «Item Augustinus paulo post ibidem in persona sua et ceterorum catholicorum: 'Sine gratia, inquit, Dei nos dicimus ad non peccandum nihil valere voluntatis arbitrio'. Igitur nec ad tentationes pravas superandum seu ad resistendum, ut illis non praebeamus consensum.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 17-20; VI, 25.

[138] «Quinta suppositio est quod homo ad agendum actus bonos moraliter etiam non meritorios vitae aeternae taliter indiget adiuvari a Deo, qualiter non indiget adiuvari ad agendum actus moraliter pravos.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 20-22; VI, 27.

riassume il parere della Sacra Scrittura, dei santi e dei dottori latini, greci ed orientali, tra i quali spicca il Dottore Cattolico, per il quale l'uomo non può volere il bene, sebbene egli sia sufficiente a volere il male.[139] Altrove è Pietro Lombardo ad aver interpretato l'Ipponate, allo scopo di sostenere il carattere non meritorio dei beni, come l'agricoltura e l'edilizia, compiuti dall'uomo con il solo libero arbitrio senza la grazia operante.[140]

La causalità divina del peccato

Mentre è comunemente accettato che Dio non causi efficientemente il peccato, propriamente inteso, non v'è un'uniformità dottrinale sulla causazione della volizione malvagia o del suo abito interiore od esteriore; la parte affermativa appare a Gregorio più consona ai pareri dei santi ed alle opinioni dei dottori moderni.[141]

[139] «Residuas omitto, quia non ita directe pertinent ad propositum. Sed ex istis evidenter patet catholice tenendum esse, secundum doctrinam sancti huius, quod in statu isto naturae infirmae et vulneratae homo non possit absque audiutorio gratiae Dei nullam habere bonam volitionem, sed tantummodo ad malam ex se sufficit; iuxta etiam doctrinam Augustini, quae aliqualiter patet ex allegatis in ratione prima supra facta ad conclusionem. Et quod satis confirmat propositum, est quod paene in omnibus libris praedicta collatio Cassiani cum correctionibus beati Prosperi appositis invenitur, quod a Patribus prioribus puto incohatum et per ecclesiam in consuetudinem tractum, ut ex illa Collatione et vera approbarentur et falsa respuerentur nec reciperentur falsa pro veris.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 4-14; VI, 43.

[140] «Demum Magister Sententiarum expresse determinat oppositum omnium praedictorum, tenens partem oppositam quaestionis. Unde 2 libro distinctione 26 ait sic: 'Ante gratiam praevenientem et operantem, qua voluntas bona praeparatur in homine, praecedunt quaedam bona ex Dei gratia et libero arbitrio, et quaedam etiam ex solo libero arbitrio, quibus tamen vitam non meretur, neque gratiam qua iustificatur'. Et postea subdit: 'Non negamus tamen multa ante hanc gratiam et praeter hanc gratiam fieri bona ab homine per liberum arbitrium, ut ait Augustinus in Responsionibus contra Pelagianos, ubi dicit homines per liberum arbitrium agros colere, domos aedificare et alia plura bona facere sine gratia operante'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 3, n. 2-11; VI, 70; cf. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sent.* II, dist. 26, cap. 7, 1, n. 4-17; I 477; PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, *Hypomnosticon*, 3, 4, 5; PL 45 1623.

[141] «Tertius articulus, videlicet utrum actualis peccati Deus sit immediata causa efficiens, ut patet ex dictis, si 'peccatum' capiatur proprie et similiter 'causa efficiens', non habet dubium; patet enim quod non. Sed si nomen peccati capiatur improprie, scilicet pro actu malo seu quem aliquis faciendo peccat, verbi gratia pro mala volitione vel aliquo alio actu interiori vel exteriori quem agit peccator, tunc dubius est. Et de ipso sunt solemnes opiniones contrariae, quarum neutram temere affirmando pro nunc conclusionem affirmativam tamquam probabiliorem et, ut mihi videtur, sanctorum dictis magis consonam teneo, sicut etiam et communius tenetur a modernis doctoribus.» Gregorius Ariminensis, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 24-32; VI, 256.

Alla prima ragione agostiniana che nega l'origine divina del moto del peccatore[142] e che paventa la bontà delle azioni, apparentemente malvagie per l'uomo,[143] Gregorio risponde che per '*motus adversionis*' Agostino non aveva inteso l'entità che si dice 'volizione', ma il significato complesso che si riferisce all'*adverti a Deo*.[144]

Alla seconda ragione agostiniana,[145] quando si considera Dio come autore di ogni nostro bene, pensiero, volizione o operazione che sia, si parla di Dio come della causa parziale e speciale delle volizioni e delle azioni umane;[146] sarebbe detestabile ed abbominevole ammettere che Dio come causa totale e generale muova[147]

[142] «Auctoritates etiam videntur plures contra praedictam conclusionem. Ait enim Augustinus 2 De libero arbitrio capitulo 39: 'Motus ille aversionis, quem fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites'. Et respondet discipulo quaerenti unde est motus voluntatis quo avertitur a Deo; per quam responsionem patet expresse Augustinum velle quod ille motus non sit ex Deo.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 14-19; VI, 271; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De libero arbitrio*, 2, 20, 54; CCSL XXIX 1-41, 272-273; PL 32 1270.

[143] «Item idem in praeallegato supra libello, qui dicitur Confutatio catholica, ait capitulo 10: 'Detestanda et abominanda opinio est, quae Deum cuiusquam malae voluntatis aut malae actionis credit auctorem.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 20-22; VI, 271; cf. PROSPER AQUITANUS, *Pro Augustino Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum*, 10; PL 51 182C.

[144] «Ad auctoritates vero respondeo. Ad primam patet responsio ex responsione ad tertiam rationem factam contra secundam conclusionem praecedentis articuli, quondam, ut ibi dictum est, per motuum aversionis non intelligit Augustinus illam entitatem quae volitio dicitur, sed illud significabile complexe quod significatur, cum dicimus voluntatem averti a Deo.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 28-32; VI, 278.

[145] «Item in De natura boni, ante medium libri: 'Cum audimus, inquit, 'omnia ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso', omnes itaque naturas intelligere debemus, quae naturaliter sunt. Neque enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant, sed vitiant, quae peccata ex voluntate esse peccantium multis modis Sancta Scriptura testatur'. Et quod nomine peccatorum intelligat malos actus, patet ex eo quod dicit 'illa esse ex voluntate peccantium'; soli enim actus voluntatis elicit vel imperati sunt ex voluntate peccantium.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 23-29; VI, 271; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De natura boni*, 28; PL 42 560; *Rm.* 11, 36.

[146] «Ad secundam dicendum quod nomen auctoris quantum ad propositum dupliciter accipi potest: Uno modo communiter pro agente totali vel partiali; et sic accipitur, cum dicitur quod 'Deus est auctor omnium naturarum et omnium quae sunt'. Alio modo specialiter pro agente totali vel partiali principali in agendo; et hoc etiam modo accipitur, cum dicitur quod 'Deus est auctor omnium bonorum nostrorum', id est bonarum cogitationum et volitionum et operationum. Talium enim vel ipse est auctor et causa efficiens totalis vel partialis principalis movens aliam partialem causam utpote voluntatem nostram ad agendum actus tales seu faciens ipsam sic agere.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 1-9; VI, 279; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De libero arbitrio*, 1, 2, 4-5; CCSL XXIX 1-36, 213; PL 32 1224.

[147] «Ad propositum, cum Deus negatur auctor malae voluntatis vel operationis, accipitur nomen auctoris secundo modo, non primo, quoniam, licet talem volitionem causet, non tamen sicut totalis eius causa sed sicut partialis, nec tamen in sic agendo

o predestini[148] la volontà umana a volere ed a fare una certa azione, buona o malvagia che sia. Questo è il proposito di Gregorio e la retta intenzione di Agostino[149].

La chiara ed evidente autorità agostiniana è addotta anche al fine di rinforzare la prova della conclusione rimigina.[150] A dispetto di Pelagio e dei pelagiani che avevano errato pericolosamente[151] nello stabilire la provenienza intrinseca delle virtù morali,[152] oltrechè la nobiltà corporale e l'agiatezza familiare, anche le ricchezze spirituali di Giuliana, figlia di Demetriade,[153] che pelagianamente vanno lodate

principalis, ita ut moveat voluntatem nostram ad agendum et faciat eam facere talem volitionem, aut modo aliquo suadeat vel excitet; hoc enim opinari detestanda et abominanda opinio est.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 10-15; VI, 279.

[148] «Ad hunc sensum ibidem locutum fuisse Augustinum evidenter patet ex obiectione cui respondet. Nam obiciebatur sibi eum dicere vel ex eius dictis sequi quod 'adulteria et corruptelae virginum sacrarum ideo contigant, quia Deus illas ad hoc praedestinavit, ut caderent'. Ad hoc sic respondet: 'Detestanda et abominanda est opinio quae Deum cuiusquam malae voluntatis aut malae actionis credit auctorem, cuius praedestinatio numquam extra iustitiam est'. Ex his patet quod vult negare Deum quemquam praedestinasse ad mala opera, negando ipsum esse talium auctorem. Unde, si accipitur auctor secundo modo, optime sequitur intentum, quoniam ad quaecumque et qualiacumque opera Deus quemquam praedestinavit, ad ea agenda volet illum et facit ut faciat illa, dicente Apostolo Ad Ephesios 2: 'Ipsius', scilicet Dei, 'sumus factura, creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis quae praeparavit Deus', id est praedestinavit, 'ut in illis ambulemus'. Creari enim dicimur per Christum in bonis operibus, quia facit non facere illa, nihilominus etiam faciens illa nobiscum. Patet etiam talis intentio Augustini ex eo quod sequitur.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 16-30; VI, 279.

[149] «Ait enim post pauca, quae etiam iuvant propositum: 'Non ergo casus ruentium, nec malignitatem iniquorum nec cupiditates peccantium praedestinatio Dei aut excitavit aut suasit aut impulit'. Negat ergo eum auctorem secundum quod auctor dicitur qui movet aut suadet etc. ad agendum; et patet propositum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 34-37, q. 1, art. 3, n. 30-34; VI, 279.

[150] «Hanc fuisse sententiam beati Augustini nullus, qui eius libros et epistulas ac sermones contra errores Pelagii scriptos vidit, ignorare permittitur, sicut satis iam etiam apparet ex auctoritatibus eiusdem superius allegatis. Praeter illas adduco aliquas multum apertas et expresse probantes praedictam sententiam. » *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 23-27; VI, 47.

[151] «Amplius immediate post recitationem verborum Pelagii praemissorum ait: 'Cernis nempe quanta in his verbis sit cavenda pernicies. Nam utique quod dictum est 'non possunt esse ista bona nisi in te' optime et verissime dictum est; iste plane cibus est. Quod vero ait 'nonnisi ex te' hoc omnino virtus est' '.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 12-15; VI, 48; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 188, 2, 5; PL 33 850.

[152] «Hic apparet manifeste eum de bonis moralibus loqui, qualia appellamus virtutes morales et actus earum; et dicit eos errare qui dicunt talium aliquid ex nobis sine Dei audiutorio nos habere.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 9-11; VI, 48.

[153] Contrariamente alla tradizione dei testimoni mss. medievali che attribuivano l'*Epistola ad Demetriadem* a Girolamo, sia Bradwardine che Rimini riconoscono l'attribuzione al Pelagio agostinizzato; cf. «Illa epistola non est beati Ieronymi, sed

per il merito conseguito e che distinguono la fanciulla dalle altre, non scaturiscono da lei stessa.[154] La giustizia, la morigeratezza, la pietà, la castità ed ogni altra virtù morale non si trovano nel soggetto che le pratica, ma sono impiantate in esso da Dio che aiuta l'uomo a conoscere con l'insegnamento ciò che occorre fare, ed a farlo con l'amore.[155] Seppure nostre, le virtù morali, donate da Dio, si trovano nell'uomo come un tesoro in dei fragili vasi,[156] in cui la grazia divina opera sulla volontà buona,[157] anch'essa ricevuta da Dio.[158]

Pelagii aut alicuius Pelagiani haeretici et profani.» THOMAS DE BRADWARDINE, *De causa dei, Contra Pelagium, et De virtute causarum, Ad suos Mertonenses libri tres*, ed. Londinii 1618, rist. Frankfürt am M. 1964, I, cap. 35, 313B; GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 14-16; VI, 25. Invece, Giovanni Capriolo persevera con la precedente attribuzione; cf. F. STEGMULLER, *Gratia sanans. Zum Schicksal des Augustinismus in der Salmantizenserschule*, in *Aurelius Augustinus. Die Festschrift der Gorres-Gesellschaft zum 1500. Todestag des heiligen Augustinus*, ed. M. Bradmann – J. Mausbach, Köln 1930, pp. 403 ss. Giovanni Eck, che pure studierà approfonditamente Rimini, assegnerà la lettera a S. Girolamo sia nel *Crisopassus* che nella disputa di Lipsia, sulla scia di Erasmo da Rotterdam; cf. H. A. OBERMAN, *La riforma protestante da Lutero a Calvino*, Bari 1989, p. 142.

[154] «Scribens enim ad Iulianam, matrem, Demetriadis virginem – cui Pelagius scribens commendando ipsam de moralibus virtutibus, quas spirituales appellat divitias, dixerat ista verba: 'Habes ergo et hic per quae merito praeponaris aliis, immo hinc magis. Nam corporalis nobilitas atque opulentia tuorum intelliguntur esse, non tua. Spirituales vero divitias nullus tibi praeter te conferre poterit. In his ergo iure laudanda, in his merito prae ceteris praeferenda es quae nisi ex te et in te esse non possunt'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 28-3; VI, 47-48; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 188, 2, 4; PL 33, 850; PELAGIUS, *Epistula ad Demetriadem*, cap. 11 = PSEUDO-HIERONIMUS, *Epistula* 1, 11; PL 30 28A.

[155] «Haec omnia sunt verba Pelagii – scribens, inquam, Augustinus, ex his verbis motus, ad illius virginis matrem ait sic: 'Non sane parvus est error illorum qui putant ex nobis ipsis nos habere, si quid iustitiae, continentiae, pietatis, castitatis in nobis est, eo quod ita nos condiderit Deus, ut ultra, praeter quod nobis revelat scientiam, nihil nos adiuvet ut ea, quae facienda discendo novimus, etiam diligendo faciamus'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 3-8; VI, 48; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 188, 1, 3; PL 33 849.

[156] «Et subdit: 'Haec Dei dona sunt, et nostra quidem sunt, sed non ex nobis. Habetis enim 'thesaurum istum' in terrenis corporibus et adhuc fragilibus tamquam 'in vasis fictilibus, ut eminentia virtutis Dei sit et non ex nobis' '; et sunt verba Apostoli loquentis tamen in prima persona 2 Ad Corinthios 4.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 16-19; VI, 48; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 188, 2, 6; PL 33 851; II *Cor.* 4, 7.

[157] «Et infra: 'Nolumus ergo ut virgo sacra, cum audit 'spirituales divitias etc.', quae nisi ex te et in te esse non possunt', ita glorietur quasi non acceperit'. Et subdit rationem dicens: 'Quia, etsi etiam ex illa propter arbitrium proprium, sine quo non operamur bonum, non tamen sicut iste dixit 'nonnisi ex illa'. Proprium quippe arbitrium nisi Dei gratia iuvetur, nec ipsa voluntas bona esse in homine potest'. 'Deus est enim, inquit Apostolus, qui operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 19-26; VI, 48; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 188, 2, 7; PL 38 851.

[158] «Confirmatur per illud quod ibidem scribit: 'An, inquit, quando Apostolo dicente audierit homo 'Quis enim te discernit?', responsurus est 'Bona voluntas mea,

Come dichiara Agostino nell'interpretazione rimigina, la nostra volontà deve essere aiutata dalla grazia divina per essere giusta, cosiccome il nostro animo deve essere soccorso per ricevere lo Spirito Santo e per infiammarsi nell'accedere alla partecipazione dell'essenza divina. Se la via della verità è nascosta, l'uomo, pur dotato del libero arbitrio, non sa vivere bene se non per l'amore,[159] per la carità di Dio,[160] che si acquisisce gratuitamente e con la quale l'uomo opera rettamente.[161]

fides mea, iustitia mea' et non continuo quod sequitur auditurus 'Quid enim habes quod non accepisti?' ' Sicut enim supra dicebatur, si ex se absque adiutorio Dei haberet voluntatem bonam moraliter et iustitiam aut aliam virtutem, utique posset respondere 'Haec habeo et non accepi' ac per hoc de illis merito in se ipso gloriari, contra illud quod intendit Apostolus.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, n. 31-5; VI, 48-49; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 188, 2, 7; PL 38 851; I *Cor.* 4, 7.

[159] «Item in De spiritu et littera, circa principium: 'Illis, inquit, acerrime ac vehementissime resistendum est, qui putant sine adiutorio Dei per se ipsam vim voluntatis humanae vel iustitiam posse perficere vel ad ipsam tendendo proficere'. Certum est autem hoc illos dicere, qui asserunt quod sine Dei adiutorio speciali possumus iuste et virtuose aliquid agere. Nam quod Augustinus non de adiutorio generalis influentiae, sed specialis Dei gratiae ipsae intelligat, apparet, quia statim, recitato quomodo Pelagiani fatebantur ad virtuosa opera nos a Deo iuvari, subdit suam catholicamque sententiam dicens: 'Nos autem dicimus humanam voluntatem sic divinitus adiuvari ad faciendam iustitiam, ut praeter quod creatus est homo cum libero arbitrio praeterque doctrinam qua ei praecipitur quaemadmodum vivere debeat, accipiat Spiritum Sanctum, quo fiat in animo eius delectatio dilectioque summi illius atque incommutabilis boni quod Deus est, etiam nunc, cum adhuc per fidem ambulatur, nondum per speciem, ut hac sibi velut arra data gratuiti muneris inardescat inhaerere Creatori atque inflammetur accedere ad partecipationem illius veri luminis, ut ex illo ei bene sit, a quo habet ut sit. Nam neque liberum arbitrium quicquam nisi ad peccandum valet, si latet veritatis via; et cum id quod agendum et quo nitendum coeperit non latere, nisi etiam delectet, non suscipitur, non bene vivitur. Ut autem diligatur, 'caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus nostris', non per arbitrium liberum quod surgit ex nobis, sed 'per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 6-26; VI, 49; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De spiritu et littera*, 2, 4; PL 44 202; 3, 5; PL 44, 203.

[160] «Ex hac etiam ratione ipse super epistolam Ad Galatas – ubi Apostolus ait: 'Vos autem in libertatem vocati estis, fratres etc.' – capitulo 5 dicit quod Iudaei ad Vetus Testamentum pertinentes 'quaedam opera legis implebant, quae in sacramentis sunt; illa vero, quae ad bonos mores pertinent, omnino non poterant. Non enim implet ea nisi caritas'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 1-5; VI, 50; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *In Galatas*, 43; PL 35 2136; *Gal.* 5, 13.

[161] «Ex his apparet quod ultra vires liberi arbitrii et speciale etiam adiutorium doctrinae Dei dicit nobis necessarium esse adiutorium Spiritus Sancti, quo Deum diligamus, scilicet propter se, nam sola talis dilectio Dei caritas dicitur, et ex qua dilectione operemur. Nam quaecumque homo agat, si non ex dilectione Dei agat, non recte nec virtuose seu bene moraliter agit, quia non propter Deum agit, ac per hoc non propter id propter quod agere debet, et ideo peccat secundum quod superius ex eiusdem dictis est probatum. Talis autem dilectio Dei non per vim liberi arbitrii, ut dicit, sed ex gratia Dei habetur.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 26-34; VI, 49.

Con il dono della misericordia di Dio l'uomo può avere ogni bene nella natura, nell'educazione e nella preghiera, nella fede, nella speranza, nei buoni costumi, nella giustizia, nel timore di Dio.[162] Secondo Gregorio, al di là della distinzione degli atti moralmente buoni in meritori ed in non-meritori,[163] appare con la massima chiarezza il parere agostiniano[164] che il teologo eremitano riprende sotto forma di una determinazione. Naturalmente, Agostino che non insegnava all'Università, non aveva determinato alcunché; ma il buon senso del lettore può facilmente rimediare all'anacronismo storiografico. Ciò che importa è che l'intenso lavoro esegetico rimigino sfoci nell'enucleazione di una conclusione agostiniana, filologicamente fondata. Secondo tale conclusione che vale come definizione universale dell'intera Chiesa cristiana, solo chi crede in Cristo ha ricevuto in quanto suo coerede molti doni spirituali per l'amore operante di Dio; senza di esso il ricevente non potrebbe compiere il bene.[165]

L'intenzione dell'azione morale

Rimini registra la concordanza con l'argomento favorevole da parte di molti moderni, come Ockham e Wodeham, che sono altamente stimati da Gregorio e che contraddicono il parere dei santi e dei Concili, favorendo l'eresia pelagiana. Quindi il Dottore Autentico presenta

[162] «Item super illud Psalmi 58 'Misericordia eius praeveniet me': 'Quando, inquit, intelliges, quia praeventus es, nisi intelligas quod ait Apostolus: 'Quid enim habes quod non accepisti?' Hoc est 'misericordia eius praeveniet me'. Denique attendens omnia bona quaecumque habere possumus, sive in natura sive in instituto sive in ipsa conversatione, in fide, in spe, in caritate, in bonis moribus, in iustitia, in timore Dei, totum non esse nisi ex illius donis, ita conclusit: 'Deus meus, misericordia mea'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 6-12; VI, 50; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Enarrationes in psalmos*, 2, 11; CCSL ed. D. E. Dekkers, I. Fraipont, Turnholti 1956, XXXIX 1-45, 925-926; PL 36 712; *Ps.* 58, 11.

[163] «Ex quo etiam patet quod illa distinctio de bonis actibus moraliter tantum et de bonis meritorie, supra facta, nihil iuvat partem oppositam in proposito.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 25-27; VI, 51.

[164] «Quantum apparet mihi non posset expressius loqui pro praedicta sententia. Nec his verbis convenienter applicari potest illa fuga distinctionis de actibus bonis meritorie et moraliter tantum, cum expresse de virtutibus moralibus earumque actibus ipse loquatur et neget eos esse posse in nobis sine adiutorio Dei.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 27-31; VI, 48.

[165] «Quod ipse etiam innuit arguendo ad secundam partem quaestionis, cum ait: 'Ne cogamur fateri sine adiutorio et munere Dei in voluntate hominis esse posse aliquid boni'. Et item affirmat in determinando quaestionem, et postea prosequendo et solvendo argumentum ad primam partem quaestionis per illam distinctionem donorum Dei.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 21-25; VI, 51.

il seguente piano di lavoro: in primo luogo le autorità e le ragioni, favorevoli al parere opposto, sono provate; in secondo luogo, l'erroneità e l'insostenibilità dell'opinione dei moderni in quanto prossima all'eresia pelagiana sono mostrate; in terzo luogo, le prove dei moderni sono confutate.[166]

Nel primo punto (che corrisponde nel testo critico al primo articolo della prima questione della distinzione 26-28), una volta definito in base alla credenza comune l'atto moralmente buono[167] come conforme alla retta ragione secondo le circostanze, richieste per la sua virtuosità,[168] il teologo eremitano conclude in primo luogo che l'uomo soggiace, al pari d'ogni altra creatura, alla generale influenza di Dio in quanto causa prima ed onnipotente, creante e conservante; l'uomo non può compiere alcun atto moralmente buono a prescindere dal soccorso speciale divino;[169] in secondo luogo, senza quest'ultimo egli non può sapere sufficientemente ciò, che va voluto e compiuto, e ciò, che va *nolitum* ed evitato. In terzo luogo, pur conoscendo sufficientemente ciò, che va voluto, e ciò, che va *nolitum*, l'uomo non può agire conformemente.[170] In altre parole, posta la teoria generale della causalità

[166] «Quia de proposita quaestione multi modernorum tenent partem affirmativam, in quo, ut mihi videtur, salva eorum debita reverentia ac iudicio meliori, plurimum dissonant a doctrina sanctorum et ab ecclesiasticis definitionibus faventque cuidam errori Pelagii condemnato, idcirco sic procedam: Nam primo partem oppositam probabo rationibus et auctoritatibus; secundo, ostendam aliam partem fuisse de articulis damnatis Pelagii, aut si in aliquo discordat, magis deviare a catholica veritate quam dictum Pelagii, et ob hoc ipsam non esse ab aliquo catholico sustinendam; tertio, arguam pro parte illa et ad eius probationes respondebo.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, n. 24-3; VI, 23-24.

[167] L'atto moralmente buono è qualificato da Gregorio anche come retto o virtuoso; cf. «Circa distinctionem 29, in qua Magister inquirit 'utrum homo ante peccatum egerit gratia operante et cooperante', quaero, utrum homo ante peccatum per liberum arbitrium et suae naturae vires praecise absque alio audiutorio Dei fuerit sufficiens ad agendum aliquem actum moraliter bonum seu vere rectum vel virtuosum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 29, q. 1, n. 6-10; VI, 115.

[168] «Quantum ad primum articulum praemitto quod ego sicut et illi de parte opposita et doctores communiter per actum moraliter bonum non aliud intelligo quam actum moralem conformem rectae rationi secundum omnes circumstantias requisitas ad hoc quod actus sit vere virtuosus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 6-9; VI, 24.

[169] Confutando Gregorio come antesignano della rinascita agostiniana e della prima teologia wittenburghese, Giovanni Steinbach, che sulla base dell'*Epistola ad Galatas* negherà la distinzione tra l'*auxilium generale* e quello *speciale*, crederà che ogni iniziativa umana, volta alla giustificazione, sia interamente dipendente dall'assistenza della grazia divina, ed attribuirà tutte le buone opere alla potenza divina; cf. H. FELD, *Martin Luthers und Wendelin Steinbachs Vorlesungen uber den Hebraerbrief. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der neutestamentlichen Exégese und Theologie*, Wiesbaden 1971, pp. 201 ss.

[170] «Quo praemisso volo tres conclusiones probare: Quorum prima est quod nullus homo in statu praesenti, Dei etiam generali influentia stante, potest absque speciali

divina ed il principio di sostituibilità, affinché io compia una certa azione moralmente buona, è richiesto che io mi conformi alla retta ragione secondo le circostanze che determinano la virtù del mio agire, ossia che io sappia se l'azione che sto per compiere, sia conforme alla retta ragione, sia moralmente buona o malvagia; se tale azione fosse buona, io sarei portato a voler compierla ed a compierla di fatto, mentre, se essa fosse malvagia e quindi colpevole in quanto difforme dalla retta ragione o deficiente di qualche circostanza,[171] inclinerei a non voler compierla ed a non compierla di fatto, ossia ad evitare di compierla.

La buona intenzione[172] in quanto operazione o scelta conforme alla retta ragione secondo le debite circostanze[173] si dirige volontariamente verso ciò che va fatto,[174] ossia verso l'amore intrinseco di Dio.[175]

auxilio eius agere aliquem actum moraliter bonum. Secunda, quod nullus homo etc potest absque speciali auxilio Dei in his quae ad moralem vitam pertinent sufficienter cognoscere quid volendum vel nolendum, agendum vel vitandum sit. Tertia, quod nullus homo etc, habita etiam sufficienti notitia de aliquo volendo vel nolendo, agendo vel vitando ex his quae ad moralem vitam pertinent, potest absque speciali auxilio conformiter velle vel agere.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 11-19; VI, 24.

171 «Ad probandum primam conclusionem praemittam aliquas suppositiones a quolibet catholico absque ulla contatione simpliciter confitendas. Quarum prima est quod nullus actus culpabilis est moraliter bonus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 21-23; VI, 24.

172 «In ista quaestione erunt duo articuli: In primo inquiretur, quae intentio censenda sit bona et quae mala; in secundo inquiretur de proposito.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, n. 28-29; VI, 281.

173 «Secundo praemitto quod bonitas et malitia intentionis, sicut et bonitas et malitia electionis et operationis sequentis, attenditur penes conformitatem et difformitatem ad rectam rationem, ut, sicut tunc dicitur operatio bona moraliter seu recta et virtuosa, quando id et taliter fit quod et qualiter fiendum esse iudicat recta ratio – per 'taliter' et 'qualiter' comprehendendo omnes circumstantias, quae communiter attenduntur in operatione virtuosa –, quando autem non sic conformiter agitur rectae rationi, operatio dicitur vitiosa et mala moraliter, sic tunc intentio operantis dicitur bona et recta quando ipsa est conformis rectae rationi – id est quando operans id intendit seu vult ultimate et propter se quod ratio recta iudicat sic esse volendum –, et tunc est prava et non recta quando non sic rectae rationi conformatur intentio eius et universaliter secundum quamlibet circumstantiam debitam secundum iudicium rectae rationis.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 1, n. 28-6; VI, 282-283.

174 «His autem praemissis pono conclusiones tres: Prima est quod ea sola intentio est recta seu moraliter bona, qua intenditur seu propter se diligitur quod est propter se diligendum sive volendum. Utor enim nunc vocabulo dilectionis generaliter, secundum quod omnis volitio dicit dilectio. Qualibet autem, qua vel diligitur quod non est diligendum vel quod est non propter se diligendum, est mala.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 1, n. 30-1; VI, 291-292. L'intenzione che non si dirige verso ciò che va amato, è malvagia o viziosa; cf. «Secunda conclusio est quod omnis intentio operantis, qua aliquid aliud a Deo intenditur, id est propter se non propter aliud diligitur, est mala et vitiosa.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 1, n. 19-20; VI, 292.

175 «Tertia conclusio est quod nulla est cuiusquam operantis recta intentio nisi Dei propter se dilectio.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 1, n. 4-5; VI, 296.

Ma, talvolta una malvagia volizione s'accompagna ed una malvagia operazione esteriore segue ad una buona intenzione.[176] Quando Agostino sembra aver accennato alla conseguenza morale tra l'intenzione e la volontà,[177] egli stava parlando delle volizioni i cui oggetti non sono essenzialmente peccati.[178] In quanto fatta per ciò per cui non deve essere fatta, l'operazione malvagia s'accompagna con l'intensione e con la volizione malvagie,[179] cosicchè l'uomo agisce virtuosamente solo per l'amore intrinseco, abituale od attuale, infuso o acquisito verso Dio.[180]

In breve, se l'intenzione è diretta verso l'amore di Dio, essa risulta buona; se essa è distorta da tale fine, si rivela malvagia. La finalità ultima dell'amore divino orienta l'utrumlibetalità della moralità; per cui nessuna operazione morale esteriore non è né buona né malvagia[181] o buona e malvagia.[182] Ma, ogni operazione morale esteriore,[183] proveniente da una malvagia volizione, è peccato.[184]

[176] «Nunc ad quaesitum pono duas conclusiones: Prima est quod non semper secundum bonitatem intentionis et bonitas electionis aut bonitas operationis exterioris, quinimmo aliquando est intentio bona, et tam electio comitans quam operatio exterior sequens pravae sunt.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 11-14; VI, 296.

[177] «Contra tamen hoc et contra conclusionem in se videtur esse auctoritas Augustini 11 De Trinitate capitulo 6 dicentis: 'Rectae autem sunt voluntates omnes sibimet religatae, si bona est illa quo referunt cunctae. Si autem prava est, pravae sunt omnes'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 2-5; VI, 298; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate*, 11, 6, 10; CCSL ed. W. J. Mountain, Turnholti 1978, La 1-39, 345-347; PL 42 992.

[178] «Ad primum horum dicendum quod, sicut declarat alia auctoritas eiusdem allegata ex libro Contra mendacium, intelligendum est illud dictum Augustini de his voluntatibus, quarum obiecta non sunt per se peccata. Ideo non est contra.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 2-5; VI, 301.

[179] «Secunda conclusio, quod semper malitiam intentionis operantis concomitatur malitia electionis et operationis, ita quod numquam alicuius mala intentione aliquid agentis est electio vel operatio bona moraliter seu virtuosa, sed mala et vitiosa, probatur. Omnis electio vel operatio facta propter illud, propter quod debet non fieri, est vitiosa.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 26-30; VI, 309.

[180] «Unum est quod numquam fit aliquid ab homine virtuose seu bene moraliter, nisi fiat ex Dei dilectione actuali vel habituali, infusa vel acquisita. Probatur, quia nihil, quod aliter fit, fit recta intentione; igitur etc.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 23-24; VI, 310.

[181] «Tertia conclusio, quod omnis operatio moralis exterior est bona vel mala moraliter et nulla penitus est neutra» *Ibidem*, dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 1-2; VI, 318.

[182] «Quarta conclusio, quod nulla operatio moralis exterior est bona et mala moraliter» *Ibidem*, dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 5-6; VI, 318.

[183] «Prima est quod aliqua operatio exterior est peccatum.» *Ibidem*. dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 6; VI, 317.

[184] «Secunda conclusio, quod omnis operatio moralis exterior ex mala voluntate proveniens est moraliter mala et peccatum» *Ibidem*, dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 27-28; VI, 317.

Con la malvagia volizione, seguita dalla malvagia operazione esteriore, piuttosto che con la sola malvagia volizione l'uomo pecca più estensivamente, cioè con un maggior numero di peccati;[185] parimenti egli pecca intensivamente, ossia con la stessa intensione di peccare,[186] con la stessa dannazione. A parità di pienezza di volizione, chi vuol uccidere ed uccide di fatto non è degno e non è condannato da Dio con una pena maggiore di chi vuol uccidere senza uccidere. Dati tre uomini, l'uno che voglia uccidere senza uccidere, l'altro che uccida di fatto, e l'altro che voglia uccidere e non possa farlo, essi meritano la stessa pena dinanzi a Dio.[187]

Sotto il piano della moralità *ex parte Dei*, la volizione e l'attualizzazione dell'azione malvagia non aggiungono nulla rispetto alla sola intensione malvagia in quanto radice fondativa di tale azione. Affinchè un certo atto cattivo mi sia imputato e divenga un peccato, commesso da me, non è necessario che io voglia compierlo senza compierlo di fatto o che io lo compia di fatto, ma è sufficiente che abbia l'intenzione di compierlo. La sola esistenza intenzionale dell'azione malvagia implica l'insorgenza d'una colpa, d'un peccato e d'una pena per chi causa tale esistenza nella propria coscienza. L'intensione in quanto tale esprime il direzionamento, l'orientamento, il flusso di tale coscienza verso il fine supremo, determinando il valore morale del suo contenuto operativo in quanto positivamente o negativamente volto, teso, rettificato verso tale fine.

Altrove si convalida una conclusione con l'interpretazione grossatestiana dell'Ipponate.[188] Poiché la bontà dell'atto umano

[185] «Quinta conclusio est quod homo plus extensive peccat, id est pluribus peccatis peccat, peccando mala voluntate et mala comitante exteriori operatione quam mala voluntate tantum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 27-29; VI, 323.

[186] «Sexta conclusio, quod homo non plus intensive, id est non intensiori peccato, peccat mala voluntate et mala operatione exterius comitante simul quam altera illarum tantummodo» *Ibidem*, dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 3-5; VI, 324.

[187] «Septima conclusio est quod homo non magis demeretur apud Deum per malam voluntatem et sequentem operationem simul quam per malam voluntatem tantummodo, supposita aequalitate voluntatis. Quod ego intelligo sic, scilicet quod homo volens aliquid agere, verbi gratia occidere, et cum hoc etiam occidens, non est dignus maiori poena nec a Deo maiori poenae deputatur quam si tantummodo vellet occidere et non occideret, supposito quod aeque plenam et in omnibus similem voluntatem occidendi haberet. Et ita dico de diversis omnibus, quorum unus vellet occidere aliquem et actu occideret, alius vero vellet occidere, non tamen occideret, quia non posset: Si voluntas foret in utroque aeque plena et cetera sint paria in eis praeter occidere et non occidere, non minus demeretur apud Deum nec maiori poena dignus est secundum veritatem ille qui non occidit quam is qui occidit, nec econverso ille magis demeretur. Et similiter loquor in aliis actibus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 42-44, q. 1, n. 8-20; VI, 324.

[188] «Idem expresse tenuit Linconiensis et esse intentionem Augustini affirmavit, sicut supra distinctione 26 articulo 1 quaestionis 1 allegatum est.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41,

deriva dalla sua tensione immediata o mediata verso Dio,[189] gli atti degli *infideles*, semplicemente considerati, che non credono in alcun dio, non sono buoni.[190] Allorchè Agostino, decantando le lodi dell'Impero romano,[191] aveva asserito la presenza delle virtù politiche o civili nei cittadini romani,[192] egli, adoperando impropriamente il vocabolo 'virtù',[193] aveva segnalato la vanità mondana delle lodevoli opere dei Romani; tali opere erano consistite in affezioni o in abiti, asserviti alla gloria umana, piuttosto che in delle vere virtù[194]

q. 1, art. 2, n. 3-4; VI, 313; cf. ROBERTUS LINCONIENSIS, *Sermo 'Erunt signa in sole et luna'*, ms. London, British Museum Royal, 6.E.V, fol. 82va; AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3, 17; PL 44 745.

[189] «Aliud corollarium est quod nullus actus hominis est moraliter bonus, nisi immediate tendat in Deum vel in aliquid propter Deum ultimate, et hoc actu vel habitu, sicut etiam in distinctione 26 dixi.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 4-6; VI, 311.

[190] «Tertium corollarium, et hoc specialiter pertinent ad distinctionem 41, est quod nullus actus hominum simpliciter infidelium est moraliter bonus. Dico autem 'simpliciter infidelium' ad excludendum schismaticos, haereticos, catechumenos et reliquos qui aliquo modo credunt et aliquali fide cognoscunt Deum.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 28-32; VI, 311.

[191] «Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod Augustinus scribit in epistula Ad Marcellinum inquiens: 'Rem pubblicam Romani constituerunt auxeruntque virtutibus, etsi non habentes veram pietatem erga verum Deum, quae illos etiam in aeternam civitatem posset salubri religione perducere, custodientes tamen quamdam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae civitati constituendae, augendae coservandaeque sufficere. Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine vera religione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hac addita fieri homines cives alterius civitatis, cuius rex veritas, cuius lex caritas, cuius modus aeternitas est'.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 6-14; VI, 313; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 138, 3, 17; PL 33 533.

[192] «Hic aperte Augustinus asserit in illis Romanis fuisse morales virtutes politicas seu civiles.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 14-16; VI, 313.

[193] «Respondeo quod hic Augustinus non utitur vocabulo virtutis stricte et proprie, ut illud tantum appellet virtutem quod est vere virtus, id est habitus qui est principium agendi quod et propter quid et quemadmodum est agendum, sicut in proposito sumitur virtus.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 18-21; VI, 313.

[194] «Et hoc patet, quoniam in 5 De civitate Dei a capitulo 12 usque ad 20 inclusive de hac materia multa disserens a proposito pluries dicit illos, qui laudabiliores visi sunt, Romanos omnia sua opera, quae laudibilia et gloriosa videbantur hominibus et ex quibus adhuc laudantur, fecisse finaliter pro gloria vana mundi. Ex quo constat illorum affectiones et habitus, quibus hoc agebant, nequaquam veras fuisse virtutes. Et hoc ipse non tacuit capitulo ibidem 19 dicens: 'Dum illud constet inter omnes veraciter pios neminem sine vera pietate, id est veri Dei vero cultu, veram posse habere virtutem'. Et addit quod facit ad propositum: 'Nec eam veram esse, quando gloriae servit humanae'. Et in sequenti capitulo – approbans sententiam eorum philosophorum, qui dixerunt non esse veras virtutes, quae ad voluptatem referuntur iuxta Epicureorum opinionem, Voluptatem quasi reginam in sella regali pingentem, cui virtutes velut famulae subservirent – addit: 'Sed non existimo satis debiti decoris esse picturam, si etiam

morali.[195] Essi avevano avuto una bontà imperfetta, volta alla costituzione, alla crescita ed alla conservazione temporale della città.[196]

In conclusione, l'Agostino, che Gregorio cita ampiamente ed intensamente, proviene da un complesso *corpus*, nel quale confluiscono sia la tradizione libraria, che sarà edita nei volumi della *Patrologia Latina*, sia varie opere pseudo-agostiniane. Ad esempio, se, da un lato, Rimini, insieme a Tommaso Bradwardine e contrariamente alla tradizione dei testimoni medievali, attribuisce l'*Epistola ad Demetriadem* non a Girolamo, ma a Pelagio, dall'altro, Gregorio, conformemente alla tradizione medievale, non distingue tra Agostino, Fulgenzio di Ruspe e Cesario di Arles (ca. 470-542).

In primo luogo, questa commistione di attribuzioni si combina con la prospettiva sincronica, con la quale i pensatori medievali, compreso

talis fingatur, ubi virtutes humanae gloriae serviunt'; volens per hoc quod, sicut illae non sunt verae virtutes quarum finis est voluptas, sic nec illae quarum finis et gloria mundi. Quod etiam statim explicite monstrat. Sed utitur Augustinus improprie vocabulo virtutis, extendendo ipsum ad eos habitus, quibus fiunt utique quae fienda sunt et vitantur vitanda, licet non propter eum finem propter quem et illa fienda et haec vitanda sunt, qui, licet secundum veritatem nec virtutes sint nec laudabiles, hominibus tamen qui intuentur tantummodo id quod fit et non propter quid fit – sive etiam ignorantes sint propter quid fieri debeant, sive non ignorantes sed tamen intentiones operantium discernere non valentes – virtutes et laudabiles habitus extimantur.» *Ibidem*, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 22-12; VI, 313-314; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De civitate Dei*, 5, 12, 20; CCSL ed. B. Dombart – A. Kalb, Turnholti 1958-1959, XLVII 105-174, 145-146; PL 41 154-167.

[195] «Et hoc etiam satis exprimit capitulo 12 dicens: 'Ista ergo laudis aviditas et cupido gloriae multa illa miranda fecit, laudabilia scilicet atque gloriosa secundum hominum extimationem'. Non ergo veras virtutes morales eis attribuit, sed putativas tantum et verae virtuti distantia minore dissimiles his habitibus quibus vitanda fiunt et fienda vitantur, sicut et contra Iulianum, ut superius allegatur, dixit: 'Non veras virtutes habendo, sed a veris virtutibus non plurimum deviando'; post quae verba mox subicit quod ipse 'virtute civili, non vera sed veri simili, daemonibus vel humanae gloriae servierunt'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 13-20; VI, 314; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De civitate Dei*, 5, 12, 1; CCSL XLVII 1-35, 142-143; PL 41 155; *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3, 25-26; PL 44 751.

[196] «Et quod non intenderet eis veras virtutes etiam civiles ascribere, etiam in verbis obiciendo allegatis satis innuit, cum ait: 'Custodientes tamen quandam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae civitati costituendae, augendae, consevandaeque sufficere'. Tali siquidem modo loquendi, quo non simpliciter 'probitatem' sed cum additamento dicit 'quandam probitatem quae etc.', satis innuit illos non habuisse veram probitatem et perfectam secundum suam rationem, sed imperfectam quondam dispositionem, quae tamen ad costitutionem, augmentum conservationemque temporalem civitatis valeret, et ideo 'civiles' etiam dicit virtutes. Nec tamen addidit 'veras' nec umquam reperi, ubi ipse diceret quod habuerunt veras. Quod tamen si dixisset, retractasse extimandus esset propter illud, quod de libro Retractationum est allegatum, et quia totiens et maxime ubi a proposito materiam istam discussit, oppositum aperte dixit.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 38-41, q. 1, art. 2, n. 21-33; VI, 314.

Gregorio, tendono a leggere i testi autoritativi e spesso a contrapporre diverse autorità dello stesso autore e/o dello stesso testo secondo il procedimento argomentativo del *sic et non* o del *pro et contra*. Questa prospettiva causa la non-distinzione tra le varie fasi storico-esistenziali del pensiero dell'autore, che funge da fonte; per cui, l'Agostino giovane é posto o anti-manicheo é posto in dialogo diretto con l'Agostino maturo o tardo.

Rispetto alla visuale rimigina, la combinazione tra la commistione delle attribuzioni e della prospettiva sincronica sembrano provocare una vasta e sistematica unità del pensiero dell'Ipponate, altamente stimato come esimio estirpatore degli errori e veritiero difensore della fede cattolica; ma allo stesso tempo tale combinazione lascia trasparire delle crepe all'interno di tale pensiero, crepe, che solo il filtro esegetico del teologo eremitano può colmare, ristabilendo l'integrità e la coerenza interna dell'insegnamento agostiniano. Ad esempio, Gregorio, ritenendo erronea l'autorità agostiniana, vi applica l'argomento dell'apologia e dell'esagerazione; ma proprio tale applicazione determina la relativizzazione di tale autorità.

Si crea un Agostino, nel quale parecchi piani ermeneutici sovente si confondono in modo indistinto. Seppure altamente stimato, questo Agostino rimigino non assurge ad autorità assoluta, ma risulta sottoposto alla determinazione della Chiesa ed alla predicazione delle Sacre Scritture.

Rispetto alla visuale del lettore contemporaneo, proprio quando Gregorio crede di sottoporre l'autorità agostiniana a tale determinazione ed a tale predicazione, egli non sta commentando Agostino con Agostino, nè Agostino con Fulgenzio, ma Fulgenzio in massima parte con Fulgenzio ed in minima parte con Agostino.

In secondo luogo, la commistione di attribuzioni si attenua, allorchè Agostino è mediatore e/o mediato da altre fonti patristiche e scolastiche. Gregorio introduce sistemi di citazioni fino al terzo livello. Esistono citazioni, nelle quali «Gregorio – Grossatesta – Agostino 'o' Gregorio – Lombardo – Agostino 'o' Gregorio – Agostino – Cipriano 'o' Gregorio – Agostino – Ambrogio 'o' Gregorio – Agostino – Cipriano – Bibbia» si rimandano a cascata. Ad esempio, Cipriano è citato indirettamente da Agostino, per affermare che l'uomo non deve vantarsi di ciò che non gli appartiene, come della produzione dell'atto moralmente buono, concausato da Dio.[197] Come aveva insegnato

[197] «Hanc sententiam catholici sanctique doctores ecclesiae docuerunt. Unde sanctus Cyprianus martyr, ut eum allegat Augustinus in De praedestinatione sanctorum dicit: 'In nullo nobis esse gloriandum, quando nihil nostrum sit'. Ad quod adhibuit Apostolum testem dicentem: 'Quid autem habes, quod non accepisti?' » *Ibidem*, dist.

Ambrogio,[198] riportato da Agostino,[199] nessuno può edificare, costruire od iniziare alcun'opera senza il Signore.[200] Cipriano[201] aveva interpretato la Bibbia[202] ed era stato interpretato da Agostino.[203] Quando in *Matteo* 6, 9 si dice che il nome del Signore sia santificato, secondo Cipriano, mediato da Agostino, s'intende che l'uomo chiede a Dio di santificarlo e perseverare nel battesimo per la santificazione e la vivificazione, assicurata dalla protezione divina.[204]

Il teologo eremitano rivisita l'intervento ermeneutico di Roberto Grossatesta[205] che, dubitando del possesso intrinseco delle virtù teoretiche e pratiche da parte degli antichi pagani, quale Scipione l'Africano,[206] si appoggiava ad Agostino[207] per affermare l'inesistenza delle quattro virtù cardinali nei *Gentiles*, come Scipione e Catone; essi in quanto privi della fede di Cristo non avevano potuto amare ciò in cui non credevano e non avevano potuto credere in ciò che non

26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 17-21; VI, 40; cf. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 3, 7; PL 44 964; CYPRIANUS, *Testim.*, 3, 4; PL 4 734B; *Cor.* 4, 7.

[198] AMBROSIUS MEDIOLANENSIS, *In Lucam*, 2, 84; PL 15 1583C.

[199] AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De gratia Christi*, 1, 44, 48; PL 44 382.

[200] «Item Ambrosius libro 2 super Lucam, et eundem etiam allegat Augustinus libro 1 De gratia Christi et peccato originali capitulo 44: 'Vides, inquit, itaque quia ubique domini virtus studiis cooperatur humanis, ut nemo possit aedificare sine domino, nemo custodire sine domino, nemo quicquam incipere sine domino'. Quomodo autem cooperatur ubique virtus domini studiis humanis, si aliquibus hominum non cooperatur actibus virtuosis? Aut quomodo nec quicquam potest homo incipere sine domino, si etiam actum virtuosum potest perficere sine eo?« GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 24-31; VI, 40.

[201] CYPRIANUS, *De oratione Domini*, 12; PL 4 527AB.

[202] *Mt.* 6, 9.

[203] AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *De correctione et gratia*, 6, 10; PL 44 922-923; *De dono perseverantiae*, 2, 4; PL 95 996 ss.

[204] «Antecedens ostendit esse verum cotidiana etiam iustorum oratio, qua dicunt: 'Sanctificetur nomen tuum'. Quibus verbis secundum expositionem beati Cypriani martyris, ut allegat Augustinus in De correctione et gratia, ubi supra, et in De bono perseverantiae, circa principium, a Deo 'petimus et rogamus ut, qui in baptismo sanctificati sumus, in eo quod esse coepimus, perseveremus'. Et subdit Cyprianus: 'Hanc continuis orationibus praecem facimus, hoc diebus ac noctibus postulamus, ut sanctificatio et vivificatio, quae de Dei gratia sumitur, ipsius protectione servetur'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 2, art. 2, n. 30-6; VI, 102-103.

[205] ROBERTUS LINCONIENSIS, *Sermo 'Erunt signa in sole et luna'*, fol. 82va.

[206] «Item Linconiensis in suo sermone De adventu, cuius initium est: 'Erunt signa in sole et luna etc.', ait sic: 'In doctrina quoque morali philosophorum et in conversatione multorum gentilium ut Scipionum et Africanorum videbantur lucere splendidae stellae virtutum, sed nunc vere manifestum est quod sine Christi fide nulla est vera virtus in alicuius doctrina seu conversatione'.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 22-27; VI, 46.

[207] ROBERTUS LINCONIENSIS, *Dicta*, ms. London, British Museum Royal, 6.E.V., cap. 56, fol. 37vb; AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Iulianum*, 4, 3; PL 44 743-745.

conoscevano.[208] Gregorio convalida l'interpretazione del Linconiense con un'altra autorità agostiniana, secondo la quale senza il soccorso della grazia divina non possono esservi né l'amore ordinato né l'atto moralmente buono o virtuoso.[209]

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[208] «Hoc ipsum asserit et dicit fuisse de intentione beati Augustini in suo Enchiridion capitulo 37, ubi tractans de quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus et quaerens, an Cato et Scipiones eiusmodi virtutes habuerint, ait sic: 'Concedimus cum Augustino quod sine fide Iesu Christi nullus umquam virtutes habuit aut habere potuit'. Et probat immediate sic: 'Non enim potest esse amor ordinatus, ubi contemnitur aut non amatur quod maxime amandum est. Cum vero non amatur nisi quod sicut aut creditur, patet quod qui nescit aut non credit dominum Iesum Christum, non amat aut contemnit quod maxime amandum est. Quapropter in tali virtus non est.» GREGORIUS ARIMINENSIS, *In Sent.* II, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 27-3; VI, 46-47.

[209] «Quod etiam probat Augustinus talibus argumentis sic dicens: 'Absit ut in aliquo sit vera virtus, nisi sit iustus etc'. Ex his patet propositum, quoniam, si sine auxilio Dei speciali non potest haberi vera virtus moralis, ut evidenter apparet ipsum sensisse, igitur nec fieri actus moraliter bonus. Item, si sine auxilio Dei non potest esse amor ordinatus, ut ipse vult, igitur nec actus moraliter bonus, quondam omnis actus virtuosus est amor ordinatus vel ipsum necessario praesupponens.» *Ibidem*, dist. 26-28, q. 1, art. 1, n. 3-10; VI, 47.

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J. WOREK, *El amor de Dios en la actividad moral cristiana segun Gregorio de Rimini y sua vicisitudes en epoc as posteriores*, «Rivista Augustiniana de Espiritualidad», 8 (1967), pp. 339-362; 9 (1968), pp. 255-312; 10 (1969), pp. 109-153; 11 (1970), pp. 431-489.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Presentation of the second edition of ***Corpus Augustinianum Gissense*** (***CAG 2***), a Cornelius MAYER editum, an EDP-instrument for the research of Augustine developed by the *Zentrum für Augustinus-Forschung* (*ZAF*) in Würzburg in co-operation with the *Kompetenzzentrum für elektronische Erschliesungs- und Publikationsverfahren in den Geisteswetenschaften* at the University of Trier (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2004).

When the project of the *Augustinus-Lexikon* (*AL*) started up in the early years of the 1980's, the need was felt for a research tool which could meet the demands of that time. To have at one's disposal a digital text by which colleagues of the *AL* could fairly swiftly asses the scope of a particular subject – with respect to form as well as content – was at the time by all means a novelty, something which earlier researchers could only have dreamt of. In those early years one diligently kept working on entering the best textual-critical works of Augustine in a database. The first edition of the CAG saw the light in 1996.

The basic text in the digital corpus of the literary oeuvre of Augustine of Hippo has now been reviewed in this second edition, this time with multi-lingual retrieval software. It further includes the latest critical editions of the approximately 30 letters discovered by Johannes DJIVAK, and the 30 Augustinian sermons discovered by François DOLBEAU. Also the most recent critical editions of other works (e.g. *De doctrina christiana* and *De Genesi adversus Manicheos*) have now been incorporated. In the first as well as in the second edition the occasional misprints and mistakes have been corrected, although misprints almost inevitably will keep occurring. The localization of the used editions is always accurately indicated, and for the researcher it has become mere child's play to copy and paste a text immediately into one's work. The speed with which a study can progress when instantly all the occurrences of a word or of a compound of words in Augustine's oeuvre can be generated, makes outdated the proverbial expression that the study of Augustine or of any other Church father requires the patience of a monk. Whereas in the past the indices of major text editions had to be used to point the way to see how a certain subject originated with Augustine and developed further or was no longer found, the search result of the *CAG* 2 swiftly offers an insight in the significance of a theme, the more so because this tool immediately gives the occurrences in chronological order.

An innovation is the additional information available for the *Epistulae* and the *Ennarationes in psalmos* concerning localization, date and further details (see the *Manual*, p. 47). Hopefully this kind of information will be extended to other works of Augustine, even though experts realize that, for instance, assigning an exact date to his writings is a perilous undertaking.

Particularly valuable is the possibility of locating quotations with biblical as well as non-biblical origin, which again can give insight into how certain thoughts of Augustine have developed, or alternatively, have come to a standstill. Not only the multiplicity of biblical quotations, but above all their integration, shows just how deeply the bishop of Hippo was imbued with biblical thought. The frequency of these quotations only conveys to us a fraction of the 'flesh and blood' that biblical text has become in the thought of this Church father. Insiders know that Augustine often quotes the bible indirectly, and frequently uses paraphrases. A.-G. Hamman once rightly pointed out that priests or religious men developed through their daily biblical reading in Latin an irreplaceable search engine which enabled them to locate also the hidden biblical quotations in the texts of the Church fathers. It certainly is a major plus point of this *CAG* 2 that the search engine for biblical quotations has been significantly refined, so that now even the search for hidden ones can be accurately described, whereby the texts which are not relevant for one's study are excluded from the end result. The user can apply a special technique, which is clearly explained in the *Manual* (on p. 56) through which, after a few trial runs, he can retrieve a large number of these hidden quotations. Nevertheless, this very sophisticated tool will never be able to completely replace the erudite reader, who not only has to be familiar with the thoughts of the Bible, but to the same extent also with its Latin vocabulary. For those who are not experts in Augustine, there is always the possibility to look up biblical quotations exclusively in the exegetical works.

The *CAG* 2 is not only designed for specialists in Augustine, who from their expertise already know, for instance, which titles they have to select in the *Work List*. It also aims to be of use to a broader range of researchers. An important asset hereby is the excellent accompanying *Manual*, written in four languages (*German, English, French, and Spanish*), and containing many helpful colour printed illustrations. It sets out in lucid language the range of possibilities of this powerful search engine, and many practical examples clarify the instructions.

Even though it does not immediately belong to our evaluation to assess the philological value of this research tool, it needs to be said that the time-consuming lemmatization of Augustine's corpus in *CAG* 2 no doubt will allow for a thorough linguistic study of Augustine's oeuvre.

CAG 2 offers the researcher the possibility to set up a rough draft of his whole study on the spot. With a click on the copy-icon on the upper-right corner of the *Search Result* items can be transferred to a text window. Changes and rearrangements can then be made as one pleases, before the material is finally placed in one's own document, by using the appropriate method. The bookmark device, which makes it possible to quickly go back to earlier retrieved information, is very useful. The possibility to open up several text windows at the same time is very user-friendly, as it readily allows for parallel readings and comparisons. We could detect hardly any flaws, except perhaps the *Quick view* which occasionally did not work, and the odd system block, which forced us to leave the program and to restart.

Apart from the corpus of Augustine's oeuvre, the *CAG* 2 also puts at the user's disposal an impressive *bibliography*. This, too, can be transferred to a work document in a similar fashion as described above, and also here, the researcher can modify the data to his own liking. Many search functions have been made available, which only increases the value of *CAG* 2 as research tool. The references of this bibliography which above all were created at the service of the *Augustinus-Lexicon* are the key *par excellence* to work faster than ever before. There are, however, with regard to the systematization of the secondary bibliography on Augustine other classifications conceivable.

With all this it is clear how today an author has for his study on Augustine all the necessary information (primary sources as well as secondary literature) available at the tip of his fingers. He only needs a small work surface, not to mention the time gained, compared to the painstaking method researchers had to use in the past to lay the foundations of their study on Augustine.

The technical assistance of *CAG* 2 is therefore a terrific offer to all researchers who are working in a technical manner on Augustine within theology, philosophy, history, linguistics, or other possibly fields of study. Those who do not know Latin well enough can turn to a number of sites on the internet where translations in several languages of Augustine's works can be consulted. The technology does not of course relieve the researcher on Augustine from his obligation

to consider the results of his searches purely as a means. Consequently, he has to go through all the items in their own context, which can often be very broad, or really, can never be broad enough. Here lurks the greatest danger of such a fast and powerful tool. The time-pressed researcher quickly wants to produce some results for his paper or publication, and limits himself to the material findings of the frequency of words or theme's, to the systematization of a certain range of thought on Augustine, but in so doing he inevitably misses the dynamic of the texts, which are only accessible after a thorough and analytical reading. Goulven Madec already warned about the danger of such a research tool: it can easily compress Augustine's thoughts into 'pills', which the impatient reader rapidly wants to get hold of. Fortunately, the genius of Augustine is sufficiently recalcitrant to make such an approach ineffective: only he who uses this new research tool wisely will find out that, paradoxically, technology exposes Augustine's genius even better than before.

Bernard Bruning, OSA

MAYER, Cornelius (ed.), EISGRUB, Alexander (coll.), *Würde und Rolle der Frau in der Spätantike: Beiträge des II. Würzburger Augustinus-Studientages am 3. Juli 2004* (Res et Signa Augustinus-Studien 3) (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag bei Echter, 2007)

This book is the stimulating result of lectures given at the Würzburger conference devoted to the study of Augustine, more specifically to the place and role he ascribed to the female person.

The first text, written by Cornelius MAYER, deals with the anthropology of Augustine; it is a fundamental inquiry, and it focuses on the growing appreciation of the body in the writings of Augustine.

In a very interesting article Michael ERLER presents a list of female philosophers in antiquity, pagan as well as Christian, in order to illustrate what Augustine, referring to his mother, says about them in *De ordine* I.31. One mostly finds female philosophers among the Stoics, because stoicism holds that all human persons participate in the *Logos*. The same is true for the garden school of Epicurus in Athens, where Epicurus' followers defended the principle that all have the same human nature. Special mention deserves Diogenes of Oinoanda and his Epicurean inscription.

Bernard HEININGER speaks about women in the beginning of Christianity and analyzes some of Paul's texts. According to the

author, we must understand the sending of the disciples as the sending of married couples: both husband and wife were sent. The role of women must have been important, otherwise there would not have existed the prohibitions of 1 *Cor* 14:34[1] and 1 *Tim* 2: 8-15[2]. 1 *Cor* 14:34 is to be considered an interpolation and 1 *Tim* 2: 8-15 an application of the cultural situation of those days.

Larissa SEELBACH shows that hasty psycho-analytical conclusions should be avoided with regard to the relationship between Monnica and Augustine. In many cases Augustine follows the opinion of his time and culture when he deals with anthropological questions, but on the higher level of spirituality between the two sexes he indubitably accepts the Bible as norm: both man and female are image of God. This article is a must for patristic scholars and systematic theologians.

A last text by Albert RAFFELT is a presentation of the second edition of the *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* (*CAG 2*).

The book concludes with a bibliography and each article is followed by a summary of the discussion held after the papers.

Tarsicius J. VAN BAVEL, OSA

Robert DODARO, *Christ and the just society in the thought of Augustine*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 262 pp.

The relation between Church and state is a recurring theme in Augustinian Studies. Some scholars, like Reinhold Niebuhr, argue that Augustine equates the *civitas dei* with the church and the *civitas terrena* with the state. Others, like Markus, argue on the contrary. Few scholars in this respect pay attention to what Augustine means by the church. True, Augustine does mean the visible church when speaking of the church. (Important to add is that Augustine is referring to the church as *corpus permixtum*.) But there is also another meaning of the church in Augustine; *ubi Christus, ubi ecclesia*. And

[1] *'Women are to remain quiet – they have no permission to speak.'*

[2] *'I want men everywhere to lift up holy hands in prayer, without anger or disputing. I also want women to dress modestly, with decency and propriety, not with braided hair or gold or pearls or expensive clothes, but with good deeds, appropriate for women who profess to worship God. A woman should learn in quietness and full submission. I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she must be silent. For Adam was formed first, then Eve. And Adam was not the one deceived; it was the woman who was deceived and became a sinner. But women will be saved through childbearing – if they continue in faith, love and holiness with propriety.'*

it is to this meaning of the church that Dodaro (professor of Patristic Theology at the Patristic Institute in Rome) is referring in his most recent book *Christ and the just society in the thought of Augustine*. This allows him to equate the just society with the church. This being said, the central question of Dodaro's book ' How did Augustine concieve the just society?' is the more important because it focuses on (christian) individuals making up society.

The book is build up around opposite origins of virtue; with the ancient concept of virtue originating in the intellectuel human soul and the christian concept of virtue originating in Christ; the only source, example and end of virtue. Dodaro is developing his argument along the line of the Ciceronian statesman and Augustine's statesman. Augustine's baptizing and transforming of the ancient concepts of statesman and heroism is seen by Dodaro as an important thread in the composition of the *City of God*.

The ciceronian statesman is someone in between a politician, a philospher and an orator. He has "a responsibility to promote the public good" (24). He has to 'render to each his due': not only in the sense of garantueeing rights and obligations in the commomwealth but also in a 'transcendental' sense; meaning that the wise statesman refers to the 'heavens and considers the meaning of eternity" (20).

Whereas in Cicero, as in antique thought in general, human beings are able to act justly 'on the strengh of their own reason', there is in Augustine's thought an impossibily to do this. Human being suffers, as a result of original sin, from the twin effect of ignorance and weakness. Christ has 'to enter the stage': being God and man he is source and example of virtue and the only one capable of healing the effects of original sin. Only then is it possible to speak of justice as 'Gerechtighkeit' or righteousness. Dodaro pushes the argument on ignorance and weakness beyond the moral level: "It (ignorance)... causes the foundational distortion of moral reason, its erroneous understanding of its own integrity." (28). Especially in chapter 3 the references to Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings do clearify the theologically necessary emphasis of Augustine on the (im)possibilities of human reason and the need for grace. 'Justice is only communicated indirectly' (145), that is; only through the incarnate Word. His union of God and man (very interesting argument on this point of Dodaro) counters ignorance and weakness by faith and humility. Augustine's concept of *Totus christus caput et corpus* is brought to bear by Dodaro to stress the uniqueness of Christ's mediatory role. It also serves to stress the importance of the 'exchange of discourse between head and body.' (113) Christ is after the formation of society.

Where Cicero's statesman and the Pelagian man are able to find true justice by their own reasoning faculty, there Augustine is stressing 'wisdom's hidden reasons' (title of ch. 4). Human being has limited capacities to know the truth and to act in accordance with it. It is only in Christ as *mysterium dei* (167) that wisdom and knowledge are united. Human being can only through grace, faith and humility start to approach both wisdom and knowledge. Dodaro refers to Augustine's treatment of the woman caught in adultery (jn. 8:3-11) and king David's repentance (1 samuel 12) to illustrate the operative value of this conversion-process. Judges and public officials (the same goes each individual human being) who recognize their own sinfull self and the pardon they recieved will act in accordance with mercy and love towards those who are to be judged.

To return to the concept of statesman, Dodaro is drawing on several letters of Augustine notably ep. 137;138;153;155) to public officials. These letters show that the theological position Augustine takes, can have and does have practical effects. In several of his letters Augustine is eager to convince these public officials that christianity does not make for a weak state. Dodaro concludes that for Augustine "Christianity is more able than rivals forms of worship to promote social reconciliation because, unlike other religions, it accepts that in return to God for the pardon that they recieve from him as sinners, all human beings are obliged to forgive one another." (200)

Giving the Cicerionian and Augustinian statesman the important role they have in his book, Dodaro does indeed tend to emphasize an individualistic reading of Augustine, as Wilken noted in his review of Dodaro's book.[1] Dodaro could have elaborated further on the social consequences of the concept of *totus christus*. It would have been interesting to look at the similarities and differences between the discourse between head (Christ) and body (church) and the interaction between statesman and citizen. Both presume a relationship, a discourse, but not on the same level: Christ is just and justifying, a statesman cannot even just, let alone justifying. In this respect statesman and citizen are on the same level: this reduces the need for emphasis on the statesman.

One other thing might be worth considering; in his book Dodaro is opposing the Ciceronian and Augustinian statesman; i.e. a secular or pagan statesman versus the christian statesman. However,

[1] Robert WILKEN, 'Augustinian justice', in: First Things 157 (November 2005), 50-53. However, I do not agree with Wilken's conclusion that Dodaro leaves it up to the reader to draw out practical, ethical guidelines.

would it be possible to apply the Augustinian framework on secular rulers? His account of the Ciceronian statesman does allow for this position when stating that a wise statesman refers for his act of justice to a transcendental dimension. When Augustine is speaking of the temporary peace in DCD, XIX, 13[2] his definition points to the obligation of governments/rulers to garantuee their people being able to live and function as human beings: an intrinsic human need to be happy, an ontological relationality and free operation of the will/love.

Dodaro's answer to his question 'how did Augustine concieve the just society' is clear: in Christ; the just and justifying *mysterium dei*. This answer may be a prelude to a new approach in Augustinian Studies. It sheds new light on 'old issues' like the relation between state and church, and the way for christians to act in this imperfect world.

The close relation between Augustine's theology and his ethics is very well demonstrated by use of Augustine's letters to public officials. The place of these letters within the Augustinian *corpus* requires more research. Could it be that these letters are the same to his ethics as the sermons are to his theology?

Dodaro's contribution to Augustinian theology and ethics is important, but not clear-cut: his understanding of Augustinian ethic (which I believe to be correct) does not allow for simple, plain and given ethical categories. It calls for self-interrogation, need for divine assistance and responsible thinking: it calls for congruence on every aspect of live.[3]

Willem BOERMA

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[2] 'temporal peace, …, the peace that consists in bodily health and soundness, and in fellowship with one's kind'

[3] en.ps. 118, 17,3

IN MEMORIAM TARSICIUS JAN VAN BAVEL

1. Some dates

Tarsicius Jan van Bavel passed away on July 28th 2007. Van Bavel was born in Tilburg (The Netherlands) on June 7th 1923. He entered the Augustinian order on September 9th 1941, made his solemn profession in Ghent on October 6th 1945, where he was also ordained to the priesthood on April 4th 1948. Under the guidance of Othmar Perler he obtained his Doctorate in Theology at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1954 with a dissertation entitled *Recherches sur la christologie de Saint Augustin. L'humain et le divin dans le Christ après Saint Augustin* (Paradosis, 10), a study that continues to be a standard work to the present day.

When the Catholic University of Leuven split in 1968, it became necessary to search for new professors to support the development of the Dutch and English language programmes within the Faculty of Theology. Prior to 1968, the faculty had been staffed – at least with respect to its full time professors – by diocesan clergy. To sustain the expansion of the new faculty, useful candidates were also sought among the regular clergy, an admirable pool of which were active in the former Centre for Ecclesial Studies (*Centrum voor Kerkelijke Studies* – CKS[1]). One of the professors at CKS was Tarsicius Jan van Bavel, a scholar who had already established an academic bibliography at the moment of his appointment at the K.U.Leuven, of which the majority of the university professors of the day could only dream. In addition, van Bavel brought his experience as an international scholar to the faculty. Thanks to Dutch Augustinians such as J. Wilderbeek osa (1905-1978), and in particular E. Hendrickx osa (1909-1985), van Bavel had acquired a taste during his formation for the study of Augustine. The provincial administration of the Flemish Augustinian Province were aware of van Bavel's intellectual talents and valued his interest in Augustine. After WWII, they sent him to the Université Miséricorde in Fribourg, Switzerland, to study under the supervision of Othmar Perler. Fribourg enjoyed an international reputation and attracted considerable respect in those days in the domain of patristics

[1] The Centre for Ecclesial Studies (*Centrum voor Kerkelijke Studies* – CKS) was established in 1967 with a view to providing collective theological formation for a number of congregations and orders of male religious. The centre was located in Leuven.

in general and Augustine research in particular. Renowned scholars such as Georges de Plinval and Charles Journet were among the academic staff and van Bavel became one of their students.

In addition to his substantial list of publications and international research experience, Tars – as he was known among his confreres and friends – also brought considerable teaching experience to the faculty. As part of the formation programme of his own order, he had taught primarily patristics, Christology, Trinity and sacraments in Ghent from 1952 and later in Leuven from 1958. In his early years, it would appear that he also taught moral theology although he seldom made reference to the fact. Van Bavel was inclined by nature to dislike condescension and exaggerated rules and regulations, and I suspect that teaching moral theology was more of a burden than a passion for him, especially within the context of moral theology in the 1950's.

I can testify from a first hand basis that van Bavel was a true teacher, in the most positive sense of the term. He had a command of the material, was aware of the most recent developments in his field, combined depth of content with simplicity of expression, taught what he believed and believed what he taught. It is understandable, therefore, that the governors of the K.U. Leuven promoted this eminent scholar to professor in ordinary in 1972, only three years after his initial appointment.

The tasks assigned to him at the Faculty of Theology were many and varied, and the number of classes he taught considerable, especially at the outset. Van Bavel was expected to teach Christology, sacramentology and Latin patrology. An external observer might be inclined to imagine such a teaching assignment as heterogeneous, but Tars saw his work in a different light. He endeavoured to attune life and teaching to one another in both the classroom and his personal existence. He never understood his patristical research, for example, with Augustine as its natural focus, as a question of exploring a figure from the past – his research with respect to the rule of Augustine offers unequivocal evidence of his command of the historian's craft, but he never considered it an end in itself – but as seeking nourishment from the past's riches. T.J. van Bavel believed strongly in the adage: *historia magistra vitae*.

Van Bavel served as chair of the faculty's Department of History of Church and Theology from 1985 to 1988, a task he fulfilled with care and sensitivity. For several years he was also a member of the faculty's assessment commission in which he enjoyed considerable moral authority on account of his academic gravity, his exemplary honesty and his role as intermediary. He may have been a man of few words, but when he spoke everyone listened.

2. Van Bavel, the Augustine specialist

Tars was a first class patrologist. While it is a literary convention of the academy to praise its members for their pioneering research, in van Bavel's case convention and reality coincide. His doctoral dissertation, completed under the supervision of Othmar Perler and, as we noted above, defended in Fribourg, was given the rather open-ended title *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin* (Fribourg, 1954). The title is justifiably open-ended, however, if one bears in mind that Christological patristic research in Leuven and elsewhere was dominated by themes from Greek patrology at the time van Bavel commenced his research. Van Bavel's research demonstrated the extent to which Augustine's Christ was caught up with humanity, a figure who was genuinely a *lac parvulorum*. Augustine's Christ appeared to manifest himself in the poor, the vulnerable, the wounded, the insignificant. If you want to meet Christ, the Church Father insisted, go then to the door of the church. The poor man lying there and begging for alms is pointing to Christ. To the present day, van Bavel's dissertation remains a standard text, as can be demonstrated by consulting such reference works as the *Augustinus-Lexikon* or *Augustine through the Ages*[2].

A second imposing work, *Répertoire bibliographique de saint Augustin 1950-1960* (*Instrumenta Patristica*, 3, Steenbrugge-Den Haag, 1963), imposing because of its more than one thousand pages, remains unequalled. The term *bibliographique* in the title does not do sufficient justice to the content of the volume. In this work, van Bavel not only collected all the scientific literature from the aforementioned period in one volume, he also provided each title with a brief summary relative to its content and added an evaluation on the basis of his now familiar 'cognac stars'. Such an evaluation was only possible after reading the studies in question and thus serves to demonstrate van Bavel's assiduous commitment to his task. While a diversity of new assignments prevented Tars from continuing this work, he saw to it that the bibliography was further maintained within the Augustinian Historical Institute by his confreres F. Van de Zande and J. Van Houtem in the first instance, and presently by Van Houtem and G. Van Reyn, based on the elaborately detailed classification system established by van Bavel himself. The bibliography

[2] For an important study representing a continuation of his doctoral research see van Bavel, *L'humanité du Christ comme "lac parvulorum" et comme "via" dans la spiritualité de Saint Augustin*, in *Augustiniana* 7 (1957) 245-281.

is and remains a gold mine for every researcher in the field of Augustinian studies[3].

In the meantime, van Bavel had turned his attention in particular to Augustine's Rule[4]. For his entire life, van Bavel demonstrated an abiding interest in the content and implementation of the Rule. He not only provided a Dutch translation thereof with accompanying commentary (*Aurelius Augustinus. Regel voor de gemeenschap. Vertaling en commentaar* [*Rule for the Community. Translation and Commentary*] Averbode, 1982)[5], but also published additional more detailed commentary on a regular basis[6].

Van Bavel was aware that the general public were unfamiliar with Augustine on account of impressive extent of his works and his often deep and penetrating thought. It thus remains one of van Bavel's merits that he succeeded both in his talks and in his writings to make Augustine the man, monk, bishop and scholar accessible to a broader public. His book *Augustinus. Van liefde en vriendschap* (*Of Love and Friendship*, Baarn, 1970) represents an excellent example in this regard[7]. The present author is also struck by the fact that not only the latter book but an entire series of articles intended in the first instance for a Dutch speaking audience, were then translated into French, English or German[8], serving as indisputable evidence that van Bavel's efforts to draw attention to the figure of Augustine and encourage contemporary study of the man were appreciated far beyond the Low Countries. Where van Bavel still had to "struggle" in 1970 to give Augustine his proper place in academic and popular literature, there was no question of a struggle in 1986, at the commemoration of the 1600th anniversary of Augustine's conversion to orthodox Christianity. On the same occasion, van Bavel published a beautifully illustrated book entitled: *Veel te laat heb ik jou liefgekregen. Leven en Werk van Augustinus van Hippo. Bij het zestiende eeuwfeest van Augustinus'*

[3] This project is currently being digitalized in cooperation with Villanova University (USA) under the project name Panta Rhei.

[4] Cf. *"Ante omnia" et "in deum" dans la Regula sancti Augustini*, in *Vigiliae Christianae* 12 (1958) 175-165; *Parallèles, vocabulaire et citations bibliques de la Regula sancti Augustini*, in *Augustiniana* 9 (1959) 12-77.

[5] The work was translated into English (1984; 1986[2]), Indonesian (1984), Italian (1986), Spanish (1986), French (1989), German (1990), Maltese (1992) and Polish (1995).

[6] Cf. J. Van Houtem, *Bibliographia Academica T.J. van Bavel*, in *Augustiniana* 40 (1990) XIX-XXXVI, passim.

[7] Reprint in 1986. The work was translated into German (*Christ in dieser Welt. Augustinus zu Fragen seiner und unserer Zeit*, Würzburg, 1974) and English (*Christians in the World: Introduction to the Spirituality of St. Augustine*, New York, 1980).

[8] *Bibliographia Academica*, passim.

bekering (*Late Have I Loved Thee. The Life and Work of Augustine of Hippo. On the Occasion of the 1600th Anniversary of Augustine's Conversion*, Heverlee, 1986). The book became a longstanding best-seller and was the subject of considerable local press interest.

Van Bavel, on a regular basis, succeeded in tracing and exposing material in relation to Augustine, which dovetailed seamlessly with contemporary interests while shedding a unique light on less contemporary problems. Reference can be made by way of example in this regard to the way in which van Bavel was able to establish the relevance of Augustine's *totus Christus* thinking for contemporary ecclesiology. Van Bavel demonstrated that Christ for Augustine was not a "distant" redeemer but a person to be realised in each of us: "Christus in nobis, pro nobis, de nobis"[9], whereby the mutual relationship of love forms the cornerstone of reliable and permanent ecclesiogenesis rather than structures thereof. According to van Bavel, Augustine had developed an ecclesiology in which there was space for freedom and in which the church was to be understood as an event of a community on pilgrimage[10]. A review of van Bavel's bibliography reveals the constancy with which he endeavoured, by taking Augustine as his point of departure, to devote attention to contemporary problems whilst entering into dialogue with such problems: creation theology, the sacrament of the Eucharist, reflection on the Trinity, the place of women in the church, the Petrine office or ecumenism[11]. This is perhaps most clear when he deals with the topic of religious life. Religious to the core and an Augustinian through and through, van Bavel was nevertheless capable of speaking as a realist about the art of dying in relation to religious communities while still focusing on the core of the religious life, and all this at a time in which religious life seemed to be in a state of persistent and permanent decay and to have lost much, if not all, of its power to attract. Van Bavel revealed himself to be an advocate of genuine religious poverty in line with Augustine. He sought after new perspectives on the vow of obedience. He saw Augustine as a theologian in search of God[12], spoke

[9] Cf. Van Bavel, *Augustinus. Van liefde en vriendschap*, pp. 93-111, p. 107; cf. also *Die Einheit des "Totus Christus" bei Augustinus*, in *Scientia Augustiniana. Festschrift A. Zumkeller zum 60. Geburtstag*, Würzburg, 1975, pp. 43-75. The theme recurs with frequency throughout van Bavel's work (cf. *Bibliographia Academica II*).

[10] Cf. *Wat voor kerk kies je? De ruimheid van Augustinus' ecclesiologie*, in TvT 16 (1976) 355-375 (translated more than once into English and German). Van Bavel's reaction to the occasionally authoritarian stance maintained by the church in doctrinal matters became something of a standard expression "How do they know all that?"

[11] *Bibliografphia Academica,* passim; *Bibliographia Academica II,* passim.

[12] Van Bavel frequently insisted in his lectures that negative theology also had a place in the theology of Augustine; cf. in this regard, the detailed study *God in*

about the core of prayer in Augustine[13], was able to present him as a liberation theologian in the best sense of the term – with respect to Augustine's option for the poor[14] –, discussed less "popular" values of his day such as humility from an Augustinian perspective, and was always in search of ways to build bridges between Augustine's world and ours[15]. Like Augustine, van Bavel was a man who could not survive without his confreres. Like Augustine, van Bavel was a man who considered common life in friendship and love as the foundation of religious life. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the major part of van Bavel's writings were devoted to this theme and exhibit a clear preference for the theme of love, whereby he cherished profoundly Augustine's idea: if God be love, then love is truly God[16].

Van Bavel not only found it important for the public to hear and read about Augustine, he also considered it opportune for them to read Augustine himself. Reference should be made in this regard to his valuable translation work. His translation of Augustine's sermons on the First Letter of John was published as early as 1969 under the title *Eenheid en liefde. Augustinus: Preken over de eerste brief van Johannes* (*Unity and love. Augustine: Sermons on the First Letter of John*, Heverlee; reprint 1992). His translation of Augustine's *Commentary on Psalm 118/119* was published in Baarn in 1996. The first complete Dutch translation of Augustine's *De Trinitate: On the Trinity* was published in Leuven just short of a decade later in 2005. In the last year of his life, Tars made a start on his translation of Augustine's *Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate*[17] and in spite of his failing health he managed to complete it. He thus symbolically occupied himself to the last with the essence of being Christian: faith, hope, and charity.

between Affirmation and Negation According to Augustine, in J.T. Lienhard, E.C. Muller, R.J. Teske (eds.), *Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum*, New York, 1993, pp. 73-97; cf. also *Spreken of zwijgen over God bij Augustinus*, in *TvT* 37 (1997) 132-148.

[13] Based on texts drawn from the works of Augustine himself, van Bavel put together a book of prayer entitled *Verlangen bidt altijd. Bidden met Augustinus*, Leuven-Heverlee, 1988; 1989[2]. He also studied Augustine's ideas on prayer more systematically in *Als je hart bidt: Augustinus' leer over het gebed*, Heverlee, 1996; 2001[2] (Spanish translation in 2001, English and German translation forthcoming in 2008).

[14] *Keuze voor de armen bij Augustinus*, in *Collationes* 21 (1991) 73-88 (translations in English, German, Italia and Spanish; cf. *Bibliographia Academica II*).

[15] See in this regard, numerous publications on the said themes in *Bibliographia Academica* and *Bibliographia Academica II*.

[16] Cf. *De kern van het religieuze leven: evangelische spanning die onze gemeenschap drijft*, Tielt, 1973; *The Basic Inspiration of Religious Life*, Villanova, 1996; *Charisma: Gemeenschap. Gemeenschap als plaats voor de Heer*, Leuven, 2000 (German translation in 2000; French translation in 2003; Spanish translation in 2004).

[17] The translation is set to be published in 2008.

3. Van Bavel, director of the Augustinian Historical Institute

T.J. van Bavel played an important role in establishing the journal *Augustiniana* and the Augustinian Historical Institute that emerged therefrom. The journal appeared for the first time in 1951. It not only published studies on Augustine's life, work and thought, but also devoted a substantial amount of attention to the history of the Augustinian order and the insights of Augustinian authors. The journal also exhibited considerable interest in the history of Jansenism. Van Bavel served as editor of the journal and head of the institute from 1973 to 2001. The journal's merits can be summed up in a few short words: from the outset, it focused its attention on the international research community. Long before the emergence of international editorial boards and referee procedures, both were incorporated as policy for the journal. As editor in chief, van Bavel was the first to read incoming contributions. Discretion and authority enabled him to convince authors to fine-tune, rewrite, emend and even omit passages from their work. The journal provided young researchers with the opportunity to present the early results of their studies to the academic community. Many academics contributed to the journal with regularity throughout their careers and it is evident from a recent survey of European academic journals that *Augustiniana* has earned its international credentials. Van Bavel also played an important role in the development of the institute. Together with his confrere Norbertus Teeuwen (1910-1973), van Bavel constructed the centre step by step, or better said, book by book. The institute's library now enjoys an international reputation and includes virtually all of the international literature in the field. The Augustine bibliography referred to at the beginning of this oration has also found its rightful place within the institute. Tars was justifiably proud of the institute. He was likewise well aware that its development would not have been possible without the financial and personal support of the Flemish and Dutch provinces of the Order of Saint Augustine, for which he was eternally grateful. The fact that careful leadership of the institute did not coincide in van Bavel's mind with an attitude of protectionism is evident from his complete cooperation in the integration of the institute into the network of the Maurits Sabbe Library of the Faculty of Theology (K.U. Leuven). The said integration led to a more intensive use of the institute's library, his library, something that brought him enormous pleasure. It allowed him to make his considerable expertise available to the last to a new generation of young, talented scholars from every corner of the globe.

4. Van Bavel, the systematic theologian

As we stated at the beginning of this oration, van Bavel not only taught Augustinian studies at the Faculty of Theology, he was also responsible for courses in Christology, Trinity, and the sacraments. Various bibliographical surveys testify to the fact that his publications in the domain of systematic theology were also worthy of distinction. It is well known that the Flemish Dominican E. Schillebeeckx had an important role to play in the development of Christological thought in his capacity as professor at the University of Nijmegen. Van Bavel represents a parallel in this regard, who likewise made a significant contribution to the renewal of Christology[18]. The Leuven systematic theologian J. Haers draws attention to van Bavel's particular interest in "a hermeneutic of the event of Jesus Christ, rooted in questions surrounding the meaning of Jesus for contemporary men and women, for those who have lived through the ecclesial and faith crisis of the 1960's." Van Bavel kept abreast of theological developments and was one of the first to introduce the theology of Rudolf Bultmann into Dutch speaking regions[19]. He also followed the thought of Piet Schoonenberg and had an enormous affinity with the thought of Edward Schillebeeckx. Van Bavel did not limit his loyalty towards his colleagues in the theological endeavour to empty words. In the controversy surrounding remain Schillebeeckx he published: *Hermeneutische knelpunten in een theologisch dispuut: Latente vooronderstellingen in de stukken van de 'zaak Schillebeeckx – Hermeneutical obstructions in a theological dispute: Latent presuppositions in the documents relating to the 'Schillebeeckx affair'*[20]. More than 25 years ago, van Bavel expressed an interest in ecological theology in his: *Kosmische christologie of theologie van de natuur? Een verkenning rond de theologie van Joseph Sittler – Cosmic Christology or theology of nature? An exploration of the theology of Joseph Sittler'*[21]. The aforementioned publications stand out for their clarity of expression, interest in important theological themes, and enormous respect for colleagues whose problems with church authorities were a cause of much concern on van Bavel's part, especially as he had come to know them as sincere and authentic theologians in search of God.

[18] Cf. J. Haers, *Dogmatische theologie*, in L. Gevers & L. Kenis (eds.), *De Faculteit Godgeleerdheid in de K.U. Leuven (1969-1995)*, Leuven, 1997, pp. 167-168.

[19] *'Actualisme' in de theologie, een bezinning naar aanleiding van R. Bultmann*, in *TvT* 6 (1966) 1-25.

[20] Cf. *TvT* 20 (1980) 340-360.

[21] *TvT* 20 (1980) 280-303.

5. To conclude...

The Festschrift presented to T.J. van Bavel on the occasion of his retirement by the Augustinian Historical Institute and the Faculty of Theology (K.U. Leuven) bore the adage *condiscipuli in schola Christi*. For Tars there was no doubt that Christians were expected to be liberating people as Jesus Christ himself was liberating. Through the many ways in which Tars expressed the love of Christ down through the years and in his concrete role as part of the *totus Christus*, the man who quoted Augustine's words "If God is love, then love is God" so frequently and with much pleasure, demonstrated how God is close to us in our fellow human beings. As a fellow disciple in the school of Christ, he was also aware that when it came to important matters, when it came to fundamental questions such as suffering (and Tars suffered) and death, there was no more room for masters and disciples within the Christian faith. Rather we are all fellow disciples in the school of the one who suffered as an example to all. Together with Augustine, he can now affirm: "Insofar as I could, insofar as you gave me the power, I have sought you."

The last written message I received from Tars contained the following: "Only in the finite do we attune ourselves to the infinite." Tars taught us to comprehend the infinite in the finite. Now that he has taken his place in the infinite, there can be little doubt that he will remain close to us in the finite. Such was the Tars we all knew, Tarsicius Jan van Bavel, a man worthy of our gratitude.

M. LAMBERIGTS

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(1990-2007)

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Anthony DUPONT

IN MEMORIAM EELCKO YPMA[1]

Sible Jan Ypma was born on April 7th 1917 in Tjerkwerd (municipality of Wonseradeel) in the province of Friesland. He was the son of Jan Ypma and Agatha Hettinga. Both his father and his mother were of farming stock. His place of birth was close to Bolsward, a centre of activity for the Franciscan friars. When as a boy he felt the vocation to become a priest, he moved from Friesland to Limburg, to complete his secondary education at the seminary of the Franciscan Friars in Venray. He finished his secondary education with a gymnasium alpha (grammar school) diploma.

However, he did not enter the Franciscan Order, but rather the Augustinian Order. On September 9th 1936 he received the habit at Witmarsum and begun his noviciate, adopting the religious name Eelcko. A year and a day later, on September 10th 1937, he took his simple vows at Witmarsum. As frater clericus he stayed in Eindhoven for two years, where he was instructed in philosophy, next in Culemborg for one year, where he was taught fundamental theology. On September 10th 1940 he made his solemn profession at Culemborg. In the same year he moved to the Augustinian monastery at Nijmegen to continue his theological studies. On May 30th 1942 he was ordained priest in 's-Hertogenbosch.

In August 1943, after completing his theological education within the Order, he was ordered as a conventualis of the monastery of Nijmegen to finish his theological studies at the local university. He took classes with, among others, Prof. Frits van der Meer. On June 17th 1947 he graduated with distinction. Under the guidance of Prof. Reinier Post he specialised in medieval church history. On March 24th 1949 he received his doctorate in theology after defending his dissertation on the "Generaal Kapittel van Sion" (Chapter General of Sion).

At the monastery of Nijmegen he filled the posts of magister caeremoniarum and of socius of the magister of the fratres clerici from August 20th 1949 to August 11th 1952. Apart from providing liturgical assistance to the numerous churches in and around Nijmegen, he also held, during that time, the position of secretary to the *Encylopaedie van het Katholicisme* (Encyclopedia of Catholicism), a project set up by the Augustinian Friars under the redaction of his fellow brethren Ephraem Hendrikx, Caspar Doensen and Winfried Bocxe. During the years 1950-1955 he carried out research on the Augustinian conventicles in the

[1] Translation by Willem Erven.

northern part of the Netherlands. On this subject he published, then as well as later, several articles. Of the relevant archival material he transcribed a substantial amount. This transcription is at the present time deposited in the Archives of the Dutch Augustinian Province at Eindhoven.

On August 11th 1952 he received an appointment for France. The Dutch Augustinians had decided in 1948 to establish themselves in Paris in order to restore the Order there. In France the Order had collapsed and been disbanded as a result of the French Revolution. Two convents were established, one in Bagneux, in the vicinity of Paris, and one in Paris itself. Originally the convent in Paris was housed in the Rue Xavier-Privas in the Quartier Latin. In 1958 it was transferred to the Rue de Javel, in the fifteenth district. In Paris Eelcko led the life of a studious monk until 1978, devoting himself to prayer and hospitality, whilst also carrying out research on the history of the Augustinian Order in France, more particularly the medieval Augustinians working at the Sorbonne. During this period he also published studies on the First Augustinian School and was engaged in editing a critical edition of the works of James of Viterbo.

In 1956 the seventh centenary of the foundation of the Augustinian Order was magnificently celebrated. From this same year dates his first publication on the history of theological education within the Order, particularly at the Sorbonne. He had been given the task by Athanasius van der Weijden, Prior Provincial of the Dutch Augustinian Province, to write a monograph within the framework of the centenary. As it turned out, he ended up writing a study on the organization of the "studia" in the Augustinian Order during the first century of its existence. The work has thoroughly proven its soundness and is still cited with approval. It contributed to a broader awareness, both inside and outside the Order, of the importance of Augustinian theological studies in the 13th-15th centuries. The publication, bearing the title *Le développement de l'enseignement chez les Ermites de Saint Augustin au XIIIe siècle*, also served as a second senior thesis. On June 8th 1956 the Conseil de la Section des Sciences Religieuses expressed a favourable opinion of it. As a result he acquired the grade of Élève diplomé of the École Pratique des Hautes Études.

In these circles he became acquainted with, among others, medievalists such as Mgr. André Combes, editor of numerous medieval manuscripts. To him he communicated the request of the Prior General for Mgr. Combes to edit the works of James of Viterbo (†1308). Within the Augustinian Order James had been revered as blessed for centuries. In 1911 his veneration was confirmed by Pope

Pius X. After this the postulator of the Order applied himself to collecting material which should ultimately lead to his sanctification. His miracles aside, the writings of the beatified man also had to be studied. In order to do this they had to be published first.

Mgr. Combes advised Eelcko to undertake the critical edition himself. And so the latter set about editing James' work, partly motivated by the Order's desire to venerate the blessed James as a saint. He started by making an inventory of the numerous manuscripts of James' writings. In view of the number of manuscripts, he was in his own time almost as popular as Thomas Aquinas. To begin with Eelcko set himself to editing James' *Quodlibeta*. The first *Quodlibet* was published in a critical edition in 1968. After the series of four *Quodlibeta* had been published, he went on from 1983 with equal zeal to edit James' *De praedicamentis in divinis*. By 1987 two volumes had been published, containing seventeen *quaestiones* in total. Because his already restricted eyesight degenerated further, he published from then on each *quaestio* separately in the journal *Augustiniana*: the 18th in 1988, and so on, until in 1999 he published his 26th and last *quaestio*. His English fellow brother Edmund Colledge, editor of the writings of medieval mystics, had indeed, on account of their good relations, offered to help him finish the remaining *quaestiones*. The cooperation was started but not continued. The final *quaestiones* are still awaiting publication.

The Augustinian Friar James of Viterbo had been active both in Paris and in Napels. For the edition of his works his Parisian episode is most important. It was there that he became a baccalaureus formatus in 1288 and afterwards a magister of theology. In his writings he entered into dialogue especially with Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Goffrey of Fontaines, and his fellow brother Giles of Rome. His knowledge of neoplatonically coloured Aristotelism was extensive. For centuries James was best known for his treatise on the Church, *De regimine christiano*, the first theological treatise on the subject.

James' thought fits into medieval Augustinianism as developed within the First Augustinian School. His theology presents a clear line of reasoning. He was capable of critically summarizing the opinions of his contemporaries, and to cite them accurately. James was creative in finding his own solutions, which is why he was called *doctor inventivus*. Because he managed to express his criticism of others in a congenial way, he is also known as *doctor gratiosus*. The latter title may also refer to the remarkable way in which he regularly expressed his gratitude towards his teachers.

From the beginning of the 13th century there was a growing conviction that the study of theology should also be made to fit into Aristotle's scientific model. Attempts to do so entailed an objectification of the study of theology: the emphasis no longer lay on the subject who theologised, and by theologizing received salvation, but on the object, the science itself. In parallel with this way of thinking, thinking about man had changed. In the new conception of man, man was no longer dependant on God in everything, but only partially so, and, like a king, he was self-sufficient in so far as his own world was concerned. It was enough for his world to be controlled by reason. Human will was an interfering factor in this, whilst in earlier tradition rational will was pre-eminently the place where man could meet God. James' *quaestiones*, which come to the fore in the *Disputationes de quolibet*, reveal the actuality of this discussion, for the period around 1300 was marked at the university by a discussion of the question of whether will was superior to reason or the other way around. This had its repercussions on the manner of theologizing and on the interpretation of the statute of theology. In two fascinating contributions Eelckós college friend and secular priest Francis Ruello, out of appreciation for his critical edition work, has given attention to James' analogy of being [*Augustiniana* 1970] and his view on the foundations of human liberty [*Augustiniana* 1975].

In the Parisian convent Eelcko Ypma was master of the novices, magister of the fratres clerici and sacristan. Out of respect for and admiration of his fellow brother and housemate Luc Verheijen, the expert on Augustine who lectured on texts of Augustine at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, Eelcko regularly found himself prepared to sign up as a student with him, in order for Verheijen to reach the required number of students for his classes.

To the many foreign guests staying at the Rue de Javel, (these were) often fellow brethren living for some years in Paris for the sake of study, he was always a friendly, benevolent, and patient host. He was always attentive to the welfare of the guests. A regular visitor to the Bibliothèque Nationale himself, he was always ready to assist them in library matters and in the secrets of town and university. He was interested in their studies, their thoughts and opinions.

In the convent at the Rue de Javel hospitality was from time to time given to the German-American Augustinian friar Francis Roth, who was involved in the *Augustinian Historical Institute* in New York. Roth had collected a lot of material on the English Augustinian Friars, and was author of the work *The English Austin Friars*. It was

he who encouraged Eelcko Ypma to occupy himself more intensively with the history of the Augustinians in France, which up untill then historians had been totally neglecting. As a result, Eelcko collected a large amount of data on French Augustinian authors and monasteries. The material on the convents and monasteries, neatly arranged in a filing cabinet, is kept in the Archive of the Dutch Augustinian Province at Eindhoven. His work *Les auteurs augustins français* was published by the *Augustijns Historisch Instituut* (Augustinian Historical Institute) in Louvain. The *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* and the *Dictionnaire d'histoire et géographie ecclésiastiques* contain his contributions on several French Augustinians.

In Paris Eelcko Ypma was a member of the circle of post-graduates who met on a weakly basis at the home of the famous medievalist and Ockham scholar Paul Vignaux to read texts of medieval philosophers. He was one of the most loyal visitors. Vignaux had suggested to him, in view of his profound knowledge of James of Viterbo, that he should obtain a second PhD degree. In order to do so, Eelcko put together a reasoned list of James' works and the author's curriculum. On March 28th 1973 he received at the Sorbonne the degree of *Docteur de l'histoire de philosophie*, 3th cycle, with the honourable mention *très bien*. The title of his dissertation was *L'activité littéraire de Jacques de Viterbe OESA à Paris*.

Thanks to the intercession of Eelcko I myself in 1974 had several informative and stimulating contacts with the exceedingly affable mister Vignaux. It was at Eelcko's instigation that I was able to attend a few sessions at Vignaux's. They were on the teachings on the Trinity of John of Ripa. During an earlier stay in Paris Eelcko had helped me in learning to read the abbreviations that are found in the theological texts of incunabula. Since, at the time, I was preparing for a dissertation on the Trinitarian theory of Gabriel Biel, I was reading the editio princeps of his *Collectorium*. The Tübingen critical edition had not yet been published. In the matter of this sort of knowledge transfer Eelcko showed himself to be an able and sympathetic teacher.

In 1978 he suffered retinal separation in his left eye. Several years before, the same thing had happened to his right eye, with the tragic result of becoming completely blind in this eye. Due to the resolute action of his prior, Serge Arminjon, who had him immediately transferred by ambulance from Paris to Utrecht, a repetition of this loss was avoided. In Utrecht he was treated at the famous Ooglijdersgasthuis (Hospital for eye patients) by Prof. Hoppenbrouwer. The eye was saved to the extant that Eelcko regained 20% of his eye sight. In

order to recuperate he stayed as a guest at the monastery of Marienhage in Eindhoven, and from the 1st of July 1979 he lived there as conventualis. He never returned to his beloved Paris.

In Eindhoven, when his eye sight had sufficiently improved, he resumed his labours of textual criticism. He preferred to work in the reading room of the monastery library. Despite his severe handicap, no-one ever heard him complain and he always remained industrious. You can imagine the posture in which he performed his work: deeply bent over, armed with his magnifying glasses, his face floating over the text, then stretching his back to search for notes in the filing cabinet or to write something down in his characteristic angular handwriting, from time to time lifting his head to keep an eye on his surroundings, particularly when he heard voices he could not identify.

For years he was a member of the consilium of the convent of Marienhage and from 1995 to 1998 he was subprior. In the Augustinian church of Eindhoven he had a much frequented confessional, but because of his handicap he could not preach, nor was he able to act as first celebrant in the daily convent mass. His piety was simple and intense. He felt a great devotion for the sainted Augustinian friar Nicholas of Tolentine, who is especially worshipped in Eindhoven and its surroundings.

As he used to do in the town centre of Paris, so he now conducted tours of the more limited area of the monastery and the church. To visitors of the monastery of Marienhage he was a friendly and well respected doorkeeper. The position of doorkeeper gave him much pleasure, partly because in the doorkeeper's lodge he could continue with his textual criticism, and partly because of his natural interest in other people.

To his fellow brethren he was communicative and easy to be with. He often managed to steer conversations with his fellow brethren in such a way that they arrived at the topic of James of Viterbo. Austere by nature, alert and precise, he maintained his mental and physical vitality up to an advanced age. During the last years of his life his mind lost some of its mental acuity, although he could still immediately call by name all those who greeted him. But during the ensuing conversations he easily switched subjects.

Strengthened by the sacrament of the dying he passed away on Sunday morning, the 26th of August 2007 in the Orangerie at Eindhoven, the temporary place of abode of the convent during the renovation of the monastery. On Friday the 31th of August his funeral service was held in the Augustinian church. During the celebration of the Eucharist a passage was read from his beloved James of Viterbo. The

passage in question was the translation of part of the *quaestio prima* of the *Disputatio tertia de quolibet*: the goal of theology is our salvation. Eelcko Ypma was buried in the midst of his fellow brethren in the convent cemetery of Marienhage, where his body lies awaiting the day of resurrection.

Martijn SCHRAMA

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Martijn SCHRAMA

AUGUSTIN CONVERTI

DIALOGUES PHILOSOPHIQUES ET MYSTÈRES DE LA FOI

L'année 387, qui fut celle du baptême d'Augustin, est aussi une année de fécondité intellectuelle et de production littéraire, facilitées par sa retraite à Cassiciacum avec Monique, son fils Adéodat et quelques disciples[1]. Les dialogues philosophiques qu'entreprend ce petit groupe d'intellectuels contient quelques passages qui, tout isolés qu'ils sont dans ce contexte, reflètent la pensée d'Augustin sur les mystères auxquels il avait été initié et auxquels il adhérait fermement. Cette présence d'éléments chrétiens dans un débat philosophique n'a pas manqué d'intriguer les commentateurs. Comment concilier cette dualité de sources? Par la juxtaposition ou la réduction de l'une à l'autre? Rouvrir ce dossier, après tant d'érudits qui se sont emparés de ces documents pour les interroger sur les rapports entre philosophie et foi chez Augustin est donc le contraire d'une aventure dans un terrain inexploré[2]. Arriverions-nous trop tard? Étant donné les interprétations divergentes qui ont été proposées et les controverses qui en ont résulté, pourquoi ne pas tenter un examen personnel, fût-il limité? Il s'agit pas de revenir sur l'hypothèse d'un Augustin plus platonicien que chrétien mais d'apprécier ses esquisses doctrinales en elles-mêmes et par rapport à leurs modèles platoniciens et à leurs développements ultérieurs dont seules les grandes lignes pourront être retenues.

Le genre libre et spontané de dialogues, malgré leur objet essentiel et leur ligne directrice, ne facilite pas le tracé d'un itinéraire progressif dans le travail d'analyse. Une première étape nous conduira de la philosophie à la sagesse chrétienne qui l'accomplit, l'accès à la connaissance supposant le rôle conjoint de l'autorité et de la raison. Une seconde étape tentera une évaluation critique de la compréhension qu'Augustin put avoir, à cette époque, des deux vérités fondamentales des «mysteria» que sont la Trinité et le salut. Vu ses limites, cet examen puisera essentiellement dans les trois Dialogues de Casssciacum, quitte à les compléter, selon l'opportunité, par l'apport d'autres œuvres contemporaines.

[1] Le *De beata vita* 1, 6 fournit la liste complète des partenaires.

[2] On doit à R HOLTE un bon état de la question; voir *Béatitude et Sagesse Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne*, E. A., 1962, p. 82-86. Voir aussi John J. O' MEARA *La jeunesse de saint Augustin*, (traduit de l'anglais) Cerf, 1988, p. 169-201. Une nouvelle approche a été tentée par O. du ROY dans *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*, Paris. 1966.

I. PHILOSOPHIE ET SAGESSE CHRETIENNE

Loin de se détourner de la philosophie, Augustin converti s'y applique avec sérieux et intéresse ses compagnons de Cassiciacum aux questions classiques de la vérité, du bonheur, du mal ou de la sagesse. Si le débat se déroule selon les règles d'un questionnement et d'une argumentation de teneur rationnelle, il lui arrive aussi d'en transgresser les limites par une confession de foi chrétienne. Augustin s'était trouvé jadis tiraillé entre la passion que la lecture de l'*Hortensius* avait attisée en lui pour la sagesse élevée au-dessus de ses particularités d'école et sa frustration devant l'absence du Christ dont il gardait la nostalgie[3]. Par réaction, il s'était tourné vers les Écritures mais en autodidacte. Ce contact lui réservait paradoxalement une autre déception de nature esthétique, en comparaison de l'élégance cicéronienne. Cette qualité sans commune mesure avec l'intérêt philosophique de l'ouvrage cicéronien prenait sa revanche au contact des livres saints[4]. Les Dialogues offrent, au contraire, un exemple de conciliation entre philosophie et foi, de l'*Hortensius* avec l'Écriture, sous l'enseigne de l'amour de la sagesse entendue comme vertu à pratiquer mais surtout comme réalité transcendante à atteindre[5]. C'est ce passage sans heurt à la foi qu'il s'agira d'apprécier: quelle est la dette d'Augustin converti à l'égard du platonisme? Les aspirations nobles mais démesurées de la raison ne trouveraient-elles leur exaucement que dans l'accueil de la foi?

A. Philosophie et foi chrétienne

Le passage spontané de la raison et la foi est facilité dans ces Dialogues, parce que, parmi les divers courants de pensée, Augustin réserve ses préférences à celui qui émerge dans le divin par la voie d'un dépassement accordable avec la foi, au moins dans sa visée, quand bien même les modalités de cet accord ne seraient pas dépourvues d'équivoques.

1) Une philosophie religieuse

L'estime qu'Augustin converti a gardée pour la philosophie, surtout platonicienne, comme une composante de son cheminement

[3] Les *Conf.* III, IV, 7 verront dans la lecture de cet ouvrage un début du conversion de la sagesse vers la Sagesse divine.

[4] *Confessions* III, IV, 7-8.

[5] Cet ouvrage gagne les compagnons d'Augustin à la philosophie et demeure un ouvrage de référence dans la discussion; cf. *C. Acad.* I, I, 4; III, IV, 7; XIV, 31.

personnel[6], se mesurera finalement à son rapport avec la foi chrétienne. Sur quel point leur rencontre se vérifie-t-elle? La question ultime est de savoir si leur rapport est d'inclusion, de complémentarité ou de symétrie.

L'appréciation que porte Augustin sur la philosophie dépend de son niveau d'élévation, car elle se hiérarchise en deux courants antinomiques: l'un est dit «de ce monde», estimant que tout est réductible au monde sensible et corporel, comme le prétendaient les épicuriens et même Zénon, selon l'interprétation schématique que donne Augustin du stoïcisme, incompatible pour ce motif avec les «mystères», c'est-à-dire la foi chrétienne[7]. Le *De ordine* portera sur cette philosophie un jugement sans appel qui en ratifie la faillite religieuse et morale:

> *Quiconque ne connaît que ce qu'atteignent les sens corporels non seulement ne me paraît pas être avec Dieu mais pas même avec lui*[8].

Une autre école, également irrecevable, contestée par le *Contra Academicos,* est naturellement le scepticisme ou le probabilisme, aussi pernicieux que le matérialisme, puisqu'il prône l'impossibilité de parvenir à la vérité, alors que pour Augustin on entre en philosophie, (comme en religion) pour saisir la vérité[9]. De plus, une condition a priori de la foi s'en trouverait sapée.

L'autre philosophie, la vraie, se vérifie à l'intérêt qu'elle porte à la question de l'âme, à son élévation du sensible vers le monde spirituel. Élaborée par Platon[10], elle a mis des siècles pour émerger d'une sorte de chaos de la pensée et de la rivalité entre les écoles et atteindre son apogée avec Plotin qui lui confère un nouvel essor[11]; ce réveil d'une pensée de sens spiritualiste et divin mérite d'être salué[12]. En s'ouvrant

[6] Ibid. VII, IX; voir Le BLOND, *Les conversions de Saint Augustin,* Aubier, 1950, p. 115-138.

[7] Cf. *De ordine*, I, XI, 32: l'Écriture réprouve les philosophes de ce monde mais non l'amour de sa sagesse. Le *De Civ. Dei* relèvera la méfiance instinctive du chrétien cultivé non envers la sagesse philosophique mais à l'égard d'une philosophie «selon les éléments du monde» (*Ac* 17, 28). Sur le sens de «mysteria» voir O. du Roy, op. cit., p 124, 5. Ce terme a-t-il «toujours» une acception chrétienne? On peut en douter au vu de *C. Ac.* XVII, 38, pourtant connu de l'auteur; voir op. cit., p 49, n.4.

[8] *De ordine* II, II, 5. Le propos est de Licentius, que ne désavoue pas Augustin. L'inspiration de ce jugement est dans la pure ligne plotinienne: l'âme doit se détacher du corps pour vivre en âme raisonnable; cf. *Ennéades* I, 2 §3; §5. Voir P. HADOT *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* Folio Gallimard, 1995, p. 252.

[9] *C. Ac.* II, III, 8.

[10] Ibid. III, XVII, 37.

[11] Ibid. III, XVIII, 41.

[12] Ibid. III, XIX, 42.

sur le transcendant, elle brise la sphère de la pure rationalité et s'apparente à une forme de religion par son objectif et par le bouclier protecteur dont l'Académie l'entoura, au dire de Cicéron[13]. Cette rétrospective sur sa genèse en présente le précieux contenu comme un arcane à protéger et à ne divulguer qu'avec réserve, à l'instar d'une doctrine religieuse[14]. Sa divulgation est soumise à la règle de la prudence, comparable aux précautions à prendre dans la pratique de l'initiation. Quoi qu'il en soit des sources et du bien-fondé de cette stratégie des Académiciens affrontés aux écoles matérialistes, épicurisme et stoïcisme, elle témoigne de leur respect religieux pour l'héritage platonicien.

Outre cette mesure, le respect envers le platonisme est encore signifié par l'emploi d'un vocabulaire religieux, comme celui de «mystère», correspondant aux «religions à mystère» et de «sacro-saints»[15] pour qualifier les enseignements de Platon. Aussi bien Augustin n'hésite-t-il pas à conjecturer avec quelle réserve Zénon, chef des stoïciens, fut accueilli dans les rangs des platoniciens, pour prévenir une éventuelle contamination; c'est pourquoi il fallut couvrir cette vénérable mais vulnérable philosophie du sceau du secret, dût-elle s'apparenter à un savoir ésotérique. Y pénétrer ne se réduit pas à un exercice intellectuel mais suppose une démarche de conversion, la purification des vices étant indispensable à l'initiation intellectuelle[16].

Platon a droit à des éloges chaleureux. Il aurait nourri sa science philosophique à deux sources: son maître Socrate et Pythagore qui admettait l'immortalité de l'âme. Poursuivant cette tradition,

> *il ajoute au charme et à la finesse socratique la connaissance qu'il possédait des questions morales, des réalités divines et humaines, connaissance acquise avec soin auprès des hommes que j'ai rappelés, et leur rattachant la dialectique comme principe d'organisation et comme critère, car elle est la sagesse ou la condition sine qua non de la sagesse, il passe pour avoir élaboré une philosophie parfaite*[17].

[13] Ibid. III, XX, 43. Cf.

[14] Augustin fait allusion au «consilium» à l'«intentio» des Académiciens dans le *C. Acad.* III, XVII, 37 et dans les *Confessions* V, X, 19. Voir B. A. 13, p. 94ss. Voir *Ep.* 118, 20.

[15] *C. Ac.* III, XVII, 38.

[16] Ibid. III, XVII, 38. Cette exigence est également plotinienne, le savoir étant indissociable de la vertu, car il s'agit de progresser vers le Bien; cf. *Ennéade* VI, 7, §34; voir Hadot, op. cit. p. 252.

[17] *C. Ac.* III, XVII, 37. Même si les *Retractationes* regrettent les éloges trop libéralement décernés à Platon et aux platoniciens, à cause de leur impiété (I, I, 4), elles ne lui dénient pas le mérite de reconnaître un monde intelligible, c'est-à-dire «la raison éternelle et immuable par laquelle Dieu a fait le monde» (I, III, 2). Les éloges réapparaissent, arguments à l'appui, dans le *De Civitate* Dei VIII, IV-V. Voir B. A. n° 31, n. 51, p. 593-594.

Ce sommaire mentionne la division tripartite de la philosophie: l'éthique, puis la connaissance, dont l'objet est double: les réalités naturelles ou sensibles, les divines ou intelligibles, lieu et source de vérité pour l'âme qui se connaît et pour le monde sensible. Ainsi la connaissance que l'âme a d'elle-même, spirituelle comme sa nature, suppose un rapport d'homogénéité avec l'origine transcendante de la vérité. Le monde divin est la source et la norme du vrai dont l'âme est le reflet et le sujet récepteur. Enfin la dernière partie est la dialectique, comprise comme l'art de raisonner, comme méthode pour penser juste. Ses mérites sont grands, car elle est chemin de vérité, en enseignant le principe de non-contradiction, en mettant en garde contre les raisonnements faux; en un mot, elle est «la science même de la vérité»[18]. Le *De ordine* se montrera encore plus élogieux à son égard:

> *Comment eût-elle (la raison) donc passé à d'autres inventions, si elle n'avait commencé par distinguer, décrire et analyser ce qu'on peut appeler ses propres outils et instruments et n'avait mis au jour cette science des sciences qu'est la «dialectique»? C'est elle qui enseigne à enseigner, elle qui enseigne à apprendre; c'est par elle que la raison se manifeste, qu'elle découvre sa nature, sa fin, sa valeur. Elle sait savoir; elle seule, non seulement veut, mais peut faire les savants.*[19]

La valeur de la dialectique découle de sa place cruciale dans l'ordre du savoir. Elle en contient le secret car, à la différence d'un sens ou d'une faculté, elle ne se rapporte à un objet extérieur que par le préalable d'une réflexion critique sur ses propres outils afin d'échapper à une perception naïve des choses. Elle est le pivot de l'enseignement et de l'apprentissage; elle donne forme aux ressources de la raison. En un mot, elle est maîtresse du savoir. Elle assure la valeur du savoir face au scepticisme. Elle est une maîtresse qui réunit les deux conditions indispensables pour former des hommes de science: le savoir et la capacité de le transmettre.

L'interrelation entre ces trois domaines, compte tenu de leur nature propre, constitue la philosophie parfaite, que le christianisme est

[18] Ibid. III, XIII, 29. Cette tripartition remonterait à Platon selon Varron; cf. Cicéron *Secondes Académiques* I, V. La dialectique fera, au contraire, l'effet d'une arme dangereuse aux yeux d'Ambroise, irrité par l'usage qu'en font les ariens; cf. Bibliothèque Augustinienne n° 14, n. 1, p. 530.

[19] *De ordine* II, XIII, 39. Augustin avait entrepris un ouvrage sur la dialectique, la rhétorique, la géométrie, l'arithmétique, thèmes qui apparaissent dans le *De ordine* III, XIII, 38ss. Voir *Retract.* I, VI. Pour une présentation synthétique de cette discipline, voir art. «Dialectique» dans *Encyclopédie Saint Augustin*, Cerf, 2005, p. 445-449. Bien qu'il s'y étende moins qu'Aristote, Plotin lui reconnaît tout son intérêt; cf. *Ennéade* I, 3 §4.

en mesure d'accréditer à la différence des autres écoles. Elle doit sa grandeur à la tradition platonicienne et, de surcroît, à sa recherche de la sagesse non seulement comme idéal de vie mais en son essence transcendante par la conversion morale. Si la sagesse se définit comme une vertu morale dont la norme est la mesure, source du bonheur, sa raison ultime est à chercher ailleurs. Augustin ne se satisfait pas d'une morale naturelle, car celle-ci ne subsiste qu'en consentant, sans transition possible, à un saut métaphysique qui en situe la source au-delà d'elle-même.

2) Les limites de l'anagogie

Le témoignage le plus net de l'anagogie platonicienne est, chez Augustin, de nature expérimentale, puisqu'il en parle à travers l'essai qu'il en fit, tout en s'inspirant de sources plotiniennes[20], dans les *Confessions* VII, X, 16; XVII, 23. Cette anagogie est évoquée dans les Dialogues de manière sommaire et sur le mode impersonnel.

Le critère d'authenticité de la philosophie, qui lui vaut sa supériorité sur les autres arts libéraux, tient à son objectif:

> *Elle promet de nous révéler clairement Dieu dans toute sa vérité et son mystère et, dès maintenant, elle veut bien nous le faire voir comme à travers une nuée transparente*[21].

L'objectif de la philosophie, qui en fait toute la noblesse, est des plus clairs. Sa démarche n'est pas de nature argumentative mais bien anagogique, puisqu'elle se propose de conduire, dès l'existence présente, à la contemplation mystique de Dieu, fût-elle indirecte et tempérée comme l'indique la métaphore paradoxale d'une nuée transparente, à forte connotation biblique.

La tentative personnelle que rapportent les *Confessions* trouve un écho dans le *De ordine*. Le mouvement anagogique s'y articule à la fonction dialectique de la raison qui l'incline à s'examiner elle-même; elle assume aussi un rôle éducatif par mode de persuasion et d'émotion, dont la rhétorique détient les recettes. Cette fonction critique et pratique constitue comme une base, une sorte de tremplin dans l'échelle du savoir à partir duquel (*hinc*) la raison se hisse vers la contemplation. La raison raisonnante se mue en vision extatique. Là est son ambition dernière:

[20] L'édition de la Bibliothèque Augustinienne 13 les présente à la n. 25, p. 687-689. Il faut faire également la part de relecture de l'événement par l'évêque.

[21] *C. Ac.* I, I, 3. Jolivet semble traduire «jam jamque» par la formule «par degrés»; ceci relève de l'interprétation.

De là, la raison a voulu se hisser vers la contemplation bienheureuse des réalités divines. Mais de peur de tomber de haut, elle chercha des degrés et se fraya un chemin à travers ses possessions et son ordre. En effet, elle désirait la beauté que seule dans sa simplicité, sans recourir à la vue, elle pouvait contempler; mais elle en était empêchée par les sens. Voilà pourquoi, elle détourna la pointe de son regard vers les sens qui revendiquent la détention de la vérité, rappelant dans leur bouillonnement inopportun celle qui se hâtait vers d'autres régions[22].

Cette épure trace l'essentiel que développera le récit de l'expérience milanaise. L'esprit cherche à s'arracher au sensible pour s'élever dans la contemplation de l'intelligible. Mais la force d'attraction des sens et leur prétention à détenir la vérité, selon l'épicurisme, finissent par l'emporter et par se le rendre captif. Malgré cette chute, la raison ne saurait se résigner à prendre les sons pour la réalité qu'ils signifient ni le donné matériel et sensible pour les règles qui en commandent l'agencement. La raison est le nombre[23], qui se déploie à partir de l'unité, principe d'existence des êtres et de la cohésion sociale. En somme l'idéal intenable de la contemplation se compense par une sorte de revanche de la raison raisonnante sur l'emprise des sens.

A défaut de satisfaire l'ambition de l'anagogie, la vraie philosophie sera une école de vie morale et religieuse. Son exercice sera de nature ascétique autant que rationnelle, car il requiert un mouvement volontaire d'intériorisation qui va à l'encontre de l'instinct d'extériorisation sous l'attrait du sensible. La concentration de l'âme sur elle est une étape indispensable de l'itinéraire qui élève vers les réalités transcendantes et le divin. Selon le *De ordine*:

Pour se connaître, il est nécessaire, grâce à un important entraînement, de se retirer des sens, de concentrer l'âme sur elle-même et de la retenir en elle.[24]

Cette voie, indirecte, médiane en quelque sorte, s'apparente à la connaissance socratique de soi grâce au retrait des sens, pour permettre à l'âme de faire retour sur elle[25], non pour se couper du monde mais pour en discerner la beauté. Replacé dans la démarche du traité, ce recueillement de l'âme en soi n'est pas directement référé à Dieu mais à la beauté de l'univers qui se refuse à la dispersion du regard

[22] *De ordine* II, XIV, 39.
[23] Ibid. XVIII, 48.
[24] *De ordine* I, I, 3.
[25] Ibid. I, II, 3. Sur la solidarité entre le savoir et la vertu, l'âme raisonnable et l'Intellect, voir P.Hadot, op. cit. p. 251-259.

dans le multiple, générateur d'indigence, mais se livre à partir d'un foyer d'unité, comparable au centre qui sert de repère pour mesurer la figure géométrique d'un cercle. Cette exigence de retour de la dispersion vers l'unité est une constante dans la pensée et la spiritualité d'Augustin. On en retrouvera l'écho dans le *De Trinitate* IV[26].

La beauté inhérente à l'ordre provoque la question de son rapport ainsi que celui du désordre qu'est le mal avec Dieu. Le long débat d'allure discursive qui s'ensuit[27], laisse aussi échapper un soupir d'intention mystique:

> *Qu'est-ce que se convertir, si ce n'est renoncer à la démesure des vices par la vertu de tempérance? Qu'est-ce que la face de Dieu, sinon la vérité à laquelle nous aspirons et à laquelle nous nous livrons, une fois purs et nets, si nous l'aimons?*[28]

Déjà lors d'une discussion au début du traité, Licentius avançait l'idée, approuvée par Augustin, que le sage est uni à Dieu car il se connaît lui-même. Contrairement aux sens corporels, l'intelligence en ouvrant le chemin de la connaissance de Dieu réalise l'union avec lui[29]:

> *Le sage embrasse Dieu et jouit de celui qui demeure à jamais*[30]

Le climat dans lequel se déroulent les dialogues d'Augustin avec ses disciples est de forte imprégnation religieuse. S'ils sont influencés par la tradition platonicienne, ouverte sur la transcendance, ils reconnaissent la faillibilité de la dialectique des degrés. Au moins posent-ils une exigence morale: la fuite du péché[31], comme condition indispensable pour cultiver même le sens de la beauté. Le sens d'une esthétique spirituelle n'est donc pas séparable d'une exigence éthique. Cette exigence introduit une note proprement chrétienne dans une pratique ascétique, ordonnée au soin de l'âme avec l'aide d'une méthode philosophique.

[26] Voir le *proemium* du livre IV, qui appartient à la dernière couche rédactionnelle, et VII, 11 où le péché prend forme de dispersion dans le multiple et le remède le retour à l'unité rendue possible par le médiateur. Cette image d'origine plotinienne (cf. *Ennéades* VI, 9 §8) apparaît aussi dans les *Soliloques* II, XIX, 33.

[27] Ibid. I, III, 11-VII, 18.

[28] Ibid. I, VIII, 23. Les transcendantaux se rejoignent en Dieu qui les récapitule et les personnifie; cf. *Conf.* VII, VII, 23.

[29] *De ordine* II, II, 5.

[30] Ibid. II, 6.

[31] «*Tamen peccata fugienda sint*» ibid. 4.; II, 6. On y devine une modification du «*omne corpus esse fugiendum*» de Porphyre; cf. *De Civ. Dei*, X, XXIX. On se reportera aussi à la longue admonestation adressée aux jeunes gens en quête de sagesse dans le *De ordine* II, VIII, 25.

La quête de Dieu n'apparaît pas de pure dépendance par rapport au platonisme, quels qu'en soient les représentants, trahissant un Augustin platonicien, car il pouvait en utiliser les ressources dans une relecture chrétienne[32]. Cette pratique brouille les frontières entre deux domaines indépendants. La question demeure toutefois ouverte de savoir jusqu'à quel point s'est effectuée cette christianisation. Pour tenter une réponse, d'autres apports devront être versés à ce dossier. Un accord est au moins possible entre les concepts susceptibles d'une signification transcendante et le langage correspondant de la foi.

3) Une sagesse chrétienne

Si la dialectique des degrés doit accuser son échec au regard d'un examen critique d'inspiration chrétienne, les concepts philosophiques de valeur transcendantale ou morale se prêtent aisément à une acception chrétienne. Celui de sagesse en offre une excellente illustration. Ainsi la finale du *De beata vita* énonce cette maxime:

Quiconque est heureux a sa mesure, c'est-à-dire la sagesse.

A peine tirée, cette conclusion de sens moral[33] passe à cette interrogation rhétorique:

Que devons-nous appeler sagesse, sinon la Sagesse de Dieu?

Le sens moral sert de tremplin pour une acception métaphysique du concept de sagesse; d'immanente elle se fait transcendante et se dispose ainsi à un sens personnel et chrétien par identification avec le Fils de Dieu:

Nous avons appris aussi par l'autorité divine que le Fils de Dieu n'est rien d'autre que la Sagesse de Dieu, or le Fils de Dieu est assurément Dieu[34].

Par sa portée psychologique et surtout existentielle, la quête du bonheur tend à un sommet divin qui réunit bonheur, sagesse et vérité dans la personne du Fils de Dieu (cf 1 *Co* 1, 24-30; *Jn* 14, 6). La Vérité par laquelle il se définit procède d'un principe ultime considéré

[32] Sur cette question débattue, voir A. MANDOUZE *Saint Augustin L'aventure de la raison et de la grâce*, E. A., 1968, p. 483-484.

[33] Du Roy a bien relevé l'origine cicéronienne de cette qualité (modus) «de juste mesure, de limite à ne pas dépasser», op. cit. p. 152.

[34] *De beata vita* 4, 33-34. Pour une analyse détaillée, voir Du Roy op. cit. p. 154-158. Les premières citations du livre de la Sagesse seront un peu postérieures; voir A.-M. La BONNARDIÈRE, *Biblia Augustiniana A.T. Le livre de la Sagesse* E. A., p. 21-22.

comme mesure, il faudrait dire mesure mesurante, en tout cas inengendré:

> *La Vérité pour être devient par une mesure suprême, dont elle procède et vers laquelle elle se tourne dans sa perfection.*[35]

Cette esquisse recourt à un panachage entre des formules proprement chrétiennes et des emprunts à la philosophie mais ajustés à une compréhension parfaitement correcte du mystère fondé sur l'autorité divine. L'objectif de la sagesse sera de saisir la dimension divine de l'unité par la connaissance de soi et de son origine divine, source insaisissable[36] du bonheur et principe de toute beauté[37]. L'intuition de Dieu «Père de la Vérité» présuppose la ressemblance de l'âme avec lui. Voilà pourquoi la connaissance de l'âme et celle de Dieu se conditionnent mutuellement.

Ce passage de la rationalité à la foi s'effectue tout naturellement, sans se heurter à quelque problème de différence épistémologique entre ces deux ordres. La démarche philosophique a pour mesure dernière la vérité du Christ et pour cime ou référence ultime le mystère trinitaire qui vient d'être esquissé, sans que la transition entre la philosophie et la foi éveille quelque scrupule. L'ouverture de la raison sur l'infini justifie ses titres de noblesse. La pratique repérable dans le *De beata vita* n'a rien d'un hapax; elle se vérifie aisément ailleurs. Ainsi le *De ordine* en donne l'illustration avec l'enthousiasme de Licentius pour cette discipline à laquelle il accorde ses préférences sur la poésie:

> *Plus belle est la philosophie, je l'avoue, que Thysbé, Pyrame, Vénus et Cupidon et toutes les amours de ce genre*[38].

Et Augustin de greffer ce trait inattendu sur un tel engouement:

> *Et il rendait grâces au Christ en soupirant.*

Puis commentant la démarche de conversion, Augustin signale la nécessité de la prière pour que Dieu nous convertisse et nous montre sa face, selon le *ps* 9, 8, que fredonnait Licentius, en un lieu que Monique estimait peu décent, mais dont Augustin se saisit comme d'une métaphore pour l'élever à un plan supérieur:

[35] *De beata vita* 34.

[36] De Dieu l'âme n'a de connaissance que celle «de savoir à quel point elle l'ignore» ibid. XVIII, 47. Cicéron définissait la sagesse comme «la science des choses humaines et divines»; cité par *C. Acad.* I, VI, 16.

[37] *De ordine* II, XIX, 51.

[38] Ibid. I, VIII, 21.

Que signifie se convertir, si ce n'est de la démesure des vices, et par la vertu et la tempérance de s'élever en soi? Qu'est-ce que la face de Dieu, si ce n'est la vérité même à laquelle nous soupirons et à laquelle nous nous livrons, purs et beaux, quand nous l'aimons?[39]

L'idée de vérité tend ainsi à une signification mystique, au sens large du terme, inséparable de celle du bonheur[40]. La philosophie réalise son authenticité en étant une quête de Dieu soutenue et finalement exaucée par la foi. Elle se conçoit comme une propédeutique à la foi dont l'autorité scelle la validité. Cette exaltation d'une pensée, perçue comme religieuse, sous l'égide de «l'homme le plus sage et le plus savant de son temps»[41] fera bien plus tard l'objet d'une sévère révision qui substituera à ces traits ceux de l'impiété[42].

B. Les conditions de la connaissance

La démarche augustinienne revêt un caractère de continuité et de dépassement qui s'applique aux moyens pour atteindre la connaissance aussi bien qu'à son objet. En clair, la raison et l'autorité, les mystères chrétiens: Christ[43] et Trinité s'entrecroisent dans une même contextualité qui rend leur séparation impossible, même si le souci de clarification recommande d'indispensables distinctions. Augustin accueille la foi par adhésion à l'autorité révélante; il vise son intelligence par le recours à la raison.

1) L'autorité et la raison au service de la vérité

La dialectique entre la vérité, comme objectif, l'autorité comme garantie et la raison comme moyen forme une structure triadique stable, qu'atteste le *De ordine* II, IX, 26:

Pour apprendre, nous nous laissons nécessairement conduire par l'autorité et la raison.

Le *Contra Academicos* relie fermement ces deux instances complémentaires. Si louable que fût intention des Académiciens à l'égard du précieux héritage platonicien, leur option pour le doute ou le

[39] Ibid. I, VIII, 23. Le texte latin disant: «in sese attolli», il semble excessif de traduire par «au-dessus de soi».
[40] Ibid. I, VIII, 24.
[41] *C. Ac.* III, XVII, 37.
[42] *Retract.* I, I, 4.
[43] Cf. *C. Ac.* II, I, 1: «Qu'est d'autre (la Sagesse) que nous transmettent les mystères sinon le Fils de Dieu?»

probabilisme répugne à Augustin dont l'ambition est d'atteindre la connaissance de la vérité avec l'indispensable concours de l'autorité et de la raison:

> *Il ne fait de doute pour personne que nous sommes portés à la science sous la double caution de l'autorité et de la raison. Aussi est-ce pour moi une certitude que je ne m'écarterai absolument sur aucun point de l'autorité du Christ, car je n'en trouve pas de plus forte. Quant à ce dont l'étude requiert des arguments subtils – car je suis désormais en des dispositions telles que je désire avec impatience saisir la vérité, non seulement par la foi, mais encore par l'intelligence – j'ai confiance de trouver, pour le moment, chez les platoniciens, des doctrines qui ne répugnent pas à nos mystères*[44].

L'action conjointe de l'autorité et de la raison constitue un principe général, incontesté, qui s'impose comme une nécessité pour parvenir à la connaissance qui se dérobe aux prétentions illusoires de l'autodidacte. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'une condition particulière à l'«*intellectus fidei*». mais d'une loi universelle. Dans le cas de la foi au Christ cette loi prend forme d'une décision personnelle, d'une adhésion irréversible qui se traduit par ce choix. L'autorité sort de sa généralité pour prendre un visage précis qui ne se réduit pas à une référence passée mais présentement saisissable dans les «*sacra nostra*», c'est-à-dire les manifestations de la vie de l'Église, ses actions sacrées, les sacrements et l'Écriture, en somme la «*regula fidei*»[45]. À elle seule, l'autorité du Christ condamnerait l'esprit à la soumission aveugle sans le correctif et le complément d'une recherche intellectuelle, qui rende la vérité intelligible; elle serait un déni du Christ en tant qu'«*intellectus*».

L'assentiment inconditionnel à l'autorité du Christ, assise de la foi, constitue les prémisses d'un travail d'intellection grâce aux ressources qu'offre la philosophie platonicienne. Elle servira de clé pour pénétrer dans l'intelligence du contenu de la foi, qui n'est certes pas indifférencié et librement exploitable mais normatif pour la raison. Cette utilisation est toutefois soumise à deux conditions: d'abord la compatibilité présumée (*confido*) de la pensée platonicienne avec les mystères chrétiens, ensuite son utilisation au moins provisoire (*interim*), en attendant mieux.

[44] *C. Ac.* III, XX, 43. Du Roy relève à juste titre l'erreur de traduction de Jolivet: entre l'autorité et la raison il n'y a pas alternative mais cumul; cf. op. cit. p. 127, n. 2. La traduction de l'intraduisible «pondus» par «caution» nous a paru la moins infidèle à son sens particulier.

[45] Voir R. HOLTE op. cit. p. 74- 76;308. L'auteur souligne le crédit total d'Augustin au Christ mais prudent aux philosophes.

La fonction pédagogique de l'autorité se concentrant sur le Christ, celle de la raison passe par sa définition qu'esquisse Augustin:

> *La raison est un mouvement de l'esprit apte à distinguer et à relier les choses que nous apprenons; s'en servir comme guide pour comprendre Dieu ou l'âme qui est en nous ou partout, il est extrêmement rare que le genre humain y parvienne, car il est difficile à quiconque s'est aventuré dans l'embarras des sens de faire retour en lui-même*[46].

Entendue comme faculté discursive, analytique ou synthétique, la raison commande l'action réfléchie, la parole fondée, le bonheur dans la contemplation[47]; sa fonction couvre des domaines tentaculaires, en particulier les sciences et les arts qui lui doivent mesure et proportion[48]. Elle en est même venue à se prendre pour le nombre qui est la mesure de toutes choses[49]. Il est surtout un mouvement qui l'a défie et l'attire: celui de rentrer en soi et de comprendre Dieu, autrement dit, la démarche même de l'ascension platonicienne, version philosophique de l'échelle de Jacob. Le pouvoir de la raison se mesure à la diversité des sciences libérales soumises à sa maîtrise mais aussi et surtout à sa capacité de s'affranchir du sensible pour s'élever jusqu'au divin selon la dialectique des degrés.

Alors que nul n'est dispensé de se rallier à l'autorité du Christ, la grande majorité s'en satisfera pour atteindre la vision de Dieu au terme de cette vie, à défaut d'y parvenir dès ici-bas. Seule une petite élite réussira à se passer des béquilles de l'autorité pour s'envoler avec les ailes de la raison[50] vers la contemplation de Dieu. Augustin se compte parmi ceux qui désirent saisir la vérité. En tout état de cause, l'exercice de la raison reste soumis à une condition: qu'il «ne répugne pas à nos mystères»[51]. Ils sont la référence ultime même du jugement porté sur le platonisme.

La reconnaissance que méritent ces deux voies différenciées s'enracine dans l'itinéraire d'Augustin; d'abord séduit par les assurances fallacieuses du rationalisme manichéen qui, se prétendant affranchi du principe d'autorité, soupçonnait la foi catholique de superstition, il fut finalement déçu et désillusionné par sa rencontre avec

[46] *De ordine*. II, XI, 30. La raison est le moyen de la dialectique dont vient le traiter le nº 29.
[47] Ibid. XII, 35.
[48] Ibid. XI, 34.
[49] Ibid. XV, 43.
[50] L'image est employée dans les *Soliloques* I, XIV, 24.
[51] *C. Ac.* III, XX, 43. Un examen attentif à la construction grammaticale relèvera le subjonctif «*quod non repugnet*» qui prend une nuance d'éventualité, de possibilité, que nous rendons par la formule: pour autant.

Faustus et se laissa gagner par la tentation sceptique[52]. Le stimulant de sa réflexion sur un sujet aussi décisif ne saurait être dissocié de son expérience passée et de ses difficultés personnelles.

2) Un ordre de priorité et d'excellence

Par rapport aux nécessités de l'apprentissage, Augustin relie autorité et raison selon un rapport inverse: la priorité revient à l'autorité, l'excellence à la raison. D'un point de vue pédagogique, il incombe, en effet, à l'autorité, c'est-à-dire au maître[53], de conduire à la science car, faute d'être infuse, elle ne peut être atteinte, fût-ce par le petit nombre, sans un guide qui en ouvre la porte[54]. L'autorité est une éveilleuse de la ou des raisons, dont elle se réclame, dans l'esprit du disciple, jusqu'à lui faire pressentir le principe de toutes choses. En aucun cas elle ne se substitue à la raison où elle puise sa force de conviction. Augustin s'applique à lui-même cette règle vis-à-vis de ses disciples:

> *Je ne veux aucunement qu'ils me croient, à moins que j'enseigne et donne mes raisons*[55].

Ainsi l'autorité ne s'impose pas indépendamment de la raison qui garde une fonction critique à son égard.

La priorité de l'autorité est réaffirmée par le *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* I, II, 3:

> *L'ordre de la nature est tel, lorsque nous apprenons quelque chose, que l'autorité précède la raison. En effet, la raison peut apparaître infirme qui, après s'être exprimée, recourt à l'autorité pour s'affermir.*

Le rôle de l'autorité n'est pas seulement inaugural mais il se poursuit sous forme de garantie et de guide, quitte à se diversifier par le truchement de divers personnages dignes de foi, en faveur des esprits trop lents pour s'en passer.

Toute autorité ne mérite cependant pas crédit, car elle peut être trompeuse; aussi est-elle soumise à un acte de discernement. Elle se

[52] *De ut. credendi* I, 2; *Confessions* V, VI, 11-VII, 12; V, X, 19. Augustin s'est rendu compte que la vie serait impossible sans faire crédit à des gens compétents; ibid. VI, V, 7. A. MANDOUZE à dégagé les phases de l'itinéraire personnel d'Augustin proposées en exemple dans le *De ut. credendi* VIII, 20; voir op. cit. p. 283-288.

[53] L'étude de ce thème serait à poursuivre avec l'analyse du langage dans le *De magistro*.

[54] *De ordine* II, IX, 26. Voir Holte op. cit. p. 325.

[55] *De ordine* II, X, 28.

présente sous une double forme, divine et humaine, mais même sa forme divine elle se prête à méprise, si on la confond avec la fourberie d'esprits aériens[56] suborneurs. En cette forme, elle ne se signale pas seulement par des prodiges mais encore, paradoxalement, par un état d'abaissement, que motive la condition de l'homme, pour lui apprendre à s'élever jusqu'à l'intelligence. Ainsi est affirmée l'humilité de Dieu dans l'incarnation:

> *Il faut appeler divine l'autorité qui, non seulement transcende dans des manifestations sensibles tout pouvoir humain mais encore qui, unie à l'homme, lui indique jusqu'à quel point elle s'est abaissée à cause de lui; elle lui commande de ne pas s'en tenir aux sens qui perçoivent ces prodiges mais de s'envoler vers l'intellect en lui montrant quel est son pouvoir, pourquoi elle accomplit ces prodiges et le peu de cas qu'elle en fait. Il faut, en effet, qu'elle enseigne sa puissance par les faits, sa clémence par l'humilité, sa nature par le précepte; toutes choses qui nous sont transmises, dans le secret et la fermeté par les mystères auxquels nous sommes initiés; en eux la vie des hommes bons est beaucoup plus facilement purifiée non par l'ambiguïté des disputes mais par l'autorité des mystères*[57].

La pensée d'Augustin se calque sur le mouvement descendant de l'autorité divine vers l'humble condition humaine afin de susciter en l'homme le mouvement inverse en vue d'un dépassement du sensible vers l'intelligible. Faute de détermination personnelle, cet «intellectus» s'identifie à l'autorité divine. L'emploi de catégories platoniciennes dans ce double mouvement établit un rapport d'altérité, mais non d'opposition, entre deux ordres qui se rejoignent dans le mystère de l'incarnation, et se démarquent ainsi de la philosophie. De plus, ce schème binaire s'articule avec un schème ternaire dont chacun des éléments comporte deux termes, selon un procédé particulièrement étudié: les faits de nature sensible sont révélateurs de la puissance ou accréditent l'autorité de Dieu, l'humilité de sa condition charnelle révèle sa miséricorde et les préceptes sa nature. Si le sens de ce concept n'est pas précisé, il s'éclaire à la lumière de la purification dont l'autorité des mystères assure l'efficacité pour conduire du sensible vers l'intelligible ou le divin. Cette purification évoque l'initiation chrétienne. La fonction d'autorité est attribuée aux mystères qui peuvent

[56] Cette mise en garde pourrait avoir son origine en *Eph* 6, 12 ou *Ap* 16, 14.

[57] *De ordine* II, IX, 27. La traduction de ce passage n'est pas aisée à cause de la formule «ipsum hominem agens» qui se continue avec «ostendit ei». Jolivet s'est mépris sur son sens, car il s'agit d'une formule d'union dans le Christ, littéralement intraduisible; voir Van BAVEL, *Recherche sur la christologie de Saint Augustin*, Fribourg, 1954, p. 42.

prendre le double sens de contenu et de célébration sacramentelle de la foi. Trois attributs divins sont retenus mais centrés sur la clémence, dont le signe est l'humilité du Dieu incarné.

Il est, à l'opposé, une forme d'autorité habituellement trompeuse, celle des hommes dont le critère de véracité sera la conformité de leur vie avec leur enseignement.

Si le langage des premiers Dialogues est celui d'une pensée en élaboration, le concours de l'autorité et de la raison, couronné par le sceau de la vérité qui l'accrédite, trouve sa formulation achevée dans le *De vera religione* XXIV, 45, postérieur de quelques années:

> *L'autorité réclame la foi et prépare l'homme à la raison. La raison conduit à l'intellection et à la connaissance. Bien que la raison n'abandonne jamais complètement l'autorité, lorsqu'il s'agit de savoir à qui il faut croire; à coup sûr, l'autorité suprême est celle de la vérité connue avec évidence.*

La coordination entre les divers concepts qui jalonnent cet extrait est subtile mais nette. Le rapport entre l'autorité et la foi est réciproque mais différent: l'autorité est exigence de foi qui, en retour, la reconnaît comme telle. Loin de former un système clos à deux termes, ce rapport s'ouvre sur un troisième, qui est plus un appel qu'une exigence, à savoir la raison comme voie vers l'intelligence. Cet énoncé est assorti d'une restriction ou plutôt d'une précision qui maintient, en matière de foi, la raison sous la dépendance de l'autorité, sans qu'elle s'en trouve étouffée (*neque... penitus deseruit*). La jonction entre l'autorité et la raison se réalise au sommet dans la Vérité reconnue. Cette Vérité s'impose dans son objectivité sous forme d'autorité tout en invitant la raison à en explorer les immenses avenues.

Les précisions et les retouches qu'Augustin apporte à son propos sont l'indice de la complexité des rapports entre l'autorité et la raison. Alors qu'à l'autorité revient une priorité fonctionnelle, en tant qu'«*admonitio*», sur le chemin du savoir, un peu comme à la perception sur le souvenir de l'objet perçu, elle ne s'impose qu'avec le concours de la raison, puisqu'elle est soumise à un travail de discernement. Par ailleurs jamais la raison ne s'en affranchira totalement, parce qu'elle aura toujours besoin d'une assise et d'un guide dans son travail d'exploration. Sur le plan précis de l'intelligence des mystères, l'autorité ne pourra jamais abdiquer sa fonction normative pour livrer la raison à une autonomie sans borne. En résumé, la crédibilité de l'autorité est à la mesure de son aptitude à attester et à servir la vérité, objet de la raison; s'il lui revient d'éveiller la raison au vrai, elle reste soumise à son discernement. Elle est appelée à s'effacer comme la foi en la vérité l'est à se transformer en vision de la vérité.

Cette insécabilité de la raison et de l'autorité est de nature à brouiller la ligne de partage entre la masse et l'élite pour les ranger dans un même état de dépendance envers une autorité identifiée à la vérité et à l'intellect divin incarné, selon la précision du *Contra Académicos* III, XIX, 42 qui sera examiné plus loin.

Compte tenu des divers courants qui traversent la philosophie, sa confrontation avec la foi en mesurera la distance sinon l'opposition ou la compatibilité qui la rend convertible en sagesse chrétienne. Celle-ci poursuit la quête spirituelle et la démarche existentielle amorcée par la philosophie mais par les vertus de foi, d'espérance et de charité[58]. Cependant pour devenir chrétienne une philosophie doit se référer au Christ comme à sa norme ultime.

II. LA PHILOSOPHIE ET LA FOI

Alors qu'Augustin a rompu avec le manichéisme, il a continué à philosopher au temps de son baptême. Ce genre d'exercice ne lui paraissait donc nullement incompatible avec l'orientation nouvelle et décisive de sa personne. Cette continuité dans la discontinuité est-elle transposable au plan des idées et des convictions d'Augustin: dans quelle mesure serait-il demeuré attaché à son héritage platonicien malgré sa conversion ou l'a-t-il assumé pour le porter à son achèvement dans la foi? Cette vérification se fera sur deux questions capitales: la Trinité et le salut.

A. Triade ou Trinité?

Le concours de l'autorité et de la raison s'avère indispensable à l'éveil et au progrès de la connaissance, car il est constitutif de toute pédagogie, a-t-il été précisé. Dans le cas de l'initiation d'Augustin aux mystères divins, quelle, fut le rôle de la raison, autrement dit de la philosophie, d'abord dans le domaine trinitaire?

1) L'autorité à défaut de raison?

L'articulation de l'autorité et de la raison est reprise selon une visée différente par le *De ordine* dans une séquence qui réunit deux considérations essentielles: le rôle de l'autorité et de la raison par rapport aux mystères chrétiens, notamment à celui de la Trinité, et de la raison par rapport aux aptitudes subjectives à en user:

[58] *De ordine* II, VIII, 25.

Double est la voie que nous suivons, lorsque l'obscurité des choses nous trouble: la raison ou, à coup sûr, l'autorité. La philosophie promet la raison mais ne délivre qu'à peine un petit nombre d'hommes qu'elle oblige non seulement à ne pas dédaigner les mystères mais qu'elle est seule à faire comprendre comme ils doivent l'être. Aucune autre fonction n'incombe à la vraie philosophie, à la philosophie authentique, si l'on peut dire, sinon d'enseigner le principe sans principe de toutes choses, l'immensité de l'intelligence qui demeure en lui, ce qui en a découlé, sans aucune dégénérescence, en vue de notre salut; le Dieu unique, tout-puissant et en même temps trois fois puissant, Père, Fils et Saint-Esprit, qu'affirment les vénérables mystères – eux qui, par une foi sincère et inébranlable, libèrent les peuples –, et non de façon confuse comme certains ni de manière arrogante comme beaucoup. Quant à ce fait sublime, qu'un si grand Dieu ait daigné revêtir et assumer pour nous un corps semblable au nôtre, plus il paraît vil, plus il déborde de miséricorde et s'éloigne, en largeur et en profondeur[59]*, de l'orgueil des habiles*[60].

[59] On pressent une réminiscence d'*Eph.* 3, 18.

[60] *De ordine* II, V, 16. La traduction exacte de certaines formules de ce passage est un casse-tête qui a motivé les corrections apportées par G. Madec à la version d'O. du Roy; cf. «A propos d'une traduction de *De ordine* II, V, 16, in *REA*, 16, 1976, p. 170-178. Deux passages s'avèrent litigieux. Au début de la citation, à quel substantif faut-il rapporter «sola» dans la phrase: «non modo non contemnere illa mysteria sed sola intellegere ut intelligenda sunt»? Alors que du Roy le rapporte à «philosophia», Madec plaide pour son rattachement à «mysteria». Dans le premier cas, la philosophie aurait le monopole d'une juste intelligence des mystères, dans l'autre, son objectif se limiterait à eux. Il est difficile de prendre parti. Pourquoi Augustin aurait-il restreint la compétence de la philosophie aux seuls mystères? Le second cas concerne la finale: «non confuse, ut quidam, nec contumeliose, ut multi praedicant». La traduction dépend d'une variante textuelle: l'édition Kröll omet «docent» avant «ueneranda mysteria». Du Roy affecte de ces deux adverbes l'enseignement des philosophes afin d'harmoniser le texte à sa thèse d'une identique Trinité dans le platonisme et la foi, la différence résultant de l'orgueil philosophique. Madec les relie à mystères, qui proclament sans confusion et sans outrage. Cette traduction, qui se rapproche à cet égard de celle de Jolivet, viserait des malfaçons de type arien ou sabellien. Cette réserve serait-elle prématurée? Elle reflèterait la «sabelliana confusio» dénoncée par Ambroise. Si la phrase est clarifiée, toutes les difficultés sont-elles levées? Le langage confus de la philosophie ne contiendrait-il pas en germe les réserves bien plus tardives émises par Augustin sur une esquisse trinitaire chez Porphyre; cf. *De Civ. Dei*, X, XXIX, 1? Encore faudrait-il demeurer cohérent car, s'il s'agit d'un enseignement confus, il est risqué d'attribuer à la philosophie la même Trinité qu'aux mystères; cf. Du Roy, op. cit., p. 125. Cette manière confuse sera peu après avouée p. 126. Sur le petit nombre, voir *De beata vita* 1, 1. Enfin le «plenius clementia» ne signalerait-il pas plutôt le christianisme d'Augustin que le «vilius» ne trahirait son platonisme? Cf. Du Roy, op. cit. p. 126.

La relation entre les deux voies à suivre frise ici l'alternative: «la raison ou, coup sûr l'autorité»[61], alors que les citations antérieures les unissaient fortement comme étant nécessaires à la connaissance[62]. Le relâchement de leur lien s'expliquerait par l'efficacité et l'audience fort disproportionnées de ces deux instances non plus dans la recherche de la connaissance mais dans la sortie de l'obscurité; est en cause non plus le savoir mais son intelligence. L'autorité garantit la certitude non la raison dont l'usage a pour effet d'opérer une sélection selon les aptitudes propres à chacun. Elle propose un idéal de connaissance qu'Augustin cherche à partager en recommandant une soif de savoir pour ainsi dire encyclopédique[63] comme nécessaire à l'intelligibilité des choses. Mais Augustin était assez réaliste pour admettre que parmi ses amis il en est qui reculent devant l'effort qu'exige la raison. Seront-ils maintenus à l'écart?

> *S'ils y répugnent ou s'ils sont absorbés par d'autres travaux ou insensibles à l'étude, qu'ils se ménagent le secours de la foi afin que, par ce lien, celui qui a promis qu'aucun de ceux qui croient en lui par les mystères ne périrait les attire à lui et les libère des maux affreux ou sournois*[64].

A défaut de l'effort rationnel, il reste le choix plus économique de la foi, comprise comme moyen de libération universelle. En d'autres termes, si la raison contemplative se heurte aux impératifs de la raison pratique ou l'idéal du «*frui*» aux urgences de l'«*uti*», il reste en tout état de cause le «*credere auctoritati*».

De quoi la philosophie est-elle en mesure de libérer si ce n'est de l'obscurité des choses à percer?[65] La petite minorité d'esprits capables d'en user fait certes figure d'élite face au grand nombre que cette méthode dépasse. Faut-il en déduire que la raison jouit d'un statut distinct et pour ainsi dire concurrent de l'autorité?[66] En d'autres termes, la philosophie ouvrirait-elle une voie symétrique par rapport à la foi, qui se rejoindraient dans un mouvement convergent vers un objectif

[61] G. Madec renforce cette alternative en introduisant un «Nous pouvons» et traduit «certe» par «à défaut»; cf. *Saint Augustin et la philosophie Notes critiques*, I. E. A. Paris, 1996, p. 20.

[62] Cf. *De ordine* II, IX, 26; *C. Ac.* III,XX,43.

[63] Cf. *De ordine* II, V, 15: «*disciplinis omnibus*».

[64] Ibid. Comment ne pas rapprocher cette formule de *Jn* 3, 16? Cette réminiscence demeure encore fort éloignée du développement que lui consacre le *Tract. In Joh.* XII, 11.

[65] Le *De moribus* I, II, 3, de peu postérieur aux Dialogues, reprendra la sombre image des «esprits humains obscurcis par l'habitude des ténèbres…»

[66] La question est clairement posée par Holte op. cit. p. 74-78.

commun, une tête d'angle, selon une image qui sera chère à Augustin prédicateur? Telle est la question capitale.

Plaiderait en faveur d'un parallélisme des sources l'emploi, de part et d'autre, du même verbe «*docere*», ou celui de «*mysteria*». Quant à l'objet de cet enseignement, les mystères, il se partage en deux énoncés symétriques de sens trinitaire, d'abord selon une terminologie conceptuelle d'origine philosophique: le «principe sans principe», l'«intelligence» et l'«émanation», immédiatement retraduite en sa nomenclature chrétienne de Père, Fils et Esprit Saint. Ce parallélisme est-il suffisant pour conduire à la conclusion que la philosophie enseignerait la même Trinité que la foi chrétienne?[67] Il faudrait établir une parité ou une indépendance entre ces deux sources que vient troubler le langage d'Augustin.

En effet, la philosophie, telle qu'il la conçoit, doit répondre à des qualités d'authenticité soumise à certains critères. Son rôle est de faire comprendre les mystères tels qu'ils doivent l'être. Ainsi le terme de mystère, assorti d'une obligation, désigne l'objet de la foi, inséparable de la «*regula fidei*», puisqu'il sert de règle à l'intelligibilité attendue de la philosophie. Soumise à une norme à respecter, elle perd sa franchise. Si le langage philosophique n'est pas récusé, il est immédiatement ressaisi et précisé selon une nomination chrétienne. En outre, n'est-il pas surprenant que se greffe la mention d'une finalité salvifique sur l'énoncé philosophique de la Trinité, s'il n'était déjà attiré par une précompréhension chrétienne?

Les ressources de la philosophie sont engagées au service de l'intelligence des mystères qui se condensent dans la Trinité, indissociable de l'incarnation. Si leur rôle est d'affranchir de l'obscurité, l'autorité, qui s'identifie au contenu révélé, est inhérente à une économie de salut. La libération revêt alors deux sens différents, nullement incompatibles: la libération par la raison est la connaissance réservée à certains privilégiés, par la foi elle est le salut offert à tous. Ce partage trouve un écho dans les *Confessions* VI, V, 7 à propos de la découverte que fit Augustin de l'autorité des Écritures qui les met à la portée de tous, tout en laissant passer quelques esprits supérieurs «jusqu'à toi». Leur destination universelle n'est pas incompatible avec une compréhension plus poussée chez quelques-uns.

Cet enseignement s'articule avec celui de l'incarnation qui constitue une provocation d'autant plus irritante pour des esprits dont l'ambition est inversement proportionnelle à cette forme d'abaissement consenti par Dieu dans sa miséricorde. Le pressentiment que la

[67] Cf. O. du Roy, op. cit. p. 125.

philosophie put avoir d'une Trinité divine fut vicié, du point de vue du salut, par son arrogance; la connaissance propre aux mystères est caractérisée par l'humilité. Ainsi cet extrait du *De ordine* II, V, 16 esquisse l'enseignement ferme et constant d'Augustin théologien.

Alors qu'Augustin prévient Evodius des difficultés et périls que réserve la raison comme chemin de vérité, il affirme avec force la priorité et la nécessité d'adhérer à l'autorité dont l'avantage est la facilité et la sûreté:

> *Une chose est de croire grâce à l'autorité, autre chose grâce à la raison. Croire à l'autorité est très économique et dispense de labeur; si cela te convient, tu pourras lire bien des choses que des hommes importants et saints ont écrites, comme sur ordre, qu'ils jugeaient salutaires pour des ignorants; ils ont voulu être crus de ceux qui ne pouvaient trouver d'autre salut à leur âme trop lente ou trop embrouillée. Si de tels hommes, en nombre très élevé, veulent saisir la vérité par la raison, ils se laisseront très facilement tromper par le mirage des arguments et tomberont dans des opinions diverses et nocives, au point de ne jamais réussir à s'en dégager et à s'en libérer, si ce n'est au prix de beaucoup de peine. Il leur est de la plus grande utilité de croire à l'autorité la plus élevée et d'y conformer leur vie. Si tu l'estimes plus utile, non seulement je n'y ferai pas opposition, mais je l'approuverai sans réserve. Mais si tu n'es pas en état de réfréner ce désir, qui te persuade d'atteindre la vérité par la raison, il faut que tu consentes à de nombreux et longs circuits, de peur de te laisser mener par une autre raison, que la seule qui mérite ce nom, c'est-à-dire la vraie raison, non seulement vraie mais certaine, étrangère à toute apparence d'erreur, à supposer toutefois qu'elle puisse être trouvée par l'homme, de façon qu'aucune controverse fausse ou trompeuse ne puisse t'en détourner.*[68]

La mise en garde ne saurait être plus claire. Augustin est conscient du prix à verser pour suivre le chemin de la raison, sa conversion étant celle d'un intellectuel qui a fini par accepter de subordonner le recours à la raison à l'autorité du Christ, autrement dit l'«*intellectus*» à la «*fides*».

Dans le florilège qui en traite, ces quelques extraits sur le rôle spécifique de l'autorité et de la raison, laissent apparaître leur cohérence. L'autorité est envisagée selon une double fonction. Sur un plan commun, elle joue le rôle d'éveilleuse du savoir; sa fonction pédagogique est provisoire, appelée à s'effacer devant l'évidence des raisons, dont elle est la servante, en attendant que le disciple atteigne une maturité intellectuelle suffisante pour s'affranchir du prestige d'un maître.

[68] *De quantitate animae* VII, 12.

Dans le domaine de la foi, elle joue un rôle normatif; elle est la force de la Vérité.

Laissons encore au *De utilitate credendi* XI, 25 le soin le formuler la sentence finale:

> *Ce que nous comprenons, nous le devons à la raison*[69]*; ce que nous croyons à l'autorité; ce que nous préjugeons à l'erreur. Quiconque comprend croit aussi, même celui qui préjuge croit; tous ceux qui croient ne comprennent pas; nul ne comprend qui préjuge.*

Deux points de vue sont retenus en termes lapidaires: celui de l'objet puis celui du sujet du savoir ou de son contraire. L'objet est référé à ses sources selon les deux modalités de l'intelligence et de la foi et, à l'opposé, de la méprise; quant au sujet, en toute hypothèse, il dépend d'un acte de croire; l'accès à l'intelligence est une particularité dans l'attitude de foi mais interdit dans le cas du préjugé qui se voit même, dans le contexte, qualifié d'immoral, car il est signe de témérité.

2) Une Trinité platonicienne?

La dette d'Augustin envers les «libri platonicorum» pour la dialectique des degrés, qui de l'intériorité s'élève à la transcendance, n'est pas en cause. Il s'agit d'examiner dans quelle mesure il se reconnaîtrait redevable au platonisme de sa découverte de la Trinité. Pour risquer une réponse, il est un préalable à soulever. Augustin prête-t-il au platonisme une connaissance de la Trinité? Sa tripartition de la philosophie en physique, dialectique et éthique offrait déjà une esquisse en consonance avec les notions de principe sans principe, d'intelligence et d'émanation, relevés dans le *De ordine*[70]. Sans anticiper sur les réserves que le *De Civitate Dei* X formulera sur la trinité porphyrienne[71], le témoignage le plus clair est celui des *Confessions* VII, IX, 13-14, mais la parité se limite au Verbe ou au Fils; le point de vue n'est donc pas formellement trinitaire. Les Dialogues ne posent pas une telle identité mais transcrivent spontanément une triade plotinienne

[69] Les *Retract.* I, XIV, 3 remplacent «Quod intelligimus» par «Quod scimus» qu'Augustin explique comme une connaissance d'origine empirique ou acquise sur des témoignages dignes de foi.

[70] On retrouverait cette tripartition, quel que soit l'ordre des termes, dans la lettre 118, III, 17-19; voir Y. MESSEN, «La triple sagesse. Les interprétations d'Ambroise et d'Augustin» in *Connaissance des Pères de l'Église*, n° 103, p. 43-52. L'exposé de cette tripartition est surtout développé dans le *De Civ. Dei* VIII, VI-VIII.

[71] Cf. *De Civ. Dei* X, XXIII; XXIX, 1.

en langage chrétien. Pareil procédé suppose une ressaisie de la pensée plotinienne dans une lecture croyante[72].

De son analyse érudite O. du Roy conclut qu'Augustin aurait identifié le contenu de son intelligence de la foi, à savoir la Trinité, avec la triade plotinienne pour en déduire: «L'incarnation n'est donc pas la révélation de la Trinité mais l'autorité morale dont nous avons besoin pour nous purifier et revenir en nous-mêmes.»[73] Ce rôle purificateur est expressément attesté dans les passages examinés. Quant à la première thèse, négative, elle ne laisse d'autre choix que celui d'un retour de la Trinité, objet de l'intelligence de la foi, vers son modèle plotinien. Qu'Augustin n'invoque pas l'incarnation comme le canal de la révélation trinitaire est-il un argument suffisant pour légitimer cette conclusion?

Le bilan des lectures platoniciennes dan les *Confessions* VII, IX, 13-14 irait-il dans ce sens? Leur rétrospective sur la découverte redevable à ces livres manifeste même plus de hardiesse que les Dialogues. Ceux-ci retraduisaient la trinité platonicienne en son appellation chrétienne; les *Confessions* enjambent cette étape en convertissant d'emblée l'apport platonicien en langage johannique et paulinien, présupposant l'homogénéité du sens à défaut d'une identité de langage. Bien qu'ad litteram l'expression fût autre, la substance était identique: «hoc idem omnino». Quelle leçon en tirer?

On remarquera que ce bilan n'est pas formellement trinitaire, puisqu'il ignore la troisième personne. Qu'Augustin ait découvert, dans ses lectures platoniciennes, la divinité de celui que Jean appelle le Verbe et Paul le Fils s'explique par les subtiles et hautes spéculations métaphy-

[72] A cette conclusion on pourrait objecter l'antériorité de la lecture des livres platoniciens à celle des livres saints, selon les *Confessions* VII, XX, 26. Mais Augustin évoque les lectures qu'il fit avant sa conversion, alors que son énoncé du mystère trinitaire en termes chrétiens assimilant les hypostases platoniciennes suppose une relecture chrétienne des énoncés philosophiques.

[73] Op. cit. p. 415; cf. p. 96-106. Voir les remarques critiques d'A. Mandouze, op. cit. p. 481, n. 10. Si déjà Ambroise avait puisé chez Plotin, ce n'était sûrement pas dans l'intention de se rallier à lui; s'il existe un cercle milanais intéressé par le néoplatonisme, au centre duquel figure Simplicianus, influencé par Victorinus et futur successeur d'Ambroise, on en vient à se demander si la référence ultime est Plotin, lu dans ses sources, ou son interprétation chrétienne. Cf. Bibliothèque Augustinienne n° 14, n. 1, p. 529-536. L'intuition plotinienne d'une entité divine proche de l'Un et convertible en la personne du Verbe ou du Fils n'est pas contestable. Mais là s'arrête le point de contact avec la foi. Une extension de dimension trinitaire, supposée conforme à une compréhension orthodoxe entre les personnes excède la concession d'Augustin et appauvrit son sens de l'incarnation en la réduisant à un moyen de purification qui conduirait à une patrie déjà connue. Du Roy en convient: «Il (Augustin) a lu Plotin à la lumière d'Ambroise. Il a reconnu la Trinité chrétienne dans les hypostases plotiniennes.» Op. cit. p. 182.

siques, voire mystiques, de Plotin sur la procession de l'Intelligence à partir de l'Un et sa conversion vers lui[74]. Ce genre de relation s'accordait aisément à celui du Logos avec Dieu selon le prologue johannique et se prêtait donc à une lecture chrétienne. Que la découverte d'Augustin se soit limitée au Verbe est confirmé par les *Confessions*:

> *Je t'avais trouvé toi, notre créateur, et ton Verbe, Dieu auprès de toi et avec toi Dieu unique, par qui tu as créé toutes choses.*[75]

Ce genre de lecture assimilatrice, si étrangère à nos règles d'interprétation, surprend moins, par comparaison avec la méthode exégétique qu'appliquera Augustin à l'Ancien Testament et en particulier aux psaumes. Il n'hésite pas à retenir le mot susceptible d'une signification allégorique ou typologique, en faisant abstraction de son contexte. Ce procédé semble bien s'inaugurer dans l'utilisation des concepts philosophiques de principe, d'intellect ou d'émanation sans se préoccuper de leur signification originelle.

Les travaux sont assez nombreux et fouillés pour établir la pénétration d'éléments plotiniens dans le discours chrétien, notamment chez Ambroise[76]; il n'est donc pas de raison que la théologie du Verbe s'en prive. Une pensée aussi subtile et spirituelle que celle de Plotin s'avérait tout à fait compatible avec la foi, même si par certains aspects elle en divergeait[77]. Il s'avère que les préventions d'un Tertullien

[74] On pourrait multiplier les références aux *Ennéades* qui attestent la transcendance de l'Intelligence: elle contient toutes choses (cf. les raisons séminales) (VI, 2 §21); elle se tourne vers l'Un et le contemple (VI, 7 §16; III, 8 §8). Ce retour est amplement attesté dans sa traduction johannique: Jn 13, 1. 3; 13, 12. 28; 16, 5. 10. 28; 17, 12-13; 20, 17.

[75] *Conf.* VIII, I, 2. L'influence du prologue de Jean sur cet énoncé se fait nettement sentir. Dressant le tableau «de l'histoire de la Raison» (op. cit. p. 132), du Roy acquiert la conviction que la Raison ordonnatrice de l'univers, inspirée par le traité *Sur la Providence* de Plotin s'identifierait à l'Esprit Saint chez Augustin. Il est vrai qu'Augustin accordera ses préférences à Plotin sur Porphyre dans leur conception d'une troisième entité, mais qui demeure à ses yeux bien floue dans le langage philosophique; cf. *De Civ. Dei* X, XXIII. Toutefois cette conviction est tempérée par l'aveu de «l'assimilation, plus timide et hésitante, de l'Âme universelle ou plus exactement de la Raison universelle avec l'Esprit-Saint». De plus, comment accorder cet autre aveu «de l'illusion où était Augustin de découvrir en Plotin toute la Trinité chrétienne» avec l'affirmation péremptoire que «la Trinité peut être connue avant même l'incarnation», c'est-à-dire chez les philosophes?

[76] Cf. COURCELLE, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin,* Paris, Boccard, 1950, p. 106-138.

[77] Une déviation tritéiste sera relevée par Augustin chez Porphyre; cf. *De Civ. Dei* X, XXIX, 1. Il faudrait aussi tenir compte de la subordination des hypostases: ainsi la pensée est inférieure au Bien: cf. *Ennéades* VI, 40. Un examen minutieux relèverait d'autres dissonances dans le rapport entre les hypostases et celui des personnes divines.

envers la philosophie étaient en voie de dépassement au profit de son assimilation critique, justifiée par l'image biblique de l'or pris aux Égyptiens. Ainsi la spéculation de Plotin sur l'Intelligence «engendrée par le plus pur des principes» comme ses rapports avec le Bien ou le premier principe ne manquent pas de résonance chrétienne[78]. Cette correspondance se laisse-t-elle diffracter en termes d'antériorité ou de postériorité? Augustin a pu retrouver dans le Verbe johannique une confirmation de ses lectures plotiniennes comme celles-ci ont pu le préparer à la lecture de Paul ou de Jean.

Quant au mouvement que suit le *Contra Academicos* et le *De ordine,* il passe de la triade[79] vers la Trinité en sa forme achevée, comme celui qui irait de la figure vers sa réalisation, d'autant qu'il est demandé à la philosophie de s'aligner sur les mystères. De plus, ces éléments de doctrine trinitaire s'articulent toujours avec l'abaissement de Dieu dans l'incarnation, qu'elle en soit la révélation ou non, comme si l'une et l'autre constituaient indissociablement le noyau de la foi. L'association de la Trinité à la christologie et aux «mystères» est un reflet du symbole de la foi dans son contenu et dans sa relation avec l'acte rituel du baptême.

En complément, la prière inaugurale des *Soliloques* (I, I, 2-6) serait-elle modelée par une structure de foi trinitaire? On notera qu'elle s'adresse d'un bout à l'autre à Dieu, relayé par le titre de Père, employé avec insistance, à huit reprises, en son début, puis cinq fois dans la finale, sans associer les titres correspondants de Fils et d'Esprit. Si ces derniers emplois sont assortis d'une note plus intime et confiante (*clementissime Pater*; I, 5) en harmonie avec le ton de l'imploration (*fac me Pater; quaeso Pater; Pater sapientissime*; I, 6), les premières occurrences se situent dans l'orbite du «*Deus universitatis conditor*» (I, 2). Dieu s'affirme d'abord dans sa fonction de créateur qui se prolonge dans celle de géniteur des qualités transcendantes de sagesse, vie, béatitude...

La plupart de ces qualités seront ensuite reprises dans une structure ternaire: «*in quo, a quo, per quem*», de consonance trinitaire. La seconde moitié de I, 3 privilégiera la forme «*per quem*», tout en incluant, par dix fois, le nominatif «*qui*». Si des citations scripturaires y apparaissent pour la première foi, elles se rapportent aussi bien au Fils qu'à l'Esprit.

[78] On se rapportera au tableau des correspondances établi par A. Solignac dans B. A. nº 13,n. 25, p. 682-689.

[79] *C. Acad.* III, XIX, 42; *De ordine* II, V, 16; II, IX, 27. Le terme de triade est utilisé par pure commodité pour distinguer les modèles philosophique et biblique.

La prière se poursuit avec l'invocation de Dieu, vu dans sa fonction providentielle et judiciaire. S'il est au principe de toutes choses, il est également au terme, refermant ainsi le cycle de la création par un mouvement de conversion, qui s'ouvre sur une perspective de salut, dont le chemin (*viaticum*) est assuré par les trois vertus théologales. Le mystère trinitaire demeure implicite dans cette prière, qui comme celles des *Confessions*, s'adressent à Dieu[80].

Finalement, la question trinitaire, chez Augustin, n'est pas étrangère à la problématique plus large du lien de dépendance entre philosophie et foi. L'hypothèse de l'antériorité de la connaissance philosophique des «mystères» sera discutée par Augustin, plus enclin à partager l'idée communément reçue des emprunts qu'aurait faits la philosophie aux livres saints. Mais le recours à cet argument ne revient-il pas à anticiper de quelque vingt années la thèse ou l'hypothèse émise par le *De Civitate Dei* VIII, XI? En remontant le temps, l'allégorie de l'or pris aux Égyptiens, qui conclut précisément le bilan des *Confessions* VII, est d'une quinzaine d'années antérieur. Le développement du même thème dans le *De doctrina christiana* II, XL, 60, se référant aux conclusions d'Ambroise, permet de remonter en 396[81]. Sans pouvoir faire reculer, témoignages à l'appui, l'idée d'une dette de la philosophie envers la foi dès Cassiciacum, elle apparaît plus probable que le rapport inverse.

Si la Trinité émane de deux sources, la raison philosophique et l'autorité de la foi, il en est une qui se jette dans l'autre ou se trouve assimilée par elle; ainsi l'esquisse philosophique, encore confuse et viciée, trouvera ses traits précis et épurés grâce à l'autorité de la foi, inséparable de l'effet cathartique de l'incarnation. La raison ne se dissout pas dans l'autorité, mais l'autorité lui fournit son objet et en règle l'exercice.

[80] Si nous avons examiné l'éventuelle portée trinitaire de cette prière, c'est en raison de l'interprétation majorante d'O. du Roy qui veut y discerner trois couplets se rapportant respectivement au Père, au Fils et à l'Esprit. Il faudrait au moins expliquer pourquoi celui du Fils contient les trois prépositions (comme si la Ternité était dans le Fils et non le Fils dans la Trinité) et celui de l'Esprit des citations scripturaires qui ne le concernent pas; cf. op. cit. p. 196-206.

[81] Cf. *De doctr. christ.* I, 43; *Ep.* 31, 8. Des points de ressemblance entre les écrits philosophiques et bibliques ont soulevé la question de leur dépendance dans la polémique entre païens et chrétiens. Alors que le *De doct. christ.* II, 43 se réfère à des hypothèses comme la rencontre de Platon et de Jérémie en Égypte ou l'antériorité de la littérature juive sur Pythagore et Platon, son disciple, indirect, le *De Civ. Dei* VIII se montre plus soucieux d'exactitude chronologique et plus précis sur les points de contacts entre ces deux sources. La chronologie écarte une rencontre entre Jérémie et Platon de même que sa connaissance des LXX. Les points de convergence portent sur la création, l'immutabilité divine, l'identité du philosophe: celui qui aime Dieu. Voir G. Madec *Ambroise et la philosophie*, E. A., 1974, p. 249-256.

Laissons à Holte le soin de conclure: «Il est impossible qu'Augustin ait pensé que la philosophie, indépendamment de l'autorité, ait pu parvenir à cette doctrine[82].»

3) Trinité et incarnation

Les deux citations précédentes, empruntées au *De ordine* II, V, 16 et au *Contra Academicos* II, XIX, 42 qui ont servi de source pour l'établissement des rapports entre autorité et raison offrent une documentation non moins précieuse pour déterminer le rapport entre la Trinité et l'incarnation qui apparaissent comme deux termes organiquement liés, signe d'une convergence de point de vue.

La difficulté que rencontre une juste interprétation de ces textes vient de l'enchevêtrement de leurs thèmes qu'il incombe à l'analyse de dégager et d'ordonner; ainsi interfèrent philosophie et autorité, connaissance et salut, Trinité et incarnation. Le rôle imparti à la philosophie, dont la raison est l'instrument, est d'«enseigner» la structure ternaire du divin non à sa convenance mais selon la norme de la foi; autrement dit, son rôle est de conduire à l'intelligibilité de ce mystère ceux qui en ont les aptitudes. Nullement négligeable, cette finalité intellectuelle est toutefois dépendante d'un autre facteur: le mouvement d'abaissement de Dieu, inspiré par sa miséricorde, pour conduire les âmes engluées vers la patrie. Le paradoxe qui répugne à l'autosuffisance de la raison est que Dieu nous rejoigne sur le terrain dont certains esprits voudraient s'arracher par eux-mêmes.

La philosophie et la foi ne font pas figure de deux propositions indépendantes de nature optionnelle. La différence entre leur efficacité respective se mesure à la disproportion numérique de leurs bénéficiaires; alors que la philosophie trace un raidillon très sélectif, la foi s'ouvre comme une large avenue accessible au grand nombre. La raison de cette différence d'envergure réside précisément dans le rapport exactement inverse qu'elles entretiennent l'une et l'autre avec l'immédiateté de la réalité corporelle: alors que le mouvement ascendant de la méthode philosophique, cherchant à dépasser le monde du corps, est d'une exigence qui la restreint à une élite, dans le régime de la foi, le corps est au contraire assumé d'abord par Dieu pour être ensuite accueilli dans une attitude d'humilité, qui sera le repoussoir des esprits orgueilleux.

Ceci étant, il s'agit de savoir si l'anagogie est une voie de salut ou seulement de connaissance pour le petit nombre. La patrie est-elle

[82] Op. cit., p. 323.

l'objet d'un état extatique fulgurant ou le port définitif à gagner? La rétrospective des *Confessions* sur l'antériorité des lectures platoniciennes par rapport à la méditation des Écritures peut apporter un éclairage utile. En posant la différence radicale entre la présomption et la confession, Augustin distingue «ceux qui voient où il faut aller, sans voir par où» et «celui qui est la voie conduisant non seulement à la vision mais à l'habitation de la patrie bienheureuse.»[83] Ces distinctions claires marquent un net progrès par rapport au langage des Dialogues. La formule embryonnaire du *Contra Academicos* atteint toute sa force et sa précision: le but de l'incarnation est pour tous la vision permanente, c'est-à-dire l'habitation de la patrie.

En complément, un retour sur la finale du *De beata vita* trouve ici sa place, d'autant qu'elle ne reprend pas la terminologie trinitaire déjà rencontrée. Le *De ordine* introduisait la Trinité à partir du rôle de l'autorité ou de la raison, c'est-à-dire d'une instance externe à l'homme et d'une autre interne également transcendante mais qui se fait condescendante envers lui. Dans la conclusion du *De beata vita*, le terme d'autorité n'apparaît qu'une fois mais assorti d'un «etiam» qui suppose une autre notion, la sagesse qui remplace celle de raison; la vérité, qui lui est équivalente, se substitue à l'intelligence ou l'intellect et la mesure au principe sans principe.

Ce changement de registre lexical reproduit le type de rapport entre les divers termes ou hypostases tel qu'il ressortait du *De ordine*. La mesure qui ne se règle sur aucune autre qu'elle-même est l'équivalent du principe sans principe. Son essence transcendante se nierait si elle ne comprenait la vérité:

> *Il est nécessaire que la mesure souveraine soit une vraie mesure.*

Cette précision apparemment anodine est lourde de conséquence car elle habilite la mesure à engendrer la vérité, instaurant un rapport de réciprocité diversifiée entre ces deux termes actif et passif: à la génération la vérité répond par la connaissance de son origine dans la mesure:

> *De même que la vérité est engendrée par la mesure, la mesure est connue de la vérité. C'est pourquoi jamais la vérité ne fut sans mesure ni la mesure sans vérité*[84].

La diversité de leur rapport s'allie à leur éternelle coexistence; la mesure a comme propriété d'être inengendrée; à défaut du terme, une périphrase en tient lieu.

[83] *Confessions* VII, XX, 6.

[84] *De beata vita* 34. Pour une analyse technique et détaillée de tout ce passage et le repérage de ses sources nous renvoyons à l'étude d'O. du Roy, op. cit. p. 154-171.

L'Esprit apparaît sous sa fonction d'avertissement (*admonitio*); ce que corrobore son émanation[85] jusqu'à nous à partir de Dieu par la source de la vérité. Il est un éveilleur de la recherche et de la soif de Dieu, inassouvie dans notre condition itinérante tant que nous n'accédons pas à la connaissance parfaite qui se laisse façonner par les fonctions imparties à chaque hypostase pour répondre aux aspirations de l'homme:

> *Le rassasiement des âmes, voilà la vie bienheureuse: connaître dans la piété et la perfection qui nous introduit dans la vérité, de quelle vérité nous jouissons et qui nous relie à la mesure souveraine*[86].

Pour une intelligence éclairée, les trois acteurs ne forment qu'un seul Dieu, une seule substance. La signification trinitaire d'une telle logique, malgré la coloration fortement plotinienne de la nomenclature utilisée, ne fait aucun doute et suscite tout naturellement sa ressaisie sous forme de prière dans la bouche de Monique:

> *Fove praecantes, Trinitas.*

Ces trois mots d'une hymne ambrosienne couronnent un discours qui associe l'appareil conceptuel plotinien à une recherche de la sagesse et de la béatitude dont la plénitude s'atteint dans la jouissance de la Trinité chrétienne grâce aux vertus théologales, selon Monique:

> *voilà sans aucun doute la vie bienheureuse qui est la vie parfaite à laquelle il faut présumer que, si nous nous pressons, nous pourrons être conduits par une foi solide, une espérance vive, une ardente charité*[87].

Ce passage de la confession à l'invocation marque une nette prise de distance par rapport à la métaphysique platonicienne. O. du Roy convient que si Augustin «assimile les grandes orientations de la pensée plotinienne, il ne semble pas s'intéresser à en comprendre le détail. Il lit trop personnellement et avec un esprit trop original, trop actif pour ne pas assumer aussitôt dans une synthèse personnelle les concepts qu'il rencontre.» Il est obligé de transposer «une procession par subordination à une procession qui maintient la parfaite égalité des deux termes.»[88] Nul doute que la spéculation de Plotin passe par une sérieuse décantation dans un condensé de foi trinitaire qui se hâte de transcrire une terminologie philosophique. Sans sous-estimer les

[85] Cf. *De ordine* II, V, 16.
[86] *De beata vita* IV, 35.
[87] Ibid.
[88] O. du Roy, op. cit. p. 158.

emprunts que consentent les dialogues à la philosophie, on ne peut méconnaître leur originalité et leur indépendance, vu leur tour vivant et polyphonique, par rapport à des modèles livresques; ceci est particulièrement vrai du *De beata vita*.

B. De l'extase à la vision bienheureuse

Si, de l'aveu d'Augustin, le Christ exerce une fonction cathartique, celle-ci a-t-elle pour fin l'illumination des esprits capables d'y parvenir ou vise-t-elle un objectif plus large et décisif qui est le salut dans l'au-delà?

1) Le but de l'incarnation

L'examen de la corrélation entre l'autorité et la raison trouve son prolongement dans celui de leur efficacité libératrice ou salvifique. En termes plus précis, si au lendemain de sa conversion, Augustin reconnaissait à la raison philosophique la capacité d'un envol vers le divin, le rôle du Christ se réduirait-il à un recours par mode de suppléance pour le grand nombre?

A l'opposé du courant matérialiste (stoïcisme), la vraie philosophie crée les conditions nécessaires pour stimuler la démarche ascendante du retour en soi comme étape préalable mais indispensable à la contemplation de la patrie[89]. Il n'est pas de doute que cette méthode, dont Augustin tentera l'expérience, soit d'origine platonicienne[90], mais dans quelle mesure se montre-t-elle efficace?

> *Après bien des siècles et bien des débats s'est distillée, à mon avis, une discipline philosophique parfaitement vraie. Cette philosophie n'est pas celle de ce monde, que nos mystères abominent à très juste titre, mais celle du monde intelligible, auquel la subtilité de la raison n'aurait jamais ramené les âmes aveuglées par les ténèbres multiformes de l'erreur et enfouies sous l'énorme amas des souillures corporelles, si le Dieu souverain, animé de miséricorde pour son peuple, n'avait incliné et abaissé jusqu'au corps humain l'autorité de l'intellect divin, de sorte qu'incitées non seulement par ses préceptes, mais encore par ses œuvres, les âmes pussent, même sans dispute d'écoles, rentrer en elles-mêmes et regarder la patrie*[91].

[89] *C. Ac.* III, XIX, 42. Sur l'origine plotinienne de cette métaphore qu'Augustin aurait également pu entendre de la bouche d'Ambroise, voir la note érudite d'O. du Roy, op. cit. p. 96, n. 4.

[90] O. Du Roy, op. cit., p. 117, n. 2.

[91] *C. Acad.* III, XIX, 42.

Cette philosophie idéale, qui mérite le qualificatif de parfaitement vraie, résulte d'une (ré)conciliation entre Platon et Aristote; après des siècles de discussions, elle s'est affranchie des attaches terrestres pour s'orienter vers le monde intelligible par opposition au monde sensible. Quel est le sens proprement augustinien de ce concept de monde intelligible? Quand une quarantaine d'années plus tard, révisant le *De ordine*, Augustin retrouve cette notion, loin de la renier, il cherche à dépasser sa lettre étrangère à l'usage ecclésial, pour en privilégier le sens. Il l'identifie à «la raison éternelle et immuable par laquelle Dieu a créé le monde[92]»; elle s'identifie à son plan ordonnateur sur le monde qu'on est en droit d'identifier au Verbe divin en qui tout était vie[93]. Il ne se rétracte pas sur ce point qui cautionne l'authenticité de cette philosophie. Ce monde est certes connaissable, sinon comment la philosophie pourrait-elle s'y intéresser; mais est-il accessible à nos esprits? Par la condition posée (*nisi summus Deus... ad ipsum corpus declinaret*), la réponse ne peut être que négative. Si sa visée se veut salutaire, elle reste intentionnelle, et ne prend la forme d'une possibilité effective qu'en vertu de l'incarnation.

La finale de cette citation reprend les catégories propres à cette philosophie, à savoir une démarche ascendante: entrer en soi pour contempler la patrie. Mais il est clairement affirmé que l'échec était inévitable malgré les ressources les plus subtiles[94] de la raison à cause de son impuissance à ramener les âmes de leur égarement et à les dégager de leur enlisement dans la chair. La performance intellectuelle de la raison est neutralisée par son impuissance morale. Il fallait une démarche de sens inverse qui, partant des cimes du divin, s'abaissât non seulement au niveau de l'esprit mais encore du corps humain. Le langage philosophique se laisse ainsi pénétrer par la nouveauté chrétienne reconnue comme l'indispensable ferment d'une tentative qu'elle préserve de l'échec. En effet, malgré sa formulation laconique, l'économie chrétienne est nettement affirmée dans son principe: le Dieu souverain; dans son sujet: l'intellect divin; dans son effet: l'incarnation; dans sa finalité: servir d'exemple vivant qui trace aux âmes le chemin à suivre pour rejoindre la «patrie». L'absence du vocabulaire

[92] *Retract.* I, III, 2.

[93] Cf. *De Gen. ad lit.* I, XVIII, 36; V, XIV, 31; *Tract. In Joh.* I, 16-18; *De Trin.* IV, I, 3.

[94] Selon du Roy, cette raison comprendrait plusieurs niveaux: au-delà de la raison humaine, elle concernerait le *logos* qui, selon Plotin, devrait ramener les âmes à leur principe; mieux, elle désignerait une réalité divine; op. cit. p. 118. G. Madec y voit beaucoup plus simplement «l'exercice de la dialectique» cf. *Saint Augustin et la philosophie*, p. 20.

de péché et de salut est compensée par le langage imagé de souillure et de patrie. Mais quel sens convient-il de donner à l'expression «regarder la patrie»? La question est aussi délicate que cruciale.

Pour sobre que soit le dossier relatif à l'incarnation dans les premiers traités d'Augustin, celle-ci y est clairement établie comme l'indispensable relais d'une philosophie dont les ressources n'étant pas à la hauteur de ses ambitions ont besoin d'une suppléance. Ainsi dans le contexte d'un débat sur Dieu et l'ordre, le *De ordine* affirme encore le mystère de l'incarnation, conjointement à la Trinité, certes en termes trop sommaires[95] mais fermes, malgré quelque insuffisance ou quelque hésitation dans le maniement des points de vue de la nature et des personnes divines chez les deux disciples d'Augustin, Licentius et Trygetius:

> *Si donc Dieu nous a envoyé le Christ selon son ordre et si nous ne nions pas que le Christ est Dieu, non seulement Dieu régit tout mais il est régi selon l'ordre... Quand nous nommons Dieu, ce n'est pas le Christ qui vient à notre esprit mais le Père. Lui vient à notre esprit, quand nous nommons le Fils de Dieu. Nierons-nous donc que le Fils de Dieu soit Dieu?... Ce n'est pas improprement que le Fils est dit Dieu.*[96]

Si l'incarnation est essentielle au langage de la foi dans les Dialogues, sa finalité n'est pas aussi clairement explicitée. C'est la raison de bien des débats. La formule «regarder la patrie» est susceptible de prendre une signification extatique, sans quitter le programme plotinien. Vu la difficulté à gravir ce sommet, l'intellect divin se serait incarné pour soutenir les esprits dans cette ascension épuisante. Le terme de cette logique reviendrait à conformer la personne du Christ à celle d'un sage venu doper les esprits, surtout la masse, pour lui faire franchir le seuil de l'inaccessible et la conduire au terme où la raison élève l'élite[97]. Le fruit de l'économie chrétienne passerait bien vite, s'il devait se réduire à une lueur fugitive, sans portée eschatologique.

Si le propos des Dialogues demeure à cet égard embryonnaire, il ne reste plus qu'à faire quelques pas avec Augustin pour voir en quel sens se développera cet embryon

2) Contemplation ou salut?

Les textes recueillis dans le *Contra Academicos* III, XIX, 42 et le *De ordine* II, V, 16 attribuent à l'incarnation une visée de sens

[95] N'apparaît pas la mention de l'Esprit, ce qui ne signifie pas qu'il soit ignoré.
[96] *De ordine* I, X, 29.
[97] Telle est l'interprétation d'O. du Roy, que nous ne croyons pas trahir; cf. op. cit. p. 118-119. On est proche du «Platon des foules» d'Alfaric.

contemplatif. Est-elle également perçue comme moyen de salut? Quelle est la véritable portée de l'aspiration de l'âme vers la patrie? Quelle est la validité qu'Augustin maintient à la philosophie, même au bénéfice restreint d'une élite?

Si le christianisme intervient comme moyen de suppléance à la disposition du grand nombre, il n'est plus la voie mais une voie de salut. En d'autres termes, l'incarnation jouerait, mutatis mutandis, un rôle comparable à celui de la théurgie par rapport à la philosophie, Porphyre complétant Plotin au service des foules?[98] Faudrait-il supposer une double conversion d'Augustin à la foi chrétienne, passant du Christ comme une voie au Christ comme seule voie d'accès à la patrie? Il est certain que la distance est grande entre son imprécision des débuts et la rigueur qu'il adoptera par la suite. Son évolution sur ce sujet est indéniable.

Pour pénétrer l'intelligence augustinienne de l'échelle de l'âme la référence obligée est le *De quantitate animae* XXXIII, 70-76 qui la partage en sept degrés[99]. Le propos a pour centre le rapport unificateur et vivificateur de l'âme sur le corps et de Dieu sur l'âme en qui elle trouve son havre de bonheur. Suivant un mouvement graduel, l'âme est envisagée dans son action sur les sens, puis en son retour sur elle avec le travail de la mémoire; mais c'est la pratique de la vertu qui la conduit à se préférer au corps et aux sens au point de défier la mort[100]. Cette montée a pour condition l'ascèse, soutenue par le «secours du Dieu véritable et souverain»[101], qui prend forme d'imploration avec le *ps* 52, 12; ainsi s'amorce une théologie de la grâce. Ce détachement permet à l'âme de trouver en elle le bonheur, non dans le repli sur soi, mais en courant vers Dieu, vers «la contemplation de la vérité même», au prix d'une purification persévérante. Alors elle atteint sa vraie demeure, faite de la jouissance du souverain Bien, qui s'identifie au Créateur de toutes choses, en qui elle rejoint son propre principe.

[98] *De Civ. Dei* IX, XXIII-XXXI; avec cette réserve que la théurgie serait sans effet sur l'âme intellectuelle.

[99] Ce traité fut écrit après le retour d'Augustin à Rome, probablement en 388. Nous ne reprenons pas une analyse détaillée de cet ensemble et de ses sources déjà réalisée par O. du Roy, op. cit. p. 256-267.

[100] Cf *De quantitate animae* XXVIII, 54. «L'âme de l'homme se soustrait au corps autant qu'elle en est capable par la raison et par la science, dont il est question, en raison de leur grande supériorité sur les sens; elle goûte mieux les jouissances intérieures; mais plus elle s'abaisse vers les sens, plus aussi elle rend l'homme semblable à la bête.» Le défi à la mort est un thème du *De bono mortis* d'Ambroise dont les emprunts à *Ennéade* I ont été relevés par Courcelle, op. cit. p. 118-119; mais ce traité fait de deux homélies serait de 390 donc postérieur au *De quantitate animae*. Cette attitide de bravoure face à la mort est aussi un topos des récits de martyre.

[101] *De quantitate animae* XXXIII, 73.

Ainsi récapitulée, cette ascension culmine dans un état extatique que seul le langage métaphorique est en mesure de suggérer. Augustin demeure le chantre de l'état contemplatif, mais qu'il ne conçoit ni sans une profonde purification ni sans l'aide de Dieu. Cet état fait éclater la disproportion entre les biens éternels et les vanités de ce monde. Mais quelle est la nature exacte de cette contemplation? Relève-t-elle du ravissement ou du salut final? La cime qu'atteint l'âme en Dieu s'identifierait-elle à l'état de béatitude définitive ou à l'éblouissement fulgurant mais instantané de l'expérience milanaise ou d'Ostie selon les *Confessions*? Ces deux formes se distinguent mal, puisque de grandes âmes qui ont parlé de ce bonheur ne pouvaient en témoigner sans en avoir fait l'expérience et que, par ailleurs, la poursuite de cette course[102] conduisant au Dieu souverain prend une saveur eschatologique. Déjà le *Contra Academicos* I, VIII, 23 établissait un lien de continuité entre la recherche de la sagesse, source du bonheur, et le dernier jour:

> *Il trouvera (le sage) prêt à entrer en possession de ce qu'il a désiré et à jouir, à bon droit, de la béatitude après avoir joui auparavant du bonheur humain.*

Que la mort ait pour effet la pleine réunion de l'âme à Dieu est clairement affirmé par les *Soliloques* en référence implicite de I *Co* 13, 13; c'est également la promesse d'une vie bienheureuse qui met le point final à ce dialogue[103].

Le *De quantitate animae* réaffirme ce passage de l'avant-goût du bonheur à sa réalisation:

> *Voilà ce que j'ose maintenant te dire: si nous tenons avec une parfaite constance la course que Dieu nous commande et que nous avons entreprise, nous parviendrons par la force et la sagesse de Dieu, à la cause souveraine ou à l'auteur souverain ou au principe souverain de toutes choses, à moins qu'il soit possible de nommer de manière plus adéquate un Être d'une telle importance; une fois que nous l'aurons compris, nous nous rendrons vraiment compte que sous le soleil tout est vanité des vanités (Eccl* 1, 1)[104].

Qu'elle soit de nature extatique ou eschatologique, l'assouvissement des aspirations de l'âme éclaire le langage ambivalent d'Augustin au sujet de deux états aussi difficiles à distinguer que les représentations

[102] Ces grandes âmes pourraient être Plotin et, dans une moindre mesure, Porphyre. L'image de la course semble bien inspirée par Paul; cf. I *Co* 9, 24, 26; *Ga* 2, 2; 5, 7; *Ph* 2, 16.

[103] Voir *Soliloques* I, VII, 14; II, 36.

[104] *De quantitate animae* XXXIII, 76.

picturales de la transfiguration et de la résurrection. Mais le dernier mot d'Augustin n'est pas encore dit.

L'extrait du *De ordine* II, V, 15 relie son évocation de la Trinité en langage platonicien au salut sans expliciter le sens de ce terme d'emploi fort rare dans les Dialogues[105]. Son propos laconique est encore à éclairer par un bref exposé du *De quantitate animae* qui complète et prolonge la hiérarchie des sept degrés de l'échelle intérieure. L'orientation eschatologique de cet aboutissement ne fait plus de doute car elle est consacrée au corps. En se détachant de lui, la montée de l'âme risquait de rallier une conception platonicienne qui est ici corrigée par les retrouvailles du corps grâce à la résurrection, mentionnée pour la première fois par Augustin. Cette note pascale concerne d'abord la résurrection finale de l'humanité, implicitement comprise dans les attributs du Christ «modèle et de prémices de notre salut»[106].

Ces deux vérités, incarnation et résurrection, réhabilitent le corps, objet de dérision dans le courant platonicien, et tracent la ligne de séparation entre lui et la foi. Cette revalorisation est à éclairer par les remarques antérieures sur la «formatio» et la «reformatio»[107] de l'image que nous sommes; ce sont les deux termes d'un mouvement parabolique qui va de la création à la chute et à la recréation dans le Christ, prémices de la moisson future. Alors se réalise la contemplation d'une vérité à peine pressentie ici-bas au point de rendre la mort désirable pour en hâter l'échéance. Le sens eschatologique de cet aboutissement ne laisse plus subsister aucun doute.

Tandis que les Dialogues contiennent une formulation du mystère trinitaire que facilitait le langage platonicien, celle du salut demeure beaucoup plus discrète et se dégage avec peine d'une expérience mystique qui renvoie aux tentatives milanaises et surtout à la vision d'Ostie. Or, cette dernière expérience, qui précéda de peu le décès de Monique, est discrètement mais nettement reliée à la béatitude finale. Alors que l'âme quitte la région de dissemblance pour gagner celle d'une inépuisable abondance, elle éprouve un avant-goût «de ce que serait la vie éternelle des saints»[108]:

> *la vie éternelle est telle que fut cet instant d'intelligence après lequel nous soupirons, n'est-ce pas ce que signifie: 'entre dans la joie de ton Seigneur'(Mt* 25, 21)[109].

[105] Il ne se rencontre que dans le *De quantitate animae* VII, 12; XXXIII, 76 et les *Soliloques* I, I, 4.
[106] Ibid. XXXIII, 76.
[107] Voir du Roy, op. cit. p. 266-267.
[108] *Confessions* IX, X, 23.
[109] Ibid., 25. Voir P. COURCELLE op. cit. p. 224-226.

Un précieux indice est ainsi postérieurement apporté du lien qu'Augustin entendait établir, même s'il l'a formulé beaucoup plus tardivement, entre une expérience intérieure et la vie éternelle dont elle offre l'exemple le plus approchant[110].

3) Une pensée en développement

L'appréciation d'une pensée suppose d'abord qu'on ne se trompe pas de genre littéraire. Ces Dialogues ne sont pas des traités de théologie. Ils visent un but pédagogique dont les règles demandent l'adaptation du propos aux besoins et au niveau des disciples qui accompagnent le maître dans sa retraite, lui aussi à la recherche du vrai en dialoguant avec lui-même et avec l'aide de Dieu[111]. Alors que, dans les dialogues réels, le débat philosophique débouche sur l'évocation de la Trinité, ce dialogue tout intérieur s'ouvre par une longue prière à Dieu qui prélude à une quête philosophique. La note chrétienne, mais timidement trinitaire[112], est donnée au départ et non au terme.

Bien des vérités qui seront au cœur de l'enseignement d'Augustin pasteur y sont déjà en germe. Si l'on supposait une maîtrise de l'homme sur la voie qui donne accès à la vision, la prière des *Soliloques* I, I, 3 suffirait à détromper avec son hymne de louange et d'action de grâce à Dieu pour ses bienfaits, en particulier la conversion, l'exaucement, le pain de vie. Le même ouvrage précise, par mode d'analogie, le rôle de la raison: elle est à l'esprit ce que le regard est à l'œil; mais regarder n'est pas synonyme de voir. Ce but ne se laisse atteindre que par un œil sain, c'est-à-dire purifié, qualité qui suppose la foi, inséparable de l'espérance et de la charité:

> *sans ces trois vertus, aucune âme ne parvient à une guérison qui lui permette de voir son Dieu, c'est-à-dire de le comprendre*[113].

Ainsi la vie chrétienne féconde la raison. Un peu plus loin, de façon similaire au *De ordine* II, V, 16, le même traité affirme: «on atteint la sagesse par plus d'une voie»[114]. La question essentielle porte

[110] Qu'il soit bien entendu que nous entrons pas ici dans les problèmes complexes que soulève la mystique chez Augustin; pour une présentation synthétique on consultera *Encyclopédie Saint Augustin* art. «Mystique», p. 986-991.

[111] *Soliloques* II, 14.

[112] On y relève une seule esquisse trinitaire, à savoir l'unité entre l'engendrant et l'engendré I, 4. A partir du n° 5, l'interpellation se fait plus intime, passant du nom de Dieu à celui de Père.

[113] Ibid., I, VI, 12.

[114] Ibid. I, XIII, 23.

sur le sens de cette image. Le contexte ne plaide pas pour une dualité de moyens entre philosophie et foi mais pour une adaptation en fonction des capacités de chacun, dont la saisie de la lumière physique sert de comparaison. S'il est de yeux assez vigoureux pour se tourner vers le soleil, il en est d'autres qui n'en supportent pas l'éclat et qui nécessitent une pédagogie appropriée pour s'accoutumer à la sagesse dans le renoncement aux biens terrestres. Qui en est chargé?

> *La Beauté sait quand elle doit se montrer, car elle accomplit la tâche du médecin*[115].

L'initiative est d'origine transcendante, esquissant la doctrine du don gratuit de la grâce. Le médecin, qui sera l'un des titres privilégiés qu'Augustin réservera au Christ, prend-il déjà cette signification? Le contexte ne permet ni de l'assurer ni de l'exclure.

La question de la vision de Dieu posée à partir de l'expérience platonicienne se distingue encore mal de la vision béatifique, en raison de leur proximité. En confrontant la perspective des Dialogues avec celle qu'adoptera plus tard Augustin soit dans la lettre 147 ou dans le *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, chronologiquement proches, on mesure l'évolution de sa pensée[116]. On ne peut demeurer insensible au glissement considérable de sa réflexion qui, délaissant les tentatives platoniciennes, s'appuie désormais résolument sur l'autorité de l'Écriture et sur des exemples bibliques: Moïse et surtout Paul. A l'anagogie platonicienne se substitue l'expérience biblique de la vision de Dieu ou des théophanies par des hommes vivants, c'est-à-dire radicalement dépendante de son bon vouloir, selon cette sentence de la lettre 147, 37:

> *Si vous demandez comment on dit que Dieu est invisible, puisqu'on peut le voir, je réponds qu'il est invisible par sa nature, mais qu'on peut le voir quand il veut et comme il veut, car il a été vu de plusieurs, non tel qu'il est, mais sous la forme qu'il lui a plu de choisir.*

Bien que le préalable à cette vision, encore médiate, à travers les formes voulues par Dieu, ne soit pas la mort, il requiert un détachement des sens tel que Paul ne savait plus s'il lui fut donné de goûter la vision éternelle avec ou sans son corps (2 *Co* 12, 2-3)[117].

[115] Ibid. I, XIV, 25.

[116] Voir Marie-Anne VANNIER «Augustin et la relecture de l'*In Lucam* d'Ambroise dans les *lettres* 147 et 148.», in *Connaissance des Pères de l'Église*, n° 103, 2006, p. 53-58.

[117] Ibid. 55-56.

Enfin le lien entre la vision et la résurrection s'affermit[118]. La vie bienheureuse promise aux cœurs purs «assurera le repos, l'ineffable vision de la vérité»[119], non plus en énigme mais en face. Augustin postule une différence d'intensité entre la félicité et la paix de l'âme qui, même séparée de son corps, continue à en subir un certain attrait, et l'état final de la résurrection, consécutive à la spiritualisation et à la soumission totale du corps[120]. Les *Retractationes* I, II; IV, 2 relèveront l'ambiguïté qui touche la connaissance parfaite de Dieu pour la renvoyer dans l'état eschatologique.

Finalement, la confession de foi des Dialogues est celle de l'incarnation illuminatrice, libératrice, salutaire. En elle se concrétise l'aide divine indispensable à la contemplation et au salut dans la résurrection. Mais le passage de l'incarnation à la résurrection du Christ, à savoir la croix, n'apparaît pas[121]. Cette absence s'accorde avec la continuité entre sagesse païenne et Sagesse chrétienne, que ne viennent rompre ni la dialectique paulinienne sur la sagesse humaine et la folie de la croix (I *Co* 1, 22-31) ni l'accusation d'une détention de la vérité dans l'iniquité (*Ro* 1, 18). Il faudra attendre le *De Genesi contra manicheos* pour voir apparaître une mention formelle de la croix et de la crucifixion[122], un ouvrage polémique dont l'enjeu est théologique. Augustin se reprochera aussi un manque de netteté au sujet du Christ unique voie du salut[123].

* *
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Au terme de cet examen, l'antériorité et donc l'indépendance de la connaissance de la Trinité, chez Augustin, par rapport à sa découverte de l'incarnation demeure problématique, tandis qu'est assurée la convertibilité d'intuitions platoniciennes en convictions chrétiennes. Ce fait peut avoir l'effet d'un mirage, mais il s'agit de savoir si les pressentiments d'un Plotin sont à la hauteur du mystère trinitaire ou

[118] Cf. *Ep.* 147, 18; 22; 27; 49.

[119] *De Gen. ad lit.* XII, XXVI, 54.

[120] Ibid. XII, XXXII, 60. La note 52, 5 c de la B. A. 49, p. 584 relève l'insuffisance de cette explication. Mais est-il possible de faire beaucoup mieux? Si la félicité de l'âme est totale, à quoi bon la résurrection des corps? Voir les précisions de E. Lamirande *L'Église céleste selon Saint Augustin*, E. A. 1963, p. 215-224.

[121] Le péché, inconnu de Plotin n'est mentionné que sous forme de souillure, mais s'agit-il d'une souillure morale ou charnelle?

[122] Cf. XX, 31; XXII, 34. Du Roy note également le retard de l'apparition du thème de la création; op. cit. p. 183-184.

[123] *Retract.* I, IV, 3.

s'ils sont susceptibles d'en subir l'attraction au point de s'y laisser intégrer. Leur lecture en fonction et à la lumière de leur accomplissement par la foi ne devrait pas plus surprendre, nous l'avons déjà noté, que la méthode d'interprétation chrétienne des figures et énigmes de l'Ancien Testament. Le langage que tient Augustin sur le salut, dont l'illumination donne un avant-goût, repose essentiellement sur l'effet purificateur de l'incarnation, indépendamment de la croix salutaire. Aussi la sagesse se trouve-t-elle transposable en Sagesse divine sans passer par la dialectique de la sagesse humaine et la folie divine, solidaire de la croix thème qu'Augustin, pasteur, aura à cœur de valoriser ultérieurement.

Les premiers pas d'un converti de fraîche date et dont la conversion est d'abord intellectuelle sont naturellement plus attirés par l'idéal, certes exigeant, de connaissance de la vérité et d'illumination, dont le Christ est garant, que par la croix rédemptrice de l'unique médiateur. Les *Soliloques* dissipent l'éventuel malentendu qui pouvait découler des autres dialogues sur l'inspiration proprement chrétienne de la vision de Dieu en la subordonnant aux vertus théologales. Il leur revient d'établir en nous l'indispensable connaturalité avec Dieu pour faire l'expérience de sa présence. Le terme à atteindre paraît plus séduisant que ce chemin, si déconcertant, à emprunter, alors qu'ultérieurement cet ordre de priorité s'inversera[124].

La pensée d'Augustin n'est pas réductible à ses formes débutantes, car elle se précise et s'affermit au rythme de son évolution personnelle, c'est-à-dire de sa prise de conscience de la radicalité de l'économie chrétienne. La sympathie, certes critique[125], qu'il gardera envers la philosophie grecque contraste avec sa répulsion instinctive pour les cultes païens. Il est vrai que l'activité de l'esprit sous le contrôle de la raison n'a pas grand rapport avec des croyances mythiques qui prennent corps dans des rites et des actes cultuels. L'espace de la réflexion philosophique n'est pas celui des temples. La connaissance qu'il acquiert de ces deux domaines lui vient de la même source livresque: Varron[126]. Il lui doit une classification des formes de la religion romaine, et à travers Cicéron[127], celle de la tradition philosophique grecque. Confronté avec la sagesse et la religion, en leur origine profane ou païenne, il leur réserva un traitement des plus contrastés.

[124] *Tract. in Jn* II, 2-3.
[125] Cf. *De Civ. Dei* VIII, XIIIss.
[126] Cf. *De Civ. Dei* X, V.
[127] Dans les *Secondes Académiques*, qui relate un entretien entre Varron et Cicéron, celui-ci esquisse l'histoire de la philosophie depuis Socrate jusqu'à son époque; cf. *De Civ. Dei* X, II.

Augustin, né d'une mère chrétienne, état d'un tempérament trop intellectuel, d'une trop haute culture, pour se laisser attirer par des formes religieuses dont les pratiques cultuelles l'eussent amené à fréquenter les temples. Ses sympathies manichéennes n'étaient pas désintéressées et répondaient provisoirement à son inquiétude sur la question du mal. Il s'est plutôt laissé tenter par l'astrologie, se donnant bonne conscience parce que les astrologues s'abstenaient de pratiques sacrificielles, allant jusqu'à se compromettre avec l'usage de cet art[128]. On constate ainsi une disparité flagrante entre l'attrait d'Augustin pour la philosophie, sous l'effet stimulant des questions morales ou métaphysiques qui l'obsédaient, et une nette réserve, si ce n'est une aversion envers des pratiques inévitablement marquées par la superstition païenne.

Les tableaux de la philosophie et de la religion se ressemblent, au moins dans leur structure, adoptant une même division tripartite: la physique, l'éthique et la logique, pour l'une et la religion naturelle, civile et mythique, œuvre des poètes, pour l'autre. Ces deux dernières sont réductibles, tant cette distinction est artificielle et leurs divinités également corrompues. Une religion polythéiste et idolâtre ne peut qu'attiser le rejet d'Augustin, entériné par le jugement de Paul en *Ro* 1,20-23[129]. Augustin est le héraut de l'originalité et de l'indépendance de la foi, vis-à-vis de la philosophie dont l'excellence a pour mesure son accord avec la foi qui sert de critère déterminant. Finalement la discrimination ne joue pas tant entre raison et religion qu'envers une sagesse qui aspire au Dieu unique mais qui sera objet de réprobation tout autant que la religion dans la mesure où elle s'égare dans la dérive polythéiste[130].

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[128] *Conf.* IV, III, 4; VII, VI, 8.
[129] Cf. *De Civ. Dei* VIII, X, 1.
[130] Ibid. VIII, XIV

„PETRUS A PETRA, PETRA VERO ECCLESIA“ MT 16, 18 BEI AUGUSTINUS

Wenn man in Rom das Hauptschiff des Petersdoms durchquert, dann befindet sich hinter dem Hauptaltar die Cathedra Petri, die von vier Kirchenvätern gestützt wird: den Bischöfen Augustinus und Ambrosius, sowie den Gelehrten Athanasius und Johannes Chrysostomus. Wenn man aber diese vier Personen als Stütze des päpstlichen Stuhles sehen will, dann ist es unumgänglich, ihre Einstellung zum Papst ihrer Zeit zu untersuchen.

In die Einstellung Augustins soll dieser Artikel Einblick gewähren. Aus der Fülle seiner vielen Schriften sollen die Zitate jener Bibelstelle herausgefiltert werden, die für das Papsttum schon immer von Bedeutung waren, und die in großen Lettern die Kuppel des Petersdomes zieren: TU ES PETRUS ET SUPER HANC PETRAM AEDIFICABO ECCLESIAM MEAM.

Schon seit der Frühzeit der Kirche gab es eine besondere Verehrung für den Apostel Petrus in Rom. Auch wenn gesicherte historische Belege für einen Romaufenthalt des Petrus fehlen, so gilt es dennoch als unbestritten, dass er das Martyrium in Rom erlitten hat. Zu deutlich sind die Belege, in denen Petrus in Rom verankert wird. Zudem ist auffällig, dass sich in der Frühzeit der Kirche keine andere Stadt rühmt, das Grab des Apostels zu besitzen. Mit Sicherheit war er nicht der erste Bischof von Rom oder gar der erste Papst, als welcher er heute bezeichnet wird, da sich diese Auffassung mit den kollegialen Leitungsstrukturen am Anfang nicht vereinbaren lässt.

Schemenhaft taucht Mt 16, 18 erstmals in Zusammenhang mit dem römischen Bischof bei Bischof Viktor I. auf, der von 189 – 199 der Leiter der römischen Gemeinde war. Im sogenannten „Osterfeststreit“ versuchte er, sich mit seinem Termin gegen die kleinasiatischen Gemeinden, die die quartadezimanische Praxis einhielten, durchzusetzen. Eusebius von Cäsarea überliefert nun in seiner „Historia ecclesiastica“ einen Brief von Viktors Gegenspieler Polykrates. Anhand dieser Textstelle lässt sich nun annehmen, dass Viktor in seinem nicht mehr erhaltenen Brief mit der apostolischen Gründung seines Bischofssitzes argumentiert hat und vielleicht – aber nur vielleicht – zu diesem Zweck schon das Zitat Mt 16, 18 verwendet hat: Er ist der Nachfolger dessen, der von Christus zum Felsen der Kirche gemacht wurde. „Es gelingt Rom jedoch nicht, gegen die andersartige Auffassung und Praxis eines erheblichen Teiles der Kirche seine

Position durchzusetzen."[1] Zum ersten Mal belegt ist schließlich der Hinweis auf Mt 16, 18 bei Stephan I. von Rom (254-256). Er verwendet dieses Zitat gegen Cyprian, um seine Autorität auf die Hl. Schrift zu stützen.

1. Tertullian und Mt 16, 18

Petrus genießt bei Tertullian großes Ansehen. Er ist das Beispiel (*exemplum*) schlechthin, sowohl in der katholischen, als auch in der montanistischen Phase Tertullians. In der katholischen Sichtweise ist er der Träger der universalen Wahrheit (*praescr. haer.* = CSEL 70, 26f.), in der montanistischen Zeit wird er zum geistbegabten Menschen (*homo spiritalis*) schlechthin erhoben (*pud.; scorp.* = CChr.SL. 2, 1088.1325.1327). Petrus besitzt für Tertullian auch deshalb eine herausragende Stellung, weil er eine dreifache Funktion ausübt: Als Schlüsselträger, Fundament und Inhaber der Binde- und Lösegewalt. Diese Begriffe fallen bei Tertullian oft mit der Erwähnung des Petrus zusammen. Und auch für das „Elite-Bewusstsein" der Montanisten ist diese Linie von gewissem Nutzen. Haendler bringt dies zum Ausdruck: „Petrus ist der Stammvater der Pneumatiker, der überlegenen Theologen, der mutigen Bekenner, der sittlich Strengen, die eine zweite Ehe ablehnen. Unbestreitbar ist, dass dieses Petrusbild höchst einseitig gezeichnet ist; deutlich tritt dies heraus, dass Tertullian an Petrus gerade die Züge betont, die wir auch in Tertullians Charakter finden."[2]

Doch der Primat unter den anderen Aposteln, den Tertullian zweifellos dem Petrus zuerkennt, wird nicht übertragen auf einen Primat des römischen Bischofs. Mit Sicherheit kannte Tertullian die herausragende Stellung Roms, war sie doch die apostolische Gründung, die Nordafrika am nächsten lag, aber er versäumte es dennoch nie, die Gleichrangigkeit mit den anderen Gemeinden apostolischer Gründung zu betonen. Dies zeigt er eindeutig in *praescr. haer.* 36, 1-4. Zwar ist hier ausführlich von Rom die Rede, das überaus lobend erwähnt wird, aber es besteht kein Zweifel, dass die kleinasiatischen Kirchen – nämlich Korinth, Philippi und Ephesus – sich ebenso auf die apostolische Gründung berufen können. Und noch etwas fällt auf: Nicht Petrus macht die Besonderheit Roms aus, sondern Petrus, Paulus und Johannes! „Nicht der eine Petrus, sondern die drei Apostel begründen die

[1] Schatz, K., Der päpstliche Primat. Seine Geschichte von den Ursprüngen bis zur Gegenwart. Würzburg 1990, S. 24. Gemeint sind der Osterfeststreit sowie der Ketzertaufstreit.

[2] Haendler, Die drei großen nordafrikanischen Kirchenväter über Mt. 16,18-19. In: ThLZ 81 (1956), S. 363.

besondere Apostolizität Roms.“[3] Die Nähe Karthagos zu Rom spielt hierbei auch keine unwesentliche Rolle. Hier greift aber zu Recht die Hypothese von Farmer-Kereszty, die das atl. Dreizeugenrecht einbringen. Ekklesiologisch steht Tertullian in der paulinischen Tradition. Er sieht die Kirche als Leib, deren Haupt Christus ist. Deshalb ist für ihn die Vorstellung fremd, dass sich eine Gemeinde zum Haupt über die anderen macht, sondern als Gemeinschaft zusammen bilden die vielen Gemeinden eine Kirche.

2. Cyprian von Karthago und Mt 16, 18.

Welche Einstellung zum römischen Primat lässt sich aus Cyprians schriftlicher Theorie einerseits und seiner Praxis – sichtbar am Verhalten im Ketzertaufstreit – andererseits ablesen?

Er geht zunächst von einer herausragenden Stellung jedes einzelnen Bischofs aus. Die Einheit mit der Kirche bedeutet sich an den jeweiligen Ortsbischof zu halten. Wer sich nicht an seinen Ortsbischof anschließt, exkommuniziert sich somit aus der Kirche.

Die Ortsbischöfe bilden wiederum eine Gemeinschaft, in der sie durch Übereinstimmung in Glaubensfragen die Einheit der Kirche bewahren. Petrus spielt für diese Gemeinschaft insofern eine Rolle, als dass er der eine ist, der von Christus *zuerst* die Binde- und Lösegewalt übertragen bekommen hat, damit „die Kirche nach seinem [= Christi] Willen eine sein und bleiben soll.“[4] Mt 16, 18 ist für Cyprian eine Hervorhebung des Petrus mit späterer Wirkung für alle Bischöfe, aber nicht eine Hervorhebung des römischen Bischofs: „Durch die zuerst dem Petrus verliehene Regierungsgewalt in der Kirche (Mt. 16, 18) wurde der Apostel nicht bloß Symbol oder Typus der Einheit, sondern auch und in erster Linie Realgrund der Einheit, die durch ihn und von ihm her innerlich begründet wird. Die Bestallung Petri ist nämlich auch Rechtsgrund für jede bischöfliche Gewalt, d.h. jeder Bischof steht in realem, direktem Zusammenhang mit Petrus.“[5] Einen Jurisdiktionsprimat des römischen Bischofs hält Cyprian somit für unvereinbar mit seiner Lehre. Deutlich macht er dies in seiner Fassung A von de eccl. unit. 4: Was Petrus war, waren auch die anderen Apostel, und ebenso ist auch der römische Bischof das, was die anderen Bischöfe sind. Zwar besitzt er als Nachfolger des Petrus den *primatus*, aber es

[3] Adam, Der Kirchenbegriff Tertullians, Paderborn 1907, S. 46.

[4] Altaner, B. – Stuiber, A., Patrologie. Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter. Freiburg [8]1978. S. 178.

[5] A.a.O., S. 179.

handelt sich lediglich um einen Ehrenvorrang als *primus inter pares*. Und in ep. 59,14 (= CSEL 3/2, 683) betont er zwar ausdrücklich, dass in Rom die *cathedra Petri* und *ecclesia principalis* ist, dass aber von dort aus dann die *unitas sacerdotalis* ausgegangen ist. Klausnitzer führt über die Einstellung Cyprians zum römischen Bischof an: „In der Sicht Cyprians ist der Bischof von Rom als *Bischof* dieser Stadt Sprachrohr des Glaubens der (Gesamt-)Kirche, in derselben Weise, wie der Bischof von Karthago als *Bischof* seiner Gemeinde der authentische Sprecher des Glaubens der (Gesamt-)Kirche ist."[6] Allerdings fehlt es auch nicht an Stimmen, die hier durchaus eine Anerkennung des römischen Primats sehen. Marschall trifft die Einstellung Cyprians exakt, wobei er sie richtigerweise in Kontinuität zur ganzen nordafrikanischen Kirche setzt: „Cyprians Gesamthaltung ist nicht klar, wie auch die Haltung der gesamten afrikanischen Tradition schwankend und unausgereift ist."[7]

I. Mt 16, 18 bei Augustinus von Hippo: Die Auswertung der entscheidenden Stellen

Das CAG[8] filtert aus den Werken Augustins 26 Belege heraus, die nun im Folgenden dargestellt werden. Drei weitere Belege finden sich noch im Stellenverzeichnis des Aufsatzes von Anne-Marie la Bonnardière[9]. Es handelt sich hierbei um die Stellen Io. eu. tr. 11, 5, Io. eu. tr. 7, 14 und s. 183, 14. Es würde allerdings zu weit führen, alle Stellen einzeln aufzuführen. Deshalb soll hier nur aus den zusammengestellten Gruppen nur eine Auswahl getroffen werden.

1. Allgemeine exegetische Aussagen

An einigen Stellen lässt sich erkennen, dass Augustinus Mt 16, 18 zwar des Öfteren in seine Texte eingefügt hat, aber scheinbar keinen tieferen Sinn dahinter erkennen lässt bzw. an den Stellen aus rein exegetischer Sichtweise interessiert ist. Diese Stellen sind daher für den eigentlichen Zweck dieser Darstellung wenig ergiebig, sollen aber

[6] Klausnitzer, W., Der Primat des Bischofs von Rom. Entwicklung – Dogma – Ökumenische Zukunft, Freiburg u.a. 2004, S. 172.

[7] Marschall, W., Karthago und Rom (Päpste und Papsttum, Bd 1), Stuttgart 1971, S. 38.

[8] Hrsg. von Cornelius Mayer.

[9] La Bonnardière, A.-M., Tu es Petrus. La péricope Matthieu 16, 13-23 dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin. In: Irén 34 (1961), 458-463.

auch nicht ganz fallengelassen werden, sondern der Vollständigkeit wegen genannt werden: Cons. ev. 2, 34. 109; Qu. 2, 154; c. litt. Pet. 2, 247, cath. fr. 60f., s. 358, 5 und En. Ps, 60, 3

Anhand dieser Textzeugnisse Augustins konnten wir sehen, wie er sich in – zum Teil in Zusammenhang mit Mt 7, 24-27 – zu Mt 16, 18 äußert. Er verwendet dieses Zitat allerdings recht vage und zweideutig in seiner Polemik gegen die Donatisten. Problematisch ist dabei vor allem seine Zuordnung zur Kirche. Die Kirche ist die, die auf Fels erbaut ist. Wer aber gehört zu dieser Kirche? Und wer sind die, die auf Fels gebaut haben? Die logische Antwort wäre: die Katholiken, aber Augustinus umreißt diese Aussage immer nur durch Schriftzitate. Außerdem stellt sich die Frage, wer der Fels ist. In *en. ps.* 60, 3 und *s.* 358, 5 stellt Augustinus durch Verwendung von 1 Kor 10, 4 klar, dass Christus der Fels ist. Bei den anderen Belegen bleibt es jedoch im Dunkeln.

2. *Die Selbstkorrektur des Augustinus – retractationes 1, 21, 1 (= CChr.SL. 57, 62)*

Chronologisch ist dieses Werk des Augustinus am Ende seines Lebens anzusiedeln, doch für den weiteren Verlauf ist es als Zwischeneinschub sehr interessant, weil es den Wechsel in seiner Auslegung von Mt 16, 18 deutlich macht. Das Besondere an den Retractationes ist, dass Augustinus nämlich seine bisherigen Schriften auf Fehler untersucht und dabei einige Korrekturen vornimmt. Durch diese Art der Selbstkorrektur sind uns auch Schriften des Kirchenvaters bekannt, die uns nicht mehr vorliegen. Zu diesen verlorenen Schriften gehört unter anderem der „contra epistolam Donati haeretici liber unus“, den Augustinus im 21. Kapitel des ersten Buches der Retractationes bespricht. Da er selbst davon spricht, dass er dieses Buch „...eodem presbyterii mei tempore...“ verfasst habe, muss es zwischen 391 und 395 entstanden sein, als Augustinus unter Valerius in Hippo als Presbyter wirkte. In diesem Werk sagt Augustinus nach Auskunft der *retr.* an einer Stelle über den Apostel Petrus, dass auf ihn wie auf einen Felsen die Kirche gegründet worden sei („de apostolo Petro, quod in illo tamquam in petra fundata sit ecclesia“). Und übereinstimmend dazu verweist er auf den Vers aus den Hymnen des heiligen Ambrosius: „hoc ipse petra ecclesiae canente culpam diluit“. Augustinus ist sich auch der Tatsache bewusst, dass er es nicht bei dieser Auslegung von Mt 16, 18 belassen hat, sondern sich unter Verwendung von 1 Kor 10, 4 noch eine weitere Auslegung zueigen gemacht hat. So schreibt er selbst: „ut super hunc intellegeretur quem confessus est

Petrus dicens: «tu es Christus filius dei uiui», ac sic Petrus ab hac petra appellatus personam ecclesiae figuraret, quae super hanc petram aedificatur et accepit claues regni caelorum." Als Begründung dient dem Kirchenlehrer hierbei auch Bedeutungsunterschied von Petrus und petra; Christus hat nämlich nicht gesagt: „tu es petra", sondern: „tu es Petrus". Abschließend folgt dann der Beleg „petra autem erat Christus" (1 Kor 10, 4). Petrus hat also nicht sich selbst bekannt, sondern Christus, den Felsen, und hat von daher seinen Namen erhalten und bildete die Person der Kirche, die auf diesem Felsen gebaut wurde („...ac sic Petrus ab hac petra appellatus personam ecclesiae figuraret, quae super hanc petram aedificatur et accepit claues regni caelorum."). Indem Augustinus allerdings die Deutung des Ambrosius umwirft, untergräbt er quasi dessen Autorität und zugleich scheint auch dieser Vers beim Volk sehr beliebt gewesen zu sein. Diese Schwierigkeit muss Augustinus nun umgehen. Er tut dies sehr geschickt, indem er am Ende des Kapitels die endgültige Entscheidung dem Leser überlässt („harum duarum autem sententiarum quae sit probabilior, eligat lector."). Jedoch lässt die ungleiche Besprechung der beiden Meinungen erkennen, für welche Meinung sich Augustinus längst schon entschieden hat. So schreibt Hofmann zu Recht: „Die Rücksicht auf die Autorität des hl. Ambrosius und die weite Verbreitung seiner Auffassung verboten es Augustinus wohl, die frühere Deutung später schlechthin abzulehnen. Aber daran, dass er selbst seine Entscheidung getroffen hat, lässt der ganze Tenor der Stelle und die Ausführlichkeit, mit der er die zweite Meinung begründet, keinen Zweifel."[10] Bestätigt wird dies durch die Auffassung Grabowskis: „For in his works, and especially in a passage of his Retractationes, written at the end of his life, he resorts to another interpretation according to which Christ, whose divinity St. Peter confessed, was the foundation rock (petra) of the church."[11]

3. Petrus = petra

Wenn Augustinus in den *retr.* schreibt, dass er gegen den Brief des Donatus die Auslegung Petrus = petra gewählt hat, so unterschlägt

[10] Hofmann, F., Der Kirchenbegriff des Hl. Augustinus in seinen Grundlagen und in seiner Entwicklung. Münster 1978, S. 317.

[11] Grabowski, St., Saint Augustine and the Primacy of the Roman Bishops. In: Tr 4 (1946), S. 93. Nicht bestätigen lässt sich die Auffassung von La Bonnardière, Tu es Petrus, 482: „En dernier ressort, en 426-427, saint Augustin laisse le lecteur libre de son option. C'est dire qu'à aucun moment il n'accordé lui-même un sens théologique important à son interpretation."

er freilich, dass sich mehrmals in seinem Psalmenkommentar die Deutung finden lässt, dass Petrus der Fels ist, auf den die Kirche erbaut wurde.

a) Enarrationes in Psalmos 39, 25 (=CChr.SL. 38, 443)

In diesem Abschnitt der Psalmauslegung geht Augustinus auf den Psalmvers 39, 15 ein: „conuertantur retrorsum et reuereantur, qui uolunt mihi mala. conuertantur retrorsum“ Bestes Beispiel für diejenigen, die dem Herrn vorangehen wollen, ist Petrus, der nicht akzeptieren will, dass Jesus für unser Heil leiden wird. Für Petrus hatte dieser Ausspruch (Mt 16, 22) Folgen, musste er sich doch als Satan beschimpfen lassen. Für Augustinus lag sein Fehler eindeutig darin, dass er nicht zur Nachfolge bereit war, sondern den Weg vorausgehen wollte. Wenn er diesen Fehler jedoch nicht begeht, was wird er dann sein? Die Antwort darauf findet sich für Augustinus bei Mt 16, 18: „ideo, inquit, satanas, quia uis antecedere eum quem debes sequi; si autem retro fueris, et secutus fueris, iam non satanas. quid ergo? «super hanc petram, aedificabo ecclesiam meam».“

b) Enarrationes in Psalmos 55, 15 (=CChr.SL. 39, 688f.)

Ähnlich wie Ps 39, 15 lautet auch Ps 55, 10, auf den Augustinus hier eingeht: „convertantur inimici mei retrorsum“. Durch das retrorsum angeregt spricht Augustinus wiederum von Vorausgehen und Nachfolgen. Erklärbar ist diese Ähnlichkeit zu Ps 39, 15 durch das Abfassungsdatum; der Kirchenvater schrieb diese Worte um das Jahr 412 in Karthago nieder, also in unmittelbarer zeitlicher Nähe und ebenfalls vor dem Hintergrund der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Donatismus.

c) In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 11, 5 (=CChr.SL. 36, 112)

Wir müssen uns fragen, warum Augustinus hier die Bezeichung als Fels einfügt. Ohne Zweifel ist damit Petrus selbst bezeichnet. Möglicherweise gibt es zwei Gründe dafür: Zum einen setzt Augustinus bewusst einen Querverweis zu Mt 16, 16. Beide Bekenntnisse lauten ja ähnlich: „Du bist der Heilige Gottes“ (Joh 6, 69) und „Du bist der Sohn des lebendigen Gottes“ (Mt 16, 16) und kommen beide aus dem Mund des Petrus. Andererseits hatte er aber auch im Hinterkopf die Fortsetzung der Geschichte – nämlich die Bezeichnung des Iudas Iskariot als Teufel (Joh 6,70f.) – und betonte deshalb die Stellung des Petrus als Felsen gesondert.

4. fides = petra

Grabowski schreibt zu dieser Interpretation Augustins: „However equivalent to making Christ the foundation of the Church is the assertation in the Saint's writings that St. Peter's faith in Christ or his confession of Christ's divinity is the foundation of the Church"[12] Allerdings – so wird sich in *trin.* 2, 28 zeigen – geht Augustinus davon aus, dass der Glaube allgemein ohne Bezug zu Petrus ebenfalls als Fels zu bezeichnen ist.

a) De trinitate 2, 28 (=CChr.SL. 50, 117-119)

In *trin.* 2, 28 spricht er darüber, die „posteriora" Christi zu sehen. Er geht dabei auf Ex 33, 20-23 ein, wo Mose das Gesicht Gottes sehen will. Was genau dann jedoch Augustinus mit „posteriora" bezeichnet, wird nicht deutlich. Er spricht davon, „...ut posteriora eius accipiantur caro eius in qua de uirgine natus est et mortuus et resurrexit, siue propter postremitatem mortalitatis posteriora dicta sint, siue quod eam prope in fine saeculi, hoc est posterius, suscipere dignatus est.". Anhand von 2 Kor 5, 7 folgert Augustinus, dass wir die „posteriora Christi" – das ist sein Fleisch – durch den Glauben sehen müssen, weil wir ja auf dem festen Fundament des Glaubens stehen, das Felsen bedeutet, und wir sehen es von einer sicheren Warte aus – nämlich die katholische Kirche – über die gesagt ist: „Auf diesen Felsen will ich meine Kirche bauen." („sed «dum peregrinamur a domino et per fidem ambulamus non per speciem», posteriora Christi, hoc est carnem, per ipsam fidem uidere debemus, id est in solido fidei fundamento stantes quod significat petra, et eam de tali tutissima specula intuentes, in catholica scilicet ecclesia de qua dictum est: «et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam»."). Mit Recht äußert sich La Bonnardière kritisch über diese Stelle, indem sie schreibt, dass diese Texte zwar vom Verständnis her klarer sind, aber dafür die Interpretation heikel ist.[13] Auch im folgenden Kapitel führt Augustinus diesen Gedanken fort, indem er schreibt, dass der Glaube an die Auferstehung selbst uns gesund und gerecht gemacht habe. Das Verdienst unseres Glaubens sei also die Auferstehung des Leibes Christi. Dass er leiblich am Kreuz gestorben ist – so Augustinus – erkennen auch die Gegner an, aber an der Auferstehung zweifeln sie. Wir hingegen glauben daran sehr fest, weil wir es ja wie von der Festigkeit eines Felsens

[12] Grabowski, Saint Augustine, S. 93.
[13] La Bonnardière, Tu es Petrus, S. 485.

herab betrachten, von wo wir die Adoption und die Erlösung unseres Körpers erhoffen.

Hier zeigt sich also, dass es in diesem Text keinesfalls um Petrus geht, sondern allein um den katholischen Glauben. Der Glaube bildet den Felsengrund für die Kirche, und die Kirche, von der ja gesagt ist, dass sie auf dem Felsen gebaut ist, ist gleichzeitig die sichere Beobachtungswarte dafür, dass wir an die Auferstehung Christi glauben können.

b) In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus 10, 1 (= PL 35, 2053f.)

Der Traktat zum ersten Johannesbrief wurde von Augustinus wohl in der Osterwoche des Jahres 407 gehalten. Die letzten beiden Predigten jedoch, also auch die zehnte Predigt, wurden von Augustinus um das Himmelfahrtsfest herum gehalten.

Der Erste Johannesbrief, der ja vor allem durch die Thematik der Nächsten- und Gottesliebe und durch das Heraustreten des innergemeindlichen Schismas geprägt ist, ist für Augustinus natürlich wie dazu geschaffen, seine Gedanken über das nordafrikanische Schisma zwischen Katholiken und Donatisten zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Auf Mt 16, 18 geht Augustinus im ersten Kapitel der zehnten Predigt ein, in der er über den Glauben an Christus in 1 Joh 5, 1a spricht: „Jeder, der glaubt, daß Jesus der Christus ist, stammt von Gott.“ Zunächst erläutert der Bischof für seine Gemeinde, was es heißt, im Glauben auf Christus hin zu wandeln: „per illum curris, ad illum curris, in ipso requiescis.“ Und dieses Wandern auf Christus heißt für Augustinus jedoch auch glauben, dass er der Christus ist. Und hier führt der Prediger Augustinus eine bemerkenswerte Doppelung des Glaubens an Christus ein: Er macht nämlich den Unterschied zwischen dem Glauben an Christus, den die Christen haben und den sie in ihrem Leben und ihren Werken zum Ausdruck bringen und dem Glauben der Dämonen, von denen es in der Schrift ebenfalls heißt, dass sie an Gott glauben und zittern (Jak 2, 19). Wie die Dämonen Jesus als Heiligen Gottes bekennen (Mk 1, 24), so bekennt ja auch Petrus, der sagt: „Du bist Christus, der Sohn des lebendigen Gottes“ (Mt 16, 16). Für Augustinus hat dieses Bekenntnis bzw. dieser Glaube des Petrus ein besonderes Lob verdient, nämlich der Fels für die Kirche zu sein („uidete quae laudes prosequantur hanc fidem: «tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam.»“). Wenn man durch diese Aussage bis hierhin noch meinen könnte, dass Petrus vielleicht der Fels *aufgrund* seines Glaubens ist, so widerlegt dies Augustinus dies im Folgenden jedoch gesondert: „quid est, «super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam

meam»? super hanc fidem, super id quod dictum est, «tu es Christus filius dei uiui». «super hanc petram», inquit, «fundabo ecclesiam meam».“ Und doch bekennen ja auch die Dämonen mit quasi denselben Worten wie es Petrus tut. Sie sagen „Du bist der Heilige Gottes“ (Mk 1,24) bzw. „Du bist der Sohn Gottes“ (Mt 8,29 parr.). Es gibt jedoch einen entscheidenden Unterschied zwischen ihren Worten und den Worten des Petrus – das Ziel ihres Bekenntnisses; deshalb schreibt Augustinus, dass es zwar die gleichen Worte seien, aber nicht derselbe Geist („eadem uerba, non idem animus.“). Das Bekenntnis der Dämonen ist ohne jegliche Liebe („sine dilectione“), während Petrus von Liebe erfüllt spricht. Er bekennt den Sohn Gottes, „ut amplecteretur“; die Dämonen hingegen „ut Christus ab eis recederet.“ Letztlich überträgt Augustinus diese Zweideutigkeit in die Situation der Gemeinde von Hippo Regius: Wenn die Häretiker von sich sagen, dass sie an Christus glauben, dann geben sie ein Beispiel für den Glauben der Dämonen. Die Christen jedoch legen in ihrem Glauben ein Bekenntnis ab, um – wie Petrus – an Christus festzuhalten.

5. petra = Christus

Die Interpretation, die bei Augustinus am häufigsten vorkommt, ist die Identifikation von petra mit Christus. Wir haben ja bereits in der Selbstkorrektur der *retr.* gesehen, dass Augustinus sich nach und nach auf diese Auslegung einließ.

a) Predigt 76, 1 (= PL 38, 749)

Diese Predigt hielt Augustinus wohl in den Jahren 410-412 über die Stelle Mt 14, 24-33. Das Besondere an dieser Perikope ist ja, dass gerade Petrus, der Erstberufene unter den Aposteln, hier als Zweifler und Kleingläubiger dargestellt wird. Dies beschäftigt auch Augustinus, der die Figur des Petrus als Sprecher der Apostel heraushebt: „ipse enim Petrus in apostolorum ordine primus, in Christi amore promptissimus, saepe unus respondet pro omnibus.“ So spricht auch beim Messiasbekenntnis von Cäsarea Philippi Petrus im Namen aller („unus pro multis dedit responsum, unitas in multis“). Für diese Aussage bekommt Petrus dann die Zusage, dass auf den Felsen die Kirche erbaut werde. Und hier sieht Augustinus die Änderung des Namens des Petrus gegeben, der ja vorher Simon genannt wurde („Simon quippe antea uocabatur. hoc autem ei nomen, ut Petrus appellaretur, a domino impositum est“). Augustinus weiß auch einiges über die Bedeutung dieser Namensänderung zu sagen: Für ihn ist Petrus an

dieser Stelle nämlich nicht der Fels, sondern er bedeutet die Kirche. Der Fels ist Christus, Petrus ist aber der „populus christianus“. Deswegen, weil petra die ursprüngliche Bezeichung ist („petra enim principale nomen est“), lässt sich folgern, dass petra nicht nach Petrus benannt ist, sondern dass Petrus von der petra seinen Namen erhalten hat („ideo Petrus a petra, non petra a Petro:“). Analog dazu nennt Augustinus, dass ja Christus auch nicht seinen Namen vom Christen erhalten hat, sondern die Bezeichnung Christ wurde von Christus her abgeleitet („quomodo non a christiano Christus, sed a Christo christianus uocatur.“).

Und so führt Augustinus erneut die Zusage an Petrus auf und interpretiert sie in folgendem Sinne: Indem Jesus sagt „Super hanc petram“, meint er, dass er seine Kirche auf den Felsen bauen werde, den Petrus bekannt hat, den er mit Namen genannt hat, als er sagte: „Tu es filius Dei vivi“. Das Fazit aus dieser Stelle ist für Augustinus also kein anderes, als dass Christus die Kirche auf sich selbst, den Sohn Gottes, baut, nicht auf Petrus („id est, super meipsum filium dei uiui aedificabo ecclesiam meam. super me aedificabo te, non me super te.“).

Noch deutlicher macht Augustinus dies im 2. Kapitel der Predigt, das zwar kurz, aber drastisch ist: Es scheint Menschen zu geben, die auf Menschen erbaut sein wollen: „Ich halte zu Paulus – ich zu Apollos – ich zu Kephas“ (1 Kor 1, 12). Andere wiederum wollen nicht, dass die Kirche auf Petrus erbaut wird, sondern auf dem Felsen: „Ich zu Christus“ (1 Kor 1, 12). Für Augustinus hat Paulus jedoch richtig erkannt, dass nicht der Verkünder der Maßgebende ist, sondern allein Christus: „Ist denn Christus zerteilt? Wurde etwa Paulus für euch gekreuzigt? Oder seid ihr auf den Namen des Paulus getauft worden?“ (1 Kor 1, 13). So wenig, wie Paulus in seinem Namen handelte, so wenig handelte Petrus in seinem Namen, sondern alles geschah allein im Namen Christi. Deswegen wurde die petra auch nicht auf Petrus errichtet, sondern Petrus auf der petra! („quomodo non in Pauli, sic nec in Petri, sed in nomine Christi: ut Petrus aedificaretur super petram, non petra super Petrum.“).

b) In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 124, 5 (=CChr.SL. 36, 683)

Der 124. Traktat zum Johannesevangelium, der von Augustinus 417 gehalten wurde, handelt vom sog. Nachtragskapitel des Evangeliums, der Erscheinung des Auferstandenen am See von Tiberias und der angedeuteten Konkurrenz zwischen Petrus und dem Lieblingsjünger. Ausgehend davon fragt Augustinus in Io. eu. tr. 124, 4: „quis est

duorum discipulorum melior, qui minus quam condiscipulus eius diligit Christum, et plus quam condiscipulus eius diligitur a Christo? an ille quem minus quam condiscipulum eius diligit Christus, cum plus ipse quam suus condiscipulus diligat Christum?".

Die Kirche aber – so lehrt Augustinus – vergibt diese Sünden, und ihr Repräsentant ist Petrus „wegen des Primates seines Apostolates" („propter apostolatus sui primatum"). Und wiederum in Anspielung auf Mt 7, 24-27 stellt Augustinus die Aussage auf, dass diese Kirche ja durch nichts erschüttert werden könne, da sie auf der petra gegründet worden sei, von der Petrus seinen Namen erhalten hat. Also ergibt sich daraus für Augustinus wieder nur eine möglich Folgerung: „non enim a Petro petra, sed Petrus a petra; sicut non Christus a christiano, sed christianus a Christo uocatur." Denn Christus hat zu ihm durch das Felsenwort gesagt, dass er auf den Felsen, den Petrus verheißen hat, die Kirche errichten werde. Also nicht auf Petrus, sondern – ganz im paulinischen Sinne – auf Christus! Und auf diesem Fundament schließlich ist Petrus selbst gebaut! („super hanc ergo, inquit, petram quam confessus es, aedificabo ecclesiam meam, meam. petra enim erat Christus; super quod fundamentum etiam ipse aedificatus est Petrus.").

Deshalb sieht Augustinus auch in der Person des Petrus keinen Primatsanspruch für den römischen Bischof belegt, sondern Petrus stellt die gesamte Kirche dar; dies bestätigt Augustinus, wenn er in Io. eu. tr. 124, 5 sagt: „ecclesia ergo quae fundatur in Christo, claues ab eo regni caelorum accepit in Petro, id est potestatem ligandi soluendique peccata."

c) Predigt 295, 1 (= PL 38, 1348f.)

Anlass dieser Predigt war der 29.06., das Fest der Heiligen Petrus und Paulus; allerdings ist sich die Forschung unklar über das Jahr. Petrus wird an seinem Festtag von Augustinus besonders lobend erwähnt. Er ist beatus, weil er der erste unter den Aposteln und ein standhafter Verehrer („amator") Christi ist. Deswegen verdient er es, zu hören, dass er Petrus ist und auf diesen Felsen Christus seine Kirche erbauen wird. Doch schon wird Augustinus in seiner Auslegung konkreter, wenn er schreibt, dass Christus auf diesen Felsen auch den Glauben erbauen werde, den Petrus bekannt hat („super hanc petram aedificabo fidem, quam confiteris."). So ist es also in Augustins Augen unmöglich, dass Petrus gleichzeitig die petra ist, wenn auf der petra der Glaube, den Petrus bekannt hat, gegründet wird. Und dann fährt Augustinus mit der bekannten Auslegung fort,

dass petra ja nicht von Petrus komme, sondern Petrus von petra, wie auch Christ von Christus kommt. Allerdings wird er zwischendurch undeutlich, wenn er sagt: „super hoc quod dixisti, «tu es Christus filius dei uiui», aedificabo ecclesiam meam.“ Denn wenn Augustinus ausdrückt, dass Christus ja auf den Ausspruch Petri seine Kirche erbauen will, dann müsste diese Stelle eigentlich unter die Kategorie petra = fides fallen. Er verwendet ja das Neutrum hoc, was den Ausspruch des Petrus, sein Bekenntnis, bezeichnet, und nicht das Personalpronomen hunc. Allerdings entschärft er diese Unklarheit wieder, indem er Paulus als Zeugen aufführt, der ja in 1 Kor 10, 1-4 die Angabe macht: „Ihr sollt wissen, Brüder, daß unsere Väter alle unter der Wolke waren, alle durch das Meer zogen und alle auf Mose getauft wurden in der Wolke und im Meer. Alle aßen auch die gleiche gottgeschenkte Speise, und alle tranken den gleichen gottgeschenkten Trank; denn sie tranken aus dem lebensspendenden Felsen, der mit ihnen zog. Und dieser Fels war Christus.“ Und auf die vorausgehende Frage: „nosse de qua petra Petrus dicatur?“ gibt Augustinus die Antwort: „ecce unde Petrus.“

d) Predigt 244, 1 (= PL 38, 1147f.)

In dieser Predigt der Osterwoche 408 oder 409 richtet Augustinus sein Augenmerk hauptsächlich auf Joh 20,9: „Denn sie verstanden die Schrift noch nicht, daß er aus den Toten auferstehen musste.“ Und Augustinus fragt nun, wo denn beim Auffinden des leeren Grabes ihr Glaube gewesen sei. Schließlich hätte doch Jesus oft genug vorhergesagt, dass er überliefert, getötet und auferstehen werde. Petrus, einer der beiden, die am Ostertag zum Grab kamen, hat ja noch vorher das Messiasbekenntnis abgelegt und dafür die Verheißung erhalten: „Tu es Petrus.“. Mit dem gekreuzigten Herrn ist jedoch dieser Glaube untergegangen. Denn Augustinus schreibt: „tamdiu enim Petrus filium dei credidit, donec uideret in ligno pendentem, donec uideret clauis affixum, donec uideret mortuum, donec uideret sepultum.“ Dann jedoch war der Glaube verloren, und der Kirchenvater fragt zu Recht: „ubi petra? ubi firmitas petrae?“ Es gibt auf diese Fragen nur eine richtige Antwort, nämlich die, dass nicht Petrus die petra darstellte, sondern in Wirklichkeit Christus, der auferstand, damit er als petra den Petrus stärken könne. Denn jener habe von der petra seinen Namen Petrus erhalten. Und wäre die petra nicht am Leben, so wäre auch Petrus zugrundegegangen („petra erat ipse Christus, ille autem a petra Petrus. ideo surrexerat petra, ut firmaret Petrum: nam perierat Petrus, nisi uiueret petra.“).

6. In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 7, 14 (=CChr.SL. 36, 74)

Das große Thema des Kapitels ist die Umbenennung des Simon zu Petrus in Joh 1, 24. Augustinus sieht darin jedoch nichts Großes, sondern er bringt gleich die Interpretation, dass Petrus von petra kommt. Allerdings vertritt er hier eine andere Deutungsweise: die petra ist hier aber nicht Christus, sondern die Kirche! „Magnum quia mutauit ei nomen; et fecit de Simone Petrum? Petrus autem a petra, petra uero ecclesia; ergo in Petri nomine figurata est ecclesia." Augustinus fragt nun weiter: „et quis securus, nisi qui aedificat super petram?" Und von da aus kommt er nun auf das Gleichnis Jesu vom klugen und vom törichten Mann zu sprechen. Und bezogen auf die Kirche fragt Augustinus dann weiter: „Quid prodest quia intrat Ecclesiam, qui vult super arenam aedificare? Audiendo enim et non faciendo, aedificat quidem, sed super arenam. Si enim nihil audit, nihil aedificat: si autem audit, aedificat. Sed quaerimus, ubi. Si enim audit et facit, super petram: si audit et non facit, super arenam. (...) Quid ergo illi qui non audiunt? securi sunt? securos eos dicit, quia nihil aedificant? Nudi sunt sub pluvia, ante ventos, ante flumina: cum venerint ista, ante illos tollunt, quam domos deiciant.". Es gibt für Augustinus also nur eine einzige Lösung: „Ergo una est securitas, et aedificare, et super petram aedificare." Und noch wichtiger ist, dass dieses Hören und Befolgen sofort eintritt, denn schon heute kann man von den Strömen weggerissen werden. Deshalb aber benannte Jesus den Simon in Petrus um, dass dadurch das Geheimnis des Felsens gelüftet werde. Denn wenn er schon vorher Petrus geheißen hätte, so hätte sich niemand darüber Gedanken gemacht. So jedoch wird der Leser des Evangeliums quasi gezwungen, sich über diese Namenänderung des Petrus Gedanken zu machen – und wird so an das Geheimnis des Felsens herangeführt.

Als Fazit lässt sich festhalten, dass Augustinus auf den ersten Blick auch hier recht doppeldeutig mit Mt 7, 24-27 arbeitet. Zwar ist seine Deutung petra = ecclesia neu, dennoch wird diese im Folgenden wieder unklar, weil man sich fragen muss: Wer ist der, der erbaut? Und was ist die Funktion des Petrus, der die Kirche symbolisiert.

II. Augustinus zum römischen Primat in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Donatismus

1. „Ab ipso Petro numeramus" – epistula 53, 2 (= CSEL 34/2, 153f.)

Der 53. Brief, den Augustinus an seinen Freund Generosus schreibt, bildet eine Ausnahme unter allen Stellen, an denen Augustinus

auf Mt 16, 18 eingeht, weil Augustinus hier – und nur hier – eine Verbindung von Mt 16, 18 mit dem römischen Bischofssitz herstellt, indem er das Felsenwort als wörtliches Zitat einfließen lässt. Diesen Brief schreibt Augustinus zusammen mit Fortunatus und Alypius um das Jahr 400 herum. Der entsprechende Artikel im Augustinus-Lexikon weist uns auf den Hintergrund des Schreibens: „Der in Constantine lebende Katholik Generosus hat von einem donatistischen Priester einen Brief erhalten, der im Auftrag eines Engels verfasst worden sein soll und donatistische Bischofslisten enthält, in denen Petilianus als letzter Bischof angeführt wird (cf. ep. 53, 1). Mit diesem Brief wandte Generosus sich an seinen Bischof Fortunatus und zugleich an Augustinus und Alypius. Diese schreiben ihm gemeinsam ep. 53 und liefern ihm darin Argumente für ihre Überzeugung, dass die katholische Kirche die einzig wahre sei. Die Absender fügen eine Auflistung aller römischen Bischöfe bei und weisen darauf hin, dass sich unter diesen kein Donatist befinde.“[14]

Nachdem Augustinus Generosus davor gewarnt hat, sich vom Ganzen lostrennen zu lassen und sich den Verheißungen Gottes zu entziehen (*ep.* 53, 1), blickt er auf die Bischofsliste der Kirche von Rom, da diese Reihenfolge von ihm als „certius et vere salubriter“ angesehen wird. Er schreibt, dass er mit Petrus beginnen wird, zu dem der Herr sagte „Auf diesen Felsen will ich meine Kirche bauen, und die Pforten der Hölle werden sie nicht überwältigen.“ („…ab ipso Petro numeramus, cui totius Ecclesiae figuram gerenti Dominus ait: *Super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam, et portae inferorum non vincent eam“).* Anschließend reiht er nacheinander die Bischöfe von Linus bis Anastasius auf um mit der Feststellung zu schließen: „In hoc ordine successionis nullus donatista episcopus invenitur.“ Allerdings sei von den Donatisten ein Geweihter nach Rom geschickt worden, der dort einige Afrikaner zu seinen Anhängern zählte und die Bezeichnung der Montenser oder Kutzupiter verbreitete („Sed ex transverso ex Africa ordinatum miserunt, qui paucis praesidens Afris in urbe Roma Montensium vel Cutzupitarum vocabulum propagavit.“). Nun stellt sich aber dem aufmerksamen Leser dieses Briefes die Frage, was denn genau die Verwendung von Mt 16, 18 in diesem Zusammenhang aussagt. Handelt es sich um eine Anerkennung des Primats der römischen Bischöfe, der von Petrus auf sie übergegangen ist? Grabowski ist dieser Auffassung, wenn er schreibt: „Here we have St. Peter as the figure or symbol representative of the whole Church and invested with the promise of being the foundation-stone of the Church;

[14] Divjak, J., Epistulae. In: AL 2 (hg. v. Cornelius Mayer u.a.), Basel 1996-2002, S. 956.

(...) Yes, indeed St. Augustine considers it the first and most excellent example, but also an example of a foremost see. It is the see of Saint Peter, the first apostle, who is in the passage at issue the foundation-stone (*petra*), and whose see on that account is the foundation-stone (*petra*) of the whole Church-as he expressly says in the *Psalmus contra partem Donati* – hence, a careful catalogue of his successors is given."[15] Einige Jahre später verdeutlicht Grabowski die Anerkennung eines universalkirchlichen Primats durch Augustinus: „The ‚first of the Apostles' who was made the petra is the actual principle of the Church's unity, living in his successors. (...) As for St. Augustine, leaning on tradition he sees in the passage not only the primacy of St. Peter but also of his successors, occupying the *cathedra Petri*. There was no doubt in St. Augustine's mind, where that cathedra was. He was certain that it was established by St. Peter in Rome."[16] Aber vertritt Augustinus diese Ansicht wirklich oder ist dies nur die Sichtweise Grabowskis? Er spricht ja eben nicht aus, dass die cathedra Petri der Fels ist, sondern nur Petrus selbst. Und können wir denn davon ausgehen, dass ausgerechnet der nordafrikanische Bischof Augustinus ohne gesonderte Erwähnung eine Sukzessions der römischen Bischöfe im Primat vertritt? Fritz Hofmann geht nicht von einer Sukzession im Primat aus, wenn er hier keinen anderen Anhaltspunkt sieht als den, dass „die Verbindung mit der römischen Kirche die sicherste Bürgschaft der Verbindung zugleich mit der apostolischen Kirche ist."[17] Und er bringt das Ganze auf das kurze, aber unmissverständliche Fazit: „Von einer Übertragung dieser typischen Aufgabe Petri [gemeint ist mit dieser Aufgabe, dass Petrus ‚figura totius ecclesiae'ist] an seine Nachfolger ist nicht die Rede."[18] Letztlich bleibt hier nur der Kompromiss, dass Augustinus zwar den römischen Bischofssitz als etwas Besonderes ansieht, da er ja von Petrus ausgehend die Apostolizität und somit die Einheit der Kirche repräsentiert, aber keinesfalls eine Vorrangstellung des römischen Bischofs daraus ableitet. Er braucht aber die Sukzession der römischen Bischöfe gegen die donatistischen Bischofslisten. Eine afrikanische Bischofsliste –beispielsweise von Hippo – hätte sicherlich keine Anerkennung gefunden und das weiß Augustinus. Bringt er aber den bedeutenden Bischofssitz Rom mit in seine Aussagen, so ist dagegen nur schwerlich Wiederspruch möglich, denn in ihr sind keine Donatisten vorhanden und sie geht auf Petrus

[15] Grabowski, Saint Augustin, S. 109.

[16] Grabowski, St., The Church. An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine. o.O. 1957, S. 131f.

[17] Hofmann, Kirchenbegriff, S. 322.

[18] A.a.O.

zurück, der die *ganze* Kirche versinnbildlicht. Doch wir wissen, dass Augustinus noch andere Berührungspunkte mit Rom in seinen Werken hat. Diese sollen zur Klärung der Frage gesondert erörtert werden.

2. *„Numerate sacerdotes vel ab ipsa Petri sede“ – Psalmus contra partem Donati 229-231 (=CSEL 51, 12)*

Augustinus lehnt sich stark an Mt 16, 18f. an, wenn er im Jahre 393[19] schreibt: „Numerate sacerdotes vel ab ipsa Petri sede et in ordine illo patrum quis cui successit videte: ipsa est petra quam non vincunt superbae inferorum portae.“

Hofmann[20] weist darauf hin, dass diese Verse am Ende eines Abschnittes stehen, der den Donatisten zeigen soll, „catholica quid sit et quid praecisum a vite“. Demzufolge sieht er also in der Bezeichnung „petra“ nicht den römischen Stuhl, sondern die ganze katholische Kirche gegeben. Die Erklärung lautet bei ihm folgendermaßen: „Augustinus antwortet mit dem Hinweis auf den Stuhl Petri, dessen Bischofsreihe sich in ununterbrochener Folge bis auf Petrus zurückführen lässt, dem der Herr als dem Repräsentanten der auf die petra Christus gegründete Kirche die Schlüsselgewalt übergeben hat. (...) Mit der unüberwindlichen petra ist also hier gemäß augustinischem Sprachgebrauch nicht der römische Stuhl, sondern die katholische Kirche gemeint.“[21] Wenn also der römische Stuhl als Beispiel für die Kirche steht, dann ist die petra die Kirche; eine besondere Autorität Roms ist nicht erkennbar, „schon deswegen nicht, weil es sich dem Zusammenhang nach nicht um eine die Wahrheit der Lehre, sondern die Gemeinschaft der Liebe handelt.“[22] Auch Grabowski ist der Ansicht, dass das Thema der Verse die *Catholica* ist; allerdings ist er in Bezug auf die *petra* einer ganz anderen Ansicht: „The wording of the passage is too specific and concrete to bear out a general doctrine of episcopal succession. St. Peter, the *sedes Petri*, which is a *petra*, cannot but signify one see and in consequence its succession of bishops. (...) This *sedes Petri* and its successive occupants are the *petra* upon which the Church is so built that in consequence it will not be vanquished by the proud gates of hell.“[23] Also braucht es zwei Dinge, um zur *Catholica* zu

[19] Fuhrer, Th., Augustinus. Darmstadt 2004, S. 61.
[20] Hofmann, Kirchenbegriff, S. 321.
[21] Hofmann, Kirchenbegriff, S. 321f.
[22] A.a.O., S. 322.
[23] Grabowski, The Church, S. 140. Wiederum versucht Grabowski eine Anerkennung des römischen Primats durch Augustinus zu belegen.

gehören: Man muss mit der Apostolischen Kirche in Verbindung stehen und man muss mit der Kirche in Verbindung stehen, die auf Petrus gegründet ist[24]. Allerdings sagt Augustinus davon kein Wort; zwar bezieht er sich auf die sedes Petri, aber er spricht lediglich davon, dass sie der Garant für die katholische Lehre ist, denn die Pforten der Unterwelt können sie nicht überwinden. Doch muss man sich davor hüten, zuviel Spekulation bei der Interpretation dieser Aussage Augustins zuzulassen. In Übereinstimmung mit Marschall kann man festhalten, dass Augustinus hier eindeutig von der *sedes Petri* spricht und damit unzweifelhaft den römischen Stuhl meint[25]. Von einer übergreifenden Autorität ist jedoch überhaupt keine Rede. Wie bei *ep.* 53 kommt man um die Frage nicht herum, was denn die Intention Augustins mit diesem Streitlied war. Er will gegen die Donatisten vorgehen und braucht dazu den römischen Bischofssitz und seine historische Bedeutung. Er weiß, dass die Bedeutung dieser *sedes* nicht bestritten werden kann, aber das heißt nicht automatisch, dass er ihr unumschränkte Befugnisse in der Autorität einräumt.

III. Das Petrusbild Augustins in Verbindung mit Mt 16, 18: Petrus als figura ecclesiae

Vor allem in den Predigten und den Psalmenauslegungen wird Petrus als *figura* bezeichnet. Zunächst einmal muss als Vorbemerkung dazu erklärt werden, dass Petrus keineswegs die einzige *figura* für Augustinus darstellt. Es gibt noch andere *figurae*[26], die in der Regel als allegorische Auslegung zur Kirche zu sehen sind: Robert Eno[27] weist darauf hin, dass Augustinus in seinen frühen Schriften gegen die Luciferianer und Donatisten Petrus als Sünder darstellt, der aber die Schlüssel für die Vergebung der Sünden erhalten hatte.

Wie Petrus seine Stärken und seine Schwächen hat, wenn er in einem Moment Christus als unsterblichen Sohn Gottes bekennt, aber im nächsten Moment schon wieder dessen Tod fürchtet, so hat auch die Kirche starke und schwache Glieder. Sie braucht aber beides; denn ohne sie kann sie nicht existieren. Und Petrus, der beides repräsentiert, ist dennoch der Erste und Herausragende unter den Aposteln[28].

[24] Vgl. a.a.O., S. 141.

[25] A.a.O.

[26] s. 4, 25 (=CChr.SL. 41, 37-39) Io. eu. tr. 15, 10 (=CChr.SL. 36, 154): En. ps. 103, 3,2 (=CChr.SL. 40, 1499).

[27] Eno, R., Forma Petri – Petrus, Figura Ecclesiae: The uses of Peter. In: Aug(L) 40/41 (1990), S. 671.

[28] *s.* 76, 4.

Warum aber ist es für Augustinus wichtig, Petrus als *figura ecclesiae* in dieser Art und Weise hervorzuheben? Die Antwort findet sich bei Eno: „Peter is a chosen spokesman and symbol because he is first in the ordo of the Apostles and outstanding in his love for Christ. But he is always quick to add that the Church received the keys; it is not a privilege for Peter himself personally. Would such an hypothesis make sense? – To say that Peter alone received them but non John, James and the other Apostles? No. Peter as a figura ecclesiae means that what was given to one was given in fact to the Church.“[29] Außerdem weist Eno darauf hin, dass Petrus auch das Symbol der Einheit ist, der als Vertreter der Apostel, als Einer für den Rest spricht. Es ist daher kein Zufall, dass ausgerechnet Petrus vom Herrn die Aufgabe erhalten hat, der Fels für die Kirche zu sein und die Schlüssel für das Himmelreich zu hüten. Dennoch nennt ihn Augustinus nur anfangs in seinem Werk den Felsen und bezieht dann die Felsenfunktion immer mehr auf Christus. Haendler liefert dafür die Erklärung: „Petrus muss sich zurückweisen lassen; erst als ein zur Demut bekehrter Mensch kann er Fels der Kirche werden. Diese Einschränkung des Felsenwortes an Petrus führt dann ganz logisch dazu, dass Augustin später den Felsen nur noch auf Christus deuten wollte.“[30]

Doch viel mehr muss man doch davon ausgehen, dass es sich um ein ähnliches Problem handelt wie bei der Überreichung der Schlüssel. Wenn Petrus der Fels für die Kirche wäre, wer sollte dann der Fels sein? Dieses Problem löst Augustinus auf die bekannte Weise, indem er 1 Kor 10, 4 heranzieht: „*petra autem erat Christus*“.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich mit Eno sagen: „For Augustine, Peter, though first among the Apostles, did not particularly stand forth as a symbol of unity in the Church dependent on Christ's continuing gifts. In the New Testament, by Augustine's reckoning, Peter frequently represented the Church insofar as it received graces from Christ its Lord. (…) Here as so often Augustine's picture of the Church involves humility rather than triumphalism, the humility of a sinful Church which must daily pray: «Forgive us our sins».“[31]

An diese Interpretation für Petrus als figura ecclesiae knüpft Augustinus in *Io. eu. tr.* 124, 5 an: „dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris'. hoc agit ecclesia spe beata in hac uita aerumnosa; cuius ecclesiae Petrus apostolus, propter apostolatus sui primatum, gerebat figurata generalitate personam“. Petrus ist der

[29] Eno, Forma Petri, S. 674.
[30] A.a.O., S. 115.
[31] A.a.O., S. 676.

Erste unter den Aposteln, aber bei der Übergabe der Schlüssel des Himmelreiches stellt er die Kirche dar.

Nachdem Augustinus die Konkurrenzsituation zwischen Petrus und dem Lieblingsjünger im Nachtragskapitel des Johannesevangeliums ausgelegt hat, betont er die Stellung des Petrus als das Abbild der Kirche. Er steht für die Gesamtheit der Kirche, für die Christus gelitten hat und die in die Nachfolge Christi gerufen wird: „sed uniuersitati dicitur: «sequere me», pro qua uniuersitate passus est Christus; de quo dicit idem Petrus: «Christus pro nobis passus est, relinquens nobis exemplum, ut sequamur uestigia eius». ecce propter quod ei dictum est: «sequere me».“ Neben dieser Kirche kennt Augustinus aber noch eine andere Kirche, die nicht sichtbar auf Erden vertreten ist. Deshalb schreibt er, dass es ein doppeltes Leben gibt: Das eine im Glauben, das andere im Schauen; das eine in der Zeit der Pilgerschaft, das andere in der Ewigkeit der Wohnung („duas itaque uitas sibi diuinitus praedicatas et commendatas nouit ecclesia, quarum est una in fide, altera in specie; una in tempore peregrinationis, altera in aeternitate mansionis“).

Das Dasein in der sichtbaren Welt wird verkörpert durch Petrus, das in der unsichtbaren Welt durch Johannes. Das jetzige Dasein findet seinen Abschluss im Ende der Welt; das andere Dasein wird erst nach dem Weltende vollendet, ist dann aber bis in alle Ewigkeit („ista significata est per apostolum Petrum, illa per Iohannem. tota hic agitur ista usque in huius saeculi finem, et illic inuenit finem; differtur illa complenda post huius saeculi finem, sed in futuro saeculo non habet finem“). Daraus ergibt sich dann auch die Erkenntnis für die Aussprüche Jesu an die beiden Jünger, die ihn lieben: Die pilgernde Kirche, die durch Petrus verkörpert wird, soll Jesus nachfolgen; die unsichtbare Kirche aber, die in Johannes dargestellt ist, soll so bleiben, bis er kommt, damit sie dann vollendet wird („ideo dicitur huic: «sequere me»: de illo autem: «sic eum uolo manere donec ueniam; quid ad te? tu me sequere». quid enim est hoc? (...) quod apertius ita dici potest: perfecta me sequatur actio, informata meae passionis exemplo; inchoata uero contemplatio maneat donec uenio, perficienda cum uenero“).

So bleibt Augustinus seiner Auffassung treu, dass Petrus die Kirche ist, die auf Christus gegründet ist und dass deswegen Petrus den Primat vor den anderen Aposteln hat.

IV Mt 16, 18, Augustinus und das Papsttum – ein abschließendes Gesamtfazit

Mt 16, 18 taucht bei Augustinus vor allem in Auseinandersetzung mit den Donatisten auf. Es ist dies ein Ergebnis des Aufeinanderprallens

zweier völlig unterschiedlicher Ekklesiologien: Die Donatisten einerseits beanspruchen für sich, die Kirche der Reinen zu sein, während Augustinus durchaus erkennt, dass es Stärken und Schwächen in der Kirche gibt, so wie sie der Apostel Petrus in seiner Person vereint.

Hofmann schreibt dazu: „Die antidonatistische Blickrichtung führte somit Augustinus dazu, Mt. 16, 18 über Cyprian und die altafrikanische Exegese hinaus von jeder Beziehung zum Primat Petri und zum Episkopat zu lösen und die Stelle nicht auf die sichtbare empirische, sondern auf die unsichtbare heilige Kirche und ihr Haupt (sc. Christus) zu beziehen.“[32]

Wie aber ist es dann um den Primat Petri bestellt? Sowohl Hofmann[33] als auch Caspar sehen diesen Primat nicht als Folge von Mt 16, 18, sondern als dessen Voraussetzung: „Der Primat des Petrus war in Augustins Augen, genau wie einst für Cyprian, ein persönlicher Erstlingsrang; er war auch nicht Inhalt oder Folge der Verheißung in Mt. 16, 18. 19, sondern deren Voraussetzung: weil Petrus den Primat der Jüngerschaft und besonderen Jüngertreue besaß, erging an ihn jene Verheißung.“[34] Augustinus änderte die Interpretation von Mt 16, 18 im Laufe seines Lebens. Nicht Petrus war die petra, sondern einzig und allein Christus, der dann Petrus auf sich gründete. Und Petrus war die figura ecclesiae, die vom Herrn in Cäsarea Philippi die Vollmacht der Sündenvergebung erhalten hatte. Deshalb, weil die Kirche diese Vollmacht hat, kann sie für sich auch in Anspruch nehmen, dass sie eben nicht das Ideal der Heiligkeit zwangsläufig erfüllen muss, sondern dass sie wie ihr Typus Petrus auch Schwächen neben ihren Stärken aufweisen darf. Caspar macht dies deutlich, wenn er über Mt 16, 19 schreibt: „Ausdrücklich wies er (sc. Augustinus) die Deutung ab, als ob die Schlüsselgewalt dem Petrus nur für sich allein übergeben worden sei; während sein ‚Primat' ein persönlicher, kein amtlicher Vorzug sei, sei Petrus umgekehrt Inhaber der Schlüsselgewalt nur als Repräsentant der Kirche. ‚Diese Schlüssel hat nicht der eine Mensch empfangen, sondern die Einheit der Kirche' (s 295, 2); wie für Cyprian, so war auch für Augustin die Schlüsselverleihung an den e i n e n Petrus Symbol und zugleich Gewähr der *unitas ecclesiae*.“[35]

Nun stellt sich jedoch die Frage, wie die Einstellung Augustins zum römischen Stuhl zu bewerten ist. Denn wie wir gesehen haben, hat Augustinus in einer Zeit, in der der römische Bischof sich bereits auf dieses Wort berief, doch eine grundlegend andere – ja sogar gegenteilige

[32] Hofmann, Kirchenbegriff, S. 318.

[33] Hofmann, Kirchenbegriff, S. 320.

[34] Caspar, E., Geschichte des Papsttums. Bd. 1. Von den Anfängen bis zur Höhe der Weltherrschaft. Tübingen 1930, S. 338f.

[35] A.a.O., S. 339.

– Interpretation abgegeben: Gerade indem er Petrus die Funktion als Fels für die Kirche abspricht, drückt er doch aus, dass er sie dem römischen Bischof als Nachfolger des Petrus nicht zuerkennt.

Zwar wurde die eine Stelle in *ep.* 53, 2, in der Augustinus die römische Bischofsliste aufzählt, diskutiert, doch lässt sich daraus keine Anerkennung eines römischen Primats ableiten. Er bezeichnet ja extra Petrus als „figura totius ecclesiae", ehe er das Mt-Zitat einfügt. Doch in aller Abweichung von der römischen Primatslehre war es ja nie Ziel Augustins, gegen diese Lehre zu polemisieren, auch wenn er schreibt „Christiani sumus, non Petriani."[36]

Andererseits stellt sich auch die Frage, welchen Sinn es gehabt hätte, in die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Donatismus den römischen Stuhl miteinzubeziehen. Augustinus wusste, dass in der Vergangenheit der römische Bischof Miltiades keine Einigung im donatistischen Streit erzielt hatte. Warum sollte dies dem aktuellen römischen Bischof gelingen? Und zudem war der Donatismus kein universalkirchliches Problem; es war rein auf Afrika beschränkt und hat dort durch die Gewalttaten der Circumcellionen sogar die kirchliche Ebene überschritten. Zwar bezieht Augustinus in *epp.* 43,7; 53, 2 und *Ps. c. Don.* 229-231 die sedes apostolica mit ein und wir haben auch gesehen, dass er dem donatistischen Partikularismus die Universalkirche entgegenhält (vgl. *c. litt. Pet.* 2, 247), aber er wusste vermutlich selbst, dass dies nur auf dem Papier möglich war, nicht in der Realität. Denn Augustinus war nicht nur ein ausgeprägter Theologe, sondern auch zu sehr Politiker, um blauäugig auf ein Machtwort des Apostolischen Stuhls zu vertrauen, das von den Donatisten ja doch nie akzeptiert werden würde. Er dachte, dass dieses afrikanische Problem nur auf der Ebene Afrikas durch Synoden zu lösen sei. Und als diese Strategie fehlschlug, „entdeckte der Kirchenmann Augustinus den Staat: Er forderte Gewaltmaßnahmen des Staates gegen christliche Häretiker. Zunächst wollte er sie nur belehren. Als dies nichts nutzte und als es zu Gewalttätigkeiten von der anderen Seite kam, rief er nach den Machtmitteln des Staates."[37]

Und anders sieht es eben in der Auseinandersetzung mit Pelagius und seinen Anhängern aus. Diese Lehre stammte aus Rom, so dass Augustinus sich ohne weiteres an den römischen Bischof wenden konnte, um eine Verurteilung zu erwirken. Pelagius war zum Zeitpunkt seiner Verurteilung durch die afrikanischen Synoden in Jerusalem; eine Verurteilung durch die afrikanische Ortskirche hätte dort wenig bewirkt, aber eine Verurteilung durch den Apostolischen Stuhl Roms zog ganz andere Kreise.

[36] *En. Ps.* 44, 23 (=CChr.SL. 38, 511).
[37] Flasch, K., Augustin. Einführung in sein Denken. Stuttgart ^{3}2003. S. 164.

Augustinus war sich dessen bewusst und agierte deshalb geschickt mit Rom gegen Pelagius. Gemeinhin könnte man Augustinus als Opportunisten bezeichnen, der für sich die Gunst der Umstände ausnutzt. Caspar umschreibt diese Tatsache: „Die Sache ist erledigt (causa finita est), möge endlich auch der Irrtum erledigt sein!“ Augustin griff also aus dem einen Innocenzschreiben die These, dass alle Angelegenheiten der Kirche erst durch Kenntnisnahme Roms ihre endgültige Erledigung (finienda) finden könnten, auf; er tat es um seines eigenen Ziels, der ‚Erledigung' des Pelagianismus, nicht um der These selbst willen.“[38]

Gegen den Pelagianismus zog Augustinus mit Rom an einem Strang und dies wollte er auch dann nicht aufgeben, als Zosimus, der Nachfolger des Innozenz in Rom, zunächst aufgrund seiner Charakterschwäche mit dem Pelagianismus sympathisierte, und umgekehrt die afrikanischen Bischöfe sich nun als Angeklagte sehen mussten. Ein Einlenken kam für sie nicht in Frage.

Augustinus hat in dieser Auseinandersetzung mit Zosimus dennoch seinen primatsfreundlichen Ton nie verloren: „Gerade die Art, in der er diesen Papst vom Vorwurf des ‚Verrates', wie ihn besonders Julian mit Eifer erhob, reinzuwaschen sucht, zeigt, dass er nicht mit der Möglichkeit rechnete, dass der römische Bischof eine falsche Lehre vertreten, einen Irrtum lehren könne. (...) Der Papst habe von Anfang an die Irrtümer klar gesehen, zu denen Caelestius hinneigte.“[39]

Mit keinem dieser Fakten ist jedoch eine Anerkennung der Lehrautorität gegeben, was Hofmann vor allem daran festmacht, dass sich Zosimus während seiner Amtszeit öfter in innerafrikanische Streitigkeiten einmischen wollte, dabei aber jedes Mal scheiterte[40].

Daran lässt sich am besten erkennen, wie das Denken Augustins zum römischen Primatsanspruch war: Regionalkirchlich sah er als erste und oberste Instanz die Synode; erst auf Ebene der Universalkirche war er bereit, nach Rom zu appellieren. Und diese Zweigleisigkeit im Denken Augustins – sowohl im Konflikt mit den Donatisten, als auch mit den Pelagianern – fasst Marschall in sechs Punkten zusammen:

1. „Augustins Lehre und Haltung in der Frage des römischen Primates ist insofern nicht klar, als sich bei ihm zwei widerstreitende Linien finden.
2. Man kann aus Augustinus keinen römischen Primat im Sinne einer lehrmäßigen oder jurisdiktionellen Überordnung Roms beweisen.

[38] Caspar, Papsttum, S. 338.
[39] Hofmann, Kirchenbegriff, S. 446.
[40] A.a.O. S. 448-455.

3. Es lässt sich bei ihm aber auch kein praktischer oder theoretischer Konziliarismus feststellen; denn dazu ist seine Grundhaltung zu romfreundlich.
4. Man wird deshalb Augustinus in die afrikanische Gesamttradition stellen müssen, in die er sich harmonisch einfügt.
5. Er zeigte persönlich eine große Ehrerbietung gegenüber dem Apostolischen Stuhl in Rom. Das kann folgende Gründe haben:
   a) Rom war die alte Hauptstadt und «Mutter» des Reiches.
   b) Für die Afrikaner war Rom (vgl. Tertullian) der nächstgelegene «Apostolische Stuhl», und es war vor allem der Stuhl Petri.
   d) Auch für Augustinus mag das von Afrikanern immer wieder gespürte «Mehr» Roms, über das er sich wohl selbst noch keine Rechenschaft geben konnte, eine Rolle gespielt haben.
6. Diese ehrerbietige Haltung brachte Augustinus aber nicht in Gegensatz zu seinen afrikanischen Kollegen; er genoss vielmehr ein hohes Ansehen in Afrika."[41]

Es gilt jedoch auch folgendes zu beachten: Mt 16, 18 hat bei Augustinus nicht nur die Stellung des römischen Primats, sondern auch die Person des Petrus im Blick. Er ist die *figura ecclesiae*, die auf Christus erbaut ist. Augustinus arbeitet also nicht nur systematisch-ekklesiologisch mit Mt 16, 18, sondern auch pastoral, indem er dieses Zitat immer wieder dazu benutzt, seine Gemeindemitglieder v.a. im Streit gegen die Donatisten davon zu überzeugen, dass sie auf dem Fels erbaut sind (frühere Deutung) bzw. in der Kirche sind, die in Petrus verkörpert und die auf Christus erbaut ist (spätere Deutung). Als Nordafrikaner hat Augustinus ein etwas eigenwilliges Verhältnis zu Rom, aber man sollte sich davor hüten, in jeder Verwendung von Mt 16, 18 und in jeder Aussage über Petrus, die sich nicht auf Rom bezieht, gleich eine Abwertung des römischen Bischofssitzes zu sehen. Er hielt einen Bezug von Mt 16, 18 auf seine Gemeinde für sinnvoller als einen Bezug auf das (entfernte) Rom. Der Kirchenvater war sich seiner Stellung als Bischof in seiner Gemeinde bewusst; deutlich wird dies an einer ganz anderen Stelle, nämlich der Predigt 340 (= PL 38, 1482), wo er die Aufforderung Jesu an Petrus „Weide meine Schafe"(Joh 21, 17), das damals wie heute ebenfalls auf den römischen Bischof bezogen wird, auf sein Bischofsamt hindeutet. Aber er war auch geschickt genug, um den Einfluss des römischen Stuhls zu nutzen, wenn es ihm kirchenpolitisch notwendig erschien.

Andreas SCHRAUT

[41] Marschall, Karthago und Rom, S. 70f.

HAEC FIDES EST: OBSERVATIONS ON THE TEXTUAL TRADITION OF PELAGIUS'S "LIBELLUS FIDEI"

For some reason, modern scholarship hasn't shown too much interest in Pelagius's last writing, his work of self-defence called the *Libellus fidei*. Mostly two other writings are used for historical, theological or literary investigations: the *Expositiones XIII Epistularum Pauli* and the letter *Ad Demetriadem*. Further, lots of ink have been spent in debates on the authenticity of some twenty writings supposedly by Pelagius.[1] The confession *Libellus fidei* however is usually mentioned only in passing or banished to the footnotes.[2]

The most obvious reason for this is the relatively small size of the confession. Of the three writings that are widely accepted as genuine works of Pelagius, the *Libellus fidei* is by far the smallest.[3] The *Expositiones* for example occupy 537 pages in Souter's edition, while Pelagius's confession would take approximately 5-6 pages if printed in the same type-setting. It is probably felt that few words mean little content. Yet, if such a suspicion is accurate remains to be seen.

Another reason may be formed by Augustine's efforts to prove Pelagius's unreliability in general and that of the *Libellus fidei* in particular.[4] The African bishop explicitly quotes two passages from this confession, one on baptism and another on divine aid for doing good works,[5] arguing that the *Libellus fidei* is deliberately ambiguous and

[1] G. DE PLINVAL, 'Recherches sur l'œuvre littéraire de Pélage', in: Revue de Philologie de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes 60 (1934), p. 9-41. De Plinval's corpus of writings has been largely abandoned. R.F. Evans has defended the authenticity of four of these writings, but opinions differ on this subject. For a summary of the debate, see: S. THIER, *Kirche bei Pelagius* (Patristische Texte und Studiën 50), Berlin 1999, p. 22-30.

[2] *E.g.* R.F. EVANS, *Four Letters of Pelagius*, New York 1968, p. 123, n. 82. Evans might have taken some benefit from including the *Libellus fidei* in his research, for example in his pragraphs on the heavenly mansions (p. 59), the use of *adsumo*, *secundum* and *iuxta* (p. 64, 87), the gerund (p.106-7) and the mentioning of certain heretics (p. 114). Another example of a work ignoring the *Libellus fidei* largely, even though it might have added some relevant material, is: J. B. VALERO, *Las bases antropologicas de Pelagio en su tratado de las Expositiones*, Madrid 1980.

[3] *I.e.* the *Libellus fidei*, the *Expositiones*, and *Ad Demetriadem*. Evans (ibid.) points to its size as the reason for leaving out the *Libellus fidei*.

[4] Cf. especially AUGUSTINE, *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* and *De gestis Pelagii*, *passim*.

[5] AUGUSTINE, *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, I, 35, 36 and II, 24; see below for a discussion of these quotations. I reckon that it was Augustine who introduced the title 'Libellus fidei'; see: *ibid*, I, 30, 33.

misleading.[6] Such accusations, of course, do not contribute to the status of Pelagius's confession and their echoes can be heard up to modern times.[7]

There are however also reasons to give the *Libellus fidei* a more prominent place in Pelagius-research.

First, there is the aspect of genre. The *Libellus fidei* is a confession, systematically stating convictions concerning the faith. In doing so, it obtains a dogmatic focus. In this respect the *Libellus fidei* differs from the other undisputed works in genre: exegetical commentary as in the *Expositiones* and pastoral instruction as in *Ad Demetriadem*. If one sets out to reconstruct Pelagius's theology in its coherence, a confession seems to be a more fitting source than a letter with pastoral instructions intended for a young girl called Demetrias.[8]

Secondly, the *Libellus fidei* has explicitly been written to deal with the accusations cast in Pelagius's teeth and eventually leading to his conviction by Innocentius I. This cannot be said of any other extant writing, whether disputed or undisputed. The *Expositiones* were written before the Pelagian controversy broke out (between 405 and 410 A.D.). *Ad Demetriadem* (approximately 413 A.D.) shows some signs of dispute, but those are not the focus of this letter. The very fact that the *Libellus fidei* is the only extant writing in which Pelagius defends himself against the accusations of his opponents, should be enough to draw our critical but warm interest.

The third reason is that the *Libellus fidei* is Pelagius's last writing, as far as we know. It was written in 417 A.D., directed to pope Innocentius I but because of his death handed to his successor Zosimus. Its late date makes it indispensable for the chronological reconstruction of both the Pelagian controversy and the development of Pelagius's thought.

[6] *E.g.* in *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*: *utquid ergo et hoc damnavit Pelagius, nisi ut catholica synodus falleretur* (II, 14), *absolutionem suam fallendo furatus est* (II, 15), *iam vero in libro fidei suae... multo evidentius se ipsum tegendo nudavit* (II, 24).

[7] Cf. for example the opposite views of J. FERGUSON, *Pelagius: A Historical and Theological Study*, New York 1956, p. 99 and S. WENZLOWSKY, *Die Briefe der Päpste und die an sie gerichteten Schreiben*, (Bibliothek der Kirchenväter), Bd. 3., Kempten 1877, p. 191-2.

[8] Another explicitly dogmatic source, though incomplete, is formed by the preserved Christological and Trinitarian fragments, which are supposed to belong to Pelagius's lost work *De fide trinitatis*.

In this article, I intend to draw attention to a fundamental aspect of the *Libellus fidei*: its textual restoration.[9]

Until the present day, no critical edition has appeared of this work.[10] Since the invention of book printing at least fifteen editions were published, but most of them are dependent on each other, eventually going back to very few manuscripts.[11] Some editions tell us that the text *in vetere codice vaticano repertus est*, together with some letters of Zosimus.[12] This small basis contrasts with the almost

[9] This preliminary survey is part of a dissertation I am preparing for the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, under supervision of prof. dr. P.J.J. van Geest and prof.dr. A. van de Beek.

[10] The lack of critical editions is a remarkable aspect of modern Pelagius-research. Only the *Expositiones* have been edited, by A. Souter, though his textcritical choices have not remained entirely undisputed. A critical edition of *Ad Demetriadem* remains in preparation for some two decades now.

[11] MIGNE's editions: PL 39, 2181-3 (pseudo-Augustine); PL 30, 181 (no text); PL 45, 1716-8; PL 48, 488-91 (pseudo-Jerome); PL 98, 1113-5 (*Libri Carolini*, III, 1).

Pseudo-Jerome: C. BARONIUS, *Annales ecclesiastici*, tom.V, Antwerpen 1596, p. 395-406 (ad anno 417); J. GARNIER, *Iuliani Eclanensis episcopi libellus fidei missus ad sedem apostolicam in causa Pelagianorum*, Paris 1673, p. 225-8; J.D. MANSI (ed.), *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, vol. IV, Graz 1960 (reprint, first edition Firenza 1757-1798), p. 355-8; D. VALLARSI, *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi operum mantissa*, tom. 11, pars 2, Venezia 1771, p. 202-5; C.G.F. WALCH (ed.), *Bibliotheca symbolica*, Lemgo 1770, p. 192-6; W. WALL (ed.), *Historia baptismi infantum*, vol. I, Bremen 1748, p. 372-91.

Pseudo-Augustine: *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi operum*, tom. V, Antwerpen 1700, Appendix IV, p. 274-5 (PL 39, 2181-3).

Libri Carolini (III, 1): H. BASTGEN, (ed.), *Libri Carolini sive Caroli Magni Capitulare de Imaginibus* (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Legum sectio III, Concilia, Tomus II, Suppl.), Hannover 1924, 1979 (repr.), p. 106-8; A. FREEMAN (ed.), *Opus Caroli regis contra synodum (Libri Carolini)*, (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Concilia, Tomus II, Suppl. I), Hannover 1998, p. 336-40.

Combined or synoptic versions: A. and G.L. HAHN, (eds.), *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche*, Breslau 1897[3], p. 288-92 (pseudo-Jerome with notes on variants of pseudo-Augustine and the *Libri Carolini*); J. LAUNOY, *De auctore vero professionis fidei, quae Pelagio, Hieronymo, Augustino tribui vulgo solet*, in: Opera Omnia, tom. 2, pars 2, Köln 1731 (first published in 1651), p. 306-8 (pseudo-Augustine and pseudo-Jerome synoptically).

Cf. also E. DEKKERS, *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina), Turnhout 1995[3], no. 731; J. MACHIELSEN, *Clavis Patristica Pseudepigraphorum Medii Aevi* (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina), Ia, no. 1021 and IIa, no. 1392; H.J. FREDE, *Kirchenschriftsteller. Verzeichnis und Sigel*, Freiburg 1981[3], p. 478; F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi*, tom. IV, Madrid 1954, no. 6370.7; M. LAPIDGE, R.A. SHARPE, *A bibliography of Celtic-Latin literature 400-1200* (Dictionary of Medieval Latin from Celtic Sources, Ancillary Publications, 1), Dublin 1985, p. 5, no. 6.

[12] PL45, 1716; VALLARSI, *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi operum mantissa, 11,2*, p. 202; both referring to Baronius, who is not entirely clear on the subject (*Annales ecclesiastici, V*, p. 400-4). During a short visit to the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana in the early summer of 2007 I have not been able to trace a manuscript containing both

200 manuscripts listed by B. Lambert in his *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*.[13]

Before we focus on the manuscript tradition, we will look at the confession from a redaction-critical point of view and consider the most important redactions: pseudo-Jerome, together with the version found in the *Libri Carolini*, and pseudo-Augustine. Also, we will compare them to some quotes from the *Libellus fidei* in other writings.

Pseudo-Jerome and the Libri Carolini

A remarkable characteristic of Pelagius's writings is that they survived only because the names of his most bitter opponents were placed above it: Augustine and Jerome.[14] In fact, under the orthodox name of the last, the *Libellus fidei* acquired quite some fame during the Middle Ages.[15] It's textual transmission is impressive. Only few of Jerome's writings are attested in as many manuscripts as his opponent's *Libellus fidei*. Even more ironically, Jerome's *Dialogus adversus pelagianorum* is transmitted in less than half as many manuscripts as Pelagius's confession.

Scholars usually refer to the pseudo-Jerome version of the *Libellus fidei*. The text of this tradition makes a genuine impression, ending with the promise to conform to the pope's judgement and expressing the hope that the writer's reputation be restored and that his opponents be exposed as heretics. Neither the pope nor the writer is mentioned by name, but it is clear that this passage fits the situation

the *Libellus fidei* and letters by Zosimus. The matter is of some importance, since a combination of writings of Pelagius and Zosimus suggests that we the writer of the manuscript (or its *Vorlage*) was aware of the Pelagian origin of the *Libellus fidei*. In that case we are perhaps looking for a genuine, non-pseudepigraphic text, perhaps with Pelagius name above it. Cf. also GARNIER (PL 48, 488) and Severinus Binius's short introduction in MANSI (*Sacrorum conciliorum, IV*, p. 355), where a Vatican manuscript is mentioned but not Zosimus's letters.

[13] B. LAMBERT (ed.), *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta* (Instrumenta Patristica IV), vol. IIIA, Steenbrugge 1970, no. 316.

[14] An exception is the commentary, which was also transmitted in an anoymous version.

[15] This fame is attested by the vast manuscript tradition and the many quotations from it by theological authorities. Remigius Lugdunensis, Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard, Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, Duns Scotus and others quoted the confession as a patristic hall-mark of orthodoxy, not knowing whose work they were actually referring to. Peter Lombard even quotes a passage as if it were directed against Pelagius himself: *...quod Hieronymus in Explanatione fidei catholicae ad Damasum Papam, Ioviniani et Manichaei ac Pelagii errores collidens docet...*; PETER LOMBARD, *Sententiae* II, xxviii, 4. A similar harmonization is found in REMIGIUS, *De tribus epistolis liber*, 39; PL 121, 1053-4.

Pelagius was in after the condemnation by Innocentius I. It appears that in pseudo-Jerome we find a text that has not been revised, at least not thoroughly.

Within the pseudo-Jerome tradition we can distinguish two sub-traditions by their respective superscriptions. In some manuscripts the confession is directed to Augustine and Alypius – which is strange given the fact that the text itself addresses *te qui petri et fidem et sedem tenes*. This applies to neither of the two African bishops.[16] In other manuscripts we find a more logical name above the text: pope Damasus, who indeed corresponded with Jerome several times.[17]

The different headings are of some importance. They may help to reconstruct the transmission of the pseudo-Jerome tradition, assuming that scribes were reluctant to change one address into another, which of course may have happened but not very often. From now on, I will indicate these sub-traditions as the A-family (Augustine and Alypius) and the D-family (Damasus). As we will see below, a selection of manuscripts shows that both traditions do have their own variants, though not many significant ones.[18]

The question remains which tradition is the oldest. The earliest manuscripts, dating from the beginning of the ninth century, are from the A-family.[19] The D-family appears to be at least fifty years younger, with many witnesses from the tenth century onwards.[20]

I suspect that some ninth century scribe or redactor has remarked the contradiction between the names of Augustine and Alypius on the one hand and the mentioning of a pope on the other, and decided to correct the apparent mistake in the conviction that Damasus was the most likely alternative. During the Carolingian Renaissance court-scholars like Alcuin revised the Bible and writings of the church fathers, aiming for widely accepted, authentic standard texts. Perhaps

[16] Jerome's correspondence contains one genuine letter to Augustine and Alypius (*ep.* 143), which has a strongly anti-Pelagian character. In several codices this letter stands next to pseudo-Jerome's confession, probably because of the resemblance in address.

[17] JEROME, *ep.* 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 35 and 36.

[18] One significant example is the addition of *dicimus* in a textcritical key-passage (§17), a variant found only in manuscripts from the D-family.

[19] *E.g.* Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, Aug. Perg. 18, f. 16-16v; and Aug. Perg. 52, f. 48-49. One Paris manuscript of the same date mentions no specific address at all; Bibliothèque Nationale Lat. 1451, f 9-10.

[20] The earliest D-witness I have been able to find so far is an incomplete manuscript in The Hague, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 130.E.6, f 6-7, dating from the second half of the ninth century.

the correction of *ad Augustinum et Alypium* into *ad Damasum* has taken place in these circles?

An indication that the *Libellus fidei* was highly regarded at Charlemagne's court, is its incorporation into at least two writings of his court-scholars.

The most important one is the *Libri Carolini*.[21] Obviously, at that time no one was conscious of the Pelagian origin of the confession. It was accepted without question as an orthodox work of Jerome. The last paragraph, addressing the pope directly, has been reworked. Apparently it was not considered an essential part of the confession itself, but more a postscript that may be edited if necessary. The edited wording is adapted to its functioning in the *Libri Carolini*, but shows clear similarities to the original postscript:[22]

Libellus fidei, 26

Haec fides est papa beatissime, quam in *catholica* ecclesia didicimus quamque semper tenuimus <et *tenemus*>. In qua si minus perite aut parum caute aliquid forte positum est emendari cupimus a te, qui Petri et fidem et sedem tenes. Sin autem *haec* nostra *confessio* apostolatus tui iudicio conprobatur, quicumque me macularе voluerit, se inperitum vel malivolum, vel etiam non catholicum non me hereticum conprobabit.

Libri Carolini, III, 1

Haec est catholicae traditionis *fidei* vera integritas, quam sincero corde credimus et fatemur et in hoc opere beati Hieronimi verbis expressam taxavimus. *Haec est* vera *fides*, *hanc confessionem* conservamus atque *tenemus*. Quam quisque inconvulse et intemerate custodierit, perpetuam salutem habebit.

The mentioning of a work *beati Hieronimi* suggests that the *Libri Carolini*-version belongs to the pseudo-Jerome tradition. A preliminary textual comparison based on several pseudo-Jerome manuscripts, confirms this suspicion. In fact, there are no unique variants at all to be found in the *Libri Carolini*, except for a few

[21] *Libri Carolini*, III, 1. In the first version several other confessions were incorporated, but in an early stage their text was erased and replaced by the *Libellus fidei*. According to Freeman this was motivated by the campaign against adoptianism. FREEMAN, *Opus caroli regis contra synodum*, p. 44, 336 (n. 3), 353, 355, 360. The original manuscript, though corrected, redacted and not preserved entirely, is kept in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 7207.

[22] Parallels are indicated by italics. For the text of the *Libellus fidei*, see the work-edition below. The text of the *Libri Carolini* is taken from FREEMAN, *Opus caroli regis contra synodum*, p. 340.

minor differences and of course the redacted postscript.[23] The *Libri Carolini*-text does not clearly concur with either the A- or the D-family, sometimes following readings of the former, at other times following the latter.

Though not fully independent because of its close relation to pseudo-Jerome, and despite of the redaction of the postscript, the *Libri Carolini* must be regarded as an important textual witness, if only for its early date.[24] A clear indication that the main body of the *Libellus fidei* has remained untouched, is the fact that the *filioque* has not been inserted into the text even though Charlemagne held the acknowledgment of it to be essential for salvation.[25]

A second work related to Charlemagne's court, in which parts of the *Libellus fidei* are incorporated, is *De ordine baptismi* by Theodulf of Orléans.[26] Freeman argues that this Spanishman (760-821) is also the writer of the first version of the *Libri Carolini*.[27] Whether he also inserted the *Libellus fidei* into this work, is less clear. His quotations of Pelagius's confession in *De ordine baptismi* are somewhat loose and their textcritical weight must not be overestimated, but generally speaking they match with the *Libri Carolini* text, except for the addition of the *filioque*. Possibly, the redactors of the *Libri Carolini* used the same, or a similar, text as Theodulf did.

The earliest quotation of the pseudo-Jerome text dates from shortly before 780 A.D. Lullus of Mainz, who sent a profession of faith to Rome in order to receive the *pallium*. For the writing of it, he took inspiration from several other confessions, such as the Nicene Creed, the symbol of the Synod of Toledo (675 A.D.) and Pelagius's *Libellus fidei*.

[23] The only variants unique for the *Libri Carolini* compared to pseudo-Jerome, are three differences in word-order: *creata sunt omnia*: 3 1 2 (*Libellus fidei*, 2), *deitatis scilicet*: 2 1 (12) and *omnium potestate*: 2 1 (14), and a passage reading *mansuros* for *permansuros* (15). The differences among manuscripts of pseudo-Jerome are much more numerous and often more significant than these four variants. See also the work-edition below.

[24] The incorporation of the *Libellus fidei* can be dated 793 A.D.; FREEMAN, *Opus caroli regis contra synodum*, p. 36-8, 44, 68.

[25] Cf. also the discussion in *Libri Carolini*, III, 3. The editions of Bastgen and Freeman, following the autograph, do not report any insertion of (*ex patre*) *et filio* (*procedentem*) into the text of the *Libellus fidei*. Migne however does read *et filio*, reprinting an earlier edition of Melchior Goldast. Footnote *a* explains this as a redactional intervention on the basis of III, 3 and 8; see PL 98, 1113. Besides, the insertion of the filioque is quite rare in manuscripts of the Libellus fidei. Among the manuscripts I have been able to consult, only one fifteenth century Paris manuscript adds *et filio*: Bibliothèque Mazarine, 575 (263), f. 63-64v.

[26] THEODULF OF ORLÉANS, *De ordine baptismi*, 7; PL 105, 227-8.

[27] FREEMAN, *Opus caroli regis contra synodum*, p. 12-23

Lullus doesn't make his sources explicit, but W. Levison discovered that he took large parts from Pelagius's confession. He suggests that Lullus used a collection of symbols 'comparable with that of the Augiensis no. xviii of Karlsruhe of the early ninth century'.[28]

Which textual tradition of it did Lullus use? Comparison shows that his quotations match pseudo-Jerome far better than pseudo-Augustine (see below), and that within pseudo-Jerome, Lullus's text is closest to the A-family.[29] It can therefore be used as an early pseudo-Jerome witness, for example in weighing differences with other textual traditions.

Pseudo-Augustine

The pseudo-Augustine version of the *Libellus fidei* is the other main textual tradition. It is found in a lot less manuscripts but still no less interesting. In most editions of Augustine's works it is found as *sermo 236 appendicis*.[30] It concerns a reworking of the text into a sermon and therefore shows evident signs of redaction, clearer than pseudo-Jerome and even the *Libri Carolini*-version.

In the seventeenth century, Jean Garnier suggested that this sermo actually wasn't the confession by Pelagius, but a very similar one by his companion Caelestius. In his *Dissertatio V* Garnier sets out to reconstruct Caelestius's text. In order to do so, he combines the pseudo-Augustine text with quotations of Coelestius found in Augustines work.[31] However, these two do not match. Moreover, quotations by Augustine of *Pelagius's* confession are found verbatim in pseudo-Augustine.

Garnier nevertheless published a synoptical overview of both Pelagius's and Caelestius's confession.[32] The smaller differences in the text he interprets as signs of different authorship. However, according to some manuscripts of pseudo-Jerome those differences do not

[28] W. LEVISON, *England and the Continent in the Eighth Century. The Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford in the Hilary Term 1943*, Oxford 1946, 1956[3], p. 233-40. The quotation is from p. 238. In fact, the indicated manuscript, which is some twenty to thirty years younger than Lullus's profession, is also the basis for our work-edition below.

[29] For this purpose, I have used the text as given by Levison. He admits not to have consulted the manuscript, which was not accessible because of the Second World War, but reconstructed it from other printed editions.

[30] This is the numbering of the Mauristes, the earlier numbering is *sermo de tempore* 191.

[31] J. GARNIER, *Dissertatio V*; PL 48, 497-505.

[32] *Ibid.*

appear at all. Textcritical comparison could have helped him avoid such pitfalls. In short Garniers reconstruction takes too much cutting and pasting to be credible. In modern scholarship his hypothesis is largely forgotten or ignored.

The reception of pseudo-Augustine is less impressive than that of pseudo-Jerome. The most famous use of the pseudo-Augustine version of the *Libellus fidei*, is when Sorbonne scholars in 1521 used it in their *Articulis* against Martin Luther, assuming that they were quoting an authentic sermon by Augustine.[33]

It was the pseudo-Jerome version however that acquired quite some fame in Middle Ages scholasticism. Pseudo-Augustine possibly functioned more in (monasterial) liturgy. For example, there is a Dublin manuscript with sermons for the liturgical period between Easter and Pentecost, incorporating this version of the *Libellus fidei*.[34]

The redactional development of pseudo-Augustine has probably taken place in two stages. First, the postscript was modified in a way similar to what happened with the *Libri Carolini*. Again the last paragraph was apparently considered an editable, non-essential part of the text. The purpose of this redaction was to make the confession suitable for reading in, probably, liturgical settings – for example in monasteries-as is indicated by a repeated *dilectissimi fratres*. This stage of the pseudo-Augustine version can be found in a Vatican manuscript from the ninth century: a text of the *Libellus fidei* with only a modified postscript.[35]

The next stage is the addition of a prologue to the text. When this took place, and to what purpose, is not entirely clear. The Dublin manuscript already mentioned, written in the twelfth or thirteenth century, has the full text of pseudo-Augstine including the prologue. On this basis we may tentatively conclude that the addition of the prologue has taken place somewhere between the ninth and the twelfth century.

Whether the text *between* the prologue and the postscript has been redacted too, is another question. Often, scholars dealing with the *Libellus fidei* ignore the pseudo-Augustine version altogether. Taking the redactional changes and additions (postscript and prologue) into account, this may strike us as a logical choice. Since the pseudo-Jerome version appears much more authentic, this is the version usually referred to.

Nonetheless, it is thinkable that the main body of pseudo-Augustine's text has remained untouched, that is, not touched deliberately.

[33] LAUNOY, *De auctore vero professionis fidei*, p. 303-5.
[34] Dublin, Trinity College Library, 187, f.138-139 (no. 95), saec. xii-xiii.
[35] Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. Lat.191, f49-49v and 51-52v.

To change the postscript serves a clear purpose. The reason why a prologue was added is less clear, but it suits the character of the text as it was at that time.

Between the prologue and the postscript, we find a text that shows significant differences with pseudo-Jerome. We will discuss some differences shortly below. But none of those variants arose evidently from the same motivation as the redaction of the postscript. They might as well be textual variants from a tradition that has developed independently from pseudo-Jerome for centuries.

One example may serve to illustrate this. In his *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, Augustine quotes the *Libellus fidei* three times.[36] The first and third quotation are in fact verbatim identical. It concerns a phrase focussing on baptism. When we compare Augustine's version of it to pseudo-Augustine and pseudo-Jerome, we find that they differ in only one word:[37]

De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, I, 35; II, 24	*Libellus fidei*, 17 (pseudo-Augustine)	*Libellus fidei*, 17(pseudo-Jerome)
Baptisma unum tenemus, quod isdem sacramenti verbis in infantibus, quibus etiam in maioribus dicimus *esse celebrandum.*	*Baptisma unum tenemus, quod iisdem sacramenti verbis in infantibus, quibus etiam in maioribus* dicimus *esse celebrandum.*	*Baptisma unum tenemus, quod isdem sacramenti verbis in infantibus, quibus etiam in maioribus* [asserimus] *esse celebrandum.*

When we compare Augustine's quotation to the two main traditions of the *Libellus fidei*, it strikes that it matches the pseudo-Augustine version exactly. Pseudo-Jerome however, has two variants: one omitting any verb, one with *asserimus*. Augustine's quotation occurs twice and both are verbatim identical, and stems from a tradition that has come to us independently from the transmission of the *Libellus fidei*. When we use Augustine's quotation as a reference point for trying pseudo-Jerome and pseudo-Augustine, the last one turns out to be the best, at least in this case.[38]

[36] AUGUSTINE, *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, I, 35, 36; II, 24.

[37] Cf. also a paraphrase of the same passage in *ibid.*, II, 1. The italics indicate parallels. The text of Augustine is taken from CSEL 42, p. 152-3, 182, the pseudo-Augustine text from PL 39, 2183, see also the work-edition below. The pseudo-Jerome text is taken from the same work-edition, of which the critical apparatus shows that some pseudo-Jerome manuscripts of the D-family add the word *asserimus* (indicated above between square brackets).

[38] Augustine's other quotation (*De gratia Christi*, I, 36) comes from *Libellus fidei* 25: *Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos indigere dei semper auxilio.*

Until is proved otherwise, then, it seems wise to treat the main body of pseudo-Augustine as a source to reckon with for the textcritical reconstruction of the *Libellus fidei*, next to pseudo-Jerome and the *Libri Carolini*.

We now turn to a brief discussion of the prologue, the pseudo-Augustine variants and the postscript.

The opening sentences of the prologue were borrowed from an encyclical of the Synod of Sardica (343/4 A.D.), which reacted against spreading Arianism in the empire. Why especially this Sardica text was used, is not clear. The *Libellus fidei* criticizes Arianism, but also a whole range of other contemporary 'heresies'.

We now give the full text of the prologue of pseudo-Augustine's *Libellus fidei* and the relevant passage from the Sardica encyclical:[39]

Libellus fidei
(pseudo-Augustine prologue)

Multa quidem et frequenter ausi sunt Ariani haeretici adversus servos Dei, qui fidem rectam et catholicam custodiunt, per *adulterinam doctrinam* as*sere*re, et *orthodoxos persequi tentaverunt. In tantum autem nunc exsurrexerunt contra fidem*, ita *ut* multos ex vobis polluerint, et aures vestras commoverint, *ut* animas laniarent.

Sceleratae autem haeresis suae perfidiam tegunt: sed non diutius haec illis facere permissum est. Est enim

Synod of Sardica

Multa quidem et frequenter ausi sunt Arriani heretici adversus servos Dei, qui fidem rectam et catolicam custodiunt. Adulterinam <namque> *doctrinam* in*sere*ntes *orthodoxos persequi tem*taverunt. *In tantum autem nunc exsurrexerunt contra fidem*, <*ut*> non religiosam pietatem id clementissimorum imperatorum lateret... *etc.*

Remarkably, the sequence of these words is the same in every textual witness of pseudo-Jerome I have been able to consult, while in the traditions of Augustine and pseudo-Augustine the word-order differs from manuscript to manuscript.

[39] The italics indicate parallels. The text of pseudo-Augustine is taken from PL 39, 2181, but see also the work-edition below. The text of the Synod of Sardica is taken from A. FEDER's edition in CSEL 65, p. 103-6. This edition prints several Greek and Latin versions of the text next to each other. I have followed the Latin of Hilarius of Poitiers, not because this is necessarily the most reliable one, but because it is closest to pseudo-Augustine's version of the *Libellus fidei*. Apparently, it is from this translation that the editor of pseudo-Jerome borrowed these words. According to Gelzer, Hilarius's translation is 'viel schlechter' than the other Latin translation that is taken from the collection of Dionisius Diaconus. Neither Gelzer nor Feder has recognized the borrowing of the Synod's letter for pseudo-Augustine's *sermo app.* 236. I. GELZER, 'Das Rundschreiben der Synode von Serdika', in: Zeitschrift für neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 40 (1941), p. 12-3. Cf. also E. DEKKERS, *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina), Turnhout 1995[3], no. 448, and references.

gubernator ecclesiarum suarum Dominus, qui pro omnibus nobis mortem sustinuit.

Et ideo indeficiens nobis est oratio, dilectissimi fratres: primo, ut sancta Domini et catholica ecclesia dissensionibus omnibus et haeresibus carens, unitatem spiritus in vinculo charitatis ubique conservet, quam per fidem rectam et vitam immaculatam tenere, amplecti, servare, custodire omnibus invocantibus Dominum est quidem justum, praecipue tamen episcopis, qui ecclesiis praesunt; secundo, ut ecclesiae regula sanctaque patrum traditio atque judicia in perpetuum firma solidaque permaneant. Est autem patrum nostrorum fides haec: (Credimus... *etc.*)

Now we turn to the brief discussion of some passages in which pseudo-Augustine differs from pseudo-Jerome. For each variant the question is: is this reading original, or inferior?

The first two passages run as follows:[40]

Libellus fidei, 2, 6 (pseudo-Jerome)	*Libellus fidei*, 2, 6 (pseudo-Augustine)
Non factum aut adoptivum sed genitum et unius cum Patre substantiae, <quod Greci dicunt homoousion> *atque ita per omnia aequalem Deo Patri* (...)	*Non factum aut adoptivum sed genitum, unius cum Patre substantiae,* quod Graeci dicunt homoousion, *atque ita per omnia aequalem Deo Patri* (...)
Non enim nomina tantummodo sed etiam nominum proprietates, id est personas vel ut Greci exprimunt epotasis hoc est subsistentias, *confitemur.*	*Non enim nomina tantummodo sed etiam nominam proprietates, id est, personas confitemur.*

The omitted phrase *ut Greci exprimunt epostatis hoc est subsistentias* is in every manuscript and printed edition of pseudo-Jerome I

[40] Italics indicate parallel wording. For pseudo-Jerome see the work-edition below. Pseudo-Augustine is taken from PL 39, 2181-3, but see also the work-edition.

have consulted. However, the similar phrase *quod Graeci dicunt homoousion*, found in pseudo-Augustine, is omitted in almost every pseudo-Jerome manuscript, though not in the printed editions. In short, the ambivalent textual evidence on both these sentences casts serious doubt on their authenticity.[41]

Another passage in paragraph 13:[42]

Libellus fidei, 13 (pseudo-Jerome)	*Libellus fidei*, 13 (pseudo-Augustine)
Mortuus <est> ergo Dei Filius secundum scripturas iuxta id quod mori poterat, resurrexit tertia die, ascendit in caelum, sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris, manente *ea*<dem> *natura carnis in qua natus et passus est, in qua etiam resurrexit.*	*Mortuus est ergo Dei Filius ea*dem *natura carnis, in qua natus et passus est, in qua etiam resurrexit.*

Is this an omission in pseudo-Augustine, or an expansion in pseudo-Jerome? Fact is that the omitted or added phrase resembles both the Apostolicum and the symbol of Nicea-Constantinople, which seem to have served roughly as models for Pelagius while he was designing his own confession. Second, the ascension to heaven is omitted altogether, so that the line of argument in pseudo-Augustine seems to 'jump' from Jesus's death and resurrection to his return from heaven. Third, the text of pseudo-Jerome seems to echo Romans 8:34 and Pelagius's commentary to that text.[43] Last, the words following this passage fit better to pseudo-Jerome than pseudo-Augustine.[44] I assume therefore that in this passage the text of pseudo-Augustine is inferior.

We find a similar problem in the next section:[45]

[41] Compare for details the critical apparatus of the work-edition below.

[42] The italics indicate parallels. The text of pseudo-Jerome is taken from the work-edition below; pseudo-Augustine is taken from PL 39, 2182, but see also the work-edition.

[43] A. SOUTER, *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul. II: Text* (Texts and Studies vol. IX), Cambridge 1926, Eugene 2004 (repr.), p. 70.

[44] I.e. *Non enim (!) exinanita est humanitatis substantia, sed glorificata in aeternum cum deitate mansura. Venturus est ad judicium vivorum et mortuorum, ut et justos remuneret, et puniat peccatores* (PL 39, 2182). The word *enim* seems to refer to *manente*.

[45] The italics indicate parallels. The text of pseudo-Jerome is taken from the work-edition below; the text of pseudo-Augustine is taken from PL 39, 2182, but see also the work-edition.

Libellus fidei, 13-14 (pseudo-Jerome)	*Libellus fidei*, 13-14 (pseudo-Augustine)
...sed glorificata et *in aeternum cum deitate mansura.* Accepta ergo a Patre omnium potestate quae in caelo sunt et in terra, *venturus est ad iudicium vivorum* ac *mortuorum, ut et iustos remuneret et puniat peccatores.*	*...sed glorificata in aeternum cum deitate mansura. Venturus est ad iudicium vivorum* et *mortuorum, ut et iustos remuneret et puniat peccatores.*

It is difficult to judge whether this is an expansion or an omission. I reckon an unintended omission to be unlikely, since it concerns a complete ad neatly fitting phrase. Unintended omissions however tend to leave mutilated sentences.

Deliberate deleting is nevertheless possible. The phrase *accepta ergo a patre omnium potestate* echoes Matthew 28:18, but in a modified wording. As the Vulgate and the Old Latin read: *data est mihi omnes potestas*. Perhaps some scribe fell over this and removed the passage (which is in that case authentic)? On the other hand, the eight century quotation by Lullus Remigiensis leaves out these words, which suggests that they were missing in early pseudo-Jerome manuscripts as well (which indicates that these words were not authentic).[46] In this case, arguments pro and contra weigh up to each other, leaving the final verdict over this passage yet to be reached.

In paragraph 18 we find a possible addition:[47]

Libellus fidei, 18 (pseudo-Jerome)	*Libellus fidei*, 18 (pseudo-Augustine)
Hominem, si post baptismum lapsus fuerit, per penitentiam credimus posse salvari.	*Hominem, si post baptismum lapsus fuerit*, primo per reconciliationem, deinde *per penitentiam credimus posse salvari.*

As with the previous two, I have found this variant in no other textual tradition than pseudo-Augustine. And again it is difficult to judge whether it was added, or removed in some early stage of transmission of pseudo-Jerome. Since the distinction between reconciliation and penitence was no matter of dispute during the Pelagian controversy, and since Pelagius seemed anxious not to spend too many words on the matter, I find it hard to escape the impression that the phrase was inserted later, in order to specify its meaning.

[46] See above for a discussion of Lullus's quotations.

[47] The italics indicate parallels. The text of pseudo-Jerome is taken from the work-edition below; the text of pseudo-Augustine is taken from PL 39, 2183.

All together, some variants of pseudo-Augustine may be authentic, while others appear additions or omissions. As is the case with other traditions, also pseudo-Augustine remains to be treated with caution.

Last, we take a look at the closing paragraph, which has been subject to redactional changes. It's text is as follows, compared to pseudo-Jerome:[48]

Libellus fidei, 26 (pseudo-Jerome)	*Libellus fidei*, 26 (pseudo Augustine)
Haec fides est papa beatissime, *quam in catholica ecclesia didicimus quamque semper tenuimus <et tenemus>*. In qua si minus perite aut parum caute aliquid forte positum est emendari cupimus a te, qui Petri et fidem et sedem tenes. Sin autem haec nostra confessio apostolatus tui iudicio conprobatur, quicumque me maculare voluerit, se inperitum vel malivolum, vel etiam non catholicum non me hereticum conprobabit.	*Haec est fides,* dilectissimi fratres, *quam in catholica didicimus ecclesia, quamque semper tenuimus et tenemus,* quam credimus et a vestra bonitate deinceps posse teneri.

What strikes most, is that the original postscript has been abridged by more than a half. Only the first sentence of the original was fit to survive, the passage on heresy and papal approvement was not relevant in the new context and therefore deleted. One compact phrase ends the 'sermon'.

The fact that *et tenemus* is found in the pseudo-Augustine version, is important for textcritical reasons. Until now, I have not found these words in any manuscript of the pseudo-Jerome tradition. They are however in the printed editions I consulted. To conclude, these words probably belong to the original, but were dropped out in a later stage of pseudo-Jerome's textual transmission.[49]

The textual transmission

The following overview roughly sketches the textual transmission of the *Libellus fidei*, based on the above analysis. The overview

[48] The italics indicate parallels. The text of pseudo-Jerome is taken from the work-edition below; the text of pseudo-Augustine is taken from PL 39, 2183, but see also the work-edition.

[49] Cf. also the passage above on the postscript of the *Libri Carolini*, where *atque tenemus* is possibly a remnant of the same text. All this together makes it defendable to incorporate *et tenemus* between sharp brackets in the work-edition below.

is provisional, illustrating the evidence seen so far in manuscript and printed edition. For a full stemma more research is necessary. Only a minority of the at least 200 manuscripts has been consulted.

In the overview, the capitalized text indicates the main traditions. The dotted lines pointing to names in italics, indicate quotations from the *Libellus fidei*. These reveal something about the reception of Pelagius's confession. After Augustine, who was quite aware of who he was quoting, several early and later mediaeval writers used the *Libellus fidei* assuming that it was written by Jerome or Augustine.

The quotations also have some textcritical relevance. Especially the quotations by Augustine, Lullus and the writers of the *Libri Carolini* antedate the earliest extant manuscripts of the *Libellus fidei*. Early quotations, especially the longer and unedited ones, supplement our findings from the manuscript tradition and are for that reason incorporated into the following overview.



Printed editions

Since the invention of book-printing, several editions of the Libellus fidei have appeared. These editions have been very different in scope. From the collections of works of Jerome and Augustine to collected symbols, from discussions on the *Libellus fidei* itself to a historical survey of infant baptism.[50]

Today, Migne's reprints are the most commonly used. For this reason, I decided to incorporate them in my work-edition of the *Libellus fidei* below by their volume-number (*viz. PL39*, *PL45* and *PL48*), and not by the name of their sources. I will do the same in the following discussion of the editions.

Generally speaking, the printed editions I have consulted form a text group of their own. In several readings, they resemble each other and differ from most of the consulted manuscripts. First, there are changes in word order. The editions for example read unanimously *in christo hominem confitetur* in paragraph 9 and *confiteri necesse est* in paragraph 12. Secondly, the editions add words and phrases, like (*duas*) *esse* in paragraph 9 and *et tenemus* in paragraph 26.

In a number of cases the printed editions concur with other traditions, like pseudo-Augustine, *e.g.* the addition of *quod Graeci dicunt homoousion* in paragraph 2.[51] Also, a group of manuscripts of Italian origin shares some variants, for example the addition of *confitemur et* in paragraph 15. This sheds some light on the provenance of the manuscript or the editions are based upon: they probably are of Italian origin. This confirms what we have already discussed above, that some editions refer to an ancient Vatican manuscript.

Though the printed editions seem to go back to very few, closely related manuscripts, some resemble each other more than others.

Volume 48 of the *Patrologia Latina*, for example, is a reprint of Garnier's edition of Marius Mercator.[52] The edition omits the phrase *non (...) quae adsumpsit sed secundum illam*, in paragraph 12. In 1673 Garnier published an edition of a confession similar to the *Libellus fidei*, attributed by him to Julianus of Eclanum. In this work he also included a text of Pelagius's confession. Remarkably, this 1673-edition leaves

[50] For a list of printed editions, see above, note 11.

[51] Of the nineteen consulted manuscripts of pseudo-Jerome, I have found this variant only in Utrecht, University Library, 4.J.19 (106), f.61a-64a (saec. xv, D-family). See also the discussion in the above paragraph on pseudo-Augustine.

[52] Within this work, the text of the *Libellus fidei* is found in *Dissertatio V*. After the text of Pelagius, Garnier sets out to reconstruct Caelestius's *Libellus fidei* based on pseudo-Augustine (PL 48, 497-505). The weaknesses of his approach have been discussed above.

out the same phrase, only maintaining the preceding *non* and thereby creating an opposite meaning.

Apart from this editorial mistake and a somewhat different paragraph division, 1673-edition concurs with Garnier's text as we now find it in Migne. Therefore, in the work-edition below of these two only PL 48 will be incorporated.

Two other editions closely related to each other, are those of Hahn and Walch, both collections of symbols. Hahn probably used the text of Walch for his edition, as his text matches exactly with that of Walch. He also copied the omission of *non enim aliter confiteri possumus eternum patrem nisi confiteamur etiam coeternum filium* in paragraph 3. The omission is caused by the homoioteleuton *filium-filium* and found only in these two editions.

This indicates that Hahn's edition does not offer a fully reliable text, despite of its semi-critical reputation deserved by the footnotes with variants from the *Libri Carolini* and pseudo-Augustine. Since Hahn's edition is used more widely than Walch's, I will refer also to him in the critical work-text below.

Another coherent group is formed by PL 45, Baronius and Mansi. PL 45 is referred to more often than other versions, combining the accessibility of the *Patrologia Latina* series with a rather reliable text (Garnier being too deviant, Hahn being less accessible). Baronius has of course been of foundational importance with his *Annales ecclesiastici*, but the quality of his work has later been criticized. It is referred to in several other editions, among which PL 45 and PL 48. Mansi offers a collection of documents related to councils and synods. His text of the *Libellus fidei* has been translated into German by Wenzlowsky.[53]

Their texts resemble each other, for example in paragraph 6 where they read *confutantes* instead of *confundentes*, and *confitemur* instead of *fatemur*. The only main difference is that for some reason, Baronius and Mansi omit the phrase *tres personas expressas sub proprietate* in paragraph 6, while PL 45 doesn't.[54]

Vallarsi and Wall do not clearly belong to a group, at some places their readings concur, though seldom exclusively. Vallarsi published an edition of Jerome's work that was formerly widely used.

[53] WENZLOWSKY, *Die Briefe der Päpste, III*, p. 191-2.

[54] Whether the omission occurs already in a manuscript, or while editing the text for print, is not entirely clear. In the former case, PL 45 is possibly based on another manuscript than Baronius and Mansi. In the latter case, the Mauristes, on whose work PL 45 is based, have either remarked and corrected the omission of Baronius, or simply did a better job copying the same manuscript. I suspect that the omission has occurred while editing the text for print.

Wall focussed on the history of infant baptism, printing the *Libellus fidei* for its remarks on baptism. His edition is well annotated and comes with an English translation.

To conclude, the printed editions go back to few, closely related manuscripts. Apparently no textcritical comparisons have been made. Several editions mistakenly omit entire phrases (Walch, Hahn, Baronius, Mansi, Garnier, PL 48). Either they used unreliable sources, or their redaction and print setting happened uncarefully. It is striking that the edition that appears to be the most scientific, Hahn, is not reliable itself in its text. All together, Wall, Vallarsi en PL 45 seem to make the best impression, but of these only the last is easily and widely accessible.

Consulted manuscripts

For the purpose of this survey, I have consulted a selection of the large amount of manuscripts containing some version of the *Libellus fidei*.[55] I would like to emphasize that the text given below must therefore not be seen as a definitive critical edition but as a work-edition, intended to compare printed editions and manuscript evidence and trace the most important textcritical points of discussion.

For the selection of the manuscripts, I have used three criteria. First, the selection is focussed mainly on manuscripts of Italian and Northern French provenance. Second, the manuscripts date from a period ranging from the ninth to the fifteenth century. Third, I have attempted to find witnesses from all textual traditions: pseudo-Jerome (A- and D-family) and pseudo-Augustine. For reasons of brevity, only the most typical manuscripts will be displayed separately in the work-edition.[56]

[55] For the heuristics, Lambert's overview (*Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*, IIIA, no. 316) has been taken as a starting point. A few things however must be kept in mind. First, his list of manuscripts is based on catalogues and not on original manuscripts; second, it is incomplete as it misses the codices that can be found in catalogues published after 1970; and third, Lambert focusses on the pseudo-Jerome tradition only. Some corrections and additions are listed in J. DIVJAK, F. RÖMER, 'Ergänzungen zur Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta (1)', in: Scriptorium 30 (1976), p. 105. Pseudo-Augustine is covered by HÜWA: *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des heiligen Augustinus*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission zur Herausgabe des Corpus der lateinischen Kirchenväter, vol i-, Wien 1969-. A problem is that HÜWA is still incomplete, as for example volumes on France have not yet appeared.

[56] The consulted manuscripts are listed below. Those marked with an * are incorporated into the work-edition:
*Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 575 (263), f. 63-64v (saec. xv, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
*Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 1451, f. 9-10 (saec. ix, pseudo-Jerome, no A/D-family);
*Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 1867, f. 115-116 (saec. ix, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);

As for their provenance, France and Italy are area's of some significance. Northern France has a rich history of textual transmission, with important scriptoria in for example Corbie, Tours and Saint-Germain-des-Prés. The provenance of manuscripts now in French public libraries is not always clear. Many manuscripts from local monasteries and cathedrals were confiscated during the French Revolution. The information on their origin often doesn't reach back further than what monastry or cathedral it originates from.

Italy has a manuscript tradition of its own.[57] In the *Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana* several ancient codices are preserved. As already indicated, the printed editions appear to have a connection with Italian traditions. Further, there is a group of Italian manuscripts that has a few specific variants in common. For example, in the last paragraph

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 1896, f. 107-108 (saec. xiv, pseudo-Jerome, D-family);
Alençon, Bibliothèque Municipale, 9, f. 2-3 (saec. xiii, pseudo-Jerome, D-family);
Angers, Bibliothèque Municipale, 154 (146), f. 58v-59v (saec. xii, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale, 386 (E.248), f. 36-36v (saec. xii, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
*Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, Aug. Perg. 18, f. 16-16v (saec. ix, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, Aug. Perg. 52, f. 48-49 (saec. ix, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
Vatican City, B.A.V., Palat. Lat. 186, f. 1-3v (saec. ix, pseudo-Jerome, no A/D-family);
*Vatican City, B.A.V., Reg. Lat. 191, 49-49v, 51-52v, (saec. ix, pseudo-Augustine);
Vatican City, B.A.V., Reg. Lat. 192, f. 131-131v (saec. xii, pseudo-Jerome, D-family);
*Vatican City, B.A.V., Vat. Lat. 341, f. 49-50 (saec. x-xi, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
Vatican City, B.A.V., Vat. Lat. 355, f 73-74v (saec. ix-x, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
Vatican City, B.A.V., Vat. Lat. 650, f. 37v-38v (saec. x, pseudo-Jerome, A-family);
Belluno, Biblioteca Lolliniana, 3, f. 43-44 (saec. xv, pseudo-Jerome, D-family);
*Den Haag, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 130.E.6, f. 6-7 (saec. ix, pseudo-Jerome, D-family);
*Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Voss. Lat. F29, f. 2v-3v (saec. xii, pseudo-Jerome, D-family)
Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Periz. F.36, f. 81-82v (saec. xv, pseudo-Jerome, D-family)
*Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek, 4.J.19 (106), f. 61a-64a (saec. xv, pseudo-Jerome, D-family)

[57] It is perhaps also worth remarking that in Italy the *Libellus fidei* was first read, since it was sent to Rome. There Pelagius had worked for years and apparently gained support, which is indicated at least by the resignation of eighteen bishops refusing to subscribe Zosimus's *Epistola Tractoria* in which Pelagius was condemned. Whether this means that Italian textual traditions should be taken more seriously than others, is of course another question.

they read *culpare* and *catholico nomine* instead of *maculare* and *catholicum non me*.[58]

Today, most manuscripts are found in the Paris and Vatican libraries, followed by those of Milan, London and Firenza. Further, there are manuscripts in libraries all over Western Europe. By my knowledge, the *Libellus fidei*, although written from Jerusalem, has not entered the Greek world, for example in translated form.

It is striking that manuscripts with pseudo-Jerome texts are numerous, while pseudo-Augustine is quite seldom. For this survey, I have not yet been able to find more than two and consult more than one pseudo-Augustine manuscript. In the work-edition below I will exhibit the consulted Vatican manuscript together with the printed editions of Migne (based on the Benedictine edition of Augustine's works, indicated in the critical apparatus as *PL39*) and Launoy (A^{Lau}).

The following work-edition of the *Libellus fidei* is based on the Aug. Perg. 18 from the Badische Landesbibliothek in Karlsruhe, dating from the beginning of the ninth century. It is one of the oldest manuscripts consulted, a famous one too, finding its origin in the reputed monastery of Reichenau and, concerning the *Libellus fidei*, offering an overall convincing text of the pseudo-Jerome tradition (in this case, the A-family). Pseudo-Jerome includes a postscript that is probably original and un-redacted, and deserves therefore, at least in the choice of a basis-text, priority over pseudo-Augustine.

At the end of the work-edition a collation of the pseudo-Augustine prologue and postscript will be displayed as well, based on the text of Migne, which concurs far better with the consulted manuscript than Launoy. The manuscript itself does not include the prologue, and can therefore not serve as a basis for the collation.

The same is done with the postscript as redacted in the *Libri Carolini*, based on Freeman's edition.

We now turn to the discussion of the displayed manuscripts. Unless indicated otherwise, the originals have been consulted. The presented literature is not exhaustive but offers a starting point for further investigation. The manuscripts are codified as follows:[59] first a serial number (of applicable), then a capital letter indicating the main tradition, next a letter indicating the sub-tradition (if applicable), and lastly a numbers roughly indicating the century. For example, *2Ha9* means:

[58] *I.e.* the Vaticana Latina 341 and 650 and the Paris Bibliothèque Mazarine, 575 (263). Cf. also the similar though not identical text of the quotations in THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, II, ii, 11.2 and WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, *Dialogus*, I, iii, 50; I, vii, 71.

[59] This system is loosely inspired by the codification of Qumran-manuscripts.

2 the serial number
H pseudo-Jerome (A stands for pseudo-Augustine)
a A-family (d stands for D-family, x for texts without addressee)
9 ninth century

Similarly, *Hx9* is a pseudo-Jerome without addressee, thus not belonging to the D- or A tradition, stemming from the ninth century; while *A9* is a pseudo-Augustine manuscript from the ninth century.

A9 **Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg.Lat. 191, f.49-49^{v}, 51-52^{v}**

Date: saec. ix-x (Carey: 800-825)

Provenance: Reims

Family: pseudo-Augustine

Parchment, 105+V ff., 175×125 mm, written in single column. The manuscript contains various works on ecclesiastical offices, grace, sin, free will and predestination, penitence, Trinitarian dogma, etc.

Pelagius's confession is incorporated in the early, short, pseudo-Augustine redaction. The catalogue (p. 453) refers to PL 39, 2181-2183, which indicates that the text has been recognized as pseudo-Augustinian, but nevertheless misinteprets the title above the text. The words *ex libro s(an)c(t)i aug(ustini)* are mistakenly suggested to refer to Augustine's quotations in *De gratia christi*. An easier and more evident solution would be that the given text is taken from a manuscript with works of Augustine, to whom it is therefore ascribed.

Significantly, it is immediately followed by a part of a treatise by Hincmar, archbishop of Reims (see PL 125, 63-64), explaining the *libero arbitrio*, already mentioned in the last paragraphs of the *Libellus fidei*, in a Augustinian sense, *viz.* that it was before the fall that man possessed this free will.

The codex contains several penitential texts, among which a list of penitential questions integrated into liturgical ordines, connected to the penitential of Halitgar of Cambrai (before 830). According to Gaastra, this type of penitentials began to appear from the late ninth century onwards (p. 87-8), which fits the date indicated by the catalogue (saec. ix-x, Carey however estimated 800-825, p. 57). Overall, free will and predestination together with sin and penance seem to form the themes of this small manuscript.

The version of the *Libellus fidei* in Reg. Lat. 191 attests an early redaction of pseudo-Augustine, without the prologue by

which it has become known in the printed editions (PL 39 and Launoy). The variants typical of pseudo-Augustine (see the discussion above), are all found in this manuscript.
The text of Reg. Lat. 191 is much closer to PL 39 (*i.e.* the Benedictine edition) than to the version of Launoy, in which second person plurals (*vobis*, *vestras*) have turned into first person plurals (*nobis*, *nostras*). The overall impression is that the Vatican manuscript confirms the quality of Migne's version of the text. From this we may infer that also Migne's version of the prologue, not included in the manuscript, is to be regarded the better one, at least for now.
Literature: F.M. CAREY, 'The Scriptorium of Reims during the Archbishopric of Hincmar', in: *Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of Edward Kennard Rand*, New York 1938, p. 41-60; A. CERLINI, 'Una scuola Francesi di tachigrafi nel secolo IX', in: *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati*, vol. VI: Paleografia, Bibliografia, Varia (Studi e Testi 126), Città del Vaticano 1946, p. 122-46; A.H. GAASTRA, 'Penance and the Law: the Penitential Canons of the *Collection in Nine Books*', in: Early Medieval Europe 14, I (2006), p. 85–102; M. OBERLEITNER, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des heiligen Augustinus*, Bd. I/1: Italiën (Sitzungsberichte 263), Wien 1969, p. 389; *idem*, Bd. I/2: Italiën (Sitzungsberichte 267), Wien 1970, p. 338; A. WILMART, *Codices Reginensis Latini*, tom. I: Codices 1-250, Città del Vaticano 1937, p. 452-8.

Hx9 **Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 1451, f. 9-10**
Date: 800-816
Provenance: Saint-Maur-des-Fossés
Family: pseudo-Jerome (no addressee indicated)
Parchment, 108 ff., 325×235 mm., written in single column. The manuscript is a collection of confessions, letters, a popelist, council-texts and canons. It contains the *collectio canonum* by Dionysius Exiguus († 540), in the recension of Saint-Maur-des-Fossés, from where this manuscript originates. Other witnesses of this collection are the Vatican Reg. Lat. 1127 and The Hague, Museum Meermanno, 10B4. Most scholars believe that the Paris and Vatican manuscripts are copies of the Meermanno-codex (see Boeren and Levison for references). Unfortunately, the first part of the Dutch manuscript has been lost, including the *Libellus fidei*. I have not yet been able to consult the Vatican witness. The three manuscripts are assumed to have their origin in an archetype from about 600 A.D.

By my knowledge, *Hx9* is, together with *1Ha9* (see below), the oldest manuscript containing the *Libellus fidei* in its pseudo-Jerome version. Opinions differ somewhat on the exact dating (some argue 796, Rand estimates a careful 'before 816'), which is based on a list of popes on f. 6v-7. Its original provenance is disputed. Also it has been suggested that *Hx9* was written in Tours, but it was again Rand who contested that opinion.

In the margin at the beginning of our confession we find written in a late hand: *Pelagij, non Hiernonymj*. The text itself contains many minor and major corrections, especially on folio 9v, apparently most of them made by the writer itself. I have tried to identify the original wording of some passages written *in rasura* by using ultra violet light, though without result. There are also some small variant readings, sometimes concurring with *Hd9* (see below), sometimes without parallel in other manuscripts or printed editions. Since many of these variants are added, changed or removed during the correcting of the text, I am inclined to doubt the their value. They are perhaps more likely to be attributed to an uncareful scribe than to some unique textual tradition.

A few variants and unclear passages are not or only briefly mentioned in the work-edition below because of their complexity:

§2: lacuna between *esse* and *confitemur*, the original text is illegible.

§6: <u>*nomen vel*</u> in stead of *nominum*. Does the underlining indicate a correction, and if so, what kind of correction?

§6: omission of *epostasis*, possibly as a result of parapblepsis with *hoc est*.

§10: the somewhat puzzling phrase *quod nulla [……..] haeresis profiteri videatur a confusione utraque…*, already deviant from the majority reading, has been corrected into *quod non nulla [……..] haeresis profiteri videatur quod confusioni utraque et….* The lacuna probably once contained the word *umquam*, as in other manuscripts.

§12: instead of *tota trinitas quam* the text reads: *tot<u>a</u> trinitas^{<u>te</u>} <u>quam.</u>* The text however difficult to decipher and the meaning of the underlining is unclear.

§25: *et peccare et non peccare posse* (a specifically Pelagian phrase) is written *in rasura*. The same counts for *et fidem et sedem tenes*. The original text is illegible.

Literature: P.C. BOEREN, *Catalogus van de handschriften van het Rijksmuseum Meermanno-Westreenianum*, Den Haag 1979, p. 29-31; K. KÜNSTLE, Eine Bibliothek der Symbole und Theologischer Traktate (Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur - und Dogmengeschichte, I, 4), Mainz 1900, p. 35-42, 119-21. LAMBERT, *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*, IIIA, p. 85; W. LEVISON, *Handschriften des Museum Meermanno-Westreenianum im Haag* (Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für altere deutsche Geschichtskunde 38), Hannover/Leipzig 1913, p. 513-18; E.A. LOWE, *Codices Latini Antiquores*, vol. V, Oxford 1950, p. 4-5, nr. 528; *idem*, *Supplement*, Oxford 1970, p. 53; F. MAASSEN, *Geschichte der Quellen und der Literatur des canonischen Rechts*, Bd. I, Gratz 1870, p. 613-24; E.K. RAND, 'A Supplement on Dodaldus', in: Speculum (1931), p. 587-99; *Bibliothèque Nationale Catalogue Général des Manuscrits Latins*, vol. II, Paris 1940, p. 7.

1Ha9 **Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, Aug. Perg. 18, f. 16-16^{v}**

Date: first quarter of the ninth century (Bischoff), ca. 806 (Holder), 802-806 (Künstle)

Provenance: Reichenau

Family: pseudo-Jerome, A-family

Parchment, 90 ff., 418×294 mm., written in two columns. Aug. Perg. 18 is a well-known collection of symbols, dating from the early church up to Charlemagne. I have consulted the manuscript from a photographic colour-reproduction.

The codex is mentioned already in the Reichenauer catalogue from 821/822. The text, written by librarian Reginbert von Reichenau in a clear Carolingian minuscule, contains several small corrections, mostly forgotten letters of adaptations in spelling. These appear to have been placed by the scribe himself, except for at least one correction: the addition of *(sed) ITA* in §5, the colour of the ink and the capital writing clearly differing from the other corrections. In §14 the text appears to read...*sint et in terra*, which is clearly a mistake and not attested anywhere else. Probably the *u* and the *n* of *sunt* have collided into *in*. The text does not give any further remarkable variants. By my knowledge, *1Ha9* is, together with *Hx9*, the oldest textual witness of pseudo-Jerome. Künstle (p. 40) argues that *Hx9* is dependent on *1Ha9*, but this is not quite confirmed by textual comparison; see the critical apparatus below. Its provenance from

Reichenau, like Sankt Gallen one of the most prominent monasteries of the Carolingian age, adds some to its status. Souter's explorations into the textual transmission of Pelagius's *Expositiones* led to another Karlsruhe manuscript from Reichenau, the monastery of which is supposed to have had connections with Italian scriptoria. Being one of the oldest manuscripts, copied much more careful than *Hx9*, and of such reliable origin, *1Ha9* seems the most likely candidate to be used as the basis for a critical work-edition.

Literature: B. BISCHOFF, *Katalog der festländischen Handschriften des neunten Jahrhunderts (mit Ausnahme der wisigotischen)*, (Veröffentlichungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), Teil I, Wiesbaden 1998, p. 333, no. 1590; K. KÜNSTLE, *Eine Bibliothek der Symbole und Theologischer Traktate* (Forschungen zur christlichen Litteratur- und Dogmengeschichte, I, 4), Mainz 1900; LAMBERT, *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*, IIIA, p. 83; A. HOLDER (ed.), *Die Reichenauer Handschriften* (Die Handschriften der Badischen Landesbibliothek in Karlsruhe 5), Bd. 1, Leipzig 1906, Wiesbaden 1970 (repr.), p. 58-69.

2Ha9 **Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 1867, f. 115-116**

Date: saec. ix

Provenance: uncertain

Family: A

Parchment, 210 ff., 270×220 mm., written in single column. The manuscript contains letters by, ascribed to or directed to Jerome. Such collections appear more and more frequently during the Middle Ages and form the bulk of the textual witnesses of the *Libellus fidei* in the fifteenth century.

Left of the incipit *Credimus...* stands the number 24. This numbering runs only from 22 to 25. The part before it has been written by another hand and with lager, red initials. In the part after it the lay-out changes gradually. Since the size of parchment, the colour of the ink and the distribution of text space remain fairly constant, I assume that the codex has not been assembled from different parts but rather was copied by different scribes. Perhaps the fragmented numbering is derives from a source-manuscript? Studies by palaeographical experts may shed more light on this. The catalogue record is very brief and not much literature has appeared on this manuscript.

The text of the *Libellus fidei* does at any rate not resemble the Italian text types I have seen so far. However, it cannot be identified unequivocally with the either the Karlsruhe or the

Northern French manuscripts either, concurring at one place with the former and at the other with the latter.
There are no significant variants to be found in this text, compared to other pseudo-Jerome witnesses.
Literature: LAMBERT, *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*, IIIA, p. 85; *Bibliothèque Nationale Catalogue Général des Manuscrits Latins*, vol. II, Paris 1940, p. 207.

Ha10 **Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 341, f. 49-50**
Date: saec. x-xi
Provenance: Italy?
Family: pseudo-Jerome, A-family
Parchment, 219+II ff., 385×267 mm, written in two columns. The codex contains works by, ascribed to or directed to Jerome, some excerpts and lists of emperors and popes.
The provenance is not indicated in the catalogue, but the text type of the *Libellus fidei* points to Italy. It is similar to that of two other manuscripts from this region, Vat. Lat. 650 and Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 575 (see below). Typical variants of these are *culpare* and *catholico nomine* in paragraph 26. Since not all consulted Italian manuscripts have these variants, apparently we are dealing with some sub-tradition.
Vat. Lat. 341 and 650 are closely related. Apart from a few minor differences, their text is identical. Both omit, for example, *invisibilis ut pater* in paragraph 12, apparently due to a homoioteleuton. The question arises whether the text in manuscript 341 (saec. x-xi) was directly copied from 650 (saec. x). The answer must be negative, as can be infered from a similar fault on folio 49. There, the scribe of manuscript 341 has copied the passage running from *et qui semper* (paragraph 3) to *de una persona dicitur* (5) twice, caused by the homoioteleuton *dicitur – dicitur*. The double passage has been crossed out by the scribe. If 650 were the source for 341, we would expect both *dicitur*'s to stand at the end of a line, provoking the scribal error in 341. This, however, is not the case.
In Vat. Lat. 341 the *Libellus fidei* is preceded by a genuine letter of Jerome addressed, like the confession itself, to Augustine and Alypius (*ep.* 143). As in other collections of Jerome's letters, the two writings probably stand next to each other because of their identical addressee.
Literature: B. LAMBERT, *Bibliotheca Hieronyminiana Manuscripta*, III A, p. 87: A. REIFFERSCHEID, *Die römischen Bibliotheken* (Sitzungsberichte 63), Wien 1869, p. 686-90; M. VATTASSO, P.F. de'Cavalieri, *Codices Vaticani Latini*, tom. I: Codices 1-678, Roma 1902, p. 243-5.

Ha15 **Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 575 (263), f. 63-64^{v}**
Date: saec. xv
Provenance: Italy
Family: pseudo-Jerome, A-family
Parchment, 302 ff. (576: 322 ff.), 386×270 mm., written in single column, in a regular, humanistic handwriting. Manuscript 575 and 576 belong together, forming a two-volume collection of letters and works by, ascribed to or directed to Jerome. Since the manuscripts of the Bibliothèque Mazarine were not accessible because of construction-works, I have transcribed the manuscript from microfilm.
Both volumes open with a decorated portrait of Jerome, but parts of these illustrations were never completed. Also elsewhere in the manuscripts we find blank spaces never filled in. The text of the *Libellus fidei*, according to the tradition to which it belongs directed to Augustine and Alypius, is preceded by the authentic letter of Jerome addressed to the same bishops (*ep.* 143). The manuscript has been in possession in Saint Victor, but was copied and illuminated in Italy. Molinier (p. 244-5) points to the Italian character of the decorations and illustrations. This provenance is confirmed by the text-type of the *Libellus fidei*, resembling that of the Vaticana Latina 341 and 650 (see above).
Also remarkable is the addition of *et filio* (filioque) in paragraph 4, a clearly theological variant. An addition with a theological edge is *(quam hominem) imperfectum in deo,* in paragraph 10. It is probably intended as a clarification but creates problems by placing *in deo* parallel to *in filio*. In paragraph 25 we encounter another theological variant, where the text reads *(qui cum Iouiniano adserunt hominem) post baptismum (non posse peccare)*. By bringing baptism in, the sharp edge of contrasting two opposite extremities is diminished.
In other manuscripts I have found hardly any undisputable theological variants. In this respect, *Ha15* stands out as an exception.
Literature: B. LAMBERT, *Bibliotheca Hieronyminiana Manuscripta*, IIIA, p. 85; A. MOLINIER, *Catalogue des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Mazarine*, vol. I, Paris 1885, p. 238-45.

Hd9 **The Hague, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 130.E.6, f. 6-7**
Date: ca. 865-900 (Bischoff), saec. ix-x (catalogue)
Provenance: Southern Netherlands, Northern France, Stavelot?
Family: pseudo-Jerome, D-family
Parchment, 7 ff., 214×142 mm., written in single column. A collection of symbols and commentaries to the credo. The

manuscript is in its extant form a fragment of a larger codex. The text breaks off in the middle of the *Libellus fidei*, after...*dolorem*, *mortem* (paragraph 11).

Of the consulted manuscripts of the D-family, *Hd9* is the oldest. The most remarkable variant is the omission of *personam ut dicamus duas perfectas atque integras esse* (paragraph 9), caused by the homoioteleuton *esse – esse*. Further the manuscript does not contain any significant variants.

Literature: B. BISCHOFF, *Katalog der festländischen Handschriften*, I (1998), p. 300, no. 1435; A.W. BYVANCK, 'Aantekeningen over handschriften met miniaturen. XII. Weinig bekende handschriften met miniaturen in Nederland', in: Oudheidkundig Jaarboek, third series 11 (1931), p. 6-7, plate 6; *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae*, vol. I, Den Haag 1922, p. 96, no. 405; A.S. KORTEWEG, 'Les fonds médiévaux de la Koninklijke Bibliotheek (Bibliothèque Royale) de La Haye', in: Pluteus 3 (1985), p. 180; A.S. KORTEWEG, C.A. Chavannes-Mazel, *Schatten van de Koninklijke Bibliotheek. Acht eeuwen verluchte handschriften*, Den Haag 1980, p. XII, 24, 28, 29, no. 11; C.W. DE KRUYTER, 'Franse geïllumineerde handschriften in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek', in: Bibliotheek-informatie (1975), p. 3, no. 12; B. LAMBERT, IIIA, *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*, p. 82; M.T. WIESER, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke des heiligen Augustinus*, Bd. VIII/1 (Sitzungsberichte 685), Wien 2000, p. 243.

Hd12 **Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Voss. Lat.F29, f. 2^{v}-3^{v}**

Date: saec. xii

Provenance: 'Gallia?' (De Meyier), formerly in possession the abbeys of Orbais and Brie

Family: pseudo-Jerome, D-family

Parchment, 310 ff., 327×230 mm., written in two columns. A collection of letters and works by, ascribed to or directed to Jerome. The manuscript opens, as is the case more often, with the text of the *Libellus fidei* (f. 2^{v}).

Some variants are the omission of (*dominum*) *nostrum* (paragraph 2) and of *dei* (20), both typically occuring in manuscripts of the D-family. Also, *Hd12* reads *asserimus esse celebrandum* in paragraph 17. This passage is also quoted by Augustine, who reads, together with pseudo-Augustine, *dicimus esse celebrandum* (see above).

I assume that at an early stage the word dicimus was omitted in the D-family. Later, some scribe has corrected this by inserting

asserimus. It is quite unfortunate that the text of *Hd9* breaks off before reaching this passage, otherwise it could perhaps have shed some light on the matter.
Literature: WIESER, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung*, VIII/1, p. 243; K.A. DE MEYIER, *Codices Vossiani Latini*, pars I: Codices in folio, Leiden 1973, p. 62-5.

Hd15 **Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Cod. 4.J.19 (106), f. 61[a]-64[a]**
Date: ca. 1450-1475 (Wieser)
Provenance: Carthusian monastry 'Nieuwlicht' near Utrecht
Family: pseudo-Jerome, D-family
Parchment, 116 ff., 'in quarto', written in single column. The manuscript contains writings about, by or attributed to Jerome. The text of the *Libellus fidei* has been divided into six parts, each commencing with a colourized initial and a superscription in red. Smaller units are indicated by capitals marked red.
The most remarkable variant of this work is the addition of *quod graeci dicunt omousion* (paragraph 2, see also discussion above). *Hd15* is the only pseudo-Jerome manuscript I have found so far containing this phrase. Yet, it can be found in every printed edition of the *Libellus fidei* and in the pseudo-Augustine family.
Some other specific variants are: *profitemur* instead of *confitemur* (paragraph 6), *hominem* instead of *nostrum* (11), *incommutabilis* instead of *inconvertibilis* (12), and *mortuum* instead of *mentitum* (§23). A few omissions: *et humanitatis* (10), *peccatorum quoque* (16) and *damnamus* (24).
Literature: *Handschriften en oude drukken van de Utrechtse Universiteitsbibliotheek*, p. 26-9; B. LAMBERT, *Bibliotheca Hieronymiana Manuscripta*, IIIA, p. 86; P.A. TIELE, *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum Bibliothecae Universitatis Rheno-Trajectinae*, vol. I, Utrecht 1887, p. 30; K. VAN DER HORST, *Illuminated and Decorated Medieval Manuscripts in the University Library, Utrecht*, Maarssen/'s-Gravenhage 1989, p. 21-2, 368-9, no. 72; WIESER, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung*, VIII/1, p. 243; *Godgeleerde Bijdragen*, vol. VI, eerste stuk (1832), p. 51-74.

Some technical remarks on the text-edition

The edition we now turn to, is presented in a manner largely based on the principles of the Ruusbroecgenootschap, to which I refer for reasons of brevity.[60] Some additional points of attention are:

[60] G. de Baere (ed.), *Jan van Ruusbroec. Opera omnia*, (Studiën en tekstuitgaven van ons geestelijk erf, vol. XX, 10 = Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, vol. CX), Tielt/Turnhout 1991, p. 66-72.

1. Elements between sharp brackets (<>) indicate readings added to the text of *1Ha9*. Elements between square brackets ([]) indicate readings found in *1Ha9* but left out in other groups of manuscripts or printed editions. These two types of elements represent significant variants on which discussion is possible. I would like to stress that they should *not* be interpreted as definitive textcritical choices, but as an indication of the most important readings calling for further inquiry.

2. Words in the text that are marked with an asterisk (*), indicate corrected or adjusted readings, deviant from *1Ha9*.

3. The spelling follows that of *1Ha9*. An exception is formed by proper names, of which the first letter is capitalized. Abbreviations are solved, ligatures (æ, ę, œ, &) are normalized (ae, oe, et).

4. Corrections in manuscripts are printed separately in the critical apparatus only if they are of some textcritical significance, such as the addition by another hand of (*sed*) *ita* (paragraph 5) in *1Ha9*. Changes in spelling and corrected scribal mistakes are not mentioned separately.

5. The following variants are presented in the critical apparatus:
- omissions of syllables, words or phrases
- additions of syllables, words or phrases
- changes in word order
- replacements of words by other words

6. Not presented are:
- differences in spelling
- evident mistakes in spelling

7. Changes in word order are indicated as follows: the words concerned are presented first, followed by numbers indicating the alternative sequence of the variant. Other changes in the position of a word are indicated by the word *post*.

8. When all the incorporated printed editions of pseudo-Jerome (PL 45, PL 48, Baronius, Hahn, Launoy, Mansi, Vallarsi, Walch en Wall) have the same reading, they are together indicated as *Eds*. Their respective abbreviations are: *PL45*, *PL48*, *Bar*, *Hahn*, *Mansi*, *Lau*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall*.

9. The pseudo-Augustine editions (PL 39 and Launoy) are indicated by the abbreviations: *PL39* and A^{Lau}.

10. The *Libri Carolini* (according to Freeman's edition) is indicated by the abbreviation *LC*. Augustine's quotations in *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* I, 35, 36; II 24 (CSEL 42, p. 152-3, 182) are indicated by *Aug*.

11. Further, the following sigla are used:
- *des.* *desinit*, the text breaks off after the indicated word
- *hapl.* *haplography*
- *homtel.* *homoioteleuton*

– ^{c} *correction*

– txt *text*, the text as exhibited (only used with corrections)

12. The text is divided into paragraphs. The numbers between square brackets incorporated in the text itself, indicate the paragraph-division as uses by J. Garnier in his *Dissertatio V* (PL 48, 488-91). This division is chosen for its small paragraphs, making precise references possible. The paragraph-divisions of PL 45 and PL 39 are also in use. Synoptically the respective divisions can be displayed as follows:

PL 48	PL 45	PL 39
		1
[1]	1	2
[2]	2	
[3]		
[4]	3	
[5]		3
[6]		
[7]		
[8]	4	4
[9]		
[10]		
[11]	5	5
[12]		
[13]		
[14]		
[15]	6	
[16]		
[17]	7	
[18]		
[19]	8	6
[20]	9	
[21]	10	
[22]		
[23]	11	
[24]	12	
[25]	13	
[26]	14	

Libellus fidei

[1] Credimus in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, cunctorum visibilium et invisibilium conditorem.

[2] Credimus et in Dominum nostrum Ihesum Christum per quem creata sunt omnia, verum Deum unigenitum et verum Dei Filium, non factum aut adoptivum* sed genitum et unius cum Patre substantiae <quod Greci dicunt homoousion> atque ita per omnia aequalem Deo Patri, ut nec tempore nec gradu nec potestate esse possit inferior. Tantumque esse confitemur illum qui est genitus, quantus est ille qui genuit. [3] Non autem quia dicimus genitum a Patre Filium divinae et ineffabili generationi aliquod tempus adscribimus, sed nec Patrem <dicimus> aliquando coepisse nec Filium. Non enim aliter confiteri possumus aeternum Patrem nisi confiteamur etiam coaeternum Filium. Ex Filio enim Pater dicitur, et qui semper Pater fuit, semper habuit Filium.

[4] Credimus et in Spiritum Sanctum, Deum verum ex Patre procedentem, aequalem per omnia Patri et Filio, <natura,> voluntate, potestate, aeternitate, substantia.

[5] Nec est prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus, nihil quod inferius superiusve dici possit, sed tota Deitas sui perfectione aequalis est ut exceptis vocabulis, quae proprietatem personarum indicant, quicquid de una persona dicitur de tribus dignissime possit intelligi*. [6] Atque ut confundentes Arrium unam eandemque dicimus Trinitatis esse

1 *prologus cf PL39*, A^{Lau} • **3** et *om Bar* | nostrum *om Hd12* • **4** creata sunt omnia: 3 1 2 *LC* | deum: dei *Ha15* | et *om PL39*, *A9* • **5** aut: non *PL45* | adoptivum: adoptativum *1Ha9*; optatum, *5Hd15* | et *om PL48*, *Lau*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **6** quod Greci dicunt homoousion *Hd15*, *Eds*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **7** ut *om 2Ha9* | gradu… potestate: 2 1 *Hx9* | esse possit: 2 1 *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd15*, *Eds* • **8** esse confitemur: 2 1 *Ha15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Hahn*, *Mansi*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall*, txt $Ha15^{c}$ | confitemur illum: 2 1 *Hd15* | quantus: quantum *Ha15* • **10** divinae: divina *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Hahn*, *Mansi*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall* | generationi: generatione *1Ha9*, *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Hahn*, *Mansi*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall*; txt $1Ha9^{c}$ | (aliquod) ei *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Hahn*, *Mansi*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall* • **11** dicimus *PL48*, *Lau*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | non enim … coaeternum filium *om Hahn*, *Walch* (*homtel.*) | non: nec *Ha15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi*, *Vsi*, *Wall* | aliter confiteri possumus: 3 1 2 *PL39*, A^{Lau}; 1 3 2 *A9* • **12** (etiam) et *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | coaeternum filium: 2 1 *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **13** filio: illo *PL48*, *Lau* | enim *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **14** habuit filium: 2 1 *Eds*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **15** deum verum: 2 1 *Eds* | (ex patre) et filio *Ha15*, *cf LC apud Migne* • **16** natura *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **19** superiusve: superiusque *Ha15*, *Mansi*, *PL39*, A^{Lau} | sed: ita *1Hx9*, *Hd9*, *A9*; ideo *PL39*, A^{Lau} | (sed) ita $1Ha9^{c}$ | deitas: trinitas A^{Lau} | sui: sua *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **21** dicitur: dicunt *Vsi* | (dignissime) in divinitate *Hx9* | intelligi: intellegi *1Hx9*, *1Ha9*, *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Hd9*, *A9*; txt $1Hx9^{c}$, $Hd9^{c}$ • **22** confundentes: confutantes *Hx9*, *Hd9*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | esse substantiam 2 1 A^{Lau} •

substantiam et unum in tribus personis fatemur Deum, ita impietatem Sabellii declinantes tres personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus. Non ipsum sibi Patrem, ipsum [sibi] Filium, ipsum [sibi] Spiritum Sanctum esse dicentes, sed aliam Patris, aliam Filii, aliam Spiritus Sancti esse personam. Non enim nomina tantummodo sed etiam nominum proprietates id est personas [vel ut Greci exprimunt epotasis hoc est subsistentias*] confitemur.

[7] Nec Pater Filii aut Sancti Spiritus personam aliquando excludit, nec rursus Filius aut Spiritus Sanctus Patris nomen personamque recipit. Sed Pater semper Pater est, Filius semper Filius <est>, Spiritus Sanctus semper Spirius Sanctus <est>, itaque substantia unum sunt, personis ac nominibus distinguuntur.

[8] Ipsum autem Dei Filium qui absque initio aeternitatem cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto possidet, dicimus in fine saeculorum perfectum naturae nostrae hominem suscepisse ex Maria semper virgine, et verbum carnem esse factum adsumendo hominem non permutando deitatem. Nec* ut quidam sceleratissime opinantur Spiritum Sanctum dicimus fuisse pro semine, sed potentia ac virtute creatoris operatum.

[9] Sic autem confitemur in Christo unam Filii esse personam, ut dicamus duas perfectas atque integras esse substantias, id est deitatis et humanitatis, quae ex anima continetur et corpore. Atque ut

1 fatemur: confitemur *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* | (ita) et *Ha15* • **2** tres personas expressas sub proprietate *om Bar*, *Mansi* | expressas: expressa *PL45* | sub: sed *1Ha9*; sui *PL45*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9*; txt *1Ha9*^{c} • **3** sibi (filium) *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | sibi (spiritum) *om Hx9*, *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *Mansi*, *LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **4** spiritus sancti 2 1 *A9* • **6** nominum: nomen vel *Hx9* | vel ut greci exprimunt epotasis hoc est subsistentias *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | ut: sicut *Hx9*^{c} | epotasis *om Hx9 (hapl.)* • **7** hoc: id *Ha15* | subsistentias: substantias *Hx9*, *1Ha9*, *Ha15*, *Hd15*, *PL48* | confitemur: profitemur *Hd15* • **8** sancti spiritus: 2 1 *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Eds*, *PL39*, A^{Lau} • **9** sanctus: sancti *Ha15* | aut (patris) *Ha15* • **10** recipit: recepit *Vsi*, *A9*; suscepit *PL45*, *Bar*; suscipit *Mansi* | est *om Hd9*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | (filius) est *Hx9*, *Eds*; et *2Ha9* • **11** est *Ha15*, *Eds*; et *2Ha9* | sunt: est *Hx9* • **12** distinguuntur: distinguntur *Hx9*, *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *LC*, *A9*; txt *Hd9*^{c} • **13** aeternitatem *om* A^{Lau} • **14** spiritu sancto 2 1 *A9* | possidet: possedet *1Ha9*; possedit *Hd15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi*; est A^{Lau}; txt *1Ha9*^{c} | perfectum: perfecte *Hd15* • **15** naturae nostrae: 2 1 *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* | semper *om Hd12*, *Hd15*; txt *Hd12*^{c} • **16** sed (adsumendo) *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | adsumendo: adsumendum *Hx9*, txt *Hx9*^{c} | non: nec *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *PL48*, *Wall* | permutando: permutandum *Hx9*, txt *Hx9*^{c} • **17** nec: non *1Ha9*, A^{Lau} | sceleratissime: scelestissime *1Ha9*; asceleratissime *2Ha9*; sceleratissimi *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9*; txt *1Ha9*^{c} | spiritum sanctum: 2 1 *Hx9*, *A9* • **18** fuisse *om PL48*, *Lau*; *post* semine A^{Lau} | potentia: potentiam *Hd15* | ac: et *Hd15*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | operatum: operatam *Hd15* • **19** autem *om Mansi* | filii esse: 2 1 *Hx9* | personam… integras esse *om Hd9* (*homtel.*) • **20** perfectas *om* A^{Lau} | esse *post* duas *Eds*| id est *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | (deitatis) scilicet *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **21** quae: qua *A9* | continetur: continentur *Ha15*; constat *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* •

condemnamus Fotinum, qui solum et nudum hominem confitetur in Christo, ita anathematizamus Apollinarem et eius similes, qui dicunt Dei Filium minus aliquid de humana suscepisse natura, et vel in carne vel in anima vel in sensu adsumptum hominem his propter quos adsumptus est fuisse dissimilem, quem absque sola peccati macula, quae naturalis non est, nobis confitemur fuisse conformem. [10] Illorum quoque similiter execramur blasphemiam qui novo sensu adserere conantur, a tempore suscepte carnis omnia quae erant deitatis in hominem demigrasse, et rursum quae erant humanitatis in Deum esse transfusa. Ut quod nulla umquam heresis dicere ausa esse videatur hac confusione utraque exinanita substantia, deitatis scilicet et humanitatis, et a proprio statu in aliud esse mutata, ut qui tam Deum inperfectum in Filio quam hominem confitentur, ut nec Deum vere nec hominem tenere credantur.

[11] Nos autem ita dicimus susceptum a Dei Filio passibile nostrum, ut Deitas inpassibilis permaneret. Passus <est> enim Filius [Dei] non putative sed vere omnia quae scriptura testatur, id est esuriem, sitim, lassitudinem, dolorem, mortem et caetera huiusmodi. [12] Secundum illud passus est quod pati poterat, id est [non] secundum illam substantiam [quae adsumpsit sed secundum illam] quae adsumpta

1 condemnamus: condemnemus *1Ha9*; txt *1Ha9^{c}* | hominem confitetur in christo: 3 4 1 2 *Eds* • **2** et *om Hd15* • **5** quem: quoniam *A^{Lau}* | sola: soli *Hd15* | peccati: peccata *A9* • **6** non *om Hd15* | nobis *om Ha15* | fuisse: esse *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi*; *om Hahn*, *Walch* • **7** similiter execramur 2 1 *A^{Lau}* | execramur: execramus *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *A9* | blasphemiam: blasphemias *Hx9^{c}* • **8** suscepte: acceptae *A^{Lau}* | erant: erat *Hd15* | deitatis: divinitatis *PL39*, *A^{Lau}* • **9** erant humanitatis: 2 1 *Hx9*, *Hd9*, *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | deum: deo *Hx9* • **10** transfusa: transfusum *2Ha9* | quod…utraque *cf Hx9 et Hx9^{c}* | umquam: nunquam *Mansi* | heresis: hereses *1Ha9*; txt *1Ha9^{c}* | dicere ausa esse: ausa est dicere *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | esse: est *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *Eds*, *LC* | confusione: confessione *A9* • **11** utraque: utique *Hd9* | (utraque) natura *Hahn*, *Walch* | esse (substantia) et *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | deitatis scilicet: 2 1 *LC* | et humanitatis *om Hd15* | a: amisso *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* • **13** aliud: alium *PL48*; aliquid *2Ha9* | ut *om Hx9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Hahn*, *Mansi*, *Vsi*, *Wall*, *Walch*, *LC* | inperfectum: perfectum *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | (hominem) imperfectum in deo *Ha15* • **13** confitentur: confitemur *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | ut *om Ha15*, *PL48*, *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | vere: verum *Eds* • **14** tenere: temere *A^{Lau}*, *cf nota PL39* | credantur: credamur *PL39*, *A9*; credamus *A^{Lau}*, *cf nota PL39* • **15** ita *om Hd9* | ita *post* susceptum *Hx9^{c}*, *Eds* | susceptum: suscepto *1Ha9*, *2Ha9*; txt *1Ha9^{c}* | dei: deo *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* | dei filio: 2 1 *Hahn*, *Walch* | passibile nostrum: hominem, *A^{Lau}* | nostrum: hominem *Hd15* • **16** deitas: deitam *Hx9*, *Hd9*; deus tamen *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | inpassibilis: inpassibile *Hx9*, *Hd9* | est *Hx9^{c}*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd15*, *Eds*, *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | enim: etenim *PL39*, *A^{Lau}* | filius dei: 2 1 *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Eds*, *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | dei *om Hx9*, *1Ha9*, *2Ha9*, *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *LC*; txt *1Ha9^{c}* • **18** mortem *des Hd9* | et (secundum) *Hd15*; sed (secundum) *PL39*, *A^{Lau}*, *A9* | illud: illam id *2Ha9* • **19** id est *om A^{Lau}* | non (…) quae adsumpsit sed secundum illam *om PL48* • **20** quae: quam *PL45*, *Mansi* •

est. Ipse enim Dei Filius secundum deitatem suam impassibilis est ut Pater, inconprehensibilis ut Pater, invisibilis ut Pater, inconvertibilis ut Pater, <incorruptiblis ut Pater>. Et quamvis propria persona Filii, id est Dei Verbum, suscepit passibilem hominem, ita tamen eius habitatione secundum suam substantiam Deitas Verbi nihil passa est, ut tota Trinitas quam [quam] inpassibilem necesse est confiteri.

[13] Mortuus <est> ergo Dei Filius [secundum scripturas iuxta id quod mori poterat, resurrexit tertia die, ascendit in caelum, sedet* ad dexteram Dei Patris, manente] ea<dem> natura carnis in qua natus et passus est, in qua etiam resurrexit, non enim exinanita est humanitatis substantia sed glorificata et in aeternum cum deitate mansura. [14] [Accepta ergo a Patre omnium potestate quae in caelo sunt* et in terra,] venturus est ad iudicium vivorum ac mortuorum, ut et iustos remuneret et puniat peccatores.

[15] Et resurrectionem etiam carnis <confitemur et> credimus, ut dicamus nos in eadem in qua nunc sumus veritate membrorum esse reparandos, qualesque semel post resurrectionem fuerimus effecti, in perpetuo permansuros. [16] Unam esse vitam sanctorum <omnium>, sed premia pro labore diversa, e contrario pro modo delictorum peccatorum

1 deitatem suam: 2 1 *PL48*, *Hahn*, *Lau*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall* | deitatem: divinitatem *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* | suam *om Hx9*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* | (impassibilis) est *om A9* • **2** inconprehensibilis (...) invisibilis: 2 1 *2Ha9* | inconprehensibilis ut pater *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | invisibilis: invincibilis *Vsi* | invisibilis ut pater *om Ha10* | invisibilis ut pater, inconvertibilis ut pater *om* A^{Lau} | inconvertibilis: incommutabilis *Hd15* • **3** incorruptibilis ut pater *PL39*, A^{Lau}; incorruptilis (*sic!*) ut pater *A9* | propria: tota *Ha15*; proprie *PL39* • **4** verbum: verbo *1Ha9*, *2Ha9*, txt *1Ha9*^{c} | suscepit: susceperit *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | habitatione: habitationem *Hx9*, *Hd15*; inhabitatione *PL39*, A^{Lau}; inhabitationem *A9* • **5** deitas: deitatis *1Ha9*, *2Ha9*; txt *1Ha9*^{c} | verbi *om Mansi* | (verbi) accepit iam *Hx9*^{c} | est: sit *Hx9*; sit *om Hx9*^{c} | tota trinitas quam *cf Hx9*^{c} • **6** quam *om Hx9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *Eds*, *LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | (impassibilem) esse *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | necesse est confiteri: 3 1 2 *Eds* • **7** est (ergo) *Hx9*, *2Ha9*, *Ha15*, *Hd9*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *Eds*, *LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | secundum... manente *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | iuxta: secundum *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* • **8** id: illud *PL48*, *Hahn*, *Lau*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall* | in caelum: in caelos *Hx9* | sedet: sedit *1Ha9* • **9** ad: a *Wall* | dei *om Ha15* | ea: eadem *PL45*, *PL48*, *Lau*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **10** et passus: est passus *Hd15* | est[1] *post* natus A^{Lau} | etiam: et A^{Lau} • **11** et *om PL39*, A^{Lau}; est *A9* • **12** accepta ... terra *om PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | omnium potestate: 2 1 *LC*; omne potestate *1Ha9*; txt *1Ha9*^{c} | sunt: sint *1Ha9*; *om 2Ha9*, *Ha10*; txt *Ha10*^{c} • **13** ac: et *Hx9*, *PL48*, *Hahn*, *Lau*, *Vsi*, *Walch*, *Wall*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9*; hac *2Ha9* • **15** Et *post* carnis *2Ha9*; *om Hx9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *Eds*, *LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | etiam *om Hx9*, *2Ha9*, *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Hd15*, *LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | ita (credimus) *Hx9*, *LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | confitemur et (credimus) *Ha10*, *Ha15*, *Eds* • **17** in *om A9* | effecti: affecti *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* | (effecti) tales *Hx9*^{c} • **18** perpetuo: perpetuum *Ha15*, *Hd15*, *Eds*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | permansuros: mansuros *LC*, A^{Lau} | unam esse vitam: 3 2 1 *Hd15* | esse: etiam *Ha15* | vitam sanctorum 2 1 A^{Lau} | (sanctorum) omnium *2Ha9*, *Eds*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* • **19** et (e contrario) *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | e *om Hx9* | (delictorum) et *Hx9*^{c} | peccatorum quoque *om Hd15* •

quoque esse supplicia. [17] Baptisma unum tenemus, quod isdem sacramenti verbis in infantibus quibus etiam in maioribus <dicimus> esse celebrandum. [18] Hominem, si post baptismum lapsus fuerit, <primo per reconciliationem deinde> per penitentiam credimus posse salvari.

[19] Novum et vetus testamentum recipimus in eo librorum numero quem sanctae catholicae ecclesiae tradit auctoritas. [20] Animas a Deo dari credimus quas ab ipso factas dicimus, anathematizantes eos qui animam quasi partem Dei divinae dicunt esse substantiae. Eorum quoque condemnamus errorem qui eas ante peccasse vel in caelis conversatas fuisse dicunt quam in corpora mitterentur.

[21] Execramur etiam eorum blasphemiam, qui dicunt inpossibile aliquid homini a Deo esse preceptum et mandata Dei non a singulis sed ab omnibus in commune posse servari, [22] vel qui primas nuptias cum Manicheo, aut secundas cum Catafrigis damnant. [23] Anathematizamus etiam illos qui Dei Filium necessitate carnis mentitum esse dicunt et eum propter adsumptum hominem non omnia facere potuisse quae voluit. [24] Ioviniani quoque damnamus heresim qui dicit nullam in futuro meritorum esse distantiam, nosque eas ibi habituros esse virtutes quas hic habere neglexerimus*. [25] Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium ut dicamus nos semper Dei indigere auxilio, et tam illos errare qui cum Manicheo dicunt hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Ioviniano adserunt hominem non posse peccare, uterque enim tollit arbitrii libertatem. Nos vero dicimus hominem semper et peccare et non peccare posse, ut semper nos liberi confiteamur esse arbitrii.

2 in[1] *om Ha10*, *A9*; txt *Ha10*^{c} | in infantibus *om Lau* | quibus: quibusve *A9* | in[2] *om A9* | dicimus *PL39*, *A*^{Lau}, *A9*, *Aug (2x)*; dicimus: asserimus *Hd12*, *Eds* • **3** et (hominem) *Hd15* | lapsus: lassus *Ha15* | (fuerit) primo per reconciliationem deinde *PL39*, *A*^{Lau}, *A9* • **4** posse: possit *2Ha9*, *om Hd15* • **6** eo: illo *PL39*, *A*^{Lau}, *A9* • **7** quem: quo *Hx9*^{c} | catholicae ecclesiae: 2 1 *PL39*, *A*^{Lau}, *A9* | tradit: tradidit *Hx9*, *LC* • **8** anathematizantes: anathematizamus *Ha15* • **9** eos: omnes *Bar*, *Mansi* | animam: animas *Eds*, *LC* | dei *om Hd12*, *Eds*, *A*^{Lau} • **11** caelis: coelo *PL39* | fuisse: esse *PL39*, *A9* | corpora: corpore *Hx9*, *Mansi*, *A9* • **12** execramur: exsecramus *Hx9*, *Hd12*, *Hd15*, *PL45* | etiam *om Hd12* | eorum blasphemiam: 2 1 *PL39* | blasphemiam: blasphaemia *Hx9*; blasphaemias *Hx9*^{c} • **13** esse preceptum: 2 1 *Eds*, *A*^{Lau} | et: e *2Ha9* | (non) a *om Hx9* • **14** omnibus: hominibus *Hd12*; txt *Hd12*^{c} | commune: communi *Bar*, *Mansi* • **15** aut: vel *2Ha9*, *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi*, *PL39* | catafrigis: catafrigas *1Ha9*; txt *1Ha9*^{c} • **16** mentitum: mortuum *Hd15* • **18** damnamus *om Hd15* | heresim: errorem *PL39*, *A9* • **19** meritorum esse: 2 1 *Hd15* | eas ibi: 2 1 *Ha15* | ibi *om 2Ha9* • **20** neglexerimus: negleximus *1Ha9*, *Hd15*, *A*^{Lau}, *A9*; txt *1Ha9*^{c} | (sic) esse *Bar* • **21** semper dei indigere auxilio: 3 2 1 4 *Aug*; 2 1 3 4 *PL39*; 2 3 1 4 *A9* • **22** errare: execrare *A9*^{c}; ecrare *A9* | manicheo: manichaeis *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* • **23** post baptismum (non posse) *Ha15* • **24** arbitrii libertatem: 2 1 *PL45*, *Bar*, *Mansi* • **25** semper *om PL39*, *A*^{Lau}, *A9* | semper nos: 2 1 *Hx9* • **26** esse *om Hd15*, *A9* •

[26] Haec fides est papa beatissime, quam in catholica ecclesia didicimus quamque semper tenuimus <et tenemus>. In qua si minus perite aut parum caute aliquid forte positum est emendari cupimus a te, qui Petri et fidem et sedem tenes. Sin autem haec nostra confessio apostolatus tui iudicio conprobatur, quicumque me maculare voluerit se inperitum vel malivolum, vel etiam non catholicum, non me hereticum conprobabit.

Prologus apud pseudo-Augustinum

Multa quidem et frequenter ausi sunt Ariani haeretici adversus servos Dei, qui fidem rectam et catholicam custodiunt, per adulterinam doctrinam asserere et orthodoxos persequi tentaverunt. In tantum autem nunc exsurrexerunt contra fidem, ita ut multos ex vobis polluerint et aures vestras commoverint, ut animas laniarent.

Sceleratae autem haeresis suae perfidiam tegunt: sed non diutius haec illis facere permissum est. Est enim gubernator ecclesiarum suarum Dominus, qui pro omnibus nobis mortem sustinuit.

Et ideo indeficiens nobis est oratio, dilectissimi fratres: primo, ut sancta Domini et catholica ecclesia dissensionibus omnibus et haeresibus carens, unitatem spiritus in vinculo charitatis ubique conservet, quam per fidem rectam et vitam immaculatam tenere, amplecti, servare, custodire omnibus invocantibus Dominum est quidem justum, praecipue tamen episcopis, qui ecclesiis praesunt; secundo, ut ecclesiae regula sanctaque patrum traditio atque judicia in perpetuum firma solidaque permaneant. Est autem patrum nostrorum fides haec:

[1] Credimus in Deum Patrem omnipotentem... *etc.*

Postscriptum apud pseudo-Augustinum

[26] Haec fides est, dilectissimi fratres, quam in catholica didicimus ecclesia, quamque semper tenuimus et tenemus, quam credimus et a vestra bonitate deinceps posse teneri.

1 Haec...conprobabit (*postscriptum*) *cf LC*, *PL39*, A^{Lau}, *A9* | fides est: 2 1 *Hd15*, *Bar* | est *om Hx9*; txt $Hx9^{c}$ | catholica ecclesia: 2 1 *Eds* | ecclesia *om 1Ha9*, txt $1Ha9^{c}$ • **2** et tenemus *Eds* | minus: mens *Hx9*; txt $Hx9^{c}$ • **3** in (caute) *1Ha9*; txt $1Ha9^{c}$ | aliquid forte: 2 1 *Ha10*, *Ha15* • **4** sin: si *Ha15* | haec nostra confessio *om Hx9* • **5** maculare: culpare *Ha10*, *Ha15* • **6** malivolum: malevolum *Hx9*, *Eds*; manivolum *2Ha9* | catholicum non me: catholico nomine *Ha10*, *Ha15* •

3 tentaverunt: tentarunt A^{Lau} • **4** vobis: nobis A^{Lau} • **5** vestras: nostras A^{Lau} • **7** haec illis: hic vel A^{Lau} •

1 est fides: 2 1 *A9* | catholica didicimus ecclesia: 3 1 2 *A9* • **3** vestra bonitate: nobis A^{Lau} •

Postscriptum apud Libri Carolini

[26] Haec est catholicae traditionis fidei vera integritas, quam sincero corde credimus et fatemur et in hoc opere beati Hieronimi verbis expressam taxavimus. Haec est vera fides, hanc confessionem conservamus atque tenemus. Quam quisque inconvulse et intemerate custodierit, perpetuam salutem habebit.

Conclusions and perspectives

Having surveyed the redactions and textual transmission of the *Libellus fidei*, we may summarize the findings as follows.

First, of the two main traditions, pseudo-Jerome and pseudo-Augustine, the former is far better known and makes the most authentic impression. However, whether it is justified to lay aside pseudo-Augustine altogether, is another question. Of course, its postscript is clearly redacted and in some stage a prologue was added. But it takes more than that to prove that the main part of the text is unreliable as well. Quotations in Augustine's *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, for example, point to the opposite direction. Further investigation of the manuscript traditions is necessary to solve this matter. Given the significant differences between the two traditions something is at stake here.

Second, a critical edition is usually based upon a single manuscript. Given the differences between the two text traditions, however, it is not yet a settled matter that this procedure should be followed in the case of the *Libellus fidei* as well. The mutilated postscript of pseudo-Augustine is not fit to be used as the basis for a critical edition, of course, but what if the main text of this tradition turns out to be the most reliable? In that case it seems more fitting to collate a reconstructed text, comparable to that of the Nestle-Aland editions of the Greek New Testament, or to present a synoptic text in two columns. Pseudo-Augustine, *if* deemed worthy, might offer the better readings for the main part of the text, pseudo-Jerome for the postscript. What procedure we are to follow, depends on the results of the investigations announced above.

Third, apart from the clash between textual traditions, the work-edition presents a row of variants, of which a large part was not attested in the printed editions that have appeared so far. What can be deemed authentic and what not? More comprehensive manuscript-research and the reconstruction of a stemma are necessary for sound textcritical choice-making.

Fourth, the printed editions have a narrow textual basis and are often unreliable, sometimes omitting entire phrases. Of the well accessible editions of Migne, PL 45 stands out as the best.

Fifth, some printed editions have reports on a Vatican manuscript containing the *Libellus fidei* together with letters of Zosimus. That combination is remarkable. Zosimus first rehabilitated and then condemned Pelagius. If Pelagius's confession is contained in one manuscript with letters of this pope, the scribe must have been aware of its true origins. In that case, possibly there is, or was at the end of the Middle Ages, a non-pseudepigraphic version of the *Libellus fidei*. In the standard catalogues, that unfortunately do not cover the entire Vatican collection, I have not been able to trace this manuscript. Were the editors of the printed editions perhaps confusing matters? Is the manuscript lost? Or can it be recovered, and what kind of text will it then bring us?

Sixth, textcritical research is not the end but the beginning, opening new avenues for theological and literary investigation. In further research, I intend to make an analysis of the *Libellus fidei*, of its origins and sources, and its historical, literary and theological context. From its manuscript tradition and the quotations in works of mediaeval writers some insights can be drawn on the reception of Pelagius's confession, the work of a proclaimed heretic dressed in the orthodox clothes of the names of Jerome and Augustine.

Some specific questions of analysis arise already. The identification of the pseudo-Jerome and pseudo-Augustine texts with Pelagius's *Libellus fidei* is today undisputed. A few passages however seem to condemn theological convictions that were deemed heresy many years later. Paragraph 10, for example, seems to rebuke Eutyches, though without mentioning him by name. Eutyches was not condemned until 448 A.D. and eventually at the council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.), more than thirty years after Pelagius wrote his confession. Are we dealing here with a later insertion to the text? Or are those people (*qui novo sensu adserere conantur...*) criticized in the *Libellus fidei* perhaps early forerunners of Eutyches? Was Pelagius ahead of his time? Or is the text we are dealing with not his after all? That last question shows what is at stake: the very identification of the text surveyed in this article with Pelagius's confession called the *Libellus fidei*.

The identifying of texts has occupied much of last centuries Pelagius-research. Entire lists of letters and treatises have been ascribed to the British monk, only to be rejected some years later. Often an insufficient method was used: placing columns of text next to each other and then comparing the agreements. Later, scholars like R.F. Evans have tried to fine-tune methodology by focussing also on vocabulary, biblical quotations, and syntax and style.[61] Nevertheless,

[61] EVANS, *Four letters of Pelagius, New York 1968.*

discussion concerning the attribution of several works to Pelagius remains. Perhaps, a rethinking is necessary of the method of identifying texts.

A test-case for this is formed by a group of fragments that has been ascribed to Pelagius in the assumption that they belong to his now lost work *De fide trinitatis*.[62] This identification was made partly on basis of comparison with the *Libellus fidei*. But are these fragments indeed all of the same work and all by Pelagius? What method was used, and was it sufficient? Do instruments like electronic databases open up new avenues for the identification of texts?

And of course, the question is also whether the identification will stand once a critical edition of the *Libellus fidei* appears.

Peter Johannes VAN EGMOND

[62] GENNADIUS mentions that Pelagius had written such a work; see *De viris illustribus*, 43. Arguments on the identification and an edition of the fragments can be found in P.C. MARTINI, *Ambrosiaster. De auctore, operibus, theologia*, (Spicilegium Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani 4), Roma 1944, p. 161-210.

LIMITATIONS TO *EXERCITATIO MENTIS*: CHANGES IN RHETORICAL STYLE IN AUGUSTINE'S DIALOGUES.

'When then Apollo says: 'Know thyself,' he says, 'Know thy soul', For the body is as it were a vessel or a sort of shelter for the soul: every act of your soul is an act of yours.'[1]

Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* I.22.52

Augustine must have been familiar with this text and with the rich tradition of reflection on the self, forthcoming from the Socratic exegesis of the Delphic command. As his ancestors, Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations* addressed the problem of the introspection and the self-knowledge. Difficulties arise, because when we turn the focus of the eye of our soul from the exterior objects towards the inner self, we 'see by means of the soul alone' (*animo ipso animum videre*). Cicero studies the nature of the soul 'as it were in a house that is not its own', which is 'more doubtful than the conception of the nature of the soul when it has quitted the body'. The immediate context of this discussion of the possibility of self-knowledge is an argument to proof the soul's immortality. This, for Cicero, leads in the end to the conclusion that there must be a fifth (material and immortal) essence of both gods and souls. (I.26.65) An epistemological problem concerning self-knowledge rises: 'the soul does not see its own shape' (*non videt formam suam*; I.27.67)

In the past, Augustine's earlier works sometimes haven been contrasted with his later works because of the prominent presence of philosophical topics and the presumed absence of scriptural and doctrinal language.[2] More recently, scholarly attention focussed on Augustine's biographical liminal situation in Cassiciacum: his position

[1] M.T. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, I.22.52, Transl. J.E. King (Cambridge Mass. 1950), 63. This article is an extended version of a paper read at the XVth International Conference on Patristic Studies at the University of Oxford 2007. It is part of a research project at Utrecht University on Augustine's reception of self-knowledge, Therapy and *exercitatio animi* which I hope to finish with a dissertation on this subject. I am grateful to my supervisors Willemien Otten and Paul van Geest for their advices and to Rob Brouwer and Simon Paul for their comments on draft versions of this article.

[2] See Carol Harrisson's refutation of a presumed dichotomy between the earlier and the later Augustinian works in C. Harrisson., *Rethinking Augustine's early Theology. An Argument for Continuity.*, (Oxford 2006).

between a secular career as a professor in rhetoric and the baptised Christian who later became ordained as a priest and would occupy the seat of the bishop of Hippo.[3]

What attracts the attention in this article is Augustine's pedagogy in his earlier works, which I will argue being a rhetorical pedagogy, which serves Augustine's purpose to teach a Christian philosophy. This should not surprise us, because Augustine was educated as a professor in rhetoric, which combines his interest in teaching and his interest in rhetoric. In what follows we will study and compare elements of the rhetorical structure of dialogues written in the Cassiciacum period and in the year after his leave from Cassiciacum in Rome, *De ordine*, *De beata vita*, *De Magistro*, *Contra Academicos*, and *De quantitate animae*. We will see how the rhetorical structure supports Augustine's peculiar and specific view on topics, treated by Cicero, such as self-knowledge, nature of the human soul and the happy life. The rhetorical structure of the Cassiciacum dialogues expresses a fine rationality which points the reader to the necessity of the acceptance of the path of the authority of faith and church in addition to the path of reason, which has been explored by Cicero and many other philosophers.

Augustine and Selfknowledge

Augustine's special sensibility for the *topos* of the inner self and self-knowledge has been noticed by scholars[4] and can be traced in many works, but especially in his dialogues, in the *Confessiones*, and especially in *De Trinitate*.

As Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, and recently also Richard Sorabji have shown, a tradition of reflection on the self and care for the self has been productive in the intellectual environment which directly or indirectly might have influenced Augustine.[5]

Pierre Courcelle has described a rich diversity in tradition and reception of the Delphic 'know yourself' from Plato's dialogues until

[3] St. Cooper, 'Scripture at Cassiciaum: I Corinthians 13:13 in the Soliloquies.' In: *Augustinian Studies* 27/2 (1996) 21-46., and more recently C. Coneybeare, 'The Duty of a Teacher: Liminality and *disciplina* in Augustine's D*e Ordine'*, in A*ugustine and the Disciplines. From Cassiciacum to Confessiones*., K. Pollmann and M. Vessey (eds.), Oxford 2005., 49-66. Further C. Coneybeare, *The Irrational Augustine* (Oxford 2006).

[4] Ch. Taylor, *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity* (Harvard 1989), and recently R. Sorabji, *Self. Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death.* (Oxford 2006), esp. 212-33.

[5] P. Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford 2005); M. Foucault, *History of Sexuality* vol. 3. 'The Care of the Self' (Paris 1984); R. Sorabji, *Emotions and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford 2005). P. Rabbow, *Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (München 1954)

early Christian theologians.[6] Pierre Hadot has elaborated extensively on the aspect of exercise and self-knowledge in ancient philosophy and explained the element of exercise in early Christianity in its continuity with the existing tradition of exercise: Christianity as a *philosophia christiana*.[7] Michel Foucault has studied in his third volume of his *History of Sexuality* the archaeology of an existing practice of the care of the self, especially in the stoic tradition and its continuation in early monasticism.[8] Richard Sorabji, in his *Emotion and Peace of Mind* has deepened these insights with his study of Epictetus, Evagrius and Augustine.

Among early Christian theological reflection on the *topos* of the self-knowledge – often in the context of allegorizing commentaries on the book Song of Songs[9] – Augustine takes a distinctive and personal position in his interpretation and expression of the reflection on the self. It was Johannes Brachtendorf who noticed the vital function of the disciplines for the faculty of reason in the quest for the self-knowledge.[10]

As Michael Foley has pointed out, several Cassiciacum dialogues were written in response to works of Cicero.[11] Augustine's *Contra academicos* reacting on Cicero's *Academica*; *De beata vita* on Cicero's *De finibus* and on the *Tusculan disputations* and *De ordine* as a response to Cicero's *De natura deorum* and *De fato*. Despite his admiration for Cicero, Augustine did not copy Cicero straightaway, but – probably inspired by Cicero's example of borrowing and transforming ideas – transformed Ciceronian thought to serve his own (rhetorical) purpose: the introduction of Christianity in the Roman Empire.[12]

[6] P. Courcelle, *Connais toi-même. De Socrate à Saint Bernard* (Paris 1974-1975).

[7] Hadot, o.c. 107

[8] For an evaluation of Hadot's and Foucault's view on self and identity, see Richard Sorabji's recent *Self, Ancient and modern Insights about Individuality. Life and Death.* (Oxford 2006) 48-53. and A. Nehamas, *The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault.*, (Berkeley 2000)

[9] See Origin (Hom. in Cant., Comm. in Cant) and Ambrose (in Ps. 118). See Courcelle o.c. 97-163. The passage commenting on is Cant. Cant. I.8. In this passage the soul is invited to learn to recognize her likeness to the divine after which she was created. (Genesis) The *gnoti seaton* is an invitation for the bride to recognize in wherein her beauty consists. Beauty, on its turn, incites in the soul a desire for the celestial and intelligible things. Therefore, the soul must recollect itself, concentrate itself and – far from the sensible things – comprehend itself and adhere itself to the Truth.

[10] J. Brachtendorf, 'Self -knowledge and the Sciences in Augustine's early Thinking.' Paper read at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy.

[11] M. Foley, 'Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues.' in: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 45 (1999), 51-77.

[12] Foley, 76.

Oratio perpetua in Augustine's early work

What attracts our attention now is Augustine's use of rhetorical instruments in his Cassiciacum dialogues and also in some works from the year 388 and 389, the year Augustine had to wait in Rome for his journey to Africa and his actual return to Africa. These dialogues show towards the end of the work a change of the dialogue style, *ratio obliqua* to a monologue, which in literature has been denoted as *oratio perpetua*.[13]

These rhetorical alterations occur in a majority of the dialogues, but most distinctive in *Contra Academicos* (386-87), *De beata vita* (386-87), *De ordine* (386-387) *De Magistro (389)*, and *De quantitate animae (388)*.[14] As a professional rhetorician, we can expect Augustine to use his rhetorical skills intentionally. Therefore, we also expect these rhetorical alterations to have significance in structure and argumentations. Consequently, we now will have a closer look at the context of these alterations.

(For an outline of the discourses of the dialogues and the relative position of the start of the oratio perpetua figure, see Table 1)

Augustine's dialogues

In *Contra Academicos* the change occurs after a request of Alypius, who quotes Cicero's *De finibus*, at the point when Augustine asks Alypius to defend the position of the Academics. They agree that

[13] Heinrich Lausberg describes *oratio perpetua* in contrast with the interrupted *oratio concisa* and quotes Quintilianus 2.20.7 who compares oratory with the manual fight of the dialectics: *duo … genera orationis: altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice, quas … Zeno adeo coniunxit ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam explicatae diceret similem.* Cf. H. Lausberg., *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik.,* (München1973) esp. §920, p. 456. For a detailed study of Cicero's tactical use of the *oratio perpetua* in the persecution of the Roman governor from Sicily Verres (70AD), see Thomas D. Frazel, 'The Composition and Circulation of Cicero's *In Verrem*.' In: *The Classical Quarterly* 54.1 (2004) 128-42. (Thanks to the advises from Rob Brouwer and Karin Salomons)

[14] *Contra Academicos* III.7.15; *De ordine* 10.30; *De beata vita* 33, *De Magistro* 10.32-33, *De quantitate animae* XXXII.69-XXXIII.70. *De musica* and *De libero arbitrio* also expose the switch from dialogue towards a monologuous teaching style. These changes occur in the last books of these works, which are from significant later date as the before mentioned works: resp. 391 and 395. Therefore we excluded them from the scope of this article which concerns Augustine's works from the Cassiciacum period and immediate after.

at this moment the burden for Alypius' intellect is too heavy, and Augustine decides to continue in monologue. He explains to Alypius the defects of the (exoteric) Academic position and the presumed esoteric Platonic doctrine of the Academics which culminates in an account of the 'philosophy of the other, intelligible world'. Augustine refers to the crucial role of self-knowledge when he points out that 'truth about the intelligible is refined and brightened in the soul that knows itself.'[15] It is only with help of incarnation that we can reach the realm of the intelligible world: 'Yet the most subtle chain of reasoning would never call back to this intelligible world souls that have been blinded by the manifold shadows of error and rendered forgetful by the deepest filth from the body, had not God the Highest, moved by a certain compassion for the multitude, humbled and submitted the authority of the Divine Intellect even to the human body itself.'[16] The monologue finds its climax when Augustine points to the path of the authority of Christ: 'I'm resolved not to depart from the authority of Christ on any score whatsoever: I find no more powerful authority.'[17]

In *De beata vita* it is an anti-Academic agenda which underscores the dialogue. With help of the *topos* of the banquet the discussion develops towards the conclusion that the happy life is a living with God (17). Augustine alters direct speech in *oratio perpetua* when they discuss the virtues *temperantia* and *modestia* (31). The conclusion is that happiness is the possession of God's wisdom. It is divine authority which discloses that God's wisdom is the Son of God who proceeds from a highest Measure (34). Monnica recognizes and identifies in this Neo-platonic idiom a reference to the Trinity and – as a reaction – she recites a line of Ambrose's hymn to the Trinity. She concludes that only a person who lives according to the theological virtues faith, hope and love, can live a happy life. Once more the path of faith and authority is a necessary condition for a happy life. This conclusion does not deny the value of the path of reason but makes clear that, chronologically, a first phase of formation needs the path of the authority of the Bible and faith in the Trinity.[18]

De ordine shows an analogous modification of style in II.30 when Augustine starts his monologue on eternal reason as a path

[15] *Contra Academicos* III.17.37, transl. P. King (Indianapolis 1995). See also K. Schlapbach, *Contra Academicos Buch I. Einleitung und Kommentar*, (Berlin 2003), 192-3, and C. Coneybeare, *The Irrational Augustine*. (Oxford 2006), 38-9.

[16] *Contra Academicos* III.19.42.

[17] *Contra Academicos* III.20.43.

[18] For an excellent analysis of Monnica's crucial role in *De beata vita*, see Catherine Coneybeare's reading in *The Irrational Augustine* (Oxford 2006), 64-92.

towards God and into the self. Augustine describes an abstracting ascent of the intellect from temporal objects towards the intelligible realm. This ascent presupposes reason as its fundament, but Augustine criticizes the exclusive focus on the path of reason. The reason is that for most people this route is fallacious, as 'only a rare class of men is capable of using [reason] as a guide to the knowledge of God or of the soul; either of the soul within us or the world-soul' (*quae aut in nobis aut usque quaque est animam*). This is due to nothing else than the fact that, for anyone who has advanced toward objects of sense, it is difficult to return to himself.[19] Only when reason is self-restrained and discovers the order in itself, it can focus its attention towards God, 'the source of all truth.'[20] Augustine makes it clear that the path of authority is indispensable in addition to the path of reason.

In *De magistro* 10.32-33, the switch from dialogue to monologue happens at the moment when the topic of the discussion moves on from a debate on signs to a discourse on the nature of learning without signs. Within this discourse the function of the conventional teacher – who teaches with help of signs – is explained as a stimulus for the student to return into his self in order to consult his inner Teacher. Augustine identifies this Teacher as Christ. It seems, in this case the switch from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio perpetua* warns the reader that a shift to a different style of pedagogy occurs. The first part of the dialogue concerns learning from signs, while in the monologue Augustine clarifies how we can learn without signs in the interiority from the inner Teacher when we turn into our selves.

De quantitate animae was written in 388 during Augustine's second stay in Rome before he was able to return to Africa. It is a conversation with Evodius. After having discussed the (divine) origin of the soul, Evodius and Augustine discuss the magnitude of the soul and function of the memory. They conclude that the soul cannot be divided as a body can be divided.[21] At the end of XXXII.68 Augustine refers to deficiencies in Evodius education in order to address the complex question of the (neo)platonic theory on the division of the soul at the *momentum* of in its connection with the body. Augustine's conclusion is that the magnitude of the soul is not determined by extension or time, but by its strength and power. They decide to postpone the discussion of the question of the number of souls. The change from

[19] *De ordine* II.11.30, transl. R.P. Russell, 'Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil', (New York 1948).

[20] *De ordine* II.19.51.

[21] *De quantitate animae* XXXI.62-XXXII.66.

dialogue towards *oratio perpetua* occurs immediately after this conclusion.

Augustine starts to explain to Evodius the value (valeam) of the soul and decides with a reference to the topic of self-knowledge to restrict his speech on the human soul, for 'it is only for her that we should care if we care for our self' (*quam solam curare debemus, si nobismetipsis curae sumus*).[22] In a seven staged ladder Augustine describes the ascent of the soul. First the level of biology, the senses, the memory, purification of the soul, continuation of purification and self-awareness, cleansing of the eye of the soul, and the last stage which is not a stage but a house (destination): the stage of *frui* and *delectatio*.[23] In the latter stage Augustine explains the path towards God (Christ) and explains why we are fed well by the *lac parvulorum* of the church[24], and he summarizes main topics of the Rule of Faith: incarnation and resurrection. The relationship with the main topic of this dialogue – the nature of the soul becomes clear, when Augustine clarifies the intermediate position of the human soul. He concludes that the magnitude of the soul is reconstituted by the reconciliation of the soul with God with help of the *vera religione*, which will liberate the soul in the service to God.[25] Faith is therefore a indispensable element in the ascent of the soul. The ascent of the soul is explained in terms of the path towards contemplation, of the turn inwards, which simultaneously is a movement upwards. But Augustine also uses the metaphor of participation in beauty. Despite the free will only the *vera religione* reconciles the soul with God, which has been divorced from God because of sin. Faith guides the soul, purifies and reforms her, and feeds the soul. Love and merits of good works can strengthen the soul. The conclusion is ambivalent: the soul suffers death because of sin, but this does not destroy the power to excel in moral virtue. Truth, the vision of God himself is the reward for a virtuous life, which respects meticulously Gods commands.

Returning to the question of the change to *oratio perpetua* in XIII.70, it seems that it marks Evodius' deficiency in education in front of the ascent of the soul. Augustine's description of the ascent of the soul in terms of the ladder, and the subsequent explanation of major articles of the creed, makes it clear that the *lac parvulorum* of

[22] *De quantitate animae* XXXIII.70

[23] *De quantitate animae* XXXIII.71-76

[24] See T.J. van Bavel, 'L'humanité du Christ comme *lac parvulorum* et comme *via* dans la spiritualité de saint Augustin.', in: *Augustiniana* (1957) 7, 245-281.

[25] *De quantitate animae* XXXIV.78

the church is indispensable for the soul on its journey towards God, which is closely connected with a turn inwards.

In 1972, Bernd Reiner Voss noticed the structuring framework of reason and authority in the dialogues. According to him, the rhetorical changes have a rhetorical function in the dissolving of the literary distance between the 'dialogue-author' and the 'dialogue-speaker'.[26]

We have seen that the *oratio perpetua* starts at crucial stages in the dialogues: the moment where Augustine (or Monnica) employ arguments and insights which exceed the regular use of reason and, which sometimes culminate in the name of Christ or in an explanation on the Rule of Faith (*De Magistro, Contra Academicos). De ordine* closes with an account of the divine presence in the order, and in *De beata vita* Monnica concludes with a prayer to the Trinity. In *De quantitate animae* the change to *oratio perpetua* occurs when the question of indivisibility of the soul is at stake. This question immediately touches Augustine's view of the self and the individuality, which was one of the issues on which Augustine must have felt urged to develop his own position, possibly in reaction on a platonic view on the self, which allowed, or even assumed a multiple self, as the embodied souls are divided selves from the unified intelligible self.[27] Augustine's reply is a description of the ascent of the soul in seven grades and an explanation of major articles from the Creed. This was followed by a description of the present intermediate position of the soul, reconciliated with God with help of the *vera religione*. This appears to be a theological reply to a contemporary question concerning the human soul and the nature of the self, amplified with help of Augustine's rhetorical skills in service of his new born mission.

These observations support the impression that Augustine with help of his characteristic ambivalent philosophic-Christian idiom, his scriptural references, prayers to the Trinity and the mentioning of the name of Christ had a refined apologetic agenda, which he implemented with help of his rhetorical skills. Augustine's position does not exclude the path of reason – why would he otherwise spend pages on the discussion of the disciplines – but rather adds a new discipline to the familiar disciplines: the discipline of Christian faith in the authority of Christ. This Christian doctrine requires an attitude of intellectual

[26] B.R. Voss, *Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur* (München 1970), 217-20.

[27] For a discussion of individuality in Platonism and Neoplatonism, see Richard Sorabji, *Self, Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death.* (Oxford 2006), esp. Ch. 6: Is the true self individual in the Platonist tradition from Plato to Averroës?, pp. 115-53.

modesty in the approval of the authority of the Bible and the teaching of the church in the Rule of Faith, which obviously formed the context of interpretation for Augustine in his earlier and later scriptural exegesis.[28].

Augustine probably expresses this attitude of intellectual modesty as a contrast to the attitude of pride which irritated him in philosophical debate as well as in the praxis of the Manichean religion. Obviously, this did not withhold him from using their knowledge and skills for his own purpose: the defence of the faith as a true philosophy. What could be characteristic of Augustine's true philosophy? Augustine's contribution to the eudaimonistic discourse is a presentation of Christ as a mediator of real happiness. (*De beata vita*) Reacting on Manichean ideas on the nature of evil, Augustine develops his own ideas on divine order and the function of the *disciplinae* in this order. (*De ordine*) In *De quantitate animae*, Augustine's reaction on the current discussion of the nature and essence of the human soul is an ascent of the soul and an exposure on the faith of the church. In *Contra academicos*, Augustine discusses incarnation as a necessary intermediate for the soul who wants to acquire knowledge of the self, in addition to his enthusiast plead for the secret history of Platonism.

In his view, Augustine does not exclude the path of reason, but he modifies current ideas on the ascent of the soul with its special position of the study of disciplines as training for the soul (*exercitatio mentis*).

It seems Augustine's rhetorical changes of style signalize limitations to the capacity of human reason and of the principle of *exercitatio mentis*. He warns the reader that from that point on, the argument presupposes the recognition of the path of the discipline of Christian doctrine. The noticed switches of 'rhetorical gear' also alarm the reader that it is Augustine (or Monnica) personally who explain their view on the topics and no longer a variety of opinions and thought as expressed in the variety of voices in the dialogue.

What could be the significance of Augustine's focus to include the authority of faith and scripture in his pedagogical framework? Augustine's thought is much too refined to explain his rhetorical changes in a simple reason – authority dichotomy as (pagan) philosophy versus (Christian) theology.

[28] F. Young, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture*. (Cambridge 1997). For a discussion of the presence of Augustine's theme's of grace and providence in his early works, see Carol Harrison's *Rethinking Augustine's early Theology*., o.c.

Michael Foley in his article noticed the close correspondence between Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues and Ciceronian works. Augustine thus imitates Cicero in his capacity to transform intellectual and literary concepts from the past.

As the concept of self-knowledge is a major structuring topic in the dialogues, it can be assumed that Augustine intended to express his view on the topic of the self-knowledge, possibly as a reaction on the traditional treatment of the topic of self-knowledge, which he could have read in Cicero and other authors.

Origin and nature of Augustine's concept of self has recently been the subject of scholarly attention. Some ascribed to Augustine the invention of the concept of inner self which has dominated centuries of western philosophy and theology.[29] Others, as recently Richard Sorabji, suggest a similarity in Porphyry's account of the self and the epistemological suppositions for knowledge of the self, or awareness of the self, and Augustine's so called Cogito-arguments in *De Trinitate*, but also from an earlier date. Sorabji showed that not only (neo)platonic discourse, but also in sceptical and stoic schools, the discussion on the epistemological conditions for knowledge of the self was a major topic. As Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault both have shown, the consequential ethical practice was a practice of exercise. Certain existing practices of religious life matched very well with this concept of exercise, such as forms of monastic life, in the solitude of the desert as well as in the communal monastic life, which later became Augustine's ideal. As the reception of the Delphic command has been complex, the discussion on the knowledge of the self was itself an expression of a variety of practices and (mystical) theories. Seneca prescribed practices of self-examination[30], Gnostic, platonic and Christian interpretations which took the shape of the quest for the divine presence in the self in mysticism, but also materialistic interpretations of the soul such as in the Tusculan Disputations of Cicero. What the exact shape and nature was of these 'techniques de soi' remains object of discussion, but the mere presence of them shows that Augustine very well could have known about these exercises.[31] As self knowledge was one of the major topics of philosophical debate, Augustine very well could – in whatever form – have felt an impulse

[29] Taylor o.c.

[30] e.g. Seneca, *De Ira* III.36

[31] On the discussion between Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, and Martha Nussbaum's criticism on both of them see, J. Sellars, *The Art of Living. The Stoics on Nature and Function of Philosophy*. (Burlington/Ashgate 2003) 116-18; 174-5.

as a new born Christian to articulate the intellectual framework of his view on *philosophia christiana*. It is likely that this included a reaction or even a reply on the existing discourse on self and self-knowledge or even self-awareness.

What can we refer to as characteristic of Augustine's early account of the complex tradition of self-knowledge? It is clear that both the Socratic account and Augustine's discourse state that a mental state of 'conscious ignorance' is a necessary condition for the start of the process of formation. This is e.g. expressed within the classical tradition in the literary figure of Alcibiades in Plato's dialogues and in its commentaries and reception. Augustine's appreciation of the function of secondary emotions – Alcibiades' grief – in the process of mental growth and formation echoes Cicero's description of secondary emotions in his *Tusculan Disputations*.[32]

It is in this context that Monnicás person highlights. As Catherine Coneybeare has shown in her reading of the dialogues, Monnica's role is a very special role.[33] Among authors in Augustine's intellectual environment it was not uncommon to use allegorical literary techniques of personification, often with help of female figures: Varro's personifications of the *disciplinae*, Augustine's Reason in the Soliloquies, Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis*, and – later – Boethius' Lady Philosophy.[34] Danuta Shanzer has pointed to Varro's influence on Augustine's style. Monnica's role seems to be too special and crucial in Augustine's dialogues to be a mere literary convention. Augustine's use of rhetorical skills, especially of the *oratio perpetua* in his early works suggest that Monnica's literary person – her presence and her role – somehow must have served Augustine's rhetorical purpose to explain essential aspects of his reply to the classical heritage of reflection on the self. The Monnica from the dialogues incorporates elements of Augustine's concept of 'humble wisdom', which adds to the path of reason the discipline of the authority of Christ, faith as *exercitatio mentis*, as a religious exercise.[35] This included a virtuous life according to, and with help of, the theological virtues.

[32] J. Brachtendorf,., 'Cicero and Augustine on the Passions.' in: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 43(1997) 289-308, especially 294-5 and 300-3.

[33] C. Coneybeare, *The Irrational Augustine* (Oxford 2006).

[34] D.R. Shanzer, 'Augustine's Disciplines: *Silunt diutius Musae Varronis?*' in K. Pollmann/M. Vessey (eds), *Augustine and the Disciplines. From Cassiciacum to Confessions* (Oxford 2005), 69-112.

[35] W. Otten, *Exercitatio mentis: religie als denkoefening*. Diesrede van de Universiteit Utrecht 2007.

These observations suggest that Augustine used his rhetorical skills to highlight the overarching framework of reason **and** authority in his early works.

It seems the above-mentioned observations do support Johannes Brachtendorfs reported observations in his lecture at the World Conference of Philosophy. Concerning the function of the *disciplinae* they also support to a large extend Catherine Coneybeare's observations in the staging and construction of the Cassiciacum dialogues and Augustine's fashioning of Monnica's role. Simultaneously the discussed observations suggest that Augustine's rationality was a rhetorical rationality which presupposed the act of faith. Perhaps this could be evaluated as a philosophical weakness or irrationality, but the straightforwardness of the use of the rhetorical techniques suggest that for Augustine himself this (already) was obvious, as early as the Cassiciacum period.[36] This eventually would support Carol Harrison's observations concerning the presence of theological topics such as grace in the earlier work of Augustine. Augustine's rhetorical pedagogy shows a rhetorical rationality, which simultaneously imitates and transforms classical intellectual heritage.

Augustine suggests in his reaction on the classical and contemporary variety of opinions in the discussion on knowledge of the self that the path of the disciplines (reason) alone is not sufficient. Augustine adds the path of faith and of the authority of Christian discipline, which will later finds its more developed expression in *De Doctrina Christiana* and *De Trinitate* as a scriptural hermeneutics and as possibly also as a reply to the tradition of reflection on the self.

Martin CLAES

[36] Coneybeare, *The Irrational Augustine* o.c. 38 and 40.

AUGUSTINIAN BIBLE EXEGESIS IN LOUVAIN, THE CASE OF JOHN HESSELS' COMMENTARY ON 1 JOHN 2,15-18A

I. Renewed biblical and Augustinian studies

In reaction to the widespread corruption of Church and clergy and the failure to bring about institutional reform by means of Councils, the late medieval believer was inclined to concentrate on his or her individual fate. In other words, the individual believer's own salvation or damnation increasingly became the focus of attention. Inspiration for personal conversion was to be found, in the first instance, in the Scriptures as well as the early Church Fathers. Authors such as Eugene F. Rice and Berndt Hamm have stressed that Jerome, who promoted an ascetic life of prayer and penance together with a Bible based spirituality, had become the paradigm for Christian living for the wealthy and educated elite, for citizens and religious men and women around 1500[1]. Anthony David Wright has pointed out, however, that it was rather Augustine's concern for sinful humanity's need for a merciful God that attuned him to the spiritual questions of the (coming) Modern Era, a concern for which the Church Father had progressively sought support in biblical sources and Paul in particular[2]. Interest in Paul and Augustine, however, was originally restricted to the universities and the *studia generalia* of the religious orders. Nevertheless, a number of monastic and canonical orders gradually tried to implement

* I wish to thank our colleague, prof. Brian Doyle, for his invaluable assistance in translating the text.

[1] Eugene F. RICE, *Saint Jerome in the Renaissance*, Baltimore – London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985; Berndt HAMM, *Hieronymus-Begeisterung und Augustinismus vor der Reformation: Beobachtungen zur Beziehung zwischen Humanismus und Frömmigkeitstheologie (am Beispiel Nürnbergs)*, in Kenneth HAGEN (ed.), *Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300-1650). Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of his Sixtieth Birthday*, Leiden, Brill, 1990, 127-235.

[2] Anthony D. WRIGHT, *The Counter-Reformation: Catholic Europe and the Non-Christian World*, 2nd ed., Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, pp. 1-33, 163-164, 232-241. See also Heiko A. OBERMAN, *"Tuus sum, salvum me fac": Augustinréveil zwischen Renaissance und Reformation*, in Cornelius Petrus MAYER – Willigis ECKERMANN (eds.), *Scientia Augustiniana: Studien über Augustinus, den Augustinismus und den Augustinerorden. Festschrift Adolar Zumkeller OSA zum 60. Geburtstag* (Cassiciacum, 30), Würzburg, Augustinus-Verlag, 1975, 349-394; William J. BOUWSMA, *The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought*, in Heiko A. OBERMAN – Thomas A. BRADY (eds.), *Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations. Dedicated to Paul Oskar Kristeller on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 14), Leiden, Brill, 1975, 3-60.

a stricter observance of Augustine's rule. Augustinian spirituality likewise found its way from the pulpit to a broader public, such that his theology of grace was no longer confined to an exclusively academic world, but became a pastoral and even existential concern. A fine example of this Augustinian renaissance is to be found in Johann von Staupitz, vicar general of the observant Saxon congregation of the Augustinian Hermits, who distanced himself from the scholastic approach and established a biblical theology and piety based on Paul and Augustine[3]. The model of Augustine as bishop of Hippo also inspired a few reform-minded bishops, particularly in southern Europe. The latter endeavoured to improve clerical formation and behaviour as well as the catechetical formation of the faithful. Biblical studies and the study of Augustine and other Church Fathers were supported at the time by a wave of new text editions. In the years 1503-06, for example, the Basel based publisher Johannes Amerbach edited Augustine's *Opera Omnia*, 11 parts in nine volumes[4].

During his youth in his native Netherlands, Erasmus (1466/69 – 1536)[5] had extensive contact with the Brethren of the Common Life, who cherished a 'Jeromian' spirituality and were thus referred to as *Hieronymiani*, and later entered the monastery of the Augustinian Canons Regular in Stein near Gouda. In one of his letters, Erasmus writes that, as a young canon, he read and copied all of Jerome's letters. In the said institutions, which had their origins in the *Devotio Moderna*, the Bible and the Church Fathers took pride of place. This education undoubtedly left a mark on the young Erasmus, who was later to emerge as the leader of the biblical humanists. Erasmus sought to draw from God's original Word as it had been expressed in the words of Scripture. To this end, he published successive editions of his

[3] Adolar ZUMKELLER, *Johannes von Staupitz und seine christliche Heilslehre* (Cassiciacum, 45), Würzburg, Augustinus-Verlag, 1994, pp. 25-27; Franz POSSET, *The Front-Runner of the Catholic Reformation: The Life and Works of Johann von Staupitz* (St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History), Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003. See also Richard WETZEL, *Staupitz Augustinianus: An Account of the Reception of Augustine in his Tübingen Sermons*, in Heiko A. OBERMAN – Frank A. JAMES – Erik Leland SAAK (eds.), *Via Augustini: Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation. Essays in Honor of Damasus Trapp, O.S.A.* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 4), Leiden, Brill, 1991, 72-115.

[4] On the Amerbach edition see Joseph DE GHELLINCK, *La première édition imprimée des "Opera omnia S. Augustini"*, in Henry BAILLIEN – Arm. J. JANSSENS (eds.), *Miscellanea J. Gessler*, vol. 1, Deurne, Impr. C. Govaerts, 1948, 530-547.

[5] A general introduction can be found in Jan DEN BOEFT, *Erasmus and the Church Fathers*, in Irena BACKUS (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, vol. 2, Leiden, Brill, 1997, 537-572.

Latin-Greek New Testament, beginning in 1516. In the same year, Amerbach edited Jerome's *Opera Omnia*. Erasmus was in charge of the first four (of nine) volumes containing letters, *apologiae*, and treatises written by the Church Father. Erasmus considered Jerome, next to Origen[6], as the patron of a renewed biblical theology[7]. Needless to say, he was also open to those works of Augustine that contributed to his project[8]. In his *Annotationes* on the New Testament, he abundantly quotes from Augustine's Bible commentaries. More fundamentally, however, Erasmus appeals to Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana* as an important source of his biblical humanist principles. In the said work, Augustine states that a moderate knowledge of the liberal arts is necessary for a Christian in interpreting and preaching the Bible. Erasmus borrows this argument from Augustine and, as a consequence, the Church Father's book is consistently present in works from the beginning to the end of the humanist's career, particularly in his *Antibarbari* (1503), *Methodus* (1516) and the *Ratio verae theologiae* (1518), but also in his later work on the art of preaching, the *Ecclesiastes* (1535)[9]. Augustine's *De civitate Dei* played a role in the *Encomium moriae* (Praise of Folly, 1511), the *Querela pacis* (1517), the *Consultatio de bello Turcico* (1530) and even *De vidua Christiana* (1529)[10]. Augustine's views on grace and free will, which echoed throughout John Colet's Oxford lectures on the Pauline Epistles, also found its way into the central chapters of Erasmus' *Enchiridion* (1503), a work that, in its turn, exercised an enormous influence on the piety of the sixteenth century[11]. The humanist was

[6] André GODIN, *Érasme lecteur d'Origène* (Travaux d'humanisme et renaissance, 190), Genève, Droz, 1982.

[7] For an introduction to the relationship between Erasmus and Jerome see RICE, *Saint Jerome in the Renaissance*, pp. 116-136; see also John C. OLIN, *Erasmus and Saint Jerome: The Close Bond and Its Significance*, in *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society. Yearbook* 7 (1987) 33-53; Mark VESSEY, *Erasmus' Jerome: The Publishing of a Christian Author*, in *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society. Yearbook* 14 (1994) 62-99.

[8] On Erasmus and Augustine, see Robert D. SIDER, *Erasmus*, in Allan D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, Grand Rapids, MI – Cambridge, Eerdmans, 1999, 312-315; see also Charles BÉNÉ, *Érasme et Saint Augustin ou influence de Saint Augustin sur l'humanisme d'Érasme* (Travaux d'humanisme et renaissance, 103), Genève, Droz, 1969; Peter Iver KAUFMAN, *Augustinian Piety and Catholic Reform: Augustine, Colet, and Erasmus*, Macon, GA, Mercer University Press, 1982, pp. 111-141; Viviane MELLINGHOFF-BOURGERIE, *Érasme éditeur et interprète de Saint Augustin*, in Kurt FLASCH – Dominique DE COURCELLES (eds.), *Augustinus in der Neuzeit. Colloque de la Herzog August Bibliothek de Wolfenbüttel 14-17 octobre 1996*, Turnhout, Brepols, 1998, 53-81.

[9] BÉNÉ, *Érasme et Saint Augustin*.

[10] MELLINGHOFF-BOURGERIE, *Érasme éditeur et interprète de Saint Augustin*.

prepared to accept the priority of God's grace as it appeared in the Church Father's earlier works, before his controversy with the Pelagians. This view was more appropriately reconciled with his own (Neo-Stoic) humanist conceptions, stressing the intrinsic possibilities of humanity's will to perform acts that were worthy of God's grace and thus contributed to human salvation. In his debate with Luther, Erasmus fully recognizes his debt to Augustine (although it is possible that he depended on late medieval Augustinian theologians such as Hugolinus of Orvieto)[12]. Nevertheless, the humanist could not conceal that he had problems with Augustine's later, anti-Pelagian, works in which the necessity of grace was over-emphasized to the detriment of free will (*De libero arbitrio* [1524] and the two *Hyperaspistes* [1526, 1527]). In his editions of the Church Fathers, Erasmus evidently gave a place to the works of Augustine (as simply one Father among the others). He was assisted in his endeavours by Maarten Lips and the Augustinian Canons Regular of the monastery of Sint-Maartensdal in Louvain, and was able to elicit the collaboration of Juan-Luis Vivès for his edition of *De civitate Dei*. Erasmus' ten folio volumes were published in 1528-29 by the printer-editor Johannes Froben in Basel.

There can be little doubt that Martin Luther (1483 – 1546)[13] enjoyed a prominent place in the Augustinian renaissance of the early

[11] P.I. Kaufman has advanced the thesis that John Colet's soteriology, formulated in his Oxford lectures on the Pauline Epistles, comes very close to that of Augustine. It remains difficult to determine whether Colet was conscious about his dept to Augustine. Kaufman believes nevertheless that Colet's views influenced Erasmus and that they became characteristic of early sixteenth-century Catholic reform (KAUFMAN, *Augustinian Piety and Catholic Reform*, pp. *vii-viii*, 52-54, 69-73, 118-128, 143-148). The view that Augustine was "Colet's favourite Latin Father", is confirmed in John B. GLEASON, *John Colet*, Berkeley, CA – Los Angeles – London, University of California Press, 1989, p. 70, also pp. 201-202 and p. 205. Wayne J. Hankey adds that "we might account for Colet's Augustinianism in this way, *provided* that we recognize all that is implied in his acceptance of the Pseudo-Dionysius as the most privileged interpreter of Paul" (Wayne J. HANKEY, *Augustinian Immediacy and Dionysian Mediation in John Colet, Edmund Spenser, Richard Hooker and the Cardinal de Bérulle*, in FLASCH – DE COURCELLES [eds.], *Augustinus in der Neuzeit*, 125-160, p. 134).

[12] See, for example, Christoph P.M. BURGER, *Augustinus' betekenis voor Erasmus' opvatting van de vrije wil*, in Johannes VAN OORT (ed.), *De kerkvaders in Reformatie en Nadere Reformatie*, Zoetermeer, Boekencentrum, 1997, 21-34; Christoph P.M. BURGER, *De receptie van Augustinus' genadeleer: Gregorius van Rimini, Hugolinus van Orvieto, Erasmus en Luther (tot 1518)*, in Paul VAN GEEST – Johannes VAN OORT (eds.), *Augustiniana Neerlandica: Aspecten van Augustinus' spiritualiteit en haar doorwerking*, Leuven, Peeters, 2005, 413-425, pp. 420-422. Comp. KAUFMAN, *Augustinian Piety and Catholic Reform*, pp. 134-141.

[13] A general introduction can be found in Manfred SCHULZE, *Martin Luther and the Church Fathers*, in BACKUS (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, vol. 2, 573-626, pp. 576-578.

sixteenth century. As a member of the observant Saxon congregation of the Augustinian Hermits and as the spiritual son of Johann von Staupitz, he not only imbibed Augustine's rule but also a significant portion of his other writings. While studying theology in Erfurt, however, Luther only read *De Trinitate*, *De civitate Dei*, the *Confessiones*, and some of the Church Father's sermons, and did not become acquainted with Augustine's anti-Pelagian works[14]. Augustine's theology was particularly influential at the University of Wittenberg, where he was considered the preferred interpreter of the Scriptures. Luther himself, *doctor bibliae* at Wittenberg, advanced the thesis that Scripture was the sole necessary and sufficient access to the divine Truths. Characteristic of the era, he revealed himself a radical defender of the centrality of the Scriptures. Luther further admitted that Augustine had played a crucial role in his reformational breakthrough (winter 1518/19?). On the basis of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, as elucidated by the Church Father's anti-Pelagian works (particularly *De spiritu et littera*, but also *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, *Contra Iulianum* and *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*) he came to the conviction that it was impossible for any fundamentally sinful human being to earn his righteousness by doing good works[15]. Luther even

[14] On the debated question of Luther's dependence (or lack thereof) on late medieval Augustinian theologians in general and Staupitz in particular, see David C. STEINMETZ, *Luther and Staupitz: An Essay in the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation* (Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 4), Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1980; Markus WRIEDT, *Gnade und Erwählung: Eine Untersuchung zu Johann von Staupitz und Martin Luther* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz. Abteilung Religionsgeschichte, 141), Mainz, Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1991; see also Adolar ZUMKELLER, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters* (Cassiciacum, 35), Würzburg, Augustinus-Verlag, 1984, pp. 461-502; Lothar GRAF ZU DOHNA, *Staupitz and Luther: Continuity and Breakthrough at the Beginning of the Reformation*, in OBERMAN – JAMES – SAAK (eds.), *Via Augustini*, 116-129; ZUMKELLER, *Johannes von Staupitz und seine christliche Heilslehre*, pp. 217-229.

[15] For an introduction to the relationship between Luther and Augustine, see Philip D. KREY, *Luther, Martin*, in FITZGERALD (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages*, 516-518. See also Rosemarie MÜLLER-STREISAND, *Zur Rezeption Augustins bei Luther*, in *Evangelische Theologie* 22 (1962) 602-615; Charles BOYER, *Luther et sa doctrine*, Rome, Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1970, pp. 15-44; Leif GRANE, *Augustins "Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola apostoli ad Romanos" in Luthers Römerbriefvorlesung*, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 69 (1972) 304-330; ID., *Divus Paulus et S. Augustinus, interpres eius fidelissimus: Über Luthers Verhältnis zu Augustin*, in Gerhard EBELING – Eberhard JÜNGEL – Gerd SCHUNACK (eds.), *Festschrift für Ernst Fuchs*, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1973, 133-146; Reinhart STAATS, *Augustins „De spiritu et littera" in Luthers reformatorischer Erkenntnis*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 98 (1987) 28-47; Berhard LOHSE, *Zum Wittenberger Augustinismus:*

developed a more radical conception of the continued effect of sin as an aversion to God than Augustine. It was only through faith that baptized Christians could hope to be saved by God's graceful initiative. Luther's absolute denial of the idea that a person had the capacity to contribute to his or her own salvation, and hence the debate surrounding Augustine's interpretation, eventually led to a rift between Luther and Erasmus. Nevertheless, Luther also took his distance from Augustine (and *a priori* from the other Church Fathers). He was convinced in principle that the Fathers could err and effectively had done so. Their opinions had to be tested by the divine and absolute authority of God's Word in Scripture.

II. Augustinianism in Louvain

In Louvain, specific interest in Augustinian studies (as part of a broader revival of patristic studies) dates back, at least, to the last quarter of the fifteenth century. At the request of the students, and after having sought the advice of the professors and doctors of the Faculty of Theology, the town magistrate of Louvain created a new extraordinary course destined to explain the treatises of Duns Scotus and those of Augustine, beginning in 1479. The lecturer in charge of the course agreed to read and explain the treatises *De doctrina Christiana* – Augustine's work on biblical hermeneutics –, *De civitate Dei*, or another of the Church Father's works on Sundays and feast days[16]. John of Westphalia, the University's 'in-house' printer, edited Augustine's *De civitate Dei* (with commentary by Thomas Waleys and Nicholas Trivet) in 1488, in addition to a few of the Church Father's other works (e.g. *De consensu evangelistarum* [1481/83] and *De Trinitate* [1495])[17].

Augustins Schrift De Spiritu et Littera in der Auslegung bei Staupitz, Luther und Karlstadt, in HAGEN (ed.), *Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology*, 89-109; Johannes VAN OORT, *Augustin, le Moyen Âge, Luther: Augustin et son influence, spécialement sur Luther*, in *la Revue Réformée* 51/3 (2000) 42-56; BURGER, *De receptie van Augustinus' genadeleer*, pp. 422-423.

[16] Joseph WILS, *Les professeurs de l'ancienne Faculté de théologie de l'Université de Louvain*, in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 4 (1927) 338-358, pp. 340-341.

[17] *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke*, vol. 3, Leipzig, Karl W. Hiersemann, 1928, nos 2886, 2898, 2930; M.-Louis POLAIN, *Catalogue des livres imprimés au quinzième siècle des bibliothèques de Belgique*, vol. 1, Brussels, Société des Bibliophiles & Iconophiles de Belgique, 1932, nos 363, 374, 419.

The correct interpretation of *De doctrina Christiana*, and hence the position of the Bible within theological studies, was at stake in the debate between the biblical humanists and the scholastic theologians who included the Louvain 'magister' Jacobus Latomus (c.1475 – 1544) among their number[18]. In a later phase of the controversy – dealing with Luther – Latomus stressed that Scripture had always to be interpreted according to the *regula fidei,* the Catholic faith as it was defined by the Church over the course of Tradition. The Fathers of the Church and the scholastic theologians were called to be the most important witnesses of the Tradition. Augustine was not only considered a Church Father, he was taken to be the first scholastic theologian[19]. Pointing to the 'correct' interpretation of the Bible, Augustine (and the other *doctores*), Latomus rejected Luther's central assertion and insisted that after baptism, given the help of divine grace, free will was capable of believing the Gospel and of doing good works that pleased God and were meritorious for the afterlife[20]. Latomus' appeal

[18] On Augustinianism at the Faculty of Theology in Louvain, see especially Mathijs LAMBERIGTS – Leo KENIS (eds.), *L'Augustinisme à l'ancienne Faculté de théologie de Louvain* (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 111), Leuven, University Press Peeters, 1994. The absence of this work in A.D. Wright's revised bibliography represents a significant lacuna.

[19] Marcel GIELIS, *L'augustinisme anti-érasmien des premiers controversistes de Louvain Jacques Latomus et Jean Driedo*, in LAMBERIGTS – KENIS (eds.), *L'Augustinisme à l'ancienne Faculté*, 19-61, pp. 19-32. This article is based for the most part on the author's excellent doctoral dissertation: Marcel GIELIS, *Scholastiek en Humanisme: De kritiek van de Leuvense theoloog Jacobus Latomus op de Erasmiaanse theologiehervorming* (TFT-Studies, 23), Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1994. See also Charles BÉNÉ, *Saint Augustin dans la controverse sur les trois langues à Louvain en 1518 et 1519*, in [Joseph COPPENS (ed.),] *Colloquium Erasmianum. Actes du Colloque International réuni à Mons du 26 au 29 octobre 1967 à l'occasion du cinquième centenaire de la naissance d'Érasme*, Mons, Centre Universitaire de l'État, 1968, 19-32; Erika RUMMEL, *Erasmus' Conflict with Latomus: Round two*, in *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 80 (1989) 5-23; ID., *Erasmus and his Catholic Critics* (Bibliotheca humanistica et reformatorica, 45), vol. 1, Nieuwkoop, De Graaf, 1989, pp. 72-87; Wim FRANÇOIS, *Ad divinarum rerum cognitionem: Petrus Mosellanus and Jacobus Latomus on Biblical or Scholastic Theology*, in *Renaissance and Reformation/ Renaissance et Réforme* 29 (2005) 13-47.

[20] Leopold VINKEN, *Jacobus Latomus en Maarten Luther: De botsing van twee visies op theologie*, in Edmond J.M. VAN EIJL (ed.), *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797: Bijdragen tot haar geschiedenis. Contributions to its History. Contributions à son histoire* (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 45), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1977, 299-311; Rudolf HERMANN, *Studien zur Theologie Luthers und des Luthertums*, ed. Horst BEINTKER (Gesammelte und nachgelassene Werke, 2), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981, pp. 256-268; Erwin ISERLOH, *Kirche – Ereignis und Institution: Aufsätze und Vorträge*. Band II: *Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation* (Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte, Supplementband 3/II), Münster, Aschendorff, 1985, pp. 70-87; Jos E. VERCRUYSSE, *Jacobus*

to the Bible and Augustine was embedded to a large extent within a preformed scholastic framework. In the thirties and forties of the sixteenth century, however, Augustinianism in Louvain grew to full stature through the works of John Driedo (1479/80 – 1535). In line with Latomus, Driedo emphasized both Scripture and the traditions of the Church as sources that gave access to the divine Truth. More than Latomus, however, he stressed the importance of biblical studies, appealing in this regard to Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*[21]. In the field of justification doctrine, Driedo dissociated himself from the scholastic frame of thought and is likely to have studied the works of Augustine. He finally developed a strict Augustinian theology that was closer to Luther than to Erasmus, the latter having been accused of Pelagianism[22]. A third leading theologian who deserves our attention is Ruard Tapper (1487 – 1559), although he was evidently more attached to the Thomistic tradition than to strict Augustinianism[23].

The Louvain Theological Faculty continued nevertheless to develop into an independent centre of Catholic Augustinianism, even after the Council of Trent. The decrees of the latter, whether on the sources of faith or on justification, were in any case a careful search for expressions that could do as much justice as possible to every legitimate form of existing Catholic thought[24]. In the course of the sixteenth century, Augustinian theology in Louvain reached its pinnacle in Michel de Bay or Baius (1513-89), who continued and even

Latomus und Martin Luther: Einführendes zu einer Kontroverse, in *Gregorianum* 64 (1983) 515-538; ID., *Die Stellung Augustins in Jacobus Latomus' Auseinandersetzung mit Luther*, in LAMBERIGTS – KENIS (eds.), *L'Augustinisme à l'ancienne Faculté*, 7-18; Anna VIND, *Ein Streit um Worte: Luther versus Latomus*, in *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 46 (2004) 448-466; ID., *The Use of Augustine by Latomus und Luther*, in Ulrik NISSEN et al. (eds.), *Luther between Present and Past: Studies in Luther and Lutheranism* (Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 56), Helsinki, Luther-Agricola-Society, 2004, 132-150.

[21] Wim FRANÇOIS, *Augustinus als 'De onweerlegbare vertolker van de theologie': Johannes Driedo over Schrift, Augustinus en de katholieke traditie (1533)*, in VAN GEEST – VAN OORT (eds.), *Augustiniana Neerlandica*, 427-446. See also John L. MURPHY, *The Notion of Tradition in John Driedo* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana. Facultas Theologiae. Dissertatio ad lauream), Milwaukee, WI, Seraphic Press, 1959.

[22] GIELIS, *L'augustinisme anti-érasmien des premiers controversistes de Louvain*, pp. 32-61.

[23] Valentine J. PETER, *The Doctrine of Ruard Tapper (1487-1559): Regarding Original Sin and Justification* (Pontifica Universitas a S. Thoma Aq. in Urbe. Facultas Theologiae. Pars dissertationis ad lauream), Rome, s.n., 1965; Martijn SCHRAMA, *Ruard Tapper und die Möglichkeit gute Werken zu verrichten: "Non omnia opera hominis mala"*, in LAMBERIGTS – KENIS (eds.), *L'Augustinisme à l'ancienne Faculté*, 63-98.

[24] Comp. WRIGHT, *The Counter-Reformation*, pp. 20-21.

radicalized the strict Augustinian stance of his master, John Driedo. Augustine's doctrine of grace and salvation was regarded as the primary channel of communication between the opposing confessional camps in Europe. Accusations of deviation from reaffirmed orthodoxy ultimately earned Baius a papal condemnation in 1567. He and his like-minded colleagues submitted[25]. Interest in Augustinian theology in Louvain also went hand in hand with the endeavour to publish an improved edition of the Church Father's work. In the years 1576-77, a new edition of Augustine's works (ten volumes), thoroughly revised by Louvain theologians, was published by Christopher Plantin in Antwerp[26].

III. Augustinian Biblical exegesis in Louvain and John Hessels

The existence of an Augustinian school of Catholic biblical exegesis in Louvain is a little known fact. In 1546, two so-called 'professors royal' were appointed at the University of Louvain by Emperor Charles V, one in the Sacred Scriptures and the other in Scholastic Theology. There is much to be said for the suggestion that Charles V associated himself in so doing with the spirit of the Council of Trent. Inspired by the humanism of the day, the Council's fifth session (June 17, 1546) expressed the desire that biblical studies be made available in institutes for training the clergy to allow the latter to base their preaching on biblical texts[27]. The newly appointed professors taught

[25] From the abundant literature available on M. Baius, we refer to Xavier-Marie LE BACHELET, *Baius, Michel*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 2-1 (1905) 38-111; Henri DE LUBAC, *Augustinisme et théologie moderne* (Théologie, 63), Paris, Aubier, 1965, esp. pp. 15-48; Vittorino GROSSI, *Baio e Bellarmino, interpreti di S. Agostino nelle questioni del soprannaturale* (Studia Ephemeridis "Augustinianum", 3), Rome, Augustinianum, 1968; Alfred VANNESTE, *Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius*, in VAN EIJL (ed.), *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797*, 327-350; Alfred VANNESTE, *Le "De prima hominis justitia" de M. Baius: Une relecture critique*, and Manfred BIERSACK, *Bellarmin und die "Causa Baii"*, in LAMBERIGTS – KENIS (eds.), *L'Augustinisme à l'ancienne Faculté*, 123-166, and 167-178; Martin W.F. STONE, *Michael Baius (1513-1589) and the Debate on 'Pure Nature': Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth-Century Scholasticism*, in Jill KRAYE – Risto SAARINEN (eds.), *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2004, 51-90.

[26] Lucien CEYSSENS, *Le "Saint Augustin" du XVIIe siècle: L'édition de Louvain (1577)*, in *XVIIe Siècle* 34 (1982) 103-120. Also Léon VOET, *The Plantin Press (1555-1589): A Bibliography of the Works Printed and Published by Christopher Plantin at Antwerpen and Leiden*, vol. 1, Amsterdam, van Hoeve, 1980, 205-218.

[27] The text of the decree: *Sessio quinta: Decretum de lectione et praedicatione*, in *Concilium Tridentinum: Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum nova collectio*. T. V. *Actorum* Pars IIa, ed. Stephanus EHSES, Freiburg i.Br., Herder, 1911,

every day (while the *professores ordinarii* only taught on a daily basis for six weeks of the year). This was a new evolution, since it meant that the Sacred Scriptures as a whole, or at least the greater part thereof, and systematic theology in its entirety were now in the hands of qualified professors[28]. It gave an important impetus to what has been called the Golden Age of Catholic Bible Exegesis during the period between 1550 and 1650.

The first professor royal of Sacred Scriptures was John Leonard van der Eycken (or Hasselius). He served as part of a delegation to the Council of Trent in 1551 while his chair, in the meantime, was entrusted to the young doctor Michel de Bay, or Baius. When Van der Eycken passed away in Trent in 1552[29], his young substitute remained in his post and before long had gathered a considerable following in Louvain. Baius found an ally in his younger yet equally intelligent colleague John Hessels (1522-66)[30], who taught theology and Sacred

pp. 241-243. On the origin of the Tridentine decree on Bible study and preaching, see Arthur ALLGEIER, *Das Konzil von Trient und das theologische Studium*, in *Historisches Jahrbuch im auftrage der Görres-Gesellschaft* 52 (1932) 313-339; Hubert JEDIN, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient*. Band II: *Die erste Trienter Tagungsperiode 1545/47*, Freiburg i.Br., Herder, 1957, pp. 83-103; Leopold LENTNER, *Volkssprache und Sakralsprache: Geschichte einer Lebensfrage bis zum Ende des Konzils von Trient* (Wiener Beiträge zur Theologie, 5), Vienna, Herder 1964, pp. 264-274; Frederick J. MCGINNESS, *An Erasmian Legacy: Ecclesiastes and the Reform of Preaching at Trent*, in Ronald K. DELPH – Michelle M. FONTAINE – John Jeffries MARTIN (eds.), *Heresy, Culture, and Religion in Early Modern Italy: Contexts and Contestations* (Sixteenth Century Essays & Studies, 76), Kirksville, MO, Truman State University Press, 2006, 93-112.

[28] Edmond J.M. VAN EIJL, *De theologische faculteit te Leuven in de XV^e en XVI^e eeuw: Organisatie en opleiding*, in VAN EIJL (ed.), *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797*, 69-153, pp. 95-98, 152. See also Victor BARONI, *La Contre-Réforme devant la Bible: La question biblique* (doctoral dissertation Faculty of Theology Lausanne), Lausanne: La Concorde, 1943, pp. 235-237, 287-296; Robert DE LANGHE, *Les recherches bibliques à l'Université de Louvain*, in Joseph COPPENS – Albert DESCAMPS – Édouard MASSAUX (eds.), *Sacra Pagina: Miscellanea biblica congressus internationalis catholici de re biblica* (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 12-13), vol. 1, Gembloux, Duculot, 1959, 28-40, pp. 29-30.

[29] Petrus Franciscus Xaverius DE RAM, *Mémoire sur la part que le clergé de Belgique et spécialement les docteurs de l'Université de Louvain, ont prise au Concile de Trente* (Académie Royale de Belgique. Nouveaux Mémoires, 14), Brussels, Hayez, 1841, pp. 32-35. In addition to Van der Eycken, other Louvain theologians sent to the Council included Ruard Tapper, Franciscus Sonnius and Josse Ravesteyn from Tielt (or Tiletanus).

[30] On Hessels' life and works, see, for example, Edward VAN EVEN, *Hessels (Jean)*, in *Biographie Nationale de Belgique* 9 (1886-87) 320-322; J. FORGET, *Hessels, Jean*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 6 (1920) 2321-2324; André DUVAL, *Hessels (Jean)*, in *Catholicisme* 5 (1957) 699-700.

Scripture to the young Norbertines of the Premonstratensian abbey of Park, just outside the city walls, between 1551 and 1559, and assisted abbot Ludovicus van den Berghe (r. 1543-58) in his endeavour to restore the strict observance of the rule and community life, efforts that were continued by his successor Charles Van der Linden (r. 1558-1576)[31]. Largely due to the facilities and material support offered by the abbey, Hessels simultaneously continued his own studies at the Faculty of Theology[32]. He was appointed professor at the Faculty in 1554 and awarded the degree of Doctor in Theology in 1556. In 1562, Hessels was ultimately appointed to the chair of professor royal in Scholastic Theology. Both 'royal chairs' – Sacred Scriptures and Scholastic Theology – were thus entrusted to a new generation of professors. The 'old guard', which still consisted of the disciples of Adrian of Utrecht and was represented by Ruard Tapper, lost a considerable degree of influence in the process. The irony of the situation, however, is that Baius, professor royal of Sacred Scriptures, did not publish any significant Bible commentary, whereas Hessels, his colleague in Scholastic Theology, did produce some interesting commentaries. It should be remembered, however, that another colleague of Baius and Hessels, namely Cornelius Jansenius of Ghent, ordinary professor of theology and later bishop of Ghent, would prove to be Louvain's major biblical scholar of the Early Modern Era. While Hessels may not

[31] "Ludovicus Van den Berghe, abbas Parchensis ab anno 1543 ad annum 1558, perpetuam sui memoriam Parchensibus reliquit, monasterium illud laboribus Joannis Hesselii lectoris in eum statum reformans, ut multis aliis in sanctitate et studiorum exercitiis sit exemplar" (Joannes MOLANUS, *Historiae Lovaniensium*, liber XI, ed. Petrus Franciscus Xaverius DE RAM [Collection de Chroniques Belges inédites, 9/2], Brussels, Hayez, 1861, p. 691. Comp. Emile VALVEKENS, *L'Ordre de Prémontré et le Concile de Trente: Le chapitre national néerlandais de 1572*, in *Analecta Praemonstratensia* 6 [1930] 74-97, pp. 75-76; Norbert Joseph WEYNS, *La réforme des Prémontrés aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles particulièrement dans la circarie de Brabant*, in *Analecta Praemonstratensia* 46 [1970] 5-51, pp. 14-15). This is an early testimony to the cooperation between the Louvain theologians belonging to the Augustinian faction of the Faculty and the abbots of the (rich and powerful) Brabant Premonstratensian abbeys. Louvain theologians not only spent some years teaching the young Norbertines, but eventually contributed to the Premonstratensians' clear-cut option for a strict Augustinian theology of grace. This would become even more manifest in the course of the seventeenth century (See Norbert Joseph WEYNS, *De Brabantse Norbertijnen en het Jansenisme*, in *Analecta Praemonstratensia* 29 [1953] 5-66).

[32] "... summa cum laude sacro illi Collegio locoque [Parchensi] ... in quo tot ille annos sacras est literas interpretatus; cuiusque liberalitate ac munificentia et in studiis fotus, et ad summum est Doctoratus gradum evectus". (Henricus GRAVIUS, *Epistola dedicatoria Carolo Lindano Monasterii Parcensis ... Abbati*, in Ioannes HESSELS, *In priorem B. Pauli apostoli ad Timotheum epistolam Commentarius*/a Henrico Gravio, Lovanii: apud Ioannem Bogardum, 1568, [8], 193, [1] f.; in –8°, f. A7v).

have enjoyed the fame of Cornelius Jansenius, he can still be considered an early representative of a Louvain school of Augustinian Bible exegesis.

As we know, Augustine's anti-Pelagian works led both Baius and Hessels to like-minded conceptions regarding Adam's fall, the consequences thereof for posterity, and the relationship between grace and free will. Their positions on these matters came suspiciously close to those of Luther, Calvin and the other reformers. Concerns about their orthodoxy and the hope that close contacts with the Apostolic See and the Catholic bishops would bring both theologians into line with Catholic tradition contributed to their selection as Louvain's representatives at the Council of Trent. This is evident from the letters written in June and July 1561 to Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga by Bishop (later Cardinal) Gianfrancesco Commendone who was actually sent to the north to invite the Catholic and Protestant Estates of Germany to participate in the Council of Trent[33]. On the occasion of a visit to Louvain earlier that year, the nuncio had cautioned Hessels and his colleague Judocus Ravesteyn of Tielt (Tiletanus), insisting on the need to preserve the unity of doctrine. In a letter to Commendone dated May 1561, Hessels remembers the event and confirms his undivided engagement in the fight against heresy, basing himself "on the ancient and solid foundations of the faith"[34].

The theological method, on which both Baius and Hessels based themselves, is also explained in a frequently quoted letter written by the former to Cardinal Ludovico Simoneta in 1568. Their theology was characterised by a radical return to the Scriptures and the Church Fathers, both of which enjoyed a degree of credit among the Protestants and were thus the best way to tackle the "heretics". Baius, however, did not conceal the fact that he and Hessels made particular reference to the work

[33] G. Commendone to E. Gonzaga, 9 June 1561, in *Concilium Tridentinum: Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum nova collectio*. T. VIII. *Actorum* Pars Va, ed. Stephanus Ehses, Freiburg i.Br., Herder, 1919, p. 224 l. 3-20; *Idem*, 15 June 1561, pp. 226-227; *Idem*, 24 July 1561, pp. 234-236. Baius and Hessels, together with Jansenius of Ghent, were at the Council from the summer of 1563 to the spring of 1564.

[34] "... attenta exhortatione, qua me et magistrum nostrum Tiletanum in collegio societatis Iesu generaliter super unitate doctrinae exhortari dignatus es ... Nobis etiam praecipue incumbere putamus, ut studendo, docendo, disputando ex antiquissimis et solidissimis nostrae religionis fundamentis studeamus nostri temporis erroribus occurrere" (J. Hessels to G. Commendone, 27 May 1561, in *Concilium Tridentinum*. T. VIII. *Actorum* Pars Va, ed. Ehses, p. 215 l. 19-21, 25-27; comp. G. Commendone to E. Gonzaga, 9 June 1561, in *Concilium Tridentinum*. T. VIII. *Actorum* Pars Va, ed. Ehses, p. 223 l. 8-18).

of Augustine[35]. The letter in question was written a few months after Pope Pius V had rebuked Baius with an official condemnation (1567), which was provoked in its turn by an earlier censure of excerpts from Baius' works by various foreign theological faculties. Hessels himself escaped condemnation, partly because he was considered more moderate than Baius[36] and partly because he died in 1566 at the youthful age of 44 years. In his letter to the Cardinal Simoneta, Baius nevertheless expresses his conviction that the condemnation also affected his like-minded colleague and friend John Hessels[37].

John Hessels enjoyed a profound familiarity with the works of Augustine. A text has also been preserved in the Louvain University archives in which Hessels questions the authenticity of a number of works attributed to Augustine in Erasmus' Froben edition, which might have made his colleagues aware of the problems associated with the said corpus and have evoked the need for a new and improved edition of Augustine's writings[38]. A revised and improved

[35] "Ante annos octodecim, cum primum coepi publice et quotidie sacram Theologiam in Scholis nostris profiteri, partim ob Haereticos, qui nihil audire volunt, nisi Scripturam sacram et veterum dicta Sanctorum, partim etiam ob consortium cum optimo quodam et eruditissimo viro Joanne Hessels, Sacrae Theologiae Professore, qui eandem docendi normam sequebatur in lectione, quam nunc plusquam octodecim annos continuos Deo me confortante quotidie prosecutus sum; post lectionem Petri Lombardi et alicujus Doctoris Scholastici, conatus sum sacrae Theologiae studium statim revocare ad Scripturam sacram, et veterum scripta Sanctorum, Cypriani, Ambrosii, Hieronymi, Augustini, Leonis, Prosperi, Gregorii, et similium, quos etiam Haeretici saltem aliqua ex parte venerantur ... nos totos ad horum Veterum, et praesertim D. Augustini (qui in tractandis quaestionibus omnium diligentissimus fuit) imitationem formare conamur ..." (M. Baius to L. Simonete, 16 March 1568, in [Michael BAIUS,] *Michaelis Baii ... Opera: Cum Bullis Pontificum et aliis ipsius causam spectantibus ... opuscula aucta*/studio A.P. theologi [Gabrielis Gerberon], Coloniae Agripinae: sumptibus Balthasaris ab Egmont et Sociovum, 1696, 2t. in 1 v. [XVIII, (2), 492, 248 p.]; in–4°, t. 2, pp. 124-125).

[36] G. Commendone to E. Gonzaga, 24 July 1561, in *Concilium Tridentinum*. T. VIII. *Actorum* Pars Va, ed. EHSES, p. 234 l. 17-18: "... l' Hessels, ch' è il più moderato ..."; p. 235 l. 30-31: "... il Bay solo come più pericoloso..."

[37] M. Baius to L. Simoneta, 16 March 1568, in [Michael BAIUS,] *Michaelis Baii ... Opera*, ed. GERBERON, t. 2, pp. 125-126.

[38] The two page text is part of a compilation consisting of orations, consultations etc. written by John Hessels and other professors of the Faculty. The handwriting reveals that the compilation was copied at the end of the sixteenth century by John Molanus, who was one of the promoters of the Louvain Augustine edition. The said text, with the number 32, belonged among the items preserved in the Archives of Ghent Seminary until they were brought back to the University Archives in Louvain. See Ferdinandus CLAEYS-BOÚÚAERT, *Inventaire de documents relatifs à l'ancienne Université de Louvain (Faculté de Théologie) conservés au Grand Séminaire de Gand*, in Léon VAN DER ESSEN (ed.), *L'Université de Louvain à travers cinq siècles: Études historiques*, Brussels, A. Lesigne, 1927, 273-308, p. 279.

Louvain edition of Augustine was only to appear ten years after Hessels' death, in 1577. In his introduction to this extensive work, the editor, John Molanus or Van der Meulen, admits to having had the "manuscript censures that John Hessels made on nine volumes"[39] at his disposal in the process of deliberating on the authenticity of Augustine's works.

John Hessels left a number of theological and polemical works to posterity. His famous *Catechismus*, a systematic exposition of dogmatic and moral theology, was published posthumously in 1571[40]. Although he was holder of the royal chair in Scholastic Theology, Hessels also left a number of Bible commentaries, three of which were edited after his death by his younger colleague Henry Gravius and published by Jean (I) Bogard (Joannes Bogardus) in Louvain in 1568: A commentary on the First Letter of Paul to Timothy, a commentary on the First Letter of Peter and a commentary on the First Letter of John[41]. In the preliminary pages of the commentary on the Epistle to Timothy, we find a dedication written by Gravius to Abbot Charles Van der Linden of Park Abbey, who had been one of Hessels' students when the latter lectured in the abbey and who had maintained amicable relations with his professor. Hessels' commentary on the Gospel of Matthew was published in 1572, again thanks to the efforts of Henry Gravius[42]. In what follows, we will examine Hessels' discussion of 1 John 2,15-18a, a pericope that is not without importance for Augustinian theology.

[39] "Quae vero manifeste deprehensa constat Augustini non esse, ea praemissis censuris in Appendice sui tomi reponenda censui. In his autem censuris Erasmus aliquoties; saepius autem Indiculus Possidii; citationes Bedae: censura manuscripta doctissimi theologi Ioannis Hesselii in novem tomos; et reverendi patris Martini Lipsii in tomum decimum, magno nobis adiumento fuerunt" ([Aurelius Augustinus,] *Opera D. Aurelii Augustini ... tomis decem comprehensa*.../per theologos Lovanienses... [Ioannem Molanum], Antverpiae: ex officina Christophori Plantini, 1576-77; in –f°, [introductio] f *4v).

[40] Mathijs LAMBERIGTS, *The Place of Augustine in the First and the Second Books of Hessels' Catechismus*, in LAMBERIGTS – KENIS (eds.), *L'Augustinisme à l'ancienne Faculté*, 99-122.

[41] Ioannes HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis apostoli et evangelistae canonicam epistolam absolutissimus Commentarius*/a Henrico Gravio, Lovanii: apud Ioannem Bogardum, 1568, [8], 121, [1] f.; in –8°.

[42] See Jean-Pierre DELVILLE, *L'Europe de l'exégèse au XVIe siècle: Interprétations de la parabole des ouvriers à la vigne (Matthieu 20,1-16)* (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 174), Leuven, University Press – Peeters, 2004, pp. 468-474.

IV. John Hessels' commentary on 1 John 2,15-18a

15 *Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the charity of the Father is not in him.* 16 *For all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not of the Father, but is of the world.* 17 *And the world passeth away, and the concupiscence thereof: but he that doth the will of God, abideth for ever.* 18a *Little children, it is the last hour ...*

1. Love of the world and love of God

In his commentary on verse 15[43], Hessels insists that the concept "world" should be taken literally, but that it also refers to the 'worldly' people who opt for the created world instead of the law of the Creator. Hessels implores his readers and listeners not to love the world as such, arguing on the basis of Matt 6,24 that anyone who loves the world cannot love God at the same time. The 'worldly' people to whom the concept refers, however, are to be loved and removed from the world according to the will of Christ. A connection is made at this juncture with John 15,19[44]. Hessels' description of the contrast between love of the world and love of God sounds particularly Augustinian[45] and is reminiscent of the Church Father's second sermon on

[43] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 36v.

[44] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 36v: "Diligi prohibetur hic mundus inquantum mundus est sive impius: Nam quatenus sunt homines, diligendi sunt, et eruendi de mundo ..."

[45] The contrast between heavenly and earthly things plays an important role in almost all ethical questions touched upon by Augustine in his *Sermones ad populum*, *Enarrationes* etc. Prompted by his pastoral preoccupations, however, the Church Father also stresses the gradual conversion from the love of the world to the love of God. This represents the basic idea of all the conversion schemes in the *Confessiones*: Aversion from the earthly and conversion to the heavenly. The contrast is also present in Augustine's doctrinal writings (e.g. *De civitate Dei*) where the ethical distinction has even been built upon an ontological distinction. Human persons are at liberty to make use of the world but not to enjoy it on its own account. People were to love God and their fellow human beings, to the extent that the latter refer to God (Comp. Dany DIDEBERG, *Saint Augustin et la première épître de Saint Jean: Une théologie de l'agapé* [Théologie Historique, 34], Paris, Beauchesne, 1975, pp. 175-181; also Raymond F. CANNING, *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Leuven, Augustinian Historical Institute, 1993). It is clear that this is also related to the Augustinian topic of *uti* and *frui* (Anthony DUPONT, *Using or Enjoying Humans: Uti et Frui in Augustine*, in *Augustiniana* 54 [2004] 475-506; the bibliography gives a list of studies consecrated to the theme of love, albeit from the perspective of *uti* and *frui*).

the First Letter of John[46], although this is not mentioned as such in the margins of his book.

2. The threefold temptation

1 John 2,16 provides the reason why the world should not be loved: It is rampant with the *concupiscentia carnis* or the *desire of the flesh*, the *concupiscentia oculorum* or the *lust of the eyes* and the *superbia vitae* or the *ambitions of the present life*, none of which is 'of the Father'. Hessels' commentary[47] stands completely in line with the interpretation Augustine offers of the same verse. The Church Father had initially related this threefold temptation from 1 John 2,16 with his threefold understanding of the passions, which still had its roots in Antiquity: *voluptas*, *curiositas* and *superbia* or *ambitio saeculi*. We find a detailed meditation on 1 John 2,16 in the second part of the tenth book of Augustine's *Confessiones* (*Conf.* X, 30 [41] – 39 [64]), from 397, which even derives its structure from the threefold temptation as described in the said verse. The Church Father also elaborates on *concupiscentia carnis*, *concupiscentia oculorum* and *superbia vitae* in his second sermon on the First Letter of John (406-407)[48]. Hessels' commentary on the first temptation is particularly reminiscent of the latter work, although – as we noted above – no direct reference is made to his source in the edition of 1568. In a paraphrase of Augustine's second sermon on the First Letter of John[49], Hessels considers the *concupiscentia carnis* to be an unordered desire for the things of the flesh whereby natural life is maintained, and he explicitly alludes to food and drink in this regard, as well as the *concubitus* or the 'shared bed'[50]. In line with Augustine[51], Hessels understands the *concupiscentia*

[46] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 11-12, ed. Paul AGAËSSE (SC, 75), Paris, Cerf, 1961, p. 174.

[47] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37r-v: "Tria explicat Ioannes quibus universa comprehendit quae habent impii quibus Deo adversantur..."

[48] For further commentary on these passages, see DIDEBERG, *S. Augustin et 1 Jean*, pp. 182-186; James J. O'DONNELL, *Augustine: Confessions*. Vol. III: *Commentary on Books 8-13. Indexes*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 150-154, 199-249.

[49] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 12 (SC, 75), p. 176: "Hoc ergo, ait nobis: 'desiderium carnis est', id est, desiderium earum rerum quae pertinent ad carnem, sicut cibus et concubitus, et cetera hujusmodi".

[50] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37r: "Concupiscentiam carnis vocat inordinatum desiderium earum rerum quae pertinent ad carnem, quibus natura sustentatur, cuiusmodi sunt cibus ac potus, et concubitus, quo humani generis species conservatur, et alia consimilia".

[51] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 13 (SC, 75), p. 176: "... desiderium oculorum dicit omnem curiositatem. Jam quam late patet

oculorum as *curiositas*. In contrast to our contemporary understanding of the term, curiosity has a negative connotation in Hessels' commentary. Among the cherished objects of curiosity, Hessels includes[52] the acquisition of unusual and godless arts, the observation of vain and immoral spectacles etc. Hessels then goes on to interrupt his line of thought, which exhibits a considerable degree of influence from Augustine's second sermon on the First Letter of John, dwelling further on the difference between the *concupiscentia carnis* and the *concupiscentia oculorum*, evidently on the basis of elements borrowed in this instance from the tenth book of Augustine's *Confessiones*. Hessels argues that one should understand the *concupiscentia carnis* to embrace every form of desire for whatever gratifies the senses by its very nature. He refers by way of example to attractive colours that please the eye, and sweet odours that indulge our sense of smell. They serve as a supplement to the aforementioned food, drink and shared bed, although Hessels remains far-removed from Augustine's "sense-by-sense exploration of the temptations of the flesh: Touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight"[53], which we encounter in the tenth book of his *Confessiones*. Hessels distinguishes between the *concupiscentia carnis* and the *concupiscentia oculorum*, basing himself on the observation that the latter does not long for things that are desirable by nature, but for things considered to be desirable by human fantasy, which are sometimes even offensive to the senses[54]. With *Confessiones* X, 35 in mind, he adds that this is rightly called the "ocular desire", because it refers to a hunger for knowledge, and the eyes enjoy pride of place among the five senses when it comes to the acquisition of knowledge[55]. As we already noted, the insertion of elements borrowed from *Confessiones* X interrupts Hessels' structured discussion of 1 John 2,16 to some degree, although they appear to have been necessary, nevertheless, for clarifying his distinction between the *concupiscentia carnis*

curiositas? Ipsa in spectaculis, in theatris, in sacramentis diaboli, in magicis artibus, in maleficiis ipsa est curiositas".

[52] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37r: "Concupiscentiam oculorum appellat omnem curiositatem, quae valde late patet, ut in addiscendis curiosis ac nephariis artibus; in vanis aut turpibus contuendis spectaculis, in conquirendis magnis opibus, in dinoscendis carpendisque proximorum vitiis".

[53] O'DONNELL, *Augustine: Confessions*. Vol II: *Commentary on Books 1-7*, p. 211.

[54] Hessels may be alluding to Augustine's *Confessiones* X, 35 (55), ed. Lucas VERHEIJEN (CC SL, 27), Turnhout, Brepols, 1981, pp. 184 l. 21 – 185 l. 25.

[55] This is a clear allusion to Augustine's *Confessiones* X, 35 (54) (CC SL, 27), p. 184 l. 7-9. Comp. Hans BLUMENBERG, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought), Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995, pp. 309-323.

and the *concupiscentia oculorum*. Hessels returns to Augustine's second sermon on the First Letter of John in his discussion of the *superbia*[56]. Augustine prefers to refer to the *superbia* as the *ambitio saeculi*, a concept Hessels does not borrow from the Church Father. According to the Louvain theologian, the *superbia* stirs an unordered desire in a person to tower above other people and even to hand himself over to difficult tasks, to elicit praise and consider himself exalted, on account of his wealth or power or intellect and science, or even personal virtue[57].

Following his discussion of the threefold temptation in 1 John 16, on the basis of texts from Augustine, Hessels goes on to argue that Adam himself was subject to the same three temptations and was overcome by them[58]. It should be noted for the sake of clarity that this idea is not to be found in the works of Augustine! From Hessels' perspective, Adam was tempted by the *concupiscentia carnis* when the enemy persuaded him to eat the forbidden fruit; by the *concupiscentia oculorum* when he suggested: "You will acquire knowledge of good and evil and your eyes shall be opened", and by the *superbia* when he said: "You shall become like gods". Hessels adds that Adam's descendants will be confronted by the same [three] temptations in an immense variety of forms as long as they are part of this world[59]. In the margins of the 1568 edition of Hessels' book, reference is clearly made at this point to Augustine's *Confessiones*, book X, from chapter 28 to the end. For the first time, reference is explicitly made to a work of Augustine[60].

By way of contrast with Adam and his descendants, Hessels points out that Jesus was also subject to the same temptation but was not overcome by them (Matt 4,1-11)[61]. He was tempted by the

[56] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 13 (SC, 75), p. 178: "Ambitio saeculi superbia est. Jactare se vult in honoribus; magnus sibi videtur homo, sive de divitiis, sive de aliqua potentia".

[57] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37v: "Superbia est, qua quis inordinate quaerit excellere, et ardua tentat, qua quis ambit honores, et magnus sibi videtur, sive ob divitias, sive ob potentiam, sive ob ingenium et scientiam, sive etiam propter ipsam virtutem".

[58] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37v: "Per haec tria tentatus et victus est Adam ..."

[59] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37v: "Per eadem haec innumeris modis tentatur posteritas Adae quamdiu in hoc mundo vivit ..."

[60] Although Hessels' text is particularly reminiscent of *Conf.* X, 35 (54-55), the Louvain theologian refers in a more general way to the famous passage of Augustine, *Confessiones* X, 28 (39) – 43 (70) (CC SL, 27), pp. 175-193.

[61] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 37v – 38r: "Ab iisdem vitiis tentatus est et dominus Iesus, sed non item superatus ..."

concupiscentia carnis when Satan suggested that he "tell the stones to become bread". He was lured by the *concupiscentia oculorum* when Satan advised him to throw himself to the ground from the highest point in the temple and see if God's angels would guard him. At first sight, this is not an obvious connection, but it is completely in line with Augustine who even saw the servants of God tempted by curiosity "so that they wish to work a miracle, to test whether God listens to them in regard to miracles"[62]. Finally, Jesus was tempted by the *superbia* when Satan promised him all the kingdoms of the world with all their magnificence if he would fall down in worship before him. It would also appear that Hessels was inspired by Augustine's second sermon on the First Letter of John in the composition of this passage, although the 1568 edition still contains no explicit reference to the said work[63]. As a matter of fact, Augustine is one of the few Church Fathers (if not the only one) to relate 1 John 2, 16 to the narrative of Jesus' temptation in the wilderness[64]. Hessels goes on to argue that Christ proposed three forms of antidote to these three evils in the gospel[65]. As an antidote to the *concupiscentia carnis* he proposed fasting, to the *concupiscentia oculorum* the giving of alms and charity towards one's neighbour, and to the *superbia* of this life humble prayer (Matt 6,1-18). In similar fashion, the apostle Paul proposed moderation, justice and piety (Titus 2,1-15).

Hessels notes in passing that John's words in the passage in question were not intended as an explanation of every sin but rather of the evil roots of every sin[66]. He makes explicit reference in this regard to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, the first and only time he does so in his discussion of this pericope. More specifically, Hessels refers to Thomas' explanation with reference to the *concupiscentia oculorum*. The fact that Thomas in turn explicitly refers to Augustine's *Confessiones* X, 35 with regard to this point has the effect of turning Hessels' reference to Thomas into an indirect reference to Augustine[67].

[62] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 13 (SC, 75), p. 176. Comp. Augustine, *Tractates on the First Epistle of John*, tract. 2, trans. John W. RETTIG (The Fathers of the Church: A new translation, 92), Washington, D.C., C.U.A. Press, 1995, p. 156.

[63] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 14 (SC, 75), pp. 178-180.

[64] DIDEBERG, *S. Augustin et 1 Jean*, p. 186.

[65] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 38r: "Adversus tria haec mala proponit Christus in Euangelio tria item antidota ..."

[66] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 38r.

[67] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 77, art. 5 (ed. Leonina, 7), Rome, Typographia de Propaganda Fide, 1892, pp. 66-67.

3. The nature of concupiscentia

Hessels continues by stating that he wishes to elaborate on John's allusion to the fact that the threefold temptation does not come from God but rather from the world. Without further ado, however, the Louvain professor passes over the threefold temptation and goes on to offer a number of observations with respect to *concupiscentia* as such. In so doing, he follows completely in the footsteps of Augustine, who focuses on the nature of *concupiscentia* in the second stage of his exegesis of 1 John 2,16, during the controversy with Julian of Aeclanum. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Hessels cites *Contra Iulianum* IV, chapters 13 and 14 (421/422) in some detail at this juncture[68]. In line with Augustine[69], Hessels considers *concupiscentia* in the first instance as a fundamental deficiency of human nature after the fall and in this sense as a punishment for original sin (*poena peccati*). At the same time, however, it is a particularly compelling incitement or stimulus to sin. In Augustine's opinion, all human beings, even those who have been baptised, are subject to the temptations of the flesh, which runs counter to the spirit and lures men and women into taking revenge, for example, or the pursuit of wealth, or the imposition of one's own will, or the pursuit of honours. Sexual desire is clearly the manifestation par excellence of *concupiscentia*, although it does not have a prominent place in Hessels' argumentation. Given the fact that *concupiscentia* directs human desire in an unordered manner in all sorts of erroneous directions, human beings come to love the very things they should avoid and avoid the things they should embrace. It goes without saying that Hessels also makes reference to the particularly Augustinian theme of the struggle between *concupiscentia* and *continentia*, the latter understood by the Church Father as nothing other than a gift of God.

[68] DIDEBERG, *S. Augustin et 1 Jean*, pp. 187-189.

[69] According to Augustine, concupiscence indicates a longing both for what is good and what is bad. The Church Father recognises that there is a spiritual concupiscence for wisdom, for example, and a natural longing for happiness. Due to the injured will of man, concupiscence usually has a pejorative connotation, and bears on every desire of the flesh hostile to the spirit. It is therefore referred to as *concupiscentia carnis*. Comp. Mathijs LAMBERIGTS, *A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality*, in Robert DODARO – George LAWLESS (eds.), *Augustine and His Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner*, London – New York, Routledge, 2000, 176-197; see also Gerald BONNER, *Concupiscentia*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, ed. Cornelius MAYER, vol. 1, Basel, Schwabe & Co. AG, 1986-94, cc. 1113-1122; Gerald BONNER, Libido *and* Concupiscentia *in St. Augustine*, in Frank Leslie CROSS (ed.), *Studia Patristica*. Vol. VI: *Papers Presented to the Third International Conference on Patristic Studies Held at Christ Church, Oxford, 1959*. Part IV: *Theologica, Augustiniana*, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1962, 303-314.

As we already noted, Hessels elaborates in the first instance on the Johannine observation that *concupiscentia* (in its threefold form) does not come from God but comes rather from the world[70]. Indeed, God can never be the cause of sin, to which human beings submit themselves and give their consent. Hessels goes on to argue that even the *concupiscentia* of infants prior to baptism, to which the latter do not grant their consent and which one cannot thus describe as sinful, does not come from the Father. Together with Augustine, he adds: "If such *concupiscentia* were to come from God, everything it desires would have to be granted it... If we ourselves are unable to grant it whatever it desires, the Father would have to be asked to satisfy the *concupiscentia*, which he has ultimately given"[71]. In support of Augustine, Hessels makes reference to the Venerable Bede's commentary on the First Letter of John[72]. Hessels also insists that this *concupiscentia* should not be loved, rather it should be approached with hatred and even persecuted when it manifests itself among the righteous. It ensnares people in a life that runs counter to the Spirit, prevents them from doing good, and tempts them to act in violation of God's commandments. A large number of biblical quotations are used in support of this idea, taken in particular from Paul's Epistles (e.g. Col 3,5, Rom 7,15 and 18-19, Gal 5,17) and from the Letter of James (1,14). Two further quotations from Augustine are likewise used in support of this idea, one from his commentary on Psalm 118[73] and the other from *De civitate Dei*[74].

Hessels also deals with an associated question, namely whether it is possible to argue that death does not come from God but from the world[75]. He responds by insisting in the first instance that God did not

[70] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 38r – 39v: "Porro manifestum est tria haec dum nobis dominantur, eisque consensum praebemus, ex Deo non esse... Ista igitur concupiscentia secundum Ioannem non est diligenda, sed odio habenda et persequenda etiam in iusto ... Displicet enim Deo haec concupiscentia, ut quae non ex ipso, sed ex mundo est orta ...".

[71] A chain of quotations from Augustine's *Contra Iulianum*, IV, ca. 13.64; ca. 14.65 and 73, ed. Jacques-Paul MIGNE (PL, 44), Paris, Migne, 1841, cc. 769 l. 28-39; 770 l. 11-15 and 775 l. 10-19.22-27.

[72] Beda Venerabilis, *In epistulas septem catholicas. Lib IV (in 1 Io)*, cap. II, 16, ed. David HURST (CC SL, 121), Turnhout, Brepols, 1983, p. 294 l. 191-196. With references to Qoh 7,30; Jas 1,13.

[73] Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps. CXVIII*, s. VIII, 4, ed. Eligius DEKKERS – Iohannes FRAIPONT (CC SL, 40), Turnhout, Brepols, 1956, p. 1688 l. 34-41.

[74] Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, 28, ed. Bernhard DOMBART – Alphonsus KALB (CC SL, 48), Turnhout, Brepols, 1955, p. 348 l. 11-17.

[75] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 39v – 40v: "... Deus (inquit Sapiens) mortem non fecit: creavit enim hominem talem, qui posset nunquam

make death a part of human nature, rather he made human beings in such a way that they could never die. Hessels adds, however, that God has stricken humanity with death as a punishment for sin. He supports his ideas for the most part with references to the Scriptures: Wis 1,13, Sir 11,14, Deut 32,39, Jas 1,13. Hessels thus distinguishes between death, which ultimately comes from God, and *concupiscentia*, which cannot have God as its origin or source. While death is to be understood as an evil, it is used by God as an instrument of his justice in order to punish sin. It goes without saying that *concupiscentia* is also to be understood as an evil, but in contrast to death, it is completely opposed to justice and thus implies an incitement to sin. In a brief digression, Hessels adds nevertheless that God has also been able to turn *concupiscentia* into a punishment for sin and that it thereby came to serve justice. This leads him to the realisation that righteous people could also make use of *concupiscentia* in a good way, citing the sixteenth chapter of Augustine's *Contra Iulianum* V[76] in support of his argument. In the passage in question, Augustine appeals to Prov 10 sec. LXX, and in particular to 1 John 2,15-16[77], in order to demonstrate that it was possible to make use of something evil in a good way, such as the *concupiscentia carnis* within marriage. According to Augustine, therefore, human persons are at liberty to make use of the world but not to love the world. Returning to the comparison with death, Hessels repeats that he is fundamentally convinced that death, as opposed to *concupiscentia*, is not from the world. By way of decisive argument, he points out that Christ freely subjected himself to death, as the Father had commissioned him (with a reference to John 10,17-18), arguing that it would have been impossible for Christ to embrace something that was of this world. The Louvain theologian concludes by making reference to a number of Greek Church Fathers, namely Methodius of Olympus, Epiphanius of Salamis, Gregory of Nazianzus and Irenaeus of Lyon, each of whom had argued that death was created by God so that the evil of *concupiscentia* in humans would not

mori: eam tamen in poenam peccati Deus inflixit … At prava concupiscentia, qua nullum bonum, sed malum omne concupiscitur, Deum non habet authorem … Quare nullo unquam casu eligenda est prava concupiscentia, aut ei consentiendum, quemadmodum mortem aliquando optare et eligere licet …"

[76] Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, V, ca. 16.60, ed. Jacques-Paul MIGNE (PL, 44), Paris, Migne, 1841, c. 817 l. 13-26.

[77] "Thus, the Apostle John does not tell us not to use the world, but says: 'Do not love the world', in which he also puts the concupiscence of the flesh" (Augustine, *Against Julian*, V, ca 16.60, trans. Matthew A. SCHUMACHER [The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, 35], Washington, D.C., C.U.A. Press, 1977, p. 299).

be immortal. God used death in order to prevent humans from sinning forever[78]!

[78] [In margine: In haeresi Origenis. In oratio de Pascha Lib. 3 c. 35]. John Hessels first refers to Methodius of Olympus (also named Methodius Martyr) who reacted in his work *De resurrectione* (or the *Aglaophon*) against Origen's spiritualism and defended the identity of the earthly body with the heavenly, glorified body. The positive view of death, which is said to prevent humans from sinning, is to be found in Methodius Olympius, *De resurrectione* I, 38, 5; 39, 5-7; particularly I, 40, 4 – 44, 5; also I, 45, 6; II, 6, 3, ed. G. Nathanael BONWETSCH (CGS, 27), Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1917, pp. 281 l. 14 – 282 l. 2; 283 l. 13 – 284 l. 8; particularly pp. 284 l. 22 – 294 l. 5; also pp. 295 l. 6-12; 339 l. 17 – 340 l. 1. It is improbable that Hessels had direct access to the works of this Church Father. Methodius' *De resurrectione* I, 20 – II, 8, however, had been copied in its entirety by Epiphanius of Salamis, in his *Panarion haer.* 64, 12-62. The passages in Methodius' works to which we referred, are more specifically to be found in Epiphanius, *Panarion haer.* 64, 30, 8; 31, 8-11; particularly 64, 32, 4 – 36, 5; also 64, 37, (6.3); 64, 60, 3, ed. Karl HOLL – Jürgen DUMMER (GCS, 37), Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1980, pp. 449 l. 10-12; 450 l. 20 – 451 l. 7; particularly pp. 451 l. 21 – 457 l. 21; also pp. 458 l. 18 – 459 l. 3; 495 l. 17-19. Editions of Epiphanius' works were available in sixteenth century. In 1542, Janus Cornarius published his self-made Latin translation of the *Panarion*, the *Contra ogdoaginta haereses opus* (followed in 1544 by a Greek edition). This edition had been reprinted several times, complementing it with other books of Epiphanius' (see, for example, Paul Oskar KRISTELLER et al. [eds.], *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum. Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries. Annotated Lists and Guides*, vol. 7, Washington, D.C., C.U.A. Press, 1992, pp. 43-46). Furthermore, Hessels also discovers the concept of death as an antidote to sin in the work of Gregory of Nazianzus. He undoubtedly refers to Gregorius Nazianzenus, *Oratio XLV. In sanctum Pascha II*[a], VIII, ed. Jacques-Paul MIGNE (PG, 36), Paris, Migne, 1858, c. 633 l. 14-17. The same passage is also to be found word for word in Gregorius Nazianzenus, *Oratio XXXVIII. In Natiuitatem uel In Theophania*, 12, ed. Claudio MORESCHINI – Paul GALLAY (SC, 358), Paris, Cerf, 1990, p. 130 l. 27-30. *Oratio* '38' belongs to the collection of nine *Orationes* that Rufinus of Aquilea translated into Latin. Gregory's *Oratio* '45' *de Pascha* was also translated into Latin, after Rufinus' time, by an anonymous translator. It was attested for the first time in cod. Laurent. San Marco 584, dating from the ninth century. It is possible that this translation of *Oratio* '45' was adapted by Willibald Pirckheimer and inserted in his edition of 1531, which contains 37 *orationes*. These translations were also integrated into later editions (KRISTELLER et al. [eds.], *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum*, vol. 2, 1971, pp. 46-48, 53-55, 134-135, 151-153). To illustrate his point, Hessels finally refers to Irenaeus Lugdunensis, *Adversus haereses* III, 23, 6, ed. Norbert BROX (Fontes Christiani, 8/3), Freiburg i.Br., Herder, 1995, p. 290 l. 14-23. This Latin translation, made by an anonymous and dating back before 400, was edited and printed by Erasmus for the first time in 1526 and enjoyed several reprints (KRISTELLER et al. [eds.], *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum*, vol. 7, 1992, pp. 17-23, 32-37). In the margin of the text, reference is made to Lib. 3 c. 35, but the passage to which Hessels (or his editor) intends to refer, stems from c. 37. In some of Erasmus' Irenaeus editions, the numbering of c. 36 and c. 37 has been dropped and the text of these chapters has simply been printed under the heading of c. 35. In these editions, the numbering immediately goes from c. 35 to c. 38. This is the case with respect to the 1534 edition, for example, but further research needs to be done in order to determine whether there are still other editions of this kind. It is clear, nonetheless, that Hessels made use of one of them. 'Good' prints included the *editio princeps* from 1526 and the reprints of 1548 and 1560.

Hessels was thus convinced that *concupiscentia* did not come from God but from the world, and as a consequence it should not be loved. In his reading of 1 John 2,17, however, Hessels observes a second reason why the world and its associated *concupiscentia* should not be loved[79], namely *the world is finite*[80]. Inserting cross-references to other Bible passages, he explains this as follows: Bad people perish – together with all other temporal things – so that there can be no further opportunity to satisfy any sort of evil temptation on the Day of Judgement[81]. Hessels adds at this juncture that what we can expect at the end of time happens on a daily basis at the death of an individual godless person, to those who have indulged themselves in the satisfaction of worldly desires[82]. The person who does God's will and loves him above all temporal things, however, shall not perish but shall remain. The holy desires the said person cherished in this life will not have been in vain, rather they will be fulfilled in eternity. Although the saints became finite and mortal on account of original sin, they will nevertheless taste immortality in the hope granted them by Christ. Hessels supports his argument once again with a literal quotation from Augustine's second sermon on the First Letter of John[83]. Although reference is made to the Church Father as his source, Hessels or his editor do not indicate the precise work from which the quotation has been taken, in spite of the fact that Hessels quotes repeatedly from Augustine's second sermon on the First Letter of John.

Although the pericope 1 John 2,15-17 is taken to be a unity, Hessels also makes reference to verse 18a in his commentary, in which he observes a third reason why we should not love the world: *Children, the final hour is at hand*[84]. The Louvain theologian underlines the fact that he and his contemporaries were experiencing the end of time, in which the coming of Christ in judgement was nearby, in which false prophets and those who indulge their wicked desires were in abundance. The closer the coming of the Lord and the more abundant the masters of

[79] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis … Commentarius*, f. 40v – 41v: "*Et mundus transit*. Addit Ioannes aliam rationem cur mundus non sit diligendus, nec eius concupiscentia …"

[80] As a Bible passage expressing the same idea, Hessels is referring to 1 Pet 1,24.

[81] Rev 18.

[82] PsG [VUL] 145,4.

[83] Augustine, *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* tract. II., 10 (SC, 75), p. 170.

[84] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis … Commentarius*, f. 41v – 42r: "Tertiam adijcit rationem cur non debeamus diligere mundum: quia videlicet nunc extremum tempus est, quo Christi ad iudicium imminet adventus, quo abundant pseudoapostoli, et pravarum concupiscentiarum imitatores …"

injustice, the more the righteous should strive to avoid the temptations of this world. Hessels refers in this instance to Rom 13,11, Matt 4,17, PsG [VUL] 11,2 and PsG [VUL] 118,126-27. It was not unusual in the sixteenth century to believe that the final hour had dawned and to interpret the various phenomena of the turbulent times (the schism between Protestants and Catholics, the advance of the Turks etc.) in the light of the Scriptures. Hessels mitigates his statement, however, and avoids creating anxiety with respect to the end of time by distancing himself from endeavours to establish a concrete moment in the proximate future. In his opinion, Augustine rightly countered those who took the reference to "an hour" in the Scriptures to imply a specific moment in time. Hessels refers in this instance to Augustine's Letter to Hesychius on the end of time (i.e. letter 199)[85]. The individuals in question maintained that six-thousand years represented a single day and that five hundred years – a twelfth of six-thousand – had to represent an hour.

Hessels concludes his commentary on 1 John 2,15-18a with a note on the term of address *Children* or *Filioli*[86], which he considered to be both flattering and exhortatory at the same time. He alludes in this regard to Augustine – probably his commentary on Psalm 38[87] – who considered the term of address to be a recommendation to continue in one's spiritual growth and to develop manly strength, precisely because the inescapable final hour was at hand.

V. Conclusion

We may conclude, therefore, that Hessels' commentary on 1 John 2,15-18a is full of references to the Bible and the Church Fathers, with Augustine taking pride of place. In addition to the quotations referred to explicitly in the margins of his book, several other allusions to Augustine are evident in his work. In his discussion of the threefold temptation from the text of 1 John, Augustine's commentary on the First Letter of John and chapter ten of his *Confessiones* clearly play an important role. When Hessels writes in more fundamental terms on *concupiscentia*, however, he makes abundant use of Augustine's anti-Pelagian work *Contra Iulianum* so that the Church Father's vision of the sin of Adam and original sin is clearly evident. It fact, it would be fair to say that the second part of Hessels' commentary is

[85] Augustine, *Ep. CXCIX. De fine saeculi*, ed. Alois GOLDBACHER (CSEL, 57), Vienna, Tempsky – Leipzig, Freytag, 1911, p. 258 l. 4-7.

[86] HESSELS, *In primam B. Ioannis ... Commentarius*, f. 42r.

[87] Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps. XXXVIII*, 3, ed. Eligius DEKKERS – Iohannes FRAIPONT (CC SL, 38), Turnhout, Brepols, 1956, p. 405 l. 69-72.

nothing more in places than a chain of quotations from Augustine's book. Nevertheless, the Louvain theologian seems to be fully aware of the two stages of Augustine's exegesis of 1 John 2,16, which permits us to presume that he was well acquainted with the Church Father's work and realm of thought. It is also striking that Hessels refers only once to the great medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, in spite of the fact that the Louvain professor was professor royal of Scholastic Theology from 1562. The precise date of origin of Hessels' posthumously edited and published Bible commentaries remains a question, although it is possible that they stem from the period in which he served as a lecturer in Park Abbey.

Wim FRANÇOIS

FROM DRIEDO TO BELLARMINE. THE CONCEPT OF PURE NATURE IN THE 16TH CENTURY

1. Introduction

In his celebrated collection of historical-critical studies entitled *Augustinisme et théologie moderne*, Henri de Lubac argues that the attentive historian of theology should be able to detect the contours of the theology of the modern period – i.e. the period from the Council of Trent to the Second Vatican Council – in Leuven's theology faculty and its surroundings prior to the Baius affair[1]. One of the most important features of this modern Catholic theology is its recognition of the existence of the possibility of a state of pure nature. The present article will sketch the genesis and evolution of the theory of 'pure nature' in Leuven[2].

Prior to the Second Vatican Council, it was generally accepted that the theory of 'pure nature' was first formulated by Robert Bellarmine (in his polemic again Michael Baius), from which fact the theory borrows its authority. In the context of the discussion surrounding Henri de Lubac's *Surnaturel* (1946) and the 'nouvelle théologie', Pieter Smulders published an article in which he demonstrated that the concept of 'pure nature' was already to be found among Leuven theologians before Baius and likewise before Bellarmine. Smulders

[1] H. DE LUBAC, *Augustinisme et théologie moderne* (Théologie, 63), Paris, Aubier, 1965, p. 183: "Dès avant l'affaire baianiste, et dans ce milieu même de Louvain qui en fut le théâtre, l'historien averti discerne comme les premiers linéaments de la théologie qui devait, jointe à celle de Cajetan et de son école, s'épanouir vers la fin du siècle chez Molina, Bañez et Suarez. Avec Jean Driedo, avec Ruard Tapper, une orientation se dessine".

[2] For the history of the Faculty of Theology in Leuven see the bibliography included in: E.J.M. VAN EIJL (ed.), *Facultas S. Theologiae Lovaniensis 1432-1797. Contributions à son histoire* (BETL, 45), Leuven, University Press, 1977, supplemented more recently by L. KENIS & M. LAMBERIGTS (eds.), *L'Ancienne faculté de théologie de Louvain 1432-1797. Bibliographie des années 1977-1992*, in M. LAMBERIGTS (ed.), *L'augustinisme à l'ancienne faculté de théologie de Louvain* (BETL, 111), Leuven, University Press, 1994, pp. 419-442. A recent overviews of the history of the Faculty of Theology up to the eve of the Council of Trent is also found in M. GIELIS, *Leuven theologians as opponents of Erasmus and of humanistic theology*, in, *Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus*, ed. by Erika Rummel, Leiden, Brill (expected winter 2007). Further literature can be found in the bibliographies of these documents. For a clear presentation of the various levels of appointment as professor at the Faculty of Theology see E.J.M. VAN EIJL, *De theologische faculteit te Leuven in de XVe en XVIe eeuw. Organisatie en opleiding*, in VAN EIJL (ed.), *Facultas S. Theologiae*, pp. 84-102.

points out, nevertheless, that the Leuven theologians in question maintained a different understanding of the concept than that of Cajetan, for example. This leads him to a number of theological conclusions, among them the belief that de Lubac's theology does not offer an adequate response to the problems to which 'modern' Catholic theology – with its various theories of 'pure nature' – had given rise[3].

Based on our own research into the available sources and accounting for the literature that has appeared since de Lubac and Smulders, the goal of this study is to establish a new synthetic overview of the genesis and evolution of the theory of 'pure nature' in 16th century Leuven. We hope to investigate the theological implications of the latter, such as the condemnation of de Lubac's theology of grace and the discussion it engendered, in later publications.

We will focus our attention in the following pages on three theologians in particular: John Driedo (ca. 1480 – 1535), a representative of the generation of polemical theologians who was tutor to the key figure in the entire story, namely Michael Baius, and may have contributed to the form of Augustinianism that was later condemned as Baianism; Michael Baius (1513-1589) himself and Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), who taught for a number of years at the Jesuit College in Leuven where he became acquainted with the theology of the Leuven School. His understanding of nature and grace clearly bear traces of the latter.

2. John Driedo

The theology developed by John Driedo[4] on the question of grace and nature[5] is particularly evident in a work published after his

[3] P. SMULDERS, *De oorsprong van de theorie der zuivere natuur. Vergeten meesters der Leuvense school*, in *Bijdragen* 10 (1949) 105-127.

[4] M. GIELIS, *Johannes Driedo. Anwalt der Tradition im Streit mit Humanismus und Reformation*, in M. H. JUNG & P. WALTER (eds.), *Theologen des 16. Jahrhunderts. Humanismus – Reformation – Katholische Erneuerung*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002, pp. 135-153; R. BAIER, *Driedo(ens) Johannes*, in *Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon*, Bd. XXII (2003), Herzeberg, Spalten, pp. 280-284; cf. the website *Verlag Traugott Bautz* (www.bautz.de), link *Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon Online*, s.v. 'Driedo(ens)', where additional literature can be found, in particular W. FRANÇOIS, *Augustinus als 'onweerlegbare vertolker van de theologie'. Johannes Driedo over Schrift, Augustinus en de katholieke Traditie (1533)*, in P. VAN GEEST & H. VAN OORT (eds.), *Augustiniana Neerlandica. Aspecten van Augustinus' spiritualiteit en haar doorwerking*, Leuven, Peeters, 2005, pp. 427-446 on Driedo's Augustinianism.

[5] On Driedo's doctrine of grace in *De gratia* see M. GIELIS, *L'Augustinisme anti-érasmien des premiers controversistes de Louvain Jacques Latomus et Jean Driedo*,

death by a colleague at the faculty of theology, Ruard Tapper[6]: *De gratia et libero arbitrio*. The two-volume publication is polemical in character, although the tone it maintains is consistently respectable and matter-of-fact. It was written as a refutation of three different heresies: Lutheranism[7], Pelagianism and Manichaeism. While the fact that the lion's share of the author's attention is given to the contestation of Pelagianism might seem unusual, it is important to remember that the alledged heresy in question was not a thing of the past in Driedo's day. On the contrary, he argued that one of his contemporaries, someone who had even lived in the same city of Leuven for a time, was a defender of Pelagianism, namely Erasmus.

After much hesitation, Erasmus had set about writing a document entitled *De libero arbitrio*[8] in which he rejected Luther's theology. The reformer responded with his vehement *De servo arbitrio*. The way in which Erasmus approached free will in his pamphlet, however, did not engender immediate enthusiasm among the Leuven theologians, the majority of whom had already maintained serious objections to a humanistic theology of renewal for a considerable period of time[9]. It would appear from the reports sent by Dirk van Heeze to the Roman Curia concerning his mission to silence the theologians of Leuven on the question of Erasmus, that the former considered the latter's

in LAMBERIGTS (ed.), *L'augustinisme*, pp. 19-61; cf. T. DHANIS, *L'anti-pélagianisme dans le De captivitate et redemptione humani generis de Jean Driedo*, in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 51 (1956) 454-470.

[6] P. FABISCH, *Ruard Tapper (1487-1559)*, in E. ISERLOH (ed.), *Katholische Theologen der Reformationszeit*, Vol. IV (Katholisches Leben und Kirchenreform im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung, 47), Münster, Aschendorff, 1987, pp. 58-74.

[7] W. FRANÇOIS, *The Louvain theologian John Driedo vs. the German Reformer Martin Luther. And who could impose their Truth...*, in L. BOEVE, M. LAMBERIGTS, T. MERRIGAN (eds.), *Theology and the Quest for Truth* (BETL, 202), Leuven, 2006, pp. 31-60

[8] For Erasmus' ideas on free will and his stance on Augustine see: C.P.M. BURGER, *Augustinus' betekenis voor Erasmus' opvatting van de vrije wil*, in J. VAN OORT (ed.), *De kerkvaders in Reformatie en Nadere Reformatie*, Zoetermeer, Boekencentrum, 1997, pp. 21-34.

[9] Erasmus' most vehement critic in Leuven was the Carmelite Nicolaus Egmondanus, who spoke of him in the most condescending terms: ANASTASE DE ST.-PAUL, *Baechem d'Egmond*, in *DHGE* 6 (1954) col. 157-158 and M. O'ROURKE BOYLE, *Nicolaas Baechem*, in P.G. BIETENHOLZ & T.B. DEUTSCHER (eds.), *Contemporaries of Erasmus. A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation* (Collected Works of Erasmus), Toronto – Buffalo – London, 1985-87, Vol. I, pp. 81-83. Jacobus Latomus was similarly dedicated in his rejection of Erasmus: M. GIELIS, *Latomus, Jacobus*, in *Nationaal biografisch woordenboek*, Vol. 15, Belgian Royal Academy, Brussels, 1996, cols. 425-435. On the relationship between Erasmus and the university see M.A. NAUWELAERTS, *De universiteit van Leuven en het Humanisme*, in *Onze Alma Mater* 34 (1980) 104-109.

understanding of free will to be even more heterodox than that of Luther[10]. If one were to follow Erasmus in the opinion that the *liberum arbitrium* is capable of deeds that can bring about its own salvation, then God's grace loses its significance, its primacy and priority. This was unacceptable to the Leuven theologians.

Driedo likewise rejected Erasmus' teaching on free will and grace, arguing that it inclined towards Pelagianism. The accusation in question turned around the humanist's recognition of the possibility of doing good deeds that have a meritorious character without reference to a prior gift of grace[11], such that the grace of God is ascribed only a limited role. Erasmus believed it was possible for people to acquire salvation without having received grace through the sacraments. According to Driedo, however, it remained a mystery of divine election that non-believers and children who had died prior to baptism could not acquire eternal salvation, in spite of the fact that they were not personally responsible for their situation.

2.1. Creation and original sin

Driedo's identification of Pelagianism in Erasmus' work centres around the former's own understanding of creation and the fall of humanity in which the interpretation of Rom. 5,12 played a crucial role[12]. According to Driedo, many theologians were inclined to interpret this verse in a manner that avoided the strict consequences of the doctrine of original sin[13], objecting to the idea that newborn infants

[10] Letters written to Blosius and Giberti: P. BALAN, *Monumenta Reformationis Lutheranae*, Regensburg, 1884, p. 552-563; see esp. p. 562: "quae ratio sinat ut falsa et pernitiosa [...] non damnentur in Erasmo? Animamus hominem ad scribendum contra Lutherum; [...] sed timeo quod longe melius esset eum dehortari ne quicquam ultra scriberet, nisi forte omnia sacra et syncera esse credimus quae [...] de libero arbitrio [...] scripsisse cernitur".

[11] Deeds that are determinative of the ultimate salvation of the human person, and thereby bearing a 'meritorious' character, such that the human person can be understood as responsible for his or her own salvation.

[12] The Vulgate version of this passage reads: "Propterea sicut per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit in quo omnes peccaverunt [...]". In a slightly contrived interpretation of this verse, the word 'quo' is understood as relative pronoun referring to Adam, through whom sin had come into the world. This was considered to be a strong scriptural argument in support of the doctrine of original sin. A considerable number of scholastic theologians likewise considered the Vulgate's 'Poenitentiam agite!' (Convert!) to be a reference supporting the sacrament of penance.

[13] J. DRIEDO, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, f. 103v C – 115v B: "octo difficultates ex Paulo de originali peccato"; see esp. f. 103v C: "Amplius autem et hic consyderandum, nonnullos solennes esse sacrae theologiae interpretes, tam vetustiores quam

should be burdened with sin. There can be little doubt that Erasmus was among the theologians in question. The latter was unable to detect an immediate scriptural foundation for the doctrine of original sin in the form of inherited sin in the Romans text. For Erasmus, the sin of contemporary men and woman was more of an 'imitation' of Adam's first sin. Driedo could not have disagreed more. Adam's sin had caused the fall of *all* humanity. Everyone was thus born 'in a state of sin' and in need of Christ's redemptive grace to achieve his or her original state of righteousness anew.

The differences between Driedo's perspective and that of Erasmus become all the more evident when one examines their different notions of *concupiscentia*. Driedo insists that many theologian of his day followed Pelagius by approaching concupiscence as a natural phenomenon and not as having its roots in original sin[14]. He quotes one of Erasmus' early works – the *Encomium matrimonii* published in Leuven by Dirk Martens in 1518 – word for word without making reference to his specific source, although he does make explicit use of Erasmus' name, an otherwise singular event in the Leuven theologian's extensive

huius temporis, qui locum hunc Apostoli ita interpretantur, quod ex eodem concludi non possit, parvulum mox natum, ullum habere peccatum, aut nasci in ira et indignatione divina, [...]"; f. 104v A: "Similibus quoque interpretationibus innixi sunt nonnuli huius temporis interpretes qui aut carpunt aut silentio praetereunt interpretationem [...] patrum [...] qui interpretantur Apostolum in hoc loco loqui de propagatione [...] peccati"; f. 104v C: "[...] nonnulli sic interpretantur, ut ex hac Apostoli doctrina ad illorum mentem interpretata, non relinquatur locus probandi ullum esse in parvulis originale peccatum"; f. 116r A: "[...] vulpes subintroierunt in Dei Ecclesiam, quae variis et peregrinis interpretationibus demoliuntur vineas, scripturas sacras adulterantes, et antiquas haereses renovantes, que et supradicta scripturae testimonia aliorsum ita interpretantur, ut ex eis prorsus fundari non possit ullum esse in parvulis originale peccatum [...]"; f. 121r B: "Hanc quoque Pelagii interpretationem imitati sunt qui hoc tempore putantur solennes sacrae scripturae interpretes, volentes forsitan occultas haereses seminare de parvulis non baptizandis".

14 DRIEDO, *De gratia*, f. 162r A – B: "Et hanc sententiam visi sunt approbare quidam huius temporis amatores voluptatis, ac etiam novarum rerum inventores, qui singularitate scientiae gaudentes perturbant omnia, quae tradidit nobis veneranda antiquitas, censentes carnis nostrae pruriginem, Venerisque stimulos a natura, non a peccato proficisci, quibusdam moti rationibus: 'Primum, quod neque Deus neque natura quicquam faciunt frustra. Deus genitale membrum condidit, et vim gignendi addidit. Deinde matrimoni opus sub innocentiae statu seu ante culpam, sine his stimulis peragi non potuit [...] Amplius autem, et in caeteris animantibus tales stimuli a natura, non a peccato proficiscuntur. Postremo addunt, nos huiuscemodi prurigines carnis nostrae reddere imaginatione nostra foedas, quae suapte natura pulchrae sunt et honestae". Cf. f. 132r D. "Argumenta vero solutionesque eorum, quibus haeretici conantur probare, concupiscentiam carnis, stimulum Veneris, seu pruriginem libidinis, esse naturale bonum; infra patebunt in secundo tractatu libri secundi".

writings[15]. According to Erasmus, the sexual instincts of the human person continued to be good in themselves, even after the fall[16]. Erasmus' line of reasoning harks back to the ancient idea that God never does anything by mistake: if God created the human person with genital organs, it goes without saying that the latter also have a purpose. Driedo was inclined to follow Augustine's argumentation in this regard, however, maintaining that *concupiscentia* was one of the negative consequences of the fall, a characteristic of the corrupt state of human nature when it is deprived of grace. For Driedo, the phenomenon is thus essentially evil and he refers to it explicitly as 'evil' concupiscence, in spite of the fact that Augustine recognised the positive use thereof, namely in the context of marriage and procreation[17]. Driedo's doctrine of grace, together with his idea of 'pure nature', must be understood nevertheless against the background of his teaching on creation and the fall.

2.2. The Doctrine of Grace

a. Historical-theological backgrounds: From the Doctor Gratiae to the Doctor Angelicus

As most theologians in this controversy tend to do, Driedo refers to the works of Augustine in virtually every part of his argument.

[15] DRIEDO, *De gratia*, f. 166v D – 167r A.: "Ad ea quae ad roborandum Pelagii heresim adiiciuntur in argumentis ex sententia Erasmi docentis, pruriginem carnis stimulosque Veneris non a peccate, sed a natura proficisci, facilis ets responsio …".

[16] D. ERASMUS, *Encomium matrimonii*, ed. J.-C. MARGOLIN, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterdami*, t. I, 5, Amsterdam-Oxford, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975,p. 398-400, l. 183-186 and 190-195: "[…] si merito, velut adagionis vice ubique decantatum, neque deum neque naturam quicquam frustra facere, cur haec membra tribuit, cur hos stimulos, hanc gignendi vim addidit, si coelibatus laudi ducitur? […] Nec audio qui mihi dicat foedam illam pruriginem et Veneris stimulos non a natura, sed peccato profectam. Quid tam dissimile veri? Quasi vero matrimonium, cuius munus sine his stimulis peragi nequit, non culpam precesserit. Iam in caeteris animantibus unde illi stimuli? an a natura an peccato? Mirum ni a natura. Postremo nos imaginatione foedum reddimus, quod suapte natura pulchrum ac sanctum est". Cf. D. ERASMUS, *Apologia pro declamatione matrimonii*, in ERASMUS, *Opera omnia*, Leiden, 1706, c. 109 C: "… rationibus undique petitis rem ago, quod genus est illud, quod alicubi dictum, stimulos gignendi non a peccato, sed a natura profectos, cum agatur de iis stimulis, qui rationi non repugnant".

[17] Augustine did not deem 'concupiscentia' to be a serious sin, but considered it rather as a 'peccatum veniale', see M. LAMBERIGTS, *A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality*, in R. DODARO & G. LAWLESS (eds.), *Augustine and his Critics. Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner*, Londen, New York, NY, Routledge, 2000, pp. 176-197.Cfr. G. BONNER, *Concupiscentia*, in C. MAYER (ed.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*. Vol. 1: *Aaron-Conuersio*, Basel, Schwabe & co., 1986-1994, cols. 1113-1122.

Augustine's basic idea can be summarised as follows: the human person originally enjoyed a positive relationship with the creator, but because of original sin, humanity as a whole has been confronted with the loss of the state it once had in paradise (*natura vitiata*). This implies that generation after generation is born in a state of sin, and that the human person is incapable of achieving the good unaided[18]. Human free will is not enough to allow human persons to live according to the commandments of God since it is likewise obscured by the power of sin. God sent His Son, however, to liberate humanity by offering them his redemptive grace[19]. The source of every misfortune is the hold exerted by original sin on humanity. A consequence of this conviction is the absolute necessity of baptising children to save them for eternal life in the event that they should die a premature death[20].

This theology of grace is further specified in the scholastic period by Thomas Aquinas, among others[21]. For Thomas, the deeds of those who have acquired a state of grace through baptism and have been influenced by the *liberum arbitrium* are '*de condigno*' meritorious deeds[22]. Other medieval theologians gave more credit to fallen humanity than Thomas was inclined to do. Thinkers such as William of Ockham and the Nominalist School recognised that the human person had the ability to perform deeds with a positive moral character under their own steam as it were, deeds that were also meritorious from the viewpoint of salvation. In contrast to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas was prepared to accept that the human person was capable of morally good deeds in spite of his or her fallen state, still he refused to accept the suggestion that such deeds were meritorious when it came to eternal salvation. This ultimately implied that the human person was unable to bring about his or her own salvation, and Thomas maintained an opposition between the natural order and the order of grace[23].

[18] Cfr. the debate with Julian of Aeclanum, M. LAMBERIGTS, *Iulianus IV (Iulianus von Aeclanum)*, in *Realenzyklopädie für Antike und Christentum* 19 (1999), 483-505.

[19] V.H. DRECOLL, *Gratia*, in C.P. MAYER (ed.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*, Vol. 3, Basel, Schwabe, cols. 182-242.

[20] W. HARMLESS, *Baptism*, in A.D. FITZGERALD, *Augustine through the Ages*, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids MI & Cambridge, 1999, pp. 84-91

[21] See a.o. J.B. KORS, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après S. Thomas. Les sources. La doctrine* (Bibliothèque thomiste, 2), Kain, 1922.

[22] Later theologians (especially during the period of baroque scholasticism) insisted, however, that even those in a state of grace were in need of actual or immediate grace ('gratia cooperans') in order to avoid sin.

[23] A. VANNESTE, *Le 'De primi hominis justitia' de Baius*, in LAMBERIGTS (ed.), *L'augustinisme*, pp. 123-166.

The Nominalist School, on the other hand, maintained that the person who did everything in his or her power to live an ethical life based on equity and reasonableness could contribute positively to his or her own salvation. Such a life was understood as meritorious '*de congruo*'. At the level of the doctrine of predestination, this lead to the notion of '*praedestinatio post praevisa merita*': thanks to divine prescient knowledge, God is aware of the potential merits of the human person (ascribed exclusively to his or her moral activities) and is thus able to grant the said individual his grace and favour a positive 'salvific' predestination.

Erasmus' thinking in this regard can be understood in line with that of Nominalist theology[24]. Bearing in mind that he limited the influence of original sin to an occasional and individual inclination to sin, it remained possible for human persons to cooperate in bringing about their own salvation on the basis of their morally correct deeds. This implied that a non-believer who had remained faithful to the natural law was capable of performing meritorious deeds without being aware of it.

b. Grace versus moral deeds

The Nominalist/Erasmian line of argument places a logical emphasis on the personal responsibility of the human person for his or her own salvation. Driedo, however, sternly rejects this rather moralistic vision of the Christian life. If one is to take the fall seriously, he claims, it makes no sense to argue that fallen humanity is capable of earning salvation on the basis of its own deeds. The theology of creation lies at the heart of Driedo's doctrine of grace. At the moment of creation, the human person was given both reason and a *liberum arbitrium*. Furthermore, in the paradisiacal state, the human person had received the gift of grace and was free from *concupiscentia*. According to Driedo, the true nature of the human person prior to the fall was

[24] It should be noted in this regard that the 'sources' of Erasmus thought are the focus of considerable debate. Authors such as Bouwsma, for example, are inclined to describe his thought as a renaissance-like neo-stoicism (W.J. BOUWSMA, *The Two Faces of Humanism. Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought*, in H.A. OBERMANN & T.A. BRADY (eds.), *Itinerarium Italicum. The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations. Dedicated to P.O. Kristeller on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 14), Leiden, Brill, 1975, pp. 3-60), while Burger insists on the influence of Hugolinus of Orvieto (C.M. BURGER, *De receptie van Augustinus' genadeleer. Gregorius van Rimini, Hugolinus van Orvieto, Erasmus en Luther (tot 1518)*, in VAN GEEST & VAN OORT (eds.) *Augustiniana Neerlandica*, pp. 420-422).

one of intactness and integrity, free from negative *concupiscentia*, free from suffering and death. After the fall, however, humanity was subject to sin and human persons were "natura filii irae"[25] As far as he is concerned, therefore, humanity's originally good nature had been corrupted and this had two primary implications: the loss of humanity's originally righteous state and the loss of the positive orientation of the will towards God. After the fall, humanity was inclined to evil, and this could only be undone by Christ's gift of grace.

According to Driedo, the loss of the state of righteousness likewise deprived human persons of the possibility of performing good works since a good work is a gift of God. This position is quite understandable when we bear in mind that original sin for Driedo determines everything. For this reason, Driedo prefers to speak of fallen *humanity* rather than fallen *human beings* in the individual sense. Being part of humanity as a collective implies being born *ipso facto* in a *state of sin*. It makes no difference if the individual has sinned under the influence of his or her own will. It is of primary importance to realise that God's wrath rests on all human persons, in spite of the fact that an individual person may not have sinned by his or her own free will. In Driedo's opinion, human nature had been corrupted by original sin to such an extent that even the possibility of acting morally had been undermined. Where Thomas was able to accept that fallen men and women were capable of performing morally correct deeds, albeit without salvific value, Driedo takes matters a step further. The 'yet to be justified' human person was so corrupt that the performance of morally correct deeds had become transparently impossible[26]. While there can be little doubt that Thomas and Driedo oppose one another in this regard, the latter's opposition to the Ockhamist tradition and Erasmus is even more manifest[27]. A discussion of the correctness of Driedo's interpretation of Augustine's vision of morality would take

[25] DRIEDO, *De gratia*, f. 79v C-D: "Homo iam post lapsum Ade filius irae natus, et in peccato conceptus"; f. 119v B: "Caput [...], in quo [...] demonstratur, parvulos nasci filios irae, vinculo damnationis obstrictos". The terminology here is borrowed from Ef. 2,3. It is interesting to note that the expression is also found in the *Decretum de iustificatione*, Cap.1 dated January 13th 1547, from the sixth session of the Council of Trent. See Denz. 793.

[26] DRIEDO, *De gratia*, f. 164v B: "Aristoteles ceterique philosophi ignorantes Dei iustitiam, veram iustitiam a peccato liberantem et gratificantem ad vitam aeternam, non sunt assequuti et idcirco aliter docet fides Christiana". In the margins: "Iustitia Dei longe diversa a iustitia morali".

[27] Both the Nominalists and Erasmus recognised the possibility that unjustified people could perform meritorious deeds. This moralistic vision was not at home among Driedo's Augustinian ideas.

us beyond the boundaries of the present contribution. It is important to note, nevertheless, that Driedo considered himself to be supported by the *doctor gratiae*.

2.3. Driedo and pura natura

The concept of pure nature stemming from the theology of the 16th century is both well-known and disputed in equal measure. The concept takes its point of departure from the following question: could God have created humanity in an exclusively natural order, in which it was not destined to live according to the gift of grace and look forward to the ultimate beatific vision of God, but limited rather to a merely immanent finality? Some theologians were inclined to respond to this question by positing the existence of two strictly distinct finalities with respect to human existence: a natural finality on the one hand, in proportion to the capacities of human nature, considered pure in itself and thus detached from the human person's need for grace (brought abut by original sin), and a supernatural finality on the other hand, which presupposes a free enhancement of human nature.

The development of this idea ran counter to the medieval notion that the single finality was to be found in the final *visio beatifica* – based on the *desiderium naturale*. The proposed separation of finalities ascribed two different states to humanity, which were related to one another in a hierarchical way. This tradition has clear roots in Cajetan's idea if a division between the order of natural morality and the order of grace. According to a broadly accepted hypothesis, maintained into the middle of the last century, the first to make mention of a *natura pura* was Robert Bellarmine in the context of his dispute with Baius.

To what extent did Driedo already maintain a notion of *pura natura*? In order to answer this question we return to his theology of creation in which he inquires inductively whether God should not be considered unjust when he condemns human beings for a fault they themselves did not commit. He responds to his own question – *modo hypothetico* – by noting that God could have created without original justice, and thus without the right to the *visio beatifica*[28]. In other

[28] DRIEDO, *De gratia*, f. 119v A: "Quod si Deus primum hominem talem condidisset qualis nunc est, id est, mortalem, secundum carnem pronum concupiscere adversus spiritum, et non praeditum originali iustitia, qua tenerent omnia sub suo dominio, tunc in eo carentia originalis iustitiae nulla esset culpa: quia non esset illa carentia tum facta ulla transgressione voluntaria". A parallel text can be found in another of his works: DRIEDO, *De concordia*, f. 13v D – 14r B; for the text see SMULDERS, *Oorsprong*, p. 113 and DE LUBAC, *Augustinisme*, p. 184.

words, God could have created human beings according to a completely different order than he *de facto* did, i.e. in a state of immediate fallenness. Such an 'unfallen' human state would imply that there was no prior violation of God's commandment. Driedo makes reference to the possibility of a pure natural order in *De gratia et libero arbitrio* as well as *De concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis*[29].

By hypothesising a creation of humanity according to a purely natural order, Driedo was endeavouring to solve a problem that was close to his heart, namely the fate of the multitudes of people who had never been given the chance to become Christian and receive baptism. The problem in question was raised by a number of theologians of the 'via moderna' and by humanists such as Erasmus. They asked themselves whether God should not be consider unjust when he punishes people for a sin they did not commit, a sin committed in fact by their forefather Adam. Driedo's hypothesis of a creation of humanity according to a different order thus appears to have the same goal as those who defend a 'rational' theological anthropology (i.e. the fully-fledged theory of pure nature and twofold finality), namely to offer an answer to the problem of theodicy or the 'justification of God'. Driedo's answer is that God is free to give to those he has already granted the great blessing of earthly life, the even greater blessing of eternal life, which is a supernatural good.

This answer poses a serious problem, however, one to which de Lubac has already alluded[30]. According to Driedo, the hypothetically pure natural state of the human person is equal to the state in which the human person is now born, the state of (sinful) fallen nature. Bearing in mind that the human person (theologically speaking) is ultimately created by God in order to be happy with Him but is unable to achieve this goal when left to his or her natural powers, he or she is thus of necessity unhappy when abandoned to his or her natural powers. Such a state can only lead to hell and damnation. For this reason, it is difficult to imagine that God would create human persons in a state in which human life is ultimately meaningless and absurd. One cannot claim in line with Driedo, therefore, that an unhappy and meaningless human existence in such a natural state is a blessing and should be understood as a gift of God. Human nature can only be understood as 'grace' if it is not absurd. In line with Martin Luther and the other major Augustinian theologian of his day, Driedo insists on fidelity to

[29] This work was also published posthumously by Ruard Tapper.

[30] DE LUBAC, *Augustinisme*, pp. 184-185: "L'hypothèse imaginée par Driedo accuse une pensée peu réfléchie, inapte à concevoir la liberté, même divine, sinon sous les formes de l'arbitraire".

Revelation, which teaches us that human persons are (now) no longer the same as God wanted them to be at creation. When he endeavours to conceive of a pure nature to be characterised as 'good' (as a grace), he can only think of fallen nature in its present state ('*natura ut nunc est*'), in spite of his efforts to make sin an abstraction. Such an understanding of human nature does not solve the problem, rather it relocates it. Instead of questioning the righteousness of a God who punishes people on account of the sin of their forefather Adam, he is now forced to question the goodness of a God who creates men and women only to hand them over to hell and damnation.

It is important to bear in mind in this regard that Driedo's approach is strictly theological. His theory of *natura pura* avoids the abstract and speculative philosophical dimension found, for example, in Cajetan (and also in embryonic form in Thomas[31]). Driedo's evident aversion to the overuse of philosophy has its roots in Augustine, who branded recourse to philosophy as a denial of the reality of original sin, which impinges on human reason. Driedo is thus obliged to adopt a radical, salvation-historical point of departure. As a theologian, he is interested in the state of *human nature* both in the present and prior to original sin. It is only against the background of these theological concerns, whereby the notion '*human nature*' is never approached as an abstract concept, that Driedo is able to distinguish between the two natures. His reflections on the idea of *natura pura* are rooted in Augustinian creation-theological preoccupations. In this sense, Driedo's doctrine of pure nature differs radically from that of Cajetan. For Driedo, the suggestion of a double (positive) finality with respect to human existence is unthinkable. If human persons are not oriented towards God, they face eternal damnation.

3. Michael Baius

Michael Baius[32] was born in 1513 near the city of Ath, obtained his degree in the *artes* and theology at the university of Leuven and was appointed professor royal (*professor regius*) in Sacred Scriptures

[31] A. VANNESTE, *Saint Thomas et le problème du surnaturel*, in *ETL* 64 (1988) 348-370.

[32] V. GROSSI, *Bajus, Michael*, in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, Vol. V, 1979, pp. 133-137; F.W. BAUTZ, *Bajus Michael, Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon*, Band I (1990), 349-350; see also the website *Verlag Traugott Bautz* (www.bautz.de), link *Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon Online*, s.v. *Bajus, Michael*.

in 1549. A year after his appointment, he became president of the Pope's College where he demonstrated his skills as both president and teacher while continuing to be actively involved in pastoral work. The government valued his ability to counter the claims of the Reformation and appointed him as royal commissioner for the 'general pardon'[33]. In this capacity, he enjoyed the power to grant amnesty on behalf of the government to those who had compromised themselves with the doctrines and teachings of the reformers.

3.1. The condemnations of Baius

In spite of Baius' many qualities, a number of his colleagues at the faculty – among them Ruard Tapper and Josse Ravesteyn[34] – were suspicious of his aversion to scholasticism, which had inspired him to develop his own conceptual framework, rooted for the most part in the Church Fathers and alien to the majority of scholastic theologians. From the 1560's onwards, Baius was subject to consistent critique with respect to his highly Augustinian theology. Ravensteyn isolated fifteen contestable propositions from two of Baius published works and sent them to the universities of Alcala and Salamanca where they were condemned in 1565 and 1567. Division of this kind among Catholic theologians was a thorn in the flesh of Philip II, since it appeared to weaken Catholicism's position. For this reason he insisted that Rome provide a solution in order to bring a speedy end to the dispute. Other colleagues at the faculty of theology were likewise of the opinion that Baius had gone too far and invited the king to submit the matter to the Roman authorities. Philip agreed to their request, as did Archbishop Granvelle of Mechelen. On October 1st, Pius V promulgated a bull inspired by the censorship activities of the Spanish inquisition entitled *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* in which 79 of Baius' propositions were condemned.

The bull was first presented to Baius in person and then to a closed group of professors at the faculty of theology. Baius' immediate submission does not suggest that he considered himself to have

[33] Detailed information can be found in V. SOEN, *Geen pardon zonder paus! Studie over de complementariteit van het koninklijk en pauselijk generaal pardon (1570-1574) en over generaal inquisiteur Michael Baius (1560-1576)* (Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten), Brussels, in preparation.

[34] W. TROXLER, *Ravesteyn Josse*, in *Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon*, Band VII (1994), 1422-1424; see also the website *Verlag Traugott Bautz* (www.bautz.de), link *Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon Online*, s.v. 'Ravesteyn, Josse'; and M. LAMBERIGTS, *Ravesteyn, Josse*, in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, Band VIII (1999), col. 862-863.

been unjustly treated. He nevertheless addressed a letter of protest to Pius V, who answered in 1569 that the Leuven professor should reconcile himself with the situation. Once again Baius submitted. In the same year, the faculty published the bull in an endeavour to suppress rumours that the entire faculty of theology had been subject to condemnation. In spite of its ups and downs, Baius' career does not seem to have suffered from the affair. In 1575, he became dean of the chapter of St Peter's Church.

When Gregory XIII promulgated the condemnatory bull for a second time in 1580 (included word for word in his *Provisionis nostrae*), Baius and the faculty submitted for a third time. To counter the still lively rumour mill, the faculty charged one of its senior professors, Johannes Lensaeus[35], with the task of compiling a *Corpus Doctrinae*[36], intended to determine the position of the faculty on the difficult questions of grace and nature, predestination and free will. The manifesto was approved unequivocally by the entire faculty in 1586 and remained free of condemnation by Rome or another theological faculty. Michael Baius died three years later and was buried in the chapel of the Pope's College, of which he was president to the day of his death. In the following pages we will review some of the core aspects of Baius' thought.

3.2. The Doctrine of Grace: Protestant and Pelagian perspectives[37]

In his book *Surnaturel*[38], Henri de Lubac accuses Baius of developing an overly legalistic theology. His critique brings us immediately to the very core of the Baianistic conceptual world. De Lubac's accusation is related to Baius' doctrine of justification, or more precisely, to his description of the human person *in statu iustitiae*, as elaborated in his *De primi hominis iustitia* and *De virtutibus impiorum*. Baius interprets the concept *iustitia* in the first instance as 'the human state of obedience to the law and strict observance of God's commandments

[35] M. GIELIS, *Lensaeus (de Lens) Johannes*, in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, Vol. 6 (1997) col. 813.

[36] The *Corpus doctrinae* has its roots in Pope Gregory XIII's determination to settle the various disputes surrounding Baianism. The pope encouraged Johannes Franciscus Bononi, nuntius of Cologne and Johannes Hauchin, Archbishop of Mechelen, to involve themselves in the matter and they in turn exhorted the faculty to compile the corpus. See E.J.M. VAN EIJL, *La controverse louvaniste autour de la grâce et du libre arbitre à la fin du XVIe siècle*, in LAMBERIGTS (ed.), *L'augustinisme*, p. 215.

[37] Cf. A. VANNESTE, *Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius*, in E.J.M. VAN EIJL (ed.), *Facultas S. Theologiae*, pp. 327-350.

[38] H. DE LUBAC, *Surnaturel. Études historiques* (Théologie, 8), Paris, 1946.

with which charity ultimately coincides'. Both before and after the fall – supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism converge on this point in 'Baianism' – *iustitia proprie dicta* consists of the meticulous fulfilment of the commandments. The human person can only be justified and thereby attain salvation by observing the commandments in the presence of the Creator. In line with Augustine, Baius maintains that such merits are only possible thanks to a divine gift of grace, whereby the *liberum arbitrium* is brought into harmony with the divine will. One can only speak of *iustitia* on the basis of an *a priori* gift offered by God. In the last analysis, therefore, the human person needs the grace of Christ as the *conditio sine qua non* for human merit. Up to this point, Baius would be likely to receive the approval of all Catholic theologians. Nevertheless, Baius maintains that human nature has been injured and weakened by the fall to such a degree that it also needs God's grace to behave 'naturally' (ethically, humanly, with dignity). He thus creates the impression that the human person has a right to the grace necessary to act according to his or her nature and that God as Creator of the said nature is obliged, as it were, to grant such grace. For de Lubac, the idea that the human person can lay claim to grace and has the right to salvation (as completion of his or her nature) is one of the most objectionable elements of Baius' theology[39].

Baius' ideas concerning human merit and human freedom are indeed surprising to a certain extent and can only be correctly understood within their anti-Protestant polemical context, which is particularly nuanced where Baius is concerned. Instead of being part of the throng of theologians who dismissed the ideas of Protestantism *en masse*, Baius exhibits a genuine desire to enter into the debate and even accepts a number of Protestantism's basic intuitions. His theology is an endeavour to return to Augustinianism, following thus in the footsteps of Driedo. He nevertheless rejects the idea that the *liberum arbitrium* had

[39] De Lubac even resurrects the old accusation that Baius was a Pelagian. If the human person, according to a 'classical' Pelagian, can assert his or her right to salvation before God on the basis of his or her own works, which have a meritorious character without any prior sanctification or justification by God, then the same human person, according to the 'juridicising' pelagian Baius can assert his or her claim to salvation because God is obliged to ensure that human nature maintains its integrity or has it restored. On the other hand, de Lubac himself was accused of Pelagianism, since he challenged the doctrine of pure nature. De Lubac insists, however, that there is no question of a claim emanating from the human person as such, but rather an 'exigence divine', the fulfilment of a claim to which God is obliged to himself and not to the human person. The present authors would be inclined to include Baius here. It is thus clear that according to Baius any so-called claim on the part of the human person to grace and salvation should be understood in a particularly restrictive sense.

the capacity to keep God's commandments even after the fall (in spite of the *consuetudo peccandi* stemming from the sin of Adam). He argues on the basis of the Bible and the Church Fathers – thus sharing common ground with Protestantism at the level of methodology – that human nature is truly and radically (i.e. to its roots) corrupt. In its fallen state, the *liberum arbitrium* is no longer able to do good of itself[40].

Baius also differs with Protestantism, however, especially with respect to the potential restoration of fallen humanity. He considered the Protestant idea of the non-imputation of sin after justification to be inadequate[41]. In his opinion, and thanks to Christ's grace that should be understood as a genuine gift, the capacity to do good was *effectively* restored. For Protestants, *iustificatio* was separate from *sanctificatio*, while for Baius they coincided. Salvation for Baius thus represented an *intrinsic* justification. This must also be understood correctly. For Baius, grace did not have an ontological character (as was the case with respect to the scholastic doctrine of grace with its distinction between *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* – as well as *gratia sanctificans*). Baius understands grace rather as an *animi motus*, which can also be described as *adiutorium*[42].

3.3. Baius and pure nature

What is the significance of Baius' understanding of grace for our understanding of pure nature? Baius clearly agrees with Driedo to the extent that he takes Adam's original sin as the departure point of this theology. Both theologians then adjoin the necessity of redemption by Christ. It is not surprising, therefore, that Baius refers in the preface to his *De peccato originis* to Augustine, according to whom human history is embodied in the narrative of two people: one through whom all people have been placed under the yoke of sin and one through whom all people have been liberated from sin[43]. The theological

[40] "Quod liberum arbitrium hominis, quale nunc est, ex se neque bonum facere possit, neque tentationem ullam superare." Quoted according to VANNESTE, *Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius*, p. 333.

[41] At the risk of generalising, one could describe the Protestant vision as a changed attitude on God's part with respect to the human person. The latter remains a sinner nevertheless.

[42] This offers a good example of the difference in terminology employed in the scholastic theological discourse and that employed by Baius, who borrowed his concepts from the reflections of the Church Fathers, in particular Augustine.

[43] A. AUGUSTINUS, *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, II.24: "in causa duorum hominum quorum per unum venundati sumus sub peccato, per alterum redimimur a peccato".

status of the contemporary human person is resolutely determined by the radical change brought about in human *nature* by original sin, a change that brings about an absolute need for grace. When we read Baius, we should understand every statement about grace in relation to the fall and to redemption. In like fashion to that of Driedo, Baius' theology of grace is radically salvation-historical in conception[44].

When we examine Baius' explanation of original justification at closer quarters, restoration and the corruption of human nature would appear to be correlated. Reference to restoration requires an existing state of corruption, and corruption in its turn engenders an expectation of restoration. Legitimate allusion to the corruption of human nature presupposes that there is true evil. The fall has to be taken seriously. This is exactly what Baius attempts to do when he defines the *vitium originis* as *naturalium privatio bonorum*. This definition is of crucial importance. Baius' definition of the *vitium originis* as *naturalium privatio bonorum* implies that the original or supralapsarian justification of the human person was not a supplementary grace. There can be no question of and *additional* gift of grace, bestowed on human nature in its paradisiacal state, as a consequence of which original sin disappeared. With this in mind, it becomes possible to make an abstraction of grace and speak of a pure human nature, exclusive of the additional gift of grace. In other words, this would imply a theory of *natura pura*. From this perspective, Baius' reaction against Pelagianism – which was related to a reaction against the distinction between nature and the supernatural generally accepted in post-Tridentine Catholic theology – becomes more accessible. If one considers the grace of the unfallen state to be supplementary, additional to an already intact human nature, and maintains that the latter disappears with original sin, then one can argue that human nature remains intact, even after the fall. Sin is not taken seriously, and as a consequence the concept of grace remains an 'empty box'.

For Baius this implies *de facto* Pelagianism, since the consequences of the fall are minimalised in such a vision to the loss of something that the human person does not need to be complete[45]. For the Leuven magister, by contrast, original sin was an authentic *actus viciosus*, whereby human nature was fundamentally damaged. Baius had

[44] See in this regard V. GROSSI, *Peccato e grazia nell'antropologia di Baio*, in *Augustinianum* 8 (1968) 69ff.

[45] Baius alludes to a "nudam iustitiae originalis, in qua naturaliter a Deo conditi sumus, privationem". Cfr. VANNESTE, *Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius*, p. 334.

exhibited the same anti-Pelagian concerns as his teacher Driedo in his anti-Erasmian stance. Yet, at the same time he rejects the *natura pura* doctrine as Pelagian[46]. In this sense, he distances himself remarkably enough from Driedo. In contrast to other scholastics, Driedo had arrived at this doctrine of pure nature on the basis of biblical and Augustinian propositions rather than philosophical speculation based on Aristotelian entelechism. In addition, however, he maintained the old hypothesis of a single, unique finality in which both nature and grace are oriented towards the *visio beatifica*. It is not impossible that Baius considered this to be contradictory. Baius likewise took biblical and Augustinian conceptual frameworks as his point of departure. Indeed, in terms of methodology he was even more radical than his teacher and rejected elements of his theology in which he detected concessions to a form of Pelagianism that must have been inherent to scholasticism.

4. Baius' theological anthropology and the Catholic tradition

To conclude our brief study of Baius we will endeavour to determine the source of the radicality with which he developed his theological ideas. Vanneste points out that a correct understanding of Baius' Christian anthropology[47] requires seeing it as a radicalisation of the Augustinian idea of the *natura viciata*[48], and thus of the classical hypothesis that sin brings about a degree of injury in the human person. This completely legitimate Christian biblical hypothesis acquires a disproportionate importance in Baius' system. He radicalises it in a twofold manner, first by making the idea of a *per se* corrupt human nature the basis of his theology, and second by introducing such a far-reaching definition of corruption. This can be illustrated on the basis of a closer consideration of the *liberum arbitrium*.

For Baius, the free will of the fallen human person differed radically from that of Adam. Adam was granted a *natura sana* at creation and possessed, as 'part' thereof, a free will that was capable of inducing good

[46] See in this regard M.W.F. STONE, *Michael Baius (1513-1589) and the Debate on 'Pure Nature'. Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth Century Scholasticism*, in J. KRAYE & R. SAARINEN (eds.), *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity* (The New Synthesis Historical Library, 57), Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2005, pp. 51-90.

[47] In spite of its age, J.P. VAN DOOREN, *Michael Baius. Zijn leer over de mens* (Van Gorcum's theologische bibliotheek, 29), Assen, Van Gorcum, 1958, continues to be informative in this regard.

[48] Vanneste notes that Baius holds an incorrect interpretation of Augustine's *natura vitiata*, arguing that one would do the classical hypothesis more justice by accepting that corruption is the consequence of sin, which remains secondary. Human nature is injured thereby and human freedom is reduced.

works. If Adam had remained in this state, he would have been able to lay claim to salvation and reward with justification, but he disobeyed and all of human nature became corrupt as a result. In order to corrupt human nature as such, Baius maintains, sin did not bring about the loss of something incidental. It would be wrong to argue, for example, that a child is born in a state of sin. Rather one must say that a child comes into the world with an *a priori* corrupt nature. Baius' goal here is the formal confirmation that every person is fundamentally sinful. For Baius, by contrast, human nature as it was before the fall disappears and freedom in its entirety is lost. In his opinion, sin not only brings about the loss of something added to human nature, but also the damaging of human nature as such (*privatio naturalium bonorum*). This demonstrates once again that one cannot speak of *natura pura* in regard to Baius[49]. The particularity of his position is to be found in the radical extent of the corruption to which nature is liable on account of sin.

4. Robert Bellarmine

Robert Bellarmine[50] was born in Montepulciano in the Italian region of Tuscany on October 4th 1542. Under the guidance of his uncle, Cardinal Cervini, he was introduced to the Latin and Greek classics and he commenced his study of the *artes* in 1560 at the Jesuit run Roman College. One of his professors was Frans of Toledo, who was associated with Molinism. After studying the *artes*, Bellarmine interrupted his curriculum in order to find his way in everyday life. From 1567 to 1568 he taught rhetoric at Mondovi, where he started to explore theology as an autodidact.

1. Bellarmine and Leuven[51]

In the middle of the 16th century, the Jesuits established a residence in Leuven that enjoyed the support of professors such as Ruard

[49] VANNESTE, *Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius*, p. 337: "Pour qu'il y ait vraie corruption il faut que la nature ait perdu son intégrité, la perte d'un surajouté, même très précieux, ne suffit pas. Une nature qui a conservé sa santé et sa bonté naturelles n'est pas une nature corrompue".

[50] G. GALEOTA, *Belarmino, Roberto*, in O'NEILL & DOMÍNGUEZ (ed.), *Diccionario histórico*, Vol. I, pp. 387-390; BAUTZ, *Bellarmin, Robert, Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon*, Band I (1990), 473-474; see also the website *Verlag Traugott Bautz* (www.bautz.de), link *Biographisch-Bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon Online*, s.v. 'Bellarmin, Robert'.

[51] Cf. L. CEYSSENS, *Bellarmin et Louvain*, in LAMBERIGTS (ed.), *L'augustinisme*, pp. 179-205.

Tapper and Martinus Rythovius. Bellarmine was sent to Leuven in the spring of 1569 after completing his third year of theology in Padua[52] and quickly settled into his new home where he was to give lessons to the Leuven Jesuits and complete his own studies. He also established something of a name for himself as a preacher. The young Jesuit received the tonsure, the minor ordinations and the sub-diaconate in a single ceremony on February 9th 1570 in Liege. Three weeks later he was ordained deacon and priest by the bishop of Ghent Cornelius Jansenius (1568-1576). Little can be said with certitude about the remainder of his theological formation in Leuven, beyond the fact that he followed classes at the *Collegium Trilinguae* with a view to sharpening his classical language skills.

When Bellarmine arrived in Leuven, Michael Baius had already been branded a theologian suspected of heterodox opinions. The papal pull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* had been promulgated, and while the content thereof was still unknown, the turbulent situation at the faculty of theology would not have slipped his notice. While it is probable that Bellarmine already distanced himself in his own theology classes from the positions maintained by Baius, there are no indications of a direct controversy between the two[53]. During his stay in Leuven, Bellarmine seems to have been particularly Augustinian in his thinking, not differing to any great degree from the theological positions of the Leuven School. In 1570-1571, he vehemently disagreed with theologians who maintained an 'auxilium sufficiens', which became a '*gratia efficax*' in conformity with the '*liberum arbitrium*'[54]. This is entirely in line with Augustine, and even exhibits an element of kinship with Baianism. It would appear that Bellarmine immersed himself from the outset in the Augustinian atmosphere that dominated in Leuven. In 1573, he applied his vision for the first time to the positions that would later be considered Jesuit theology. Three years later, Bellarmine left Leuven once again after a planned stay of seven years. It was only after his departure from the city that he came to distance

[52] On Bellarmine's earlier theological training and the development of his ideas, see a.o. M. BIERSACK, *Initia Bellarminiana. Die Prädestinationslehre bei Robert Bellarmin SJ bis zu seiner Löwener Vorlesungen 1570-1576* (Historische Studien in Auftrag der Historischen Kommission der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, 15), Stuttgart, Steiner, 1989.

[53] See M. BIERSACK, *Bellarmin und die 'Causa Baii'*, in LAMBERIGTS (ed.), *L'augustinisme*, p. 176: "Bellarmin kam nicht nach Löwen um gegen Baius zu streiten. Zumindest die Löwener hatten keinen Eindruck von einer polemischen Haltung des Jesuiten gegen Sie".

[54] BIERSACK, *Bellarmin und die 'Causa Baii'*, pp. 171-173.

himself more openly from the deviant Augustinianism of Baius. This later rejection of Baianism will constitute the focus of the following paragraph.

2. Bellarmine's polemic with Baius

Bellarmine's rejection of Baianism did not hark back to the moderate vision of the *natura viciata*, according to which human nature is only corrupt to a certain degree (*aliquo modo*). In contrast, the later to be canonised Bellarmine provided a highly systematic analysis of the supernatural character of original justification. In his best known work *De controversiis christianae fidei* – which should be situated in the context of anti-Protestant polemic in line with the works of Baius – Bellarmine clearly states what he believes to be the Catholic position with regard to two heresies, namely Pelagianism and Lutheranism: "Catholic theologians are convinced that Adam was granted many supernatural gifts at creation. Through Adam's sin, however, all humanity experienced degradation. Nevertheless, while the supernatural gifts were lost, free will and the other natural gifts remained intact"[55]. Bellarmine endeavours to escape both heterodox positions by stating unequivocally that original justification was a supernatural gift that was lost in the fall, leaving humanity in a state of degradation. Humanity's natural possibilities, however, remained unaffected. Bellarmine clearly adopts a completely different stance to that of Baius on the extent of humanity's corrupt state brought about by Adam's sin. Where Baius radicalised the Augustinian notion of the *natura viciata* in a twofold manner, Bellarmine deprives the latter of all content. The only corruption to be spoken of is the loss of supernatural gifts[56]. The passage we have examined, therefore, is not only against Protestantism, but equally against Baius. This becomes evident at the end of the said chapter of *De controversiis christianae fidei* where Bellarmine quotes the papal bull of 1567 to the letter.

[55] BELLARMINUS, *Controversiae*: "Porro Catholici Doctores, qui multis supernaturalibus donis primum nostrum parentem initio creationis ornatum fuisse non dubitant, duos ullos errores (Pelagianism and Lutheranism) sine ulla difficultate declinant. Docent enim, per Adae peccatum totum hominem vere deteriorem esse factum; et tamen nec liberum arbitrium, neque alia naturalia dona, sed solum supernaturalia perdidisse". Cf. VANNESTE, *Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Baius*, p. 342.

[56] According to Bellarmine: "supernaturalium bonorum privatio". According to Baius, one should speak of a "naturalium bonorum privatio", whereby human nature became completely and fundamentally corrupt.

3. Bellarmine and the natura pura

It will be apparent from what we have said so far that Bellarmine accepts the notion of a *natura pura*. As a matter of fact, he describes the state of original justification in terms of a surplus of grace. In his opinion, only this surplus was lost as a result of original sin. In rejecting Baius, he explicitly presupposes that God could have created humanity for a goal other than the beatific vision in order to demonstrate that grace is a 'supernatural' gift. Bellarmine thus speaks in this regard of a pure natural state, which enjoys only a hypothetical character and never existed in reality. For him there is only one genuine order and that is the supernatural order, since humanity was created in reality to be happy in and with God. As a consequence, humanity is to be characterised on the basis of its '*desiderium naturale ad visionem beatificam*'. Bellarmine thus remains in line with the Leuven augustinian School[57].

In his reflections on the said state of pure nature, however, Bellarmine points out that this can also be compared with the situation of non-believers: if one makes abstraction of sin itself (and thus of grace!), the human person in a state of fallen nature does not differ in any way from the human person in a state of pure nature. To use Bellarmine's image, they differ from one another as a naked person differs from a person who has been robbed of all his clothing[58]. Bellarmine thus considers himself obliged to explore the significance of the life of a non-believer who has not received sanctifying grace and consequently does not share in salvation. Bellarmine is of the opinion that the life of a person should not be considered absurd because God has withheld the means necessary to achieve the beatific vision[59]. As with Cajetan (and ultimately Thomas!), such ideas locate Bellarmine's image of the human person more in the philosophical world than the

[57] Cf. H. RONDET, *Le problème de la nature pure et la théologie du XVIe siècle*, in *Recherches de science religieuse* 35 (1948) 481-521; p. 516. According to Rondet, Bellarmine was "trop augustinien encore pour se faire une haute idée d'une fin purement naturelle. Pour lui l'esprit se définit par son rapport avec Dieu possédé face à face".

[58] BELLARMINUS, *Controversiae*, c. V, 12: "non magis differt status hominis post lapsum, quam differat spoliatus a nudo; neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis ignorantia, et infirmitate laborat, quam esset, et laboret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturae, non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia, neque ex alicujus malae qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adae peccatum amissione profluxit".

[59] BELLARMINUS, *Controversiae. De gratia primi hominis*, c. 7: "Aequum omnino fuisse ut Deus homini ad talem finem tam sublimem ordinato, media necessaria non negaret; tamen nihil absurdum secuturum, si negasset". Cf. RONDET, *Problème*, p. 515 and DE LUBAC, *Augustinisme*, p. 191.

theological world. By incorporating this philosophical perspective in his doctrine of pure nature, he succeeds in solving the problem that arose as a result of Driedo's hypothesis of pure nature.

Bellarmine's theological anthropology is subject to considerable tension because it endeavoures to combine several traditions. In certain places he describes the human person as he or she now is, a being with a wounded nature that is characterised by a natural desire to see God. In other places, however, he speaks of the state of pure nature, which he views from a philosophical perspective and more or less equates with the situation of non-believers. In his efforts to counter Lutheranism and Pelagianism, Bellarmine thus places himself in a 'Baianist' light, maintaining a position that ought to be described as 'Pelagianising'. Bellarmine's stance likewise accords with the work of Driedo, specifically where the latter differed so radically from his student Baius, namely in his formulation of the hypothesis of the state of pure nature.

Based on our analysis of the reception of Driedo by Baius and Bellarmine, it might be plausible to argue that the conflict between these two theologians[60] already had its roots *in nucleo* in Driedo's work. In reaction to Erasmus' (semi-)Pelagianism, Driedo developed a theory on the state of pure nature and thereby drew critical attention to the problem of the salvation or meaning of the life of those who find themselves outside the order of grace. His student Baius rejected the doctrine of pure nature, but was left with a dilemma: strict Augustinianism, in which human nature is seen as so corrupt that it becomes necessary to consider non-believers as condemned to hell, and a new form of Pelagianism in which humanity is considered capable of demanding salvation from God in order to preserve or restore the integrity of human nature. Bellarmine solves the problem by integrating Cajetan's philosophical understanding of the human person into Driedo's doctrine of pure nature. In so doing, however, he took an important step in the direction of the theology of the modern period, which recognises a dual finality for human existence.

Conclusions

An initial conclusion to be drawn from our research is that all *lovanienses* – certainly from the time of the students of Adrian of

[60] More information in this regard can be found, for example, in V. Grossi, *Due interpreti di San Agostino nelle questioni del sopranaturale. Michele Baio, Roberto Bellarmino*, in *Augustinianum* 6 (1966) 203-225.

Utrecht (Latomus, Driedo, Tapper) – appear once again to share a single characteristic feature: a passion for Augustine and a correlative aversion to Pelagianism, with which each of them contended in his own manner. This Augustinianism lead Driedo to criticise scholastic theology with its Aristotelian roots. Spurred on by his teacher Adrian, Driedo revealed a preference for a more 'modern' positive theology, taking the Scriptures and Augustine as its point of departure and as its theological sources. While Driedo nevertheless made room for the scholastic tradition in his Augustinian theology, however, Baius presents us with a theology focused one-sidedly on Augustine. Rooted in his Leuven background, Baius' major critic Robert Bellarmine was also extremely Augustinian, although he allowed for the input of scholasticism to an even greater degree than Driedo. This lead to a more balanced theology, which aligned itself seamlessly with Leuven's 'doctrina augustiniano-scholastica', as it can be found in Johannes Lensaeus' *Corpus doctrinae*, for example.

A second conclusion is that not all Leuven theologians shared a single interpretation of Augustine's ideas. On the basis of his own interpretation, Driedo was able to accept the theory of a hypothetical *pura natura*. His student Baius, on the other hand, opposed Driedo on the very issue of the *natura pura*, which was nevertheless followed by Bellarmine. The latter associated the notion of a hypothetical state of pure nature in which God could have created humanity but did not, with the philosophical speculations of Cajetan – fully in line with Thomas Aquinas – on the possibility of the human person 'in puris naturalibus', considered from the perspective of his or her nature alone, detached from any Christian theological perspective. In so doing, the doctor of the church Robert Bellarmine adopted a position that ran radically counter to that of Michael Baius.

As a final conclusion we can observe that theory of a hypothetical pure nature did not originate in Bellarmine's opposition to Baius, but rather in Driedo's critique of Erasmus. This has far reaching consequences for the interpretation of the theory in question, which Pius XII defended – against de Lubac's ideas? – in the encyclical *Humani generis* in 1950.

Karim SCHELKENS & Marcel GIELIS

PLATONIC MYTH AND THE BEGETTING OF THE DIVINE LOGOS IN EGIDIO OF VITERBO, O.E.S.A

Articulation of the dogmas of the Christian faith began in the context of Hellenistic Judaism. John's Gospel's description of Christianity's principal doctrine, that of God the Father's begetting of a divine Son, Jesus, God who was with God "in the beginning" is an elegant expression of the teaching that Jesus is not only the historical *Messiah* of Judaism but is also the preexistent *Logos* and eternally divine. The description is vague, however, from the standpoint of the philosophical tradition of discussions about change and will and necessity, ideas intimately connected with the act of generation or begetting. As Christianity moved deeper into the sphere of Hellenistic culture, Christian thinkers responded to that philosophical tradition to which Christianity was then linked. The philosophical legacy of dicussions of change entered early into Christian theological writings. In the third century Origen of Alexandria observed in his treatise *On Prayer* that inanimate things are moved of necessity, that is, as the effect of an external cause, what the later tradition labeled *ex agente*. Animate things may move by their own nature *ex se* in response to external causes, rational beings are also moved by necessity and nature but also by their own will *per se*.[1] Origen is here in a defense of the efficacy of prayer employing distinctions about change in various beings that were first articulated in Plato's *Phaedrus* and which are later expressed in Aristotle and then by the Stoics, namely that change is a kind of motion that entails a cause, but the causes are different for different types of things. And we find in Carneades a discussion of the role of the free will as a cause of motion in human beings. Begetting is an act, a change, a *motus*. But how is one to understand the act of begetting in the eternal God? Is acknowledgement of God's begetting of an offspring an admission of mutability in God? Does God beget willingly? If not, was God then unwilling, or coerced, to beget the Son? But if God does will to act in begetting a divine son, then it may seem that a movement of God's will preceded the act of begetting.

Those questions are rooted in the controversy which brought the desire to gain consensus on the matter of divine generation to the forefront and which affected virtuallly every aspect of Christian thought and worship. Among all Christians there was a conviction that the Son

[1] *De oratione*, 6.1.

is begotten by the Father willingly, but to supporters of what was to become known as Arianism, the Father's willing generation of the Son implied that the Son did not exist before the Father willed to beget him. Classic stages of the controversy with Arianism produced the orthodox credal description of Christ as *monogenes* of the father *pro panton ton aionon*, as *fos ek fotos*, *theos alethinos ek theou alethinou*, and which confessed Christ as *homoousios* with the Father. Thus he is not, like the rest of creation, a product of the Father's will if the act of will is understood as preceding the act of begetting, or if the Father's will to beget the Son, or for that matter, the Son's will to be begotten, is seen as something added to the divine nature.

The elements of the catholic and orthodox solution are found in Athanasius in his dispute with Arianism. In his Third Oration against the Arians, for example, Athanasius describes the statement that the Son was begotten by the will of God as perilous, because the Arians make the phrase 'by the will of God' equivalent to an admission that 'at some point before which the Son did not exist.' Athanasius laid down the essence of the traditional counterargument, that it is proper to understand that the Son is begotten by the Father's will, but not a preceding will. Then to the related problem, "If not by will, then by necessity," Athanasius asks whether God was God by will or by necessity: "Who is it which imposes this necessity on Him? But if it be extravagant to speak of necessity in the case of God, and therefore it is by nature that he is good, much more is he, and more truly, Father of the Son by nature and not by will."[2] But while it is inappropriate to say, "of will He came to be," since that suggests "He might not have been," it is proper to say, the Father has good pleasure towards his Son," which indicates an accompanying will instead of a preceding or added will.[3]

By the early fourth century the Church had reached the enduring consensus of mainstream Christianity. The history of medieval Latin Scholastic, systematic theological discourse rests upon that legacy of questions about the relationship between Father as father and

[2] "Καὶ τίς ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπιβαλὼν αὐτῷ; Εἰ δὲ ἄτοπόν ἐστι λέγειν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ ἀνάγκην, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φύσει ἀγαθός ἐστιν· εἴη ἂν πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀληθέστερον τοῦ Υἱοῦ φύσει καὶ οὐκ ἐκ βουλήσεως Πατήρ" (*Orationes tres adversus Arianos*, PG 26.456).

[3] "Καὶ γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι λέγειν, Βουλήσει γέγονεν, ἕτερον δὲ, ὅτι Ἴδιον ὄντα φύσει τὸν Υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀγαπᾷ καὶ θέλει αὐτόν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν, Ἐκ βουλήσεως γέγονε, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μὴ εἶναί ποτε τοῦτον σημαίνει· ἔπειτα δὲ, καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἄμφω ῥοπὴν ἔχει, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὥστε δύνασθαί τινα νοεῖν, ὅτι ἠδύνατο καὶ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὸν Υἱόν" (ibid. PG 26.464).

Son as son and those efforts to answer in rational terms. Although the patristic testimony succeeded in laying the foundations of the Church's collective dogma, discrepancies real or apparent did exist among individual early Christian writers and sometimes within a single writer. Medieval synthesizers attempted to resolve them systematically. In the twelfth century, Peter Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences* set apparent contradictions in the patristic witness alongside each other and showed how they may be reconciled. His synthesis produced what was to be the principal university textbook in theology for more than six centuries. As early as the sixth distinction of Book One, Peter Lombard took up the question of whether the Father's begetting of the Son is by will, necessity, or nature.[4] Peter had to include this question because while the established Nicene dogma affirmed Christ as God's only son according to essence and not as a product of the Father's will, many prominent early Christian writers, including Ignatius, Justin, Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen had written, and with proper understanding, about Christ as Son of God according to the will of God.[5]

The history of the articulation of this doctrine continued for centuries, especially since to prepare a commentary on the *Sentences* of the Lombard was the rite of passage to the teaching license in theology during the western Middle Ages and on into the eighteenth century. This study examines Egidio of Viterbo's *Sentences* commentary that was by 1510 virtually in the form in which we have it today.[6] His

[4] Peter Lombard, *Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi Sententiae in quattuor libris Distinctae*. 3rd ed. 3 vols. *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4-5*. Grottaferrata [Rome].Vol. 1, part 2, 89-91.

[5] Ignatius of Antioch speaks of Christ as "Son of God according to the will and power of God" (υἱὸν θεοῦ κατὰ θέλημα καὶ δύναμιν θεοῦ [*Epistolae genuinae* 6.1.1]). Justin Martyr uses a similar phrase, "God and Son according to His will" (κατὰ βουλὴν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ [Dial. Tryph. 127.4]). The *Contra Noetum*, attributed to Hippolytus of Rome contains, "You seek concerning the origin of the Logos, whom indeed God the Father willing, begot as he willed (περὶ δὲ Λόγου γένεσιν ζητεῖς, ὅνπερ βουληθεὶς ὁ Θεὸς Πατὴρ ἐγέννησεν ὡς ἠθέλησεν [*contra heresin Noeti*. 16.4]). Origen writes "This Son surely was begotten of the will of the Father" (Οὗτος δὴ ὁ υἱὸς ἐκ θελήματος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγενήθη [*Peri arch*. 4. 28, as cited by Justin Martyr *Ep. ad Menam*]).

[6] On the specific issues leading up to the present question in Egidio see especially Daniel J. Nodes, "Scholasticism and New Philology: Egidio da Viterbo (1469-1532) on Divine Generation," *Traditio* 57 (2002): 317-340. On the *Commentarium ad mentem Platonis* and its author in general see John W. O'Malley, *Egidio of Viterbo on Church and Reform* (Leiden, 1968). For other topics in the Commentarium see D. Nodes, "A Hydra in the Gardens of Adonis: Literary Allusion and the Language of Humanism in Egidio of Viterbo (1469-1532)," *Renaissance Quarterly*, 57.2 (2004): 1-24; D. Nodes, "Homeric Allegory in Egidio of Viterbo's Reflections on the Human Soul," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 65 (1998): 320-32; and

commentary, subtitled "*ad mentem Platonis*," bears witness to the influence of Renaissance humanism and the Platonic and Patristic revival on the standard Scholastic argumentation connected to this question.[7] Peter Lombard had introduced the question on which we are focusing here, whether the Son is begotten by will, necessity, or nature, by immediately declaring that it is by nature. Peter quoted first from a letter of Orosius that simply states that the divine generation was neither by will nor by necessity, but by nature, "for there is no necessity in God; nor can the will precede [divine] wisdom."[8] Peter then cites Augustine in Book 15 of *De Trinitate,* who tells the story of one astute man's catholic response to a shrewd attempt to trap him into the Arian position.[9] When asked whether the Son was son by will or by necessity, the man asked in turn whether God was God by will or by necessity, his point being to show that just as God is God neither willingly nor unwillingly, but naturally, so too is his Logos the Son by nature.[10]

Peter did not let the matter rest there but tested the validity of other arguments in the tradition on this question. There is, for example, an argument that 'homogenizes' God's attributes: Since being and willing are one in God, if the Son is son according to essence, he is also son by will. Similarly, then, it might be said that, since in God being is the same as knowing, since God begets the son knowingly, he therefore begets him willingly. But Peter acknowledged that that argument is easy to refute: Just because God's knowledge and will are one and the same, whatever is said about his knowledge is not necessarily also said about his will, and vice versa. God does not will by his will all those things which he knows by his knowledge, since his knowledge knows both good and evil things but his will only wills the good. God has given the human and angelic will the prerogative to reject the divine will. Thus, although God's nature and will are one, yet it is said

D. Nodes, "Humanism in the Commentary *ad mentem Platonis* of Egidio of Viterbo," *Augustiniana* 45 (1995): 285-98. All citations from Egidio's commentary in this article are based on Vat. Lat. 6325. Corrections are based on readings of four other MSS (Rome, Biblioteca Angelica 636; Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale VIII F 8; Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale XIV H 71; Hamburg, Staats-und Universitätsbibliotek, Codex Philol. 308).

[7] On Egidio's education see Francis X. Martin, "Egidio of Viterbo as Scripture Scholar," in *Egidio da Viterbo, O.S.A. e il suo tempo*, 191-221.

[8] "De hoc Orosius ad Augustinum ita ait: 'Voluntate genuit Pater Filium, vel necessitate? Nec voluntate nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est; praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest" (*Sententiarum Liber I, Dist. 6, Cap. 1.1*).

[9] See Augustine, *De Trinitate,* 15.20 CCL 50A, 516.

[10] Ibid., *Cap. 1.2.*

that the Father begot the Son by nature, not by will, and that he is God by nature, not by will.

In his resolution Peter returns in true Scholastic method to the earlier objections that neither by necessity nor by will did the Father beget the Son, in order to show how this teaching is to be understood. Clearly there is a sense in which the Father does beget the Son according to his will, just as there is a sense in which he begets him according to his power, and goodness, and wisdom and qualities of this kind. The key to understanding is, as Athanasius had taught, not to understand ἐκ θελήσεως, *ex voluntate* as referring to a will that either precedes or causes the divine generation.[11]

Many Schoolmen of the Middle Ages in their own *Sentences* commentaries were to follow that line of thought. Egidio of Viterbo's distinctive contribution of framing the discussion *ad mentem Platonis* bears witness to his situation in Italy at the height of the Platonic revival, even having a brief contact with Marsilio Ficino (1433-99), toward the end of Ficino's life. The formal pattern of his project is evident in his treatment of each theological question he treats. For distinction six he begins with a discussion of the problem in the abstract in the manner of the Scholastic method, but before concluding he draws from the Platonic dialogues, classical mythology, and even epic poetry to illustrate the truth of the dogma from the mystical philosophical tradition of *theologia poetica*.

Egidio begins his treatment of this question with a chapter acknowledging that it is possible to speak of divine generation as *ex voluntate* as well as *ex natura*, provided that the descriptive labels are properly understood.[12] His account of how the Father begets the Son *ex voluntate* begins with a variation of the weak argument regarding the equality of aspects of the divine being; but here willing and acting instead of willing and knowing are related: "Plainly God knows whatever he does, inasmuch as he who is without understanding does nothing; wherefore it follows that whatever [God the Father] does, he does by will. Now he begets the Son. It follows that he begets him by will."[13] But then he gives an indication of his special contribution from

[11] "Nec voluntate praecedenti vel accedenti genuit Filium, nec prius volens quam generans genuit Filium" ibid., 1.D6.c.1.4.

[12] Ch. 78 is titled, Deus Filium gignit voluntate, modo quodam, alio non. Vat. Lat. 6325, fol. 105r[a].

[13] "Cognoscit plane Deus quaecumque agit, quippe qui absque intelligentia agit nihil; quare sequitur, ut voluntate agat quicquid agit. Atqui gignit, uti ostendimus, Filium. Sequitur ut eundem voluntate gignat" (78, fol. 105r[b]).

the Platonic works. At first he simply cites the *Timaeus* in support of a standard argument in the Scholastic tradition.

> Since, as the *Timaeus* bears witness, [God] is good, it is clear that he wills all good things. But since the generation of the Son is the best thing, not only will that seem to be what God wills, but what he most enthusiastically wills. Wherefore it happens that he seems to have begotten the Son by will.[14]

This is true despite what the Fathers also teach, "and my Augustine the chief of them," Egidio says, namely that [God] begets the divine offspring not by will, not by necessity, but by nature.[15] Egidio then makes the necessary concession in pointing out the great difference between begetting by nature, which always tends toward one thing, and by will, if by that term we mean by art, which is capable of producing many different products. And here Egidio introduces examples of ancient artists: Phidias, as he was preparing to make a sculpture of Venus out of marble, pondered a thousand forms in his mind in which he could sculpt her. For he could form her nude, covered with a cloak, standing, seated, coming out of the sea from her loins up, or showing herself completely to Mars or Paris. Protogenes depicts snowy mount Ripheos and smouldering Mount Aetna. Apelles was able to paint a cypress tree or a laurel. And the Pythagorean myth of the choice of Hercules between two ways, pleasure and virtue, show what an act of will is. And those who heed this lesson, Egidio concludes, do not grunt like Ulysses's companion Elpenor, who was changed into a pig; "And so will is the cause of those things which can exist in one or another way; but nature [is the cause] of those things which so exist that they cannnot be otherwise."[16]

So as a first article of his systematic resolution of the problem, Egidio notes the difference between will and nature as related to generation. He does this by using the traditional arguments, but now supplemented from the mythological and poetic traditions. From here it is a matter of affirming the key distinction between *voluntas praecedens* or *efficiens*, and *voluntas accedens*. God surely begets the Son

[14] "Cum praeterea, Timeo teste [Tim. 30a], sit bonus, bona omnia velit perspicuum est, Filii vero generatio optima cum sit, non modo ea esse videbitur, quam Deus velit, sed quam vehementissime velit. Ex quo fit, ut voluntate prolem genuisse videatur" (78, fol. 105r^{b}).

[15] "Verum sacrarum rerum vestigatores, atque eorum princeps Augustinus meus, non voluntate, non necessitate, sed natura gigni divinam prolem volunt" *Ibid.*

[16] "Eorum itaque voluntas est causa, quae alia atque alia ratione se habere possunt; eorum vero natura, quae ita sese habent, ut secus esse non possint" (78, fol. 105v^{b}).

willingly according to the latter sense but not the former. Thus, to conclude this section of his resolution, Egidio points out how firmly Plato accords with this proper understanding of divine generation: The principle that nature produces offspring of one's own kind and not as the product of a variable will is demonstrated in the *Cratylus*. Here he has in mind Cratylus 393b, where Socrates gives examples of each animal and plant producing offspring of its own kind. Socrates says even that he is not speaking about prodigies, but "of the natural offspring of each species after its kind."[17] Similarly, the *Republic*, Egidio says, speaks of the father begetting an offspring as like as possible to himself, and here he has Book VI in mind, which speaks of the sun as "a child of goodness and a counterpart to its father, goodness."[18] Egidio then makes his most assertive statement in defense of Platonic thought as supporting the Church's teaching against Arianism on this question, and in general. It is a tribute to his age that he marshalls such additional argumentation from the philosophical literature in the wake of the centuries of Patristic framing of the orthodox solution and Scholastic theological method reinforcing it, because as he says, his times demand philosophical reasoning:

> And so the fathers of our council (*senatus*) can at last see how easily we refute alien [doctrines], also how effectively we confirm our own, if we receive not faithless dogmas but the philosophy of the most kindred [Platonic] Academy: not because there is need of philosophy for faith but because we have arrived at an age that our fastidious times consider to be old wives' tales whatever has not come forth from the halls of philosophy. Therefore we have undertaken this labor, if we have accomplished anything, in order that we might confirm by the authority of this most renowned philosopher and by our own, if the firmest adducing of proofs can be desired in any matter, he who approaches so closely to divine matters, so cherishes them, so goes on foot into the opinion, that no longer it seems that it must be said about Philo, "either Philo platonizes," but "either Plato christianizes or more truly mosaicizes."[19]

[17] "οὔ τι λέγω ἐὰν ὥσπερ τέρας γένηται... ἀλλ' οὗ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ γένους ἔκγονον τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο λέγω" (Crt. 393b – c).

[18] Cf. R. 508c: "φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ."

[19] "Atque ita videre tandem possunt nostri senatus patres, quam facile aliena confutemus, quam etiam efficaciter nostra confirmemus, si non impia dogmata, sed cognatissimae Academiae philosophiam recipiamus: non quod philosophia fidei opus sit, nihil enim est fide aut religione constantius, ut ante demonstravimus, sed quoniam eo ventum est aevi, ut delicata saecula aniles putent fabulas, quae de philosophiae penetralibus eruta non sint. Idcirco hunc laborem suscepimus, si quid modo effecimus, ut

Egidio thus concludes that the first two arguments he has presented defend the *voluntas* of the Father as accompanying and assenting to the begetting of the Son, and the last two arguments as destroying the idea of the *voluntas* as initiating and presiding over the work of Father's begetting of the Son.[20]

To that foundation is connected a second problem, which Egidio takes up in his next chapter: If God is said in any way to beget by will (and it is right to think that he does), then this implies that God does not beget the Son of necessity; but that would suggest that the divine Trinity is a contingency. But to say that God begets the Son by necessity (and the tradition within which Egidio writes holds this) could imply that God is therefore compelled by some greater power to beget. The reconciliation of this question also has a history of argument rooted in the Patristic and Scholastic literature. It is referred to the pursuit of distinctions regarding the meaning of necessity: that which is eternal is necessary in the sense that it must always exist. Thomas Aquinas's own *Sentences* commentary exemplifies the late medieval line of reasoning that Egidio inherited.[21]

Thomas separates the necessary into what is absolute necessity (*necessarium absolute*) and conditional necessity (*necessarium ex conditione*). Then he further divides conditional necessity into the conditional according to the end (*ex conditione finis*) and according to the agent (*ex conditione agentis*). Finally, he divides the conditional according to the end into an end that pertains to the subject's existence (*ad esse*) or to its well being (*ad bene esse*). Among these distinctions of necessity, only absolute necessity pertains to the Father's begetting of the Son. But even here, as Thomas argues, absolute necessity is for creatures that which is either materially or formally necessary for them to be what they are essentially, as it is necessary for man to die, or to be rational; but those absolute necessities depend on an external cause, namely God, man's maker. In God, however, who is simple being, absolute necessity is the divine essence itself. That is to say that God "must be" depends on no external cause.

huius opinatissimi philosophi auctoritate et nostra confirmaremus, si qua firmissima in re confirmatio desiderari potest, qui quidem adeo divinis propius accedit, adeo favet, adeo it pedibus in sententiam, ut iam non de Philone dicendum videatur, "aut Philo platonissat," sed, "aut Plato christissat, aut verius mossisat." (78, fol. 106r[b]). For the quotation cf. Erasmus, *Adage* 2.7.71.

[20] "Duae superiores rationes voluntatem assistentem et comitem defendunt, sequentes explodunt, ut initium et ut geniturae muneri praesidentem" (78, *ibid.*).

[21] For Thomas' handling of this see *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Scriptum super Sententiis, lib. I, D. 6, Q. 1, art. 1-3.*

Certainly, then, any conditional necessity does not pertain to God. Agent necessity, for example, as to say that a man must run because he is threatened by another man holding a knife, is improper, since such an action is not necessary unless there is someone compelling it. Final necessity *ad esse*, as to say that food is necessary to live, or final necessity *ad bene esse*, as to say that a boat is necessary for navigating the seas, is related to some external impulse. Thomas therefore reasons that divine generation is only properly characterized as an absolute necessity of the first cause.

Egidio of Viterbo's treatment of the proper understanding of necessity in divine generation assumes that traditional line of abstract reasoning.[22] True to his project, however, he brings witnesses from the Platonic dialogues, Hellenic myth, and poetry in support of the arguments. One of his favorite observations is that while we learn in the *Cratylus* that those who gave names to things were highly skilled, yet "many things whose nature is different are designated by the same name."[23] This surely holds true for the word 'necessity.' Egidio points out that regarding necessity itself, Horace speaks of dread necessity, 'dira necessitas,' which men fear exceedingly.[24] For Egidio, necessity is linked to causality: there are as many necessities as there are causes. And as there are three causes, there are three necessities. First, there is the uncaused cause. Secondly, there are internal causes: material (man must

[22] "Quod si voluntate genitam divinam dicimus prolem, cum penes voluntatem sit libertatis arbitrium, ut possit tam volens agere, quam nolens non agere. Quae autem hoc pacto aguntur, nulla necessitate agi solent; quam ob rem Deus non necessitate genuisse credi fortasse poterit. Deinceps a potentiori fortiorique vi compellitur, quicquid ad agendum necessitate compellitur, quem ad modum errantes stellae a primo orbe quotidiana conversione occiduas oras versus rapiuntur, cum ipsae in diversas ferri plagas ament. Obeunt quin etiam animantes vitam, quam mallent immortalem atque perpetuam, quod quidem haud alia contingit ratione, nisi quod maior vis inferiorem superat. At si Deo maius potentiusque nihil umquam est, non est, cur quicquam necessitate agere credatur. Verum enimvero quaecumque aeterna sunt, nulla ratio est, ut umquam non esse possint. Quae autem fieri non potest, ut non sint, nec ut non essent fieri umquam potuit, ea necessaria propria appellatione nuncupantur. At Deus Optimus Maximus, ut ipse aeternus est, et sua omnia quapropter tam ipse, quam sua omnia necessaria sunt. Et quoniam, uti saepissime diximus, prolem genuit, non nisi necessitate illam genuit.

Nam quae ita a Deo profecta sunt, ut etiam non proficisci potuerint, ea omnia posteaquam non erant, ex nihilo facta sunt. Divina soboles, neque umquam non fuit, neque ex nihilo prodiit, neque etiam facta est, quippe quam novimus et fuisse semper et ex paterna substantia non factam fuisse, sed genitam. Quare parentem divinum quemadmodum genuisse, ita necessitate genuisse sentiendum est" (79, fol. 106r^{b} - v^{b}).

[23] "Quoniam tamen plerumque usu venit, ut eodem nomine multa significentur, quorum quidem diversa ratio sit" (79, fol. 106v^{b}).

[24] Horace, *Odes* 3.24.6.

eventually die) and formal (of necessity man partakes of reason). Thirdly, there are external causes: agent and final. Aristotle had said that internal causes are simple whether they are initiated or not, and external causes are not simple but depend on what is received from outside, and they are weak because they may be absent or resisted.

Egidio reverses the order when illustrating the types of causes with examples drawn from poetry and myth so that he can dispense with all but that necessity which pertains to divine generation. He does seem to allude to the example Thomas had given, but only to point out that all cases of external necessity are weak necessities after all, "for one does not have to go on a ship at all or obey pirates, unless indeed the former from a final cause, if we should wish to cross the seas, and the latter from the efficient cause, if we fall into the pirates' hands."[25] But then Egidio illustrates external, agent necessity by drawing examples of the need to die from epic figures Patroclus killed by Hector, Hector by Achilles, and Achilles by Paris; and to illustrate external final necessity Egidio notes that there are thousands of Christian martyrs who did not resist the need to die for their faith at the hands of another. In addition, final necessity also elicits from Egidio the example of Eros from the *Symposium*, because love, seeking its end, is in that work called poor and needy (*pauper atque indigus*). Egidio's references to the epic heroes dying in combat and Christian martyrs dying from passive resistance and Eros's neediness, rather than merely dressing the argument with literary allusions, exemplify the abstract concepts of agent and final necessity more vividly and more cogently than the Scholastics' more generic examples.

Egidio then illustrates simple, internal causality under the familiar distinction between formal and material necessity; and so he observes that although an external necessity, say, that urges our death, may spare our lives, the internal one, our essential mortality, does not spare us. Thus, he says, the mythology alludes to these abstract concepts connected to necessity in the names of the three *Parcae*. Egidio knows the derivation of the three mythological Fates or *Moirai* or *Parcae*, derived from 'parcĕre, 'to spare,' and that the three are euphemistically called 'the sparing ones.' He knew of the presence of the three Parcae in the Myth of Er in Book 10 of the *Republic*. He also knew of the allegorization of Necessity surrounded by the three fates in their identities as Atropos, Lachesis, and Clotho from Marsilio

[25] "neque piratis parere necesse omnino est, nisi illud quidem ex fine, si maria transmittere velimus, hoc vero ex efficiente, si in eorum manus incidamus" (79, fol. 107r^{b}).

Ficino.[26] But despite the affinity Marsilio Ficino had with the Scholastic tradition, Egidio is the one who applies this mode of interpretation to the technical world of Scholastic theology on this specific question of divine generation within the *Sentences*-commentary genre.[27] He firmly declares that this necessity *simpliciter*, namely the internal, stronger kind of material and formal necessity is not sufficient to describe the necessity of God's generation of the Son, since when it comes to finite creatures, that necessity is contingent on the existence of the object it is compelling. That means for creatures, which have a beginning and an end, their necessity to be will have a similar beginning and end. So it is the third type of necessity (in Egidio's reversed ordering for discussion) alone that is attributed to God. For divine necessity is both internal and eternal.

The Father who begets the Son has neither an efficient nor a final cause (externals), nor a limited material nor a formal cause (internals) upon which the begetting depends. God is 'immobile' in that he is moved neither by external nor by changeable internal impulses, and his immobile condition is eternal. Egidio says that that quality is expressed poetically by Homer, and he cites a line from the Odyssey in Latin as, "Non enim vertitur mens semper existentium deorum," The mind of the gods who exist eternally is not turned," where is expressed both the immobility of the divine mind and also the eternity of that immobility.[28] The text in Homer reads, "the mind of the eternal gods is not easily turned," but it will be seen that Egidio had good reason, both in terms of his application and a subsequent etymology, to alter that verse. For in what follows he makes his most creative

[26] See, for example, Marsilio Ficino, *De immortalitate animorum*, book 17, ch. 3: "Necessitas enim anima mundi ideo dicitur, quoniam fatali eius virtute ducitur universum. Inter genua, inquam, id est, per virtutem eius inferiorem volvendis sphaeris accommodatam. Siquidem mente rationeque divinis incumbit, etsi inferior virtus universalis est una, tamen quasi triplex cognominatur. Lachesis, id est sortitia, quia sortes singulas inserit. Clotho, id est, revolutrix, quia involutas a principio sortes unicuique suas certis ordinibus temporibusque evolvit. Atropos, id est inconvertibilis, quuia in sortibus evolvendis immutabili ratione procedit. Ad has omnes deas Plato asserit ire animam ad inferiora vergentem, eo videlicet ordine, ut postquam et sortibus in eam Lachesis incidentibus naturaliter elementalem concupiverit vitam, et propositis multiplicibus vitarum exemplis, pro arbitrio certam vitam, eiusque ducem elegerit daemonem, tunc Lachcesis electionem confirmat. Inde ab eodem daemone ad Clotho, et Atropon necessitatemque ducatur" (*Opera Omnia*, 2nd. ed., vol. 1 [Basil, 1576; repr. Turin, 1959, 1962], 422.

[27] For Ficino's connection with Scholasticism and the Augustinians,the order to which Egidio himself belonged, see P.O. Kristeller, "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," *Traditio* 2 (1944): 272 n. 84.

[28] "οὐ γάρ τ' αἶψα θεῶν τρέπεται νόος αἰὲν ἐόντων" (Od. 3.147).

attempt to support the argument from mythology by associating the names of the three individual Parcae to the three types causes and necessities.

Egidio has said, as mentioned above, that Antiquity surrounded the three causalities, and thus the three kinds of necessity, with a veil of the myth of the three Fates. We now can see what they mean. Thus the Parca Atropos is the uncaused cause and absolute necessity. Egidio says that this name was given to the ancients to that fate that is unchanged, "and it is the one to whom especially this name Atropos both squares and agrees."[29] Similarly in the mythology Lachesis, 'the apportioner,' who determines how much time is allotted to each person, is here external necessity, that is, the poetic symbol for the *ex agente* and *ex fine* necessity of the Scholastics:

> They made Lachesis the external cause of agent and end, and indeed her necessity does not force anything *simpliciter*, except that it wants to appoint the end or has affected a moving cause; therefore this first Parca, from 'apportioning,' has been allotted the name Lachesis.[30]

Lastly, internal, that is, material and formal necessity is symbolized by Clotho in the mythology. She is 'the spinner,' who spins the thread of life. For Egidio, her name, derived from spinning, turning, changing, reflects her changeability into every likeness and species. Such is the causality and necessity that acts on matter:

> The second necessity of material sustaining a form, which like Egyptian Proteus, is turned into every likeness (*species*) and form, and is called Clotho from spinning, and she has a conjoined form because it clings to a changeable thing. Therefore even now she changes into becoming, now into ending.[31]

Egidio says those names are the best kind of names, for according to the *Cratylus*, the best names signify natures or the functions of natures of things. Egidio thus summarizes the question at hand: The Father begets of eternal necessity; the Son is begotten of eternal neces-

[29] "Ipse idem est, cui maxime hoc nomen Atropos et quadrat et convenit" (79, fol. 108r[a]). This is a play on the language of R. 527a: "τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παράτεινειν."

[30] "Lachesim externam fecerunt agentis ac finis, cuius quidem necessitas non simpliciter quicquam cogit, nisi id sortiri vel finem voluerit vel causam moventem contigerit; ideo Lachesis nomen prima haec Parca a sortiendo sortita est" (79, fol. 108r[b]).

[31] "Altera necessitas materiae formam sustinentis, quae veluti Aegyptius Proteus, in omnem speciem formamque convertitur, atque ideo a volvendo Clotho dicta est, cui coniuncta forma quia vertibili haeret rei, idcirco etiam ipsa nunc in ortum nunc in occasum vertitur" (79, fol.108r[b]).

sity. There is no Clotho or Lachesis connected with divine necessity; Atropos is the condition of his begetting a son.

This application of the myth of the Parcae, like the other applications of classical poetry and philosophy brought to bear on the sixth Distinction of Book One helps explain in what sense the Son's generation is *ex voluntate*, and in another sense, *ex natura*. The discussion reveals a theologian trained in the Scholastic manner, but one constructively influenced by Renaissance humanism and the Platonic and patristic revivals, for whom myth and poetry, beyond syllogistic reasoning, are vehicles to divine knowledge.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Gerald BONNER, *Freedom and necessity: st. Augustine's teaching on divine power and human freedom* (Washington: Catholic univeristy of America, 2007), 142 p. (ISBN: 978-0-8132-1474-0)

In a prefatory note, Gerald Bonner outlines the various aims of his new publication: to set out Augustine's final understanding of divine predestination, in which he claims that free choice still exists in fallen human beings; secondly, to highlight the harshness of the consequences of his doctrine of Original Sin; thirdly, to draw attention to a more positive side of Augustine's theology, namely his notion of participation and deification. Less clear in the prefatory note (and in the title) of his work is that Pelagianism will also play a central role in this study. The author will not only render a more balanced view of this alternative theology, with its strong emphasis on human free will, but he tries also to find out the reasons why Augustine reacted with sustained violence and bitterness against their position.

Covering a varied range of topics within the confines of a book of merely 142 pages is a remarkable tour de force, something which only an erudite Augustine scholar such as Gerald Bonner is able to accomplish. The following items are only some of the subjects dealt within this study: the notion of God's omnipotence, the role of Christ, the meaning of baptism, Original sin and its consequences, the concept of participation and deification, and the creation from nothing. Augustine's intellectual illumination around 395/6 receives particular attention, since it became a defining moment for his final view on human free choice, whereby he came to acknowledge that God's grace was stronger than freedom of choice. Gerald Bonner also assesses the way in which Augustine attempted to remedy the problem of responsibility in his gloomy view on fallen man, who is only free to do evil, and, more generally, what led Augustine to come to his theology of predestination, in which only a small minority will be saved by God's freely given grace, and the majority will suffer eternal punishment, without being able to escape this harsh fate. Importantly, the author draws attention to the fact that some of the more grim tenets of Augustine's theology enjoyed broad acceptance among Christians at the time, who saw Origen's universalism condemned by the Church. Gerald Bonner wonders why Augustine, endowed with such a sensitive and wide-ranging mind, did not attempt to rise above them.

The author's lucid literary style, with its meticulous choice of wording, makes this book a pleasure to read and a storehouse of

quotable phrases. He amply demonstrates his familiarity with various writings of Augustine (his anti-Pelagian writings, epistles, sermons, early dialogues, and, of course, his masterpieces (*Confessiones*, *De civitate Dei*, *De Trinitate*)), which greatly contributes to the richness of the work.

This fine study not only provides a refreshing, balanced view of Pelagianism, it does the same for Augustine, by putting his harsh theology of predestination next to his more optimistic conceptions of participation and deification. Brought out particularly well is the import of Augustine's belief in creation from nothing (inspired by (Neo-)Platonism), which provided a rational argument for his claim that man is utterly dependent on God, so that any form of independence would lead to self-annihilation. At the same time, Augustine's adoption of the pagan philosophical concept of divine providence, assures him that an omnipotent God does not play with his creation as an irrational tyrant, but that he, as a reasonable being, governs his creation to the tiniest detail within a supernatural just order. On the other hand, there exists in the human soul an inherent, natural yearning for God, its Creator. Gerald Bonner arrives at a crucial question: does the fallen human soul retain some initiative in this aspiration towards God? Augustine's final answer, from 395/6 onwards, will be negative. This natural yearning, which is also reflected in man's desire to be happy, is hopelessly misdirected in fallen man. This makes him seek happiness in created things rather than in the Creator, the source of all happiness. Any reorientation of this natural yearning in man towards God, will have been prompted by God Himself: the initiative towards man's salvation lies therefore entirely in God's hands. Within Augustine's system there is a problem of responsibility: we cannot but sin without God's saving grace, but we cannot be held responsible for something which we have no power to avoid. Pelagius can (easily) defend God's justice in condemning sinners and unbelievers, by arguing that they were responsible for the choices they made in life. This is a view akin to our modern thinking, Gerald Bonner states. Augustine found a solution in Adam's fall: his theory of the seminal identity of the human race, makes that humanity shares moral responsibility for this fall. In making the conditions of salvation more demanding by insisting that only baptized people can be saved (the only exception are martyrs), Augustine is ready to accept all the harsh consequences of his system. He gives the example of the death of twin babies, of which only one of them has received baptism, due to circumstances which obviously are beyond their control. The one baby will be saved, the other will be eternally damned. This is one of the grimmest consequences of Augus-

tine's theology. Where many would start questioning the system, and see the advantages of the Pelagian system, Augustine nevertheless relentlessly stuck to his view. His system rested on two main requirements: it had to be rational, and nothing in it should give even the slightest opening for human pride, the root of all sin.

To present an intricate and wide-ranging subject matter in a comprehensive manner, a clear overall structure and a tight line of reasoning is mandatory. In these, Gerald Bonner has not been entirely successful. If one were to read only the conclusion, one would have the impression that Gerald Bonner wanted to present his assessment of the Augustinian and Pelagian position concerning free will, whereby the pros and cons of both systems would be summed up, and where an attempt was made to understand Augustine's harsh attitude towards a position which had something to recommend itself. The title and the prefatory note of the book however do not point towards such a content.

Various repetitions in the book make the overall line of reasoning rather confusing.[1] The use of cross-referencing would have made the study as a whole more transparent and more closely knit together. Although the indices at the end of the book can help to find where a particular topic has been discussed elsewhere, it would have been useful for the reader if reference was made, even if only in a footnote, to an earlier treatment of the matter in the book. Perhaps the most arresting example of this shortcoming is Bonner's use of *Letter* 166. It is quoted on p. 74, and again on p. 109, where it is cited for making a similar point, namely to show that Augustine himself was disturbed by some of the harsher aspects of his theology. Only an attentive reader would realize that both quotations come from the same letter. More striking is the fact that on p. 109, Gerald Bonner cast doubt on the sincerity of Augustine in this letter ('If we are to take seriously his letter for Jerome'). Such a qualification has not been made in the first reference to Letter *166*. Also in other instances sources are being used as if for the first time, while, actually, this is not the case. An explanation for this seeming sloppiness can be found in the introduction, in

[1] For instance, the literal repetition of 'These two paradoxical aspects of Augustine's thought will be the theme of our following chapters' (on p. 29 and again on p. 33); the line of reasoning on participation in chapter 1, (p. 30-31), returns in chapter 3 (p. 52-53). Although Gerald Bonner writes on p. 30 he will return to the subject later, much on p. 52-53 seems repetition which could have been avoided. For instance, on p. 30 he refers to question 46, 2 of *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta-tribus*, and in a footnote he quotes the Latin text of the whole section. On page 52, he refers again to this section and then gives a full English translation of the text.

which Gerald Bonner writes: 'This book grew out of a course of four lectures which I was due to give at the University of Malta in 2001'. Possibly the author lacked the time to fully integrate these four separate lectures into one consistent whole, to make the line of reasoning more tight, and the overall structure more apparent, and to remove unnecessary repetitions, since they only have their use in a series of oral lectures. Because so many diverse topics are being discussed in a rather disjointed line of reasoning, it is difficult to summarize the work. Further, there are some smaller errors which almost inevitably creep into any study: Augustine's conversion moment is not described in book IX of *Confessiones* (p. 58), but in book VIII; likewise, the discussion of the (Neo-)Platonists is not to be found in book VIII (p. 104), but in book VII.

There is further the treatment of the issue concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and free will on pages 39-41, with the question: '*Does his foreknowledge constrain us to act as He foresees?*'. Gerald Bonner refers to the lengthy discussion of this problem in *Confessiones* book XI, in which Augustine argues that, because God is outside time, past, present, and future exist as an eternal present. Therefore, there is technically no foreknowledge at all, only knowledge. Equally – if not more – important is Augustine's argument in book V of *De civiate dei*. Augustine replies here to Cicero's criticism of the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and man's free will. His solution to maintain both is the claim that our wills themselves play an important part in the order of causes, which is, for God, fixed, and contained in his foreknowledge (V.9). The fact that God knows what we freely will (since he knows all the causes which make us will it and act upon it), does not mean that God constrains our will. Confusing is Gerald Bonner's statement in this section concerning this problem that one can very easily find quotations in Augustine's work which declare both God's *omnipotence* and human freedom of choice, seeing that the term omnipotence is something quite different than 'omniscience' or 'prescience'. Gerald Bonner criticises that Christian predestinarians are 'not consistent in applying their principles to everyday life' (p. 39), because in pastoral practice most of them act as if the individual has free will. Yet, Augustine's explanation in his letter to Firmus shows that this does not necessarily have to be inconsistent. Augustine only asks to treat everybody as he or she is, namely a potential elect; everybody can be in the possession of free will, and have the power to choose and do good at any given moment in time, because we cannot know to whom and when God is giving his grace. Within the context of freedom and necessity, the existence of a causational

universal fixed order to which Augustine seems to subscribe is an important feature.

In his revaluation of the Pelagian position, Gerald Bonner posits that the acknowledgement of human free will, and therefore of individual responsibility for our actions is something which we would be sympathetic to. However, even in our time the existence of free will is being questioned. We may have stopped believing in the existence of God, but we have therefore not abandoned the idea of universal determinism and of a (linear) causal order, to which Augustine also seems to have subscribed. These tenets are in themselves sufficient to question the existence of free will. Particularly the modern idea that we are a product of nature (our genes) and nurture (experience), can lead to a denial of free will.[2] Also the modern term *diminished responsibility* used in court, seems to undercut the Pelagian idea that we are responsible for the choices we make. The discovery that the MAOA gene is a factor in a person's aggressive behaviour in combination with the existence of childhood maltreatment, threatens the idea of individual responsibility. How far can a person with an inherited malfunctioning MAOA gene (nature/genes) and with a history of childhood maltreatment (nurture/experience) be held responsible for his aggressive and asocial behaviour later in life?[3]

Two factors should perhaps have deserved more attention in Gerald Bonner's study. The first one is astrology, whose influence on Augustine has often been underestimated. We should not forget that Augustine was an adherent to astrology longer than to Manicheism.[4] One of the claims of astrology is that the wills of human beings are controlled by the stars, or else, if the stars are understood as only signs, our wills are nevertheless controlled by the will of God, who also holds sway over the stars.[5] This is echoed in Augustine's system, in which God exerts control over the will of man, only, unlike astrology, we cannot know what God has in store for us. Furthermore, the difference between the Biblical twins Jacob and Esau helped Augustine realize just how profoundly God has control over our lives. Augustine's own example of two babies, the one baptized and saved, the other not baptized and therefore doomed, was no doubt inspired by the twin

[2] See the book on popular science of Matt Ridley, *Nature via nurture: genes, experience and what makes us human* (London: Harper, 2004).

[3] Matt Ridley 2004, p. 267-269.

[4] Leo Charles Ferrari, 'Augustine and astrology', *Laval théologique et philosophique* 33 (1977), 241-251.

[5] AUGUSTINE, *De civitate Dei* v.1.

argument used by the opponents of astrology. The problem of astrology (different 'fates' of twins), was solved within Augustine's system by God freely giving saving grace to the one but withholding it to the other. Gerald Bonner mentions that Julian accused Augustine of having remained a Manichee, but Augustine has also been accused of reintroducing astral fate with his conception of grace and predestination. This accusation should not come as a surprise, since Augustine at times identifies the Biblical *sors* with grace, whereby he has to warn his readers not to think of astral fate.[6]

A second factor, which is only scantily referred to by Gerald Bonner, concerns the contribution of psychology in our attempt to understand Augustine's grim attitude towards Pelagians and how he came to believe in his harsh system. When for instance Gerald Bonner states that 'Augustine could not bear not to win' (p. 101), he could have referred to Augustine's acknowledgement in *Confessiones* that as a child he loved to win in competitive games.[7]

When Gerald Bonner points out that the Pelagian saw man as *emancipatus a Deo*, he could have contrasted this, as Peter Brown did in his study, with Augustine 'likening his relation to God to that of a baby to its mother's breast, utterly dependent'.[8] Also when Gerald Bonner rightly refers to the aristocratic character of Pelagianism, he could have reflected on Augustine's negative attitude towards pagan (aristocratic) 'ideology', visible not only in *De civitate Dei*, but also in the first philosophical dialogues. We should not forget that in his former life Augustine had been pushed to become a member of the aristocracy, and that in his youth he was expected to take on board its ideology. Peter Brown brings out very well the aristocratic, traditional way of thinking behind Pelagian's theology,[9] so that it is perhaps no wonder that Augustine was very much opposed to it. This is in line with Augustine's strong hostility towards pride, praise and glory. The basic principle of traditional ideology was the link between one's own

[6] AUGUSTINE, *Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 118.4: 'in sorte autem quid, nisi Dei gratia commendata est?' Augustine's journey from astrology to divine grace has been thoroughly examined by Bernard Bruning in his comprehensive article, 'De l'astrologie à la grâce', *Augustiniana* 41 (1991), 575-643..

[7] AUGUSTINE, *Confessiones* I. x (16).

[8] Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: a biography*, 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 2000), p. 352.

[9] Peter Brown 2000, p. 369: 'No matter how self-consciously Christian the Pelagian movement had been, it rested firmly on a bed rock of the old ethical ideals of paganism, especially on Stoicism. Its moral exhortations had appealed to a classical sense of the resources and autonomy of the human mind'.

merit (*virtus*) and reward (praise, honour). Already in his first writings we can see Augustine opposing this traditional ideology, when he posits in the introductions of *De beata vita* and *De academicis*, that one's *virtus* is not strong enough to reach the happy life, and that the help of *Fortuna* is required. This help from *Fortuna* can be understood as God's freely given grace. Augustine's long-standing aversion for the traditional, aristocratic ideology may therefore have contributed to his hostile reaction against Pelagianism.

Despite this criticism of lack of overall structure and occasional sloppiness, there is no doubt that the positive aspects of this study greatly outweigh these minor points. Each chapter of this concise publication contains such a wealth of insights and enough food for thought to make it worth reading it again and again.

Geert VAN REYN

Johannes BRACHTENDORF, *Augustine's Confessiones*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005, 315 p. ISBN: 3-534-15423-1

Augustine's *Confessiones* is a classic of world literature in which many a person has buried himself willingly or unwillingly. The many available commentaries which help the reader to penetrate into the deeper layers of the work are, if only from a historical viewpoint, certainly not superfluous. The assistance Brachtendorf offers with his study purports to be more than historical. The author masterfully paints the philosophical background of Antiquity, from which the inquisitive Augustine profusely drew to embellish his new ideas. But even this is not sufficient for Brachtendorf: each time he wants to show the mark Augustine left on his legacy of the past. This backward projection he also carries through within the work of Augustine itself, in which he already was engaged in an in-depth exploration of the subject. When it emerges that Augustine has developed the matter further at a riper age, Brachtendorf also makes a projection in the future. This so to speak forward projection goes further than Augustine, since Brachtendorf witnesses the same subject reemerge centuries later, demonstrating how much this Church Father has become the hinge for many a theme in the history of ideas of Western thought. Later philosophers such as Kant, Nietsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein are being dealt with where required. Also here the author shows the indebtedness of these people towards Augustine, and he points out where they are at variance with him.

To all readers of Augustine – among whom some very distinguished – Brachtendorf gives some valuable advice in his introduction: '*Vielmehr halt (Augustin) stets alle Fäden seines Denkens gleichzeitig in der Hand, so dass er von einem Thema aus Brücken zu mehreren anderen schlagen kann. Doch Augustines Kompostionsstil zeugt keineswegs von logisches Schwäche, sondern eher von systematischer Stärke, insofern er nämlich sachliche Verbindungen zwischen Gegenstandsgebieten herstellt, die zunächst als unverbunden erscheinen*' (p. 13). Therefore, do not read to fast, otherwise one fails to notice a certain play of rethoric in the text. Brachtendorf also considers the tenacity with which *Confessiones* has to fit one particular genre to be a consequence of the same haste. From the very beginning the author wants to work out what ties together the individual books of this work. After an in-depth study it turns out that the question of happiness is the leitmotiv of *Confessiones*, which not incidentally occupies itself with *ars vivendi* of our *conditio humana*. This question of happiness also occupied Plato, Plotinos and Cicero. However, the Church Father will fundamentally alter their terminology, which he so abundantly used to paint the misery of this earthly life after Original sin. A return from the false happiness in the sensible order, where everything passes and nothing remains, Augustine derives from Plotinos. Also his call to turn towards your inner self, where truth resides, is taken over by the Christian philosopher, but he will substitute emanation with the idea of Creation and monism with monotheism. Philosophy may try to develop a therapy for the mentally ill, but only the Christian way heals and leads to the goal which the classical philosophers are able to discern, but unable to attain, simply because they do not know Christ. The true therapy to lead to happiness will belong to Christianity (pp. 17-39).

Augustine will posit his own analysis of human existence against the Hellenistic and Neo-platonic philosophy. From the first book of *Confessiones* on, he deduces from his personal and biographic road to God a general structure of being-human, of which the *memoria*-theory in the tenth book renders the clear outlines. To be able to find happiness, rational insight will no longer suffice; belief in the activity of God will become indispensable. The ethical understanding based on the nature of man in classical philosophy, no longer suffices to lift a man out of his natural misery (p. 49). The bishop of Hippo will repeat after Paul as a catchphrase that man will find misery if he exchanges his Creator with His creatures and ultimately looks for himself in them (pp. 41-62).

For this erring man the preacher not only uses the Plotinos' metaphor of the soul straying from the Father: he finds this imagery also in the parable of the lost son. The cause of this sin is pride,

through which man seeks to put himself in the place of God. The same madness Augustine recognizes in his juvenile prank of the pear theft, when he sought to contest the prohibition because it was prohibited. It is really no small sin wanting to challenge the order of being, through which man rejects his appointed place and in so doing cannot find his happiness (pp. 63-68)? In book III Brachtendorf outlines the gnostic religion in so far that the quest for happiness led Augustine fall in the Manichean guile (pp. 69-84). In book IV the deep mourning for the loss of a childhood friend provides Augustine once more with the opportunity to present unhappiness as a perverted love, in which a temporary creature has been put in the place of the everlasting God. Here, Augustine takes the opportunity to appreciate and correct the stoic understanding of the affects. The therapy of feelings will consist herein that the orientation of the human will shall be given back to the will of God. With this Brachtendorf connects the relation between *uti-frui*, in which he strips *uti* of its instrumental meaning. Perhaps the author could have made an appeal to a broader bibliography regarding this subject. Man's urge to imitate and be himself God in this mourning episode as well as in the pear theft, Brachtendorf regrettably did not wish to elucidate from *superbia* in the (original) Fall (pp. 85-99). Book V, in which Augustine describes the undermining of his Manichean belief, is for Brachtendorf the opportunity to place the faith defection, against the philosophical background of scepticism (pp. 99-112). In book VI Augustine examines the arguments to believe, and he also scrutinizes his erring concerning the highest good, through which he already can partly reach forward to the conversion of the will in book VIII (pp. 113-118). In book VII the author follows the breakthrough of neo-platonic thought which helped Augustine to liberate himself completely from the dualism of Manicheism, with his so-called rationalism and his genealogy of evil. With its grab for the divinity, evil has been caused by no-one else but mankind. Evil in its state as non-being will keep Augustine from considering evil as a power apart from God. Also here, the author neglects to look into the later works to see what Augustine further thinks of *superbia*. The new point of view of rationality causes the imminent convert to stand in a new relation to faith. What does Augustine have to do with the relation Plato-Paulus unless he not only lets faith refer to historical facts, but also let count as a condition to grasp the rationality of the content of faith. The metaphysical order of Being from the platonic world will show how much Augustine is indebted to this philosophical tradition to grasp his idea of God as the spiritual reality at the top of everything which exists. This invites Brachtendorf of course to compare the *Confessiones* with his earliest writings, in which also the spiritual ascent

to the divine has been developed (pp. 113-154). In book VIII the author follows the line of thinking of Augustine's conversion regarding the will, in which continence (abstinence) *in* sexuality proves to be the most difficult obstacle. Here, the author clarifies the text frequently with developments in later writings. The weakness and disunity of the will can only be healed through the intervention of grace. At the end of this book Brachtendorf halts to give an expanded 'status quaestionis' of the development which Augustine's doctrine of grace has gone through, at the moment when he composes his *Confessiones*, providing a clear and successful analysis (pp. 155-188). In book IX Augustine places the death of his mother Monnica in sharp contrast with the mourning he went through at the loss of his childhood friend in book IV. Against the mourning for his mother the young adolescent of before feels himself armed with the Christian hope as opposed to these who do not believe in the resurrection. Regrettably, the author does not refer to the editorial link which unmistakably exists between the *visio* which precedes the death of Monnica and the way in which the son comes to terms with this sorrow. Is not the handling during the grieving process precisely the discovery of *tenere* which only exists in the love towards God (p. 192)? Even though the adolescent who thought himself to be a god is dead and is striving for a different happiness ever since his acknowledgment of God, the *visio* of Ostia has not completely conquered death (pp. 189-201). Book X in which *memoria* takes up a central place, Brachtendorf considers to be a pivotal text between the first nine and the three remaining books, through which *Confessiones* undeniably form a unity. In his pursuit of happiness man has to come across the question of God, before he can come into touch with the historical Divine Revelation (of God). Rightly, the author points to the fact that to be aware of happiness, does not necessarily imply that one is aware of God. Yet, implicit knowledge of God is essential for the restlessness of the heart, that only finds its rest in God.

This theoretical insight Augustine will from book I on bring to the practical level, when he starts recounting his life story: the search for happiness in friendship, with Cicero, with the Manicheans, in honour, and in lust. Only the (Neo-)Platonic philosophers will help him acquire a correct insight of himself and of God, in the world and the people. With Paul and his Christology of humility he sees the possibility of bringing to unity the complex will, and to finally reach his highest happiness in book IX, after being driven by a restless heart from the beginning. It is now obvious that Augustine will investigate in *memoria* and in time the conditions which would make it possible to further ascend towards God. Whereas in the previous books it was

still not clear that Augustine had set his sight on something more than conversion in his own life story, it becomes clear from books X and XI onwards '*dass Augustinus seine eigene Bekehrungsgeschichte interpretiert als Zeugnis für eine allgemein menschliche Situation. So wie er selbst sich Gott zuwandte, so vermag jeder Mensch sich zu bekehren und Gott zu suchen, weil jeder Mensch kraft seiner Vernunftnatur ein implizites Wissen um Gott besitzt*' (p. 216). With the inevitable references to *De trinitate* where the Church father describes human consciousness within his Trinitarian structure, Brachtendorf shows that, throughout the whole history of ideas, philosophers were fascinated by Augustine's analysis of memory in book X and of time in book XI. After a preceding analysis of time itself the author compares Augustine with the tradition of Antiquity, out of which he drew, and after summing up the similarities and differences, to continue the dialogue of Heidegger with Augustine in which *Sein und Zeit* takes up a central position. In book X Brachtendorf treats the three temptations or the so-called *cupiditas triplex* of the converted person in a rather neglectful fashion. The reason eludes us why this time he does not make a comparison with an earlier text such as *De vera religione* 37,68 – 54,106 (pp. 202 – 235, X; 236 – 265, XI). The exegetical approach of the first verses of Genesis in book XII prompts the author again to make a comparison with the aftereffect of Augustine, which this time he places in a hermeunetic dialogue with Gadamer (pp. 266-277). In book XIII Brachtendorf underlines once more the similarities and the differences with Plotinos regarding Creation as an allegory of salvation. Finally, the author discerns in the very last part the initial impetus to a trinitarian reflection in humankind (pp. 278-289).

In the concluding remarks the author sums up all the arguments, which he has built up in the course of the study, to demonstrate that the genre of *Confessiones* should not be narrowed down to a Protreptikos with philosophical content after the manner of Aristotle or Cicero, but that it exhorts to a wisdom which reaches beyond philosophy and which comprises faith (p. 292).

In the course of his commentary the author has found enough reasons to see that the unity in this masterpiece (I-IX, X, XI-XIII) should be seen above all in the question of happiness and destiny, which returns as a refrain in the study. The number of pages Brachtendorf devotes to each book allows us to discover his aim: how did Antiquity look at human happiness, what did Augustine inherit and what did he change in this aspect, and how did generations after him pick up this subject matter? Because of his sick soul, Augustine kept pursuing his apparent happiness and continued to search for the highest

good in the wrong places, through which it became clear what could have been the reason for his unhappiness. With the adoration of temporary pleasure in earthly goods the searcher of happiness wanted to be a god and at the same time he repeated the primal sin from which all later misery stemmed. The return to happiness lies on the road of Christological humility, which wishes to be a victory of pride as cause of all misery on earth. Not philosophy holds the key of therapy, but Christian faith (pp. 290-303).

Confessiones is certainly not a book which one should present to someone as a first introduction to Augustine. Taking up Brachtendorf's study as preparation for reading this classic from Christian Antiquity certainly is highly recommended, but it will not be easy for beginners. Nevertheless, this work has to its merit the fact that it guides the reader into the philosophical setting of those days and allows the aftereffects to be felt right up to the present day. To grasp the full bearing of *Confessiones*, Brachtendorf has opted for a twofold movement in his commentary: a movement backwards in Antiquity, where the great master of Western thinking obtained his philosophizing tools, which he in turn adapted to working tools at the service of his newly won insights. This movement backwards the author repeated when he sought connection with Augustine's earlier works, and after that a movement forwards to the later works, which confirm or alter what until then Augustine had claimed. This movement forwards the author implements beyond the limits of Augustine, finding himself in the history of ideas, in which some intuitions of this Church father are fruitfully continued or altered. Needless to say that the author has to be widely-read in the subject matter in order to be able to present such a study, of which the results could be termed impressive. Brachtendorf clearly did not have the intention to render a very specialized analysis of the texts, but he certainly has succeeded in making more manifest the purpose of this classic.

Bernard BRUNING

Annemaré KOTZÉ, *Augustine's Confessions. Communicative Purpose and Audience*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 71)

It is now generally agreed among scholars that characterizing *Confessiones* as an autobiography, hinders rather than facilitates the understanding of this high point in literary history. Annemaré Kotzé manages to underpin this insight in an exciting and interesting study,

in which she offers a comprehensive analysis of *Confessiones* as a 'protreptic' work. She does this by taking into account the reciprocity between Augustine's communicative purpose and his audience, whilst recognizing the fact that literary genres are at times interwoven in *Confessiones*. A paraenetic text aims at a change in behaviour of people who already share the author's world view. The writer of a protreptic text not only seeks from his audience a change in conduct, he also aims for a correction or adaptation of their world view (cf. p. 58). Kotzé's choice to examine the protreptic aspect of *Confessiones* is closely connected with her focus on the Manicheans as Augustine's intended audience. It should be here already noted: Kotzé manages to make conceivable the idea that *Confessiones* is a fine example of the protreptic genre, and that Augustine, even more so than hitherto assumed, had the intention to reach the Manicheans when composing his masterpiece.

The book is structured into five disproportionate chapters: the relatively short third chapter serves as a hinge between the first and the last two, more elaborate, chapters. The first two chapters focus on the audience. In the first chapter Kotzé evaluates in a kind of historiographical survey research done on *Confessiones* by an 'academic audience'. She deals with studies relating mainly to her own subject matter, i.e. those which have as central theme the purpose, intended audience ('fellow Christians', and above all Manichees), and literary aspects, as well as the historical, autobiographical or protreptic quality of *Confessiones*. She specifically pays attention to research that has identified a common denominator in the thirteen books of *Confessiones*. The reason for this approach becomes clear in the next chapter. In chapter two Kotzé offers an insight into the original readers of *Confessiones*. Mindful of the fact that protreptic and paraenetic texts have certain characteristics in common, she analyses literary antecedents of *Confessiones*, such as Cicero's *Hortensius* and Augustine's own *Contra academicos*. Her conclusion is that Augustine has consciously written down the autobiographical narrative of books I-IX for the education of his audience, and that he has intertwined these, as is common in protreptic literature, with a philosophical discourse exegesis, mainly in books X-XIII, for a protreptic communicative purpose (cf. p. 72; p. 249). The unity of the thirteen books can thus be discerned if one understands these books as protreptic. The idea that *Confessiones* was written with a protreptic purpose in mind is according to Kotzé inextricably linked to the notion that 'the potential Manichean reader constitutes an important segment of Augustine's target audience' (p. 88). Consequently, she gives in this second chapter

an overview of recent insights into the Manichean perception of friendship, their structure of organization, their set of beliefs, their awareness of sin, and their ideas on creation.

Starting from her study of 2001 ('Reading Psalm 4 to the Manicheans', in *Vigiliae Christianae* 55 (2001), 119-136), Kotzé delivers in the third chapter the strongest evidence for her contention that Augustine also wished to target a Manichean audience when composing *Confessiones*, and that in so doing he had a protreptic purpose in mind. It is no coincidence that it is in his emotionally coloured reflection on *psalm* 4 (*Conf.* 9.4.8-11) that Augustine refers to the Manichean dualistic cosmology by using their terminology. For Kotzé this proves that he identified himself with the Manicheans so that they in turn would identify themselves with him. Kotzé never loses sight of the fact that Augustine is directing himself to his fellow Christians. At the same time, she observes that he does not address his former co-religionists harshly or scathingly, but rather fraternally, as if this is a matter of corporate identity. Kotzé is right in recognizing herein a protreptic strategy: Augustine wishes to make credible the Incarnation, Christ's death and resurrection, particularly to Manicheans, who refuse to accept these tenets. In chapter four Kotzé deduces the protreptic-paraenetic aspiration of *Confessiones*, whether explicitly or implicitly stated, from numerous crucial passages: the *praedicator* in the opening paragraph; the alternation of the young Augustine as a character in the narrative with the older bishop Augustine, who is constantly praying in *Confessiones*, and who at times seems to be dominated by the young Augustine; the way in which *Mt.* 7:7 ('petite et dabitur vobis, quaerite en invenietis, pulsate et aperietur vobis') is repeatedly quoted; certain types of imagery; Augustine's self-reflection; finally, the conversion stories of Anthony, Alypius, and Augustine himself. According to her, in all these aspects evidence can be found that 'there is no book or lengthy section of narrative in the Confessions where protreptic-paraenetic purpose is not one of the important issues of the narrator's mind' (p. 147). Particularly well rendered is the way in which Augustine seeks to incorporate in his conversion stories elements of recognition, change, and identification with the praying man in *Confessiones*, by describing the effect of conversion in erotic terms or in metaphors derived from fire-imagery.

Although she seeks to prove in the final chapter that the Manicheans were in fact Augustine's target audience in *Confessiones*, Kotzé does not lose sight of the paraenetic function of the work. Accordingly, she understands Augustine's words on hope in difficult circumstances, the value and authority of Scripture, and the preaching

and example of the minister (*Conf.* 13.13-26) as paraenetic; the words on the unity of the Old and New Testament she recognizes as protreptic, because the Manicheans denied this concord (*Conf.* 13.32-49). Kotzé sees in Augustine's digressions on friendship reminiscences on the way in which friendship was experienced in Manichean 'cells'; his revulsion of the uninterested reader concords with the Manichean aversion to *curiositas*. Remarkably, she does not refer in her analysis of friendship to its neo-platonic conception, bearing in mind the influence it had on Augustine. Kotzé reduces the way in which Augustine develops the issue of time in book XI to his awareness of Manichean dogmatism and to his endeavour, which should be termed protreptic, to bring about a change in their thinking by attuning to their thoughts. The same she does with Augustine's examination of the goodness of creation and Creator, and of the unchangeability of God's will.

As Kotzé demonstrates in her study that Augustine applies the formal and stylistic characteristics of the protreptic genre in a virtuous way, her literary-historical research fills a gap in the research already done on *Confessiones*. Praiseworthy is that she remains conscious of the fact that Augustine's orientation is not exclusively towards the Manicheans, and that it represents 'only one line of melody in a dense polyphonic composition' (p. 208). Nevertheless, she succeeds in making conceivable – also owing to many recent studies on Manicheism – that Augustine sought to make his former co-religionists receptive to his new faith, and to his view on time and eternity by means of specific allusions and images.

Studies on book XI have already established that Augustine sought to bring about that the Manicheans would abandon their views on time and eternity and adopt his instead, and these studies find their culmination in Kotzé's work.

As Kotzé states, true readers are for Augustine those who are joined with him in the *caritas* of his church. However, she shows convincingly in her study that, as if it was no trouble at all, Augustine also sought to change his Manichean readers by persuading them to adopt his religious conviction. Her opinion can also be further corroborated by a closer analysis of the medicinal topoi, which Augustine uses in *Conf.* 4.12.8, and in his description of Monnica's end (*Conf.* 9.8.1.8). Kotzé briefly touches upon these topoi, because the Manicheans recognized these (cf. p. 132). Like some church fathers before him – the apologists of the 2nd and 3rd century straightforwardly portrayed Christ as a more powerful healer than Aesculapius – Augustine was encouraged by the healing stories in the gospels to characterize Jesus as the *medicus* of a humanity infested with sickness (cf. P.C.J. EYKENBOOM,

Het Christus-medicusmotief in de preken van Sint Augustinus, Assen, 1960). As a result of Kotzé's findings, it has once more become clear how skilfully Augustine applied this Christ-medicus motif to allow the immensity and intensity of the mystery of the Incarnation find acceptance among fellow-Christians as well as Manicheans. It is well-known that the Manicheans denied the Incarnation because it seemed impossible to them that God would lower himself to matter, and they imagined Christ merely as *patibilis*, as someone who was capable of suffering. By means of the Christ-medicus motif Augustine explains the Incarnation as an example of God's humility. Its immensity consists herein that God's descend goes hand in hand with grace as *antidotum* for the whole of humanity and its history. The intensity of the Incarnation can be experienced in Augustine's conception, if also in the life of an individual Christ's humility is interpreted as *antidotum* to a vanity which can only lead to isolation. By explaining these aspects in reciprocity with each other by means of the Christ-medicus motif, Augustine tries to convince his fellow Christians that man befits humility, and that humility brings openness and insight into the mystery of the Incarnation. Kotzé's findings once more make clear that Augustine's at times harsh words against the Manicheans – the same happened against the Donatists and later the monks of Hadrumetum – can be brought back to his connection with them, and his great concern for a correct perception of Christ, who in his quality as *medicus* bridges the gap between the Manichean perception of Christ and that of the bishop of Hippo.

To conclude, Kotzé has convincingly revealed in her study the protreptic strength of Augustine in his *Confessiones*. Thanks to her research it has to be recognized, more distinctly than before, that Augustine links his paraenetic and mystagogic aspirations with a protreptic one, and that together they do not form separate threads, but one magnificent *textura*.

Paul VAN GEEST

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