

USING OR ENJOYING HUMANS

Uti and frui in Augustine

'Are you going to work about *uti* and *frui* in the thinking of Augustine? But so much has already been published about that topic.' This was the reply I heard the most at the question of Augustine-scholars what I was writing my thesis about. Mission impossible, or rather, mission already accomplished seemed to be the obvious message. Indeed, at first sight the amount of research-papers, articles and other kind of publications about Augustine's writing and thinking about *uti* and *frui* is vast. Nevertheless, a somewhat closer examination of that literature, revealed that a great part of those studies are reducible to a small number of positions centred in a polemical discourse. That polemical motive, especially the tackling of the theses of the 'other side', is the main reason why one has often remained blind for new approaches to the augustinian problem of *uti* and *frui*. My second finding – arrived at by means of a careful reading of the two main treatises of Augustine on the topic of *uti* and *frui*, *De doctrina christiana* I and *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *quaestio* 30, was that some of the interpretations in the recent literature are – partly or completely – wrong and could be refuted and even corrected. In a first instance this article will provide a picture of the structure of that polemical discussion and its implications. Also I intend to go further, beyond that *status quaestionis*. The main intention of this article is to present an evaluation of the different positions with the two main texts of Augustine as a criterion. Those two texts may be regarded as the basis of Augustine's opinion about *uti* and *frui* since they are the only treatises that are entirely devoted to that subject.

Before beginning this article, I have to admit, that the search for and the correction of possible wrong interpretations of Augustine was not the main reason for my investigation. For me the fact that Augustine tried to answer an intrinsic human question was much more important: what do we have to do with our fellow-men? Reading Augustine, I discovered bit by bit that he offers us his proper, nuanced and well-thought-out answer. His insight represents a novel voice in the debate whether we have to perceive our neighbour as an instrument for our own goals and our own pleasure, or as an end *in se*.

1. The roots of the discussion about *uti* and *frui* in Augustine

The interest in a systematic study of the meaning of *uti* and *frui* in Augustine, takes as its starting point a book about the ethics of Augustine by Joseph Mausbach, as well as an excursion about *fruitio Dei* in a study by Heinrich Scholz about *De civitate Dei*.¹ Mausbach regards *uti* and *frui* as an explanatory schema for the difference between *cupiditas*, loving the temporal *propter se*, and *caritas*, loving God *propter se* while loving the temporal *propter aliud*. Scholz distinguishes two kinds of *frui*, a dialectical and a mystical one. In making that distinction, he begins a frequently re-appearing discussion whether there are distinctive different types of *frui*.

The most influential scholar in this preliminary stadium of the study of the augustinian *uti* and *frui* is Rudolf Lorenz. He wrote two well known studies: one about the significance of *frui* in the reflections of Augustine and another about the roots of Augustine's *frui*.² Although Lorenz himself does not really take part in the polemic, many of the polemicists take recourse to his articles. That is why he could not be neglected in a study concerning *uti* and *frui*.

For Augustine, *fruitio Dei* has two meanings, according to Lorenz: 'entering in a divine world order' and 'clinging to, or possessing God'. More important, and much discussed, is his theory that Varro, and in particular his lost *De Philosophia*, was responsible for Augustine's thinking and writing about *uti* and *frui*. At first sight, however, its origin could be situated in Cicero's thinking in general, and in his *De Officiis* in particular. The structural difference between *honestum* and *utile* in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, *quaestio* 30, and the significance this has for *uti* and *frui* there, could easily have been inspired by the difference between *honestum* and *utile* in Cicero's *De Officiis*. Other significant themes, such as the relation between temporal goods (which are only *utendum* and *referendum ad*) and the *summum bonum* (that is *fruendum*), can also be found in Cicero. Nevertheless, two reasons eliminate Cicero as a possible contentent for the parenthood of Augustine's *uti* and *frui*. Lorenz points out that

¹ MAUSBACH J., *Die Ethik des Heiligen Augustinus*, Herder & co., Freiburg im Breisgau 1909, (Zweite vermehrte Auflage 1929). SCHOLZ H., *Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte. Ein Kommentar zu Augustinus De civitate Dei. Mit einem Exkursus: Fruitio Dei, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Mystik*, J.C. Hinrichs, Leipzig 1911.

² LORENZ R., *Fruitio dei bei Augustin*, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (63), 1950-1951, pp. 95-132 en *Die Herkunft des augustinischen Frui Deo*, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (64), 1952-1953, pp. 34-60 & (Nachtrag) pp. 359-390.

Cicero never equates *uti* with *referre ad aliud*, nor does he equate *frui* with *amare propter id ipsum*, whereas that equation is essential in Augustine. Contrary to Augustine, Cicero conceives of *uti* and *frui* as co-extensive. Investigating further, Lorenz comes to the conclusion that it was Varro who influenced Augustine. Lorenz bases his arguments on *De civitate Dei* XIX, 1-3. The parallels between Augustine's and Varro's texts, textual as well as with regard to content (especially the two schemas *natura – doctrina – usus* and *propter se – propter aliud*), are simply too striking to be coincidental. My remarks concerning Lorenz's thesis are twofold. First, I have doubts about the resolute rejection of Cicero as an influence on Augustine. When Lorenz bases his case on *De civitate Dei*³, he seems to forget that Augustine wrote his two main treatises about *uti* and *frui* at least twenty years earlier. More importantly, Lorenz does not realise that Augustine is practically our only source of Varro. In that case it is very difficult to tell what precisely comes from Augustine and what comes from Varro. It is even more difficult to establish any possible influence of the one on the other. Reading a little bit further in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83 may shed light on the issue: Augustine cites Cicero's *De inventione rhetorica* 2 in *quaestio* 31.⁴ Put differently, Cicero seems to play a role in any case. Furthermore, as Oliver O'Donovan points out, for Augustine, *usus* means something exclusive, that is to say, it is in an exclusive disjunction with *frui*.⁵ Varro, on the other hand, sees *usus* as inclusive. O'Donovan adds that Lorenz does not have to look for such a complicated solution. The real solution is actually quite simple. In the classical ethics of Augustine's time it was common to make a distinction between goods with an intrinsic value and goods from which only contingent advantages follow. Augustine called that distinction *frui* and *uti*, Cicero called it

³ *De civitate Dei* XI, 25 & XIX, 1-3, and also *De Trinitate* X,XI,17 may indicate a possible origin in Varro.

⁴ The above mentioned passage from *De inventione rhetorica* 2 in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 31 is about virtues. In this passage is Cicero not stoic but rather platonic. Cicero gives *honestas* the platonic meaning of the intrinsic value of the desired object, *utilitas* refers to the contingent advantages that flow from that object.

Christian Gnilka remarks that in the context of the *summum bonum* the pair *uti-frui* could also be read in Seneca's *De beata vita* X,3. This gives reasons to believe that Augustine did not have to fall back on only one source, but that he was inspired by a much broader literal and spiritual atmosphere. GNILKA C., *KRËSIS, Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur*, Schwabe & co., Basel/Stuttgart, 1984, p. 82.

⁵ O'DONOVAN O., *Usus and fruitio in Augustine – De doctrina christiana I*, *The Journal of Theological Studies* (33), 1982, pp. 361-397.

honestas and *utilitas*. In that case it is only self evident that when Augustine read that distinction in Cicero, he linked it with his own distinction of the same meaning. Second, we do not really need an investigation of the origin of the augustinian *frui*. I will return to this second point later, when dealing with the discussion between Ragnar Holte and those who interpret Augustine in an instrumentalist fashion.

Having explored the roots of the study of the augustinian *uti* and *frui*, we have to examine the discussion in the literature about that particular topic. I will divide this discussion into two parts: early literature and more recent literature. That division is somewhat artificial since all participants of the second polemical round will debate the scholars of the first round. The division may nevertheless be justified: the treatment of *uti* and *frui* was initially placed in the greater context of a discussion about love in Augustine in general. Only more recent studies are exclusively devoted to the significance of *uti* and *frui*.

2. The first controversy: love in Augustine in general

2.1 Augustine under fire

egoism

The early discussion is focussed on the question of the nature of Augustine's thinking: whether it is egoistic, instrumentalist, erotic, hedonistic or non-Christian. Karl Holl, Anders Nygren, Gunnar Hultgren and Josef Brechtken in particular, accuse Augustine of defending an egoism by emphasizing the individual human desire for happiness. In their interpretation selflove is central for Augustine. In that case selflove, although oriented to God, would be nothing other than a sublimated form of an egocentric longing for one's own and individual *beatitudo*.

instrumentalism

Closely related to the accusation of a selfish search for happiness, is the charge of an instrumentalist approach to love and the fellow man. This charge is levelled by thinkers influenced by Immanuel Kant, such as Hannah Arendt, Karl Holl, Anders Nygren, Gunnar Hultgren, Josef Brechtken and Kurt Flasch.⁶ They think that Augustine

⁶ "Vom geschlechtlichen Ausdruck menschlicher Liebe hat Augustin daher nur mit Zeichen des Abscheus gesprochen. Auch wenn er ihn schließlich toleriert, zwängt er ihn in ein rohes Schema von Mittel und Zweck. Nie deutet er ihn als ein

reduces love of the neighbour to a means for achieving ones own perfection. In their eyes, the *uti homine* required by Augustine, is only an utilitarian use of human beings, in the worst and vulgar sense. They perceive *uti* and *frui* as means and end respectively. "[...] la relation entre *frui* et *uti* est identique à celle qui existe entre le but et le moyen."⁷ This kind of reasoning tends to conclude that God does not tolerate any kind of love except the love for Him alone.⁸ Nygren even goes one step further: even the love for God is a means inferior to the *frui Deo*. The highest human achievement is the enjoyment, the possession of God. Only when that is achieved, can one find fulfilment, rest and peace. Even the love for God shares the fate of the love of the neighbour: it becomes relative.

erotism

In the context of the charge of instrumentalism, Nygren, Hultgren and Brechtken accuse Augustine of not having been able to leave the Hellenistic theory of *eros* so as to reach the Christian concept of love.⁹ In their opinion Augustine's perception of love, especially his

Verhältnis unter Personen. [...] Da Augustin nur Gott als Selbstzweck anerkennt, muß er sich selbst und jede andere Person nur als Mittel zu diesem Zweck ansehen. Diese Instrumentalisierung des eigenen und jeden fremden Lebens zerstört die Erfahrung eines anderen Menschen als Person. Die rigorose Anwendung des Begriffs-paars "gebrauchen – genießen" verhindert von Grund auf eine Theorie der Liebe, gebietet sie doch, das eigene Leben und das Leben des Nächsten als Mittel zu einem überirdischen Zweck zu "gebrauchen". [...] Darin liegt eine Distanzierung des Menschen von sich selbst und anderen, eine radikale Versachlichung menschlicher Beziehungen: Wir dürfen den anderen Menschen nur lieben, sofern er auf die ewige Seligkeit bezogen ist." FLASCH K., *Augustin. Einführung in sein Denken*, Philipp Reclam jun., Stuttgart 1980, pp. 135-136.

⁷ NYGREN A., *Eros et Agapè – La notion chrétienne de l'amour et ses transformations*, JUNDT P. (trad.), Aubier, Paris 1944, p. 66.

⁸ « "L'amour de Dieu exclut tout autre amour [...]" NYGREN A., *op. cit.* p. 65.

Nygren claims that the central thesis in Augustine is: "O si Deum digne amemus, nummos omnino non amabimus." This sentence comes from *In Iohannis evangelium* tr. XL, 10: "Non amat multum nummum, qui amat Deum. Et ego palpaui infirmitatem non ausus sum dicere: Non amat nummum; sed: non multum amat nummum; quasi amandus sit nummus, sed non multum. O si Deum digne amemus, nummos omnino non amabimus!" (CCL 36, p. 356) Raymond Canning replies Nygren by showing that Nygren does not read this citation correct.

⁹ "Même en s'aidant du groupe *uti* et *frui*, Augustin n'a pas dépassé la conception hellénistique traditionnelle, déterminée par l'*éros*. Quand il déclare qu'il faut utiliser le monde pour parvenir à la jouissance de Dieu, cette pensée est, en dernière analyse, analogue à celle de Platon, qui nous invite à ne pas laisser enchaîner par les choses du monde, mais à nous servir d'elles, comme de degrés, pour nous élever vers le monde supérieur." NYGREN A., *op. cit.* p. 74.

perception of love of the neighbour, does not come close to approach the Christian *agape*. Augustine's thinking is fixed in platonic categories: we must not get lost in the beauties of this world. That is why we have to use the things of this world – such as human love – as a ladder to reach a higher world. That form of love, that *eros*, is selfish and opposite to the self-denying service to the neighbour to which human beings are called by the biblical *agape*. This charge is very similar to the charge of instrumentalism, and the same replies can be made against it. Further, 'erotic' implies that augustinian love would be a striving, a greedy desire to find rest, an *appetitus*. That rest is only achieved in God, in *fruitio Dei*.

2.2 Refutation of the accusations

2.2.1 In general terms

In the first round of defence, I will use 'general' arguments. Those arguments deal mainly with Augustine's thinking and writing in general. They can be found in the writings of William Riordan O'Connor, John Burnaby, Ragnar Holte, Luc Verheijen, Tarsicius Johannes Van Bavel and Raymond Canning. The second round will be based on the two basis-texts *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 and *De doctrina christiana* I.

Not selfish

First should it be noted that, since the complaints of egoism and instrumentalism are closely related – for it is for my own sake that I use my neighbour – they may receive, certainly in general terms, the same answers.

I already noted that Augustine makes a difference between *libido* or *cupiditas* and *caritas*. *Libido/cupiditas* is indeed selfish and instrumentalist in an abusive and exploitative sense. But in Augustine's perspective, *libido/cupiditas* only refer to bad forms of love. Augustine calls good love *caritas*, and the love for God and the neighbour are precisely forms of *caritas*. This good love is certainly not meant to be self-profiting in an amoral sense. It should also be mentioned that the distinction between *uti* and *frui* is not as univocal as our contemporary common-sense distinction between using and enjoying. This point will be made clearer when the general use of *uti* and *frui* in classical Latin will be investigated later on in this article.

The charge of egoism cannot stand, simply because Augustine's stress on the importance of community. Not the individual but the community should be the central focus of love. Love is just a *vis*

unitiva. One may be reminded, for example, how much attention Augustine pays to *caritas unitatis* (there can only be unity in the church through mutual love between the believers). Another clue lies in what Augustine understands as the *summum bonum*. The *summum bonum* is a *bonum commune* and not a *bonum privatum*. So for Augustine, real love could not possibly be selfish. The highest good of the soul is giving oneself to God. Rather than a belonging to oneself this is a belonging to God, and that is not egocentric. In that moment an 'I' that enjoys no longer exists.

not instrumentalist in a bad sense

In the love for God I already love my neighbour.¹⁰ In that sense it is impossible to see my neighbour only as an instrument in my search for God. That love for God is love for the neighbour Augustine illustrates by his concept of two forms of *ordo*. Love for the neighbour takes the first place in the *ordo faciendi* and the second one in the *ordo praecipendi* while the love for God comes first in the *ordo praecipendi* and secondly in the *ordo faciendi*.¹¹ As Raymond Canning emphasises, the love for the neighbour and for God are deeply united and intrinsically connected. Love for the neighbour is much more than only a preparation for the love of God. Love for the neighbour is so important, that one can find God in it.¹² Claiming that, for Augustine, only God may be loved means to neglect Augustine's thought of *ordinata dilectio*. Love is essentially a matter of order. Love can only be good, when there is an order in the different modes of love and in the objects of love. This implies that, besides God, other objects may be loved. Not only the love for the neighbour, but even the correct use of temporal goods is already love, because it respects the order of the creation, since it obeys the Creator. When the use of the world is not a deviation of the love for God, then the love for the neighbour is even less different from the love for God.¹³

¹⁰ See footnote 59.

¹¹ *In Iohannis Evangelium*, XVII, 8 (10-12): "Dei dilectio prior est ordine praecipendi, proximi autem dilectio prior est ordine faciendi." (CCL 36, p. 174)

¹² *De Trinitate* VIII, 10: "[...] sed et hoc ideo quia et qui proximum diligit consequens est ut ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligit. Deus autem dilectio est, et qui manet in dilectione in Deo manet. Consequens ergo est ut praecipue Deum diligit." (CCL 50, p. 283)

¹³ Nygren uses a quote from *In Ioannis Evangelium* tr. XL, 10 to argue that for Augustine God is the sole object of love. The following sentence from that text, which Nygren seems to forget, shows that the love for money, for the world, and temporal things pursued for their own pleasure, are indeed not in concordance with the love for God. But it also points out that the correct use of temporal goods in order

The very doubts which will be dealt with in the second part of this article, doubts Augustine has whether to regard human beings as objects of *frui* or *uti*, are a sign of how important the love for the neighbour is for Augustine. Such an important love cannot merely be a selfish instrument.

In reply to Nygren, it should be noted that love for God is not a state of rest: "La fruitio Dei n'est pas alors un sentiment passif, mais le point d'appui où se rassemblent les forces."¹⁴ Love and enjoyment are essentially connected. This means that loving God is not the automatic end of that love.¹⁵ One enjoys only what one loves and loves only what one enjoys. That is why the love for God does not end when the enjoying of God starts.¹⁶

Holte against instrumentalism: an evaluation

Ragnar Holte is the great defender of Augustine against the charge of instrumentalism.¹⁷ He does this by using the ethics of the

to provide earthly needs during our earthly pilgrimage, does corresponds to real love. "Erit tibi nummus instrumentum peregrinationis, non irritamentum cupiditatis; quo utaris ad necessitatem, non quo fruaris ad delectationem. Deum ama, si aliquid in te egit quod audis et laudas. Utere mundo, non te capiat mundus." (CCL 36, p. 356) cf. Praeceptum 5,2: "Et ideo, quanto, amplius rem communem quam propria vestra curaveritis, tanto vos amplius profecisse noveritis; ut in omnibus quibus utitur transitura necessitas, superemineat, quae permanet, caritas." (VERHEIJEN L., *La règle de Saint Augustin. I. Tradition Manuscrite*, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1967, pp. 429-430.)

¹⁴ HULTGREN G., *Le commandement d'amour chez Augustin – Interprétation Philosophique et Théologique d'après les Ecrits de la période 386-400*, Vrin, Paris 1939, p. 156.

¹⁵ "Il est vrai qu' Augustin s'applique, avant tout, à faire ressortir le rôle de l'amour en tant que facteur préparatoire et à spéculer sur l'opposition existant entre le désir et la possession de manière à attribuer à l'amour le désir et à la *fruitio* la possession, mais cela n'empêche pas l'amour de faire également partie de la *fruitio*." HULTGREN G., op. cit. pp. 149-150.

¹⁶ John Burnaby, as a specific refutation of Nygren's charge that, for Augustine, even the love for God becomes relative, writes: "According to Nygren, the formula by which Augustine intended to provide for a relative love of the creature, while reserving absolute love for God, in fact makes *all* love, even the love of God, relative to the self and its enjoyment. But this condition is merely the consequence of Nygren's false restriction of *amor* to desire." BURNABY J., *Amor Dei – A study of St. Augustine's teaching on the Love of God as the motive of Christian Life*, Hodder and Stoughton, London 1938, p. 109.

¹⁷ HOLTE R., *Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne*, Institut des Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1962 (original: *Beatitudo och Sapientia. Augustinus och de antika filososkolornas diskussion om manenniskans livsmål*, Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, Stockholm 1958.)

Stoa. Tracing the origin of *uti* and *frui* back to the Stoa, by using the arguments of Lorenz, Holte feels justified in applying stoic thinking to Augustine's *uti* and *frui*. Augustine links *uti* and *frui* in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 with *utile* and *honestum*. That last pair is typically stoic, and has a strong ethical connotation: not the object but the right orientation constitutes morality. In that sense the use (*uti*) of humans by humans, as Augustine several times demands, does not sound so negatively utilitarian. *Uti* in the love of the neighbour from a stoic perspective, is not the use of the neighbour for one's own advantage, but the referring of all human deeds, which, coincidentally, belong to the domain of *utilia*, to the moral norm.¹⁸ I appreciate Holte's attempt to clear Augustine of the charge of instrumentalism, but I think he is looking in the wrong direction. On the one hand, in the texts in which Augustine deals with *uti/frui homine* there are a sufficient number of leads that may prove to us with certainty that Augustine does not approach humans in an instrumentalist way. On the other hand, I do not find the search for a hypothetical origin really necessary as argument in a plea against an instrumentalist interpretation. In my opinion, two other arguments are more self evident: the meaning of *uti* (and *frui*) in the general use of language in Augustine's time, and Augustine's own use of those terms in his writings preceding their systematic treatment in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 and *De doctrina christiana* I.

The investigation of the use of *uti* and *frui* in classical Latin is very instructive, in several ways. First, the Latin terms *uti* and *frui* have a much broader spectrum of meanings. *Uti* has several meanings that cannot possibly be translated with the English 'use'. *Uti*, for example, may mean: to deal with a person, to associate oneself with a person, to have friendly, familiarly and even intimate relations – in a certainly not utilitarian way. In some cases *uti* can even mean 'to experience, to enjoy, to undergo'. In opposite side, *frui* may sometimes stand for 'to get advantage or profit from, to be at someone's benefit'. Apparently in Latin it is not so easy to maintain a strict

¹⁸ The basic meaning of *uti* lies in the verb *referre*: "[...] il traduit l'acte par lequel l'action extérieure est rapportée à la norme morale: l' *honestum*; or cette norme coïncide avec Dieu; partant cet acte est déjà un acte d'amour de Dieu. C'est là, croyons-nous, le point central de la morale augustinienne: la moralité de l'amour d'usage ne se définit pas par l'objet aimé, mais par le choix qui en est fait pour sa conformité avec la loi morale, c'est-à-dire par référence à l'amour de Dieu; or ce choix constitue déjà un acte d'amour de Dieu. Tout amour d'usage légitime comprend donc un élément d'amour de Dieu. Et c'est en cet élément que consiste sa moralité." HOLTE R., *op. cit.* p. 203.

difference between *uti* and *frui*. This is illustrated by the term 'usufructus', English 'usufruct'. The term combines *uti* and *frui*: the right to use and enjoy something. All these findings lead to two conclusions. First, we may not associate the Latin pair *uti* and *frui* with our contemporary common-sense distinction between using and enjoying. They do not constitute an opposition in Latin. Second, when Augustine speaks about *uti homine*, he does not mean the same (ab)use of humans against which Kant so firmly reacted. Applied to humans, *uti* does not (always) have an utilitarian meaning.

Uti and *frui* do not constitute a rhetorical pair in the Italian writings (386-388). *Frui* is defined as "praesto habere quod diligis".¹⁹ *Uti* designates the relation in which humans are the subject and worldly goods are the object. Only God is to be loved.²⁰ That we may not love the things of this world, does not mean that we may have contempt for them. *Usus* is not bad *in se*, it is actually morally valuable because it helps us to reach God. *Usus* becomes bad when it happens out of a wrong orientation.²¹ The scope of *uti* expands in the writings of Thagaste (388-391). Now humans are also the object of *uti*. Here *uti* undergoes a fundamental change of meaning. *Uti* no longer has a strict and dominantly utilitarian meaning. In *De vera religione* humans are, for the first time, counted among objects of use, but immediately separated from the other use-objects.²² 'Recte utitur temporalibus' is parallel with 'hominibus consulit'. The correct use of fellow humans is to care for these fellow humans. *Uti* here receives the relational and non-utilitarian meaning that was available in Latin. It is in the writings of the Presbyterate (391-395) that *uti* and *frui* explicitly form a rhetorical couple. The essence of that pair is

¹⁹ *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manichaeorum* I, III, 4. (PL 32, p. 1312).

²⁰ *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manichaeorum* I, XX, 37 (PL 32, p. 1327/ CSEL 90, p. 42): "Amandus igitur solus Deus est: omnis vero iste mundus, id est, omnia sensibilia contemnenda, utendum autem his ad huius vitae necessitatem."

²¹ *De libero arbitrio* I, XV, 33: "Cum igitur eisdem rebus alius male alius bene utatur, et is quidem qui male, amore his inhereat atque implicetur – scilicet subditus eis rebus quas ei subditas esse oportebat, et ea bona sibi constituens quibus ordinandis beneque tractandis ipse esse utique bonum [...] sed eis totus superferatur, et habere illa atque regere, cum opus est paratus, et amittere ac non habere paratior."

²² *De vera religione* XLVII, 91 (CCL 32, pp. 246-247): "Hic uir, quamdiu est in hac vita, utitur amico ad rependam gratiam, utitur inimico ad patientiam, utitur quibus potest ad beneficentiam, utitur omnibus ad benevolentiam. Et quamquam temporalia non diligit, ipse recte utitur temporalibus et pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit, si aequaliter non potest omnibus."

formulated in *Enarratio in Psalmos* 4,8: "[...] nec facile inveniuntur qui diligant bona interiora, id est, ad interiorem hominem pertinentia, quae sola diligenda sunt, ceteris autem ad necessitatem utendum, non ad gaudium perfruendum."²³ The material and the earthly are only allowed to be used (*uti*) but not to be enjoyed. *Uti* and *frui* seem to be contraries here. In the second text of the *Presbyterate* in which Augustine writes about *uti* and *frui* as a pair, which will be discussed later on, the *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30, Augustine is more nuanced about the relation between those two verbs. Conclusion: In defending Augustine the search for stoic roots can be interesting, but is not necessary. In Augustine's writing before *De doctrina christiana I* and in Latin in general, can we already find a positive, non-selfish and non-utilitarian *uti*.

about eroticism

The charge of a longing erotic love can be dealt with in two directions. Aimé Becker argues that a longing and striving kind of love is not always bad. There exists a longing kind of love in which the lover forgets himself. Such a love is, for example, the loving movement from a creature to its Creator. Longing love is not always *superbia*.²⁴ In that sense a striving love is not always wrong, and it is certainly not unchristian. John Burnaby pursues another direction. He points out that love for God and the neighbour can hardly be called striving. Those kinds of love are, after all, more than only a longing desire for *beata vita*, they are obedience to the *lex aeterna*.²⁵ And precisely that obedience is the biblical agape.

²³ CCL 38, p. 17.

²⁴ BECKER A., *De l'instinct du bonheur à l'extase de la béatitude – Théologie et pédagogie du bonheur dans la prédication de Saint Augustin*, P. Lethielleux, Paris 1967, Ch. 10, pp. 280-316: reply to Nygren.

²⁵ Ragnar Holte develops the same reasoning. *Frui Deo* is, as Lorenz already showed, a submission to the law. That law becomes even an object of love. The love for God is love for the law. Holte found this insight in the writings of Gösta Hök. HOLTE R., *op. cit.* pp. 228-229. Hök G., *Augustin und die antike Tugendlehre*, Kerygma und Dogma (6), 1960, pp. 104-130.

The thought that the relation to God is connected with submission to the *lex aeterna* is also described by SCHUBERT P.A., *Augustins Lex-aeterna-Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen*, Aschendorff, Münster i. W. 1924.

2.2.1 Specific refutations: based on *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 and *De doctrina christiana* I

1. *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30

The question that Augustine tries to answer in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 is 'Vtrum omnia in utilitatem hominis creata sint?'. What if humans are subjects and temporal goods objects? Consequently the meaning of *uti homine* is not the specific topic of the 30th question. Nevertheless, arguments against the charges of egoism and instrumentalism can be found there.

The choice between *uti* and *frui*, as well as *uti* and *frui* themselves, have to occur in a ordered way. There is a double *ordinatio*. First of all, the correct verb has to be applied to the correct object: *frui fruendis* and *uti utendis*.²⁶ Second, when one uses something, one has to do it moderately, according to the needs one has.²⁷ These choices are ethical as well as rational. That this is an ethical matter, is already clear from Augustine's choice of words; namely, he speaks about *virtus* and *vitium*. Only a human being gifted with reason, only a wise man, can *uti* in a correct way.²⁸ *Ratio* makes humans superior to the rest of creation. *Ratio* is something that all humans share. All humans are equals in that respect. Equals cannot and should not try to dominate and use each other as instruments. *Uti* is thus not something arbitrary, but very ordered and strictly defined. The function of *uti* is to help to get to *frui*.

The object *ad fruendum* is invisible, intelligible and spiritual, or in other words: God. All that is bodily and visible is to be used (*uti*). This implies that humans are *ad utendum*. Augustine, however, immediately adds that humans are not to be used *ad eminentiam* but *ad societatem*. Humans are to be used, but not in the same manner as other earthly instruments are to be used.²⁹ Humans are equals and

²⁶ *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 38, 10-15): "Omnis itaque humana peruersio est, quod etiam uitium uocatur, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae uirtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti."

²⁷ *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 39, 28-29): "Utilibus autem utendum est omnibus, ut quoque eorum opus est."

²⁸ *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 49, 32-35): "Scire namque quo quidque referendum sit, non datum est rationis expertibus neque ipsis rationalibus stultis. Nec uti quisque potest ea re quae quo referenda sit nescit; nec quisquam potest scire nisi sapiens."

²⁹ *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 39, 40-44): "Perfecta igitur hominis ratio, quae uirtus uocatur, utitur primo se ipsa ad intelligendum Deum, ut eo fruatur a quo etiam facta est; utitur autem ceteris rationalibus animantibus ad

should try to build up community. Augustine is here far removed from a self-centred selfish ethics. Besides, Augustine has great respect for all living creatures: bodies should be used for noble goals: patience, moderation, truth, justice and health.³⁰ Furthermore, Augustine reacts explicitly against egocentric attempts to achieve *fruitio*. Those who are too much orientated towards their own goals, are guilty of *superbia*.³¹

"Omnia ergo quae facta sunt, in usum hominis facta sunt, quia omnibus utitur iudicando ratio, quae homini data est."³² In *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 *uti* expresses the attitude we have to adopt in relation to the created world. Augustine answers: yes, we may use the creation. Actually, his answer goes still further: the creation has to be used, *uti* is the only permitted relation of humans to the world. The conclusion with regard to humans as objects is that they should be used. It is to be noted, however, that using humans is not entirely the same as using temporal goods. *Uti* of humans as objects is respectful, community-minded and based on equality. It is not hedonistic and vulgar utilitarian. Certainly, inter-human relationships have a certain instrumentalist character but that instrumentalism is not as bad as it sounds. *Uti homine* is always aimed at noble causes in a rational and moderate way.

2. *De doctrina christiana* I

It has already been mentioned that Lorenz – and Holte in his footsteps – uses the couple *honestum-utile* to argue a stoic origin of Augustine's *uti* and to prove in that way that *uti* is not egoistic and instrumentalistic. I think that is not necessary. Textually and with regard to the content, there are enough arguments in *De doctrina christiana* I.³³ Besides, Augustine does not use the pair *honestum-*

societatem, irrationalibus ad eminentiam. Vitam etiam suam ad id refert, ut fruatur Deo; ita enim beata est."

³⁰ *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 46-52): "Vtitur etiam corporibus quibusdam uiuificandis ad beneficentiam – sic enim utitur suo corpore –, quibusdam assumendis uel respuendis ad ualitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustitiam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod ueritatis documentum; utitur etiam his a quibus se abstinet ad temperantiam."

³¹ *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 45-46): "Quae profecto inchoat miseriam per superbiam, si ad se ipsam, non ad deum referatur."

³² *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CCL 44A, p. 40, 59-61).

³³ For text-edition, numbering of chapters, paragraphs and alineas, I rely on the CSEL-edition of William MacAllen Green. Augustine himself only distinguished four books in *De doctrina christiana*. Succeeding text-editions refined the classifica-

utile in *De doctrina christiana* I, whereas it is the most important treatise regarding *uti* and *frui*.

In *De doctrina christiana* I, love, as *amare* and *diligere*, is a crucial term in the definitions of *uti* and *frui*. Just as in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 order, *ordinata dilectio* as Augustine calls it in *De doctrina christiana* I, plays an essential role in love. Not only the correct verb, *uti* or *frui*, has to be applied to the correct object, but one has to keep the right sequence and moderation in mind. Love has to happen according to a strict order: from the body as the lowest object of love, *via* humans, to God as the highest object of love.³⁴ Even so ordered love is a matter of moderation: respecting the 'more or less' that can be distinguished in the order of things.³⁵ By stressing the discipline and moderation that are focused upon in Augustine's concept of love in *De doctrina christiana* I, I only wanted to show that it is not fair to accuse Augustine of having instrumentalist, selfish and erotic ideas about love.

Those who accuse Augustine of instrumentalism and egoism when he writes about *uti homine*, forget that the use of humans is completely different from the use of the rest of creation, as is clearly stated in *De doctrina christiana* I.

Such an *uti* of humans is connected with love. *Uti* of humans by humans is not just 'using', it is always a form of love, *diligere*. This in contrast to the use we may make of the rest of the creation.³⁶

tion. The edition of Green is the end of that evolution. In citing the Latin texts, it has no sense to mention the page-numbers because the alinea-classification is much more detailed. GREEN Guilemus M. (ed., introd.), *De Doctrina Christiana*, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 80, (Sancti Aurelii Augustini opera sect. VI, pars VI), Vindobonae, Hoelder/Pichler/Tempski 1963.

³⁴ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXVII, 28 (60): "Et si Deus omni homine amplius diligendus est, amplius quisque Deum debet diligere quam se ipsum. Item amplius alius homo diligendus est quam corpus nostrum, quia propter Deum omnia ista diligenda sunt et potest nobiscum alius homo Deo perfrui, quod non potest corpus, quia corpus per animam vivit qua fruimur Deo."

³⁵ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXVII, 28 (59): "Ille autem iuste et sancte vivit qui rerum integer aestimator est. Ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligit quod non est diligendum, aut non diligit quod diligendum est, aut amplius diligit quod minus diligendum est, aut aequè diligit quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est, aut minus vel amplius quod aequè diligendum est. Omnis peccator in quantum peccator est, non est diligendus; et omnis homo in quantum homo est, diligendus est propter Deum, Deus vero propter se ipsum." (The underlined sentence is not mentioned in CSEL, but it is in CCL 32, p. 22)

³⁶ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXIII, 22 (44): "Non autem omnia quibus utendum est diligenda sunt, sed ea sola quae aut nobiscum societate quadam referuntur in Deum, sicuti est homo, vel angelus, aut ad nos relata, beneficio Dei par nos indigent,

Conclusion: the neighbour is to be used, but that is not the same use as we have of temporal goods. The latter are real instruments. My neighbour is not such an instrument. That is revealed by what Augustine understands as using humans: *officium misericordiae*. Augustine formulates explicitly and at length (from alinea 61 to 72), that using humans stands for taking care of them mercifully, like the Good Samaritan. He specifies that, because it is impossible to include all humans in our care, we have to look for those who are spatially, temporally or otherwise close to us.

Nevertheless, in any case my neighbour remains (a sort of) useful instrument. But, that is not the whole truth about my neighbour. My neighbour is more than only *ad utendum*, he may be the object of *frui*. So, my fellow humans are not just an instrument, they are also an end. Augustine's approach to humans, the combination of *uti* and *frui* in *Domino* will be explained at more fully in the refutation of the charge of being inconsequent. The fact that Augustine extends *frui*-love to humans, is in itself already a sign of how highly love of the neighbour is esteemed by him.

As has already been shown in general, Augustine does not propagate a selfish love. When we read *De doctrina christiana* I carefully, we even find three specific thoughts that prevent a selfish love. Augustine states clearly that is impossible to be calculating in human relationships. You simply cannot manipulate your neighbour, take care of him only to achieve in that way the *fruitio*, since that *fruitio* is a *merces*, mercifully given by God.³⁷ *Merces* means a reward, something you do not receive automatically or as a necessary consequence of your work. Helping your neighbour is 'useful' and 'advantageous', but even Augustine does not know (*'nescio'*) how. Actually it is not to known, not predictable. It does not depend on human action, but depends entirely on Gods initiative. In that sense it is not fit to speak about an egoistic approach to love. It is also interesting, that Augustine writes *invicem* in the same alinea. We have to enjoy each other in God. In other places Augustine stresses that *uti* is a communal activity. We

sicuti est corpus. Nam utique martyres non dilexerunt scelus persequentium se, quo tamen usi sunt ad promerendum Deum."

³⁷ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXII, 35 (76): "Ille igitur usus qui dicitur Dei quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem. Cuius autem non miseremur et cui consulimus, ad eius quidem utilitatem id facimus eamque intuemur, sed nescio quo modo etiam nostra fit consequens, cum eam misericordiam quam impendimus egenti, sine mercede non relinquit Deus. Haec autem merces summa est ut ipso perfruamur, et omnes qui eo fruimur, nobis etiam invicem in ipso perfruamur."

have to do it together (*cum*).³⁸ I love God not *via* but *cum* my neighbour. So *uti* of neighbour is not really the employment of an instrument but rather the formation of a community aiming at a higher love.³⁹ Humans form community through communal activity aimed at a communal goal in enjoying God. In all our love, we have to keep God in mind. So, just as we may not love our neighbour because of that neighbour in him- or herself, we may not love our neighbour because of ourselves.⁴⁰ Now, it has to be clear, love of the neighbour is not selfish in Augustine.⁴¹ Besides, we have to give all our love to God. Nothing is left for selfish love!⁴²

³⁸ For example *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21, (43). (See footnote 42.) Another illustration is the use of 'nobiscum (societate)' in (44), (60) and (84) where Augustine states that the loving of God *via* the temporal things is a communal activity.

³⁹ Augustine calls the desire to dominate other people sinful [(46)-(47)] because all humans are equal. When ruling over other people is forbidden, the wish to instrumentalise other people is certainly excluded.

Cf. *In Epistulam Iohannis*, tr. VIII, IV, 5: "Numquid sic amandi sunt homines, tanquam consumendi? Sed amicitia quaedam benevolentiae est, ut aliquando praestemus eis quos amamus. Quid, si non sit quod praestemus? Sola benevolentia sufficit amanti [...] Opta aequalem, ut ambo sub uno sitis cui nihil praestari potest." (PL 35, pp. 2038-2039).

⁴⁰ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (41): "Sed nec se ipso quisquam frui debet, si liquide advertas, quia nec se ipsum debet propter se ipsum diligere, sed propter illum quo fruendum est. Tunc est quippe optimus homo, cum tota vita sua pergit in incommutabilem vitam, et toto affectu inheret illi. Si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad Deum, sed ad se ipsum conversus, non ad incommutabile aliquid convertitur. Et propterea iam cum defectu aliquo se fruitur, quia melior est cum totus haeret atque constringitur incommutabili bono, quam cum inde vel ad se ipsum relaxatur." *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (42): "Si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non suscenseat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter Deum diligis. Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: Diliges, inquit, proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, Deum vero ex toto corde, ex tota anima ex tota mente, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem vitam et omnem intellectum in illum conferas a quo habes ea ipsa quae confers."

⁴¹ Cf. *In Epistulam Iohannis* tr. V,3; VI,2; VI,4: "Verum nobis responderit, quia diligimus, et germana dilectio est in nobis: non ficta, sed sincera; salutem fraternam quaerens, nullum emolumentum exspectans a fratre, nisi salutem ipsius." (PL 35, p. 2021).

⁴² *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (43): "Cum autem ait toto corde, tota anima, tota mente, nullam vitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae vacare debeat et quasi locum dare ut alia re velit frui, sed quicquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc rapiatur quo totus dilectionis impetus currit. Quisquis ergo recte diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat Deum. Sic enim eum diligens tamquam se ipsum, totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem Dei quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cuius derivatione minuatur."

3. The more recent discussion: more specific about *uti* and *frui*

3.1 Augustine is not consequent and coherent in *De doctrina christiana* I

The question that Augustine tries to solve in *De doctrina christiana* I is what humans have to do with fellow humans. Do they have to *uti* each other? What is then the meaning of that *uti*? Or is a *frui* of humans by humans also possible? Oliver O'Donovan in particular complains that Augustine is inconsequent and incoherent in addressing that complicated question.⁴³ According to O'Donovan, Augustine first placed humans under *uti* by the following reasoning: in the beginning of *De doctrina christiana* I Augustine makes the exclusive disjunction: either only *uti* or only *frui*. When this premise is combined with the premise that only God is *ad fruendum*, the conclusion about our behaviour to humans is obvious. The only permitted relation between humans is one of *uti*. Augustine sees earthly existence as a pilgrimage to the afterlife. This motive of pilgrimage is the reason why *uti* always keeps a dominating instrumentalist meaning. According to O'Donovan, that thought of instrumental and utilitarian using of humans was too much for Augustine too stomach. Augustine began to realise that he was thinking in an unchristian fashion. That is why he corrected himself by placing humans in the category *ad fruendum*. Since Augustine changed his thoughts, he is to be called inconsequent. The *frui* of humans by humans is in contradiction with the strict definitions that Augustine gave in the beginning of his book. Placing humans under *frui* is applying the verb *frui* in an unjust and not fitting way. O'Donovan claims that Augustine himself admits this in the words: "abusive, non proprie diceris frui."⁴⁴ O'Donovan concludes that *De doctrina christiana* I is not a clearly descriptive, thoroughly thought through and final conception of *uti* and *frui*.⁴⁵ He regards *De doctrina christiana* I as a work in which Augustine explores his thoughts and doubts. O'Donovan thinks that he is sup-

⁴³ O'DONOVAN O., *Usus and fruitio in Augustine – De doctrina christiana I*, The Journal of Theological Studies (33), 1982, pp. 361-397. That article is the elaboration of an idea about *uti* and *frui* in O'DONOVAN O., *The problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London 1980, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁴ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII, 37 (80).

⁴⁵ Brechtken has the same opinion about Augustine's choice for *frui homine*. Augustine is doubting whether to place humans under *frui* or *uti*. By accident, he stumbles on a quote Paul's letter to Philemon: 'Ita, frater, ego te fruar in domino.' (Fil.20) According to Brechtken, this quote acts as a last resort for Augustine. *Frui homine in domino* was not consequently built in his reasoning from the beginning.

ported by the fact that Augustine never refers to the love of the neighbour as *uti* after *De doctrina christiana* I.

3.2 *De doctrina christiana* I is coherent and consequent

3.2.1 Defence of Augustine in recent literature

Three Augustine-scholars react against the charge of inconsequence. Luc Verheijen refers to the structure of *De doctrina christiana* I to argue that Augustine reasoning is very consequent.⁴⁶ *De doctrina christiana* I is built around the *magna quaestio*: what to do with the neighbour: *uti*, *frui* or both? Since that *magna quaestio* consists of three parts, there should be three answers in *De doctrina christiana* I. The first part of the question is whether humans can be the object of *frui*. Augustine answers: no, not here on earth. The second part of the question is whether humans can be the object of *uti*. The answer is: yes, here on earth. Third, are humans object of both *frui* and *uti*? The answer to this question is the central point of Augustine's exposition. It is a nuanced answer, completely in accordance with the two previous answers: yes, humans are during this life on earth the object of *uti* and yes, even so humans are object of *frui*, but in the next and eternal life.⁴⁷ That is a real *frui*, not in an earthly but in a heavenly sense since only God and not a creature can bring humans into complete salvation. That is why it is a *frui in Deo*. Verheijen finds confirmation of this in the quote from Paul: "Ita frater, ego te fruar in Domino" in *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII, 37 (79). With the words *in Domino* Paul did not refer to an enjoyment of Philemon in heaven. Because an earthly encounter between Paul and Philemon was not excluded, *in Domino* means that Paul wanted to orientate the earthly encounter completely to God. Conclusion, according to Verheijen, is that humans can enjoy each other but only

⁴⁶ VERHEIJEN L., *Le premier livre du De doctrina christiana d' Augustin – Un traité de 'télécologie' biblique*, in DEN BOEFT J. & VAN OORT J. (eds) *Augustiniana Traiectana*, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1987, pp. 169-187.

⁴⁷ VERHEIJEN L., *a. cit.*, pp. 179-180: "En 22(20) Augustin s'est demandé, répétons-le, si les hommes doivent être ou bien *a* objet de *frui*; ou *b* objet de *uti*; ou encore *c* aussi bien objet de *uti* que de *frui*. Augustin a répondu immédiatement «non» pour *a*; «oui» pour *b*. Mais il ne répond pas tout de suite à la question *c*. Sa réponse finale à cette question sera «oui» à *b* + *a*, c'est-à-dire «oui» pour *b* (il maintient la réponse déjà donnée), mais «oui» aussi pour *a* ..., plus tard. Quand il disait en 22(20) «non» pour *a*, il se plaçait nettement et explicitement dans des perspectives terrestres. Maintenant il se situe en pensée dans la situation définitive: plus tard, c'est-à-dire au ciel, l'homme sera à *frui* (mais «en Dieu»). [...] la réponse à la question *c* ne contredit donc nullement les réponses immédiates données aux questions *a* et *b*."

with the addition: *in Domino*. Here on earth it is impossible for humans to enjoy each other completely. Only *uti* is possible here. When we do speak, here on earth, about the *frui* of humans, then it is always inchoative, anticipating the real enjoyment that can only take place in heaven. Since the relation of humans here on earth is always more of an *uti*, the *frui* of the neighbour of Paul is actually also more of an *uti*. In that sense the application of the *frui* to humans is a broad and non-technical use of that verb.⁴⁸ Augustine states this explicitly because he did not want to over-interpret the words of Paul since Augustine wasn't really certain that Paul referred to an earthly encounter with Philemon. *Frui homine in Domino* is therefore a consequent implication of the assumptions made at the outset.

Tarsicius Johannes Van Bavel expands the thought of Verheijen that in this life an anticipated but imperfect *fruitio* of humans is possible: even earthly goods can be objects of such a *fruitio* for Augustine.⁴⁹ Especially against Brechtken, Raymond Canning replies that Augustine's apparent uncertainty whether to place humans under *uti* or *frui* is a sign that love for God is closely connected with love for the neighbour.⁵⁰ *De doctrina christiana* I is not a point in case in an argument to accuse Augustine of a lack of biblical Christianity. Rather there we see a theologian at work, not a doubter, someone who tries several ways to express the complicated relation between God and man.

3.2.2 An own reading of *De doctrina christiana* I

That humans have to *uti* their neighbours, does not imply that they are forbidden to *frui* of their neighbours. The disjunction is not exclusive. When humans are the object, both options are possible. We can find this in several ways in *De doctrina christiana* I.⁵¹

⁴⁸ That is the already mentioned 'abusive, non proprie diceris frui'. According to Verheijen, in contrast to O'Donovan's interpretation, these words do not constitute a correction of Augustine by himself.

⁴⁹ VAN BAVEL T.J., *Fruitio, delectatio and voluptas in Augustine*, Augustinus (37), 1993, pp. 499-510.

VAN BAVEL T.J., *a. cit.* p. 502: "If we look at Augustine's writings as a whole, we see that he sticks nearly always to his technical distinction between *uti* and *frui*. Nevertheless, besides many texts rejecting the perverse fruition of earthly things, there is a smaller number of texts speaking positively or neutrally of enjoying earthly goods. This applies in particular to interpersonal relationships."

⁵⁰ CANNING R., *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine*, Augustinian Historical Institute, Heverlee-Leuven, 1993 (especially Chapter 3: *Uti/Frui in Relation to Love for Neighbour and Love for God*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-115).

⁵¹ Already in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 it is clear that *uti* and *frui* do not constitute an exclusive disjunction. Augustine introduces in that question *uti*

First of all, Augustine makes a difference between three sorts of realities: those that are only *ad utendum*, those that are only *ad fruendum* and the category *fruuntur et utuntur*. This last category is the category for humans. The fact that Augustine does not place humans under the category of realities either of those that are solely the object of *uti* or those that are solely the object of *frui*, is very significant. By making of humans a third category, Augustine already shows from the beginning that humans are not an object only of *frui* or *uti*.⁵² If Augustine believed the opposite, he would have defined humans immediately as objects of use or enjoyment. But no, Augustine prefers to remain careful and to wait in judging the position of humans. Second, only the fact that the *magna quaestio* exists of three options – *uti*, *frui* or *uti* and *frui* our neighbours – also demonstrates that, according to Augustine, when humans are the object, *uti* and *frui* do not exclude each other.⁵³ As we will see, the answer to that *magna quaestio* – *uti* AND *frui* – is the strongest proof possible to demonstrate that there is not even any question of an exclusive disjunction.

Furthermore, Augustine explicitly states that there is no big difference between *uti* and *frui* when applied to humans. The third definition of *uti* and *frui* in *De doctrina christiana* I, which only applies to humans, states that both *uti* and *frui* are a form of *diligere*.⁵⁴ In other words they lie very close to one another. When

and *frui* with the parallel couple *honestum* and *utile*. He stresses that both couples are parallel (“Ut inter honestum et utile interest, ita et inter fruendum et utendum.”) but even so he emphasises that *honestum* and *utile* are not opposite. (“[...] illud sane custodientes ut honestum et utile modo sibimet aduersuntur. *Adversari* enim haec sibi aliquando imperite ac uulgariter existimantur.”) So we may conclude that Augustine does not regard *uti* and *frui* as opposite. (CCL 44 A, p. 38, 1-2/8-10)

⁵² *De doctrina christiana* I, III, 3 (7): “Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae quibus fruendum est beatos nos faciunt; istis quibus utendum est tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuvamur et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos beatos faciunt, pervenire atque his inherere possimus. Nos vero qui fruimur et utimur inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, impeditur cursus noster et aliquando etiam deflectitur, ut ab his rebus quibus fruendum est obtinendis vel retardemur vel etiam revocemur inferiorum amore praepediti.”

⁵³ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 20 (40): “Itaque magna quaestio est, utrum frui se homines debeant an uti an utrumque. Praeceptum est enim nobis ut diligamus invicem, sed quaeritur utrum propter se homo ab homine diligendus sit an propter aliud. Si enim propter se, fruimur eo; si propter aliud, utimur eo. Videtur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus. Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur beata vita, cuius etiamsi nondum res, tamen spes eius nos hoc tempore consolatur. *Maledictus autem qui spem suam ponit in homine.* [Jer. 17,5]”

⁵⁴ See *De doctrina christiana* I, XXIII, 22 (44), previously as cited in footnote 36.

humans are the object, *frui* is very close to *uti* of humans, that is *uti cum dilectione*.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII, 37, (79): "Quamquam vicinissime dicitur *frui cum dilectione uti*." To read this paragraph as whole: see footnote 60. As pointed out previously, there are two (even three) sorts of *uti*. One can only understand that *uti* and *frui* both are possible in the case of humans as their object, when one can distinguish the different kinds of *uti*. When humans are the object, *uti* and *frui* are very close to one another. *Uti cum dilectione* and *frui in Domino* happen almost simultaneously. Humans are creatures and in that sense object of *uti*. Since humans are exceptional creatures, this is not an ordinary *uti*. In two senses it is another *uti* than the *uti* of which the other creatures are object. Because reason makes all humans equal, they cannot use each other like ordinary creatures. That special status also emerged in the commandment of divine love: humans have to be loved. That is the big difference between the two *uti*'s: the possibility of *cum dilectione*. *Uti* of humans by humans is an *uti cum dilectione* because humans are more than ordinary creatures. Because there is something divine in humans, they are the object of *frui*. Since humans are not God, it is *frui in Domino*. It is a *frui* of the presence of God in humans in their orientation to God. On the one hand the answer '*uti* and *frui*' is logical, on the other hand it is more complicated than it seems. *Uti* and *frui* with humans as subject and object can be distinguished but they cannot be separated. They are distinct but not really different. Enjoying the divine in the neighbour has to lead to enjoying God. In this sense the enjoying of humans is close to the loving use of humans, namely in being orientated to a higher aim. *Frui* by humans of humans, has to be referred to Something else, and is relative. *Frui* by humans of God, stands by itself, and is absolute. (One textual reference to two sorts of *frui* is, for example: *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIV, 37 (80): "Cum enim adest quod diligitur, etiam delectationem secum necesse est gerat. Per quam si transieris eamque ad illud ubi permanendum est rettuleris, uteris ea et abusive, non proprie diceris *frui*. Si vero inhaerens atque permanseris, finem in ea ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie *frui* dicendus es. Quod non faciendum est nisi in illa Trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono.") As Augustine explains in paragraphs (73) – (74), he sees a third kind of *uti*. Besides the two *uti*'s of which humans are the subject, there exist an *uti* with God as the subject (and humans as object). *Frui* means the striving after something for an end, an end that is higher than the one that strives for it. Such striving cannot be applied to the relation from God to humans. In that case *uti* is the only way to express such a relation. *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXI, 34 (73): "Quapropter adhuc ambiguum videtur esse, cum dicimus ea re nos *perfrui*, quam diligimus propter se ipsam, et ea re nobis fruendum esse tantum, qua efficimur beati, ceteris vero utendum. Diligit enim nos Deus, et multum nobis dilectionem eius erga nos divina scriptura commendat. Quomodo ergo diligit? Ut nobis utatur, an ut fruatur?" *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXI, 34 (74): "Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit. Omne enim nostrum bonum vel ipse vel ab ipso est. Cui autem obscurum vel dubium est, non egere lucem rerum harum nitore quas ipsa inlustraverit? Dicit apertissime etiam propheta: Dixi Domino, Dominus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quem ad modum diligit." We may even say that *uti* with humans as object and subject is closer to *uti* by God of humans than *uti* by humans of temporal goods, since the two *uti*'s with humans as the object have one thing in common:

Based on that allegedly exclusive disjunction, Brechtken and O'Donovan go even further. It is either *frui* or *uti*. Augustine first places humans under *uti*. That implies that a human *frui* of humans is not optional. When later in *De doctrina christiana* I, he states that *frui homine* is possible, he contradicts himself. That final answer, namely that humans could enjoy each other, wasn't in Augustine's mind from the beginning. I think that such an interpretation does not give Augustine the credit he deserves. An objective reading of the text reveals a well developed structure in *De doctrina christiana* I.⁵⁶ The fundamental structure of *De doctrina christiana* I is actually quite simple. Augustine starts with 3 premises:

- (1) subject: humans + object: creature = *uti*
- (2) subject: humans + object: God = *frui*
- (3) Humans are created and have something divine.

Augustine introduces these three basic premises in the preparatory part of *De doctrina christiana* I.⁵⁷ Subsequently, Augustine asks: what if humans are both object and subject? The answer: *uti* and *frui* results logically out of the three premises. It is a valid conclusion. The movement in *De doctrina christiana* I is consequent from the very beginning to the end.⁵⁸

The third premise requires some further clarification. In the next paragraph (40) Augustine will ask the *magna quaestio*. But already here in (39) he gives the answer. That humans use and enjoy

love. But Augustine notes that, despite this likeness, there is a difference. The *uti* of God (as subject) is disinterested. Cf. *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXII, 35 (75): "Sed neque sic utitur ut nos; nam nos res quibus utimur ad id referimus ut Dei bonitate perfruamur, Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert."

⁵⁶ (See: 5. addendum; 5.1 textstructure of *De doctrina christiana* I.)

⁵⁷ In *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, (20) (39) these three premises come together: "In his igitur omnibus rebus illae tantum sunt quibus fruendum est, quas aeternas atque incommutabiles commemoravimus; ceteris autem utendum est ut ad illarum perfructionem pervenire possimus. Nos itaque qui fruimur et utimur aliis rebus, res aliquae sumus. Magna enim quaedam res est homo, factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, non in quantum mortali corpore includitur, sed in quantum bestias rationalis animae honore praecedit."

⁵⁸ Augustine's exposition of *uti* and *frui* is not only consequent in the first book of *De doctrina christiana*, but the pair also occupies a consequent place in the entirety of the work. *Uti* and *frui* fit coherently in the exegetical, ontological and hermeneutical explanations of the rest of *De doctrina christiana* I. This consistency in the whole of the four books can here only be mentioned briefly, since it is a detailed and subtle matter that requires a long explanation that exceeds the aims of this article by far.

was already written in the beginning. Up until now, Augustine has remained silent about what humans precisely are, whether *fruendum* or *utendum*. Now, he provides a clue. Humans have got a mortal body and a rational soul. The mortal body belongs to the creation. Apparently the rational soul exceeds the status of a common creature, transcends the animals. The rational soul, although created and in that sense also a creature, is created in God's image and likeness. The rational soul therefore has something divine. And that is the crucial point in Augustine's search to solve the *magna quaestio*. Only the eternal and the divine is to be enjoyed. The rest is to be used. In humans, however, something immortal and divine is also present, namely the rational soul.⁵⁹ Something similar has already been suggested in (25) and (26), where Augustine writes about creation and incarnation: God is present in the creation and the Word of God lives in humans. The conclusion is easily drawn: there is something enjoyable in humans. This is also the reason why, when Augustine speaks of a human *frui homine*, he speaks of a *frui in Domino*.⁶⁰ When humans enjoy humans, they enjoy each other as far as God himself is present in humans. That is what we read in the first sentences of (79). From the very beginning of *De doctrina christiana* I Augustine makes us understand that there is something divine in humans. *Frui homine in Deo* has to be understood with this clue. Humans may

⁵⁹ The idea of there being something divine in humans can also be found in other texts of Augustine in different contexts. Augustine does not go as far as Manicheism and Priscillianism. The human soul is a divine element in humans in their opinion. Augustine conceives of the human soul, although incorporeal and eternal, as created, and as such not divine *in se*. Nevertheless the human soul is the being that is closest to God, because created *imaginem et similitudinem Dei*. This is why the human soul is *capax Dei*. (*De Trinitate* XIV, IV,6; XIV, VIII, 11). God is (and has to be) present in our love for our fellow men. (*In Iohannis evangelium*, XVII,8, *Sermo* 336,2). Christ identifies himself with mankind out of love for mankind. (*De civitate Dei* XVII,18) That is why we touch God already in our love for humans. (*In Iohannis evangelium* LXV,2; *Sermo* 265,8,9). Love for humans is love for God. This thought is implied in Augustine's concept of *Totus Christus*. God transcends humans. Nevertheless, we do not have to look for Him outside humans, he is in humans: 'interior intimo meo et superior summo meo.' (*Confessiones* III, VI,11). God can be discovered, step by step, through an internal search of human reason. (*Confessiones* VII, XVII,23)

⁶⁰ *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXIII,37 (79): "Cum autem homine in Deo frueris, Deo potius quam homine frueris. Illo enim frueris quo efficeris beatus, et ad eum te pervenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis ut venias. Inde ad Philomonem Paulus: Ita frater, inquit, ego te fruar in Domino. Quod si non addidisset, in Domino et te fruar tantum dixisset, in eo constituisset, spem beatitudinis suae. Quamquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti."

enjoy humans in the Lord, because humans are in the Lord, because the Lord Himself is present in humans. This is an invitation but also a restriction. Only as far as the Lord is present in humans, are humans enjoyable. This is emphasised and illustrated by Augustine with the words of Paul to Philemon.⁶¹ Augustine shows that Paul does not want to enjoy Philemon the human, but of the divine in Philemon. That is why enjoying humans by humans requires the addition 'in the Lord'. My neighbour, as a human being, is after all not our source of happiness. To qualify *frui* with in *Deo* or in *Domino* actually shows that it is God Who is enjoyed: God in humans. Augustine, furthermore, cannot demand obedience to the two presupposed commandments of love, at the core of *De doctrina christiana* I, if he does not see something divine in humans.⁶² If humans have to orient all their love entirely and completely to God, then love of the neighbour is only understandable if, and only if, there is something of that God present in the neighbour.

Based on an analysis of the content of *De doctrina christiana* I, it is possible to argue that the option *frui* AND *uti* regarding humans as object is a consequent one. O'Donovan used the lack of a reference to love for the neighbour as *uti* following the *De doctrina christiana* I as proof for his thesis, that Augustine corrected himself in *De doctrina christiana* I. First of all, that alleged absence, in no way detracts

⁶¹ Paul's 'ego te fruar' may certainly not be read as proof or justification forwarded by Augustine to make the *frui homine* plausible. *Frui homine in Domino* follows consequently from Augustine's reasoning. The citation from Philemon 20 is nothing more than an illustration. At the most, it is a post factual argument. If Augustine had only appealed to that citation as an argument for *auctoritas*, he would be wrong. It is only in Latin that *fruar* is written in Philemon 20. The Greek source-text mentions a form of the verb *ovivaμai*, which actually means 'gaining profit from' being closer to 'using' than 'enjoying'.

⁶² *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (42): "Si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non susceat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter Deum diligis. Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: *Diliges inquit, proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum*, Deum vero *ex toto corde, ex tota anima ex tota mente*, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem vitam et omnem intellectum in illum conferas a quo habes ea ipsa quae confers." *De doctrina christiana* I, XXII, 21 (43): "Cum autem ait *toto corde, tota anima, tota mente*, nullam vitae nostrae partem reliquit, quae vacare debeat et quasi locum dare ut alia re velit frui, sed quicquid aliud diligendum venerit in animum, illuc rapiatur quo totus dilectionis impetus currit. Quisquis ergo recte diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat Deum. Sic enim eum diligens tamquam se ipsum, totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem Dei quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cuius derivatione minuatur."

from the internal coherence of *De doctrina christiana* I. Furthermore, *uti* and *frui* re-appear in the later writings, all though they are not dealt with as a specific theme. Above all, the fascinating discovery of *De doctrina christiana* I is precisely that *frui* of humans by humans is possible. In the reasoning of the earlier writings, *uti* of humans by humans was clearly obvious. The essence and the message of *De doctrina christiana* I is that human *frui* of humans is permissible because there is something divine in mankind. Once that is proved, Augustine can fall back on it in later works without further argumentation.⁶³ Furthermore, although only scarcely I was able to find, some examples of later writings in which Augustine carefully speaks of *uti* of humans by humans.⁶⁴

Frui homine in Domino is consequent with all premises. *Uti* of humans by humans does not exclude *frui* of humans by humans. Augustine remarks from the very beginning that there is something divine in mankind. Actually, Augustine already hints at the answer even before putting the great question. Everything had been thought through in advance. His well structured answer was present from the beginning and Augustine never lost sight of it. A reading of the text with attention to the subtle game of definitions reveals a fully considered and well-prepared schema with different but concordant answers.⁶⁵

⁶³ In *De doctrina christiana* I, XXXV, 39 (84), the epilogue of the first book of *De doctrina christiana*, Augustine comes back on *uti* of humans by humans, after dealing at length with the possibility of *frui homine*. I find that very significant. By doing this, Augustine emphasises that *uti* and *frui* go together when humans are the object. However, he does not do so explicitly. He speaks of the reality that enjoys together with us and of the combination of *uti* and *dilectio*. At that moment in *De doctrina christiana* I, the focused reader understands that this refers to using humans by humans. Augustine in this way demonstrates the coherence of his reasoning. He has not corrected himself. *Uti* of humans by humans is not replaced by enjoying humans by humans. No, both are possible and stand consequent next to each other.

⁶⁴ Despite O'Donovan's claim, citations can be found after *De doctrina christiana* I in which Augustine speaks of using humans by humans. In *De civitate Dei* XIX, XIII, 2 (CCL 48, p. 680) community with others ('societas sui generis') clearly is mentioned among the goods that, if used correctly ('recte usus'), lead to an eternal life 'ad fruendum Deo et proximo in Deo'. True friendship is used, only if God binds humans with and in love. (*Confessiones* IV, IV, 7 – CCL 27, p. 43)

⁶⁵ See: 5. Addendum.

4. Conclusion

Our fellow-men: do we have to treat them as means or as ends? According to Augustine, fellow-men are not our final end, but only a means to that end. At the same time, the fellow-men carry in them that final end and are (a sign of) that end. Augustine's answer is not formulated so univocally, but that is its value. Augustine realises that the question itself, just like the status of (fellow-)men, is too complex to be answered without nuances. Augustine stresses the unique status of humans: creature, but creature *par excellence* because created in the image of its Creator. That exceptional status shows that there are many levels to the question of the correct relationship between humans. The merit of Augustine lies in the attention for the complexity of this matter. He understands that it is not easy to formulate the relations between humans, since those relations have many aspects. He does not want to lose sight of that plenitude. He achieves this by making a difference between *uti* and *frui*, worked out in a schema of several definitions. Because of the divine presence in humans, humans can be an end for each other and thus not a means. In that sense, humans can enjoy each other. Nevertheless, humans are not an absolute end for each other, only God is. That is why humans remain an usable instrument. To use neighbours, however, does not mean in this context an egoistic manipulating of the neighbours, but a loving taking care of them. Augustine expresses this complex relationship between humans by showing that humans can *uti* AND *frui* each-other.

Frui stands for love, not *eros*, but *agape*. *Frui* is *agape* because not I but God stands at the center in *frui*-love. That self-denial is confirmed when Augustine emphasises the *merces*-aspect of *frui*. *Frui* cannot be calculated. Furthermore, *frui* is clearly situated in a context of obedience and that is the context of *agape*-love. Meanwhile, it is clear that *uti homine* is not utilitarian and selfish, but a sort of love. *Uti* (of the neighbour) has to happen in an ordered, moderate and rational fashion.

Put differently, the *magna quaestio* – how to deal with fellow-men: *uti*, *frui* or both – receives three affirmative answers. Yes, the fellow-man is there to use, but in a moderate and non-utilitarian way, namely by taking care of him. Yes, the fellow-man is there to enjoy, but *in Domino*. Yes, the fellow-man is there to use and enjoy. While investigating Augustine's quest for these answers, we also noticed the subtle and complex relation between the love for God and love for humans. They are two sides of the same coin.

As a last remark of this article, I want to sum up the two cardinal points of my 'rehabilitation' of Augustine: 1) an analysis of the structure of the different definitions in *De doctrina christiana* I and 2) a new approach to that book, namely starting from the insight that Augustine perceives something divine in humans. These two points have sufficiently demonstrated that it is wrong to accuse Augustine of a selfish and hedonistic instrumentalism and of being an incoherent writer and thinker.

5. Addendum: structure and definitions

5.1 Schema I: Textstructure of *De doctrina christiana* I

The text itself, apart from its content, shows a good organised, well thought out and structured schema. Only on a textual basis, *De Doctrina Christiana* I presents the following structure:

- (1) - (39): preparation
 - o (1) - (7): place of *uti en frui* in the schemas of *De Doctrina Christiana*
 - o (7) - (39): *uti – frui*
 - (7) - (9): two definitions of *uti en frui*
 - (9): the **temporal** as object and humans as subject: only *uti*
 - (10) - (38): **God** as object and humans as subject: only *frui*
(+ theological exposition of the meaning of God, the reality *ad fruentum*: Trinity, Incarnation,...)
 - (39): the exceptional status of **humans**: *ratio*
- (40) - (83): *magna quaestio*
 - o (40): What is the correct attitude when humans are object (and subject)?
 - A. Have humans to *uti* their fellow-men?
 - B. Have humans to *frui* their fellow-men?
 - C. Have humans to *uti* and *frui* their fellow-men?
 - Definition of *uti en frui* for humans as object of *uti* and *frui*
 - o (41) - (75): *uti*
 - (41): **Yes**, humans are the object of *uti*.
(with humans as subject of that *uti*)
 - (42) - (72): **How**
 - (42) - (60): negative formulation: Human *uti* with humans as object is different from human *uti* with temporal goods as object.
 - o (42) - (43): *Uti* of humans by humans is connected with the double love-commandment.
 - o (44) - (45): In contrast to *uti* with the temporal as object, *uti* with the fellow-man may be accompanied by love.
 - o (46) - (47): Humans may not dominate humans.

- o (48) - (58): Self-love and love for the proper body is natural and allowed in the double commandment to love.
- o (59) - (60): the importance of order in love
- (61) - (72): positive formulation: *uti* with humans as subject and humans as object: different aspects and consequences of love of the neighbour.
 - (73) - (75): explanation of **God** as subject and humans as object of *uti* in order to clarify *uti* with humans as object and subject.
- o (76) - (83): *frui*
- o (76): **Yes**, humans are the object of *frui*.
 - (with humans as subject of that *frui*)
 - (77) - (80): **How** *frui* of humans by humans: *in Domino*
 - (81) - (83): illustration of *frui hominibus in Domino*: **Christ** as way and as end.
- (84) - (85): retrospection and summary
- (86) - (95): *Uti* and *frui* are placed back in the greater whole of *De doctrina christiana*: study of Holy Scripture out of love.

5.2 Schema II: 'sorts' of *uti* and *frui*

- **FRUI** = diligere
 - o frui^1 = Humans enjoy God.
(subject *frui*: humans + object *frui*: God)
 - o frui^1 = Humans enjoy humans.
(subject *frui*: humans + object *frui*: humans)
= *frui homine in Domino*
- **UTI**
 - o uti^1 = God uses humans. = diligere
(subject *uti*: God + object *uti*: humans)
 - o uti^1 = Humans use x.
(subject *uti*: humans)
 - $\text{uti}^{2 \cdot 2}$: x = what may be loved (diligere). = *uti cum dilectione*
 - body
 - himself
 - fellow-man
 - (object *uti*: humans)
 - $\text{uti}^{2 \cdot 2}$: x = what is not allowed to be loved.
= earthly and temporal things
(object *uti*: creatures, except humans)
 - frui^2 and $\text{uti}^{2 \cdot 1}$ are close to each other. (humans as subject and object).

5.3 Schema III: the relations

subject	object	uti or frui	meaning	with dilectio?
God	humans	uti ¹	desinterested	yes
humans	God	frui ¹	only complete in heaven	yes
humans	earthly goods	uti ^{2·2}	in function of frui ¹	NO
humans	humans	uti ^{2·1}	= uti cum dilectione in function of frui ¹	yes
		frui ²	is close to uti ^{2·1} only complete in heaven in function of frui ¹	

6. Bibliography

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