

author, we must understand the sending of the disciples as the sending of married couples: both husband and wife were sent. The role of women must have been important, otherwise there would not have existed the prohibitions of 1 *Cor* 14:34¹ and 1 *Tim* 2: 8-15². 1 *Cor* 14:34 is to be considered an interpolation and 1 *Tim* 2: 8-15 an application of the cultural situation of those days.

Larissa SEELBACH shows that hasty psycho-analytical conclusions should be avoided with regard to the relationship between Monica and Augustine. In many cases Augustine follows the opinion of his time and culture when he deals with anthropological questions, but on the higher level of spirituality between the two sexes he indubitably accepts the Bible as norm: both man and female are image of God. This article is a must for patristic scholars and systematic theologians.

A last text by Albert RAFFELT is a presentation of the second edition of the *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* (CAG 2).

The book concludes with a bibliography and each article is followed by a summary of the discussion held after the papers.

Tarsicius J. VAN BAVEL, OSA

Robert DODARO, *Christ and the just society in the thought of Augustine*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 262 pp.

The relation between Church and state is a recurring theme in Augustinian Studies. Some scholars, like Reinhold Niebuhr, argue that Augustine equates the *civitas dei* with the church and the *civitas terrena* with the state. Others, like Markus, argue on the contrary. Few scholars in this respect pay attention to what Augustine means by the church. True, Augustine does mean the visible church when speaking of the church. (Important to add is that Augustine is referring to the church as *corpus permixtum*.) But there is also another meaning of the church in Augustine; *ubi Christus, ubi ecclesia*. And

¹ 'Women are to remain quiet – they have no permission to speak.'

² 'I want men everywhere to lift up holy hands in prayer, without anger or disputing. I also want women to dress modestly, with decency and propriety, not with braided hair or gold or pearls or expensive clothes, but with good deeds, appropriate for women who profess to worship God. A woman should learn in quietness and full submission. I do not permit a woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she must be silent. For Adam was formed first, then Eve. And Adam was not the one deceived; it was the woman who was deceived and became a sinner. But women will be saved through childbearing – if they continue in faith, love and holiness with propriety.'

it is to this meaning of the church that Dodaro (professor of Patristic Theology at the Patristic Institute in Rome) is referring in his most recent book *Christ and the just society in the thought of Augustine*. This allows him to equate the just society with the church. This being said, the central question of Dodaro's book 'How did Augustine conceive the just society?' is the more important because it focuses on (christian) individuals making up society.

The book is build up around opposite origins of virtue; with the ancient concept of virtue originating in the intellectual human soul and the christian concept of virtue originating in Christ; the only source, example and end of virtue. Dodaro is developing his argument along the line of the Ciceronian statesman and Augustine's statesman. Augustine's baptizing and transforming of the ancient concepts of statesman and heroism is seen by Dodaro as an important thread in the composition of the *City of God*.

The ciceronian statesman is someone in between a politician, a philosopher and an orator. He has "a responsibility to promote the public good" (24). He has to 'render to each his due': not only in the sense of guaranteeing rights and obligations in the commonwealth but also in a 'transcendental' sense; meaning that the wise statesman refers to the 'heavens and considers the meaning of eternity' (20).

Whereas in Cicero, as in antique thought in general, human beings are able to act justly 'on the strength of their own reason', there is in Augustine's thought an impossibility to do this. Human being suffers, as a result of original sin, from the twin effect of ignorance and weakness. Christ has 'to enter the stage': being God and man he is source and example of virtue and the only one capable of healing the effects of original sin. Only then is it possible to speak of justice as 'Gerechtigkeit' or righteousness. Dodaro pushes the argument on ignorance and weakness beyond the moral level: "It (ignorance)... causes the foundational distortion of moral reason, its erroneous understanding of its own integrity." (28). Especially in chapter 3 the references to Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings do clarify the theologically necessary emphasis of Augustine on the (im)possibilities of human reason and the need for grace. 'Justice is only communicated indirectly' (145), that is; only through the incarnate Word. His union of God and man (very interesting argument on this point of Dodaro) counters ignorance and weakness by faith and humility. Augustine's concept of *Totus christus caput et corpus* is brought to bear by Dodaro to stress the uniqueness of Christ's mediatory role. It also serves to stress the importance of the 'exchange of discourse between head and body.' (113) Christ is after the formation of society.

Where Cicero's statesman and the Pelagian man are able to find true justice by their own reasoning faculty, there Augustine is stressing 'wisdom's hidden reasons' (title of ch. 4). Human being has limited capacities to know the truth and to act in accordance with it. It is only in Christ as *mysterium dei* (167) that wisdom and knowledge are united. Human being can only through grace, faith and humility start to approach both wisdom and knowledge. Dodaro refers to Augustine's treatment of the woman caught in adultery (jn. 8:3-11) and king David's repentance (1 samuel 12) to illustrate the operative value of this conversion-process. Judges and public officials (the same goes each individual human being) who recognize their own sinfull self and the pardon they recieved will act in accordance with mercy and love towards those who are to be judged.

To return to the concept of statesman, Dodaro is drawing on several letters of Augustine notably ep. 137;138;153;155) to public officials. These letters show that the theological position Augustine takes, can have and does have practical effects. In several of his letters Augustine is eager to convince these public officials that christi-anity does not make for a weak state. Dodaro concludes that for Augustine "Christianity is more able than rivals forms of worship to promote social reconciliation because, unlike other religions, it accepts that in return to God for the pardon that they receive from him as sinners, all human beings are obliged to forgive one another." (200)

Giving the Ciceronian and Augustinian statesman the important role they have in his book, Dodaro does indeed tend to emphasize an individualistic reading of Augustine, as Wilken noted in his review of Dodaro's book.¹ Dodaro could have elaborated further on the social consequences of the concept of *totus christus*. It would have been interesting to look at the similarities and differences between the discourse between head (Christ) and body (church) and the interaction between statesman and citizen. Both presume a relationship, a discourse, but not on the same level: Christ is just and justifying, a statesman cannot even just, let alone justifying. In this respect statesman and citizen are on the same level: this reduces the need for emphasis on the statesman.

One other thing might be worth considering; in his book Dodaro is opposing the Ciceronian and Augustinian statesman; i.e. a secular or pagan statesman versus the christian statesman. However,

¹ Robert WILKEN, 'Augustinian justice', in: *First Things* 157 (November 2005), 50-53. However, I do not agree with Wilken's conclusion that Dodaro leaves it up to the reader to draw out practical, ethical guidelines.

would it be possible to apply the Augustinian framework on secular rulers? His account of the Ciceronian statesman does allow for this position when stating that a wise statesman refers for his act of justice to a transcendental dimension. When Augustine is speaking of the temporary peace in DCD, XIX, 13² his definition points to the obligation of governments/rulers to guarantee their people being able to live and function as human beings: an intrinsic human need to be happy, an ontological relationality and free operation of the will/love.

Dodaro's answer to his question 'how did Augustine conceive the just society' is clear: in Christ; the just and justifying *mysterium dei*. This answer may be a prelude to a new approach in Augustinian Studies. It sheds new light on 'old issues' like the relation between state and church, and the way for Christians to act in this imperfect world.

The close relation between Augustine's theology and his ethics is very well demonstrated by use of Augustine's letters to public officials. The place of these letters within the Augustinian *corpus* requires more research. Could it be that these letters are the same to his ethics as the sermons are to his theology?

Dodaro's contribution to Augustinian theology and ethics is important, but not clear-cut: his understanding of Augustinian ethic (which I believe to be correct) does not allow for simple, plain and given ethical categories. It calls for self-interrogation, need for divine assistance and responsible thinking: it calls for congruence on every aspect of life.³

Willem BOERMA

W. Boerma holds a masters degree in International Relations and is currently preparing a doctoral dissertation on the reception of Augustine in the thought of Niebuhr, Wight and Elshtain.

² 'temporal peace, ..., the peace that consists in bodily health and soundness, and in fellowship with one's kind'

³ en.ps. 118, 17,3