
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TIJSCHRIFT VOOR DE STUDIE VAN SINT AUGUSTINUS EN DE AUGUSTIJNENORDE

REVUE POUR L'ÉTUDE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN ET DE L'ORDRE DES AUGUSTINS

JAARGANG 54 ANNÉE
2004

INSTITUTUM HISTORICUM AUGUSTINIANUM LOVANII



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AVANT-PROPOS

Le 7 juin 2003 T.J. van Bavel a eu 80 ans. C'est une raison pour célébrer cet anniversaire par un modeste recueil de Mélanges. Il y a exactement 14 ans qu'à l'occasion de son éméritat à la Katholieke Universiteit de Leuven, nous lui avons offert dans cette même revue les *Mélanges T.J. van Bavel*. Modeste peut-être mais non moins important pour autant, car, à côté de deux éditions critiques du *sermo ad populum LXVII* et du *sermo habitus ad mensam sancti martyris Cypriani*, toutes deux précédées d'une introduction scientifique, nous pouvons offrir aux lecteurs un éventail d'articles intéressants sur Augustin. Fidèle à la tradition de la revue, il y a aussi pour les spécialistes un certain nombre de contributions intéressantes sur l'histoire de l'Ordre.

Depuis 1990, notre rédacteur en chef, T.J. van Bavel, qui entretemps a remis sa tâche en d'autres mains, ne s'est pas reposé sans rien faire. Dans *Augustiniana* seule il a encore publié trois articles (Années 45, 46, 47). De plus, les conditions de santé changeantes ne l'ont pas empêché de publier en 1996 une monographie sur la prière chez Augustin, *Als je hart bidt...* (Institut Historique Augustinien, Leuven), réimprimée en 2001 et dont les traductions anglaise et allemande sont sous presse. Ensuite il a rassemblé, sous le titre énigmatique *Ooit een land van kloosters* (Institut Historique Augustinien, 1999), tous les textes sur la vie religieuse qu'il a pu retrouver dans l'oeuvre d'Augustin. Ils respirent tous d'une manière remarquable la vie religieuse augustinienne qui s'était déjà répandue sur toute l'Afrique du Nord du vivant de ce Père de l'Église. Une année plus tôt T.J. van Bavel avait encore affiné sa propre traduction de la *Règle* en vue d'une édition de luxe accompagnée du texte latin, dans la *Regel van Augustinus* (Institut Historique Augustinien, Leuven, 1998). Enfin, à l'usage de la vie augustinienne d'aujourd'hui, il a écrit *Charisma: gemeenschap* où, à côté d'une présentation solide de l'amitié chez Augustin, il offre une transposition personnelle de la conception d'Augustin sur la vie commune (Institut Historique Augustinien, Leuven, 2001). Cet ouvrage a déjà été traduit en français, en allemand et en espagnol alors que les traductions anglaise et tchèque sont sous presse. En même temps il vient de terminer la traduction en néerlandais du *De trinitate*, première dans ce domaine linguistique, mais qui attend encore son éditeur.

"Frère âne proteste" bien sûr mais en bon augustin il ne se laisse pas faire la leçon par cette spiritualité franciscaine. Son esprit continue sans répit à vivre dans la jeunesse d'Israël dont le Psaume

92 dit que, malgré l'âge, elle continue à porter des fruits 'luxuriants, pleins de sève et verts'! Un de ces fruits c'est un livre en préparation où il veut se pencher encore une fois sur la femme chez Augustin… dont la tradition biblique dit qu'elle est la mère de la vie. Jeunesse et vieillesse continuent à se rejoindre et méritent pour cela davantage qu'un recueil de mélanges.

B. BRUNING et J. LAM CONG QUY

LE *SERMO AD POPULUM* LXVII DE SAINT AUGUSTIN

I. INTRODUCTION, ÉDITION, ANNOTATIONS CRITIQUES

Lors de notre préparation d'une nouvelle édition critique des *sermones ad populum* LI - LXXA de saint Augustin[1], l'établissement du texte du *sermo* LXVII (*PL* 38, col. 433-437) posait des problèmes inhérents à la dualité de la tradition manuscrite; dans bien des cas, le choix entre les leçons divergentes ne s'est imposé qu'après une analyse des contextes et/ou une comparaison avec des passages augustiniens analogues. Nous soumettons ces raisonnements au jugement des lecteurs de ce numéro spécial d'*Augustiniana*, en premier lieu à l'esprit sagace de T.J. VAN BAVEL: si le *s.* 67 a fourni matière à d'autres connaisseurs d'Augustin pour des études excellentes sur les notions de *confessio* et de *conuersio*, c'est dans les *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin* — parues il y a maintenant un demi-siècle! — que pour la première fois a été mise en relief la place de ce sermon dans l'élaboration de la doctrine du Christ prédestiné.

Le Professeur van Bavel fixait le *terminus a quo* de ce sermon vers 412. La christologie du paragr. 7 (ll. 106-126) exclut une date antérieure: car c'est sous la pression de la controverse pélagienne qu'est née l'idée que la nature humaine du Christ, n'ayant pas existé avant l'union avec le Verbe, n'a pu mériter cette union, et que celle-ci est donc un exemple parfait de la grâce. Cette idée se manifeste pour la première fois dans le deuxième livre du *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* (décembre 411) et sera répétée à plusieurs reprises jusqu'en 429[2]. L'emploi de la formule *una persona* (ll. 113-114), attestée depuis 411 seulement, confirme que l'homélie doit être située dans la période d'activité antipélagienne de l'évêque

[1] Ce volume des sermons d'Augustin d'Hippone paraîtra prochainement dans la *Series Latina* du *Corpus Christianorum*. Le regretté P. P. VERBRAKEN avait préparé l'édition, et à sa mort un bon nombre de sermons étaient prêts à être imprimés; son édition du sermon 51 (l'un de la série Mayence-Lorsch) a été revue et corrigée par F. DOLBEAU pour le nouveau volume.

[2] T.J.VAN BAVEL, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. L'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint Augustin* (Paradosis 10), Fribourg 1954, p. 37 et nn. 87 et 88; cfr. M. F. BERROUARD, 'La grâce d'union de l'incarnation', dans *Saint Augustin, Homélies sur l'Évangile de saint Jean LV-LXXIX* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne 74 A), 1993, p. 456-458; P. M. HOMBERT, *Gloria gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 148), Paris 1996, p. 489-497.

d'Hippone[3]. Cette datation du *s.* 67 a été reproduite d'une façon inadéquate dans la liste de dom Verbraken et, sous l'influence de cette liste, dans deux répertoires récents[4]. P. M. HOMBERT, tout en admettant 412 comme limite *ante quam non*, est porté à placer le sermon vers 415[5].

Sommaire du s. 67

Voulant s'associer, pendant la lecture évangélique, aux paroles du Christ *Confiteor tibi Pater* (*Luc.*10, 21)[6], des fidèles s'étaient frappé la poitrine en signe de repentance. Le prédicateur leur enseigne que la *confessio* du texte de Luc est une *confessio laudis* (*paragr. 1*). Tandis que le *confiteor* du Christ n'implique aucune peccabilité, la *confessio* des chrétiens est double: elle comporte une *accusatio peccati sui* et une louange de Dieu. En effet, ceux qui manifestent leur contrition reconnaissent par ce fait même que c'est Dieu qui les a empêchés de sombrer dans le péché, leurs propres forces étant

[3] T. J.VAN BAVEL, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin*, p. 20 et p. 22 n. 29; W. GEERLINGS, *Christus Exemplum* (Tübinger Theologische Studien 13), Mainz 1978, p. 120; H. R. DROBNER, *Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus. Zur Herkunft der Formel* una persona (Philosophia Patrum 8), Leyde 1986, p. 169-171, cfr. p. 250 n. 20.

[4] La première mention du *s.* 67 dans les *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin* (p. 22 n. 29) fait partie d'un paragraphe intitulé '*Les textes postérieurs à 400*' qui recueille les attestations des deux formules *unitas personae* (apparaissant dès 400) et *una persona* (depuis 411); c'est ce titre collectif, non la datation des textes contenant *una persona*, qui a été reproduit par P. P. VERBRAKEN, *Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin* (Instrumenta Patristica 12), Steenbrugge et La Haye, 1976, p. 70 ('après 400'); l'année 400 fonctionne également comme *terminus a quo* dans les listes de H. J. FREDE, *Kirchenschriftsteller. Verzeichnis und Sigel*, Freiburg i.Br. 1995, p. 225 et E. REBILLARD dans *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. D. FITZGERALD, Grand Rapids et Cambridge 1999, p. 776.

[5] P. M. HOMBERT, *Gloria gratiae*, p. 493 n. 181: la thématique du paragr. 7 permet de prendre 412 comme *terminus a quo*, la majorité des citations d'*Eccli.* 17, 26 (cf. *s.* 67, l. 40) se situe entre 412 et 417; IDEM, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 163), Paris 2000, p. 337-338 n. 23: comme dans le *s.* 67, *Eccli.* 17, 26 est associé à la résurrection de Lazare dans *en. Ps.* 67, une homélie dictée en 415. La datation de notre sermon vers 415 est acceptée par J. ANOZ, 'Cronología de la producción agustiniana', dans *Augustinus* 47 (2002) 229-312, en part. p. 271.

[6] C'était effectivement l'évangile de Luc qui avait fourni la leçon liturgique, Matthieu (11, 25) ne mentionnant pas le 'frisson de joie' du Christ: voir *s.* 67, l. 3 *exsultasse* et ll. 140-141 *exsultauit*.

inadéquates. Dieu les a ressuscités de la mort, Dieu en soit loué (*paragr. 2*)[7].

Après avoir comparé la déchéance amenée par le péché au tombeau de Lazare, et à l'appel de Jésus le rôle primordial de la grâce dans la conversion, saint Augustin fait un rapprochement entre le rôle de l'Église dans la réconciliation et l'ordre donné aux disciples qui assistaient au miracle: *Soluite illum et sinite ire* (*Jean* 11, 44) (*paragr. 3*)[8].

Le premier tiers de l'homélie se termine (*paragr. 4a*) par le tableau d'une audience en justice, reprenant le thème de l'*accusatio sui*; le Seigneur y tient le rôle de *liberator*: une allusion au début (v. 3) et/ou à la partie finale (v. 48) du *Psaume* 17, sans doute le psaume qui avait accompagné la péricope évangélique.

C'est d'ailleurs par une remarque concernant celui qui s'y exprime par la bouche du psalmiste (*ille*: l. 60; cf. ll. 90-91: *hoc enim coeperam dicere*) que commence la deuxième section de notre sermon. Le corps de la section explique le quatrième verset psalmique. Dans les *paragr. 4b et 5*, les 'ennemis' de *ab inimicis meis saluus ero* (*Ps.* 17, fin du v. 4) sont identifiés avec le diable et ses anges à l'aide de *Eph.* 6, 12-13. L'hémistiche *laudans inuocabo Dominum* (v. 4, début) fait l'objet du *paragr. 6*; ce paragraphe atteint son point culminant dans la sentence *Quidquid ergo putaueris boni te habere abs te, deuiasti a laude Dei*. Une partie du Psaume s'appliquant au Christ *secundum hominem*, c.-à-d. en tant qu' *homo assumptus*[9], l'occasion se présente d'attaquer les positions pélagiennes avec un argument décisif: le *paragr. 7* décrit l'union de la nature humaine du Christ avec le Verbe comme n'existant que par la grâce (ll. 108-114), dépassant les notions naturelles (ll. 114-119), prototype et source de toute grâce (ll. 119-126)[10].

[7] Voir J. RATZINGER, 'Originalität und Überlieferung in Augustins Begriff der *confessio*', dans *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 3 (1957) p. 375-392; E. VALGIGLIO, *Confessio nella Bibbia e nella letteratura cristiana antica*, Turin 1980, p. 173-212; C. MAYER, 'Confessio, confiteri', dans *Augustinus-Lexikon*, col. 1122-1134.

[8] A. M. LA BONNARDIÈRE, 'Pénitence et réconciliation des pénitents d'après saint Augustin, III', dans *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 14 (1968) p. 181-204; M. F. BERROUARD, 'Un symbole de la grande pénitence: la résurrection de Lazare et son déliement', dans *Saint Augustin, Homélies sur l'Évangile de saint Jean XLIV-LIV* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne 73 B), 1989, p. 469-473; F. GENN, *Trinität und Amt nach Augustinus*, Einsiedeln 1986, p. 282-283.

[9] *En. Ps.* 17, *Praef.*: *'ipsi Dauid', hoc est, manu forti: Christo secundum hominem.*

[10] T. J. VAN BAVEL, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin*, p. 37-41; P. M. HOMBERT, *Gloria gratiae*, p. 491-497.

La dernière partie de l'homélie revient sur la péricope évangélique (*paragr. 8a*), constatant que «ce qui fit tressaillir de joie le Seigneur était inexistant, à moins de demeurer caché afin de nous être révélé (*aut non erat aut latebat ut reueletur nobis*)» (l. 140)[11]. L'objet par excellence de la Révélation, c'est l'Incarnation; le sermon reste sur le même terrain que dans le *paragr. 7*. Ceux qui se refusent à cette Vérité, désignés dans l'évangile ironiquement comme *sapientes* et *prudentes*, pèchent par manque d'humilité. La critique d'Augustin concerne-t-elle ici les seuls néo-platoniciens? Dans les *Confessions*, la *Cité de Dieu* et plusieurs sermons, ces philosophes ont été attaqués à l'aide de ce même texte *Luc* 10, 21 / *Matth.* 11, 25 et caractérisés par le même vice, l'orgueil[12]. Le contexte actuel pourrait faire présumer que le reproche vise aussi les pélagiens; tout en professant la foi en l'Incarnation, ceux-ci ne refusent-ils pas d'en accepter les conséquences? L'admonition finale aux auditeurs de ne rien présumer de leur propre discernement et d'implorer l'illumination divine (*paragr. 8b-9*) n'est toutefois pas spécifiquement antipélagienne[13].

L'établissement du texte

Suite à une lacune dans leur exemplaire de la collection ancienne de sermons augustiniens *De Paenitentia* (*Π*), les Mauristes ont dû établir leur texte du sermon 67 exclusivement sur base de la collection médiévale *De Verbis Domini et Apostoli* (*V*); or, grâce aux recherches de Dom LAMBOT[14], il est actuellement possible d'en reconstituer la version *De Paenitentia*.

[11] Voir ci-dessous, la note complémentaire à propos de la l. 140.

[12] W. WIELAND, *Offenbarung bei Augustinus* (Tübinger Theologische Studien 12), Mainz 1978, p. 257-260.

[13] Elle viserait les pélagiens ouvertement si elle évoquait l'élément affectif de l'*illuminatio*, comme dans *De gratia Christi* 1, 13, 15: *Haec gratia si doctrina dicenda est, certe sic dicatur, ut altius et interius eam Deus cum ineffabili suauitate credatur infundere (...) ita ut non ostendat tantummodo ueritatem, uerum etiam impertiat caritatem (...) simul donans et quid agant scire et quod sciunt agere* (cf. W. WIELAND, *Offenbarung*, p. 249-257).

[14] Grâce à l'amabilité des PP. P.-M. Bogaert et D. Misonne, nous avons pu utiliser les cahiers de dom Lambot: un fonds extrêmement précieux de renseignements sur les sources (collections et mss. isolés) pour l'édition de chaque sermon, et de notices critiques.

Π est héritier direct d'une collection africaine [15]. On connaît peu de mss. contenant le recueil *Π* comme tel; tous sont lorrains ou bourguignons. Il s'agit d'abord des restes d'un manuscrit démembré et lacuneux, datant de ca. 700 [16]: la seule source *Π* dont disposaient les Mauristes. Le ms. intégral avait toutefois été la source indirecte de deux codex du IX^e^ siècle, nos P^1 et P^2; mais dans la copie sur laquelle ceux-ci reposent indépendamment l'un de l'autre, on avait remanié l'ordre des homélies, et quelquefois même le texte [17]. En outre, on peut actuellement faire appel à deux recueils de décrétales et d'opuscules portant sur la discipline ecclésiastique (r^1 et r^2, mss. français respectivement des IX^e^ et X^e^ siècles), qui contiennent un texte du *s.* 67 dont l'appartenance à la tradition *Π* est hors de doute. Étant peu correct en soi mais sans lien avec P^1 ou P^2, provenant peut-être d'un ms. *Π* d'une autre famille, le texte $r^{1/2}$ rendra des services pour éliminer des éléments secondaires dans la version $P^{1/2}$ de l'homélie. On ne signale aucune trace de la tradition *Π* en dehors du territoire français.

De Verbis Domini et Apostoli (*V*) est une collection composite; le compilateur a puisé dans plusieurs recueils (dont la plupart ont disparu depuis lors), mais sans faire usage de la tradition *Π* [18]. Selon dom VERBRAKEN, connaisseur éminent de la collection *V*, elle s'est formée en Italie du Nord dans les premières décennies du VIII^e^

[15] Voir C. LAMBOT, *CCSL* 41 (1961) p. X-XI; IDEM, 'La tradition manuscrite des sermons de saint Augustin pour la Noël et l'Épiphanie', dans *Revue Bénédictine* 77 (1967) p. 217-254, en part. p. 221; IDEM, 'Les sermons de saint Augustin pour les fêtes des martyrs', *ibid.* 79 (1969) p. 82-97, en part. p. 85; P. P. VERBRAKEN, *Études critiques...* , p. 200.

[16] Ce sont les fragments PARIS, *BN* lat. 11641 + SAINT-PETERSBOURG, *Bibl. Publ.* F. papyr. I. 1 + GENÈVE, *Bibl. publ. et univ.* lat. 16; le ms. était probablement originaire de Luxeuil: *CLA* n° 614, vols. V p. 28 et 59; VII p. 15 et 56; XI p. 4 et 30; *Suppl.* p. 55.

[17] Ces deux manuscrits sont CAMBRAI, *BM* 567 (Cambrai, Notre-Dame: vraisemblablement écrit à Lyon selon B. BISCHOFF, *Katalog der festländischen Hss. des IX. Jahrhunderts*, Wiesbaden 1998, p. 176) et CAMBRIDGE, *Univ. Libr.* Add. 3479 (Saint-Mihiel, ms. originaire de l'Est la France: B. BISCHOFF, *ibid.*, p. 185). Notre examen de l'apparat de l'édition des *ss.* 18, 20, 21, 38 et 41 de C. LAMBOT, *CCSL* 41 (1961), p. 246-250. 261-267. 278-286. 476-487. 496-502, confrontant le ms. luxovien (qui y est désigné par le sigle P^1) avec nos $P^{1.2}$ (les sigles $P^{2.3}$), a fourni 65 variantes par lesquelles ceux-ci s'écartent ensemble du premier ms.; dans le ms. intermédiaire, on remplaça *saluum facere* par le synonyme *saluare* (p. 261 l. 19), et se risqua aux conjectures *carior* (au lieu de *caro*: p. 280 l. 131) et *crede* (sa source avait écrit *credere*: p. 478 l. 48).

[18] Il existe toutefois une branche de la tradition *V* dont tous nos témoins comportent des leçons *Π* par l'effet d'une contamination datant du IX^e^ siècle au plus tard (*infra*).

siècle[19], et s'est scindée très tôt en deux familles. Le groupe *A* a conservé l'ordre primitif des sermons, et la qualité de son texte est convenable; mentionnée dans un catalogue de Reichenau au début du X^e^ siècle, cette famille se répandit à travers les régions germaniques méridionales aux XIe et XII^e^ siècles. Dom Verbraken se doutait que cette famille s'était scindée en deux branches au cours du X^e^ siècle au plus tard. La famille *B* est marquée par une dégradation du texte et par l'introduction du *s. app. 109* et du *s.* 384 dans la première partie de la collection *V*, c.-à-d. dans la section *De Verbis Domini*; dès la deuxième moitié du IX^e^ siècle, elle se trouvait dans les bibliothèques de plusieurs abbayes et cathédrales de France, et il en subsiste six ou sept exemplaires français datant de cette époque. Sur base de variantes caractéristiques, dom Verbraken distinguait, à l'intérieur de la seconde famille, les branches B_1 et B_2 et le rameau B_2 *augmenté*; il signalait l'existence d'un ms. assez tardif (XIIe s.) qui témoigne de l'époque où la famille *B* ne s'était pas encore divisée[20]. Le *s.* 67 faisant partie de la section *De Verbis Domini* de la collection *V*, la tradition manuscrite exemplifiée par les six mss. *V* de notre apparat critique ne concerne que cette section-ci[21]. Les mss. intitulés V^2, V^3, V^4 et V^6 représentent quatre groupes de dom Verbraken, respectivement

[19] P. P. VERBRAKEN, 'La collection de sermons de saint Augustin De Verbis Domini et Apostoli', dans *Revue Bénédictine* 77 (1967) p. 27-46; IDEM, *Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin* (Instrumenta Patristica 12), Steenbrugge et La Haye 1976, p. 218-225; IDEM, 'Jalons pour une édition critique des sermons de saint Augustin sur le Nouveau Testament', dans *Atti del Congresso internazionale su S.Agostino nel XVI centenario della Conversione (Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986)*, I, Rome 1987, p. 127-134.

[20] P.P. VERBRAKEN, 'La collection ...', p. 36-42. On peut suivre la genèse de sa pensée dans ses éditions commentées des sermons 52, 71 et 112, *Revue Bénédictine* 74 (1964) p. 9-35; 75 (1965) p. 54-108; 76 (1966) p. 41-58

[21] Il s'agit de la première série des sermons du recueil, c.-à-d. des sermons sur les Évangiles. Pour la série finale, celle des sermons *De Verbis Apostoli*, la tradition manuscrite ne correspond qu'en partie à celle de *De Verbis Domini*, ce qui a nécessité la mise en chantier de recherches particulières, qui avaient été annoncées par le dr. G. PARTOENS dans son article 'La collection de sermons augustiniens *De Verbis Apostoli*. Introduction et liste des manuscrits les plus anciens', dans *Revue Bénédictine* 111 (2001) p. 317-352, et dont les articles suivants marquent les premières étapes: 'Une version remaniée de la collection de sermons augustiniens *De uerbis Apostoli* et les relations généalogiques de ses témoins', dans *Sacris Erudiri* 41 (2002) p. 137-163; 'Le sermon 151 de saint Augustin. Introduction et édition', dans *Revue Bénédictine* 113 (2003) p.18-70; 'Le sermon 176 de saint Augustin sur 1 Tim. 1,15-16, Ps. 94,2/6 et Lc. 17,11-19. Introduction et édition', dans *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 49 (2003) p.85-122; et, bien entendu, l'édition commentée du sermon 131 du volume actuel d'*Augustiniana*.

A, B_1, B_2 et B_2 *augmenté*[22]. Dans une étude dont la parution précédera peut-être celle de l'article en présence[23], nous avons cherché à repérer les variantes marquant les divers sous-groupes de *A*, B_1 et B_2 dans trois sermons *De Verbis Domini* et à trouver les mss. les plus fidèles au texte primitif de chaque famille/branche; tandis que l'édition existante des trois sermons repose sur un choix plutôt restreint de mss., notre heuristique couvre tous les mss. *De Verbis Domini* d'avant 1100, et en outre ceux du XII[e] siècle qui s'écartent des traditions courantes. Sur ces recherches s'appuie le choix des quatre mss. susmentionnés; mais l'entreprise a aussi entraîné la découverte de deux nouveaux groupes importants de témoins de la section *De Verbis Domini*. Il s'agit tout d'abord de trois mss. associant l'ordre et le nombre primitif des sermons à un texte apparenté à celui d'une des deux «branches *A*» de dom Verbraken, mais de bien meilleure qualité: l'une de ces «branches» s'avère être une nouvelle famille, ce qui implique une table généalogique tripartite des traditions *De Verbis Domini*. Le ms. auquel nous attribuons dans cet article le sigle V^1 (CUES, *Hôpital* 36), appartient à ce nouveau groupe; il date de la fin du X[e] ou du début du XI[e] siècle, et nous pensons qu'il est originaire de Metz[24] et qu'il est

[22] À l'encontre de V^2, V^3 et V^6, le ms. V^4 (ROUEN, *BM* 487: provenant de Jumièges, XI[e] s.), dont le texte *ante correctionem* sera notre représentant de la branche B_2, n'est jamais cité dans l'apparat des éditions publiées par dom Verbraken. La cause en est peut-être l'état actuel du ms., une main plus récente ayant introduit de nombreuses leçons d'un rameau secondaire de la branche B_1. Toutefois, le texte originel est toujours lisible sous les biffures et les surcharges, et une comparaison avec les autres témoins B_2 d'avant le XII[e] siècle nous a appris qu'il présente les variantes typiques de la branche B_2 mais non les marques des différents sous-groupes; ses variantes particulières ne sont pas nombreuses. De tous les mss. de sa branche que nous connaissons, c'est sans doute V^4 *(a.c.)* qui se rapproche le plus du texte B_2 primitif.

[23] L. DE CONINCK - B. COPPIETERS 'T WALLANT - R. DEMEULENAERE, *La tradition manuscrite du recueil* De Verbis Domini *jusqu'au XII[e] siècle. Prolégomènes à une édition critique des* Sermones ad populum *d'Augustin d'Hippone sur les évangiles (ss. 51 à 147)*: à paraître dans la série *Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia*.

[24] Notre conjecture est motivée par le fait qu'un codex très similaire au ms. de l'*Hospitalbibliothek* est qualifié par une main du XIV[e] siècle comme appartenant à la bibliothèque des Célestins de Metz: le ms. BERNE, *Burgerbibliothek* 110. Il a été écrit au X[e] siècle selon H. HAGEN, *Catalogus codicum Bernensium*, Berne 1875, p. 155-156; le catalogue ne précise pas si ce ms. pourrait dater de la fin du siècle, ce qui nous confirmerait dans notre effort pour en déterminer la source (voir la note suivante). De ce ms. bernois, il ne subsiste que les deux premiers cahiers, comprenant la table et les six premiers sermons *De Verbis Domini*; mais les liens avec le ms. cusain sont évidents: dans les deux mss., la section de 64 sermons *De Verbis Domini* sans le *s.* 384 ou *app.* 109 est/était suivie du sermon *In natali Domini* de Fulgence (CPL 829), et le texte des sermons *V* disponibles pour une confrontation s'avère être à peu près identique. — Un troisième ms. de ce même groupe est PARIS, *BN* lat. 9536 (Echternach, XII[e]), au texte étroitement apparenté à celui des précédants, mais dont les 64 sermons sont disposés dans un ordre thématique.

un descendant d'un exemplaire italien (?) du X^e siècle, détruit pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale[25]. Enfin, l'absence de la plupart des variantes de B_1 et B_2 dans certains mss. *B* des XII^e et XIII^e siècles, originaires d'abbayes flamandes ou voisines de la Flandre, atteste la survivance d'une tradition *B* qui a pris son origine dans la souche *B* avant la bifurcation de celle-ci en B_1 et B_2 ; l'idée d'examiner ces mss. tardifs de plus près nous a été suggérée par M. PARTOENS, qui avait constaté l'excellence d'un ms. *De Verbis Apostoli* provenant de la même région[26]. Parmi les témoins de la section *De Verbis Domini*, notre V^5 (DOUAI, *BM* 273, XII^e siècle, originaire de l'abbaye d'Anchin) mérite une place d'honneur à cause de la pureté relative de son texte[27], bien que la composition globale du recueil y ait été remaniée; et la comparaison des variantes a révélé que c'est cette branche, non B_2, qui a produit le rameau que dom Verbraken avait qualifié de *B_2 augmenté*. La valeur de la branche pour la reconstitution du texte

[25] Voir les données fournies dans le *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques des départements*, vol.5, Paris 1879, p. 21, au sujet du ms. METZ, *BM* 48 (X^e siècle), dans lequel on pouvait lire qu'il avait été offert à l'abbaye St-Vincent par l'évêque local Déodéricus (965-984); or, on sait d'autres sources qu'ayant accompagné l'empereur Othon II lors de l'expédition de celui-ci en Italie (981-983), l'évêque fit don à St-Vincent d'objets précieux (oeuvres d'art, reliques) qu'il avait recueillis pendant son séjour: le ms. a pu provenir lui aussi de la péninsule, ce qui en expliquerait la composition et la qualité. En effet, tandis que dom VERBRAKEN ('La collection...', p. 45 et *Études critiques...*, p. 224) range ce ms. parmi les 'incertains', c.-à-d. parmi ceux dont on ne saurait spécifier le contenu ou l'appartenance, le *Catalogue général* (loc. laud.) précise qu'il comprenait 64 sermons, ce qui implique qu'il se composait de la section *De Verbis Domini* et qu'il en avait conservé l'ordonnance primitive, sans le *s.* 384 et sans *app.* 109, deux caractéristiques de la configuration répandue en France. La tradition *V* de la région germanique méridionale présentait elle aussi la configuration primitive, mais son texte véhiculait plusieurs variantes provenant de la famille *B*: celles-ci sont absentes des deux mss. messins qui survivent et du ms. d'Echternach. Il y avait à Metz encore un autre ms. comprenant 64 sermons *De Verbis Domini* et pouvant donc être lui aussi une copie du ms. de St-Vincent: METZ, *BM* 49; ayant été écrit au XI^e siècle, il portait le titre de propriété *liber sancti Laurentii* avant d'entrer dans la bibliothèque de l'abbaye St-Arnould, ensuite dans la bibliothèque publique, et enfin au Mont-Saint-Quentin, où il a péri en même temps que le ms. 48, qui était probablement sa source: voir *Catalogue général...*, vol. 5, p. 21-22.

[26] Ce ms. *De Verbis Apostoli* d'une époque plutôt avancée du XIIe s., DOUAI, *BM* 251 (copié pour Marchiennes) est apparenté à deux mss. cisterciens conservés à BRUGES, *BP* 255 et 257 et datant du XIII^e siècle selon A. DE POORTER, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Publique de la ville de Bruges*, Gembloux / Paris 1934, p. 294-296 et A. HOSTE, *De handschriften van Ter Doest*, Steenbrugge 1993, p. 255.

[27] Précisons toutefois que tous nos témoins de la 'nouvelle' branche ont emprunté quelques variantes à B_1 et/ou B_2, mais rarement les mêmes: c'est en faisant abstraction de leurs divergences mutuelles qu'on constate que leur base collective diffère de celle des autres groupes *B*.

originel *B* du s. 67 souffre du fait qu'elle a subi une contamination par un ms. *Π*; ceci se passa avant que B_2 *augmenté* ne se fût détaché d'elle [28]. Florus de Lyon a copié trois extraits du *s.* 67 pour son *expositio in Apostolum* sur un ms. B_2augm [29] nettement plus ancien que notre V^6.

L'identité et l'autorité de la source à laquelle *V* a puisé le texte de ce sermon étant inconnues, *Π* sera notre témoin privilégié, dans la mesure où les deux traditions sont mutuellement irréconciliables et où nous ne disposons pas d'arguments suffisamment solides pour étayer l'une ou l'autre. Les racines africaines et la continuité de la tradition expliquent que nous retrouvons dans *Π* des formes et des constructions propres au latin de l'Antiquité tardive, éliminées dans *V* par souci puriste; *Π* nous permet aussi de rémédier à des erreurs ou à des inexactitudes de la collection *V*, celles-ci étant pour la plupart banales (lapsus, fautes de lecture, omissions, inversions, gloses introduites dans le texte). Il arrive toutefois, surtout vers la fin du sermon, que la comparaison avec *V* tourne au désavantage de *Π*, trop enclin à écarter les difficultés d'interprétation par des modifications du texte. Le simple énoncé des différences entre les traditions en apparat critique ne suffisant pas toujours, on trouvera à la fin de cet article des notes critiques complémentaires, annoncées dans l'apparat par la formule *uide adnotationes*.

[28] Voir *infra*, l'apparat des ll. 4. 10. 16. 29. 49. 73. 77/78. 101. 103. 172 du *s.* 67.

[29] Voir les ll. 68. 70. 100. 143/144.

Édition du texte

CONSPECTVS SIGLORVM

P Collection *De paenitentia*, accord des mss. suivants:
P[1] CAMBRAI *Bibl. Mun.* 567, fol. 57-59[v] (ix), *Lyon (?), ensuite Cambrai, Notre-Dame*
P[2] CAMBRIDGE *Univ. Libr.* Add. 3479, fol. 96-98[v] (ix), *Saint-Mihiel.*

r Recueils apparentés à *De paenitentia*, accord des mss. suivants:
r[1] PARIS *Bibl. Nat.* lat. 1927, fol. 120[v]-124 (ix), *Limoges*
r[2] PARIS *Bibl. Nat.* 10741, fol. 98[v]-102[v] (x), *origine inconnue.*

V Collection *De Verbis Domini*, accord des mss. suivants:
V[1] CUES *Hospitabibl.* 36, fol. 21-23[v] (x-xi), *Metz (?), ensuite Nicolas de Cusa*
V[2] SCHAFFHOUSE *Stadtbibl.* Min. 23, fol. 17[v]-20[v] (xii), *Petershausen (?), ensuite Allerheiligen*
V[3] MUNICH *Staatsbibl.* Clm 14171, fol. 16-18 (ix), *Soissons (?), ensuite Ratisbonne*
V[4] ROUEN *Bibl. Mun.* 487 (A. 215), fol. 22-25 (xi), *prov.: Jumièges*
V[5] DOUAI *Bibl. Mun.* 273, fol. 14-15[bis] (xii), *Anchin*
V[6] PARIS *Bibl. Nat.* lat. 2017, fol. 15[v]-17 (xi), *Moissac.*

flor Florus de Lyon, mss. TROYES *Bibl. Mun.* 96, fol. 5 (*Rom.* 1, 18). 201 (*Gal.* 6, 3). 218 (*Eph.* 6, 11-14) (ix), *Mannon de St-Oyan*; et LYON *Bibl. Mun.* 484, fol. 61 (*Gal.* 6, 3). 92 (*Eph.* 6, 11-14) (ix), *Florus (?), ensuite Comtes de Lyon.*

edd accord des éditions suivantes:
am J. Amerbach, Plura ac diuersa diui Aurelij Augustini Sermonum Opera, t. I, pars ii (Bâle 1494), fol. [9-10[v]]
maur Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Operum t. V (...) opera et studio monachorum Ordinis S. Benedicti, è Congregatione S. Mauri (Paris 1683), col. 373-378.

DE EO QVOD SCRIPTVM EST CONFITEOR TIBI DOMINE PATER CAELI ET TERRAE

I. **1.** Sanctum euangelium cum legeretur, audiuimus exsultasse Dominum Iesum in spiritu atque dixisse: CONFITEOR TIBI, PATER, DOMINE CAELI ET TERRAE, QVI ABSCONDISTI HAEC A SAPIENTIBVS ET PRVDENTIBVS ET REVELASTI EA PARVVLIS. Hoc usque interim uerba Domini, si digne, si diligenter, si – quod primum est – pie consideremus, inuenimus primitus non semper, cum in scripturis legimus 'confessionem', debere nos intellegere uocem peccatoris. Maxime autem hoc dicendum fuit, et hinc admonenda caritas uestra, quia mox, ut hoc uerbum sonuit ore lectoris, secutus est et sonitus tunsionis pectoris uestri, audito scilicet quod Dominus ait: *Confiteor tibi, Pater.* In hoc ipso quod sonuit 'confiteor', pectora tutudistis. Tundere autem pectus quid est nisi arguere quod latet in pectore et euidenti pulsu occultum castigare peccatum? Quare hoc fecistis, nisi quia audistis: *Confiteor tibi, Pater*? 'Confiteor' audistis; qui confiteretur non attendistis. Nunc ergo aduertite. Si "Confiteor" Christus dixit, a quo longe est omne peccatum, non

3 cfr *Luc.* 10, 21 **4/6. 12. 13. 15. 16. 17** *Luc.* 10, 21

10/13 mox - tutudistis] cfr *en. Ps.* 117, 1; 137, 2; 141, 19; 144, 13; *qu. Mt.* 9; *s.* 29, 2; 29 B, 2; 68 *auct.* (= Mai 126), 2; 332, 4 **13/15** tundere - peccatum] cfr *s.* 113 B, 3 **17/19** si - ipsos] cfr *en. Ps.* 7, 19; 29 *s.* 2, 19. 22; 66, 6; 69, 6; 78, 17; 94, 4; 99, 16; 105, 2; 110, 2; 117, 1-2; 118 *s.* 4, 4; 137, 2; 141, 19; 144, 13; *ep.* 140, 24; *qu. Mt.* 9; *s.* 29, 2-4; *s.* 29 A, 1; *s.* 29 B, 1-2; 68 *auct.*, 2-3

1/2 *Titulus*: incipit (*om.* $r^{1.2}$, sermo sancti augustini $r^{2p.c.}$) de eo quod scriptum est confiteor tibi domine pater (*tr.* pater domine $r^{2p.c.}$) caeli et terrae .xvi. (.xvi. om. $r^{1.2}$) *P* $r^{1.2}$, item (incipit V^5) eiusdem (sermo *praem.* V^2, .viii. *add.* V^5) de uerbis domini in euangelio secundum matheum confiteor tibi pater domine (domine *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$, *tr.* domine pater V^5) caeli et terrae (quia/qui abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus et reuelasti ea paruulis *add.* $V^{5.6p.c.}$) et cetera (et cetera *om.* V^2, et reliqua sermo augustini episcopi de eadem re $V^{6p.c.}$) quae sequuntur (subsequuntur V^4, quae sequuntur *om.* $V^{2.5.6}$) .viii. (.viii. *om.* $V^{4.5(cf.supra).6}$) *V — uide adnotationes* **3/4** exsultasse dominum iesum] *tr.* d. i. e. V^1 **4** atque] et V^{1-5} *edd* confitebor $r^{2a.c.}$ pater domine] *in ras.* r^2 **5** qui] quia $P^{1a.c.,ut\ uid.}$ *edd* a] om. r^1 **6** hoc] huc *V edd — uide adnotationes* **7** quod] quid $r^{2a.c.}$ **8** in] *om.* $P^{1a.c.2}$ $r^{1.2a.c.}$ **10** hinc] hanc $r^{1a.c.}$ ut] et r^1, *in ras.* V^6 ore] *om.* V^{1-5} *am*, in *praem.* V^6 *maur — uide adnotationes* **11** et] etiam *V edd* sonus *V edd — uide adnotationes* tunsionis] tonsionis V^5 pectoris] peccatoris $V^{4a.c.}$ uestri] nostri V^4 **13** tundistis $P^{1a.c.2}$ r^2 V^6, tunditis r^1, tudistis $V^{3a.c.}$ pectus] pectora V^2 est] dicitur V^6 **14** uidenti $r^{1.2}$ pulso $P^{1a.c.2}$ *r* $V^{1-3.6}$ **16** qui - attendistis] *om.* $r^{2a.c.}$ qui] qua V^5 confitetur V^{1-5} *edd* attenditis r^1 **16/17** aduertite] attendite V^2 **17** longe est] *tr.* V^1 omni r^1

solius est peccatoris sed aliquando etiam laudatoris. Confiteamur ergo, siue laudantes Deum, siue accusantes nos ipsos. Pia est utraque confessio, siue cum te reprehendis qui non es sine peccato, siue cum illum laudas qui non potest habere peccatum.

2. Si autem bene cogitemus, reprehensio tua laus ipsius est. Quare enim iam confiteris in accusatione peccati tui? In accusatione ipsius tui quare confiteris, nisi quia iam ex mortuis uiuus factus es? Scriptura quippe dicit: *A mortuo, quasi qui non sit, perit confessio.* (PL 434) Si perit a mortuo confessio, qui confitetur uiuit; et, si peccatum confitetur, utique a morte reuixit. Si peccati confessor reuixit a morte, quis eum suscitauit? Nullus mortuus est sui ipsius suscitator. Ille se potuit suscitare qui, mortua carne, non est mortuus. Etenim hoc suscitauit quod mortuum fuerat. Ille suscitauit qui uiuebat in se, in carne autem suscitanda mortuus erat. Non enim Pater solus Filium suscitauit, de quo dictum est ab apostolo: *Propter quod Deus eum exaltauit*, sed etiam Dominus se ipsum, id est: corpus suum. Vnde dicit: *Soluite templum hoc et triduo suscitabo illud.* Mortuus autem peccator, maxime ille quem moles malae consuetudinis premit, quasi sepultus est, ut La-

25 *Eccli.* 17, 26 **32** *Phil.* 2, 9 **33/34** *Ioh.* 2, 19

22/29 si - mortuus] cfr *en. Ps.* 87, 10 **30/34** ille - illud] cfr *cons. eu.* 4, 10, 12; *c. s. Arrian.*, col. 695; *en. Ps.* 40, 12; 56, 8; 108, 23; *Io. eu. tr.* 10, 11; 110,3; *s.* 37, 2; 52, 13; 305, 3 **34/40** mortuus - confessio] cfr *en. Ps.* 67, 8; 68 *s.* 1, 19; 142, 13; *Io. eu. tr.* 22, 7; 49, 3. 19. 24; *s.* 98, 5-6. 128, 14; 139 A, 2; *s. dom. m.* 1, 35

18 peccatoris] confessio *add. P r — uide adnotationes* aliquando etiam laudatoris] *tr.* etiam aliquando laudatoris *P maur*, etiam laudatoris aliquando *r* aliquando] *om. am* confitemur *V edd* **19** nos ipsos] nosmetipsos $V^{2.4}$ utraque] uestra $V^{6a.c.}$ **20** peccati r^{1} **21** laudes $V^{5.6a.c.}$ **22/24** cogitemus - mortuis] *uide adnotationes* **22** cogitemus] cogitas *P r* ipsius] illius *P r* **23** peccati - accusatione] *om. am* **23/24** ipsius tui] *tr. maur* **24** quare] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ iam] tam P^{2}, *om. V edd* mortuis] mortuo *V maur* **25** dicit] ait *edd* **25/26** si - confessio] *om.* r^{1} si perit a] in ras. $r^{2p.c.}$ **26** si] sic $V^{3a.c.}$ **26/27** peccatum confitetur] *tr.* P^{1} **27** reuixit[1]] resurrexit $r^{1a.c.,ut\ uid.}$, *in ras.* V^{6} peccato $r^{2a.c.}$ morte] mortuis V^{2} **28** est sui ipsius suscitator] *tr.* sui i. susc. e. V^{2} **29** suscitare] *om.* $P^{1a.c.}$, *ante* potuit *suppl.* $P^{1p.c.}$ qui] quia V^{3} est mortuus] *tr.* $V^{1-4.6}$ *edd* suscitauit] suscitabat V^{2}, se *add. maur* **30** autem] *om.* V^{6} **31** suscitanda] sua *praem. maur* erat] est V^{2} **32** deus eum] *tr. am* deus] et *praem.* r^{2} *maur* eum] illum *P r* V^{2} exaltauit] suscitauit $V^{2.4p.c.5}$ **33** etiam] et *praem.* r^{2} **34** triduo] triduum $P^{1a.c.}$, post triduum $P^{1p.c.}$, post triduo P^{2}, in triduo $V^{1.2.5}$ *edd* suscitabo] excitabo V^{1} **34/38** mortuus autem - alte] *uide adnotationes* **34** mortuus] est *add.* $V^{1.2.4-6}$ *maur* peccator] est *praem.* $V^{1.3}$ *am* **35** moles] molis V^{3} malae] *om. V edd* consuetudinis] consuetudine $V^{3a.c.}$ ut] *om. V edd.*

zarus. Parum enim erat quia mortuus: etiam sepultus. Quisquis igitur mole consuetudinis malae uitae – terrenarum scilicet cupiditatum – alte premitur, ita ut in illo iam factum sit quod in quodam psalmo miserabiliter dicitur: *Dixit stultus in corde suo: 'Non est Deus'*, fit talis de quali dictum est: *A mortuo, uelut qui non sit, perit confessio.* Quis eum suscitabit, nisi qui, remota lapide, clamauit dicens: *Lazare, prodi foras*? Quid est autem 'foras prodire' nisi quod occultum erat foras prodere? Qui confitetur foras prodit. Foras prodire non posset, nisi uiueret; uiuere non posset, nisi resuscitatus esset. Ergo, in confessione, sui accusatio Dei est laudatio.

II. **3.** Dicit ergo aliquis: "Quid prode est ecclesia, si iam confessor uoce dominica resuscitatus prodit?" Audi quid prode est ecclesia confitenti. Huic Dominus ait: *Quae solueritis in terra, soluta erunt et in caelo.* Ipsum Lazarum attende: cum in uinculis prodiit, iam uiuebat confitendo; sed nondum liber ambulabat, uinculis irretitus. Quid ergo ecclesia, cui dictum est: *Quae solueritis soluta erunt*, nisi quod Dominus continuo ad discipulos: *Soluite illum et sinite ire*?

39 *Ps.* 13, 1; 52, 1 **40** *Eccli.* 17, 26 **41/42** *Ioh.* 11, 43 **48/49. 51** *Matth.* 18, 18 **49/50** cfr *Ioh.* 11, 44 **52** *Ioh.* 11, 44

40/44 quis - esset] cfr *Io. eu. tr.* 22, 7; 49, 24; 101 *s.* 2, 3; 295, 2; 352, 8 **47/52** audi - ire] cfr *Io. eu. tr.* 22, 7; 49, 24; 101 *s.* 2, 3; *s.* 98, 6; 139 A, 2; 295, 2; 352, 8

36 mortuus] est *add. P r* sepultus] est *add. P r* **37** mole] molae r^2, malae *V edd* terrenarum scilicet] *tr.* V^4 cupiditatem $r^{2a.c.}$ **38** alte] altae *P*, mole *V edd* ut] *om. am.* in[1]] n *(sic)* $r^{2a.c.}$, *om.* r^1 **38/39** mirabiliter *am* **39** dicitur] dicit P^2 **40** quali] qua $P^{1a.c.2}$, quo $P^{1p.c.}$, quale $r^{1.2a.c.}$ uelut qui] ueluti *P r* **41** suscitabit] suscitauit *P r*, resuscitauit *am* remota lapide] *P* r^1, remotum (-um *in ras.*) lapidem r^2, remoto lapide *V edd — uide adnotationes* prodi] ueni V^2, *praem.* ueni $V^{6a.c.}$ **42** est] om. $P^{2a.c.}$ foras[2]] *om.* V^2 **43** prodere] prodire *P r* $V^{1.3.5a.c.6}$ *am* qui - prodit] *om.* r^1 non posset] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ posset] posse $V^{3a.c.}$ nisi] *om.* $r^{2a.c.}$ **44** uiueret] non *praem.* $V^{6a.c.}$ posset] possit $V^{3a.c.}$ **45** accusatio] excusatio V^3 dei] om. $r^{1.2a.c.}$ est laudatio] *tr. V edd* **46/49** prode - in] *uide adnotationes* **46** prode est] *ita* $r^{1.2a.c.}$, prodest *P* $r^{2p.c.}$ *V edd* ecclesiam r^2 si iam] suam r^2 **46/47** uocem r^1 **47** audi] *om. V edd* prode est] ita $r^{2a.c.}$, prodest *P* $r^{1.2p.c.}$ *V edd* **48** huic] huc $r^{2a.c.}$, cui *V edd* in terra] super terram *P r* soluta] solutae $V^{3.4a.c.}$ et] om. V^4 **49** in] *om.* V^{1-5} *edd* prodit *P V edd* **49/50** uiuebat confitendo] uiuendo confitebatur $V^{4a.c.}$ **50** nondum] non r^1 irretitus] inreciatus V^3 **51** ecclesia] facit *praem. V edd* soluta] solutae $V^{4a.c.}$ **51/52** dominus] ait *praem. V edd.* **52** ad] a P^2 ire] abire r^2 $V^{1.2.5.6}$ *edd*

4. Siue ergo nos accusemus, siue Deum laudemus, bis Deum laudamus, si pie nos accusamus Deumque laudamus: quando Deum laudamus, tamquam eum qui sine peccato est praedicamus; quando autem nos ipsos accusamus, ei per quem reuiximus gloriam damus. Hoc si feceris, nullam occasionem inuenit inimicus qua te circumueniat ante iudicem. Cum enim tu ipse fueris tui accusator et Dominus liberator, quid erit ille nisi calumniator?

Merito ille hinc sibi tutelam prouidit aduersus *inimicos*, non conspicuos – *carnem et sanguinem*, miserandam potius quam cauendam – , sed aduersus illos inimicos contra quos apostolus nos hortatur armemur: *Non est uobis colluctatio aduersus carnem et sanguinem*, id est: aduersus homines quos uidetis saeuire in uos. Vasa sunt, alius utitur; organa sunt, alius tangit. *Immisit se*, inquit, *diabolus in cor Iudae, ut traderet Dominum.* Ait aliquis: "Quid ergo ego feci?" Audi apostolum: (PL 435) *Neque detis locum diabolo.* Tu mala uoluntate locum dedisti: intrauit, possidet, utitur. Locum non dares, non possideret.

III. **5.** Ergo nos admonens ait: *Non est uobis colluctatio aduersus carnem et sanguinem, sed aduersus principes et potestates.* Possit

60 cfr *Ps.* 17, 4 **61** cfr *Eph.* 6, 12 **62/63** cfr *Eph.* 6, 13 **63** *Eph.* 6, 12 **65/66** *Ioh.* 13, 2 **67** *Eph.* 4, 27 **69/70.** *Eph.* 6, 12

53 ergo] cfr supra, 17-21 **58** tu - liberator] cfr *en. Ps.* 68 *s.*1, 19 **60** ille] sc. psalmista: cfr infra, 92-93 **64/65** uasa - tangit] cfr *en. Ps.* 139, 4. 11; 141, 14; *Gn. litt.* 11, 22; *pat.* 10, 9; *s.* 149, 16; 301, 4; 335 D, *PLS* 2, 779 **65/68** immisit - possideret] cfr *bapt.* 5, 8; *en. Ps.* 136, 9; *Io. eu. tr.* 55, 4; *s.* 301, 4 **68** intrauit, possidet] uide adnotationes **69** ergo] cfr supra, 60

53 laudemus] semper illi gratias agere studeamus a quo gratia gratis datur cuicumque datur *add.* V^2 bis] ergo *add.* V^2 **53/54** laudamus] laudemus $V^{4a.c.}$ **54** si pie - laudamus] *om.* $P\,r$ — *uide adnotationes* accusamus] accusemus $V^{4a.c.}$ deumque] deum $V^{4p.c.}$, deum utique *maur* **54/55** quando deum laudamus tamquam] deum laudamus quando V^2 **55** tamquam - praedicamus] *om.* $r^{2a.c.}$ praedicamus] deumque laudamus *add.* V^2 autem] *om.* V^2 **56** ei] et $r\,V^{2.3}$, *om.* $V^{4a.c.}$ reuiximus] resurreximus *V edd* **57** feceris] feceritis V^2 qua] qui $V^{1.4.6}$ *am* **58** tui] *om. V edd* **59** illi r^1 **60** hinc] hunc $V^{3a.c.}$ **60/87** aduersus - credendo] *excerpsit flor* **60** aduersus] aduersos P^2, aduersarius $V^{3a.c.}$ **61** carnem] non *praem. flor* **62** quos] nos r^1 **63** armemur] armemus $P\,r^2$, ut *praem.* $V^{1.2.4.5}$ *edd* uobis] nobis *V flor edd* — *uide adnotationes* **64** uos] nos V^6, uobis *flor* **64/65** alius utitur] *tr.* $V^{3.5}$ **65** immisit] misit $V^{6a.c.}$ se] om. $V^{2.4a.c.}$ **66** ego] *om.* r^1 **66/67** audi apostolum] *om.* V^6 **67** locum diabolo] *tr.* V^6 **68** possidet] possedit *flor edd* — *uide adnotationes* locum non dares] $V^{3.6a.c.}$ *flor*, si locum non dares *P r edd*, locum non dares si V^1, locum si non dares $V^{2.4.5.6p.c.}$ — *uide adnotationes* possideret] possideres r^1 **69** uobis] nobis $V^{1.2.5.6}$ *flor edd* **70** posset V^6 *flor*

quisque putare: "aduersus reges terrae, aduersus potentes saeculi". Quare? Ipsi non 'caro et sanguis'? Simul dictum est: *Non aduersus carnem et sanguinem*: auertere itaque ab omni homine. Restant inimici: *Aduersus principes et potestates, spiritalia nequitiae, rectores mundi.* Quasi plus dedit diabolo et angelis eius; plus dedit: 'rectores mundi' appellauit. Ne male intellegas, exponit quid sit mundus cuius sunt illi rectores: *rectores mundi*, inquit, *tenebrarum harum.* Quid est 'mundi tenebrarum harum'? Quibus dilectoribus suis et infidelibus plenus est mundus, has appellat 'tenebras' apostolus. Harum rector est diabolus et angeli eius. Hae tenebrae non naturales sunt, non incommutabiles sunt: mutantur et lux efficiuntur, credunt et credendo illuminantur. Quod cum in eis factum fuerit, audient: *Fuistis enim aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino.* Nam, quando tenebrae, non in Domino; iterum, quando lux, non in te sed in Domino. *Quid enim habes quod non accepisti?* Quia ergo sunt inuisibiles inimici, inuisibi-

72/73. 74/75. 75/76. 77 *Eph.* 6, 12 **82/83** *Eph.* 5, 8 **84/85** *I Cor.* 4, 7

73/80 restant - eius] cfr *agon.* 3; *en. Ps.* 34 *s.* 1, 4; 54, 4; 76, 7; 117,4; 139, 4; 141, 14-15; 142, 16; 143, 4; *ep.* 140, 57; *Io. eu. tr.* 79, 2; *s.* 198 *auct* (=Dolbeau 26), 26; 222, col. 1091; 335 D, *PLS* 2, 779-780 **80/81** hae - efficiuntur] cfr inter alia *en. Ps.* 7, 19; 143, 6 **81/82** credendo illuminantur] cfr *ciu.* 18, 32; *en. Ps.* 143, 4; *Io. eu. tr.* 27, 7; 54, 4; qu. eu. 2, 39; util. cred. 1, 2 **83/84** nam - Domino[1]] cfr *adn. Iob* 39; *en. Ps.* 25 *s.* 2, 11; 54, 4; 65, 15; 93, 6; 103 *s.* 1, 7; 103 *s.* 2, 2; 139, 4; 143,4; *Io. eu. tr.* 2, 6.10; 22, 10; *s.* 49, 3; 182, 6; 216, 4; 258, 2; 336, 2; etc. **84** quando - Domino[2]] cfr *Io. eu. tr.* 2, 6 **85** ergo] cfr supra, 60-61. 70-73 **85/89** quia - inimicos] cfr *agon.* 2, 2; *en. Ps.* 34 *s.* 1, 2-5

71 quisquam $V^{5.6}$ potentes] potestates $V^{3.5}$ *flor maur* **72** simul] semel *V flor edd* **73** auertere] auerte *P r* $V^{6a.c.}$, aduertere V^{2} itaque] *om. V flor edd* homine] homini r^{2} restant] *coniecimus*, restanti *P* $r^{1.2a.c}$, resistanti $r^{2p.c.}$, qui ergo restant *V flor edd* **74** spiritalia nequitiae] *uide adnotationes* spiritalia] spiritalis $V^{1.3.5}$ *flor edd*, spiritales $V^{2.4.6}$ nequitiae] nequitia et *P r* **74/75** rectores - dedit[2]] *om.* V^{3} **74** rectores] quos *praem.* V^{2} **74/75** mundi] appellauit *add.* $r^{2p.c.}$ **75** dedit[2]] cum *add.* $r^{2p.c.}$ **76** ne] sed *praem. V flor edd* sunt] sint *am* **77** illi] ille $V^{6a.c.}$ inquit] *om. V flor edd* **77/78** quid - harum] *om.* r^{1} $V^{6a.c.}$ **77** quid est] quidem $r^{2a.c.}$ **78/79** quibus - rector est] *uide adnotationes* **78** quibus] qui $P^{1a.c.}$, est rector *add. V flor edd* delectoribus $r^{1.2a.c.}$ infidelibus] suis *add.* $r^{1.2a.c.}$, quibus *add.* V^{2} **79** has] hos $V^{4p.c.5}$ appellat tenebras apostolus] *tr.* appellat apostolus tenebras (tenebrarum $V^{4p.c.}$) *V flor am*, apostolus appellat tenebras *maur* harum] tenebrarum *add. P r* rector est] rectorem P^{2} *am*, rectores *V flor maur* **80** diabolus] diabolum V^{2}, diabolos V^{4} angeli] angelos $V^{2.4}$ hae] haec P^{2}, et r^{1}, e $V^{3a.c.}$, eae *flor* naturale $P^{2a.c.}$ **81** lux] lumen *am* **83/84** nam - domino[1]] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ **84** in te] iterum r^{1}, in tenebris r^{2} **85** quia] que V^{6}

liter expugnandi. Quippe hostem uisibilem uinces feriendo, inuisibilem uinces credendo. Visibilis est hostis homo, uisibile est et ferire; inuisibilis est hostis diabolus, inuisibile est et credere. Est ergo pugna inuisibilis aduersus inuisibiles inimicos.

IV. **6.** Ab his inimicis quomodo se tutum dicit quidam? Hoc enim coeperam dicere et necesse habui de istis inimicis aliquanta commemorans tractare. Iam ergo cognitis inimicis, uideamus tutelam. *Laudans inuocabo Dominum et ab inimicis meis saluus ero.* Habes quid agas. Laudans inuoca, sed Dominum laudans inuoca. Si enim te laudaueris, ab inimicis tuis saluus non eris. Laudans inuoca Dominum et ab inimicis tuis saluus eris. Quia quid ait ipse Dominus? *Sacrificium laudis glorificauit me et ibi uia est ubi ostendam illi salutare meum.* Vbi uia? In sacrificio laudis. Noli pedem extra hanc uiam mittere. In uia esto, a uia noli recedere; a laude Domini nec unguem, nedum pedem. Si enim uolueris ab hac uia deuiare et pro Domino te laudare, non eris saluus ab illis inimicis, quia de ipsis dictum est: *Iuxta semitas scandala posuerunt mihi.* Quidquid ergo putaueris boni te habere abs te, deuiasti a laude Dei. Quid iam miraris si te seducit inimicus, quando tui ipsius seductor es? Audi apostolum: *Qui enim putat se aliquid esse, cum nihil sit, se ipsum seducit.*

92/93 *Ps.* 17, 4 **96/97** *Ps.* 49, 23 **101/102** *Ps.*139,6 **104/105** *Gal.* 6, 3

90/91 hoc enim coeperam dicere] cfr supra, 60 **96/103** quia - Dei] cfr *en. Ps.* 49, 30-31; 139, 9; 141, 9; *s.* 142 *auct* (=Wilmart 11), 1-2

86 expugnandi] sunt *praem.* $r^{2p.c.}$ V^5 *flor edd* uinces] uincis *V flor edd* **86/87** inuisibilem uinces] *om.* r^1 **87** uinces] uincis r^2 *V flor edd* uisibile] uisibilis r^2 **87/88** inuisibilis] inuisibile r^1 **88** inuisibile] in uisibili/// $V^{6a.c.}$ **90** se tutum] si totum *P r*, se tuum $V^{3a.c.}$, se totum $V^{6a.c.}$ quidam] quid est V^3 **91** istis] his *am* aliquanta] aliquanto $V^{1\text{-}3.\,4a.c.\,5.\,6}$, aliquando *am* **91/92** commemorans] cum mora $V^{1\text{-}3.\,4p.c.\,5.\,6p.c.}$ *edd*, cum more $V^{4a.c.\,6a.c.}$ **93** habes] habens r^1 agas] habes $V^{3a.c.}$ **94** inuoca sed] inuocasse $r^{2a.c.}$ inuoca[1]] inuocas r^1 inuoca[2]] inuocasse $r^{2a.c.}$ **95** non] *om.* P^2 r^2 **95/105** laudans - seducit] *excerpsit flor* **95** laudans] lauda r^1 **96** quid] *del.* $V^{4p.c.}$, quod *am* ait] dixit $V^{4p.c.}$ **97** glorificauit] glorificabit $V^{1.\,2.\,5}$ *flor edd*, honorificabit V^6 ibi] ubi V^4 illi] illis *P*, eis V^3 salutare meum] salutarem meum P $r^{2a.c.}$ **98** sacrificium r^2 hanc uiam] *tr.* V^2 **98/99** a uia noli] *tr.* noli a uia *am* **99** laudem $r^{1.\,2a.c}$ domini] dei $V^{3\ in\ ras.}$ nedum] nec $r^{2p.c.}$, ne V^6 **100** uia] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ *flor* **101** illis inimicis] tr. V^1 illis] his V^6 ipsis] illis *am* semitam *V flor edd* scandalum *P* V^5 **102** mihi] *om. P* boni te] bonitate $P^{1.\,2a.c}$ $r^{2a.c.}$, *tr.* V^1 abs] a r^1 **103** mirares $P^{1a.c}$ r^1 seducet r^1 inimus $P^{1a.c.\,2}$ tui] tu *r* V^6, tu *praem.* V^2 **104** qui] cum $P^{1a.c\,2}$ *r* putat se] *tr.* V^5 aliquid esse] *tr.* $V^{2\text{-}6}$ *flor* **105** se ipsum] ipse se V^2

7. Dominum ergo attende confitentem: *Confiteor tibi,* (PL 436) *Domine, Pater, caeli et terrae.* 'Confiteor tibi': "Laudo te; laudo te, non accuso me." Quantum autem pertinet ad ipsius hominis susceptionem: tota gratia, singularis gratia, perfecta gratia. Quid meruit homo ille qui Christus est, si tollas gratiam, et tantam gratiam qua unum oportebat esse Christum et ipsum esse quem nouimus? Tolle istam gratiam: quid Christus nisi homo? quid nisi quod tu? Suscepit animam, suscepit corpus, suscepit plenum hominem: coaptat sibi, unam facit dominus cum seruo personam. Quanta ista gratia? Christus in caelo, Christus in terra; simul Christus et in caelo et in terra; nec duo Christi sed idem Christus et in caelo et in terra. Christus apud Patrem, Christus in utero uirginis; Christus in cruce, Christus apud inferos subueniens quibusdam, eo autem ipso die in paradiso cum latrone

106/107 *Luc.* 10, 21 **118/119** cfr *Luc.* 23, 41-42

108/113 quantum - hominem] cfr *correct.* 11, 30; *en. Ps.* 108, 23; *ench.* 11, 36; 28, 108; *ep.* 177, 16. 187, 40; *en. Ps.* 108, 23; *Io. eu. tr.* 74, 3; 82, 4; *c. Iul. imp.* 4, 84; *pecc. mer.* 2, 17, 27; *praed. sanct.* 15, 30-31; *s.* 174, 2; 185, 3; *trin.* 13, 22. 15, 26 (V. BAVEL, *Recherches*, p. 37-41; BERROUARD, *BA* 74A, p. 456-458; HOMBERT, *Gloria*, p. 491-497) **113/114** coaptat - personam] cfr *corrept.*, col. 934; *en. Ps.* 40, 2; 67, 23; 88 *s.* 2, 3; *ench.* 11; *ep.* 137, 3; 140, 4; 169, 2; 187, 3. 13; *Io eu tr.* 19, 15; 27, 4; 49, 18; 53, 3; 69, 3; 99, 1; 107, 5; 108, 5; 110, 6; *c. Iul. imp.* 4, col. 1386; *c. Max.* 1, col. 756; 2, col. 765. 789; *pecc. mer.* 1, 31, 60; *perseu.*, col. 1033; *s.* 91, 3; 130, 3; 265 B, 2; 293, 7; 294, 9; *c. s. Arrian.*, col. 688. 690; *trin.* 13, 17. 19. 15, 26 (V. BAVEL, *Recherches*, p. 20-26; DROBNER, *Person-Exegese*, p. 252. 255. 258) **114/115** Christus - terra[2]] cfr *ep.* 187, 4; *Io. eu. tr.* 27, 4; 31, 9; 36, 8; 78, 3; *pecc. mer.* 1, 31, 60; *s.* 28,4; 132 A, 1; 177, 13; 184, 1; 202, 2; 294, 9; etc. **115/116** nec duo Christi] cfr *ep.* 140, 4; 169, 2; *Io. eu. tr.* 27, 4; 78, 3; 99, 1; *perseu.* 24, 67; *s.* 130, 3; 186, 1; 242, 6; 261, 7; *c. s. Arrian.* col. 688 (BERROUARD, *BA* 74A, p. 468) **116/117** Christus[2] - uirginis] cfr *diu. qu.* 42; *s.* 341 *auct.* (=Dolbeau 22), 8 **117/118** Christus[3] - quibusdam] cfr *adn. Iob* 38; *ciu.* 17, 11; 20, 15; *en. Ps.* 48, *s.* 2, 5; 85, 17-18; 87, 10; *ep.* 164, 1-5; 187, 2; *c. Faust.* 12, 35; *Gn. litt.* 12, 33-34; *Io. eu. tr.* 111, 2; *c. Iul. imp.* 6, col. 1523. 1553. 1582; *s.* 53 A, 13; 198 *auct.*, 49; 265, 2; 265 A, 1; 285, 2; 335 C, *PLS* 2, 754 (R. GOUNELLE, *La descente du Christ aux Enfers*, Coll. Ét. Aug. Ant. 162, Paris 2000, p. 401-402. 450)

106 confitebor r^{1} **106/107** domine pater] *tr. V maur* **107** terra *P* laudo te] *semel scr. P r* V^{2-5} **108** homines $r^{1.\ 2a.c}$ **109** gratia[2]] *om.* r^{1} quid] quod *P r* **110** tollas] tollis V^{6} qua] quia *am* **111/112** istam gratiam] *tr. edd* **112** quid[1]] qui r^{1} tu] ut *P r* **113** unam] et *praem. P r* **114** dominus cum seruo] *tr.* c. s. d. V^{1} **115** simul] semel *P r* et[1]] *om.* P^{2} $V^{6a.c.}$ **115/116** nec - terra] *om.* $r^{1.\ 2a.c}$ **115** nec] haec $r^{2p.c.}$ **116** et[1]] *om.* V^{5} *am* **117** crucem *P r* apud] ab V^{3}, ad $V^{4a.c.,ut\ uid.}$ **118** eo] ego r^{1}, ea *maur* ipsa V^{4} *maur* die] christus *add. V edd*

confitente. Et ibi latro quid meruit, nisi quia illam uiam tenuit ubi ostendit salutare suum? A qua tibi pes non exeat! In eo enim quod se accusauit, Deum laudauit; et uitam suam beatam praesumpsit quidem a Domino, et ait illi: *Domine, memento mei, cum ueneris in regno tuo*: considerabat enim facinora sua, et pro magno habebat si ei uel in fine parceretur. Dominus autem continuo, cum ille diceret: *Memento mei* – sed quando? *cum ueneris in regno tuo* – : *Amen dico tibi, hodie mecum eris in paradiso.* Misericordia obtulit quod miseria distulit.

V. **8.** Audi ergo Dominum confitentem: *Confiteor tibi, Pater.* Quid? In quo te laudo? Haec enim confessio, ut diximus, laudem habet: *Qui abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus et reuelasti ea paruulis.* Quid est hoc, fratres? A contrario sensu intellegite. *Abscondisti*, inquit, *haec a sapientibus et prudentibus*, et non dixit: "reuelasti ea stultis et imprudentibus", sed ait: *abscondisti* quidem *a sapientibus et prudentibus, et reuelasti ea paruulis*. Sapientibus et prudentibus irridendis arrogantibus, falso grandibus, uere autem tumentibus, opposuit non-sapientes non-prudentes, sed paruulos. Qui sunt paruuli? Humiles. Ergo,

119/120 cfr *Ps.* 49, 23 **122/123. 124/125** *Luc.* 23, 42 **125/126** *Luc.* 23, 43 **127. 128/129. 130/131. 132/133.** *Luc.* 10, 21

119/126 et - paradiso] cfr *an. et or.* 1, 9, 11; *bapt.* 2, 1, 2; 4, 22, 29; *en. Ps.* 34 *s.*1, 14; 39, 15; 55, 12; *Io. eu. tr.* 9, 4; 109, 4; 111, 2; *c. Iul.* 6, col. 848; *s.* 53 A, 13; 111 *auct.* (= Lambot 18), 2; 232, 6; 234, 2; 285, 2; 327, 2; 328 *auct.* (= Lambot 13), *RBén* 51 (1939) 19; 331, 2; 335 C, *PLS* 2, 754; *Simpl.* 1, 2, 19 **126** misericordia - distulit] cfr *en. Ps.* 39, 15; *s.* 285, 2; 327, 2; 335 C, *PLS* 2, 754 **127** audi ergo Dominum confitentem] cfr supra, 3-21 **128** ut diximus] cfr supra, 17-21 **134** grandibus ... tumentibus] uide adnotationes **135** qui sunt paruuli? humiles] *en. Ps.* 18 *s.*1, 8; 118 *s.* 27, 3; *ep.* 140, 24; *c. Iul. imp.* 6, col. 1523; *s.* 29, 2; 68 *auct.*, 7

119 confitentem *P r* ibi] *in ras.* $r^{2p.c.}$ metuit V^3 uia r^1 **119/120** ostendit] deus *add. P r* **120** qua] quo *P r* pes ... exeat] pedes ... exeant V^4 enim] *om.* V^6 **121** beatam] fecit *add.* $V^{2.4}$ *maur* quidem] quidam r^1, quid est V^3 **122** et] sed *P r* — *uide adnotationes* cum] dum V^5 *am* **122/123** regnum tuum $r^{2p.c.}$ *V edd* **125** regnum tuum $r^{2p.c.}$ *V edd* amen] inquit *add. edd* tibi] inquit *add.* V^2 **126** misericordiam r^2 miseria] misericordiam r^2, misericordia $V^{4a.c.,ut\ uid.}$ **127** pater] domine *praem.* V^2 *am*, domine caeli et terrae V^4, domine caeli et terrae *add.* $V^{1.3.5.6p.c.}$ *maur*, caeli et terrae *add.* $V^{2.6a.c.}$ *am* quid] *del.* $P^{2p.c.}$, confiteor *add. V edd* **128** diximus] dixi *V edd* qui] quia P^2 $V^{5.6p.c.}$ *maur* **129** abscondisti] absconditi $V^{3a.c.}$ sapientibus et prudentibus] *tr. am* **130** quid est] quidem r^1 intellegite] intellege *am* **130/131** inquit haec a sapientibus] *tr.* h. a s. i. V^6 inquit haec] *tr.* V^{1-5} *edd* **132** imprudentibus] prudentibus r^1 quidam V^3 **132/133** et prudentibus] *om.* V^5 **133** et[1]] *om. r* ea] *om.* V^{2-5}, *del.* $V^{6p.c.}$ **134/137** grandibus - intellegi] *uide adnotationes* **134** grandibus] gradibus *P* timentibus $V^{3a.c.}$ **134/135** sapientes] insipientes *maur* **135** prudentes] imprudentes *maur*

abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus. Nomine sapientium et prudentium superbos intellegi ipse exposuit, cum ait: *reuelasti ea paruulis*. Ergo, "abscondisti non-paruulis". Quid est 'non-paruulis'? Non-humilibus. Quid est 'non-humilibus' nisi superbis? O uia Domini! Aut non erat, aut latebat ut reueletur nobis unde Dominus exsultauit. Quia reuelatum est paruulis, debemus esse paruuli; nam, si uoluerimus esse magni, quasi sapientes et prudentes, non nobis illud reuelatur. Qui sunt magni? Sapientes et prudentes. *Dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt.* Habes remedium a contrario. Si dicendo te esse sapientem stultus factus es, dic te stul-(PL 437)-tum et sapiens eris. Sed dic, dic et intus dic, quia sic est, ut dicis. Si dicis, noli coram hominibus dicere et coram Deo non dicere. Prorsus, quod ad te ipsum pertinet, quod ad tua, tenebrosus es. Quid est enim aliud esse stultum nisi esse tenebrosum in corde? Denique de illis sic ait: *Dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt*. Antequam hoc diceret, quid sursum? *Et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum*. Dic quia tu tibi lumen non es. Vt multum, oculus es, lumen non es. Quid prodest patens et sanus oculus, si lumen desit? Ergo dic a te tibi lumen non esse et clama quod scrip-

136. 137/138 *Luc.* 10, 21 **139/140** cfr *Ps.* 49, 23 **140/141** cfr *Luc.* 10, 21
143/144. 149/150 *Rom.* 1, 22 **150/151** *Rom.* 1, 21

139/140 o uia Domini] uide adnotationes **140/141** unde Dominus exsultauit] cfr supra, 109-119 **144/145** si - eris] cfr *en. Ps.* 126, 4 **148** tenebrosus] uide adnotationes **151/153** dic - desit] cfr *en. Ps.* 143, 4; *gest. Pel.* 3, 7; *Io. eu. tr.* 2, 6; 14, 1; 19, 11; 22, 10; 35, 3; 48, 6; *s.* 159 B, 6; 360 B, 10; 360 F, 5

137 superbos] superbus $V^{1\text{-}5}$ *am* intellegi] *maur*, intellege $V^{6a.c.}$, uoluit *add. P r*, potest *add.* $V^{1\text{-}5.\,6p.c.}$ *am* **138** ergo - paruulis[1]] *om.* $P^{1a.c}$ quid est] quidem $r^{1.\,2a.c}$ **139** quid est non humilibus] *om.* r^{1} quid] qui r^{2} non[2]] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ superbis] superbos r^{1}, non *praem.* V^{4} **139/157** o uia - te[1]] *excerpsit flor* **139/140** o uia domini aut non erat aut latebat] petamus *P r — uide adnotationes* **140** reuelaretur *maur* nobis] et *praem. P r* **140/141** exsultauit] exultabat $V^{2.\,3.\,5}$ **141** quia] nisi *praem. am* **142/143** non - prudentes] *om.* P^{2} **143** magni] et *add.* P^{1} *r* **143/144** dicentes - sapientes] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ *flor* **143** dicentes] *add.* enim $V^{4p.c.}$ esse] *om.* r^{1} **144** habes ... te] habet ... se *P r — uide adnotationes* **145** sapientem] *om.* $P^{1a.c\,2}$ *r* es] est *P r* te] om. *P r* **146** sed dic] *del.* $P^{2p.c.}$ sed] sic *am* dic[2]] *om.* r^{1} **146/147** noli coram hominibus] *tr.* coram hominibus noli *am* **147** ad] a $V^{6a.c.}$ **147/149** quod - tenebrosum] *uide adnotationes* **147** te ipsum] temetipsum V^{5} **148** quod ad tua tenebrosus es] stultus es quod ad (a $r^{2p.c.}$) te ipsum pertinet (quod - pertinet *om.* $r^{2a.c.}$) etsi abhorret *P r* **149** tenebrosum] insipientem *P r* de illis sic] *tr.* s. d. i V^{1} **150** dicerent *V flor edd* rursum $V^{2.\,4.\,6a.c.}$ *maur* et] *om. P r* **151** eorum] *om.* am quia tu tibi] qui tu $r^{1a.c.}$ **152** oculus[1]] oculos $P^{1a.c}$ $r^{1.\,2a.c}$ $V^{1a.c.}$ non es quid] numquid *P r* patiens $P^{1a.c\,2}$ *r* **153** dic a te tibi] dic tibi *(inter* dic *et* tibi *duabus uel tribus litt. erasis)* P^{1}, dicit tibi *(-it in ras.* r^{2}*)* P^{2} *r*, dic et ibi $V^{2\text{-}4p.c.}$, dicat et ibi *(*ibi *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$*)* $V^{4a.c.\,6}$

tum est: *Tu illuminabis lucernam meam, Domine*; lumine tuo, Domine, *illuminabis tenebras meas*. Meae enim nihil nisi tenebrae; tu autem lumen fugans tenebras, illuminans me; non a me mihi lumen exsistens sed lumen non participans nisi in te et ex te.

9. Sic et Iohannes, amicus sponsi, Christus putabatur, lumen putabatur. *Non erat ille lumen, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat* autem *lumen uerum*. Quod est uerum? *Quod illuminat omnem hominem.* Si lumen uerum quod illuminat omnem hominem, ergo et Iohannem recte dicentem, recte confitentem. *Nos* autem *de plenitudine eius accepimus*: uide si aliquid dixit quam: *Tu illuminabis lucernam meam, Domine*. Denique iam illuminatus testimonium perhibebat; propter caecos lucerna diei testimonium perhibebat. Vide quia lucerna est: *Vos*, inquit, *misistis ad Iohannem et uoluistis exsultare ad horam in lumine eius: ille erat lucerna ardens et lucens*. Ille 'lucerna', hoc est: res illuminata, accensa ut luceret. Quae accendi potest, potest et exstingui; sed, ut non exstinguatur, uentum superbiae non patiatur. Ergo *confiteor tibi, Domine, Pater, caeli et terrae, qui abs-*

154/155 *Ps.* 17, 29 **158** cfr *Ioh.* 3, 29 **159** *Ioh.* 1, 8 **160/161** *Ioh.* 1, 9 **162/163** *Ioh.* 1, 16 **163/164** *Ps.* 17, 29 **166/167** *Ioh.* 5, 33. 35 **170/171** *Luc.* 10, 21

155/157 meae - te[2]] cfr *ciu.* 10, 2; *conf.* 9, 4; *ep.* 140, 3; *f. et symb.* 4, 6; *Io. eu. tr.* 22, 10; 48, 10; *s.* 183, 5; 198 *auct.*, 24; 379 *auct.* (=Lambot 20), 6; *spir. et litt.* 7, 11; *trin.* 14, 12; etc. **159/162** non - Iohannem] cfr *ep.* 140, 3; *Io. eu. tr.* 2, 6-7; 14, 2; *s.* 342, 2; 379 *auct.*, 5-6; 380, 7 **165** propter - perhibebat] cfr *Io. eu. tr.* 2, 6-9; 35, 6. 8; *s.* 128, 1; 293, 4; 308 A, 1; 342, 2; 379 *auct.*, 5 **168/170** quae - patiatur] cfr *en. Ps.* 88, *s.* 1, 13. 17; *ep.* 140, 3; *Io. eu. tr.* 23, 3; *s.* 66, 1; 133, 6; 166, 4; 182, 5; 287, 3; 289, 4; 290, 1; 292, 4; 293, 3; 293 D, 1; 342, 2; 379 *auct.*, 6; 380, 7

154/155 lumine tuo domine] *om. P r* **155** meae] me r^2, mea V^2 enim] *del.* $P^{1p.c.}$, *om.* P^2 **156** illuminans] illumina V^5 a me] *om. am* a] *om. P r* mihi] nihil V^6 **157** et ex te] *om. V flor edd — uide adnotationes* **158** sic] sicut P^2 r^2 et iohannes] *tr. am* iohannis $P^{1a.c\,2}$ christus] christi V^3 **158/159** lumen putabatur] *om.* V^3 **159** lumine] quod autem erat lumen *add. V edd* **160** erat - uerum[1]] *uide adnotationes* **160** autem] *om. V edd* quod[1]] quid *V edd* illuminat omnem] illuminationem r^1 **161** lumen uerum] *tr. V edd* et] *om.* $r^{2a.c.}$ V^6 **162** iohanne ... dicente ... confitente r^2 **162/163** plenitudinem P^2 r^1 **163** uide si] uides V^6 aliquid] aliud $P^{1p.c.}$ *V edd — uide adnotationes* dixit] *om.* r^1 quam tu] quantum $V^{3a.c.}$ **165** propter caecos lucerna] uide quia lucerna est r^1 caecos] cetos $P^{1a.c}$, coetus $V^{3a.c.}$ **166** uos] uox r^1 **167** et lucens] *bis scr.* r^1 **168/169** potest] *semel scr.* r^2 **169** et] *om. am* **170** confiteor - terrae] *tr.* tibi pater domine caeli et terrae confiteor $V^{6a.c.}$ domine pater] *tr.* $P^{1p.c.2}$ $r^{1.\,2p.c}$ $V^{1\text{-}3.\,4p.c.(cf.infra)\,5.\,6p.c.(cf.supra)}$ *maur* pater] *om.* $V^{4a.c.}$ **170/173** qui - potuerunt] *uide adnotationes* **170** qui] *om. P* $r^{1.\,2a.c.}$

condisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus, lumen se putantibus, et tenebrae erant; et eo quod tenebrae erant et lumen se putabant, nec illuminari potuerunt. Illi autem qui tenebrae erant et tenebras se esse confitebantur, paruuli erant, non magni; humiles erant, non superbi. Recte ergo dicebant: *Tu illuminabis lucernam meam, Domine*. Se 175
agnoscebant, Dominum laudabant, a uia salutari non recedebant. Laudantes Dominum inuocabant et ab inimicis suis salui erant.

10. Conuersi ad Dominum ...

175 *Ps.* 17, 29 **177** cfr *Ps.* 17, 4

171/172 putantibus ... eo] putabant ... lugeo *P r* **172** quod] quo r^2 V^6 **172/173** illuminare *r* V^3 **173** potuerunt] meruerunt *P* r^1, meruerant r^2, poterant $V^{6a.c.}$, potuerant *am* tenebras] tenebrae r^2 se] *om.* $r^{1.\,2a.c}$ **174** erant[2]] *om.* $V^{6a.c.}$ **175** illuminabis] humiliabis V^6 **176** agnoscebant] accusabant *P r* — *uide adnotationes* dominum] deum *P r* salutaris r^2 **177** dominum] deum *P r* **178** conuersi ad dominum] amen *P*, amen explicit r^1, explicit deo gratias amen r^2, explicit V^1, explicit sermo sancti augustini .viii. (tr. .viii. sermo - augustini V^5) *add.* $V^{3\text{-}5}$, ORATIO SANCTI AUGUSTINI FINITIS SERMONIBUS *praem.* V^6, deum patrem omnipotentem. puro corde ei quantum potest paruitas uestra (nostra *maur*). maximas atque uberes (uberas $V^{6a.c.}$) gratias agamus. precantes toto animo singularem mansuetudinem eius. ut preces nostras in beneplacito suo exaudire dignetur. inimicum a nostris actibus et cogitationibus sua uirtute expellat nobis (nobis *del.* $V^{6p.c.}$). multiplicet fidem. gubernet mentem. spiritales cogitationes concedat. et ad beatitudinem suam perducat. per iesum christum filium eius. amen *add.* V^6 *maur — uide adnotationes*.

Notes complémentaires (*«adnotationes»*)

1-2: En appliquant les observations et les recommandations de F. DOLBEAU, 'Les titres des sermons d'Augustin', dans *Titres et articulations du texte dans les œuvres antiques. Actes du colloque international de Chantilly, déc. 1994* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Antiquité 152), Paris 1997, p. 447-468 (spéc. p. 449. 451-452. 456. 460), nous empruntons notre titre de ce sermon à la tradition *Π*, les rubriques de celle-ci ayant conservé des éléments très anciens comme le terme générique *tractatus* (*ss.* 192. 300) et certaines indications de lieu (*habitus in basilica Fausti*: *s.* 296) et de date festive ou fériale (*in Theophania*: *s.* 52; *habitus die dominica*: s. 87). Les titres de la collection *V* ont été rédigés ou pour le moins adaptés par le compilateur médiéval; d'où la mention de l'évangile de Matthieu dans la rubrique *V* du *s.* 67, bien que ce soit le récit de Luc qui forme la base du sermon. – La succession *Domine Pater* dans le texte biblique *Luc* 10, 21 du titre ancien de notre sermon (*Π*) et de l'un de nos témoins du titre médiéval (V^5), réapparaît dans la version *Π* des ll. 106-107 et 170, comme dans le sermon 24, l. 112 (ed.Lambot; tous les mss du *s.* 24 reposent sur *Π*). *Π* et *V* lisent *Pater Domine* à la l. 4 du *s.* 67, et c'est dans cet ordre que les noms *Pater* et *Domine* de *Luc* 10, 21 et *Matth.* 11, 25 sont cités le plus souvent dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre augustinienne (voir P. TOMBEUR, CLCLT-5, Turnhout 2002, 'domine pater c*eli' et 'pater domine c*eli'), ce qui ne nous autorise toutefois pas à normaliser le titre ou les ll. 106-107 et 170.

6: Voir, à propos de *hōc* = *hūc*: R.KÜHNER-F.HOLZWEISSIG, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, I, Hanovre 1912², § 227 b, p. 1020; *ThLL* VI, 3 (1936-1942) 3072, 73-76. 3074, 1-3. Il est certain qu'Augustin a écrit ou prononcé *hōc usque* («jusqu'à maintenant» ou «jusqu'à ce point») dans *Gn. litt.* 4, 33 et 12, 11; *en. Ps.* 129, 10; *s.* 110 p. 642,18 et *s.* 229 L p. 487, 24 Morin; *ciu.* 15, 17 et 18, 54 (CLCLT-5, 'hoc usque', parmi des passages moins sûrs et d'autres où la jonction de *hoc* et de *usque* est fortuite).

10-11: Les leçons *Π* dans *uerbum sonuit ore* (ore *om.* V^{1-5}, *praem.* in V^6) *lectoris* et *sonitus* (sonus *V*) *tunsionis pectoris uestri* semblent être confirmés par trois textes traitant ce même sujet: *en. Ps.* 117, 1 *nam ubi hoc uerbum* lectoris ore *sonuerit, continuo strepitus pius pectora tundentium consequitur*; *s.* 29 B, 2 (F. DOLBEAU, *Vingt-six sermons...*, p. 24, 25) ... *ut prope semper, quando* ore lectoris *auditur 'confitemini', continuo pectora tundantur*; *s.* 332, 4 *uidi in* sonitu, *uidi in pectoribus uestris, quando tutudistis pectora uestra.*

18: Le génitif attributif dans *non solius est peccatoris*, reprenant la substance des ll. 7-9 (*inuenimus ... non semper, cum in scripturis legimus 'confessionem', debere nos intellegere uocem peccatoris*), rend superflue une nouvelle mention du terme *confessio* comme sujet de la phrase, d'autant plus que la notion de *confessio* vient d'être actualisée par *si 'confiteor' Christus dixit* (l. 17). La divergence entre *Π*, qui explicite le sujet, et *V*, où

il est sous-entendu, semble donc être due à une intervention de la source π, ou à un glossateur de la collection *Π*.

22: En optant pour la deuxième personne *cogitas* (au lieu de *cogitemus V*) et pour le pronom *illius* (pro: *ipsius V*), *Π* s'est conformé à *reprehendis*, *laudas* et *illum* (ll. 20-21). Une évolution inverse (*V* recherchant l'asymétrie) se conçoit difficilement: nous écrivons donc *cogitemus* et *ipsius*.

24: Doit-on choisir *ex mortuis* (*Π*) ou *ex mortuo* (*V*)? Cette fois, c'est de la leçon *V* que l'on trouve un équivalent dans le contexte: *a mortuo quasi qui non sit perit confessio* (*Eccl.* 17, 36: l.25). Ajoutons que la phrase en question, *ex mortuo/mortuis uiuus factus*, ne se rapporte pas à la condition du *mortuus* décrite par l'Ecclésiaste – s'il en était ainsi, l'expression *ex mortuo* serait motivée –, mais à la résurrection spirituelle (la délivrance par la grâce) qui fera l'objet des ll. 26 sqq.; or, chez Augustin, comme dans la Bible, *ex mortuis* fait partie de la formule usuelle pour indiquer le retour de la mort (morale ou physique) à la vie (CLCLT-5, 'ex mortuis': 56 textes d'Augustin, contre un seul texte *ex mortuo uiuum* dans *pecc. mer.* 1, 6; dans ce dernier passage, l'expression *ex mortuo* se trouve en position symétrique avec *ex mortali immortale*, ce qui peut avoir amené l'emploi du singulier).

34-38: La tradition *V* a modifié la syntaxe des ll. 34-36 en y insérant *est* (l. 34) après avoir omis ou supprimé *ut* (l. 35). Dans la phrase suivante (l. 36), c'est plutôt la version *Π* qui est secondaire, ayant ajouté deux *est* inutiles. Il y a une nouvelle divergence entre les deux traditions dans les ll. 36-38: faut-il lire *quisquis (...) mole consuetudinis malae uitae (...) alte premitur* (*Π*) ou *quisquis (...) malae consuetudinis, malae uitae (...) mole premitur* (*V*)? La version *V* pouvant s'expliquer comme une simplification de *mole consuetudinis malae uitae*, et cette dernière construction étant confirmée par des textes tels que *de consuetudine carnalis uitae* (*ep.* 147, 17) et *suae malae conuersationis consuetudo* (*c. Iul.* 2, col.676) (voir CLCLT-5, 'consuetud* /3 mal*' et 'consuetud* /3 uitae'), nous donnons la préférence à la leçon *Π*. C'est probablement pour éviter d'employer deux fois la combinaison *malae consuetudinis* que *V* a supprimé *malae* à la l. 35.

41: L'ablatif du féminin *remota* étant attesté solidement dans *Π*, soulignons le genre marqué du mot *lapis* dans ce contexte, où il désigne la pierre tombale. Voir, pour *lapis* fém., *ThLL* VII, 2 (1956-1979) 948, 60-77.

46: Seuls r^{1} et $r^{2a.c.}$ ont conservé ici *prode est*, une leçon dont l'authenticité est garantie par 13 autres *sententiae* augustiniennes du CLCLT-5, parmi lesquelles nous signalons *Nam et daemones credunt (...), non est autem prode illis* (ms. MONTECASS. 17; *non autem prodest illis* ms. NAPLES *B. N.* Vienn. lat. 14) *quia credunt* (s. 16 A, p. 228 l. 387 Lambot). Voir, au sujet de cette tmèse assez courante dans le latin de l'Antiquité tardive, E. LOEFSTEDT, *Syntactica* II, Lund 1933, p. 402-403 n. 2 et *Late Latin*, Oslo 1959, p. 175;

M. LEUMANN, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre* (Handb. d. Alt.-Wiss. II, 2, 1), Munich 1977, p. 271. 562; *ThLL* X, 2 (1996) 1594.

47-48: Le compilateur de la collection *V*, ou sa source, a calqué le texte sur celui des ll. 50-51: *Quid ergo ecclesia, cui dictum est ...* .

48: Bien que nous accordions en principe plus de crédit à *Π* qu'à *V* lorsque ces deux traditions sont en désaccord au sujet du texte biblique, nous faisons une exception pour la leçon *in terra*, que nous lisons dans tous nos témoins *V*. Si nous faisons abstraction du *s.* 67, Augustin cite *Matth.* 18, 18 trente-trois fois dans ses homélies et ses écrits. *In terra* y prédomine fortement (28 textes) sur la leçon *super terram*, qui correspond à celle de la Vulgate (CLCLT-5 'solu* /5 terr*'). *Π* peut avoir emprunté sa variante *super terram* à la traduction hiëronymienne; d'autre part, il nous semble peu probable que le compilateur de la collection *V* ait reconstitué une leçon de la *Vetus Latina* si elle ne se trouvait pas dans sa source.

49: Les combinaisons *cum uinculis*, *cum catenis*, *cum fasciis* ne signifiant jamais 'ligoté' ou 'enchaîné' ou 'entouré d'un bandage' chez Augustin (CLCLT-5, q.v.; dix-sept fois *in uinculis* et deux fois *in catenis*), c'est à bon droit que *Π* écrit *cum in uinculis prodiit*.

54: Les moines de Saint-Maur ont révisé la phrase *si pie nos accusamus Deumque laudamus*. Telle qu'elle est transmise dans la tradition *V*, elle se joint aux mots *bis Deum laudamus* précédés à leur tour de la double proposition adverbiale *siue nos accusemus siue Deum laudemus* (l. 53). Il s'agit donc d'une nouvelle phrase conditionnelle dépendant de la même principale, et les Mauristes la considéraient comme inutile: tandis que *si pie nos accusamus* comporte encore une précision à l'égard de *siue nos accusemus*, ils voyaient dans *Deumque laudamus* une répétition pure et simple de *siue Deum laudemus*. Ils ont donc remplacé *–que* par *utique* et traité *Deum laudamus* comme une proposition indépendante. Nous nous demandons toutefois s'ils n'ont pas soulevé un faux problème. Pourquoi l'adverbe *pie* ne déterminerait-il pas *Deum laudamus* et *nos accusamus* à la fois? Le prédicateur a souligné plus haut – et c'était nécessaire, car l'assistance s'était trompée sur la portée du *confiteor* du Christ – que la louange de Dieu est *pia* si elle ne doute pas de l'impeccabilité divine (ll. 19-21); cette idée, il la reprend maintenant par les mots *si pie (...) Deum laudamus* (l. 54), et il la précisera ensuite: *quando Deum laudamus, tamquam eum qui sine peccato est praedicamus* (ll. 54-55). Le devoir de la *pia accusatio sui* – l'autre thème des ll. 3 à 59 –, défini comme *te reprehendis qui non es sine peccato* (l. 20) et repris dans *si pie nos accusamus* (l. 54), sera associé finalement à la *laus Dei*: *quando autem nos ipsos accusamus, ei per quem reuiximus gloriam damus* (ll. 55-56). Loin donc d'être inutile, notre petite phrase, telle qu'elle a été transmise dans la collection *V*, fait partie intégrante de la transition entre le corps et la conclusion du premier tiers du *s.* 67. Elle manque dans la

tradition *Π*, ce qui s'explique comme une omission par saut du même au même (car la proposition précédente se termine elle aussi par le mot *laudamus*), ou par une tendance à éliminer des passages censés être redondants (voir *infra*, ll. 139-140 et l. 178).

63. 69: En qualifiant *Eph.* 6, 12 comme un appel (l. 62: *hortatur*) et comme un avertissement (l. 69: *admonens*), le commentaire fourni par Augustin garantit la leçon *uobis* (*Π*); dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre augustinienne, cette leçon de *Eph.* 6, 12 est un peu moins fréquente que *nobis*, qu'on y trouve 19 fois, mais elle y est néanmoins présentée 11 fois comme citation littérale (*ait apostolus* etc.), sans compter le *s.* 67 (CLCLT-5, '*obis co*luctatio').

68: La tradition *Π* reproduisant parfois mieux que *V* l'orthographe et les finesses phonétiques de l'archétype, nous écrivons comme elle *possidet*. Le *s.* 32, 11 fournit une paraphrase de *Eph.* 4, 27 combinant également *intrare* et *possidēre*: *ibi enim uoluit ostendere apostolus, quia quamuis intret et* possideat *diabolus, homo illi tamen locum dedit ut posset intrare* (p. 404 l. 221 Lambot). On pourrait toutefois citer deux autres passages décrivant l'intervention du diable et dans lesquels c'est le verbe *possīdĕre* qui est joint à *intrare*: *si intrauit et* possedit, *attende quia tu neglegenter clausisti* (*en. Ps.* 141, 3) et *intrauit ergo post hunc panem Satanas in Domini traditorem, ut sibi iam traditum plenius* possideret, *in quem prius intrauerat ut deciperet* (*Io. eu. tr.* 62, 2: le parallélisme syntaxique avec decipĕret prouve qu'il faut lire possidĕret) (cfr. CLCLT-5, 'intra* /10 poss*d*' et 'locum diabolo').

68: Au sujet de la parataxe grammaticale remplaçant la proposition conditionnelle dans la langue familière, voir A. ERNOUT-F. THOMAS, *Syntaxe latine*, Paris 1953, p. 386 et J. B. HOFMANN-A. SZANTYR, *Lateinische Syntaxis und Stilistik* (Handb. d. Alt.-Wiss. II, 2, 2), Munich 1965, p. 656-657.

74: Les Mauristes, n'ayant trouvé dans leurs mss. du *s.* 67 (qui appartenaient tous à la tradition *V*) que les leçons *spiritales nequitiae* et *spiritalis nequitiae*, ont opté pour la seconde; mais partout où Augustin cite ou paraphrase ce passage de *Eph.* 6, 12, il écrit *spiritalia nequitiae* (CLCLT-5, 'spirit*al* /5 nequiti*': 31 *sententiae*, le *s.* 67 non inclus); les deux passages qui s'écartent de la règle, *ep.* 228,7 *timeamus ne oues Christi spiritalis nequitiae gladio ... trucidentur* et *ciu.* 14,11 *per angelicam praesentiam ... spiritali nequitia sibi subiecto*, sont de libres adaptations.

78-79: À propos de *aduersus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum* (*Eph.* 6, 12), Augustin pose la question quel est ce «monde de ces ténèbres». Voici sa réponse d'après la version *Π*: *Quibus dilectoribus suis et infidelibus plenus est mundus, has appellat 'tenebras' apostolus.* La phrase que nous venons de citer est complexe, l'objet direct de *appellat*, c.-à-d. *dilectores suos (=rectorum) et infideles*, étant enclavé dans la proposition relative. L'autre tradition (*V*) dépend d'une source dans laquelle un réviseur s'était mis à décomposer

la phrase en deux propositions indépendantes; après le relatif *quibus*, attaché désormais à la phrase précédente *Quid est 'mundi tenebrarum harum'?*, le réviseur ajouta *est rector*. Mais ce nom interpolé, '*rector*', d'où venait-il? *Π* à lui seul a la leçon *rector* au singulier au début de la phrase suivante (l. 79), *Harum rector est* (*rectorem* P^2, *rectores V*) *diabolus et angeli eius*, la copule et l'attribut s'y accordant avec le sujet le plus proche; partout ailleurs dans le contexte (ll. 74. 75. 77), nous lisons le pluriel *rectores* dans *Π* comme dans *V*. Attestant l'emploi du mot au singulier dans sa source, cette interpolation de *V* garantit l'ancienneté de la leçon *Π* '*rector*' de la l. 79.

122: La combinaison *quidem ... et* (*V*, tandis que *Π* écrit *sed*) réapparaîtra aux ll. 132-133 dans les deux traditions.

134: *Grandibus* est authentique: l'adage que le *tumor* de l'orgueil n'est pas la véritable *granditas* réapparaît dans *conf.* 3, 5 *ego dedignabar esse paruulus, et turgidus fastu mihi grandis uidebar* et *s.* 198 *auct.*, 10 *aliud est granditas, aliud tumor: nam et quod tumet quasi grande apparet, sed sanum non est*; voir aussi les textes cités par F. DOLBEAU dans *Vingt-six sermons...*, p. 374. Le *-n-* était omis ou illisible dans l'archétype, ce qui a donné la variante *gradibus* (*P*) et la conjecture *gradientibus* (dans certains mss. *V* de moindre importance); mais la plupart des mss. *Π* et *V* ont reconstitué la leçon primitive, celle-ci étant à portée de la main.

134-135: Les Mauristes ont amendé cette paraphrase des paroles du Christ comme suit: *Sapientibus et prudentibus irridendis (...) opposuit non insipientes* (*sapientes* mss.), *non imprudentes* (*prudentes* mss.), *sed paruulos*, «se moquant des sages et des avisés (...), le Christ ne leur opposait pas les déraisonnables ou les étourdis, mais les humbles». Cette conjecture est démentie par la suite de ce même paragraphe, où le prédicateur recommande à l'auditoire d'assumer pleinement l'ignorance humaine: *dic te stultum (...) quia sic est ut dicis* (ll. 145-146). Or, si l'humble est un *stultus* qui est conscient d'être *stultus*, il n'y a pas d'incompatibilité entre *non sapientes* et *non prudentes* d'une part, *paruuli* de l'autre. *Sed* s'avère être la clef de l'interprétation correcte du texte, marquant dans ce contexte une restriction («mais tout au moins»), non l'opposition pure et simple («mais au contraire»); quant aux deux *non*, ils ne se rapportent qu'aux éléments *sapientes* et *prudentes*, la phrase restant affirmative: «(...) il leur opposait les non-sages et les non-avisés, à condition toutefois qu'ils soient humbles». Le texte qui a été transmis par les mss. (le témoignage de la collection *V* étant appuyé par celui de *Π*) est donc correct.

137: *Intellegi* est suivi de *uoluit* dans *Π*, de *potest* dans *V*; les deux traditions interprètent *ipse exposuit* comme le début d'une nouvelle phrase. La combinaison *superbos intellegi potest* ne peut pas être correcte; *superbus intellegi potest*, la leçon de presque tous les mss. *V*, est manifestement une correction secondaire, incompatible avec les pluriels *sapientium et prudentium*. D'autre

part, *intellegi uoluit* est une expression courante; mais on s'explique mal comment *uoluit* aurait pu devenir *potest*. Il nous semble plus probable que ces verbes ont été interpolés l'un comme l'autre, et que le texte primitif subordonnait *superbos intellegi* à *ipse exposuit*.

139-141: Pour interpréter ces trois lignes '*O uia Domini! Aut non erat aut latebat ut reueletur nobis unde Dominus exsultauit*', qui n'apparaissent comme telles que dans la tradition *V*, il est nécessaire d'examiner d'abord les deux phrases qui suivent ('*Quia reuelatum est paruulis debemus esse paruuli. Nam si uoluerimus esse magni ... non nobis illud reuelatur*' ll. 141-143): les formes *reuelatum* et *illud* ne peuvent se rapporter à *uia Domini*, mais s'accordent à un pronom neutre sous-entendu, antécédent de *unde*; *unde Dominus exsultauit* s'avère être une proposition relative. *<Hoc> unde Dominus exsultauit* est donc sujet de *aut non erat aut latebat*; c'est la cause de la joie du Seigneur – non la *uia Domini* – qui «était inexistante, à moins de demeurer cachée afin de nous être révélée». Quelle était cette cause nécessairement ('*aut non erat aut ...*') inconnue ou incompréhensible pour les orgueilleux ('*si uoluerimus esse magni ... non nobis illud reuelatur*'), qui, – ayant été dévoilée ('*reuelatum est*') à ceux-là seuls ('*latebat*') des contemporains de Jésus qui possédaient de l'humilité ('*paruulis*'), – se manifestera aux auditeurs d'Augustin ('*ut reueletur nobis*'), à condition qu'ils soient humbles eux-mêmes ('*debemus esse paruuli*')? Il s'agit d'un des aspects de l'Incarnation. Lequel? L'accent mis sur l'humilité comme préliminaire à l'illumination humaine pourrait faire penser à l'humiliation (kénose) du Verbe lui-même, mais pourquoi cette humiliation serait-elle présentée comme une cause de joie de la part de Jésus, et comment cadrerait-elle avec le contexte dans la lecture évangélique ('*Omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo*': *Luc* 10, 22)? C'est donc plutôt l'élévation par la grâce de la nature humaine de Jésus, mentionnée déjà dans le paragr.7 (ll. 108-119), qui fait l'objet des ll. 139-143. Dans le *s.* 68 *auct.*, qui date des dernières années de la vie d'Augustin, la joie de Jésus est motivée exactement de la même façon (*Miscellanea Agostiniana* I, p. 362, ll. 17-22). Or, l'humilité requise afin que le chrétien se rende compte de la joie du Christ est celle d'accepter que la grâce précède les mérites, et donc que nous ne pouvons avoir de mérite sans l'avoir reçu: modestie évoquée au début du texte qui nous occupe par les mots *o uia Domini*, qui rappellent la *uia in sacrificio laudis* (ll. 97-98). Il ressort en effet d'une consultation du *corpus* augustinien dans le CLCLT-5, 'uia* /1 domini' (90 *sententiae*) et 'uia* /1 eius' (129 *sententiae*) qu'Augustin emploie l'expression *uia Domini/eius* au singulier surtout dans les significations 'la voie de l'homme vers le Seigneur' ou 'le mode de vie humaine ordonné par le Seigneur', tandis que le pluriel *uiae* s'applique le plus souvent aux interventions divines; cette distinction repose en partie sur l'influence de certains textes bibliques: *Ps.* 36, 23 *Apud Dominum gressus hominis diriguntur et uiam eius uolet* et *Ps.* 49, 23 (*supra*) d'une part, et *Ps.* 24, 10 *Vniuersae uiae Domini misericordia et ueritas* et *Rom.* 11, 33 *Quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius et inuestigabiles uiae eius* de l'autre. La source

de notre tradition *Π*, s'offusquant sans doute de trouver l'expression *uia Domini* combinée avec *aut non erat aut latebat*, a substitué à cet ensemble une prière d'être renseignée sur ce qui a réjoui le Christ ('petamus *ut reueletur* et *nobis unde Dominus exsultauit*'), mais de cette façon elle ne donne plus de réponse valable à la question qui avait été posée.

144-145: Le raisonnement paradoxal *si dicendo te esse sapientem stultus factus es* (cf. *Rom.* 1, 22), *dic te stultum et sapiens eris* exige un mode d'expression vif et direct: d'où la deuxième personne du singulier. La tradition *Π* met la proposition conditionnelle à la troisième personne (influencée peut-être par le pronom *se* du texte paulinien) et supprime *te* dans la principale, tout en retenant *eris*: il est clair qu'elle cherche à écarter ce qui lui semble heurter le bon sens.

147-149: Ces lignes font partie d'une paraphrase de quatre passages bibliques enchaînés un à un par synonymie ou antonymie, qui occupe l'ensemble du par. 8 (*sapientes* ⇔ *stulti* = *obscuratum est insipiens cor* ⇔ *illuminabis tenebras meas*). À l'opposé des soi-disant *sapientes* de *Luc* 10, 21 (ll. 128-129) y apparaissent les bons catholiques qui attendent de la part de Dieu, et de Dieu seul, la Lumière de la Vérité (*Ps.* 17, 29: ll. 154-155). Nos trois lignes de texte, ll. 147-149, se rattachent au raisonnement autour de *Rom.*1, 22 (ll.143-144); ils seront suivis, dans les ll. 150-157, d'un passage dans lequel le prédicateur réclamera chez l'auditoire la conscience d'avoir le *cor insipiens et obscuratum* (cf. *Rom.*1, 21: ll. 150-151), et déduira du terme paulinien *obscuratum* qu'ils ont besoin d'*illuminatio*. Nos ll. 147-149 forment donc la transition entre *dic te stultum* (l. 145) et *dic quia tu tibi lumen non es* (l. 151); la *stultitia* qu'il faut assumer, c'est un *cor insipiens et obscuratum*: voilà leur message. Or, *stultus* est associé à *insipiens* dans *Π*, à *tenebrosus* dans *V*; tandis que cette dernière tradition fait une liaison immédiate avec le verset complet *obscuratum est insipiens cor*, *Π* se contente provisiorement du terme *insipiens*. Augustin anticipe sur la citation de *Rom.*1, 21 (ll. 150-151), si l'on s'en remet à *V*; selon *Π* il patiente, présumant que la citation comme telle suffira pour établir le lien entre *stultus* = *insipiens* d'une part et *obscuratus* de l'autre. Quelle est la tradition qui reflète le mieux le texte authentique? Il se trouve un élément secondaire dans tous nos témoins *Π*, à savoir la répétition de *quod ad te ipsum pertinet* suivie de la remarque *etsi abhorret* ('quoiqu'il y ait une différence' ou 'quoique cela inspire de la répugnance'): étant causée par l'*homoearchon* avec *quod ad tua tenebrosus es* (*V*), la répétition dans *Π* garantit l'authenticité de cette dernière phrase de *V*, ou tout au moins du début de la phrase, un éventuel attribut *stultus* fourni par l'archétype ayant à la rigueur pu être remplacé par *tenebrosus* dans *V*. Ajoutons toutefois que le mot *tenebrosus* réapparaît dans des contextes augustiniens analogues au nôtre: *Io. eu. tr.* 3, 5 *opus erat ut homo diceret de luce testimonium, non quidem tenebrosus, sed iam illuminatus*; *tr.* 22, 10 *in peccato tuo tenebrosus eras; conuerteris ut illuminaris*; *en. Ps.*16,14 ... *eis qui corde sordido et tenebroso lucem sapientiae uidere non possunt*; etc. (voir le *corpus* augustinien dans CLCLT-5 s.v. 'tenebros*').

L'erreur que nous venons de signaler (la répétition) n'exclut pas pour autant que la tradition *Π* soit une source valable pour d'autres éléments dont elle est le seul témoin; on pourrait donc être tenté de reconstituer les deux premières phrases de la manière suivante: *prorsus quod ad te ipsum pertinet* (*Π*+*V*) *stultus es* (*Π*)*; quod ad tua, tenebrosus es* (*V*); mais nous pensons que cette symétrie et ce *distinguo* livresque ne s'accordent guère avec la vivacité du sermon. L'autorité de *Π* dans ce passage s'étant finalement révélé faible, un choix s'impose entre *insipiens* ou *tenebrosus* dans la phrase *Quid est enim aliud esse stultum nisi esse insipienten / tenebrosum in corde*, et nous optons pour *tenebrosum* (*V*).

157: Dans la tradition *Π*, la prière qu'Augustin propose à l'auditoire vers la fin du paragr. 8 se termine par la belle formule *lumen non participans nisi in te et ex te*, «si j'ai part à la Lumière, c'est en Toi, <la Lumière venant> de Toi»: en demeurant dans une relation constitutive avec Dieu (*in te*), l'homme participe à la Lumière (voir P. M. Hombert, *Gloria gratiae*, p. 432-433); en effet, la Lumière vient de Dieu (*ex te*). Les éditions de nos prédécesseurs ne contenaient qu'une partie de cette formule, les trois derniers mots *et ex te* manquant dans leurs sources, qui appartenaient toutes à la tradition *V*. Bien qu'on ne trouve ces mots que dans *Π*, nous ne pensons pas qu'ils y constituent une interpolation. Ils se rattachent fermement au contexte, ayant été annoncés au cours de la prière elle-même par la négation du contraire, c.-à-d. par *non a me* (l. 156); l'expression *non a me* est transmise telle quelle dans la collection *V*, mais elle est devenue incompréhensible dans tous nos mss. *Π*, la préposition *a* y étant omise, ce qui semble exclure que la tradition *Π* ait pu s'en inspirer pour introduire *et ex te* dans le texte.

160: Au début du paragr. 9 (jusqu'à la l. 170), le prédicateur utilise la préface du quatrième évangile pour présenter saint Jean-Baptiste comme participant à la Lumière divine sans qu'il ait prétendu être la Lumière elle-même. Le verset *Jean* 1, 8 est son point de départ: *Non erat ille lumen, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine* (l. 159). La tradition *Π* fait suivre ce verset des premiers mots du v. 1, 9 *Erat lumen uerum*, et elle prête à *erat* la valeur de *exsistebat* en l'isolant de *lumen verum* par l'insertion de *autem* entre *erat* et *lumen*: «il y avait cependant la véritable lumière» (l. 160), ce qui fournit matière, toujours selon *Π*, à la question *Quod est uerum?*, c.-à-d. «Quelle <lumière> est la véritable <lumière>?» (l. 160), suivie, comme réponse, de la deuxième partie du v. 1, 9 *Quod illuminat omnem hominem* (ll. 160-161). Ce dernier texte mène à la conclusion que le Précurseur était éclairé par la Lumière divine de la même façon que tout homme 'illuminé' par elle: *Si lumen uerum quod illuminat omnem hominem, ergo et Iohannem recte dicentem, recte confitentem* (ll. 161-162). Ce raisonnement s'accorde avec celui de *Io. eu. tr.* 2, 7 et des *ss.* 342, 2. 379 *auct.* (=Lambot 20), 5-6 et 380, 7; il est parfaitement cohérent, soulignant la modération de Jean comme un exemple à suivre. La tradition *V*, par contre, ne se contentant pas de la question 'Quelle lumière?' (*Quod autem erat lumen?*), mais annonçant aussi une définition du concept 'véritable Lumière' (*Quid est 'uerum'?*), fait ressortir

plutôt l'unicité de la Lumière dont Jean rendait témoignage. La divergence entre *Π* et *V* se reflète dans l'ordre des termes *lumen* et *verum* de notre l. 161: *V* écrit *Si uerum lumen quod illuminat omnem hominem, ergo et Johannem recte dicentem, recte confitentem*, ce qui est plus facile à paraphraser qu'à traduire, 'véritable' en français moderne ne pouvant plus réunir les significations 'sincère' et 'qui mérite son nom', et l'adverbe *et* s'avérant être lourd de sens dans ce contexte-ci: «Si la Lumière éclairant tout être humain est la véritable lumière, et qu'elle est véridique, elle fait que Jean ne nous trompe pas par son message et sa confession, pas plus que la Lumière elle-même».

163: La prière de la fin du paragr. 8 comprenait le verset 29 du *Ps.* 17: *Tu illuminabis lucernam meam, Domine*; après avoir distingué la Lumière de l'illumination participante (voir la note précédente), le prédicateur ajoute maintenant qu'il faut interpréter ce verset psalmique au moyen de *Jean* 1, 16: '*Nos* autem *de plenitudine eius accepimus*: uide si aliquid (*sic* $P^{1\ a.c.}$ 2 $r^{1.2}$; aliud $P^{1\ p.c.}$ *V edd*) dixit quam *Tu illuminabis lucernam meam, Domine*.' Il est clair que la source π écrivait *aliquid*; c'est la *lectio difficilior*, sujette à être 'corrigée' en *aliud* dans la tradition manuscrite et dans les éditions. De la consultation du *corpus* augustinien dans le CLCLT-5 s.v. 'aliqui* %3 quam' (141 *sententiae*) résulte le passage comparable que voici: *Quid si non quaerit aliquid quam id quod habet?* (*s.* Lambot 4 = *s.* 359 A, *RBén* 49 (1937) p. 261 l.118). Dès l'époque classique, l'adverbe *quam* s'emploie parfois dans la signification 'autre que': K. E. GEORGES, *Ausführliches lateinisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch*, II, Hanovre 1918 (Bâle 1969), c. 2131 ('mit ausgelassenem *alius*'); A. BLAISE, *Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens*, Turnhout 1954, p. 689 ('sous-entendu *aliud*, ou au lieu de *nisi*').

170-173: Voir d'abord, en ce qui concerne la leçon *Domine Pater*, les remarques à propos des ll. 1-2 (*supra*). Quant aux lignes de texte qui nous occupent ici même, ils forment le commentaire final des paroles *abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus* (*Luc* 10, 21). Dans la tradition *Π*, le style est plus laconique et direct que dans *V*: omission de *qui* devant *abscondisti* (l.170), répétition des deux phrases *lumen se putabant* et *tenebrae erant* sans variation dans la morphologie des mots (l. 171). De plus, le commentateur y parle par la bouche du Seigneur lui-même, qui «s'afflige» (*lugeo*: l. 172) de ce qu'il y eût des personnes qui, se trouvant dans l'obscurité, pensaient toutefois qu'elles étaient la Lumière elle-même, et qui, «par leur propre faute, n'ont pas reçu d'illumination» (*nec illuminari meruerunt*: l. 173). Le Christ ayant «tressailli de joie» en pensant à l'élévation de sa nature humaine (supra, ll.140-141), on peut s'imaginer que l'orgueil humain lui ait donné de la peine (*lugeo*); quant à l'expression '*mereor illuminari*', elle est courante dans des contextes similaires augustiniens (*en. Ps.* 65, 5. 96, 5. 109, 5. 138, 15: voir CLCLT-5, 'illumin* / mer*'). Tout est donc bien clair et il n'y aurait aucun problème, si *V* ne présentait des difficultés d'interprétation ayant pu occasionner, comme résultats d'une conjecture, quelques-unes au moins des leçons divergentes de *Π*. La tradition *V* écrit: *et eo quod tenebrae erant et*

lumen se putabant, nec illuminari potuerunt (ll. 172-173). *Eo* tenant la place de *lugeo*, les mots *nec illuminari potuerunt* s'y avèrent être la proposition principale et *nec* y signifie «même pas»: si, dans *Π*, *nec* a la fonction d'un adverbe coordonnant («et ... n'ont pas»), est-ce parce que la source π s'est méprise quant à la relation entre les trois verbes *erant*, *putabant* et *potuerunt* et qu'elle a changé *eo* en *lugeo* afin d'obtenir une période acceptable? Dans *V* la formulation de la fin de la phrase est beaucoup plus incisive, puisque *potuerunt* y prend la place de *meruerunt*: «ils ne disposaient même pas de la possibilité (*potuerunt*) de recevoir l'illumination». On pourrait objecter (et la source π a-t-elle changé *potuerunt* en *meruerunt* parce qu'elle a fait l'objection elle-même?) que la nature humaine ne perd jamais *la possibilité* de l'illumination, Dieu étant libre de lui accorder cette grâce à tout moment; il y a cependant un autre texte homilétique dans lequel Augustin fait abstraction d'une intervention divine pour poser que l'âme qui se replie sur elle-même ne 'peut' (*posse*) être illuminée: *Si ad te conuersus posses illuminari, numquam posses tenebrari, quia tecum semper esses. Quare illuminatus es? quia conuertisti te ad aliud quod tu non eras. Quid est aliud quod tu non eras? Deus lumen est* (*en. Ps.* 25, *s.* 2, 11: CLCLT-5, 'illumin* / po*').

176: Le contexte prouve que *se agnoscebant* (*V*) est la leçon authentique: 'se connaître', c'est éviter l'infatuation de ceux qui *tenebrae erant et lumen se putabant* (l. 172).

178: Les mots *Conuersi ad Dominum* se trouvent à la fin du *s.* 67 dans nos mss. $V^{2\text{-}5}$. C'est la formule tronquée, commune aux différents types d'oraison par lesquels Augustin terminait ses sermons. Certains mss.*V* (dont V^6 est le plus ancien) y placent l'une des formes développées de la prière: la version *A1* d'après la typologie proposée par F. DOLBEAU, 'L'oraison *Conversi ad Dominum* ... . Un bilan provisoire des recensions existantes', dans *Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft* 41 (1999) 295-322. Les Mauristes ont suivi ces mss.: la version *A1* est devenue le paragr. 10 de leur édition du *s.* 67. Or, bien qu'elle soit authentiquement augustinienne en soi, rien n'indique qu'elle ait été rattachée au *s.* 67 de longue date: V^6 (XI^e s.) l'a intitulée comme si elle ne s'appliquait pas spécifiquement à cette homélie-ci (*oratio sancti augustini finitis sermonibus*); dans St-Omer, *B.M.* 77 (XIIe s.), un ms. *V* de la même branche que notre V^5, elle a été ajoutée en marge par une seconde main. Toute trace de la formule *Conuersi ad Dominum* est absente dans la tradition *Π*. Les mss. $P^{1.2}$ ajoutent souvent un *amen* à la fin de leurs sermons; ayant copié la formule *Conuersi ad Dominum* dans leur troisième et quatrième sermon de la série *De paenitentia* (les *ss.* 18 et 87), ils l'ont apparemment omise ensuite.

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LE SERMON 131 DE SAINT AUGUSTIN

I INTRODUCTION ET ÉDITION*

1. Datation du sermon

Le sermon 131, qui s'insère dans la prédication antipélagienne d'Augustin, doit être compté parmi ses allocutions les plus connues. Si la littérature ecclésiastique du Moyen Âge en citait souvent l'exorde offrant un exposé concis sur l'eucharistie (§ 1),[1] les modernes s'intéressent surtout à la péroraison (§ 10), où l'évêque mentionne à l'appui de l'argumentation développée dans le corpus (§§ 2-9) les rescrits du pape Innocent I approuvant la condamnation de l'hérésie par les conciles de Carthage et de Milev en 416:

> [...] ubi tales inueneritis, occultare nolite. Redarguite contradicentes et resistentes ad nos perducite. Iam enim de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad Sedem apostolicam; inde etiam rescripta uenerunt. Causa finita est: error utinam aliquando finiatur! (*Serm.* 131, 10; ll. 162-165)[2]

* Nous remercions le professeur L. De Coninck pour les conseils et la correction des premières versions de cet article, ainsi que B. Coppieters 't Wallant et F. Debroe pour la révision du texte français.

[1] Voir notre traitement de la transmission indirecte du sermon (3.2.).

[2] Voir *Epist.* 175-176 (les lettres envoyées à Rome par les conciles africains); 181-182 (les rescrits papaux). Pour un aperçu des différentes interprétations qu'a suscitées l'appel d'Augustin à l'autorité de l'évêque de Rome, voir W. Marschall, *Karthago und Rom. Die Stellung der nordafrikanischen Kirche zum apostolischen Stuhl in Rom* (*Päpste und Papsttum* 1, Stuttgart 1971) pp. 55-58. Nous nous rangeons du côté de O. Wermelinger, *Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432* (*Päpste und Papsttum* 7, Stuttgart 1975) p. 154 ('Die Worte [...] sind vorerst nicht als eine verbindliche Anerkennung römischer Suprematie in zwischenkirchlichen Beziehungen zu interpretieren. Die Sinnspitze dieses ersten Kommentars zu den Antworten des Innozenz liegt in der Akzentuierung des zweifach gefällten Grundsatzentscheides gegen die neue Lehre und ihre Anhänger.'); M. Wojtowytsch, *Papsttum und Konzile von den Anfängen bis zu Leo I. (440-461). Studien zur Entstehung der Überordnung des Papstes über Konzile* (*Päpste und Papsttum* 17, Stuttgart 1981) pp. 236-237; 438-439 (bibliographie); P.J. Carefoote, *Augustine, the Pelagians and the Papacy. An Examination of the Political and Theological Implications of Papal Involvement in the Pelagian Controversy* (diss. doct. - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 1995) pp. 51-52; 70; 122-123; 126-127; 133-134; 153-154; 176 n. 146.

Pour deux raisons, les Mauristes ont daté le sermon du 23 septembre 417: (**1**) les rescrits d'Innocent datent du 27 janvier 417;[3] (**2**) le titre du sermon tel que les éditeurs bénédictins l'ont reconstitué sur base d'un ancien manuscrit de la Santa Croce in Gerusalemme à Rome (l'actuel *Roma Bibl. Naz. Vitt. Em. 1357*), signale que le sermon fut prêché dans la *mensa Cypriani* un dimanche 23 septembre (*Sermo habitus ad mensam sancti martyris Cypriani* VIII *Kal. Oct. – Die Dominica – De gratia Dei*), ce qui correspond à la situation de l'an 417: dans la période délimitée par l'arrivée des rescrits d'Innocent à Carthage et la mort d'Augustin, le 23 septembre ne tombait un dimanche qu'en 417, 423 et 428.[4] Précisant l'argumentation mauriste, O. PERLER a fait remarquer qu'en 423 ou 428, un exposé tel que le sermon 131 aurait profité davantage de la mention de quelques mesures antipélagiennes postérieures à celle que prit Innocent au début de 417: 'l'évêque aurait parlé tout autrement, les pélagiens ayant fait l'objet en 418 de trois mesures extrêmement graves: un rescrit impérial [le 30 avril], une déclaration solennelle du concile général d'Afrique [le 1er mai] et une encyclique destinée par le pape [Zosime] aux évêques de l'univers catholique [juin-juillet].'[5]

Contrairement à ce que prétendent les Mauristes, le codex *Roma Bibl. Naz. Vitt. Em. 1357* date notre sermon non pas d'un dimanche 23, mais d'un dimanche 24 septembre (*VIII Kal. Oct. – Die Dominica*). Les mêmes données se retrouvent dans trois autres manuscrits italiens apparentés à celui de la Santa Croce.[6] Or, le 24 septembre ne tomba un dimanche qu'une fois entre le 27 janvier 417 et la mort d'Augustin, c'est-à-dire en 422. Puisque nous ne disposons d'aucun autre indice de la présence éventuelle d'Augustin à Carthage en cette année et que l'argument de PERLER rend improbable toute datation postérieure au printemps de l'année 418, nous croyons que notre sermon fut bien prêché le 23 septembre 417 (*VIII Kal. Oct.*) et que le témoignage des manuscrits

[3] Voir O. PERLER-J.-L. MAIER, *Les voyages de saint Augustin* (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité* 36, Paris 1969) p. 335.

[4] Pour la datation des Mauristes, voir *PL* 38, c. 729 n. c. Pour la *mensa Cypriani*, c'est-à-dire la basilique marquant l'endroit du martyre de saint Cyprien, voir L. ENNABLI, *Carthage. Une métropole chrétienne du IVe à la fin du VIIe siècle* (*Études d'Antiquités africaines*, Paris 1997) pp. 24-26 (n° 9).

[5] Voir O. PERLER-J.-L. MAIER, *Les voyages de saint Augustin* [n. 3] pp. 336-337.

[6] *Firenze Bibl. Laur. Mugello 11 (XI)*; *Monte Cassino 11 (XI²)*; *Vat. Vrbin. lat. 77 (XV)*. Ces manuscrits et *Roma Bibl. Naz. Vitt. Em. 1357* sont les quatre représentants de la collection Sessorienne de sermons augustiniens. Voir 3.1.1.

signalés repose sur une faute d'orthographe qui a changé le chiffre VIIII en VIII.[7]

La datation proposée implique que notre sermon fut prononcé deux jours après la révocation du jugement d'Innocent par son successeur Zosime (le 21 septembre) et quelques semaines avant que soit arrivée officiellement à Carthage la nouvelle de ce changement d'avis de la part du Siège Apostolique (le 2 novembre).[8] Selon plusieurs chercheurs, l'insistance sur le verdict d'Innocent à la fin de l'homélie 131 fut inspirée par la crainte qu'avec l'entrée en fonction de Zosime le 18 mars 417, Rome ne fût plus aussi favorable à la cause des évêques africains qu'elle ne l'était au début de l'année.[9]

2. Contenu du sermon

La prédication du sermon 131 fut précédée de la lecture d'un passage du VI^e^ chapitre de l'évangile de saint Jean comprenant au moins les versets 54-66. La péricope a donné lieu à une double réflexion: le premier paragraphe de l'homélie propose une exégèse des versets Io 6,54 et 61-65 sur la communion à la chair et au sang du Seigneur comme condition nécessaire à la vie éternelle, tandis que les neuf paragraphes suivants développent à partir de Io 6,66 une argumentation antipélagienne sur la grâce divine. Bien que la renommée

[7] Bien qu'ils fassent référence à notre sermon selon la numérotation de l'édition bénédictine, le Mauriste Pierre Coustant et Pietro Ballerini le datent du 'VIII Kal. Octobris 417'. Voir *PL* 20, c. 654, n. f (l'édition de la correspondance du pape Zosime empruntée à *Epistolae Romanorum Pontificum*. Tom. I [Paris 1721]); *PL* 56, cc. 1011 BC et 1013 A (= *Opera Sancti Leonis Magni pontificis*. Tom. III [Rome 1757]).

[8] Voir O. PERLER-J.-L. MAIER, *Les voyages de saint Augustin* [n. 3] pp. 335-340.

[9] Voir G. DE PLINVAL, *Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme. Étude d'histoire littéraire et religieuse* (Lausanne-...-Bâle 1943) pp. 311-312 ('Cette parole célèbre est un cri d'alarme. [...] Saint Augustin sait déjà, ou du moins il pressent, qu'en Italie aussi bien qu'en Afrique, un mouvement de réaction se dessine contre les excommunications prononcées.'); G. BONNER, *St Augustine of Hippo. Life and Controversies* (Norwich 1986 [édition révisée de celle de 1963]) p. 342; O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius* [n. 2] pp. 153-154 ('Das Gerücht von der römischen Kehrtwendung konnte schon vor der Ankunft des Basiliscus [le 2 novembre] nach Afrika gedrungen sein und erste Alarmzeichen ausgelöst haben. Es scheint, dass im vieldiskutierten Schlussteil des augustinischen *Sermo 131* vom 23. September 417 in der Mensa Cypriani zu Karthago eine ernsthafte Sorge über die sich anbahnende Entwicklung aufbricht. [...] Die gleichzeitig geforderten inquisitorischen Massnahmen gegen heimliche Sympathisanten sollten all jene warnen, die meinen, man könne angesichts des römischen "Frontwechsels" von der früher ausgehandelten Position abweichen.'); P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo. A Biography*. A New Edition with an Epilogue (Berkeley-Los Angeles 2000) p. 360.

du sermon soit due initialement au premier paragraphe sur l'eucharistie (voir plus haut), le deuxième volet constitue clairement l'essentiel du propos d'Augustin. L'étendue et la clarté de l'argumentation sur la grâce forment en effet contraste avec la concision et le caractère plutôt allusif du premier paragraphe.

a. L'exégèse eucharistique de Io 6,54 et 61-65 (§ 1)

§ 1. L'exorde du sermon oppose deux interpretations, l'une matérielle, l'autre spirituelle, du verset Io 6,54 (*Nisi manducaueritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum, non habebitis uitam in uobis*). Selon la première, qui était celle de la plupart des disciples, les propos du Christ exhortent à l'anthropophagie, c'est-à-dire à la consommation pure et simple de Son corps naturel.[10] En réaction à l'indignation qu'elle avait provoquée (Io 6,61; ll. 7-14), le Christ a réfuté cette interprétation charnelle par la profétie de l'Ascension: *Hoc uos scandalizat? Si ergo uideritis Filium hominis ascendentem ubi erat prius?* (Io 6, 62-63) Se désignant dans sa condition humaine (*Filius hominis*), le Seigneur entend signifier ici 'que c'est dans l'intégrité de sa nature humaine qu'il va monter au ciel et que, par conséquent, la chair qu'il donnera à manger ne peut pas être sa chair dans son état naturel.' (ll. 14-19)[11] S'appuyant sur Io 6,64 (*Spiritus est qui uiuificat, caro autem non prodest quicquam. Verba quae locutus sum uobis, spiritus et uita sunt*; ll. 25-26), Augustin propose une exégèse spirituelle de Io 6,54 (ll. 20-28). Le verset indiquerait qu'on n'aura part à la vie éternelle que si le pain et le vin de l'eucharistie, qui sont identifiés à la chair et au sang du Christ, sont consommés spirituellement, c'est-à-dire s'ils sont reçus avec les dispositions convenables: *Tunc autem hoc erit – id est uita unicuique erit corpus et sanguis Christi – si quod in sacramento uisibiliter sumitur, in ipsa ueritate*

[10] Pour l'interprétation matérielle ou 'anthrophagique' de Io 6,54 comme raison de l'étonnement des disciples, comparer *In Ioh. euang.* 11, 5; 27, 1-3; 5; *In psalm.* 33, *serm.* 1, 8; 98, 9; Tert., *Resurr.* 37; Or., *In Leu.* 7, 5 (*PG* 12, c. 487-488). Voir également M. COMEAU, *Saint Augustin. Exégète du quatrième évangile* (*Études de théologie historique*, Paris 1930) pp. 175-176; M.-F. BERROUARD, *L'être sacramentel de l'eucharistie selon saint Augustin. Commentaire de Jean VI, 60-63 dans le* Tractatus *XXVII, 1-6 et 11-12* in Iohannis Euangelium, dans: *Nouvelle revue théologique* 99 (1977) pp. 702-721 (en part. pp. 703-707); *L'être sacramentel de l'eucharistie*, dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 72 (Paris 1977) pp. 824-827 (n° 66).

[11] Comparer *In Ioh. euang.* 27, 3. Voir également M.-F. BERROUARD, *L'être sacramentel de l'eucharistie selon saint Augustin* [n. 10] pp. 706-707; *L'être sacramentel de l'eucharistie* [n. 10] p. 825 (d'où proviennent les paroles citées ci-dessus); *L'intégrité de la nature humaine du Christ après sa résurrection*, dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 72 (Paris 1977) pp. 827-828 (n° 67).

spiritualiter manducetur, spiritualiter bibatur (ll. 23-24).[12] L'exégèse d'Augustin se concentre sur la disposition intérieure du communiant; elle ne nous renseigne pas quant à la nature précise de l'identification du pain et du vin eucharistiques à la chair et au sang du Seigneur.

b. L'exposé sur la grâce divine à partir de Io 6,66 (§§ 2-10)

§ 2. Partant de Io 6,66 (*Nemo uenit ad me, nisi cui datum fuerit a Patre meo*), Augustin souligne que la foi grâce à laquelle nous mangeons spirituellement la chair et le sang du Christ, est un don de Dieu. C'est ce qui ressort également de Io 6,44: *Nemo uenit ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum.* La traction du Père dont parle le dernier verset, n'abolit pas la liberté de l'homme, bien qu'elle soit une force irrésistible. Utilisant l'image de la marche vers Dieu présente dans les deux versets johanniques (*Nemo uenit ad me*), Augustin insiste qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une force physique, mais de l'amour, qui porte la volonté qui aime vers l'être aimé:

> *Nemo uenit ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum.* Non dixit 'duxerit', sed 'traxerit'. Ista uiolentia cordi fit, non carni. Quid ergo miraris? Crede et uenis; ama et traheris. Ne arbitreris istam asperam molestamque uiolentiam: dulcis est, suauis est, ipsa suauitas te trahit. Nonne ouis trahitur cui esurienti herba monstratur? Et puto quia non corpore impellitur, sed desiderio colligatur. Sic et tu ueni ad Christum. Noli longa itinera meditari: ubi credis, ibi uenis. Ad illum enim qui ubique est, amando uenitur, non nauigando. (ll. 31-37)[13]

§ 3. La foi, qui est un don accordé selon un plan divin caché (ll. 41-42), doit être accueillie dans une disposition reconnaissante et

[12] Comparer *In Ioh. euang.* 27, 5-6; *In psalm.* 98, 9. Voir également M. COMEAU, *Saint Augustin. Exégète du quatrième évangile* [n. 10] pp. 182-185; M.-F. BERROUARD, *L'être sacramentel de l'eucharistie selon saint Augustin* [n. 10] pp. 717-720; *L'être sacramentel de l'eucharistie* [n. 10] pp. 825-827; *L'eucharistie sacrement de communion par la participation à l'Esprit du Christ*, dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 72 (Paris 1977) pp. 830-832 (n° 71).

[13] Selon M.-F. BERROUARD, ces lignes du sermon 131 marquent un tournant décisif dans l'exégèse augustinienne de Io 6,44. A partir de maintenant, l'évêque d'Hippone interprète la traction du Père vers le Christ comme une action qui s'exerce directement sur la volonté de l'homme et provoque chez celui-ci l'amour pour la révélation (comparer *Grat. Christ.* 1, 10, 11; *C. Pelag.* 1, 3, 6; 19, 37; *C. Iulian.* 4, 8, 44; 5, 4, 14; *Praed. sanct.* 8, 15). Dans les œuvres précédant notre sermon, comme dans le *In Ioh. euang.* 26, 2-9, la traction aurait consisté surtout en l'enseignement donné par le Père, le don de la foi ou de l'adhésion à la révélation jouant un moindre rôle (*In Ioh. euang.* 26, 9: *Quid est autem uos trahi a Patre, nisi discere a Patre?*; *CCSL* 36, p. 264, ll. 6-7). Voir M.-F. BERROUARD, *La foi, don de Dieu et acte libre de l'homme*, dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 72 (Paris 1977) pp. 804-809 (n° 55). Pour la traction du Père, voir également J. AMENGUAL BATLE, *La atracción del Padre y la fe en Cristo* (Bilbao 1973).

humble – *cum timore et tremore*, comme le disait l'Apôtre (Phil 2,12). Si l'on attribue aux propres mérites ce qui en vérité ne peut être qu'un don gratuit de Dieu, on quitte la 'voie juste' de la foi. Cette métaphore empruntée à Ps 2,11-12 (*Seruite Domino in timore et exsultate cum tremore. Apprehendite disciplinam, ne quando irascatur Dominus et pereatis de uia iusta*) rejoint l'image de la marche vers Dieu dans le deuxième paragraphe:

> Gaudeat quia datum est; gratias agat danti corde humili, non arroganti, ne quod humilis meruit, superbus amittat. Nam etiam qui iam in ipsa uia iusta ambulant, si sibi eam tribuerint et uiribus suis, pereunt de illa. Ideo humilitatem nos docens sancta scriptura per apostolum dicit: *Cum timore et tremore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini.* (ll. 43-47)

Comme Augustin le soulignera dans les paragraphes suivants, la conception de la grâce divine élaborée jusqu'ici s'écarte de celle de Pélage, qui ne comporte que les dons de la Loi et du libre arbitre (§§ 4-5) ainsi que la rémission des péchés au baptême (§ 6).

§§ **4-5.** Reprenant la métaphore qu'Augustin avait empruntée à Ps 2,11-12, un adversaire pélagien imaginaire objecte que les dons de la Loi et du libre arbitre lui suffisent à marcher sur la 'voie de la justice':

> *'Sed iam', inquis, 'ambulo uiam iustam. Opus erat ut discerem; opus erat ut per doctrinam legis scirem quid agerem. Habeo liberum uoluntatis arbitrium: quis me ab ista uia separabit?'* (ll. 53-54)

La réaction d'Augustin à cette objection est double. Il signale en premier lieu que le pélagianisme tombe dans l'arrogance du psalmiste, qui s'enorgueillit de son abondance, bien qu'elle vînt de Dieu, et que le Seigneur dépouilla ensuite de ce qu'il avait, pour lui enseigner l'humilité (Ps 29,7-8: *Ego dixi in abundantia mea: 'Non mouebor in aeternum.' Domine, in uoluntate tua praestitisti decori meo uirtutem. Auertisti autem faciem tuam et factus sum conturbatus*; ll. 55-70).[14] L'évêque souligne ensuite au moyen d'une exégèse de Ps 2,11-13 que c'est précisément l'assurance dont témoigne l'objection pélagienne citée, qui nous fait dévier de la 'voie juste' (ll. 71-87). La persévérance dans la foi étant un don de Dieu, il ne reste plus au chrétien que d'avoir confiance en Lui:

[14] Pour Ps 29,7-8 dans l'œuvre d'Augustin, voir P.-M. HOMBERT, Gloria gratiae. *Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité* 148, Paris 1996) pp. 306-309; *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité* 163, Paris 2000) pp. 225-226.

Hoc Dominus dicit: '*Apprehendite disciplinam: exsultate,* sed *cum tremore*', ut semper humiles teneatis quod accepistis, *ne quando irascatur Dominus* utique superbis, sibi quod habent tribuentibus, non illi a quo habent gratias agentibus. *Ne quando irascatur Dominus et pereatis de uia iusta.* Numquid dixit: 'Ne quando irascatur Dominus et non ueniatis ad uiam iustam?' Numquid: 'Ne quando irascatur Dominus et non uos perducat ad uiam iustam aut non uos admittat ad uiam iustam?' Iam in illa ambulatis! Nolite superbire, ne etiam de illa pereatis: *et pereatis*, inquit, *de uia iusta, cum exarserit in breui ira eius super uos* – non in longum.[15] Vbi superbis, ibi quod acceperas, perdis. His territus homo quasi diceret: 'Quid ergo faciam?', sequitur: *Beati omnes qui confidunt in eum* – non in se, sed in eum. *Gratia salui facti sumus, non ex nobis, sed Dei donum est.* (ll. 77-87)

§ 6. Prolongeant l'image de la marche vers Dieu, Augustin offre ensuite une exégèse concise de la parabole du bon Samaritain. Le voyageur laissé pour mort sur la route représente l'homme après la chute d'Adam (ll. 90-92), tandis que les premiers soins qui lui sont administrés par le Samaritain, symbolisent la rémission des péchés au baptême (ll. 96-100). L'absolution des péchés n'implique toutefois pas que le chrétien baptisé ait perdu toute faiblesse (l. 95). La santé foncière ne lui sera rendue qu'à la fin des temps après une guérison progressive sous l'action de la grâce au sein de l'Église (ll. 93; 99-104). Ce processus est représenté par le transport du malade à l'auberge et le rétablissement qui s'ensuivit. La grâce divine ne se limite donc pas au pardon accordé par le baptême, sur lequel insiste un adversaire pélagien imaginaire aux lignes 94-95.[16]

§§ 7-8. L'exégèse de Ps 102,2-4 proposée dans les paragraphes suivants souligne une fois de plus que la vie chrétienne tout entière

[15] Augustin fait dépendre Ps 2,13a (*cum exarserit in breui ira eius super uos*) de Ps 2,12b (*ne quando irascatur Dominus et pereatis de uia iusta*). Comparer *Nat. et grat.* 32, 36, où l'évêque développe le même argument qu'ici (voir l'apparat de parallèles). Selon l'*In psalm.* 2, 11, le verset Ps 2,13a dépend de Ps 2,13b (*beati omnes qui confidunt in eum*).

[16] Pour la parabole du bon Samaritain dans l'œuvre d'Augustin, voir D. SANCHIS, Samaritanus ille. *L'exégèse augustinienne de la parabole du bon Samaritain*, dans: *Recherches de science religieuse* 49 (1961) pp. 406-425; M.-F. BERROUARD, *L'interprétation christologique de la parabole du bon Samaritain*, dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 73 A (Paris 1988) pp. 516-517 (n° 33); R. TESKE, *The Good Samaritan (Lk 10:29-37) in Augustine's Exegesis*, in: F. VAN FLETEREN-J.C. SCHNAUBELT, *Augustine. Biblical Exegete* (*Collectanea augustiniana* 5, New York - ... - Oxford 2001) pp. 347-367. Pour les précurseurs de l'interprétation christologique du bon Samaritain proposée par Augustin, voir surtout M.-F. BERROUARD p. 517 et R. TESKE pp. 347 et 358 n. 6.

est régie par la grâce de Dieu et qu'elle ne se limite pas aux dons de la Loi et du libre arbitre ainsi qu'à la rémission des péchés au baptême. Ces versets du psaume réclament la reconnaissance du croyant envers le Seigneur (*Benedic, anima mea, Dominum*, 2a) pour les dons successifs qui jalonnent sa marche vers le salut (*et noli obliuisci omnes retributiones eius*, 2b): **(1)** le pardon des péchés au baptême (3a: *qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis* – ll. 110-111); **(2)** la guérison progressive sous l'action de la grâce au sein de l'Église (3b: *qui sanat omnes languores tuos* – ll. 111-113 ~ ll. 105-108); **(3)** la résurrection (4a: *qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam* – ll. 113-122); **(4)** la glorification céleste (4b: *qui coronat te* …). La glorification n'est pas une récompense pour des mérites préalables, mais l'acte gratuit d'un Dieu miséricordieux (4b: *…in miseratione et misericordia*) (ll. 123-135).[17] A vrai dire, l'homme n'a aucun titre à être appelé, ni à être justifié après la vocation, ni à être glorifié après la justification (l. 130; comparer Rom 8,30).

§§ **9-10.** Il y a des gens qui se considèrent comme de bons chrétiens, mais qui croient pouvoir réaliser la justice sans aide divine. Ignorant la Justice de Dieu, ils ressemblent aux Juifs tels qu'ils sont décrits dans Rom 10,3 (*Ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti* – ll. 136-140). S'opposant à la grâce du Christ, qui est révélée par le Nouveau Testament, ils commettent une faute plus grave que le peuple de l'Ancienne Alliance, auquel la grâce divine était restée cachée (ll. 140-153). Leurs opinions hérétiques sont contredites par le fait même de la venue du Christ, qui perdrait sa signification si la Loi et la nature humaine suffisaient à accomplir la justice (ll. 153-157). Après avoir appliqué une deuxième fois la description des Juifs dans Rom 10,(2-)3 aux Pélagiens (ll. 158-161), Augustin insiste sur le fait que l'hérésie a été condamnée par les conciles de Carthage et de Milev, à l'avis desquels s'est rallié l'évêque de Rome (ll. 163-164). Il déconseille la fausse miséricorde (*peruersa misericordia*, l. 162): il faut s'opposer aux hérétiques et, le cas échéant, les dénoncer auprès des évêques (ll. 161-163). La vraie compassion (*Fratres mei, compatimini mecum* – l. 161) exige que les fidèles attirent l'attention des hétérodoxes (*ut aduertant, monemus*, l. 165), qu'ils leur révèlent la vérité (*ut instruantur, docemus*, l. 165) et surtout – puisque c'est le Père et pas l'homme qui produit l'adhésion intérieure à l'orthodoxie (voir §§ 2-3)

[17] Pour cette exégèse de Ps 102,2-4, qu'on retrouve surtout dans les ouvrages augustiniens contre le Pélagianisme, voir P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches* [n. 14] pp. 411-413 (liste des occurences suivie d'un bref commentaire).

– qu'ils prient pour que leurs adversaires s'y convertissent (*ut mutentur, oremus*, ll. 165-166).[18]

3. La transmission du sermon

3.1. La tradition directe

3.1.1. Le témoignage de quatre collections


Un premier recueil qui nous a transmis le sermon 131 est l'antique collection Sessorienne, dont nous avons collationné les deux témoins principaux:

S[a] - *Roma Bibl. Naz. Vitt. Em. 1357 (VIII ex. / IX)* origine: *Campanie* provenance: *Nonantola, Rome-Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, Chester Beatty* (ff. 47[v]-52[v])

S[b] - *Monte Cassino 11 (ca. 1080)* origine: *Monte Cassino* (pp. 151-154)

Le manuscrit *Napoli Bibl. Naz. Vienn. lat. 14 (XI)* origine: *Napoli San Severino* (*N*) contient, outre des sermons de l'antique collection Campanienne, plusieurs articles de la Sessorienne, y compris le sermon 131 (ff. 84-85[v]). La collection *De uerbis Apostoli*, qui constitue le deuxième volet d'un ensemble plus vaste appelé *De uerbis Domini et Apostoli* (VDA = VD + VA), a emprunté notre sermon à un témoin perdu de la collection Sessorienne. Comme nous l'avons démontré ailleurs, les relations généalogiques de *N*, *S*[a.b] et VA peuvent être représentées de la manière suivante:[19]

[18] Le passage de l'indicatif (*monemus, docemus*, l. 165) au subjonctif (*oremus*, l. 166), grâce auquel le sermon se termine par un triple homoioteleuton, marque la différence entre ce que l'homme peut effectuer (attirer l'attention, enseigner) et ce qui dépend de la volonté divine (donner la foi). Dans la lettre 186 à Paulin de Nole, qui date de la même année que le sermon 131, Augustin se sert de la même triade dans un contexte presque identique au nôtre (le comportement exigé envers les hérétiques + Rm 10,2-3): *Sed quid plura? Non solum ad istos uitandos cauti esse debemus, uerum etiam ad docendos uel monendos, si patiantur, pigrescere non debemus. Plus eis tamen sine dubitatione praestamus, si, ut corrigantur, oremus, ne cum tantis ingeniis uel pereant uel alios perdant praesumptione damnabili,* quia zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam; ignorantes *autem* Dei iustitiam, *id est iustitiam quae ex Deo est,* et suam uolentes constituere iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti [Rm 10,2-3]. [...] *Non autem ideo pro istis non debemus orare, quia, si non corriguntur, eorum imputandum est uoluntati, qui nolunt credere etiam ad hoc ipsum sibi necessariam gratiam Saluatoris quod putant consistere in solis uiribus uoluntatis. Nam et illi quibus sunt isti in hac causa omnino simillimi – de quibus hoc dixit Apostolus, quod* ignorantes Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti – *profecto suae*



Une quatrième collection contenant le sermon 131 est le *Collectorium* de Robert de' Bardi, chancelier de la Sorbonne de 1336 à 1349 (*Valencia Bibl. Univ. 607 (40) (XIV)* origine: *France*). Le texte y figure une première fois dans la quatrième partie (ff. 165^{v}-167), qui est constituée pour la plupart de sermons VDA. La cinquième partie cite les lignes 4-45 (*audiuimus-illa*) de notre sermon (f. 238-238^{v}). On sait depuis longtemps que Robert a emprunté plusieurs articles de sa collection au manuscrit corrigé *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 14292 (XII)* (V^{22} $^{a.c. / p.c.}$).[20] Ceci vaut également, semble-t-il, pour le sermon 131.[21]

uoluntatis uitio non credebant. [...] *Et tamen quia uoluntas, ut ad uera credenda moueatur, non sibi sufficit, nisi per gratiam Deus opituletur, dicente ipso Domino cum de non credentibus loqueretur:* Nemo uenit ad me, nisi ei datum fuerit a Patre [Io 6,66], *propter hoc et apostolus, quamuis eis instanter euangelium praedicaret, parum tamen esse credebat, nisi pro illis etiam oraret ut crederent. Ait enim:* Fratres, bona uoluntas quidem cordis mei et deprecatio ad Deum fit pro illis in salutem [Rm 10,1]*; et tunc adiunxit illa quae diximus:* Testimonium enim illis perhibeo quia zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam, *etc. Oremus ergo pro illis, sancte frater.* (*Epist.* 186, 11, 37-38; *CSEL* 57, pp. 76-78) Pour ce rapprochement de *Serm.* 131, 10 et *Epist.* 186, 11, 37-38, voir B. KURSAWE, *Docere, delectare, movere. Die officia oratoris bei Augustinus in Rhetorik und Gnadenlehre* (*Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums*. Neue Folge. 1. Reihe: *Monographien* 15, Paderborn - [...] - Zürich 2000) pp. 111-112.

[19] La composition et les relations de *N*, $S^{a.b}$ et VA ont été amplement discutées dans G. PARTOENS, *La collection de sermons augustiniens* De verbis Apostoli. *Introduction et liste des manuscrits les plus anciens*, dans: *Revue bénédictine* 111 (2001) pp. 317-352 (en part. pp. 319; 329-338).

[20] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Le Sermon 176 de saint Augustin sur 1 Tim. 1, 15-16, Ps. 94, 2/6 et Lc. 17, 11-19. Introduction et édition*, dans: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 49 (2003) pp. 85-122 (en part. p. 98; avec bibliographie).

[21] La citation partielle dans la cinquième partie contient toutes les variantes du même texte dans V^{22} $^{a.c. / p.c.}$. La version intégrale du sermon dans la quatrième partie contient le bon texte à cinq endroits où V^{22} $^{a.c. / p.c.}$ a conservé une faute (**57** *misericordiam*; **75** *audite*; **78** *humiles*; **79** *utique*; **101** *cum*). Vu qu'il s'agit chaque fois d'une erreur qui se corrige très facilement, ces cas ne posent aucun problème à notre hypothèse (V^{22}: *misericoriam*; *audi* suivi de *quod nostis*; *humilies*; *utque*; *cum* introduisant une subordonnée explicative, mais précédé de *sed*).

3.1.2. Les relations généalogiques des manuscrits VA

a. La classification des manuscrits selon les critères de dom P.-P. VERBRAKEN

Le restant de cet exposé sur la transmission directe du sermon 131 sera consacré aux relations généalogiques de la plupart des témoins VA antérieurs au XIII^e siècle. Il s'inscrit dans une étude générale de la transmission de la collection, à laquelle nous nous consacrons depuis quelques années. L'édition du sermon 131 en constitue un point de départ idéal, puisque la connaissance de la position stemmatique de l'ensemble de nos témoins VA par rapport aux autres branches de la transmission de cette homélie (*N* et $S^{a.b}$) nous permet de reconstruire le texte de l'hyparchétype VA selon une probabilité confinant à la certitude.[22]

Dans l'aperçu suivant, nous avons répartis les 33 témoins étudiés selon la classification proposée par dom P.-P. VERBRAKEN en 1967 (sigles $V^{1\text{-}33}$).[23] Nous avons également indiqué pour chaque manuscrit s'il contient la collection VDA dans sa totalité ou s'il n'en offre que le deuxième volet (VA). Pour des raisons qui seront clarifiées au cours de cette introduction, nous n'avons retenu que 21 manuscrits dans l'apparat critique de l'édition (sigles $V^{a\text{-}u}$).

A

V^1 - *Einsiedeln Stiftsbibl. 140 (XI ex.)* (pp. 3-8)	VA	-
V^2 - *Schaffhausen Stadtbibl. Min. 24 (1080-1096)* (ff. 2^v-5^v)	VA	V^a
V^3 - *Admont Stiftsbibl. 498 (XII)* (ff. 2^v-5^v)	VA	-
V^4 - *Engelberg Stiftsbibl. 16 (1147-1178)* (ff. 136^v-139)	VDA	V^b
V^5 - *Heiligenkreuz Stiftsbibl. 135 (XII^3)* (ff. 2^v-5^v)	VA	-
V^6 - *Zwettl Stiftsbibl. 183 (XII-XIII)* (ff. 171^v-174^v)	VA	-

B

V^7 - *Saint-Omer Bibl. Mun. 77 (XII)* (ff. 79^v-81)	VDA	V^c

B, remanié

V^8 - *Douai Bibl. Mun. 251 (XII ex.)* (ff. 85^v-88)	VA	V^d

[22] Notre démarche est comparable à celle de P.-P. VERBRAKEN, qui a édité trois sermons transmis par la Sessorienne à VD (52, 71 et 112) pour établir un *stemma codicum* des principaux témoins de la collection. Voir G. PARTOENS, *La collection* [n. 19] pp. 328-329.

[23] Nous reprenons la liste des témoins VA que nous avons publiée dans *La collection* [n. 19] pp. 343-350. Pour la classification de VERBRAKEN, voir *La collection de sermons de saint Augustin "De verbis Domini et Apostoli"*, dans: *Revue bénédictine* 77 (1967) pp. 27-46 (en part. pp. 34-38).

B_1

V^9 - *München Bay. Staatsbibl. Clm 14171 (IX)* (ff. 141-143^v)	VDA	V^e
V^{10} - *Saint-Omer Bibl. Mun. 268 (IX)*[24]	VA	-
V^{11} - *Vat. lat. 8566 (X)* (ff. 133-135^v)	VDA	V^f
V^{12} - *Arras Bibl. Mun. 60 (129) (XI)* (ff. 103-104^v)[25]	VDA	V^g
V^{13} - *Avranches Bibl. Mun. 82 (XI^2)* (ff. 75-76)	VDA	V^h
V^{14} - *Eton College Library 106 (XII^1)* (ff. 75^v -77)	VDA	-
V^{15} - *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 12199 (XII^2)* (ff. 142-145)	VDA	V^i
V^{16} - *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16851 (XII)* (ff. 109-111)	VDA	-
V^{17} - *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16854 (XII^3)* (ff. 115^v-117^v)	VDA	V^j

B_1*

V^{18} - *Orléans Bibl. Mun. 164 (141) (IX)* (pp. 218-221)	VDA	V^k
V^{19} - *Rouen Bibl. Mun. 487 (XI-XII)* (ff. 188^v-189^v)	VDA	V^l

B_2

V^{20} - *Vendôme Bibl. Mun. 40 (XI)* (ff. 126-128^v)	VDA	V^m
V^{21} - *Paris Bibl. Maz. 611 (XII)* (ff. 155^v -159)	VDA	-
V^{22} - *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 14292 (XII)* (ff. 64-65^v)	VDA	V^n
V^{23} - *Reims Bibl. Mun. 95 (XII)* (ff. 73^v-75)	VDA	-
V^{24} - *Valenciennes Bibl. Mun. 157 (XII^1)* (ff. 132^v-134^v)	VDA	V^o
V^{25} - *Vat. lat. 476 (XII)* (ff. 2-6^v)[26]	VA	V^p
V^{26} - *Charleville Bibl. Mun. 202.8 (XII^2)* (ff. 1^v-4^v)	VA	V^q

B_2remanié

V^{27} - *Vat. lat. 474 (IX)* (ff. 95-97)	VDA	V^r
V^{28} - *Berlin Theol. lat. 2° 665 (XI)* (ff. 105-107)	VDA	-
V^{29} - *Basel Univ. AN.IV.16 (XI-XII)* (ff. 1^v-4^v)	VA	-
V^{30} - *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 198 (XII)* (ff. 150-152^v)	VDA	V^s
V^{31} - *Vat. lat. 475 (XII)* (ff. 131-133)	VDA	-

B_2augmenté

V^{32} - *Dijon Bibl. Mun. 143 (XII^1)* (ff. 199^v-201^v)	VDA	V^t
V^{33} - *London Brit. Libr. Add. 10942 (XII)* (ff. 89^v-92^v)	VA	V^u

Nous nous sommes attardés ailleurs sur la nature des critères de classification de VERBRAKEN, qui ont été établis surtout sur base d'une

[24] Ce manuscrit du type VA ne contient pas les trois premiers articles de la version courante de la collection (*Serm.* 384, 131 et 163). Comme il résulte des *capitula* contemporains (ff. 1-1^v), ceux-ci n'ont jamais figuré dans le manuscrit.

[25] Dans ce manuscrit, le sermon 131 n'a été transmis que partiellement (62 [*quia*]-166).

[26] Nous avons suggéré ailleurs que V^{25} provient du Prieuré de Sainte-Marie à Novy-les-Moines près de Rethel (*Sancta Maria de Noveio*) (voir G. PARTOENS, *La collection* [n. 19] p. 347). Selon C. MÄRTL, V^{25} proviendrait de 'Sainte-Marie in Neuvy-sur-Loire' (*Kardinal Jean Jouffroy († 1473). Leben und Werk* [*Beiträge zur Geschichte und Quellenkunde des Mittelalters* 18, Sigmaringen 1996] p. 288). Malheureusement, cette hypothèse n'a pas été argumentée.

étude approfondie de la transmission VD. Nous y avons également indiqué les problèmes méthodologiques qui se posent à leur application à l'ensemble des témoins VA.[27] Nous n'y reviendrons plus ici. Relevons seulement que la répartition des manuscrits $V^{1\text{-}33}$ selon les critères de VERBRAKEN n'est pas corroborée par la distribution des variantes pour le sermon 131: alors que les manuscrits du type A ($V^{1\text{-}6}$) sont caractérisés par plusieurs erreurs significatives, il n'en va pas de même pour ceux de la famille B en général ($V^{7\text{-}33}$) et des branches B_1 et B_2 en particulier ($V^{9\text{-}19} + V^{20\text{-}33}$). Quelles seront donc les conclusions qui peuvent se déduire légitimement de la distribution des variantes pour le sermon 131?

b. L'hyparchétype α

Dans un article consacré aux rapports entre les manuscrits du type B_2remanié de VERBRAKEN ($V^{27\text{-}31}$),[28] nous nous sommes concentrés sur six lacunes caractérisant le texte du sermon 153 (VA-4) dans $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}12.(13).16\text{-}23.25.27\ a.c.}$. Ce sermon figure dans *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{1\text{-}33}$ ainsi que dans le petit recueil intitulé *Orationes de concupiscentia carnis aduersus spiritum* représenté ici par *Orléans Bibl. Mun. 159 (IX)* (O^1), *Trier Seminarbibl. 131 (XV)* (O^2) et le florilège augustinien de Florus de Lyon (*flor*).[29]

***PL* 38, c. 827, ll. 15-16:** dicere sensit quid possis (posset V^{24}, posses *N* V^{26}) *N* $V^{7.8.24.26.27\ p.c.\ 30\text{-}33}$] *om.* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}23.25.27\ a.c.\ 28.29}$ $O^{1.2}$ *flor* || **c. 829, ll. 30-31:** quid est quia (quia *om. N* V^7 $O^{1.2}$ *flor*) eramus (quaeramus $S^{a.b}$, erant $O^{1.2}$, essemus *flor*) in carne *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.26.27\ p.c.\ 30\text{-}33}$ $O^{1.2}$ *flor*] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}23.25.27\ a.c.\ 28.29}$ || **ll. 33-34:** aut eis (iam *add.* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24\ a.c.\ 26.27\ p.c.\ 30\text{-}32}$) loquebatur (loquebamur V^{31}) qui iam exierant (exierat S^b) morte (morte *om.* $V^{14.15.27\ secunda\ manu\ 28.29}$ $O^{1.2}$ *flor*, morte $V^{27\ tertia\ manu}$) de ista carne *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.14.15.24.26.27\ p.c.\ 28\text{-}33}$ $O^{1.2}$ *flor*] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}13.16\text{-}23.25.27\ a.c.}$ || **ll. 58-59:** noli expauescere quia dixi migra de carne (tua *add.* $V^{14.15}$ $O^{1.2}$) non tibi (non tibi *om.* $V^{14.15}$ $O^{1.2}$) dixi (non *add.* $O^{1.2}$) ut moriaris *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.14.15.24.26.27\ p.c.\ 30\text{-}32}$ $O^{1.2}$] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}12.16\text{-}23.25.27\ a.c.\ 28.29.33}$, *def.* V^{13}, dixi non ut moriaris *flor* || **c. 832, ll. 13-14:** (sed V^7) ut appareat peccatum $S^{a.b\ p.c.}$ $V^{7.8.26.27\ p.c.\ 30.31}$] *om.* $S^{b\ a.c.}$ $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}12.14\text{-}25.27\ a.c.\ 28.29.32.33}$ $O^{1.2}$ *flor*, *def. N* V^{13} || **l. 14:** quid est $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.26.27\ p.c.\ 28\text{-}31.32\ p.c.}$ $O^{1.2}$ *flor*] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.9\text{-}12.16.17.21.22.25.27\ a.c.\ 32\ a.c.33}$, sed $V^{14.15.18\text{-}20.23}$, *def. N* V^{13}

[27] Voir G. PARTOENS, *La collection* [n. 19] pp. 324-329.

[28] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Une version remaniée de la collection de sermons augustiniens* De uerbis Apostoli *et les relations généalogiques de ses témoins*, dans: *Sacris Erudiri* 41 (2002) pp. 137-163 (en part. pp. 146-147).

[29] Pour ce recueil, voir G. PARTOENS, *Une version remaniée* [n. 28] pp. 147-149; *Le sermon 151 de saint Augustin. Introduction et édition*, dans: *Revue bénédictine* 113 (2003) pp. 18-70 (en part. pp. 32-33; 35-38; 41-43).

Nous croyons avoir démontré dans l'article mentionné que les manuscrits V^{28-31} remontent tous à V^{27} et que les bonnes lectures qu'ils contiennent aux endroits concernés sont le fruit de contamination.[30] La présence des mots *aut eis loquebatur qui iam exierant de ista carne* (c. 829, ll. 33-34) et *noli expauescere quia dixi migra de carne tua dixi ut moriaris* (ll. 58-59) dans les manuscrits $V^{14.15}$ serait également due à une intervention correctrice.[31] L'apparat précédent nous permet donc de postuler un hyparchétype α dont le texte était caractérisé par les lacunes indiquées et auquel remontent tous nos témoins du type A de la classification de VERBRAKEN (V^{1-6}) ainsi qu'une grande partie des manuscrits de sa famille B ($V^{9-23.25.27-31}$). α daterait au plus tard du début du IX^e^ siècle (comparer l'âge de $V^{9.10.18.27}$). La distribution de quelques variantes pour le sermon 131 semble confirmer notre hypothèse:

46 nos docens (*cens V^{32}) *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.26.32.33}$] docens nos $V^{1\text{-}6.9.11.13\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$, *def.* $V^{10.12}$ || **89** ista $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.26.30\ p.c.\ 31\text{-}33}$ (*cf. etiam uerba* ut ista non dicas *pro* nisi quando ista dicit *in N*)] hoc $V^{1.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23.25}$, *om.* $V^{2\text{-}6.9.11.12.16.17.21.22.27\text{-}29.30\ a.c.}$, uel hoc dicat $V^{3\ s.l.}$, *def.* V^{10} || **125** tumidum *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8\ i.t.\ 24.26.32.33}$] turgidum $V^{1.3\text{-}6.9.11\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$, euangelii V^{2}, uel turgidum $V^{8\ s.l.}$, *def.* V^{10} || **142** ergo *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.32\ a.c.\ 33}$] ut intelligant V^{1}, intellexisse $V^{2.4.9.11\text{-}16.19.20.22\ a.c.\ 23.27\text{-}29.30\ a.c.\ 32\ p.c.}$ (*del.* $V^{30\ p.c.}$, *om.* V^{31}), non intellexisse $V^{3.5\ a.c.\ 6.22\ p.c.}$, non intellexisse quos $V^{5\ p.c.\ 21.25.26}$, intellectu V^{17}, intell* $V^{18\ a.c.}$, intellegere $V^{18\ p.c.}$, *def.* V^{10} || **150** inuenis *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.26.32.33}$] inuenies $V^{2\text{-}6.9.11.12.14\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$, *non leg.* V^{1}, *def.* $V^{10.13}$ || **159** testimonium-habent *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{7.8.24.26.32.33}$] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.9.11\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$, *def.* V^{10} || **164** error *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{8.24.26.32.33}$] *post* finiatur $V^{1\text{-}7.9.11.12.13\ p.c.\ 14\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$, *ante* finiatur $V^{13\ a.c.}$, *def.* V^{10}

$V^{7.8.24.26.32.33}$, qui appartiennent tous à la famille B de VERBRAKEN, ne remontent pas à α ou n'en dépendent que partiellement (en cas de contamination: comparer la situation dans $V^{14.15.28\text{-}31}$). Ils ne semblent pas constituer une branche dont l'hyparchétype se situerait au même niveau que α: ni pour le sermon 131 (VA-2), ni pour 153 (VA-4), nous n'avons trouvé d'erreurs significatives caractérisant l'ensemble de ces six manuscrits.


c. Les manuscrits dépendant d'α (y compris $V^{14.15.28\text{-}31}$)

Plusieurs groupes de manuscrits apparentés peuvent être identifiés à l'intérieur de $V^{1\text{-}6.9.11\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$ (V^{10} ne contient pas le sermon 131

[30] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Une version remaniée* [n. 28] pp. 146-154.
[31] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Une version remaniée* [n. 28] p. 148 n. 32.

[n. 24]). Il s'est révélé toutefois impossible d'établir un arbre généalogique englobant l'ensemble de ces témoins.

(1) La distribution des variantes pour le sermon 131 confirme la parenté des manuscrits de la famille A de VERBRAKEN ($V^{1\text{-}6}$)[32] ainsi que le stemma que nous avons proposé dans un article consacré à la transmission du sermon 176 (VA-10):[33]



[32] **6** quorum] quod *N* $V^{1\text{-}6.17.33}$ || **12-13** murmura cogitationis] murmura cordis *N*, murmur ac cogitationes $V^{1\text{-}6}$, murmur cogitationis $V^{8.16.21.22.25}$, murmura cogitationes V^{11}, murmura cognouisset cogitationis $V^{17\ a.c.}$, murmur cogitationum $V^{24.26}$ || **34** cui] cum *N* $V^{1\text{-}6.23}$ || **47** inde aliquid] aliquid inde $V^{1\text{-}6}$ || **56** dederat] erat $V^{1\text{-}6}$ || **71** sicut] sic et *N* $V^{3.7.13\text{-}15.18.19.21.25.26.30\ p.c.\ 31.33}$, sic $V^{1.2.4\text{-}6.22\ p.c.\ 23}$ || **125** corona illa] coronam $V^{1\text{-}6}$, illa $V^{22\ a.c.\ 25}$, ipsa V^{21} || **130** iustificatum] et *praem.* $V^{1\text{-}6}$ || **135** bene] bona $V^{1\text{-}6}$ || **136** ergo] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6}$ || domini] est *add.* $V^{1\text{-}6.19}$ || **141** occultae] occultatae $V^{1\text{-}6.24}$ || temporibus[2]] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6}$, tempus $V^{20.23}$ || **144** hoc] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.11.16}$.

[33] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Le sermon 176 de saint Augustin* [n. 20] pp. 95-96. Variantes typiques de $V^{1\text{-}3.5.6}$: **45** iusta] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}3.5.6}$, iuxta V^{9}, iusti $V^{22\ p.c.}$, ista V^{25} || **65** largitore] largiente $V^{1\text{-}3.5.6}$, largitorem V^{11}, *non leg.* V^{14}, largi*te $V^{17\ a.c.}$ || **116** ubi[2]-tuus] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}3.5.6}$. Vu que $V^{1.2}$ sont plus anciens que V^{4}, les manuscrits $V^{1\text{-}3.5.6}$ ne peuvent remonter à ce dernier. Variantes typiques de $V^{1.3.5.6}$: **43** patre] meo *add.* $V^{1.3.5.6.17.21.25.26.30.31.33}$ || **54** uia] uita $V^{1.3.5.6}$ || **55** quadam (quaedam $V^{21\ a.c.}$) abundantia] abundantia quadam $V^{1.3.5.6}$, abundantia $V^{13.25\ a.c.}$ || **113** corruptione] interitu $V^{1.3.5.6}$, corruptio $V^{4\ a.c.}$, corruptione* $V^{14\ a.c.}$ || **119** uerba (mea *add.* $V^{24\ a.c.}$) sunt] sunt uerba $V^{1.3.5.6}$, *ante* non (l. 119) V^{7} || **165** monemus] admonemus $V^{1.3.5.6}$. $V^{1.3.5.6}$ ne remontent pas à V^{2}: **13** auditos] auditores V^{2} || **47** ipsorum] *om.* *N*, et *praem.* $V^{2.27\text{-}29}$, *legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{30\ a.c.}$ (et?) || **125** tumidum] turgidum $V^{1.3\text{-}6.9.11\text{-}23.25.27\text{-}31}$, euangelii V^{2}, uel turgidum $V^{8\ s.l.}$. Variantes typiques de $V^{3.5.6}$: **73** uideo] enim *add.* $V^{3.5.6}$, uides V^{7} || **86-87** dei donum] donum dei *N* $V^{3.5.6.20.23}$, donum *add.* V^{21} || **88** hoc[1]] *om.* $V^{3.5.6}$, haec V^{21} || **135** dona sunt] sunt dona $V^{3.5.6}$ || **146-147** petiuit alterum] alterum petiuit $V^{3.5.6}$ || **147** signum] a domino *add.* $V^{3.5.6}$ || **158** de] *om.* $V^{3.5.6}$ || **162** non-nolite] *om.* $V^{3.5.6.29}$. $V^{3.5.6}$ ne peuvent

L'*editio princeps* d'Amerbach/Dodon (Bâle 1494; *am*) dépend d'un manuscrit VA qui remontait à l'hyparchétype β^1, mais qui était indépendant de β^2.[34] Ce modèle était probablement fort apparenté à notre V^2 provenant de l'abbaye d'Allerheiligen à Schaffhausen.[35] Par l'intermédiaire de l'édition suisse, la branche représentée par $V^{1\text{-}6}$ a influencé le texte des Mauristes (Paris 1683; *maur*). Celui-ci n'est basé sur aucun témoin VA du type A de VERBRAKEN,[36] mais contient toutefois quelques variantes typiques de β et de β^1 (**34** *cui*, **47** *inde aliquid*, **116** *ubi*^{2}*-tuus*).

(**2**) Dans l'introduction à l'édition du sermon 176 (VA-10), nous avons signalé une certaine parenté entre $V^{10.11.16}$. Elle est confirmée pour les deux derniers manuscrits par la transmission du sermon 131 (qui fait défaut dans V^{10} [n. 24]).[37] Préparant l'édition des sermons 153-156, nous avons pu constater que ces manuscrits du type B_1 selon la classification de VERBRAKEN partagent plusieurs fautes caractéristiques avec $V^{1\text{-}6}$, c'est-à-dire avec sa famille A. Cette distribution de variantes se retrouve quatre fois pour le sermon 131.[38] L. DE CONINCK,

remonter à V^1: **142** ergo] ut intelligant V^1, intellexisse $V^{2.4.9.11\text{-}16.19.20.22\ a.c.\ 23.27\text{-}29.30\ a.c.\ 32\ p.c.}$ (*del.* $V^{30\ p.c.}$, *om.* V^{31}), non intellexisse $V^{3.5\ a.c.\ 6.22\ p.c.}$, non intellexisse quos $V^{5\ p.c.\ 21.25.26}$, intellectu V^{17}, intell* $V^{18\ a.c.}$, intellegere $V^{18\ p.c.}$. Variantes typiques de $V^{5.6}$: **6** dixit] dicit $V^{5.6}$, dedit $V^{24.26}$ || **142** manifestae] manifestatae $V^{5.6.25}$, reuelatae V^{24} || **152** christiani] uos *praem.* *N*, o *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23.30\ p.c.\ 31}$, christianis $V^{5.6.26.30\ a.c.}$. $V^{5.6}$ ne remontent pas à V^3: **7** aliud] sunt *add.* V^3 || **18** nobis] *om.* $V^{3.17}$, salutem et *add.* V^{26} || **23** corpus et sanguis (sanguinis V^{11}) christi] corpus christi et sanguinis V^3 (sanguis $V^{3\ p.c.}$) || **30** dominus] *om.* V^3 || **32** sed] et V^3. Après correction, $V^{5\ a.c.\ /\ p.c.}$ contient quelques variantes qui sont absentes de V^6, mais qui ne mettent pas en doute la dépendance du dernier par rapport au premier (**90**: *arbitii* au lieu de *arbitrii*; **113**: *quis* au lieu de *qui*; **114**: *corrumptione* au lieu de *corruptione*; **126**: *corona te* au lieu de *coronat te*^{2}).

[34] *Am* contient les variantes typiques de β [n. 32] et β^1 [n. 33]. L'édition ne contient aucune variante typique de β^2 [n. 33]. Pour les sources de l'édition d'Amerbach, voir P.-P. VERBRAKEN, *Les éditions successives des "Sermons" de saint Augustin*, dans: *Troisième centenaire de l'édition mauriste de saint Augustin* (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité* 127, Paris 1990) pp. 157-167 (en part. p. 158).

[35] L'édition d'Amerbach contient une des *lectiones singulares* de ce manuscrit: *auditores* au lieu de *auditos* à la ligne 13 [n. 33].

[36] Voir C. LAMBOT, *Les manuscrits des sermons de saint Augustin utilisés par les Mauristes*, dans: *Revue bénédictine* 79 (1969) pp. 98-114 (en part. pp. 102 [III]; 108).

[37] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Le sermon 176 de saint Augustin* [n. 20] p. 97. Variantes typiques de $V^{11.16}$: **39** nauigabat] nauigauit $V^{11.16.27\text{-}31}$, nauigat $V^{22\ a.c.}$ || **70** putabas] putabis $V^{11.16\ a.c.}$ || **82** aut] ait $V^{11.16}$ || **131** saluae factae] salui facti $V^{11.16}$, salui factae $V^{18\ a.c.}$ || **139** christianos] christionos S^b, christiani $V^{11.16}$, christianius $V^{27\ a.c.}$ || **148** repete] attende *N*, repente S^b, repetit $V^{11.27\ a.c.}$, repetet V^{16}, repeti $V^{30\ a.c.}$ || **149** quasi uellus] quas uellum $V^{11\ a.c.}$, quasi uellum $V^{16\ a.c.\ 27\ a.c.}$ || **156** nos istis] nostis $V^{11.16}$.

[38] **74** praeuenitis] peruenitis $V^{2.4.11.27\text{-}29}$, praeuenistis V^{16} || praeuenistis] praeuenitis $S^{a\ a.c.}$ $V^{1.3.5.6.9.12\text{-}15.16\ p.c.\ 17\text{-}26.33}$, peruenitis $V^{2.4.11.27\ a.c.\ 28.29}$, *om.* $V^{16\ a.c.}$ || **88** tertio] in *praem.* $V^{1\text{-}6.11.16}$ || **144** hoc] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6.11.16}$.

B. COPPIETERS 'T WALLANT et R. DEMEULENAERE, qui préparent actuellement une étude des relations généalogiques des principaux témoins du volet VD de VDA, ont fait une observation analogue: 'La tradition A_2 [= un groupe de manuscrits auquel appartient *Engelberg Stiftsbibl. 16* [V^4], notre seul témoin du type A à contenir les volets VD et VA (A_2^9 dans le *conspectus siglorum* de DE CONINCK, COPPIETERS et DEMEULENAERE)] se rapproche parfois du texte de la branche B_1. C'est ce qui ressort d'une façon assez spectaculaire dans le fait que les mss. $A_2^{3.6.9}$ ont le sermon 112 (VD 33) incomplet,[39] le trait distinctif de B_1 par excellence;[40] dans A_2^6 la lacune a été comblée en marge par le correcteur. Ces trois mss. ne sont aucunement les seuls de leur groupe à s'accorder de temps en temps avec B_1.'[41]

(3) Quelques variantes, qui sont le fruit d'une manipulation intentionnelle du texte de notre sermon, suggèrent une parenté entre $V^{13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23}$:

> **51** tremore] fac *add.* $V^{13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23}$ || **65** impleam] implear $V^{7.22\ p.c.\ 26.30\ p.c.}$ *maur*, impleor $V^{13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23.31}$, complaceam $V^{21\ i.t.}$, uel inpleam $V^{21\ s.l.}$ || **89** ista] hoc $V^{1.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23.25}$, *om.* $V^{2\text{-}6.9.11.12.16.17.21.22.27\text{-}29.30\ a.c.}$, uel hoc dicat $V^{3\ s.l.}$

V^7, dont nous avons dit qu'il a retenu de bonnes lectures qui ne peuvent remonter à l'hyparchétype α, partage des variantes du même type raisonné avec $V^{13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23}$ ou au moins avec $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19}$ (il n'y a pas de variantes typiques de $V^{7.20.23}$):

> **64** ad] et *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18.19}$ || **72** timore] inquit *add.* $V^{7.13.14.18.19}$ + tremore] inquit *add.* V^{15} || **98** semiuiuus] carissimi *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.22\ p.c.\ 23}$ || **141** prius] sed *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23}$ || **152** ignoscitur] ignoscetur $V^{1\text{-}9.11\text{-}16.18\text{-}32}$, tandem *add.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.22\ p.c.\ 23.30\ p.c.\ 31}$ + christiani] uos *praem. N*, o *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23.30\ p.c.\ 31}$, christianis $V^{5.6.26.30\ a.c.}$

Nous excluons pour deux raisons que les leçons indiquées aient été introduites au VIII^e^ / IX^e^ siècle (comparer la datation de V^{18}: IX^e^ siècle) dans une source dépendant d'α sur base d'une collation avec un précurseur lointain de V^7 (XII^e^ siècle) et transmises ensuite aux

[39] $A_2^{3.6}$: *München Bay. Staatsbibl. Clm 21231 (XI-XII)*; *Stuttgart Landesbibl. HB VII 19 (XII$^{2/4}$)*.

[40] Dans les manuscrits du type B_1(*), *Serm.* 112 (VD-33) se termine par *obdormiam in morte* (*Rev. bén.* 76 [1966] p. 53, l. 178) au lieu de *nascetur intus voluntas* (p. 54, ll. 189-190). Comparer P.-P. VERBRAKEN, *La collection* [n. 23] p. 34.

[41] Citation empruntée à une version provisoire du livre L. DE CONINCK-R. DEMEULENAERE-B. COPPIETERS 'T WALLANT, *La tradition manuscrite du recueil* De Verbis Domini *jusqu'au XII^e^ siècle. Prolégomènes à une édition critique des* Sermones ad Populum *d'Augustin d'Hippone sur les Évangiles (ss. 51 à 147)*, qui sera publié prochainement dans la série *Instrumenta Patristica*.

manuscrits $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19(.20.23)}$: **(1)** les variantes caractéristiques de $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18.19(.20.23)}$ et de $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19(.20.23)}$ ont toutes le même caractère raisonné; **(2)** en cas d'une influence d'un précurseur de V^7 sur $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19(.20.23)}$, ces derniers auraient en toute vraisemblance été purifiés d'au moins quelques fautes typiques d'α; or, nous n'avons trouvé aucune variante qui caractérise les manuscrits $V^{1\text{-}6.9.11.12.16.17(.20).21.22(.23).25.27\text{-}31}$ à un endroit où $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19(.20.23)}$ offrent le bon texte. Les données du dernier apparat nous semblent donc plutôt le résultat d'un croisement d'une source indépendant d'α et une autre qui remontait à cet hyparchétype et contenait les variantes indiquées.

Les manuscrits $V^{13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23}$, dont les cinq premiers font preuve d'une parenté ultérieure,[42] appartiennent à trois groupes différents de la classification de VERBRAKEN: B_1 ($V^{13\text{-}15}$), B_1* ($V^{18.19}$) et B_2 ($V^{20.23}$).

- $V^{18.19}$: Dans les manuscrits du type B_1* de VERBRAKEN, les sermons VA consacrés aux épîtres catholiques font défaut (VA-25 jusqu'à VA-34).[43] Cette branche doit avoir vu le jour de bonne heure, comme le démontrent l'âge de V^{18} (IX^e^ siècle) et le fait que celui-ci ne peut être un ancêtre de V^{19}.[44] Le grand nombre de manuscrits du genre B_1* dans les listes des témoins V(D)A établies par VERBRAKEN démontre la popularité dont jouissait cette famille au Moyen Âge.[45]
- V^{13}: Selon les critères de VERBRAKEN, le manuscrit V^{13}, qui date du XII^e^ siècle et a perdu la plus grande partie des sermons VA suite à un incendie, est un manuscrit du type B_1: il en a les traits distinctifs, tandis que les *capitula* au ff. 2-2^v démontrent qu'il contenait à l'origine les sermons VA consacrés aux épîtres catholiques.[46] On

[42] **9-10** ipsa (ipse $V^{21\ a.c.}$) uita] uita ipsa $V^{4\ a.c.}$, ipsam uitam V^7, est *praem.* $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19}$ || **64** ad] et *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18.19}$ || **72** timore] inquit *add.* $V^{7.13.14.18.19}$ + tremore] inquit *add.* V^{15}.


[43] Pour ce trait distinctif, voir P.-P. VERBRAKEN, *La collection* [n. 23] p. 35. Pour la composition du manuscrit V^{19}, voir G. PARTOENS, *La collection* [n. 19] p. 328: 'Bien que la partie VA de ce manuscrit ne contienne que les sermons du premier groupe sur les épîtres pauliniennes (B1*) et que nos collations aient démontré que son texte du sermon 153 (VA-4) est un représentant typique du rameau B1*, sa partie VD n'a pas les caractéristiques de la branche B1. Or, le professeur L. De Coninck, qui prépare actuellement avec B. Coppieters et R. Demeulenaere une édition des sermons 51 à 70A, nous a signalé que cette partie du manuscrit contient la plupart des variantes caractéristiques de la branche B2.' + n. 42: 'En plus, la partie VD du manuscrit a été corrigée par une seconde main sur base d'un modèle du type B1*'.

[44] Voir **58-59** *non-mea*; **63** *unde*; **72** *est*; **109** *dominum*.

[45] Les listes de témoins V(D)A publiées par VERBRAKEN en 1967 (*La collection* [n. 23] pp. 42-43;45) contiennent plus de 30 exemplaires du type B_1*(*).

[46] Le dernier *capitulum* lisible au f. 2^v est LXXXXIIII *Item eiusdem de uerbis Pauli Apostoli: Vt de dormientibus non contristemur* [...] *quae pro eis celebrantur* (= VDA-96 / VA-32 / *Serm.* 172). Pour les traits distinctifs de B_1, voir P.-P. VERBRAKEN, *La collection* [n. 23] pp. 34-35.

pourrait donc croire que V^{13} est un exemple tardif d'un sous-groupe à l'intérieur de B_1 auquel remonterait l'hyparchétype de nos témoins $V^{18.19}$ (B_1*). Pour le sermon 131, $V^{18.19}$ ne partagent toutefois aucune faute significative à un endroit où V^{13} offre le bon texte, ce qui semble exclure un stemma du type suivant:[47]



Si l'on accepte que la suppression des épîtres catholiques ne s'est pas produite de façon indépendante dans $V^{18.19}$, la 'contradiction' entre la distribution de ce trait distinctif et celle des variantes textuelles s'explique de façon la plus économique par l'hypothèse que V^{13} remonte à un témoin du même type que $V^{18.19}$ (B_1* selon la classification de VERBRAKEN) auquel furent ajoutés les sermons sur les épîtres catholiques.[48]

[47] Nous parlons ici de *n'importe quelle* variante commune à $V^{18.19}$ (y comprises celles que ces deux manuscrits partagent avec n'importe quel autre manuscrit). La seule faute présente dans $V^{18.19}$ et absente de V^{13} est la forme *accipe* au lieu de *accepi* à la ligne 95. Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une faute significative (comparer la correction de *accipe* en *accepi* dans V^{18}), cette constatation ne pose pas de problèmes à notre hypothèse. Aux autres endroits où notre apparat critique signale une faute dans $V^{18.19}$ sans mentionner sa présence dans V^{13}, ceci est dû au fait que ce dernier manuscrit contient une lacune à l'endroit concerné (**16** *concisurus*) ou que les lignes en question y sont devenues illisibles à cause de mutilations subies lors d'un incendie (**49** *uallem + suscipite*, **115** *fit*, **116** *est*^{2}, **120** *nusquam*, **150** *inuenis*). Un contrôle supplémentaire sur microfilm a relevé que V^{13} contenait en toute vraisemblance également les fautes de $V^{18.19}$ pour **49** *suscipite*, **115** *fit*, **120** *nusquam*, **150** *inuenis*. Ce contrôle était impossible pour **49** *uallem* et **116** *est*^{2}.

[48] Vu que V^{13} se termine abruptement au f. 79^v après le début du sermon VA-5 (*Serm.* 154), nous n'avons pu corroborer cette hypothèse par l'édition du sermon 176 (VA-10).

– $V^{14.15}$: Le cas de ces manuscrits, qui appartiennent à la famille B_1 de VERBRAKEN et partagent plusieurs variantes uniques,[49] est comparable à celui de V^{13}. Ici non plus, nous ne sommes pas portés à les considérer comme des représentants tardifs d'un sous-groupe à l'intérieur de B_1 dont serait issue la branche B_1*. Leur version du sermon 131 remonte plutôt à un manuscrit du même type que $V^{18.19}$ (B_1* selon la classification de VERBRAKEN). Le bon texte qui se retrouve ici à quelques endroits où $V^{18.19}$ contiennent une faute identique,[50] s'explique probablement par le fait que $V^{14.15}$ offrent une version corrigée du sermon.[51] Les recherches de L. DE CONINCK ont abouti à la même conclusion: selon lui, V^{15} contiendrait 'des sermons VD d'un type B_1* plutôt corrompu' (DE CONINCK n'a pas étudié notre manuscrit V^{14}).[52]
– $V^{20.23}$: Ces manuscrits, qui se caractérisent par plusieurs fautes typiques,[53] s'accordent sur quelques leçons avec $V^{13\text{-}15.18.19}$ (B_1* au sens élargi = 'B_1*'). Ils appartiennent néanmoins à la famille B_2 de VERBRAKEN. Selon L. DE CONINCK, le texte des sermons VD dans V^{20} - il n'a pas impliqué V^{23} dans ses recherches - est fort apparenté à la version qu'en donnent quatre manuscrits anciens appartenant à la famille B_2 de VERBRAKEN, c'est-à-dire notre V^{27} ainsi que trois témoins qui ne contiennent que la collection VD: *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 2013 (IX)*, *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 2015 (IX)* et *Autun Bibl. Mun. Sém. 14 (X^2)*. Ayant constaté une certaine parenté supplémentaire entre V^{20} et les exemplaires du type 'B_1*' qu'il avait consultés (nos manuscrits $V^{15.18}$ ainsi que *Lincoln Cathedral 90 (XII in.)* et *Durham Cathedral B II 18 (XII^1)*), DE CONINCK a conclu que V^{20} remonte à un manuscrit du

[49] **26** inquit quidam] quidam inquit $V^{14.15}$, ex uobis *add.* V^{17} || **32** ergo] *om.* $V^{14.15}$ || **49** in uobis] *om.* $V^{14.15}$ || **64** custodirem] ostendisti-erat (l. 62) *add.* $V^{14.15}$, fortitudinem meam *add.* $V^{32.33}$ || **83** de illa] *om.* $V^{14\ a.c.\ 15}$ || **109-110** quas retributiones] *om.* $V^{14.15}$.

[50] Voir **49** *uallem*; **120** *nusquam*.

[51] Comparer ce que nous avons dit plus haut concernant les additions secondaires dans le texte du sermon 153 dans ces manuscrits.

[52] Ces paroles furent empruntées à la version provisoire du texte de L. DE CONINCK-R. DEMEULENAERE-B. COPPIETERS 'T WALLANT annoncé dans la n. 41.

[53] Comparer la situation pour le sermon 176 (G. PARTOENS, *Le sermon 176 de saint Augustin* [n. 20] p. 97). Variantes typiques de $V^{20.23}$: **19** breuiter soluit] soluit breuiter $V^{20.23}$ || **41** praedicato christo (christum $V^{22\ a.c.}$) crucifixo] praedicatum christum crucifixum $V^{20.22\ p.c.\ 23}$ || **65** seruatore] seruatorem S^a, saluatore $V^{20.23}$ || **71** cum] in $V^{20.23}$, *om.* $V^{32\ a.c.}$ || **92-93** transiens samaritanus] samaritanus transiens $V^{20.23}$ || **99** et uinum] et oleum V^{19}, *om.* $V^{20.23}$ || suis] atque uinum *add.* $V^{20.23}$ || **116-117** ibi-tuus] *om.* $V^{20.22.23}$ || **117** inuenies] inuenis $V^{7.25.26}$, ibi recte quaeris *add.* $V^{20.23}$ || **132** merces] *post* imputatur $V^{20.23}$ || **141** temporibus^2] *om.* $V^{1\text{-}6}$, tempus $V^{20.23}$ || **143** a domino signum] signum a domino $V^{20.23}$ || **157** christus] *post* est $V^{20.23}$, *post* gratis $V^{21.33}$.

type B_2 de VERBRAKEN corrigé sur base d'un témoin de la branche 'B_1*'. Contrairement au cas de la collection VD, la distribution des variantes pour le sermon 131 ne nous permet pas d'en déduire une parenté spécifique entre tous les témoins de la famille B_2 de VERBRAKEN en général ($V^{20\text{-}33}$) ou entre les manuscrits $V^{20.23.27(\text{-}31)}$ en particulier.[54] Nous avons démontré ailleurs qu'on ne peut appliquer les résultats d'une étude généalogique des témoins VD à la transmission de la collection VA si cette dernière ne les confirme pas de façon évidente.[55] Pour cette raison, nous préférons nous limiter ici à la simple constatation d'une certaine parenté entre les volets VA dans $V^{20.23}$ et nos témoins de 'B1*' ($V^{13\text{-}15.18.19}$). L'édition d'autres sermons VA nous permettra peut-être d'en préciser la nature.

Nous avons vu plus haut que V^7 est le fruit du croisement de 'B_1*' avec une source indépendante d'α, tandis que $V^{20.23}$ sont issus peut-être de la contamination de cette famille avec une autre branche de la transmission. En outre, un correcteur a introduit des variantes caractéristiques de 'B_1*' dans $V^{22.30}$.[56] L'impact par contamination de 'B_1*' s'explique en toute vraisemblance de la même façon que la large diffusion dans l'Europe médiévale des manuscrits du type B_1* pur: le texte de ce groupe est le fruit d'une manipulation du texte augustinien avec le but d'en améliorer la lisibilité (voir plus haut).[57]

(4) La distribution de variantes pour le sermon 131 confirme l'affinité des manuscrits $V^{21.22.25}$ que nous avons démontrée ailleurs sur base de la transmission du sermon 176. On trouve en effet des variantes typiques de $V^{21.22.25}$, de $V^{21.22}$, de $V^{21.25}$ et de $V^{22.25}$.[58]

[54] La seule variante plaidant éventuellement en faveur d'une parenté spécifique entre $V^{20.23.27}$ se trouve à la ligne 74: clamando^2] quia *praem.* $V^{20.23.27\text{-}31}$ (les manuscrits $V^{28\text{-}31}$ dépendent ici de V^{27}).

[55] Voir G. PARTOENS, *La collection* [n. 19] pp. 327-328.

[56] **98** semiuiuus] carissimi *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.22\ p.c.\ 23}$ || **152** ignoscitur] ignoscetur $V^{1\text{-}9.11\text{-}16.18\text{-}32}$, tandem *add.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.22\ p.c.\ 23.30\ p.c.\ 31}$ + christiani] uos *praem. N*, o *praem.* $V^{7.13\text{-}15.18\text{-}20.23.30\ p.c.\ 31}$, christianis $V^{5.6.26.30\ a.c.}$.

[57] Comparer le jugement de DE CONINCK dans l'étude de la transmission de la collection VD que nous avons annoncée dans la n. 41: 'Le rameau B_1* a eu de l'impact à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur de la branche B_1.' Il a repéré cette influence dans nos manuscrits $V^{7.20.30}$ ainsi que dans *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 12200 (XIII)*, *Angers Bibl. Mun. 156 (XII)* et le volet VD de *Rouen Bibl. Mun. 487* (qui est du type B_2, tandis que sa partie VA - notre V^{19} - appartient à la branche B_1* [n. 43]).

[58] **12-13** murmura cogitationis] murmura cordis *N*, murmur ac cogitationes $V^{1\text{-}6}$, murmur cogitationis $V^{8.16.21.22.25}$, murmura cogitationes V^{11}, murmura cognouisset cogitationis $V^{17\ a.c.}$, murmur cogitationum $V^{24.26}$ || **13** uoce] uocem $V^{21.22.25}$ || **25** audiuimus] audimus $V^{21\ a.c.\ 22}$ || **31** nemo] et *praem.* $V^{21.25}$ || **36** enim] *om.* $V^{19\ a.c.\ 30}$, ergo V^{21}, autem $V^{22.25}$ || **48-49** et^1-uobis] *om.* $V^{16\ a.c.\ 21\ a.c.\ 25}$ || **52-53** -pere^1-iustam] $V^{22\ in\ rasura}$ + **52** sed-sapere^2] *om.* $V^{21.25}$ || **70-71** de^1-quid] $V^{22\ in\ rasura}$ + **70** et-tuo^2] *om.*

(5) Les manuscrits appartenant à la branche B_2remanié de VERBRAKEN ($V^{27\text{-}31}$) sont caractérisés par plusieurs fautes caractéristiques.[59] Nous avons démontré ailleurs[60] à propos de la transmission des sermons 153 (VA-4) et 176 (VA-10) que $V^{28.29}$ descendent en droite ligne de $V^{27\ a.c.\ /\ p.c.}$,[61] tandis que V^{30} a subi au moins quelques influences de ce manuscrit corrigé. Nous croyons avoir prouvé également que $V^{30\ a.c.\ /\ p.c.}$ a servi de modèle à copier et que V^{31} dépend d'un descendant retouché de ce manuscrit.[62]

d. Les manuscrits (partiellement?) indépendants d'α ($V^{7.8.24.26.32.33}$)

Comme il a été indiqué plus haut, la distribution des variantes pour le sermon 131 permet uniquement de postuler l'indépendance (partielle?) de ces six témoins par rapport à α. Nous n'avons pas trouvé d'erreurs typiques de $V^{7.8.24.26.32.33}$, qui nous permettraient de les faire remonter à un hyparchétype à la même hauteur que celui-ci. Deux groupes de manuscrits apparentés peuvent être identifiés:

(1) Les manuscrits $V^{24.26}$ originaires du Nord de la France (respectivement de Saint-Amand-en-Pévèle et de Signy).[63]

$V^{12.21.25}$ || **77** dominus] *om.* $V^{21\ a.c.\ 22\ a.c.}$ || **120** nusquam] numquam $V^{12.16\ a.c.\ 18.19.21.22\ a.c.\ 25}$, quia *praem.* $V^{14.15.18.19}$, ubi *praem.* $V^{21.25}$ || conscientiam] conscientem V^{9}, conscientia $V^{11.16.33}$, scientiam $V^{21.22\ a.c.}$, tuam *add.* V^{25} || **125** corona illa] coronam $V^{1\text{-}6}$, illa $V^{22\ a.c.\ 25}$, ipsa V^{21} || **126** coronat te[2]] corona te *N* $V^{2.22.27\text{-}29}$, coronat sed V^{3}, coronate $V^{9\ a.c.\ 12.18}$, coronam te $V^{9\ p.c.}$, coron* V^{13}, coronant me V^{16}, qui *praem.* V^{17}, coronam $V^{21.25}$, corona V^{26}, coronat * $V^{32\ a.c.}$, coronat $V^{32\ p.c.}$, coronat me V^{33} || **142** ergo] ut intelligant V^{1}, intellexisse $V^{2.4.9.11\text{-}16.19.20.22\ a.c.\ 23.27\text{-}29.30\ a.c.\ 32\ p.c.}$ (*del.* $V^{30\ p.c.}$, *om.* V^{31}), non intellexisse $V^{3.5\ a.c.\ 6.22\ p.c.}$, non intellexisse quos $V^{5\ p.c.\ 21.25.26}$, intellectu V^{17}, intell* $V^{18\ a.c.}$, intellegere $V^{18\ p.c.}$ || **165** aduertant] auertant $V^{21.25}$.

[59] **21** reficeris[1]] reficieris V^{17}, refice $V^{27\ a.c.}$, reficere $V^{27\ p.c.\ 28.29.30\ i.t.\ 31}$, uel -is $V^{30\ s.l.}$ || **24** manducetur] manducatur $V^{4\ a.c.\ 27\text{-}30}$ + bibatur] bibitur $V^{9.27\ a.c.\ 28\text{-}30}$, bibetur V^{11} || **35** colligatur] colligitur $V^{9.27\text{-}29.30\ a.c.}$ || **39** nauigabat] nauigauit $V^{11.16.27\text{-}31}$, nauigat $V^{22\ a.c.}$ || **57** misericordiam] misericordia $S^{a.b}$, misericordis V^{17}, misericoriam V^{22}, per *praem.* $V^{27\text{-}29.32\ p.c.}$, *legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{30\ a.c.}$ || confessum] confessus $V^{9\ a.c.}$, esse atque *add.* $V^{27\text{-}31}$, esse et *add.* $V^{32\ p.c.}$ || **72** ipsorum] *om. N* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*), et *praem.* $V^{27\text{-}29}$, *legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{30\ a.c.}$ (et?) || **74** clamando[2]] quia *praem.* $V^{20.23.27\text{-}31}$ || **102** regnum] regna $V^{27\text{-}31}$.

[60] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Une version remaniée* [n. 28] pp. 137-163.

[61] Ceci est confirmé par la transmission du *Serm.* 131. $V^{28.29}$ en offrent un texte qui contient les variantes non rectifiées de V^{27} (à une exception près: **62** quod $V^{28.29}$] quo V^{27}), tandis qu'ils s'accordent pour la plupart avec les interventions (correctes ou erronnées) de $V^{27\ p.c.}$.

[62] Le fait que V^{31} offre le bon texte à plusieurs endroits où $V^{30\ a.c.\ +\ p.c.}$ contient une variante fautive, s'explique probablement par la correction que nous avons postulée entre $V^{30\ a.c.\ +\ p.c.}$ et V^{31} (**15** *uos*, **24** *manducetur* + *bibatur*, **32** *traxerit*[1], **36** *enim*, **127** *uirtus mea fecit hoc*).

[63] **6** dixit] dicit $V^{5.6}$, dedit $V^{24.26}$ || **12-13** murmura cogitationis] murmura cordis *N*, murmur ac cogitationes $V^{1\text{-}6}$, murmur cogitationis $V^{8.16.21.22.25}$, murmura cogitationes

(2) Les manuscrits $V^{32.33}$ du type B_2augmenté de VERBRAKEN.[64] Ajoutons que ce rameau semble s'être croisé avec la branche B_2remanié dans le milieu cistercien bourguignon. Dans V^{30}, qui provient de la bibliothèque de Clairvaux, un correcteur a introduit une variante caractéristique de la branche B_2augmenté ($V^{32.33}$), tandis que le manuscrit V^{32} provenant de Cîteaux contient deux variantes qui semblent avoir été empruntées à la branche B_2remanié ($V^{27\text{-}31}$).[65] Ce croisement des deux branches explique un autre phénomène se situant au niveau de la composition des manuscrits. Les trois homélies qui clôturent la version courante de VA (VA-32 à VA-34: *Serm.* 172-173 et *App.* 109) ont été remplacées par le sermon 131 Mai dans $V^{30.31}$ et dans un représentant plus tardif de la branche B_2remanié (*Stockholm Kungl. Bibl. A 146 (XIII)*). En dehors de ces trois manuscrits, le texte pseudo-augustinien a été conservé uniquement dans V^{32} et dans un ancien témoin partiel de la branche B_2augmenté (*Paris Bibl. Nat. nouv. acq. lat. 448 (IX)*).[66]

3.2. La tradition indirecte médiévale

Le sermon 131 ayant joui d'une certaine popularité au Moyen Âge, nous n'avons pas l'intention d'offrir ici une liste exhaustive de toutes ses citations médiévales. L'aperçu suivant repose sur les descriptions de quelques florilèges médiévaux, sur les index des éditions du *CCCM*, ainsi que sur des sondages au moyen de la *PLD*, du *CLCLT*-5 et du *eMGH*-3.

(1) Bède le Vénérable (672/673-735) a intégré les lignes 41-52 de notre sermon dans la section consacrée à l'épître aux Philippiens de sa *Collectio in Apostolum* (frg. 346 Fransen; Phil 2,12; *bed*). Ce

V^{11}, murmura cognouisset cogitationis $V^{17\ a.c.}$, murmur cogitationum $V^{24.26}$ || **31** inueniemus] inuenimus $V^{24.26}$ || **34** te trahit (trahat $V^{16\ p.c.}$)] trahit te $V^{24.26}$ || **59** ego ergo] ego $V^{7\ a.c.\ 14\ a.c.\ 21\ a.c.}$, ergo ego $V^{24\text{-}26}$, *legere nequeo quod add.* $V^{27\ a.c.}$ || **98** in uia ille] ille in uia $V^{13.17.24.26}$ || **131** non[1]] iam *praem. N* $V^{24.26.33}$ || **145** mane] manu $V^{11.24.26}$ || **148** occulta] occultata $V^{1\text{-}6.24.26}$ || **152** gratiam manifestamque] manifestamque gratiam $V^{24.26}$ || **166** oremus] oramus $V^{3.5.6.17.20.21.23.24.26}$.

[64] **5** enim] *om.* $V^{32.33}$ || **64** custodirem] ostendisti-erat (l. 62) *add.* $V^{14.15}$, fortitudinem meam *add.* $V^{32.33}$, custodire V^{28} || **85** sequitur] *om.* $V^{32\ a.c.\ 33}$ || **99** uulneribus] in *praem.* V^{3}, ulceribus $V^{32.33}$ || **126** hic] inquit V^{9}, *om.* $V^{32\ a.c.\ 33}$ || **141** gratiae[2]] gratia V^{11}, *om.* $V^{32\ a.c.\ 33}$ || **143** petiuit a domino] a domino petiuit $V^{32.33}$ (a domino *post* signum (l. 143) $V^{20.23}$)|| **145** est[1]] autem *add.* $V^{32.33}$ || est[2]] *om.* $V^{32.33}$ || **165** ut[3]] et $V^{32\ a.c.\ 33}$.

[65] **57** misericordiam] misericordia $S^{a.b}$, misericordis V^{17}, misericoriam V^{22}, per *praem.* $V^{27\text{-}29.32\ p.c.}$, *legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{30\ a.c.}$ || confessum] confessus $V^{9\ a.c.}$, esse atque *add.* $V^{27\text{-}31}$, esse et *add.* $V^{32\ p.c.}$ || **101** uiuendo] uidendo V^{11}, ueniendo $V^{30\ p.c.\ 31\text{-}33}$, modo *praem.* V^{16}.

fragment ne semble pas avoir de relation particulière avec un ou plusieurs de nos témoins directs. Le fragment de Bède fut repris par Raban Maur (ca. 780-856) dans le XIX^e^ livre de ses *Enarrationes in epistolas Pauli* (*In Epist. ad Philipp.*, *PL* 112, c. 493, ll. 14-31).[67]

(2) Les lignes 4-30 (*audiuimus-meo*) du sermon 131, qui porte le titre *De corpore et sanguine Domini* dans la collection VA, sont citées dans deux recueils carolingiens de textes patristiques sur l'eucharistie: **(a)** le fragment figure comme deuxième article dans un florilège de onze textes que Pascase Radbert (ca. 790-ca. 860) ajouta avant 850 à son *De corpore et sanguine Domini* (831-833) (*pasch*; témoin principal: *Arras Bibl. Mun. 775 (744) (ca. 875)* origine: *Corbie* provenance: *Saint-Vaast*, ff. 75 ss.).[68] Grâce au titre, nous savons que le fragment remonte à un manuscrit qui contenait les deux volets de la collection VDA: *Agustini* [sic] *de corpore et sanguine Domini* [= VA-2] *ex libro De uerbis Domini*. La collation du fragment tel qu'il a été édité dans le *CCCM* 16 (pp. 163-164)[69] n'a relevé aucun lien spécifique avec un ou plusieurs de nos témoins directs de V(D)A. Vers 850, Pascase incorpora également deux de ses lettres, adressées à Frédugard de Corbie, dans son dossier *De corpore et sanguine Domini*.[70] Chacune contient des citations empruntées à la partie du sermon couverte par le fragment du florilège (comparer *CCCM* 16, p. 155, ll. 322-325 *et*[1]*-bibatur*, ll. 337-339 *qui-potest* et p. 170, ll. 800-801 *erit-uitam* avec respectivement *Serm.* 131, ll. 23-24 *tunc-bibatur*, ll. 17-18 *qui-potuit*[2] et l. 10 *erit-uitam*). **(b)** les lignes 4-30 (*audiuimus-meo*) figurent comme troisième article dans un florilège en vingt-et-un textes qui fut composé vers 865 et se trouve juxtaposé dans plusieurs manuscrits

[66] Voir G. PARTOENS, *Une version remaniée* [n. 28] pp. 139-140 + n. 9.

[67] Le texte de Raban Maur a les limites du fragment de Bède et en partage les variantes principales: **42-44** *audiuit-arroganti*, **45** *ipsa + ambulant*, **46** *dicit*, **47** *sibi inde*, **49** *et tremore*. Pour l'influence de Bède sur l'ouvrage de Raban Maur, voir G. PARTOENS, *Le sermon 151 de saint Augustin* [n. 29] p. 49 + n. 112.

[68] Pour ce florilège de onze citations patristiques, voir J.-P. BOUHOT, *Ratramne de Corbie. Histoire littéraire et controverses doctrinales* (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Moyen Âge et Temps Modernes* 6, Paris 1976) pp. 117-124. Il a été décrit par A. WILMART (*XI. Reg. Lat. 73 (fol. 38-42). Un développement patristique sur l'Eucharistie dans la lettre de Pascase Radbert à Fredigard*, dans: *Analecta Reginensia. Extraits des manuscrits latins de la reine Christine conservés au Vatican* [*Studi e Testi* 59, Rome 1933] pp. 267-278 [en part. pp. 276-277]).

[69] L'édition du recueil de onze citations patristiques dans le *CCCM* 16 (pp. 162-169) n'offre que les neuf premiers textes dans leur ordre primitif. L'édition de WILMART (*XI. Reg. Lat. 73 (fol. 38-42)* [n. 68] pp. 267-275) offre ces neuf articles dans l'ordre remanié de la prétendue quatrième édition du dossier *De corpore et sanguine Domini* de Pascase. Voir J.-P. BOUHOT, *Ratramne de Corbie* [n. 68] pp. 119-120 n. 10.

[70] Voir J.-P. BOUHOT, *Ratramne de Corbie* [n. 68] pp. 117-124.

au *De corpore et sanguine Domini* de Ratramne de Corbie († ca. 870) (témoin principal: *Gand Universiteitsbibl. 909 (ca. 875)* origine: *Corbie* provenance: *Lobbes*, ff. 1-15).[71] Ce recueil est apparenté à celui qui fut ajouté au *De corpore et sanguine Domini* de Pascase Radbert (voir p.ex. le titre du fragment emprunté au sermon 131 dans le manuscrit de Gand: *Domini sancti Augustini de corpore et sanguine Domini. Ex libro de uerbis Domini*).[72] Le fragment du sermon 131 dans le florilège en vingt-et-un textes ne semble pas avoir de lien spécifique avec un ou plusieurs de nos témoins directs.

(3) L'*Expositio beati Pauli collecta ex libris sancti Augustini* de Florus de Lyon (milieu du IX^e^ siècle) offre deux extraits du sermon (*flor*).[73] Le premier fragment, couvrant les lignes 4-24 (*audiuimus-bibatur*), est cité dans la section du florilège consacrée à 1 Cor 10,16. Son texte semble être apparenté à celui de la branche B_2augmenté de VA, dont un exemplaire se trouvait dans la bibliothèque capitulaire de Lyon.[74] Le deuxième extrait, commentant Phil 2,12-14, couvre la

[71] Pour une description du florilège en vingt-et-un textes, voir J.N. BAKHUIZEN VAN DEN BRINK, *Ratramnus. De corpore et sanguine Domini*. Texte établi d'après les manuscrits et notice bibliographique par - (*Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*. Afd. *Letterkunde*. Nieuwe reeks LXI.1, Amsterdam 1954) pp. 25-27. Pour les témoins manuscrits, voir J.-P. BOUHOT, *Ratramne de Corbie* [n. 68] pp. 139-140.

[72] Selon J.-P. BOUHOT, les deux florilèges constitueraient des adaptations d'une collection antérieure. Voir *Ratramne de Corbie* [n. 68] p. 120 n. 10: 'On distinguera [dans le florilège de onze citations] [...] les neuf fragments (nn. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) qui se retrouvent exactement ou de façon plus complète dans le florilège en 21 textes [...], et les deux morceaux (nn. 3 et 6) qui résument la pensée d'Augustin dans son commentaire sur l'évangile de saint Jean (*Tract. in Ioh.*, 26 et 27). Radbert est directement responsable de ces deux textes, et a emprunté les autres à un florilège déjà constitué.' Comparer p. 141.

[73] Dans sa description du florilège, C. CHARLIER affirme qu'un troisième fragment du sermon 131 figure sous le titre *De uerbis euangelii 13* dans la section consacrée à Rm 10,2-3. Voir C. CHARLIER, *La compilation augustinienne de Florus sur l'Apôtre. Sources et authenticité*, dans: *Revue bénédictine* 57 (1947) pp. 132-186 (en part. p. 181). Dans *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96*, on trouve en effet à propos de Rm 10,2-3 un fragment tiré *Ex sermone de uerbis euangelii XIII* (f. 67). Il s'agit toutefois d'un extrait du sermon 129 (§ 2), qui constitue le treizième article de la section consacrée à l'évangile de saint Jean dans deux témoins de la branche B_2augmenté de VD (*Dijon Bibl. Mun. 143* [notre V^{32}] et *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 2017 (XI)*). Pour cette bévue, CHARLIER est tributaire de la description du florilège publiée dans *PL* 119, où nous lisons dans la colonne 306: 'Id., *Serm.* 13, *de uer. euang.*, tom. V, part. II, col. 734 [= *Serm.* 131, 10 traitant Rm 10,2-3]'.

[74] Pour le fragment en question, il n'y a qu'une seule variante relevant la dépendance de Florus par rapport à la branche B_2augmenté de VA (**5** enim] *om.* $V^{32.33}$ *flor*). Nous savons toutefois avec certitude que le diacre a utilisé un exemplaire VD(A) de cette branche pour la confection de son florilège (voir G. PARTOENS, *La collection* [n. 19] pp. 326-327; 338-339 [avec bibliographie ultérieure]).

même partie du texte que le fragment conservé chez Bède (ll. 41-52), mais ne semble pas en dépendre.[75] Faute de variantes significatives, nous ne pouvons que supposer par extrapolation que le savant carolingien a puisé ici à la même source VA qu'au cas des lignes 4-24. D'autres citations du sermon 131 se trouvent dans l'*Expositio missae* de Florus (ll. 20-24 *manducent*[1]*-bibatur*)[76] ainsi que dans un 'document antiamalarien' figurant dans *Metz Bibl. Mun. 1212*,[77] qu'on attribue traditionnellement au diacre lyonnais (ll. 14-18 *hoc-potuit*[2]).[78]

(4) La présence des lignes 4-24 dans l'œuvre de Florus ainsi que des lignes 4-30 dans les recueils liés aux *De corpore et sanguine Domini* de Pascase et Ratramne et dans les lettres de Pascase à Frédugard explique en toute vraisemblance la grande quantité de citations de ces lignes dans des textes plus tardifs se rapportant aux controverses eucharistiques. Nous nous limitons ici à l'énumération de quelques exemples: le *De cauendis uitiis et uirtutibus exercendis* d'Hincmar de Reims († 882; en dépendance du florilège augustinien de Florus),[79] la *Confessio fidei* de Jean de Fécamp († 1078; en dépendance de l'*Expositio missae* de Florus),[80] le *Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini* de Lanfranc de Canterbury (ca. 1010-1089),[81] le

[75] Voir **42-44** *audiuit-arroganti*, **45** *ipsa + ambulant*, **46** *dicit*, **47** *sibi inde*, **49** *et tremore*.

[76] *PL* 119, c. 64, ll. 47-56.

[77] Voir l'édition de J.M. HANSSENS, *Un document "antiamalarien"*, dans: *Ephemerides Liturgicae* 41 (1927) pp. 237-244 (en part. p. 241 n. 4). Le fragment est introduit par les mots *Et in libro de uerbis Domini ait* et semble donc remonter à un exemplaire contenant les deux volets de la collection VDA (comparer la situation dans les florilèges eucharistiques carolingiens en onze et vingt-et-un textes).

[78] Voir K. ZECHIEL-ECKES, *Florus von Lyon als Kirchenpolitiker und Publizist. Studien zur Persönlichkeit eines karolingischen "Intellektuellen" am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung mit Amalarius (835-838) und des Prädestinationsstreits (851-855)* (*Quellen und Forschungen zum Recht im Mittelalter* 8, Stuttgart 1999) pp. 47-50.

[79] Voir *PL* 125, c. 923, ll. 33-52 = *Serm.* 131, ll. 4-24 *audiuimus-bibatur*. Le texte de Hincmar tel qu'il a été édité dans *PL* 125 contient plusieurs variantes typiques de *flor* (**4** *audiuimus + humanum saluatorem*, **6-7** *quorum-ergo*, **8** *diceret*, **9** *diceret*, **10-18** *scandalizati-potuit*[2], **19** *et-quaestionem*). Pour la dépendance d'Hincmar par rapport à Florus, voir aussi A. WILMART, *Distiques d'Hincmar sur l'eucharistie? Un sermon oublié de s. Augustin sur le même sujet*, dans: *Revue bénédictine* 40 (1928) pp. 87-98 (en part. p. 92 + n. 4).

[80] Voir *PL* 101, c. 1091, ll. 47-54 = ll. 21-24 *illud*[1]*-bibatur*. Pour la dépendance de Jean de Fécamp par rapport à l'*Expositio missae* de Florus, voir J. GEISELMANN, *Ps. Alkuins* Confessio Fidei pars IV de corpore et sanguine Domini, *eine antiberengarianische Ueberarbeitung der* expositio missae *des Florus von Lyon*, dans: *Theologische Quartalschrift* 105 (1924) pp. 272-295 (en part. p. 284).

[81] Voir C. MARTELLO, *Lanfranco contro Berengario nel* Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e note (*Symbolon. Studi e testi di filosofia antica e medievale* 22, Catania 2001) p. 140, ll. 209-210 = *Serm.* 131, l. 10 *erit-uitam*.

Rescriptum contra Lanfrancum de Bérenger de Tours (ca. 1000-1088),[82] la lettre à Béranger sur la Présence réelle de Hugues de Breteuil († 1050),[83] le *Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini* de Durand de Troarn (début XI^e siècle-1088),[84] le *De sacramento* d'Alger de Liège († 1131/1132).[85]

(5) Un fragment de notre sermon figure dans la section *De uerbis Apostoli* de la partie augustinienne du *Florilegium Duacense*,[86] qui aurait vu le jour dans le scriptorium de Clairvaux et a circulé dans les milieux bénédictin et cistercien des Flandres (Clairmarais, Marchiennes, Saint-Vaast d'Arras).[87] L'origine clarévalienne du florilège explique la présence de quelques variantes qui figurent uniquement dans le manuscrit V^{30}, qui était conservé dans la bibliothèque de l'abbaye bourguignonne.[88]

(6) Les lignes 49-51 (*uallem-gratiam*) sont citées dans un petit florilège augustinien du XIII^e siècle attribué récemment à un certain

[82] Voir *CCCM* 84, p. 195, ll. 228-231 = *Serm.* 131, ll. 21-22 *illud*[1]*-uita*.

[83] Voir J.-C. DIDIER-P. DELHAYE, *Hugues de Breteuil, évêque de Langres († 1050). Lettre à Bérenger de Tours sur la Présence réelle*, dans: *Recherches Augustiniennes* 16 (1981) pp. 289-331 (en part. p. 324, ll. 12-14 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 6-7 *sacramentum-fideles* + ll. 23-24 *tunc-bibatur*) et p. 326, ll. 9-11 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 6-7 *sacramentum-audiunt* + l. 10 *erit-uitam*).

[84] Voir *PL* 149, c. 1391, ll. 1-3 (= *Serm.* 131, l. 10 *erit-uitam*); c. 1402, l. 47-c. 1403, l. 6 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 5-19 *locutus-quaestionem*); c. 1409, ll. 4-10 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 16-19 *putastis-quaestionem*).

[85] Voir *PL* 180, c. 769, ll. 24-26 (= *Serm.* 131, l. 10 *erit-uitam*); c. 773, ll. 39-42 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 23-24 *tunc-bibatur*); c. 775, ll. 18-19 et ll. 42-47 (= *Serm.* 131, l. 10 *erit-uitam* et ll. 4-7 *audiuimus-fideles*); c. 784, ll. 9-20 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 16-22 *putastis-uita*); c. 798, ll. 10-13 (= *Serm.* 131, ll. 23-24 *tunc-bibatur*). Les fragments dans les colonnes 773, 775, 784 et 798 sont introduits par la formule *in libro / sermone de uerbis Domini* (~ les titres de notre sermon dans les florilèges eucharistiques carolingiens en onze et vingt-et-un textes).

[86] Voir *Douai Bibl. Mun. 285 (XII^2)* origine: *Nord de la France* provenance: *Anchin*, f. 56^v et *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 437 (XII ex.)* provenance: *Clairvaux*, ff. 105-105^v.

[87] Pour la diffusion du florilège, voir T. FALMAGNE, *Les cisterciens et les nouvelles formes d'organisation des florilèges aux 12^e et 13^e siècles*, dans: *Archiuum Latinitatis Medii Aeui* 55 (1997) pp. 73-176 (en part. p. 166); *Un texte en contexte. Les* Flores Paradisi *et le milieu culturel de Villers-en-Brabant dans la première moitié du 13^e siècle* (*Instrumenta patristica et mediaevalia* 39, Turnhout 2001) pp. 387-388; *Florilegium Duacense*, dans: L. BUSINE-L. VANDAMME-N. GEIRNAERT-S. LEYTS, *Besloten wereld. Open Boeken. Middeleeuwse handschriften in dialoog met actuele kunst* (Tielt 2002) pp. 140-141. Voir également B. MUNK OLSEN, *Les classiques latins dans les florilèges médiévaux antérieurs au XIII^e siècle*, dans: *Revue d'histoire des textes* 9 (1979) pp. 47-121 (en part. pp. 84-89).

[88] Bien que le florilège (*duac*) ne cite que peu de lignes du sermon 131 (**8-9** *nisi-uobis*, **10-12** *scandalizati-audire*, **27-28** *durus*[2]*-incredulis*, **31-37** *nemo-nauigando*), il contient deux variantes typiques de V^{30}: **32** traxerit[1]] attraxerit V^{30} *duac* || **36** enim] *om.* $V^{19\ a.c.\ 30}$ *duac*, ergo V^{21}, autem $V^{22.25}$.

Guillaume, doyen de la collégiale de Notre-Dame de Courtrai vers 1228-1234.[89]

(7) Dans le *Milleloquium ueritatis* de Barthélémy d'Urbino (compilé entre 1321 et 1345), notre sermon est cité plusieurs fois sous le titre de *Sermo primus de uerbis Apostoli*.[90]

4. Édition

4.1. Principes d'édition

Étant donné que plusieurs variantes suggèrent que *N* est le fruit d'une manipulation visant une plus grande lisibilité du texte augustinien,[91] nous avons suivi en principe le témoignage de *S V* (σ) dans les cas où cette branche s'oppose au manuscrit napolitain.

Abstraction faite de variantes graphiques insignifiantes, que nous avons homogénéisées, l'apparat critique est exhaustif. Un deuxième apparat identifie les citations bibliques. Il fait également référence, au sein de l'œuvre augustinienne, à des passages présentant des affinités verbales frappantes avec notre sermon. Nous n'avons pas cherché à offrir une liste de tous les parallèles au niveau du contenu.

4.2. Conspectus siglorum

N *Napoli Bibl. Naz. Vienn. lat. 14 (XI)* origine: *Napoli San Severino* (ff. 84-85^{v})

S^{a} *Roma Bibl. Naz. Vitt. Em. 1357 (VIII ex. / IX)* origine: *Campanie* provenance: *Nonantola, Rome - Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, Chester Beatty* (ff. 47^{v}-52^{v})

[89] Voir p. ex. *Laon Bibl. Mun. 179 (XIII²)*, f. 125 et *Poitiers Bibl. Mun. 99 (XIII²)*, f. 220^{v}; T. FALMAGNE, *Le* Liber Florigerus*: Recherches sur l'attribution d'un florilège augustinien du XIII*^{e} *siècle (avant 1260)*, dans: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 45 (1999) pp. 139-181.

[90] Voir *S. Augustini Milleloquium veritatis* (Paris 1645) vol. 1, p. 116 (s.v. *baptismus*; ll. 94-101 [*sufficit-transimus*]); p. 346 (s.v. *domus*; ll. 101-104 [*domus-sanemur*]); p. 395 (s.v. *eucharistia*; ll. 20-24 [*manducent*^{1}*-bibatur*]); p. 400 (s.v. *eucharistia*; ll. 8-10 [*nisi-uitam*]); p. 584 (s.v. *iustitia*; ll. 136-139 [*quomodo-facit*]); vol. 2, p. 49 (s.v. *magister*; l. 4 [*audiuimus-saluatorem*]); p. 552 (s.v. *uiolentia*; ll. 31-40 [*nemo-christi*]). Nous avons comparé le texte de l'édition de 1645 avec celui du manuscrit *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 2119 (XIV)*. Voir respectivement ff. ?, ?, 156, 157, 222^{v}, 243^{v}, 436.

[91] Citations bibliques adaptatées à la Vulgate: **12** *eum potest*; **47/72** *ipsorum*; **61** *autem*; **65** *enim*; **86** *non*²; **115** *fit*; **118-119** *est peccatum*; **159** *illis perhibeo*. Interventions au niveau syntaxique des phrases: **7** *qui* + *audiunt* + *commendans*; **9** *et* + *alius*; **29** *doni* + *meriti*; **105/106** *adhuc*$^{1.2}$; **116** *ubi*^{3} + **117** *quaeres*; **143** *gedeon. Lectiones faciliores*: **42** *ascendit*$^{1.2}$; **127** *fatentur*; **148** *nube*.

S^b *Monte Cassino 11 (ca. 1080)* origine: *Monte Cassino* (pp. 151-154)
V^a *Schaffhausen Stadtbibl. Min. 24 (1080-1096)* origine et provenance: *Schaffhausen, Allerheiligen* (ff. 2^v-5^v)
V^b *Engelberg Stiftsbibl. 16 (1147-1178)* origine: *Engelberg* (ff. 136^v-139)
V^c *Saint-Omer Bibl. Mun. 77 (XII)* provenance: *Saint-Bertin* (ff. 79^v-81)
V^d *Douai Bibl. Mun. 251 (XII ex.)* provenance: *Marchiennes* (ff. 85^v-88)
V^e *München Bay. Staatsbibl. Clm 14171 (IX)* origine: *Nord de la France* provenance: *Regensburg, Saint-Emmeran* (ff. 141-143^v)
V^f *Vat. lat. 8566 (X)* (ff. 133-135^v)
V^g *Arras Bibl. Mun. 60 (129) (XI)* provenance: *Saint-Vaast* (ff. 103-104^v)
V^h *Avranches Bibl. Mun. 82 (XI^2)* origine et provenance: *Mont Saint-Michel* (ff. 75-76)
V^i *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 12199 (XII^2)* origine et provenance: *Corbie, Saint-Pierre* (ff. 142-145)
V^j *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16854 (XII^3)* origine: *Ouest de la France* provenance: *Lonrey, Saint-Cyran; Paris, Maison de l'Oratoire* (ff. 115^v-117^v)
V^k *Orléans Bibl. Mun. 164 (141) (IX)* origine: *Fleury-sur-Loire, Saint-Benoît (?)* provenance: *Fleury-sur-Loire, Saint-Benoît* (pp. 218-221)
V^l *Rouen Bibl. Mun. 487 (XI-XII)* provenance: *Jumièges, Saint-Pierre* (ff. 188^v-189^v)
V^m *Vendôme Bibl. Mun. 40 (XI)* origine et provenance: *Vendôme, La Trinité* (ff. 126-128^v)
V^n *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 14292 (XII)* provenance: *Paris, Saint-Victor* (ff. 64-65^v)
V^o *Valenciennes Bibl. Mun. 157 (XII^1)* provenance: *Saint-Amand-en-Pévèle* (ff. 132^v-134^v)
V^p *Vat. lat. 476 (XII)* provenance: *Novy-les-Moines, Prieuré de Sainte-Marie* (ff. 2-6^v)
V^q *Charleville Bibl. Mun. 202.8 (XII^2)* origine et provenance: *Signy, Notre-Dame* (ff. 1^v-4^v)
V^r *Vat. lat. 474 (IX)* origine: *Tours?* provenance: *Saint-Vivant-sous-Vergy* (ff. 95-97)
V^s *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 198 (XII)* provenance: *Clairvaux* (ff. 150-152^v)[92]
V^t *Dijon Bibl. Mun. 143 (XII^1)* origine et provenance: *Cîteaux* (ff. 199^v-201^v)
V^u *London Brit. Libr. Add. 10942 (XII)* origine et provenance: *La Charité (Haute-Saône)* (ff. 89^v-92^v)
bed *Saint-Omer Bibl. Mun. 91 (IX)* provenance: *Saint-Bertin* (f. 101)
flor *Troyes Bibl. Mun. 96 (IX med.) Mannon de Saint-Oyen*, provenance: *Saint-Oyen* (ff. 131^v; 226)

[92] Nous remercions le dr. L. VERWEIJ d'avoir contrôlé plusieurs variantes sur l'original.

pasch *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaeualis* 16 (Turnhout 1969) (pp. 163-164)
ratr *Gand Universiteitsbibl. 909 (ca. 875)* origine: *Corbie* provenance: *Lobbes* (ff. 4-4^{v})[93]
am Amerbach-Dodon (Bâle 1494), ff. a3-a4
maur Mauristes, vol. 5 (Paris 1683) cc. 640-645 = *PL* 38, cc. 729-734

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[93] Nous remercions le prof. D. SACRÉ d'avoir fait la collation de ce fragment.

SERMO HABITUS AD MENSAM SANCTI MARTYRIS CYPRIANI VIIII KAL. OCT. - DIE DOMINICA DE GRATIA DEI

1. Audiuimus ueracem magistrum, diuinum redemptorem, humanum saluatorem, commendantem nobis pretium nostrum sanguinem suum. Locutus est enim nobis de corpore et sanguine suo, quorum corpus dixit escam, sanguinem potum. Sacramentum fidelium agnoscunt fideles; audientes autem quid aliud quam qui audiunt? Cum ergo commendans talem escam et talem potum diceret: *Nisi manducaueritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum, non habebitis uitam in uobis* et hoc diceret de uita quis alius quam ipsa uita? - erit autem illi homini mors, non uita, qui mendacem putauerit uitam - scandalizati sunt

6-7 référence à la *disciplina arcani*. Comparer *Serm.* 132, 1 (Dominus Iesus Christus exhortatus est promissione uitae aeternae ad manducandum carnem suam et bibendum sanguinem suum. Qui audistis haec, nondum omnes intellexistis. Qui enim baptizati et fideles estis, quid dixerit nostis. Qui autem inter uos adhuc catechumeni uel audientes uocantur, potuerunt esse, cum legeretur, audientes; numquid et intellegentes?); M. COMEAU, *Augustin. Exégète du quatrième évangile* [n. 10] pp. 176-178 || **8-9** Io 6,54

1-3 *inscriptio quam habent* $S^{a.b}$ (incipit *praem.* S^{a}; *correxi lectionem* VIII *quam habent* $S^{a.b}$ [*cf. praefationem*]), sermo sancti augustini episcopi sabbato ante palmas *N*, *inscriptio quam habent* $V^{a.b.c.e.f.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t.u}$: de corpore et sanguine domini et de uerbis apostoli cum tremore et timore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini (item eiusdem *praem.* $V^{a.c.e.f.j.l.r.t.u}$, tim. et trem. *pro* trem. et tim. $V^{a.c.h.j.l\ p.c.\ o.q.t.u}$, ipsorumque *pro* ipsorum V^{a}, item sermo eiusdem *praem.* $V^{b.n}$, item sermo sancti augustini episcopi *praem.* V^{c}, et de uerbis apostoli *om.* $V^{c\ a.c.}$ [et *non suppleuit* $V^{c\ p.c.}$], *non leguntur uerba* de corpore et san- *in* V^{h}, salutem *ante* uestram V^{i}, incipit LXVI eiusdem *praem.* V^{k}, tim. et tim. *pro* trem. et tim. $V^{i\ a.c.}$, incipit sermo primus beati augustini episcopi *praem.* V^{m}, tremo *pro* tremore V^{n}, operamini *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$, sermo eiusdem *praem.* V^{o}, ipsorum *om.* $V^{o.q}$, sermo sancti augustini *** de corp. et sang. dom. et de uerb. apost. cum timore *** operamini V^{p}, sermo primus *praem.* V^{q}, et *uerbo* ipsorum *praem.* V^{r}, incipit sermo primus sancti augustini *praem.* V^{s}, de corp. et sang. dom. et *om.* V^{s}, *legere nequeo quod uerbo* ipsorum *praem.* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ [et?], - ips* salu* *** V^{u}), incipit eiusdem XVIII^{us} de corpore et sanguine domini et de uerbis apostoli in epistula ad philippenses [*sequuntur uersus* Phil 2,12-13] V^{d}, *def.* V^{g} || **4-62** audiuimus-mihi] *def.* V^{g} || **4** audiuimus] auduimus $V^{i\ a.c.}$, *inc. flor* (1 Cor 10,16; *inscriptio*: ex sermone de corpore et sanguine domini) *pasch* (*inscriptio*: agustini de corpore et sanguine domini ex libro de uerbis domini) *ratr* (*inscriptio*: domini sancti augustini de corpore et sanguine domini ex libro de uerbis domini), audiamus *flor* || humanum saluatorem] *om. flor* || **5** sanguinem] sanguine S^{b} || enim nobis] *non leg.* $V^{p\ a.c.}$ || enim] *om.* $V^{t.u}$ *flor* || nobis[2]] *om.* $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || **6-7** quorum-ergo] *om. flor* || **6** quorum] quod *N* $V^{a.b.j.u}$ *am*, *om. maur* || corpus dixit escam] escam dixit corpus suum V^{p} || dixit] dedit $V^{o.q}$, esse *add. ratr* || sanguinem] et *praem.* V^{q} *ratr* || **7** agnoscunt] agnosc*nt V^{c} || fideles] fides V^{f} || audientes autem] audient $V^{o\ i.t.}$, alias audientes autem $V^{o\ i.m.}$ || audientes] infideles V^{p} || quid] qui $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || qui] quod *N* $V^{c.d}$, *non. leg.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$, uitam $V^{n\ p.c.}$, id quo $V^{q\ a.c.}$, id de quo $V^{q\ p.c.}$, *om.* $V^{r\ a.c.\ u}$ *maur* || audiunt] fieri gestiunt *add. N*, audiuit V^{n} || commendans] dominus *add. N*, commendasset $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || **8** diceret] -que *add.* $V^{r\ a.c.}$, *om. flor ratr* || meam] filii hominis V^{i} || **9** meum] *om.* V^{i} || et] cum *add. N* V^{c} || diceret] dicer* $V^{p\ a.c.}$, dixit *flor*, dicere *ratr* || quis alius] quid aliud V^{c} || alius] intelligeretur *add. N* || **9-10** ipsa uita] uita ipsa $V^{b\ a.c.}$, ipsam uitam V^{c}, est *praem.* $V^{h.i.k.l}$ || **10** mendacem] m*n*acem $V^{i\ a.c.}$ || uitam] uita *flor* || **10-18** scandalizati-potuit[2]] *om. flor*

discipuli eius - non quidem omnes, sed plurimi - dicentes apud se ipsos: *Durus est hic sermo; quis eum potest audire?* Cum autem hoc Dominus apud semet ipsum cognouisset et murmura cogitationis audisset, cogitantibus nec sonantibus uoce respondit, ut se auditos esse cognoscerent et talia cogitare desinerent. Quid ergo respondit? *Hoc uos scandalizat? Si ergo uideritis Filium hominis ascendentem ubi erat prius?* Quid sibi uult *Hoc uos scandalizat?* Putastis quia de hoc corpore, quod uidetis, partes facturus sum et membra mea concisurus et uobis daturus? Quid *Si ergo uideritis Filium hominis ascendentem ubi erat prius?* Certe, qui integer ascendere potuit, consumi non potuit. Ergo et de corpore ac sanguine suo dedit nobis salubrem refectionem et tam magnam breuiter soluit de sua integritate quaestionem. Manducent ergo qui manducant, et bibant qui bibunt. Esuriant et sitiant: uitam manducent, uitam bibant. Illud manducare refici est, sed sic reficeris, ut non deficiat unde reficeris. Illud bibere quid est nisi uiuere? Manduca uitam, bibe uitam: habebis uitam et integra est uita.

11-12 Io 6,61 || **14-17** Io 6,62-63 || **16-17** putastis-daturus] *In Ioh. euang.* 11, 5; 27, 1-3; 5; *In psalm.* 33, *serm.* 1, 8; 98, 9; *Introduction* n. 10 || **17-19** certe-quaestionem] *In Ioh. euang.* 27, 3 (Illi enim putabant eum erogaturum corpus suum; ille autem dixit se ascensurum in caelum, utique integrum. *Cum uideritis Filium hominis ascendentem ubi erat prius*, certe uel tunc uidebitis quia non eo modo quo putatis, erogat corpus suum; certe uel tunc intellegetis quia gratia eius non consumitur morsibus); *Introduction* n. 11 || **22-28** *In Ioh. euang.* 27, 5-6; *In psalm.* 98, 9 (Ille autem instruxit eos et ait illis: *Spiritus est qui uiuificat; caro autem nihil prodest: uerba quae locutus sum uobis, spiritus est et uita.* Spiritualiter intellegite quod locutus sum; non hoc corpus quod uidetis, manducaturi estis et bibituri illum sanguinem quem fusuri sunt qui me crucifigent. Sacramentum aliquod uobis commendaui; spiritualiter intellectum uiuificabit uos. Etsi necesse est illud uisibiliter celebrari, oportet tamen inuisibiliter intellegi); *Introduction* n. 12

11 se] semet $V^{a.b.f.j.p.q.t.u}$ *pasch ratr am* || durus est] *iterat* V^{j} || hic sermo] sermo hic $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || **12** eum potest] potest eum *N* V^{i} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*), enim potest eum V^{q} || semet] se V^{n} || **12-13** murmura cogitationis] murmura cordis *N*, murmur ac cogitationes $V^{a.b}$ *am*, murmur cogitationis $V^{d.n.p}$, murmura cogitationes V^{f}, murmura cognouisset cogitationis $V^{j\ a.c.}$, murmur cogitationum $V^{o.q}$ || **13** sonantibus uoce (uocem $V^{a.p}$)] uoce sonantibus *maur* || auditos] auditores V^{a} *am* || **14** quid] quod $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || hoc uos scandalizat (scadalizat $V^{s\ a.c.}$)] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || **15** uos] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.\ s}$ || scandalizat] sandalizat $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **16** putastis] *ita N* $S^{a\ a.c.}$ $V^{a.b.d.e\ a.c.\ f.m.o.r\ a.c.\ u}$ *pasch ratr am*, putatis $S^{a\ p.c.\ b}$ $V^{c.e\ p.c.\ h.i.j.k.l.n.p.q.r\ p.c.\ s.t}$ *maur* || corpore] meo *add. maur* || uidetis] *non leg. ratr*$^{a.c.}$ (uideatis?) || facturus] facturum V^{f} || sum] sim $V^{j.q.s}$ || et[1]-concisurus] *om.* V^{h} || mea] me* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || concisurus] *ita N* $S^{a\ p.c.\ b}$ $V^{c.f.o.p.q\ p.c.\ r.t}$ *pasch ratr maur*, conscis(s)urus $S^{a\ a.c.}$ $V^{a.b.d.e.i.j.k.l.m.n.q\ a.c.\ s.u}$ *am* || **17** quid] est *add.* V^{c}, quod V^{u} || si ergo] ergo si V^{q} || erat] era $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || qui] quid *N* || **18** ascendere] ascendi $V^{a.e\ a.c.\ f.m.r\ a.c.}$ *am* || consumi] consum* $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || potuit[2]] putuit $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || **18-19** et-quaestionem] *def.* V^{h} || **18** et] *om. ratr* || ac] et V^{c} || sanguine] de *praem.* $V^{a.b.c.f.r.s.t.u}$ *flor am* || dedit] parauit V^{q} || nobis] *om.* V^{j} *flor* $^{a.c.}$, salutem et *add.* V^{q} || **19** refectionem] refectione V^{f} || et-quaestionem] *om. flor* || breuiter soluit] soluit breuiter V^{m} || de] et *praem.* V^{i} || integritate] integritatem V^{f} || **20** esuriant et sitiant] esuriunt et sitiunt V^{u} || esuriant] esurient *flor* $^{a.c.}$ || sitiant] qui *praem.* V^{c} || uitam] aeternam *add.* $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || manducent[2]] et *add. N* || **21** uitam bibant] bibant uitam *N* || refici] reficere *N* || sed] si *add.* $N^{p.c.}$ || reficeris[1]] reficieris V^{j}, refice $V^{r\ a.c.}$, reficere $V^{r\ p.c.\ s\ i.t.}$, uel -is $V^{s\ s.l.}$ || ut-reficeris[2]] *om.* V^{j} || unde] inde $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **22** est[1]] *post* uiuere V^{j} || uiuere] uere V^{c} || manduca] manducant $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || bibe uitam] *om.* $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || habebis] habis V^{n}

Tunc autem hoc erit - id est uita unicuique erit corpus et sanguis Christi - si quod in sacramento uisibiliter sumitur, in ipsa ueritate spiritualiter manducetur, spiritualiter bibatur. Audiuimus enim ipsum Dominum dicentem: *Spiritus est qui uiuificat, caro autem non prodest quicquam. Verba quae locutus sum uobis, spiritus et uita sunt. Sed sunt*, inquit, *quidam qui non credunt.* Ipsi dicebant: *Durus est hic sermo; quis eum potest audire?* Durus est, sed duris - hoc est incredibilis, sed incredulis.

2. Sed ut doceret nos etiam ipsum credere doni esse, non meriti: *Sicut*, inquit, *dixi uobis, nemo uenit ad me, nisi cui datum fuerit a Patre meo.* Vbi autem hoc Dominus dixerit - si superiora euangelii recolamus, inueniemus eum dixisse: *Nemo uenit ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum.* Non dixit 'duxerit', sed 'traxerit'. Ista uiolentia cordi fit, non carni. Quid ergo miraris? Crede et uenis; ama et traheris. Ne arbitreris istam asperam molestamque uiolentiam: dulcis est, suauis est, ipsa suauitas te trahit. Nonne ouis trahitur cui esurienti herba monstratur? Et puto quia non corpore impellitur, sed desiderio colligatur. Sic et tu ueni ad Christum. Noli longa itinera meditari: ubi credis, ibi uenis. Ad illum enim qui ubique est,

25-27 spiritus-credunt] Io 6,64-65 || **27** durus[1]-audire] Io 6,61 || **29-30** Io 6,66 || **31-32** Io 6,44 || **32-37** *Grat. Christ.* 1, 10, 11; *C. Pelag.* 1, 3, 6; 19, 37; *C. Iulian.* 4, 8, 44; 5, 4, 14; *Praed. sanct.* 8, 15; *Introduction* n. 13 || **32** Non dixit 'duxerit', sed 'traxerit'] *C. Pelag.* 1, 19, 37 (Non enim ait: 'duxerit', ut illic aliquo modo intellegamus praecedere uoluntatem. Quis trahitur, si iam uolebat?) || **33-37** J. AMENGUAL BATLE, *La atracción del Padre* [n. 13] pp. 52-53 ('uenir a Cristo') || **34-35** *In Ioh. euang.* 26, 5 (Ramum uiridem ostendis oui et trahis illam. Nuces puero demonstrantur et trahitur, et quo currit trahitur, amando trahitur, sine laesione corporis trahitur, cordis uinculo trahitur)

23 tunc] tun $V^{j\,a.c.}$ || erit[2]] *om.* $V^{q\,a.c.}$ || sanguis] sanguinis V^{f}, domini *add. flor* || quod] quos $V^{j\,a.c.}$, id *praem.* V^{q} || **24** sacramento] sacramenta $V^{n\,a.c.}$ || uisibiliter] uisibiter $V^{f\,a.c.}$ || spiritualiter[1]] spiri*tualiter *ratr*$^{a.c.}$ || manducetur] manducatur $V^{b\,a.c.\,r.s}$ || bibatur] bibitur $V^{e.r\,a.c.\,s}$, bibetur V^{f}, *fin. flor* || **25** audiuimus] audimus V^{n} || ipsum dominum dicentem] dicentem ipsum dominum V^{p} || dominum] deum V^{c} || **25-26** non prodest quicquam] nichil prodest *ratr* || **25** prodest] prode*st $S^{a\,a.c.}$ || **26** locutus sum] ego loquor V^{q} || sum] *om.* $V^{f\,a.c.}$ || uobis] *om.* V^{n} || sed] q *add.* $V^{j\,a.c.}$ || inquit quidam] quidam inquit V^{i}, ex uobis *add.* V^{j} || **27** credunt] crediderunt $V^{i\,a.c.}$ || eum potest] potest eum *am* || durus[2]] duris $V^{n\,a.c.}$ || **28** hoc] id *am* || incredibilis] non credulis S^{b}, est *add.* V^{d} || sed incredulis] *om.* V^{c} || sed] *om.* V^{p}, et $V^{r\,a.c.}$ || **29** ipsum credere] credere ipsum *ratr* || ipsum] ipsud $S^{a.b}$ V^{f} || doni] ipsius *praem. N* || non meriti] *non leg.* $V^{r\,a.c.}$ || non] *om.* $V^{n\,a.c.}$ || meriti] nostri *praem. N* || **30-31** cui-nisi] *om. N* || **30** meo] *fin. pasch ratr* || hoc] *om.* $V^{i\,a.c.}$ || **31** euangelii] euagelii S^{b} || recolamus] recolam $V^{f\,a.c.}$, recolamur $V^{r\,a.c.}$ || inueniemus] inuenimus $V^{o.q}$ || nemo] et *praem.* V^{p} || ad me] *om.* V^{s} || nisi] ni $V^{e\,a.c.}$ || **31-32** me traxerit] *om.* $V^{l\,a.c.}$ || **32** traxerit[1]] attraxerit V^{s} || eum] *om.* $V^{b\,a.c.}$ || traxerit[2]] traxit $V^{r\,a.c.}$ || cordi] cordis $V^{f\,a.c.}$ || ergo] *om.* V^{i} || **33** asperam molestamque uiolentiam] uiolentiam asperam molestamque *N*, molestam asperamque uiolentiam V^{j}, uiolentiam asperam uel molestam V^{l} || molestamque] *iterat* $V^{b\,a.c.}$, molestemque $V^{e\,a.c.}$ || **34** ipsa] ipse V^{f} || suauitas] suauiatas $V^{j\,a.c.}$ || te trahit] trahit te $V^{o.q}$ || nonne ouis] non eo uis V^{f} || cui] cum *N* $V^{a.b}$ *am maur* || **35** colligatur] colligitur $V^{e.r.s\,a.c.}$ || ueni] *om.* $V^{j\,a.c.}$, adueni $V^{r\,a.c.}$ || **36** itinera] it*nera $V^{i\,a.c.}$, itenera $V^{n\,a.c.}$ || meditari] meditare V^{f} || ibi] ubi V^{f} || enim] *om.* $V^{l\,a.c.\,s}$, autem $V^{n.p}$ || est] *om.* $V^{m\,a.c.}$

amando uenitur, non nauigando. Sed quoniam etiam in tali itinere abundant fluctus et tempestates diuersarum temptationum, in crucifixum crede, ut fides tua lignum possit ascendere. Non mergeris, si ligno portaberis. Sic, sic in huius saeculi fluctibus nauigabat ille qui dicebat: *Mihi autem absit gloriari, nisi in cruce Domini nostri Iesu Christi.*

3. Mirum est autem quod praedicato Christo crucifixo audiunt duo: unus contemnit, alter ascendit. Qui contemnit, imputet sibi; qui ascendit, non arroget sibi. Audiuit enim a ueraci magistro: *Nemo uenit ad me, nisi datum fuerit ei a Patre.* Gaudeat quia datum est; gratias agat danti corde humili, non arroganti, ne quod humilis meruit, superbus amittat. Nam etiam qui iam in ipsa uia iusta ambulant, si sibi eam tribuerint et uiribus suis, pereunt de illa. Ideo humilitatem nos docens sancta scriptura per apostolum dicit: *Cum timore et tremore uestram*

37 amando uenitur, non nauigando] *In Ioh. euang.* 26, 3 (Non enim ad Christum ambulando currimus, sed credendo); 32, 1 (nec migrando, sed amando ueniamus) || **37-40** *lignum crucis-fluctus saeculi*] *In psalm.* 103, *serm.* 4, 5 (Naues ecclesias intellegimus, commeant inter tempestates, inter procellas temptationum, inter fluctus saeculi, inter animalia pusilla et magna. Gubernator est Christus in ligno crucis suae); *Serm.* 252, 2; *Catech. rud.* 27, 53 || **40** Gal 6,14; P.-M. HOMBERT, Gloria gratiae [n. 14] pp. 467-470 ('se glorifier dans la croix du Christ'); *Nouvelles recherches* [n. 14] pp. 367-370 || **41-43** *Praed. sanct.* 8, 15 (Cum igitur euangelium praedicatur, quidam credunt, quidam non credunt; sed qui credunt, praedicatore forinsecus insonante, intus a Patre audiunt atque discunt; qui autem non credunt, foris audiunt, intus non audiunt neque discunt: hoc est, illis datur ut credant, illis non datur, quia *nemo*, inquit, *uenit ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum.* [...] Ergo trahi a Patre ad Christum et audire ac discere a Patre ut ueniat ad Christum, nihil aliud est quam donum accipere a Patre quo credat in Christum. Neque enim audientes euangelium a non audientibus, sed credentes a non credentibus discernebat qui dicebat: *Nemo uenit ad me, nisi fuerit ei datum a Patre meo*); *Grat. Christ.* 1, 10, 11 || **43** Io 6,66 || **44** ne-amittat] *Serm.* 13, 3 (en combinaison avec Phil 2,12-13 ~ ll. 46-49) || **44-45** nam-illa] cf. Ps 2,12; ll. 53-54; 80-84 || **46-49** Phil 2,12-13; P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches* [n. 14] pp. 274-275

37 nauigando] *non leg.* $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || itinere] ite *praem.* $V^{j\ a.c.}$, itenere $V^{n\ a.c.}$, honore et *praem.* V^{q} || **38** tempestates] tempestas $V^{h.i.k.l.n.p}$ || diuersarum] *om.* $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || crucifixum] crufixum $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || lignum possit] possit lignum V^{q} || **39** si] sed $V^{a.b.c.d.e.f.h.i.j.k.m.n.o.q.r.s\ a.c.\ t}$ *am maur* || portaberis] portaueris S^{a} || sic[2]] *om. N* || saeculi fluctibus] fluctibus saeculi V^{s} || nauigabat] nauigauit $V^{f.r.s}$, nauigat $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **40** cruce] crucem $S^{a\ a.c.}$ || nostri] mei S^{b}, *om.* V^{t} || **41** mirum] *inc. bed* (Phil 2,12; *inscriptio*: ex sermone de nisi manducaueritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum non habebitis [habebis *a.c.*] uitam in nobis) *flor* (Phil 2,12-14; *inscriptio*: ex sermone de uerbis apostoli) || praedicato christo crucifixo] praedicatum christum crucifixum $V^{m.n\ p.c.}$ (praedicato christum crucifixo $V^{n\ a.c.}$) || **42** ascendit[1] (cf. *ascendere*, l. 39)] assentit *N* (*lectio facilior*) || contemnit] compempnit V^{j} || ascendit[2] (cf. *ascendere*, l. 39)] assentit *N* (*lectio facilior*) || **42-44** audiuit-arroganti] *om. bed* || **42** audiuit] audiunt V^{r}, audi ut $V^{t\ a.c.}$, audi* ut $V^{t\ p.c.}$, audiat V^{u} || ueraci] uerace *N* S^{b} $V^{j.t.u}$ *flor* (*fortasse ex archetypo*), uerac* S^{a} || **43** datum fuerit ei] ei datum fuerit *N*, fuerit ei datum V^{j} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || patre] meo *add.* $V^{j.p.q.s.u}$ *maur* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || gaudeat] gaudet $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || quia] cui $V^{s\ p.c.}$ || **43-44** gratias agat danti] danti gratias V^{p} || **44** corde] cordi S^{b} || non] *om.* V^{e} || arroganti] agat *add.* V^{p} || ne] nec $V^{f\ p.c.}$ || amittat] atmittat V^{j}, ammittat $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || **45** ipsa] ista V^{o}, *om. bed* || uia] uita V^{b} || iusta] *om.* V^{a} *am*, iuxta V^{e}, iusti $V^{n\ p.c.}$, ista V^{p} || ambulant] ambulabant *bed* || sibi eam] eam sibi V^{o} || tribuerint] tribuerit $S^{b\ a.c.}$, attribuerint $V^{c.d}$ || illa] uia *N* || **46** humilitatem] humilitate S^{b} || nos docens (*cens V^{t})] docens nos $V^{a.b.e.f.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.s}$ *am* || sancta scriptura] s* scritura $V^{j\ a.c.}$, scriptura sancta V^{p} || dicit] loquitur *bed* || uestram] uestrum *bed* $^{a.c.}$

ipsorum salutem operamini. Et ne sibi inde aliquid darent quia dixit *operamini*, continuo subiunxit: *Deus enim est qui operatur in uobis et uelle et operari pro bona uoluntate. Deus est qui operatur in uobis*: ideo *cum timore et tremore* uallem facite, imbrem suscipite. Depressa implentur, alta siccantur. Gratia pluuia est. Quid ergo miraris, si *Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam*? Ideo *cum timore et tremore*, id est cum humilitate. *Noli altum sapere, sed time. Time*, ut implearis; *noli altum sapere*, ne sicceris.

4. 'Sed iam', inquis, 'ambulo uiam iustam. Opus erat ut discerem; opus erat ut per doctrinam legis scirem quid agerem. Habeo liberum uoluntatis arbitrium: quis me ab ista uia separabit?' Si legas diligenter, inuenies quendam de sua quadam abundantia, quam tamen acceperat, extollere se coepisse; Dominum autem misericordem, ut doceret humilitatem, quod dederat, abstulisse; illum uero subito inopem remansisse et misericordiam Dei recordatione confessum dixisse: *Ego dixi in abundantia mea: 'Non mouebor in aeternum.' - Ego dixi in abundantia mea*, sed *ego dixi*, homo dixi: *Omnis homo mendax. Ego dixi. Ego* ergo *dixi in abundantia*

47-48 ne-subiunxit] *Gen. ad litt.* 8, 12, 27; *Grat. Christ.* 1, 5, 6; *In psalm.* 142, 10 || **49-50** uallem-est] cf. l. 108; *Serm.* 175, 3 (Iam si humiles sunt, ualles sunt; quod infuderis capiunt, non dimittunt. Si uenerit aqua super altitudinem, decurrit et defluit; si uenerit aqua ad concauum et humilem locum, et capitur et stat); 289, 3; *In psalm.* 103, *serm.* 2, 10 || **50-51** deus-gratiam] Iac 4,6; 1 Pt 5,5 || **51** cum[1]-tremore] Phil 2,12 || **51-52** noli-sapere[2]] Rm 11,20; P. PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins* [*Cassiciacum* 5, Würzburg 1938] p. 135 || **53-70** Ps 29,7-8; P.-M. HOMBERT, Gloria gratiae [n. 14] pp. 306-309; *Nouvelles recherches* [n. 14] pp. 225-226; *Introduction* n. 14 || **53-54** cf. ll. 44-45; 80-84 || **58-59** ego[1]-dixi[1]] Ps 29,7 || **59** omnis homo mendax] Ps 115,11 || **59-62** ego[2]-conturbatus] Ps 29,7-8

47 ipsorum] *om. N* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*), et *praem.* $V^{a.r}$ *bed, legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ (et?) || salutem operamini] operamini salutem V^{j} || sibi inde] qui *praem.* $V^{j\ a.c.}$, inde sibi *bed* || inde aliquid] aliquid inde $V^{a.b}$ *am maur* || quia dixit] quod ait V^{p} || **48** subiunxit] subiuxit *bed* || deus[1]] *iterat* V^{j} || enim est] est enim V^{q} || qui] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || **48-49** et[1]-uobis] *om.* V^{p} || **48** et uelle] *iterat* $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || operari] perficere V^{q} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || **48-50** deus[2]-est] *def.* V^{h} || **49** est] *om.* S^{b} || qui] *om.* $V^{a\ a.c.}$ || in uobis] *om.* V^{t} || uobis] nobis S^{b} || et tremore] *om. bed* || uallem] uellus $V^{k.l.n\ a.c.}$ (cf. ll. 142-150), ualles V^{p} || facite] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || suscipite] suscipere $V^{i.k.l}$ || **50** implentur] impleantur $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || superbis] superbos *bed* $^{a.c.}$ || **51** tremore] fac *add.* $V^{h.i.k.l.m}$ || **52-53** -pere[1]-iustam] $V^{n\ in\ rasura}$ || **52** sed-sapere[2]] *om.* V^{p} || sicceris] *fin. bed flor* || **53** iam] etiam $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || inquis ambulo] ambulo inquis V^{c} || inquis] imquis V^{u} || iustam] istam $V^{h.i.p.q}$ *am maur* || erat[1]] era $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || discerem-ut[2]] *om.* $V^{i.j.k}$ || discerem] *ita N* $V^{a.b.d.f\ p.c.\ l\ p.c.\ m.n.o.p.q.r\ p.c.\ s.t.u}$ *am maur*, dicerem $S^{a.b}$ $V^{c.e.h.l\ a.c.\ r\ a.c.}$, diceret $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **54** agerem] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || liberum uoluntatis] uoluntatis liberum V^{u} || uoluntatis arbitrium] arbitrium uoluntatis $V^{j.p}$ || uoluntatis] *om.* $V^{c\ a.c.}$ || ab ista uia separabit] separabit a uia ista V^{q} || separabit] separauit $V^{c\ a.c.}$, sparabit $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || **55** inuenies] inuenes $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || quendam] quandam $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || quadam] *om.* $V^{h.p\ a.c.}$ || **56** se] *om.* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || coepisse] posse et coepisse iactari V^{s} || **56-57** dominum-abstulisse] *rasura in* V^{t}, *correxit* $V^{t\ i.m.}$ || **56** autem] *om.* $V^{j.t\ a.c.}$ || dederat] erat $V^{a.b}$ *am* || **57** abstulisse] abstulisset S^{b}, obstulisse V^{c} || inopem] in opere $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || remansisse] remansisset S^{b}, remansse *praem.* $V^{j\ a.c.}$, mansisse V^{s} || misericordiam] misericordia $S^{a.b}$, misericordis V^{j}, misericoriam V^{n}, per *praem.* $V^{r.t\ p.c.}$, *legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ (per?) || confessum] confessus $V^{e\ a.c.}$, esse atque *add.* $V^{t.s}$, esse et *add.* $V^{t\ p.c.}$ || **58** abundantia[1]] abuntia $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || **58-59** non-mea] *om.* V^{k} || **58-59** abundantia mea] mea abundantia V^{s} || **59** mea] non mouebor *add.* $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || sed] si *add.* $V^{t\ p.c.\ s}$ || ego ergo] ego $V^{c\ a.c.}$, ergo ego $V^{o.p.q}$ *maur, legere nequeo quod add.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || abundantia] habuntia V^{j}

mea. Tanta erat abundantia, ut hoc dicere auderem: *Non mouebor in aeternum*. Quid deinde? *Domine, in uoluntate tua praestitisti decori meo uirtutem. Auertisti autem faciem tuam et factus sum conturbatus*. 'Ostendisti', inquit, 'mihi quia illud quod abundabam, de tuo erat. Ostendisti mihi unde peterem, cui tribuerem quod acciperem, cui gratias agere deberem, ad quem currerem sitiens, unde implerer, et quo impletus essem ad quem custodirem. *Fortitudinem enim meam ad te custodiam*. Quod te largitore impleam, te seruatore non perdam. *Fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam*. Hoc ut ostenderes mihi, *auertisti faciem tuam et factus sum conturbatus*. *Conturbatus*, quia siccatus; siccatus, quia exaltatus.' Dic ergo siccus et aridus, ut rursus implearis: *Anima mea uelut terra sine aqua tibi*. Dic: *Anima mea uelut terra sine aqua tibi*. Tu enim dixeras, non Dominus dixerat: *Non mouebor in aeternum*. Tu dixeras praesumens de te, sed non de tuo - et quasi putabas de tuo.

5. Quid ergo Dominus dicit? *Seruite Domino in timore et exsultate cum tremore*. Sicut apostolus: *Cum timore et tremore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini. Deus est enim qui operatur in uobis*. Ergo *exsultate cum tremore, ne quando irascatur Dominus*. Video quia

65-66 fortitudinem-custodiam] Ps 58,10 || **66-67** auertisti-conturbatus[2]] Ps 29,8 || **68-69** anima[1]-tibi] Ps 142,6 || **69** non[2]-aeternum] Ps 29,7 || **71** Ps 2,11 || **72-73** cum-uobis] Phil 2,12-13 || **73-80** exsultate-iusta] Ps 2,11-12

60 erat] ergo *praem.* V^{j}, erit $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || abundantia] mea *add.* V^{e}, habuntia V^{j} || auderem] audierem V^{k} || **61** uoluntate] bona *praem.* S^{b} || praestitisti] praestiti V^{o} || uirtutem] uirtute S^{b} || autem] *om.* *N* $V^{h.k.m.o.q}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || tuam] a me *add.* $V^{b.j.k.m.n\ p.c.\ o.p.q}$ *maur* || **62** quia] quod V^{c}, *inc.* V^{g} || quod] *ita* $N^{a.c.}$ $S^{a.b}$ $V^{a.b.d.e.f.g.h.j.k.l\ a.c.\ o.p.t.u}$ *am* (*cf. ThLL* 1, s.u. *abundo*, c. 235, ll. 32-36), quo $N^{p.c.}$ $V^{c.i.l\ p.c.m.n\ p.c.\ q.r.s\ p.c.}$ *maur*, *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$, quo* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ (quod?) || abundabam] abundabat $V^{j.o}$ || **63** mihi] inquit *add.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || unde] ut V^{k} || cui[1]] unde V^{j} || tribuerem] *non leg.* V^{t} || acciperem] *ita* *N* $S^{a.b}$, acceperam $V^{a.b.h.i.j.k.l.p.u}$ *am maur*, acceperim $V^{c.d.f.g.m.n.o.q.r\ p.c.\ s.t}$, acciperim $V^{e.r\ a.c.}$ || agere] agere* $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || **64** currerem sitiens] sitiens currerem *N* || sitiens] sciens V^{e}, faciens $V^{f\ a.c.}$, si sciens V^{j} || implerer et quo] impl* $V^{p\ a.c.}$ || implerer] implerem *N* || quo] cum $V^{e.n\ p.c.\ u}$, *non leg.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$, cum *add.* V^{p} || ad] et *praem.* $V^{c.h.i.k.l}$ || custodirem] ostendisti-erat (l. 62) *add.* V^{t}, fortitudinem meam *add.* $V^{t.u}$ || **65** enim] *om.* *N* $V^{a\ a.c.\ h\ a.c.\ p.s}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*), inquit V^{q} || ad te] *om.* $V^{c\ a.c.}$ || **65-66** quod-custodiam] *om.* $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || **65** quod] *ita* *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{a.b.c.e\ p.c.\ f.h.i.j.k.l.m.n\ p.c.\ o.r.t.u}$ *am*, quo $V^{d.g.n\ a.c.\ p.q.s\ p.c.}$ *maur*, quo* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ (quod?) || largitore] largiente V^{a} *am*, largitorem V^{f}, largi*te $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || impleam] *ita* *N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{a.b.d.e\ p.c.\ f.g.j.n\ a.c.\ o.p.r.s\ a.c.\ t.u}$ *am*, implear $V^{c.n\ p.c.\ q.s\ p.c.}$ *maur*, impleor $V^{h.i.k.l.m}$ || seruatore] seruatorem S^{a}, saluatore V^{m} || **66** fortitudinem-custodiam] *om.* V^{j} || meam] cum *add.* $V^{t\ p.c.}$ || ut] *non leg.* S^{a}, *om.* $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || tuam] a me *add.* $V^{j.q}$ *maur* || **67** conturbatus[1]] conturbatuus V^{t} || **68** mea[1]] tua $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || uelut[1]] sicut V^{j} || **68-69** dic-tibi] *om.* *N* $V^{e.h.j}$ || **68** mea[2]] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || uelut[2]] sicut S^{b} || **69** sine] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || dixeras[1]] dixas $S^{a\ a.c.}$, dexeras V^{u} || **70** praesumens de te] de te praesumens V^{q} || **70-71** de[1]-quid] $V^{n\ in\ rasura}$ || **70** de[2]] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || et-tuo[2]] *om.* $V^{g.p}$ || putabas de tuo] de tuo putabas V^{j} || putabas] putabis V^{f} || **71** dominus] domin* $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || exsultate] ei *add.* S^{b} $V^{a.b.c.d.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t.u}$ *am maur* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || cum] in V^{m}, *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || sicut] *ita* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{d.e.f.g.j.m.n\ a.c.\ o.r.s\ a.c.\ t}$, sic et *N* $V^{c.h.i.k.l.p.q.s\ p.c.\ u}$ *maur*, sic $V^{a.b.n\ p.c.}$ *am* || **72** timore] inquit *add.* $V^{c.h.k.l}$ || tremore] inquit *add.* V^{j} || ipsorum] *om.* *N* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*), et *praem.* V^{t}, *legere nequeo quod praem.* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ (et?) || salutem operamini] operamini salutem V^{j} || salutem] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || est enim] enim est V^{o} || est] *om.* $V^{b\ a.c.\ k\ a.c.}$, *post* enim $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || **73** tremore] timore V^{j} || uideo] uides V^{c} || quia] *om.* $V^{h\ a.c.}$

clamando praeuenitis. Quid enim dicturus sum scitis, clamando praeuenistis. Et hoc unde habetis, nisi quia docuit ad quem credendo uenistis? Hoc ergo dicit. Audite quod nostis. Non doceo, sed commemoro praedicando. Immo nec doceo, quia nostis, nec commemoro, quia meministis, sed simul dicamus quod nobiscum tenetis. Hoc Dominus dicit: '*Apprehendite disciplinam*: *exsultate*, sed *cum tremore*', ut semper humiles teneatis quod accepistis, *ne quando irascatur Dominus* utique superbis, sibi quod habent tribuentibus, non illi a quo habent gratias agentibus. *Ne quando irascatur Dominus et pereatis de uia iusta*. Numquid dixit: 'Ne quando irascatur Dominus et non ueniatis ad uiam iustam?' Numquid: 'Ne quando irascatur Dominus et non uos perducat ad uiam iustam aut non uos admittat ad uiam iustam?' Iam in illa ambulatis! Nolite superbire, ne etiam de illa pereatis: *et pereatis*, inquit, *de uia iusta*, *cum exarserit in breui ira eius super uos* - non in longum. Vbi superbis, ibi quod acceperas, perdis. His territus homo quasi diceret: 'Quid ergo faciam?', sequitur: *Beati omnes qui confidunt in eum* - non in se, sed in eum. *Gratia salui facti sumus, non ex nobis, sed Dei donum est.*

6. Forte dicatis: 'Quid sibi uult quod hoc saepe dicit? Iterum hoc et tertio hoc et prope

80-84 cf. ll. 44-45; 53-54 || **80-83** *Serm.* 13, 2 (Non enim ait: 'Ne quando irascatur Dominus et non intretis in uiam iustam', sed: *pereatis de uia iusta.* Iam enim uideris tibi iustus [...] De hac uia peribis, si tibi ista praesumpseris, si tibi ista a te ipso esse putaueris. Infideles enim non intrant in uiam iustam, superbi pereunt de uia iusta); *Nat. et grat.* 32, 36; *Corrept.* 9, 24 || **83-86** et-eum[1]] Ps 2,12-13 (pour la structure syntaxique de ces versets, voir *Introduction* n. 15) || **86-87** gratia-est] Eph 2,8

74 praeuenitis-clamando[2]] *om.* $S^{a.b}$ V^{p} || praeuenitis] peruenitis $V^{a.b.f.r}$ || sum] sim $V^{c.e.f.g.h.i.k.l.m.n.o.q.r.s.t.u}$ || clamando[2]] quia *praem.* $V^{m.r.s}$ || praeuenistis] *ita N* $S^{a\,p.c.\ b}$ $V^{c.d.r\,p.c.\ s.t}$, praeuenitis $S^{a\,a.c.}$ $V^{e.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.u}$ *am maur*, peruenitis $V^{a.b.f.r\,a.c.}$ || hoc] huc $V^{h\,a.c.}$, *om.* $V^{q\,a.c.}$ || **75** nisi quia] quia nisi V^{u} || audite] audi V^{n} || quod] quia S^{b} || **76** nec] non V^{d} || **77** nobiscum tenetis] nobis contenetis $V^{e\,a.c.}$ || dominus dicit] dicit dominus V^{q} || dominus] *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || dicit] dixit $V^{g.h.i.k.l.n}$ || **78** exsultate] et *praem.* $V^{a.b.d.f.g.h.i.k.l.m.o.q}$ *am maur* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || cum tremore] contremore $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || humiles] humiliter V^{e}, humilies V^{n} || **79** irascatur] ir *praem.* $V^{d\ a.c.}$, *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **79-81** dominus-quando[2]] *def.* V^{h} || **79** dominus] et pereatis de uia iusta *add.* $V^{e\ a.c.}$, uobis *praem.* V^{p} || utique] utque $V^{g.n}$, ut V^{p} || quod] *iterat* $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || habent] habeant $V^{d\ a.c.}$ || illi] ille V^{k} || quo] *o V^{k} || **80** gratias] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || agentibus] agentes $V^{a.e.f.g.i.l.n.r.s\ a.c.}$ || irascatur] *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$, *post* dominus $V^{n\ p.c.}$ || **81** ne[1]] *om.* $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || ueniatis] *ueniatis $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || **81-82** numquid-iustam[1]] *om.* $S^{a.b}$ || **81** numquid] negando *add.* $V^{d\ a.c.}$, dixit *add.* V^{q} || **82** aut] ait V^{f} || admittat] amittat $V^{f.j.r\ a.c.}$ || **83** in illa] *non leg.* $V^{d\ a.c.}$ || etiam] *non leg.* V^{g} || de illa] *om.* V^{t} || pereatis[1]] excidatis V^{s} || et] *om.* $V^{u\ a.c.}$ || **84** exarserit] inquit *add.* V^{p} || eius] utinam *add.* $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || uos] nos V^{k} || in[2]] *om.* V^{n} || **85** his] his* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || diceret] dicet V^{u} || ergo] ego V^{o} || sequitur] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.\ u}$ || **86** eum[1]] eo $V^{c.h.i.j.k\ p.c.\ l.m.o.p.q.s}$ *maur* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*), *non leg.* $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || eum[2]] eo $V^{c.h.i.k\ p.c.\ l.m.p.q.s\ p.c.}$ *maur, non leg.* $V^{k\ a.c.}$, e* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || gratia] enim *add.* V^{p} || non[2]] et hoc *praem. N* V^{p} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || **86-87** dei donum] donum dei *N* V^{m} || **88** dicatis] dicitis $S^{a\,p.c.\ b}$ $V^{b\ p.c.\ r\,a.c.}$ || quod hoc] hoc quod $V^{s\,a.c.}$ || quod] *om.* V^{p} || dicit] dicis *N* S^{b}, dicitur V^{t}, iter *add.* $V^{d\,a.c.}$ || tertio] in *praem.* $V^{a.b.f}$ *am*, tertium *maur*

numquam loquitur, nisi quando ista dicit.' Vtinam non sine causa dicam! Sunt enim homines ingrati gratiae multum tribuentes inopi sauciaeque naturae. Verum est: magnas arbitrii liberi uires homo, cum conderetur, accepit, sed peccando amisit. In mortem lapsus est, infirmus factus est, a latronibus semiuiuus in uia relictus est. In iumentum suum leuauit eum transiens Samaritanus, quod interpretatur 'custos'; ad stabulum adhuc perducitur. Quid extollitur? Adhuc curatur. 'Sed sufficit', inquit, 'mihi quod in baptismo accepi remissionem omnium peccatorum.' Numquid quia deleta est iniquitas, finita est infirmitas? 'Accepi', inquit, 'remissionem omnium peccatorum.' Prorsus uerum est: deleta sunt cuncta peccata in sacramento baptismatis; cuncta prorsus dicta, facta, cogitata, cuncta deleta sunt. Sed hoc est quod infusum est in uia: oleum et uinum. Retinetis semiuiuus in uia ille a latronibus sauciatus quomodo sit consolatus accipiens oleum et uinum uulneribus suis. Iam utique errori eius indultum fuit et tamen sanatur languor in stabulo. Stabulum, si agnoscitis, Ecclesia est. Stabulum modo, quia uiuendo transimus; domus erit, unde numquam migrabimus, cum ad regnum coelorum sani peruenerimus. Interim in stabulo libenter curemur, non adhuc languidi de sanitate gloriemur, ne nihil aliud superbiendo faciamus, nisi ut numquam curando

92-104 cf. Lc 10, 30-35; *Introduction* n. 16 || **93** Samaritanus, quod interpretatur 'custos'] *Quaest. euang.* 2, 19; 40, 4; *In Ioh. euang.* 43, 2; *Serm.* 171, 2; *In psalm.* 30, II, *serm.* 1, 8; 68, *serm.* 2, 11; 125, 15; 136, 7; M.-F. BERROUARD dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 73 A (Paris 1988) pp. 420-421 n. 8 || **94** adhuc curatur] *Serm.* 154, 13 (Languor repugnat sanitati. Semiuiuus iacebat in uia, curatur adhuc, sanentur omnes languores eius) || **99-100** quomodo-fuit] l'huile et le vin versés sur les blessures du voyageur aggressé comme images du baptême: *Serm.* 179 A, 7 (infusum est tibi uinum et oleum, sacramentum Vnigeniti percepisti; *PLS* 2, c. 715); *Quaest. euang.* 2, 19 (à propos de Lc 10,34: oleum consolatio spei bonae propter indulgentiam datam ad reconciliationem pacis)

89 numquam] uix umquam *N* || loquitur] loqueris *N* S^{b} || nisi-dicit] ut ista non dicas *N* || ista] *ita* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{c.d.o.q.s\ p.c.\ t.u}$ (*cf. etiam uerba* ut ista non dicas *in N*), *om.* $V^{a.b.e.f.g.j.n.r.s\ a.c.}$ *am*, hoc $V^{h.i.k.l.m.p}$ *maur* || dicit] dicis S^{b} || sine] sic *praem.* V^{n} || causa] causam V^{c} || **90** gratiae] dei *add. N* || inopi] inopis V^{f} || sauciaeque] sauciae qu* $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || magnas] quia *praem. N* || liberi] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || **91** cum] *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || peccando] has *praem. N* || mortem] mortalem V^{c}, morte $V^{e.j}$, morem V^{p} || **92** a-est[2]] *om.* V^{j} || latronibus] l*tronibus $S^{a\ a.c.}$ || in uia relictus est] relictus est in uia V^{j} || **92-93** transiens samaritanus] samaritanus transiens V^{m} || **93** quod] qui V^{p} || adhuc] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || extollitur] extollit V^{e} || **94** sed] *om.* V^{h} || inquit] inquis S^{b} || baptismo] baptimo $V^{f\ a.c.}$, baptis $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || **95** numquid] quid *N* || accepi] accipi $V^{b\ a.c.}$, accipe $V^{f.g.i.k\ a.c.\ l.n\ a.c.\ r\ a.c.}$, accepit V^{p} || inquit] enim V^{e}, inquis $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || **96** cuncta peccata] peccata cuncta $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || **97** prorsus] prsus *N*, *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || dicta] dita $S^{a\ a.c.}$, deleta sunt *praem.* V^{q} || est] *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **98** semiuiuus] carissimi *praem.* $V^{c.h.i.k.l.m.n\ p.c.}$ *maur* || in uia ille] ille in uia $V^{h.j.o.q}$ *maur* || a] *om.* $V^{i.l}$ || **99** sit] si* $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || oleum] uinum V^{j} || et uinum] *om.* V^{m} || uinum] oleum V^{j} || uulneribus] ulceribus $V^{t.u}$ || suis] atque uinum *add.* V^{m} || **100** sanatur languor] languor eius sanatur V^{q} || sanatur] sanatus V^{e} || stabulo] *legere nequeo quod add.* $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || stabulum] stabulo $S^{a.b}$ || **101** modo] est *add.* $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || quia] qua V^{q} || uiuendo] uidendo V^{f}, ueniendo $V^{s\ p.c.\ t.u}$ || unde] ubi V^{p} || migrabimus] migrauimus S^{b} $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || cum] sed *praem.* V^{n} || **102** regnum] regna $V^{r.s}$ || in] *om.* V^{n} || curemur] curemus $V^{e\ a.c.\ f.u}$ || non] ne V^{e} || adhuc] huc V^{f} || **103** gloriemur] glorimur $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || aliud] aliquid V^{c} || faciamus] faciemus $V^{f.g.n\ a.c.\ r\ a.c.}$

sanemur.

7. *Benedic, anima mea, Dominum.* Dic animae tuae, dic! Adhuc in hac uita es; adhuc carnem fragilem portas; adhuc *corpus quod corrumpitur, aggrauat animam*; adhuc post integritatem remissionis accepisti remedium orationis; adhuc utique dicis, donec sanentur languores tui: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra.* Dic ergo animae tuae - humilis uallis, non erectus collis - dic animae tuae: *Benedic, anima mea, Dominum et noli obliuisci omnes retributiones eius.* Quas retributiones? Dic, enumera, gratias age! Quas retributiones? *Qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis.* Hoc factum est in baptismo. Quid fit modo? *Qui sanat omnes languores tuos.* Hoc fit modo, agnosco. Sed quamdiu hic sum, *corpus quod corrumpitur, aggrauat animam.* Dic ergo et quod sequitur. *Qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam.* Post redemptionem de corruptione quid restat? *Quando corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, tunc fit sermo qui scriptus est: 'Absorpta est mors in uictoria. Vbi est, mors, contentio tua? Vbi est, mors, aculeus tuus?'* Ibi recte: *Vbi est, mors, aculeus tuus?* Quaeres locum eius et non inuenies. Quid est aculeus mortis? Quid est *Vbi est, mors, aculeus tuus?* Vbi est peccatum? Quaeris et nusquam est. *Aculeus enim mortis est*

105-129 Ps 102,1-4; P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches* [n. 14] pp. 411-413; *Introduction* n. 17 || **105** Ps 102,1/2 || **106** Sap 9,15 || **108** dimitte-nostra] Mt 6,12 || humilis-collis] cf. ll. 49-50 || **109-112** benedic-tuos] Ps 102,2-3 || **112-113** corpus-animam] Sap 9,15 || **113** qui-tuam] Ps 102,4 || **114-119** 1 Cor 15,54-56

104 sanemur] sanamur $V^{e\ a.c.}$, curemur V^{n} || **105** dominum] domino $V^{c.f.k\ p.c.\ o.p.q}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || adhuc[1]] cum *praem. N*, dum *add.* V^{f} || hac] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || es] est $S^{a.b}$ || adhuc[2]] cum *praem. N* || **105-106** carnem fragilem] fragilem carnem $V^{i.u}$ || **106** adhuc[1]] cum *praem. N* || corpus] copus $S^{a\ a.c.}$ || aggrauat] agrabat $S^{a\ a.c.}$ || adhuc[2]] cum *praem. N* || integritatem] integritatatem V^{m} || **107** remissionis] resurrectionis *am* || utique] itaque V^{j} || sanentur] sanantur $V^{j\ a.c.}$, sanetur $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || tui] nostri V^{p} || **108** dimitte] demitte V^{p} || uallis] conuallis V^{q} || erectus] rectus S^{a} || **109** dominum] domino $V^{f.k.n.o.p.q}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || omnes] omnis $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **109-110** quas retributiones] *om.* V^{i} || **109** quas] et *add.* $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || **110** propitius] propitiatus $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || **111** quid fit modo] *iterat* $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || sanat] samat $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || **111-112** languores tuos] infirmitates tuas V^{q} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || **112** agnosco] agnosce V^{q} || **112-121** sed-titillet] *def.* V^{h} || **112-113** sed-ergo] *om.* $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **112** sed] et V^{r} || aggrauat] adgrabat S^{a} || **113** animam] anima S^{b} || quod] quid $V^{e.f.g.n\ a.c.\ r.s\ a.c.}$ || redimit] redimet $S^{a.b}$ $V^{r\ a.c.}$, redemit $V^{c.k\ a.c.}$ || corruptione] corruptio $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || **114** redemptionem] redemptione V^{f} || de corruptione] *om.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || corruptione] curruptione $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || hoc] *om.* $V^{p\ a.c.}$ || induerit] induetur $S^{a.b}$ $V^{i.u}$ || incorruptionem] incorruptione V^{i} || **115** hoc] *om.* $V^{i\ a.c.}$ || tunc] hoc V^{e} || fit] fiet *N* $V^{c.d.g.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.t.u}$ *maur* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || sermo] *om.* $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || **116** uictoria] uictoriam S^{b} $V^{i.u}$ *maur* || mors[1]] *om.* V^{u} || ubi[2]-tuus] *om.* V^{a} *am maur* || est[2]] *om.* $V^{k.l}$ || mors[2]] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || aculeus] *sex fere litterae quae non leguntur in* $V^{d\ a.c.}$ || **116-117** ibi-tuus] *om.* $V^{m.n}$ || **116** ibi] ubi V^{f} || ubi[3]] dicetur *praem. N* V^{u}, quaeris *praem.* $V^{s\ p.c.}$ || mors[3]] *om.* V^{i} || **117** quaeres] quia *praem. N*, quaeris $V^{a.b.c.e.f.g.j.n.o.p.q.r.t}$ *am maur* || inuenies] inuenis $V^{c.p.q}$ *maur*, ibi recte quaeris *add.* V^{m} || **117-118** ubi est mors] ubi mors $V^{a.m\ p.c.}$, ub*mors $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || **118** mors] *om.* $V^{i\ a.c.}$, *post* aculeus[2] $V^{i\ p.c.}$ || peccatum] tuum *add.* V^{o} || **118-119** est peccatum] peccatum est *N* V^{i} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*)

peccatum. Apostoli, non mea uerba sunt. Tunc dicetur: *Vbi est, mors, aculeus tuus?* Nusquam erit peccatum, nec quod te capiat, nec quod te impugnet, nec quod conscientiam titillet. Tunc, tunc non dicetur: *Debita nostra dimitte nobis*. Sed quid dicetur? *Domine Deus noster, pacem da nobis; omnia enim reddidisti nobis*.

8. Denique post redemptionem ab omni corruptione quid restat nisi corona iustitiae? Ipsa certe restat, sed etiam in ipsa uel sub ipsa non sit caput turgidum, ut recipiat coronam. Audi, attende psalmum, quam nolit corona illa tumidum caput. Cum dixisset: *Qui redimit de corruptione uitam tuam, Qui coronat te*, inquit. Iam hic dicturus eras: '*Coronat te*: merita mea fatentur, uirtus mea fecit hoc. Debitum redditur, non donatur.' Audi potius psalmum; nam et hoc tu dicis: *Omnis homo mendax*. Audi Deus quid dicat: *Qui coronat te in miseratione et misericordia*. De misericordia te coronat, de miseratione te coronat. Non enim dignus fuisti quem uocaret et uocatum iustificaret, iustificatum glorificaret. *Reliquiae per electionem gratiae saluae factae sunt. Si autem gratia, non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia*. Nam *ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum*

121 debita-nobis] Mt 6,12 || **121-122** domine-nobis[2]] Is 26,12 || **123** cf. 2 Tim 4,8 || **125-126** Ps 102,4 || **128** omnis homo mendax] Ps 115,11 || **128-129** qui-misericordia[1]] Ps 102,4 || **130** uocaret-glorificaret] cf. Rom 8,30 || **130-132** reliquiae-gratia] Rm 11,5-6 || **132-133** ei-debitum[2]] Rm 4,4; Rm 4,4 comme raison (*nam*, l. 132) de Rm 11,6: *Epist.* 177, 8; *Serm.* 10, 3; *Pat.* 20, 17; *Spir. et litt.* 24, 40; *Gest. Pelag.* 14, 33; *Grat.* 8, 19; P. PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins* [*ad ll.* 51-52] pp. 139-140

119 non mea uerba sunt] uerba sunt non mea V^{c} || uerba] mea *add.* $V^{o\ a.c.}$ || dicetur] dicitur $V^{f.g.j.p}$, *non leg.* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **120** nusquam] numquam $V^{g.k.l.n\ a.c.\ p}$, quia *praem.* $V^{i.k.l}$, ubi *praem.* V^{p} || nec[1]] *om. N*, ne $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || capiat] capit $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || nec[2]] ne $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || nec quod[3]] *iterat* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || conscientiam] conscientem V^{c}, conscientia $V^{f.u}$, scientiam $V^{n\ a.c.}$, tuam *add.* V^{p} *am* || **121** tunc[2]] *ita N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{c.t.u}$, *om.* $V^{a.b.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s}$ *am maur* || non] *om.* $V^{c\ a.c.}$ || dicetur[1]] dicitur V^{f} || debita nostra dimitte (demitte S^{a} $V^{c\ a.c.}$) nobis] dimitte nostra debita nobis V^{o}, dimitte nobis debita nostra $V^{q.s}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || dicetur[2]] dicitur V^{f} || **122** noster] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || da] das $V^{s\ p.c.}$ (*cf.* dabis *in uersione uulgata*) || reddidisti] reddidisti* $V^{s\ a.c.}$ (-s?) || **123** corona] c*rona V^{c} || **123-124** certe restat] restat certe $V^{u\ a.c.}$ || **124** etiam] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || sub] etiam *praem.* V^{p} || ut] *om.* $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || coronam] gratiae *add.* V^{b} || **125** attende] attente *N* || quam] quia $V^{g.h.i.k.l.m.p.r.s}$, qu* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || nolit] olit $S^{a\ a.c.}$ || corona illa] coronam $V^{a.b}$ *am*, illa $V^{n\ a.c.\ p}$ || tumidum] *ita N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{c.d\ i.t.\ o.q.t.u}$, euangelii V^{a}, turgidum $V^{b.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.s}$ *am maur*, uel turgidum $V^{d\ s.l.}$ || redimit] redimet $S^{a.b}$ $V^{a.b.m.r\ a.c.}$ *am*, redemit $V^{i.k}$ || **126** corruptione] corruptionem $V^{c\ a.c.}$, interitu $V^{p.q}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || hic] inquit V^{c}, *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.\ u}$ || dicturus] dictu*us $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || coronat te[2]] corona te *N* $V^{a.n.r}$ *am*, coronate $V^{c\ a.c.\ g.k}$, coronam te $V^{c\ p.c.}$, coron* V^{h}, qui *praem.* V^{j}, coronam V^{p}, corona V^{q}, coronat * $V^{t\ a.c.}$, coronat $V^{t\ p.c.}$, coronat me V^{u} || **127** fatentur] fecerunt *N* (*lectio facilior*; *cf.* fecit *in eadem linea*), faterentur $S^{a.b}$, fatetur $V^{q.u}$, fate*ntur $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || uirtus mea fecit hoc] fecit hoc uirtus mea V^{s} || et] *om. N* || **128** hoc] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || tu] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || omnis] autem *add. N* || homo] h* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || audi-dicat] *om. N* || deus] *non leg.* $V^{k\ a.c.}$, psalmum $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || quid] qui V^{f} || miseratione] miseratio $V^{b\ a.c.}$, misericordia V^{j} || **129** misericordia[1]] miseratione V^{j} || te[2]] *om.* $V^{e.k}$ || **130** et uocatum iustificaret] iustificaret et uocatum $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || iustificatum] et *praem.* $V^{a.b}$ *am* || reliquiae] saluae *add.* $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || **131** saluae factae] salui facti V^{f}, salui factae $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || gratia[1]] gratiae V^{j} || non[1]-gratia[2]] *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || non[1]] iam *praem. N* $V^{o.q.u}$ *maur* || alioquin] aliqui $V^{k\ a.c.}$, alioqui $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || **131-132** iam-gratia] *om.* $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || **131** iam] *om.* $S^{a.b}$ || **132** qui] quo $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || merces] *post* imputatur V^{m} || imputatur] *ita N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{j.p.t.u}$ (*cf. usum sancti Augustini*), imputabitur $V^{a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.k.l.m.n.o.q.r\ p.c.\ s}$ *am maur*, putabitur $V^{t\ a.c.}$

debitum. Apostolus loquitur: *non secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum. Te* autem *coronat in miseratione et misericordia* et, si tua merita praecesserunt, dicit tibi Deus: 'Discute
135 bene merita tua et uidebis quia dona sunt mea.'

9. Haec est ergo iustitia Dei. Quomodo dicitur *Domini salus* non qua saluus est Dominus, sed quam dat eis quos saluos facit, sic et *Dei gratia per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum* iustitia Dei dicitur: non qua iustus est Dominus, sed qua iustificat eos quos ex impiis iustos facit. Quidam uero - quomodo aliquando Iudaei - et Christianos se dici uolunt et, adhuc
140 *ignorantes Dei iustitiam*, suam uolunt constituere, etiam temporibus nostris, temporibus apertae gratiae, temporibus nunc reuelatae, prius occultae gratiae, temporibus nunc in area manifestae gratiae, quae aliquando latebat in uellere. Paucos intellexisse uideo: plures ergo

133-135 te-mea] *In Ioh. euang.* 3, 10; *Serm.* 170, 10; 297, 6 (reddet coronam debitam his meritis tuis. Sed ut reddatur tibi corona tua, Dei dona sunt merita tua); 333, 5; M.-F. BERROUARD dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 71 (Paris 1969) pp. 860-861 (n° 21) || **133-134** te-misericordia] Ps 102,4 || **136-139** *Spir. et litt.* 32, 56; *Grat.* 12, 24; *C. Iulian. op. imperf.* 6, 18; *Epist.* 140, 30, 72 (Sicut ergo quod legitur *Domini est salus*, non ea salus intellegitur qua Dominus saluus est, sed qua hi salui sunt quos ipse saluos facit, sic, cum legitur Dei iustitia in eo quod scriptum est *Ignorantes Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere*, non est illa intellegenda qua Deus iustus est, sed qua iusti sunt homines quos gratia sua iustificat); M.-F. BERROUARD dans: *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 72 (Paris 1977) pp. 799-800 (n° 52) || **136** Ps 3,9 || **137** Rom 7,25 || **140** Rom 10,3 (cf. ll. 158-161); P. PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins* [*ad ll.* 51-52] pp. 129-130 || **142-150** cf. Idc 6,36-40; *C. Faust.* 12, 32; *Vn. eccl.* 5, 10; *In psalm.* 45, 10; 71, 9; 137, 9; *Serm.* 360 A, 3 (Area est orbis terrarum, in uellere populus Iudaeorum. Totus orbis terrarum ista gratia uacuus erat, area ergo sicca erat. Haec gratia apud populum Iudaicum erat, sed *in uellere*. Quid est *in uellere*? Non in manifestatione fidei, sed in nube secreti erat, sed in aperto non erat. [...] Nunc ergo siccum uellus est, expressus est inde Christus [...] sicco uellere, aream rigauit. Et haec fides non est in nube uelleris, sed in aperta manifestatione: omnibus praedicatur, ab omnibus cognoscitur. Sacramentum habet in secreto, uerbum in publico); *Epist.* 177, 14; *Grat. Christ.* 2, 25, 29; *Quaest. hept.* 5, 29; 7, 49, 8-11; M. DULAEY, *Sur quelques points d'exégèse figurée de l'Ancien Testament dans les sermons de Mayence*, dans: G. MADEC, *Augustin prédicateur (395-411)* (*Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité* 159, Paris 1998) pp. 247-266 (en part. p. 248 + nn. 3 et 4)

133-134 apostolus-coronat] $V^{n\ in\ rasura}$ || **133** apostolus-debitum[2]] *om.* $V^{h.i.j.k\ a.c.\ m.p}$ || loquitur] apostolus *add.* V^{e} || **134** miseratione et misericordia] misericordia et miseratione V^{e} (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || merita praecesserunt] praecesserunt merita V^{l} || praecesserunt] praecesserant $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || dicit] dicet $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || **135** bene] bona $V^{a.b}$ *am* || **136** ergo] *om.* $V^{a.b}$ *am* || iustitia] gratia $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || domini] est *add.* $V^{a.b.l}$ *am* || salus] *non leg. N* || qua] quia $V^{m\ a.c.\ p}$ || **137** quam] qua $S^{a.b}$ $V^{c.f.g.r}$ || eis] is $V^{p\ p.c.}$ || quos] quod $S^{b\ a.c.}$ || gratia] est *add.* $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || christum] *om.* V^{m} || **138** dei] *om.* $V^{b\ a.c\ q\ a.c.}$ || dominus] *om.* V^{e} || qua[2]] quia $V^{e.g.r\ a.c.}$ || iustificat] iustos facit V^{q}, iustitia *praem.* V^{s} || ex] *om.* $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || impiis] impios $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **139** aliquando] *om.* V^{q} || et[1]] *om.* $V^{l.r\ a.c.}$ || christianos] christionos S^{b}, christiani V^{f}, christianius $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || dici] dixi $V^{b\ a.c.}$, *ici $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **140** ignorantes] ignoran $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || suam] et *praem.* V^{h} || uolunt] uolentes V^{h} || temporibus[2]] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || **141** apertae gratiae] aperta gratia V^{f} || nunc[1]] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || reuelatae] reuelata V^{f} || prius] sed *praem.* $V^{c.h.i.k.l.m}$ || occultae] occultatae $V^{a.b.o}$ *am* || gratiae[2]] gratia V^{f}, *om.* $V^{t\ a.c.\ u}$ || temporibus[2]] *om.* $V^{a.b}$ *am*, tempus V^{m} || **142** manifestae] reuelatae V^{o}, manifestatae V^{p} || paucos] pauos $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || ergo] *ita N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{c.d.o.t\ a.c.\ u}$, intellexisse $V^{a.b.e.f.g.h.i.l.m.n\ a.c.\ r.s\ a.c.\ t\ p.c.}$ (*del.* $V^{s\ p.c.}$), intellectu V^{j}, intell* $V^{k\ a.c.}$, intellegere $V^{k\ p.c.}$, non intellexisse $V^{n\ p.c.}$ *am*, non intellexisse quos $V^{p.q}$, non intellexisse quos ego *maur*

nequaquam tacendo fraudabo. Quidam de antiquis iustis Gedeon petiuit a Domino signum et dixit: 'Peto, Domine, ut uellus hoc quod in area pono, compluatur et area sicca sit.' Factum est: complutum est uellus, area tota sicca erat. Expressit mane uellus in pelue, quoniam humilibus datur gratia - et in pelue Dominus nostis quid fecerit discipulis suis. Item petiuit alterum signum: 'Volo', inquit, 'Domine, ut uellus siccum sit, area compluta.' Et hoc factum est. Repete tempus Veteris Testamenti: gratia occulta est in nube, tamquam imber in uellere. Attende modo tempus Noui Testamenti: discute gentem Iudaeorum, quasi uellus siccum inuenis; orbis uero totus tamquam illa area plenus est gratia non occulta, sed manifesta. Vnde multum plangere cogimur fratres nostros, qui non contra occultam, sed contra apertam gratiam manifestamque contendunt. Ignoscitur Iudaeis. Quid, Christiani? Quare inimici gratiae Christi? Quare de uobis praesumentes? Quare ingrati? Quare enim Christus uenit? Numquid natura hic non erat? Natura non erat, quam multum laudando decipitis? Numquid

145-146 expressit-suis] *Serm.* 360 A, 3 (*Expressum est uellus et impleuit peluem aqua.* Nec frustra *peluem.* Etenim peluis a pedibus luendis dicta est, id est a pedibus lauandis, tamquam peluis quod pedes luat. Ergo et ipsa expressio uelleris Christum manauit. Christus enim commendans humilitatem in pelue discipulis pedes lauit. Nunc ergo siccum uellus est, expressus est inde Christus. Vere expressus est, quia per pressuras eiectus. *Dixerunt enim coloni: Hic est heres, uenite, occidamus eum et nostra erit hereditas. Et occiderunt eum*, inquit, *et eiecerunt eum extra ciuitatem.* Expresso uellere, foras aquam miserunt. De qua tamen ut humilitas extenderetur expressi, abstulit inde quos uoluit et iit ad gentes, ut aliud signum impleret: sicco uellere, aream rigauit) || **146** et-suis] cf. Io 13,5

143 tacendo] *om.* V^{j} || fraudabo] fraudabor $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || gedeon] nomine *praem. N*, iedeon V^{e} || petiuit a domino] a domino petiuit $V^{t.u}$ || a domino signum] signum a domino V^{m} || **144** domine] domino $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || hoc] *om.* $V^{a.b.f}$ *am* || compluatur] compulatur $V^{b\ a.c.}$ || sit] s*t $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || **144-151** factum-multum] *def.* V^{h} || **145** est[1]] autem *add.* $V^{t.u}$ || est[2]] *om.* $V^{t.u}$ || tota sicca] sicca tota $V^{a\ a.c.\ c.j.u}$ || expressit] exp*essi* $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || mane] manu $V^{f.o.q}$, ma*ne $V^{g\ a.c.}$, ma*e $V^{n.\ a.c.}$ || pelue] peluim $V^{a.b.q}$ *am*, peluem $V^{c.s\ a.c.}$, pelui $V^{f\ p.c.\ n\ p.c.\ o.p}$, pel*ue $V^{m\ a.c.}$, pelu* $V^{n\ a.c.}$, pel*e $V^{r\ a.c.}$, peluen V^{u} || **146** gratia] gratiam $V^{d\ a.c.}$, *ante* humilibus V^{i} || pelue] pelui $V^{a.b.f\ p.c.\ n\ p.c.\ o.p.q}$ *am*, pelu* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || dominus] *post* fecerit V^{d} *maur*, *ante* fecerit V^{p} || fecerit] lauans pedes *add.* $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || item] iterum V^{d} || petiuit] p*tiu* $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **147** inquit domine] domine inquit V^{d} || area] et *praem. N* $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || **147-148** et-est[1]] *iterat* $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || **148** repete] attende *N* (*cf.* attende, l. 149), repente S^{b}, repetit $V^{f.r\ a.c.}$, repeti $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || tempus] tes *add.* $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || occulta] occultata $V^{a.b.o.q}$ *am* || est[2]] erat *N* || nube] *uide testimonium sermonis* 360 A, 3, lege *N* (*lectio facilior*) || imber] ymbrem V^{e} || **149** attende] attente S^{b} || quasi uellus] quas uellum $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || uellus] uellum $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || **150** inuenis] inuenies $V^{a.b.e.f.g.i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.s}$ *am maur* || tamquam] quasi V^{s} || manifesta] manifestata V^{p} || **151** occultam-contra[2]] *om.* $V^{a\ a.c.}$ || occultam] occulta V^{f}, occultum $V^{j\ a.c.}$ || **152** gratiam manifestamque] manifestamque gratiam $V^{o.q}$ || manifestamque] manifestam quae $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || ignoscitur] ignoscetur $V^{a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.k.l.m.n.o.p.q.r.s.t}$, tandem *add.* $V^{c.h.i.k.l.m.n\ p.c.\ s\ p.c.}$ || quid] quia V^{e}, quod $V^{s\ a.c.}$ || christiani] uos *praem. N*, o *praem.* $V^{c.h.i.k.l.m.s\ p.c.}$, christianis $V^{q.s\ a.c.}$ || quare] estis *add. N* || inimici] estis *add.* $V^{k\ p.c.}$ || **153** christi] dei V^{p} || enim] ergo V^{u} || **154** natura[1]] *om.* $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || non erat[1]] nouerat $V^{r\ a.c.}$ || erat[1]] era $V^{k\ a.c.}$ || natura[2]] hic *add.* V^{q} || decipitis] decepistis V^{j}

lex hic non erat? Sed ait apostolus: *Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est.* Quod ait apostolus de lege, hoc nos istis dicimus de natura: 'Si per naturam iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est.'

10. Quod ergo dictum est de Iudaeis, hoc omnino in istis uidemus: *zelum Dei habent. Testimonium illis perhibeo, quia zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam.* Quid est *non secundum scientiam? Ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et suam uolentes constituere iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti.* Fratres mei, compatimini mecum. Vbi tales inueneritis, occultare nolite, non sit in uobis peruersa misericordia; prorsus, ubi tales inueneritis, occultare nolite. Redarguite contradicentes et resistentes ad nos perducite. Iam enim de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad Sedem apostolicam; inde etiam rescripta uenerunt. Causa finita est: error utinam aliquando finiatur! Ergo ut aduertant, monemus; ut instruantur, docemus; ut mutentur, oremus. Conuersi ad Dominum …

155 Gal 2,21 || **155-157** *Nat. et grat.* 2, 2; *Grat.* 13, 25 (sicut eis qui uolentes in lege iustificari, a gratia exciderunt, uerissime dicit: *Si ex lege iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est*, sic et his qui gratiam quam commendat et percipit fides Christi, putant esse naturam, uerissime dicitur: 'Si ex natura iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est.'); *C. Iulian* 4, 3, 17; *C. Iulian. op. imperf.* 2, 188 || **158-161** Rm 10,2-3 || **163-165** iam-finiatur] *Epist.* 175-176; 181-182; *Introduction* n. 2 || **164** causa finita est] formule identique dans des œuvres antidonatistes (*Psalm. c. Don.* 45; *Post coll. ad Don.* 35, 58; *Coll. cum Don.* 16, 30; *C. Gaud.* 2, 13, 14; *Epist.* 108, 6) et d'autres textes contre le Pélagianisme (*Anim.* 4, 18, 27; *C. Iulian.* 3, 1, 5; 21, 45; *Epist.* 193, 4); *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1 (Bâle 1986-1994) c. 828 || **165-166** monere-docere-orare] *Epist.* 186, 37-38; *Introduction* n. 18

155-156 si-apostolus] *om.* $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **155** iustitia] iustitiam V^{b} || gratis mortuus est] mortuus est gratis V^{t} || **156** ait apostolus] ergo dictum est V^{t} || nos istis] nostis V^{f} || dicimus] dicamus V^{q} || de natura] *ante* istis V^{3} || naturam] natura S^{a} $V^{f\ p.c.}$, natura* $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **157** christus] *post* est V^{m}, *post* gratis V^{u} || gratis] *om.* V^{e} || **158** dictum est de iudaeis] de iudaeis dictum est V^{h} || hoc] hic $V^{g.n}$ || in] de V^{u} || **159** testimonium-habent] *om.* $V^{a.b.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.s}$ *am* || illis perhibeo] perhibeo illis *N* (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || **159-160** quid-scientiam] *om. N* $V^{f\ a.c.}$ || **160** enim dei] dei enim V^{u} || constituere] statuere $V^{3.s}$ (*cf. uersionem uulgatam*) || **161** fratres] com *add.* V^{s} || compatimini] compati*mini $V^{1\ a.c.}$ || inueneritis] inueritis $V^{3\ a.c.}$ || occultare] olcultare V^{3} || nolite] redarguite contra *add.* $V^{3\ a.c.}$ || **162** misericordia] *sequuntur duae lineae erasae in* V^{t} || inueneritis] inueniritis $V^{b.p\ a.c.}$ || occultare] olcultare V^{3} || **163** redarguite] rearguete $V^{e\ a.c.}$ || contradicentes] contadicentes $S^{a\ a.c.}$ || concilia] consilia $V^{e.n}$ || **164** apostolicam] apostol* $V^{t\ a.c.}$ || inde] unde V^{d} || uenerunt] uerunt V^{3} || est] sunt S^{b} || error] *ita N* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{d.o.q.t.u}$, *post* finiatur $V^{a.b.c.e.f.g.h\ p.c.\ i.j.k.l.m.n.p.r.s}$ *am maur, ante* finiatur $V^{h\ a.c.}$ || utinam] ut*i*nam $V^{n\ a.c.}$ || **165** aliquando] *om.* $V^{m\ a.c.}$ || aduertant] auertant V^{p} || ut[2]] *om.* $V^{q\ a.c.}$ || ut[3]] et $V^{t\ a.c.\ u}$ || **166** oremus] oramus $V^{j.m.o.q}$ || conuersi ad dominum (domnum *am*)] *om. N* S^{b}, explicit *add.* $S^{a.b}$ $V^{e.g.k.l.t.u}$, explicit sermo (primus *add.* V^{m}) sancti augustini *add.* $V^{d.h.m}$, explicit sermo *add.* V^{3}, *tota oratione commemorata sequuntur uerba* explicit sermo sancti augustini *in* V^{q}

L'ACCLAMATION BIBLIQUE ET LITURGIQUE *FIAT FIAT* CHEZ SAINT AUGUSTIN

À moins d'erreur de notre part, il semble que l'on n'ait pas porté jusqu'à ce jour grande attention à l'expression *fiat fiat* passée de la Bible dans la liturgie à travers les témoignages qu'en livre Augustin, sauf celui du compte rendu de l'élection de son successeur Héraclius, objet de son *Epistola* 213[1]. Cette enquête nous a paru mériter d'être faite, car elle enrichit le portrait d'Augustin comme pasteur, orateur et exégète. Ce sont au totale treize textes ou passages que nous allons examiner et qui nous présentent un évêque très au fait des usages liturgiques de son temps, ainsi qu'un grand docteur bien informé des positions de ses illustres prédécesseurs comme Origène, Eusèbe, Hilaire et Ambroise.

Nous pensions au premier abord traiter la question en regroupant par thèmes les passages repérés, mais comme les interprétations souvent s'entremêlent, nous avons opté pour un exposé chronologique des textes[2].

Augustin fait aussi allusion en passant à une division du Psautier en cinq livres, fondée sur la présence du doublet *γένοιτο γένοιτο, fiat fiat* en fin des Psaumes 40, 71, 88, 105, division proposée par les Hébreux et dont font état plusieurs Pères, parfois avec réserve. Nous avons jugé utile de regrouper tous ces témoignages patristiques dans une note complémentaire pour mieux exposer la transmission d'un écrivain à l'autre de cette tradition discutable.

[1] Les seules allusions au doublet *fiat fiat* que nous ayons repérées dans les bibliographies sont celle de F. Cabrol, art. *Acclamations*, dans DACL, t. 1, col. 241, et celle de Th. Klauser, art. *Akklamation*, dans Reallexikon f. Ant. und Christ., Bd. 1, 1950, col. 225, à propos de l'Epist. 213; et du même, art. *Amen*, ibid. Supplement 1, 1985, col. 315-318. – Sur la lettre 213 d'Augustin relatant l'élection d'Eraclius comme futur évêque d'Hippone, voir P. Verbraken, Les *deux sermons du prêtre Eraclius d'Hippone*, dans Revue bénédictine, t. 71, 1961, p. 3-22; A.-M. La Bonnardière, *Eraclius*, dans DHGE, t. 15, col. 662-663.

[2] Pour les datations des passages étudiés en cours d'article nous nous référerons principalement aux ouvrages suivants: Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*, Paris 2000; A. Kunzelmann, *Die Chronologie der Sermones des hl. Augustinus*, in Miscellanea Agostiniana, 2, Roma 1931, p. 417-520; Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *Recherches de chronologie augustinienne*, Paris 1965; Othmar Perler, *Les voyages de saint Augustin*, Paris 1969; Henri Rondet, *Essais sur la chronologie des Enarrationes in Psalmos de saint Augustin*, dans Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, aux dates diverses précisées; S. M. Zarb, *Chronologia Enarrationum S. Augustini in Psalmos*, Valetta-Malta 1948; S. M. Zarb, *Chronologia operum s. Augustini secundum ordinem Retractationum digesta*, Romae 1934. Seul le nom de l'Auteur sera donné.

– *Epistola* 41, 1 (CSEL 34, 2, p. 82, 1 sq.), lettre d'Alypius et d'Augustin, datée ordinairement du début de l'épiscopat de l'évêque d'Hippone, adressée à Aurelius de Carthage pour le féliciter d'avoir accordé à ses prêtres la possibilité de prêcher aux fidèles en sa présence:

> «Per quorum (presbyterorum) linguas clamat caritas tua maiore uoce in cordibus hominum quam illi in auribus. *Deo gratias*. Nam quid melius et animo geramus et ore promamus et calamo exprimamus quam *Deo gratias* ? Hoc nec dici breuius nec audiri laetius nec intellegi grandius nec agi fructuosius potest. *Deo gratias,* qui te et tam fideli pectore ditauit erga filios tuos et id, quod in intimo animae habebas, quo humanus oculus non penetrat, eduxit in lucem donando tibi, non solum ut bene uelles, uerum etiam in quibus posset apparere, quod uelles. *Ita plane fiat, fiat.* 'Luceant haec opera coram hominibus, uideant, gaudeant, glorificent Patrem, qui in caelis est' (Matth. 5, 16)... (in fine) ut te pro illo adiuuet Dominus. *Amen.*»

Nous avons certainement dans ce premier texte un emploi littéraire (quid melius... *calamo* exprimamus quam 'Deo gratias') de trois *acclamations liturgiques: Deo gratias*, *fiat fiat*, *amen*, fréquentes à l'époque d'Augustin. L'acclamation *fiat fiat*, vient après le triple *Deo gratias*, et traduit un souhait à l'égard d'Alypius, souhait renforcé par la locution adverbiale introductive *ita plane*, 'oui sincèrement, que cela advienne!', que se réalise son saint désir de non seulement vouloir le bien, mais aussi d'en faciliter la manifestation en autorisant les prêtres à prêcher devant lui (ut bene uelles, uerum etiam in quibus posset apparere, quod uelles. *Ita plane fiat fiat*). Et la finale de la lettre reprend une formule tout aussi liturgique: «que Dieu vous aide dans ce que vous faites pour lui. *Amen*».

– *Ad catholicos de secta Donatistarum,* 8, 22 (CSEL 52, p. 256, 7 sq.) rédigé vers 401-402. Dans ce texte Augustin commente assez longuement le Psaume 71, dont les versets 9-11 annoncent selon lui l'expansion de l'Église sur toute la terre, ainsi que la soumission de tous les rois au joug du Christ; puis viennent comme en conclusion les derniers versets 17-19 qui confirment cette extension de l'Église regroupant toutes les nations:

> «'Et benedicentur in eo omnes tribus terrae, omnes gentes magnificabunt eum. Benedictus Dominus Deus Israhel, qui facit mirabilia solus. Et benedictum nomen gloriae eius in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi, et replebitur gloria eius omnis terra. *Fiat, fiat* '. Ite nunc, Donatistae, et clamate: *non fiat, non fiat.* Vicit uos Dei uerbum dicens: *fiat, fiat.* Ecce manifestata est in psalmis ecclesia toto orbe diffusa.»

Le recours à l'acclamation biblique *fiat, fiat* est ici manifeste. Augustin commentera bien plus tard, vers 415, ces mêmes versets dans son *Enarratio* sur ce Psaume 71, versets que nous examinerons plus loin. Mais on voit qu'il connaît déjà parfaitement ce psaume au moment de sa controverse avec les Donatistes, puisqu'il s'y réfère pas moins de deux fois pour réfuter la visée nationaliste de leur secte, dans l'*Epist. ad Catholicos*, et peu après dans l'*Epist.* 93 qu'il nous faut citer.

– *Epistola* 93, 20 (CSEL 34, 2, p. 465, 19 sq.), datée de 404 (Perler, p. 250, 449), où Augustin se réfère à nouveau au Ps. 71, v. 17-19, dans un même contexte, en adversaire du donatisme. Dans cette lettre adressée à l'évêque rogatiste Vincent Victor de Carthagène, l'évêque d'Hippone insiste sur la catholicité de l'Église voulue par Dieu en reprenant les mêmes versets:

> «'Et benedicentur in eo omnes tribus terrae, omnes gentes magnificabunt eum. Benedictus Dominus Deus Israhel, qui facit mirabilia solus, et benedictum nomen gloriae eius in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi. Et replebitur gloria eius omnis terra: *fiat, fiat*.' Et tu sedes Cartennis, et cum decem Rogatistis, qui remansistis, dicis: *non fiat, non fiat*.»

Au souhait exprimé par les termes bibliques: '*fiat, fiat*', les Donatistes répliquent ouvertement par leur refus de l'unité: '*non fiat, non fiat*'. La reprise verbale de cette réplique des Donatistes, qu'Augustin relève, est frappante; elle est peut-être un écho direct d'un débat public auquel l'évêque d'Hippone a participé.

– *Sermo* 8, 3, 79 sq. (éd. Lambot, CC 41, p. 81). Dans ce sermon qui aurait été prêché à Carthage en 403/404 (Humbert, p. 98-99 et non en 411 avec Kunzelmann p. 446 / Lambot, p. 78 / Perler, p. 282, 289, 457) Augustin met en parallèle les dix plaies d'Égypte et les dix commandements. Mais il introduit son développement en rappelant le passage du livre de l'Exode (7, 9-12) relatant le miracle du bâton de Moyse, symbole du royaume de Dieu et du peuple de Dieu (uirgam significare regnum Dei, idemque regnum esse utique populum Dei). Ce bâton a été transformé en serpent, symbole de la mortalité (serpentem autem tempus mortalitatis huius, mors enim a serpente propinata est), images reprises au *sermo* 6, 7 (CC 41, p. 65): «Virga regnum significat, serpens mortalitatem». Ce serpent a englouti les bâtons des magiciens de Pharaon qu'il a transformés également en serpents. Mais à la fin des temps, que figure la queue du serpent, viendra le triomphe du Christ sur les impies et le retour en la possession de Dieu de son royaume.

«Tunc demum cauda (serpentis) comprehensa identidem uirga facta est, et regnum remeauit ad manum. Sunt enim uirgae magorum populi impiorum. Qui tamen populi impiorum, uicti Christi nomine, cum in eius corpus transferuntur tamquam a serpente Moysi deuorantur, donec redeamus regnum Dei ad manum Dei, sed in fine mortalis saeculi, quod significat cauda serpentis. Magnum signum: *fiat, fiat.* Audistis quid debeatis desiderare; audite quid debeatis uitare.»

Les mots '*fiat fiat*' en ce passage du sermon ont certainement été prononcés par le prédicateur comme *acclamation liturgique* pour être repris par les fidèles. A la suite de la proclamation de l'orateur *magnum signum*, qui fait référence à la verge de Moyse et à son symbolisme, on s'attend à la réaction de l'auditoire *fiat fiat*, acquiescement que l'évêque ne peut qu'approuver: 'Audistis quid debeatis desiderare...'. C. Lambot dans l'édition de ce sermon (CC 41, p. 82, l. 86 note) avait déjà suggéré sans l'expliciter cette interprétation en renvoyant à Ps. 105, 48, où, comme nous le verrons, Augustin dans l'*Enarratio* correspondante relève la finale biblique du verset: *Et dicet omnis populus... fiat fiat'*.

– *En. in Ps.* 40, 14, 35 (CC 39, p. 459). Cette *Enarratio* du Psaume 40, prêchée en juin 411 (Zarb, p.127-131, 135, 171; Perler, p. 295; peut-être avant 400, Rondet, *Essais...*, Bulletin..., 65, 1964, p. 133-136), s'achève assez brièvement par la citation, sans commentaire, du dernier verset du psaume: «et dicamus omnes (v. 14): 'Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel a saeculo et in saeculum'. Et dicet omnis populus: '*fiat fiat*'» (Sept. Εὐλογητὸς κύριος ὁ θεὸς Ισραηλ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα γένοιτο γένοιτο).

Le prédicateur introduit cependant sa citation du verset par une expression spécifique: '*dicamus omnes*: Benedictus... in saeculum'; quant au verset il s'achève expressément par les mots: '*et dicet omnis populus*: *fiat fiat*'. Ces expressions ne sont pas de simples clichés oratoires, elles ont à notre sens une signification précise. La première au présent 'disons tous', invite toute l'assemblée, clergé et fidèles réunis à proclamer: 'Béni soit le Dieu d'Israël de siècle en siècle', et la seconde au future 'et tout le peuple dira: *fiat, fiat*'. Au terme de ce commentaire prêché du Psaume 40, Augustin donne à l'acclamation biblique qui conclut le psaume *un cadre liturgique*.

– *En. in Ps.* 88, S. 2, 14, 15 (CC 39, p. 1243) v. 53: «Benedictio Domini in aeternum. Fiat, fiat». (Sept. Εὐλογητὸς κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. γένοιτο γένοιτο). Il convient tout d'abord de noter qu'Augustin dans cette *Enarratio* datée du 13 septembre 411 (Rondet,

Essais..., Bulletin... 48, 1967, p. 183-184; Perler p. 297, n. 8) cite ce verset avec la variante unique *benedictio* au lieu de *benedictus* (correction erronée des Lovanienses) pour rendre le grec εὐλογητὸς. Il a soin aussi de préciser dans son commentaire la raison d'être du doublet *fiat fiat* (l. 16):

> «Et ad *confirmandam* benedictionem, ne quis timeat: *fiat fiat*. Ista subscriptio est cautionis Dei. Securi ergo de promissionibus eius, praeterita credamus, praesentia cognoscamus, futura speremus»; in fine (p. 1244, l. 56) «ut *benedictio Domini in aeternum* maneat super uos. *Fiat, fiat.*»

C'est très probablement à Ambroise qu'Augustin emprunte cette interprétation du doublet *fiat fiat* au sens de *confirmation*. L'Évêque de Milan, commentant un verset parallèle, Ps. 40, v. 14, *Explanatio super psalmos XII*, 36 (CSEL 64, p. 253-254): «*Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel in aeternum (om. ms. v) a saeculo et in saeculum; fiat, fiat*» estime que l'acclamation biblique finale *fiat fiat* peut avoir diverses significations, soit d'ordonner ou d'imposer (*imperare*), soit de prier ou de supplier (*precari*), soit d'approuver ou de confirmer (*confirmare*), mais précédée ou introduite par l'expression *benedictus Dominus Deus* au sens d'un souhait, c'est bien le sens de *confirmation* ou de ratification qu'il faut donner aux mots *fiat fiat* du fait même de leur répétition [3].

Augustin après Ambroise, dans la reprise des versets bibliques où revient ce doublet, insiste sur sa valeur *confirmative*: 'ad confirmandam benedictionem'. Au terme de ce sermon sur le Ps. 88, c'est très probablement sur les lèvres des fidèles qu'a surgi l'acclamation

[3] Ambroise, *Explanatio Psalmorum XII*, Psalmus 40, 35-37 (CSEL 64, p. 253, 28 – 225, 24) §35 (v. 14) – 36: «'*Benedictus*, inquit, *Dominus Deus Israel*', hoc est populi Deum uidentis, qui et Dominum suum et Deum credit, '*a saeculo et in saeculum, fiat fiat*'. In Hebraeo habet *amen amen*, ut asseruerunt qui librum legerunt in Hebraicis litteris scriptum. Graecus hoc loco γένοιτο γένοιτο (2 ed. γενέσθω γενέσθω) dixit, quod est *fiat fiat*. Quod uerbum diuersas significationes habet, ut sit interdum *imperantis*, interdum *precantis*, interdum *confirmantis* aliquid. *Imperantis* est, cum superior inferiori statuit quid faciendum sit uel sequendum. *Precantis* est sicut illud: '*fiat uoluntas tua*'; non enim Deo quis imperat, sed precem fundit. *Confirmantis* est, cum benedicit propheta uel sacerdos uel sanctus aliquis et *populus respondet*: '*fiat fiat*'. Hic ergo magis *confirmatio* mihi uidetur benedictionis quam oratio uel deprecatio, maxime quia *repetitio* ipsius facta sermonis est. Et uidetur Hebraeus quidem sermo mutatus, sed idem sensus expressus. Sicut enim, cum sacerdos benedicit, populus respondet: '*amen*', *confirmans* benedictionem sibi quam plebi sacerdos a Domino deprecatur, ita in psalmo responsum est '*fiat fiat*', quasi '*amen amen*'. *Amen* autem *confirmationis* uerbum euidenter ostenditur in euangelio, ubi Dominus *confirmans* sermonem suum dicit: '*amen, amen dico uobis*' (Ioh. 3, 5 et 16, 23). Maior autem uis est, ubi *repetitus est sermo*...»

fiat fiat, bien qu'elle ne soit pas introduite expressément par *dicet omnis populus*, car la façon dont l'orateur détache la louange '*benedictio Domini in aeternum* maneat super uos', de la confimation '*fiat fiat*' qui suit, laisse entendre que celle-ci a été proclamée à pleine voix par l'assemblée.

– *En. in Ps.* 74, 3, 14 (CC 39, p. 1026) datée par Zarb de la fin 411 ou début 412. À propos du v. 3 du Ps. 74: '*Confitebimur tibi, Deus, confitebimur tibi*', Augustin souligne la répétition du verbe *confitebimur* et précise que cette reprise a valeur de *confirmation:* '*ipsa repetitio, confirmatio est*' (l. 1). La répétition revient souvent dans les Saintes Écritures, ajoute-t-il, et sous diverses formes, dans le redoublement de telle ou telle expression, mais aussi dans des événements comme le double songe de Pharaon dont fait état la Genèse 41, 1-7, et que Joseph interprète (v. 32) comme une *confirmation*. La répétition dans la Bible n'est pas synonyme de tautologie ou de verbosité, précise-t-il (l. 12), avec allusion au doublet *fiat fiat*:

> «Firmamentum autem esse sententiae in *repetitione*, multis scripturarum locis docemur. Inde est quod Dominus ait: *Amen, amen*. Inde in aliquibus Psalmis: *Fiat, fiat*; ad significationem rei sufficeret unum *fiat*, ad significationem *firmitatis* accessit alterum *fiat*. Rex Aegypti Pharao ... uidit somnium idem Pharao... Et quid est interpretatus Ioseph? Si meministis, non duo sunt ista somnia, sed uisum unum. '*Una est*, inquit (Gen. 41, 25), *interpretatio eorum*' '*sed quod rursus uidisti*, ait (Gen. 41, 32), *ad confirmationem ualet*'[4] Haec dixi ut non putetis *repetitionem* in uerbis sanctae linguae, quasi loquacitatis esse appetitum. Saepe ibi *repetitio* firmamenti habet uim. *Paratum cor meum, Deus*, inquit, *paratum est cor meum* (Ps. 56, 8). Alio loco dicit: *Sustine Dominum, uiriliter age*; *et confortetur cor tuum, et sustine Dominum* (Ps. 26, 14). Innumerabilia talia sunt per omnes scripturas. His sufficit commendasse nos uobis loquendi genus, quod obseruetis in omnibus similibus; modo ad rem aduertite.»

Cette valeur confirmative de la répétition est ici occasionnée par le doublet *confitebimur confitebimur* du v. 3 du Ps. 74, elle sera reprise expressément à propos du doublet *fiat fiat*, comme nous le verrons, dans les *En. in Ps.* 105, 1 (CC 40, p. 1553) et *En. in Ps.* 150,

[4] Avec la *Vetus latina*, vol. 2 *Genesis*, Freiburg 1951, nous pensons que le passage '*Una* est, inquit, interpretatio eorum, sed quod rursus uidisti, ait, ad *confirmationem* ualet', est non pas une citation textuelle, mais une adaptation de deux versets distincts du chap. 41 de la Genèse, d'abord au v. 25 'et dixit Joseph ad Pharaonem somnium *unum* est...', puis au v. 32 'quod autem iterauit somnium Pharao bis quia *uerum* erit uerbum hoc a Deo'.

2 (CC 40, p. 2192). Là encore Augustin nous semble tributaire d'Ambroise qui notait, comme nous l'avons vu précédemment (cf. note 3), que c'est la *repetitio* dans le doublet *fiat fiat* qui donnait à celui-ci valeur de *confirmatio*.

– *En. in Ps.* 71, 21, 1 sq., datée de 415 avant Pâques (La Bon. p. 42, 132; Perler, p. 328) (CC 39, p. 985). Augustin cite le verset 19 du Ps. 71, avec renvoi aux commentaires de ce verset chez certains interprètes:

> «*Et benedictum nomen gloriae eius in aeternum, et in saeculum saeculi* (Sept. Καὶ εὐλογητὸν τὸ ὄνομμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος). Quid aliud latini interpretes dicerent, qui non possent dicere *in aeternum et in aeternum aeterni*? Quasi enim aliud dictum sit *in aeternum*, et aliud *in saeculum*, ita sonat; sed graecus habet εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, quod forte commodius diceretur *in saeculum et in saeculum saeculi*; ut *in saeculum* intellegeretur, quantum hoc saeculum durat; *in saeculum* autem *saeculi*, quod post huius finem futurum promittitur. *Et replebitur gloria eius omnis terra: fiat fiat* (Sept. καὶ πληρωθήσεται τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἡ γῆ. γένοιτο γένοιτο). Iussisti, Domine, *ita fit, ita fit*, donec illud quod coepit *a flumine*, perueniat omnino *usque ad terminos orbis terrae* (v. 8).»

Ce verset 19 du Ps. 71 a déjà été cité par Augustin lors de sa controverse avec les Donatistes vers 401/402 en deux textes dont nous avons fait état plus haut, dans l'*Epistola ad catholicos de secta Donatistarum* 8, 22 et l'*Epist.* 93, 20, mais l'évêque insistait alors sur le sens approbateur de l'acclamation *fiat fiat* de la fin du verset. Ici il se fait plus précis tout d'abord sur la signification de certains mots du verset '*in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi*', du fait de l'impossibilité pour les latins de rendre mot à mot le correspondant grec εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος. Cette difficulté avait déjà été soulignée par Jérôme[5]. Il est à noter que l'expression biblique 'in

[5] A propos de l'expression *in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi* du Ps. 71, v. 19, Jérôme précise que ces termes ne figurent ni dans l'Hébreu ni dans la Septante, mais qu'ils ont été ajoutés par les Grecs, soit Aquila, Symmaque et Théodotion, cf. *Epist.* 106, 44, Ad Sunniam et Fretelam, de Psalterio quae *de LXX interpretum editione corrupta sint*, datée de 404/410, (CSEL 55, p. 268, 6 sq.; *Biblia Sacra iuxta latinam vulgatam versionem*, t. X, *Liber Psalmorum*, Rome 1953, p. 24, 21-25): «In eodem (Ps. 71, 19): 'Et benedictum nomen maiestatis eius in aeternum'. Hoc ergo quod in Graeco inuenisse uos dicitis: 'In aeternum' et 'in saeculum saeculi', superflue a Graecis sciatis adpositum, quod nec Hebraeus habet nec Septuaginta interpretes»; d'où sa propre version de ce verset du Psautier (*Biblia Sacra*..., X, p. 169): 'et benedictum nomen maiestatis eius in aeternum et replebitur maiestate eius omnis terra fiat

aeternum et in saeculum saeculi' réapparaît chez Augustin dans le Ps. 47, v. 15, cf. *En in ps.* 47, 25, 12 et 30 (CC 38, p. 350) sans commentaire; et l'équivalence entre *in aeternum* et *in saeculum saeculi* est parfaitement signifiée au Ps. 60, v. 9, cf. *En. in ps.* 60, 10: «Sic psallam nomini tuo Deus in saeculum saeculi... Vis *in saeculum saeculi* psallere? Vis *in aeternum* psallere»[6]. Le doublet biblique *fiat fiat*, repris et renforcé par l'adverbe *ita* également doublé, exprime le plus vif souhait que toute la terre soit remplie de la gloire de Dieu.

– *En. in Ps.* 150, 2, 1 sq. (CC 40, p. 2192), prêchée en 415/416. Augustin aborde dans ce sermon, pour la première fois, le problème de l'ordonnancement du Psautier qui lui apparaît de prime abord mystérieux. Pourquoi cent cinquante psaumes, soit un multiple de cinquante, chiffre mystérieux, puisque correspondant à la venue du Saint-Esprit cinquante jours après la résurrection du Christ. En multipliant aussi cinquante par trois, chiffre symbolisant la Trinité, nous arrivons aussi à cent cinquante. Et après quelques autres spéculations numériques, Augustin fait état d'une présentation ancienne du Psautier en cinq livres: Ps. 1-40, Ps. 41-71, Ps. 72-88, Ps. 89-105, Ps.106-150, division fondée sur la présence du doublet *fiat fiat* en fin de chacun des Psaumes 40, 71, 88 et 105. Mais après réflexion, dit-il, il ne peut admettre une telle présentation du Psautier (§2, 1-11):

> «Quod ergo quidam omnium psalmorum quinque libros esse crediderunt, illud secuti sunt, quoties in fine psalmi dictum fuerit: *fiat, fiat.* Sed huius dispertitionis rationem cum uellem comprehendere, non ualui; quia nec ipsae quinque partes aequales sunt inter se, etsi non scripturae quantitate, saltem psalmorum ipso numero, ut tricenos haberent. Et si uniuscuiusque libri finis est *fiat fiat*, cur liber quintus idemque ultimus non eodem fine sit terminatus, merito quaeri potest. Nos autem scripturae canonicae auctoritatem sequentes ubi legitur (Act. 1, 20): 'Scriptum est enim in libro psalmorum', unum psalmorum librum esse nouimus.»

fiat'. Cette remarque de Jérôme avec la correction du verset est intéressante, car elle nous éclaire sur sa méthode de travail et ses propres références, dans le cas à Eusèbe, *Commentarii in Psalmos*, in Ps. 71, v. 20-21 (PG 23, 820, 31-32) où on lit seulement εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. Dans un précédent passage de la même lettre 106, 35 (CSEL 55, p. 264; *Biblia Sacra...*, X, p. 21, 24-25), à propos de ces correspondances du grec au latin, dans le Ps. 60, v. 9 où revient l'expression 'in saeculum saeculi', il insiste sur les difficultés de traduction: «Pro quo in graeco sit *in saeculum*. Et in hebraeo semel habet 'LAED' id est *in aeternum*, et non 'LOLAM', quod est *in saeculum*».

[6] Voir notre article *L'ambiguïté du concept biblique αἰών (saeculum uel aeternum) dénoncée et interprétée par Augustin*, in *Weiner Studien*, 114, 2001, p. 575-596.

Il est très probable qu'Augustin ait eu connaissance de cette tradition remontant à Origène à travers Hilaire, *Tract. super Psalmos*, Instructio 1 (CSEL 22, p. 3, l. 3-19)[7], car il reprend l'argument avancé par l'évêque de Poitiers pour défendre l'unité du Psautier en se référant au livre des Actes des Apôtres. Mais l'évêque d'Hippone ne propose ici aucune exégèse du doublet, comme il l'a fait dans les précédents passages examinés, du fait qu'en finale de ce Psaume 150, les mots *fiat fiat* ne figurent pas, comme il le relève, d'où il tire argument pour rejeter cette division du Psautier en cinq livres.

– *En. in Ps.* 105, 1, 18; 37, 9 et 69 (CC 40, p. 1553, 1568-1569). Dans cette *Enarratio* prêchée après 418 (Lab. p. 149) soit peu après celle concernant le dernier Psaume 150, Augustin fait allusion à trois reprises en cours de commentaire à l'acclamation *fiat fiat*. Dans l'introduction il est plus préoccupé de justifier l'exclamation *Alleluia* comme titre donné à ce Psaume ainsi qu'au précédent, et dont la version africaine est témoin (cf. éd. A. Rahlfs, *Psalmi cum Odis*, Göttingen 1979 (3 éd.), p. 164 n. 1, et p. 269, n. 1); ces deux psaumes constituent une catégorie spécifique du Psautier, qu'il dénomme *Alleluiatici psalmi*. Il rappelle alors en passant une autre tradition qui propose une division du Psautier en cinq livres:

> «Fieri enim potuit ut aliqua ratione laudationis Dei totus Psalmorum liber, qui libris quinque constare perhibetur, nam ubi scriptum est: *fiat fiat*, ibi fines librorum esse dicunt…»

Il revient sur l'exégèse du doublet en commentant le verset final du Psaume 105, 48 (§37, 9 et 69): «*Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel a saeculo et usque in saeculum, et dicet omnis populus: fiat, fiat* (Sept. Εὐλογητὸς κύριος ὁ θεὸς Ισραηλ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος. καὶ ἐρεῖ πᾶς ὁ λαός. γένοιτο γένοιτο). Il explicite d'abord l'expression *a saeculo usque in saeculum*:

> «quod intellegimus, ab aeterno usque in aeternum; quia sine fine laudabitur ab eis de quibus dicitur: 'Beati qui habitant in domo tua, in saecula saeculorum laudabunt te'.»

Feront partie des élus appelés à la contemplation juifs et païens, soit tous ceux qui auront rejeté le mal. Quelle fervente conclusion à l'adresse des auditeurs d'Augustin, qui conclut son sermon par ces mots:

[7] Voir note complémentaire en fin d'article: *La division du Psautier en cinq livres*.

«*Et dicet omnis populus*: iste populus praedestinatorum de circumcisione et praeputio, gens sancta, populus in adoptionem: *fiat fiat.*»

N'avons-nous pas ici un écho de la clameur approbatrice et jubilante des fidèles d'Hippone (*dicet omnis populus*), qui ont eu le privilège d'assister à la liturgie de ce jour.

– *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum,* datées de 419-420 (Perler p. 363), II in Exodum 154, 4, 2490 (CC 33, p. 142). Tout à fait incidemment pour justifier un doublet scripturaire dans *Exode* 34, v. 19 'misericordiam praestabo cui misericordiam praestitero', *répétition* qui à ses yeux traduirait une décision irrévocable de Dieu, Augustin évoque des doublets similaires, dont la *repetitio* est significative:

«Et tamen fortius ille ipse ibi sensus est, quod aut ipsius misericordiae suae firmitatem Deus ista *repetitione* monstrauit – sicut: *amen amen*, sicut *fiat fiat*, sicut repetitio somnii Pharaonis pluraque similia – aut in utrisque populis, id est gentibus et Hebraeis, hoc modo Deus praenuntiauit misericordiam se esse facturum.»

Aucune référence scripturaire n'est annexée ici par les éditeurs, mais vient à l'esprit le verset psalmique Psaume 74, 3, avec son commentaire dans *En. in* Ps.74 signalé précédemment, où l'on a relevé qu'aux yeux d'Augustin le doublet *fiat fiat,* comme aussi le double songe de Pharaon, devaient être interprétés comme une *confirmatio*[8].

– Rédigeant sa *Cité de Dieu*, Augustin se devait de revenir sur l'un ou l'autre des versets psalmiques, précédemment commentés, relatifs à l'éternelle béatitude que partageront tous les justes de l'ancienne comme de la nouvelle alliance. Vers 419/420, il reprend son commentaire du Psaume 88 prêché en septembre 411, dont on a fait état précédemment, et à peu près dans les mêmes termes. On retrouve donc dans le *De ciuitate Dei* 17, 12, 54-55, 62 (CC 48, p. 577), au terme d'un long commentaire du Psaume 88, sur plusieurs paragraphes, §§9 à 12, son exégèse du verset final, cité avec la variante *benedictio*:

«ubi psalmus iste concluditur: *Benedictio Domini in aeternum, fiat, fiat,* uniuerso populo Dei ad caelestem Hierusalem pertinenti siue in illis qui latebant in testamento uetere, antequam reuelaretur nouum, siue in his qui iam testamento nouo reuelato manifeste pertinere cernuntur ad Christum, satis congruit. Benedictio quippe Domini in

[8] Voir ci-dessus note 4.

semine Dauid non ad aliquod tempus, qualis diebus Salomonis apparuit, sed *in aeternum* speranda est, in qua certissima spe dicitur: *Fiat, fiat*. Illius enim spei est *confirmatio* uerbi huius iteratio.»

La bénédiction de Dieu à l'égard des siens n'est pas temporelle, elle est ordonnée vers l'éternité, motif de notre espérance si assurée que, d'avance on la proclame *fiat fiat*. Augustin réitère ici son interprétation donnée en 411 dans l'*Enarratio in Ps.* 88, de l'acclamation biblique *fiat fiat*, et qui doit être entendue comme la confirmation de notre ferme espérance.

– *Epistola* 213 (CSEL 57, p. 372-379). Cette lettre d'Augustin est du point de vue chronologique le dernier des textes où figure le doublet *fiat fiat*, que nous avons entrepris d'analyser dans cet article. Elle est fort connue et signalée par les auteurs qui ont étudié les *Acclamations liturgiques*[9]. Elle relate l'élection, le 26 septembre 426, par la communauté d'Hippone, du prêtre Eraclius, sur proposition d'Augustin, comme son successeur. Tout au long de cette cérémonie liturgique dans la basilique d'Hippone, il y eut entre l'évêque et ses fidèles des échanges, exprimant d'une part un souhait d'Augustin et de la part de ses auditeurs leur acquiescement le plus fervent, car ce ne sont que des actions de grâce: *Deo gratias*, *Christo laudes*, *exaudi Christe*, ou des expressions de leur reconnaissance: *Augustino uita*, *te patrem*, *te episcopum*, *dignus et iustus est*, *bene meritus bene dignus*, et leur approbation à la proposition qui leur est faite d'accepter le prêtre Héraclius comme son successeur: *Iudicio tuo gratias agimus*, *Heraclium episcopum*. Et pour confirmation au cours de cette liturgie la double acclamation *fiat fiat* aurait été reprise par intervalles, douze fois, vingt cinq fois, quatorze fois. De telles précisions données par le secrétaire d'Augustin ne peuvent être mises en doute. Nous avons là un témoignage irrécusable de l'usage de l'acclamation *fiat fiat* dans la liturgie, comme l'étaient les doublets *amen amen*, *alleluia alleluia*.

Aucune référence biblique n'est donnée ici pour justifier l'acclamation de l'assemblée ecclésiale, mais on ne peut douter que celle-ci se rattache à un usage fort ancien comme le soupçonnait déjà Cassiodore dans son *Expositio Psalmorum*, en conclusion de son commentaire sur le Ps. 105, v. 48, (CC 98, p. 972, l. 621) où vient en finale le doublet *fiat fiat*, avec reprise du commentaire augustinien comme nous le précisons dans la note finale, il ajoutait:

[9] Voir note 1.

«Sic hodieque in ecclesiis orantibus sacerdotibus respondetur *amen* id est *fiat*. Sic iam illis temporibus (prophetarum) ipsi indicabantur, qui nunc idem faciunt. Conuenit enim magis haec uerba ad talem intellectum trahere, quam librorum determinationes aduertere, sicut quibusdam placet.»

La présence du doublet ou de l'acclamation *fiat fiat* dans les œuvres d'Augustin méritait à notre sens une enquête. Nous avons là un ensemble de témoignages dont l'occasion immédiate est tantôt un commentaire biblique tantôt une prédication ou une cérémonie ecclésiale, mais qui révèlent une grande intelligence de leur auteur. Ce sont de fait des témoignages d'un grand Docteur et d'un illustre Évêque, au courant de la tradition de ces textes comme de leur interprétation de la part de ses prédécesseurs, et très au fait des usages liturgiques. Ces témoignages ont été exprimés selon les occasions, mais ils s'interfèrent souvent du point de vue de leur exégèse, de sorte que nous ne pouvions adopter une présentation thématique.

En résumé disons qu'aux yeux d'Augustin, à la suite d'Ambroise, la *repetitio* de *fiat fiat* dans les Écritures doit être interprétée comme une *confirmation*. Et bien qu'il ne le dise pas expressément, l'acclamation *fiat fiat* au cours d'une cérémonie liturgique doit être interprétée également comme un *confirmation* ou *approbation* de la part des fidèles, que ce soit au terme d'un sermon de l'évêque ou à l'occasion d'une élection à une charge ecclésiale.

Augustin n'ignore pas non plus, comme nous l'avons noté à propos de ses commentaires des Psaumes 150 et 105, que le doublet *fiat fiat* en finale des Psaumes 40, 71, 88 et 105 a suscité très anciennement une opinion relative à la présentation du Psautier en cinq livres, division tout à fait hypothétique à ses yeux. Mais comme elle figure en plusieurs commentaires du Psautier qu'Augustin a eu en main, dont ceux d'Hilaire et d'Ambroise, auxquels nous avons fait allusion, nous avons jugé plus simple de regrouper dans une note complémentaire tous ces témoignages confirmant leur tradition.

NOTE: **La division du Psautier en cinq livres.**

Au cours de cette enquête sur l'emploi du doublet *fiat fiat* chez Augustin, nous avons noté qu'en deux passages (*En. in Ps.* 150, 2, 1; CC 40, p. 2192 – *En. in Ps.* 105, 1, 18; CC 40, p. 1553) il est fait allusion à la division du Psautier en cinq livres proposée par certains (*quidam*), division fort ancienne, mais qu'il ne retient pas personnellement, s'en tenant à l'unité du Psautier, en se référant probablement à Hilaire. Cette tradition remontant aux Hébreux, était connue en

milieu grec comme en témoignent Origène et Eusèbe et on la retrouve chez les latins Hilaire et Ambroise. Mais comme il nous a été difficile de préciser quels sont ces *quidam* détenteurs de cette tradition, nous estimons utile de citer dans leur ordre chronologique les principaux témoignages que nous avons relevés.

On trouve un premier témoignage de cette division du Psautier chez **Origène**, *Libri in Psalmos*, introduction (PG 12, 1056 A, 3-12)[10]:

> «Εἰς πέντε βιβλία διαιροῦσιν Ἑβραῖοι τὴν τῶν Ψαλμῶν βίβλον· ὧν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον· 'Μακάριος ἀνὴρ ὃς οὐκ ἐπορεύθη ἐν βουλῇ ἀσεβῶν', ἕως τῶν τελευταίων τοῦ τεσσαρακοστοῦ· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον· '"Ον τρόπον ἐπιποθεῖ ἡ ἔλαφος', ἕως πρώτου ἑβδομηκοστοῦ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον· 'Ὡς ἀγαθὸς τῷ Ισραηλ ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς εὐθέσι τῇ καρδίᾳ', ἕως πη΄· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον· 'Κύριε, καταφυγὴ ἐγενήθης ἡμῖν ἐν γενεᾷ καὶ γενεᾷ,' ἕως τοῦ ρε΄· τὸ δὲ πέμπτον· ''Εξομολογεῖσθε τῷ Κυρίῳ', ἕως τῶν ἐσχάτων.»

Il faut noter qu'Origène dans ce passage ne mentionne pas ce qui justifiait aux yeux des Hébreux cette division du Psautier en cinq livres, à savoir le doublet *fiat fiat* inséré à la fin de chacun des quatre premiers livres, mention explicite que l'on va trouver chez Eusèbe et après lui chez la plupart des auteurs suivants.

Eusèbe reprend en plusieurs passages cette division, s'inspirant très probablement d'Origène, mais en ajoutant des précisions complémentaires.

– Une première allusion générale figure dans l'introduction de ses *Commentaria in Psalmos* (PG 23, 66 C-68 A):

> «Εἰς πέντε δὲ μέρη τὴν πᾶσαν τῶν Ψαλμῶν βίβλον παῖδες Ἑβραίων διαιροῦσι πρῶτον εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ α΄ μέχρι μ΄· δεύτερον εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ μα΄ μέχρις οβ΄· τρίτον εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ ογ΄ μέχρις πη΄· τέταρτον εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ πθ΄ μέχρις ρε΄· πέμπτον εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ ρς΄ μέχρι τέλους.»

Eusèbe revient sur cette division à la fin de chacune des sections:

– In Ps. 40, v. 14 (PG 23, 365):

> «Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸ Ισραηλ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα· *γένοιτο γένοιτο*· ἢ κατὰ τὸν Ἀκύλαν, *πεπιστωμένως*,

[10] Cf. CPG 1426, 3; G. Rietz, *De Origenis prologis in Psalterium quaestiones selectae*, Ienae 1914, p. 15; Robert Devreesse, *Les anciens commentateurs grecs des Psaumes*, Rome 1970, p. 3, n. 15; Pierre Nautin, *Origène. Sa vie et son oeuvre*, Paris 1977, p. 249, 28 et p. 277.

πεπιστωμένως· κατὰ δὲ τὸν Σύμμαχον· *Ἀμὴν, ἀμὴν*· ἔνθεν ὁ Σωτὴρ καὶ Κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγοις εἰς πίστωσιν τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων παραλαμβάνειν εἴωθε τό· *Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν*· οὗ τὴν διάνοιαν σαφέστερον ἡρμήνευσεν ὁ Ἀκύλας εἰπὼν *πεπιστωμένως, πεπιστωμένως*. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ διῃρημένης τῆς ὅλης βίβλου τῶν ψαλμῶν εἰς πέντε μέρη, τὸ πρῶτον μέρος ἐνταῦθα περιγράφεται, ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ α΄ ψαλμοῦ, τελευτῶν δὲ εἰς τὸν μετὰ χεῖρας. Ὥρα δὴ οὖν μεταβῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον· ὅπερ ἄρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μα΄ ψαλμοῦ, συμπεραιοῦται δὲ εἰς τὸν οα΄.»

– In Ps. 71, v. 19-20 (PG 23, 817 D – 820 A):

«‘Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς Ισραηλ, ὁ ποιῶν θαυμάσια μόνος’. Ἐπιτήρει δὲ, ὡς ἕκαστον μέρος τῆς βίβλου τῶν ψαλμῶν εἰς ὅμοιον καταλήγει τέλος. Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρώτου μέρους τελευταῖος ἦν ὁ μ΄, οὗ πρὸς τῷ τέλει ἐλέγετο· “Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς Ισραηλ, ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.· *γένοιτο γένοιτο*”· τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου τελευταῖος ἦν ὁ μετὰ χεῖρας ὁμοίως... τοῦ δὲ τρίτου μέρους... ‘Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα· *γένοιτο γένοιτο*’. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ τετάρτου μέρους... ‘Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος... καὶ ἐρεῖ πᾶς ὁ λαός· *γένοιτο γένοιτο*’. Τὸ δὲ πέμπτον μέρος εἰς τὸ *ἀλληλούϊα* καταλήγει, ἐν ᾧ καὶ πᾶσα περιγέγραπται ἡ βίβλος.» – Et quelques lignes plus loin, Eusèbe explicite l’interprétation de *fiat fiat* à entendre au en sens de confirmation: (ibid., 821 A) «πεπιστούμενος τε αὐτὰ καὶ λέγων· ‘*γένοιτο γένοιτο*’· ἢ κατὰ τὸν Ἀκύλαν, ‘*πεπιστωμένως πεπιστωμένως*’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν Σύμμαχον· *ἀμὴν καὶ ἀμήν*.»

– In Ps. 88, v. 53 (PG 23, 1121 C):

«Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα · ἡμᾶς τε διδάσκει προσυπακούειν τὸ, *γένοιτο γένοιτο* ὅπερ ἐστὶν Ἑβραϊκὴ φωνὴ, *ἀμὴν ἀμήν*. (ibid. 1124 B) Τὸ δὲ ἐπισφράγισμα παντὸς τοῦ λόγου τὸ, Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, *γένοιτο γένοιτο*, κατὰ μὲν τὸν Ἀκύλαν ἀντὶ τοῦ *γένοιτο γένοιτο πεπιστωμένος πεπιστωμένος* περιέχει· κατὰ δὲ τὸν Σύμμαχον, ὁμοίως τῷ Ἑβραϊκῷ *Ἀμὴν καὶ ἀμήν* .»

– Quant au commentaire du verset finale du quatrième livre, soit Ps. 88, v. 48, Eusèbe n’y voit qu’une invitation à penser à l’au delà où seront rassemblés autour du Christ une multitude d’âmes provenant de toutes les races pour louer Dieu à jamais (PG 23, 1320, B):

«Ευλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς... τοῦ αἰῶνος. Καὶ ἐρεῖ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς *γένοιτο γένοιτο*.’ Ἀκολούθως τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ φήσαντι· Ἐν παντὶ εὐχαριστεῖσθε, καὶ 0νῦν ὁ λόγος διδάσκει, πάντοτε εὐλογεῖν τὸν Κύριον...»

Tertullien (c. 197-220) cite les versets 18-19 du Ps. 71 d'une manière particulière dans *Aduersus Marcionem* V, 9, 12, 27 (CC 1, p. 691):

> *«Et beatum (Deum) dicent quoniam 'Benedictus Dominus Deus Israhelis, qui facit mirabilia solus. Benedictum nomen gloriae eius et replebitur uniuersa terra gloria eius.»*

On peut se demander si dans le second verset les omissions de *in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi*, puis *fiat fiat* sont voulues ou correspondent à une version grecque ancienne. Précédemment à propos du commentaire d'Augustin En. in Ps. 71, 21, nous avons fait état des versions différentes de ce verset chez Augustin et chez Jérôme.

Hilaire de Poitiers (c. 315-367/68) est le premier auteur latin à nous faire connaître à travers ses écrits les positions d'Origène, au témoignage de Jérôme[11]. Hilaire fait explicitement allusion à la division ancienne du Psautier, dans la Préface de ses *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Instructio 1 (CSEL 22, p. 3, l. 3-19):

> «Diuersas esse plurimorum in psalmorum libro opiniones, ex libris ipsis, quos scriptos reliquerunt, compertum habemus. Nam aliqui eos Hebraeorum in quinque libros diuisos uolunt esse, ut sit usque in quadragesimum psalmum liber primus et a quadragesimo usque ad septuagesimum primum liber secundus et ex eo usque in octogesimum octauum liber tertius et usque in centesimum quintum liber quartus – ob quod hi omnes psalmi in consummatione sua habent, *fiat, fiat*, concludatur deinde in centesimo quinquagesimo psalmo liber quintus. Alii uero ita inscribendos psalmos existimauerunt psalmi David, quo titulo intellegi uolunt, eos omnes a Dauid fuisse conscriptos. Sed nos secundum apostolicam auctoritatem librum psalmorum et nuncupamus et scribimus. Ita in Actis Apostolorum dictum meminimus (Act. 1, 20): 'scriptum est enim in libro psalmodie: fiat domus eius deserta, et episcopium eius accipiet alius'.»

Il faut toutefois noter la précision que, par rapport à Origène, Hilaire apporte que c'est la présence du doublet *fiat fiat* à la fin des Ps. 40,

[11] *De uiris inlustribus*, 100, 1-2 (éd. Aldo Ceresa-Gastaldo, Nardi editore Firenze, p. 204): «Hilarius... confecit... *In psalmos commentarios*, primum uidelicet et secundum et a quinquagesimo primo usque ad sexagesimum secundum et a centesimo octauo decimo usque ad extremum, in quo opere imitatus Origenem nonnulla etiam de suo addidit»; *Epist.* 57, 6 (CSEL 54, p. 512, 1): «Sufficit in præsenti nominasse Hilarium confessorem, qui homilias in Iob et in psalmos tractatus plurimos in Latinum uertit e Graeco».

71, 88 et 105 qui justifie la division en cinq livres. Mais comme il ne commente pas ces Psaumes, il ne fait plus allusion à cette division, tout en proposant d'autres[12], et en insistant sur l'unicité du *Liber Psalmorum* au témoignage des *Actes des Apôtres* 1, 20, argument que lui empruntera Augustin, comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, dans *En. in Ps.*150, 2.

Ambroise (330/340-374) dans son *Explanatio Psalmorum* XX, où il explique le Psaume 40, en vient au §36 au commentaire du verset final 14 (CSEL 64, p. 253, 28 sq.):

> «'Benedictus, inquit, Dominus Deus Israel', hoc est populi Deum uidentis, qui et Dominum suum et Deum credit, 'a saeculo et in saeculum, *fiat, fiat*'. In Hebraeo habet *amen, amen*, ut asseruerunt qui librum legerunt in Hebraicis litteris scriptum. Graecus hoc loco γενέσθω, γενέσθω dixit, quod est '*fiat, fiat*'. Quod uerbum diuersas significationes habet, ut sit interdum imperantis, interdum precantis, interdum confirmantis aliquid...»

Ce commentaire a certainement inspiré Augustin, lors de la rédaction de l'*Enarrratio in Ps.* 88, sermo 2, comme nous l'avons indiqué.

Au §37, (ibid. p. 254-255), empruntant probablement à Eusèbe, Ambroise précise longuement la portée du doublet *fiat fiat* dans la divison hébraïque du Psautier en cinq livres, Ps. 1-40; Ps. 41-71; Ps. 72-88; Ps. 89-105; Ps. 106-150 en y interférant une application à la vie du Christ et à celle du chrétien. Augustin n'y fait pas écho dans son propre commentaire du Psaume 40, mais on note une brève allusion lorsque'il explique des derniers versets des Psaumes 105 et 150:

> «Indicium quoque est libri finiti '*fiat fiat*'. Nam *in quinque libros* diuisum uidetur esse psalterium. *Primus liber* hoc psalmo finitur, hoc est quadragesimo. Et pulchre usque ad passionem saluatoris quadragesimus psalmus est comprehensus qui finem libro daret, quoniam passio Domini finis est quadragesimae, ut *secundus liber* a mysteriis renouationis inciperet, qui liber, utpote quadragesimae, perfectiora sacramenta complectitur... Qui liber finitur in psalmo septuagesimo primo, quo regnum Christi pacificum toto orbe diffusum prophetico sermone annuntiatur remissioque peccatorum; ubi, cum benedictionem Domini praemisisset, subtexuit: (Ps. 71, 19) 'et replebitur maiestate eius omnis terra. Fiat fiat'. *Tertiusquoque liber* finitur octauo psalmo, et ibi habet: (Ps. 88, 53) 'Benedictus Dominus in aeternum. Fiat fiat'. *Quartus liber* finitur centesimo quinto psalmo, et ibi habet:

[12] Cf. *Clauis christ.* et *Frede* 428; É. Goffinet, *L'utilisation d'Origène dans le commentaire des psaumes de saint Hilaire de Poitiers*, Löwen 1965, p. 21-22.

(Ps. 105, 48) 'Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel a saeculo et usque in saeculum; et dicet omnis populus: fiat fiat'. *Quintus liber* usque ad finem est, ubi pro hoc uerbo propheta dicit: (Ps. 150, 6) 'omnis spiritus laudet Dominum'.»

La finale du verset 19 n'est citée qu'en passant et sans commentaire (ibid, p. 255, 16-17): "et replebitur maiestate eius omnis terra. Fiat, fiat", mais avec la variante *maiestate* au lieu de *gloria*.

Dans les paragraphes suivants 39 à 41 sont proposées d'autres justifications spirituelles de cette répartition du Psautier en quatre livres, comme les quatre livres d'un unique évangile, les cinq sens physiques de l'homme spirituel, la double orientation ascendante et descendante de la même prière, et il conclut son *Explanatio Psalmi* 40 (ibid. p. 258, 12-14): "*Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel*, qui tanta nobis aperuit mysteria, *a saeculo et in saeculum*, id est ex infinito in infinitum. *Fiat Fiat*".

Il convient de faire mention ici du témoignage d'**Épiphane** († 403) dans son *De mensuris et ponderibus* 5 (PG 43, 244 D - 245 A), où parmi d'autres divisions des livres de l'Ancien Testament proposées par les Hébreux, il cite celle du Psautier en cinq livres:

«Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι τοῦτό σε μὴ παρέλθοι, ὦ φιλόκαλε, ὅτι καὶ Ψαλτήριον διεῖλον εἰς πέντε βιβλία οἱ Ἑβραῖοι, ὥστε εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλην πεντάτευχον. Ἀπὸ γὰρ πρώτου ψαλμοῦ ἄχρι τεσσαρακοστοῦ, μίαν ἐλογίσαντο βίβλον· ἀπὸ δὲ τεσσαρακοστοῦ πρώτου ἄχρι τοῦ ἑβδομηκοστοῦ πρώτου, δευτέραν ἡγήσαντο· ἀπὸ ἑβδομηκοστοῦ δευτέρου ἕως ὀγδοηκοστοῦ ὀγδόου, τρίτον βιβλίον ἐποιήσαντο· ἀπὸ δὲ ὀγδοηκοστοῦ ἐννάτου ἕως ἑκατοστοῦ πέμπτου, τετάρτην ἐποίησαν· ἀπὸ δὲ ἑκατοστοῦ ἕκτου ἕως τοῦ ἑκατοστοῦ πεντηκοστοῦ, τὴν πέμπτην συνέθηκαν· ἕκαστον γὰρ ψαλμὸν ἔχοντα ἐν τῷ τέλει, *Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος γένοιτο γένοιτο*, τέλος εἶναι βιβλίου ἐδικαίωσαν· εὑρίσκεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τε τῷ τεσσαρακοστῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑβδομηκοστῷ πρώτῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀγδοηκοστῷ ὀγδόῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑκατοστῷ πέμπτῳ· ἐν δὲ τῷ τέλει τῆς πέμπτης βίβλου ἀντὶ τοῦ, *Εὐλογητος Κύριος, γένοιτο γένοιτο*, τέθειται τὸ, *Πᾶσα πνοὴ αἰνεσάτω τὸν Κύριον, ἀλληλούϊα.*»

Ce texte d'Épiphane réapparaît dans quelques chaînes sous le nom d'Hippolyte (GCS 1, 2, p. 143; cf. CPG 3761. 2), ou de Nicétas (PG 69, 713). Voir R. Devreesse, *DB Sup.*, s.n. Chaînes exégétiques, p. 1128.

C'est très probablement à Eusèbe que **Jérôme** († 419) emprunte directement ses allusions à la division du Psautier. Tout en

défendant son unité, il précise que ces deux mots venant en finale de certains psaumes correspondaient pour les Hébreux à la divison du Psautier en cinq livres, comme ils ont réparti en douze livrets le livre des douze petits Prophètes.

– *Epistola ad Marcellam*, 23, 1, datée de 381, (CSEL 54, p. 211, 2):

> «Cum hora ferme tertia hodiernae diei septuagesimum secundum psalmum, id est tertii libri principium, legere coepissemus, et docere cogeremur tituli ipsius partem ad finem secundi libri, partem ad principium tertii libri pertinere: quod scilicet *defecerunt hymni Dauid filii Iesse*, finis esset prioris, *psalmus* uero *Asaph* principium sequentis…»

– *Epistola ad Marcellam*, 26, 4, datée de 384, (CSEL 54, p. 222, 4):

> «*Amen* uero Aquila πεπιστωμένως exprimit, quod nos *fideliter* possumus dicere, ductum aduerbium ex nomine fidei *amuna*, Septuaginta γένοιτο, id est *fiat*. Vnde et in fine librorum, *in quinque siquidem uolumina* psalterium apud Hebraeos diuisum est, '*fiat, fiat*' transtulerunt, quod in Hebraeo legitur '*amen, amen*', quo scilicet ea uere dicta quae supra dicta sunt *confirmentur*.»

– *Epistola ad Cyprianum*, 140, 4, datée de 417/8, (CSEL 56, p. 272):

> «Aiunt Hebraei uno psalmorum *uolumine quinque libros* contineri: a primo usque ad quadragesimum; et a quadragesimo primo usque ad septuagesimum primum; et a septuagesimo secundo usque ad octogesimum octauum; et ab octogesimo nono, qui quarti libri initium est, et quem nunc disserimus, usque ad centesimum quintum. In quorum omnium fine duplex '*amen*' positum est, quod Septuaginta transferunt '*fiat, fiat*'; et a centesimo sexto usque ad finem. Instar duodecim prophetarum, qui et ipsi, cum proprios libellos ediderint, unius uoluminis nomine continentur.»

– *Epistula Hieronymi ad Sofronium*, datée de 404/10, in *Biblia sacra iuxta Vulgatam uersionem*, Romae 1953, T. X, Genesis-Psalmi, Praefatio, p. 4-5; – ed. Stuttgart, 2 ed., 1975, T. I, p. 768; après avoir signalé l'ancienne division en cinq livres du Psautier, Jérôme dit sa préférence pour son unité, adoptant en cela le témoignage des Actes des Apôtres auquel Hilaire en appelait:

> «Scio quosdam putare Psalterium *in quinque libros* esse diuisum, ut ubicumque apud Septuaginta interpretes scriptum est γένοιτο γένοιτο, id est *fiat fiat*, finis librorum sit, pro quo in hebraeo legitur AMEN AMEN. Nos autem Hebraeorum auctoritatem secuti et maxime Apostolorum qui semper in Nouo Testamento Psalmorum librum nominant, *unum uolumen adserimus*. Psalmos quoque omnes

eorum testamur auctorum qui ponuntur in titulis, Dauid scilicet et Asaph et Idithum, filiorum Core, Eman Ezraitae, Mosi et Salomonis et reliquorum, quos Ezras uno uolumine comprehendit. Si enim *amen*, pro quo Aquila transtulit πεπιστωμένως, in fine tantum librorum ponitur et non interdum aut in exordio aut in calce sermonis siue sententiae, numquam et Saluator in Euangelio loqueretur: *Amen amen dico uobis*... Nam et titulus ipse hebraicus SEPHAR THALLIM, quod interpretatur *Volumen hymnorum*, apostolicae auctoritati congruens, non plures libros, sed *unum uolumen* ostendit.»

– *Commentarioli in Psalmos,* Ps 40, 14 (CC 72, p. 208, 5)

«Benedictus Dominus Deus Israhel a saeculo et in saeculum: fiat fiat". Pro *fiat fiat*, in hebraeo scribitur *amen amen*; quod Aquila πεπιστωμένως, id est *uere* siue *fideliter* transtulit. Et sciendum primum librum psalterii hic esse finitum; secundum uero esse a quadragesimo primo usque ad septuagesimum primum; tertium a septuagesimo secundo usque ad octogesimum octauum; quartum ab octogesimo nono usque in centesimum quintum; quintum a centesimo sexto usque in finem.»

Ibid. Ps. 72, 1 (CC 72, p. 217):

«Sciendum quod septuagesimus primus psalmus secundi libri finis sit: unde et in extremo habet *fiat, fiat*. Pro quo nos in superioribus demonstrauimus *amen, amen* in hebraeo dici.»

Ibid. Ps. 88, 1 (CC 72, p. 222):

«Distulit (Pater) autem eum (Filium), ut quem sancti illo tempore regnaturum putabant, expectent eum in die iudicii in sua maiestate uenturum, *Fiat fiat*. Ecce et hic per uerbum *Amen* tertius concluditur liber.»

Ibid. Ps.105, 48 (CC 72, p. 230):

«'*Et dicet omnis populus*: *fiat*'. Quarti libri finis unum tantum habet *Amen*, licet in graeco duo legantur.»

– *In Ps.* 88, dans *Tractuum in psalmos series altera* (CC 78, p. 414, 4-9):

«Lectus est octogesimus nonus psalmus, cuius titulus hic est: *Oratio Moysi hominis Dei*. Quarti libri exordium est, quoniam psalterium in quinque libros diuisum scire debemus. A primo usque quadragesimum liber primus, a quadragesimo usque septuagesimum primum liber secundus, a septuagesimo primo usque ad octogesimum octauum liber tertius, ab octogesimo octauo usque ad centesimum

quintum liber quartus, a centesimo quinto usque in finem liber quintus; et ideo quarti libri principium est *Oratio Moysi hominis Dei.* Hebraei non solum istum psalmum, sed et alios decem qui sequuntur, quoniam in eis titulus non habetur, putant a Moyse esse conscriptos.»

Dans tous ces textes Jérôme indique clairement que la division en cinq livres du Psautier comme celle du Livre des Petits prophètes en douze livrets est une opinion traditionnelle chez les Hébreux: *-apud Hebraeos*, *- aiunt Hebraei*, *- scio quosdam putare*, *- in Hebraeo scribitur amen... et sciendum*, alors que l'unicité du livre des Psaumes est à son sens indiscutable. Il insiste aussi en trois autres passages sur la valeur *confirmative* du mot *amen*:
- *Comm. in Matth* I, 6, 13 (CC 77, p. 37, 788): «Amen... quod Aquila interpretatur *fideliter*, nos *uere* possumus dicere»
- *In Galat.* I, 5 (PL 26, 317 B): «*Amen* Septuaginta transtulerunt γένοιτο, id est *fiat*, Aquila πεπιστωμένως, *uere* siue *fideliter*»
- Ibid. III, 6, 18 (PL 26, 438 C): «*Amen* enim Septuaginta interpretes *fiat*; Aquila, Symmachus et Theodotio *fideliter* siue *uere* interpretati sunt.»

Prosper d'Aquitaine († 420/450) dans son *Expositio psalmorum a C ad CL* (CC 68 A, p. 43, 237 sq.) pour la finale du commentaire du Ps 105, reprend ad litteram le commentaire d'Augustin, cf. supra *En. in Ps.* 105, 37, 69:

> «'Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel a saeculo et usque in saeculum' id est ab aeterno usque in aeternum, quia sine fine laudabitur ab eis de quibus dicitur: 'Beati qui habitant in domo tua, Domine, in saecula saeculorum laudabunt te (Ps.83, 5)' – (l. 253) '*Et dicet omnis populus*', id est omnis electio praedestinatorum, omnes filii promissionis, qui sunt ex circumcisione, et in praeputio gens sancta, populus adoptionis. *Fiat fiat.*"

Théodoret († 428) dans son *Interpretatio in Psalmos* ne fait nulle part allusion à la quintuple division hébraïque du Psautier, mais il insiste sur l'exégèse du doublet *fiat fiat* à la fin de ses commentaires des Ps. 71, 88, 105:

> – Ps. 71, 19 (PG 80, 1441 B): «Διὸ καὶ ἐπιλέγει, *γένοιτο γένοιτο*· ἢ κατὰ τὸν Ἀκύλαν *πεπιστωμένως πεπιστωμένως*, ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἀψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ δέξεται πάντως τὸ τεξοδ.»
>
> – Ps. 88, 53 (ibid. 1597 C): «'Εύλογητὸς Κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα· *γένοιτο γένοιτο.*' Ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος ἡ ὑμνῳδία... Ταύτην δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ὁ Ἀκύλας δείκνυσιν ἀκριβέστερον, τὸ *ἀμὴν ἀμὴν* ἑρμηνεύσας· ἔφη γὰρ *πεπιστωμένος καὶ πεπιστευμένος*, ἀντὶ τοῦ, Ἀληθὴς εἶ, καὶ λίαν ἀληθής. Εὐλογητὸς τοίνυν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα·

βεβαιοῖς γάρ σου τοῖς ἔργοις τὰς ὑποσχέσεις.» – Ps. 105, 48) (ibid. 1736 A): «'Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ θεὸς Ισραὴλ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος. Καὶ ἐρεῖ πᾶς ὁ λαός, γένοιτο γένοιτο'. Προσήκει δὲ τὸν λαὸν ἅπαντα τὸ 'Αμὴν τῇ τῶν ὑμνούντων ἐπιφέρειν φωνῇ. Τὸ γὰρ *γένοιτο γένοιτο, ἀμὴν καὶ ἀμὴν*, ὁ 'Εβραῖος καλεῖ. Ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἔθος ἐν ταῖς 'Εκκλησίας μεμένηκε τὸ τῇ δοξολογίᾳ τοῦ ἱερέως διὰ τοῦ *ἀμὴν* συντίθεσθαι τὸν λαὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐντεῦθεν κοινωνίαν προσφέρειν, καὶ τὴν εὐλογίαν λαμβάνειν.»

Attribués à **Hésychius** († c. 440) plusieurs fragments se trouvent dispersés çà et là dans des commentaires de Psaumes tantôt sous son nom tantôt sous le nom d'Athanase.

– *In. Ps.* 40, v. 14, *Commentarius magnus* (PG 27, 200 C), sous le nom d'Athanase:

«Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς 'Ισραὴλ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος...», expression d'action de grâce pour le passé et pour le futur, conformément au dire de saint Paul (I Cor. 13, 9-10) 'ex parte cognoscimus et ex parte prophetamus; cum autem uenerit quod perfectum est, euacuabitur quod ex parte est'.

«Τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον προκοπῇ τὸ ἀπὸ μέρους παύεται. Διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Ψαλμῳδὸς ἐπήγαγε, γένοιτο γένοιτο, καὶ διπλασιάζει τὴν εὐχήν». Double supplication, car, dans l'au-delà, la foi et les oeuvres bonnes deviendront louanges ou bénédictions de Dieu, et parviendront à leur couronnement, dont seront exclus les impies et les infidèles.

En finale une précision sur la division du psautier:

«Εἰδέναι δὲ δεῖ, ὅτι τὴν ψαλμικὴν ταύτην προφητείαν εἰς πέντε τινὲς διελόντες βίβλους, μέχρι τούτου τοῦ ψαλμοῦ τὴν πρώτην νομίζουσιν· ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῷ τέλει στέφανον ὥσπερ τὴν εὐλογίαν τὴν εἰς Θεὸν κέκτηται. Ὅθεν οὕτω διαιροῦσι καὶ τὰς ὑπάρξεις τὰς τέσσαρας.»[13]

– *In Ps.* 71, v. 18, *Fragmenta e catenis* (PG 93, 1237 C):

«'Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ 'Ισραήλ' Διὰ τί δὲ διπλασιάζει τὸ γένοιτο; 'Επιταχῦναι τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐλευθερίαν βουλόμενος καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων ἐλπίδα. Ὅταν γὰρ ἡ γῆ πληρωθῇ τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ, τότε ὁ παρὼν κόσμος συντελεῖται, καὶ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐμφανίσεται.»[14]

[13] Cf. R. Devreesse, Les anciens commentateurs des Psaumes..., p. 252, n. 57.

[14] Ibid. p. 256, n. 68, dans Vatic. 525, f. 263, ferait suite à un avertissement sur la division du psautier, qui n'est pas reproduit dans PG.

– *In Ps.* 88, v. 53, *Commentarius magnus*, (PG 55, 755; cf. CPG 6554. 3):

> «Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, *γένοιτο γένοιτο*". Καλὴν σφραγῖδα τοῖς λόγοις ὁ προφήτης ἐπέθηκε. Διπλασιάζει γὰρ τὴν εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν εὐλογίαν Ὅθεν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν ἑρμηνευτῶν ἀντὶτοῦ *γένοιτο γένοιτο ἀμὴν ἀμὴν* ἐκδεδώκασι. Καὶ τίνος χάριν τὴν εὐλογίαν ἐδιπλασίασε; Ἐπειδὴ παραγενόμενος ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς καὶ τῶν προφητῶν τὸν ὀνειδισμὸν καὶ τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ἔπαυσε. Σὺ δὲ μὴ ἀγνόει τὴν τρίτην τῶν ἑρμηνευτῶν βίβλον πέρας ἐνταῦθα λαμβάνειν καὶ σφραγίζεσθαι. Μέμνησαι γὰρ ὅτι καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται εἰς πέντε μὲν βίβλους τὴν ψαλμικὴν προφητείαν μερίζεσθαι, συντελεῖσθαι δὲ ἑκάστην ὑπὸ ψαλμοῦ, δοξολογίαν πρὸς τῷ τέλει *ἀμὴν* ἐπιφέρουσαν ἔχοντος.»[15]

– *In Ps.* 105, 48, *Fragmenta e catenis* (PG 93, 1301 A):

> «'Εὐλογητὸς Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς Ισραηλ'. Μέχρι τῶν ἐνταῦθα τὴν τετάρτην βίβλον τῶν ψαλμῶν Ἑβραίων παῖδες ὁρίζονται· εἰς πέντε γὰρ τὴν τοῦ Δαβὶδ προφητείαν διελόντες (καθὰ καὶ πρότερον ἔφαμεν), ἕκαστον ψαλμὸν ᾧ τοῦτο τέλος πρόσκειται Ἀμὴν Αμὴν, συμπλήρωσιν εἶναι μιᾶς βίβλου νομίζουσιν.»[16]

Cassiodore († c. 580) rappelle, en plusieurs passages de son *Expositio psalmorum*, ces divisions du Psautier qu'il a lues chez ses prédécesseurs latins, mais à la suite d'Hilaire, d'Augustin, de Jérôme il tient à affirmer à son tour que le Psautier ne constitue qu'un seul livre:

– *Praefatio*, cap. XII (CC 97, p. 15):

> «Utrum in quinque voluminibus psalmorum sit secanda contextio, an certe unus liber debeat nuncupari. Beatus Hieronymus[17] prophetiam psalmorum in quinque libris putauit esse diuidendam, quia in textu operis huius quarto legitur: *fiat fiat*; dum hoc uerbo intercedente, nonnulla se uideatur aperire diuisio. Huic fauet assensa posteritas. Credo dum sibi consultum iudicauit, quod in multas partes coarctabatur taediosa longinquitas. Hilarius[18] autem, Pictauiensis episcopus, diuinarum rerum acutissimus et profundissimus exquisitor, congruentius librum aestimat dici debere psalmorum, quia in hebraeo unum uolumen est et maxime cum in Actibus apostolorum legatur dictum: *In libro psalmorum*. Quapropter merito unus liber dicitur, qui tanta auctoritate firmatur.»

[15] Cf. R. Devreesse, Les anciens commentateurs des Psaumes…, p. 258.
[16] Cf. Ibid., p. 259, n. 84.
[17] Cf. supra p. 14-15.
[18] Cf. supra p. 12.

– *In Ps.* 40, 14, 256 sq. Ibid. (CC 97, p. 378):

> «'Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel a saeculo et usque in saeculum: fiat fiat'... Nam quod dixit: *a saeculo*, praesentem mundum significat, ex quo administrari coepta sunt omnia. *Et usque in saeculum*, futurum uult intellegi, ubi iam omnia aeterna consistunt, nec aliqua temporis mutabilitate dilabuntur. Nam licet *saeculum* istud deficiat, Dei tamen benedictio incommutabilis perseuerat. Addidit *fiat fiat*. Hoc uerbum geminatum instanter ab omnibus praedicat esse faciendum. Non enim sic intellegendum est, ut putetur *fiat benedictus Dominus*, tamquam si non laudetur *benedictus* non sit; sed hoc est *fiat*, unde nos proficimus, dum iugiter eius laudibus occupamur. Aliqui uero expositorum pro istius uerbi nouitate, quod est hic et in septuagesimo primo, siue in octogesimo octauo, uel in centesimo quinto, in quinque libros psalterium diuidendum esse putauerunt. Sed eis non esse consentiendum in praefatione nostra sufficienter ostensum est. In Actibus quippe apostolorum unus liber legitur esse psalmorum.»

– *In Ps.* 71, 19, 436 sq. Ibid. (CC 98, p. 658):

> «'Et benedictum nomen maiestatis eius in aeternum et in saeculum saeculi; et replebitur maiestate eius omnis terra: fiat fiat.'... Adiecit: *fiat fiat*. Optantis est quidem dicere *fiat*, sed nimium desiderantis ipsum repetere. Quod magis ad mysterium aliquorum psalmorum positum debemus aduertere, non (sicut uisum est aliquibus) libri unitatem ad multas perducere sectiones. Magnificus psalmus, quem geminata uota secuta sunt; aduentus enim Domini omnino debuit desideranter optari.»

– *In Ps.* 88, 53, 725 sq. Ibid. (CC 98, p. 819):

> «'Benedictus Dominus in aeternum: fiat fiat'. Post illam felicissimam sanctissimamque commutationem, dignum fuit ut laus Domini subderetur, qui eam immeritis agnoscitur contulisse mortalibus. Pulchre autem contra maledictiones gentilium temporales positum est: *Benedictus Dominus in aeternum*, quoniam quae dicunt illi caduca sunt; laus enim Domini permanet in aeternum, quia talia donare nouit, quae nullo fine clauduntur. Sequitur *fiat fiat*, ut de tantis promissionibus nemo dubitaret, ubi *confirmatio* iterata succederet, et tamquam subscriptio boni principis sacris iussionibus adderetur. Sed hoc magis *ad psalmorum laudem* debemus accipere, non (sicut quibusdam uisum est) ad libri aliquam sectionem.»

– *In Ps.* 105, 48, 609 sq. Ibid. (CC 98, p. 971):

> «'Benedictus Dominus Deus Israel a saeculo et usque in saeculum; et dicet omnis populus: fiat fiat'. Haec est laus quam superiore uersu congregatos optauit populos personare. Hoc etiam nunc sancta canit

> Ecclesia, quae se de tanto bono praesenti tempore consolatur. Sed hoc dicit ab isto saeculo usque ad illud perpetuum saeculum esse faciendum, ut continuata laus numquam debeat habere fastidium. Sed cum praedictos hymnos deuotus Iudaeorm populus canat, quis est iste alter qui dicit: *fiat fiat*, scilicet (ut mihi uidetur) populus ille preputii est, qui eo tempore in fide non erat, quando psalmus iste canebatur; qui tamen prophetiae uirtute futurus introductus est, ut amore uniuersitatis diceret *fiat fiat*. Sic hodieque in ecclesiis orantibus sacerdotibus respondetur *amen*, id est *fiat*. Sic iam illis temporibus ipsi indicabantur, qui nunc idem faciunt. Conuenit enim magis haec uerba ad talem intellectum trahere, quam librorum determinationes aduertere, sicut quibusdam placet.»

En lisant dans la phrase antépénultième de cette finale 'Sic hodieque in ecclesiis orantibus sacerdotibus respondetur *amen*, id est *fiat*', plusieurs textes d'Augustin précédemment cités pourraient être donnés en référence, nous ne ferons qu'une mention particulière de l'*Epistola* 213 relatant l'élection d'Eraclius comme successeur d'Augustin, où il est dit: «A populo acclamatum est: fiat fiat, dictum uicies quinquies..., fiat fiat, dictum quater decies...» Et l'on ne peut mieux conclure cette enquête sur le doublet *fiat fiat* qu'en reprenant la dernière phrase de Cassiodore: «Conuenit enim magis haec uerba ad talem intellectum trahere, quam librorum determinationes aduertere, sicut quibusdam placet».

Georges FOLLIET

AUGUSTINE ON THE DEACON-PREACHER-MARTYR STEPHEN

The early Christian writers were profoundly impressed by Stephen, the first martyr. The Greek homiletic tradition contains a number of sermons in his honour, sermons by John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Asterius of Amasea, Proclus of Constantinople, and Hesychius of Jerusalem.[1] In the west, it is mainly the oeuvre of Augustine which deserves our attention. A few years ago Father Mayer collected a large amount of data from the sermons of Augustine regarding the celebration of Stephen the first martyr.[2] In what follows, an attempt is made, to add to Father Mayer's work by analyzing this data and offering some comments on the results.[3]

I The earliest Latin records

Tertullian

A good place to begin is with a look at the pre-Augustinian Latin tradition. It becomes immediately obvious that Tertullian took a lively interest in the life, ministry, and death of Stephen (cf. Acts 6-7). For him, Stephen is a model of patience in the face of suffering precisely because he 'while being stoned prays for the forgiveness of his enemies' (*De patientia* 14,1).[4] In *Scorpiace* 15,2, Stephen is important as one of many who are persecuted because of Christ: in Acts it reads: 'Stephen is buried (under the stones)'.[5] In *De resurrectione mortuorum* 55,9, Tertullian shows that a human remains human even when he receives preferential treatment from God. He uses the examples of both Moses and 'Stephen, who looked like an angel, but whose mortal human knees had nevertheless given way during the stoning (*Ac* 6,15 and 7,60)'.[6] In *Adversus Praxean* 30,5, and with

[1] See the list in the *Clavis Patrum Graecorum.*

[2] C. Mayer O.S.A., "'Attende Stephanum conservum tuum' (*Serm.* 317, 2, 3). Sinn und Wert der Märtyrerverehrung nach den Stephanuspredigten Augustins", *Festschrift Bartelink,* ed. Bastiaensen – Hilhorst – Kneepkens, Steenbrugis 1989, 217-237.

[3] Here, Chadwick-Healy's CD-ROM edition of the *Patrologia Latina* has been a great help. For patristic quotations, however, the best available critical editions were consulted.

[4] *Lapidatur … et veniam hostibus suis postulat* (*Ac* 7,60).

[5] *Stephanus opprimitur.*

[6] *Stephanus angelicum iam fastigium induerat, sed non alia genua in lapidatione succiderant.*

regard to the relationship between the Father and the Son in the Trinity, Tertullian states that the Son *sits* at the right hand of the Father. The fact 'that Stephen, while being stoned, saw Him still *standing* at His right hand (Acts 7, 55), was an announcement that He would sit afterwards, when the Father puts all his enemies under his feet (cf. *Ps* 109[110],1 and *Heb* 1,13)'.[7] As we will see, the question of whether Stephen was sitting or standing at the right hand of the Father will also capture the attention of Ambrose and Augustine.

Cyprian

In the extant writings of Cyprian, Stephen appears only once. The text of *De bono patientiae* 16 is very similar to the aforementioned passage quoted from Tertullian: here, too, his *patientia* is praised. It is praised precisely because Stephen 'although killed by violence and by stones, did not pray for revenge, but for forgiveness for his murderers'.[8]

Hilary

Just after the middle of the fourth century, Hilary of Poitiers, in his comments on Psalm 58 (59),6, a verse which contains the exclamation: "*Exsurge in occursum mihi!*" ('Rise and come towards me!'), places these words in the mouth of Stephen and notes that he was the first martyr in name of God the Father. He also notes that, in response to Stephen's call, 'the Father descended to the edge of heaven as it were to meet him'.[9]

Stephen also plays a part in Hilary's wonderful allegorical interpretation of *Mt* 17,13. Matthew 17,24-27 relates the story about the miraculous payment of the temple tax, when the Lord asks Peter to cast his hook – the hook of the heavenly teachings – in the water – the water of the world – and to pay for both of them by means of the coin he found in the mouth of the first fish he caught. Hilary writes: 'Peter indeed cast … the hook of the heavenly teachings … into this, the blessed first martyr sank his teeth … Stephen came up first; he had the coin in his mouth' and it was the equivalent of the two

[7] *Hunc (Filium) vidit Stephanus cum lapidaretur, adhuc stantem ad dexteram Dei, ut exinde sessurum donec ponat illi Pater omnes inimicos sub pedibus suis.*

[8] *Qui cum … vi et lapidibus necaretur, non sibi vindictam sed interfectoribus veniam postulabat.*

[9] *… cum primo nominis sui martyri Stephano velut in primoribus caeli in occursum a Deo Patre descensum sit.*

didrachmas that were owed: 'one for Christ, and one for the preaching of Christ'.[10]

The image of Stephen as the first fish caught by the new teaching of Christ is also present in the work of Ambrose. Ambrose's source for his comments is not immediately apparent. Origen does not involve Stephen in his interpretation of this passage of Matthew, which he, by the way, interprets unfavourably.[11] Did Hilary serve as a source of inspiration for Ambrose?

Ambrose

In *Exameron* 5,6,16, Ambrose also calls Stephen the fish that was caught 'in Peter's' net. As the first follower of the gospel, he came out of the water with the coin of justice in his mouth. He then cried out: 'Behold, I see the heavens opened and the Son of Man standing at God's right hand.' The fish was actually the Lord Jesus, because he knew that Stephen's mouth contained the exact amount of tax that was owed. Indeed, through his glorious martyr's death, the well-spoken defender (*locuples adsertor*) has done justice to both the judgement and the teaching of Peter as well as to the grace of Christ'.[12] A similar train of thought is to be found in *Expositio evangelii Lucae* 4,75. Here Peter has caught 'the first fish, possibly the first martyr, who carried the drachma, the tax amount owed, in his mouth. Our drachma is Christ. The first martyr, Stephen, carried a treasure in his mouth, due to the fact that he was proclaiming Christ by means of his martyr's death'.[13] Comparable to this is *De virginitate* 119, in which we read that 'the martyr who was the first to come up from the sea to heaven, was caught by Peter before the service at the altar, not with a net, but with a hook, in order to ascend to heaven

[10] *Petrus … doctrinae hamum misit in saeculo;… huic adhaesit beatus ille primus martyr hamo …. Stephanus igitur primus ascendit, Stephanus staterem ore continuit, … quia talis … stater et pro Christo erat et pro Christi praedicatione solvendus.*

[11] See F. Ledegang, *Mysterium ecclesiae. Beelden voor de kerk en haar leden bij Origenes*, 2 pts., diss. Nijmegen 1992, 1,184.447-448.

[12] *Petrus … misit retia et conplexus est Stephanum, qui de evangelio primus ascendit habens in ore suo statera iustitiae; unde … clamavit dicens: ecce video caelos apertos et Filium hominis stantem ad dexteram Dei. Pro hoc pisce stabat Dominus Iesus; sciebat enim esse in ore eius pretium sui census; denique glorioso martyrio et Petri iudicium atque doctrinam et Christi gratiam locuples adsertor inplevit.*

[13] *Et fortasse primus hic piscis primus est martyr in ore habens didragma, hoc est pretium census. Didragma nostrum Christus est. Habebat igitur primus ille martyr, Stephanus scilicet, in ore thesaurum, cum Christum in passione loqueretur.*

in the stream of his blood, with a treasure in his mouth, since he proclaimed Christ through the testimony of his martyr's death'.[14]

In the story of the stoning, Stephen sees Jesus standing at the right hand of the Father (*Ac* 7,55). Ambrose, in *Epist. 63*,5, comments: 'Jesus stood there as a supporter, He stood there as a devoted helper to assist his athlete Stephen in battle; He stood there as one prepared (paratus) to crown his martyr'.[15] Here, for Stephen, in full accord with the traditional terminology for martyrdom as a battle against the devil, the designation "athlete of Christ" is used.

In *Explanatio psalmi 45*,13, Ambrose states that 'when someone sins heavily, God is disposed toward him in such a way that he departs from him [and] this is why Adam saw God walking away from him after his sin and that is why Stephen saw Him standing (*Acts* 7,55); one fell because of his evil sin, the other received the crown of martyrdom'[16]: The statement of Acts that Stephen saw the Lord standing and Paul's wish for believers to remain standing (*1 Cor* 15,58: *stabiles estote et immobiles*; *Col* 1,23 *immobiles a spe evangelii*) lead Ambrose, in *Explanatio psalmi 61*,18, to conjure up the image of a "double standing": 'by faith, the immovable standing Stephen was seeing the immovable standing Christ,' the two motionless ones compare favourably with 'the children of the traitor, who according to the psalm have to wander about aimlessly and are reduced to beggary'.[17]

Finally there is the passage from *De fide ad Gratianum* 3,17,137-141, where, just like Tertullian in *Adversus Praxean*, Ambrose poses a question about both the standing and sitting (*stare et sedere*), of the Son of Man at the right hand of the Father. Ambrose's text is anti-Arian; he emphasizes the equality between Father and Son. Could it have been that the words of Stephen were used by the Arians to support their opinion? In any case, the passage deserves to be quoted in full. In passing it should be noted that the same terminology of a fight against the devil is used to indicate the martyrdom:

[14] *Martyr ... ille qui de mari ad caelum primus ascendit, captus a Petro minister altaris, non reti sed hamo levatur, ut rivo sui sanguinis elevaretur ad caelum; cuius in ore thesaurus erat, cum Christum in confessione loqueretur.*

[15] *Stabat Iesus quasi advocatus; stabat quasi sollicitus, ut Stephanum athletam suum certantem iuvaret; stabat quasi paratus, ut coronaret suum martyrem.*

[16] *Ubi ... aliquis gravius peccat, commovetur in eo Deus, ut ab eo transeat. Unde et Adae peccanti deambulare visus est et Stephano stare, quia ille in praevaricatione lapsus est, hic in martyrio coronatus.*

[17] *Immobilis ergo fide Stephanus immobilem Christum videbat; ... non movit se Stephanus, non movit et Christus; ... commoti amoveantur filii eius et mendicent.*

'With regard to the standing at the right hand of God, this is only found in one place, [the one] where Stephen says that he saw Jesus standing at the right hand of God. Why does it always say that He is sitting at the right hand of God, and only in one place that He is standing? He is sitting as the judge of the living and the dead, He is standing as the defender of his friends. So he was standing as a priest, when He offered his Father the sacrifice of the good martyr; He was standing, when he went to present, as his protector, the well-deserved reward to the good wrestler for his exhausting battle. To indicate even more clearly that the standing did not imply a deficiency, but, on the contrary, power, Stephen pleaded with the Son to recommend him to the Father with the words: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." To demonstrate the equality in power of the Father and the Son, he spoke again and said: "Lord, do not blame them for this sin." The Lord says the same thing to the Father during his own suffering as the Son of Man (*Lk* 23,34); it is also the prayer of Stephen to the Son of God in the hour of his torture. That the request for a blessing is addressed equally to both Father and Son, proves the equality of their power. If they (the Arians) claim that Stephen said this to the Father, they must have noted that the preceding request was addressed to the Son. Even if we follow their reasoning, the unity in majesty of Father and Son is demonstrated by us, then if the request is made to Father and Son, the equality of the prayer indicates equality of doing. If they object to the fact that the Son is addressed with 'Lord', we conclude that they are also trying to deny Him the designation 'Lord'.[18]

II Augustine

Augustine is, or has, a 'Stephen's story' all on his own. Mayer's research on the series of sermons he composed on

[18] *Uno tantum loco stantem ad dexteram Dei Iesum Stephanus vidisse se dixit... Cur ... ubique ad dexteram sedere ostenditur, uno legitur in loco stare? Sedet quasi iudex vivorum et mortuorum; stat quasi advocatus suorum. Stabat ergo quasi sacerdos, quando Patri hostiam boni martyris offerebat; stabat quasi bono luctatori bravium tanti praesul certaminis redditurus....* (140) *Ut autem evidentius cognosceretur nulla esse stantis iniuria, sed potestas, Filium Stephanus obsecrabat, ut se amplius commendaret Patri, dicens: Domine Iesu, recipe spiritum meum. Et ut eandem Patris et Filii potestatem esse ostenderet, repetivit dicens: Domine, ne statuas illis hoc peccatum. Hoc Dominus in passione propria quasi Filius hominis Patri dicit; hoc et Stephanus Filium Dei in suo martyrio deprecatur. Cum eadem gratia a Patre Filioque deposcitur, eadem potentia declaratur.* (141) *Aut si volunt Stephanum Patri dixisse, ... advertant tamen ... quod Filius prius sit rogatus. Nos autem et secundum eorum interpretationem ostendimus unitatem paternae maiestatis et Filii; nam cum Pater rogatur et Filius, aequalitas precationis operationis indicat unitatem. Si autem illis non placet Filio dictum 'Domine', videmus quod etiam Dominum eum negare conantur.*

Stephen[19] have already made this clear, but, if Mayer's research is supplemented with other examples from Augustine's oeuvre, the picture can be completed.

Stephen in Augustine's oeuvre

§ 1. *The martyr Stephen*

What applied to the church of his time, also applied to Augustine once he had become a Christian and began to preach. Devotion to the martyrs was both popular and important, and Augustine, being the liturgist and preacher that he was, went along with this. Stephen, the first martyr, could count on receiving his sympathy and his eloquence. This is especially because, as he states in *Sermo* 315,1,1, Stephen's *passio* is to be found in the canonical book of the Acts of the Apostles and, as such, possesses an inherent guarantee of dependability which invites both preaching and reflection. In a sermon on the words 'The harvest is bountiful …' Augustine says (*Sermo* 101,2,2) that 'the first preachers of the gospel, the apostles, were sent out as harvesters and, wielding the scythe of the gospel, brought the sheaves to the threshing floor of the Lord, where Stephen' – the first of the new crop – 'had to be threshed'.[20] Obviously in the background is the thought that Stephen is the first martyr of the New Testament. In *Sermo* 315,1,1, 316,1,1 and 317,1,1 Augustine, in passing, draws attention to the fact that Stephen, appointed by the apostles as deacon and as such their inferior, has preceded them in martyrdom.

He also pays attention to the attitude of Stephen, who first sees the heavens opened during the stoning and who sees Jesus standing at God's right hand (*Acts* 7,56), but who, when kneeling down before his death, pleads with the Lord not to hold his persecutors accountable for their sin (*Acts* 7,60). In *Sermo* 315,3-4,5 and 6,7, this is commented on: 'standing' (*stans*) Stephen was praying for himself, asking as a martyr for his just reward; 'kneeling down' (*fixo genu*) he prayed for mercy for his persecutors. In *Sermo* 49,10,11, the question is again: why first standing, and then kneeling down? The preacher answers: 'Who prays for a just man has an easy task, and that is why

[19] See also footnote 2. This series consists of *sermones* 314-324. Sermons 320 – 324 describe what happened in Hippo, probably during the years 425 and 426, with regard to Stephen's relics. Note well that they are of secondary importance in Augustine's reasoning.

[20] *Missi messores cum falce evangelii portaverunt manipulos ad aream dominicam, ubi Stephanus trituraretur.*

Stephen was praying for himself standing. When he then had to pray for the Jews, for the murderers of Christ, for the murderers of the saints, for his own murderers: he was aware of the fact that their godlessness was enormous, even gigantic and difficult to forgive, and he kneeled down'.[21] The same train of thought is to be found in the sermons on Stephen. In *Sermo* 316,3,3; 317,4,5; and 319,4,4, Augustine makes it a point to note that Stephen prays for himself standing and for his executioners kneeling down. This is also the case in *Sermo* 90,9.

Augustine also connects the standing of Stephen with the standing of Jesus, who, in Stephen's vision, is standing at the right hand of God (*Acts* 7,55). In *Sermo* 314,1,1, he explains: 'Stephen saw Jesus standing and that is why he was standing himself and did not fall: Jesus was standing high above and was looking down on his warrior below and gave him, his soldier, invincible strength not to fall'.[22] In the explanation of the *Credo*, Augustine remarks, with reference to this 'standing' of Jesus, on the apparent contradiction with the creed's 'He is sitting at the right hand of the Father'. In *Sermo* 213,4,4, a speech delivered for *traditio symboli*, i.e., the introduction of the baptismal candidates to the creed, he poses the following question to the text of the *symbolum*: 'How can Stephen say that he saw the Son of Man standing at the right hand of the Father?' He gives the answer by means of the Latin *sedere* 'to sit', a verb with a wide range of meanings. The *sedet* of the creed means: 'he remains', 'he is'.[23] We find the same explanation in *Sermo* 214,8, yet another sermon delivered at a *traditio symboli*. We should not interpret the term *sedere* literally. For example, we often say about a person that 'he has sat so and so years in a convent, meaning: he has remained or lived there'.[24] 'Sitting' is 'remaining', is 'being'. In a word, it is the Latin idiom with its large number of meanings for *sedere* that provides Augustine with a solution to the problem.

The fact that Stephen suffered death by stoning also presents an opportunity for a variety of observations. Specifically, Augustine connects the hardness of the stones with Stephen's

[21] *Qui pro iusto orat non laborat: ideo stans pro se oravit. Ventum est ut oraret pro Iudaeis, pro interfectoribus Christi, pro interfectoribus sanctorum, pro lapidatoribus suis; attendit nimiam et magnam esse impietatem ipsorum, quae difficile donari posset, et genu fixit.*

[22] *Iesum stantem videbat; ideo stabat et non cadebat; quia stans sursum et deorsum certantem desuper spectans, invictas militi suo vires ne caderet suggerebat.*

[23] *Sedet ... dictum est: manet, habitat.*

[24] *Tot annos ... in monasterio sedit: hoc est, ... commoratus est, habitavit.*

reproach to the Jews that they are '*dura cervice*' or 'hard-headed' (*Acts* 7,51). This detail is presented in the most surprising manners. In *Sermo* 317,4,5: 'when (the persecutors) had gone to the stones, hard people to hard stones, they threw their equals on him; he was stoned with rocks, he who died for the Rock, the rock that was Jesus'.[25] In *Sermo* 49,9,10, 'stones threw stones, hard people threw hard stones, those who received the Law on stone, threw stones'.[26] *Sermo* 315,3,5 offers more of the same, though here Stephen is presented as a teacher of law. 'What law? The law they received on the stone tables. Rightly turned to stone themselves, they stoned the friend of Christ'.[27] In *Sermo* 316,2,2: 'Under their stones Stephen had to endure hard men, who threw what they were themselves. Do you want to know that he had to endure hard men? These are his words: "Hard-headed ..."'.[28] In *Enarrat. in Ps 147*,25-26, Augustine speaks about the hardness of crystal which characterized Saul/Paul at and after the death of Stephen. 'Among those who threw stones at the holy martyr Stephen, was that hard one (Saul), who was maybe even harder than the others: he was holding the coats of all those who were throwing stones, so that by the hands of all of them he might be stoned ... Behold Saul that block of crystal had become, after the death and the stoning of Stephen, desensitized towards Christ by a sort of hardness; he requested letters to the high priests (*Acts* 9,2) to gather christians from all over ... Saul hard as crystal persecuted Stephen to death'.[29] Similar to this is *Sermo* 229 I,4: 'Seven deacons were appointed, among whom Stephen, full of the Holy Spirit, took pride of place. When they were appointed, the spirit of the holy Stephen did not back away from the preaching of the truth: he was blazing, sparks were flying, he inflamed others, until the Jews, filled with fanatical anger, threw from the

[25] *Cum ad lapides cucurrissent, duri ad duros, iactabant in illum pares suos; petris lapidabatur qui pro Petra moriebatur ... petra autem erat Christus.*

[26] *Lapides ... mittunt lapides, dura duri. Qui in lapide legem acceperunt, lapides mittunt.*

[27] *Quam legem ...? Quam illi in tabulis lapideis acceperunt. Merito lapidei facti amicum Christi lapidaverunt.*

[28] *Inter lapides patiebatur duros, mittentes quid nisi quod erant? Ut sciatis quia duros patiebatur, hoc illis dixit: Dura cervice ...*

[29] *Inter lapidatores sancti Stephani martyris, ibi erat iste durus, et forte ceteris durior: omnium enim lapidantium vestimenta servabat, ut omnium manibus lapidaret.* (26) *... Ecce venit illud crystallum Saulus post caedem et lapidationem Stephani, duritia quadam stupidus in Christum, petiit litteras a sacerdotibus, ut undique exhibeat christianos... Saulus durus ut crystallum Stephanum est persecutus ad mortem.*

hardness of their heart hard stones on him, and provided us, in that way, with a martyr, the precursor of all martyrs'.[30] Augustine also speaks about the hard stones thrown by hard people in *Enarrat. in Ps 132*,8 and *Sermo* 319,2,2.

A peculiarity in Augustine's description of the persecutors, who reacted to Stephen's words by plugging their ears and by attacking him (*Acts* 7,57), is that he quotes a Psalm text about a viper depriving itself of hearing and that he then connects this to a chapter from the *Physiologus*, a popular work on natural phenomena (with a special emphasis on animal behaviour) interpreted from a Christian point of view.[31] The Psalm verse reads: the wicked have poison as from a snake 'as from a deaf viper, that plugs its ears' (*sicut aspidis surdae et obturantis aures suas Ps* 57[58],5). This verse is also referred to in *Sermo* 315,3,5, since there is mentioned that the persecutors 'plugged their ears' (*aures obturaverunt*). In *Sermo* 316,2,2, the behaviour of the viper is elaborated on in great detail, and in exact accord with the text of the *Physiologus*: 'You recognize them (the persecutors) in the Psalm: "as from a deaf viper, that plugs its ears to avoid hearing the voice of the enchanter". About vipers it is said' (here the text of *Physiologus* begins) 'that, when the enchanter approaches them with his entreaties, and they refuse to appear from their holes, they press one ear to the ground and plug their other ear with their tail; even so the enchanter succeeds in getting them out .... In the same way the persecutors did not come outside yet, they plugged their ears. Yet' (it was going to happen anyway) 'let them come outside now, let them show who they are: let them run to the stones. They ran to them, they stoned him'.[32] Augustine has taken even more from the *Physiologus*. For another example, note that once

[30] *Ordinati sunt septem diaconi, inter quos eminebat plenus Spiritu sancto Stephanus. Illis ordinatis sancti Stephani spiritus a praedicatione veritatis se non continebat: fervebat, scintillabat, accendebat, quousque Iudaei impleti zelo pro duritia cordis sui iniecerunt super eum duram lapidationem, et nobis fecerunt martyrem omnium martyrum metatorem.*

[31] This is a very early work on 'christian physics'. It may have been written as far back as the second century. It is certain that it was originally written in Greek. What was to become a very popular Latin translation was made sometime in the fourth century. In my view, the text about the viper is a welcome addition to our knowledge of the *Physiologus* as used by Augustine.

[32] *Agnoscis illos in psalmo "Sicut aspidis", inquit, "surdae et obturantis aures suas, ne audiat vocem incantantis ..." Sicut enim dicuntur aspides, quando incantantur, ut non prorumpant et exeant de cavernis suis, premere unam aurem ad terram et de cauda sibi alteram obturare, et tamen incantator producit illas ..., sic et isti ... nondum prorumpebant: obturaverunt aures suas. Iam prorumpant, appareant qui sint: ad lapides currant. Cucurrerunt, lapidaverunt.*

when he commented on the text of Jeremias 17,11, he used the description of the angry partridge to symbolize the devil.[33]

Two more remarks on Augustine's representation of the martyr Stephen will be helpful. Once he uses the fact that in Greek the name Stephen means 'crown'. Thus he says in *Sermo* 204,3: 'not all Jews are rejected: remember the crowd that greeted Jesus on Palm Sunday; remember the first disciples and apostles, remember 'Stephen, who in Greek was called "crown", and who was the first to achieve the crown of martyrdom after the resurrection of the Lord'.[34] This is formulated in an even more graphic way in *Sermo* 314,2: Stephen 'finally obtained what he was called; in glorification of his name he was led to the crown'.[35] In *Sermo* 229 C,1 the Latin-speaking listeners also have the meaning of the name Stephen explained to them.

In *Sermo* 49,10,11, the idea that the martyr is a type of warrior leads Augustine, during a lyrical speech addressed directly to Stephen, to use the honorary title, also used by Ambrose, *athleta*: 'come, athlete of Christ, look at Him who for your sake has hung on the Cross (ligno)'.[36]

§ 2. *"Pray for those who persecute you"*

Augustine constantly emphasizes that the martyr Stephen imitates Christ by praying for his persecutors. The reason for his doing this, at least according to *Enarr. in Ps 69*,3, was the great commandment given in the sermon on the Mount: 'Love your enemies ... and pray for those who persecute you (*Mt* 5,44)'. In *De sermone domini in monte* 1,21,69, Stephen is also referred to when these are considered. Regarding the difficult obligation to forgive one's enemies, Augustine repeatedly mentions the example of Jesus and Jesus' imitation by Stephen. For example, notice *Enarr. in Ps 108*,4: 'Hanging from the cross (the Lord) said: "Father, forgive them, for they know

[33] See A.A.R. Bastiaensen, La *perdrix* animal méchant figure du diable: Augustin héritier d'une tradition exégétique, *Collectanea Augustiniana. Mélanges T.J. van Bavel,* published by Bruning – Lamberigts – Van Houtem, 2 pts., Leuven 1990, 1,193-217; which offers more detailed information on the history of the text from the *Physiologus*. The text on the viper is *Physiologus* 59, in German translation by Ursula Treu, *Der Physiologus. Naturkunde in frühchristlicher Deutung,* [2]Hanau 1987, 106-107.

[34] *Stephanus in graeca lingua coronae nomine appellatus, et prior post resurrectionem Domini martyrio coronatus.*

[35] *In fine quod vocabatur adeptus est; sui nominis gloria Stephanus perductus est ad coronam.*

[36] *Eia athleta Christi, inspice illum qui pro te pependit in ligno.*

not what they are doing". The holy Stephen followed his example ... and prayed for his murderers with the words: "Lord, do not hold them accountable for this sin"'.[37] A similar point of view is to be found in *Enarr. in Ps 132*,8. In *Sermo* 90,9, Stephen's prayer 'Lord, do not hold them accountable for this sin' is claimed to be the equivalent of 'let me die physically, do not let them die spiritually'.[38] Typical is also the reflection of *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 6,3 on the raven and the dove that Noah sent out from the ark to explore the drying earth. The dove is Stephen, the raven are his persecutors. Stephen forgave just like the Lord: 'Stephen, filled with the Holy Spirit, was honest, because he wronged no one; he was devout, because he tried to persuade to the impious. He also spoke out against the Jews: "Hard-headed and uncircumcised in heart and ears, you have always resisted the Holy Spirit". It was a violent attack, but the dove continues on without gall, without bitterness. What followed, shows clearly that the dove preached without bitterness. When they heard those words, the raven(s) ran immediately to the stones and stoned Stephen. Shortly before, he had attacked them with fiery conviction, as if they were his enemies, and he came down on them with these blazing words ... "Hardheaded and uncircumcised in heart and ears". If you had heard those words, you might have thought that Stephen, if it were up to him, had wished that they would be consumed (by the fire). Then, when the stones came flying from their hands, kneeling down he said: "Lord, do not hold them accountable for this sin" ... As had been demonstrated by the Master before him ... Hanging from the cross He had said: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they are doing".[39] With regard to Stephen's harsh reproach addressed to his opponents: 'Hardheaded and uncircumcised

[37] *Pendens in cruce dixit: Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt. Cuius vestigia secutus sanctus Stephanus ... oravit pro lapidantibus, dicens: Domine, ne statuas illis hoc delictum.*

[38] *Ego moriar in carne, non illi in corde.*

[39] *Stephanus plenus spiritu sancto simplex erat quia nemini nocebat, fervens erat quia impios arguebat. Non enim tacuit Iudaeis, cuius sunt verba illa flammantia: 'Dura cervice, et non circumcisi corde et auribus, vos semper restitistis Spiritui sancto'. Magnus impetus, sed columba sine felle saevit. Nam ut noveritis quia sine felle saeviebat, illi auditis his verbis qui corvi erant, ad lapides statim adversus columbam cucurrerunt, coepit Stephanus lapidari; et qui paulo ante fremens et fervens spiritu, tamquam in inimicos impetum fecerat, et tamquam violentus invectus erat in verbis igneis atque ... flammantibus ...: 'Dura cervice, et non circumcisi corde et auribus': ut qui ea verba audiret, putaret Stephanum, si ei liceret, statim illos velle consumi, venientibus in se lapidibus ex manibus eorum, genu fixo ait: 'Domine, ne statuas illis hoc delictum' .... Prior ... illud fecerat Magister,... qui pendens in cruce ait: 'Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt'.*

...' Augustinue sums up Stephen's motivation in an eloquent and short formula that we can find in *Sermo* 317,4,5: 'his voice cries out loudly, because it loves''.[40]

The *conservus*-theme, which recurs frequently in later sermons, is especially noteworthy. Its context is rather pastoral: Augustine points out to his audience that it is difficult to forgive enemies, but not impossible. He exhorts them to look at Stephen: they are servants of the Lord, just like he is. Together with him we are all servants, *conservi*, of the Lord. If it is possible for one *conservus*, Stephen, to forgive his enemies in imitation of the example of Jesus, the same should be possible for and might even be required of us, his *conservi*. In *Sermo* 49,9,10, Augustine lets an imaginary Christian utter: to forgive one's enemies, yes, Christ is capable of that, but this cannot be expected of me, an ordinary human being. He answers: 'Just look at Stephen, your *conservus*; ... he was human (too); ... he was speaking to the Jews, he was furious with them and he loved them'.[41] In *Sermo* 56,12,16 Augustine lets the resisting Christian speak again: 'yes, Christ could forgive, He was Christ, the only-begotten Son, but I, poor human being cannot ...:'Remember your *conservus*. Stephen was stoned ... and he prayed for his enemies'.[42] The same in *Sermo* 149,15,16: 'If we find it too difficult to follow the Lord, who forgives his enemies, let us follow our *conservus*'.[43] In *Sermo* 284,6, at the occasion of the commemoration of the martyrs Marianus and Jacob, we find the following answer to the complaint that it is too difficult to imitate the Lord: 'Follow, as gift of the Lord, your *conservus*, follow Stephen, follow Marianus and Jacob. These were human beings, these were your *conservi*, born just like you, but crowned, by Him who was born differently'.[44] The *conservus*-theme is set in sharpest relief in two sermons specifically dedicated to Stephen. In *Sermo* 315,6,8, the answer to the appeal to human weakness is: 'Are you not aware of the fact that Stephen is your *conservus*? ... Nobody must say in his heart: who does such a thing? Look, Stephen did it. Out of his own

[40] *Lingua clamat, quod amat.* According to the version noted by Wilmart (*Revue Bénédictine* 44[1932], 203, n. 2), to be preferred over that of *P.L.*: *Lingua clamat, cor amat.*

[41] *Attende Stephanum conservum tuum; ... homo erat; ... loquebatur Iudaeis, saeviebat et diligebat.*

[42] *Cogitetur a te conservus tuus. Stephanus lapidabatur, et ... pro inimicis orabat.*

[43] *Si ergo multum est ad nos imitari Dominum, imitemur conservum.*

[44] *Ex gratia Domini imitare conservum, imitare Stephanum, imitare Marianum et Iacobum. Homines erant, conservi erant, sicut tu nati, sed ab illo qui non sic natus est, coronati.*

accord? By himself? If he did it through the gift of God, has he entered first and then closed the door in your face? Has he first crossed the bridge and then destroyed it? Is it too heavy for you? Then you too must pray. The fountain flows, the fountain has not dried up'.[45] The appeal and its rebuttal sound almost enchanting in *Sermo* 317,2,3: 'He was able to do this, as Son of God ... for His body was hanging on the cross, but within [it] God was present. Who is able to do such a thing? Has God deceived us (when He ordered us to love our enemies)? That is out of the question; He has not deceived us. If you are finding it too difficult to follow your Lord, then look at Stephen, your *conservus*. Christ the Lord is the only-begotten Son of the Father: does this apply to Stephen too? .... He has been born just like you, he is born from a body just like you, he is reborn due to Him through whom you are also reborn, he is redeemed for the same price as you, he is equally expensive. One deed of sale was drawn up for all of us. The gospel is the deed of sale which states that all of us have been bought: you are in it, he is in it. It is a deed of sale, because we are slaves; it is a testament, because we are children. Look at him, look at your *conservus*'.[46]

§ 3. *Stephen and Paul*

Stephen and Saul/Paul are a favorite pair in Augustine' reflections: they recur frequently throughout his oeuvre. The two of them were tied together in Acts 7:59 and speaking or writing about one of them often led him to speaking or writing about the other.[47] Even prior to 400 Augustine, in *Epistolae ad Romanos inchoata expositio* 15, in commenting on the text about a word spoken against the Holy Spirit that cannot be forgiven (*Mt* 12,32), notes that Stephen, himself

[45] *Nescis quia Stephanus est conservus tuus?... Nemo dicat in corde suo: Quis illud facit? Ecce Stephanus fecit: de se, de suo fecit? Si autem de dono Dei fecit, numquid intravit et contra te clausit? Numquid pontem transivit et praecidit? Multum est ad te? Pete et tu. Fons manat, non siccavit.*

[46] *Ipse hoc potuit, tamquam Filius Dei ... Caro enim pendebat, sed Deus intus latebat. Nos autem quid sumus, qui ista faciamus? Fefellit qui iussit? Absit: non fefellit. Si multum ad te putas imitari Dominum tuum, attende Stephanum conservum tuum. Dominus Christus, unicus Dei Filius: numquid hoc Stephanus? ... Sic natus est ut tu; inde natus est, unde et tu; ab eo renatus est a quo et tu, eo pretio redemptus quo et tu; tanti valet quanti vales. Unum instrumentum nobis factum est. Evangelium instrumentum est, ubi omnes empti sumus: ubi tu, ibi ille. Quia servi sumus, instrumentum est; quia filii sumus, testamentum est. Ipsum attende, conservum attende.* With regard to Stephen's kneeling pose during the prayer for forgiveness for his enemies and persecutors, see §1 entitled '*The Martyr Stephen*' *supra*.

[47] In §1 *supra* we quoted from *Enarr. in Ps 147*,25-26 regarding both of them.

full of the Holy Spirit (*Ac* 6,5 and 7,55), reproached the Jews for having sinned against that same Spirit: *Vos semper spiritui sancto restitistis* (*Ac* 7,51). Saul was also among those Jews who were opposing the Holy Spirit and were stoning Stephen, 'with his own hands he held onto the coats of the ones throwing stones: this was a deed which he later, having been totally filled with that Holy Spirit, ... reproaches himself for'.[48] The example of Christ and Stephen, who both prayed for their persecutors, is quoted in the equally early *De sermone domini in monte* 1,22,73, in connection to the command to 'pray for those who persecute you' (*Mt* 5,44). In 1,22,77, the former persecutor Paul is speaking: 'as Paul himself said, he chastened his body (*1 Cor* 9,26) and 'that rejected and negated ... his behaviour during the persecution of Stephen and the other christians'.[49] Both men are also mentioned in *De consensu evangelistarum* 1,10,16. Paul, who, after the stoning of the deacon-martyr Stephen, was still called Saul, persecuted the christians (*Acts* 8,3).

Epistula ad catholicos de secta donatistarum 11,30 is directed against the Donatists and in connection with the Catholic belief in the expansion of the church throughout the entire world: that expansion began with the *passio Stephani diaconi*, when Saul as persecutor caused a first dispersion of the believers outside of Jerusalem (cf. Acts 8:1-3). Augustine's commentary the First Epistle of John, the *In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus*, dates back to the beginning of the fifth century. In 5,4, Jesus' forgiveness for his executioners is seen as the lesson, which his disciples including both Stephen and Paul, put into practice: 'Stephen was being stoned, and, kneeling down, he said: "Lord, do not hold them accountable for this sin" ... Also pay attention to what Paul says: "I too would like to sacrifice myself for you (*2 Cor* 12,15)". He was among those whom Stephen was praying for, when he was killed by their hands'.[50] In the opening lines of *Sermo* 278, 1,1, Paul, while still Saul, is said to be full of rage. In that rage he 'dragged the Christians to their deaths; ... he was the executor of the Jews' rage, both in the stoning of the holy martyr Stephen and in the exhibition (exhibendis) and punishment of

[48] *... in manibus omnium quorum vestimenta servabat; quod ipse sibi postea ... increpat, eo ipso Spiritu iam plenissimus.*

[49] *Hoc in se prosternebat et debilitabat ... unde Stephanum ceterosque christianos fuerat persecutus.*

[50] *Lapidabatur Stephanus, et genu fixo ait: Domine, ne statuas illis hoc delictum... Audi et apostolum Paulum: et ipse, inquit, impendar pro animabus vestris. Inter illos enim erat pro quibus Stephanus deprecabatur, quando eorum manibus moriebatur.*

the others'.[51] A passage from another sermon (*Sermo* 279,1,1) mentions that Saul 'was obviously present ... when the first martyr Stephen was being stoned. ... He held on to the coats, in order to assist the hands of those throwing stones: this way he could rage on even more fiercely ... than if he had been throwing stones himself'.[52] In *Sermo* 116,6,6–7,7, with regard to the expansion of the young church we read: 'Let the Jews rage, let them work, let Stephen be stoned, let Saul hold on to the coats of those throwing stones ...; let Stephen be killed, let the church of Jerusalem be shaken up (*Acts* 8,1), let burning pieces of wood depart (discedant), let them set off and spread fire. For somehow or other the wood of the Holy Spirit was burning in the church of Jerusalem, since they believed they were of one heart and of one soul for God (*Acts* 2,44-45; 4,32). After Stephen's stoning that woodpile had to endure a persecution: the wood got scattered and the world caught fire. ... The raging Saul ... received letters from the high priests (*Acts* 9,2) and set off as a mad man. ... But where is God, where is Christ, where is the one who will crown Stephen? Where but in heaven?'[53] With regard to Saul's holding of the coats of the stoners, *Sermo* 175,6,7 says: 'Saul was a terrible sinner...; is he not the one whose one hand was not enough for the stoning of Stephen and who held on to the coats of the others?'[54] There are also two corresponding passages from *Sermo* 299,6 and *Sermo Dolbeau 4*,6. In the first of these, Saul/Paul is addressed: 'Yet you were the one who ... dragged the christians to their death, and, who, when Stephen was being stoned, held onto the coats of all in order to stone him with the hands of all?'[55] In the second passage,

[51] *... pertrahebat christianos ad necem; ... minister furoris Iudaeorum, sive in lapidatione sancti martyris Stephani sive in ceteris exhibendis et adducendis ad poenam.*

[52] *Quando lapidatus est Stephanus primus martyr ..., evidentius aderat et Saulus.... Ut enim esset in omnium lapidantium manibus, ipse omnium vestimenta servabat, magis saeviens ... quam suis manibus lapidando.*

[53] *Insaniant Iudaei, impleantur zelo, lapidetur Stephanus, servet lapidantium vestimenta Saulus .... Occidatur Stephanus, perturbetur ecclesia Jerosolymitana: discedant inde ligna ardentia, accedant et incendant. Ligna enim quodam modo in ecclesia Jerosolymitana ardebant Spiritu sancto, quando erat in illis in Deum anima una et cor unum. Lapidato Stephano passa est illa congeries persecutionem: sparsa sunt ligna et accensus est mundus* (7,7) *... Furens Saulus ... accepit epistulas a principibus sacerdotum, et coepit ire saeviens ... Sed ubi deus, ubi Christus, ubi Stephani coronator? Ubi, nisi in caelo?*

[54] *... in iniquitate primus; ... nonne ille est cui ad lapidandum Stephanum manus una non sufficiebat, et aliorum vestimenta servabat?*

[55] *Tu eras ille ... qui christianos trahebas ad mortem, qui, cum lapidaretur Stephanus, ut in omnium manibus lapidares, omnium vestimenta servabas?*

Saul/Paul is not addressed, but he is talked about: 'Is that not Saul who was present 'when Stephen was stoned, and who held on to the coats of those throwing stones in order to stone him with the hands of all?'[56]

In a sermon given on the occasion of the feast celebration of Peter and Paul, we find a different, but still very "Augustinian" train of thought (*Sermo* 298,1,1): 'Peter is the one who appointed him (Stephen) as deacon, Paul was his persecutor .... We have said that Paul was Stephen's persecutor. Peter must be regarded as the denier of the Lord. Peter has washed away his disavowal of the Lord with his tears, Paul has paid for his persecution of Stephen with blindness'.[57]

§ 4. *Stephen's oration*

Augustine was not just inspired by Stephen's death as a martyr. He was also interested in the oration Stephen addressed to the members of the Sanhedrin (*Ac* 7,2-53). Augustine was very familiar with this oration. More than once he cited from it without mentioning Stephen – for example in *Enarr. in Ps 46*,6, and *Sermo* 6,2,2, where *Ac* 7,30 and 7,39 are quoted, respectively. Most of the time, however, his name is added. He considers Stephen to be an authority on the history of the Jewish people. In one of the sermons on Stephen, *Sermo* 315,2,3, Augustine presents Stephen as the teacher of his Jewish audience: 'He explained ... the law of God to them from the beginning'.[58] In *Sermo* 217,4, he recalls an utterance from Stephen from the same oration: 'Listen to the words of the holy Stephen (*Ac* 7,47–48) ... "Solomon built Him a house, but the most High does not dwell in temples made with hands"'.[59] In *Quaestiones in Exodum* 2, Augustine completes the text *Exodus* 2,12 with an illustration taken from the story about Stephen (*Acts* 7,25). In *Quaestiones in Genesim* 25,3, he tries to reconcile the apparent

[56] .... *cum lapidaretur Stephanus, qui lapidantibus vestimenta servavit, ut in omnium manibus lapidaret?* The same presentation also in *Sermo* 317,4,5 [in addition to Wilmart (see footnote 39), 205]: 'Saul who stoned with the hands of all, who held on to the coats of those throwing stones' *Saulus, qui omnium manibus lapidabat, qui lapidantium vestimenta servabat.*

[57] *Petrus illius ordinator, Paulus illius persecutor ... Paulum diximus Stephani fuisse persecutorem, Petrum respiciamus Domini negatorem. Petrus negationem Domini lacrimis lavit; Paulus persecutionem Stephani caecitate expiavit.*

[58] *Hic ... exposuit illis ab initio legem Dei.*

[59] *Audite sanctum Stephanum ... 'Salomon aedificavit ei domum', sed Summus non in manufactis templis habitat.*

contradiction between the text of *Genesis* 12,1 and the words of Stephen recorded in *Acts* 7,4. In *Quaestiones in Genesim* 56, he makes a similar attempt with *Genesis* 21,32-33 and *Acts* 7,5. *Genesis* 12,1 and Stephen (*Ac* 7,4) are again under discussion in *De civitate dei* 16,15,2. In *ibid.* 16,32,3 the statements of *Genesis* 11,31-32 and of Stephen (*Acts* 7,4) are harmonized.

Stephen's oration also supplies Augustine with material for theological discussion. In his work against the Pelagian Julian of Aeclanum (*Contra Iulianum* 6,24,76), Stephen's claim that it was Moses who 'fled on that word [to Midian]' (*Acts* 7, 29) is used as starting point for a reflection on the meaning of God's word. In the dispute with the Arian bishop Maximinus, the divine nature of the Holy Spirit and its indwelling in the believer is brought up for discussion, and Augustine's response includes Stephen's statement (*Acts* 7,47-48) regarding God's 'dwelling place' (*Contra Maximinum* 2,21,1).

Stephen's words against the Jews frequently lead Augustine to contemplations of the problem of the *visio Dei*: viz. is God visible to man? In the early text of *Contra Adimantum* 1,9, he writes in order to oppose the Manichean rejection of the Old Testament. At issue here is the figure of Moses. Stephen says (*Acts* 7,30-38) that God appeared to Moses in the burning bush and on Mount Sinai. According to Augustine, Stephen uses the expression 'angel of God' to indicate God himself. 'He speaks by means of an angel, as an angel who proclaims the truth; it is correctly said that "God has spoken" and that "the angel has spoken"'.[60]

Augustine deals comprehensively with this problem in *De trinitate* 3,10,24. Here he again emphasizes, with reference to Stephen, that the expression 'the angel of God' can indicate God the Lord himself. He writes: 'Stephen recounts all of this in the Acts of the Apostles (*Acts* 7,30-38), in the same way as it was told in the old books. ... The God of glory appeared to our father Abraham in Mesopotamia ... following these words he says that an angel appeared to Moses ... and that the angel of the Lord appeared to him in the Sinai desert in the burning bush. When he was drawing closer in order to inspect [it], the voice of the Lord said: "I am the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." ... Here he identifies the angel with the Lord as well as with the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of

[60] *Sic et in angelo ipse loquitur, quando veritatem angelus adnuntiat, et recte dicitur 'deus dixit'... et item recte dicitur 'angelus dixit'.*

Jacob'.[61] The judgement of Stephen (*Acts* 7,51-53) are quoted in *De trinitate* 3,10,26. Augustine comments: "You have received the Law in the utterances of the angels, and you have not kept it!": 'The Law was given to that people by utterances of the angels, but in that Law the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ was being prepared (disponebatur) and announced, and He Himself, as Word of God, was present, in a miraculous, indescribable way in the angels through whose utterances the Law was given'.[62] A passage from *Sermo* 7,6 exhibits a similar thought: 'Our fathers recognized the Lord in angels; ... they gave glory not to the shapes that were carrying, but to the One inhabiting ... Stephen says (*Acts* 7, 53): '"You have received the Law by the disposition of angels, and you have not kept it!": If he had said "from an angel", not "from angels", then some people might have said: "it is Christ", then he is called "the angel of God's decision", He is the Christ because he is called "the angel of the Great Counsellor". An "angel" is thus Christ, are then "angels" not Christ? The apostle Paul said that the seed of Abraham has been, a deposit done through angels by the hand of the Mediator'.[63] In his letter to Consentius on religious knowledge (*Epist.* 120,2,9), Augustine argues with reference to Jesus' appearance to Stephen ('I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing at the right hand of God'[*Acts* 7,56]), that the corporality of the risen Lord was visible to mortal eyes: 'just as the Lord showed himself after his resurrection to his disciples, and after his Ascension to the apostle Paul and to the deacon Stephen'.[64] *Epist.*147 (*De videndo deo*), 6,18 is also worth quoting here: 'God appeared ... to Abraham

[61] *Nam et Stephanus in actibus apostolorum eo more narrat haec quo etiam in veteribus libris conscripta sunt ... Deus gloriae apparuit Abrahae patri nostro cum esset in Mesopotamia ... In consequentibus dicit quod Moysi angelus apparuit.... Apparuit illi in deserto montis Sinai angelus Domini in flamma ignis in rubo. Qui cum accederet considerare, facta est vox Domini: Ego Deus patrum tuorum, Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac et Deus Iacob... Hic certe et angelum et Dominum dicit eundemque Deum Abraham et Deum Isaac et Deum Iacob.*

[62] *In edictis quidem angelorum illi populo lex data est, sed Domini Iesu Christi per eam disponebatur et praenuntiabatur adventus, et ipse tamquam Verbum Dei miro et ineffabili modo erat in angelis in quorum edictis lex dabatur.*

[63] *Patres nostri Dominum in angelis agnoscebant ... non portantibus, sed insidenti gloriam dabant... In Actibus apostolorum Stephanus dicit: ... qui accepistis legem in edictis angelorum, et non custodistis. Si diceret 'angeli' et non 'angelorum', non deerant illi qui dicerent: Christus est, quia dictus est magni consilii angelus. Angelus Christus, numquid angeli Christus? Dicit et apostolus Paulus, quoniam semen Abrahae dispensatum est; dispositum, inquit, per angelos in manu Mediatoris.*

[64] *... sicut se discipulis post resurrectionem Dominus ostendit, sicut etiam post ascensionem apostolo Paulo et diacono Stephano.*

because He willed it; He didn't appear to others because He did not will it. He was also seen by Stephen when he was being stoned by the people, the heavens being opened; Jesus was also seen standing at the right hand of God, but he was not seen by the people'.[65]

Augustine's attention was often drawn to the closing of Stephen's oration when he fiercely rebuked the Jewish leaders: '[You are] hard-headed and uncircumcised in your heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit, just as your fathers did before you. Which of the prophets have your fathers not persecuted? They have slain those who announced the coming of the Just One whom you have now betrayed and murdered. You have received the Law put into effect by the angels, but you have not kept it! (*Acts* 7,51-53).' Stephen's words are over-simplified in so far as past events are presented as relating to the entire Jewish people. Augustine follows this line of interpretation and just like in the text of *Epist.* 147 cited above, Stephen and 'the people' came face to face with one another. Augustine took 'the people' to mean the Jewish people, as if the whole race was involved against Stephen, and not just a group following their leaders. In *Sermo* 319,4,4, Augustine alludes to Stephen's prayer for his executioners: he prayed for them kneeling down:'so great was Stephen's humility; but great is the guilt of that people'.[66] The short expression *Iudaei* 'the Jews' is usually what is used; but there can be no doubt that the whole Jewish people is meant. In *Contra Gaudentium* 1,23,26, we find the identification of Stephen's persecutors and 'the Jews'. The identification is made via a reference to John 16,2: 'The hour will come that they who kill you will think that they are offering service to God'. Augustine writes: 'What the Lord had predicted to his friends ... has been fulfilled by the Jews, who have killed the holy Stephen and many others, thinking that they were offering service to God'.[67] In *Sermo* 315,6,9, the brief answer to the question of what an angry person can contribute is: 'what the Jews [gave] to Stephen: punishment for themselves, the crown for him'.[68] In a earlier passage of the same sermon (5,7) the Jews are called 'great criminals'.[69] The text of *Epist.* 184A,2,4 labels them as 'unbelievers', for

[65] *Apparuit ... deus Abrahae quia voluit; aliis, quia noluit, non apparuit. Visum est etiam Stephano, cum lapidaretur a populo, aperiri caelum; visus est etiam Iesus stans ad dexteram dei et non est visus a populo.*

[66] *Tanta humilitas Stephani; magnus reatus est illius populi.*

[67] *Quod Dominus praedixit suis, per Iudaeos impletum est, qui sanctum Stephanum et multos alios occiderunt, dum putabant se officium Deo facere.*

[68] *... quod Iudaei Stephano: sibi poenam, illi coronam.*

[69] *... tam scelerati.*

whom the Lord, when He was being mocked by them hanging from the cross, and the blessed Stephan, when he was being stoned, prayed'.[70] In *Sermo* 47,3,3, amidst a discussion of whether good can spring from evil, we hear something similar: '[this is] what the Jews did to Stephen: by doing evil they sent him to the good [One]'.[71] In *Sermo* 252,4,4, Augustine complains about the amount of chaff among the Christian wheat in his own day and he links this, without immediate cause, to the faulty behaviour for which Stephen reproached the Jews (*Acts* 7,51).[72] In *Sermo* 49,10,11 – cf. *supra* – the guilt of the Jews is painted in the blackest of terms. Of Stephen Augustine notes that he also 'prayed for the Jews, the murderers of Christ, the murderers of the saints, his own murderers: he was aware of the fact that their godlessness was beyond measure even gigantic while also being difficult to forgive'.[73] In §1 *supra*, the harshness of Stephen's murderers was made clear by quoting an excerpt from *Sermo* 229 I,4, where these murderers are called simply 'Jews': '... until the Jews, filled with fanatical anger/zeal, threw hard stones on him from the hardness of their heart'.[74] In *Sermo* 278,1,1 Saul is called 'the agent (minister) of the rage of the Jews'.[75]

Augustine does not in the least temper the sharpness of Stephen's words. He is however aware of the fact that Stephen himself was a Jew. Stephen belonged to the congregation of Jerusalem, the source of and model for all subsequent Christian churches. Augustine staunchly defended the unique character of this first church and its exceptional sense of community when he wrote against the Donatists, who, due to their focus on African Christianity, could not see anything especially praiseworthy about the city or the church of Jerusalem.[76] In *Sermo* 204,3 he wrote: 'not all Jews have been rejected: remember the crowd which greeted Jesus on Palm Sunday; 'remember the disciples, chosen from that crowd, becoming apostles,

[70] *... pro infidelibus ... pro qualibus et Dominus, cum pendens inrideretur, et beatus Stephanus, cum lapidaretur, oravit.*

[71] *Quod Stephano Iudaei fecerunt: faciendo malum miserunt ad bonum.*

[72] *Unde Iudaeos quoque Stephanus accusabat.*

[73] *... ut oraret pro Iudaeis, pro interfectoribus Christi, pro interfectoribus sanctorum, pro lapidatoribus suis; attendit nimiam et magnam esse impietatem ipsorum, quae difficile donari posset.*

[74] *... quousque Iudaei impleti zelo pro duritia cordis sui iniecerunt super eum duram lapidationem.*

[75] *... minister furoris Iudaeorum.*

[76] See my study *Urbs beata Jerusalem:* Saint Augustin sur Jérusalem, in *The Apostolic Age in Patristic Thought*, ed. Hilhorst, Leiden 2003, 227-240, esp. pp. 230-231.

remember 'Stephen ... being the first to receive the crown of martyrdom after the resurrection of the Lord'.[77]

§ 5. *Corollarium on the chronology of the sermons on Stephen*

A few words on the dating of the specific sermons on Stephen (*Sermo* 314–324) will be helpful at this point. Sermons 316–324 were certainly delivered after 415. This was the year Stephen's relics were discovered in Jerusalem. Some of these relics soon found their way to Africa – in *Epist.* 212,1 Augustine reports 'that the widow Galla and her daughter, the virgin Simpliciola, have brought with them relics of the most blessed and most glorious martyr Stephen'[78] – just like in *Sermo* 316, Augustine presupposes their presence in Hippo [79]. This is not the case in *Sermo* 315: the relics are not mentioned. The starting point of that sermon *Acts* 6,1-6, the passage which discusses the choosing of the seven deacons. As a matter of fact, this is a real 'Stephen' sermon, the richest of the whole series. Stephen had always been of great interest to Augustine, but here we find an especially strong concentration of his ideas and favorite themes – e.g. "appointed by the apostles, but preceding them as martyr"; "praying standing for himself, and praying kneeling down for his persecutors"; "Stephen our *conservus*" – all of which point to a later period in Augustine's preaching career and which are repeatedly employed in his later sermons on Stephen. The theme of the deaf viper also appears in sermons 315 and 316, suggesting chronological proximity. Although the relics are not mentioned in *Sermo* 315, it is not necessary to consider it as having been preached before 415. There would probably not have been a large chronological gap within this series of sermons on Stephen.

Sermo 314 is probably not significantly earlier than *Sermones 316-324*. Striking, however, is the mention of the date of Stephen's feast day on the 26th of December. Augustine begins with a reminder of the feast of Christmas that had been celebrated the day before: 'Yesterday we celebrated the feast of the birth of the Lord; today we celebrate the feast of his servant; at the feast of the birth of the Lord we celebrated the mercy of his birth, at the feast of his servant we

[77] *Cogitentur qui discipuli inde electi et apostoli facti sunt; cogitetur Stephanus ... prior post resurrectionem Domini martyrio coronatus.*

[78] *Galla vidua et eius filia Simpliciola virgo portant secum reliquias beatissimi et gloriosissimi martyris Stephani.*

[79] See footnote 19.

celebrate that he was crowned'.[80] *Sermo* 317,4,5 also contains a reminder of the feast of Christmas: 'We have celebrated the feast of the birth of the Lord; let us also celebrate that of his servant'.[81] It is likely that *Sermo* 314 and *Sermo* 317 are closely linked chronologically. It seems necessary to assign all these sermons on Stephen to the same period, i.e., the years after 415. It seems quite possible that the feast of Stephen was introduced in Hippo only after the discovery of the relics in 415 and the arrival of some of these relics in Africa.

Conclusions

1) The comparison of Augustine's sermons on Stephen to those of his predecessors, including Ambrose, reveals several innovations. Augustine uses Stephen's story in his own unique way, although there are some points of contact with earlier writers and preachers. For example, many have claimed that: "martyrdom is a battle" or "the martyr is an *athleta*", just as many have wrestled with "how to reconcile the standing of the Son of Man seen by Stephen with the sitting of Christ at the right hand of the Father". In the end though these similarities are largely superficial. Augustine's interpretation of the coin-episode (*Mt* 17,24-27) as found in *Enarr. in Ps 137*,16 (namely that the fish is Christ and his mouth contains two coins which together are worth four drachmas which symbolize the four gospels), is completely different from those of either Hilary or Ambrose.[82] It is obvious that these reflections are for the most part Augustine's own.

2) Augustine's interest in Stephen is prominent even in his early works. It is closely linked with his even deeper interest in the story of Paul's conversion from persecutor to apostle. In Augustine's mind, Saul was Stephen's chief executioner precisely because he held the garments of those throwing the stones. For Augustine, this made his conversion on the road to Damascus even more miraculous. Both Paul and Stephen ended their lives as martyrs; in the end, Stephen

[80] *Natalem Domini hesterna die celebravimus; servi hodie natalem celebramus; sed natalem Domini celebravimus quo nasci dignatus est; natalem servi celebramus quo coronatus est.*

[81] *Celebravimus natalem Domini, celebremus et servi* (in addition to Wilmart, 205; see footnote 38).

[82] Recall also of the unfavourable interpretation of this offered by Origen (cf. footnote 11). Apparently no solid exegetical tradition existed for this rather intriguing Matthean passage.

welcomes as a friend the man who contributed so significantly to his death.

3) Clearly, Augustine's portrait of Stephen undergoes development. The presentation of Paul holding the clothes of those throwing stones is rather early. The same goes for Augustine's repeated references to Stephen's oration against the stiff-necked Jewish leaders. The problems associated with the *visio dei* and with Christ's sitting and standing at the right hand of the Father are also posed early on. The *conservus*-theme and the theme of the double posture of prayer – standing praying for himself, and praying kneeling down for his executioners – only occurs in works of the later years, when the adoration of Stephen had grown in importance, probably due to the discovery of his relics. This data might prove helpful for the dating of a number Augustine's sermons: particularly *Sermones* 41, 56, 149 and 284, all of which contain the *conservus*-theme. Verbraken's suggests an early date for all these sermons.[83] It seems most suitable to place them after 415, together with the sermons specifically devoted to Stephen.

4) Augustine's giftedness as a preacher did not only consist of an amazing ability to vary his themes. Also characteristic of his preaching are his imaginative powers, his force of presentation, his skilful word and thought selection. The biblical story of Stephen's stoning encouraged his imaginative powers. The hard stones represent the hardness of the heart's of the throwers.[84] He was mainly interested in Saul, who held the coats of those throwing stones. Augustine also regarded him as a stoner, even as the chief stoner, the one who took charge of all stones. In *Sermo* 116,3,3, he says: 'Just throwing stones with his own hands he considered insufficient: he held on to the coats of those throwing stones'.[85] He expressed the same sentiment in *Sermo* 315,5,7: 'Saul ... held on to the coats of those throwing stones so that he might stone with the hands of all'.[86] The expression in *Sermo* 175,6,7 is also striking: 'one hand did not suffice to throw stones onto Stephen'.[87] The same portrayal of the 'stoning' Saul is to

[83] See the relevant sections of P.-P. Verbraken, Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin, Instrumenta Patristica 12, Steenbrugis – Hagae Comitis, 1976.

[84] See the discussion in §1 *supra*.

[85] *Adhuc manus suas quibus lapidaret parum putabat: lapidantium vestimenta servabat.*

[86] *Saulus vestimenta lapidantium servabat, ut omnium manibus lapidaret.*

[87] *... cui ad lapidandum Stephanum manus una non sufficiebat.*

be found in *Sermo* 168,4,4; 279,1,1; 298,4,4; 299,6; 229 C,1; 317,4,5 and *Dolbeau* 4. These depictions remind us of those we saw in *Sermo* 176,2,2, where, with regard to the necessity of the baptism of children, he paints a powerful image of babies who walk 'on other people's feet' – those of parents, godparents, caretakers – 'with great haste to obtain healing (sanentur)'.[88]

Also striking is the depiction of the (scattering fire of the preaching), lit and kindled by the spark of Stephen's word. In *Sermo* 229 I,4, we are told that 'the spirit of the holy Stephen did not refrain from the preaching of the truth: he was blazing, sparks were flying, he inflamed others'.[89] The next phase of the process (cf. *Acts* 8,1 and recall that after Stephen's death the church of Jerusalem was persecuted and scattered in all directions) is described in *Sermo* 299 B,4: 'After the martyr's passion of the most blessed Stephen, the brothers in Jerusalem were dispersed, and because they were lights, they were on fire with the spirit of God; wherever they came, they started a blaze'.[90] *Sermo* 116,6,6 is even more exhaustive and expressive: 'Let Stephen be killed, let the church of Jerusalem be shaken (*Acts* 8,1), let the burning pieces of wood depart, let them disperse and catch fire. Then, somehow, those pieces of wood of the Holy Spirit burnt in the church of Jerusalem, since they were of one heart and of one soul for God (*Acts* 2,44-45; 4,32). After Stephen's death, that woodpile was allowed to face persecution: the wood was scattered and the world burst into flames'.[91] This same presentation is also found in *Sermo* 229 I,4: 'After Stephen's murder, the church which had been born in Jerusalem, had to endure persecution .... The persecution started and the brothers got scattered, because the burning wood of the woodpile started a fire wherever it went throughout the earth'.[92]

[88] *Alienis pedibus currunt ut sanentur.*

[89] *Sancti Stephani spiritus a praedicatione veritatis se non continebat: fervebat, scintillabat, accendebat.*

[90] *Post passionem beatissimi Stephani dispersi sunt fratres qui erant in Jerosolymis, et quia lumina erant, spiritu Dei ardebant: quocumque venerant accendebant.*

[91] *Occidatur Stephanus, perturbetur ecclesia Jerosolymitana, discedant inde ligna ardentia, accedant et incendant. Ligna enim quodam modo in ecclesia Jerosolymitana ardebant Spiritu sancto, quando erat illis in Deum anima una et cor unum. Lapidato Stephano passa est illa congeries persecutionem: sparsa sunt ligna et accensus est mundus.*

[92] *Occiso itaque Stephano persecutionem passa est ecclesia, quae nata est in Hierosolymis ... Facta est persecutio et dispersi sunt fratres; quia de una congerie ignis ligna ardentia dispersa per terram, quocumque venera<n>t, accendeba<n>t.*

The words of *Sermo* 315,5,8 will form a fitting conclusion: 'Stephen is humbled, Christ is exalted; Stephen is bent down to the ground, Christ is hung high on the wood. He was seated on the chair of the cross, and from there was teaching Stephen the rule of love'.[93] This image is quite typical of Augustine: the bishop-rhetor in his *cathedra* holding up the Lord as the perfect teacher for his flock, and portraying Christ as speaking directly to his disciple Stephen from his throne, the cross.[94]

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[93] *Quod Stephanus humilis, Christus sublimis; quod ille ad terram inclinatus, hoc Christus in ligno suspensus. Sedebat in cathedra crucis, et docebat Stephanum regulam pietatis.*

[94] A final remark. Many passages from Augustine's oeuvre concerning Stephen have been discussed. I noted down several more, but I judge these to be 'neutral' and without being able to add little or nothing to our knowledge. The inquisitive researcher can read *Enarrat. in Ps 103*,1,16 and *108*,19; *In evang. Ioh.* 95,3, 101,4 and 120,4; *Sermo* 61 A,5; 128,2,3 and 266,2,2.

AMBROSE, PAUL AND EXPOSITIO PSALMI CXVIII

A. General introduction

Stimulated by the Arian controversy to explain the Christ's relation to the Father, writers of the fourth century turned quite naturally to Paul whose language about Christ and whose vision of Christ could clarify and solidify the meaning and the truth of the Christ's sonship. That is not a way of saying that Paul was previously neglected, nor is it a suggestion that the process was straightforward. Rather it suggests that, by the time of Ambrose, some passages from Paul's letters had become mainstays of the Christian teaching about Christ. It may also describe something of the process of Ambrose of Milan who, commenting on psalm 118, recognized Paul's emphasis on Jesus Christ[1] as capable of establishing Christ's place in the hearts and minds of his listeners and readers in a dynamic and positive way. No merely polemical document, his commentary sought to foster christian life and doctrine together by showing how Christian action and thought found their culmination in Christ. Thus Ambrose says:

> "The first thing that we must do is to exercise ourselves in the warfare of life and mend our ways. When we have so set ourselves on the right course that the correction of error and the grace of purity are attained, then shall we come – in the proper order and way – to the acquisition of known doctrine. Morals first and then mysteries.... It is the same with the holy Church. At the world's beginning she was betrothed in paradise, then prefigured in the flood, proclaimed in the Law, and called through the prophets. She has long awaited the redemption of man, the grace of the Gospel and the coming of the beloved.... From morals she proceeds to mysteries."[2]

A few citations from Paul combine for a glimpse of Ambrose's use of Paul as a way to point to and stimulate his hearers to appreciate

[1] For example, in Col 1:19: "in him all fullness was pleased to dwell"; Col 2:3: "in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge"; Eph 4:10: "that he might fill all things".

[2] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 2... 5: primum ergo exercenda est uitae militia, corrigendi mores. cum haec instituerimus ad cursum debitum, ut sit offensionis correctio, puritatis gratia, tunc ad studia percipiendae cognitionis ueniamus suo ordine et uia. prima igitur sunt moralia, secunda mystica.... ita ergo et sancta ecclesia, quae in primordiis mundi desponsata in paradiso, praefigurata in diluuio, adnuntiata per legem, uocata per prophetas diu redemptionem hominum, euangelii decorem, dilecti expectasset aduentum... et a moralibus uenit ad mystica.

Christ's role in their lives. Thus, he affirms that the end or fulfillment of the law is Christ[3] and the fulfillment of the law is love,[4] thereby setting the goal for Christian effort. Commenting on the very first verse of the psalm, Ambrose writes about the demand of fidelity in turning eagerly toward Christ:

> "Who is undefiled (immaculatus)? Certainly not one who walks in any way whatever, but rather one who walks in Christ... Whoever walks in this way will not stray' provided however that he never goes back from this way. The Law is the way; and therefore, so long as he is undefiled, he must walk in the law of the Lord... He should not wait, rather he should keep going. Forgetting what lies behind and eager for what is before him [Phil 3:13] he should press on to his destination. He should make speed to his prize and exert himself earnestly to the end, for the end of the law is Christ [Rom 10:4]. There are many who wish to walk in the way, but not to the end. The Jews do not walk to the end, because they do not walk as far as Christ. The Manichean, who argues against the Law, does not walk in the way. But true faith walks there, for it accepts the Law and understands the fullness of the Law [Rom 13:10].[5]

Three further texts complement one another in their description of the dynamic process to which a christian is to be committed: "*I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; in the future there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness*";[6] "*forgetting what lies behind but straining forward to what lies ahead,*"[7] "*I*

[3] Rom 10:4: *finis enim legis est Christus*. Quotations or allusions can be found at *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 8; 2, 36; 5, 23. 24; 8, 16; 12, 45.47. 48; 15, 8; 16, 36; 18, 37; 20, 3.

[4] Rom 13:10: *plenitudo* enim *legis caritas est. Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 8; 5, 20; 16, 44; 18, 37; 20, 56.

[5] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1.8.: Sed quis est inmaculatus? non utique qui in quacumque uia ambulat, sed qui in Christo ambulat. ipse enim dixit: ego sum uia. in hac uia qui ambulat, errare non nouit, si tamen ab hac uia numquam recedat. est et uia lex, et ideo, dum inmaculatus est, in lege domini ambulat; nec ambulare in uia hac desinat, ne inmaculatus esse desistat. non declinet in dexteram aut laeuam, non titubet, non resistat, non expectet, sed ambulet superiora obliuiscens [Phil 3:13] et ea quae sunt priora appetens ad destinatum sequatur. ad brauium festinet, contendat usque ad finem; *finis enim legis est Christus* [Rom 10:4]. multi uolunt ambulare in uia, sed non usque ad finem. non ambulant Iudaei usque ad finem, qui non usque ad Christum ambulant, non ambulat Manicheus in uia, qui legem refutat, sed ambulat uera fides, quae et legem suscipit et plenitudinem legis [Rom 13:10] agnoscit.

[6] 2 Tim 4:7-8: *certamen certaui, cursum consummaui; reposita est mihi corona iustitiae*. One part or another of these verses is found at: *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 3; 4, 27; 5, 26; 6, 30; 7, 3.12; 12, 41; 20, 21.

[7] Phil 3:13: *obliuiscentes superiora et ea quae posteriora sunt adpetentes. Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 8; 2, 1; 4, 26; 5, 28; 15;23.

drive my body and train it.[8] Christian effort is guided by the imitation of Paul – insofar as he imitates Christ (1 Cor 11:1; cf. 1 Cor 4:16), the Word of God: "Daily reading should be our practice so that we might meditate on and imitate what we read."[9] "Day and night we should train, so to speak, in the gymnasium of the heavenly Scriptures… We must not fight like people who do not know what the fight is about or like people beating the air."[10] Christ and the imitation of Christ is Ambrose's primary focus in what might be called the result of a kind of *lectio divina* within that community. Paul's words help him to articulate that message in forceful, energetic terms. Commenting on psalm 118, 131 ("I opened my mouth and panted"), Ambrose shows how Paul leads along the way to Christ. He says:

> You must understand what the 'mouth' is. It means your heart or inner disposition. The soul has a mouth, the soul has members. Open this mouth not only to Christ but also to the disciple of Christ, who offered his mouth to Christ to be filled. He says: "Our mouth is open to you, Corinthians; our heart is wide open." He is advising us to be imitators of him, just as he is of Christ. He who is holier than they opened his mouth to Christ; they who are lower than he opened their mouth to the Apostle.[11]

This paper will explore Ambrose's commentary on psalm 118, seeking to describe who Paul was for Ambrose and to identify the role that Paul (his experience, words, and thoughts) played in that commentary. Since it is a work which was written late in Ambrose's life,[12] it should provide a good example of Ambrose's mature thought: therein might one rightly expect to find Ambrose fully in control of his rhetorical, theological and pastoral skills. Ambrose's

[8] 1 Cor 9:27: *castigat corpus suum. Exp. Ps. cxviii* 7, 32; 11, 9. 14; 12, 28; 19, 19; 20, 52.

[9] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 12, 33: *Sit nobis ergo cotidiana lectio pro exercitio, ut quae legimus meditemur imitari.*

[10] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 12, 28: sit nobis tota die ac nocte exercitii usus in quadam caelestium scripturarum palaestra… nitamur non ut in incertum *nec ut aera caedentes* [1 Cor 9:26].

[11] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 17, 10: Intellege ergo quid os sit, utrum cor an interioris hominis habitus. habet os anima quae habet membra. hoc os aperi non solum Christo, sed etiam Christi discipulo, qui *os suum Christo inplendum praebuit et ideo dicit: os nostrum patet ad uos, o Corinthii, cor nostrum dilatatum est* [2 Cor 6:11]. ideo imitatores nos sui esse debere admonet, sicut ipse Christi est [1 Cor 11:1]. qui sanctior est, Christo aperiat os suum, qui inferior, Apostolo.

[12] Perhaps between May 395 and February 396. See L.F. Pizzolato, "Ambrogio e Paolino di Nola: per una più precisa datazione della *Expositio psalmi cxviii* di Ambrogio," in *Polyanthema. Studi di letteratura cristiana antica* offerti a Salvatore Costanza, Messina 1989 (Studi tardoantichi 7) 333-345.

commentary on psalm 118 is nearly 120,000 words, that is, three times as long as the commentaries of Hilary and of Augustine on the same Scriptural text.[13]

B. Expositio psalmi cxviii

Some fragments of previous commenaries of psalm 118 (from Origen, Eusebio of Caesarea, Didimus of Alexandria, Apollinarius of Laodocea) are known to us.[14] The commentary of Hilary of Poitiers has been handed down intact.[15] Ambrose's *Expositio psalmi cxviii* was delivered orally, over a period of several months, and written down only later.[16] The use of psalm 118 in the liturgy at this time appears conjectural.[17] However, the liturgy was "le lieu de la christologie" (L.-M. Chauvet)[18] and that had to be the original context for these sermons.

Ambrose's commentary was not only longer than other commentaries on this psalm or in this period in the West, but it was not composed as a part of a larger group of psalm commentaries – almost as if he had singled it out as deserving of special treatment. That fact does suggest that Ambrose had a particular reason for choosing to comment on this psalm.

For Ambrose to comment on a psalm which was fully focused on the Law,[19] showing how it revealed Jesus Christ, may have been a project that was particularly significant for the well-educated people of Milan, a fact to which Augustine surely bears witness.[20] That fact

[13] Hillary's commentary is about 44,000 words; Augustine's commentary is just over 40,000 words.

[14] R. Devreesse, Les anciens commentateurs grecs des Psaumes (Studi e Testi 264), Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana 1970; M. J. Rondeau, Les Commentaires patristiques du Psautier *IIIe-Ve siècles, I (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 219), Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium 1982.

[15] CSEL 22, 354-544.

[16] On the oral basis of Ambrose's work in general, see the recent overview by P. Moretti, *Non harundo sed calamus: Aspetti letterari della "Explanatio psalmorum XII" di Ambrogio*. Milano: Edizioni Universitarie di Lettere Economia Diritto, 2000, pp. 27-28.

[17] L.F. Pizzolato, *Expositio Psalmi CXVIII*, Introduzione (p. 9-51), Sancti Ambrosii Episcopi Mediolanensis Opera Omnia (SAEMO) 9-10, Milano: Città Nuova 1987, p. 21 where he suggests liturgical and monastic connections.

[18] G. Madec, *Le Christ de Saint Augustin*, Paris: Desclée, 2001, p. 80.

[19] Note that a study of all the various shades of meaning of "law" in this commentary is still needed.

[20] *Conf.* V, 14, 24; VI, 4, 6; VI, 5, 8. Cf. Pizzolato, *Expositio*, p. 24.

should not be allowed to obscure the presence of many other people of varied background, but the way that Ambrose personalizes his message, whether by direct address or in extended examples, to those who may have been people in leadership roles would make all the more sense if such people were among his listeners.[21] For such as these, a meditation on the law would have been all the more pertinent insofar as it transcended the legalistic context of daily life and reached toward Christ.

It is at least clear that this commentary is not primarily polemical, even though erroneous positions of Jews, Manichees, Sabellians and Apolinarians are noted. Ambrose is more concerned with moving his listeners (or readers) to christ-like living than with a theoretical exposition of the meaning of the text or with the use of psalm 118 to further merely ecclesiastical purposes.

Hence, this commentary is constantly concerned with the perfection of love as found in Jesus Christ, with the mystery that lies behind the moral message, completing it, and with how to bring about truly Christian action and meditation. One could even say that his commentary seeks to integrate the christian with the human, the secular with the sacred.[22] Such a project could not be limited to the well-educated who heard or read it.

This psalm of 176 verses was focused in a particular way on the law. Not unlike his predecessors, Ambrose was interested in the relationship *lex-Christus* and, especially, with the passage from the Law to Christ.[23] Ambrose was also fascinated by the meanings of the individual letters of the Hebrew alphabet – an interest that will soon wane,[24] as well as by the unity of the eight verses that followed each letter. These facts and the placement of this psalm at the center of the psalter (as he saw it) allowed him, from the beginning, to highlight its perfect splendor.[25] Thus, the eight verses in each of the 22 parts point to the mystery of the Resurrection.[26]

The complex, elliptical,[27] even digressive style of this commentary depends less on who might have been his audience than on a

[21] See, for example, *Exp. Ps. cxviii* the examples of soldiers and their general in sermon 5, the "tu imperator" of sermon 8, 41, the inclusion of *presbyter* and *episcopus* in 3, 15.

[22] Cf. Pizzolato, *Expositio*, p. 25.

[23] Cf. Pizzolato, *Expositio*, p. 16.

[24] Cf. Pizzolato, *Expositio*, p. 17; Ambrose notes a similar structure in two other psalms: 110 and 111.

[25] Prol. 1: *perfecti splendoris.*

[26] Prol. 2.

[27] G. Nauroy, "La Structure..." pp. 219-221.

pedagogical choice that Ambrose made. In his effort to bring the Christian message to people who were capable of understanding and who must have been interested in a detailed analysis, Ambrose chose to display all his rhetorical skill. His particular way of doing that has, in recent years, been described as manierism ("maniérisme"). Hervé Savon explains manierism as a way to overcome the distance between biblical words and contemporary culture: "cet artifice répond à un besoin bien réel: celui d'une communauté qui doit vivre quotidiennement de textes sacreés venus d'un passé lointain et d'une civilisation étrangère. [le mélange des genres devient] le moyen de rendre sensible le paradoxe du message à transmettre."[28] It was thus a way to use apparent contradictions in words or meanings to be resolved by heeping on a number of Scriptural passages, often one after the other, thus allowing a new meaning to bring delight to those listening. Such *delectatio* was thus intended to move, not by merely rational logic, but by inviting the listeners to enter into a different constellation of meaning.

In this commentary on psalm 118, the relationship of Old Testament figures (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, David, etc.) to Christ provides significant insights into the way that Ambrose finds Christ within the Hebrew Scriptures. He will speak of David, for example, as the true David or the true prophet[29] to indicate that it is really Christ who is speaking. Such a process allowed Ambrose to demonstrate that Christian understanding and wisdom was already present in the Old Testament, thus preceding the 'wisdom' of the philosophers. For Ambrose, philosophy was derived from and owed everything to biblical wisdom.[30] That perspective meant that Ambrose saw Paul's message as a confirmation of his own message, and that christians were to press on beyond the moral message of the Scriptures to appreciate, understand and live the mystery of Christ's witness and of his passion and death. Paul helped Ambrose witness to the

[28] H. Savon, "Maniérisme et allégorie dans l'oeuvre d'Ambroise de Milan," *Revue des Etudes Latines* 55 (1977) 203-221, p. 203. See also P. Moretti, *Non harundo...*, p. 13, n. 11 who summarizes some examples of E.R. Curtius, (*Letteratura europea e Medio Evo latino*, R. Antonelli, ed., Firenze 1992, pp. 303-334): "... come l'abuso di certe figure retoriche (iperbato, perifrasi, *annominatio*, metafora) e il gusto per ciò che è strano, arduo, virtuosistico (procedimenti lipogrammatici e pangrammatici, carmi gigurati, *logodaedalia*, asindeti a zeppa, versi *rapportati*, schemi sommatori)....".

[29] *verus propheta*: 8, 53; *verus David*: 14, 4; 21, 11. Never does Ambrose speak of *verus Paulus* in this commentary.

[30] See G. Madec, *Saint Ambroise et la philosophie*, Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes 1974, 93, nn. 398. 399.

dynamic connection of Old Testament words and experiences as they were brought to fulfillment in Christ.

In the commentary on psalm 118, Ambrose will present that dynamic process, not primarily by an exegesis of the letters of Paul, but by selecting and including some of Paul's words (or experiences) to clarify and/or confirm the witness of the prophet David. A few, chosen texts point the listeners (or readers) toward the dynamic of christian living: reaching for the mystery of Christ. That activity was rightly an activity of the Church, and not merely focused on the individual christian: "When you pray, go into your room and pray to your father in secret with the door shut. That room of the church is the body of Christ; therein does the king lead her into the most profound mysteries."[31]

Thus, Ambrose's intention for this commentary may be related to progress in christian living, whether by the individual or by the church.[32] That is also what he says, whether in the prologue "Just as little children begin by learning the alphabet, we too, by a sort of alphabet, may learn the art of right living."[33] or at the beginning of sermon 22:

> "We have already stated (in prologue 1) that the one hundred and eighteenth psalm signifies the progress of one who, proficient in moral teaching, has put aside the childishness of an unchallenged mind and assumed instead the knowledge of advanced counsel and the age of mature prudence. ... progress is taken as the end of fault."[34]

[31] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 16: tu autem cum orabis, intra in cubiculum tuum et clauso ostio ora patrem tuum in abscondito. cubiculum ecclesiae corpus est Christi; introduxit eam rex in omnia interiora mysteria.

[32] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 17, 15: There is no doubt that here too "steps" signify the progress of the Church or of the soul (*non est dubium gressus hic quoque ecclesiae uel animae profectus significari*).

[33] Prol. 1: quem per singulas Hebraeorum digessit litteras, ut, quemadmodum paruulorum ingenia primis litterarum elementis adsuescunt discendi usum adsumere, ita etiam nos huiusmodi elementis usum discamus uiuendi.

[34] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 22.1: psalmo autem isto, hoc est centesimo octauo decimo, profectum hominis diximus significari, qui doctrinae moralis magisteriis eruditus deponeret omnem inexercitatae mentis infantiam, adsumeret autem ueterani consilii scientiam et prudentiae senilis aetatem.... hic ergo est profectus, finis ut culpae sit. Cf. *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 9, 9: God's kindness is not ordinary but always looks for progress in discipline (*non ergo bonitas ista uulgaris est, sed quae semper disciplinae expectet profectum*); 17, 6-7: If you want to make progress, then learn from the verses that follow. 'The revelation of your words gives me light and gives understanding to little ones' [Ps. 118, 130] (*profectum quaeris? agnosce ex his uersiculis qui secuntur. "Manifestatio sermonum tuorum inluminat me et intellectum dat paruulis"*).

Progress, development toward the fullness of Christ is a constant presence in this commentary as moral striving and mystical leanings are interlaced throughout the commentary – and, no doubt, throughout christian life. Such progress depends heavily on the gift of God, on the *iustitia Dei*, whereby pardon of sin is the primary joy of Christian *confessio*. Hence, very shortly after the text from sermon 22, Ambrose cites Paul's letter to Titus (3:4-5) to emphasize that such striving is the result, not of any justice we might claim, but of God's mercy.

III. Who was Paul for Ambrose?

A rapid overview of the experiences of Paul and the qualities in Paul that Ambrose emphasized will set the stage for a presentation of the way that significant parts of Paul's letters were integrated into Ambrose's message. As part of the story of Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus, he became the *vas electionis* (Acts 9:15), a title used in at least 6 paragraphs in this commentary.[35]

> "Paul, the divinely chosen vessel, the doctor of the Gentiles, says that he is the least, unworthy to hold the name of that office which he ranked higher than all the works he performed. He claims nothing for himself, but imputes all to the grace of God. Surely this is beautiful in a just man."[36]

> "Even the saints are in the shadow as long as they are in this body. They do not see perfectly, but imperfectly [1 Cor 13:9]. They know only in part. As Paul says, *Our knowledge is imperfect*. He, the instrument [Act 9:15] whose eyes Christ opened, whom he illuminated with his own grace, even he did not see face to face, but only a reflection as in a glass.[37]

[35] *Exp. Ps. cxciii* 3, 18; 6, 32; 12, 41; 14, 24; 20, 16; 21, 11.

[36] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 20, 16: ille uas electionis diuinae, ille gentium doctor minimum esse se dicit, indignum eius officii nomine quod suis operibus praeferebat nihilque sibi adrogat, sed totum gratiae dei deputat. hoc utique decet iustum. 20.16. Est ergo humilitas laboris et fatigationis, est et humilitas uirtutis atque propositi, quam et in secundis et prosperis et in otio positus tenet ***iustus***. nullo scilicet fractus labore, nullius certaminis dubius euentu humilem omnibus affectum exhibet nec sua extollere studet, sed magis minuere operis sui pretium et meriti sui gratiam. audi iustum humiliantem se: ego, inquit, *sum minimus Apostolorum* [1 Cor 15:7]. ille uas electionis diuinae, ille gentium doctor minimum esse se dicit, indignum eius officii nomine quod suis operibus praeferebat nihilque sibi adrogat, sed totum gratiae dei deputat. hoc utique decet iustum.

[37] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 18: omnes ergo etiam sancti in umbra sunt, quamdiu sunt in corpore: non perfecte uident, non perfecte, sed ex parte cognoscunt. ipse Paulus ait: *ex parte enim cognoscimus* [1 Cor 13:9], ipse uas electionis, cui Christus oculos reddidit et sua inluminauit gratia, non facie ad faciem, sed per speculum uidebat.

Chosen from the beginning (*Exp. Ps. cxviii* 6, 32), he became an instrument of grace. This choice of the teacher of the gentiles was also a sign of the choice of the gentiles in their very flesh or even a statement about humanity itself:

> The sinful flesh of man was the property of the devil, but once we believed in Christ, our flesh began to be a chosen vessel. You know this from the apostle Paul who was sent to the Gentiles, for the Lord Jesus said to Ananias: "Go, for he is my chosen vessel. Rightly was the name of Christ invoked."[38]

> [The devil] would even have inflated Paul with pride. What Paul do I mean? The one who was made an apostle not by man but by Jesus Christ. [The devil] had very nearly deceived him, such that Paul asked God to take from him that torment of the flesh that so humiliated him. But the good Lord who wanted to make Paul stronger by means of his very infirmities, let him see the angel of Satan. In this way God overcame the devil by his own strategies.[39]

Paul's experience of conversion was not always focused on that which happened on the road to Damascus. Thus, in a passage from sermon 3 of his commentary, Ambrose notes an inner change in Paul, from shame to confidence:

> It is the same with Paul [as with David], who once said: "I hardly deserve the name apostle" [1 Cor 15:9] but later said: "All there is to come now is the crown of justice, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will give to me on that Day; and not only to me, but to all those who have longed for his Appearing." [2 Tim 4:8] Here, the Apostle is confident; in the previous place he prays as one who is still ashamed. His later assurance stems neither from arrogance nor from insolence, but from the innocense of one whose conscience does not reproach him and who asks for payment from the master he serves.[40]

[38] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 21, 11: uas diaboli caro erat hominis peccatoris; sed posteaquam in Christum credidimus, caro nostra coepit esse uas electionis, ut habes de apostolo Paulo, qui ad gentes missus est, dictum ad Ananiam a domino Iesu: uade, quoniam uas electionis mihi est. hoc utique decet iustum.

[39] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3.36: Inflare uolebat et Paulum. quem Paulum? illum utique Apostolum non ab hominibus neque per hominem, sed per Iesum Christum [Gal 1:1]. et paene deceperat, ita ut stimulum carnis suae, qui se humiliabat, rogaret auferri [2 Cor 12:7-8]. sed bonus dominus, qui Paulum infirmitatibus uellet facere fortiorem, adhibuit ei angelum satanae, ut suis diabolus artibus uinceretur.

[40] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3,3: siquidem etiam Paulus, qui ante dixerat: *non sum dignus uocari Apostolus* [1 Cor 15:9], postea ait: *reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi dominus in illa die, iustus iudex, non solum autem mihi, sed et his qui diligunt aduentum eius* [2 Tim 4:8]. et Apostolus sibi pollicetur, hic autem uerecundius adhuc precatur, quod utique non insolentis adrogantiae, sed innocentis est conscientiae, ab ipso cui seruieris petere mercedem …

Often, to address the question of change, Ambrose will use the comparative tense when speaking about Paul, addressing a sense of growth or of development in Paul's experience. This passage from the seventh sermon provides a good sense of the dynamic movement toward greater charity – a familiar ambrosian theme:

> Let us take the example of the Apostle Paul, how he wept for the sin of another, as he himself says: "When I wrote to you, in deep distress and anguish of mind and in tears." [2 Cor 2:4] Although he was grieved to the heart, he did not wish those whom he cided to be cast down. So he added: "It was not to sadden you but to let you know how much more love I have for you." [2 Cor 2:4 *ut sciatis quam caritatem habeo in uobis abundantius*] He wanted those who had gone astray and done wrong to be sad to the point of doing penance, but not beyond that to the point of wretchedness (*non usque ad maestitiam profundiorem*). Rather he wanted the sadness of those he corrected to turn into joy for the one who had to correct. That is why he says: "If I have hurt you, who else could give me joy but those whom I hurt?" [2 Cor 2:2] So he chides them that their repentance might turn into salvation. He condemns them only in order to absolve them. He shuts them out only so as to receive them back. If he does not at once forgive it is only so that he can later set them free. Paul acted like this because as an expert in the Law he knew the precept of him who says: "Faintness takes hold of me because of the sinners who forsake your law."[41]

Paul, expert in the Law, interpreted that law as spiritual.[42] That interpretation transformed the Law into Gospel, even as Augustine's understanding of the Scripture was transformed when he heard Ambrose's position. Ambrose thus acted as Paul did when he opened

[41] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 7.18: exemplum accipe Apostolicum. Paulus enim in peccato flebat alieno, sicut ait ipse: *nam ex multa tribulatione et angustia cordis scripsi uobis per multas lacrimas* [2 Cor 2:4] et cum ipse contristaretur, eos ipsos quos arguebat contristari nolebat. denique addidit: *non ut contristemini, sed ut sciatis quam caritatem habeo in uobis abundantius* [2 Cor 2:4]. contristari enim uolebat usque ad paenitentiam lapsos, non usque ad maestitiam profundiorem, tantum ut eorum qui arguebantur maestitia gaudium fieret arguenti. unde ait: *si enim ego contristo uos, quis est qui me laetificet nisi qui contristatur ex me* [2 Cor 2:2]? arguit itaque, ut alleuet diuturnitatem maestitiae, quo paenitentia fieret in salutem; damnat ut absoluat, excludit ut recipiat, non ignoscit ut liberet. ideo talis Paulus, qui bene peritus in lege cognouerat praeceptum dicentis: pusillanimitas detinuit me a peccatoribus derelinquentibus legem tuam.

[42] Rom 7:14: lex spiritalis *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 26; 5, 37; 7, 35; 8, 15; 15, 2.9; 17, 28; 18, 36; 21, 12.14; see also Eph 6:17 and Heb 4:12 where it is a question of the penetrating spiritual sword: *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 5, 25; 19, 38 and 13, 6; 15, 35.39; 18, 21 19, 38.

his heart to the Corinthians;[43] he sought to stretch the hearts of his listeners:

> "To those who run along the way [of your commandments], the Apostle says: Be free, and do not harness yourselves with unbelievers." Speaking of himself, he says to the Corinthians: "We have spoken frankly to you, Corinthians, our heart has been opened." Of Solomon too it was said: "The breadth of his heart is as the shore of the sea." Notice the distinction: let the way be narrower (*angustior*), let the heart be wider (*latius*) so that it can support the habitation of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit."[44]

Hence, Ambrose's Paul is a soldier who fights against spiritual powers,[45] an athlete that does not look back,[46] but runs the race so that he might receive the prize / the reward / the crown of justice.[47]

> "One who is to award a prize has to be a spectator at the games; so also no one is crowned without having taken part in the contest. God allows us to be tested many times, for – as is only right – he wants to award prizes fairly to those who play their part in the contest and not to those who sleep. Those whose heads are fit to wear the crown of flowers must first be covered in dust. Victory is the ornament not of soft and pleasure-loving people, but of those who are toughened by hard toil and diligent exercise.
>
> He should make speed to his prize and exert himself earnestly to the end, for the end of the law is Christ. There are many who wish to walk in the way, but not to the end.. true faith walks there, for it accepts the Law and understands the fullness of the Law.[48]

[43] 2 Cor 6:11: *cor nostrum dilatatum est. Exp. Ps. cxviii* 4, 27; 6, 31; 12, 13.50; 17, 10.

[44] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 4, 27: denique currentibus uiam domini ait Apostolus: *dilatamini et uos et nolite iugum ducere cum infidelibus* [2 Cor 6:13-14] et de se ait: *os nostrum patet ad uos, o Corinthii, cor nostrum dilatatum est* [2 Cor 6:11]. ideo et de Salomone dicitur: latitudo cordis eius sicut harena maris. et uide distantiam: uia sit angustior, cor latius, ut patris et filii et spiritus sancti sustineat mansionem.

[45] Eph 6:12: *quoniam non est nobis conluctatio aduersus carnem et sanguinem, sed aduersus principatus et potestates, aduersus mundi huius rectores tenebrarum harum, aduersus spiritalia nequitiae quae sunt in caelestibus. Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 45; 8, 39.46.58; 10, 14; 11, 21.24; 16, 11; 19, 7; 20, 9; 21, 6; 22, 16.

[46] Phil 3:13: ambulet superiora obliuiscens et ea quae sunt priora appetens ad destinatum sequatur. *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 8; 2, 1; 4, 26; 5, 28; 15, 23.

[47] See 2 Tim 4:7-8 (see note 5); 1 Cor 9:24-27 (see note 7); 2 Tim 2:5 (*Exp. Ps. cxviii* 10, 30; 8, 5); 1 Thes 2:19 (*Exp. Ps. cxviii* 15, 10).

[48] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 18, 5: qui uult dare praemium, debet spectare certamen, quia nemo sine certamine coronatur [2 Tim 2:5]. sinit ergo nos saepe temptari, uolens iuste praemia dare luctanti utique, non dormienti. non decet redimitos floribus corona, sed puluerulentos nec molles deliciis, sed labore exercitatos ornat uictoria.

Paul, whose conversation transcends the present,[49] interprets the Scriptures in a way that leads to Christ. Thus does Ambrose speak of rushing impatiently *ad perfectiora* (*Exp. Ps. cxviii* 5, 13) and of learning to seek Christ from those who hold him passionately (*Exp. Ps. cxviii* 7, 36). Even the experience of misfortune recalls the glory that waits for us: "Whoever hopes for better things to come is not broken by matters of lesser consequence."[50] Likewise, the passage from milk to solid food is a familiar image in all of Ambrose's writings. "Under the teaching of the Apostle, the Corinthians improved so much that they, previously only able for children's milk, later abounded in all the riches of wisdom and understanding."[51]

Christ for Ambrose is not just culmination of the Law, but of everything. Hence, the passages that speak of Christ as "omnia et in omnibus"[52] or as the one who "implet omnia"[53] on in whom "omnia constet"[54] all amplify the basic thrust of Ambrose's interest in moving his hearers toward Christ, the fullness of love and the end of the law.

IV. What was Paul's role in the Expositio psalmi cxviii?

Ambrose's use of New Testament texts is certainly not limited to those from Paul, nor does the number of citations from Paul's letters outnumber those from other New Testament texts. But Paul plays a significant part in Ambrose's exegesis of psalm 118. Is it possible to provide a description of the role that Ambrose gives Paul in his commentary on psalm 118? V. Hahn has written that Ambrose does

Exp. Ps. cxviii 1.8: ad brauium festinet, contendat usque ad finem; *finis enim legis est Christus* [Rom 10:4]. multi uolunt ambulare in uia, sed non usque ad finem. … ambulat uera fides, quae et legem suscipit et plenitudinem legis [Rom 13:10] agnoscit.

[49] Phil 3:20: *nostra autem conuersatio in caelis est. Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 31; 6, 31; 8, 18; 9, 12; 12, 12; 14, 10.

[50] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 7,6: nam etsi illa acciderint, tamen grauia esse non possunt dicenti: *existimo enim quod indignae sint passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam* [Rom 8:18]. quisquis enim meliora sperat, numquam leuioribus frangitur.

[51] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 2, 32: in tantum doctrina Apostoli corinthii profecerunt, ut, qui ante non poterant nisi sicut paruuli lac solum bibere [1 Cor 3:2], postea in omnibus diuitiis abundarent cognitionis et uerbi; cf. too, *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 19, 21: quod euidentius expressit Esaias dicens: tribulationem super tribulationem expecta, spem super spem. ad perlactatos et abductos ab uberibus loquebatur, hoc est ad eos qui prima infantiae alimenta transissent cibo iam habiles fortiori [Heb 5:12.14].

[52] See 1 Cor 12:6; 15:28; Col 3:9-11. *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 20; 10, 17; 12, 25.27.

[53] See Eph 4:10. *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 17, 9; 19, 36.

[54] See col 1:17. *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 3, 20; 19, 41, 20, 2; 21, 12.

more than cite Paul; he thinks as Paul thinks.[55] That could suggest that to try to articulate Paul's role in a succinct way is something like trying to set a limit to the sea. However, some conclusions can be attempted.

Ambrose refers to Paul by name (or to Saul in *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 14, 6) or as the Apostle, a term that does not exclude its use for other apostles. His description of the liturgy of the Word in Milan identifies the place for reading from the Apostle: "First the Prophet is read then the Apostle, and finally the Gospel."[56] Just as the organization of the liturgy of the Word passed from prophet to apostle to Christ, so does the role of the apostle Paul hold together – as glue – Ambrose's efforts to unite the human experience he finds in David's words with the daily ideals he proposes from the life of Christ. Paul does appear to have a specific role in facilitating the passage from shadow to reality, from the human to the divine, from what is incomplete or imperfect to the all, the fullness or the perfection of Christ.

A "chosen instrument" (Acts 9:15) Paul's experience and his words are a stimulus to christian conversion because they identify the role that Christ had in Paul's life, bringing him to conversion and continually enhancing that conversion. Likewise, Paul's words on the life and person of Jesus Christ informed Ambrose's reflection, providing a dynamic thrust to the imitation of Christ, the end of the Law (Rom 10:4) and the fullness of wisdom and knowledge.[57] What is significant, however, is not just the fact that Christ is the goal of Ambrose's exegesis of psalm 118; it is what this pauline emphasis 'says' about his listeners and how he might have expected them to benefit from this exalted definition of Christ, already present in David's words. Yet, throughout this commentary, Paul is praised for his ministry to justice and for the crown of justice that he received. For Ambrose, Paul's ministry and experience are focused on justice.

> What is the crown of glory if not the Church, who crowns Christ her head? What but the church is the joy of all the earth? ... Christ is not sought within this world, for he desired his own disciples to be above the world. What is the diadem with which Christ is crowned unless it is the crown of glory? Joseph had the crown of chastity, *Paul of justice*, Peter of faith. There are crowns for every single

[55] V. Hahn, *Das wahre Gesetz. Eine Untersuchung der Auffassung des Ambrosius von Mailand vom Verhältnis der beiden Testamente*, Münster in W. 1969, p. 514.

[56] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 17, 10: prius propheta legatur et Apostolus et sic euangelium

[57] Col 2:3 is cited or alluded to in several places: *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 1, 16; 2, 27.29.32; 12, 4.

> virtue. But only Christ has the crown of glory, with which the Church has crowned him.[58]

Hence, it makes sense to seek to uncover the roots of Ambrose's understanding of justice as both a social experience and a theological categorgy – every bit as interesting as later elaborations will be.[59] The citation from Romans 10:4, Christ is the end of the law, continues: for the justification of all who have faith.[60]

> "No one belongs to Christ unless he is a stranger to sin; no one belongs to Christ unless he shows that he is Christ's own servant... Who then belongs to God if not the person who can say: "My conscience does not reproach me" [1 Cor 4:4]? This is what Paul, the apostle of Jesus Christ [1 Cor 1:1] could say because he was innocent in his conduct toward everyone. I however belong at one moment to God and at the next to sadness or to anger or to gossip. But whoever has many masters cannot say to the one Master, "Lord Jesus, I am yours." I think it was of those other masters that Paul spoke when he said: "For although there are so-called gods, either in heaven or on earth, for us there is only one God, the Father from whom all things have their being; and for whom we exist; and there is one Lord Jesus, through whom all things come and through whom we exist." [1 Cor 8:5-6] The apostle Paul belonged fully to the Word. Therefore he could say: "You seek proof of Christ who speaks in me." [2 Cor 13:3] That meant "I am of Christ;" and the Lord replied to him: "You are mine." Because he could truly say: "I am yours" he hears from the Lord: "You are mine." It was of Paul that the Lord, speaking to Ananias when he sent him to heal Paul, said: "You must go because this man is my chosen instrument." [Acts 9:15] Because Paul continued steadfastly as Christ's own, successfully fighting the good fight, he merited the crown of justice.[61]

[58] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 15.11: Quae est autem corona gloriae nisi ecclesia, quae caput suum Christum coronat? quae iucunditas uniuersae terrae nisi domus populi christiani,.. non intra hunc mundum quaeritur Christus, qui supra mundum suos uoluit esse discipulos. quae est corona qua coronatur Christus nisi corona gloriae? Ioseph coronam habuit castitatis, Paulus *iustitia*e, Petrus fidei – singularum uirtutum coronae sunt -: solus Christus habet coronam gloriae qua eum ecclesia coronauit. in hac corona omnes coronae sunt, quia gloria non portio unius coronae, sed praemium omnium coronarum est.

[59] See McGrath, *Justitia Dei* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986) for an appreciation of justice beginning with Augustine. The gap in the study of justice prior to Augustine needs to be filled in: precisely with a study of justice in Ambrose.

[60] F*inis legis est Christus ad iustitiam omni credenti*, cited in *Exp. Ps. cxviii 5, 23*; 12, 45; 20, 3.

[61] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 12.41: Non ergo est Christi nisi qui est alienus a crimine, non est Christi nisi qui potest semper se Christi seruulum demonstrare... quis ergo est dei

Paul, the just one, will receive the crown of justice after having fought the good fight of understanding that the law leads to Christ and to the reward of faithfulness to Christ: the crown of justice. "*In your justice give me life.* [Ps. 118: 40] The psalmist dares to say that life is true when it is lived according to the justice of God. That is what the apostles lived, or rather, what they live."[62] Justice, for Ambrose, is life-giving, both in relation to apostolic choice and according to Christ's example. In that sense, it is one of the virtues, a way to live according to one's created nature;[63] in another place it is *confessio*, to recognize and name God's justice, that saves: Thus "Jesus, the one through whom all things exist and through whom we exist... came so that "our love might be formed in the paths of virtue... Then you will have progressed from confessing the truth to a knowledge of just and holy behavior." [64] Justice is also that trait in Christ that makes us the justice of God, as Paul teaches:

> "Listen to what the Apostle said in today's reading: "He died once to sin." [Rom 6:10] Christ died once, for you the sinner; do not sin again after your baptism. He died once for all in general and for each one in particular – once, not repeatedly. You are sin, O man, therefore the almighty Father made his own Christ "sin." [2 Cor 5:21] He

nisi qui potest dicere: *nihil mihi conscius sum* [1 Cor 4:4]? ideo dicebatur Paulus Apostolus Iesu Christi [1 Cor 1:1]. quia nulli alii obnoxius tenebatur. ego autem nunc dei mei sum, nunc tristitiae, nunc iracundiae, nunc uerbi otiosi. et ideo qui plures dominos habet non potest uni dicere: domine Iesu, tuus sum. unde arbitror etiam de huius mundi dominis dixisse Paulum: *nam etsi sunt qui dicantur dii siue in caelo siue in terra, nobis tamen unus deus pater, ex quo omnia et nos in illum, et unus dominus Iesus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum* [1 Cor 8:5-6]. uerbi igitur totus erat Apostolus Paulus. ideo dicebat: *quoniam experimentum quaeritis eius qui in me loquitur Christus* [2 Cor 13:3]. ille ergo dicebat: Christi sum, et respondebat ei dominus: meus es. qui uere dicit: tuus sum, audit a domino: meus es. denique de ipso dominus ad Ananiam, cum mitteret eum ad sanandum Paulum, ait: uade, quoniam uas electionis [Act 9:15] est mihi. et quia perseuerauit Christi esse, quasi impleto certamine coronam meruit inuenire *iustitiae* [2 Tim 4:7-8].

[62] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 5.47: In tua iustitia uiuifica me. audet et dicit, eo quod illa uera sit uita quae uiuit secundum dei *iustitia*m, quam uiuebant Apostoli, immo quam uiuunt.

[63] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 10, 15: ibi operatur, ibi ostenditur homo ad similitudinem et imaginem dei, ubi iustitiae, ubi sapientiae, ubi omnis forma uirtutis adsumitur. See too *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 10, 28. qui ergo iustus est, examine iustitiae suae credit, quia dei iusta iudicia sunt, uel secundum Graecum, quia iudicia dei sunt ipsa iustitia.

[64] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 20.57: Iesum, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum [1 Cor 8:6]... uenit, ut uirtutis semitis noster informaretur affectus, ut morum mansuetudinem conuersationis eius disceremus exemplo, ut aboleretur culpa per gratiam, et tunc a ueritatis confessione ad cognitionem iustitiae processisti.

> made him man, so that he might bear our sins. The Lord Jesus died for me who am sin "so that we might become in him the justice of God." [2 Cor 5:21][65]

For Ambrose, therefore, the teaching of Paul is more than a practical way to call on his people to act rightly. With Paul he can affirm the inability of all to do anything apart from the grace of God (*Exp. Ps. cxviii* 19, 14) and trace the outline of a theology of kenotic justice revealed in Christ and lived by those who belong to the body of Christ. The one who searches out God's justices is the one who remains close to God. "The Apostle says to them "You who were far off have been brought close by the blood o Christ." [Eph 2:13] The blood of Christ is our justice. that is why he says to John: "Permit us to fulfill all justice."[66] Likewise is Paul present implicitly in this text where the justice of God is intimately related to the kenosis of Christ:

> The just person chooses to be tested and is not afraid of temptation. For whoever has determined to keep the judgments of God does not fear temptation. Where was this decided but in the heart? There should we be rooted and fixed firmly [Eph 3:17], not floating nor carried along by every wind of doctrine [Eph 4:14]. Therefore, deep within our own heart, our breast, our own deepest self we decide so that the prophetic word may be given to us: 'the thoughts of the just are paths.' In these paths the just person walks securely and therefore says: 'Test me, Lord, and tempt me.' Here too in accordance with his own avowal, he who had sworn and detemined to keep the judgments of God's justice, saying that he wants to be put to the test, because he believed that he had to submit to humiliation for the sake of Christ.[67]

[65] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 18.42: Audis quid dixerit hodie Apostolus? *peccato*, inquit, *mortuus est semel* [Rom 6:10]. semel tibi peccatori mortuus est Christus; noli iterum peccare post baptismum. omnibus in commune semel mortuus est et singulis semel moritur, non frequenter. peccatum es, o homo; ideo peccatum fecit christum suum omnipotens pater [2 Cor 5:21], hominem fecit, qui peccata nostra portaret. mihi ergo peccato mortuus est dominus Iesus, *ut nos in illo essemus iustitia dei* [2 Cor 5:21]. cf. Exp. Ps. cxviii 6, 21

[66] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 20, 28: et ideo iustitias dei quaerentibus dicit apostolus: uos qui eratis longe facti estis prope in sanguine Christi. sanguis Christi iustitia est; denique ipse ait ad Iohannem: sine nos implere omnem iustitiam.

[67] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 14, 18: Iustus ergo optat probari, temptari non timet; qui enim statuit custodire iudicia dei, non timet temptationes. ubi statuit nisi in corde? illic enim radicati et fundati esse debemus [Eph 3:17], non fluitantes neque mobiles omni uento doctrinae [Eph 4:14]. intus ergo statuamus in corde nostro, in pectore, in animo, ut fiat nobis illud propheticum: cogitationes iustorum semitae. in his semitis bene ambulat iustus; ideo dicit: proba me, domine, et tempta me. denique hoc loco auctoritati respondens suae, qui iurauerat et statuerat custodire iudicia iustitiae dei, probari uoluisse se dicit, qui humilitatem subeundam credidit esse pro Christo. See too *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 12, 6 where humility and justice are also interrelated: humilitas

The pauline theology of Ambrose in this commentary forms a fundamental part of the overall message that Ambrose seeks to give in these 22 sermons. Even though Ambrose has in some way reworked the original sermons into a single work, the successive letters of the Hebrew alphabet have contributed variously to the overall theme described at the beginning of the last sermon: about the progress of one who, already instructed in moral teaching, has put aside the childishness of an unchallenged mind and assumed instead the knowledge of advanced counsel and the age of mature prudence (see note 29). Paul has guided this process, inviting the listeners to appreciate the fullness or perfection found in Christ, the spiritual quality of dedication in those who seek to imitate him, and the reward of that progress: the crown of justice. Thus, Ambrose has spoken of the athlete in spiritual terms: "You should show the struggles that your body has been in, so that you can say: 'I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course.' Then the judge of the spiritual contest, having seen the evidence, will award you the crown of justice. For you have fulfilled the law of the combat."[68]

V. Conclusion

This paper has focused on Paul and Ambrose. Hence, it has left more than a few perspectives untouched. Just how the mystical interpretations of the Song of Songs might need to be woven into this discussion – perhaps to the point of casting a shadow on the contribution that Paul made to Ambrose's commentary – has not been studied. Since the Song of Songs is more pervasive than are citations from Paul, such an outcome is indeed possible. However, the process which begins with a focus on Paul has had the advantage of not dealing directly with the structure of the commentary, but with some of its most significant themes. To continue this process by studying the relationship between Paul and the Song of Songs is

ergo, quae a domino est, plena iustitiae, plena est aequitatis, quia non exeunt mala de ore domini. denique qui humiliabatur a domino dicebat: humiliatus sum, et saluum me fecit," and *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 20, 56: sicut enim initium sapientiae timor domini, plenitudo autem sapientiae dilectio – lex enim sapientia, plenitudo autem legis dilectio –, ita plenitudo uerborum dei sapientia cognitioque iustitiae.

[68] *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 20, 21: ostende et cordis tui certamina, ut dicas: *certamen bonum certaui, cursum consummaui* [2 Tim 4:7] et uidens spiritalis iudex certaminis coronam iustitiae decernat, quoniam legem agonis implesti.

likely to uncover other riches that might be missed by some other method. No doubt, such a study would have to pay attention to a pauline text that is not mentioned in what has been written above, namely, 2 Cor 2:15.[69]

Allan D. FITZGERALD OSA

[69] "We are the aroma of Christ for God among those who are being saved and among those who are perishing." *Exp. Ps. cxviii* 5, 7.16.34; 15, 14; 22, 17.44.

EXERCISES IN GRACE: AUGUSTINE'S *EN. IN PS. 118*[1]

With the completion of the 32 *sermones* that make up Augustine's exposition of what he calls the *magnus psalmus*, the 176 verses of his Latin Psalm 118, the Bishop of Hippo finally brought to a conclusion a project that had extended over some three decades.[2] He undertook a systematic commentary on the psalms during the first days of his public ministry as a priest in Hippo Regius and by the early 420's all but one of the 150 psalms had received his explicit attention. He tells us in the *Prooemium* to his exposition on Psalm 118, one among a number of unique features of this commentary, the reason for the lacuna:

> With the Lord's gracious help I have expounded as best I could all the other psalms contained in the book which, as we all know, is by the Church's custom called the Psalter. I have done so partly in sermons to the people, and partly by dictation. But always I put off the exposition of Psalm 118, not so much because of its formidable length as because of its profundity, which few can fathom. My brethren took it badly that this psalm alone should lack an exposition in our insignificant writings (*opusculis nostris*), inasmuch as it too belongs to the collection of psalms; and they pressed me insistently to discharge the debt. But for a long time I did not yield to their request or even to their commands, because every time I tried to think about it, it always seemed far beyond the powers of my mind. The plainer it seems, the more profound does it appear to me, so much so

[1] This study of Augustine's exposition of *Psalm 118* seeks to highlight the vital connection in Augustine's writings between, if we may be allowed to use modern terminology, theology and spirituality, an insight that is a consistent theme throughout the writings of Fr. Tarcisius van Bavel, O.S.A. It is to him that I dedicate this essay. See also his Aurelius Augustinus, *Commentaar op psalm 118/119*: Vertaald, ingeleid en van aantekeningen voorzien door T.J. van Bavel o.s.a. (Baarn/Antwerpen: Ambok/Kritak, 1996).

[2] The recent literature on Augustine and the psalms is extensive. In particular, see Michael Fiedrowicz, *"Psalmus Vox Totius Christi": Studien zu Augustins "Enarrationes in Psalmos,"* (Frieburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1997); also: "Introduction," by Michael Fiedrowicz, in *Expositions of the Psalms, 1-32*, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, translation and notes by Maria Boulding, O.S.B., ed., John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Hyde Park: N.Y.: New City Press, 2000), 13-66; "*Enarrationes in Psalmos*," Hildegund Müller, "Philologische Aspekte, 804-837; Michael Fiedrowicz, "Theologische Aspekte," 838-858, *Augustinus-Lexicon*, 2, 5/6, ed. Cornelius Mayer, redaction, Karl Heinz Chelius and Andreas E.J. Grote (Basel: Schwabe & Co. A.G., 2001), esp. 831-832.

> that I cannot even demonstrate how profound it is. When in other psalms some passage presents difficulty, at least the obscurity itself is obvious, even though the meaning is hidden; but in this psalm not even the obscurity is evident, for on the surface the psalm is so simple that it might be thought to require a reader or listener only, not an expositor. Now at long last I approach the task of dealing with it, but I have absolutely no idea what I can manage. All the same I trust that God will be with me and will help me, for so he has done on all those occasions when I have sufficiently expounded matters which at first had seemed to me difficult or almost impossible to understand. I have decided to tackle it in public sermons, which the Greeks call homilies. I think this is the fairest way, because then church congregations will not be denied comprehension of this psalm. They are accustomed to enjoy the sound of it when it is sung, as they do with other psalms. Let this be enough by way of prologue. Now let us begin to speak about the psalm itself, after what seemed necessary as an introduction.[3]

Augustine's comments are both remarkable and intriguing. He leaves no doubt that he considers an exposition of this *psalmus magnus* to be particularly challenging. It has a daunting *obscuritas* which is not even apparent and, even having at last undertaken the exposition, he still remains unsure of his own capability to adequately explain it. As will be seen, Augustine turns to the Apostle Paul to resolve this expository dilemma.

Two significant modern studies signaled a renewed awareness of the importance of this work. In 1962 Charles Kannengieser published his "*Enarratio in Psalmum CXVIII:* Science de la revelation et progrès spirituel."[4] In short stead, Anne-Marie La Bonnardière built upon this work in her 1965 study of Augustinian chronology, with a specific chapter dedicated to his exposition of Psalm 118.[5] Kannengieser noted its irenic tone, the virtual absence of polemics, as well as its erudite approach. This "*commentaire magnifique*,"[6] he noted, offered a mature and balanced pastoral statement of the life of grace. For its composition, he proposed the years 420-422. Mme. La Bonnardière, with her characteristic careful attention to scriptural

[3] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, "Prooemium"; CCL 40, 1664-1665. Unless otherwise noted, the English translation is from *Expositions of the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos) 99-120*, III/19, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, translation and notes by Maria Boulding, O.S.B., ed., John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Hyde Park: N.Y.: New City Press, 2003), 342.

[4] *Recherches Augustiniennes* 2 (1962): 359-381.

[5] See also, Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*. A New Edition with an Epilogue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 2000), 376.

[6] Kannengieser, 362.

citations as a basis for determining chronology, proposed a period of some unknown duration after 422.[7] Both scholars noted that the Pelagian controversy left its mark upon this lengthy psalm exposition. Prolonged and often bitter debates about freedom, sinlessness, concupiscence, asceticism, and a host of other related topics required Augustine to ponder and address such issues. The exposition provided occasion for Augustine to present a constructive rather than polemical explanation of his theology of grace. La Bonnardière also proposed that the commentary embodies Augustine's own pastoral principle, outlined in *De doctrina Christiana* IV.29.62, that less-capable preachers can utilize sermons prepared by others more capable. Augustine, she suggested, took the occasion to offer "model homilies" for preachers, a resource made even more necessary given the Bishop's insistence upon the psalm's elusive *obscuritas*. Kannengieser argued also for a specific "theological" intention. The psalm provides occasion for Augustine to articulate a carefully developed teaching on the nature of supernatural knowledge and the relationship between grace and prayer. I would like to affirm both authors' insights and suggest a further intention. Before doing so, some remarks are in order regarding the exposition's make-up.

An Overview:

> Let us wander in the sweet delight of Christ's meadows... *(see* ep. *84.1).*

The 32 *sermones* that make up this work, introduced by the already-noted brief explanatory *Prooemium*, offer a lush Augustinian landscape of biblical commentary, theological statement, and spiritual counsel. While the structure of the *expositio* is provided by the 176 verses of Augustine's Latin text of *Psalm* 118, these verses are explained by weaving them into an even richer biblical tapestry drawn from a wide range of scriptural texts. The Bible itself will explain, clarify, and amplify the Psalmist's intention and meaning.[8] Thus the 176 verses, stated, repeated and paraphrased, are coupled

[7] Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *Recherches de Chronologie Augustinienne* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1965), 119-141; see also the comments of Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Nouvelles Recherches de Chronologie Augustinienne* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2000) 126, 167, 587.

[8] This is a constant exegetical principle for Augustine: "In those places where things are used openly we may learn how to interpret them when they appear in obscure places. *doct. chr.* III.26.37, CSEL 80, 101-102. English translation taken from Saint Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, trans. with intro. by D.W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), 101.

with an additional 560+ biblical references.[9] What is particularly striking about these references is the overwhelming weight given to the writings of St. Paul. Citations from "The Apostle"[10] outweigh all others, over 230. Matthew's gospel is notably present throughout, not surprising for a psalm on the Law, but with some 60+ references trails the Pauline citations considerably. Though the text cannot be simply reduced to being a Pauline commentary on the psalm, the presence of Paul is so consistent and dominant as to allow Paul's voice to be the primary vehicle to transmit the Psalmist's message. The cumulative effect is that this is Psalm 118 *secundum Paulum*–the *obscuritas* and *profunditas* that so impeded Augustine's previous attempts have at last found illumination. Paul teaches Augustine to read this Psalm of the Law as a Psalm of the Law of faith, a faith that always points to grace.[11]

> The law of faith is this: that we believe and pray to be empowered through grace to accomplish what we cannot do by ourselves, lest being ignorant of God's justice and attempting to set up our own, we fail to submit to the justice of God (see Rom 10:3). The justice of God who commands us is expressed in the law of works, but the mercy of him who helps us is exercised through the law of faith.[12]

This is one of a number of key programatic affirmations throughout the commentary, laying out the foundational theological issues at stake: faith and grace, prayer and knowledge, justice and mercy, works, willing and doing – and how they intersect. Such issues will theologically drive the unfolding of the *expositio*.

As already noted, this work is non-polemical. Its tone is overwhelmingly positive and its style a tempered simplicity. This, however, does not mean that Augustine is ever willing to compromise the exegetical, theological, and spiritual principles forged in the crucible of the Pelagian controversy. Its debates over nature, perfection,

[9] This is based upon the scriptural index in the *Corpus Christianorum* apparatus, CCL 40, 1664-1776.

[10] Throughout his writings Augustine will often simply refer to St. Paul as "The Apostle."

[11] Augustine first uses the expression *lex gratiae* in *Simpl.* I.1.16, CCL 44, 20, l. 294; for a work closer to this exposition see *s.*152.7, and especially 11, PL 38, 823, 825.

[12] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, X.5, CCL 40, 1694. "Haec est lex fidei, qua credimus et oramus per gratiam nobis donari, ut faciamus quod per nosmetipsos implere non possumus; ne ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et nostram uolentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non simus subiecti. In lege itaque factorum est Dei iubentis iustitia; in lege autem fidei, subuenientis misericordia."

sinlessness, and concupiscence provide an unmistakable backdrop for the exposition: *nisi gratia dei* echoes in a variety of formulations throughout the work, with all its underlying presuppositions and affirmations.[13] Nonetheless, Augustine finds occasion here to put aside the harsh and uncompromising approach of the polemicist and state his understanding of a theology of grace constructively. Equally notable is a rather consistent erudite approach, a marked contrast with his other psalm commentaries. He cites Greek codices often, complemented by a variety of Latin codices with variant reading. Expressions such as "*ut nonnulli codices habent*" occur repeatedly.[14] One can picture Augustine seated before a vast work table, piled high with Greek and Latin versions of the Psalter. Along with this abiding concern for textual criticism, there is an equally persistent attention to grammar (e.g., gender of nouns, XV,8, 1714); verb tenses, (XIX,2, 1727); cases and parts of speech (XXIX,3, 1764-1765; 9, 1767). Augustine has undertaken a decidedly scholarly and sophisticated approach to the biblical text, presupposing an equal capability for his intended audience. Those he addresses are presumed to be able to delight not only in theological details but also in textual and grammatical intricacies. He is, indeed, writing for intellectually and theologically advanced brethren who are concerned with how to read Scripture correctly yet critically. But to what end? If these are brethren hungry for knowledge of the Scriptures, it is equally apparent, certainly on Augustine's part, that they must link this knowledge to a desire to make progress in holiness and virtue. Augustine's intention throughout is to link carefully both of these aims. If the Pelagians, for Augustine, were onesidedly concerned about good asceticism, Augustine will be concerned about **both** good theology **and** good asceticism, what one might call the "discipline of grace."

> *Teach me about sweetness, and instruction, and knowledge, for I have believed in your commands* (Ps 118.66). He must be asking for these things to be increased and brought to perfection in him; for since he has already acknowledged that *you have provided sweetness for your servant*, how can he now pray, *Teach me about sweetness*,

[13] See *En. in Ps. CXVIII*, IV.3-4, CCL 40, 1675; VI.5, 1682; XII.3, 1702; XVII.2, 1719; XXVI.1, 1753; 7, 1755; XXVII.9, 1760.

[14] Augustine makes references to other codices some twenty-eight times, e.g. "unde nonnulli etiam latini codices non habent," IV.1, 1674; "sicut quidam codices habent," XIII.3, 1706; "sicut alii codices habent," XV.5, 1713; "plures enim codices non habent," XVI.2, 1716; "nam in quibusdam codicibus et hoc legitur," XXVII.9, 1760.

> unless he is pleading that God's grace may become more and more familiar to him through the sweetness of what is good? After all, the disciples who prayed, *Lord increase our faith*, (Lk 17:5) truly had faith. As long as our life in this world lasts, this request must be the song on those are on their way. The Psalmist continues by asking for instruction, or as several codices have it, *discipline*. But our scriptures customarily use the word discipline as a translation of the Greek παιδεια in contexts where painful instruction is meant. So, for example, we read, *Those whom the Lord loves, he corrects*, and *he whips every child whom he accepts*. This is the sort of discipline usually envisaged in the Church's writings when the Greek speaks of παιδεια. The word occurs a little further on in the Letter to the Hebrews; *All discipline seems at the time a matter for sadness, not joy; but afterward it yields the peace-giving harvest of righteousness in those who have been trained by it* (Heb 12:6, 11).[15]

What this psalm will teach is a Christian *paideia*, the discipline of grace, offering schooling, exercises, even painful instruction not only for theological growth but perhaps even more importantly for spiritual and ascetical growth and progress. True understanding of this Psalm of the Law will enable these brethren to grow in faith and live in grace, provided they are willing to be good students: *Dic nobis, Paule beatissime*, (*s.*II.2, CCL 40, 670).

Molestissime ferrent fratres mei (*En. in Ps. 118*, Prooemium)

Augustine's *Prooemium* to this work tells us that he was long under pressure from his brethren, *fratres mei*, to bring to completion his voluminous and protracted commentary on the entire Psalter. Who were these *fratres mei*? Augustine frequently makes reference in his

[15] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XVII.2. CCL 40, 1719. "Suauitatem, et eruditionem, et scientiam doce me, inquit, quoniam mandatis tuis credidi. Augeri sibi ista poscit et perfici: nam utique qui iam dixerat, Suauitatem fecisti cum seruo tuo; quomodo dicit, Suauitatem doce me, nisi ut ei gratia Dei magis magisque innotescat dulcedine bonitatis? Habebant enim fidem qui dixerunt: Domine, auge nobis fidem. Et quamdiu uiuitur in hoc mundo, proficientium est ista cantatio. Addidit autem, et eruditionem; uel sicut plures codices habent, disciplinam. Sed disciplinam, quam Graeci appellant παιδειαν, ibi Scripturae nostrae ponere consueuerunt, ibi intelligenda est per molestias eruditio; secundum illud: Quem enim diligit Dominus, corripit; flagellat autem omnem filium quem recipit. Haec apud ecclesiasticas litteras dici assolet disciplina, interpretata de graeco, ubi legitur, παιδειαν. Hoc enim uerbum in graeco positum est in Epistola ad Hebraeos, ubi latinus interpres ait: Omnis disciplina ad praesens non gaudii uidetur esse, sed tristitiae; postea autem fructum pacificum his qui per eam certarunt, reddit iustitiae."

Letters to the "*fratres qui mecum sunt in Domino*,"[16] the brethren who are members of his *monasterium clericorum*[17] in Hippo Regius. He surely has them in mind, but perhaps not only them. It is also probable that *fratres mei* refers to a wider circle of kindred bishops and fellow *serui Dei* who shared with Augustine a common love for Christ's church and its scriptures, an office of preaching and teaching, and a commitment to a life of holiness and ascetical dedication to spiritual growth and progress.[18] If so, it is then likely that their insistence came not only from a deep desire to see the project completed, but equally from their own fervent yearning to better know, understand, and live according to the Scriptures. They would have, in fact, learned from Augustine himself that God's word must not only be preached and taught. It must be lived: Augustine fostered such attitudes through his long-standing practice of discussing the scriptures with "the brethren,"[19] and not only in Hippo Regius.[20] It may be conjectured that these same brethren would have also been well acquainted with Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, at the date of the exposition still incomplete but, even in its unfinished form, circulating as a valuable guide for understanding, preaching, and living the Scriptures.[21] Paralleling the precepts proposed and explained by Augustine as necessary guidelines for undertaking the work of interpretation, there is a complementary theme that permeates the work: the life of the expositor is integral to the truth the expositor wishes to communicate. In fact, without an accompanying holiness of life, scripture's truth is compromised by contrary living.[22]. Interspersed throughout this presentation of exegetical precepts is continuous counsel regarding the expositors way of life:

[16] *Ep.* 63.1, CSEL 34/2, 226; see Paul Monceaux, "La formule '*qui mecum sunt fratres*' dans la correspondance de saint Augustin," in *Mélanges Paul Thomas*, 529-537 (Bruges: Imprimerie Sainte Catherine, 1930).

[17] See *ss.* 355-356, PL 39, 1568-1581.

[18] "Viel mehr dürfte Augustinus Ps. 118 vor einem kleineren Kreis seiner Kleriker zu deren homiletischer Instruktion ausgelegt..." Fiedrowicz, *Psalmus Vox Totius Christi*, 20.

[19] "Interrogabar a fratribus," *retr.* I.XXVI.1, CCL 57, 74.

[20] He locates his "propositions" on Romans in Carthage: "Cum presbyter adhuc essem, contigit ut apud Carthaginem inter nos qui simul eramus, Ad Romanos apostoli epistola legeretur, et quaedam interrogabar a fratribus; quibus cum, sicut poteram responderem..." *retr.* I.XXIII.1, CCL 57, 66-67.

[21] Regarding this work, its composition, interruption, audience, theology, etc. see "*De doctrina christiana*": *A Classic of Western Culture*, eds. Duane W.H. Arnold and Pamela Bright (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

[22] *Doct. chr.* IV.29.62, CSEL 80, 168.

> When the student of Holy Scripture, having been instructed in this way [a reference to Augustine's previous teaching], begins to approach his text, he should always bear in mind the apostolic saying, "Knowledge puffs up; but charity edifies" (1 Cor 8:1).[23]

Augustine not only points out here that exegesis must be accompanied by wisdom and humility,[24] but likewise insists upon the expositor's need for faith, hope, and love,[25] "good endeavor and good habits,"[26] and the practice of a host of other evangelical virtues:

> ... for the life of the speaker (*uita docentis*) has greater weight in determining whether he is obediently heard than any grandness of eloquence.[27]

A persistent theme throughout the *De doctrina christiana* is that the one who teaches to others what he himself has learned from the scriptures can never rest content with knowledge of languages, grammatical and textual expertise, and all the other important technical learnings proposed by Augustine as integral to the act of exposition. First and foremost he must live the truth he finds in the Scriptures. In a striking way his exposition of Psalm 118 provides a classic model for this Augustinian insistence. Not only does it provide a substantive theological understanding of the "law of grace," but just as importantly it offers necessary spiritual guidance and direction in order to *live* that same law of grace.

The Pelagian controversy, one may propose, taught Augustine that sound theology and a complementary sound ascetical practice are inseparable. The admirable Pelagian concern for holiness of life among God's people was, in Augustine's estimation, fatally compromised by their theological misunderstanding (at a certain point willful!) of the nature of that holiness. Perhaps the distinctive approach of Pelagius that so sets him at odds with Augustine is no better capsulized than in his remarks to the young virgin Demetrias:

> There is, I maintain, a sort of *natural sanctity* (emphasis added) in our minds which, presiding as it were in the mind's citadel, administers judgment equally on the evil and the good and, just as it favours honourable and upright actions, so too condemns wrong deeds and, on the evidence of conscience, distinguishes the one side from the other

[23] Ibid., II.41.62, CSEL 80, 76-77; see III.1.1, CSEL 80, 79; IV.27.59, CSEL 80, 166.

[24] See esp. ibid. II.42.63, CSEL 80, 78.

[25] Ibid., I.39.43-40.44, CSEL 80, 32-33.

[26] Ibid., I.10.10, CSEL 80, 13. *On Christian Doctrine*, p. 13.

[27] Ibid., IV.27.59, CSEL 80, 165-166.

> by a kind of inner law; nor, in fine, does it seek to deceive by any display of cleverness or of counterfeit brilliance in argument but either denounces or defends us by our thoughts themselves, surely the most reliable and incorruptible of witnesses.[28]

It is precisely such spiritual dissonance between what might be anachronistically called theology and spirituality that the exposition seeks to avoid; in fact, it offers a radically differing view of the nature of holiness, the powers of the mind, and its outcome in wrongdoing or good deeds:

> If the saints' refusal to declare themselves sinless is no more than a precaution against arrogance rather than an admission of the truth, why do they confess their sins in the hope of deserving forgiveness and cleansing? Surely confession is not made merely in order to avoid pretentiousness? How will a real cleansing from sins be earned by a confession of sins that is hollow? The hauteur of the proud is self-deceiving. In the hearing of other people it feigns humility by calling itself sinful, while in its impious conceit it declares itself sinless in its own heart. But let it fall silent now and wither away like grass. People who claim to be without sin deceive themselves, and the truth is not in them; but when they make their claim in the hearing of others they mislead not only themselves but others too, through the perversity of their unhealthy teaching. Even if they say it only within their own hearts they lead themselves astray there, for then there is no truth within them. Being self-deceived within, they lose the light of truth from their hearts.[29]

[28] *Epistola XVII Pelagii ad Demetriadem*, IV, PL XXXIII, 1101. "Est enim, inquam, in animis nostris naturalis quaedam, ut ita dixerim, sanctitas, quae uelut in arce animi praesidens, exercet mali bonique iudicium; et ut honestis rectisque actibus fauet, ita sinistra opera condemnat, atque ad conscientiae testimoniuum diuersas partes domestica quadam lege diiudicat: nec ullo prorsus ingenio, aut fucato aliquo argumentorum colore decipit; ipsis nos cogitationibus, fidelissimis et integerrimis sane testibus, aut arguit, aut defendit." English translation, B R. Rees, *Pelagius: Life and Letters*, vol. II (Woodbridge, U.K.: The Boydell Press, 1998), 40.

[29] *En. Ps. CVIII*, II.2, CCL 40, 1669. "Si enim propter arrogantiam deuitandam, non propter ueritatem fatendam, non dicunt sancti se non habere peccatum; quid est quod confitentur, ut remissionem mundationemque mereantur? An et hoc fit, ut arrogantia deuitetur? Quomodo ergo impetrabitur peccatorum uera mundatio, quorum est falsa confessio? Conticescat igitur et arescat elatio fenea superborum, se ipsa seducens, quae in auribus hominum simulata humilitate dicit se habere peccatum, in corde autem suo impia elatione dicit se non habere peccatum. Qui enim hoc dicunt, seipsos seducunt, et ueritas in eis non est. Sed quando in auribus hominum hoc dicunt, non tantum seipsos, sed alios quoque doctrinae insanae peruersitate seducunt: cum uero id in corde suo dicunt, illic seipsos seducunt, illic ueritas in eis non est; ac per hoc seipsos in corde suo seducunt, et in suo corde ueritatis lumen amittunt."

Christian holiness and theological orthodoxy are inseparable, a persistent theme throughout the patristic era.

These observations support the consensus of modern scholarship that dates this work to the years immediately following 422. Augustine had just completed the six books of the *Contra Iulianum* and had every reason to believe that the acrimonious and wearisome Pelagian debates were behind him. This, to be sure, did not mean that he was prepared to surrender or even compromise the foundational issues, principles, and arguments of the debates: "*audacia de libero arbitrio contra gratiam confidentis*," *s.*XIX.7, CCL 40, 1729). Rather, it seems to have provided him with an opportunity to place these hard-fought principles into a more unified and constructive framework. He was, after all, speaking to *fratres mei*, many like him fellow *dispensatores uerbi et sacramenti*,[30] sharing with him a deep commitment to an itinerary of truth and holiness. Their task was not only to preach God's way, but to traverse that very way themselves. It was imperative that the foundational charge laid against the Pelagians, self-reliance that was nothing less than pride, not infect their own striving for holiness.

> The apostle Paul enjoins the same fear and trembling on his faithful disciples: *Work out your own salvation in fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work in you, inspiring both will and work, for his own good purpose* (Phil 2:12-13). The ways of the righteous are thus open to the Lord's gaze so that he may guide their steps, for theirs are the ways of which the Book of Proverbs says, *The ways on the right are known to the Lord, but those on the left are crooked* (Prv 4:37). We are meant to understand that these perverse ways are unknown to the Lord in the sense that he will say to certain crooked persons, *I never knew you* (Mt 7:23). But Proverbs goes on to show the purpose of the Lord's knowing the ways of the just at his right hand, for immediately it adds, *He will direct your steps, and further your journey in peace* (Prv 4:27). There we have the reason why the psalmist says, *I have kept your commandments and your testimonies*. If we were to ask him how he did it, he would reply, *All my ways are open to your scrutiny, O Lord.* [31]

The journey of holiness is one guided, directed, and furthered by the Lord. It is, in short, the way of grace.

[30] See *s.*301A.1, MA 1, 81, PL 46, 874.

[31] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXXI.8, CCL 40, 1773. "Nam hunc timorem et tremorem apostolus etiam Paulus imponit eis quibus dicit, Cum timore et tremore uestram ipsorum salutem operamini: et cur hoc dixerit aperiens, Deus est enim, inquit, qui operatur in uobis et uelle et operari, pro bona uoluntate. Ad hoc sunt ergo in conspectu Domini uiae iustorum, ut dirigat gressus eorum, quoniam ipsae sunt uiae de quibus scriptum est in Prouerbiis, *Vias autem quae a dextris sunt, nouit Dominus: peruersae autem sunt*, inquit, *quae a sinistris*: ut intelligeremus quod eas non nouerit Dominus,

All is Grace

The central affirmation that holds together the entire exposition is thus one of grace, indeed, one might say, a theology **and** a spirituality of grace. The doctrine of grace demands not just intellectual assent but must be transformed into a way of life.[32] Throughout the exposition such insistence often takes the form of concise yet dense maxims that affirm the theological principle of grace but can equally be spiritually employed as easily remembered precepts for living.

> *fides non immemor gratiae* (*s.*IV.2, CCL 40, 1674)
> *per fidem ad... gratiam* (see *s.*XXVI.7, CCL 40, 1755)
> *lex enim ad hoc prodest, ut mittat ad gratiam* (*s.*XXV.5, CCL 40, 1750)
> *gratiae filius, homo nouus, cantator noui cantici, heres testamenti noui* (*s.*V.3, CCL 40, 1677)
> *nisi gratia dei* (*s.*IV.3, CCL 40, 1675; see VI.5, CCL 40, 1682; XII,3 CCL 40, 1702; XXVI.7, CCL 40, 1755; XXVII. 9, CCL 40, 1760)
> *ut secundum gratiam firma sit promissio omni semini* (*s.*X.3, CCL 40, 1793)
> *sed totum dei gratiae retribuamus* (*s.*XIII.1, CCL 40, 1705)
> *ut iustificentur gratis per gratiam ipsius* (*s.*XXII.2, CCL 40, 1737)
> *iustificat gratis per gratiam ipsius* (*s.*XXV.2, CCL 40, 1748)
> *opus iustitiae... opus gratiae* (*s.*XXVI.1, CCL 40, 1753)

It may be suggested that Augustine envisioned them in a fashion similar to the "arrow prayers" he mentions in his Letter to Proba:

> The brothers in Egypt are said to say frequent prayers, but very brief ones that are tossed off as if in a rush, so that a vigilant and keen intention, which is very necessary for one who prays, may not fade away and grow dull over longer periods.[33]

propter quod peruersis dicturus est, Non noui uos. Porro ut ostenderet quo fructu uias quae a dextris sunt, id est iustorum, nouerit Dominus, continuo subiecit: Ipse enim rectos faciet gressus tuos, et itinera tua in pace producet. Ecce quare ait etiam iste, Custodiui mandata tua et testimonia tua. Et uelut quaereremus hoc unde potuerit: Quia omnes, inquit, uiae meae in conspectu tuo, Domine."

[32] See Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, Edited with an introduction by Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

[33] *Ep.* 130.10.20, CSEL 44, 62-63. "Dicuntur fratres in aegypto crebras quidem habere orationes sed eas tamen breuissimas et raptim quodam modo iaculatas, ne illa uigilanter erecta, quae oranti plurimum necessaria est, per productiores moras euanescat atque hebetetur intentio." St. Augustine, *Letters 100 – 155*. The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century. Translation and notes by Roland Teske, S.J., ed. Boniface Ramsey (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 2003), 193.

These "darts of grace" can be employed to teach grace as well as to enkindle the "intention of grace," ever subject to distraction and inattention.

Underlying each axiom is a substantive theological account, more often than not Pauline in origin, affirming that the *lex Dei* that is the focus of this psalm is none other than the *lex gratiae*:[34] "*gratia itaque Dei nobis praecipue commendatur.*"[35] And even this awareness is a gift of grace: *nemo comprehendit, nisi a Domino acceperit intellectum.*[36] And what is ever meant to be understood is that this is not simply "grace" but always *gratia Christi*. He comments upon v. 121 of the Psalm: "*Feci iudicium et iustitiam; ne tradas me nocentibus me.*"

> [F]or who creates justice in human beings? He only, who justifies the godless; that is to say, he who by his grace turns the impious into the just (see Rom 4:5). Hence the apostle says, *They are justified freely by his grace* (Rom 3:24). We conclude, therefore, that as the work of grace is to create justice in just persons, so will those just persons act justly, manifesting the work of the justice they have within them.[37]

Ex impio iustum is the work of the grace of Christ; this is the *opus Christi*.[38]

Once again it is important to emphasize that the Pelagian controversy convinced Augustine of the necessity to insist that an affirmation of the *ueritas gratiae* (see *s.*XIX.3, CCL 40, 1727) demands a concomitant willingness to live accordingly: the *ueritas gratiae* demands a *conuersatio gratiae*.[39] Without a doubt, the initial concerns of Pelagius seemed to have been precisely one of life-style: his perception that the Christian life was increasingly compromised by spiritual sloth and mediocrity. Augustine's heated, bitter, and prolonged

[34] *S.*152.11, PL 38, 825. "Alia ergo lex, ut dicere coeperam, tibi ostendat peccatum, alia tollat: ostendat peccatum lex litterae, tollat peccatum lex gratiae."

[35] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XI.4, CCL 40, 1697.

[36] Ibid.

[37] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXVI.1, CCL 40, 1753. "Quis enim facit in homine iustitiam, nisi qui iustificat impium, hoc est, per gratiam suam ex impio facit iustum? Unde ait Apostolus: *Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius*. Facit ergo iustitiam, id est, opus iustitiae, qui habet in se iustitiam, id est opus gratiae."

[38] See *Io. Eu. tr.* LXX.2, CCL 36, 508: "In hoc opere faciamus opera christi, quia et ipsum credere in Christum, opus est Christi."

[39] Perhaps no more clearly highlighted than in the *Rule of Saint Augustine* (*Praeceptum*) VIII.1: "de bona **conuersatione** flagrantes, non sicut serui sub lege, sed sicut liberi **sub gratia** constituti." *Praeceptum*, Édition Critique, in L. Verheijen, *La Règle de saint Augustin*, I, *Tradition manuscrite* (Paris: Revue des Études Augustinnienes, 1967), 437, ll. 237-239.

debates with his Pelagian opponents centered around issues of "living": free will, sinlessness, perfection, desire, and a host of other issues. Augustine found himself forced to walk a delicate line between grace and asceticism. How affirm the former without negating the latter? For sure, these disputes only further convinced Augustine that the scars of *ignorantia* and *infirmitas* will never be fully healed "*cum in carne adhuc uiueres*" (*s.*II.2, CCL 40, 1670). The living of the life of the grace of Christ will always be marked by imperfection. Augustine does indeed signal a striking departure from a long-standing ascetical tradition that affirmed heroic holiness as its intention and goal. It is precisely why Augustine turns to the authority of the apostle Paul in this regard. Could anyone accuse Paul of sloth or mediocrity?

> Tell us, then, most blessed Paul: did you walk in the ways of the Lord while you still lived in the flesh?" "Of course I did," he answers... Tell us, please apostle: during your life in the flesh, when you were walking the Lord's ways, did you sin at all, or were you without sin? Let us listen now... *–dic nobis, Paule beatissime, utrum ambulaueris in uiis Domini cum in carne adhuc uiueres?... dic, obsecro, o apostole, quando adhuc in carne uiuens in uiis Domini ambulabas; habebas peccatum, an sine peccato eras...*[40]

It is Augustine's reliance upon the authority of the apostle that will make these "exercises in grace" intensely Pauline in their orientation. The apostle himself will teach as well as model what it means to walk in the way of the Lord, the way set forth throughout this *magnus psalmus*: "*Vide illum Saulum, postea Paulum ...*" (*s.*VII.2, CCL 40, 1683). It is not only necessary to listen to Paul, one must look at the example of Paul's own life and journey to discover and learn what is the Christian journey of holiness.

Walking the Way of the Lord.

Augustine's expansive exposition offers a comprehensive, dynamic, and demanding vision of the Christian life: one where grace both prompts and supports a life marked by love and humility, intelligence and service; one that provides a model that does justice to the redemption wrought by Christ. The very length of the psalm allows for breadth, depth, and repetition: each verse providing occasion for exploring or reiterating still another aspect of the life according to the law of grace. A sampling of the most consistently emphasized themes

[40] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, II.2, CCL 1670.

will demonstrate the contours of this distinctively Augustinian vision of the Christian life.

Grace's grammar:

As a professional rhetor, with an intense interest in both the nature and use of language, Augustine pays close attention to the Latin text of *Psalm* 118. When it comes to Scripture, God's word, grammar and vocabulary take on theological significance, enabling Augustine to find, in the very make-up of the text, firm support for insisting that its message of grace. For example he pays close attention to the, at first glance, insignificant conjunctions and adverbs such as *ne*, *ut*, and *utinam*. He will find here what we may call "the grammar of grace." He comments on v. 5 of the Psalm: "*Utinam dirigantur uiae meae ad custodiendas iustificationes tuas.*"

> When you hear the phrase, "O that..! (*utinam*)" you must recognize the accents of someone who is yearning. And when you hear this voice of longing and hope, lay aside your overbearing presumption, for no one expresses longing if he is so free to choose that he can bring about the desired outcome with no help from anyone else. If a man or woman is longing for something to happen, something which God has commanded, we must infer that it is absolutely necessary to pray to God, that he may grant what he has himself enjoined.[41]

He continues by noting that if it were only a question of "*solis nostrae uoluntatis uiribus impleantur*" we would not find the "*utinam*," a grammatical buttress for the theological principle: "*nisi adiuuet tua gratia.*" In commenting on v. 121, "*Feci iudicium et iustitiam; ne tradas me nocentibus me*," we find another example of this grammar of grace:

> When the psalmist prays not to be delivered (***ne*** *tradatur*) by the Lord to his adversaries, what is he asking if not what we ask in prayer when we say, *Lead us not into temptation* (***ne*** *nos inferas in tentationem*) (Mt 6:3). It is this adversary that Paul has in mind when he says, *I was afraid that the tempter might have tempted you* (***ne*** *forte*

[41] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, IV.2, CCL 40, 1674. "Ubi audis *utinam* uocem optantis agnosce; at agnita uoce optantis, depone superbiam praesumentis. Quis enim se dicat optare quod sic habet in arbitrii potestate, ut nullo indigens adiumento id possit efficere? Ergo si optat homo quod praecipit Deus; ut det ipse quod praecipit, rogandus est Deus." The echoes here with *conf.* X.29.40, CCL 27, 176, seem obvious, a text that Pelagius found unpalatable, see *perseu.* 20.53, PL 45, 1026.

> *tentauerit uos qui tentat*) (1 Th 3:5). God hands over to the tempter anyone whom he himself abandons. The tempter cannot deceive a person whom God does not abandon; to human beauty in someone like that, God in his kindly will adds strength.[42]

Augustine suggests that the very syntax of the text affirms grace, reinforcing the inspired text's meaning, evident in the clear link between the "*ne*" of the Psalm and the "*ne*" of the Lord's Prayer, both in turn connecting with the Apostle's affirmation to the Thessalonians. Augustine continues by linking the mentioned "adversary" to the struggle with "*concupiscentia*":

> When, therefore, a person has crucified the flesh through chaste fear of God, is corrupted by no carnal allurement, practices judgment, and deals justly, such a one should pray not to be delivered to his adversaries (***ne*** *aduersantibus tradatur*), lest through fear of suffering a horrible fate (***ne*** *timendo*) he yield to the persecutors and commit horrible deeds instead. Pray he must, because God who grants him the victory over concupiscence, so that he is not dragged away by sensuality (***ne*** *uoluptate pertrahatur*), grants him also strong, steadfast endurance, so that he is not broken by pain (***ne*** *dolore frangatur*).[43]

"*Ut*" functions in the same way. V. 60, "*Paratus sum et non sum turbatus,* ***ut*** *custodiam mandata tua,*" is preceded by "*denique hoc impetrato gratiae beneficio.*" This is even clearer in a comment on v. 80: "*Fiat cor meum immaculatum in iustificationibus tuis,* ***ut*** *non confundar.*"

> Here Christ speaks once more in the voice of his body, his holy people, and prays that his heart – the heart of his members, that is – may be free from stain. This can come about only through God's justifying work, not through any efforts of their own, and so cleanness of heart is prayed for, not presumed. The phrase, *that I may not be put to shame*, is reminiscent of words we met in the opening lines of this psalm, *O that my ways may be directed toward observing your ways of justice! Then I shall not be put to shame, if I look carefully into all*

[42] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXVI.2, CCL 40, 1753-1754. "Orans itaque **ne** tradatur a Domino aduersantibus sibi, quid orat, nisi quod oramus cum dicimus, **Ne** nos inferas in tentationem? Aduersarius est enim de quo dicit Apostolus, **Ne** forte tentauerit uos qui tentat. Ei tradit Deus quem deserit. Eum quippe ille non decipit, quem iste non deserit, in uoluntate sua praestans decori hominis uirtutem…"

[43] Ibid. "Quisquis igitur a timore Dei casto crucifixas habet carnes suas, et nulla carnali corruptus illecebra facit iudicium opusque iustitiae, orare debet **ne** aduersantibus tradatur; id est, **ne** timendo perpeti mala, ad facienda mala persequentibus cedat. A quo enim accipit uictoriam concupiscentiae, **ne** uoluptate pertrahatur; ab illo etiam robur patientiae, ne dolore frangatur…"

> *your statutes*. But there the expression used was *O that …!* (*utinam*) which indicates a wish; here we have instead the language of prayer, *Let my heart be unsullied* (*fiat cor meum immaculatum*). However, there is no disagreement between them, and neither displays the arrogance of free will trusting to itself in opposition to grace. In the earlier verse the psalmist said *I shall not be put to shame* (*tunc non confundar*), and now he prays *that I may not be put to shame* (*ut non confundar*). The heart of Christ's members, the heart of his body, is rendered immaculate by the grace of God that flows to it through its head, that is, through Jesus Christ, our Lord. Grace flows to Christ's members through the laver of rebirth, in which all our past sins have been destroyed… In all these ways, through the new birth given to us, through help afforded to us in our struggle, and through prayer poured out, our heart is purified from its pollution, so that we may not be put to shame.[44]

This attention to grammar is not meant to be taken as an excursion into erudition. Rather, it confirms Augustine's insistence that even the Psalm's syntax affirms the law of grace.

Grace's prayer:

At the outset of *sermo* XIV Augustine comments:

> This man of God (*homo Dei*) has hitherto been begging for the help of God's grace, as he constantly prayed, *In your justice give me life; and let your mercy come upon me, O Lord.*"[45]

Augustine recalls vv. 41-42 of *Psalm* 118, observing in the psalmist's declaration uncontestable evidence of the need to pray for grace. Prayer is a persistent theme throughout the exposition, as already

[44] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XIX.7, CCL 40, 1729. "Redit ad uocem corporis sui, sancti scilicet populi sui, et iam immaculatum fieri cor suum precatur, hoc est cor membrorum suorum; in iustificationibus Dei, non in uiribus eorum: poposcit enim hoc, non praesumpsit. Quod autem addidit, **Ut** non confundar; tale aliquid et in primis huius psalmi uersibus inuenitur, ubi dixit, Utinam dirigantur uiae meae ad custodiendas iustificationes tuas: tunc non confundar, cum inspicio in omnia mandata tua. Quod ibi, quia dixit, Utinam, uno uerbo significauit optantis; hoc isto loco apertioribus uerbis expressit orantis, dicendo, Fiat cor meum immaculatum: **ut** nec in illa, nec in ista sententia, quae utraque una est, inueniatur audacia de libero arbitrio contra gratiam confidentis… Ita donata nobis regeneratione, adiuta conflictione, fusa precatione, fit cor nostrum immaculatum, **ut** non confundamur…"

[45] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XIV.1, CCL 40, 1707. "Petebat enim homo Dei superius adiutorium gratiae Dei, cum dicebat, *In tua iustitia uiuifica me; et ueniat super me misericordia tua, Domine*."

noted by Kannengieser.[46] Augustine is firm to insist, however, that the psalmist's prayer is also theological statement: *Quid igitur orat, nisi ut praecepta quae Deus imponit iubendo, impleri faciat adiuuando*? (*s.*XXVII.6, CCL 40, 1759); *orat ut sibi lex a Domino ponatur* (*s.*XI.1, CCL 40, 1696); *orat ut per spiritum faciat quod per litteram sciebat* (ibid. 4, CCL 40, 1698); *orat ut uelit* (ibid.6, CCL 40, 1698); *ecce orat, ut adiuuetur ad custodienda uerba dei* (*s.*V.3, CCL 40, 1678); *orat... ut concupiscentia qua concupiscitur aduersus spiritum, magis magisque minuatur* (*s.*X.2, CCL 40, 1693); *hoc itaque orat, ut in ipsa uoluntate proficiat* (*s.*XI.6, CCL 40, 1698); *orat ut non sit eius uita sub sole, ubi omnia uanitas; sed in illo sit, in quo se uiuificari petit* (*s.*XII.1, CCL 40, 1700), etc. The prayer for grace covers all aspects of a holy life, from virtuous living to interior peace. At various points throughout the exposition it also prompts Augustine to return to a scriptural text that is highlighted all throughout his writings, namely Mt. 7:7, on asking, seeking, and knocking. Here it becomes a telling affirmation regarding the life of grace. He comments upon v. 131: "*Os meum aperui, et attraxi spiritum, quoniam mandata tua desiderabam.*"

> What else was he longing for, if not to observe God's commandments? But a weak person has no means of performing mighty feats, nor could a little one achieve great things; so he opened his mouth to confess that he could not do it of himself, and he drew in the Breath that would empower him to do it. He opened his mouth **to ask, seek, and knock**; he thirsted, and he drank in the good Spirit, through whom he would be able to do what he could not do unaided: observe the command that was holy, and just, and good. If we, evil as we are, know how to give good gifts to our children, how much more will our Father in heaven give his good Spirit to those who ask him? It is not those impelled by their own spirit, but all those moved by the Spirit of God, who are children of God. This does not mean they do nothing but that they are moved by the good Spirit in what they do (*a bono aguntur ut agant [boni]*), for otherwise they might be active indeed but do nothing good. The more generously the good Spirit is bestowed on someone by the Father, the more he or she becomes a good son or daughter of God.[47]

[46] Kannengieser, 376-377.

[47] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXVII.4, CCL 40, 1758. "Quid desiderabat, nisi facere mandata diuina? Sed non erat unde faceret infirmus fortia, paruulus magna: aperuit os, confitens quod per se ipse non faceret; et attraxit unde faceret: aperuit os **petendo, quaerendo, pulsando**; et sitiens hausit spiritum bonum, unde faceret, quod per seipsum non poterat, *mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum. Si enim nos cum simus mali, nouimus bona data dare filiis nostris; quanto magis Pater noster de coelo dat*

The Christian's life of grace must be a continuous prayer of *petendo*, *quaerendo*, *pulsando*, emblematic of a divine-human spiritual and moral intimacy: *a bono aguntur ut agant.*

> [God] makes us ask for the one we most desire to receive; he makes us seek the one we long to find; he makes us knock at the door of him into whose presence we strive to come. This is what the apostle is teaching us when he says that we cry out, *Abba! Father!* (Rom 8:15) in the Holy Spirit. Again in another place he says, *God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son, crying Abba! Father*! (Gal 4:6). How can we be said to cry out if the Spirit himself is crying out in us? Surely because he has been making us cry out, ever since he first began to dwell in us. Once we have received him he works in us, empowering us to go on demanding more, so that by asking, seeking, knocking, we may receive him in ever greater plenitude. All those who are impelled by the Spirit of God are sons and daughters of God, whether their prayer arises from a good life or begs that a good life may be granted to them (cf. Rom 8:14).[48]

If we must pray for grace, nonetheless, the very prayer for grace is itself a grace! *Ipse nos facit petere.* Once again Augustine affirms a mysterious intimacy that allows for both divine and human agency.

Love and grace:

If Paul provided Augustine with the exegetical-theological resources necessary to bring to light the psalm's *obscuritas*, one Pauline text that served him well was Rom 5:5 with its declaration of God's love poured forth into human hearts by the Holy Spirit. In this *psalmus legis* it ought to come as no surprise that Augustine will be guided by the *lex caritatis*. It is the most used Pauline text (some 11 times) in the exposition and by this time in Augustine's

spiritum bonum petentibus eum? Non enim qui spiritu suo agunt, sed quotquot spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei: non quia ipsi nihil agunt; sed ne nihil boni agant, a bono aguntur ut agant. Nam tanto magis efficitur quisque filius bonus, quanto largius ei datur a Patre spiritus bonus."

[48] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XIV.2, CCL 40, 1709. "Ac per hoc ipse nos facit petere, quem desideramus accipere; ipse nos facit quaerere, quem cupimus inuenire; ipse nos facit pulsare, ad quem nitimur peruenire. Hoc docet Apostolus, qui cum dicat in spiritu sancto nos clamare, *Abba, Pater*; rursus alio loco dicit, *Dedit Deus spiritum Filii sui in corda nostra clamantem, Abba, Pater*. Quomodo nos clamamus, si ipse clamat in nobis, nisi quia clamare nos fecit, dum habitare coepit in nobis? Etiam hoc itaque agit acceptus, ut largius accipiendus petendo, quaerendo, pulsando, poscatur. Siue enim ut uita bona petatur, siue ut bene uiuatur; quotquot spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei."

own theological development has become a key affirmation of the nature and functioning of the grace of Christ.[49] He comments on v. 127: "*Ideo dilexi mandata tua super aurum et topazion.*"

> The effect of grace is that God's commandments, which could not possibly be implemented by fear, are fulfilled by love; for through grace *the charity of God has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given us* (Rom 5:5). This is why the Lord himself declared, *I came not to annul the law, but to bring it to fullness* (Mt 5:17); and the apostle concurred: *The fullness of the law is love* (Rom 13:10).[50]

Augustine turns to Paul to establish an intimate operational link between *gratia* and *caritas*, a connection made even stronger by the Apostle's linking the pair to faith: "*fides quae per dilectionem operatur*" (Gal 5:6).[51] These bonds taken on programmatic status for understanding the true nature and intent of God's law:

> The law he means is the law of faith (see Rom 3:27); not an idle faith, but the faith that is active through love (see Gal 5:6). In response to such faith believers receive the grace that strengthens them in temporal troubles, so that they do not perish in the humiliation attendant on our mortality.[52]

Love resolves what may be perceived as an apparent, inevitable, and even irreconcilable conflict between freedom and obedience, grace and works, law and faith. This faith which works through love is always a "*fides non immemor gratiae*" (*s.*IV.2, CCL 40, 1674). It is this same love which guarantees that the *lex fidei* does not become an *inanis fidei*.[53] Commenting upon v. 119: "*Propterea dilexi testimonia tua, quae sunt in lege tua,*" Augustine delicately holds in harmony grace, love, and the law:

> But that is why *I have loved your testimonies*, the testimonies enshrined in your law, which tell of your grace, bidding me look in

[49] See A.-M. La Bonnardière, "Le verset paulinien Rom. 5,5 dans l'oeuvre de s. Augustin," in *AugM* (1954), 657-665.

[50] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXVI.8, CCL 40, 1756. "Id agit gratia, ut dilectione impleantur mandata Dei, quae timore non poterant. *Gratia* quippe *Dei diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.* Propter quod et ipse Dominus dicit, Non *ueni legem soluere, sed implere*; et idem Apostolus, *Plenitudo legis caritas.*"

[51] Its importance also noted by Kannegieser, 376-377.

[52] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXI.4, CCL 40, 1734. "Ista lex fidei est; non inanis fidei, sed quae per dilectionem operatur. Per hanc impetratur gratia, quae fortes facit in tribulatione temporali, ne pereant in humilitate mortali."

[53] Ibid.

> myself for no righteousness of my own but only yours. The function of law is to send us to grace. Not only does law bear witness to the justice of God to be revealed outside the law; it also turns those who know the law into law-breakers, to such a point that the letter is death-dealing (see 2 Cor 3:6). In either case, the fear it arouses forces us to flee to the life-giving Spirit, through whom every kind of sin is blotted out and charity is breathed into us, that we may act aright. *Therefore*, says the psalmist, *I have loved your testimonies*.[54]

Augustine portrays the grace of love as both transformative and performative. It overcomes fear, it inspires goodly deeds.

Grace's knowledge:

Augustine seems well aware that the theology of grace he is explaining provocatively challenges human understanding. On the surface, it might seem that the Pelagian account of human autonomy and responsibility is much more "reasonable." A frequent charge of Augustine's Pelagian opponents was precisely that this Augustinian view of the divine-human relationship goes against human reason.[55] Augustine provocatively responds to the charge by insisting that grace is necessary for a correct understanding of grace. He comments on v. 66, "*Mandatis tuis credidi*":

> What can it mean, then, to say, *I have believed in your commands*? Surely it means, "I have believed that it was you who so commanded us, not some mere mortal, even though your commands are passed on through human beings to other human beings." And since I have believed that these are your commandments, let the faith by which I believe it win from you the grace I need to do what you have commanded. If someone who is no more than human were to lay those commands on me from outside, would he also help me from within to do what he ordered? Of course not. Do you, then, teach me sweetness by inspiring charity, teach me discipline by granting me patience, and

[54] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXV.5, CCL 40, 1750. "Propterea dilexi testimonia tua, quae sunt in lege tua, de gratia tua; ut non sit in me iustitia mea, sed tua. Lex enim ad hoc prodest, ut mittat ad gratiam. Non solum enim quod attestatur manifestandae iustitiae Dei, quae sine lege est; uerum etiam hoc ipso quod praeuaricantes facit, ita ut etiam littera occidat; ad uiuificantem spiritum confugere timore compellit, per quem peccatorum deleatur uniuersitas, et recte factorum caritas inspiretur: Propterea, inquit, *dilexi testimonia tua*."

[55] See for example how Augustine emphasizes *rationabilius* when arguing against Julian, *c. Iul.* I.7.33, PL 44, 664.

> teach me knowledge by illuminating my intelligence, *because I have believed in your commands*.[56]

"Teach me knowledge by illuminating my intelligence": we have here another action of grace, imparting knowledge and understanding to the mind. This knowledge and understanding, itself a grace, has as its content grace. Augustine finds even greater support for such an affirmation in the "*Da mihi intellectum, et scrutabor legem tuam, et custodiam illam in toto corde meo*" of v. 34: He will repeat it often in the course of the exposition to affirm that the understanding of grace is itself a grace to be sought:

> *Give me understanding, that I may know your testimonies*. We must never cease to offer this prayer, for it is not enough to have received understanding once and learned God's testimonies once; we need to keep on receiving it all the time and to be drinking continually from the fountain of eternal light. As a person grows in understanding, so do God's testimonies become known more and more.[57]

This *intellectum gratiae* is not only a theoretical understanding but a conconmitant commitment to growth and progress: Commenting still another time upon *da mihi intellectum*, he considers what is meant by such understanding:

> Is not understanding a quality inherent in human nature, distinguishing us from the beasts? Or is human nature so badly deformed by sin that even its reason needs reformation? Yes, perhaps it does, for the apostle says to all who are reborn, *Be renewed spiritually in your minds* (Eph 4:23), and obviously understanding is exercised through the mind. Again he says, *Allow yourselves to be reformed by the renewal of your minds* (Rom 4:12). But when he speaks of those who have no share in the new birth, he warns, *This I must say, and adjure you in the Lord: Walk no more now as the pagans walk. Their minds are empty; they are darkened in their understanding and estranged*

[56] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XVII.4, CCL 40, 1721. "Quid est ergo, *mandatis tuis credidi*, nisi, credidi quod tu illa mandaueris, non aliquis homo, quamuis per homines hominibus ministrata sint? Quia itaque credidi tua esse mandata, ipsa fides mea qua id credidi, impetret abs te gratiam qua faciam quod mandasti. Si enim homo mihi haec iuberet forinsecus; numquid, ut etiam facerem quod iubebat, adiuaret intrinsecus? Doce ergo me suauitatem inspirando caritatem, doce me disciplinam donando patientiam, doce me scientiam illuminando intelligentiam: *Quoniam mandatis tuis credidi*."

[57] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXVI.6, CCL 40, 1755. "*Da mihi intellectum, et sciam testimonia tua*. Numquam intermittenda est ista petitio. Non enim sufficit accepisse intellectum, et Dei testimonia didicisse, nisi semper accipiatur, et quodam modo semper bibatur de fonte lucis aeternae. Testimonia quippe Dei, quanto fit quisque intelligentior, tanto magis magisque sciuntur."

> *from the way of God by the ignorance that is in them, owing to the blindness of their hearts* (Eph 4:17). The blindness of the inner eyes is a lack of understanding, but as hearts are cleansed by faith (see Acts 15:9) eyes are opened and become ever clearer. It is true that without some understanding no one can believe in God; but the faith whereby we begin to believe in him has a healing effect, so that we come to understand more. There are some things that we do not believe unless we understand, and others that we do not understand unless we believe. What I mean is this: since faith comes by hearing (Rom 10:17), and hearing receives the word of Christ, how can anyone believe a preacher of the faith unless he or she at least understands the language that is spoken, not to mention all else? On the other hand, there must be some things that we cannot understand unless we first believe, for the prophet says, *Unless your believe, you will not understand* (Is. 7:9, LXX). We must conclude that our understanding develops to grasp more firmly the truths we have believed and that our faith grows to believe more firmly what we have begun to understand. By its very act of understanding the mind develops and thus penetrates the truths of faith more deeply. This process occurs not through our natural powers but by the help and gracious gift of God; it is a process not of nature but of healing, which imparts to a diseased eye the power to see.[58]

Grace is not only a question of the will, it is just as importantly one of the mind, as Augustine lays out a remarkable account of how grace transforms human intellect. Once again he turns to Paul, showing him

[58] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XVIII.3, CCL 40, 1724. "Nonne ipsi naturae humanae intellectus est inditus, ut eo discernatur a pecore? An sic est deformata peccando, ut etiam hoc in ea reformandum sit? Propter quod et Apostolus omnibus ad regenerationem pertinentibus dicit, *Renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae*: et utique intellectus in mente est. Hinc rursus ait, *Reformamini in nouitate sensus uestri*: de his autem qui huius regenerationis consortes non erant, *Hoc* inquit, *dico et testificor in Domino, ut non iam ambuletis sicut et Gentes ambulant in uanitate mentis suae, obscurati intelligentia, alienati a uia Dei per ignorantiam, quae est in illis propter caecitatem cordis eorum*. Propter hos igitur interiores oculos, quorum caecitas est non intelligere, ut aperiantur, et magis magisque serenentur, *fide corda mundantur*. Quamuis enim, nisi aliquid intelligat, nemo possit credere in Deum; tamen ipsa fide qua credit, sanatur, ut intelligat ampliora. Alia sunt enim quae nisi intelligamus, non credimus; et alia sunt quae nisi credamus, non intelligimus. Nam cum *fides sit ex auditu, auditus autem per uerbum Christi*; quomodo credit praedicanti fidem, qui, ut alia taceam, linguam ipsam quam loquitur non intelligit? Sed nisi essent rursus aliqua quae intelligere non possumus, nisi ante credamus, propheta non diceret, *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*. Proficit ergo noster intellectus ad intelligenda quae credat, et fides proficit ad credenda quae intelligat; et eadem ipsa ut magis magisque intelligantur, in ipso intellectu proficit mens. Sed hoc non fit propriis tanquam naturalibus uiribus, sed Deo adiuuante atque donante; sicut medicina fit, non natura, ut uitiatus oculus uim cernendi recipiat."

calling Christians to an on-going and ever deepening understanding of God's workings. This apostolic exhortation is aligned by the Bishop of Hippo with a key Isaian text found in his Latin text of the Septuagint, mined and explored throughout his writings as an affirmation of the complementary relationship that exists between *fides* and *ratio*: "*Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.*" Faith leads to the *gratiae scientia* (*s.*XVI.6, CCL 40, 1718), a knowledge that itself is transformed by love so that it may be profitable:

> ... if knowledge outranks charity in importance, it does not build anyone up but only puffs him up (see 1 Cor 8:1). However, when charity in its sweet benevolence has grown so great that it cannot be quenched by the tribulations to which discipline subjects it, then knowledge will be profitable. Through the gift of knowledge a person comes to know himself better. He discerns what he has merited by his own acts, and what gifts have been bestowed on him by God. He realizes that through those endowments he is capable of things he formerly knew to be impossible for him, things he certainly could not have done by himself.[59]

As in every other aspect of grace's working, a true knowledge and understanding of grace confirm yet again that "all is grace."

Grace and Interiority

A particularly acute challenge Augustine received from his Pelagian opponents was that his articulation of a theology of grace eviscerated human freedom, reducing it to a hollow shell. His recently completed *Contra Iulianum* must still be fresh in his mind where he noted that Julian of Eclanum charged that his theology of grace not only demoralizes the Christian, but given the central role of human sexuality in this debate, encourages licentiousness. "You say," Augustine quotes Julian,

> "that I have no other intention in mind than to swear allegiance to the vices in order to make war against the virtues, to strive for the destruction of the city of God with every bit of cunning and fury, and to frighten with despair over acquiring chastity those who resist

[59] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XVII.2, CCL 40, 1720 "... quoniam si magnitudine sua praecedit scientia magnitudinem caritatis, non aedificat, sed inflat. Cum ergo tanta fuerit caritas in bonitate suaui, ut tribulationibus non possit exstingui, quas adhibet disciplina; tunc utilis erit scientia, qua innotescit etiam sibi homo quid ipse meruerit, et quae a Deo donata sint ei, per quae posse se sciat quae se posse nesciebat, et per seipsum omnino non poterat."

> shamefulness. You say that I falsely claim that the strength of foul sexual desire is so great that reason cannot govern it and hold it in check, for even the legion of apostles did not fight against it."[60]

Throughout the debates Augustine's persistent response to the charge is a never flagging insistence that freedom for goodness is precisely what grace bestows.[61] Grace is the *gratia liberatoris*,[62] the very title *liberator* emphasizing the freedom bestowed. Augustine buttresses his argument in a variety of ways, in particular with the assertion that this action of grace is never invasive nor intrusive because it works from within, doing so in a loving and redemptive way, as only the creator of humankind could so make it work:

> You, who are more intimate to me than my inmost self, have set a law within my heart by the action of your Spirit, as though writing it with your finger. You have written it within me so that I may not dread it like a loveless slave but love it with chaste fear like a son or daughter and fear it with chaste love.[63]

Grace, Augustine insists, does not interfere nor enslave. Echoing here a theme that has been constant since the *Confessions*,[64] Augustine contends that this interior working of God's Spirit is alone what enables us to understand and carry out the true intent of the *lex Dei*:

> This is the Spirit through whom charity is poured out in our hearts, so that by loving God and neighbor we may carry out the divine commands.[65]

In its interiority, grace works upon both mind and will, conferring freedom and manifesting itself as love. God's spirit, the God who creates and redeems humanity, is able to dwell within the human heart in such a way that there is never a question of intrusion, interference,

[60] *C. Iul.* III.26.65, PL 44, 735. "... quod non sit alia mei sensus intentio, quam ad inferendum uirtutibus bellum in uitiorum sacramenta iurare, et ad excidium ciuitatis Dei, omni astu, omni furore conniti, adipiscendae castitatis desperatione repugnantes turpitudini territare, mentiri me tantas obscenae libidinis uires, ut eam ratio regere ac frenare non possit, cui nec Apostolorum legio repugnauerit."

[61] See *c. Iul.* III.1.2, PL 44, 702-703.

[62] See *nupt. et conc.* II.3.8, CSEL 42, 259-260.

[63] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XXII.6, CCL 40, 1740. "Tu interior intimis meis, tu intus in corde legem posuisti mihi spiritu tuo, tanquam digito tuo; ut eam non tanquam seruus sine amore metuerem, sed casto timore ut filius diligerem, et dilectione casta timerem."

[64] *Conf.* III.6.11, CCL 27, 33.

[65] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XIV.2, CCL 40, 1709. "Hic est ille spiritus per quem diffunditur caritas in cordibus nostris, ut Deum proximumque diligendo diuina mandata faciamus."

restriction. *Suauitas* is a key term employed by Augustine to affirm how grace is present, its gentle working and delightful effect. He can thus comment on v. 65, *Suauitatem fecisti cum seruo tuo, Domine, secundum uerbum tuum*:

> Now when the psalm says, *You have provided sweetness for your servant*, I think it means neither more nor less than "you determined that I should be delighted with what is good"; for to find enjoyment in goodness is a great gift from God. If the opposite is the case, and some good action enjoined by law is performed not out of delight in righteousness but from dread of punishment, because God is feared but not loved, that action is done as a slave would do it, not in a spirit of freedom. *But a slave does not stay in the house permanently, whereas a son stays for ever* (Jn 7:35), because *charity made perfect casts out fear* (1 Jn. 4:18). And so, Lord, *you have provided sweetness for your servant* by turning one who was a slave into your son or daughter.[66]

This is the *libertas gloriae filiorum Dei* (Rom 8:20-25), a freedom grounded in grace, a freedom guaranteed by grace, a freedom created by grace, marked by an interior *suauitas* and *delectatio* that restores, empowers, and redirects the will toward God, once God's Spirit dwells within.

> *I walked continually in wide freedom*, says the psalmist, *because I sought your commandments*. He sought them and found them, because he asked for and received the good Spirit. Made good by the Spirit, he was able to do good things well (*quo factus bonus bene faceret bona*) from the faith that operates through love (see Gal 5:6).[67]

Once again Augustine lays out in striking and suggestive language an intimate and reciprocal relationship between God and the faithful, portraying both its graced character on God's part and the moral and spiritual integrity of the believer. There is no question of the giftedness of goodness, yet this goodness proceeds from the very heart of the sons and daughters of God and so, through grace, is truly free.

[66] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XVII.1, CCL 40, 1718-1719. "Nihil hic ergo aliud dictum existimo, *Suauitatem fecisti cum seruo tuo*, nisi, fecisti ut me delectaret bonum. Quando enim delectat bonum, magnum est Dei donum. Quando autem bonum opus quod lex imperat, fit timore poenae, non delectatione iustitiae, cum Deus metuitur, non amatur; seruiliter fit, non liberaliter. *Seruus autem non manet in domo in aeternum, filius manet in aeternum*; quia *consummata charitas foras mittit timorem. Suauitatem* itaque *fecisti cum seruo tuo*, Domine, faciendo filium qui seruus fuit..."

[67] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, XIV.2, CCL 40, 1709. "Ergo *ambulabam*, inquit, *in latitudine quoniam mandata tua exquisiui*. Exquisierat et inuenerat, quoniam petierat et acceperat Spiritum bonum, quo factus bonus bene faceret bona, ex fide quae per dilectionem operatur."

Grace and Imperfection

If the contention is correct that Augustine intends this commentary to be not merely expository but to serve as a veritable handbook for servants of God making progress in holiness, an inevitable theme that must be faced concerns the question of perfection. Not surprisingly, it became another bitterly argued topic during the course of the Pelagian controversy, specifically debated under the protocol of sinlessness.[68] Can God's holy ones achieve such a state of perfection in this life that they no longer sin? Augustine's answer is unequivocal:

> A difficult question was raised by a verse in this psalm. We read there, *Those who break his law have not walked in his ways* (v. 3); and the apostle John asserts that *sin is breaking God's law* (1 Jn 3:4). Yet scripture also says, and rightly, as we know, *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us* (ibid. 1:8). How is it possible, then, that the saints are not without sin in this life and yet walk in the Lord's ways, when those who break his law do not walk in them? It is puzzling, but the apostle Paul resolves the difficulty. *It is not I who am at work, he says, but the sin that dwells in me* (Rom 7:17). How can Paul be without sin, if sin dwells within him? Yet he walks in the Lord's ways, ways untrodden by those who sin, because it is not he himself who does the bad thing but the sin dwelling in him. One problem has been solved, however, only to give rise to another that is more difficult: how can someone be said to act, when it is not he himself who performs the action? Paul asserted both these things: *What I do is what I do not want to do* (Rom 7:16), and, *It is not I who am at work, but the sin that dwells in me*. From these texts we must conclude that when it is the sin dwelling in us that is at work, we ourselves are not performing the action, for then our will in no way consents to it and even keeps control over our bodily members to restrain them from obeying sin's desires. If we do not will it, what can sin effect, other than illicit desires? If the will does not consent to such desires, there can indeed be emotional upheaval, but sin is given no scope to achieve its purpose. The apostle commanded us to make sure this is the case: *Do not let sin reign in your mortal body, so as to persuade you to yield to its cravings; and do not make your members available to sin as weapons of iniquity* (ibid. 6: 12, 13).[69]

[68] Recent scholarship has questioned Augustine's portrayal of "the Pelagians" in this regard; see M. Lamberigts, "Recent Research into Pelagianism," *Augustiniana* 52 (2002), 2/4, 181.

[69] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, III.1, CCL 40, 1671. "Propter id quod in psalmo isto scriptum est, *Non enim qui operantur iniquitatem, in uiis eius ambulauerunt*, quoniam *peccatum iniquitas est*, sicut Ioannes apostolus dicit, exorta difficilis quaestio, Quomodo possint sancti in hac uita et non esse sine peccato, quia et illud uerum est, *Si dixerimus*

Throughout the debates about "sinlessness" Augustine has looked to Paul, finding in both his teaching and example a holiness not marked by perfection but rather by humility.[70] "Tell us please, apostle: during your life in the flesh, when you were walking in the Lord's ways, did you sin at all, or were you without sin?" (*s.*II.2, CCL 40, 1670). Drawing upon key and theologically dense texts from *Romans* (anchoring the just excerpted text) as well as other Pauline affirmations such as: "*Quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem* (2 Cor 5:6, 7), Augustine proposes a model for Christian holiness marked not by accomplishment and victory but by tension and struggle. A favorite Augustinian description of this situation, once again taken from Pauline writings, is *corpus mortis huius*, the body of this death (see *ss.*II.3, CCL 40, 1671; X.2, CCL 40, 1693; XX.3, CCL 40, 1731; see Rom 7:24). This is not an "anatomical" statement but a key Augustinian affirmation regarding theological anthropology: the "body of this death" refers to a present embodied experience marked by the wounds and scars of the first sin and a haunting and intractable mortality. It is buttressed by a constant reference to *pereginatio*, *exercitatio*, and *humilitas*, true Augustinian hallmarks of the spiritual journey. *Pereginatio* reminds one that an eartly home is not to be found: "*et in hac peregrinatione gemitu pio supernae patriae suspirarunt*" (*s.*VIII.1, CCL 40, 1685); *exercitatio* teaches that there is never room for complacency: "*Sic autem se in dei mandatis exercet ecclesia, aduersus omnes inimicos fidei Christianae atque catholicae* (*s.*VI.4, CCL 40, 1681); and *humilitas* becomes the defining characteristic of

quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et ueritas in nobis non est; et tamen ambulare uias Domini, quas non ambulant qui operantur iniquitatem: soluta est, dicente apostolo Paulo, *Iam non ergo operor illud, sed id quod in me habitat peccatum.* Quomodo enim est sine peccato, in quo habitat peccatum? Ambulat tamen uias Domini, quas non ambulant qui operantur; quia iam non ipse operatur illud, sed quod in eo habitat peccatum. Verumtamen ita soluta est quaestio ista, ut difficilior altera nasceretur, Quomodo agat homo quod ipse non agit. Utrumque enim dixit; et, *Non quod uolo, ago*; et, *Non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum.* Unde intelligere debemus, quando peccatum quod habitat in nobis, operatur in nobis, tunc nos id non operari; quando nequaquam ei uoluntas nostra consentit, et tenet etiam corporis membra, ne obediant desideriis eius. Quid enim operatur peccatum nolentibus nobis, nisi sola illicita desideria? Quibus si uoluntatis non adhibeatur assensus; mouetur quidem nonnullus affectus, sed nullus ei relaxatur effectus. Hoc praecepit idem apostolus, ubi dicit: *Non ergo regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore, ad obediendum desideriis eius; nec exhibeatis membra uestra arma iniquitatis peccato.*"

[70] In this regard see the comments by Pierre-Marie Hombert, *"Gloria Gratiae". Se glorifie en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 306-310.

Christian holiness, placing in proper perspective all other virtues and aspirations: *profecto haec ipsa humilitas in loco peregrinationis huius, quae nox recte intelligitur, prodest eis qui salubriter exercentur in ea, ut discant non superbire*; (*s.*XV.8, CCL 40, 1715). It is from this perspective that Augustine offers a model for the spiritual journey that is marked by a progressive rather than a success model: *et quamdiu uiuitur in hoc mundo, proficientium est ista cantatio* (*s.*XVII.2, CCL 40, 1719). This emphasis on *proficere* enables Augustine to insist on improvement and yet hold firm to a notion of imperfection. This is not meant to encourage mediocrity or negligence, rather its intent is a humble diligence.

> Let Christ's holy family raise a different cry, Christ's holy fellowship that is bearing fruit and growing throughout the whole world, humble in its truthfulness and truthful in its humility. Let it shout, *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. But if we confess our sins, he is so faithful and just that he forgives us our sins, and cleanses us from all iniquity* (1 Jn 1:8-9). This declaration must be matched by inner conviction, for humility will be genuine if it is not so much flaunted by the tongue as modeled on the apostle's description: *Not haughty, but of one mind with humble folk.* (Rom 12:16).[71]

This awareness of imperfection prompts both humble dedication and an ever-deepening receptivity to progressing in God's grace: "*et ab hac morte si perseueranter proficit, quotidie reuiuiscere, uiuificante illo, cuius gratia homo noster interior renouatur de die in diem*" (2 Cor 4.16).

Via gratiae[72]

If Augustine has given to those entrusted with the task of teaching and preaching the scriptures the capstone for his monumental *opus* on the Psalter, he has equally offered in this lengthy series of

[71] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, II.1, CCL 40, 1669. "Exclamet autem sancta familia Christi, fructificans et crescens in uniuerso mundo, humiliter uerax et ueraciter humilis; exclamet, inquam: *Si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et ueritas in nobis non est. Quod si confessi fuerimus delicta nostra, fidelis est et iustus, ut dimittat nobis peccata nostra, et mundet nos ab omni iniquitate.* Haec ut dicuntur, ita sentiantur. Tunc enim erit humilitas uera, si non sola ostentetur in lingua; ut simus secundum Apostolum, *non alta sapientes, sed humilibus consentientes.*"

[72] *En. Ps. CXVIII*, X.6, CCL 40, 1695. "Non currerem, nisi dilatasses cor meum."

homilies a veritable guide, complex as it is comprehensive, for the journey of grace. In the step-by-step exposition, each verse of the great psalm, one might say, shedding light on yet another stage or aspect of the path of grace, Augustine sets forth not so much a systematic program for attaining virtue and holiness but rather a set of guiding values and principles. The very expansive nature of the commentary suggests the dynamic and unprogrammatic character of the journey of faith, one that cannot be circumscribed by rubrical formulas, one that cannot be simplistically reduced to specific practices or behavioral details, yet a journey in need of guiding values and principles grounded in, expressive of, and secured by key Christological and scriptural affirmations. The foundational affirmation remains always *gratia Christi*, humbly acknowledged and lovingly lived, so that *gratia*, *caritas*, and *humilitas* become together the hallmarks of an Augustinian vision of the Christian life. What is perhaps most remarkable about the exposition is the way it takes all of the hard-fought theological principles of the Pelagian controversy and turns them into living precepts for making progress in grace. It reminds us that Augustine the theologian and polemicist can never by separated from Augustine the pastor and spiritual guide – and himself *seruus Dei*. His insistence that "all is grace" is never merely a theoretical or academic insistence but is intended to be a profound statement about the Christian life, how it is to be lived, its affirmation offering the only sure guide for a true life in God, the life of faith and holiness. It is equally evident that Augustine never discounted the importance of *understanding* the journey, its history, make-up, content, and implications: the Psalmist's *da mihi intellectum* becomes both a call and a warrant to undertake the journey intelligently, with heart **and** mind, the scriptures ever in hand as both map and mirror. In the end, the expositor has received from Augustine not only a valuable exegetical-hermeneutical resource, but perhaps even more importantly, a vision of the journey of faith, with the law of grace as both light and path.

Thomas F. MARTIN OSA

DER ANFANG DES GLAUBENS: VERDIENST ODER GNADE?

Die Wendung *initium fidei* thematisiert in der Gnadenlehre Augustins das Problem, ob der Anfang des Glaubens, der *fides qua creditur*[1], primär menschliches Werk oder göttliches Geschenk, Verdienst oder Gnade ist. Sie wurde von Augustin geprägt und in die westliche Theologie eingeführt, in der sie vor ihm weder als fester Terminus noch als theologisches Sachproblem zu finden ist.[2]

Bei Augustin selbst kommt die Wendung erst in den anti- und semipelagianischen Schriften inhaltlich geklärt und entfaltet vor. Das Sachproblem hingegen ohne Verwendung des Terminus *initium fidei* findet man schon in früheren Schriften angesprochen, wenn auch in einer Entwicklung begriffen, die in Simpl. 1,2 zu ihrem Abschluss gelangte.[3] Außerdem gebrauchte Augustin die Wendung *initium fidei* auch in allgemeinsprachlichem Sinn und unterschiedlicher Bedeutung, wie zunächst gezeigt werden soll.

1. Die Wendung *initium fidei* in allgemeinsprachlicher Bedeutung

Zum ersten Mal wird die Wendung *initium fidei* in exp. Gal. 38,9 CSEL 84,107, entstanden 394/395[4], erwähnt. In Auslegung von Gal 4,19 stellt hier Augustin den Anfang des Glaubens seiner Erstarkung und Vollendung gegenüber. Das Problem, ob dieser Anfang gnadenhaft oder verdienstlich, also vom freien Willen des Menschen oder von der Gnade initiiert ist, steht allerdings nicht im Gesichtsfeld des Auslegers, gibt darum auch für die Lösung dieses Problems

[1] In der erst von Augustin getroffenen Unterscheidung von *fides quae* und *fides qua creditur* gehört *initium fidei* zur letzteren und bezeichnet den Glaubensakt, in dem sich der menschliche Wille der fides (catholica) zuwendet, so dass diese im Geist des Glaubenden ist. Vgl. trin. 13,5 CCL 50A,386:... aliud sunt ea quae creduntur, aliud fides qua creduntur. Illa quippe in rebus sunt quae uel esse uel fuisse uel futura esse dicuntur; haec autem in animo credentis est, ei tantum conspicua cuius est, quamuis sit et in aliis, non ipsa sed similis. Vgl. dazu ebd. 14,11 CCL 50A,438; perf. iust. 41 CSEL 42,44 (unten FN 65); LÜHRMANN 113-115. 117f.

[2] Bezüglich Origenes und der griechischen Vätertradition vgl. unten S. (164f).

[3] Augustin verweist in praed. sanct. 8 PL 44,965f und perseu. 52.55 PL 45,1025f.1027 auf *Ad Simplicianum* als die Schrift, in der er seine neu gewonnene Erkenntnis, auch der Anfang des Glaubens sei gnadengeschenkt, zum ersten Mal niedergeschrieben habe; vgl. unten S. (167-174).

[4] Vgl. PERLER-MAIER 158; RING, Proleg. 2,26.

nichts her.[5] Dies gilt auch von en. Ps. 9,14 CCL 38,66, wo Augustin die portae... filiae Sion (vgl. Ps 9,15) als die sacramenta et *initia fidei,* quae pulsantibus aperiuntur (vgl. Mt 7,7), deutet.[6] Möglicherweise befindet sich eine weitere frühe Erwähnung des Glaubensanfangs in en. Ps. 33,1,10; 2,2 CCL 38,281.283, doch auch hier sagt Augustin nichts zu dessen Verdienstlichkeit oder Gnadenhaftigkeit.[7] Auch in späteren Werken, die nicht zur Gruppe der Gnadenschriften gehören, kommt *initium fidei* vor, ohne dass Augustin damit die Frage nach Verdienst oder Gnade tangieren würde. So versteht er beispielsweise in en. Ps. 35,1 (entstanden 412) unter *initium fidei* den anfänglichen Glauben, dem noch die Einsicht fehlt, oder er stellt wie in s. 168,2 (vor 416) den bloßen Glauben dem durch die Liebe wirkenden Glauben oder wie in Io. eu. tr. 40,9 (nach 413) dem vorläufigen Glauben hier dessen Lohn in der ewigen Schau gegenüber.[8]

2. Der Glaubensanfang ohne die Wendung *initium fidei* in Werken vor *Ad Simplicianum*

Ohne die Wendung *initium fidei* zu gebrauchen, äußert sich Augustin auch schon in Werken vor Simpl. zum Sachproblem des Glaubensursprungs und dessen Bezug zur Gnade. Es handelt sich hierbei in erster Linie um Auslegungen zum Römer- und Galaterbrief, die er allesamt als Presbyter etwa zwischen 391 und 396 verfasst hat.

Am deutlichsten und ausführlichsten spricht er über das Problem in der *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad*

[5] LÖHRER 251 FN 3 deutet die Stelle dahingehend, dass mit *initium fidei* "der ganze Glaube, durch den der Mensch wiedergeboren wird" gemeint sei. Aber dann ist m. E. der Terminus *initium* hier nicht nur überflüssig, sondern geradezu unsinnig. Augustin sieht in Gal 4,19 den Anfang des Glaubens seiner Fortentwicklung gegenübergestellt: Paulus sorget sich nicht um den Anfang des Glaubens, einen Akt in der Vergangenheit, mit dem die Galater gläubig wurden, sondern um die Weiterentwicklung und Reifung ihres Glaubens.

[6] Die Entstehungszeit von en. Ps. 9 ist umstritten; vgl. CCL 38,V.XV-XIX; RONDET 62(1961)114-127.

[7] Die Entstehung dieser beiden Enarrationes lässt sich nicht exakt festlegen, sondern wird für den Zeitraum von 395 bis 405 angenommen; vgl. RONDET 65(1964)110-113. Zeitlich nicht einzuordnen ist s. 43,1 CCL 41,508: Initium bonae uitae, cui uita etiam aeterna debetur, recta fides est. Est autem fides credere quod nondum uides, cuius fidei merces est uidere quod credis. Hier werden der Glaube, der Anfang des guten Lebens, hier auf Erden und die Schau im Jenseits als seine Belohnung gegenübergestellt.

[8] Vgl. ferner trin. 1,1.4; en. Ps. 31,2,5; 70,2,3; s. 71,19; 105,6; 168,2; Io. eu. tr. 103,3; KANY 322f.

Romanos[9], einem kleineren Werk, das als Niederschrift von mündlichen Erklärungen im Sommer/Herbst 394 entstanden ist.[10] Er stellt hier in 52,12 CSEL 84,35 die unmissverständliche Regel auf: *Quod ergo credimus, nostrum est, quod autem bonum operamur, illius, qui credentibus in se dat spiritum sanctum.* Der Glaube ist dem Menschen, das gute Werk ist Gott zuzuschreiben, der dem Glaubenden zum Tun des Guten den Heiligen Geist schenkt. Der Mensch entscheidet sich zwar kraft eigenen Willensaktes für den Glauben, ist dabei aber nicht autark, sondern auf die Berufung durch Gott angewiesen, da er ohne diese überhaupt nicht wollen kann.[11] Im Vorherwissen des künftigen Glaubens, doch ohne Berücksichtigung der künftigen guten Werke, die Gott ja selbst gnadenhaft schenkt, beruft er den Menschen. Die Tatsache, dass einer aufgrund eigener Willensentscheidung gläubig wird, ist der notwendige und zugleich verdienstvolle Anfang, dem aber zeitlich die Berufung durch Gott vorangeht. Der Glaubende muss aber auch das Gute tun, wozu sein Wille allein nicht die Kraft hat; diese erhält er von Gott, der dem Glaubenden im Hl. Geist die Liebe eingießt, also Gnade als Lohn für den Glauben.[12]

Augustin verankerte also in dieser Zeit die Erwählung durch Gott im menschlichen Glauben und Wollen, welche die von Gott vorausgewussten Kriterien der Erwählung bilden.[13] Aus der Erwählung

[9] Die Ausführungen Augustins finden sich vor allem in den Kapiteln 52-54, einer Auslegung von Röm 9,11-13.15-21. Die Edition von J. Divjak in CSEL 84, die hier benützt wird, hat die Kapitelseinteilung der Mauriner nicht übernommen, sondern eine neue eingeführt. Nach PL 35,2078-2081 handelt es sich hier um die Kapitel 60-62. Zu Augustins Auffassung vom Glaubensanfang in exp. prop. Rm. vgl. MARAFIOTI 545-549; DRECOLL 147-171.

[10] Vgl. retr. 1,24 CCL 57,71-73; MUTZENBECHER, Einleitung: CCL 44,XXX; PERLER-MAIER 162; RING, Proleg. 1,11.

[11] Vgl. exp. prop. Rm. 54 CSEL 84,36:... quia neque velle possumus, nisi vocemur, et cum post vocationem voluerimus, non sufficit voluntas nostra et cursus noster, nisi deus et vires currentibus praebeat et perducat, quo vocat. Vgl. auch unten FN 12:... non quidem deus elegit opera, quae ipse largitur,... sed tamen elegit fidem. Augustin kennt hier nur ein Wollen, das in der Reaktion auf eine äußere oder innere Anregung besteht; ein rein intentionales Wollen liegt außerhalb seines Gesichtskreises.

[12] Vgl. ebd. 52,9f CSEL 84,34: Sed quoniam spiritus sanctus non datur nisi credentibus, non quidem deus elegit opera, quae ipse largitur, cum dat spiritum sanctum, ut per caritatem bona operemur, sed tamen elegit fidem. Quia nisi quisque credat in eum et in accipiendi uoluntate permaneat, non accipit donum dei, id est spiritum sanctum, per quem diffusa caritate bonum possit operari....; 53,6 CSEL 84,36: Non ergo elegit deus bene operantes sed credentes potius, ut ipse illos faciat bene operari.

[13] Diesen widersprüchlichen Erwählungsbegriff hat Augustin später, bemerkenswerterweise erst lang nach Simpl., aufgegeben und die Erwählung einzig an den göttlichen Ratschluss gebunden gesehen; vgl. RING, Proleg. 3,266-268; Electio in der Gnadenlehre; ders., Art. Electio.

fließt die Berufung, die folglich mittelbar von der künftigen Glaubensentscheidung des Menschen abhängt, faktisch aber dieser in der Zeit vorausgehen muss, da der Mensch ohne sie überhaupt nicht wollen kann.[14] Die Berufung ist eine Art äußerer Gnade, deren Gnadenhaftigkeit nach den Worten Augustins darin besteht, dass sie dem Sünder zuteil wird, der noch keine Verdienste aufweist, sondern nur Böses, für das er die Verdammung verdient hätte.[15] Dabei hält Augustin – wohl mit antimanichäischer Tendenz zur Verteidigung der Willensfreiheit – unerschütterlich daran fest, dass der Willensensakt, in dem der Mensch sich zum Glauben und dann kraft der Liebe zum guten Werk entscheidet, in der Macht des menschlichen Willens liegt.[16] Der Anfang des Glaubens ist Verdienst, weil der menschliche Wille sich ja aus eigener Kraft für die Berufung zum Glauben entscheidet; im Glauben wiederum verdient er sich den Hl. Geist, dessen Eingießung eigentlich doch Gnade ist, durch die der Glaubende gut handeln kann, so dass er sich das ewige Leben verdient.[17] Die Widersprüchlichkeit dieser Argumentation – in der Sache wie in der Terminologie – ist unübersehbar. Augustin wird sie dann in Simpl. selbst aufdecken und korrigieren.

Auch wenn die alternative Frage nach dem Ursprung des Glaubensaktes im menschlichen Willen oder in der Gnade nicht Gegenstand direkter Erörterungen in der exp. Gal. war und Augustin sich daher hier auch nicht ausdrücklich zu diesem Problem geäußert hat[18], steht diesbezüglich sein Galaterkommentar noch ganz im Denkhorizont von exp. prop. Rm., wie dies z. B. auch seine fast zeitgleich verfasste unvollendete Schrift über den Römerbrief, ep. Rm. inch. 7,7, bezeugt:

[14] Vgl. oben FN 11.

[15] Vgl. exp. prop. Rm. 52 CSEL 84,35: Est autem gratia, ut uocatio peccatori praerogetur, cum eius merita nulla, nisi ad damnationem praecesserint. Quod si uocatus uocantem secutus fuerit, quod est iam in libero arbitrio, merebitur et spiritum sanctum per quem bona possit operari, in quo permanens – quod nihilominus est in libero arbitrio – merebitur etiam uitam aeternam, quae nulla possit labe corrumpi. Beachtenswert ist hierbei, dass Augustin in diesem Zusammenhang dreimal hintereinander das Wort Gnade gebraucht, in exp. prop. Rm. insgesamt vergleichsweise nur 15-mal.

[16] Vgl. oben FN 12:... nisi quisque credat in eum et in accipiendi uoluntate permaneat, non accipit donum dei, id est spiritum sanctum,...; FN 15:... quod est iam in libero arbitrio... quod nihilominus est in libero arbitrio...

[17] Vgl. oben FN 15:... merebitur et spiritum sanctum... merebitur etiam uitam aeternam...

[18] Vgl. RING, Proleg. 2,30f.33f. Zur Gnadenlehre Augustins in exp. Gal. vgl. DRECOLL 171-187. Der Autor verweist zu Recht darauf, dass Augustin in exp. Gal. eine genauere Verhältnisbestimmung und Zuordnung von *gratia* und *fides* nicht getroffen habe (187.207).

Quamquam enim sibi quis tribuat, quod uocanti obtemperat, nemo potest sibi tribuere, quod uocatus est.[19] Dies hat den gleichen Sinn wie die oben zitierte Regel in exp. prop. Rm. 60. Obschon Augustin in exp. Gal. relativ oft von *gratia fidei* spricht, darf diese Wendung daher nicht im Sinne seines späteren radikalen Gnadenbegriffs verstanden werden. Noch hält er ja daran fest, dass der Wille den Glaubensakt eigenständig und verdienstlich setzt. Doch ist davon auszugehen, dass dieser Gedanke in den Zusammenhängen, an denen Augustin die Wendung *gratia fidei* gebraucht, überhaupt nicht anklingt. Es geht hier hauptsächlich um die Gnade des Glaubens an Jesus Christus, um das dritte heilsgeschichtliche Stadium, in dem die Liebe die Glaubenden befähigt, das Gesetz zu erfüllen und das Gute zu tun, im Unterschied zum Zustand *sub lege*, der zweiten heilsgeschichtlichen Stufe, in der die überstarke Begierlichkeit den menschlichen Willen stets besiegt, so dass er das Gute nur wirkungslos wollen, aber nicht tun kann.[20] Bei *gratia fidei* in exp. Gal. handelt es sich also um grundsätzliche Aussagen zur Heilsgeschichte und kaum um solche, die über die Rezeption von Gnade und Glauben durch das Individuum handeln.[21] In der Wendung *gratia fidei* nähert sich ferner *gratia* der Bedeutung nach stark der Liebe an. Die Liebe ist die Gnade, die dem Glaubenden als Lohn für seinen Glauben geschenkt wird und ohne die von ihm weder das Gesetz erfüllt noch das Gute getan werden kann.[22]

Auch in den übrigen Schriften vor Simpl. hat *gratia fidei* noch nicht im vollen Sinne die Bedeutung, dass der ganze Glaube,

[19] Fast wortgleich ist diu. qu. 68,4 CCL 44A,181: Propterea et si quisquam sibi tribuit quod uenit uocatus, non sibi potest tribuere quod uocatus est. Vgl. auch exp. prop. Rm. 53.

[20] Über die vier heilsgeschichtliche Stadien bzw. Stufen äußert sich Augustin u. a. hier in exp. Gal. 46 CSEL 84,120-122 und besonders ausführlich in diu. qu. 66,3-7 CCL 44A,154-163. Vgl. ferner unten FN 22f; RING, Proleg. 2,31.36-38.287-297. 359-362 FN 108; DRECOLL, insbesondere S. 150-159.180-199.203-207.

[21] Vgl. z.B. exp. Gal. 1.15f.18f.; TESELLE 1335f.

[22] Vgl. exp. Gal. 1 CSEL 84,55: Non enim aufert peccata nisi gratia fidei, quae per dilectionem operatur (vgl. Gal 5,6); ebd. 46 CSEL 84,120f:... nec intelligunt hoc eis dictum, si gratiam fidei susceptam tenere nolunt, per quam solam possunt spiritu ambulare et concupiscentias carnis non perficere, si ergo nolunt eam tenere,... uincuntur concupiscentia carnis, quam sequendo deserunt gratiam fidei... Tertia est uita sub gratia, quando nihil temporalis commodi iustitiae praeponitur, quod nisi caritate spirituali, quam dominus exemplo suo docuit et gratia donauit, fieri non potest. Vgl. ferner ebd. 24 CSEL 84,88: Superbienti ergo populo lex posita est, ut, quoniam gratiam caritatis nisi humiliatus accipere non posset et sine hac gratia nullo modo praecepta legis impleret, transgressione humiliaretur, ut quaereret gratiam...; ebd. 61 CSEL 84,136: Seminatio in spiritu est ex fide cum caritate seruire iustitiae et non obaudire desideriis peccati, quamuis de mortali carne existentibus. Vgl. oben FN 12; RING, Proleg. 2,31 FN 19; 33f; 358 FN 104.

einschließlich seinem Anfang, Gnade ist. Man muss vielmehr von der Voraussetzung ausgehen, dass Augustin auch hier unausgesprochen den Akt der Glaubensannahme dem menschlichen Willen zuschreibt und dass *gratia fidei* meist das dritte heilsgeschichtliche Stadium meint[23] oder den sakramentalen Anfang des Glaubens (vielleicht Taufe und Eucharistie)[24]. In diu. qu. 66,2.7 CCL 44A,153.163 äußert sich Augustin dahingehend, dass durch den Glauben die Gnade kommt bzw. die Hilfe des Erlösers erfleht wird, so dass der Glaubende die Erlösung verdient. Indirekt spricht er hier also vom Glauben als Ursache der Gnade, auch wenn das Problem nicht näher berücksichtigt wird. In diu. qu. 68 hingegen zeigt er ein gewisses Schwanken in seinen Ausführungen, so dass man meinen könnte, hier kündige sich schon die Problemlösung von Simpl. 1,2 an: *Ipsa autem gratia, quae data est per fidem, nullis nostris meritis praecedentibus data est. Quod est enim meritum peccatoris et impii? Christus autem pro impiis et peccatoribus mortuus est, ut ad credendum non merito, sed gratia uocaremur, credendo autem etiam meritum compararemus* (ebd. 3 CCL 44A,177f). D.h. mit anderen Worten, dass wir zwar durch den Glauben die Gnade erlangen, aber unverdientermaßen, wenn der Gnade keine Verdienste unsererseits vorausgehen; denn zum Glauben werden wir aus Gnade gerufen, die nicht der Glaube verdient, sondern für uns Sünder Christus in seinem Tod verdient hat. Durch den Glauben wird nicht die Gnade verdient, wohl aber werden durch ihn Verdienste erworben. Andererseits schreibt Augustin ebd. 4, dass Gottes Wille nicht ungerecht sein kann, daher müssen in den Erwählten verborgenste Verdienste vorausgehen, wodurch sie zwar nicht gerechtfertigt sind, wohl aber der Rechtfertigung so würdig sind, wie andere wegen ihrer Sünden und fehlenden Reue Verhärtung und Verstoßung verdienen; denn ebd. 5 bestimmt Augustin diese verborgensten Verdienste als ein Weniger an Sünden oder als Reueschmerz über diese, wodurch man des Erbarmens Gottes würdig ist. Es muss also irgendwie im Menschen der von Gott vorhergewusste gute Wille vorausgehen, dem ja auf Erden der Friede verheißen ist (vgl. Lk 2,14). Doch wird dieser gute Wille durch äußere oder innere

[23] Vgl. diu. qu. 61,7 CCL 44A,129f: Toto enim saeculo generis humani tertium tempus est, quo *fidei christianae gratia* data est; primum est ante legem, secundum sub lege, tertium sub gratia; et quoniam quartum adhuc restat, quo ad plenissimam pacem Hierusalem caelestis uenturi sumus, quo tendit quisquis recte credit in Christum,…

[24] Vgl. ep. Rm. inch. 16 CSEL 84,168: Si enim propterea credit non dari ueniam, quia *gratia fidei* sacramentisque fidelium iam perceptis non potest dici peccasse ignorantia, uideat… aliam causam esse, cum dicitur propterea non ignosci, quia uerbum dixit aduersus spiritum sanctum.

Zeichen hervorgerufen, da der Mensch ohne eine solche Berufung überhaupt nicht wollen kann. Die Berufung bewirkt vor jedem Verdienst den guten Willen; daher mag zwar einer den Willensakt, aufgrund dessen er zum ewigen Hochzeitsmahl (vgl. Lk 14,16-24) kommt, sich selbst zuschreiben, die Berufung kann er keinesfalls sich selbst zuschreiben.[25]

Der hermeneutische Schlüssel für die Gedanken Augustins ist das Vorherwissen Gottes, das für die Erwählung und Berufung des Menschen, seiner Vorherbestimmung zu Gnade und Heil, bestimmend ist. Es ist dies nach Augustin aber nur im Blick auf den künftigen Glauben des Menschen, nicht im Blick auf dessen ebenfalls vorhergewussten guten Taten, die ja Gaben seiner Gnade sind und nicht wie der primäre Glaubensakt eigenständiges Verdienst des Menschen.[26] In diu. qu. 68 wird auch der künftige Glaube nicht mehr direkt genannt, sondern ganz allgemein der gute Wille und verborgenste Verdienste, bestehend in einem Weniger an Sünden oder in der Reue über diese, die, wie man folgern darf, dem göttlichen Allwissen natürlich nicht verborgen sind, so dass Gott entsprechend diesem seinen Wissen gerecht zu Heil oder Verdammnis vorherbestimmt. Die *praescientia* Gottes ist so etwas wie die Vermittlung oder Brücke zwischen der göttlichen Allmacht und Gerechtigkeit in der Zuteilung (oder Verweigerung) der Gnade einerseits und der Eigenständigkeit und Verdienstlichkeit des menschlichen Willensaktes zum Glauben (bzw. der Verwerflichkeit seines Unglaubens) andererseits. In der Zeit geht das Wirken Gottes am Menschen, gerade auch bezüglich dessen Glauben, dem menschlichen Verhalten immer voraus, trotzdem ist die von Gott *vorhergesehene* Willensentscheidung des Menschen zum Glauben, seine Annahme der göttlichen Berufung, entscheidend und damit auch

[25] Vgl. diu. qu. 68,4f CCL 44A,180f: Prorsus cuius uult miseretur et quem uult obdurat; sed haec uoluntas dei iniusta esse non potest. Venit enim de occultissimis meritis… Praecedit ergo aliquid in peccatoribus, quo quamuis nondum sint iustificati, digni efficiantur iustificatione. (5.)… leuioribus quisque peccatis aut certe quamuis grauioribus et multis, tamen magno gemitu et dolore paenitendi misericordia dei dignus fuerit… sed deus non miseretur,… nisi uoluntas praecesserit, quia in terra pax hominibus bonae uoluntatis. Et quoniam nec uelle quisquam potest nisi admonitus et uocatus,… efficitur ut etiam ipsum uelle deus operetur in nobis…. Vocatio ergo ante meritum uoluntatem operatur. Propterea et si quisquam sibi tribuit quod uenit uocatus, non sibi potest tribuere quod uocatus est. In diu. qu. 76,1 CCL 44A,218-220 ist das Problem des Glaubensanfangs nicht angesprochen, sondern es geht um eine Harmonisierung zwischen Jak 2,20 und Röm 3,28: Dem Glauben gehen keine Gesetzeswerke voraus (Röm), sondern diese folgen notwendigerweise aus ihm (Jak). Vgl. Ring, Jakobusbrief, insbesondere S. 97f.160f.171-174.

[26] Vgl. exp. prop. Rm. 52,9f; 53,6; oben FN 12. Vgl. ferner Ring, Proleg. 1,108-110 FN 30f.35.

ursächlich für Gottes Vorherbestimmung. Darin äußert sich eine Spannung und Widersprüchlichkeit, die Augustin auf die Dauer nicht übersehen konnte; er hat sie vielmehr dann in der erneuten Auslegung von Röm 9 in Simpl. 1,2 so gelöst: Gott *reagiert* nicht auf das Verdienst des Menschen, sondern er *agiert* ursächlich durch die Spendung der Gnade, aus welcher der Glaube folgt, durch den der Mensch mit dem Tun des Guten verdienstlich *reagiert*.

Da auch in den weiteren Schriften Augustins vor Simpl. die maßgebliche Bedeutung des göttlichen Vorherwissens, also die Orientierung Gottes am künftigen menschlichen Verhalten, zumindest implizit gelehrt wird, muss dies bei der Interpretation aller seiner dortigen Aussagen zu Gnade und Glauben berücksichtigt werden.[27]

3. Die Tradition vor Augustin

Mit seiner Lehre von der Erstverantwortlichkeit des Menschen für den Glaubensakt und vom Vorherwissen Gottes als Voraussetzung für seine Vorherbestimmung[28] war Augustin von einer Tradition beeinflusst, die man in Ost und West findet.[29]

ORIGENES äußerte sich in seinem Römerbriefkommentar mehrfach und ausführlich über das Vorherwissen und Vorherbestimmen Gottes, wobei er betonte, dass etwas nicht deswegen sein wird, weil Gott es vorherweiß, sondern weil es sein wird, weiß Gott es vorher. Gottes Vorherwissen dient für seine Verfügungsmacht, schränkt aber dabei die Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen nicht ein.[30] Er zieht auch den Schöpfungsgedanken heran, indem er lehrt, dass wir von Gott die Kraft zur Bewegung anerschaffen bekommen haben, wir selbst aber gebrauchen diese Bewegung zum Guten oder Schlechten hin. Wir haben vom Schöpfer das Wollen und Vollenden erhalten, wir selbst

[27] Für die Aussagen AUGUSTINS zum Verhältnis zwischen menschlichem Glauben und Gnade in seinen übrigen frühen Schriften vgl. LÖHRER 233-241; für exp. Gal. vgl. DRECOLL 171-187; für diu. qu. 68 vgl. MARAFIOTI 549-555;

[28] Vgl. Schelkle 340-343.346f.348.350.352f.

[29] Zu ORIGENES vgl. GORDAY 77f; HEITHER 4,16-19; LÜHRMANN 91-94; zu ORIGENES und andere vgl. SCHELKLE 347f.

[30] Vgl. z. B. Ad Rom. 7,8 PG 14,1126 (HEITHER 4,98f):… secundum dei propositum, qui sciens in eis religiosam mentem et salutis inesse desiderium, vocati dicantur… Hoc ergo pacto neque in praescientia dei vel salutis vel perditionis nostrae causa consistit… Nam etsi communi intellectu de praescientia sentiamus, non propterea erit aliquid, quia id scit deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, scitur a deo, antequam fiat. Vgl. HEITHER 4,92-102. Vgl. ferner de principiis 3,1,21.24 (GÖRGEMANNS-KARPP 548f.558f).

aber sind es, die das Wollen zum Besten oder zu dessen Gegenteil hin gebrauchen.[31] Er hebt die Unerlässlichkeit des Glaubens stark hervor, doch das Problem des Glaubensanfangs wird bei ihm nicht diskutiert; er bietet hier höchstens Ansätze, wenn er beispielsweise zwischen dem Glauben, der in uns ist und dem, der durch die Gnade vermittelt wird, unterscheidet.[32]

Bei den griechischen Vätern wird der Glaube meist mit dem Glaubensbekenntnis gleichgesetzt und unter dem Aspekt der Rechtgläubigkeit in Abwehr häretischer Lehren erörtert. Die mit dem *initium fidei* verbundene Problematik, wie sie Augustin diskutiert, wird nicht behandelt, wohl nicht einmal gesehen.[33] Es war wohl einzig JOHANNES CHRYSOSTOMUS, bei dem Anklänge an das Problem des Glaubensanfangs zu finden sind. Er führt in einer Predigt aus: «*Das Glauben gemäß seinem Anfang* und das Gehorchen der Berufung gegenüber kommt unserer guten Gesinnung zu, wenn aber der Glaube grundgelegt wurde, benötigen wir die Hilfe des Hl. Geistes, damit er (der Glaube) immer unerschüttert und fest bleibe.»[34] An anderer Stelle erklärt er mit aller Klarheit: «Unser ist zu wählen und zu wollen, Gottes aber zu vollenden und zu Ende zu bringen.»[35]

Bei den Lateinern argumentierte AMBROSIUS ähnlich: «Es ist nicht in der Macht des Menschen, sondern des sich erbarmenden Gottes, dass du vollenden kannst, was du begonnen hast»[36]. Aber es ist in der Macht des Menschen, sich Gott zu öffnen oder zu verschließen; denn Gott will niemand zwingen.[37]

[31] Vgl. de principiis 3,1,20 (GÖRGEMANNS-KARPP 542f).

[32] Vgl. Ad Rom. 9,3 PG 14,1213: Ut ergo tanta in nobis fides inveniatur, quanta possit sublimiorem gratiam promereri, nostri operis videtur et studii... Ebd. 1214:... quae sit fides, quae a nobis requiratur, et quae sit, quae a deo per gratiam datur.... Quod fides quidem, quae speret et credat et absque ulla dubitatione confidat, in nobis est, ratio vero fidei ipsius et scientia et perfectus eorum, quae credimus, intellectus donatur a deo. Ebd. 1215: Sicut est fides, quam docuimus esse in nobis, et rursus est fides, quae per gratiam datur... ita etiam in unoquoque horum, quae supra enumeravimus a deo per gratiam dari, est et in nobis aliquid, ad cuius unusquisque mensuram vel rationem gratiam promeretur. Vgl. HEITHER 2,10-27; 4,19-21; 5,54.56.58.

[33] Vgl. LÜHRMANN 102-109.

[34] De verbis apostoli PG 51,276: τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν πιστεῦσαι; vgl. LÖHRER 249.

[35] Hom. ad ep. Hebr. 12,3 PG 63,99f; vgl. SCHELKLE 344f; LÜHRMANN 106f.

[36] Exp. Ps. 118,10,35 CSEL 62,224: non est in hominis potestate, sed miserentis dei est, ut possis complere quae coeperis; vgl. Schelkle 345.

[37] Vgl. exp. Ps. 118,12,13 CSEL 62,258: Sed in nobis est, quod non semper ingreditur, non semper manet. Pateat aduenienti ianua tua; aperi ianuam tuam... si tu mentis tuae ianuam claudas. Etsi possit intrare,... non uult inuitos cogere. Vgl. ferner ebd. 20,27 CSEL 62,458; JANSEN 18f; LÜHRMANN 112.

Die gleiche Ansicht vertrat auch der AMBROSIASTER: «Alle Gnade führt er (Paulus) nämlich immer auf Gott zurück, so dass das Wollen in unserer Macht liegt, das Vollenden aber in der Macht Gottes.»[38]

Um die Gerechtigkeit der Vorherbestimmung Gottes im Erwählen und Verwerfen zu erweisen, berief man sich nicht anders als auch der frühe Augustin auf Gottes Vorherwissen. Weil Gott das künftige gute oder böse Verhalten des Menschen, dessen Glauben bzw. Unglauben, weiß, gewährt oder verweigert er dementsprechend seine Gnade.[39] Es wurde zumeist der Grundsatz *post praevisa merita* vertreten, womit man glaubte, weder die Gerechtigkeit Gottes noch auch den freien Willen des Menschen infrage zu stellen.

Augustin hat zwar hier, wie noch zu zeigen sein wird, in *Ad Simplicianum* seine früheren Aussagen in wesentlichen Teilen korrigiert, aber er hat sie genau so wenig wie die Zeugnisse der Tradition für häretisch deklariert. Man kann seine – geradezu entschuldigende – Kritik an der dritten Regel des donatistischen Theologen TYCONIUS auf die früheren Positionen, die eigene eingeschlossen, bezüglich des Glaubensanfangs und der göttlichen Präszienz übertragen. In *doctrina christiana* schreibt er, Tyconius habe in seiner dritten Regel erklärt, die Werke würden uns durch das Verdienst des Glaubens gegeben; dieser selbst aber sei so aus uns, dass wir ihn nicht von Gott hätten. Aber er hätte die Häresie (der Pelagianer) noch nicht gekannt, die uns in der Verteidigung der Gnade Gottes so sehr geübt habe, dass wir nun besser (als er damals) auf die Aussagen der Hl. Schrift achteten, wonach auch der Glaube selbst ein Geschenk Gottes sei.[40] Obschon Augustin selbst in Simpl. nicht erst durch Häretiker zur Änderung seiner Auffassung von Glaubensanfang und Gnade gekommen war, sondern, veranlasst durch den Brief Simplicians, durch das erneute Studium von Röm 9, hat er die hier gewonnenen Einsichten in seinen antipelagianischen Schriften später noch entfaltet und vertieft.

[38] Ad Fil. 2,13 CSEL 81,3,146: omnem enim gratiam semper reportat ad deum, ut nostrum sit velle, perficere vero dei. Vgl. LÖHRER 249; LÜHRMANN 111; DRECOLL 167.

[39] Vgl. z.B. Ambrosiast., ad Rom. 9,11-9,19 CSEL 81,1,312-327; insbesondere ebd. 9,11: praescientiam flagitat in his causis, quia non aliud potest evenire quam novit deus futurum.... unum elegit praescientia et alterum sprevit... nam neminem damnat, antequam peccet, et nullum coronat, antequam vincat...; ebd. 9,15: illius miserebor, cui praescius eram quod misericordiam daturus essem, sciens conversurum illum et mansurum apud me...; ebd. 9,19: qui ergo tam providus et bonus est ambigi non debet, quia iustus est. Vgl. ferner SCHELKLE 347-350.353.

[40] Vgl. doctr. Chr. 3,46 CCL 32,105f; LÖHRER 249f; DRECOLL 167.

Wenn aber die Gnade auch den Anfang des Glaubens wirkt und nicht nur die guten Werke, so verliert in Augustins Gnadentheologie das Vorherwissen Gottes seine bisherige beherrschende Rolle; denn Gott wird dann nicht mehr durch sein Vorherwissen vom menschlichen Glauben bestimmt, sondern handelt einzig aufgrund des eigenen ewigen Ratschlusses; sein Vorherwissen gründet in seiner Prädestination und nicht umgekehrt, wie er vor Simpl. vertreten hatte.[41] War in den Schriften Augustins vor *Simpl.* das Vorherwissen Gottes die Voraussetzung der Vorherbestimmung des Menschen zur Gnade gewesen, so bestimmte Augustin seit *Simpl.* die Prädestination zur Gnade als das Vorherwissen Gottes von seinem eigenen Handeln aufgrund seines ewigen Ratschlusses. Freilich kann dessen Gerechtigkeit nun nicht mehr durch das Konstrukt der Präszienz plausibel gemacht werden, sondern muss der göttlichen Autorität der Bibel geglaubt werden.[42]

Auch wenn ab Simpl. in der Gnadentheologie Augustins die Argumentation mit der Präszienz Gottes für die Begründung der Gerechtigkeit seiner Prädestination unterbleibt, so behält das Vorherwissen Gottes weiterhin eine gewisse Bedeutung, zwar nicht für die Tatsache der Vorherbestimmung, wohl aber für die Modalität der Berufung, wie unten noch näher erläutert wird.

4. Der Glaubensanfang in *Ad Simplicianum*

Augustin beginnt das zweite Buch seiner *Retractationes* mit der Besprechung seiner zwei Bücher an Simplician. Dies mag unmittelbar damit zusammenhängen, dass es sich dabei um seine Erstlingsschrift als Bischof handelte und er im zweiten Buch der retr. die Bücher aus seiner Zeit als Bischof begutachtet, aber es kann auch als symbolischer Hinweis dafür dienen, dass Augustin mit Simpl. in seiner Gnadenlehre ein neues Kapitel aufgeschlagen, eine neue Position gewonnen hat, die er bis zu seinem Lebensende nicht mehr geändert hat. Die Bedeutung

[41] Dies gilt aber nur für die Prädestination zur Gnade, nicht für die Verwerfung. Für diese hielt Augustin weiterhin daran fest, dass Gott aufgrund seines Vorherwissens vom Unglauben bzw. von den Missverdiensten den Menschen zur Verdammung vorherbestimmt. Vgl. RING, Proleg. 3,308-310; ders., Bruch 49-58.

[42] Cf. *Simpl.* 1,2,22, das Abschlusskapitel der Quaestio. Unter Berufung auf Röm 9,14 weist Augustin hier den Vorwurf der Ungerechtigkeit gegen Gottes unbegreifliche Erwählung zurück und fordert Glauben, auch wenn wir nicht zu begreifen vermögen; denn wer die gesamte körperliche und geistige Welt erschaffen hat, hat (nach Weish 11,21) alles nach Zahl und Gewicht und Maß geordnet.

von Simpl. 1,2 ist in der Forschung unstrittig, unterschiedlich ist die Bewertung und Kennzeichnung der Neuorientierung, die Augustin darin vollzogen hat. Kurt FLASCH hat in seinem Buch mit dem reißerischen Titel *Logik des Schreckens* Augustins neue Gnadenkonzeption einen *Bruch* (z. B. S. 47.50.61.270-276) genannt, mit dem Augustin seine bisherigen Überzeugungen von der Gnade radikal aufgegeben habe, so dass ihn keine geistige Lebensader mehr mit dem früher Gedachten und Geschriebenen verband.[43] Simpl. 1 brachte gewiss eine Wende in Augustins Gnadenlehre und zweifellos auch wesentlich Neues, aber seine Gedanken können durchaus als Fortentwicklung seiner früheren Erkenntnisse begriffen werden, mit denen ihn wohl mehr verbindet, als ihn von ihnen trennt.[44]

Den Anlass zu den beiden Büchern, die traditionell den Titel *Ad Simplicianum libri duo de diuersis quaestionibus* (o. ä.) tragen[45], hatte Simplician, Nachfolger des Ambrosius als Bischof von Mailand, in einem leider verloren gegangenen Brief gegeben, von dem wir aus Augustins Antwortbrief, ep. 37, und aus der Vorrede zum ersten Buch des Werks wissen. In letzterer bemerkt Augustin, dass er die von Simplician zum Römerbrief gestellten Fragen schon früher untersucht und erörtert habe, aber da er mit den dort gefundenen Lösungen nicht mehr zufrieden sei, habe er die fraglichen Worte des Apostels in ihrem Sinnzusammenhang noch vorsichtiger und genauer durchforscht, um darin nichts zu übergehen.[46] Aus der Vorrede geht deutlich hervor, dass Augustin selbst sich in Simpl. von seinen früheren

[43] Vgl. dazu die Rezension, RING, Bruch oder Entwicklung im Gnadenbegriff Augustins; hier S. 38f. Der Schreiber dieser Zeilen hat in Proleg. 3,270 selbst das Wort *Bruch* verwendet, um die Neuorientierung Augustins in Simpl. zu kennzeichnen. Allerdings bezog sich dabei *Bruch* nur auf die Neueinschätzung des Glaubensanfangs und wurde in Unkenntnis der Schrift Flaschs gewählt; ist diese doch kurz vor Proleg. 3, aber nach Abschluss der Arbeiten an diesem Kommentar erschienen. Das Wort *Bruch* wäre bei einer Kenntnis der Thesen und der Wortwahl Flaschs, um keine falschen Assoziationen zu suggerieren, bestimmt unterlassen worden.

[44] Vgl. hierzu insbesondere die reichhaltigen Ausführungen von DRECOLL, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins.

[45] Vgl. retr. 2,1 CCL 57,89: Librorum quos episcopus elaboraui primi duo sunt ad Simplicianum… de diuersis quaestionibus, quarum duas ex epistula Pauli apostoli ad Romanos in primum librum contuli…

[46] Vgl. Simpl. 1 prol. CCL 44,7: Et illa quidem quae de Paulo apostolo dissoluenda proposuisti iam a nobis erant utcumque discussa litterisque mandata. Sed tamen eadem ipsa uerba apostolica tenoremque sententiarum non contentus inquisitione atque explicatione praeterita, ne quid in ea neglegentius praeterissem, cautius adtentiusque rimatus sum… Es gibt keinen Hinweis, dass außer Simplicians Anfrage noch andere Gründe Augustin zu seiner Neuuntersuchung veranlasst haben. Offen muss bleiben, ob die Unzufriedenheit Augustins mit seinen früheren Lösungen auch schon vor Simplicians Brief sich eingestellt hatte.

Lösungen abgesetzt und nach neuen, befriedigenderen Antworten gesucht hat, wobei er sich durchaus bewusst war, dass die auszulegenden Worte des Apostels keineswegs leicht und mühelos verstanden werden könnten.[47]

Die neuen Einsichten, die in Simpl. 1,2 beschrieben sind, haben sich Augustin tief eingeprägt und wurden zur Grundlage nicht nur seiner späteren antipelagianischen Gnadenschriften, sondern überhaupt seiner Gnadenauffassung, wie sie sich in allen seinen Schriften nach seiner Bischofsweihe kund tut. In perseu., seinem letzten Werk überhaupt, hob er als das Neue in Simpl. 1,2 die zweifache Erkenntnis hervor, dass uns die Gnade Gottes nicht nach unseren Verdiensten gegeben werde und somit auch der Anfang des Glaubens nicht menschliches Verdienst, sondern Gottes Gabe sei.[48] In retr. 2,1 hatte er zuvor seine viel zitierte Bewertung der Wende in *Simpl.* so artikuliert: *In cuius quaestionis solutione laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia.* Bezogen auf die Frage nach dem Ursprung des Glaubens kann man aus dem Satz folgern, dass Augustin mit der Voraussetzung an die Auslegung von Röm 9 herangetreten war, dass der Glaube in die Kompetenz des freien Willens des Menschen falle; als Ergebnis vermittelte ihm seine Untersuchung aber die neue Einsicht, dass die Gnade Gottes, da sie voraussetzungslos sei, auch den Glauben schenke, und zwar von Anfang an.[49]

Bevor Augustin in Simpl. 1,2 die Einzelauslegung von Röm 9,10-29 ausformuliert, benennt er im 2. Kapitel der Quaestio in Vorwegnahme der Quintessenz seiner exegetischen Überlegungen die beiden erwähnten neuen Einsichten: die Voraussetzungslosigkeit der

[47] Vgl. ebd.: non enim tu ea percontanda censeres, si eorum intellectus facilis atque expeditus foret.

[48] Vgl. perseu. 52: Quod plenius sapere coepi in ea disputatione, quam scripsi ad beatae memoriae Simplicianum episcopum Mediolanensis ecclesiae, in mei episcopatus exordio, quando et initium fidei donum dei esse cognovi et asserui. Ebd. 55:... videant,... utrum... remanserit aliquid quo vocetur in dubium, gratiam dei non secundum merita nostra dari, et utrum ibi non satis egerim, etiam initium fidei esse donum dei... Vgl. dazu praed. sanct. 8:... Hoc igitur apostoli testimonium (sc. 1 Kor 4,7)... non sinit quemquam fidelium dicere: Habeo fidem quam non accepi.... Sed ne hoc quidem potest dici: Quamvis non habeam perfectam fidem, habeo tamen eius initium, quo in Christum primitus credidi. Ebd. 55:... ad Simplicianum Mediolanensem episcopum scripsi... gratiam dei non secundum merita nostra dari et... etiam initium fidei esse donum dei...

[49] Nicht über den freien Willen des Menschen siegte die Gnade, sondern in Augustins eigenem Bemühen bezüglich der Rolle des freien Willens im Berufungsvorgang, also in Augustins Erkenntnisprozess, war die Gnade siegreich. Vgl. RING, Bruch 52f.

Gnade und die Gnadenhaftigkeit auch des Glaubensanfangs.[50] Er verwendet zwar dabei den Fachterminus *initium fidei* nicht, wohl aber spricht er gleichbedeutend von den *inchoationes fidei*. Er illustriert diese Anfänge mit dem Beispiel des Glaubens von Katechumenen, den er mit einer Empfängnis vergleicht: Der anfängliche Glaube der Katechumenen muss noch so wachsen und zur Taufe führen, wie die Empfängnis zu einer Geburt. Wie aber ohne Geburt die Empfängnis mit einem Abortus endet, so ist der Glaube ohne Taufe tot und führt nicht zum ewigen Leben. All dem geht die Gnade voraus, der selbst keine Verdienste vorausgehen, auch nicht aus Gesetzeserfüllung oder Glauben, sondern sie ist stets ungeschuldet, nur Ausfluss der Barmherzigkeit Gottes.[51] Der Glaubende bedarf auch nach der Taufe weiterhin der Gnade, um durch gute Werke zu reifen und zur Vollendung, zum ewigen Leben, zu gelangen. Die *gratia fidei* bedeutet demnach in Simpl. nicht nur wie in exp. Gal., dass dem Glauben (als eigenständigem Akt des menschlichen Willens) die Gnade (der Liebe, der Vollendung) geschenkt wird, sondern dass der Glaube selbst Gnade und Anfang des Gnadenweges ist. Diese Deutung wird gestützt durch die Auslegung, die Augustin zu Röm 9,12 gibt: ... *«non ex operibus, sed ex uocante», id est ex eo qui uocando ad fidem gratia iustificat impium*[52] und durch die rhetorische Frage, die er anschließend ebd. 7 stellt: *Quaeritur autem, utrum uel fides mereatur hominis iustificationem, an uero nec fidei merita praecedant misericordiam dei, sed et fides ipsa inter dona gratiae numeretur...*[53] Zum

[50] Es kann als wahrscheinlich angenommen werden, dass Augustin Simpl. 1,2,2 erst nach Abschluss seiner exegetischen Arbeit an Röm 9 ausformuliert und programmatisch dem Anfang der Quaestio nach Angabe der auszulegenden Materie in 1,2,1 beigefügt hat. Eine ähnliche Vorgehensweise findet man z.B. in ep. Rm. inch. bezüglich der Ausführungen über die Sünde wider den Hl. Geist: In 14,1f gibt er zu Anfang seines Exkurses in Leitsätzen seine Lösung des Problems an, bevor er dieses in 10 Kapiteln abhandelt. Vgl. RING, Die Sünde wider den Hl. Geist 13; ders., Proleg. 2,50.

[51] Vgl. Simpl. 1,2,2 CCL 44,25: Fiunt ergo inchoationes fidei quaedam conceptionibus similes. Non tamen solum concipi sed etiam nasci opus est, ut ad uitam perueniatur aeternam. Nihil tamen horum sine gratia misericordiae dei, quia et opera si qua sunt bona consequuntur, ut dictum est, illam gratiam non praecedunt.

[52] Ebd. 6 CCL 44,31.

[53] Anders DRECOLL 225 FN 187, nach dem es sich hierbei *um eine Fragestellung handelt und nicht um eine Aussage (vgl. außerdem den Konjunktiv: numeretur), die vorerst nur durch die zeitliche Vorordnung der misericordia beantwortet wird.* Der Konjunktiv wurde hier von Augustin aus grammatischen Gründen gesetzt, weil der Satzteil noch zur indirekten Frage gehört und diese im Lateinischen ja den Konjunktiv verlangt. Dass es Augustin aber nicht nur um eine *zeitliche Vorordnung der misericordia* ging, sondern um eine grundsätzliche und ursächliche, spricht er ebd. klar genug aus, wenn er z.B. fortfährt (ebd. 7 CCL 44,31f): Nemo enim credit qui

Verständnis des Gesagten kann auch ebd. 12 herangezogen werden, wo Augustin allgemein zum guten Willen, und zwar wiederum in Form einer rhetorischen Frage, ausführt: *Nam si quaeramus, utrum dei donum sit uoluntas bona, mirum si negare quisquam audeat.*

An sich ist die Wendung *gratia fidei* deutungsoffen. Sie konnte von Augustin in exp. Gal. von seinem damaligen Verstehenshorizont her so interpretiert werden, dass aufgrund des göttlichen Vorherwissens der Glaube die Gnade zum guten Tun und zur Vollendung erhält. Die nämliche Wendung konnte aber bei einem geänderten Verstehenshorizont von diesem her neu gedeutet werden, so dass in den retr. die *gratia fidei* der exp. Gal. weder korrigiert noch umgedeutet werden musste. Wie oben ausgeführt, spielte in den Schriften Augustins vor Simpl. und in der Tradition vor ihm das Vorherwissen Gottes als Voraussetzung der Vorherbestimmung die entscheidende Rolle. Dieses Verhältnis wurde in Simpl. grundlegend umgekehrt, indem nun die Prädestination als Grund für die Präszienz Gottes und der göttliche Ratschluss (propositum dei) als einziger und maßgeblicher Grund für die Vorherbestimmung zur Gnade angesehen wurde. *Gratia fidei* bedeutet nun innerhalb dieses geänderten Verstehenshorizonts, dass der Glaube selbst Gnade ist und nicht, dass diese dem Verdienst des – von Gott allerdings vorhergewussten – Glaubens geschuldet ist.[54]

Dieser Wandel im Verstehenshorizont Augustins soll anhand des Vergleichs der Auslegung von Röm 9,15 in exp. prop. Rm. und Simpl. aufgezeigt werden, woraus hervorgeht, dass Augustin in Simpl. den Glauben selbst als Gnade betrachtete.[55] Der Wortlaut von Röm 9,15 heißt: *«Miserebor cuius misereor, et misericordiam praestabo cuius miserebor.»* In exp. prop. Rm. 53 schrieb er zu Röm 9,15: [1] *Cui ergo misertus ero, ut eum vocem,* [2] *miserebor adhuc eius, cum crediderit. [Quomodo autem adhuc, nisi ut credenti et petenti det spiritum sanctum?]* [3] *Quo dato misericordiam praestabit,*

non uocatur. Misericors autem deus uocat nullis hoc uel fidei meritis largiens, quia merita fidei sequuntur uocationem potius quam praecedant.... Nisi ergo uocando praecedat misericordia dei, nec credere quisquam potest... Vgl. dazu die grundsätzlichen Aussagen Augustins ebd. 2 CCL 44,24f.

[54] Grammatisch handelt es sich im ersten Fall um einen genitivus subjectivus, im zweiten Fall um einen genitivus epexegeticus, bei dem der Genitiv den Inhalt des Beziehungswortes erläutert, d.h., in der Formel *gratia fidei* besteht die gratia in der fides, oder m.a.W., die fides ist gratia. Vgl. TESELLE 1336: Die fides ist *gift of grace (Simpl. 1,2,2.7).*

[55] Ähnlich verbesserte Augustin bezüglich der Auslegung von Röm 9,16 die exegetischen Ergebnisse aus exp. prop. Rm. 53 CSEL 84,36 (vgl. auch ep. Rm. inch. 7,7; diu. qu. 68,5) in Simpl. 1,2;10; vgl. RING, Proleg. 3,284-286.

cui misericors fuerit, id est, ut faciat eum misericordem, quo bona possit per dilectionem operari. In Simpl. 1,2,9 hingegen deutet er den Vers so aus: [1] *Cui misertus erit deus ut eum vocet,* [2] *miserebitur eius ut credat,* [3] *et cui misericors fuerit ut credat, misericordiam praestabit, hoc est faciet eum misericordem, ut etiam bene operetur.* Bezüglich der Berufung [1] und des Glaubensvollzugs im guten Werk [3] herrscht zwischen beiden Schriften grundsätzliche Übereinstimmung; denn Berufung wie gutes Werk werden auf die Gnade zurückgeführt. Hingegen unterscheiden sie sich in [2] doppelt: einmal bezüglich des Glaubensaktes und dann im Blick auf das unmittelbare Ziel des göttlichen Erbarmens. In exp. prop. Rm. formulierte Augustin [miserebor adhuc eius,] *cum crediderit,* in Simpl. [miserebitur eius] *ut credat,* er ersetzte also das *cum crediderit* durch das *ut credat.* In exp. prop. Rm. ist das Ziel des göttlichen Erbarmens bereits die Gnade zum guten Werk, die dem, der zum Glauben gefunden hat, im Hl. Geist geschenkt wird, was Augustin durch das *adhuc* und dann in einem eigenen erläuternden Fragesatz zum Ausdruck bringt. In Simpl. dagegen ist in [2] einzig das *ut credat,* der Glaube, Ziel und Wirkung des göttlichen Erbarmens. Das *cum crediderit* bedeutet, dass einer, der (durch die Berufung) selbst zum Glauben gefunden hat, die Gnade des guten Handelns erhält, das *ut credat* hingegen, dass einem die Barmherzigkeit geschenkt wird, dass er glaube. In Simpl. wird nicht dem bereits Glaubenden und (aus diesem Glauben) Bittenden (*credenti et petenti,* exp. prop. Rm. 53*)* Barmherzigkeit geschenkt, so dass er die Willenskraft zum guten Tun hat, sondern alle drei Teilglieder, Berufung, Glauben und gutes Werk, sind Gnade, obschon auch der Wille daran beteiligt ist:*...quia nemo potest credere nisi uelit, nemo uelle nisi uocetur, nemo autem sibi potest praestare ut uocetur, uocando deus praestat et fidem, quia sine uocatione non potest quisquam credere, quamuis nullus credat inuitus* (Simpl. 1,2,10 CCL 44,34f).[56]

Da also Glaube wie Werke auf die Gnade zurückzuführen sind, sind sie beide letztlich Ausfluss des göttlichen Ratschlusses,

[56] Vgl. zur Deutung von Röm 9,15 RING, Proleg. 3,275f. Anders DRECOLL 228 FN 193. Doch ist gegen seinen Einwand festzustellen, dass die entscheidende Änderung nicht der Zeitenwechsel, sondern die Ersetzung des *cum* durch das *ut* ist, d. h., der Ursache durch die Wirkung bzw. das Ziel. Aber auch der Zeitenwechsel von Futur und Futur exact drückt mehr als nur eine zeitliche Abfolge aus; vgl. dazu die Transponierung der Future in die Gegenwart und Vergangenheit in Simpl. 1,2,9 CCL 44,34: Quod si eam credendo se meruisse quis iactat, nouerit eum sibi praestitisse ut crederet, qui miseretur inspirando fidem cuius misertus est, ut adhuc infideli uocationem impertiret.

der ohne Verdienste seitens des Menschen diesen zur Gnade beruft. Augustin formuliert dies in Simpl. 1,2,6 so: *Non ergo secundum electionem propositum dei manet, sed ex proposito electio, id est non quia inuenit deus opera bona in hominibus quae eligat, ideo manet propositum iustificationis ipsius, sed quia illud manet ut iustificet credentes, ideo inuenit opera quae iam eligat ad regnum caelorum.*[57]... Ebd. 7 fährt er fort: *Quaeritur autem, utrum uel fides meratur hominis iustificationem, an uero nec fidei merita praecedant misericordiam dei, sed et fides ipsa inter dona gratiae numeretur... Nisi ergo uocando praecedat misericordia dei, nec credere quisquam potest... Ergo ante omne meritum est gratia...* Das Vorherwissen Gottes gründet demnach in seiner Vorherbestimmung und nicht umgekehrt, wie er vor Simpl. vertreten hatte.[58] Dies muss auch bei der Deutung des Glaubensbegriffs in Simpl. beachtet werden.[59]

Dennoch hat das Vorherwissen Gottes in Simpl. nicht jede Bedeutung und Funktion verloren. Sie ist zwar nicht für die Tatsache der Vorherbestimmung Gottes entscheidend, wohl aber für die Wirksamkeit der individuellen Berufung. Denn weil Gott die Reaktion des menschlichen Willens kennt, weiß er die angemessene Weise der Berufung so zu wählen, dass der Mensch immer zustimmt, wenn Gott dies will.[60] Augustin fasst dies am Schluss von ebd. 13 kurz und

[57] Zum richtigen Verständnis der Stelle muss beachtet werden, dass in Simpl. Augustin den Begriff *electio* noch für die Erwählung zum ewigen Leben aufgrund von Verdiensten reservierte. Erst relativ spät in seiner antipelagianischen Periode (seit ep. 186, Mitte 417) änderte Augustin seinen electio-Begriff und verstand ihn als Erwählung aus Gnade aufgrund des göttlichen Ratschlusses. Vgl. oben FN 13.

[58] Vgl. Simpl. 1,2,8: Si enim quia praesciebat deus futura eius opera mala, propterea eum praedestinauit ut seruiret minori, propterea praedestinauit et Iacob, ut ei maior seruiret, quia futura eius bona opera praesciebat, et falsum est iam quod ait: «non ex operibus» (Röm 9,12). Si autem uerum est quod non ex operibus et inde hoc probat, quia de nondum natis nondumque aliquid operatis hoc dictum est, unde nec ex fide, quae in nondum natis similiter nondum erat...

[59] Anders Drecoll 225 FN 187f. Bei einem solchen Standpunkt müsste man allerdings die gedankliche Einheit der Quaestio infrage stellen und annehmen, dass Augustin nach Beendigung der Quaestio das Geschriebene nicht mehr kritisch durchgelesen und bei sich widersprechenden Aussagen diese nicht harmonisiert hat. Jedenfalls verweist seine Erinnerung auf das Gegenteil, wie aus späteren Schriften zu ersehen ist, nämlich dass die Voraussetzungslosigkeit der Gnade und die Gnadenhaftigkeit auch des Glaubensanfangs der durchgehende Leitfaden seiner Erwägungen in Simpl. 1,2 war, ohne dass er von anfänglichen Abweichungen von diesen Ergebnissen etwas gemerkt hat. Vgl. oben FN 46.48.51.

[60] Vgl. Simpl. 1,2,13f. Augustin nennt diese wirksame Berufung *vocatio congrua* bzw. *apta*, in den späteren Schriften hauptsächlich *vocatio secundum propositum*. Vgl. Ring, Proleg. 3,300-325, insbesondere S. 300-304.

präzis zusammen: *Cuius autem miseretur, sic eum uocat, quomodo scit ei congruere, ut uocantem non respuat.*[61]

5. Der Glaubensanfang in den Gnadenschriften nach Simpl.

Auch in den antipelagianischen Schriften kommt die Wendung *initium fidei* relativ selten vor und wird von Augustin in Ausführungen gebraucht, in denen er als übergeordnetes Thema die Unverdienbarkeit der Gnade verteidigt und in diesem Rahmen auch über die Gnadenhaftigkeit des ganzen Glaubens zu sprechen kommt: Da die Gnade vor jedem Verdienst steht, geht ihr auch ein Verdienst des Glaubens nicht voraus, sondern sie initiiert so den Glauben, wie sie ihn zur Vollendung führt. Sowohl in seinem Brief an einen gewissen Vitalis (ep. 217, geschrieben nach 416), als auch an den römischen Archidiakon Sixtus, den späteren Papst Sixtus III (ep. 194 aus dem Jahr 418), betont Augustin zwar die Verdienstlichkeit des Glaubens, dem aber wie jedem Verdienst die Gnade vorausgehe.[62] Im erstgenannten Brief argumentiert Augustin, wie später auch sonst (cf. z. B. *perseu.* 6; unten FN 72), mit der Praxis der Kirche, für die Ungläubigen zu beten, damit Gott sie zum Glauben bekehre. Dies ist für Augustin ein beweiskräftiges Argument, dass Gott mit seiner Gnade

[61] DJUTH 447 beginnt ihren Artikel über *initium fidei* mit conf. 8,12-9,1, der Bekehrungsgeschichte Augustins. Aber seine Bekehrung, die Augustin zweifelsohne als gnadengewirkt deutete, war mehr als nur der Anfang eines Glaubens, den er ja nie vollständig verloren hatte. Das eigentliche Problem, ob der Akt des Glaubensanfangs menschliches Werk oder Gnade ist, wird von der Autorin fast nur im Blick auf Augustins Auseinandersetzung mit den Mönchen von Südgallien, den sog. Massiliensern, erörtert. Die Schriften vor den semipelagianischen werden nur unvollständig und kursorisch zur Deutung herangezogen.

[62] Vgl. ep. 217,29 CSEL 57,424:... tu autem... initium fidei, ubi est etiam initium bonae, hoc est piae uoluntatis, non uis esse donum dei, sed ex nobis nos habere contendis, ut credere incipiamus; cetera autem religiosae uitae bona deum per gratiam suam iam ex fide petentibus, quaerentibus, pulsantibus (vgl. Mt 7,7) donare consentis. Nec adtendis ideo pro infidelibus deum rogari, ut credant, quoniam deus donat et fidem; ideo pro eis, qui crediderint, deo gratias agi, quoniam donat et fidem. Vgl. ferner ep. 194,9 CSEL 57,183: Neque enim nullum est meritum fidei, qua fide ille dicebat: «domine, propitius esto mihi peccatori et descendit iustificatus» merito fidelis humilitatis, «quoniam, qui se humiliat, exaltabitur» (Lk 18,13f).... restat, inquam, ut ipsam fidem non humano, quod isti extollunt, tribuamus arbitrio nec ullis praecedentibus meritis, quoniam inde incipiunt bona, quaecumque sunt, merita, sed gratuitum dei donum esse fateamur, si gratiam ueram, id est sine meritis cogitemus, quia, sicut in eadem epistula legitur, «deus unicuique partitur mensuram fidei» (Röm 12,3). Opera quippe bona fiunt ab homine, fides autem fit in homine, sine qua illa a nullo fiunt homine; «omne» enim, «quod non est ex fide, peccatum est» (Röm 14,23).

auf den menschlichen Willen wirkt und diesen zum Glauben lenkt. In den *Verhandlungen mit Pelagius* aus dem Jahr 417 erklärt er, dass das Gute erst mit dem Glauben beginnt, während ohne ihn alles Sünde ist (vgl. Röm 14,23). Der Glaube selbst aber wird nicht durch Verdienste erlangt, sondern aus der Barmherzigkeit Gottes, die uns in allem Guten vorausgeht.[63] Der Mensch beginnt durch die Initiative des Glaubens sich nur dann vom Bösen zum Guten zu wandeln, wenn die ungeschuldete Gnade Gottes dies in ihm bewirkt, schreibt er in *Gegen zwei pelagianische Briefe*, entstanden 420/21; denn wie niemand ohne den Herrn das Gute vollenden kann, so kann es auch niemand ohne ihn beginnen.[64] In *Die Vollendung der menschlichen Gerechtigkeit*, verfasst um 415, führt Augustin aus, dass sich jeder in dem Maße für das Gute entscheidet, wie es ihm Gott zugemessen hat (vgl. Röm 12,13), wie überhaupt nur der zu Christus, dem Fürsten des Glaubens, kommen kann, den der Vater zieht (vgl. Joh 6,4), was vom Glauben an Christus zu verstehen sei.[65] Es ist unschwer zu erkennen, dass die Aussagen dieser drei Werke übereinstimmend mit antipelagianischer Tendenz den Vorrang der Gnade vor dem freien Willen des Menschen verteidigen. Kein menschliches Verdienst bedingt die Gnade, sondern diese ermöglicht und bewirkt alles Gute, den Glauben mit eingeschlossen. Die Gedanken fußen auf dem Fundament, das in Simpl. 1,2 gelegt wurde, wonach die Gnade auch dem Glauben vorausgeht, da ohne Gottes Ruf niemand glaubt, obschon keiner gegen seinen Willen glaubt.[66] Die in Simpl. gewonnenen Einsichten führt Augustin hauptsächlich dadurch weiter, dass er zu ihrer Begründung neue Beweisstellen aus der Hl. Schrift vorlegt und so seine Ergebnisse biblisch vertieft.

[63] Vgl. gest. Pel. 34 CSEL 42,89f:... ne quisquam existimet ad ipsam fidem meritis operum perueniri, cum ipsa sit initium, unde bona opera incipiant, quoniam, ut dictum est, «quod» ex ipsa «non est, peccatum est» (Röm 14,23).... quapropter quamuis bene operandi gratiam fides impetret, ipsam certe fidem ut haberemus, nulla fide meruimus, sed in ea nobis danda, in qua dominum sequeremur, misericordia eius praeuenit nos.

[64] Vgl. c. ep. Pel. 2,23 CSEL 60,486:... nec omnino incipit homo ex malo in bonum per initium fidei commutari, nisi hoc in illo agat indebita et gratuita misericordia dei.... quia, sicut nemo potest bonum perficere sine domino, sic nemo incipere sine domino.

[65] Vgl. perf. iust. 41 CSEL 42,44:... et quisque ita eligit bonum, «sicut unicuique deus partitus est mensuram fidei» (Röm 12,13), et: «nemo potest ad me uenire», ait princeps fidei, «nisi pater qui misit me traxerit eum» (Joh 6,4). quod de fide dictum esse qua in eum creditur...

[66] Vgl. Simpl. 1,2,10 CCL 44,35:... quia sine uocatione non potest quisquam credere, quamuis nullus credat inuitus... Nemo itaque credit non uocatus, sed non omnis credit uocatus...

Die Hauptmasse der Aussagen über das *initium fidei* findet sich in den beiden semipelagianischen Spätwerken *Die Vorherbestimmung der Heiligen* und *Die Gabe der Beharrlichkeit*, die Augustin ein knappes Jahr vor seinem Tod, also im Jahr 429, geschrieben hat. Die äußeren Umstände und der Anlass der beiden Werke haben sich gegenüber den antipelagianischen Schriften insofern geändert, als Augustin hier nicht direkt pelagianische Häretiker abwehrte, sondern für Katholiken schrieb, die bezüglich des Glaubensanfangs einen Standpunkt vertraten, der dem Augustins vor seiner Bischofsweihe entsprach und den er dann in Simpl., seinem ersten Werk als Bischof, revidiert hatte.[67]

In praed. sanct. 3 wendet sich Augustin zunächst gegen die pelagianische Lehre, nach welcher der Glaube aus uns und nur sein Wachstum von Gott stamme, so dass also Gottes Gnade entsprechend unseren Verdiensten gegeben werde: Der Anfang des Glaubens stamme also aus uns und Gott danke uns gewissermaßen dafür, indem er uns die Vollendung des Glaubens und all das schenke, worum wir gläubig bäten. Augustin verweist in dem Zusammenhang darauf, dass diese Meinung durch die Synode von Jerusalem und auf ihr durch den angeklagten Pelagius selbst verurteilt worden sei.[68] Zur Untermauerung dieser Verurteilung führt er dann im folgenden Kapitel 4 einige Schriftbeweise an, z. B. Röm 11,35f, Phil 1,29, 1 Kor 7,25, insbesondere verweist er auf die Bekehrung des Apostels Paulus, der durch die Übermacht der Gnade zum Glauben an Christus bekehrt worden sei.[69] Im nächsten Kapitel 5 zitiert er dann 2 Kor 3,5 «*Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex deo est*» und leitet davon ab, dass sowohl der Anfang als auch das Wachstum des Glaubens wie überhaupt alles Guten von Gott stammen, der uns das Vermögen dazu gibt: *Attendant hic et verba ista perpendant, qui putant ex nobis esse fidei coeptum et ex deo esse fidei supplementum.... unde in omni opere bono et incipiendo et perficiendo*

[67] Über Abfassungszeit, Adressaten und Anlass der beiden Spätschriften vgl. ZUMKELLER, Einleitung. ALG 7,58-73.

[68] Vgl. praed. sanct. 3 PL 44,961f:... ex nobis quidem nos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum eius ex deo: tanquam fides non ab ipso donetur nobis, sed ab ipso tantum augeatur in nobis, eo merito, quo coepit a nobis. Non ergo receditur ab ea sententia, quam Pelagius ipse in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, sicut eadem gesta testantur, damnare compulsus est, gratiam dei secundum merita nostra dari; si non pertinet ad dei gratiam quod credere coepimus, sed illud potius quod propter hoc nobis additur, ut plenius perfectiusque credamus: ac per hoc, initium fidei nostrae priores damus deo, ut retribuatur nobis et supplementum eius; et si quid aliud fideliter poscimus.

[69] Vgl. ebd. 4 PL 44,962.

sufficientia nostra ex deo est: ita nemo sibi sufficit vel ad incipiendam vel ad perficiendam fidem, sed sufficientia nostra ex deo est ... In den weiteren Kapiteln des Werkes entfaltet er dann ausführlich diese Gedanken und berichtet auch von der Entwicklung der eigenen Glaubensüberzeugung, wie er schließlich in Simpl. selbst zur Erkenntnis gelangt sei, dass der ganze Glaube, sein Anfang wie sein Wachstum, von der Gnade bedingt sei, während diese selbst keine Vorgaben im Menschen habe. In den letzten Kapiteln des Werks greift er die Gnadenhaftigkeit auch des Glaubensanfangs nochmals auf und führt diesen auf die Berufung Gottes gemäß ewigem Ratschluss zurück, wobei er sich vorwiegend auf Beweisstellen aus den Paulusbriefen stützt.[70] Im Abschlusskapitel 43 entschuldigt er sich bei den Adressaten des Werks für seine Weitschweifigkeit und hebt nochmals den Hauptgedanken der Schrift hervor: Die Ansicht sei falsch, dass nur das Wachstum des Glaubens Gabe Gottes sei, während der Anfang des Glaubens einzig auf die Entscheidung des Menschen zurückgehe.... "Deshalb haben wir uns mit aller Kraft darauf verlegt, auch schon den Anfang des Glaubens als Gottes Gabe zu erweisen.... ebenso wie die Enthaltsamkeit, Geduld, Gerechtigkeit, Gottesfurcht usw."[71]

In seinem letzten Werk, *Die Gabe der Beharrlichkeit*, greift er den Gedanken auf, den er in ep. 217 (vgl. oben FN 62) schon gebracht hatte, dass nämlich das Gebet der Kirche für die Ungläubigen Beweis für die Gnadenhaftigkeit auch des Glaubensanfangs sei; die Gnade beschränke sich aber nicht auf den Anfang, sondern schließe die Beharrlichkeit im Glauben mit ein.[72] Darin unterscheiden

[70] Vgl. ebd. 39 PL 44,989:..... noua erat et recens eorum fides praedicato sibi euangelio, qua fide audita, gratias deo pro eis agit apostolus (vgl. Eph 1,13-16)... donum enim eius est etiam incipiens fides, ne apostoli falsa uel fallax gratiarum actio merito iudicetur. Quid illud? Nonne initium fidei apparet Thessalonicensium, de quo tamen idem apostolus deo gratias agit, dicens,... (1 Thess 2,13)?... deus igitur operatur in cordibus hominum, uocatione illa secundum propositum suum, de qua multum locuti sumus,... Vgl. ferner ebd. 40f PL 44,989f.

[71] Ebd. 43 PL 44,992:... propter quod institimus, quantum potuimus, ut etiam ipsum initium fidei donum dei esse ostenderemus.... sicut continentiam, patientiam, iustitiam, pietatem, et cetera,... Übersetzung von ZUMKELLER, ALG 7,325.327.

[72] Vgl. perseu. 6 PL 45,997f:... ut scilicet pro infidelibus... orare intelligantur fideles,... ubi euidenter ostendit, et initium fidei esse donum dei, quando non tantum pro fidelibus ut augeatur in eis uel perseueret fides, uerum etiam pro infidelibus ut habere incipiant eam quam penitus non habebant,... sancta orat ecclesia.... quod si ita est, in ea quidem parte qua optamus ut homines ex infidelibus fiant fideles, non perseuerantia, sed initium uidetur optari:: in ea vero qua optamus ut homines in facienda voluntate dei aequentur angelis dei, cum hoc orant sancti, perseverantiam demonstrantur orare; quoniam nemo pervenit ad illam summam... beatitudinem, nisi in ea sanctitate quam sumpsit in terra, perseveraverit usque in fidem.

sich die beiden, dass Gott den Anfang des Glaubens auch ohne Gebet schenkt, nicht aber die Beharrlichkeit, die erbetet werden muss.[73] Dann kommt Augustin auf die Vorherbestimmung zu sprechen, die er als das Vorherwissen Gottes von seinen eigenen künftigen Gaben beschreibt.[74] Er wendet sich dabei gegen jene, die meinen, durch die Verkündigung der Vorherbestimmung werde die Wirkung der Predigt gefährdet, weswegen sie insbesondere die Gnadenhaftigkeit des Glaubensanfangs und der Beharrlichkeit im Glauben ausschließlich der menschlichen Willensentscheidung zuschrieben.[75] Daraus folge, dass die Gnade Gottes das Verdienst des Glaubens voraussetze und Gott diesem seine übrigen Gnadengaben schenke, was auch Augustins Kritiker nicht leugneten. Darin sieht Augustin eine doppelte Inkonsequenz: Weder beeinträchtige die Predigt über den Gnadencharakter dieser Gaben die Wirkkraft der Predigt über sie, noch beschränkten sie sich auf die Predigt solcher Haltungen, die nach ihrer Ansicht ausschließlich von der menschlichen Entscheidungskraft abhingen, nämlich der Glaubensanfang und die Beharrung im Glauben.[76] Die Leugner der Prädestination würden sich dagegen wenden, "dass man den Menschen verkündigt, es seien Gottes Gaben, wenn einer zum Glauben kommt und im Glauben verharrt, da mehr Hoffnungslosigkeit als Aufmunterung verursacht werde, wenn die Zuhörer sich denken, es sei für die menschliche Unwissenheit doch ungewiss, wem Gott diese Gaben gebe oder wem er sie nicht gebe"[77], wer also zu Gnade und Heil

[73] Vgl. ebd. 39 PL 45,1017: Immo cum constet alia deum, danda etiam non orantibus, sicut initium fidei; alia nonnisi orantibus praeparasse, sicut usque in finem perseuerantiam: profecto qui ex se ipso hanc se habere putat, non orat ut habeat. Cauendum est igitur, ne, dum timemus ne tepescat hortatio, exstinguatur oratio, accendatur elatio.

[74] Vgl. ebd. 42 PL 45,1019: Ergo nec dantur a deo, aut ea se daturum esse nescivit. Quod si et dantur, et ea se daturum esse praescivit, profecto praedestinavit. Vgl. ferner ebd. 43 PL 45,1020: Cum… ostenderimus, et initium fidei, et usque in finem perseuerantiam, dei dona esse; nec ulla sua futura dona, et quae danda essent, et quibus danda essent, deum non praescire potuisse; ac per hoc praedestinatos ab illo esse, quos liberat et coronat…

[75] Vgl. ebd. 42 PL 45,1019: Sed ii qui solum initium fidei et usque in finem perseuerantiam sic in nostra constituunt potestate, ut dei dona esse non putent, neque ad haec habenda atque retinenda deum operari nostras cogitationes et uoluntates, cetera uero ipsum dare concedunt, cum ab illo impetrantur credentis fide…

[76] Vgl. ebd.:… cetera uero ipsum dare concedunt, cum ab illo impetrantur credentis fide; cur ad ipsa cetera exhortationem, eorumque ceterorum praedicationem definitione praedestinationis non metuunt impediri? Ebd. 45 PL 45,1021: Neque isti, propter quos haec dicimus, qui praedicatione praedestinationis et gratiae exhortationem clamitant impediri, ad sola illa exhortantur dona, quae non a deo dari, sed a nobis esse contendunt, sicut sunt initium fidei, et in ea usque in finem perseuerantia…

[77] Ebd. 43 PL 45,1020. Zur Übersetzung vgl. ZUMKELLER, ALG 7,401.

vorherbestimmt sei und wer nicht. Was Augustin in *perseu.* im Vergleich zu *Simpl.* betont herausstellte, war nicht die Tatsache, sondern die Entfaltung des Gedankens, dass der ganze Glaube von seinem Anfang bis zu seiner Vollendung als Gnadengeschenk anzusehen sei. In *Simpl.* schrieb er seine revolutionierende Erkenntnis nieder, dass der Anfang des Glaubens primär göttliches Werk und somit Gnade sei und folglich nicht auf das göttliche Vorherwissen, wie er es vor *Simpl.* gelehrt hatte, sondern auf den göttlichen Ratschluss zurückgehe, in *perseu.* dehnt er logischerweise diese Einsicht, die in nuce schon die Gnadenhaftigkeit der Beharrung enthielt, ausdrücklich auf die Beharrung im Glauben aus und legt dar, dass das Vorherwissen der eigenen Heilstaten durch Gott nichts anderes als Vorherbestimmung zu Gnade und Heil sei.[78] Zwischen dem Anfang des Glaubens und seiner Beständigkeit bis zur Vollendung liegen aber noch mittlere Gaben, kraft derer wir auf rechte Weise leben. Dass sie uns von Gott dank der Vermittlung des Glaubens geschenkt werden, leugneten auch die Kritiker der Prädestinationslehre Augustins nicht. Von alldem aber, vom Anfang des Glaubens und allen seinen übrigen Gaben bis ans Ende, hat Gott vorhergewusst, dass er sie den von ihm Berufenen schenken werde. Wenn dem aber so ist, dann zeugt von übergroßer Streitsucht, wenn man der Lehre von der Vorherbestimmung widerspricht oder an ihr auch nur zweifelt.[79]

Mit der Lehre von der Gnadenhaftigkeit des Glaubensanfangs hängt nur mittelbar zusammen, wie Augustin über die Prädestination zu predigen empfiehlt.[80] Zur Abrundung des bisher Gesagten, soll dennoch darüber in kurzen Worten berichtet werden. Augustin warnt vor jeder unpsychologischen Härte und Einseitigkeit in der Predigt. Die Zuhörer sollen nicht geschockt und abgestoßen, sondern erschüttert und gewonnen werden. Daher vermeide man alle extremen Positionen und vor allem spreche man bei Aussagen über die Verwerfung nie in der zweiten Person, sondern wähle besser die dritte. Man fordere zum Gebet auf, für die Anwesenden um die Gabe der Beharrlichkeit im

[78] Vgl. perseu. 52.54f PL 45,1026-1028. In dem Zusammenhang muss darauf verwiesen werden, dass die Prädestination bei Augustin vorzüglich ein positiv geprägter Begriff ist und die Vorherbestimmung zu Gnade und Heil besagt. Vgl. oben FN 41.

[79] Vgl. perseu. 56 PL 45,1028: Inter initium autem fidei et perfectionem perseuerantiae, media sunt illa, quibus recte uiuimus, quae ipsi etiam donari nobis a deo fide impetrante consentiunt. Haec autem omnia, initium scilicet fidei, et cetera usque in finem dona sua, deus largiturum se uocatis suis esse praesciuit. Nimiae igitur contentionis est, praedestinationi contradicere, uel de praedestinatione dubitare. Zur Übersetzung vgl. ZUMKELLER, ALG 7,423.

[80] Vgl. vor allem perseu. 57-62 PL 45,1028-1031.

Guten, für die anderen um Gnade und Umkehr. Es müsse das Streben dahin gehen, dass alle, denen man begegnet, zum Frieden mit Gott gelangen.[81] Die Betonung von Gnade und Vorherbestimmung habe das Ziel, die Zuhörer zur Demut zu führen, damit sie nicht durch Stolz der Gnade verlustig gehen, doch vermeide man zugleich die Gefahr, durch Übertreibung das gute menschliche Streben zu lähmen. Abschließend soll darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Augustin bereits in den Traktaten zum Johannes-Evangelium als pastoralen Grundsatz herausgestellt hatte, dass die Gnade nicht auf Kosten des freien Willens so betont werden dürfe, dass die Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen für sein Tun gefährdet werde; es dürfe aber auch nicht der freie Wille so herausgehoben werden, dass der Mensch auf seine Tugend stolz werde und gerade dadurch die Gnade verliere[82]: *Niemand wage den freien Willen so zu verteidigen, dass er uns die Gebetsbitte «Führe uns nicht in Versuchung»* (Mt 6,13) *zu beseitigen sucht; andererseits leugne niemand den freien Willen und wage die Sünde zu entschuldigen!... Denn manche erhebt ein allzu großes Vertrauen auf ihren Willen zum Stolz, so wie manche ein allzu großes Misstrauen in den eigenen Willen in Nachlässigkeit stürzen lässt.*[83]

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[81] Vgl. corrept. 47 CSEL 92,277: Quia ergo nos qui salui futuri sint nescientes, omnes quibus praedicamus hanc pacem saluos fieri uelle deus iubet, et ipse hoc in nobis operatur diffundendo istam caritatem in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis... Bereits in exp. Gal. 61,15 CSEL 84,137 hatte Augustin geschrieben: Omnibus enim pari dilectione vita aeterna optanda est... Vgl. RING, Proleg. 2,32f.

[82] Vgl. Io. eu. tr. 53,8-11 CCL 36,455-457; RING, Proleg. 3,309f FN 415.

[83] Io. eu. tr. 53,8 CCL 36,455: Tantum ne audeat quisquam liberum arbitrium sic defendere, ut nobis orationem qua dicamus «Ne nos inferas in tentationem» (Mt 6,13), conetur auferre; rursus, ne quisquam neget uoluntatis arbitrium, et audeat excusare peccatum.... Nam et quosdam nimia suae uoluntatis fiducia extulit in superbiam, et quosdam nimia suae uoluntatis diffidentia deiecit in negligentiam.

[84] Die Abkürzungen folgen dem AL 1,XXVI-LX, ausgenommen die biblischen Schriften, die nach den sog. Loccumer Richtlinien abgekürzt werden, vgl. dazu die deutsche Einheitsübersetzung der Bibel.

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AN ANTI-PELAGIAN *CAUEAT* AUGUSTINE'S *EP.* 188 TO JULIANA

During the winter of 417/418[1] Augustine and Alypius wrote a letter to *Anicia Iuliana*[2] (=Juliana), *inlustris filia*[3] and *famula Dei*[4], a *domina* belonging to the *gens Anicia*[5]. This family was simultaneously one of the most aristocratic and wealthy families of the Roman Empire[6] and one of the most renowned in Christianity. In fact, according to Prudentius, the first high-ranked conversions to the Christian faith[7] among the Roman aristocracy, at least in the male line[8], took place among this *gens*.

[1] See O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432* (PuP, 7), Stuttgart, 1975, p. 205, n. 353. Although Hombert initially gives the traditional dating of 417/418 (cf. P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* [CEAug.SA, 163], Paris, 2000, p. 225), he later makes his preference for the beginning of 418 clear (cf. *Ibid.*, p. 227, n. 55 and p. 640).

[2] See C. and L. PIETRI (eds.), *Anicia Iuliana* 3, in *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, T. I: *A-K*, Rome, 1999, pp. 1169-1171.

[3] Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188, *inscriptio* and 1,1, *CSEL* 57, p. 119.

[4] ID., *De bono uiduitatis* (*inscriptio*), *CSEL* 41, p. 305.

[5] Cf. JEROME, *Ep.* 130,3, *CSEL* 56, p. 170; AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 150, *CSEL* 44, p. 381.

[6] Cf. AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, *Rerum gestarum* 27,11,1, ed. M.-A. MARIÉ (Le Belles Lettres), pp. 137-138; PROCOPIUS OF CAESAREA, *De bellis* 1,2,27, ed. D. ROQUES (Les Belles Lettres), p. 33.

[7] Although his words should not be accepted uncritically, Prudentius does affirm that Sextus Anicius Petronius Probus was the first to add to the prestige of Christian Rome with his conversion: "Fertur enim ante alios generosus Anicius urbis / inlustrasse caput" (PRUDENTIUS, *Contra Symmachum* 1, vv. 552-553, *CCL* 126, p. 204). Laurence writes: "On peut fort bien admettre que Probus ait conçu cette conversion comme l'un des moyens de confirmer le pouvoir et l'influence de sa famille en s'inscrivant dans une évolution religieuse éminemment liée à celle de la politique. (...) il ne pouvait s'agir que d'un christianisme «moyen»" (P. LAURENCE, *Proba, Juliana et Démétrias. Le christianisme des femmes de la* gens Anicia *dans la première moitié du V^e siècle*, in *REAug* 48 [2002] 131-163, p. 136).

[8] We should not forget that Faltonia Vetitia Proba (see C. and L. PIETRI [eds.], *Faltonia Vetitia Proba*, in *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, T. II: *L-Z*, Rome, 2000, p. 1831), had written a *carmen sacrum*, the *Cento uergilianus de laudibus Christi* (cf. PROBA, *Cento*, *CSEL* 16/1, pp. 568-609). According to Laurence, "de manière presque systématique, la conversion des femmes a précédé celle des hommes, surtout dans cette classe où les charges officielles ont longtemps été liées au culte traditionnel: il est fortement probable qu'au III^e siècle, et même au II^e, des femmes de cette famille étaient déjà chrétiennes" (P. LAURENCE, *op. cit.*, p. 136).

Juliana, who had married *Anicius Hermogenianus Olybrius*, son of *Sextus Claudius Petronius Probus*[9] and *Anicia Faltonia Proba*[10], and consul in 395, was widowed before the sack of Rome in 410[11]. Together with her children[12] (one of whom was *Demetrias*[13]), her mother-in-law Proba and a group of *uirgines* and widows, she left Rome after the sack and, like many of her fellow-citizens[14], she went into exile. Juliana's group initially travelled to Southern Gaul before finally setting in North Africa, where the *Anicii* had vast possessions. After "buying" their safety by letting part of their fortune be confiscated[15] by the corrupt and cruel Heraclianus, *comes* of Africa, they settled in Carthage[16].

Although Proba and Juliana must have met Augustine soon after their arrival in Africa[17], their official introduction took place between 412 and 413 during one of the Bishop of Hippo's visits to Carthage[18].

[9] See C. and L. PIETRI (eds.), *Sex(tus) Claudius Petronius Probus* 3, in *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, T. II: *L-Z*, Rome, 2000, pp. 1840-1841.

[10] Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 130,30, *CSEL* 44, p. 76. See C. and L. PIETRI (eds.), *Anicia Faltonia Proba* 2, in *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, T. II, *cit.*, pp. 1831-1833.

[11] Cf. JEROME, *Ep.* 130,3, *CSEL* 56, p. 177.

[12] Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De bono uiduitatis* 8,11 and 14,18, *CSEL* 41, pp. 315 and 324-325; JEROME, *Ep.* 130,6, *CSEL* 56, p. 182.

[13] See G. BARDY, *Démetriade*, in *DSp* 3 (1957) 133-137; O. WERMELINGER, *Demetrias*, in *AugL* 2 (1996) 289-290; C. and L. PIETRI (eds.), *Demetrias Amnia*, in *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, T. I, *cit.*, pp. 544-547.

[14] For more on this diaspora see S. MAZZARINO, *L'impero romano*, Vol. III, Bari, 1976, pp. 798ff.

[15] "...tacita proscriptione mercata sit" (JEROME, *Ep.* 130,7, *CSEL* 56, p. 185).

[16] After leading a rebellion against the emperor Honorius, Heraclianus was eventually executed at Carthage in 413. See A. MANDOUZE *et al.* (eds.), *Heraclianus*, in *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 1: Prosopographie de l'Afrique chrétienne (303-533)*, Paris, 1982, pp. 552-553.

[17] Augustine's *Ep.* 130 on prayer (*CSEL* 44, pp. 40-77) and *Ep.* 131 (*CSEL* 44, pp. 77-79), both addressed to Proba and written in 412, suggest that an epistolary exchange had already taken place between the bishop of Hippo and the little group of *dominae* (see P.-M. HOMBERT, *op. cit.*, p. 250, n. 13). Moreover, we may gather that Augustine had already had some sort of relation with the *Anicii* after his own conversion, presumably during his second stay in Rome (387-388), before he returned to Africa. Ties with the *Anicii* family are documented in an inscription written by Anicius Bassus for Monica, the mother of Augustine, who died in Ostia in 387. This inscription celebrates both the mother and the son (cf. *Anicius Aucherius Bassus*, in C. and L. PIETRI (eds.), *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2: Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313-604)*, T. I, *cit.*, p. 271).

[18] "Licet enim uos per litteras primum, deinde etiam praesentia corporali pia et catholica..." (AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,1,1, *CSEL* 57, p. 119).

It was on that occasion that Augustine encouraged Demetrias' sacred *propositum* to assume the virginal veil, in spite of the fact that a marriage had already been arranged for her. In the end, Demetrias' determination, in combination with Augustine's support[19], managed to win Juliana and Proba's blessing: the *uelatio* was performed by Aurelius, the Bishop of Carthage[20], some time in 413. Augustine learned of the consecration after receiving a letter written by both Juliana and Proba[21]. He replied to them expressing great joy for the good news and thanking them for the present (*apophoretum*) with which the news was accompanied[22].

In 414 Juliana received the treatise *De bono uiduitatis* that Augustine had written at her request[23]. In it Juliana was encouraged to live her *continentia uidualis* in the same way her daugther was living her virginal consecration[24]. As for Demetrias, Augustine suggested (apparently without having received a specific request) that she should read his treatise *De sancta uirginitate*[25], a work written earlier[26] in response to Jovinian's appeals against virginity and perpetual continence. Juliana had also been previously advised to read this

[19] Augustine himself mentions the influence he exercised on Demetrias' decision: "...cuius ministerii nostri adiuuante gratia et misericordia saluatoris in domo uestra tantus fructus exortus est, ut humanis nuptiis iam paratis sancta Demetrias spiritalem sponsi illius praeferret amplexum" (*Ibid.* 188,1,1, p. 120).

[20] "...ad inprecationem pontificis" (JEROME, *Ep.* 130,2, *CSEL* 56, p. 176).

[21] "Nesciremus autem, quem ad modum nostra illa tunc exhortatio a fideli et nobili uirgine fuisset accepta, nisi nobis profectis, cum post paululum professa fuisset sanctimoniam uirginalem, hoc ingens Dei donum, quod per seruos quidem suos plantat et rigat, sed per se ipsum dat incrementum, nobis operariis prouenisse uestrarum litterarum laetissimo nuntio et ueraci testimonio disceremus" (AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,1,1, *CSEL* 57, p. 120).

[22] Cf. ID., *Ep.* 150, *CSEL* 44, pp. 380-382. The *apophoretum*, like that sent to Augustine on the occasion of Demetrias' *uelatio* ("uelationis apophoretum": *Ibid.*, p. 382), was a present given at dinner-table for guests to take home.

[23] Cf. ID., *De bono uiduitatis* 1,1, *CSEL* 41, pp. 305-306; *Ibid.* 14,18, pp. 324-325.

[24] "Nunc ergo illi regi, qui unicae sponsae, cuius membra estis, speciem concupiuit, ueraciter simul placete, simul inhaerete, illa integritate uirginali, tu continentia uiduali, ambae pulchritudine spiritali" (*Ibid.* 19,24, p. 334).

[25] "Virgo autem sancta proles uestra, si aliquid de sua professione desiderat ex laboribus nostris, habet grandem librum *de sancta uirginitate*, quem legat" (*Ibid.* 23,29, p. 342).

[26] The usual dating of Augustine's *De sancta uirginitate* is 401. According to Hombert, however, this little treatise was actually written in two stages: chs. 1-38 in 404, and chs. 39-57 in 412 (cf. P.-M. Hombert, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-136 and 638). Interestingly, Hombert's hypothesis does account for the anti-Pelagian use of *impeccantia* (cf. AUGUSTINE, *De sancta uirginitate* 50,51, *CSEL* 41, p. 296). This usage could not have occurred as early as 401.

work which, in the words of Augustine, contained many useful things for both kinds of continence, namely that of a virgin and that of a widow[27]. Finally, after Juliana's group had returned to Rome, she wrote a letter (now lost) to Augustine with the aim of reassuring him that she and her *domuncula* were far removed from persons corrupting the catholic faith with their perverse writings[28], and that they remained steadfast with respect to the orthodox teaching of the Church. The reassurance went as far as asserting that they were all on guard even against small errors (*paruos errores*)[29].

It is at this point that a joint letter, the *Ep.* 188, was sent to Juliana by Augustine and Alypius. Knowing about the ties existing between Pelagius and the *Anicii*, the two bishops remained suspicion that Juliana's household was still sympathetic to Pelagianism. They repeated their warning about those who were hostile to the doctrine of grace (viz. the Pelagians, although they are not explicitly mentioned), and advised her to pray so that she might continue to receive God's grace.

The aim of this contribution is to analyse and set *Ep.* 188 (which presents itself as a short anti-Pelagian manifesto[30]) in its broader historical and theological context. The reason for the two bishops to reiterate the doctrinal errors of the Pelagians came from an anonymous writing addressed to Demetrias, a writing which Augustine and Alypius suspected to be the work of Pelagius because of the theories therein expounded. In point of fact, Pelagius, an old acquaintance of the *Anicii*, had indeed written a letter addressed to Demetrias[31] at the request of her mother Juliana, just as Jerome had done[32].

[27] Cf. ID., *De bono uiduitatis*. 23,29, *CSEL* 41, pp. 342-343.

[28] "...qui prauis tractatibus uenerandam fidem saepe corrumpunt" (cit. in ID., *Ep.* 188,1,2, *CSEL* 57, p. 121).

[29] Cf. *infra*, n. 39.

[30] Notable examples of anti-Pelagian manifestos disguised as *epistulae* are Augustine's letters to Hilary (cf. *Ep.* 157, *CSEL* 44, pp. 449-488), to Innocent (cf. *Ep.* 177, *CSEL* 44, pp. 669-688), to Sixtus (cf. *Ep.* 194, *CSEL* 57, pp. 176-214) and to Vitalis (cf. *Ep.* 217, *CSEL* 57, pp. 403-425).

[31] PELAGIUS, *Ep. ad Demetriadem*, *PL* 30, cc. 15-45.

[32] Cf. JEROME, *Ep.* 130, *CSEL* 56, pp. 175-201. It is likely, however, that the insistence ("in extorquendo": *Ibid.* 130,1, p. 176) with which Jerome was asked by Proba and Juliana to write to Demetrias, was the result of Augustine's pressure on the two aristocratic *dominae*. In point of fact it seems very strange that Jerome was also asked for spiritual advice since it is well-known that he did not enjoy a good relationship with the *Anicii* (see W. DUNPHY, *Saint Jerome and the* Gens Anicia, *[Ep. 130 to Demetrias]*, in *SP* 18/4, Kalamazoo–Louvain, 1990, pp. 139-145). Dunphy suggests that Augustine, having learned the request made to Pelagius, must have "convinced Proba to forget the old rancour and invite Jerome's contribution to bal-

1. *Ep.* 188 and its anti-Pelagian *caveat*

To start with, the fact that Augustine writes to Juliana, and not to Demetrias, cannot be passed over without comment. As it has been suggested, and probably correctly, that this fact shows that Augustine did "not construe Demetrias as the governing principle of her own ascetic life"[33]. By focusing on her mother, he seems to suggest "the inability and lack of authority in the daugther"[34], whom, due to her young age[35], he probably believed to be still naieve and highly impressionable[36].

Augustine begins *Ep.* 188 reiterating the warning (*admonitio*) he had made to Juliana on a previous occasion (probably in a letter now lost), against unorthodox opinions (*contraria gratiae Dei dogmata*)[37]. Although it appears that the first warning did not fall on deaf ears[38], Augustine felt it necessary to repeat it, in spite of Juliana's assurance that her *domuncula* was nothing if not orthodox. According

ance that of Pelagius. In the meantime he *[Augustine]* could wait until he had read more of Pelagius' writings" (*Ibid.*, pp. 144-145). In fact, "it is only after he has read Pelagius' contribution that he *[Augustine]* will write a critique of that letter. Augustine had no wish to enter into direct conflict with Pelagius without having some definite written evidence of his thought to hand" (*Ibid.*, p. 144).

[33] A. S. JACOBS, *Writing Demetrias: Ascetic Logic in Ancient Christianity*, in *Church History. Studies in Christianity and Culture* 69 (2000) 719-748, p. 732.

[34] *Loc. cit.*

[35] We may surmise that Demetrias was about 14/15 years old. In the late Roman Empire girls could be married within two or three years of their puberty, the latter roughly coinciding with the 12th birthday. As Macrobius writes: "Nam et secundum iura publica duodecimus annus in femina et quartus decimus in puero definit pubertatis aetatem" (MACROBIUS, *Saturnalia* 7,7,6, ed. I. WILLIS, Teubner, Stutgardiae et Lipsiae, 1994, p. 423). See also TERTULLIAN, *De uirginibus uelandis* 11,6, *CCL* 2, p. 1221.

[36] This can be inferred from Augustine's somehow ironic words: "...legat uirgo Christi, unde credat uirginalem suam sanctitatem omnesque spiritales diuitias non nisi ex se ipsa sibi esse, atque ita, (...) discat Deo esse – quod absit! – ingrata" (AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,2,4, *CSEL* 57, p. 122).

[37] ID., *Ep.* 188,1,2, *CSEL* 57, p. 120. In his *De bono uiduitatis*, however, Augustine had already warned Juliana about the opinions of friends who unduly emphasize man's natural ability to do good. Cf., *e. g.*: "Sic enim conantur defendere hominis liberum arbitrium, ut eo solo etiam Dei gratia non adiuti ualeamus, quod diuinitus iubetur, inplere" (ID., *De bono uiduitatis* 17,21, *CSEL* 41, p. 329); "nisi ... in hominis constituant potestate non adiuta Dei munere, sed solo arbitrio liberae uoluntatis exerta – quasi possit esse ad perficiendum opus bonum uoluntas libera nisi Dei munere liberata – ..." (*Ibid.* 18,22, p. 331).

[38] "Sane, quod me hortatur reuerentia uestra, ne aures indulgeam his hominibus, qui prauis tractatibus uenerandam fidem saepe corrumpunt, gratias uberes ago tam piae admonitioni" (from Juliana's letter to Augustine, cit. in ID., *Ep.* 188,1,2, pp. 120-121).

to the Roman *domina*, her household adhered so closely to the Catholic teaching that not only were heresies or persons propagating opinions contrary to the faith carefully avoided, but they also avoided those teachings which merely *seemed* to contain small errors (*paruos errores*)[39].

One wonders whether Juliana's words are an indication that by 417/418, i. e. in the heat of the Pelagian controversy, Pelagius' previous connection with the *gens Anicia* had already been weakened, or, even more drastically, whether the *Anicii* had once and for all distanced themselves from Pelagius and his movement. On one hand, Juliana's words, if taken literally, would incline us to believe that something of this nature must have occurred. But, on the other hand, the vagueness of the reference to "small errors" impels us to investigate their exact meaning preventing us from drawing hasty conclusions. If the latter, one possible explanation is that, while professing her attachment to the Catholic teaching and while trying to dispel Augustine's apprehensions about the orthodoxy of her household, Juliana was also trying to free an old friend and spiritual adviser from the accusations of heresy. In this interpretation, Juliana's words would seem to be an attempt to communicate the opinion that Pelagius was not unorthodox but that he had merely fallen into "small errors"! If Juliana's ties with Pelagianism were never broken, or if they had even been intensified after Pelagius' and Coelestius' rehabilitation in 417, it would seem to follow that Juliana and her *domuncula* were unable to see Pelagianism as a heresy, as Augustine's fears and suspicions would suggest[40]. For Juliana and her household, Pelagius, besides

[39] "Sed nouerit sacerdotium uestrum longe me ac domunculam meam ab huius modi personis esse discretam; omnisque familia nostra adeo catholicam sequitur fidem, ut in nullam haeresim aliquando deuiauerit nec umquam lapsa sit, non dico in eas sectas, quae uix expiantur, sed nec in eas, quae paruos habere uidentur errores" (from Juliana's letter to Augustine, cit. in *Ibid.* 188,1,3, p. 121).

[40] This can be inferred from Augustine's reaction to her conviction that heresies worthy of this name are only those opposing the Trinitarian doctrine: "...sed non hinc solum error humanus obrepit, ut aliquid secus sentiatur de indiuidua Trinitate. Sunt enim et alia, in quibus perniciosissime erratur, sicuti hoc est, unde diutius fortasse, quam satis esset uestrae fideli castaeque prudentiae, in hac epistula locuti sumus" (*Ibid.* 188,3,10, pp. 127-128). As Brown writes: "The noble Roman Christians who had read the '*Letter to Demetrias*' with pleasure, were frankly unimpressed by the dire warnings of Augustine and Alypius. Demetrias' mother, Juliana, will put these fussy, provincial bishops firmly in their place: her family had never been touched by any heresy (...). A good Christian of the Later Empire, 'heresy' to her had meant Greek errors on the Godhead, not African scruples on grace and freewill" (P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo. A Biography*, London, 1967, pp. 355-356).

being "an ardent ascetic who had written an urgent admonition for their daugther"[41], was and remained an old friend. Despite his fall from grace, their esteem and sympathy towards the renowned ascetic and spiritual adviser remained unbroken[42].

Juliana's ambiguity, however, failed to reduce Augustine's growing suspicions regarding the real extent of her understanding and, hence, her repudation of Pelagius' views, views with which the *Anicii* had been familiar for a long time, probably since the British reformer began his ministry to the Roman élite in the last decade of the 4th century[43]. These suspicions were the grounds for the Bishop of Hippo for writing to Juliana, whose household, he knew, exercised a considerable influence in the Christian milieu[44]. He tried to help her see how dangerous the Pelagian teaching was, a task made especially difficult when it was so subtly disguised. As Augustine would contend, that which may appear to be harmless or to be the mere result of one's overzealous Christian commitment could in fact be the cause of serious error and be repleted with dire consequences when set against the orthodox understanding of Christian doctrine and ascetic praxis.

Thus Augustine begins to explain why the views of Pelagius (who Augustine clearly suspects to be the true author of the writing to Demetrias[45]) are dangerous. The Pelagian attribution to human free

[41] *Ibid.* p. 344.

[42] "Sans faire ouvertement adhésion aux doctrines de Pélage, Proba et Juliana ne cessèrent de lui garder leur estime" (G. de PLINVAL, *Pélage. Ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme. Étude d'histoire littéraire et religieuse*, Lausanne *et al.*, 1943, pp. 215-216).

[43] We should not forget that Pelagius had probably lived in Rome for more than twenty years, until he left it after the city was taken by Alaric in 410. There he came in touch with the great Christian families, above all the *Anicii*: "À Rome il *[Pélage]* semble avoir eu accès dans les grandes maisons chrétiennes, chez Marcella, chez Pammaque et Océanus. Mais il y a surtout une famille dont la protection avouée ou devinée procura à Pélage un incontestable appui: c'est la *gens Anicia*" (G. DE PLINVAL, *op. cit.*, p. 214). As to the support of the Roman aristocracy to Pelagius see: P. BROWN, *Aspects of Christianization of the Roman Aristocracy*, in ID., *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustin*, London, 1972, pp. 161-182; ID., *Pelagius and His Supporters: Aims and Environment*, in *Ibid.* pp. 183-207; ID., *The Patrons of Pelagius: the Roman Aristocracy between East and West*, in *Ibid.* pp. 208-226.

[44] A mild form of *captatio beneuolentiae*, is perhaps included in Augustine's referring to Juliana's household a "no small Church of Christ": "Domum enim uestram non paruam Christi ecclesiam deputamus" (AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,1,3, *CSEL* 57, p. 121). See also: "Nam illud optime nouimus cum omnibus uestris cultores uos esse et fuisse indiuiduae Trinitatis" (*Ibid.* 188,3,10, p. 127).

[45] Pelagius' name will only crop up in the last paragraph of the letter: cf. (*Ibid.* 188,3,14, p. 130). Augustine will claim with certainty Pelagius' authorship of the *Ep. ad Demetriadem* in his *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* (cf. 1,37,40, *CSEL* 42, p. 155).

will, rather than to God's gift of grace, of the ability to pursue a life of *iustitia, continentia, pietas* and *castitas*, should not be regarded as a *paruus error*[46]. On the contrary it is precisely this perilous conviction that must be so rigorously opposed. To share this view it would also necessitate the acceptance of the opinion that God's grace, which is necessary to live justly and uprightly, works merely through human nature and scriptural revelation. This, in its turn, would entail the belief that both the ability to will the good and to love God and one's neighbours ultimately depend on man, who would thus be regarded as being sufficient in himself and able of his own will (*arbitrio proprio*) to perform anything he wishes and which is dear to him[47]. No doubt, Augustine continues, those who hold such opinions and refuse to accept the Apostle's words that "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (Rom 5,5)[48], refuse also to accept that only divine grace (and more specifically the grace of the Saviour) enables human beings to seek perfect life. The inability to recognize this truth, Augustine concludes, cannot be regarded as a trivial matter; it is actually an indication of how greatly one may err[49].

At this point Augustine reveals the cause of his preoccupations with regard to the spiritual well-being of Juliana and her household: they must not listen to the exhortations contained in the anonymous writing addressed to Demetrias, where it is said that virginal purity and the spiritual riches that she enjoys come from herself alone. For support, Augustine then quotes from that anonymous writing:

> In this respect too, then, you have possessions which rightly entitle you to be set above others, indeed even more so; for everyone realizes that your nobility in the physical sense and your wealth belong to your family, not to you, but no one except you yourself will be able to endow you with spiritual riches, and it is for these that you are rightly to be praised, for these that you are deservedly set above others, and they are things which cannot be within you unless they come from you[50].

[46] ID., *Ep.* 188,1,3, *CSEL* 57, p. 121.

[47] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

[48] See A.-M. LA BONNARDIÈRE, *Le verset paulinien Rom. V,5 dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin*, in *AugMag*, T. II, Paris, 1954, pp. 657-665.

[49] "...quantum et quam exitiabiliter erret" (AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,1,3, p. 122). See also the expression "perniciosissime erratur" (*Ibid.* 188,3,10, p. 128).

[50] "Habes ergo et hic per quae merito praeponaris aliis, immo hinc magis; nam corporalis nobilitas atque opulentia tuorum intellegentur esse non tua, spiritales uero diuitias nullus tibi praeter te conferre poterit. In his ergo iure laudanda, in his merito ceteris praeferenda es, quae nisi ex te et in te esse non possunt" (*Ibid.*, 188,2,4, p. 122; Augustine's quotation is taken from PELAGIUS, *Ep. ad Demetriadem* 11, *PL*

According to Augustine, to believe that the spiritual riches that Demetrias enjoys are to be found in herself and come from her, is not only the result of a venemous theory (*uirus*)[51] but is also a clear sign of ingratitude towards God[52]. The best reply to such a view is given by the Apostle's words: "We have this treasure in earthen vessels to show that the excellency of power belongs to God and not to us" (2 Cor 4,7).

2. Augustine's short manifesto against Pelagian tenets

At this point, with rapid brush-strokes and in the light of his understanding of the doctrine of grace, Augustine synthesizes what he considers to be the main errors of Pelagianism, in order to once again put Juliana on guard against them.

A. The goodness and the freedom of the will

Once again the bishop of Hippo affirms that the spiritual goods do not originate in Demetrias' good will, her faith, or her righteousness. These all must be seen as God's gifts bestowed by grace. Undoubtedly man's free will has a say in the decision-making process concerning the good that has to be pursued. Yet, unlike the anonymous writer, Augustine counters the belief that the accomplishment of good rests on the operation of the free will alone. Man's good will (*bona uoluntas*) in the act of doing good is made possible precisely because his freedom (*arbitrium*) is enlightened and sustained by grace[53]. Therefore it is not enough to appeal to the teaching of revelation, as though one could derive from it alone the necessary strength to persevere in faith and to keep God's commandments. God is at work in both man's willing and acting (cf. Phil 2,13) through the inspiration of love (*caritas*) which is the only thing that enables him

30, p. 26). For this English translation, see: B. R. REES, *The Letters of Pelagius and His Followers*, Woodbridge, 1991, p. 48. See also AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,2,7 and 8, *CSEL* 57, pp. 125 and 126; *Ibid.* 188,3,14, p. 130. As Wermelinger writes: "Die Widerlegung der Demetriasstelle (...) geschieht ganz im Geiste des 5. Kanons der Karthagischen Konzils vom 1. Mai 418" (O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius, cit.*, p. 205, n. 353).

[51] AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,2,5, *CSEL* 57, p. 123.

[52] Cf. *Ibid.* 188,2,4, p. 122 (see *supra*, n. 36).

[53] "Proprium quippe arbitrium nisi Dei gratia iuuetur, nec ipsa bona uoluntas esse in homine potest" (*Ibid.* 188,2,7, p. 125).

to turn to God and to put into practice what he has learned from scriptural revelation[54]. The mere knowledge of God's law is not enough to bring it into effect. Only the love that God bestows on man helps him to walk in that direction[55].

In a nutshell, Augustine sketches his teaching on the relationship between grace and free will and, in line with his theocentric and predestinarian view, he explains the centrality of God's love working in the heart of man. Closely connected to this theocentrism is the distinction (*discretio*) that God makes with regard to those He wishes to set apart from the *massa mortis perditionisque*[56]. While he is sure that all the members which comprise this *massa* originated in Adam's disobedience, the bishop of Hippo cannot be explicit with regard to how this *discretio* actually comes about. Later, for example, when he quotes Lc 19,10 (*Venit quaerere et saluare quod perierat*) he seems to retain the general understanding that Christ has come to save all humanity because all men have perished in the fall of their forefather Adam and, hence, need to be saved. And all this in spite of the fact that on this particular point Augustine developed and retained until the end of his life a predestinarian view whereby salvation is restricted to the *electi*.

B. Humility and obedience vs. boasting

From his *répertoire* of scriptural passages Augustine frequently cited 1 Cor 4,7, a verse that has become a favourite for support of his view on the sovereignty of God's grace: *Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem et accepisti, quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis?* (1 Cor 4,7)[57]. He uses this verse to counter the implicit sense of ingratitude towards God he feels Pelagius' teaching contains[58]. For example, Augustine describes Demetrias' consecration as a gift of God (*Dei*

[54] "Non (...) tantum modo scientiam reuelando, ut nouerimus, quid facere debeamus, sed etiam inspirando caritatem, ut ea, quae discendo nouimus, etiam diligendo faciamus" (*Loc. cit.*). Cf. also *Ibid.* 188,1,3, p. 121.

[55] "Non igitur tantum modo in hoc nos adiuuat Deus, ut sciamus, quid agendum sit, uerum etiam ut amando agamus, quod discendo iam scimus" (*Ibid.* 188,2,8, p. 126).

[56] *Ibid.* 188,2,7, p. 125.

[57] See also allusions in *Ibid.* 188,2,8, p. 126; 188,3,9, p. 127; 188,3,14, p. 130. This scriptural quotation will be used over and over again in Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings: see the list provided in P.-M. HOMBERT, *Gloria gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (CEAug.SA – 148), Paris, 1996, pp. 22-24.

[58] Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,2,4, *CSEL* 57, p. 122 (see *supra*, n. 36).

donum)[59], and he is at pains to state that her *sanctimonia/continentia uirginalis* is not something she has achieved on her own strength, as though it were the result of her decision and commitment. Relying on texts such as Jac 1,17 ("Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est descendens a Patre luminum")[60] and Wis 8,21-22 ("Et cum scirem quia nemo potest esse continens, nisi Deus det. Et hoc ipsum erat sapientiae, scire cuius esset hoc donum")[61], the Bishop of Hippo stresses that the choice of undertaking a life of virginal continence does not rest on human capabilities but is the result of divine grace as that grace is given by the Holy Spirit. Only when divine action is assumed can one affirm that the gifts of continence and chastity belong *also* to the person upon whom it is bestowed, even though such a person is the "recipient" and not the source of the gift[62]. Thus, Demetrias' boasting regarding her own consecration must be rooted in God, the cause of all her gifts and the unique cause of her ability to boast[63]. Only in this way, namely by recognizing that God alone is the source of all her spiritual *bona*, will she be able to continue to progress toward a life of perfection. She must acknowledge that the progress comes not by or as a result of human encouragement, but thanks to God's grace working in her. From this, it also becomes clear what the primary purpose of Christian prayer is. Referring to 1 Thess 5,17-18 ("Sine intermissione orate, in omnibus gratias agite")[64], Augustine underlines that one should not pray to God only in order to be helped in growing and persevering in the good, but above all to *obtain* the good[65].

It is worth recalling, at this stage, the understanding that Augustine had of humility and obedience and how he developed it in close connection with the role Christ plays in his doctrine of grace.

Among all the scriptural passages that played a role in the Bishop of Hippo's doctrine of Christ's incarnation and redemption[66],

[59] "De ipsa quoque sacra continentia uirginali, quod non sibi sit ex se ipsa, sed sit Dei donum" (*Ibid.* 188,1,2, p. 120). See also *Ibid.* 188,2,6, p. 123.

[60] Cf. *Ibid.* 188,2,6, p. 124.

[61] Cf. *Ibid.* 188,2,8, p. 126, and 188,3,12, p. 129. See A.-M. La Bonnardière, *Le livre de la Sagesse* (Biblia Augustiniana), Paris, 1970, esp. Pp. 103-107 and 277-288.

[62] "Haec Dei dona sunt et uestra quidem sunt sed non ex uobis" (Augustine, *Ep.* 188,2,6, *CSEL* 57, p. 124).

[63] "Ita quippe est in ea salubriter gloria eius, cum Deus, qui in illa est, ipse est gloria eius, a quo habet omnia bona, quibus est bona,..." (*Ibid.* 188,3,9, p. 127).

[64] Cf. *Ibid.* 188,2,7, pp. 124-125.

[65] Cf. *loc. cit.*

[66] See A. Dihle, *Demut*, in *RAC* 3 (1957) 735-778, c. 772.

two are especially important: Jn 1,14 and Phil 2,6-8. Christ is not only the *magister humilitatis*[67] and the *doctor humilitatis*[68], but also the example that the believer has to imitate (*exemplum humilitatis*)[69]. In this way Christ shows that humility has its fountain-head in the Son of God made flesh, in the *Deus humilis*[70]. "The way of humility", Augustine writes, "comes from no other source; it comes only from Christ. It is the way originated by him who, though most high, came in humility"[71]. Precisely because it is rooted in God and not in man's commitments and achievements, Augustine considers humility as a permanent ontological character of which man should be conscious[72]. His truest characteristic is, in fact, his consciousness of being a creature, of being dependent on God the creator and, most importantly, on his gift of grace and salvation[73]. Whether he recognizes it or not, his existence is marked by this innate feature, which was shown eminently in Christ, the source of humility and its perfect model[74]. Furthermore, in the light of his concept of *Christus totus*, it becomes even more evident that the believer, as an obedient member

[67] "Humilis ueni, humilitatem docere ueni, magister humilitatis ueni; (...) qui mihi adhaeret, humilis erit, quia non facit uoluntatem suam, sed Dei" (AUGUSTINE, *Tractatus in Euangelium Ioannis* 25,16, *CCL* 36, p. 257). "Humilitatis enim magister est Christus, qui humiliauit semetipsum, factus oboediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis" (*Ibid.* 51,3, p. 440). Cf. also *Ibid.* 25,19, p. 259.

[68] "Doctor itaque humilitatis uenit non facere uoluntatem suam, sed uoluntatem eius qui misit illum" (*Ibid.* 25,18, p. 258). "Doctor itaque humilitatis Christus..." (ID., *De sancta uirginitate* 31,31, *CSEL* 41, p. 269). See O. SCHAFFNER, *Christliche Demut. Des Hl. Augustinus Lehre von der Humilitas* [Cass. 17], Würzburg, 1959, pp. 83-135).

[69] AUGUSTINE, *De fide et symbolo* 4,6, *CSEL* 41, p. 9.

[70] "Deus propter te humilis factus est. Puderet te fortasse imitari humilem hominem, saltem imitare humilem Deum" (ID., *Tractatus in Euangelium Ioannis* 25,16, p. 257). Cf. *Ibid.* 55,7, p. 466.

[71] "Via humilitatis huius aliunde manat; a Christo uenit. Haec uia ab illo est, qui cum esset altus, humilis uenit" (ID., *Enarrationes in psalmos* 31, s. II,18, *CCL* 38, p. 239).

[72] "La humilidad en el pensamiento de san Agustín tiene un carácter de permanencia. No es un mero acto. Es un modo continuo de existir que responde a una raíz ontológica" (J. L. AZCONA, *La doctrina de la humildad en los «Tractatus in Ioannem»*, in *Augustinus* 17 [1972] 27-45; 113-154; 255-288, p. 113).

[73] "Tibi autem non dicitur, Esto aliquid minus quam es: sed, Cognosce quod es. Cognosce te infirmum, cognosce te hominem, cognosce te peccatorem; cognosce quia ille iustificat" (AUGUSTINE, *Sermo* 137,4,4, *PL* 38, c. 756).

[74] See O. SCHAFFNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-138; I. W. A. JAMIESON, *Augustine's* Confessiones*: The Structure of Humility*, in *Augustiniana* 24 (1974) 234-246; A. VERWILGHEN, *Le Christ Jésus, source de l'humilité chrétienne (Phil. 2,6-8)*, in A.-M. LA BONNARDIÈRE (ed.), *Saint Augustin et la Bible*, Paris, 1986, pp. 427-437; A. COSTA, *El camino de la humildad en las Enarraciones sobre los salmos de san Agustín*, in *Cuadernos monasticos* 22 (1987) 23-41.

of the body, cannot but pursue the same humility that characterizes Christ-the-head[75].

If humility is an inborn virtue in every Christian, the virgins, who are consecrated to God in a special manner, must deepen their awareness of it. This was made plain in the treatise that Augustine advised Demetrias and her mother to read, the *De sancta uirginitate*. In it, while repeatedly praising the state of virginity, the Bishop of Hippo was also frequently at pains to warn over and over again against the danger of pride[76]. Maintaining one's virginity is a great good (*magnum bonum*) which comes from God. However, those who have embraced it must also be careful not to let it be ruined by pride (*ne superbia corrumpatur*)[77]. In fact, if only God can guard and protect virginity (which is his gift), and if God is love (cf. 1 Jn 4,8.16), then it follows that love is also the guardian of virginity, and that same love finds its dwelling-place in humility[78]. A proud virgin stands in stark contrast to the true meaning of her *propositum*. In that regard, Augustine affirmed clearly that a married but humble person is in a better position to serve as a witness to the Christian faith than a proud virgin[79].

Furthermore, according to Augustine, true humility corresponds to a state of "spiritual infancy" or "poverty of spirit", that same state that Jesus proclaimed to be a Christian beatitude and which uniquely gives access to the kingdom of God[80]: "Who are the poor in spirit? The humble, those who tremble at God's words, who confess their sins, and rely on no merits or righteousness of their own. Who are the poor in spirit? Those who when they do anything good,

[75] "Princeps tuus humilis, et tu superbus? Caput humile, et membrum superbum? Absit. Non vult esse de corpore capitis humilis, qui amat superbiam" (AUGUSTINE, *Sermo* 354,9,9, *PL* 39, c. 1568).

[76] "Non solum ergo praedicanda est uirginitas, ut ametur, uerum etiam monenda, ne infletur" (ID., *De sancta uirginitate* 1,1, *CSEL* 41, p. 236). The theme of humility being exhalted in connection with virginity comes back over and over again in the treatise: cf. *Ibid.* 31,31–56,57, pp. 268-302 *passim*.

[77] *Ibid.* 33,33, p. 273.

[78] "Non ergo custodit bonum uirginale nisi Deus ipse, qui dedit, et Deus caritas est. Custos ergo uirginitatis caritas; locus autem huius custodis humilitas" (*Ibid.* 51,52, p. 297).

[79] "Non dubito praeferre humilem mulierem virgini superbae" (ID., *Sermo* 354,9,9, *PL* 39, c. 1568). And again: "Et audeo dicere, coniugalem agentes vitam, si tenent humilitatem, superbis castis meliores sunt" (*Ibid.* 354,4,4, c. 1565).

[80] "*Talium est enim regnum coelorum [Mt 19,14]*, humilium scilicet, hoc est, spiritualiter parvulorum. (...) Humilitatem illam loquor, quae non vult perituris rebus excellere, sed aeternum aliquid veraciter cogitat, quo non suis viribus, sed adiuta perveniat" (*Ibid.* 353,2,1, *PL* 39, c. 1561).

they praise God; when they do wrong, they accuse themselves"[81]. By underlining humility as "spiritual infancy", in conformity to his doctrine of the sovereignty of grace, Augustine distinguishes his view from the concept of humility generally shared by the Church Fathers. The latter, in fact, preferred to follow Paul in his description of "infancy" as a stage in life prior to obtaining the full perfection of manhood in Christ (cf. *e. g.*, Eph 4,12-13; Col 1,28)[82]. Augustine is of course aware of Paul's negative emphasis on spiritual infancy, but he is able to masterly join together the Apostle's exhortation to be infants in regard to evil but adults in thinking (cf. 1 Cor 14,20) with the Gospel teaching on infancy as a sign of true humility (cf. Mt 11,25; 18,2-5.10-14; 19,14), and not necessarily equivalent with immaturity (*fatuitas*)[83]. It follows that spiritual infancy/humility is the prerequisite of and the foundation for perfection. The acquisition of the latter, through virtue and wisdom, constitutes (to use a metaphor employed by Augustine but also employed by Biblical authors) the edifice which is built upon the foundation: "For, in order that what is being built might be completed, the building is added, the foundation is not removed"[84].

Moreover, in Augustine's eyes, it is paramount that humility be closely interwoven with obedience. In fact, the creature's reliance on God's providence and her humble submission to God's commandments find their natural expression in obedience. Just as humility is considered the foundation upon which perfection can be sought and built, so too is obedience regarded as the *maxima uirtus*,

[81] "Qui sunt pauperes spiritu? Humiles, trementes uerba Dei, confitentes peccata sua; non de suis meritis, nec de sua iustitia praesumentes. Qui sunt pauperes spiritu? Qui quando faciunt aliquid boni, Deum laudant; quando mali se accusant" (ID., *Enarrationes in psalmos* 73,24, *CCL* 39, pp. 1020-1021). See also: ID., *De sermone Domini in monte* 1,3,10, *CCL* 35, pp. 7-8; *Sermo* 53,1, *PL* 38, cc. 364-365; *De sancta uirginitate* 32,32, *CSEL* 41, pp. 269-272.

[82] In Paul's eyes spiritual infants (νήπιοι) are those who are not firmly rooted in faith and are "tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the cunning of men" (Eph 4,14). They behave childishly and are immature in their ability to discern the ways of God (cf. 1 Cor 13,11; 14,20). The majority of the Fathers equated "spiritual infancy" with a Christian life far removed from perfection (see M.-F. BERROUARD, *Enfance spirituelle, I-III*, in *DSp* 4/1 [1960] 682-705, cc. 698-703).

[83] "Proponitur enim pueritia ad imitandum humilitatem, et item proponitur pueritia ad cauendum fatuitatem" (AUGUSTINE, *Enarrationes in psalmos* 46,2, *CCL* 38, p. 530).

[84] "Fundamenti uero ideo est aptior similitudo, quia ut perficiatur quod struitur, additur aedificium, non subtrahitur fundamentum" (ID., *Tractatus in Euangelium Ioannis* 98,6, *CCL* 36, p. 580).

the source (*origo*), the mother (*mater*) and the guardian (*custos*) of all other virtues[85]. It reminds the rational creature that while submission to the Creator is advantageous, the pursuit of one's own selfish will brings only pain and destruction. According to Augustine, obedience is the source and perfection of all justice (*iustitiae origo atque perfectio*). In fact, it is precisely here that we we find the major difference (*magna distinctio*) between the first Adam, who by his disobedience brought death to us all, and the second Adam, Christ, who, through his obedience unto death, became the fountainhead of our salvation[86].

C. Other Pelagian errors.

After having stressed the importance of a virgin's humility and obedience, Augustine briefly summarizes the general tenets of the Pelagians' teaching. Firstly, he says that their definitions of grace are so ambiguous that when they speak of grace or of God's help they speak interchangeably of nature, of free will (as pertaining to the goodness of nature), of doctrine (divine revelation) and the remission of sins[87]. Moreover, argues Augustine, even when the Pelagians are forced by the word of God to admit that one needs to pray in order not to fall into temptation (cf. Mt 26,41), they continue to interpret it in a way that makes something less than the means by which the will is strengthened and enabled to put into practice the truth of Christian revelation. On the contrary, they see prayer as an activity which facilitates man's knowledge of the truth in such a way that he can more easily learn what it is he has been asked to do[88]. Jesus himself stands out as an *exemplum* for all who wish to live justly. Yet again, Augustine continues, there is evidence that the Pelagians regard knowledge as a sufficient means for both learning

[85] "Omnium origo materque uirtutum" (ID., *Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum* 14,19, *CCL* 49, p. 50); "Sed oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae uirtus in creatura rationali mater quodam modo est omnium custosque uirtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei subditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere uoluntatem" (ID., *De ciuitate Dei* 14,12, *CCL* 48, p. 434); "...oboedientia: quam uirtutem tamquam radicalem atque, ut dici solet, matricem et plane generalem..." (ID., *De bono coniugali* 24,32, *CSEL* 41, p. 228); ID., *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum* 2,21,35, *CSEL* 60, p. 107. Augustine considered obedience as the "Grundhaltung des Menschen" (K. S. FRANK, *Gehorsam*, in *RAC* 9 [1976] 390-430, c. 423).

[86] Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Enarrationes in psalmos* 71,6, *CCL* 39, p. 975.

[87] Cf. ID., *Ep* 188,3,11-12, *CSEL* 57, pp. 128-129.

[88] *Loc. cit.*

and fulfilling the divine commandments. They do not clearly and directly acknowledge the need of God's love and God's *adiutorium*[89], a need which is acknowledged in the Bible by the sage who explicitly asked for the gift of chastity in order to avoid sin[90]. He knew that chastity is a gift of God and that, as such, it could not be achieved through knowkedge alone. On the contrary he asked to be endowed with the wisdom of the Holy Spirit in order to be able to practise the virtue of continence. Thus, Augustine concludes, in the writings of the Pelagians grace is not affirmed in the same way the apostle Paul did when he spoke of the need for man's works to be grounded in faith[91] and his knowledge by charity (cf Rom 12,3; 1 Cor 8,1), viz. the infusion of love (*inspiratio caritatis*)[92] that enables the believer to follow God's commandments.

3. Further implications

In Augustine's *Ep.* 188 it is possible to discern both an historical and a theological theme. This epistle reinforces the principle that the role of non-religious factors in a theological conflict should not be overlooked or underestimated. The clash between Augustinianism and Pelagianism is but one example of how secular factors were often exploited by both parties in the hope of gaining the support of aristocratic families whose influence might prove decisive for the acceptance of one religious opinion and the rejection of the other. As mentioned above, it is likely that Pelagius had enjoyed the support and the protection of, among others, the *gens Anicia*. This helps to explain the expression "small errors", used by Juliana in her letter to Augustine, especially if it was an attempt to shelter Pelagius from the "scrupulous" investigation of the bishop of Hippo and his friend Alypius, both of whom must have suspected that solid ties were still existing between the renowned ascetic and the *Anicii* were still in place. Jerome too, on the basis of the link he made between Origenism and Pelagianism, was on his guard against the *Anicii*. He felt that he had good reason to suspect that they were continuing to provide support for Pelagius, just as they had done previously for

[89] *Ibid.* 188,3,12, p. 129.
[90] See *supra*, n. 61.
[91] Augustine quotes Rom 12,3; 1,17; 14,23; Heb 11,6; 10,38; Gal 3,11; 5,6. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Ep.* 188,3,13, *CSEL* 57, p. 129.
[92] Cf. *Ibid.* 188,3,13, pp. 129-130.

Rufinus[93]. This, in its turn, would explain why, beyond the *politesse mondaine* which dominates the rhetorical tone of his letter to Demetrias, Jerome's reference to the "constraints" laid on him by Juliana's request (*in extorquendo*)[94] should *not* be regarded as rhetorical. Rather, they serve to express his uneasiness in redacting the letter against his will. Nonetheless, Jerome took advantage of the occasion to warn Demetrias against the risks of what he believed to be Origenism disguised as Pelagianism[95], and to speak out (although he did not mention the *Anicii* explicitly) against the dangers of any connection with the latter's party. On the other hand, it is likely that he was thinking of the *gens Anicia* when, in 415, in a letter to Ctesiphon, someone with "Pelagian" sympathies, he expressed his deep regret about that *sancta atque inlustris domus* welcoming heretics and even going so far as to support them materially, an action which, in his eyes, was the equivalent of accepting their teaching[96]. Moreover, in his *Dialogi contra Pelagianos*, Jerome openly complained about the fact that Pelagius had dared to write to Juliana a letter offering spiritual advice to Demetrias[97], and it is highly probable that he was thinking of Proba and Juliana (and maybe also of Albina and Melania) when he complained that Pelagius was being protected by his *amazonae* (*sic!*)[98].

In the heat of the Pelagian controversy Juliana and her *domuncula* must have chosen in favour of pragmatism. Triggered by the concern for doctrinal uniformity (towards which the great aristocratic families moved after the sack of Rome in 410[99], largely for the sake of enhancing political stability) the *Anicii* ceased lobbying for the Pelagian movement, even though they continued to hold onto the friendship and esteem they had always felt for its leader. But there was something even greater behind this desire for doctrinal uniformity and political stability. In point of fact, the religious orthodoxy of the *gens*

[93] In the West the Origenist controversy pitted Rufinus against Jerome. The former was backed by the *Turcii*, the *Antonii*, and, most likely, by the *Anicii*. This last link can be inferred from a letter that John Chrysostom (who suffered considerably at the hands of the anti-Origenist party) sent to Juliana to thank her for having supported his cause in Rome: cf. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, *Ep.* 168, *PG* 52, c. 709.

[94] JEROME, *Ep.* 130,1, *CSEL* 56, p. 176. See *supra*, n. 32.

[95] Jerome makes the link between Origenism and Pelagianism by exhorting Demetrias to hold to the faith as expressed by Innocent I, a staunch anti-Pelagian (cf. *Ibid.* 130,16, p. 196).

[96] *Ibid.* 133,13, p. 260.

[97] Cf. ID., *Dialogi contra Pelagianos* 3,14, *CCL* 80, p. 116.

[98] Cf. *Ibid.* 1,26, p. 33.

[99] "As for the great families who returned to their palaces in Rome, they would move with the times – towards uniformity" (P. BROWN, *Pelagius and His Supporters: Aim and Environment*, *cit.*, p. 191).

Anicia had always gone hand in hand with the splendour and the prestige of their wordly status, a factor that could never be underestimated and had always to be considered. Here lies the fundamental reason for Juliana's and, by extension, her household's impartiality in theological discussions and intrigues[100], and particularly for their alignment with the religious establishment once Pelagius had been officially condemned as heretic[101]. The proof of this lies in the fact that Juliana quickly came to be regarded as an "outstanding member of the Church"[102], while her daughter Demetrias, whose virginity assigned her a particular relationship vis-à-vis the ecclesiastical hierarchy, became associated with pope Leo the Great in subsequent decades[103].

The above considerations make it probable that Juliana's reception of Augustine's *Ep.* 188 must have been respectful. Although this opinion cannot be documented, it seems clear that the letter must have inspired an attentive and thoughtful reading, even if it was not warmly received[104].

Also interesting is, from a theological point of view, Augustine's approach to the issue of humility and obedience compared to that of Pelagius. Augustine countered the view of the anonymous author of the *Ep. ad Demetriadem*, who betrays a fundamental optimism with regard to the capabilities of human nature, by reiterating his doctrine of grace. More particularly, he regarded obedience, i. e. man's humble submission to God, as the "mother of virtues" which uniquely makes possible commitments to God as well as any quest for perfection[105].

[100] "Justement fière de sa rectitude doctrinale, la *gens Anicia* ne se laissait embrigader dans aucune coterie: elle voulait planer impartiale au-dessus des intrigues" (G. DE PLINVAL, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-216).

[101] "Wichtige Anhänger des Pelagius sind bald nach der Verurteilung verstummt oder haben aus Furcht vor Repressalien mit Pelagius gebrochen" (O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius, cit.*, p. 220).

[102] "Singulare membrum ecclesiae..." (INNOCENT I, *Ep.*15, *PL* 20, c. 518).

[103] Cf. L. DUCHESNE, *Liber Pontificalis*, T. I, Paris, 1886, p. 238; O. WERMELINGER, *Demetrias*, *cit.*, c. 291; C. and L. PIETRI (eds.), *Demetrias Amnia*, *cit.*, p. 546.

[104] Since no argument *e silentio* can ever be decisive one wonders how Clark is able to infer that Augustine's *Ep.* 188 jeopardized irremediably his relationship with Juliana and the *Anicii*. According to her, in fact, Augustine "killed a blossoming relationship with the Anician women through his hostility to Pelagian views" (E. A. CLARK, *The Origenist Controversy. The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate*, Princeton, 1992, p. 24).

[105] With regard to Augustine's labelling of obedience as the "mother of virtues", Colish writes: "His nomination of obedience as the mother of virtues (...) rather than Stoic prudence, Aristotelian justice, or Ambrosian temperance, reflects the deep misgivings of the later Augustine about man's ability to function as a moral agent *sui iuris*" (M. L. COLISH, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages,* Vol. II: *Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century*, Leiden, 1990, p. 227).

His emphasis on the working of divine grace within the heart of the believer, and, more particularly, in the life of a consecrated virgin, highlights Augustine's skepticism regarding the ability of man to live in an ethically responsible way. The bishop of Hippo's position is further clarified by his emphasis on God's sovereign grace acting in a prevenient and unfathomable way with regard to the *liberum arbitrium* and the *(bona) uoluntas* of those He has elected to salvation.

As for Pelagius, his optimistic emphasis on *naturae bonum*[106] and the capabilities ensuing from man's *naturalis quaedam sanctitas*[107] was ultimately the result of his conviction that it was precisely man's ability to steer his own ethical course that guaranteed the authenticity of his belief. In the eyes of the ascetic Briton, it is the *operum confessio* and the *conuersationis effectus* that are most important, not the *eloquentiae pompa*[108]. Pelagius would probably not have denied that humility also played a role in the area of Christian commitment. However, he probably would have understood this within the positive framework of man's natural ability. In fact, in exhorting Demetrias to pay special attention "to *avoid* false humility and to *follow* that *true* humility which Christ taught us and in which pride is not included, for many *pursue* the shadow of this virtue, few its *truth* [*Italics mine*]"[109], Pelagius stresses the autarchy of human capabilities. He believed that Demetrias' autonomous nature possessed naturally these virtues and that they allowed her to *avoid* false humility and to *follow* and *pursue* the *true* one without a special inner grace being added to that nature.

Obviously that the premises from which Augustine and Pelagius began were very different. While the Bishop of Hippo regarded humility as obedient submission to God engendered by interior grace, the ascetic Briton saw humility as a virtue that human beings naturally possess in themselves and which they can put into practice by

[106] Cf. PELAGIUS, *Ep. ad Demetriadem* 1-8, *PL* 30, cc. 16-25 *passim*.

[107] "Est enim (...) in animis nostris naturalis quaedam (ut ita dixerim) sanctitas: quae velut in arce animi praesidens, exercet mali bonique iudicium" (*Ibid.* 4, c. 19).

[108] Cf. ID., *In epistolam ad Corinthios* 4,19, *PLS* 1, c. 1193. See J.-M. SALAMITO, *Excellence chrétienne et valeurs aristocratiques: la morale de Pélage dans son contexte ecclésial et social*, in G. FREYBURGER and L. PERNOT (eds.), *Du héros païen au saint chrétien. Actes du colloque organisé par le Centre d'Analyse des Rhétoriques Religieuses de l'Antiquité (C.A.R.R.A.), Strasbourg, 1er-2 décembre 1995* (CEAug, Série Antiquité, 154), Paris, 1997, pp. 139-157, p. 141.

[109] "Praecipue tamen fictam humilitatem fugiens, illam sectare quae vera est, quam Christus docuit, humilitatem, in qua non sit superbia inclusa. Multi enim huius virtutis umbram, veritatem eius sequuntur pauci" (PELAGIUS, *Ep. ad Demetriadem* 20, *PL* 30, c. 36).

the free exercise of their will[110]. Christ is the *exemplum* for all believers as well as the model (*forma*) of perfect obedience to the will of God, i. e. the obedience unto death (cf. Phil 2,8)[111]. Pelagius believed that by following Christ's example, humility and obedience can be consistently achieved through the active commitment of the individual believer who, being *capax gratiae*, can submit himself to God by his own initiative and thus gain both the temporal happiness and the eternal salvation that God has promised[112]. For Pelagius, humility and obedience are virtues which belong to the domain of example and imitation. In this sense, their *ueritas* requires the seal of "visibility". That is why Pelagius (who must have also recognized that the *Anicii* occupied a prominent place in the Roman aristocratic world) compares Demetrias' consecration to a stage-play (*spectaculum*) whose authenticity must be seen and recognized by the world[113], so that it will inspire others to imitate it.

Thus, Demetrias' consecration gave Augustine the occasion to focus on his theological (anti-Pelagian) position. For the bishop of Hippo, a consecrated life is the result of divine grace, the gift of God whose love both inspires and perfects it by bestowing on it, through the gifts of humility and obedience, the necessary spiritual strength. As a consequence, Augustine felt compelled to put the *Anicii* on guard against the Pelagian view, a view which, on the contrary, held that the *sanctum propositum* could be pursued through dedicated personal commitment and whose success was guaranteed by the fundamental goodness of human nature. Indeed, in Augustine's *Ep.* 188, the ascetic context which inspired the request for spiritual advice, was transformed into a pretext for a theological confrontation. More precisely, a pretext for Augustine "to transform Demetrias' ascetic calling into one more chapter in his theological controversy with Pelagius and his followers"[114].

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[110] According to Pelagius, humility is, above all, to be identified with "endurance" (*patientia*): cf. *loc. cit.*

[111] ID., *In Epistolam ad Romanos* 5,12, *PLS* 1, c. 1136.

[112] "Ihrem Gehalt nach zielt die Demut auf die vollkommen Unterwerfung unter den Willen Gottes. Formal betrachtet erwächst diese Demut jedoch aus einem ichbezogenen Bedürfnis, dem Verlangen nach ewigem Heil" (S. THIER, *Kirche bei Pelagius* [PTS, 50], Berlin-New York, 1999, p. 320).

[113] "...et ad spectaculum uitae tuae totum consedisse mundum" (PELAGIUS, *Ep. ad Demetriadem* 14, *PL* 30, c. 29). As Salamito writes, Pelagius "conçoit la sainteté comme une évidence qui éclate aux yeux de tous et suscite l'imitation; il accorde moins d'importance à la persuasion qu'à l'émulation" (J.-M. SALAMITO, *art. cit.*, p. 148).

[114] A. S. JACOBS, *art. cit.*, p. 732, n. 63.

"I DO THE EVIL THAT I DO NOT WILL": AUGUSTINE AND JULIAN ON ROMANS 7:5-25 DURING THE SECOND PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY (418-430)

The year 418 was a crucial turning point in the Pelagian controversy.[1] Pelagius and Caelestius had quit the scene. Augustine's well-known sermon containing the declaration *Causa finita est* (sermo 131), was delivered in response to these events. What Augustine could not foresee, however, is that the second – and even more vigorous – period of the Pelagian controversy was about to start. Together with eighteen other bishops, Julian of Aeclanum, refused to sign the *Epistula Tractoria* of Pope Zosimus which had condemned Pelagius and Caelestius. This refusal marked the beginning of the second phase of the Pelagian controversy.[2]

In Julian of Aeclanum Augustine encountered a formidable opponent. Augustine's frequently-heated debates with Julian raged for over the course of twelve years: from 418 until the former's death in 430. The first book of *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (418/419) contains Augustine's reaction to Julian's claim that original sin implied a condemnation of marriage and had made the latter tantamount to a work of the devil. Julian's rebuttal to Augustine's book came quickly: *Ad Turbantium* was published in 420/421.[3] After having received a summary of *Ad Turbantium*, Augustine reacted against it with part two of *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (420/421). A little later, and after obtaining an unabridged version of Julian's *Ad Turbantium*, Augustine composed his *Contra Iulianum* (421 or a little later).

[1] On April 30th, the Imperial court in Ravenna condemned and exiled Pelagius and Caelestius. The Council of Carthage issued nine canons attacking the Pelagian understanding of grace without mentioning either Pelagius or Caelestius by name. At the beginning of the summer, Zosimus confirmed the empire's action by condemning Pelagius and Caelestius in his *Epistula Tractoria*. O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der römischen Bischhöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432* (Päpste und Papsttum, 7), Stuttgart, 1975, p. 196-204 and 316-318.

[2] During the first Pelagian Controversy (411-417) the central Pelagian figures were Pelagius and Caelestius. The dispute concentrated on doctrinal questions such as grace and free will. The second Pelagian controversy (418-430) saw Julian of Aeclanum siding with the Pelagian camp in order to challenge Augustine's views on marriage. The second controversy is, from the beginning, characterized by a high-level of rhetoric and bitterness.

[3] Julian's *Ad Turbantium* is fragmentarily preserved in Augustine's *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia II*, *Contra Iulianum*, and *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*. For them, see CCL 88, 340-396.

Meanwhile, Julian reacted against *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia II* with a second book, the *Ad Florum* (probably 421/422). Augustine refutes this work in *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* (428-430). The fact that Augustine quotes his opponent at length is fortuitous: it is through Augustine's quotations of Julian that the work has been preserved. Finally, we should not forget Augustine's *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* (about 420). As the title makes plain, this work contains Augustine's reaction to two Pelagian letters: (1) a letter from Julian to the Pelagians at Rome and (2) a letter from the eighteen non-conformist bishops who had refused to sign the papal condemnation of Pelagius and Caelestius.[4]

In the course of the discussion with Julian, Augustine repeatedly delivered a comprehensive commentary on Romans 7. These frequent references are interesting not only because they demonstrate that Augustine changed his mind regarding the meaning and application of Romans 7, but also because Augustine employed these verses as a vehicle for explaining his views on both the freedom of the will and *concupiscentia carnis*. In what follows, I will first look at Augustine's interpretation of Romans 7 as it is given in *De Nupitiis et concupiscentia*, *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum*, *Contra Iulianum*, and *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*.[5] This will be followed by a survey of Julian's interpretation as it has been preserved in (the relevant fragments of) his books *Ad Florum* and *Ad Turbantium*.

1. Augustine' s interpretation of Romans 7:5-25

In the first part of ***De nuptiis et concupiscentia***, written during the winter of 418-419, Augustine wanted to prove that he considered marriage as a *bonum* and that it needed to be distinguished from evil desire. In his view, a genuine marriage comprised three goods: pro-

[4] G. BONNER, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, in: A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *Augustine trough the Ages. An encyclopedia*, Grand Rapids / Cambridge, p. 592-593; G. BONNER, *Contra Iulianum*, in: A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 480; G. BONNER, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, in A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 480-481. M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum*, in: A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 478-479.

[5] For a discussion of Romans 7 and 8 in Sermons 151-156 (October 419 or more likely 417), see: E. TESELLE, Exploring the Inner Conflict. Augustine's Sermons on Romans 7 and 8, in: D. PATTE / E. TESELLE, *Engaging Augustine on Romans. Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation*, Harrisburg, 2002, p. 111-128. E. TESELLE also presents Augustine's Old Latin Text of Romans 7-8 and its English Translation, in D. PATTE / E. TESELLE, *o.c.*, p. 129-146. – Romans 7 is scarcely present in Augustine's epistles in the period 418-430 (references are found e.g. in Ep. 194 (Romans 7,24.25; late 418 or early 419) and in Ep. 196 (Romans 7:7-16.17.24-25; year: 418).

creation, fidelity, and the sacrament. On the other hand, the lust of the flesh is not natural to marriage. It is an evil that has resulted from the first sin. Because of this *concupiscentia*, even a marriage between Christians does not produce pure and unblemished children of God.[6] Instead the product is always children contaminated by this original sin, children who are in desperate need of being reborn into God's family through the sacrament of baptism. With baptism the guilt of original sin is forgiven so that it is no longer counted as sin. *Concupiscentia* itself remains present –even post-baptism– not as a substance, but as a kind of bad, evil and disease-like quality. This disease is being healed in the lives of those who are baptized and making progress. Its complete healing, however, must await the redemption of our bodies in the resurrection.[7]

It is within this *concupiscentia*-laden framework that Augustine offers an analysis of Romans 7:15-25. According to his reading, the phrase "the body of this death" (cf. Romans 7:24) is best seen as indicating the present condition of Christians. Concupiscence of the flesh is ever-present. Even in the periods in which one manages to avoid consenting to it, it remains the evil and shameful desire against which one must struggle. According to Augustine, the apostle Paul is speaking of these desires when he says: *"Non enim quod uolo hoc ago, sed quod odi, illud facio"* (Romans 7:15) and *"Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod in me habitat peccatum"* (Romans 7:17).

Note well that this is the first time that Augustine interprets the 'I' of Romans 7:15 as referring to the apostle Paul himself, even if he does so with more than a little hesitation: *"Idem apostolus loquens velut ex suae personae introductione"*.[8] In his early commentaries on Romans, Augustine had consistently interpreted this verse as referring to humans *sub lege*.[9] In every instance in which he offers commen-

[6] In order to help his readers, Augustine provides them with an example: even the domesticated olive tree produces only the seed of wild olive trees. See *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,32,37–1,34,39 in CSEL 42, p.248.

[7] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,25,28 CSEL 42, pp.240-241.

[8] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,27,30 CSEL 42, p.242.

[9] In both his commentary on Romans (394) and his commentary on Galatians (394/395), Augustine works out a new schema to describe the way by which humans can reach eternal and perfect peace. The scheme is repeated in *De diversis Quaestionibus 66* and is referred to without being repeated in *Ad Simplicianum*. It makes use of the concept *concupiscentia* and comprises four stages *(gradus)* which Augustine has derived from Paul. In sum, the scheme run as follows: *"Itaque quattuor istos gradus hominis distinguamus, ante Legem, sub Lege, sub gratia, in pace. Ante Legem, sequimur concupiscentiam carnis: sub Lege, trahimur ab ea: sub gratia, nec sequimur eam, nec trahimur ab ea: in pace, nulla est concupiscentia carnis."* (*Exp.*

tary on Romans 7 in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, however, he introduces the verses by *inquit* (v. 16.19-20.22-23), *ait* (v. 17.24-25a.25b), *adiuxit / subiugit* (v. 17.18.25b) or *sequitur* (v.21). From this one may conclude that Augustine wants the 'I' to be interpreted as referring to the apostle.[10]

Let us turn back briefly to Romans 7:15.17. On the one hand, my will is in harmony with the will of the Law, specifically the Law which commands me: *"Non concupisces"* (Exodus 20:17). On the other hand, says Augustine, the 'I' of Romans 7 makes it plain that these desires are real for the baptized believer, even if he does not consent to them. In other words, even a great saint like the apostle suffers under the law of *concupiscentia*. Even Paul is not *omni ex parte perfectus*. Nevertheless, Augustine is clear that this fact cannot be used to excuse sinful behavior. It would be a mistake to consent to the desire and then claim innocence or powerlessness by pretending that: "It is not I who do it".[11]

When Paul says in verse 15: *"Non emin quod uolo, hoc ago, sed quod odi, illud facio"*, Augustine believes that this *"illud facio"*

quarumdam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos 12, p. 6). *Ante legem* we live in ignorance with respect to sin. We live as followers of our fleshly desires and do not fight against our evil lusts. We lust and readily consent to our sinful impulses. *Sub lege* we gain knowledge about our sin. We fight against concupiscence, but we are overcome by the "habit of sin". This is because we are not yet assisted by faith. *Sub gratia* we are no longer conquered by the temptation of *uoluptas*. Grace restores to use a measure of free will and the possibility to do the good. In the fourth stage, *in pace*, concupiscence no longer exists. There is no struggle; we live in perfect and harmonious peace. This state will only be reached when the mortal body is made immortal in the resurrection. Regarding this schema, T.F. MARTIN, *Rhetoric and Exegesis in Augustine's Interpretation of Romans 7:24-25a* (Studies in Bible and Early Christianity, 47), Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter, 2001, p. 63 remarks: "Paul will be carefully subjected to what seems to be his own hermeneutical rule, yet it is a rule that is uniquely a product of Augustine's distinctive reading of the Apostle!" Writing *De diversis Quaestionibus* and *Expositio ad Romanos*, Augustine believed that Paul, in Romans 7:7-25, referred to humans under the law *(sub lege)*. The Law demonstrates that people *sub lege*, because of sin, are not able to fulfill the prescripts of the Law. A humble attitude and the invocation of divine grace is their only hope for overcoming this internal struggle. In *Ad Simplicianum*, the difference between the "sub lege" and "sub gratia" is less distinct. Regarding Romans 7:14 ("*ego autem carnalis sum*"), Augustine, in *De diversis quaestionibus*, noted that: "I consent to the flesh, not yet set free by spiritual grace". In *Ad Simplicianum*, however, Augustine explains this verse by noting that there are two kinds of *carnalis*. Besides those who are *nondum (...) sub gratia sed sub lege*, the word *carnalis* can also refer to those who are *ad quemdam modum carnales*: *iam etiam sub gratia consituti, iam redempti sanguine Domini, et renati per fidem.* (*De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* 1,1,7) See also: W.S. BABOCK, *Augustine's Interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396)* in: *Augustinian Studies* 10 (1979) 55-74.

[10] Comp. A.F.N. LEKKERKERKER, *Römer 7 und Römer 9 bei Augustin*, Amsterdam, 1942, p. 44.

[11] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,27,30 CSEL 42, p.242.

means *"concupisco"*. In other words, Paul, even as he is striving for perfection, does not and has no kept the rule *"Non concupisces"* (cf. Exodus 20, 17) which he has mentioned in verse 7. Paul gives in to evil desire in spite of the fact that he does not actually want to. Therefore he says in verse 20: *"iam non ego operor illus, sed quod habitat in me peccatum"*. The Law reveals a requirement which we cannot completely fulfill because of our own powerlessness. How then does Augustine understand the verb *facere* in verse 15? By appealing to verse 18: *"Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio"*. He comments:

> *"He (= Paul) said this, because the good is brought to completion when no evil desire exist, just as evil is brought to completion when one obeys evil desires. But when they exist and are not obeyed, evil is not brought to completion, because they are not obeyed, and the good is not brought to completion, because they exist. Rather, the good is achieved in part, because one does not consent to evil desires, and the evil remains in part, because one still has such desires. For this reason, then, the apostle did not say that he cannot do the good, but that he cannot bring it to completion. After all, people do much good in carrying out the words of scripture: 'Do not go after your desires' (Sir. 18:30), but they do not bring the good to completion, because they do not fulfill the words of scripture, Do not desire (Ex. 20, 17)"* [12]

After having made a distinction between *facere* and *perficere* Augustine remarks that Paul, as long as he is *in hac mortalitate*, struggled against evil desires. *Bonum facere* is here seen as the equivalent of avoiding giving one's consent to evil desires; *bonum perficere* is linked to the total absence of evil desires. According to Augustine,

[12] For this trans. see R. TESKE (ed.), *The Works of Saint Augustine* 1, 24, New York 1998, p.48. "Hoc ideo dictum est quia tunc perficitur bonum, quando desideria mala nulla sunt, sicut tunc perficitur malum, quando malis desideriis oboeditur, quando autem sunt quidem, sed non eis oboeditur nec malum perficitur, quia non eis oboeditur, nec bonum, quia sunt, sed fit ex aliqua parte bonum, quia concupiscentiae malae consentitur, et ex aliqua parte remanet malum, quia uel concupiscitur. Ideo ergo apostolus non ait facere bonum sibi non adiacere, sed perficere. Multum enim boni facit, qui facit quod scriptum est: "Post concupiscentias tuas non eas" (Sir. 18, 30), sed non perficit, quia non inplet quod scriptum est: "Non concupiscas" (Ex. 20:17). *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,29,32 CSEL 42, p. 244; cf. also *Contra Iulianum* 3,62 PL 44 col. 734; VI, 54 PL 44, col. 854-855; *Opus imperfectum* 6,9 PL 45 col. 1517. See also A.F.N. LEKKERKERKER, *Römer 7 und Römer 9 bei Augustin*, p. Amsterdam, 1954, pp. 54-55. LEKKERKERKER remarks that the distinction between *perficere* and *facere* is due to an inconsistency of the Latin translation. See also: PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, Würzburg, 1938, p. 169.

the latter is only possible in the life to come, *in illa inmortalitate beatissima*.[13]

Regarding Romans 7:23b (*"et captivantem me sub lege peccati"*) Augustine gives two possible explanations: *"either in the sense of trying to take me captive, that is, pushing me to consent to and do the action, or rather – and this is beyond controversy – in the sense of holding me captive according to the flesh"*.[14] The first interpretation, according to which the person is pushed towards consent, is rejected. Interestingly, in Augustine's later works, it is no longer even introduced as a legitimate option.[15] The centerpiece of the bishop's hermeneutical grid here is the fact that we still live with "the body of this death," from which we will be set free only when we are resurrected to our new life in Christ.

Augustine's position relating the 'I' in Romans 7 is clearer in ***Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum*** (ca. 420).[16] Here Augustine has to defend himself against Julian who not only denies that the 'I' of Romans 7:18 could refer to Paul but who also reproaches Augustine for implying that Paul and other apostles had always been polluted by this unbridled passion.[17] Basing himself on a series of biblical quotations, Augustine "proves" that the Law could never take away sin but, rather, always and only causes it to increase. The Law is not bad (Romans 7:12). The value of the Law is to be found in the fact that it brought knowledge of sin. In Romans 7:7 (*"sed peccatum non cognoui nisi per legem"*) Augustine sees an indication that Paul is speaking *"tamquam de se"*. He adds that even if the 'I' of chapter 7 does not refer to Paul but, as the Pelagians prefer, to one under the law, it remains true that the law *in se* does not and cannot in any way mediate salvation.[18]

[13] *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,29,32 (CSEL 42, p. 244).

[14] Again this trans. is from p. 49 of TESKE (cf. n. 9 *supra*). "quod autem dixit: et captiuantem me sub lege peccati, hoc est: sub se ipsa, quae est in membris meis, aut captiuantem dixit captiuare conantem, id est ad consentiendum inplendum que cogentem, aut potius – quod non habet controuersiam – captiuantem secundum carnem, quam nisi teneret carnalis concupiscentia, quam legem peccati uocat, non utique in ea ullum inlicitum desiderium, cui mens oboedire non debeat, commoueret". *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,30,34 (CSEL 42, p. 245).

[15] M.F. BERROUARD, *L'Exégèse augustinienne de Rom. 7,7-25 entre 396 et 418 avec des remarques sur les deux premières périodes de la crise pélagienne*, in: *Recherches augustiniennes* 16, Paris, 1981, p. 101-195, p. 192-193.

[16] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,13-24 CSEL 60, p. 433-455.

[17] *Epistula ad Romanos*, frg. 5, CCL 88, p. 391 (= *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,8,13 CSEL 60, p. 433).

[18] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,13 CSEL 60, p. 433-435. See also: *ibid*, 1,16 CSEL 60, p. 438. Augustine mentions that even if one sees this passage as dealing with someone *sub lege*, it remains true that this person experiences a certain powerlessness. In other words, there is something not exactly "free" about

Nevertheless it is clear that, according to the bishop of Hippo, verses 7b-13[19] should be understood autobiographically: Paul refers to his own childhood[20] (Romans 7:9a: *ego autem uiuebam aliquando sine lege*) and to the period during which he was a transgressor of the Law (Romans 7:9b: *adueniente autem mandato peccatum reuixit*). Augustine makes a special point of the fact that Paul was not capable of keeping the Law: *"Ego autem mortuus sum"* (v. 9c).[21]

From the beginning of his interpretation of 7:14-25, Augustine claims that Paul stands *sub gratia*, but is, in spite of this position, still subject to his mortal and corruptible flesh and still struggles against the inclination towards sin. Verse 14b *("ego autem carnalis sum")* is understood as referring to Paul the spiritually redeemed saint whose body *hic et nunc* remains in need of liberation. Augustine makes a note of the fact that Paul uses the present form *sum* and not the perfect *fui*. The term *carnalis* should be understood against the background of 1 Corinthians 15:44 *("Seminatur corpus animale, surgit corpus spiritale")* and implies that the apostle did not yet have a spiritual body.[22] Augustine interprets the expression *"uenundatus sum sub peccato"* (Romans 7:14c) by making a reference to Romans 8:23: *"Et nos primitias habentes spiritus et ipsi in nobismet ipsis ingemescimus adoptionem exspectantes, redemptionem cor-*

our free will. Augustine's point is that the Law *in se* does adequately resolve the fallen human being's dilemma.

[19] Regarding the slight, if ultimately insignificant, differences in the Latin biblical text, see F.-J. THONNARD, in: BA 23, n. 66.

[20] *"Aetatem suam promam ab infantia ante rationales annos uoluerit intellegi"*. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,14, CSEL 60, p. 436. For the modern exegetical discussion see: Th. C. DE KRUYF, *De brief van Paulus aan de Romeinen*, Boxtel, 1986, p. 153.

[21] Augustine believes that Paul's statement here does not contradict Phil. 3:6: *"Secundum iustitiam, quae in lege est, conversatus sine querella"*. The two texts are expressing different attitudes. Paul might have kept the *forum externum* of the Law out of fear, but this does not mean that he did not transgress the law in his heart. Eph. 2:1-5 and Tit. 3:3 prove that this is indeed was the case. According to Augustine, these texts refer to the time Paul was still called Saul. The reason for this is that, in Eph. 2:6ff and in Titus 3:4-7, he explicitly acknowledges that he was liberated by God's goodness and love, *non ex operibus iustitiae, qua nos fecimus* (Tit. 3:5). *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,15 CSEL 60, p. 437. Augustine's point is that Paul admits that in his life as Saul he was led by sinful desires and that he was doing that which his selfishness and evil inclinations was compelling him to do. This sinfulness refers to the time prior to Paul's conversion, i.e. the time he was still living under the law. For the bishop of Hippo, this proves that the formal keeping of the Law does not necessarily imply sinlessness.

[22] The word *carnalis* is best understood as *mortalis*: *"Ego autem carnalis sum, (...) sicus posset dicere: "Ego autem mortalis sum"; quod utique non nise secundum corpus intellegeretur dixisse, quod nondum fuerat inmortalitate uestitum"* (*Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,17 CSEL 60, p. 439).

poris nostri". He clearly believes it is legitimate to claim that 14bc refers to an already saved Paul whose body still needs liberation *a corruptione*. According to Augustine, this actually applies to everyone since everyone is continually struggling *spiritali dilectione cum carnis affectione sine consensione*.[23]

Augustine's exegesis of 7:15 is emphatic in the claim that the apostle did not consent to his *concupiscentia carnis*. Instead Paul consents to the Law rather than to the concupiscence of the flesh.[24] Regarding the correct understanding of the 'I' in Romans 7, Augustine, having noted that verse 17 reads *"Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod habitat in me peccatum,"* goes on to claim that *nunc autem* can mean nothing other than *iam nunc sub gratia*.[25] At the same time, Augustine does acknowledge that verse 23 contains a possible difficulty for this interpretation: *"Uideo autem aliam legem in membris meis, (...) captiuantem me in lege peccati..."*.

The expression *captiuantem me* (v. 23) might be initially surprising. It is certainly surprising if one simultaneously thinks of the *ego carnalis sum* (v. 14b) and *uenundatus sub peccato* (v. 14c). One could get the impression that such statements refer to someone *sub lege* and not yet *sub gratia*. Augustine, however, believes that this is not the case: by analogy with the expression *"ego autem carnalis sum"* (v. 14b) and *"uenundatus sub peccato"* (v. 14c), Augustine explains verse 23 with a reference to the *caro corruptibilis*. All these verses indicate a sinful impulse, not an intellectual assent to this impulse. It belongs to me because it is in my flesh. My flesh is I; it does not refer to another or second nature within me.[26]

Verse 24: *"Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius"* refers to Paul's own life as a Christian. Here, Paul the Christian is asking for full and complete liberation. The liberation of the *corpus mortis* implies a total cure from the disease of *concupiscentia carnis* and the translation of the body *ad gloriam*. This much-desired total healing is still future. Although it is already present in an initial stage (*etiam et nos ipsi primitias habentes spiritu*, cf. Romans 8:23), it will only become fully real at the resurrection.[27] It is a classic example of "already ... not yet."

[23] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,17 CSEL 60, p. 439-440.

[24] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,17 CSEL 60, p. 439-440.

[25] "Quid est 'nunc autem' nisi 'iam nunc sub gratia, quae liberavit delectationem uoluntatis a consensione cupiditatis?" *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,18 CSEL 60 p. 440.

[26] "Sic et hoc potest intellegi, ut "captivantem me" dixerit "carne" non mente, "motione" non cnsensione, iet ideo "captiuantem me" quia et in ipsa carne non est aliena natura, sed nostra" (*Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,20 CSEL 60, p. 441-442.

[27] See: *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,23 CSEL 60, p; 443.

The originality[28] of Augustine's interpretation here lies in the fact that he now explains why he thinks that this passage should be seen as referring to humans *sub gratia*. In support of this interpretation he draws the reader's attention to the *nunc* of Romans 7:17. According to Augustine, this verse should be read together with both Romans 7:22 (*"Condelector enim legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem"*) and Romans 8:1 (*"nulla ergo condemnatio est nunc his qui sunt in Christo Iesu"*). Augustine wonders how someone *sub lege* could assert that he delights in the law of God after the inward person. He concludes that these texts can only apply to human beings who are *sub gratia*.[29] Augustine admits that he did not always hold this opinion. Earlier he thought that the apostle was describing a man under the law. Here Augustine is referring to *Expositio Quarumdam propositionum ex epistula apostolica ad Romanos*, *Expositio epistulae ad Galatos* and his letter *Ad Simplicianum*.[30] Now, however, he has changed his mind. At the same time, he is quick to assert that he believes that this new exegesis does not detract from the apostle's holiness. He is speaking about himself and his fellow Christians all of whom are *sub gratia*.

Augustine concludes by claiming (again) that Paul was speaking about himself as a Christian, as well as about all of those who are standing under grace, as Paul says, not yet being in the *perfecta pax*, in which death will be conquered (1 Corinthians 15:54), and our mortal body will be liberated from the *concupiscentia carnis*, which we currently must

[28] In *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,22. Augustine himself says: *"Visum autem aliquando etiam mihi fuerat 'hominem sub lege' isto apostoli sermone describi. Sed vim mihi postea ista verba fecerunt (+ here the verses follow)"*. Augustine seems to have been influenced here by a new reading of the text. See Ph. PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, (Cassiciacum, 5), Würtzburg, 1938, p. 163 and A.F.N. LEKKERKERKER, *Römer 7 und Römer 9 bei Augustin*, Amsterdam, 1942, p. 52. Although here Augustine explicitly says that he holds a new interpretation, this does not mean that, earlier, he would not have applied certain verses of this passage to Christians; see e.g. *De peccatorum meritis* 2,4; 2, 17; *De natura et gratia* 58; 68, *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 12; 17; 18; 28. What is new is Augustine's explicit explaination of why he thinks this passage should be understood as referring to Christians *sub gratia*.

[29] See *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,22 CSEL 60 p. 442-443. Perhaps the present tense verbs of vv. 14ff also played a role in the formulation of this new interpretation. Cf. I, 17 CSEL 60, p. 439; Cf. Ph. PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, p. 165. For comments regarding a parallel interpretation of Romans 7:14ff. in the recently discovered letter 6* (CSEL 88, p. 34-25), see M.F. BERROUARD, *Les lettres 6* et 19* de saint Augustin. Leur date et les renseignement qu'elles apportent sur l'évolution de la crise "pelagienne"* in *Revue des Études augustiniennes* 27 (1981) 264-277, specifically 274-276.

[30] See supra note 9.

resist.[31] In a word, the "late" Augustine reads Romans 7:14ff. autobiographically of both Paul and every genuinely converted Christian.

In ***Contra Iulianum*** (composed in 421), Romans 7 is read in reference to all Christians who are on their way to perfection. Augustine emphasizes (in reaction to Julian) that Paul's statements regarding the experience of a sinful longing (vv. 18.20.23-25) refer to both Paul himself and to Christians in general.[32] A new element is the fact that Augustine supports his interpretation of Romans with verses from Galatians 5. Paul does address the Galatians with almost the same words as those found in Romans 7:14-15: there is talk of being willing but not being able (Gal. 5:17c), of a struggle between the spirit and the flesh (v. 17a-b), of walking according to the spirit in order to avoid the works of *concupiscentia carnis* (v. 16). There is also talk of being let by the spirit (Gal. 5:18; cf. Rom. 7:20) just as the call not to obey the sinful desires (Rom. 6:12) attunes very well to the expression "*concupiscentias carnis ne perficeritis*" (Gal. 5:16b).[33]

At the end of the last book of *Contra Iulianum*, Augustine once more urges Julian to accept the "correct" understanding of Romans 7. When Julian reproaches Augustine for misunderstanding Romans 7, Augustine admits that this is certainly true regarding his earlier attempts to interpret it.[34] In this exegesis, he thought 7:14 and 7:22

[31] "Hic atque huiusmodi in ista scripturae apostolicae circumstantia diligenter consideratis recte intellegitur apostolus non quidem se solum in sua persona, verum alios etiam sub gratia constitutos significasse". *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 1,24 CSEL 60 p. 444. See also: 1,17 CSEL 60, p. 439-440.

[32] "Describebat humanam in hac corruptibili carne naturam, non opere Dei cum vitio primitus institutam, sed ex uoluntatis arbitrio ueniente primorum hominum uitio sauciatam" *Contra Iulianum* 3,61 PL 44 col. 733.; "Iste ergo conflictus non Iudaeorum, nec quorumlibet aliorum sed plane Christianorum fildelium et bene uiuendo in hoc certamine laborantium, breuiter ostenditur ad Romanos, ubi ait: "Igitur ipse ego mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati" (Rom. 7:25)" *Contra Iulianum* 3,62 PL 44, col. 734.

[33] "Recole tamen quid scribat ad Galatas, certe homines baptizatos. "Dico autem, inquit, spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis" (Gal. 5:16). Non ait: Ne feceritis, quia eas non habere non poterant; sed "Ne perfeceritis"; id est ne opera earum, consensu uoluntatis impleatis. Caro enim, inquit, concupiscat aduerus spiritum, et spiritus aduersum carnem: haec enim inuicem aduersantur; ut non ea quae uultis faciatis" (Gal. 5:17). Uide si non hoc est ad Romanos: "Non enim quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod nolo malum hoc ago". Deinde ad Galatas addit et dicit: "Quod si spiritu ducimini; non adhuc estis sub lege (Gal. 5:18). Uide si non hoc est ad Romanos: "Iam non ego operor illud"; et "Condelector legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem" et "non regenet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore, ad obediendum desideriis eius" (cf. Rom. 7:15.20.22 and 6:12); *Contra Iulianum* 3,62 PL 44 col. 733; For a clear stress on the fact that this refers to christians, see *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 1,72 CSEL 85,1 p. 86; 6,8 PL 45 col. 1514. Cf. Ph. PLATZ, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, (Cassiciacum, 5) Würzburg, 1938, p. 164.

[34] "Imo uero ego prius eum aliter intellexeram, uel potius non intellexeram, quod mea quaedam illius temporis etiam scripta testantur", *Contra Iulianum* 6,70 PL 44 col. 865.

referred to human beings under the law. At that time he thought of concupiscence as a compelling and irresistible force and, therefore, one that could not be ascribed to "saint" Paul.[35] It was only later, says Augustine, that he realized that these *concupiscentiae carnales* are not completely eliminated by baptism and continue to dwell inside baptized people, intrinsic as they are to the *corpus corruptibile* that will only become a *corpus spirituale* at the resurrection.[36] Julian wanted to ascribe the claim of Romans 7:20 ("It is not I that do that") to someone still under the law. Julian held the view that the forgiveness of sins also implied a liberation from concupiscence so that "grace is not needed to avoid sins and conquer carnal desires". Augustine rejects this on the grounds that it clearly contradicts the experience of all Christians – Paul included. In 7:1-13, Paul is speaking about living under law, not under grace. Augustine refers to the past tenses verbs in these verses, in opposition to the *nunc* which stands out so clearly, along with a number of present tense verbs in verses 14 and following. Of course, one should fight against all evil desires. When they are fully conquered, they will cease to exist. In this respect Augustine's view differs from the view of the Manicheans who thought that both a good and an evil substance could exist separately.

When Julian objects, Augustine answers by noting that his exegesis is neither the first nor the only to take the "I" of Romans 7 in this way. He even claims that it was his reading of commentators like "Hilary, Gregory, Ambrose, and the other holy and famous teachers of the Church"[37] that forced him to change his opinion.

Augustine does not adduce quotations from their works at this place, but elsewhere he does. In *Contra Iulianum* 2,27 he quotes

[35] "Il conçoit (...) le péché dont parle Saint-Paul comme un péché actuel consenti, et non pas comme le mouvement spontané de la concupiscence auquelle on résiste. Dans ces conditions l'idée qu'en Rom. VII, 7-25, l'Apôtre parlerait de l'homme sub gratia, donc aussi de lui-même, ne pouvait lui venir à l'esprit" A. DE VEER, *L'Exégèse de Rom. VII et ses variations*, in: BA 23, Paris, 1974, p. 770-778.

[36] "Sed postea melioribus et intellegentioribus cessi, uel potius ipsi, quod fatendum est ueritati, ut viderem in illis Apostoli vocibus gemitum esse sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium. Qui cum mente sint spirituales, adhuc tamen isto corruptibili corpore quod aggrauat animam (Wis. 9:16), recte intelliguntur esse carnales, quia erunt et corpore spirituales, quando seminatum corpus animale, resurget corpus spirituale (cf. 1 Cor 15:44); et recte adhuc intelliguntur ea parte captiui sub lege peccati, quae desideriorum, quibus non censentiunt, motibus subiacet" *Contra Iulianum* 6,70 PL 44 col. 865-866. See also A. SAGE, *Le péché originel dans la pensée de saint Augustin de 412 à 430*, in: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 15 (1969) 75-112, p. 87.

[37] "hinc factum est ut sic ista intelligerem, quemadmodum intellexit hilarius, gregorius, ambrosius et caeteri ecclesiae sancti noti que doctores, qui et ipsum apostolum aduersus carnales concupiscentias quas habere nolebat, et tamen habebat, strenue conflixisse, eumdem que conflictum suum illis suis uerbis contestatum fuisse senserunt". *Contra Iulianum* 6,23,70 PL 45 col. 866.

Hilary, a *defensor acerrimus* of the catholic Church against the *haeretici*. In Hilary's sermon on Job Augustine reads that we merit to regain the richness of the first creation which we lost through the devil in Adam's offence. We are purified by the struggle with the passions warring in us. We should rejoice because 'if there is no war, there is no victory'.[38] Also Gregory refers to the inner conflict in his *Apologia de fuga sua* 2,91: "We are under attack within ourselves from our own vices and passions, and we are day and night oppressed by the burning temptations of the body of this lowliness and of the body of death (...) The law of sin which is in our members resists the law of the spirit".[39] The third person Augustine refers to is Ambrose who teaches that the *corpus mortis* (Romans 7:23) refers to the Christian Paul.[40] Regarding Romans 7,23.18-20 Ambrose underlines that during this lifetime humans - even after baptism - still experience drifts even if they offer resistance to them. It is our duty to fight against this flesh.[41] According to Ambrose the *bona uita* should be situated after this life, when the *lex carnalis* no longer opposes the *lex mentis* (Galatians 5:17), when there is no conflict with the body of this death (Romans 7:23).[42] Who are the *ceteri Ecclesiae sancti notique doctores* Augustine refers to? It seems that at least Jerome should be understood.[43] It is remarkably that throughout the Pelagian controversy Augustine refers only very summarily to Jerome's work because his authority was not approved by the Pelagians. Apart from the influence the above-mentioned authors have had on Augustine, it is evident that Augustine's new interpretation of Romans 7 also resulted from his own rereading of the text.

It is also during this period that Augustine is writing his *Retractationes* (426). On no less than four occasions he mentions his

[38] See: *Contra Iulianum* 2,27 (PL 44 col. 692). See on this text: J. DOIGNON, *Corpora vitiorum materies. Une formule-clé du gragment sur Job d' Hilaire de Poitiers, inspiré d'Origène et transmis par Augustin (Contra Iulinaum 2, 8,27)*, in: *Vigiliae Christianae* 35 (1981) p. 209-221.

[39] GREGORY NAZIANZUS, *Oratio apologetica* 2,91 (PG 35,494) in Rufinus' translation, *Apologeticus* 91 (CSEL 46,67-68). This text is quoted in Augustine, *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 1,67 (CSEL 85,1 p. 71-72). The translation is again Teske's.

[40] Ambrose, De *Paenitentia* 1,13 (SC 179, 62-64) is quoted by Augustine in: *Contra Iuliaunum* 2,5 (PL 44 col. 675). In *Contra Iulianum* 2,13 Augustine quotes a series of texts from Ambrose, *De paradiso*, namely 11,53; 12,54; 12,60 and 15,77.

[41] This text from *De sacramento regenerationis sive de philosophia* is quoted by Augustine in *Contra Iulianum* 2,14 (PL 44 col. 683-684).

[42] *De bono mortis* 3,9 is quoted by Augustine in *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* 4,31 (CSEL 60, p. 567).

[43] See: M. F. BERROUARD, *o.c.*, p. 194.

change of opinion. And each time he adapts it to the context and content of the particular work he is discussing (cf. 1,23,1; 1,24,2; 1,26; and 2,1(28),1). While the *Retractationes* are presented as an objective report, it should not be read as if it were totally removed from the polemics of the Pelagian controversy. De Veer aptly remarks that, in the middle of the controversy, Augustine declares his new opinion to be the only one that is really possible (*Contra Iulianum* 6,23,70), whereas, in the more tranquil environment of the *Retractationes*, he presents it simply as the more probable.[44]

In ***Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*** (428-430), Augustine distinguishes different kinds of sins in order to interpret Romans 7:19. He claims that there are three elements that should be distinguished: (1) sin, (2) the penalty of sin and (3) sin that is itself also the punishment of sin. Augustine defines number one above, i.e., "sin", as the doing of what justice forbids and as acts from which human beings are free to abstain. The sin of Adam is the prime example of this. Augustine remarks that there are, of course, evil actions which human beings do and from which they are free to hold back, but there is no one who is as free as that first man insofar as he was "undamaged", i.e., in the same state as that in which he was originally created by God. In order to explain "the penalty of sin" Augustine refers to sinners being killed for their crimes or being tormented by corporal punishment. Romans 7:19 should be situated in the third category: as sin that is itself the punishment of sin. This situation is then related to the "body of this death".[45]

At the end of the first book of *Opus imperfectum* Augustine refers again to the tradition when he wonders whether Romans 7:19 should be understood as referring to someone who is still under the law or to the apostle himself post-conversion. According to Augustine, Romans 7:19 refers to the evil of concupiscence which exists in the body of this death. The situation of the body of this death did not yet exist in paradise and will be removed at the end of times when this corruptible body will have put on incorruptibility. Here, Augustine is in line with Ambrose: he explicitly references Ambrose's *Commentary on the Gospel of Luke* and his lost work, *The Sacrament of Rebirth or Philosophy*, which he also quotes in *Contra Iulianum* 2,5,14. It was Ambrose's conviction that Adam perished and that all perished in him.[46]

[44] A. De Veer, *L'Exegèse de Rom. VII et ses variations*, in: BA 23, Paris, 1974, 770-778.

[45] *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 1,47 CSEL 85,1 p. 34-35.

[46] See: *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 1,48; 1,71 and 1,99 CSEL 85,1.

Augustine also opposes Julian's interpretation of Romans 7:14-25. For starters, Augustine claims that Julian's interpretation is illogical. One cannot expect a Jew to claim that he had the hope of being liberated by God's grace as it had been given through Jesus Christ. Augustine then quotes 7:15 and 7:17-19. Nowhere is a past tense employed: the text reads *facio* not *feci* (v. 15), *operor* not *operatus sum* (v. 17), *ago* not *egi* (v. 19), *quod nolo* not *non quod volo* (v. 19b). All these time stipulations indicate a situation that still obtains. Verses 22-23 make mention of the tension between the *condelectatio legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem* as well as to the opposing law of sin that is in our flesh. This very real ongoing tension shows Julian's interpretation of Romans 7:24, which would see this as referring to the past, to be impossible. In Augustine's mind, such an interpretation also contains other dangers. For example, one might be tempted to think that the liberation that has been provided by Christ stops at the forgiveness of sin. That this is not the case is proven by the fact that we also pray, as part of the *Our Father*, not to be lead into temptation (Matthew 6:13).[47] It is only with the recognition of the abiding tension between the inclination towards sin on the one hand and the inner delight because of God's Law on the other that the enduring quest for grace (as expressed in the prayer) receives its full meaning.

Finally, note that, although Augustine usually interprets Romans 7:14-25 as referring to human beings *sub gratia*, there are passages which leave the reader with the impression that Augustine is thinking of a man who had not yet been set free. For example, this seems to be the case in *Opus imperfectum* 5,28 (see PL 45 col. 1467), 5,51 (*ibid.*, 1486), and 5,52 (*ibid.*, 1486). In book 5, the discussion revolves around the problem of the relationship between *necessitas* and *voluntas*, concepts which, according to Julian, are completely different. Augustine calls on Romans 7:15 and 7:19-20 in order to demonstrate that such a view does not do justice to the experience of human beings (5,28 contains a clear reference to Paul). Within themselves, human beings experience that they lack the power to do what they want. Augustine notes that such a human must have lost whatever *libertas* (*libertas perdita*, cf. 5, 28,51) he might have previously had, that he needs grace (5,28), and that he could not possibly have yet been "set free". Augustine insists on defending the view that a human being, as long as God's grace has not converted him, is not able to do the good by means of his own power. He is still subject to the power of his own sinful desires.

[47] *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 1,67 CSEL 85,1, p. 71.

Although Augustine, especially in the *Opus imperfectum*, often refers to these 'verses of powerlessness', it should also be realized that, in spite of this recognition of inner disharmony in human beings, Augustine sees, in the intentional orientation towards the good, an expression of our liberty. It is true that human beings are no longer in possession of Adam's *libertas* (cf. Rom. 7:15.18b; Gal. 5:17). Nevertheless, the believer does, in some sense, hold onto a relative yet very real *libertas*: "if they had no freedom, they could not even have willed that which is holy and righteous and good"[48].

In sum, we can say that Augustine stressed the verses of Romans 7 that express a lack of human power *simultaneously* with the need for grace (here, cf., esp. Romans 7:24). He is convinced that now, after Adam's transgression, human beings are born under the penal necessity of sinning to which Saint Paul referred in Romans 7, a necessity from which one can be set free only by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Romans 7: 25).

2. Julian's interpretation of Romans 7: 14-25

There is no systematic discussion of Romans 7:14-25 in the extant writings of Julian of Aeclanum. As Julian hints in *Ad Florum*, *Ad Turbantium* could well have contained at least one.[49] Julian does not think that the Paul of this passage is speaking of himself as a Christian. Rather, he is speaking on behalf of the Jews who, because they are yet to identify themselves with Christ, are still *sub lege*.[50]

[48] "Si nulla eis esset, id quod sanctum et iustum et bonum est, nec velle potuissent" (*Opus imperfectum* 6,11 PL 45 col. 1520).

[49] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*) 1, 68 CSEL 85, 1, p. 72.

[50] Cf. *Ad Turbantium* fr. 83 CCL 88, p. 361 (= *Contra Iulianum* 3,61) and frg. 319-320 (= *Contra Iulianum* 6,72), CCL 88 p. 394-395. Julian here defends an interpretation which was followed by the majority of the Fathers. Cf. SCHELKE, *Paulus Lehrer der Väter*, p. 245ff. At the same time, interpretation in which the 'I' refers to Paul do exist in early Christian literature (cf. p. 242-245). K.H. SCHELKE correctly remarks that Jerome, like Augustine, defended both views. Augustine repudiates the first interpretation in favour of the second one (See e.g. *Retractationes* 1,22,2; Cf. also K.H. SCHELKE, *o.c.*, p. 247-248). Regarding the habit of sinning, Julian's interpretation is very similar to the view of Pelagius. Like Julian, Pelagius speaks of someone who is no longer capable of doing the good: "Hinc in persona eius hominis loquitur qui legem accipit, id est, qui primum Dei mandati congnoscit, cum consuetudinem habeat delinquendi". *In epistulam ad Romanos* 7:7: "Et iam quasi inebriatus consuetudine peccatorum, ignori quid facio, quid enim operor, non intellego" (*id.* 7:15). "Ante consuetudinem ergo libens ego ipse faciebam" (7:17). "Est voluntas, sed non est effectus, quia carnalis consuetudo voluntati resisted (*id.* 7:18); "Non ego, quia invitus, sed consuetudo peccati, quam tamen necessitatem

Julian remains open the possibility that Paul is referring to his own status prior to his conversion.[51] According to Julian, the sentence "For I know that good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh" (Romans 7:18) contradicts Galatians 2:20: "It is not I who live, but Christ lives in me", if one interprets the "I" as referring to the Christian Paul.[52] In other words, Romans 7 must be about those who have refused Christ's gifts. And they have probably refused them because they think that they have no need of them.[53] Julian refuses to believe that there exists a force within human nature that compels a human to act against his own will.[54] At the same time, he does admit that a habit of sinning can trap one in a lifestyle that is very difficult to change. It seems that Julian would have explained Romans 7:15 not in terms of the compelling force of inborn concupiscence but simply in terms of bad habits.[55] At this point, however, he also introduces the caveat that Paul has exaggerated the *uis consuetudinis*.[56] According to Julian, orthodox Catholics have always interpreted verses such as 7:15 and 7:18 without disparaging human nature. They may well refer to an odious way of life, but they cannot refer to an inherently corrupt and dysfunctional human being.[57]

What was God's plan in giving the Law? Julian knows from Romans 7:12 that "the commandment is holy, just and good". Therefore, God must not have given the law with the intention that it would cause a worsening of human nature. The Lawgiver intended to better human beings and to show them how to practice virtue. *De facto* just the opposite occurred. In many cases, it seems that the law actually worked in such a way as to help evil become more evil.[58] Elsewhere, Julian links Romans 7:12-13 *("For the law is holy, and the commandment holy, just, and good, but in order that sin might be seen as sin, it produces death for me through the good so that sin might*

ipse mihi paravi" (*id.* 7:20). The Latin text is edited by: A. SOUTER, *Pelagius's Exposition of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul*, vols. 1-3, Texts and Studies 9, 1-3, Cambridge, 1922-1931. For an English translation and helpful introduction see: T.S. DE BRUYN, *Pelagius's Commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, Oxford, 1993.

[51] *Ad Turbantium* frg. 323 CCL 88, p. 395 (= *Contra Iulianum* 3,64).

[52] *Ad Turbantium* frg. 317 CCL 88, p. 394 (= *Contra Iulianum* 6,23,71).

[53] *Ad Turbantium* frg. 319 CCL 88, p. 394 (= *Contra Iulianum* 6,72); frg. 320 CCL 88, p. 394-395 (=*Contra Iulianum* 6,72).

[54] *Ad Turbantium* frg. 318 CCL 88, p. 394 (= *Contra Iulianum* 6,71), see also frg. 85 CCL 88 p. 362 (= *Contra Iulianum* 3,65) and frg. 87 CCL 88, p. 363 (= *Contra Iulianum* 2,30).

[55] Cf. *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 4,87.

[56] *Ad Turbantium* frg. 321 CCL 88, p. 395 (= *Contra Iulianum* 6,23,73).

[57] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus Imperfectum Contra Iulianum*) 3,178.

[58] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus Imperfectum Contra Iulianum*) 2,220.

become sinful in excess through the commandment") with 1 Corinthians 15:55-56: *"Where death is your sting? Where is your victory. But the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law."* From this he concludes that "[t]his power, then, which your sting obtained by the help of voluntary sinfulness in us, is shown to have been conquered and broken by the virtues of the faithful and so by the crowns of the faithful".[59]

In the first book of *Ad Florum*, Julian addresses the issues of freedom and grace. Julian argues that Romans 7: 24-25 does not condemn human nature. Rather it shows us that the law of sin in the members is merely the detritus that has resulted from the bad habit of sinning. In the sentence *"Miser ergo homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius"* (Romans 7:24), Julian finds evidence of the negative impact of sin from which we can only be liberated by Christ. Our liberation will only commence when we get serious about practicing virtue.[60] In Julian's mind, it is clear that here Paul is addressing the Jews who, even after the Law had been given, kept on sinning. *Corpus mortis huius* thus refers to sin, not to the created flesh as such. Had it been the latter, Paul would have spoken of *mors corporis*. That in order to comprehend Julian's schema one must think ethically, even in the instances where "natural" terminology is used, is made clear in his exegesis of Colossians 3:5-7: *"Mortificate membra uestra quae sunt super terram, immunditiam et auaritiam, quae est simulacrorum seruitus, propter quae uenit ira Dei in filios incredulitatis, in quibus et uos aliquando uiueretis in illis"* ("Put to death your members which are upon earth: fornication, impurity, and avarice, which is the worship of idols on account of which the anger of God comes upon the children of unbelief, among whom you once walked when you lived among them"). According to Julian, it is clear that *membra* here stands for *peccata*. Moreover, is it not obvious that Romans 6:6 is trying to tell us that the *corpus peccati* is being destroyed by the cross *ut ultra non seruiamus peccato*?[61] The call for liberation in Romans 7:24 refers to sins that have been freely committed. Verse 25 gives the ultimate solution to the problem: Christ's grace.[62]

[59] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus Imperfectum Contra Iulianum*) 6,40. The translations and quotations are again Teske's (cf. n.9 *supra*).

[60] Cf. *Ad Florum* (= *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*) 1,67 CSEL 85,1 p. 67.

[61] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*) 1,67 CSEL 85,1 p. 68.

[62] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*) 1,67 CSEL 85,1 p. 68.

Julian then tackles Romans 7:23: "But I see another law in my members, resisting the law of my mind and taking me captive under the law of sin which is in my members". According to Julian, this sentence refers to the situation of a new or recent convert. Prior to that recent event, the convert had been a "sinner" i.e., he had been used to sinning. This habit was like a second nature that generated resistance when the new believer began to make better ethical choices. After all, it was only one chapter earlier that Paul had written "[w]hat I say is only human on account of the weakness of the flesh" (Romans 6:19). Clearly, this is not about the created condition, but about the *vitia*. Flesh is used to speak figuratively of sins. In the same verse Paul claimed that they had formerly offered their members in the service of uncleanness and iniquity upon iniquity. This idea is re-confirmed by Romans 7:5: *"Cum essemus in carne, passions peccatorum ... operabantur"*. Obviously Paul was alive when he wrote these words: he was still in the possession of a body. The expression "no longer being in the flesh" then must refer to the human being who is no longer living in a sinful situation. *Cum essemus in carne* thus refers to sin, not to the created substance.[63] Paul has condemned morally evil acts, but he has not condemned the body; after all, it is something God has created. Romans 7:14-25 should not be seen as either discrediting human nature or as a condemnation of desire as such. It is simply a condemnation of immoral deeds. Julian thinks that this is the only interpretation that allows one to make human deeds the actual locus for guilt. That locus cannot be either marriage or sexual intercourse which, according to Julian, belong to the natural order. They have both been instituted by God. In a word, Romans 7 cannot be used to critique either sexual intercourse or marriage, just as it cannot be said to have restricted human freedom or to have overpowered it.[64]

In *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 2,2,6 Augustine reproaches Julian for having omitted part of Augustine's statement when he quoted from Augustine's *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,1,1. Augustine even thinks that Julian might have excised the phrase "(if human beings had not first sinned) in the body of that former life, though they cannot now be conceived without it in the body if this death" (see Romans 7:24) on purpose. Later, Julian, in his *Ad Florum*, rebuts this charge by calling Augustine a liar. Augustine now admits

[63] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*) 1,69 CSEL 85,1 p. 75-76.

[64] *Ad Florum* (= *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*) 1,72.

that the omission was made by the one who had summarized the *Ad Turbantium* for him, but he adds: *"id praetermisit ne tua rideretur exspectata et prolata responsio"* (Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum 1,67 CSEL 85,1 p. 69). In Augustine's mind, the ridiculous element was not in Julian's exegesis seen *in toto*. Rather, the problem lay in the fact that Julian had claimed that an unconverted Jew would be likely to claim that the grace of Christ would set him free.

3. Conclusions and final remarks

The essential difference between Augustine's and Julian's interpretation lies in the fact that Augustine accepts the idea of original sin whereas Julian explicitly rejects it. Augustine stresses the necessity of grace; Julian the possibilities of human free will. Augustine works out his interpretation on two levels: the level of the individual and the level of the entirety of the human race. As he comments on Romans 7 Augustine demonstrates how the human will has been affected by Adam's fall. Augustine's observations on 7:15 and 7:19 show what he means when he discusses the loss of the pure freedom of the will *(libertas)*. Julian does not accept that our will has been fundamentally changed because of Adam's fall. While Augustine's view implies the need for a limited free will for the continued existence of sin, Julian believes that sin can only exist if and when the will is fully free. Julian can only explain the experience of moral incapacity that is found in Romans 7 as a negative consequence of habit. Julian let even slip the remark that the apostle had exaggerated the *vis consuetudinis*. In Julian's efforts to attribute *uoluntarium* to each and every sinful act, he is forced to deny or downplay the element of compulsives that seems so obvious in 7:19 as Paul describes his experience of the true nature of *peccatum*.

According to the Augustine, the 'I' of Romans 7:14-25 is both a general statement applicable to all Christians *sub gratia* and a particular (and autobiographical) statement applicable to Paul. Augustine supports this with data gleaned from the actual experience of Christians. He also refers to Galatians 5:16-17 with its inner tension between the *concupiscentia carnis* and the *concupiscentia spiritus*. Augustine also makes much of Paul's choice of the present tense verbs forms in Romans 7:14-25. Finally, it is during this stage of the controversy that he admits that the interpretation given by others in combination with his own ongoing studies had led him to this new exegesis. For Julian it goes without saying that the 'I' in

Romans 7:14-25 refers to humans *sub lege*. Augustine was right when he critiqued Julian's exegesis as inconsistent insofar as a Jew under the Law would not cry out that Christ's grace would set him free. Though Augustine offers his *sub gratia*- interpretation as one that had been carefully considered, it should be said that the bishop of Hippo never pushed Julian to admit that these verses can *only* refer to someone *sub gratia*. Finally it must be admitted that Julian, just as Augustine had done, could marshal Christian tradition in support of his view.

In Augustine's view it is the real-world, here-and-now, situation of Christians that lies behind the reference to "the body of this death" (cf. Romans 7:24). According to Julian the *corpus mortis* is not related to our nature as such but to our sinful habits, of which we can be freed by Christ, if we will but apply ourselves and our still-free wills to the practice of virtue. Augustine believed that humans "in the body of this death" were still able to struggle against their sinful desires. Of course, he also acknowledges that all honest believers know that absolute sinlessness is impossible in this life. At the same time, he stresses that this realization rests on an honest analysis of one's own post-lapsarian possibilities and weaknesses, rather than on an *in se* "pessimistic" view of human beings.

It is a pity that Augustine and Julian were so often "speaking their own languages" and could never manage to enter completely into each other's way of thinking. Augustine was particularly keen to defend Christ's grace, while Julian was concerned to preserve the ethical call inherent in being a genuine disciple of Christ. What Augustine failed to see was that Julian also had an appreciation for Christ's grace that was every bit as important to him as morality and ethics were to Augustine.[65]

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WEAKER VESSELS AND HINDERED PRAYERS: 1 PETER 3:7 IN JEROME AND AUGUSTINE

In his influential article entitled "Augustine's View on Women," T.J. Van Bavel discussed in some detail to the degree to which the Bishop of Hippo derived his views from scripture.[1] While Van Bavel's text and notes make it plain that the most fruitful sources for Augustine's thinking were Pauline, on several occasions he also draws our attention to the role the First Epistle of Peter played in the Bishop's thinking.[2] The Petrine passage most germane to this issue is undoubtedly that of 1 Peter 3:1-7 and, of these verses, the most interesting is the longish verse 7. Augustine's text of this verse would most likely have read as follows:

> Viri simili ratione concordes et caste uiuentes cum uxoribus uestris et tamquam uasi infirmiori et subiecto tribuite honorem quasi/uelut coheredibus gratiae, et uidete ne inpediantur orationes uestrae[3]

It is the aim of this article to discuss in greater detail Augustine's exegesis of this verse and to highlight particular aspects of it by placing his thoughts alongside those of Jerome, his near contemporary. Through such an examination, this article will offer further proof that Van Bavel did the scholarly world a positive service when he highlighted the Bishop of Hippo's relatively moderate attitude toward women, toward married sexuality, and toward inter-gender relationships. While Van Bavel's writings have always remained sensitive to Augustine's being a man of his time, his work has gone a long way toward enabling contemporary scholarship to fully appreciate Augustine's judiciousness vis-à-vis the views of many of his fourth- and fifth-century contemporaries.

[1] See *Augustiniana* 39 (1989): 5-53.

[2] The first and most direct of these is found on p.6 where, in discussing the Augustine's take on the subordination of women, Van Bavel notes: "As a child of his time Augustine considered the woman as subordinate to the man. He adopted the prevailing idea of antiquity about the inferior condition of women in society ... [but] as Augustine does always after his conversion, in the question of subordination of women, *he bases himself primarily on the Bible, especially on 1 Peter 3:7 ...*" (italics added). Cf. also pp. 14, 42, 51, and 52.

[3] This quotation is based on that which may be found in 12,14 of *b. coniug* (cf. CSEL 41, p.206). A comparison of the three places where Augustine clearly cites, or intends to cite, 1 Peter 3:7 reveals that his text remained quite stable between the years 401, the date of composition for *b. coniug.*, and 422, the year in which *c. Iul.* was completed. Indeed, the only significant variant is that he once replaces the normal "quasi" with "uelut." Cf. also the relevant nn. *infra*.

Jerome and 1 Peter 3:7

According to the apparatus of the Beuron project's *Vetus Latina* edition of the Catholic Epistles,[4] Jerome employed 1 Peter 3:7 eight times. Of these eight, three are rather insignificant allusions that contribute little to our understanding of his reading of this verse.[5] Of the remaining five, four are worthy of a closer look.[6]

The first interesting reference to 1 Peter 3:7 is in Jerome's commentary on Titus, a relatively superficial work composed in haste in 386.[7] Jerome uses our verse to comment on Titus 2:3-5, a passage which he read as:

> Anus similiter in habitu sancto, non incentrices, non uino multo seruientes; bene docentes, ut ad castitatem erudiant adolescentulas, ut ament uiros suos, ut ament filios: pudicas, castas, habentes domus diligentiam, benignas, subditas uiris suis, ut uerbum Dei non blasphemetur.

Somewhat surprising is the fact that this lemma is not immediately commented on: instead, 1 Peter 3:7 is introduced into the

[4] See *Vetus Latina die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel* 26/1 Epistulae Catholicae, ed. W. Thiele (Freiburg: Herder, 1969), 131-133. These pp. also reveal that Jerome and Augustine were among the very first Latin writers to make use of this v. In fact, only three other contemporaneous writers make any clear use of it: Ambrose, who references it 3x; Pelagius, who uses it once in his Pauline commentary; and Rufinus who includes a reference to it in his translation of Origen's commentary on the book of Joshua.

[5] In addition to its being an allusion, that found in Paragraph 52 of the *Praecepta* section of Jerome's translation of the so-called *Pachomiana Latina* is less than helpful precisely because it is not original to Jerome. For the allusion, which uses the epithet "uasa infirmiora" as a synonym for "mulierculae," see *Pachomiana Latina règle et épitres de S. Pachome, épitre de S. Théodore et "liber" de S. Orsiesius texte latin de S. Jérôme*, A. Boon, ed. Bibliothèque de la Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique 7 (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1932), 27. Those listed by the *Vetus Latina* as coming from Jerome's commentaries on the minor prophets Joel and Micah are also, at best, allusions. In fact, the phrase "uas infirmum" from the Micah commentary could just as easily be an allusion to 1 Thess 4:4 not 1 Pet 3:7. For the evidence on these two, cf. CCSL 76, pp.185 and 511, respectively. For more on 1 Thess 4:4 in the early Latin tradition, see J. Doignon, "L'exégèse latin ancienne de 1 Thessaloniciens 4,4-5 sur la possession de notre vas: schema classiques et éclairages chrétiens" *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* 83/3 (1982): 163-177; see pp. 170-172 for Doignon's discussion of Jerome's contribution. For an example of Augustine's use of 1 Thess 4:4, see p.13 *infra*.

[6] These five are: *Comm. in e. ad Titum* 2:3-5; *Adu. Iou.* I,7 (2x); I,8; and *e.* 48. Although the use in *Adu. Iou.* I,8 is a clear citation, its use there is relatively unimportant and, hence, will not be included in this discussion.

[7] For this date see P. Nautin, "Les date des commentaires de Jérôme sur les épîtres pauliniennes" *Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique* 74 (1979): 5-12, esp. p.9.

discussion straightaway. He writes: "Although the apostle Peter taught that husbands owed their wives honor as weaker vessels, he was not teaching that a wife, who certainly has a weaker vessel for a body, also has a weaker soul."[8] This is followed by an application of the Lord's statement to Paul regarding Paul's prayers for relief in the face of his "thorn," namely that "power is made perfect in weakness (*uirtus in infirmitate perficitur*; cf. 2 Cor 12:9)." From here there follows a discussion of the Titus passage. For our purposes, most important is the way in which Jerome asserts that Peter's comments regarding a woman's inherent weakness should be restricted to that sex's physical capacities. Having made this assumption, Jerome is then free to make what many in the ancient world must have regarded as a novel assertion, namely that there is no inherent spiritual or "soulical" difference between the sexes.[9] Indeed, implicit here is the idea that women should embrace and accept their physical deficiencies relative to men since, when seen correctly, they are actually opportunities for a deeper experience of God and His grace.

All of Jerome's other important uses of 1 Peter 3:7 are found in just two paragraphs of his controversial treatise *Aduersus Iouinianum* and in one section of his *epistula* 49. *Adu. Iou.* was published in 393.[10] Its caustic and extreme tone earned Jerome much criticism,

[8] This is my own trans. For the Latin, cf. PL 26, col.615:"Tametsi Apostolus Petrus praeceperit, ut uiri uxoribus suis tanquam infirmiori uasculo honorem tribuant, non tamen arbitrandum est, quod uxor, quae corporis uasculum habet infirmum, statim et anima infirmior sit."

[9] The fact that all of Jerome's Pauline commentaries (there were four in total: Philemon, Galatians, Ephesians and Titus) were written at the urging of his females friends and supporters Paula, Eustocium, and Marcella most probably rendered his comments more "philogynist." For a work which helpfully summarizes many aspects of Jerome, his work, and his context and which pairs these summaries with many helpful, if not always easily obtainable, bibliographical entries see A. Fürst, *Hieronymus Askese und Wissenschaft in der Spätanike* (Freiburg: Herder, 2003). See esp. pp.52-55 and 309-310 for the topic "Die Frauen um Hieronymus." Prominent in Fürst's bibliography are several works by P. Laurence. By far the most detailed is his *Jérôme et le nouveau modèle féminin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes Série Antiquité 155 (Paris: Institut Études Augustiniennes, 1997). See pp. 205-224 of that work for a detailed discussion of Jerome's exegesis of 1 Cor 7 in the *Contra Iovinianum*; on p.211 and n.154 Laurence comments on the fact that in his exegesis Jerome "diffère grandement d'un" Augustine.

[10] For a thesis that contains several unsupported accusations against Jovinian and his person as well as several equally unexplainable *encomia* for both Jerome and his work, see J. Nolan, *Jerome and Jovinian* (Abstract of S.T.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 1956), *passim*. For example, on p.27 and without referencing a source, Gavin writing about Jovinian's character and trustworthiness claims that "there is no doubt that Jovinian in his new life did not live as a monk should live, that he did give reasons for complaint." For interesting and far more balanced contextualizations of

both overtly and covertly, and this negative reaction compelled him to launch an apologetic campaign in order to rebut his critics and to further defend the positions he had adopted there. *Epistula* 49, which was drafted in 394, was part of that campaign.[11]

Jovinian's chief "mistake" and most notorious "sin" was his claim that the baptized believer's marital status and degree of past sexual experience made no difference in his or her ability to be pleasing to God or in the quality of his or her eternal reward.[12] Like both Pope Siricius and Ambrose before him, Jerome simply could not abide this attempt at "democratizing" the fourth-century church. In fact, for Jerome, whose commitment to celibacy and asceticism was (like almost everything else he adopted) rendered even more extreme by the peculiarities of his personality, the line between what was an attack on the prevailing orthodoxy and what was an attack on him personally was often blurred.

In the first part of *Adu. Iou.* Book I, Jerome is intent on letting Paul, or, more specifically, the plain text of 1 Corinthians 7, counter Jovinian's disruptive assertions.[13] I,7-8, the two paragraphs which

Jovinian, his teachings, and his probable motivations see both A. Budzin, "Jovinian's Four Theses on the Christian Life: An Alternative Patristic Spirituality," *Toronto Journal of Theology* 4 (1988): 44-59 and D. Hunter, "Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary in Late Fourth-Century Rome," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 1 (1993): 47-71, esp. pp. 51-61. For a brief but helpful summary of the role this controversy played in Jerome's life, see J. Kelly, *Jerome* (London: Duckworth, 1975), 181-189. More particularly, for Kelly's positive opinion regarding the literary and rhetorical quality of the *Adu. Iou.*, see pp.181-182. However, for his assessment that, in the final analysis, its argument seems "singularly superficial and unconvincing," see p. 186.

[11] While this fact is widely recognized, the words of K. Cooper are helpful. She writes: "Jerome's Letter 49 to Pammachius represents an attempt to soften the ferocity of his attack on Jovinian." See her *The Virgin and the Bride Idealized Womanhood in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 97.

[12] Indeed, it is this theme that dominates Book I of the *Adu. Iou.* Here, cf. Hunter, *Helvidius, Jovinian, and the Virginity of Mary*, 52: "It is baptism, Jovinian argued, that establishes the holiness of each Christian, not ascetic merit" and "Jovinian appears to have placed a particular stress on the unity of the church, a unity constituted by the indwelling of the triune God, a unity which ought not to be divided by distinctions of ascetic merit."

[13] Cf. these lines from near the end of I,6 (PL 23, col.228): "Opponam in prima fronte apostolum Paulum, et quasi fortissimum ducem, suis telis, id est, suis armabo sententiis. Sciscitantibus enim super hac quaestione Corinthiis, plenissime respondit Doctor Gentium, et Magister Ecclesiae. Quidquid autem statuerit, hoc Christi in eo loquentis, legem putemus." Here, too, Kelly is helpful, esp. with regard to the *quality* of Jerome exegesis. He writes: "But it was St Paul whom he made his chief oracle, twisting the famous texts of 1 Corinthians 7 and 1 Timothy to wrest from them an even greater aversion to marriage and second marriages than they contain ..." and "Where [Jerome] has a useful [exegetical] card, he overplays it. Where he is at a disadvantage ... he resorts to an unnatural exegesis to distort the scriptural record." For these remarks see Kelly, *Jerome*, 183 and 186 respectively.

contain the aforementioned references to our verse, are both dominated by Jerome's exegesis of 1 Cor 7:1b: "bonum est homini mulierem non tangere." A long discussion of the application of this half-verse leads Jerome to a further consideration of the "requirement" mentioned in 7:5 that all married persons should render conjugal rights to their partners in order to ensure that "weak" and "needy" partners are able to maintain their self-control. After quoting 7:5 ("nolite fraudare inuicem, nisi forte ex consensu ad tempus, ut uacetis orationi"), and undoubtedly because that verse includes the notion that, if both partners agree, conjugal relations may be temporarily suspended for the sake of prayer, Jerome links 1 Cor 7:5 and 1 Peter 3:7. His motivation is plain: 1 Peter 3:7, like 1 Cor 7:5, includes the idea that there is a real and unavoidable link between how one treats one's marriage partner and one's prayer life. Most important for our purposes is the fact that in 1 Peter 3:7, the nature of the link is vague enough to allow the creative exegete a lot of room to maneuver. Jerome writes:

> I ask you, what is the quality of that good thing which hinders prayer? Which does not allow the body of Christ to be received? So long as I fulfil the role of a husband, I do not fulfill the [call to] continence (*non impleo continentis*). The same Apostle in another place commands us to pray always (cf. 1 Thess 5:17). If we are to pray always, it follows that we must never be in the bondage of wedlock, for as often as I render my wife her due, I am not able to pray. The Apostle Peter had experience of the bonds of marriage (*experimentum habens coniugalium uinculorum*).[14] See how he fashions the Church, and what lesson he teaches Christians: "Husbands in the same way live with your wives according to knowledge, giving honor to the woman, as to a weaker vessel, just as they are also joint-heirs of the grace of life; in order that your prayers might not be hindered" (1 Pet 3:7). Observe that, in the same sense as S. Paul, because in both cases the spirit is also the same, so now S. Peter says that prayers are hindered by the performance of marriage duty (*officio coniugali*).[15]

[14] This language regarding Peter and his marriage is, as Kelly points out (cf. his *Jerome*, 187 and n.47), not even the most pejorative of Jerome's statements found in the *Adu. Iou.* Cf. I,26 (PL 23, col.258) where he refers Peter's marriage as a "defilement (*sordes*) … [that] is not washed away by martyrdom."

[15] This English trans. is based on that of W. Freemantle, *The Principle Works of St. Jerome*, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Second Series, 6, eds. P. Schaff and H. Wace (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1893; reprint, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), 351. In several places I have modified the English to make it more contemporary and, in the case of the quotations from *e*.49, in order to bring the text into conformity with the CSEL edition. For the Latin behind this particular passage, see PL 23, col.230.

Especially noteworthy in this passage is the extremely literal and rigid nature of the exegesis. Apparently, Jerome wanted his readers to accept that Paul's exhortation to "let us pray always (*semper oremus*)" was best understood as a call to be literally always at prayer. He also seems to have expected his readers to accept that his own well-known and normal day-to-day activities such as writing, translating, and reading – not to mention eating, drinking, and sleeping – did not prohibit *his* fulfilling of this scriptural "command."[16] After citing 1 Pet 3:2-3, Jerome returns to discussing his understanding of Peter's teaching regarding marriage. This comment contains a very clear allusion, to 1 Peter 3:7:

> You see what kind of marriage [Peter] enjoins. Husbands and wives are to dwell together according to knowledge, so that they may know what God wishes and desires, and may give honor to the weak vessel, woman. If we abstain from intercourse, we give honour to our wives: if we do not abstain, it is clear that insult is the opposite of honour.[17]

The differences between these uses of our verse and that which is found in the Titus commentary are both obvious and striking. Not only has Jerome introduced the whole verse in place of the earlier brief reference to women as "weaker vessels" (apparently a point which he was never overly concerned with), here, he has also settled explicitly on the link between marital relations and prayer. Implicit here is the notion that even lawful sexual intercourse with one's marriage partner renders prayer impossible, just as the exemplary nature of total abstinence, again, even within a marriage, is made quite explicit. When strung together, these ideas allowed Jerome to foist onto his readers the conclusion that 1 Peter 3:7 was originally written with the aim of discouraging marital sexual relations.[18]

[16] Here, cf. *e.*22,37, a letter written approximately 10 years earlier, where he is much more realistic about the application of 1 Thess 5:17. There, he implies that having "appointed hours for praying" is sufficient and further moderates the Thessalonian exhortation by asserting that "for the saints even sleep may be a prayer." For the Latin, cf. CSEL 54, p.201; this English trans. was taken from *ACW* 33, p.173.

[17] For the English, *ibid.*; for the Latin, *ibid*, col.231. Helpful for "unpacking" all that this passage contains are the comments of Y.-M. Duval, *L'affaire Jovinien. D'une crise de la société romaine à une crise de la pensée chrétienne à la fin du IVè et au début du Vè siècle*, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 83 (Roma: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 2003), 119-121 and n.85. Cf. also n.29 *infra*.

[18] That this point was derivative from Jerome's exegesis of 1 Pet 3:7 has also been noted by D. Heimann, "The Polemical Application of Scripture in St. Jerome," in *Studia Patristica XII Papers presented to the Sixth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1971 Part I*, ed. E. Livingstone (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975), 309-316, esp. 311 where he notes that "One must also read between the lines of Scripture, as it were ... 1 Peter 3,7 ... eventually is manouvered (sic) [by Jerome] into the meaning that perfect chastity is what the Apostle means to prescribe."

As noted above, Jerome's *epistula* 49 was written in 394 as part of his rebuttal against the severe criticism he had received for the views contained in the *Adu. Iou.*[19] As one might expect given Jerome's personality, the tone of this letter is extremely defensive and self-justificatory. Interesting, however, is the fact that this attempt at self-justification is not allowed to alter his expressed view of matrimony or his previously-established exegesis of scripture. In fact, in this letter, the claims that neither his opinions nor his exegesis are novel are pushed to a new position of prominence. Paragraph 15 begins:

> From all [the foregoing] considerations it is clear that I have said nothing at all new concerning virginity and marriage, but have followed in all respects the judgment of older writers – of Ambrose, that is to say, and others who have discussed the doctrines of the Church.[20]

A few lines later, after quoting for his new readers the passage just cited from *Adu. Iou.*, he reprises some of that work's exegesis. He refers again to 1 Thess 5:17, to several verses from 1 Cor 7, and to 1 Pet 3:7. He also reasserts his radical claim regarding the meaning of 1 Cor 7. He follows this with an exegesis of the exegesis he gave in the *Adu. Iou.*:

> When I do my duty as a husband, I cannot fulfill the requirements of continence. The same apostle, in another place, commands us to pray always (cf. 1 Thess 5:17). "But if we are always to pray we must never yield to the claims of wedlock, for, as often as I render my wife her due, I am not able to pray (*orare non possum*)." When I spoke thus it is clear that I relied on the words of the apostle: "Do not defraud each other, except by mutual consent and for a brief period, so that you may devote yourselves to prayer" (cf. 1 Cor 7:5). The

[19] For a well-worded summary regarding the negative reception of the work, see Kelly, *Jerome*, 187. Also interesting is Kelly's labeling (cf. p. 188) of *e.* 49 as "an enormously long, carefully argued *pièce justificatif*."

[20] For the English, *ibid.*, 75; for the Latin, CSEL 54, 375-376. Although its presence here is not altogether unjustified, it is important to note that there is no clear reference to Ambrose in the Latin original of this passage either in the CSEL or in the older and substantially different PL edition (cf. PL 22, col. 505). Jerome's favorable attitude toward the "older writer" Ambrose in the *Adu. Iou.* is surprising given his outspoken animosity toward him on other occasions. Apparently, Jerome felt that their general agreement on the issue of virginity and continence was enough to overlook other theological and exegetical differences. This inconsistency did not escape Kelly's notice. On p. 189 of his *Jerome* he writes: "in his dire straits [Jerome] did not hesitate to cite his *bête-noire* as a witness" (cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 143-144). For my approach to this English trans., cf. n. 15 *supra*.

> Apostle Paul tells us that when we have intercourse (*coimus*) with our wives we are not able to pray (*nos orare non posse*). Peter, too, exhorts us to continence, that our "prayers might not be hindered" (cf. 1 Pet 3:7).[21]

The exaggerated nature of the claims found in this passage are manifest to anyone who takes the time to read the relevant biblical citations. *Prima facie*, in 1 Cor 7:5 Paul seems to have been simply encouraging Christian married couples to set aside time to pray; the idea that intercourse makes prayer impossible is in no way discernable from either the context or wording. The 1 Peter 3 passage is equally unsupportive of Jerome's cause: any reference whatsoever to sexual activity or to continence is singularly absent. In spite of this, Jerome seems to think that he is being exceptionally persuasive. Without further comment, he continues his *apologia*:

> How, I should like to know, have I sinned in all this? What have I done? How have I been at fault? ... Am I attacked because I have ventured to add to the words of the apostle these words of my own: "What kind of good thing is that which prevents a man from receiving the body of Christ?" If so, I will make answer briefly thus: Which is the most important, to pray or to receive Christ's body? Surely to receive Christ's body. If, then, sexual intercourse hinders the less important thing, much more does it hinder that which is more important.

Keeping both the tone and the content of these last lines in mind as a foil, we will now briefly survey of how the Bishop of Hippo employed our verse.

Augustine and 1 Peter 3:7

The Bishop of Hippo also employed 1 Peter 3:7 on eight occasions, one of which was in the compendium known as the *Speculum*. Of the remaining seven, four are merely allusions to various parts of verse 7. The three that cite it directly will form the core of the discussion that follows.[22]

[21] For the English, *ibid.*, 75; for the Latin, *ibid.*, 376.

[22] Again, this is based on the information provided by the *Vetus Latina* apparatus. Cf. n.4 *supra*. The four allusions mentioned here are *e.* 20,3 in which Augustine refers to the wife of the letter's recipient, Antoninus, as an "infirmiori uasi"; *c. Jul.* 2,20, where, in the midst of a discussion about the role of sexual desire in marriage, Augustine notes Julian's reluctance to admit that sexual desire could negatively affect a Christian couple's prayer life: "coniugum impediretur oratio"; *s.* 51,21, where, in between

De bono coniugali, a treatise written circa 401, represents Augustine's "first attempt at a systematic treatment of marriage."[23] As such, and like Jerome before him, the Bishop of Hippo could have hardly avoided engaging what Paul had to say about marriage in 1 Corinthians 7. Indeed, his exegesis of this chapter of scripture dominates Paragraph 10 along with several of those which follow. Paragraph 12, which is largely dedicated to a discussion of sexual relations that are "unnatural (*contra naturam*)," and the first half of Paragraph 13, in which Augustine follows Paul in extolling the virtues of remaining unmarried so that one is better able to focus on pleasing God (cf. 1 Cor 7:32-35; 40), are, in turn, followed by a discussion which deals with the challenges inherent in trying to balance being married with being devoted to God.

Having voiced his agreement with Paul regarding the reality of this difficulty, Augustine, as he opens Paragraph 14, shifts his focus from married people in general to married women in particular before going on to ask whether some of Paul's words of 1 Cor 7:32-34 should be taken as absolute statements applicable to all married women or simply to the majority of them. As he affirms the latter point, he employs both 1 Tim 2:9-10 and 1 Peter 3:1-7. Like Jerome before him, Augustine's marshalling of the claims and exhortations of two apostles to support his point is a subtle but effective rhetorical technique.[24] The implicit message is that if both of these great apostles shared the same view on this subject, then it behooves us to heed their advice. The rest of this paragraph is marked by a realistic, as opposed to an idealistic or romantic, tone:

> ... there is the rare married woman who even in complying with the demands of marriage thinks only of how to please God, and does not adorn herself "with plaits in her hair or with gold and pearls and

references to important Pauline passages about marriage and the respective roles of the husband and the wife, Augustine affirms that wives are "cohaeredem gratiae"; and, finally, *Trin.* XII,12, where, in a passage that is both similar to that of *s.*51,21 and one Van Bavel makes much of, the Bishop again alludes to 1 Peter 3:7's co-hereditary principle ("feminas ... sint nobiscum gratiae cohaeredes") in the midst of multiple references to Paul. For Prof. Van Bavel's most detailed comments on this latter passage, see his "Woman as the Image of God in Augustine's '*De Trinitate* XII,'" in *Signum Pietatis Festgabe für Cornelius Petrus Mayer OSA zum 60 Geburtstag* ed. A. Zumkeller OSA (Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1989), 267-288.

[23] For this quote and a brief introduction to the work, see A. Fitzgerald et al., eds. *Augustine through the Ages An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), s.v. "*Bono conjugali, de*" by D. Hunter. For more on the *b. coniug*, see Hunter's "Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look At Augustine's Teaching on Sex, Marriage and Celibacy," *Augustinian Studies* 25 (1994): 153-177, esp. 157-163.

[24] Cf. pp.6-7 *supra* as well as the quotations from 13,15 and the V,40 of the *c. Iul infra.*

> expensive clothes, but in the manner appropriate for women who show their devotion by their good conduct" (1 Tim 2:9-10). The apostle Peter also describes and commends this kind of marriage ... (citation of 1 Peter 3:1-7 *in toto*) ... So then, is it true that marriages like this are not concerned about what has to do with the Lord, how to please the Lord (cf. 1 Cor 7:32)? Who could deny though that they are an extremely rare occurrence? Moreover, even in these rare cases almost always people like this did not marry intending to be like this, but they became like this after they were already married.[25]

13,15 then opens with an interesting and relatively positive claim regarding both the Christian's regenerated ability to opt for celibacy and the Bible's "correctness" in exhorting them to make just such a commitment. The Bishop is quite direct:

> In our time when Christians who are free (*liberi*) from the bond of marriage and strong enough (*ualentes*) to abstain from all sexual union perceive that, as it was written, 'it is now not the time for embracing, but the time for refraining from all embracing (Eccl. 3:5),' and it is no longer required as a duty to human society, who would not choose to keep the celibate state of virginity or widowhood rather than endure the tribulation of the flesh (*tribulationem carnis*) that is inseparable from marriage ...?"[26]

[25] For this English trans. see *WSA* I,9, p.44; for the Latin, CSEL 41, pp.205-206. The (last few and somewhat-oblique) lines of this passage read: "Ita ne uero coniugia talia non cogitant ea quae sunt Domini, quomodo placeant Domino? Sed perrara sunt – quis negat? – Et in ipsa raritate paene omnes, qui tales sunt, non ut tales essent, coniuncti sunt, sed iam coniuncti tales facti sunt."

[26] For this English see *ibid.*, pp.44-45; for the Latin, *ibid.*, p.207. Although a detailed discussion would take us too far afield, it is interesting to note that the absence from this discussion of one of Augustine's favorite verses: Wisdom 8:21. This v., which reads "*et cum scirem quia nemo potest esse continens nisi Deus det et hoc ipsum erat sapientiae, scire cuius esset hoc donum*," was employed by Augustine on more than 25 occasions and frequently when he was addressing issues related to continence (of all kinds), grace, and the intersection of the two. That he had already used it in such contexts is proven by its repeated presence in *conf.* X, and esp. in X,29. *Conf.* was completed in 401 just before and perhaps overlapping with the composition of *b. conjug.* In *conf.* X,29, Augustine makes plain his need for help in the area of sexual continence and twice repeats his famous line "*(Continentiam iubes:) Da quod iubes et iube quod uis.*" In *b. conjug.*, however, the emphasis is far more on being "free (*liberi*)" and on being "strong enough (*ualentes*)." This somewhat inconsistent use of Wis 8:21 at this relatively early stage in Augustine's ministry adds support to D. Hunter's claim that "Augustine's ideas on sex, marriage and celibacy developed over the course of his lifetime." See his "*Augustinian Pessimism?*," 153 for this quote. For an excellent study of the role Wisdom played in the thinking and writing of Augustine, see A.-M. La Bonnardière, *Biblia Augustiniana A.T.: Le livre de la Sagesse* Études Augustiniennes Série Antiquité (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1970), esp. 103-107 and 287-288 for Wis 8:21.

This obviously rhetorical question is followed by a brief excursus in which Augustine defends the conduct of Old Testament figures, especially with regard to the then-common practice of polygamy. Here, as elsewhere, his idealization of their behavior was based on their "duty" to propagate and increase the number of human beings. Although he recognizes that this duty is no longer binding for this dispensation, Augustine is significantly less idealistic regarding the sexual conduct of his married contemporaries. He continues:

> Yet in private conversation, either with married persons or those who have been married, have we ever heard any people give any indication that they never have relations with their wives except with the hope of conceiving? What the apostles command married people to do, therefore, is essential for marriage; but what they allow as something excusable (*uenialiter*), or what hinders prayer (*inpedit orationes*), is not something marriage demands, but something it puts up with.[27]

Although it is not perfectly clear from this particular context what Augustine is thinking of as the activity that "hinders prayer," it would seem that he had in mind the activities that he elsewhere labeled excessive sexual indulgence.[28] If so, it would also seem that the particular idea of a link between one's sexual activities and one's ability to pray without hindrance is an idea that he picked up from his reading of Jerome, but, as elsewhere, is one which he went on to modify. Also significant here is the repeated use of the plural "apostles (*apostoli*)" in another attempt to secure more authority for his position.

[27] *Ibid.*, p.45.

[28] Although it is only rarely used in his oeuvre (12x in 7 different works), passages in which the term "*uenialiter*" does occur are often significant. This is esp. true when it shows up in contexts where the main issue is the existence and the effects of *concupiscentia carnis*. See, e.g., *c. Iul* II,10,33 and *c. Iul. imp.* I,68. The phrase "*inpedit orationes*" only occurs 2x in Augustine, both of which are in *b. coniug.* It is in the second of these (i.e., 20,23; cf. CSEL 41, p.217) that Augustine makes the link most clearly. He seems to have done this by extrapolating from a few Old Testament passages that, either implicitly or explicitly, label sexual relations before certain sacred or cultic activities as problematic (e.g., Ex 19:15; Lev 15:16-18; Lev 22:4; and I Sam 21:4-5). He writes: "Nec quod purificari lex hominem et post coniugalem concubitum iubet, peccatum esse declarat, si non est ille, qui secundum ueniam conceditur, qui etiam nimius inpedit orationes." For a solid and balanced account of the Bishop of Hippo's views on sex and sexuality generally, see M. Lamberigts, "A Critical Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine's View of Sexuality," in *Augustine and His Critics Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner* eds. R. Dodaro and G. Lawless (London: Routledge, 1999), 176-197.

De bono uiduitatis, a treatise written about 414 in response to the request of Juliana, a Christian widow and member of a Roman noble family, is, in many ways, a re-iteration of Augustine's teaching on marriage and celibacy. Its similarities with *De bono coniugali*, especially with respect to reading and exegesis of scripture, are clear.

Early in the treatise and after reaffirming the good of both marriage and chaste widowhood in 3,4, the Bishop of Hippo goes on in 4,5-5,7 to defend the goodness and acceptability of Christian second marriages and to condemn those "heretics" who reject them, including Tertullian.[29] Prominent (again) throughout this section are Pauline statements, especially those borrowed from 1 Corinthians 7.[30] Especially interesting is the way in which 4,5 opens. Here, after having concluded the previous paragraph with a citation of 1 Cor 7:6-7 and its emphasis on continence and celibacy as a gift from God (*donum... a Deo*),[31] Augustine writes "you see how even married chastity (*coniugalem pudicitiam*) and fidelity to the obligations of a Christian marriage (*tori christiani matrimonialem fidem*) are also a great gift from God."[32]

It is 5,7 that contains this work's use of 1 Peter 3:7. In this case, it follows references to 1 Cor 7:35 and 7:8 and is sandwiched between two citations of 1 Cor 7:38, 7:40 and 7:34. Its being placed precisely here is clearly intentional. Not only is the entire paragraph

[29] If in fact Augustine was aware of Jerome's dependence on Tertullian for the content of the *Adu. Iou.*, then it is at least possible that the disparaging remarks regarding Tertullian here are also implicit critiques of Jerome, his technique, and his position. For an older study which clearly outlines the links between Tertullian and Jerome's *Adu. Iou.*, see F. Schultzen, "Die Benutzung der Schriften Tertullians *de monogamia* und *de ieiunio* bei Hieronymus *adu. Iouinianum*," *Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* 3 (1894): 485-502. For a much more recent study which links Tertullian's *De ieiunio* and Jerome's very important *e.*22, see N. Adkin, "Tertullian's '*De ieiunio*' and Jerome's '*Libellus de uirginitate seruanda*' (epist.22)," *Wiener Studien* 104 (1991): 149-160, esp. 149 and its nn. Still more recently, see *passim* in the two aforementioned works of P. Laurence (*Jérôme et le nouveau modèle féminin*) and Y.-M. Duval (*L'affaire Jovinien*).

[30] Note the comment that concludes 1,2 and that comes directly on the heels of a citation of Rom 12:3: "All I must do to teach you, therefore, the words of that Doctor [i.e., Paul] and offer any comment the Lord inspires concerning them." 2,3 then opens with a reference to 1 Cor 7:8.

[31] Augustine cites 1 Cor 7:6-7 as follows: "Hoc autem dico secundum ueniam, non secundum imperium. Volo autem omnes homines esse sicut me ipsum: sed unusquisque proprium donum habet a Deo, alius sic, alius quidem sic."

[32] Although the sentiment quoted here should probably not be regarded as an allusion to Wis 8:21 (there are only one or two vocabulary parallels), it certainly does reflect the spirit of that v. (cf. n.26 *supra*). For the Latin of the portions of 3,5 and 4,5 cited here, see CSEL 41, p.308.

meant to be an indirect refutation of the logic of those, e.g. Jerome, who practically condemned marriage by claiming that it was "bad" in comparison to the "good" of chaste widowhood and the "better" of virginity,[33] the mustering of a quotation by Peter is again intended to add extra apostolic authority of the opinion Augustine wished to defend. In this sense, he was beating Jerome at his own game.[34] Augustine writes:

> What is more honorable is certainly honorable. [Paul] openly declared that this was better than that other good thing, when he said, "Anyone who has his daughter married does well; and anyone who does not have his daughter married does better" (1 Cor 7:38); and that this was more blessed than that other thing that is blessed, when he said, "She will be more blessed if she remains as she is" (1 Cor 7:40). It is not possible to think something is dishonorable, when the apostle Peter says this about it: "Husbands, honor your wives as more fragile vessels, subject to your guidance but along with you heirs of grace" (1 Peter 3:7). And addressing those women he exhorts them to be subject to their husbands after the example of Sarah ... (1 Peter 3:5-6 *in toto* follows)[35]

Although he offers no further comment, the Bishop of Hippo clearly wanted to draw attention to Peter's command that husbands were to "give honor (*tribuite honorem*)" to their wives. In Augustine's mind, it was impossible that such a thing would have been written had Peter regarded the having of a wife as intrinsically evil. In Augustine's mind, Peter's marriage is anything but "sordes."[36] Also notable is the fact that Augustine says nothing, either explicitly or

[33] For example, following a citation of 1 Cor 7:35, Augustine comments, "[just] because [Paul] called the excellence of the unmarried state honorable, it does not follow that we should think the marriage bond to be dishonorable." Although Jerome repeatedly claims to be pro-marriage (cf., e.g., *Adu. Iou.* I,3), his tortured, if rhetorically-driven, logic regarding the relationship of other states to virginity are made abundantly clear. See, e.g., *Adu. Iou.* I,7.

[34] As we saw *supra*, Jerome himself used this exact same rhetorical device to support a decidedly different view in *Adu. Iou.*

[35] For this English trans., see *WSA* I,9, p.116; for the Latin, CSEL 41, p.311.

[36] On this label, cf. p.5 and n.14 *supra*. However, conspicuous by its absence is any reference to 1 Cor 9:5, a text which finds Paul waxing eloquent about his "right (*licentiam/potestatem*)" to take along a believing wife on his missionary endeavors, just as he claims the other apostles, Peter, and the Lord's brothers did or were doing. This text is known to have generated many problems for many of the early church's more ascetically minded scribes and commentators. For one of Jerome's longest discussions about this v. as well as an interesting note regarding the history of its exegesis, see p.375 and n.3 (left-hand column) of Freemantle's NPNF trans. (cf. n.15 *supra*) as well as Paragraph 10 of his *e.* 22.

implicitly, about the remainder of the verse: not only does he refrain from comment regarding the "subjection" or "weakness" that the verse attributes to women, but, in this instance, he also stops short of including the verse's final negative result clause, viz., "and see that your prayers are not hindered (*et uidete ne inpediantur orationes uestrae*)."

V,38 of the *Contra Iulianum* closes with a citation of 1 Thessalonians 4:4-5. According to Augustine, this text reads "that each one of you knows how to possess his own vessel not in the disease of desire, like the pagans who do not know God."[37] The Bishop's citation of this text serves as the culmination of a broader accusation that Julian has refused "to understand the words of the apostle." The actual debate about the meaning of these Pauline verses is then discussed at length in V,40: according to Augustine, Julian did not see these verses as applicable to marriage, rather, in his view, they provided us with a warning against fornication. The Bishop of Hippo, on the other hand, thought it better to see them as applicable to marriage and, hence, as further support for his view that even married couples should strive to limit the frequency of their copulation so as to limit their slavery to the evil of sexual concupiscence. Not surprisingly, Augustine's dismissal of Julian's exegesis is highly rhetorical:

> [By taking these verses this way] you removed from marital intercourse all the goodness of self-control so that no one thinks that he possesses his vessel in the disease of desire, regardless of the amount of desire with which he goes wild in the sexual organs of his wife! … You could have said that the apostle was speaking of that disease of desire without incorrectly denying that he referred to a man's wife as "his own vessel." The apostle Peter also uses this expression in the same context when he admonishes husbands to honor their wives as more fragile vessels and as coheirs of grace. He goes on to say, "And see that you do not allow your prayers to be hindered" (1 Pet 3:7). In the same way, his fellow apostle (*coapostolus*) prescribes times of prayer for the self-control of married couples and permits them by way of concession (cf. 1 Cor 7:5-6), though only with one's spouse, to have intercourse with the intention of having not a child, but pleasure."[38]

Here, Augustine's use of 1 Peter 3:7 serves two distinct purposes. First, and most directly, he calls upon the fact that Paul in 1 Thess 4 and Peter in 1 Peter 3 both use forms of the word "vessel

[37] *WSA* I,24, p.458; cf. PL 44, col. 807: "ut sciat unusquisque uestrum suum uas possidere, non in morbo desiderii, sicut gentes, quae ignorant Deum."

[38] See *ibid.*, p.459; for the Latin, *ibid.*

(*uas/uasum*)" to support his more primary contention that 1 Thess 4 instructs us in the proper way of conducting marital relations. Augustine seems to have assumed that this was an opportunity to apply the exegetical principle of allowing the clear portions of the Bible to illuminate and clarify the more obscure.[39] Because it is clear that Peter was using "vessel" to refer to a wife, Paul, so the reasoning would go, must have been doing the same thing. Second, in these lines Augustine again claims that Peter and Paul shared the same view of marriage. This time, however, his claim is far more overt: he introduces the term "fellow apostle (*coapostolus*)" in order to underline Peter's and Paul's equal level of authority and, of course, to increase the authority of his own statements.[40] The warrant for this is provided by linking the final exhortatory warning of 1 Peter 3:7 with an allusion to 1 Cor 7, specifically to 7:5-6. Curiously absent is any explanation of why Peter's exhortation to not allow prayers to be hindered should be seen as a possible danger of overindulgence in sexual activity. That Paul desired married couples to abstain from sexual relations for brief periods and to dedicate these times to prayer is made explicit in 1 Cor 7:5. However, and as was noted in the section on Jerome *supra*, 1 Peter 3 contains no overt reference to (marital) sexual relations whatsoever.

Summary and Conclusion

In spite of the similarities, many of which are undoubtedly due to their being virtual contemporaries, this survey has made the differences between Jerome's and Augustine's views on 1 Peter 3:7 plain. It is true that no reader, especially one from the 21st-century, could accuse either of these fathers of advocating sexual license. Both clearly considered it dangerous to exaggerate one's exposure to sexual desire or to pursue sexual relations with abandon. This, in turn, drove both – albeit for different reasons – to be ardent champions of sexual self-control, even when the subject under discussion was married sexual activity. Both also employed the same rhetorical devices to make their point. Most prominent here is how both repeatedly set Pauline and Petrine statements side by side as a means of implicitly

[39] For his discussion of this particular exegetical principle, see *doc Chr.* II,9,14 and III,15,23.

[40] Interestingly, this *termus technicus*, in various forms, is used 26x by Augustine. It is not restricted to the combination of Peter and Paul. Jerome, on the other hand, never employs it.

claiming the correctness of their views: how could they be wrong if they were teaching precisely what two of the most important apostles had taught?

On the other hand, given their differences in personality and position, to say nothing about the fact that Augustine can occasionally be shown to be attempting a "correction" of some of Jerome's more extreme positions, their respective exegesis also contains several significant differences.

First, the fact that Jerome only references to 1 Peter 3:7's statement on prayer were in polemical contexts should not go overlooked. He obviously knew and was using 1 Peter by the mid-380's. Yet, he only linked it specifically with sexual activity when he penned the *Adu. Iou.* Second, and although he does not offer any explicit support for the idea in the passages examined here, Jerome seems to have assumed that sexual relations always defile the participants, at least temporarily.[41] Jerome apparently believed that even married sexual activity disbars one from (immediate) access to the Eucharist and, to use Peter's phrase, "hinders" one's prayers. Third, he also claims that when a man engages in sexual activity, even with his lawful wife, he dishonors her. Taken together, these three considerations allowed him to assert that Peter's primary motivation for writing 1 Peter 3:7 was to discourage both the sordid bonds of marriage as well as any and all sexual activity, just as it was also Paul's primary motivation for penning 1 Cor 7. Conspicuous by its absence from this exegesis, especially as far as 1 Cor 7 is concerned, is any sensitivity to the New Testament's eschatological sub-currents. Far from seeing Paul's points regarding marriage in relation to the fact that "the time is short" (cf. 1 Cor 7:29), Jerome prefers to see them as intrinsically problematic. In Jerome's view, Christians, if it is at all possible, should avoid marriage just as they should avoid all non-Platonic contact with members of the opposite sex.

Augustine is both more balanced and more realistic. His reading of 1 Peter 3 leads him to the conclusion that it was not Peter's real intent there to discourage marriage. On the contrary, in Augustine's mind, Peter's words make it impossible to regard marriage as dishonorable. Just like Paul in 1 Cor 7, Peter's actual intent was to commend a certain type of marriage, namely one in which both partners strive together to see that the physical aspect of their relationship achieves and maintains its proper place. The Bishop of Hippo clearly prefers

[41] Cf. n. 28 *supra* where a list of Old Testament texts which could have been used to support such an agenda is given.

celibacy, just as he clearly intends to exhort all his readers, even the married, to ever-increasing chastity. At the same time, he is also clearly cognizant of the fact that this goal is usually only pursued by a small minority of the most mature Christians. More importantly, in these passages, he never speaks in negative terms about Peter's own marriage just as he never portrays Peter as regretting having taken a wife. In a word, Augustine wanted all those under his care and influence to know the freedom and peace of not being bound by their sexual drives or their marriage beds, as he himself had once been. Unlike Jerome, he always stopped short of outright condemnation.

Is it likely that 21st-century Christians will find Augustine's views on women, married sexuality and inter-gender relationships thoroughly appealing? Probably not. As Van Bavel has repeatedly made plain, however, our difficulties with Augustine or with his views on sexuality, however profound, only assume their true acuity when he is seen as a man of his time and when his thoughts are properly contextualized.

Jonathan YATES

ST. AUGUSTINE ON THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST AND TEMPTATION

In the Aquinas Lecture for 1999 Marilyn McCord Adams addressed the question of what sort of human nature the Word of God assumed in the incarnation according to various medieval thinkers. Given the Chalcedonian definition, one might suppose that there would not be much difference among the views of subsequent orthodox Christian thinkers.[1] She, however, examined the understanding of Christ's human nature in six theologians of the Middle Ages, namely, Anselm, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, and Martin Luther, and showed that their conceptions of the human nature of Christ differed considerably and in interesting ways that had a significant impact on how they understood the role of Christ. This study will take Augustine of Hippo as example of another thinker with an interestingly different conception of the human nature assumed by Christ. Or, more precisely, this study will examine two aspects of Augustine's view of Christ's human nature which, I believe, have interesting implications for our understanding of Christ's role in our redemption and salvation and as a model for our imitation, especially in enduring temptation.

No one who accepts the Gospels can deny that Christ was tempted. His fast for forty days and subsequent temptation by the devil are presented in all three of the synoptic Gospels, and Augustine clearly recognized this and held that Christ's temptations were meant to teach us how we are to respond to temptation. He said, for example, in a homily on the Gospel of John that "he was tempted, but not in danger, in order that he might teach you who are in danger how to reply to the tempter and how not to follow the tempter, but to escape from the danger of temptation."[2] But he also claimed that Christ would not have been tempted if he had not willed to be. "For," Augustine says, "he also deigned to be tempted by the devil, by whom he, of course, would not have been tempted if he did not will to be, just as, if he did not will to, he would not have suffered, and he replied to the devil what you ought to reply to him

[1] Marilyn McCord Adams, *What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology*. The Aquinas Lecture, 1999 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999). Adams briefly mentions Augustine's interpretation of the words of Psalm 21, which drew my attention to the topic of this paper.

[2] "Et ille quidem tentatus est, sed non periclitatus; ut doceret te in tentatione periclitantem tentatori respondere, et post tentatorem non ire, sed de periculo tentationis exire" (*In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 52, 3: CCL 36, 447).

in temptations."[3] Augustine sees the triple temptation of Christ by the devil as exemplifying every sort of temptation that a human being can face. Speaking of the triple sin of 1 John, Augustine says, "These are three, and you find nothing by which human cupidity can be tempted except the desire of the flesh or the desire of the eyes or the ambition of the world. Through these three the Lord was tempted by the devil."[4] Similarly, in a homily on Psalm 30, Augustine interprets the Psalmist's words, "You will lead me out of the snare they have hidden for me," as referring to the suffering of Christ and to the snare which the devil lays for every human being. Of that snare he says that the devil "put in the snare error and terror: error by which he entices, terror by which he breaks and snatches. Close the door of cupidity against error; close the door of fear against terror, and you will be led out of the snare. Your commander, who deigned even to be tempted on your account, revealed in himself an example of such a fight."[5] Clearly Augustine thought that Christ's temptations by the devil were meant to be a lesson for Christians in facing and overcoming temptation.

There are, however, in Augustine limitations on the extent to which Christ was tempted. For example, the bishop of Hippo never directly cited Heb 4:15, which says, "For we do not have a high priest who cannot sympathize with our weaknesses, but one tempted in everything like us, but without sin. With confidence, therefore, let us approach the throne of grace in order that we may obtain mercy and find grace in timely help." The author of the Letter to the Hebrews urges us to approach with confidence the throne of grace in order to obtain mercy and to find grace in opportune help, precisely because we have a high priest who can show compassion toward our weaknesses and who was tempted in all things like us, but was without sin. Augustine, however, alludes to it this passage only five times, always while quoting Ambrose of Milan as an authority against the Pelagians in order to show that Ambrose held the doctrine of original

[3] "Nam et tentari dignatus est a diabolo, a quo utique si nollet non tentaretur, quemadmodum si nollet non pateretur: et ea respondit diabolo, quae tu in tentationibus debeas respondere. (Ibid.)

[4] "Tria sunt ista, et nihil invenis unde tentetur cupiditas humana, nisi aut desiderio carnis, aut desiderio oculorum, aut ambitione saeculi. Per ista tria tentatus est Dominus a diabolo" (*In Johannis epistulam* 2, 14: P L 35, 1996).

[5] "Posuit in muscipula errorem et terrorem: errorem quo illiciat, terrorem quo frangat, et rapiat. Tu claude januam cupiditatis contra errorem; tu claude januam timoris contra terrorem, et educeris de muscipula. Hujusmodi pugnae exemplum ipse tibi Imperator tuus, qui propter te etiam tentari dignatus est, in se demonstravit" (*Enarrationes in Psalmos* XXX, Enarratio 2, Sermo 1, 10: CCL 38, 198).

sin.[6] Each time he quotes the late bishop of Milan's words from his no longer extant commentary on Isaiah. Ambrose had said: "And so as a man, he was tempted in all things, and in the likeness of human beings he endured all things, but as one born of the Spirit, he held back from sin. For 'every human being is a liar' (Ps 115:2), and no one is without sin except the one God. It remained true, then, that from a man and a woman, that is, through that union of bodies, no one is found to be free of sin. But he who is free of sin is also free from this sort of conception."[7] The allusion to Heb 4:15, while clear enough and noted by the editors of PL, is hardly the focal point of the quotation.

When, moreover, Augustine looks at certain specific instances in which Christ was, it would seem, tempted, he virtually removes him from any exposure to temptation. In the body of this paper I will look at two instances of this procedure, which throw interesting light upon the sort of human nature that Christ assumed and, I believe, raise some questions about whether the bishop of Hippo accepted in its literal sense the claim that our high priest was tempted like us in all things, while remaining without sin.

I. The Temptation to Despair in the Face of Death

In speaking of the fear of death, Karl Rahner said that a Christian needs not face death like a Stoic or like Socrates, but may "imitate Jesus in the Garden of Olives or pray as he did on the cross, 'God, my God, why have you abandoned me?' and then add, 'Into your hands I commend my spirit, O absolutely incomprehensible God.'"[8] That is, in the face of death a Christian might acknowledge a desperate fear and yet also confidently entrust himself to the hands of

[6] Augustine quotes Ambrose's *Expositio in Isaiam prophetam*, a work that is no longer extant, in *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* II, 41, 47, in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I, 35, 40, and II, 5, 15, in *Contra Julianum* I, 4, 11, and in *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* IV, 106, 3.

[7] "Item idem ipse cum exponeret Isaiam prophetam loquens de Christo: 'Ideo,' inquit, 'et quasi homo per universa tentatus est, et in similitudine hominum cuncta sustinuit: sed quasi de Spiritu natus abstinuit a peccato. *Omnis enim homo mendax* (Ps 115:2); et nemo sine peccato, nisi unus Deus. Servatum est igitur, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti. Qui autem expers est delicti, expers est etiam hujusmodi conceptionis" (*De peccato originali* II, 41, 47: PL 41, 410).

[8] Karl Rahner, *Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965-1982*, ed. Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons, tr. Harvey Egan (New York: Crossroad, 1986), pp. 209-10.

God, as Christ did in confronting his death. But if Christ on the cross is to be a model for Christians in the face of death, Christ had to say those words from Psalm 21 as an expression of his own fear and feeling of abandonment in the face of death. Augustine, however, claims that Christ's words on the cross, "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" (Mt 27:46) did not express Christ's own personal fear and feeling of abandonment by God. Rather, he claims that Christ spoke those words in the person of his body, the Church. In both his *Enarrationes in Psalmos* and *De gratia Novi Testamenti*, which are the only two of his writings in which he comments extensively on the Psalm, Augustine places Christ's expression of abandonment in the mouth of the Church.

In the *Enarrationes in Psalmos* he asks, "What did the Lord intend to say? After all, God had not abandoned him since he himself was God. Certainly, the Son of God is God; certainly, the Word of God is God."[9] In confirmation that he is God, Augustine appeals to the words of John's Prologue and says, "And since God, the Word, became flesh, he hung upon the cross and said, 'My God, my God, look at me. Why have you abandoned me?'" (Ps 21:2)[10] But Augustine goes on to ask why he said this: "Why does he say this if not because we were there, if not because the Church is the body of Christ."[11] Why did he say this "if not somehow to make us attentive, saying: 'This Psalm was written about me.'"[12] Augustine seems not to think that the incarnate Word could have addressed the words of the Psalm to God the Father.

But the Psalm continues: "Far from my salvation are the words of my sins" (Ps 21:2). Augustine asks, "Which sins? For it was said of him, 'He did not commit sin, nor was deceit found in his mouth'" (1 Pt 2:22).[13] Hence, Augustine asks, "How could Christ have said, 'My sins,' except because he prays for our sins and made our sins his sins in order that he might make his righteousness our

[9] "Quid voluit dicere Dominus? Non enim dereliquerat illum Deus, cum ipse esset Deus; utique Filius Dei Deus, utique Verbum Dei Deus" (*Enarrationes in Psalmos* XXI, enarratio 2, 3: CCL 38, 123).

[10] "Et cum Verbum Deus factum esset caro, pendebat in cruce, et dicebat: Deus meus, Deus meus, respice me: quare me dereliquisti?" (Ibid.).

[11] "Quare dicitur, nisi quia nos ibi eramus, nisi quia corpus Christi Ecclesia" (Ibid.).

[12] "Utquid dixit, Deus meus, Deus meus, respice me: quare me dereliquisti? nisi quodammodo intentos nos faciens et dicens, Psalmus iste de me scriptus est?" (Ibid.).

[13] "Quorum delictorum, de quo dictum est: Qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore ejus?" (Ibid.).

righteousness."[14] Since Christ himself had no sins, he must – at least on the assumption that the whole Psalm was about him – have said, "My sins," in the person of the Church. And in the same way, he said, "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" not in his own person, since he was God and could not abandon himself, but in the person of the Church. But in that case Christ the man on the cross was not tempted by thoughts of abandonment in the face of death, as other human beings might be tempted. That is, he is not himself someone who is able to sympathize with our weaknesses because he experienced them, although he was instructing us on how we might behave.

Augustine is simply applying to the words of Christ on the cross the first rule of Tyconius, "On the Lord and his Body," which the bishop had found in the Donatist exegete's *Liber Regularum*.[15] Augustine incorporated Tyconius' seven rules in his own work on biblical interpretation, *De doctrina Christiana* III, 30, 42-56, 134.[16] He illustrates the first rule with a verse from Isaiah: "He placed a crown on me as on a bridegroom and adorned me with jewels as a wife" (Is 61:10). Augustine says, "One person, after all, is speaking.... and yet it is of course necessary to understand which of these two statements belongs to the head and which to the body, that is, to Christ and to the Church."[17] Similarly Tyconius interprets the stone hewn from the mountain in Dan 2:24 as referring initially to Christ the head, but then to his body when it fills the whole world.

In Letter 140, which is also in the *Retractationes* called a work, namely, *De gratia Novi Testamenti*,[18] Augustine uses Psalm 21 as a framework for structuring his response to the five questions posed for him by his friend and former Manichee, Honoratus,[19] for whom he had earlier written *De utilitate credendi*. The first of Hon-

[14] "Quomodo ergo dicit delictorum meorum; nisi quia pro delictis nostris ipse precatur, et delicta nostra sua delicta fecit, ut justitiam suam nostram justitiam faceret?" (Ibid.)

[15] See *The Book of Rules of Tyconius*, ed. F. C. Burkitt (Cambridge: University Press, 1894; repr. Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus, 1967).

[16] See *Augustine: De Doctrina Christiana*, ed. with an introduction, translation, and notes by R. P. H. Green, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

[17] Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana* III, 31, 44: CCL 32, 104.

[18] Augustine, *Retractationes* II, 36: CCL 57, 119-20.

[19] In *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* V, 26: PL 45, 1464, Julian seems to confirm that the Manichean Honoratus was the same person as the Honoratus with whom Augustine later corresponded.

oratus' five questions asked what the words of the Lord, "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" meant.[20] Turning to these words, Augustine says, "Hence, Christ the man and the same Christ God, by whose most merciful humanity and in whose form of a servant we ought to learn what we should scorn in this life and what we should hope for in the next, took up in his Passion... the voice of our weakness... said, 'God, my God, why have you abandoned me?' (Ps 22:2).[21] Since Honoratus had asked about the meaning of these words, Augustine begins an explanation of the whole Psalm in order to distinguish the grace of the New Testament from that of the Old.

Christ's words on the cross, Augustine explains, show that the Psalm was a prophecy about him so that we can understand "how the grace of the New Testament did not go unmentioned even at that time when it was veiled in the Old."[22] Augustine says that the Psalm says "in the person of Christ what belongs to the form of the servant in which he bore our weakness."[23] Augustine's words need to be read with care for he distinguishes the person of Christ, the form of the servant, and our weakness. He says that Christ said the words of the Psalm "in the voice of our weakness," and adds that Paul also prayed with that voice when his prayer was not heard and he was in some sense abandoned. "In the voice of this weakness of ours, which our head transferred to himself, there is said in the Psalm, 'My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?' He is, of course, abandoned in prayer insofar as he is not heard."[24]

Up to this point it is not perfectly clear whose voice it is that speaks these words. But Augustine continues, "Jesus transferred this voice to himself, namely, the voice of his body, that is, of his Church, which needs to be reformed from the old human being into the new, the voice, namely, of his human weakness, to which the goods of the Old

[20] See Augustine, *Epistula* 140, 1, 2: CSEL 44. 156.

[21] "Proinde homo Christus idemque Deus Christus, cujus misericordissima humanitate, atque in cujus forma servili discere deberemus quid in hac vita contemnendum, et quid in alia sperandum esset, in ipsa passione... suscepit vocem infirmitatis nostrae... et dixit: Deus meus, Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti?' (*Epistula* 140, 5, 14: CSEL 44, 165).

[22] "Quemadmodum gratia Testamenti Novi nec eo tempore tacebatur, quando in Vetere velabatur" (*Epistula* 140, 6, 15: CSEL 44, 166).

[23] "Dicitur enim ex persona Christi, quod ad formam servi attinet, in qua portabatur nostra infirmitas" (Ibid.).

[24] "Ex voce ergo hujus infirmitatis nostrae, quam in se transfiguravit caput nostrum, dicitur in hoc psalmo, Deus meus, Deus meus, respice in me; quare me dereliquisti? In eo quippe derelinquitur deprecans, in quo non exauditur" (Ibid.).

Testament had to be denied in order that it would learn to desire and to hope for the goods of the New."[25] Among the goods of the old human being the continuation of the present life is chief. "But these words by which the human day and the length of this life are desired are words of sins and are far from that salvation of which we do not possess the reality, but for which we do already possess the hope."[26] Augustine explains that immediately after the words, "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" the Psalm adds: "Far from my salvation are the words of my sins" (Ps 21:2). In one sense this can mean: "These are words of my sins, and they are far from that salvation of mine."[27] But the words could also be grouped in another way so that they say: "'Why have you abandoned me far from my salvation?' as if to say: 'By abandoning me, that is, by not hearing me you have become far from my salvation, that is, from the present salvation of this life,' so that the other sense is: The words of my sins, that is, these words I spoke, are words of my sins because they are the words of carnal desires."[28]

At this point Augustine makes it clear that these are the words of the Church. "Christ says these words in the person of his body, which is the Church. He says these words in the person of the weakness of sinful flesh, which he transferred to that likeness of sinful flesh, which he assumed from the Virgin."[29] Here again it is important to see the distinction Augustine makes between sinful flesh, in the weakness of which Christ said these words, and the likeness of sinful flesh, which Christ assumed from the Virgin. He continues, "He speaks these words in the person of his spouse, because he has united her to himself in some way."[30] Augustine cites Is 61:10, which he had

[25] "Hanc in se vocem transfiguravit Jesus, vocem scilicet corporis sui, hoc est Ecclesiae suae a vetere homine in novum reformandae; vocem scilicet infirmitatis suae humanae, cui deneganda fuerant bona Veteris Testamenti, ut bona Novi Testamenti optare atque sperare jam disceret" (Ibid.).

[26] "Sed haec verba, quibus humanus dies et vitae hujus prolixitas concupiscitur, verba sunt delictorum, et longe sunt ab ea salute cujus nondum rem, sed jam spem gerimus" (Ibid.).

[27] "Haec verba delictorum meorum sunt, et longe ab illa salute mea sunt" (*Epistula* 140, 6, 17: CSEL 44, 167).

[28] "Quare me dereliquisti longe a salute mea? tanquam diceret, Relinquendo me, hoc est, non me exaudiendo, longe factus es a salute mea, praesenti scilicet salute hujus vitae: ut alius sensus sit, verba delictorum meorum, id est, ista quae dixi, verba sunt delictorum meorum, quia verba sunt carnalium desideriorum" (*Epistula* 140, 6, 17: CSEL 44, 166-7).

[29] "Haec ex persona sui corporis Christus dicit, quod est Ecclesia. Haec ex persona dicit infirmitatis carnis peccati, quam transfiguravit in eam quam sumpsit ex Virgine, similitudinem carnis peccati" (*Epistula* 140, 6, 18: CSEL 44, 168).

[30] "Haec Sponsus ex persona sponsae loquitur, quia univit eam sibi quodam modo" (Ibid.).

used in *De doctrina christiana* to exemplify Tyconius' first rule, and applies them to what Paul said about Christ and the Church in Eph 5:31-32. As if his readers might balk at this interpretation, Augustine asks, "Why, then, do we disdain to hear the voice of the body from the lips of the head? The Church suffered in him when he suffered for the Church, just as he suffered in the Church when the Church suffered for him. For, just as we heard the voice of the Church suffering in Christ: 'God, my God, look,' and so on, so we also heard the voice of Christ suffering in the Church: 'Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?'"[31] Augustine uses his doctrine of the whole Christ (totus Christus), both head and body, in order to remove the cry of abandonment on the cross from the person of Christ the head and to apply it to Christ the body, that is, the Church. Thus on the cross Christ himself did not experience any thoughts of abandonment by God, but simply applied to himself the words of his body, the Church.

II. Christ and Sexual Temptation

In the fourth book of Julian of Eclanum's *Ad Florum* Augustine read quite to his surprise that Julian had accused him of reviving the heresy of the Apollinarists.[32] Augustine had a right to be surprised since he was writing his reply to Julian's *Ad Florum*, the huge *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*, at the same time that he was writing for Quodvultdeus, a deacon and the future bishop of Carthage, *De haeresibus*, in which he, of course, dealt with Apollinarism, listing it as the fifty-fifth of the eighty-eight heresies that had arisen since the coming of Christ.[33] Augustine was well informed about what Apollinaris of

[31] "Quid ergo dedignamur audire vocem corporis ex ore capitis? Ecclesia in illo patiebatur, quando pro Ecclesia patiebatur: sicut etiam in Ecclesia patiebatur ipse, quando pro illo Ecclesia patiebatur. Nam sicut audivimus Ecclesiae vocem in Christo patientis, Deus, Deus meus, respice, etc., sic etiam audivimus Christi vocem in Ecclesia patientis, Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris" (*Epistula* 140, 6, 18: CSEL 44, 169).

[32] See *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* IV, 47: PL 45, 1365. Apollinaris of Laodicea was a prominent theologian, exegete, polemicist, and man of letters in the 4th century. He broke away from the Church in 375. See Augustine, *De haeresibus* 55: CCL 46, 325; for an English translation see *Heresies* in *Arianism and Other Heresies* (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995). Or see Charles Kannengieser, "Apollinaris of Laodicea, Apollinarism,"in *The Encyclopedia of the Early Church*, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), I, 58-59.

[33] See Epistula 224, 2: CSEL 57, 452, in which Augustine explains that he is writing his answer to Julian's *Ad Florum* and writing his *Retractationes*, but will, nonetheless, begin *De haeresibus* for Quodvultdeus.

Laodicea held according to the best sources available to him, namely, the *Anacephalaiosis* attributed to Epiphanius of Salamis and the *Diversarum haeresion liber* of Philaster of Brescia.[34]

The accusation that Julian brought against Augustine of reviving the heresy of the Apollinarists initially stunned Augustine, but the ensuing debate presents a key for opening up the two quite different views of the humanity assumed by the Word according to the two bishops, especially with relation to Christ's experiencing sexual temptation. Both of them held that Christ, the Son of God, assumed a true human nature, like ours in all things save sin. But the nature that Christ assumed according to Julian and the nature that Christ assumed according to Augustine seem quite different and have quite different implications, not merely for the masculinity of Jesus, but also for his ability to function as a model, especially for male chastity. Hence, the difference between Augustine's view of the human nature of Christ and that of Julian is not merely speculatively interesting, though somewhat indelicate in the discussion of the body of the savior to which it leads. It is also practically of interest in terms of Christ's being a model of chastity, because, if Augustine is correct, then Jesus never experienced the sort of sexual arousal and temptations that other men experience and with which they have to struggle if they are to remain chaste.

In the fourth book of *Ad Florum* Julian warns his reader against the teaching of Augustine.[35] He says to Augustine, "I warn the reader, then, to be fully alert at this point, for he will see that you revive the heresy of the Apollinarists with an addition from Mani,"[36] Julian goes on to explain what Apollinaris held, namely, that he "is said to have first introduced such an incarnation of Christ that he said that he assumed from the human substance only the body, while the deity itself took the place of the soul. Christ would seem to have assumed,

[34] Epiphanius (315-403), bishop of Salamis on Cyprus, wrote a large work on heresies called *Panarion*, a "medicine chest" of antidotes for heresy. Augustine knew only the *Anacephalaiosis*, which he took to be a work of Epiphanius, though scholars now claim that the work was produced by someone else. Philaster of Brescia wrote his *Diversarum heresion liber* between 380 and 390. For Philaster's work, see CCL 9, 207-324.

[35] Julian's work is extant only in the *Opus imperfectum*, though because of the bitterness that had arisen over Augustine's having allegedly misquoted Julian in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, it seems certain that Augustine quoted the whole of the first six books of *Ad Florum*. The last two books of the work are lost, since Augustine died before responding to them.

[36] "Hic igitur ut adsit toto animo lector, admoneo: videbit enim Apollinaristarum haeresim, sed cum Manichaei per te adjectione reparari" (*Op. imp.* IV, 49: PL 45, 1365).

not a man, but the cadaver of a man."[37] This first position of Apollinaris was, Julian notes, quickly and easily refuted by the words of the Lord: "I have it in my power to lay down my soul, and I have it in my power to take it up again" (Jn 10:18). But Apollinaris "thought up something else which might give birth to this heresy of his, which lasts up to the present, and he said that there was indeed a human soul in Christ, but that he did not have any senses of the body, and he declared that he was unable to suffer any sins."[38]

Augustine appeals to the book that Epiphanius of Cyprus wrote on heresies[39] and reports what the book contained, namely, that some Apollinarists held that Christ's "body was consubstantial with the divinity," while others "denied that he assumed a human soul," and still others taught that "he did not assume flesh from created flesh, that is, of Mary, but that the Word became flesh," and still later some claimed that "he did not assume a mind."[40] Augustine insists, "I have never read, except in your book, your claim that the Apollinarists held that Christ did not have the senses of the body and was incapable of suffering, nor have I ever heard it from anyone."[41]

Nello Cipriani has in a recent study examined the character of the Apollinarism with which Julian charges Augustine and has pointed to its sources in the anti-Apollinarism of the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia.[42] Cipriani argues that Apollinaris himself

[37] "Apollinaris quippe primo talem incarnationem Christi induxisse fertur, ut diceret solum corpus de humana substantia assumptum videri, pro anima vero ipsam fuisse deitatem; Christusque non hominem, sed cadaver videretur hominis suscepisse" (Ibid.).

[38] "Excogitavit aliud unde ejus haeresis, quae perdurat hactenus, nasceretur; et dixit, animam quidem humanam in Christo fuisse, sed sensus in eo corporis non fuisse, atque impassibilem eum pronuntiavit universis exstitisse peccatis" (*Ibid.*).

[39] For the *Anacephaliosis*, see *Epiphanius I: Panarion Haeres. 1-33*, ed. K. Holl (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'she Buchhandlung, 1915), 234-237, *Epiphanius II: Panarion Haeres. 34-64*, ed. K. Holl and J. Dummer (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1980), 1-4, 211-214, and *Epiphanius III: Panarion Haeres. 65-80*, ed. K. Holl and J. Dummer (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985), or see PG 42, 853-873.

[40] "Epiphanius... dixit Apollinaristarum quosdam in Domino Jesu Christo divinitati corpus consubstantiale dixisse; alios autem negasse quod animam sumpserit; alios... contendisse non eum carnem sumpsisse de creata carne, id est, Mariae, sed Verbum carnem factum; postea vero... dixisse quod non sumpserit mentem" (*Op. imp.* IV, 49: PL 45, 1365).

[41] "Quod ergo affirmas Apollinaristas asseverasse in Christo sensus corporis non fuisse, eumque illos pronuntiasse impassibilem; nec uspiam legi, nisi in hoc libro tuo, nec aliquando ab aliquo audivi" (Ibid.). See Augustine, *De haeresibus* 55,: CCL 46, 325 and *Anacephalaiosis* III, ii, 1: PG 42: 873.

[42] See N. Cipriani, "Echi antiapollinaristici e aristotelismo nella polemica di Giuliano d'Eclano," *Augustinianum* 21 (1981): 373-389.

did not deny the senses to Christ's body, as Julian claimed that he did.

> Egli aveva semplicemente detto che i movimenti o affezioni (*pathemata*) della psiche animale e della carne, invece di essere guidati da un *nous* humano, erano guidati dal Verbo, perché questo era sufficiente a garantire la santità del Redentore. Erano stati i critici di Apollinare a dedurre dalla tesi della vivificazione della carne ad opera del Verbo, comme logica consequenza, negazione della sensibilità corporale e perfino il carattere fittizio del corpo di Christo."[43]

Cipriani also argues that it was Theodore of Mopsuestia who was the source of the Aristotelian elements that François Refoulé had pointed out in Julian's thought.[44]

The accusation that Augustine denied bodily sensibility or senses to Christ must have initially struck Augustine as outlandish, but Julian soon makes it clear what he has in mind. He claims that, according to Apollinaris and Augustine, "Christ did not avoid sins by virtue of his judgment, but that by the blessedness of a flesh, which was deprived of our senses, he could not experience the desire for sins."[45] Apollinaris, Julian claims, "deprived [Christ] of the fullness of our natural senses for fear that he would become lowered in dignity by sharing in our flesh."[46] Julian points out that the Catholic opposition to Apollinaris was fierce "because in accord with such a faith the mysteries of Christ would suffer a greater loss than the members of Christ."[47] The Catholics argued, "For, if Christ... was born a son of David... in order that he might give us an example and that we might follow in the footsteps of him who committed no sin... but did not, nonetheless, put on the characteristics of our substance in every respect, if he possessed either flesh without a soul or a human nature without the senses that nature gave us, we are shown that he could not

[43] Cipriani, "Echi antiapollinaristici," p. 383. Cipriani cites a passage from a homily of Theodore of Mopsuestia in which he uses the same line of argument against Apollinarism.

[44] See François Refoulé, "Julien d'Éclane, théologien et philosophe," *Recherche de science religieuse* 53 (1964): 42-84 and 233-247.

[45] "Non qui virtute judicii delicta vitasset; sed qui felicitate carnis a nostris sensibus sequestratae, cupiditatem vitiorum sentire nequivisset"(*Op. imp.* IV, 48: PL 45, 1366).

[46] "Ne carnis nostrae communione vilesceret, naturalium eum sensuum integritate fraudavit" (*Op. imp.* IV, 49: PL 45, 1367).

[47] "Quia apud talem fidem majus damnum mysteria Christi, quam membra perferrent" (Ibid.).

have fulfilled the role of an example and of the law."[48] Julian runs through the temptations associated with the senses of sight, smell, taste, and hearing and claims that there would have been nothing praiseworthy in Christ's self-discipline if he did not have these senses. Finally, however, he asks, "But what is the glory of chastity if he lacked virility rather than had will power, and if what he was thought to accomplish by the strength of his mind came from the weakness of his members?"[49] Not merely would Christ have lost all merit for his actions and suffering, but his teaching would have been charged with fraud if he said to human beings: "By conquering the real impulses of your nature, imitate the chastity of him whose impotence made him appear chaste."[50] Then in a somewhat surprising turn, Julian acknowledges that Apollinaris did not say all these things, but he insists that they all follow from his one claim that "Christ the man lacked those senses that are given by nature and that fall into sins, not by use, but by excess."[51]

Julian accuses Augustine of blaming "concupiscence of the flesh in accord with the statements of his teacher, Mani."[52] He continues, "You say that the concupiscence of the senses was not present in the body of Christ, either in accord with the Manichees or in accord with the Apollinarists."[53] Then in another odd twist Julian seems to concede that Augustine really was not an Apollinarist, but was a Manichee – something that is, of course, worse. At that point Julian demands the passage of scripture where Augustine "reads that Christ was naturally a eunuch."[54] He insists that Christ "did not shun the male sex, but assumed its reality, in every respect whole in his

[48] "Si enim... factus est Christus ex semine David... ut nobis daret exemplum, et sequeremur vestigia ejus, qui peccatum non fecit,... nec tamen per omnia substantiae nostrae induit proprietatem, si vel carnem sine anima, vel hominem sine sensibus, quibus nos imbuit natura, gestavit, exempli formam et legis non docetur implesse" (Ibid.).

[49] "Quae autem gloria castitatis, si virilitas magis aberat quam voluntas, et quod putabatur fieri de vigore animi, veniebat de debilitate membrorum?" (Ibid.).

[50] "Imitamini castitatem, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes, illius quem debilitas fecit pudicum videri" (*Op. imp.* IV, 50: PL 45, 1368).

[51] "Et Apollinaris omnia ista non dixerat: per illud unum quod pronuntiarat, homini Christo defuisse eos sensus, qui a natura inditi, non usu, sed excessu ad vitia labuntur; haec omnia quae a Catholicis relata sunt, praejudicio opinionis suae mutus excepit." (Ibid.).

[52] "Concupiscentiam carnis accusas, juxta praeceptoris tui dicta Manichaei" (Ibid.)

[53] "Dicis concupiscentiam sensuum in Christi corpore non fuisse, vel secundum Manichaeos, vel secundum Apollinaristas" (Ibid.).

[54] "Illud efflagito, ubi tu legeris Christum eunuchum fuisse naturaliter" (*Op. imp.* IV, 52: PL 45, 1369).

organs, whole in his body, a true human, a complete man" and that "there was in him the concupiscence of the flesh mingled with the senses of the whole body and the reality and sound condition of his members."[55] Against the docetist views of Mani and Apollinaris, by whom he means, of course, Augustine, Julian insists, "Nothing in my Lord causes me shame. I maintain the reality of the members into which he entered on account of my salvation in order that I might receive the solid support of his example."[56] The holiness of Christ was, Julian insists, due to "the goodness of his mind," not to "a defect of his flesh."[57] He proclaims that "the faith of Christians is not embarrassed to say that Christ has sexual organs, even though we conceal these in our own case as modestly as possible."[58] Christ lacked "nothing belonging to nature," and his "chastity was lofty in its constant integrity and was not aroused by the longing of desire because it was the virgin spouse of his holy mind."[59] Julian argues that, even if Christ had not assumed concupiscence of the flesh – for once using Augustine's biblical terminology – he would not have condemned it by not assuming it, just as he did not condemn marriage by choosing the higher good of chastity. He "would not have condemned the sense of the genital flesh, even if he had chosen not to have the capacity for it in his substance."[60]

Augustine, on the other hand, insists that Christ did not have sinful flesh, but only the likeness of sinful flesh and that he, therefore, did not have concupiscence of the flesh that resists the spirit.[61] He accused

[55] "Et tamen ita aversatus non est sexum virilem, ut ejus susciperet veritatem, integer per omnia viscerum, integer corporis, homo verus, vir perfectus… concupiscentiam carnis totius corporis immixtam sensibus, et veritatem ac sanitatem conditionemque membrorum fuisse in eo" (*Op. imp.* IV, 52: PL 45, 1369-70).

[56] "Nihil ergo me pudet in Domino meo: in quae propter salutem meam venit, teneo veritatem membrorum, ut exempli ejus soliditatem arcemque suscipiam" (*Op. imp.* IV, 52: PL 45, 1370).

[57] "Praedico omnem in eo sanctitatem beneficio animi, non carnis stetisse praejudicio" (*Op. imp.* IV, 54: 1371).

[58] "Non erubescit fides Christianorum, dicere Christum habuisse genitalia; cum tamen ea in nobis, quam honestissime possumus, occulamus" (Ibid.).

[59] "Castitasque ejus continua integritate celsa, nullo permota libidinis appetitu, quae virgo sanctae mentis exstiterat (*Op. imp.* IV, 57: PL 45, 1373).

[60] "Ita nec sensum carnis genitalis damnasset, si ejus possibilitatem nec in substantia sua habere voluisset" (*Op. imp.* IV, 58: PL 45, 1374).

[61] On the distinction between "sinful flesh" (caro peccati) and "the likeness of sinful flesh" (similitudo carnis peccati), which is based on Rom 8:3, see Thomas Weinandy, *In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993). Weinandy argues strongly that Christ assumed "our own sinful humanity" although "he never sinned personally, or… had an inner propensity to sin (concupiscence)…" (p. 18).

Julian of not even sparing Christ's dreams. Augustine regularly personifies "concupiscence of the flesh" in arguing against Julian and speaks of it as Julian's "darling" or "favorite." He says, "We know that Christ did, of course, sleep, and if your darling ("*suscepta*") was present in him, she at times surely deluded his sleeping senses by such dreams that it seemed to him that he was even having intercourse, and so his flesh aroused by the stimulus of this good of yours would make his genitals uselessly erect and pour forth useless seed."[62]

Again Julian argues that, even if Christ did not include in his own members "the sense of the sexual organs," he surely did not make something evil when he formed the members of the patriarchs and gave them "sex and its sense."[63] For Julian the body of the savior lacked nothing of the nature of human beings. Augustine, on the other hand, says to Julian "You blaspheme enormously when you make the flesh of Christ equal to the flesh of other human beings. You do not see that he came, not in sinful flesh, but in the likeness of sinful flesh."[64] Augustine argues that "Christ abstained from sin in such a way that he abstained from every desire for sin, not so that he resisted a desire he had, but so that the desire never existed at all. It was not that he could not have had it, if he had willed to, but he would not have rightly willed to have what sinful flesh, which he did not have, would not have forced him to have even against his will."[65]

The two bishops used a different language in referring to what one says Christ had and the other says he did not have. For Julian it is a natural sense of the body; more specifically it is the sense of the sexual organs, which for Julian includes a natural concupiscence or desire. At times he calls it simply virility.[66] Julian almost always

[62] "Dormisse quippe novimus Christum, in quo si erat ista tua suscepta, profecto sopitos ejus sensus aliquando per talia somnia deludebat, ut sibi etiam concumbere videretur, atque ita caro ejus isto tuo bono stimulante commota, et in irritum extenderet genitalia et irrita effunderet semina. (Ibid.).

[63] "Fac ergo, quoniam Christus, cum sua membra formaret, noluerit eis sensum admiscere genitalium, quo usurus non erat: num ideo cum Isaac, Jacob, et omnium membra fingebat, eisque et sexum dabat et sensum, malum aliquid faciebat? (*Op. imp.* IV, 59: PL 45, 1375).

[64] "Immaniter, Juliane, blasphemas, coaequans carnem Christi caeterorum hominum carni; nec videns illum venisse non in carne peccati, sed in similitudine carnis peccati, quod nullo modo verum esset, nisi caeterorum esset caro peccati" (*Op. imp.* IV, 60: PL 45, 1375).

[65] "Christus abstinuit a peccato, ut abstineret etiam ab omni cupiditate peccati: non ut ei existenti resisteret, sed ut illa nunquam prorsus existeret; non quod eam non posset habere si vellet, sed non recte vellet, quod eum caro peccati quam non gerebat, etiam invitum habere non cogeret (*Op. imp.* IV, 58: PL 45, 1374).

[66] See above note 49.

avoids using the words "concupiscence of the flesh," by which Paul says the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal 5:17) and which John says does not come from the Father (1 Jn 2:16). He prefers to speak of a "natural concupiscence," which he holds is not blameworthy in its genus, species, or moderate use, but only in its excess.[67] For Julian sexual desire is as natural and good as the desire for food and drink, provided, of course, it is not excessive. Without it Christ was, according to Julian, impotent, a eunuch, not a real man. As Julian sees the Augustine's position, Christ's discipline with regard to food, drink, and sex was due to a lack of human senses and their corresponding desires, not to the strength of his will. Just as he cannot serve as a model for temperance regarding food or drink, since he did not have the sense of taste and the desire for food and drink, so he cannot, in Julian's view, serve as a model of chastity, since he did not have any sensation in his sexual organs or any sexual desires. So too, for Julian his status as a teacher is undermined, since he could not know what he was talking about if he simply lacked the desires, urges, and longings of the rest of mankind.

For Augustine, on the other hand, what Christ lacked was not something natural, but a defect in human nature stemming from original sin and inclining one to sin. Christ had a human soul and a human, male body; what he lacked was "sinful flesh," the injured or damaged human nature the rest of us have inherited from Adam. He lacked the desire or longing of the flesh that rebels against the mind, but he had the full range of human senses and the male sexual organs, which he could have used if he had wanted to. What he lacked was any desire or longing that he had to fight against or resist in order to be temperate or chaste. For such a desire, which would have to be resisted, is for Augustine a sinful desire.

For Julian human nature is much closer to the sort of human nature of which Aristotle writes, namely, the specific essence as a source of activities, including natural desires. Refoulé argues that Julian derived his concept of nature along with numerous other features of his thought from the Aristotelian philosophy of the period.[68] In fact, he concludes, "Julien fut sans nul doute l'un des premiers à tenter une synthèse entre les principes de la philosophie aristotélienne et les données de la Révélation."[69] He even likens Julian to Thomas

[67] "Clarebit... concupiscentiae naturalis non genus, non speciem, non modum, sed excessum tantum in culpam venire" (*Op. imp.* IV, 25: PL 45, 1351).

[68] Though others limit the influence of Aristotle to the categories and dialectic, Refoulé points to the Aristotelian influence on Julian's concepts of justice, of the virtues, and of nature. See Refoulé, pp. 233-244.

Aquinas![70] Such an Aristotelian human nature contains only good characteristics, which for a Christian Aristotelian are God- given. For Augustine, on the other hand, "human nature," as it has existed, not as it will exist in the future life, means either that state in which Adam and Eve were created by God, a state in which there was nothing but good, or that state in which we humans are now born with the damage inherited from Adam's sin.[71] Sexual desire (*libido*) can be called natural, "because every human being is born with it,"[72] but in itself it is something evil. "It is not our nature, but a defect against which we must fight by means of virtue. For we do not conquer something good by a good, but something evil by a good"[73] For Augustine the human nature assumed by the Word is like the human nature with which Adam and Eve were created, not like the fallen human nature with which each of us is now born.[74] As Adam and Eve were not created with sinful flesh and its disorderly desires, so the human nature Christ assumed was not sinful flesh, but the likeness of sinful flesh, and had no such disorderly desires or concupiscence of the flesh.

Given Augustine's conviction rooted in the Letters of Paul and of John that concupiscence of the flesh is a disordered desire that is not merely the result of Adam's sin, but also an evil in itself, though an evil of which one can make good use within marriage, it is understandable why he denies its presence in Christ. The human Christ could not, according to Augustine, be subject to such disordered longings and desires, sexual or otherwise. Christ's sexuality was completely under the control of his will so that he experienced no rebellion of the flesh; he had no sexual desire since he did not will to. Otherwise, he would have had sinful flesh like ours rather than the

[69] Refoulé, p. 245.

[70] Refoulé, p. 44.

[71] Augustine stated such a definition of "nature" in *De libero arbitrio* III, 19, 54: CCL 29, 307: "Sic etiam ipsam naturam aliter dicimus cum proprie loquimur naturam hominis in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est, aliter istam in qua ex illius damnati poena et mortales et ignari et carni subditi nascimur, iuxta quem modum dicit Apostolus: Fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae sicut et ceteri."

[72] "Quod autem nunc agitur, naturalem esse libidinem et ego dico, quia cum illa nascitur omnis homo..." (*Contra Iulianum* V, 7, 27: PL 44, 801).

[73] "Adhuc non euigilas, ut intelligas nostram naturam non esse, sed uitium, contra quod uirtute pugnamus? Neque enim bono bonum, sed bono utique malum uincimus" (*Contra Iulianum* V, 7, 28: PL 44, 801).

[74] This is especially apparent from Augustine's claim in *De civitate Dei* XIV, 23 that, if Adam and Eve had not sinned, they would have given birth to children in paradise without any lust and that their sexual organs would have obeyed their will in the same way as our hands and feet now are moved in obedience to our will.

likeness of sinful flesh. On the other hand, Julian certainly seems to have a strong argument when he claims that the Augustinian Christ cannot be a credible teacher or model of chastity if he had none of the urges and inclinations of other males. Hence, Julian presents us with a Christ who is, in some ways, a much more attractive teacher and example of the virtues, and especially of chastity, than the Christ of Augustine. The problem is a knotty one, and the heart of the problem lies in the different concepts of nature and their implications – an issue that will surface in different forms later in the history of theology at the time of Baius and Jansenius, especially in the latter's battle against the Jesuit defenders of the so-called "pure nature."[75] But that is another story for another time. For the present let it suffice that this paper has shown that the sort of human nature that Christ assumed according to Augustine, that is, the likeness of sinful flesh, is significantly different from the sort of human nature we have, that is, sinful flesh, so that the temptations that the Augustinian Christ faced seem quite different from the temptations that the rest of the human race encounters.

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[75] See my "Augustine, Jansenius, and the State of Pure Nature," in *Augustinus in der Neuzeit*, ed. Kurt Flasch and Dominique de Courcelles (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), pp. 161-174

AUGUSTINE ON PREDESTINATION: SOME QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE REVISITED

Augustine's view of predestination is both much discussed and much debated[1]. Here it is not my intention to present a complete survey of Augustine's development and "final" position regarding predestination. This is something which systematic theologians have done repeatedly. A good example of the latter is G. Kraus' *Vorherbestimmung. Tradtionelle Prädestinationslehre im Licht gegenwärtiger Theologie* (Ökumenische Forschungen, II. Soteriologische Abteilung. V. Vorherbestimmung), Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 1977[2]. Recent works on Augustine's ideas about grace and predestination often lack any reference to Kraus' book[3]. Others, which do manage to mention it in the bibliography[4], often fail to pay appropriate attention to its nuances.

1. Presentation of Kraus' position

Kraus' presentation is, by any standard, very coherent. It is firmly grounded in a serious reading of both Augustine and the secondary literature. Kraus emphasizes that in the *De libero arbitrio* God is presented as one who does not coerce human beings[5] and that, even in the *Expositio quarumdam propostionum ex Epistula ad Romanos*, grace does not override free will[6]. Human beings receive power as a result of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It is through the Spirit that God's love is communicated to them. However, perseverance in the

[1] The literature on this topic is abundant; see, e.g., S. IODICE, *Legge e Grazia in S. Agostino*, Napels, 1977; J.P. BURNS, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1980; D. OGLIARI, *Gratia et certamen. The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the So-called Semipelagians* (BETL, 169), Leuven, 2004 (with an impressive bibliography).

[2] This is not to say that Kraus' study is above critique. Cf. *infra*.

[3] See, e.g., P.-M. HOMBERT, *Gloria gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité, 148), Paris, 1996. Also note that there is no reference to the book of Kraus in the otherwise very exhaustive bibliography in the *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*.

[4] See, e.g., J.M.J. LANGE VAN RAVENSWAAY, *Augustinus totus noster. Das Augustinverständnis bei Johannes Calvin* (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 45), Göttingen, 1990; J. LÖSSL, *Intellectus Gratiae. Die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins von Hippo* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 38), Leiden, New York & Köln, 1997.

[5] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 30.

[6] Cf. *Expositio* 60, *PL* 35, 2078.

faith is a task specifically reserved for the human will. Consequently, eternal life is received as a merit. On this level, Kraus speaks of "bedingte Prädestination die bedingt ist durch die vorausgehenden menslichen Verdienste"[7]. He also notes that, after the radical change in *Ad Simplicianum* (396-397), Augustine holds an "unbedingte Prädestination", a "Vorherbestimmung, die durch reinen Beschluss Gottes, völlig unabhänging von menschlichen Wollen und Tun, geschieht"[8]. From *Ad Simplicianum* onwards, according to Kraus, Augustine forfeited any meaningful concept of the freedom of the human will. Human merits no longer play an important role in the process of salvation and sanctification. Election is based soley upon God's plan[9]. Grace is needed in order to believe, in order to live a good life, in order to persevere. Without grace, "richtet der menschliche Wille nichts aus"[10]. This grace is irresistible, absolutely gratuitous, absolutely efficacious. Adam's fall resulted in the condemnation of all human beings. All belong to the *massa damnata*, the *massa peccati*. It is only because of God's mercy that any are elected from out of this mass[11]. Augustine did not consider this election as unjust or as the result of God's arbitrariness. It was simply something "*incomprehensibile*" (cf. Rom. 11,33)[12]. Regarding the absolute gratuity of this gift, Kraus emphasizes that Augustine surrendered the last remnants of a positive, human capability to do the good in favour of an absolutely uninhibited and absolutely prior divine activity. Although, on a formal level, the free will may be said to continue to exist, in Kraus' view, it seems to be more of a *res inanis*[13]. All is

[7] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, pp. 30-31.

[8] V.H. DRECOLL, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustinus* (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 109), Tübingen, 1999, although he was not specifically engaging Kraus' position, argued convincingly that *Ad Simplicianum* I,2 should not be seen as a "rupture" or departure from Augustine's previously developed doctrine of grace; cf. pp. 218-250; pp. 358-359.

[9] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 31, with reference to *Ad Simplicanum* I,2,6, *CCSL* 44, p. 31.

[10] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 32 (with many references to *Ad Simplicianum*).

[11] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 33, with references to *Ad Simplicianum* I,2,17, *CCSL* 44, p. 43; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 6,11, *PL* 44, 969; 8,14, 8,15, *PL* 44, 971; 20,41, *PL* 44, 989-990; *De dono perseverantiae* 8,16, *PL* 45, 1002; 8,17, *PL* 45, 1003; 9,23, *PL* 45, 1005-1006; 11,25, *PL* 45, 1007-1008; 12,28, *PL* 44, 1009-1010. V. GROSSI, *Il termine "Praedestinatio" tra il 420-435: dalla linea agostiniana dei "Salvati" a quella di "Salvati e dannati"*, in *Augustinianum* 25 (1985) 27-64 presents a much more nuanced view.

[12] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 33.

[13] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 36; references to *De dono perseverantiae* 13,33, *PL* 45, 1013; *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16,32, *PL* 44, 900-901; 17,33, *PL* 44, 901.

attributed to God: the *initium fidei*[14], the gift of perseverance[15], and the absolute gratuity of predestination[16]. Predestination is situated in God's eternal foreknowledge[17]. This is clearly demonstrated in that a small minority of children are baptized, while others, because they remain unbaptized, are eternally lost[18], just as it is also illustrated in the life and passion of Christ[19]. This predestination is infallible and irresistible; it is "unerschütterliche Sicherheit"[20]. Kraus speaks in this case of a complete determination of human beings' lives and destinies[21], of a necessity to sin[22], realised by God, and this both on the level of inclination and on the level of realisation[23]. This predestination is further characterized by its particularity. Augustine speaks of a fixed number, of a remnant of the saved in comparison to the almost numberless number of the condemned. This forces him to interpret 1 Tim. 2,4 (cf. *infra*) in such a way that the *omnes* is understood to refer only to the predestined. He pays especial attention to the *vult* (i.e. to God's will or desire)[24]. This is due to the fact that, since the fall, "bleibt dem Menschen nichts Gutes mehr, keinerlei Kraft und keinerlei Verdienst"[25]. Because of the fall and its effects (especially that of both physical and spiritual death, which, for Augustine, was a completely just judgment), salvation is only possible by God's grace through the unique redeemer and mediator, Jesus Christ. This salvation is not meant for all, but for some[26].

This predestination is a mystery: grace and free will are both subjected to God's absolute sovereignty[27]. Augustine therefore sug-

[14] See, e.g., *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, 8,16, *PL* 44, 972; 11,22, *PL* 44, 976.
[15] *De dono perseverantiae* 13,33, *PL* 45, 1012; 7,15, *PL* 45, 1002.
[16] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,15, *PL* 44, 890-891; *De dono perseverantiae* 8,20; *PL* 45, 1004; 7,14, *PL* 45, 1001; 21,54, *PL* 45, 1026-1027.
[17] Cf. *De dono perseverantiae* 21,56, *PL* 45, 1028; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 10,19, *PL* 44, 974-975.
[18] *De dono perseverantiae* 11,25, *PL* 45, 1007-1008; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 12,23, *PL* 44, 977.
[19] *De dono perseverantiae* 24,67, *PL* 45, 1033-1034.
[20] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 37; references to *De correptione et gratia* 9,20-21, *CSEL* 92; pp. 241-244; 7,14, *CSEL* 92, p. 234; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 17,34, *PL* 44; 985-986; *De dono perseverantiae* 17,41; *PL* 44, 1018-1019; 18,47, *PL* 44, 1022-1033.
[21] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 20,41, *PL* 44, 906-907; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 20,41; *PL* 44, 990.
[22] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 20,41, *PL* 44, 906; 21,42, *PL* 44, 907.
[23] With reference to *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 21,42, *PL* 44, 906.
[24] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 39 (with many references).
[25] With reference to *De dono perseverantiae* 7,13, *PL* 44, 1001.
[26] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, pp. 40-41.
[27] *De dono perseverantiae* 11,25, *PL* 44, 1007; 13,32, *PL* 44, 1012.

gests that sometimes it might be wise not to speak about it to those who cannot understand it[28].

In his conclusion, Kraus first sums up the positive elements of Augustine's thinking on predestination. It is a valuable critique of human pride, contributes to the growth of humility, gives all the praise and honour to God, and leads to a rediscovery of the biblical emphasis on grace. On the negative side, Kraus notes elements such as the loss of the freedom of the will, the *necessitas peccandi,* an excessive emphasis on the irresistable grace, the complete passivity of human beings, the particularity of salvation and the incorrect reading and application of Paul. According to Kraus, in this, Augustine seems to have left the realm of exegesis and has begun to treat Scripture as mere fodder for speculation[29].

Space does not permit further detailed interaction with Kraus' view. However, in what follows, I intend to illustrate that the reality of a certain ambivalence in Augustine must be taken in to account if we are to do justice to all the nuances of the bishop of Hippo's thinking. In other words, I will try to show that a merely systematic approach tends to simplify the otherwise complex "Augustinian system".

2. Preliminary remarks

In opposition to what is often said[30], the doctrine of predestination as such did not play an important role in Augustine's anti-Pelagian oeuvre. Note, for example, the following *loci* where Augustine uses the term.

In *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II,26[31], Augustine discusses the question of why no human being lives sinlessly. Simply put, this is because they do not genuinely desire to[32]. Indeed, they do not want to do what is right, either because they do not know what it is or because they do not find it attractive[33]. The vices of ignorance

[28] *Ibidem.*

[29] KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, pp. 44ff.

[30] See KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 27; G. NYGREN, *Das Prädestinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins* (StTL, 12) Lund & Göttingen, 1956, pp. 8f.

[31] *CSEL* 60, pp. 98-99.

[32] *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II,26, *CSEL* 60, p. 98: "Quia homines nolunt."

[33] *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II,26, *CSEL* 60, p. 98: "Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est, sive quia latet an iustum sit sive quia non delectat."

and weakness are invoked in order to explain why human beings do not will what they should will. However, with the help of God's grace, people become able to do what they should do. Augustine adds: if they do not want to do it, it is their fault, not God's, for "they were predestined either to be damned because of their sinful pride or to have that same pride judged and corrected, if they are children of mercy"[34]. Here, it would seem that predestination to condemnation is based upon a person's own sinful pride, not upon any predetermined judgment made in eternity past.

In *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II,47[35], Augustine underlines the fact that through Adam sin entered the world and through it death and that death was passed on to all human beings (Rom. 5,12). As a consequence, human beings, as long as they are subject to carnal generation and live in this corruptible world, cannot be called absolutely sinless, apart from Christ, who reconciles Creator and creation through the forgiveness of sins. Christ will never deny his grace to those he predestined *per certissimam praescientiam et iustissimam beneficentiam* for eternal life[36]. Here, it is evident that predestination is related to foreknowledge and the underserved kindness of the Saviour. One can not speak here of an "unbedingte Prädestination"[37].

The link foreknowledge-predestination is also present in *De spiritu et littera* 5,7[38]. To live a good life is a gift of God. This is true not only because God gave human beings a free will, without which no one lives either a good or a bad life – a position Augustine never abandoned: if there is no free will, there can be no meaningful talk of ethics. We know that God gave us a genuinely free will both because he gave the law to us in order to show us how to live and because he has poured out his love into the hearts of those (Rom. 5,5) he foreknew through the Holy Spirit in order that he might predestine them[39]. He

[34] *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II,26, *CSEL* 60, p. 99: "Qua (grace) ut non adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo, sive damnandi praedestinati sunt propter iniquitatem superbiae sive contra ipsam suam superbiam iudicandi et erudiendi, si filii sunt misericordiae."

[35] *CSEL* 60, pp. 117-118.

[36] *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II,47, *CSEL* 60, p. 118: "Idem ipse dominus noster hanc suam medellam nullis generis humani temporibus ante ultimum futurum adhuc iudicium denegavit eis, quos per certissimam praescientiam et iustissimam beneficentiam secum regnaturos in vitam praedestinavit aeternam."

[37] Also in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I,32, *CSEL* 60, p. 3 and II,43, *CSEL* 60, p. 114 the word "praedestinati" is used, but again, there is no further development of the idea.

[38] *CSEL* 60, p. 159.

[39] A.-M. La Bonnardière, *Le verset paulinien Rom. V,5 dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin*, in *Augustinus Magister II*, Paris, 1954, pp. 657-665.

predestined them in order that he might call them; he called them in order that he might justify them, and he justified them in order that he might glorify them (Rom. 8,28ff.)[40].

A nearly-identical use of Rom. 8,28ff. also occurs in *De spiritu et littera* 24,40[41] and in *De natura et gratia* 5,5[42]. In the latter text, Augustine stresses that salvation comes through Christ alone and not on the basis of our merits. Therefore, one can only thank God for his mercy since he sets free only those he wants to set free. Indeed, in his justice, he could have condemned all. Predestination is also linked to foreknowledge in this passage, but, at least here, Augustine offers little commentary on how the two go together[43]. When Augustine mentions that people are predestined *ad interitum*, the context makes clear that this happens on the basis of God's foreknowledge[44].

In *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,22[45], Augustine is paraphrasing Rom. 8,28ff. in order to challenge Julian's position that the good will or intention can be present in human beings *sine adiutorio Dei* and that human beings are therefore worthy of God's grace. When Augustine states that those who have been elected, have been elected *ante constitutionem mundi*, this is illustrated with the story of Jacob and Esaü (Rom. 9,11-13), is exegetically based on the *multi vocati, pauci electi* idea of Mt. 20,16 and, in so far as the *propositum* is concerned, is supported by a reference to 2 Tim. 1,8-10[46].

[40] *De spiritu et littera* 5,7, *CSEL* 60, p. 159: "Quia per Spiritum sanctum diffundit caritatem in cordibus eorum quos praescivit ut praedestinaret, praedestinavit ut vocaret, vocavit ut iustificaret, iustificavit ut glorificaret."

[41] *CSEL* 60, pp. 193-194.

[42] *CSEL* 60, p. 236.

[43] Similar interpretations can be found in *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 15,35, *CSEL* 42, p. 36; 20,43, *CSEL* 42, p. 46; *De gestis Pelagii* 3,7, *CSEL* 42, pp. 58-59 (in this case, those who will not be saved, are so, because they "se idoneos ad se ipsos regendos putant et praefidenti cervice propriae voluntatis illum dedignatur habere rectorem." Both *De gestis Pelagii* 17,41, *CSEL* 42, p. 97 and 35,64, *CSEL* 42, p. 119 are discussing the correct meaning of a statement of Pelagius, but do not contribute to a better understanding of Augustine's own reflections on predestination.

[44] *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 13,31, *CSEL* 42, p. 32: "In eo genere hominum, quod praedestinatum est ad interitum. Super hos enim respexit Dei praescientia protulitque sententiam."

[45] *CSEL* 60, pp. 483-484.

[46] Cf. A. ZUMKELLER, *"Propositum" in seinem spezifisch christlichen und theologischen Verständnis bei Augustinus*, in *Homo spiritalis. Festgabe für L. Verheijen zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*. Herausgegeben von C. MAYER, unter Mitwirkung von K.H. CHELIUS (*Cassiciacum*, 38), Würzburg, 1987, 295-310; for an excellent study on this topic as such, see T.G. RING, *"Electio" in der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, in A. ZUMKELLER & A. KRUEMMEL (eds.), *Traditio Augustiniana. Studien über Augustinus und seine Rezeption. Festgabe für Willigis Eckermann OSA zum 60. Geburtstag* (Cassiciacum, 46), Würzburg, 1994, pp. 39-79.

The same imprecision vis-à-vis the doctrine of predestination is, with one exception, also present in *Contra Iulianum*: only those who have received the spirit of God and who know what they have received from God, belong to the number of the predestined[47].

The aforementioned exception is found in *Contra Iulianum* V,14[48]. Commenting on a reference Julian makes to Rom. 2,4, Augustine agrees that God's goodness leads to repentance, but, he adds, God does so only for those he predestined. Through his patience he allows room for repentance, since he does not want anyone to perish. Those who are elected, are called according to his plan. Quoting a series of Scriptural texts, Augustine concludes that these people are chosen *electionem gratiae*[49]. Those, who are elected and predestined, even those *qui pessimam duxerunt vitam*, will not die, for God shows them and their brothers the depth of the evil from which grace alone can set them free through the one mediator, Christ. Then, Augustine adds, those who are not elected, are born *ad utilitatem* of the elect, for God does not create anyone either without purpose or by chance, just as is he not ignorant of the good he will produce from them[50]. He immediately adds that these people because of the hardness of their unrepentant hearts, store up for themselves anger for the day of wrath, the day upon which all are repaid according to their works. Augustine also stresses the importance of prayer: we pray in order to be saved, in order to invoke God's mercy. Finally, he states that God does not make our wills evil, but he makes use of them precisely as he wills[51]. These nuances make clear that one cannot derive a "pure predestination"-line from this passage.

In his final and most extensive work against the Pelagians, the *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*, there is only one reference to predestination[52].

Often, 1 Tim. 2,4: "Deus omnes homines vult salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire", is invoked by both Julian and modern commentators as an argument against Augustine's predestination doctrine[53].

[47] *Contra Iulianum* IV,16, *PL* 44, 745.

[48] *PL* 44, 791-792.

[49] Quoted are 2 Petr. 3,9; 2 Tim. 2,19; Rom. 8,28-30; Mt. 22,14; 2 Tim. 1,8-9; Eph. 1,4; Rom. 4,17; see *Contra Iulianum* V,14, *PL* 44, 791-792.

[50] *Contra Iulianum* V,14, *PL* 792.

[51] *Contra Iulianum* V,15, *PL* 44, 793: "Qui non facit voluntates malas, sed utitur eis ut voluerit, cum aliquid inique velle non possit."

[52] *Opus imperfectum* I,94, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 109.

[53] HOMBERT, *Gloriae gratiae*, p. 315 speaks about Augustine's exegesis of this passage as "ne peut satisfaire". With regard to Augustine's position about this text, see A. SAGE, *La volonté salvifique universelle de Dieu dans la pensée de saint Augustin*, in *Recherches augustiniennes* 3 (1965) 107-131.

In the Pelagian controversy, Augustine himself seldom discussed this text. In fact, he employed it only three times in all of his writings against the Pelagians: *De spiritu et littera* 33,57-58, *De gestis Pelagii* 24,48 and *Contra Iulianum* IV,42.44.

In *De spiritu et littera* 33,57-58[54], the question of whether the will by which we believe is itself a gift of God or the result of the free will's own activity is discussed. If one denies the first position, how can he answer the Paul of 1 Cor. 4,7: "Quid enim habes quod non accepisti? Si autem et accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis". On the other hand, Augustine is well aware that 1 Cor. 4,7 causes problems *in se*. An interpretation in which one could boast because one has received the *voluntas credendi* thanks to God's grace, gives unbelievers and sinners an excuse for their profligate state. They do not believe because God did not give them the grace that they required (cf. Rom. 9-11)[55]. Augustine contends that both grace and free will are involved[56]. At the same time, if we believe because of something inherent in our own nature, why does not everybody receive this grace, since God is the creator of all human beings? On the other hand, if our belief is a gift of God, why is it not given to all since in 1 Tim. 2,4 we read that God wills that all human beings be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth? Augustine stresses that the free will is given to the rational soul as part of its nature, but this gift is a *media vis*, which is able to turn either to faith or to unbelief. However, Augustine continues, this kind of free will is not the will by which one believes. Only the one who is *vocante Deo* ever truly desires to believe[57]. Augustine explains 1 Tim. 2,4 by noting that God wants all human beings to be saved and come to the knowledge of truth, but not so that God deprives them of free choice: on the contrary, all will be judged

[54] *CSEL* 60, pp. 215-217.

[55] *De spiritu et littera* 33,57, *CSEL* 60, pp. 215-216: "Respondere possimus: ecce habemus voluntatem credendi, quam non accepimus, ecce ubi gloriamur, quod non acceperimus, si autem dixerimus etiam huiusmodi voluntatem non esse nisi donum Dei, rursus metuendum est, ne infideles atque impii non immerito se veluti iuste excusare videantur ideo non credidisse, quod dare illis Deus istam noluit voluntatem."

[56] On this point, *De spiritu et littera* 33,57, *CSEL* 60, p. 216 is very clear: "Sed credimus, ut inpetremus hanc gratiam, si utique voluntate credimus."

[57] *De spiritu et littera* 33,58, *CSEL* 60, p. 216: "Quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter adtributum a creatore animae rationali illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest et ideo nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest homo habere quam non acceperit, quando quidem vocante Deo surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum crearetur accepit."

according to their good or bad use of it[58]. According to Augustine, this does not mean that the will of God is defeated: people act against God's will and for that reason they deprive themselves of the great and supreme good of salvation. This proves that they hold God's mercy in contempt[59]. It will be clear, that in this case Augustine's interpretation of 1 Tim. 2,4 is an "open" one and that it does not offer arguments that support a rigid doctrine of predestination.

In *De gestis Pelagii* 24,48[60], 1 Tim. 2,4 is quoted as part of an excerpt taken from a letter of James and Timasius that has been integrated in Augustine's work. There, Augustine offers no detailed comments regarding 1 Tim. 2:4.

More substantial is the reference to 1 Tim 2,4 in *Contra Iulianum* IV,42.44. Julian refers to this verse in a context in which he criticizes Augustine's view of grace. According to Julian, Augustine's view of grace necessitates that people are made good necessarily[61]. Augustine does not expect any effort from the human will and, therefore, seems to hold a position which contradicts Mt. 7,7-8: "Ask and you will receive; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened for you. For everyone who asks receives; everyone who seeks finds; and the door will be opened for everyone who knocks"[62].

In Julian's view, God, who wants that all human beings be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, will open the door for those who knock[63]. In his response, Augustine again brings up the question of the children. Obviously, some are baptised without willing it. Those who are baptised are saved. Others are not baptised and, hence, will not be saved. Why? Augustine does not know the answer, but makes it clear that the following three elements are essential to him: all who are saved, are saved through Christ; God is good and just; God is almighty. Because of the first point, the *all* in 1 Tim. 2,4 must be interpreted as referring to all who are justified in Christ, the only mediator between God and human beings (cf. 1 Tim. 2,5). The central position of Christ as Saviour compels Augustine to accept a

[58] *De spiritu et littera* 33,58, *CSEL* 60, p. 216: "Vult autem Deus omnes homines fieri et in agnitionem veritatis venire, non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes iustissime iudicentur."

[59] *Ibidem.*

[60] *CSEL* 60, p. 102.

[61] *Ad Turbantium* frg. 121, *CCSL* 88, p. 121: "Dicis etiam illud vestrum contra Christi gratiam saepe a vobis inaniter dictum, quod scilicet appellatione gratiae bonos fieri homines fatali necessitate dicamus."

[62] Cf. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 122, *CCSL* 88, p. 367.

[63] *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 123, *CCSL* 88, p. 367.

restrictive reading of all, for de facto, not all will be saved, but only those who believe and persevere.

He further supports his position with John 6,44: "None can come to me, unless the Father who sent me draws them," and with John 6,66: "None can come to me unless it has been given to them by my Father." Concerning the second element: the axiom that God is both good and just must lead to the following conclusion: some children enter the kingdom of God by grace because God is good and other children do not enter because God is just[64].

As far as I can see, Augustine never refers to his work *Ad Simplicianum* when debating with the Pelagians. In *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiae*, however, he regularly refers to that work in order to show the unity and consistency of his positions. That he considered it a clear exposition of his views is indicated by the fact that Augustine suggested that Hilarius and Prosper give this book to the monks of Gaul so that they canbecome familiar with Augustine's position[65].

One must also admit that the opponents in Hadrumetum and Gaul were never accused of heresy. They are called *fratres*[66] and *carissimi*[67] who will certainly come to the truth about predestination if only they will continue to walk in the same way "in quod pervenerunt"[68]. Augustine explicitly acknowledges that they confess both the doctrine of original sin and the necessity of faith in the death of Christ for the justification of the sinner[69]. They are not called *inimici gratiae*[70]. Therefore is seems fair to conclude that Augustine's teachings about predestination can, at least for the most part, be reduced to the works written either at the request of a colleague or as clarifications for brethren: *Ad Simplicianum*, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De correptione et gratia*, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, and *De dono perseverantiae*.

[64] Cf. *Contra Iulianum* IV,42-46, *PL* 44, 760-761.

[65] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 4,8, *PL* 44, 966: "Nam si curassent, invenissent istam quaestionem secundum veritatem divinarum Scripturarum solutam in primo libro duorum, quos ad beatae memoriae Simplicianum scripsi... Nisi forte non eos noverunt; quod si ita est, facite ut noverint."

[66] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* I,1, *PL* 44, 881; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 1,2, *PL* 44, 961.

[67] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,7, *PL* 44, 886.

[68] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 1,2, *PL* 44, 961.

[69] Therefore, Augustine underlines: "Retenta ergo ista in quae pervenerunt, plurimum eos a Pelagianorum errore discernunt."; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 1,2, *PL* 44, 961.

[70] Against KRAUS, *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 34.

3. Did Augustine give up the freedom of the will in his Semi-pelagian oeuvre?[71]

One of the negative aspects of Augustine's position, according to Kraus, was that he surrendered the existence of genuine freedom. Not surprisingly, Augustine, in his writings to the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseille, denies this. He even boasts that he, not the Pelagians, is the *defensor liberi arbitrii*[72]. In the beginning of *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, Augustine explicitly states that one of the intentions of this work is to react against those who "sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium"[73]. I believe that Augustine was sincere when he made these claims.

In his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, Augustine explicitly states that Scripture clearly and explicitly proves the existence of the free will. In this regard, he refers to God's requirements, which are only meaningful if human beings can realise them and by doing so can receive a reward. God's precepts do not make sense if there is no free will that can fulfil them in order to receive the promised rewards[74]. Human sins are clear evidence of the existence of the free will[75]. Augustine concludes his defence of the existence of the free will with two assertions: "Velle enim et nolle propriae voluntatis est"[76] and "Semper est (...) in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper est bona"[77]. For Augustine, it goes without saying that we will whenever we will and that the "bene vivendum" and "recte agendum" belongs to our free will, but that God operates in such a way so as to insure

[71] J.M. Rist, *Augustine on Free Will and Predestination*, in *Journal of Theological Studies* 20 (1969) 420-447.

[72] See esp. *Opus imperfectum* III,214, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 505: "Me non esse liberi arbitrii (...) negatorem, sed potius defensorem Dei gratia confitendo"; cf. also, e.g., *De correptione et gratia* 8,17, *CSEL* 44, 238: "... secundum gratiam Dei, non contra eam, libertas defenditur voluntatis. Voluntas quippe humana non libertate consequitur gratiam, sed gratia potius libertatem..."

[73] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,1, *PL* 44, 881: "Sed quoniam sunt quidem, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium, aut quando gratia defenditur, negari existiment liberum arbitrium."

[74] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2,2, *PL* 44, 882: "Quomodo autem revelaverit, commemoro vos, non humano eloquio, sed divino. Primum, quia ipsa divina praecepta homini non prodessent, nisi haberet liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quo ea faciens ad promissa praemia perveniret." See also 2,4, *PL* 44, 883-884 (with many references to the Old and New Testament).

[75] Cf. the conclusion at the end of *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 21,3, *PL* 44, 883: "Ecce apertissime videmus expressum liberum humanae voluntatis arbitrium."

[76] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 3,5, *PL* 44, 885.

[77] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 15,31, *PL* 44, 899.

that his *electi* will the good[78]. Whenever we do the good, it is really we who do it, but it is God who works in us in such a way that we do it "praebendo vires efficacissimas"[79]. In other words, in Augustine's view, an individual's meritorious activities and received grace go hand in hand. Even in contexts where Augustine states that grace prevails, he immediately adds that the free will still exists[80]. To confess and believe that God operates in our hearts does not lead Augustine to a denial of the normal experience of the believers that they indeed are willing to believe and to live according to the requirements of faith[81]. Indeed, when talking about the story of the Philistines and Arabs, Augustine stresses that the Lord inspired them to come to Israel, but at the same time he is convinced that they came to this land because they themselves wanted to come[82].

4. Acting under the influence of God's grace is not contrary to doing what one wants to do

It is fascinating to see that Augustine repeatedly claims that acting according to God's will is not necessarily opposed to acting according to the natural will of the human being. Grace and free will are not antithetical[83]: believers, at least some of the time, do what God wants them to do and they are, at the same time, most willing to do so[84]. Indeed, such a way of living will lead to an eternal reward, but even that reward is the result of God's help and grace[85]. We over-

[78] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16,32, *PL* 44, 900: "Certum est nos velle, cum volumus; sed ille facit ut velimus bonum..."

[79] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16,32, *PL* 44, 900-901.

[80] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 11,21, *PL* 44, 899.

[81] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 20,41, *PL* 44, 905."Satis me disputasse arbitror adversus eos qui gratiam Dei vehementer oppugnant, qua voluntas humana non tollitur..."

[82] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 21,42, *PL* 44, 907.

[83] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 21,42, *PL* 44, 907-908: "imo utrumque uerum est, quia et sua uoluntate uenerunt, et tamen spiritum eorum dominus suscitauit." See, in this regard, M. DJUTH, *Stoicism and Augustine's Doctrine of Human Freedom after 396*, in J. SCHNAUBELT & F. VAN FLETEREN (eds.), *Augustine: Second Founder of the Faith* (Collectanea Augustiniana, 1), New-York-Frankfurt am Main-Paris, 1990, pp. 387-401.

[84] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2,4, *PL* 44, 884: "Neque cum aliquid secundum Deum operatur, alienet hoc a propria uoluntate."

[85] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,6, *PL* 44, 885: "... ut ad uitam piam et bonam conuersationem, cui merces aeterna debetur, adiutorio et gratiae Dei locus non relinquatur ...".

come sin thanks to God's grace, but, Augustine adds, it is a grace which helps the free will[86]. Grace can never be given according to our merits[87]. It is true that grace takes the lead in the process of conversion to the faith and in that of the guiding of the believer in Christian living[88], but, and this seems to be the crucial point, grace does so in such a way that human beings *sub gratia* love, at least some of the time, the pursuit of obedience. Augustine, speaking about the Spirit's activity, uses verbs such as "accenditur" with respect to the will in order to make clear that, thanks to the Spirit's activity, human beings can be made to be genuinely willing to do what God wants them to do[89].

Of course, it must be admitted – and this is probably one of the reasons why people sometimes claim that the "late" Augustine has abandoned whatever real and meaningful belief in the freedom of the will that he had once held that free will does not play an important role in *De praedestinatione sanctorum* or *De dono perseverantiae*. This can at least partly be explained by the historical context of those works. On the other hand – and in *De praedestinatione sanctorum* this point is explicitly stated in a context where Augustine is explaining that he had missed the point in his *Expositio* – that to believe and to act belong to our free will and at the same time are given by the Spirit of faith and charity. He adds, that God prepares our will (Prov. 8,35 LXX) but both to believe and to act "utrumque nostrum (sunt), quia non fit nisi volentibus nobis"[90]. In other words, the psychological experience of "I will" remains real, at least on the level of lived experience. That God prepares the will of the elect does not automatically mean that the "credere vel non credere" should not belong to the human beings' free will[91].

In *De dono perseverantiae*, the emphasis on prayer – I will return to this point later – for the non-believers and for the faithful proves that the will is still able to be changed. Meanwhile, it must be stressed that

[86] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,8, *PL* 44, 887: "Ergo et uictoria qua peccatum uincitur, nihil aliud est quam donum Dei, in isto certamine adiuuantis liberum arbitrium."

[87] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5,13, *PL* 44, 889: "His et talibus testimoniis diuinis probatur, gratiam Dei non secundum merita nostra dari: quandoquidem non solum nullis bonis, uerum etiam multis meritis malis praecedentibus uidemus datam, et quotidie dari uidemus."

[88] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,13, *PL* 44, 889-990.

[89] See, e.g., *De correptione et gratia* 12,38, *CSEL* 92, p. 266.

[90] Cf. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 3,7, *PL* 44, 965.

[91] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 5,10, *PL* 44, 968: "Non quia credere vel non credere non est in arbitrio voluntatis humanae, sed in electis praeparatur voluntas a domino. Ideo ad ipsam quoque fidem, quae in voluntate est, pertinet, quis enim te discernit."

Augustine seems to be irritated when he reads: "Voluntate sua quisque deserit Deum, ut merito deseratur a Deo", for he adds: "Quis hoc negaverit?"[92] Does such a sign of irritation not prove that Augustine in no way intends to annihilate human responsibility? The point must be, Augustine continues, that we pray in order that "desereri a Deo" should ultimately not happen. After all, is it not true that nothing happens, if God does not permit it? He alone is the one who is able "a malo in bonum flectere voluntates, et in lapsum pronas convertere, ac dirigere in sibi placitum gressum"[93]. In other words, Augustine does not seem to exclude that even in the case of the primacy of God's grace, the will in itself still plays a role: to the monks of Hadrumetum it is said that, because of God's grace and their own will, they live a life of continence (Wisdom 8,1)[94]. The victory in the struggle against sin is a gift of God, "in isto certamine adiuvantis liberum arbitrium"[95].

Moreover, Augustine certainly believed that God is able to act in the heart of human beings, but he did not believe that God did so by means of physical force: "Intus egit, corda tenuit, corda movit, eosque voluntatibus eorum, quas ipse in illis operatus est, traxit"[96]. When one carefully looks at the verbs, one sees that the verbs used are typical of the way in which Augustine describes grace's activity: *movere, trahere, invitare* etc. They are also verbs that refer to one's psychological experience. One gets the impression that by the use of such verbs Augustine suggests that God takes the human being as his creature seriously. When taking into account these verbs, one must admit that Augustine's point is that one can only be invited if one's will is still in some sense active and in some sense still has a role to play.

Further, as far as I can see, Augustine never gave up the idea of *merita*. In the works to the monks, he speaks explicitly of merits. He even does so in contexts where he is actively defending his views on grace[97]. Of course, the initiative is taken by God, but, once given, our

[92] *De dono perseverantiae* 6,11, *PL* 45, 1000.

[93] *De dono perseverantiae* 6,12, *PL* 45, 1000.

[94] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,7, *PL* 44, 886: "Quibus autem non est datum, aut nolunt, aut non implent quod volunt; quibus autem datum est, sic volunt ut impleant quod volunt. Itaque, ut hoc verbum, quod non ab omnibus capitur, ab aliquibus capiatur, et Dei donum est, *et liberum arbitrium.*"

[95] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,8, *PL* 44, 887.

[96] *De correptione et gratia* 14,45, *CSEL* 92, p. 275.

[97] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,1, *PL* 44, 881: "Propter eos qui hominis liberum arbitrium sic praedicant et defendunt, ut Dei gratiam qua vocamur ad eum et a nostris malis meritis liberamur, et per quam *bona merita* comparamus quibus ad vitam perveniamus aeternam, negare audeant et conentur auferre, multa iam disseruimus, litterisque mandavimus, quantum nobis Dominus donare dignatus est."

"merita bona incipiunt"[98]. Once justified, the just one lives *ex fide*. This means that he or she acts only – at least part of the time – *per dilectionem*. This lifestyle results in being awarded eternal life by God according to one's deeds[99]. At the same time, Augustine can claim that our merits are gifts of God[100], but this does not mean that our free will is destroyed[101]. It only means that this will needs the help of grace "ne sine causa voluntati eius iubeatur"[102]. But, at the same time, this grace cannot be such "ut propriam perderent voluntatem"[103].

The next element which further complicates the whole affair is the fact that, on the one hand, the mortification of the works of the flesh is considered to be a gift of God, but that to this the idea is immediately added that: "exigitur tamen a nobis proposito praemio vitae". According to Augustine, the meaning of this is clear: we must mortify the deeds of the flesh and yet, at the same time, it is God who works within us to generate our ability to do this[104]. Traces of Pauline thinking are obviously present here. Augustine did not consider the preaching of predestination a hindrance to one's moral life. On the contrary, he believed that it actually helped people in their struggles[105]. For Augustine – and here he seems to have been convinced that he was following both the tradition (esp. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzus) and Scripture –[106] the belief that God's grace

[98] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,13, *PL* 44, 889: "Sed plane cum data fuerit, incipiunt esse etiam merita nostra bona, per illam tamen..."; 6,14, *PL* 44, 890: "Ista utique iam merita sua bona commemorat (=Paul; reference to 2 Tim. 4,6-7); ut post bona merita consequatur coronam, qui post merita mala consecutus est gratiam."

[99] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 7,18, *PL* 44, 892: "... istam fidem ex qua iustus vivit, id est, quae per dilectionem operatur, ut reddat ei Deus vitam aeternam secundum opera eius."

[100] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 8,20, *PL* 44, 893.

[101] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,8, *PL* 44, 886: "Neque enim praeciperentur, nisi homo haberet propriam voluntatem, qua divinis praeceptis obediret."; 10,22, *PL* 44, 894: "Itaque, fratres, debetis quidem per liberum arbitrium non facere mala, et facere bona..."

[102] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,9, *PL* 44, 887.

[103] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5,12, *PL* 44, 889.

[104] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 11,22, *PL* 44, 976: "Ideo enim haec et nobis praecipiuntur, et dona Dei esse monstrantur, ut intelligatur quod et nos ea facimus, et Deus facit ut illa faciamus."

[105] *De dono perseverantiae* 17,41, *PL* 1019: "Non solum ergo praedicatione praedestinationis ab hoc opere non impeditur, verum et ad hoc adiuvatur, ut cum gloriatur, in Domino glorietur."

[106] And one must admit, that Augustine is very confident that he is right: "Hoc scio, neminem contra istam praedestinationem, quam secundum Scripturas sanctas defendimus, nisi errando disputare potuisse."; *De dono perseverantiae* 19,48, *PL* 45, 1023.

precedes our merits does not contradict the fact that we must be continually exhorted to fulfill God's precepts[107]. What Augustine frequently seemed to fear was that people would begin to attribute to themselves the good things they did as if it they had been accomplished by themselves alone[108].

Because of the importance of ideas like "filii Dei", "caritas Dei", and the role of Christ, I am a bit hesitant about the claim that Augustine believed that God predestines to sin[109]. In Rom. 9,18: "Cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult obdurat autem secundum iudicium", the *obdurare* is always interpreted either as God permits (*permittere*) that one is seduced "mala eius merita"[110], or as God hardens through his just judgement even as Pharaoh hardens himself by his own free wil[111], or as proof that God, in his perfectly righteous judgement, "digna retribuens"[112], because of the "praecedentibus meritis"[113].

According to Kraus[114], God should bring about sins. In order to prove this, he refers to *De gratia et libero arbitrio*[115]: "Quomodo dixerit Dominus huic homini maledicere David, quis sapiens et intelliget? Non enim iubendo dixit, ubi oboedientia laudaretur; sed quod eius voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam *in hoc peccatum* iudicio suo iusto et occulto *inclinavit*." Only the words in italics are quoted by Kraus.

[107] Cf. *De dono perseverantiae* 19,49, *PL* 45, 1023: "Unde supra dicti tractatores excellentissimi divinorum eloquiorum, et gratiam Dei veram, sicut praedicanda est, praedicarunt, id est, quam nulla merita humana praecedunt; et ad facienda divina praecepta instanter hortati sunt, ut qui haberent donum obedientiae, quibus iussis obediendum esset, audirent." On this chapter, see J. CHÉNÉ, *Sur un texte du "De dono perseverantiae" (Cap. XIX, n. 49)*, in *REA* 6 (1960) 309-313.

[108] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 9,21, *PL* 44, 894: "Non enim, quia dixit: Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari, pro bona voluntate (Phil. 2,13), ideo liberum arbitrium abstulisse putandus est. Quod si ita esset, non superius dixisset: Cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini (Phil. 2,12). Quando enim iubetur ut operentur, liberum eorum convenitur arbitrium: sed ideo cum timore et tremore, ne sibi tribuendo quod bene operantur, de bonis tanquam suis extollantur operibus."

[109] D. OGLIARI, *The Role of Christ and the Church in the Light of Augustine's Theory of Predestination*, in *ETL* 79 (2003) 347-364 argues that, from a systematic theological point of view, because of the predestination, Christ can no longer play a decisive role in the salvation history.

[110] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 23,45, *PL* 44, 910-911.

[111] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 23,45, *PL* 44, 911. Cf. also, L.F. PIZZOLATO, *L'induramento del cuore del Faraone: tra Gregorio di Nissa e Agostino*, in *Augustinianum* 35 (1995) 511-525.

[112] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 8,14, *PL* 44, 972.

[113] *De dono perseverantiae* 11,25, *PL* 45, 1007; cf. also *Opus imperfectum* I,141, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 160.

[114] *Vorherbestimmung*, p. 38.

[115] *PL* 44, 906.

In rebuttal to this position, it should be noted that Augustine speaks of a "voluntas mala proprio suo". Furthermore, in the same context, Augustine states: "Nec causa tacita est, cur ei Dominus isto modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc est cor eius malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit." Obviously, in Augustine's view, the true basis of this evil action is the evil free will of Shemi. The *mittere* is weakened by the *dimittere*, a feature which seems to indicate a desire on Augustine's part to weaken the radically strong position, found in Scripture. Augustine's consistent position is that their will is already evil.

The same can be said about another text quoted by Kraus, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 21,43[116]: "Manifestatur, *operari Deum* in cordibus hominibus *ad inclinandas eorum voluntates* quocumque voluerit, sive ad bono pro sua misericordia, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, iudicio utique suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper tamen iusto." Again, note that Kraus only quoted the words in italics, but one must admit that the presence of the evil is a prerequisite[117]. The text explicitly refers to evil deeds (*ad mala pro meritis eorum*), opposed to God's mercy (*misericordia sua*). It is clear that God makes use of the evil will, not that he makes a will evil.

In passing, it is worth mentioning that the Hadrumetum dossier, especially with regard to the role played therein by the Bible, is in many senses unique[118]. Several texts are used only in discussions "entre doctes théologiens: jamais saint Augustin n'a traité, dans sa catéchèse, ni dans sa prédication pastorale des péricopes bibliques qui font l'objet des remarques présentes. Les écrits aux moines d'Adrumète sont un dossier particulier sur un sujet théologique donné"[119]. In other words, Augustine was speaking to colleagues, not to the faithful in general.

5. "Harsh predestination" versus God's love

Augustine was posthumously awarded the honorary titles of both *Doctor gratiae* and *Doctor caritatis*. This concern for love also

[116] *PL* 44, 909.

[117] It must be underlined that the texts, quoted from Scripture, in *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 21,42, *PL* 44, 907-909, speak of an activity of God, resulting in evil deeds of human beings.

[118] A.-M. La Bonnardière, *Quelques remarques sur les citations scripturaires du De gratia et libero arbitrio*, in *REA* 9 (1963) 77-85.

[119] La Bonnardière, *a.c.*, p. 84.

plays a role in the works we are considering here. Especially in *De gratia et libero arbitrio,* Augustine collected an impressive dossier of biblical texts which refer clearly and directly to God's love for us as the impetus for both our love for him and our love for others[120]. We love because we were loved first[121]. What else, Augustine asks, is the desire for the good than love that comes from God[122] through Jesus Christ in whom this love is present in its fullest and purest form?[123]. Indeed, who loved the weak more than Christ, the one who who was made weak and crucified for all?[124] Every thought or act of human beings can only be qualified as *bonum* if it has been done in love. This is proved by Scripture (as well as by the martyrs)[125]. Even here, however, Augustine will add that they are meaningless if human beings no longer possess a free will[126]. True, it is in human nature's potential to believe and to love, but these can only be genuinely possessed as a result of the gift of grace[127]. In Augustine's perception, this is as it should be: if one has the opportunity to choose either for his own free will or for a will under grace, one would be a fool to choose for the former[128]. Truly just actions are only those actions which are done with and in love (*cum dilectione, cum delectatione iustitiae*). The result is described as sweetness,

[120] See, e.g., *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 7,16, *PL* 44, 891; 17,33, *PL* 44, 901; 17,34, *PL* 44, 902.

[121] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 18,38, *PL* 44, 904: "Nemo ergo vos fallat, fratres mei: quia nos non diligeremus Deum, nisi nos prior ipse diligeret. (...) Gratia nos facit legis dilectores..."; *Opus imperfectum* I,131, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 144: "Gratia quippe hominem praevenit, ut diligat Deum, qui delectatione operetur bona. Quod et Iohannes apostolus apertissime ostendit, ubi ait: 'Nos diligamus, quoniam prior dilexit nos.' (1 Jh 4,19) Non ergo diligamur, quia dileximus, sed quia dilecti sumus, diligamus."

[122] *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,21, *CSEL* 60, p. 482: "Quid est enim boni cupiditas nisi caritas, de qua Iohannes apostolus sine ambiguitate loquitur dicens: caritas ex Deo est (1Jh 4,7b)?"; cf. also, e.g., *De dono perseverantiae* 21,56, *PL* 45, 1028; *Opus imperfectum* I,95, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 110; II,142, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 266, etc.

[123] *De correptione et gratia* 7,15, *CSEL* 92, p. 235.

[124] *De correptione et gratia* 16,49, *CSEL* 92, p. 280.

[125] See e.g. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 17,33, *PL* 44, 901.

[126] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 18,37, *PL* 44, 903: "Haec omnia praecepta dilectionis, id est charitatis, quae tanta et talia sunt, ut quidquid se putaverit homo facere bene, si fiat sine charitate, nullo modo fiat bene; haec ergo praecepta charitatis inaniter darentur hominibus, non habentibus liberum voluntatis arbitrium..."

[127] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 5,10, *PL* 44, 968: "Proinde posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere charitatem, naturae est hominum: habere autem fidem quemadmodum habere charitatem, gratiae est fidelium."

[128] Cf. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 11,21, *PL* 44, 976.

happiness, *suavitas*[129]. Because of this love, the *sarcina Christi* will be a light one[130]. True love is love which finds its origin in God, it is love given by God through grace[131]. God operates in our hearts in order to generate love. He has committed himself to bringing it to completion through continual cooperation with us. Because of their love for God, the just of the Old Testament could believe that Jesus Christ was the one to come[132]. The whole content of the Law can be summarized in the fulfilmment of the commendment to love God and to love one another[133]. This love makes the difference between acts done in faith and those done for other, less-authentic motivations. It supersedes knowledge: "Sed maius est donum charitas quam scientia"[134].

Such love changes peoples' lives. This was certainly the case for Augustine. The sign or fruit that people had experienced God's love, Augustine argued, is that they are transformed into "magni amatores" of God. He never neglected to preach this truth[135]. In history, many examples can be found of people who confessed that what they were, did, believed, was the result of God's love. One may think here not only of Paul, but in fact of the general message of most of the Christian Scriptures. Only if people have experienced God's overwhelming goodness, will they be able to recognize their own weakness and sinfulness. In their weakness, people have experienced God's mercy, a position that, according to Augustine, was shared by the monks of Marseille[136]. He then concludes that God has foreseen (*praescivit*) that it was good for Him to give these gifts to those who are being called[137]. In this regard, I think it is extremely important to stress that, in *De correptione et gratia*, in a context where he is speaking about saints, who, by "nature", are expected to persevere, Augustine explicitly asks the

[129] See *De correptione et gratia* 2,4, *CSEL* 92, pp. 221-222; *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16,33, *PL* 44, 901.

[130] *Ibid.*

[131] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 18,37, *PL* 44, 903-904.

[132] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 13,25, *PL* 44, 896.

[133] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 17,34ff., *PL* 44, 902ff.

[134] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 19,40, *PL* 44, 905.

[135] *De dono perseverantiae* 21,56, *PL* 45, 1028: "Quoniam charitas ex ipso est: sicut dixerunt quos fecit magnos, non solum amatores, verum etiam praedicatores suos."

[136] *De dono perseverantiae* 21,56, *PL* 45, 1028: "Inter initium autem fidei et perfectionem perseverantiae, media sunt illa, quibus recte vivimus, quae ipsi etiam donari nobis a Deo fide impetrante consentiunt."

[137] *De dono perseverantiae* 21,56, *PL* 44, 1028: "Haec autem omnia, initium scilicet fidei, et caetera usque in finem dona sua, Deus largiturum se vocatis suis esse praescivit".

following: Who among faithful dares to boast that he belongs to the predestined?[138] Once again, the theme of humility is implicitly introduced[139].

Finally, note Augustine's concern that even the rebuke of sinners is always done with and in love, true gift of the Spirit[140]. Precisely because of the fact that one never knows who will be saved, one must pray for the rebuked one so that he will be saved[141], for, Augustine continued, our hearts must be changed by love in order even to wish that all will be saved[142].

In the discussion about the status of the freedom of the will in Augustine's theological schema, it is important to see that the "functioning" of this free will is internally related to the presence of love: the will must be *ardentissima*, fully inflamed and empowered by divine love. There is, as it were, an identification of charity and, as such, of a *voluntas ardentissima*[143]. As was said above, love is a gift of God. Without the existence of our free will, however, it is of no real value. One is only enabled to obey God truly and with sweet sincerety when God's love is involved[144].

6. "Harsh predestination" versus prayer

One of the surprising things in Augustine's works that are directed to the monks is the pride of place given to the *oratio fidelium*. According to A. Vinel[145], references to it are, with one

[138] *De correptione et gratia* 13,40, *CSEL* 92, 268: "Quis enim ex multitudine fidelium, quamdiu in hac mortalitate uiuitur, in numero praedestinatorum se esse praesumat?"

[139] Commentators seem to forget that boasting is not appreciated in Scripture; see in this regard, *De correptione et gratia* 8,17, *CSEL* 92, p. 238. The commend to pray for perseverence reveals that we need it and that God is willing to give it; see, in this regard, *De dono perseverantiae* 2,3, *PL* 45, 996: "O homo, non uerborum tuorum tantum, uerum etiam cogitationum testis est Deus: si aliquid a tanto diuite ueraciter ac fideliter poscis; ab illo, a quo poscis, te accipere crede quod poscis."

[140] *De correptione et gratia* 6,9, *CSEL* 92, p. 227; 9,25, *CSEL* 92, p. 249; 15,46-47, *CSEL* 92, pp. 276-277.

[141] *De correptione et gratia* 14,43, *CSEL* 92, p. 272: "Sub isto ergo incerto ex caritate adhibenda est cuius exitus ignoratur, et pro illo cui adhibetur orandum est ut sanetur."

[142] *De correptione et gratia* 15,46, *CSEL* 92, p. 276.

[143] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 17,33, *PL* 44, 901.

[144] *De dono perseverantiae* 16,41, *PL* 45, 1018: "... charitatem, qua uno Deo veraciter et suaviter oboeditur".

[145] A. VINEL, *Le rôle de la liturgie dans la réflexion doctrinale de saint Augustin contre les Pélagiens*, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986 (unpublished doctoral dissertation), pp. 205ff.

exception[146], only found in this oeuvre. Augustine is convinced that the *initium fidei* is a gift of God, not from human beings. This is made plain in the story of Paul's conversion[147]. On the other hand, prayer is suggested as a means for acquiring a better understanding of the complex relationship between grace and free will[148]. It is also a means for gaining a better insight into the mystery of predestination, both from the position of the disciple and from that of the teacher[149]. Indeed, prayer is considered to be the right medium for all those who seek to understand. God will give them all the understanding that they require [150]. Of course, because prayer is related to faith, only those who have been gifted with faith will be inclined to pray for the empowerment to do what is required of them[151].

We are ordered to pray in order that the "nolentes" will be made "volentes". Augustine also suggests that, in such case, the faith of those who pray, "Dei praevenit gratiam"[152]. The order to pray for others makes clear that faith does not completely depend upon one's own free will[153]. Why should we be exhorted to pray for our ennemies, if God was not able and willing to convert them?[154] When the faithful pray, they pray in order that their own faith may grow and that of the unbelievers may begin to become a reality[155]. Such prayer supposes (at least a partial) recognition of the will's weakness and

[146] *Opus imperfectum* VI,41, *PL* 45, 1606.

[147] Cf. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 2,3-4, *PL* 44, 963.

[148] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,1, *PL* 44, 881: "Quidquid est autem quo pervenire nondum potest vestrae mentis intentio, pacem inter vos et charitatem servantes, a Domino ut intelligatis orate."

[149] Cf. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 1,2, *PL* 44, 961.

[150] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 24,46, *PL* 44, 912.

[151] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 14,28, *PL* 44, 898.

[152] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 8,15, *PL* 44, 971-972: "Aut si non facit volentes ex nolentibus Deus, utquid orat Ecclesia secundum praeceptum Domini pro persecutoribus suis? (...) Quid ergo oramus pro nolentibus credere, nisi ut Deus in illis operetur et velle? (...) Orat pro non credentibus, quid, nisi ut credant? (...) Si ergo fides orantium Dei praevenit gratiam, numquid eorum fides, pro quibus oratur ut credant, Dei praevenit gratiam?"

[153] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 14,29, *PL* 44, 898: "Nam si fides liberi est tantummodo arbitrii, nec datur a Deo, propter quid pro eis qui nolunt credere, oramus ut credant?"

[154] *De dono perseverantiae* 22,60, *PL* 45, 1029-1030: "Deus enim qui omnia quae praedestinauit impleuit, ideo et pro inimicis fidei orare nos uoluit; ut hinc intelligeremus, quod ipse etiam infidelibus donet ut credant, et uolentes ex nolentibus faciat."

[155] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 11,22, *PL* 44, 976: "Rogant credentes, ut sibi augeatur fides; rogant pro non credentibus, ut eis donetur fides"; cf. also 14,27, *PL* 44, 981; *De correptione et gratia* 2,3, *CSEL* 92, p. 221; 3,5, *CSEL* 92, pp. 222-223; *De dono perseverantiae* 7,15, *PL* 45, 1002.

insufficiency. But it also contains a strong belief that God will give the praying one the power not to be led into temptation[156]. We can fulfill the requirements, if we want, but since the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov. 8,35 LXX), we must ask him "ut tantum velimus, quantum sufficit ut volendo faciamus"[157]. When people do not do the good expected, or do not do it with love, Augustine admonishes them to pray in order that they might receive what they do not yet have[158]. Rebuke is considered to be an invitation to the sinner to pray in order that his love, with God's merciful help, will grow and so that, in the end, he finally does what is expected[159]. It is important to admonish, teach, exhort, increase, but such activities are only useful when accompanied by prayer to the one who gives all these things[160]. When people thank God for the faith of other people, they do so because they believe that this faith is, from its very beginning, also a gift of God[161]. God prepares our hearts in order that we do not hear the Gospel in vain but so that we are converted and believe[162]. The same arguments can also be found in *De dono perseverantiae*. One has to pray in order to receive the gift of perseverance, and, when this is done, it can be looked for expectantly[163]. Again, the Church prays in order that the unbelievers may believe, and that believers might persevere[164]. God, from whom come both peace and charity, is also the giver of faith. Augustine again repeats that this is the reason why we pray to God: not only that faith may be increased in those who possess it, but alo that it may be given to those who do not yet possess it[165]. It is the Church's task to pray that those who are not yet called might be called. To this Augustine adds an interesting idea; could it

[156] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4,9, *PL* 44, 887; 13,26, *PL* 44, 897 (here, Augustine combines prayer for forgiveness and prayer for strength); 24,46, *PL* 44, 912.

[157] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 16,32, *PL* 44, 900.

[158] *De correptione et gratia* 2,4, *CSEL* 92, p. 222.

[159] *De correptione et gratia* 5,7, *CSEL* 92, p. 224.

[160] *De correptione et gratia* 2,3, *CSEL* 92, p. 221.

[161] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 19,39, *PL* 44, 989

[162] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 19,39, *PL* 44, 989: "Deus igitur operatur in cordibus hominum, vocatione illa secundum propositum suum, de qua multum locuti sumus, ut non inaniter audiant Evangelium, sed eo audito convertantur et credant". Because of the first part of the sentence, the *sed*, the *eo audito*, I think that *convertantur* is to be understood as reflexive and not passive.

[163] *De dono perseverantiae* II,3, *PL* 45, 996: "Si aliquid a tanto divite veraciter ac fideliter poscis, ab illo, a quo poscis, te accipere crede quod poscis."

[164] *De dono perseverantiae* 7,15, *PL* 44, 1002: "Orat (Ecclesia), ut increduli credant: Deus ergo convertit ad fidem. Orat, ut credentes perseverent: Deus ergo donat perseverantiam usque in finem."

[165] *De dono perseverantiae* 17,44, *PL* 45, 1021.

not be that those who are predestined are predestined in such a way that they need our prayers in order to receive the grace by which they come to be numbered among the elect?[166]. The fact that God knows what we need is not an argument for not (at least not without conviction) praying[167]. Again, Augustine states that our prayer proves that God is able to change one's heart and help the saint to persevere[168], as well as that our prayer has a role to play in the process of grace and predestination. In light of the stress on prayer, it should be no surprise that Augustine ended his work on grace and free will with the request that the monks of Hadrumetum should pray for him "ut temperanter et pie et iuste uiuamus in hoc saeculo, exspectantes illam beatam spem, et manifestationem domini et saluatoris nostri Iesu Christi, cui est honor et gloria et regnum cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto in saecula saeculorum"[169].

7. Some concluding remarks

In my opinion, Kraus rightly pointed out that Augustine's views cannot be understood without a reference to God as almighty. In that sense, God does what he wants in heaven and on earth, he does it when he wants it, and no human will can resist God's will[170]. Augustine even adds that God does what he wants "de ipsis hominum voluntatibus"[171] and that no sin will be done "nisi voluntas Dei"[172]. Augustine was convinced that with such position he was in line with Scripture. For example: Augustine understands the story of Saul to teach that God is able to influence human beings' actions. He quotes from 1 Sam. 10,25-27: "Et dimisit Samuel populum, et abiit

[166] *De dono perseverantiae* 22,60, *PL* 44, 1029: "Et si qui sunt nondum vocati, pro eis ut vocentur oremus? Fortassis enim sic praedestinati sunt, ut nostris orationibus concedantur, et accipiant eamdem gratiam, qua velint atque efficiantur electi."

[167] *De dono perseverantiae* 16,39, *PL* 44, 1017: "Imo cum constet alia Deum, danda etiam non orantibus, sicut initium fidei, alia nonnisi orantibus praeparasse, sicut usque in finem perseverantiam, profecto qui ex se ipso hanc se habere putat, non orat ut habeat."

[168] *De dono perseverantiae* 23,63, *PL* 45 1031-1032.

[169] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 24,46, *PL* 44, 912.

[170] *De correptione et gratia* 14,45, *CSEL* 92, 275: "Non est itaque dubitandum, voluntati Dei, qui in coelo et in terra omnia quaecumque voluit fecit, et qui etiam illa quae futura sunt fecit, humanas voluntates non posse resistere, quominus faciat ipse quod vult."

[171] *Ibidem.*

[172] *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 16,33, *PL* 44, 984.

unusquisque in locum suum; et Saul abiit in domum suam in Gabaa; et abierunt potentes *quorum tetigit Dominus corda* cum Saule". Whenever one checks the "shocking" passages in Augustine, one has to admit that Scripture is used as a basis[173]. One can discuss whether Augustine always correctly interpreted Scripture but at the same time, one must agree that Scripture itself is not unproblematic![174]

According to Kraus, Augustine left the Western tradition when emphasizing that grace precedes the free will. Augustine would disagree with such critique. Indeed, in the *Retractationes*, when commenting on *Ad Simplicianum*, Augustine first quoted 1 Cor. 4,7: "Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis?" and then explicitly refered to the title of Cyprian's, *Ad Quirinum* 3,4: "Quod volens etiam martyr Cyprianus ostendere, hoc totum ipso titulo definivit dicens: In nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit"[175]. Among the texts quoted by Cyprian in order to explain this title, one will find, like in Augustine, 1 Cor. 4,7[176]. In other words, Augustine was convinced and not without some reason that he followed the African line of theology as presented by Cyprian.

Further, I suggest that much of what Augustine said on predestination, is said to monks, to those who had already experienced God's overwhelming grace and recognized this in all humility, or, if they had been yet to recognize it, must be warned not to rely on themselves. At the end of *De dono perseverantiae* 21,55[177], inspired by the virtue of humility, Augustine asked his readers not to follow him in all his ideas, unless they found his position compelling[178]. He referred

[173] *De correptione et gratia* 14,45, *CSEL* 92, pp. 273ff.

[174] It goes without saying that the reception of Paul by Augustine is a matter of debate, but, at the same time, one must admit that Paul himselve is not always clear. On Paul's reception by Augustine, see, among others, P. FREDERIKSEN, *Paul and Augustine: Narratives, Orthodox Traditions, and the Retrospective Self*, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S. 37 (1986) 3-34. On the reception of Paul in the West before Augustine, see K. STOWERS, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles*, New Haven, 1994.

[175] See *CCSL* 57, p. 90. To this text of Cyprian is also referred in *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,9,25, *CSEL* 60, p. 552. In the broader context (IV,8,21-IV,9,27), Cyprian is often quoted in favour of the doctrine of original sin and grace. Other references to this text are found in *De dono perseverantiae* 14,36, *PL* 45, 1015; 17,43, *PL* 45, 1020; 19,48, *PL* 45, 1023; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 3,7, *PL* 44, 964.

[176] Cf. *CCSL* 3, p. 92.

[177] *PL* 45, 1027-1028.

[178] "Quamvis neminem velim sic amplecti omnia mea, ut me sequatur, nisi in iis in quibus me non errasse perspexerit."

to his *Retractationes* in order to make clear that he himself repeatedly had changed his mind. He added: "Proficienter me existimo Deo miserante scripsisse, non tamen a perfectione coepisse". Perfection does not belong to human beings: the claiming of perfection is rather a sign of arrogance than of truth. Indeed, human beings can only hope that they have made in their life such a progress that at the end of that life perfection, not punishment will be given[179]. I do think that this position makes clear that Augustine was willing to accept fair critiques, at least from fellow monks. He could accept disagreement and suggested that in that case people must protect peace and love among each other and pray to God[180].

At this time, Augustine could not accept any form of grace if it was grace that had been given as a result of our efforts. At the same time, the bishop of Hippo, even in the works under discussion, spoke of *merita nostra bona*. These merits were simultaneously the result of God's grace and our efforts: God always gives us the ability to perform merit-caring good works[181]. The merits are ours and *dona Dei*[182]. But, in the long run, all will be the result of grace, even in case of the saints[183]. In other words, if the primacy of grace was protected, Augustine could accept the presence of "our" merits.

I have the impression, that Augustine himself was aware of the "problematic" character of his predestination doctrine, but apparently not of the difficulties one will be confronted with when systematizing it. Near the end of *De dono perseverantiae*, Augustine underlines that one must not present the predestination doctrine to the people in the way he has just finished doing. The preacher must add something like: "You must hope for the gift of perseverance and pray daily for it. By doing this, you may trust that you do belong to the predestined, for God himself grants even our doing of this". In other words, the preacher's message must be one of hope and support, not one of despair[184]. Moreover, Augustine is well aware that this kind of teaching cannot be understood by those who are slow at mind or weak in

[179] "Bonae quippe spei est homo, si eum sic proficientem dies ultimus vitae huius invenerit, ut adiiciantur ei quae proficienti defuerunt, et perficiendus quam puniendus potius iudicetur."; *De dono perseverantiae* 21,55, *PL* 45, 1028.

[180] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,1, *PL* 44, 881.

[181] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,13, *PL* 44, 889.

[182] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,15, *PL* 44, 890: "Si enim merita nostra sic intelligerent, ut etiam ipsa dona Dei esse cognoscerent, non esset reprobanda ista sententia ...".

[183] *De correptione et gratia* 13,42, *CSEL* 92, p. 271.

[184] Cf. *De dono perseverantiae* 22,62, *PL* 45, 1030-1031; cf. also his hesitant attitude concerning the preaching of rejection in the previous chapter.

faith, but this is not a matter of life or death: more important is that they pay attention to their prayers so that they may persevere[185].

This is not to say that Augustine's views are in no way problematic[186]. This is the case when the fate of the unbaptized children is discussed. Augustine considered the baptism of children as a grace that shows the magnanimity of God's goodness to all the faithful[187], but also accepted that the unbaptized were sent to hell. One does not appreciate the appeal of Augustine on the fate of children as a proof for the truth of predestination[188]. The idea that God wants to show what human beings can do with his help and what they in fact are without this help, suggests that God is more of a tyrant than a loving father[189]. Especially in the case of infants, one might ask what kind of God is the one who does not save children, especially in the case where it is the parents who are longing for their baptism[190]. It is, within the context of personal autonomy and responsibility, also embarrasing to read that Augustine held that post lapsarian human free will suffices for evil acts, but is too weak for doing good acts[191]. Of course, human beings are capable of giving up faith "usque ad mortem"[192]. That human pride must be punished is an idea that can be found in Stoic philosophy. Still, the question remains: why must God use such draconic means in order to realize this[193].

It seems to me that several of the "problematic" positions can be explained if a proper distinction is made between the psychological and metaphysical level. On the psychological level, God is

[185] Cf. *De dono perseverantiae* 23,63, *PL* 45, 1031.

[186] Cf. J. WETZEL, *Snares of Truth. Augustine on Free Will and Predestination*, in R. DODARO & G. LAWLESS (eds.), *Augustine and his Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner*, London-New York, 2000, pp. 124-141, esp. pp. 126-130.

[187] *De dono perseverantiae* 17,41, *PL* 44, 1018: "Sed mirabilior et fidelibus evidentior largitas bonitatis Dei est, quod etiam parvulis, quibus obedientia non est illius aetatis ut detur, datur haec gratia."

[188] Cf. *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 12,24, *PL* 44, 977ff.; *De correptione et gratia* 8,18, *CSEL* 92, p. 239.

[189] *De correptione et gratia* 10,28, *CSEL* 92, pp. 252-253; 13,42, *CSEL* 92, p. 271; cf. also *De dono perseverantiae* 11,25, *PL* 45, 1007-1008: "Itaque misericordiam eius in his qui liberantur, et veritatem in his qui puniuntur, sine dubitatione credamus: neque inscrutabilia scrutari, aut investigabilia vestigare conemur." In a sense, one has the impression that Augustine on the one hand asks to accept the given situation as such, on the other hand, he invites us not to try to understand it; cf. also 8,19, *PL* 45, 1003: "Voluntate autem sua cadit, qui cadit; et voluntate Dei stat, qui stat." See also 11,23, *PL* 45, 1005-1006.

[190] *De dono perseverantiae* 11,31, *PL* 45, 1011-1012.

[191] *De correptione et gratia* 11,31, *CSEL* 92, p. 256.

[192] *De correptione et gratia* 12,35, *CSEL* 92, p. 262.

[193] *De correptione et gratia* 12,37, *CSEL* 92, p. 264.

experienced as a loving God, who takes the first initiative in the *ordo salutis*. At the same time, his love is experienced as an invitation to which people are willing to answer in a positive way, simply because it is exalted as the path toward ultimate happiness. On a metaphysical level, a cogent reflection on God's almightiness led Augustine to a position in which freedom, love, grace and prayer while present are nevertheless underestimated. I would suggest that one really respects Augustine's ideas when one is willing to respect (if not also accept) the paradoxical "cohabitation" of dogmatic ideas and experienced spirituality. If this excise has made clear that neither a dogmatic systematization nor a pious "spiritualisation" do justice to Augustine's positions, it has truly been an *opus prodigum*.

Mathijs LAMBERIGTS

L'IDENTIFICATION INTERDITE ET IMPOSÉE AVEC DIEU

Sur le moralisme de Julien D'ECLANE

I Introduction: le moralisme de l'historiographie

La littérature récente sur la question pélagienne a été caractérisée, depuis plus d'une décennie, par deux éléments importants. Tout d'abord l'on a affaire à une certaine concentration sur la personne et l'œuvre de Julien, deuxièmement l'on est témoin d'une remarquable réhabilitation de ce dernier. Et par *réhabilitation* nous entendons, pour éviter tout malentendu, la correction qu'a apportée l'historiographie [1] à une image trop teinte et abîmée par des intérêts théologiques, voire dogmatiques [2]. Différents auteurs ont essayé, souvent avec une grande perspicacité dans de remarquables études[3], d'analyser la pensée de Julien et de lui donner la place à laquelle il a droit et non celle que lui a réservée le préjugé dogmatique. Ce qui mène à la conclusion que la réalité historique était beaucoup trop compliquée, trop diversifiée, pour être saisie à l'aide de la seule notion du 'pélagianisme'[4].

Aussi justifiées qu'elles fussent, ces corrections ont tout de même l'air de dépasser le seul niveau de l'historiographie. Il y va aussi d'une certaine sympathie qui est basée sur la conviction que, moralement, la position julienne est plus compréhensible, plus acceptable, que celle d'Augustin. Julien n'avait-il pas raison en soutenant

[1] Ainsi que l'écrit M. Lamberigts, dans, *Recent Research Into Pelagianism With Particular Emphasis on the Role of Julian of Aeclanum*, dans *Augustiniana* 52 (2002) 175-198.

[2] Comme l'écrit M. LAMBERIGTS, *art. cit.*:'The manner with which Augustine struggled with the Pelagians led in part to the fact that dogmatic theology, rooted in doctrinal presuppositions, transformed Pelagianism into a system that was quickly qualified as heretical', pg. 176. Et *ibid*: 'We are inclined to argue on the basis of the present survey that progress in historical research into the Pelagian controversy has led to a degree of 'dogmatic' deterioration', pg. 198.

[3] Notamment J. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum: Studien zu seinem Leben, seiner Werk, seiner Lehre und Ihrer Überlieferung*, Leiden 2001. Bien que ne se référant pas à la période de la lutte pélagienne à proprement dire, il faut aussi citer l'étude approfondie de V.H. DRECOLL, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*, Tübingen 1999.

[4] Voir, M. LAMBERIGTS, *art. cit.*, pg. 178 sqq. The problem can also be seen as one of the elements of the reception of te pelagian controversy. Voir, J. LÖSSL, *Augustine on Predestination: Consequences for the Reception*, dans, *Augustiniana* 52 (2002) 241-72.

qu'il est immoral de croire en une prédestination figurant comme une sorte de Terreur divine, qu'il est immoral de forger une théologie qui semble rendre Dieu l'auteur du mal, qu'il est immoral de cantonner d'emblée la vie et l'amour dans une cruelle volonté divine? C'est indubitablement une approche qui nous sera souvent beaucoup plus sympathique que celle de l'évêque d'Hippone. Ce penchant s'illustre bien par les études de M. Lamberigts, l'un des spécialistes dans le domaine du pélagianisme. En 1988, Lamberigts écrivait encore que la profondeur et la complexité du débat entre Augustin et Julien l'empêchait de choisir entre les deux antagonistes[5]. Un point de vue qu'il répète en 1996 en disant que lorsque deux grands théologiens se disputent, la vérité se trouvera sans doute des deux côtés[6]. Mais en 2002, le ton semble basculer. Il montre amplement que le point de départ théologique de Julien se situe dans une morale qui n'est pas défigurée par le péché originel et par l'infirmité de la volonté humaine. Une morale qui ne peut avoir d'autre garant que Dieu lui-même, étant donné qu'Il est le garant et l'auteur de la bonne création. Ce qui mène naturellement à une toute autre conception de la grâce et de la justice divine.

La question est de savoir alors si en effet, l'essentiel du débat entre Augustin et Julien peut être défini en termes de morale. En revanche, si tel n'est pas le cas et si la moralisation ne s'avère pas la meilleure approche du litige entre Augustin et Julien, d'où vient alors cette interprétation? Trouve-t-elle son origine dans le fait que de nos jours l'approche julienne s'accorde beaucoup mieux avec la théologie dominante qu'à l'époque d'Augustin? Car, tout comme Julien, nous avons tendance à affirmer que Dieu ne peut être qu'amour et qu'on ne veut s'identifier avec Lui que tant qu'Il se laisse définir comme l'amour tout court. Donc, est-ce qu'on s'identifie avec Dieu parce qu'Il est bon, parce qu'Il est amour, et que, dès qu'on ne peut plus L'identifier avec ces qualités positives, on ne trouvera plus de raisons de croire en Lui. Autrement dit, aurait-on affaire à une 'victoire subtile du pélagianisme'[7] nous imposant comme seul espace de la théologie les notions de l'amour et du bien, une théologie où l'espace est foncièrement celui de l'identification. La conséquence? Une éventuelle non-identification

[5] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum: A Plea for a Good Creator*, dans, *Augustiniana* 38 (1988) 5-24.

[6] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian and Augustine on the Origine of the Soul*, dans, *Augustiniana* 46 (1996) 243-60. 'When two clever persons discuss with one another, probably both are often partly right. This is also he case with Julian and Augustine'.

[7] Selon l'expression de M. HANBY, dans son, *Augustine and Modernity*, London, New York 2003, *The Subtle Triumph of Pelagianism* (106 sqq).

avec Dieu serait basée sur le fait que Dieu ne serait pas bon, ne serait pas amour, et donc qu'Il ne serait pas acceptable ni crédible. Une telle non-identification ne représenterait alors aucun espace épistémologique, car l'espace entier de la théologie serait absorbé par la morale[8]. Telle pourrait être la conséquence de l'introduction d'une approche moralisatrice dans l'évaluation du débat entre Julien et Augustin.

En revanche, on trouve une autre approche chez J. Wetzel[9], qui souligne que '*Augustine disliked the moral torpor of the doctrine*' (i.e. of predestination) [10]. Et que l'auteur lui-même n'aime pas du tout les discours modernes sur le Dieu-amour: '*I dislike what it must inevitably concede to modern sentimentality about love*'[11]. Et d'expliquer que des notions tels qu'*amour*, *désir*, *grâce* furent essentiellement pour Augustin des termes qui dépassent le cadre de la morale. Une approche donc, qui se base sur la différence essentielle et ontologique entre Créateur et créature, comme l'a amplement décrite T.J. van Bavel [12]. Car c'est là que se trouve l'essentiel de la divergence entre les deux approches: la morale fait partie du monde créé et elle n'est pas un moyen pour réunir ces deux réalités.

Le but de cet article sera donc d'examiner quelques petits éléments du débat entre Augustin et Julien sur la justice divine. Un examen avec une double approche. Principalement, au niveau de l'historiographie, la question sera de savoir si la moralisation julienne n'est pas justement au coeur du litige? Puis, au niveau de la théologie, la question sera de savoir si la moralisation de thèmes théologiques n'amène pas la destruction de la théologie même? Si Julien essaye, en revenant inlassablement sur le soi-disant manichéisme d'Augustin,

[8] Une même approche se laisse reconnaître dans l'ecclésiologie où la question principale peut être celle de savoir comment il faudrait réconcilier la conception d'une Église destinée au salut universel avec celle de la prédestination. Voir, D. Ogliari, *The Role of Christ and of the Church in the Light of Augustine's Theory of Predestination*, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 79 (2003) 347-64.

[9] J. Wetzel, *Snares of Truth. Augustine on Free Will and Predestination*, dans, R. Dodaro et G. Lawless, Augustine and his Critics. Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner, London, New York 2000, pp 124-141. Comme il l'écrivait déjà dans son *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, Cambridge 1992: If God's power always lies at the bottom of ours, then we must cease trying to mark self-determination at the point where unadulterated human power begins to assert itself. Instead, Augustine invites us to observe the way in which we can define ourselves without having to appeal to sefl-generated sources of power. The philosophical interest of grace emerges out of this process of self-definition. (pg. 126)

[10] *Art. cit.* pg. 138.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] T.J. Van Bavel, *De goedheid en schoonheid van de schepping bij Augustinus*, dans, *Lof van de Schepping*, publication du Augustijns Historisch Instituut, Leuven 1997, 5-19.

de moraliser le débat, quelle en est la conséquence pour la théologie? A-t-il apporté la bonne perspective à la théologie ou faut-il plutôt se rappeler les paroles de Nietzsche que l'essentiel de la foi et de toute la théologie se situera toujours *Jenseits vom Guten und Bösem* et qu'un christianisme qui se définit comme morale perdra toute sa force puisque la vérité n'est pas forcément compatible avec la morale?

II L'Opus Imperfectum

Commençons par la première question. Quelle est la définition de la justice divine que donnent les deux antagonistes? Etant donné que la seule œuvre dans laquelle la voix de Julien nous est conservée est l'*Opus Imperfectum*, nous nous concentrons sur quelques fragments de ce livre. Dans la première partie, Julien reproche à Augustin d'inverser la notion de Créateur et de créature, c'est-à-dire de Dieu et de l'homme. Parmi ces deux, il y en a un qui juge et l'autre qui est jugé, ce qui implique qu'il faut examiner la nature de la culpabilité et de la justice. Puis il définit la justice comme suit:

> *La justice est à la fois, comme les doctes ont l'habitude de la définir et comme nous pouvons la comprendre, la plus grande vertu de toutes les vertus (si, avec les Stoïciens, il est permis de créer une hiérarchie dans les vertus), qui se réalise par le devoir de donner soigneusement à chacun ce qui lui revient, sans fraude ni grâce*[13].

La définition en elle-même n'est qu'un cliché qui était à la fois la base du droit romain et un cliché de la philosophie populaire. On la trouve chez Cicéron [14], chez Ulpian [15], mais elle remonte à Platon[16] et a été reprise par les Stoïciens[17]. En plus, certains veulent y voir un

[13] *Opus Imperfectum* I,35: *Iustitia est, et ut ab eruditis definiri solet et ut nos intellegere possumus, uirtus, si per Stoicos liceat alteri alteram praeferre, uirtutum omnium maxima, fungens diligenter officio ad restituendum sua unicuique sine fraude sine gratia.*

[14] *De Officiis* I,5,15: *Iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo cernitur.*

[15] *Digest* I,1: *Iustitia est constans et perpetua uoluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi. Iuris praecpta sunt haec: honeste uiuere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.*

[16] *Pol.* IV,10

[17] Voir, M.L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. I. Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature*, Leiden 1985.

parallèle avec le récit biblique dans lequel Jésus dit qu'il faut rendre à César ce qui est à César et à Dieu ce qui est à Dieu (Matthieu 22,15-22), ce qui pourtant est peu probable [18].

L'origine de cette phrase pourtant, ne nous retiendra pas ici. Ce qui est plus intéressant, c'est la double restriction que Julien apporte: *sine fraude, sine gratia* (sans fraude, ni grâce). Deux éléments qui servent à rendre la justice aussi neutre que possible. Il ne doit pas y avoir du favoritisme, ni dans le sens négatif ni dans le sens positif. La justice, aux yeux de Julien, est en effet une déesse avec un bandeau, tranchant chaque question avec la plus grande objectivité. Le point de Julien est donc clair. Dieu est pour lui le garant d'une justice qui juge chaque être humain selon les mêmes critères. Chacun rendra des comptes et chacun sera jugé de la même façon. Si jamais les critères que la justice applique à l'un, ne seraient pas les mêmes que ceux qu'elle applique aux autres, on aurait affaire à une justice minée. Autrement dit, si la grâce prend d'autres voies que celles d'une justice strictement objective, elle ne serait rien d'autre que de la fraude. Fraude et grâce sont juxtaposées et là où la grâce ne va pas de pair avec la justice, elle n'est autre que fraude. Le point est clair et la grâce n'a aucune chance d'être une qualité divine *en* soi et *pour* soi.

Dans sa réponse Augustin procède prudemment et il fait un premier pas contre les convictions juliennes. Il cite Eccl 40,1[19] et poursuit en demandant à Julien pourquoi Dieu a posé un si grave fardeau de malheur sur les épaules des enfants: de quelle justice s'agit-il alors? La question est tout à fait justifiée, car si la grâce ne peut être qu'un prolongement de la justice, pourquoi parler encore de la grâce? Mais si réellement il en est ainsi, pourquoi deux enfants peuvent-ils avoir un sort différent? Par exemple, en raison de quelle justice un enfant sera-t-il sauvé grâce au baptême, alors qu'un autre, sans cette adoption, mourra? Pourquoi n'ont-ils pas le même sort, soit le salut soit le refus du salut? La cause, qu'elle soit bien ou mal, leur est commune tout de

[18] Ainsi LAMBERIGTS avance que la conception de 'to each his due' serait en effet une allusion biblique dans l'œuvre de Julien. Voir, M. LAMBERIGTS, *Recent Research...*, note 88. C'est peu probable. La notion a été beaucoup trop connue pour encore pouvoir y reconnaître une allusion biblique. Voir, M.L. COLISH, *Op. cit.*: The notion of rendering to each what is his is found in Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of justice as well as in Stoicism (pg 357). Aussi le récit biblique ne parle-t-il pas de *restituere*, comme le texte de Julien, mais de *reddere*. L'édition de M. ZELZER dans le CSEL ne donne pas de référence non plus.

[19] *Eccl.* 40,1: *graue iugum est super filios Adam a die exitus de uentre matris eorum.*

même[20]? C'est-à-dire la justice divine, si du moins Julien a raison. Le passage est important car Augustin montre pour une première fois que la justice, telle que la définit Julien, n'est pas en mesure de justifier le sort de l'homme. Il construit un paradoxe et par ce moyen il montre qu'il doit y avoir autre chose que la justice déterminant le destin de l'homme. Autrement dit, si la justice forme le cadre de la morale, ce ne sera pas en recourant aux notions du bien et du mal que l'on arrivera à comprendre tel ou tel sort de tel ou tel homme.

Donc là où Julien voit une équivalence entre la grâce et la fraude et s'en sert pour sauvegarder l'objectivité de la justice (car le favoritisme contredit la justice), Augustin voit un autre rapport entre la justice et la grâce. Certes, il y a la justice, et la grâce ne contredira pas la justice. Mais elle peut donner à la justice un autre caractère. Sinon, comment expliquer qu'un enfant baptisé ait un autre sort qu'un enfant non-baptisé? Julien maintient que le bien se situe justement dans l'objectivité de la justice, alors qu'Augustin croit que cette objectivité n'est qu'une illusion. Même plus, c'est justement l'objectivité de la justice qui nous permet, aux yeux de Julien, de nous identifier avec le bien – donc avec Dieu – alors qu'Augustin se voit obligé de souligner que cet objectivité ne nous permet pas d'atteindre le bien, la réalité divine. Le bien, apparemment, se situe au-delà de l'horizon de l'objectivité et on ne peut donc s'identifier avec lui. Ce qui est une conclusion importante. La morale n'est pas la voie qui nous permet de nous identifier avec Dieu. Certes, Dieu est bon, mais cette bonté est une autre bonté que celle de la morale ordinaire, qui se laisse définir comme justice neutre. Là donc où, pour Julien, la vie est essentiellement moralisée, elle ne peut plus l'être aux yeux d'Augustin. La vie doit être défaite de la morale ordinaire si l'on veut en saisir l'essentiel. Julien pense que c'est justement dans son effort moral que l'homme trouve sa dignité, alors qu'Augustin soutient que cette dignité se trouve uniquement dans la foi [21]. Le premier reste, de par son approche, un théologien profondément influencé par le Stoïcisme[22], le second en revanche ne se reconnaît plus dans cette moralisation de la vie.

[20] *Op. Imperf.* I,35: *Dic ergo qua iustitia retributum sit paruulis grave iugum tam magnae manifestae miseriae, dic qua iustitia ille paruulus adoptetur in baptismo, ille sine hac adoptione moriatur, cur non sit ambobus honor iste communis aut ab isto honore alienatio, cum sit ambobus seu bona seu mala causa communis*?

[21] Comme le dit S. LANCEL, dans, *Saint Augustin*, Paris 1999, 'une pédagogie de la foi' (pg 611).

[22] Comme le dit d'une belle façon P. HADOT, dans, *Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Antique*, Paris 1995, L'indifférence stoïcienne est profondément différente de l'indif-

Le débat continue et Julien se réfère de nouveau aux Stoïciens et il explique, en se référant à Zénon, que la justice forme une unité avec la *prudentia*, *fortitudo* et *temperantia*[23]. Il cite donc les vertus cardinales, se basant sur l'un des schémas connus de l'Antiquité. Et à spécifier ensuite que là où une de ces vertus fait défaut, toutes feront défaut, en s'appuyant sur un autre texte de l'Ecclésiaste[24]. Augustin, à son tour, ne paraît guère impressionné, car la citation de l'Ecclésiaste lui permet de trouver dans ce même livre des arguments pour contredire Julien. Si l'Ecclésiaste dit que tout est vanité et que l'homme est donc semblable à la vanité, comment est-il possible que l'être humain, qui d'origine a été créé semblable à la vérité, soit devenu semblable à cette vanité nocive?[25] Et même si les enfants en seraient exempts, en vertu de quelle qualité seraient-ils restés justes? Qu'est-ce qui les aurait sauvés? Sont-ils irréprochables aux yeux de la justice divine, comme la définit Julien?[26] Sur quoi Julien explique que pour lui Dieu est l'origine de la justice, alors que les lois et jugements en sont les effets. En fait, c'est comme le rapport entre le genre et l'espèce. Dieu est le genre de la justice, nos actes peuvent en être l'espèce[27]. La réponse a l'air d'être profonde, elle s'appuie sur un raisonnement quasiment philosophique (genre-effets), mais la brèche est là: ou bien Julien explique en quelle mesure la nécessité du baptême correspond aux critères d'une justice neutre, ou bien il définit le sort de l'homme en d'autres termes que ceux d'une justice *sine fraude, sine gratia*. C'est-à-dire, ce ne sera pas la morale qui nous fera comprendre le destin de l'homme, ce ne sera pas la morale qui nous rapprochera de Dieu.

férence pyrrhonienne...Pour le stoïcien, il y a aussi une seule chose qui n'est pas indifférente, mais c'est l'intention morale, bonne en soi, quelle que soit la matière à laquelle elle s'applique et qui engage l'homme à se modifier lui-même et son attitude à l'égard du monde. (pg. 207/8)

[23] *Op. Imperf.* I,36: *Quod si eam maximam dici Zeno non siuerit, qui tantam virtutum copulam unitatemque confirmat...cum docuerit, nec prudentiam, nec fortitudinem, nec temperatiam posse sine iustitia contineri.*

[24] *Ibid.*: *secundum quam ueritatem et Ecclesiastes pronuntiat: qui in uno peccauerit, multa bona perdet.*

[25] *Ibid.*: *Audi eumdem Ecclesiasten dicentem: uanitas uanitatum et omnina uanitas; quae abundantia hominis in omni labore suo, quem ipse laborat sub sole etc.? Et dic mihi, quare homo etiam uanitati similis factus est.*

[26] *Ibid.*: *An hinc excipis paruulos, quos crescendo et, si bene erudiantur, proficiendo, tam magnam minuere, cum qua nati sunt, uanitatem; nec ea tota carere, nisi omnes dies uanitatis uelut umbra transierint.*

[27] *Ibid.* I,37: *Origo eius diuinitas est...ut ergo genus eius (quo nomine nihil aliud quam originem intellgi uolo) deus est; ita species eius in legum promulgatione iudiciorumque apparet effectibus.*

Il est clair que Julien reste entièrement dans le cadre de la philosophie classique[28], encore qu'il s'agisse des lieux communs qui ne remontent pas précisément à telle ou telle école. Il n'y a que l'allusion à Zénon, qui pourtant ne représente pas non plus une vraie référence. En revanche, maintenant que Julien a été conduit à admettre que Dieu est l'origine de la justice – ce qui ne contredit pas encore sa définition de la justice comme la vertu par laquelle on donne à chacun son dû – Augustin saisit sa chance. Si Dieu est donc l'origine de la justice, pourquoi Julien ne veut-il pas avouer que l'homme reçoit la justice comme un don de Dieu et qu'elle n'est pas l'équivalent du libre arbitre humain?[29] Lisez Rom 10,3, le texte qui parle de ceux qui veulent ériger leur propre justice et refusent de se soumettre à celle de Dieu. Sur quoi Julien répond qu'en effet Dieu est pour lui l'équivalent de la justice. Il est donc la vertu qui contient toutes les autres choses et qui rend à chacun son dû sans fraude ni favoritisme[30]. De nouveau, Augustin essaye de coincer son adversaire. Car si la justice rend à chacun son dû, comment expliquer alors la parabole des ouvriers de la onzième heure. Est-ce possible de comprendre cette histoire sans avoir recours à la notion de la grâce? Ou faut-il constater que Dieu, ce jour-là, avait oublié la justice? Non, ce qu'il faut dire c'est que la justice ne fait de tort à personne, mais que la grâce accorde beaucoup à ceux qui ne l'ont pas mérité. Une grâce qui ne dépend en fait que de la miséricorde divine[31]. Donc c'est ici pour une première fois que

[28] C'est pourquoi il est dommage que Th. RUTTEN, dans son beau livre, *Augustinus Mysticus. Mystiek, narcisme en echoïsme bij Augustinus, geïllustreerd aan Confessiones en Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Baarn 2003, ne parle pas de l'époque du pélagianisme. Le clivage entre l'héritage philosophique et l'héritage paulinien (avec son pessimisme caractéristique, selon l'auteur), dans lequel il voit sombrer toute la théologie occidentale, se montre davantage dans la période du pélagianisme. Bien que ce soit une fascinante lecture, la thèse principale paraît exagérer ce clivage. Augustin aurait-t-il pu parler d'un *frui deo* s'il regardait les capacités de l'homme uniquement sous le jour du péché, de l'infirmité etc.?

[29] *Ibid.* I,37: *Si origo iustitiae deus est, ut fateris, cur homini ab ipso dari iustitiam non fateris, et potius humanae uoluntatis arbitrium, quam dei donum uis esse iustitiam.*

[30] *Ibid.* I,38: *Est autem deus, est itaque sine ambiguitate iustitia. Non est autem aliud quam uirtus omnia continens, et restituens suum cuique, sine fraude, sine gratia.*

[31] *Ibid.*: *Definisti esse iustitiam uirtutem omnia continentem, et restituentem suum unicuique, sine fraude, sine gratia. Proinde uidemus eam sine fraude restituisse denarium eis, qui per totum diem in opere uineae laborauerant; hoc enim placuerat, hoc conuenerat, ad hanc mercedem se fuisse conductos negare non poterant. Sed dic mihi, quaeso te, quomodo eis sine gratia tantumdem dedit, qui una hora in illo opere fuerunt? An amiserat fortasse iustitiam? Cohibe itaque te potius. Neminem quippe fraudat diuina iustitia, sed multa donat non merentibus gratia.*

nous voyons, chez Augustin, que la grâce a d'autres origines qu'uniquement la justice. Elle est aussi originaire de la miséricorde et ne peut pas être réduite à la justice neutre, comme le voulait Julien.

C'est donc là que se situe aussi la raison pour laquelle entre deux enfants l'un est admis au Règne céleste alors que l'autre ne l'est pas. Julien avoue que la clémence est un élément important dans la justice divine, ce qui fait dire à Augustin que cela se montre encore plus clairement quand on examine l'origine du mot *miséricorde*, une origine qui se trouve naturellement dans le mot *misère*. Or, cette miséricorde on la voit clairement dans le cas des enfants, l'un baptisé, l'autre non baptisé. Car pourquoi faudrait-il accorder de la miséricorde à un enfant s'il n'est pas sujet à la misère? D'autre part, s'il est sujet à la misère, les soi-disant mérites ne peuvent être compris que dans le sens négatif et en même temps Dieu, puisqu'Il est juste, ne peut être miséricordieux que si l'être humain est en effet dans la misère. Tout cela s'illustre bien avec le cas des deux enfants. Imaginez qu'ils meurent tous les deux, comment Dieu agira-t-il? S'il est uniquement miséricordieux vis-à-vis du baptisé, où se situe alors la faute de l'autre étant donné que Julien n'admet pas l'existence d'un péché originel? S'il est miséricordieux vis-à-vis des deux, quel serait le mérite du baptême, étant donné qu'en Dieu il n'y a pas d'acception de personnes? Ou encore, pourquoi Dieu ne les accepterait-Il pas tous les deux, étant donné que tous les deux ont été créés d'après son image? Est-ce parce que Dieu n'est pas en mesure de faire ce qu'il veut?[32] Si tel est le cas, cela mènerait à la conclusion que l'omnipuissance n'est pas identique à la justice divine.

Voilà Augustin arrivé à son but. Il a commencé par faire admettre que la clémence, la miséricorde, doivent faire partie de la justice divine et il les a donc définies comme autre chose qu'une justice purement neutre. Cette modification lui a permis d'avancer prudemment et de constater que la justice divine n'est pas quelque chose

[32] *Ibid.* I,39: *Saltem misericordiae nomen attende, et unde dicta sit, respice. Quid igitur opus est misericordia, ubi nulla est miseria? Miseriam porro in paruulis si nullam esse dicitis, eis misericordiam praebendam negatis; si ullam esse dicitis, malum meritum ostenditis. Neque enim sub deo iusto miser esse quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest. Ecce duo paruuli iacent: unus eorum baptizatus, alter non baptizatus exspirat; cui eorum dicis deum fuisse clementem? Si uni, ostende alterius malum meritum, qui negas esse originale peccatum; si ambobus, ostende baptizati ullum bonum meritum, qui negas gratiam, ubi nulla est acceptio personarum; et dic, si potes, cur ambos adoptare noluerit, qui certe ambos ad imaginem suam condidit. An ita iustus est, ut non sit omnipotens, si uoluit et non potuit? Ubi certe illorum nullus noluit, ne impedimentum potestatis diuinae referatis ad meritum uoluntatis humanae; hic certe nulli eorum dicere potest deus: uolui, et noluisti.*

de neutre, mais qu'elle ne pourra jamais être comprise sans la grâce. Une grâce qui – beaucoup plus que la justice dans le sens julien – doit être entendue comme la force décisive dans le sort de l'homme. Car sans cette grâce, on n'arrive pas à trouver un sens au baptême qui, selon Julien, n'apporte pas le salut. Le salut, aux yeux de Julien, doit être lié aux mérites, ce qui forcément ne s'applique pas aux enfants. Si, par contre, le salut 'répond' en quelque sorte à la misère originelle dans laquelle l'homme se trouve, la justice doit être intimement liée à la grâce. Ce qui donnerait un tout à faut autre sens à la notion du *bien*. Ce qui est *bien*, on peut le voir, c'est de sauver les enfants, donc les baptiser. Mais ce bien qui se réalise dans le baptême, n'est pas un bien avec lequel on peut s'identifier car il ne se laisse pas comprendre à l'aide des catégories morales.

Toute identification avec Dieu est interdite dans cette conception augustinienne du bien. En même temps, elle est imposée car il n'y que le Dieu miséricordieux en qui l'homme peut croire et en qui il peut se fier. L'identification avec Dieu se situe dans un autre cadre que celui de la morale, elle est celle de la foi, mais cette foi est elle aussi un élément que l'on n'arrive pas à comprendre avec des termes logiques. La foi n'est pas le moyen qui nous permet de comprendre Dieu, elle n'est pas la voie qui nous révèle une intelligence du divin. Au contraire, la foi est d'emblée comprise dans une structure rompue et fracturée. On pourrait presque dire qu'elle est située dans une structure post-moderne. Il n'y pas de logique, pas de morale, pas de grandes histoires nous expliquant le comportement divin vis-à-vis des créatures. Certes, la Bible nous explique beaucoup sur Dieu, elle nous montre un Dieu puissant et elle nous parle de création, de réconciliation et de résurrection. Et il en va de même pour la morale, les dix commandements; tous sont utiles et nous parlent de Dieu. Mais tous sont incapables de nous révéler l'essentiel de l'amour divin, qui se montre dans un choix qui est le cœur de la grâce divine. Un choix qui peut-être n'est pas juste à notre sentiment, mais qui ne se justifie qu'aux yeux de Dieu lui-même. De notre point de vue, il n'y a aucune justification, ce qui implique qu'il n'y a aucune identification possible avec ce Dieu insaisissable.

III Le De Trinitate

Autrement dit, le *bien* divin ne sera jamais l'équivalent de ce qui *moralement* est bien car ce bien-là est une qualité humaine. Elle est quelque chose qu'on peut réaliser à partir du moment que l'on est

en mesure d'agir et que l'on peut réfléchir sur ses actes. Le bien divin, par contre, se réalise déjà depuis la naissance et sera donc forcément entendu comme autre chose que le bien moral. Voilà l'essentiel de ce petit fragment de l'*Opus Imperfectum*: si l'on parle du bien, il ne faut pas le comprendre en termes de morale.

Mais s'il en est ainsi, de quel genre de bien parle-t-on alors? Cette question nous mène au *De Trinitate*, où Augustin parle également du bien, mais dans un autre sens en effet que dans le sens moral. Notons en passant que les recherches ne font que rarement le rapprochement entre la théologie trinitaire et la théologie anti-pélagienne[33]. Cette dernière est considérée comme un élément plus ou moins à part dans une œuvre magnifique. Un élément qui représente une certaine défiguration de la pensée d'Augustin, défiguration qui serait due à la controverse avec Julien dans laquelle Augustin se serait laissé entraîner vers des points de vue extrémistes[34]. La pensée trinitaire, par contre, serait l'expression d'un esprit qui accentue les limitations de notre connaissance et donc la largeur de Dieu, qui est perçue à travers des analogies où notamment le mouvement de l'amour joue un rôle important. Mais en fait, il est artificiel de vouloir séparer ces deux aspects de la pensée augustinienne. Le *De Trinitate* n'est pas une œuvre qui parle principalement de l'épistémologie et la lutte pélagienne n'est pas un débat où l'on discute uniquement du salut de l'homme. Sotériologie et épistémologie vont de pair. En plus, l'œuvre sur la Trinité est achevée à l'époque où les querelles pélagiennes ont éclaté et il n'y a nulle raison de détacher l'un de l'autre.

Nous regarderons donc un fragment du Ve livre du *De Trinitate*, là où Augustin définit Dieu comme le bien suprême, mais ce bien suprême est tout d'abord une description de la structure trinitaire de Dieu et non une description de la morale:

[33] Pour un rapprochement entre la théologie trinitaire et la théologie anti-pélagienne, voir, M. HANBY, *op. cit.*, 74 sqq. Une même opinion chez C. HANSON, Augustine. *Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity*, Oxford, 2000. Ce rapprochement demande qu'on considère la théologie trinitaire d'Augustin sous un autre angle que celui du néoplatonisme. Voir là-dessus, M.R. BARNES, *Rereading Augustine on the Trinity*, dans, S.T. DAVIS, D. KENDALL, G. O'COLLINS, The Trinity, Oxford 1999, pg 145-76: The existence of the 'Cappadocians' and a Cappadocian theology, the presumed integrity of the concept of 'christology'...and the fundamental character of 'Neoplatonic' trinitarism in Augustine's theology. Each of these thoroughly modern categories for understanding patristic theology is, in fact, an act of self-definition on the part of modern Systematic theology, and needs to be acknowledged (and studied) as such', pg 175. Contre: M. FIEDROWICZ, *Apologie im Frühen Christentum. Die Kontroverse um den Christlichen Wahrheitsanspruch in den ersten Jahrhunderten*, Paderborn 2000.

[34] Comme le suggère P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo*, nouvelle édition, Berkeley 2000, 387-88 et 390 ff.

Avant tout, retenons ceci: toute qualification absolue de cette souveraine et divine sublimité a une signification substantielle, et une qualification relative appartient à l'ordre non de la substance, mais de la relation...De même, le Père est bon, bon le fils, bon le Saint-Esprit, pourtant il n'y a pas trois bons, mais un seul bon, celui dont parle l'Ecriture: 'Personne n'est bon si ce n'est Dieu seul.' Le Seigneur Jésus, en effet, pour prévenir de la part de celui qui l'appelait 'bon maître', en l'abordant comme un homme, l'erreur de ne voir en lui qu'un homme, ne dit pas: personne n'est bon que le Père seul, mais 'personne n'est bon que Dieu seul'. La raison en est que dans le nom de 'Père', c'est le Père personnellement qui est désigné; dans le nom de 'Dieu', c'est lui et le Fils et le Saint-Esprit, car la Trinité est un seul Dieu[35].

Le bien dont parle Augustin dans ce texte, n'est pas un bien dans le sens relatif, c'est-à-dire par rapport à quelqu'un d'autre. En effet, le Père est bon, le Fils est bon et le Saint Esprit est bon, mais ils ne le sont pas par rapport à eux-mêmes; ils ne sont qu'un seul Dieu. Donc on ne peut même pas dire que Dieu est bon par rapport à Lui-même. Il est bon tout court, comme quelque chose qui lui appartient sans qu'il y ait un rapport à autrui. Autrement dit, le bien ne peut jamais être un prédicat de Dieu[36]. Les prédicats représentent nos moyens intellectuels qui nous permettent de saisir des aspects de la présence divine et ils peuvent donc être divisés selon les différentes catégories: qualité, quantité, lieu, temps etc. Les prédicats jettent en fait le pont entre notre intelligence et l'être divin. Ils nous permettent de nous identifier avec Dieu, ne fût-ce au niveau de l'intelligence (car chaque intelligence est identification entre sujet réfléchissant et objet réfléchi). En revanche, dès que l'on constate que le bien ne peut être conçu comme un prédicat, il devient inaccessible à l'intelligence. Une identification avec le bien divin n'est donc pas possible. Nous ignorons comment nous approcher de ce bien; le bien fait partie de l'immanence divine.

[35] *De Trinitate* V,VIII,9*: Quapropter illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et diuina sublimitas substantialiter dici; quod autem ad aliquid non substantialiter sed relatiue... Et bonus pater, bonus filius, bonus spiritus sanctus; nec tres boni sed unus est bonus de quo dictum est*: Nemo bonus nisi unus deus. *Etenim dominus Iesus ne ab illo qui dixerat*: Magister bone, *tamquam hominem compellans secundum hominem tantummodo intellegeretur ideo non ait*: Nemo bonus nisi solus pater, *sed*: Nemo bonus nisi unus deus. *In patris enim nomine ipse per se pater pronuntiatur, in dei uero et ipse et filius et spiritus sanctus quia trinitas unus deus*. Cf. BA 15, pg. 443.445.

[36] Comme il l'écrit d'une très belle façon dans *De Trinitate* V,I;2: *Quod ergo non inuenimus in meliore nostro non debemus in illo quaerere quod longe melius est meliore nostro, ut sic intelligamus deum si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum.*

Dès lors, faut-il s'arrêter de chercher le bien et se résigner? Est-ce vraiment impossible de dire quoi que ce soit sur le bien ou de s'en inspirer? La réponse n'est pas évidente. Le schéma le plus habituel a recours à la distinction entre l'immanence et l'économie divines, suggérant qu'il est certainement vrai que l'on ne peut saisir la substance divine elle-même, mais qu'on peut au moins se référer à l'économie[37]. L'économie qui se révèle dans les trois personnes, avec leurs œuvres distinctes, mais inséparables. C'est cette économie qui nous confronte avec la création, avec l'amour, avec la réconciliation tels que Dieu les a œuvrés. Et naturellement, dans cette économie le Christ aura le rôle prépondérant. C'est lui qui nous rappelle l'unité essentielle entre *creatio*, *conversio* et *formatio*.

Dans le texte cité ci-dessus, en revanche, ce principe semble renversé. Le Christ refuse expressément d'être appelé bon puisqu'il n'y a qu'un seul qui peut être appelé bon et c'est Dieu lui-même. Donc, de nouveau, on a le sentiment que le bien lui-même est situé en dehors de l'économie, comme l'avait déjà indiqué Augustin un peu plus haut. Et dans une pensée tout à fait logique, il explique que le Christ, dans ce passage, ne dit pas que personne n'est bon sauf le *Père*, mais que personne n'est bon sauf *Dieu*. La conclusion n'a donc rien d'étonnant: la bonté divine est l'équivalent de la substance divine. Mais à partir de ce moment-là, Augustin renverse l'argumentation. Il poursuit en soutenant que le Christ a voulu montrer par là qu'il fallait le considérer non seulement comme homme, mais aussi comme manifestation de Dieu lui-même: *ne... secundum hominem tantummodo intellegeretur*. Et puisque le bien est l'équivalent de la substance divine et puisque le Christ s'est identifié à ce Dieu unique, on peut trouver le bien en Christ, *à condition de le reconnaître comme Dieu lui-même*.

Autrement dit, d'un côté le Christ refuse toute identification avec le bien, mais d'un autre côté il l'impose en montrant que son existence comporte d'autres dimensions que celles d'un être humain. La bonté de Dieu n'est pas comme une qualité que l'on peut illustrer en se référant au Christ homme. On ne peut pas dire: regardez ce que fait Jésus, faisons comme Lui, imitons-Le et nous pratiquerons le bien, nous le connaîtrons. Car dans ce cas-là, le bien serait en effet d'ordre moral. Il s'agirait des actes qui soi-disant seraient conformes à la volonté divine, encore qu'en vérité cette volonté ne se laisse pas traduire en préceptes moraux. Le bien, la bonté divine, ne sont pas

[37] Voir, B. STUDER, *Trinity and Incarnation. The Faith of the Early Church*, Edinburgh 1995.

d'ordre moral, mais ils sont essentiels à Dieu. Ils ne sont pas d'ordre déontologique, mais d'ordre ontologique.

Voilà la conclusion d'Augustin, aussi curieuse qu'elle soit. Tout d'abord il situe le bien à l'intérieur de l'essence divine et puis il se sert de ce raisonnement pour mettre en avant la double nature du Christ: non seulement homme, mais aussi Dieu. La combinaison de ces deux éléments soulève des questions. Car apparemment, il ne veut pas se satisfaire de l'idée que le bien divin est incompréhensible, il veut aussi mettre en avant qu'on trouve, dans la vie humaine du Christ, une dimension que l'on ne peut saisir qu'à l'aide de la notion de la trinité. Il y a, dans le Christ, une dimension divine qui lui appartient essentiellement. C'est-à-dire il s'agit d'une dimension qui ne lui a pas été attribuée, mais qui lui est propre. Ce qui mène à la conclusion que la Trinité sert à définir le propre du bien. En plus, on ne peut pas dire que cette bonté fait partie d'une des trois personnes en particulier. Elle n'est pas l'une des qualités qui définit le Père comme Père, le Fils comme Fils et l'Esprit comme Esprit. Naturellement, la création est bonne, la réconciliation est bonne, mais elles ne le sont pas dans le sens exclusif. L'une n'est pas bonne par rapport à l'autre, la réconciliation ne peut pas être estimée 'meilleure' que la création. Toutes les deux, elles manifestent le bien divin, mais ce bien divin est indivisible. La création n'est donc pas bonne dans le sens moral. Si l'Ecriture nous dit que Dieu voyait que la création était bonne, cela doit être entendu dans un autre sens. Et de nouveau, il faut se référer à la double nature du Christ. Si le Christ est homme et Dieu, on peut dire qu'en Lui nous sommes confrontés avec une transformation de l'existence. Ce qui, au premier abord, est une existence humaine, est également présence divine. Cette autre dimension, qui n'est peut-être pas tout de suite saisissable, peut être regardée comme une transformation de l'être. Une transformation qui, dans le Christ, est d'emblée présente et qui n'a plus besoin de se réaliser. Mais qui dans notre vie doit encore se réaliser[38].

Si donc le raisonnement d'Augustin a pour but de nous faire comprendre que toute la réalité humaine doit être vue sous l'angle de la transformation, on peut appliquer cette argumentation à la question du bien. Apparemment, le bien, qui au premier abord peut être compris dans le sens moral, comporte encore d'autres dimensions. Des dimensions qui dépassent le cadre de la morale, mais qui élèvent le bien au niveau du divin. Autrement dit, l'ordre déontologique doit

[38] Voir la belle étude de D. SHULMAN et G.G. STROUMA, *Self and Self-Transformation in the History of Religions*, Oxford 2002.

être élevé au niveau de l'ordre ontologique, l'existence doit être élevée au niveau de l'essence. Toutefois, cette dimension substantielle n'appartient pas aux hommes en général, elle doit leur être confiée. Comme le dit Augustin:

> *Par exemple, si l'on appelle la Trinité un seul Dieu, grand, bon, éternel, tout-puissant, on peut dire pareillement que ce même Dieu est lui-même sa divinité, lui-même sa grandeur, lui-même sa bonté, lui-même son éternité, lui-même sa toute-puissance, mais on ne peut pas appeler la Trinité 'Père', sauf comparativement à la créature en raison de la filiation adoptive. Le texte de l'Ecriture: 'Écoute Israël, le Seigneur ton Dieu est un Dieu unique', n'a pas un sens qui doive exclure le Fils ou le Saint-Esprit, lui le Seigneur unique, notre Dieu, qu'à bon droit nous appelons aussi notre père parce qu'il nous régénère par sa grâce*[39].

La transformation réalisée doit s'appeler une adoption ou une régénération. L'homme découvre cette autre dimension dans sa vie grâce à la régénération. Toutefois, ces deux éléments – adoption et régénération – ne sont pas tellement différents. Ils se complètent, mais ne peuvent être compris que dans le cadre de la théologie trinitaire. Car la théologie trinitaire accentue la séparation entre la Créateur et la créature en insistant sur tous les éléments qui appartiennent essentiellement à Dieu. Un Dieu qui est un, un Dieu dont l'économie ne situe pas le Père à un rang plus élevé que celui du Fils[40]. Cette théologie n'offre donc pas une possible identification avec Dieu, justement en vertu de ce clivage entre l'essence divine et la création. De ce clivage, la bonté fait partie.

En même temps, la théologie trinitaire révèle à l'homme qu'il existe d'autres dimensions dans la vie, grâce à l'économie divine. Mais ces autres dimensions n'ont rien à voir avec l'essence divine; de nouveau, l'identification n'est pas possible. Ces autres dimensions parlent plutôt de la régénération, de l'adoption. On peut dire que cette adoption soit quelque chose de bien, mais elle ne représente pas la

[39] *De Trinitate* V,XI,12: *Sicut enim trinitas unus deus dicitur magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deitas ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia; non sic dici potest trinitas pater nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. Quod enim scriptum est:* Audi, Israhel: dominus deus tuus dominus unus est, *non utique excepto filio aut excepto spiritu sancto oportet intellegi, quem unum dominum deum nostrum recte dicimus etiam patrem nostrum per gratiam suam nos regenerantem.* Cf. BA 15, pg. 451.

[40] Voir, R. Cross, *On Generic and Derivative Views of God's Trinitarian Substance*, dans, *Scott. Journ. Theol.* 56 (2003) 464-80.

bonté elle-même. Donc, bien que cette économie divine soit le reflet de l'immanence, elle ne peut pas être comprise en termes de bien.

La seule possibilité se trouve dans l'interprétation du mot *régénération*. Le Fils a été généré par le Père et Il représente un mouvement de l'intérieur vers l'extérieur. L'homme en revanche doit réaliser exactement l'inverse: il faut qu'il fasse le retour de l'extérieur à l'intérieur: il faut qu'il soit *ré*-généré. Autrement dit, il faut qu'il devienne réellement l'image de Dieu, qu'il ressemble enfin réellement à son Créateur. Ce qui veut dire que le bien ne représente rien d'autre que de reconnaître que la relation entre *l'immanence* et *l'économie* divines se reflète dans la relation entre *création* et *réconciliation*. Autrement dit, il faut reconnaître qu'il existe aussi un double mouvement dans la grâce. Il y a celle que l'on rencontre dans la création et celle qui se manifeste dans la réconciliation. Et le rapport entre ces deux est-il basé sur la morale? Est-ce grâce à une certaine vertu que l'on participe à ce mouvement entre création et réconciliation? Non, il est uniquement basé sur la vocation de la création de refléter la structure trinitaire de Dieu. Mais, dira-t-on, faut-il alors accepter que beaucoup sont appelés, mais peu sont élus (*multi vocati, pauci electi*)? Non, il faut accepter que le résultat de ce mouvement, qui est donc de refléter le divin et de le regagner, ne peut pas être connu puisqu'il relève de l'unité divine qui, elle, naturellement est inconnaissable. Dès que le sort de l'homme s'inscrit dans l'unité divine, il ne peut plus être suivi. Le bien, qui est l'équivalent de l'un, est au-dessus de l'intelligence humaine, il est επεκεινα της ουσιας. Le bien est donc aussi *jenseits vom Gutem und Bösem*. Il interdit l'identification avec Dieu, il impose une identification avec une intelligence de Dieu qui accepte ses limites. C'est-à-dire garantit une certaine liberté, il garantit que la vérité reste la vérité, justement en vertu d'être insaisissable. Le bien, dès qu'il est identifié avec la morale, sert à cantonner la foi dans un moralisme étouffant, sert à confondre la théologie avec un humanisme qui se baserait sur les mêmes préceptes moraux. Ce qu'on peut dire, c'est qu'Augustin a refusé de réduire l'héritage de la philosophie (néo-)platonicienne à une attitude où la réflexion sur Dieu serait toujours vouée à suivre les voies de la morale. Mais d'emblée Augustin a choisi de ne pas faire ainsi. Déjà dans les Confessions il appelle dieu la beauté (*pulchritudo*), indiquant ainsi qu'il s'agissait d'une présence qui dépasse les normes de la morale. La beauté est amorale, elle n'a pas de rôle dans le débat déontologique. La beauté peut être une mitrailleuse dont l'acier froid et brillant, dont la forme, évoque la beauté, sans que l'on ignore que l'emploi est tout à fait immoral. Dieu est-Il donc comparable à une telle mitrailleuse? Non, mais si l'on veut réfléchir sur Dieu sans

contraintes morales, il y a un prix à payer, c'est de concevoir l'inconcevable, l'immoral. Si l'on choisit l'autre approche et si l'on identifie Dieu tout de suite avec le bien moral, on aura vite fini de pouvoir réfléchir sur Lui. Tel était peut-être un élément dans l'enjeu de la lutte pélagienne, tel est peut-être aussi un élément mi-caché mi-avoué dans l'historiographie moderne qui favorise tant Julien sans se rendre compte du prix que l'on aura à payer. Car naturellement, il est parfois nécessaire de repousser le dogmatisme qui déteint sur l'historiographie. Mais il serait naïf de croire que l'on puisse pratiquer l'historiographie sans poser au préalable quelques questions philosophiques, voire dogmatiques.

Matthias SMALBRUGGE

LA FEMINOLOGIE D'AUGUSTIN ET LES DROITS HUMAINS DES FEMMES

Contexte actuel

Issue d'un catholicisme minoritaire en Norvège, à l'époque où a la conversion atteignait surtout une élite sociale et intellectuelle inspirée de la mission des dominicains formés à l'école du Saulchoir, j'avais dix ans lorsque ma mère s'est convertie. Confrontée comme étudiante à la culture méditerranéenne du type patriarcal, j'ai éprouvé un choc culturel. En vue de clarifier le fondement religieux de cette tradition androcentrique surtout transmise par les institutions de l'Église catholique, j'ai commencé en 1961 à étudier la formation de l'anthropologie chrétienne chez Augustin et Thomas d'Aquin[1].

Devenue ainsi pionnière de *Gender Studies* en sciences religieuses, je constate avec regret que l'opposition Vaticane aux droits humains des femmes est renforcée sous le pontificat actuel[2]. Aux Nations Unies, Le Saint-Siège n'a pas signé *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW 1979), tout en votant avec des états islamistes aux Conférences sur les droits humains (Vienne 1993), la démographie (Le Caire 1994) et les femmes (Beijing 1995)[3]. Cette concordance résulte de l'anthropologie commune à ces variantes du monothéisme, où le Créateur unique établit des devoirs et des droits spécifiques et différents pour les deux sexes[4]. Il est important de constater que cette complémentarité asymétrique, où les fonctions masculines et féminines sont divisées et non interchangeables, postulent des droits spécifiques pour les femmes, *Women's Rights*, mais non pas des droits humains universels,

[1] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, *Subordination et Equivalence. Nature et rôle de la femme d'après Augustin et Thomas d'Aquin*, Oslo, Paris 1968; ead., *Subordination and Equivalence. The Nature and Role of woman in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. A Reprint of a Pioneering Classic*, Kampen 1995.

[2] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Jean Paul II et les femmes, dans *Lumière et Vie* 52, 2003, 57- 69.

[3] Doris E. Buss: Robes, Relics, and Rights: The Vatican and the Beijing Conference, dans *Social & Legal Studies* 7, 1998, 339-363; Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Religion Confronting Women's Human Rights: the Case of Roman Catholicism, dans Øyvind Norderval, Katrine Lund Ore (éds.), *From Patristics to Matristics. Selected Articles on Christian Gender Models* by Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Roma 2002, 289-308.

[4] Kari Elisabeth Børresen (éd.), *Christian and Islamic Gender Models*, Roma 2004 (in press).

Women's Human Rights. Il en résulte un conflit fondamental entre les droits humains des femmes et le droit humain de liberté religieuse[5]. En effet, ce principe séculier protège les religions millénaires qui s'opposent à l'idéal moderne de l'équivalence bio-socio-culturelle des femmes. Dans le débat international, cet antagonisme concerne surtout l'islam, mais aussi la majorité du christianisme, à savoir le catholicisme romain et l'orthodoxie, suivis du protestantisme conservateur[6].

Subordination ontologique.

Il est donc essentiel de reconnaître que l'infériorité des femmes reste axiomatique dans toutes les grandes religions. Selon l'hindouisme et le bouddhisme, la prééminence des hommes est manifestée par la réincarnation graduée en corps masculin, féminin ou animal. Cette hiérarchie ontologique est déterminée par la valeur morale des existences précédentes. Une telle protologie se retrouve chez Platon, exprimée par le mythe de la création dans *Timaios* (41d-42d). Les variantes monothéistes, à savoir le judaïsme, le christianisme et l'islam, sont structurées par l'interaction du théocentrisme et de l'androcentrisme. En conséquence, Dieu est décrit comme andromorphe ou métasexuel, dans le sens d'incompatibilité foncière entre divinité et féminité. Corrélativement, l'humanité masculine est considérée comme primaire et dirigeante, tandis que l'humanité féminine est définie comme dérivée et subordonnée.

De fait, toutes les grandes religions considèrent l'existence des femmes comme ordonnée à la procréation des hommes. Cette fonction maternelle est définie comme purement instrumentale, bien exemplifiée par la biologie androcentrique d'Aristote dans *De generatione animalium* (728a, 765b, 766a-b). Selon l'hindouisme et le bouddhisme, la hiérarchie ontologique place les femmes entre les hommes et les bêtes, c'est-à-dire que le sexe féminin est censé être infra-humain en tant que infra-mâle. Par conséquent, les femmes sont

[5] Condamnée par Pie IX dans le *Syllabus errorum modernorum* (1864), et affirmée comme un droit humain par le concile Vatican II: *Declaratio de libertate religiosa, "Dignitatis humanae"* (1965), cf. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, New York 1948, art. 18.

[6] Courtney W. Howland (éd.), *Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women*, London 1999; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights Tradition and Politics*, Oxford 1999; Jonas Svensson, *Women's Human Rights and Islam*, Lund 2000.

Eline Vuola, Remaking Universals? Transnational Feminism(s) Challenging Fundamentalist Ecumenism, dans *Theory, Culture & Society* 19, 2002, 175-195.

nées pour fonctionner comme des animaux domestiques supérieurs. Leur rôle est d'enfanter des fils, servir mari et beaux-parents, tout en s'appliquant aux autres besognes de subsistance. Dans les variantes monothéistes, les femmes sont définies comme des êtres humains, mais de second rang. Étant donné que chaque individu sexué a une seule existence terrestre, toute mobilité ontologique est exclue.

Dans ce contexte globalement archaïque, il faut préciser que le debâcle de l'androcentrisme dans la civilisation occidentale constitue la révolution épistémologique la plus fondamentale dans l'histoire de l'humanité. Lorsque les hommes ne sont plus définis comme des êtres humains de sexe primaire, l'affirmation théorique et la réalisation pratique de l'autonomie bio-socio-culturelle des femmes représentent un défi plus subversif que ne le furent les effondrements du géocentrisme (Copernic) et de l'anthropocentrisme (Darwin)[7].

Équivalence eschatologique

Néanmoins, il est important de noter que les variantes monothéistes concordent en affirmant l'équivalence eschatologique des êtres humains, c'est-à-dire que l'hiérarchie sexuelle établie par Dieu dans la création sera dépassée par la restauration future. Au cours de l'histoire du christianisme, cette équivalence humaine *coram Deo* détermine l'inclusion graduelle de l'humanité féminine dans la définition de l'être humain créé à l'image de Dieu. Indispensable pour affirmer les droits humains des deux sexes, le privilège de l'*imago Dei* est à la base des droits de l'homme, valeur proclamée en Europe occidentale à partir du 17e siècle et transformée en droits humains pour les deux sexes depuis le 20e siècle. Par conséquent, cette évolution présuppose la foi de l'Église ancienne en l'équivalence des hommes et des femmes dans l'ordre du salut, réinterprétée par la théologie féministe comme étant normative déjà dans ce monde.

Évolution de l'image de Dieu

Dans cette perspective historique, je trouve utile de faire un retour critique à la féminologie d'Augustin. Comme j'ai souligné à plusieurs reprises, ce grand Père de l'Église latin est un précurseur du

[7] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Féminisme et Christianisme, dans Fiorenza Taricone (éd.), *E maschio e femmina li creò*, Verona 1998, 83-99.

féminisme moderne en affirmant l'unicité de la création, s'efforçant ainsi d'inclure la *femina/mulier* en tant qu'être humain théomorphe, *homo*[8]. Afin d'évaluer cette contribution d'Augustin, il faut retracer les étapes doctrinales de l'*imago Dei*[9].

Étant donné le clivage monothéiste entre le divin et le féminin, le privilège d'être créé à l'image d'un Dieu décrit comme andromorphe ou métasexuel est corrélativement réservé à l'humanité mâle ou à l'âme asexuée. Conformément aux textes bibliques *ad litteram*, l'exégèse ancienne affirme que seuls les hommes sont créés à l'image de Dieu (Gen. 1,26-27a; 2,7; I Cor. 11,7), tandis que les femmes deviennent également théomorphes par incorporation au Christ dans l'ordre du salut (Gal. 3,28; Col. 3,10-11; Eph. 4,13, cf. Ev. Thom. 114). En "devenant mâles", c'est-à-dire fils de Dieu et frères du Christ, les femmes ont accès à la plénitude de l'image divine, malgré leur féminité subalterne[10]. Ce premier stade de l'évolution doctrinale persiste dans l'exégèse antiochéenne, comme chez Jean Chrysostome, et survit au Moyen Age par les citations de l'Ambrosiaster, transmises dans le *Corpus Iuris Canonici* sous les noms d'Ambroise et d'Augustin[11]. Ici, le défaut de l'*imago Dei* chez les femmes dans l'ordre créé est invoqué pour justifier leur incapacité juridique et culturelle par l'*impedimentum sexus*, à la fois dans la société et dans l'Église.

Un changement important de l'anthropologie chrétienne est introduit par Clément d'Alexandrie. Il est le premier auteur patristique qui combine le texte sur l'image en Gen. 1,26-27a avec la différenciation sexuelle selon 1,27b, formule littéralement liée à la fécondité en 1,28. Clément justifie ce déplacement exégétique en invoquant Gal. 3,28: "il n'y a pas mâle et femelle, vous êtes tous un (homme) dans le Christ Jésus". Il faut noter cependant que ce verset est une citation négative de Gen. 1,27b, dans le sens d'une abolition de la distinction des sexes par retour à la perfection d'origine, qui est comprise à la fois comme unité présexuelle et parfaite masculinité Christomorphe. Moyennant une définition asexuée de l'image comme

[8] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, In Defence of Augustine: how femina is homo, dans *From Patristics to Matristics*, 15-32; ead., Patristic "Feminism", the Case of Augustine, dans *From Patristics to Matristics*, 33-47.

[9] Evolution analysée dans Kari Elisabeth Børresen (éd.), *The Image of God. Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, Minneapolis MN 1995.

[10] Karl Vogt, "Becoming Male": A Gnostic, Early Christian and Islamic Metaphor, dans Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Karl Vogt, *Women's Studies of the Christian and Islamic Traditions*, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1993, 217-242.

[11] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Imago Dei, privilège masculin? Interprétation augustinienne et pseudo-augustinienn de Gen. 1, 27 et I Cor. 11, 7, dans *Augustinianum* 25, Roma 1985, 213-234.

capacité morale et intellectuelle, Clément réussit à attribuer ce privilège aux femmes dès la création, malgré leur sexe secondaire. Par conséquent, l'équivalence des femmes en tant qu'êtres humains rationnels (*anthropos*) ne supprime pas leur subordination en tant que corporellement dérivées (*gyne*) (Paidagogos 1, 4, 10-11, 1; Stromata 4, 8, 58, 2-60, 4). Tout à fait exceptionnel au 3e siècle, le stratagème "féministe" de Clément est approfondi par Augustin, avant d'être transmis à la théologie scholastique et de demeurer incontesté jusqu'au 20e siècle[12].

Anticipée par l'usage des métaphores féminines dans le discours sur Dieu dans la matristique médiévale, l'exégèse feministe du 19e siècle introduit une nouvelle définition holistique de l'image de Dieu, comprenant tout être humain en tant que masculin ou féminin[13]. Cette anthropologie unitaire, surpassant la dualité traditionnelle entre l'âme spirituelle et le corps sexué, est d'abord adoptée par des exégètes protestants, pour être acceptée dans la théologie catholique depuis le concile Vatican II, tandis que la théologie orthodoxe en reste encore au stade des Pères de l'Église cappadocienne.

De création double à la création unique

Les deux récits differents de la création du premier homme et de sa femme, selon Gen. 1,26-28 et Gen. 2,7,18,21-24, posaient un problème de cohérence scripturaire (l'hypothèse de deux sources ne fut avancée qu'en 1711 par Henning Bernhard Witter). En contexte platonisant, Philon d'Alexandrie introduit la théorie de la double création. D'abord d'un prototype humain parfait et donc purement spirituel, créé à l'image d'un Dieu qui est axiomatiquement métasexuel. Ensuite la formation du premier couple corporellement sexué, l'homme primaire et sa femme dérivée. Conformément à cette hiérarchie des sexes, Philon interprète Gen. 1,27b: "mâle et femelle il les créa", de manière allégorique, comme décrivant les parties supérieure et inferieure de l'âme humaine. La raison (*nous*), figurée par Adam, est créée à l'image divine, tandis que la perception sensorielle (*aisthesis*), figurée

[12] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Gender and Exegesis in the Latin Fathers, dans *From Patristics to Matristics*, 49-60.

[13] Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Discours sur Dieu: patristique et matristique, dans *Augustinus* 38, 1993, 121-135; ead., Ancient and Medieval Church Mothers, dans *From Patristics to Matristics*, 145-169; ead., *Julian of Norwich: a Model of Feminist Theology*, dans ibid., 231-246; ead., Religious Feminism and Female Godlanguage from Hildegard von Bingen to Thérèse de Lisieux, dans ibid., 247-272.

par Ève, n'est pas théomorphe[14]. Cette exégèse, qui présuppose une incompabilité foncière entre le divin et le féminin, est reprise par Origène (In Genesim Homilia 1,14-15). Chez Grégoire de Nysse, la division sexuelle est ajoutée par Dieu à la création d'origine en prévision de la chute, afin que la mort comme peine du péché soit compensée par la fécondité charnelle (De hominis opificio 16).

Il faut souligner que cette connexion entre chute et sexualité détermine tout l'ascétisme ancien, aussi bien dans sa forme radicalement encratite que dans la variante mitigée des Pères de l'Église[15]. Ici, le mariage est toléré en vue de la procréation, mais la continence et la virginité restent les moyens par excellence pour retourner à la perfection présexuelle de la première création. Écartée du concept de la divinité métasexuelle et donc de l'image divine, la féminité est en outre associée au péché comme cause ou conséquence de la chute d'origine.

Converti au christianisme après dix années passées dans le manichéisme, Augustin ne se libère que graduellement de ce dualisme ontologique. Dans *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (389/91), il décrit la création d'origine comme parfaitement incorporelle, interprétant la différenciation sexuelle comme ordonnée à une fécondité spirituelle, qui n'est transformée en fertilité charnelle qu'après le péché. Au paradis, l'union de l'homme et de la femme était chaste. Ils vivaient dans une harmonie parfaite, l'homme dirigeant et la femme obéissant, engendrant des fruits spirituels (opinion corrigée en Retractationes 1,10,2; 1,13,8).

Dans *De bono conjugali* (401), Augustin propose deux intreprétations de la fécondité paradisiaque selon Gen. 1,28. Par la grâce divine, les premiers parents auraient pu se reproduire sans union charnelle, ou bien les corps d'Adam et d'Ève, créés naturellement mortels, seraient devenus plus tard spirituels en récompense de leur obéissance à Dieu. En ce cas, la génération corporelle est admissible, dans la mesure où la mortalité qui lui est connexe ferait place à l'incorruptibilité (2,2). Au commencement de *De Genesi ad litteram* (401/14), Augustin est encore indécis: la difficulté concerne le lien entre propagation charnelle et mortalité du corps humain. Il n'exclut donc pas la possibilité d'une multiplication par mode spirituel au paradis (3,21). Plus tard dans ce même écrit, Augustin réussit à concilier la

[14] Richard A. Baer, Jr., *Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female*, Leiden 1970.
Dorothy Sly, *Philo's Perception of Women*. Atlanta GA 1990.

[15] Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, *Enkrateia e Antropologia*, "Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum" 20, Roma 1984.

création à l'image divine, affirmée dans Gen. 1,26-27a: "Faisons l'homme (*homo*) à notre image, selon notre ressemblance,... Dieu créa l'homme à son image, à l'image de Dieu il le créa", avec la différenciation sexuelle: "mâle et femelle il les créa"; en vue de la fécondité charnelle selon Gen. 1,27b-28. Celle-ci est réalisée par le modelage du corps d'Adam (Gen.2,7) et la formation de la *mulier* à partir de sa côte (Gen. 2,21-23). Afin d'expliquer cette unicité de la création, malgré la divergence des deux récits, Augustin invoque la théorie stoïcienne des raisons séminales. Ainsi l'*informatio* selon Gen. 1 concerne la création instantanée des âmes du premier couple, tandis que leurs corps et tous leurs êtres à venir ne sont créés qu'en germe. Ensuite, cette création virtuelle est actualisée au cours des âges par la *confirmatio*, exprimée en Gen. 2 (6,3,5-7,10-11,14-15,18; 7,24,28; 9,13,15,17-19; 10,1-3). Par conséquent, la *femina*, est définie comme être humain, *homo*, dans la mesure où elle possède une âme rationnelle et asexuée créée à l'image de Dieu, et parce que son corps de sexe féminin fait partie de l'ordre de la création. C'est-à-dire que la formation instantanée établit Adam et Ève, et donc chaque homme et chaque femme, en position d'égalité vis-à-vis du Créateur. D'autre part, la formation temporelle, où la *mulier* apparaît après et à partir d'Adam, établit une relation hiérarchique entre les deux sexes. Par conséquent, Augustin considère que la condition subordonnée de la femme, axiomatique dans l'Antiquité romaine, est immuablement normative parce qu'établie par Dieu dans l'ordre créé.

Finalité du sexe féminin

Adoptant une perspective de dualité, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* offre une exégèse allégorique de la fonction auxiliaire et subordonnée de la *mulier*, comme l'enfantement des bonnes oeuvres à la louange de Dieu. En invoquant I Cor. 11,3: "l'homme est le chef de la femme" avec I Tim. 2,12, Augustin compare la *femina* parfaitement obéissante au paradis avec le désir corporel contrôlé par l'âme virilement rationnelle (2,11,15). En *De catechizandis rudibus* (399/400), Augustin explique que, selon Gen. 1,26-27a, l'être humain primaire, *homo*, est créé à l'image de Dieu afin de participer au commandement divin sur toute la création. Cet *homo* est ensuite identifié avec le *uir* portant l'image divine selon I Cor. 11,7. Ainsi, le rôle auxiliaire de la *femina* selon Gen. 2,18 est interprété au sens spirituel d'imitation morale de la sainteté et de la sagesse de son chef (18,29).

En perspective unitaire dans *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustin réussit à combiner la différenciation sexuelle en vue de la fertilité corporelle selon Gen. 1,27b-28, et la finalité de la *femina* en tant qu'aide selon Gen. 2,18. Il explique donc la raison d'être du sexe féminin de manière exclusivement physiologique. Augustin ne voit pas à quelle fin la femme aurait été donnée à l'homme en qualité d'aide, sinon pour engendrer des enfants. Adam serait mieux assisté en son travail par un autre mâle, *masculus*, et sa solitude serait mieux soulagée par un ami du même sexe. Par conséquent, le rôle spécifique de la *femina* est de servir d'instrument à la procréation de l'homme (9,5, cf. 9,7,11). Cette interprétation de la différence des sexes comme constitutive de l'ordre créé présuppose une biologie androcentrique de type aristotélicien, répandue au temps d'Augustin[16]. Ainsi, la fonction féminine est secondaire et passive, donc comparable à la terre qui reçoit le semence (9,3).

Exégèse allégorique de Paul

Tout en refusant la dualité anthropologique de la création double, où la corporéité mortelle et sexuée est liée au péché d'origine comme cause ou effet, Augustin conserve la définition connexe de l'image divine comme purement spirituelle. Par conséquent, l'*imago Dei* ne concerne que l'âme rationnelle, qui en tant qu'incorporelle est immortelle et asexuée (De Genesi ad litteram, 3,20; De Trinitate 12,7,12). Inversement, la différenciation des sexes est restreinte au niveau du corps. Cette dualité permet à Augustin d'inclure la *femina* comme être humain rationnel, créé à l'image du Dieu, tout en lui refusant ce privilège en tant qu'être humain de sexe féminin. En affirmant la création unique et la fécondité charnelle comme instituée dès l'origine, Augustin n'éprouve plus le besoin d'expliquer la différenciation sexuelle de manière allégorique. Puisque la création de l'âme à l'image divine coïncide avec la formation causale des corps du premier couple, *masculus* et *femina* (Gen. 1,27b) se rattachent à *homo* (Gen. 1,26-27a). La cohésion du composé humain, âme théomorphe et corps sexué, est ainsi garantie par l'unicité de l'acte créateur. Afin d'assurer l'équivalence spirituelle de la *femina*, créée à l'image de Dieu en dépit de son sexe non théomorphe, Augustin est le premier Père de l'Église qui explicitement affronte I Cor. 11,7: "L'homme

[16] Aline Rousselle, *La Contamination spirituelle. Science, droit et religion dans l'Antiquité*, Paris 1998, 25-86.

(*uir*) ne doit pas se couvrir la tête, parce qu'il est l'image et le reflet de Dieu, quant à la femme (*mulier*), elle est le reflet de l'homme". Dans l'exégèse antiochéenne, ce texte de Paul est compris littéralement comme excluant la femme de l'image de Dieu. C'est pourquoi Augustin a recours à une exégèse allégorique du couple *uir-mulier*, en reprenant le symbolisme du couple *masculus-femina* chez Philon et Origène. Ce stratagème est utilisé pour expliquer l'absence de l'image divine chez la *mulier*, qui figure la partie inférieure de l'âme, adonnée aux nécessités temporelles. Le raisonnement présuppose donc une relation hiérarchique entre les deux sexes dans l'ordre créé, autrement dit la partie supérieure de l'âme, adonnée à la contemplation des vérités éternelles, figure l'homme en tant que *uir*: par la supériorité de son sexe, il reflète l'excellence de l'image divine dans son âme rationnelle. Différenciée du *masculus* / *uir* par l'infériorité de son sexe, la *femina* / *mulier* est incapable de refléter l'image divine qu'elle aussi possède dans son âme rationnelle, et par laquelle elle est définie comme *homo*. En conséquence, la *femina* est frappée d'une incohérence entre son âme théomorphe et son sexe dérivé, laquelle ne se trouve pas chez l'homme en raison de son sexe primaire.

Comme le montre son interprétation de I Cor. 11,7 dans *De Genesi ad litteram* (3,22), Augustin s'efforce ainsi d'expliquer l'équivalence de l'être humain de sexe féminin dans l'ordre du salut, malgré l'incompatibilité axiomatique entre le divin et le féminin. Il recourt à l'ingénieuse explication que l'âme spirituelle, créée à l'image de Dieu, a une double fonction: la contemplation de la vérité éternelle et le gouvernement des choses temporelles, une partie qui commande, une partie qui obéit. Seule mériterait d'être appelée de Dieu la partie de l'âme qui s'attache à la contemplation de la vérité immuable. C'est à cette figure que se réfère l'Apôtre Paul, lorsqu'il dit que l'homme seul est l'image et la gloire de Dieu, mais la femme est la gloire de l'homme (I Cor. 11,7). Donc, bien que la diversité des sexes en deux personnes différentes figure, extérieurement et corporellement, une dualité qui se retrouve intérieurement dans l'âme d'une seule personne, la femme, n'étant femme que par son corps, est elle aussi renouvelée en son âme spirituelle dans la connaissance de Dieu à l'image de celui qui l'a créée (Col. 3,10), là où il n'y a ni mâle ni femelle (Gal. 3,28).

Dans *De Trinitate* (399/419), Augustin reprend l'allégorie de la relation hiérarchique des fonctions de l'âme humaine afin d'harmoniser I Cor. 11,7 avec l'équivalence spirituelle de l'*imago Dei*, garantie par l'inclusion de la *femina* dans la création unique, selon Gen. 1,26-27b. Tout en réservant la suprématie du *uir* au plan symbolique,

l'exégèse d'Augustin accentue le clivage entre féminité auxiliaire, propre de la *mulier*, et l'image divine de son âme rationnelle, tandis que la masculinité de l'homme est conforme à son privilège théomorphe. Parce que l'homme est l'image de Dieu, il ne doit pas se voiler la tête, mais la femme ne l'est pas et doit par conséquent voiler la sienne. Lorsqu'elle est tout adonnée à la contemplation de la vérité, l'âme humaine est image de Dieu; mais lorsque quelque chose d'elle se détache du fait qu'une partie de l'attention s'applique à agir sur le temporel, l'âme, en cette part d'elle- même qui voit et consulte la vérité, reste néanmoins image de Dieu; mais en cette part qui s'applique à une action sur les réalites inférieures, elle n'est pas image de Dieu. C'est-à-dire que la femme participe à l'image divine en tant qu'attachée à l'homme dans ce sens qu'elle partage la partie supérieure de l'âme, tandis que le *uir* est théomorphe en tant qu'être humain autonome (12,7,10).

Comme pour Clément d'Alexandrie, il s'agit pour Augustin d'attribuer à la *femina* le privilège de l'image asexuée dès la création, en combinant cette *imago Dei* avec le thème du devenir mâle par incorporation au Christ. Il souligne qu'en devenant chrétiennes, les femmes sont renouvelées à l'image de Dieu, là où il n'y a pas de sexe (Gal. 3,28). C'est-à-dire que l'être humain (*homo*) est créé à l'image de Dieu en son âme spirituelle (Eph. 4,23-24). Lorsque l'homme (*uir*) ne doit pas se voiler la tête parce qu'il est l'image et la gloire de Dieu, tandis que la femme doit voiler la sienne parce qu'elle est la gloire de l'homme (I Cor. 11,7), Augustin précise donc que la femme est renouvelée en son âme spirituelle, en la connaissance de Dieu selon l'image de celui qui l'a créée (Col. 3,10). Il conclut que l'image de Dieu ne réside qu'en cette partie de l'âme qui s'attache aux raisons éternelles, les contemple et s'en inspire, privilège qui, de toute évidence, appartient non seulement aux hommes, mais aussi aux femmes (12,7,12-13).

Sexuologie du péché d'origine

Interprétant la chute du premier couple dans *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustin met l'accent sur la fonction instrumentale de la *femina*, qui renverse la hiérarchie des sexes établie par l'ordre créateur (11,27,34; 8,17). Puisque la raison d'être de la femme est sa fonction maternelle, la *mulier* est frappé de manière spéciale en tant qu'aide pour la procréation. Comme peine du péché, elle souffre les douleurs de l'enfantement et reste sous la domination de son *uir*

(Gen. 3,16). Il est important pour Augustin de légitimer et de garantir la subordination bio-sociologique des femmes par la hiérarchie des sexes instituée dès la création. Seulement lorsque la condition féminine dégénère en servitude du péché d'origine, comme l'esclavage, elle devient une punition (11,37; cf. De ciuitate Dei 19,14-16). Étant donné le rôle instrumental d'Ève dans la chute originelle, dont Adam seul assume la pleine responsabilité, les conséquences du premier péché sont transmises uniquement par Adam, et ensuite de père en enfant. Invoquant Rom. 5,12, ce lien entre le premier homme et tout le genre humain est compris de manière à la fois morale et biologique. Par conséquent, Augustin précise que la culpabiblité collective est transmise par voie séminale. Suivant son interprétation de la création unique, il insiste sur la bonté originelle de la propagation de la chair, selon Gen. 1,28. Contre la dévaluation du mariage propre de la double création, Augustin affirme que l'union des sexes en vue de fertilité corporelle est instituée avant la chute (De ciuitate Dei 14,21-24,26; De gratia Christi et de peccato originali 2,35,40). D'autre part, il conserve l'angoisse encratite devant l'orgasme, prônant que la *libido* est une conséquence du *reatus*[17].

Nouvel Adam et nouvelle Ève

Tout comme la culpabilité collective englobe le genre humain en Adam, la rédemption est opérée par le Christ en tant que nouvel Adam. Conformément au rôle instrumental d'Ève dans la chute, la nouvelle Ève est auxiliaire dans l'ordre du salut. Le Christ s'incarne par l'intermédiaire de Marie, et l'oeuvre rédemptrice s'accomplit avec l'aide de l'Église. Par conséquent, cette typologie où mère et épouse représentent l'élément subordonné, transpose la hiérarchie des sexes de l'ordre créé à l'ordre de la rédemption. Néanmoins, il est important de noter qu'Augustin, comme dans *De agone christiano* (396), insiste sur la nécessité de participation féminine afin de garantir l'inclusivité

[17] David A. Hunter, Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine's Teaching on Sex, Marriage and Celibacy, dans *Augustinian Studies* 25, 1994, 153-177; Mathijs Lamberigts, Julien d'Eclane et Augustin d'Hippone. Deux conceptions d'Adam, dans *Collectanea Augustiniana* I, Leuven 1990, 373-410; id., Some Critiques on Augustine's View of Sexuality Revisited, dans *Studia Patristica* 33, Leuven 1997, 152-161; Giulia Sfameni Gasparro, *Agostino. Tra etica e religione*, Brescia 1999, 15-73; Johannes van Oort, Augustine and Mani on concupiscentia sexualis, dans J. den Boeft, J. van Oort (éds.), *Augustiniana Traiectina*, "Etudes Augustiniennes" 119, Paris 1987, 137-152.

du salut, c'est-à-dire englobant les deux sexes. Ainsi, le Christ s'incarne dans le sexe masculin, pour naître d'une femme (22,24; cf. De uera religione 16,30; De fide et symbolo 4,9). La libération de l'être humain, *homo*, est ainsi manifestée de manière plénière, afin que les deux sexes soient assurés d'être sauvés (Sermo Denis 25,4). D'autre part dans *De diuersis quaestionibus* (388/96), la prééminence du sexe masculin est renforcée par l'incarnation du Christ comme *uir*, en assumant l'humanité mâle en tant que sexe le plus honorable, tandis que l'affranchissement du sexe féminin est garantie par sa naissance d'une femme (11).

Conformément à la finalité d'Ève comme instrument de procréation dans l'ordre créé, Augustin considère l'Église, en tant que nouvelle Ève et épouse du Christ, sous l'angle de la fécondité spirituelle. C'est ainsi que dans *De ciuitate Dei*, la première *femina*, tirée du flanc d'Adam, figure l'Église jaillissant du côté percé du Christ. Cette analogie de Gen. 2,21 et de Jean 19,34 se trouve déjà chez Tertullien (De anima 43,10), où le sang et l'eau signifient les sacrements de l'Église (22,17; cf. In Johannis euangelium tractatus 15,8; 120,2).

Augustin élabore le parallèle entre Ève et l'*ecclesia* au sens nuptial, où la nouvelle Ève est mère des vivants, en référence à Gen. 2,24; 3,20 et Eph. 5,31-32 (In Johannis euangelium tractatus 9,10; De nuptiis et concupiscentia 2,4,12). En tant qu'épouse du Christ, l'*ecclesia* est vierge (II Cor. 11,2), et la multitude des fidèles participe à sa fécondité spirituelle par la foi. La communauté ecclésiale, qui comprend des hommes et des femmes, vierges ou non, se comporte donc de manière virginale vis-à-vis de son époux, le Christ (In Johannis euangelium tractatus 13,12; Enarrationes in Psalmos 90,2,9; 147,10; Sermo 213,7,7). Dans ce symbolisme de la nouvelle Ève, Marie et l'Église sont fusionnées, l'une et l'autre étant à la fois vierge et mère. Comme chez Ambroise (De institutione virginis 14,88-89; Expositio in Lucam 2,7,56-57), Marie est le type de la virginité de l'Église; et sa fécondité corporelle, en enfantant le Christ, est considérée dans la perspective de la maternité spirituelle de l'*ecclesia* (De sancta uirginitate 2,2-6,6). Participant à la fécondité virginale de l'Église par sa foi en la mission du Christ, Marie est un membre prééminent de cette *mater ecclesia* (Sermo Denis 25,7).

Résurrection du sexe féminin

Représentant l'élément féminin dans la création comme dans la rédemption, Ève, Marie et l'Église sont des modèles pour chaque

femina. Cette typologie place l'*ecclesia virgo* comme épouse subordonnée vis-à-vis du Christ (II Cor. 11,2; I Cor. 11,3). D'autre part, du fait de leur renouvellement spirituel dans l'ordre du salut, les fidèles deviennent parfaitement virils (Eph. 4,13) par incorporation au Christ chef (Sermo Mai 20,3).

Chez Augustin cette complémentarité asymétrique est contrebalancée par une interprétation équivalente de la résurrection. La *femina*, en tant qu'être humain sexuellement différent du prototype masculin, fait partie de l'ordre créé. Suivant sa perspective de création unique, Augustin est le premier Père de l'Église qui précise que les femmes ressusciteront avec leurs corps féminins. Dans *De ciuitate Dei* (413/427), Augustin se distingue donc explicitement de l'eschatologie propre à la création double, humanité masculine ou asexuée. Par conséquent, Augustin propose une exégèse inclusive du *uir perfectus* en Eph. 4,13: "à l'état d'homme parfait, à la taille du Christ dans sa plénitude". L'assimilation au Christ en Rom. 8,29: "semblable à l'image de son Fils", n'est donc plus interprétée dans le sens que les femmes seront transformées en mâles. Dans la résurrection, l'organisme féminin subsistera, mais libéré de sa fonction spécifique de l'ordre créé, ne servant plus à la propagation charnelle. Parce que le sexe féminin relève de la nature, non du vice, il lui sera accordé une beauté nouvelle. De son point de vue masculin, Augustin précise que cette féminité parfaite n'excitera pas la concupiscence désormais disparue, mais servira à glorifier la sagesse et la clémence de Dieu. Comme Dieu a créé l'humanité en deux sexes, la création sera renouvelée dans sa totalité (22,17).

Augustin poursuit son exposé sur la félicité de l'au-delà en interprétant Matt. 22,30: "À la résurrection, en effet, on ne prend ni femme, ni mari; mais on est comme des anges dans le ciel". En précisant que ce texte montre que le Seigneur nie le mariage et non pas l'existence des femmes dans la vie céleste, Augustin fait sans doute un echo ironique à la beatitude virilement angélique visée par Jérôme (Commentarius in Eph. 3,5; Apologia contra Rufinum 1,28-29; cf. Epistula 108,23). Augustin considère également la résurrection du sexe masculin ou féminin dans une perspective de perfection individuelle. Combinant Eph. 4,13 et Ps. 112,1: "Heureux l'homme qui craint le Seigneur", il explique que le terme *uir* ici est à comprendre dans le sens inclusif d'*homo* et donc désignant aussi bien la *femina* (22,18; cf. 15,17). Augustin précise encore que l'identification scripturaire de *uir* et *homo* en Ps. 112,1, n'exclut pas l'inclusion de la *femina* dans la terminologie de l'humain (Enarrationes in Psalmos 118,5,2).

Dans un exposé antérieur, *De sermone Domini in monte* Augustin cite Matt. 22,30 et Gal. 3,28 dans le contexte de Luc. 14,26: "Si quelqu'un vient à moi, et s'il ne hait pas son père, sa mère, sa femme, ses enfants, ses frères et ses soeurs, et même sa propre vie, il ne peut être mon disciple". Insistant sur la libération de la concupiscence masculine au paradis, Augustin explique que le bon mari chrétien doit refuser la présence de sa *femina* ressuscitée en tant qu'épouse, tout en désirant qu'elle soit transformée en *homo* par restauration de la perfection originelle (1,15,41). Il faut souligner que ce texte n'exprime pas une misogynie proprement dite, mais plutôt la réaction du mâle hétérosexuel provoqué par l'antagonisme axiomatique entre amour de Dieu et attraction du sexe féminin. Ce conflit fondamental de l'ascétisme chrétien devient manifeste dans sa propre conversion (Soliloquia 1,10,17; Confessiones 6,15,26).

Féminologie ambivalente

Quoiqu'incontestée dans la société antique, Augustin éprouve néanmoins le besoin de démontrer que la subordination féminine est établie par Dieu dès la création. Dans *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (419/21), Augustin justifie la polygamie des patriarches de l'Ancien Testament comme conforme à la suprématie masculine. Il invoque I Cor. 11,3 et Col. 3,18: "Femmes, soyez soumises à vos maris", pour affirmer le caractère normatif de l'asymétrie des deux sexes (1,9,10). Par conséquent, Augustin souligne que le fonctionnement harmonieux de la communauté humaine implique une relation hiérarchique des parties. Une subordination fondée sur l'infériorité du subordonné est juste; étant donné la supériorité intellectuelle de l'homme, axiomatique au temps d'Augustin, la femme est ainsi soumise à lui comme un enfant à un adulte (In heptateuchum locutionum 1,53; cf. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum 1,30,63). Il est donc important pour Augustin de distinguer entre la subordination féminine établie par l'ordre créé et l'esclavage possiblement réformable, parce que résultant de la chute d'origine.

Néanmoins, dans *De agone christiano* (396), Augustin précise que l'ordre du salut est démocratique en englobant des êtres humains de toutes conditions. Par conséquent, hommes, femmes, enfants et esclaves sont mis en mouvement par l'espérance de la vie éternelle (12,137; cf. De fide, spe et caritate 27,103). Il en résulte une disharmonie entre les deux ordres dans ce monde, où subordination sexuelle et sociale sont en vigueur et restent normatives, tandis

que l'équivalence de la rédemption est déjà à l'oeuvre. Il est donc à noter que dans *Expositio ad Galatas* (394/5), Augustin évite de préciser dans quelle mesure cette distribution des rôles ethniques, sociaux et sexuels provient de l'ordre créé ou de la peine du péché. Puisque le corps est encore mort à cause du péché (Rom. 8,23), cette différence de nation, de condition et de sexe est à la vérité abolie par l'unité de la foi (Gal. 3,28), mais elle persiste dans la société mortelle, il faut conserver son ordre dans le chemin de cette vie, et les Apôtres le prescrivent, ceux qui ont donné des règles très salutaires sur la manière dont doivent vivre selon la différence des nations Juifs et Grecs, selon la différence des conditions maîtres et esclaves, selon la différence des sexes maris et femmes (28).

Ce décalage entre équivalence rédemptrice et hiérarchie temporelle est particulièrement visible dans la féminologie d'Augustin[18]. Il s'agit de démontrer comment les femmes possèdent l'image de Dieu, malgré leur sexe non théomorphe. Ce défi est proprement théologique, résultant du concept même de la divinité, où la féminité est absente ou écartée. L'autre obstacle pour inclure la *femina* comme pleinement humaine dans le système symbolique et doctrinal résulte de son anthropologie. Dépassant le monisme androcentrique du christianisme primitif, où les femmes sont transformées en hommes par incorporation au Christ dans l'ordre du salut, l'équivalence asexuée exclut également le féminin de l'humain. Chez Grégoire de Nysse, la création double est égalitaire en aliénant la corporéité, tant masculine que féminine de la perfection initiale. En effet, l'anthropologie dualiste adoptée par la plupart des Pères de l'Église, impose une définition de l'être humain où la différenciation sexuelle est limitée au corps et où l'image de Dieu est limitée à l'âme rationnelle. Cette scission fondamentale est préservée par Augustin, malgré son effort pour affirmer la création unique. Il en résulte un "féminisme" dualiste, où la *femina* est définie come *homo* en tant que creeé à l'*imago Dei* selon son âme asexuée. D'autre part, à cause de l'incompabilité foncière entre le divin et le féminin, la *mulier* ne peut être un symbole de cette image en tant qu'être sexué. Gardant la cohérence entre masculinité et *imago Dei*, propre au monisme androcentrique, Augustin cherche à expliquer l'existence de la féminité dans l'ordre créé. Lorsqu'il définit la raison d'être de la *femina* par sa fonction auxiliaire dans la procréation charnelle, elle reste coincée par cette finalité spécifique, axiomatiquement subordonnée.

[18] Pour une vue d'ensemble voir Kari Elisabeth Børresen, La féminologie d'Augustin, dans *From Patristics to Matristics*, 61-89.

Conclusion

En perspective opposée du féminisme moderne, où l'équivalence des sexes est axiomatique, la féminologie d'Augustin reste donc très ambivalente. Trois éléments sont contraires aux droits humains des femmes: la hiérarchie des sexes ordonnée par Dieu bloque leur équivalence bio-socio-culturelle. La transposition de cette asymétrie à l'ordre du salut par la typologie Christ-Église renforce leur incapacité culturelle. L'autonomie reproductive des femmes est empêchée par la doctrine du péché originel, où le mal de la concupiscence est neutralisé par le bien de la fécondité, selon son adage de "bene uti malo".

Depuis le concile Vatican II, l'Église romaine a cessé de favoriser la subordination des femmes dans la société civile. Il faut aussi noter que la structure hiérarchique du mariage est quasi disparue dans le *Codex Iuris Canonici* (1983). En contraste, l'état subordonné du sexe féminin est conservé dans les institutions ecclésiales. L'asymétrie typologique est invoquée pour exclure les femmes du sacerdoce et de l'épiscopat, aussi bien dans le catholicisme que dans l'orthodoxie. Par cet *impedimentum sexus*, elles restent écartées du gouvernement et du magistère de l'Église. Il est donc important d'observer que la typologie classique est élaborée à partir du 2e siècle par Justin et Irénée, en conformité avec le premier stade de l'anthropologie chrétienne. Ici, l'élément primaire, le nouvel Adam, est à la fois andromorphe et divin, tandis que l'élément subordonné, la nouvelle Ève, est à la fois gynécomorphe et humain. Cette transposition de la relation asymétrique de l'ordre créateur à l'ordre du salut est logiquement incompatible avec l'attribution postérieure de l'*imago Dei* aux femmes dès la création. Cherchant d'harmoniser ces deux thèmes incohérents, Augustin souligne que la nouvelle Ève garantit la rédemption de l'humanité féminine, et que les femmes vont ressusciter avec leur sexe restauré.

En effet, l'exégèse "féministe" d'Augustin a eu un tel succès que la théologie contemporaine moins historique croit que les femmes sont théomorphes déjà selon la Génèse *ad litteram*! Ce voilement du fait que l'inclusion des femmes dans l'*imago Dei* est réalisée au cours de l'histoire chrétienne, produit une confusion apologétique d'image ajustée et de typologie arrêtée[19]. Le procédé sert surtout à obscurcir

[19] Ce mélange disparate caractérise la féminologie de Jean Paul II, cf. Kari Elisabeth Børresen, Image ajustée, typologie arrêtée: analyse critique de Mulieris dignitatem, dans Børresen & Vogt 1993, 343-357; Kari Vogt, Catholicisme et Islam: Une rhétorique apologétique commune à propos de la femme, dans ibid., 359-365

l'androcentrisme foncier du symbolisme typologique, qui constitue la christologie, l'ecclésiologie et la mariologie, tant catholiques qu'orthodoxes.

Plus funeste en contexte global est la lutte vaticane contre les moyens efficaces de contraception, parce que la fécondité volontaire est une *conditio sine qua non* pour la collaboration des deux sexes dans tous les domaines de la société. C'est précisement à cause de cette révolution biologique que le féminisme est devenu un mouvement de masse dans les pays développés. De même, les organisations des Nations Unies travaillent pour assurer le droit humain de reproduction autonome aux femmes du tiers-monde. Paradoxalement, le concept stoïcien de fertilité "naturelle", invoqueé par les Pères de l'Église pour défendre le mariage contre l'ascétisme encratite, est aujourd'hui repris *in absurdum* par le Saint-Siège. Condamnant l'usage des préservatifs pour arrêter le fléau global de SIDA, l'Église institutionnelle agit en obstacle aux droits humains. Dans cette situation infortunée, il faut justement valoriser l'effort d'Augustin pour inclure les deux sexes dans l'humanité créée à l'image de Dieu.

Kari E. Børresen

„WENN MÄNNER NACH DEN SCHRIFTEN FRAGEN WÜRDEN, WÜRDE ICH NICHT MIT FRAUEN REDEN" – ODER: MARCELLA ALS LÜCKENBÜßERIN?

Die im Titel genannte Aussage des Hieronymus[1] scheint seine Einstellung zu Frauen klar und deutlich auf den Punkt zu bringen.[2] Ist hiermit nicht bereits alles gesagt? Der erste Blick legt dies nahe, doch wagen wir einen zweiten!

Zuvor stellt sich noch eine ganz grundsätzliche Anfrage, auf die van Bavel aufmerksam macht: Wie sinnvoll ist es überhaupt, die Gedanken altkirchlicher Autoren im Blick auf Frauen zu erforschen? Die Antwort hängt ganz von der jeweiligen Erwartungshaltung ab. Derjenige, der sich von einem solchen Unterfangen eine Auskunft hinsichtlich moderner Fragen erhofft, der wird enttäuscht sein.[3] Wer hingegen die Geschichte, die unseren modernen Fragestellungen vorangeht, zu rekonstruieren wünscht, dem werden solche Studien außerordentlich hilfreich sein![4]

Enttäuschungen möchte dieser Artikel natürlich vermeiden. Selbstredend kann unser heutiges Verständnis von Emanzipation und Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter nicht als Maßstab für das Verhältnis zwischen Hieronymus und Marcella dienen. Nur aus seiner Zeit heraus können wir es annähernd erschließen. Statt in metahistorische Be- und Verurteilungen zu verfallen, sollen im Folgenden historisch zu verortende Einschätzungen in ihrem jeweiligen Kontext zur Sprache kommen. Gelingt es, Marcellas Lebensrealität als Subjekt geschichtlichen Handelns ansatzweise sichtbar zu machen[5], ist m. E.

[1] ep. 65.1 PL 22,625: «Si viri de Scripturis quaererent, mulieribus non loquerer.»

[2] Vgl. R. Radford Ruether, Misogynism and Virginal Feminism in the Fathers of the Church, in: Dies. (Hg.), Religion and Sexism. Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, New York 1974, 150-183, hier: 150: "The usual image of the Fathers of the Church (...) is that of fanatical ascetics and woman haters."

[3] Vgl. T. J. van Bavel, The Anthropology of Augustine, in: Louvain Studies 5 (1974) 34-47, hier: 35: "... there is an enormous difference between the early Christian and modern estimate of man."

[4] Vgl. T. J. van Bavel, Augustine's View on Women, in: Augustiniana 39 (1989) 5-53, hier: 5: "Is it meaningful to investigate the thought of an author who lived at the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century regarding women? If one expects to find there an answer to modern questions, the answer will be: no. But if one wishes to reconstruct the history which precedes the modern problematic, then such a study can be useful."

[5] Vgl. A. Jensen, Gottes selbstbewusste Töchter. Frauenemanzipation im frühen Christentum? (Theologische Frauenforschung in Europa 9), Münster u.ö. ²2003, 12.

bereits ein erster Schritt zur Erfassung ihrer Rolle und Persönlichkeit getan. Darüber hinaus zeigt sich an diesem geschichtlichen Beispiel, dass eine geschlechtsspezifische Rollenzuschreibung keine statische Größe ist. Vielmehr ist das jeweilige Frauenbild ein soziales und kontextabhängiges Konstrukt, dessen inhaltliche Füllung sich in jeder Epoche, in jedem Kulturkreis, in jeder Gesellschaft und in jeder zwischenmenschlichen Begegnung neu als Aufgabe stellt. In diesem Sinne ist die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Frauenverständnis eines altkirchlichen Autors nützlich, denn sie regt durch Kontraste, Abgrenzungen, Überraschungen, Facettenreichtum und Polemisierungen zur eigenen denkerischen Leistung an und ermutigt somit, gegenwärtige Errungenschaften nicht als Selbstverständlichkeit, sondern als stetige Herausforderung wahr- und ernstzunehmen.

Am Anfang einer derartigen Urteilsbildung steht die historische Rekonstruktion. Erschwert wird dieses Vorhaben dadurch, dass das weibliche Lebens- und Selbstverständnis in der Spätantike fast ausschließlich über die Textzeugnisse von Männern erschlossen werden kann. Die überlieferte Sicht ist also eine männliche, und es gilt, die Intention des Verfassers vor allen Folgerungen mit zu berücksichtigen.

Anhand von epistula 127, einem von Hieronymus 412/413 n. Chr. zu Ehren seiner Freundin Marcella verfassten Nekrolog, tritt das sehr deutlich zu Tage. Dieser Nachruf auf Marcella, die hochbetagt noch im Jahre 410 n. Chr. die Plünderungen der Soldaten des Alarich miterleben musste, hebt u.a. hervor, dass sie die Eindringlinge mit unerschrockenem Antlitz empfangen sowie die Schläge mit Stöcken und Riemen nicht gespürt habe.[6] Monate nach dieser Begebenheit sei sie dann „gesund, unversehrt und mit rüstigem Körper im Herrn“[7] entschlafen. Insgesamt zeigt dieser Brief, wie sehr die Absicht des Verfassers über die biographisch als erwähnenswert befundenen Inhalte entschied. Marcella erscheint als „der berühmte Schmuck aller Heiligen und der Stadt Rom im besonderen“[8]. Die literarische Nachgestaltung ihres Lebens steht also unverkennbar im Kontext

[6] ep. 127.13 PL 22,1095.

[7] ep. 127.14 PL 22,1095: «Post aliquot dies, sano, integro, vegetoque corpusculo, obdormivit in Domino ....»

[8] ep. 127.1 PL 22,1087: «Neque vero Marcellam tuam, imo meam; et ut verius loquar, nostram, omniumque Sanctorum, et propriae Romanae urbis inclytum decus institutis rhetorum predicabo»; Übs. ep. 127 hier stets zitiert nach S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella – Discipula et Magistra. Auf den Spuren einer römischen Christin des 4. Jahrhunderts (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 91), Berlin u.ö. 1998, 247-256.

kirchenpolitisch-hagiographischer Interessen. Hieronymus zeichnete nicht weniger als das Vor- und Idealbild einer christlichen Römerin, dessen Ausstrahlungskraft er sicher sein konnte. Der Ruhm dieser Frau – seiner Freundin! – strahlte nicht zuletzt auch auf ihn ab. Laut seiner Darstellung glänzte Marcella bereits vor der ersten gemeinsamen Begegnung durch Bescheidenheit und lobenswerte Tugendhaftigkeit. Ferner teilte Hieronymus mit, dass sie bei der Auswahl ihrer Sozialkontakte wählerisch gewesen sei – ein Hinweis, mit welchem er ganz nebenbei die Bedeutung der ihm von Marcella entgegengebrachten Wertschätzung andeuten konnte.

„Selten ging sie an die Öffentlichkeit, und am meisten mied sie die Häuser nobler Frauen, damit sie nicht gezwungen wurde zu sehen, was sie verachtet hatte. Die Kirchen der Apostel und Märtyrer suchte sie häufig auf, aber mit stillen Gebeten, Gebeten, die auch die Menge der Leute mieden."[9]

Marcella setzte demnach klare Prioritäten und eignete sich als allseits bekannte, adelige Römerin in hervorragender Weise dazu, das ideal gelebte Christentum augenscheinlich zu verkörpern und geradezu beiläufig zu bewerben.

Hieronymus verstand es, einflussreiche Frauen für das Christentum und seine damit verbundenen eigenen Ambitionen einzunehmen. Solche Frauen stellten eine wertvolle Verbindung zu den Mächtigen der Welt dar, die durch sie angesprochen und für die kirchlichen Ziele gewonnen werden konnten.[10] Die Christianisierung des spätantiken Adels wurde besonders von Frauen der Oberschicht vorangetrieben.[11]

Den Kontakt nahm Hieronymus vielfach durch Briefe auf. Unermüdlich verfasste er eine solche Vielzahl von Briefen an Frauen, dass kein anderer Kirchenvater es ihm in dieser Hinsicht gleich tat.

[9] ep. 127.3f. PL 22,1088f.: «Raro procedebat ad publicum, et maxime nobilium matronarum vitabat domos, ne cogeretur videre quod contempserat. Apostolorum et Martyrum basilicas secretis celebrans orationibus, et quae populorum frequentiam declinarent.»

[10] Vgl. z. B. B. Feichtinger, Apostolae apostolarum. Frauenaskese als Befreiung und Zwang bei Hieronymus (Studien zur klassischen Philologie 94), Frankfurt a.M. u.ö. 1995, 320; P. Brown, Aspects of the christianization of the roman aristocracy, in: The Journal of Roman Studies 51 (1961) 1-11, hier: 11; S. Rebenich, Hieronymus und sein Kreis. Prosopographische und sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchungen (Historia 72), Stuttgart 1992, 154; Chr. Steininger, Die ideale christliche Frau. Virgo-Vidua-Nupta. Eine Studie zum Bild der idealen christlichen Frau bei Hieronymus und Pelagius, St. Ottilien 1997, 11; A. Yarbrough, Christianization in the Fourth Century: The Example of Roman Women, in: Church History 45 (1976) 149-165.

[11] A. Fürst, Hieronymus. Askese und Wissenschaft in der Spätantike, Freiburg/Brsg. 2003, 52.

Augustin adressierte lediglich 7 Prozent seiner Briefe an Frauen, Chrysostomus immerhin schon 23 Prozent. Bei Hieronymus aber waren über ein Drittel, nämlich 34 Prozent seiner Briefe an Frauen gerichtet.[12]

Dem ersten Zusammentreffen mit Marcella ging ausnahmsweise kein von Hieronymus initiierter Briefwechsel voran. Gemeinsam mit Bischof Paulinus und Epiphanius von Salamis kam Hieronymus 382 n. Chr. nach Rom. Hieronymus nahm diese Reise als Begleiter und Dolmetscher des Paulinus auf sich, der bei Papst Damasus gegen das Konzil von Konstantinopel 381 n. Chr. Einspruch erheben wollte, weil dieses seinen Gegenspieler Meletius als Bischof von Antiochien anerkannt hatte. Zuvor hatte Paulinus Hieronymus zum Presbyter ordiniert. Während Paulinus und Epiphanius im Sommer 383 n. Chr. die Heimreise antraten, zog Hieronymus es vor, in Rom zu bleiben. Er selbst teilte seiner Leserschaft stolz mit, dass er die ehrenvolle Stellung als Sekretär des Papstes Damasus innegehabt habe, doch „diese in eine unglaubwürdige Geschichte eingeflochtene Behauptung scheint nicht verlässlich zu sein (ep. 123,9)."[13]

Ein wesentlicher Beweggrund für den Entschluss des Hieronymus, in der ewigen Stadt zu verweilen, bestand wohl eher darin, dass er schnell zum schillernden Zentrum jenes Kreises hochadliger, reicher Damen, die Marcellas Nähe suchten, avanciert war. Diese Entwicklung war zu Beginn keineswegs sein Verdienst. Vielmehr war es die berühmte siebenundfünfzigjährige Marcella gewesen, die selbstbewusst die Initiative ergriffen und den ersten Schritt auf jenen fünfunddreißigjährigen Schriftgelehrten zu gemacht hatte.[14] Nach anfänglicher brieflicher Konversation lud sie ihn zu „regelmäßigen ‚Lehrveranstaltungen'"[15] ein. Marcella, die wir heute zweifelsohne als „Trendsetterin" bezeichnen könnten, eröffnete mit ihrem Modell „intellektueller Salonaskese"[16] ein neues Lebensgefühl, das auch Raum für die Entfaltung von Hieronymus' Persönlichkeit ließ. Offensichtlich kamen die Frauen um Marcella mit Hieronymus trotz seines schwierigen

[12] Vgl. E. A. Clark, Theory and Practice in Late Ancient Asceticism. Jerome, Chrysostom, and Augustine, in: Journal of feminist studies in religion 5 (1989) 25-46, hier: 34.

[13] P. Nautin, Art.: Hieronymus, in: TRE XV (1986) 304-315, hier: 305.

[14] Zu Altersangaben vgl. Chr. Krumreich, Hieronymus und die christlichen feminae clarissimae, Bonn 1993, 72.

[15] S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella, 238.

[16] A. Fürst, Hieronymus, 53.

Charakters, der „die für einen Choleriker typischen Eigenschaften“[17] aufwies, aus.[18]

Wenngleich Hieronymus in dieser Zeit natürlich auch mit vielen Männern zusammentraf, hielt er selbst diese Begegnungen weniger eifrig für seine Nachwelt fest.[19] Waren diese Zusammenkünfte nicht erfreulich? Ermangelte es den römischen Männern etwa an Begeisterungsfähigkeit für das Auftreten des Hieronymus? Wir wissen es nicht wirklich, aber so mancher meint es doch zumindest zu erahnen: „Die Vorliebe für ein weibliches Publikum, das ihn bewundert und versteht und das er belehren, erziehen und ermahnen kann, ist (...) ein bleibender Zug seines Naturells.“[20] Schnell drängt sich der Eindruck auf, als habe Hieronymus lediglich in einem unkritischen Kreis leicht zu beeindruckender Frauen brilliert. Seine Gesprächspartnerinnen waren jedoch gebildet und vertraten einen relativ selbstbewussten Frauentyp, der sich in den höheren Gesellschaftsschichten in beträchtlicher Zahl fand.[21]

Zwar stand die männliche Führungsposition und die damit einhergehende Hierarchie damals außer Frage, aber es bildete sich – zumindest innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Oberschicht – eine aktive Position der Römerinnen heraus, so dass diesen ein gewisses Maß an eigenverantwortetem Handlungsspielraum möglich war. Von ihrer geistigen Freiheit machten die Frauen um Marcella regen Gebrauch. Der intellektuelle Anspruch, den dieser Zirkel hatte, war äußert hoch und ein eifriges Studium der heiligen Schriften fand schon im Vorfeld der Bekanntschaft mit Hieronymus statt.[22]

Dennoch muss hier vor einer vorschnellen Idealisierung einer vermeintlichen weiblichen Eigenständigkeit in der Spätantike gewarnt werden. Realistisch betrachtet hing die größere Selbstbestimmung dieser Frauen eng mit ihren finanziellen Möglichkeiten zusammen. Gerade diese Funktion als „Finanzquelle“ machte reiche Christinnen für ihre männlichen „Förderer“ so interessant. Oftmals erblickten diese

[17] G. J. M. Bartelink, Hieronymus, in: M. Greschat (Hg.), Gestalten der Kirchengeschichte (Alte Kirche II/2), Stuttgart u.ö. ^{2}1994, 145-165, hier: 158.

[18] H. Freiherr von Campenhausen, Lateinische Kirchenväter, Stuttgart u.ö. ^{7}1995, 140: „Abgesehen von einem kleinen Kreis asketischer Freundinnen und blind ergebener Anhänger hat es kaum jemand fertig gebracht, mit Hieronymus dauernd in Frieden zu leben,....“

[19] Vgl. J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome. His Life, Writings and Controversies, London 1975, 91.

[20] H. Freiherr von Campenhausen, Kirchenväter, 126.

[21] Vgl. P. Brown, Die Keuschheit der Engel. Sexuelle Entsagung, Askese und Körperlichkeit im frühen Christentum, München 1994, 376.

[22] S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella, 237.

in einer selbstbewussten, enthaltsamen, christlichen Römerin nicht so sehr die „Frau", sondern vielmehr die „Asketin". „Entweiblichung" war die Folge. Äußerlich trat diese Entwicklung sichtbar zu Tage. Hieronymus beschrieb dies bei Marcella:

> „Unsere Witwe macht von solcher Kleidung Gebrauch, die die Kälte abhält und nicht Körperteile entblösst; sie verschmäht das Gold mit Ausnahme des Siegelringes und in den Mägen der Bedürftigen bewahrt sie mehr auf als im Geldbeutel."[23]

Das Erscheinungsbild änderte sich, indem auf kostbare Kleidung, Schmuck und andere Mittel zur Betonung der weiblichen Schönheit bewusst verzichtet wurde. Mit der äußeren Veränderung ging auch eine innere einher. Diese Entwicklung nahm ihren Ausgangspunkt bei der „Weiblichkeit", bzw. dem, was mit ihr assoziiert wurde, und endete bei der „Männlichkeit". Alle Tugenden, die sich die Frau auf ihrem selbstgewählten, gottgefälligen Weg erarbeitete, waren figurativ männlich konnotiert. Dieses Schema findet sich immer wieder in der Schilderung „heiliger" Frauen: „Early hagiographic literature thus emphasizes the holiness of woman by polarizing ‚male' and ‚female', and by describing holiness as something that transcends femalness."[24]

Einer derart „entweiblichten" Frau konnten Männer wie Hieronymus dank „spiritueller Desexualisierung"[25] leicht eine intellektuelle und geistige Gleichwertigkeit attestieren, da sich hieraus ja keine Zugeständnisse für die übrigen, nicht asketisch lebenden „weiblichen" Frauen herleiten ließen. Die gesellschaftliche Forderung nach einer Unterordnung der Frau blieb unangetastet.

Je tugendsamer eine Frau also wurde, desto „männlicher" war ihr Auftreten. Eine solche Frau bedeutete jedoch eine Ausnahmeerscheinung und nicht die Regel, denn sie hob sich von ihren gewöhnlichen Geschlechtsgenossinnen ab. Noch 1880 erklärte Pauthe in seiner «Histoire de Sainte Marcelle» im vollmundigen Ton tiefster Überzeugung: «La fille des patriciens [Marcelle] unissait à des trésors de tendresse, de dévouement, de tendresse, d'héroïsme, une finesse de jugement et une fermeté de raison bien rares chez son sexe.»[26]

[23] ep. 127.3f. PL 22,1088f.: «Nostra vidua talibus usa est vestibus quibus arceret frigus, non membra nudaret: aurum usque ad annuli signaculum repudians, et magis in ventribus egenorum, quam in marsupiis recondens.»

[24] K. Vogt, „Becoming Male". A Gnostic and Early Christian Metaphor, in: K. E. Børessen (Hg.), The Image of God. Gender Models in Judae-Christian Tradition, Minneapolis 1995, 170-186, hier: 180.

[25] K. Thraede, Art.: Frau, in: RAC 8 (1972) 197-269, hier: 246.

[26] L. Pauthe, Histoire de Sainte Marcelle. La vie religieuse chez les Patriciennes de Rome au IV^{e} siècle, Paris ^{2}1884, 3.

Nach diesem kleinen Exkurs, der die Grenzen christlicher Selbstentfaltung „als Frau" aufzeigte, wenden wir uns nun dem räumlichen und geistigen Mittelpunkt der gelehrten Frauengruppe zu: Marcellas Palast am Aventin.[27] In diesem wohnte die aristokratische Witwe[28] mit ihrer Mutter Albina. Albina hatte es nicht immer leicht mit ihrer Tochter, denn Marcella verstand es, ihren eigenen Kopf durchzusetzen. Nachdem ihr Ehemann sieben Monate nach der Heirat verstarb[29], wollte Marcella Witwe bleiben. Durch diesen Entschluss entzog sie sich der gesellschaftlichen Erwartungshaltung und minderte als begehrte Heiratskandidatin die Chancen senatorischer Männer, durch die Geburt gemeinsamer Kinder das Fortbestehen ihres Geschlechts zu sichern.[30] Auf einen Heiratsantrag musste Marcella nicht lange warten. Umgehend folgte die Absage an den Bewerber, dessen Anliegen sie unverblümt zurückwies. Dies ist umso bemerkenswerter, da kein geringerer als der reiche Konsul Cerealis um ihre Hand anhielt. Die Worte, mit denen Marcella Cerealis ihre ablehnende Entscheidung darlegte[31], zeugen von „einem stolzen Selbstwertgefühl, freiem Geist und einer guten Portion Ironie"[32]. In der diesbezüglichen Darstellung des Hieronymus sucht man vergeblich nach Marcellas Berufung auf die Treue zum verstorbenen Gatten. Eine solche Erklärung wäre für das heidnische Univirat konstitutiv gewesen.[33] Für Marcella hatten andere Werte zu gelten. Ihr schwebte ein monastischer Lebensstil vor, wobei umstritten bleibt, ob sie bereits als Mädchen durch die Person des Athanasius von Alexandrien mit derartigen Ideen in Berührung gekommen war.[34] Die Vermutung, dass der Tod des Gatten womöglich den Anschein einer „von der Vorsehung vermittelten

[27] Die Tatsache, dass Marcella eine nicht zu leugnende Multiplikatorinnenfunktion auch und vor allem unter Frauen innehatte, relativiert im konkreten Fall die Einschätzung von I. Ludolphy, Art.: Frau V. Alte Kirche und Mittelalter, in: TRE XI (1983) 436-441, hier: 436: „Wie weit Frauen unter Frauen missionierend wirkten, ist nicht nachprüfbar, da das in der Abgeschlossenheit des Hauses geschah."

[28] Zur Abstammung von Marcella vgl. Chr. Krumreich, Hieronymus, 71, 73; S. Rebenich, Hieronymus, 173.

[29] Zur eventuellen Stilisierung der Zahl 7 vgl. B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 169 Anm. 6.

[30] Vgl. J. d'Ivray, Saint Jérome et les Dames de l'Aventin, Paris 1938, 138: «Pourtant, son incontestable beauté et son immense richesse faisaient d'elle un des partis les plus convoités de la société romaine.»

[31] ep. 127.2 PL 22,1088.

[32] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 170.

[33] Chr. Steininger, Frau, 109.

[34] Vgl. B. Conring, Hieronymus als Briefschreiber. Ein Beitrag zur spätantiken Epistolographie, Diss. masch. Jena 1999, 155 Anm. 66; B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 171; J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome, 92; S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella, 26.

zweiten Chance“[35] für sie gehabt habe, ist nicht gänzlich unwahrscheinlich. Zumindest Hieronymus könnte diese Deutung, die er jedoch nicht explizit bietet, gefallen haben.

Marcellas selbstbestimmten und von männlicher Einflussnahme unabhängigen Lebensstil akzeptierte Albina schließlich, nachdem die beiden Frauen einen Kompromiss gefunden hatten: Marcella erklärte sich bereit, ihr beträchtliches Vermögen der Verwandtschaft und nicht der Kirche zukommen zu lassen.[36]

Was hier im Kleinen ein Arrangement zwischen Mutter und Tochter war, das familiäre Streitigkeiten gar nicht erst aufkommen lassen sollte, bekam im Großen auf die gesamte römische Aristokratie bezogen eine andere Dimension. Die Tendenz, die Kirche durch Schenkungen zu begünstigen, nahm derart zu, dass so manche senatorische Familie sich in ihrer finanziellen Stellung gefährdet sah. Folglich fühlten sich die Kaiser genötigt, Schritte gegen die testamentarischen Verfügungen zu Gunsten der Kirche einzuleiten. So erließ etwa Valentinian 370 n. Chr. ein Gesetz, welches es der Kirche erschwerte, Witwen und Waisen zu beerben.[37]

War nun für die Verwandtschaft gesorgt, fand Marcella ihr eigenes Wohl im Studium der biblischen Schriften. Ihr Wissensdurst war nahezu unerschöpflich. Im fortgeschrittenen Alter bestürmte sie Hieronymus mit einer solchen Vielzahl an theologischen Fragen, dass er diese einerseits als Bürde empfand[38], andererseits jedoch nicht umhin kam, seine große Anerkennung für die gelehrte Frau und ihre Anliegen zum Ausdruck zu bringen: «dum interrogas, doces»[39]. Seine Bewunderung für Marcella ging sogar noch viel weiter und nahm mitunter geradezu apologetische Züge an:

> „Im Gemach der Marcella wurde Eustochium, der Schmuck der Jungfräulichkeit, aufgezogen, so dass die Schätzung leicht fällt: was für eine Lehrerin, wo es solche Schülerinnen gibt. Vielleicht mag der ungläubige Leser darüber lachen, dass ich mich bei den Vorzügen von Frauen (Weiblein) aufhalte, er – wenn er sich erinnert an die heiligen Frauen, die Begleiterinnen des Herrn und Heilandes, die ihm mit ihrem Besitz dienten, und an die drei Marien, die vor dem Kreuz standen, und besonders an Maria‚Magdalena', die wegen des Fleißes und des Glaubenseifers den Namen des hohen Turmes erhalten hat, und als erste vor den Aposteln verdiente, den auferstandenen Christus zu sehen – er wird mehr sich wegen des Stolzes als uns wegen der

[35] Vgl. Chr. Steininger, Frau, 128.
[36] Vgl. ep. 127.4 PL 22,1089.
[37] Chr. Steininger, Frau, 63.
[38] Vgl. z. B. ep. 28.1 PL 22,433.
[39] ep. 59.1 PL 22,586.

Albernheiten verurteilen, die wir die Tüchtigkeit nicht nach dem Geschlecht, sondern nach der Seele beurteilen."[40]

Vordergründig mutet es wegweisend und fortschrittlich an, wenn Hieronymus seine Gesprächspartner bzw. Gesprächspartnerinnen nicht nach dem Geschlecht, sondern nach der Beschaffenheit ihrer Seele einzuschätzen vorgab. Diese Aussage erklärt sich jedoch auf dem Hintergrund der oben gezeigten Tendenz zur Desexualisierung tugendhafter Frauen. In ihren Seelen sind solche Frauen, die Hieronymus seiner Aufmerksamkeit für Wert erachtete, per definitionem „entweiblicht". Folglich fiel es ihm auch nicht weiter schwer, seine Gesprächspartnerinnen nicht nach dem Geschlecht zu beurteilen, da dieses ja nur über ihre gesellschaftlich untergeordnete Stellung, die nach wie vor außer Frage stand, Auskunft gab. Auf der seelischen, nicht aber auf der gesellschaftlichen oder gar der kirchenhierarchischen Ebene begegnete Marcella Hieronymus als ein begabtes Gegenüber, das dem Kirchenvater selbst in nichts nachstand. Nur auf dieser Ebene erschien sie ihm als gleichwertige Partnerin.

Sicherlich war Marcella eine außergewöhnliche Christin. Dennoch wäre sie zwangsläufig der Vergessenheit anheim gefallen, könnten wir heute nicht auf Hieronymus' Briefe zurückgreifen und uns auf diese Art und Weise ein Bild von ihr machen.

Ohne Hieronymus wäre Marcella, deren asketische Vorbildfunktion als eine der reichsten römischen Aristokratinnen ihrer Zeit nicht unterschätzt werden darf, in literarischer Sicht bedeutungslos für ihre Nachwelt geblieben. Hieronymus' Textzeugnisse dokumentieren aber, dass es nicht nur berühmte Männer, sondern auch Frauen gab, die maßgeblich und aktiv zum Wachstum der Kirche beigetragen haben. Männern wie Hieronymus, die Briefe an solche Frauen richteten und – was eine noch größere Auszeichnung war – in ihren Schriften über sie berichteten[41], ist es letztlich zu verdanken, wenn Frauen

[40] ep. 127.5 PL 22,1090: «In hujus cubiculo nutrita Eustochium, virginitatis decus: ut facilis aestimatio sit, qualis magistra, ubi tales discipulae. Rideat forsan infidelis lector, me in mulierciarum laudibus immorari, qui, si recordetur sanctas feminas, comites Domini Salvatoris, quae ministrabant ei de sua substantia, et tres Marias stantes ante crucem, Mariamque proprie Magdalenen, quae ob sedulitatem et ardorem fidei, turritae nomen accepit, et prima ante Apostolos, Christum videre meruit resurgentem, se potius superbiae, quam nos condemnabit ineptiarum: qui virtutes non sexu, sed animo judicamus.»

[41] E. Giannarelli, Women and Miracles in Christian Biography (IVth – Vth centuries), in: Studia Patristica 25 (1993) 376-380, hier: 377: "It was quite difficult for a woman, who spent her life in an all-female world, to find a biographer: writers were exclusively men. This fact also explains why such a small number of biographies was dedicated to holy women."

wie Marcella nicht unsichtbar bleiben. Ob Hieronymus seinen oder Marcellas Ruhm zu mehren beabsichtigte, ist eine andere Frage. Fest steht jedoch, dass er Marcella große Achtung entgegenbrachte, die er auch durch die Anzahl seiner Briefe an sie ausdrückte. Während ein bereits zu Lebzeiten hoch geschätzter Theologe wie Augustin lediglich neun Schreiben aus der Feder des Hieronymus sein Eigen nennen konnte[42], erhielt Marcella mehr Briefe von ihm als irgendein Mann.[43]

Warum war dies so? Marcella stellte für Hieronymus eine außerordentlich geeignete Multiplikatorin dar. Zu ihrer hochadeligen römischen Familie zählten auch zahlreiche Konsuln und Präfekten. Ihr Palast umfasste eine „exzeptionelle theologische Bibliothek“[44] und war zudem ein beliebter Tagungsort für von Marcella organisierte theologische Seminare, welche sich an ein beide Geschlechter umfassendes Laienpublikum richteten.[45] Feichtinger lokalisiert hier daher eine „Art theologische Hochschule“[46]. Junge Frauen und Witwen, von denen Paula und deren schon genannte Tochter Eustochium neben Marcella die bekanntesten sind, scharten sich um Letztere und sahen in dem neuen Trend zum asketischen Leben eine sinngebende Alternative zum geschäftigen Treiben der römischen Gesellschaft. Diese Frauen zogen sich wie Marcella von der Öffentlichkeit zurück, verzichteten auf Schmuck, trugen einen Schleier und ihre Wohltätigkeit und Freigiebigkeit kannte – sehr zum Leidwesen ihrer wenig begeisterten Verwandtschaft – scheinbar keine Grenzen. Dieser „semimonastisch“[47] lebende, intellektuelle Kreis faszinierte wiederum viele andere römische Christinnen.

Marcellas Vorbildfunktion kann schwerlich unterschätzt werden. Sie war eine „Pionierin der erfolgreichen Verbindung von spätantiker Aristokratie und asketischem Christentum“[48]. Als Bindeglied zwischen beiden Bereichen kam ihr ihre Bildung zugute, so dass sie u.a. eine Synthese aus den heidnischen Traditionen philosophischer

[42] Vgl. S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella, 3 Anm. 12.

[43] Vgl. B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 168 Anm. 2: „Ep. 23-29; 32; 34; 37; 38; 40-44; 46; 59; 97 sind an sie adressiert, die Apologia adversus libros Rufini sowie der Danielkommentar sind ihr (und Pammachius) gewidmet. Darüber hinaus wird Marcella in ep. 22; 41; 30,14; 45; 47; 48; 54; 65; 107; 127 erwähnt. Vgl. auch das Lob Marcellas im Prolog zum Galater-Kommentar.“

[44] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 169 Anm. 3.

[45] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 169 Anm. 3.

[46] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 172.

[47] Vgl. B. Conring, Hieronymus, 155; vgl. E. A. Clark, Ascetic Renunciation and Feminine Advancement: A Paradox of Late Ancient Christianity, in: Anglican theological review 6 (1981) 240-257, hier: 247, die diese monastische Erscheinungsform als “familial monasticism” bezeichnet.

[48] A. Fürst, Hieronymus, 53.

und literarischer Zirkel und dem Anspruch christlicher Askese erzielen konnte. Wegweisend und nahezu nebenbei legte Marcella so „einen Grundstein für die große Zukunft der Klöster als Bildungsstätten und Kulturzentren."[49] Sugano betont, dass man Marcella nicht vergessen dürfe, wenn man Benedikt von Nursia den Begründer des abendländischen Mönchtums nenne.[50] „In Person und Wirken der Marcella, der meditierenden und dennoch rastlos Tätigen, haben wir schon das ora et labora."[51]

Zu dem Zeitpunkt, als Hieronymus in ihr Leben trat, hatte Marcella bereits ihren eigenen Lebensentwurf verwirklicht. In geradezu idealer Weise ergänzte diese Witwe somit das Werk des Hieronymus, denn sie hatte „auf ihre integrative Weise zur gesellschaftlichen Durchsetzung und Anerkennung asketischer Lebensformen in Rom ebenso viel beigetragen wie die konfliktfreudige Askesepropaganda eines Hieronymus"[52]. Heutzutage würden wir vielleicht sagen, dass Marcella die ideale „Frontfrau" der leidenschaftlich geführten „Kampagne für das asketische Leben"[53] des Hieronymus war.

Wen wundert es daher, dass diese außergewöhnliche Frau die „langjährige Freundin und intellektuelle Diskussionspartnerin"[54] des Kirchenvaters wurde? Wo sonst fand Hieronymus ein so dankbares Publikum, wie dies bei den Frauen um Marcella der Fall war? Hieronymus führte die Frauen nicht nur in seine eigenen Gedanken ein, sondern auch in ein vertieftes Bibelstudium. Eifrig lernten seine Schülerinnen und bestürmten ihn mit exegetischen sowie mit theologischen Fragen. Seine eigenen Antworten brachte Hieronymus zu Papier, wobei er wohl nicht weniger anstrebte als „urbi et orbi seine Gelehrsamkeit kund zu tun."[55]

Nicht nur Hieronymus' Bibelexegese vermochte zu begeistern. Sehr wahrscheinlich übte Marcella ebenfalls eine rege Lehrtätigkeit aus[56], verfasste womöglich auch theologische Schriften und führte somit faktisch das kirchliche Lehrverbot für Frauen ad absurdum.[57]

[49] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 173.

[50] K. Sugano, Marcella von Rom. Ein Lebensbild, in: M. Wissemann (Hg.), Roma renascens. Beiträge zur Spätantike und Rezeptionsgeschichte (FS I. Opelt), Frankfurt a.M. 1988, 355-370, hier: 368 Anm. 36.

[51] K. Sugano, Marcella, 361.

[52] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 173; vgl. A. Fürst, Hieronymus, 52.

[53] K. Sugano, Das Rombild des Hieronymus, Frankfurt a.M. 1983, 28.

[54] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 168.

[55] G. Grützmacher, Hieronymus. Eine biographische Studie zur Alten Kirchengeschichte (Bd. 1), Neudr. Aalen ²1986, 231f.

[56] Vgl. ep. 127.7 PL 22,1091.

[57] Vgl. B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 169 Anm. 3.

Neben Hieronymus suchten die Montanisten Marcella – und sicherlich auch ihren gesellschaftlichen Einfluss – für sich zu gewinnen. Hieronymus nahm diese Bemühungen gelassen zur Kenntnis und betonte in epistula 41 an Marcella, dass sie in der Schrift ja selbst eingehend Bescheid wüsste, so dass ihr die Fragen der Montanisten keine Verlegenheit bereiten würden.[58] Offensichtlich hatte er vollstes Vertrauen in ihre kritische Urteilskraft.

Der Kontakt zwischen Hieronymus und Marcella beschränkte sich aber nicht nur auf die wissenschaftliche Ebene. Freundschaftliche Züge prägten diese ungewöhnliche Verbindungen nicht minder. So sehr Marcella Hieronymus auch schätzte, machte sie sich allerdings keine Illusionen über sein aufbrausendes Wesen.[59] Kelly kommt zu folgendem Urteil: „Yet there are hints that Marcella disliked, and sought to curb, her friend's petulant and tasteless outbursts which could do him only harm. Intelligent and well poised, she had a firmer character than he."[60]

In epistula 27 ging Hieronymus auf Marcellas Beschwichtigungsversuche ein. Vor seinem geistige Auge sah er, wie sie beim Lesen die Stirn runzelte und ihm gar am liebsten mit der Hand den Mund zuhalten wollte.[61] Trotz aller Nähe zum Kirchenvater bewahrte Marcella ihre geistige Unabhängigkeit.

Marcella bedachte Hieronymus sowohl mit Kritik als auch mit kostbaren Geschenken. So erhielt dieser etwa einmal ein neues Gewand, einen Sessel, Kerzen und Becher von ihr. Hieronymus maß Marcellas Aufmerksamkeit eine tiefere Bedeutung bei: Das Gewand stehe für das Fasten, der Sessel für die häusliche Sittsamkeit, die Kerzen für das Licht, mit dem der Bräutigam erwartet werde, der Kelch für die Mortifikation und das Martyrium. Für sich selbst wollte er eine solch anspruchvolle Deutung – sicherlich mit einem Augenzwickern – nicht gelten lassen. In seinem Falle verweise der Sessel auf die Faulheit, der Kelch auf das Gelage usw. Für die Spenderin gelte hingegen die erste Auslegung.[62] Hierbei handelt es sich um eine vergleichsweise harmlose Anwendung der allegorischen Methode. In einem Brief an Paula, deren Tochter den Schleier genommen hatte, ging Hieronymus gar so weit, Paula als „Schwiegermutter Gottes"[63] zu bezeichnen.

[58] ep. 41.4 PL 22,476.

[59] H. Freiherr von Campenhausen, Kirchenväter, 126f.: „Diese offenbar bedeutende Frau wagt es ihrerseits, den unruhigen Mann ein wenig zu erziehen, und sucht ihm seine Freude am Lästern und Polemisieren abzugewöhnen."

[60] J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome, 96.

[61] ep. 27.2 PL 22,432.

[62] ep. 44 PL 22,480.

[63] ep. 22.20 PL 22,407: «Socrus Dei....»

Die kokettierende Leichtigkeit seines römischen Lebensstils sollte nicht von Dauer sein. 384 n. Chr. verstarb Hieronymus' Gönner Papst Damasus, und der Kirchenvater sah sich nun den Anfeindungen des römischen Klerus ausgesetzt. Hinzu kam die offen zur Schau gestellte ablehnende Haltung vieler anderer Römer. Schon lange war ihnen Hieronymus' Vorliebe für adelige Frauen und sein bedenklicher Einfluss auf diese ein Dorn im Auge gewesen. Seinen Kritikern wollte sich der stolze Kirchenvater nicht dauerhaft stellen, so dass er 385 n. Chr. gemeinsam mit Paula Rom verließ und eine neue Wirkungsstätte in Bethlehem fand. Räumlich trennten sich die Wege von Marcella und Hieronymus, da diese es vorzog, in Rom zu bleiben.

Spekulationen und unterschiedliche Meinungen hinsichtlich einer eventuellen etwa zehnjährigen Entfremdung und Verstimmung zwischen Marcella und Hieronymus zerren posthum am Band dieser ungewöhnlichen Freundschaft[64], die hierdurch nur umso interessanter wird. Besonders die These Nautins belebt die Phantasie: Als es die Nachfolge des Damasus zu regeln galt, habe Marcella sich für die Kandidatur des Siricius stark gemacht, obwohl Hieronymus selbst das Papstamt begehrt habe[65], für welches ihn mehrere Freunde als würdig und geeignet erachtet hätten.[66] Der gekränkte Hieronymus habe daraufhin Marcella seine Aufmerksamkeit entzogen.

Ihren Einfluss auf die Päpste büßte Marcella auch mit dem Amtsantritt des auf Siricius folgenden Anastasius I nicht ein.[67] Bei diesem setzte sie sich nach anfänglichem Zögern für die Interessen des Hieronymus und gegen Johannes von Jerusalem und Rufinus ein.[68]

Rufinus von Aquileia hatte Hieronymus auf das Äußerste erzürnt, weil er sich im Vorwort seiner Übersetzung des Werkes „De principiis" von Origenes auf das Beispiel des Hieronymus berief. In der Tat hatte Hieronymus einst Homilien des Origenes ins Lateinische übertragen, wollte aber nunmehr keineswegs in der Öffentlichkeit als ein Verteidiger des Origenes erscheinen. Daher fertigte Hieronymus

[64] Vgl. z. B. zur Diskussion dieser Fragestellung B. Conring, Hieronymus, 156 Anm. 70; B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 175; S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella, 174, 186.

[65] P. Nautin, La liste des œuvres de Jérôme dans le «De viris inlustribus», in: Orpheus 5 (1984) 319-334, hier: 332: «Marcelle a dû se montrer plus favorable à la candidature de Sirice, qui fut élu, qu'à celle de Jérôme, et celui-ci lui en a tenu rigueur au point de ne pas lui écrire le moindre mot jusqu'en 394.»

[66] Vgl. ep. 45.3 PL 22,481.

[67] Vgl. J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome, 246: "... Anastasius I (399-402), looked with a kindlier eye on the strict ascetic movement, and almost immediately found himself under strong pressure from Marcella to have Origen's writings proscribed."

[68] Vgl. J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome, 236, 242.

selbst eine die Irrtümer des Origenes kommentierende Übersetzung von „De principiis" sowie einen das Vorwort von Rufinus widerlegenden Begleitbrief an, um sein in Mitleidenschaft gezogenes Ansehen in Rom zu rehabilitieren. Ein literarischer Schlagabtausch war die Folge. Schließlich sah auch Marcella Hieronymus' Ruf gefährdet und bezog Stellung. Hieronymus schilderte Marcellas Engagement eindrücklich:

> „Da gab es die heilige Marcella, die sich lange Zeit zurückgehalten hat, damit nicht geglaubt wurde, sie handle durch irgendeine Eifersucht; nachdem sie merkte, dass der durch den apostolischen Mund gepriesene Glaube in vielem verletzt werde (...), widerstand sie öffentlich, lieber wollte sie Gott als den Menschen gefallen."[69]

Der Widerstand nahm konkrete Züge an, sie ergriff das Wort und verstand es, sich Gehör zu verschaffen.[70] Marcella hielt den ein oder anderen Faden, der zum Zentrum kirchlicher Macht führte, fest in ihrer Hand und machte sich so manche Verstrickung zu Nutze. Zum „Lob der Marcella"[71] hielt Hieronymus die Details fest:

> „Sie stimmte zuerst der Verurteilung der Häretiker zu: indem sie Zeugen hinzubrachte, die zuerst von ihnen unterrichtet, später aber vom häretischen Irrtum geheilt wurden; indem sie auf die Menge der Getäuschten zeigte und indem sie die unfrommen Bücher περι αρχων erwähnte, welche sich als solche erwiesen, die durch die Hand des Skorpions verbessert waren; wobei die Häretiker, die mit häufigen Briefen herbeizitiert wurden, um sich zu verteidigen, nicht zu kommen wagten; und die Stärke des Gewissens war so groß, dass sie lieber als Abwesende verurteilt als als Anwesende überführt werden wollten. Der Ursprung dieses so glorreichen Sieges war Marcella...."[72]

[69] ep. 127.9 PL 22,1092f.: «Tunc sancta Marcella, quae diu se cohibuerat, ne per aemulationem quippiam facere videretur, postquam sensit fidem apostolico ore laudatam (Rom 1.18), in plerisque violari, ita ut sacerdotes quoque, et nonullos monachorum, maximeque saeculi homines, in assensum sui traheret; ac simplicitati illuderet Episcopi, qui de suo ingenio caeteros aestimabat, publice restitit: malens Deo placere, quam hominibus.»

[70] Vgl. ep. 41 PL 22,474-476; ep. 42 PL 22,477f.; ep. 127.9f. PL 22,1092f.

[71] ep. 127.10 PL 22,1093: «Dicas, quid haec ad laudem Marcellae?»

[72] ep. 127.10 PL 22,1093: «Damnationis haereticorum haec fuit principium: dum adducit testes, qui prius ab eis eruditi, et postea ab haeretico fuerant errore correpti: dum ostendit multitudinem deceptorum, dum impia περι αρχων ingerit volumina, quae emendata manu scorpii monstrabantur: dum acciti frequentibus litteris haeretici, ut se defenderent, venire non sunt ausi: tantaque vis conscientiae fuit, ub magis absentes damnari, quam praesentes coargui maluerint. Hujus tam gloriosae victoriae origo Marcella est ....»

Bei Marcella diente religiöses Engagement nicht als „‚Politikersatz' für Frauen"[73], sondern führte ihr im Gegenteil geradezu die Notwendigkeit eigener Schritte als „Theologin und Kirchenpolitikerin"[74] in der politischen Arena vor Augen.

Nach dem Weggang des Hieronymus habe Marcella als eine „Zentralfigur der christlichen Gemeinde"[75] seinen Platz in Rom eingenommen. Ihre Eignung stand für Hieronymus – zumindest nach ihrem Tod – außer Frage:

> „Was ich in ihr an Tugenden, was an Geist, was an Heiligkeit, was an Reinheit gefunden habe, scheue ich zu sagen, damit ich das Vertrauen in die Glaubwürdigkeit nicht überschreite (...). Nur dies will ich sagen: was immer bei mir nach langem Studium angesammelt und durch langanhaltendes Nachdenken gleichsam in mein Naturell (Wesen, Sinnesart) gewendet worden ist, dies hat sie gekostet, dies hat sie gelernt und besessen: so dass nach meinem Wegzug, wenn sich irgendein Streit um ein Schriftzeugnis erhoben hat, man sich zu ihr als Richterin aufmachte."[76]

In Anbetracht dieser Schilderung ist es sehr verlockend, aber dennoch irreführend, Ansätze von gelebter Gleichberechtigung erkennen zu wollen. Zu Recht warnt Gause vor einer Beschreibung großer Frauen, die der Beschreibung großer Männer an die Seite gestellt werde und dabei den Eindruck hervorrufe, als hätten die Frauen innerhalb der Geschichte ähnliche Positionen ausgefüllt wie die Männer. Hierbei werde zu wenig thematisiert, inwiefern Frauen durch ihr Geschlecht bewusst ausgegrenzt worden seien, welche Spielräume sie gehabt hätten und wie diese wiederum durch gesellschaftliche Veränderungen erweitert oder eingeschränkt worden seien.[77]

Marcella konnte in einem gewissen Rahmen in Erscheinung treten, ihren Einfluss geltend machen und sogar Hieronymus vertreten, aber sie blieb dennoch von den ihrem Geschlecht auferlegten Grenzen umfangen.

[73] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 319.

[74] K. Sugano, Marcella, 365.

[75] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 175.

[76] ep. 127.7 PL 22,1091: «Quid in illa virtutum, quid ingenii, quid sanctitatis, quid puritatis invenerim, vereor dicere, ne fidem credulitatis excedam, et tibi majorem dolorem iacutiam, recordanti quanto bono carueris. Hoc solum dicam, quod quidquid in nobis longo fuit studio congregatum, et meditatione diuturna, quasi in naturam versum: hoc illa libavit, hoc didicit, atque possedit: ita ut post profectionem nostram, si de aliquo testimonio Scripturarum esset oborta cententio, ad illam judicem pergeretur.»

[77] Vgl. U. Gause, Geschlecht als historische Kategorie. Was leistet eine feministische Perspektive für die Kirchengeschichte? Ein Diskussionsbeitrag, in: A. Doering-Manteuffel, K. Nowack (Hg.), Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte. Urteilsbildung und Methoden, Stuttgart u.ö. 1996, 164-179, hier: 167.

Betrachtet man die hochachtungsvolle Verbindung zwischen Marcella und Hieronymus, so muss der eingangs zitierte Ausspruch des Kirchenvaters wie ein Verrat an der intellektuellen Weggefährtin und „ebenbürtigen Partnerin“[78] wirken: „Wenn Männer nach den Schriften fragen würden, würde ich nicht mit Frauen reden.“[79] Sind es aber wirklich die Frauen, die Hieronymus hier im Blick hat? Sind es nicht eher Männer, die sich durch den intellektuellen Wissensdurst von Frauen zu eigenen Bemühungen angespornt fühlen sollten? Versucht der Kirchenvater nicht tatsächlich seine „‚frauenzentrierte' Literaturproduktion“[80] zu rechtfertigen? Entsprach die keineswegs neue, sprachliche Abwertung der Frau nicht einer geradezu traditionellen, zu Hieronymus' Zeit akzeptierten gesellschaftlichen Grundhaltung?[81]

Verhieß der erste Blick nichts Gutes, vermochte doch der zweite zumindest die Heftigkeit der Aussage zu relativieren und ins Verhältnis zum gelebten Geschlechterverständnis des Hieronymus zu setzen. Ohne dass Hieronymus die gesellschaftliche Position der Frau zu stärken beabsichtigte, legte dieser streitbare Kirchenvater doch immerhin Zeugnis ab, „für die große Aktivität und Souveränität Marcellas und zugleich für die enorme Einflusskraft einer Frau auf die römische Kirchenpolitik, die bei der Beurteilung der Gesamtsituation christlicher Frauen jener Zeit, die da doch‚zu schweigen' hatten, Berücksichtigung finden sollte und manchen Ersteindruck relativieren könnte.“[82]

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[78] S. Letsch-Brunner, Marcella, 241.

[79] ep. 65.1 PL 22,625: «Si viri de Scripturis quaererent, mulieribus non loquerer.»

[80] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 7.

[81] Vgl. J. Beaucamp, Le vocabulaire de la faiblesse féminine dans les textes juridiques romains du IIIe au VIe siècle, in: Revue Historique du droit français et étranger 54 (1976) 485-508, hier: 485: «... la référence à la faiblesse féminine est une constante dans le droit romain, du IIIe siècle au moins au VIe siècle: il est donc exclu de faire intervenir à ce sujet une influence du christianisme.»; E. A. Clark, Sex, Shame, and Rhetoric. En-gendering Early Christian Ethics, in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59 (1990) 221-245, hier: 227f.: "That honor and shame are sexually coded is agreed on by almost all anthropologists of the Mediterranean, who adopt Julian Pitt-Rivers' thesis that honor is linked to men and shame to women."; Zum «infirmitas sexus»-Verständnis vgl. S. Dixon, Infirmitas sexus: Womanly weekness in roman law, in: Tijdshrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 52 (1984) 343-371; K. Thraede, Frau, 242f.; S. Soennecken, Misogynie oder Philogynie? Philologisch-theologische Untersuchungen zum Wortfeld Frau bei Augustinus, Frankfurt a. M. u.ö. 1993, 21: „Trotz punktueller Fortschritte wurden eine vollkommene Gleichberechtigung und Emanzipation der Römerin zu keiner Zeit erreicht, dazu war man noch zu sehr den traditionellen Ansichten verhaftet.“

[82] B. Feichtinger, Apostolae, 177.

„DIE FRAU UND IHRE GOTTEBENBILDLICHKEIT BEI AUGUSTIN“

Zur Veröffentlichung einer längst fälligen, umfassenden und gründlichen Studie über ein vielerörtertes Thema

Die Frauenbewegung, jenes heißdiskutierte Thema der Neuzeit[1], ließ nicht nur die Literatur über die gesellschaftliche Rolle der Frau in der Gegenwart anschwellen[2], sie lenkte die Aufmerksamkeit zugleich auch auf die Geschichte der Rechtsstellung der Frau sowie auf die Gründe ihrer Unterdrückung schon in der Antike und in der christlichen Spätantike[3]. Dass dem Christentum darin ein nicht geringer Anteil zukam, dies versteht sich bei der engen Verflechtung von Religion und Gesellschaft beinahe von selbst. In der Flut der einschlägigen Veröffentlichungen über die Rolle der Frau in der christlichen Spätantike stellen die Untersuchungen über Augustinus jene der übrigen Kirchenschriftsteller weit in den Schatten. Wer die auf das Stichwortverzeichnis des *Augustinus-Lexikons* (= *AL*) konzipierte EDV-Sekundärliteratur im Internetportal www.augustinus.de konsultiert, erhält zur Zeit, um nur die gewichtigeren Frauenbegriffe und Frauennamen zu erwähnen, folgende Anzahl von Treffern: für ‹Maria uirgo et mater› 287, für ‹Monnica› 191, für ‹femina› 141, für ‹uirgo› 139, für ‹Eua› 68 und für ‹mulier› 44 Titel.

Wen wundert dies, kennen wir doch unter den Schriftstellern des frühen Christentums inklusive der Spätantike kaum einen besser als den Bischof von Hippo, den wohl bedeutendsten auch unter den Kirchenvätern. Die Gründe dafür sind einleuchtend. Augustinus ist der Verfasser der *Confessiones*, in denen er einiges auch an autobiographischem Material verarbeitet hat. Schon zu seinen Lebzeiten war er ein vielgelesener Autor. Er selbst sorgte für die Verbreitung seiner Werke, die er in

[1] E. Boedecker, *Marksteine der deutschen Frauenbewegung von ihren Anfängen im 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Neuanfang nach 1945*, Hannover 1962. – I. Wendt, Das Rollenverhalten von Mann und Frau: *Der Mensch. Woher kommen wir? Was sind wir? Wohin gehen wir?* Bd. V. *Soziales und geschichtliches Verhalten des Menschen*, Zürich 1983, 150-185.

[2] Siehe die verschiedenen Handbücher und Frauenlexika wie H. Lange/G. Bäumer, *Handbuch der Frauenbewegung*, 4 Bde., Berlin 1901 = 1981 (?); A. Lissner/R. Süssmuth/K.Walter (Hrg.), *Frauenlexikon*, Freiburg 1991; G. Muschiol (Hrg.), *Katholikinnen und Moderne*, Münster 2003.

[3] Für die Antike B. Röll (griechische) und H. Thyen (römische), Frau: Lexikon der Alten Welt, Zürich/Stuttgart 1965, 998sq.; B. Wagner-Hasel, Frau II. Griechenland und Rom A-E: DNP 4 (1998) 634-637; für die nichtchristliche Antike und für die christliche Spätantike K. Thräde, Frau: RAC 8 (1969-1972) 197-269.

seiner Bibliothek ordentlich bewahrte[4] und die durch glückliche Umstände der Nachwelt erhalten blieben[5]. Darüber hinaus verfasste sein bischöflicher Zeitgenosse und Freund Possidius eine Biographie über ihn, die mit zu den besten ihres Genres aus der Spätantike zählt[6]. Diese ausgezeichnete Quellenlage ist es, die uns einen verlässlichen Einblick sowohl in die Person wie auch in das Werk Augustins vermittelt. Das hohe Interesse der Forschung an seiner Auffassung über die Frau, über ihre Rolle in der Gesellschaft und in der Kirche hat nicht zuletzt in dieser ausgezeichneten Quellenlage seine Gründe.

Der jüngst erst im *AL* erschienene Artikel ‹Femina›[7] informiert in gebotener Kürze über das Frauenbild vor Augustinus, er unterteilt die etwa 130 Frauennamen in antike, biblische und zeitgenössische und berichtet auch anhand des *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense augmentatum augmentandumque* (= *CAG*) über die Statistik der Tausende Mal vorkommenden Frauentermini, Berufe, Verwandtschafts- und Altersbezeichnungen, kirchlicher und sozialer Ränge und dergleichen mehr. Von den Frauen, die in Augustins Biographie eine Rolle spielten, werden die Mutter Monnica erwähnt[8], ferner die leibliche Schwester ohne Namensangabe, die Konkubinen vor seiner Bekehrung ebenfalls ohne Namensangaben und ganz allgemein die Briefpartnerinnen (24 an der Zahl) unter seiner 300 Briefe umfassenden Korrespondenz[9]. In Fragen der Rollenzuweisung der Frau folgt Augustin, wenngleich sich gelegentlich kritisch absetzend, den gesellschaftlichen Normen seiner Zeit, d. h. er ordnet die Frau dem Manne unter. In der anthropologischen Auffassung über die Frau sowie ihrer theologischen Beurteilung folgt er jedoch den gesellschaftlichen Normen nicht. Maßgebend bleibt hierin für ihn die Lehre der Bibel von der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen. Der Satz aus *Gn* 1,27, „So schuf Gott den Menschen nach seinem Abbild, nach Gottes Bild schuf er ihn, als Mann und Frau erschuf er sie", ist und bleibt die hermeneutische Norm bei der Auslegung auch der sonst häufig nicht gerade zugunsten der Frau sich artikulierenden Bibelstellen. Durch den Sündenfall büßten beide ihre ursprüngliche Würde ein, kraft der Erlösung wird diese beiden im künftigen Zustand des Heils wiederhergestellt.

Es dürfte einleuchten, dass es in den Geisteswissenschaften über ein und denselben Gegenstand – in unserem Fall über die Frau –

[4] Possid. uita Aug. 31.

[5] Siehe das von K. H. CHELIUS im AL 1 (1986-1994) XXIII-XLII erstellte Werkverzeichnis.

[6] Eingeleitet und übersetzt von A. VON HARNACK, *Possidius. Augustins Leben*, Berlin 1930.

[7] C. MÜLLER, Femina: AL 2 (2002) 1266-1281.

[8] Seltsamer Weise kommt der Name nur einmal (*conf.* 9,37) vor.

[9] Aufgeführt im Artikel J. DIVJAK, RED., Epistulae: AL 2 (1996-202) 893-1057.

unterschiedliche hermeneutische Aspekte geben kann. Aspekte der Gesellschaft sind andere als die der Anthropologie, um nur diese beiden zu nennen. Dass aber Aspekte der Anthropologie und daraus resultierende Bewertungen umfassender und darum auch gewichtiger sind als die der Gesellschaft, wer wollte dies leugnen? Es ist deshalb unzulässig, gesellschaftliche Betrachtungsweisen zugleich als anthropologische auszuweisen und zu vermitteln. Damit ist freilich nicht gesagt, anthropologische Aspekte seien eo ipso irrtumsfrei, wohl aber sind sie den gesellschaftlichen gegenüber vorrangig. Augustins Auffassung von der Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau resultiert nicht aus seiner Gesellschaftslehre, sie gehört zu seiner Anthropologie, die ihrerseits in seiner Ontologie, seiner Lehre vom Sein des Seienden, gründet.

Der ‹Femina›-Artikel des *AL* führt in der Bibliographie eine stattliche Liste an selektierter Sekundärliteratur an. Wenngleich die englisch-, französisch- und spanischsprachige Augustinusforschung dem Thema Frau größeres Interesse entgegenbrachte als die deutsche, so darf doch erfreut festgestellt werden, dass zwei Monographien, auf die sich die Darstellung des *AL*-Artikels auch vorzüglich stützt, aus deutschsprachigem Raum kommen. Es sind dies die Dissertationen von SILVIA SOENNECKEN, *Misogynie oder Philogynie? Philologisch-theologische Untersuchungen zum Wortfeld Frau bei Augustinus*[10] und von LARISSA SEELBACH, *„Das weibliche Geschlecht ist ja kein Gebrechen...“. Die Frau und ihre Gottebenbildlichkeit bei Augustin*[11]. Die erstgenannte liegt bereits in der dritten Auflage vor, die letztgenannte ist noch vor Fertigstellung des ‹Femina›-Artikels im *AL* erschienen. Diese verdient unsere Aufmerksamkeit nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil sie ihr Thema in einer Weise aufgreift und behandelt, wie dies der Jubilar Tarsicius J. van Bavel schon immer erörtert wissen haben wollte. Ein Blick auf die Titel einiger seiner wegweisenden Veröffentlichungen zeigt bereits die Richtigkeit der von der Autorin gewählten Methode[12].

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[10] Frankfurt a. M. 1993.

[11] Würzburg 2002.

[12] Im Literaturverzeichnis werden von T.J. VAN BAVEL angeführt: The Anthropology of Augustine: LouvSt. 5 (1974) 34-47; Augustines's View on Women: Aug(L) 39 (1989) 5-53; Woman as the Image of God in Augustine's "De Trinitate XII": *Signum pietatis. Festschrift für C.P. Mayer* (hrg. von A. ZUMKELLER), Würzburg 1989, 267-288; The Creator and the Integrity of Creation in the Fathers of the Church especially in Saint Augustine: AugStud 21 (1990) 1-33.

L. Seelbach legt ihren Stoff in vier Kapiteln dar. In biographischer Reihenfolge erfahren wir zunächst etwas über die Frauen, mit denen Augustinus zu tun hatte: über seine Mutter Monnica (Kapitel 1), über seine Konkubine(n) (Kapitel 2), über Frauen, zu denen er sonst Kontakte hatte (Kapitel 3). Nach Einblick in die konkreten Umgänge mit Frauen wird schließlich seine Lehre von der Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau gebührend erörtert (Kapitel 4).

Kapitel 1 mit der Überschrift *Der Sohn – Augustin über seine Mutter* (23-90) ist zweifelsohne mit spürbarer Sympathie für die in psychoanalytischen Untersuchungen viel geschmähte Monnica geschrieben – aber auch mit Sachverstand. Diese Darstellung dürfte mit zu den besten gehören, die wir über Monnica besitzen. Treffend wird gleich zum Beginn festgestellt, Augustinus habe in seinen *Confessiones* keine Monnica-Biographie geschrieben, sondern seiner Mutter ein literarisches Denkmal gesetzt. Kritisch durchmustert die Verfasserin den speziell im 13. Jahrhundert zunächst in Italien einsetzenden Monnica-Kult, der sich dann nach der Renaissance in ganz Europa verbreitet hatte. Berichtet wird auch vom sensationellen Fund einer Marmorplatte in Ostia im Jahr 1945 mit der Inschrift über sie. An Biographischem über Monnicas Jugend, Monnica als Ehefrau und als Mutter erfahren wir nur, was die kritisch gelesenen Augustinustexte, auch die über die *Confessiones* hinaus, festhalten. Dazu zählen vorzüglich die sogenannten Dialoge, die bald nach Augustins Bekehrung in Cassiciacum unweit Mailand entstanden sind. Sie beinhalten Gespräche über die Widerlegung des Skepsis in *De Academicis*, über das Glück in *De beata uita* und über die Ordnung in *De ordine*, bei denen Monnica nicht nur aktiv, sondern gelegentlich sogar problemlösend beteiligt war.

Zu den Höhepunkten der *Confessiones* zählt deren Bericht über die Vision Augustins mit seiner Mutter in Ostia[13] und Monnicas Tod. Gewiss setzt dieses Erlebnis Kenntnisse des Neuplatonismus voraus. Wenn aber Augustinus an der Teilhabe seiner Mutter daran keinen Zweifel aufkommen lässt, so wollte er damit ihre intellektuelle Fähigkeit und in gewisser Hinsicht auch ihre Gleichrangigkeit unmissverständlich hervorheben. Für Monnica hat es der Darstellung Augustins zufolge nur ‹zwei Brennpunkte gegeben: ihre Liebe zu Gott und ihre Liebe zu ihrem Sohn› (69). Das ganze Kapitel erreicht im Abschnitt 1,8: *Monnicas geistliche Mutterschaft* (70-81) seinen Höhepunkt. Darin breitet die Verfasserin bereits all das vor, was sie abschließend

[13] Siehe A. VON HARNACK, Die Höhepunkte in Augustins Konfessionen: *Aus Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit*, Gießen 1916, 67-99, dort 95-99.

gegenüber psychoanalytischen Deutungsversuchen ins Feld zu führen gedenkt. Sie lässt eine Reihe von literarischen Parallelen, ‹Monnica und Dido›, ‹Monnica und Maria›, ‹Monnica und Venus›, ‹Monnica und Cornelia› (römische Matrone) gleichsam Revue passieren, um die Eigenständigkeit der geistlichen Mutterschaft Monnicas in ein helles Licht zu rücken. Monnica sei eben mehr als nur Augustins irdische Mutter. Es sei deshalb nahezu unmöglich, Augustinus auf dem Hintergrund seiner Beziehung zu seiner Mutter für einen ‹Misogynisten›, einen Frauenfeind zu halten. Darauf folgt dann ein ebenso hochaktueller wie hochinteressanter Exkurs.

Der Exkurs trägt die Überschrift: *Psychoanalytische Deutungsversuche* (81-92). Dem Leser wird zunächst die wichtigere Literatur zu diesem Teil der Augustinusforschung vorgestellt[14]. Nach den Vertretern dieses Forschungszweiges werde Augustins Psyche den interessierten Theologen, Historikern und Analytikern neue Erkenntnisse bescheiden. Ja, Augustins *Confessiones* lüden zu deren Lektüre unter psychoanalytischer Optik geradezu ein. „Wäre Augustin psychisch gesund und ohne Beeinträchtigungen gewesen“, so das Resümee jener Deutungsversuche, so „hätte er die Confessiones nie geschrieben“ (83).

Der Abschnitt *Zusammenstellung psychoanalytischer Einzelbeobachtungen* (84-89) – diese erstrecken sich nicht nur auf Augustinus, sondern auch auf dessen Vater Patricius und selbstverständlich auf die Neurotikerin par excellence Monnica – besteht aus einem Katalog von Widersprüchen. Augustin sei ein Muttersöhnchen gewesen; unfähig, Glück in der Liebe zu Frauen zu finden; die besitzergreifende Mutter habe zu einer Reihe von Protesthandlungen geführt wie zur Verbindung mit einer Konkubine und zur Flucht in den Manichäismus und dergleichen mehr. Der Exkurs endet mit einigen suggestiven *Anfragen* (90-92). Hat Augustin sich nicht doch eher als Theologen denn als Autobiographen verstanden? Dies bleibt eine der entscheidenden Anfragen an die psychoanalytischen Deutungsversuche. Und ist nicht die Verschiedenheit der Kulturen zu beachten mit der eine unterschiedliche Vorstellung dessen einhergeht, was als

[14] Genannt werden unter anderen E.R. DODDS, Augustine's Confessions. A Study of Spiritual Maladjustment: Hibbert Journal 26 (1928) 459-473; C. KLIGERMANN, A Psychoanalytic Study of the Confessions of St. Augustine: Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 5 (1957) 469-488; P. FREDRIKSEN, Augustine and his Analysts: The Possibility of a Psychohistory: Soundings 61 (1978) 206-227; von Bedeutung ist der Sammelband D. CAPPS/J.E. DITTES (ed.), *The Hunger of the Heart: Reflections on the Confessions of Augustine* (Society for the Scientific Study of Religion 8), o.O. 1990.

‹krank› oder ‹gesund›, als ‹normal› oder als ‹anomal› zu gelte hat? Aus der unerlässlichen Einschätzung der historischen Wandlungsprozesse in den Kulturen zieht die Verfasserin in Bezug auf die psychoanalytischen Deutungsversuche den Schluss, „dass vor einer Bewertung stets die Untersuchung der sozialen und historischen Gegebenheiten stehen müsste“ (90).

Das verhältnismäßig kurze Kapitel 2 *Der Lebensgefährte – Augustin und seine Konkubine* (93-117) informiert unter 2.1 *Augustins Konkubine* (93-105) nicht nur über das etwa anderthalb Jahrzehnt dauernde Verhältnis Augustins zu jener Frau, die ihm einen hochbegabten Sohn, Adeodatus, schenkte[15], es zeigt unter 2.2 *Der Konkubinat als Institution* (105-112) auch den rechtlichen Rahmen solcher Verbindungen auf, den Konkubinat als Institution, seine Ausrichtung auf Dauer, die Stellung der daraus hervorgegangenen illegitimen Kinder und noch anderes mehr. Aufschlussreich ist die eher zurückhaltende Stellung des Christentums in der Ablehnung des Konkubinats zur Zeit Augustins, obgleich schon seit dem Mailänder Edikt von 313 sowohl der Staat wie auch die Kirche ihre diesbezüglichen Reserven nicht verheimlichten. Ambrosius z.B. lehnte ihn als Ehebruch ab. Die gleiche strikte Haltung nahm auch Augustinus als Bischof ein. Immerhin beurteilte er eine den Kinderwunsch bejahende Konkubine milder als eine diesen verneinende Ehefrau.

Im Kontext dieses Kapitels erfährt der Leser einiges auch über die sexuelle Praktiken, den ‹coitus interruptus›, die Drogen, die Verhütungsmittel und die Abtreibung. Desgleichen erfährt er als möglichen Grund zum Verschweigen des Namens und der Persönlichkeit der Konkubine Augustins, das bis in die Gegenwart herauf die Fantasie der Leser der *Confessiones* erregt[16], ein ganzes Bündel von Erklärungen. Nicht von Gefühlskälte dürfte das immerhin vierzehn Jahre währende Verhältnis dieser Partnerschaft geprägt gewesen sein, sonst hätte Augustin nicht von der ‹Treue des Lagers›, das er mit ihr teilte[17], noch von der Trauer über ihren Verlust[18] und von der ‹blutenden Wunde›, welche die Trennung hinterließ[19], schreiben können.

Das Kapitel 3 trägt die Überschrift *Der Bischof – Augustinus an und über Frauen* (93-170). Dass der Bischof Augustinus kein

[15] Über seine Begabung äußert sich Augustinus in *beata u.* 6 und vor allem in *conf.* 9,14: „horror mihi erat illud ingenium“.

[16] J. GAARDER, *Das Leben ist kurz. Vita brevis*, München 1999, wird S. 15 erwähnt.

[17] *Conf.* 4,2.

[18] *Sol.* 1,17.

[19] *Conf.* 6,25.

Frauenfeind, geschweige denn ein ‹verbitterter› gewesen sei, dies geht aus seinem pastoralen Verhältnis zu den Frauen hervor. Das gewichtige Kapitel behandelt zunächst unter 3.1 *Die Rolle der Frau in der Römischen Antike und der Alten Kirche* (118-127). Der Abschnitt zeichnet aufgrund der herangezogenen Literatur[20] eine staunenswerte politisch wie privatrechtlich abgesicherte Stellung der Frau in der Römischen Antike. Nach neueren Untersuchungen hatte das herkömmliche Bild von der römischen Matrone wenig mit der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Realität gemein. Dennoch blieb die Unterordnung der Frau unter den Mann eine soziale Selbstverständlichkeit. Resümierend heißt es S. 120: „Trotz punktueller Fortschritte wurden eine vollkommene Gleichberechtigung und Emanzipation der Römerin zu keiner Zeit erreicht“. Uneinheitlich präsentiert sich das Frauenbild in der Kirche. Obgleich Frauen vielfach Wegbereiterinnen des Christentums waren, so setzte die Rücksetzung ihrer Position bereits in der neutestamentlichen Zeit ein. Spätestens seit dem 2. Jahrhundert tritt der Kontrast zur zeitgenössischen Emanzipation klar in Erscheinung. Im 3. Jahrhundert war von einem Anteil der Frauen an kirchlichen Ämtern überhaupt nicht mehr die Rede und im 4. Jahrhundert „hatte sich die Kirche von einer unbefangenen Anerkennung der Frau im gemeindlichen Gefüge entfernt“ (123).

Um Augustins Sonderstellung in der Patristik recht würdigen zu können, ist ein Blick in die Werke anderer Kirchenväter aufschlussreich. Peter Browns *Body and Society* ist diesbezüglich geradezu entlarvend[21]. Gewiss hielt auch Augustinus an der etablierten Rollenverteilung fest, aber an der geistigen Ebenbürtigkeit der Frau mit dem Mann ließ er keinen Zweifel aufkommen. T. van Bavel zitierend bemerkt die Autorin: „Geistig, nicht körperlich, stehen Mann und Frau auf der gleichen Ebene. Texte, die der These einer grundsätzlichen intellektuellen Ebenbürtigkeit der Geschlechter entgegenstehen, haben bei Augustin Seltenheitswert“[22]. Sie erhärtet diese ihre These von der intellektuellen Gleichheit zwischen Mann und Frau mit dem Hinweis auf die bereits erwähnte Teilnahme Monicas an philosophischen Gesprächen in den Frühdialogen sowie auf die geistig anspruchsvollen Auseinandersetzungen Augustins mit

[20] Zu nennen sind vor allem K. THRÄDE, Frau (siehe n. 3) sowie J. LEIPOLDT, *Die Frau in der Antiken Welt und im Urchristentum*, Leipzig ²1955.

[21] Der volle Titel: *The Body and Society. Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity*, New York 1988.

[22] Sie zitiert *qu.* 1,153 und fügt hinzu: „cf. van BAVEL (Augustine's View on Women), l.c. 7: ‹This is the only text in which Augustine asserts explicitly that women are intellectually inferior to men›“.

seinen Briefpartnerinnen. Dies hielt indes den glühenden Verfechter des klerikalen und monastischen Zölibates nicht davon ab, die körperliche Nähe von Frauen, selbst aus dem Kreis der Verwandten, tunlichst zu meiden. Ein so drastisches Verhalten sei bei Augustin wieder nicht auf Frauenfeindseligkeit zurückzuführen, sondern auf sein an das Zölibat gebundenes Amtsverständnis, in dem er der Vorbildfunktion eine erhebliche Bedeutung zumaß.

Von *Augustins Schwester* handelt der Abschnitt 3.2 (127-140), diese war Oberin eines Klosters für Nonnen in Hippo und hieß wahrscheinlich Perpetua, und von *Augustins Briefe an Frauen* der Abschnitt 3.3 (141-156). Wenngleich vom gegenwärtig vorliegenden Briefcorpus Augustins nur etwa 7 % an Frauen adressiert sind – von dem des Hieronymus sind es immerhin 34 % – und wenngleich der Briefverkehr Augustins mit Frauen erst relativ spät, erst nach 408, einsetzt, so sind daraus keine negativen Schlüsse zu ziehen. Dies gilt auch hinsichtlich des Stils der Briefe an Frauen, die sich an Gefühlsäußerungen von den Briefen an Männer kaum unterscheiden. Auffallend und vielsagend ist vielmehr der von Ausnahmen abgesehen vorzüglich theologische Inhalt der Briefe[23]. Daraus aber ist zu schließen, dass Augustin die Männer und Frauen als intellektuell gleichwertig betrachtete. Ein beredtes Zeugnis solcher Gleichwertigkeit ist die Korrespondenz mit der dem Hochadel abstammenden Proba, die Augustinus um Unterweisung für ihr Gebetsleben bat. *Epistula* 130, eigentlich eine theologisch profunde Abhandlung über das Gebet – *De orando deo* –, bezeugt indirekt zugleich die geistigen Fähigkeiten der Adressatin. Ähnliches gilt von der früh verwitweten Juliana, der Schwiegertochter Probas, der Augustinus die Schrift *De bono uiduitatis* widmete, und ebenso von deren Tochter Demetrias, die in noch jungen Jahren in ein Kloster eintrat und die Augustin in den *epistulae* 150 und 188 vor den Irrtümern des Pelagius gewarnt hatte. Nahezu alle Briefe an Frauen atmen die pastorale Sorge und bezeugen den hohen Respekt, den ihr Verfasser ihnen aufgrund ihrer Würde als Person zu schulden überzeugt war.

Verständlicher Weise manifestiert sich die Wertschätzung der Frau in einer Gesellschaft allem voran in deren Stellung innerhalb der Ehe. Diesen Aspekt der Frauenfrage bei Augustinus behandelt der Abschnitt 3.4 *Das eheliche Verhältnis von Mann und Frau* (156-170). Da Augustins Eheverständnis eine Entwicklung durchlief, wird diese zuerst kurz skizziert. Fasste der frühe Augustin den Satz aus *Gn* 1,28

[23] Bei den Briefen 92 und 99 an Italica sowie den Briefen 124 und 126 an Albina geht es um materielle Dinge.

über den Befehl zur Fruchtbarkeit des ersten Menschenpaares noch geistig und bildlich auf, so korrigierte er diese spiritualistische Auslegung in seinem großen Kommentar *De Genesi ad litteram* und verfasste eine eigene Schrift, der er den programmatischen Titel *De bono coniugali* gab. Die Ehe ist demnach ein ‹bonum›, ein Gut. Diese Klarstellung war deshalb wichtig, weil es in der Kirche Kreise gab, die der Jungfräulichkeit unter einer negativen Bewertung der Ehe den Vorrang zuerkennen zu müssen glaubten. Zu den konstituierenden Faktoren der Ehe zählen nach Augustinus die Nachkommenschaft, die Treue und das Sakrament. Weil Nachkommenschaft die Sexualität zur Voraussetzung hat, ist diese nach Augustin, allerdings nur in Hinordnung auf ihren ‹finis primarius›, ebenfalls ein Gut.

Hinsichtlich der ehelichen Rechte und Pflichten kannte der Bischof keinen Unterschied zwischen Mann und Frau. Generell nahm er in Bezug auf das Zusammenleben der Eheleute kein Blatt vor den Mund. Er protestierte sogar gegen eine Diskriminierung der Frau durch das römische Gesetz[24]. Trotz dieses Maximums an Zugeständnissen hielt er an der faktischen Verpflichtung der Frau, sich dem Mann unterzuordnen, fest, zumal er diese Regelung durch zahlreiche Bibeltexte gestützt sah. Aber er erblickte in der Überordnung des Mannes keine Machtstellung, sondern die Verantwortung und die Sorge für die Familie in Wahrung der ‹pax domestica›. Selbstredend hielt er an der Unauflöslichkeit der Ehe fest. Er wusste nur zu gut, wer bei Trennung und Wiederverheiratung in der Regel den Kürzeren zog. So nahm er sich noch in den späteren Jahren seines Lebens auch dieser Problematik an und verfasste die pastorale Schrift *De adulterinis coniugiis – Die ehebrecherischen Verbindungen.*

Kapitel 4 *Der Theologe – Augustin über die Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau* (171-237) scheint im Verhältnis zu dem Stoff der vorausgegangenen Kapitel einer μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος zu gleichen. Dieser Wechsel von Augustins täglichem Umgang mit Frauen zur theologischen Reflexion über die Frau im Lichte der biblischen Offenbarung ist jedoch methodisch beabsichtigt: Wie fast immer herrscht bei Augustinus keine Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Im Gegenteil, die Praxis rechtfertigt sich aus der Theorie, in diesem Fall aus der theologischen Reflexion.

Augustins Anthropologie ist nicht nur der griechisch-neuplatonischen Philosophie, sondern ebenso auch der biblischen Offenbarungs-

[24] Auch diesbezüglich zitiert die Verfasserin VAN BAVEL, op.cit. 53: „An important point is further his protest against the discrimination of women by civil law. In doing so he assailed social injustice in his own day“.

lehre verpflichtet. Deshalb wendet sich die Studie in 4.1 *Die Auslegung der Schöpfungsgeschichte* (171-186) zunächst den verschiedenen Genesisauslegungen Augustins zu, um dann in 4.2 *Augustins Menschenbild und dessen Auswirkung auf die Lehre der Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau* (192-237) auch weitere Texte, vor allem aus *De trinitate,* in die Erörterung mit einzubeziehen.

Kenntnisreich setzt sich die Autorin in 4.1.1 *Eine Schöpfung – zwei Aspekte* (171-175) mit der Eigenart der augustinischen Bibelexegese, speziell seiner Auslegung von *Gn* 1-3 und darin wieder mit dem zweifachen Aspekt der Schöpfung auseinander, in der theoretisch über die ‹rationes causales seu seminales› selbst dynamische Prinzipien der Evolution an- und vorgedacht werden. Eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem Teilaspekt 4.1.2 *Die Erschaffung der Frau und ihre Aufgabe* (175-186) gewidmet. Die Erschaffung des Menschen erfolgte in zwei Stufen, potentiell in den ‹rationes seminales› und real in Raum und Zeit. Das Privileg des Menschseins – dies ist ungemein wichtig – gründet in der Potentialität. Sie involviert die Gottebenbildlichkeit und damit auch die Gleichrangigkeit der Geschlechter. Bezüglich der Fortpflanzung in der sogenannten Paradiesesehe musste Augustin sich erst über eine rein geistige zu einer sexuellen Auffassung (jedoch ohne Konkupiszenz) durchringen. In aller Klarheit sieht er den Sinn der Erschaffung der Frau nicht nur in der geistigen Partnerschaft, sondern auch in der Fortpflanzung. Allerdings teilte er mit den Gelehrten seiner Zeit die Auffassung, dass der Embryo ein Produkt des männlichen Samens sei, während die Frau nur den Raum für Nahrung und Wachstum zur Verfügung stellte. Die Entstehung Evas aus Adams Seite unterstreicht die Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes und mit dem Neuen Testament erblickt er im ersten Menschenpaar das Verhältnis von Christus und seiner Kirche.

Die soziale Hierarchisierung war erst eine Folge des Sündenfalles. Höchst aufschlussreich für die Lehre Augustins über die Frau ist deshalb der Abschnitt 4.1.3 *Der Sündenfall und seine Konsequenzen* (186-192). Sünde ist nach Augustin ‹superbia›, diese gründet aber nicht im Leib, sondern im Geist, was für die Gleichheit der Geschlechter wieder von höchster Bedeutung ist. Die Versuchung, letztlich ebenfalls ein geistiger Vorgang, verdeutlicht dies: Beide ließen sich überlisten. Die Ansicht, das Essen der verbotenen Frucht sei eine Vorwegnahme der Sexualität, wird zurückgewiesen. Die Konkupiszenz, daran hielt Augustin zeit seines Lebens fest, war nicht Motivation zur Sünde, sondern deren Folge. Zu Recht bestreitet die Verfasserin die Konzentration der augustinischen Erbsündenlehre vorzüglich, wenn nicht ausschließlich auf die Zeugung des Menschen

durch die Konkupiszenz: „Die Implikationen der Konkupiszenz umfassen weitaus mehr als lediglich die sexuelle Begierde“ (191).

Der zweite Teil dieses Kapitels, der Höhepunkt der Studie, beginnt mit einer ausführlicheren Darstellung der augustinischen Anthropologie. Die Seele macht das Wesen des Menschen aus, zu dem freilich auch der Leib gehört. Sie ist nicht von göttlicher Substanz, kommt aber von Gott, und zwar „nulla natura interposita“ (193). Mit Vorliebe differenziert deshalb Augustin zwischen dem ‹homo exterior› und dem ‹homo interior› und setzt den Letzteren vom Ersteren ab. Diese Unterscheidung ist auch insofern von Bedeutung, als das Geschlechtsspezifische allein am ‹homo exterior› in Erscheinung tritt. Daraus folgert die Verfasserin zu Recht: „Nach dem ‹homo exterior› ist die Frau dem Mann unterlegen, da ihre körperliche und soziale Stellung letztlich der traditionellen patriarchalischen Nachordnung der Frau entspricht. Wichtig ist, in aller Klarheit herauszustellen, dass Augustin in *De Genesi ad litteram* die Inferiorität der Frau nur auf die Leiblichkeit bezog und nicht wie in früheren Werken der ganzen Frau attestierte. Daher gilt in Bezug auf die Gottebenbildlichkeit: ‹Denn richtig verstehen wir das *nach seinem Bilde* nur in Bezug auf die Seele, so wie jenes *männlich und weiblich* nur in Bezug auf den Leib›“ (198f.). Diese Folgerung Seelbachs kann deshalb nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden, weil Augustin die aus *Gn* 1,27 gezogene Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen – also auch die der Frau – zur hermeneutischen Norm erhob, in deren Lichte er andere, weniger frauenfreundliche Äußerungen der Bibel, selbst solche wie *1 Kor* 11,7, zu interpretieren unternahm, die der Intention des Apostels nicht entsprach.

Unbeschadet der Integrität der Frau als Mensch, aber in der Anerkennung ihrer gesellschaftlich niederen Position überträgt Augustin die in *1 Kor* 11,7 vorgenommene Differenzierung lediglich allegorisch auch auf die zwei Schichten der Seele, deren eine, die männliche, die ‹contemplatio ueritiatis›, deren andere, die weibliche hingegen die ‹administratio rerum temporalium› zum Gegenstand habe (203). Die durch den Sündenfall getrübte Gottebenbildlichkeit wie deren Wiederherstellung durch Christi Erlösungswerk betreffen Mann und Frau in gleicher Weise und in gleicher Intensität. Mit Verve wendet sich die Verfasserin – wieder im Anschluss an van Bavel[25] – gegen die angebliche Leugnung einer natürlichen Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau in den Schriften des

[25] Sie zitiert auf S. 206 in der Anmerkung 1268 dessen Aufsatz, Woman as the Image of God in Augustine's "De Trinitate XII", 267f.

Kirchenvaters. Umsichtig weist sie, zwischen einer wörtlichen und einer geistigen Schriftauslegung differenzierend, nach, wie Augustin *Gn* 1,27 wörtlich auslegend, *1 Kor* 11,7 hingegen geistig, beide Bibelstellen miteinander in Einklang zu bringen versuchte. Hierbei zitiert sie den Satz aus *ciu.* 22,17, den sie als Titel für ihre Studie wählte: „Das weibliche Geschlecht ist ja kein Gebrechen, sondern Natur".

Der Abschnitt 4.2.1 *Ein Geist mit zwei Funktionen* (213-218) präzisiert das augustinische Verständnis des ‹homo interior› auf die Geistseele, die ‹mens›, hin. Hinsichtlich ihrer Aufgaben hat diese zwei Bereiche, den der ‹sapientia› und den der ‹scientia›. Während Gegenstand der ‹sapientia› die ‹aeterna› sind, richtet sich die ‹scientia› auf die ‹temporalia›. Wenngleich Augustinus der ‹sapientia› die männliche, der ‹scientia› hingegen die weibliche Funktion zuordnete, so kann doch davon keine Rede sein, dass er den Geschlechtern das eine oder andere absprach. Der unmittelbar folgende Abschnitt 4.2.2 *Das Bild des dreieinen Gottes in jedem Menschen* (218f.) illustriert diesen wichtigen anthropologischen Befund.

Die Crux der ‹Frauenfrage› innerhalb des Christentums liegt in der Interpretation von *1 Kor* 11,7, wonach der Mann sein Haupt deshalb nicht zu bedecken brauche, weil er als Mann Gottes Bild und Abglanz, während die Frau lediglich des Mannes Abglanz sei. Die Abschnitte 4.2.3 *Von der sozialen zur figurativen Hierarchie* (220-225) und 4.2.4 *Die Behebung von Widersprüchen durch figurative Deutung – ein Beispiel* (225-227) beschäftigen sich nochmals eingehend mit der Exegese dieser Stelle. Augustin entging der Widerspruch zu seiner Auffassung von der Gleichheit zwischen Mann und Frau natürlich nicht. Er beseitigt ihn unter Hinzuziehung der erwähnten Distinktion zwischen der ‹sapientia› und der ‹scientia› ein und derselben ‹mens›. Rein figurativ entsprächen beide Funktionen der ‹mens› der sozialen Über- und Unterordnung von Mann und Frau. Die als männlich höher konnotierte ‹sapientia› und die als weiblich niedriger konnotierte ‹scientia› schmälern die beiden, Mann und Frau, gemeinsame Ausstattung mit der ‹mens› nicht. Lediglich im übertragenen Sinn spiegelt sich im Verhältnis von ‹scientia› zu ‹sapientia› in der ‹mens humana› die soziale und physische Inferiorität der Frau. Die in *1 Kor* 11,7 beschriebene, von Augustin jedoch figurativ interpretierte Hierarchie zwischen Mann und Frau mit ihren kulturspezifischen Folgen der Verschleierung von Frauen „hat ihren Sitz im Leben sicherlich im sozialen Gefälle von Augustins Zeit" (222). Ähnlich verfährt Augustin mit anderen,

die Stellung der Frau diskreditierenden Texten wie z.B. dem aus *1 Tim* 2,14sq.[26]

Der letzte Abschnitt der Arbeit, 4.2.5 *Die eine gemeinsame Natur in jedem menschlichen Geist* (227-237), hat die in mehreren Paulusstellen (*Eph* 4,23f., *Kol* 3,9f. (*Gal* 3,26-28) zur Sprache gebrachte Erneuerung des Menschen durch Christi Erlösungswerk zum Thema. Sich auf die Galaterstelle berufend, hält Augustinus an der durch die Gnade Christi gewirkten Gleichheit zwischen Mann und Frau fest. Vom Erlösungsgeschehen her fällt Licht auch auf die Wiederherstellung der durch die Sünde lädierten ‹similitudo› und ‹imago› von Mann und Frau. Im Kontext der Erörterung der Bedeutungsumfänge von der ‹similitudo› und der ‹imago› wird nochmals deutlich, dass das Geschehen der Sünde nicht im Bereich des Leibes bzw. der Sinne des Leibes, sondern in dem des Geistes, also dem der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen stattfand. Eine qualitativ unterschiedliche Schuldzuweisung hinsichtlich eines Rollengefälles von der ‹contemplatio› und ‹sapientia› für den Mann zur ‹actio› und ‹scientia› für die Frau, geschweige denn eine Gleichsetzung der Frau mit dem Leibessinn, dem ‹sensus corporis›, in Abhebung von der Gleichsetzung des Mannes mit dem Geist, der ‹mens›, was einzelne Theologen zu vertreten schienen, lehnt Augustin ab[27].

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Der Studie L. Seelbachs dürfte in absehbarer Zeit eine Zweitauflage folgen. Dabei sollten offensichtliche Fehler korrigiert, festgestellte Mängel beseitigt und Desiderata eingearbeitet werden. Dazu einiges: 1.) Nicht Attila war der ‹Rom-Eroberer› am Ende des ersten Jahrzehntes des fünften Jahrhunderts (27), sondern (wie auf S. 146 richtig:) Alarich. 2.) Die *Confessiones* seien die ‹berühmteste und einflussreichste Autobiographie der Antike› heißt es S. 29. Zwar wird sofort kritisch bemerkt, diese seien keine Biographie im ‹konventionellen› Sinn, dennoch ist S. 80 vom Kontrast zwischen ‹den letzten drei Büchern› zu den vorausgehenden die Rede. Dies ist nicht ganz richtig. Augustins *Confessiones* sind ein Protreptikos. Darüber informierte E. Feldmann in mehreren Veröffentlichungen. Die protreptischen Tendenzen, die er zweifelsohne auch mit Monnica verfolgte, bleiben leider ausgeblendet. Feldmann sollte unbedingt berücksichtigt

[26] Auch hierbei folgt die Verfasserin weithin den Studien VAN BAVELS. Siehe die Anmerkung 1371 sowie 1375.

[27] Cf. *trin.* 12,20.

und in die Literatur mit aufgenommen werden[28], Monnicas (der Frau) Persönlichkeit bei der Werbung für das Christentum würde dadurch in ein noch helleres Licht rücken. 3.) Wenn schon das Zitieren den Technischen Richtlinien des *AL* und dem *CAG* folgt, dann: *De ciuitate dei* und nicht *Dei* (196), *De Genesi ad litteram* und nicht *Litteram* (198, 203), ferner *De trinitate* und nicht *Trinitate* (203). 4.) Die Autorin bemüht sich, auf historische Entwicklungen in Augustins Denken hinzuweisen. Es wäre hilfreich bei Schriften, die dafür relevant sind, das Datum der Abfassung hinzuzufügen (157). 5.) Auf S. 136 wird das Problem der Echtheit der *epistula* 211 erörtert, wenn auch nur kurz. Hier vermisst man die wichtige Studie von L. Verheijen[29]. 6.) Auf S. 141 wird irrtümlich das Fehlen von Informationen über die Briefpartner und -partnerinnen Augustins vor der 1991 erschienenen Studie F. Morgensterns beklagt. Indes findet man nicht nur die Briefpartner in dem bereits 1923 von A. Goldbacher herausgegebenen Band CSEL 58, 12-53: „Index I. Nomina eorum, ad quos et a quibus scriptae sunt epistulae, praeter ipsum Augustinum" aufgeführt, sondern sogar nähere Angaben zu den Adressaten ebd.: „Index III. De epistularum ordine atque temporibus". Standard dazu ist gegenwärtig der 2001 erschienene Artikel *Epistulae* von J. Divjak und der Redaktion des AL[30]. 7.) Dass Monnica ihren Sohn in „Bosheit empfangen" und „in Sünden in ihrem Schoß" genährt hatte (40), sind Reflexionszitate aus *Ps* 51,7 des seine Gnadenlehre in den *Confessiones* verbreitenden Augustinus. Sie sollten als solche gekennzeichnet werden. 8.) S. 151 ist von der geistlichen Schönheit aus *De bono uiduitatis* 24 die Rede. Die ‹pulchritudo spiritalis› gehört mit zu den charakteristischen Termini der augustinischen Spiritualität und sollte deshalb ebenfalls als solcher kenntlich werden, zumal er auch in der Regel für Frauen steht[31]. 9.) Treffend das Urteil über die negative Sicht der Sexualität als Kraft, weil diese den Geist des Menschen von Gott abzulenken vermag (159), aber auch hier wäre ein Hinweis auf die philosophische wie theologische Tradition, in der Augustin stand, hilfreich. 10.) Auf S. 229 und S. 233 kommen gehäuft Termini aus der Erkenntnistheorie und der Ontologie Augustins wie ‹ratio›, ‹imago›, ‹similitudo›, ‹sapientia›, ‹scientia› etc. zur Sprache. Kurze Informationen über die Philosophie, der Augustin verpflichtet war, wären hier angebracht.

[28] Siehe den magistralen Artikel *Confessiones*: AL 1 (1986-1994) 1134-1193.
[29] L. Verheijen, *La règle de saint Augustin* 1-2, Paris 1967.
[30] Bd 2, 893-1057.
[31] Siehe auch *ep.* 211,16: „spiritalis pulchritudinis amatrices".

Trotz dieser vielleicht dicht und gehäuft wirkenden Kritik hat L. Seelbach mit ihrer Dissertation einen, weil umfassend und gründlich bearbeiteten, längst fälligen Forschungsbeitrag zum Themenbereich ‹Die Frau bei Augustinus› vorgelegt. Dass sie für den viel geschmähten Kirchenvater Partei ergreift, wer will ihr das aufgrund ihrer Recherchen verübeln? Ist Augustinus tatsächlich jenes ‹schwarze Schaf, gar jener Sündenbock›, für den ihn bestimmte feministische Kreisen halten? Ging er als Mensch, als Philosoph und Theologe, allem voran aber als Mann der Kirche mit Frauen in seiner näheren und weiteren Umgebung wirklich so um, dass er sie in ihrer Würde verletzte? Ist es wissenschaftlich gerechtfertigt, den in der männlich sozialisierten Kultur und Zivilisation der ausgehenden christlichen Spätantike aufgewachsenen Bischof von unseren modernen sozialen Errungenschaften her in den Blick zu nehmen und zu beurteilen? Solche Überlegungen begründen zu Recht das Ziel, die Methode und den Aufbau der Untersuchung.

Wer vermag schon die Jahr für Jahr immer noch um Hunderte von Titeln anwachsende Sekundärliteratur zu Augustins Person und Werk – darunter stets auch eine stattliche Reihe zum Thema ‹Frau› – zu überschauen und kritisch zu sondieren? Die vorgenommene Begrenzung auf ein gutes Dutzend der wichtigeren Veröffentlichungen zu den vier Kapiteln und deren kurze Charakterisierung gleich zum Beginn der Arbeit leuchtet darum ein[32]. Dabei wird kritisch festgestellt, dass die englisch-, französisch- und spanischsprachige Forschung dem Frauenbild Augustins stets größeres Interesse entgegenbrachte als die deutschsprachige. Unter den Veröffentlichungen zum Frauenbild ganz allgemein werden genannt: K.E. BØRRESEN, *Subordination et Équivalence*[33], K. POWER, *Veiled Desire. Augustine's Writing on Women*[34] und die bereits vorgestellte Dissertation von S. SOENNECKEN, *Misogynie oder Philogynie?* Zum Thema ‹Monnica› gebe es zwar eine Fülle von Schriften, meist jedoch erbaulichen Inhalts. Eine dominierende Rolle spiele Monnica dagegen in der Flut psychoanalytischer Deutungsversuche über ihre Person und über ihren Sohn. Bezüglich der Konkubine Augustins werden neben den Standardwerken über den Konkubinat auch Untersuchungen über Einzelaspekte aufgeführt, darunter befinden sich aber keine, die der Bedeutung der langjährigen Lebensgefährtin Augustins gebührend

[32] Die Auseinandersetzung mit zahlreichen weiteren Publikationen erfolgt jeweils an Ort und Stelle der Arbeit.

[33] Untertitel: *The Nature and Role of Women in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas*, Washington, D.C. 1981.

[34] London 1995.

Rechnung trüge. Ein etwas differenzierteres Bild biete die Literatur über Augustins Kontakte zu anderen Frauen. T. van Bavel wird hier genannt, der gleich in mehreren Artikeln die Bedeutung solcher Kontakte für die Frauenfrage bei Augustinus gesehen und hervorgehoben habe. Wenig Interesse zeige die Forschung an Augustins Schwester, die hier erstmalig ausführlicher zur Darstellung kommt. Ähnliches gilt bezüglich der Briefpartnerinnen und der daraus zu ziehenden Schlüsse für das Thema, während zu Augustins Eheverständnis die Monographie von É. SCHMITT, *Le mariage Chrétien dans l'œuvre des Saint Augustin*[35] recht aufschlussreich sei. Zum Kapitel über die Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau werden vier Titel aufgeführt: J.J. O'MEARA, *The Creation of Man in St. Augustine's De Genesi ad Litteram*[36], J. BRACHTENDORF, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus. Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in „De Trinitate"*[37], M. SCHMAUS, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des heiligen Augustinus*[38] und J.E. SULLIVAN, *The Image of God. The Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence*[39].

Zu erwähnen ist die durchgängig sorgfältige Zitierung speziell der Augustinus-Texte nach den Doppelangaben (Textcorpus und Edition) des *CAG*. Zu loben ist nicht nur die richtige Schreibung des Namens Monnica mit Doppel-‹n›, sondern auch die Erklärung ihres Namens, der möglicherweise mit der Gottheit ‹Mon› zu tun hat (32). Die pastorale Intention, die Augustin mit der relativ breiten Darstellung seiner Mutter verfolgt haben dürfte, wird klar zur Sprache gebracht. Ihr verdankt er das Leben, nicht nur im irdischen, sondern in dem für einen Christen eigentlichen Sinn. Strikte Orientierung sowohl am Text wie auch an der Fachliteratur führt zu Urteilen wie: „Es gilt erneut in aller Deutlichkeit darauf hinzuweisen, dass Augustin Monnicas Leben nur in Beziehung zu seinem eigenen sah" (37), oder: „Für Augustinus verkörpert Monnica geradezu die Mutter Kirche" (41). Daraus wird verständlich, dass die *Confessiones* an einer objektiven Biographie Monnicas desinteressiert sind, woraus allerdings „auf ein grundsätzliches Desinteresse Monnicas an ihren anderen Kindern und Familienangehörigen" (70) nicht geschlossen werden kann. Wenn deshalb Augustin das Verhältnis Monnicas zu ihren anderen Kindern mit einem ‹beredten Schweigen› übergeht und eine ‹gezielte Auswahl› aus ihrem Leben getroffen hat, dann zeigt dies

[35] Untertitel: *Une théologie baptismale de la vie conjugale*, Paris 1983.
[36] Villanova 1980.
[37] Hamburg 2000.
[38] Münster ^{2}1967.
[39] Dubuque 1963.

nochmals deutlich, wie er alles, was er in seine *Confessiones* mit aufnahm, strikte deren Leitgedanken zu- und unterordnete. Dabei freilich war er als Rhetor mit dem Repertoire kunstvoller Beschreibungen von Personen bestens vertraut, was sich auch in der Darstellung Monnicas spiegelt. „Dennoch lag ihm die Wahrhaftigkeit von Texten weitaus mehr am Herzen als die bloße Beredsamkeit“ (71). Solche Urteile über Monnica machen zugleich die innere Distanz einsichtig, die Augustin aus der Perspektive der *Confessiones* seinem Vater Patricius gegenüber hegte. Einsichtig wird auch die Kritik der Verfasserin an den Kritikern Augustins, etwa am Diktum von K. Flasch, Augustin habe Patricius ‹literarisch aus dem Weg geräumt› (44). Das ist zwar spritzig formuliert, ob es aber auch sachlich zutrifft, darüber wird man nach der Lektüre dieses Buches zumindest Zweifel anmelden.

Wie schon erwähnt, konzentriert sich die Kritik Seelbachs auf die psychoanalytischen Deutungsversuche, denen ein eigener ‹Exkurs› mit einem ganzen Bündel von ‹Anfragen› vorbehalten ist. Die Kritik der Psychoanalyse, inzwischen zu einem stattlichen Arsenal angewachsen, gipfelt in der Feststellung der Analytiker: „Wäre Augustin psychisch gesund und ohne Beeinträchtigungen gewesen, hätte er die Confessiones nie geschrieben“ (83). Die Verfasserin konstatiert indes auf der gleichen Seite, indem sie sich auf den Mediziner B. Legewie[40] beruft: „Die auf psychoanalytischem Weg gewonnenen Einsichten stimmen jedoch nicht unbedingt miteinander überein“. Hier nur einige Paradigmen aus der Sammlung der von den Analytikern Augustin und Monnica zugeschriebenen psychischen ‹maladjustments› (84-89): Muttersöhnchen; asexuelle Erziehung; Unfähigkeit, Glück in der Liebe zu Frauen zu finden; homosexuelle Aktivitäten; inzestuöse Absichten Monnicas Augustin gegenüber; Frigidität; depressiv-narzisstische Persönlichkeitsstruktur; religiöse Protesthandlungen durch Flucht in den Manichäismus; Mangel an väterlicher Wärme dem eigenen Sohn Adeodatus gegenüber; Trennung von der Konkubine aus ödipalen Beziehungen zur Mutter; Prägung des Gottesbildes aus negativer Einstellung zur Sexualität; unkritische Anerkennung der kirchlichen Autorität; das Befolgen des ‹tolle lege!› als Ausdruck verinnerlichter Strafautorität; Jesus-Komplex aus Mangel an Enthaltsamkeit; die *Confessiones* ein Textfetischismus; die Beerdigung der Mutter in Ostia, eine Erfüllung infantiler und ödipaler Phantasien. Mit P. Frederiksen[41] stellt Seelbach fest,

[40] *Augustinus. Eine Psychobiographie*, Bonn 1925.
[41] Augustine and his Analysts (siehe n. 14).

„dass solche psychoanalytischen Analysen dazu tendierten, wichtige Beobachtungen mit Überinterpretationen und schlechter Handhabung des Textes zu kombinieren" (90).

Auf der gleichen Argumentationshöhe folgt die Auseinandersetzung mit den Kritikern Augustins in Punkto seines Verhältnisses zur Konkubine und Ersatzgeliebten, zur leiblichen Schwester, zu den Briefpartnerinnen und zu seiner christlichen Ehelehre. Stets orientiert sich die Darstellung am Text und an der reichlich und kritisch herangezogenen Sekundärliteratur. Augustins Beziehung zu den Frauen wird in der Regel zusammen mit den gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen seiner Zeit erörtert. Aufgrund solch wissenschaftstheoretisch korrekter Methode gewinnt der Leser die Überzeugung, dass er zuverlässig informiert wird. Aus den präzisen Zusammenfassungen jeweils am Ende größerer Abschnitte sei die auf S. 155f. wiedergegeben: „Resümierend ist festzustellen, dass Augustin in seinen Briefen an Frauen als ein Bischof begegnet, der Trost spendet, ermahnt, vor Irrlehren warnt, Streit schlichtet, sich bedankt, für die Frauen betet, ihre Klugheit, ihren Glauben und ihr Verhalten lobt, auf sie eingeht und Bitten erfüllt, zum Briefwechsel ermutigt sowie theologische Unterweisungen gibt[42]. Augustin geht in seinen Briefen also respektvoll auf Frauen ein und benachteiligt sie nicht aufgrund ihres Geschlechts".

Streng genommen besteht diese Studie nicht aus vier Kapiteln, sondern aus zwei Teilen, einem ersten mit den Kapiteln 1-3, deren Stoff sich aus historisch relevanten Personen, Ereignissen und Gegebenheiten aus dem Leben Augustins rekrutiert, und einem zweiten mit dem Kapitel 4, dessen Thema sich in der Darstellung der Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau erschöpft. Teil II – dies erkennt man unschwer – bestätigt als Theorie Augustins Umgang mit Frauen. Es ist also keine Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis festzustellen. Dies leuchtet ein, wenn man bedenkt, dass es eigentlich das Verständnis des Menschen als ‹imago dei› war, das ihm in Mailand den Zugang zum Christentum ermöglicht hatte.

Seelbach hat die Bedeutung der augustinischen Exegese von *Gn* 1,26f. für die Anthropologie des Kirchenvaters samt der Konsequenzen, die dieser daraus für die Bewertung der Frau gezogen hat, erkannt und mustergültig dargestellt. Sorgfältig geht sie, zwischen den Früh- und Spätschriften unterscheidend und dabei eine gewisse Entwicklung bei Augustins feststellend (198), den möglichen Auslegungen der Erschaffung Evas nach (175-186), referiert Erhellendes

[42] Es sei erwähnt, dass zu jeder Feststellung in diesem Satz einschlägige Belege gegeben werden – insgesamt 23.

zur Erbsünde, insistiert auf der Lehre von der Seele als dem entscheidenden Kriterium des Menschseins und setzt den Bischof von Hippo deutlich von jenen christlichen Schriftstellern ab, die in Bezug auf die Verachtung des Körpers sich philosophisch wie theologisch hervortaten. Das Geschlechtsspezifische gründet nicht in der Seele, sondern im Körper. Nur im Blick auf diese Differenz finden sich auch bei Augustinus Texte, die einer Vor- und Unterordnung zwischen Mann und Frau das Wort reden. Mit guten Argumenten wehrt Seelbach die Auslegung der feministischen Theologin Radford Ruether von *trin.* 12,10 ab, wonach Augustin angeblich im Mann allein ‹das vollständige Ebenbild Gottes› gesehen habe und wonach dies der Frau nur zusammen mit ihrem Mann zukomme (207f.). Kritisch wendet sie sich auch gegen die Auffassung von K. Power, die, zwischen der Gottebenbildlichkeit der Frau als Mensch und der Frau als Frau unterscheidend, letzterer diese Wesenseigenschaft abspricht (208-210). Sich jedoch auf die Arbeiten von R. Arbesmann sowie S. Soennecken stützend, erklärt sie, die leibliche Verschiedenheit reiche nicht in den menschlichen Geist hinein, wo die Gottebenbildlichkeit auch der Frau gleich dem Mann ihre Wurzeln habe.

De trinitate zählt mit zu den Höhepunkten des geistigen Schaffens Augustins. Es überrascht deshalb nicht, wenn die Verfasserin ihre Studie mit der gewichtigen Unterscheidung zwischen dem ‹homo exterior› und dem ‹homo interior›, die dort im Buch 12 vorgenommen wird, schließt. Ihre Darstellung lässt keinen Zweifel darüber aufkommen, dass das Bild des dreieinigen Gottes in jeder geistbegabten Kreatur vorhanden ist. Das soziale Gefälle, das in der irdischen Wirklichkeit zwischen Mann und Frau besteht, dürfe und könne *Gn* 1,27 außer Kraft setzen. Deshalb lasse auch Augustin in Bezug auf den Unterschied zwischen der ‹sapientia› und der ‹scientia› als Teile der Geistseele, die er nur funktional dem Mann und der Frau zuordnen zu müssen glaubte, lediglich eine figurative Hierarchie gelten. Die Differenz sei mehr eine symbolische als eine reale. Seelbach zitiert abermals van Bavel: „A symbol, however, must have some ground in reality. That reality is nothing else than a certain subordination of women on the level of the mind. Only thus a real subordination on a lower level (which we today can no longer accept) can become a symbol of subordination on a higher level“[43].

Augustins Einschätzung der Frau positiv zu würdigen, wird man dann am ehesten bereit sein, wenn man diese mit der aus den

[43] S. 221, Anmerkung 1359. Zitat aus: Woman as the Image of God in Augustine's "De trintiate XII", 286.

Werken anderer christlicher Schriftsteller seiner Zeit vergleicht. Die hier besprochene Studie tut dies über die herangezogene einschlägige Sekundärliteratur, etwa den Artikel von K. Thräde[44] oder P. Browns *Die Keuschheit der Engel*.[45] In der literarischen Umgebung seiner Epoche wirkt Augustin bei aller zeit- und gesellschaftsgebundenen Bewertung der Frau geradezu unzeitgemäß. „Verglichen mit anderen Kirchenvätern", heißt es deshalb treffend schon mitten in der Studie, „bediente sich Augustin eher einer moderaten Ausdrucksweise und ließ sich nicht zu verächtlichen Beschimpfungen des weiblichen Geschlechtes hinreißen. Ein negatives Frauenbild kann Augustin nicht unbesehen unterstellt werden" (125). Gegen dieses Resümee wird T. van Bavel nichts einzuwenden haben.

Cornelius P. MAYER OSA

[44] Siehe n. 3.

[45] Der Titel der deutschen Übersetzung, eine Metapher, ist irreführend. Zur Originalausgabe siehe n. 21.

AB UTERO MATRIS MEAE, QUAE MULTUM SPERAUIT IN TE[1]
LA MATERNITÉ ET LA PATERNITÉ D'AUGUSTIN

Les Confessions font le récit d'une conversion. Seuls les noyaux historiques qui sont au service de cette conversion ont été retenus et sont inextricablement mêlés aux commentaires religieux qu'Augustin y ajoute.[2] Le rôle joué par sa mère Monique dans cette histoire de conversion ne doit guère être sous-estimé[3] mais le rôle de la mère terrestre sera pourtant complètement terminé à sa mort, qui conclut non sans raison la partie historique des Confessions.[4] Le fait historique de ce décès est limité à une communication pragmatique: sa mère avait cinquante-six ans à sa mort, Augustin trente-trois.[5] Le commentaire religieux sera d'autant plus long.[6]

Vers la même époque où il rédigea les Confessions, Augustin écrivit une lettre à Laetus, dans laquelle il élabore un commentaire religieux analogue au sujet de l'adieu à sa mère.[7]

[1] *Confessiones* 1,11,17, CC 27, p. 9. Nous remercions J. Van Houtem pour la traduction française du texte.

[2] B. CLÉMENT, *L'invention du commentaire: Augustin, Jacques Derrida*, Paris, 2000, p. 58: "...pour Augustin la conversion est précisément le processus par lequel l'esprit peut tenir ensemble son origine (et sa finalité) spirituelle et le développement historique de son extistence."

[3] R. BRÄNDLE – W. NEIDHART, *Lebensgeschichte und Theologie, Ein Beitrag zur psychohistorischen Interpretation Augustin*, in *Theologische Zeitschrift* (Festschrift B. REICHE) 40 (1984) 2, 157-180, p. 161: "Augustin setzt an zu einer neuen Lektüre, einer neuen Interpretation seiner Vergangenheit, von seiner Kindheit bis zu seiner Konversion. Diese Epoche war beherrscht und geprägt von einer Gestalt: seine Mutter Monnica. Die Beziehungen zwischen ihr und Augustin sind der rote Faden, der die Bekenntnisse durchzieht, darin sind sich Historiker und Analytiker einig."

[4] Inutile de démontrer encore que les *Confessiones* ne constituent pas une biographie au sens strict du terme. Augustin procède d'une manière très sélective et ne relate que les faits qui appuient l'histoire de sa conversion. Le commentaire religieux qu'il en fait veut montrer que la mort de sa mère forme la conclusion de sa conversion et en même temps le point de départ d'une vie nouvelle.

[5] *Confessiones* 9,11,28, p. 149.

[6] H.-G. SURMUND, *"Factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio", (Confessiones IV,4).* Untersuchungen zu Erfahrung und Deutung des Todes bei Augustinus, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Problems der "mors immatura", 1977, p. 51: "...die 'Confessiones' referieren ja nicht blo§Fakten; sie stellen vielmehr Geschehnisse interpretierend dar, suchen sie besser und tiefer zu verstehen, als er in der Befangenheit des unmittelbaren Erlebens, im 'Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks' möglich war."

[7] Voir A. GABILLON, *Pour une datation de la lettre 243 d'Augustin à Laetus* in *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 40 (1994), 127-142. À partir d'une critique interne, entre autres, l'auteur arrive à la conclusion que la lettre doit être contemporaine des Confessions: 397. Cf. A. MANDOUZE, *Prosopographie de L'Afrique chrétienne (303-533)*, in *Prosopographie chrétienne des Bas-Empire*, 1, Paris, 1982, p. 623s.

Lettre 243

Laetus est un nouveau venu dans un des deux monastères d'Hippone – probablement le monastère laïque (*monasterium laicorum*) – et était parti chez sa mère pour régler quelques intérêts d'affaires la concernant. Pour cette raison, entre autres, sa mère voulut détourner son fils de son désir de mener une vie religieuse. Entretemps Laetus avait écrit une lettre au monastère à ce sujet avec la prière de la faire lire à Augustin. Dans sa réponse Augustin examine les causes du doute de Laetus et le rôle que sa mère y joue. Comment le nouveau soldat du Christ peut-il abandonner le camp où il doit construire la tour? lui demande Augustin d'emblée.[8] Sur cette tour il se trouvera en position ferme et pourra lutter avec les armes de la Parole de Dieu, de sorte que les tentations ne pourront l'atteindre.[9] Apparemment Laetus n'a pas encore trouvé le langage adéquat pour répondre à sa mère. Ignore-t-il donc qu'il est même en mesure de se battre comme un roi, puisque le Christ-Roi n'a pas dédaigné de devenir son frère? L'autre roi, celui qui dispose de vingt mille hommes, ne pourra résister

[8] *Epistula* 243,1, CSEL 57, p. 568: "Si te igitur tironem Christi profiteris, castra ne deseras, in quibus tibi etiam aedificanda turris est illa, de qua in euangelio dominus loquitur." Dans les *Confessiones* aussi Augustin présente ce projet monastique comme la construction d'une tour: "... Et exuabatur mundo mens eius... Respondit ille adhaerere se socium tantae mercedis tantaeque militiae. Et ambo iam tui aedificabant turrem sumptu idoneo relinquendi omnia sua ex carne inquinatum." (*Confessiones* 8,6,15, CC 27, p. 123). Dans les *Confessiones* 8,6,15: "Te si piget imitari, noli aduersari." et dans l'*Epistula* 243,10, p. 577: "Sed non uult sequi? Non impediat.", la résistance à ce projet monastique est formulée en termes similaires. Voir A. GABILLON, *Pour une datation de la lettre 243 d'Augustin à Laetus*..., p. 136.

[9] *Ibid.*: "In ea quippe stantem et sub armis verbi Dei militantem..." Dans cette lettre Augustin applique *militia* à la vie monastique, ce qui était déjà une tradition à l'époque d'Augustin: J. LECLERCQ, *'Militare Deo' dans la tradition patristiqe et monastique*, in *'Militia Christi' e Crociata nei sec. XI-XIII*. Atti della XI Settimana internazionale di studio, Mendola, 28 ag. – 1 sett. 1989, Milan, Vita e pensiero, 1992, p. 3-18. Voir aussi A. ZUMKELLER, *Biblische und altchristliche Leitbilder des klösterlichen Lebens im Schrifttum des heiligen Augustinus*, in *Augustiniana* 18 (1968) 5-21, p. 10-12; A. SANCHEZ CARAZO, *La conversiòn de San Agust"n y la vida monàstica*, in *Scripta Theologica* 18 (1986) 827-846, p. 838-839, montre que la conversion même d'Augustin est présentée dans le cadre d'une nouvelle *militia*, qui a changé d'*imperator*. Le converti veut d'ailleurs servir (*militare*) en tant que moine, ce qui n'empêche pas Augustin de considerer tous les chrétiens – le clergé inclus – comme les soldats du Christ: S. POQUE, *Le langage symbolique dans la prédication d'Augustin d'Hippone*, t. I, Paris, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1984, 37-68; l'auteur dit pourtant dans t. II, p. 46*, n. 149: "Nous dirons que *militia* devient 'un terme technique du monachisme' précisément parce que le moine est par excellence un lutteur contre le diable." Voir enfin J. SEPULCHRE, *Léxico monástico en las cartas de San Agust'n*, in *Revista Agustiniana* 34 (1993) 799-829, p. 812s.

aux dix mille hommes qui suivent les instructions du Christ.[10] Cet autre roi est bien sûr l'ange déchu qui a trébuché sur l'orgueil et la cupidité. C'est par ce camp de l'avidité que Laetus est tenté maintenant.

L'image de la tour et des camps de combattants est précédée chez Luc du texte sur le rejet des liens familiaux et l'acceptation de la croix de l'imitation, qu'Augustin comprend comme deux conditions necessaires[11] pour terminer la construction de la tour et évaluer les rapports de force entre les deux camps.[12] Le lien familial avec les parents, l'épouse et les enfants, les frères et les soeurs, appartient à l'ordre de la propriété que Laetus n'arrive pas à quitter. C'est le lien de la particularité, de la possession, de l'individualité qui nous entortille et empêche d'atteindre le bien commun qui demeure pour toujours. Le particulier et l'individuel, on ne peut les retenir. Il leur est propre d'être transitoires dans le temps.[13] Ce raisonnement est sans doute familier à Laetus car Augustin passe tout de suite à son application concrète. Que peut-il, Augustin, avoir en commun avec Laetus dans la femme (*quaedam mulier*), la mère de ce dernier mais pas sa mère à lui? Ce que cette femme a de particulier dans toute l'histoire de Laetus qui a précédé, Augustin ne peut pas le partager avec le nouveau venu dans la vie religieuse. Le fait particulier que Laetus a été conçu en elle, qu'elle l'a porté en son sein, qu'elle lui a donné le jour et l'a allaité, tout cela s'est déroulé dans le temps et est passé dans le temps.[14] Par contre le fait que la mère de Laetus est une 'soeur' dans le Christ, Augustin le partage non seulement avec Laetus mais avec

[10] *Id.*, p. 569s.: "...cum sit rex noster, tamen ea societate, qua etiam frater esse dignatus est, reges appellasse milites suos..." Voir note 42. Cf. *Sermo Morin* 10,3, MA I, 625: "Tantus campi doctor captiuus ducitur..."

[11] *Id.* 3, p. 570: "Praelocutio autem superior cum extrema conclusione concordat."

[12] Luc 14,26-33.

[13] *Id.* 3, p. 570: "Omnia enim haec propria eius sunt, quae plerumque implicant et impediunt ad obtinenda non ista propria temporaliter transitura sed in aeternum mansura communia." S. POQUE, *Le langage symbolique dans la prédication d'Augustin d'Hippone*... p. 50s. souligne que l'opposition entre l'éternel et le temporel correspond à l'opposition entre *stantem* (note 8) et celui qui est submergé par l'instabilité des passions: "*Stare* est le mot qui évoque l'attitude du soldat en première ligne; il revient fréquemment sur les lèvres d'Augustin, dans un contexte qui dénote l'image militaire, mais l'originalité d'Augustin consiste en ce que, chez lui, le terme participe de cette nostalgie d'atteindre "ce qui ne passe pas", et ressortit alors à la méditation philosophique." Voir aussi AUGUSTINUS-LEXIKON, *Commune – proprium*, c. 1079-1089, hrgb von C. MAYER, Vol. 1, Basel, 1986-1994 où G. Madec n'a pas jugé nécessaire de mentionner la lette 243.

[14] *Ibid.*: "Quo enim tibi nunc quaedam mulier mater est, hoc ipso utique non est et mihi. Quapropter hoc temporale ac transitorium est, sicut transisse iam uides, quod te concepit, quod gestauit utero, quod peperit, quod lacte nutriuit."

tous ceux qui ont reçu la promesse de l'héritage céleste qui est Dieu le Père et Christ le Frère en une seule communion d'amour.[15] Cette communion n'est pas entachée par le temps, mais est éternelle. Elle sera d'autant plus fortement ancrée dans l'espoir qu'elle est moins régie par le droit privé et plus par le droit commun.[16] Ce point de départ fixe le ton de la lettre et nous fait deviner qu'Augustin présentera Laetus comme victime de la particularité, de l'individualité dans l'ordre sensoriel et de l'irréversibilité dans l'ordre temporel. Celui qui ne réussit pas à quitter cet ordre particulier au profit de l'ordre supérieur de la *caritas*, ne pourra se soustraire à la douleur de la perte et des adieux et au chagrin inconsolable. Pour pouvoir engager le combat avec succès le soldat est muni de l'arme de la Parole de Dieu.[17]

Ces idées, Augustin les avait déjà développées dans le *De uera religione*, alors qu'il résidait encore à Thagaste. Dans cet écrit il voulait distinguer l'amour particulier tel qu'il est vécu dans les parentés charnelles, de l'amour du prochain. Frères, fils, époux, parents, familiers et même concitoyens sont liés par une parenté temporaire et transitoire.[18] De tels liens nous incombent par la naissance et la mort, ils appartiennent à l'ordre corporel qui depuis le péché originel est marqué de fugacité. Sans la naissance et la mort, le va-et-vient des générations n'existerait pas. Il nous faut donc aimer dans l'homme ce qui appartient à l'ordre de l'impérissable et dépasse les générations transitoires.[19] Ce

[15] *Ibid.*: "Quod autem soror in Christo est, et tibi est et mihi et omnibus, quibus una caelestis hereditas et pater deus et frater Christus in eadem caritatis societate promittitur."

[16] *Id.*, p. 570s.: "Haec aeterna sunt; haec nulla temporis labe deterantur; haec tanto firmius tenenda sperantur, quanto minus priuato sed communi potius iure obtinenda praedicantur."

[17] *Id.* 1, p. 568: "...et sub armis verbi Dei militantem..."

[18] *De uera religione* 46,88, CC 32, p. 244: "Sed nec sic quidem ab homine homo diligendus est, ut diliguntur carnales fratres uel filii uel coniuges uel quique cognati aut affines aut ciues." Dans ses *Retractationes* 1,13,8, CC 57, p. 40, Augustin critique ce texte, qui selon lui pourrait suggérer que sans le péché originel et la mort qui s'ensuivit, il n'y aurait pas eu de cha"ne de succession. Même sans la mort les enfants auraient succédé à leurs parents, fait-il remarquer, et ceci jusqu'à ce que le nombre fixé par la providence divine aurait été atteinte. Cette remarque d'Augustin ne change pourtant en rien sa conception du péché originel et du désordre que celui-ci cause dans la concupiscence. La privatisation trouble le bon ordre du corps et de l'âme; du *communis* elle plonge l'âme dans le *priuatus* ce qui donne naissance à la *concupiscentia* qui comme un joug héréditaire pèse sur tous les descendants d'Adam. Avant la chute il n'y avait pas question de privatisation, même pas dans l'ordre sensoriel qui devait être bien ordonné par la charité.

[19] *Ibid.*: "Non enim ullas tales necessitudines haberemus, quae nascendo et moriendo contingunt, si natura nostra in praeceptis et in imagine dei manens in istam corruptionem non relegaretur."

n'est pas dans la mesure où quelqu'un est fils ou époux ou parent qu'il est digne d'être aimé, mais dans la mesure où il appartient à Dieu dont il est l'image.[20] C'est là seulement que cet homme est propriété commune de tous, ce qu'on appelle le royaume de Dieu. Tout autre amour est privé et verse dans la particularité qui n'a pas de véritable avenir. La consanguinité ou la parenté disparaissent dans la cha"ne transitoire des générations successives. Qu'on ne puisse servir deux ma"tres (Mt 6,24) est expliqué par Augustin comme deux sortes d'amour qu'on ne peut pas pratiquer en même temps. On devra se séparer de l'amour particulier qu'on est appelé à abandonner, pour demeurer dans l'amour commun auquel nous sommes tous appelés.[21]

Le péché que Dieu nous appelle à abandonner et à haïr est le péché originel dont Augustin ne donne pas de définition précise ici.[22] Plus tard, dans son grand commentaire du récit de la création, il le fera et définira le péché d'Adam comme une chute depuis l'universel dans le privé ou le particulier. À côté de la convoitise des richesses comme sens spécifique (*specialis*), la cupidité a aussi un sens général (*generalis*) par où elle est, comme l'orgueil, la racine de tous les maux. Qu'est-ce que la cupidité sinon le désir de posséder plus qu'il n'est permis, à cause de l'élévation à laquelle elle aspire et de son amour de l'intérêt personnel?[23] En voulant s'enrichir cet amour de

[20] *Id.*, p. 245: "... carnali consuetudini resistamus, docens neminem aptum esse regno dei, qui nos istas carnales necessittudines oderit..."

[21] *Ibid.*: "Quid ergo mirum, si ad regnum non peruenit, qui non communem, sed priuatam rem diligit.... *Nemo potest duobus dominis seruire*. Nemo enim potest perfecte diligere quo uocamur, nisi oderit unde revocamur."

[22] Néanmoins on y trouve les premières esquisses de ce qu'Augustin appellera plus tard *peccatum originale*. *Id.* 23, p. 202: "Trahitur ergo ad poenas, quia diligendo inferiora in egestate uoluptatum suarum et in doloribus apud inferos ordinatur....malum, id est peccatum et poena peccati."; 25, p. 202: "...mortem mortalem, quam debemus primo peccato..."; 38, p. 210: "Non ergo arbor illa malum est, quae in medio paradisi plantate scribitur, sed diuini praecepti trangressio..." Plus ou moins contemporain *De libero arbitrio* laisse entrevoir les mêmes idées: 2,54, CSEL74, p. 87s.: "Si enim motus iste, id est auersio uoluntatis o domino deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est... defectiuus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est..."; 3,51, p. 132: "Omnis autem poena si iusta est peccati poena est et supplicium nominatur..."; 3,52, p. 133: "Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut amittat quisque quod bene uti noluit cum sine posset difficulate si uellet... Nam sunt reuera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas. Ex ignorantia dehonestat error, ex difficultate cruciatus adfligit."; 3,56, p. 135: "Nam cum ad ignorantiam difficultatemque peruenerit illa peccatrix, ideo poena recte dicitur quia melior ante hanc poenam fuit."

[23] *De Genesi ad litteram* 11,15,19, CSEL 28/1, p. 347: "Merito initium omnis peccati superbiam scriptura definiuit dicens: initium omnis peccati superbia. Cui testimonio non inconuenienter aptatur etiam illud, quod apostolus ait: radix omnium malorum est auaritia, si auaritiam generalem intellegamus, qua quisque adpetit aliquid amplius quam oportet propter excellentiam suam et quendam propriae rei amorem."

soi-même s'appauvrit, ce qu'Augustin souligne par une allusion au latin *priuatio*. L'amour de la cause personnelle (*res propria*) a un effet privatisant et en même temps prive l'homme (*priuatus*) de ce qu'il désire, de sorte qu'au lieu d'une augmentation ou une croissance (*incrementum*) il se produit une diminution (*detrimentum*).[24]

> "Lors donc que l'orgueil prétend s'élever, c'est alors qu'il est précipité dans l'étroitesse et l'indigence, puisque, par cet amour funeste de soi, il est réduit de ce qu'il possédait en commun à ce qu'il possède en propre.[25]"

L'orgueil voulant s'enrichir est par là même privé du bien commun et retombe tout de suite dans l'éparpillement du manque ou de la pénurie (*egestas*), où seuls le tourmentent encore les soucis angoissants du bien propre privatisé.

Plus tard encore, dans le *De trinitate*, Augustin rendra manifeste le lien qui existe entre l'orgueil et la cupidité. Il les considérera tous les deux comme seule cause du mal. L'amour du pouvoir propre provoque un glissement de l'universel, qui est commun à tous, vers la partie qui est séparée de toutes les autres. Par cet orgueil impie, principe de tous les péchés (Si10,15), l'âme se coupe des lois divines qui gouvernent l'univers (*uniuersitas*) de la création et désire davantage que ce bien universel. Comme il n'existe rien de plus riche que cet univers même, l'âme est portée à le gouverner plutôt par sa loi à elle et est poussée vers l'intérêt partial où, au lieu de l'abondance, elle reçoit ce qui est inférieur. C'est pourquoi la cupidité aussi (*auaritia*) est nommée racine de tous les maux (1 Tm 6,10). À l'encontre des lois de l'ensemble, l'âme cupide essaie de faire quelque chose de particulier et le réalise par le propre corps (*corpus proprium*) qui possède toujours d'une manière partiale.[26] Augustin rattache ici l'orgueil d'une telle manière à la cupidité que cette dernière découle (*unde*)

[24] *Ibid.*: "Cui sapienter nomen latina lingua indidit, cum appellauit priuatum, quam potius a detrimento quam ab incremento dictum elucet; omnis enim priuatio minuit."

[25] *Ibid.*: "Unde itaque uult eminere superbia, inde in angustias egestatemque contruditur. Cum a communi ad proprium damnoso sui amore redigitur." Cf. Bibliothèque Augustinienne (BA) 49, 259.

[26] *De trinitate* 12,9,14, CC 50, p. 368s.: "Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima a communi uniuerso ad priuatam partem prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia quod initium peccati dicitur, cum in uniuersitate creaturae deum rectorem secuta legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid uniuerso appetens atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius uniuersitate, in curam partilem truditur et sic aliquid est amplius concupiscendo minuitur, unde et auaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum; totumque illud ubi aliquid proprium contra leges quibus uniuersitas administratur agere nititur per corpus proprium gerit quod partiliter possidet..."

naturellement et nécessairement de la première car l'orgueil nous coupe du bien commun et nous enfonce dans la division que causent les biens matériels. Ce n'est pas le corporel et le temporel qui sont mauvais quand l'homme orgueilleux retombe dans l'éparpillement. Lorsque l'âme cherche quelque chose qui est plus (*amplius*) que l'universel découlant de l'unité de Dieu, elle est livrée au corps qui symbolise le désir de posséder (*proprius*), dans la mesure où même les limites spatiales du corps soutiennent l'expérience du propre dans la propriété. En désirant davantage que ce qui est commun, l'âme cupide s'arroge le divin comme une propriété et mêle l'éternel au temporel qui, faute d'être ma"trisé par la véritable unité, devient éparpillement. Il est inévitable que la cupidité s'éveille en elle, par laquelle elle essaiera en vain d'acquérir cet *amplius*.

Pour des raisons pareilles Augustin, dans le *De uera religione*, exhorta à haïr la parenté temporelle (*temporales necessitudines*) quand nous brûlons d'amour pour l'éternité. Il décrit alors la présence de cet amour éternel dans la charité pour montrer que le véritable amour ne peut pas être ancré dans la particularité de la parenté corporelle. Nous devons aimer notre prochain comme nous-mêmes, nous dit-on. Mais comment nous aimons-nous nous-mêmes? Personne ne peut être pour soi-même père ou fils ou parent ou quelque chose de ce genre et donc ne peut aimer soi-même comme tel, mais chacun n'est pour soi-même qu'un être humain. Dans le prochain nous devons donc aimer ce qu'il est pour lui-même.[27] Les corps qui nous rendent particuliers, ne sont pas ce que nous sommes, et donc ce n'est pas le corporel que nous devons prendre à coeur. Dans cette vue Augustin a compris tout de suite le sens de la prescription: 'Ne convoitez pas les biens de votre prochain' (Ex 20,7), car ceux-ci divisent et sont cause de jalousie. Quiconque aime donc dans le prochain autre chose qu'il n'est pour lui- même, ne l'aime pas comme soi-même. La nature humaine doit donc être aimée sans le conditionnement corporel.[28]

[27] *De uera religione* 89, CC 32, p. 245: "... Certe enim sibi ipse nemo est pater aut filius aut affinis aut aliquid huius modo, sed tantum homo. Qui ergo diligit aliquem tamquam se ipsum, hoc in eo debet diligere, quod sibi ipse est." Cf. *Id.* 88, p. 245: "Magis enim est inhumanum non amare in homine quod homo est, sed amare quod filius est. Hoc est enim non in eo amare illud, quod ad deum pertinet, sed amare illud, quod ad se pertinet. Quid ergo mirum, si ad regnum non peruenit, qui non communem, sed priuatam rem diligit." Ce qui appartient à Dieu est ce que quelqu'un est pour lui-même!

[28] *Ibid.*: "Corpora uero non sunt, quod nos sumus. Non ergo in homine est expetendum aut desiderandum. Valet enim ad hoc etiam, quod praeceptum est: *Ne concupiscas rem proximi tui*. Quapropter quisquis in proximo aliud diligit quam sibi ipse est, non eum diligit tanquam se ipsum. Ipsa igitur natura humana sine carnali condicione diligenda est..."

De la même manière Augustin a analysé dans le *De sermone Domini in monte*,[29] la parenté temporelle qui nous fait aimer père et mère, épouse et enfants, frères et soeurs. Pour devenir frères et soeurs sous l'un et unique Père, ceux qui sont parents doivent renoncer à ce lien particulier. Le royaume éternel ne conna"t pas de telles parentés passagères. Ceux qui désirent se préparer ici-bas à la vie de ce royaume, doivent non pas mépriser les gens eux- mêmes mais les parentés temporelles qui constituent les soutiens de la vie transitoire qui s'étend de la naissance à la mort.[30] Dans ce royaume, le mari n'aimera plus son épouse en tant qu'être sexué mais en tant que créature de Dieu qu'il espère voir transfigurée et renouvelée. Ce qu'ils désirent tous les deux ce n'est plus l'unification sujette à la fugacité mais l'unité impérissable qui est dans le Christ. Dans cet état nouveau ils ne se distingueront plus comme homme et femme, tout comme le juif et le Grec, l'homme libre et l'esclave auront abandonné toute différence. Même l'ennemi avec qui nous vivons maintenant dans la discorde, ne différera plus de nous en tant qu'homme quand il atteindra, renouvelé et corrigé, le royaume des cieux.[31] Quelles que soient les différences de liens ou de parentés, sur le chemin vers ce royaume personne ne dira plus 'mon' père car chacun s'adressera là à Dieu comme 'notre' père. Personne ne dira plus 'ma' mère mais tous appelleront la Jérusalem céleste 'notre' mère. Là personne ne dira plus 'mon' frère, mais tout un chacun sera là pour tous 'notre' frère.[32]

Qui brûle d'amour pour l'éternité se détournera des parentés temporelles comme inférieures. Le temporel et le privé ou le particulier s'opposent désormais à l'éternel et le commun ou l'universel. En se distanciant de la particularité qui essaie toujours de privatiser, Augustin voit de tout autres relations à l'oeuvre dans le royaume des cieux. La paternité particulière dispara"t en faveur de la paternité universelle à l'intérieur de laquelle chacun peut être le père de l'autre et

[29] Cet ouvrage est de deux ans postérieur au *De uera religione*.

[30] *De sermone Domini in monte* 1,15, 40, CC 35, p. 44: "Regnum enim aeternum, quo discipulos suos, quod etiam fratres appellat, vocare dignatus est, non habet huiusmodi necessitudines temporales.... Oportet ergo ut quisquis illius regni uitam iam hic meditari uoluerit, oderit non ipsos homines sed istas necessitudines temporales, quibus ista quae transitura est uita fulcitur, quae nascendo et moriendo peragitur." Cf. *Id.* 42, p. 46.

[31] *Ibid.* Voir aussi 41, p. 45: "Sic inuenitur bonus christianus diligere in una femina creaturam dei, quam reformari et renouari desiderat, odisse autem coniunctionem copulationemque corruptibilem atque mortalem, hoc est diligere in ea quod homo est, odisse quod uxor est. Ita etiam diligit inimicum, non in quantum inimicus est, sed in quantum homo est, ut hoc ei uelit prouenire quod sibi, id est ut ad regnum caelorum conrectus renouatusque perueniat."

le frère de l'autre. Par l'abolition du particulier dans le commun, les relations particulières sont transformées et portées au niveau de relations symboliques:

> "Ceux qui aiment Dieu et font sa volonté forment une seule famille dont il est le père. Ils sont les uns pour les autres des pères quand ils veillent les uns sur les autres, des fils quand ils s'obéissent mutuellement, des frères surtout, puisque le testament du même Père les convie au même héritage".[33]

Tout ce que Laetus doit faire maintenant c'est de situer sa mère à l'intérieur de cette parenté symbolique. Tant que sa mère est en état de le détourner de son intention religieuse, aussi bien elle-même que lui, le novice, sont encore aux prises de la mère particulière. Dès qu'elle sera la soeur de Laetus et de tous les autres qui se soumettent à Dieu le Père et à l'Église-Mère, elle ne sera plus un obstacle sur la voie de son fils. Tous nos frères, poursuit Augustin, l'aimeront non pas dans sa maison privée mais dans la demeure publique de l'amour de Dieu.[34] Il convient maintenant que Laetus fasse s'éteindre la parenté corporelle (*carnalis necessitudo*)[35] et refuse de placer sa naissance privée des entrailles de sa mère au- dessus de sa naissance spirituelle dans le sein de l'Église. De ses sentiments qui sont temporels aussi il doit se défaire pour ne plus aimer dans son âme que l'échange et la communion. Alors la mère de Laetus trouvera sa demeure dans

[32] *Ibid.*: "...ubi nemo dicit pater meus, sed omnes uni deo pater noster; nec mater mea, sed omnes illi Hierusalem mater nostra; nec frater meus, sed omnes de omnibus frater noster."

[33] *De uera religione* 46,89, CC 32, p. 245: "Omnes sub uno deo patre cognati sunt, qui eum diligunt et faciunt uoluntatem ipsius, et inuicem sibi sunt et patres, cum sibi consulunt, et filii, cum sibi obtemperant, et fratres maxime, quia eos unus pater testamento suo ad unam hereditatem uocat." Cf. BA 8, p. 90.

[34] *Epistula* 243,4, CSEL 57, p. 571: "...nisi ex quo tua propria mater est? Nam ex quo soror est omnibus, quibus est pater deus et mater ecclesia... omnes fratres nostros, qui eam non priuata sicut te in domo uestra sed publica in domo dei caritate diligimus." *De ciuitate dei* 21,26, CC 28, p. 799: avec Matthieu 10,37 en main Augustin défendra que quelqu'un est capable d'aimer ses parents selon la chair dans l'esprit du Christ, de sorte que cet amour ne sera pas détruit par le feu éternel au jugement dernier: "Comment quelqu'un peut-il aimer plus que le Christ ceux qu'il aime certainement à cause du Christ?" Voir *Sermo* 344,2, PL 39, p. 1512s. sur la charité ordonnée. Aussi *Sermo Denis* 25,4, MA I, p. 59: "ordinate et pie". Et *Sermo* 349,7, PL 39, p. 1532.

[35] Cette expression doit être comparée avec les *temporales necessitudines* du *De uera religione* et du *De sermone Domini in monte* cités ci-dessus. Le lien ou la parenté (*necessitudo*) est de nature transitoire et est parfois employé en rapport avec Matthieu 10,37 comme dans *De ciuitate dei* 21,26, CC 48, p. 799. Il est clair que la *necessitas* de la vie mortelle terrestre se situe dans l'ordre de l'*uti* dans la *ciuitas terrena* qui s'oppose au *frui* dans la *ciuitas caelestis*.

la vie que son fils s'était proposé de vivre et dont Augustin dira sans cesse: 'Il y avait entre eux une seule âme et un seul coeur cheminant vers Dieu' (Ac 4,32). Son âme, Laetus ne la possédera plus alors comme une propriété privée car elle appartiendra à tous ceux dont les âmes lui appartiennent maintenant à leur tour; ou, mieux, dont les âmes avec celle de Laetus ne sont plus des âmes mais ne forment qu'une seule âme, l'âme unique du Christ.[36] Arrivé à ce point, ajoute Augustin avec raison, il est très facile de mépriser la mort.[37]

Qu'on ne doive pas craindre la mort de la particularité et de la cupidité, Augustin le démontrera dans le paragraphe suivant de sa lettre. Comme on dit à propos de l'âme qu'elle doit haïr ou perdre sa propre vie pour gagner la vie, ainsi on peut dire aussi à propos des parents que nous devons les perdre pour les gagner. Il ne s'agit pas pour l'homme de se tuer réellement, ce qui serait répréhensible, ni, par conséquent, de tuer ses parents. Il faut tuer l'affection corporelle de notre âme par où sera ouverte la voie vers la vie future. Au lieu de perdre notre âme en aimant ce monde, nous la trouverons dans la vie éternelle. De la même manière nous devons tuer l'affection corporelle dans l'amour des parents avec le glaive de la Parole de Dieu. En effet, par ce lien corporel les parents essaient d'impliquer eux-mêmes et leurs enfants dans les affaires de ce monde. Cette parenté corporelle, Augustin exhorte Laetus à la frapper mortellement, mais de façon respectueuse et résolue, du glaive de la Parole de Dieu. Ce n'est pas la mort réelle qu'Augustin a en vue mais la mort symbolique qui dans les parents allume ce qui les transforme en frères des enfants qu'ils ont engendrés dans le temps. Avec leurs enfants ils reconnaissent en Dieu comme père et en l'Église comme mère leurs parents éternels.[38]

[36] *Id.*, p. 571s.: "...ut hoc ipsum, quo te priuatim diligit, interficiatur in ea, ne, quod ex utero suo te genuit, pluris pendat, quam quod ex utero ecclesiae genita est tecum....diligat autem in ea communionem societatemque illam, qua dictum est: 'Erat illis in deum anima et cor unum' (Act. 4,32). Sic enim anima tua non est propria sed omnium fratrum, quorum etiam animae tuae sunt uel potius quorum animae cum tua non animae sed anima una est, Christi unica..."

[37] *Id.*, p. 572: "Inde ad contemptum mortis facillime peruenitur." Cf. *Confessiones* 9,28, CC 27, p. 149: "...cum quibusdam amicis meis materna fiducia conloquebatur quodam die de contemptu uitae huius et bono mortis..." et *Epistula* 10,3, CC 34/1, p. 24.

[38] *Id.* 5, p. 572s.: "... non ad id ualet, ut se quisque interimat, quod inexpiabile nefas est, et tamen ualet, ut interimat in se carnalem animae affectum, quo cum impedimento futurae uitae praesens uita delectat... ita de parentibus rectissime dicitur, ut, qui eos amat, perdat eos non more parricidarum interficiens, sed spiritali gladio uerbi dei carnalem affectum eorum, quo et se ipsos et eos, quod genuerunt, implicamentis huius saeculi obligare conantur, pie fidenterque percutiens et occidens illud in eis uiuere faciat. Quo fratres sunt, quo cum filiis suis temporalibus parentes aeternos deum

Prenant comme exemple la mère des sept Maccabées[39] qui refusa de placer le lien affectif et la vie ici-bas au-dessus des lois divines, Augustin veut inciter Laetus à reprendre la construction de sa tour évangélique et à s'armer pour le combat contre les ambitions de sa mère mortelle.[40]

Vers la même époque Augustin met son peuple en garde contre la charge affective ambigüe de la parenté terrestre. Les liens avec les parents peuvent d'une part être agréables et exercer une grande séduction, mais d'autre part ils peuvent être dangereux et former une menace. La cupidité (*cupiditas*) constitue un lien entre les membres d'une famille et la peur (*timor*) veut empêcher qu'ils soient séparés. Ce sont les deux portes par où le trouble peut entrer dans le coeur.[41]

ecclesiamque cognoscunt." La tournure *pie fidenterque*, paradoxalement, exprime le respect qu'on éprouve pour la parenté. Cf. *Sermo Dolbeau* 13,3, RB102 (1992), p. 296: "Et tamen ipsam iuberis odisse, ne et ipsa seducat uolens hic esse, uolens huic carni adhaerere, nolens in meliora emigrare... ergo qui amat animam suam, perdat eam hic, ut in uitam aeternam inueniat illam. Ergo contraria susurrantes non audias, nec patrem nec matrem, nec uxorem, nec filios, nec ipsam animam tuam."

[39] 2 M 7.

[40] *Epistula* 243,6, CSEL 57, p. 573: "...ut uigilemus in castris, ut aedificemus turrem, de qua hostem sempiternae uitae et prospicere et propellere ualeamus et retinet mater non plane talis, qualis Machabaeorum fuit... nam mater, quae te ad discendam uitam remoueri a curis saecularibus non permittit..." Cf. *Sermo* 100,2, PL 38, c. 603s.: "Quid est: 'Ordinate in me caritatem'? Facite gradus, et cuiue quod debetur, restituite. Nolite anteriora posterioribus subdere. Amate parentes, sed praeponite deum parentibus. Attende matrem Machabaeorum... Praecepit, et secuti sunt. Quod docuit mater filios, hoc docebat dominus Iesus Christus istum cui dicebat: 'Sequere me'". Plus tard Augustin répétera un peu différemment l'idée de la libération des Maccabées qu'il considère plutôt comme un couronnement par rapport au témoignage des trois hommes dans la fournaise de Nabuchodonosor; l'accent est mis sur la transition comme but ultime: *En. Ps.* 148,11, PL 37, c. 1945s.; *id.* 68, *s.* 2,3, PL 36, c. 855; *Sermo* 300,6, PL 38, c. 1379: "Facta mater septem martyrum, septies martyr: a filiis non separata spectando, et filiis addita moriendo."; *Sermo* 301,2, PL 38, c. 1381: "Machabaei melius et tutius liberati sunt. Ab illis tribus uiris, ceteris remanentibus, illa una tentatio superata est. Ab istis ista uita finita, quae tota tentatio est."; *Sermo* 286,6, PL 38, c. 1300: "Homines saeculi huius amatores si interrogem: ego inter tres pueros uolebam esse, dicit mihi anima infirma. Erubesce matri Machabaeorum, quae uoluit filios suos ante se mori, quia sciebat non mori."

[41] *Sermo Dolbeau* 13,3, RB102 (1992), p. 289: "...utraque ianua pulsatur, qua intratur ad cor: cupiditas et timor. Cupiditatis ianuant pulsant pater, mater, uxor, filii, fratres: omnia blanda sunt, suauia sunt, dulcia sunt.... Timoris ianuam pulsant minae, furor, opprobria, ad extremum ipsi dolores corporis." Voir S. POQUE, *Le langage symbolique dans la prédication d'Augustin d'Hippone*... p. 49: "...l'ennemi est disposé sur deux rangs: *prima acie*, voici les séductions du monde; en seconde ligne, sa cruauté. Le couple *blandiri-minari*, qui est un thème traditionnel de la diatribe, revient avec une insistance un peu monotone dans la prédication augustinienne sur les martyrs;... une expression moins banale, grâce à l'imagerie militaire (*Sermo* 335,1, PL 38, p. 1470)."

Si quelqu'un n'est pas cupide, il n'a rien à craindre et se sent libre. Une liberté qui permet aux enfants de Dieu d'utiliser ce monde sans y être asservis.[42] Pourtant il est possible que les portes de la cupidité et de la peur soient aménagées de telle manière qu'elles ne soient plus nuisibles mais servent la cause de Dieu: ne désirer rien d'autre ou personne d'autre qui soit plus que ce que Dieu promet, i.c. les parents, et ne craindre rien d'autre que la séparation dont Dieu nous menace si nous le quittons.[43] C'est à cette séparation qu'un jour éve a séduit Adam et c'est pourquoi nous devons être vigilants quand Ève, dans les liens de parenté, continue à exercer sa séduction sur l'esprit mâle.[44] Dans le même sens Augustin exhorte Laetus à placer l'amour supérieur au-dessus de la chaleur terrestre qu'éve lui offre dans sa mère.[45] L'amour pur et sincère de l'évangile doit se couper du serpent insidieux qui, de nouveau, par son ambigüité et sa duplicité (*duplicitas*), exerce sa séduction à travers le roi et ses vingt mille guerriers. Pour le coeur la sincérité et l'unanimité (*simplicitas*) qui se trouvent dans les dix mille combattants, suffisent pour remporter la victoire sur les vingt mille qui sont ambigus et divisés.[46]

[42] *Id.*, p. 289s.: "Qui te non inuenit cupidum, inuenit liberum... ad quam libertatem nos hortatur illa apostolica lectio, ubi est: 'et qui utuntur hoc mundo tamquam non utentes sint' (1 Cor. 7,31), ut habeant libertatis usum, non cupiditatis adfectum."

[43] *Id.* 5, p. 290: "Instructi igitur ex utroque latere et munitam habentes utramque ianuam cupiditatis et timoris, nihil cupientes amplius quam quod promittit deus, nihil timentes amplius quam quod minatur deus, blandientes minantesque repellimus." Il vaudrait certainement la peine de comparer cette pensée avec ce qui a été développé dans le *De uera religione* 42,79-53,103, CC 32, pp. 239-260 concernant la *cupiditas triplex*. Cette cupidité est une déformation du désir humain lors du péché originel. Cette déformation n'est pas une destruction parce qu'une analyse précise permet de découvrir dans la déformation elle-même les vestiges (*uestigium*, *admonitio*) de ce qui a été avant la chute. Ainsi Augustin découvre les motivations originelles (l'orgueil par exemple conduit au désir légitime de conna"tre; tout comme la beauté d'un corps n'est pas méprisable pour un désir bien ordonné) de ces cupidités qui sont parfaitement acceptables et légitimes. Si elles sont déformées, elle peuvent aussi être réformées et réparées, et reprendre leur statut originel. Cette restauration vaut aussi pour le désir et la peur dans le sermon Dolbeau 13.

[44] *Id.*, p. 292s.: "Euam caue: tunc non est membrum tuum, sed serpentis ministerium.... uide, ne uxor a deo separet. Sed quod coniunxit, homo non debet separare. Humanus adfectus debet ab ipso deo hominem separare? Et ubi erit quod modo audistis: 'Quis nos separabit a caritate Christi?' (Rom. 8,35) hic ergo timere noli..."

[45] *Epistula* 243,10, CSEL 57, p. 577: "...hic habeant locum materna terrena ipsa beneficia... noli esse ingratus, repende gratiam matri tuae, repende spiritalia pro carnalibus, pro temporalibus sempiterna.... caue, ne in deterius peruertat et euertat. Quid interest, utrum in uxore an in matre, dum tamen Eua in qualibet muliere caueatur?"

[46] *Ibid.*: "...suggestione quasi officium tibi caritatis obtendit, ut te a germanissima et sincerissima euangelii caritate detorqueat, ad astutiam serpentis pertinet et ad duplicitatem regis illius, qui habet uiginta milia, quam nos docemur decem milium, hoc est cordis, in qua deum quaerimus, simplicitate superare." Voir note 9.

À deux reprises Augustin parle dans sa lettre à Laetus de l'arme ou le glaive de la Parole de Dieu, qui doit inciser la particularité de la propriété, de la cupidité, de la convoitise, des liens familiaux.[47] La deuxième fois il cite de manière couverte Éphésiens 6,11: *et gladium spiritus, quod est uerbus dei.* On retrouve ailleurs dans l'oeuvre d'Augustin cette image du glaive spirituel qui doit séparer les enfants des parents possessifs qui veulent empêcher leurs enfants de choisir les biens célestes au lieu des biens terrestres.[48] Il s'agit en fait de l'opposition entre le lien de la chair et le lien de l'esprit. Il se produit une purification de la cupidité (*cupiditas*) qui doit se transformer en désir (*desiderium*). Pour indiquer ce processus de purification Augustin recourt aussi à l'image du feu. Quand les enfants sont séparés de leurs parents par le glaive de Dieu, ils subissent intérieurement une purification des liens affectifs qui se transforment en *caritas* divine.[49] Bien sûr le berger rassurera ses brebis en leur disant qu'ils sont aussi tenus à aimer leurs parents et leurs enfants, mais seulement dans le bon ordre: jamais ils ne doivent les placer au-dessus du Christ, de Dieu, du Créateur.[50] Par sa force symbolisante la parole ne

[47] Voir note 16: "...et sub armis verbi Dei militantem..." (1) et la note précédente"...spiritali gladio uerbi dei..." (5).

[48] *Enarrationes in psalmos* 44,11, PL 36, c. 500s.: "Placet iuueni alicui deo seruire, displicet patri; diuisus sunt aduersus se: ille promittit terrenam hereditatem, ille amat caelestem... deus solus illi praefertur; et tamen litigat cum filio uolente seruire deo. Sed fortior est ille gladius spiritalis separans, quam copulans natura carnalis." Cf. *Id.* 67,6, c. 815.

[49] *Id.* 96,7, PL 37, c. 1240s.: "... 'ignem ueni mittere in terram.' (Luc 12,49) Sic ignem, quomodo gladium... gladius uerbi ipsius salubriter nos separauit a consuetudine mala. Gladium enim adtulit, et separauit unumquemque fidelium aut a patre suo qui in Christum non crediderat, aut a matre similiter infideli... separati sumus ab eo quod eramus; sed gladius intercessit secernens, non interficiens. Hoc modo et ignis: 'ignem ueni mittere in terram'. Exarserunt homines credentes in eum, acceperunt flammam caritatis.... Aurum fides est, fenum carnalis concupiscentia est." Cf. *Id.* 143,17, c. 1866 où Augustin fait une distinction entre un *gladius malignus* et un *gladius benignus*, qui dans l'intérêt de la foi sépare les enfants des parents. Il parle de cette même séparation dans *sermo* 313,4, PL 38, c. 1424 pour illustrer encore la purification intérieure qui, en ce cas, va jusqu'au martyre: "Quo gladio spiritali a martyribus suis caelestia concupiscentibus gaudia, terrenos male blandos separauit affectus, quibus de caelo ad terram reuocarentur astricti, nisi gladius intercideret Christi."

[50] *Sermo* 349,7, PL 39, c. 1532: "... non in eis nisi Christum diligatis... non dico ut non diligas patrem, non dico ut non diligas filios; sed plus dilige Christum... 'Qui amat patrem aut matrem plus quam me, non est me dignus' (Matth.. 10,37)" Dans un sermon postérieur, le *sermo* 344,2, PL 39, c. 1512, Augustin dit expressément en commentant Matthieu 10,37.38: "Amorem parentum, uxoris, filiorum, non abstulit, sed ordinauit... ama uxorem, ama filios secundum deum... ideo non debes illos plus deo diligere, quos omnino male diligis, si neglexeris tecum ad deum ducere.". Cf. *Sermo Denis* 25,4, MA I, p. 159; *sermo Etaix* 1, RB 86 (1976), p. 43, 45s. "In huiusmodi necessitudinem nominibus humanus angustatur affectus. In carnali propagatione non

tue que symboliquement, car cette mise à mort n'est pas une destruction. La cupidité assaillie sera vaincue dans la mesure où elle sera transformée et changée en *caritas*, où elle retournera le *priuatus* de la cupidité vers le *communis* du désir dont personne n'est exclu.

L' adieu à sa mère Monique

Les conseils et les exhortations qu'Augustin donne à Laetus reflètent le rapport qu'il avait développé avec sa propre mère. La communication en apparence pragmatique de sa mort est enfermée entre d'une part le renoncement du désir tout terrestre d'avoir une tombe quant à elle et d'autre part la répression du chagrin terrestre quant à lui.

> "Ainsi donc, au neuvième jour de sa maladie, à la cinquante-sixième année de son âge, à la trente-troisième de mon âge, cette âme religieuse et pieuse se détacha du corps."[51]

Dans cette constatation distante Augustin établit très clairement un lien entre sa vie à lui et celle de sa mère, avec cette différence que Monique a déjà surmonté le chagrin des adieux et Augustin pas encore. Après la vision d'Ostie sa mère avait comme d'elle-même perdu toutes attaches terrestres. La présence physique de ses deux fils à son lit de mort, en particulier celle d'Augustin, ne comptait plus en présence de son aspiration à l'autre vie. Le lien avec le sol africain aussi avait complètement disparu car elle avait abandonné tout désir d'être enterré près de son mari.[52] Monique explique à ses fils que le souvenir qu'ils conserveront d'elle n'a aucun rapport avec sa dépouille mortelle. Ce qu'elle demande n'est pas un souvenir lié à un lieu, mais un souvenir à l'autel du Seigneur qui n'est jamais lié à un endroit et peut s'accomplir n'importe où.[53]

potest quisque unius hominis esse frater et mater. Quis ignorat quia non potest? Sed caritas non angustatur.... 'Ordinate in me caritatem' (Cantique 2,4). Ama ordinate ut sis ordinatus.", 47; *De ciuitate Dei* 1,26, CC 48, p. 799.

[51] *Confessiones* 9,11,28, CC 27, p. 149s.: "Ergo die nono aegritudinis suae, quiquagesimo et sexto anno aetatis suae, tricesimo et tertio aetatis meae, anima illa religiosa et pia corpore soluta est." Cf. BA 14, p. 125.

[52] *Id.*, p. 149: "...ut coniuncta terra amborum coniugum terra tegeretur." Son désir antérieur d'être à côté de son mari dans la tombe prévue, Augustin l'attribua à une faiblesse de l'âme humaine encore incapable de comprendre les choses divines: "... ut est animus humanus minus capax diuinorum..."

[53] *Id.* 9,11,27, p. 149: "... tantum illud uos rogo, ut ad domini altare memineritis mei, ubiubi fueritis." Voir les textes pour une attitude pareille de maturité chrétienne chez J.J. O'Donnell, *Augustine, Confessions*, III, Oxford, 1992, p. 138s.

Qu'Augustin soit encore attaché d'une manière terrestre à sa mère ressort du parallélisme dans la communication: Monique dans sa cinquante-sixième année ne vit plus ici mais ailleurs alors qu'Augustin dans sa trente-troisième année vit encore ici-bas et pas encore ailleurs. Provisoirement ses adieux[54] à cette vie terrestre ne se sont pas encore accomplis parce qu'Augustin est toujours lié à sa mère d'une manière terrestre. Augustin fermera les yeux de sa mère décédée mais est en même temps submergé d'un chagrin immense. Il réussit à réprimer ce chagrin comme il convient à un homme, mais fait remarquer en passant que lui aussi comme Adéodat est confronté avec les restes d'une enfance encore bien vivante en son for intérieur.[55] Cette tristesse enfantine, Augustin la désapprouve comme impie parce qu'elle pleure comme si la disparition de l'être était complète.[56] Comme si devenir adulte consiste à transcender le vide radical de la mort! En cherchant comme d'habitude la cause du grand chagrin qui s'est rabattu sur lui alors, il conclut que grâce à la bonne entente qui régnait entre eux, sa vie terrestre était quasiment une avec celle de sa mère.[57] La déchirement de cette unité intime procure à Augustin un double chagrin: d'a-

[54] Quant à l'âge de son frère Navigius, présent lui aussi au décès de Monique, Augustin ne dit mot, ni de la relation de celui-là avec Monique. Pour certains psychologues une raison de plus pour répéter qu'Augustin était narcissiquement orienté sur lui-même et ne considérait les choses qu'en fonction de sa propre personne. Ils négligent le fait qu'Augustin ne mentionne et décrit dans ses Confessions que les faits et les personnes ayant eu quelque importance dans l'histoire de sa conversion.

[55] *Id.* 9,12,29, p. 150: "Hoc modo etiam meum quiddam puerile quod labebatur in fletus, iuuenali uoce cordis, cohercebatur et tacebat."

[56] *Ibid.*: "... his plerumque solet deplorari quaedam miseria morientium aut quasi omnimoda extinctio..."

[57] *Id.* 9,12,30, p. 150: "Quoniam itaque deserebar tam magno eius solacio, sauciabatur anima et quasi dilaniabatur uita, quasi una facta erat ex mea et illius." J. M. QUINN, OSA, *A Companion to the Confessions of St. Augustine*, New York-Washington, Peter Lang, 2002, p. 513: "When his closest friend in Thagaste died, the desolate Augustine felt that his friend comprised one-half of his soul (4,6,12); much more so was Monica, his most cherished friend, the other half of his soul, for they had dwelt together for most of Augustine's nearly thirty- three years. In losing Monica, Augustine lost part of his self; he was one huge wound bleeding with greef." Nous voulons démontrer dans une autre étude qu'il y a des similitudes mais aussi de grandes différences entre le chagrin qu'Augustin éprouva lors de la mort de son ami de jeunesse et celui éprouvé pour sa mère. En même temps nous expliquerons pourquoi les reproches à l'adresse de Monique qui aurait créé cette unité pathologique, sont plutôt curieux. Voir E. TESELLE, *Augustine as Client and as Theorist*, in D. Capps and J.E. DITTES, *The Hunger and the Heart: Reflections on the Confessions of Augustine*, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Monograph Series, Number 8, 1990, 203-216, p. 212: "Monica was a hovering mother, unable to let go, treating Augustine like an extension of herself." Même A. MANDOUZE, *Saint Augustin. L'aventure de la raison et de la grâce*, Paris, Études Augustiniennes, 1968, p. 181, juge que Monique a poussé Augustin indirectement vers la vie célibataire, lorsque

bord la perte de cette présence chérie l'atteint profondément malgré sa ma"trise extérieure et ensuite il est déçu du fait que ses attaches terrestres sont encore si fortes.[58] Après les funérailles il prend un bain dans l'espoir d'être ainsi purifié et délivré de son angoisse. En effet, à l'exemple des Grecs, les Romains croyaient qu'un bain chaud (*balneum*) ferait passer l'amertume du chagrin aux sueurs corporelles salées.[59] Tout déçu Augustin doit constater que le chagrin ne s'est pas vaporisé et se livre au sommeil qui lui procure quelque soulagement. À son réveil il se souvient de la belle hymne, dans laquelle Ambroise chante la paternité du Créateur de toute chose. C'est la reconnaissance de cette paternité divine qui finalement délivrera Augustin. En se livrant au sommeil les membres fatigués se détendent, l'esprit soucieux s'allège et le chagrin anxieux s'envole.[60] L'élaboration de la paternité

celui-ci s'est mis d'accord avec sa mère pour renvoyer sa bien-aimée. "Le fait est que Monique crut bon d'intervenir brutalement et que, pour "maternelle" qu'elle soit, cette conduite semble, même aux yeux de l'historien de l'antiquité, "(un peu) humaine, trop humaine" (p. 179). Aussi L.C. SEELBACH, *"Das weibliche Geschlecht ist ja kein Gebrechen..."*, Die Frau und und ihre Gottebenbildlichkeit bei Augustin, Cassiciacum 50, Augustinnus-Verlag, Würzburg, 2002, p. 52 semble savoir: "Richtig glücklich schien Monnica mit einer Eheschlie§ung nicht gewesen zu sein, denn im Anschluss an die Bekehrungsszene im Mailänder Garten schilderte Augustin die Reaktion der jubelnden Mutter: conf. 8,12,30." Enfin R. BRÄNDLE – W. NEIDHART, *Lebensgeschichte und Theologie, Ein Beitrag zur psychohistorischen Interpretation Augustin...*: "...als Bekehrung zum ehelosen Leben – tut Augustin einen entscheidenden Schritt auf seine Mutter zu. In Ostia erwächst daraus die Frucht. Zum erstenmal gelingt Augustin – zusammen mit seiner Mutter – der mystische Aufstieg." Il y a certainement un lien étroit entre la *uisio* à Ostia et la manière dont Augustin a vécu la mort de sa mère, ce qui est tout autre chose que l'insinuation d'une relation trouble entre Monique et son fils. Expliquer ce lien en recourant à une raison de composition, est incompréhensible de la part d'un ma"tre de grande envergure comme P. COURCELLE, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin*, Paris 1968, p. 233: "...peut-être a-t-il préféré, pour des raisons de composition, clôre sa biographie sur un épisode saillant, comme est l'extase d'Ostie." Nous reviendons à ce point dans une autre étude.

[58] *Id.* 9,12,31, p. 151: "...increpabam mollitiam affectus mei et constringebam fluxum moeroris... Et quia mihi uehementer displicebat tantum in me posse haec humana, quae ordine debito et sorte conditionis nostrae accidere necesse est, alio dolore dolebam dolorem meum et duplici tristitia macerabar."

[59] *Id.* 9,12,32, p. 151: "Visum etiam mihi est, ut irem lauatum, quod audieram inde balneis nomen inditum, quia Graeci balanion dixerint, quod anxietatem pellat ex animo.... Neque enim exudauit de corde meo maeroris amaritudo." Cf. *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* 14, p. 131.

[60] *Id.*, p. 151s.: "...recordatus sum ueridicos uersus Ambrosii tui: tu es enim,

deus, creator omnium
polique rector uestiens
diem decoro lumine,
noctem sopora gratia,
artus solutos ut quies
reddat laboris usui!
mentesque fessas alleuet
luctuque soluat anxios."

divine amène Augustin à ne plus parler de Monique en tant que mère mais en tant que servante qui a vécu pleine de piété envers son Créateur et de tendresse sacrée et complaisante à l'égard des hommes.[61] Ce n'est que maintenant qu'Augustin est en droit de pleurer la perte d'une telle femme, car ce n'est pas de sa présence physique qu'il sera privé désormais, mais de son témoignage.

> "Je pris plaisir à pleurer devant toi, sur elle et pour elle, sur moi et pour moi. Je lâchai les larmes que je retenais, pour les laisser couler autant qu'elles voudraient et en faire un lit sous mon coeur. Il y trouva son repos, car tu étais là prêtant l'oreille, toi, et non pas quelque homme qui eût avec superbe interprété mes pleurs."[62]

Au risque de prononcer un jugement orgueilleux, nous voulons quand même attirer l'attention sur le retournement qui s'est produit dans le chagrin d'Augustin. Le lien intime entre Augustin et sa mère subsiste, mais tous deux ont maintenant un père nouveau en Dieu par où le rapport entre eux deux a reçu un contenu différent. Dieu comme l'Autre dans ce rapport a introduit l'altérité dans leur relation, qui constitue non pas une aliénation mais plutôt l'affirmation de leur identité nouvelle. 'Sur elle et pour elle, sur moi et pour moi': 'sur' (*de*) installe le rapport indirect de la troisième personne, 'pour' (*pro*) installe le rapport direct de la deuxième personne. Ce n'est pas dans le chagrin de l'enfance où subsiste la relation confuse de la mère avec son enfant qu'Augustin trouve la consolation mais dans le chagrin adulte vis-à-vis du Père divin. Dans le chagrin enfantin il n'était pas clair sur qui il pleurait, sur sa mère ou sur lui-même. Maintenant il les distingue nettement tous les deux, chacun avec son passé de pécheur comme enfant d'Adam.[63]

Voir O'DONNELL, *Augustine, Confessions*, III..., p. 142s. qui commente cette citation d'une manière moins satisfaisante: "Quoting this hymn has the additional effect... of bringing Ambrose back to mind one last time, associated with Monnica... his influence, potent but almost invisible..." Voir encore B. CLÉMENT, *L'invention de commentaire: Augustin, Jacques Derrida*, Paris, 2000, p. 68.

[61] *Id.* 9,12,33, p. 152: "Atque inde paulatim reducebam in pristinum sensum ancillam tuam conuersationemque eius piam in te et sancte in nos blandam atque morigeram..."

[62] *Ibid.*: "...et libuit flere in conspectu tuo de illa et pro illa, de me et pro me. Et dimisi lacrimas, quas continebam, ut effluerent quantum uellent, substernens eas cordi meo: et requieuit in eis, quoniam ibi erant aures tuae, non cuiusquam homnis superbe interpretantis ploratum meum." Cf. BA 14, p. 133.

[63] L'interprétation de Quinn est fort différente de la nôtre et se base sur une lecture biographique et moralisatrice: "So with a certain pleasure all the pent-up grief discharged tears in the presence of God about her and for her, about himself and for himself. About her: though her eventual glory was beyond doubt, he cried over the loss of her body, the shrine of het soul. For her: his tears were offered as a kind of prayer in the event her soul might be languishing in purgatory. About himself: he felt compunction for harrowing her by sexual excesses and thick-sculled allegiance to

> "Quant à moi, le coeur enfin guéri de cette blessure où l'on pouvait blâmer une faiblesse de la chair, je répands devant toi, ô notre Dieu, pour celle qui fut la servante, des larmes d'un tout autre genre; elles coulent d'un esprit fortement ébranlé au spectacle des dangers de toute âme qui meurt en Adam. (...) je n'ose dire qu'à partir du moment où tu la régénéras par le baptême, aucune parole contraire à ton précepte n'est sortie de sa bouche."[64]

Avec un chagrin en essence orienté vers quelqu'un qui est différent de lui-même, Augustin peut maintenant se soucier du destin d'une femme, destin qui repose désormais entre les mains de Dieu. Ce n'est qu'en se préoccupant de sa détresse à elle qui est détachée de lui-même qu'il aura vraiment fait ses adieux à sa mère terrestre. C'est alors seulement qu'il pourra invoquer la miséricorde divine:

> "Remets, Seigneur, remets-les, je t'en supplie! N'entre pas en justice avec elle! Que la miséricorde passe par-dessus la justice, puisque tes paroles sont vraies et que tu as promis la miséricorde aux miséricordieux."[65]

Manichean darkness. For himself: tears were released so unrestrainedly that they formed a mat on which his heart could lie, reposing in God's presence, in a quasi-sleep that dissolved his anxious grief in line with Ambrose's hymn (9,12,32)." (*A Companion to the Confessions of St. Augustine*... p. 515f.) Une lecture traditionnelle s'énonce chez D. HATTRUP, *Die Mystik von Cassiciacum und Ostia*, in Norbert FISCHER und Cornelius MAYER, *Die Confessiones des Augustinus von Hippo, Einführung und Interpretationen zu den dreizehn Büchern*, Forschungen zur Europäischen Geistesgeschichte, Bd. 1, Freiburg, Herder, 1998, 389-443, qui explique la double douleur par un conflit paulinien: "Seiner Überzeugung nach muss er mit allem einverstanden sein, was von Gott kommt. Der gute Wille steht mit seinem weniger gutwilligen Fleisch in diesem Punkt noch in Widerstreit. Deshalb erleidet er ein zweites Leiden über sein Leiden hinaus (9,34 "alio dolore dolebam dolorem meum"), ein Reflexionsleiden, dass sich der Tatsache schämt, dass das Gefühl nicht ganz so wie der Wille mit Gott übereinstimmt." (p. 434s.)

[64] *Id.* 9,13,34, CC 27, p. 152: "Ego autem iam sanato corde ab illo uulnere, in quo poterat redargui carnalis affectus, fundo tibi, deus noster, pro illa famula tua longe aliud lacrimarum genus, quod manat de concusso spiritu consideratione periculorum omnis animae, quae in Adam moritur.... non tamen audeo dicere, ex quo eam per baptismum regenerasti, nullum uerbum exisse ab ore eius contra praeceptum tuum." Cf. BA 14, p. 133.

[65] *Id.* 9,13,35, p. 153: "Dimitte, domine, dimitte, obsecro, ne intres cum ea in iudicium. Superexultet misericordia iudicio, quoniam eloquia tua uera sunt et promisisti misericordiam misericordibus." Cf. BA 14, p. 135. Voir O'DONNELL, *Augustine, Confessions*, III..., p. 143: "The portrayal of Monnica in the early books is not without undertones of restrained criticism for the worldliness of her ambitions and her willingness to settl for what she could get from her morally unpromising son."

À sa prière pour Monique Augustin associe maintenant aussi Patrice. Il ne parle pas de lui comme son père mais comme le mari de sa mère. Avec lui Monique a fait preuve d'une patience inépuisable, le voulant gagner pour Dieu. Dans ce triangle de père, mère et fils il est possible d'invoquer Dieu comme père de tous les humains. Tous les serviteurs de Dieu Augustin les nomme désormais ses frères, tous les fils de Dieu ses ma"tres. Ainsi Monique et Patrice aussi deviennent serfs de Dieu par la chair de qui Augustin est entré dans ce monde. Ses parents n'ont été que des instruments, Dieu seul est l'origine de son existence. Et il ajoute avec insistance: "Je ne sais pas comment". Augustin se rend compte que Dieu est son créateur mais sa mémoire ne porte pas assez loin pour savoir comment Dieu l'a créé. Dieu est en tout cas son commencement mais comment il a commencé en Dieu, il l'ignore.[66]

Dans cette même recherche il remarque que sa mémoire ne porte pas plus loin que l'époque où il commença à parler. En d'autres mots, la mémoire ne commence à fonctionner qu'à partir du moment où l'homme sait parler.[67] Mais ce commencement de la parole aussi précède la mémoire. L'*infantia* est donc l'âge, Augustin dira plus tard, dont on ne se rappelle rien, qui est couvert de ténèbres. Appliquée aux âges de l'humanité, l'enfance correspond à l'époque de Noé lorsque par le déluge tout était couvert d'eau. De tout ce qui a existé alors, il ne reste plus l'ombre d'un souvenir.[68] Sans donner une explication plus précise il établit ici un lien remarquable entre le langage et la mémoire, de sorte qu'on peut se demander si la mémoire et le langage ne commencent pas à fonctionner simultanément.[69] De l'époque d'avant l'enfance non plus il ne se rappelle rien: la naissance, le sein maternel.[70] Et avant la chaude sécurité du sein maternel, où étais-je?

[66] Dans le premier livre des Confessions déjà Augustin est à la recherche de ce commencement irretrouvable: "Quid enim est quod uolo dicere, domine, nisi quia nescio, unde uenerim huc, in istam dico uitam mortalem an mortem uitalem? Nescio. Et susceperunt me consolationes miserationum tuarum, sicut audiui a parentibus carnis meae, ex quo et in qua me formasti in tempore: non enim ego memini." (1,6,7, p. 4)

[67] *Id.*1,8,13, p. 7: "Non enim eram infans, qui non farer, sed iam puer loquens eram. Et memini hoc, et unde loqui didiceram, post aduerti".

[68] *De ciuitate dei* 16,43, CC 48, p. 550: "A pueritia namque homo incipit loqui post infantiam, quae hinc appellata est, quod fari non potest. Quam profecto aetatem primam demergit obliuio, sicut aetas prima generis humani est deleta diluuio. Quotus enim quisque est, qui suam recordetur infantiam?"

[69] Voir aussi *De uera religione* 26,48, CC 32, p. 217; *Enarrationes in psalmos* 21,1,11, CC 38, p. 118; *De natura et origine animae* 4,5,6, CSEL 60, p. 386 et 4,4,5, p. 384-385.

[70] *Confessiones* 1,7,12, p. 7: "Quantum enim adtinet ad obliuionis meae tenebrae, par illi est, quam uixi in matris utero."

> "Qu'en était-il même avant celle-ci, ô ma douceur, mon Dieu? Étais-je quelque part ou quelqu'un? En fait, qui peut me le dire? Je n'ai personne. Ni mon père, ni ma mère ne l'ont pu, ni l'expérience des autres, ni mon propre souvenir."[71]

Le caractère insaisissable de début est lié au fait qu'Augustin ne s'est pas fait lui-même, que c'est Dieu qui l'a fait:

> "D'où un être animé, tel que celui-là, peut-il venir sinon de toi, Seigneur? Quelqu'un sera-t-il par hasard l'artisan de sa propre création? Ou bien tire-t-on d'ailleurs un courant par lequel l'être et la vie se répandent en nous, sans que tu nous crées, toi, Seigneur...?"[72]

Sous le signe de cette paternité divine, les parents d'Augustin deviennent ses frères et l'Église catholique devient leur mère à tous. De la Jérusalem éternelle à laquelle tous les humains aspirent, ils en deviennent tous concitoyens.[73]

Par la mort de Monique se termine le livre neuf des Confessions. Le processus de deuil l'a délivré de la mère selon la chair et des attaches terrestres en général, et l'a placé sous une autre parenté, celle

[71] *Id.* 1,6,9, p. 5: "Quid ante hanc etiam, dulcedo mea, deus meus? Fuine alicubi aut aliquis? Nam quis mihi dicat ista non habeo; nec pater nec mater potuerunt nec aliorum experimentum nec memoria mea." Cf. BA 13, p. 289.

[72] *Id.* 1,6,10, p. 5: "Unde hoc tale animal nisi abs te, domine? An quisquam se faciendi erit artifex, aut ulla uena trahitur aliunde, qua esse et uiuere currat in nos, praeterquam quod tu facis nos, domine..."

[73] *Id.* 9,13,37, p. 154: "Meminerint cum affectu pio parentum meorum in hac luce transitoria et fratrum meorum sub te patre in matre catholica et ciuium meorum in aeterna Hierusalem, cui suspirat peregrinatio populi tui..." O'Donnell, *Augustine, Confessions*, III..., p. 148s. À part les interprétations violentes d'une 'psychanalyse appliqué' nous pouvons souscrire à cette pensée de Paul Rigby, *Augustine's Confessions: the Recognition of Fatherhood*, in Donald Capps and James E. Dittes, *The Hunger of the Heart: Reflections on the Confessions of Augustine*, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Monograph Series, Number 8, 1990, 143- 165, p. 158: "What is recognized, however, is fatherhood, not the individual father. The representation of fatherhood is extricated from individual fathers and their interests.... The ethical life of the community transforms the father-son relation... What is recognized, however, is not the individual father but the fatherhood freed from Patricius who is a fellow-citizen for whom one prays and a parent "in this transitory life" (Conf. 9,13); fatherhood itself is recognized in God as father." Voir aussi H. Kotila, "Monica's Death in Augustine's *Confessions* IX.11-13", in: *Studia Patristica* vol. XXVII, ed. By E.A. Livingstone, Leuven, Peeters, 1993, 337- 342, p. 340. Néanmoins R. Brändle – W. Neidhart, *Lebensgeschichte und Theologie, Ein Beitrag zur psychohistorischen Interpretation Augustin...* trouve qu'Augustin a grandement méconnu la paternité. Voir p. 166, n. 67: "Conf. 10,4,6: Diese faszinierende Passage bildet allerdings eher eine Ausnahme. Augustin findet in seinem Suchen nach Gott nur selten Begriffe der Väterlichkeit. Viel häufiger sind Attribute oder Bezeichnungen für Gott, die in der Sphäre des Weiblichen gehören."

de Dieu le Père et l'Église-Mère. L'histoire personnelle d'Augustin cédera la place maintenant à l'histoire de l'Église ou la Cité de Dieu. Le livre dix des Confessions qui se penche sur la *memoria* et le souvenir du tout premier début de cette autre histoire, l'histoire universelle, se raccorde donc sans faille à la conclusion de l'histoire particulière d'Augustin lui-même.

Conclusion

En guise de conclusion, arrêtons-nous un instant auprès du titre de cet article: "Au sortir du sein de ma mère, qui avait mis beaucoup d'espoir en toi."[74] Par la foi la maternité terrestre de Monique a pu se développer et se transformer en une autre maternité, la céleste. Cette transformation ne vaut pas pour Monique seule, mais aussi pour son fils. N'avaient-ils pas, de concert avec Patricius, leur part dans le projet ambitieux pour la famille?[75] Dans la lettre 243 et dans les textes écrits vers 397 Augustin traduisit ce revirement comme la transition du domaine particulier au domaine universel, de la privatisation à la communion. Même la chute, résultat de l'orgueil qui est cupidité en même temps, il continuera plus tard à la représenter comme l'opposition entre *priuatus* et *communis*. Mais le couple *peccatum* et *caritas* remplacera peu à peu l'ancien couple plutôt abstrait et philosophique. Les sentiments ou la vie passionnelle marqués par le péché originel montrent la privatisation de la maternité cupide, dont non seulement Laetus mais aussi sa mère sont les victimes. Par le glaive de la Parole de Dieu ou le pouvoir de la parole symbolisante, mère et enfant sont expropriés de ce qu'ils s'étaient approprié et se situent désormais dans le domaine de la *caritas* où il y a de la place pour tous. Là ils ressortiront sous une nouvelle paternité, celle de Dieu, et une nouvelle maternité, celle de l'Église.

Pour arriver à la reconnaissance de cette nouvelle parenté, où Monique et son fils deviennent soeur et frère l'une de l'autre, Augustin a d'abord dû passer par le processus de dueil lors du décès de sa mère terrestre. Ce n'est qu'alors que le converti comprendra quel rôle la foi de sa mère a joué dans la reconnaissance de la paternité divine.

[74] BA 13, p. 303.

[75] C. LEPELLEY, *Spes saeculi: le milieu social d'Augustin et ses ambitions séculières avant sa conversion*, in *S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione*, Atti I, Roma, 1987, 99-117, p. 116s.

En cela le rôle de Patrice a été presque nul[76] et sa mort à lui n'a provoqué aucune catharsis en Augustin.[77] En vertu de leur contrat de mariage Monique appelait Patrice *dominus*, mais après sa conversion à la fin de sa vie Patrice, tout comme sa femme, sera nommé *seruus*.[78] Maintenant Augustin, dans les livres suivants des Confessions, peut aller à la recherche du commencement de son existence dans le Père divin, dans la création. Mais là la signification de son commencement changera à fond puisque le commencement *in principio* ne sera plus temporel, ce principe étant le Verbe dans lequel Dieu créa le ciel et la terre. Mais grâce à ce Verbe divin la mémoire humaine aura le pouvoir d'en parler, de ce commencement impossible à la fois temporel et éternel, sans l'atteindre pour autant.[79]

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[76] *Confessiones* 1,11,17, CC 27, p. 10.: "Nam illa satagebat, ut tu mihi pater esses, deus meus, potius quam ille, et in hoc adiuuabas eam, ut superaret uirum, cui melior seruiebat, quia in hoc tibi utique id iubenti seruiebat." Pourtant le zèle de Monique amènera aussi Patrice à se convertir; c'est pourquoi son mari est mentionné nommément dans la profession de foi d'Augustin: "...meminerint ad altare tuum Monnicae, famulae tuae, cum Patricio, quondam eius coniuge, per quorum carnem introduxi me in hanc uitam, quemadmodum nescio." (*id.* 9,13,37, p. 154) Dans toute son oeuvre Augustin ne cite qu'une seule fois le nom de sa mère et c'est dans ce dernier texte. Y a-t-il une explication historique à cet hapax ou y a-t-il une raison théologique?

[77] Ce n'est qu'en passant et presque irréverencieusement qu'Augustin mentionne la mort de son père: "Non enim ad acuendam linguam, quod uidebar emere maternis mercedibus, cum agerem annum aetatis undeuicensimum iam defuncto patre ante biennium..."

[78] *Id.* 9,9,22, p. 146: "Erat etiam serua seruorum."

[79] B. CLÉMENT, *L'invention du commentaire: Augustin...*, p. 5: "Le commentaire du récit de l'origine y vient en effet *après* le récit de vie (qu'on appelle ou non autobiographie. Cette succession, assez ordinairement tenue pour problématique, donne en réalité la logique poétique de l'oeuvre...". Encore pp. 60, 64, 130, 134s., 169.

AUGUSTINE'S FAMILY AS A SPACE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Few people have written as deeply and with such scholarly competence about Augustine's family as Professor van Bavel,[1] to whom I dedicate this paper on his 80th birthday. Augustine's family remains a subject of intense scholarly debate.[2] The reasons are twofold, though closely connected. Firstly, some of the facts are not entirely clear and remain open to interpretation. Secondly, the subject matter is of general current interest. Many people hold strong views on "the family" and these naturally influence their interpretation of historical phenomena. This is one of the reasons why some of the issues concerning Augustine's family continue to be hotly debated. This paper is not immune from this condition. It is only a small contribution to a much larger debate. But it might offer a new look at a particular aspect in a particular field, namely the family as a space of religious experience.

Contemporary family and religion – a paradox

It takes its starting point from a paradox in the current debate about the family and religion. Some recent opinion polls[3] suggest that even in the most secularized parts of the world most people claim to have some sort of religious experience, or at least to seek such an experience. Similarly the family. Its death was announced decades ago. Yet according to some recent polls more than three quarters of those participating declared that their family supported them in life, not only materially, but also morally, and even spiritually. In Europe and the US in the early 1950s by contrast only one fifth of the

[1] I am especially indebted to his "Augustine's View on Women," in: *Augustiniana* 39 (1989) 5-53; see also *Ever Ancient, Ever New. Augustine's View on Women* (Villanova: Augustinian Press, 1990).

[2] See only recently D. Shanzer, "Avulsa a latere meo," in: *JRS* 92 (2002) 157-76.

[3] The reflections that follow do not represent a specialist sociologist's analysis, but an informed lay person's interpretation of a series of polls conducted in the last three years in various countries in western Europe, e. g. by MORI, ICM and IMF (Allensbach). The results of these polls are in the public domain and can be checked on the websites of the relevant institutes.

population felt able to say that. But family life now, of course, whether in its ideal or in its real form, looks very different from family life then. Fewer people identify family with the small family unit (father-mother-children). More and more see it as a network of relationships, a cluster of several households, with members from several generations, and often with children and relatives from present as well as former married or non-married relationships and the partners from these relationships.

And for many this new kind of family does not merely serve as a pragmatic, or an emergency solution. By far the majority especially of young people experience the joys and difficulties arising from family life as enriching. Family for them is a place where they feel needed and called to take responsibility, but where they also experience joy, love, and fulfilment in life. And many associate these experiences with religion. Especially young parents seek to extend their family experience into a religious dimension. To them their family experience is a basic form of religious experience. At first glance this seems paradoxical. Nowadays religious experience is increasingly sought outside institutions. Yet the family, inspite of being itself an institution, seems to be experienced by many as a place that can facilitate religious experience. Also, many families seek to link themselves to religious communities. Practical theologians have, of course, already become aware of this and consider it a challenge and a chance.[4] But the phenomenon might also prove interesting in the light of historical theology.

The family as an obstacle to and catalyst of Early Christian religious experience

One of my aims in this essay is to show that the paradox is not new. Already in the Early Church religious institutions in general and the family in particular were considered obstacles and catalysts of religious experience.[5] Those who converted to Christianity were not isolated individuals, but members, and very often leading members, heads, of families. Sometimes the latter may have implied that

[4] See, e. g., G. MARSCHÜTZ, "Zur Zukunft der Familie: soziologische Befunde – theologische Herausforderungen," in: *ThPQ* 149 (2001) 57-65.

[5] For a recent study see H. JUNGBAUER, *"Ehre Vater und Mutter"* (WUNT 2.146; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002) 306-371.

a family converted as a whole,[6] but not always. Still, at the beginning of the 5th century, at a time when paganism was already being suppressed, Augustine, as the bishop of Hippo, could only say that, while many families in his congregation had no more pagan members, most families had at least one Christian member.[7] The least one can conclude from this remark is that most families in Hippo were heterogeneous in their religious beliefs. But this must have implied that children did not normally learn their faith from their parents; husbands and wives adhered to different faiths, as did grandparents and grandchildren, masters and slaves, landlords and workers. The impact of that on religious and family life must have been enormous, not just in terms of potential conflict, but especially in terms of ability to tolerate different beliefs, and live alongside very intimate friends and relations who sometimes held very different beliefs.

It is this phenomenon which interests me in this paper, the Late Antique family as a place where adherents of different religions and beliefs, different ways of life, pagans, heretics, schismatics, catechumens, baptised persons, clergy, ascetics and ordinary lay people shared their experience, including their religious experience, and how this impacted on Christianity in that culture during that period.

My approach is limited by the available sources. Augustine (with his family) is one of the very few examples, where we can paint a slightly fuller picture, though even in his case many questions must remain unanswered. Other examples would be the Cappadocians, to a lesser extent the circles around Rufinus of Aquileia and Jerome, and of Paulinus of Nola. Augustine, of course, is not only interesting as a historical figure. He also had a tremendous influence on the formation of western ideas about the relationship of the individual, especially the individual adolescent and young adult, to his or her family. And in one way or another this influence is still tangible today. But in this paper I can only hint at that latter aspect.

A note on the phrase "religious experience". I am aware of its vagueness. But I think it might be useful in this context. For despite the huge gap between the Late Antique situation and the situation

[6] See, e. g., famously, Acts 16:15 on the baptism of Lydia "and her 'house'" (*oíkos*, *domus*); cf. below for the high degree of equivalence in this context of *domus* and *familia*, "house" and family.

[7] *Sermo* 302.19 (PL 38, 1392): *unum scio ... in hac ciuitate multas inueniri domos, in quibus non sit uel unus paganus; nullam domum inueniri, ubi non sint Christiani*; for the Early Christian character of this state of affairs generally see P. LAMPE, "Urchristliche Missionswege nach Rom: Haushalte paganer Herrschaft als jüdisch-christliche Keimzellen," in: *ZNW* 92 (2001) 123-27.

today it of all concepts might provide a ground for reflecting on what the two situations have in common, and where they remain irreconcilably different. This might help towards interpreting, halfway adequately, Late Antique reality, but also to formulate anew, in a qualified and timely manner, the norms and values of Early Christian *praxis* for Christian life today.

Augustine's family – some hard facts

Now, what was, for Augustine, his family? In what way, or ways (!), was it, for him and other members of his family a "space", or *locus*, of religious experience? Augustine was born in 354 in Thagaste, a small Roman settlement in what is now northeast Algeria. His father Patricius was a taxable citizen, a *curialis* or *decurio*. He owned land, slaves, a relatively comfortable house, a small fortune, reputation. He was *honestior*, and a *paterfamilias*.[8] One of his ancestors had acquired Roman citizenship after becoming a freedman in the early 3rd century.[9]

To be established in this sense was always important for Augustine. It was one of many attitudes of his which his conversion did not change. Though he did once say that he was of a poor upbringing[10] – he may (or may not) have meant this in a literal sense –, he also claimed, in what has to be considered a far more significant remark, that his paternal inheritance, probably a third of his father's fortune, made the church of Hippo one twentieth better off.[11] How does this square with the fact that as a sixteen year old he had to interrupt his studies because of lack of funds?[12] The explanation is that

[8] POSSID. *Vit. Aug.* 1 (PL 32, 33).

[9] See for this the discussion in G. BONNER, *Saint Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies* (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 1986) 36.

[10] *Sermo* 356.13 (PL 39, 1579-80); cf. also D. C. LAMBOT, *Sancti Augustini sermones selecti duodeviginti* (SPM 1; Utrecht: Spectrum, 1950) 140-41; and the discussion in B. D. SHAW, "The Family in Late Antiquity: The Experience of Augustine," in: *Past and Present* 115 (1987) 3-51.

[11] *Epist.* 126.7 (CSEL 44, 13): *uix enim uigesima particula res mea paterna existimari potest in comparatione praediorum ecclesiae, quae nunc ut dominus existimor possidere*. Augustine would not make this claim, if he was not particularly proud of it, or certain that it could be verified, or at least not be falsified. He is keen to be on record of having said that. But on the other hand he also compares himself here with "really" rich people like Romanianus or Melania the Younger, whose inheritances (in the case of the latter) may have constituted the entire wealth of more than one big diocese.

[12] See *conf.* 2.3.5; 6.7.11 (CCL 27, 19-20; 80-81).

these were probably cash flow problems, serious no doubt, but temporary, as it turned out. His father had just died, and probably taxes had to be paid. Perhaps debtors defaulted in turn. But the family estates remained intact. Augustine's brother Navigius soon followed the father as a *curialis*, and he could pay off his brother and his sister. This family was neither destitute nor ruined, but on the contrary rather well endowed, and also, equally important, well connected. Within a year Augustine had a sponsor who helped him to continue his studies in Carthage and later on even to pursue his career in Rome and Milan, Romanianus, a local magnate and friend and patron of the family – probably also with financial interests (as creditor or debtor?). What may also be considered for the situation of 370 is the cut throat nature of the whole system of financing higher education. Not only students, professors, too, were constantly short of cash. Augustine tells of his worries as a professor in Rome, when his students did not pay their fees at the end of term.[13] But again, young men from less established and well endowed families, less well connected, simply would not have continued with their studies or chosen another profession.

The established life style of his family always remained an important aspect of Augustine's religious experience. He does say once that Christian poverty is more authentic if it does not depend on earthly inheritance,[14] but the whole point is that he himself was unacquainted with such a poverty. His inheritance gave security to himself, his family, and later to his religious community and his church.

Law and love

Family, *familia*, for Augustine, consists of several layers. The core at the centre are his father, mother, brother and sister. But in the outer areas it also comprises a larger group of people, not so much "extended family" in a social anthropological sense, but a group of people fixed by law, the members of the house (*domus*), like slaves and tenants (*inquilini*).[15] Clearly, these people were not family in the sense children, cousins or grandparents were. They had duties, but few rights, or should we say privileges. Often, they were crushed

[13] See *conf.* 5.12.22 (CCL 27, 72).

[14] See *epist.* 126.7 (CSEL 44, 13): *multo ergo liquidius et securius in hoc amatur christiana paupertas, in quo nulla rerum ampliorum potest putari cupiditas.*

[15] See SHAW (n. 10) 15 n. 40.

between warring factions. Thus when one day tensions ran high between Augustine's mother and her mother-in-law and the *paterfamilias* had to step in, they accused some of their slaves of upsetting the *pax domestica* by spinning intrigues. In return, the father subjected these slaves to *disciplina familiae*, i. e. he gave them a sound thrashing, thus restoring *concordia suorum*.[16]

There is hardly anything sentimental about such conditions. Yet none the less it would be quite wrong to think of these structures merely in legalistic terms. True, a *paterfamilias* had the right over life and death, not only of slaves, but also of his wife and children. He could treat them as he pleased, maltreat them, and even kill them. He could establish a quasi second wife[17] in his household, as Augustine did in 385 in Milan, after he had engaged himself to a ten year old girl. He had to wait for his bride to reach her legal age for marriage and meanwhile to content himself with a more mature mistress. He had already dismissed his common law wife, the love of his life from his youth. There is no indication that anyone could have done anything against such behaviour on his part, though equally we must not conclude that such behaviour was generally considered acceptable, on whatever grounds.[18] Even if conservative minded women, like Augustine's mother as portrayed by her son, did not openly protest against it, their quiet disapproval alone may well have been damnatory, and not just from a Christian perspective. True, there was a hard edge to the Roman soul. Justice was held supreme. It was expected to be enforced with severity[19] to maintain discipline, order, and the traditional way of family life, be it against the *improbitas* of an intransigent first born son, or the *perversitas* of a power-hungry wife aspiring to take charge of the *familia* herself.[20] But deep down at the bottom of the heart there was also a profound desire for enduring passionate and compassionate love. Augustine tells of a slave wet-nurse, who before him had brought up his mother and her father.[21] And, more famously, he also tells credibly and movingly of the love of his first (common law) wife. The split with her, on his initiative and therefore

[16] See *conf.* 9.9.20 (CCL 27, 145-46) and the discussion in SHAW (n. 10) 15.

[17] For the difficulties of the exact description of the relationship as well as for the other terms in this passage see now Shanzer (n. 2). Mistress and concubine are not quite what is meant.

[18] Cf. J. EVANS GRUBBS, *Law and Family in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) 155.

[19] Cf. SHAW (n. 10) 24 on the motif of *durus pater*.

[20] Cf. SHAW (n. 10) 28 on the *pax perversa* of a *domus*, in which a woman is in charge; *ibid.* 31 also on the *ira* of a husband, father, and lord.

[21] *Conf.* 9.8.17 (CCL 27, 143); SHAW (n. 10) 42.

on his responsibility (or fault), he records, broke his heart, in spite of being, in his opinion, legal, morally justifiable, and above all spiritually (i. e. religiously) motivated.[22] This clash of hard-hearted legalism and sentimental desire for inner fulfilment clearly indicates the fault lines in the social, and mental and emotional landscape in which Augustine's and his family members' religious experience can be situated.

Inner space and outer boundaries

Harsh and brutal though it may be, the *dominatio* by the *paterfamilias* remains ultimately an external force, and under normal circumstances it does not last very long due to the normal life expectancy of men. In the long run Augustine's family was dominated by women. Augustine never got to know his grandfathers.[23] They had died long before he was even a child. When his father died in 370, Augustine was 17, his mother 41. It was her who from now on till her death in 387 seems to have acted at least *de facto*, if not *de iure*, as *materfamilias*, a situation which the law tolerated, though it was rarely ratified. Ironically, as a bishop Augustine later condemned the practice.[24] Yet his mother being in charge as *materfamilias* was by far not the only *de facto* arrangement in his family during his teens. It was during his mother's headship of the family that his partner and their child stayed with her "under one roof." Apparently the quasi marriage was never ratified by any sort of valid contract. As a consequence it could easily be dissolved. Impossible to say if that was what was intended from the outset. Certain legal impediments may have prohibited a legal marriage. But, whatever the original intention, the arrangement contained a convenient get-out clause for Augustine and his family, as turned out fourteen years later, in the events of 385. Generally, an unmarried partner staying with the other family was not legally a member of that family. Nor was any child from such a union. Woman and child could easily be sent away, and Augustine's, or better, Monica's, family, now residents of Milan, did just that. They sent away the woman, though not her (and Augustine's) son. One can only assume that that was done by mutual consent. In legal

[22] See EVANS GRUBBS (n. 18) 300, who notes that Augustine could even rely on the backing of his move by the local bishop, Ambrose.

[23] Cf. *mus.* 6.11.32 (PL 32, 1130); SHAW (n. 10) 18.

[24] For a discussion of his views on the matter see SHAW (n. 10) 33.

terms Adeodatus should have returned with his mother to her family, which was also his. In Augustine's family, with Monica in charge, his legal status remained ambiguous, to say the least. He certainly had no legal entitlement. Had Augustine died, he might have been left with nothing to live on. In the event it was him who died only three years later, very much to the dismay of his father, and no doubt also his mother.

Emotional development and failure

In an outpouring of grief over his son's death Augustine professed how deeply he had loved him, just as his mother. But very little of that love had been tangible in 385. What indeed would Adeodatus's legal status have been after Augustine's marriage to a promising heiress? How must he have felt? All entitlements would have been with her children. And, to be sure, it was primarily Augustine's plan to pursue that marriage, not Monica's. True, Monica helped with the arrangements. But that was her duty as acting head of the family, not from her own ambition. It was the convention, and she had been explicitely asked to do so by her son.[25] Yes it also may have seemed reasonable under the circumstances, but on the whole the situation was confused. Augustine's behaviour was extremely erratic. Monica can hardly have felt comfortable in her role. Augustine had chosen the girl, but all of a sudden he was not so sure any more. It is hardly surprising that when he asked his mother for advice he found her evasive and unhelpful. His own feeble attempts at dream divination, too, yielded no satisfactory results. He remained undecided.

Moreover, with the bride being two years under age the marriage had to wait in any case. This drove Augustine to begin another non-marital relationship.[26] It did not last for very long, a few weeks, or months, at most, it seems. Obviously, it was not able to fill the gap that had opened up. Only now, confronted with a major life crisis, Augustine decided to enter the ascetic life. Only later, much later, it turned out that it was for good. To a contemporary onlooker, who would have witnessed Augustine's "conversion" reeling off in real time, it might well have looked quite pathetic in its unintentional display of male vanity and human weakness. But that is not the point

[25] See *conf.* 6.12-13 (CCL 27, 88-89), and K. POWER, "'Sed unam tamen': Augustine and His Concubine," in: *AugStud* 23 (1992) 49-76, 57 n. 99; for this passage in *conf.* also Shanzer (n. 2).

[26] For the different layers of motivation see POWER (n. 25) 56-58.

here, nor, by the way, is the fact that many individual elements of the conversion narrative are literary motifs. Augustine may have styled his story, but that does not (necessarily) mean that he invented it in its entirety. His account may be extremely one-sided, subjective, even questionable and objectionable, but it is not a piece of fiction, be it historical or allegorical. This is why it can be used (albeit critically) as a source for historical and biographical research.

What is most striking in the present context is how much Augustine's life after his conversion remained very much the same as before. The continuity is striking. His ascetic life begins in the bosom of his family. To Cassiciacum he moves with his mother, his son, his brother, two cousins and the sons of two patrons. Yes, his partner is missing, but we are told that he knows that she went back to Africa also to join the ascetic life. So could that indicate that he deems her still in union with him, at least in some sense? In any case, his mother continues to be in charge, for the time being; for she will be dead in little more than half a year. Two years will pass before Adeodatus also dies, and a very close friend, too, Nebridius.

This whole phase in Augustine's life, from 385 to 387, is characterised less by the workings of family relationships as such than by different sorts of relationship crises and breakdowns with which Augustine's life was riddled during that period. In part Augustine was himself responsible for the disasters that befell him, in part he was the "victim" of fate, or divine providence, as he himself would have put it. In 385 alone he ruined no less than three marital, or quasi marital, relationships, in 386 his professional career. In 387 his mother died, in 389 his son Adeodatus, and his close friend Nebridius. Clearly, these events demonstrated the limits of human life on earth, including family life, not only in physical but also in principal terms. And yet, far from abandoning the family as a model for any kind of life, including religious life, Augustine continued to interpret his life in these very terms. He not only continued to live consciously in the context of his family thus making use of his family as a space for religious experience and development, he also interpreted the latter in terms of the former, and increasingly so, beginning with Cassiciacum, and ending in the Hippo of the late 420s.

Family in a context of religious diversity

Having sketched out the development of Augustine's family life up to 387 with a focus mainly on himself individually, I will now

try to focus on his family in the religious context of his time. Here and there we have already been able to throw a glimpse at his family as a space of religious experience. In what follows now, this aspect should become even more compelling.

When Augustine was born in 354, Constantius II. (337-361) was in sole charge of the Roman Empire.[27] The opponent of Athanasius and patron of the Homoeans was known in Africa as the scourge of the Donatist schismatics and a champion of the orthodox, or catholic, Caecilian cause. Fear of the Emperor drove the Donatist town of Thagaste back to Catholicism, Augustine writes.[28] In 362 Constantius' II. successor Julian revoked the measure, but with little consequence for Augustine's family. The most dominant Christian in it, his mother, came from a *domus* which, as it seems, was already catholic when she was born, around 330.[29] In those days, even more significantly, Thagaste had been mainly pagan. It had been a different age. Augustine's father still originated from that generation. It was the generation that separated him from his wife, in terms of years as much as in terms of how he viewed the world. He was still an old style pagan, who submitted to baptism only on his death bed. There were Donatists among Augustine's relatives, for example a cousin Severinus, whom Augustine labels wealthy, educated and prudent. They were on good terms.[30] But Augustine himself was not attracted by Donatism. His career, as it turned out, led him elsewhere.

The mother's religious authority and influence upon the family was strong, not only on the children, but also on the husband. Augustine reports that it was mainly due to her that towards the end of his life he became a catechumen and let himself eventually be baptised; though this was only very shortly before his death. Thus it could equally be argued that he put up a staunch and principled resistance against her advances until he was too weak to resist. Augustine and his brother and sister, too, became catechumens, whilst they were still children. The fact that less than a generation later Augustine had his

[27] For what follows cf. W. H. C. FREND, "The Family of Augustine: A Microcosm of Religious Change in North Africa," in: G. MADEC U. A., HRSG., *Congresso internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione, Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986* 1-3 (SEA 24-26; Rom: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1987) 1, 135-51. Covering the same ground as Frend I shall focus not so much on the aspect of religious change as on that of a continuing religious diversity.

[28] See *epist.* 93.17 (CSEL 34/2, 462): *...ciuitas mea, quae cum tota esset in parte Donati, ad unitatem catholicam legum imperialium timore conuersa est.*

[29] See *conf.* 9.8.17-18 (CCL 27, 143-44); A. MANDOUZE, *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas Empire 1: Afrique 303-533* (Paris: CNRS, 1982) 758-62.

[30] *Epist.* 52 (CSEL 34/2, 149-51).

son baptised as a baby might indicate a change in the practice, though this could also be due to regional differences (between the respective homes of Adeodatus's mother and father).

Augustine was not only exposed to orthodox (catholic) Christianity represented by his mother, he also got to know other religions. Later in his life he remembered Madauros, Apuleius' birthplace, not only as a place of excellent grammar schools, but also as a city where traditional classical paganism was still very much alive, e. g. in the person of his grammar teacher. His own attitude to classical education as one aspect of an ancient and archaic set of religious beliefs and practices, though universally relevant, was strongly influenced by that late childhood experience of that kind of education offered in a still functioning traditional context. One has to remember that he belonged to one of the last generations in the west who enjoyed that privilege. In the course of the 5th century secondary and higher education was to become a prerogative of the church.

In fact, his positive encounter with and respectful attitude towards paganism in the shape of classical education could in part explain why, as a student of rhetoric in Carthage, Augustine was less interested in the austere and evangelical doctrine of Donatism than in the seemingly philosophical, free and enlightened spirituality of Manicheism. On the other hand his interest in Manicheism and his long (albeit loose) adherence to it as hearer (*auditor*) was probably superseded by the fact that he never stopped being a catechumen in the catholic church.[31] Thus one could say that between 371 and 383 Augustine lived, more or less, in two parallel universes as far as his religion was concerned. That he retained his catechumenate was due at least in part to the continuing influence of his mother. It may have been easier to reconcile with a loose adherence to Manicheism than a dedicated commitment to Donatism. There would have been a real alternative. But his mother, too, was ambiguous. Considering to exclude her son, when she first heard of his religious escapade, she decided otherwise, not on religious principle, but on what one may interpret as pastoral and family grounds: She reckoned (and not in vain) that this would enable her to continue to exert religious influence not only on her son, but also on her grandson, to whom she also became very much emotionally attached. And on both counts she may in turn have been influenced by Augustine's partner, who, like her, was strongly committed to the Catholic faith.

[31] See for this L. C. FERRARI, "Young Augustine: Both Catholic and Manichee," in: *AugStud* 26 (1995) 109-128.

Religion, culture, and education and the family

A striking feature of North African Manicheism, as portrayed by Augustine, is its attraction for well educated, rich and ambitious men from the provincial urban elite. Augustine, Alypius, Romanianus and his son Licentius, they all belonged to the best families of Thagaste. What attracted them to Manicheism, a cult that was considered a dangerous, heretical, form of Christianity by pagans, Donatists, and Catholics alike. Already illegal in the 370s it was severely banned, or persecuted, from 382. (Interestingly, it was a year later that Augustine finally decided to quit.) Manicheism had no church discipline like Catholics and Donatists and it rejected the Old Testament as part of the Christian tradition. Instead it offered a seemingly intellectually open, rational and, above all, aesthetic religion. It lacked what might have been considered the strict legalism of Catholicism and the fanatic enthusiasm of Donatism. Its aestheticism resulted from a materialist ontology. One of its more tangible effects was a morbid obsession, not dissimilar to that in modern forms of materialism, with the body, its beauty and its purity. While a Manichee Augustine wrote a work, later lost, about beauty. He was morbid about his body, understood it as life doomed to death,[32] but led at the same time an extremely body conscious life, sexual life included. Since Manicheism saw every human life as a soul lost or damned in the flesh, it recommended sexual abstinence to its members in order to avoid the conception of further human beings. But clearly, there were other ways to avoid conception. Thus less dedicated members ("hearers" like Augustine) not prepared to achieve the highest degree of purity through sexual abstinence, could be sexually active, but they had to practise contraception. Later Augustine writes that he used practices to that effect which his partner detested.[33] Apparently they violated not only her religious convictions but even her dignity as a human being and woman.

Thus the affectuated intellectualism of North African Manicheism as practised and experienced by Augustine and his "mates", while claiming to be emancipated, enlightened and mature, seems rather to be characterised by what impresses as an adolescent, immature, male arrogance, while the Catholic faith of his mother and his partner, which the young Augustine rejected as infantile and

[32] For the sources see FREND (n. 27) 147.

[33] See *bono coniug.* 11.12 (CSEL 41, 203-204); SHAW (n. 10) 45; POWER (n. 25) 55.

unacceptable for an educated gentleman, strikes as far more mature, responsible and down to earth. Moreove, both, Augustine's mother and his partner are not in the least uneducated or narrowminded. His mother, it seems, knew her Bible,[34] and in the Cassiciacum dialogues she is portrayed as a capable, even superior, participant with a dry sense of humour and a sharp, critical mind.[35] Again, questions regarding the historicity of particular passages in the dialogues aside, the mere fact that Augustine presents Monica as a participant in the dialogues, and the role he ascribes to her, should be sufficient to conclude that he had remained in some form of a continuous dialogue with her. That in itself should be astonishing enough. And what is almost proven in the case of the mother might also be safely assumed of the partner.[36] And this has a lot to do with education.

Education was not, and certainly not primarily, a characteristic of Augustine's Manicheism. It is a general characteristic of religious experience in his family. It enabled all members not only to develop and grow each in their own, individual, religious experience, but also to tolerate others in theirs. And there was, even for today's standards, an enormous range of religious experience lived and shared in that family. There was the father, brought up in a largely traditional pagan culture, but married to a Christian wife and slowly considering his position. There was the mother, a Catholic in a predominantly Donatist environment. There were relatives who were Donatists. There were the children, brought up as catechumens, yet also well educated and socially functional. Augustine's sister married off and after the early death of her husband established as a widow. His brother as the family heir. There were also risks involved, and Monica is reported as having taken such risks. She kept in contact with Augustine, his partner and their child, even though it was in breach of her authority that Augustine adhered to Manicheism. In the long run, the family stayed together, not just as a unit driven by economic necessity, but as a group with social, cultural, and religious objectives. That is the impression one gets from the Cassiciacum dialogues. Besides Monica even the brother Navigius strikes as witty, liberal minded, critical, and interested in intellectual discourse, if not as genial as Augustine and Adeodatus. Only death was going to part them.

[34] See the revealing hint in *ord.* 2.1 (CCL 29, 106.5-10): *mater nostra cuius ingenium atque in res divinas inflammatum animum...*

[35] See FREND (n. 27) 143.

[36] See POWER (n. 25) 52.

Conclusion

No doubt material wealth was of decisive importance for Augustine's family. It guaranteed to a high degree its identity, integrity, social status and mere existence. It also mattered for the size of the family, the fact that it transcended the core unit (father-mother-children), though that core unit remained the spiritual and material centre of the family. But material wealth, besides social and legal status, was only a means to an end. Augustine's family could persist on a minimum of all of these. It was not merely an economic, social, or legal institution. It had a spiritual heart, a living soul, with an emotional potential that enabled individual family members to use economic, social and legal grey zones. These often experienced a hot-and-cold bath between economic utilitarianism, social pragmatism and legal formalism on the one hand, and genuine affection and compassion on the other. Forced into a straitjacket of traditions, social conventions and legal requirements, they were also able to experience, or at least deeply to wish for, that individuals would treat other individuals on an individual basis, and grant exceptions sometimes to themselves, and sometimes to others as well, in all fields of life, including religion.

There was therefore genuine religious experience, but it was constrained, and, more importantly, it was embedded in the context of the family. The family was the place of religious experience. But that is not all. Education, it turned out, was decisive for the way religious experience was consciously made, reflected upon, and shared. It mainly made possible that degree of mutual tolerance necessary to allow for the diversity which individual experience inevitably creates. Seen from this perspective it is not surprising that we find exactly these three vital elements present in Augustine's family, to an astonishing degree: education, tolerance, and a diversity of religious experience.

And one could argue further that it was that tolerance that made it possible for Augustine to deepen the religious experience, which accompanied his failure and the rupture of the fabric of his previous life in 385/6, to an encounter with God in the crisis, and a transcendence of that religious experience itself. Thus tolerance is here once more not an end in itself, but a by-product of the deepseated conviction that the personal, practical, example is more effective and more authoritative than any form of rhetoric and coercion. But then of course it has always been easier to put this conviction again itself into rhetoric rather than into practice; which is one of the reasons why,

apparently, there was a development away from the seemingly more open situation between 360 and 390, towards more homogeneity, and at the same time, less tolerance. One could argue that this may also be due to the way in which Augustine records that period in his autobiographical writings, that he even intended that period to look more open in order to contrast it with the more secure period of his later years (the 420s). But on the other hand the religious situation in Augustine's family during those years did reflect a wider development in society. There simply was less religious tolerance and diversity under Theodosius I. than there had been in the previous decades; though this could again be due to the fact that we draw such a lot of our information regarding religion and religious change during that period from Augustine and writers recording similar experiences.

In spite of fundamental differences between the Late Antique situation and the situation today there may be areas where we can compare the two; for today, too, one important question is whether the family, especially through the newly found openness towards it, as outlined at the beginning of this paper, can offer space for religious experience and development; or are we facing the danger that a deficit in education and, consequently, in the ability to tolerate the respective other as other, will contribute to the erosion of the kind of religious identity that leads to strength in spirit, mind, and will? In other words, is there a tendency (in spite, or precisely because of, the accelerated secularization process) towards more homogeneity and less tolerance, or can an emphasis on personal witness guarantee a high degree of religious identity, plurality and tolerance? Augustine's family offers an interesting case study for both phenomena, for the potentials and the dangers of the family as a space of religious experience.

Josef Lössl

DIE MENSCHHEIT JESU CHRISTI UND DIE GOTTESSCHAU IN AUGUSTINS WERK *DE TRINITATE*

a) Der Mensch Jesus Christus und die christliche Spiritualität

Die Bedeutung der Menschheit Jesu Christi ist innerhalb der Geschichte der christlichen Spiritualität unumstritten; denn jeder Versuch spiritueller Annäherung an Gott beginnt mit der Betrachtung der Gestalt Jesu Christi[1]. Jesus Christus ist der Sohn Gottes und damit dessen exponentes Bild: "Wer mich gesehen hat, hat den Vater gesehen" (Joh 14, 9). Gleichzeitig ist das Ziel der herkömmlichen christlichen Kontemplation nicht die humanitas, sondern die divinitas Christi, die er mit dem Vater und dem Hl. Geist teilt. Auf der letzten Stufe der Kontemplation gilt es deshalb, sich von allen "bildhaften" Anleihen freizumachen. Galt diese "rätselhafte" Rolle des Menschen Jesus Christus auch für den Bischof von Hippo? Auch Augustinus fragt, ob denn der Leib Jesu Christi dann aufhören würde zu existieren, wenn der Mensch einmal zur vollendeten Schau gelangt ist. Doch legt er sich gegen die Manichäer fest, dass Jesus Christus leiblich zum Himmel aufgefahren ist und dort zur Rechten des Vaters sitzt und als Mensch wiederkommen wird, um Gericht über Lebende und Tote zu halten[2]. Das Menschsein Jesu Christi behält also auch über den Tod hinaus seinen unverminderten Wert.

In dieser Arbeit zu Ehren des Jubilars, der in der Mitte der sechziger Jahre mit zwei für die gegenwärtige Forschung[3] noch unvermindert wertvolle Arbeiten über die Christologie bei Augustinus[4] die

[1] Vgl. M. VILLER & K. RAHNER, *Aszese und Mystik in der Väterzeit. Ein Abriß*, Freiburg i. Br.: Herder Verlag, 1939, pp. 295-302; P. MOMMAERS, *The Riddle of the Christian Mystical Experience. The Role of the Humanity of Jesus* (Louvain theological & pastoral monographs, 29), Louvain: Peeters Press, 2003, pp. 7ff.

[2] *c. Faust.* V, 4 (CSEL 25/1, 275, 20/22): "filius hominis est, accepit potestatem iudicium faciendi, quia in ipsa forma uenturus est ad iudicium, ut et a bonis et a malis uideatur".

[3] So beendete G. MADEC, *Christus*, in *AL*, Bd. I, 903 seinen langen Artikel mit der Erwähnung der Doktorarbeit von van Bavel. Insgesamt hat Madec ihn etwa 18 mal zitiert.

[4] T. J. v. BAVEL, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin* (Paradosis, 10), Fribourg, 1954; id., *L'humanité du Christ comme lac parvulorum et comme via dans la spiritualité de saint Augustin*, in *Aug*(L) 7 (1957), pp. 245-281.

Forschung aus der Einseitigkeit der Scheelschen Verengung[5] befreit hat, wollen wir uns der Frage nach der Bedeutung des Menschseins Jesu Christi innerhalb von *De Trinitate* widmen. Dabei wollen wir diese Frage mit der Problematik der Erkenntnis und der Schau Gottes verbinden.

b) Die sogenannte "exercitatio mentis"

In seinem 1998 erschienenen Artikel[6] will Lewis Ayres zeigen, dass der von Augustinus verwendete Begriff "exercitatio mentis" nicht allein die Funktion erfüllt, den Geist auf dessen intellektuelle Unzulänglichkeit in Bezug auf die Erkenntnis der göttlichen Dreieinigkeit vorzubereiten und ihn dadurch auf die für den Erkenntnisprozess unbedingte Notwendigkeit des Glaubens an Jesus Christus hinzuweisen, wie John Cavadini behauptete[7]. Gegen diese seiner Meinung nach zu kurz gegriffene These betont Ayres m. E. zu Recht, dass die "exercitatio" bereits Teil des Glaubensvollzugs ist, die jedoch nur im Kontext des "Christological drama of redemption" richtig verstanden werden kann. Nach ihm beabsichtigt Augustinus eine christozentrische *exercitatio*:

> "On the one hand we need such an exercitatio if we are to comprehend the structure of the Incarnation, and, on the other hand, it is the Incarnation which, as the core of the redemptive dispensatio, provides such an exercitatio: this basic structure is continuously present in Augustinés thought from at least the 390s through to the completion of trin. and beyond"[8].

Deshalb ist es nicht überraschend, dass Ayres das dreizehnte Buch als den herausragenden theologischen *Locus* von *De Trinitate* erklärte[9].

[5] O. SCHEEL, *Die Anschauung Augustins über Christi Person und Werk. Unter Berücksichtigung ihrer verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen und ihrer dogmengeschichtlichen Stellung*, Tübingen – Leipzig, 1901.

[6] L. AYRES, *The Christological Context of Augustinés De trinitate XIII: Toward Relocating Books VIII-XV*, in *AugStud* 29 (1998) 1, pp. 111-139. Er hat ihn unserem Jubilar zu dessen 75. Geburtstag gewidmet.

[7] J. CAVADINI, "*The Structure and Intention of Augustinés De trinitate*", in *AugStud* 23 (1992), pp. 103-123.

[8] L. AYRES, *The Christological Context*, p. 135.

[9] L. AYRES, *Christological Context*, p. 136: "Book XIII should more accurately be read as revealing the theological context for the exposition of all eight books of the latter half of trin. In other words, Book XIII reveals the Christological location of the exercitatio which Augustine has been trying to lead us into throughout, and thus draws our attention to the central importance of Augustinés Christology and theological anthropology for understanding the investigation of Books VII-XII".

Schon allein die äußere Struktur des Werkes scheint die von Ayres aufgestellte These von der christologischen Zentrierung zu bestätigen. Nach der gegenwärtigen Auffassung hat Augustinus das dreizehnte Buch, in dem Jesus Christus eine prädominante Rolle zuerkannt wird, zu Anfang des Jahres 418, d. h. zu Beginn seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Julian von Aeclanum[10], verfasst. Diesen Christozentrismus hat er rückwirkend in den *Proemien* zu den Büchern II – III – IV –VIII repetiert[11]. Es ist daher ebenso unstrittig, dass Augustinus mit diesen um 418 geschriebenen Vorbemerkungen die einheitliche Struktur des Werkes *De Trinitate* unterstreichen wollte. Dass er die beiden Teile von *De Trinitate* als eine Einheit verstand, wird in der gegenwärtigen Forschung[12] nicht mehr bestritten, wie es die beiden Zusammenfassungen u. a. im XIII. und XV. Buch klar zeigen[13]. Somit repräsentiert das dreizehnte Buch den theologischen Überbau, von dem aus die übrigen Bücher interpretiert werden müssen.

Auch wenn Ayres hier m. E. Recht hat, so müssen wir den Gebrauch des Begriffes "exercitatio" differenzierter sehen. Augustinus verwendet in seinem Werk über die Dreieinigkeit nirgends das Substantiv "exercitatio"[14], doch gebraucht er den Komparativ "exercitatior", und zwar zunächst in *Trin.* IX, 12, 17 (CCL 50, 308, 14sq.):

[10] Dazu die noch unveröffentlichte Dissertation von M. LAMBERIGTS, *De polemiek tussen Julianus van Aeclanum en Augustinus van Hippo. Een bijdrage tot de theologiegeschiedenis van de tweede pelagiaanse controverse* (418-430), Universität Leuven, 1988.

[11] Vgl. A. SCHINDLER, *Wort und Analogie in Augustins Trinitätslehre*, Tübingen, 1965, p. 10: "Unsere Chronologie sieht also aus: 399 bis 405: Bücher I – IV; 410 bis 415: Bücher VIII bis XII, 1. Teil; 418 bis 421: Bücher XII, 2. Teil bis XV; Bücher V bis VII wohl zwischen 405 und 415."; P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité, 163), Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2000, pp. 45-80. 638: "L. I: 400 – 403, L. II – III: 411/412 – 413, L. IV: 414 – 415"; J. LAM CONG QUY, *"Der Mensch als das Ereignis der Selbstmitteilung Gottes". Karl Rahners anthropologisch gewendete Christologie in der Begegnung mit Augustins gratialer Christozentrik in "De Trinitate". Ein Versuch* (Faculty of Theology – unveröffentlichte Abhandlung), Universität Leuven, 2000, p. 60: "Nach unserem Ergebnis hat Augustinus die Bücher I–III wahrscheinlich in der Zeit von 400–405 verfasst, während das Buch IV um 415 beendet wurde, wobei die Vorbemerkung höchstwahrscheinlich erst Anfang 418 zum IV. Buch hinzugefügt worden ist. Weiter müßten die Bücher V-XII um die Mitte des Jahres 415-418 geschrieben worden sein. Endlich hat Augustinus die Bücher XIII-XV in der Zeit von 418-420 abgeschlossen".

[12] Vgl. u. a. dazu M. SCHMAUS, *Die Denkform Augustins in seinem Werk De Trinitate*, in *BAW* 6 (1962), pp. 1-25; E.HILL, *St. Augustine's De Trinitate. The doctrinal significance of its structure*, in *REAug.* 19 (1973), pp. 277-286; E. MULLER, *Rhetorical and Theological Issues in the structuring of Augustine's De Trinitate*, in *StPatr.* 27 (1993), pp. 356-368.

[13] *Trin.* XIII, 20, 25-26 (CCL 50A, 417, 64 – 420, 77); XV, 3, 4 – 5 (CCL 50A, 462, 1 – 467, 112).

[14] Eine Ausnahme ist zu finden in *Trin.* IV, 11, 14 (CCL 50, 179, 4): "exercitationibus". Diese Stelle ist für unsere Untersuchung jedoch insignifikant.

> "Quod nunc in mente humana utcumque uestigare conamur ut ex inferiore imagine in qua nobis familarius natura ipsa nostra quasi interrogata respondet *exercitatiorem mentis aciem* ab inluminata creatura ad lumen incommutabile dirigamus".

Und am Ende des XIII Buches verwendet Augustinus noch einmal den Komparativ, diesmal im Ablativ:

> "Placuit quippe uelut gradatim ascendentibus in utraque requirere apud interiorem hominem quandam sui cuiusque generis trinitatem sicut prius apud exteriorem quaesiuimus ut ad illam trinitatem quae deus est pro nostro modulo, si tamen uel hoc possumus, saltem *in aenigmate* et *per speculum* contuendam *exercitatiore* in his inferioribus rebus *mente* ueniamus"[15]

Diese beiden Stellen unterstreichen ganz deutlich die überragende Stellung des Geistes innerhalb der Suche nach dem trinitarischen Gottesbild. Dabei ist die Suche für Augustinus zunächst eine Selbstsuche, d. h., der Geist strebt zunächst nach Selbsterkenntnis. Dieses Streben finden wir bereits in dem X. Buch der *Confessiones*:

> "Transibo ergo et memoriam, ut attingam eum, qui separauit me a quadrupedibus et a uolatilibus caeli sapientiorem me fecit, transibo et memoriam, ut ubi te inueniam, uere bone, secura suauitas, et ubi te inueniam? Si praeter memoriam meam te inuenio, immemor tui sum. Et quomodo iam inueniam te, si memor non sum tui?"[16].

Noch deutlicher schreibt Augustinus in *De uera religione* XXXIX, 72 (CCL 32, 234, 12/14) über das gleiche Thema:

> "Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat ueritas. Et si tuam naturam mutabilem inueneris, transcende et te ipsum".

Die Selbsterkenntnis aber führt zur Kenntnis der Wahrheit, die Gott ist und die über dem menschlichen Geist liegt[17]. Dieser ist nach unserem Kirchenvater in einen höheren und niedrigeren Teil aufgeteilt.

[15] *Trin.* XIII, 20, 26 (50A, 418, 27/33).

[16] *Conf.* X, 17, 26 (CCL 27, 169, 22/27). Vgl. *Gen.* 1, 26 sq. Siehe auch T. J. v. BAVEL, *God between affirmation and negation according to Augustine*, in T. J. LIENHARD & E. MULLER & R. J. TESKE (eds.), *Augustine. Presbyter factus sum* (Collectanea Augustiniana), New York, 1993, pp. 73-97.

[17] *Trin.* X, 5, 7 (CCL 50, 320, 1/8): "Vtquid ergo ei praeceptum est ut se ipsa cognoscat? Credo ut se cogitet et secundum naturam suam uiuat, id est ut secundum suam naturam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra est quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet. Multa enim per cupiditatem prauam tamquam sui sit oblita sic agit. Videt enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra in praestantiore natura quae deus est".

Während jener für die contemplatio dei[18] zuständig ist, wird diesem die Aufgabe der Erkenntnis "rerum temporalium atque mutabilium"[19] zugewiesen. Die *exercitatio mentis* betrifft also nicht den höheren Teil, sondern vielmehr den niedrigeren Teil des Geistes. Ersterer ist das Abbild der Trinität schlechthin und weist in sich schon immer die Stetigkeit der Trinität auf[20]. Nach Brachtendorf operieren die drei Kräfte des höheren Geistes, nämlich die *memoria*, *intelligentia* und *uoluntas*, entsprechend den Kriterien der Dauerhaftigkeit und Gleichheit, wie sie in der göttlichen Trinität vorhanden sind[21]. Diesen Charakter kann der höhere Geist nach *De Trinitate* trotz der Verfehlungen des Menschen nicht verlieren. Hier hat Augustinus seine frühere Auffassung geändert. Vor 413 vertrat er die Meinung, dass der Mensch durch die Sünde seine Gottebenbildlichkeit verloren hat[22]. Nach 413 hat Augustinus seine frühere radikale These abgemildert[23]. Dies könnte damit zusammenhängen, dass die Kontroverse mit den Pelagianern ihn dazu bewogen hat, seine Position zu revidieren. Die Einsicht in das Wirken der Gnade und die Rolle Christi in seiner Menschwerdung u. a. haben wohl zu dieser Milderung geführt[24].

Der niedrigere Teil des Geistes, den Augustinus mit "anima rationalis"[25], "mens rationalis"[26] oder auch mit "intelligentia

[18] *Trin.* I, 8, 16 (CCL 50, 49, 65): "ad contemplationem dei et patris"; I, 8, 17 (CCL 50, 50, 95); I, 9, 18 (CCL 50, 55, 26sq.); I, 10, 20 (CCL 50, 56, 3); XII, 4, 4 (CCL 50, 358, 1/15).

[19] *Trin.* XII, 12, 17 (CCL 50, 271, 29).

[20] *Trin.* XII, 4, 4 (CCL 50, 358, 11/13): "quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum non solum trinitas sed etiam imago dei".

[21] J. BRACHTENDORF, *Die Struktur des Geistes nach Augustinus. Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate"*, (Paradeigmata, 19), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000, pp. 187-193.

[22] *Gn. ad litt.* VI,, 27 (CSEL 28/1, 199, 1/2): "hanc imaginem in spiritu mentis inpressam perdidit Adam per peccatum". Vgl. *diu. qu.* 67, 4. 6 (CCL 44 A, 167-168, 66/80. 1760-172, 121/149)); C. P. MAYER, *Die Zeichen in der geistigen Entwicklung und in der Theologie des jungen Augustinus* (Cassiciacum, 24), Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, 1969, pp. 271-284; G. BONNER, *Augustine's Doctrine of Man: Image of God and Sinner*, in *Augustinianum* 24 (1984), pp. 495-514.

[23] *Rectr.* II, 24 (CCL 57, 110, 19/22): "In sexto libro quod dixi Adam imaginem dei, secundum quam factus est, perdidisse peccato, non sic accipiendum est, tamquam in eo nulla remanserit, sed quod tam deformis, ut reformatione opus haberet".

[24] Vgl. J. E. SULLIVAN, *The Image of God*, Dubuque Iowa, 1963, p. 43; J. McW. DEWART, *The Christology of the Pelagian Controversy*, in *StPatr* XVII (1982) 3, pp. 1221-1244; G. MADEC, *Le Christ de Saint Augustin. La Patrie et la Voie* (Collection <Jésus et Jésus-Christ>, 36), Paris: Desclée, 2001, pp. 221-234.

[25] *Trin.* II, 17, 28 (CCL 50, 119, 38); III, 2, 8 (CCL 50, 133, 24/25); IV, 20, 28 (CCL 50, 198, 71); XI, 2, 6 (CCL 50, 339, 157).

[26] *Trin.* IV, 1, 3 (CCL 50, 163, 59); IV, 18, 24 (CCL 50, 191, 10); IX, 12, 17 (CCL 50, 308, 19).

rationalis"[27] nennt und der "in actione temporalium"[28] verwickelt ist bzw. "ad actionem scientiam pertinere"[29], kann durch die *temporalia* verführt werden. Darum soll er sich einüben, aus dem Körperlichen das Ewige zu erkennen[30]. Dafür verwendet Augustinus auch folgende Ausdrücke wie "inquisitione proficiente"[31]; "inquisitio est appetitus inueniendi"[32] oder "inquisitione proficitur"[33]. Die *exercitatio mentis* ist demnach die Aufgabe des niedrigeren Teils des Geistes. Er soll sich einüben, damit er in sich selbst die göttlichen Spuren der Trinität (uestigium trinitatis) entdeckt. Durch die "exercitatiore acie mentis" gelangt der niedrigere Teil des Geistes zum höheren Teil des Geistes. Wenn der Mensch also zu seinem Gott aufsteigen will, dann muss er in sich zunächst einen Punkt suchen, wo er bereits frei von Wandelbarkeit ist. Dieser Punkt ist der höhere Geist in der Stetigkeit und Dauerhaftigkeit seines Wirkens. Er muss deshalb erst einmal zu sich selbst finden und zwar dort, wo die Kontinuität gewahrt ist:

> "Haec igitur trinitatis mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit"[34].

Freilich kann der niedrige Teil des Geistes dabei nicht stehen bleiben, da er noch zu schwach ist[35]. Die Stetigkeit des Geistes gerät ins Ungleichgewicht, weil er stets der Gefahr ausgesetzt ist, dem Zeitlichen nachzugeben und darin zu versinken. Darum benötigt er Hilfe.

c) Die Menschheit Jesu Christi als Scientia und Sapientia

Gott hat also seine dispensatio auf die menschliche Schwäche ausgerichtet. Nach Augustinus muss die Arznei der Krankheit angepasst sein, will sie die effektivste Heilung erzielen:

[27] *Trin.* X, 5, 7 (CCL 50, 321, 33/34).
[28] *Trin.* XII, 4, 4 (CCL 50, 358, 13/14).
[29] *Trin.* XII, 13, 22 (CCL 50, 375, 21).
[30] *Trin.* XIII, 20, 26 (CCL 50A, 418, 31/33): "saltem in aenigmate et per speculum contuendam exercitatiore in his inferioribus rebus mente ueniamus".
[31] *Trin.*, prol. (CCL 50, 25, 9/10).
[32] *Trin.* IX, 12, 18 (CCL 50, 310, 53/54).
[33] *Trin.* XV, 2, 2 (CCL 50A, 461, 19/20).
[34] *Trin.* XIV, 12, 15 (CCL 50A, 442,1/4).
[35] *Trin.* XII, 14, 23 (CCL 50, 376, 54/61): "Non autem solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum sine spatiis localibus manent intelligibiles incorporalesque rationes, uerum etiam motionum in temporibus transeuntium sine temporali transitu stant etiam ipsae utique intellegibiles, non sensibiles. Ad quas mentis acie peruenire paucorum est, et cum peruenitur quantum fieri potest non in eis manet ipse peruentor, sed ueluti acies ipsa reuerberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio".

> "Vt ergo ab huiusmodi falsitatibus humanus animus purgaretur, sancta scriptura paruulis congruens nullius generis rerum uerba uitauit ex quibus quasi gradatim ad diuina atque sublimia noster intellectus uelut nutritus assurgeret"[36].

So hat Gott im Alten Testament mit Hilfe von Erscheinungen zu den Vätern gesprochen. Im Neuen Testament jedoch wurde das Wort Gottes selbst Mensch. In *De Trinitate* finden wir nun zwei ausgezeichnete Passagen über die Rolle des Menschseins Jesu Christi für die *Visio Dei*, nämlich einmal im IV (aus dem Jahre 415) und XIII (418) Buch. Davor hat Augustinus mit dem Werk *C. Faust.* (400-404) die Menschwerdung des Logos gegen die Manichäer "erfolgreich" verteidigt und 397 mit der Schrift *Ad Simpl.* seine für die folgenden theologisch-pastoralen Arbeiten bestimmende Gnadenlehre ausformuliert, die im Grunde bis zu seinem Lebensende galt[37].

Dass Gott Mensch wurde, hat Augustinus lange Zeit Probleme bereitet. Denn bei den Manichäern lernte er den Glauben an den *Salvator spiritalis* kennen[38]. Darum kann es nach manichäischer Auffassung keine Inkarnation des Gottessohnes gegeben haben, da der Sohn Gottes sonst hätte wirklich sterben müssen. Dies würde als Konsequenz mit sich bringen, dass die Hoffnung auf die Rückführung in das Reich des Lichts mit dem Tod Jesu begraben worden wäre. Die platonische Philosophie hat den Bischof von Hippo zwar aus den Fängen des manichäischen Dualismus befreit. Jedoch konnte sie ihn nicht über die wahren Gründe der Menschwerdung Gottes belehren. Die Würdigung der Menschheit Jesu kommt bei Augustinus in dem Augenblick zur vollen Entfaltung, als ihm die Bedeutung der Gnade Gottes aufging. So hat Augustinus zum ersten Mal in der auch gegen die Manichäer gerichteten Schrift *Util. cred.* den Begriff *gratia* mit dem Genitivobjekt *Christi* verknüpft und zwar genau dort, wo er aus dem Brief an die *Galater* 3, 24 und 5, 4 zitierte und diese Verse so auslegte:

[36] *Trin.* I, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 28, 37/41).

[37] Siehe den Artikel T. G. RING, *Der Anfang des Glaubens: Verdienst oder Gnade?*, in diesem Band.

[38] F. DECRET, *La doctrine centrale du spiritalis salvator dans les sources manichéennes africaines*, in R. E. EMMERICK – W. SUNDERMANN – P. ZIEME (Hrsg.), *Studia Manichaica. IV. Internationaler Kongreß zum Manichäismus, Berlin, 14.-18. Juli 1997* (Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Sonderband 4), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000, pp. 138-153; vgl. auch E. ROSE, *Die manichäische Christologie* (Studies in Oriental Religions, Bd. 5), Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979; M. FRANZMANN, *Jesus in the Manichaen Writings – Work in Progress*, in R. E. EMMERICK – W. SUNDERMANN – P. ZIEME (Hrsg.), *Studia Manichaica*, pp. 220-246.

"a quibus gratia Christi cum liberat, non legem illam damnat, sed aliquando nos obtemperare suae caritati, non seruire timore legis inuitat"[39].

Die Gnade Christi ist also jene Liebe, die den Menschen dazu einlädt, das "gute" Gesetz nicht mehr aus Furcht, sondern, der Liebe Christi nachfolgend, es ebenfalls aus Liebe zu erfüllen. Hier hat der Bischof bereits das vorweggenommen, was er später auch in *Exp. Gal.* XLII (CSEL 84, 114, 12 – 116, 14) ausgeführt hat[40]. In der Auslegung von *Gal.* 5, 4: "*Euacuati estis a Christo, qui in lege iustificamini*" erklärte er, dass das Vertrauen auf die eigenen Werke nicht die Rechtfertigung bringt, sondern vielmehr den stolzen Menschen dadurch sogar aus der Gnade Christi herausfallen lässt. Ja, das Gesetz, das geistlich und deshalb gut ist, zeigt nur die Ohnmacht des fleischlichen Sünders an, da dieser nicht imstande ist, die Forderungen des Gesetzes zu erfüllen. Denn wäre der Mensch durch die Werke des Gesetzes gerechtfertigt, dann wäre nach *Gal.* 2, 21 der Tod Christi umsonst gewesen. Übrigens hat Augustinus diesen paulinischen Vers zum allerersten Male in seiner *Exp. Gal* XVII (CSEL 84, 75, 3/4) zitiert und kommentiert. In den antipelagianischen Schriften wurde *Gal.* 2, 21 häufiger als ein durchschlagendes Argument zur Verteidigung des unbedingten Vorrangs der Gnade[41] verwendet. Die Konsequenz dieses gnadenhaften Heilshandelns des inkarnierten Logos ist das Hervorrufen des Glaubens an denselben Christus. So verwundert es uns nicht, wenn Augustinus in den *Confessiones* den Prozess seiner Bekehrung eng mit der Suche nach dem Verständnis der Menschwerdung Jesu Christi verknüpfte. Denn die Bekenntnisse wurden kurz vor 400 verfasst, also unmittelbar in der Zeit, in der Augustinus die Schrift *Ad Simplicianum* (395-398)[42] beendet hatte. In der am 18. März 413[43] gehaltenen Predigt zum Johannes-

[39] Vgl. *Util. cred.* IX (CSEL 25/1, 12, 19/21).

[40] Zur theologischen Bedeutung dieser Schrift innerhalb des Gesamtwerks Augustins, siehe. T. G. RING, *ALG II*, pp. 32-43.

[41] Augustinus hat den Vers *Gal.* 2, 21 insgesamt 27mal zitiert. In den antipelagianischen Schriften kommt er 16mal vor.

[42] T. G. RING, *ALG III*, p. 26.

[43] Also kurz vor dem Verfassen des IV. Buch von *De Trinitate*, in dem die erlösende Rolle Christi ausführlich angesprochen wurde. Dass die pelagianische Kontroverse hier eine Rolle spielt, ist nicht mehr strittig; vgl. J. PLAGNIEUX, *"L'influence de la lutte antipélagienne sur le De Trinitate ou christocentrisme de saint Augustin"*, in *Augustinus Magister*, Paris, 1954, Bd. II, pp. 817-829; dazu. W. GEERLINGS, *Christus Exemplum. Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins* (TTS, 13), Mainz: Grünewald, 1978, p. 215; siehe auch V. H. DRECOLL, *Mens-notia-amor. Gnadenlehre und Trinitätslehre in De Trinitate IX und in De peccatorum meritis et remissione/De spiritu et littera*, in J. BRACHTENDORF (Hg.), *Gott und sein Bild. Augustins De Trinitate im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung*, Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 2000, pp. 137-153.

evangelium wird diese Verbindung von Gnade und Menschheit Jesu von Augustinus am deutlichsten zum Ausdruck gebracht:

> "Non erat ista in Veteri Testamento, quia lex minabatur, non opitulabatur; iubebat, non sanabat; languorem ostendebat, non auferebat; sed illi praeparabat medico uenturo cum gratia et ueritate; tamquam ad aliquem quem curare uult medicus, mittat primo seruum suum, ut ligatum illum inueniat. Sanus non erat, sanari nolebat, et ne sanaretur, sanum se esse iactabat. Missa lex est, ligauit eum; inuenit se reum, iam clamat de ligatura. Venit Dominus, curat amaris aliquantum et acribus medicamentis... prior passus est ut te consolaretur, tamquam dicens: Quod times pati pro te, prior patior pro te. Haec est gratia, et magna gratia. Quis illam digne collaudat?"[44]

In *De Trinitate* lässt Augustinus ebenfalls keinerlei Zweifel aufkommen, dass Gott für die Menschheit Mensch wurde[45]. Eine kleine Wiedergabe der von Augustinus niedergeschriebenen Passagen genügt zur Verdeutlichung:

> *"in carne autem natum et passum et resurrexisse et ascendisse non nisi filium"*[46], *"carnem viderunt et crucifixerunt"*[47], *"humana infirmitate ex qua crucifixus est"*[48], *"propter carnem susceptam mortalis est filius"*[49], *"indutus carne mortali"*[50], *"carnem factum"*[51], *"humanam animam et carnem mortalemque factum"*[52], *"in forma serui factus est homo"*[53], *"homo propter acceptum hominem"*[54], *filius hominis... suscepta humana natura"*[55], *"filius in carne apparens inter homines fecit"*[56], *"propter natiuitatem incarnationis eius"*[57].

Durch diese wahre Menschwerdung ist der *homo Christus Iesus* darum auch gleichzeitig der wahre *mediator dei et hominum*[58] (vgl. 1 Tim 2, 5), während die Manichäer nur an den *falsus mediator*

[44] *Tr. eu. Io.* III, 14 (CCL 36, 26, 1 – 27, 16).
[45] *Trin.* XII, 5, 5 (CCL 50, 359, 21/24).
[46] *Trin.* I, 5, 8 (CCL 50, 36, 8sq.).
[47] *Trin.* I, 6, 11 (CCL 50, 40, 58).
[48] *Trin.* I, 1, 3 (CCL 50, 30, 80).
[49] *Trin.* II, 9, 15 (CCl 50, 100, 21sq.).
[50] *Trin.* IV, 3, 6 (CCL 50, 167, 54sq.).
[51] *Trin* IV, 11, 31 (CCL 50, 203, 42).
[52] *Trin.* XIII, 10, 13 (CCL 50A, 399, 4).
[53] *Trin* I, 7, 14 (CCL 50, 46, 41).
[54] *Trin* I, 7, 14 (CCL 50, 46, 46).
[55] *Trin.* I, 8, 15 (CCl 50, 47, 21sq.).
[56] *Trin.* II, 1, 3 (CCL 50, 83, 41sq.).
[57] *Trin* I, 6, 9 (CCL 50, 38, 8sq.).
[58] Vgl. G. REMY, *Le Christ médiateur dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin*, 2 Bde., Lille-Paris, 1979.

festhielten, was ihnen allein zum Verderben gereichte; denn dieser hat die Menschen nur in den Tod geführt, obwohl er ihn nicht selbst erlitten hatte. Folglich konnte er auch nicht die Auferstehung des Leibes, wie Paulus sie lehrte, vermitteln. Für Augustinus hat der *homo Iesus* vor seinem Tod jedoch sich selbst sogar dem Teufel zur Versuchung angeboten, um dadurch die Versuchungen gänzlich zu überwinden.

Für unseren afrikanischen Theologen gibt es außerhalb der Menschwerdung des Gottessohnes keine geeignete *medicina* zur Rettung der menschlichen *infirmitas*. In der Tat, die *unitas personae* ist *illa summa gratia*, die jemals in der Zeit geschah und dem Menschen geschenkt wurde[59]. Der Hauptgrund seines Menschwerdens besteht darin, den Menschen am ewigen Leben teilnehmen zu lassen:

> "Eius enim uitae aeternae et nos participes facti pro modulo nostro immortales efficimur"[60].

In den Ereignissen, die Jesus Christus als Mensch für die Menschen erlitt, hat er diesen so viele Wohltaten erworben[61]. Darum ist der *homo Jesus Christus mediator uitae*[62], *rex humilis*[63], der den zweifachen Tod des Menschen an Seele und Leib mit seinem einfachen Tod bezahlte; sodann ist er *pignor gratuitus salutis*[64], *sacrificium*[65], *interioris sacramentum* und *exterioris exemplum*[66], *magister bonus*[67], *iudex*[68], *medicus* bzw. *medicina*[69], *uia caritatis* bzw. *via*

[59] *Trin.* XIII, 19, 24 (415, 26/27; 416, 32/33): "ineffabili gratiae largitate... In rebus per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est, quod homo in unitatem personae coniunctus est deo".

[60] *Trin.* I, 6, 10 (CCL 50, 39, 33/34); I, 7, 14 (CCL 50, 44, 5/6); IV, 18, 24 (CCL 50, 192,. 38/41).

[61] *Trin.* XIII, 16, 21 (CCL 50A, 410, 41): "de humanitate suscepta tantum beneficii colatum est hominibus"

[62] *Trin.* IV, 13, 17 (CCL 50, 182, 30).

[63] *Trin.* IV, 12, 15 (CCL 50, 180, 12).

[64] *Trin.* IV, proem., 1 (CCL 50, 159, 15).

[65] *Trin.* VI, 13, 19 (CCL 50, 186, 120).

[66] *Trin.* IV, 3, 6 (CCL 50, 167, 57).

[67] *Trin.* I, 13, 31 (CCL 50, 77, 149).

[68] *Trin.* I, 13, 30 (CCL 50, 73, 83): "iudex forma filii hominis apparebit".

[69] *Trin.* XIII, 10, 14 (CCL 50, 401, 51); IV, 12, 15 (CCL 50, 181, 33). Dazu R. ARBESMANN, *The concept of "Christus medicus" in St. Augustine*, in *Traditio* 10 (1954), pp. 1-28; R. SCHNEIDER, *Was hat uns Augustinus "theologia medicinalis" heute zu sagen?* in *Kerygma und Dogma* 3 (1957), pp. 307-315; P. C. J. EIJKENBOOM, *Het Christus-Medicusmotief in de preken van sint Augustinus*, Assen: Van Gorcum, 1960; M. HONECKER, *Christus medicus*, in *Kerygma und Dogma* 31 (1985), pp. 307-323; J. HÜBNER, *Christus medicus. Ein Symbol des Erlösungsgeschehens und ein Modell ärztlichen Handelns*, in *Kerygma und Dogma* 31 (1985), pp. 324-335.

temporalis per humilitatem[70]. Auffällig in *De Trin.* ist die Tatsache, dass Augustinus wichtige Begriffe wie *lac*, *panis*, *cibus*, *alimentum* oder *nutritus* nicht direkt auf die Rolle des Menschen Jesus Christus bezieht; *lac*[71] z. B. wird mit der Verkündigungsweise des Völkerapostels in Beziehung gesetzt. Auf diese Weise soll Christologisches mit der Ekklesiologie verbunden werden. Auch zählt Augustinus mitunter den Glauben, der die Menschen auf ihrer irdischen Pilgerreise ernährt, zu den *necessaria*, die den Geist reinigen[72]. Jedoch hängt die reinigende Kraft des Glaubens von der wahren Menschwerdung Jesu Christi ab. So ist der Glaube der Häretiker, vor allem aber der der Manichäer, welche die Menschwerdung ablehnen, in den Augen Augustins nur eine *fides ficta*. Im Gegensatz dazu ist die *fides catholica* aufgrund der Realität des Menschseins Jesu wahr. Durch die Menschheit Jesu Christi gewinnt der Glaube die Sicherheit[73], dass in Jesus Christus alle Menschen auferstehen werden, da Jesus Christus in seiner leiblichen Auferstehung den Seinen als erster vorausgegangen war. Nur in diesem Sinne kann Augustinus vom Verdienst des von Gott gegebenen Glaubens sprechen. Darum ist der katholische Glaube ein heilsamer Glaube[74]. Aus diesem Grund möchte Augustinus mit 1 *Kor* 2, 2 seinen Lesern empfehlen, sich nicht von der Gnade des gekreuzigten Christus zu entfernen: sie sollen sich die Hoffnung auf die endgültige Schau Gottes nicht nehmen lassen[75]. Denselben Gedanken hat Augustinus in *Io. tr. eu* I, 17 (CCL 36, 10, 23/25) unterstrichen:

> "De lacte nutriat, ut ad cibum perueniat. A Christo per carnem nato non recedat, donec perueniat ad Christum ab uno Patre natum".

Die treibende Kraft zum Glauben liegt also nicht beim Menschen, sondern beim *homo Christus Iesus* selbst. Er initiiert durch seine Existenz auf Erden den Glauben, der die ungerechten Menschen rechtfertigt.

Jedoch ist es nicht dasselbe zu wissen, was man glauben muss, um die Glückseligkeit zu erreichen, und zu wissen, was die Glaubens-

[70] *Trin.* I, 3, 5 (CCL 50, 32, 4); VII, 3, 5 (CCL 50, 253, 62).

[71] Vgl. 1 *Kor.* 3, 1 sq. Dazu *Trin.* I, 1, 3 (CCL 50, 30, 86). Die Milch wird hier auf die Rolle des Paulus bezogen, der zu den fleischlichen Kindern nicht wie zu den Geistigen reden konnte.

[72] *Trin.* I, 1, 3 (CCL 50, 30, 72/73).

[73] Augustinus versuchte sogar diese Sicherheit der Hoffnung durch eine mathematische Formel zu beweisen, vgl. *Trin.* IV, 4, 7 – 6, 10 (CCL 50, 169 – 175).

[74] *Trin.* I, 13, 31 (CCL 50, 79, 204): "sana doctrina"; *Trin.* II, 17, 29 (CCL 50, 119, 61): "fidei sanitate".

[75] *Trin.* I, 1, 3 (CCL 50, 30, 69/87).

inhalte sind, um Gott in rechter Gesinnung zu verehren[76]. Jenes betrifft die *scientia*, die nicht unbedingt schon zum glückseligen Leben führen muss; während dieses sich auf die *sapientia* bezieht, obwohl beide im Grunde nur die eine wahre *scientia* sind, da die Weisheit im Grunde nichts anderes ist als die Wissenschaft von den göttlichen und menschlichen Dingen. Beides ist also in Jesus Christus zusammengefasst, da er sowohl die *scientia* als auch die *sapientia* ist (Kol 2, 2-3). Deshalb gibt es auch nur einen Glauben an den Gottmenschen Jesus Christus. In diesem Kontext wird der *mens exercitatior* eine wichtige Funktion zuerkannt. Zum einen soll der Geist erkennen, dass die ganze Ordnung des Kosmos, dessen Teil der Mensch ist, letztlich auf Jesus Christus hinweist. Denn durch seine Menschwerdung hat er die Gerechtigkeit wiederhergestellt, wobei die Wiederherstellung der Gerechtigkeit gleichbedeutend mit der Wiederherstellung der Ordnung ist[77]. Dazu gehört aber auch die Selbsterkenntnis, d.h. das Wissen darum, dass der Mensch nicht dem dienen darf, was unter ihm ist, sondern allein dem, was über ihm ist. Die Selbsterkenntnis zeigt ihm die Ordnung der Natur als das Abbild der Dreieinigkeit, das auf Gott zurückgeht. So wird der Glaubensinhalt ihm einsichtig. Die Richtigkeit des Glaubens ist eine Voraussetzung zur Verehrung Gottes. Die *exercitatio mentis* geschieht also nur im Rahmen des vorgegebenen Glaubens. Nach Augustinus verheißt der Glaube allein die Unsterblichkeit, welche die wahre Seligkeit ausmacht[78]. Denn das Unglück besteht ja in der Angst vor dem Verlust der vergänglichen Dinge, wie sie im Angesicht des Todes am radikalsten in Erscheinung tritt. Damit der Glaube nicht irrt und in "phantasmata" ausartet, sucht der Geist nach der ewigen Erkenntnis. Darum gibt es für Augustinus kaum eine bessere Wissenschaft als die Wissenschaft, die sich der Erkenntnis des *homo-deus Jesus Christus* hingibt. Diese *scientia* zielt darauf, den Menschen in seiner enormen und oft nicht zu bändigenden Willenskraft zu disziplinieren, damit er einst Gott schauen kann.

Es bleiben noch folgende Fragen zu beantworten: Wird der Mensch in der Schau seinem Gott gleich? Wieweit hat der Mensch Kenntnis von der Wahrheit, welche zugleich die göttliche Dreieinigkeit selbst ist?

[76] *Trin.* XIV, 1, 3 (CCL 50A, 424, 63/66): "Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam uitam beatam quae non nisi aeterna est, aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum est et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur."

[77] *Trin.* XIII, 13, 17 (CCL 50A, 404, 12/13). Dazu J. Rief, *Der Ordobegriff des jungen Augustinus* (Abhandlungen zur Moraltheologie), Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 1962, pp. 216-235.

[78] *Trin.* XIII, 9, 12 (CCL 50A, 398, 52/55).

d) Die uisio dei

Ausdrücklich sagt Augustinus, dass die Weisheit, auf die die *exercitatio mentis* hinarbeitet, auch wenn es sich um eine *exercitatior* handelt, nicht die *sapientia dei* selbst ist; denn diese bleibt dem menschlichen Intellekt verborgen und kann allein vom Logos Gottes vollkommen geschaut werden. Es gibt also trotz der geistigen Fähigkeiten des Menschen einen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen der menschlichen und der göttlichen Substanz, die der Mensch nicht überbrücken kann. Selbst in der ewigen Schau wird der Mensch nicht Gott gleich sein, sondern nur Gott ähnlich.

Dem Bischof von Hippo geht es in seinem Werk "De trinitate" auch nicht darum, über die göttliche Weisheit zu debattieren, was einer "superbia" gleich käme; sondern vielmehr will er "de sapientia hominis" sprechen, da sie dem menschlichen Zustand angepasst ist. Diese ist nur deshalb möglich, weil die Weisheit Gottes selbst Menschengestalt angenommen hat. Diese aber erzieht zur Gottesfurcht, die zugleich positiv zur Gottesverehrung führt[79]. Nach der ewigen Wesenheit Gottes zu forschen, liegt nicht im Interesse Augustins, sondern sein primäres Ziel ist die Erforschung nach dem Ort des Glückes: "Noli ergo quaerere in aeternitatem qualitatem, sed felicitatem"[80]. Dass der Mensch trotz seiner Verfehlungen nicht a priori von der "originalis regio beatitudinis"[81] getrennt ist, haben wir bereits dargelegt. Die Gefährdung liegt vielmehr in der niederen Region des Geistes, die für den Umgang mit dem Zeitlichen bestimmt ist. Anthropologischer Ausgangspunkt Augustins ist also nicht der Intellekt bzw. der Wille, sondern das faktische Affiziertsein des Menschen von der Todesfurcht[82]. In der Gier und in der Angst des Kindes nach der Muttermilch, die es als Neider seines eigenen Milchbruders (conlactaneum) entlarvt[83], sieht Augustinus ein

[79] *Trin.* XIV, 1, 1 (CCL 50A, 421, 1/5): "Nunc de sapientia nobis est disserendum, non illa dei quae procul dubio deus est (nam sapientia dei filius eius unigenitus dicitur) sed loquemur de hominis sapientia, uera tamen quae secundum deum est et uerus ac praecipuus cultus eius est".

[80] *S.* CCLXI, 2 (PL 38, 1203).

[81] *Retr.* I, 1, 3 (CCL 57, 9, 79); *en. Ps.* LVIII, 1, 18 (CCL 39, 742, 11); *en. Ps.* LXXXV, 24 (CCL 39, 1196, 18).

[82] R. SCHNEIDER, *"theologia medicinalis"*, p. 308: "Bei Augustins Auffassung der Empfindungen, des Affiziertseins (in diesem Sinne der Affekte) muß der Horizont Leben – Tod gesehen werden. Die Frage Leben – Tod ist die erste. Wer sich in der Todesangst befindet, dessen Denken ist verwirrt und dessen Wollen ist planlos oder gelähmt... Und deshalb haben die Empfindungen den Vorrang vor dem Denken und Wollen. Denn in ihnen kommt die Betroffenheit meines Lebens im Horizont von Leben und Tod zum Ausdruck".

Beispiel dafür, wie der Mensch schon sehr bald von zeitlichen Affekten eingenommen wird. Diese können die exercitatio mentis für sich einnehmen und den Mensch tödlich verwunden. Der niedrige Teil des Geistes muss daher von diesem Gefühl des Todes affiniert und geheilt werden, damit er Rechtes denken und tun kann. Denn unser afrikanischer Kirchenmann ignoriert gewiss nicht, dass es bei den Menschen vielfältige Glücksvorstellungen existieren, obwohl alle das Glück wünschen. Die Entscheidung für eine bestimmte Meinung wird jeweils von der Stärke der Affekte determiniert. Diese heilende Funktion übernimmt der von Jesus Christus durch seine Menschwerdung und Auferstehung gestiftete Glaube:

> "fidem quoque de temporalibus rebus quas pro nobis aeternus fecit et passus est in homine quem temporaliter gessit atque ad aeterna peruexit ad eandem aeternorum adeptionem prodesse disserui"[84].

Jedoch führt der Glaube zu dem zurück, der die Menschen zum Glauben berufen hat:

> "Quaeram te, domine, inuocans te et inuocem te credens in te: praedicatus enim es nobis. Inuocat te, domine, fides mea, quam dedisti mihi, quam inspirasti mihi per humanitatem filii tui, per ministerium praedicatoris tui"[85].

Die Menschheit Jesu[86] erneuert und konsolidiert die Einheit bzw. die Harmonie zwischen den beiden Teilen des Geistes. Der Tod und die Auferstehung Jesu hat den Geist vom Zustand des Affiziertseins vom Tod befreit und ihn neu auferstehen lassen.

Die Heilsmöglichkeit, die dem Menschen über den höheren Teil des Geistes als Abbild Gottes schon immer gegeben ist, wird jetzt von dem niederen Teil des Geistes aktualisiert, weil er nun geheilt worden ist. Jetzt und hier sieht der Mensch durch die Hoffnung des Glaubens das zukünftige Heil im dreifaltigen Gott.

Jos. LAM CONG Quy OSA

[83] *Conf.* I, 1, 11 (CCL 27, 6, 19/22): "ita imbecillitas membrorum infantilium innocens est, non animus infantium. uidi ergo expertus sum telantem paruulum: nondum loquebatur et intuebatur pallidus amaro aspectus conlactaneum suum".

[84] *Trin.* XIV, 1, 3 (CCL 50A, 424, 73/77).

[85] *Conf.* I, 1 (CCL 27, 1, 14/17).

[86] Damit meine ich alle geschichtlichen Ereignisse im Leben, Sterben und Auferstehen Jesu.

POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES IN AUGUSTINE, LETTER 155 TO MACEDONIUS

One of the most persistent set of questions concerning Augustine's political thought involves the manner and extent to which he believes that a Christian ethics ought to influence political structures in the Roman Empire. Scholars examining this and related questions during the last century divide between those who find that Augustine does little or nothing to promote a specifically Christian political ethics, and those who find evidence for such a program in his writings, however limited in scope.[1] Scholars agree that Augustine did

[1] Among those scholars who dismiss the possibility of finding in Augustine a workable Christian political ethics is F. Dahn, *Die Könige der Germanen*, vol. 11, Leipzig, E.A. Fleischmann, 1908, p. 209, who accuses Augustine's doctrine of being "logically false, morally diseased, politically corrupt, and incompatible with one's duties to the state." T. Mommsen, *St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress: The Background of the* City of God, in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 12, 1951, pp. 346-374, at p. 370 = D.F. Donnelly (ed.), *The City of God. A Collection of Critcal Essays*, New York, Peter Lang, 1995, pp. 353-372, at p. 368, advances the view that "Augustine regarded the purely secular aspects of the drama of mankind as relatively insignificant" in comparison with the theological. J. Straub, *Augustins Sorge um die regeneratio imperii. Das Imperium Romanum als civitas terrena*, in *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 73, 1954, pp. 36-60, at p. 59, holds that, although in his later years Augustine allows for "little improvements which can be brought about by individual Christians within the secular state," he does not expect the Christian religion to alter the essentially fallen condition of social and political life in the earthly city. E. Fortin, *Political Idealism and Christianity in the Thought of St. Augustine*, Villanova, Villanova University Press, 1972 = ibid., in *Classical Christianity and the Political Order. Reflections on the Theologico-Political Problem*, ed. J.B. Benestad, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 31-63, at 47, concludes, "... there is, strictly speaking, for Augustine no such thing as a Christian polity. Christianity was never intended as a substitute for the political life. It transcends all regimes and is of necessity limited in its practical applications by the modalities of its existence in this world." These and similar views have been rehearsed by M. Ruokanen, *Theology of Social Life in Augustine's* De ciuitate Dei, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993, pp. 102, 108, 117, 158. Among scholars who regard Augustine's political ethics positively, G. Combès, *La doctrine politique de saint Augustin*, Paris, Plon, 1927, p. 112, concludes that, for Augustine, the Christian state exists where Christ rules interiorly in the souls of the head of state, the magistrates, and all the citizens. R. A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 166-178, finds a balance in Augustine through the concept of "eschatological hope," which does not permit "a politically sterile withdrawl" from society. Markus argues instead that hope results in a "critical" and "subversive" attitude on the part of the Christian toward political society, but also one that is "realistically constructive" toward it (p. 170). Such an attitude, for Markus, "draws the believer into participation in political life and into full membership of his society without tethering him to any ideology or final political vision" (p. 173). G. Lettieri, *Il senso della storia in Agostino d'Ippona. Il* saeculum *e la gloria*

not think Christians should avoid public office.[2] But they disagree over the extent to which he urged upon public officials a Christian ethic for governing the Empire.

As a contribution to this discussion, I suggest a fresh examination of Letter 155 to Macedonius, the imperial vicar of Africa (*uicarius Africae*) between AD 413-414.[3] I shall argue that this letter demonstrates an affinity in Augustine's political thought between two sets of virtues: the political virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice,[4] on the one hand, and the virtues of faith, hope, and love, on the other. Augustine maintains that faith, hope, and love transform the manner in which Christian statesmen practice the political virtues, so that they more closely resemble virtues as they will exist in the heavenly city. Furthermore, I shall demonstrate that Augustine's account of this transformation of political virtues parallels Neoplatonist explanations of the purification of the soul through a hierarchy of virtue, beginning with the political virtues. For Augustine, faith,

nel De Civitate Dei, Rome, Borla, 1988, pp. 198-199, maintains that although the idea in Augustine of a Christian empire in which each member of society is inspired by Christian values is intentionally utopian, nevertheless it suggests the possibility for Augustine of at least a partial penetration of Christian ideals in the political society of his time. J. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990, argues that "Augustine's philosophy of history appears more viable than that of either Hegel or Marx" (p. 389). For Milbank, Augustine's political ethics is to be found in his "deconstruction of antique political society," wherein "the code of a peaceful mode of existence has historically arisen as 'something else', an *altera civitas*, having no logical or causal connection with the city of violence" (ibid.). Lettieri, op. cit., pp. 198-204, and Ruokanen, op. cit., pp. 77-111, discuss other among the most influential studies concerning Augustine's evaluation of Christian political involvement.

[2] See, for example, C. Lepelley, *Ciuis, ciuitas*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, vol. 1, ed. C. Mayer, Basel, Schwabe, 1986-1994, cc. 942-947, at c. 956, citing *ep.* 138.15, *ciu.* 2.19.

[3] CSEL 44.430-447. On Macedonius in general, see J. R. Martindale, *The Prosopography of the Late Roman Empire*, vol. 2: *(A.D. 395-527)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 697 s.v. Macedonius 3; A. Mandouze, ed., *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire*, vol. 1: *Prosopographie de l'Afrique chrétienne (AD 303-533)*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1982, pp. 659-661 s.v. Macedonius 2. See also F. Morgenstern, *Die Briefpartner des Augustinus von Hippo. Prosopographische, sozial- und ideologie-geschichtliche Untersuchungen*, Bochum, Universitätsverlag N. Brockmeyer, 1993, pp. 107-8.

[4] Ambrose dubbed these the "cardinal" virtues (cf. *Expositio euangelii secundum Lucam* 5.49.62), but earlier philosophers hearkening back to Plato (cf. *Republic* IV. 430C) termed them "political" or "civic/civil" virtues. See, for example, Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.2: *politikē aretē*. Augustine referred to them as "*uirtutes ciuiles*", as at *ep.* 138.17 (CSEL 44.145). See also *Acad.* 3.37 (CCL 29.57), *c. Iul.* 4.26 (PL 44.751). The two designations are synonymous, but for the sake of clarity I shall refer to them as political virtues throughout this paper.

hope, and love draw the believer beyond the limited, temporal perspectives of the earthly city into a deeper knowledge and love of the true God, and therefore into the eternal reality of the heavenly city. He argues in Letter 155 that Macedonius's faith, hope, and love should alter the way he practices prudence and justice while fulfilling the duties of his office. Although the letter offers the clearest explanation of the relationship between the two sets of virtues to be found in Augustine's writings, it leaves much to be desired in its description of the full role of virtues in political ethics.[5] Nevertheless, it contains sufficient discussion of the topic to suggest that, in relating the two sets of virtues as he does, Augustine is thinking within a framework analogous to that of Neoplatonist philosophers, such as Porphyry. From Plotinus and Porphyry in the third century, to Proclus, Macrobius, and Marinus in the fifth century, Neoplatonist philosophers consciously set the political virtues in relationship to the purificatory virtues in urging the divinization of the philosopher. Among these Neoplatonist philosophers there is considerable divergence in describing how these levels of virtue relate to each other. However, one finds sufficient similarity between their approaches to outline a foundation for a general virtue theory. In this paper I shall set out a series of parallels linking Augustine's thinking about political virtues with that of Neoplatonists. These parallels enable us to understand better how Augustine believes Christian statesmen can incorporate the ethics that pertain to the heavenly city within their administration of the Roman Empire. Understood against the background of Neoplatonist writings on political virtues, Augustine's Letter 155 further suggests a clearer intention on his part to approach political ethics within a systematic framework than has hitherto been supposed by scholars.

Before proceeding, I should clarify that throughout this paper I use the term "earthly city" (*ciuitas terrena*) as a synonym for the Roman Empire in Augustine's time, in the sense that the empire is an organized political society. It is true that, for Augustine, the primary meaning of the term "earthly city" reaches beyond any particular

[5] C. Brittain, *Attention Deficit in Plotinus and Augustine: Psychological Problems in Christian and Platonist Theories of the Grades of Virtue*, in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 18, ed. J.J. Cleary and G.M. Gurtler, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 2003, pp. 223-263, at p. 248, holds that at Augustine, *sol.* 1.14 (AD 386), faith, hope, and charity can be seen to act as "cathartic virtues", in the sense in which the Neoplatonists used this term. I discuss this Neoplatonic category under the designation "purificatory virtues" below. However, I do not believe that the discussion of faith, hope, and charity at *sol.* 1.14 offers a clear example of Augustine's application of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the grades of virtue.

political entity, or even all of them taken together (*ciuitates terrenae*). In its strictest sense for him, the term "earthly city" refers to the city governed by the devil (*ciuitas diaboli*), in which no virtue can be found. According to this interpretation of the term, it is inconceivable in Augustine's view that a virtuous Christian could play any part in the governance of the "earthly city". Nevertheless, the term *ciuitas terrena* is also ambiguous for Augustine, because of his position that the city of God and the earthly city are mixed in the present time (*saeculum*), and that they will be separated only in the end-time.[6] Thus, Johannes van Oort points out that Augustine considered the Rome of his time an "earthly city," and that even earthly states ruled by Christian emperors with Christians as their citizens "are and remain earthly states" (*ciuitates terrenae*).[7] Augustine demonstrates this use of the term "earthly city" in a letter to the Roman imperial tribune and notary Flavius Marcellinus, written in AD 411/312.[8]

Augustine's Correspondence with Macedonius

As the imperial vicar for Africa, Macedonius was responsible for the administration of justice in the African civil diocese. He was a Catholic Christian and refers to Augustine as a spiritual father.[9] At sometime during Macedonius's two-year tenure in this post, Augustine wrote to him, presumably in order to request clemency on behalf of an individual facing the death penalty. In his initial reply, the vicar expressed puzzlement that bishops should consider intercessions of this kind a duty that pertains to religion (*ex religione*).[10] In his

[6] See, for example, *ciu.* 1.35, *en. Ps.* 61.8, 64.2.

[7] See J. van Oort, *Jerusalem and Babylon. A Study into Augustine's* City of God *and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1991, p. 130. See also pp. 151-163. For further discussion, see F.-J. Thonnard, *Le problème di l'État chrétien*, in *Œuvres di saint Augustin*, vol. 37: *La cité de Dieu. Livres XIX-XXII: Triomphe de la cité céleste*, ed. G. Bardy and G. Combès, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1960, pp. 748-752; and Lettieri, op. cit., pp. 201-204.

[8] See *ep.* 138.17 (CCL 44.144): "... custodientes tamen quandam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae ciuitati constituendae, augendae conseruandaeque sufficere."

[9] See *ep.* 154.1 (infra, n. 23).

[10] See *ep.* 153.1 (CSEL 44.396), citing *ep.* 152.2 (Macedonius to Augustine). Augustine's initial letter is not extant, but see *ep.* 152.1 (Macedonius to Augustine) (CSEL 44.393): "itaque sine mora quod, optabat, obtinuit. uerum quoniam extitit occasio, hoc ipsum, quantulumcumque est, quod admonitus indulsi, nolo sine mercede remanere." In a later letter, Macedonius again refers to the favor. See *ep.* 154.1 (Macedonius to Augustine) (CSEL 44.428): "Miro modo afficior sapientia tua et in illis, quae edidisti, et in his, quae interveniens pro sollicitis mittere non grauaris. [...]

response, Augustine makes a number of observations about the qualities that should characterize the piety (*pietas*) of the Christian statesman. In doing so, he indicates that the statesman's practice of the virtues necessary for good government should anticipate the fulfillment of virtue in the heavenly city.

He begins by asserting that, whereas God's mercy, blessedness, and justice are supreme, public officials are not sinless, and their virtue is not the same as God's. As a consequence, they ought to fear divine judgment, seek divine pardon, and not regard their decision to show mercy in imitation of Christ as a failure to perform a duty.[11] In asking Macedonius to accept this last point, Augustine seeks no small concession from the imperial governor, who fears that mercy can easily be mistaken for leniency, with the result that justice is compromised.[12] Augustine readily admits the difficulties involved for human beings in balancing the two virtues.[13] Furthermore, he recognizes two arguments in the scriptures regarding capital punishment. The first is indicated at Rom 13:3-5: "If you do evil, then fear him; for he does not wield a sword in vain. He is a minister of God and avenger of his anger on the wrongdoer." The passage in Romans containing this verse leads Augustine to acknowledge a theoretical justification in applying the death penalty. An alternative approach is indicated at Jn 8:7: "Let the one without sin cast the first stone."

proinde statim commendatis effectum desiderii tribui; nam sperandi uiam ante patefeceram." See also Possidius, *Vita Augustini* 20. Among the more recent scholarly writings on this correspondence are the studies by K. Raikas, *The State Juridical Dimension of the Office of a Bishop and Letter 153 of St Augustine to Vicarius Africae Macedonius*, in *Vescovi e pastori in epoca teodosiana*, Rome, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1997, pp. 683-94; P. Kaufman, *Augustine, Macedonius, and the Courts*, in *Augustinian Studies*, 34:1, 2003, pp. 67-82; and R. Dodaro, *Augustine of Hippo Between the Secular City and the City of God*, in *Augustinus Afer. Saint Augustin: africanité et universalité. Actes du colloque international Alger-Annaba, 1-7 avril 2001*, Fribourg, Éditions Universitaires Fribourg, 2003, pp. 287-305.

[11] See *ep.* 153.8 (CSEL 44.404-5): "igitur super peccatores tanta sit patientia, tanta misericordia dei, ut in hac temporali uita moribus emendatis non damnentur in aeternum, qui nullius, quae sibi praebeatur, expectat misericordiam, quoniam nemo est illo beatior, nemo potentior, nemo iustior, quales nos esse oportet homines erga homines, qui hanc uitam nostram quantacumque laude cumulemus, eam sine peccato esse non dicimus, quia, «si dixerimus, nos ipsos», sicut scriptum est, *decipimus et ueritas in nobis non est* (1 Jn 1:8). [...] tamen etiam ipsos criminum ultores atque in hoc officio non ira propria concitatos sed legum ministros nec suarum sed alienarum iniuriarum examinatarum uindices, quales iudices esse debent, terruit censura diuina, ut cogitarent sibi propter sua peccata dei misericordiam necessariam nec putarent ad culpam sui officii pertinere, si quid erga eos misericorditer agerent, quorum uitae necisque haberent legitimam potestatem."

[12] See *ep.* 152.2-3 (Macedonius to Augustine).

[13] See *ep.* 153.17-18.

The pericope in John's Gospel concerning the woman caught in adultery suggests to Augustine that only Christ can justly apply the death penalty.[14] Augustine frames his discussion of capital punishment with these two scriptural passages. They indicate for him the moral dilemma faced by the magistrate who desires to observe both justice and mercy in capital cases. He then indicates a resolution of the competing arguments without collapsing one into the other. Key to understanding his nuanced approach to the issue is the role that he assigns to John 8:3-11, the pericope of the woman caught in adultery, in resolving the tension within the scriptures between approval of capital punishment and general precepts espousing mercy and forgiveness of enemies.[15] Christian rulers may, indeed, cite scripture in support of their decision to impose the death penalty, Augustine concedes. He warns, however, that in doing so, they should bear in mind that the scribes and Pharisees who brought the adulteress to Christ for condemnation also believed that the scriptures supported imposition of the death penalty by public authorities.[16] Making this point enables Augustine to draw Macedonius's attention to Christ's function in clarifying the dispositions of the soul that are required in order to interpret biblical precepts correctly. He highlights the dialectic between two features of Christ's response as represented at Jn 8:3-11. He points out that, although they are unambiguous, the scriptural passages which the scribes and Pharisees have in mind commanding death by stoning for adulterers (cf. Dt 22:22-24; Lv 20:10) do not prevent Christ from showing mercy to the woman. At the same time, in doing so Christ cannot be said to contradict or abrogate the divine law.[17]

In Letter 155, Augustine leaves behind the specific concerns regarding capital punishment which he discussed in Letter 153, such as God's intention to reform and not destroy wrongdoers, the legitimacy of judicial clemency, and the responsibility of officials to deter serious crime and safeguard public order. Instead, in Letter 155 he explores the interior dispositions of the soul which seeks to draw closer to wisdom. He states that Macedonius should fix his attention

[14] Augustine cites Rom 13 at *ep.* 153.19; however, he anticipates the passage already at *ep.* 153.16. He introduces discussion of Jn 8:3-11 at *ep.* 153.9.

[15] See especially *ep.* 153.15-16.

[16] See *ep.* 153.9, where Augustine makes this point in a reference to the obligation of the judges at Jn 8:3-11 to "serve the Law." Both Dt 22:22-24 and Lv 20:10 oblige death by stoning as punishment for adultery.

[17] See *ep.* 153.9 (CSEL 44.405): "ita nec legem inprobauit, quae huius modi reas iussit occidi,...". See also, *s.* 13.4, *Io. eu. tr.* 33.5 (CCL 36.308): "Non dixit: Non lapidetur! ne contra legem dicere uideretur." The argument recurs at *en. Ps.* 50.8.

on the love of God that pertains to the heavenly city.[18] To do so, he should allow his understanding and practice of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice to be transformed by faith, hope, and love, because these latter virtues are directed toward the knowledge and love of God, in whom all virtues, including justice and mercy, find their true source and end (*finis*).

This last statement represents a synthesis of a number of arguments within the letter. First, Augustine stresses the importance of the virtue of hope in acquiring the eternal benefits (*bona aeterna*) which are possessed in the heavenly city. Hope, he maintains, sustains Christians in their endurance of the trials associated with this temporal life. It does so in conjunction with faith by teaching believers that the blessedness they seek for themselves cannot be found in this life, but must be longed for in the life to come, on the basis of trust in God's promises.[19] In general for Augustine, faith establishes the ground for hope, both of which are preparations for the love of God.[20] The relationship of hope to love is important to Augustine's general argument in this letter. He leads up to it by observing that in the past, philosophers have failed to find blessedness in this life, though they have searched for it.[21] Christ, on the other hand, has revealed that blessedness is attainable only after death, in the life to come. In the present life, trials must be borne joyfully in patient expectation of this blessedness. For Augustine, this is the significance of St Paul's counsel to "rejoice in hope and be patient in trials" (Rom 12:12).[22] He

[18] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.1 (CSEL 44.430): "... quod animum tuum caritate aeternitatis et ueritatis atque ipsius caritatis affectum diuinae illi caelestique rei publicae, cuius regnator est Christus et in qua sola semper beataque uiuendum est, si recte hic pieque uiuatur, agnosco inhiantem, uideo propinquantem eiusque potiundae amplector ardentem."

[19] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.4 (CSEL 44.434): "Hoc piorum praemium est, cuius adipiscendi spe uitam istam temporalem atque mortalem, non tam delectabiliter quam tolerabiliter ducimus, et mala eius tunc bono consilio et diuino munere fortiter ferimus, cum bonorum aeternorum fideli dei promissione et fideli nostra exspectatione gaudeamus." Note the expression "*fideli nostra exspectatione*" (= in our faithful hope) by which Augustine connects faith and hope.

[20] For further discussion of the relationship of faith to hope, see M. Jackson, *Faith, Hope and Charity and Prayer in St. Augustine*, in *Studia Patristica. Papers presented to the Tenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1987*, vol. 22, ed. E. A. Livingstone, Leuven, Peeters Press, 1989, pp. 265-270. Jackson observes that for Augustine, "faith is the ground of hope which is a preparation for loving communion with God" (p. 267, citing *trin.* 8.6).

[21] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.2-3.

[22] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.4 (CSEL 44.434): "ad hoc nos exhortatus apostolus Paulus ait: *spe gaudentes, in tribulatione patientes* (Rom 12:12). ad hanc spem exhortor per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum. hoc enim deus ipse magister...".

returns to this conclusion later in this letter when he insists that the Christian statesman must govern prudently and justly while recognizing what the virtue of hope teaches: that he not conceive of his primary aim to foster happiness in this earthly life as an end in itself. Were he to do so, the statesman would risk elevating the pursuit of temporal benefits, such as health, wealth, and liberty, above the pursuit of eternal benefits, such as blessedness and life in God, which transcend death. For Augustine, Christian morality requires the statesman to harmonize his desire for benefits in the earthly city with his longing for the benefits of the heavenly city. In situations where the two sets of goods are in conflict with each other, hope requires the statesman to choose the lasting benefits of the heavenly city. Hope, for Augustine, therefore redirects the aim of political virtues away from an exclusive concern with assuring benefits for the earthly city to the pursuit of the blessedness that belongs to the heavenly city. In this way, hope alters the statesman's conception of political virtues.

Augustine continues discussing the differences between virtues as they are conceived in the present life and the way they exist in the heavenly city. He takes as his first example the virtue of wisdom (*sapientia*). In his final letter to Augustine, Macedonius praised the bishop's wisdom as evidenced in the first three books of *City of God* and in the letter Augustine wrote to him concerning capital punishment (Letter 153).[23] In response, Augustine makes three points relative to his own wisdom. First, he says that he fails to recognize in himself the wisdom that Macedonius finds in him.[24] He adds that wisdom in this present life "consists in the true worship of the true God," which he identifies as the virtue of piety (*pietas*), whereas wisdom in the life to come is identical to eternal blessedness. In the present life, the practice of wisdom as piety is a task to be performed, whereas in the life to come the soul enjoys wisdom exclusively as a benefit. Finally, Augustine insists that any wisdom he may actually possess is a direct result of divine grace, and not the product of his

[23] See *ep.* 154.1 (Macedonius to Augustine) (CSEL 44.428): "Miro modo afficio sapientia tua, et in illis quae edidisti, et in his quae interueniens pro sollicitis mittere non grauaris. Nam et illa tantum habent acuminis, scientiae, sanctitatis, ut nihil supra sit; et haec tantum uerecundiae, ut nisi faciam quod mandas, culpam penes me remanere, non in negotio esse diiudicem, domine merito uenerabilis, et uere suspiciende pater."

[24] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.1 (CSEL 44.431): "Quamuis sapientiam quam mihi tribuis, in me non agnoscam..."; *ep.* 155.5 (CSEL 44.435): "hinc enim ausus sum haec ad te loqui, ut tibi sapientiam, non qualis mihi sit, ostentarem, sed qualis esse debeat ostenderem."

own efforts or merit.[25] He says that he "hopes in faith" (*fideliter sperare*) that God will bring his wisdom to full maturity.[26]

This last point recalls the fundamental connection in Augustine's thought between the virtues of faith, hope, and love, on the one hand, and humility, on the other. Humility is that quintessentially Augustinian virtue, which by countering moral presumption in the soul, enables divine grace to impart true virtue to it. To demonstrate that the path to "true virtue" (*uera uirtus*) encompasses faith, hope, and love, Augustine pairs Ps 17(18):1 ("I will *love* you, Lord, my virtue") with Ps 39(40):5 ("Blessed is the man whose *hope* is in the name of the Lord..."), and states that believers should "hold these words *faithfully* in [their] hearts." Christians who seek true virtue have God as the object of their faith, hope, and love, and they pray to God to increase these virtues in them.[27] Augustine insists that true virtue inheres in human reason only if God is present to it as a light to the mind. Trust placed in oneself is, therefore, folly.[28] Finally, he claims that what holds true for an individual holds true as well for a nation. Quoting from Ps 143(144), he stresses the psalmist's (and the Holy Spirit's) judgment that only the "sons of foreigners" (*filii alienorum*) think of Israel as blessed on account of its material prosperity and security, its storehouses full of grain, its fatted cattle, its public order. Israel, in the psalmist's view, knows instead that "that nation is blessed whose God is the Lord."[29]

[25] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.5 (CSEL 44.435-6): "haec est autem in praesenti saeculo uerus ueri dei cultus, ut sit eius in futuro saeculo certus atque integer fructus. hic constantissima pietas, ibi sempiterna felicitas. ex ista sapientia, quae una uera est, si quid habeo, a deo sumpsi, non a me praesumpsi;...".

[26] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.5 (CSEL 44.436): "ex ista sapientia, quae una uera est, si quid habeo, a deo sumpsi, non a me praesumpsi; atque ab illo in me perfici fideliter spero, a quo inchoatum esse humiliter gaudeo; nec in eo quod adhuc non donauit incredulus, nec in eo quod iam donauit ingratus. non enim meo uel ingenio uel merito, sed eius dono sum, si quid laudabiliter sum. nam quaedam acutissima et excellentissima ingenia tanto in mairores errores ierunt, quanto praefidentius tamquam suis uiribus cucurruerunt, nec suppliciter ac ueraciter deum, ut sibi uiam ostenderet, petiuerunt."

[27] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.6 (CSEL 44.436): "Si ergo nos uirtus uera delectat, ei dicamus, quod in eius sacris litteris legimus: *diligam te, domine, uirtus mea* (Ps 17[18]:1); et si uere beati esse uolumus – quod nolle non possumus –, id quod in eisdem litteris didicimus, fido corde teneamus: *beatus uir cuius est nomen domini spex eius, et non respexit in uanitates et insanias mendaces* (Ps 39 [40]: 4 LXX). On the importance for Augustine of prayer in fostering faith, hope, and love, see Jackson, op. cit.

[28] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.6 (CSEL 44.436-7): "quanta est uanitas, quanta insania, quantumque mendacium, hominem mortalem... in seipso fidere ut beatus sit, quando ne illud quidem, quod habet in naturae suae dignitate praecipuum, id est mentem atque rationem, potest uindicare ab erroribus, nisi deus adsit lux mentium."

[29] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.7 (CSEL 44.437-8), quoting Ps 143(144):11-15.

In Augustine's view, without the transformation of the political virtues through faith, hope, and especially love, the statesman would pursue a form of peace and prosperity devoid of the love of God as the supreme good. As hinted at in his earlier discussion of hope, he holds that statesmen corrupt their political virtues when they understand the aims of these virtues within the limited, temporal horizon of this present life, without considering the end to which virtues are directed in the heavenly city.[30] He illustrates this point by comparing political virtues as they are understood before and after their transformation by faith, hope, and love.

For Augustine, considered without the changed perspective provided by faith, hope, and love, prudence is the virtue that guides the statesman in reflecting on human affairs, fortitude enables him to overcome fear of his enemies, temperance leads him to avoid corruption, and justice allows him to render to each his or her due. These are the political virtues classically defined, as they are known from Plato onward.[31] Augustine then reasons that in the heavenly city these same four virtues are not conceived in terms of struggles against any evils, as they are in the present life. Thus, in the heavenly city prudence will no longer be obliged to judge between good and bad, because evil will not exist; fortitude will no longer need to endure troubles bravely, because worldly difficulties will not exist; temperance will not ward off passions, because passions will not exist; and justice will not require that wealth be used to assist the poor, because poverty and material need will not

[30] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.10 (CSEL 44.440): "itaque si omnis prudentia tua, qua consulere conaris rebus humanis; si omnis fortitudo, qua nullius iniquitate aduersante terreris, si omnis temperantia, qua in tanta labe nequissimae consuetudinis hominum te a corruptionibus abstines, si omnis iustitia, qua recte iudicando sua cuique distribuis, id laborat, id nititur, ut hi quibus uis ut bene sit, salui sint corpore, et ab omni cuiusquam improbitate tuti atque pacati, habeant filios sicut nouellas constabilitas, filias ornatas sicut similitudinem templi, cellaria plena eructantia ex hoc in hoc, fecundas oues, crassas boues, nec maceriae ruina deformet praedium, nec litigantium clamor personet in plateis eorum (cf. Ps 143[144]:12-15); ita non erunt uerae uirtutes tuae, sicut nec istorum beatitudo."

[31] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.10 (supra, n. 30). See Plato, *Republic* IV. 427E-434D. These conventional definitions of the political virtues can also be found in Stoic authors. See, for example, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim (Stuttgart, 1968), 1:49-50 (n. 200-201), 3:63-72 (n. 262-294). Cicero's discussion of the virtues in terms of a practical ethics useful for governing is an important source for Augustine. See Cicero, *De inuentione* 2.159-167, *De officiis*, Book 1. Still useful as a guide to this discussion is H. F. North, *Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature*, in *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan*, ed. L. Wallach, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 165-183.

exist.[32] As a consequence, he reasons that only one virtue exists in the heavenly city, namely adherence to God, as Psalm 72(73) affirms, "For me it is good to cling to God." Augustine says that this virtue is also called wisdom (*sapientia*), and that it is identical with its reward, which is blessedness (*beatitudo*).[33] But he adds that this virtue can also be identified with prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. At this point he indicates how these virtues exist in the heavenly city. He explains that the soul in heaven acts prudently when it clings to God as the good which it can never lose; it acts with fortitude because it clings tenaciously to this good and will not be torn from it; it acts temperately in that it clings to this good in a pure manner, because it can no longer be corrupted; and it acts justly because it is right for it to cling to this good, to which it is deservedly subordinate.[34]

After outlining what the political virtues look like in the heavenly city and noting how they differ from the same virtues conventionally conceived, Augustine proposes that, in the present life, believers ought to aim at practicing these virtues as they exist in the heavenly city. Approached in this way, he says, prudence in this life will consist in choosing to love God, whom we ought to love; fortitude will allow no hardship to deter us from that love; temperance will allow no temptation to distract us from it; and justice will prevent pride from keeping us from it.[35] He repeats these revised definitions of

[32] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.12 (CSEL 44.442): "... ubi iam nec prudenter discernantur a bonis mala, quae non erunt; nec fortiter tolerentur aduersa, quia non ibi erit nis quod amemus, non etiam quod toleremus; nec temperanter libido frenetur, ubi nulla eius incitamenta sentiemus; nec iuste subueniatur ope indigentibus, ubi inopem atque indignum non habebimus."

[33] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.12 (CSEL 44.442): "una ibi uirtus erit, et idipsum erit uirtus praemiumque uirtutis, quod dicit in sanctis eloquiis homo qui hoc amat: *mihi autem adhaerere deo bonum est* (Ps 72[73]:28). haec ibi erit plena et sempiterna sapientia, eademque ueraciter uita iam beata: peruentio quippe est ad aeternum ac summum bonum, cui adhaerere in aeternum est finis nostri boni."

[34] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.12 (CSEL 44.442): "dicatur haec et prudentia, quia prospectissime adhaerebit bono quod non amittatur; et fortitudo, quia firmissime adhaerebit bono unde non auellatur; et temperantia, quia castissime adhaerebit bono ubi non corrumpatur; et iustitia, quia rectissime adhaerebit bono cui merito subiciatur."

[35] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.13 (CSEL 44.443): "quamquam et in hac uita, uirtus non est nisi diligere, quod diligendum est; id eligere, prudentia est, nullius inde auerti molestiis fortitudo est, nullis inlecebris, temperantia est, nulla superbia iustitia est. quid autem eligamus quod praecipue diligamus, nisi quo nihil melius inuenimus. hoc deus est, cui si diligendo aliquid uel praeponimus, uel aequamus, nos ipsos diligere nescimus. tanto enim nobis melius est, quanto magis in illum imus, quo nihil melius est." Compare this passage with a parallel one at *trin.* 14.12.

the political virtues later in the letter, saying that when anyone upon sober reflection chooses to love God, he is prudent; when he does not allow hardships to deter him, he acts with fortitude; when he does not allow pleasures to deflect him, he is temperate; and when he prevents self-importance from deterring him from loving God, he is just.[36] In both cases, Augustine redefines the political virtues as they should be practiced on earth in a manner consistent with their perfections in the heavenly city. Clearly for him, the virtues as practiced in the heavenly city provide models for how they should be observed in the present life. In order to practice these virtues in this way, however, the statesman must become aware of the difference between the virtues as they are traditionally understood, and the way they are redefined based upon their model forms in the heavenly city.

Augustine suggests that faith, hope, and love, considered collectively under the heading "true piety" (*uera pietas*), provide the means for the statesman to do this. In his view, the Christian statesman's primary objective in governing piously should be to assist his subjects to love God as completely as possible. This fundamental aim should guide all of his endeavors to advance even the temporal welfare of his subjects, whether he seeks to assist those in material need or to discipline those who undermine public security.[37] By objecting to the conventional definitions of political virtues, Augustine does not imply that statesmen should neglect the pursuit of temporal benefits for his subjects. Instead, he proposes that once they understand the aims of these virtues as they are found in the heavenly city, their

[36] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.16 (CSEL 44.446): "hoc qui sobria discretione eligit, prudens est; qui nulla hinc afflictione auertitur, fortis est, qui nulla alia delectatione, temperans est, qui nulla elatione, iustus est."

[37] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.12 (CSEL 44.441-2): "si enim uirtutes quas accepisti, a quo acceperis sentiens, eique gratias agens, eas ad ipsius cultum etiam in tuis istis saecularibus honoribus conferas, tuaeque potestati subditos homines ad eum colendum exemplo tuae religiosae uitae, et ipso studio consulendi, seu fouendo seu terrendo erigas et adducas, nihilque aliud in eo quod per te securius uiuunt, uelis, nisi ut hinc illum promereantur, apud quem beate uiuent; et uerae illae uirtutes erunt...". See also C. Mayer, "Pietas" *und* "vera pietas quae caritas est". *Zwei Kernfragen der Auseinandersetzung Augustins mit der heidnischen Antike*, in *Augustiniana Traiectina. Communications présentées au Colloque International d'Utrecht 13-14 novembre 1986*, ed. J. den Boeft and J. van Oort, Paris, Études augustiniennes, 1987, pp. 119-136, at p. 126, who explains the significance for Augustine of the adjective "uera" in relation to "pietas": "Nun hat das Adjektiv uerus, -a, -um" wie Übrigens auch das dazugehörige Substantiv "ueritas" im augustinischen Sprachgebrauch einen sozusagen über die Tagesereignisse hinausrangenden Gehalt. "Veritas" ist letzlich Gott und alles, was zu seinem Wesen gehört. Darum kommt auch die Beifügung "uerus, -a, -um" streng genommen nur Gott und dem zu, was zu Gott gehört bzw. was mit ihm zu tun hat."

expectations about the substance of the benefits which they should promote in the present age undergoes change. Thus, for example, when the statesman conceives of the virtue of peace in temporal terms, he thinks of its end as freedom from suffering. But when he conceives of it in terms of the heavenly city, he thinks of its aim as a life of blessedness in God.[38]

He also insists that by loving God in this manner, the statesman fulfills the divine commandment to love his neighbor as himself (cf. Mt 22:37-40, Mk 12:30-1, Lk 10:27, Dt 6:5, Lv 19:18). By loving God, the statesman also loves himself, because he can choose no greater good for himself than God. Moreover, the statesman's love of God obliges him to assist his subjects in loving God. Thus, by loving God properly he also loves his neighbor, because he can seek no greater good for his neighbor than God. The statesman's proper love of God therefore extends both to love of self and neighbor: the three loves are united in the love of God. Finally, Augustine emphasizes that the commandment to love one's neighbor obliges the statesman to love all human beings without discrimination.[39]

Augustine does not draw from these conclusions a more specifically Christian political program or ethics for Macedonius. He does not return to the question of capital punishment which dominates this exchange of letters with the vicar. Yet if Letter 155 is read against the backdrop of Letter 153, the conclusions which Augustine reaches can be seen as relevant to the discussion of capital punishment in the earlier letter, as well as to other ethical questions related to the imperial vicar's office. Augustine's core argument in Letter 155 is that Macedonius's Christian piety, his faith, hope, and love of God, requires him to alter the way he conceives and practices political virtues from the

[38] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.10 (CSEL 44.440-441): "si quaelibet, inquam, administratio tua, illis quas commemoraui instructa uirtutibus, hoc intentionis fine determinantur, ut homines secundum carnem nullas iniquas molestias patiantur; nec ad te existimas pertinere, quo istam quietem, quam praestare niteris, referant, id est (ut uerbis non ambiam) quomodo deum uerum, ubi est quietae uitae omnis fructus, colant, nihil tibi prodest ad uitam uere beatam tantus labor."

[39] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.14 (CSEL 44.444): "ad illum ergo quanta opera possumus, etiam illi ut perueniant agamus, quos tamquam nosmetipsos diligimus, si nosmetipsos diligere, illum diligendo iam nouimus. Christus namque, id est ueritas, dicit in duobus praeceptis totam legem prophetasque pendere, ut diligamus deum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, et diligamus proximos tamquam nosmetipsos (cf. Mt 22:37-40, Mk 12:30-1, Lk 10:27, Dt 6:5, Lv 19:18). proximus sane hoc loco, non sanguinis propinquitate, sed rationis soceitate pensandus est, in qua socii sunt omnes homines." For further treatment of the relationship between love of God and love of neighbor in Augustine's thought, see T. van Bavel, *The Double Face of Love in Augustine*, in *Augustinian Studies*, 17, 1986, pp. 169-181.

manner in which these virtues are conventionally understood. Prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice must now be understood as aspects of love, Augustine argues.[40] Justice in its classical sense is defined as 'rendering to each his due', an understanding which is close in Roman jurisprudence to establishing and maintaining an equity between parties.[41] If this definition of justice is transformed by Christian piety into an aspect of the love of God, Augustine implies, then the statesman who seeks to punish justly would seek to do so in a manner that conforms, as far as possible, to this love. As we have seen in this letter, however, love of God implies for Augustine a specific form of love of self and neighbor. His comments at the close of Letter 155 urge the statesman to love his neighbor in a way that promotes in the neighbor a deeper love of God. Much of Augustine's discussion in Letter 153 about the preference that magistrates should give to reforming wrongdoers rather than destroying them can be seen as adhering to this principle of neighbor-love in Letter 155. At the same time, Letter 155 draws the earlier discussion in Letter 153 into a broader context, one with deeper implications for the virtuous rule of Christian statesmen than the specific context of capital punishment allows in Letter 153. Augustine's discussion in Letter 155 of the transformation of political virtues though faith, hope, and love opens up for consideration a wider horizon of ethical issues pertaining to government. One example of the possibilities implicit in this discussion can be found in Augustine's brief reference in the letter to the virtue of peace, mentioned above.

[40] It should be noted that Augustine first makes this point in AD 388 at *mor.* 1.25 (CSEL 90.29-30): "namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur uirtus, ex ipsius amoris uario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur. itaque illas quatuor uirtutes, quarum utinam ita in mentibus uis ut nomina in ore sunt omnium, sic etiam definire non dubitem, ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato seruiens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuuatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. sed hunc amorem non cuiuslibet sed dei esse diximus, id est summi boni, summae sapientiae summaeque concordiae. quare definire etiam sic licet, ut temperantiam dicamus esse amorem deo sese integrum incorruptumque seruantem, fortitudinem amorem omnia propter deum facile perferentem, iustitiam amorem deo tantum seruientem et ob hoc bene imperantem ceteris quae homini subiecta sunt, prudentiam amorem bene discernentem ea quibus adiuuetur in deum ab his quibus impediri potest."

[41] For the concept of justice as the habit of the soul or the virtue whereby one "gives to each his or her due," see Plato, *Republic* IV. 427E-434D; Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1129A; 1130A; *Rhetoric* 1366B9; Cicero, *De inuentione* 2.160; *De finibus bonorum et malorum* 5.65, as well as Roman legal codes as at *Digesta* 1.1 [Ulpian] = Justinian, *Institutiones* 1.1. The same concept is found in Augustine at *ord.* 1.19; ibid. 2.22; *diu. qu.* 2; ibid. 31.1; *lib. arb.*1.27; *en. Ps.* 83.11; *ciu.* 19.4; ibid. 19.21.

There is something striking about the personal context of Augustine's discussion of virtue and government in this last of his letters to Macedonius. As noted, Augustine does not attempt here to draw out specific ethical conclusions for the imperial vicar, but instead to indicate to him a mode of religious life based in the practice of faith, hope, and love through which his practice of the political virtues in the exercise of his public office will be gradually perfected. Augustine's careful avoidance in Letter 153 of an outright moral condemnation of capital punishment allows him to pose to Macedonius the more difficult obligation to examine the morality of the penalty for himself, in the light of the reformed conceptions of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice which arise from their transformation in his soul through true piety. Augustine argues in Letter 155 that as a result of original sin, the Christian statesman's rule while on his earthly pilgrimage will never be perfectly virtuous. As a consequence, he will never completely overcome the difficulties in harmonizing justice and mercy, as when he is faced with the need to punish criminals. Nevertheless, Augustine is confident that as long as the statesman's attempt to govern with true piety leads him to understand the aims of political virtues in harmony with the love of God, and provided that he receives with humility the grace that Christ bestows on him in this endeavor, his prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice will gradually converge in the love of God.

As much as it is possible in Letter 155 to detect a political ethics at work in Augustine's thought, a more systematic foundation for this ethics appears in the letter when it is read against the background of the transformation of the political virtues as this is discussed by Neoplatonist writers. In the next two sections of this paper, we shall examine this question as it is treated by Neoplatonist philosophers in the third century, and again in the fifth and sixth centuries.

Political and Purificatory Virtues in Early Neoplatonist Philosophers

In discussing the role of the political virtues and their transformation as a result of the soul's purification, Plotinus draws explicitly from Plato. In his treatise "On Virtues" at *Ennead* 1.2, Plotinus takes as the starting point for his discussion a passage from *Theaetetus* (176A-B) in which Plato implies that evil is located in the material world, and that to escape it the soul must flee the body and the sensate

world and become similar to God. Plotinus reports Plato as suggesting that human beings are able to do this by cultivating virtues such as prudence (*phronēsis*), which make them just (*dikaioi*) and pius (*hosioi*). Plotinus thus understands Plato as teaching that the soul is drawn by virtues to the good, and that this movement implies "assimilation to God".[42] In Plotinus's view, virtues assist in this spiritual process following the soul's purification (*katharsis*) from the body and the material world (in which evil exists as a privation of the good).

Plotinus's approach to virtue involves a hierarchy comprising "lower" and "higher" virtues. He calls the political virtues as found in Plato, *Republic* IV. 427 E – 443B (prudence, fortitude, temperance, justice) "lower" virtues because, as the designation "political" implies, they involve the soul with community life in the earthly city (*polis*), and this involvement implies an association between them and the body.[43] However, despite the inferior position to which Plotinus assigns the political virtues relative to higher virtues, he recognizes their utility in diminishing the disorder in temporal life caused by an excess of human passions and desires, when the soul fails to impose appropriate limits and measures on them.[44] To the degree that political virtues regulate the soul's desires and lead it to prefer the truth to false opinions, they can be said to mark the beginning of the soul's assimilation to God. Yet, Plotinus concludes, moral and spiritual perfection cannot be achieved by the soul unless it transcends the body and the passions which its attachment to the body causes within the soul. To do this the soul requires the higher virtues (*meizones aretai*), also called "purifications" (*katharseis*), which purify the soul of the evil that adheres to it as a consequence of its relationship to the body.[45]

[42] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.1, along with the explanation by G. Catapano, *Epékeina tês philosophías. L'eticità del filosofare in Plotino*, Padua, CLEOP, 1995, 49-51.

[43] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.1. Plato's discussion of the four virtues at *Republic* IV. 427E-434D provides the background for Plotinus's treatment of the political virtues.

[44] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.2. At *Ennead* 2.9.15, Plotinus criticizes the Gnostics for rejecting the necessity of justice and temperance in the pursuit of moral perfection. For discussion, see Catapano, op. cit., 53 and n. 31. See also J. Dillon, *Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the Grades of Virtue*, in *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie*, ed. H.-D. Blume and F. Mann, Münster, Aschendorfesche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983, pp. 92-105.

[45] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.3. Plotinus attributes to Plato the view that there are two kinds of virtues, political and purificatory, and that the former cannot assimilate the soul to God. But this position cannot be found in Plato's writings. See Catapano, op. cit., p. 54, who examines Plotinus's statement in relation to Plato, *Phaedo* 82A-B and *Republic* VII. 518D-E. A. Armstrong (ed.), *Plotinus I. Porphyry on the Life of*

Plotinus does not name the higher virtues in terms different from the lower, political virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, but instead he indirectly indicates a continuity, in name at least, between these four virtues before and after the soul's purification. He seems to suggest that as a result of this purification, the virtues change their focus from the lower realm of the soul-body composite to the higher realm of intellectual reality.[46] Thus, he states that following the soul's purification, prudence consists in thinking about intellectual reality without the influence of opinions introduced to the mind through its association with the body. Similarly, temperance after the soul's purification represents its freedom from emotions associated with the body; fortitude its freedom from fear of abandoning the body; and justice the uncontested dominion of reason and intellect.[47] Plotinus insists, however, that although the soul in this purified state becomes God-like, virtues pertain to the human soul, not to the intellect (*nous*) or the One.[48] He then offers a second set of explanations for the higher virtues, one that follows from the principle that as the soul becomes more contemplative following its purification, the higher virtues focus on their exemplars (*paradeigmata*) in the second hypostasis, the Intellect. He explains that wisdom or prudence[49] thus consists in the soul's contemplation of the realities which the Intellect possesses through immediate contact; justice consists in the soul's activity in directing itself toward the Intellect; temperance in the soul's inward turning toward the Intellect; and fortitude in its freedom from affections.[50] Finally, Plotinus offers a third way to conceive the higher virtues – as analogues to four different attributes of the Intellect. Thus, wisdom is likened to the Intellect's intuitive

Plotinus and the Order of His Books, Enneads 1.1-9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 135 n. 2, notes that at *Republic* IV. 430C, Plato uses the epithet "civic" in relation to virtues, and that at *Phaedo* 69BC he calls virtues "purifications", but without any of the implications drawn by Plotinus in this passage. On the relationship between virtues in Plato and Plotinus, see J. Rist, *Eros and Psyche. Studies in Plato, Plotinus and Origen*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964, pp. 169-191.

[46] Catapano, op. cit., pp. 187-189, likens the purificatory virtues in Plotinus's thought to the virtues characteristic of the philosopher. In this sense, the purificatory virtues resemble prudence (*phronēsis*) or wisdom (*sophia*), which, as philosophical virtues, according to Plotinus, draw the philosopher's soul into the perfect understanding of of eternal realities.

[47] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.3. See also *Ennead* 5.1.10.

[48] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.3.

[49] Wisdom (*sophia*) and prudence (*phronēsis*) are interchangeable terms for Plotinus. See *Ennead* 1.2.6.

[50] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.6.

thought; temperance to its self-concentration; justice (here designated *oikeopragia*) to its characteristic activity; and fortitude to its immateriality and the condition by which it abides pure by itself. In this way, Plotinus argues, the higher virtues imply one another reciprocally, so that it is impossible to conceive of one of them as not implying the others.[51] Moreover, he reasons that the higher virtues are in some way derived from their corresponding exemplars in the Intellect.[52] Scholars have noted that the three descriptions which Plotinus offers for the virtues – the lower (political) virtues as corresponding to the soul-body relationship, the higher virtues considered in relation to the soul alone, and the higher virtues considered in relation to the Intellect – imply a mimetic relationship between each of the three levels, in descending order from the virtues in the Intellect, to virtues in the soul, to virtues in the soul-body composite.[53] According to this interpretation of Plotinus, the lower virtues are weaker imitations of virtues as they exist in the contemplative life of the soul following its purification from association with the body. These "purificatory" virtues, in turn, are weaker imitations of the virtues which characterize pure thought itself.[54] In Plotinus's view, the person who seeks happiness (*eudaimonia*) must progress gradually from the lower to the higher virtues. He may continue to possess the lower virtues while he cultivates the higher virtues; however, if he practices the political virtues but does not possess higher virtues, none of his lower virtues can be perfected.[55] Recognizing that, owing to the soul's continued association with the body, it is impossible even for an individual who cultivates the higher virtues in the contemplative life to rid his soul completely of passions, Plotinus nevertheless asks why the higher virtues in such a person do not simply make the lower virtues redundant. In other words, why would a person who seeks happiness merely limit his reaction to his emotions by exercising his lower virtues, rather than banish these emotions completely from his soul by exercising the higher virtues? Plotinus clearly indicates his preference for the latter approach, because it implies a decision to leave behind the life of the "good man" who practices political virtues, and to choose the life of the gods (*bios tōn theōn*).[56]

[51] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.7. I follow the translation of Armstrong, op. cit., p. 145.

[52] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.6, and the explanation by Catapano, op. cit., p. 60.

[53] So Catapano, op. cit., p. 60, citing W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia. Die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen*, Würzburg, Triltsch Verlag, 1959, pp. 150-155.

[54] See Catapano, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

[55] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.7.

[56] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.7. Cf. ibid., 1.2.5.

In Chapter 32 of his *Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*, Porphyry attempts to systematize his teacher Plotinus's discussion at *Ennead* 1.2 of the gradations of virtue, along with the discussion of the four virtues identified by Plato at *Republic* IV. 427 E – 443B.[57] With Plotinus, he first considers them as "political virtues". Their function, he says, is to moderate the passions and to limit the effects of irrationality on the soul, for the benefit of community life. At this lowest level in the grades of virtue, Porphyry maintains, prudence corresponds to the rational soul, fortitude to the irascible soul, temperance balances the concupiscible with the rational soul, and justice assures that each soul fulfills its proper duty in relation to the others. Porphyry then considers the same four virtues under the heading of "purificatory virtues",[58] the second of four levels of virtue which he treats in ascending order. As purificatory virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice purify the soul of the actions and passions of the body, and thus prepare it for contemplation of the paradigms of virtues in the divine intellect. These virtues distance the soul from the things that pertain to the lower realm, Porphyry maintains, thus elevating it to its proper essence. Prudence as a purificatory virtue frees the soul of opinions formed through its association with the body, and thus enables the soul to purify itself through pure thought alone; temperance frees it from the passions; fortitude frees it from fear of detachment from the body; while justice ensures the uncontested domination in the soul of reason and intellect. Following Plotinus, Porphyry acknowledges a positive role for the political virtues in improving the moral condition of mortal man and preparing the purification of the soul. In this way, he says, their aim is to enable man to live according to his nature (*kata phusin*). However, Porphyry insists, the political virtues are superseded by the purificatory virtues, whose aim is to produce impassibility (*apatheia*) in the soul, after which it can be assimilated to God (*homoiōsis pros theon*). Porphyry notes that these virtues both purify the soul from the consequences of its association with the body and aid it in its spiritual ascent once it is purified. In saying this, he goes beyond Plotinus, who seems not to clarify whether the purificatory virtues purify the soul or act on it only once it has been purified. To these two levels of virtue, which are clearly indicated in Plotinus's treatise, Porphyry adds another two

[57] See Porphyry, *Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes* 32 (ed. E. Lamberz, Leipzig, Teubner, 1975, pp. 28-31). Unless otherwise indicated, my summary of Porphyry's doctrine on the gradations of virtues is taken entirely from this text.

[58] I shall translate *aretai kathartikai* as "purificatory virtues", and not as "cathartic virtues", as the term is sometimes translated.

levels, the "contemplative virtues" and the "paradigmatic virtues", which Plotinus does not treat as specific gradations of virtue. The contemplative virtues, Porphyry explains, are those that pertain to the soul when it acts in a purely intellectual manner. As contemplative virtues, wisdom (or prudence) enables the soul to contemplate the principles which belong to the divine intellect; justice enables it to fulfill its proper function by directing its gaze toward the divine intellect; temperance enables its interior conversion toward the divine intellect; and fortitude consists in the impassibility by which the soul is assimilated to that which it contemplates. These contemplative virtues, Porphyry maintains, imply each other reciprocally. Finally, he describes the paradigmatic virtues, the highest of the four levels of virtue, as exemplary principles proper to the divine intellect. Thus, wisdom in the divine intellect consists of pure thought; temperance is expressed in the intellect's conversion to itself; justice in the intellect's accomplishment of the activity proper to itself; fortitude in the power by which the intellect remains itself. Although by designating these principles "virtues", Porphyry does not accurately represent Plotinus, he does follow Plotinus closely in explaining that these four principles of the divine intellect provide paradigms for the corresponding virtues in the human soul.[59] Other parallel points link Porphyry's treatment of the grades of virtue at *Sententia* 32 with that of Plotinus at *Ennead* 1.2. With Plotinus, for example, Porphyry holds that although an individual's possession of a higher grade of virtue necessarily implies his possession of the lower grades, the opposite case is not true. Moreover, Porphyry points out that one can possess both the political and purificatory virtues at the same time. However, he holds that the purificatory virtues ought to be practiced in preference to the political virtues, because they direct the soul to even higher virtues and thus contribute to the soul's assimilation to God. After describing the four levels of virtues at *Sententia* 32, Porphyry returns to discussing the purificatory virtues in more detail, insisting that they are achievable in this life and that they lead to higher virtues.

His brief treatment here of the process through which an individual, by practicing the purificatory virtues, purifies his soul of attachment to the body parallels a discussion in another of his writings, *Ad Marcellam*. In this letter written late in his life to his wife, Porphyry urges Marcella to continue practicing the philosophical life

[59] See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.3, where he clearly indicates that virtue is proper to the soul, not to the divine intellect. See also *Ennead* 1.2.1, 1.2.6, and the remarks by Dillon, op. cit., p. 96.

while he is away on a journey.[60] His description in this letter of the ascetical practices necessary for the philosophical life matches that of the practices which he associates at *Sententia* 32 with the purificatory virtues. For example, he tells Marcella that she should "ascend into herself", recollect from memory and ponder the clear thoughts concerning the philosophical life which emerge from the confused and obscure perceptions in her mind. At *Sententia* 32, he associates this same process of recollection with the practice of the purificatory virtues.[61] Moreover, just prior to giving this advice to Marcella, he stresses the necessity of purifying her soul of passions, the source of evil in the soul, so it can draw near to God in pursuit of its salvation (*sōteria*).[62] Porphyry's reference to "purification" in this context further links this discussion with that of the purificatory virtues at *Sententia* 32. However, although he is cautious to stress in *Ad Marcellam* that worship alone, without the practice of virtue, does not advance the soul toward God, he is more explicit here than in his *Sententiae* in linking purification of the soul with religious practices, such as prayer and worship, which he associates with the soul's assimilation to God.[63]

In conjunction with this assimilation, Porphyry identifies four principles (*stoikeia*) which enable the soul to draw near to God: faith (*pistis*), truth (*alētheia*), love (*erōs*), and hope (*elpis*).[64] Concerning the first principle, Porphyry claims that "it is necessary to have faith that the conversion (*epistrophē*) to God is the only salvation." Moreover, he says, "the faithful must be as eager as possible to know the truth about God."[65] Porphyry thus pairs faith (*pistis*) with knowledge (*gnōsis*) of God. Scholarly inquiry concerning the significance for

[60] For background to the letter, see E. des Places (ed.), *Vie de Pythagore; Lettre à Marcella*, Paris, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 1982; *Porphyry the Philosopher To Marcella*, Text and Translation with Introduction and Notes by K. O'Brien Wicker, Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1987, pp. 1-41; and *Porfirio. Vangelo di un pagano*, ed. A. R. Sodano, Milan, Rusconi, 1993, pp. 3-42.

[61] Compare Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 10 (in conjunction with *Ad Marcellam* 8-9) with *Sententia* 32. Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio. Introduzione*, op. cit., p. 41 n. 5, indicates this parallel, which he also finds in Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 2.48, and in Augustine, *Confessiones* 2.1.1. See also Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., p. 32 n. 49; p. 33 n. 50. Throughout this essay, I will quote from the English translation of *Ad Marcellam* by K. O'Brien Wicker, op. cit.

[62] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 9. Porphyry here adapts the central assertion from Plato, *Phaedo* 67 B2.

[63] See, for example, Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 12, 16 (on the necessity of virtue), 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24.

[64] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 24.

[65] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 24.

Porphyry of this coupling has focused on the relationship between this passage at *Ad Marcellam* 24 and Paul's praise of faith, hope, and especially love at 1 Corinthians 13.[66] Angelo Sodano, in particular, argues that *Ad Marcellam* represents a continuation of the anti-Christian polemic found in Porphyry's *Aduersus Christianos*. Sodano holds that in this letter, Porphyry offers a series of principles and maxims from Greek philosophy intended to demonstrate that whatever ethical and ascetical wisdom is found in Christianity, as represented in the Old and New Testaments, existed earlier and in a superior form in Greek thought.[67] In Sodano's view, for example, Porphyry's coupling of faith (*pistis*) with the truth (*alētheia*) about God within his tetrad of virtues is meant to correct Paul's emphasis at 1 Cor 13 on love (*agapē*) as superior to the possession of charismatic gifts and spiritual knowledge (*gnōsis*).[68] Thus, according to Sodano, against Paul's insistence at 1 Cor 13: 8 that the spiritual knowledge achievable in our bodily condition is only partial ("now we see as in a glass darkly..."), Porphyry claims that faith guides reason to an apprehension of knowledge about God that is certain.[69] Sodano maintains that

[66] See A. von Harnack, *Über den Ursprung der Formel 'Glaube, Liebe, Hoffnung'*, in idem, *Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit*, Gießen, Töpelmann, 1916, pp. 3-18, who argues that Porphyry's tetrad depends directly on Paul's triad. R. Reitzenstein, *Die Entstehung der Formel 'Glaube, Liebe, Hoffnung'* in *Historisches Zeitschrift*, 20, 1916, pp. 189-208; idem, *Die Formel 'Glaube, Liebe, Hoffnung' bei Paulus*, in *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil. – Hist. Klasse*, 1916, pp. 367-416; idem, *Historia Monachorum und Historia Lausaica. Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Mönchtums und der früchristlichen Begriffe Gnostiker und Pneumatiker*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1916; idem, *Nachwort*, in *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil. – Hist. Klasse*, 1917, pp. 130-151, argues against Harnack that the tetrad found in Porphyry was already known among Corinthian Christians at the time of Paul, and that the apostle wrote 1 Cor 13:13 in opposition to it. P. Corssen, *Paulus und Porphyrios*, in *Sokrates*, 73, 1919, pp. 18-30, argues against Harnack that the tetrad is not derived in opposition to Paul, but has deep roots in Porphyry's philosophy. Finally, W. Pötscher, *Porphyrios, Πρὸς Μαρκέλλαν*. Griechischer Text. Herausgeben, übersetzt, eingeleitet und erklärt von W. Pötscher, Leiden, Brill, 1969, pp. 89-95, thinks that Porphyry's reference to the four *stoikeia* at *Ad Marcellam* 24 depends on Numenius's four *stoikeia* in nature. Pötscher is aware that the same tetrad is also found in the *Chaldean Oracles*, but he does not believe that this work was a source for Porphyry. However, H. Lewy, *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Late Roman Empire*, rev. ed. M. Tardieu, Paris, Études augustiniennes, 1978, pp. 137-157, argues in favor of this possibility. Other contributions to this discussion are provided by O'Brien Wicker (ed.), op. cit., p. 110 ad. loc., and Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., pp. 117-119 and 125-126.

[67] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., especially pp. 25-42.

[68] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., pp. 117-126.

[69] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., pp. 120-123. In support of this position, Sodano cites Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 21.

in taking this position, Porphyry is asserting against Christians the Neoplatonic belief that the human soul is a divine entity and that its salvation therefore requires a return to the knowledge of eternal principles. Faith, in this view, is subordinate and propaedeutic to true spiritual knowledge, which is attainable in this life through philosophical effort. Sodano interprets Porphyry as opposing what he understood as a Christian anti-intellectualism, demonstrated in Paul's exclusion of knowledge (*gnōsis*) as a virtue – a move which Porphyry viewed as dangerous to the soul's formation.[70] Sodano explains that love (*erōs*) follows from faith and truth in Porphyry's tetrad of virtues, because it derives from a sure knowledge of God.[71] The soul loves what it knows through its intellectual conversion (*epistrophē*). "For it is necessary ...", Porphyry writes to Marcella, "for the knower to love the one he knows...".[72] Finally, Sodano concludes, hope (*elpis*) completes Porphyry's tetrad of principles which guide the soul to salvation, by nourishing it with the expectation of happiness that belongs to those who have purified themselves through faith, truth, and love.[73]

The purificatory function of Porphyry's four principles is attested in the letter to Marcella by their association with the virtues that accomplish the soul's liberation from passions and opinions. "Virtue alone draws the soul upward and toward what is kindred," Porphyry writes to Marcella.[74] He explains further that wisdom (*sophia*) implies knowledge of God (*epistēmē peri theou*), and that this knowledge rejects opinions (*doxa*) about God common to the masses, along with the "empty talk of rhetoricians."[75] To illustrate this point, Porphyry insists that the wise man worships God not because he believes God needs to be worshipped, as the impious believe, but in order to be conformed to the divine dignity.[76] Porphyry's discussion in this letter of the importance of the four principles is linked with his description of true piety (*eusebeia*), the virtue through which the soul becomes God-like though correct worship. Purification of the soul from false opinions about God represents

[70] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., p. 122.
[71] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., p. 123.
[72] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 24.
[73] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., p. 124, who identifies the meaning of hope as expressed by Porphyry at *Ad Marcellam* 24 with that of Plato at *Phaedo* 114C 2-3 and 114C 1-2.
[74] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 16.
[75] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 17.
[76] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 17-18.

rejection of vulgarity in worship, but more importantly, he says, it represents the cultivation of the intellect in its pursuit of true understandings of God.[77] Porphyry insists that strong faith accompanied by knowledge about God convinces the more philosophically advanced that God exists and that they live under his scrutiny and care.[78]

Some scholars have suggested that Porphyry derived his four principles in conjunction with the so-called *Chaldean Oracles*, a theosophical mystery poem composed of epigrammatic revelations which most scholars date to the late second century, and which exists today only as a compilation of fragments.[79] According to the *Oracles*, love, truth, and faith as virtues pertain to the three "governors" or "rulers" of the world: the aion which governs the cosmic circle or empyrean world; the sun which rules the ethereal world, comprising the fixed stars and planets; and the moon which rules the hylic or sublunar circle, comprising the earth. Proclus quotes the *Oracles* as asserting that these three virtues (which he identifies as *pistis*, *kalētheia*, and *erōs*) provide the means by which theurgists unite themselves to God.[80] In another quotation from the *Oracles*, provided by the sixth-century philosopher Olympiodorus, hope (*elpis*) is said to nourish the theurgist.[81] Karin Alt argues against Harnack that Porphyry's conception of love (*erōs*) resembles that of Plato in *Symposium*, a spiritual power through which knowledge of the loved one is obtained. Furthermore, she argues that whereas Porphyry's conception of love is close to that of the *Chaldean Oracles*, it is far removed from Paul's concept of *agapē* at 1 Cor 13.[82] She supports this point by

[77] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 19-23.

[78] See Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 21.

[79] See É. des Places (ed.), *Oracles Chaldaïques*, Paris, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 1971; idem, *Les Oracles chaldaïques*, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, vol. 2.17.4, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1984, pp. 2299-2335; and R. Majercic, *The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1989. On the dating, see H.-D. Saffrey, *Les néoplatoniciens et les Oracles chaldaïques*, in *Revue des Études augustiniennes*, 27, 1981, pp. 209-225.

[80] See des Places (ed.), *Oracles*, op. cit., pp. 189, 199. Fragment 46, which refers to this triad of virtues, is found at Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* (ed. E. Diehl, *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, vol. 1, Leipzig, Teubner, 1903, p. 212). See the explanation by Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio, Vangelo*, op. cit., pp. 125-126, citing Lewy, *Chaldean Oracles*, op. cit., pp. 144-149.

[81] Fragment 47, which refers to hope, is found at Olympiodorus, *In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria* A VII 1 (ed. W. Norvin, Leipzig, Teubner, 1913, p. 39).

[82] See K. Alt, *Glaube, Wahrheit, Liebe, Hoffnung bei Porphyrios*, in *Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche. Festschrift für Ulrich Wickert zum siebzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. D. Wyrwa with B. Aland and C. Schäublin, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1997, pp. 25-43, at 39-43.

observing that Iamblichus (c. 250 – c. 325), a disciple of Porphyry, mentions the triad of love, hope, and faith in conjunction with the role of prayer in the theurgist's purification and union with the gods.[83] Iamblichus's familiarity with the *Chaldean Oracles* supports the assumption that his association of love, faith, and hope with theurgic union derives from that work, and it provides Alt with additional reason for thinking that Porphyry develops his conception of his tetrad of principles in conjunction with his reading of the *Oracles*, and not in opposition to Paul's arguments at 1 Cor 13, as Harnack suggested. Sodano, who develops Harnack's argument, nevertheless recognizes the affinity between Porphyry's explanation of faith, truth, love, and hope in *Ad Marcellam* and the four virtues as found in the *Chaldean Oracles*, and he concedes that Porphyry had the four elements from the *Oracles* in mind as he determined both the number of his *stoikeia* and their purificatory function within the soul. However, Sodano also believes that Porphyry transposed and reinterpreted the Chaldean tetrad within his Platonic and Neoplatonic system, and that he gave it an ethical emphasis which it did not previously have.[84]

Dominic O'Meara recently joined those scholars who credit Iamblichus with increasing the number of levels of virtues to seven from Porphyry's four.[85] Although no scale of virtues as such can be found in any of Iamblichus's surviving writings, O'Meara suggests that in his lost treatise *On Virtues*, he inserted two levels of virtue beneath the political virtues (at the lowest level the "natural" virtues, followed by the "ethical" virtues), while he also added the "theurgic" virtues above Porphyry's paradigmatic virtues. As support for this view, O'Meara cites the eleventh-century philosopher Michael Psellus, "who attributes to Iamblichus a more elaborate list of the virtues than that to be found in Porphyry's *Sentences*."[86] O'Meara also cites a letter of Iamblichus to Sopatros, in which he discusses the

[83] See Alt, *Glaube*, op. cit., p. 39, citing Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 5.26 (ed. É. des Places, *Jamblique. Les mystères d'Egypte*, Paris, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 1966, p. 182).

[84] See Sodano (ed.), *Porfirio. Vangelo*, op. cit., p. 126, citing J. Rist, *Plotinus. The Road to Reality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 239.

[85] See D. O'Meara, *Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 46-49.

[86] O'Meara, op. cit., p. 46, citing Michael Psellus, *Philosophica minora* (vol. 2, ed. D. O'Meara, Leipzig, Teubner, 1989, p. 111). O'Meara also cites H.-D. Saffrey, *Abamon, pseudonyme de Jamblique*, in *Philomanthes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1971, 227-239 = idem, *Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin*, Paris, J. Vrin, 1990, pp. 210-211.

education of children in ethical virtue.[87] Assuming that O'Meara is correct, Iamblichus joins Porphyry in proposing both that the political virtues are transformed by the purificatory virtues within a more elaborate grades of virtue, and that faith, hope, and love play a significant role in the soul's assimilation to the divine.

Political and Purificatory Virtues in Later Neoplatonist Philosophers

In holding both of these positions, Porphyry and Iamblichus are followed in the fifth century by Proclus (c. 412–485) and in the sixth century by Olympiodorus of Alexandria, Neoplatonist philosophers who, as we have seen, incorporate into their commentaries on Plato the four elements of faith, knowledge, love, and hope, and who also carry forward earlier Neoplatonic treatments of a grades of virtue aimed at the purification of the soul and its assimilation to the divine.[88] Other fifth-century Neoplatonists who also depend upon Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus for their views on the purification of the soul in relation to a scale of virtue include Hierocles (d. 431/432) and Marinus.[89] Synesius, a fifth-century Christian bishop of Ptolemais (Libya) (AD 410), also refers to a scale of virtue, which he learned from Porphyry.[90]

Macrobius's *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* provides an important source for the transmission of this Neoplatonic grades of virtue in the Latin-speaking, western Empire.[91] In this work he reflects upon Cicero's affirmation (*De re publica* 6.13.3) that the

[87] See O'Meara, op. cit., p. 47.

[88] For treatment of the four elements by Proclus and Olympiodorus, see supra, nn. 80 and 81. For Proclus's treatment of the grades of virtue, see *Procli Diadochi in Platonis rem publicam commentarii* (vol. 1, ed. W. Kroll, Leipzig, Teubner, 1899, p. 12). See also Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem* 96,7-16. For Olympiodorus's treatment of the grades of virtue, see his *In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria* A I 4-5; A VIII 1-11; and B (ed. W. Norvin, Leipzig, Teubner, 1913, pp. 3, 45-50, and 114-121).

[89] In addition to O'Meara, op. cit., the best recent discussion of the Neoplatonic grades of virtue in fifth and sixth century Neoplatonists is found in Marinus, *Proclus ou Sur le bonheur*, ed. H.-D. Saffrey and A.-P. Segonds, Paris, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 2001, pp. lxix-c. It should be noted that Saffrey and Segonds do not include Iamblichus in their summary of Neoplatonists who treat, or even indicate, a grades of virtue in their writings.

[90] See Saffrey and Segonds (eds.), op. cit., p. lxxviii, referring to Synesius, *Epistula* 140. See also A. Garzya, *Osservazioni sull'Epistola 140 di Sinesio*, in *Platonism in Late Antiquity*, ed. S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 231-238.

[91] For background, see *Macrobe, Commentaire au songe de Scipion*, ed. M. Armisen-Marchetti, 2 vols., Paris, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 2000-2003.

statesman who "preserves, aids, or enlarges" his *patria* will enjoy eternal happiness.[92] Macrobius accepts that happiness can be found only in the practice of that kind of virtue which is normally reserved to philosophers, because it requires complete detachment from worldly affairs and wisdom born of the contemplation of divine realities. But then he asks how the statesman, who does not aspire to these noble philosophical aims, can hope to acquire the virtue which produces happiness.[93] He resolves this dilemma by turning to Porphyry's four-tiered grades of virtue, which he mistakenly attributes to Plotinus's treatise *On Virtues*.[94] He notes that this hierarchy includes the political virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice), which he says are concerned with establishing the primacy of reason over those passions which interfere with the good government of the soul, the family, and the *res publica*. Macrobius argues that because Plotinus includes the political virtues within the grades of virtue that lead to happiness, the statesman who practices the political virtues enjoys the promise of eternal happiness which Cicero had indicated.[95] It is clear, however, both in Plotinus and in Porphyry that happiness is attained only by those who transcend the political virtues, and whose souls are assimilated to the divine through purification of attachment to the body and its passions. Macrobius omits mention of this crucial point in the Neoplatonic doctrine of the grades of virtue.[96]

[92] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.8.1 (ed. L. Scarpa, *Macrobii Ambrosii Theodosii, Commentariorum in somnium Scipionis libri duo. Introduzione, testo, traduzione e note*, Padua, Liviana Editrice, 1981, pp. 132-134). Macrobius quotes directly from Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis* 3.13, which is found in the sixth book of Cicero's *De re publica*. Macrobius apparently knew the *Somnium Scipionis* as a separate work. See also P. Boyancé, *Études sur le Songe de Scipion, Essai d'histoire et de psychologie religieuse*, Bordeaux, Feret, 1936, pp. 138-147, who lists sources for the position that Cicero takes in this passage among Stoic, Neopythagorean, and other ancient Greek philosophers.

[93] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.8.3.

[94] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.8.5-6. He neglects even to mention Porphyry's *Sententia* 32, from which he derives this grades of virtue. See P. Henry, *Plotin et l'Occident. Firmicus Maternus, Marius Victorinus, Saint Augustin et Macrobe*, Louvain, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934, pp. 154-162, who establishes Macrobius's dependence upon Porphyry, *Sententia* 32. On this point see also Saffrey and Segonds (eds.), op. cit., pp. lxxix-lxxx, and J. Flamant, *Macrobe et le néoplatonisme latin, à la fin du IVe siècle*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1977, pp. 596-608, especially p. 607.

[95] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.8.12. On this "specious argument" by Macrobius, see especially, Flamant, *Macrobe*, op. cit., p. 598-599.

[96] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 1.8.5-11. Flamant, op. cit., pp. 600-608, examines Macrobius's treatment of the four levels of virtue in detail and compares it with those of Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2, and Porphyry, *Sententia* 32, making it unnecessary for me to repeat the comparison here.

Moreover, he omits the affirmation, common to Plotinus and Porphyry, that although possession of the higher virtues signifies possession of the lower virtues, the opposite is not the case.[97] By summarizing his Neoplatonist sources in this way, Macrobius seeks to harmonize Cicero's position with that of Plotinus and Porphyry at the point where they are least reconcilable.

Nevertheless, Macrobius's summary of Porphyry's four levels of virtue is otherwise largely accurate,[98] and it may be possible to find in his commentary a strong affirmation of the role of the higher virtues in the Neoplatonic system. Jacques Flamant has drawn attention to Macrobius's citation of Cicero's final exhortation in the *Dream of Scipio*, that the statesman should engage in the finest pursuits, those "undertaken in defense of the *patria*," because these activities guarantee a "swifter flight [of the soul] to its proper home and permanent abode." But Cicero adds to this counsel that the soul should be permitted to "contemplate what lies outside itself," and thus "detach itself as much as may be from the body."[99] Immediately following this citation of Cicero, Macrobius outlines three types of virtue which he sees implied in Cicero's text: 1) higher, contemplative virtues (*uirtutes otiosae*), which, he says, pertain to philosophers and are exemplified in Pythagoras; 2) active virtues (*uirtutes negotiosae*), which are practiced by statesmen (*rectores rei publicae*) and are exemplified in Romulus; and 3) a mixed category which belongs to those rare statesmen who also pursue philosophy and who exhibit both the contemplative and active virtues. Among such men Macrobius names Lycurgus and Solon for the Greeks, and Numa and the two Catos for the Romans.[100] Flamant cites this final argument of Macrobius against the views of scholars who, in his opinion, limit Macrobius's appreciation of the Neoplatonic doctrine on the virtues to the self-serving aim of justifying Cicero's position that eternal happiness is guaranteed to those statesmen who selflessly advance the well-being of the *res publica*.[101] In Flamant's

[97] See Flamant, op. cit., p. 602, citing Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.7, and Porphyry, *Sententia* 32.

[98] So argues Flamant, op. cit., pp. 607-608. Furthermore, he asserts that Macrobius's only sources for his account of the four levels of virtue were Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2, and Porphyry, *Sententia* 32.

[99] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 2.17.2-4 (ed. Scarpa, *Macrobii*, op. cit., p. 360), quoting Cicero, *De re publica* 6.26.29.

[100] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 2.17.5-9 (ed. Scarpa, *Macrobii*, op. cit., pp. 360-362).

[101] See Flamant, op. cit., p. 610, where he criticises the views of K. Mras, *Macrobius' Kommentar zu Ciceros Somnium. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.*, S.P.A.W. Phil. Hist. Klasse, 1933, pp. 232-288.

view, Macrobius's discussion of the three kinds of virtue follows from Cicero's decision at the end of the *Dream of Scipio* to place political action and philosophical contemplation in close proximity to each other. Flamant sees Macrobius as also led by Cicero's text to harmonize it with the Neoplatonist teaching regarding the necessity for philosophers to long for the separation of their souls from their bodies and to acquire virtues in pursuit of the reward that is reserved by God for the most virtuous.[102] Flamant thus understands Macrobius as affirming the superiority of the contemplative virtues over the political virtues.[103]

Writing also in the fifth century, Marinus of Neapolis, author of the *Vita Procli*, treats the Neoplatonic grades of virtues in relation to the life of his teacher.[104] He is followed in this endeavor in the sixth-century *Vita Isidori*, a work of the Neoplatonist philosopher Damascius, which evaluates Isidore's contemporaries and predecessors in terms of their place in the same grades of virtue.[105] Marinus classifies virtues into six distinct groups, in ascending order: physical, moral, political, purificatory, contemplative, and theurgic.[106] His biography consists largely in demonstrating evidence for these virtues in the life of Proclus. Significantly, he states at the beginning of the work his conviction that Proclus was the happiest man of renown to have lived for a long time, and that his happiness, which was perfect, consisted in his possession of both internal goods, such as wisdom, and external goods, such as prosperity.[107] It becomes clear in the course of the biography that Marinus traces Proclus's progress from the lower to the higher classes of virtue chronologically, from his boyhood and youth

[102] See Macrobius, *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis* 2.17.12 (ed. Scarpa, *Macrobii*, op. cit., p. 362).

[103] See Flamant, op. cit., p. 610.

[104] For a critical edition, see Marinus, *Proclus*, op. cit. See also R. Masullo (ed.), *Vita di Proclo, Marino di Neapoli. Testo critico, introduzione, traduzione e commentario*, Naples, M. D'Auria editore, 1985. A noteworthy study on the work is provided by H. Blumenthal, *Marinus' Life of Proclus: Neoplatonist Biography*, in *Byzantion*, 54, 1984, 469-494 = idem, *Soul and Intellect. Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism*, Aldershot, Variorum, 1993, Essay XIII. An excellent English translation together with notes and introduction has been published by M. Edwards, *Neoplatonic Saints. The Lives of Plotinus and Proclus by their Students*, Liverpool, University of Liverpool Press, 2000, pp. xliv-lv, 58-115.

[105] See *Damascii Vitae Isidori reliquiae*, ed. C. Zinten, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1967. O'Meara, op. cit., p. 49, observes that "[s]ome of them, for example Theosebius, are pegged at the level of 'political' virtue, not having gone much higher," citing Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, fragment 109, in the edition by Zinten, op. cit.

[106] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 3.

[107] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 2. See the helpful note on internal and external goods at Edwards, op. cit., p. 60 n. 29.

to his later years. According to Marinus, Proclus exhibits the traditional political virtues by the time he concludes his study of philosophy at Athens.[108] Marinus recounts that as a philosopher, Proclus offered counsel to the Athenian magistrates on matters of justice. Moreover, he advised scholars in the city to be discrete (or temperate).[109] Marinus indicates that Proclus demonstrated fortitude in and outside Athens on various occasions, notably during a controversy in the city, which Henri-Dominique Saffrey suggests concerned the forced conversion of the temple of Asclepius into a Christian church.[110] In addition to these virtues, other political virtues which Marinus attributes to Proclus include piety, philanthropy, and friendship.[111] Following Plotinus, Marinus says of political virtues that they impose limits and measures on the temper and appetites of the soul, and that they annihilate passions and false opinions.[112] Thus, he says, political virtues can be called purifications of a sort, and can be thought of as bringing about the moral improvement of those who possess them in this present life. Yet, like Porphyry at *Sententia* 32, Marinus emphasizes the role of the higher, purificatory virtues in liberating the soul completely from the consequences of its attachment to the body.[113] He reports that Proclus limited his consumption of food and drink and abstained from eating meat. Moreover, he carefully observed religious rituals and fasts aimed at purifying the soul. Marinus records him as praying, keeping vigils, and even authoring hymns in praise of the gods. All these observances were aimed at self-denial.[114] The effect of these practices on Proclus according to Marinus was to give him greater freedom from passions with respect to physical pain brought on by illness or to anger and other emotions brought on by external circumstances.[115] Marinus claims that Proclus's soul, purified in this way, "all but departed from the body."[116] At this point in Proclus's spiritual development, according to Marinus, his

[108] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 14-17.

[109] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 15, and Edwards, op. cit., p. 78 n. 146, on *sophrosunē* in the passage in question.

[110] See H.-D. Saffrey, *Allusions anti-chrétienes chez Proclus*, in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et philologiques*, 59, 1975, pp. 553-563, at pp. 555-557, cited at Edwards, op. cit., p. 79 nn. 149, 151.

[111] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 15-17.

[112] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 18. Cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.2.

[113] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 18.

[114] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 19.

[115] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 20.

[116] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 20. I follow the English translation at Edwards, op. cit., p. 90.

soul's temperance manifested itself in the total absence of feeling (*apatheia*), a consequence of its detachment from the body; its fortitude consisted in the absence of fear of death, understood as separation from the body; its justice consisted in the right ordering of the soul's inferior faculties to the mind and reason.[117]

Marinus goes on to explain how Proclus proceeds from these purificatory virtues to the contemplative virtues, in which the soul knows the paradigms of the divine intellect without the need for discursive reasoning or dialectic.[118] Virtue at this stage in Proclus's spiritual ascent is no longer called practical reason (*phronēsis*), but rather wisdom (*sophia*). Proclus is portrayed as speaking as if under divine inspiration and sharing in divine illumination. Marinus, carefully adhering to the model advanced earlier in Plotinus and Porphyry, discusses justice, temperance, and fortitude as they exist in the soul of Proclus as contemplative virtues. Thus, he says, justice is exhibited in the way that Proclus's soul does what is proper to it, by attending to intellect and God. His temperance consists in his soul's inward reversion to the mind, a state in which it does not succumb to distraction. His fortitude is expressed in his soul's desire to possess the impassibility which it beholds in God.[119] In this state of virtue, according to Marinus, Proclus has accomplished what Plotinus had stated was the purpose of the soul's purification, to exchange the life of the "good man" for that of the gods.[120] Marinus clearly holds that Proclus attained this spiritual condition and practiced the virtues at this high level while still alive and active as a philosopher.[121] He further attributes to him a progression to the highest level of virtue, the theurgic virtues.[122]

Augustine and Neoplatonist Accounts of the Grades of Virtue

This review of the teachings concerning the grades of virtue offered by Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Macrobius, and Marinus reveals strong parallels with Augustine's discussion in Letter 155 of the transformation of the political virtues through faith, hope, and

[117] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 21.
[118] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 22.
[119] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 24-25. See Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.1; Porphyry, *Sententia* 32.
[120] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 25; cf. Plotinus, *Ennead* 1.2.1.
[121] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 26.
[122] See Marinus, *Vita Procli* 28.

love. Perhaps the strongest of these parallels can be seen in the similarity between Augustine's description of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice as they are lived in the heavenly city, and the Neoplatonists' description of them following the soul's purification. With regard to this parallel, both Augustine and the Neoplatonist authors we have examined differentiate between prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice as they exist when the soul is struggling against evils, and these virtues as they exist in the soul that has been freed from the struggle with evil. For example, at the lower levels, both Augustine and the Neoplatonists consider fortitude as the virtue which wards off fear of death, while they associate temperance with the struggle to keep the soul from yielding to passions. For both Augustine and the Neoplatonists, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice undergo a gradual change in their respective aims as the soul becomes more detached from the influence of the body and from the material world to which the body belongs, and as it draws closer to the divine. Clearly, for Augustine, the transformation of the political virtues involves their becoming forms of love of God, whereas for the Neoplatonists, the higher virtues exhibit a greater purification of knowledge of the eternal principles contained in the divine intellect. But this difference in emphasis is less striking when the relationship between love and knowledge is examined more closely in both Augustine and Neoplatonist philosophers. Furthermore, for both Augustine and the Neoplatonists, as the soul approaches or attains assimilation to God, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice are described as forms of an effortless adherence to God (or to intellect for some Neoplatonists), which is completely free from distraction or other concerns. Augustine in Letter 155 describes this state as repose, whereas the Neoplatonists describe it as an unencumbered contemplation.

Augustine and the Neoplatonists both view the relationship between the different conceptions or levels of the political virtues hierarchically, in the sense that the lower levels exist as imitations of the higher levels. In Letter 155 Augustine identifies three distinct levels of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. At the lowest level, he considers the political virtues under their conventional definitions. At the highest level, in the heavenly city, he says that they exist as aspects or qualities of the soul's adherence to God. At this level, he explains, the soul clings to God prudently, courageously, temperately, and justly.[123] Between these two levels Augustine

[123] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.12 (supra, n. 34).

locates a significant intermediate level, which he says describes these virtues as they exist in the soul that embraces true piety in this life. He insists that at this level, prudence chooses to love God as the highest good, fortitude allows no hardship, temperance no temptation, and justice no pride from keeping the soul from loving God.[124] Thus, Augustine tells Macedonius that the prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice which he should practice through true piety find their true paradigms in these virtues as they are practiced in the heavenly city. Augustine shares with the Neoplatonists the view that an individual who practices the political virtues as conventionally understood already acts in a morally responsible way. This individual's actions are certainly more virtuous than are those of an individual who does not practice these virtues at all.[125] At the same time, Augustine believes that the statesman becomes more truly virtuous as he leaves behind the lower level of the political virtues conventionally understood and, through faith, hope, and love, ascends to the intermediate level, where his practice of the political virtues is attuned to the love of God that he will perfectly embrace only after death, in the heavenly city. In this way Augustine's conception of the statesman's personal progress in virtue corresponds to his place in a scale of virtue. Once again Augustine's explanation of the transformation of the political virtues parallels that of Neoplatonist philosophers. Finally, in Plotinus, as in the other Neoplatonists we have examined, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, considered as "higher" virtues, imply one another reciprocally, so that the soul which possesses any one of them can also be said to possess each of the others. In Augustine,

[124] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.13 (supra, n. 35).

[125] Augustine makes this point with striking clarity at Letter 138 to Marcellinus, when he distinguishes between the "powerful political virtues" that the Romans practiced in establishing and enlarging the *res publica*, and, on the other hand, that true religion, which, had the Romans adopted, would have resuted in their becoming citizens of the heavenly city. See Augustine, *ep.* 138.17 (CSEL 44.145): "deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum ualerent ciuiles etiam sine uera religione uirtutes, ut intellegeretur hac addita fieri homines ciues alterius ciuitatis, cuius rex ueritas, cuius lex caritas, cuius modus aeternitas." One is here reminded of Augustine's observation at *ciu.* 5.13 (CCL 47.147) about the virtues practiced by pagan Roman political leaders, that they were "less base" (*minus turpes*) than those Roman leaders who practiced no virtues at all. Thus, I believe that Brittain, op. cit., p. 252, is wrong to conclude that Augustine's grades of virtue differ from the Neoplatonists' insofar as he denies that pagan ethical virtues or virtuous people exist, and that "the lowest grade of virtue Augustine can recognize is that of a faithful Christian ...". Augustine's position on the virtues of non-Christians is more nuanced than Brittain's stark statement of it allows.

this principle is expressed in the identification in the heavenly city of the each of the political virtues with the one virtue, which Augustine calls adherence to God, but which he also identifies as wisdom and blessedness.[126]

The developments in the fifth century by Macrobius and Marinus of the accounts of the grades of virtue by Plotinus and Porphyry offer two additional, important parallels to Augustine's Letter 155. First, Macrobius makes a case for applying the Neoplatonic scale of virtues to the statesman, where previously only the sage or the philosophical soul was thought capable of ascending from the lower to the higher virtues. Macrobius claims that within his mixed category of virtues, which incorporates both the contemplative and active virtues, one can find those rare statesmen, such as Lycurgus, Solon, Numa, and the two Catos, who combine the pursuit of philosophy with good government.[127] Marinus, on the other hand, employs the grades of virtue as a way of describing the moral progress of a specific individual known to him, his teacher Proclus, whereas in Plotinus and Porphyry, the scale of virtues was discussed only theoretically, without application to any particular person.[128] Marinus charts Proclus's progress from practicing lower grades of virtue to higher ones.

In Augustine, we see parallels of both these developments in his application of the grades of virtue to Macedonius. At the beginning of Letter 155, Augustine tells the imperial vicar that he already "approaches near to God's heavenly commonwealth" and that he "burns with a desire for it," insofar as he is also "inspired with a love for eternity, for truth and for love."[129] Augustine's attribution to Macedonius of a love for truth and for love echoes the qualities which he later points to in Book 19 of *De ciuitate dei* as the conse-

[126] J. P. Langan, *Augustine on the Unity and the Interconnection of the Virtues*, in *Theological Studies*, 72, 1979, pp. 81-95, associates Augustine's position on the interconnectedness of all virtues mostly with Stoic philosophical premises, and omits explanations drawn from Neoplatonism.

[127] See supra n. 100.

[128] Although Porphyry speaks abundantly in his *Vita Plotini* about Plotinus's virtues and his ascent to the divine (notably at *Vita Plotini* 23), he does not refer in any systematic way to a moral or spiritual ascent by Plotinus through the several grades of virtue, as Marinus does in the case of Proclus.

[129] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.1 (CSEL 44.430): "... quod animum tuum caritate aeternitatis et ueritatis atque ipsius caritatis affectum diuinae illi caelestique rei publicae, cuius regnator est Christus et in qua sola semper beataque uiuendum est, si recte hic pieque uiuatur, agnosco inhiantem, uideo propinquantem eiusque potiundae amplector ardentem."

quences of a mixed contemplative–active life.[130] His reasons for acknowledging these qualities in Macedonius can be surmised from the content of their correspondence, in particular from Letter 154, which the vicar wrote to Augustine just shortly before. In his letter, Macedonius indicates that he has granted the pardon sought by Augustine. Moreover, he thanks Augustine for sending copies of the first three books of *De ciuitate dei*, which had just been completed, and which he had to request twice from the bishop before receiving.[131] Macedonius expresses deep admiration for the content of these books. He says that they demanded time from him, snatching him up from the anxieties associated with his office.[132] He tells Augustine that he does not know what to admire more about the books, the maturity of the priesthood which they exhibit, the teachings of philosophy, the wide knowledge of history, or the pleasing eloquence which they offer.[133] Macedonius endorses the perspective on Roman history that Augustine presents in these books. He specifically praises the contrast the bishop draws between the errors of the Romans' forefathers, who immersed themselves in pleasures, and thus forfeited the happiness they sought in this life, and, on the other hand, the commandments and the mysteries of the incarnation and of eternal life, which is offered as a reward to the truly virtuous. He adds that these commandments and mysteries "even lighten the burden of this present age and of the unavoidable circumstances into

[130] At *ciu.* 19.19 (cf. *ciu.* 19.1), Augustine considers the social and cultural practices of Christians (*mores populi christiani*) in conjunction with the three kinds of life (*genera uitae*), contemplative, active and mixed, which the Roman intellectual Marcus Terentius Varro had presented in *De philosophia*. He emends the content of Varro's categories so that the contemplative life is associated with the study of philosophical truth (*ueritas*), while the active life is portrayed as charitable service (*caritas*) on behalf of one's neighbor. He suggests that the mixed life represents the attempts of contemplatives to pass on to others the fruits of their philosophical investigations in an effort to improve the welfare of their neighbors. At *ciu.* 19.19 he specifically mentions bishops in this connection. See F.-J. Thonnard, *Les trois états de vie*, in *Œuvres de saint Augustin. La Cité de Dieu. Livres XIX-XXII: Triomphe de la cité céleste*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1960, pp. 752-753.

[131] See Augustine, *ep.* 154.2 (Macedonius to Augustine). We learn at Augustine, *ep.* 152.3 (Macedonius to Augustine) of the imperial vicar's annoyance at having to ask a second time to have the books.

[132] See Augustine, *ep.* 154.2 (Macedonius to Augustine) (CSEL 44.429): "explicui tuos libros; neque enim tam languidi aut inertes erant, ut me aliud quam se curare paterentur: iniecerunt manum, ereptumque aliis sollicitudinum causis, suis vinculis illigarunt (ita enim mihi Deus propitius sit) …".

[133] See Augustine, *ep.* 154.2 (Macedonius to Augustine) (CSEL 44.429): "… ut ego anceps sim, quid in illis magis mirer, sacerdotii perfectionem, philosophiae dogmata, historiae plenam notitiam an facundiae iucunditatem …".

which we have been born."[134] In the light of the vicar's letter, Augustine's statement at the beginning of Letter 155 that Macedonius exhibits love for love (*caritas*) could be explained by reference to the pardon which he extended to the individual facing the death penalty, whereas his love for truth could be said to follow from his professed commitment to the Christian religion (*uera pietas*) and its teachings, as exhibited in his reaction to Augustine's writings. Augustine could also find a basis in Macedonius's letter for the virtues of faith, hope, and love, which figure prominently in his response to the vicar. Macedonius's profession of Christian faith and hope is clear from his endorsement of Augustine's view in *De ciuitate dei* that the mysteries of the incarnation and eternal life as a reward for virtue lighten the burdens associated with this present life. Thus, in his response to Macedonius, Augustine claims that although the vicar exercises political responsibilities in this life, he lives already "near to the heavenly city," and adds that although he wears the belt of an earthly judge, he has his mind largely fixed on the heavenly commonwealth.[135] In these terms, Augustine brings together in Macedonius the qualities of the philosopher-statesman, which Macrobius presents just a few years later in Neoplatonic terms. He also seems to argue that Macedonius has either attained already, or is close to attaining, that intermediate level of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice in which these virtues are practiced in conjunction with faith, hope, and love.

The parallels which I have drawn between Augustine's Letter 155 to Macedonius and the writings of Neoplatonic philosophers concerning the grades of virtue do not inevitably lead to the conclusion that Augustine had first-hand knowledge of the relevant Neoplatonic texts. He could not have known Macrobius or Marinus, and we have no evidence that he ever read Iamblichus. Otmar Schissel

[134] See Augustine, *ep.* 154.2 (Macedonius to Augustine) (CSEL 44.429): "conuicti namque sunt impudenter pertinaces, iam inde a bonis quae memorant saeculis, pro naturae rerum obscuritate contigisse peiora, falsosque omnes illitis quadam dulcedine felicitatibus suis, per quas non ad beatitudinem, sed ad praerupta sunt ducti: haec uero nostra praecepta, et simplicis uerique dei mysteria, praeter uitam perpetuam quam purissimis uirtutibus pollicentur, etiam haec saecularia et necessario qui nati sumus euentura mitigare."

[135] See Augustine, *ep.* 155.17 (CSEL 44.447): "pietas igitur, id est uerus ueri dei cultus ad omnia prodest, et quae molestias huius uitae auertat aut leniat et quae ad illam uitam salutemque perducat, ubi nec aliquid iam mali patiamur et bono summo sempiternoque perfruamur. ad hanc te perfectius assequendam et perseuerantissime retinendam exhortor ut me ipsum. cuius nisi iam particeps esses tuosque istos honores temporales ei seruire opotere iudicares, [...] ut te appareat in terreni iudices cingulo non parua ex parte caelestem rem publicam cogitare."

von Fleschenberg has attempted to demonstrate that Augustine's discussion at *De quantitate animae* 70-81 of the last four of the seven gradations of the soul depends upon Plotinus's treatise *On Virtues* (= *Ennead* 1.2), and most directly upon Porphyry's four grades of virtue at *Sententia* 32.[136] Yet the paraphrases of Porphyry's *Sententia* 32 that Schissel von Fleschenberg finds in *De quantitate animae* can at best be described as parallels of thought, and do not establish with certainty a direct use or even knowledge of this text by Augustine.[137] Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Alain-Philippe Segonds make the important observation that Augustine's discussion in *De quantitate animae* is about grades of the soul, not of virtue. Nowhere in this text does Augustine speak of grades of virtue.[138] For this reason, they do not include Augustine among those writers, pagan and Christian, who advanced versions of Plotinus's and Porphyry's doctrines. The passages in question from *De quantitate animae*, therefore, should not be pressed to establish direct contact by Augustine with Porphyry's *Sententia* 32. To hold this view, however, one need not conclude that Augustine was unaware of Porphyry's doctrine. Yet he may have learned of it from another work of Porphyry than the *Sententiae*, one which may no longer be extent. On the other hand, he may have learned of the doctrine from a source closer to Iamblichus's writings, some of which have similarly been lost, although we have evidence that they were

[136] O. Schissel von Fleschenberg, *Marinos von Neapolis und die neuplatonischen Tugendgrade*, Athens, Kunstdruckerei & Verlag, 1928, pp. 81-94, especially pp. 88-89. For further discussion of the question of Augustine's dependence upon Porphyry for the doctrine of grades of virtue, see O. Du Roy, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin*, Paris, Études augustiniennes, 1966, pp. 256-67; B. Neil, *Neo-Platonic Influence on Augustine's Conception of the Ascent of the Soul in «De quantitate animae»*, in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, vol. 2, ed. P. Allen et al., Everton Park, Centre for Early Christian Studies, Australian Catholic University, 1999, pp. 197-215; and Brittain, op. cit. W. Theiler, *Porphyrios und Augustin*, Halle, Niemeyer, 1933 [= idem, *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1966], provides a list of parallels between Augustine's writings and Porphyry's *Sententiae* (see the *Stellenverzeichnis zur Lehre des Porphyrios* at the conclusion of the book for references). However, Theiler's arguments in this work are generally regarded with skepticism by many scholars.

[137] A. Solignac, *Réminiscences plotiniennes et porphyriennes dans le début du "De ordine" de saint Augustin*, in *Archives de philosophie*, n. s. 20, 1957, pp. 457-462, finds echoes of Porphyry, *Sententiae* 35, 37, and 40 in Augustine's *De ordine*. On this point, see also Du Roy, op. cit., pp. 183-196.

[138] See Saffrey and Segonds, op. cit., p. lxxix, n. 1. Nevertheless, Brittain, op. cit., pp. 248-260, follows closely Schissel von Fleschenberg and Du Roy, op. cit., p. 258-260, in treating *quant. an.* 70-81 as though it were a commentary on the grades of virtue, inspired by Plotinus and Porphyry.

known to Proclus and Olympiodorus. It is also possible that from the latter half of the fourth through the sixth centuries, various forms of this doctrine as found in the early Neoplatonists had circulated widely throughout the Empire, and that Augustine learned of it through intermediary sources. Perhaps the most that can be said with certainty about the doctrine of the grades of virtue which Augustine explores in Letter 155 is that there are strong parallels between it and various elaborations of this doctrine by Neoplatonic writers. To say this, however, is to say much.

The same cautious approach to parallels between Augustine's Letter 155 and Neoplatonist writings ought to prevail in regard to the role of faith, hope, and love, as virtues which draw the soul closer to God. We saw the importance that Porphyry in *Ad Marcellam* attaches to the four principles of faith, knowledge, hope, and love in conjunction with the purification of the soul as it approaches God, and the possible role of the *Chaldean Oracles* as a source for this doctrine in Porphyry. We also saw a parallel role for faith, hope, and love at Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 5.26. Certainly, the significance of faith, hope, and love in Augustine's account of the ascent of the soul to God is derived from other sources, both biblical and patristic, not the least in conjunction with 1 Corinthians 13. We cannot say that he knew Porphyry's *Ad Marcellam* or the so-called *Liber de mysteriis*, attributed to Iamblichus.[139] However, the juxtaposition of these three virtues in relation to the political virtues and the subsequent purification of the soul which Augustine discusses in Letter 155 offers another striking parallel to the treatment they receive in these Neoplatonist writings. This fact should be noted, even if we cannot yet account for it. The enduring significance of these principles or virtues for the Neoplatonists is indicated by the fact that in the fifth and sixth centuries, they reoccur in commentaries on Platonic dialogues by Proclus and Olympiodorus.[140] Dominic O'Meara's recent book, *Platonopolis*, has demonstrated that our understanding of the revival of Neoplatonist political thought in the fifth and sixth centuries is still in an initial phase.[141]

[139] Theiler, op. cit., claims to have identified a number of parallels between Porphyry's *Ad Marcellam* and various works of Augustine. But see my remarks supra, n. 136.

[140] See supra nn. 80, 81.

[141] In the light of Augustine's correspondence with Christian public officials such as Macedonius and Flavius Marcellinus (see my argument at infra, nn. 142, 143), O'Meara may want to rethink his conclusion that Augustine eventually rejects completely Neoplatonic political ideas. See O'Meara, op. cit., pp. 154-158; 202.

I believe that the examination in this paper of Augustine's use of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the grades of virtue strengthens O'Meara's central argument, concerning the revival of Neoplatonic political philosophy in the fifth and sixth centuries.

Conclusion

Nevertheless, what emerges from this analysis and comparison of Augustine's Letter 155 with Neoplatonist accounts of the grades of virtue is a clearer picture of Augustine's intentions in this letter, one with wider consequences for our conception of his political ethics than we have previously perceived. Letter 155 confirms that Augustine is aware of some form of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the grades of virtue, and that he frames his discussion of Macedonius's political responsibilities against the backdrop of this Neoplatonic doctrine, which he nonetheless modifies to suit his own theological assumptions. Two important consequences follow from this effort, in addition to those indicated at the conclusion of the initial section of this article. First, by incorporating a version of the Neoplatonic doctrine into the counsel he gives to Macedonius, Augustine bridges a gap between the virtuous life of the heavenly city and the virtuous life of Christians who govern the earthly city. Letter 155, with its emphasis on the transformation of the political virtues through faith, hope, and love, shows in more detail than we have previously understood how in Augustine's view it is possible for Christian statesmen to deepen their love of God as "citizens of the heavenly city," without abandoning the obligations of their political offices. One might even say that Augustine sets this as a general expectation for Christian statesmen. About two years before writing Letter 155, Augustine wrote Letter 138 to the Roman imperial tribune and notary Marcellinus, and in the course of the letter, asserted that faith, hope, and love make Christians "adopted citizens" of the heavenly city, so that they either reform the morals of those who would allow vices to rage in the earthly commonwealth or, failing to reform these individuals, they are at least able to tolerate them.[142] As in Letter 155, Augustine makes this claim about faith, hope, and love in the context of a discussion of the status of political virtues before and after their transformation

[142] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.17 (CCL 44.144): "...cui nos ciues adsciscit fides, spes, caritas, ut, quam diu inde peregrinamur, feramus eos, si corrigere non ualemus, qui uitiis inpunitis uolunt stare rem publicam, ...".

through true piety.[143] Other occasions in which Augustine discusses faith, hope, and love in the context of the transformation of political virtues can also be found in his writings.[144]

Representative of those commentators who perceive in Augustine's thought a gap between the good citizen and the good Christian is the late Ernest Fortin, who insisted that,

> "Christian wisdom and political power may occasionally coexist in a single subject, the person of the Christian ruler, but even in that case, they remain distinct, cooperating with each other whenever possible but never merging into the other. [...] The Christian who, by his active presence in the city, is willy-nilly caught up in its more or less just distribution of goods and honors or its more or less just wars is not being asked to love the evils consequent on the establishment and maintenance of that society, but only the substantive justice which it embodies and which would not exist without it.
> [...]
> "By judiciously blending the teaching of classical philosophy with that of the Bible, Augustine was able to counter the massive objections to which on political grounds Christianity was exposed, as well as the massive objections to which on Christian grounds the political life was exposed. Yet the solution at which he arrived cannot be said to have been completely harmonious or symmetrical. He reduced but did not suppress the tension between man's perfection as a citizen and his perfection as a Christian and a human being. It disposed of the problem of the political life, not by integrating the Christian fully into it, but by moving beyond it in the direction of a goal which was not only transpolitical but other-worldly."[145]

[143] As is clear from what immediately follows the preceding passage (supra, n. 142) at Augustine, *ep.* 138.17 (CCL 44.144): "... quam primi Romani constituerunt auxeruntque uirtutibus etsi non habentes ueram pietatem erga deum uerum, quae illos etiam in aeternam ciuitatem posset salubri religione perducere, custodientes tamen quandam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae ciuitati constituendae, augendae conseruandaeque sufficere." These statements should be read in the context of this entire section of the letter.

[144] See, for example, Augustine, *ciu.* 5.20 (CCL 47.157): "unde non ei digne seruit soliditas quaedam firmitasque uirtutum, ut nihil prouideat prouidentia, nihil distribuat iustitia, nihil toleret fortitudo, nihil temperantia moderetur, nisi unde placeatur hominibus et uentosae gloriae seruiatur. nec illi se ab ista foeditate defenderint, qui, cum aliena spernant iudicia uelut gloriae contemptores, sibi sapientes uidentur et sibi placent. nam eorum uirtus, si tamen ulla est, alio modo quodam humanae subditur laudi; neque enim ipse, qui sibi placet, homo non est. qui autem uera pietate in deum, quem diligit, credit et sperat, plus intendit in ea, in quibus sibi displicet, quam in ea, si qua in illo sunt, quae non tam ipsi quam ueritati placent; neque id tribuit, unde iam potest placere, nisi eius misericordiae, cui metuit displicere; de his sanatis gratias agens, de illis sanandis preces fundens."

[145] See Fortin, op. cit., p. 47-49.

Fortin's description of Augustine's Christian ruler or citizen assumes the inevitability of a moral compromise between the two poles of civic responsibility and Christianity. By this reading, either the Christian ruler/citizen gives more weight to the tenets of the Christian religion and less to the sometimes harsh obligations of public office, or he fulfills his public duties while paying less heed to the "other-worldly" claims on his soul made by his Christian faith. However, Fortin's summation of Augustine's thinking does not allow the possibility of a gradation of political virtues, such as justice. Fortin assumes, for example, that the concept of justice behind the Christian statesman's distribution of goods and honors, or his conduct of just wars, remains constant, and does not undergo any modification as a result of his faith, hope, and love. We might even say that, according to Fortin, Augustine equates the demands of justice as conceived by the Christian statesman with the demands of justice as conceived by Roman statesmen who give no place to Christian faith, hope, and love. However, Letter 155 clarifies that for Augustine the concept of justice, as of the other political virtues, undergoes significant change in the statesman once he considers his public responsibilities in the light of the claims of Christian faith, hope, and love.

Augustine gives some indication of this changed perspective in Letter 138 to Marcellinus. As already noted, this letter contains a brief but telling reference to the fact that the political virtues undergo transformation in the Christian statesman as a result of his faith, hope, and love.[146] Elsewhere in the letter, Augustine responds to the accusation by the proconsul of Africa, Rufius Volusianus, that the morals of the Christian religion are not suitable for governing the Roman Empire.[147] In response, Augustine claims not only that Christian morals would not harm the Empire, but that they would likely

[146] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.17 (supra nn. 142, 143).

[147] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.9 (cf. Augustine, *ep.* 136.2 [Flavius Marcellinus to Augustine]). On Rufius Volusianus, see A. Chastagnol, *Le sénateur Volusien et la conversion d'une famille de l'aristocratie romaine au Bas-Empire*, in *Revue des études anciennes*, 58, 1956, pp. 241-253. See also É. Rebillard, *Augustin et le rituel épistolaire de l'élite sociale et culturelle de son temps. Eléments pour une analyse processuelle des relations de l'évèque et de la cité dans l'antiquité tardive*, in *L'évèque dans la Cité du IV^e^ au V^e^ siècle. Image et autorité*, ed. É. Rebillard and C. Sotinel, Rome, École française de Rome, 1998, pp. 127-152, and N. McLynn, *Augustine's Roman Empire*, in *History, Apocalypse and Imagination: New Essay on Augustine's the Secular* City of God, ed. M. Vessey, et al., Bowling Green, Bowling Green State University, Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999 (= *Augustinian Studies*, 30:2, 1999), pp. 29-44, at pp. 40-44.

enhance its strength in the face of its enemies.[148] He says, for example, that the Gospel admonition at Mt 5:39-41 to turn the other cheek when struck by an assailant can result in an evil person being defeated through the goodness, rather than the brute force, of his Christian adversary. He adds that while Christians who pursue less violent means in the defence of society must be prepared to tolerate some loss of temporal benefits, they witness to their conviction that there are higher goods to be sought in life, among them faith and justice. Furthermore, by taking this stand, Christians may succeed in drawing their enemies into reforming themselves by choosing these eternal goods.[149] Against the criticism that attempts to practice Christian nonviolence in this way would leave the Empire defenceless against its enemies, Augustine responds that this moral principle is not meant to rule out the use of force altogether, but to curb it, thereby rendering the force applied less harsh.[150] He concludes this argument by stating,

> "If the earthly commonwealth observes Christian precepts in this way, then even wars will be waged in a spirit of benevolence; their aim will be to serve the defeated more easily by securing a peaceful society that is pious and just."[151]

[148] See, for example, Augustine, *ep.* 138.10 (CSEL 44.135): "cum uero legitur praecipiente auctoritate diuina non reddendum malum pro malo, cum haec tam salubris admonitio congregationibus populorum tamquam publicis utriusque sexus atque omnium aetatum et dignitatum scholis de superiore loco personat, accusatur religio tamquam inimica rei publicae. quae si, ut dignum est, audiretur, longe melius Romulo, Numa, Bruto ceterisque illis Romanae gentis praeclaris uiris constitueret, consecraret, firmaret augeretque rem publicam."

[149] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.11 (CSEL 44.136-137): "qui ergo uincit bono malum, patienter amittit temporalia commoda, ut doceat, quam pro fide atque iustitia contemnenda sint, quae ille nimis amando fit malus, ac sic iniuriosus ab eo ipso, cui fecit iniuriam, discat, qualia sint, propter quae fecit iniuriam, atque in concordiam, qua nihil est utilius ciuitati, paenitens adquiratur uictus non saeuientis uiribus sed beniuolentia patientis."

[150] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.14 (CSEL 44. 139-140): "sunt ergo ista praecepta patientiae semper in cordis praeparatione retinenda ipsaque beniuolentia, ne reddatur malum pro malo, semper in uoluntate complenda est. agenda sunt autem multa etiam cum inuitis benigna quadam asperitate plectendis, quorum potius utilitati consulendum est quam uoluntati, quod in principe ciuitatis luculentissime illorum litterae laudauerunt. nam in corripiendo filio quamlibet aspere numquam profecto amor paternus amittitur; fit tamen, quod nolit et doleat, qui etiam inuitus uidetur dolore sanandus."

[151] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.14 (CSEL 44. 140): "ac per hoc si terrena ista res publica praecepta christiana custodiat, et ipsa bella sine beniuolentia non gerentur, ut ad pietatis iustitiaeque pacatam societatem uictis facilius consulatur." English translation by E. M. Atkins at *Augustine. Political Writings*, ed. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 38.

Augustine's conclusion implies that the kind of benevolence, peace, piety, and justice produced in an earthly commonwealth which is governed according to Christian precepts should be morally superior to the benevolence, peace, piety, and justice found in a commonwealth not governed according to these principles. As if to provide evidence for this point, Augustine later indicates that the political virtues of the earliest Romans established and enlarged their commonwealth, and that although these Romans did not practice true piety, they nonetheless practiced virtues such as integrity (*probitas*) in order to defend their earthly city.

> "For God," Augustine declares, "revealed in the wealth and fame of the Roman Empire how powerful are civic virtues even without true piety; to make it clear that with the addition of this, human beings become citizens of the other city, whose king is truth, whose law is order, and whose limit is love."[152]

It will perhaps only become completely clear through a careful reading of Letter 155 that, for Augustine, the addition of true piety and the resulting acquisition of citizenship in the "other city" of which he speaks in Letter 138 ought to lead to the transformation of political virtues in the Christian statesman above the elementary level of these virtues that the Romans observed without true piety.[153] The

[152] See Augustine, *ep.* 138.17 (CSEL 44. 144-145): "uitiis inpunitis uolunt stare rem publicam, quam primi Romani constituerunt auxeruntque uirtutibus etsi non habentes ueram pietatem erga deum uerum, quae illos etiam in aeternam ciuitatem posset salubri religione perducere, custodientes tamen quandam sui generis probitatem, quae posset terrenae ciuitati constituendae, augendae conseruandaeque sufficere. deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum ualerent ciuiles etiam sine uera religione uirtutes, ut intellegeretur hac addita fieri homines ciues alterius ciuitatis, cuius rex ueritas, cuius lex caritas, cuius modus aeternitas." English translation as at Atkins, op. cit., p. 40.

[153] H. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963, seems to miss this point when he writes at p. 142: "Provided that the Christian keeps patience and benevolence in his heart as he punishes and disciplines the criminal for his own good and for that of society, he commits no sin 'in correcting with a certain benevolent severity, even against their own wishes, men whose welfare rather than their wishes it is our duty to consult' ...", citing Augustine, *ep.* 138.14. In making this statement, Deane seems as unaware as Fortin that when Augustine refers in this and similar passages to political virtues such as patience and benevolence, he thinks of them as having been transformed in the Christian statesman as a consequence of his true piety (faith, hope, and love), and therefore as virtues which are practiced in a way not characteristic of pagan public officials. To understand what is precisely "Christian" about Augustine political ethics, one has to try to understand how he imagines the difference between governing through political virtues as they conform to true piety, and governing through political virtues which do not.

presence of this hierarchy of virtue in Augustine's political thought progressively diminishes the conflict which Fortin and others detect in it between the justice which statesmen are obliged to pursue in the earthly city and the love of God which their Christian commitment requires of them.[154]

A second, related consequence follows from this first general conclusion. Letter 155 gives us further reason to approach Augustine's political ethics through a more systematic examination of his virtue theory. Studies of Augustine's political thought to date have for the most part ignored the role of virtues, which may yet be shown to be central to his political ethics.[155] The study of a comprehensive virtue theory in Augustine would fill a lacuna in Augustinian studies, while, in my view, it also offers the most promising way to advance our understanding of his political ethics.

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[154] At another point in Letter 138, Augustine observes that the failures which Volusianus attributes to Christian emperors, if true, are the result of their moral faults, and not of the Gospel teaching which ought to have inspired them. See Augustine, *ep.* 138.16.

[155] In any future study of Augustine's virtue theory, the role of humility in relation to other virtues must be examined with particular care. Though I have not commented greatly on the precise role Augustine assigns to humility in Letter 155, the relationship between it and the other virtues which he urges Macedonius to practice is clear, and consists largely in recognizing that whatever true virtue he practices is a consequence of divine grace and not of his own efforts. See, for example, Augustine, *ep.* 155.5, 155.9, 155.12.

USING OR ENJOYING HUMANS

Uti and *frui* in Augustine

'Are you going to work about *uti* and *frui* in the thinking of Augustine? But so much has already been published about that topic.' This was the reply I heard the most at the question of Augustine-scholars what I was writing my thesis about. Mission impossible, or rather, mission already accomplished seemed to be the obvious message. Indeed, at first sight the amount of research-papers, articles and other kind of publications about Augustine's writing and thinking about *uti* and *frui* is vast. Nevertheless, a somewhat closer examination of that literature, revealed that a great part of those studies are reducible to a small number of positions centred in a polemical discourse. That polemical motive, especially the tackling of the theses of the 'other side', is the main reason why one has often remained blind for new approaches to the augustinian problem of *uti* and *frui*. My second finding – arrived at by means of a careful reading of the two main treatises of Augustine on the topic of *uti* and *frui*, *De doctrina christiana* I and *De diversis quaestionibus 83*, *quaestio 30*, was that some of the interpretations in the recent literature are – partly or completely – wrong and could be refuted and even corrected. In a first instance this article will provide a picture of the structure of that polemical discussion and its implications. Also I intend to go further, beyond that *status quaestionis*. The main intention of this article is to present an evaluation of the different positions with the two main texts of Augustine as a criterion. Those two texts may be regarded as the basis of Augustine's opinion about *uti* and *frui* since they are the only treatises that are entirely devoted to that subject.

Before beginning this article, I have to admit, that the search for and the correction of possible wrong interpretations of Augustine was not the main reason for my investigation. For me the fact that Augustine tried to answer an intrinsic human question was much more important: what do we have to do with our fellow-men? Reading Augustine, I discovered bit by bit that he offers us his proper, nuanced and well-thought-out answer. His insight represents a novel voice in the debate whether we have to perceive our neighbour as an instrument for our own goals and our own pleasure, or as an end *in se*.

1. The roots of the discussion about *uti* and *frui* in Augustine

The interest in a systematic study of the meaning of *uti* and *frui* in Augustine, takes as its starting point a book about the ethics of Augustine by Joseph Mausbach, as well as an excursion about *fruitio Dei* in a study by Heinrich Scholz about *De civitate Dei*.[1] Mausbach regards *uti* and *frui* as an explanatory schema for the difference between *cupiditas*, loving the temporal *propter se*, and *caritas*, loving God *propter se* while loving the temporal *propter aliud*. Scholz distinguishes two kinds of *frui*, a dialectical and a mystical one. In making that distinction, he begins a frequently re-appearing discussion whether there are distinctive different types of *frui*.

The most influential scholar in this preliminary stadium of the study of the augustinian *uti* and *frui* is Rudolf Lorenz. He wrote two well known studies: one about the significance of *frui* in the reflections of Augustine and another about the roots of Augustine's *frui*.[2] Although Lorenz himself does not really take part in the polemic, many of the polemicists take recourse to his articles. That is why he could not be neglected in a study concerning *uti* and *frui*.

For Augustine, *fruitio Dei* has two meanings, according to Lorenz: 'entering in a divine world order' and 'clinging to, or possessing God'. More important, and much discussed, is his theory that Varro, and in particular his lost *De Philosophia*, was responsible for Augustine's thinking and writing about *uti* and *frui*. At first sight, however, its origin could be situated in Cicero's thinking in general, and in his *De Officiis* in particular. The structural difference between *honestum* and *utile* in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *quaestio* 30, and the significance this has for *uti* and *frui* there, could easily have been inspired by the difference between *honestum* and *utile* in Cicero's *De Officiis*. Other significant themes, such as the relation between temporal goods (which are only *utendum* and *referendum ad*) and the *summum bonum* (that is *fruendum*), can also be found in Cicero. Nevertheless, two reasons eliminate Cicero as a possible contendent for the parenthood of Augustine's *uti* and *frui*. Lorenz points out that

[1] MAUSBACH J., *Die Ethik des Heiligen Augustinus*, Herder & co., Freiburg im Breisgau 1909, (Zweite vermehrte Auflage 1929). SCHOLZ H., *Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte . Ein Kommentar zu Augustinus De civitate Dei. Mit einem Exkursus: Fruitio Dei, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Mystik*, J.C. Hinrichs, Leipzig 1911.

[2] LORENZ R., *Fruitio dei bei Augustin*, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte (63), 1950-1951, pp. 95-132 en *Die Herkunft des augustinischen Frui Deo*, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte (64), 1952-1953, pp. 34-60 & (*Nachtrag*) pp. 359-390.

Cicero never equates *uti* with *referre ad aliud,* nor does he equate *frui* with *amare propter id ipsum*, whereas that equation is essential in Augustine. Contrary to Augustine, Cicero conceives of *uti* and *frui* as co-extensive. Investigating further, Lorenz comes to the conclusion that it was Varro who influenced Augustine. Lorenz bases his arguments on *De civitate Dei* XIX, 1-3. The parallels between Augustine's and Varro's texts, textual as well as with regard to content (especially the two schemas *natura – doctrina – usus* and *propter se – propter aliud*), are simply too striking to be coincidental. My remarks concerning Lorenz's thesis are twofold. First, I have doubts about the resolute rejection of Cicero as an influence on Augustine. When Lorenz bases his case on *De civitate Dei*[3], he seems to forget that Augustine wrote his two main treatises about *uti* and *frui* at least twenty years earlier. More importantly, Lorenz does not realise that Augustine is practically our only source of Varro. In that case it is very difficult to tell what precisely comes from Augustine and what comes from Varro. It is even more difficult to establish any possible influence of the one on the other. Reading a little bit further in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83 may shed light on the issue: Augustine cites Cicero's *De inventione rhetorica* 2 in *quaestio* 31.[4] Put differently, Cicero seems to play a role in any case. Furthermore, as Oliver O'Donovan points out, for Augustine, *usus* means something exclusive, that is to say, it is in an exclusive disjunction with *frui*.[5] Varro, on the other hand, sees *usus* as inclusive. O'Donovan adds that Lorenz does not have to look for such a complicated solution. The real solution is actually quite simple. In the classical ethics of Augustine's time it was common to make a distinction between goods with an intrinsic value and goods from which only contingent advantages follow. Augustine called that distinction *frui* and *uti*, Cicero called it

[3] *De civitate Dei* XI, 25 & XIX, 1-3, and also *De Trinitate* X,XI,17 may indicate a possible origin in Varro.

[4] The above mentioned passage from *De inventione rhetorica* 2 in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 31 is about virtues. In this passage is Cicero not stoic but rather platonic. Cicero gives *honestas* the platonic meaning of the intrinsic value of the desired object, *utilitas* refers to the contingent advantages that flow from that object.

Christian Gnilka remarks that in the context of the *summum bonum* the pair *uti-frui* could also be read in Seneca's *De beata vita* X,3. This gives reasons to believe that Augustine did not have to fall back on only one source, but that he was inspired by a much broader literal and spiritual atmosphere. GNILKA C., *KRÈSIS, Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur*, Schwabe & co., Basel/Stuttgart, 1984, p. 82.

[5] O'DONOVAN O., *Usus and fruitio in Augustine – De doctrina christiana I*, The Journal of Theological Studies (33), 1982, pp. 361-397.

honestas and *utilitas*. In that case it is only self evident that when Augustine read that distinction in Cicero, he linked it with his own distinction of the same meaning. Second, we do not really need an investigation of the origin of the augustinian *frui*. I will return to this second point later, when dealing with the discussion between Ragnar Holte and those who interpret Augustine in an instrumentalist fashion.

Having explored the roots of the study of the augustinian *uti* and *frui*, we have to examine the discussion in the literature about that particular topic. I will divide this discussion into two parts: early literature and more recent literature. That division is somewhat artificial since all participants of the second polemical round will debate the scholars of the first round. The division may nevertheless be justified: the treatment of *uti* and *frui* was initially placed in the greater context of a discussion about love in Augustine in general. Only more recent studies are exclusively devoted to the significance of *uti* and *frui*.

2. The first controversy: love in Augustine in general

2.1 Augustine under fire

egoism

The early discussion is focussed on the question of the nature of Augustine's thinking: whether it is egoistic, instrumentalist, erotic, hedonistic or non-Christian. Karl Holl, Anders Nygren, Gunnar Hultgren and Josef Brechtken in particular, accuse Augustine of defending an egoism by emphasizing the individual human desire for happiness. In their interpretation selflove is central for Augustine. In that case selflove, although oriented to God, would be nothing other than a sublimated form of an egocentric longing for one's own and individual *beatitudo*.

instrumentalism

Closely related to the accusation of a selfish search for happiness, is the charge of an instrumentalist approach to love and the fellow man. This charge is levelled by thinkers influenced by Immanuel Kant, such as Hannah Arendt, Karl Holl, Anders Nygren, Gunnar Hultgren, Josef Brechtken and Kurt Flasch.[6] They think that Augustine

[6] "Vom geschlechtlichen Ausdruck menschlicher Liebe hat Augustin daher nur mit Zeichen des Abscheus gesprochen. Auch wenn er ihn schließlich toleriert, zwängt er ihn in ein rohes Schema von Mittel und Zweck. Nie deutet er ihn als ein

reduces love of the neighbour to a means for achieving ones own perfection. In their eyes, the *uti homine* required by Augustine, is only an utilitarian use of human beings, in the worst and vulgar sense. They perceive *uti* and *frui* as means and end respectively. " [...] la relation entre frui et uti est identique à celle qui existe entre le but et le moyen."[7] This kind of reasoning tends to conclude that God does not tolerate any kind of love except the love for Him alone.[8] Nygren even goes one step further: even the love for God is a means inferior to the *frui Deo*. The highest human achievement is the enjoyment, the possession of God. Only when that is achieved, can one find fulfilment, rest and peace. Even the love for God shares the fate of the love of the neighbour: it becomes relative.

erotism

In the context of the charge of instrumentalism, Nygren, Hultgren and Brechtken accuse Augustine of not having been able to leave the Hellenistic theory of *eros* so as to reach the Christian concept of love.[9] In their opinion Augustine's perception of love, especially his

Verhältnis unter Personen. [...] Da Augustin nur Gott als Selbstzweck anerkennt, muß er sich selbst und jede andere Person nur als Mittel zu diesem Zweck ansehen. Diese Instrumentalisierung des eigenen und jeden fremden Lebens zerstört die Erfahrung eines anderen Menschen als Person. Die rigorose Anwendung des Begriffspaars "gebrauchen – genießen" verhindert von Grund auf eine Theorie der Liebe, gebietet sie doch, das eigene Leben und das Leben des Nächsten als Mittel zu einem überirdischen Zweck zu "gebrauchen". [...] Darin liegt eine Distanzierung des Menschen von sich selbst un anderen, eine radikale Versachligung menschlicher Beziehungen: Wir dürfen den anderen Menschen nur lieben, sofern er auf die ewige Seligkeit bezogen ist." FLASCH K., *Augustin. Einführung in sein Denken*, Philipp Reclam jun., Stuttgart 1980, pp. 135-136.

[7] NYGREN A., *Eros et Agapè – La notion chrétienne de l'amour et ses transformations*, JUNDT P. (trad.), Aubier, Paris 1944, p. 66.

[8] «"L'amour de Dieu exclut tout autre amour [...]" NYGREN A. , *op. cit.* p. 65.

Nygren claims that the central these in Augustine is: "O si Deum digne amemus, nummos omnino non amabimus." This sentence comes from *In Iohannis evangelium* tr. XL, 10: "Non amat multum nummum, qui amat Deum. Et ego palpaui infirmitatem non ausus sum dicere: Non amat nummum; sed: non multum amat nummum; quasi amandus sit nummus, sed non multum. O si Deum digne amemus, nummos omnino non amabimus!" (CCL 36, p. 356) Raymond Canning replies Nygren by showing that Nygren does not read this citation correct.

[9] "Même en s' aidant du groupe *uti* et *frui*, Augustin n' a pas dépassé la conception hellénistique traditionnelle, déterminée par l'êros. Quand il déclare qu'il faut utiliser le monde pour parvenir à la jouissance de Dieu, cette pensée est, en dernière analyse, analogue à celle de Platon, qui nous invite à ne pas laisser enchaîner par les choses du monde, mais à nous servir d'elles, comme de degrés, pour nous élever vers le monde supérieur." NYGREN A., *op.cit.* p. 74.

perception of love of the neighbour, does not come close to approach the Christian *agape*. Augustine's thinking is fixed in platonic categories: we must not get lost in the beauties of this world. That is why we have to use the things of this world – such as human love – as a ladder to reach a higher world. That form of love, that *eros,* is selfish and opposite to the self-denying service to the neighbour to which human beings are called by the biblical *agape*. This charge is very similar to the charge of instrumentalism, and the same replies can be made against it. Further, 'erotic' implies that augustinian love would be a striving, a greedy desire to find rest, an *appetitus*. That rest is only achieved in God, in *fruitio Dei*.

2.2 Refutation of the accusations

2.2.1 In general terms

In the first round of defence, I will use 'general' arguments. Those arguments deal mainly with Augustine's thinking and writing in general. They can be found in the writings of William Riordan O'Connor, John Burnaby, Ragnar Holte, Luc Verheijen, Tarsicius Johannes Van Bavel and Raymond Canning. The second round will be based on the two basis-texts *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 and *De doctrina christiana I.*

Not selfish

First should it be noted that, since the complaints of egoism and instrumentalism are closely related – for it is for my own sake that I use my neighbour – they may receive, certainly in general terms, the same answers.

I already noted that Augustine makes a difference between *libido* or *cupiditas* and *caritas*. *Libido/cupiditas* is indeed selfish and instrumentalist in an abusive and exploitative sense. But in Augustine's perspective, *libido/cupiditas* only refer to bad forms of love. Augustine calls good love *caritas*, and the love for God and the neighbour are precisely forms of *caritas*. This good love is certainly not meant to be self-profiting in an amoral sense. It should also be mentioned that the distinction between *uti* and *frui* is not as univocal as our contemporary common-sense distinction between using and enjoying. This point will be made clearer when the general use of *uti* and *frui* in classical Latin will be investigated later on in this article.

The charge of egoism cannot stand, simply because Augustine's stress on the importance of community. Not the individual but the community should be the central focus of love. Love is just a *vis*

unitiva. One may be reminded, for example, how much attention Augustine pays to *caritas unitatis* (there can only be unity in the church through mutual love between the believers). Another clue lies in what Augustine understands as the *summum bonum*. The *summum bonum* is a *bonum commune* and not a *bonum privatum*. So for Augustine, real love could not possibly be selfish. The highest good of the soul is giving oneself to God. Rather than a belonging to oneself this is a belonging to God, and that is not egocentric. In that moment an 'I' that enjoys no longer exists.

not instrumentalist in a bad sense

In the love for God I already love my neighbour.[10] In that sense it is impossible to see my neighbour only as an instrument in my search for God. That love for God is love for the neighbour Augustine illustrates by his concept of two forms of *ordo*. Love for the neighbour takes the first place in the *ordo faciendi* and the second one in the *ordo praecipiendi* while the love for God comes first in the *ordo praecipiendi* and secondly in the *ordo faciendi*.[11] As Raymond Canning emphasises, the love for the neighbour and for God are deeply united and intrinsically connected. Love for the neighbour is much more than only a preparation for the love of God. Love for the neighbour is so important, that one can find God in it.[12] Claiming that, for Augustine, only God may be loved means to neglect Augustine's thought of *ordinata dilectio*. Love is essentially a matter of order. Love can only be good, when there is an order in the different modes of love and in the objects of love. This implies that, besides God, other objects may be loved. Not only the love for the neighbour, but even the correct use of temporal goods is already love, because it respects the order of the creation, since it obeys the Creator. When the use of the world is not a deviation of the love for God, then the love for the neighbour is even less different from the love for God.[13]

[10] See footnote 59.

[11] *In Iohannis Evangelium*, XVII, 8 (10-12): "Dei dilectio prior est ordine praecipiendi, proximi autem dilectio prior est ordine faciendi." (CCL 36, p. 174)

[12] *De Trinitate* VIII, 10: "[...] sed et hoc ideo quia et qui proximum diligit consequens est ut ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est, et qui manet in dilectione in Deo manet. Consequens ergo est ut praecipue Deum diligat." (CCL 50, p. 283)

[13] Nygren uses a quote from *In Ioannis Evangelium* tr. XL, 10 to argue that for Augustine God is the sole object of love. The following sentence from that text, which Nygren seems to forget, shows that the love for money, for the world, and temporal things pursued for their own pleasure, are indeed not in concordance with the love for God. But it also points out that the correct use of temporal goods in order

The very doubts which will be dealt with in the second part of this article, doubts Augustine has whether to regard human beings as objects of *frui* or *uti,* are a sign of how important the love for the neighbour is for Augustine. Such an important love cannot merely be a selfish instrument.

In reply to Nygren, it should be noted that love for God is not a state of rest: "La fruitio Dei n'est pas alors un sentiment passif, mais le point d'appui où se rassemblent les forces."[14] Love and enjoyment are essentially connected. This means that loving God is not the automatic end of that love.[15] One enjoys only what one loves and loves only what one enjoys. That is why the love for God does not end when the enjoying of God starts.[16]

Holte against instrumentalism: an evaluation

Ragnar Holte is the great defender of Augustine against the charge of instrumentalism.[17] He does this by using the ethics of the

to provide earthly needs during our earthly pilgrimage, does corresponds to real love. "Erit tibi nummus instrumentum peregrinationis, non irritamentum cupiditatis; quo utaris ad necessitatem, non quo fruaris ad delectationem. Deum ama, si aliquid in te egit quod audis et laudas. Utere mundo, non te capiat mundus." (CCL 36, p. 356) cf. Praeceptum 5,2: "Et ideo, quanto, amplius rem communem quam propria vestra curaveritis, tanto vos amplius profecisse noveritis; ut in omnibus quibus utitur transitura necessitas, superemineat, quae permanet, caritas." (VERHEIJEN L., *La règle de Saint Augustin. I. Tradition Manuscrite*, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1967, pp. 429-430.)

[14] HULTGREN G., *Le commandement d'amour chez Augustin – Interprétation Philosophique et Théologique d'après les Ecrits de la période 386-400*, Vrin, Paris 1939, p. 156.

[15] "Il est vrai qu' Augustin s'applique, avant tout, à faire ressortir le rôle de l'amour en tant que facteur préparatoire et à spéculer sur l'opposition existant entre le désir et la possession de manière à attribuer à l'amour le désir et à la *fruitio* la possession, mais cela n'empêche pas l'amour de faire également partie de la *fruitio*." HULTGREN G., op. cit. pp. 149-150.

[16] John Burnaby, as a specific refutation of Nygren's charge that, for Augustine, even the love for God becomes relative, writes: "According to Nygren, the formula by which Augustine intended to provide for a relative love of the creature, while reserving absolute love for God, in fact makes *all* love, even the love of God, relative to the self and its enjoyment. But this condition is merely the consequence of Nygren's false restriction of *amor* to desire." BURNABY J., *Amor Dei – A study of St. Augustine's teaching on the Love of God as the motive of Christian Life*, Hodder and Stoughton, Londen 1938, p. 109.

[17] HOLTE R., *Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne*, Institut des Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1962 (original: *Beatitudo och Sapientia. Augustinus och de antika filososkolornas diskussion om manenniskans livsmal*, Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokföerlag, Stockholm 1958.)

Stoa. Tracing the origin of *uti* and *frui* back to the Stoa, by using the arguments of Lorenz, Holte feels justified in applying stoic thinking to Augustine's *uti* and *frui*. Augustine links *uti* and *frui* in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 with *utile* and *honestum*. That last pair is typically stoic, and has a strong ethical connotation: not the object but the right orientation constitutes morality. In that sense the use (*uti*) of humans by humans, as Augustine several times demands, does not sound so negatively utilitarian. *Uti* in the love of the neighbour from a stoic perspective, is not the use of the neighbour for one's own advantage, but the referring of all human deeds, which, coincidentally, belong to the domain of *utilia*, to the moral norm.[18] I appreciate Holte's attempt to clear Augustine of the charge of instrumentalism, but I think he is looking in the wrong direction. On the one hand, in the texts in which Augustine deals with *uti/frui homine* there are a sufficient number of leads that may prove to us with certainty that Augustine does not approach humans in an instrumentalist way. On the other hand, I do not find the search for a hypothetical origin really necessary as argument in a plea against an instrumentalist interpretation. In my opinion, two other arguments are more self evident: the meaning of *uti* (and *frui*) in the general use of language in Augustine's time, and Augustine's own use of those terms in his writings preceding their systematic treatment in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 and *De doctrina christiana I*.

The investigation of the use of *uti* and *frui* in classical Latin is very instructive, in several ways. First, the Latin terms *uti* and *frui* have a much broader spectrum of meanings. *Uti* has several meanings that cannot possibly be translated with the English 'use'. *Uti*, for example, may mean: to deal with a person, to associate oneself with a person, to have friendly, familiarly and even intimate relations – in a certainly not utilitarian way. In some cases *uti* can even mean 'to experience, to enjoy, to undergo'. In opposite side, *frui* may sometimes stand for 'to get advantage or profit from, to be at someone's benefit'. Apparently in Latin it is not so easy to maintain a strict

[18] The basic meaning of *uti* lies in the verb *referre*: "[...] il traduit l'acte par lequel l'action extérieure est rapportée à la norme morale: l' *honestum*; or cette norme coïncide avec Dieu; partant cet acte est déjà un acte d'amour de Dieu. C'est là, croyons-nous, le point central de la morale augustinienne: la moralité de l'amour d'usage ne se définit pas par l'objet aimé, mais par le choix qui en est fait pour sa conformité avec la loi morale, c'est-à-dire par référence à l'amour de Dieu; or ce choix constitue déjà un acte d'amour de Dieu. Tout amour d'usage légitime comprend donc un élément d'amour de Dieu. Et c'est en cet élément que consiste sa moralité." HOLTE R., *op. cit.* p. 203.

difference between *uti* and *frui*. This is illustrated by the term 'usufructus', English 'usufruct'. The term combines *uti* and *frui*: the right to use and enjoy something. All these findings lead to two conclusions. First, we may not associate the Latin pair *uti* and *frui* with our contemporary common-sense distinction between using and enjoying. They do not constitute an opposition in Latin. Second, when Augustine speaks about *uti homine*, he does not mean the same (ab)use of humans against which Kant so firmly reacted. Applied to humans, *uti* does not (always) have an utilitarian meaning.

Uti and *frui* do not constitute a rhetorical pair in the Italian writings (386-388). *Frui* is defined as "praesto habere quod diligis".[19] *Uti* designates the relation in which humans are the subject and worldly goods are the object. Only God is to be loved.[20] That we may not love the things of this world, does not mean that we may have contempt for them. *Usus* is not bad *in se*, it is actually morally valuable because it helps us to reach God. *Usus* becomes bad when it happens out of a wrong orientation.[21] The scope of *uti* expands in the writings of Thagaste (388-391). Now humans are also the object of *uti*. Here *uti* undergoes a fundamental change of meaning. *Uti* no longer has a strict and dominantly utilitarian meaning. In *De vera religione* humans are, for the first time, counted among objects of use, but immediately separated from the other use-objects.[22] 'Recte utitur temporalibus' is parallel with 'hominibus consulit'. The correct use of fellow humans is to care for these fellow humans. *Uti* here receives the relational and non-utilitarian meaning that was available in Latin. It is in the writings of the Presbyterate (391-395) that *uti* and *frui* explicitly form a rhetorical couple. The essence of that pair is

[19] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manichaeorum I, III, 4.* (PL 32, p. 1312).

[20] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manichaeorum I, XX, 37* (PL 32, p.1327/ CSEL 90, p. 42): "Amandus igitur solus Deus est: omnis vero iste mundus, id est, omnia sensibilia contemnenda, utendum autem his ad huius vitae necessitatem."

[21] *De libero arbitrio I, XV, 33*: "Cum igitur eisdem rebus alius male alius bene utatur, et is quidem qui male, amore his inhereat atque implicetur – scilicet subditus eis rebus quas ei subditas esse opportebat, et ea bona sibi constituens quibus ordinandis beneque tractandis ipse esse utique bonum [...] sed eis totus superferatur, et habere illa atque regere, cum opus est paratus, et amittere ac non habere paratior."

[22] *De vera religione XLVII,91* (CCL 32, pp. 246-247): "Hic uir, quamdiu est in hac vita, utitur amico ad rependam gratiam, utitur inimico ad patientiam, utitur quibus potest ad beneficentiam, utitur omnibus ad beneuolentiam. Et quamquam temporalia non diligat, ipse recte utitur temporalibus et pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit, si aequaliter non potest omnibus."

formulated in *Enarratio in Psalmos* 4,8: "[...] nec facile inveniuntur qui diligant bona interiora, id est, ad interiorem hominem pertinentia, quae sola diligenda sunt, ceteris autem ad necessitatem utendum, non ad gaudium perfruendum."[23] The material and the earthly are only allowed to be used (*uti*) but not to be enjoyed. *Uti* and *frui* seem to be contraries here. In the second text of the Presbyterate in which Augustine writes about *uti* and *frui* as an pair, which will be discussed later on, the *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30, Augustine is more nuanced about the relation between those two verbs. Conclusion: In defending Augustine the search for stoic roots can be interesting, but is not necessary. In Augustine's writing before *De doctrina christiana I* and in Latin in general, can we already find a positive, non-selfish and non-utilitarian *uti*.

about erotism

The charge of a longing erotic love can be dealt with in two directions. Aimé Becker argues that a longing and striving kind of love is not always bad. There exists a longing kind of love in which the lover forgets himself. Such a love is, for example, the loving movement from a creature to its Creator. Longing love is not always *superbia*.[24] In that sense a striving love is not always wrong, and it is certainly not unchristian. John Burnaby pursues another direction. He points out that love for God and the neighbour can hardly be called striving. Those kinds of love are, after all, more than only a longing desire for *beata vita*, they are obedience to the *lex aeterna*.[25] And precisely that obedience is the biblical agape.

[23] CCL 38, p. 17.

[24] BECKER A., *De l'instinct du bonheur à l'extase de la béatitude – Théologie et pédagogie du bonheur dans la prédication de Saint Augustin*, P. Lethielleux, Paris 1967, Ch. 10, pp. 280-316: reply to Nygren.

[25] Ragnar Holte develops the same reasoning. *Frui Deo* is, as Lorenz already showed, a submission to the law. That law becomes even an object of love. The love for God is love for the law. Holte found this insight in the writings of Gösta Hök. HOLTE R., *op. cit.* pp. 228-229. HÖK G., *Augustin und die antike Tugendlehre*, Kerygma und Dogma (6), 1960, pp. 104-130.

The thought that the relation to God is connected with submission to the *lex aeterna* is also described by SCHUBERT P.A., *Augustins Lex-aeterna-Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen*, Aschendorff, Münster i. W. 1924.

2.2.1 Specific refutations: based on *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 and *De doctrina christiana* I

1. De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 30

The question that Augustine tries to answer in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 is 'Vtrum omnia in utilitatem hominis creata sint?'. What if humans are subjects and temporal goods objects? Consequently the meaning of *uti homine* is not the specific topic of the 30th question. Nevertheless, arguments against the charges of egoism and instrumentalism can be found there.

The choice between *uti* and *frui*, as well as *uti* and *frui* themselves, have to occur in a ordered way. There is a double *ordinatio*. First of all, the correct verb has to be applied to the correct object: *frui fruendis* and *uti utendis*.[26] Second, when one uses something, one has to do it moderately, according to the needs one has.[27] These choices are ethical as well as rational. That this is an ethical matter, is already clear from Augustine's choice of words; namely, he speaks about *virtus* and *vitium*. Only a human being gifted with reason, only a wise man, can *uti* in a correct way.[28] *Ratio* makes humans superior to the rest of creation. *Ratio* is something that all humans share. All humans are equals in that respect. Equals cannot and should not try to dominate and use each other as instruments. *Uti* is thus not something arbitrary, but very ordered and strictly defined. The function of *uti* is to help to get to *frui*.

The object *ad fruendum* is invisible, intelligible and spiritual, or in other words: God. All that is bodily and visible is to be used (*uti*). This implies that humans are *ad utendum*. Augustine, however, immediately adds that humans are not to be used *ad eminentiam* but *ad societatem*. Humans are to be used, but not in the same manner as other earthly instruments are to be used.[29] Humans are equals and

[26] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 38, 10-15): "Omnis itaque humana peruersio est, quod etiam uitium uocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae uirtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti."

[27] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 39, 28-29): "Utilibus autem utendum est omnibus, ut quoque eorum opus est."

[28] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 49, 32-35): "Scire namque quo quidque referendum sit, non datum est rationis expertibus neque ipsis rationalibus stultis. Nec uti quisque potest ea re quae quo referenda sit nescit; nec quisquam potest scire nisi sapiens."

[29] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 39, 40-44): "Perfecta igitur hominis ratio, quae virtus vocatur, utitur primo se ipsa ad intelligendum Deum, ut eo fruatur a quo etiam facta est; utitur autem ceteris rationalibus animantibus ad

should try to build up community. Augustine is here far removed from a self-centred selfish ethics. Besides, Augustine has great respect for all living creatures: bodies should be used for noble goals: patience, moderation, truth, justice and health.[30] Furthermore, Augustine reacts explicitly against egocentric attempts to achieve *fruitio*. Those who are too much orientated towards their own goals, are guilty of *superbia*.[31]

"Omnia ergo quae facta sunt, in usum hominis facta sunt, quia omnibus utitur iudicando ratio, quae homini data est."[32] In *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 *uti* expresses the attitude we have to adopt in relation to the created world. Augustine answers: yes, we may use the creation. Actually, his answer goes still further: the creation has to be used, *uti* is the only permitted relation of humans to the world. The conclusion with regard to humans as objects is that they should be used. It is to be noted, however, that using humans is not entirely the same as using temporal goods. *Uti* of humans as objects is respectful, community-minded and based on equality. It is not hedonistic and vulgar utilitarian. Certainly, inter-human relationships have a certain instrumentalist character but that instrumentalism is not as bad as it sounds. *Uti homine* is always aimed at noble causes in a rational and moderate way.

2. De doctrina christiana I

It has already been mentioned that Lorenz – and Holte in his footsteps – uses the couple *honestum-utile* to argue a stoic origin of Augustine's *uti* and to prove in that way that *uti* is not egoistic and instrumentalistic. I think that is not necessary. Textually and with regard to the content, there are enough arguments in *De doctrina christiana* I.[33] Besides, Augustine does not use the pair *honestum-*

societatem, inrationalibus ad eminentiam. Vitam etiam suam ad id refert, ut fruatur Deo; ita enim beata est."

[30] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 46-52): "Vtitur etiam corporibus quibusdam uiuificandis ad beneficentiam – sic enim utitur suo corpore –, quibusdam assumendis uel respuendis ad ualitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustitiam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod ueritatis documentum; utitur etiam his a quibus se abstinet ad temperantiam."

[31] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 45-46): "Quae profecto inchoat miseriam per superbiam, si ad se ipsam, non ad deum referatur. "

[32] *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 59-61).

[33] For text-edition, numbering of chapters, paragraphs and alineas, I rely on the CSEL-edition of William MacAllen Green. Augustine himself only distinguished four books in *De doctrina christiana*. Succeeding text-editions refined the classifica-

utile in *De doctrina christiana* I, whereas it is the most important treatise regarding *uti* and *frui*.

In *De doctrina christiana* I, love, as *amare* and *diligere*, is a crucial term in the definitions of *uti* and *frui*. Just as in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q*. 30 order, *ordinata dilectio* as Augustine calls it in *De doctrina christiana* I, plays an essential role in love. Not only the correct verb, *uti* or *frui*, has to be applied to the correct object, but one has to keep the right sequence and moderation in mind. Love has to happen according to a strict order: from the body as the lowest object of love, *via* humans, to God as the highest object of love.[34] Even so ordered love is a matter of moderation: respecting the 'more or less' that can be distinguished in the order of things.[35] By stressing the discipline and moderation that are focused upon in Augustine's concept of love in *De doctrina christiana* I, I only wanted to show that it is not fair to accuse Augustine of having instrumentalist, selfish and erotic ideas about love.

Those who accuse Augustine of instrumentalism and egoism when he writes about *uti homine*, forget that the use of humans is completely different from the use of the rest of creation, as is clearly stated in *De doctrina christiana* I.

Such an *uti* of humans is connected with love. *Uti* of humans by humans is not just 'using', it is always a form of love, *diligere*. This in contrast to the use we may make of the rest of the creation.[36]

tion. The edition of Green is the end of that evolution. In citing the Latin texts, it has no sense to mention the page-numbers because the alinea-classification is much more detailed. GREEN Guilemus M. (ed., introd.), *De Doctrina Christiana*, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 80, (Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera sect. VI, pars VI),Vindobonae, Hoelder/Pichler/Tempski 1963.

[34] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXVII, 28 (60): "Et si Deus omni homine amplius diligendus est, amplius quisque Deum debet diligere quam se ipsum. Item amplius alius homo diligendus est quam corpus nostrum, quia propter Deum omnia ista diligenda sunt et potest nobiscum alius homo Deo perfrui, quod non potest corpus, quia corpus per animam vivit qua fruimur Deo."

[35] *De doctrina christiana* I , XXVII, 28 (59): "Ille autem iuste et sancte vivit qui rerum integer aestimator est. Ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod diligendum est, aut amplius diligat quod minus diligendum est, aut aeque diligat quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est, aut minus vel amplius quod aeque diligendum est. Omnis peccator in quantum peccator est, non est diligendus; et omnis homo in quantum homo est, diligendus est propter Deum, Deus vero propter se ipsum." (The underlined sentence is not mentioned in CSEL, but it is in CCL 32, p. 22)

[36] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXIII, 22 (44): "Non autem omnia quibus utendum est diligenda sunt, sed ea sola quae aut nobiscum societate quadam referuntur in Deum, sicuti est homo, vel angelus, aut ad nos relata, beneficio Dei par nos indigent,

Conclusion: the neighbour is to be used, but that is not the same use as we have of temporal goods. The latter are real instruments. My neighbour is not such an instrument. That is revealed by what Augustine understands as using humans: *officium misericordiae*. Augustine formulates explicitly and at length (from alinea 61 to 72), that using humans stands for taking care of them mercifully, like the Good Samaritan. He specifies that, because it is impossible to include all humans in our care, we have to look for those who are spatially, temporally or otherwise close to us.

Nevertheless, in any case my neighbour remains (a sort of) useful instrument. But, that is not the whole truth about my neighbour. My neighbour is more than only *ad utendum*, he may be the object of *frui*. So, my fellow humans are not just an instrument, they are also an end. Augustine's approach to humans, the combination of *uti* and *frui in Domino* will be explained at more fully in the refutation of the charge of being inconsequent. The fact that Augustine extends *frui*-love to humans, is in itself already a sign of how highly love of the neighbour is esteemed by him.

As has already been shown in general, Augustine does not propagate a selfish love. When we read *De doctrina christiana* I carefully, we even find three specific thoughts that prevent a selfish love. Augustine states clearly that is impossible to be calculating in human relationships. You simply cannot manipulate your neighbour, take care of him only to achieve in that way the *fruitio*, since that *fruitio* is a *merces*, mercifully given by God.[37] *Merces* means a reward, something you do not receive automatically or as a necessary consequence of your work. Helping your neighbour is 'useful' and 'advantageous', but even Augustine does not know (*'nescio'*) how. Actually it is not to known, not predictable. It does not depend on human action, but depends entirely on Gods initiative. In that sense it is not fit to speak about an egoistic approach to love. It is also interesting, that Augustine writes *invicem* in the same alinea. We have to enjoy each other in God. In other places Augustine stresses that *uti* is a communal activity. We

sicuti est corpus. Nam utique martyres non dilexerunt scelus persequentium se, quo tamen usi sunt ad promerendum Deum."

[37] *De doctrina christiana* I , XXXII, 35 (76): "Ille igitur usus qui dicitur Dei quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem. Cuius autem non miseremur et cui consulimus, ad eius quidem utilitatem id facimus eamque intuemur, sed nescio quo modo etiam nostra fit consequens, cum eam misericordiam quam impendimus egenti, sine mercede non relinquit Deus. Haec autem merces summa est ut ipso perfruamur, et omnes qui eo fruimur, nobis etiam invicem in ipso perfruamur."

have to do it together (*cum*).[38] I love God not *via* but *cum* my neighbour. So *uti* of neighbour is not really the employment of an instrument but rather the formation of a community aiming at a higher love.[39] Humans form community through communal activity aimed at a communal goal in enjoying God. In all our love, we have to keep God in mind. So, just as we may not love our neighbour because of that neighbour in him- or herself, we may not love our neighbour because of ourselves.[40] Now, it has to be clear, love of the neighbour is not selfish in Augustine.[41] Besides, we have to give all our love to God. Nothing is left for selfish love![42]

[38] For example *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII,21 ,(43). (See footnote 42.) Another illustration is the use of 'nobiscum (societate)' in (44), (60) and (84) where Augustine states that the loving of God *via* the temporal things is a communal activity.

[39] Augustine calls the desire to dominate other people sinful [(46)-(47)] because all humans are equal. When ruling over other people is forbidden, the wish to instrumentalise other people is certainly excluded.

Cf. *In Epistulam Iohannis*, tr. VIII, IV, 5: "Numquid sic amandi sunt hominess, tanquam consumendi? Sed amicitia quaedam benevolentiae est, ut aliquando praestemus eis quos amamus. Quid, si non sit quod praestemus? Sola benevolentia sufficit amanti [...] Opta aequalem, ut ambo sub uno sitis cui nihil praestari potest." (PL 35, pp. 2038-2039).

[40] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (41): "Sed nec se ipso quisquam frui debet, si liquide advertas, quia nec se ipsum debet propter se ipsum diligere, sed propter illum quo fruendum est. Tunc est quippe optimus homo, cum tota vita sua pergit in incommutabilem vitam, et toto affectu inheret illi. Si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad Deum, sed ad se ipsum conversus, non ad incommutabile aliquid convertitur. Et propterea iam cum defectu aliquo se fruitur, quia melior est cum totus haeret atque constringitur incommutabili bono, quam cum inde vel ad se ipsum relaxatur." *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (42): "Si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non suscenseat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter Deum diligis. Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: Diliges, inquit, proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, Deum vero ex toto corde, ex tota anima ex tota mente, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem vitam et omnem intellectum in illum conferas a quo habes ea ipsa quae confers."

[41] Cf. *In Epistulam Iohannis* tr. V,3; VI,2; VI,4: "Verum nobis responderit, quia diligimus, et germana dilectio est in nobis: non ficta, sed sincera; salutem fraternam quaerens, nullum emolumentum exspectans a fratre, nisi salutem ipsius." (PL 35,p. 2021).

[42] De doctrina christiana I, XXII, 21 (43): "Cum autem ait toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, nullam vitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae vacare debeat et quasi locum dare ut alia re velit frui, sed quidquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc rapiatur quo totus dilectionis impetus currit. Quisquis ergo recte diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat Deum. Sic enim eum diligens tamquam se ipsum, totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem Dei quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cuius derivatione minuatur."

3. The more recent discussion: more specific about *uti* and *frui*

3.1 Augustine is not consequent and coherent in *De doctrina christiana* I

The question that Augustine tries to solve in *De doctrina christiana* I is what humans have to do with fellow humans. Do they have to *uti* each other? What is then the meaning of that *uti?* Or is a *frui* of humans by humans also possible? Oliver O'Donovan in particular complains that Augustine is inconsequent and incoherent in addressing that complicated question.[43] According to O'Donovan, Augustine first placed humans under *uti* by the following reasoning: in the beginning of *De doctrina christiana* I Augustine makes the exclusive disjunction: either only *uti* or only *frui*. When this premise is combined with the premise that only God is *ad fruendum*, the conclusion about our behaviour to humans is obvious. The only permitted relation between humans is one of *uti*. Augustine sees earthly existence as a pilgrimage to the afterlife. This motive of pilgrimage is the reason why *uti* always keeps a dominating instrumentalist meaning. According to O' Donovan, that thought of instrumental and utilitarian using of humans was too much for Augustine too stomach. Augustine began to realise that he was thinking in an unchristian fashion. That is why he corrected himself by placing humans in the category *ad fruendum*. Since Augustine changed his thoughts, he is to be called inconsequent. The *frui* of humans by humans is in contradiction with the strict definitions that Augustine gave in the beginning of his book. Placing humans under *frui* is applying the verb *frui* in an unjust and not fitting way. O'Donovan claims that Augustine himself admits this in the words: "abusive, non proprie diceris frui."[44] O'Donovan concludes that *De doctrina christiana* I is not a clearly descriptive, thoroughly thought through and final conception of *uti* and *frui*.[45] He regards De *doctrina christiana* I as a work in which Augustine explores his thoughts and doubts. O'Donovan thinks that he is sup-

[43] O'Donovan O., *Usus and fruitio in Augustine – De doctrina christiana I*, The Journal of Theological Studies (33), 1982, pp. 361-397. That article is the elaboration of an idea about *uti* and *frui* in O' Donovan O., *The problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London 1980, pp. 28-29.

[44] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII, 37 (80).

[45] Brechtken has the same opinion about Augustine's choice for *frui homine*. Augustine is doubting whether to place humans under *frui* or *uti*. By accident, he stumbles on a quote Paul's letter to Philemon: 'Ita, frater, ego te fruar in domino.' (Fil.20) According to Brechtken, this quote acts as a last resort for Augustine. *Frui homine in domino* was not consequently built in his reasoning from the beginning.

ported by the fact that Augustine never refers to the love of the neighbour as *uti* after *De doctrina christiana* I.

3.2 *De doctrina christiana* I is coherent and consequent

3.2.1 Defence of Augustine in recent literature

Three Augustine-scholars react against the charge of inconsequence. Luc Verheijen refers to the structure of *De doctrina christiana* I to argue that Augustine reasoning is very consequent.[46] *De doctrina christiana* I is built around the *magna quaestio*: what to do with the neighbour: *uti*, *frui* or both? Since that *magna quaestio* consists of three parts, there should be three answers in *De doctrina christiana* I. The first part of the question is whether humans can be the object of *frui*. Augustine answers: no, not here on earth. The second part of the question is whether humans can be the object of *uti*. The answer is: yes, here on earth. Third, are humans object of both *frui* and *uti*? The answer to this question is the central point of Augustine's exposition. It is a nuanced answer, completely in accordance with the two previous answers: yes, humans are during this life on earth the object of *uti* and yes, even so humans are object of *frui*, but in the next and eternal life.[47] That is a real *frui*, not in an earthly but in a heavenly sense since only God and not a creature can bring humans into complete salvation. That is why it is a *frui* <u>*in Deo*</u>. Verheijen finds confirmation of this in the quote from Paul: "Ita frater, ego te fruar in Domino" in *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII, 37 (79). With the words *in Domino* Paul did not refer to an enjoyment of Philemon in heaven. Because an earthly encounter between Paul and Philemon was not excluded, *in Domino* means that Paul wanted to orientate the earthly encounter completely to God. Conclusion, according to Verheijen, is that humans can enjoy each other but only

[46] VERHEIJEN L., *Le premier livre du De doctrina christiana d' Augustin – Un traité de 'télicologie' biblique*, in DEN BOEFT J. & VAN OORT J. (eds) *Augustiniana Traiectana*, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1987, pp. 169-187.

[47] VERHEIJEN L., *a. cit.*, pp. 179-180: "En 22(20) Augustin s'est demandé, répétons-le, si les hommes doivent être ou bien *a* objet de *frui*; ou *b* objet de *uti*; ou encore *c* aussi bien objet de *uti* que de *frui*. Augustin a répondu immédiatement «non» pour *a*; «oui» pour *b*. Mais il ne répond pas tout de suite à la question *c*. Sa réponse finale à cette question sera «oui» à *b* + *a*, c'est-à-dire «oui» pour *b* (il maintient la réponse déjà donnée), mais «oui» aussi pour *a* ..., plus tard. Quand il disait en 22(20) «non» pour *a*, il se plaçait nettement et explicitement dans des perspectives terrestres. Maintenant il se situe en pensée dans la situation définitive: plus tard, c'est-à-dire au ciel, l'homme sera à *frui* (mais «en Dieu»). [...] la réponse à la question *c* ne contredit donc nullement les réponses immédiates données aux questions *a* et *b*."

with the addition: *in Domino*. Here on earth it is impossible for humans to enjoy each other completely. Only *uti* is possible here. When we do speak, here on earth, about the *frui* of humans, then it is always inchoative, anticipating the real enjoyment that can only take place in heaven. Since the relation of humans here on earth is always more of an *uti*, the *frui* of the neighbour of Paul is actually also more of an *uti*. In that sense the application of the *frui* to humans is a broad and non-technical use of that verb.[48] Augustine states this explicitly because he did not want to over-interpret the words of Paul since Augustine wasn't really certain that Paul referred to an earthly encounter with Philemon. *Frui homine in Domino* is therefore a consequent implication of the assumptions made at the outset.

Tarsicius Johannes Van Bavel expands the thought of Verheijen that in this life an anticipated but imperfect *fruitio* of humans is possible: even earthly goods can be objects of such a *fruitio* for Augustine.[49] Especially against Brechtken, Raymond Canning replies that Augustine's apparent uncertainty whether to place humans under *uti* or *frui* is a sign that love for God is closely connected with love for the neighbour.[50] *De doctrina christiana* I is not a point in case in an argument to accuse Augustine of a lack of biblical Christianity. Rather there we see a theologian at work, not a doubter, someone who tries several ways to express the complicated relation between God and man.

3.2.2 An own reading of *De doctrina christiana* I

That humans have to *uti* their neighbours, does not imply that they are forbidden to *frui* of their neighbours. The disjunction is not exclusive. When humans are the object, both options are possible. We can find this in several ways in *De doctrina christiana* I.[51]

[48] That is the already mentioned 'abusive, non proprie diceris frui'. According to Verheijen, in contrast to O'Donovan's interpretation, these words do not constitute a correction of Augustine by himself.

[49] Van Bavel T.J., *Fruitio, delectatio and voluptas in Augustine*, Augustinus (37), 1993, pp. 499-510.

Van Bavel T.J., *a. cit.* p. 502: "If we look at Augustine's writings as a whole, we see that he sticks nearly always to his technical distinction between *uti* and *frui*. Nevertheless, besides many texts rejecting the perverse fruition of earthly things, there is a smaller number of texts speaking positively or neutrally of enjoying earthly goods. This applies in particular to interpersonal relationships."

[50] Canning R., *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Augustinian Historical Institute, Heverlee-Leuven, 1993 (especially Chapter 3: *Uti/Frui in Relation to Love for Neighbour and Love for God*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-115).

[51] Already in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *q.* 30 it is clear that *uti* and *frui* do not constitute an exclusive disjunction. Augustine introduces in that question *uti*

First of all, Augustine makes a difference between three sorts of realities: those that are only *ad utendum*, those that are only *ad fruendum* and the category *fruuntur et utuntur*. This last category is the category for humans. The fact that Augustine does not place humans under the category of realities either of those that are solely the object of *uti* or those that are solely the object of *frui*, is very significant. By making of humans a third category, Augustine already shows from the beginning that humans are not an object only of *frui* or *uti*.[52] If Augustine believed the opposite, he would have defined humans immediately as objects of use or enjoyment. But no, Augustine prefers to remain careful and to wait in judging the position of humans. Second, only the fact that the *magna quaestio* exists of three options – *uti*, *frui* or *uti* and *frui* our neighbours – also demonstrates that, according to Augustine, when humans are the object, *uti* and *frui* do not exclude each other.[53] As we will see, the answer to that *magna quaestio* – *uti* AND *frui* – is the strongest proof possible to demonstrate that there is not even any question of an exclusive disjunction.

Furthermore, Augustine explicitly states that there is no big difference between *uti* and *frui* when applied to humans. The third definition of *uti* and *frui* in *De doctrina christiana* I, which only applies to humans, states that both *uti* and *frui* are a form of *diligere*.[54] In other words they lie very close to one another. When

and *frui* with the parallel couple *honestum* and *utile*. He stresses that both couples are parallel ("Ut inter honestum et utile interest, ita et inter fruendum et utendum.") but even so he emphasises that *honestum* and *utile* are not opposite. ("[…] illud sane custodientes ut honestum et utile modo sibimet aduersuntur. *Adversari* enim haec sibi aliquando imperite ac uulgariter existimantur.") So we may conclude that Augustine does not regard *uti* and *frui* as opposite. (CCL 44 A, p. 38, 1-2/8-10)

[52] *De doctrina christiana* I, III, 3 (7): "Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae quibus fruendum est beatos nos faciunt; istis quibus utendum est tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuvamur et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos beatos faciunt, pervenire atque his inherere possimus. Nos vero qui fruimur et utimur inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, impeditur cursus noster et aliquando etiam deflectitur , ut ab his rebus quibus fruendum est obtinendis vel retardemur vel etiam revocemur inferiorum amore praepediti."

[53] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 20 (40): "Itaque magna quaestio est, utrum frui se hominess debeant an uti an utrumque. Praeceptum est enim nobis ut diligamus invicem, sed quaeritur utrum propter se homo ab homine diligendus sit an propter aliud. Si enim propter se, fruimur eo; si propter aliud, utimur eo. Videtur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus. Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur beata vita, cuius etiamsi nondum res, tamen spes eius nos hoc tempore consolatur. *Maledictus autem qui spem suam ponit in homine.* [Jer. 17,5]"

[54] See *De doctrina christiana* I, XXIII, 22 (44), previously as cited in footnote 36.

humans are the object, *frui* is very close to *uti* of humans, that is *uti cum dilectione*.[55]

[55] *De doctrina christiana* I , XXXIII, 37, (79):"Quamquam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti." To read this paragraph as whole: see footnote 60. As pointed out previously, there are two (even three) sorts of *uti*. One can only understand that *uti* and *frui* both are possible in the case of humans as their object, when one can distinguish the different kinds of *uti*. When humans are the object, *uti* and *frui* are very close to one another. *Uti cum dilectione* and *frui in Domino* happen almost simultaneously. Humans are creatures and in that sense object of *uti*. Since humans are exceptional creatures, this is not an ordinary *uti*. In two senses it is another *uti* than the *uti* of which the other creatures are object. Because reason makes all humans equal, they cannot use each other like ordinary creatures. That special status also emerged in the commandment of divine love: humans have to be loved. That is the big difference between the two *uti*'s: the possibility of *cum dilectione*. *Uti* of humans by humans is an *uti cum dilectione* because humans are more than ordinary creatures. Because there is something divine in humans, they are the object of *frui*. Since humans are not God, it is *frui in Domino*. It is a *frui* of the presence of God in humans in their orientation to God. On the one hand the answer '*uti* and *frui*' is logical, on the other hand it is more complicated than it seems. *Uti* and *frui* with humans as subject and object can be distinguished but they cannot be separated. They are distinct but not really different. Enjoying the divine in the neighbour has to lead to enjoying God. In this sense the enjoying of humans is close to the loving use of humans, namely in being orientated to a higher aim. *Frui* by humans of humans, has to be referred to Something else, and is relative. *Frui* by humans of God, stands by itself, and is absolute. (One textual reference to two sorts of *frui* is, for example: *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIV, 37 (80): "Cum enim adest quod diligitur, etiam delectationem secum necesse est gerat. Per quam si transieris eamque ad illud ubi permanendum est rettuleris, uteris ea et abusive, non proprie diceris frui. Si vero inhaeresis atque permanseris, finem in ea ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui dicendus es. Quod non faciendum est nisi in illa Trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono.") As Augustine explains in paragraphs (73) – (74), he sees a third kind of *uti*. Besides the two uti's of which humans are the subject, there exist an *uti* with God as the subject (and humans as object). *Frui* means the striving after something for an end, an end that is higher than the one that strives for it. Such striving cannot be applied to the relation from God to humans. In that case *uti* is the only way to express such a relation. *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXI, 34 (73): "Quapropter adhuc ambiguum videtur esse, cum dicimus ea re nos perfrui, quam diligimus propter se ipsam, et ea re nobis fruendum esse tantum, qua efficimur beati, ceteris vero utendum. Diligit enim nos Deus, et multum nobis dilectionem eius erga nos divina scriptura commendat. Quomodo ergo diligit? Ut nobis utatur, an ut fruatur?" *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXI, 34 (74): "Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit. Omne enim nostrum bonum vel ipse vel ab ipso est. Cui autem obscurum vel dubium est, non egere lucem rerum harum nitore quas ipsa inlustraverit? Dicit apertissime etiam propheta: Dixi Domino, Dominus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quem ad modum diligat." We may even say that *uti* with humans as object and subject is closer to *uti* by God of humans than *uti* by humans of temporal goods, since the two *uti*'s with humans as the object have one thing in common:

Based on that allegedly exclusive disjunction, Brechtken and O'Donovan go even further. It is either *frui* or *uti*. Augustine first places humans under *uti*. That implies that a human *frui* of humans is not optional. When later in *De doctrina christiana* I, he states that *frui homine* is possible, he contradicts himself. That final answer, namely that humans could enjoy each other, wasn't in Augustine's mind from the beginning. I think that such an interpretation does not give Augustine the credit he deserves. An objective reading of the text reveals a well developed structure in *De doctrina christiana* I.[56] The fundamental structure of *De doctrina christiana* I is actually quite simple. Augustine starts with 3 premises:

(1) subject: humans + object: creature = *uti*
(2) subject: humans + object: God = *frui*
(3) Humans are created and have something divine.

Augustine introduces these three basic premises in the preparatory part of *De doctrina christiana* I.[57] Subsequently, Augustine asks: what if humans are both object and subject? The answer: *uti* and *frui* results logically out of the three premises. It is a valid conclusion. The movement in *De doctrina christiana* I is consequent from the very beginning to the end.[58]

The third premise requires some further clarification. In the next paragraph (40) Augustine will ask the *magna quaestio*. But already here in (39) he gives the answer. That humans use and enjoy

love. But Augustine notes that, despite this likeness, there is a difference. The *uti* of God (as subject) is disinterested. Cf. *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXII, 35 (75): "Sed neque sic utitur ut nos; nam nos res quibus utimur ad id referimus ut Dei bonitate perfruamur, Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert."

[56] (See: 5. addendum; 5.1 textstructure of *De doctrina christiana* I.)

[57] In *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, (20) (39) these three premises come together: "In his igitur omnibus rebus illae tantum sunt quibus fruendum est, quas aeternas atque incommutabiles commemoravimus; ceteris autem utendum est ut ad illarum perfructionem pervenire possimus. Nos itaque qui fruimur et utimur aliis rebus, res aliquae sumus. Magna enim quaedam res est homo, factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, non in quantum mortali corpore includitur, sed in quantum bestias rationalis animae honore praecedit."

[58] Augustine's exposition of *uti* and *frui* is not only consequent in the first book of *De doctrina christiana*, but the pair also occupies a consequent place in the entirety of the work. *Uti* and *frui* fit coherently in the exegetical, ontological and hermeneutical explanations of the rest of *De doctrina christiana* I. This consistency in the whole of the four books can here only be mentioned briefly, since it is a detailed and subtle matter that requires a long explanation that exceeds the aims of this article by far.

was already written in the beginning. Up until now, Augustine has remained silent about what humans precisely are, whether *fruendum* or *utendum*. Now, he provides a clue. Humans have got a mortal body and a rational soul. The mortal body belongs to the creation. Apparently the rational soul exceeds the status of a common creature, transcends the animals. The rational soul, although created and in that sense also a creature, is created in Gods image and likeness. The rational soul therefore has something divine. And that is the crucial point in Augustine's search to solve the *magna quaestio*. Only the eternal and the divine is to be enjoyed. The rest is to be used. In humans, however, something immortal and divine is also present, namely the rational soul.[59] Something similar has already been suggested in (25) and (26), where Augustine writes about creation and incarnation: God is present in the creation and the Word of God lives in humans. The conclusion is easily drawn: there is something enjoyable in humans. This is also the reason why, when Augustine speaks of a human *frui homine*, he speaks of a *frui in Domino*.[60] When humans enjoy humans, they enjoy each other as far as God himself is present in humans. That is what we read in the first sentences of (79). From the very beginning of *De doctrina christiana* I Augustine makes us understand that there is something divine in humans. *Frui homine in Deo* has to be understood with this clue. Humans may

[59] The idea of there being something divine in humans can also be found in other texts of Augustine in different contexts. Augustine does not go as far as Manicheïsm and Priscillianism. The human soul is a divine element in humans in their opinion. Augustine conceives of the human soul, although incorporeal and eternal, as created. and as such not divine *in se*. Nevertheless the human soul is the being that is closest to God, because created *imaginem et similitudinem Dei*. This is why the human soul is *capax Dei*. (*De Trinitate* XIV, IV,6; XIV, VIII, 11). God is (and has to be) present in our love for our fellow men. (*In Iohannis evangelium*, XVII,8, *Sermo* 336,2). Christ identifies himself with mankind out of love for mankind. (*De civitate Dei* XVII,18) That is why we touch God already in our love for humans. (*In Iohannis evangelium* LXV,2; *Sermo* 265,8,9). Love for humans is love for God. This thought is implied in Augustine's concept of *Totus Christus*. God transcends humans. Nevertheless, we do not have to look for Him outside humans, he is in humans: 'interior intimo meo et superior summo meo.' (*Confessiones* III, VI,11). God can be discovered, step by step, through an internal search of human reason. (*Confessiones* VII, XVII,23)

[60] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII,37 (79): "Cum autem homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius quam homine frueris. Illo enim frueris quo efficeris beatus, et ad eum te pervenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis ut venias. Inde ad Philomonem Paulus: Ita frater, inquit, ego te fruar in Domino. Quod si non addidisset, in Domino et te fruar tantum dixisset, in eo constituisset, spem beatitudinis suae. Quamquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti."

enjoy humans in the Lord, because humans are in the Lord, because the Lord Himself is present in humans. This is an invitation but also a restriction. Only as far as the Lord is present in humans, are humans enjoyable. This is emphasised and illustrated by Augustine with the words of Paul to Philemon.[61] Augustine shows that Paul does not want to enjoy Philemon the human, but of the divine in Philemon. That is why enjoying humans by humans requires the addition 'in the Lord'. My neighbour, as a human being, is after all not our source of happiness. To qualify *frui* with in *Deo* or in *Domino* actually shows that it is God Who is enjoyed: God in humans. Augustine, furthermore, cannot demand obedience to the two presupposed commandments of love, at the core of *De doctrina christiana* I, if he does not see something divine in humans.[62] If humans have to orient all their love entirely and completely to God, then love of the neighbour is only understandable if, and only if, there is something of that God present in the neighbour.

Based on an analysis of the content of *De doctrina christiana* I, it is possible to argue that the option *frui* AND *uti* regarding humans as object is a consequent one. O'Donovan used the lack of a reference to love for the neighbour as *uti* following the *De doctrina christiana* I as proof for his thesis, that Augustine corrected himself in *De doctrina christiana* I. First of all, that alleged absence, in no way detracts

[61] Paul's 'ego te fruar' may certainly not be read as proof or justification forwarded by Augustine to make the *frui homine* plausible. *Frui homine in Domino* follows consequently from Augustine's reasoning. The citation from Philemon 20 is nothing more than an illustration. At the most, it is a post factual argument. If Augustine had only appealed to that citation as an argument for *auctoritas*, he would be wrong. It is only in Latin that *fruar* is written in Philemon 20. The Greek source-text mentions a form of the verb *ονιναμαι*, which actually means 'gaining profit from' being closer to 'using' than 'enjoying'.

[62] *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (42): "Si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non suscenseat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter Deum diligis. Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constitua est: *Diliges* inquit, *proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum*, Deum vero *ex toto corde, ex tota anima ex tota mente*, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem vitam et omnem intellectum in illum conferas a quo habes ea ipsa quae confers." *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (43): "Cum autem ait toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, nullam vitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae vacare debeat et quasi locum dare ut alia re velit frui, sed quidquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc rapiatur quo totus dilectionis impetus currit. Quisquis ergo recte diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat Deum. Sic enim eum diligens tamquam se ipsum, totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem Dei quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cuius derivatione minuatur."

from the internal coherence of *De doctrina christiana* I. Furthermore, *uti* and *frui* re-appear in the later writings, all though they are not dealt with as a specific theme. Above all, the fascinating discovery of *De doctrina christiana* I is precisely that *frui* of humans by humans is possible. In the reasoning of the earlier writings, *uti* of humans by humans was clearly obvious. The essence and the message of *De doctrina christiana* I is that human *frui* of humans is permissible because there is something divine in mankind. Once that is proved, Augustine can fall back on it in later works without further argumentation.[63] Furthermore, although only scarcely I was able to find, some examples of later writings in which Augustine carefully speaks of *uti* of humans by humans.[64]

Frui homine in Domino is consequent with all premises. *Uti* of humans by humans does not exclude *frui* of humans by humans. Augustine remarks from the very beginning that there is something divine in mankind. Actually, Augustine already hints at the answer even before putting the great question. Everything had been thought through in advance. His well structured answer was present from the beginning and Augustine never lost sight of it. A reading of the text with attention to the subtle game of definitions reveals a fully considered and well-prepared schema with different but concordant answers.[65]

[63] In *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXV, 39 (84), the epilogue of the first book of *De doctrina christiana*, Augustine comes back on *uti* of humans by humans, after dealing at length with the possibility of *frui homine*. I find that very significant. By doing this, Augustine emphasises that *uti* and *frui* go together when humans are the object. However, he does not do so explicitly. He speaks of the reality that enjoys together with us and of the combination of *uti* and *dilectio*. At that moment in *De doctrina christiana* I, the focused reader understands that this refers to using humans by humans. Augustine in this way demonstrates the coherence of his reasoning. He has not corrected himself. *Uti* of humans by humans is not replaced by enjoying humans by humans. No, both are possible and stand consequent next to each other.

[64] Despite O'Donovan's claim, citations can be found after *De doctrina christiana* I in which Augustine speaks of using humans by humans. In *De civitate Dei* XIX, XIII, 2 (CCL 48, p. 680) community with others ('societas sui generis') clearly is mentioned among the goods that, if used correctly ('recte usus'), lead to an eternal life 'ad fruendum Deo et proximo in Deo'. True friendship is used, only if God binds humans with and in love. (*Confessiones* IV,IV,7 – CCL 27, p. 43)

[65] See: 5. Addendum.

4. Conclusion

Our fellow-men: do we have to treat them as means or as ends? According to Augustine, fellow-men are not our final end, but only a means to that end. At the same time, the fellow-men carry in them that final end and are (a sign of) that end. Augustine's answer is not formulated so univocaly, but that is its value. Augustine realises that the question itself, just like the status of (fellow-)men, is too complex to be answered without nuances. Augustine stresses the unique status of humans: creature, but creature *par excellence* because created in the image of its Creator. That exceptional status shows that there are many levels to the question of the correct relationship between humans. The merit of Augustine lies in the attention for the complexity of this matter. He understands that it is not easy to formulate the relations between humans, since those relations have many aspects. He does not want to lose sight of that plenitude. He achieves this by making a difference between *uti* and *frui*, worked out in a schema of several definitions. Because of the divine presence in humans, humans can be an end for each other and thus not a means. In that sense, humans can enjoy each other. Nevertheless, humans are not an absolute end for each other, only God is. That is why humans remain an usable instrument. To use neighbours, however, does not mean in this context an egoistic manipulating of the neighbours, but a loving taking care of them. Augustine expresses this complex relationship between humans by showing that humans can *uti* AND *frui* each-other.

Frui stands for love, not *eros,* but *agape*. *Frui* is *agape* because not I but God stands at the center in *frui*-love. That self-denial is confirmed when Augustine emphasises the *merces*-aspect of *frui*. *Frui* cannot be calculated. Furthermore, *frui* is clearly situated in a context of obedience and that is the context of *agape*-love. Meanwhile, it is clear that *uti homine* is not utilitarian and selfish, but a sort of love. *Uti* (of the neighbour) has to happen in an ordered, moderate and rational fashion.

Put differently, the *magna quaestio* – how to deal with fellow-men: *uti*, *frui* or both – receives three affirmative answers. Yes, the fellow-man is there to use, but in a moderate and non-utilitarian way, namely by taking care of him. Yes, the fellow-man is there to enjoy, but *in Domino*. Yes, the fellow-man is there to use and enjoy. While investigating Augustine's quest for these answers, we also noticed the subtle and complex relation between the love for God and love for humans. They are two sides of the same coin.

As a last remark of this article, I want to sum up the two cardinal points of my 'rehabilitation' of Augustine: 1) an analysis of the structure of the different definitions in *De doctrina christiana* I and 2) a new approach to that book, namely starting from the insight that Augustine perceives something divine in humans. These two points have sufficiently demonstrated that it is wrong to accuse Augustine of a selfish and hedonistic instrumentalism and of being an incoherent writer and thinker.

5. Addendum: structure and definitions

5.1 Schema I: Textstructure of *De doctrina christiana* I

The text itself, apart from its content, shows a good organised, well thought out and structured schema. Only on a textual basis, *De Doctrina Christiana* I presents the following structure:

- (1) - (39): preparation
  - (1) - (7): place of *uti* en *frui* in the schemas of *De Doctrina Christiana*
  - (7) - (39): *uti – frui*
    - (7) - (9): two definitions of *uti* en *frui*
    - (9): the **temporal** as object and humans as subject: only *uti*
    - (10) - (38): **God** as object and humans as subject: only *frui*
      (+ theological exposition of the meaning of God, the reality *ad fruendum*: Trinity, Incarnation,...)
    - (39): the exceptional status of **humans:** *ratio*
- (40) - (83): *magna quaestio*
  - (40): What is the correct attitude when humans are object (and subject)?
    - A. Have humans to *uti* their fellow-men?
      B. Have humans to *frui* their fellow-men?
      C. Have humans to *uti* and *frui* their fellow-men?
    - Definition of *uti* en *frui* for humans as object of *uti* and *frui*
  - (41) - (75): *uti*
    - (41): **Yes**, humans are the object of *uti*.
      (with humans as subject of that *uti*)
    - (42) - (72): **How**
      - (42) - (60): negative formulation: Human *uti* with humans as object is different from human *uti* with temporal goods as object.
        - (42) - (43): *Uti* of humans by humans is connected with the double love-commandment.
        - (44) - (45): In contrast to *uti* with the temporal as object, *uti* with the fellow-man may be accompanied by love.
        - (46) - (47): Humans may not dominate humans.

- o (48) - (58): Self-love and love for the proper body is natural and allowed in the double commandment to love.
  - o (59) - (60): the importance of order in love
  - (61) - (72): positive formulation: *uti* with humans as subject and humans as object: different aspects and consequences of love of the neighbour.
    - (73) - (75): explanation of **God** as subject and humans as object of *uti* in order to clarify *uti* with humans as object and subject.
- o (76) - (83): *frui*
- o (76): **Yes**, humans are the object of *frui*.
  (with humans as subject of that *frui*)
  - (77) - (80): **How** *frui* of humans by humans: *in Domino*
  - (81) - (83): illustration of *frui hominibus in Domino*: **Christ** as way and as end.

- (84) - (85): retrospection and summary

(86) - (95): *Uti* and *frui* are placed back in the greater whole of *De doctrina christiana*: study of Holy Scripture out of love.

5.2 Schema II: 'sorts' of *uti* and *frui*

- **FRUI** = diligere
  - o frui [1] = Humans enjoy God.
    (subject frui: humans + object frui: God)
  - o frui [1] = Humans enjoy humans.
    (subject frui: humans + object frui: humans)
    = frui homine in Domino

- **UTI**
  - o uti [1] = God uses humans. = diligere
    (subject uti: God + object uti: humans)
  - o uti [1] = Humans use x.
    (subject uti: humans)
    - uti [2·2]: x = what may be loved (diligere). = uti cum dilectione
      - body
      - himself
      - fellow-man

      (object uti: humans)
    - uti [2·2]: x = what is not allowed to be loved.
      = earthly and temporal things
      (object uti: creatures, except humans)

- frui [2] and uti [2·1] are close to each other. *(humans as subject and object).*

5.3 Schema III: the relations

subject	object	uti or frui	meaning	with dilectio?
God	humans	uti [1]	desinterested	yes
humans	God	frui [1]	only complete in heaven	yes
humans	earthly goods	uti [2·2]	in function of frui [1]	NO
humans	humans	uti [2·1]	= uti cum dilectione in function of frui [1]	yes
		frui [2]	is close to uti [2·1] only complete in heaven in function of frui [1]	

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MENS INMOTA MOTA MANE

Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine's Theory of the Passions[1]

1. Augustine's Platonic Creed

In the *De vera religione*, Augustine states his adherence to a Platonic worldview in the following way: if we were to ask Plato himself, he would convince us that

> "truth cannot be seen with the bodily eyes, but only with the pure mind. Any soul that would attach itself to the truth would attain happiness and perfection. Nothing hinders the perception of the truth more than a life devoted to lusts and the false images of sensible things, which, coming from the sensible world, are impressed upon us through the body, and which generate manifold opinions and errors." (*De vera relig.* III, 3).[2]

Thus, Augustine readily accepts the Platonic bipartition of the sensible and the intelligible world. The realm of the body yields lusts and false images, whereas the pure mind is oriented towards truth and perfection. The use of "us" (*nobis*) in this passage is noteworthy: the images of sensible things are said to be impressed upon us through the body. So the "us" does not include the body here, but rather the place where the images are generated – i.e., the soul, who can either attach itself to truth or be led astray by bodily movements.[3] This is not to say that Augustine excludes the bodily existence from his notion of the human person. But what it does mean is that the soul is the seat of our perception. The body is thus seen as a mere instrument that hands over the impressions to the soul.

[1] For a meticulous study on the terminology concerning pleasure in Augustine, see T.J. Van Bavel, "*Fruitio, delectatio* and *voluptas* in Augustine", in *Augustinus*, 37 (1993), 499-510.

[2] Partly translated by Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine* (Oxford Theological Monographs), Oxford, 1992, 17.

[3] This comes close to Plotinus's use of the word ἡμεῖς, with this restriction, that Plotinus does reduce the person to this "we". According to Plotinus, 'we' are in the first place 'the highest part of ourselves', i.e., the part of the soul that does not descend into the body –although the body does depend on this part: our soul uses it as an instrument (I 1, 3.3-4: χρωμένη μὲν οὖν σώματι οἷα ὀργάνῳ). Although we cannot say that 'we' are devoid of corporeality, our body plays only a subordinate role and does not at all affect our essence. 'We', then, is a technical term, indicating the human soul in its highest realization (the 'higher' part of the soul which is its plenitude). All other human attributes are not 'we', but 'ours': they all depend in their proper way on this upper part (*Enn.* IV 4, 18.10-36; cf. I 1, 7.14-18).

Thus, the operation of the soul is different from that of the body, in this sense, that the body has its own way of being influenced by the external world, and that the vicissitudes of the body can only reach the soul in a modified way. They are translated, as it were, into a language which the soul understands.

That this is so, can be inferred from other texts, where Augustine argues that there is a difference between the things that reach our senses (sounds, views, tastes, etc.), and their *significatio*, which is grasped by the soul.[4] The body simply undergoes the movements that attain the senses, whereas the soul actively takes them over and understands them. Hence, the soul's life is characterized by mere activity (*actio*), whereas the condition of the body is entirely and exclusively qualified as passivity (*passio*).[5]

This emphatic statement of the difference between corporeal states and the soul's active reaction to them leads to a peculiar paradox, highlighted by Etienne Gilson,[6] which can be paraphrased as follows: if the soul is nothing but activity, how is it possible that it is influenced by the body? Does this not imply that at least the soul "undergoes" what is offered to it by the body? On the other hand, if the body is entirely passive, how is it possible that it influences the soul? Does this not imply a certain activity of the body, handing over its data to the soul?

This is a paradox every Platonist will have to face. Augustine was by no means the first to try and save the soul's autonomous operation in its interaction with the body. He was predated by the early Neo-Platonists, and particularly by Porphyry, who had an undeniable influence on Augustine's theory of sense perception.

2. Augustine's Theory of Sense Perception

Augustine expounds his theory of sense perception in *De quantitate animae* XXIII, 41-XXXII, 69, and in the sixth book of the *De musica*. Evidence from the later works shows that he remained true to this theory, although he added some important modifications.

The starting point of the theory is again Platonic: the body undergoes influences from the sensible world, which are taken over

[4] *De quantitate animae* XXXII, 66; *De ordine* II, 34; *De Genesi ad litteram* III, V, 7.

[5] This distinction underlies the entire discussion of *De musica* VI.

[6] E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1943 (2ème éd.), 76.

by the soul. Plato himself qualified this overall scheme by adding that not every affect (πάθημα) of the body reaches the soul. Some παθήματα are too weak; they vanish in the body before being taken up by the soul, and hence, they are not perceived (Plato, *Philebus*, 33 d). This statement is made in the context of Plato's theory of pleasure: pleasure, he says, is the repletion of a lack, on the condition that the movement of the repletion is strong enough to be actually sensed. If the movement is too weak, then nothing is perceived, although the lack may actually be replenished. This theory of pleasure and perception has its own inherent problems, which the later Platonic tradition was eager to resolve. An important point was the simple connection between the quantity, or intensity, of the physiological movement and the pleasure which is felt as a consequence. Does replenishment have to be intense in order to be felt? We might just as well feel an enormous pleasure when a very small lack is being replenished (e.g., when listening to music: what kind of lack is involved there?).

Despite these problems, on which we will have the occasion to return, the underlying theory of perception has proven to be very influential in the later tradition. For it gives a clue on the independent operation of body and soul, and explicitly places sense perception in the soul. Moreover, it provides a model that explains why a corporeal movement does not necessarily cause alterations in the soul.

But what happens when a movement of the body does reach the soul? The Stoics elaborated a very systematic view of this process, starting from the central claim that the soul is ἀπαθής: it does not "undergo" anything. If the soul takes over a movement of the body, it does so by its own autonomous activity. When a mental impression presents itself as the result of the body's passively undergoing a movement, our soul becomes active. It *judges* (κρίνει) the bodily movements, deciding whether it approves or disapproves of them. This is what the Stoics called an "assent" (συγκατάθεσις): a practical judgment of reason on which the eventual performance of an action depends. A given assent results in an impulse (ὁρμή), which is defined as a 'motion of thought towards something or away from something'[7].

[7] *SVF* [= I. ab Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Lipsiae, 3 vols., 1903-1905, *Indices* 1924] 3.92.4-5; A.W. Price, *Mental Conflict*, London/New York, 1995, 146. The first and most important impulse of living beings is the striving for self-preservation, which is directed towards that which is most proper, and thus most appropriate (οἰκεῖον) to them: *SVF* 3.178-189; Long-Sedley [= A.A. Long-D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1987] 57D. This is a reaction against the Epicureans, who fostered the idea that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the original impulses of all living beings.

If there are no external obstructions, then the action follows automatically and immediately upon the impulse (Sen., *Ep.* 113.18 [=*SVF* 3.169]). Thus, according to the Stoics, the soul performs its own operation of judging the movements, without being affected by them.

This Stoic doctrine was taken over by the Neo-Platonists, within the context of their peculiar view on the connexion of body and soul – stressing, of course, the soul's independent existence. Plotinus repeatedly discusses the question of whether 'affects' (πάθη) naturally belong to the body or to the soul.[8]. Plotinus' answer is that the soul must be completely 'ἀπαθής'. The seat of affects is the body, but not taken as such: a body in itself would never be able to experience any affect. It must be the body insofar as it is alive and ensouled, or "the body that wants to be not only body".[9] The bodily affect cannot reach the (embodied) soul but in a modified form: the soul consciously perceives the affect, as a form of 'knowledge' (γνῶσις),[10] without being affected itself.[11] To be sure, in the soul there can be no question of 'affects'. Plotinus indicates that perception (the sensitive soul) clearly is to be distinguished from affects: the former consists in 'activities *concerning* the affects', which are more precisely termed 'judgments' (κρίσεις), i.e., evaluations of the affects by a faculty of a different nature. For it would be impossible that the soul would be affected in the same way as the body:[12]

> "For us, the pain of this body and the pleasure of this kind result in an unaffected knowledge." (IV 4, 18.9-10)[13]

Augustine's version of the doctrine is often classified as "Stoic". Indeed, it is very much influenced by Stoic thought (particularly by Cicero),[14] but, as it may appear from the parallel texts in

[8] The question is raised at *Enn.* I 1, and returns as one of the 'Difficulties about the soul' treated at *Enn.* IV 4. See also *Enn.* III 6 'On the impassibility of things without body' (Περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας τῶν ἀσωμάτων), and IV 8 'On the descent of the soul into bodies' (Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα καθόδου τῆς ψυχῆς).

[9] IV 4, 20.5-6: ὃ σῶμα μέν ἐστιν, ἐθέλει δὲ μὴ μόνον σῶμα εἶναι.

[10] See the definition of pleasure and pain: *Enn.* IV 4, 19,2-4 (discussed below, p. ***).

[11] *Enn.* IV 4, 18.12-13: Πᾶσα δὲ ἤσθετο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάθος οὐκ αὐτὴ παθοῦσα. See also III 6, 3.17-19: Καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ τὸ τῆς διαχύσεως τοῦτο καὶ εἰς αἴσθησιν ἦκον περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκέτι πάθος.

[12] III 6, 1.1-7; cf. H.J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology. His Doctrine of the Embodied Soul*, Den Haag, 1971, 70.

[13] Cf. III 6, 3.1-7; 16-19; 4.7-8.

[14] See, e.g., J. Brachtendorf, "Cicero and Augustine on the Passions", in *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes*, 43 (1997), 289-308, who gives an excellent survey of the Stoic influences, and who also shows that Augustine's version of Stoicism is not always consistent. I believe that this exactly reveals the heart of the matter, viz., that Augustine's interpretation of Stoicism is mediated through Neo-Platonic doctrine.

Plotinus, this influence is subordinate to a much more important feature: Augustine's theory of perception is essentially Neo-Platonic, and the Stoic background is reinterpreted on a Neo-Platonic canvas – as it was the case in the Greek Neo-Platonic authors themselves.

In *De quantitate animae*, Augustine ventures to provide a definition of *sensus*. In a first move, sense perception is said to be the situation in which "the soul is aware of what the body is undergoing" (*non latere animam quod patitur corpus*). However, the discussion partners agree that there are things which the body undergoes, and which do not remain hidden to the soul, without however being called "*sensus*". If we grow old, for instance, we know that we are getting older; this awareness is not a case of sense perception, but it is the result of an operation of our *ratio*. Hence, there is a need to reformulate the definition, excluding this kind of indirect awareness of bodily changes. The new definition states that "sense perception is an affect of the body which by itself is not hidden from the soul" (*sensus [est] passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam*). The "*per seipsam*" denotes an immediate reception of the corporeal movement in the soul, and thus excludes the type of indirect awareness that troubled the first definition.

This new definition does not solve all the questions: how about the opposition between the passivity of the body and the activity of the soul? The definition of *sensus* does not solve the paradox. And how is it possible that some movements are felt by the soul, whereas others are not? Is it only the intensity that counts here? In *De musica*, VI, Augustine offers a sophisticated answer to precisely these questions. The operations of the soul are based, he says, on a physiological process: in every sensory organ there is an element that corresponds (*similia similibus*) to the corporeal nature of the sensed objects: the eye contains something bright (*luminosum aliquid*), the mouth something wet (*humidum*), etc. On the basis of this likeness, everything goes well and calmly (*cum quiete*) as long as the senses are touched by things which correspond to their nature. But when sensible things do not correspond to the natural quality of the sensory organs, they cause an alteration (*alteritas*) of the body, and in this case, the soul concentrates its attention to this influence:

> "At that moment, it is said that the soul sees, hears, smells, tastes or feels by touching; by these activities, it gladly associates with things appropriate to it, and painfully resists to what is not appropriate. These, I think, are the operations which the soul exhibits over against affects of the body, when the soul senses, without, however, undergoing the passive states themselves." (*De mus.* VI, V, 10)

This is an interesting passage, as it limits the range of sense perception to the soul's feeling something strange, something which does not fit with the proper nature of the sense organs. The consequence must be that, if our constellation is at ease, without any disturbance, we do not sense: everything is going smoothly and easily, and there is no attention of our soul required.[15] This may seem rather odd at first sight, but again, the Platonic background may help to elucidate this point.

In the *Philebus*, on the basis of the idea that not all influences are heavy enough to be actually sensed, Plato argues that, although there will always be lacks and replenishments, we sometimes attain a condition in which none of the lacks or of the replenishments are actually felt. They are present, of course, but they are all too small to be sensed. Plato calls this the "neutral condition" (οὐδέτερος βίος) in which we have neither pleasure nor pain (*Philebus* 42 c – 44 a). This is not to say that in this situation, we attain perfect happiness: in fact, it is essential to note that it is a state without any pleasure, and Plato points out that taking this state to be a pleasure (because of the absence of pain) is a form of having false, erroneous pleasures. What does happen in this condition is that we just arrive at a situation without any felt disturbance. Our lacks and replenishments are going on, says Plato (referring to Heraclitus' adagio of πάντα ῥεῖ): our nature is involved in a permanent flux of lack and repletion, but for a while, we do not notice them. We reach a state of contentment, a short pause of the conundrum of pleasure and pain. As opposed to many others, and in particular Epicurus, who will later argue that any absence of pain is a pleasure per definition, Plato accepts a middle state in which we do not sense at all. I just had a good meal, my hunger and thirst are over (of course they will come back, but I do not feel this at the moment), I do not have any pain in the body, etc. I am just at ease. In this case, I do not sense, because there are no physiological movements that reach my soul.

Augustine is in line with this Platonic concept of a "neutral state", and, as a consequence, with the statement that any sense perception is either a pleasure or a pain: if felt, the movements of lack

[15] *De mus.* VI, V, 13: *sicut est affectio corporis quae sanitas dicitur: nulla quippe attentione nostra opus habet, non quia nihil tunc agit anima in corpore, sed quia nihil facilius agit.* Cf. *Ibid.*, VI, V,15: [talking about the difference between absence of perceptions in trees, and absence of perceptions in our "neutral state"] *Aliud est enim summa stoliditate, aliud summa sanitate corporis nihil sentire. Nam in altero instrumenta desunt, quae adversus passiones corporis moveantur, in altero ipsae passiones.*

and replenishment always yield either pleasure or pain. The soul exerts its operations as a reaction to the affects of the body; those operations, Augustine says, yield pleasure when the soul can accept the affects, and they yield pain when the soul resists to them.[16] Or, in other words: pain occurs when the soul is aware of an external disturbance, whereas pleasure is the awareness of the return of that which is in accordance with nature.[17]

Augustine's account, however, contains an important extra point, which does away with one of the aforementioned difficulties in Plato's theory: is there an automatic correspondence between the intensity of a movement and our feeling it? In Plato, a movement is felt, and must be felt, if it is intense enough to attain the soul. But if so, how is it possible, for instance, that we are caught and disturbed by a small pain, say, in our finger, whereas a lack which is far greater, say a cancer, sometimes is not detected or felt? Or, conversely, how is it possible that an intense pain in our finger sometimes does not disturb us for a while (e.g., when we are occupied by other businesses)? In Plato, the perception remained too tightly bound to a physiological explanation, which did not allow to account for situations in which feeling pleasure or pain is not just a matter of the intensity of the bodily movements. But the later tradition provided an answer to this problem. Plotinus made an important step, when he stated that the soul takes over the movement of the body in an ἀντίληψις (which is mostly translated as "consciousness", but which actually means "taking over", like when relay racers take over the stick). By this ἀντίληψις, Plotinus says, "the soul understands (συνιείσης) the quality that is present in the bodies, and takes up the forms of them (αὐτῶν, i.e., of the bodies) in itself" (Plot., *Enn.* IV 4, 23.1-4). Thus, Plotinus combines the Aristotelian notion of abstraction (in which the soul takes over the forms)[18] with the Platonic the-

[16] *De mus.* VI, V, 12: *Hae sunt operationes quas adhibet anima praecedentibus passionibus corporis; quae delectant eam associantem, offendunt resistentem.*

[17] *De mus.* VI, V, 9: *Corporalia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi eius aut adversetur, aut congruat. Ideoque cum renititur adversanti, et materiam sibi subiectam in operis sui vias difficulter impingit, fit attentior ex difficultate in actionem; quae difficultas propter attentionem, cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur, et hoc vocatur aut dolor labor. Cum autem congruit quod infertur, aut adiacet, facile totum id vel ex eo quantum opus est, in sui operis itinera traducit. Et ista eius actio qua suum corpus convenienti extrinsecus corpori adiungit, quoniam propter quiddam adventitium attentius agitur, non latet; sed propter convenientiam, cum voluptate sentitur.*

[18] The "qualities" mentioned in the text are the accidental forms.

ory of reminiscence: the soul being ἀπαθής, there is no direct link between the sensible forms (that are present in the sensible things) and the forms that are activated in knowledge. The mediation between them is procured by the sensory organs, which are corporeal, but which contain an intelligible part as well.[19] In any case, this taking over by the soul is essentially a task of cognition (γνωρίζειν).[20] Almost in passing, Plotinus remarks that this ἀντίληψις of the soul implies a certain attention (προσοχή) of the soul:

> "Sense-perception knows the image (and the soul starts from the image), and either provides what is desired – it is its function to do so – or resists and holds out and pays no attention either to what started the desire or to that which is desired afterwards" (*Enn.* IV 4, 20.18-20).

A strained attention is necessary in order to be able to have a proper understanding of the things perceived.

These incidental remarks of Plotinus were taken over by his pupil Porphyry, who gave the προσοχή a technical meaning, not just as something that is important in sense experience (as it was the case in Plotinus), but as one of its constituent parts.

In his *De abstinentia* (a tasty treatise on the abstinence from eating meat), Porphyry argues that no one can successfully escape from the lure of this world by resisting the temptation. Someone, for instance, who is painfully occupied by a healthy diet, actually shows that he/she is too much attached to eating and drinking.[21] What we should do, is to pay no attention at all to things that might lead us astray:

> "The person who has deviated from intellect is in the very place where he turned aside: he runs hence and forth with the attention (προσοχή) of his apprehension (ἀντίληψις), and where the apprehension is, he is. It is one thing not to pay attention to the perceptibles because you are concerned with other matters, another for someone who is paying attention to them (ἐφιστάντα) to think he is not present."[22]

[19] *Enn.* IV 4, 23.20-49.

[20] Cf. *Enn.* V 1, 12.12-14: "Cognition arises when there is a handing over (μετάδοσις) and a taking over (ἀντίληψις). If then there is to be a taking over (ἀντίληψις) of what is presented in this way, we must turn our power of apprehension inwards, and make it attend (τὴν προσοχὴν ἔχειν) to what is there."

[21] Porph., *De abstin.* I 38.

[22] Porph., *De abstin.* I 39 (trans. Clark, thoroughly modified). There is a textual problem here: ἐφιστάντα (translated as "someone who is paying attention to them") is the reading of the Valentinus edition 1655; the mss. read ἀφιστάντα (meaning "someone who stands aside", trans. Clark). I prefer ἐφιστάντα, because it precisely illustrates what has been said about those who are eager to follow diets etc.: they are trying to cope with passions, by paying particular attention to them. But that is exactly what Porphyry wants us to avoid: we should pay no attention to them at all.

So the direction of our attention is decisive for the way in which we are susceptible for the influences of the external world. Moreover, the passage quoted intimates that an ἀντίληψις is impossible without any kind of προσοχή. Thus, the notion of attention gets the status of a formal element in the theory of perception and action.[23] The advantage of this is that it becomes possible to explain that a wise person (in the Stoic sense of the word) can be present in the corporeal world, without giving up his/her indifference to the influence of lower nature. One can have an ἀντίληψις of passions, without necessarily surrendering to them.

This Porphyrian προσοχή, or *attentio*, is literally taken over by Augustine in his *De musica*:

> "But when those things occur which affect the body with a kind of alteration, so to speak, then the soul exerts more attentive actions, adapted to the different parts of the body or the sensory organs." (*De mus.* VI, V, 10)

The entire discussion of sense perception hinges on the attention of the soul: a disturbance of the body is only felt if the soul pays attention to it, if it exerts *attentiores actiones*. The *attentio* is the condition for sense experience: if the soul is unattentive to a certain bodily movement, then it is not felt.

> "To cut things short: my view is that when the soul senses something in the body, it does not undergo anything from it, but it pays a particular attention to the affects. These operations, which are either easy (when the affects are in accordance with nature) or difficult (when they are contrary to nature), do not conceal the soul. That is the entire account of what is called 'to perceive'."[24]

3. The Passions

As we have seen, the Platonic-Augustinian account of sense perception starts from the irreducible distinction between the activity of the soul and the passivity of the body. Until now, we have taken this distinction between *actio* and *passio* in a merely descriptive or neutral sense: the perception of the soul presupposes a movement in

[23] Cf. also *Ibid.* I 41.

[24] *De mus.* VI, V, 9-10: *Et ne longe faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur.*

the body, which is a *passio* (translated as "affect"). But the terminology is not that neutral. In fact, it is needless to say that in the standard philosophical use, the word *passio* is not merely that which the body undergoes, but normally denotes a morally bad movement, which overcomes the rational soul and leads it astray. The same can be said of the *attentio*: although, as we have seen, every perception requires attention, not every attention is morally equivalent. There is a clear scheme of good and bad orientations of attention underlying this seemingly neutral description. Thus, the terminology of *passio* (and *attentio*) never is just descriptive (indicating any movement that the body undergoes); it always entails a normative qualification (indicating those movements from which we have to stay away).

This morally negative qualification of the passions was stressed by the Stoics, who claimed that they should be eradicated in order to attain the good life. In their view, passions are wrong assessments of corporeal movements, which are taken to be good and choice worthy, where in fact they are bad or indifferent. Our approval of them rests on a wrong judgment, the effect of which is that our reason is overwhelmed by the unreasonable movements. The wise man will be able to avoid these passions, since his assessment of impulses is always correct: he rightly takes something bad as bad, something good as good, and something indifferent as indifferent. Of course, this analysis does not mean that the wise person will never experience the physiological movements that may pave the way for the passions, like pleasure or pain. The wise person is he or she who is able to feel pleasure without losing the right rational control over one's deeds, i.e., without allowing this pleasure to become a passion. Indeed, some pleasures are unavoidable even in the life of the sage: he, too, will at the very least have to eat, drink, and have sexual intercourse. The wise person will be able to assess these impulses as bad, or at least indifferent (whereas the ordinary man will be overpowered by their excessive violence); he will not pursue them, but if they occur they will not disturb him at all.[25]

[25] Cf. Long-Sedley [see n.7], I 421, who qualify the indifferent pleasures as the 'entirely involuntary or unavoidable by-products of natural human behaviour'. The problem with this account is that there is no reason to call this judgment about an indifferent as indifferent a 'pleasure' (although the quoted sources do make this inference). Maybe this 'pleasant sensation' is to be understood as a mere presentation of a present good without any assent to the presentation. In this case, it will not lead to a judgment and so there will not be a πάθος, nor a εὐπάθεια. It just remains a 'shock' (πληγή, or *ictus*). I owe this idea to a personal communication of R. Sorabji. In this case, then, the indifferent pleasure could, perhaps, be considered as a kind of

This Stoic doctrine was echoed in Neo-Platonism, as an elaboration of Plato's incitation (in the *Theaetetus* 176a-b) to flee from this world. Plotinus reaffirms the Stoic ideal of the sage whose happiness is not disturbed by external fortunes or misfortunes (sickness, lack, death, health, and even sense perception *tout court*).[26] In his conception, this means that we should leave the level of the body behind us, and strive for a full realization of our 'higher' soul:

> "So we must 'flee from here' [*Theaet.* 176 a 8 – b 1] and 'separate' [*Phaedo* 67 c 6] ourselves from what has been added to us, and not be the composite thing, the ensouled body in which the nature of body (which has some trace of soul) has the greater power." (Plot. *Enn.* II 3, 9.20-23)

This does not mean that our bodily existence is altogether bad,[27] although it should be added that the care for the body at least hinders the zest to strive for the higher.[28]

In Porphyry we find this idea in the statement that the sensible world is always trying to lead us astray, and that we must therefore pay no attention to it at all. After quoting the passage form the *Theaetetus* (173 c – 174 a) in which Plato describes the inability of the philosopher to adapt to this world, Porphyry explains that this comes down to the following:

> "In these words Plato says that one remains impassive to these things [i.e., the sensible world] and out of their reach, not by descending to them, but by not lowering oneself to any of them."[29]

This Neo-Platonic solution of fleeing from this world was attractive to the younger Augustine: in his *Soliloquiae*, he makes Reason say the following:

> "I can give you only one advise, for I know no other: we ought to flee entirely from these sensible things, and we should carefully beware, while we bear this body, that our feathers are not hindered by their glue. For we need to have our feathers intact and perfect, in order to fly away from this darkness, towards the light over there.

'preliminary affection' (προπάθεια), which is an 'unchosen bodily reaction to which even the sage remains liable' (as defined by Price, *Op. cit.* [see n.7], 162). On Augustine's cognitive interpretation of these προπάθειαι: see Sarah C. Byers, "Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic 'Preliminary Passions' (*Propatheiai*)", in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 41 (2003), 433-448.

[26] See I 4, 3-16.

[27] This is affirmed at IV 8, 6-7.

[28] See, e.g., III 6, 5.1-10.

[29] Porph., *De abstin.* I 37, trans. Clark, modified.

> That light does not even deign to show itself to those imprisoned in this cave, unless they were capable of breaking it open or destroying it, so that they can evade to the rays of that light."[30]

In his later works, Augustine rejects this world-resignation, and looking back in the *Retractationes*, he recognizes that in his earlier works, he was too much influenced by a bad maxim of Porphyry.[31] This entails that he changed his view on the role of the body in the passions. In line with his overall positive view on the nature of the body, he comes to a new view on the interaction of body and soul, without, however, rejecting the basic Platonic premises of the doctrine.

Augustine's new view is original: passions are not bad per se; it all depends on the moral orientation of the one who undergoes them. As a consequence, the ambiguity of the traditional definition of the passions vanishes: a passion is no longer per definition a morally bad reaction of the soul. Instead, a passion is in se neutral, and receives its moral value from the intention of the agent. The central point of the shifting emphasis is the role of *voluntas*: it is the orientation of the will that determines whether a passion is good or bad.

In *De civitate Dei* IX, Augustine discusses the pagan philosophical theories of passions: the Platonists[32] (also termed Peripatetics here), who plead for a moderation of the passions, over against the Stoics who wanted to eradicate them. Augustine agrees with the suggestion of Cicero, that the discussion between Platonists and Stoics concerned only the wording, and not the doctrine itself: they all agreed that the mind of the wise man is not afflicted by passions. Thus, Virgil described his hero Aeneas as shedding tears without actually being afflicted: *mens inmota mota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes*.[33] As opposed to this pagan view, Augustine then proceeds to expound the Christian doctrine: a Christian can be afflicted, e.g., by the sorrow of someone else. The central question to be asked, then, is not *whether* pious persons can be caught by anger, fear, or sadness, but *on what grounds* they are passionate.

[30] *Solil.* I, XIV: *Unum est quod tibi possum praecipere; nihil plus novi: penitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda, cavendumque magnopere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne quo eorum visco pennae nostrae impediantur, quibus integris perfectisque opus est, ut ad illam lucem ab his tenebris evolemus: quae se ne ostendere quidem dignatur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista vel effracta vel dissoluta possint in auras suas evadere.* Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 246 c-d, and, of course, *Resp.* VII, 514 a – 517 a.

[31] *Retract.* I, IV, 3.

[32] This does not concern the Neoplatonists, but the Platonists to whom Cicero (who is Augustine's main source here) is referring; for the Neoplatonists agreed with the Stoics on this matter.

[33] Virgil, *Eneid* IV 449; quoted at *Civ. Dei* IX, IV, 3.

In other words, it is not bad to be passionate, but you must be passionate for the right reason. If so, for instance, if you have compassion (*compassio*, which comes down to *misericordia*, being caught in our hearts by the misery of someone else), your compassion makes you more *humane* (*humanius*). Thus, Augustine asserts that right passions (i.e., passions that serve right reason) are good, and even that they are virtues rather than vices.[34]

Contrary to what Augustine suggests, this idea is not altogether opposed to what the pagan philosophers had maintained. In the first place, of course, throwing together the Platonists and the Peripatetics is not quite doing justice to the latter, and especially on the subject of the passions, where the Aristotelian idea of μετριοπάθεια is about to play a central role – we will have to come back to this, for the influence of Aristotle is too big to be neglected. Moreover, in the Stoics and in the Neo-Platonists alike, the theory of the passions exceeds the borders of a harsh rejection of emotions. For indeed, even the most vivid opponent to passions (including pleasure and desire) will have to argue that, in the end, his own life choice is the most desirable, and promises the purest and finest kind of pleasure.

Thus, Stoics and Neo-Platonists did accept a transposition of the passions to a rational level, i.e., to the life of the wise, who will have these motions without being led astray by them. These "good affects" or εὐπάθειαι are threefold: joy (χαρά), will (βούλησις), and carefulness (εὐλάβεια), as a transposition of pleasure, desire, and fear. An equivalent to the fourth principal passion, pain, is not accepted, since the wise person is not susceptible to pain whatsoever. He will rightly assess pain as something indifferent or bad altogether.

These εὐπάθειαι are not mentioned in the ninth book of *De civitate Dei*, but they are addressed in the fourteenth book. Augustine here argues that all pagan philosophers chose a life *secundum carnem* – which is not a life devoted to corporeal lusts, but the life of someone who has turned himself (body and soul) away from his divine destination, and takes himself to be the measure (*secundum seipsum*). In doing so, he becomes like the devil, who owes his wickedness to his ambition to take the place of God. The list of pagan philosophers includes Epicureans and Stoics, as well as the Platonists, who maintain that the origin of evil lies in the corporeal nature. Augustine again deduces this from Virgil, whom he interprets by Platonising

[34] *Civ. Dei* IX, V.

him,[35] connecting his words *clausae tenebris et carcere caeco*[36] to a Neo-Platonic rendering of the Platonic idea of the body as a prison or chain of the soul (*Phaedo* 82 e). Thus, Augustine concludes, according to the Platonists, the origin of vice lies in the earthly organs and mortal limbs, which cause the passions.

But the Platonists are a case apart: they do recognise, Augustine says, that the corporeal nature is not evil in se, since it is formed by God. As a consequence, the passions do not stem from the body as such, and can even exist in the purified soul, after the corruption of the body. Augustine makes this point by referring to (a Platonising interpretation of) Virgil. But it is true that the "real" Platonists said this. As we have pointed out already, Plotinus held that the passions can be situated only in the ensouled body, the combination (τὸ συναμφότερον[37]) of lower soul and body. At *Enn.* I 8, Plotinus states that the soul can only be associated with the body when it descends to 'lower nature' (χείρων φύσις): only in this case fear, desire, distress, and anger (θυμοί) can come to be. They all reveal a certain situation of the combination (σύνθετον, or σύστασις) body-soul: fear that the combination will be resolved, distress when it is resolved, etc. (I 8, 15.14-18). Porphyry even strengthened the idea by insisting on the Platonic statement that the soul can even become corporeal, when it is too much nailed to the body (*Phaedo* 83 d).[38]

This is a hint which Augustine takes very seriously: in the end, the Platonists agree that passions can only arise in the combination of body and soul; they do not depend on the body as such. This brings him to his main point: if the corporeal nature as such is not responsible for the passions – or in any case, for the passions' being evil –, then the corporeal impulses as such are not bad. Rather, their possible badness is the result of the soul's attitude towards them. That is to say, they can as well be good, if the soul has a good intention. The central hinge of the value of the passions is the orientation of the will. The four main passions (pleasure, pain, desire and fear) are vicious, if

[35] Cf. P. Courcelle, «Interprétations néo-platonisantes du livre VI de l'*Enéide*», in *Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne* (*Entretiens Fond. Hardt*, III), Vandoeuvres, Genève, 1955, 95-136.

[36] *Eneid* VI 734; *Civ. Dei* XIV, III, 2.

[37] Cf. Plato, *Alc. I* 130 a 9.

[38] Cf. Porph., *De abst.* I 31 and 38, where the "nail" mentioned in the *Phaedo* is identified as sense perception, which fixes the soul to bodily pleasure. At I 57, the image is reversed, describing the final goal of nailing our soul to the higher realm.

and only if the will is bad. If the will is good (*recta*), then the passions are not only excusable, but even praiseworthy.[39]

The elaborated notion of the will is here taking over the role formerly attributed to the *attentio*: all motions of the passionate soul are *voluntates*. Augustine makes this very clear by reformulating the Stoic definition of the four main passions:

> "When we approve of striving for the things we want, we speak of a desire, when we approve of enjoying the things we want, we speak of a pleasure. In the same way, when we disapprove of a thing which we do not want to happen, then this kind of will is fear, and when we disapprove of something which happens to us against our will, then this kind of will is distress."[40]

Augustine here sustains the Stoic theory of a passion being the result of the assent (συγκατάθεσις) given to an impulse, but by the addition of the notion of *voluntas*, the Stoic terminology is actually turned upside down: the Stoics put the emphasis on the value of the object of our passion, determining a passion as a wrong assessment of this objective value. The Augustinian *voluntas* changes the mode entirely towards our subjective attitude: the moral value of the things we want depends on the moral value of our will. Hence, it must be possible that passions also occur in a morally good sense, in people who live *secundum Deum* and are *amatores boni*. Their good will (*bona voluntas*, or *amor*, or *caritas*) causes good passions. This claim is corroborated by references to Scriptural passages, showing that the pious do have longings, joys and fears. These are the Stoic εὐπάθειαι, or *constantiae*: the transpositions of the passions to a level at which reason keeps control, and is not led astray by irrational movements. As we have seen, the Stoics do not accept a rational equivalent of the fourth passion, pain. But Augustine does not agree: he points out that a good man can be sad, when he recognises that he has sinned. The Stoics are right, Augustine says, in this sense, that the true wise does not commit sins, and thus, that he cannot have this *tristitia*. But even then, Augustine adds, the *cives sanctae civitatis* (i.e., the Christian wise) can be sad, when they contrast their present state to the expected divine adoption and redemption of the body, or when

[39] *Civ. Dei* XIV, VI: *Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt.*

[40] *Civ.* Dei XIV, VI: *Cum consentimus appetendo ea quae volumus, cupiditas; cum autem consentimus fruendo his quae volumus, laetitia vocatur. Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, talis voluntas metus est, cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus accidit, talis voluntas tristitia est.*

they commit sin (for thinking that one is without sin is a sinful lie), and when they are tempted (*Civ. Dei* XIV, IX, 1). In sum, a true Christian has good passions (just as Christ himself could shed tears, be anxious, or be compassionate), passions which are in accordance with right reason (*recta ratio*).

It is important to note that Augustine here actually departs from the Stoic doctrine of εὐπάθεια. The Stoic *constantiae* are not passions, since the wise man's life is marked by the strictest ἀπάθεια. Εὐπάθεια is ἀπάθεια: a stable state of the wise man's mind, which allows him to avoid passionate motions. The only thing that happens in εὐλάβεια, χαρά, and βούλησις is a physiological process of broadening of the soul, whereas in a passion, a physiological reaction goes together with a darkening of the power of reason, on the basis of a wrong judgment about a certain impulse's being preferable or not. In the εὐπάθειαι, this latter effect is excluded, since they are good reactions to the recognition of a good impulse's being good. In Augustine's perspective, however, the *constantiae* are reinterpreted as *genuine* passions: the pious man is not ἀπαθής; he does feel fear, pleasure, compassion, etc., albeit as a result of his good will and in accordance with right reason.

As a matter of fact, Augustine's reinterpretation is not Stoic at all any more. Rather, Augustine's viewpoint is in line with that of Aristotle, though expressed in a Stoic terminology. For Augustine echoes Aristotle's overall aim to exercise μετριοπάθεια, tempering the passions as a result of employing right reason – and for Aristotle, right reason is the measure of virtue (*Nicomachean Ethics* II 4).[41] Of course, the Stoics also referred to "right reason" in order to indicate εὐπάθεια. But it is important to note the difference between the two accounts. For the Stoics, reason which is not hindered by external impulses is always "right reason"; the rational powers as such are always good. For Augustine, on the other hand, "right reason" is opposed to a bad orientation of reason. According to him, it is possible to be entirely rational without being good (for example, in the exercise of the *prudentia carnis*). Thus, the "righteousness" of reason is not guaranteed once our rational faculty takes control. Hence, a life devoted to reason is not per se good. It can be either good or bad. And in both cases, it is susceptible to passions.

[41] It is true that Augustine refers to this μετριοπάθεια in a negative way, when he says that some people are able to moderate their passions, but are so proud and boasting because of their lack of piety, that they are caught by another, even worse evil (*Civ. Dei* XIV, IX, 6). This is not to say that μετριοπάθεια is bad in se: it comes down to the overall reproach that the pagans, even those who have high moral standards, always fall prey to *superbia*, which turns their virtues into vices.

Augustine thus rejects the entire idea of ἀπάθεια altogether. This rejection of ἀπάθεια, however, does not come down to the claim that the soul does have passions after all. I think Augustine always remains true to the doctrine that the soul *in se* does not have passions. The rebuttal of ἀπάθεια rather means that the absence of passions cannot be a healthy state for a living being that has a bodily existence. If there is a body involved, then impassibility is an unattainable and undesirable state. Apart from this, the view of the way in which body and soul are combined, remains unchanged.

In any case, Augustine leaves open a possible ἀπάθεια in the life after Redemption: freedom from passions is good and highly choice worthy, he says, but not in our present life.[42] For our sinful state needs passions; we *must* feel anger and fear in order to avoid sins, and we *must* be able to be compassionate. A life without passions would be a state of reproachable, inhumane, insensibility, even worse than vice (*Civ. Dei* XIV, IX, 4).[43]

Thus, Augustine leaves the Stoic theory behind. He allows for a positive notion of the passions (which he introduces as a reinterpretation of the Stoic εὐπάθειαι). Doing so, he avoids a riddle inherent to the Stoic doctrine. Indeed, eventually, it is very difficult for a Stoic to argue for a qualitative difference between the passions and the εὐπάθειαι. On this point, there was a great controversy among the Stoics themselves. The standard theory, established by Chrysippus, held that joy and pleasure stem from the same impulse, which, in the case of pleasure, becomes 'excessive', thus going beyond the rational proportion.[44] In this case, then, there is no difference in kind between pleasure and joy. The only difference is that pleasure exceeds the limits set by rational choice. But, then, it is difficult to explain how an impulse becomes excessive: how are we to decide where the limit lies between a movement that is reasonable and a movement that breaks out of the limits set by reason? Probably on the ground of this kind of objections, Posidonius strongly disagreed with the standard Stoic doctrine. He rejected Chrysippus' unitary view of the soul, and returned to the Platonic, threefold division of the psyche. He thus drew an opposition

[42] *Civ. Dei* XIV, IX, 4: *bona plane et maxime optanda, sed nec ipsa huius est vitae.*

[43] On the inhumane character of that state: *Ibid.* XIV, IX, 6.

[44] Galen, *Plac.* 4.2.10-18 (Long-Sedley 65J; *SVF* 3.462). The example given by Long-Sedley [see n.7] I GHGGHG420 is illuminating: they compare right rational proportion to the setting of a speed limit. What is below the limit is in accordance with reason, what goes beyond it is excessive and passionate.

between reason and the irrational parts of the soul,[45] which had important repercussions for the theory of passions. For it enabled him to maintain that an impulse is brought along either by reason or by the irrational part of the soul. In the former case, the impulse leads to εὐπάθεια (or joy in particular), while in the latter case it will result in a passion (viz., pleasure). This entails a difference in kind between pleasure and joy, corresponding to the difference of the faculties from which they originate. This was the version of Stoicism that was the most influential in the Platonic schools, and the Neo-Platonic reformulation rests on this Posidonian theory.

Augustine, for his part, is able to avoid this discussion on the exact difference between εὐπάθειαι and passions: for him, passions and *constantiae* are just qualitatively identical. They all fall under one and the same account of "a passion"; the goodness of the *constantiae* is not depending on criteria within the *constantiae* themselves, but rather on the orientation of the will of the person who has the passions.

4. The Passions in the Afterlife

As we have seen, Augustine pushes ἀπάθεια back, away from our present life, accusing the Stoics of propagating an inhumane lack of sensibility. Does this mean, then, that ἀπάθεια finds its proper place in the afterlife? Augustine seems to accept that, in the texts we have been following until now: he admits that we need passions for the sake of our sinful existence, adding that ἀπάθεια is good and choice worthy, though not in this life.

However, Augustine proceeds by modifying this statement. In a first move, he goes on stating that the *perfecta beatitudo* is without fear and distress, but, surprisingly, and without preparation, he suddenly raises the following question: "Who would say, without entirely missing the truth, that there will not be love (*amor*) and joy (*gaudium*) in that life?"[46] This *Deus ex machina* – if I may use this expression – is striking, and shows the immense hesitation of Augustine as to whether ἀπάθεια would ever be desirable. Moreover, he immediately revokes his judgment about the absence of fear, arguing that there is likely to be a *timor castus* in the afterlife: a fear that

[45] Galen took over this view, and used Posidonius to criticize Chrysippus; cf. Long-Sedley I 422-423.

[46] *Civ. Dei* XIV, IX, 4.

keeps us away from sin (not by a sorrow about any weakness, but by the tranquillity of our love). In any case, distress and fear *stricto sensu* are dropped from the list of passions in the redeemed life, and only two passions are left over: *gaudium* and *amor*. The reason for this selection is to be sought in the loss of mortality.[47] A mortal pleasure and desire are always coloured by the possibility of losing their object. Hence, in the mortal state, we must include the opposite affects of distress and fear, which are implied by the possibility of the loss. Any experience of pleasure in this mortal life goes together with a possible pain, which is its starting point (pleasure occurring when a lack is remedied), and which will become actual when the object of our pleasure is lost. And, correspondingly, every desire implies fear, since the wish to attain the object goes together with the possibility that the object will ever be lost, if indeed it is attained at all.

In the immortal state, to the contrary, this possibility of losing the object of pleasure and desire is excluded: we shall always be present with the object of our longing, and we shall always enjoy this presence, without, however, getting so united to it that our desire would come to an end. The immortal *gaudium* and *amor* are rooted in a desire that is never fully satisfied, despite its eternal and perfect satisfaction. Contrary to its pagan Neo-Platonic counterpart, the Augustinian final unity never does away with alterity. The will does not come to rest, not even when it finds its ultimate and final destination in the vision of God.[48]

On the basis of what has been said before concerning the interaction of body and soul, one can now explain why this redeemed state still has passions: after all, it remains a corporeal state, and hence, passions are unavoidable in this state as well. In the end, it is due to this corporeality that we will never merge together with the object of our contemplation. Our bodily existence, even in the afterlife, is the cause of the impossibility of doing away with alterity.

With this view of the passions in the redeemed life, Augustine again complicates the matter which he had simplified before. We have seen how he brings all passions and *constantiae* together under one single heading, thus avoiding the deadlock of the Stoics about a qualitative difference between passions and εὐπάθειαι. But now, when he suddenly accepts only two passions in the afterlife, I think the difficulty returns as a boomerang. The reason why the two counterparts to joy and love are excluded is clear enough. But the fact that

[47] I wish to thank Bernard Bruning, who brought this point to my attention.
[48] *De Trin.* XI, 6, 10.

only these two passions are left, without their counterparts, implies an essential modification of those two passions. Indeed, there is an immense difference between having a pleasure in contrast to pain, and having a pleasure without the possibility of pain. And the same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for desire. Thus, the qualitative difference that Augustine denied between passion and εὐπάθεια is replaced by a qualitative difference between the passions in this life (no matter whether they are *secundum carnem* –i.e., passions– or *secundum Deum* –i.e., *constantiae*–) and the passions in the afterlife. In the final section, I want to make this point with reference to pleasure, as a kind of test case for the entire doctrine of passions.

5. Pleasure (and Pain?)

One of the main features of the Augustinian theory of sense perception is the central role attributed to pleasure and pain. We pointed out already that a sense perception always either is a pleasure or a pain. There are states in which we do not have pleasure or pain, but these are states in which we simply do not have sense perception at all. With this statement, Augustine is in line with Plato (as argued before) and with Aristotle, for whom pleasure is a natural or physiological sign that everything is "all right", whereas pain is a signal that something is going wrong.

This overall idea is expressed in the following, clear-cut definitions of pleasure and pain:

> "What is the so-called bodily pain, but a sudden corruption of the healthy state of that which the soul, by making a wrong use of it, brought to corruption? And what is the so-called spiritual pain, but the privation of perishable things which the soul enjoyed or hoped to enjoy?" (*De vera relig.* XII, 23)
>
> "Ask yourself what is captivating in bodily pleasure: you will find nothing but accordance (*convenientia*); for things that are opposing us (*resistentia*) yield pain, whereas things that are in accordance (*convenientia*) yield pleasure." (*Ibid.* XXXIX, 72)

This is a Platonic definition, going back to Plato's *Philebus*, where pleasure is defined as the felt restoration of a lack. On the basis of Aristotle's view of pleasure as a natural sign, the Stoic theory of *convenientia* is coupled with this process of restoration: our first natural impulse is to preserve our life, by striving for those things that naturally supply that which is *conveniens*, i.e., in accordance with nature. When this convenience is attained, we welcome it

with pleasure. But this pleasure is exclusively linked to the restoration process; hence, it is absent in the healthy state reached after the restoration. In the tenth book of the *Confessions*, Augustine draws a distinction between *voluptas* and *salus*, exactly on the basis of this definition of pleasure: "*ipse enim transitus* [*sc. ex indigentiae molestia ad quietem satietatis*] *voluptas est*» (*Conf.* X, 44). The final state of health (*salus*) is a state of rest in satisfaction (*quies satietatis*), which is without *voluptas*. And, Augustine adds, it is in the movement towards satisfaction that all kinds of temptations occur: we tend to seek pleasure for its own sake, whereas the real goal of the pleasureable movements is the healthy state. Thus, pleasure is seen as a kind of self-destructive movement towards this state: the closer we get to satisfaction, the less pleasure we shall experience.

This is the doctrine of pleasure as we find it in the Neo-Platonic tradition. Plotinus, for instance, gives the following definition of pain and pleasure:

> "Pain is consciousness of withdrawal of a body which is being deprived of the image of soul, and pleasure is the knowledge of a living being that the image of soul is again fitting itself back in the body." (IV 4, 19.2-4)

In this passage, the "image of soul" is the lower soul, which is combined with the body, and exerts vital functions: vegetation (the soul being the one who nourishes the body, "as a mother"),[49] sensation, and discursive thinking. The "higher" soul, on the other hand, does not descend into the material world, and remains eternally in the intelligible world; it does not need discursive thinking, but intuitively grasps the νοῦς. That the body "is deprived of the image of soul" does not mean that the combination of body and soul really is resolved. This would entail the impossibility to experience pleasure, distress, or whatsoever, since perception is one of the psychic functions[50]. It rather means that the combination is threatened, and that the body is about to lose the image of soul. The harm done to the integrity of the body (which causes pain) is radically opposed to the natural function of vegetative soul, whose task it is to nourish, to cure, and to save the body. According to this analysis, pain is the awareness of the broken harmony between the actual condition of the body and the natural aim of the function of the soul; pleasure is the consciousness of the restoration of this harmony.

[49] *Enn.* IV 4, 20.25-36
[50] Cf. *Enn.* IV 4, 28.22-58.

This parallel with Plotinian texts adduces evidence that Augustine's definition of pleasure is essentially Neo-Platonic. It is on this basis that Augustine can argue that there is no qualitative difference between the pleasures – qua pleasures – of a life *secundum carnem* and a life *secundum Deum*, since both lives equally consist in a combination of body and soul. However clear this may seem at first sight, this Platonic definition of pleasure is causing problems, if we are to accept the existence of pleasure in the redeemed life, in a state where a lack will no longer exist. Indeed, the absence of a lack contradicts the very definition of pleasure as the restoration of a lack, which would entail that pleasure simply is impossible in this state. On the other hand, this state should be pleasurable, if we want to argue convincingly that it is the most desirable state of all.

Again, Augustine is by no means the first or the only author who had to cope with this typical problem. In fact, the question raised here is inherent to the entire Platonic tradition, and to Neo-Platonism in particular. In the Neo-Platonic tradition, philosophers have been struggling with the question of what was to happen, when we reach the ultimate unity: is it not likely that this state will yield the purest pleasure, without any lack or pain?[51] The answer is very difficult, given the definition of pleasure. The standard Neo-Platonic view is that we shall attain a kind of "joy" that is different from genuine pleasure. At I 4 Plotinus writes the following:

> "When people ask about what is pleasant in a life of the sage, they will not suppose that he should enjoy any of the pleasures of the debauchee or of the body –these cannot be present and they are destructive of happiness– or even extreme emotional pleasures of any kind –why should the good man have any?– but only those pleasures which accompany the presence of goods, i.e. pleasures that do not consist in movements or in a process of becoming: for the goods are there already, and the good man is present to himself; his pleasure and cheerfulness are at rest. The good man is always cheerful; his state is tranquil, his disposition contented and undisturbed by any so-called evils –if he is really good. If anyone looks for another kind of pleasure in the life of virtue it is not the life of virtue he is looking for. (I 4, 12.1-12, trans. Rist, combined with Armstrong)

In this passage, the "pleasure of the sage" is not to be taken literally. As Plotinus points out in one of his most important treatises, in the "good life", which is the highest performance of our natural

[51] Cf. my *Pleasure and the Good Life. Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists*, Leiden (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 85), 2000.

condition, we have a kind of "pleasure". However, it is described as "a state of luminous clarity", and it is by no means a genuine pleasure, for we have left behind the affective movements of the world of becoming:

> "Assuming that such a state of intellect is most pleasing and acceptable, they[52] say that it is mixed with pleasure because they cannot find an appropriate way of speaking about it. (VI 7, 30.24-27)

If this is no genuine pleasure, then what is it? What allows us to call this a "joy"? In fact, the existence of this joy is argued by referring to a completely different definition of pleasure, which is that of Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle said that pleasure, rather than being the restoration of a lack, is the effect of our performing an activity in a perfect way, without any hindrance. If we enjoy playing the flute, then this is not, Aristotle says, because our activity fills a lack, but because we are well performing the activity of playing the flute. The Neo-Platonists were eager to take over this Aristotelian notion of pleasure, to indicate the highest kind of pleasure: Plotinus' joy occurs exactly in the actualised life of virtue, which is said to be the unimpeded performance of our natural condition. As ever, the Neo-Platonists follow Plato as far as they can, using all other philosophical schools in order to mould the Platonic viewpoint, and finding particular resort in Aristotle, when Plato can no longer be followed. But, on the other hand, they remain true to Plato: for them, this joy cannot be a genuine pleasure, because it cannot be reconciled with the Platonic definition of pleasure as the restoration of a lack.

When Augustine takes over the Neo-Platonic definition of pleasure, he also inherits the peculiar problem of explaining the existence of a pleasure in a state without any lack. In the earlier works, Augustine seems to opt for the radical Neo-Platonic solution: there will not be any pleasure there. What we shall attain is a "neutral" condition, as outlined by Plato, and not a pleasure.[53] This is in line with the overall definition of pleasure as the transition towards a state of contentment.[54]

[52] One does not expect a plural form here. Clearly, Plato himself is meant in the first place. The plural, however, places the reference in a broader perspective; it may, then, imply the entire Platonic 'school', including Aristotle.

[53] *De mus.* VI, V, 15: *Aliud est summa stoliditate, aliud summa sanitate corporis nihil sentire. Nam in altero instrumenta desunt, quae adversus passiones corporis moveantur, in altero ipsae passiones.*

[54] Cf. *Conf.* X, 44, quoted above, and *Vera relig.* LII, 101: *quid appetit voluptas corporis nisi quietem, quae non est nisi ubi nulla est indigentia et nulla corruptio?*

Later on, however, Augustine changes his mind: pleasure is worth wile in itself. As we have seen, the *gaudium* in the redeemed life is a pleasure without any possible distress. This is in line with his acceptance of the passions in the good life. But this does not mean that he is leaving the overall Platonic framework. For the question of how to say that this *gaudium* can be called a pleasure is addressed by taking over peculiar Neo-Platonic schemes. Augustine will make his point by stating that there are two kinds of "*quies*": one is the result of satiation, and occurs after the pleasurable movement, while the other occurs "when we find our joy in the Lord" (*delectare in domino*), according to the word of the Psalmist. The latter kind is true rest: the satiation of the body can never be eternal nor even longlasting, whereas enjoying God is an everlasting rest.[55] But how can this rest be enjoyable? We find an answer to this question in the *De Trinitate*. After having indicated (in the eleventh book) that our will can take a rest when a partial goal is achieved, and that we can enjoy this (partial) rest,[56] Augustine points out (in the fifteenth book) that our will is accomplished or perfected (*perficitur*) when it attains what it was tending to, and when it takes rest in this attainment. The result of this is that the desire of the one who was seeking (*appetitus quaerentis*) is modified into the love of the one who feels joy (*amor fruentis*).[57] Hence, the joy of *frui* consists in the perfection of the will (*voluntas*), when it attains its final goal. This may seem paradoxical, since at first sight it entails that the will is perfect when it comes to its end. But that is not what is meant here: when the will attains its final object, and thus finds its rest in God, the will does not cease. Playing on the words, one could say that the will does not come to its end when it attains its end. Rather, it finds its rest in the attainment, but the activity of willing continues. The attainment modifies the character of the activity, from desire (of that which is not present yet) to love (of that which is present), and the affect changes correspondingly: from *voluptas* (in the movement) to *frui* (at rest).[58]

Thus, we can conclude that when Augustine transposes pleasure to the state of the redeemed body, he is doing the same as the pagan Neo-Platonists: he follows Aristotle rather than Plato. The

[55] *Ep.* 55.18.
[56] *De Trin.* XI, VI, 10.
[57] *Ibid.* XV, XXVI, 47.
[58] Cf. Augustine's definition of *frui* at *De Trin.* X, X, 13: *fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit.*

notion of *gaudium* rests on the Aristotelian definition of pleasure as the supplementary effect of an unimpeded activity, namely, of the perfect activity of the will that has attained its final goal. That is what makes *voluptas* (the pleasure in this life, being the restoration of a lack) different in kind from *gaudium*, or from *frui Deo*.

Gerd VAN RIEL

STOIC AGAINST HIS WILL? AUGUSTINE ON THE GOOD LIFE IN *DE BEATA VITA* AND THE *PRAECEPTUM*

1. Introduction

1.1. Anthropological optimism in Christianity?

As far as directives concerning the good life are concerned, philosophy and Christianity do not appear to agree. Philosophical ideas concerning this theme have always been viewed with suspicion by Christian leaders, because human nature was represented in a too rosy colour and divine grace had no part in redemption.

Thus, Origen was condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 553. Origen saw mankind capable of eliminating by himself the results of the fall of man and capable of rediscovering the personal godly "I". His optimistic view of mankind must have appealed to the Christian humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam. He once remarked that he learned more from one page of Origen than ten pages of Augustine.[1] Maybe his opinion was based on the trust that Origen lets mankind shine through, while Erasmus had studied those sections from Augustine's work where mankind is represented as disorganized and thus incapable of reaching God's grace. Despite Erasmus' great influence on Church and society, Augustine remained throughout the ages the great *auctoritas*. Not Origen, who had an optimistic view of mankind and was indebted to pagan philosophy. The Church historian and later Cardinal J. de Jong remarked that Origen 'teveel den invloed ondergaat der Philosophie (Plato en Stoa)' (is too much influenced by Philosophy (Plato and Stoa). He therefore agrees with the quote from Porphyry which Eusebius had included in his *Historia Ecclesiastica*,

[1] 'Plus me docet christianae philosophiae unica Originis pagina quam decem Augustini', Erasmus, *epistola* 844 (ed. Allen, dl. 3, 337), quoted in: A.J.M. Davids, *Patrologie en patristiek. Overwegingen naar aanleiding van Eusebius' geschiedenis van de Oude Kerk. Rede uitgesproken ter gelegenheid van het aftreden als hoogleraar in de Patrologie, Patristiek en Geschiedenis van de Oude Kerk aan de Faculteit der Theologie van de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen op vrijdag 30 augustus 2002* (Nijmegen 2002), 8.

that 'hij (Origen, pvg) leeft als een Christen, maar dacht als een Griek'. (he lived as a Christian but thought as a Greek).[2]

De Jong was certainly not the only one to voice a discrepancy between Christianity and pagan philosophy based on Augustine's elaboration of God's grace. It was always emphasized that the neo-platonists played down the effects of primal sin, did not consider grace as important, and that therefore in their intellectual teachings an idea of self-deification could be perceived.[3] Because there it was stated that mankind could transcend the gulf between himself and God, the philosophers were imputed with an arrogance and pride which was considered typical neo-platonic or described as plotinian.[4] Nevertheless, in time a certain ambivalence developed in the judgement of neo-platonism and Christianity. Thus, Augustine was also brought forward as the one in whom both streams of thought came together. Just as Plato and Plotinus, after all, he also considered the body to be subservient to the mind, and a lower state of being. This was because he as well was focussed on another world and thus considered being in this world as incomplete.[5] It was also pointed out that in Augustine human reason and divine grace are not mutually exclusive.[6] It was, however, remarked that the *humilitas* ('humility') was considered as exclusively Christian, and that Augustine considered this virtue as the basic attitude towards receptiveness for God's grace.[7]

[2] Kardinaal de Jong, *Handboek der Kerkgeschiedenis*. Herzien en verbeterd door dr. R.R. Post (Utrecht etc. 1947-1949[4]) 4 vols., vol.1, 172.

[3] See f.i.: P. Maréchal, 'La vision de Dieu au sommet de la contemplation d'après Saint Augustin,' in: *Nouvelle Révue Theologique* 58(1930), 89-109; 191-204; E. Hendrikx, 'Platonisches und biblisches Denken bei Augustinus', in: *Augustinus Magister* I (1954-55), 285-299.

[4] F. Cayré, 'Notes sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin. Premiers appels de Dieu à la vie intérieure', in: *L'Année theologique* 11 (1951), 239-243; id. 'La Mystique divine courante d'après Saint Augustin ou la sagesse priante, âme des "Confessions" et règle d'action', in: *Divinitas* 3(1959), 43-76; id. La contemplation Augustinienne. Principes de Spiritualité et Théologie (Bruges-Paris 1954[2]), 52-56; 262-263.

[5] Cf. H. Kraft, *Einführung in die Patrologie* (Darmstadt 1991), 119.

[6] Limited summary of this discussion in C. Koetsveld, *O schoonheid, zo oud en zo nieuw. Over christelijke spiritualiteit en de leer waarin zij wortelt, met de kerkvader Augustinus als gids* (Kampen 1992), 147-148.

[7] Cf. e.g. M. Rosenberger, *Der Weg des Lebens. Zum Zusammenhang von Christologie und Spiritualität in der Verkündigung des heiligen Augustinus* (Regensburg 1996), 79-83; V. Grossi, 'Agostino', in: *Dizionario di Mistica* (Città del Vaticano 1998), kol. 58-65. Cf. also Th. Rutten, *Augustinus mysticus. Mystiek, narcisme en echoïsme bij Augustinus, geïllustreerd aan* Confessiones *en* Enarrationes in Psalmos (Baarn 2003), 64-118.

1.2 Towards a question

Because Augustine considers grace of the utmost importance, he does not appear to be the right person to teach modern man about the art of living. At best his early work can deliver some interesting points of view, as it was not yet steeped in the Christian teaching and still echoed of pagan philosophy. Augustine became explicitly involved in 386 in the discussion in late antiquity of the art of living and order of life with his *De beata vita*. In this small treatise the shrewd discussion of self-assured people echoes through. They appear to trust especially their own power of thought in their individual search for happiness. The influence of Cicero and Plotinus is obvious and appears larger than that of Scripture and the Christian tradition of faith.[8] However, once a bishop, in around 397 in his *Praeceptum*, he presents his fellow brothers in his house a tangible order of life apparently based on another notion of life. In this, a superior dictates certain rules on behalf of an order of life which on first view appear to disqualify the care for oneself because the *communal* life is considered the way towards a receptiveness for grace.

This begs certain questions. Does Augustine as a young, not yet baptised, person share the anthropological optimism of the classical philosophers and Origen? Does he play down, once a bishop, the power of mankind, and only then amplifies the idea of bodily inferiority in order to emphasize the need for grace?

In this contribution, based on an analysis of the two aforementioned small treatises, I will try to make clear that the guidelines of ancient philosophy had a longer effect on Augustine than a study of his opinion of grace alone or even his own words in the *Confessiones* could surmise. In any case, in his practical work he integrates insights from the classical art of living into the Christian teachings in a manner which in no way shows any distrust of philosophy. To the contrary, he does this in a way which provides stepping stones for a modern discussion of the art of living and her contribution.

[8] Cf. W. Beierwaltes, 'Agostino e il neoplatonismo cristiano', in: *Platonismo e filosofia patristica* (Milano 1995), 16f: states that even though Augustine thanks to the *Hortensius* became acquainted with philosophy, nevertheless in thinking through of the great questions he was more indebted to neo-platonism. He knew Plotinus' work a.o. through the translation by Marius Victorinus, cf. E.B.J. Postma, *Augustinus, De beata vita* (Amsterdam 1946), 38. By the way, the seven phases in Augustine's design for a spiritual way in *De vera religione* reflect his indebtedness as well to neo-platonism.

2. Ideas on the order of life and the art of living

2.1 De beata vita

In 386, Augustine, together with some family members and friends, stayed at the estate Cassiciacum near Milan. According with the neo-platonic view on friendship, in which dialogue served metaphysics as a way to happiness and the *Zweckfreundschaft* was based on mutual benevolence and respect, four discussions were held.[9] The friends in fact embodied the ideal as stated by Cicero in his *Laelius. De Amicitia* in which he says that friendship is no more than the perfect agreement in way of seeing supernatural and natural situations and which involves mutual compatibility and devotion. Augustine himself filled the part of the *invitator* and later revised the conversations as noted by the stenographer into four writings: *De beata vita, Soliloquia, De ordine,* and *Contra academicos*. In all dialogues the view is echoed that living according to reason is necessary in order to gain insight into the order of things and to experience happiness.[10] But not only do revelation and reason bring knowledge of God, an orderly way of life makes one receptive towards God.[11] Plotinus echoes through, when Augustine describes the unity with God – the One, for Plotinus – as the final destiny of mankind.[12]

The discussion which would be the foundation for *De beata vita*, began on November 13th 386, Augustine's 32nd birthday (*Beata*

[9] I. Hadot, 'Amicitia', in: C. Mayer (red.), *Augustinuslexikon* (Basel 1986-.....), vol. 1, kol. 287-293, esp. 291, leaves it at this observation. The manner in which Augustine christianises friendship, which is discussed by Van Bavel, she does not discuss. Cf. for example, T.J. van Bavel, *Charisma: Gemeenschap. Gemeenschap als plaats voor de Heer*. Heverlee-Leuven, 2000; id., 'Natural en Spiritual Relationships in Augustine', in: *Augustiniana* 46(1996), 197-242; id., *Augustinus. Van liefde en vriendschap*. Kampen, 1986[3].

[10] Augustinus, *De ordine*. Ed. W.M. Green, *Corpvs Christianorvm* Series Latina (Turnholti 1954 sqq.), vol. 29, II, 5, 16-17; 5, 18-19 (p. 115-117); II, 11, 30-34 (p. 124-127); II, 18, 48; 19, 49-51 (p. 133-135). (Henceforward abbreviated as *CCSL*); Augustinus, *Contra Academicos*. Ed. W.M. Green (*CCSL* 29), II, 2, 5 (p. 19).

[11] See P. van Geest, *Integriteit als weg naar God. Over de spiritualiteit van Augustinus. Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar Augustijnse Studies aan de Katholieke Theologische Universiteit te Utrecht op vrijdag 18 oktober 2002* (Utrecht 2002), 11-14.

[12] J. Doignon, 'Beata uita (De-)', in: A. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids-Cambridge 1999), col. 618- 624, esp. 621.

vita I, par. 6). For three days it formed an effervescent interruption of the dialogue upon which *Contra academicos* would be based.[13] It is considered the most religious work by Augustine himself (*ibidem* I, par. 5).

Because human sinfulness is not explicitly catalogued, it is assumed that Augustine in *De beata vita* did not describe his conversion to Christianity but to neo-platonism. He later would reflect this in a variant which witnesses a Christianised recollection in his *Confessiones*.[14] In a certain sense this is true. In *De beata vita*, Augustine uses images for his conversion which he, probably to avoid misconception, does not use any longer in the *Confessiones*. In the images in *De beata vita*, after all, his tribute to ancient philosophy resounds. For example, the stay at Cassiciacum evoked Plotinus' and Cicero's image of philosophy as a safe haven in a stormy world (*Beata vita* I, par. 1). His own past he indicates according to this image in the idea borrowed from Seneca of the seafarer. This he uses in order to invite the maecenas and Plotinus follower Manlius Theodorus to categorise him into a certain group. There is a group that lands in calm waters at a certain age by 'just' tugging at the oars. There is a group that only reaches for books, and is thus brought back to the harbour, after the wind has led them to deep misery (*altissima miserarium*; *ibidem* I/26). This misery goes together with the caress of the deceptive comfort of pleasure and honours (*falacissima serenitas uoluptatum honorumque*; *ibidem* I/27). Finally, there is the group, that at full sea thinks of the motherland and – immediately or after wanderings – courses for the longed-for peaceful life (*ibidem* I/28-32).[15] In order to have his maecenas make the best choice, Augustine then gives an outline of his life. Especially in this biography an act of dependence on the philosophers resounds, more

[13] Augustinus, *De beata vita*. Ed. W.M. Green, *Corpvs Christianorvm* Series Latina (Turnholti 1954 sqq.), vol. 29, II, 2, 65-85, inz. *Beata Vita* 9 (p. 70); Augustinus, *Retractationum libri II*. Ed. A. Mutzenbecher (*CCSL* 57), I, 2, 4.

[14] Based on a comparison with the account on this matter in *De beata vita*, many have doubted since Harnack the historical authenticity of Augustine's story of conversion in the *Confessiones*. Cf. J. Mc William, 'Cassiciacum Dialogues' in: *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, kol. 135-143, esp. 36-138; Pierre Courcelle had already discovered in his innovative research into the *Confessiones* that Augustine strived for historical accuracy in his attempt to fathom his inner self before God and find the image of God within himself: P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*. Paris, 1968.

[15] Cf. V.H. Drecoll, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins* (Tübingen1999), 27, note 9 and 10 (*Beiträge zur historischen Theologie* 109). One finds literature and references here, mostly derived from the edition by Green (cf. footnote 13).

than faith in Scripture. After all, he first states that he was attracted to philosophy by Cicero's *Hortensius*.[16] Nevertheless, his disappointment with manichaeism and the academics evolves in a confession that he has learnt from Ambrosius' sermons that nothing corporal can be understood for soul and God. However, also Manlius Theodorus is mentioned as a teacher in this context. Furthermore, Augustine professes that women and ambition have withheld him from sailing into the harbour of philosophy and that social esteem made him tally in studying Plotinus' books (sic), books considered highly by his maecenas.[17] Besides the wish to study the philosophers, Augustine was apparently also accustomed to coquetry ....

2.2 The influence of classical philosophy

Even though he would still have to undergo a *pectoris dolor* (*ibidem*, I/105) in order to be able to set course for the harbour of philosophy, in the introductory part of the actual dialogue of *De beata vita* Augustine appears to ascribe reaching this to his own powers. However, also in the rest of the work, the influence of neo-platonism is obvious. The *De beata vita* thus seems to reflect the awareness of life of the modern, self-conscious human being who, especially in his aspirations towards autonomy, tries to find happiness.

Thus, Augustine, in the onset to the actual debate with Cicero, links malignity (*nequitia*) as the mother of all deficiencies (*vitia*) to transience, evanescence, and 'nothingness'. Together with Cicero, Augustine also mentions fertility (*frugalitas*) and temperance (*temperantia*) as the most important parts of virtue (*virtus*), which remains, and is always the same (*ibidem* II/60-73).[18] At the end he repeats the contradiction between *nequitia* and *frugalitas* in terms of "nothingness" and "being". He describes *frugalitas* as *temperantia* and *modestia*: moderation and self-control (*ibidem* IV/194-204).[19]

[16] Cf. T. van Bavel, 'The influence of Cicero's Ideal of Friendship on Augustine', in: J. den Boeft, J. van Oort (ed), *Augustiniana Trajectina. Communications au Colloque International d'Utrecht 13-14 novembre 1986* (Paris 1987), 59-72 (*Études Augustiniennes*).

[17] Cf. however Augustinus, *Confessionum libri XIII*. Ed. L. Verheijen (*CCSL* 27), 9, 2.

[18] 'Est autem aliquid, si manet, si constat, si semper tale est, ut est uirtus. Cuius magna pars est atque pulcherrima, quae temperantia et frugalitas dicitur' Green mentions as source: Cicero, *Tusc.* (=Colloquies in Tusculum, pvg), 3, 8, 16; Ed. Green, 70.

[19] 'Merito etiam uirtutum omnium matrem multi frugalitatem esse dixerunt. Quibus consentiens Tullius etiam in popolari oratione ait: *ut uolet quisque accipiat; ego tamen frugalitatem, id est modestiam et temperantiam, uirtutem maximam iudico*', ed. Green, 70.

Trygetius and Augustine, in *Beata Vita* II, 8 derive the *virtus* from the human mind and admonish to take good care of it. Mankind is thus individually capable, through a tempered life which leads to fertility, to attain something immortal. It is this positive view of humanity upon which Cicero's ideas of virtue are based.

In the following actual discussion, it appears that Augustine's confession to be tributary to Cicero's *Hortensius* is no mere sycophancy.[20] Not only the theme 'We wish to be happy' (*Beatos nos esse uolumus*; *ibidem* II/85), but many of the convincing thoughts can be traced back to this work. Thus, Augustine lets Monnica say that someone who wishes for something bad, is *miser*, even if he has all he wants. In order to support this idea of his mother's in the dialogue, he uses a quote from the *Hortensius* in which it is stated that it is no great problem not to receive what one wants, rather than to wish for something that is not appropriate. A corrupt will brings a person more bad things than fate will grant in good things.[21] Even the portrayal of Orata Augustine has borrowed from Cicero. Orata is a rich man who longs for nothing and thus appears wise, but is *miser* because of his fear of losing everything. Contrary to the fullness of the *sapientia* through his fear he knows the *animi egestas* (*ibidem* IV, par. 26-28, esp. 120-127). Does the appreciation for the *apatheia* resound here? Tribute to the Stoa resounds when Augustine places the *egere* not on the bodily level but on the level of the *animus* (cf. also *ibidem*, IV/35-40). Augustine's view of corporality is also Stoic: the *sapiens* moves away from bodily imperfection, does not fear *mors corporis* nor *dolores*, even if he will try to avoid these (*Beata vita* IV/32-60). Because Augustine here reflects as someone who accepts his suffering out of self-respect rather than from longing for it in order to be like Christ, he rather looks like the ideal of the gentleman more than illustrating a Christian.[22] Finally, his emphasis on the necessity of

[20] cf. Drecoll, *o.c.*, 34, noot 38: *De beata vita* II/ 95 – 101= *Hortensius frg.* 59-59b. Cf. ed. Green, 70.

[21] '*Ecce autem .... Falsum id quidem; uelle enim quod non deceat, id est ipsum miserrimum. Nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod uelis, quam adipisci uelle quod non oporteat. Plus enim mali prauitas uoluntatis adfert quam fortuna cuiquam boni*', *De beata vita*, II, 10, ed. Green, 71.

[22] K. Löwith, 'Can there be a christian gentleman?', in: *Vorträge und Abhandlungen zur Kritik der christlichen Überlieferung* (Stuttgart 1966), 28-38, states that there are no gentlemen nor Christians any more in this world, because both gentlemen and Christians believe that their respective attitudes can be reconciled. That Augustine assumes that humility flows from the longing to be more like Christ is seen in his elaboration of the *Christus-medicus* idea. Cf. P. van Geest, 'Inveni medicum, qui in caelo habitat et in terris spargit medicamenta... Augustinus van Hippo over ziekte en genezing', in: *Leidschrift. Historisch Tijdschrift* 17 (2002), 29-50.

modesty (*modestia*, derived from *modus*) and *temperantia* (can be reduced to *temperies*: the right mixture) reflects his preference for Stoicism, that it is good in life to be temperate.[23] Excess from abundance of scarcity are seen by Augustine as deficiency, based this thought because both lack temperance. Happiness for him exists in that wisdom which encompasses measure and balance and shuts out excesses as imperfections.[24] The basis for all these words are the ideas of the Stoa. From these, and other parts of the text, one may safely adduce that Augustine's vision of the happy life in no way surpasses classical thought, but, even more so, actually derives from this an attraction for people who find the key to good life in inner stability and self-control. A.H. Armstrong once stated that the attractiveness of Christianity lies in the elements it has borrowed from Greek philosophy.[25] *De beata vita* seems to agree with this scholar.

2.3 The stratification of virtue and wisdom

Paradoxically, this last thought is both true and not true. Augustine considered balance and self-control essential, and not the only possibility to reconcile man with his existence and experience a preview of redemption.

From *De beata vita* it is also clear that around 386 he went to lengths to appropriate and interiorize the Christian mysteries. This process did not entail that the ideas of the ancient philosophers were considered outdated and pagan; these were after all used with agreement and appreciation. Nevertheless, Augustine's renewed study of Scripture added another perspective to the classical thoughts on the good life.

This change in perspective is already seen in the beginning when Augustine names the good life not only as a task but also as a *donum dei* (*Beata vita* I/ 125-127).[26] Up to the end of *De Beata vita*

[23] Ferwerda quotes as source Terentius, *Andria*, 61; cf. Augustinus, *Over het gelukkige leven*. Bezorgd, vertaald en van een inleiding en verklarende noten voorzien door dr. R. Ferwerda (Baarn-Kapellen z.j.),83; Cf. however also: R. Jolivet, 'Introduction', in: *Oeuvres de saint Augustin*. 1re série: *Opuscules* I: *Problèmes fondamentaux* (Paris 1939), 216-217 (*Bibliothèque Augustinienne*).

[24] 'Quidquid igitur uel parum uel nimium est, quia modo eget, obnoxium est egestati. Modus ergo animi sapientia est. Etenim sapientia contraria stultitiae non negatur et stultitia egestas, egestati autem contraria plenitudo: sapientia igitur plenitudo. In plenitudine autem modus: modus igitur animo in sapientia est. Vnde illud praeclarum est et non inmerito diffamatur: *hoc primum in uita esse utile, ut ne quid nimis*', ed. Green, 83.

[25] A.H. Armstrong, 'Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation', in: *Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard* (Fontenay-aux-Roses 1981), 47-62, esp. 54.

[26] Drecoll, *o.c.*, 27-49.

the strain remains visible between human activity ('festinantes') and passivity ('perduci') in order to attain the *beata vita* (cf. *ibidem* IV/291 f).[27] In addition, it has recently been shown that Augustine ascribes in *De Beata Vita* a decisive meaning to *Deum habere* in order to be *beatus* (cf. *ibidem* II, par. 11). The *Deum habere* is in first instance linked by Licentius to the good life, by Trygetius to doing the will of God (*ibidem* II, 12f), and by Adeodatus finally to *caste vivere* (*ibidem* III, par. 18). Augustine brings together these definitions in the statement that whoever does what God wills, lives a good life (*ibidem* III/22-27; cf. III/ 48-50; III/41-46). Then he concludes that, if someone does what God wills, he does not have God, for he is still searching (*ibidem* III/51-61; III/65-68). As *Deum invenire* is similar to *beatus esse*, *Deum quaerere* does not include the *beatus esse*. Searching after all goes together with change and thus is not similar to God's being, *semper manens*. Thus Augustine deprives man the possibility of making himself *beatus*. In this, Augustine differs radically from Cicero who did consider the search for truth as an activity leading to *beatus* and thus conceded mankind the possibility to reach the state of being *beatus* all by himself.[28]

That Augustine sees happiness within the finding, and, in the process of becoming Christian, not in the searching, he also shows in Monnica's words in *De beata vita*. The dependant relation of mankind to God she reflects in her proposal to replace the *Deum habere* by *Deum propitium habere*. Whoever leads a good life will find a merciful God, whoever leads a bad life an *infestus Deus* (*ibidem* III/68-73). By considering God either as *propitius* or *infestus* (unkind) Augustine shows the link between how man lives to his vision of God. Just before he also suggested that a virtuous life by itself is not good, but especially leads to a kind of receptiveness, or sensitivity towards God. In *De beata vita* II, 11 after all, he lets Monnica say that only through spiritual self-control (*anima sui moderatione*) man can reach being *beatus*. Augustine adds to this: except for spiritual temperance (soul) one must acquire what is *semper manens* (*ibidem* II/145-146). At the end of II, par. 8 he characterised the *virtus* as seen as *semper manens*; at the end of II, par. 11 he is allowed to call God *aeternus* and *semper manens*.[29] Because he not only

[27] Drecoll, *o.c.*, 44.

[28] Drecoll, *o.c.*, 37 (points at *Contra Academicos* 1, 3).

[29] 'Deus, inquam, uobis aeternus esse semper manens videtur? – Hoc quidem, inquit Licentius, ita certum est ut interrogatione non egeat, ceterique omnes pia deuotione concinuerunt. – Deum igitur, inquam, qui habet, beatus est', ed. Green, 72.

describes the *virtus* (or *frugalitas* and *temperantia*) but also *Deus* in terms of *semper manere*, all the more because in *De beata Vita* IV he specifies the *certissimae res* as *virtutis prescriptum* together with *divina lex sapientiae* (*ibidem* IV/40-60; IV, 25), Augustine suggests an intrinsic link between acting virtuously and a sensitivity towards God's being. Augustine thus opens Cicero's description of *virtus* by linking virtue to the ontological distinction between *nihil esse* and *esse*, nothingness and being. And by ascribing the same qualities to *virtus* as to God, *aeternus et semper manens*, he brings about the belief that the good order of life clarifies God's being. Moreover, he suggests an obligation for exertion if one wishes to 'own' this being, if one wishes a receptiveness, or sensitivity towards God.

Through a similar procedure, Augustine in *De beata vita* adds another level of meaning to the words *sapientia* and *modus* which they did not yet have in the classical philosophy. In IV, par. 32, he connects wisdom to being able in the mind to keeping the right measure. Based on the Stoic *Ne quid nimis* (nothing too much) – principle, wisdom appears to go together with inner balance. When one goes into excess in luxury and ambition, or, on the contrary, if he is fearful or depressed, then the mind will not find wisdom (IV, par. 33):

'Habet ego modum suum, id est sapientiam, quisquis beatus est.'[30]

As Augustine in the following calls Christ *sapientia dei* (IV/250 f), in *De beata vita* he already demonstrates his conversion to Christianity rather than to neo-platonism. He equates Christ to the *veritas*, issuing forth from the *summus modus*, God, and also returning to Him (*Beata vita* IV, par. 34). *Beatus*, now, appears to be the one, who, enjoying truth, is bound through truth to the highest measure (*ibidem* IV/281-283).[31] *Sapientia* and *modus* are thus used in a double meaning. The *modus* stands for virtue *and* the *summa modus* for the being of God the Father; the *sapientia* for virtue *and* for the being of the Son.[32]

[30] This principle is stated in: Terentius, *Andria* 1,1, 34; Cicero, *De finibus*, 3, 22; Seneca, *Epistula* 94, 43. Cf. note 24.

[31] 'Illa est igitur plena satietas animorum, hoc est beata uita, pie perfecteque cognoscere, a quo inducaris in ueritatem, qua ueritate perfruaris, per quid conectaris summo modo', ed. Green, 84.

[32] *Beata Vita* IV, par 33-34; ed. Green, 83-84. Cf. ook: Cf. G. Madec, 'Si Plato viveret... Augustin, De vera religione 3.3', in: *Néoplatonisme: Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard*, 231-247, esp. 232-235; Madec argues that Augustine for example in *Contra Academicos* 3.19.42 with the philosophical terminology does express 'la specificité du christianisme': l'abaissement de l'intellect, la kénose du Noûs, est bien dans son esprit l'incarnation du Verbe'.

Even though the meanings remain clearly distinct, Augustine's optimism on mankind echoes through in the use of the same words for a divine and human characteristic. By reusing the words he makes it clear that man, by his own powers, can reach a sensitivity for God's being through gathering the human *modus* and *sapientia*. And, despite the fact that an exertion is required in order to attain this receptiveness, one must also rely on grace. Augustine after all also indicates that the *admonitio*, the Holy Spirit, enlightens man so that he may remember God (*ibidem* IV/268-270). Thus all appear dependant of the Trinitarian *summus modus-veritas-admonitio,* Father-Son-Holy Spirit. Even the guidelines emanate from the divine *admonitio*![33]

Whether his *tranquillitas* after the *pectoris dolor* grew from reading Plotinus' books, Augustine does not mention in *De beata vita* I, par. 4. Maybe he was silent through tactical reasons. Did he do so in order not to upset his neo-platonic maecenas Manlius Theodorus and did he realise that his understanding of *modus, virtus* and *sapientia* partly, but in essence, differed from the philosophers whom he nevertheless admired? He wisely does not diverge. In any case, in *De beata vita* Augustine does not drown the classical philosophers' understanding of ethics and virtue by emphasizing the primacy of God's grace. He adds with respect to the philosophers a new perspective to the words *virtus*, *modus* and *sapientia* by, on the one hand, recognising it as a way to insight into God's being, but, on the other hand, also and especially as a quality of God Himself. Thus in these words an anthropological optimism resounds, which owes to classical philosophy. But furthermore, a concept of life sounds through in which man is reconciled with life and tastes a preview of the deepest salvation by realising his dependence on a merciful God. In the words *virtus, modus* and *sapientia* Augustine thus interweaves the human and divine reality in a manner which was then as yet unknown.

3. Applied art of living

3.1 The Praeceptum

As will now become clear in the *Praeceptum*, this connection between the human and divine reality was always remembered.

[33] See for the trinitarian formula of Augustine especially J. Doignon, 'Notes complémentaires', in: *Oeuvres de saint Augustin* 4/1, *Dialogues philosophiques. De beata vita – La vie heureuse* (Bruges 1986). Introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes et tables par Jean Doignon, 151-152 (*Bibliothèque Augustinienne*).

Nevertheless, Stoic against his will so it seems, Augustine still owed much to the Stoa when writing this small treatise as a bishop. We will come to this now.

In 396, when he succeeded Valerius as bishop of Hippo, he founded in the bishop's house a community of clergy. Before he settled there himself, he had written the *Praeceptum* around 397 for the lay convent in the garden of the diocese where he had been attached to as priest and superior. It was a small, normative treatise with a long genesis, rooted in classical philosophy, but also rooted in the *experience* that Augustine had undergone since his return to Africa in communal life.[34] In his bishop's house, he needed to keep in consideration that even though people could together choose an ideal, they may not be compatible in character. In Cassiciacum he lived with similarly minded and moulded people, in Hippo, for example, there was Possidius, who, contrary to Augustine, had never enjoyed an education before he entered the convent. Augustine's earlier ideas on friendship were tested and purified through these experiences.[35] It is no longer a question of a pure neo-platonic view on friendship.[36] In his *Confessiones*, which he also began in 397, he states explicitly that friendship only exists where God is the adhesive between people, who are attached to each other with the love poured out into the hearts by the Holy Spirit.[37] Apparently, the emphasis on the Spirit is accompanied by the insight that communal life is not simple as is suggested in the neo-platonic ideal of friendship.

By the way, this is not the only difference which becomes obvious when one compares *De beata vita* to the *Confessiones*. Besides the fact that he defines the dialogues from before his baptism as issuing from 'the school of arrogance', the thoughts on Manlius Theodorus are radically different.[38] In *De beata vita* he praises him for his knowledge of Plotinus

[34] The research done by P. Verheyen has shown that the text had a long genesis. At its basis lays another small treatise: *De ordine*. This work was inspired by the "Pythagoras", a piece of work which Augustine considered an archetypical for early Christian thinking on behaviour, values and an example of a treatise in which the process of ascent is developed. Cf. L. Verheijen, 'Vers la Beauté spirituelle', in: *Nouvelle Approche de la Règle de Saint Augustin* (Bégrolles en Mauges 1980), 201-242, esp. 239 –242 (*Vie monastique* 8).

[35] For the dating, see L. Verheijen, 'La Loi et la Grâce. La "date ancienne" et la "date récente" de la Règle', in: *Nouvelle Approche* (1980), 58-73, and id., 'Réflexions sur les identités augustiniennes 386, 397, 412, 426, "1215"', in: L. Verheijen, *Nouvelle approche de la Règle de saint Augustin*. II. *Chemin vers la vie heureuse* (Louvain 1988), 74-85, esp. 80-81.

[36] I. Hadot, 'Amicitia', in: *Augustinuslexikon*, vol. 1, kol. 287-293; esp. 291.

[37] Augustinus, *Confessionum libri XIII*, 4,4,7; cf. 4, 5,5.

[38] *ibidem*, 9, 4, 7 (137). Cf. Drecoll, *o.c.*, 31, footnote 24 for further literary references.

and for his generosity, as we have seen, eleven years later Augustine calls his maecenas a bombastic and arrogant man (*Confessiones* VII, 9, 13). The coquetry, typical for his younger years, appears to have been conquered by the bishop, but somehow the change in attitude seems strange. Even though based on his *Confessiones* Augustine is seen as the author in whom the modern subject (as far as the interior and experience are concerned) for the first time plays an important part, in his work it does appear that he disqualifies the 'care for himself' which he had borrowed from the Stoa. He extensively describes his sins, in the hope that God in His mercy will accept him anyway. The aspiration of the self-assured searcher who in *De beata vita* sees the receptiveness for God originate from a personally wrought proper way of living, no longer resounds. Much more a man speaks out here who knows that feelings of sinfulness and powerlessness will be overshadowed by God's power.

Despite the qualification of his earlier work in the *Confessiones*, his distancing from Manlius Theodorus, and the repeated emphasis of his own sinfulness and need for grace, Augustine's thinking before and after his baptism shows more unity than he wishes to convey in the *Confessiones*. The anthropological optimism and his tribute to the Stoa resound in the *Praeceptum* which he wrote shortly before the *Confessiones*. Apparently against his wish, since he defines the dialogues from before his baptism as issuing from 'the school of arrogance'! But in spite of this, the thoughts on finding a merciful God through a proper way of living form the introduction and theoretical foundation to the guidelines which he described for his community in the *Praeceptum*.

3.2 The community as a way to a merciful God

In order to discover the influence of the philosophers in Augustine's *Praeceptum,* it is important to keep in mind that the young Augustine saw receptiveness for God enclosed within a proper way of life. This insight, as described in *De beata vita*, he never abandoned. He only recognised after his baptism and ordinations that the community should receive more credit than was initially assumed. As bishop, it became clearer that the unity of a community is no foregone conclusion, but is nevertheless a way to God.

Thus Augustine opens his *Praeceptum* with the admonition to live together '*of one soul and one heart*, on the way to God'.[39] This

[39] Augustinus, *Praeceptum*, I, 2, in: *Praeceptum*, in: L. Verheijen, *La règle de saint Augustin*. Paris, 1967. 2 vols., vol. 1 *Tradition manuscrite*; vol. 2 *Recherches Historiques* (*Etudes Augustiniennes*), vol. 1, 417-437, quotation: 417.

unity of heart and soul was ascribed to the first Christians in Jerusalem in Acts 4:32, and was considered an ideal for him. At the end of the first chapter he connects the sensitivity for the mystery of God, reached through the unity of heart and soul, with the vision of a communal relationship:

> 'Primum, propter quod in unum estis congregati, ut unanimes habitetis in domo *et* sit uobis anima una et cor unum in de*um*.'[40]

The inclusion in the first chapter makes it clear that for Augustine from 397, the perfection of the individual is correlated to the wholeness of the community. The latter as we have seen, is more of a task than a gift. The directives for the order of the day, prayer times, fasting, distribution of tasks, brotherly admonition, and obedience in the following chapters after all serve towards this unity. They are the evidence for the fact that Augustine saw this unity carried by the manner in which the specific daily existence is experienced. However, it is also clear that he has not abandoned the ideas from his youth: an ordered life is still a way to God. Furthermore, at the end of the *Praeceptum* his loyalty to the insights stated in *De beata vita* are seen. The orderly life, and thus the exertions of man himself, leads to a community through the order and measure which exists. *Idealiter* the community, by living this orderly life, finally tunes in to the wavelength in which it would be captured by a desire for spiritual beauty and becomes sensitive to the power of God's grace. In the eighth and final chapter Augustine writes:

> 'Donet dominus, ut obseruetis haec omnia cum dilectione, tamquam spiritalis pulchritudinis amatores et bono Christi odore de bona conuersatione flagrantes, non sicut serui sub lege, sed sicut liberi, sub gratia constituti.'[41]

Thus a fundamental principle appears which Augustine stated a year before his baptism in *De beata vita*. It turns out here, that this principle is still relevant in his thoughts on the proper life when he is bishop: Through a proper way of living man is focussed on and sensitive to *deus propitius*.

Although in the *Praeceptum* the community is now made explicit as an indispensable link in the process towards a receptiveness for God, the same principle resounds as in *De beata vita*. The ethically justified way of life makes receptive to, sensitive for immortality

[40] *Praeceptum*, I, 8, (418).
[41] *Praeceptum*, VIII, 1 (437).

(*Beata vita* II, par. 8; IV, par. 31), the being of God. Augustine still believes that man through his own effort and within the earthly reality can reach the wavelength on which he will be receptive to the grace of God.

3.3 Stoic against his will? The application of the Ne quid nimis *principle.*

In several of the directives of the *Praeceptum* it is clear that from 386 to 397 Augustine had not only studied and interiorised the Christian mysteries. The distancing of his works from his youth discloses that this process of making it his own went together with the influence of Stoic principles on his thoughts on communal life. Even more so: in *De beata vita* he 'only' catalogues the *ne quid nimis*-principle, he appears to have applied it in the side-notes for two directives in the *Praeceptum*. The Stoa remains influential whether he wishes or not.

Within the inclusion through which he proposes the unity of heart and soul as a way to God, Augustine introduces the communal property. There must be no personal property, everything amongst the brothers must be shared and the superior must provide for food and clothing.[42] The communal unity is thus based on a specific foundation. But the standard is followed by a side-note which shows that Augustine sees the standard as a directive for personal growth. After all, he writes that the superior should not give an equal amount to all, after all, not all are equally strong, but to each must be given what he needs.[43]

Augustine shows he is aware that sharing goods does not necessarily emerge from the fact that this is a standard. The unity of heart and soul would after all be founded on quicksand should the standards be implemented from a top-down approach. He must have realised that freedmen go through a different process of becoming accustomed to communal goods than owning freeborn. In order to let each discover the value of communal property and thus strive towards an authentic unity of heart and soul, Augustine takes each individual separately.[44] He appears to grant each the room for growth towards unity of heart and soul. But he does not tally in calling those who are

[42] *Praeceptum*, I, 3 (418).
[43] *Ibidem.*
[44] Cf. F. van der Meer, *Augustinus de zielzorger. Een studie over de praktijk van een kerkvader* (Brussel-Utrecht 1947), 155.

not yet accustomed as 'weak'.[45] However, in spite of this sharp definition his conviction resounds that each individual's development must be taken seriously, only then can he grow naturally towards the measure of the community. But especially at the beginning of this process it is clear: *ne quid nimis*. In fact, Augustine states explicitly the foundation of the side-note of the *Praeceptum* in *De beata vita* when he writes:

> 'Vnde illud praeclarum est et non inmerito diffamatur: *hoc primum in uita esse utile, ut ne quid nimis*.'[46]

Even in the advice concerning fasting, the *ne quid nimis*-principle is applied. First, Augustine states the standard to be followed by two side-notes. He first advises to control the body through fasting and abstinence from food and drink, immediately following he adds that this is only allowed where one's health allows. The sick must receive appropriate food, but he must be able to let go of this treatment when well.[47]

Fasting as a means to control bodily desires must never be to the detriment of one's health, and thus the weak must be spared. The right measure must be kept, and therefore: nothing too much. For the unity within the community it is possible that not all follow the same regime, however paradoxical this may seem. Already in *De beata vita* Augustine stated explicitly that a person must keep in mind the measure which nature has set for the body: not eating leads to loss of weight, eating to growth and strength (*De beata vita* II/23-24). Thus it appears that he does not ascribe to the idea of negating the body because the spirit is higher in the order of being; he also does not ascribe to rigid ascetics.[48]

From this second side-note as well, it appears that the bishop was still inspired by the priciples of the Stoa, and that these were the foundation for his guidelines for an order of life which would enhance communal unity. This unity must be fought for. The insights of the Stoa have had more influence than he would care to admit in public. And even longer! Also in his letter to Proba, written in 412, he is still loyal to this principle. First of all Augustine states, as he does in *De beata vita*, that a happy life does not necessarily means that you get what you want, but that it is related to not doing anything improper (5.10; cf. *De*

[45] See also *Praeceptum* I, 3-7; III, 3-4 (418-419; 421-422).
[46] Cf. note 24.
[47] *Praeceptum* III, 1-5 (421-423).
[48] Cf. for Plato and Plotinus: H. Kraft, *Einführung in die Patrologie* (Darmstadt 1991), 119.

beata vita IV/194-204). But he also states that prayer is a struggle with fasting and abstinence, and each must do what they can. What one can only do less, is done in another who can do more…[49]

4. Conclusion

Because of the stratification in Augustine's work it is necessary for a complete study of his reliance on the Stoa to find a proper method in order to keep the thoughts of the Stoa separate from these of Scripture. J. Doignon and R. Ferwerda have undoubtedly contributed through the comparison between sources and their interest in parallelism in Plotinus' *Enneads* and *De beata Vita*. Especially the former has stated, based on the *Soliloquia*, that the thinking of the Stoa is included in prayer; this prayer already betrays Augustine's Christianity because it is there that he deeply believes that for purification man is still dependent on God.[50]

In a certain sense, this contribution can be seen in line with the previously mentioned research. After all, as we have seen now, it was attempted to make clear that Augustine, on the ***word-level*** tries to intensify the sensitivity for and at the same time the knowledge of dependence on God through a word which is considered by the *veteres* a virtue as much as a quality of God. Thus he opens up the meaning and Christianizes it at the same time. That Augustine mentions his conversion to Christianity already in his early works is also seen in this word level. In the guidelines for an order for life, but also in the description of the word *virtus* the great respect for philosophy rings out. F.i., the *virtus* appears to be the ***way*** to insight in God's being, but on the other hand, also and especially as a characteristic for describing God *Himself*. He thus provides the expression with a new perspective.

It is also on the level of the application of the stoic ***Prinzipienlehre*** that the effect of the *veteres* in Augustine's work can be noticed. It appears in the comparison of *De beata vita* and the *Praeceptum* that

[49] Augustinus, *Epistula 130 ad Probam*. Ed. J. Zycha. *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Pragae-Vindobonae-Lipsiae 1877 sqq.), vol. 41, 303-343, esp. 343.

[50] J. Doignon, 'Notes complémentaires', in: *Oeuvres de saint Augustin* 4/1 *Dialogues philosophiques. De beata vita – La vie heureuse* (Bruges 1986) Introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes et tables par Jean Doignon, 145-146;148-149 (*Bibliothèque Augustinienne*);; id., 'La prière liminaire des *Soliloquia* dans la ligne philosophique des Dialogues de Cassiciacum', in: J. den Boeft, J. van Oort (ed), *Augustiniana Trajectina. Communications au Colloque International d'Utrecht 13-14 novembre 1986* (Paris 1987), 85-105, esp. 86-87, 104-105 (*Études Augustiniennes*); R. Ferwerda, 'Plotinus' Presence in Augustine', in: *ibidem*, 106-118.

Augustine at least in his works on the art of living and order of life was always inspired by the principles and optimism of the classical philosophers. Although he does not share their view of the affects for instance, and Professor van Bavel has successfully shown that Augustine has turned around Cicero's sequence. At the passing of the years, Augustine saw that friendship is more than an intellectual affair because in friendship eternity can be tasted. That is why, contrary to Cicero, he places the human before the divine. This can be seen in the *Praeceptum* as well. Nevertheless, in the line of thought suggested and indicated by Van Bavel the influence of the *veteres* resounds in Augustine's work on the level of the application of principles. Already before his baptism he presents in his first treatise the theoretical foundations for this, based on the classics. Not only does an anthropological optimism ring out, thanks to classical philosophy, but also a awareness that man is reconciled with his existence and already tastes the deepest redemption because he knows that he is dependant on a merciful God.

In his *Praeceptum* Augustine has let this dual insight become the foundation for the organizational advice for an order of life in his community. The bishop has remained faithful to the insights of his youth, more than he will admit. Indeed, in the *Confessiones* he distances himself from his earlier works by stating the arrogance, and is Manlius Theodorus gradually less favoured. But in the *Praeceptum* he catalogues not only several principles from classical antiquity concerning the order of life, as in *De beata vita*, but he also applies them in the guidelines. In this, the typical Stoic 'care for oneself' is in no way disqualified. There are no stark guidelines resulting in a rigidly ascetic way of life, in which the vision of man as sinful is the foundation. His thoughts on the *ne quid nimis* principle probably have saved him from an anthropological pessimism.

The principles within the Stoic ideal of the good life are thus in no way 'evaporated' in Augustine's practical works. To the contrary: in *De beata vita* they are happily appreciated in the course of a design for life where the vision of God is intensified, and in the *Praeceptum* with this in mind applied. Thus it appears that the indebtedness to the guidelines of the Stoa has made Augustine, like Origen, an optimist, at least in his work written for life itsélf. But faith in human ability was for Augustine apparently not redeeming enough. According to him, this did not bring about the reconciliation searched by his brothers. A foretaste of the final redemption man will find when he becomes sensitive to God through his *ordo vitae*.

Paul VAN GEEST

DIDACTICALLY RESPONSIBLE USE OF HUMOUR IN ST. AUGUSTINE'S *SERMO* 53,12-14.

Introduction

Humour and laughter are not the first features one associates with a writer from ancient times, and especially not a church father. In fact the church fathers had problems with any kind of exuberance at all. In their view, civilized people did not indulge in laughter. However, modern anthropological, sociological and psychological research has proved not only that humour and laughter are universally human and have always existed, but also that no community could survive without them. A community without language is not a community, and the same goes for humour.

There must therefore have been humour and laughter in St. Augustine's time.[1] Nearly all the evidence is of a negative attitude to humour and laughter on the part of St. Augustine (and all other church fathers), although between the lines one can find glimpses of authentic humour – humour which provokes contrasts and a particular kind of amusement. This is because the way he preaches follows the way he taught in his previous career. Certainly, his use of humour is mostly didactically based. Education is, after all, based on wonder, and wonder is a very important means of when necessary arousing wonder and of sustaining the interest generated. This is confirmed by theories on education and humour developed in the last decades.

St. Augustine therefore uses humour to support the learning process, to a small extent but with a certain regularity. This article tries to show this through an example: a fragment from a sermon in which St. Augustine unmistakably uses the possibilities which humour offers him: *Sermo* 53,12-14. To this end it is necessary first to talk about the indissoluble link between his preaching and his teaching, before turning to teaching and humour in general. The sermon is then placed in its historical context, after which its didactic and humoristic content are examined. The issues of concern are how, and to what extent, does St. Augustine handle humour, and how are theories about humour and laughter applicable in this context. Finally, an impression is given of his general attitude to humour and laughter.

[1] Raskin 1985, 1-2: "Independently of their age, sex, social or economic status, culture or epoch, people are capable of finding things funny, and laughing at them."

1 St. Augustine, preacher and teacher

In his sermons St. Augustine stands out clearly as the teacher speaking in a gentle and fatherly tone to his pupils. He does it not only implicitly, in the way he approaches his listeners intellectually, but also explicitly by presenting himself directly as a teacher[2]. In the last lines of *Sermo* 53,13 he says: "Now think hard, and instruct me; I'm appointing you the teacher, and make myself the child. Won't you please teach me?"[3] Even though he here reverses the roles with a didactic trick and a rhetorical question, thereby giving the impression of being a teacher only indirectly, he is still the teacher (doctor) and his audience are students (here called 'parvuli' – little ones). The firm yet friendly demand for attention in this passage is also characteristic of a teacher: "Please be so kind as to listen to me, because I was so kind just now as to listen to you."[4]

As a preacher St. Augustine is still the teacher he used to be.[5] And why wouldn't he be? He was a great teacher and he knew it. "Great teachers," says Daniel Doyle in an attempt to show that St. Augustine the preacher developed from the teacher – "are born with innate qualities that dispose them to become great teachers: curiosity, memory, analytical and conceptual ability, passion, hunger for truth, a desire to communicate, a love of wisdom. Yet such grace is insufficient unless it is accompanied by skills carefully cultivated and honed through disciplined learning, mentoring, and experience. Expert teachers master words and play with them in ways that invite others to explore and understand the mysteries of our world and of ourselves. Great teachers change the lives of their students. They teach beyond their subject matter. They make a lasting difference."[6]

Reading his work makes clear why Doyle's description of the teacher fits St. Augustine so well. We are fortunate that a good deal of his voluminous writings has survived – both the practical and the theoretical ones. The sermons are examples of the practical work,

[2] See also *Sermo* 53A, 1: Accedentes ergo ad se discipulos suos magister unus et verus docebat ista, (...). Et vos venistis ad nos, ut ipso adiuvante loquamur vobis et doceamus vos. The English translations of the sermons are from: Hill 1991.

[3] *Sermo* 53,13: Modo iam cogita, et doce me. Adhibeo te doctorem, et me parvulum facio. Doce me – obsecro te.

[4] *Sermo* 53,14: Si placet, audi me, quia in eo quod tibi placuit, audivi te.

[5] Verwilghen 1998, 233: "Lorsqu'Augustin siégait dans sa *cathedra* épiscopale, (...), il se retrouvait en somme dans une situation assez semblable à celle qu'il avait occupée dans sa précédente carrière. Il redevenait un professeur occupé à expliquer un texte venerable."

[6] Doyle 2000, 81.

while the theoretical writings allow the reader a look behind the scenes of sermon practice.

Two important and very informative works on this subject, which furthermore span almost his entire career, are *De catechizandis rudibus* en *De doctrina christiana*.[7] Whilst the former is mainly concerned with instruction in faith to individuals or small groups, the latter is about education of larger groups. Although it is outside the scope of this article to discuss both works, it is necessary to give some attention to *De doctrina christiana* on the subject of Christian rhetoric.

As far as rhetoric is concerned, St. Augustine was a man of his time. In full accordance with the Roman education system he was trained in grammar and rhetoric. This curriculum has been discussed extensively in many works.[8] Due to his commitment to the Christian faith, however, he distanced himself from certain habits inherited from pre-Christian times. At the same time, he became more and more convinced during his career as preacher that it could do no harm to adapt the traditional Greek-Roman rhetoric of Cicero and Quintilian[9] (but not the Second Sophistic) which in his time determined what rhetoric was and had put it in a bad light) to Christian requirements. His criterion was immediateness.[10] He had no choice, because to put it briefly, Christian preaching then had imposed fundamentally different requirements on preachers than those which rhetoric had imposed on orators. Whilst according to Cicero and Quintilian the orator's main task towards listeners was one of persuasion,[11] St. Augustine knew only too well that his aim should be more to keep the attention of an audience already convinced.[12] No easy job, in which he found

[7] *De catechizandis rudibus* was written around 400 and therefore is an early work. St. Augustine (354-430) was ordained as priest in 391 and as bishop in 395. He preached from his ordination as priest until his death. *De doctrina christiana* was written in two phases. Books 1 and 2 and part of book 3 were written in 397. The rest of book 3 and book 4 (highly important for this study) were written in 427, not long before his death in 430.

[8] Amongst others, in: Marrou (1958) 1983.

[9] For a short but clear survey: Leeman/Braet, *Klassieke retorica* 1987.

[10] Brown 1992, 224: "The need to get a message over put such pressure on St. Augustine that the complicated structure of classical rhetoric collapsed." See also Oberhelman 1991, 110-111.

[11] Scanlon 1994, 44: "The rhetor must persuade the audience here and now. And plausibility, rather than truth, is the goal."

[12] Scanlon 1994, 44: "Instruction is the primary purpose of Christian rhetoric." Oberhelman 1991, 116: "The primary purpose of the Christian orator/preacher/teacher, however, must always be the clear and, at the same time, not inelegant presentation of Christian truth."

he could only succeed by offering good and interesting teaching (docere) and by very seriously taking the listeners' mannerisms into account.[13] *De doctrina christiana*[14] documents his attempts to make a theoretical change from a classical persuasion-oriented rhetoric to a Christian teaching-oriented rhetoric in which truth and eloquence are bound together following St. Paul's example.[15] The translation from theory to practice is shown most clearly in the sermons.

2 What is good education?

We have seen that for St. Augustine a good sermon did not need to be persuasive in a classical sense. In his time he could assume that most of the audience belonged to the Christian faith. The days of the Apology were over. A Christian preacher would do better to teach his audience, provide explanations, and grasp every opportunity to inform them and deepen their convictions. Not in a forced way, but giving them the means to digest optimally the by no means easy Scriptures. In a manner of speaking, he gave them food.[16]

St. Augustine quite rightly did not hesitate to make clever use of his talent, knowledge, and experience as grammarian and orator. Even when preaching he was still a teacher. By then the young church had attained some adulthood and he had gained a certain status, so that he could (and was allowed to) assume that the church congregation in front of him was, in principle, interested in what he had to say. As a result, he found himself in a fairly comfortable situation, by no means dissimilar from that of a (modern) lecturer. To demonstrate this we must first concentrate on the relationship between preaching and education. What is education?

[13] Kursawe 2000, 12-13: "St. Augustine ist durchaus ein Anhänger der traditionellen Rhetorik, die das Einwirken auf die Affekte für eine wichtige Aufgabe des Redners hält. (...) Für die christliche Predigt gilt dies noch aus tieferen Gründen. Durch die Offenbarung wird die ganze Seele des Menschen angesprochen; Gott wirkt auf das ganze Innere des Menschen ein, biblisch gesprochen auf sein Herz."

[14] Kursawe 2000, 153-161. Kursawe distinguishes three layers: first, the parts which St. Augustine takes from classical rhetoric; second, the parts which he supplements or narrows down; thirdly, the parts which he rejects.

[15] Oberhelman 1991, 116: "St. Paul is the outstanding example of how eloquence and truth are to be conjoined. His eloquence was produced naturally, without any training in, or knowledge of, the rules of rhetorical schools: his own thoughts, sincerity, and the truth led him to his heights of oratory."

[16] Brown 1992, 220.

One of the many theoreticians who have succeeded in getting to the core of education is the philosopher Cornelis Verhoeven. Verhoeven characterizes education succinctly as "an intellectual training based on knowledge of the subject on the part of the teacher and on interest on the part of the pupil",[17] and further on he adds: "a service which assumes a need but, like a restaurant without hunger or appetite, cannot exist without a need. [18] Looked at like this, education stands on two cornerstones: on one hand training and service by the teacher, and on the other the interest of the student. Particularly interesting is the way Verhoeven translates his theory into practice: "The job of education is to maximize interest, not to excite it".[19] His standpoint, therefore, is that in principle the student has to be interested, so that the teacher doesn't have to start from scratch but can jump in at a certain level. Good teaching thus demands an active attitude from both teacher and student.

However, the pupil's assumed interest can only really unfold if pupil and teacher can keep their mutual influence warm and can let it blossom. Interest is like a breeding ground that has to be continuously watered with wonder, or in other words, has to be continuously stimulated. Why? Because "interest is a preamble for possible surprising discoveries."[20] Healthy teacher-student interaction holds the student's attention and maintains the need for surprise in both of them. There have to be opportunities for surprise, and it takes time to create them. Good teaching, therefore, cannot be restricted in terms of time. "There is no room for interest", writes Verhoeven, "unless wonder gets the chance to return to a higher degree of chaos where there is as yet no tyranny of preconceptions. In moments of surprise, the rules of practice are broken and the world is unmanageable".[21] In other words, to avoid drying up, the breeding ground of interest must be kept watered with wonder. It may even be necessary to depart temporarily from the level of thought achieved so far, and to return to a lower level in order to start again towards the top with renewed élan.

"Wonder means a temporary brake on the control of the world, but also a broadening of the view".[22] To keep on awakening interest whilst still making progress, there have to be periods of consolidation

[17] Verhoeven 1980, 39.
[18] Verhoeven 1980, 39.
[19] Verhoeven 1980, 39.
[20] Verhoeven 1980, 44.
[21] Verhoeven 1980, 44. Verhoeven's theory is confirmed in practice in: Skynner/Cleese 1996.
[22] Verhoeven 1980, 13.

and even some backward steps. Or, as Verhoeven says elsewhere: "Didactics sometimes requires a gear change to a higher state of chaos where preconceptions are challenged in order to reach a higher dimension in a broader context."[23] This means that occasionally the student, directed by the teacher, must let go of what he has learned so far, go back a step, and then allow himself to be given a new challenge. When this happens, a kind of vacuum can occur in which student and teacher – fully aware of the consequences – get the opportunity to look at the problem from a distance or to put it into perspective, and in so doing arrive at broader and deeper understanding than when sticking only to familiar paths. There has to be optimal interaction and trust between student and teacher. It is precisely in an optimal learning situation that the aesthetical experience brought about by humour can play an important role; it is humour – says the philosopher John Morreall – that allows people to mark time.[24] A teacher who dares to make use of humour widens his students' awareness,[25] even though it takes him more time and effort. "A teacher who integrates humour into the learning experience" – says Morreall – "will have to put more effort into teaching. He or she will be dealing with students no longer as mere receivers of pre-packaged information, but as curious, playful, creative human beings, who experiment with ideas, occasionally ask outlandish questions, and may sometimes even get bored enough to make wisecracks. Such a teacher will no longer be able to present his or her material as neat chunks of knowledge which can be understood in only one way, nor to present trains of thought which move inexorably from a given point to a pre-established conclusion. He or she will not even take it as given that all of class time must be spent in learning something."[26] It is noticeable how well, from the standpoint of theory, Morreall's view links up with Verhoeven's. And also how, from the standpoint of practice, Morrealls's view ties up with Doyle's description of the ideal teacher which he sees in St. Augustine.

In short, good teaching rests not only on known didactic principles but more importantly on interaction, on the process which takes

[23] Verhoeven 1980, 12.

[24] Morreall 1983, 94: "Aesthetic experience generally is important in our lives. We need to be able to stop occasionally amid the practical stream of everyday living to simply enjoy attending to things and situations we perceive or imagine." This fits perfectly with Verhoeven's theory.

[25] Morreall 1983, 96-97: "If teachers paid more attention to humour, moreover, they would also find that it is most useful in getting students to see more aesthetically and creatively."

[26] Morreall 1983, 98.

place between teacher and student. To put it another way: in the case of an interested audience, persuasion (persuadere) is of less importance, so that the emphasis can be on instruction (docere) and, if required and/or possible, on amusement (delectare). Instruction by itself would lead to a dry and therefore unworkable atmosphere, whilst with pure amusement the teacher would not be taken seriously. The basis for a healthy learning situation is an optimal mixture of good, extensive and clear instruction aimed at learning, combined with some amusement from time to time to provide relaxation, which in turn makes room for more depth.

It is hard to find a more vivid description of education as seen by St. Augustine, shown in both his theoretical and practical works, than that of Verhoeven. What Verhoeven states is actually none other than St. Augustine's theory, although very condensed. If we replace the teacher by the preacher and the student by the listener, we can transport ourselves to the Basilica Tricilarum in Carthage. It was there that St. Augustine deployed his broad expertise to train his listeners by stimulating and maximizing their interest.

3 Humour and laughter

Interest is based on wonder, says Verhoeven. One can only get a sense of wonder if one is prepared to let go of one's normal level of thinking and for a moment move back to an earlier, lower level. Roughly speaking, one leaves order behind and regresses temporarily into disorder. The danger is that familiarity, which is characteristic of order, stifles the need for new thinking. Then one shuts oneself off from new impressions and gets stuck in a closed world. The psychiatrist Skynner and the comedian John Cleese write in their book that in order to function effectively one has to shift from open to closed mode, however difficult that is.[27] They are saying the same as Verhoeven. In closed mode there is not the willingness to question things, whereas in open mode it is possible to let new information in.

[27] Skynner/Cleese 1996, 86-87. 86: "About the open mode: this is the state we are in when we open up to the world, absorb new information and adjust our mind-map accordingly, so as to make it more complete and accurate. The map then represents the world better and guides us in working out what to do to achieve our goals." 87: "About the closed mode: in this mode we are indeed shut off from the kind of information which could free us. It is like being on automatic pilot. We just follow the programme, which was first associated with certain attitudes or emotions, and was triggered by some need to get into action. The switch from open to closed mode is easy, the way back is not."

Theoretical research confirms practice.[28] In closed mode all we do is to add details to what we already know, but in open mode we can change ideas, look for new solutions, and adjust goals.[29] Not only experienced comedians like Cleese exploit this mechanism fully, but also good teachers and preachers. Humour is one of the ways to help people to change their behaviour, to be flexible, and to put themselves in open mode.[30]

To come to grips with the phenomenon humour it is best to start with laughter. Although at first sight people can hardly distinguish the two, they are nevertheless separate phenomena. Humour represents the intellectual side, laughter the physical.[31] Or, humour nearly always causes a laugh or a smile,[32] but a laugh is not necessarily caused by humour. There are other impulses such as aggression and amusement which can cause laughter. Over the centuries, researchers from various disciplines have come to three theories about laughter: the superiority theory, the incongruity theory and the relief theory. The philosopher John Morreall gives an extensive description and a crystal clear historical context.

The superiority theory is based on emotions, and states that laughter expresses a person's feeling of power over, and aggression towards, another. Ridicule, for example, belongs to this theory.[33] The

[28] See Morreall 1983, 121; 122; 127-128. 121: "A person with a humorous attitude toward life, (...) has the capacity for distancing himself from the practical aspects of most situations. (...), a person with a rich sense of humour tends to be more relaxed, less disappointed by failure." 122: "Having a sense of humour, then, involves flexibility and openness to experience which a fundamentally serious person lacks." 127-128: "Once we give up the idea that everything is related practically to us too, we are no longer restricted to seeing things in just one way. (...) And, (...) this mental flexibility brings an openness to experience." See also: Gilhus 1997, 3.

[29] Skynner/Cleese 1996, 88.

[30] Skynner/Cleese 1996, 90.

[31] If we apply this to a language situation, then the rule is that the sender (speaker or writer) who wants to make good use of humour has to be able to judge exactly which amusing contradictions will make the receiver (reader or listener) laugh, and also how to handle the contradictions to get this effect. The reader or listener exposed to such amusing contradictions experiences a build-up of emotional tension. This has to be released as quickly as possible if he is not to go crazy. The release takes place through hilarity: mental enjoyment usually manifested as laughter whereby one "can express an awareness of fun or excitement" (Winkler Prins Encyclopaedia).

[32] Ross 1998, 2: "It is simplistic to say that it [humour] is just for a laugh. There may be a target for the humour – a person, an institution or a set of beliefs – where the underlying purpose is deadly serious."

[33] See Morreall 1983, 4-14. The superiority theory goes back to Plato. It says that laughter expresses a person's feeling of superiority over another (Morreall

incongruity theory has a cognitive and rational basis, saying that laughter is an intellectual reaction to something unexpected, illogical or inappropriate. In this theory, laughter is based on humour,[34] provided that the context allows it[35] and that the people involved are not only sufficiently competent in the language [36] but are also in the right mood.[37] The relief theory views laughter as the release of pent-up energy, the result of emotional relief.[38] Finding none of these adequate,[39] Morreall adds a fourth which combines the best of the others.

1983, 4). This kind of laughter is emotionally determined (Morreall 1983, 20: While the superiority theory focuses on emotions involved in laughter (...)). Laughter, according to Plato, is always harmful: both to the one laughing and to the person being laughed at. The one being laughed at suffers under it, whilst the one laughing being hurtful and so is a lesser a person as a result. Furthermore, laughter indicates that the person laughing has lost control of himself, and that damages his humanity. Aristotle is not so strict about this. He does not only see disadvantages but even sees an advantage. To laugh at someone is not always the same as scorning him. It can function as social correction to get someone to correct himself. Nevertheless, Aristotle advises caution. Centuries later, Hobbes supports this theory by suggesting that people laugh when they are winning. He also agrees with the hurtful side of laughter: as an expression of malicious pleasure it affects one's character adversely. Other writers add further nuances. According to the superiority theory, laughter is the same as scorn. See also Gilhus 1997, 5.

[34] See Morreall 1983, 15-19. The incongruity theory stems from an early attempt by Aristotle and is of a cognitive nature (Morreall 1983, 15: (...) for the incongruity theory, amusement is an intellectual reaction to something that is unexpected, illogical or inappropriate in some or other way). The theory covers the objects and the ideas which cause the laughter. According to this theory, humour is about building up a certain expectation and some tension which is then released in an unexpected way. For practical reasons, Cicero and after him Quintilian also accepted this explanation. Centuries later the incongruity theory was elaborated by Kant, Schopenhauer and others. It is this theory which connects humour with laughter. Ross 1998, 7: "[The incongruity theory] states that humour is created out of a conflict between what is expected and what actually occurs in the joke."

[35] Rothbart 1976, 38: "[incongruity can also lead to other reactions like fear, curiosity or a tendency to want to solve a problem]. Failure to resolve the incongruity in the joking situation leads to perplexity or confusion and no smiling or laughter."

[36] Apte 1985, 179: "It depends, however, on the speaker's awareness of linguistic structure and vocabulary."

[37] Zillmann/Cantor 1976, 93: "(...) that the intensity of the response to humorous presentations critically depends upon the respondents' affective disposition toward the protagonists involved."

[38] See Morreall 1983, 20-37. The relief theory is from the last centuries. It states that laughter is an emotional outlet, a kind of relaxation, whereby pent-up nervous energy is released through a bodily reaction (Morreall 1983, 20). This sort of laughter is similar to a form of relief-giving crying. See also: Ross 1998, 63: "The psychic release theory of humour explains the triggering of laughter by a sense of release from a threat being overcome – such as a reduction of fears (...)."

[39] Morreall 1983, 38: "(...) that no version of any of these theories is comprehensive enough to account for all cases of laughter."

It has a broad application and roughly speaking states that laughter is the result of a pleasant psychological shift.[40]

Although laughter is the subject of all three theories, only the incongruity theory refers to a direct relationship between laughter and humour. In the other two, laughter has a different cause and function. The practice of laughter and the theory of humour are related to each other in the same way as the practice of the spoken word is related to the theory of rhetoric. In both cases, theory was derived from practice and was therefore of a later date. The difference is that whilst the theory of the spoken word, because of its almost immediately recognized usefulness, reached a high degree of refinement quickly, we had to wait almost until the twentieth century for a good theory of humour, and this was due to the age old negative attitude to it.[41] This is strange, seeing that laughing is as human as talking. Animals have neither humour[42] nor language[43] comparable to humans. Humour and language are typically human phenomena, concludes the anthropologist

[40] Morreall 1983, 38-59. 39: "Laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift."

[41] It is only in recent decades that humour and laughter have been studied intensively. Even the social sciences avoided this subject for ages, surprisingly since they in particular are directed towards universal human behaviour. Years of inveterate mistrust of humour and particularly of laughter, humour's external expression, made them so suspect that no-one was prepared to put their professional reputation at risk (see Morreall 1983, ix: "But until a few years ago, the study of laughter was treated in academic circles as frivolous. Because laughter is not a serious activity, the understated argument seemed to run, it is not possible to take a serious interest in it; and so anyone proclaiming an interest in studying laughter probably just wants to goof off"). Nowadays the old objections are swept away. It is suddenly perfectly possible, and even necessary, to study humour and laughter. After all, they are phenomena which can give good answers to questions about why humans behave as they do (see Morreall 1983, ix-x: "The fact that laughter and humor involve a nonserious attitude does not imply that we cannot adopt a serious attitude toward examining them. Nor does the nonserious attitude in laughter and humor render them somehow unimportant as features of human life, and therefore unworthy of our attention. Indeed, our capacity to laugh is anything but a peripheral aspect of human life, and to understand our laughter is to go a long way toward understanding our humanity").

[42] Apte 1985, 177: "'True laughter exists only among human beings'" (Hertzler 1970:27). Although we may not share Hertzler's rather strong view, given recent work on animal communication (Linden 1980), the fact remains that the faculties of language and humour have advanced in human beings to a degree considerably greater than that found in any other animals. Gilhus is stricter – Gilhus 1997, 3: "Laughter is a universal human expression, restricted to humans and therefore understood as a dividing line between humankind and animals". St. Augustine too recognized this difference between humans and animals. In *De libero arbitrio* 1,18 (written between 388 and 395) he says: Sunt alia quaedam, quae iam cadere in feras non videntur nec tamen in homine ipso summa sunt, ut iocari et ridere.

[43] Apte 1985, 177: "(...) defined *Homo sapiens* as a creature with language".

Apte after extensive research, and they belong to all people in all times. There are considerable similarities between humour and language. They share a likeness in the area of their universal technical aspects, for example, and their reception is culturally determined.[44] Furthermore, they are in some ways dependent on each other. Language provides humour with material, for example. And the way a particular culture uses language determines whether or not a message is perceived as humorous.[45]

Besides similarities between humour and language,[46] there are also similarities between language and religion, and between humour and religion. Apte says that religion as a structuring and connecting factor[47] affects human life as much as language and humour.[48] Religion also has the special feature that it concerns the supernatural, which human beings have little or no control over.[49] When language is inadequate, humour can come in useful for a religious community.[50] This will become clear later on.

[44] Apte 1985, 177-178: "Both language and humour have universal and culture-specific attributes." About language: "The universal attributes are mainly formal in nature, while the culture-specific ones are substantive. (…) In short, human languages exhibit a certain degree of structural similarity in having phonological and grammatical units or similar types, and in using similar techniques to put them together (…)." About humour: "Humour too has both universal and culture-specific attributes. The techniques used in humour are universal, (…). The substantive nature of humour, like that of language, varies across cultures: (…)." See also: Raskin (1985) 1-2.

[45] Apte 1985, 178-179: "Humour and language show not only similarities but also interdependence, which is manifested in two important ways. Firstly, concerning 'linguistic humour', the very nature of language becomes the subject matter of humour. Its phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic elements and their interrelationships are exploited in creating humour. Secondly, concerning 'sociolinguistic humour', the development, comprehension, and appreciation of humour are determined to a considerable degree by the use and function of language in society, and by the cultural attitudes and values associated with it."

[46] See also: Ross 1998, 2.

[47] Apte 1985, 151: "Religion seems highly influential in shaping cultural values and in moulding and maintaining social organizations in human societies everywhere."

[48] Apte 1985, 151: "Religion resembles humour and language in being omnipresent, pervasive, and yet non-obtrusive at the level of individual consciousness in the way in which it affects the rest of human behaviour."

[49] Apte 1985, 151: "A primary concept of religion is that of the supernatural, which may include beings, objects, and spirits – in short, all metaphysical forces over which human beings exert little control. (…) The primary purpose of such behaviour is the well-being of a society and of individuals, from both the materialistic and the spiritualistic perspective."

[50] This a very interesting observation by Apte. St. Augustine spent his whole life looking for ways to express the inexpressible in spite of the shortcomings of language. See Louth 1989, and: Smith 2000, 66-86.

So we see that next to language (and religion), humour is of great importance for communication.[51] In this connection the sociologist Martineau says that humour can be abrasive and lubricating, or both.[52] In both cases it has a connecting effect: as lubricant it can oil the communication process and as abrasive it can shake up communication that has got stuck. Humour enables one to correct someone else in a socially acceptable way.[53] There is no doubt that the use of humour helps social interaction – in fact it is essential for mutual understanding.[54] That humour is universal – for all people in all times – has been proved not only by anthropological but also by sociological research.

Although for centuries humour and laughter were looked down upon, they were never ignored, not even in times when little or no research could be done. This is proved by the continuing accusations and warnings.[55] Underneath all this negative publicity lay a single idea, namely the dogged association of humour and, worse still, laughter, with exuberance. Critics were always drawing parallels between on the one hand humour and laughter, and on the other hand all sorts of other phenomena to do with tension and relief (in the form of lust based on sexuality or power). They saw laughter as evidence of lack of self-control which could not but have a destructive effect.

[51] Martineau 1972, 101-103. 102: "[Humour is a] widely diffused type of social process and specific medium of communication." 101: "Humour is a pervasive phenomenon in the social fabric of most, if not all, societies." 103: "Humour is a part of every social system and can be analysed as one social process affecting the system; humour occurs in every type of human interaction and can be analysed as to how it influences each interaction pattern and the social structure emerging from it." See also Morreall 1983, 115-116. 115: "To laugh with another person (...) is to get closer to that person." 116: "Humour also facilitates social interaction in a number of situations where it is added to a basically serious piece of communication to eliminate the offensiveness which that communication might otherwise have."

[52] Martineau 1972, 103: "As an abrasive (...), it constitutes a measure of sand. The consequence of such abrasive humour is interpersonal friction and a juncture in the communication process which may modify the character of the interaction. As lubricant: Humour is intended to initiate social interaction and to keep the machinery of interaction operating freely and smoothly." Cf. Morreall 1983, 117: "(...) the frequency of non-manipulative humour in group interaction is a good indicator of intimacy in the group."

[53] Bergson (1899) 1993.

[54] Martineau 1972, 114: "The humorous communicative instance becomes a vehicle or social mechanism employed for interaction. Humour may assume different forms and has different functions in various structural settings." See also: Ross 1998, 2: "Like other aspects of language, humour is a way in which people show their allegiance to a group. (...) The social context is important for the creation and reception of humour."

[55] Gilhus 1997, 66.

Laughter damaged character. Not that laughter was entirely forbidden, but you had to exert the utmost restraint. This negative attitude is not surprising in view of the origin of the oldest discourses on humour and laughter, initially from philosophers[56] and later from rhetoricians and church fathers who were in close contact with them. Although rhetoricians like Cicero and Quintilian undoubtedly recognized the advantages of humour and laughter in a judicious context, they seldom applied them.[57] Therefore in classical literature, humour and laughter are mostly suppressed or avoided.

[56] Aristocratic philosophers, in reaction to Sophists, saw dangers in humour. Plato(427-347), for example, agitated for strict modesty regarding exuberant humour, although stopping short of complete abstinence. Aristotle (384-322) took a milder line. He saw laughter as a relaxation mechanism which distinguished humans from animals. But real, refined, humour belonged exclusively to the domain of the upper classes, because they were more used to being modest. All the same, he was not against a joke now and then, as long as it was fitting. The Greeks associated the exuberant form of humour with professional jokers; they were only allowed to practise at feasts, and belonged to a completely different social class. Nevertheless one assumes, although it is not always easy to prove, that humour was by no means unimportant in speechmaking. See Bremmer/Roodenburg 1999.

[57] The distinction between refined and exuberant laughter was something the Romans took over from the Greeks. At first it was applied mainly to theatre – the playwrights Plautus and Terentius (in the second century B.C.) were for example masters at playing on words and St. Augustine would be influenced strongly by their work. Later on the distinction was applied to rhetoric. A laugh can happen spontaneously but it can also be induced (see for the role of the laughter in ancient rhetoric Martin 1974, 138-147). Due to their practical approach the Romans saw benefits in humour, not only dangers. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43), speaker, statesman and philosopher, was the first of them to recognize the possible benefits and to want to throw light on the phenomenon systematically. In the second book of his work *De oratore* (2,54,219-2,71,290), where it is assumed he was elaborating in his own way on the lost second book of Aristotle's *Poetica*, he discusses refined humour in the light of a possible favourable effect on the process of persuasion within judicious speechmaking. He maintains not only that humour connects work with pleasure (2,54,216: "Also jesting and shafts of wit are agreeable and often highly effective" (Suavis autem est et vehementer saepe utilis iocus et facetiae)), but also that he had experienced the beneficial effect of humour in many court cases (2,54,219: "(...), I have very often seen things at court being achieved through humour and flashes of wit ((...)", multum in causis persaepe lepore et facetiis profici vidi)). At least, that is what he has Caesar say. In his *De officiis* he established an authoritative terminology by describing the two kinds of humour as follows: "There are, generally speaking, two sorts of jest: the one coarse, rude, vicious, indecent, and the other refined, polite, clever and witty. The latter abounds not only in our own Plautus and the Old Comedy of Athens, but also in the books of Socratic philosophy" (Duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum, obscenum, alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum. Quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiquae comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt) (*De officiis* 1,104). Hence we can conclude that there is a type of humour which knows no bounds, and a type which never goes beyond the bounds of decency. The latter is

The same applies to the Scriptures.[58] Jónsson observes that humour is in fact there if you are open to it.[59] Jesus himself, he says, stands in the middle of the rabbis' tradition where humour was gladly used to achieve the greatest graphical effect in teaching.[60] Morreall nevertheless maintains that laughter caused by humour scarcely occurs in the Bible.[61] It is true that there are very few words to do with laughing and telling jokes, and fewer in the Old Testament than in the New.[62]

nearly always used for mild and constructive criticism within the same social class of freeborn, and is eminently suitable for (refined) drama (F. Graf, *Cicero, Plautus en de Romeinse humor*, in: Bremmer/Roodenburg 1999, 43-54). From Cicero's actual speeches it is evident that he employed subtle humour where possible. But he was of course very careful not to go too far and be taken for an entertainer. In his sixth book in *De Institutione Oratoria,* the rhetorician Marcus Fabius Quintilian (35-100) – obviously inspired by Cicero – distinguishes the various aspects of humour (6,3,1-112). Quintilian too saw many benefits in a well-dosed application of humour in an address, since this "arouses the judge's laughter and so dispels these gloomy emotions, frequently diverts his attention from the facts, and sometimes also refreshes or restores him when he is bored or tired" (risum iudicis movendo et illos tristes solvit adfectus et animum ab intentione rerum frequenter avertit et aliquando etiam reficit et a satietate vel a fatigatione renovat) (6,3,1). Humour was thus an important means to loosen up the stick-in-the-mud and put stiff people at their ease, to wake up the inattentive and divert pernickety critics.

[58] It is almost impossible to discover the position of humour and laughter in the Scriptures because Scriptural writers, as opposed to classical heathen authors, left us no theory to consult. The only possibility of getting a glimpse of the subject is to analyse the practice shown in the texts themselves. See Jónsson 1965: his research reveals that the Scriptures, in particular the New Testament, are by no means lacking in humour for those who can or want to see it. See Morreall 1983, 94: "And yet if students were educated to read literature sensitively, they would find humor in practically every writer."

[59] Jónsson 1965, 90/92. 90: "It is no easy task to discriminate between the different types of humour and irony that may be found in the New Testament. This cannot be done with any mathematical exactness as so much depends on the subjective feeling of the scholar." 92: "Considering the subjective element in the valuation of humour in all ages, some of my examples may become a matter of endless discussion, but even if the readers might disagree with regard to some texts, it should not necessarily disprove the general conclusion regarding the question as to whether the New Testament authors make use of humorous expressions and terms."

[60] Jónsson 1965, 90: "The literature of the rabbis is of special importance in this connection as it was a common homiletic method in their circles to include comical and humoristic examples in their illustrative teaching and preaching. Similes, parables and terms that Jesus made use of quite often are akin to such expressions in the haggadic literature and there is no reason to believe that this was felt differently by those who were listening to Jesus."

[61] Morreall 1983, 9: "(...) the laugh of derision (...) is almost the only kind of laughter found in the Bible."

[62] The verb *ridere* and its derivatives occur a number of times in the Old Testament but seldom in the sense of the incongruity theory. One case is Gen. 17-18, the story of God's healing of the childlessness of Abraham and Sarah. In the New Testament the verb *ridere* occurs only three times (always in contrast to crying): "How

And even then, these verses disapprove highly of laughter.[63] It is these texts which formed the attitude to humour in the early church.[64] Morreall says that the Scriptures use ridicule only (i.e. laughter according to the superiority theory).[65] Gilhus shares this opinion.[66] The result of all this is that thinkers, teachers and writers from classical and Biblical times managed together to establish their suspicions against humour and laughter most securely. So much so that it was not until the last two centuries that, first very cautiously but later openly, people dared to see that they also held blessings. It must be emphasized that this old-fashioned view of humour and laughter comes from intellectual circles. We know hardly anything about the attitude of the man in the street although we can draw some conclusions from the Bible text.

4 St. Augustine's Sermo 53

On January 21st 413, the festival of St. Agnes, St. Augustine preached on the Beatitudes (Matt. 5,3-10) in the Basilica Tricilarum in Carthage. This sermon has been kept though the ages and is known as *Sermo* 53.[67] Right from the start he gets the attention of the

blest are you who weep now; you shall laugh" (Luke 6,21); "Alas for you who laugh now; you shall mourn and weep" (Luke 6,25); "Be sorrowful, mourn and weep. Turn your laughter into mourning and your gaiety into gloom" (James 4,9). *Deridere* and *irridere* are found a number of times in both the New and the Old Testament, but only in the sense of ridiculing.

[63] Gilhus 1997, 60: "These sayings are stamped with a negative attitude towards gaiety in this life, combined with an expectation of great happiness to come, at least for some. (...) Laughter has moved out of the present world and has become a subject of eschatology and apocalyptism, a sign of the joy which will be released at the end of time."

[64] Gilhus 1997, 60-61: "The critique of worldly laughter reflected in the sayings from Luke found fruitful ground in the early Church and took root."

[65] Morreall 1983, 9: "In the Bible, too, laughter has negative connotations. It is seldom mentioned, but when it is, it is almost always the laugh of derision."

[66] Gilhus 1997, 22-27. In the Old Testament: 22: "Divine laughter in the Old Testament is a mocking laughter." 24: "Jehovah's divine laughter was the derisive laughter of male power." 26: "Divine laughter was a destructive force, it came from a wide open mouth (!), more powerful and terrible than those set with teeth and swords, ready to swallow and destroy. (...) Jehovah's laughter crushed and destroyed those who opposed him." In the New Testament: 27: "This laughter is instrumental in preserving the divine/human hierarchy, putting humans in their place in relation to divine beings, making order in the world. In short, divine laughter appears as a mechanism of control that contributes to a rational management of the cosmos."

[67] See Verbraken 1994, 19-20. Sermo 53 was probably preached in 413 but it may have been shortly after 415. See Verbraken 1976, 65.

listeners by using a double antithesis to tell what had happened to the martyr: she was publicly slain and secretly crowned.[68] Without saying it in so many words, he also suggests that even after all the adversity the world could impose she had at last found happiness (i.e. a good life in heaven). The message is that to get to heaven we have to make an effort on earth. But we do not need to stand alone in these attempts, since the Scriptures offer us advice. The blessings in the Sermon on the Mount[69] are an example, where Jesus provides his followers with directions to guide and support them.[70] The blessings inspired St. Augustine to remind the audience in Carthage (and particularly on the feast day of the martyr) that a happy life in heaven was within their reach as long as they worked for it on earth.[71]

In *Sermo* 53 St. Augustine adheres to the enumerating character of the Beatitudes. So the sermon is a collection of more or less complete sub-sermons of varying length, each beatitude being covered separately. In some sub-sermons there are longer and shorter more or less independent elements.[72] In this manner St. Augustine devotes extra attention to the sixth beatitude (Matthew 5,8: "Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God") – in fact more than half of the sermon (chapters 6-16). In this sub-sermon, chapters 12-14 are fairly autonomous. In these chapters he advises the audience not to imagine God as a person, and he does this in his own particular style and not without humour.

[68] *Sermo* 53,1: (...) palam occisae, occulte coronatae, (...). A razor-sharp double antithesis: the martyr was dead on earth but crowned in heaven. And on top of that, everyone had seen how she had died whilst no-one had seen her being crowned. It had been possible, through (physical) eyes, to see her suffering and her death, but not to see her happiness. It was therefore hardly surprising that not everybody cherished the wish to follow her example.

[69] In The Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7), Jesus teaches his pupils as a real lecturer. See Mathew 5,2: (...) docebat (...). See also Wenneker/Van Reisen 2000, Introduction, 14-16. The Beatitudes are in Matthew 5,3-12 and Luke 6,20-23. St. Augustine, in a practical way, describes the Beatitudes as advice for attaining a happy life. See *Sermo* 53,1: (...) multas causas beatae vitae (...) ((...) several ways to attain a life of bliss, (...)).

[70] Right from the start Jesus is teaching. See Mathew 5,2: (...) docebat (...). See also *Sermo* 53A, 1.

[71] *Sermo* 53,1: Quod volumus, quod desideramus, quod petimus, post erit; quod autem iubemur ut faciamus propter illud quod post erit, modo sit. (What we want, what we desire, what we are aiming at, will come afterwards; but what we are told to do for the sake of what will come afterwards, must come now).

[72] Cf. *Sermons* 56-59 on the Lord's Prayer. These sermons have a similar structure.

Sermo 53,12-14

The advice which Jesus gives in the form of beatitudes is not as clear as it seems at first sight, at least not immediately. People naturally tend to take things they hear literally. So on hearing the sixth Beatitude, and bearing in mind the corporeal and anthropomorphic image of God, they are inclined to think incorrectly that God can physically be seen.[73] But since chapters 1-6 have already explained that God is spirit, this incorrect concept, although a universally human tendency, is not allowed. To make sure this comes across, St. Augustine tackles the problem in chapters 7-11 mainly in a serious way, but becoming slightly more playful later on. In chapters 12-14 he uses humour to emphasize the insights. In chapters 15-16 he finishes the sermon on a serious note.

In chapter 7 St. Augustine teaches: "Don't start thinking here about a corporeal face."[74] You have to look for God with your heart, not with your eyes. It sounds very definite: "It talks about God's countenance, about God's arm, about God's hands, about God's footstool, about God's seat," he says, "but don't think about human limbs,"[75] however tempting that is. The limbs and objects have a deeper, figurative meaning which he then carefully explains: "God's hands mean God's power, God's face is God's knowledge, God's feet are God's presence. God's seat, if you wish, is you."[76] Now that it is clear that man can perceive God only spiritually, it is also clear that he cannot see Him in the normal way with his eyes, because they can only see something which takes up space. And He, being omnipresent, has no physical size. Therefore only the eyes of the heart can see God.

In chapter 9 St. Augustine answers the question why the Scriptures so often ascribe limbs to God. It is done for reasons connected to mnemotechnics: "It's as though physical activities were allotted to various parts of the body, and someone were to say for example: Blessed are those who have feet, because they shall walk; blessed are those who have hands, because they shall work; blessed are those who have voices, because they shall shout; blessed are those who

[73] A sermon in which St. Augustine very subtly approaches God, as Trinity, via the philosophical road, is *Sermo* 52.

[74] *Sermo* 53,7: Non hic corporea facies cogitetur.

[75] *Sermo* 53,7: Dicitur Dei vultus, dicitur Dei brachium, dicitur Dei manus, dicuntur Dei pedes, dicitur Dei sedes, dicitur scabellum pedum eius; sed noli membra cogitare.

[76] *Sermo* 53,7: Manus Dei, potentia Dei. Facies Dei, notitia Dei. Pedes Dei, praesentia Dei. Sedes Dei, si vis, tu es.

have mouths and tongues, for they shall speak; blessed are those who have eyes, for they shall see.''[77] For the purposes of good instruction, he relates a part of the body to its practical usefulness. This reasoning is not as naive as it seems. The Beatitudes do exactly the same but in a spiritual sense: "In the same way, he was as it were putting the parts of a spiritual body together, and teaching us what belonged to what. Humility is suited to possessing the earth; mourning is suited to being consoled; hunger and thirst for justice are suited to being satisfied; mercy is suited to obtaining mercy; a pure heart is suited to seeing God."[78] Thus the comparison between the physical and the spiritual body is complete.

In chapters 10 and 11 St. Augustine explains that through belief we can purify the eyes of our heart. Not through any old belief, but through true belief rather than the devil's: "So let us distinguish our faith, and see that believing is not enough. That's not the sort of faith that purifies the heart. *Purifying their hearts*, it says, *by faith* (Acts 15,9). But which faith, what sort of faith? The one, surely, which the apostle Paul defines when he says *Faith which works through love* (Gal 5,6)."[79]

a *Sermo* 53,12

"And now what does faith itself actually do? With so many testimonies from Scripture, so many different readings, such a plentiful variety of sermons and exhortations, what does it actually do, if not ensure that we now see by a mirror in the riddle, later on face to face? But not so that you should turn your thoughts back again to that face of yours. Think of the face of the heart. Force your heart to think about divine matters, compel it, drive it on. Anything that occurs to it in its thinking which is like a body, fling it away. You cannot yet say,

[77] *Sermo* 53,9: Quemadmodum si corporalia opera membris corporalibus coaptaret et diceret verbi gratia quisquam: 'Beati qui pedes habent, quia ipsi ambulabunt; beati qui manus habent, quia ipsi operabuntur; beati qui vocem habent, quia ipsi clamabunt; beati qui os et linguam habent, quia ipsi loquentur; beati qui oculos: ipsi enim videbuint'.

[78] *Sermo* 53,9: Sic, tamquam spiritalia membra componens, docuit quid ad quid pertineat: apta est humilitas ad habendum regnum caelorum, apta mansuetudo ad possidendam terram, apta luctus ad consolationem, apta fames et sitis iustitiae ad saturitatem, aptas misericordia ad impetrandam misericordiam, aptum mundum cor ad videndum Deum.

[79] *Sermo* 53,11: Discernamus ergo fidem nostram, nec credere sufficiat. Non est talis fides quae mundat cor. *Fide*, inquit, *mundans corda eorum*. Sed qua fide, quali fide, nisi quam definit Paulus apostolus, ubi ait: *Fides quae per dilectionem operatur*?

"This is what He is"; but do at least say, "This is what He is not." When, after all, will you be able to say: "This is what God is"? Not even when you see him, because what you see is inexpressible. The apostle says he was snatched up to the third heaven and heard words that cannot be uttered. If the words cannot be uttered, what about the one whose words they are?

So perhaps, while you are thinking about God, some vast and wonderful shape in vaguely human form crosses your mind. You have set it up in the sight of your mind's eye, something huge, massive, vast, its enormous bulk spreading in all directions. Somewhere you reached the end of it. If you've reached the end of it, it isn't God. If you can't find the end of it, where is its face? You are thinking of some bulk or mass, and in order to distinguish its various members or parts, you have to define the bulky mass, give it an outline or limits. Unless you give it an outline you can't distinguish its parts. What are you up to, you foolish materialist way of thinking? You have constructed a vast bulky mass, and the more enormous it is, the greater is the honour you imagine you are giving to God. If someone else adds just a yard or a pound, he makes it even bigger."[80]

a 1 Commentary on *Sermo* 53,12

The core of chapters 12-14 is the contrast between knowing and believing, visible and invisible, reality and illusion, spirit and body. The question is: what is the use of belief which is founded on such complex and multiform Scriptures: "with so many testimonies from Scripture, so many different readings, such a plentiful variety of sermons and exhortations"? To find the answer it's best to leave the

[80] *Sermo* 53,12: Et modo ipsa fides quid agit? Tantis testimoniis scripturarum, tam multiplici lectione, tam varia copiosaque exhortatione quid agit, nisi ut videamus *per speculum in aenigmate*, postea *facie ad faciem*? Sed non iterum tu redeas ad istam faciem tuam. Faciem cordis cogita. Coge cor tuum cogitare divina, compelle, urge. Quidquid simile corporis cogitanti occurrerit, abice. Nondum potes dicere: 'Hoc est'; saltem dic: 'Non est hoc'. Quando enim dices: 'Hoc est Deus'? Nec cum videris, quia ineffabile est quod videbis. Si dici potuit, non est hoc. Raptum se dicit apostolus in tertium caelum et audisse ineffabilia verba. Si effabilia sunt verba, quid est cuius sunt verba? Cogitanti ergo tibi de Deo occurrit aliqua fortasse in humana specie mira et amplissima magnitudo: constituisti eam in conspectu cogitationis tuae tamquam magnum aliquid, amplissimum, grande, ingentissima mole diffusum. Finisti alicubi. Si finisti, Deus non est; si non finisti, facies ubi est? Cogitas molem et, ut membra distinguas, definis molem. Aliter enim membra distinguere non potes, nisi moli dederis finem. Quid agis, stulta et carnalis cogitatio? Grandem molem fecisti, et tanto grandiorem quanto te putasti Deum amplius honorare. Addit alius unum cubitum et facit tibi maiorem Deum.

complexity and multiformity for what they are (St. Augustine emphasizes them stylistically by means of an anaphora and an asyndeton), and to take another approach: "But not that you should turn your thoughts back to that face again." The admonishing tone brought about by the subjunctive *redeas* together with the personal pronoun *tu*, which is always used to give heavy emphasis, show that St. Augustine now addresses himself as teacher to a (fictitious) student who is running around in circles and can't escape. The student displays obstinacy, in other words mechanical and compulsive behaviour which must be corrected.[81] Corrections should primarily be done privately. Only as a last resort should outsiders be brought in.[82] To correct those who felt touched by his criticism, St. Augustine had to step back from his personal involvement with the audience and be formal for a time. This is why he uses *tu* instead of the usual pronoun *vos*.

In this earthly life there is only belief, but in heaven there is knowledge. This at first sight paradoxical idea, originally platonic, is borrowed by St. Augustine from St. Paul (1 Cor. 13,12). What the body's eyes see is transient and unreal, the opposite of what the heart's eyes see. To conceive of God is the job of the heart not the head. The modest admonishment in the subjunctive *redeas* now changes to hard commands in the imperative: "Think (...). Force (...), compel (...), drive (...) on. (...) throw (...) away. (...) do (...) say, (...)." He does this because his experience tells him how difficult it is for a human being to avoid a corporeal image of God. To build up one's belief one certainly needs a concept of God, but an anthropomorphic image is strictly forbidden. He then proceeds to explain the rule. He makes it clear that in this life on earth, God can only be approached from the opposite: ("You cannot say,"This is what He is"; but do at least say,"This is what He is not."). You can't say what He is, only what He is not. Even someone who had seen Him would not be able to describe Him. And if he pretends he can, then he cannot be talking about God. God is beyond words ("that human lips may not repeat them", 2 Cor. 12, 2-4: adapted by St. Augustine by the firm but unmistakeable"ineffable (inexpressible)"), and if something can be explained in words it can't be divine.

However, many people think of God as a person, although bigger and better, something colossal, or worse still, a bulk. They do God no justice and even make a joke of Him. To point out the incongruity

[81] To discover incorrect behaviour but not correct it, would be remiss. See for example *Sermo* 82,4.

[82] According to *Regula* 4,9.

of this kind of thought, St. Augustine uses a hyperbole: "You have set it up (i.e."some vast and wonderful shape in vaguely human form") in the sight of your mind's eye as something huge, massive, vast, its enormous bulk spreading in all directions." This rather coarse imagery and the use of a hyperbole are the first steps towards humour. Then he says: "Somewhere you reached the end of it." In an image like this, God is limited. And: "If you've reached the end of it, it isn't God." God is not only ineffable but also infinite. The logic is watertight. The question now is: how do you assign a countenance to God if He is infinite ("If you can't find the end of it, where is its face?")? St. Augustine continues along the lines of the hyperbole: "You are thinking of some bulk or mass," and "in order to distinguish its various members or parts, you have to define the bulky mass." Because of the importance of this conclusion it is repeated in somewhat different words: "Unless you give it an outline you can't distinguish its parts".

At this point it seems that in a formal sense the teacher in St. Augustine is not addressing his listeners so much as their thoughts; in other words, he doesn't blame the individual directly but attempts to reach him via his (personified) mind, which is determined by his body: "What are you up to, you foolish materialist way of thinking?" This makes it easier for him to say something unpleasant. The listener's mind is not only fleshly, which in itself is bad enough, but also foolish. Now the hyperbole changes into derision: "You construct a vast bulky mass, and the more enormous it is, the greater is the honour you imagine you are giving to God". Man imagines a bigger God in order to be able to honour Him more intensively. As if this was not enough jeering, in the last sentence of this chapter he cuts down the (anonymous) dissidents: "If someone else adds just a yard or a pound, he makes it even bigger." In this statement both the emotionally-determined superiority theory and the intellectually-determined incongruity theory are in play. According to the first theory, St. Augustine puts the dissidents at a disadvantage. According to the second, he exaggerates the incongruity of a physical deity by suggesting that God can be made taller by anyone who puts his mind to it. There is an element of hyperbole here too. The logic is so compelling that the "way of thinking (*cogitatio*)", or the listener himself, will have a tough job to find arguments to defend an opposing standpoint.

b *Sermo* 53,13

"'But I've read it,' you say. What have you read, you who have understood nothing? But tell us all the same what you've read. Don't let's brush aside the child playing with ideas. Tell us, what

have you read? *Heaven is my throne, while the earth is my footstool.* I hear you; I've read it too. But you perhaps think yourself the better for having read it and believed it. Well, I too believe what you have read. Let's be companions in believing. What am I saying? Let's be companions in seeking!
So there you are, hold on to what you have read and believed: *Heaven is my throne.* That is, "my chair" – "throne," you see, is a Greek word, for which the English is "chair", while the earth is my footstool. Haven't you also read that other text, *Who measured heaven with the palm of his hand*? I think you have read it; you recognize it, and affirm that you believe it. We both, after all, read each text in that same place, we both believe each of them. Now think hard, and instruct me; I'm appointing you as the teacher and making myself the child. Now will you please teach me? Who ever sat in the palm of his own hand?"[83]

b 1 Commentary on *Sermo* 53,13

The opponent reckons to have found defensive arguments in the Scriptures: "'But I've read it', you say. What have you read, you who have understood nothing?" St. Augustine pretends to interrupt the other person in order to rub in again the fact that he has understood nothing. "But tell us all the same what you've read." Whoever has read the Scriptures would seem to be fairly sure of himself with the quotation from Isaiah (66,1): *Heaven is my throne, while the earth is my footstool.* This verse, taken out of context, makes a non-anthropomorphic image of God almost impossible. At first sight St. Augustine seems to agree with his student, except that he treats him like a child. This evokes a teaching situation in which the student is a beginner. St. Augustine says he has read the Isaiah verse too ("I hear you; I've read it too"), and also believes it ("I too believe what you have read."). This is no argument. Scholarship appears to say that the (imaginary) opponent is right: "'throne' you see, is a Greek word, for which the English

[83] *Sermo* 53,13: 'Sed legi', inquis. Quid legisti, qui nihil intellexisti? Et tamen dic. Quid legisti? Non repellamus parvulum corde ludentem. Dic. Quid legisti? '*Caelum mihi thronum est, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum*'. Aio: 'Legi et ego'. Sed tu forte potiorem te putas, quia legisti et credidisti. Credo et ego quod dixisti. Simul credamus. Quid dico! Simul quaeramus. Ecce tene quod legisti et quod credidisti: *Caelum mihi thronum est* – id est sedes – ('thronus' enim graece, latine 'sedes' est) – *terra autem scabellum pedum meorum.* Non legisti et aliud: *Qui palmo mensus est caelum*? Puto te legisse: cognoscis, et te credere confiteris. Ibi enim utrumque legimus, utrumque credimus. Modo iam cogita, et doce me. Adhibeo te doctorem, et me parvulum facio. Doce me – obsecro te – quis est qui sedet in palmo suo?

is 'chair'." This logic gives St. Augustine the chance to bring in another verse from Isaiah (40,12), with which he can not only ridicule his opponent's reasoning but defeat him completely, and also, more importantly, strengthen his belief. If God has a throne, He must have a backside too. St. Augustine now applies the incongruity theory in the extreme: *Who measured heaven with the palm of his hand?* The listeners' reaction is to agree because they begin to feel where the speaker is leading them, and St. Augustine observes: "I think you have read it; you recognize it, and affirm that you believe it." This marks an intermediate phase in his speech, that in the meantime is directed to the fictitious listener again. Speaker and listener are familiar with both texts: "We both, after all, read each text in that same place, we both believe each of them." And now what? At this moment, the experienced teacher in St. Augustine, like a stand-up comedian, reverses the roles and goes on in a way that many a cabaret artist would envy: "Now think hard, and instruct me; I'm appointing you as the teacher and making myself the child. Now will you please teach me? Whoever sat in the palm of his own hand?" The crux is the word heaven. In the two quotations from Isaiah, God does two things with heaven which are incompatible: 1) He sits on top of heaven and 2) He measures heaven with the palm of his hand. Now everyone understands why a physical and anthropomorphic image of God is not realistic.

c *Sermo* 53,14

"What you've done is to copy the shape and outlines of God's limbs and features from the human body. Perhaps the notion crept into your mind that we are made in God's image as far as our bodies are concerned. I'll accept that concept for the time being, as something to be considered, discussed, examined, and thrashed out by argument. Please be so kind as to listen to me, because just now I was kind enough to listen to you. So, God is seated in heaven, and He is measuring heaven with the palm of his hand. Does this same heaven become wider when He is sitting in it, and narrower when He is measuring it? Or is God Himself the same size in his seat as He is in his palm? If that's the case, God didn't make us in his own likeness, because we have palms which are much narrower than the part of the body we sit with. But if He is as broad in the palm as He is in the beam, then in our case He made these parts very unequal. No, that's not where the likeliness lies. Such an idol should be ashamed of itself in a Christian mind."[84]

[84] *Sermo* 53,14: Ecce figuras et liniamenta membrorum Dei a corpore humano duxisti. Sed forte subrepsit tibi ut secundum corpus putares nos factos ad imaginem

c 1 Commentary on *Sermo* 53,14

In chapter 14 St. Augustine expands on the problem of heaven in order to improve his audience's notion of God. The quotations from Isaiah might lead them to conclude that God is physical and anthropomorphic, which would have a comical effect here due to the highly contrasting imagery. Then comes, very cynically: "But perhaps the notion crept into your mind that we were made in God's image as regards our bodies." One is expected to think about this working hypothesis before concluding that it is untenable: "I'll accept this, for the time being, as something to be considered, discussed, examined, thrashed out by argument." What is accepted is the contradiction in: "God is seated in heaven, and He is measuring heaven with the palm of his hand." St. Augustine exaggerates the assumed ridiculousness of this statement even further by putting two rhetorical questions: "Does the same heaven become wide when He is sitting in it, and narrow when He's measuring it?" and: "Or is God Himself the same size in his backside as He is in his palm?" The first rhetorical question focuses on heaven, the second on God. St. Augustine skips the first but not the second: it is associated with Genesis 1,26-27. If we take Isaiah literally, the words in Genesis can't be true: "If that's the case, God didn't make us in his own likeness, because we have palms which are much narrower than the part of the body we sit on. But if He is as broad in the palm as He is in the beam, then for us He made our parts very unequal. No, that's not where the likeness lies." It is because everything in the Bible is true that the listeners are not allowed to have an anthropomorphic image of God. And if they have it nevertheless, they are not honouring God but an idol, and a Christian should be deeply ashamed of this: "Such an idol should be ashamed of itself in a Christian mind." The conclusion is that God is indeed not to be captured in words because language is inadequate. The only thing left for mankind to do, is to praise Him.[85] This thought rounds off the digression about a human image of God and the introduction to the last chapter.

Dei. Interim accipio considerandum, discutiendum, requirendum, disputando excutiendum. Si placet, audi me, quia in eo quod tibi placuit, audivi te. Sedet Deus in caelo, et palmo metitur caelum. Idem caelum fit latum cum sedet, et angustum cum metitur? An ipse Deus tantus est in sedendo, quantus in palmo? Si hoc ita est, non ad similitudinem suam nos fecit: nos enim palmum angustiorem valde habemus, quam partem corporis qua sedemus. Ille autem, si tam latus est in palmo suo quam latus est in sessione sua, disparia membra nobis fecit. Non est ista similitudo. Erubescat ergo tale idolum in corde christiano.

[85] See Smith 2000 and: Louth 1989.

5 The physical, anthropomorphic God

Before St. Augustine's time, but also during it, it was not uncommon for Christians to imagine God as physical and anthropomorphic.[86] The Scriptures gave every reason to do so. From the first book of the Old Testament (Genesis) up to the last of the New Testament (Revelation) there are allusions to God in human form.[87] And although, under the influence of Neoplatonism, Christians gradually began to adopt a new, incorporeal and non-anthropomorphic image of God which in the end would definitively dominate the whole of Christian theology,[88] there were still movements which didn't choose this road and held to a human-like God. An example of such a movement was Manicheism, to which St. Augustine belonged for nine years before his conversion in 386. Dissatisfied with Manicheism because it had no answers to a number of questions he considered critical[89], he gradually lost interest in the movement. Also at this time (384) he moved to Milan to take up the post of city rhetorician. His interest in other speakers then led him to the church of the Catholic Bishop Ambrose in Milan.[90] Within a year his initial purely professional interest turned into commitment. This was due not only to the exhortations of his mother Monica who had joined him at the beginning of 385, but also to the new way of thinking with which Ambrose had managed to broaden his horizons.[91] It was also indirectly thanks to Ambrose that St. Augustine got to know the work of the Neoplatonists, and via St. Paul started to reassess the Scriptures which until then he had rejected. Furthermore, Ambrose confronted him with allegorical interpretations of the Scriptures. And so he found answers

[86] Griffin/Paulsen 2002, 97: "It has been recognized by at least some scholars that many early Christians, and not only the *simpliciores*, believed God to be corporeal (materially embodied) or anthropomorphic (humanlike in form), as some Biblical narratives portray Him." In this article they disagree (successfully) with Kim Paffenroth who holds the opposite view.

[87] Gen 1,26-27. 26: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image and likeness (…).' 27: "So God created man in his own image; in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." Rev 20,11: "Then I saw a great white throne, and the One who sat upon it; (…)."

[88] Griffin/Paulsen 2002, 97: "(…) that Christian theology which developed, primarily under the influence of Platonism, a non-anthropomorphic and incorporeal conception of God that has come to dominate all subsequent theology and philosophy".

[89] Firstly, is God good? Secondly, is He spiritual? Thirdly, is He righteous? See O'Donnell 1994, 27.

[90] Ambrose (339-397) was the bishop of Milan.

[91] Patout Burns 1990, 373-374.

to his questions.[92] Now that he completely accepted Christian belief he could make a clean break with Manicheism. His spectacular conversion followed in 386.

Breaking with Manicheism did not mean that Manichean concepts went entirely out of sight. Although he certainly did leave the theory behind, some of the questions stayed with him all his life.[93] One in particular concerned the picture people had of God. He refers to this many times in his works, always taking the opportunity to prove that God is incorporeal, non-anthropomorphic, spirit, and often reasoning from the tangible via the absurd to the abstract.

It is hardly surprising that also in his sermons for the public St. Augustine addressed the issue of the image of God. The sermons not only gave him the chance to "test" new ideas, which were intended for his main works, on his audience.[94] But they also enabled him to elaborate on established ideas for the benefit of those already familiar with them.[95] The fragment from *Sermo* 53 (chapters 12-14) shows he occasionally went so far as to steal the show.[96] This passage is about generally-accepted ideas.[97] The question is well-known – whether one may conceive of God in human form – and the answer is well-known

[92] O'Donnell 1994, 27: "Ambrose's sermons, with their emphasis on the Pauline distinction of letter and spirit as a means of interpreting the chasm between the Old and New Testament, rescued God's justice. The first encounter with the books of the Platonists, revealed to him a God who was not like the all-penetrating sea soaking into the sponge of material creation, but who was instead a spirit. The final stage in that revelation came on second look to the Platonists, when the doctrine of evil as a privation of good made itself understood to him, and he could see that all that was created was good, and thus that the creator Himself was good." See also: Patout Burns 1990, 373-377, and: Griffin/Paulsen 2002, 108.

[93] O'Donnell 1994, 31: "My own view is that Augustine fully shook off his Manicheism in every matter of doctrine, but never shook off the questions they had asked. The God he clung to so insistently was precisely the God who would ward off the Manichean God, and so in that way there are dim shadows of Manichean doctrine lying across Augustine's words down through his whole career."

[94] Dolbeau 1998, 96: "(The sermons) sont au coeur même de la création d'Augustin, le reflet au quotidien de ses pensées et souvent un banc d'essai pour l'argumentation d'ouvrages en cours de redaction." See also Mohrmann 1948, LIII: "But even his study room remained open for unsophisticated listeners. Augustine had the extraordinary gift of being able to explain insights he had found as scientific thinker and theologian in simple and clear terms, understandable to the man in the street. So we see how year in, year out his sermons reflected his scientific work."

[95] An example of an ultra-subtle incorporeal and non-anthropomorphic approach to God and the Trinity in a sermon can be found in *Sermo* 52.

[96] Brown 1992, 220: Most of Augustine's sermons were very successful performances before an enthusiastic Carthage public.

[97] These ideas can be found, amongst others, in *Confessiones* (written between 397 and 401) 7,1,1-2. A translation of the *Confessiones* is in: Boulding 1996.

too: no, it is not right. His criticism is directed not only to the Manicheans (this sermon was given nearly twenty years after his break with them) but also to contemporary Catholic Christians who see God as corporeal and anthropomorphic. The latter, being Catholics, may be considered superior to the Manicheans, but they are still far inferior to "good" Catholics: their belief is carnal and their behaviour childlike. Children have to be brought up to develop from carnal to spiritual beings. It is therefore important to ensure that their development does not stagnate.[98] And who can do this better than a teacher? What makes this passage so remarkable, preached as it is not to a group of Manicheans but to a church full of Catholic Christians? Not the ideas; or rather, not what was actually said, but how it was said.

6 St. Augustine and humour

St. Augustine never made propaganda for laughter, quite the reverse. In a number of places he makes no doubt of his aversion to it. It might even be that his dislike was a formal (but nonetheless serious) reaction to his Manichean background. Manicheism was a Gnostic sect. The Gnostics – who subjected Christian learning to critical analysis and so helped to develop it[99] – were not against humour and laughter, because of their dualistic world view. For them the spiritual world was present in the material world and at the same time hidden in it. Their dynamic approach in relation to this contrast (incongruity theory), in which they distanced themselves from other movements like Jewry and Christianity, often led to laughter (laughing at the opinions of others sounds like the superiority theory). So did the

[98] Griffin/Paulsen 2002, 109-11. 109: "He frankly confesses that some do believe this, but they are children in their understanding." 110: "Carnal and childish Christians err concerning anthropomorphic language in Scripture, understanding it literally instead of allegorically. St. Augustine's view on this gives another slant to the matter, because it brings up the question as to why the Scriptures use carnal images. The reason is that man develops from the carnal to the spiritual. The carnal image is a sort of first step towards the spiritual image." 111: "The Scriptures include carnal images for their sake, as stepping stones to higher conceptions of God."

[99] Gilhus 1997, 69/75. 69: "The Gnostics were important participants in the Christian movement, and they flourished at a time when the Christian doctrine was not yet firmly established. Early Christianity was a complex phenomenon, and it was in part shaped through dialogue and conflict with Gnostic groups and their texts." 75: "Humour and laughter open up the body and the mind, laughter is a sign of receptivity; with it the body literally opens up." Cf. Skynner/Cleese 1996.

resulting insight, this time following the relief theory. The Gnostics found salvation through knowledge (gnosis). To achieve this was like solving a puzzle or seeing a joke.[100] The dualism was mainly applicable to Jesus, who was both God and man. In Jesus lay the essence of Gnosticism, namely that the material had been mistaken for the spiritual.[101] For them too, true humour was based on incongruity – particularly the contrast between spirit and body – but still had a purpose: to learn.[102]

For Christians, and thus for the converted St. Augustine, the body including physical reactions like laughter were formally suspect. He brings up all the old objections to laughter again. Like all Christians, he sees laughter as proof of irrationality and weakness of character.[103] In addition, he chooses for his sermons subjects out of the most venerable Scriptures, because they are inspired by the Holy Spirit.[104] However, he was in heart and soul a teacher, and a man of language and rhetoric. And so he was impelled to use the possibilities which humour offered him to meet the demand for laughter and amusement,which everyone is born with. Humour and laughter have been shown above to be universal; in other words, for all people and all times. For this reason St. Augustine regularly wielded the powerful weapon of humour, albeit always with great subtlety. He had no time for boisterous laughter, at least not on paper, since he was steeped in the classical heathen tradition and, later on, in the Biblical tradition. These two traditions together formed a grand corpus of texts which he knew like the back of his hand.

a Laughing as an expression of irrationality

In St. Augustine's eyes the ability to laugh (as we have seen earlier) is an important difference between humans and animals. In his early philosophical dialogue *De libero arbitrio*, written between 388 and 395 (between his conversion and becoming bishop) when

[100] Gilhus 1997, 70: "The process of acquiring salvific knowledge was akin to solving a riddle or seeing the point of a joke. (…), the Gnostic approach was dynamic and incorporated the laughter of insight and understanding."

[101] Gilhus 1997, 72: "The heart of Gnostic ideology: matter mistaken for spirit."

[102] Gilhus 1997, 75: "(The Gnostic laugh is) seeing through, understanding a point, acquiring new knowledge, an exploitation of the universal connection between wit and learning; 'ha-ha' and 'a-ha'. The laugh creates openings: laughter represented a passage from the hidden to the revealed, (…)."

[103] Gilhus 1997, 61/62. 61: "In its inarticulate outbursts, laughter violates rational thought and speech." 62: "Excessive laughter reveals weakness of character and destroys discipline."

[104] *De doctrina christiana*, 4,21,59.

through study and prayer he throws off his 'old' life, he says: "But there are other things which apparently do not pertain to animal life, though even in man they are not his highest endowments, such as the power to jest and laugh".[105] Animals, he says, differ from humans in that they do not seem able to make jokes and to laugh, and a good thing too. Why? St. Augustine gives an explanation of his disdain for this ability, a disdain most clearly confessed. This change took place very soon after his conversion:"Anyone with true discernment of human nature will say that this is a human quality, though of a lower order."[106] Although joking and laughing are only human, they are not marks of good character.

Thus the tone is set: people may laugh, but it doesn't earn them respect. They had better do it as little as possible. And if they do laugh, it is evidence of an unfitting lack of a sense of reality. There is after all no need to laugh. The fact that at birth we don't laugh but cry, says it all: "The newborn infant might first laugh before he wept," he says in a sermon from 412 - "why doth he commence life with weeping? He knoweth not yet how to laugh: why doth he already know how to weep? Because he hath begun to enter upon this life."[107] Life on earth gives cause to weep but not to laugh. In this statement we get a glimpse of the difference between the physical and the metaphysical laugh which we also see in the New Testament. It had considerable influence on the church fathers, and so on St. Augustine too.[108] People cry immediately after birth but nevertheless start to laugh very early on: "After this I began to smile, at first only in my sleep and then when I was awake,"[109] writes St. Augustine in the first book of his *Confessiones* (397). Even this uncontrolled reflex laugh, which he produced as an infant, proves that physical laughter points to irrationality. Inarticulate children were considered not yet rational by the standards of ancient times.

It is strange too that society told children in infancy and puberty to control the unbridled reflex laugh (and other physical

[105] *De libero arbitrio*, 1,18: Sunt alia quaedam, quae iam cadere in feras non videntur nec tamen in homine ipso summa sunt, ut iocari et ridere; (...). The translation of *De libero arbitrio* is in: Russell 1967. There are a number of quotations from this translation.

[106] *De libero arbitrio*, 1,18: (...); quod humanum quidem, sed infimum hominis iudicat, quisquis de natura humana rectissime iudicat

[107] *Enarratio in psalmum* 126,10 (sermon in Carthage in 412): Poterat ridere prius puer qui nascitur? Quare a fletu incipit ridere? Ridere nondum novit; quare plorare iam novit? Quia coepit ire in istam vitam.

[108] See Gilhus 1997, 60-61.

[109] *Confessiones* 1,6,8: Post et ridere coepi, dormiens primo, deinde vigilans.

expressions of exuberance) at all costs.[110] This attitude is in complete contrast with certain kinds of adult laughter which from a child's standpoint are uncompassionate, and here we see the superiority theory at work. Although in adulthood he had no problem with this, the young St. Augustine saw the far too nonchalant attitude of adults (including, to his astonishment, his own parents) towards children as the ultimate in unfairness: "But if this person (...), who are terrified of such tortures, could he still make light of them, as did our parents, who laughed at the torments we boys suffered?"[111] It seems that for the first time he realized that he lived in a topsy-turvy world where people laughed at the wrong things.

Laughing at the wrong things happens also in the theatre. Before his conversion St. Augustine often went to the theatre, although over the years he managed to free himself completely from its magnetic attraction. There too, laughter evidenced irrationality, falling under both the superiority and the amusement theories. By its very nature theatre is the prime example of all that is deceptive and counter to truth: after all, actors are always pretending and therefore violating truth: "(...) nearly all those who make jokes lie."[112] In this respect heathen playwrights made actors speak ill about heathen gods. "Quae si adoranda sunt, cur ea rident in theatris? Si autem ridenda sunt, plus ridendum est, cum adorantur in templis."[113] In this passage St. Augustine compares the physical laugh, which exhibits ignorance, gullibility or irrationality (in the theatre they laugh at gods which in the temple are praised), with the intellectual laugh which shows that one is in control. In *De civitate Dei* he denounces even more sternly the sordid situation around the authority of the various gods – a situation which in a way reminds one of modern bureaucracy: "(...) which, when it is done by mimics knowing what they are doing, is deservedly laughed at in the theatre, but when it is done by foolish persons who do not know better, is more deservedly ridiculed in the world."[114] The comparison between theatre actors and everyday idiots illustrates clearly how false heathen gods are: "(...) and though

[110] As for example the *puerilem levitatem* in *De ordine*, 1,21.

[111] *Confessiones*, 1,9,15: Estne quisquam (...), qui (..) varia tormenta (...) ita parvi aestimet, (...) quemadmodum parentes nostri ridebant tormenta, quibus pueri a magistris affligebamur.

[112] *Soliloquia* 2,16 (written in 387): (...) et omnes fere qui iocantur, mentiuntur.

[113] *De consensu evangelistarum* 1,13 (written in 400).

[114] *De civitate Dei* 6,1 (written between 413 and 427): Quod cum fit ab scientibus mimis, digne ridentur in theatro; cum vero a nescientibus stultis, dignius inridentur in mundo. A translation of *De civitate Dei* is in: Schaff 1979. There are a number of quotations from this translation.

the gods who are laughed at in the theatre are not other than those who are adored in the temples."[115]

Heathen gods were often victims of St. Augustine's sharp tongue. In an early letter (390/1) to the enlightened heathen Maximus, devotee of a kind of heathen monotheism, he writes that if they want to laugh at themselves there is no shortage of material: "Verum tamen si ridere delectat, habes apud vos magnam materiam facetiarum: deum stercutium, deum cluacinam, Venerem calvam, deum timorem, deum pallorem, deam febrem et cetera innumerabilia huiusce modi, quibus Romani antiqui simulacrorum cultores templa fecerunt et colenda censuerunt."[116] In this sentence it becomes quite clear that what he means by the word *ridere* and all its derivatives (like *deridere* and *irridere*) is not so much "humorous" as "ridiculous", or rather, the humorous via the ridiculous. Up to this point he has used *ridere* meaning corporeal and senseless.

b Laughter as expression of elation

Real laughter does however occur with St. Augustine, usually as a reaction to cases of refined humour. As said earlier, we find examples of the practical application of humour at various places in his works, and we find his theoretical ideas reflected in, for example, *De catechizandis rudibus* and *De doctrina christiana*. Reading the sermons, it is noticeable how easily he handles humour and laughter: he does it professionally, i.e. in the right dosage and yet spontaneously. The idea behind this is his conviction that a preacher's enthusiasm will nearly always infect listeners, but that in some cases it will do no harm (and might even be necessary) to heighten a sense of elation with a bit of humour, not for its own sake but always within the subject, and in a refined way, never farcical.

Real humour does not have to lead to loud laughter, rather it should be an extension of enthusiasm. "Indeed, people listen to us with much greater pleasure when we ourselves take pleasure in this same work of instruction. The thread of our discourse is affected by the very joy that we ourselves experience, and as a consequence is delivered more easily and received more gratefully,"[117] he says. If a

[115] *De civitate Dei* 6,6: (...) nec alii dii rideantur in theatris, quam qui adorantur in templis.

[116] *Epistula* 17,2 (written in 390/1).

[117] *De catechizandis rudibus* 2,4: Et re quidem vera multo gratius audimur, cum et nos eodem opere delectamur: afficitur enim filium locutionis nostrae ipso nostro gaudio, et exit facilius atque acceptius.

listener gets tired, humour can help to liven him up: "When we observe this, we should either refresh his mind by saying something seasoned with a becoming liveliness and suited to the matter under discussion, (...)."[118] This fun (*hilaritas*, but in particular *honesta hilaritas*) has to do with stimulation: "or something calculated to arouse great wonder and amazement, (...)."[119] "Nunc tamen nemo ambigit, et cum aliqua difficultate quaesita multo gratius inveniri."[120] Whatever incites wonder and amazement can incite laughter, according to the incongruity theory. It can be a simple pun. It can also be a stimulating train of thought in a longer passage, as occurs in the refined humour of the classical heathen and Biblical traditions, both of which had a strong influence on St. Augustine. For example: in a dialogue with his son Adeodatus he starts reasoning in such a complicated way that Adeodatus must almost certainly have had to laugh (inwardly): "You have made an intelligent mistake. But in order that you may be mistaken no longer, pay closer attention to what I have to say, if only I can express it the way I want to. Now dealing with words by means of words is just as bewildering as intertwining and scratching one's fingers, when it is almost impossible to tell, except for the person doing it, which fingers are itching and which are relieving the itch." To which Adeodatus replies: "Look, I am all attention! That analogy has stirred my curiosity."[121] Humour here is clearly a question of intellect and for the purpose of instruction. This is stated in *De vera religione*: "(...) id est mentis acie, qua videntur omnes, qui docti aut urbani aut faceti nominantur, excellere (...)."[122]

Humour and laughter are primarily of a social nature: "Perhaps because it is not easy to enjoy a joke by oneself? Not easy, to be sure,"[123] writes St. Augustine. But people can still experience hilarity on their own: "but it does sometimes happen that people who are

[118] *De catechizandis rudibus* 13,19: Quod ubi senserimus, renovare oportet ejus animum, dicendo aliquid honesta hilaritate conditum et aptum rei quae agitur, (...).

[119] *De catechizandis rudibus* 13,19: (...) vel aliquid valde mirandum et stupendum.

[120] *De doctrina christiana* 2,8,13.

[121] *De magistro* 5,14 (written in 389): Aug. Acute quidem falleris, sed ut falli desinas, acutius attende quod dicam, si tamen id dicere, ut volo, valuero: nam verbis de verbis agere tam implicatum est, quam digitos digitis inserere et confricare, ubi vix dignoscitur, nisi ab eo ipso, qui id agit, qui digiti pruriant, et qui auxilientur prurientibus. Ad. Et toto animo adsum, nam ista haec similitudo me intentissimum fecit. A translation of *De Magistro* is in: Russell (1968) 1990.

[122] *De vera religione* (written in 389).

[123] *Confessiones* 2,9,17: An quia etiam nemo facile solus ridet? Nemo quidem facile, (...).

entirely alone, with no one else present, are overcome by laughter if something very funny presents itself to their senses or their thoughts."[124] But however much fun there is in secret amusement, humour works best in group situations.[125] There is an example of this in *De beata vita*: "While the others laughed at the fact that they were misled through their own admissions, our mother, stunned for a while, requested that through an explanation I should loosen and untangle for her the logical knot I had been compelled to present."[126] The very fact that Monica does not join in with the laughter shows that the situation is illogical. In passing it should be noted that the humour in these cases arises from intellectual stimulation.

c True laughter

It is surprising that the physical laugh, as opposed to refined humour, hardly appears anymore in St. Augustine's later works. The words *ridere* and *iocari* and their derivatives do however occur in the later works, quite frequently in fact. But the way they are used follows the excerpts from the New Testament quoted earlier, and is also in line with the traditional basic attitude to laughter which he had in the meantime adopted. Later on he makes a structural association between physical laughter and foolishness. The ultimate true laughter, however, has nothing to do with humour and cannot even be known in this life. It belongs to the life to come. From this argument it follows that all laughter in this life is false and a sign of irrationality, and thus should be avoided. In *Sermo* 175 (preached in 412) St. Augustine states this very clearly: "People who have lost their minds through fever are much more dangerously ill. They laugh, and sane people cry. What's more, those of sound mind cry for the crazy ones who are laughing. If you propose a choice between these two things – which is better, to laugh or to cry – is there anybody who wouldn't prefer to laugh? And then, because repentance involves salutary sorrow, the Lord presented tears as a requirement, laughter as the resulting benefit. How? He says it in the Gospel, "*Blessed are those who cry, because they shall laugh*" (Luke 6,21). So crying is a requirement,

[124] *Confessiones* 2,9,17: (...), sed tamen etiam solos et singulos homines, cum alius nemo praesens est, vincit risus aliquando, si aliquid nimium ridiculum vel sensibus occurrit vel animo.

[125] See also Bergson (1993) pages 31-32.

[126] *De beata vita* 3,19 (written in 386): Hic cum se ceteri concessionibus suis deceptis riderent, postulavit mater, cum diu stupida fuisset, ut ei hoc ipsum, quod conclusionis necessitate intorte dixeram, explicando relaxarem atque solverem. A translation of *De beata vita* is in: Schopp 1948.

and laughter the reward, of wisdom. He says laughter, meaning joy: not guffawing, but jumping for joy. So if you put the choice between these two things, if you ask which of these is the better, to laugh or to cry, everybody wants to laugh and would rather not cry. But now if you add particular individuals to these expressions of feeling, and put the choice with persons included: which is better, for a crazy person to laugh or a sane person to cry; everyone prefers tears with sanity to laughter with madness. Such is the value of mental health, which is preferable even with lamentation."[127]

The distinction between crying and laughing is connected in a paradoxical way with life on earth and life in heaven: whoever laughs now will cry later, and whoever cries now will laugh later. Someone who laughs now is ill (*aegrotant*), silly (*phreneticus*) or blind (*caecus*). "Insane," says St. Augustine threateningly in *Sermo* 122,2, referring to the Scriptures, "Madman, the stone is lying here, and that's why you mock it. But if you mock, you are blind; if you are blind, you stumble; if you stumble, you are shaken to pieces; (...)."[128] Life on earth is a vale of tears: if you are ill you move from "crying with laughter"on earth in this life to"crying without laughter" in the other life. In other words, you move from one form of crying to another.[129] Laughing in this life therefore means that one has the delusion of being healthy whilst in fact one is sick or mad, and it means that weeping is a sign of health. The latter is true laughter: "He wrote laughter, meaning joy: not guffawing, but jumping for joy."[130]

[127] *Sermo* 175,2: Periculosius aegrotant, qui mentem febribus perdiderunt. Illi rident, et sani plorant. Ridet enim phreneticus: sed non est sanus. Porro autem qui qui mentis est sanae, plorat phreneticum ridentem. Primum, si duo ista proponas, quid est melius, ridere, an plorare? Quis non sibi eligat ridere? Denique propter dolorem salubrem paenitentiae, in fletu Dominus posuit officium, in risu beneficium. Quomodo? Quando ait in Evangelio, Beati qui plorant, quoniam ridebunt. Ergo in ploratu officium est, in risu est praemium sapientiae. Risum enim pro gaudio posuit, non cachinnationem, sed exsultationem. Ergo si duo ista proponas, et quaeras quid horum sit melius, ridere, an plorare: omnis homo plorare non vult, et ridere vult. Porro si addas personas ad istos affectus, et ita proponas cum personis: Quid est melius, ridere phreneticum, an plorare sanum? Eligit sibi homo fletum cum sanitate, quam risum cum amentia. Tantum valet mentis sanitas, ut etiam cum planctu eligatur. See also: *Sermo* 31,4.

[128] *Sermo* 122,2: Insane, iacet lapis, et ideo rides. Sed cum rides, caecus es; cum caecus es, offendis; cum offendis, conquassaris; (...).

[129] *Sermo* 31,3 (preached before 405): (...) a fletu ad fletum, a fletu cum risu ad fletum sine risu.

[130] *Sermo* 175,2: Risum enim pro gaudio posuit, non cachinnationem, sed exsultationem.

7 Conclusions

Chapters 12-14 of *Sermo* 53 are clearly about a form of elevated, and to our eyes modern, teaching. In an unpretentious way this teaching employs an elevated kind of humour, pleasing to the ear, both stimulating and instructive; in fact a kind of humour which falls within all definitions of refined humour. In spite of an attitude to humour which is consistently negative, the church fathers including St. Augustine do indeed use humour, as is to be expected in view of the universal character of the phenomenon. It is clear even from the excerpt selected that St. Augustine applies the incongruity theory, but he also uses the superiority theory (the only kind of humour in Christian times, according to Morreall) in a refined way. St. Augustine makes his imputations only indirectly, by addressing a fictitious opponent or, even more simply, the opponent's thoughts. Because St. Augustine knows what he is talking about, he is aware of his strengths. Not everybody can use this humour. An approach like this to such a subject (God) could lead to a chaotic atmosphere or even to self-mockery. The teacher in St. Augustine, however, is master of the technique. He even dares to create such a situation deliberately, with the express purpose of bringing his listeners into the open mode. St. Augustine is able to apply both the superiority theory and the incongruity theory in a complex way. The tension inherent in the humour works roughly speaking on two subjects. On one hand there is the contrast between the Most High and the disproportionate outward human form ascribed to Him. On the other hand there is the contrast between the learned bishop at one with his subject matter and the (fictitious) ordinary man who hardly knows anything about the Scriptures, or in any case not enough to be able to play with them. Behind the first subject lies the incongruity theory and behind the second lies the superiority theory. The latter appears in an extremely mild form, since St. Augustine's purpose with it is didactic, as also with the incongruity theory actually. Didactic goals, after all, assume an optimal atmosphere of communication and trust in which the method is not to find fault but to correct. In the field of religion an atmosphere of trust is a prerequisite.

The ultimate capability of St. Augustine lies in the effect of his presentations to enable the listener, or in our times the reader, to identify with both preacher and fictitious opponent. Along the way the listener is alerted to his shortcomings so that he can remove them and end up on the right road. The great value of St. Augustine's knowledge and experience leads imperceptibly to a form of differen-

tiated teaching. Everyone can benefit from it in his own way, by eliminating faults and correcting inadequacies. More convincing proof of his superior qualities as teacher can hardly be imagined. His humour is abrasive and lubricating at the same time, and as has been shown, this is only possible with an optimal relationship of trust. It is therefore not likely that he preached this sermon to dissidents or unbelievers; nothing points to this. It seems probable that he preached to Catholic Carthaginians who knew the subject backwards and – as was then the case – were intellectually curious as to how the famous bishop would tackle the subject matter this time. And they knew only too well that there was a chance that the teacher-preacher St. Augustine would shine like a real cabaret artist. His sermons were becoming more and more like workshops.[131] And, as his friend and biographer Possidius says: "there are no words to express how much Christians admired him and unanimously praised him."[132]

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[131] Van Bavel 1992, Introduction, VII: "Nowadays we would sooner call these sermons "workshops". See also Brown 1992, 220-222.

[132] Possidius, *Vita sancti Augustini*, 5.

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THE OFFICE IN HONOUR OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: AN UNKNOWN WORK OF RUPERT OF DEUTZ

Saint Augustine is one of few saints whose cults did not die with them.[1] Nonetheless, even Augustine was rendered a saint as much by posterity as by his holiness of life. Even the cult of the Bishop of Hippo has its history. Thus, the office used in his honour for his feast only dates from the twelfth century. The words and music of the office were in use as late as the twentieth century with the different religious orders which follow the Rule of Augustine,[2] while the author of the office of Saint Norbert derived his inspiration from it.[3] But who compiled the office of Augustine? And was it commissioned? This essay will first analyse the development of the cult of Augustine up to the twelfth century. Then it will address the question of the identity of the author of the office.

[1] Augustine was highly esteemed even during his life. Thus the generally rather surly Jerome wrote to him in 418 saying: *...in orbe celebraris. Catholici te conditorem antiquae rursum fidei venerantur atque suscipiunt, et quod signum maioris gloriae est, omnes haeretici detestantur*, Ep. 141 (PL 22, 1180). Similarly, when he was on his own sickbed, Augustine was asked to heal a sick person by the laying on of hands, Possidii Vita S.Augustini, c.29 (written between 432 and 437, published in: Vita di Cipriano, Vita di Ambrogio, Vita di Agostino, ed. H. Weiskotten and A. Bastiaensen. Milan, 1975). When the Emperor Theodosius summoned a council in Ephesus in 430, he addressed his invitation to the bishops in letters to the metropolitans. Augustine was the only bishop to receive a personal invitation. In November 430, the Emperor sent the senior official Ebagnius from Constantinople to Hippo to invite Augustine urgently to attend. However, when Ebagnius finally arrived in Carthage, bishop Capreolus had to inform him that Augustine had died some months before (Liberatus Diaconus, Breviarium, c.5, PL 68,977). Around 500, the monk Eugippius remarked in the preface to his anthology of Augustine's writings that Augustine was much esteemed by the Holy See on account of his teaching (PL 62,559).

[2] J. Stiltingh, Cultus sancti Augustini. – Acta Sanctorum VI (1868) 362ff; English translation by J. Schnaubelt in: Augustine in iconography. History and legend, ed. J. Schnaubelt and F. van Fleteren. New York, 1999, pp. 65-110; E. Esteban, De festis et ritibus sacris O.E.S.A. – Analecta Augustiniana 8 (1919/20) and 16 (1937/38); A. Manser, Aus der älteren Geschichte der Augustinusverehrung. – Benediktinische Monatschrift. Zur Pflege religiösen und geistigen Lebens 12 (1930) 287-298 and 387-396; H. Stone, St.Augustine's bones. A microhistory. Boston, 2002.

[3] C. van Liempd, De lotgevallen van het Sint Norbertusofficie. – Analecta Praemonstratensia 10 (1934) 48-90.

The Carthaginian calendar

In 1682 Jean Mabillon found an hitherto unknown text on the cover of a manuscript in the library of Cluny which turned out to be a liturgical calendar. The manuscript itself, a commentary on the prophet Isaiah by Saint Jerome, is no longer extant. Fortunately, however, Mabillon published the notes he took of the calendar. It gave the annual feasts of the martyrs and bishops of the church of Carthage: *Hic continentur dies nataliciorum martyrum et depositiones episcoporum quos ecclesia Carthagenis anniversaria celebrant.*[4] The last name on the list was that of Eugene, the bishop who probably took it with him into exile in Gaul, where he died in Albi in 505.

The calendar gave Augustine's name for 29 August: *iiii kalendas Septembris depositio Restituti et Augustini episcopi.* Restitutus had been Bishop of Carthage around 350. In his 'Indiculus', Possidius (+ after 437) reports a sermon preached by Augustine on the feast of Restitutus, which is no longer extant.[5] The fact that Augustine's name appears on the calendar proves that he was known and venerated outside his own diocese of Hippo relatively shortly after his death. Close observation of the record reveals that Augustine's name was interpolated after the calendar received its final form. The original calendar has the *genitivus pluralis* where the names of more than one bishop appear on the same day: i.e. *non. Jan. depositio sancti Deogratias et Eugeni episcoporum.* Augustine's name, however, is in the *genitivus singularis*, indicating that it was inserted behind that of Restitutus at a later date. This interpolation, however, cannot have originated in Gaul, since it was known there that 28 August, and not 29, was the day of Augustine's death. This information had passed from Possidius' Vita[6] to Prosper of Aquitane's 'Chronicon'[7], which in turn was the source for all Gallic calendars. Consequently, the calendar must have received its definitive form before Eugene brought it to Gaul.[8] Early Christian liturgy afforded as much, if not more, importance to the day of interment as to the day of actual death. Therefore, in Carthage, by contrast to the tradition in Gaul, Augustine's death was connected with 29 August.

[4] J. Mabillon – T. Ruinart, Vetera Analecta. Paris, 1682, III, p. 399; Die drei ältesten Martyrologien, ed. H. Lietzmann, Bonn, 1911, p. 2; E. Rose, Communitas in commemoratione. Liturgisch Latijn en liturgische gedachtenis in het Missale Gothicum. Utrecht 2001 (diss.), p. 330.

[5] Indiculus, ed. A. Wilmart. – Miscellanea Agostiniana. Roma, 1930, II, p. 195.

[6] Vita S.Augustini, c.3.

Limoges

During his life, Saint Augustine entertained cordial relations with Paulinus of Nola (+431), a member of the Anicius family to which Bishop Ruricius of Limoges also belonged. Ruricius, still alive in 506, was celebrated in a poem by Venantius Fortunatus.[9] He erected a church dedicated to Saint Augustine in Limoges, probably as part of a monastery. Ruricius shared the desire of Pomerius Afer (+ after 498) and Caesarius of Arles (+542) to bring Augustine's monastic ideal to Gaul. Since the erection of a sanctuary often indicates the emergence of a new cult, it may be presumed that this was the case in Limoges too.[10]

To a certain extent, Augustine was also venerated in Arles, the metropolitan see of Gaul. His name was certainly included on the calendar of the primate of Gaul's church as early as 542, as it was recorded of Caesarius of Arles that he had died "on the day before the feast of the holy Bishop Augustine."[11]

The oldest portrait of Augustine

In the years between 590 and 604, Pope Gregory the Great had furnished the Lateran palace with a library decorated with frescoed portraits of Greek and Latin Church fathers. Among these images was that of Augustine, portrayed as an elderly man expounding the contents of a voluminous codex opened in front of him. A subscription

[7] *Aurelius Augustinus episcopus per omnia excellentissimus moritur v kal. Sept., libris Juliani, inter impetus obsidentium Wandalorum in ipso dierum suorum fine respondens et gloriose in defensione christianae gratiae perseverans,* PL 51,595; See MGH Auct. Antiqu. IX, 2, p. 473.

[8] DACL 15(1950)435-436.

[9] *Tempore quisque suo fundans pia templa patroni, iste Augustini, condidit ille patri*, Venantius Fortunatus, Epitaphium Ruriciorum (PL 88,157).

[10] In an eleventh-century sacramentary from Limoges Augustine's name is included in the *Libera nos*, the embolism after the *Pater noster*. This is the only known case where it appears in that part of the eucharistic liturgy. The abbey of Saint Martialis in Limoges obtained the sacramentary in 1120, but it is likely that it belonged previously to the monastery founded by Ruricius, V. Leroquais, Les sacramentaires et les missels manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France. Paris, 1924, I, p.158.

[11] *... et inter non modicos quos patiebatur dolores, sciscitatus est quam in proximo esset beatissimi Augustini depositionis dies ... Tertio namque die post sancti Genesi festum, id est, sexto kalendarum Septembrium, ante diem depositionis [sic] sancti Augustini antistitis, et post diem dedicationis monasterii sui, ... imminente hora prima ... beatam animam laetus emisit ad Christum,* Vita S. Caesarii Episcopi, PL 67,1041-1042.

proves that the portrait is Augustine's: 'Many fathers treated of many different subjects, but he treated of all subjects by vigorously setting forth their mystical meaning in the Roman language.'[12]

The image in the Lateran palace shows a marked likeness to a portrait on Boethius' diptych, which dates from the second half of the seventh century and is now in the Museo Cristiano in Brescia. Above the middle portrait the name 'Augustine' is inscribed, clearly with the purpose of emphasising his prominence. The inscription in the Lateran library effectively had the same intention, taking Possidius' 'Vita Sancti Augustini' as a model.[13]

The question arises from this as to how these two portraits, both presenting a good likeness of their subject, could be made more than 160 years after Augustine's death. The answer may be that they were both inspired by the same historical source. In 1952 a signet ring was discovered in Numidia bearing Augustine's effigy and dating from 636. It is presently in the Vatican Museums. Although the features of the image on the ring can no longer be discerned clearly, it is not unlikely that the artist who made Augustine's oldest portrait was familiar with a faithful image on a similar ring.[14] The skills of Late Roman seal makers in counterfeiting such portraits are well-attested.

While Augustine was venerated as the teacher of orthodoxy in Carthage, Limoges, Arles, and Rome, his relics were soon to become the centre of their own cult in Pavia.

The translation of Augustine's relics to Sardinia

The translation of Augustine's relics to Sardinia, mentioned for the first time in Venerable Bede's (+735) 'De temporum ratione', is

[12] *Diversi diversa patres, omnia dixit romano eloqu mystica sensa tonens,* F. Verstappen, Augustinus' oudste portret. – Augustinus over de kerk. Heverlee, 1991, p.19-33. In the fifth and sixth centuries, Augustine was considered to be the first Western theologian to measure up to the great theologians of the Eastern Church. This was also the reason that he was summoned to attend the Council of Ephesus.

[13] Vita S.Augustini, c.7 and 31.

[14] Verstappen, Augustinus' oudste portret, p. 28. Later portraits in J. Courcelle, Revue des études augustiniennes 10(1964)51-96; Recherches augustiniennes 4(1966)37-48. A portrait of Augustine already existed during his lifetime. When Bishop Victorinus called a synod in 401 after he had usurped the primacy of Numidia, Augustine criticised him in a letter (59,2) to which he affixed his seal: *Hanc epistulam signatam misi anulo, qui exprimit faciem hominis adtendentis in latus* (CSEL 34.2, p.220). Of course this profile needs not necessarily have been that of Augustine himself. Nevertheless, the text of the letter indicates that such signet rings were in general use. They often bore scrupulously faithful portraits.

proof of the fact that he had become the centre of a cult. While writing of a second translation in his own time, between 721 and 725, Bede records the reason for the first translation, which had taken place 'long ago': *Liuthbrandus, audiens quod Sarraceni depopulata Sardinia etiam loca fedarent illa, ubi ossa sancti Augustini episcopi propter vastationem barbarorum olim translata et honorifice fuerant condita, misit et dato magno praetio accepit et transulit ea in Ticinis, ibique cum debito tanto patri honore recondidit.*[15]

Augustine died in 430 in Hippo and was buried there in the nave of the Basilica Pacis. His remains were later transferred to a chapel dedicated to Saint Stephen near the cathedral.[16] During excavations in this chapel, conducted by Erwan Marec in 1930, a richly adorned grave was discovered which had evidently been emptied. A sarcophagus containing the remains of an infant had been placed in it. The epitaph was also missing, whereas other graves were still intact. However, in spite of this evidence, no conclusive proof can be given that the excavated tomb was in fact Augustine's initial burial place.

Having laid siege to Hippo for many months, the Vandals finally took the city in 431, after the defendants had agreed on a treaty with King Genseric (428-477). No great devastation followed the fall of Hippo and Augustine's library remained intact.[17] It was not until the reign of King Huneric (+484) that records of heavy persecutions and exile began to appear. The king decreed on 24 January 484 that Arian bishops were to replace the Catholic bishops, and that church buildings were to be handed over to the Arians. Recusants were threatened with exile, and among them Bishop Eugene of Carthage was mentioned by name.[18] Eugene eventually left for Gaul.

Calm returned during Gunthamund's reign (484-496), only to disappear again under the government of his brother Thransamund

[15] De temporum ratione LXVI (PL 90,571); Martyrologium (PL 94,1023); Chronicon (MGH XIII,321); Paulus Diaconus, De gestis Langobardorum VI,48 (PL 95,655); J. Hallenbeck, The transferal of the relics of Saint Augustine of Hippo from Sardinia to Pavia in the early middle ages. New York, 2000, p. 6 dates the event between 721 and 725. Hallenbeck's critical study is important as a meticulous assessment of the written sources in which the translation is mentioned.

[16] G. Radan, The Basilica Pacis of Hippo. – Augustine in iconography, p. 163-164. E. Rose, Communitas in commemoratione, p. 338-339 discusses the special veneration which Saint Stephen enjoyed in Hippo.

[17] H. Dennis, Another note on the Vandal occupation of Hippo. – Journal of Roman Studies, 15(1925)263-268.

[18] *Cuncti ordines clericos sed et monachos et laicos CCCC circiter exsiliis durioribus relegat; et Eugenius episcopus Carthaginensis ecclesiae post dira eremi exsilia, plurimis afflictionibus poenisque clarus habetur*, Victor Tunnunensis, Chronicon anno 479 (PL 68,946: CC 173A).

(496-523), when persecution was rife. It was directed especially at the bishops, and many of them were exiled. However, the Vandals declined in power during the subsequent reigns of Hilderic (523-530) and Gelimer (530-533). Consequently, Bede's *olim* probably referred to Thransamund's reign, more precisely to October 498, when yet another wave of exiled African bishops left for Sardinia. Many intensive trade links existed between North Africa and Sardinia at the time.[19] *Catholicorum ecclesias claudit et in Sardiniam exsilio ex omni Africana ecclesia CXX episcopos mitit.*[20] The Bishop of Hippo may well have been part of this group. Did he carry the remains of his illustrious predecessor with him?[21]

Some historians have suggested that the barbarians mentioned by Bede were the Vandals, and that Augustine's tomb in Hippo was under threat of desecration at their hands. However, there is no evidence whatever to support these conjectures. Nor is there evidence to confirm the supposition that the exiles brought Augustine's remains to Sardinia because they wished to carry the relics of an important saint with them. If that were the case, the question would have to be answered as to why they did not also bring the relics of Cyprian, or those of Felicity and Perpetua. Moreover, in that case, it would be difficult to understand why Augustine's relics were not returned to Hippo when exile was eventually abolished under King Hilderic's reign.

Remarkably, the translation is recorded in none of the extant sources from the sixth or seventh centuries. Victor of Vita (+ after 484) made no mention of the event, neither did Victor of Tunnuna (+ after 566) in his continuation of Prosper's chronicle, nor did Isidore of Seville (+636). Similarly, the 'Vita S. Fulgentii' is silent about the event, although it did mention Fulgentius' (+527) exile to Sardinia from 507 to 515. During his exile, Fulgentius founded a monastery which followed the Rule of Augustine. It was constructed near the metropolitan cathedral dedicated to Saint Saturninus in Cagliari, the

[19] Thus the seal of the patrician Hypatos, a seventh-century African refugee, bearing Augustine's effigy, was recovered in Sardinia, R. Rowland, The sojourn of the body of Saint Augustine in Sardinia. – Augustine in iconography, p. 191 (p. 189-196).

[20] Victor Tunnunensis, Chronicon anno 479 (PL 68,948); Isidorus Hispalensis, Historia de regibus Gothorum (PL 83, 1079).

[21] Rowland, The sojourn, p. 190. According to Stiltingh the first translation took place during Thransamund's reign, at the beginning of the sixth century, English edition Schnaubelt, p. 68. An important, though little known study is A. De Romanis, La duplice traslazione delle reliquie di Sant'Agostino. – Sant'Agostino. Il santo dottore nella vita e nelle opere. Roma, 1931, p. 393-419.

island's capital at the time.[22] According to tradition, Augustine's relics were placed in a church named 'Sant'Agostino vecchio', which was pulled down in 1884. The crypt of this church was preserved and is still accessible to visitors.[23]

Archaeological and historical evidence thus indicates that Augustine was first venerated soon after his death, and that his cult spread swiftly from Hippo to Carthage, Gaul, Rome, and Sardinia. Two traditions may be identified in the early history of his veneration. One tradition, consisting of the cult of his relics, spread from Hippo mainly to Sardinia. The other, consisting of the study of his writings, spread from Hippo mainly to Carthage, Gaul, and Rome. It is most likely that, in Gaul, Augustine's writings were read predominantly in the monasteries and much less, or not at all, by the secular clergy. Consequently, the discovery and veneration of Augustine as a doctor of the Church took place especially in the monasteries of Gaul. This was indeed a discovery, since Augustine was a stranger to readers in Gaul, quite unlike their popular saints such as Martin of Tours. Augustine was first known as a doctor of the Church in the monasteries of Gaul, and as a consequence it was in Gaul that his writings became known and a cult developed.

The translation of Augustine's relics to Pavia

Bede repeated his report that 'the relics of Augustine were recently translated to Pavia on the orders of Liutprand, King of the Lombards' in similar words in his martyrology. He was the first to introduce this second translation as a separate memoria on the liturgical calendar. For the month of August he records: *v kal. Sept. natale b. Hermetis martyris... in Africa depositio [sic] s. Augustini episcopi qui primo de civitate sua propter barbaros in Sardiniam translatus est et nuper a Luitbrando, rege Longobardorum, Ticinum relatus et honorifice conditus est.*[24] This report became a fixed formula and was repeated in almost all martyrologies. The fact that Bede recorded both

[22] S.Fulgentii Ruspensis Vita (PL 65,143); Acta Sanctorum, Jan.I, p. 32, Rowland, The sojourn, p. 191-193.

[23] DHGE 11(1939)168.

[24] Bede, Martyrologium (PL 94,1023). If Bede's *barbari* are interpreted to be the Arabs who caused African Christians to flee in the second half of the seventh century, the translation must be dated much later than the fifth century. However, in his writings Bede himself clearly distinguishes between barbarians and Muslims, B.Hackett, San Pietro in Ciel d'oro, Pavia. – Augustine in iconography, p. 200.

translations on 28 August indicates that he did not know the date of the second translation. It also shows that Augustine's *natale* was not observed in Yarrow.

Boethius, who had been put to death in 524, was venerated in Pavia as a martyr, and a sanctuary had been constructed over his tomb. When Liutprand became King of the Lombards in 712, he founded a monastery dedicated to Saint Peter beside the sanctuary. He subsequently went to great lengths to obtain Augustine's relics in Sardinia, and was even prepared to pay a considerable sum of money to acquire them. It is not known who received his money: either the keepers of the relics or the conquerors of the island.[25]

The question arises as to what Liutprand's motives might have been for this interest in Augustine. Recent wars, a reconquest by Byzantium and the establishment of Lombard rule had completely redrawn the political map of sixth-century Italy. This political turbulence had caused widespread social upheaval and confusion with regard to territorial claims and social stratification. The Church and the secular government attempted to allay the social unrest by taking recourse to an approved remedy. They set about stimulating the veneration of a saint. The development of a popular cult could provide a forceful encouragement to the population to regain trust, loyalty and public spirit.[26] Therefore Liutprand not only pursued the relics of Augustine, but also those of other saints. Accordingly he made a generous gesture by presenting Pavia with an *ornamentum* of several holy martyrs and confessors.[27] The second translation of Augustine's relics was therefore inspired by political motives. Pavia was indeed the capital of the kings of Lombardy, but it definitively had to yield to Milan as far as prestige was concerned. The relics of Ambrose were kept in Milan, the saint who had baptised Augustine. Liutprand hoped that the standing of Pavia would be enhanced by the presence of Augustine's relics to such an extent that the city could in effect compete with Milan.[28]

The fact that Bede did not know the date of the second translation proves that the event did not immediately result in the spread of a new liturgical feast. It is mentioned not only by Bede, but also by

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 197-222. L. Pignelli, Gli Arabi e la Sardegna. Le invasione arabe in Sardegna dal 704 al 1016. Catania, 1976.

[26] N. Everett, The Hagiography of Lombard Italy. – Hagiographica 7(2000)49-126, especially p. 124. See also Hallenbeck, The transferal, p. 59-112, 183-205 for Liutprand's political motives in seeking the translation.

[27] Everett, The Hagiography, p. 69, footnote 59.

[28] 'The Vita Siri (8th century), the Laudes Mediolanensis Civitatis, and, to a much lesser extent, the Carmen de Synodo, all seem imbued with a sense of civic pride in their respective cities', Everett, The Hagiography, p. 71.

Paul the Deacon (+ c.800): *Luitprandus ... misit et dato magno pretio accepti, et transtulit ea in urbem Ticinensem, ibique cum debito tanti patri honore condidit.*[29] Paul recounts Saint Saturninus' benefactions and Liutprand's translation of Augustine's relics in the course of a history of Pavia.[30]

In Bede's time, only the commemoration of the translation was known in England. However, the cult of Augustine in England burgeoned in the eleventh century, due to the acquisition of an important relic in 1022. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Ethelnoth the Good (+1038), procured a large relic of Augustine's left arm at the price of one hundred talents of silver and one talent of gold at the Council of Pavia. The abbey of Coventry obtained the relic through the mediation of its founders, Count Leofric of Mercia and his spouse.[31]

The date of the second translation is thus unknown. Interestingly, two manuscripts, one from Rheims and the other from St. Gallen, mention 18 October as the date of Augustine's *natale*. This could be an indication that the second translation was connected with this date. It is also possible, however, that the month of October refers to 498, when many bishops were forced to leave North Africa. At any rate, the feast of the translation was kept on 11 October in all liturgical books of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. From the twelfth century onward, apart from the *natale,* a separate feast of the translation was observed in Lombardy on 11 October, in some places on 27 February. A similar feast was kept by the Premonstratensians, the canons of Arrouaise and the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre. Since this date does not appear anywhere in sources earlier than the twelfth century, its origins are a matter of speculation.

It may for instance be supposed that the monks of Bobbio, to whom the custody of Augustine's relics at Pavia was originally entrusted, celebrated the feast of the translation on 18 October. Since Augustine's star was beginning to shine at the time, it is not unlikely that the need was increasingly felt for a second commemoration apart from the *natale*. However, in the twelfth century Saint Luke's feast was celebrated on 18 October, and it was unthinkable that the feast of an evangelist would be suppressed by that of a bishop, or indeed that Luke would have to share this day with Augustine. Forced therefore to look for another date, the choice naturally fell on 11 October. That date was the closest free date to 18.

[29] Paulus Diaconus, De gestis Langobardorum, VI,48.
[30] Everett, The Hagiography, p. 72.
[31] PL 179,1164; Hackett, San Pietro in Ciel d'oro, p. 201-202.

In 1222, Pope Honorius III relieved the Benedictines of their custody of Augustine's relics and entrusted it to Canons Regular instead.[32] It is of service now to examine the history of how Augustine received his place in the liturgical books.

Augustine's name in the liturgical books

The liturgical commemoration of Augustine with prayers proper to it was long unknown in Rome and Gaul, the two centres from which the liturgy in the West received its shape. It was not until the eighth century that Augustine's name first appeared in liturgical prayers. In Rome, 28 August traditionally was the feast of the martyr Hermes. Thus the 'Depositio martyrum', a Roman list of martyrs dating back to 354, placed Hermes' feast on that date.[33] Similarly, Augustine's name is absent from many later Roman evangeliaria and lectionaries, and the Gallic sacramentaries (the 'Missale Gothicum' and the 'Missale Bobbiense') did not provide for a separate Mass for his feast. Remarkably, in spite of the absence of a liturgical cult, Gallic liturgical books often contained prayers derived from Augustine's sermons. Among these the 'Ante oculos tuos, Domine' featured prominently; a prayer which became a popular devotional prayer in the Augustinian family and was later ascribed to Augustine. In its original form, however, it appears to have been a compilation of texts from the Mozarabic 'Liber ordinum'.[34]

Augustine's *natale* appears only in the 'Martyrologium Hieronymianum', and then as a later interpolation. The manuscript is a pseudo-Jerome, compiled by a priest in Northern Italy in the first half of the fifth century and copied in the abbey of Echternach in the eighth. The copyist added several passages, including one containing Augustine's name.[35]

[32] *Ibidem*, p. 202.

[33] *V kal. Sept. Hermetis in basiliae Salaria vetere*, LThK 5(1996)9; MGH IX,70. See Rose, Communitas, p. 330 for the 'Depositio martyrum'.

[34] M. Férotin, Le Liber ordinum. Paris, 1904, c.356; Le Liber mozarabicus sacramentorum et les manuscrits mozarabes, ed. M. Férotin. Paris, 1912, c.615-616. The 'Ante oculos' was used as a prayer *in die tribulationis*. Bartholomew of Urbino O.E.S.A. ascribed it to Augustine in his Divi Aurelii Augustini Milleloquium Veritatis under the heading *tribulatio*, adding: *Qualiter in tribulatione rogandus Deus sit ostendit [Augustinus] in oratione quam fecit dum esset obsessa civitas Hipponensis ab exercitu barbarorum. Quam orationem prout in antiquo libro sub ipsa rubrice reperi, hic posui*. It was propagated by the Augustinian Prior General, Jerome Seripando (+1563), and subsequently included among the optional prayers after Mass as *Oratio S. Augustini* by Pope Urban VIII.

[35] *V kal. Sept. in Africa civitate Hippone regio depositio [sic] sancti Augustini episcopi et confessoris*, PL 30,473; DACL 10(1932)2539. For the 'Martyrologium Hieronymianum', see Rose, Communitas, p. 329-330.

It was not before the mid-eighth century that Augustine began to appear in the Proper of Saints, the *Sanctorale*. This occurred for the first time in the abbey of Flavigny, where the existing 'Sacramentarium Gelasianum Vetus' was being edited and supplemented.[36] One of the additions was the *natale* of Augustine, whose fame as a theologian was spreading among the monks. As a consequence, the commemoration of Saint Hermes on 28 August had to yield to that of the Church father: *Natale s. Augustini presbyteri [sic!] v kal. Sept., eodem die natale Hermetis*.[37] Augustine appears on 28 August in this edited 'Gelasianum', which in turn was the source for the thirty eighth-century Gelasian sacramentaries that are still extant. All copies except two had Augustine's *natale* on the same date. The two exceptions were the manuscripts from Rheims and St. Gallen mentioned previously, which placed the commemoration on 18 October.

The texts of the liturgical prayers for the new feast were derived from existing prayers. They were adapted simply by adding words, leaving them out or changing them where appropriate. Thus the collect was created by interpolating the words *intercedente beato Augustino*. These prayers were later included in the common of saints. For the preface, the monks used the texts of two prefaces for the feast of Saint Laurence on 10 August. Consequently, the text of the new preface had no more than accidental bearing on Augustine's life. Thus the words *ut esset ara et sacrificium*, suitable indeed for a martyr, but not so for a confessor, were retained.

The first appearance of Augustine's feast in a lectionary was in the Comes codex of the abbey of Murbach. This codex was the first to give *Carissimi testificor* (2 Tim. 4:1) and *Vigilate ergo* (Matth. 24:42) as the traditional readings for the feast. The Comes codex was compiled in the late eighth century, and its calendar still betrayed the influence of Carthage: *iiii k. Sept. deposs. sancti Augustini episcopi*.[38]

[36] The 'Sacramentarium Gelasianum Vetus' ordered the feasts and commemorations according to the liturgical year. It is preserved only in a Gallic manuscript, Bibl. Vat. Reg.Lat. 316 (c.750), Rose, Communitas, p. 331-332.

[37] P. de Puniet, Le sacramentaire romain de Gellone. – Ephemerides Liturgicae 50-51(1936-37)43, 79, 134*; E. Bourque, Etude sur les sacramentaires romains, tom.I, Les textes primitifs. Roma, 1949; tom.II, Les textes remaniés, 1: Le Gélasien du VIIIe siècle. Québec, 1952, p.225 and 240. In the Missale Gothicum, Augustine is even referred to as a deacon, Rose, Communitas, p. 87.

[38] A. Wilmart, Le Comes de Murbach. – Revue Bénédictine 30(1913)25; A. Wilmart, Nouvelles remarques sur le feuillet de Besançon. Description du ms. 184. – Revue Bénédictine 30(1913)124.

The lectionary gave 2 Tim. 4:1-8 as the epistle. This pericope also appeared in the Roman, Mozarabic, Gallic and Ambrosian lectionaries, but began there with the preceding verses 2 Tim. 3:16-17. Nevertheless, the later Roman lectionaries followed the Comes in giving 2 Tim. 4:1 as the first verse of the reading. The subsequent pericope, 2 Tim. 4:1-8, was also used for the Mass on the vigil of the feast of one confessor. By choosing this particular biblical passage, the Comes used the pericope reserved for a priest's feast for the Mass for Augustine's feast. It is true that this passage was also used as epistle on the feasts of other saints in the later Roman Missal. But it may be correctly asserted that it was first used as such for the feast of Augustine.

The Comes lectionary gave Matth. 24: 42-47 as the gospel. This passage had hitherto been reserved for the feasts of Saints Marcellus and Eugene and for the feast of the translation of Saint Martin's relics. The later Roman Missal gave Matth. 5:13-19 as the gospel for the feast of Augustine. This passage was taken from the Common of Doctors of the Church. Two opposite developments may thus be identified in the history of the Roman Missal: the epistle, 2 Tim. 4: 1-8, went from the feast of Augustine to the Common of Doctors, and the gospel, Matth. 5: 13-19, went from the Common of Doctors to the feast of Augustine. However, there was as yet no separate office for the new feast.

Augustine in the liturgy: Spain and the Frankish Empire

By contrast with Spain[39] and the Frankish Empire, no liturgical cult of Augustine existed in either Milan, Rome, Southern Italy, England or Ireland at the end of the first millennium. The Ambrosian liturgy, which had developed completely independently from the eighth-century 'Gelasianum' as far as the commemmoration of Augustine was concerned, had no separate prayers for the saint. In the eleventh century, the Roman basilicas of Saint Peter and Saint John Lateran each had their own traditions when it came to Augustine's feast. Moreover, the martyr Hermes continued to hold the primary place on 28 August in these Roman churches for many centuries. It was not until the thirteenth century that the influence of the mendicant orders caused this situation to be reversed.[40]

[39] Le Liber mozarabicus, c.412-421.

[40] *In natale s. Augustini episcopi et confessoris eodem die s.Hermetis martyris*, M. Andrieu, Le missel de la chapelle papale à la fin du 13e siècle. – Miscellanea Ehrle. Roma, 1924, p. 348-376.

In Southern Italy, 28 August appeared as Augustine's *natale* in the late eighth-century calendar of Monte Cassino, although no separate prayers for the feast were provided.[41] In England, the Roman and Southern Italian custom was observed for many centuries, so that Bede's report effectively was Augustine's first appearance in English liturgical records. However, the eighth-century Gelasiana did not become influential in England until the tenth and eleventh centuries. Consequently, it was only then that Augustine's feast began to be observed. By contrast, Augustine's name appeared in the Irish martyrology of Oengus the Culdee as early as 804.[42]

In the Frankish Empire the tendency around 800 was for greater unity in liturgical practice. Augustine at first appeared only in the Gelasiana, but later also in other sacramentaries. The Frankish Empire saw the most important development of Augustine's cult, though initially centred on the Mass rather than on the divine office. It is possible that the saint's commemoration was at times indeed observed in choir. However, the common of one confessor would probably have been used at such occasions.

By contrast, the Mozarabic liturgy showed a great interest in Augustine as a saint, apart from having incorporated many prayers derived from his writings. Thus the Codex Silensis Sextus from the Benedictine abbey of Silos contained a separate Mass and office for Augustine's *natale*.[43] This Codex also provided neums in Visigoth musical notation for these texts. It is not unlikely that this liturgy dates back to the seventh century, before the Moorish invasions. Although obviously the liturgical commemoration of Augustine was observed, his feast did not rank as high as that of saints such as Fructuosus of Braga (+665). This may be concluded from the fact that the office of matins on Augustine's feast had only three nocturnes, whereas that on Saint Fructuosus's feast had four. However, the abolition of the entire Mozarabic liturgy in 1085 at the Council of Burgos meant that this practice exercised no influence on the subsequent development of a liturgy for the feast of Augustine.[44]

[41] E. Loew, Die ältesten Kalendarien aus Monte Cassino (Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters III,3). Munich, 1908; G. Morin, Les quatre plus anciens calendriers du Mont Cassin. – Revue Bénédictine 25(1908)486ff and 26(1909)175ff.

[42] LThK 7(1998)982; The Martyrology of Oengus the Culdee, ed. W. Stokes. London, 1905, p. 179.

[43] London British Museum, Add. 30845 (tenth or eleventh century); Le liber mozarabicus, c.820.

[44] LThK 6(1961)1093.

During the course of the eighth century the liturgical cult of Augustine spread steadily to Northern Europe. This happened tentatively at first, as with the copyist of the 'Martyrologium Hieronymianum' in Echternach, but later with increasing self-confidence, as with the martyrology of Yarrow, which was written determinedly by Bede in full certainty of the facts concerning the recent translation of the saint's relics. Nonetheless, even by Bede's reckoning Saint Hermes continued to take the primary place on the calendar for 28 August. The monks of Flavigny and Murbach were the first to assign that honour to Augustine, perhaps because Hermes was not widely known among the Franks. While they may not have aspired to originality, the monks nonetheless drew up prayers, readings and a preface to constitute a Mass proper to Augustine's feast. The spread of their liturgical books brought great renown to Augustine throughout the Frankish Empire.

The interest in Augustine which existed in Echternach, Flavigny and Murbach was kindled mainly by acquaintance with his writings and teaching, and developed quite separately from the cult of his relics. The latter, with which Bede was familiar in Yarrow, had spread from Sardinia to Pavia. However, these two traditions converged in the eleventh century in Northern France. The ideal of the *vita apostolica* flourished and Augustine's Rule was rediscovered as a viable model of apostolic life. This development resulted in an upsurge of liturgical interest in Augustine. The rise of the orders of canons greatly stimulated his veneration,[45] and their newly found devotion soon demanded a separate office proper to the saint's feast.

A separate office

The new liturgical cult of Augustine was first evidenced by the development of a Mass for his feast day. By contrast, there were no traces of a separate office until the twelfth century, with the sole exception of the Spanish Codex Silensis Sextus mentioned previously. Twelfth-century manuscripts for the first time reveal a separate office, with hymns, antiphons and responsories proper to the feast. This office is known as *Laetare mater nostra Jerusalem*, by the words of the first antiphon of first vespers.

The identity of the author, the origins and the spread of the office have long been shrouded in mystery. A papal bull of 1570

[45] M. Schrama, Van Augustinus tot augustijnen eremieten. De overlevering van Augustinus' Regel. – Zeven eeuwen augustijnen. Gent, 1996, p. 19-29.

identified Saint Thomas Aquinas as the author,[46] while Xystus Schier, an Augustinian and a historian of the Order, had to admit in 1758 that he did not know the identity of the compiler.[47] A century and a half later the situation was unchanged when Guido Dreves and Clemens Blume also admitted to ignorance in this matter in their collection of hymns.[48] It has been Pancratius Langeveld's merit to have made an inventory of the manuscripts which featured the office.[49] This inventory has made it possible to revisit the issue of the origins of the office using the methods of historical criticism.

The office of Saint Augustine appeared in the liturgical books of several religious orders, such as the Dominican 'Ordinarium', which was adopted between 1254 and 1260.[50] However, it had appeared much earlier in the lectionary of the abbey of Canons Regular of Saint Léger near Soissons. The abbey of Saint Léger had been affiliated with the congregation of Arrouaise in 1138,[51] and Gervase had established its liturgical practice before 1123. The office also appeared in the Prémontré antiphonary, which predates the definitive liturgical settlement arrived at by Hugh de Fosses (+1164/74). The first general chapter of Prémontré took place in 1137.[52] The office also appeared in the antiphonary of the abbey of Saint Victor, which was in force from ca. 1140 onwards. Guilduin established the abbey's liturgical practice before 1155.[53] Together with Saint Léger, Prémontré, and Saint Victor, Arrouaise was the most important centre of Canons Regular in Northern France at the time.

[46] *Licet ecclesia* (18 December 1570) addressed to the Canons Regular of the Lateran, Bullarium ...collectio, ed. H. Mainardi – C. Cocquelines, Roma, 1746, tom. IV, pars III, p. 140.

[47] X. Schier, Conatus historico-criticus ad officia et festa propria O.E.S.A. Wien Nat. Bibl., Bibl. Pal. 7238, fasc. 11.

[48] G. Dreves – Cl. Blume, Analecta hymnica medii aevi, Leipzig, 1886-1912, tom.52, p. 111; Cl. Blume, Die Hymnen des Thesaurus Hymnologicus, tom. II: Die Hymnen des 12. bis 16. Jahrhunderts. Leipzig, 1909, p. 110-113.

[49] Pancratius (Cornelis) Langeveld OSA (1909-1976). Fr. Langeveld's notes are in the Archives of the Dutch Province of the Order of Saint Augustine in Eindhoven. The Archivist, Dr. A. de Meijer OSA, kindly allowed me to use them.

[50] Ordinarium iuxta ritum sacri ordinis fratrum praedicatorum, ed. M. Guerrini. Roma, 1921, p. 100, no. 414; W. Bonniwell, A history of the dominican liturgy. New York, 1945, p. 85.

[51] Vat.Bibl. Reg. Lat. 593, fol. 93-102 (mid-twelfth century). Poquet de Laprairie, Histoire de l'abbaye de Saint Léger de Soissons. 1851.

[52] L'Ordinaire de Prémontré d'après des manuscrits du XIIe et du XIIIe siècles, ed. P. Lefèvre, Louvain, 1941, cap.14.; P. Lefèvre, La liturgie de Prémontré, – Ephemerides Liturgicae 62(1948)195ff.

[53] F. Bonnard, Histoire de l'abbaye et de l'Ordre de St. Victor. Paris 1908; L. Delisle, Inventaire des manuscrits de l'abbaye de Saint Victor. Paris, 1869.

Remarkably, the office also appeared in the breviary of the Benedictine abbey of Saint Bertin near Saint Omer.[54] It was added to the breviary together with clear musical notation – in a different hand, but dating from the same time. Moreover, the text was adapted to the Benedictine *cursus*. This text is one of the oldest extant versions of the office. The abbey of Sithiu in the diocese of Therouanne was one of the most famous monasteries of Flanders, and had adopted the name of Saint Bertin around 1100 in honour of its founder, Saint Bertinus (+698). In the eleventh century, the abbey possessed a renowned scriptorium containing four hundred manuscripts, among them twenty-eight of Augustine's works. The community joined the Cluniac Order under abbot Lambert (1095-1125),[55] while at the same time persuading two abbeys in Liege, Saint James's and Saint Laurence's, to join Cluny as well.

Finally, parts of the office also appeared in a breviary of the abbey of Canons Regular of Saint Loup at Troyes. The manuscript includes the invitatory, several antiphons, responsories and short readings.[56] In 1104 four priests who had adopted the canonical life according to the Rule of Augustine, received an *aedicula S. Martino nuncupata*, which later developed into the monastery of Canons Regular of Saint Martin. This community was given charge of the church of Saint Loup at Troyes.[57]

An eleventh-century 'Vita S. Augustini'

The writing of a saint's life, just as the veneration of his relics, is a clear indication that the cult of a saint has newly arisen or is in the process of being stimulated. Many lives of Augustine started to appear around the twelfth century: for instance, Philip of Harveng's 'Vita S. Augustini' (Vita IV, ca.1150) was circulated widely.[58]

[54] Arras Bibl. Mun. 269, fol.140, 144, 141 (early twelfth century), V. Leroquais, Les bréviaires manuscrits des bibliothèques de France. Paris, 1934, I, p. 43.

[55] LThK 2(1958)269-270; MGH XIII, 600-663; DACL 12(1936)2082-2084 and 15(1950)1499-1501.

[56] Troyes Bibl. Mun. 571, fol.193 (early twelfth century); Leroquais, Les bréviaires, IV, p. 216.

[57] One of the Canons Regular of the abbey of Saint Loup at Troyes, Peter Comestor, preached a series of sermons on Augustine in the years 1135 and 1136 (PL 198,1783-92, 1792-96, 1796-1800).

[58] N. Weyns, Philippe de Harveng O.Praem. (1100-1183). – Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 12 (1984) 1297-1302. Philip's *vita* appears in PL 203,1205-1234. *Quant aux autres Vita B. Augustini Philippe y a transposé en son style de prose rimée des vitae existantes* (DSp. col.1301). In the prologue, Philip does indeed refer to earlier

Moreover, a longer *vita* of Augustine had been written earlier, at the beginning of the century (Vita III), in addition to that of Possidius (Vita I) and another, shorter one (Vita II), attributed to Ivo of Chartres (1040-1115).[59]

Considering its division into nine passages of approximately equal length, it may be safely presumed that 'Vita II' was intended to be read during matins. The lectionary of Saint Léger shows that it was indeed used in matins of its office for Augustine's feast.[60] The content of the nine lessons is as follows:

Lectio prima: Augustine's birth and youth; his parents defer baptism in spite of the boy's serious stomach disease; his school days, his difficulties with Greek; when he reads the Hortensius, it changes his interests and causes him to abandon all vain hope.

Lectio secunda: Bishop Ambrose, Augustine's friendship with Alypius and Nebridius; he considers that he is still far from the Lord; when you eat Me, I will not change into you, but you will change into Me (cfr. responsory 11[61]); normal light hurts sick eyes (cfr. responsory 12); then he grasps the invisible things of God through comprehensible things (cfr. responsory 13).

Lectio tertia: There is but one hope of progress, namely that he might come to embrace the one mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ; Augustine starts to read Saint Paul (cfr. responsory 17); his visit to Simplicianus, the servant of God (responsory 18); he inquires which way he should walk, because his daily pursuits displease him (cfr. responsory 19).

Lectio quarta: He tells Ambrose of his conversion and asks him which books of the Bible he should read (cfr. antiphon 9);

vitae which were still extant: *Quae enim hic de eo dicta sunt alibi, et si non eisdem verbis, eodem tamen sensu scripta sunt, et ibi forte melius, sed brevius hic* (PL 203, 1205). For the content of his *vita*, see: E. Saak, High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524. Leiden, 2002, p. 175-183.

[59] See Appendix I, p. 633 below.

[60] Vita II may be found in the lectionary of the abbey of Saint Léger (Bibl. Vat. Reg. Lat. 593, fol. 94r-99v), and is followed there immediately by the text of the office. Vita II also appears in the following manuscripts in the Paris Bibl. Nat.: Lat. 17627 (eleventh century), Nouv. Acq. Lat. 1606 (eleventh century), Lat. 5592 (twelfth century); in Chartres Bibl. Mun. 190 (twelfth century), and in a manuscript at Saint Peter's, Cambridge (PL 161, XLVI) under the title of 'Excerptiones Ivonis Carnotensis De Confessionibus et Vita b. Augustini'. C. Dereine, Enquête sur la Règle de Saint Augustin. – Scriptorium 2(1948)36.

[61] Mentioned here are those parts of matins which show a resemblance to the text of 'Vita II'. The order of the content of the responsories and antiphons was also determined by 'Vita II'.

Ambrose advises him to start with the prophet Isaiah (cfr. antiphon 10); but, when he follows this advice, he finds he cannot manage as much as the first chapter (cfr. antiphon 10); when the time comes to put his name forward for baptism, he returns to Milan (cfr. antiphon 15); he is baptised together with his friend Alypius and his son Adeodatus; at that time all concern for fleeting things disappears (cfr. antiphon 16).

Lectio quinta: He founds his monastery and writes the 'Retractationes'.

Lectio sexta: He writes the 'Speculum': a collection containing every instruction and commandment found in the Bible.

Lectio septima: His mother's death, his own preparation for death, and the penitential psalms.

Lectio octava: He heals a sick person during his own last illness.[62]

Lectio nona: Possidius' epilogue.[63]

'Vita II' more or less literally follows the text of the Confessions up to the fifth lesson, and from the sixth onward it follows that of 'Vita I.' Moreover, the sequence of the passages is also derived from the Confessions, with the grammatical first person singular being replaced by the third person throughout the text. The style of the text is rather factual and unembellished, because all sentences that were not strictly functional were omitted. Augustine's biographical facts are recounted soberly, with particular consideration for his spiritual life. It would seem that the author of 'Vita II' primarily intended to trace the saint's spiritual development towards the religious life. To achieve this goal he used a collection of biographical facts on the one hand and a number of meditations written by Augustine himself on the other hand. By contrast, Augustine's period as a bishop receives little attention, and then only on account of two works which he wrote during the time of his episcopate, the 'Speculum' and the 'Retractationes'. The *vita* emphasised the exemplariness of Augustine's preparation for death, and recognised his holiness by recounting how he healed a sick person while on his own deathbed. The ninth lesson succinctly recapitulates Augustine's greatness as a saint and a bishop in the words of Possidius' epilogue. Remarkably, the recount of his mother's death immediately precedes that of his own, and though their respective ages are mentioned in the text, no explanation for this circumstance is given.

[62] See footnote 1 above.

[63] 'Vita II' differs from the Confessions on two accounts. Firstly, the *vita* recounts how Monica insisted that the boy Augustine be baptised in view of a sudden stomach illness, and how his father prevented it. Secondly, Simplicianus is called Supplicianus in the *vita* and Alypius Alipidius.

The relation between 'Vita III' and 'Vita II'

A newer *vita* (Vita III) was written by a monk of the abbey of Saint Laurence in Liege: Rupert, the future abbot of Deutz (ca. 1075-1129). This work was thought to have been lost for many centuries, until it was discovered by the Bollandists in a manuscript in the nineteenth century.[64] It has never been published.[65] It was mentioned, however, by another monk of Saint Laurence's abbey, Rainer, in his 'De ineptiis cuiusdam idiotae libellus ad amicum primum' (c. 1160). Rainer's work lists the writings of several monks of the abbey, including Rupert: *Igitur cum adhuc esset iunior, scripsit libellum metrice in laudem Spiritus Sancti cuius proficiebat magis aspiratione, quam alicuius magistri eruditione. Item alium de diversis scripturarum sententiis, nicholominus annectens versu heroyco de incarnatione Domini. Uno etiam libello statum nostrae prosecutus est ecclesiae, videlicet a quibus exstructa sit, quae bona vel quae mala de manu Domini ab Evraclo Leodiensium episcopo usque ad Obertum susceperit. De hac eadem quoque materia aliud opusculum saphyco confecit metro. Vitam denique sancti Augustini, necnon et sanctae Odiliae virginis radiante melioravit stilo. De sanctis Theodardo martyre, Goare ac Severo confessoribus cantus composuit. Factus presbiter...*[66]

In the prologue to 'Vita III', Rupert expresses his intention of describing Augustine's life in three parts: how he was called from darkness to the light (derived from books III-VI, IX and XI of the Confessions). How he served as bishop and doctor of the Church (derived from Possidius). How he was called from this vale of tears into the joy of the Lord (derived from Possidius).[67] The third part only comprises two pages (fol. 80v-81v), whereas the first parts comprise

[64] Cat. Hagiographicorum Bibl. Reg. Bruxellensis. Brussels, 1889, II, p. 328: *...vitam s. Augustini, vitam s. Odiliae virginis quae quidem evanuisse videntur* (MGH XII,624). The text of Rupert's *vita* was found in a Passional (Brussels Kon. Bibl. 9368) and is a fifteenth-century copy from Saint Laurence's abbey.

[65] See for the version used here (a transcription by Langeveld): Appendix II, p. 637.

[66] MGH XX, 595ss (595-603). The 'Vita vere apostolica' was not written by Rupert. (PL 170,642).

[67] *Merito ergo illum in domo caelestis agricolae dignum honore dixerim, cuius fides atque studium ecclesiasticae agriculturae profuit semper et proderit. Honoranda est lingua in illo gratia Dei, cuius magnitudinem nulla potest lingua verbis prosequi: et in laude ipsius referendum, quomodo vel quibus de tenebris in admirabile lumen suum illum vocaverit, qualiter illum episcopum atque doctorem ecclesiarum fecerit, tandemque a praesenti convalle lacrimarum evocatum tamquam bonum et fidelem servum in gaudium suum introduxerit*, fol. 74s.

eight (fol. 74r –77v) and seven pages (fol. 77v-80v) respectively. 'Vita III' is three times the length of 'Vita II', and in view of its wording, its comprehensiveness and its structure, it may not be presumed to have been for matins. 'Vita III' outlines Augustine's youth and student days, his ties with the Manichees, his days as a teacher, Monica's sorrow on account of his errors, his friendship with Alypius and Nebridius, his decision to receive baptism, their prayers together to obtain relief of his toothache, his baptism together with Alypius and Adeodatus, Monica's joy. The *vita* concludes with a prayer taken from the Confessions.

Remarkably, there are no references to or quotations from books VII and VIII of the Confessions. There are, however, frequent quotations from the first six books, in the order which they have in the Confessions. In numerous lengthy extracts, Augustine himself addresses God while he discloses his own thoughts. The text connecting these passages was written by Rupert, but even its content was derived from the Confessions. Such a mode of composing the *vita* obviously indicates that the author preferred a lively and personal discourse to a sober account of the facts as in 'Vita II'. Rupert dwelt at length on Augustine's relationship with his mother Monica, although he did not recount the story of her own life: *de cuius vita et moribus tractare non est operis huius*. Frequently he stressed the grace of Augustine's conversion: according to God's plan humble wisdom replaced arrogant philosophy in Augustine.[68] Perhaps Rupert wished to emphasise divine providence once more when he included the story of the theft of lead of which Alypius had been falsely accused.

It may be deduced from Rainer's list that Rupert read and edited an earlier *vita*: *Vitam denique sancti Augustini … radiante melioravit stilo*. This occurred before Rupert's ordination in December 1108. The *vita* he read must have been 'Vita II', although it is difficult to trace its influence on his own subsequent 'Vita III'. The two texts had no more in common than a number of words and short passages.[69] Vita III derived its information from the Confessions and

[68] *Columna nubis in qua thronum suum posuit sapientia Dei; de tenebris in admirabile lumen suum illum vocaverit; versatus sum in tenebris falsitatis; ipse in doctrina pietatis deformiter erraret; eliminari mundanae sapientiae fabricis, ut postea esset tanto acutior quanto doctior, ad confodiendam linguam philosophicae loquacitatis; quia enim antea bonas margaritas quaerens malas invenerat atque haereticas, nunc inventa una pretiosa margarita, unius scilicet Dei vera sapientia; in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi.*

[69] *Beatus Augustinus; Affricanus; Thagastensi; sanctus Ambrosius; quorum Alipius ex eodem quo ipse erat ortus municipio, parentibus primatibus municipalibus Augustino minor natu; Nebridius etiam relicta patria vicina Kartagini, atque ipsa*

from Possidius, but, unlike 'Vita II', did not always follow Augustine's choice of words. Nonetheless, the two *vitae* both mention certain individual biographical facts: Augustine's place of birth, Saint Ambrose, Thagaste as Alypius' place of birth and Carthage as Nebridius's, Augustine's dismissal as a teacher, his baptism together with Adeodatus, his age at the time of death. Nevertheless, 'Vita II' and 'Vita III' only share three common quotations from the Confessions: VI, 11, VI, 17 and IX, 13-14.

'Vita III' does not have 'Vita II's sober, factual style and abounds with stylistic devices, pious reflections and biblical metaphors.[70] Rupert certainly did not shun rhetorical effect. Some expressions and words used in the text are simply colloquialisms of his day literally translated into Latin, making for a grotesque and sometimes inadvertently comic combination of the vernacular and scholastic Latin. The connecting passages which Rupert placed between the extracts from Augustine are of a markedly lower stylistic standard than the quotations themselves.[71]

The intention of 'Vita III' is not so much to outline Augustine's spiritual development in a few sketches, but to give a detailed description of the events of his life. The goal of the text was to illustrate the miracle of how the servant of God Augustine turned from an erring philosopher into an ardent doctor of the Church. The text recounted many more biographical details than 'Vita II'. Nevertheless, it showed a remarkable lacuna with regard to the biographical element by failing to quote at all from books VII and VIII of the Confessions. 'Vita III' differed in this respect from 'Vita II', which reproduced as many passages from these two books as from the others.

Kartagine,..., relicto paterno rure optimo; denuntiavit peractis vindemialibus ut scolasticis suis Mediolanenses venditorem verborum alium provideren ... et insinuavit per litteras sancto Ambrosio pristinos errores suos et praesens votum suum; inde ubi tempus advenit quo se nomen dare oporteret; renatus cum eo Alipius; adiunxerunt etiam sibi puerum a deo datum ex ipso, id est Augustinum carnaliter natum ...; monasterium; secundum apostolicam normam; nihil haberent proprium; manus impositionem sanitatem conferret; anno aetatis suae LXXVI, episcopatus autem XL.

[70] *Columna nubis, vineam suam, sagittam electam; quam difficile tandem illos a se pharao dimiserit, iam veniendum est ad mare baptismi; sacrosque ingressus est fontes in quibus verus Aegyptius diabolus submersus est; verusque Israel transivit et salvatus est; frangebat parvulis Christi panem verbi Dei et potans eos puro fonte scripturarum; Fortunatus similis illi Philisteo; et quasi Goliath non parcens rotabat blasphemias in Deum Israel; pastores esse multos qui pascerent semetipsos, lac comederent et lanis operirentur, gregem autem et ipsi segnes non pascerent; sed qui caecavit latrunculos Syriae sanctum quaerentes Eliseum, fecit et hos amantes errare iste de civitate Dei contra civitatem illorum Sodomam cruentam et impacatam.*

[71] I am grateful to Joost van Neer for pointing this out to me.

However, the author of 'Vita III' supplemented this deficiency by including a succinct abstract in the nineteenth paragraph.[72]

The office compared to 'Vita II' and 'Vita III'

The fact that biographical data are found not only in 'Vita II' and 'Vita III', but also in the antiphons and responsories of the office of Augustine, calls for a comparative study of the three texts. In the following, the different parts of the office have each been given a number, followed by the first words of the antiphon or responsory:

FIRST VESPERS: 1.ant. *Laetare mater*; 2.ant. *Huius mater*; 3.ant. *Distulit tamen*; 4.ant. *Surgens autem*; 5.ant. *Inventus igitur*; 6.ant.ad magn. *Adest dies celebris*.

MATINS: 7.invit. *Magnus Dominus* (Conf. I,1); 8.ant. *Aperuit Augustinus codicem* (Conf. VIII,29); 9.ant. *Insinuavit ergo per litteras* (Conf. IX,13); 10.ant. *At ille iussit Isaiam* (Conf. IX,13); 11.resp. *Invenit se Augustinus longe* (Conf. VII,16); 12.resp. *Sensit igitur et expertus est* (Conf. VII,22); 13.resp. *Tum vero invisibilia Dei* (Conf. VII,23 and 25); 14.ant. *Verumtamen primam huius lectionem* (Conf., IX,13); 15.ant. *Inde ubi tempus advenit* (Conf. IX,14); 16.ant. *Nec satiabatur illis diebus* (Conf. IX,14); 17.resp. *Itaque avidissime legere* (Conf.VII, 27); 18.resp. *Misit ergo Dominus in mentem* (Conf. VIII, 1); 19.resp. *Volebat enim conferenti* (Conf. VIII,1 and 2); 20.ant. *Flebat autem uberrime* (Conf. IX,14); 21.ant. *Voces igitur illae* (Conf IX,14); 22.ant. *Adiunctus inde Nebridio* (Conf. IX,17); 23.resp. *Vulneravit caritas Christi* (Conf. IX,3 and 2); 24.resp. *Accepta baptismi gratia* (Conf. IX,23 and 26); 25.resp. *Verbum Dei* (Poss. 31).

LAUDS: 26.ant. *Post mortem matris reversus* (Poss. 3); 27.ant. *Comperta autem eius fama* (Poss. 4); 28.ant. *Factus ergo presbyter* (Poss. 5); 29.ant. *Sanctus autem Valerius* (Poss. 5); 30.ant. *Eodem tempore Fortunatus* (Poss. 6); 31.ant. ad ben. *In diebus eius* (Poss. 28).

SECOND VESPERS: 32.ant. ad mag. *Hodie gloriosus pater*; 33.hymnus *Magne pater Augustine*.

This numbering will enable a comparative reading of the individual parts of the office and the texts of the two *vitae*. This comparison involves identifying the differences and the parallels. It is of

[72] *Iam quia longum est prosequi, quanta contulerint, quanta quisierint, quam difficile tandem illos a se pharao dimiserit, iam veniendum est ad mare baptismi, per quod transierunt onusti atque suffarcinati opibus Aegypti, videlicet pleni omni scientia saeculari. Augustinus, ut dictum est, paterne susceptus a sancto episcopo Ambrosio, et per eum sana Christi doctrina correctus.*

service primarily because the detected disparities will bring to light clues as to the identity of the author. Moreover, a comparative reading will possibly also throw some light on the remarkable lacuna which exists in the text of 'Vita III'.

Parallels between the office and 'Vita II'

The second, third and fourth lessons of 'Vita II' to great extent correspond to different groups of responsories and antiphons from matins: antiphons 9 and 10; the responsories 11, 12 and 13; the antiphons 14,15 and 16; and the responsories 17, 18 and 19. In composing the office, the author obviously not only used 'Vita II' to provide a cycle of lessons, but also employed the text to compile several groups of antiphons and responsories. The parallels between 'Vita II' and the office may hardly be attributed to Ivo of Chartres. The authorship of the *vita* may perhaps be ascribed to him with some reason, but it is impossible that he could have been the author of the office. Neither the date of the manuscripts in which it is found, nor the history of its spread, nor certainly its musical accompaniment, which apparently stems from the School of Liege, could warrant such a conclusion. The opposite alternative is consequently likely: that the author of the office used 'Vita II.'

Parallels between the office and 'Vita III'

Just as the office corresponds to several parts of 'Vita II', there are also parallels with 'Vita III':

– 1. The second antiphon of vespers is in praise of Saint Monica, Augustine's mother.[73] This was the first time in history that an antiphon was devoted to her. Monica is further mentioned as mother in the second responsory of the third nocturne,[74] in the third antiphon of the third nocturne,[75] and in the first antiphon of

[73] 2.ant. *Huius mater devotissima, quam carne prius pepererat mundo, caritatis visceribus postmodum, multo semine lacrimarum genuit Christo.*

[74] 24.resp. *Accepta baptismi gratia, positus apud Ostia Tiberina, cum matre sua colloquebatur soli valde dulciter, et inhiabant ore cordis pariter in superna fluenta fontis vitae; vilescebatque mundus iste…*

[75] 22.ant. *Adiunctus inde Nebridio et Evodio remeabat ad Africam, quaerens, quis eos ad bene vivendum locus haberet utilius; sed, cum esset apud Ostia Tiberina, pia mater eius defunctus est.*

lauds.[76] Although she was mentioned often in 'Vita III',[77] a separate cult of Monica was still unknown at the beginning of the twelfth century. The place afforded to Augustine's mother in 'Vita III' and in the office was still a far cry from the veneration for her which developed after 20 April 1162. On that date her relics were translated from Ostia to the abbey of Arrouaise. The cult of Monica was further stimulated by a 'Vita S. Monicae' written by Walter, a canon of the abbey, to propagate devotion to the saintly mother of Augustine.[78]

– 2. The invitatory of matins is a paraphrase of the first sentences of the Confessions together with the biblical quotation *qui de tenebris vos vocavit in admirabile lumen suum* (1 Peter 2:9). The same combination appears in the prologue to 'Vita III.'[79]
– 3. The second antiphon of lauds speaks of Augustine's forcible ordination to the priesthood,[80] and is practically identical to Possidius' Vita (c.4), with the exception of the words *licet invitum*. Possidius has *ubertim eo flente* in this place. The expression *licet invitum* also appears in 'Vita III' (*tenentes eum licet invitum renitentem*), as indeed in 'Vita IV'.

[76] 26.ant. *Post mortem matris reversus est Augustinus ad agros proprios, ubi cum amicis ieiuniis et orationibus vacans, scribebat libros et docebat indoctos.*

[77] Monica is referred to in seven paragraphs: par.4. *Flebat autem pro illo mater fidelis et pia...*, fol. 74r; par. 10: *nec indicabas mihi nec matri, quae me profectum atrociter planxit et usque ad mare secuta est...*, fol. 74v; par. 13: *iam venerat ad eum mater pietate fortis...*, fol.75r; par. 23-26: *mater autem eius vidua casta, pia ac sobria ... ut quotquot haec legerint, meminerint ad altare tuum Monicae famulae tuae*, fol. 76v-77r.

[78] F. Gosse, Histoire de l'abbaye et de l'ancienne congrégation des chanoines réguliers d'Arrouaise. Lille, 1786 (reprint, Arras, 1972), p. 550-573; L. Milis, Een reliekenroof uit de twaalfde eeuw. – Spiegel Historiael 3(1968)685-690. In fact, it is from Walter's account that we know that the office of Augustine was in use in the abbey of Arrouaise in 1162: *Inde cum eisdem veni Arroasiam ubi cum solemni processione et summa devotione tam clerici quam laici obviam exierunt [20 April 1162]; et cum magna exultatione cantantes responsum 'Accepta baptismi gratia' [24.resp.] in ecclesiam inferentes, super altare quod in honore beatissimi Augustini...specialiter consecratum est, posuerunt, ut quasi superveniens mater prius filii memoriam visitaret*, Gosse, Histoire, p. 569.

[79] See footnote 67 above.; 7.invit. *Magnus Dominus et laudabilis valde, et sapientia eius non est numerus, qui de tenebris gentium lumen ecclesiae suae vocavit Augustinum*, a comparable text to *Et hunc quidem Dei dispensatio, antequam vocaret in admirabile lumen suum, permisit adolescentem errare in tenebris manicheorum, sed in eodem errore mirabili gratia nescientem circumvolabat Spiritus iste...*, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius. De operibus Spiritus Sancti, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 24). Turnhout, 1972. p. 2071.

[80] 27. ant. *Comperta autem eius fama, beatus Valerius Hipponensis episcopus eum ad se accersiri fecit, et licet invitum presbyterum ordinavit.*

– 4. The second antiphon of lauds[81] shows that the author did not distinguish between the two monastic communities which Augustine established in Hippo: that for laymen in the grounds of the episcopal residence, and that for clerics in the residence itself. The author only knows of one monastery, that for the clergy. 'Vita III' has the same interpretation, while Philip of Harveng on the contrary does distinguish two monasteries in Hippo in his 'Vita IV.' Moreover, in 'Vita III', Possidius' *modum et regulam* has been replaced by *normam...regulam*. By changing these words, the author of 'Vita III' afforded a legal interpretation to the monastic rule, whereas Possidius' choice of words served to emphasise the apostolic norm of Acts 4:32. The author of 'Vita III' clearly considered the monastic rule for the clergy to be a legal document.
– 5. Due to the fifth antiphon of lauds, Augustine's disputation with Fortunatus occupies a relatively important place.[82] Possidius had much less attention for this event (c.6). However, 'Vita III' concurs with the office in devoting a considerable amount of space to this history: one page of the sixteen which the *vita* numbered.[83] By contrast, Philip of Harveng dedicated only a brief chapter to the episode (c.20).
– 6. The metaphor used in the hymn to describe Augustine as the expounder of Scripture to the faithful also appears in paragraph 30 of 'Vita III.' It is the metaphor of Augustine who breaks the bread of the word for the faithful and refreshes them at the pure fountain of Scripture.[84]

The lacuna in 'Vita III'

The reason why a lacuna appears in 'Vita III' cannot be elucidated without first analysing the biographical aspects of the office. In

[81] 28. ant. *Factus ergo presbyter monasterium clericorum mox instituit, et coepit vivere secundum regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam.*

[82] 30. ant. *Eodem tempore Fortunatus presbyter manichaeorum versutia plurimos seducebat, quem sanctus Augustinus in conventu omnium disputens publice superavit.*

[83] *Erat in his diebus quidam manichaeorum presbyter Fortunatus...Obmutuit ille et...non audens aiebat se collaturum cum doctoribus, ea in quibus defecisset ipse superatus* (par. 32), fol. 78r-78v.

[84] 33.hymn. *Frangis nobis favos mellis de scripturis disserens...Tu de verbis salvatoris dulcem panem conficis; et propinae potum vitae de psalmorum nectare.* And in 'Vita III': *...et frangebat parvulis christi panem verbi Dei et potans eos pure fonte scripturarum docebat...* (par. 30).

the antiphons of VESPERS, the biographical facts are incorporated into texts of a meditative character. Thus, the lines that herald Augustine's conversion are of a reflective nature: 2.ant. Monica bore him for Christ through her tears; 3.ant. The grace of baptism was deferred because he desired to comprehend through vain philosophy with his own puffed-up intellect what may only be grasped by the pious through faith; 4.ant. After many errors, his soul finally rose to seek the true Bridegroom, who died for him so that he would not perish, but cling to Him for ever; 5.ant. The watchmen of the city found his soul in this state, and took off his old garb.

The Magnificat antiphon (6.ant.) is of a different nature. It is an exclamation of joy at the coming of the great feast, which calls on the angels, the prophets and the apostles to join in.

The antiphons and responsories of MATINS place full emphasis on Augustine's conversion and baptism. In fact, they do so to such an extent that it has been conjectured that the entire office was originally intended for the feast of his conversion.[85] The antiphons form a chronological series of expressly biographical facts: 8.ant. During his crisis, Augustine opens the Bible at the verse: 'put on the Lord Jesus Christ' (Rom. 13,13); 9.ant. He writes to Ambrose and asks him which books of the Bible to read; 10.ant. Ambrose advises him to read Isaiah; 14.ant. However, Augustine runs aground as early as the first chapter; 15.ant. He returns to Milan and is baptised there by Ambrose; 16.ant. The sweetness of God's ordinance overwhelms him; 20 ant. He is moved to tears by the psalms; 21.ant. The sound of the psalms reaches into the depths of his heart; 22.ant. He returns to Africa together with Nebridius and Evodius, but his mother dies in Ostia on the Tiber.

The responsories were also ordered chronologically: 11.resp. Augustine considers that he is still far from the Lord. Not you will change Me into you, but you will change into Me; 12.resp. The light is hurtful to sick eyes, but pleasing to healthy eyes; 13.resp. Augustine desires to see the invisible things of God; 17.resp. He begins to read avidly, especially Saint Paul; 18.resp. The Lord inspires him to

[85] N. Concetti: De officio et missa in solemni festo s.p.Augustini. – Analecta Augustiniana 13(1930)216-246, especially p. 216vv; N. Greubel, Augustinus in der Liturgie. – St. Augustin [Festschrift] zur Jahrhundertfeier dargeboten. Würzburg, 1930, 70-76, especially p. 70. Greubel does not know who wrote the office, p. 74; E. Wagenhäuser, Die liturgische Texte am Fest des hl.Vaters Augustinus. – Cor Unum 12(1954)46-51, especially p. 46, according to Wagenhäuser the emphasis on Simplicianus' and Augustine's priesthood in the office indicates that it was compiled by a canon, p. 49.

visit Simplicianus; 19.resp. He wants to explain his difficulties to him, so that he may advise him which way is the best for someone in his condition. Different people travel upon the way of God in different ways.; 23.resp. The love of Christ has wounded his heart; 24.resp. After he receives baptism, he engages in sweet conversations with his mother in Ostia on the Tiber; 25.resp. He preaches the word of God powerfully and ardently until the days of his last illness.

Both series, that of antiphons and that of responsories, thus respect the chronology of the story of Augustine's conversion. Moreover, comparative reading has also revealed that the first three responsories adhere perfectly to the lessons, that is to 'Vita II'. 10.ant. is followed by the first lesson and 11.resp., which in turn is followed by the second lesson and 12.resp. and the third lesson and 13.resp. After the first three responsories, the connection becomes less clear. 16.ant. is followed by the fourth lesson and 17.resp, the fifth lesson and 18.resp., the sixth lesson and 19.resp. 22.ant. is followed by the seventh lesson and 23.resp, and the eighth lesson and 24.resp. The ninth lesson, finally, is followed by 25.resp., which do correspond.

The antiphons of LAUDS have a quite different atmosphere from those of vespers. They are based on Possidius and relate chronologically ordered facts. The antiphons of lauds were intended to show what good was wrought by Augustine after his conversion, both with regard to the development of religious life, as with regard to the African Church in general: 26.ant. After his mother's demise, he returns to his parental home to live there together with several friends. Fasting and praying, he writes books and teaches; 27.ant. Valerius has Augustine brought before him on account of his fame, and ordains him to the priesthood in spite of his own protests; 28.ant. Once a priest, Augustine founds a monastery for clerics and begins to live according to the precepts of the apostles; 29.ant. Valerius rejoices greatly at the presence of this godsend, ideally suited to build up the Church by teaching the true doctrine; 30.ant. In those days Fortunatus converts many people to Manicheism. Augustine triumphs over him in a public disputation; 31.ant. ad ben. At that time the barbarians laid siege to Hippo. On account of this, Augustine weeps day and night, but he dies in peace.

This comparative analysis of the biographical aspects of 'Vita II', 'Vita III' and the office evinces the conclusion that 'Vita III' contains more biographical material than 'Vita II', but that 'Vita III' shows a lacuna regarding the episode of Augustine's preparation for baptism which is told in books VII and VIII of the Confessions. Unlike 'Vita II', which quotes book VIII once, 'Vita III' contains no

extracts at all from these books. However, when 'Vita III' and the office are compared, it emerges that both sources, when taken together, provide a complete picture of that period in Augustine's life. Whereas par. 19 of 'Vita III' more or less passes by his preparation for baptism – or provides only a summary of the episode –, the antiphons and responsories of matins go into great detail on this issue.

Three documents have been compared: 'Vita II', 'Vita III' and the office. All three relate to the Confessions, either by quoting from them directly or by deriving thoughts or facts from them. The author of 'Vita II' is not the same person as the author of the office. The author of 'Vita III', however, is. The authorship of the office may consequently be attributed to Rupert of Liege, on the basis of the parallels which exist between 'Vita III' and the office.[86] Rupert used the text of 'Vita II' in writing 'Vita III' and matins. This may be concluded clearly from the relation which all three documents bear to the Confessions.[87]

The antiphons and responsories of matins thus form an essential supplement to the episode of Augustine's preparation for baptism which is mentioned only incidentally in par. 19 of 'Vita III'. However, this supplement was not derived directly from books VII and VIII of the Confessions, but evidently from the second, third, and fourth lessons of 'Vita II'. The question arises as to why such a striking lacuna appears in 'Vita III'. It may be said in answer that Rupert must have made this omission purposely, intending to complement the *vita* with the text of matins. But what reasons could he have had for this? It is

[86] Langeveld first identified Rupert as the author: '...de aanhef van het kerkelijk officie ter ere van Augustinus dat in het begin van de twaalfde eeuw door Robertus van Luik vervaardigd werd', P. Langeveld, De werkende stilte. De oorsprong der grote kloosterorden. Amsterdam, 1957, p. 104.
'...ook een Vita S. Augustini... dat nauw samenhangt en verwant is met het Augustinusofficie dat in de twaalfde eeuw door de augustijnen-koorheren een snelle en wijde verspreiding vond', P. Langeveld, Rupert van Deutz. – Liturgisch woordenboek. Roermond, 1968, col. 2460-61.

[87] The quotations which appear in both documents are in italics.
The Confessions are quoted as follows in the second, third, and fourth lessons of 'Vita II': the second lesson from Conf: *VII,16; VII,23;* the third lesson from: VII,24; *VII,25; VII,27; VIII,1; VIII,1 and 2;* the fourth lesson from: *IX,13; IX,13 and 14; IX,13; IX,14; IX,14.*
'Vita III' quotes from Conf VI,17 in par. 18, followed by par. 19 without any quotations; followed by par. 20 which quotes from Conf IX,12; par. 21 quotes from IX,13; par. 22 from IX,14; however, the quotations in par. 20-22 do not coincide with those in the fourth lesson.
In the office, the text of matins quotes from Conf.: *VII, 16, VII,22, VII, 23 and 25, VII,27;* VIII,29, *VIII,1 VIII,1 and 2;* IX,3 and 2, IX,13, IX, 14, IX, 17, IX, 23 and 26.

probable that the answer will be found in a study of Rupert's own biography. However, before turning to this subject, definitive evidence must first be furnished that Rupert indeed wrote the office.

The office in relation to Rupert's other works

The analogies between 'Vita III' and the office all point to Rupert of Liege as the author. This assumption would be considerably strengthened if any parallels between the office and Rupert's other works could be identified. It is consequently of service here to analyse the office further in relation to Rupert's other writings.

- 7. The third antiphon of vespers is directed against the dialecticians.[88] At the end of the eleventh century, new schools of theology were arising. The struggle between theologians and dialecticians was in full swing when Abelard (+1142) gave it a decisive turn. Rupert's 'De divinis officiis', a document written as early as 1112, witnesses already to his dislike of the use of dialectics in theology. In 1117, Rupert was preparing a debate about this subject with Anselm of Laon (+1117) and William of Champeaux (+1121).[89]
- 8. The Magnificat antiphon of vespers[90] contains a similar idea to that expressed in the line from the hymn for Augustine: *Quae obscura prius erant, nobis plana faciens.* Rupert also subscribed to the common view that the Church fathers provided further interpretation of the original revelation. The prophets and the apostles were the true witnesses of revelation, they received the *prima gratia dispensandi.* Nevertheless, some truths remained obscure at first, because the time of their disclosure had not yet come. It was the task of the apostolic fathers and the fathers of the Church to set forth these truths. Theirs was the *secunda gratia dispensandi.*[91]

[88] 3. ant. *Distulit tamen diu baptismi gratia, quia tumens inani philosophia volebat humana ratione comprehendere, quod pia mens vivacitate fidei nititur apprehendere.*

[89] Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti (PL 170,482); Rupert de Deutz, Les oeuvres du Saint Esprit, tom. I, introd. J. Gribomont (Sources Chrétiennes 131). Paris, 1967, p. 10; J. van Engen, Rupert of Deutz. Berkeley-London, 1983, p. 72-81, 96-105.

[90] *Adest dies celebris, quo salutus nexu carnis sanctus praesul Augustinus assumptus est cum angelis; ubi gaudet cum prophetis, laetatur cum apostolis; quorum plenus Spiritu, quae praedixerunt mystica, fecit nobis pervia, post quos secunda dispensandi verbi Dei primus refulsit gratia.*

[91] *Secundo post apostolos meriti vel gratiae loco viri apostolici patres orthodoxi et doctores catholici sal dicuntur et sunt, atque lux mundi; quia videlicet sapienter atque fideliter tractando ac retractando sacram legis et prophetarum scripturam,*

– 9. The Magnificat antiphon of the second vespers contains the words: *...decoratus una stola securusque de reliquia.*[92] This description of *stola* as festive attire is also found in *Singulis quoque proferri iussit binas stolas* (Gen. 45:22) and in *Et datae sunt illis singulae stolae albae* (Rev. 6:11). According to Rupert, one of these two *stolae* symbolises the immortality of the soul, and the other the immortality of the body.[93] This interpretation can also be found in pseudo-Augustine, Sermones ad fratres in eremo.[94]
– 10. The references to the Song of songs in the fourth and fifth antiphons of vespers and in the seventh responsory of matins[95] are clarified in Rupert's commentary on the Song of songs.[96]

quidquid in ea quasi carnaliter sonat, ita sermonem invido condiunt et spiritualiter sapiat, et quod erat clausum patescat, quod obscurum et tenebrosum videbatur, clarum et lucidum fiat, De gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaeum, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 29). Turnhout, 1979, p. 115; Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 56-58. 71-73, 92-115, 335-369.

[92] *Hodie gloriosus pater Augustinus, dissoluta huius habitationis domo, domum non manefactum accepit in caelis, quam sibi cooperante Dei gratia, manu, lingua, fabrefecit in terris; ubi quod iam sitivit internum, gustat aeternum, decoratus una stola, securusque de reliqua.*

[93] *Resurgent enim, et quibus nunc datae sunt singulae stolae albae, tunc dabuntur geminae, ut sint beati tam immortali beatitudine animae, quam beata corporis immortalitate*, In Apocalypsim (PL 69,953). *Etenim nunc quidem electorum animae, ubi depositio carnis onere feliciter laetantur, una stola, id est, stola suimet beatitudine perfruuntur; ubi autem omnes resurreximus, quicumque immutabimur, binas stolas singulo, id est animae simul et corporis duplicem gloriam obtinebimus*, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius. In Genesim, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 21). Turnhout, 1971, p. 546.

[94] *quod duae stolae sunt duae resurrectiones quarum una est animae, quando resuscitatur a vitiis in quibus mortua iacebat; altera corporis quando corpus configuratum erit corpori claritatis Christi* (PL 40,1282). The expression *prima stola* occurs frequently with Augustine, e.g. in De Trinitate, 12,11. See also: *Haec ergo prima stola est quietis atque iucunditatis, qua post mortem carnis anima tantum perfruitur, secunda illa erit, cum recepto corpore de animae et carnis immortalitate laetabitur*, Julian of Toledo (+690), Prognosticon futuri saeculi, II,35 (PL 96,495).

[95] 4. ant.: *Surgens autem post multos circuitus errorum, circuibat civitatem per vicos et plateas, quaerendo verum animae virum, pro quo ne moreretur, dignum iudicaret mori, ut eius semper inhaereret amori.*

5. ant.: *Inventus igitur a custodibus civitatis et pallio vetustatis exutus, diligenter pertratata cum illis veritate, quem desiderabat invenit, et castis amplexibus ardenter inhaesit.*

23. resp: *Vulneravat caritas Christi cor eius, et gestabat verba eius in visceribus quasi sagittas acutas: et exempla servorum Dei quos de mortuis vivos fecerat tamquam carbonas vastatores...*

[96] *Sed qui dilectum suum non invenit, restat, ut surgat, civitatem circumeat, id est, sanctam ecclesiam electorum, mente et inquisitione percurrat, per vicos et plateas quaerat, id est, per angusta et lata gradientes, et aspiciat ut si qua invenire in eis valeat, eius vestigia exquirat...*, In Canticum Canticorum de incarnatione Domini, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 26). Turnhout, 1974, p. 59. *Haec erant iacula ipsorum, et istis percusserunt me et vulneraverunt me percussi ipsi, et vulnerati a me vicissim sagittis acutis...*, *ibidem*, p. 115.

It is true that certain individual parallels may also be identified between the office and other twelfth-century theologians. Nonetheless, it is only in Rupert's writings that all are found together. A closer study of Rupert's person and work will undoubtedly reveal further parallels,[97] especially in his style and choice of words, his interest in weeping and visions,[98] and in 'sweet affections and chaste embraces'.[99] Consequently, it may be safely assumed that Rupert was the author of the office.

Moreover, it is very likely that Rupert also composed the music to accompany it. The numerical succession of modes in the series of antiphons and responsories is highly reminiscent of the School of Liege. Notwithstanding his intention to create harmony between text and melody, Rupert did not choose the modes on the basis of the contents of the text.[100] Rather, he followed the custom of the School of Liege by connecting the series of antiphons and responsories with the eight modes in their succession: the first antiphon of vespers was composed in the first mode, the second antiphon in the second mode etc. Perhaps this technique holds little artistic appeal to contemporary ears. Nevertheless, the sustained succession of modes does reveal that each of the three component parts of the office (vespers, matins and lauds) were composed as a whole. When composing the music for lauds, however, the composer first employed the plagal modes before using the authentic modes to proceed in reverse order.[101] The influence of the School of Liege is clearly distinguishable in the compositions, due to the lengthy texts of the antiphons and the melismatic melodies. The latter possess great ambits, are of an improvised nature and lack a dominant.[102]

Musical composition was highly esteemed in the abbeys of Saints James and Laurence in Liege. Not only Rupert, but also Wazelinus – his pupil and later the seventh abbot – and Gisbert, his brother

[97] Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 95-134.

[98] De gloria et honore, p. 367 and 384; In Canticum, p. 111. For a discussion of Rupert as a visionary, see B. McGinn, Die Mystik im Abendland. Freiburg, 1996, II, p. 500-509.

[99] 5. ant: *...et castis amplexibus ardenter inhaesit.*

[100] Rupert specifically remarks about the harmony between text and melody, see De divinis officiis, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 7). Turnhout, 1967, p. 255.

[101] Lauds: 26. ant. in the second mode; 27.ant. in the fourth mode; 28. ant. in the sixth mode; 29. ant. in the eighth mode; 30. ant. in the seventh mode; 31. ant.ben in the fifth mode. Second vespers: 32. ant. ad magn. in the third mode. First vespers: 6. ant.ad magn. in the first mode.

[102] J. Smits van Waesberghe, Muziekgeschiedenis der Middeleeuwen, I: De Luiksche Muziekschool. Tilburg [1936], p. 150vv, 442-451.

John, and Nizo, all witness to the fact that Saint Laurence's produced many compositions of new offices. Like Saint James's, the abbey was a workshop for offices. A commission for an office meant that both the words and the music were commissioned from the same author.[103]

The question obviously arises as to why Rainer did not mention the office in his list of works. A plausible explanation is that it was not written for his own abbey and consequently did not appear in the liturgical books used in Saint Laurence's. Usually, the text of a new office was distributed to other abbeys by enclosing it with copies of other commissioned texts.[104] When compiling his list of Rupert's writings around 1160, thirty years after the latters death, Rainer did not discover the office in Saint Laurence's abbey, neither in the books used in the choir nor in the library. However, he did find 'Vita III' there. Evidence for this fact comes from manuscript 9368 in the Royal Library in Brussels, which came from the abbey of Saint Laurence.

The dating of Rupert's works

Rupert, or Robert, was born around 1075 in or in the vicinity of Liege.[105] Around 1082, his parents sent him to the school of Saint

[103] *Ibidem*, p. 390, 394. Rupert wrote about different subjects from the history of music, e.g. about the relation between intervals, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius. De operibus Spiritus Sancti, p. 2048-50. He wrote warmly about how someone's heart may be opened to the grace of the Holy Spirit through the senses rather than through the mere reading of Scripture: *Non dubito plerosque esse, qui huius rei experimentum quantulumcumque assecuti sint et secundum illud ecemplum nonnumquam persenserint in auditu sive decantatione laudis, sive orationis bene et morose cum musico modulamine sonantis, quod ipsorum viscera concuteret impetus Spiritus Sancti, inundans affectus divinae inspirationis, vis magna sanctae compunctionis. Fit denique nescio qua naturae vi, ut multo amplius afficiar audiendo sublimiter canentem ecclesiae chorum cum multitudine sonorum...quam si simplicem eiusdem orationis litteraturam...legam vel audiam,* De gloria et honore, p. 156. *Movet enim intus musica, vi quadam et potentia naturali spiritum hominis, et tum decenter convenit cum verbo vel sensu divinae laudis, concutit penetralia cordis, et illam quam accepit homo resuscitat in eo gratiam Spiritus Dei*, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius. In Reg. V,23, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 22). Turnhout, 1972, p. 1440.

[104] For instance Ruperti De victoria verbi Dei + Officium de S. Judico, Brussels Kon. Bibl. 9737-38; Ruperti In libro Job + Hymni in honorem S. Mariae Magdalenae, 9935; Ruperti De gloria et honore Filii hominis + Conversio Otgerii et Benedicti, 9578-80; Historia Francorum + Officium Mariae Aegyptiacae, 9361-67.

[105] J. van Engen, Rupert de Deutz. – Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 13(1988)1126-1133; Maria Arduini, Rupert von Deutz. – TRE 29(1998)474-483; P. Engelbert, Rupert von Deutz. – LThK 8(1999)1366-1367. I have based this article on Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz (1983), who focusses on Rupert as a theologian, not as a musician.

Laurence's abbey on the Mons Publicanus outside Liege. Later he entered the order and made his profession ca. 1091. Rupert received an education in the abbey school and learnt to write verse and prose. Saint Laurence's school reached the pinnacle of its success under the abbacy of Berengarius (1077-1116). However, the abbot and many monks were driven from the monastery in February 1092 by the anti-reformist Bishop Othbert. They went to the daughter house of Saint Hubert and from there to Evergnicourt between Rheims and Laon.[106] The community returned to Saint Laurence's in July 1095. The abbey assumed the discipline and customs of Cluny between 1100 and 1105.

Rupert went through a lengthy crisis between 1100 and 1108. He felt unworthy of the priestly dignity and refused to receive ordination at the hands of Othbert. Simultaneously, he studied the *artes* – especially rhetoric and music – under the supervision of the monk Heribrand,[107] composing several liturgical hymns. Within the abbey, this was a certain way to establish his profile and so to be called to higher duties.[108] It is not unlikely that the 'Vita S.Augustini' came about in this way. Rupert was finally ordained by Othbert in 1108. Subsequently, he went through an extremely productive period of teaching and writing. In the years to come, Rupert only rarely referred again to the works he wrote before ordination.[109]

He worked on 'De divinis officiis' from 1109 to 1112, and started 'De Trinitate et operibus eius' afterwards. He completed it in 1116, together with 'In evangelium sancti Johannis'.[110] In the summer of 1116 he wrote 'De voluntate Dei', in which he snubbed, not only the School of Laon, but also the students and clergy of Liege.[111]

[106] Les oeuvres du Saint Esprit, introd. Gribomont, p. 8. Rupert wrote a poem against Bishop Othbert in 1095, Carmina exulis, see Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 30.

[107] *... et prudens Heribrandus qui et ipse litterarum peritus pueritiae meae magister exstitit*, De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius (Epistula ad Cunonem), ed. R. Haacke (CCM 21). Turnhout, 1971, p. 121.

[108] Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 30.

[109] 'Ordination also divided the minor works of his early years from his major ones and quite probably composition in verse from commentary in prose', *ibidem*, p. 54.

[110] Rupert probably succeeded Heribrand as the abbey's scholast. The fact that he suddenly interrupted 'De sancta Trinitate' to write 'In evangelium sancti Johannis' is probably an indication of this. 'In evangelium sancti Johannis' shows traits of Rupert's teaching, *ibidem*, p.103-105. Rainer also reports that Rupert taught, MGH XX, 595, 597.

[111] For the animosity which Rupert had aroused in Liege, see Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p.158ff., 167, 215ff. He was forced to go into exile twice on account of the tense situation in Liege: from 1116 to 1117 he stayed in the abbey of Siegburg, and in 1119 in Cologne.

This work caused such a furore in Liege, that he had to flee to Siegburg, where the abbot Kuno was sympathetic to him. However, he was summoned to appear before a commission of theologians in Liege in the spring of 1117 to give account for his by now notorious 'De voluntate Dei'. In the same year he travelled to Laon to dispute with Anselm, who died before his arrival, and to Châlons-sur-Marne to dispute with Bishop William of Champeaux.

Between 1119 and 1120 he rewrote the 'Vita S. Heriberti' at the commission of Marcward, abbot of Deutz near Cologne.[112] Heribert was the founder of the abbey of Deutz, which in its turn was originally a daughter house of Siegburg. Rupert eventually succeeded Marcward as abbot of Deutz. Between 1121 and 1128 he wrote the 'Passio beati Eliphii' and between ca. 1125 and 1128 the 'Sermo de S. Pantaleone.'

Rupert had met the Archbishop of Cologne, Frederic of Schwarzburg (+1131) through the mediation of the abbot Kuno. Frederic asked him in 1119 to write a commentary on the Book of the Apocalypse. In the autumn of 1120 Frederic appointed him abbot of Deutz. In 1121, Rupert completed 'In Apocalypsim'. At Christmas 1124 he was in Rome. In 1125, he completed both 'In Canticum Canticorum de incarnatione Domini' and 'Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti', and started work on 'De gloria et honore Filii hominis super Matthaeam', which was completed in 1127. He worked on 'De glorificatione Trinitatis et processione Spiritus Sancti' from March to August 1128, and died on 4 March 1129 in the abbey of Deutz, where he was buried.

Abbot Kuno, who became Archbishop of Ratisbon in 1126, was the main propagator of Rupert's writings. Just as Hugh of Saint Victor was a worthy exponent of the theology of the Victorines, and Bernard of the monastic theology of the Cistercians, so Rupert was the exponent of the monastic theology of the Benedictines.[113]

[112] The 'Vita S. Heriberti' (PL 170,389-428; Vita Heriberti, ed. P. Ditter. Bonn, 1976), like the 'Vita S.Augustini' and the 'Vita S. Odiliae', is the revision of an existing *vita*. Rupert acknowledges this in the prologue: *Tu mihi hoc opus, venerande pater Marcwarde, imposuisti, quatenus sancti archipraesulis Heriberti vitam virtutibus splendidam, sed prioris, ut tibi videbatur, styli rubigine subobscuram, novo rescriberem styli.*

[113] Ca. 1146, Arno of Reichersberg ascribed this honour to Rupert in his Scutum canonicorum (PL 194,1519), Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 4.

The place of the office in Rupert's work

Most points of contact between the office of Augustine and Rupert's other works are found in De divinis officiis (1112), De voluntate Dei (1116), De sancta Trinitate (1116), In Apocalypsim (1121), Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti (1125), In Canticum (1125) and De gloria et honore (1127). The assumption could indeed arise from the parallels between the office and these writings, that Rupert must have worked on the office during the same productive period in which these other works were completed.[114]

However, this assumption is challenged by the fact that Rupert wrote 'Vita III' before his ordination, that is, before 1108. Since it has been established already that a close textual relationship exists between 'Vita II', 'Vita III' and the office, it is most likely that Rupert completed the office before 1108. It is true that the similarities mentioned above between the office and Rupert's other writings may be found mainly in works completed after his ordination. It is also true that Rupert only became famous, if not infamous, as a theologian after his ordination. Nevertheless, the supposition is justified that Rupert had already developed his theological thought to some extent before his ordination, even though he would take this development further only afterwards.

Moreover, the musical composition of the office enables a more precise dating of the work in the chronological range of Rupert's writings. It is certain that matins were completed at the same time as vespers and lauds. Rupert admittedly attempted to distinguish vespers, matins, and lauds from each other both musically and textually – especially the responsories 23 *Vulneraverat*, 24 *Accepta baptismi* and 25 *Verbum Dei* differ melodically and musically. Furthermore, the order of the modes indicates that each part was intended as a separate entity. Nevertheless, the office as a whole still forms a clear musical unity.[115] It was indeed the custom in the twelfth century that the same author wrote both the text and the music of a commissioned office. It may be safely concluded from the foregoing that Rupert adhered to this practice and is the author of both text and music. Moreover, in view of the work's modest length, it is not likely that a great span of time passed between its commencement and its completion.

[114] Thus several verbal parallels may also be distinguished between In evangelium sancti Johannis and De divinis officiis, 'but such repeated phrases can be found all through Rupert's work', *ibidem*, p. 134.

[115] I am grateful to Anthony Zielhorst for pointing this out to me.

A return to 'Vita III' and the text of matins

The relation between 'Vita III' and the lacuna has been mentioned already, but no explanation has yet been offered. Perhaps some further speculation concerning the chronological correlation between 'Vita III' and an early collection of texts will clarify the situation. Rupert would have used this collection to examine his soul. The lacuna, created deliberately by Rupert, is an indication that he intended the text of 'Vita III' and the collection of extracts from the Confessions to form a single coherent entity. Taking further the assumption that Rupert selected the texts for the office in two stages, the following hypotheses are plausible. In the first stage, Rupert would have compiled a collection of texts. This collection justified the omission in 'Vita III'. All this occurred during a period in which the young monk Rupert was privately studying the life of Augustine, without any special commission to do so or to write an office. In the second stage, an office had been commissioned, and Rupert would have widened his collection with a view to fulfilling the terms of the commission.

The first stage was before Rupert's ordination. It is clear from Rainer's list that Rupert occasionally wrote works as a young monk. He wrote short historical documents, some verse and musical compositions. Rupert himself mentions a *libellum hymnorum* which he wrote in honour of the Holy Spirit: ... *scribendo libellum hymnorum in laudibus Spiritus Sancti...sic incipiens magnam intus versabam materiam per angustum foramen ubertim prodire non valentem, dum metricis pedibus verba ligando ut in scholaribus assuetus eram longum in paucis sermonibus laborem assumerem.*[116] It may consequently be assumed that Rupert had already created a collection of texts derived from 'Vita II'. He then studied the biography of Augustine and re-edited 'Vita II', simply for reasons of piety or as a try-out, and without the intention to write an office.[117] It is not unlikely that Rupert collected a series of texts from 'Vita II' during the years of personal crisis preceding his ordination. These extracts especially concerned Augustine's preparation for baptism and could bear him up during his own preparation for the important decision he had to take. Very possibly he then decided to study the Confessions and re-edit and improve the

[116] De gloria et honore, p. 380-381.

[117] Rainer recounts how he himself was caught experimenting with musical composition during the lessons by the scholast, Smits van Waesberghe, Muziekgeschiedenis, p. 447-449.

short 'Vita II' to suit his own needs and circumstances. While thus compiling 'Vita III', he simply passed over the episode of Augustine's preparation of baptism (par. 19), since he already had a collection of texts dealing with that part of the saint's biography.

This collection of texts used by Rupert to mirror his own situation fits in quite well with the description of his own youth. Had the collection been compiled after 'Vita III', Rupert would have had no reason to interrupt the work so abruptly at such a crucial part. Therefore, it is quite probable that Rupert left out the episode of the preparation for baptism because he already had his collection and was planning to put it to some special use. Perhaps he considered setting it to music or perhaps he had already done so and intended the composition and 'Vita III' to be moulded into a single whole. It is indeed also possible that Rupert considered writing an oratorio in honour of Augustine, both as a preparation for his own ordination and as a way of creating a profile for himself in the abbey.[118]

In conclusion, it may be said that 'Vita II' provided the point of departure for the entire enterprise. Using this *vita*, Rupert assembled a collection of extracts for personal reading. Then he wrote 'Vita III' – for devotional reasons, as a try-out or to impress his fellow monks – planning to combine it with the collection of texts to form an oratorio. This explains why he omitted an important part of Augustine's biography from 'Vita III': it was covered already by his collection. The *vita* and the collection belonged together and complemented each other. In later years, when Rupert was composing an office for the feast of Augustine, he used part of his juvenile work and 'Vita II' to create the text of matins. In doing so, he used his collection of extracts separately from 'Vita III'. As a consequence, this work was handed down on its own. It must be admitted, however, that this hypothesis remains no more than speculation.

'Magis aspiratione quam alicuius magistri eruditione'

In 'De gloria et honore', Rupert shows to what extent he identified his own life story with Augustine's. His confession of the eight

[118] The abbey of Saint Laurence had a tradition of oratorios. Lambert, abbot from 1061 to 1069, not only compiled the office for the feast of Saint Heribert of Cologne, but also set the Vita S. Heriberti to music. Musical activity in the monastery was not confined to the writing of new offices. It is known, for instance, that Gisbert, besides composing several hymns, wrote music to accompany the story of Joseph in Egypt and several episodes from the life of King David, *ibidem*, p. 443.

years before his ordination, years of anxiety and depression, commences with the image of Babylon holding the Church captive.[119] Rupert dedicated the work to abbot Kuno, who had become Archbishop of Ratisbon in 1126. Kuno had asked him why he had written so many works. In his response, Rupert speaks of the most difficult time of his life and compares it with the years Augustine spent searching for God.[120] Rupert's account speaks of a time of apparitions and visions. He knew beforehand that this period would take eight years, for he had been told in a vision: *Adhuc octo annis victurus es et non plus.*[121] He believed at first that the time of his death had been foretold, and so these years became a time of waiting.[122]

However, in the eighth year Christ appeared to him, speaking to him and making a gesture as if to embrace him: *apprehendi quem diligit anima mea, tenui illum, amplexatus sum eum, diutius exosculatus sum eum.*[123] This convinced him that he would not die, but rather that he must strive to achieve a greater understanding of the depth of the mysteries of Christ ... *quot sacramentorum eius profunda deinceps clarius intellegere deberem.*[124] Rupert thus assumed a life of constant study and writing. Then his fear of the priesthood also disappeared, leaving him prepared and motivated to receive ordination shortly afterwards, *hunc sacrum, licet indignus, ordinem suscepi.*[125] The first book he wrote following ordination was 'De divinis officiis'.

It has been argued in the foregoing that at least part of the text of Augustine's office had already been prepared before Rupert's ordination. Rupert used a body of text that already existed when he compiled the office. In effect, there are several weighty arguments to indicate that he completed the entire office before his ordination. 1. As

[119] ... *sedebam iuxta flumen magnae Babylonis, iuxta fluvium Chobar, quod interpretatur gravitudo vel gravitas. De illa namque Babylone loquor, cuius est rex vel princeps, in qua tyrannizavit spiritualis Nabuchodonosor, scilicet diabolus, iugumque suum aggragavit super filios quoque civitatis dei viventis Hierusalem caelestis...*, De gloria et honore, p. 368, r. 201-207.

[120] Rupert tells his life story in De gloria et honore XII (p. 363-396). His portrait was included in an edition of De divinis officiis (CCM 7) and Les oeuvres du Saint Esprit (SC 131): *Hic aperit typicosa nove signacula legis/ quam statuit sub carne novi presentia regis.* H. Silvestre, Que nous apprend Renier de Saint-Laurent sur Rupert de Deutz?- Sacris Erudiri 22(1982)49-97.

[121] De gloria et honore, p. 374, r. 435.

[122] *Eodem ergo tempore sollicitus fuit; secundo quoque anno vel tertio, in mortis expectatione suspensus, quarto, quinto et sexto similiter, ibidem*, p. 374, r. 444.

[123] *Ibidem*, p. 383, r. 759.

[124] *Ibidem*, p. 383, r. 772.

[125] *Ibidem*, p. 383, r. 779.

far as the content of Rupert's ideas is concerned, there is no reason why he could not have completed the office before the time of his fame, because he had developed the key concepts of his thinking much earlier. 2. Music appears exclusively in Rupert's juvenile curriculum. Rainer says of those years: *Igitur cum adhuc esset iunior, scripsit libellum metrice in laudem Spiritus Sancti cuius proficiebat magis aspiratione, quam alicuius magistri eruditione*. Does Rainer imply here that Rupert's early compositions were remarkable more for their creator's good intentions than for their quality? Certainly the melodies of the office leave the impression of being the fruits of an immature musical mind: they are uniform, somewhat artificial and they lack imagination. 3. It is doubtful whether Rupert would have had the time to occupy himself with a musical project in his later years, since his commission to teach and write assumed all of his time. It is true that he did have time for other occupations during one particular period of his life after ordination. From 1117 to 1119 he had to flee in the face of malicious threats and consequently postponed his writing. It is not likely, however, that he was in the mood for musical composition during those years.

An office for Canons Regular

While the textual predecessor of the office for the feast of Augustine may have been intended for Rupert's private devotional use, the office in its complete form was neither intended for private devotion, nor indeed for Rupert's own abbey. Otherwise Rainer would have come across it when compiling his list, and Rupert would have used a Benedictine *cursus* of 12 responsories and 21 antiphons, in stead of following the canonical custom of 9 responsories and 22 antiphons. Moreover, Rupert would not have acclaimed the Rule of Augustine so highly in song if it were intended for his own Benedictine abbey, nor would he have overseen the fact that Augustine also founded a monastery for laity in addition to that for clergy. Perhaps someone in Rupert's entourage drew his attention to the increasing demand for an office for the feast of Augustine in the new abbeys of Canons Regular. Perhaps, indeed, Rupert was asked to write such an office.

The spread of his work shows that the office was known in the whole of France some decades after it was completed, especially with the canonical orders in the North, and via the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre as far away as Jerusalem. A study of the spread of

the manuscripts and the textual variations contained in them reveals that the text of the office was disseminated from the congregation of Arrouaise. Before the office reached Paris in the thirteenth century, it had been spread mostly from Arrouaise. In fact, there was an altar dedicated to Saint Augustine in the abbey church of Arrouaise.[126] But does the fact that it was spread from Arrouaise necessarily indicate that there was direct contact between Rupert and the abbey? In that case, the abbey would have commissioned the office from Rupert. However, this hypothesis entails certain difficulties.

The most important of these is that Rupert's biography reveals several rather heated and unresolved disputes with canons. These disputes mainly took place between 1112 and 1125. This period consequently does not seem the most likely to expect a favourable response from Rupert to any request from the new clerical monks. It is true that he was personally acquainted with several canons while he still lived in Saint Laurence's abbey. These canons would have belonged to the adjoining canonical abbey of Saint Giles, which was also situated on the Mons Publicanus. Saint Giles had originally been a hermitage, but it had been transformed into an abbey of Canons Regular around 1115. Rupert defended certain monastic practices against the canons as early as in 'De divinis officiis'. The fact that these matters drew his attention at all is an indication of the presence of several collegiate churches in Liege, but also of the foundation of new canonical houses outside the town.[127] Moreover, the widely-read 'Altercatio monachi et clerici quod liceat monacho praedicare'[128] is also attributed to Rupert. This work, the text of an acerbic dispute with Saint Norbert about the question as to whether monks were permitted to preach, was written between 1120 and 1122.

In his work 'Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti' (1125) Rupert expressed his annoyance at the fact that canons had started to follow the bad example of their brothers in Northern France by calling their superior 'abbot' and giving him a crozier: '*...qui dicit: Ego sum Augustini, pastorali virga investiri et abbas in ecclesia velit nominari. Nam et in superioribus Franciae locis hoc maxime iam coeptum est fieri, et miramur plerique unde ratio vel auctoritas sumpta sit.*'[129] Gervase was the first to call himself 'abbot' when he became

[126] See footnote 78 above.

[127] C. Dereine, Les chanoines réguliers au diocèse de Liège avant Saint Norbert. Brussels, 1952.

[128] PL 170,537-542. For Rupert's troubled relations with Norbert, see Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti, PL 170,490.

[129] PL 170,526.

provost of Arrouaise on 8 May 1121.[130] He did so in order to emphasise the monastic character of the order.

However, it was not uncommon for houses of Canons Regular – in this case Arrouaise – to commission offices intended for their own liturgy from monks of an older order. The canons belonged to a new order, which as yet lacked the culture and indeed the ability to compile an office itself. At that time, Arrouaise, which was recognised only in 1097 as a foundation by the bishop of Arras, was not much more than a hermitage with a hospice attached to it. In 1106, Bishop John of Therouanne consecrated the stone church. It was not until Gervase that the house became an abbey. In 1138, the abbey of Saint Léger in Soissons was affiliated with Arrouaise, eleven years after a great number of canonical abbeys were affiliated with Arrouaise in the same year of 1127.[131]

Most new orders of Canons Regular in the twelfth century came around to organising their liturgy definitively only several generations later, at the time of the third or fourth successor to the founder. Thus the liturgy of Saint Victor was organised by Guilduin before 1155, even though its antiphonary had been used since 1140. The antiphonary of Prémontré also dated from before the definitive drawing up of the liturgy under Hugh de Fosses (+1164/74). The first general chapter was held in 1137. Gervase settled the abbey's liturgical practice before 1123. He highly valued the sung office and played an important part in its organisation.[132] It is, therefore, not improbable that the demand for an office of Augustine sprung from the drawing up of proposals for the 1121 general chapter for new constitutions and liturgical arrangements by the first leaders of Arrouaise, Conon (+1122) and Gervase. Conon had been made a cardinal during the Council of Troyes in 1107, and shortly afterwards was appointed papal legate to Syria and Jerusalem. He attended the Council of Beauvais in 1114. He travelled widely while amassing a huge treasure of relics for his abbey, and died on 9 August 1122. Perhaps Conon mediated the commission for the office.[133] Since

[130] L. Milis, Gervasio. – Dizionario degli Istituti di Perfezione 4(1977)1113-1114. Gervase resigned the abbacy in 1147, but only died in 1171.

[131] See Milis, Orde van Arrouaise, p. 27, 55 and footnote 51 above.

[132] Gosse, Histoire de l'abbaye, p. 32ff; S. Axters, Geschiedenis van de vroomheid in de Nederlanden. Antwerpen, 1950, I, p. 242-251. 'Vers 1116 on fait un pas décisif vers l'organisation communautaire définitive de la maison; *canonicus* remplace dorénavant dans les chartes '*eremita*', Constitutiones canonicorum regularium ordinis Arroasiensis, ed. L. Milis (CCM 20). Turnhout, 1970, p. VII.

[133] Acta Sanctorum, Jan. II, p. 116; C. Dereine, Conon de Préneste. – DHGE 13(1956)461-471.

Rupert had the reputation of being an admirer of Augustine[134] and a liturgist,[135] it was quite natural that a new order should have requested the services of someone like him.

John of Therouanne

It is probable that there was another mediator apart from Conon. It is indeed true that Rupert's relations with the canons were rather less cordial in his later years than in his youth. This does not, however, preclude the possibility that he was on friendly terms with individual canons even later.[136] Thus Rupert always kept on good terms with John, Bishop of Therouanne (+1130).[137] Rupert met him once, though the exact date is unknown, and wrote about this encounter in 'Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti'.[138] His discussions with Bishop John concerned the question as to whether the canons occupied a higher place in the spiritual order than the monks. The Bishop took it in bad part that Rupert had characterised the movement of the Canons Regular as *inferior, latior, laxior*.[139] This was hardly surprising, since John was the great champion of the cause of the Canons Regular in Flanders. A pupil of Ivo of Chartres, he had left the monastery for the canonical life and became bishop of Therouanne in 1099. He was a keen supporter of the Gregorian Reform.[140] Rupert 'thought highly of Bishop John of Therouanne ("*religioso et venerabili viro*") and noted favourably those canons who chose today to live the common life'.[141] Therouanne, Saint Bertin – which lay in

[134] Rupert called the Church father a 'column' and a 'prop of truth': *Iste est Augustinus, columna et firmamentum veritatis, et vere columna nubis* (De sancta Trinitate et operibus eius (CCM 24), p. 2071. Nevertheless, he assured readers that he was no uncritical admirer: *Proinde non ita simus incauti adulatores beati Augustini*, In evangelium sancti Johannis, ed. R. Haacke (CCM 9). Turnhout, 1969, p. 341, r. 1603.

[135] Smits van Waesberghe, Muziekgeschiedenis, p. 392, 442-446.

[136] 'As a leading member of his community and a likely candidate one day for an abbacy, Rupert doubtless undertook missions from time to time for his abbey', Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 159.

[137] John is also known as John of Waasten or John of Warneton, *Ibidem*, p. 159, 309-310, 318, 323, 331.

[138] '*Ante annos aliquot...*', PL 170,536-537.

[139] Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 310.

[140] L. Milis, L'ordre des chanoines réguliers d'Arrouaise. Bruges 1969; LThK 5(1960)1092; MGH XV, 2, 1140-1145.

[141] Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, p. 318; Super quaedam capitula regulae Benedicti (PL170,536). 'L'influence de Thérouanne sur Arrouaise a été très considérable...à partir du moment où Jean de Warneton, l'archidiacre d'Arras, monta sur le siège épiscopal, Constitutiones, p. XXVIII-XXIX and LXXI-LXXII.

John's diocese –, Arrouaise, and Liege met in the person of John, as indeed they did in the oldest extant manuscript containing the office of Augustine, the breviary of Saint Bertin. It is regrettable that a closer dating of both Rupert's encounter with John and of the manuscript is impossible.[142]

The monks of Saint Bertin had convinced the two abbeys of Saints James and Laurence of Liege to join the Cluniac movement. Liturgical relations must have existed between the three abbeys from that date onwards. The fact that three offices from Liege appear in the breviary of Saint Bertin witnesses to this. Moreover, Saint Bertin and Arrouaise had agreed to form a bond of prayer in this period, although the exact date is unknown.[143] Finally, John and Gervase had always maintained warm relations with Arrouaise.[144] This fact explains why Liege, Saint Bertin and Arrouaise were closely associated. Apart from Gervase of Arrouaise and Conon, Cardinal of Praeneste from 1107 onward, it could thus also have been John of Therouanne, who mediated between Arrouaise and Rupert in the affair of the commission. In view of the still rather vague lines which go from Rupert's juvenile work in Liege to Arrouaise, it is probably prudent to speak of mediation rather than of a commission as such.

Another canon of Arrouaise, Achard, travelled to Jerusalem in the entourage of Conon during his mission to Jerusalem. Achard stayed behind and in 1112 became prior of the chapter founded by Godfrey of Bouillon on the Templum Domini near the former mosque of Omar. When official documents were being drawn up, Achard often acted as a witness for the king or the Latin patriarch. The Order of Templars was founded in 1118 during his priorate. Achard was especially devoted to the cause of restoring the treasures of the temple. With that object in view he composed 'Templum Solomonis', a poem describing the history of the temple. He died around 1137.[145]

It is likely that the office *Laetare mater nostra Jerusalem* was sung for the first time in the mother house of the congregation of Arrouaise.[146] It is also quite probable that the same office, quite

[142] Arras Bibl. Mun. 269, see footnote 54 above.

[143] The weight of this piece of evidence must not be exaggerated. Gosse, Histoire de l'abbaye, p. 66, does not even mention the year in which it took place.

[144] Milis, Orde van Arrouaise, p. 54.

[145] E. Ledos, Achard. – Dictionnaire de biographie française 1(1932)283-285.

[146] Constitutiones, no. 110: 'In festo s. Aug. ad vesp. Antiphona 'Laetare mater' cum caeteris antiphonis et psalmis de feria, responsorium 'Vulneravit', hymnus

soon after its completion, was sung not only in Saint Bertin, but also in the Templum Domini, that is, in Jerusalem itself.[147]

'Magne Pater', commemoratio de sancto Hermete, ad matutinas novem lectiones fiunt de vita ipsius sive libro Confessionum, scil. 'Retinebant me nugae'; see also no. 38 and 121.

[147] The patron of the abbey of Arrouaise was Saint Nicholas (Milis, Orde van Arrouaise, p. 27), and it was not known by the name of 'Temple of Jerusalem', P. Lehmann, Die mittellateinischen Dichtungen der Prioren des Tempels von Jerusalem Acardus und Gaufridus.- MGH Schriften des Reichsinstituts für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde. Festgabe Karl Strecker. Stuttgart, 1941 (1952, second edition).

Appendix I

VITA S. AUGUSTINI
(codice Reg. Lat. 593 Bibliothecae Vaticanae desumpta; adhibita est orthographia codicis)

lectio prima
Beatus itaque augustinus ex provintia affricana civitate thagastensi. de numero curialium honestissimis valde parentibus oriundus fuit. Cuius carnalis pater patricius. mater vero monica noncupata est. Iste puer nutritus sub //fol.94v// diligentia et litteris imbutus. in scolam missus ad plenum eruditus est. Una autem dierum nimio dolore stomachi vexatus: anxie valde laborabat. Hortante beata matre ut baptizaretur renuente gentili patre eius: baptismum dilatum est. Interim vero miserante dei gratia: dolore quiescente sanatus est. Cuius mundatio ad hoc dilata est: quasi necesse esset ut ad hoc sordidaretur si viviveret: quia maius peccatum esset si post baptismum peccaret. Grecas namque litteras quibus docebatur oderat: latinas satis diligebat. Interea pervenit in librum quendam ciceronis cuius linguam pene omnes mirantur: pectus non ita. Sed liber ille ipsius exortationem continet ad philosophiam: et vocatur hortensius. Ille vero liber mutavit affectum eius. et ad ipsum dominum preces eius et vota convertit: ac desiderabilia eius. fecit alia. Viluit ei repente omnis vana spes: et inmortalitatem sapientie concupiscebat estu cordis incredibili. et insurgere ceperat: ut ad dominum rediret.

//fol.95r//
lectio secunda
Omni quippe die dominico audiebat augustinus sanctum ambrosium verbum veritatitis recte populo disserentem. sepiusque in sermonibus suis dicentem. Littera enim occidit: spiritus autem vivificat. Et colloquebatur cum karissimis sibi amicis. alipidio et nebridio. mutuas questiones. Quorum alipidius ex eodem quo ipse erat ortus municipio. parentibus primatibus municipalibus augustino minor natu. Nam et studuerat apud augustinum cum in suo oppido docere cepit. et postea cartagine et diligebat eum multum. Qui etiam aliquando romam ierat. Nebridius etiam relicta patria vicina kartagini atque ipsa kartagine relicto paterno rure optimo: abiit mediolanum querens augustinum. Quo invento: erant pariter hi tres nutantes in consilio quisnam esset tenendus modus vite. Reverberavit enim deus infirmitatem aspectus eius radians in eum vehementer: atque contremuit amore et horrore et invenit se longe esse a deo in regione dissimilitudinis tamquam audiret vocem dei de excelso. Cibus sum grandium cresce et manducabis me. Nec tu me mutabis in te. sicut cibum carnis tuae: sed tu mutaberis in me. Et cognovit quoniam pro iniquitate erudivit hominem et tabescere fecit sicut haraneam animam eius. Et sensit et expertus est non esse mirum quod palato non sano pena est panis: qui sano suavis est. Et oculis egris. odiosa lux: que puris est amabilis. Tunc vero invisibilia dei per quae sunt intellecta conspexit. sed aciem figere non valuit. et repercussa infirmitate redditus

solitis non secum ferebat nisi ama[ntem] memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem que comedere nondum valet.

//fol.95v//
lectio tertia
Et querebat viam roboris comparandi quid esset idoneum ad fruendum deum nec inveniebat donec amplecteretur mediatorem dei et hominum hominem jhesum christum. Non enim tenebat dominum jhesum humilis humilem nec cuius rei magistra esset eius infirmitas noverat. Quid enim sacramenti haberet verbum caro factum est: nec suspicari quidem poterat. Itaque avidissime arripuit venerabilem stilum. spiritus dei et pre ceteris apostolum paulum: et perierunt ille questiones in quibus aliquando visus est adversari sibi et non congruere testimoniis legis et prophetarum textus sermonis eius. Et apparuit ei una facies eloquiorum castorum et exultare cum tremore didicit. Post hec inmisit dominus in mentem eius visumque est ei bonum pergere ad supplicianum servum dei. Audiebat enim quod a iuventute serviret deo. Jam vero tunc senuerat et longa etate in tam bono studio sectande vie dei multa expertus multa edoctus ei videbatur et vere sic erat. Unde ei ut proferret volebat conferenti secum estus suos quis esset aptus //fol.96r// modus sic affecto ut ipse erat ad ambulandum in via dei. Videbat enim plenam ecclesiam. et alius sic ibat: alius autem sic. Ei autem displicebat quod agebat in seculo. et oneri ei erat valde: non iam inflammantibus cupiditatibus ut solebant spe honoris et pecunie ad tolerandam illam servitutem tam gravem. Jam enim illa non delectabant pre dulcedine dei et decore domus eius.

//fol.96v//
lectio quarta
Denuntiavit peractis vindemialibus ut scolasticis suis mediolanenses venditores verborum alium proviserent: et quod deo ipse servire iam decrevisset. Et insinuavit per litteras sancto ambrosio pristinos errores suos et presens votum suum ut ipse moneret quid de libris sanctis legere deberet: quo percipiende tante gratie paratior aptiorque fieret. At ille iussit ysaiam prophetam quod pre ceteris evangelii vocationisque gentium sit prenunciator apertior. Verumtamen ille primam huius lectionem non intelligens totumque talem arbitrans distulit repetendum: excercitatior in dominico eloquio. Inde ubi tempus advenit quo se nomen dare oporteret: relicto rure mediolanum remeavit. Placuit et alipio renasci in christo: pariter cum ipso. Adiunxerat etiam sibi puerum adeo //fol.97r// datum ex augustino carnaliter natum. Annorum enim XVci erat et ingenio preveniebat multos doctos viros: et erat patri horrori illud eius ingenium. Nam est liber eius: qui scribitur de magistro. iste puer ibi cum patre loquitur. cum esset annorum XVci: sed cito de terra abstulit eum deus. Et baptizati sunt a sancto ambrosio: et fugit ab eis sollicitudo vite preterite. Nec satiabatur augustinus illis diebus dulcedine mirabili considerare altitudinem consilii divini: super salutem generis humani.

lectio quinta
Factusque presbyter monasterium intra ecclesiam mox instituit. et cum dei servis vivere cepit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam maxime ut nemo quicquam proprium in illa sotietate haberet sed essent eis omnia communia. et distribueretur unicuique sicut opus erat. quod iam ipse prior fecerat cum de transmarinis ad sua remeasset. //fol.97v// Ante proximum vero diem obitus sui a se dictatos et editos recensuit libros sive eos quos primo tempore sue conversionis adhuc laicus sive quos presbyter sive quos episcopus dictaverat et quecumque in his recognovit aliter quam se haberet ecclesiastica regula a se fuisse dictata et scripta cum adhuc ecclesiasticum usum minus sciret minusque sapuisset a semetipso et reprehensa et correcta sunt. Unde etiam duo scripsit volumina quorum titulus est de recensione librorum.

lectio sexta
Preceptos etiam sibi quosdam libros ante diligentiorem emendationem et nonnullis fratribus conquerebatur licet eos post modum emendasset. Inperfecta etiam quedam librorum suorum preventus morte dereliquid. Quique prodesse omnibus volens et valentibus multa legere et non valentibus ex utroque divino testamento veteri et novo premissa prefatione precepta divina ad vite regulam pertinentia excerpsit atque ex his unum //fol.98r// codicem fecit ut qui vellet legeret atque ex eo vel quam obediens deo inobediensque esset agnosceret: et hoc opus voluit speculum apellare.

//fol.98v//
lectio septima
Ergo die nono egritudinis sue. L. et VIto anno etatis sue: XXXmo et tercio etatis augustini. anima illa religiosa et pia carne soluta est. Sane ille sanctus in vita sua prolixa pro utilitate ac felicitate sancte ecclesie divinitus condinata nam vixit annis septuaginta sex: in clericatu autem vel episcopatu annis ferme XLta. dicere nobis inter familiaria colloquia consuaverat post perceptum baptismum etiam laudatos christianos et sacerdotes. absque digna et competenti penitentia exire de corpore non debere quod et ipse fecit ultima qua defunctus est egritudine. Nam sibi iusserit psalmos daviticos qui sunt paucissimi de penitentia scribi ipsosque quaterniones iacens in lecto contra parietem positos diebus sue infirmitatis intuebatur et legebat. et ubertim ac iugiter flebat.

//fol.99r//
lectio octava
Novi quoque etiam eumdem presbyterum et episcopum pro quibusdam energuminis patientibus ut oraret rogatum eumque in oratione lacrimas fundentem Deum rogasse: et demones ab hominibus recessise. Itemque ad egrotantem lecto vacantem quondam cum suo egroto venisse et rogavisse ut eidem manus inponeret quo sanus esse posset: respondisse si aliquid posset sibi

hoc utique primitus prestitisset: et illum dixisse visitatum se fuisse sibique per somnum dictum esse. Vade ad augustinum episcopum ut eidem manum imponat: et salvus erit. Quod dum cumperisset facere non distulit: et illum infirmum. continuo dominus sanum ab eodem discedere fecit.

//fol.99v//
lectio nona
Et ne intentio eius a quoquam impediretur ante dies ferme decem quam exiret de corpore: a nobis postulavit presentibus ne quis ad eum ingrederetur nisi his tantum horis quibus medici ad inspiciendum intrabant vel cum ei refectio inferretur et ita observatum et factum est: et omni illo tempore orationi vacabat. Verbum dei usque ad ipsam suam extremam egritudinem inpretermisse alacriter et fortiter sana mente sanoque consilio in ecclesia predicabat. membris omnibus sui corporis incolumis et integro aspectu atque auditu et ut scriptum est. nobis astantibus et videntibus et orantibus dormivit cum patribus suis et nutritus in bona senectute et nobis coram positis pro eius commendanda corporis depositione sacrificium eo oblatum est et sepultus est. Testamentum fecit nullum quia unde faceret pauper dei non habuit. Ecclesie bibliotecam omnesque codices diligenter posteris custodiendos semper iubebat. Si quid vero ecclesia vel in sumptibus vel in ornamentis habuit fidei presbyteri qui sub eodem domus ecclesie curam gerebat dimisit. Nec suos consanguineos vel in proposito vel extra constitutos: in sua vita et morte vulgi more tractavit: quibus dum adhuc superesset. id si opus fuit quod et ceteris erogavit: non ut divicias haberent sed ut aut non: aut minus egerent. Erat enim non solum eruditus scriba in regno celorum de tesauro suo proferens nova et vetera. et unus negotiatorum qui inventa preciosa margarita que habebat venditis comparavit verum etiam ex his ad quos scriptum est: sic loquimini et sic facite et de quibus salvator dicit. qui fecerit et docuerit: hic magnus vocabitur in regno celorum.

Appendix II

VITA S. AUGUSTINI auctore RUPERTO TUITIENSI
(codice 9368 fol.74v-82v Bibl.Reg.Bruxellensis desumpta; adhibita est orthographia linguae classicae ac interpunctio moderna; textus divisio est nostra)

VITA SANCTI AUGUSTINI YPPONENSIS EPISCOPI, QUAM COMPOSUIT MAGISTER ROBERTUS ABBAS TUICENSIS ET MONACHUS HUIUS LOCI

1. Quid gratiae, quid honoris beato Augustino debeat Ecclesia Christi, omnis qui recte sapit intelligit. Ipse est enim columna nubis in qua thronum suum posuit sapientia Dei, de cuius ore tamquam de nube plena aquis, Christus vineam suam, id est sanctam Ecclesiam caelestis doctrinae pluviis irrigare non desinit. Noverunt hoc palmites boni in quibus fidei pulchritudo numquam deflorescit, quam pleniter ejus aquis irrigati sint, quantoque studio vulpes parvulas quae demoliebantur vineas iste persecutus sit et ceperit. Merito ergo illum in domo caelestis agricolae dignum honore dixerim, cuius fides atque studium ecclesiasticae agriculturae profuit semper et proderit. Honoranda est itaque in illo gratia Dei, cuius magnitudinem nulla potest lingua verbis prosequi: et in laude Ipsius referendum, quomodo vel quibus de tenebris in admirabile lumen suum illum vocaverit, qualiter illum episcopum atque doctorem ecclesiarum fecerit, tandemque a praesenti convalle lacrimarum evocatum tamquam bonum et fidelem servum in gaudium Suum introduxerit.

2. Hic itaque beatus Augustinus natione Affricanus oppido Tagastensi christianis parentibus ortus, claro genere quo erat editus factus est clarior, arborque bona radice sua in suis fructibus dulcior.

3. Verum adhuc adolescens cum necdum veterem hominem deposu- //*fol.74r*// isset, neque novum per baptismum in Christo induisset, incurrit Manichaeorum sectam perfidam atque sordissimam. Sicut ipse in scriptis suis Domino confitens ait: [1] "cum te, Domine, Deus, non secundum intellectum mentis quo me praestare voluisti belluis, sed secundum sensum carnis quaererem: offendi illam mulierem audacem, inopem prudentiae, juxta aenigma Salomonis, sedentem super sellam in foribus, et dicentem: panes occultos libenter edite et aquam furtivam dulcem bibite. Quae me seduxit, quia invenit foris, habitantem in oculis carnis meae: et talia ruminantem apud me, qualia per illam vorassem".

4. Flebat autem pro illo mater fidelis et pia, amplius quam flent matres corporae funera. Cumque conturbata pro illo lugeret, et sempiternam ejus salutem in gemitibus parturiret: consolatus est eam Pater misericordiarum Deus, veram per soporem dignatus illi ostendere visionem, quam ipse refert hoc modo: [2] "Vidit se stantem in quadam regula lignea et advenientem ad se

[1] Conf. Lib.III.11.
[2] Conf. Lib.III.19.

juvenem splendidum, hilarem atque arridentem sibi, cum esset illa tristis et moerore confecta. Qui cum causas ab ea quaesisset moestitiae suae, atque illa respondisset, perditionem meam se plangere", jussit ille quo secura esset, atque admonuit, ut attenderet et videret: ibi filium esse ubi et ipsa esset. "Quod illa ubi attendit vidit me juxta se in eadem regula stantem".

5. Hoc visum [3] "cum mihi narrasset, et ego ad id trahere conarer, ut illa se potius non desperaret futuram esse quod eram ego: continuo sine aliqua haesitatione: non, inquit, non enim mihi dictum est: ibi tu, ille ubi; sed ubi tu, ille ibi." "Novem ferme anni secuti sunt, quibus in illo limo profundi versatus sum in tenebris falsitatis, cum saepe surgere conarer et gravius allideror".

6. [4] "Docebam autem in illis annis artem rhetoricam", "non quo discipuli mei contra caput agerent innocentis, sed aliquando pro capite nocentis".

7. Quanti autem quamquam ardentis fuerit ingenii in omnibus artium liberalium disciplinis, ipse non ut arrogans, sed ut integratum sese divinis beneficiis accusans declarat his verbis: [5] "cum non dares", inquit, Domine Deus, "auditui meo gaudium et laetitiam nec exultarent ossa quae humiliata non erant", "quid mihi proderant, quod annos ferme natus XX., cum in manus meas venissent Aristotelicae quaedam quas appellant decem Categorias, quarum nomina cum eas rhetor Carthaginensis magister meus buccis typo crepantibus conmemoraret, et alii qui docti habebantur, tamquam in nescio quid magnum et divinum inhiabam, legi eas solus et intellexi".

8. Et post pauca: [6] Quoscumque libros legere potui "de arte loquendi aut //*fol. 74v*// disserendi, quidquid de dimensionibus figurarum, de musicis, de numeris, sine magna difficultate nullo hominum tradente intellexi". Haec ideo commemorat ut se accuset, quod cum ingenio agili sine ullo adminiculo humani magisterii tot nodosissimos libros enodaret, ipse in doctrina pietatis deformiter erraret.

9. Deus autem in cuius manu sunt filii excussorum sicut sagittae in manu potentis, ipse hunc quem posturus erat sibi quasi sagittam electam, disponebat, confrari, formari, atque eliminari mundanae sapientiae fabricis: ut postea esset tanto acutior quanto doctior, ad confodiendam linguam philosophicae loquacitatis. Cum autem contemplacuit ei qui illum praescivit et praedestinavit, ut vocaret atque justificaret eum per gratiam baptismi, tunc misericordia ejus quae hactenus a longe cicumvolabat eum appropinquavit, ut aversum converteret et sub umbra alarum suarum erroneum corrigeret.

10. Egit ergo ut Romam pergeret suadentibus amicis et ibi potius doceret quod docebat Carthagini. De qua profectione sua loquitur ipse cum Deo inter caetera: [7] "Quare abirem, et illuc irem, tu sciebas Deus; nec indicabas

[3] Conf. Lib.III.20.
[4] Conf. Lib.IV.2.
[5] Conf. Lib.IV.27-28.
[6] Conf. Lib.IV.30.
[7] Conf. Lib.V.15.

mihi nec matri, quae me profectum atrociter planxit, et usque ad mare secuta est. Sed fefelli eam violenter me tenentem, ut aut revocaret, aut mecum pergeret; et finxi me amicum nolle deserere, donec vento facto navigaret. Et mentitus sum matri et illi matri et evasi: quia et hoc dimisisti mihi misericorditer, servans me ab aquia maris plenum exsecrandis sordibus, usque ad aquam gratiae tuae, qua me abluto siccarentur flumina maternorum oculorum, quibus pro me quotidie rigabat terram sub vulto suo. Et tamen recusanti sine me redire, vix persuasi ut in loco, qui proximus erat nostrae navi memoriae beati Cypriani maneret ea nocte. Sed ea nocte clanculo ego profectus sum: illa autem mansit, orando et flendo. Et quid petebat, Deus meus, tantis lacrimis, nisi ut navigare me non sineres? Sed tu alte consulens, et exaudiens cardinem desiderii ejus, non curasti quod tunc petebat, ut me faceres quod semper petebat. Flavit ventus et implevit vela nostra, et littus subtraxit aspectibus nostris, in quo mane illa insaniebat dolore, et querelis et gemitu implebat aures tuas contemnentes ista; cum et me cupiditatibus meis raperes ad finiendas ipsas cupiditates, et illius carnale desiderium justo dolorum flagello va-//*fol.75r*// pularet. Amabat enim secum praesentiam meam more matrum, sed multis multo amplius: et nesciebat, quid tu illi gaudiorum facturus esses de absentia mea."

11. [8] Et paulo post: Veniens, inquit, Romam, "ecce excipior flagello aegritudinis corporalis, et ibam jam ad inferos, portans omnia mala quae commiseram, et in te, et in me." Quo vulnere si feriretur cor matris, numquam sanaretur. Et hoc illa nesciebat, et tamen pro me absens orabat. "Recreasti ergo me ab illa aegritudine, et salvum fecisti filium ancillae tuae; tunc interim corpore, ut esset cui meliorem atque certiorem salutem dares animae".

12. [9] Profectus ergo Romam jungebatur falsis illis atque fallentibus Manichaeis. Postquam autem missus est a Mediolano Romam ad praefectum urbis, ut illi civitati rethoricae magister provideretur, ambivit ipse Augustinus, ut dictione proposita probatum se praefectus tunc Symmachus mitteret. Et venit ad Mediolanum ad Ambrosium episcopum, Dei cultorem, in optimis virtutibus orbi terrae notum, cuius tunc eloquia strenue ministrabant adipem frumenti dominici, et laetitiam olei, et sobriam abrietatem populo Dei.

13. [10] Jam venerat ad eum mater pietate fortis, terra marique illum secuta et de periculis omnibus de Deo secura. Diligebat autem illum virum sanctum Ambrosium sicut angelum Dei; per quem sperabat filium ad fidem perduci catholicam, atque ad fontem aquae salientis in vitam aeternam.

14. [11] Erant tunc cum eo familiarissimi Alipius et Nebridius; quorum Alipius ex eodem quo ipse municipio erat ortus parentibus primatibus, eo minor natu. Gurges autem morum Carthaginensium, quibus theatrica fervent

[8] Conf. Lib. V.16-18.
[9] Conf. Lib. V.23.
[10] cfr. Conf. Lib. VI.11.
[11] Conf. Lib. VI.11.

spectacula, absorbuerat eum insania Circensium. De quo ipse Augustinus: [12] Tu, inquit, Domine, "qui praesides omnibus quae creasti, non eum eras oblitus futurum inter filios tuos antistitem sacramenti tui. Et ut tibi aperte tribueretur ejus correctio, per me quidem illam, sed nesciente me operatus es. Nam quodam die cum sederem loco solito et coram me adessent discipuli, venit, salutavit, sedit atque in ea quae agebatur animum intendit. Et forte lectio in manibus erat, quam dum exponerem, opportune mihi adhibenda videretur similitudo Circensium, quo illud quod insinuabam, et jucundius et planius fieret, cum irrisione mordaci eorum quos illa captivasset insania. Scis tu, Deus noster, quod tunc de Alipio ab illa peste sanando non cogitaverim. At ille in se rapuit, meque illud non nisi prop- //*fol.75v*// ter se dixisse credidit. Et quod alius acciperet ad mihi succensendum, accepit honestus adolescens ad sibi succensendum et ad me ardentius diligendum". "Etenim post illa verba proripuit se ex illa fovea tam alta, qua libenter demergebatur, et cum mira voluptate caecabatur; et excussit animum forti temperantia et resiluerunt ab eo omnes sordes Circensium et amplius illuc non accessit".

15. Refert autem de hoc eodem, quod praesenti operi non incongrue videtur inserendum, quia commodum, est exemplum ad rem dubiam diligenter investigandam, et neminem temere condemnandum. Nec longa erit digressio audire de Alipio loquentem Augustinum; quod ab ipso sit descriptum; praesertim cum ambo pariter de Aegypto ascenderunt, ambo pariter mare rubrum baptismi transierunt. Cum inquit [13] "Adhuc studeret, jam me audiens apud Carhaginem et meridie cogitaret in foro quod recitaturus erat, sicut exerceri scholastici solent, sivisti eum comprehendi ab aeditimis fori tamquam furem. Non arbitror aliam ob causam te permisisse, Deus noster, nisi ut ille vir tantus futurus jam inciperet discere, quam non facile in cognoscendis causis homo ab homine damnandus esset temeraria credulitate. Quippe ante tribunal deambulabat solus cum tabulis ac stylo, cum ecce adolescens quidam ex numero scholasticorum fur verus securim clanculo apportans, illo non sentiente ingressus est ad cancellos plumbeos, qui vico argentario desuper praeminent et praecidere plumbum coepit. Sono autem securis audito, submurmuraverunt argentarii qui subter erant, et miserunt, qui apprehenderent quem forte invenissent. Quorum vocibus auditis, relicto instrumento ille discessit, timens ne cum eo teneretur. Alipius autem qui eum non viderat intrantem, exeuntem sensit, et celeriter vidit abeuntem. Et causam scire cupiens ingressus est locum, et inventam securim stans atque, admirans considerabat. Cum ecce illi qui missi erant, reperiunt eum solum ferentem ferrum cuius sonitu exciti venerant: tenent, attrahunt: congregatis inquilinis fori, tamquam furem manifestum se comprehendisse gloriantur et inde judiciis offerendum ducebatur".

16. [14] "Sed hactenus docendus fuit. Statim enim, Domine, subvenisti innocentiae cuius testis eras solus. Cum enim duceretur vel ad custodiam vel

[12] Conf. Lib. VI.12..
[13] Conf. Lib. VI.14.
[14] Conf. Lib. VI.15.

ad supplicium, fit eis obviam quidam architectus, cuius maxima cura erat publicarum fabricarum. Gau- //*fol.76r*// dent illi eum potissimum occurrisse, cui solebant ipsi venire in suspicionem ablatarum rerum quae perissent de foro, ut quasi tandem jam ille cognosceret a quibus haec fierent. Verum autem viderat homo saepe Alipium in domo cuiusdam senatoris, ad quem salutandum ventitabat. Statimque cognitum manu apprehensa semovit a turbis, et tanti mali causam quaerens, quid gestum esset audivit. Omnesque tumultuantes qui aderant et minaciter frementes jussit venire secum. Et venerunt ad domum illius adolescentis qui rem commiserat. Puer vero erat ante ostium; et tam parvus erat, ut nihil exinde domino suo metuens, facile posset totum indicare. Cum eo quippe in foro fuit pedissequus. Quem postea recoluit Alipius, architecto intimavit. At ille securim demonstravit puero, quaerens ab eo cuius esset. Qui confestim: nostra, inquit. Deinde interrogatus, aperuit caetera. Sic in illam domum translata causa, confusisque turbis quae de illo triumphare jam coeperant, futurus dispensator verbi tui, et multarum in Ecclesia tua causarum examinator, experientior instructiorque discessit".

17. Hunc ergo, inquit [15] "Romae inveneram, et adhaesit mihi fortissimo" desiderio, "mecumque nutabat concilio, quisnam esset tenendus vitae modus".

18. [16] "Nebridius etiam qui relicta patria vicina Carthagini, atque ipsa Carthagine, ubi frequentissimus erat, relicto rure paterno optimo, relicta domo, et non secutura matre, nullam ob aliam causam Mediolanum venerat, nisi ut mecum viveret, in flagrantissimo studio veritatis atque sapientiae". "Et erat ora trium egentium, et inopiam suam sibimet invicam anhelantium, et a te expectantium, ut dares eis escam in tempore opportuno".

19. Iam quia longum est prosequi, quanta contulerint, quanta quisierint, quam difficile tandem illos a se Pharao dimiserit, jam veniendum est ad mare baptismi, per quod transierunt onusti atque suffarcinati opibus Aegypti, videlicet pleni omni scientia saeculari. Augustinus, ut dictum est, paterne susceptus a sancto episcopo Ambrosio, et per eum sana Christi doctrina correctus, valdeque dulci eloquentia viri delectatus, et maxime provocatus exemplo Victorini quondam urbis Romae rethoris, cuius laudabilem conversionem a sancto viro Simpliciano didicerat et christianum defunctum audierat, rupit omnes moras et excussit se currens et sitiens ad Deum fontem vivum, sicut deciderat cervus ad fontes aquarum.

20. Arreptus est tunc acri dolore dentium, sicut ipse ait loquens ad Deum: [17] "Nec oblitus sum", inquit, "nec silebo flagelli tui asperitatem, et misericordiae tuae celeritatem mirabilem. Dolore dentium tunc cru- //*fol.76v*// ciabas me. Et cum in tantum ingravesceret ut non valerem loqui, ascendit in cor meum admonere omnes meos qui aderant, ut deprecarentur te pro me, Deum salutis omnimodae. Et scripsi hoc in cera et dedi eis, ut legeretur. Mox,

[15] Conf. Lib. VI.16.
[16] Conf. Lib. VI.17.
[17] Conf. Lib. IX.12.

ut genus supplici affectu fiximus, fugit dolor ille. Sed quis dolor?aut quomodo fugit? Expavi, fateor, Domine meus, Deus meus, nihil enim tale ab ineunte aetate expertus fueram".

21. [18] Denuntiavit post haec, ut scholastici[s] suis Mediolanenses venditorem verborum alium providerent, eo quod Deo servire ipse delegisset. Et insinuavit per litteras antistiti Christi, viro sancto Ambrosio pristinos errores suos et praesens votum suum.

22. [19] Inde ubi tempus advenit quo eum nomen suum dare oportuit Mediolanum accessit. Dato ergo nomine suo suscepit nomen Domini novus homo: sacrosque ingressus est fontes, in quibus verus Aegyptus diabolus submersus est: verusque Israel transivit et salvatus est. O quantum erat in caelo gaudium angelis Dei in inventione dragmae tam pretiosae tamquam fulgentis, cum renovaretur juventus aquilae, quae acutis oculis et illustratis Christi lumine usque ad nubes evolaret; atque tenebrosas aquas in nubibus aeris libero arbitrio intuitu perspiceret. Quantum gaudebat mater Ecclesia in generationem talis filii, tamque eo tempore necessarii, cum a rabidis canibus vestimenta ejus scinderentur, atque a malignis piscibus, id est perfidis haereticis retis ejus rumperentur. Renatus est cum eo Alipius jam indutus humilitate congrus Christi sacramentis, adeo ut Italicum solum glaciale nudo pede tereret fortissimus domitor corporis. Adjunxerunt etiam sibi puerum a Deo datum ex ipso, id est Augustino carnaliter natum, cuius mater et ipsa totam se Deo voverat. Annorum ferme erat XV. puer a Deo datus et ingenio praeveniebat multos graves et doctos viros. Unde et Augustinus breviter commendans illum: "horrori", inquit, "mihi erat illud ingenium". "Est liber qui inscribitur: de Magistro: ipse ibi loquitur mecum". "Cum esset annorum XVI. multa in eo mirabiliora expertus sum. Cito, Domine Deus, de terra abstulisti eum et nunc securior recordor illum". Cum his gaudebat Augustinus assumptos in adoptionem filiorum Dei, adscriptus inter filios Sponsi, filios crucis Christi.

23. Mater autem ejus vidua casta, pia, atque sobria, quales Deus amat, quae filium per multos gemitus atque juges lacrimas iterum parturierat, cum quidem pareret tristitiam habuerat; nunc autem jam non numerat pressurae propter gaudium quia natus erat homo in Deum. De cuius vita et mo-
//*fol.77r*// ribus tractare non est operis huius. Maxime cum omnia illa ex verbis piissimi filii ejus noscantur. Hoc tantum dixisse sufficiat, quia completo hoc desiderio suo, pro quo solo vivere volebat, quod solum videre desiderabat, scilicet quod ad sacramentum Christi Augustinus filius suus transierat, et pro errore assumpserat veritatem, Quinquagesimo et sexto anno aetatis suae, tricesimo et tertio aetatis filii, anima illa religiosa et pia corpore soluta est.

24. Gratulatur autem testimonio ejus filius pius, dicens: [20] "Quod in ea ipsa ultima aegritudine, obsequiis meis interblandiens, appellabat me pium et commemorabat grandi dilectionis affectu, numquam se audisse ex ore meo jaculatum in se durum aut contumeliosum sermonem".

[18] cfr. Conf. Lib. IX.13.
[19] cfr. Conf. Lib. IX.14.
[20] Conf. Lib. IX.30.

25. Item post aliqua, dum ejus merita commemorat, sic Domino Deo memorabili pietate supplicat: [21] "Ego", inquit, "laus mea et vita mea, Deus cordis mei, sepositis paulisper bonis ejus actibus, pro quibus tibi gaudens gratias ago, nunc pro peccatis matris meae deprecor te: exaudi me per Medicinam vulnerum nostrorum, quae pependit in ligno, et sedens ad dexteram tuam te interpellat pro nobis".

26. Item post pauca: [22] "Inspira, Domine Deus meus, servis tuis, fratribus meis, filiis tuis, dominis meis, quibus et voce et corde et litteris servio: ut quotquot haec legerint, meminerint ad altare tuum Monicae famulae tuae, cum Patricio quondam ejus conjuge, per quorum carnem introduxisti me in hanc vitam; quemadmodum nescio".

27. Ipse autem cognoscens Deum, immo cognitus ab eo, decrevit post sanctum baptismum nullum ulterius cum fallaci saeculo habere negotium, sed esse sine sollicitudine, sine uxore, sine filiis, absque domibus, absque agrorum possessione. Quis enim antea bonas margaritas quaerens malas invenerat atque haereticas, nunc inventa una pretiosa margarita, unius scilicet Dei vera sapientia, tanto eam ardentius amabat quanto pulchriorem invenerat. Et quanto desiderio dixerit sapientiae: soror mea es, et prudentiam vocaverit amicam suam: haec orationis ejus verba declarant: [23] "Obsecro, Pater, per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum filium tuum, virum dexterae tuae, filium hominis, quem confirmasti tibi Mediatorem tuum et nostrum, per quem nos quaesisti non quaerentes te, quaesisti autem ut quaeremus te", "per Eum te obsecro, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et interpellat pro nobis, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi: "placeat in conspectu misericordiae tuae invenire me gratiam in conspectu tuo: ut aperiantur pulsanti mihi interiora sermonum tuorum". Hoc exemplo Salomonis postulavit; verum non exemplo illius in nocte, sed in die accepit: quia ipse //*fol.77v*// usque in finem cum sapientiae lumine perseveravit.

28. Jam omiserat negotium litterarum propter quod mare transierat; fuitque consilii redire in Africam post tres annos, ex quo Italiam advenerat. Rediit ergo de transmarinis partibus tamquam negotiator dives et inclitus deferens secum quod non portaverat aurem fidei pretiosum, et quod in lucrum expenderet commissum sibi a Domino caelestis sapientiae talentum. Factumque est gaudium super hoc Africanis ecclesiis, sicut quondam discipulis Christi super inopinata mutatione Sauli. Et sicut tunc Judaei, sic et nunc confundebantur homines impii et derelicti a salute Manichaei.

29. [24] Erat tunc in ecclesia Ypponensi pontifex Valerius, vir per omnia sanctus ac Deo dignus; sed linguae officio parum praesidii ferebat populo Dei contra ipsos vel alios oblatratores veritatis. Homo enim natura graecus in aliena lingua eloquentiae palmam contra loquaces obtinere non poterat. Ideoque summopere desiderabatur presbyter, qui scientia doctus,

[21] Conf. Lib. IX.35.
[22] Conf. Lib. IX.37.
[23] Conf. Lib. XI.4.
[24] cfr. POSS. Vita.7.

eloquio fluens, quod in hac parte deerat, ecclesiae illius vice suppleret. Dum ergo die quadam praedictus episcopus de tali viro perquirendo populum exhortaretur, ecce tamquam a Deo missus adstabat in medio eorum Augustinus. Cuius universi scientiam, facundiam, sanctumque scientes officio convenire propositum, tenentes eum licet invitum renitentem, seque cum lacrimis indignum profitentem, sancto pontifici ordinandum obtulerunt. Erat enim humilis et parvus in oculis suis, quales excelsus Dominus respicit, et recumbebat in novissimo loco, vocatus ad nuptias, ideoque nunc dicebatur ei a Domino: amice ascende superius. Itaque coactus humili cervice suscepit jugum Domini, et ejus oneris fortiter subiit laborem, cuius humiliter timuit dignitatem.

30. [25] Et quia jam erat rebus nudatus et pauper spiritu, quales in evangelio suo beatificat Dominus, continuo construxit monasterium ad habitandum sibi cum pusillo grege fratrum, qui ejus exemplo provocati simile supplere propositum, ut secundum, apostolicam normam communiter viventes, nihil haberent proprium. Quibus etiam scripsit regulam, sermone brevem, praeceptis gravem qui velut per angustam incedentes viam, quanto devotius tanto facilius, pergerent ad vitam. Interea parens jussionibus episcopi sui serviebat humiliter tam voce quam litteris populo Dei, et frangebat parvulis Christi panem Verbi Dei, et potans eos puro fonte scripturarum, docebat ut caverent se nosas et putentes aquas haereticorum.

31. [26] Reprehendebatur autem in hoc venerabilis episcopus a nonnullis comprovincialium episcoporum, eo quod hacte- //*fol.78r*// nus non fuisset consuetudinis in Africanis ecclesiis presbyteros coram episcopis verbum facere ad populum. At ille gloriam quaerens Christi non sua, fatebatur humiliter impossibilitatis suae causam, et facti sui prudenter reddebat rationem. Alebat se commissarum animarum communi utilitati prospicere, et quod non posset per seipsum, id necessario perficere velle per alium. Praeterea consuetudinem hanc esse in orientalibus ecclesiis, ut coram episcopis populum doceant presbyteri, quibus ab ipsis episcopis ea potestas data fuerit. Itaque jure fieri, quod ex aequo et bono valeret apud se, alias autem etiam consuetudine. Ita ratione reddita laborabat Augustinus ut ceperat in ministerio verbi, et erat sermo oris ejus quasi impetus fluminis, qui laetificat civitatem Dei. Nonnulli autem episcoporum utile secuti exemplum, fecerunt sibi episcopi etiam adjutores in hac parte presbyteros quos elegerunt.

32. [27] Erat in his diebus quidam Manicaeorum presbyter Fortunatus, similis illi Phylisteo, qui blasphemavit Deum Israel, quia magnitudine linguae confisus, quasi fortibus armis, et grandi mole corporis, humiles servos Christi provocabat saepius ad conflictum sermonis. Adeunt ergo Augustinum Ipponenses omnes cives, atque peregrini catholici, Donatistis quoque pariter adjunctis, certamen iniret, si forte manufortis Christus per os ejus adesset, et alienigena percusso auferret opprobrium ab Israel. Manichaei

[25] cfr. POSS. Vita.8.
[26] cfr. POSS. Vita.9.
[27] cfr. POSS. Vita.10-12.

enim et Donatistae necnon et reliquae haereses, ut vere geminina viperarum invicem persequuntur, invicem mordent, atque dissidentiunt, tantummodo contra catholicam Ecclesiam una acie, uno eodemque animo dimicant. At ille non in se sed in illo confidens qui dixit: non vos estis qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri qui loquitur in vobis, in verbo ipsius, si vellet Manichaeus, ille sese in congressum ire promisit. Timebat haereticus ille contra talem, quem optime noverat, subire certamen, sed provocatus a catholicis, stimulatus a suis, pudorem suum non ferret si solo metu refugisset. Procedunt in medio. Ambo docti, ambo famosi: hic assertione veritatis, ille falsitatis. Ingens utrimque spectaculum: Ille qui posuerat in caelum os suum, loquebatur iniquitatem in excelsum, et quasi Goliath non parcens rotabat blasphemias in Deum Israel. Contra hic, habens in pera profundes memoriae limpidissimos lapides sumptos de torrente scripturarum, percussit atque confregit erectam superbiae frontem, dejectumque in terram suis armis expolians, ut ait quidam tam doctus quam fidelis: pollutam rigide transfixit cuspide linguam. //*fol.78v*// Igitur obmutuit ille, et iniquitas oppilavit os suum, et oppipare [sic!] non audens aiebat se collaturum cum doctoribus ea in quibus defecisset ipse superatus, et siquidem suae sectae nullae rationes subvenire potuissent, tunc demum transiturum se ad eam qua victus erat fidem. Et haec quidem dum adhuc teneretur dixit, sed postquam avolavit tamquam bubo, aut noctua refuga lucis, nusquam in ille regione amplius comparuit. Disputatum est autem per totum biduum, totumque praelium atque intra currentes ictus verborum praesentibus notariis litteris excepti sunt. Eat inde libellus: contra Fortunatum, in quo de Manichaeis commune Christi fides agit tropheum, quando videlicet omnes fugerunt videntes quod cecidisset fortissimus eorum.

33. [28] Augustinus igitur potens in doctrina sana, confluentibus alacriter catholicis, docebat eos cum auctoritate publice et privatim, et ventilabat cornibus ferreis omnes Africanarum haeresium lupos, maxime Donatistas et Manichaeos.

34. [29] Revoluens etiam gentilium ac philosophorum libros, oculis eorum ingerebat deorum quos colebant ignominia, et ita suis ab eo telis confodiebantur, qui crucem Christi aspernabantur tamquam stultitiam. Taliter homo illuminatus a Deo refulgebat cunctis instar lampadis lucens, propriis ne offenderent, impiis ne laterent. Innotuitque nomen ejus ecclesiis Christi transmare et in oriente positis, et sicut uno in corpore uni membro congaudent caetera, sic congaudebant illi ecclesiae, cui talem Christi lucernam paraverat.

35. [30] Interea dum vice sui pontificis adesset omnibus virga fortis et gloriosus, baculus, timere coepit sanctus episcopus idem Valerius, ne sibi auferretur, quia jam ad episcopatum alterius ecclesiae fuerat expetitus. Suam enim, id est Ipponensem, ecclesiam, sicut hac luce praesente illuminatam, sic

[28] cfr. POSS. Vita.13.
[29] cfr. POSS. Vita.14.
[30] cfr. POSS. Vita.15.

remota providebat obscurandam. Hoc itaque timens, antistiti Carthaginensi primati episcoporum secretis intimat litteris cum supplici obsecratione navim sanctae ecclesiae, quam ipse regendam suscepisset, ab alio rectore deinceps regi oportere. Causamque reddens aiebat aevo gravem se esse, corpore infirmum, scientia quoque parum idoneum. Et cum talis vel sereno maris navigationem timeat aggredi, tum maxime periculosum esse, cum ventus esset contrarius, cum fluctus feri maris dispumarent suas confusiones, ac sidera errantia, videlicet haeretici, multas vias ostenderent erroris. Prospiceret ergo periclitantis ecclesiae saluti, quam suo sanguine Christus acquisivit, et Augustinum tamquam maris peritissimum pro se vel secum residere consentiret //*fol.79r*// ad gubernaculi clavum. Huiusmodi rationes per litteras missis et remissis frequenter, tandem ut petebat ejus consensum voti compos obtinuit.

36. [31] Deinde caeteros coepiscopos Ipponem adesse petit, de praecipuis asserens agendum esse negotiis. Megalium quoque primatem episcoporum a Nimidie rogat suppliciter visitatum se advenire. Convenientibus ergo quamplurimis episcopis, congregatis clericis, insperatam coram omnibus causam quae supra dicta est suppliciter exponit. Rogat deinde ipsorum sanctum conventum propter Dominum, quem esse crederet in medio ipsorum, quippe qui in nomine ejus congregati essent: ut desiderium suum Domini Dei utile perficerent. Laudatur ab omni conventu homo Dei, eo quod germane diligat gregem Christi. Dilectionem illam inde comprobari, quod numquam omnibus cum austeritate imperaverit; et nunc, ut non cupidus honoris, pastorem illis utilem acquisierit. Pastores esse multos, qui pascerent semetipsos, lac comederent et lanis operirentur, gregem autem et ipse segnes non pascerent, et aliis pascendi locum non darent. Accitur deinde Augustinus et jubetur ut episcopatum quem gerebat actibus, loco quoque et nomine suscipiat. Ille diu contradicere et viventis episcopi sedem se numquam occupaturum affirmare. Contra pluribus praelatis in medium transmarinis exemplis acclamantibus clericis, jubentibus et admirantibus episcopis, cavens ne nimia humilitas in pertinacia declinaret consilio acquievit ut obediret. Ordinatus ergo pro episcoporum atque cleri arbitrio, accepit benedictionem a Domino.

37. [32] Ejus rei felicitatem omnem arbitror laudatorum eloquentiam ante ire. Nam coepit non solum suae sed etiam aliis ecclesiis, quocumque vocabatur, adesse doctor facundus, et fidei defensor acerrimus. Et sicut coaxantes ranae, tonante caelo, attonitae conquiescunt, sic Donatistae vel omnes haeretici ad vocem sermonum ejus vel tractatuum attoniti, cum indignarentur muttire non audebant. Tractatus autem ejus praesentibus notariis exceptos, magistris suis legendos offerebant. Illi ut vere lupi in vestimentis ovium euntes in illis tractatibus, velut quibusdam carminibus de se compositis, detractam sibi pellem videbant et irascebantur, quia nitidi coram hominibus incedentes, ibi parebat quam essent introrsum turpes.

[31] cfr. POSS. Vita.16.
[32] cfr. POSS. Vita.17.

38. [33] Et si quid in tractatibus ejus de fide disputantibus in caveis suis oblatrassent, cum id referretur ad Augustinum, provocabat eos ut palam oblocuturi prodirent ad conflictum. At illi jam dudum experti solidum Ecclesiae dentem, metuebant eum velut ancipitem gladium, velut arcum semper //*fol.79v*// extentum. Et versi in furorem, eo quod rationibus diffiderent, dicebant eum lupum ab omnibus insequendum et occidendum, quem si qui quorum in defensionem sui gregis interemissent, promitterent eos ab omnibus esse culpis absolutos, et dicerent eis quod Moyses filiis Levi: consecrastis manus vestras Domino. [34]

39. [35] Ob hoc insaniebant et sanguinem ejus sitiebant Circilliones [sic!] Donatistarum, quos continentes vocant, dirum genus hominum perversum ac violentum. Hi turmatim discurrentes et eo tumultu quo retia Domini ruperant foris in catholicos debacchantes, alios rebus, alios vita privabant, alios quovis membro detruncabant, aliis calcem vivam in oculis mittebant. Inde tam feri tamquam crudeles, etiam suis erant odibiles.

40. [36] Sed cum haec facerent arbitrabantur se nihil fecisse donec Augustinum de terra delevissent. Ejus itaque vias explorantes, aliquotiens armati sederunt in insidiis, ut interficerent transeuntem. Ita quadam die pene inciderat in manus eorum et inducturus erat Ecclesiae incomparabilem luctum. Insidiabantur idem Circilliones et ipse more suo pergebat ad exhortandas catholicas plebes. Sed qui caecavit latrunculos Syriae sanctum quaerentes Eliseum, fecit et hos amentes errare, donec transiret qui quaerebatur, et per aliam viam perveniret in eum quo tendebat locum.

41. [37] Ex eo monasterio quo presbyter factus constituerat, multis ecclesiis presbyteros et episcopos rogatus dederat, qui fide magni, scientia clari, pro muro erant fidelibus Christi.

42. [38] Horum unos Calamensi ecclesiae datus episcopus ab illis Circillionibus insidias passus, comprehensus et rebus cunctis spoliatus, ipse quoque gravissima caede est affectus. Pro his Crispinus Donatistarum, qui Calamae erat episcopus, tenetur, et auraria multa damnatus a judicibus tandem intercedentis Augustini beneficio liberatur.

43. [39] Itaque Deus laudem Ecclesiae suae non tacebat, cum et per hunc doctorem veritatis dissiparet, quas haeretici texebant, aranearum telas, et per catholicos homines potestatibus praeditos temerarias atque cruentas eorum proruptiones compesceret. Nam et ab Honorio christianissimo imperatore fuerat edictum nullo loco Donatistas haereticos esse debere. Et ne calumniarentur, vim sibi non Dei Justitiam fieri, jussit colligi apud Carthaginem concilium episcoporum, tam Donatistarum quam Catholicorum, ad quod tribunum de latere suo misit atque notarium. In quo omnes ante et pro omnibus defensor fidei fortissimus exstitit per omnia laudabilis Augustinus.

[33] cfr. POSS. Vita.18.
[34] Exodus 32,29.
[35] cfr. POSS. Vita.19-20.
[36] cfr. POSS. Vita.23.
[37] cfr. POSS. Vita.21-22.
[38] cfr. POSS. Vita.24-25.
[39] cfr. POSS. Vita.26.

44. Attamen principes haereticorum quamvis de errore convincti, nec sic poterant ad veritatis cultum //*fol.80r*// revocari, quoniam adhaeserant antiquo pecorum praeposito mortis, qui pugnantibus sanctis angelis, id est sacerdotibus catholicis, projectus in terram trahebat eam, quam caudae suae adhaeserat tertiam partem stellarum [40], non caritate sed scientia inflante micantium.

45. [41] De plebibus tamen quas seduxerant, quotidie quamplurimi revertebantur ad catholicam matrem Ecclesiam. Huic scissio [sic!] doctorum quadam die illud mirabile contigit, quod, cum sermonem faceret ad populum verbum Domini, quod fiebat per eum ipso nesciente neque ita in dispositione habente, ventilare coepit haeresim Manichaeorum. Cumque de hoc ipse miraretur utique discipuli ejus, ecce post biduum veniens negotiator quidam, et ad pedes ejus provolutus confitebatur, quod pluribus annis Manichaeorum secta fuisset secutus, et illo die, illoque sermone per ipsum in fide catholica suscitatus. Ille gaudens Domino gratias egit auctori et ordinatori nostrae salutis, in cuius manu sumus et nos et sermones nostri. Ille autem eousque in membris Ecclesiae profecit, ut in aliam regionem profectus, promotus sit ad officium presbyterii.

46. [42] Pascentius quidam comes domus regiae, per cuius linguam haeresis ariana velut hydria centenorum capitum sibilabat, hunc invictum fidei testem provocavit, multisque interpositis honoratis et nobilibus viris, cum eo contulit et victus est.

47. [43] Maximus quoque ejusdem perfidiae signifer et episcopus, cum Gothis ad Africam veniens, quamplurimis potentatibus et praeclaris interpositis viris, cum eo contulit et superatus est. Longum nimis est et paene impossibile singillatim prosequi, quos et cum quibus hic venerabilium litterarum defensor conflictus egerit.

48. [44] Plena sunt libris ejus armaria, et tam multis ut vix quilibet studiosissimus eos perlegere sufficiat; in quibus tota paene intentio totumque studium ejus est destruere parietes dealbatos haeretica peste pollutos, quorum habitatores Dominus per Moysen esse judicat immundos. Et si de omni armatura, quam suspendit in sanctae Ecclesiae propugnaculis, solus ille cognitus esset liber, quem scripsit de Civitate Dei, sic quoque multam illi gratiam deberent cives ejusdem Civitatis Dei, cunctique milites imperatoris ejus Christi. Nam cum illam Civitatem jam supra montem positam, jam toto mundo conspicuam, cives terrenae et alienae a Deo civitatis abscondere non valentes infamarent, et blasphemiis impugnarent, ita ut jam usu diceretur in plateis: pluvia desit causa christiani, iste de Civitate Dei contra civitatem illorum sodomam, cruentam et impacatam //*fol.80v*// fortiter ac fideliter disseruit, et sepulcrum patens oris sorum loquentium mendacium magnis et veris rationibus ex ipsorum maxime libris occlusit.

[40] cfr. Apoc. 12.4
[41] cfr. POSS. Vita.30-31.
[42] cfr. POSS. Vita.34-35.
[43] cfr. POSS. Vita.36.sqq.
[44] cfr. POSS. Vita.40.

49. [45] His autem sanctis ejus studiis concors erat et vita privata misericors. Hospitalis pauperum refugium; consolatio viduarum ac pupillorum; habensque cum simplicitate columbae astutiam serpentis; prudens erat in discretione boni et mali; justus tribuendo suum jus unicuique pro dignitate cuiusque; fortis et laboris patiens; cum ratione utilitatis moderatus et continens a cunctis cupiditatibus. Obtrectatores omnes oderat, et contra hos in mensa sua frugali et parca, tales versiculos scriptos habebat:

Quisquis amas dictis absentum rodere vitam.
Hanc mensam indignam noveris esse tui.

Ut autem ipse ait in libro Confessionum suarum numquam illustrari voluit operatione signorum. Memoriter quippe tenebat et in suis tractatibus saepe commemorabat optimam boni magistri propositionem, quod non dixit: discite a me super mare pedibus ambulare, vel: discite a me mortuos suscitare, sed: quia mitis sum et humilis corde. Verumtamen ne propter humilitatem desereret caritatis compassionem, adhuc presbyter et jam factus episcopus, oblatis sibi infirmis, et his qui a demonibus vexabantur, orabat pro illis et sanabantur, et demones ab obsessis corporibus fugabantur.

50. [46] His ita de bonis ejus actibus breviter exactis superest aperire qualiter praesentis vitae militiam finiens transierit ad eum, cui fide non ficta militaverat: Christum regem et Civitatem sanctorum caelestem Jerusalem. In illis diebus virga furoris Domini gens Wandalorum cum Gothis aliisque diversis nationibus ab Hispaniae partibus, navibus in Africam transvecta, velut impetus tempestatis incubuerat civitatibus et ecclesiis Africanis, omnia complens atrocibus malis, caedibus, rapinis, incendiis. Hoc horribili flagello, civitatibus cunctis excidio praeditis, tres erant superstites: Carthago, Cirta, Ippone.

51. [47] Harum primam Ipponem obsidio circumdedit. Videns ergo pius pastor Augustinus angustiam dominici gregis a facie circumfrementium ferarum trepidantis, die quadam multis coram positis, altius ingemuit et cunctis audientibus id se rogare Dominum dixit: ut aut manum suam extentam misericorditer retraheret, aut se de praesenti saeculo citius exire juberet. Nam illorum miseriam quibus timebat et sanctae Ecclesiae direptionem videre non poterat.

52. [48] Ecce autem tertio //*fol.81r*// mense illius obsidionis correptus febribus decubuit, et in aegritudine quotidie magis ac magis exercebatur, jam jam ut petierat ad Dominum migraturus. Sic aegrotanti quidam infirmus in lecto jacens oblatus est, ut ei per benedictionem et sacrae manus impositionem sanitatem conferret. Qui cum more suae humilitatis diceret, hoc suae non esse virtutis, se quoque sic aegrotum jacere, si quid posset ipse primo sibi medendum fuisse. At ille qui offerebat infirmum mandatum se dixit accepisse per visum quatenus illum deferret ad Augustinum. Quo audito

[45] cfr. POSS. Vita.41-60.
[46] cfr. POSS. Vita.61-63.
[47] cfr. POSS. Vita.64-65.
[48] cfr. POSS. Vita.66.

nihil cunctatus manum imposuit, benedixit, statimque mirum in modum infirmus contactu infirmi sanus factus surrexit.

53. [49] Per idem tempus interrogatus est hic vere legis peritus et scriba doctus in regno caelorum ab Honorato, viro sancto, ecclesiae Thiabensis episcopo, liceret ne sacerdotibus vel caeteris Ecclesiae ministris in tali periculo deserere gregem quem suo sanguine Christus acquisivit. Nam in illa tempestate populo Dei periclitante, illi sese periculo subtrahere deliberabant, idque praetenta quasi utili vel honesta causa, prudenter se facturum existimabant. Alebant opus fore, ut perdita civitate qui de populo superviverent ecclesiasticis officiis ut ministris non carerent; ideoque magis sui quam quorumlibet popularium esse necessariam salutem. Siquidem hoc fecisse Paulum apostolum, cum in sporta submissus est per murum et sic evasit manus persecutorum. Sic ipsum quoque Dominum Herode persequente fugisse in Aegyptum, eundemque postea praecepisse discipulis: cum vos persecuti fuerint in una civitate fugite in aliam. Ad hanc interrogationem rescripsit epistulam satis utilem cunctis Ecclesiae Dei ministris, quam hic propter prolixitatem inserere non libuit. Summa autem ejus est, in communi periculo pastorum et ovium, pastoribus non esse fugiendum. Nam si fugiant, eos non pastores sed mercenarios videri, nec ad eos pertinere de ovibus, qui videntes lupum venientem dimittunt oves et fugiunt. Exemplum apostoli vel ipsius Domini, quod ipsi ad firmamentum suae rationis adhibuissent tunc esse sequendum, cum soli pastores quaeruntur et periculum eorum non est commune cum ovibus.

54. [50] Interea beatus servus ille Domini, qui super custodiam suam stans totis noctibus vigilaverat, jam venire, jamque per molestiam corporis Dominum suum pulsare sentiebat. Erat autem ex hilaritate mentis aspectus pulcher et sermo dulcis, et nunc plusquam hactenus habere videbatur illuminatos oculos cordis. Jam enim aspirabat dies et inclinabantur umbrae mortalitatis. Solem quippe justitiae cuius hactenus lumen viderat in luna, videlicet in *//fol.81v//* praesenti ecclesia, nunc appropinquante jamque in seipso videndum quaedam intellectualis lucis in ejus mente percurrebat aurora. In hunc ergo mundos oculos cordis intendens, rogat se non inquietari, neminem ad se nisi certis horis ingredi. Septem poenitentiae psalmos in pariete descriptos habens prae oculis assidue decantabat, faciens ipse quod docuerat semper, neminem quamlibet justum debere finiri sine poenitentia. Venit dies et hora qui desiderabatur et aderant discipuli flentes et cum multis lacrimis discessuro tanto petri ultimum vale dicentes. Illisque psallentibus et flentibus illa felix anima, reserata janua corporis, laeta Dominum suum excepit, et inter manus illorum, habitatore discedente, vacua relicta est habitatio corporis, anno aetatis suae LXXVI., episcopatus autem XL. Corpus cum omni honore ut dignum erat sepulturae traditum expectat beatam resurrectionem mortuorum, quam optime credidit, pro qua legitime certavit, de cuius hostibus loquendo et scribendo saepissime triumphavit. Testamentum nullum fecit, quia unde faceret, pauper Christi non habuit.

[49] cfr. POSS. Vita.67.
[50] cfr. POSS. Vita.68-69.

55. Exauditus ergo est ne videret mala civitatis suae ut petierat: quae post ejus obitum ab hostibus capta et succensa est. Nunc Deo vivit et nobis non obiit, quia quod legimus ipse loquitur; et in ecclesiis filiis dignitatem magistri semper obtinet, et sicut stella fulgebit in perpetuas aeternitates. Amen.

Martijn SCHRAMA OSA

NEUENTDECKTE SCHRIFTEN DES ERFURTER THEOLOGIEPROFESSORS JOHANNES NATHIN OSA

Zur Einführung

Der 3. Januar 1481 wurde zu einem Trauertag nicht nur für den Erfurter Augustinerkonvent, sondern auch für die Erfurter Universität. An diesem Tag wurde in der Augustinerkirche der hochangesehene Theologieprofessor und Cathedraticus der Augustiner Johannes von Dorsten zur letzten Ruhe bestattet.

Der Verstorbene war der Sohn einer angesehenen Bürgerfamilie aus dem westfälischen Dorsten. Er ließ sich im Frühjahr 1437 im Alter von etwa 14 Jahren an der Kölner Universität intitulieren als "Famulus" des Pariser Magisters und nunmehrigen Kölner Dr. med. Bernard von Loen. Schon diese Tatsache war ein deutlicher Hinweis auf das weitreichende akademische Interesse des jungen Mannes. Ohne schon ein bestimmtes Studienziel im Auge zu haben, suchte er möglichst viel Wissen seiner Zeit in sich aufzunehmen. Sein Interesse richtete sich auch bald auf juristische und kanonistische Studien, einschließlich der humanistischen Bestrebungen der damaligen Zeit, sowie auf geschichtliche Forschung und religiöse Fragen.

Erst 19 Jahre nach seinem Kölner Studienbeginn entschloss sich Dorsten im Alter von 33 Jahren, 1454 zur Immatrikulation an der damals weltbekannten Universität zu Erfurt. Dort begann er, schon 33 Jahre alt, an der Artistenfakultät das Studium und wurde im Jahre 1458 als erster von 19 Bewerbern zum "magister artium" promoviert. Danach entschloss er sich im Sommer des folgendes Jahres zum Eintritt in das Erfurter Augustinerkloster und wurde dort 1465 zum Priester geweiht. 1463/64 ist er erstmals als Bachalar der Theologie bezeugt. Seine Promotion zum Doktor der Theologie geschah am 14. Oktober 1465. Sofort übertrug ihm der Orden die Leitung des Generalstudiums im Augustinerkloster und den Universitätslehrstuhl des Ordens. Der moderne Historiker der Erfurter Universität Professor Erich Kleineidam ist der Überzeugung, dass kein anderer als Johannes von Dorsten im Lauf der folgenden 16 Jahre die Erfurter Theologie als Prediger und durch seine Schriften stark angeregt und erneuert hat.[1]

[1] Siehe dazu A. Zumkeller, Johannes von Dorsten, in: Westfälische Lebensbilder 19 (1988) 16-18.- siehe auch Erich Kleineidam in: Universitas Studii Erffordensis II, Leipzig 1982[2].

1467 bis 81 wirkte Dorsten auch als Provinzial der thüringisch-sächsischen Augustinerprovinz und vertrat sie 1470 auf ihrem Generalkapitel in Bologna.

Deshalb war es so schwer, die durch seinen Tod enstandene Lücke zu schließen. Es dauerte volle 8 Jahre, bis der Posten des Dorsten wieder besetzt werden konnte.

I. Die Persönlichkeit des Johannes Nathin

Der schließlich nach langen Jahren als Nachfolger in Aussicht genommene Johannes Nathin stammte aus der thüringischen Kleinstadt Neuenkirchen, etwas nördlich von Eisenach. In jungen Jahren hatte er sich an der Artistenfakultät in Erfurt immatrikuliert. 1472 wurde er als Zweiter von insgesamt 19 Kandidaten zum "magister artium" promoviert. Bald darauf trat er in das Erfurter Augustinerkloster ein und wurde als "Lector" nach Tübingen versetzt. 1484 hielt er dort seinen "Cursus biblicus". 1486 begann er in Tübingen seine Sentenzenlesung. Nach Erfurt zurückgekehrt, erwarb er dort im April 1488 den Titel des Licentiatus in Theologie. Seine Promotion zum Magister der Theologie erfolgte am 31. Oktober 1489. Gleichzeitig übernahm er den Erfurter Universitätslehrstuhl der Augustiner und wurde Studienregens am internationalen Studium der Augustiner in Erfurt.

Johannes Nathin hat insgesamt 40 Jahre lang – 1489 bis zu seinem Tod am 22. Oktober 1529 – den Lehrstuhl der Augustiner als Theologieprofessor innegehabt. Nathin besaß eine ausreichende Begabung und erhielt eine gute Vorbildung. Auch war er erfüllt von Begeisterung für ein reformiertes Ordensleben, zu dem er sich bei seiner Profess verpflichtet hatte. Freilich eine mitreißende Persönlichkeit wie sein Vorgänger Johannes von Dorsten scheint er nicht gewesen zu sein.

Was hat Johannes Nathin in all den Jahrzehnten für eine Theologie vertreten? Leider sind bis heute von ihm keine Schriften bekannt geworden. Doch hat ein japanischer Universitätsprofessor Jun Matsuurana in der "Wissenschaftlichen Allgemeinbibliothek Erfurt" eine Anzahl von Inkunabeln entdeckt, die aus der damaligen Bibliothek des Erfurter Augustinerklosters stammen. Ich selbst konnte bei einem letzten Besuch der Erfurter Bibliothek kurz vor der Wende mich mit einer dieser Inkunabeln näher beschäftigen, die überraschende Aufschlüsse über Johannes Nathin bietet.

II. Beschreibung der aufgefundenen Erfurter Inkunabel. "Ink. I, 71, Basel 1486".

Auf der Schneide steht ein "tex sen+".- auf dem Rücken findet sich ein Papierschild mit der alten Signatur: G/57.-

Im Vorderdeckel ist oben handschriftlich ein Text von 9 Zeilen eingetragen, mit Bezug auf die "Moralia" Gregors des Großen.-

Auf fol. I v. ist ein Pergamentblatt vorgebunden, auf dem sich oben die Aufschrift findet:

"Fr Fr Erem. S. Augustini Erfordiae" (17./18. Jht).-

Unten auf dem selben Blatt findet sich eine Notiz über die Auferstehung der Toten.-

Auf fol. I v. ist die Rede von einer Bulle Papst Bonifaz (IX?), gerichtet an den Episc. Tudert.-

Nur die linke Hälfte des Pergaments ist erhalten; es fehlt die Datumszeile.- Es handelt sich um die Übertragung eines Benefiziums an einen Johannes, Kleriker der Mainzer Diözese.-

Die Blätter der Ink. I, 71 sind durchgezählt von a (1,2) bis z (1,2); danach von A (1.2) bis R (1.2).-

Auf Blatt I v. findet sich folgende wichtige Besitzerangabe: Iste liber pertinet pri (=patri) mgro (=magistro). Das Weitere wurde gestrichen.-

Darunter von anderer Hand mit größeren Buchstaben: Ad usum pris [mgri Johanis de Natyn] – Der geklammerte Text wurde nachträglich gestrichen. – Darunter mit großen Buchstaben von einer wohl etwas späteren Hand des 16. Jahrhunderts: "conventus Erff." – Darunter findet sich gedruckt: "textus sententiarum". – Darunter steht ein handschriftlicher Text von 22 Zeilen, in dem 16 Stellen aufgezählt sind, an denen der Lombarde "declinaverit ex opinionibus modernorum et minus probabiliter posuerit". – Auf dem Rand findet sich ein Verweis auf Bonaventura "in fine secundi". –

Auf fol. 1 v. finden sich handschriftlich 12 Zeilen Text, in denen "Thomas de Argentina et beatus Thomas" genannt werden. –

Auf fol. 2 v. steht nochmals ein Eintrag der Bibliothek der Augustiner zu "Erphord". (aus dem 17./18. Jahrhundert). –

Es ergibt sich als *wichtiges Ergebenis*: Die Ink. I, 71 (Basel 1486) war offenbar lange Zeit im Besitz und Gebrauch des amtierenden P. Mag. Johannes von Nathin. Die zahlreichen Randglossen, vor allem im 1. und 2. Sentenzenbuch, dürften von ihm selbst stammen. – Leider sind Photokopien von den Blättern der alten Inkunabel nicht

lesbar, so dass über die Randnotizen der Inkunabel grundsätzlich nur das in Erfurt verwahrte Original Auskunft geben kann.

III. Hier erhebt sich die nicht unwichtige Frage: *Welche Theologie hat Johannes Nathin als maßgebender Universitätsprofessor der Erfurter Augustiner vertreten?*

Ein Blick in die Liste der von ihm zitierten Autoren gibt darauf eine interessante Antwort. Es sind vor allem die angesehenen Lehrer seines Ordens, zumal Ägidius Romanus, auf dessen Lehre er sich gerne beruft. Gelegentlich wird auch Thomas von Straßburg erwähnt und neben ihm der hl. Thomas von Aquin. Auch die Quodlibeta des Jakobus von Viterbo sind ihm nicht unbekannt. Zu seinen vielgenannten Autoren gehört außerdem der Augustinerchorherr Hugo von St. Victor.

In Nathins theologischen Darlegungen finden sich Randglossen bis ans Ende des zweiten Sentenzenbuches. Sehr ausgeprägt ist eine sterke Tendenz, entweder gewisse augustinische Sätze beim Lombarden genauer zu verifizieren oder auch entsprechende Sätze aus den Werken des Kirchenvaters auf den Rändern des Manuskripts zu vermerken.

Wie aber steht es mit dem *Verhältnis zur "via moderna"* bzw. zu dem Tübinger Philosophieprofessor Gabriel Biel? Dieser hatte in jenen Jahren eine Theologie im Geiste der "via moderna" aufzubauen gesucht. Unmittelbare Beziehungen zu Biel und seiner Lehre sind bei Nathin nicht nachweisbar. Interessanterweise wird Biels Name in den Randglossen der ersten beiden Sentenzenbücher nie erwähnt, ebensowenig wie der Name Wilhelm Ockhams. Um trotzdem einen gewissen Einfluss der Lehre des Biel und seines Nominalismus ausschließen zu können, wäre es jedenfalls notwendig, den ganzen Text der beiden ersten Bücher des Nathin nochmals genauer durchzuarbeiten am Originaltext, der in Erfurt liegt.

IV. Der kühne Plan des Johannes Nathin, durch eine gemeinsame Protesturkunde vom 22. Juni 1523 die gefährdete deutsche Reformkongregation zu retten.

Für den 21. Juni 1523 hatte der Nachfolger des aus seinem Amt geschiedenen Johannes Staupitz, der rechtmäßig gewählte Generalvikar der deutschen Reformkongregation Wenzeslaus Linck ein Kongregationskapitel ins sächsische Kloster Grimma ausgeschrieben, das freilich zu einer Katastrophe wurde. Denn es war nur eine kleine Anzahl von Kapitularen, die tatsächlich nach Grimma

kamen; vor allem war der Generalvikar Linck nicht erschienen, sondern hatte nur sein Amtssiegel übersandt. Denn auf Veranlassung seines Kurfürsten Friedrich des Weisen hatte er mittlerweile Orden und Kirche verlassen und die Stelle des lutherischen Predigers im sächsischen Altenburg übernommen. Er war damals schon mit der Vorbereitung seiner Hochzeit beschäftigt.

Die kleine Zahl der eingetroffenen Kapitularen begann trotzdem, wie festgesetzt, am 21. Juni ihre Sitzungen. Freilich fehlten, wohl auch wegen der unsicheren Zeitverhältnisse, welche die gegenseitige Verständigung erschwerten, alle schwäbischen und niederrheinischen Konvente, auch die süddeutschen Klöster von Regensburg, Nürnberg und München.

Anwesend waren als gewählte Diskreten; für Erfurt Johannes Nathin, für Eschwege Conrad Aldorff, für Heidelberg Georg Doliatoris, für Sternberg (Mecklenburg) Casper Piscatoris, dazu der Prior und Professor der Theologie von Eschwege Johannes Spangenberg, sowie der Definitor des vorausgegangenen Kongregationskapitels, der Lector der Theologie Nikolaus Besslerius. Sie alle waren Mitglieder der "unio regularis observantiae".

Johannes Nathin konnte die Versammlung angesichts der kritischen Situation für seinen Plan gewinnen, durch einen kirchlichen Notar mit päpstlicher Bestätigung eine Urkunde erstellen zu lassen, die folgende Forderungen enthalten sollte. Zunächst war mit Berufung auf die Satzungen der Reformkongregation zu klären, zu welchem Zeitpunkt und an welchem Ort die Neuwahl des Generalvikars stattfinden sollte. Der entscheidende Punkt, der ganz klar herausgestellt werden musste, besagte, dass die anwesenden Kapitulare und alle Mitglieder der Reformkongregation, für die sie sprächen, treue Söhne der katholischen Mutter Kirche seien und die neuen Lehren der sogenannten Martinianer oder Lutheraner niemals vertreten hätten oder nachmals vertreten würden.

Noch am gleichen Tage wurde die Reise der Kapitulare nach dem nahen Leipzig in die Wege geleitet. Die Franziskanerminoriten in Leipzig hatten für die Gäste die Unterkunft schon vorbereitet; und auch der Notar Sixtus Stablyn war schon rechtzeitig verständigt und legte am kommenden Tag den Kapitularen die gewünschte Protesturkunde zur Unterschrift vor. Die Leipziger Franziskaner und ein Konrad Pauli aus Hindelang, Kleriker der Augsburger Diözese, zeichneten als geladene Zeugen.[2]

[2] Die Originalkunde befindet sich heute im Hauptstaatsarchiv Magdeburg. Ihre kritische Edition bei A. Overmann, Urkundenbuch: der Erfurter Stifte und Klöster III, Magdeburg 1934 Nr 588 S. 332 f.

Schlussbemerkung.

Übrigens ist das Manuskript Ink. I/71 des Augustinermagisters Johannes Nathin nach seinem Tod von einem Unbekannten des 16. oder 17. Jahrhunderts für seine theologischen Fragen benützt worden, deren Quellen und Autoren näherer Untersuchung bedürfen. Der Autor war offensichtlich kein Mitglied des Augustinerordens, sondern dürfte unter den lutherischen Professoren zu suchen sein, die nach der Gründung des evangelischen Gymnasiums in den Räumen des ehemaligen Augustinerklosters Erfurt unterrichtet haben.

Adolar ZUMKELLER OSA

ALEXIUS (JOHANN ADAM) MOLITOR

Augustiner und Komponist

Am 19. November 1730 wurde dem Johann Adam Georg Müller und seiner Frau Susanne geb. Fleck ihr sechstes und letztes Kind geschenkt. Es war ein Söhnlein und erhielt in der Taufe den Namen Johann Adam[1]. Die Heimat des Knaben war Simmershausen.

Es gibt in Deutschland drei Orte, die Simmershausen heißen. Der eine liegt nördlich von Kassel und dürfte somit als Heimat der Müllers nicht in Frage kommen. Ein anderer findet sich ein wenig östlich der Bundesstraße 278, nicht weit von Hilders, östlich von Fulda, jedoch auf heute bayerischem Gebiet. Das dritte Simmershausen liegt in Thüringen, aber nicht sehr weit von Königshofen im Grabfeld entfernt; fast genau zwischen Königshofen und Hildburgshausen, ist somit Münnerstadt, wo Johann Adam das Gymnasium besuchen sollte, näher als das Simmershausen bei Hilders.

Ein Blick in Neumanns Orts-Lexikon des Deutsches Reiches, das 1894 in Leipzig und Wien verlegt wurde[2], bringt über die Lage von Johann Adam Müllers Geburtsort schon fast die Gewissheit. Simmershausen, das heute im Bundesland Thüringen liegt, gehörte ehemals zu Sachsen-Meiningen und hatte eine evangelische Pfarrkirche, scheidet also als Geburtsort des katholischen Johann Adam aus. Das andere Simmershausen war zwar – seit 1866[3] – preußisch, gehörte zum Regierungsbezirk Kassel, zum Kreis Gersfeld, zum Amtsgericht Hilders. Die Postanstalt befand sich in Tann a. Rhön; es hatte 607 Einwohner und eine katholische Pfarrkirche.

Letzte Sicherheit gibt eine Karte vom Hochstifts Würzburg, die 1791 auf Befehl des Fürstbischofs Franz Ludwig von Erthal angefertigt worden ist[4]. Auf dieser Karte ist Simmershausen im äußersten

[1] Adam Gottron, Der Komponist Alexius Molitor, ein Münnerstädter Klosterschüler, in: Vinculum. Mürschter-Seminar-Echo. Heft 20 (Ostern 1958) 16-18. Der Artikel war zunächst im Würzburger Sonntagsblatt vom 28.101957 publiziert. Naturgemäß sind keine Quellen angegeben, was eine Überprüfung der Daten schwer macht.

[2] Neumann, Orts=Lexikons des Deutschen Reichs, Leipzig und Wien [3]1894, 834.

[3] Komp, Art. Fulda, in: Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon. Bd. 4, Freiburg/Br. [2]1886, 2113: Im Friedenschluss von 1866 musste Bayern die Distrikte Gersfeld und Orb an Preußen abtreten.

[4] Diese Karte liegt bei dem Werk: P. Kolb/E,G.Krenig, Unterfränkische Geschichte. Bd.4/1, Würzburg 1998.

Norden des Fürstbistums als Pfarrdorf zum Amt Hilders gehörig verzeichnet. Nach einem unter Johann Philipp von Schönborn 1669 angelegtem Titular war Hilders Sitz eines Kellers und eines Zentgrafen[5].

Die Studienanstalt für den nördlichen Teil des geistlichen Herzogtums Franken war in Münnerstadt, weshalb auch Johann Adam Müller dorthin zog, vielleicht von seinem Pfarrer dazu ermuntert. Das Gymnasium, das der Junge aus der Rhön besuchen sollte, war schon von Julius Echter geplant[6], jedoch der Kriegs- und anderer Nöte halber erst 1660 von Johann Philipp von Schönborn tatsächlich ins Leben gerufen worden. Die Leitung hatte der Gründer den Bartholomiten anvertraut, deren einer, Dr. Johannes Ueßmann, zugleich Pfarrer von Münnerstadt, das Gymnasium im Jahre 1660/61 mit zwölf Schülern eröffnete. Er begann seinen Unterricht mit Secunda, fügte im folgenden Jahr die Syntaxis an, 1662/63 die Poetica und schließlich, 1663/64 die Rhetorica. Als 1685 die Augustiner die Leitung des Gymnasiums übernahmen, beließen sie zunächst diese Ordnung. Erst am 2.Januar 1738 wurde mit Erlaubnis des Fürstbischofs Friedrich Karl von Schönborn die erste Klasse, die Infima, eingerichtet, sehr zum Verdruss des Geistlichen Rates und der Vorstände der lateinischen Rektoratsschulen in Münnerstadt, Neustadt, Hollstadt, Königshofen, Kissingen[7]. Trotz des Widerspruchs genannter Kreise blieb der Fürst bei seinem Entschluss: Am 12. März 1738 erging aus der Würzburger Kanzlei die Mitteilung, dass der „Bischoff zu Bamberg und Wirtzburg…dero Augustiner Convent zu Münnerstadt wegen Docirung Infimae jährlich fünfftzig Reichsthaler aus Ihro allhiesigen Universitäts Rezeptorat gnädigst zugelegt haben…“[8] Der Grund für die Einführung der untersten Klasse war, dass die Buben, die nach Münnerstadt kamen, um frohgemut den Grundstein ihrer Karriere in Kirche oder Staat zu legen, oft nur kümmerliche Voraussetzungen dazu mitbrachten. Denn der „Liber professorii“, eine dem „Ordo in Gymnasio nostro Münnerstadiano observandus“ eingefügte Schrift, mahnt die Lehrer: „Da auch aus verschiedenen Orten und Gegenden Jünglinge zu uns kommen, die nicht einmal die einfachsten Grundlagen gut beherrschen, soll der Pater Professor der Secunda bis Weihnachten die

[5] E. Riedenauer, Die Landämter des Hochstifts Würzburg und ihr Personal im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, in: Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter 37/38 (1975) 451.

[6] Zum Folgenden: A. Kunzelmann, 300 Jahre Gymnasium Münnerstadt, in: 300 Jahre Humanistisches Gymnasium Münnerstadt, Gesamtherstellung: R.Schunk KG Königshofen/Gr. 1960, 3-ff.

[7] Kunzelmann, a.a.O. 17.

[8] Akten Nr. 68 im Provinzarchiv Würzburg (PA).

Buchstaben, die Zusammensetzungen (derselben zu Wörtern?) und die anderen Anfangsgegenstände erklären, damit er nicht zu bauen anfange, bevor er das Fundament gelegt hat."[9] Eine spätere Hand hat im zitierten Abschnitt des Liber Professorii das Wort „Secunda" durch „Infima" ersetzt. „Die einfachsten Grundlagen" wurden also ab 1738 den Infimisten beigebracht.

Im Münnerstadter Gymnasium gab es eine Marianische Schülerkongregation. Der Catalogus nominum et officiorum omnium sodalium, der Namenskatalog aller Mitglieder hat sich erhalten[10]. Mit Hilfe dieser Mitgliedsverzeichnisse kann die Zeit, in der Molitor den studia humaniora oblag, festgestellt werden. Am 30. November 1743 wurde mit 16 anderen Schülern der Infima auch Joannes Adamus Molitor aus Simmershausen in das Album Marianum eingetragen, das erste Mal, dass sich sein Name in der latinisierten Form findet; wahrscheinlich waren es Lehrer und Mitschüler, die den Johann Adam diesem Humanistenbrauch unterwarfen. Unter den Neuaufnahmen dieses Jahres waren vier Secundani, ein Syntaxista, ein Poeta und zwei Rhetoren. Johann Adam aber war Infimist, Besucher der untersten Klasse, Schulanfänger also. Im Dezember 1747 wurden Joannes Adamus Molitor Simmershusanus und Joannes Casparus Herleth Münnerstadianus, beide Rhetoren, von den Sodalen zu Notaren der Kongregation gewählt. Mit diesen beiden Erwähnungen ist die Gymnasialzeit unseres Helden abgegrenzt: 1743/44 war er Schüler der Infima, 1744/45 besuchte er die Secunda, 1745/46 die Syntaxis, 1746/47 war er Poeta und 1747/48 Rhetor, wie aus oben zitierter Eintragung hervorgeht.

Während Molitors Schulzeit war P. Antonius Lurtz Leiter der Anstalt. Das Provinzkapitel, das im Mai 1743 in Schwäbisch Gemünd gefeiert wurde, hatte ihn zum Prior und Praefectus Scholarum in Münnerstadt ernannt[11], und er blieb in diesen Ämtern 1746, 1749 und 1752. Er war ein Bruder des Benedtiktinerabtes von Neustadt am Main Benedikt Lurtz[12]. Nach dem „Ordo in Gymnasio nostro Münnerstadiano observandus" hatte der Präfekt die bildungswilligen Knaben in die Schule aufzunehmen und die Zeugnisse auszustellen, die er

[9] Kunzelmann, a.a.O. 13.

[10] Catalogus nominum et officiorum omnium sodalium almae congregationis nostrae B.M.V. de Consolatione ab anno 1735. Im Provinzarchiv Würzburg (PA). Stdb. Nr. 19. Ohne Seitenzählung.

[11] Akten der Provinz-Kapitel der Rheinisch-Schwäbischen Provinz II. Band, 1699-1762, pag 344. Im PA Standbuch II.

[12] D. Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum. Die Verstorbenen der rheinisch-schwäbischen Augustinerprovinz und der neuen deutschen Ordensprovinz 1650-1950, Würzburg 1972, Nr. 824 S. 311.

unterschreiben und mit dem Stempel des Konvents versehen musste[13]. P. Lurtz spielte also im Schülerleben Molitors eine wichtige Rolle.

Wer waren die oder der Augustiner, der den Gymnasiasten Johann Adam Molitor in Münnerstadt unterrichtete? Das Kapitel des Jahres 1746, das in Weil der Stadt gefeiert wurde, nennt die folgenden Mitglieder des Münnerstädter Kollegiums: P. Laurentius Fröling Professor Infimae, P. Hermann Schreier Professor Secundae, P. Cajetan Schmitt Professor Syntaxeos, P. Sebastian Limpert Professor Poetices und P. Joachim Böll Professor Rhetorices[14]. Das Kapitel hatte am 28. April begonnen, die aufgezeichnete Besetzung des Gymnasiums war also die des Schuljahres 1745/46. Johann Adam Molitor war in der Syntaxis; Professor dieser Klasse war Cajetan Schmitt. Nach dem Monumentum Pietatis des P. Pius Keller war Schmitt Lehrer in Münnerstadt vom Schuljahr 1743/44 bis 1747/48[15], muss also den jungen Molitor die ganze Gymnasialzeit hindurch begleitet haben.

Cajetan Schmitt unterrichtete, soweit mit Hilfe des Katalogs der Marianischen Schülerkongregation feststellbar, während der fünf Jahre seines Dienstes die folgenden Schüler: Georg Behr aus Großeibstadt, Johannes Petrus Bonfig aus Unsleben, Georg Gass aus Althausen, Johannes Gehring aus Waldaschach (Waldaschacensis. Vermutlich Aschach bei Bad Bocklet), Caspar Geiss aus Wildflecken, Johannes Geiss aus Wildflecken, Franz Held aus Gerolzhofen (Gerlocurianus), Caspar Herleth aus Münnerstadt, Michael Horbelt aus Schönau, Johann Adam Keul (Keil) aus Euerdorf, Eucharius Mack aus Mellrichstadt, Bartholomäus Mölter aus Würzburg, Johann Adam Molitor aus Simmershausen und Johann Georg Walther aus Bischofsheim.

Für die Augustiner war nicht nur die Vermittlung von Wissen wichtig, sondern stets auch die religiöse Erziehung ihrer Schüler. Deshalb gründeten sie am 17. April 1735 zum 50jährigen Bestehen des Gymnasiums die erwähnte Marianische Schülerkongregation. Der Provinzial Dr. Sigismund Büttner, überaus eifriger Förderer der Liturgie und insbesondere der Marienverehrung, war bei dem Festakt persönlich anwesend[16] und wurde Protektor der Vereinigung, was beides

[13] Kunzelmann a.a.O. 11.

[14] Kapitelsakten im PA Stdb Nr. 2 pag 364.

[15] P. Pius Keller, Monumentum Pietatis quo scripto sollemnia saecularia altera Gymnasii Münnerstadiani IV A. Id. Aug. rite celebranda indicit P. Pius Keller, Professor. Würzburg 1860, 16.

[16] Kunzelmann, a.a.O. 16.

die Wichtigkeit, welche die in Münnerstadt lehrenden Augustiner der Neugründung beimaßen, unterstreicht. Sicher ahmte man mit dieser Einrichtung die Jesuiten nach, man gab jedoch der frommen Vereinigung einen augustinischen Touch, indem man als Titel Congregatio Beatae Mariae Virginis de Consolatione, der Jungfrau vom Trost, wählte, unter welchem Namen die Mutter Gottes bei den Augustinern besonders verehrt wurde und in manchen Ordenskirchen mit heute noch beliebter Andacht verehrt wird[17]. Zwei Mal im Jahr, im Mai und im Spätherbst, zu Beginn des neuen Schuljahres, versammelten sich die Sodalen, um ihren Vorstand zu wählen und neue Mitglieder aufzunehmen. Eine stattliche Reihe von Amtsträgern wurde bei dieser Gelegenheit bestimmt: Zunächst der Präfekt, dem zwei Assistenten an die Seite gegeben wurden, dann der Sekretär, vier Konsultoren, zwei Notare, der Sakristan und einige Lektoren. In den lateinisch abgefassten Protokollen der Mitgliederversammlungen, die in den zwei schmalen Bänden des Catalogus enthalten sind, werden mit Schwung und frommer Phantasie die Gewählten charakterisiert, wohl um deren Wahl zu begründen.

Am Ende der Protokolle ist stets, wie es sich gehört, der Ort der Versammlung und das Datum angegeben: Man traf sich „in Aula almae Congregationis Mariano-Consolatoriae". Das war der Festsaal des Gymnasiums, der 1693 fertig gestellt und dessen Decke vom Augustiner-Bruder Thomas Zeni mit prachtvollen Stuckfiguren geschmückt worden war[18]. Nach dem „Liber Professorii" wurde 1737 die Aula in eine Kirche verwandelt, Bilder wurden aufgehängt und eine Orgel zum Preis von 79 fränkischen Gulden gekauft[19]. 1733 war schon ein kleineres Instrument – es hatte nur 3 Gulden gekostet – für das „Musaeum", dem Studierraum für die Patres Professoren, erworben worden[20]. Musik wurde also in Münnerstadt durchaus gepflegt und zwar nicht nur die Orgelmusik. Als am 6. Juli 1740 die Äbte von Bildhausen, Bronnbach und Amorbach die Augustiner in Münnerstadt besuchten, wurden sie vom ganzen Konvent mit festlicher Musik empfangen[21].

Die Sodalen der Kongregation wurden nicht nur zu den Wahlen versammelt, sondern trafen sich allsonntäglich in der Aula zu

[17] R. Arbesmann, Das Erbe St.Augustins. Die Heiligen des Ordens, Würzburg 1979, 35.
[18] Kunzelmann, a.a.O. 16.
[19] Kunzelmann, a.a.O. 17.
[20] Kunzelmann, a.a.O. 16.
[21] S. Back / A. Zumkeller, Das Augustinerkloster in Münnerstadt, Würzburg 1975, 165.

Andacht und Gebet[22]. Während dieser frommen Übungen wurde auch gesungen, weshalb im Mai und im Herbst jeweils ein Organist und Leiter des Gesanges sowie einen Schüler, der die Musik nicht nur durch seine Stimme, sondern mit seinem ganzen Körper befördern soll, indem er den Blasbalg tritt, musicam promovebit non voce solum, sed toto corpore animando folles[23], erkoren wurden.

Es ist ein wenig verwunderlich, dass Johann Adam Molitor, der doch später als Komponist zu Berühmtheit gelangen sollte, in seiner Zeit als Sodale der marianischen Kongregation niemals das Amt des Gesangsleiters oder Organisten versah. Für die Arbeit des Blasbalgtreters, die er auch nie ausüben musste, war wohl kaum eine besondere musikalische Begabung erforderlich. Jedoch wurde er von der Kongregation im Dezember 1747 zum Notarius gewählt. Er sollte verhindern, dass die Scholaren nicht „das süße Joch einer so großen Mutter zuweilen abschüttelten". Er hatte die Anwesenheit der Mitglieder bei den Versammlungen zu kontrollieren, sollte auch Fehlverhalten korrigieren, wie die Kongregation vom November 1746 die Aufgabe der Notare umschreibt. Mit Molitor, der Rhetor war, wurde sein Klassenkamerad Kaspar Herleth aus Münnerstadt und der Poeta Matthaeus Friedrich aus Wolfmannshausen, einem Ort westlich von Mellrichstadt, heute jedoch auf thüringischem Gebiet gelegen, in dieses Amt gewählt.

Jedoch war Molitor während seiner Münnerstädter Schulzeit durchaus aktiv auf musikalischem Gebiet, wenn man dem Mainzer Prälaten, Musikhistoriker und Universitätsprofessor Adam Gottron[24] glauben darf. Der berichtet nämlich, dass es in Münnerstadt einen Musiklehrer gegeben habe, Georg Joachim Joseph Hahn, der zugleich Rektor der Infima gewesen sei. Dieser Hahn habe jedes Jahr eine Schuloper komponiert. Schon im ersten Schuljahr habe Molitor den Abraham gespielt, 1745 die Europa und 1746 als Schüler der Syntaxis die Pietas, als Poeta sei ihm in dem Theaterstück „Alexius Petrowitz" die Rolle des Politikus anvertraut worden und in der Rhetorica habe er den Johann Baptista in dem Spiel „Paulus Aemilianus Papinianus" dargestellt. Gottron veröffentlichte diese Nachrichten im Würzburger Sonntagsblatt[25], weshalb er seinem Artikel keine Quellenangaben hinzu fügte. Jedoch ist tatsächlich am 2. Oktober 1747

[22] Ebd. 172.

[23] S. das Protokoll der Versammlung vom 1. Mai 1744: Der wackere Blasbalgtreter war Georg Ledermann, Sekundaner, aus Oberstreu.

[24] Heinz Leitermann, Zweitausend Jahre Mainz. Mainz 1962, 146.

[25] Würzburger Sonntagsblatt vom 28. Oktober 1957. Abgedruckt in: Vinculum. Mürschter-Seminar-Echo. Heft 20. Ostern 1958, 16-18.

das Stück aufgeführt worden: Apollo Iovi rebellis Divinitate sua orbatus et Maiestate exulus, sive Alexius Petrowitz ob nefandam saepius in parentem rebellionem haereditario successionis jure privatus, capitali tandem sententia tactus, a morte vero praereptus. Autor dieser Tragödie war P. Sebastian Limbert. Am 30. September 1748 brachten die Schüler den Paulus Aemilius Papinianus pro veritate et justititia morte gloriosa occumbens auf die Bühne. Gewöhnlich war der Lehrer der Rhetorica Verfasser der actio autumnalis. Den Paulus Aemilius Papinianus hatte P. Cajetan Schmitt gedichtet, der Lehrer Molitors war[26]. Jedoch waren die Tragödien und Kommödien (denn auch die gab es) keineswegs Schulopern, sondern Sprechtheater, das durch Chöre aufgelockert wurde. Im Stück „Gosbertus primus Christianus Franconiae Dux", das P. Possidius Zitter geschrieben und am 27. September 1757 zur Aufführung gebracht hatte, trat vier Mal ein Chor auf, der die heidnischen Göttinnen und Götter über die Christianisierung des Frankenlandes singend räsonieren und Pläne spinnen ließ, wie der Erfolg der Missionare zu verhindern sei. Da ihr Bemühen erfolglos bleibt, ergreifen die Götter die Flucht, worauf der Chor der Virtutes erscheint[27]. Das gedruckte Programm unterrichtete in Kürze das geneigte Publikum nicht nur über der Inhalt der einzelnen Akte und über die Personen und ihre Darsteller, sondern auch über den, der die Musik komponiert hatte und die Chöre leitete: Modos musicos composuit Consultus et Eruditus Dominus Georgius Joachimus Josephus Hahn, Senator, et Chori Münnerstadiani Regens[28]. So war Molitor, wie Hermann Ullrich sagt, mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit einer von Hahns Schülern in der Musik. Auch mag er bei den Theateraufführungen unter Hahns Anleitung gesungen haben[29]; denn der ist 1712 in Münnerstadt geboren und erscheint 1746 als S.M. Magdalena Chori rectore[30], als Chorleiter an der Stradtpfarrkirche

[26] Thomas Beckmann, Das Schultheater am Gymnasium Münnerstadt, in: 300 Jahre Humanistisches Gymnasium Münnerstadt, Königshofen i.G. 1960, 86.

[27] Thomas Beckmann, Das Schultheater am Gymnasium Münnerstadt, 89. Das Original dieses Stückes befindet sich im PA Akten Nr. 64 V.

[28] Akten Nr. 64 V im PA. Einen zweiten Theaterzettel, der Hahns Namen trägt, abgedruckt bei A. Zumkeller, Ein bedeutender Münnerstädter Schulmann und Gelehrter des 18. Jahrhunderts: P. Possidius Zitter O.S.A., in: H. Fügert (Hrsg), Johann-Philipp-von-Schönborn-Gymansium Münnerstadt, Münnerstadt 1985, 61. Zu Hahn s. Hermann Ullrich, Art. Hahn, Georg Joachim Joseph, in: Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Personenteil 8, Bärenreiter-Verlag [2]2002, 399.

[29] Im PA Würzburg Akten Nr. 64 sind leider erst die Theaterstücke ab 1750 aufbewahrt.Übrigens sind auch in diesen Manuskripten nur selten die Namen der Schüler genannt, die am Stück als Schauspieler mitgewirkt haben.

[30] Hermann Ullrich, a.a.O.

Maria Magdalena. Jedoch war der Consultus und Eruditus Dominus nicht der Rektor der Infima, wenigstens nicht zu den Zeiten unseres jungen Studenten; denn seit 1738 war die Infima – wie dargelegt – dem Augustinerkonvent übertragen, und seit dem Kapitel des Jahres 1740 findet sich auch immer der Name des betreffenden Lehrers in den Akten. Im genannten Jahr war es P. Angelus Lohner, 1743 P. Sebastian Limpert, 1746 P. Laurentius Fröhling und 1749 P. Evodius Braun[31].

1748 schloss Molitor erfolgreich seine gymnasiale Ausbildung in Münnerstadt ab. Von den 14 Schülern seiner Klasse, traten fünf in den Augustiner-Eremitenorden ein: Sie empfingen am 23. Oktober 1748 den schwarzen Habit in Oberndorf am Neckar und begannen ihr Probejahr, das Noviziat[32]. Der Gymnasiallehrer der Aspiranten Cajetan Schmitt, der, wie üblich, nach Abschluss des fünfjährigen Kurses aus dem Schuldienst ausgeschieden war, begleitete sie von Münnerstadt an den Neckar, wurde Novizenmeister[33]. Diese Fünf waren: Johann Peter Bonfig, der sich fortan Cajetan nannte und bereits im Noviziat die Orgel schlug. Er war mit Molitor im November 1743 in die Marianische Kongregation eingetreten, als beide Infimisten waren, grüne Neulinge in Münnerstadt. Im Mai 1747 wurde er zum Consultor, im Dezember 1747 zum Präfekten, zum Vorsitzenden des frommen Vereins gewählt, und am 5. Mai 1748 im Amt bestätigt[34]. Johann Georg Melchior Geissler aus Königshofen erhielt mit Eintritt in das Noviziat den Ordensnamen Bernhard[35]. Er war nicht unter den Infimisten, die im November 1743 in die Kongregation aufgenommen worden waren. Am 7. Mai 1747 wurde er jedoch zum Consultor gewählt. Auch der Jahrgangsgenosse Johann Adam Keul oder Keil, wie Bonfig am 7. Mai 1747 zum Consultor der Marianischen Schülerkongregation in Münnerstadt durch Wahl bestimmt, trat am 23. Oktober 1748 das Noviziat an und wurde von Stund an Hermann

[31] Stdb 2 im PA: S 329 Provinzkapitel in Weil der Stadt 1740 Mai 5. Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum Nr. 814 (Angelus Lohner). S. 329 in Schwäbisch Gemünd 1743 Mai 2. Gesterkamp Nr. 805 (Sebastian Limpert). S. 364 in Weil der Stadt 1746 April 28. Gesterkamp Nr. 381 (Laurentius Fröhling). In Freiburg/Br 1749 April 24. Gesterkamp Nr. 156.

[32] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum Nr. 890 S. 333: Molitor legte am 24. Oktober 1749 die Gelübde ab. Da das Noviziat ein Jahr und ein Tag dauert, muss er am 23. Oktober 1748 das Noviziat begonnen haben.

[33] Zu den Novizen s. Kapitelsakten PA Stb Nr. 2, pag 384s.

[34] Catalogus…omnium sodalium…congregationis Nostrae BMV de Consolatione: In der Versammlung am 7. Mai 1747 wird der Poeta Joannes Petrus Bonfig zum Consultor der Kongregation gewählt.

[35] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 421 S. 165.

genannt. Er sollte ebenfalls mehrere Jahre als Organist wirken: Zunächst noch als Student in Lauingen, dann, schon Priester, in Memmingen, in Uttenweiler, im Schweizer Freiburg und schließlich wieder in Lauingen. Im Juni 1781 reiste er mit dem Subprior des Klosters in Freiburg im Üchtland Benedikt Kiel nach Italien. Es war beider Absicht, dort in die Zisterzienserabtei Casamari einzutreten. Keuls Namen findet sich jedoch nicht im Totenbuch der Abbazia[36]. Auch Benedikt Kiel scheint es nicht bis nach Casamari geschafft zu haben; denn er starb als Hauskaplan bei der Familie Thurn und Taxis in Dischingen[37]. Johann Molitor, als Ordensmann Alexius geheißen, wurde schon in der Novizenliste Komponist genannt. Der fünfte schließlich, Johann Georg Walther, der als Augustiner den Namen Martin tragen sollte, war mit Bonfig und Molitor im November 1743 als Infimist in die Marianische Kongregation eingetreten. Von 1762 bis 1765 sollte er als Lehrer in Münnerstadt tätig werden. Er starb jung, mit 38 Jahren in Memmingen[38].

Zu diesen Fünf stießen Antonius Bentzheimer[39], der im Kloster seinen Taufnamen beibehalten durfte, der aus Würzburg stammte, später nach Bitsch im Elsass versetzt werden sollte, dort als Aushilfspriester und als Terminar arbeitete und bereits 1763 starb[40]; Bartholomäus Mayer aus Gottenau, einem Ort, der östlich von Memmingen liegt. Über das dortige Augustinerkloster wird Mayer in den Orden gekommen sein. Als Mönch nannte er sich Conrad, betrug sich nicht immer mönchsgemäß; denn er wurde in Lauingen „ob graviora crimina" auf ein Jahr in den Klosterkarzer gesteckt und mit der Entlassung aus dem Orden bedroht. Die Strafe traf ihn, weil er, wie den Akten des 1767 gefeierten Kapitels zu entnehmen ist[41], aus dem Konvent in Memmingen geflohen war, sich zu dem lutherischen Pfarrer derselben Stadt begeben und Zivilkleider angelegt hatte, und weil noch andere schwere Verfehlungen aktenkundig geworden waren. In einem fremden Territorium aufgegriffen war er nach Lauingen gebracht worden, wo das Kapitel tagte. Die Kapitelsrichter, die Iudices causarum, untersuchten den Fall, fanden den Angeklagten geständig, aber reuelos. Das Definitorium urteilte nun, dass P. Conrad, wenn er sich in der Haft besönne und zur Umkehr bereit wäre, mit der Erlaubnis des Generalpriors, oder wenn er einen wohlwollenden

[36] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 692 S. 264.
[37] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 693 S. 264f.
[38] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 1380 S. 510f. Gesterkamp schreibt: Walter.
[39] S. Akten der Provinzkapitel. PA Stdb. Nr. 2 pag 384.
[40] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 96 S. 53.
[41] Akten der Provinzkapitel, Lauingen 1767 Mai 7. Im PA Stdb. Nr. 3 pag 40f.

Oberen fände, in eine andere Provinz des Ordens übertreten dürfte. Wenn diese Voraussetzungen jedoch nicht erfüllt würden, sollte er entweder auf Lebenszeit im Kerker bleiben oder aus dem Orden ausgestossen werden. Das Kapitel des Jahres 1783 nennt ihn an letzter Stelle auf der Liste der Lauinger Patres[42]: Er starb zu einem unbekannten Zeitpunkt in Stuttgart[43]. Dort machten seit 1786 Eulogius Schneider, ehemaliger Franziskaner, und 1795/96 Benedikt Maria Werkmeister, ehemaliger Benediktiner, die katholische Hofkapelle zu einem Zentrum radikaler Aufklärung[44]. Zu dem Noviziatskurs gehörten ferner Wendelin Mayr (Mayer), dessen Taufname auch Wendelin war und der aus Heidingsfeld stammte; er sollte später zum Baccalaureus und Magister promoviert, 1779 zum Provinzial gewählt werden, und mehrmals als Definitor und auch als Praeses Capituli fungieren[45]; Jacobus Mohr aus Würzburg, im Kloster Honoratus genannt[46]; Georg Proceller (in den Akten: Brodzeller) aus Mühlhausen (vermutlich bei Würzburg. Wäre Mühlhausen an der Wern gemeint, wäre er in Münnerstadt ans Gymnasium gegangen), der den Klosternamen Clemens annahm. Er starb schon 1764 in Würzburg[47]; Franz Anton Rheinfeld, als Augustiner Ulrich geheißen, aus Neuburg an der Donau, der gewiss über das Kloster Lauingen zum Orden gestoßen ist[48]; Johann Michael Sennenfelder aus Wiesentheid, im Kloster Erwin genannt, der schon 1759 sterben sollte[49]; Matthäus Wucherer aus Würzburg, der als Augustiner Johannes Bonus hieß, 1781, da Subprior des Klosters in Freiburg im Breisgau, Mitglied der von den weltlichen Behörden von der Rheno-Suevia losgetrennten vorderösterreichischen Provinz wurde[50]; und schließlich Johann Balthasar Samhaber aus Gerolzhofen. Der erhielt im Orden den Namen Bonaventura und wirkte 1790 als Director Musices in Würzburg, 1798 als Director Chori Musici daselbst[51].

Es war ein stattliches Kloster, dieses Ordenshaus in Oberndorf, in dem die jungen Männer unter P. Cajetan Schmitts Leitung das

[42] Akten der Provinzkapitel, Würzburg 1783 Juli 6. Im PA Stdb. Nr. 3 pag 154.
[43] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 848 S. 318f.
[44] Zu Schneider s. P. Minges, Geschichte der Franziskaner in Bayern, München 1896, 225; 238. Zu Werkmeister: H. Tüchle, Art. Werkmeister, in: LThK 10, 1965, 1054f.
[45] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 863 S. 324.
[46] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 888 S. 333.
[47] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 1002 S. 371.
[48] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 1040 S. 385.
[49] Gesterkamp, Nr. 1230 S. 457. In den Kapitelakten im PA wird er Lehnenfelder geschrieben.
[50] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 1464 S. 542.
[51] Gesterkamp, Nr. 1096 S. 405f.

Noviziat durchliefen. 1558 hatten es die Augustiner von den Augustinerinnen übernommen und hatten alsbald begonnen, die verrotteten Gebäude durch neue zu ersetzen. 1597 wurde der Ostflügel, der direkt auf den Neckar blickt, errichtet und 1619 der Südflügel. Im nämlichen Jahr wurde auch die Kirche, welche die Nordseite des Quadrums bildete, vom Weihbischof von Konstanz konsekriert. Den Westflügel ließ der Prior Joseph Bassing 1723 aufführen. Alexius Molitor und Genossen sahen also einen Neubau, der allerdings „in sehr nachlässiger Bauweise" errichtet worden war[52]. Nach dem Provinzkapitel des Jahres 1749 schlug der neugewählte Provinzial Dr. Hermann Hermann, der zuvor Prior in Oberndorf gewesen war und nach Ende seiner Amtszeit wieder werden sollte, seinen Sitz in der Neckarstadt auf. Während Hermanns Provinzialat war Simon Will Prior, der gleichzeitig als Sozius des Provinzials fungierte[53].

In der Kirche des Klosters gab es gewiss eine Orgel; denn als Prior Columban Filisdorf 1661 das Gotteshaus „ausweissen" ließ, „und ein new gestühl darein setzen, auch den boden erschütten undt mit besseren stainen belegen", da ließ er auch „die Orgel transferieren von dem ingang des Chors..."[54]

Die rheinisch-schwäbische Provinz hatte im Jahre 1748/49 noch einige Novizen, die unter der Leitung des P. Gelasius Chauffour das Probejahr in Landau durchliefen[55]. Es waren dies Josef Barozy aus Landau, der sein ganzes Ordensleben in seiner Heimatstadt verbringen sollte[56]; Ambrosius Delisle, auch er in Landau geboren, Alipius Delong aus Gommersdorf und Vinzenz Stephan, ebenfalls ein Landauer, der in Bitsch Lehrer der Inferiores und in Landau Professor Rhetorices wurde.

Landau in der Pfalz kann auf eine sehr alte und reiche Musiktradition zurückblicken[57]: In dem Landauer Schulmeister-Eid von

[52] E. Hannmann, Das ehemalige Augustinerkloster. Baugeschichte und denkmalpflegerische Problematik. In: Augustinerklosterkirche – Kulturhaus der Stadt Oberndorf am Neckar, Oberndorf 1978, 10f. Die Baumaßnahme Bassings berichtet auch kurz: A. Höhn, Chronologia Provinciae Rheno-Suevicae Ordinis FF. Eremitarum S.P. Augustini, o.O. 1744, 348.

[53] Kapitelsakten Freiburg Br. 1749 April 24. Im PA Stdb. Nr. 2 pag 384. Zu Hermann Hermann s. Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, 559 S. 215f. Zu Simon Will ebd. Nr. 1441 S. 532.

[54] Protocollum Oberndorf, fol 88r. Im Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. Signatur H 14/15 Nr. 190. Kopie im PA.

[55] Kapitelsakten des Provinzkapitels 1749 April 24 Freiburg Br. Im PA Stdb. Nr. 2 pag 388.

[56] Gesterkamp, Nr. 59 S. 41.

[57] Zum Folgenden: W. Krumbach, Musik in Kirche und Schule, in: Prot. Stiftskirchengemeinde Landau (Hrsg), Die Stiftskirche – Zeugnis des Glaubens und Wahrzeichen Landaus 1333-1983, Landau 1983, 28f.

1432 wurde der Lehrer der Lateinschule verpflichtet, dass er die Schüler zu Chore gehen lassen und auch selbst mitgehen sollte. Ferner: „Von den Cantilenen", die er das Jahr über abhält, „soll er von eyne knaben nit me nemen dann eynen pfen." (soll er von den Knaben nit mehr denn einen Pfennig nehmen)[58]. Der Chor hatte einen großen Auftritt, als der Bischof von Speyer 1456 die Stadt besuchte. Nach Prozession vom Stadttor zur Stiftskirche, an der die Chorherren – in Landau Steigerherren genannt – und auch die Augustinermönche teilnahmen, „sange man eyn lobliche missa von vielen stimmen zu Ehren der Sancta Maria mit orgelen und ander loblichen gesängen." Mit Einführung der Reformation in Landau nahm die Kirchenmusik keineswegs ab, sondern eher neuen Aufschwung, wobei die Figuralmusik weiterhin Aufgabe des Chores der Lateinschule blieb. Die Leistungen müssen sich auf hohem Niveau bewegt haben, da es kein Zufall sein kann, dass der Speyerer Gymnasialdirektor Abraham Schadäus den 2.Band seines „Promptuarium musicum", 1612 zu Straßburg gedruckt, dem Rat der Stadt Landau widmete, dessen Musikliebe, wie in der Vorrede gerühmt wird, weithin bekannt sei. Dieser Band enthält einhundert Motetten zu fünf bis acht Stimmen für das Kirchenjahr zwischen Ostern und Pfingsten. Das Musikgut jener Zeit aus ganz Europa wird dargeboten – bis zu Palestrinas und Giovanni Gabrielis Kompositionen. Caspar Vincentius, Domorganist in Speyer und Worms, hat dieses reiche Repertoire mit einer Orgelbegleitung nach Art des gerade in Italien aufkommenden, in Deutschland noch weithin unbekannten Basso continuo versehen. Das Promptuarium diente, wie Wilhelm Krumbach betont, beiden Konfessionen. So mögen es auch die Augustiner, die sich trotz Reformation in der pfälzischen Reichsstadt halten konnten, kennen gelernt und in der rheinisch-schwäbischen Provinz verbreitet haben.

Durch den Frieden von Münster wurde Landau 1648 mit neun anderen elsässischen Reichsstädten dem Königreich Frankreich zugeschlagen, jedoch rückte erst 1679 eine französische Besatzung ein. 1687 reiste dann der bedeutende fanzösische Festungsbaumeister Vauban an, um die topographischen Gegebenheiten in Augenschein zu nehmen, da hier „die stärkste Festung der Christenheit" entstehen sollte. Schon im folgenden Jahr wurde der Grundstein dazu gelegt[59]. Frankreich versuchte zunehmend, die Stadt vom Reich zu trennen,

[58] Der Eid wird bei Krumbach in modernem Deutsch zitiert. In der Originalsprache bei R. Fendler, Landau und seine Schulen, in: Landau in der Pfalz, Landau 1974, 332.

[59] R. Fendler, 342.

was sich sogar auf die Orden auswirkte. Im Jahre 1722 machte Marschall Du Bourg, Kommandant von Straßburg, ein Königliches Mandat bekannt, welches anordnete, dass alle Prioren und Subprioren, die nicht Untertanen des Königs sind, das Elsass so bald als möglich zu verlassen hätten, und durch Subjekte des Königs zu ersetzen seien. Nach Höhn[60] wurde für die elsässischen Augustinerklöster ein Provinzvikar ernannt: P. Bonaventura Beck, der ein Elsässer aus Mackenheim war[61]. Dem Provinzial Dr.Marianus Goth war es nicht möglich, die unter französischer Herrschaft stehenden Klöster der rheinisch-schwäbischen Provinz zu besuchen. Es war eine kleine Sensation, als sich der Provinzial Dr. Martin Dröscher 1736 nicht nur die Erlaubnis erwirkte, die Ordenshäuser im Elsass visitieren, sondern sogar das Provinzkapitel in Landau halten zu dürfen[62]. Die Prioren von Colmar, Hagenau, Weißenburg usw. konnten noch einige Jahrzehnte lang an den den Provinzkapiteln teilnehmen. Erst 1764 stellte das Kapitel zu Speyer lakonisch fest: „Die hochwürdigen Patres Prioren aus dem Elsass sind ähnlich wie andere nicht erschienen“[63]. In der Tat sind 1764 die Konvente Bitsch, Colmar, Hagenau, Landau, Rappoltsweiler und Weissenburg von der rheinisch-schwäbischen Provinz abgetrennt worden und bildeten die elsässische Provinz[64]. Staatlicher Druck war wohl ausgeübt worden, stieß jedoch bei den unter französischer Herrschaft lebenden Augustinern nicht auf Widerstand. Halb zog man sie, halb sanken sie hin[65].

Schon 1748/49 dürften die Novizen in Oberndorf und die in Landau kaum von einander Kenntnis gehabt haben.

Am 24. Oktober 1749 legten in Münnerstadt die Gelübde ab[66] die Fratres Caietan Bonfig, Bernhard Geissler, Hermann Keul (Keil), Alexius Molitor und Martin Walter. In Würzburg banden sich – natürlich auch am 24. Oktober – durch die Profess an den Orden die Fratres Antonius Bentzheimer, Wendelin Mayr, Honoratus Mohr, Clemens Proceller, Bonaventura Samhaber, Erwin Sennenfelder und Johannes Bonus Wucherer. Conrad Mayer gelobte Armut, Keuschheit und Gehorsam in Memmingen und Ulrich Rheinfeld in Lauingen. Die

[60] A. Höhn, Chronologia Provinciae Rheno-Suevicae Ordinis FF. Eremitarum S.P.Augustini, o.O. 1744, 345f.

[61] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 86 S. 51.

[62] M. Wernicke, Hospiz der Augustiner in Wiesloch, in: Cor Unum 55 (Würzburg 1997) 99.

[63] Akten der Provinzkapitel Speyer 1764 Mai 10-15. PA Stdb. Nr. 3 fol 6v.

[64] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, 11.

[65] T. Beckmann / A. Zumkeller, Geschichte des Würzburger Augustinerklosters von der Gründung im Jahre 1262 bis zur Gegenwart, Würzburg 2001, 400f.

[66] Über den Ort s. Gesterkamp. Oben die entsprechenden Fußnoten.

Profess fand also jeweils in dem Kloster statt, das dem Heimatort der jungen Männer am nächsten lag, so dass die Angehörigen an der Feier teilnehmen konnten.

Sofort nach der Profess begann das zweijährige Studium der Philosophie. Jedes Kapitel wählte von neuem die Studienorte und die Lektoren, die Lehrer der jungen Leute [67]. Das Provinzkapitel, das im April 1749, im Jahr der Profess Molitors, im deutschen Freiburg gefeiert wurde, bestimmte folgende Häuser, in denen die jungen Leute Philosophie studieren sollten: den gastgebenden Konvent Freiburg im Breisgau, wo Blasius Schlender[68] als Lektor wirkte, und Konstanz, wo Alexander Samhaber dozierte[69]. In eines dieser beiden Klöster ist Molitor nach Ablegung der Gelübde versetzt worden. Wenn er denn in Freiburg studiert haben sollte, so lernte er dort seinen Mitbruder Felix Gass aus Neustadt an der Saale kennen, der schon als Kleriker in Freiburg Organist war, später in Freiburg im Üchtland die Orgel spielte, 1743 ins deutsche Freiburg zurückkehrte und dort bis zu seinem Tode im Jahre 1752 als Organist und Komponist wirkte[70].

Das Provinzkapitel, das am 20. April 1752 in Oberndorf begann[71], sah Johann Adam Molitor als Student im Augustinerkloster Mainz. Nach einem Exemplar der Kapitelsakten, das im Stadtarchiv Mainz aufbewahrt wird, war er Subdiakon[72]. Mit ihm widmeten sich dort seine Kursgenossen Anton Bentzheimer, Cajetan Bonfig, beide bereits Diakone, Bonaventura Samhaber, Martin Walter und Erwin Sennenfelder der Wissenschaft. Es gab noch zwei ältere Studenten, die schon Priester waren: Gerhard Schellenberger und Thomas Gibbon de Burgo, ein Ire. Lektor in Mainz war Hermann Bocklett. Nach den Kapitelsakten, die im Provinzarchiv zu Würzburg aufbewahrt werden, lehrte er Philosophie, nach dem Mainzer Exemplar jedoch Theologie, was wahrscheinlicher ist; denn Molitor und seine Kursgenossen, die in Mainz die jüngsten Studenten waren, hatten, wie bekannt, 1749 ihr Studium aufgenommen. Es ist kaum glaubhaft, dass sie sich nach drei Jahren noch mit der Philosophie befassten. Der

[67] S.Th. Beckmann / A. Zumkeller, Geschichte des Würzburger Augustinerklosters, 342f.

[68] Provinzkapitel Freiburg Br. 1749 April 24, PA Stdb. Nr. 2 pag 381.

[69] Ebd. pag 384.

[70] Protocollum Freiburg Br., pag 279 (Fotokopie im Augustinus-Institut Würzburg):...V.P. Felix Gass componista et organista... Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr. 405 S. 159.

[71] Provinzkapitel Oberndorf 1752 April 20. Stdb. Nr. 2, pag 399. Im PA.

[72] Provinzkapitel Oberndorf 1752 April 20. Stadtarchiv Mainz Signatur 13/71 fol 297r.

Abschreiber der in Würzburg aufbewahrten Akten hat gewiss einen Flüchtigkeitsfehler begangen; dem in dem Exemplar der Kapitelsakten, das im Mainzer Stadtarchiv liegt, werden die acht jungen Männer auch ausdrücklich Theologiae Studiosi genannt.

Der Lehrer dieser Studiosi, Hermann Bocklett, war ein Franke aus Bad Kissingen. Er wurde 1761 zum Baccalaureus promoviert, gab vorher schon – 1758 – zusammen mit P.Dr. Isidor Keppler[73], Professor in Erfurt, ein Gutachten ab über die Doktorarbeit des Augustiners Jordan Simon. Der nun war Professor an der Universität Erfurt (schon bevor er zum Doktor promoviert wurde). Er stand, wie Erich Kleineidam befindet, „auf der Höhe der Zeit"[74], war also ein Aufklärungstheologe wie sein Mitbruder Engelbert Klüpfel, einer, der das Studium der Gottesgelehrsamkeit reformieren, es wegführen wollte von fruchtlosen Disputationen, von Spekulationen, die nicht in den Fontes, der Heiligen Schrift, den Vätern, der Kirchengeschichte ihre Argumente suchte. Bocklett, der bis 1764 Lektor der Theologie in Mainz blieb, war als einer, der über Simons Arbeit zu urteilen hatte, gewiss ein Gelehrter, der auch auf der Höhe der Zeit war. 1764 erhielt er vom Kapitel die Weisung, sich an einer Universität um das Doktorat zu bewerben. Die Teilnehmerliste des Kapitels 1767 führt ihn als Magister, als Doktor also[75].

Zum Prior des bedeutenden Konventes in Mainz war Dr. Alexander Zitter wiedergewählt worden „propter continuationem aedificii". Er sollte also einen begonnen Bau weiterführen. Zitter, der übrigens ein Franke aus Neustadt an der Saale war, sollte sechs Jahre später zum Provinzial gewählt werden[76].

Der Konvent verfügte über mehrere Organisten: P. Bernhard Dehn (Then, Theen) aus Ettleben, der schon seit 1725 in Mainz die Königin der Instrumente spielte[77]; P. Anton Mühlfelder aus Schweinau bei Nürnberg, der vor seinem Mainzer Aufenthalt bereits in Uttenweiler Organist war, später in Erfurt, Breisach, in Freiburg in der Schweiz, Oberndorf und Schwäbisch Gemünd die Kirchenmusik pflegte[78]; schließlich P. Cölestin Wüst aus Kleinwenkheim, der nach kurzer Dienstzeit in Uttenweiler von 1749 bis zu seinem Tode 1761 die Orgel in Mainz spielte, und den das Totenbuch des Augustinerklosters Uttenweiler „Organista celeberrimus" nennt[79]. Die musikali-

[73] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr 684 S. 261.
[74] E. Kleineidam, Universitas Studii Erffordensis IV, Leipzig 1988, 147.
[75] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr 131 S. 65.
[76] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr 1494 S. 553.
[77] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr 228, S. 97.
[78] Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr 910, S. 342.
[79] Zitiert bei Gesterkamp Nr 1467 S. 542f.

schen Fratres Cajetan Bonfig, Alexius Molitor und Bonaventura Samhaber sind also in einen Konvent gekommen, der ihrer Begabung wahrscheinlich förderlich war.

Am 22. Dezember 1753 wurde Molitor zum Priester geweiht. Dennoch war sein Studium noch nicht abgeschlossen. In den Akten des Provinzkapitels, das am 17. April 1755 in Mainz eröffnet wurde, werden Cajetan Bonfig, Alexius Molitor, Bonaventura Samhaber, Martin Walter, Erwin Sennenfelder, die alle bereits Patres sind, als Sacrorum canonum auditores geführt. Zu ihnen waren noch die Kurskollegen Wendelin Mayer und Clemens Prozeller gestoßen, die allerdings die Priesterweihe noch nicht empfangen hatten[80]. Der Lehrer der Studenten war P. Baccalaureus Alexander Samhaber.

Die Rechtswissenschaft war das Eingangstor, durch das aufgeklärtes Gedankengut in das katholische Deutschland gelangte. Fürst der Kanonisten aber war Johann Caspar Barthel, ein Schüler Prospero Lambertinis, des späteren Papstes Benedikt XIV., der ihn mit der historisch-kritischen Methode vertraut gemacht hatte, seit 1727 Professor der Kanonistik an der Würzburger Universität und Regens des Priesterseminars[81]. Durch seine Lehrtätigkeit entwickelte sich die Hohe Schule zu einem der tonangebenden geistigen Zentren der Aufklärung im Südwesten des Reiches. Barthel löste sich von der bis dahin von den Kanonisten betriebenen isolierten Exegese des päpstlichen Dekretalenrechts und suchte aus den Quellen die Eigenständigkeit und das geschichtliche Gewachsensein der Rechte der deutschen Reichskirche gegenüber dem römischen Papsttum zu beweisen und nachzuzeichnen. Er lehrte, wie 1796 der spätere Würzburger Weihbischof Georg Zirkel schrieb, „die deutsche Kirche ihre Rechte und Selbständigkeit fühlen". Die Kehrseite dieser die Freiheit der Germania Sacra verherrlichenden Medaille war Barthels Wendung gegen die aus Pseudoisidor abgeleiteten absolutistisch-monarchischen Ansprüche und Rechte der Päpste. Jedoch blieb der Würzburger Professor völlig auf dem Boden des katholischen Glaubens und Lebens, folgte nicht dem Weg einiger seiner Schüler, der in den Febronianismus mündete.

[80] Provinzkapitel Mainz 1755 April 17. PA Stdb. Nr. 2 pag 419. Akten im Stadtarchiv Mainz fol 309r.

[81] Heribert Raab, Die „katholische Ideenrevolution" des 18. Jahrhunderts. Der Einbruch der Geschichte in die Kanonistik und die Auswirkungen in Kirche und Reich bis zum Emser Kongress. In: Harm Klueting (Hrsg), Katholische Aufklärung – Aufklärung im katholischen Deutschland, Hamburg 1993, 104-118. Friedrich Merzbacher, Johann Caspar Barthel (1697-1771), in: Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter 39 (1977) 183-201. Anton Schindling, Die Julius-Universität im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, in: Peter Baumgart (Hrsg), Vierhundert Jahre Universität Würzburg. Eine Festschrift, Neustadt Aisch 1982, 77-128.

Ein direkter Einfluss Barthels auf die Augustiner der rheinisch-schwäbischen Provinz ist nicht nachweisbar; denn seit Augustin Gibbon de Burgo, dem Iren und späteren Provinzial der Rheno-Suevica, der am 16.September 1655 imatrikuliert wurde[82], hat von ihnen keiner mehr an der Alma Julia Herbipolensis studiert. Freilich kannten sie den berühmten Professor, Regens und Kanonikus an Stift Haug vielleicht sogar aus persönlichen Begegnungen, sicher aber von dessen Auftritten bei festlichen Anlässen. So hörten sie Barthels lateinische Ansprache, als sie sich im Dom einfanden, um den von der Huldigungsreise zurückkehrenden Fürstbischof Anselm Franz von Ingelheim zu begrüßen[83].

In Mainz, wo Molitor studierte, dozierte zwar Peter Anton Frank, ein Schüler Barthels, die Rechte, war aber erst 1770 Professor daselbst geworden[84]. Ein anderer Professor, der in Würzburg studiert hatte, war Johann Jung. Noch später als Frank, nämlich 1783, nahm er in Mainz die Lehrtätigkeit auf. Er dozierte Kirchengeschichte, die erst durch die Aufklärung einen Platz im theologischen Fächerkanon gefunden hatte. Zwar übernahm er die auch erst seit der Aufklärung gültige Einteilung der Kirchengeschichte in die Perioden der Formatio, der Deformatio und Reformatio, zwar rezipierte er auch protestantische Autoren und war von Febronius beeindruckt, verfolgte jedoch in der Theologie als Ex-Jesuit eine eher traditionell-konservative Richtung[85].

Den Augustinern in Mainz aber ging es ähnlich wie denen in Würzburg: Seit fast einem Jahrhundert hatte keiner von ihnen dort den Doktorgrad erhalten. 1668 wurde Florentius Minodt[86], 1670 Carolus Le Clerc, der zwar Franzose, jedoch Mitglied der rheinisch-schwäbischen Provinz, später sogar deren Provinzial war, zusammen mit seinem Mitbruder Konrad Wagenhauser promoviert[87]. Schon sie mussten sich durch Unterschrift verpflichten, dass sie keine Professur

[82] Die Matrikel der Universität Würzburg Hrsgegeb. von Sebastian Merkle. Erster Teil. Erste Hälfte. München und Leipzig 1922, 232.

[83] Thomas Beckmann/Adolar Zumkeller, Geschichte des Würzburger Augustinerklosters von der Gründung im Jahre 1262 bis zur Gegenwart, Würzburg 2001, 288f.

[84] Walter Killy (Hrsg), Deutsche biographische Enzyklopädie (DBE). Band 3, Darmstadt 1996, 402.f

[85] Dominik Burkard, Art. Jung, Johannes, in: W.Bantz/T.Bantz (Hrsg), Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon. XVII. Band. Ergänzungen IV. Herzberg 2000, 724-733.

[86] A. Höhn, Chronologia Provinciae Rheno-Suevice Ordinis FF. Eremitarum S.P. Augustini, 1744, 294. Erich Kleineidam, Universitas Studii Erffordensis IV, Leipzig 1988, 50.

[87] A. Höhn, 303.

an der Universität anstreben wollten. Als sie es doch taten, wurden sie von der Fakultät und vom Erzbischof-Kurfürsten abgewiesen. Die Lehrstühle blieben den Benediktinern vorbehalten. Noch 1761 wurde Alexander Samhabers Bitte, zur Promotion zugelassen zu werden vom Erzbischof abschlägig beschieden, weil er überhaupt alle Bettelmönche als Doktoranden ablehnte. Dabei war die Fakultät bereit gewesen, Samhaber die Doktorwürde zu verleihen[88].

Wenn auch direkte Verbindungen der Augustiner zu den Protagonisten der Aufklärung im südlichen Deutschland nicht sichtbar sind, so verbreitete sich doch die „katholische Ideenrevolution" in der rheinisch-schwäbischen Provinz. Isidor Keppler[89], der im Erfurter Kloster Theologie dozierte und 1749 an der dortigen Universität zum Doktor promoviert wurde, legte nicht mehr das barocke Dogmatikwerk seines Ordensgenossen Augustin Gibbon aus, wie es bisher üblich war, sondern das Lehrbuch des italienischen Augustiners Gian Lorenzo Berti „De theologicis disciplinis". Der erging sich nicht in Spekulationen, sondern stützte sich auf die Doktrin des Ordensvaters Augustinus, was patristisch-historische Studien voraussetzte. Die Ausgabe dieses Werkes, die 1749/50 in zehn Bänden bei J.Gastel in Stadt am Hof erschien, trägt dann auch den bezeichnenden Titel: "...Theologia historico-dogmatico-scholastica, seu libri de theologicis disciplinis, opus...primo octo tomis editum Romae, quibus novissime accesserunt duo tomi, comprehendentes Augustinianum systema de gratia..." Kepler war Professor an der Universität Erfurt und mit ihm die Ordensgenossen Johannes Renniger, unter dem Alexander Samhaber 1743 im Kloster zu Uttenweiler die Moraltheologie studiert hatte[90], und Basilius Schlender, der 1749 in Freiburg im Breisgau Philosophie doziert hatte und dort vielleicht Molitors Lehrer gewesen war. In Erfurt studierte Engelbert Klüpfel, später ein führender Theologe der Aufklärungszeit. Er wurde 1767 an die vorderösterreichische Universität in Freiburg im Breisgau berufen, wo er die von Stephan Rautenstrauch konzipierte und von Kaiser Joseph II. mit nicht nur sanfter Gewalt durchgesetzte Reform des Theologiestudiums stützen und tragen sollte, welcher Aufgabe sich

[88] Kleineidam, a.a.O. 50.

[89] Zu ihm und zum Folgenden Kleineidam, a.a.O. 129ff. Zu Berti s. F. Rojo, Ensayo bibliográfico de Noris, Bellelli y Berti, in: Analecta Augustiniana 26 (Roma 1963) 336-356. Der Titel des Werkes Bertis:...Joannis Laurentii Berti,...librorum de theologicis disciplinis. Romae, Antonius de Rubeis, 1739-1745. 8 Bände. Schon 1751 schafften es die Erfurter Augustiner an.

[90] Akten der Provinzkapitel. Schwäbisch Gemünd 1743 Mai 2. Stdb. Nr. 2 im PA pp. 344s.

Klüpfel mit Bravour entledigte. Im Programm Rautenstrauchs werden die Bestrebungen der katholischen Aufklärung gebündelt, weswegen es sich lohnt, einen Blick darauf zu werfen: Inhaltlich sollte die Theologie durch ein gründliches Studium der Quellen und durch stärkere Berücksichtigung der beruflichen Erfordernisse bereichert werden. Deswegen hatten die Studenten die für das Lesen der ersten Quelle, der Hl.Schrift, notwendigen Sprachen Hebräisch und Griechisch zu erlernen. Die Dogmatik, die Klüpfel immerhin 38 Jahre lang in Freiburg vertrat, sollte das Herz der Hörer ergreifen, um „würdige Diener des Evangeliums und vollkommene Seelsorger zu bilden", heißt es in der Einleitung für Lehrer der Dogmatik von 1776. Man traute dem hl.Augustinus, dem der Lehrer Klüpfel als seinem Lehrer folgen sollte und wollte, eher zu, das Herz der Studenten zu ergreifen als den Spekulationen der Jesuiten. Es wurde ein Lehrstuhl für Pastoraltheologie eingerichtet und die Studenten wurden verpflichtet, die geistliche Beredsamkeit beim Professor für „deutsche Wohlredenheit" zu hören[91].

Der Theologie der katholischen Aufklärung war es ein dringliches Anliegen, die Menschen zum praktischen Christentum zu führen. Der berühmte Würzburger Professor der Dogmatik Franz Oberthür betonte eher das „Rechthandeln" als das „Rechtglauben" „und wollte zurVervollkommnung von Humanität und Volksbildung anleiten[92]. Auch den Aufklärern, die von der Religionskritik sich von Theologie und Kirche abgewandt hatten, lag das Volkswohl und die Hebung der Bildung auch in ärmeren Schichten am Herzen.

Als Molitor nach Mainz versetzt wurde, hatten die Ideen die Aufklärung im Augustinerkloster und in Stadt und Kurfürstentum eine Heimstatt, lagen in der geistigen Luft, die der junge Mönch atmetete. Schon seit einem Jahrzehnt war Johann Friedrich Karl Reichsgraf von Ostein Kurfürst und Erzbischof des Hochstiftes. Im Jahre 1743 war er gewählt worden[93]. In der Reichspolitik war der Einfluss des Regenten zwar sehr begrenzt, innenpolitisch aber hatte er Erfolge zu verzeichnen, die er freilich der Klugheit seines Vetters Anton Heinrich Friedrich von Stadion verdankte, den er zum Staatsminister und persönlichen Berater

[91] Wendelin Rauch, Engelbert Klüpfel, ein führender Theologe der Aufklärungszeit, Freiburg im Breisgau 1922, 40, 41f.

[92] Anton Schindling, Professor Franz Berg, ein Aufklärer in Würzburg, in: Rottenburger Jahrbuch für Kirchengeschichte 3 (1984) 42.

[93] Zum Folgenden: F. Jürgensmeier, Art. Ostein, Johann Friedrich Karl (seit 1712 Reichsgraf) von (1689-1763), in: E. Gatz, Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches 1648 bis 1803, Berlin 1990, 331-334. H. Leitermann, Zweitausend Jahre Mainz, Mainz 1962, 142f.

berief. Der, Anhänger der französischen Aufklärung, am Volkswohl orientierter Merkantilist, Feind der Jesuiten und der römischen Kurie, gründete 1746 die Höchster Porzellanmanufaktur, jährlich zwei Messen, eine Handelskammer und ein Handelsgericht. Durch Ausbau von Straßen und Wasserwegen hob er die Infrastruktur, verbesserte die Rechtspflege durch Einführung des Kurmainzer Landrechtes und hob das Volksschulwesen. Der Erzbischof selbst war an Wissenschaften und Kunst sehr interessiert. Er ließ einen botanischen Garten anlegen, das anatomische Institut wurde errichtet und die Universitätsbibliothek ausgebaut. Er veranlasste auch Reformen des Theologiestudiums: Die Exegese erhielt einen hervorragenderen Platz, die Kirchengeschichte konnte sich etablieren. Mit der Berufung des Intendanten Konrad Ernst Ackermann und seiner Truppe nahm das Mainzer Theater einen ungeahnten Aufschwung. Das klassische französische Drama und die italienische Oper verdrängten das lateinische Jesuitendrama.

Besonders begeisterte sich Ostein für die Musik, für Bach und Händel. 1763 gab der junge Mozart in Mainz ein Konzert. Dem Erzbischof gelang es, den böhmischen Komponisten Johannes Zach als Hofkapellmeister an seine Residenz zu ziehen, von dem viele Messen, Motette, Hymnen, Symphonien, Quartette und Konzerte erhalten sind. Molitor lebte also in einer für seine Kunst anregenden Atmosphäre.

Die Anregungen waren bei Molitor nicht verloren. Es waren aber Anregungen für einen schon geformten Komponisten. Man darf vermuten, dass die Begabung des Augustiners in Münnerstadt entdeckt worden war, dass sie sich entfalten und weiter entwickeln konnte im Raum der Traditionen des Ordens. Zwar gibt es noch keine umfassende Untersuchung über die Bedeutung der Augustiner-Eremiten für die Pflege der Musik in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Man darf aber sagen, dass die Musik früh ein wesentlicher Bestandteil in der Liturgie des Ordens war. Augustinus hinterließ nicht nur die älteste Klosterregel des Abendlandes, sondern äußerte sich auch wie kein anderer Theolge der Spätantike zur Musik. Diesem musikalischen Erbe sind die Regensburger Konstitutionen von 1290 verpflichtet, die als eine der Aufgaben des Novizenmeisters die Unterweisung der Ordensaspiranten in Chorgebet und Liturgischem Gesang nennen[94]. 1308 verfügte das Generalklapitel in Genua die Einrichtung

[94] Constutiones Ratisbonenses, Capitulum XVII. – Quales debeat esse magister novitiorum et de quibus ipsi novitii instruantur. Nr 111…Instruat eos de Regula, de Constitutionibus, de Officio, de cantu, de moribus, de signis, et aliis observantiis Ordinis. Schon im Capitulum XVI. – De tempore et qualitate eorum, qui ad Ordinem recipiuntur, wird verlangt, dass der Kandidat singen könne oder wenigstens zu der Hoffnung berechtige, den Gesang zu erlernen: Nr. 104. Pro Clerico autem nullus

eigener Gesangsschulen in den einzelnen Konventen durch die Provinzkapitel[95].

In diese Tradition wuchs Molitor hinein, als er im Jahre 1743 in Münnerstadt seine Gymnasialstudien aufnahm. Was Kirchengesang und Kirchenmusik betrifft, so wurde bei den Münnerstädter Augustinern im 18. Jahrhundert viel Wert sowohl auf die Ausbildung der Schüler als auch auf die Ausübung der Musik – namentlich des Gregorianischen Chorals – gelegt. 1736 gab der damalige Provinzial Dr. Sigismund Büttner zu Konstanz ein eigenes „Cantuale Augustiniano-Romanum" heraus, das neben einer Choralschule die ordenseigenen Choralmelodien enthielt. Im Vorwort zu diesem Werk trug der Provinzial den Novizenmeistern auf, die Novizen und Studenten des Ordens eifrig im Choralgesang zu unterrichten. Dass diese Vorschrift in Münnerstadt befolgt wurde, beweisen die mehr als 15 Cantuale, die noch heute in der Münnerstädter Klosterbibliothek aufbewahrt werden und die deutliche Spuren häufigen Gebrauchs tragen[96]. Auch die polyphone Musik wurde gepflegt: Das Miserere, das an jedem Mittwoch der Fastenzeit zu beten war, die Litanei, die an allen Samstagen und Vigilien stattfand, konnte auch mehrstimmig gesungen werden[97]. Am Festtag des hl. Sebastian, so berichtet der Chronist des Münnerstädter Klosters, wurde alljährlich ein „musicalisch ampt" in der Klosterkirche gefeiert. Es ist anzunehmen, dass damit eine instrumental begleitete Messe gemeint ist[98]. In einem Stundenplan des Gymnasiums vom Jahre 1773/74 ist der Mittwoch zwar als Erholungstag vorgesehen, „nach dem Mittagessen" jedoch „sind musikalische Übungen" angesetzt[99].

Novitius recipiatur ad Ordinem, nisi legere vel cantare sciverit competenter, vel sit docibilis aut aptus ad addiscendum. S. Ignacio Aramburu Cendoya, O.S.A., Las primitivas Constituciones de los Agustinos (Ratisbonenses del año 1290), Valladolid 1966, pp. 58; 59.

[95] Antiquiores quae extant definitiones capitulorum generalium ordinis. XI. Capitulum Generale Januense, in Analecta Augustiniana 3 (Roma 1909/10), 79: Item diffinimus quod vicarii et diffinitores provincialium capitulorum scolas in cantu in quolibet conuentu sue provincie, sub certa pena imponenda priori qui tales scolas seruare non fecerit, debeant ordinare. Zum Ganzen vgl. Finscher, Ludwig (Hrsg.), Art. Augustiner-Eremiten, in: Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart (MGG), 2. neubearb. Ausgabe, Sachteil Bd.1, Kassel, London usw. 1994, Sp. 1034.

[96] S. Back / A. Zumkeller, Das Augustinerkloster Münnerstadt, 165. Ebd Anm. 390 wird die entsprechende Mahnung Büttners zitiert: Quo autem exactius cantus choralis addiscatur, praecipio ac mando, ut RR.PP. Subpriores vel Magistri Novitiorum curae suae commissos Fratres Clericos in praescriptis canendi methodos sedulo instruant et exerceant. Vgl. MGG, a.a.O., 1036.

[97] Kunzelmann, a.a.O., 11.

[98] S. Back / A. Zumkeller, Das Augustinerkloster in Münnerstadt, Würzburg 1975, 165.

[99] A. Kunzelmann, a.a.O., 19. MGG, a.a.O., Sp.1037.

In dieser der Musik freundlichen Umgebung fing Alexius Molitor, der begabte junge Mann, früh an zu komponieren, wird er doch bereits als Novize Komponist genannt. Aus seinem musikalischem Schaffen sind uns heute 17 Messen, zwei Requiem und zwei Oratorien bekannt. Zu diesen größeren Formen treten einige kleinere Werke. Die Entstehungszeit dieser Werke dürfte von 1747 bis zu Molitors frühem Tod 1753 anzusiedeln sein; doch stehen wir hier vor dem Problem der Datierbarkeit – keines dieser Werke trägt ein Entstehungsdatum. Die Überlieferungslage ist durchweg gut. Oft sind die Stücke zwei- bis dreimal überliefert, das Requiem in Es-Dur sogar siebenmal. Die weite Verbreitung der Werke sticht ins Auge: Kompositionen von Molitor finden sich von Fulda über Ebrach, Weyarn, Konstanz, Ottobeuren bis Einsiedeln. Geht man davon aus, dass es sich hierbei nur noch um einen Bruchteil des Repertoires handelt, das vor der Säkularisation und vor den beiden Weltkriegen vorhanden war, zeigt sich, dass Molitor ein sehr bekannter Komponist seiner Zeit gewesen sein muss. Bemerkenswert hierbei ist, dass seine Werke nicht nur in Augustinerkonventen, sondern auch in Bibliotheken anderer Orden und fürstäbtlicher Höfe zu finden sind. Das Requiem in Es-Dur wurde anlässlich des Todes von Kaiser Josef II. sogar noch 17 Jahre nach Molitors Hinscheiden im Frankfurter Dom aufgeführt[100].

Molitor beschäftigt meist einen Klangkörper mit vierstimmigem Chor, erster und zweiter Violine, häufig Bratsche, Orgel, zwei Hörner und zwei Trompeten mit Pauken. Zu dieser Besetzung treten als nächstes noch vor den Oboen die Flöten hinzu. Diese Bevorzugung der Flöten vor den Oboen deutet mit ziemlicher Sicherheit auf Johannes Zach als Lehrer hin. Mit ihm gemein hat er daneben die Vorliebe für Synkopen und die Sparsamkeit der Ausweichungen[101]. Seine Instrumentalsätze erinnnern an Andantes aus den ersten Streichquartetten Haydns durch die vorsichtige Ablösung der Bratsche vom Generalbass, wie das auch Zach bereits versucht. Andererseits müssen aber auch süddeutsche Einflüsse angenommen werden, denn in seinem Oratorium „Daniel" benutzt er zum Teil zwei Bratschen.

Als ausgezeichnetes Beispiel für Molitors Schaffen sei nun die „Missa Solemnis in g/D" vorgestellt. Schon vor jeglicher eingehender

[100] Gottron, Adam, Der Komponist Alexius Molitor, O.Er.S.Aug. ein Student der Mainzer Universität, in: Jahrbuch der Vereinigung Freunde der Universität Mainz 9 (1960) 49.

[101] Ebd. 51.

Arbeit an der Messe sticht der doppelte Titel ins Auge: g-Moll und D-Dur. Die Messe beginnt in klingendem g-Moll – notiert allerdings nach altem Stil in g-Dorisch – und endet in strahlendem D-Dur. Die obsolete Vorzeichensetzung erstaunt in der gleichen Art im ersten Teil des „Agnus Dei" (eng verwandt mit dem Kyrie) und dem „Tu Solus" des „Gloria". Vielleicht ist mit dieser alten Tradition die Notiz auf dem Umschlag einer Quelle zu verstehen: „Majestatem ecclesiarum auget stylus antiquus". Wie noch gezeigt wird, steht und stellt sich Molitor bewusst an den Übergang von Barock zu Klassik und bietet ein Beispiel zauberhafter vorklassischer Kompositionskunst.

Zu den Quellen: Die umfangreichste und einheitlichste Quelle stammt aus der Bibliothek der Fürstäbtlichen Hofkapelle Fulda, die danach anzusiedelnde aus der Bibliothek der Zisterzienserabtei Ebrach; bei der dritten, kürzesten – und interessantesten – Quelle handelt es sich um eine Art „Missa brevis-Bearbeitung" der Messe. Diese Handschrift stammt aus dem kleinen Örtchen Kleinbardorf und wurde vermutlich von einem Dorfschullehrer zum Gebrauch auf dem Lande gekürzt und vereinfacht. Zu diesen drei Manuskripten kommt eine Spartenabschrift des dritten Teiles des „Kyrie", des kompletten „Gloria" und des „Dona nobis", die 1951 durch den schon erwähnten Mainzer Prälaten und Musikwissenschaftler Prof. Dr. Adam Gottron angefertigt wurden.

Die Handschrift der Fürstäbtlichen Hofkapelle zu Fulda ist auf etwa 1760 datierbar, weist als einzige die volle Besetzung Canto, Alto, Tenore, Basso, Violine I/II, Viola, Horn I/II, Trompete I/II, Orgel und Pauke auf und hat neben der größten Anzahl von Takten das einheitlichste Äußere. Der Schreiber dieser Quelle ist uns namentlich bekannt. Er hieß Knauff. Er verzierte die Einzelstimmen sogar mit Farben.

Nur 17 Takte weniger hat die zweite Quelle, das Manuskript aus Ebrach. Es weist eine kürzere Fassung des dritten Kyrie-Teils auf. Diese Quelle ist auf etwa 1780 zu datieren. Sie ist deutlich weniger liebevoll und einheitlich gestaltet als die Handschrift aus Fulda. Außerdem fehlt in Ebrach die Paukenstimme. Es müssen zwei Schreiberhände angenommen werden, obwohl am Ende der Orgelstimme die Initialen „J.M.F." stehen. Gab es in der Fuldaer Quelle wenige Korrekturen und Fehler, so häufen sie sich in Ebrach. Es deutet also vieles darauf hin, dass bei der Fuldaer Fassung eine größere zeitliche – und vielleicht auch räumliche? – Nähe zum Komponisten gegeben ist als bei der Ebracher Version.

Besonders eklatant werden die Unterschiede zur nächsten Handschrift. Sie stammt aus Kleinbardorf bei Kitzingen und zeigt mit

ihren 984 – im Gegensatz zu 1325 – Takten eine Art „Missa-brevis-Fassung" der „Missa Solemnis". Die vielen Korrekturen, das uneinheitliche Äußere und die nochmals spätere Datierung auf 1790 lassen den Rückschluss auf eine Bearbeitung für dörfliche Verhältnisse zu.

Für die Edition und die Aufführung der Messe war die Fuldaer Fassung am ausschlaggebensten[102]. Die anzunehmende Vollständigkeit der Takte, des Textes und der Instrumente, die sehr gute Überlieferung (kaum Fehler, deutliches Schriftbild, einheitliches Seitenmaß, gute Textierung, Continuo-Bezifferung sehr genau) machten die Entscheidung für diese Handschrift leicht.

Obwohl die Messe sicherlich „Kind der Zeit" ist, überraschen doch einige Absonderlichkeiten. Wie bereits angedeutet erstaunt schon die doppelte Namensgebung mit „Missa Solemnis g/D". Eine weitere Eigentümlichkeit findet sich am Ende des Kyrie. Nach breit durchgeführter Fuge endet der Satz im unbegleiteten Unisono des Chores. Parallelen finden sich in der B-Dur-Messe von Friedrich Witt und bei Johann Georg Keller. Auch die Instrumentation mit gleichzeitig geführten Trompeten und Hörnern ist bemerkenswert. Die Trompeten sind in damaliger Zeit eher Instrumente des Barock, wohingegen die Hörner eher der Klassik zuzuordnen sind. So steht nicht nur Alexius Molitor selbst am Übergang von Barock zu Klassik, sondern auch sein feines Gespür für Instrumentation.

Als Ergebnis der Beschäftigung mit dieser Messe steht man einerseits vor einem zauberhaften musikalischen Werk, andererseits wird man aber des unglaublich großen, noch unbekannten Repertoires gewahr! Die Einordnung Alexius Molitors und seiner Messe in der damaligen Zeit vermittelt uns somit nicht nur wichtige Erkenntnisse über ordenseigene Komponisten bei den Augustinern und über eine Reihe von Kleinmeistern. Sie mag auch Anstoß geben, das ungeheuer umfangreiche Repertoire zu sichten und Aufklärung zu finden über die Netzwerke und den Hintergrund, auf dem die kirchenmusikalischen Werke eines Abbé Vogler, eines Johann Adolf Hasse und eines Joseph Haydn entstehen konnten.

Trotz der intensiven und extensiven Beschäftigung mit der Musik, vergaß Molitor die Verpflichtungen nicht, die ihm sein

[102] Caroline Prozeller hat die Messe für die Aufführung bearbeitet. Unter ihrer Leitung wurde sie am 16. Mai 2003 in der Wallfahrtskirche zu Mariä Himmelfahrt und zum hl. Gregor in Fährbrück und am 18. Mai in der Augustinerkirche Würzburg einem zahlreichen und begeisterten Publikum dargeboten. Vgl. das Programm vom 18. Mai 2003 mit kurzem Lebenslauf des Komponisten, Einführung in sein Schaffen, Vorstellung der Sängerinnen und Sänger und musikalische Ausbildung und Tätigkeit Caroline Prozellers. Anmerkung von Michael Wernicke, Augen- und Ohrenzeuge.

priesterlicher Beruf aufgab. In den Kapitelsakten wird Molitor zwar immer Komponist genannt, aber auch Beichtvater und Prediger. „Wegen seiner Tugendhaftigkeit, seines unermüdlichen Eifers, den Sterbenden beizustehen, war Alexius Molitor...den Mainzern lieb und teuer“[103] Wohl im Jahre 1770 wurde Molitor Beichtvater des Dompropstes Hugo Franz Karl Reichsgraf von Eltz zu Kempenich[104], nahm eine Vertrauenstellung ein, die für sein Ansehen auch als Seelsorger spricht. Vor ihm hatte den Posten Bernhard Geissler bekleidet, ein Schulkamerad aus Münnerstädter Tagen und Kursgenosse Molitors. In seiner Dispositio Familiarum führt das 1767 zu Lauingen gefeierte Provinzkapitel den Geissler als „Confessor Excellentissimi D(omini) Praepositi Metropolitani Comitis ab Elz“[105]. Geissler starb jedoch am 21.September 1770[106]. Nach dessem Tod mag der hochmögende Prälat den P. Alexius berufen haben. Jedenfalls steht in den Akten des 1771 stattgehabten Kapitels zu lesen: V.P. Alexius Molitor Confessor Excellentissimi Domini Praepositi Metropolitanae Ecclesiae, et componista[107]. Eltz hatte keine größeren politischen Ambitionen, sammelte Waffen und Gemälde, hatte einen herausragenden Marstall. Jedoch kümmerte er sich um die Volksschulen in Ungarn, wo er Besitzungen hatte, im zum Erzstift Mainz gehörigen Eichsfeld, wo er Statthalter war, und im Spessart. Diese bedachte er auch in seinem Testament. In den Bemühungen traf er sich mit dem Staatsminister von Stadion, dem er ansonsten gewiss nicht geneigt war; denn der Prälat war ein Gegner der Aufklärung auch in ihrer katholischen Spielart und doch als Förderer der Volksbildung deren Kind.

Molitor starb zu Mainz am 16. Juni 1773, 42 Jahre und sieben Monate alt, wie das Totenbuch des Freiburger Augustinerklosters gewissenhaft vermerkt[108]. Eine febris soporosa ac putrida habe seinen Tod verursacht. Die moderne Medizin nennt eine Bewußtseinsstörung Sopor. Im klassischen Latein heißt sopor Schlaf, auch Todesschlaf. Putresco bedeutet im klassischen Latein vermodern. Das Lexikon der Medizin übersetzt putrid mit faulig, übelriechend und verweist auf

[103] Das behauptete Adam Gottron, Der Komponist Alexius Molitor, ein Münnerstädter Klosterschüler, in: Vinculum. Mürschter-Seminar-Echo. Heft 19 (1957) 17. Er bleibt den Beweis allerdings schuldig.

[104] F. Jürgensmeier, Art. Eltz zu Kempenich, Hugo Franz Karl Reichsfreiherr (seit 1733 Reichsgraf) von, in: E.Gatz (Hrsg), Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches 1648 bis 1803, Berlin 1990, 90f.

[105] Provinzkapitel Lauingen 1767 Mai 7. PA Stdb. Nr. 3 pag 36.

[106] D. Gesterkamp, Liber Mortuorum, Nr 421 S.165.

[107] Provinzkapitel Schwäbisch Gmünd 1771 April 18. PA Stdb. Nr. 3 pag 66f.

[108] Mortuarium des Augustinereremitenordens 1297-1785. Im Erzbischöfl. Archiv Freiburg i.Br. Karton 49, 3. Photokopie im Augustinus-Institut Würzburg.

Gangrän, was der Brand ist. Der feuchte Brand ist eine durch Fäulnisbakterien zersetzte, übelriechende Nekrose[109]. Es war jedenfalls eine schlimme Krankheit, an der Molitor starb, jedoch verschied er, so das Freiburger Totenbuch, sehr friedlich im Herrn.

Caroline PROZELLER – Michael K. WERNICKE OSA

[109] Zetkin/Schaldach, Lexikon der Medizin, Wiesbaden [16]1998, 695; 1662.

NUDUS CHRISTUS IN NUDA CRUCE

Ein christologisches Thema der Spiritualität des Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA († 1348)

Der mit dieser Festschrift geehrte P. Tars van Bavel hat verschiedene Artikel zur augustinischen Spiritualität und zur Christologie veröffentlicht. Mein Beitrag, den ich ihm in Verehrung widme, greift beide Gesichtspunkte auf und stellt sie unter dem Thema des *Nudus Christus in nuda cruce* dar. Zwar hat das Thema vordringlich einen mittelalterlichen Autor als Grundlage, es greift aber auch zurück in die Zeit der Väter, in welcher der angeführte Satz formuliert und zur Kennzeichnung spiritueller Haltungen propagiert wurde.

Einleitung

Die editorischen Arbeiten am Evangelienkommentar des Simon Fidati von Cascia *De gestis domini salvatoris,* die in diesem Jahr abgeschlossen wurden, machten mich auf die Thematik vom nackten Christus am nackten Kreuz aufmerksam.

Als ich das Wort zum ersten Mal las, stutzte ich und erinnerte mich an einen Besuch im Augustinerkloster Santo Spirito in Florenz. Dabei erzählte mir der Prior, dass der junge Michelangelo (1475-1564) einem seiner Vorgänger ein Holzkreuz geschenkt habe, auf dem Christus ganz nackt dargestellt ist.[1] Es kam mir auch das Kreuz von Benvenuto Cellini (1500-1571) mit seinem nackten Marmorcorpus in den Sinn, das ich in der Kirche des El Escorial gesehen hatte.[2]

Beide Kruzifixe wurden von Künstlern der Renaissance geschaffen, bei denen die Darstellung nackter Menschen nichts Außergewöhnliches ist.[3] Hier handelte es sich aber um ein Werk des 14.

[1] Firenze/Santo Spirito, a cura di Carla Faldi Guglielmi (Kreuz auf der hinteren Umschlagseite). In dem Werk über Michelangelo. Die Skulpturen. Text Umberto Baldini. Photogr. Liberto Perugi (Aus dem Italienischen von Andreas Grote), Stuttgart 1982, 30 wird berichtet: *Es handelt sich um den Kruzifixus, der für Niccolò di Giovanni di Lapo Bichiellini, den Prior des Klosters von Santo Spirito in Florenz, geschaffen wurde.*

[2] J. L. Gajate, El Cristo Blanco de Cellini, El Escorial 1995.

[3] „Die Idealität von Michelangelos Gestalten hat ihre Entsprechung in seiner durch die zeitgenössische neuplatonische Bewegung vorgeformten Auffassung, dass in der Schönheit des nackten Körpers der Abglanz einer spirituellen, idealen Schönheit zu finden sei, die transzendental begründet sei" (N. Himmelmann, Ideale

Jahrhunderts. Deshalb fragte ich mich verwundert, wie denn Worte vom nackten Kreuz, vom nackten Gekreuzigten und vom nackten Kreuzesnachfolger, ja von einer nackten Kreuzesnachfolgerin in die Ausführungen eines Predigers, geistlichen Schriftstellers und Spiritualen gelangten, der in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts lebte.

Die Ergebnisse meiner Nachforschungen lege ich in diesem Artikel dar, der in sieben Abschnitte gegliedert ist. In ihnen wird die Nachfolge Christi mittels der in der Patristik entwickelten Vorstellung von der Bedürfnislosigkeit (*nuditas*) und Leidenschaftslosigkeit (*apatheia*; *impassibilitas*) entwickelt.

1. Paradiesesbaum und Kreuzesbaum als Rahmen der Nachfolgeaussagen

Das Bild von der Nacktheit kommt im Zusammenhang vom Sündenfall im Paradies und von der Erlösung durch Christus am Kreuz vor. Für die ganz unterschiedlichen Ereignisse wurden zwei Bäume von Bedeutung, der Baum der Erkenntnis und der Kreuzesstamm. Beide Bäume sind wegen ihrer jeweiligen Frucht, die sie trugen, bedeutsam geworden.[4]

Das Material der beiden Bäume ist identisch, ihre Wirkung kann unterschiedlicher nicht sein. Der Paradiesesbaum führte durch die Mitwirkung des ersten Menschenpaares zum Zusammenbruch der Menschheit, während durch das Kreuz Jesu sich alle Menschen wieder aufrichten können.[5]

Der Paradiesesbaum ist lieblich anzuschauen, der Kreuzesbaum dagegen ist ein Baum der Schande und der Strafen.[6] Blickt man jedoch in die Zukunft, so erweist sich das Kreuz für die Glaubenden als zuverlässiger als der Paradiesesbaum für die Stammeltern, denn letzterer brachte die Verdammnis, während durch ersteren das Heil kam.[7]

Die Stammeltern haben vom Paradiesesbaum gekostet, weil sie meinten, wie Gott das Gute und Schlechte erkennen zu können. Nach dem Genuß der Frucht gingen ihnen die Augen auf, weil sie die

Nacktheit [Abhandlungen der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 73], Opladen 1985, 39-40). Siehe auch G. Perego, La nudità necessaria. Il ruolo del giovane di Mc 14,51-52 nel racconto marciano della passione-morte-risurrezione di Gesù, Milano 2000.

[4] Simon Fidati de Cassia, *De gestis domini salvatoris*, Würzburg 2002, VI, 318,10.

[5] VI, 318,18-19.

[6] VI, 321,108-109.

[7] VI, 321,109-110.

Nacktheit an sich ehrenwerter Güter erkannten (Gen 3,7), obwohl sie vorher, ohne zu erröten, nackt gewesen waren. Infolge des Ungehorsams der Stammeltern ist eine verworfene Nachkommenschaft nach dem Sündenfall geboren.[8]

Am Stamm des schrecklichen Kreuzes ist derjenige zur Frucht geworden, der den Stammeltern den Verzehr der Frucht des Paradiesesbaumes verboten hatte.[9] Er hat ein neues Gebot erlassen, dass durch ihn als Frucht alle zum Heil kommen.[10] Die heilbringende Frucht besteht in der Übernahme der Strafe, des eigenen Kreuzes und der Nachfolge Christi.[11]

Während das Berühren und Essen der Frucht des Paradiesesbaumes schlimme Folgen hatte, hat gerade das Nichtberühren des Kreuzesbaumes, die Uninteressiertheit an ihm den schrecklichen Tod zur Folge.[12] Durch den Paradiesesbaum sind alle Menschen zu Vertriebenen aus dem Paradies geworden, durch den Kreuzesbaum werden alle Vertriebenen ins Himmelreich zurückgerufen. Der Paradiesesbaum wurde zu einer Treppe des Abstiegs ins Grab, das Kreuz dagegen zu einer solchen des Aufstiegs in den Himmel. Hier ist unter Kreuz nicht das Holzgerüst zu verstehen, an dem Christus hing, sondern jede für die Frömmigkeit und Gerechtigkeit ertragene Strafe.[13]

Wer diese auf sich nimmt, wird das Kreuz lieben und auch die christusbringenden Leiden. Mit Christus sind wir ans Kreuz geheftet, damit die göttlichen und verehrungswürdigen Geheimnisse Christi in uns gefeiert werden. Dies bedeutet, dass wir in uns mehr die Gnade als die Natur verehren, dass wir nicht als natürlich Geborene, sondern von der Gnade Stammende leben, dass im Geiste das von der Gnade Gebotene das Übergewicht über die Natur hat und das Leben der Gnade heller leuchtet als das Leben der Natur.[14]

2. Christus als Vorbild für seine Nachfolger unter dem Bild des Nacktseins

Simon beschreibt das Leben Jesu mit folgendem Satz und verwendet in ihm auch das Bild des Nacktseins: „Sein Ende

[8] VI, 322,137-143.
[9] VI, 322,144-148.
[10] VI, 322,148-149.
[11] VI, 322,148-152.
[12] VI,323,185-186.
[13] VI,323,189-193.
[14] VI, 326, 297-327,302.

(*Omega*) kehrte zu seinem Anfang (*Alpha*) zurück (Offbg 1,8; 21,6; 22,13); so arm wie er geboren wurde, ist er auch gestorben. So wie er frei (*nudus*) von Dingen und dem Wunsch sie zu besitzen in die Welt eingetreten ist, schritt er voran und verließ er sie."[15] Jesus wird als Armer gesehen, der nichts besaß und nichts Irdisches besitzen wollte.

In diesem Sinne legt Simon die Jüngerberufung aus, bei der Jesus die Frage gestellt wurde, wo er wohne (Joh 1,38). Die Antwort Jesu: „Kommt und seht" (Joh 1,38) sei eine Einladung an die Berufenen gewesen, durch Erfahrung festzustellen, wie es um seine Wohn- und Besitzverhältnisse bestellt sei. Aus der Tatsache, dass Jesus keine eigene Wohnung auf der Erde hatte, sollten sie erkennen, dass er nicht zu Irdischem und Vorübergehendem beruft, sondern zu Göttlichem. Jesus wollte seinen Nachfolgern jegliche Hoffnung auf irdische Bequemlichkeit nehmen, damit sie ihm nur wegen der Tugend und himmlischen Belohnung nachfolgen. Mehr als Besitz und Wunder sollte die Erfahrung den Geist der Hörenden und Nachfolger zur Höhe des Glaubens an Jesus als den Sohn Gottes führen. Durch seine irdische Besitzlosigkeit (Nacktheit) wollte er ihre Glaubenskraft stärken und sie auf eine hohe Belohnung vorbereiten.[16]

Die der Kreuzigung vorausgehende Entkleidung zeigt in diesem Moment Jesu gänzliche Besitzlosigkeit. Seine Nacktheit sollte ihn der Schmach preisgeben und für die Kreuzigung leichter verfügbar machen. Der in seiner Passion ganz nackt gezeigte Jesus soll dem nachdenklichen Betrachter sagen, dass er dadurch zur Schau des nackten Wortes in der Gottheit gelangen soll. Der nackte Körper wird deshalb der Passion unterworfen, damit deutlich wird, dass nur durch die Passion Christi und deren Verdienste eine klare und unverstellte Anschauung Gottes möglich ist.[17]

In der Jüngerberufung zu einer instabilen Lebensweise wie auch durch sein Nacktsein am Kreuze macht Jesus nach Simon deutlich, dass es ihm nicht um irdische Güter ging, sondern um das Himmelreich. Dieses zeigt sich in seinem Leben ohne feste Wohnung und in seinem Leiden, das ihn der Nacktheit preisgab.

[15] VI, 302,73-75.

[16] Simon Fidati de Cassia, *De gestis domini salvatoris*, Würzburg 2000, IV, 315-316.

[17] Simon Fidati de Cassia, *De gestis domini salvatoris*, Würzburg 2002, VI, 289.

3. Maria als Nachfolgerin Christi und des Kreuzes

Es überrascht nicht, wenn Simon in seinen Ausführungen über Maria als Nachfolgerin des Kreuzes ihres Sohnes sich auch des Bildes von der Nacktheit als Interpretationshilfe bedient.

Das Bild wird von ihm erstmalig bei einem Vergleich der beiden Stammmütter Eva und Maria gebraucht. Während Eva die verbotene Frucht des Paradiesesbaumes pflückte und verkostete, war Maria frei (*nuda*) von irdischen Gütern und umfaßte in glühender Hingabe das nackte Kreuz, um dessen Früchte zu verkosten. Anders als Eva versagte sie sich die Frucht des irdischen Baumes und zeigte so, dass sie bereit war, als Arme und von allem Gelöste dem Kreuz ihres Sohnes zu folgen.[18]

Die Bereitschaft, das Eigene hintanzustellen und sich von allem zu lösen, nackt zu werden, sieht Simon bei Maria dadurch gegeben, dass sie sich der Lehre ihres Sohnes unterordnete, sich seinen Worten und seinem Verhalten anglich und sich dem Jünger Johannes anvertrauen ließ.[19] Durch dieses ganze Verhalten, so kann man zusammenfassen, wurde Maria christusförmig.

Zu einem anderen Charakteristikum Mariens, der Kreuzesförmigkeit, bemerkt Simon, dass sie von anderer Art war als die ihres Sohnes. Er verdeutlicht dies am Standort, den Mutter und Sohn zum Kreuz einnahmen. Während Jesus auf dem Kreuz stand, befand sich seine Mutter neben diesem. Zwar wurde das Kreuzesopfer für Maria nicht notwendig zur Reinigung von den Sünden, doch benötigte auch sie es als Schlüssel zum Himmelreich[20] und zur Einübung in die Liebe zu ihrem gekreuzigten Sohn. Durch das Stehen neben dem Kreuz sollte sie erkennen, dass vom Kreuz und dem Gekreuzigten das Heil der Seelen, der Untergang der Sünden, die Schließung der Unterwelt und die Tür des Himmels kommen.[21] Maria spürte, so schreibt Simon, dass sie von jenem Kreuz, neben dem sie stand, erlöst und befreit war.[22] Sie war die erste Schülerin ihres gekreuzigten Sohnes und wurde auch zur Lehrerin der ihm Nachfolgenden und neben dem Kreuze Stehenden.[23]

Die in allem christus- und kreuzesförmig gestaltete Mutter Maria ruft zur Betrachtung der von ihr eingenommenen Haltung zu

[18] Simon Fidati de Cassia, *De gestis domini salvatoris*, Würzburg 1998, I, 128, 224-229.
[19] I, 128, 224-229.
[20] I, 223, 109-112.
[21] I, 223, 112-115.
[22] I, 223, 100-101.
[23] I, 223, 112-115.

Christus und ihrem gekreuzigten Sohn auf. Simon rät zum Verweilen bei der Jungfrau neben dem Kreuz, weil es die Liebe und die Wahrheit anempfiehlt.[24]

Der beim Kreuz Stehende muß bedenken, dass der Unsterbliche für ihn sterblich wurde und am Kreuz endete. Dieser Tod war aber kein Ende für immer. Jesu Tod bewirkte, dass das sterbliche Leben unsterblich wurde.[25]

Das Kreuz zeigt auch, wie sehr die Sünde Gott mißfiel, von welchem Gewicht sie war, so dass der Sohn Gottes ihretwegen ans Kreuz kommen mußte.[26]

Die neben dem Kreuz stehende Jungfrau Maria kann auf andere Früchte des Baumes hinweisen als die Stammutter Eva. Diese schreckte vor den bösen Folgen ihrer Gebotsübertretung für das ganze Menschengeschlecht nicht zurück. Maria dagegen kann auf die zukünftigen Ehren den verweisen, der das Kreuz umfaßt.[27]

Die hier entwickelten Gedanken haben ihren Rückhalt im Evangelium. Es lehre, dass das Leben des Christusnachfolgers am Kreuz geführt und am Kreuz beendet werden soll. Das Kreuz trennt zwar von den Sinnesfreuden, die Trennung erfolgt aber wegen des übernatürlichen, die Sinne übersteigenden Lebens. Simon fordert den Menschen auf, er solle mit der Seele betrachten, wie durch die übernatürliche Ordnung vom strafenden Kreuz den Christen die Freude geboren wird. Von der Schmach sei gewaltige Ehre gekommen und von dem nur den Körper tötenden Kreuz sei das lebendige Leben für Körper und Seele entsprungen.[28]

Die Betrachtung des Kreuzes wird für denjenigen, der sich wie Maria neben das Kreuz stellt[29], wie eine Apotheke mit wohlriechenden Heilkräutern, wie ein Licht, das Helligkeit auf den Lebensweg wirft, wie eine Quelle, die Erquickung gewährt und wie ein Schatten, der Schutz vor der stechenden Sonne spendet.[30]

Der das Leiden Christi an der Seite Marias neben dem Kreuz Betrachtende erkennt, dass seine eigenen möglichen Leiden einen anderen Stellenwert haben als die Leiden Christi. Während jeder rechtgläubige Christ und die ganze Kirche neben dem Kreuz stehen, befindet sich Jesus allein auf ihm. Auch wenn die Kirche in vielen

[24] I, 223, 118.
[25] I, 223,118.
[26] I, 223, 124-126.
[27] I, 224,131-133.
[28] I, 224, 134-140.
[29] I, 224,142.
[30] I, 224,150-154.

ihrer Glieder unter körperlichem und seelischem Kreuz und Leid einhergeht, so kann sie Erlösung und Rettung nur durch den Glauben an den gekreuzigten Jesus Christus erhalten[31], indem sie anspruchslos (*nuda*) sich glaubend und vertrauend dem gekreuzigten Christus (*nudum*) zuwendet und ihm nachfolgt.

4. Die Nudus-Aussagen in der Patristik und ihr Weiterwirken im Mittelalter

Das Nacktheitsvokabular, dessen sich Simon in den vorgestellen Theologiebereichen bediente, hat er nicht selbst erfunden, sondern aus der Tradition übernommen.[32] Um feststellen zu können, ob er die Tradition originell oder durch einfache Übernahme verwandte, soll ein kurzer Überblick über die diesbezüglichen Schwerpunkte in der Patristik und im Mittelalter geboten werden. Dabei interessiert die Frage nach der Akzentsetzung durch Simon.

Simon war ein eifriger Leser patristischer Werke.[33] Deshalb ist es wahrscheinlich, dass er der Nudus-Terminologie bei ihrer Lektüre begegnete.

Vor allem trifft dies auf die Briefe des Kirchenlehrers Hieronymus (347-419/20) zu, in denen von der Nachfolge Christi erstmals in dieser Weise gesprochen wird. Hieronymus übte großen Einfluß auf das Mittelalter aus und steht darin demjenigen des hl. Augustinus kaum nach.[34] In seinen Briefen verwandte Hieronymus die Nudus-Formel verschiedentlich, da er in ihnen nicht nur Mitteilungen zu seinem Befinden übermittelte, sondern auch Richtlinien zur Lebensgestaltung gab.

Einem Presbyter Nepotianus schreibt Hieronymus, dass er außer dem Herrn nichts suchen dürfe, da dieser sein Teil geworden sei (Ps 72,26).[35] Von sich berichtet Hieronymus, dass er mit ausreichender Nahrung und Kleidung zufrieden sei und *dem nackten Kreuz als Nackter folge*.[36]

[31] I, 225, 161-165.

[32] M. Bernards, *Nudus nudum Christum sequi*, in: Wissenschaft und Weisheit 14 (1951) 148-151; J. Châtillon, *Nudum Christum nudus sequere*. Note sur les origines et la signification du thème de la nudité spirituelle dans les écrites de saint Bonaventure, in: Bibliotheca Victorina III, Paris-Turnhout 1992, 201-254.

[33] Johannes de Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia*, in: N. Mattioli, Il beato Simone Fidati da Cascia (Antologia Agostiniana II), Roma 1898, 20.

[34] LThK³ V (1996) 93.

[35] Ep. 52,5: CSEL 54, 421, 17-19.

[36] Ep. 52,5: CSEL 54, 422, 6-7.

Dem Presbyter Paulinus ruft Hieronymus die Worte Christi ins Gedächtnis: *Wenn du vollkommen sein willst, geh und verkaufe alles, was du hast, und gib es den Armen, dann komm und folge mir* (Mt 19,21). Diese Worte setzt man ins Werk, so schreibt Hieronymus, wenn man dem nackten Kreuz als Nackter nachfolgt. So steige man unbeschwerter und leichter die Jakobsleiter hinauf (Gen 28,12).[37]

Den entscheidenden Schritt der Befreiung von allen Reichtümern verdeutlicht Hieronymus am Verhalten des Crates, eines reichen Thebaners. Als dieser zum Philosophieren nach Athen zog, nahm er zum Unterhalt einen schweren Goldklumpen mit. Unterwegs entledigte er sich des Schatzes mit den Worten, er könne nicht zugleich Tugenden und zugleich Reichtümer besitzen.[38] Er wollte damit ganz drastisch sagen, dass sich beides nicht miteinander verträgt. Dem Verhalten dieses klugen Philosophen stellt Hieronymus das Verhalten vieler Christen gegenüber, die mit Gold beladen dem armen Christus nachfolgen. Unter dem Vorwand Almosen geben zu müssen, halten sie an den früheren Reichtümern fest. Hieronymus bezweifelt, ob derjenige fremdes Gut treu verteilen kann, der sein eigenes ängstlich zurückhält.[39]

Der kinderlosen Witwe Hedybia aus Gallien riet Hieronymus, dass, wenn sie vollkommen sein wolle, sie sich wie die Apostel verhalten, alles verkaufen, den Besitz den Armen geben und Christus nachfolgen solle. Wenn Hedybia das tue, dann folge sie der nackten Tugend nackt und allein.[40]

Über die Trennung von allem und die Sorge um seine Seele gibt Hieronymus dem Mönch Rusticus folgenden Rat. Wenn er das Vollkommene ersehne, dann solle er mit Abraham seine Heimat und Verwandtschaft verlassen und ins Unbekannte aufbrechen. Sollte er Vermögen haben, soll er es verkaufen und den Erlös den Armen geben. Für den Fall, dass er nichts habe, sei er von einer großen Last befreit. Er kann dann als Nackter dem nackten Christus nachfolgen. Dies sei zwar hart, groß und schwierig, aber mit hoher Belohnung verbunden.[41]

Im Dialog gegen die Pelagianer führt Hieronymus einen neuen Gedanken ein, den er im Anschluß an das folgende Jesuswort entwickelt: *Wer nicht sein Kreuz trägt und mir nachfolgt, ist meiner nicht wert* (Lk 14,27). Er sagt vom Kreuz Christi, dass es leicht sei. Wer im

[37] Ep. 58,2: CSEL 54, 529, 1-5.
[38] Ep. 58,2: CSEL 54, 529, 10-12.
[39] Ep. 58,2: CSEL 54, 529, 13-16.
[40] Ep. 120,1: CSEL 55, 477, 13-478, 2.
[41] Ep. 125: CSEL 56, 142, 5-9.

Zustand des Nacktseins hinter Jesus hergehe, verspüre dies als ein Spiel, als einen Scherz.[42]

Vergleicht man die Aussagen Simons mit denen des Hieronymus, so muß man feststellen, dass sie entweder direkt aus Hieronymus stammen oder Hieronymus' Aussagen indirekt über einen anderen Autor für Simon die Hauptquelle für seine Nudusaussagen waren.

Zu den Aussagen des Hieronymus treten noch andere Elemente hinzu, die Simons Aussagen beeinflußt haben. Es ist die Modifikation, die Johannes Cassian (360/365-432/435) am Nacktheitsargument des Hieronymus vornahm. Er fügte ihm nämlich das Motiv der Liebe hinzu, wobei er sich auf 1 Kor 13,3 bezieht, in dem Paulus fordert, dass alles von der Liebe getragen sein müsse. So kommt Cassian zu der Aussage, dass jemand nicht sofort aufgrund der Nacktheit, der Entäußerung von allen Fähigkeiten oder des Ablegens der Würden vollkommen werde. Es müsse jene Liebe hinzukommen, die der Apostel Paulus den Gliedern des Leibes Christi zuschreibt, und die allein in der Reinheit des Herzens besteht, die durch den beständigen Kontakt zu Gott hervorgerufen wird.[43]

Für Cassian gehört jedenfalls zum Mönch der wahre Verzicht, der in der Entblößung von allen Gütern und in der Nacktheit besteht.[44]

Man kann mit Recht sagen, dass bei Cassian die Nacktheit zur Tugend der Selbstverleugnung gehört und *insbesondere die Besitzlosigkeit* bezeichnet.[45] Bei ihm kann man nackt mit arm austauschen.

Gregor der Große (540-604) fügt der Nudus-Thematik einen neuen Aspekt hinzu, der von der Tradition aufgegriffen wurde und sich auch bei Simon findet. Die 32. Homilie, in der Gregor die Perikope Lk 9,23-27 von der Kreuzesnachfolge Jesu behandelt, verbindet das Nacktwerden mit dem Kampf gegen den Teufel. Die von Jesus geforderte Selbstverleugnung interpretiert Gregor als Nacktwerden und sieht in ihr die notwendige Voraussetzung für den Kampf zwischen dem Menschen und seinen teuflischen Gegnern. Da die bösen Geister nichts Eigenes in der Welt besitzen, müssen auch die Christusnachfolger auf alles Eigentum verzichten, damit sie als Nackte mit Nackten kämpfen können. Bei seiner Begründung für diese Forderung stand Gregor wohl der antike Ringkampf vor Augen, bei dem zwei nackte Ringer sich um den Sieg mühten. Würde nämlich ein

[42] *Dialogus contra Pelagianos* 2,13: PL 23, 574.
[43] *Conlationes Patrum* I,6: CSEL 13, 12, 26-30.
[44] *De institutis coenobiorum* XII,32: CSEL 17, 230, 9-10.
[45] M. Bernards, [siehe Anm. 32], 149.

Bekleideter mit einem Nackten kämpfen, würde der Bekleidete schneller zur Erde geworfen, weil der Nackte sich an seinen Kleidern festhalten kann. In allen irdischen Dingen erblickt Gregor so etwas wie Kleidungsstücke. Er fordert dazu auf, dass derjenige, der gegen den Teufel kämpft, diese irdischen Kleidungsstücke ablegt, damit er im Kampf nicht unterliegt.[46]

Das von Gregor eingebrachte Motiv des Kampfes und des Ringens mit dem Bösen wird auch von Simon aufgegriffen. Er spricht vom Kampf mit sich selber und den widerstrebenden Kräften. Ich vermute, dass sich Simon für derartige Aussagen eher von der Hl. Schrift als von Gregor dem Großen inspirieren ließ.

Im Mittelalter wurden die Aussagen zur Nudus-Thematik übernommen und auf die jeweilige Situation bezogen. Diese Tradition aus der Väterzeit riß nicht ab, sondern blieb lebendig.

Dies wird an dem Benediktiner und Kirchenreformer Petrus Damiani (1007-1072) deutlich, der auf das Bild vom nackten Krieger zurückgriff, der für Christus kämpft.[47]

Der bekannte Philosoph und Theologe Peter Abaelard (1079-1142) schrieb in seiner Klosterregel, dass man als Nackter dem nackten Christus nur nachfolgen könne, wenn man alles zurückgelassen und von allem Abstand genommen habe. Die Nachfolgeformel ist nicht etwas Unverbindliches, sondern an Christus und dessen konkreten menschlichen Stellvertreter, den Vorgesetzten, gebunden.[48]

Zur Charakterisierung der Anfänge der franziskanischen Bewegung verwendet Jakob von Vitry (1170-1240) das Nudus-Motiv. Er schreibt in seiner Historia Orientalis: *Sie entsagen allem, was sie besitzen, verleugnen sich selbst, nehmen das Kreuz auf sich und folgen nackt dem Nackten.*[49]

Die Nudus-Aussagen haben aber nicht nur im Umkreis der Armutsbewegungen des 11.-13. Jahrhunderts eine Rolle gespielt, sondern wurden auch zur Erläuterung der Nachfolgeaussagen des Evangeliums und zur Charakterisierung des Lebens des hl. Franz von Assisi verwendet. Dies geschah vor allem unter Rückgriff auf die Briefe des hl. Hieronymus von dem großen Theologen aus dem Franziskanerorden, dem hl. Bonaventura (um 1217-1274).

[46] *XL homiliae in Evangelia. Lib.* II., *Homil.* 32,2: PL 76, 1233B.

[47] *Opuscula varia*, *Opusculum* XII,V: PL 145, 255.

[48] *Epistula* VII: PL 178, 258 C.

[49] *Historia orientalis* 2,32, in: H. Boehmer, Analekten zur Geschichte des Franciscus von Assisi, 2. Aufl. von F. Wiegand, Tübingen 1930, 70, 9-10 (zitiert nach M. Bernards, 148, Anm.1).

Unter den *Quaestiones disputatae* behandelt Bonaventura in der 14. Quaestio die evangelische Vollkommenheit. Er verweist darauf, dass Christus besonders nach seinem Zustand am Kreuze nachahmenswert sei, wofür er 1 Petr 2,21 anführt. Es heißt dort, dass Christus für uns gelitten hat und uns ein Beispiel gab, damit wir ihm nachfolgen. Bonaventura stellt fest, dass Christus am Kreuz gänzlich nackt war. Er folgert daraus, indem er Hieronymus zitiert, dass ein ernster Nachfolger Jesu ihm nackt nachfolgen müsse.[50] Die Redeweise wird nicht erläutert, sondern als bekannt und verständlich vorausgesetzt.

In seinem apologetischen Opusculum zur Verteidigung der Armen (*Apologia pauperum*) beschäftigt sich Bonaventura ausführlich mit der Armut und bringt einige Unterscheidungen zum Verständnis der Nacktheit an. Er unterscheidet zwischen der Nacktheit des Herzens einerseits sowie zwischen der Nacktheit des Herzens und des Körpers andererseits.

Die Nacktheit des Herzens wird durch die Reinigung des Geistes von jedem verkehrten Begehren des Geizes und der Begierde erreicht.

Bei der Nacktheit des Herzens und des Körpers nimmt Bonaventura eine dreifache Abstufung vor.

Als groß bezeichnet er jene Nacktheit, die im Ablegen von allem Überflüssigen und dem Verzicht auf Eigentum besteht. Obwohl diese nicht notwendig zum Klerikerstand gehöre, so sei sie doch für ihn angemessen.

Als größer nennt er jene Nacktheit, die im Verzicht auf das Recht, Eigentum zu besitzen und im Verzicht auf den eigenen Willen besteht. Sie kommt den Ordensleuten (*regularibus*) und Zönobiten zu.

Der größte Grad von Nacktheit besteht in dem vorausgehend Gesagten und zusätzlich im Verzicht auf einen angemessenen Lebensunterhalt. Dieser Grad kommt den Aposteln und apostolischen Männern (Missionaren) zu. Sie haben in dieser Welt nichts. Wer alles gegeben hat und nichts für sich reservierte, hat sich in die äußerste Nacktheit versetzt.

Diesen höchsten Grad der Nacktheit strebte nach dem Bericht des Hieronymus, den Bonaventura anführt, die vornehme Witwe Paula an. Vor ihrem Tode hatte sie auf ihren großen Besitz verzichtet, um nach ihrem Tode ihrer Tochter etwas zu hinterlassen. Bei ihrem

[50] *Quaestiones disputatae. De perfectione evangelica, Quaest.* II, art. I,14 (*Opera omnia* V, *Ad Claras Aquas*; Quaracchi; 1891, 126).

Begräbnis wollte sie in ein fremdes Leinentuch gewickelt werden. Mit diesem Wort von der völligen Armut, so kommentiert Bonaventura den Hieronymus, ist der Höhepunkt der Vollkommenheit erreicht. Durch sie umfaßt jemand ausdrücklicher und angepaßter die Nacktheit des Kreuzes und ahmt den nackten Gekreuzigten nach. [51]

Das Nudus-Motiv wird von Bonaventura in seine Lebensbeschreibungen des hl. Franziskus an zwei entscheidenden Abschnitten eingeführt. Er verwendet es bei der Bekehrung und beim Tod des Heiligen. Dass Simon mit der Lebensbeschreibung des hl. Franziskus Bekanntschaft machte, legt sein Interesse für hagiographische Schriften und seine Beziehung zu Angelo Clareno nahe.

Über die Bekehrung berichtet Bonaventura in der *Legenda sancti Francisci*, dass der Vater des Franziskus, als er von seinem Schritt hörte, alles, was er ihm gegeben hatte, zurückhaben wollte. Dies sollte vor dem Bischof von Assisi geschehen. Als sie vor ihm angekommen waren, legte Franziskus ohne Aufforderung alle seine Kleider ab und übergab sie seinem Vater. Nachdem er auch die Beinkleider (*femoralia*) ausgezogen hatte, stand er vor allen ganz nackt da. Er empfahl sich dem himmlischen Vater und wurde vom Bischof halbwegs bekleidet. Auf den ihm gereichten einfachen Mantel eines Bauern malte er mit Zement mit eigener Hand ein Kreuz.

Bonaventura kommentiert die Szene mit folgenden Worten: *So also wurde der Diener des höchsten Königs nackt zurückgelassen, dass er dem nackten gekreuzigten Herrn folge, den er liebte; so wurde er mit dem Kreuz ausgestattet, damit er seine Seele dem Holz des Heiles anvertraue, auf dass er durch dieses aus dem Schiffbruch der Welt heil hervorgehe.*[52]

Den Tod des hl. Franziskus beschreibt Bonaventura in der *Legenda minor sancti Francisci* wieder mit der bekannten Nudus-Terminologie. Franziskus ließ sich vor seinem Tode nach S. Maria de Portiuncula von seinen Brüdern bringen, da er seinen Tod vorausahnte. Bei seinem Sterben wollte er noch einmal zeigen, dass er mit der Welt nichts Gemeinsames hatte. Deshalb ließ er sich in seiner Todeskrankheit ganz nackt auf den nackten Boden legen. Er tat dies, weil er wußte, dass selbst in dieser letzten Stunde der böse Feind sich noch voll Zorn gegen ihn erheben könnte. Um für diese Situation gerüstet zu sein, wollte er als Nackter mit dem Nackten kämpfen.

[51] *Opusculum* XI, cap. VII,22-23 (*Opera omnia* VIII, *Ad Claras Aquas*; Quaracchi 1898, 279-280).

[52] *Opusculum* XXIII. *Legenda Sancti Francisci* cap. 2,4 (*Opera omnia* VIII, *Ad Claras Aquas*; Quaracchi 1898, 508-509).

Mit diesen symbolischen Handlungen hat sich der am Boden und im Staub liegende Franziskus, den Bonaventura als einen entblößten Athleten bezeichnet, nicht begnügt, sondern er bedeckte mit seiner linken Hand seine rechte Seitenwunde, damit sie nicht gesehen werde. Er lag da mit heiterem, dem Himmel zugewandten Gesicht, ganz in die himmlische Glorie vertieft, und begann den Höchsten dafür zu loben, dass er, gelöst von allem, frei zu ihm gehen konnte.[53]

Der Kirchenvater Hieronymus hat die Nudus-Terminologie entwickelt und auf den Bereich der Christusnachfolge angewandt. Nachfolgende Theologen fanden den damit ausgedrückten Sachverhalt als gut getroffen und die Aufmerksamkeit ansprechend. Es ist deshalb nicht verwunderlich, dass die Terminologie von der Patristik bis ins Mittelalter beibehalten und auf verschiedene Situationen mit Modifikationen angewandt wurde. Sie wurde selbst zur Beschreibung des Anfangs und des Endes des hl. Franziskus herangezogen.

Der um geistliche Führung bemühte Augustiner Simon Fidati von Cascia, der zudem die Väterschriften schätzte und las und mit dem Franziskanerspiritualen Angelo Clareno in geistlichem Austausch stand, hatte vielerlei Gelegenheit auf das Nudus-Vokabular zu stoßen und es anzuwenden. Simon benutzte es in seinen Schriften und brachte mit seiner Hilfe verschiedene Sachverhalte des geistlichen Lebens zur Sprache. Hier sollen seine Aussagen zur Kreuzesnachfolge erarbeitet, bedacht und dargestellt werden.

5. Die Leidenschaftslosigkeit (*impassibilitas*) als Ziel der Christusnachfolge bei Simon

Für die Nudus-Terminologie und ihr Verständnis stellte, wie gezeigt, die Tradition ein breites Angebot an Aussagen zur Verfügung, auf das Simon zurückgreifen konnte. Mit ihrer Hilfe entwickelte er den Bereich des Verzichts auf die irdischen Güter und öffnete den Blick auf das Jenseits.

Neben der Nudus-Terminologie griff Simon auf einen zweiten Begriff aus der Patristik zurück, der mit den Wörtern *impassibilis* und *impassibilitas* umschrieben ist. Simon stellte die Impassibilität dem Verzicht auf die Dinge an die Seite und betonte damit den Zustand des Nichtunterworfenseins an die Neigungen des Körpers und der Seele.

[53] *Opusculum* XXIV. *Legenda minor Sancti Francisci. De transitu mortis, lectio* 3 (*Opera omnia* VIII, *Ad Claras Aquas*; Quaracchi 1898, 578).

Zu den zwei genannten Gesichtspunkten äußerte sich Simon in einem Kapitel, dem er die Überschrift gab *Vom Aufstieg Christi auf das Kreuz*.[54]

Simon spricht vom Aufstieg auf das Kreuz und nicht etwa von der Nachfolge, weil er im IV. Buch, in dem dieses Kapitel steht, verschiedene Handlungen Jesu unter dem Gesichtspunkt des *ascensus* darstellt, z. B. dem Besteigen des Schiffes, des Berges.

Bevor darauf näher eingegangen wird, muß zunächst etwas über den Blick gesagt werden, mit dem Simon auf Jesus oder Jesus Christus schaut.

6. Jesus Christus und die Nachfolge

Der unterschiedliche Blick, mit dem Simon auf Jesus oder Jesus Christus schaut, soll zunächst erhoben und vorgestellt werden, damit die Aussagen zur Kreuzesnachfolge und zum Aufstieg auf das Kreuz leichter verständlich werden.

6.1 Nachfolge nach den Schriftworten

Simon verwendet Worte Jesu oder solche aus den apostolischen Schriften, um die Bedeutung der Kreuzesnachfolge zu verdeutlichen und zu erläutern.

An erster Stelle sei die Aufforderung Jesu zur Nachfolge und zur Übernahme des eigenen Kreuzes genannt. Simon sieht in dem Wort: *Wer mein Jünger sein will, der verleugne sich selbst, nehme sein Kreuz auf sich und folge mir nach* (Mt 16,24) Jesus als denjenigen, der die Menschen zu jeder Zeit zur Kreuzesnachfolge ruft. Er schreibt über den berufenden Jesus, dass er zu einer solchen Berufung ausgewiesen sei, da er auf dem Weg vorausging und vor den schrecklichsten Strafen nicht zurückschreckte.[55]

Sodann sei auf Jesus als Vollender seines Auftrages verwiesen. Nach Joh 19,30 hat Jesus vor seinem Tode das Wort gesprochen: *Es ist vollbracht*. Damit hat Jesus nach Simons Darlegung zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass Jesus seinen Auftrag ganz ausgeführt hat. Er schreckte weder vor dem Kreuz zurück noch vor der Hingabe seines Lebens. Er führte aus, was ihm sein himmlischer Vater aufgetragen hatte.[56]

[54] Simon Fidati de Cassia, *De gestis domini salvatoris*, Würzburg 1998, II, 117,1.

[55] II, 119, 85-88.

[56] II, 120, 102-104.

Weiter ist für Simon wichtig, dass Jesus das Kreuz freiwillig auf sich nahm. Für die freiwillige Übernahme beruft sich Simon auf Hebr 12,2. Nach der Aufforderung, auf Jesus als *den Urheber und Vollender des Glaubens* zu blicken, kommt der entscheidende Satz, dass er *angesichts der vor ihm liegenden Freude das Kreuz auf sich genommen* hat, *ohne auf die Schande zu achten.* Mit der freiwilligen Annahme des Kreuzes war Schmach, Strafe und der Tod verbunden. Es ist also ein beispielloser Abstieg, den Jesus mit der freiwilligen Übernahme des Kreuzes begann.[57]

Schließlich sei noch an die Reaktion der Jünger bei der Berufung durch Jesus erinnert: *Und sie zogen die Boote an Land, ließen alles zurück und folgten ihm nach* (Lk 5,11). Dieses spontane Handeln der Jünger hat seinen Nachklang in den apostolischen Schriften gefunden. Simon zitiert Hebr 12,1, wo vom Abwerfen der Last gesprochen wird: Wir wollen *alle Last und die Fesseln der Sünde abwerfen.* Alles Behindernde soll zurückgelassen werden. Dies wird auch in 1 Kor 9,25 von den Wettkämpfern gesagt, die völlig enthaltsam leben.[58]

In diesen Worten der Hl. Schrift wird direkt von Jesus oder in seinem Auftrag zur Kreuzesnachfolge aufgerufen.

6.2 Nachfolge aufgrund der Betrachtung des Gekreuzigten

Durch seinen Kreuzestod hat Jesus die Erlösung der Menschheit bewirkt. Deshalb ist das Kreuz ihr sichtbares Zeichen. Damit die Erlösungstat Jesu bewußt wahrgenommen und ins Leben übersetzt wird, empfiehlt Simon, auf das Kreuz hinaufzusteigen und den Gekreuzigten liebevoll zu betrachten.

Die Betrachtung des Gekreuzigten ist eine Vertiefung in das Leiden Jesu. Die Anteilnahme an ihm soll die Tugenden bewußt machen, die es Jesus ermöglichten, den Kreuzestod auf sich zu nehmen. Da Jesus dies möglich war, nennt er ihn die Vollendung der Tugenden und ruft zu ihrer Betrachtung und Nachahmung auf.[59]

Zwei Verhaltensweisen Jesu hebt Simon besonders hervor, seine Nacktheit und seine Leidenschaftsfreiheit (*impassibilitas*).[60] Für beide bietet das Kreuz und der an ihm angenagelte Jesus hinreichend Betrachtungsstoff. Dieser soll den Betrachtenden zur Nachfolge Jesu anregen.

[57] II, 117, 3-6.
[58] II, 122, 162-186.
[59] II, 120, 102-104.
[60] II, 120, 120.

6.3 Nachfolge durch das Hinaufsteigen am Kreuz

Wer den Gekreuzigten betrachten will, muß am Kreuz hinaufsteigen, um mit ihm in Verbindung zu treten. Dieser Kontakt ist notwendig, da es sich nicht um ein einfaches Inspizieren Jesu handelt, sondern um eine Begegnung, aus der sich eine Nachahmung ergeben soll.

Vom Hinaufsteigenden wird gefordert, dass er diesen Schritt freiwillig tut. Es ist ein Schritt ins Leiden hinein. Aber auch ein Schritt, den Jesus vor ihm bereits getan hat.[61]

Wer am Kreuz hinaufsteigt, zeigt seine Bereitschaft zur Übung der Tugend. Die Begegnung mit dem gekreuzigten Jesus macht im einzelnen deutlich, wie die Tugend beschaffen sein kann.[62]

Der Aufstieg am Kreuz soll im Herzen demütig vorbereitet werden, denn die Demut verlangt danach, ein Gefährte der Leiden zu werden.[63]

Dazu soll die Liebe kommen, die den Geliebten bis zum Tod mit dem Liebenden verbindet. Sie verlangt danach, mit dem Vollendenden vollendet zu werden. Sie will auch in den Leiden dem Geliebten angeglichen werden, obwohl das in der Ursache nicht möglich ist.[64]

Den Aufstieg am Kreuz nennt Simon auch ein Wegstreben vom Irdischen,[65] so dass der Anfang, die Mitte und die Vollendung des Aufstiegs eine Angelegenheit der Armut ist.[66] An dieser Stelle kommt Simons *Nuditas*-Vorstellung zur Geltung.

6.4 Nachfolge durch verschiedene Kreuzesarten und die Übung der Tugenden

An den Ausführungen Simons zum Aufstieg am Kreuz wird deutlich, dass er von verschiedenen Kreuzen spricht.

Er meint nicht nur das materielle Kreuz, an das Christus mit vielen Strafen beladen genagelt wurde,[67] sondern er denkt noch an andere Belastungen, die wie Kreuze den Menschen bedrücken. Es ist für den Betroffenen erforderlich, sein Kreuz anzunehmen, damit er zur Vollendung gelangt.[68]

[61] II, 117, 8-9.
[62] II, 118, 30-42.
[63] II, 120, 105-106.
[64] II, 120, 105-110.
[65] II, 120, 111.
[66] II, 120, 112-114.
[67] II, 119, 81-82.
[68] II, 119, 80-81.

Zu den vielfältigen Kreuzen zählt Simon die sichtbaren und die unsichtbaren Kreuze, die den Menschen belasten, und mit denen er sich im Blick auf Jesus Christus auseinandersetzen soll. In diesem allgemeinen Sinn kann man unter Kreuz das verstehen, *was erstrebt, aber nicht besessen wird, oder wenn es besessen wird, nicht so vollkommen, wie es gesucht wird.*[69]

Unsichtbar ist das Kreuz dann, wenn die Seele sich infolge einer heiligen Anregung dem Kreuz Christi zuwendet und Christus um eine Tugend bittet, die Bitte aber nicht gewährt wird. Spürt die Seele, dass es deshalb nicht geschehen ist, weil die Bitte nicht so vorgebracht werden konnte, wie gewollt, so ist das für die Seele eine Pein, ein Kreuz. Andere Beispiele sind die Bitte um die Gabe des andächtigen Gebetes, der unversuchten Keuschheit, der unausrottbaren Demut und der unerschütterlichen Geduld. Der Bittende kann mit Recht davon ausgehen, dass die Seele die Tugenden besitzen sollte. Denn mit ihrer Hilfe kann sie die ihr gestellten Aufgaben erfüllen. Zwischen dem Wunsch und der Ausführung klafft jedoch ein Zwiespalt. Die daraus entstehenden Schmerzen bezeichnet Simon als das Kreuz des inneren Menschen.[70]

Als Beispiel eines inneren Kreuzes führt Simon auch das Gebot der Gottes- und Nächstenliebe an. Wenn eine Gebotserfüllung demjenigen, der sich darum bemüht, nicht in der vorgeschriebenen Weise gelingt, so ist der Schmerz, den er darüber empfindet, ein inneres Kreuz.[71]

Simon spricht auch von einem Kreuz des Nichtverstehens. Es entsteht dadurch, dass sich jemand um die Lösung einer Frage oder eines Problems bemüht, seine Anstrengungen aber nur einen Teilerfolg oder kein Ergebnis erzielten. Der Verstand wird auf diese Weise ans Kreuz geheftet.[72]

Das Ertragen der genannten Kreuze und jener, bei denen man sich selbst ein Kreuz auferlegt oder bei denen andere jemandem durch Schmähungen und Verhöhnungen Schmerzen zufügen, ist nicht ohne Wirkung und Nutzen. Bereits die Sehnsucht, so tröstet Simon, nach einem Ziel und der Wille, sachgemäß vorgehen zu wollen, bleiben nicht ohne Verdienst.[73]

Das Tragen der unterschiedlichen Kreuze oder ein Aufstieg am Kreuz Christi sind Möglichkeiten der Christusnachfolge.

[69] II, 118, 54-55.
[70] II, 118, 57- 119, 63.
[71] II, 119, 65-69.
[72] II, 119, 69-73.
[73] II, 119, 78-80; II, 119, 64-65.

6.5 Nachfolge des Gekreuzigten als Tun des Entgegengesetzten

Die freiwillige Annahme des Kreuzes hat Konsequenzen, die Simon dem Kreuzbetrachter veranschaulicht. In Hebr 12,2 heißt es von Jesus: *Er hat angesichts der vor ihm liegenden Freude das Kreuz auf sich genommen, ohne auf die Schande zu achten.* Jesus ist freiwillig in Tadel, Schmach, Strafe und Tod gegangen. Für den Gläubigen ist Jesus nicht im Tod geblieben, sondern auferstanden. Jesus hat durch seinen Tod zwar das Leid nicht abgeschafft, aber deutlich gemacht, dass auf den Kreuzträger nach überstandenem Kampf Ehre, Ruhm, Seligkeit und Leben warten.[74] Durch die Annahme und das Tragen des Kreuzes muß der Betroffene zunächst Leid und Schmach ertragen. Sie werden nach bestandenem Kampf jedoch in ihr Gegenteil verwandelt, wie das Beispiel Jesu lehrt.

Simon sucht diese Wandlung schon hier auf Erden an jemand deutlich zu machen, der sein Kreuz freiwillig auf sich nimmt Er schreibt: *Es wächst nämlich derjenige gänzlich über sich hinaus, der von freiwilligen Strafen gepeinigt wird. Sie haben gewiß einen herben Geschmack, die unsere zarte Natur als immer gegen sich gerichtet ansah. Wer den entgegengesetzten und peinigenden Strafen seine Natur aussetzt, zeigt sich als Besieger seiner Natur. Und es tritt sich selber nieder, der über sich erhaben ist, und er besiegt gänzlich den häuslichen Feind, mit dem er schläft und ißt, mit dem er weiterzieht und anhält, mit dem er ruht und spricht, der trägt und getragen wird, der durch keine anderen Mittel als den Tod von ihm getrennt wird, den zu besiegen ich einen größeren Sieg nenne, als Unzählige außerhalb seiner selbst besiegt zu haben.*[75]

Über den christlichen Streiter, der sich selbst besiegt hat, schreibt Simon, dass es nichts Unbesiegbares für ihn gibt: *Von niemand kann besiegt werden, wer von sich selbst siegreich besiegt wurde.*[76] Das trifft auf Bestrafung, Schmerz, Folter und die Schrecken der Tyrannen zu.[77] Simons Begründung für eine solche Haltung lautet, dass der betreffende Kreuztäger ein Schwert der Feindschaft zwischen seine Seele und seinen Leib legte.[78] Er spielt mit diesem Bild auf die Impassibilität der Seele an, die das Ziel der Betrachtung des Kreuzes ist.

[74] II, 117, 3-6.
[75] II, 117, 9-16.
[76] II, 117, 21-22.
[77] II, 117, 23-28.
[78] II, 117, 27-28.

6.6 Nachfolge als Hinaufsteigen am Kreuz, das als Palme dargestellt ist

Das Hinaufsteigen am Kreuz hat als Ziel das Erlangen der Herrlichkeit. Zu dieser kann jedoch nur derjenige gelangen, der sein Streben nach Selbstverwirklichung aufgegeben und auf seine Macht verzichtet hat, der glaubend und mit Demut zum Kreuz hinzutritt und an ihm hinaufsteigt.[79]

Zum Vergleich des Kreuzes mit einer Palme und des Hinaufstiegs an dieser Palme bot folgender Vers des Hohenliedes den Anlaß: *Ersteigen will ich die Palme, ich greife nach ihren Früchten* (Hld 7,8).[80]

Vom Aufstieg an der Palme wird gesagt, dass er rauh sei, was auch auf den Aufstieg am Kreuz zutrifft. Dem Heraufsteigenden an der Palme werden liebliche Früchte versprochen. Dies trifft auch auf denjenigen zu, der am Kreuz hinaufsteigt. Mit dem Hinaufsteigen auf die Palme, um an ihre Früchte zu gelangen, kann die Notwendigkeit des Aufstiegs verdeutlicht werden. Denn nur derjenige hat Zugriff auf die Früchte, der den Aufstieg tatsächlich unternimmt. Wer neben dem Baum stehen bleibt und sich nicht auf die Palme hinaufwagt, erhält keine Früchte.

Die Notwendigkeit des Aufstiegs an der Palme verdeutlicht Simon auch an den Früchten dieser Palme. Die Früchte werden nämlich nicht durch Naturvorgänge von der Palme gelöst, um dem neben oder unter dem Baum Stehenden zuzufallen. Denn sie trocknen weder ein, um dann herunterzufallen, noch werden sie vom Wind heruntergeschüttelt. Dieser Weg, an die Früchte heranzukommen, ist ausgeschlossen. Als einziger erfolgversprechender Weg bleibt das Hinaufsteigen auf die Palme.[81]

Das Bild von der Palme mit ihren Früchten überträgt Simon auf das Kreuz. Von seinen Früchten erklärt er: *Immer sind am Kreuz Früchte*.[82] Aber nur jene erhalten sie, die am Kreuz nackt und leidenschaftslos hinaufsteigen.

An dieser Stelle wird deutlich, dass Simons Kreuzesspiritualität ihre Kraft auch aus der Betrachtung des Gekreuzigten bezog. Die Ergebnisse der Betrachtung sollten im Leben umgesetzt werden, um auf diese Weise Nachfolge Christi durchzuführen.

[79] II, 119, 91-94.
[80] II, 120, 96-97.
[81] II, 120, 95-99.
[82] II, 120, 99-100.

7. Nacktheit und Impassibilität beim Kreuzesaufsteiger

Als Grundausstattung für den Kreuzesaufsteiger verlangt Simon die Bereitschaft zur Nacktheit und Impassibilität.[83] Was unter diesen beiden Begriffen zu verstehen ist und wie die damit ausgedrückten Haltungen verwirklicht werden können, soll in den nachfolgenden Darlegungen entwickelt werden.

7.1 Die Nacktheit des Kreuzesaufsteigers

Für den Kreuzesaufsteiger stellt Simon die Forderung auf, er müsse nackt werden. Das ungewöhnliche Ansinnen begründet er mit dem Hinweis auf das nackte Kreuz und den nackten Christus, der an ihm hängt. Ihnen gelte es sich anzugleichen.[84]

Die von Simon aufgestellte Forderung klingt zunächst so, als müsse der Kreuzesaufsteiger diese Tugend bereits zu Beginn seines Bemühens in Vollkommenheit besitzen. Der Eindruck täuscht jedoch. Denn für Simon gilt: *Das Hinaufsteigen am Kreuz ist ein Wegstreben von den irdischen Dingen.*[85] Damit ist eine allgemeine Richtungsangabe und ein sukzessives Bemühen angegeben.

Ganz deutlich ist das Prozeßhafte der Einübung in die Tugend der Nacktheit in Simons Gleichsetzung der Nacktheit mit der Armut erkennbar. Bei beiden spricht er vom Anfang, der Mitte und der Vollendung.[86]

Was Simon unter der Nacktheit des Kreuzesaufsteigers versteht, erläutert er bei der Besprechung der Armut, die hier mit Nacktheit gleichzusetzen ist. Vom Kreuzesaufsteiger wird gesagt, dass er nichts besitzt und sich auch nicht darum kümmert, *wenn die Güter der Welt unter die Menschen aufgeteilt werden. Selbst bei jenen Gütern, die zu Recht als die seinigen gelten, sorgt er sich nicht, sondern ist auf die Werke der Tugend bedacht. Auch für den Fall, dass seine Güter durch Los nun einmal in fremde Hände geraten, läßt er in der Seele keine Leidenschaften aufwallen. Einzig diese Leidenschaft macht er in der Seele fest, dass der göttliche Wille getan und die ganze Gerechtigkeit der Tugend erfüllt wird.*[87]

Das Ziel der Bemühungen des Kreuzesaufsteigers ist das Tun der vollen Gerechtigkeit. Das Erreichen dieses Punktes beschreibt

[83] II, 120, 120.
[84] II, 120, 100-101.
[85] II, 120, 111.
[86] II, 120, 112.
[87] II, 120, 112-117.

Simon so: *Dann nämlich wird die volle Gerechtigkeit vom Menschen getan, wenn er nicht weiß, was er innerlich oder äußerlich durch Anstrengung oder durch den Willen noch hinzufügen könnte.*[88] Simon schließt den Willen von diesen Bemühungen nicht aus, da der Wille mehr wollen kann, als der Mensch umzusetzen vermag.[89]

Wenn der Kreuzesaufsteiger sich von allem trennen soll, wenn er nackt werden muß, dann ist nicht nur die Loslösung von allen äußeren Gütern gemeint, sondern auch die Trennung von aller inneren Anhänglichkeit.[90]

Mit der Forderung nach Nacktheit oder völliger Armut für den Kreuzesaufsteiger hat Simon sowohl ein einprägsames Schlagwort aus der Patristik wie auch aus der Armutsbewegung seiner Zeit übernommen. Mit den die Armut betreffenden Fragen wurde Simon auch durch seinen engen Kontakt zu dem Franziskanerspiritualen Angelo Clareno bekannt gemacht. Der Umgang mit ihm bestärkte ihn in dieser Haltung.

7.2 Die Impassibilität des Kreuzesaufsteigers

Zur Charakterisierung des Weges, den der Kreuzesaufsteiger gehen soll, griff Simon nicht nur die dem Habenwollen des Menschen entgegenstehende *Nudus*-Terminologie auf, sondern auch die Termini *impassibilis* und *impassibilitas*, die sich auf die Freiheit von den Neigungen des Körpers und der Seele beziehen. Es geht also, wie Simon ausdrücklich betont, nicht um die Leidensfreiheit des Körpers.[91]

7.2.1 Das Vorkommen der Impassibilität in der Patristik

Die von Simon verwendeten Termini *impassibilis* und *impassibilitas* (*Apatheia*) sind vor allem durch Evagrius Ponticus (um 345-399), der zunächst in Konstantinopel und dann in Ägypten in der nitrischen Wüste und schließlich in den Kellia lebte, mit asketisch-lebenspraktischem Inhalt gefüllt worden.[92]

Die Leidenschaftslosigkeit des Mönches besteht nach Evagrius darin, dass er die Fähigkeit besitzt, ohne Zerstreuung zu beten. Einen höheren Grad hat der erreicht, der ohne Ablenkung die Psalmen zu singen vermag.[93] Zur Impassibilität gelangt man nicht ohne göttliche

[88] II, 120, 118-119.
[89] II, 120, 119-120.
[90] II, 120, 120-121.
[91] II, 120, 127.
[92] LACL 255-257.
[93] Evagrius Ponticus, *Capita practica ad Anatolium* cap. XLI: PG 40, 1231.

Gnade. Deshalb schreibt Evagrius: *Diejenigen wissen um die Gnade des Schöpfers, welche die Impassibilität der Seele durch diesen Körper erreicht haben und der Betrachtung der Dinge nicht wenig obliegen.*[94] Viller/Rahner beschreiben die *Apatheia* bei Evagrius folgendermaßen: *Die Empfindungslosigkeit, die hier gemeint ist, ist die vollkommene Freiheit des Geistes, die vollkommene Hingabe an Gott als Frucht des Verzichtes, des vollkommenen Abstreifens aller Dinge, der Demut, der ständigen Abtötung und der Verachtung des Leibes*[95].

Auch Hieronymus (um 347-419), der seit 386 in Betlehem das Leben eines Asketen und Wissenschaftlers führte, ging in seinem Brief an Ctesiphon auf die *Apatheia* ein. Er schreibt: *Evagrius Ponticus aus Ibora...gab ein Buch heraus und veröffentlichte Sätze peri apatheias, das wir mit Leidensfreiheit (impassibilitatem) oder Nichtverwirrbarkeit (imperturbationem) übersetzen können, wenn die Seele niemals durch einen Gedanken und Verstoß bewegt wird und – um es kurz zu sagen – entweder ein Fels oder Gott ist.*[96] Mit dieser spöttischen Überzeichnung wird Hieronymus der Lehre des Evagrius Ponticus nicht gerecht, der durchaus den Menschen vor Augen hat, der sich mühen muß und seine Menschlichkeit nicht verlieren soll.

Augustinus (354-430) macht in verschiedenen Werken ebenfalls Ausführungen zur *Apatheia*. Am ausführlichsten und aufschlußreichsten sind diejenigen in seinem Gottesstaat, wo er schreibt: *Versteht man also jene von den Griechen sogenannte Apatheia – auf lateinisch müßte man etwa ‚impassibilitas', Leidensunfähigkeit sagen –, wenn man sie auf die Seele, nicht den Leib bezieht, in dem Sinne, dass man von solchen Gemütserregungen frei ist, die der Vernunft widerstreiten und den Geist verwirren, so ist sie ohne Frage etwas Gutes und höchst wünschenswert, freilich in diesem Leben unerreichbar...Dann also wird jene ‚Apathie' erreicht werden, wenn es im Menschen keine Sünde mehr gibt.*[97] Simon vertrat im Gegensatz zu Augustinus eine optimistischere Auffassung, da er meinte, dass man dieses Ziel erreichen oder ihm möglichst nahe kommen kann.

[94] Idem, l. c. cap. XXXIV: PG 40, 1231.

[95] M. Viller / K. Rahner, Aszese und Mystik in der Väterzeit. Ein Abriß der frühchristlichen Spiritualität, Freiburg/Basel/Wien ²1990, 107.

[96] Hieronymus, *Ep.* 133, 3: CSEL 56, 246, 2-6.

[97] Augustinus, *De civitate dei* XIV, 9: CCL 48, 428, 92-101. Siehe auch *De musica* 6, 16, 55 (ed. M. Jacobsson, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensia, Studia Latina Stockholmiensia, Bd. 47, Stockholm 2002) und *Enarratio in psalmum* 83, 17: CCL 39, 1161, 12-15, wo es heißt: *Erit enim postea etiam bonum tuum quod desideras; requies, aeternitas, immortalitas, impassibilitas erit postea: ipsa sunt bona quae servat Deus iustis suis.*

Johannes Cassian (um 360- nach 432), der von Evagrius Ponticus beeinflußt war, übernahm auch dessen *Apatheia*-Lehre. Obwohl er sonst gern griechische Begriffe verwendet, unterläßt er es in diesem Fall und spricht von der Ruhe des Geistes (*tranquillitas mentis*). Er vermied das Wort *Apatheia*, weil es *als pelagianisches Reizwort in Verruf gekommen war.*[98]

Cassians Lehre über die Ruhe des Geistes war eine Vorlage für die Ausführungen Simons. Dies zeigen folgende Zitate aus den *Conlationes*, in denen der Meister mönchischer Vollkommenheit dazu auffordert, die ununterbrochene Beharrlichkeit im Gebet zu üben. Dafür soll der Mönch *nach einer unbeweglichen Ruhe des Geistes und immerwährender Reinheit streben.*[99] Nach Cassian erfüllt sich die Aufforderung von 1 Thess 5,17, ohne Unterlaß zu beten, *wenn der Geist in solcher Ruhe gegründet und von den Banden aller fleischlichen Leidenschaften befreit ist, wenn die Meinung des Herzens mit größter Beharrlichkeit jenem einen und höchsten Gute anhängt.*[100] Im Anschluß an Mt 10,36, wo die Hausgenossen eines Menschen seine Feinde sein werden, schreibt Cassian: *Denn niemand widersteht mir mehr als mein Sinn, der mir wahrhaft der innerste Hausgenosse ist. Und wenn wir also sorgsam sind, so werden wir von den innerlichen Feinden durchaus nicht verletzt werden können. Denn insoweit uns unsere Hausgenossen nicht widerstehen, wird das Reich Gottes in der Ruhe des Geistes erlangt.*[101]

Die Gedanken, die Cassian an verschiedenen Stellen seines Werkes vorträgt, kommen auch bei Simon vor. Es ist anzunehmen, dass Simon das Werk Cassians kannte und aus ihm schöpfte.

Johannes Klimakos hat ebenfalls die *Apatheia* betont. Da sein Werk von der *Paradiesesleiter* Simon bekannt war, kann ihm dieses ebenfalls als Vorlage gedient haben.[102]

7.2.2 Impassibilität und Aufstieg am Kreuz

Seine von der Patristik beeinflußte Lehre zur Impassibilität hat Simon mit seiner Lehre vom Aufstieg am Kreuz verbunden. Er stellt

[98] K. Ruh, Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik. Bd. 1: Die Grundlegung durch die Kirchenväter und die Mönchstheologie des 12. Jahrhunderts, München 1990, 135.

[99] *Conl.* IX, 2,1: CSEL 13,21f.

[100] *Conl.* IX, 6,5: CSEL 13, 257, 17-20.

[101] *Conl.* XVIII, 16,4: CSEL 13, 527, 15-20.

[102] *Scala paradisi* 29: PG 88, 1147-1154. Siehe auch Heiliger Johannes vom Sinai, Klimax oder die Himmelsleiter. Übers. von Mönch Georgios Makedos, mit einem Vorwort des Erzbischofs des Sinai, St. Katharinen-Kloster und Erzbistum des Sinai. Hrsg. von der Berg-Sinai-Stiftung, Athen. Würzburg 2000. Vgl. Viller/Rahner (siehe Anm. 95) 160f.

die Impassibilität als einen Zustand dar, zu dem der Kreuzesaufsteiger gelangen soll. Dieser Zustand ist die Freiheit. Simon schreibt: *Die Leidensfreiheit der Seele ist die einzige Freiheit unter dem Himmel.*[103]

7.2.2.1 Impassibilität und Unveränderlichkeit

In der Beschreibung der Impassibilität macht Simon deutlich, dass zu ihrem Grundbestand eine gewisse Unveränderlichkeit gehört. Sie soll so zur Geltung kommen, *dass sie weder bei Ehre und Schmach, bei Segen und Fluch, bei Tadel und Lob, bei Schmerzen des Körpers und seinem Wohlbefinden, bei Liebe und von anderen zugefügtem Haß eine Verdunkelung des Wechsels noch eine Umkehr noch gar eine Veränderung annimmt infolge des Studiums der Gnade, nicht Kraft der Natur; was Gott allein obliegt.*[104]

Der Kreuzesaufsteiger soll die Tugend der Unveränderlichkeit mit nicht nachlassender Kraft üben, damit er auch gegen das, was von der Natur aufsteigt, leidend leidenslos bleibt.[105]

Ein anderer Feind, der die Impassibilität des Kreuzesaufsteigers bedroht, ist der Teufel. Gegen ihn gilt es einen geheimen, unermüdlichen Streit zu führen. Bei dem Ringen kann der Kreuzesaufsteiger darauf vertrauen, dass er von Christus unterstützt wird. Denn Christus hat in eigener Person über die schrecklichen Heere des Satans triumphiert. Sein Triumph beinhaltet zweierlei, die Erlösung der Welt und das Beispiel der Nachahmung. Augenfällig wird das nachzuahmende Beispiel Jesu in der am Kreuz angehefteten Hand, die nicht zum Zurückschlagen, sondern zum Ertragen ausgestreckt ist. Dies gilt für alle Erschütterungen der Seele.[106]

Ein sicheres Zeichen für die Impassibilität der Seele stellt der Kreuzesaufsteiger dann bei sich fest, wenn er standfest bleibt, sobald die Laster bei ihm anklopfen und Eintritt verlangen.[107]

7.2.2.2 Impassibilität und Ablegen des Behindernden

Wer sich beim Aufstieg am Kreuz befindet, um zur Impassibilität zu gelangen, muß Rückschau halten, Vergleiche anstellen und sich fragen, wie weit er fortgeschritten ist und welche Strecke er noch zurückzulegen hat. Hat er sich davon ein Bild gemacht, dann soll er

[103] Simon Fidati de Cassia, *De gestis domini salvatoris*, Würzburg 1998, II, 121, 131.
[104] II, 121, 131-136.
[105] II, 121, 137-138.
[106] II, 121, 139-143.
[107] II, 121, 144-145.

sich ohne Verzögerung auf die noch zu bewältigende Strecke begeben.

Für das, was nach einer solchen Rück- und Vorschau zu tun ist, führt Simon ein Zitat aus dem Hebräerbrief an, in dem die Aufgabe umschrieben ist: *Wollen auch wir alle Last und die Fesseln der Sünde abwerfen. Laßt uns mit Ausdauer in dem Wettkampf laufen, der uns aufgetragen ist, und dabei auf Jesus blicken, den Urheber und Vollender des Glaubens; er hat angesichts der vor ihm liegenden Freude das Kreuz auf sich genommen, ohne auf die Schande zu achten. Denkt an den, der von den Sündern solchen Widerstand gegen sich erduldet hat; dann werdet ihr nicht ermatten und den Mut nicht verlieren. Ihr habt im Kampf gegen die Sünde noch nicht bis aufs Blut Widerstand geleistet* (Hebr 12,1-4).

Aus dem Schrifttext greift Simon einige Gesichtspunkte heraus, um ihre Bedeutung für den Kreuzesaufsteiger, der zur Impassibilität gelangen will, auszudeuten.

Er beginnt mit der Erläuterung der Last, die abgelegt werden soll. Damit nicht die falschen Lasten abgelegt werden, nennt er als gute Lasten das Gesetz, die Furcht und die Liebe.[108]

Lasten aber, die abgelegt werden müssen, sind solche, die beim Lauf im Wettkampf den Laufenden behindern.[109] Als behindernde Gewichte werden die Ursprungssünde, die zerrüttete Natur, die verderbende und verdorbene Liebe, alles Sichtbare und Vergängliche genannt.

Der Körper gehört natürlich nicht zu den abzulegenden Gewichten, aber eine zu große Besorgnis um ihn sollte nicht stattfinden. Dafür muß aber um so mehr Sorge auf die Seelen verwandt werden, die, wie Simon formuliert, *alle zum Sabbat der Tugend berufen sind, damit sie zum Sabbat der ewigen Seligkeit gelangen.*[110] Das Wort Sabbat hat Simon ganz bewußt gewählt. Die Heiligung des Sabbats verbietet das Tragen von Gewichten und Lasten, welche die Seele an der Verehrung Gottes hindern. Als Bestätigung dient ihm ein Wort des Propheten Jeremia, bei dem es heißt: *Wenn ihr aber nicht auf meine Gebote hört, den Sabbat zu heiligen, keine Last zu tragen und am Sabbat durch die Tore Jerusalems zu bringen, dann lege ich Feuer an seine Tore, das Jerusalems Paläste verzehrt und nie mehr erlischt* (Jer 17,27).[111]

[108] II, 122,164-165.
[109] II, 122, 166-171.
[110] II, 122, 174-181.
[111] II, 181-186.

Als abzulegende Last werden im Schrifttext auch *die Fesseln der Sünde* genannt (Hebr 12,1). Der lateinische Vulgatatext lautet in der deutschen Übersetzung *herumstehende Sünde*. Als solche könnte man, da Simon keine Einzelsünde benennt, einen zu geringen Glauben an das erlösende Kreuz ansehen. Denn besagte Sünde hindert am Lauf zum Wettkampf, der von seinem Ausrichter am Kreuz, von Jesus Christus, gefordert wird. Dafür ist es notwendig, sich den Glaubensinhalt vor Augen zu führen, den Christus durch den Tod am Kreuze bewirkte. *Infolge des Glaubens nämlich an das christustragende Kreuz ist die Strafe für das Böse in Waffen der Tugenden verwandelt worden, und was die Strafe des Verbrechers ist, wurde in das Verdienst des wahren Kämpfers umgewandelt, und was die Strafe des ersten sündigenden Menschen war, wird als Triumph des Schöpfers an Christus für den nachfolgenden Menschen durchgesetzt. Der Tod behält zwar nach Wort und Tat seine Verwerflichkeit, erwirbt aber, fromm ertragen, die ewige Herrlichkeit.*[112]

Der Glaube an die durch den Kreuzestod Jesu bewirkte Erlösung ist auch für den Fall notwendig, dass der verwöhnte Sinn vor etwas Schrecklichem zurückschreckt. Nimmt er es für Christus auf sich, wird er dafür belohnt. Infolge des Glaubens an das heilige Kreuz werden die freiwillig ertragenen körperlichen Schmerzen und die von anderen zugefügten zur Herrlichkeit umgewandelt. Auch der Tod, *der von den Liebhabern dieses Lebens mit so großem Eifer vermieden wird,* weil er mit großem Schmerz das Bewußtsein raubt, erfährt eine Umwandlung. Er wird nämlich zur Belohnung für den, der ihn im Vertrauen auf das Kreuz Christi ertragen hat.[113]

Die weitere Auslegung des Brieftextes (Hebr 12,2) führt Simon zu Jesus, den Urheber des Glaubens, *der für alle den Tod ertrug* am Kreuz.[114] Was vom Kreuzesgeschehen mit den Sinnen wahrgenommen und mit dem Verstand erfaßt werden kann, wird nur dann zum entscheidenden Heilsereignis, wenn es auf den Urheber des Glaubens bezogen wird. Auf ihn gilt es zu schauen oder besser *auf den von ihm vermehrten Glauben.*[115]

Dem Glauben an das erlösende Kreuz schreibt Simon ein besonderes Gnadenprivileg zu, das Christus diesem verliehen hat. Es besteht in der Fähigkeit, während der Lebenszeit alle Strafübel in Waffen der Tugend überführen zu können. Der Glaube an Jesus als

[112] II, 122, 187-194.
[113] II, 122, 195-123, 199.
[114] II, 123, 200-201.
[115] II, 123, 202.

den Urheber des Glaubens bewirkt auch, dass bei Unzuträglichkeiten oder dem Entzug der Freude die Widrigkeiten *zu Brücken und Wegen zum ewigen Leben werden.*[116]

Auch die Bezeichnung Jesu als *Vollender des Glaubens* (Hebr 12,2) wird von Simon im Zusammenhang mit dem Aufstieg zur Impassibilität untersucht. Seine Forderung lautet, dass man sich in der Höhe des Geistes dem Kreuz nähern soll, um dann auf Jesus als Vollender des Glaubens zu blicken. Bei diesem Geschehen wird dem Betrachter deutlich, dass an Jesus die Erlösung in vollendeter Form geschehen ist, ohne dass eine Abträglichkeit an ihr haftet. Simon nennt einige Punkte, die dies verdeutlichen. Am Kreuz wurde das göttliche Blut vergossen und die Schuld gesühnt. Es wurde die Vollendung der Tugenden herbeigeführt. Zeichen und Siegel dafür sind die Urkunde und der Schuldbrief seines Lebens und seiner Lehre.[117]

Durch ein Siegel wurden auch am Kreuz die in der Seele vorhandenen und geliebten Tugenden gezeigt und ein Überfluß der Liebe zu den Geschöpfen wurde sichtbar, die er aus den schrecklichsten Gefahren befreien mußte.[118]

Dann wurde alle Welt im vollendeten Kreuzesgeheimnis zur Hoffnung auf das übernatürliche Leben veranlaßt. *Denn der Ewige hat wegen des ewigen Lebens, das er den Zeitlichen geben wollte, den zeitlichen Tod ertragen.*[119] Durch seinen Tod hat der Ewige die Hoffnung von uns allen auf das Ewige durch Wurzeln verankert.

Durch seinen Tod hat Jesus auch seine Liebe zur Schöpfung gezeigt[120] und damit die drei göttlichen Tugenden in Vollendung den Kreuzesaufsteigern vor Augen geführt. Sie sollen sich daran messen und davon anspornen lassen.

Wer zu der von Jesus gezeigten Liebe aufsteigen will, ist zum Kreuz eingeladen. Denn an ihm hängt derjenige, *der von allen eine Antwort sucht.*[121] Damit ist die Nachahmung bestimmter Tugenden ausgesagt, welche die Betrachtung des Gekreuzigten wecken soll.

Auf das Gemälde des heiligen Kreuzes ist jegliche Demut gemalt. Aber nicht nur sie. Es fehlt weder die Eigenart noch die Vollkommenheit der anderen Tugenden.

[116] II, 123, 200-207.
[117] II, 123, 208-214.
[118] II, 123, 214-216.
[119] II, 123, 216-218.
[120] II, 123, 219.
[121] II, 123, 220-221.

Simon fährt sicher nicht ohne Grund bei derAufzählung der Tugenden mit der Erwähnung der außergewöhnlichen Armut Jesu an Dingen, Freunden und Macht fort.

Der Betrachter des Kreuzesbildes wird der außergewöhnlichen Geduld Jesu ansichtig. Man hört dort keine Klage. Es werden dort nur Gebete zum Vater laut und Segenswünsche für Fluchworte sind zu hören.[122] Außer den genannten Tugenden werden noch das Ertragen von Beschimpfungen und Spott gegen Leib und Seele, Enthaltsamkeit, das Aushalten von Durst, die Züchtigung des Leibes, Keuschheit, das Annehmen von Geringschätzung und Verachtung genannt. Simon beendet die Betrachtung der Tugenden, die er am Kreuzesbild wahrnahm, mit den Worten: *Wahrlich Jesus, der Vollender des Guten, hat jede Tugend am Kreuz vollendet.*[123]

Zu diesen von Jesus vollendeten Tugenden, die vorher Jesu Leiden waren, soll sich der Kreuzesaufsteiger hinaufbegeben. Damit kommt er an kein Ende. Es wird ihm immer noch ein Wegstück verbleiben, das er zurücklegen muß. Simon empfiehlt, dass sich der Kreuzesaufsteiger mit Glaube und Liebe ausrüste, damit er Jesus in den Leiden und in den exemplarisch vorgelebten Tugenden nachfolge, um dann von ihm zur Vollendung geführt zu werden.

7.2.3 Die Bedeutung der Impassibilität beim Hinaufsteigen am Kreuz

Simon sieht eine enge Verbindung zwischen dem Aufstieg am Kreuz und der Impassibilität. Dem Betrachter des Kreuzes werde klar, meint er, was Impassibilität bedeute. Er gibt von ihr die folgende Definition: *Sie ist eine unverrückbare Tugend und eine unverrückbare Disposition zu allem, was die Tugend der Seele und dem Körper zuwendet. Sie hat nichts Bestimmtes oder Angeeignetes zum guten Handeln und Leiden für die Gerechtigkeit. Sie strebt nämlich alles Gute an, sie freut sich für die Gerechtigkeit in allen Leiden. Im Saal der Impassibilität ist nichts traurig, erfreuende Tugenden fehlen nicht, Unordnung stiftende Übel treten nicht ein. Unverbrüchlich schützt sie sich vor großen und kleinen Lastern, und bis aufs Blut, ja sogar bis zur Annahme des Todes leistet sie Widerstand gegen die Laster, und sie läßt infolge der Rechtschaffenheit des Kämpfens nicht zu, dass ihr Feigheit zugeschrieben wird. Die sehr Erprobte sucht immer in Wettkämpfen zu sein. Den Wettkampf aber nennt sie ihre Ruhe und ihren Frieden. Um aber siegreich in einen Kampf eintreten*

[122] II, 123, 221-225.
[123] II, 123, 225- 124, 230.

zu können, sucht sie häufig einen Führer, dem sie sich ausnahmslos in seinen Anordnungen unterordnet. Immer hingeordnet auf die Trompete seines Aufbruchs nimmt sie die Last des Krieges leidenschaftslos auf sich. Sie wird nämlich niemals ankommen, außer ihr Feind zieht sich vom Menschen zurück. Ihr leidenschaftsloser Feind ist die Eigenliebe, die durch die Liebe mit dem Körper verbündet ist. Auch wer dieses überschattete, falsche Leben liebt oder zart wünscht, in den Herzen der anderen zu leben, wird niemals zu dieser Tugend gelangen. Leidenschaftslos dem Körper gegenüber eingestellt, wird er die Gefahren des Körpers nicht fürchten. Er setzt ihn nämlich wie ein Waldtier den peinigenden Übeln aus.[124]

Die hier ausführlich zitierten Ausführungen Simons zur Leidenschaftslosigkeit machen seine Vertrautheit mit dieser Tugend deutlich und zeigen, wie hilfreich sie für den Kreuzesaufsteiger ist.

7.2.4 Vorbildlich gelebte Impassibilität

Wer sich die Darlegungen zur Impassibilität vor Augen führt, kann leicht zu der Auffassung gelangen, dass in ihnen etwas Unmögliches gefordert wird. Deshalb ist es hilfreich, wenn Simon dem Kreuzaufsteiger auch einige Personen vor Augen führt, an denen er die Impassibilität aufzeigen kann.

Wer zur Impassibilität gelangen will, muß sich mit der Bedrohung durch den Tod auseinandersetzen. Simon vertritt die Auffassung, daß derjenige nicht unter dem Tod leidet, der das Leben verabscheut. Wer dem Leben feindlich gegenübersteht, dem ist der Tod ein Freund. Niemand erleidet Böses von einem Freund, wenn er ihm zu Angenehmem verhilft. Dies gilt etwa für den Apostel Paulus, der sich danach sehnte, *aufzubrechen und bei Christus zu sein* (Phil 1,23). Der Tod war ihm also ein Freund, da er ihm zu seinem ersehnten Ziel verhelfen konnte.[125]

Zu dem Thema des Schreckens vor dem Tode und seiner Überwindung durch den Kreuzesaufsteiger auf dem Weg zur Impassibilität führt Simon auch das Wort eines heiligen Kämpfers an, der von einem Tyrannen mit dem Tod bedroht wurde. Diesem gab er folgende Antwort: *Du stimmst mit meinen Wünschen geradezu überein. Und ich danke dir vielmals, weil du mich von den schlechten Herren löst und dem allergerechtesten König der Könige zurückgibst.*[126]

[124] II, 124, 236-253.
[125] II, 124, 254-259.
[126] II, 125, 260-263.

Simon zieht aus der Gelassenheit gegenüber dem Leben und der Begrüßung des Todes die Folgerung, dass die betreffende Person auch nicht an jenen Dingen hängt, die zum Erhalt des Lebens beitragen. Er sieht diese Haltung bei dem Dulder Ijob verwirklicht, der nach dem Verlust seiner Familie und seiner Habe unbeeindruckt blieb, und weder in seiner Seele noch durch ein Wort töricht gegen Gott redete.[127]

Fragt man nach den Grundlagen für die Impassibilität, so lautet Simons negative Antwort, dass sie nicht auf dem Fehlen der Sinnesorgane beruhe, wie dies bei den leblosen Dingen der Fall sei. Auch handle es sich nicht um Unbesonnene, welche die Impassibilität aus ihrer Leichtfertigkeit heraus sich zutrauen. Es wird auf Erden auch nicht jene Impassibilität angestrebt, die den Vollendeten im Himmel zukommt. Seine positive Antwort heißt, dass die hier zu behandelnde Impassibilität auf der vorherrschenden Vernunft beruht. Diese sieht alles vernünftig entstehen, leidet nicht häufig oder wird lasterhaft berührt oder geht aus einem langen Studium der Tugenden unter vielen Seufzern, glühenden Sehnsüchten und Gebeten hervor und wird durch die göttliche Gnade gewährt.[128]

Die Impassibilität hat natürlich auch etwas mit der Natur des Kreuzesaufsteigers zu tun, geht aber nie allein aus ihr hervor. Sie ist eine Gabe des Himmels, die den Menschen gewährt wird. Paulus spricht von der Gnade als einem Geschenk, das in den Herzen der Menschen und seinen Anlagen ausgegossen ist (Röm 5,5). Auf dieser Grundlage nimmt sich der nach der Impassibilität Strebende etwas Ewiges vor. Dadurch gestärkt setzt er den vorübergehenden Schmerz hintan. Er nimmt sich etwas Himmlisches vor, um das Irdische gering zu achten. Dann nimmt er sich etwas Göttliches vor, um das Menschliche zurückzustufen.[129] Für einen solchen Kreuzesaufsteiger ist jede Strafe gleichgültig, da er sich eines reinen und freien Gewissens erfreut. Jede Störung der inneren Haltung wird gering geachtet, da sich der Geist an der Tugend, Wahrheit und Ewigkeit erfreut.

Nachdem Simon einen Weg zur Impassibilität aufgezeigt hat, macht er noch einmal auf den aufmerksam, der die entscheidende Person beim Aufstieg am Kreuz ist, Jesus Christus, indem er schreibt: *Laßt uns über den nachsinnen, der die Vollendung alles Guten durch das Kreuz bewirkte* (Hebr 12,2), *an dem wir zur Erleichterung der*

[127] II, 125, 264-270.
[128] II, 125, 271-278.
[129] II, 125, 279-283.

auftretenden Ermüdungen hinaufsteigen wollen, und wir werden ganz und gar nicht versagen[130].

Als Beispiel für die Impassibilität der Seele und das Fehlen jeglicher fehlerhaften Anhänglichkeit wird Abraham genannt. Sie wird bei der Opferung des Sohnes deutlich. Ohne Schmerz der Seele war er zu dieser Tat bereit, nachdem er den göttlichen Befehl zur Opferung seines Sohnes gehört hatte. Gegen diesen erhob er weder Widerspruch, noch leistete er dagegen in der Seele Widerstand (Gen 22,1-19).

7.2.5 Stufen des Aufstiegs zur Impassibilität

Abrahams Verhalten beurteilt Simon als den Beginn des Aufstiegs am Kreuz. Er war in der Lage, ohne Schmerzen das zu ertragen, was gewöhnlich und natürlich zur Impassibilität führt.[131]

Einen höheren Grad an Impassibilität hat derjenige erreicht, der nach dem Verlust materiellen Besitzes sich mit neuen intellektuellen Gütern tröstet. Simon zählt dazu große Geduld und viel Weisheit. Er schreibt: *Viel Geduld ist nur dort, wo sich wahre Impassibilität findet, und wo viel Geduld herrscht, besteht zweifellos auch viel Weisheit.*[132]

Diesen höheren Grad der Impassibilität schreibt Simon Isaak zu. Er sieht ihn in der neuen Verbindung gegeben, die Isaak mit Rebekka eingegangen ist und durch die er sich über den Tod seiner Mutter hinwegtröstete. Den Namen Rebekka übersetzt Simon mit *viel Geduld* oder *die viel empfing*.[133]

Die zweite Erklärung des Namens Rebekka, *die viel empfing*, greift Simon auf, um die höchste Stufe der Impassibilität zu erklären. Zu ihr kann der Kreuzesaufsteiger nur dadurch gelangen, dass Gott, der höchste und vollkommene Wohltäter, ihm viel Gnade auf seinem Weg gewährte. Die Vollendung der von Jesus geschenkten und ihm zurückerstatteten Liebe ist der letzte Grad der Impassibilität hier auf Erden. Darüber hinaus kann nur noch die Impassibilität erwartet werden, die Gott, der Vater, gewährt.[134]

Die von Jesus bewirkte Impassibilität ist wegen des gegen den Willen Leidenschaftslosen, aber freiwillig Leidenden eine Tugend in der Seele und eine vollendete Handlung im Körper. Über sie urteilt

[130] II, 125, 283-289.
[131] II, 126, 293-294.
[132] II, 126, 300-302.
[133] II, 126, 298-300.
[134] II, 126, 303-307.

Simon: *Sie ist die Glückseligkeit und eine Vorstufe der himmlischen Vollendung bei denen, die sich wegen Christus in einem aktiven Kampf befinden, und weilt beglückt im Tränental. Sie ist das Glück des inneren Paradieses, da sie das gleiche Bild zurückerhielt, mit dem sie am Anfang beschenkt worden war.*[135]

Nach dem Durchschreiten des langen Weges, den der Kreuzesaufsteiger bis zum letzten Grad der Impassibilität zurücklegen muß, bleibt ihm die Hoffnung mit der er sich nach der Vollendung ausstreckt. Sie soll ihn veranlassen, den ruhmreichen und ewigen Triumph zu erwarten.[136]

In diesem Zusammenhang macht Simon eine für die Lehre von der Impassibilität interessante Bemerkung. Er weiß wahrscheinlich um die Verurteilungen, die diese Lehre erfahren hat, hält sie aber dennoch für hilfreich, da er zwischen ihr und der vollkommenen Liebe keinen Unterschied sieht. Seine Bemerkung dazu lautet: *Wenn die Verachtung der Wahrheitsaussagen aufhörte und die Augen des Verstandes und des Glaubens ohne Schatten schauen würden, sähen sie gewiß, dass die Impassibilität und die vollkommene Liebe sich nur in ihren Namen unterscheiden. Und es gibt keinen Unterschied in der Vollkommenheit des Kämpfers im Stadion, in welchem dem Siegespreis nachgejagt wird: der himmlischen Berufung* (Phil 3,14).[137]

In einigen Punkten faßt Simon die von ihm vorgetragene Lehre zur Kreuzesnachfolge zusammen. Seine Forderungen lauten: Der Aspirant solle auf den nackten Christus schauen, am nackten Kreuz emporsteigen und sich anstrengen, leidensunfähig zu werden. Bei diesen Bemühungen kommt niemand durch sein Verdienst voran, sondern nur durch die göttliche Gnade. Der Aufstieg muß bis zu dem Punkt erfolgen, an dem der Sündenfall der Stammeltern sich zutrug, also bis zur Zurückgewinnung des inneren Paradieseszustandes. Davon bleibt der uns bevorstehende sichere Tod ausgeschlossen.[138] Bis dieser eintritt, muß der Kreuzesaufsteiger voll Hoffnung nach Jesus als dem Vollender ausschauen.

Schluß

Der Aufstieg am Kreuz und der Aufstieg zur Impassibilität sind für Simon eng miteinander verbunden. Er macht damit deutlich,

[135] II, 126, 308-311.
[136] II, 126, 312.
[137] II, 126, 312-316.
[138] II, 126, 317-321.

dass die Tugend der Impassibilität nicht allein auf menschlicher Anstrengung beruht, sondern von der Kreuzestheologie geprägt ist oder sein sollte. Er schreibt deshalb: *Der Aufstieg zur Impassibilität besteht im Aufstieg am Kreuze.*[139] Simon hat sich dieses Themas angenommen, damit der weitergehende Aufstieg für seine Nachfolger lebendig bleibt und seine Nachfolger das Beispiel Christi vor Augen haben.[140]

Die Kreuzesthematik wurde in der Augustinerschule von verschiedenen Vertretern aufgegriffen.[141] Simon hat ihr durch seinen Rückgriff auf die Patristik, aus der er das *Nuditas-* und *Impassibilitas-*Thema übernahm, seine eigene Prägung gegeben, die zum Nachdenken herausfordert.

An seiner Darstellung fällt auf, dass er das Nachfolgemoment aus der Formel des Hieronymus (*Nudum Christum in nuda cruce sequi*) wegließ und sie zu dem Wort *Nudus Christus in nuda cruce* verkürzte. Daran wird deutlich, dass Simon seine Darlegungen in erster Linie für die Betrachtung konzipierte, um den Betrachter des Kreuzesbildes zur Gleichgestaltung mit dem Gekreuzigten zu führen. Das Motiv der Nachfolge wird aber nicht fallengelassen, sondern kommt in der Aufforderung, am Kreuz hinaufzusteigen, zur Geltung.

Die Ausführungen Simons zur Impassibilität gehen auf Evagrius Ponticus zurück. Sie stehen zwar in Verbindung mit der stoischen Affektenlehre,[142] haben aber bei Simon ein kreuzestheologisches Gepräge. Er verweist immer wieder auf Jesus als den Urheber und Vollender des Glaubens (Hebr 12,2). Dadurch wird deutlich, dass er die Impassibilität theologisch sieht und das entscheidend Gnadenhafte in diesen Bemühungen berücksichtigt und betont.

Zum Schluß sei darauf verwiesen, dass Simon nachdrücklich die Annahme des persönlichen Kreuzes betont. Er hat damit die Aufforderung Jesu: *Und wer nicht sein Kreuz auf sich nimmt und mir nachfolgt, ist meiner nicht würdig* (Mt 10,38) ins Bewußtsein gehoben und als Weg aufgezeigt, der unter dem Zeichen des Entgegengesetzten steht, aber dennoch zur Vollendung führt.

Willigis ECKERMANN OSA

[139] II, 127, 327.
[140] II, 127, 327-329.
[141] W. Eckermann, Luthers Kreuzestheologie. Zur Frage nach ihrem Ursprung, in: Catholica 37 (1983) 306-322. In dem Beitrag werden die Aussagen der beiden Augustinertheologen Johannes Hiltalingen von Basel († 1392) und Angelus von Döbeln († nach 1420) zur Kreuzestheologie untersucht.
[142] M. Forschner, Apathie, in: LThK^3 1, 801.

„SIMPLICITAS EVANGELICA"

„Einfachheit" als Norm und Methode im Leben und Werk des Simon Fidati von Cascia

Der junge Student und spätere Augustinertheologe Simon Fidati aus Cascia in Umbrien (* um 1295, † 1348) lernte nach eigener Aussage auf dem Heimweg von einer im Bereich der *artes liberales* angesiedelten Lehrveranstaltung den Franziskanerspiritualen Angelo Clareno kennen. Obwohl Simon bei der Schilderung dieser Begegnung den Namen des Mannes nicht mitteilt, gilt es als *communis opinio*, daß es sich um den genannten Spiritualen handelt, der zu dem im Jahre 1306 in der Nähe von Cascia gegründeten und von der Stadtrepublik Cascia unterstützen Kloster gehörte. Angelo Clareno machte im Verlauf des Gesprächs Simon darauf aufmerksam, daß er durch das Studium der mitgeführten *libri naturales*, die auf eine intensivere Beschäftigung mit dem *Quadrivium*, d.h. mit den Fächern Astronomie, Geometrie, Arithmetik und Musik, schließen lassen, niemals auf den Weg seiner eigentlichen Berufung gebracht würde, da ein wahrer Christ nicht die Erforschung der Natur (*natura*), sondern die Erlangung der Gnade (*gratia*) erstreben solle.[1]

Das Ergebnis dieser Begegnung war, daß Simon sein weltliches Studium aufgab, in das Augustinerkloster in Cascia eintrat und sich wohl mit großem Erfolg dem Theologiestudium widmete. Um so bemerkenswerter ist es, daß Simon nach dem Ende des Studiums nicht den akademischen Titel eines *magister* oder *lector* anstrebte, sondern Zeit seines Lebens ein einfacher Ordensbruder (*simplex frater*) blieb.

1. *Simplicitas* als Norm im Leben Simons

1.1 Verzicht auf akademische Titel

Bereits Johannes von Salerno (ca. 1317-1388), der bedeutendste Schüler und spätere Biograph Simons, sah sich genötigt, zu dem

[1] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris* VIII, 26 [= *Tractatus de processu peccatoris*] (IV, 187, 59 – 188, 72 Eckermann). Siehe hierzu W. Eckermann, Das Bekehrungserlebnis des Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA († 1348). Bedeutung für seine Theologie und unsere Zeit, Cor unum 58 (2000) 65-76.

geschilderten Sachverhalt Stellung zu nehmen: Er wertet ihn nicht als mangelnde Begabung, sondern als bewußten Verzicht und Zeichen der Demut (*humilitas*).[2] Die Überlegung, daß Simon möglicherweise nicht die finanziellen Mittel besaß, um die bei der Erlangung eines Titels obligatorische akademische Feier auszurichten, ist von vornherein auszuschließen, zumal Zumkeller nachgewiesen hat, daß die entsprechenden Kosten üblicherweise vom Konvent des Absolventen übernommen wurden.[3]

Aus dieser ersten Auffälligkeit in Simons noch jüngeren Jahren, daß am Ende seines Studiums zwar ein Abschluß, aber keine Verleihung eines akademischen Titels stand, ergibt sich die Frage, ob *simplicitas*, verstanden als ‚Einfachheit', Schlichtheit und Bescheidenheit, als das Motiv anzusehen ist, das den Gelehrten, der später eine mehr als zwei Maultierladungen umfassende patristische Bibliothek besitzen sollte,[4] dazu veranlaßte, weiterhin ein „einfacher Bruder" zu bleiben und eine am Evangelium ausgerichtete ‚Einfachheit' zu leben. Daher lohnt sich eine Untersuchung darüber, inwiefern die Begriffe *docta simplicitas* und *simplicitas evangelica* einerseits eine Norm in Simons Leben darstellten und andererseits die Methode in seinem schriftstellerischen Werk vorgaben. Diese Untersuchung soll im folgenden an einzelnen Punkten in seinem Leben sowie an exemplarischen Stellen seines Œuvres durchgeführt werden.

[2] Johannes von Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia*, in: Il Beato Simone Fidati da Cascia dell'ordine Romitano di S. Agostino e i suoi scritti editi ed inediti, a cura di N. Mattioli (Antologia Agostiniana, vol. 2), Roma 1898, 16-26, hier 16:... *non magister in suo ordine neque lector, sed utique simplex frater, fratrem dico Simonem de Cassia,...* 20:... *in humilitate fundatus, honestate fulcitus et prudentia eruditus...*

Diese im Stile einer Hagiographie verfaßte Biographie konzipierte Johannes von Salerno als Einführung zu seiner Edition von Simons Schriften, die er etwa zehn Jahre nach dessen Tod herausgab. Vgl. W. Eckermann/C. M. Oser-Grote, Ein Augustinerspirituale als Wanderprediger und Exeget. Der *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia* des Johannes von Salerno, eingeleitet und übersetzt, Cor unum 61 (2003) 113-121. Eine Neuedition ist in Vorbereitung: Simon Fidati de Cassia OESA, *L'ordine della vita cristiana, Tractatus de vita christiana, Epistulae, Opuscula, Fragmenta*. Johannes de Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia*, ed. Willigis Eckermann cooperante Carolin M. Oser-Grote (Cassiciacum; Suppl.bd. 19), Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag 2004.

[3] Vgl. A. Zumkeller, Hugolin von Orvieto und seine theologische Erkenntnislehre (Cassiciacum, Bd. 9), Würzburg 1941, bes. 77 mit Anm. 4. Gemäß dem Generalkapitel von Padua aus dem Jahre 1359 war für jede Magisterpromotion eines Ordensmitglieds der Betrag von 50 Gulden vorgesehen.

[4] Johannes von Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia* (wie Anm. 2) 20:... *sententiis antiquorum doctorum suum acutissimum intellectum humiliter subiugavit. Quorum libros, quotquot habere potuit, cumulavit, absque pigritia perlegit et clarissime intellexit plus quam duas salmas muli.*

1.2 Simplicitas *in der Predigt*

In den folgenden Jahren, nach Abschluß seines Studiums, trat Simon vor allem als hochgeschätzter Wanderprediger zwischen Florenz und Rom hervor und forderte seine zahlreichen Zuhörer zu Umkehr und Buße und zu einem nach dem Evangelium ausgerichteten Leben auf. Bezeichnend für seine Predigttätigkeit ist, daß er nach den Worten des Johannes von Salerno nicht mit einem ausgearbeiteten Konzept vor die Menge trat, sondern vielmehr auf die Eingebungen des Hl. Geistes vertraute und tatsächlich in dem Moment, in dem er die Leute vor sich sah, wußte, was er zu predigen hatte. Auch wenn der Biograph diese Praxis mit fehlender Vorbereitungszeit des vielgefragten Augustiners zu erklären suchte, stellt sich die Frage, ob diese Erklärung als der wahre Grund für das spontane, unvorbereitete Predigen anzusehen ist.

Dem Problem, ohne Vorbereitung predigen zu müssen, hätte Simon z.B. durch das Studium von Rhetoriklehrbüchern, die u.a. Techniken für die Stegreifrede bereithalten, abhelfen können. Ein solches Hilfsmittel stellt beispielsweise das dritte Buch von Brunetto Latinis *Tresor* (ca. 1220-1294) dar, das zahlreiche Reden- und Briefmuster enthält. Der *Tresor* war – ebenso wie Latinis kommentierte Teilübersetzung von Ciceros *De inventione* (Über die Auffindung des Stoffs) – auch in Florenz verbreitet. Im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert entstanden in Bologna weitere Sammlungen von Musterreden und -briefen, die ebenfalls in Florenz bekannt wurden. Man wird aber davon ausgehen müssen, daß es Simon fern lag, derartige Lehrbücher zu konsultieren, und er der technischen Hilfe das Vertrauen auf göttlichen Beistand vorzog. Simons Haltung entspricht ganz der Anweisung, die Jesus den Jüngern für schwierige Situationen im Rahmen ihrer künftigen Predigttätigkeit erteilte: „*Wenn man euch vor die Gerichte der Synagogen und vor die Herrscher und Machthaber schleppt, dann macht euch keine Sorgen, wie ihr euch verteidigen oder was ihr sagen sollt. Denn der Heilige Geist wird euch in der gleichen Stunde eingeben, was ihr sagen müßt.*“ (Lk 12,11f.). Außerdem ist das Vertrauen auf die Inspiration durch den Hl. Geist ein typisches Merkmal der franziskanischen Spiritualität.[5] Um aber dennoch über ein gewisses Repertoire zu verfügen, auf das er in jeder Predigt-

[5] Vgl. A. Wesjohann, *Simplicitas* als franziskanisches Ideal und der Prozeß der Institutionalisierung des Minoritenordens, in: G. Melville/J. Oberste (Hrsg.), Die Bettelorden im Aufbau. Beiträge zu Institutionalisierungsprozessen im mittelalterlichen Religiosentum (Vita regularis, Bd. 11), Münster 1999, 107-167, bes. 126 und 145f.

situation zuverlässig rekurrieren konnte, pflegte Simon die kontinuierliche Lektüre der Hl. Schrift und der Kirchenväter, d.h. vor allem ihrer exegetischen Schriften.[6]

Daneben erteilte Simon auf Anfrage auch mündliche und briefliche Ratschläge an einzelne Persönlichkeiten und wurde zum geistlichen Führer von Klerikern und Laien, Politikern und Künstlern. Sein hohes Ansehen zeigt sich beispielsweise im engen Kontakt mit dem Vallombrosaner und späteren Abt von Sta. Trinità in Florenz, Giovanni delle Celle (ca. 1310-1396), mit dem Florentiner Rechtsgelehrten und Mitbegründer des Studio, Tommaso Corsini († 1366), sowie mit dem Giotto-Schüler Taddeo Gaddi (ca. 1300-1366), dessen Holztäfelchen mit Szenen aus dem Leben Jesu und des heiligen Franz von Assisi in der Kirche Santa Croce in Florenz durch Simons Evangelienkommentar – auf den noch näher eingegangen wird – beeinflußt wurden.[7]

1.3 Simplicitas *in der Askese*

Simon führte – wie es sich für ein Mitglied des Bettelordens gehörte – ein asketisches, von Armut und Fasten geprägtes Leben, allerdings ohne dabei seine Gesundheit zu ruinieren. Diese von extremen Strömungen wie den Flagellanten geübte Praxis hielt er nicht für ein Zeichen tugendhafter Buße, sondern für bloße Übertreibung und Sünde. Bei aller Askese achtete er darauf, seinem Körper für die anstrengenden Predigtreisen genügend Nahrung zuzuführen, d.h. eine bescheidene, angemessene Askese erschien ihm höherwertiger als übermäßige und somit aufsehenerregende asketische Höchstleistungen. Auch in dieser Hinsicht, in der er mit Augustinus übereinstimmt,[8] legte Simon eine gewisse Schlichtheit an den Tag.

1.4 Simplicitas *in der Nachahmung Jesu*

Trotz oder vielmehr sogar wegen seines großen Erfolges als Wanderprediger sehnte sich Simon immer wieder danach, dem Auflauf

[6] Vgl. W. Eckermann, Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA († 1348). Europäische Theologie im lateinischen Mittelalter, Augustiniana 47 (1997) 339-356, hier 346.

[7] Die 28 (26?) Täfelchen aus Nußbaum- und Pappelholz gehören zu Gaddis Hauptwerk. Ursprünglich schmückten sie einen Reliquienschrank in der alten Sakristei von Sta. Croce, heute befinden sie sich im Museo dell'Accademia in Florenz. Vgl. I. Maione, Fra Simone Fidati e Taddeo Gaddi, L'Arte 17 (1914) 107-119.

[8] Vgl. Augustins Schrift *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum* I, 71-74, in der er die Hyperaskese der Manichäer als bloße Äußerlichkeit verurteilt.

der ihn verehrenden Menge zu entgehen und ein Leben in stiller Zurückgezogenheit zu führen, in der er Muße für Kontemplation und schriftstellerische Tätigkeit hätte. Wie bereits im frühen Mönchtum zeigte sich auch bei ihm die Sehnsucht nach der ‚Wüste‘ (*desertum*) als dem Ort der Begegnung mit Gott. Dieses Verlangen – Johannes von Salerno spricht vom Armutseifer (*zelus paupertatis*)[9] – könnte auch dadurch motiviert worden sein, daß gemäß franziskanischer Spiritualität die Predigttätigkeit, die notwendigerweise mit Wissen, Bildung, oft auch mit sozialer Geltung und materiellem Wohlstand verbunden war, nicht ohne weiteres dem Ideal der Einfachheit entsprach.[10]

Simons Wunsch, die Predigttätigkeit beenden oder zumindest unterbrechen zu dürfen, wurde jedoch seitens des Ordensgenerals der Augustiner, Wilhelm von Cremona († 1356), nicht entsprochen, vielmehr erhielt er geradezu den Befehl, weiterhin mit aller Kraft das Evangelium zu verkünden. Daher ordnete Simon – im Gehorsam gegenüber dem Ordensgeneral – sein persönliches Anliegen der pastoralen Aufgabe unter, und zwar im Bewußtsein, auf diese Weise nicht nur die Nachfolge Jesu zu predigen, sondern diese vor allem durch die äußerliche Nachahmung (*imitatio*) von Jesu Predigttätigkeit vorzuleben. Denn wie aus Simons Evangelienkommentar, der im folgenden noch näher zu betrachten sein wird, hervorgeht, war gerade die Nachahmung Jesu Christi für Simon das Ziel, das der wahre Christ im Streben nach Vollkommenheit durch Tugenden (*virtutes*) wie Demut (*humilitas*), Geduld (*patientia*), Gehorsam (*oboedientia*) und Geringschätzung der eigenen Person und der Welt ansteuern müsse. Auf diesem Weg gelange der Christ schließlich zur Christusförmigkeit (*christiformitas*), ja sogar zur Kreuzesförmigkeit (*cruciformitas*).

1.5 Simplicitas *in der Kleidung*

Nicht nur im Verhalten, auch in der Kleidung wird Simons Schlichtheit evident. Daß er als Augustinereremit einfache Kleidung trug, muß nicht eigens betont werden; zu beachten ist vielmehr, daß er – wie aus seinem in Volgare verfaßten Antwortschreiben an Madonna Isella aus Florenz, die von ihm Ratschläge zur Intensivierung ihres religiösen Lebens erbat, hervorgeht – zum Zeichen seiner Demut kein Leinenhemd, sondern ein Hemd aus Wolle (*camiscia della lana*) trug:

[9] Johannes von Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia* (wie Anm. 2) 20:... *reassumpto praedicationis officio, quod zelo reliquerat paupertatis*...

[10] Vgl. Wesjohann, *Simplicitas* als franziskanisches Ideal (wie Anm. 5), 126.

„Das Wollhemd trägt man wegen der Rauheit auf dem Körper, wegen seiner Gewöhnlichkeit, um Christus in den Widrigkeiten seines Lebens zu begleiten,[11] aus Rechtschaffenheit, als Hilfsmittel zur Keuschheit. Und auch zur Erinnerung an den Fellrock, d.h. an das Fell,[12] das unseren Stammeltern zur Buße für die Sünde gegeben wurde."[13] Das Tragen des Wollhemdes dürfte – ähnlich wie Fuchs dies für die Regularkanoniker des 12. Jahrhunderts herausgearbeitet hat – über die asketische Funktion hinaus auch eine theologische Aussage enthalten:[14] Während das hochwertigere Leinen seit der Ausstattung Aarons und seiner Söhne für den Altardienst als Symbol für das Priesteramt (*cura pastoralis*) steht, ist Wolle gleichbedeutend mit Weltentsagung, Buße und Kontemplation. Simon bringt also auch durch das Wollhemd zum Ausdruck, daß er sich als der Welt entsagender einfacher Bruder (*simplex frater*) versteht und keinesfalls sein Priestertum in den Vordergrund rücken will. Dies suchte er auch durch den Verzicht auf einen akademischen Titel – trotz Studienabschluß – zu unterstreichen.

2. *Simplicitas* als Methode im Werk Simons

Während seiner Predigtreisen schrieb Simon nicht nur zahlreiche sowohl lateinische als auch volkssprachliche Briefe, die zusammen mit den an ihn adressierten Schreiben ein *Epistularium* von etwa 40 Briefen bilden,[15] sondern auch einzelne Traktate verschiedenen Inhalts und Umfangs, die teils in lateinischer Sprache, teils in Volgare abgefaßt sind. Als lateinische Abhandlungen seien der *Tractatus de iusto iure dominii et moribus dominandi*, der *Breviliber de amicitia christiana* sowie der *Tractatus de iustitia christiana* genannt.

[11] Der Aspekt der Gleichförmigkeit mit dem leidenden Christus ist nach Simon der Weg zur christlichen Vollkommenheit.

[12] *Gen* 3,21.

[13] Lettera di Madonna Isella (?) di Firenze a Fr. Simone da Cascia, e di lui riposta, in: N. Mattioli (Hrsg.), B. Simone Fidati da Cascia dei Romitani di S. Agostino, Ordine della vita cristiana (testo di lingua) e Regola spirituale, Roma 1898, 122-124, hier 124.

[14] Vgl. F. Fuchs, Wolle oder Leinen. Zum Streit um den rechten Habit in der Regularkanonikerbewegung des 12. Jahrhunderts, in: G. Melville/A. Müller (Hrsg.), *Regula Sancti Augustini*. Normative Grundlage differenter Verbände im Mittelalter. Tagung der Akademie der Augustiner-Chorherren von Windesheim und des SFB 537, Projekt C „Institutionelle Strukturen religiöser Orden im Mittelalter" vom 14.-16. Dezember 2000 in Dresden (Publikationen der Akademie der Augustiner-Chorherren von Windesheim, Bd. 3), Paring 2002, 219-237, bes. 229-231.

[15] Eine Neuedition des *Epistulariums*, zusammen mit den *Opuscula* und *Fragmenta*, befindet sich in Vorbereitung (siehe Anm. 2).

2.1 L'ordine della vita cristiana

Im Jahre 1333 entstand in Florenz Simons Abhandlung *L'ordine della vita cristiana*,[16] die durch ihre Gliederung und Stilistik typische Merkmale einer protreptischen und zugleich eisagogischen Schrift aufweist[17] und als erster volkssprachlicher Erwachsenenkatechismus Italiens gilt. Eine lateinische anonyme Übersetzung ist wahrscheinlich in das Jahr 1417 zu datieren.[18] Die Intention von *L'ordine della vita cristiana* besteht darin, die Gläubigen zu einer wahrhaft christlichen Lebensgestaltung anzuleiten, d.h. der wahre Christ soll sich durch die Aneignung der (christlichen) Tugenden und das Meiden der Laster sowie mit ständigem Blick auf das (Vor-)Leben Jesu mit Leib und Seele an Christus angleichen. Simon betont dabei, daß jede Einzelheit im Leben Jesu für diesen Entwicklungsprozeß dienlich sei und keine als zu gering (*semplice*) oder zu unbedeutend abgetan werden dürfe.

Besondere Beachtung verdient die Tatsache, daß am Ende der Kapitelübersicht des ersten Buches Simons Adressatenkreis genannt wird: Er schreibt für die „einfachen Gläubigen“ (*per gli semplici*), mit Rücksicht auf die er möglicherweise verdächtige Themen „nur grob streifen“ (*toccandone un poco grossamente*) möchte, um – wie er am Schluß ausführt – „keine gewissen verborgenen und geheimen Dinge ans Licht zu bringen“ (*per non volere mostrare certe cose chiuse e celate*).[19] Aufgrund der durchaus nicht anspruchslosen Thematik von *L'ordine della vita cristiana* kann es sich bei den ‚Einfachen‘ wohl kaum um sogenannte ‚schlichte Gemüter‘ handeln, die man bei schwierigeren Fragen lieber in Unwissenheit läßt, vielmehr sind darunter Leser mit einem bestimmten Bildungshorizont zu sehen, die jedoch an theologisch kritischen und umstrittenen Punkten nicht rühren wollen.

[16] Der Traktat *L'ordine della vita cristiana* befindet sich im Verzeichnis der 1582 gegründeten *Accademia della Crusca* in Florenz! Die Aufgabe dieser Akademie, die 1612 das erste italienische Wörterbuch der gehobenen Sprache herausgab, bestand in der Reinigung und Pflege der italienischen Sprache, d.h. bildlich gesprochen: in der Trennung von Kleie (= ital. *crusca*) und Mehl.

[17] Charakteristika dieser Gattungen sind u.a. das dihäretische, d.h. einteilende und untergliedernde Prinzip und die an den Leser gerichteten (rhetorischen) Fragen und Aufforderungen.

[18] Die Übersetzung *Tractatus de vita christiana* befindet sich heute in der Prager Universitätsbibliothek; Prag, UB, VIII B 11.

[19] Möglicherweise handelt es sich hierbei um eine Anspielung auf Gregor von Tours, dem geoffenbart wurde, man dürfe über die Mysterien Gottes nicht diskutieren (*De virtutibus sancti Martini* II, 1 [MGH. SRM 1, 2] S. 158).

2.2 *De gestis domini salvatoris*

Noch deutlicher wird das Verständnis von Simons Adressaten in seinem Hauptwerk *De gestis domini salvatoris*, das er auf Drängen Tommaso Corsinis zwischen 1338 und 1347 in Rom niederschrieb, aber krankheitsbedingt nicht mehr vollenden und revidieren konnte. Der 15 Bücher umfassende Evangelienkommentar, der ähnlich wie Simons Frühschrift *L'ordine della vita cristiana* zur Verwirklichung des christlichen Lebens und zum Streben nach Verähnlichung mit Christus auffordert, welch letztere in der *christiformitas* und *cruciformitas* ihren Gipfelpunkt erreicht, ist nach der Aussage des ersten Prologs für zwei Personengruppen konzipiert: zum einen für „gottesfürchtige und ‚einfache' Gläubige" (*devotae animae et simplices*), zum anderen für wohl eher der Welt zugewandte Leute, die sich aber nach Unterweisung in der christlichen Lebenspraxis sehnen (*suspirantes eruditionem*).[20] Für die erste Gruppe, der vor allem Prediger – sei es aus monastischen oder klerikalen Kreisen – angehören, fungiert *De gestis domini salvatoris* als Erbauungs- und Vertiefungsbuch, bei der zweiten Gruppe steht die Lehrfunktion im Vordergrund.

2.2.1 Der Evangelienkommentar aus der Sicht des Stephan Sutor und Eucharius Cervicorn

Ein erster flüchtiger Blick in das Werk mag durchaus den Eindruck einer gewissen Schlichtheit bezüglich Inhalt, Sprache und Stilistik erwecken und den oberflächlichen Leser dazu verleiten, angesichts der Fülle spätmittelalterlicher Literatur seine Zeit lieber für das Studium ‚bedeutenderer' Werke aufzuwenden. Dem steht gegenüber, daß der Evangelienkommentar in Mitteleuropa eine sehr große Verbreitung durch etwa 70 Handschriften und sechs Drucke, darunter einem Inkunabeldruck, gefunden hat und somit ein viel gefragtes Werk darstellte.[21] Außerdem fällt auf, daß auch verschiedene Redaktoren und Korrektoren sich vor der Drucklegung genötigt sahen, in ihren Vorworten die Qualität von Simons Hauptwerk hervorzuheben.

Stephan Sutor, Redaktor und Herausgeber des Evangelienkommentars bei dem aus Langendorf in Franken stammenden und in

[20] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris, Prologus primus* (I, 4, 24f. Eckermann): *Ex caritate ad devotarum animarum et simplicium et ad aliam vitam suspirantium eruditionem.*

[21] Vgl. W. Eckermann/F.-B. Stammkötter, Die Rezeption des Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA († 1348) im Spiegel der Drucke von „*De gestis domini salvatoris*" aus den Jahren 1487-1734, Analecta Augustiniana 55 (1992) 223-246.

Basel wirkenden Verleger Adam Petri,[22] schreibt in lateinischer Sprache auf dem Titelblatt des Basler Druckes von 1517: „Das Werk ist Gold wert. Es bietet in einer noch nicht dagewesenen Ordnung eine beinahe engelhafte Erklärung der Evangelien und dient Predigern, kontemplativen Lesern und allen Christgläubigen gleichermaßen zur klaren Erleuchtung ihres Gewissens. Das Werk ist nicht weniger notwendig als äußerst angemessen.“[23]

Weitaus deutlicher und vor allem ausführlicher äußert sich im Jahre 1533 der Kölner Drucker Eucharius Cervicorn, der im lateinischen Vorwort sehr zutreffend Simons Sprache und Stilistik charakterisiert und seine Diktion zu klassischen antiken Autoren und griechischen wie lateinischen Kirchenvätern in Beziehung setzt; es soll daher nahezu im ganzen in der Übersetzung der Verfasserin wiedergegeben werden:

> „... Mit demselben Ziel legen wir dir jetzt den Simon von Cascia vor, einen wahrlich ausgezeichneten Ausleger (*enarrator*) der Wahrheit des Evangeliums.[24] Dieser zeigt bei der Behandlung der Worte Christi eine erstaunliche Sorgfalt, beim Erklären der Wunder eine Einzigartigkeit, beim Enthüllen der Geheimnisse einen seltenen Eifer, im Entwickeln der moralischen Vorschriften eine mit Strenge gemischte Milde und im Korrigieren der Laster (wozu Chrysostomus mahnt) Eifer und Menschenfreundlichkeit.
> Wenn man diesen mit jenen früheren Kommentatoren der Heiligen Schrift vergleichen will, wird man zu dem Ergebnis kommen, daß er in dem Maße, wie er im Aufbau der Rede (*orationis structura*) und in der Redeweise (*dictionis filum*) unterlegen ist, in der Bedeutung der Aussagen (*sententiarum pondus*), in der Art und Weise der Skizzierung der Taten, in der Darlegung der Geheimnisse und in der Unterweisung in den moralischen Vorschriften für das christliche Leben (*christianae vitae mores*) gleich, um nicht zu sagen: überlegen ist. Seinem Werk, in 15 Bücher unterteilt, hat er den Titel ‚Über die Taten des Herrn und Retters‘ (*de gestis domini servatoris*) gegeben.[25] Es ist von solch ungekünstelter Schönheit und solcher Urteilsschärfe,

[22] Adam Petri war der Vorläufer des heutigen Basler Druck- und Verlagshauses Schwabe, des ältesten Druck- und Verlagshauses der Welt; zum Basler Druck von 1517 siehe F. Hieronymus, 1488 Petri / Schwabe 1988. Eine traditionsreiche Basler Offizin im Spiegel ihrer frühen Drucke, 2 Halbbände, Basel 1997, 118f.

[23] *Aureum opus: Evangeliorum ordine ante inviso pene angelicam continens elucidationem: tam concionantibus quam contemplantibus ac omnibus christifidelibus ad conscientiarum serenam illustrationem: non minus necessarium quam commodatissimum...* (Titelblatt Druck Basel 1517; München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 2° Pal. lat. 366).

[24] Als *enarrator* steht Simon somit in der Tradition von Augustins Auslegungen der Psalmen (*enarrationes in psalmos*).

[25] Der hier im Vorwort zitierte Titel weicht vom Werktitel auf dem Titelblatt (*de gestis domini salvatoris*) ab!

daß man überhaupt nicht weiß, ob man mehr die klare Ordnung, die schwungvolle Darstellung oder die sorgfältig durchdachte Behandlung des Stoffs bewundern soll.[26] Denn er erwähnt die Taten Christi so, daß er sich bisweilen auf die Aussage des Seligen Hilarius,[27] auf die Vernunft einer inneren Einsicht (*interioris intelligentiae ratio*) besinnt und sie wiedergibt. Er gebraucht manchmal (ich gebe es freimütig zu) kunstlose und ziemlich bäurische Worte, die aber dennoch (was Pico della Mirandula gefällt)[28] lebendig, beherzt,[29] feurig und beißend sind, tief in den Geist eindringen und den Leser selbst mit wunderbarer Macht umgestalten.

Ich kann mich nicht zurückhalten, an dieser Stelle nicht das anzuführen, was Platon von Alkibiades berichtet, nämlich daß Alkibiades zu sagen pflegte, er sei nicht durch die sorgfältig ausgearbeiteten und treffenden Reden des Perikles bewegt worden, sondern durch die nackten und einfachen Worte (*verbis nudis et simplicibus*) des Sokrates.[30] Auch

[26] Dieser Satz, den der Drucker Eucharius Cervicorn wohl für besonders wichtig erachtet, ist wörtlich (bis auf die Variante *admirari* statt *demirari*) auf dem Titelblatt abgedruckt (Titelblatt Druck Köln 1533; München Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 2° Pal. lat. 367).

Das Prädikat ‚Schlichtheit', ‚Einfachheit', ‚ungekünstelte Schönheit' hat Cicero dem attischen Redner Lysias zuerkannt (*De oratore* III, 28: *subtilitatem Lysias... habet*).

[27] Gemeint ist wohl Hilarius von Poitiers.

[28] Es handelt sich um den humanistischen Philosophen Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), der sich gegen Lebensende in seinem Denken und seiner Lebensführung stark dem Religiösen zuwandte und ein Anhänger Savonarolas wurde.

[29] Ich verstehe *aminatis* als Verdrehung von *animatis*.

[30] *Utitur nonnumquam (ingenue fateor) rudibus et sub agrestibus verbis, sed tamen (quod Pico Mirandulae placet) vivis, aminatis, flammeis, aculeatis, ad imum spiritum penetrantibus, lectorem ipsum mirabili potestate transformantibus. Non possum mihi temperare, quin hoc loco referam id, quod de Alcibiade refert Plato: Alcibiadem scilicet dicere solitum sese nihil commoveri Periclis orationibus elaboratis et luculentis, sed Socratis verbis nudis et simplicibus.*

Vgl. Platon, *Symposium* 215 D-E, wo Alkibiades die Wirkung der Worte des Sokrates auf ihn beschreibt. In denselben Kontext gehört auch die spätere Passage (221 E – 222 A): „Und dies habe ich gleich zuerst noch übergangen, daß auch seine Reden jenen aufzuschließenden Silenen äußerst ähnlich sind. Denn wenn einer des Sokrates Reden anhören will, so werden sie ihm anfangs ganz lächerlich vorkommen, in solche Worte und Redensarten sind sie äußerlich eingehüllt, wie in das Fell eines frechen Satyrs. Denn von Lasteseln spricht er, von Schmieden und Schustern und Gerbern und scheint immer auf dieselbe Art nur dasselbe zu sagen, so daß jeder unerfahrene und unverständige Mensch über seine Reden spotten muß. Wenn sie aber einer geöffnet sieht und inwendig hineintritt, so wird er zuerst finden, daß diese Reden allein inwendig Vernunft haben, und dann, daß sie ganz göttlich sind und die schönsten Götterbilder von Tugend in sich enthalten und auf das meiste von dem oder vielmehr auf alles gerichtet sind, was dem, der gut und edel werden will, zu untersuchen gebührt." Übersetzung von Friedrich Schleiermacher in: G. Eigler (Hrsg.), Platon, Werke in acht Bänden, Griechisch und Deutsch, Bd. 3, Darmstadt 1990, 385-387.

ich bin der Ansicht, daß der Leser durch die gewöhnlichen und ziemlich holperigen Worte dieses Autors schneller und heftiger zur göttlichen Liebe hingerissen wird, außer sich gerät und – mag er wollen oder nicht – das, was Christus vorschreibt, tun wird als durch das gefällige und kraftlose literarische Werk gewisser anderer Autoren. Eine harte und holperige Rede pflegt oftmals Stacheln in den Herzen der Zuhörer zurückzulassen.

Du mögest also das in der Tat fromme und göttliche Werk dieses Autors nicht *verschmähen*, wie die Griechen sagen,[31] das heißt, wie gewisse nutzlose Ähren wegwerfen, wo du an einem alltäglichen und abgedroschenen oder ungewöhnlichen Wort oder an einem, das eine unschöne und witzlose Neuheit darstellt, Anstoß nimmst. Oder auch wie Basilius der Große sagt: *ein prächtiger Stil und kunstvolle Wortfügung*, nicht allenthalben dürfte dir das begegnen.

Du sollst dich daran erinnern, daß der Autor überall jedenfalls weise (*sapienter*) erörtert und spricht, wenn auch an manchen Stellen weniger beredt (*minus eloquenter*); ferner daß der Klang der besten und schmuckvollsten Worte leer ist, wenn ihnen keine Aussage (*sententia*) und keine Weisheit (*sapientia*) zugrundeliegt. Sagt nicht Augustinus, daß die Menschen um so mehr an Soloezismen und Barbarismen Anstoß nehmen, je schwächer sie sind, und daß sie um so schwächer sind, je gebildeter sie scheinen wollen?[32] Die Kleie der Worte wird dich nicht beeindrucken, wenn du dich am feinen Mehl der Aussagen erfreust. Die Ungleichheit der Diktion stört dich nicht, wenn die Unversehrtheit der Vorschriften dir zu Willen ist. Was verlangst du Takt und Rhythmus der Rede, wo du die Erhabenheit der Geheimnisse erwartest? Der selige Ambrosius beteuert, daß durch verführerischen Reiz und durch Schminke die Aussagen der Worte entkräftet werden.[33] Und der vergötterte Hieronymus sagt, daß die Frohe Botschaft (*evangelium*) nicht in den Worten (*verba*) der schriftstellerischen Werke enthalten ist, sondern in ihrer Bedeutung (*sensus*), nicht an der Oberfläche, sondern im Mark, nicht in den Blättern der Predigten, sondern in der Wurzel der Vernunft.[34]

Ferner wollte sich unser Autor (was sich besonders für einen Kirchenschriftsteller ziemt) klar und deutlich ausdrücken; daher hütete er sich absichtlich (wie ich vermute) davor, daß – wie der selige Augustinus schreibt – aus dem Herzen das, was er zu sagen versuchte, entschwand, solange er darauf wartete, daß es kunstvoll ausgedrückt

[31] Cervicorn streut in den lateinischen Text das griechische Wort ἀθερίζειν ein, das bei Homer belegt ist.

[32] Vgl. Augustinus, *De doctrina christiana* 2, 19f.

[33] Vgl. Ambrosius, *Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam* 8, 70.

[34] Vgl. Hieronymus, *Commentarii in IV epistulas Paulinas. Ad Galatas* 1, 1, 11-12 (PL 26, 347).

würde.[35] Und er nahm sich davor in acht, das, was durch die Frömmigkeit der Gedanken umfaßt werden muß – um die Worte des Hilarius zu gebrauchen – in die Gefahr menschlicher Rede zu bringen.[36] Dennoch paßt er manchmal seine Rede so mit Anmut und ungekünstelter Schönheit an, daß man ihn nicht fade und trocken nennen kann, und frischt sie durch das Hinzufügen von Schminke auf, ohne daß sie sich zu einem Blendwerk aufbläht.

Wer auch immer also du bist, der du den Weg des himmlischen Lebens beschreiten willst, diesen wähle dir zum Führer, dieser wird dir die angezündete Leuchte der unverdorbenen Lehre in der dunklen Nacht dieses Jahrhunderts vorantragen, so daß du klar zu durchschauen vermagst, was du denken, sprechen und tun sollst, daß es des Himmelsreiches würdig ist. Wer auch immer du bist, der du – was der Herr durch Jesaja den apostolischen Männern und Kirchenlehrern vorschreibt – auf dem dunstigen Berg oder in der Ebene ein Feldzeichen aufrichten willst, diesen nimm dir zum Beschützer und Vorkämpfer. Denn er wird dich zuverlässig lehren, wie du den Einstieg in die entschwundenen Lehren der Kirchenlehrer findest und wie man auf dem dunstigen Berg (Gott machte nämlich den Dunst zu seinem Schlupfwinkel, und Wolken und Dunst befanden sich um ihn herum) die verborgenen Sakramente der Kirche ausüben muß. Schließlich wird er dich auch unterweisen, wie du in der Ebene, wohlgemerkt unter demütigen Menschen, das Zeichen des dem Herrn Jesus Christus gehörigen Kreuzes aufrichten, gegen Babylon kämpfen, die Fahne des richtigen Glaubens umhertragen und (um mit einem griechischen Hemistichon zu schließen) mit dem Licht der Wahrheit *die finstere Nacht* dieses in die Irre gegangenen Jahrhunderts *erhellen* kannst.[37] Lebe wohl!"

Eucharius Cervicorn verfolgt mit diesem Vorwort im wesentlichen zwei Ziele: Zum einen liegt ihm daran, 16 Jahre nach Luthers Thesenanschlag die Orthodoxie von Simons Darstellungen und Lehren hervorzuheben: Die Aussagen des Evangelienkommentars sind von solcher Rechtmäßigkeit, daß sich der suchende Gläubige an ihnen wie an Wegweisern für seinen christlichen Lebensweg orientieren kann und soll.

Zum anderen geht es Cervicorn darum, den Leser in die die Diktion betreffenden Besonderheiten einzuweihen. Die genannten Auffälligkeiten, mit Augustins Worten als Soloezismen und Barbarismen bezeichnet, sind von Simon absichtlich (*ex industria*) nicht verhindert oder nicht nachträglich ausgemerzt worden, da für ihn bei der

[35] Vgl. Augustinus, *De doctrina christiana* 4, 4.
[36] Vgl. Hilarius, *De trinitate* 2, 2.
[37] Vgl. Lukian, Epigramm 19.

Verschriftlichung seiner Gedanken Aussage (*sententia*) und Weisheit (*sapientia*) eindeutig den Vorrang vor Beredsamkeit (*eloquentia*) haben und es ihm mehr auf die Bedeutung (*sensus*) als auf das Wort (*verbum*) selbst ankommt. Der Verzicht auf rhetorische Schminke (*fucus*) bedeutet nach Cervicorn sogar eine Aufwertung des Werkes, weil dadurch die natürliche, d.h. ungekünstelte Schönheit (*subtilitas*) um so strahlender zur Geltung kommt, die Klarheit der Aussage (*plane ac dilucide dicere*) gewährleistet ist und gleichzeitig der Verfasser seine Ehrfurcht vor der Größe und Heiligkeit der Thematik (*mentium religio*) zeigen kann.

Sehr geschickt versteht es Cervicorn, Simon als Vertreter des schlichten und einfachen Stils, der in der Rhetorik dem *genus subtile* zuzuordnen ist, in einer literarischen Bildungstradition von der heidnischen Antike bis zur christlichen Gegenwart zu verorten. Dabei beschränkt er sich nicht nur auf die namentliche Nennung von Autoritäten wie die griechischen beziehungsweise lateinischen Kirchenväter Johannes Chrysostomus, Basilius, Ambrosius, Augustinus, Hieronymus und Hilarius, sondern spielt auch durch Paraphrase oder wörtliche Zitate auf das jeweilige Werk oder die betreffenden Autoren an – so im Falle von Platons Symposium, Homer und Lukian. Daraus ist zu entnehmen, daß Cervicorn sein Vorwort an eine gebildete Leserschaft richtet, die gerade in Simons Schlichtheit seine eigentliche Größe und Bildung erkennt. Nur ein gebildeter Leser wird – wie einst Alkibiades – durch die „nackten und einfachen Worte“ (*verbis nudis et simplicibus*) bewegt werden und infolgedessen sein bisheriges Leben umkrempeln. Aus dem Vorwort Cervicorns soll also hervorgehen, daß Simon nicht trotz, sondern gerade wegen seiner Bildung den Evangelienkommentar in bewußt schlichtem Stil für ein gebildetes Publikum verfaßte.

2.2.2 Die *simplicitas* des Evangelienkommentars aus der Sicht Simons

Es stellt sich die Frage nach den Gründen, die Simon veranlaßt haben, in „nackten und einfachen Worten“ für „gottesfürchtige und ‚einfache‘ Gläubige“ zu schreiben, obgleich sowohl er selbst als auch seine Leser einer bestimmten Bildungsschicht zuzuordnen sind. Einen – eher arbeitstechnischen – Grund führt Cervicorn an (*ut opinor*), indem er darauf verweist, daß Simon durch zügiges, ja sogar spontanes Verschriftlichen seiner Gedanken, d.h. durch den Verzicht auf langes Ringen um Formulierungen, zu vermeiden suchte, von wichtigen Gedankengängen abzukommen und den ‚roten Faden‘ seiner Auslegungen zu verlieren. Damit dürfte Cervi-

corn insofern Recht haben, als diese Arbeitsweise auch der oben behandelten spontanen Predigtweise entspricht. Auf diesem Hintergrund ist auch die Aussage des Johannes von Salerno zu sehen, daß Simon beim Abfassen des Evangelienkommentars mit ungewöhnlicher Schnelligkeit eine ganze Seite in einem Zug niederzuschreiben pflegte.[38]

Den Hauptgrund für die sprachlich-stilistische Einfachheit nennt Simon selbst im Prolog des Evangelienkommentars: „Ich aber, der ich sozusagen erst ganz frisch dazugekommen bin, fürchtete den Ausspruch des Apostels (2 Kor 11,3), nämlich daß so, wie die Schlange durch ihre Schlauheit Eva verführte, auch unsere Sinne von der Einfachheit (*simplicitas*), die in Jesus Christus ist, abkommen könnten; daher habe ich beschlossen, nach einem Verständnis, das einfacher und für Mindere[39] nützlicher ist, das gesamte Schriftwerk des Evangeliums zu erklären."[40] Der Ausgangspunkt für Simon ist also die einfache Lehre und Botschaft vor allem des Neuen Testaments, eben „die Einfachheit, die in Jesus Christus lebendig geworden ist."[41] Nach seinem Verständnis kann er dieser Einfachheit der Frohen Botschaft seinerseits nur mit Einfachheit begegnen, die in einer speziellen Methode zum Ausdruck kommt:[42] Im Gegensatz zu Bibelkommentatoren vor ihm lehnt es Simon erstens ab, bei der Auslegung nach Belieben jeweils nur ein bestimmtes Evangelium zugrunde zu legen, so wie er es bei vielen von ihm studierten

[38] Johannes von Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia* (wie Anm. 2) 16f.: *Vidi, mirabile dictu, quod ipse scribens praedictum opus absque aliquo libro aperto praeter bibliam, ac si scriberet litteram amico suo festinanter a capite usque in finem cartae minime desistebat.*

[39] Bei den *minores* dürfte es sich generell um Leser mit demütig-bescheidener Geisteshaltung, speziell auch um mindere Brüder wie Franziskaner, Dominikaner und Augustinereremiten (Mendikanten) handeln.

[40] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris, Prologus secundus* (I, 6, 56-60 Eckermann): *Ego autem quasi novissime adveniens apostolicum dictum veritus,* ne sicut serpens seduxit Evam astutia sua, ita ne corrumpantur sensus nostri a simplicitate, quae est in Christo (2 Cor 11,3) *Jesu, disposui iuxta simpliciorem atque minoribus utiliorem intelligentiam totum corpus evangelicum declarare.*

Die deutschen Übersetzungen aus Simons Werken stammen von der Verfasserin.

[41] W. Eckermann/F.-B. Stammkötter, Die Rezeption des Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA († 1348) (wie Anm. 21), 225.

[42] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris, Prologus secundus* (I, 5, 51 – 6, 56 Eckermann): *Ego autem novissime vigilans simplicitati evangelicae studui in modo tractandi devitare antiquos, qui tantum unius evangelistarum scriptionem disserere curaverunt, sicut fuit eis in placito, et modernos, qui evangelistarum inscriptionem ad declarandum pro libito assumentes dimiserunt et in quaestionibus veritatem et puritatem evangelicam posuerunt, ut saepe videatur ab illa simplici evangelii intelligentia fuisse recessus.*

Kirchenvätern (*antiqui*) sah;[43] und zweitens distanziert er sich davon, die heilige Schrift nach Art der Scholastiker (*moderni*) in Frage-und-Antwort-Form zu interpretieren[44] oder aus ihr einzelne Sentenzen zu entnehmen, sie zu Kompendien zusammenzustellen und diese wiederum zu kommentieren.[45] Dieses Vorgehen birgt nämlich die Gefahr, daß das, was der Autor des betreffenden Bibeltextes intendierte, durch den Kommentator fehlinterpretiert wird. Um so mehr ist Simon daran gelegen, der „Intention des Autors“, die „zu einem der wichtigsten hermeneutischen Prinzipien der Theologen des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts“ wurde,[46] zu entsprechen.

Simons Methode besteht folglich darin, alle vier Evangelientexte, ergänzt durch die übrigen Schriften des Neuen Testaments, gleichberechtigt nebeneinander gelten zu lassen und diese in einer mit der Aussage der Texte harmonierenden sprachlichen Form und Stilistik auszulegen. Nur auf diesem Wege der Einfachheit (*vigilans simplicitati evangelicae*) kann er Inhalt und äußere Form in Einklang bringen, d.h. Konformität zwischen kommentiertem Werk und kommentierendem Werk erreichen. Man wird sogar behaupten dürfen, daß Simon in dieser Methode (= griech. „Weg“) *einen* Weg der Verähnlichung mit Christus sah: Der Schreiber gleicht sich dem Beschriebenen an. Daher war es für den gleichwohl gebildeten und sehr belesenen Augustinereremiten undenkbar, speziell bei der Behandlung der Evangelientexte sich durch einen durch Wortwahl und Satzkonstruktion schwierigen und mit Redeschmuck ausgestatteten Traktat gleichsam auf eine höhere Stufe als auf die der Evangelisten beziehungsweise Jesu Christi zu stellen.[47]

[43] Vgl. Augustinus, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus*; Ambrosius, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*.

[44] Wichtige Vertreter bibeltheologischer Quästionen sind Petrus Abaelard, Hugo von St-Victor, Petrus Lombardus und Robert von Melun.

[45] Die bedeutendste Sentenzensammlung sind die 1148-1252 verfaßten vier Bücher *Sententiae* des Petrus Lombardus, zu denen in der Folgezeit zahlreiche Sentenzenkommentare, so z.B. die der Augustinertheologen Hugolin von Orvieto, Gregor von Rimini und Johannes von Basel, entstanden.

[46] O. Zwierlein, ‚Interpretation‘ in Antike und Mittelalter, in: W. Geerlings/Ch. Schulze (Hrsg.), Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter. Beiträge zu seiner Erforschung (Clavis Commentariorum Antiquitatis et Medii Aevi, Bd. 2), Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002, 100.

[47] W. Eckermann hat in seinem Aufsatz „Die Harmonisierungstendenzen im Evangelienkommentar des Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA (ca. 1295-1348)“ drei Harmonisierungsbestrebungen herausgearbeitet: (1) ‚horizontale‘ Angleichung/Harmonisierung zwischen thematisch zusammengehörigen Perikopen aus verschiedenen Evangelien; (2) chronologische Harmonisierung der Biographie Jesu von der Geburt bis zur Auferstehung; durch Auswahl geeigneter Perikopen Entstehung einer organischen

Simons Methode tritt nicht zuletzt dadurch um so deutlicher hervor, daß er in Traktaten mit anderer Thematik oder in Kontexten, deren Inhalt es nahelegt, durchaus einen elaborierten und rhetorisch anspruchsvollen Stil wählt. Als Beispiele seien der *Tractatus de iusto iure dominii et moribus dominandi* genannt,[48] der die Entstehung und Legitimation von Herrschaft thematisiert, sowie sogar im Evangelienkommentar selbst der Prozeß Jesu vor Pontius Pilatus, der stilistisch dem *genus iudicale* angehört und Anklänge an Ciceros Gerichtsreden aufweist.[49]

Zusammenfassend läßt sich sagen, daß Simon durch diese Methode ein Vertreter der *docta simplicitas* ist.

3. *Pura sancta simplicitas* als Charakteristikum franziskanischer Spiritualität

Die Tatsache, daß Simon sein Leben, Wirken und schriftstellerisches Werk nach dem Leitbild der Einfachheit ausrichtete, erklärt sich – wie im folgenden zu zeigen sein wird – zu einem nicht zu unterschätzenden Teil aus dem zeitlichen und räumlichen Umfeld der franziskanischen Spiritualität. Insbesondere sind hier die Franziskanerspiritualen zu nennen, mit deren pauperistischer Geisteshaltung Simon durch die Person Angelo Clarenos in engste Berührung kam.

Welche Bedeutung der Einfachheit oder Einfalt, der sprichwörtlichen *pura sancta simplicitas* zukommt, formuliert Thomas von Celano mehrfach in seiner zweiten Franziskus-Biographie: Die Einfalt ist „Tochter der Gnade", „Schwester der Weisheit" und „Mutter

Einheit; (3) ‚vertikale' Angleichung/Harmonisierung des Lesers an den Text, indem er zur Verwirklichung des christlichen Lebens aufgerufen wird.

Als vierten Aspekt läßt sich meines Erachtens zusätzlich die (sprachlich-stilistische) Angleichung/Harmonisierung des Autors an den Text ergänzen. Durch die horizontale und vertikale Harmonisierungsbestrebung symbolisiert der Text selbst die vom Autor intendierte Kreuzesförmigkeit (*cruciformitas*). Der Beitrag erscheint in: Evangelienharmonien des Mittelalters, hrsg. von Ch. Burger/A. den Hollander/U. Schmid (Studies in Theology and Religion, hrsg. von J. W. van Henten).

[48] Der ursprünglich selbständige *Tractatus de iusto iure dominii et moribus dominandi* bildet zusammen mit dem *Tractatus de iustitia christiana* und dem *Breviliber de amicitia christiana* das 15. Buch des Evangelienkommentars, dessen eigentliches Buch *De fine hominum* Simon aufgrund seines plötzlichen Todes nicht mehr vollenden konnte. Johannes von Salerno hat posthum diese drei moraltheologischen Schriften als 15. Buch zusammengestellt.

[49] Vgl. Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris* XIII, 96 (IV, 263f. Eckermann). Simon gestaltet die Prozeßrede als eine Anklage gegen Pilatus, so daß der Richter selbst zum Angeklagten wird.

der Gerechtigkeit“. „Diese ist es, die in der Furcht Gottes sich rühmt, die nicht versteht, Böses zu tun oder zu sagen. Diese ist es, die sich selber erforscht und mit ihrem Urteil niemand verdammt, die dem Tüchtigeren die gebührende Herrschaft überläßt und für sich keine Herrschaft erstrebt. Diese ist es, die die ‚griechischen‘ Auszeichnungen nicht für die besten hält (vgl. 2 Makk 4,15), die lieber handeln als lernen oder lehren will; die in allen göttlichen Gesetzen Winkelzüge mit viel Worten, Ausschmückung und Gepränge, Prahlereien und Spitzfindigkeiten denen überläßt, die dem Untergang geweiht sind; die nicht die Rinde, sondern das Mark, nicht die Schale, sondern den Kern, nicht vielerlei, sondern viel, die das höchste, dauernde Gut sucht.“ (II, 189)[50]

Auf dem Hintergrund dieser Charakterisierung lassen sich einige Besonderheiten in Simons Leben und Werk verstehen, so z.B. sein Ausweichen vor akademischen Titeln, Ämtern und vor der Predigttätigkeit, die ihm hohes Ansehen eingebracht hatte. Auch für seine meist von Einfachheit geprägte Diktion kann die Stelle bei Celano zumindest als *eine* Erklärung (neben anderen) dienen.

Einfachheit und Einfalt sind bei Franz von Assisi jedoch nicht mit Dummheit, Naivität und geistiger Beschränktheit gleichzusetzen, sondern sind eine spezielle Denk- und Verhaltensweise auch und gerade des Gebildeten. Sie ist „der Weisheit nicht entgegen, sondern wirklich ihre Schwester, wenn sie auch für die an Wissen Armen leichter zu erlangen und nicht so schwer zu üben“ ist (II, 189). In den Schriften des Alten und besonders des Neuen Testaments zeigt sich Einfachheit (ἁπλότης, *simplicitas*) als positive Eigenschaft von Menschen, die mit der Arglosigkeit eines Kindes und mit lauterem Denken ohne Hintergedanken (Mt 6,22f.) sich vorbehaltlos Gott und den Mitmenschen hingeben (Ps 19,8; Spr 10,9; Eph 6,5; Röm 12,8) und daher seinen besonderen Schutz genießen (Ps 116,6). Daß sich Einfachheit und Klugheit nicht ausschließen, geht exemplarisch aus der Ermahnung der „wie Schafe mitten unter die Wölfe“ geschickten Apostel hervor, „klug wie die Schlangen und arglos wie die Tauben“ zu sein (Mt 10,16). Diese „Arglosigkeit nach Taubenart“ (*columbina simplicitas*) sollen – wie Simon im Evangelienkommentar ausführt – die Nachfolger Christi in ihrem Denken und Tun an den Tag legen; sie manifestiert sich darin, daß sie keinem Menschen, auch nicht nach erlittenem Unrecht, mit List begegnen, daß sie niemandem lästig werden, daß sie

[50] Thomas von Celano, Leben und Wunder des heiligen Franziskus von Assisi. Einführung, Übersetzung, Anmerkungen von P. Engelbert Grau OFM (Franziskanische Quellenschriften, Bd. 5), Werl, Westf. 1955.

vielmehr Nächstenliebe üben und über die Gnadengaben reflektieren.[51] An anderer Stelle interpretiert er einerseits die „Klugheit der Schlangen" (*prudentiam... serpentum*) als Fähigkeit, sich vor schädlichen Einwirkungen in Acht zu nehmen, für Leib und Leben Sorge zu tragen und einengende Gewohnheiten gleichsam wie eine Schlangenhaut abzulegen. Die „Arglosigkeit nach Taubenart" (*columbina simplicitas*) versteht er andererseits als geistige Verfassung, die unverbittert und innerlich gefestigt weder darauf ausgerichtet ist, jedem Unrecht zu entgehen, noch danach trachtet, für ein solches Rache zu nehmen.[52]

Kindliche Vorbehaltlosigkeit und Arglosigkeit als Ausdruck der „Einfalt des Herzens" (Eph 6,5; Kol 3,22; 2 Kor 11,3) praktizierte Simon konkret in seinem engen Vertrauensverhältnis zu Angelo Clareno, dessen Spiritualität sein Denken nachhaltig prägte. Wieviel ihm dieser Spirituale bedeutete und welche Rolle er in seinem täglichen Leben spielte, geht aus einem Brief Simons an Johannes von Salerno hervor, den er nach Clarenos Tod im Jahre 1337 verfaßte.[53] In bildlichen Worten vergleicht er diese Freundschaft mit einer Eltern-Kind-Beziehung: „Ich finde mich jetzt als kleiner Waisenknabe wieder, der seinen Beschützer verloren hat. Der Säugling hat die Mutterbrust, an der er trank, verloren, so daß er auf dem Schoß einer Stiefmutter stirbt. Der kleine Junge hat den Brotbrecher verloren, so daß er vor Hunger zugrunde geht."[54] Weitere Metaphern,

[51] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris* VII, 18 (III, 305, 137-142 Eckermann): *Columbina simplicitas* (Mt 10,16) *Christi discipulis maxime sit in voto et omnis mos per ipsam refulgeat in ipsaque consistat, ut nulli dolos etiam lacessiti iniuriis machinentur, nemini velint inferre molestiam, incedentes gementer in valle miseriae quaerentes semper atque tenentes in caritate consortium, residentes in contemplatione conspicua super fluenta gratiarum* (Ps 136,1).

[52] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris* IX, 20 (IV, 376, 34-41 Eckermann): *Et prudentiam suadet habere serpentum, non anfractus sive venenum, non bifurcatam linguam aut variam pellem, non gressus pectoris super terram, quae omnia vitio ascribuntur, sed prudentiam ad cavendum laedentia, in custodia capitis expositionem corporis, ad removendam veterem pellem inventionem angustorum, inter quae artati exuantur.*

Indicitur et columbina simplicitas, ut semper sit animus sine amaritudine, invariatus in se ipso, neque multiplicatus ad sollicitudinem evadendi, nec imaginetur, etiam si possit, rependere ultionem.

[53] Simon Fidati, *Ep.* 11 (*Frater Simon ad fratrem Johannem praedictum de morte fratris Angeli de Clarino*), in: Il Beato Simone Fidati da Cascia dell'ordine Romitano di S. Agostino e i suoi scritti editi ed inediti, a cura di N. Mattioli (wie Anm. 2) 336-339.

[54] Simon Fidati, ebd. 338: *Nam orbatus patre me cognosco pupillum, nec sub auctoribus aut tutoribus derelictum. Lactens puer mamillam perdidit, quam sugebat, ut exhalet animam suam in sinu novercae sensualitatis. Fractorem panis perdidit parvulus, ut affectus fame intereat.*

die jedoch nicht der Welt des Kindes entlehnt sind, verdeutlichen Simons Haltlosigkeit und Trauer.

Das arglose Vertrauen Simons gegenüber seinem väterlichen Beschützer und Ratgeber basierte nicht zuletzt darauf, daß Angelo Clareno die geforderte Einfachheit überzeugend vorlebte. Er war einer jener Spiritualen, denen es gelang, als hochgelehrter Mann Bildung und Schlichtheit miteinander zu vereinen. So ist Clareno – neben der Übersetzung verschiedener griechischer Kirchenväter ins Lateinische – die Übersetzung der im 7. Jh. verfaßten „Himmelsleiter“ (*Klimax*) des Johannes Klimakos aus dem Griechischen ins Lateinische zu verdanken, die auf diese Weise dem Westen erschlossen wurde und wohl auch Simon bekannt gewesen ist.[55]

Die „Einfalt des Herzens“ (*simplicitas cordis*) als Voraussetzung zur Erlangung wahrer, d.h. christlicher Weisheit (*scientia christiana*) ist auch ein zentrales Thema in Simons Brief an die heranwachsenden Kinder des Florentiner Rechtsgelehrten Tommaso Corsini: „Wahrheit und christliche Weisheit bilden sich in Euch nur dann, wenn sie mehr auf Einfachheit (*simplicitas*) als auf Scharfsinn (*acuitas*) basieren. Denn es heißt: ‚In der Einfalt eures Herzens sucht ihn‘ und anderswo: ‚Die Einfältigen waren seine Gesprächspartner‘.... Das Wissen ist um so fruchtbringender, je reineren Herzens es erworben wird, je mehr es von jeder wissenschaftlichen Fragestellung frei ist, je mehr es mit Glaube, Liebe und tätiger Nächstenliebe gepaart ist.“[56] Simon will den jungen Erwachsenen vermitteln, daß Reinheit und Einfalt des Geistes alle Weisheit dieser Welt überwinden und den Menschen auf dem Weg des Heils voranbringen[57] – eine Aussage, die an den Franziskus-Biographen Celano erinnert: „Zwei Flügel erheben den Menschen über das Irdische:

[55] Inzwischen liegt eine deutsche Übersetzung dieses Werkes vor: Heiliger Johannes vom Sinai, Klimax oder die Himmelsleiter. Übers. von Mönch Georgios Makedos. Mit einem Vorw. des Erzbischofs des Sinai. St. Katharinen-Kloster und Erzbistum des Sinai, hrsg. von der Berg-Sinai-Stiftung, Athen, Würzburg 2000.

Als neuere Abhandlung siehe J.-C. Larchet, „Die Leiter des Göttlichen Aufstiegs“ von Johannes Klimakos, Ostkirchliche Studien 49 (2000) 269-313.

[56] Simon Fidati, *Ep.* 39 (*Epistula eiusdem fratris Simonis ad filios domini Thomae de Corsinis de Florentia tunc adolescentes*), in: Il Beato Simone Fidati da Cascia dell'ordine Romitano di S. Agostino e i suoi scritti editi ed inediti, a cura di N. Mattioli (wie Anm. 2) 488-495, hier 492: *Sic formetur in vobis veritas et scientia christiana, quae magis in simplicitate quam in acuitate fundatur. Nam scriptum est: In simplicitate cordis vestri quaerite illum. Et alibi: Cum simplicibus sermocinatio eius.... Scientia vero haec eo fructuosior, quo purior discitur, quo ab omni quaestione absolvitur, quo creditur, quo diligitur, quo in actum propemodum deducitur.*

[57] Simon Fidati, ebd. 492: *Omnis scientia et omnis humana peritia destruetur, et quicquid ex ea capitur, deficiet.*

Einfalt und Lauterkeit." (II, 4)[58] Simon hat dies konkret vorgelebt, indem er nach den Worten des Johannes von Salerno seine Gegner und Verleumder nicht „durch Zank und Streit, sondern durch die Einfachheit des Herzens und kluges Schweigen" niederzuhalten pflegte.[59]

In das zeitliche und räumliche Umfeld der für Simon prägenden Spiritualität gehört auch der umbrische Laudendichter Jacopone da Todi (ca. 1230/36-ca.1306), der elf Jahre nach dem Tod seiner Frau in den Minoritenorden eintrat (wohl 1278) und sich während der ordensinternen Streitigkeiten auf die Seite der Franziskanerspiritualen stellte. Von Angelo Clareno wissen wir, daß Jacopone ein Mitglied der Gesandtschaft der Spiritualen war, die den neugewählten Papst Coelestin V. aufsuchte und von ihm im Jahre 1294 die Erlaubnis zur Gründung der „*pauperes heremitae domini Coelestini*" erhielt.[60]

Im Zentrum von Jacopones Lauden (*Laude spirituali*), die schon zu Lebzeiten des um ein gottgefälliges Leben bemühten Dichters weit verbreitet waren und nach 1310 systematisch gesammelt wurden, stehen der Lobpreis der Tugenden, insbesondere der Gottesliebe (*amore*), und des franziskanischen Armutsideals, verbunden mit herber Kritik an den Mönchsorden und der Kirche. Als Kenner der Predigtliteratur von der Patristik bis zur beginnenden Scholastik will er durch seine Lauden den zahlreichen Lesern und Hörern gleichsam predigen und sie so zu Buße, Askese und Weltentsagung antreiben.

Die Beliebtheit von Jacopones Laudendichtung spiegelt sich auch im Paraphrasieren oder Zitieren seiner Gedanken und Verse. Zwei solche Zitate finden sich in einem Brief des bereits erwähnten Vallombrosaners Giovanni delle Celle (ca. 1310-1396), eines engen Freundes Simons, an die Jesuaten, in dem er ihnen das Ideal der Armut und Besitzlosigkeit vor Augen führt.[61] Seine Aussagen bekräftigt er durch den Rekurs auf die Hl. Schrift, die Kirchenväter und auf Seneca, aber auch durch die Nennung des bei den Lesern noch immer stark im Bewußtsein verankerten Jacopone. Das Zitieren der Anfangsverse von Laude 47 [59]

[58] Thomas von Celano, Leben und Wunder des heiligen Franziskus von Assisi (wie Anm. 50).

[59] Johannes von Salerno, *Tractatus de vita et moribus fratris Simonis de Cassia* (wie Anm. 2) 19: *Quos detractores et ipse non quidem contentione et lite, sed simplicitate cordis et prudenti silentio pervincebat.*

[60] Vgl. E. Menestò, s.v. Jacopone da Todi, Lexikon des Mittelalters 5 (1999) 264f.

[61] Giovanni dalle Celle a' Gesuati, in: Mistici del Duecento e del Trecento, a cura di A. Levasti, Milano 1960, 800-816, hier 808.

Povertat' ennamorata,
grann' è la tua signoria!

die er als *„quella famosa lauda“* bezeichnet, reicht völlig aus, um die Adressaten an das Folgende zu erinnern, nämlich daß bei allem nur denkbaren Reichtum und Herrschaftsbesitz allein die Armut die wahre Herrin und den echten Reichtum darstellt und nur sie den Gläubigen auf seinem Heilsweg voranbringt.[62]

Weiter verweist Giovanni auf Laude 36 [60] mit einer ähnlichen Thematik und zitiert resümierend:[63]

Chi desprezza, sé possede;
possedenno, non se lede ecc.;

Das Paradox der Bereicherung durch Besitzlosigkeit kulminiert im Epilog, wo sich das Nichts-Haben über das Frei-Sein vom Affekt des Haben-Wollens in ein transzendentes Alles-Besitzen transformiert:[64]

Povertat' è null' avere
e nulla cosa poi volere
e onne cosa possedere
en spirito de libertate.

Die typisch franziskanische *„pura sancta simplicitas“* als ein wesentliches Element der Armut formuliert Jacopone in seiner Laude über die Tugendleiter und verbindet sie mit Keuschheit, die sich als Lauterkeit im Denken und Verhalten äußert:[65]

Vedea la Castitate
staìa sì onesta mente,
pura simplicitate
con costumi e con sensi;
guardava pura mente;

Es liegt daher nahe, daß nicht nur Giovanni delle Celle, der den *„frate Jacopo da Todi“* expressis verbis nennt, sondern auch der im Vergleich zu ihm ältere Simon Fidati das Laudarium gut kannten und gewisse Anregungen daraus für ihren jeweiligen spirituellen Kontext verarbeiteten. Dafür spricht auch, daß Giovanni und Simon zumindest

[62] Iacopone da Todi, Laude. A cura di Franco Mancini (Scrittori d'Italia, vol. 257), Roma/Bari 1974; Lauda 47: *De paupertate* (= 59: *De la sancta povertà signora de tutto*), V. 1-2.
[63] Lauda 36: *De amore paupertatis* (= 60: *De la sancta povertà e suo triplice cielo*), V. 19f.
[64] Ebd. V. 119-122.
[65] Lauda 4a (Appendice): *Scala virtutum*, V. 109-113.

brieflich (vielleicht sogar persönlich?) miteinander verkehrten, wenn auch Jacopone in diesem Briefwechsel keine direkte Rolle spielt. Möglicherweise lassen sich sogar gewisse stilistische Besonderheiten im Evangelienkommentar, wie z.B. die apostrophierenden Hymnenkataloge im 13. Buch, auf Einflüsse durch Jacopones Dichtung zurückführen.[66]

4. Simons Auffassung von der *sancta simplicitas*

Die oben behandelte (franziskanische) Formel der *pura sancta simplicitas* erscheint in Simons Evangelienkommentar im Zusammenhang mit der allegorischen Auslegung der beiden Evangelienstellen, in denen das materielle Augenlicht (*oculus simplex* bzw. *nequam*) mit dem geistigen Licht des Herzens verglichen wird.[67] Zum besseren Verständnis dieses Vergleichs, der u.a. aussagen soll, daß der Verstand (*ratio*), wenn er nicht länger im Dunkeln verharren, sondern zur Gotteserkenntnis gelangen will, mit dem Glauben (*fides*) gekoppelt sein muß, bedarf es nach Simon einer tiefergehenden Erläuterung der Begriffe Absicht (*intentio*) und Tätigkeit (*actio*), wobei ersterer auf das Auge, letzterer auf den Körper zielt: „Wenn die Absicht des Menschen einfach (*simplex*), d.h. lauter und rein (*pura*), ohne Hintergedanken (*duplicitate carens*) und ungekünstelt (*simplex*) ist und dabei nur den Einfachen (*simplicem*), den nicht Zusammengesetzten (*incompositum*) liebt und sucht, dann ist der gesamte Körper, also jede seiner Tätigkeiten, klar (*lucida*), glänzend (*clara*) und allen guten Menschen willkommen (*grata*)." (VII, 6 [III, 264, 63-66 Eckermann]). Bildlich gesprochen bedeutet dies, daß das „einfache Auge" zur Schau des „einfachen Gottes" gelangen kann.

Diesen Gedanken der „Einfachheit Gottes" nimmt Simon ein weiteres Mal auf und präzisiert: „Gott ist einfach (*simplex*), nicht zusammengesetzt (*incompositus*), gütig (*benignus*) und freigebig (*largus*), und solche Diener sucht und liebt er. Dann werden in der Einfalt des Herzens (*in simplicitate cordis*) die Gaben übertragen, wenn man in allen Tätigkeiten nichts anderes als die Ehre und das Gefallen Gottes sucht." (VII, 6 [III, 264, 94-96 Eckermann]).

[66] *De gestis domini salvatoris* XIII, 120 (VI, 353, 62 – 355, 106 Eckermann): *O beata imbecillitas,...! O carentia humanae potentiae,...! O debilitas derelicta,...!* etc.; ebd. XIII, 126 (VI, 375, 47-52 Eckermann): *O beata seductio,...! O vera seductio,...! O secura seductio,...!* etc.

[67] Vgl. Mt 6,22f. und Lk 11,34-36. Siehe dazu *De gestis domini salvatoris* VII, 6 (III, 262-266 Eckermann).

Der Begriff der „Einfachheit Gottes“ zur Bezeichnung seines Wesens, das keine Verschiedenheit, keine Veränderung und keine Vielheit zuläßt und daher keine reale Zusammensetzung (*compositio*) haben kann, war im theologischen Denken des Mittelalters weit verbreitet und wurde insbesondere durch Petrus Lombardus und durch die Verfasser der Sentenzenkommentare den Werken der Kirchenväter, vor allem Augustins, entnommen.[68] In dieser Bedeutung läßt sich der Begriff „einfach“ (*simplex*/ἁπλοῦς) in der heidnischen Philosophie über Aristoteles und Platon bis auf den Vorsokratiker Anaxagoras zurückverfolgen.

Da Gott ein „nicht zusammengesetztes“ Wesen hat, folgert Simon, daß auch die „Einfachheit des inneren Auges eine Absicht ist, die nicht auf verschiedene Ziele ausgerichtet ist, und als solche in ihrer Tätigkeit und Vorliebe nichts außer dem einen und einfachen Gott als Belohnung sucht. Sie ist über alle Annehmlichkeiten erhaben, frei vom Urteil der Menschen, ignoriert Lob und Tadel gleichermaßen und sucht Gott allein als Zeugen, Richter und Belohner für gute Taten.“[69] Es ist dies die „heilige Einfalt“ (*sancta simplicitas*), mit der man nach dem Geheiß der Weisheit – gemeint ist sowohl die Tugend als auch das alttestamentliche Buch – Gott suchen soll, und die es nicht versteht, ihn auf die Probe zu stellen.[70]

Wie aus Simons Analyse der *sancta simplicitas* hervorgeht, ist sie eine Verhaltensweise, deren Fundament, selbst wenn rationales Denken hinzukommt, allein der einfache Glaube bildet. Wer also das, was nur glaubend erfassbar ist, rational begründen will oder wer die Taten, zu deren Vollbringung sich Gott zur Menschwerdung erniedrigt hat, verspottet oder wer Werke, die sich am Evangelium orientieren (*actiones evangelicae*), nicht dankbar annimmt, da sie

[68] Vgl. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* II, 13, 3; Athanasius, *Ad Afros episc.* 8 (PG 26, Sp 1044 B); Origenes, *Contra Celsum* I, 23; Augustinus, *Trin.* V, 1; V, 12; VI, 6; *Civ.* XI, 10, 2; Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.* I, dist. 8, cap. 4,3 und 8,2. Siehe auch E. P. Meijering, Reformierte Scholastik und patristische Theologie. Die Bedeutung des Väterbeweises in der *Institutio theologiae elencticae* F. Turrettins unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gotteslehre und Christologie (Bibliotheca humanistica & reformatorica, Bd. 50), Nieuwkoop²1991, bes. 111 und 191.

[69] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris* VII, 6 (III, 265, 103-107 Eckermann): *Porro simplicitas interioris oculi est, non variata intentio ad diversos fines, nec praeterquam unum simplicem deum in his, quae agit et diligit, quaerit in praemio, et ab omnibus absoluta commodis, a iudiciis hominum libera, laudes et opprobria hominum aeque perdens, solum deum quaerit in testem, in iudicem et remuneratorem bonorum.*

[70] Ebd. 107-109 Eckermann: *In qua Sententia quaerere deum iubet* (*Sap* 1,1): In simplicitate cordis *vestri* quaerite illum. *Nescit deum temptare sancta simplicitas,....*

menschlichen Empfindungen zuwiderlaufen, der verläßt dieses sichere Fundament des Glaubens.[71]

Die Kernaussage dieses Abschnitts, d.h. der drohende Abfall vom aufrichtigen und reinen Glauben (*a fidei simplicitate homines excidunt* bzw. *a simplicitate fidei exciditur*) sowie die Gefahr, daß unsere Empfindungen auf andere ‚Reize' als auf das Evangelium reagieren (*actiones evangelicae, quae nostris sensibus adversantur,... in displicentiam et odium transeunt*), stellt nicht nur eine Synthese von Simons Analyse dar, sondern liefert gleichsam einen zweiten Schlüssel zum Gesamtverständnis des Evangelienkommentars: Dieser Abschnitt ist nämlich inhaltlich mit dem zweiten Prolog identisch, in dem Simon den Leser darüber informiert, wie er sein Werk verstanden wissen will! Unterstrichen wird die Übereinstimmung durch das in beiden Fällen verwendete und bereits genannte Zitat aus dem zweiten Korintherbrief (2 Kor 11,3): „Ich fürchte, daß so, wie die Schlange durch ihre Schlauheit Eva verführte, auch eure Sinne abgelenkt werden und von der Schlichtheit des Glaubens, die in Christus ist, abkommen." Ferner dürfte es kein Zufall sein, daß diese Kernaussage fast genau in der Mitte des Evangelienkommentars lokalisiert ist, so daß Simon ganz bewußt einen Brückenschlag vom Werkanfang bis in die Werkmitte vollzogen hat. Man kann sogar darüber spekulieren, daß Simon auch für den Epilog im 15. Buch, das uns wegen seines vorzeitigen Todes nicht in der ursprünglich geplanten Form vorliegt,[72] diese wichtige Schlüsselaussage einschließlich dem Bibelzitat vorgesehen haben könnte.

Daher scheint es plausibel, daß Simon mit den „sich am Evangelium orientierenden Werken" (*actiones evangelicae*) indirekt sein eigenes schriftstellerisches Werk im Blick hat, das aufgrund seiner ungekünstelten Schlichtheit (*simplicitas*) bei denjenigen Lesern oder Hörern kein Gefallen findet, deren Hör- und Leseempfinden (*sensibus adversantur*) mehr auf bloßen Kunstgenuß ausgerichtet ist oder – um in der Sprache der in diesem Kapitel ausgelegten Evangelienstellen zu bleiben – deren Auge nicht „einfach" (*simplex*; *incompositus*), sondern „doppelt", „zusammengesetzt", „zwiespältig" und „falsch" (*nequam*; *duplex*; *compositus*) ist. Die Tugend der Ehrlichkeit, Auf-

[71] Ebd. 115-121 Eckermann: *A fidei simplicitate homines excidunt, cum rationes eorum, quae per fidem solam tenentur, inquirunt. Solum quidem hoc est de ratione fidei, humana et composita ratione carere, necnon a simplicitate fidei exciditur, cum infima, quae deus in carne gessit, a curiosis et superbis animis deridentur, aut, cum actiones evangelicae, quae nostris sensibus adversantur, in gratum mentis non veniunt, sed potius apud multos in displicentiam et odium transeunt.*

[72] Siehe Anm. 48.

richtigkeit und Reinheit ohne jeden Hintergedanken, die ein Wesensmerkmal des Evangelienkommentars darstellt, faßt Simon am Kapitelende folgendermaßen zusammen: „Die Einfachheit (*simplicitas*) ist das Freisein von jeder Verschlagenheit und Schlauheit. Sie nimmt nur die Worte in den Mund, die sie im Herzen trägt. Sie will nicht getäuscht werden und kann selbst niemals täuschen. Zu dieser Einfachheit fordert der Erlöser seine Diener mit den Worten auf: ‚Seid arglos wie die Tauben.‘“[73]

Diese Tugend der *simplicitas evangelica* hat der Augustinereremit und -spirituale Simon Fidati von Cascia in seinem Hauptwerk durch die gezielte Wahl eines an Inhalt und Aussage adaptierten Sprachverständnisses praktiziert.[74] Als solche aber ist sie eine über sein Werk hinausreichende *docta simplicitas*, die Simons theologisch-philosophischen Bildungshorizont dokumentiert sowie sein Leben und Wirken normativ und methodisch bestimmte, wie an einzelnen Aspekten, d.h. dem Verzicht auf akademische Grade, der Predigttätigkeit, der Askese, der Nachahmung Jesu und der Kleidung, aufgezeigt wurde. Simons Bildung und Größe steckt gleichsam in einer ‚Nuß‘, die aber ein aufmerksamer Leser, sofern er selbst über ein entsprechendes Bildungsniveau verfügt, mühelos zu ‚knacken‘ versteht. Der Verfasser des Evangelienkommentars und weiterer christlich-moralischer Traktate ist somit ein typischer Vertreter der spätmittelalterlichen, vor allem franziskanischen Spiritualität, der sowohl in der Lebensführung als auch im schriftstellerischem Werk die Gratwanderung zwischen der Notwendigkeit von Bildung einerseits und dem aus der Zugehörigkeit zu einem Bettelorden resultierenden Gebot intellektueller Schlichtheit andererseits erfolgreich zu meistern verstand. Dies verschaffte ihm auch und gerade bei der geistigen Führungsschicht Italiens seine hohe Reputation.

Carolin M. OSER-GROTE

[73] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris* VII, 6 (III, 266, 159-162 Eckermann): *Simplicitas est libertas ab omni versutia et astutia, quae, quod corde non gerit, ore non profert, quae decipi non vult, decipere numquam novit, ad quam suos servos salvator hortatur* (Mt 10,16): Estote simplices sicut columbae.

[74] Simon Fidati, *De gestis domini salvatoris, Prologus secundus* (I, 6, 59f. Eckermann): *... disposui iuxta simpliciorem atque minoribus utiliorem intelligentiam totum corpus evangelicum declarare.*

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