

THE INSEPARABLE CONNECTION OF KNOWLEDGE AND LOVE. GILES OF ROME AND THE PRACTICE OF THEOLOGY¹

The austin friar Giles of Rome (c.1245-1316) must be counted amongst the classical representatives of 13th century scholasticism². Initially his work was almost as frequently quoted as that of Thomas Aquinas. But after one and a half centuries his fame became increasingly limited to the Augustinian Order alone. However, within the Order, where it was defended by representatives of the Schola Augustiniana, Giles' conception of the status of theology maintained its ground.³

In this contribution we wish to elucidate how Giles of Rome occupied a middle ground between his teacher Thomas and the Augustinians⁴ with regard to the integration of knowledge and love in theology. Whereas in Thomas this integration leaves room for a decided emphasis on knowledge and the Augustinians put a distinct emphasis on love, Giles wishes to make this integration an explicit theme.

An investigation of Giles' view demands more than an exposition of what he himself has to say about it.⁵ It cannot do without the views of his contemporaries and predecessors – by means of compa-

¹ We wish to thank Dr. Harm Goris for his critical comments and valuable suggestions.

² E. SAAK, *Aegidius Romanus*, in *Augustine through the ages. An encyclopedia*, ed. A. FITZGERALD. Grand Rapids-Cambridge, 1999, p.14-15. E. SAAK, *High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524* (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 89). Leiden, 2002. J. EASTMAN, *Das Leben des Augustiner-Eremiten Aegidius Romanus*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 100 (1989) 318-339. J. EASTMAN, *Die Werke des Aegidius Romanus*, in *Augustiniana* 44 (1994) 209-231.

³ M. SCHRAMA, *Blondel en de traditie van het ingeschapen verlangen naar God*, in *Bijdragen* 55 (1994) 414-417 and 427-428. M. SCHRAMA, *Theologia affectiva. Traces of monastic theology in the theological prolegomena of Giles of Rome*, in *Bijdragen* 57(1996) 381-404. A. ZUMKELLER, *Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters. Vertreter und philosophische-theologische Lehre*, in *Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964) 167-262. A. ZUMKELLER, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters*, Würzburg 1984.

⁴ Here, by 'Augustinians' we understand theologians of the Augustinian-Franciscan school as well as theologians from the school of St. Victor.

⁵ P. PRASSEL, *Das Theologieverständnis des Ägidius Romanus OESA (1243/47-1316)*, Frankfurt 1983. E. PANELLA (ed), *Il 'De subjecto theologie' (1297-1299) di Remigio de Girolami OP*, Milano 1982. P. NASH, *Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology*, in *Medieval Studies* 18 (1956) 61-92.

rison. This is why we will at first pay some attention to Bonaventure's († 1274), Albert the Great's († 1280) and Henry of Ghent's († 1293) thoughts on this subject-matter. Because from 1269 until 1272, Giles was Thomas Aquinas' student, during the latter's second stay in Paris, his view will only truly receive color when we explicitly contrast his thoughts to those of Thomas.⁶ Furthermore, our research will draw upon the thoughts of medieval Augustinians. Their position will mainly serve to cast a light on Giles' view, Thomas' position will serve as a contrast.

This contribution, then, investigates the relation between love and knowledge in Giles and Thomas. In doing so we would also like to address the question of the status of theology. After all, in the 13th century conceptions of theology, the relation between love and knowledge is explicitly addressed.

The question as to whether theology is a theoretical or practical science, could also arise on the basis of Aristotle's distinction between *theoria* and *praxis*. In it speculative knowledge is distinguished from practical knowledge. Practical knowledge requires *phronesis*, that is to say, prudent rational reflection, and not so much the speculative *intellectus*. When there is talk of a practical science in the 13th century, the emphasis is placed on the unity of thought and action. Whereas speculative science seeks the essence of a thing, practical science is occupied with the question of the significance of knowledge for action. It asks: does this knowledge lead to greater profundity of our spirituality? Do we become more saintly because of it? Does it bring us closer to God? To think in such a manner keeps spiritual life and the study of theology together.⁷

To us, the Augustinians seem to be characterized by a position in which love and knowledge are linked. To be true, love and knowledge are also inextricably linked in Thomas, yet for him the stress is placed on knowledge, whereas the process of knowing culminates in love for the Augustinians. The Augustinian position has three characteristics: the priority they give to theology as a practical science

⁶ J. BEUMER, *Augustinismus und Thomismus in der theologischen Prinzipienlehre des Aegidius Romanus*, in *Scholastik* 32 (1957) 542-560. See also A. ZUMKEL-LER, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung*, p. 14-17.

⁷ In particular the theologians of the Franciscan school developed these thoughts. The Austin friars feared that emphasis on action would be at the expense of God's initiative. They preferred to speak about an affective theology, in which affect was understood as an emotion. In affective theology the initiative for human action lies in the hands of God. He touches mankind; His grace works through affection, and by it mankind is led to act.

rather than to theology as a speculative science; the use made of the creation as a sign indicating God's presence, instead of using argumentation based on statements of analogy. Entailed in the signs as a starting point is a loving invitation, whereas the application of analogy primarily aims at conceptual insight. And third, their Christocentrism: upholding Christ as the example to be imitated, here too permits talk of an inviting love, in which pride keeps mankind away from love, and humility enables mankind to enter into a relationship with God through Christ.

First (1), concerning the integration of knowledge and love in theology, we will with a few strokes outline the opinions of Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Henry of Ghent. There we shall focus on the question how the term 'affect' is addressed in the relation between the practical and the speculative side of theology.

Subsequently (2) in order to be able to determine Giles' position, we will elaborate Thomas' position more thematically while contrasting it to that of the Augustinians. In so doing we shall be led by the distinction between the sign value of the creature on the one hand, and the rationality based on analogy on the other.

Finally (3) we will test Giles' and Thomas' idea on the connection of knowledge and love one more time, by means of their doctrine of the Trinitarian mission; based on the assumption that in their doctrine of mission the two theologians will freely demonstrate to which extent they are serious about the integration of love and knowledge in theology.

1. Some 13th century theologians on the status of theology

In the 13th century a speculative as well as a practical side of the *intellectus* was posited. William of Auxerre (†1231/37) was the first, who, following this line, distinguished a practical and speculative aspect of theology as a science⁸. In order to be able to answer the question how faith could be the foundation of a science, he mainly emphasized the speculative aspect of *intellectus* in faith. Through William's emphasis on the *intellectus speculativus*, the psychological interest for the affective moment of faith disappeared into the background. Willem of Auvergne (†1249) also linked faith with the *intellectus speculativus*. Faith was a sacrifice of the intellect (*sacrificium*

⁸ E. GÖSSMANN, *Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis im Mittelalter* (Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte I, 2b). Freiburg 1971, p.56-58.

intellectus). In order to finally be enlightened, the intellect first had to make a sacrifice, namely to believe.⁹

In contrast, the *Summa Halensis* observed an affective and a speculative aspect in the intellect. Faith is situated in the *intellectus affectivus*. Hereby the desiring, affective moment of faith is emphasized. Affects are further defined more precisely as a rejection of evil and a desire for the good. Genuine theology stimulates these affects. Theology was *secundum affectum pietatis per divinam traditionem*; science was *secundum comprehensionem veritatis per humanam rationem*. According to the *Summa Halensis* the inspiration took place in the *intellectus affectivus*. It made things savory (*sapere*) by destroying the distance between subject and object, and it was in this sense that there was talk of *sapientia*. *Ratiocinatio* took place in the *intellectus speculativus*; it permitted insight, precisely through taking a distance. In this respect the *Summa Halensis* was influenced by Hugh of Saint Victor, who posited a distinction between knowledge as the *causa materialis* of faith, situated in the *intellectus speculativus*, and the *affectio* as the *causa formalis* of faith, situated in the *intellectus practicus*. In the tradition of Hugh of Saint Victor (†1141), the insight of faith was understood as an affective knowledge of the truth of faith and its meaningfulness for mankind. What matters was not the speculative knowledge of truth in itself, but the meaningfulness of that knowledge for mankind.¹⁰

Bonaventure

All three of the above mentioned characteristics of the theology of the Augustinians apply to Bonaventure: Theology as practical science, an in depth elaboration of exemplarism, and a Christ centered directedness. We shall restrict ourselves primarily to the first characteristic.

Theology has a two-fold goal: it directs mankind to contemplation, but primarily to the resolution to become a good human being.¹¹ In order to emphasize the moment of faith in theology, Bonaventure

⁹ *Ibidem*, p.59-62.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.65-72.

¹¹ *Si autem medio modo consideretur ut natus extendi ad affectum, sic perficitur ab habitu medio inter pure speculativam et practicam, qui complectitur utrumque ... unde hic est contemplationis gratia et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen ut boni fiamus*, cited in U. KÖPF, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen 1974, p.203.

quotes the Letter to the Hebrews: *Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo* (11:6). Faith stimulates understanding because it is suitable to move the affects. Thus the statement "Christ died for us on the cross" moves us to love.

In the context of the *causa finalis* of theology Bonaventure asks whether theology has a practical or speculative character.¹² Scripture and theology are not so much aimed at knowledge, but wish to achieve that we become good human beings and, moreover, blessed. The sole goal of Scripture is love. Divine love is aimed at the affect in the will, and not at the intellect. Bonaventure has the tendency to have a higher estimation of the will than of the intellect. The higher one ascends the ladder of spiritual life, the more evidently does the preponderance of the moment of knowledge vanish in favor of the powers of the heart.¹³

Some of his contemporaries assert that 'practical' is said with regard to our own activities, and that theological knowledge is not dependent on the acts of mankind, which is why some call theology speculative.¹⁴ Bonaventure reacts to this opinion by listing three ways in which the perfection of our intellect is increased by scientific knowledge. First, knowledge may remain within itself and aim at nothing else; then it is a *scientia speculativa*. Second, knowledge may have a positive influence on affects; then it is wisdom. The term 'wisdom' bears the connotation of 'knowledge' as well as of 'affect'. Third, knowledge may lead to works; then it is a *scientia practica sive moralis*.

Albert the Great

In his Commentary on the Sentences Albert offers resistance to the opinion that theology coincides with morality. After all, action is not the final aim of Scripture and theology. Theological truth, as truth according to the measure of piety (*veritas secundum pietatem*), cannot

¹² M. SCHRAMA, *Dertiende eeuwse problematiek inzake het statuut van de theologie*, in *Bijdragen* 60 (1999) 249-278.

¹³ H. HEIMSOETH, *Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik*, Darmstadt 1958, p.218-219. O. LOTTIN, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, Louvain-Gembloux 1948, II, p.203-210.

¹⁴ III Sent d.23, art.1, q.2. J. FRIEDERICH, *Die Theologie als spekulative und praktische Wissenschaft nach Bonaventura und Thomas von Aquin*, Bonn 1940. E. DREYER, *Affectus in Saint Bonaventure's description of the journey of the soul to God*, Milwaukee 1983. F. SIROVIC, *Der Begriff 'Affectus' und die Willenslehre beim heiligen Bonaventura. Eine analytisch-synthetische Untersuchung*, Mödling bei Wien 1965.

be separated from the good. After all it is not only received by the intellect, but also by the affective capacity. And therefore one may call theology a *scientia affectiva*.¹⁵

In his *Summa*, however, Albert speaks about theological knowledge as practical knowledge, because that knowledge is warranted by the works of mankind. It is here that he raises the question as to the practical or speculative character of theology, but he does so in a discussion of the *causa materialis*. Therefore he makes the character of theology dependent on its object, and not on its aim. Most of the other theologians of his time deal with this question in the context of the *causa finalis*.

Albert bases his opinions on the practical character of theological knowledge on the assertion that theology is knowledge of the truth rooted in piety (Tit. 1,1). He enforces this word of Scripture with a text from the letter of James (1,25). Theological knowledge, after all, is a truth that appeals to the affects in mankind. And by this piety is nourished. At the same time it is a truth that incites good works. Even though some are of the opinion that theology is concerned with speculative knowledge, because Holy Scripture is also about God and divine works, and because mankind does not search the Scriptures for its own work but for truth as the work of God, Albert defends the opinion that theology does not seek truth as truth, but as what saves the soul. And affect (piety) and action (morality) are always involved in the way of salvation.

Ultimately Albert considers theology to be a practical science. It is concerned with the works of the virtues, cardinal as well as theological. For whatever reason the truth is sought – whether it is for utility or for enjoyment – love, as an affect, is always involved. In faith, however, one enjoys the highest truth by means of the *intellectus affectivus*. The *intellectus affectivus* plays a role here on earth, in the hope of salvation, as well as in heaven, where man has attained the actual state of salvation. It is only by means of the affect of love that the highest good can be enjoyed.

The *intellectus affectivus* is aimed at the work towards the external. Albert situates the act of faith in this faculty. Faith is a light that does not take distance from truth but leads to it. Faith does not borrow its certainty from the principles of rationality, but from the light of faith itself, which, being equivalent to the first truth, opens the eyes to that first truth. To hear the content of faith is the work of man-

¹⁵ KÖPF, *Die Anfänge*, p.197-204. *Ista scientia proprie est affectiva, id est veritatis, quae non sequestratur a ratione boni, ibidem*, p.201.

kind, to assent to it is the work of the Holy Spirit. The truth of faith cannot be proven by means of demonstration, for there is no room for demonstration in faith. Every demonstration, every proof, after all, compels assent, whereas faith demands a voluntary surrender. This is correlated to Albert's opinion that theology must be accessible for all of mankind, because it is necessary for salvation. And this is why demonstrations and proofs must not be predominant in theology. It can, however, have proofs at its disposal so as to convince heretics that they are in the wrong.¹⁶ It is worthy of note, that for his model of knowledge Albert makes use of the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, but that he uses the Neo-platonic doctrine of illumination for his model of faith.¹⁷

Henry of Ghent

Henry was the first to make a clear distinction between what Aristotle said himself and what was asserted by the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes.¹⁸ At the same time, however, this constituted an attack on the so-called high-scholastic synthesis of *fides* and *ratio*. Doubt concerning the possibility of a successful synthesis between theology and the Aristotelian doctrine of science grew among theologians. In many points of their theological doctrine of the sciences Henry and Giles of Rome already anticipated the theologians of the 14th century. Henry, like Giles, addressed the status of theology in great detail, doing so in his treatment of the *causa finalis*.

A science demands a unity of goals. This is why it may have only one qualification. Some regard theology as a practical science, because it has as its aim that men become good men. Henry considers theology to be partially of a practical, partially of a speculative nature, because it intends the *bonitas morum* as well as the *veritas fidei*. But there may only be one primary goal under which all other goals are subsumed and according to which they are ordered. Henry subsumes the practical aim to the speculative one, just as in general the *vita*

¹⁶ ... ut quasi exemplariter rusticam instrueret contionem, KÖPF, *Die Anfänge*, p.168. M. GRABMANN, *De theologia et scientia argumentativa secundum S.Albertum et S.Thomam*, in *Angelicum* 14 (1937) 39-60.

¹⁷ GÖSSMANN, *Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis*, p.88-95.

¹⁸ E. DWYER, *Die Wissenschaftslehre Heinrichs von Gent*, Würzburg 1933. J. BROWN, *Sensation in Henry of Ghent. A late medieval aristotelian-augustinian synthesis*, in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 53 (1971) 238-266. G. DANNEELS, *La foi dans la doctrine d'Henri de Gand*, Roma 1961.

activa is situated below the *vita contemplativa*. Knowledge of the truth in itself is better than the bringing about of the good by works. After all, one is only in a position to do the good once the eye has been cleansed.¹⁹

In spite of Henry's predilection for the speculative content of theology, the will still takes precedence above the intellect. The *quaestiones quodlibetales*²⁰ of the period bear witness to the fact that the question of precedence of the faculties was much debated. In Henry the dynamism of the will gains new momentum. True spontaneity lies in the will.²¹ The starting point is no longer the object of the will, but the willing self. Only the active will is truly free; the intellect, which is in fact dependent on the object of knowledge, is not. Some say that the intellect is the highest faculty of man. They take recourse to Augustine: "Undoubtedly in acts the contemplation, which resides in the intellect, gives guidance to the will."²² As a counter-argument Henry brings forward, that the will not only moves another, but also itself. To be true, the contemplative life is guided by speculative reason that is higher than practical reason (by which the active life is guided) – but both forms of life are ultimately guided by the will, which stands above both.

Henry evaluates the primacy of the faculties according to the fruits they bear. These are *habitus* and act. The object upon which an act is directed also plays a role. If these three enjoy primacy, the faculty from which they arise also enjoys primacy. In the case of the *habitus*: the *habitus* of love is a *habitus* of the will which stands above the *habitus* of wisdom which is a *habitus* of the intellect: 'Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity ...' (1 Cor 13,1). The act too, namely the willing or the loving, stands above knowing. It is the will that orders reason to think and to reason whenever and about whatever it so wishes.

The will attains perfection in the thing loved, the intellect, in contrast, in that which is understood. The will moves to that which is desired, the intellect draws what is understood towards itself. It is much more perfect to be transformed into the good as it is in itself,

¹⁹ KÖPF, *Die Anfänge*, p.94, 215-217.

²⁰ P. GLORIEUX, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, Paris 1925, p.97-349.

²¹ F. RUELO, *Les fondements de la liberté humaine selon Jacques de Viterbe OESA*, Disputatio prima de Quolibet, q. VII (1293), in *Augustiniana* 24 (1974) 283-347 and 25 (1975) 114-142.

²² *Contra Faustum* 22 (PL 42,412ss.).

than to become like the true to the extent that the true is understood. On top of that the object of the will – the good in itself – has the status of the ultimate goal. Whereas the object of understanding – the true to the extent that it has been understood – has the status of a relative good. It is, after all, a good to the extent that the intellect is able to grasp it. Hence the intellect is placed below the will.²³

2. Knowledge in the service of love

From the above it has become clear that in the 13th century some theologians looked for some form of integration of knowledge and love in theology, whereby Henry of Ghent's attempt is chronologically closest to that of Giles. We shall now direct our attention to the difference between Thomas and the Augustinians with regard to the status of theology, so as to be able to determine Giles' position more closely.

The concept of theology of the Augustinians²⁴, as inspired by Augustine, is developed with the strong awareness that the human being is a *viator*, a man on the road, mainly concerned with covering the way and the attainment of his goal. Their concept of theology has two characteristics. First, their theology is designated as a *scientia practica*: thinking is immediately connected with experience and action, with piety and ethics. Second, the sign is of importance in theology. All created things are considered to be signs referring to the divine.

Thomas, on the contrary, perceives of theology as a *scientia speculativa*²⁵. He is the first to shift the emphasis to *intellectus affectivus*, *pietas*, and *sapientia*. He sees theology as *sapientia* but then in the Aristotelian sense of the term: knowledge of the highest causes. In contrast to the theologians who preceded him, he sees the content of faith mainly as *verum*. This *verum* is the object of the *intellectus speculativus*, and not of the *intellectus practicus* or *affectivus*.²⁶ With his theology Thomas wishes to obtain the contents of knowledge, and

²³ Quodlibet I, q.14. R. MACKEN, *Heinrich von Gent im Gespräch mit seinen Zeitgenossen über die menschliche Freiheit*, in *Franziskanische Studien* 59 (1977) 125-182.

²⁴ See above, footnote 4.

²⁵ M.GRABMANN, *De quaestione Utrum theologia sit scientia speculativa an practica*, a B.Alberto et S.Thoma pertracta, in *Atti della Settimana Albertina*. Roma, 1931, p.107-126.

²⁶ GÖSSMANN, *Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis*, p.96-108.

he primarily attaches importance to the unfolding of the contents of the knowledge of faith.²⁷ In Thomas' theology analogy, instead of the sign, will become a significant factor.

Analogy²⁸

An example of analogy is provided in the proposition: 'God is wise and the creature is wise'. Here wisdom is attributed both to God and the creature. There is a unity of terms. But what kind of unity is at play here? Certainly not univocity (*univocitas*) because then, the same term, attributed to different things, has the same conceptual content. Because of the difference between God and creature, however, this cannot be the case. Neither are we dealing with complete equivocity (*aequivocitas*), because then the same term does not refer to the same conceptual content when denominating things that are different from one another, on the contrary, in spite of the use of the same term the conceptual contents are completely different. However, there also exists a unity of terms in which mutually different things are referred to with the same term, without there being talk of univocity or pure equivocity: analogy. Analogy is a way of speaking in which a displacement of the content of the meaning takes place, while an affinity of meaning remains preserved. In this way we may speak of 'healthy food', 'a healthy man' and 'healthy urine'. In each case the same word 'healthy' is used in a different way.

If we say of God that He is wise, according to Thomas, this applies in a first instance (*per prius*) to God and only in a second instance (*per posterius*) to the creatures, because God is the origin of the perfection that we ascribe to Him, with words borrowed from creatures, on the basis of our observation of creatures. God's wisdom is the *analogans*, the wisdom of the creatures the *analogatum*.²⁹ Because we assign names to God on the basis of perfection as we

²⁷ According to Thomas the act of faith is an 'actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam', *Summa Theologiae* IIaIIae, q.2, art.9. M. GRABMANN, *Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin*, Freiburg 1948. J. BEUMER, *Thomas von Aquin zum Wesen der Theologie*, in *Scholastik* 30 (1955) 195-214.

²⁸ S. PARK, *Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von Aquin, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Analogie*, Leiden 1999, chapter 5.

²⁹ J. WISSINK, *Thomas van Aquino. De actuele betekenis van zijn theologie*, Zoetermeer 1998, p.82-83. H. RIKHOF, *Over God spreken. Een tekst van Thomas van Aquino uit de Summa Theologiae*, Delft 1988.

encounter it in creation, we have to be aware of the fact that the difference is always greater than the similitude.³⁰ And that we know better what He is not, than what He is indeed.

In Thomas we read: "If, for example, the word 'wise' is said of a human being, we mean a perfection that differs from the essence of that human being and from its power and its being and all of those matters. But if we use this word for God, we do not want to indicate anything that is different from his essence, power or being. Therefore, if we use the word 'wise' for a human being, it circumscribes and encapsulates in one or other manner the thing indicated. But this is not the case when it is used for God, then the word leaves the indicated thing behind as something that is not understood, and that goes beyond the meaning of the word."³¹

Analogy is thus concerned with likeness, not equality. Because if God and creature would differ from one another in all respects, the human being would never be able to attain any knowledge of God. An utter difference would never permit any relation between God and creature. For the believer there exists a communal something, a similarity, even a similarity in imitation, a *similitudo imitationis*, between God and creature. While similitude plays an important role in the normal process of knowledge since the knower becomes similar to the known via the likeness of the known, in the knowledge of God, the knower only becomes like God in a certain sense. Because here is the difference always greater than any likeness.

Hence there is a moment of negative theology in Thomas, even if he situates this negative moment differently from Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite.³² God is not merely called good because He is the origin of created goodness, such as is the case in Pseudo-Dionysius, but He is called good because He is good, and that in an eminent way. The goal Thomas wants to achieve by the concept of *analogia*, is primarily to draw attention to the limits of human language, such as to thereby escape from the danger of wrong interpretations.³³

³⁰ Summa Theologiae, I, q.13, art.5. Vgl. Conc. Lat. IV: ... quia inter creatorem et creaturam non potest similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda, Denzinger (1963), p.262, nr.806.

³¹ Summa Theologiae, I, q.13, art.5 (RIKHOF, *Over God spreken*, p.69).

³² W. HOYE, *Die Unerkennbarkeit Gottes als die letzte Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin*, in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 19 (Berlin 1988), p.117-139.

³³ Das Ziel, das er mit dem Begriff *analogia* ... erreichen will, ist vor allem auf die Grenze der menschlichen Sprache aufmerksam zu machen und den Gefahren zu entgehen, die durch unzuverlässige Verwendungen oder Interpretationen der göttlichen Attribute entstehen können, PARK, *Die Rezeption*, p.451.

In Thomas there are three steps in the process of the knowledge of God. 1. It starts from the perfections in creation, the *via causalitatis*. 2. But because imperfections are implied in the perfections of the creatures, Thomas points out that these imperfections must be eliminated from our talk about God, the *via negationis*. 3. Finally the *via eminentiae* is applied: All the perfections a creature possesses as distinct parts, God possesses in unity. Not only does God possess perfections to the highest degree, beyond that, He possesses them in unity. Therefore, in Him, righteousness, goodness and wisdom are not actually distinguished.

Whereas the Augustinians simply took their starting point in the visible as a sign for the invisible, Thomas distinguishes signs. There are words that refer to material matters, and words that refer to non-material things. Words of the first category, such as rock, cloud, etc., undoubtedly have a referential function in the language of the Scriptures. Words of the second category, such as righteousness, wisdom etc., are suitable, more than those of the first, to reveal something about God. One gets the impression that, in order to be able to come to know God more methodically and pointedly, Thomas uses analogy so as to curb the unchecked growth invoked by the interpretation of metaphors.

The Augustinians on *ratio* and *intellectus*

Whereas knowledge in theology is of importance in Thomas, the great preoccupation of the Augustinians with love as the goal of theology causes them to consider theological knowledge in and by itself to be of no decisive import for Christians. They were impressed by the fact that it was ultimately not knowledge but love that disclosed the way to salvation. Theological knowledge was only considered valuable in so far as it was of service to love, as in Augustine's adage: No one becomes known to you, except through friendship.³⁴

To be true, in their theology the Augustinians also had an interest in truth, but according to them it was theology's ultimate task to cast light on this truth from the perspective of the good. For mankind is on the way, with the good as its goal and love as its engine. The function of knowledge is to point love along the right path. Therefore the Augustinians described their concept of theology as a *scientia*

³⁴ Nemo cognoscitur nisi per amicitiam, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q.71,5.

practica, since for them piety and ethics were more important than the results of speculative thought.³⁵

Thomas defends the thought that words, borrowed from the created order, can be applied to a more eminent order, that of the uncreated, by means of analogy. But the application of analogy on that point was not at all evident for the Augustinians. Did they then deny that lesser things could teach men something about higher things? In as much as they considered such a process to be at all possible, they were of the opinion that there one had to pursue another path, and not that of analogy.

According to them, the material things, ascertained by men in their presence and quiddity by means of the senses, can never constitute an adequate source of knowledge of the spiritual. After all the spirit transcends matter. Formally there is no bridge between them. This is why analogy cannot play a part in Augustinian theology. However, herewith is not claimed that the material and visible is completely banned from their theology. The material and visible was examined by *ratio*, whereas *intellectus* concerned itself with spiritual values as laid down in Scripture and decrees of faith. Formally, therefore, the *ratio* could not contribute to the insights of the *intellectus*. It was the *intellectus* which uncovered spiritual values, assisted by the special, internally experienced, light of the Holy Spirit. This did not take away from the fact that because of its knowledge of the creature, the *ratio* did play an important role in the theology of the Augustinians, namely as a stimulus of the proper function of the *intellectus*. Because to the extent spiritual values were expressed in the visible, it was the *ratio* that with its knowledge offered the material for the awakening of the knowledge of the *intellectus*. To the extent that the visible was a sign of the invisible, the visible also had a high significance in the theology of the Augustinians.

Therefore, in spite of the fundamental difference between *intellectus* and *ratio* that existed for them, the Augustinians were also able to assign a place to the material and visible in their theological thought. One may describe their concept of theology as being a science of man on the way to God, in service of love, in the light of the Holy Spirit, constituted by revelation and nourished by the perception of the creature as a sign and image of the Creator; whereas theology as a science is in the service of love, not as *scientia speculativa* but as *scientia practica*.

³⁵ SCHRAMA, *Dertiende eeuwse problematiek*, p. 267-268.

In the last quarter of the 13th century, as the faculties of will and intellect come to be more strictly distinguished, a sharper distinction between the functions of the will and the intellect is also developed. Science is then perceived as a function of the intellect. For 'science' to be 'in service of the will' from then on, means that a function of the intellect enters into a relation with a function of the will. The term 'relation' already implies that both functions exist separate from one another. According to this view, a science that out of itself integrates love, has become less self-evident. The functions of the intellect stand, after all, apart from the complex of functions of the will.

Because for the Augustinians theology was a science which ought to be at service of love, theological science also had to be linked to love in an integral fashion, such that both could exercise the same function together: something is after all only truly known by means of love. For the Augustinians, the central moment of theological knowledge as knowledge of spiritual values, was then the moment in which spiritual values were recognized lovingly. This idea is typical for Augustine and the Augustinians. Knowledge, according to them, had to pass through the heart to be truly knowledge. If known things had not been tasted and recognized, then they were not truly known. Consequently, something was only truly known by wisdom, for to recognize something meant to savor its quality: to taste it, value it, enjoy it.³⁶ We can then describe the concept of theology of the Augustinians that we have just formulated more poignantly in view of the integration of knowledge and love: To be serviceable to love may be elucidated by the term 'integration'.³⁷

In the framework of this concept of theology, the term *scientia practica*, was then used to indicate the knowledge proper to theology. However, at the end of the 13th century a number of theologians appear to have difficulty with this term. The theologians of the Augustinian Order, for example, opt for the term *scientia affectiva*. Even though they were not the first to introduce this term into theological discourse – Albert the Great and others had already used the term, and it even occurs in the *Summa Halensis* – they preferred to make use of it, and did so for principal reasons. It was their answer to the problem of how the will functioned. This problem arose under the influence of the condemnation of the heterodox Aristotelianism by Etienne Tempier in

³⁶ M. SCHRAMA, *Sint Bonaventura over de zeven geestesgaven*, in *Communio* 18 (1993) 359-372.

³⁷ Theology then, is the science of man on the way to God, in which love is integrated, in the light of the Holy Spirit, constituted by revelation and nourished by the perception of the creature as a sign and image of the Creator.

1277. According to the austin friar James of Viterbo (†1308), for example, the will was capable of more than mere choice amongst the objects presented to it. In its striving the will was assisted by an affective faculty that belonged to the will and on the basis of which the will was moved by itself. This contradicted the Aristotelian position that everything could only be moved by something other to itself.³⁸

In Augustine the will is identified with love and its capacity, apart from choice, also consisted of desire and of being affected. Heimsoeth has provided a sketch of the development of the thought on will and intellect in the West. In antiquity with the Greeks, intellect is the choosing and deliberating faculty. The attainment of intellectual insight is therefore the highest goal of the human being. Separate attention for the divine will arises out of the theological contention concerning the dynamism and energy of God. It is Augustine who finds a new expression for this altered attention for intellect and will. He determines the human will on the basis of the problem of evil. Conversion is a matter of the will. Everything that I do as a person, even my spontaneous behavior, is in essence an activity of the will. The dynamism of the will is alive in affects in particular. Also knowledge on all levels is dependent on the will. Rather than to love what one knows well, one seeks to know well what one lovingly leans towards.

Continuing this line the Victorines looked for a new way. To love is more original than to understand. To want eternal salvation is a desire that is exalted far above any mundane love.³⁹ Thomas, however, returns to Aristotle. Concerning the question which of the two faculties is the higher, Thomas mostly decides in favor of the intellect. The intellect is to be understood as the principle of spiritual life because it stands aloof from what is merely temporal. The intellect is

³⁸ RUELLO, *Les fondements*, 24 (1974) 318-347 and 25 (1975) 138-142. LOTTIN, *Psychologie et morale*, I, p.11-389.

When we compare the anthropological triad *memoria*, *intellectus* and *voluntas* in Augustine with the triad understanding, will and emotion as it became current in modernity, than it appears that *voluntas* has split in two into will and emotion. It would be worth the effort to investigate to which extent the reception of Aristotle on the capacities of the soul has influenced the 13th century doctrine of virtues; and whether there exists any connection between the predilection of medieval austin friars for the *theologica affectiva* and the mentioned splitting in two, see B. KENT, *Virtues of the will. The transformation of ethics in the late thirteenth century*. Washington, 1995.

³⁹ J. TAYLOR, *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor*, New York 1961 (reprint 1991), p.34-36.

able to impose a higher purpose on the will. The will is *appetitus intellectivus*. Even in the affect, Thomas puts the moment of the understanding of good or evil, into the foreground as a trait of knowledge. The intellect is the proper ground of human freedom. The intellect moves the will: *intellectus altior et prior voluntate*. In this manner truth comes to stand above the good. Only through participation in truth is the good a good.⁴⁰

Thomas on *ratio* and *intellectus*

Giles of Rome is indeed a student of Thomas, but in the case of the status of theology their opinions for a large part do not run parallel to one another. Thomas has distanced himself from the opinions of the Augustinians. Thomas' theology is characterized by two matters: First, in his theological thought the *ratio* has received its very own function.⁴¹ Second, by virtue of being knowledge, Thomas ascribes to theological knowledge an unconditional goodness.

Concerning the first characteristic, Thomas does not distinguish *intellectus* and *ratio* according to the object of knowledge, but according to the process of knowing. The *ratio* is discursive, reasons, moves, it is what begins and ends with *intellectus* as insight. According to Thomas the *ratio* can make an essential contribution to the *intellectus* that intuites spiritual reality. This process of knowing had been rejected by the Augustinians because of their spiritually determined epistemology, based on the special mode of working of the *intellectus*. Because the lower could never formally cause the higher to know something, Thomas' vision would never have found acceptance among Augustinians.

Thomas bases his view on the insight that in analogy the *praedicare eminenter* does not exclude the *praedicare formaliter*. According to Thomas it is not the case that the *via negationis* and the *via eminentiae* render all our propositions about God false, they merely indicate that these propositions are imperfect.⁴² Because with the help

⁴⁰ HEIMSOETH, *Die sechs grossen Themen*, p.210-216.

⁴¹ Differt autem ratio ab intellectu sicut multitudo ab unitate, In Boethii De Trinitate q.6, art.1, sol.3. M. CHENU, *La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle*, Paris 1957, p.91.

⁴² ... sed hoc quod in modo significandi importetur aliqua imperfectio, quae Deo non competit, non facit praedicationem esse falsam vel impropriam, sed imperfectam, I Sent., d.22, q.1, a.2 ad 4. Intellectus noster deficit a cognitione divinae majestatis, similiter etiam et enuntiatio deficit a significatione perfecta; nihilominus tamen est veritas, I Sent., d.4, q.2, a.1 ad 1.

of the *via negationis*, Thomas points out, that, even if any concept taken from what has been created is applied to God, this concept remains inseparably linked to the imperfections of the created. Whereas they do indeed qualify the concept when it is said of God, neither the *via negationis* nor the *via eminentiae* elevate the concept. After all, with help from Aristotle, Thomas makes a distinction between the *forma* and the existence (*forma dat esse*) of the creature.

Because of the restrictions attached to the coming into being of a thing, Thomas will not simply transfer the concepts borrowed from a created thing to transcendent reality, but he is obliged to assign these concepts to transcendent reality under the precondition of the *eminenter*. Because *forma* remains itself, this assignation is at the same time *formaliter*. This insight that the *praedicare eminenter* of concepts borrowed from the visible world, does not exclude the *praedicare formaliter*, creates space for *ratio* to play a very particular function in theological thinking.

In Thomas the *ratio* receives the task to cooperate in penetrating into theological data, and this in an immediate way, namely by investigating visible things as to their *forma*. When, according to the Augustinians, the *ratio* had the task to evoke, on behalf of the *intellectus*, the visible creature in its being-image-and-sign of transcendental reality, without immediately and formally serving the insight of the *intellectus*; in Thomas, the *ratio* serves to investigate the creature as to its *forma* and thereby to contribute immediately and formally to the knowledge of spiritual realities. The recognition of the inestimable significance of the formal, allows theological knowledge to contribute to a powerful intellectual construction, in which all the knowable, all of reality, all of creation and the economy of salvation is united in one whole.

Theological knowledge as unconditional goodness

Concerning the second characteristic, we claimed that according to Thomas theological knowledge is already part of unconditional goodness in and of itself. This entails that theological knowledge does not merely have value to the extent that it is in the service of love – the starting point of the Augustinians – but, furthermore, that it represents a value in and of itself. Theological knowledge in itself contributes to the goodness of humankind, because the perfection of humankind lies in knowledge. Tracing the development of this perspective will also explain it.

If we direct our gaze to Bonaventure, it appears that he too – even if probably as a concession to the spirit of the times – assigns its own goodness to theological knowledge, but under the condition that it remain connected to love.⁴³ To the extent that love that knows, is already an imperfect realization of the later perfect state of man, it entails a two-fold recognition: on the one hand man is still on the road, on the other hand, he is however already in the vicinity of his fatherland. Herewith Bonaventure strikes a note, which had hitherto not been heard in theology.

Thomas adopts Bonaventure's view concerning this 'now and later' but links it to his own concept of theology – to be true he does not link it with Bonaventure's concept of theology in which knowledge and love now already constitute the later to be attained final state, albeit in a so far imperfect manner. Thomas then, links Bonaventure's idea of the present and the hereafter to his own concept of theology. He comes to the conclusion that the intellectual possession of the world-order signifies participation – already now – in what men will later know to the full, namely God's creative wisdom. And it is in this manner that, as an advance on eternal happiness, goodness is assigned to theological knowledge in itself. When the intellectual reconstruction of the world-order – albeit piecemeal – grants us God's wisdom as a spiritual possession, the goodness of theological knowledge exists, in fact, without any precondition and is not dependent on anything. Such knowledge is sufficient to realize goodness in and out of itself. Thus, having its own dynamism and its own completion, theological knowledge threatens to become separated from love. Theological knowledge becomes a magnitude in and of itself. Therefore Thomas also does not find it necessary that theological statements are verified by ethics.⁴⁴

Herewith theology has become the spiritual possession of the world-order that is to be seized intellectually. As *scientia speculativa* it is mainly a structure of knowledge, and as such, in itself an unconditional good, although it can enter into a relationship with love and thereby become *scientia practica*, but such a bond is not at all self-evident. In a discussion of the *missiones* we will see that Thomas does, however, presuppose it.

⁴³ According to Albert, theology, like the other sciences, knows a distinction between the true and the good. But it is distinguished from the other sciences by furthermore knowing a truth that cannot be separated from the good. This truth is not only received by understanding but also by the affect, KÖPF, *Die Anfänge*, p.201.

⁴⁴ ... es ist auffällig, dass Thomas hier wie in anderem Zusammenhang ... nicht zu der von den Franziskanern so ausführlich vorgetragenen Beschreibung der Verifikationsweisen Stellung nimmt, KÖPF, *Die Anfänge*, p.207.

Giles' middle ground

Thomas' view thus completely breaks through the traditional opinions of the Augustinians. The intellective structure of Thomas' theology stands in sharp contrast to the affective-voluntative tendency of the theology of the Augustinians. Thomas investigates reality *simpliciter sub ratione formali*, the Augustinians investigate it *sub ratione boni et finis*. The visible has a formal significance in theological thought according to Thomas, for the Augustinians the visible has significance as image and symbol. Thomas' theology delivers knowledge as a value in and of itself that entails goodness per se. The theology of the Augustinians permits a knowledge that only has value within love. In their work knowledge and love are explicitly integrated into a whole.⁴⁵

Giles' opinions occupy a middle ground between the theology of the Augustinians and Thomas'. Even though Thomas' thought has not been without influence on him, in its most essential inspiration his theology builds upon the tradition of the Augustinians. Undoubtedly this may be called astonishing, since Thomas' thought singed Giles' feet, as it were. After all, in Paris he was his disciple for a number of years. In view of Giles' independent and personal treatment of theological subjects only one explanation can be forwarded for his stance: on the basis of his own starting point he only wished to adopt Thomas' opinions after some adjustment.⁴⁶

Because Giles judged the concept of theology of the Augustinians to be the most correct, in light of Thomas' contrasting view, he had to reflect on the Augustinian standpoint very consciously. His reflections had a double effect. Because of Giles' thoughts, the Augustinian position gained in focus, because the scientific character of theology, as defended by Thomas, received more attention. Giles followed the positions of the Augustinians very consciously and thoughtfully, without dismissing the value of Thomas' view. Herein consisted his significance for later theologians.⁴⁷

We may conclude provisionally that the difference between Giles' and Thomas' approaches is mainly a difference in attention. To

⁴⁵ HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, Prol. (PL 176,183v).

⁴⁶ Die allgemeine Wissenschaftslehre betreffend sind Aristoteles bzw. Thomas von Aquin die Autoritäten für Ägidius. Geht es aber um das 'Theologische' der Theologie, folgt Ägidius eher Augustinus und in dessen Gefolgschaft Hugo von Sankt Viktor und Bonaventura, PRASSEL, *Das Theologieverständnis*, p.113.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p.36-37, 135.

be true Thomas presupposes the integration of knowledge and love, but because his discussion with the Aristotelian concept of science forced upon him by his time, this presupposition is not clearly expressed at the beginning of the *Summa Theologiae*. Instead of paying more attention to the image and sign character of creation, analogy comes to play its part; instead of the split between *ratio* and *intellect* Thomas postulates a close cooperation between them; instead of looking at the world and all the things in it as a poem about God, Thomas precisely wants to make a distinction between metaphorical and literal God-talk, and investigate all the logical implications of the latter. Thomas makes it clear how talking about God demands its own precision. While Giles will not deny that precision, he moreover has the express intention to emphasize the integration of knowledge and love in his theology. For this purpose he intentionally chooses to allow himself to be inspired by the tradition of the Augustinians. And therefore he occupies his own position between Thomas and the Augustinians.

3. The *missiones*

Giles perceives the human being as an integral living being, to the extent that it consciously seeks and strives after perfection. The life of men on earth is a dynamic life directed toward God. If this dynamism is retarded, men are dead alive. According to Giles theology too belongs to this dynamism. Hence his opinion that theologizing is a conscious desire and striving for God as the highest good of man. With this he adopts the essential characteristics of the theology of the Augustinians, in which knowledge was always integrally interwoven with love. When Giles describes the aim of theology as *cognoscere Deum intendimus ut nostrum restauratorem et glorificatorem ... prout est salus nostra et finis nostrae glorificationis*⁴⁸ this Augustinian inspiration raises the strong suspicion that the *cognoscere Deum* for him has to do with life itself, and hence presupposes the indissoluble connection between love and knowledge.

In order to clarify this indissoluble connection we must pay closer consideration to Giles' thoughts on the *missiones invisibiles*, the invisible mission of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. In his thinking about the place of the practice of theology in spiritual life Giles

⁴⁸ I Sent., Prol., q.1, art.3; II Sent., d.21, q.1, art.1, dub.2.

appears to be led by the experience of the deep mystery that the life of man's spirit is a reflection of the life of the trinity.⁴⁹

In his Commentary on the Sentences Giles speaks of knowing and willing in the spiritual life of the pious, and contrasts it to the willing and knowing in the life of the impious.⁵⁰ These reflections do not deal with the willing and knowing of man in general, but about the particular situation of the knowing and willing of the believing and pious man. It is this knowing and willing which, according to Giles, lies at the basis of the practice of theology.⁵¹ The pious – in this case not only specialized theologians – are those who lead a spiritual life. Their willing and thinking, their desire and reflection are in fact a form of theology.

God is the life of the soul.⁵² He calls man to his divine life. Not only does He call man, He also effects man's answer to this call. It is the triune God Who calls and moves to answer. In the one God Giles always perceives the trinitarian character: it is the triune God Who effects the salvation of mankind. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are each involved in effecting salvation without any detriment to God's unity. Being as God one and three, however, externally (*ad extra*), the three divine persons work inseparably from one another. And therefore they also work inseparably in the spirit of the human being.⁵³

Giles comes to address the external works of the Trinity explicitly when he deals with the *missiones*. In dist. 15 of his Commentary on the Liber I Sententiarum of Peter Lombard he discusses the *missiones invisibiles* of the Holy Spirit, and in dist. 16 the *missiones visibiles*.⁵⁴ For our purposes a reflection on dist. 15 will suffice. It

⁴⁹ M. SCHMAUS, *Zur Geistlehre des Aegidius Romanus*, in *Scientia Augustiniana*, Festschrift A. Zumkeller. Würzburg 1975, p.200-213.

⁵⁰ Quia videmus aliquos illuminatos secundum intellectum, depravatos secundum voluntatem, et aliquos bonos et devotos non industres, nec habentes donum scientiae, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art.2. C. LUNA, *Theologie und menschliche Wissenschaften in den principia des Aegidius Romanus*, in *Scientia und Ars im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter*, Berlin 1994, II, p.528-547.

⁵¹ Nam sicut est in vita politica, sic suo modo in spirituali ... sic etiam suo modo est et in vita spirituali. Nam licet mali homines ..., I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art 2; see below, footnote 55.

⁵² F. STAMMKÖTTER, *Der Konflikt zwischen aristotelischer und augustinischer Ethik bei Ägidius von Rom und Gregor von Rimini*, in *Analecta Augustiniana* 59 (1996) 300-301.

⁵³ C. LUNA, *Théologie trinitaire et prédication dans les sermons de Gilles de Rome*, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 58 (1991) 99-195.

⁵⁴ The *missio visibilis* of the Son is discussed in III Sent. that deals with the incarnation.

consists of two parts. In the first part questions are asked concerning the sending of the Holy Spirit in general: Is there a mission in God; does it belong to the divine essence or to the divine relations; is it property of all three persons in the Trinity to be sent or to send; does one divine person send itself; does the Holy Spirit send the Son? In the second part the emphasis lies on the sending of the Son: is it a property of the Son to be sent; can the sending of the Son be separated from the sending of the Holy Spirit; can the sending of the Son be called 'eternal', is the Son also sent to non-rational creatures; after the incarnation, is the sending of the Son fuller and more intensive; can the soul become separated from the human body due to the sending of one of the divine persons?

If God calls the human being to divine life, and therefore to divine knowledge and divine love, then the life of the human being is divine to the extent that it consists in God. This implies that the knowledge in question is not effected by the powers proper to the human being, but that it has to be effected by the Son; the same applies for the love of the Holy Spirit. This is precisely why Son and Spirit were sent to man; so that the knowledge and love of the good human being that ascends to God may find its ground and existence in the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit.⁵⁵ But just as, on account of the divine persons indwelling in one another, the Son is inseparably linked with the Holy Spirit, likewise knowledge and love, as fruits and end-terms of the divine missions, are inseparably linked with one another in the human being, blessed by this two-fold mission.⁵⁶

This originally divine knowledge and love may occur in the human being in two states. For the human being may still be on the road, or may already have arrived in the fatherland. If the human

⁵⁵ Nam licet mali homines aliquam cognitionem astrorum vel aliorum habere possint, cognitionem tamen illam, secundum quam mittitur Filius, habere non valent. Est enim ista cognitio, ut Deum tamquam finem ultimum cognoscamus. Sed ille apprehendit aliquid ut finem, in quo finem suum constituit, et ratione cuius alia operatur. Et quia mali homines finem suum ponunt in creatura, non in Deo – propter quod fruuntur utēdis et utuntur fruēdis, in quo est tota perversitas – ignorantes dici debent, et cognitione, secundum quam mittitur Filius, sunt privati, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art.2.

⁵⁶ Et sicut missio Filii nunquam est sine missione Spiritus Sancti, sic nec e converso. Nam licet boni homines in cognitione astrorum et in aliis curiositatibus non sint docti, in cognitione tamen Dei sub ratione finis, secundum quem omnia agunt, docti sunt. Nam qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt, et quia secundum talem cognitionem Dei, secundum quam ipsum constituimus ut finem nostrorum agendorum, mittitur Filius, quam cognitionem habent quantumcunque simplices, si sunt boni, cum constituunt sibi Deum ut finem omnium agendorum, nunquam est missio Spiritus absque missione Filii, nec e converso, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art.2.

being already dwells in the heavenly fatherland, then its knowledge and love go out to God as the property of the human being. If the human being is still on the way to God as a pilgrim on earth, then knowledge and love go out to God as the aim of the human being. The activity of mission is adapted according to the state of the human being. In the fatherland the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit cause man to behold and enjoy God, whereas during our earthly exile the missions are granted in order to lead man to God in a well-directed fashion.

The knowledge of God and the love of God therefore exist on the basis of the mission of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit. And just as the missions themselves are intrinsically linked to one another, their end-terms, the knowledge of God and the love of God as the goal of man, are inseparably linked in the pious. In Giles we read that knowledge of God as the final good – knowledge on the basis of the mission of the Son – cannot exist without the love of God – infused on the basis of the mission of the Holy Spirit – because the mission of the Son is never separated from the mission of the Holy Spirit.⁵⁷ However, it is not the case that both missions totally coincide on the basis of their inseparability. They remain distinct. This difference arises on the basis of the difference in their emanation from the Trinity. The emanation of the Son is called birth, that of the Holy Spirit gift.⁵⁸

We may now give more content to Giles' expression *cognoscere Deum*. It is a knowledge that is intrinsically linked with love⁵⁹, hence a

⁵⁷ Non igitur potest esse missio Filii absque missio Spiritus Sancti, quia practice loquendo, ut hic loquimur, non est cognitio Dei ut est finale bonum, propter quod alia operamur, secundum quam cognitionem mittitur Filius absque dilectione eius secundum quam mittitur Spiritus Sanctus. Licet ergo aliqua cognitio speculativa de ipso haberi possit absque amore, non tamen separatur missio Filii a missione Spiritus Sancti, quia secundum illam missionem Filii non habetur; et sicut missio Filii nunquam est sine missione Spiritus Sancti, sic nec e converso, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art.2.

⁵⁸ Advertendum tamen quod licet huiusmodi missiones sint inseparabiles, sunt tamen distinctae et differentes; nam, ut habitum est, non est missio in divinis nisi quia una persona per aliam operatur; operari unam personam per aliam non dicimus, nisi ex eo quod una ab alia procedit. Radicalis ergo ratio in missionibus ex processione oritur, et quia Filius procedit ut natus, Spiritus Sanctus ut donum vel ut datus, missio Filii est distincta a missione Spiritus Sancti, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art.2.

⁵⁹ Quia sapientia illa, secundum quam mittitur Filius, quae est in eo quod deum cognoscimus ut finem, in quo quemdam saporem et quamdam dulcedinem constituimus, non datur malis hominibus, ad quos non mittitur Spiritus Sanctus ... Ex quo habetur, quod missio Spiritus non est absque missione Filii qui mittitur secundum dona perficientia intellectum. Et quia hae missiones inseparabiliter coniunguntur, unus effectus, ut sanctificatio creaturae, utrique missioni tribuitur, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art.2.

knowledge in love, or as Augustine already called it: *cum amore notitia*⁶⁰. If we remind ourselves how Giles described the content of theology as *cognoscere Deum ut nostrum restauratorem et glorificatorem* then we can understand how theology is for him a life-fulfillment: it is the very conscious life onto God as its ultimate goal and highest good. The desire to consciously and in a loving manner live towards God in the practice of theology is the greatest motivation in Giles' practice of theology: For the practitioner of theology it is spiritual life, in short, life itself.

Thomas on the *missiones*

Thomas has also occupied himself with the topic of the *missiones*. He also writes about it in the *Summa*.⁶¹ In virtue of His creation God is present in all creatures, but by virtue of His sanctification He is present in His rational creatures in a special way. He is present in them in a new manner which Scripture calls 'indwelling'. God's indwelling initiates the renewal of the human being. In this the three divine *personae* as well as their gifts of grace are involved. The activities of the divine *personae* and the special character of their gifts is attuned to the two faculties of the human being, the ability to know and the ability to love. In his treatment of the divine missions, however, Thomas mentions the pair 'knowing and loving' only in passing.⁶² The missions of the Holy Spirit and of the Son are attuned to these fundamental faculties of the human being. In order to raise knowing and loving onto a higher plane, a special divine presence is required. God desires, namely, to be present as be-knownn in the knower and as beloved in the lover. Through the missions of the Holy Spirit and of the Son the soul becomes conform to God⁶³ and is permitted to participate in divine love and knowledge.

Even though the Father also dwells in the soul, He is not sent. Yet He too, permits the human being to participate in His divine life in his own manner. This is the case because being sent is a form of

⁶⁰ AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate* IX, 10 (PL 42, 968s.).

⁶¹ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 43. H. RIKHOF, *Trinity in Thomas. Reading the Summa Theologiae against the background of modern problems*, in *Jaarboek 1999*, Thomas Instituut te Utrecht. Utrecht, 19 (2000) 83-100.

⁶² Et quia cognoscendo et amando creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 43, art. 3.

⁶³ ... conformatur Deo, *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae, q. 110, 1c and 4c.

giving. And if 'giving' is understood as the benevolent communication of something to someone then one may say that the Father gives Himself to the extent that He communicates Himself benevolently to the rational creature as enjoyment, as the Creator, of Whom the creature, the human being, receives the possibility to rejoice in Him.⁶⁴

There is a necessary connection between mission and grace. Through salvific grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) the human being itself is intimately connected with God. This grace is the gift of God by which the human being can receive God and through which indwelling becomes possible. Only rational creatures may be connected to God in this fashion. They alone may enjoy God, and they alone may use the divine gifts (*gratia gratis data*). By means of the divine gifts, and itself already intimately linked to God, the human being is enabled to equally bring other human beings closer to God.

Thomas first speaks about the Spirit and its gift of love, and then about the Son and His gift of knowledge. And more importantly, in Thomas' talk of two forms of conformity effected by the Spirit and the Son respectively, he explicitly links the mission of the Son to that of the Holy Spirit. Through the gift of love the soul comes to conform to the Holy Spirit. But it is not the case that by the gift of knowledge the soul simply comes to conform to the Son without any further ado. The word of the Son is not simply a word, it is the word that breathes love and speaks of love.⁶⁵

But, Thomas asks, is it not typically the work of the Holy Spirit to fill a human being with grace through its mission? And is it therefore necessary that, apart from the invisible mission of the Spirit yet another invisible mission takes place? Thomas affirms that indeed, all gifts are in their entirety linked to the mission of the Spirit, yet amongst these gifts there are some special gifts that are proper to the mission of the Son, namely all the gifts that affect the intellect.⁶⁶ Thomas' answer is a continuation of his previous reflections on the gifts in q.43, art.3. There he spoke, to be true not exclusively but at

⁶⁴ ... communicat creaturae ad fruendum, Summa Theologiae, I, q.43, art.4 ad 1.

⁶⁵ Non igitur secundum quamlibet perfectionem intellectus mittitur Filius sed secundum talem institutionem vel instructionem intellectus qua prorumpat in affectum amoris, Summa Theologiae, I, q.43, art.5 ad 2. AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate* IX,10 (PL 42,968s.).

⁶⁶ ... aliqua tamen dona secundum proprias rationes attribuuntur per quamdam appropriationem Filio, scilicet illa, quae pertinent ad intellectum, Summa Theologiae, I, q.43, art.5 ad 1.

least primarily about the Spirit. Spirit as well as Son are therefore sent in an invisible fashion.⁶⁷

Giles' and Thomas' position compared

When we compare Giles' standpoint on the missions to that of Thomas we may note several agreements but also some differences. Both deal with the same topics; not in the same order, to be true, since in the *Summa Theologiae* Thomas is at liberty to diverge from the sequence followed in the *Libri Sententiarum*, to which Giles in his commentary on the Sentences is bound. Giles and Thomas both speak about the invisible as well as the visible missions, and both address the invisible ones in greater detail. For that matter, both deal with the visible sending of the Son separately when speaking of the incarnation. Just like Thomas Giles asks whether it is fitting for a divine person to be sent, and whether it is proper to every divine person to be sent (passive). But beyond this Giles also dedicates a separate article to the sending (active), and in another he investigates in which area of Trinitarian theology the discussion of the mission is best at home: where the divine essence is dealt with, or there where the divine relations are discussed. Both theologians agree in asking the question whether the Holy Spirit also sends the Son. Just as Thomas Giles discusses the eternal character of the mission. He does indeed limit his discussion to the Son, just as he has primarily attention for the Son in his treatment of the mission in general. This in contrast to Thomas, who, as Rikhof remarked, lets all his reflections tend primarily toward the Spirit.

And there are also a number of differences. Thomas' attention for salvific grace – by means of which every mission becomes fruitful – appears to mainly come to the fore in the context of his discussion of the missions in general. In Giles this is quite different: only when he speaks of the invisible mission of the Spirit does he come to address grace.⁶⁸ However, here the sequence in the order of the *Libri Sententiarum* may have played a role.

⁶⁷ Similarly: *Quod utraque missio ordinatur ad finem unum ultimum, scilicet coniungere Deo; sed effectus utriusque missionis differt secundum duo quae inveniuntur in rationali creatura, quibus Deo coniungitur, scilicet intellectus et affectus, et ita neutra superfluit, I Sent., d.15, q.4, art.2 ad 5.*

⁶⁸ Indeed, one time Aegidius does refer to grace in passing, but not with the intention to speak explicitly about the role of saving grace: *Quia, ut dictum est, non propter quaelibet opera dicitur mitti Filius, sed propter opera gratuita, sed nunquam sunt talia opera sine missione Spiritus Sancti, ergo non est missio Filii absque missione Spiritus, I Sent., d.15, pars 2, q.1, art. 2.*

The most important difference in both of their approaches appears to be the moment in which their attention is focused on the Holy Spirit. Thomas' attention for the Spirit is predominant during his treatment of the missions in general, whereas Giles reserves a number of separate distinctions for his attention to the Spirit. The mission of the Spirit, the visible as well as the invisible, is dealt with by him in dist. 16, 17 and 18, the mission in general he deals with in dist. 15.

When Giles emphasizes the inseparability of the missions of Son and Spirit, he seems to wish to do equal justice to both missions. It is evident that the Spirit as such is here not the starting point of his reflections. Furthermore, the title of this article explicitly investigates the inseparability. Thomas, however, only mentions this inseparability in passing. While he is occupied with emphasizing the presence of the Holy Spirit as love, he mentions in passing that without love, the word as pure knowledge, would not be suitable to link the soul to God.⁶⁹ From the context it is clear that Thomas' attention is mainly directed to the position of the Holy Spirit.

It is in an entirely different place – namely there where Thomas defends that it is also proper for the Son to be sent in an invisible way – that he explains why the two missions are so closely linked: "If, concerning the 'mission' we place the emphasis on the origin, then the missions of Son and Spirit are different, just as in their generation and procession. If we place the emphasis on the effects of grace, then both missions indeed agree in the grace in which they are rooted, but are different in the effects of the grace, namely the illumination of the intellect and the conflagration of the affect. The one mission cannot exist without the other, since neither of them takes place without salvific grace, and the one person cannot be separated from the other."⁷⁰

In fact, in his argumentation Thomas wants to emphasize the presence of the Holy Spirit. In this manner, within the context of speaking about missions, the Son becomes a special case of talking about the Spirit for Thomas. Giles' attention, however, is directed towards the Son, and only after the inseparability of the mission he will talk about the Spirit. In the framework of their reflections on the

⁶⁹ ... quod una non potest esse sine alia ..., see below, footnote 70.

⁷⁰ Si loquamur de missione quantum ad originem, sic missio Filii distinguitur a missione Spiritus Sancti, sicut et generatio a processione. Si autem quantum ad effectum gratiae, sic communicant duae missiones in radice gratiae, sed distinguuntur in effectibus gratiae, qui sunt illuminatio intellectus et inflammatio affectus. Et sic manifestum est quod una non potest esse sine alia; quia neutra est sine gratia gratum faciente, nec una persona separatur ab alia, Summa Theologiae, I, q.43, art.5 ad 3.

missions, the Spirit is important for Thomas, whereas in Giles it is primarily the Son who determines his discussion.

If we direct our attention towards the anthropological aspect of their reflections, then Thomas appears to list the two distinct human faculties of knowing and loving next to each other, and to immediately link the conclusion to their mention, that therefore there are also two missions. God, after all, wishes to dwell as be-known in the knower and as beloved in the lover. For this indwelling the factor of salvific grace is important. Salvific grace, furthermore, acts as the indispensable glue that keeps the two missions together.

In Thomas the Holy Spirit determines all knowledge of God. Knowledge is a gift of the Holy Spirit – with a special status because of the Son. This has everything to do with Thomas' attention for the divine indwelling which is made possible by the gift, the mission. Also when mentioning the *sine alia* Thomas remains focused on indwelling and grace. The question remains, whether, when he speaks of the fruits of grace, he deals with them merely as a list or as being integrated. In any case, this does not become clear from his statement "*sed distinguitur in effectibus gratiae qui sunt illuminatio intellectus et inflammatio affectus*".

In this context Giles neither speaks about indwelling and grace, nor about salvific grace as the glue that holds everything together. For him there is no extra factor necessary to keep the missions together: they are integrated in and through themselves. His starting point is the Son as the Word that is sent. The Word is sent together with the Holy Spirit, such that they indeed do not coincide, since they are distinct, but neither in such a way that they can be separated. He wishes to emphasize the integration of love and knowledge. The entire art.2 makes it clear, that Giles is concerned with the inseparability of the missions. In taking the Son as the starting point of his discussion of the missions in general, it is evident that Giles' treatment is christocentric.

Conclusion

Regarding the integration of knowledge and love in theology we intended to make plausible that Giles of Rome occupies a middle ground between his teacher Thomas and the Augustinians. Whereas in Thomas the integration leaves room for a certain emphasis on knowledge, and the Augustinians place a certain emphasis on love, Giles wishes to ask attention for the integration of both more explicitly than the others.

One would expect that in the discussion of the mission in Thomas the emphasis would fall on the Word of God and in Giles on the Love of God. However, we could establish that the reverse is the case. In his discussion of the missions Thomas places emphasis on the Holy Spirit, Giles on the Son. Is this where the Augustinian Christocentrism has left its visible mark on Aegidius? If so, it would concern a Christ that leads to knowledge of God, and at the same time invites to loving imitation. It is because of Giles' thorough insight into the connection between knowledge and love, and the significance thereof for the practice of theology that one has called him in his time, not without reason *doctor fundatissimus*.

Utrecht
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The Routes of Communication

The most important artery which connected Italy with South and Central Europe was the *Via Francigena* or *Ruga Francigena*, now the *Via Cassia* (later called *Roma*) from the pilgrims bound for Rome called *Rome*. It was one of the principal routes linking Rome and Northern Europe through the Alpine passes. It may have been part of an Etruscan *Road* which once led through Rolsia, Poggio del

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