

JULIAN OF AECLANUM'S "RATIONALIST" EXEGESIS

1 ALBERT BRUCKNER REVISITED¹

It was only in the course of the twentieth century that Julian of Aeclanum was "discovered" as an exegete. In 1913 Germain Morin attributed to him a *Tractatus in Osee, Iohel, Amos*, previously thought to be a work of Rufinus of Aquileia.² In 1915 Alberto Vaccari repeated the feat with an *Expositio libri Iob*, until then held to be an errant version of the *Expositio libri Iob* of Philipp the Presbyter, disciple of Jerome.³ Vaccari's attempt, a year later, to demonstrate that Julian was also the author of a commentary on the Psalms, discovered only recently in an Ambrosian MS (*C 301 inf.*), failed, but subsequent research showed that the commentary, and a related abridged version, the so called Epitome, were translations from Theodore of Mopsuestia's commentary on the Psalms, possibly by Julian himself, or at least influenced by him.⁴

¹ This article is the revised version of a paper given at the International Augustinian Study Day on 18 May 2002 at the Augustinian Historical Institute, Heverlee, Leuven. My sincere thanks go to the members of the Institute and its director, Fr. Bernard Bruning, for inviting me on that occasion, and to the participants of the study day, and in particular Prof. Mathijs Lamberigts and Prof. Lucas De Coninck, fellow students of Julian of Aeclanum, for many helpful remarks and suggestions.

² Cf. now J. LÖSSL, "Julian of Aeclanum's *Tractatus in Osee, Iohel, Amos*. Some Notes on the Current State of Research", in: *Aug. (L)* 51 (2001) 5-37. For a critical edition cf. L. DE CONINCK, M. J. D'HONT, EDS., *Iuliani Aeclanensis expositio libri Iob, tractatus prophetarum Osee, Iohel et Amos, accedunt operum deperditorum fragmenta post Albertum Bruckner denuo collecta aucta ordinata* (CCL 88; Turnhout: Brepols, 1977) vii-xii (on the life of Julian of Aeclanum), xvii-xxx (on the text), 113-15 (sigla), 115-329 (text). For an introduction to Julian of Aeclanum cf. also M. LAMBERIGTS, "Iulianus IV (Iulianus von Aeclanum)", in: *RAC* 19 (2000) 483-505.

³ For details and further references cf. LÖSSL (n. 2) 19 n. 27; for a critical edition DE CONINCK-D'HONT (n. 2) xii-xvii (introduction), 2 (sigla), 3-109 (text); for the history of the only extant MS (Cas. 371) cf. F. NEWTON, *The Scriptorium and Library at Monte Cassino* (CSPC 7; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 197, 266, 274, 311, 318, 320, 325, 377-78; for the exegetical-historical context E. DASSMANN, "Hiob", in: *RAC* 15 (1991) 366-442, 379-91.

⁴ For an introduction to, and a critical edition of, the Latin translation cf. L. DE CONINCK, M. J. D'HONT, EDS., *Theodori Mopsuesteni Expositiones in Psalmos Iuliano Aeclanensi interprete in Latinum versae quae supersunt* (CCL 88A; Turnhout: Brepols, 1977). A more recent introduction, in the context of a more general survey of Patristic commentaries on the Psalms, can be found in M.-J. RONDEAU, *Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier (iiiie-ve siècles) I: Les travaux des Pères Grecs et Latins sur le Psautier. Recherches et Bilan* (OrChrAn 219; Rome: Pontif. Instit. Stud. Orient., 1982) 175-88. For further literature cf. LÖSSL (n. 2) 18 n. 26; ID., *Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung* (VigChrSuppl. 60; Leiden: Brill, 2001) 11-12.

Henry Barclay Swete's learned, though half hearted, guess, in 1880, that Julian could also have translated Theodore's commentary on the Minor Epistles of Saint Paul, meanwhile did not hold sway.⁵ Swete himself in the end tentatively situated the translation in an African milieu. Around the same time Carl Paucker published a study in which he proposed Julian of Aeclanum as the author of the *Tractatus in Osee, Iohel and Amos*⁶. But he did not follow up his suggestion, and so, by the end of the nineteenth century, all that was known of Julian's Biblical exegesis was drawn from the fragments of his polemical writings against Augustine as preserved in the latter's and in Marius Mercator's works⁷. Apart from that only a few snippets of a commentary on the *Canticum* and a work *De bono constantiae* were known to be preserved in Bede's commentary on the *Canticum*⁸.

In 1910 Albert Bruckner attempted a partial reconstruction of *Ad Turbantium* on the basis of the fragments preserved mainly in Augustine's *Contra Iulianum*⁹. This attempt was deemed fairly successful and was used as a basis for the current edition of De Coninck and D'Hont. Thirteen years earlier, in 1897, Bruckner had published a monograph on Julian's life and doctrine, which already contained an

⁵ Cf. H. B. SWETE, ED., *Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii I-II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1880.1882) I: lii-liii; LÖSSL (n. 4) 202.

⁶ Cf. H. RÖNSCH, ED., Carl Paucker, *Vorarbeiten zur lateinischen Sprachgeschichte. 3. Abt. II. De latinitate scriptorum quorundam seculi quarti et ineuntis quinti p. C. minorum Observationes, II. Orosius* (Berlin: Calvary, 1884) 53; fully cited in LÖSSL (n. 2) 15 n. 16.

⁷ For the fragments of *Ad Turbantium*, the letters to Valerius, Zosimus, Rufus and the Romans, the commentary on the *Canticum*, and *De bono constantiae* cf. DE CONINCK-D'HONT (n. 2) xxxi-xxxiv (introduction), 335-402 (text); the notes by Y.-M. DUVAL, "Iulianus Aeclanensis restitutus. La première édition – incomplète – de l'œuvre de Julien d'Éclane," in: *REAug* 25 (1979) 162-72; the notes and additions by M. LAMBERIGTS, "Some remarks on the critical edition of the preserved fragments of Julian of Aeclanum," in: *RTAM* 54 (1987) 238-39; and M. STEIN, „Bemerkungen zu Iulianus von Aeclanum," in: *JAC* 43 (2000) 122-25; for the fragments of *Ad Florum* cf. M. ZELZER (POST ERNESTUM KALINKA), ED., *Sancti Aureli Augustini Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum libri i-iii* (CSEL 85/1; Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1974) (books 1-3); and TH. BLAMPIN ET AL. (MAURISTS), EDS., *S. Augustini opera omnia* vol. 11 (Paris 1700; reprint. by J.-P. Migne in PL 45, 1337-1608) (books 4-6); further references in LÖSSL (n. 4) 7-8.

⁸ Now available in the critical edition by David Hurst, in: D. HURST ET AL., EDS., *Beda Opera. 2: Opera exegetica* 2B (CCL 119B; Turnhout: Brepols, 1983) 167-375.

⁹ Cf. A. BRUCKNER, ED., *Die vier Bücher Julians von Aeclanum an Turbantius. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik Julians und Augustins* (NSGTK 8; Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1910).

extensive treatment of Julian's exegesis and Biblical hermeneutics¹⁰. Thus, even before the "discovery" of Julian as an exegete in the twentieth century something, indeed a lot, was to be said about his exegesis. Bruckner, helped by Heinrich Kihn's study of 1880¹¹, already related Julian's exegesis to Antiochene exegesis, and especially to that of Theodore of Mopsuestia. And his account was influential. It helped to confirm the new discoveries on theological grounds. In a sense, the very characteristics of Julian's exegesis which we find in his newly discovered writings are only familiar to us because we first saw them in his polemical writings against Augustine, as analysed by Bruckner. Thus we have a hermeneutic circle here, and the entry point is Bruckner's study.

And it is a problematic entry point; for Bruckner, despite the sympathy, which he undoubtedly has for Julian, is ultimately biased against him¹². In his judgment Julian's approach to Scripture is deeply "rationalist" and, ultimately, "atheist".¹³ More recently, Otto Wermelinger has expressed the view that the discovery of the exegetical writings has made such blanket verdicts less likely.¹⁴ Yet he himself, while quoting Gisbert Bouwman's study on the *Tractatus Osee, Iohel, Amos* as a milestone after which Julian can no longer be "dismissed as a rationalist without faith"¹⁵, has to concede that even Bouwman, still,

¹⁰ A. BRUCKNER, *Julian von Eclanum. Sein Leben und seine Lehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pelagianismus* (TU 15/3a; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1897) 101-125, but cf. also 125-77 for numerous references to Julian's exegesis in the discussion of his doctrinal positions.

¹¹ H. KIHN, *Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten nebst einer kritischen Textausgabe von des letzteren Instituta regularia divinae legis* (Freiburg: Herder, 1880).

¹² Scholars have sometimes been confused by Bruckner's stance. The fact as such is interesting enough, i. e. that reading Bruckner we come to ask ourselves: Is he "for" or "against" Julian? And he appears inconsistent; e. g. he seems to concede that Julian's criticism of Augustine's doctrine of original sin is justified, but the basis on which he builds his arguments is not. For a telling example of different readings of Bruckner cf. M. LAMBERIGTS, "Augustine, Julian of Aeclanum and E. Pagels' Adam, Eve and the Serpent," in: *Aug. (L)* 39 (1989) 393-435, 434 n. 246. E. PAGELS, *Adam, Eve and the Serpent* (New York: Random House, 1988) 144 holds that on original sin Bruckner sides with Augustine. Lamberigts argues the opposite.

¹³ Cf. BRUCKNER (n. 10) 176, citing from A. v. HARNACK, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* 3 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1890) 183; for further discussion cf. below.

¹⁴ Cf. O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius. Die theologische Position der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 411-432* (PuP 7; Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1975) 265 n. 262.

¹⁵ Cf. above n. 14 and G. BOUWMAN, *Des Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar zu den Propheten Osee, Joel und Amos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Exegese* (AnBib 9; Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1958) 23.

speaks of Julian as a “radical rationalist” and even a “nominalist”, not considering that these two concepts actually exclude each other.¹⁶ This increases the impression that it was not primarily lack of textual evidence which made Bruckner reach his conclusion, but a dogmatic preconception. And it is this preconception with which we have to engage in order to unravel Bruckner’s treatment of Julian’s exegesis, and access the latter, and the hermeneutic principles behind it.¹⁷

I will therefore begin with a few remarks about the theological background of Bruckner’s judgment of Julian’s way of interpreting Scripture as “rationalist” and “ultimately atheist” (1.). I shall then discuss the texts, on which Bruckner grounds his verdict (2.-9.). My aim is not to give a systematic account of Julian’s Biblical hermeneutics, but to demonstrate that Julian, when interpreting Scripture, keeps well within the boundaries of Early Christian exegesis, and to a large extent even within the boundaries defined by Augustine, even when exclusively judged by his polemical works. And when we look at his exegetical practice, we shall see that his exegesis is, just as Augustine’s, not driven by some “rationalist atheism”, but by very

¹⁶ On this point cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 147 n. 4.

¹⁷ Bruckner’s talk of Julian’s (and also Augustine’s) “dogmatism” (cf. BRUCKNER (n. 10) 124) applies to himself. – To be sure, we are not here discussing a 110 year old, long fossilized, problem, but a current one. E. g. a recent article on the exegesis of Diodore, Theodore and Theodoret has argued that the historical-literal (and anti-allegorical) exegesis of these Antiochenes was dogmatically motivated (Anti-Origenist), narrow-minded, suppressing the spiritual dimension of Scripture, reductionist, and therefore, in the long run, “not successful”, “rightly” (!) condemned and rendered obsolete; cf. for this J. J. O’KEEFE, “A Letter that Killeth”: Toward a Reassessment of Antiochene Exegesis, or Diodore, Theodore, and Theodoret on the Psalms,” in: *JECS* 8 (2000) 83-104. While there is undoubtedly a close link between Antiochene dogmatic theology and exegesis, this does not say anything about the quality of either, whether they were, by their own, or by any other standard, more, or less, spiritual, orthodox, appropriate to the subject matter (God, Christ, creation, human being, and the relationships between them) than other dogmatic theologies and exegeses, e.g. the Alexandrian, whether it was right or wrong that they were condemned, or whether they would have been successful or not, had they not been condemned by one particular church tradition (not by the whole church, as O’Keefe suggests, and rendered obsolete through the destruction of their literary heritage. To introduce such value judgments as spiritual and theological appropriateness, or historical success, is to be in the same way dogmatic as the sources with which one is working. It does not result in a better understanding of the sources. One can, of course, explore the motives of those who issued the condemnations (Augustine and Leontius), and develop an understanding for their theological rationale. But to argue that Julian and Theodore were not successful because they were condemned, and that that proves that their theology was not up to the demands of their times, is absurd.

particular theological influences and concerns, pertaining to Christian tradition and spirituality (10.). Consequently, the main difference between the two lies less in their Biblical hermeneutics than in certain fundamental understandings of the Christian creed, which drive their hermeneutics.

1. Bruckner's verdict and its theologico-cultural background

Bruckner calls Julian's way of interpreting Scripture "ultimately godless"¹⁸. It is not immediately clear what he means by that; for he also calls Julian "pious and godfearing ... His faith in the just and holy God was real, true and genuine." It was "his religion, and his indefatigable struggle for it was his ethics." Yet, on the other hand, in Bruckner's view, all of Julian's "shrewd and penetrating dissertations and definitions reveal nothing of him but his reason. His heart and soul remain silent." Ultimately, he "is totally devoid of religious experience."¹⁹

Obviously, the key to the hermeneutic with which Bruckner approaches Julian, lies in his combined use of "ultimately godless" and "religious experience". Even someone of the highest intellectual and ethical calibre, an orthodox Christian who adheres to the Creed and to the catholic tradition, has to be held ultimately atheist, if he fails to display signs of religious experience as defined by the onlooker; thus Bruckner's implication. And not Augustine is the onlooker here. Augustine serves merely as a criterion against which Julian is measured. The onlooker is Bruckner; and the theological mind behind him is Adolph Harnack. "Ultimately godless" is a quotation from Harnack. "Religious experience" has the same provenance. Today it is usually associated with William James. Within a few years of the publication of Bruckner's study James would give his famous Gifford lectures on this topic²⁰. But already in 1900 Harnack wrote in his famous „Das Wesen des Christentums“, also a work which grew out of a series of lectures, that in religion only that which

¹⁸ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 176; for what follows (Bruckner's inconsistency) cf. also above n. 12.

¹⁹ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 174.

²⁰ Cf. W. JAMES, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); first published in 1902.

has been experienced, “das Erlebte”, “the inner”, are of any value²¹. As a devoted student of Harnack Bruckner had almost certainly heard his professor express this, or a similar, thought in the mid 1890s, before, or while, he composed his thesis.

However, another professor of Bruckner's, Franz Overbeck, was not impressed by Harnack's emphasis on “religious experience”. He called it “one of the flattest commonplaces in theology”²², an excuse for the absorption of modern Christianity by bourgeois culture, and an obstacle for proper historical investigation. As far as he was concerned, the essence and truth of Early Christianity was not to be found in the assumed experiences, feelings, and motives of Early Christians, but in their external affairs and conduct. Similarly, Christianity was not going to be revived in the twentieth century, if it kept on rationalizing its collusion with the liberal world by styling itself an inner force. This was not a revival, but the last convulsions of a dead body²³. Harnack reacted to this diagnosis of modern Christianity by alluding to it ironically in the opening sections of “Das Wesen des Christentums”²⁴.

Now in the foreword to his monograph Bruckner thanks both professors for the privilege to have been their student, but then dedicates the work to Harnack alone; and he adapts Harnack's view of Augustine as a champion of religious experience and a spiritual person, teacher, and theologian. In fact, at times his Augustine even strikes as a model of Harnack. Overbeck, in contrast, is introduced as a historical-critical exegete. Him Bruckner subliminally compares to

²¹ Cf. A. v. HARNACK, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Gütersloh: Kaiser, 1999) 220: „dass in der Religion nur das Erlebte und das Innerliche Wert hat.“ Ironically, Harnack uses this concept to contrast the ritualistic element in Greek orthodoxy with the monastic. The monastic movement, he argues, preserved the oh so important experiential dimension for an otherwise sterile, traditionalist and ritualistic religious tradition.

²² Cf. now F. OVERBECK, *Werke und Nachlaß 4: Kirchenlexicon. Texte, Ausgewählte Artikel A-I* (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 1995), 213.

²³ As early as 1873 Overbeck had asked contemporary theology such fundamental questions in his „Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie“. In a postscript to the second edition of 1903 he responded to some criticisms, including Harnack's; cf. F. OVERBECK, *Werke und Nachlaß 1. Schriften bis 1873* (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 1994) 155-318.

²⁴ Cf. HARNACK (n. 21) 54: Some even go as far as to point to similarities between the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and the Christian Gospel. – Today, the idea is taken slightly more seriously; cf. e. g. H. HÜBNER, *Nietzsche und das Neue Testament* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000).

Theodore of Mopsuestia, the radical Antiochene exegete, and, by implication, to Julian of Aeclanum.²⁵

These are merely a few general observations on contemporary influences upon Bruckner's work. But they may help us better to understand Bruckner's verdict, and to make a – hopefully – more balanced judgment today.

There is no doubt that Julian's interpretation of the Bible is rational. However, whether that makes it "ultimately godless", is a different matter. The fact is that it is far more in tune with traditional Early Christian interpretation of the Bible than Bruckner and others in his wake²⁶ admit.²⁷ *A fortiori* this renders it also far more in tune with Augustine's than Bruckner allows for, although Bruckner does admit that, when he develops the following argument: (1) Scripture, according to Julian, must be interpreted through Scripture in agreement with reason. (2) Julian thereby assumes Scripture to be a coherent and unified whole. (3) Augustine subscribes to the same "dogmatism" (Bruckner's expression). (4) Consequently both, Augustine and Julian "have sinned against the true sense of Scripture." Bruckner: „Es haben sich da beide in gleicher Weise gegen den wahren Schriftsinn versündigt.“²⁸

One is inclined to congratulate Bruckner for such a clear knowledge of the true sense of Scripture. But what about his verdict over Julian? If Julian and Augustine are so similar in their Biblical hermeneutics, is reason, or rationality (rationalism), really a suitable concept for defining the specific difference of Julian's exegetical approach? Is not Augustine's exegesis "rationalist" as well?²⁹ The differences are therefore subtler than Bruckner suggests. The clash is not one between a spiritual and a tendentially atheist, rationalist, worldview, but one

²⁵ Cf. e. g. BRUCKNER (n. 10) 157 n. 1; and also above n. 16. Compared to O'Keefe's opinion of Theodore, Bruckner's is rather positive, more positive in fact than his opinion of Julian.

²⁶ Cf. e. g. BOUWMAN (n. 15) 23 (above nn. 14 and 15).

²⁷ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 123-24 does in fact admit that Augustine's and Julian's hermeneutics are far more similar than his verdict suggests. He goes on, however, to dismiss both as "dogmatic" and intellectually dishonest. The ultimate reason why Bruckner prefers Augustine's is that he thinks it is more spiritual than Julian's "superficial naturalism", i. e. more based on religious experience of the kind he recognizes as such.

²⁸ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 122-24, 124.

²⁹ Cf. e. g. the seminal paper by C. STARNES, "Augustinian Biblical Exegesis and the Origins of Modern Science," in: J. C. SCHNAUBELT ET AL., EDS., *Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine: Second Founder of the Faith* (New York: Lang, 1990) 345-55.

between different views on certain aspects of Biblical hermeneutics within a wider framework, common to both, namely that of the Early Christian exegetical tradition. The differences arise partly from specific exegetical influences (e. g. Antiochene exegesis upon Julian), but far more so from certain doctrinal convictions and interpretations of the Creed (e. g. concerning the nature of God and creation). Thus it is above all Julian's own theology that shapes his Biblical hermeneutics in its individual character. Though it is not without a context or tradition, it's tradition is different from Augustine's, and it is Augustine's that is to carry the day. It is mainly this set of circumstances, individual and collective, which explains why Julian's exegesis lay itself open to the charge of Pelagianism, and why, on the other hand, it could also be accepted and defended as orthodox (in the east, but also in large parts of the west).

2. Authority and reason – against the Manichees

One of Bruckner's foremost proof texts for demonstrating Julian's rationalism is the statement in *Ad Florum* 2.16 that if something had been proven on grounds of reason, it could not be overruled by an authority: *quod ratio arguit, non potest auctoritas uindicare*³⁰. By authority Julian here means Scriptural authority, of the kind Augustine uses it to underpin his doctrine of original sin, or, as Julian prefers to call it, "natural sin" (*naturale peccatum*), namely Rom 5:12 informed by 1 Cor 15:22.³¹ It had been one of Augustine's first charges against Julian that he denied the catholic doctrine (of original sin)

³⁰ Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 2.16 (CSEL 85/1, 173); cited by BRUCKNER (n. 10) 102 as one of Julian's two most radical („am schärfsten und bündigsten“) professions of rationalism. – The other one is *Flor.* 4.136 (PL 45, 1430), discussed below under section 5. For a critical reading of this passage cf. already WERMELINGER (n. 14) 265 n. 265.

³¹ Already S. LYONNET, "Rom 5:12 chez saint Augustin. Note sur l'élaboration de la doctrine augustinienne du péché originel," in: H. U. VON BALTHASAR ET AL. EDS., *L'Homme devant Dieu. Mélanges offerts au père Henri de Lubac* (Théologie 56; Paris: Aubier, 1963) 327–39 showed that Augustine drew his idea of all human beings having sinned (= died) "in Adam" not so much from Rom 5:12 as from 1 Cor 15:22. Augustine's transfer of the notion of humanity's death in Adam in 1 Cor 15:22 to sin "in Adam" as in Rom 5:12 in the course of the Pelagian controversy was indeed innovative and creative, but that was precisely why Julian was able to hold against it, on exegetical grounds (!). As G. BONNER, "Augustine on Romans 5:12," in: F. L. CROSS, ED., *Papers Presented to the Third International congress on New Testament studies held at Christ Church, Oxford 1965* (TU 103; Studia Evangelica 5; Berlin: Akademie, 1968) 242–47 pointed out, Augustine was unable to tackle the discre-

based on these two verses.³² But already in *Ad Turbantium* 2 Julian had responded that Augustine's "doctrine" could not be based on these two verses³³, on exegetical grounds: the biblical text, especially the Greek original, did not supply that kind of meaning. And since, to Julian's knowledge, this "doctrine" was not part of the creed either, there was no other possible ground for it but mere reason³⁴, i. e. Augustine's reason. It was, according to Julian, Augustine's mind in which this "doctrine", of "natural sin", had cropped up.³⁵ Augustine had retaliated in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* and *Contra Iulianum* 6³⁶, but each time he misrepresented Julian's position. That, at least, was what Julian felt, which is why he tried repeatedly to rectify the situation and put across his authentic position. *Flor.* 2.16 represented such an opportunity. All that Julian writes here is that already in *Ad Turbantium* he had argued that since the concept of *naturale peccatum* was not in the creed, and since it could not be extracted from the Bible, Augustine would have to defend it purely on rational grounds. But now, he, Julian, had already refuted it; for he had shown, in *Ad Turbantium*, "that nothing can be confirmed through Scripture, which is not covered by justice; for if the perfect form of justice resides in God's law, nothing, which is against it, i. e. any

pancy between his understanding of the verse and the traditional understanding, according to which in quo is a translation of ἐφ' ᾧ and must therefore be understood as quatenus; cf. also LAMBERIGTS (n. 12) 394-95; ID., "Augustine as translator of Greek texts," in: A. SCHOORS, P. VAN DEUN, EDS., *Philohistôr. Miscellanea in Honorem Caroli Laga Septuagenarii* (OrLAn 60; Leuven: Peeters, 1994) 151-61, 152; and below in section 10.

³² Cf. AUG. *Nupt. et Conc.* 2.3, 8, 15, 20, 24, (CSEL 42,255.259.266.272.276.291); also MAR. MERC. *Comm. in Iul. = Coll. Palat.* 3 (ACO I/V/1, 5-6). Note that, as BRUCKNER (n. 9) 5-6 points out, Julian, in *Ad Florum*, complains that in *Nupt. et Conc.* Augustine misrepresented his position. *Flor.* 2.16 must be read in this context. Julian here merely reiterates a point, which he had already made several times over.

³³ Cf. below under section 10.

³⁴ Cf. IUL. *Turb.* 2 (CCL 88, 363-72); LÖSSL (n. 4) 213-14 (for further references); and also ID., *Intellectus gratiae. Die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins von Hippo* (VigChrSuppl 38; Leiden: Brill, 1997) 350-52.

³⁵ LYONNET (n. 31), though a tad more subtly, holds basically the same position.

³⁶ Cf. *c. duas epp. Pel.* 4.7, 19 (CSEL 60, 527-28, 542); *c. Iul.* 6.73, 75-78 (PL 44, 867-70).

injustice, is permitted to acquire through it any virtue; and therefore, that which reason has already proved, authority cannot overrule."³⁷

Does this make Julian a rationalist? Formally, probably yes. He appeals to the principle of non-contradiction. Scripture does not contradict itself. It is subject to reason. But on this he agrees with Augustine, who, in *De ordine* 2.26, had himself maintained the priority of reason over authority.³⁸ In fact, it is possible that Julian, who was not exactly unfamiliar with Augustine's early works, deliberately chose to use the pair *auctoritas-ratio* in this context, to remind Augustine of a principle, which he himself embraced.³⁹ But does it also make Julian a rationalist in content? Does he put reason before faith, i. e. the faith in God as expressed in the tradition of the church, in reference to the creed and the Bible, God's law, as Julian calls it? Certainly not. In a deeper sense, his belief that the Bible does not contradict itself is the belief that its message is the truth, and that this truth is vouched for by God himself. Therefore, human reason must not be used to redefine the message of the Bible. But this precisely, Julian argues, is what Augustine is trying to do. He reads the concept of "natural sin" into a combination of biblical verses (Rom 5:12 and 1 Cor 15:22) in order to extract from them a doctrine which he cannot back up with any (authentic) authority from either Scripture or tradition. Usually, only the Manichees do that, as once Augustine himself had pointed out.⁴⁰ Is Augustine's argument for original sin, as

³⁷ IUL. *Flor.* 2.16.2 (CSEL 85/1, 173): *ostensum est ergo nihil posse per sanctas scripturas probari, quod iustitia non possit tueri, quia, si in lege dei est perfecta forma iustitiae, nihil per eam aduersaria eius id est iniustitia sinitur uirtutis acquirere; ac per hoc, quod ratio arguit, non potest auctoritas uindicare.*

³⁸ Cf. K.-H. LÜTCKE, "Auctoritas," in: *AugL* 1, fasc. 4 (1990) 498-510, 499-500. What is even more significant in this context is that Augustine developed his *auctoritas-ratio* philosophy against the pure rationalism of the Manichees; cf. on this now especially A. HOFFMANN, *Augustins Schrift De utilitate credendi* (MBT 58; Münster: Aschendorff, 1997) 171-420, especially 250-63, 310-22, 376-80, 407-418. Julian argued that Augustine's *peccatum-naturale*-doctrine was Manichean. In *Flor.* 2.16 he argues in addition that it was rationalist as well. It is, therefore, not Julian who outs himself as a rationalist in this passage. It is Augustine whom Julian wants to expose as one.

³⁹ For Julian's familiarity with Augustine's early – and especially Anti-Manichean – works cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 55-56; for the significance cf. above n. 38.

⁴⁰ Cf. *util. cred.* 1.2 (CSEL 25/1, 4-6); *conf.* 6.6.7-8 (CCL 27, 78-79); HOFFMANN (n. 37) 179-83, 287-89; and E. TESELLE, "Faith," in: A. D. FITZGERALD, ED., *Augustine Through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999) 347-50, 348-49.

presented by Julian, therefore Manichean, not only in content, but also in structure? That is precisely what Julian is trying to suggest.

But, on the other hand, Julian is not saying that Augustine could not introduce a doctrine on grounds of reason, if it were in line with Scripture as interpreted by tradition. He is not a Biblical fundamentalist. For him, Christian doctrine does not depend on the letter of the Bible. And this, precisely, is also Augustine's view.⁴¹

Thus, in *Ad Florum* 2.16 Julian is not professing an unfettered rationalism, but a rather balanced view of how authority and reason should be jointly used within a given tradition to interpret Scripture, especially against a newly invented doctrine which in both method and content sounds alarmingly Manichean to him.

3. Resorting first to reason, then to Scripture – or: how to translate tradition

Another passage which Bruckner cites to depict Julian as a rabid rationalist can be found in *Ad Turbantium* frg. 313⁴², where Julian states the (relative) priority of reason over the authority of Scripture. It is the conclusion of a sentence:

cum igitur liquido clareat hanc sanam et ueram esse sententiam, quam primo loco ratio, deinde scripturarum munivit auctoritas...:

"...since it is crystal clear that that teaching is sane and true, which is first confirmed by reason, and second by the authority of Scripture."

However, it seems only reasonable for Julian to express his intention to support with arguments from Scripture only something which seems reasonable to him in the first place. Moreover, that "sane and true teaching" to which Julian refers, and which he has cited in the

⁴¹ Cf. e. g. that "most controverted of Augustine's statements concerning the relative authority of Scripture and the church": 'I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me;' R. B. ENO, "Authority," in: FITZGERALD (n. 40) 80-82, 80; AUG. c. ep. Man. 5 (CSEL 25/1, 197): *ego uero euangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae conuinceret auctoritas*; cf. *trin.* 1.11.22 (Scripture must be interpreted in line with the existing creeds); *doctr.* 3.2 (Scripture must be interpreted according to the *regula fidei*); also B. STUDER, „Zur Bedeutung der Heiligen Schrift in Augustins De Trinitate," in: *Aug.* 42 (2002) 127-47, 136, who argues that, for Augustine, a knowledge of the Bible as such is ultimately not necessary. Faith, hope and love are sufficient.

⁴² IUL. *Turb.* 4.313 (CCL 88, 394.411-20); cf. BRUCKNER (n. 10) 101.

previous sentence, occurs in John Chrysostom⁴³, not in Scripture, as, Bruckner implies. The phrase *deinde scripturarum munivit auctoritas* may therefore not just mean that that teaching (of Chrysostom) “accidentally happens to be confirmed by Scripture”, but rather that in order really to be that sane and true teaching it is necessary for it to be confirmed by Scripture, beyond being merely reasonable and accepted by tradition.

Seen from this perspective *Turb.* 4.313 is a testimony of Julian’s “Biblicism” rather than his rationalism. And this “Biblicism” is by no means isolated; for by citing a Patristic passage in support of his case, Julian actually outs himself as a believer in tradition rather than mere reason, or Scripture⁴⁴, although he insists, of course, that tradition must not contradict either, reason or Scripture. Thus, rather than showing himself to be a rationalist in this passage, Julian subscribes to a principle that relates reason, Scripture and tradition in a reasonable way.

It may also be worth looking at the content of the teaching in question. It says that infants are to be baptised despite the fact that they are not stained and made guilty by sin “together” (sc. with the rest of humanity): *cum non sint coinquinati peccato* (thus the text of the translation which Julian used). The reason why they should nevertheless be baptised, it continues, is because baptism adds a value to their lives, sanctity, justice etc. Julian now argues that this teaching, while being in agreement with reason and Scripture, contradicts Augustine’s “doctrine” that infants are stained with original sin and therefore not innocent, but guilty, from the moment they are born, and that it is therefore “necessary” to baptise them lest they be condemned to eternal damnation.

In *Contra Iulianum* 1.22, our main source, also for Julian’s passage, Augustine argues against Julian that Chrysostom’s teaching does not contradict his doctrine, for Chrysostom only speaks of “sins committed” (sc. by adults!), i. e. the kind of sins of which infants cannot be guilty, because they have not been able to commit such kinds of sins (or any sins, in the normal sense of the word) in their lifetime:⁴⁵

⁴³ IOH. CHRYS. *or. ad neophyt.* (SC 50, 153-54.170).

⁴⁴ For more on the relationship between reason, Scripture and tradition see below in this section.

⁴⁵ AUG. *c. Iul.* 1.22 (PL 44, 656A).

"You surely see", he writes, "that it does not say that 'infants are not co-tainted by sin', or 'sins', but that 'they have [committed] no sins' ἁμαρτήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα. Understand [sins here as] 'proper' [sins] and we have no argument."

Augustine makes a text- and translation-critical remark to support his case. In the original Greek [by which Augustine can only mean the particular MS version available to him at the time], he argues, Chrysostom speaks of infants "not having [committed] sins" (ἁμαρτήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα). In other words, his point is that Chrysostom does not criticise the concept of original sin, as the version quoted by Julian suggests. The phrase "not being co-tainted by sin" (*coinquinati peccato*) in Julian's version sounds Augustinian, or indeed North-African. It speaks of sin in the singular and associates this sin with a notion of pollution (*inquinatus*). In addition, the prefix "co-" recalls Augustine's notion of humanity existing "together", as a *massa damnata*, in a collective complex of guilt and shame "in Adam", the "first" human being, in whose corrupt nature all human beings participate from birth (or conception).

The implication here is that in Julian's version of Chrysostom's text the phrase is used only to be subsequently rejected. Augustine, in his response to Julian, tries to suggest that it cannot have been Chrysostom himself who used it; for the Greek in his text does not speak of "sin" and being "co-tainted", but of (the plural) "sins" and "having [committed] them". Thus, and that is the implication of Augustine's argument, it must have been either Julian himself, or the author from whose Latin translation of Chrysostom's text Julian cites, who created, or invented, that particular understanding of Chrysostom's text by translating the Greek ἁμαρτήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα as *coinquinati peccato*.

But things are not as simple as that. To begin with, it is quite certain that it was not Julian who procured the Latin translation. His text is independently ascertained in Anianus of Celeda's translation of a collection of homilies of Chrysostom.⁴⁶ Then was it Anianus who "created" the Augustinian, or rather anti-Augustinian, echos in the text? We cannot be sure. It is possible that he did, but he might just as well have had in front of him a Greek text which contained the expres-

⁴⁶ Cf. A. WENGER, ED., *Jean Chrysostome. Huit catéchèses baptismales inédites* (SC 50; Paris: Cerf, 1958) 33 n. 2, and 32-33 for further literature; now also H. MARTI, "Anianus von Celeda," in: S. DÖPP, W. GEERLINGS, EDS., *Lexikon der antiken christlichen Literatur* (Freiburg: Herder, 2002) 37.

sion “co-tainted by sin”, and expressed the anti-Augustinian position that infants are born innocent, and that they are therefore not baptised in order to be saved from eternal damnation (whether self-inflicted and well deserved on grounds of “proper sins” or “original sin in Adam”, or not), but in order to increase the value of their lives. We cannot exclude that Chrysostom himself formulated such an idea. Augustine’s Greek version, too, is by no means certain, as Wenger in his edition indicates.⁴⁷

What seems fairly clear is that Julian did not tamper with that text, but that he quoted Anianus’s translation correctly and in good faith to support his case. And indeed why should he have changed the text? Would not Augustine’s version have suited him just as well, had he had it, or indeed even better, for would it not have proved that Chrysostom did not even think of original sin in the context of infant baptism? For Augustine’s argument *e silentio* that Chrysostom held a doctrine of original sin like Augustine’s, because he does not deny it here, is not convincing. Rather, if Chrysostom does not mention original sin, especially in a passage like this, it seems more likely that he held no such concept at all.

But now Anianus’s version as cited by Julian implies that Chrysostom did have a concept of a common sin uniting all human beings in their sinfulness, from which baptism saves, and that he only did not implicate infants in that “common human sinfulness”. Rather than cleansing these children from some common stain of sin, Chrysostom argues (according to the text version on which Anianus’s translation is based), baptism adds sanctity etc. to the lives of infants; and that is also Julian’s and, as it seems, Anianus’s, position. Thus Chrysostom need not have formulated the phrase “co-tainted by sin” in a controversial context, i. e. as a polemic against an Augustinian, or any other, doctrine of original sin; nor is it necessary to assume that Anianus translated Chrysostom’s text with such a purpose in mind; and even the way in which Julian cites Anianus’s translation need not be interpreted exclusively in terms of his polemics, but the passage may well be a genuine reflection of his own theology of baptism.

Augustine’s argument on the other hand merely serves as a bottom line for the defence. It is not designed for attack. If it applies at all, it only demonstrates that, at least in this case, Chrysostom does not directly contradict Augustine’s teaching of original sin. What it does

⁴⁷ Cf. WENGER (n. 46) 154 (apparatus).

not prove is that Chrysostom ever held a doctrine of original sin, or that he contradicts Julian in that respect. All that Augustine argues here is that Julian uses the passage wrongly in support of his position.

Thus Augustine's charge against Julian here is not rationalism, but wrong use of an argument from tradition, a use which, according to Augustine, is caused by Julian's *a priori* refusal to accept that there exists in Christian tradition a doctrine of original sin, i. e. not just any doctrine of original sin, but a doctrine of original sin as taught by himself, Augustine. But Augustine's assumption that there exists precisely such a concept, too, is *a priori*. It is this rather narrow concept which the dispute is all about. There is no need to assume that Julian, like Chrysostom, and all of Christian tradition, did not hold some kind of doctrine of original sin. What he refused to accept was Augustine's interpretation of this doctrine. The fact that he cites Anianus's translation without quibbles may well indicate that he accepted, on the basis of Scripture and tradition, the notion of a common human sinfulness, but that he rejected, unlike Augustine, its application to infants.

Later evidence (from Julian's work *Ad Florum*) shows that Julian indeed held a concept of the sinful power of *prauitatis exempla* and *consuetudo uitiorum*⁴⁸, but he deduced that concept from the more basic concept of proper sins as free acts of individual human beings, not of some natural sin transmitted in procreation.⁴⁹

4. Scriptural authority requires a broad traditional basis – and vice versa

In *Contra Iulianum* 3.20 (cf. *Ad Turbantium* 1 frg. 25) Augustine concedes that Julian argues not only by way of "syllogisms", but also from Scripture. But, in his view, these arguments are pathetic: *laboras inaniter*⁵⁰. But are they not grounded in tradition? Bruckner rejects the view, first put forward by Klasen, that Augustine might here be referring to (or else that we might be able to illuminate this

⁴⁸ IUL. *Flor.* 1.94 (CSEL 85/1, 109.64-65).

⁴⁹ Cf. M. LAMBERIGTS, "Julian d'Éclane et Augustine d'Hippone. Deux conceptions d'Adam," in: *Aug. (L)* 40 (1990) 373-410, 381; and the discussion in LÖSSL (n. 34) 342.

⁵⁰ Cf. AUG. c. *Iul.* 3.20 (PL 44, 712); IUL. *Turb.* 1.25 (CCL 88, 346-47): *quod forsitan dicam, scripturarum non syllogismorum debere testimonio comprobari, filios de corporum commixtione nascentes, reputari diuino operi.*

passage by studying the Scriptural arguments in) a document which cannot with certainty, or exclusively, be attributed to Julian, but which nonetheless might display at least traces of his approach, namely the *libellus fidei*⁵¹, a common statement issued by a group of bishops, perhaps those led by Julian in 418, against the condemnations of Pelagius and Caelestius⁵². But if Julian was neither the author of, nor a contributor to, the *libellus fidei*, the document might be evidence of an even wider opposition to the condemnations than the one in southern Italy led by Julian. (One proposal as to its location suggests Aquileia.) In any case, an analysis of the Scriptural arguments of the *libellus fidei* in comparison to Julian's would only increase the impression that Julian's exegesis was well integrated in the traditional ecclesiastical context of his time.

5. Faith does not eclipse reason

Julian, of course, argues a position that refuses to put Scripture above reason in the sense that it would advise us to act against reason, if Scripture were to say so. But that cannot be the point of Bruckner's criticism; for clearly, Bruckner would agree with that: Reason, as Julian argues, can, and should, be given priority, because, as a general law, Scripture cannot contradict reason, which is founded on God's law, i. e. the law upheld by God's justice and equity and proclaimed by Scripture. This is behind the famous passage *Ad Florum* 4.136:⁵³

catholica uero fides neque iurgare aduersum se legem dei credit, neque ullam auctoritatem in exitium rationis admittit, nec cuiquam opinioni atque adulationi in maculam diuinae aequitatis auscultet; sed ut deum non solum credit, uerum etiam nouit omnium naturarum creatorem.

"The catholic faith, however, neither assumes that God's law would ever go to court against it, nor does it permit any authority ever to cut out reason, nor does it ever lend its ear to an opinion or insinuation which would question the notion of divine equity. Rather, it not only believes, it knows, God to be the creator of all individual beings."

⁵¹ On the authorship and original context of the *libellus fidei*, with a discussion of more recent literature, cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 12-13; also 277-78.

⁵² Cf. F. KLASSEN, *Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus* (Freiburg: Herder, 1882) 100.

⁵³ IUL. Flor. 4.136 (PL 45, 1430); cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 132.

In Bruckner's view, this is the basis of Julian's Biblical hermeneutics: „Gehen wir am besten von der Beobachtung aus, daß Julian vollkommen davon überzeugt war, daß die Hl. Schrift in allen Stücken mit seiner Lehre von dem gerechten Gott übereinstimme.“⁵⁴ Julian identifies the consistency of the Scriptural message, that Scripture does not contradict itself, with the consistency of God himself; i. e. God, in Julian's view, is to be called “just” in the very sense that he unswervingly keeps the law which he himself has laid down.⁵⁵ Bruckner concedes that this assumption is “unquestionably correct” „unbestreitbar richtig“; and he finds it epitomised in *Ad Florum* 1.4: “For if God's law is the source and mistress of God's justice, then God's equity can only be supported with its help, not impugned.”⁵⁶ But what is his quibble? “This easily resulted”, he points out, “in the misuse of individual Biblical teachings.” He quotes *Ad Florum* 2.144 as a prime example. In that passage Julian argues that the main purpose of the Pauline writings is pedagogic: they teach us to believe in God as inviolably equitable, to defend his good and honest works, and, by applying his precepts, to practice moderation, prudence and justice. And the cause for them doing so is none other than the congruence of reason, piety, and faith in them.⁵⁷

In Bruckner's view this statement proves that, for Julian, Scripture is of no value in itself. Rather, it derives its value from a superior instance of which it is the message and with which it is in fundamental and irrevocable agreement, a doctrine grounded in the solid foundations of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics. Nothing that is written contradicts the basic ideas of what is true, just, and reasonable. „Es kann demnach nichts in der Schrift stehen, was nicht gerecht und vernünftig ist.“⁵⁸ Correct. This is indeed what Julian believes. But then, it is also what virtually every other Early Christian exegete

⁵⁴ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 102.

⁵⁵ For the implications cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 135-38.

⁵⁶ IUL. *Flor.* 1.4 (CSEL 85/1, 7): *nam si lex dei fons est ac magistra iustitiae, auxiliis quoque eius dei aequitas adiuvare potest, impugnari non potest.*

⁵⁷ Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 2.144 (CSEL 85/1, 266-67): *sanctas quidem apostoli esse paginas confitemur non ob aliud nisi quia rationi pietati fidei congruentes erudiunt nos et deum credere inuiolabilis aequitatis et opera eius bona honestaque defendere et praeceptis eius moderationem prudentiam iustitiam vindicare.* Julian applies this principle also to other parts of Scripture and to Scripture as a whole, as in *Flor.* 3.60 (CSEL 85/1, 399), 4.21 (PL 45, 1348), 4.75 (PL 45, 1381) and others; cf. BRUCKNER (n. 10) 103 n. 1.

⁵⁸ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 103.

believes, including Augustine.⁵⁹ And Bruckner admits this. On passages like Dtn 24:14-18, 2 Kings 14:5-6, and Ez 18:1-30, he notes, Augustine puts forward forced explanations and Julian remains silent.⁶⁰ The last observation is not quite correct. Julian does respond to some of Augustine's "forced" exegeses.⁶¹ But even if he had remained silent in these instances, Bruckner would still have to explain why this would render him more of a rationalist than Augustine, or indeed any other Early Christian exegete.

6. God's law does not contradict its maker

Ad Florum 1.4, too, causes Bruckner concern. In *Ad Florum* 1.2 Julian accuses Augustine of interpreting Scripture with Manichean preconceptions.⁶² By his doing so, he argues, Augustine tries to avoid having to "prejudge it [Scripture] according to the perspicuous truth, and, as a consequence, having to understand it according to that which is firmly made manifest by the supremely unrestricted authorities of Sacred Scripture and insurmountable reason"⁶³. Here it is quite obvious that Julian gives precedence to Scriptural authority, and in the strongest possible terms at that. The rational principle is merely maintained, which is not surprising given the fact that, again, his argument is ultimately directed against the Manichees. But where then, for that very purpose, is his appeal to tradition? It follows in *Ad Florum* 1.5. Here Julian also specifies that for him the argument – or "syllogism", as Bruckner prefers to call it – of *Ad Florum* 1.4 is not merely an abstract and rational formula, but a teaching intimately

⁵⁹ Cf. e. g. *trin.* 8.6.9; and STUDER (n. 41) 140. The argument is strikingly similar to Julian's in *Flor.* 2.144: Saint Paul, Augustine writes, is (to be) believed, because, as Scripture tells us, he is just. On this, basic, historical-literal, level the argument is circular. But one can additionally consider what humanity and justice mean in principle. On that level one stands on much firmer ground.

⁶⁰ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 103 n. 2.

⁶¹ For an example cf. section 8.

⁶² Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 1.2 (CSEL 85/1, 6): '*quae inuenta a Manichaeis Augustini contra nos fuerant ore prolata*' and, in the next paragraph, *quae ab inimicis nostris assumi solent*.

⁶³ IUL. *Flor.* 1.3 (CSEL 85/1, 7): *testimonia tamen scripturarum ab inimicis nostris assumi solent, nec ueritati praeiudicare perspicuae et secundum hoc esse intelligenda, quod absolutissimis scripturae sanctae auctoritatibus et insuperabili ratione firmatur*.

related to the Creed. His concern is not about some law, or about divine equity as an impersonal entity, but about God himself as a reliable person: *nihil ergo per legem dei agi potest contra deum legis auctorem*⁶⁴. He does not dress his argument in a rhetoric of individual religious experience. Instead, he appeals to a common religious experience, made in a living tradition, expressed in a common creed, and, together with Scripture, interpreted accordingly. In fact it is the individual religious experience of Augustine, informed by outsiders (*inimici*), the Manichees, which Julian judges detrimental for the church.

7. Restoring the text of Scripture to its pristine condition – with fervour

In *Ad Florum* 1.5, Bruckner argues, Julian also suggests, rather "unrationally", that some passages, if they do not yield the right results, should be excluded from the Scriptural canon.⁶⁵ However, what Julian really suggests is

"to cast, in order to teach that which we believe is the fulness of truth, the light of exposition also on those passages which keep the intellect in perplexity as to what is said [in them], that these passages are given back their original dignity, and not excised from the sacred stemma like textual bastardisations (*notha*) or corruptions (*degenerantia*)."

Clearly, Julian here refers to techniques of textual and literary criticism, which should be used for theological ends, to restore the original meaning of texts. He is far from wanting to remove certain passages from the Biblical canon, nor does he intend, as Bruckner mentioned earlier, to dodge certain issues and be silent about them. On the contrary, it is he who accuses Augustine of putting certain passages at risk of being cut out from the canon of Scripture by refusing to read them with a healthy, philological- and exegetical-critical, but also theologically right mind.

⁶⁴ Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 1.5 (CSEL 85/1, 8). Julian here opposes his concept of God as a giver of law to that which, in his view, is Augustine's, namely that of an arbitrary God who is so majestic that he rules without a constitution. For Julian, however, it is not only factually evident that God rules through his law, but to do so is also essential to God's nature. An arbitrary God would not be more, but less, divine than a God who absolutely keeps to the law which he himself constitutes; for a similar clash of concepts of God in Ambrose's time cf. V.-H., DRECOLL, „Neuplatonismus und Christentum bei Ambrosius *De Isaac et anima*,“ in: ZAC 5 (2001) 104-130, 129-30.

⁶⁵ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 104.

In this respect Julian's attitude resembles Jerome's, who in turn adapted it from Eusebius.⁶⁶ But again, Augustine, too, is not fundamentally different. And that is precisely the point. One cannot say that Julian is any more of a textual critic than Augustine, or that he tries to change the canon, or purge certain texts, charges that could be, and indeed are, levelled against many Early Christian exegetes. Rather, Julian neatly fits in to the Early Christian tradition and must therefore be judged by his distinctive contribution to this tradition, as part of it, not as an abnormality.

A second characteristic which Julian shares with Jerome is polemical skill. In the non-exegetical works at least – and only those were known to Bruckner – his exegesis is often couched in polemics. As in Jerome's case⁶⁷ this should not be mistaken for a weakness. It is a method. It casts light not only on the protagonists' theological background and ethical conduct, but also on their exegetical methods, and their reflections on them. A phrase like "Eradicated be therefore the whim of undisciplined exposition!"⁶⁸ may sound exaggerated. But its meaning, the call for more philological and logical discipline in biblical exegesis, is quite clear. "Either teach a doctrine which no reason or piety can sustain, namely that it is possible or just to ascribe to somebody a natural sin, or, once and for all, stop contaminating Sacred Scripture!"⁶⁹ Note that in *Ad Florum* 1.5 Julian defined *pietas* as *non agere contra deum*, and that his talk of "contaminating" Scripture reminds once more of his philological fervour. And a last example:

"With the very best of reasons I could here avert my eyes from your glaringly frivolous exposition and pass it over in silence; for, in a sense, it is only muck that makes it so firmly stick together. But I am concerned it might be believed for its luridness rather than disbelieved for its lack of consistency."⁷⁰

⁶⁶ On him cf. D. S. WALLACE-HADRILL, *Eusebius of Caesarea* (London: Mowbray, 1960) 60: "His canon of textual criticism was this: the version which is most plainly messianic, with the least obscure additional material, is the best text."

⁶⁷ Cf. for his case the famous seminal study by I. OPELT, *Hieronymus' Streitschriften* (BKA NF 2/44; Heidelberg: Winter, 1973).

⁶⁸ IUL. *Flor.* 1.27 (CSEL 85/1, 22).

⁶⁹ IUL. *Flor.* 1.31 (CSEL 85/1, 24).

⁷⁰ IUL. *Flor.* 2.98 (CSEL 85/1, 229).

This passage is neither "entirely subjective", nor does it reveal an "unconscious inferiority complex" of Julian's towards Augustine.⁷¹ Both charges are levelled by Bruckner. Rather, Julian expresses, polemically, but quite distinctly, his view that in the passage in question, *in hoc loco*, where Augustine puts forward a particular reading of Rom 5:15⁷², he violates some fundamental rules of Scriptural exegesis. E. g. Julian reminds Augustine that there exists a hierarchy of passages in Scripture. Not every sentence, or letter, must be understood in strictly theological terms, i. e. as referring to God, Christ, the church or the eschaton.⁷³ Julian was certainly not the only Early Christian exegete who held this position⁷⁴, nor does the fact that he held it render his exegesis less theological.⁷⁵ The same applies to his polemical method. Like Jerome's, it is a literary and exegetical device rather than the sign of a weak character.⁷⁶

On a personal level polemics is an emotional treatment of a sensitive issue. For Julian, the issue was indeed a sensitive one. What was at stake was the dignity of Scripture regarding the comprehensiveness and truth of its teaching, as expressed in *Ad Florum* 1.5, and its accessibility and acceptability in the church. One would like to dismiss Augustine's Pauline exegesis as ridiculous and absurd, Julian once argues, if it were not terrifying the ignorant.⁷⁷ Julian therefore aims his polemic at what he sees as the fundamental flaws in Augustine's approach to Scripture. In the process he does not hesitate "to show off"⁷⁸, as Bouwman once wrote, display his technical expertise, to argue for a complete and coherent explanation of Scripture.

⁷¹ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 105 n. 1.

⁷² See below under section 10.

⁷³ Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 1.27 (CSEL 85/1, 23);

⁷⁴ Cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 147-64; ID., "A Shift in Patristic Exegesis: Hebrew Clarity and Historical Verity in Augustine, Jerome, Julian of Aeclanum and Theodore of Mopsuestia," in: *AugStud* 32 (2001) 157-75, 166-74.

⁷⁵ In the wake of Bruckner this was held by G. DE PLINVAL, "Julien d'Éclane devant la Bible," in: *RSR* 47 (1959) 345-66, 362; for a critique cf. LÖSSL (n. 2) 24-30, 29.

⁷⁶ Cf. above n. 67 and M. WISSEMAN, *Schimpfworte in der Bibelübersetzung des Hieronymus* (BKAW NF 2/86; Heidelberg: Winter, 1992), 1: „Bis in unsere Gegenwart haftete Hieronymus das Vorurteil an, ein stark emotional geprägter, unsachlicher Streiter zu sein. Erst in den 70er Jahren geriet diese communis opinio ins Wanken und begann der Anschauung Platz zu machen, daß die Polemik des Kirchenvaters eine exegetische Methode von wissenschaftlich-theologischem Rang darstellt, die sich in dialogischer Form, d. h. in der Auseinandersetzung realisiert.“

⁷⁷ IUL. *Flor.* 1.107 (CSEL 85/1, 125).

⁷⁸ Thus BOUWMAN (n. 15) 71: Julian never missed an opportunity to show off his learnedness („mit seiner Gelehrsamkeit zu glänzen“).

Therefore, when he speaks, in this context, of excising certain phrases from the biblical canon, or of rephrasing others, in order to make them fit with Augustine's doctrines, he does not seriously suggest that such a course be followed. Rather, he scathingly protests that, if Augustine is not stopped, it might indeed come to such an unprecedented, absurd, and ultimately catastrophic development.⁷⁹ The very fabric of Scripture would be torn to shreds, if such ineptitude and blasphemy were allowed to have their way.

8. *Scriptura sui ipsius interpres*

In positive terms then, Scripture is to be explained through Scripture itself, as Julian argues in *Ad Florum* 3.38-49 citing in full Ez 18:1-30 and interpreting it.⁸⁰ Bruckner concedes that this passage supports Julian's position, and yet he calls it a bizarre piece of evidence based on a single testimony.⁸¹ In Bruckner's view the passage – he only cites Flor. 3.49 – does not prove that Julian attaches an equally high, let alone a higher, value to Scriptural arguments than to arguments based on mere reason. Bruckner's main mistake is that he does not consider the passage in its entirety, or notice the importance which Julian attaches to it, beginning from the lengthy citation.

Julian begins by recapitulating the historical setting of the biblical passage: The Israelites in exile tended to blame their forefathers for every ill they experienced; for it was they who had caused the exile through their wrongdoing. They dressed their complaint in a proverb: "The fathers ate sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." God, through the prophet, forbade the use of that proverb on the ground that every individual is God's, and therefore every individual is judged by his or her own merits: *omnes animae meae sunt. anima quae peccat ipsa morietur*. Julian also uses this statement to underpin creationism⁸²: God creates every being, body and soul, as an individual. Therefore every being is also judged individually, accor-

⁷⁹ Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 2.184, 216 (CSEL 85/1, 301.326-27); against BRUCKNER (n. 10) 105 n. 3.

⁸⁰ IUL. *Flor.* 3.38-49 (CSEL 85/1, 377-89).

⁸¹ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 105-106.

⁸² Cf. on this M. LAMBERIGTS, "Julian of Aeclanum: a Plea for a Good Creator," in: *Aug. (L)* 38 (1988) 5-24, 8-13; ID., "Julian and Augustine on the Origin of the Soul," in: *Aug. (L)* 44 (1996) 243-60, 244-49, especially on *Flor.* 3.44.

ding to his or her deeds. Julian formulates this belief not only in dogmatic, or philosophical terms, but also as a prophetic announcement in terms of a Scriptural hermeneutic. In Hebr 6:17-18, he points out, we read that in order to communicate to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his original decision God swore an oath. Thus, he concludes, we have two solid proofs for God's designs, his promise and his oath to fulfil the promise.⁸³

In his response to the passage, Augustine points out that Hebrews speaks of the New Covenant (*Nouum Testamentum*). Julian's answer to this is not extant, but it can be reconstructed from what we know of his prophetic hermeneutics. He could answer that it is precisely this promise of God which creates the dynamic between the Old and the New Testament. For Julian, the prophetic meaning of the passage is still very much intact: What Ezekiel said is still true.⁸⁴ God himself guides us to interpret Scripture through Scripture. He condemns certain things and approves of others, he argues for certain things and against others, and he makes promises and thereby challenges, but also encourages us, to believe him.

This does, of course, not affect the underlying reasonableness of the Scriptural message. God explains Scripture through Scripture according to the fundamental law of reason laid down by himself. We participate in it with our intellect, through which we understand God's exposition. We can never credibly and intelligibly say that we only believe something on grounds of Scriptural authority without at the same time understanding it, at least to some degree, by the power of our reason; for if we can believe it in the sense that we can justify our belief in it on rational grounds, there must also be something about it that can be understood, something rational.⁸⁵ This is not excessive rationalism, but an approach shared by most Early Christian interpreters of the Bible.

⁸³ IUL. Flor. 3.40-41 (CSEL 85/1, 382).

⁸⁴ Here Julian reveals himself as a disciple of the Antiochenes, whose concept of *θεωγία* states precisely that if a deeper (typological, allegorical etc.) meaning is discovered for an Old Testament passage, it does not eclipse the more basic, historical meaning. The basic meaning remains intact; cf. F. YOUNG, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 161-85; LÖSSL (n. 4) 172-80; for a similar view in Augustine cf. *ciu.* 17.3; 13.21 (CCL 48, 554 and 404); discussed in STARNES (n. 29) 346-47.

⁸⁵ IUL. Flor. 6.16 (PL 45, 1535): *nescio sane utrum hic iam coactus inopia, tam ineptum, tam imbecillum aliquid moliaris, ut dicas, nullis te quidem rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a deo conditum, sed ad hoc credendum sola esse lectionis auctoritate contentum.*

The principle *scriptura sui ipsius interpres*, first heard in the second century⁸⁶, was adapted from pagan philology. Aristarch of Alexandria applied it to Homer, Galen to Hippocrates. The apologists argued for the rationality of faith, Irenaeus integrated it with a Biblical hermeneutic. The dynamics of prophecy was strongly emphasized by Early Christian interpreters. Only Origen tended to suppress it in favour of spiritual and allegorical exegesis. But already Eusebius, and then in his wake Jerome, but especially the Antiochenes, emphatically reasserted the role of prophecy. Again, naturally, Augustine, too, interpreted the Bible in this way. The point here is not to deny that, but to show that in this regard there is no difference between Julian and Augustine, and that Julian attacks Augustine using principles which Augustine himself, in Julian's view, should be more careful to heed.

9. Scripture does not exist without tradition

In a certain sense Julian does not distinguish between Scripture and tradition. He rather understands Scripture essentially as Scripture in tradition, and tradition as proclaiming the message of Scripture according to the principle that Scripture does not contradict reason. Bruckner argues that some polemical passages in *Ad Florum* where Julian reflects on this relationship might suggest that he does not particularly value tradition, e. g., when he writes that Augustine cites Ambrose – literally: “produces snippets (*dictiunculas*) of some bishop” – because he has no “proper” arguments from Scripture at hand.⁸⁷ But Julian here mocks Augustine's ineptitude in handling tradition rather than tradition itself; and even if Julian here mocked tradition itself, would that not show an increased reverence for Scripture on his part, which Bruckner had just denied him? So Bruckner is wrong here on at least two counts.

First he argues that Julian devalues Scripture by denying it a separate authority over against reason. Then he finds that Julian holds the same position with regard to tradition: “He puts reason before tradition, and values tradition only in so far as it does not contradict reason. He does not reflect in principle on the relationship of Scripture

⁸⁶ For this and the following (references) cf. B. NEUSCHÄFER, *Origenes als Philologe* (SBA 18; Basel: Reinhardt, 1987) 279.

⁸⁷ Cf. IUL. *Flor.* 4.107.108.111 (PL 45, 1403.1405).

and tradition.”⁸⁸ Only once, in *Ad Florum* 4.111, does he make an ironic comment about Augustine’s attitude: Augustine would undoubtedly have attacked him with a higher authority than Ambrose, he notes, had one been available. This suggests that Julian is well aware of the fact that Augustine holds the authority of Scripture superior to that of tradition. It does not say, however, that he shared that opinion in every respect, nor, as Bruckner argues, that he contradicts it. Rather, he approaches it from a slightly different angle.

In several passages Julian attributes a more or less equal authority to Scriptural and Patristic testimonies, mainly because he understands the Patristic tradition as an exegetical tradition, as Scripture mediated through tradition. Thus he can write about Rom 7:15.18 “that it has always been interpreted by the catholic writers in such a way that it does not refer to the infamy of nature but to the ill will of (bad) habit.”⁸⁹ In *Ad Florum* 3.111 he lists in a single file the Prophets, the Evangelists, the Apostles, and the “thinkers sparkling with catholic sanity”, in particular John Chrysostom, Basil of Caesarea, and Theodore of Mopsuestia; and in *Ad Florum* 4.113 he mentions the “catholic men”, as if they were to be treated on the same level with the “Sacred Scriptures”.

What Bruckner fails to consider is that Julian, while he may not systematically distinguish Canonical Scriptures and catholic authors, he does offer a (salvation-) historical model: He relates the Old Testament Prophets and the New Testament Evangelists in terms of promise and fulfilment and holds the Apostles, above all Paul, and the later Christians to be witnesses to that reality, which their opponents constantly try to obscure and corrupt. Bruckner is right, when he writes that Julian understands Scripture and tradition as realities that are entirely in agreement with themselves, with each other, and with reason. However, he is wrong in saying that Julian sees Scripture and tradition as subject to mere reason. For Julian the heights of reason are inaccessible except through the thorough and well intended study of Scripture and tradition. However, Scripture and tradition, in Julian’s view, are not in competition with each other and with reason. Rather, they are complementing each other. Any contradictions found in parts of them can be amended, some admittedly less easily than others, by looking at other parts in the context of the whole.

⁸⁸ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 108.

⁸⁹ IUL. *Flor.* 3.178 (CSEL 85/1, 479).

Once more, this is not in fundamental disagreement with Augustine. The main reason why Augustine seems to emphasize Scripture *against* tradition, and Julian to put reason and tradition above Scripture is that Augustine prefers to rely solely on Scripture. He originally does not know Julian's way of arguing Scripture from tradition, but eventually allows himself to be "bullied" to it. His complaints about this, and Julian's polemical responses, clearly suggest that Augustine accepts that Julian's way of arguing Scripture is merely more broadly based than his, and not fundamentally different.

10. Julian's exegetical practice

To illustrate Julian's application of his exegetical principles Bruckner discusses his exegeses of Rom 4:13-6:19 in *Ad Florum* 2.151-236 and of 1 Cor 15:22 in *Ad Florum* 6.31⁹⁰. He then discusses a number of criteria on which Julian relies in his exegetical practice. He sees, of course, Julian's rationalism confirmed, but he also begins to see Julian's rationalist exegesis in a wider context, particularly in that of Antiochene exegesis, and even more specifically that of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Yet he is reluctant to highlight the connections, though he concedes that there are links. For instance, he wonders why Julian does not choose a reading of Rom 5:12 based on the Greek ἐφ' ᾧ, which would favour his understanding of the verse over against that of Augustine. Could he not draw it from Theodore?⁹¹ The answer is, indeed he could. As Augustine reports in *Contra Iulianum* 6.75, that version is available to Julian. But there is no need for him to use it for amending the reading *in quo*; for "in whom", locally speaking (in a metaphorical sense), as Augustine understands it, is not the only meaning attributable to this reading. It can, as Julian points out, and in this case it does, also mean "in regard to and because of whom", *propter quem*⁹², favouring an ethical over a metaphysical reading of the phrase, Adam as *exemplum* rather than as the metaphysical principle, "in whom" every human being sins. Julian could well have read the verse in the same textual tradition as Theodore. He also may have known Theodore's exegesis of the verse and he could even have held

⁹⁰ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 112-17.

⁹¹ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 113 n. 1.

⁹² Cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 213-14.

the opinion that *in quo*, understood as *in*, in the sense of *propter quem*, might be considered a fully acceptable rendering of ἐφ' ᾧ. However, all this is secondary to the fact that his own understanding of the passage is fully covered by the same text with which Augustine argues for *his* understanding, namely *in quo*.

The example suggests that Julian had a text to which he regarded as faithful, even authoritative, even in cases when it potentially favoured Augustine's exegesis. It could also go the other way. For Rom 5:15 Julian insisted – like the Vulgate, the Itala, Ambrosiaster and others – on the reading *in plures* in the sense of “grace abounded for even more” (than death, on account of sin), against Augustine, who for his version, *in multos*, referred to the Greek.⁹³ Julian's literalism and traditionalism is confirmed by his argument that even the order of words can suggest a certain exegesis, though he concedes that the context of a passage is important, too.⁹⁴ His faithfulness to his text has also been observed for the lemma of his commentaries, though Bruckner could not yet have known this.⁹⁵ This characteristic, too, Julian shares with the majority of Early Christian exegetes, but especially with the Antiochenes.⁹⁶

Bruckner was aware of similarities between the exegeses of Julian and Theodore of Mopsuestia, e. g. for Rom 5:13. But, he emphasizes, there are also differences. Julian's ingenious idea to conceive Adam's sin parallel to the sin under the law, e. g., is not found in Theodore.⁹⁷ This is true. Theodore understands ἄχρι as “while, so long as”⁹⁸. Julian understands usque as “until”, in the sense of “up to the point in time after which”. Here Julian sides with Augustine; for, not unlike Augustine, he sees, and accepts, rightly, that Paul makes a distinction between sin before and after the introduction of the law. Sin, he argues, as a way of evildoing, does exist before the

⁹³ IUL. *Flor.* 2.204-208 (CSEL 85/1, 315-18).

⁹⁴ IUL. *Flor.* 1.108 (CSEL 85/1, 127); 2.63 (CSEL 85/1, 209-210); BRUCKNER (n. 10) 118.

⁹⁵ Cf. BOUWMAN (n. 15) 71: „Er betrachtet seinen Schrifttext als ein fest Gegebenes, an dem er nicht rüttelt;“ LÖSSL (n. 2) 18 n. 41.

⁹⁶ Cf. CH. SCHÄUBLIN, *Untersuchungen zu Methode und Herkunft der antiochenischen Exegese* (Theoph. 23; Köln-Bonn: Hanstein, 1974); 123-38; R. BULTMANN, *Die Exegese des Theodor von Mopsuestia* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984) 46.

⁹⁷ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 114 n. 1.

⁹⁸ Cf. U. WICKERT, *Studien zu den Pauluskommentaren Theodors von Mopsuestia als Beitrag zum Verständnis der antiochenischen Theologie* (BZNW 27; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1962) 124.

law, even though, at that stage, it cannot be identified as trespassing the law; for the law does not (yet) exist. Theodore, in contrast, seems to have assumed that somehow some law (natural or divine) always existed. Thus he “misses the point” (Wickert) which Paul wanted to make. But one must not conclude that Julian does not know, or not approve of, Theodore’s exegesis and its tradition. Nothing would have prevented him from judging Theodore’s exegesis in a particular case as wanting. It does not affect any of his central issues⁹⁹, and other Antiochenes did see Paul’s point.¹⁰⁰ However, what is interesting here is that Julian amends his exegesis in order to make it more similar to Augustine’s as well as more congenial to Paul’s theology. Clearly, his intention is to take the best of Paul and Augustine without subscribing to what he sees as Augustine’s problematic views.

On Rom 5:16 Bruckner observes that, unlike Theodore, Julian does not assume that grace “recapitulates” history thus saving humanity “retroactively” from sin.¹⁰¹ But Bruckner does not consider that Julian does insist that grace works universally and simultaneously in history through Christ, Adam’s future form (*forma futuri*), who frees human beings from every type of sin, whether before or under the law, and, “as the fullness of time approaches, the perfect norm of justice is reflected in Christ, and the one who was predicted as the

⁹⁹ Similarly, his treatment of Rom 4:13-32 in *Turb.* 1.54 (CCL 88, 352-53) and *Flor.* 2.153-62 (CSEL 85/1, 276-83) shows that he can accept Augustine’s exegesis in part without subscribing to all of its premises; for he understands the logic of Paul’s arguments as “rhetorical”, i. e. “elliptic”, in the sense that certain intermediate steps, which would be necessary for a full logical structure of the arguments, are missing and have to be supplemented by the exegete. In *Flor.* 2.158 he puts it as follows: “One has to understand the habit of Scripture that not everything is constantly denied which is not constantly mentioned. We must supplement with our intellect that which is not always made explicit in the text.” (In Tertullian, by the way, we find the exact opposite principle; *monog.* 4.6 (CSEL 76, 50.28): *negat scriptura, quod non notat.*) Thus with regard to the law Julian argues that it is, of course, not identical with sin. It is holy (*Flor.* 6.40). Paul, he argues, implies that God did not introduce the law to increase sin, but to provide a structure for faith. It is an extension of the order of creation. Faith needs it as a frame of reference. But it is, and has always been, worthless without faith; it was never designed to function mechanically, whether in the case of circumcision (*Flor.* 2.159), or in the case of infant baptism (*Flor.* 2.161). It was, from the very outset, intended for rational beings, who can be held responsible for their acts.

¹⁰⁰ Like Diodore of Tarsus; cf. WICKERT (n. 98) 124 n. 38.

¹⁰¹ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 114-15.

father of the future age is confirmed as the rewarder¹⁰² of the saints preceeding as well as following him."¹⁰³ This may not amount to a fully developed doctrine of recapitulation, but it displays at least a few significant characteristics of such a doctrine, e. g. it is universal and dynamic. On the other hand the fact that Theodore uses the expression ἀνακεφαλῶσις πάντων from time to time does not mean that his theology is centred around the concept of recapitulation.¹⁰⁴ This concept is simply too loose to be applied here for the comparison of Theodore's and Julian's exegetical approaches. A much more detailed analysis is required reviewing Julian's and Theodore's exegeses case by case.

Similarly, Bruckner's observation that Julian, in his exegesis of Rom 5:17, understands death as eternal punishment, while Theodore speaks of it as the temporal, physical death.¹⁰⁵ The truth is that this is not generally the case. E. g. in his *Epistula ad Rufum* 18 Julian expresses the view that death may not always be evil in itself. On the other hand Theodore seems sometimes inclined to believe that death is not always indifferent.¹⁰⁶ This aspect of uncertainty in evaluating death in Julian and Theodore is important in contrast to Augustine, who has a clear notion of the evil nature of (spiritual and physical) death as a consequence of original sin. In fact, it is his doctrine of original sin that helps Augustine to grasp such a clear concept of death, while it may be precisely the absence of such a doctrine in Theodore and Julian which is responsible for their relative uncertainty about the nature of death.

¹⁰² *Remunerator*, first attested to in TERT. apol. 36.3 (CCL 1, 147), who speaks of *deus exactor et remunerator indifferentis benignitatis*.

¹⁰³ IUL. *Flor.* 2.188 (CSEL 85/1, 306); cf. Gal 4:4 with its use in *Flor.* 4.49 (PL 45,1367): *ut nobis daret exemplum et sequeremur uestigia eius qui peccatum non fecit, nec inuentus est dolus in ore eius*, and Col 1:18 in *Flor.* 6.37 (PL 45, 1595): *deus et contineat cunctos, et compleat*. Julian conceives Christ from the point of view of the disciple, but also from an eschatological perspective similarly Theodore of Mopsuestia; cf. WICKERT (n. 98) 141.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. WICKERT (n. 98) 6. The expression is found in Eph 1:10 and variously employed by Early Christian writers, especially by Irenaeus; cf. U. HAMM, "Irenaeus von Lyon," in: DÖPP-GEERLINGS (n. 46) 351-55.

¹⁰⁵ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 115 n. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. LÖSSL (n. 4) 214.218.276-77; WICKERT (n. 98) 91-91.101-120.133-34.

Bruckner also thinks that Julian has a rather more radical view of baptism than Theodore. In Julian's view, he argues, the baptised can in fact lead a life without sin, while according to Theodore the typus of baptism allows the baptised merely to imitate the just life without actually attaining it yet, in this, earthly, life.¹⁰⁷ This understanding of Theodore's concept of baptism and its effect upon life is closely linked to the way one conceives Theodore's concept of death; for if one finds that Theodore does not consistently speak of death in terms of physical death, one may also discover that when he speaks of the future life, he does not always mean the afterlife. The Christian life is not "merely", it is already, in this, earthly, life, the image („Abbild“) of eternal life in heaven, in a true sense, as anticipation of, and participation in, eternal life in heaven.¹⁰⁸ As Theodore must not be mistaken for an otherworldly escapist, Julian must not be seen as a Stoic rationalist. His stress on the real possibility of a good life based on free-will decisions already here on earth is not intended to replace or to suppress the eschatological dimension of the Christian faith. On the contrary, Julian sees it as a necessary aspect of the reality of that dimension, already present here and now.¹⁰⁹

Thus, although Bruckner saw the similarities between Julian's and Theodore's exegeses, he did not emphasize them. In fact, he rather tended to suppress or deny them. He rightly emphasized their rationalism¹¹⁰, but he failed to put this in context, i. e. with the rationalism of Early Christian exegesis in general, including Augustine's, and with the traditions which lay behind the core issues of their theologies, their doctrines of God, creation, Christ, nature, free will, sin and grace. Bruckner's account remains the seminal treatment of Julian's exegesis and Biblical hermeneutics, in spite of its predating the discoveries of the twentieth century. But it must be used with caution, as it also frequently misrepresents some vital aspects of the exegetical dimension of the second Pelagian controversy.

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¹⁰⁷ BRUCKNER (n. 10) 115 n. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. S. GERBER, *Theodor von Mopsuestia und das Nicänum. Studien zu den katechetischen Homilien* (VigChrSuppl 51; Leiden: Brill, 2000) 213-14.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. IUL. Flor. 2.226-27 (CSEL 85/1, 341-42).

¹¹⁰ Cf. BRUCKNER (n. 10) 123 n. 3.