


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Die Augustinusvita von Benozzo Gozzoli aus der Kirche S. Agostino in San Gimignano

Matthias Strauss

Arbeit
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Magister Artium

Wer mit Anstrengungen den Pfad der Tugend erklimmt,
obgleich er, wie es heißt, rauh und dornenreich ist,
findet sich schließlich am Ende des Steigens
in einer weiten Ebene voll der ersehnten Seligkeit.
Und wenn er in die Tiefe zurückschaut und den schwierigen
und unter Gefahren zurückgelegten Weg überblickt,
dann dankt er Gott, der ihn heil hierher geleitet,
und preist in höchster Befriedigung jene Schwierigkeiten,
die ihn vorher so verdrossen.
Und wenn er sich voll Freude über die schöne Gegenwart
von den überstandenen Mühseligkeiten erholt,
bemüht er sich, ohne daß ihn das Mühe scheint, den anderen zu zeigen,
wie Hitze, Frost, Schweiß, Hunger, Durst und andere Unannehmlichkeiten,
die man erträgt, um die Tugend zu erringen, von der Armut befreien
und zu jenem sicheren und ruhigen Leben führen,
dessen sich der arbeitsame Benozzo Gozzoli in hohem Maße erfreute.

Giorgio Vasari

1. Einleitung

Hört man den Namen Benozzo Gozzoli, so ruft dieser bei vielen lediglich die Erinnerung an den "Zug der Magier" in der Hauskapelle des Palazzo Medici-Riccardi wach. Der Name Gozzoli, häufig gerade noch geläufig, kann in vielen Fällen nicht mehr zugeordnet werden. Nennt man die Augustinusvita von Gozzoli in San Gimignano, so ist diese meist übersehen und unbekannt geblieben.

Die Intention meiner Arbeit ist es, die Leistung von Benozzo Gozzoli in San Gimignano zu erhellen. Dabei soll der Schwerpunkt auf einer formalen Analyse des Zyklus liegen. Wesentlicher Grund dafür ist die mangelnde Bearbeitung in dieser Hinsicht, die bis in die jüngste Literatur hinein zu verfolgen ist. Die Diskrepanz in der Literatur, die Gozzoli meist abwertend als eher mittelmässig einschätzte und die ihm aber zugleich stetig ein grosses erzählerisches Talent zuweist, ist zu gross, als dass sie in dieser Arbeit nicht von Grund auf analysiert werden sollte.

In Zusammenhang mit der formalen Analyse des Zyklus wird ein weiterer Schwerpunkt auf der Frage nach der Narration liegen. Dabei ist die Begriffsfrage zu lösen und anschliessend auf den Zyklus zu übertragen. Dem Zyklus zugehörend sind die ausführlichen Bildunterschriften, die meines Wissens noch nicht in Bezug auf die Bilder erörtert wurden. Sie stehen den Fresken erklärend bei, erläutern jedoch nicht in jedem Fall das im Bild Gesehene. Warum gerade die vorhandenen lateinischen Erklärungen eingefügt sind, und warum es in den Bildern des Zyklus häufig schriftliche Zitatanklänge gibt, gehört in den Bereich dieser formalen Analyse.

Folgen sollen die Einflüsse auf Gozzolis Werk und seine Zyklen vor und nach San Gimignano. Dabei ist es wichtig, die Augustinerzyklen im Italien des 15. Jahrhunderts miteinzubeziehen. In diesem Bereich stütze ich mich auf die Arbeit von Jeanne und Pierre Courcelle, die Herausragendes für die Erforschung der Augustinusikonographie geleistet haben.

Den Kapiteln der Zyklusanalyse vorangestellt ist die Geschichte der Observanzbewegung in der Toskana sowohl in Hinsicht auf den Augustiner-Eremiten-Orden, wie auch auf den Auftraggeber Fra Domenico Strambi. Des weiteren wird auf den humanistischen Zeitgeist in Gozzolis Umfeld einzugehen sein. Diese Kapitel stellen einen wesentlichen Aspekt zum Verständnis des Zyklus dar, sollen hier aber nur als ein Ausblick verstanden werden, da diese noch einen immensen Forschungsbedarf beinhalten.

Stand der Literatur zu den Fresken in San Gimignano

Die Kunst Gozzolis scheint erst in letzter Zeit mehr Interesse hervorzurufen. Es ist zu erkennen, dass die Fresken in San Gimignano, wenn überhaupt erwähnt, öfter nicht beachtet wurden. Dies beweisen zahlreiche Beschreibungsfehler, die sich wie ein roter Faden durch die Literatur ziehen.[1] Burckhardt bekennt im 'Cicerone' als einziger: "Seine Fresken in Montefalco und San Gimignano kenne ich nicht."[2]

Vasari ist der erste, der Gozzolis Werk kritisch erwähnt, ihm aber zugleich Anerkennung "per la buona maniera e qualità sue"[3] zuspricht. Vasaris Kritik an Gozzoli bezieht sich häufig auf die Figurenzeichnung, beruht im eigentlichen jedoch immer wieder darauf, dass er nicht nachvollziehen konnte, dass ein Florentiner Maler in der 'zweitklassigen' Provinz malte. Vasaris unterschwellige Kritik wurde bis in unser Jahrhundert hinein von vielen Kunstwissenschaftlern bewusst oder unbewusst übernommen.

Die Beurteilung von Gozzolis Werk beginnt Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts mit Wingenroth[4] und Venturi[5], die beide eine stetige Verbesserung in Gozzolis Arbeiten erkennen, bis hin zu Berenson[6] und Grassi[7], die ihn als einen eher mittelmässigen Künstler bewerten. Herausragende Beschreibungen liefern um 1900 Crowe und Cavalcaselle[8] sowie Lagaisse[9].

[1] J.A. Crowe / G.B. Cavalcaselle: Geschichte der italienischen Malerei, Bd. III., Leipzig, 1870, S. 270. Luigi Pecori: Storia della Terra di San Gimignano, Roma, Neudruck von 1975, S. 534 f. Die Beschreibungsfehler beziehen sich im Wesentlichen auf die Inschrift im Taufbecken der Szene der "Taufe Augustinus", worin einige die Inschrift auf einer Vase zu erkennen glauben, und auf die erste Szene der "Einschulung", in der die mittig stehenden Schüler häufig als Sklaven bezeichnet werden.

[2] Jacob Burckhardt: Der Cicerone, Eine Anleitung zum Genuss der Kunstwerke Italiens, Neudruck der Urausgabe von 1855, Stuttgart, 1978, S.761.

[3] Giorgio Vasari: Le vite de' piu eccellenti pittori, scoltori ed architetti, hrsg. von Gaetano Milanesi, Firenze, Bd. III, 1878, S. 45-68.

[4] Max Wingenroth: Die Jugendwerke des Benozzo Gozzoli, Heidelberg, 1897.

[5] Adolfo Venturi: Beato Angelico e Benozzo Gozzoli, in: L`Arte 4, 1901, S. 1-29.

[6] Bernhard Berenson: Die florentinischen Maler der Renaissance, übers. von Robert West, Zürich, 1966.

[7] L. Grassi: L`arte del Quattrocento a Firenze e Siena, Roma, 1957.

[8] Crowe / Cavalcaselle, 1870, S. 262-284.

[9] Marcelle Lagaisse: Benozzo Gozzoli, Les traditions trécentistes et les tendances nouvelles chez un peintre Florentin du Quattrocento, Paris, 1934.

Eine Abhandlung über die Ikonographie des Heiligen Augustinus von Courcelle[10] aus dem Jahr 1969 beleuchtet den Zusammenhang der Augustinuszyklen in Europa. Dabei liegt ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf der Augustinusvita in San Gimignano. 1992 wird erstmals ein Katalog von Gozzolis Gesamtwerk von Rizzo[11] veröffentlicht. Esche[12] setzt sich in einer speziellen Fragestellung über das Selbstverständnis und die Zielsetzung der Augustiner-Eremiten mit dem Zyklus auseinander. 1996 veröffentlichte Cole Ahl[13] eine Monographie über Benozzo Gozzoli, in der sie sich ebenfalls mit dem Freskenzyklus in San Gimignano beschäftigt. Ihr Forschungsschwerpunkt liegt bei den Auftraggebern. Erstaunlicherweise wurde der Zyklus nie anhand von Bildanalysen und Bildbeschreibungen untersucht.

[10] Jeanne und Pierre Courcelle: Iconographie de Saint Augustin, Les Cycles du XVe Siècle, Paris, 1969.

[11] Anna Padoa-Rizzo: Benozzo Gozzoli, Catalogo completo dei dipinti, Firenze, 1992.

[12] Christiane Esche: Selbstverständnis und Zielsetzung der Augustinereremiten im 15. Jahrhundert am Beispiel der Fresken der Augustinusvita von Benozzo Gozzoli in S. Agostino in S. Gimignano, in: Institut d'Etudes Augustiniennes, Recherches Augustiniennes Volume XXV, Paris, 1991.

[13] Diane Cole Ahl: Benozzo Gozzoli, London, 1996.

2. Der Augustiner-Eremiten-Orden

Das Leben des Heiligen Augustinus können wir als bekannt voraussetzen. Anders ist es mit der Geschichte des Augustiner-Eremiten-Ordens. Die Eremiten des Augustiner-Ordens kamen 1272 nach San Gimignano. Der Orden wurde 1243 durch Papst Innozenz IV. anerkannt. Er wünschte, dass die autonomen toskanischen Einsiedeleien in einem Orden zusammengefasst würden. Sie sollten ihren eigenen Regeln, der des Heiligen Augustinus, unterstellt werden und einem General Prior Gehorsam leisten.[14] Der Orden der Augustiner-Eremiten in der Toskana war in drei Provinzen aufgeteilt: Lucca, Pisa und Siena. Am 9. April 1256 beschloss Papst Alexander IV., diesem vier weitere anzugliedern, um der Kraft des Ordens mehr Schwung zu verleihen. Daraufhin expandierte der Augustiner-Eremiten-Orden sehr schnell.[15] Anfang des 15. Jahrhunderts verloren die Ordensbrüder die Ideale des Augustinus und seine Regel aus den Augen, so dass es immer dringender wurde, eine Reform anzustreben.[16]

2.1. Die Observanzbewegung der Augustiner-Eremiten der Toskana im 15. Jahrhundert

"Wohl wäre an sich für Augustinus ein Weltleben in rein christlicher Gesinnung möglich, aber es scheitert immer wieder an den Widerständen und Versuchungen des realen Lebens. So ist schließlich doch das Kloster das eigentliche Ideal, die wahre respublica der Christen [...]."[17]

Trotz der Nähe zum Mutterhaus in Lecceto, das zum Haupthaus der Observanzbewegung für die Augustiner-Eremiten wurde, gelang es nicht, die Mönche in San Gimignano auf den alten Weg der "vita communis" zu bringen und sie der Regel von Augustinus zu unterstellen.[18] Aufgrunddessen beschloss 1457 das "Consiglio de'priori", einen Mönch des eigenen

[14] David Gutierrez OSA: Storie dell`Ordine di S. Agostino, Volume I, parte prima: Gli Agostiniani nel Medioevo (1256-1355), Roma, 1986, S. 56-67.
[15] Ebd. S. 67.
[16] A. Landucci: Sacra Ilicetana Selva, sive origo et chronicon breve coenobii et congregationis de Iliceto in Hetruria Ord. E.S.P. in Tuscia, Siena, 1653, S.136. K. Walsh: The Observant Congregations of the Augustinian Friars in Italy, c. 1385-c. 1465, Oxford, 1972.
[17] Ernst Troeltsch: Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter, Im Anschluß an die Schrift "De Civitate Dei", München, 1915, S. 46.
[18] Die Augustiner-Eremiten der Toskana pochten lange Zeit auf ihre Selbständigkeit und versuchten sich vom Mutterhaus in Lecceto zu befreien.

Hauses für die Reform in San Gimignano einzusetzen.[19] Die Kongregation bekam daraufhin im Jahre 1481 den Status eines observanten Ordens. "*Reformierte Konvente schliessen sich zu eigenen Verbänden innerhalb des Ordens zusammen, so dass praktisch ein Orden im Orden entsteht. Ähnlich verläuft die Reform bei den Augustiner-Eremiten.*"[20] Trotz der Einsetzung eines Priors rebellierten die Mönche von S. Agostino weiter gegen Lecceto und deren strikte Vorschriften. Eine päpstliche Bulle vom 7. September 1499 führte das Kloster endgültig unter die Herrschaft von Lecceto.[21] Elm betont, dass die Reformbewegung des 15. Jahrhunderts sich stark von der des frühen und späten Mittelalters unterschied: "*Die Franziskaner und Dominikaner, die Augustiner-Eremiten [...] bildeten einen Lebensstil aus, der gekennzeichnet ist durch den Willen zur Innerlichkeit, den Rückzug aus der Welt, die Revision des Verhältnisses zu Theologie und Wissenschaft, die Vorliebe für das individuelle Gebet und die Meditation* [...]."[22] Der Streit innerhalb der Observanzbewegung ging hauptsächlich um die geistige Erneuerung des Klosterlebens.

Das Studium der Wissenschaften war hier für viele Reformer unbedingte Voraussetzung. Besonders die Augustiner-Eremiten traten hierbei in den Vordergrund. Es wurden neue Bildungsnormen für das Klosterleben aufgestellt, besonders wichtig war die Rolle der Renaissance und die humanistische Bewegung. Begriffe wie "*Renaissance monasticism*" und "*Klosterhumanismus*" wurden von der Forschung geprägt.[23]

Parallel dazu verlief die Reformbemühung in Richtung einer materiellen Erneuerung der Klöster. So wurde in San Gimignano die Kirche erneuert und gleichzeitig zur Freskenausmalung Gozzolis ein neuer

[19] Pecori, 1975, S.415-16, n.1, citing letter of December 15, 1457, to Fra Domenico.

[20] Constance Proksch: Klosterreform und Geschichtsschreibung im Spätmittelalter, Wien, 1994, S.29.

[21] Pecori, 1975, S. 416-18. L. Bertoni: Il declino di un' Òsservanza, San Martino in Siena della Congregazione leccetana (1522-1620), in: Analecta Augustiniana, XXIX, 1966, S. 317 f.

[22] K. Elm: Reform- und Observanzbestrebungen im spätmittelalterlichen Ordenswesen., in: ders. (Hrsg.), Reformbemühungen und Observanzbestrebungen, Göttingen, 1986, S. 16 f.

[23] Über die Einflussnahme von Renaissance und Humanismus für die Mönchsorden Vgl.: Paul Oskar Kristeller: The Contribution of Religious Orders to Renaisance Thought and Learning, in: The American Benedictine Review, 21, 1970, S. 1-55.

Kreuzgang in Auftrag gegeben.[24] Schreiner erläutert, dass zur Reformierung der Klöster das Geschichtsbewusstsein und die Geschichtsschreibung in einem starken Zusammenhang stehen.[25] Die Klostergeschichtsschreibung bestand hauptsächlich aus der Lebensbeschreibung des heiligen Klostergründers, so auch in San Gimignano, wo der Auftrag für die Fresken der Augustinusvita genau auf den Zeitpunkt der Klosterreform fiel. Die Vita von Augustinus hat einerseits vorbildhafte Bedeutung, sie symbolisiert die besondere Würde des Ordens, andererseits wird sie zur Legitimation und Aufwertung des Klosters in dessen Geschichte eingebunden.[26] "*Zeiten der Reform sind stets auch Zeiten eines gesteigerten historischen Interesses: Erneuerung des klösterlichen Lebens und Rückbesinnung auf geschichtliche Ursprünge und Traditionen bedingen sich wechselseitig.*"[27]

Wichtig erscheint hier, dass in der Observanzbewegung in San Gimignano die Renaissance und der Humanismus im Orden an Einfluss gewannen. Bemerkbar macht sich dies auch im Freskenzyklus des Heiligen Augustinus. Eine Erneuerung des Klosterlebens, die Rückkehr zu den Idealen der Anfänge des abendländischen Mönchstums drückt sich am deutlichsten in der gemalten Vita von Augustinus aus. "Eine Erneuerung des Klosterlebens war nach der Vorstellung der spätmittelalterlichen Reformer nur durch die Rückkehr zu den ursprünglichen Prinzipien monastischer Lebensführung erreichbar. Das bedeutete, dass die Mönche, die in der Frühzeit vom Ordensstifter aufgezeichnete Regel wieder gewissenhaft einhalten sollten, so dass sich jener für die Vergangenheit überlieferte vorbildliche Zustand des Ordens erneut einstellen konnte."[28]

Im Zyklus in San Gimignano findet sich diese Einstellung wieder. Wichtig dabei scheint auch, dass der Reformer und Initiator des Zyklus von San Gimignano, Fra Domenico Strambi, sich in den Fresken Gozzolis als

[24] Saturninus Lopez O.E.S.A. : Chartularium Conventus Sancti Geminiani Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini. Edited by P. , Romae, 1930, S. 40. Proksch, 1994, S. 8.
[25] K. Schreiner: Erneuerung durch Erinnerung, Reformstreben, Geschichtsbewußtsein und Geschichtsschreibung im benediktischen Mönchtum Südwestdeutschlands an der Wende vom 15. zum 16. Jahrhundert, in: K. Andermann (Hrsg.), Historiographie am Oberrhein im späten Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit, Sigmaringen, 1988 (Berrh. Stud., Bd. 7), S. 35-87.
[26] R. Sprandel: Gesellschaft und Literatur, Göttingen, 1983, S. 61. F.-J. Schmale: Mentalität und Berichtshorizont, Wiesbaden, 1987, S. 11f.
[27] Proksch, 1994, S. 26.
[28] Ebd. S. 103.

Portraitfigur wahrscheinlich mehrmals findet und in der Inschrift der "Abreise aus Rom" ausdrücklich genannt wird. So stellt sich der Reformer als direkter Nachfolger des 'Klostergründers' Augustinus dar. Dies war nicht eine Vermessenheit des Priors, sondern entsprach dem Verständnis seiner Zeit. "*Die Fürsorge der Äbte für angemessene Formen der Gottesverehrung war für Mit- und Nachwelt ein Beweis vorbildlicher Amtsführung. In den Zusammenhang der geistlichen Wirkungsweise des Abtes gehört die Anschaffung von Kleinodien, Altargerät und Kirchenbildern zur Verschönerung der Klosterkirche.*"[29] Fra Domenico Strambi, dem Reformprior von S. Agostino in San Gimignano, kommt sicher eine wichtige, wenn nicht wesentliche Bedeutung für die Reform des Klosters zu. Ebenso hatte er einen Anteil an der Ausführung des Freskenzyklus von Gozzoli, den es noch zu erforschen gilt.

[29] Ebd. S. 216.

3. Der Auftraggeber Fra Domenico Strambi

Cole Ahl kommt sicher eine grosse Bedeutung in der Aufarbeitung des Lebens von Fra Domenico Strambi zu. Der Auftraggeber war lange Zeit bekannt, jedoch wusste man über seinen Lebenslauf relativ wenig. Erst die Forschungen von Cole Ahl führten zu neuen Erkenntnissen in diesem Bereich.[30] Weder sein Geburts-, noch Sterbedatum ist bekannt. Erstmals wird er in einer Quelle von 1445 genannt.[31] 1450 wird Strambi mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Kommune zum Studium der Theologie an die Sorbonne nach Paris geschickt, wo er sich am 5. September als Referendar eingeschrieben hat.[32] Ein Brief, den er vier Jahre später an seine Geldgeber schrieb, beweist den längeren Studienaufenthalt in Paris: "*annis quinque ad sacras litteras incumbens, die et nocte vigilare non desino, qui extra lares, patrios...*".[33] Im März 1457 beendete er sein Studium mit dem Titel eines Doktors der Theologie. Bereits neun Monate später wurde Strambi vom Prior in San Gimignano nach Hause gerufen.[34]

In der Folgezeit bis 1462 geben die Quellen keine weitere Auskunft. **Abb. 13a**
Es ist jedoch bekannt, dass Strambi durch den Generalprior des Ordens nach London geschickt worden ist. Ein Dokument vom Januar 1464 belegt seine Rückkehr aus England nach San Gimignano. Acht Tage später wurde er zum Prior von S. Agostino ernannt.[35] In der Szene der "Taufe des Augustinus" findet sich das Datum 1. April 1464. Strambi muss also sofort nach seiner Ernennung zum Prior den Auftrag für den Freskenzyklus an Benozzo Gozzoli vergeben haben. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt war der Maler noch in Florenz tätig.[36] 1470 verliess Strambi erneut San Gimignano, um nach England zu reisen, wo er zwei Jahre später zum Vikar der Augustiner in London ernannt wurde.[37]

Am 21. Mai 1478 berief man ihn zurück in die Toskana, wo er am 25. April 1479 durch den Generalprior Ambrogio da Cora zum Vikar der Provinz Siena ernannt wurde. Nach Aufenthalten in Lucca und Siena kehrte er am 3. Mai 1481 nach San Gimignano zurück. Die Quellen

[30] Cole Ahl, 1996, S.121 ff.
[31] Saturninus Lopez, O.S.A.: Chartularium Conventus Sancti Geminiani, O.E.S.A., Rom, 1929, S. 95.
[32] H. Dénifle: Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, IV, Paris, 1897, S.692.
[33] Brief vom 3. Juli 1454, in: San Gimignano, Biblioteca Comunale, Archivio del Comune, NN. 124,G. 1452-1456.
[34] Pecori, 1975, S. 415.
[35] Cole Ahl, 1996, S. 122.
[36] Padoa-Rizzo, 1992, S.150.
[37] Cole Ahl, 1996, S. 51 f.

belegen seine Freude über die Veränderung in der Kirche, die er verschönert hatte: "nostri templi Heremitarum Sancti Augustini, picturas iocalia aliaque ornamenta" [...] "ed quid nobis de tot ornamentis? Quid de toto ipso conventu sine te?"[38]Endlich wurde die Jurisdiktion von Lecceto vom Kloster anerkannt, und Strambi verliess erneut San Gimignano, um nach Paris an die Sorbonne zu gehen.[39] Daraufhin verliert sich die Spur des Priors von S. Agostino.

Während Cole Ahl schreibt, dass der Tod Fra Domenico Strambis nicht bekannt sei, nennt Degenhart ohne Hinweise auf die Quelle in einer Fussnote 1488 als Todesjahr Strambis.[40]

3.1. Strambis Einfluss auf die Augustinusvita von Gozzoli

"*Wenn man uns aber nicht mehr nach dem fragt, was offen vor unseren Sinnen liegt, sondern nach dem, was wir früher einmal mit unseren Sinnen wahrgenommen haben, dann sprechen wir nicht mehr von den Dingen selbst, sondern von den Bildern, die sie uns eingeprägt haben und die unser Gedächtnis aufgenommen hat. Und ich kenne wirklich nur den einen Grund, weshalb wir diese Dinge für wahr ausgeben können, während wir doch etwas anschauen, was nicht die Wahrheit ist: Wir behaupten ja nicht, sie zu sehen und wahrzunehmen, sondern wir behaupten nur, sie gesehen und wahrgenommen zu haben. So tragen wir diese Bilder gewissermassen als Beweise früherer Wahrnehmungen in den Kammern unseres Gedächtnisses. Und wenn wir sie in unserer Vorstellung betrachten, dann kann unser Gewissen ruhig sein, und wir lügen nicht, wenn wir davon sprechen. Aber nur für uns sind diese Bilder Beweise. Denn wenn mein Zuhörer jemals als persönlicher Zeuge wahrgenommen hat, wovon ich spreche, dann wird er nicht durch meine Worte unterrichtet, sondern er erkennt es selbst mittels der Bilder, die auch ihm eingeprägt sind.*"[41]

Ohne das Verständnis über das Leben des Auftraggebers und die Umstände, die Strambi inspiriert haben, den Zyklus zu initiieren, würde ein

[38] San Gimignano, Biblioteca Comunale, Archivio del Comune, NN 133 (Libro di deliberazioni e riforme Q 1480-1484), 68 v.
[39] Pecori, 1975, S. 416.
[40] Bernhard Degenhart / Annegrit Schmitt: Corpus der italienischen Zeichnungen, (1300-1450), Bd. II, Katalog 168-635, Berlin, 1968, S. 473. Vgl. Cole Ahl, 1996, S. 122.
[41] Aurelius Augustinus: De Magistro 11 (38) - 12 (40)

wesentlicher Bestandteil der Erkenntnis zum Zustandekommen der Fresken Gozzolis fehlen. Sicher hat Strambi einen grossen Beitrag zur Gestaltung des Zyklus geleistet. Er war ein humanistisch gebildeter Mann, der an der Sorbonne studiert hatte und Aufträge für den Orden in England übernahm. Der Zyklus reflektiert die theologischen Ideale des Heiligen Augustinus und der christlichen Mönchsgemeinschaft. Das Verständnis der Fresken hängt eng mit der Reform des Klosters zusammen. Strambi, der die Ordensgemeinschaft reformieren sollte, erneuerte gleichzeitig das Kloster und verschönerte es. Das Programm der Augustinusvita zeigte den Mönchen in schriftlicher und vor allem bildlicher Form die Ideale von Schülerschaft, die in keinem der vorangegangenen Zyklen in so deutlicher und häufiger Weise dargestellt wurden. Die Klostergemeinschaft sollte wieder zurück zu den Wurzeln geführt werden. Dies konnte am ehesten gelingen, wenn man ihr das Leben ihres vermeintlichen Klostergründers und seine Ideale vor Augen führte.

Inwieweit nun Strambi in die Arbeit von Gozzoli eingegriffen hat, ist noch nicht nachgewiesen. Es ist anzunehmen, dass der Prior, in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Künstler, die Themen des Zyklus und deren Abfolge vorgegeben hat. Allein durch das Theologiestudium muss er die Texte der 'Confessiones' und der 'Legenda Aurea' gekannt haben. Das Kloster hatte eine eigene Bibliothek, in der diese Texte vorhanden waren.[42] Die im Zyklus dargestellten Episoden des Lebens des Heiligen Augustinus sind sehr sachlich gehalten, kein einziges postumes Wunder wird gezeigt. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf der Lehre und Wissenschaft, auch dies könnte ein Einfluss Strambis sein.

Ein weiteres Zeichen der Einflussnahme durch den Auftraggeber können die Episoden, die Monika zeigen, sein. In keinem der vorhergehenden Zyklen wurde die Rolle Monikas derart ausführlich erläutert. In fünf Szenen wird sie als geistige Kraft gezeigt, die hinter Augustinus steht. Lange Zeit war Monika in der Geschichte fast unbekannt. Die Wichtigkeit, die sie im Zyklus von San Gimignano spielt, spiegelt vielleicht deren Neuentdeckung in geistlicher Sicht ab 1430 wieder. Ihre Reliquien wurden von Ostia in die Kirche San Trionfo nach Rom gebracht. Papst Martin V. definierte Monikas Rolle, vor allem ihre mütterliche

[42] Biblioteca Comunale, San Gimignano, NN 121 (Libro di deliberazioni e provvisioni 1439-1444), 156r-157r.

Fürsorge, neu. Er ernannte Monika zur 'Mutter aller Augustiner'. Kurz vor Beginn der Arbeiten am Zyklus von Gozzoli 1455 wurden ihre Reliquien in eine Kapelle in S. Agostino in Rom transferiert, was den Anfang eines gesteigerten Monika-Kultes bedeutete.[43]

Ob der Einfluss Strambis auch auf die gestalterischen Elemente des Zyklus auszuweiten ist, darf bezweifelt werden. Schon allein, dass Strambi Benozzo Gozzoli beauftragte, der kurz vorher für die Medici gearbeitet hatte, zeigt, dass er einen erfahrenen und bekannten Künstler engagieren wollte. Gozzoli hatte durch seine monumentalen Arbeiten, die er vorher geleistet hatte, sein Können unter Beweis gestellt und brachte sicher die Bildideen und Ausführungen mit in die gemeinsame Arbeit von Auftraggeber und Künstler ein.

Strambis Rolle in S. Agostino ist sicher gross gewesen, dies beweist auch die Anerkennung die er in seiner Zeit erhielt. In einer Chronik von Lecceto beschreibt der Ordenshistoriker Ambrogio Landucci Fra Domenico als einen, "*cui non immerito tribuitur nomen Fundatoris vetustissimi ac nobilissimi Monasterii Sancti Augustini*".[44]

Es ist beachtenswert, dass überhaupt noch Dokumente dieser Zeit vorhanden sind, denn nach dem Einmarsch Napoleons in Italien wurde auch das Kloster in San Gimignano in schwere Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Die Bibliothek wurde aufgelöst und teilweise nach Paris gebracht. Vieles wurde zerstört. Umgekehrt befinden sich in zahlreichen Archiven der Toskana noch Dokumente über San Gimignano, die bisher noch nicht gesichtet wurden.

[43] D. Webb: Eloquence and Education. A Humanist Approach to Hagiography, in: Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 31, 1980, S. 19-39.
[44] Landucci, 1653, S.149.

4. Analyse des Augustinus-Zyklus von Benozzo Gozzoli

4.1. Aufbau des Augustinus-Zyklus

Betritt man die 1272 erbaute Kirche S. Agostino in San Gimignano, so befindet man sich in einem Bauwerk, das sich als eine der zu jener Zeit wohlbekannten und weitverbreiteten Bettelordenskirche zu erkennen gibt.[45] Als Konventskirche für den Orden der Augustiner-Eremiten geplant, zeichnet sie sich mit der einschiffigen Anlage und dem offenen Dachstuhl auch heute noch durch ihre Schlichtheit im Inneren aus.[46]

Der Freskenzyklus von Benozzo Gozzoli ist vom Kirchenschiff nicht einzusehen, da schon 1484 ein Hochaltar von Piero Pollaiuolo vor den Eingang des Chors gesetzt wurde. Er wurde von Fra Domenico Strambi in Auftrag gegeben und zeigt die Krönung der Jungfrau Maria. Die an den Hauptchorwänden der Kirche befindlichen Fresken sind nur bei Betreten des Chores zu sehen. Der Chor stand zu jener Zeit nur den Mönchen des Klosters offen. Fraglich ist, ob zu bestimmten Kirchenfeiertagen der Gemeinde gestattet wurde, diesen zu betreten.[47]

Siebzehn Freskenbilder zeigen das Leben des Kirchenvaters Augustinus, nach dessen Regel die Klostergemeinschaft bis heute lebt. Individuell gestaltete Kompartimente sind in drei Registern übereinander gelagert. Lateinische Bildunterschriften unterlegen jeweils ein Kompartiment und erklären die dargestellte Szene. Fünf Bilder sind an jede Seitenwand des Chors gemalt. Sind die vier unteren Bilder im Format querrechteckig gewählt, so ist das fünfte und oberste durch die Form der Lünette vorgegeben. Sieben Szenen sind an der Abschlusswand der Kapelle um das einzige Fenster des Chors gruppiert. Im Kuppelgewölbe sind die vier Evangelisten dargestellt. An den Pfeilern zum Eingang des Chors werden in gemalten Muschelnischen Heilige, die sich auf San Gimignano oder Augustinus beziehen, gezeigt. **Abb. 6, 5**

[45] Ausführlich mit der Geschichte der Kirche und der Stadt San Gimignano hat sich Pecori beschäftigt. Vgl. Pecori, 1975, S. 414-418. P. S. Bellandi: Gli Agostiniani in San Gimignano e il tempio monumentale di Sant`Agostino, Florenz, o.J.

[46] Eine ausführliche Beschreibung der Kirche, des Klosters und seiner Ausstattung, Vgl. Romualdo N. Vasaturo: Chiesa di S. Agostino in San Gimignano, Vallombrosa, 1993.

[47] Nach einem persönlichen Gespräch mit dem Prior Remualdo Vasaturo 1996: Herr Vasaturo war der Meinung, dass es durchaus möglich sein könnte, dass zu bestimmten Feiertagen der Kirche der Gemeinde Einlass in den Chor gewährt wurde. Dies erscheint mir eher unwahrscheinlich.

Die nun folgende Erläuterung der dargestellten Heiligen beginnt links aussen und führt von oben nach unten. Bei der an der linken oberen Seite dargestellten Heiligen handelt es sich um Fina. Unter ihr befindet sich der Heilige Sebastian. Der Blick des Betrachters wird als nächstes zur Innenseite des Pfeilers geführt, wo der Heilige Gimignano und darunter der Heilige Bartholus abgebildet sind. Auf dem Pfeiler der gegenüberliegenden Seite befinden sich aussen die Heilige Monika und Raphael mit Tobias. An der Innenseite sind die Heiligen Nikolaus von Bari und Nikolaus von Tolentino angebracht. An den Pfeilersockeln hat Gozzoli predellenartige Szenen gemalt, die sich inhaltlich auf die darüber dargestellten Heiligen beziehen. In der Laibung oberhalb der Pfeilerkapitelle wird durch das Bild des Heiligen Johannes auf der Linken und das des Heiligen Elias auf der Rechten ein Übergang zu den in Tondi dargestellten zwölf Aposteln geschaffen. Christus wird im Bogenscheitel als Abschluss dieser traditionellen "Ahnengalerie" gezeigt. **Abb. 4, 1, 2, 3**

Die Leserichtung des Zyklus beginnt an der linken Chorwand im untersten Register. Von links nach rechts über die Fensterwand zur rechten Chorwand führt die Heiligenvita zum nächsthöher gelegenen Register und endet in der rechten Lünette. Gozzoli folgt im Aufbau des Zyklus einzelnen früheren Beispielen, wie dem von ihm einige Jahre vorher geschaffenen Franziskuszyklus in Montefalco. Für die Toskana scheint dies der erste Freskenzyklus zu sein, der diese konkrete Leserichtung aufnimmt.[48] Zugleich ist sie aber eine bildliche Metapher für die geistige Entwicklung des Augustinus, der von jugendlicher Ungläubigkeit zu einem vergeistigten, gottesfürchtigen Leben gelangt. Diese Entwicklung läuft konform mit der Leserichtung.

4.2. Die Innenraumdarstellungen[49]

Von den siebzehn abgebildeten Episoden aus der Augustinusvita können sieben als Innenraumdarstellungen angesehen werden. Dabei gilt es jedoch, zwischen den einzelnen Raumauffassungen zu unterscheiden. Während drei Bilder durch ihre herausragende kompositorische Anlage und ihre realitätsbezogene Ausarbeitung des Innenraumes hervorstechen, handelt es sich bei den übrigen um eine traditionell eher überkommene

[48] Irina Danilowa: Wandmalerei der Frührenaissance in Italien, Dresden, 1983. Vgl. Cole Ahl. 1996, S. 121.

[49] Die Bildtitel zum Zyklus sind selbst verfasst. Diese sind in "..." gesetzt.

'Mischform' zwischen Innen- und Aussenraum. Die Szenen der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago", von "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" und "Augustinus segnet das Volk" sind in klar konstruierte Innenräume eingebettet. Hingegen muss die Episode "Augustinus im Gehäus" als eine gesonderte Form gelten und bedarf einer genaueren Betrachtung. Die "Fürbitte Monikas", die "Taufe Augustinus" und der "Tod der Monika" sind sowohl in als auch ausserhalb eines Raumes angeordnet. Somit können die Innenraumdarstellungen in drei formale Kategorien eingeteilt werden: als reine Innenraumdarstellung in Form von grossen Räumen mit zahlreichen Personen; als Mischform, innerhalb derer Aussen- und Innenraum fliessend ineinander übergehen und die Sonderform von "Augustinus im Gehäus".

Augustinus lehrt in Rom **Abb. 17**

In einer hervorragenden renaisssancehaften Innenraumkulisse lehrt Augustinus Rhetorik und Philosophie. Gozzoli spielt hier mit einer Vielzahl portraithafter Züge, die er den zuhörenden Schülern verleiht. In der Mitte des Raumes befindet sich Augustinus, auf einem thronartigen Stuhl sitzend, von einer Rückenlehne hinterfangen, die die gesamte Raumhöhe einnimmt. Er ist so sehr in sein Studium vertieft, dass er die ihn umgebenden Zuhörer nicht wahrzunehmen scheint.

Der Raum wird in drei Ebenen gestaffelt. Der vordere, durch seine Grösse als der des Geschehens gekennzeichnet, geht - durch Pfeiler abgetrennt - in einen zweiten über. Dort befinden sich zwei grössere Ausgänge, die den Blick in die Landschaft öffnen.[50]

Betrachtet man das Bild "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" eingehender, so wird es durch eine genau durchdachte Konstruktion bestimmt. Das Bild besticht mittels der exakt zentralperspektivischen Anlage. Dazu teilt Gozzoli den Raum in vier gleichgrosse Bereiche, indem er den Schnittpunkt der Diagonalen und zugleich den der horizontalen Seitenhalbierenden als Fluchtpunkt benutzt. Die horizontale Seitenhalbierende wird besonders verstärkt durch die isokephalische Anordnung der drei zu Augustinus am nächsten sitzenden Zuhörer. Der Fluchtpunkt ist ein wenig über Augustinus rechter Hand anzusiedeln.

[50] Als eines der herausragendsten Bilder des Zyklus bezeichnet Gustave Gruyer die Rhetorikvorlesung.

Genau hier befindet sich auch das geistige Zentrum des Bildes.[51] Das architektonische Raumgefüge wird von Symmetrie bestimmt, woraus sich bis auf wenige Einzelheiten eine vertikale Spiegelbildlichkeit ergibt. Vertikale Elemente des Bildes betonen zunächst die Bildkonstruktion. Dabei sind die kannelierten grünen Pfeiler je drei zur Rechten und Linken der Kathedra sehr dominant. Das Streben dieser Pfeiler nach oben zu wird zwar durch das horizontal gelagerte Gebälk unterbrochen, jedoch führen die im Fries befindlichen Pilaster die ausgeprägte Bewegungsrichtung fort.

Der Innenraum wird durch die Pfeilerreihe im Bildmittelgrund geteilt **Abb. 23** und evoziert die Vorstellung einer römischen Villa.[52] Das Geschehen spielt sich ausschliesslich im vorderen Teil des Bildes ab. Der Blick des Betrachters wird über die Köpfe der Zuhörer hinweg und durch die Pfeiler hindurch in einen weiteren Raum geleitet. Gozzoli gelingt es mit Hilfe von Perspektive in der in Brauntönen gehaltenen Kassettendecke und mittels der von grauem Pietraserrena-Stein eingefassten Wandflächen einen Tiefenraum zu schaffen. Der Blick des Betrachters wird durch die rückläufige Wandfläche nicht gebremst, sondern durch symmetrisch aufgebaute Durchgänge hinaus ins Freie geleitet. Der rechte Durchgang bietet den Blick hinaus in eine Berglandschaft, die sich zusammensetzt aus dem Blick auf den Himmel, eine Zypresse und auf einen Teil der Stadt Rom. Die Gebäude können als die Cestio-Pyramide und die Porta S. Paolo in Rom definiert werden. Der linke Durchblick wird zunächst durch Arkadenbögen behindert. Auch hier setzt Gozzoli perspektivische Architekturkonstruktionen ein, um eine verstärkte Tiefenräumlichkeit zu erzeugen. Durch die Bögen wird nochmals der Blick auf einen Teil der Stadt Rom freigegeben. Der Betrachter erblickt das Kolosseum.

Die gestaffelte Tiefenräumlichkeit dient Gozzoli dazu, die konzentrierte Ansammlung des Geschehens im Bildvordergrund aufzulösen und dem Blick des Betrachters die Möglichkeit der Motivauswahl zu geben.

[51] Unter geistigem Zentrum verstehe ich, dass sich hier nicht nur das konstruierte Bildzentrum, sondern auch das Zentrum des Geschehens befindet. Genau hier liegt das Buch, aus welchem Augustinus lehrt.

[52] Die Vorstellung einer römischen Villa bezieht sich sowohl auf die Renaissancevorstellung, als auch auf den Zeitpunkt der Spätantike, in der Augustinus in Rom lehrte.

Betrachtet man nun den Vordergrund des Bildes, so erschliesst sich die Raumstruktur durch den dreifarbigen Fliesenboden, der eine Bewegung zum Zentrum des Bildes und seiner Hauptfigur hin hervorruft. Durch die bewusste Freilassung des Vordergrundes ermöglicht Gozzoli den Blick in den Raum hinein auf Augustinus ohne jegliche Störung. Die Figuren setzt er entlang der Bilddiagonalen. Die Zuhörerschaft wird eingesetzt, um den vorderen Bildraum mitzuerschliessen. Die Personen sind rechts und links im Bild so gruppiert, dass sie, folgt man ihrem Aufbau im Raum, zur Kathedra führen. Diese ist im Bildzentrum plaziert, durch eine Stufe erhöht und erstreckt sich über die gesamte Höhe des vorderen Raumes. Räumlichkeit entsteht durch die Rückenlehne in Form einer Muschelnische. Die aussergewöhnliche Hervorhebung der Kathedra und ihre überdimensionierte Rückenlehne erinnern stark an Nischen für Heiligenstatuen.[53] In abgewandelter Form übernimmt Gozzoli diese Tradition und hebt die Bedeutung von Augustinus hervor, indem er ihn vor solch einer Muschelnische sitzend darstellt. Die Tradition, Heilige in Muschelnischen hervorzuheben, ist in der Kunstgeschichte lange vor Gozzoli eingeführt worden. Schon Ghiberti hat diese Tradition in seiner Paradiestür angewandt; ebenso Donatello, Giotto, und Fra Angelico. Diese Künstler stehen in direktem Bezug zu Gozzoli.[54] Ebenso häufig findet man thronende Marien von einer Muschelnische hinterfangen. **Abb. 24, 25, 26**

Ein Beispiel, an welchem Gozzoli selbst mitarbeitete, zeigt sich in der Nikolauskapelle in Rom, die in Zusammenarbeit mit Fra Angelico ausgemalt wurde.[55] Das Neue an der Verarbeitung des Throngedankens bei Gozzoli ist, dass er diesen Thron mit Muschelnische in einen anderen **Abb. 27**

[53] "Unter 'Kathedra' konnten alle antiken Stuhlarten, trotz unterschiedlicher Benennung, verstanden werden. Nicht allein Herrscher, auch Magisterbeamte, Hausherren, Lehrer, Philosophen, Rhetoren und vornehme Frauen gaben ihrer Würde oder Autorität dadurch Ausdruck, dass sie sich setzten, während die anderen standen. Sie benutzten also eine Kathedra, und diese wurde im Laufe der Geschichte zum Symbol des Lehramtes." Dorothea Forstner: Die Welt der christlichen Symbole, Wien, 1986, S.412.

[54] Die Muschelnische kommt aus der Skulpturen hinterfangenden Architektur. Angeführt sei hier Donatellos Heiliger Ludwig von Toulouse in Santa Croce in Florenz oder das Bild des bethlehemitischen Kindermordes von Matteo di Giovanni, Siena, Palazzo Comunale.

[55] Unzählige thronende Marien von Fra Angelico mit Muschelbaldachin sind bekannt.

Zusammenhang bringt.[56] Der Thron wird in eine Kathedra, ein Lesepult verwandelt. Der Heilige, der bis dato noch Irrlehren[57] anhängt und nicht dem christlichen Glauben angehört, wird sitzend vor der Muschelnische dargestellt. Gozzoli gesteht hier Augustinus einen hohen Rang an Persönlichkeit und einen schon auf seine zukünftige Heiligkeit hindeutenden Rahmen zu.

Die verblüffende Behandlung von Licht und Schatten in diesem gut erhaltenen Bild lässt zusätzlich eine starke räumliche Wirkung entstehen. Das von links einfallende Licht wirft kleine Schlagschatten vor den im Raum links stehenden und sitzenden Personen. Die Kathedra selbst wird im innen liegenden, linken Teil beschattet. Licht und Schattenwirkung werden über die Pfeiler hinweg in den folgenden Raum, bis hin zu den ionischen Säulen der Arkaden im Bildhintergrund fortgesetzt. Erstaunlich ist hierbei, dass die reale Lichtquelle des Chores sich mit der des Bildes deckt. Das einzige Fenster befindet sich links vom Bild.

Augustinus segnet das Volk **Abb. 10**

Das Bild "Augustinus segnet das Volk" ist eine weitere Innenraumdarstellung. Gozzoli gelingt es hier in bewundernswerter Weise, den Blick vom Querschiff einer Kirche in das Längsschiff zu gestalten. Wie im Bild "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" wird ein perspektivisch exakt berechneter Innenraum dargestellt. Auch hier herrscht wiederum Symmetrie vor, deren Achse durch das Kirchenschiff verläuft und den Altar und das darauf befindliche Kreuz in zwei genaue Hälften teilt. Würde man von einem querrechteckigen Rahmen wie bei der "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" ausgehen, so würde sich der Fluchtpunkt auch hier im Schnittpunkt der Diagonalen und der Seitenhalbierenden finden.

Dieser Fluchtpunkt manifestiert sich an der Spitze des Altarkreuzes. Der Blick wird in den Tiefenraum, das heisst in das dreischiffige Kircheninnere freigegeben. Das Mittelschiff wird in Renaissancemanier mit einem Tonnengewölbe überfangen. Mittelschiff und Seitenschiffe

[56] Augustinus ist hier im Bild noch nicht als Heiliger dargestellt. Er hängt noch der Irrlehre der Manichäer an. Die Muschelnische wird folglich aus dem Kontext der religiösen Überhöhung herausgenommen und dient der Aufwertung individueller Persönlichkeit.

[57] Manichäismus: von Mani (3. Jh. n. Chr.) gestiftete dualistische persisch-hellenistisch-christliche Weltreligion. Aus: Duden. Fremdwörterbuch, Bd. 5, Wien, 1982.

werden durch korinthische Säulen getrennt, wobei jeder Säule eine an den Aussenwänden der Seitenschiffe korrespondierende, kannelierte korinthische Halbsäule entspricht. Zwischen den Halbsäulen sind jeweils Rundbogenfenster eingestellt. Der Haupteingang zur Kirche wird im Bereich des Tonnengewölbes durch einen Oculus geöffnet. Drei Masswerkfenster in gotischer Art durchbrechen die Wandfläche, während das Hauptportal der Kirche den Blick nach draussen freigibt. Der rechte Bildvordergrund ist beschädigt, so dass über die Person des Augustinus und die ihn umstehenden Figuren nichts mehr ausgesagt werden kann. Was die Raumaufteilung anbelangt, so ist der rechte Teil des Querschiffes ähnlich wie der des linken zu vermuten.

Das komplizierte geometrische Rautenmuster des Fussbodens, welches stark an Uccellos Studien geometrischer Figuren erinnert, führt am unteren Bildrand in das Bild ein.[58] An der linken, dem Betrachter zugewandten Figur mit dem langen zweigeteilten Bart, fällt ein faszinierendes Detail auf: Sein rechter Fuss und ein Stück seines Mantels überschreiten die vorgegebene Bildgrenze und öffnen sie somit für den Betrachter. Der Kirchenraum erschliesst sich nun über den Fussboden hinweg zu den zwei Stufen, auf denen der Altar steht. Das Geschehen spielt sich links und rechts vom Altar ab und, die räumliche Wirkung wird durch den Aufbau der stehenden und knienden Personen unterstützt.

Die Raumstruktur der Kirche wird in erster Linie durch die starke Tiefenräumlichkeit bestimmt. Der Eindruck, das Hauptschiff würde nach oben führen, wird durch die extreme Aufsicht auf Altar und dessen Stufen noch verstärkt. Gemildert und aufgefangen wird dies durch das Querschiff. Hier arbeitete Gozzoli mit Hilfe der horizontalen Hervorhebung der Attika und der Teile der Seitenwände des Querschiffes dem Sog entgegen. Wesentlich stärker wird die Sogwirkung durch den Anbringungsort dieses Freskos gemildert. Durch die Anbringung im dritten Register der Lünette, ist der Betrachter gezwungen, nach oben zu blicken, um das Bild betrachten zu können. Damit werden die Verkürzungen sinnvoll und verständlich. Eine verblüffende Ähnlichkeit in der Bearbeitung der Raumstruktur offenbart der Vergleich mit Masaccios Trinitätsfresko in Santa Maria Novella in Florenz.[59] Schon die Farbigkeit des gestelzten

Abb. 28

[58] Vgl. dazu das Bild der Sintflut im Chiostro Verde in Santa Maria Novella, Florenz. aus : Stefano Orlandi : S. Maria Novella, S. 44.
[59] Ornella Casazza: Masaccio, Firenze, 1990, S. 70.

Bogens und des kassettierten Tonnengewölbes, sowie die Rosetten in den Zwickeln finden Parallelen bei Masaccio.

Das dargestellte Tympanonrelief, "Maria mit dem Kinde", über der Tür des Querhauses angebracht, findet sich in zahlreichen Terrakotta-arbeiten der Familie della Robbia wieder.[60] **Abb. 29**

Augustinus im Gehäus **Abb. 8**

Das folgende Bild "Augustinus im Gehäus" zeigt eine Raum-Eck-Konstruktion. Während Augustinus an seinen Schriften arbeitet, erscheint ihm der verstorbene Hieronymus in einer Gloriole.[61] Die perspektivische Konstruktion des Raum-Eck-Motivs hat ihren Fluchtpunkt links ausserhalb des eigentlichen Bildes. Die Horizontlinie deckt sich mit dem Abschluss der Wandvertäfelung. Im Vergleich zur Raumhöhe wirkt Augustinus Grösse überdimensioniert. Die Enge und Gedrungenheit des Raumes kommt genau der Bedeutung mit der Bezeichnung 'Gehäus' überein. Die Einsicht in das 'Gehäus' entsteht durch Gozzolis Komposition: Sie ist wie die in ein Puppenhaus. Die am linken Bildrand gezeigte korinthische Säule trägt die Decke mit der Holzkassettierung.

Aufgrund des ausserhalb liegenden Fluchtpunktes wird die Decke in Unter- und Vordersicht präsentiert. Damit wird der Eindruck des Raumes als ein kleiner Kasten verstärkt. Die Wandflächen laufen rechts im Bildhintergrund in der einzigen Ecke des Raumes zusammen. Beide werden im unteren Teil durch eine Holzverkleidung mit Rahmenleiste, im oberen durch eine grünlich verputzte Mauer gestaltet. In die Mauer eingelassen sind quadratische Nischen, die als Ablagen für Bücher dienen. Augustinus sitzt auf einer an die linke Wand gestellten Holzbank. Vor ihm steht ein in Kniehöhe gehaltenes, verkürztes Schreibpult. Dieses verläuft schräg nach links und endet an der Rückwand des Raumes. Auf dem Pult liegt ein grün gebundenes Buch, darunter eine Schriftrolle, die über die Tischkante hinunterhängt. Ein aufgeschlagenes Buch steht angelehnt an der Rückwand. Ein interessantes Detail ist die ablaufende Sanduhr. Als Vanitasmotiv macht sie unmissverständlich auf den Augustinus bevorste-

[60] Als Beispiele können hier unter anderem das Waschbecken in der Sakristei in Santa Maria Novella von Giovanni della Robbia oder eine Maria mit Kind von Andrea della Robbia, Lucca, S. Michele in Foro angeführt werden.

[61] In der Fotografie ist Hieronymus nicht zu erkennen. Dieser wird in der Lünettenspitze dargestellt.

henden Tod aufmerksam. Die Vorderseite des Schreibpultes enthält ebenfalls Nischen zur Buchablage.

Die Lichtquelle dieses Bildes kommt in gemalter Form durch das Butzenglasfenster an der Rückwand, das dem Maler Gelegenheit gibt, sein Können an der verschatteten Wand zu zeigen. Spannend ist hier jedoch, dass Gozzoli zusätzlich die natürliche Lichtquelle des Kirchenfensters berücksichtigt hat. Das reale Licht kommt von links aus der Richtung des Fluchtpunktes. Die linke Seitenfront des Schreibpultes wird von oben links durch diese Lichtquelle erhellt. Hinter Augustinus entsteht dadurch ein an die Wand geworfener Schatten. Gleichartige Darstellungen des "Augustinus im Gehäus" finden sich von Botticelli in Ognissanti[62] in Florenz und von Carpaccio in San Giorgio in Venedig[63]. Eine erstaunlich ähnliche Umgangsweise mit diesem Thema ist bei Giovanni di Paolo, einem sienesichen Maler der gleichen Zeit wie Gozzoli, zu finden. Er malte die gleiche Szene in einer eher gotischen Weise, indem er seine perspektivische Auffassung dieser entlehnte.[64] **Abb. 30**

Augustinus Taufe **Abb. 13b**

Die folgenden Darstellungen zeigen Augustinus als Augustiner-Eremiten. Er trägt die Kleider des Ordens.[65] Hinter einem Taufbecken kniend wird Augustinus von Bischof Ambrosius getauft. Rechts zu Seiten des Taufbeckens stehen zwei Augustiner-Eremiten, die die Mönchskleidung halten, die Augustinus nach der Taufe tragen wird. Im Hintergrund befinden sich sein Freund Alypius und seine ins Gebet vertiefte Mutter Monika. Diese drei Figuren und Bischof Ambrosius sind in der Szene durch Nimben als Heilige gekennzeichnet. Die

[62] R. Lightbown: Sandro Botticelli, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1978, S. 50 f.
[63] H.J. Roberts: Saint Augustine in Saint Jerome`s Study, Carpaccio`s Painting and Its Legendary Source, in Art Bulletin, XLI, 1959, S. 288 f.
[64] Sammlungskatalog der Gemäldegalerie Berlin, Berlin, 1975, S.174.
[65] Da in den Confessiones des Augustinus nie von einer Ordensgründung in Italien die Rede ist, ist es im Zyklus erstaunlich, ihn in der Kleidung der Augustiner-Eremiten zu sehen. Vgl.: M. Heimberger: Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche, Paderborn, 1933, S. 398.

Bildkonstruktion der "Taufe des Augustinus"[66] durch den Bischof Ambrosius in Mailand zeichnet sich durch die verwirrende Architekturdarstellung aus. Die gleichzeitige Betrachtung von innen und aussen steht in der Tradition Giottos. Die Architektur wird wie in einer Theaterkulisse von oben hinter das Geschehen eingeschoben. Das oktogonale Baptisterium wird durch eine vergoldete Kuppel mit Rippen und an den Seiten mit Dreiecksgiebeln und Muschelornamenten verziert. Die darunter befindliche Attika zieren zu jeder Seite sieben Rosetten. Bis hierhin ist das Baptisterium von aussen gezeigt. Der untere Teil der Architekturkonstruktion besteht aus zwei Teilen und zeigt dieses nun von innen. Der äussere Bereich ist im Bildhintergrund lediglich durch die dunkelrote Rückwand mit der Inschrift: "*Te deum Laudamus. Te dominun Confitemur*" und den nur schwach zu erkennenden korinthischen Pilastern angedeutet. Der innere Bereich besteht aus den kannelierten korinthischen Pfeilern, welche im hinteren Teil die oktogonale Form beibehalten, vorne jedoch wird aufgrund des Geschehens die Form aufgelöst. Die Zweischaligkeit wird aufgehoben.

Das Geschehen der Taufe spielt sich ausschliesslich vor dieser Scheinarchitektur ab, so dass auch das Taufbecken vor die Architektur des Baptisteriums versetzt wird, und die Personen sich darum gruppieren. Die Lichtführung ist sehr zurückhaltend. Das Licht fällt von links in das Bild ein und ermöglicht somit eine Überschattung des rechten Teil des grünen Mantels der linken Figur. Der gleichen wirft die Gestalt des Bischofs Ambrosius ein Schatten auf das etwas hinter ihm liegende Taufbecken.

4.3. Die Stadtlandschaft, der öffentliche Raum, die Naturlandschaft

Den bereits genannten sieben Innenraumdarstellungen stellt Gozzoli zehn Aussenraumszenen gegenüber. Lediglich drei Szenen spielen im öffentlichen Stadtraum: die "Einschulung in Tagaste", die "Ankunft in

[66] Gruyer beschreibt den Zyklus, als einen der schönsten, die er gesehen habe. Zweifelhaft ist jedoch, ob er diesen Zyklus jemals persönlich zu sehen bekam, da er in der Szene der Taufe Augustinus schreibt: "Augustin converti est baptisé par saint Ambroise. On lit sur une vase cette inscription" [Inschrift des Taufbeckens]. Die Inschrift befand sich jedoch immer im Taufbecken. Dieses erkennt man auch bei ungenauer Betrachtung. Gustave Gruyer: Les Monuments de l'art à San Gimignano, in: Gazette des Beaux-Arts,71 II, 1870, S.162-182. Vgl. Fussnote: 1.

Mailand" und die "Predigt des Ambrosius". Fünf Fresken sind mit ihren Handlungsabläufen in die Natur verlegt: Die "Augustinus verlässt Afrika", die "Ankunft im Hafen von Ostia", die "Abreise aus Rom", die "Bekehrungsszene" und die "Regelübergabe". Der "Tod Augustinus" stellt insofern eine Ausnahme von den vorher genannten Bildern dar, als er in der Abgeschiedenheit eines Kreuzganges gezeigt wird. Es handelt sich also weder um öffentlichen Raum noch um freie Natur. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit der "Diskussion Augustinus' mit dem Häretiker Fortunatus". Auch hier spielt sich das Geschehen in einem Innenhof ab. Der "Tod der Monika" wurde bei den Innenraumdarstellungen schon erwähnt und nimmt auch dort eine Sonderstellung ein.

Einschulung in Tagaste **Abb. 22**

Das erste Fresko zeigt zwei inhaltlich zusammengehörende Szenen. Vor dem Hintergrund der idealisierten Renaissancestadt Tagaste in Afrika wird Augustinus im linken Teil des Bildes vom Lehrer der Grammatikschule abgeholt. Die Eltern, Monika und Patricius, stehen, während sie Augustinus dem Lehrer übergeben, in resignierter Geste hinter ihrem Kinde. Auf der rechten Seite des Freskos ist die Grammatikschule dargestellt, in der Augustinus unterrichtet wird. Ein Kleinkind mit entblösstem Gesäss, auf dem Rücken eines älteren Schülers gehalten, wird durch den Lehrer mit einer Peitsche gezüchtigt. Augustinus befindet sich als zu lobendes Beispiel daneben. Die beiden Szenen sind durch zwei ältere Schüler getrennt, die auf der Strasse stehen. Durch ihre Blickrichtung gehören sie zu der Verabschiedungsszene links. Sie können jedoch in der inhaltlichen und räumlichen Wirkung der zweiten Szene zugeordnet werden. Bei der Betrachtung des Bildes entsteht Verwirrung über das Verhältnis beider Szenen und ihren inhaltlichen Bezug. In der Darstellung erschliesst sich dem Betrachter nicht auf Anhieb die Leserichtung und die erzählerischen Abläufe, vielmehr bedarf es dafür einiger Kenntnisse der Historie. Weitere Unsicherheit ergibt sich aus der Wiederholung der Person des Lehrers wie auch der des Augustinus.[67] **Abb. 31, 32**

Die Einführung in den Zyklus geschieht durch die grossartig gestaltete Szene der "Einschulung in Tagaste". Hier zeigt Gozzoli sein ganzes Können, indem er die Szene vor eine fiktive, renaissanceartige Stadtlandschaft plaziert. Am linken Bildrand setzt die Inszenierung mit **Abb. 33**

[67] Vgl. Cole Ahl: 1996, S. 127.

einer phantastischen Eingangsloggia, einem Triumphbogen ähnlich, ein. Auf der Brüstung der Loggia sind vier Pfeiler mit Akanthus-Volutenkapitellen angebracht. Darüber erheben sich die Bögen des Eingangsbereiches. Diese sind mit Rosetten verziert und schliessen mit einer Agraffe ab. In den Zwickeln befinden sich sowohl innen, als auch aussen Viktorien oder Putten. Ein Bukranionfries und eine Fläche mit Marmorinkrustation und Pilastern ziert die Loggia nach oben hin. Der Eingang selbst wird durch eine Muschel und eine Puttenstatuette abgeschlossen.

Durch die Loggia bietet sich ein Durchblick auf das dahinterliegende Gebäude mit Zwillingsfenstern. Die im vorderen Teil des Bildes beginnende Strasse führt den Blick nach hinten in die Stadtlandschaft hinein bis zu einer einschiffigen gotischen Saalkirche mit vorgelagertem Narthex und Campanile. Rechts von der Kirche befindet sich das Stadttor, durch das eine Aussicht aus der Stadt hinaus ermöglicht wird. Daneben ragt ein mehrstöckiges Gebäude mit Wehrzinnen und Glockenturm hervor, ein Palazzo Comunale, wie er in vielen Städten der Toskana üblich ist. Das Gebäude der rechten Bildhälfte wird durch seinen arkadenhaften Unterbau hervorgehoben. Auf einem Sockel erheben sich die Pfeiler mit Kapitellen toskanischer Ordnung, die die Bögen tragen. In den Bogenzwickeln sind Rosetten eingelassen. Darüber erhebt sich das Wohngeschoss mit zahlreichen Rundbogenfenstern, die in verschiedenartiger Weise dargestellt sind. Die einzelnen Gebäude der Stadt, der Vorplatz, auf dem sich das eigentliche Geschehen abspielt, die Strassenführung bis hin zum Stadttor sind in präziser perspektivischer Konstruktion wiedergegeben und bearbeitet. Selten gelingt es Gozzoli, eine so perfekte Tiefenräumlichkeit in ein Bild zu bannen. Unterstützt wird die stadträumliche Struktur durch die kleiner werdenden Personen auf der Strasse, die bis hin zum Stadttor gezeigt werden.

Die beiden Szenen des Bildes spielen sich im Bildvordergrund ab. Links stellt Gozzoli die Verabschiedung des jungen Augustinus durch seine Eltern dar. Augustinus und seine Eltern empfangen den Lehrer der Schule. Die zweite Szene wird im rechten vorderen Bildteil gezeigt. Hier sieht man den Lehrer einen Schüler züchtigen, während Augustinus im rechten vorderen Bildteil neben diesem steht und das Alphabet lernt. Beide Szenen sind nicht auf Anhieb zu trennen und zu deuten. Diese Problematik soll jedoch bei der Frage des Narrativen geklärt werden, ebenso die figürliche Darstellungsweise.

Ankunft in Mailand **Abb. 15**

Die im ersten Moment verwirrende Vielfalt der Szenen macht dieses Bild zu einem der interessantesten im Zyklus. Die Beschreibung erfolgt in Leserichtung. Der Betrachter erkennt zuerst das Pferd, auf dem Augustinus nach Mailand geritten ist. Augustinus selbst befindet sich in der Mitte des Bildes, wo ihm gerade Sporen und Reisemantel abgenommen werden. In der Folge schliesst sich direkt die Szene der Begrüssung Augustinus durch Bischof Ambrosius an. In der Loggia zwischen diesen beiden Szenen wird noch eine weitere eingefügt. Es handelt sich um die Begrüssung Augustinus durch den Stadtpräfekten Mailands, Theodosius [Name nicht sicher]. Ähnlich wie im ersten Bild ist auch hier die Leserichtung nicht augenscheinlich und erschliesst sich dem Betrachter nur über genaue Kenntnisse der Heiligenvita des Augustinus. Die "Ankunft in Mailand" zeigt im Gegensatz zur "Einschulungsszene" keine grössere Stadtlandschaft. Gozzoli beschränkt sich hier lediglich auf einen kleineren Ausschnitt am linken Bildrand, mit einem eingeschossigen Gebäude mit Blendarkaden und zwei dahinterliegenden Türmen. Den architektonischen Hauptanteil des Bildes macht eine Loggia aus, die fast über die gesamte Höhe des Bildes gezeigt wird. Lediglich vor dieser wird ein Freiraum gelassen, um zwei Szenen des Bildes unterzubringen. **Abb. 34**

Die Loggia steht, ähnlich wie die bei der "Einschulungsszene", auf einem Sockel. Auf vier Säulen mit ionischen Kapitellen erheben sich drei Arkadenbögen. In die Bogenzwickel sind Rosetten gesetzt. Die Loggia erstreckt sich in den Tiefenraum mit fünf Arkadenbögen, überspannt wird diese durch ein Kreuzrippengewölbe. Die perfekte perspektivische Architekturgestaltung ist im selben Stil wie schon in anderen Bildern des Zyklus konstruiert. Der Fluchtpunkt liegt exakt im Schnittpunkt der Seitenhalbierenden an Augustinus linker Schulter. Gozzoli verzichtet hier jedoch auf die Beibehaltung der Symmetrie im Bild.

Betrachtet man die Loggia genauer, stellt man fest, dass sie aus einer Verdoppelung besteht. Durch eine Abtrennung einer Wand mit einer eingefügten Tür sind die beiden linken Bögen von dem des Rechten getrennt. Im äussersten rechten Bogen, wiederholt sich Tür und Wand ein weiteres Mal. Betrachtet man die Szenen im Bild, so erklärt sich diese Wiederholung. Drei Szenen spielen sich hier per Zeitraffer ab. Augustinus erreicht Mailand, es werden ihm die Sporen und sein Reisegewand abgenommen. Daraufhin begrüsst er Ambrosius, den Bischof der Stadt Mailand, welcher ganz rechts im Bild dargestellt ist. Hinterfangen wird

diese Episode durch den äussersten rechten Arkadenbogen. Nun verlagert sich das Geschehen in die Loggia des mittleren Arkadenbogens, in der man Augustinus ein weiteres Mal erkennt. Augustinus kniet vor dem Stadtpräfekten Theodosius und wird von ihm begrüsst. An dieser Stelle gelingt es Gozzoli, die drei zeitversetzt spielenden Szenen durch die Wiederholung der Architektur in einem Bild zusammenzufassen und zugleich voneinander abzusetzen.

Ambrosius Predigt **Abb. 16**

Die Vielfalt der Szenen wird in den Hauptbildern beibehalten. Auch in diesem Bild finden sich erneut drei Szenen, die bei flüchtiger Betrachtung schwer zu identifizieren sind. Alle drei Handlungen spielen sich auf einem öffentlichen Platz in Mailand ab. Links sitzt Bischof Ambrosius und diskutiert mit dem vor ihm stehenden Augustinus über Glaubensfragen. Im Bildmittelgrund kniet Monika vor Ambrosius. Sie bittet diesen auf die Bekehrung ihres Sohnes hinzuwirken. Rechts vorne eine grössere Anzahl sitzender Personen, darunter Monika und Augustinus, die der Predigt des Ambrosius zuhören.

Ein weiterer öffentlicher Raum wird in der "Predigt des Ambrosius" gezeigt. Während Gozzoli im vorhergehenden Bild, der "Ankunft in Mailand", noch die drei zeitlich versetzten Handlungsabläufe durch Architektur zu trennen versuchte, setzte er nun den drei Szenen in diesem Bild eine einheitliche Stadtkulisse gegenüber, ohne die diese in irgendeiner Weise voneinander zu trennen. Auf einem öffentlichen Platz spielen sich alle drei Geschehnisse ab, die im eigentlichen Sinne zeitlich und räumlich voneinander zu trennen sind. Dies unterliess Gozzoli und setzte sie gleichberechtigt nebeneinander.

Den Hintergrund bildet eine Stadtkulisse, die durch die Vielfalt der Gebäude und durch Ein- und Ausblicke gekennzeichnet ist. Die Figuren werden nun stärker in die Architektur eingebunden. Gozzoli setzte wieder das Mittel der Zentralperspektive ein. Fluchtpunkt und Horizontlinie sind am Türsturz des Hauseinganges hinter dem mittleren Arkadenbogen anzusetzen. Davor spielt sich die erste Szene ab, in der 'Monika vor Ambrosius' kniet. Der Erzählstrang wird vorne links fortgesetzt, wo Ambrosius und Augustinus miteinander diskutierend gezeigt werden und endet rechts mit der 'Predigt des Ambrosius'.

Den Stadtlandschaften sind fünf Bilder mit Landschaftskulissen entgegengesetzt. Die "Augustinus verlässt Afrika" wird keine Relevanz in der Betrachtung haben, da das Fresko vollständig zerstört ist.

Ankunft im Hafen von Ostia **Abb. 19**

Das folgende Fresko zeigt die "Ankunft von Augustinus im Hafen von Ostia". Der untere Teil des Bildes ist durch Feuchtigkeit zerstört und mehrmals rekonstruiert worden. Augustinus, durch seine Kleidung als Doktor ausgewiesen, wird von einem Kollegen herzlich begrüsst. Den hohen Rang und die Stellung, die Augustinus in dieser Szene einnimmt, verdeutlichen unterstützend die ihn begleitenden Diener. Beachtenswert ist die Landschaftsdarstellung, die Gozzoli erstmals als Bildhintergrund in den Zyklus integriert.

In der Szene der "Ankunft im Hafen von Ostia" wird im Vordergrund des Bildes die Begrüssung von Augustinus gezeigt. Diener tragen sein Schwert[68] und Gepäck an Land. Im Bildmittelgrund befindet sich der Schiffsmast mit dem Segel, ein Hinweis auf die gerade stattfindende Ankunft. Der grösste Teil des Bildes besteht jedoch aus Landschaft und verblüfft durch seine naturnahe Darstellung. Am rechten Bildrand erhebt sich ein Laubbaum, der in die hügelige Landschaft im Bildhintergrund einführt. Vereinzelte Gehöfte und ein kleines Castello werden durch Busch- und Baumgruppen gerahmt, während sich zum linken Bildrand hin die Landschaft in weiter Ferne verliert.

Abreise aus Rom **Abb. 18**

Augustinus verlässt Rom zu Pferde und mit grossem Gefolge. Einem Fürsten gleich wird er im Bild von Gozzoli dargestellt. Im Hintergrund links befindet sich die Stadt Rom. Augustinus wird dabei am rechten und linken Bildrand von Figuren gerahmt, die jedoch mit dem eigentlichen Bildvorgang nichts zu tun haben. Sie weisen stark portraithafte Züge auf.[69] Die Gesellschaft verliert sich nach rechts hinten in der Landschaft und wird dort nochmals wiederholt. Am obersten Rand des Bildes befinden sich

[68] Augustinus erklärt die Stelle des 44. Psalms, Vers 4: "Dein Schwert gürt um die Lenden, starker Held" - "Dein Schwert - was ist es anders als dein Wort? Mit diesem hat er [Christus] die Feinde niedergestreckt, mit diesem Schwert den Sohn vom Vater, die Tochter von der Mutter, die Schwiegertochter von der Schwiegermutter getrennt(...)" (ML 36. 500). Zitiert nach: Forstner, 1986, S. 442.

[69] Den Figuren wurden immer wieder Namen zugewiesen. Die daraus entstandene kontroverse Diskussion wäre zu umfangreich, um sie in dieser Arbeit darzustellen. Aus diesem Grund findet selten eine Bewertung meinerseits statt, zumal die Tatsache der Benennung häufig unerheblich für den Ansatz der Arbeit ist.

zwei Engel mit einem Spruchband. Auf diesem wird auf den Auftraggeber des Zyklus, Fra Domenico Strambi, den ausführenden Künstler, Benozzo Gozzoli und das Datum der Ausführung der Fresken hingewiesen.

Im Bild der "Abreise aus Rom" zeigt sich eine sehr starke Beziehung zu Gozzolis Fresko "Der Zug der heiligen drei Könige" in Florenz.[70] Links im Bildhintergrund ist die Stadt Rom zu erkennen, welche den Betrachter durch ihre geographische Genauigkeit in Erstaunen versetzt. Noch vor den Stadtmauern erkennt man die Engelsburg, auf deren Turmspitze sich der Engel befindet. Am äussersten linken Bildrand ist das Pantheon, dahinter die Trajanssäule, rechts noch die Pyramide des Caio Cestio zu erkennen. Zusätzlich werden in das Stadtbild zahlreiche Kirchen integriert. Von hier aus bewegt sich der Zug des abreisenden Augustinus hinein in die Landschaft. **Abb. 35, 36**

Eine Landschaft ist zu sehen, deren Darstellung von Gozzoli im Gegensatz zu der in Florenz lieblicher wirkt und perspektivisch korrigiert wird. Es herrschen nicht mehr die giottesken Felsklippen und einzelnen Landschaftsversatzstücke vor, wie sie in Florenz noch zu finden sind. Gozzoli beweist, dass er die Natur genau beobachtet hat und diese auch im Bild umsetzten kann. Dattelpalme, Zypresse, Orangen und andere Baumarten werden über die Landschaft harmonisch verteilt. Dazwischen ziehen sich Hecken und Wege in perspektivisch perfekter Verkürzung bis zur Horizontlinie. Belebt wird die Landschaft durch den sich im rechten Bildhintergrund nochmals wiederholenden Zug des Augustinus zusätzlich durch eine Schafherde mit Hirten links davon. Um die Dattelpalme herum, die rechts von Augustinus steht, findet man eine Jagdszene ähnlich der, die auch im Zug der Heiligen drei Könige vorkommt. **Abb. 37**

Den Bildvordergrund ist durch den reitenden Augustinus bestimmt, der von einem Diener begleitet wird, und dem Gefolge links hinter ihm. Die Personen am rechten und linken Bildrand, die auf einer Art Felsplateau stehen, gehören nicht zur Szene, sondern sind Assistenzfiguren.

Die Bekehrung **Abb. 14**

Die inhaltlich wichtigste Szene wird in diesem Bild wiedergegeben. Augustinus hat sich in einem Garten in Mailand unter einem Feigenbaum

[70] A. Amaducci: La cappella di Palazzo Medici, Firenze, 1977.

niedergelassen[71] und liest in den Paulusbriefen. Durch diese wird die endgültige Bekehrung des Augustinus eingeleitet. Neben ihm steht sein Freund Alypius, der mit seiner Rechten auf das bedeutungsvolle Ereignis verweist: In grosser innerlicher Zerrissenheit unter einem Feigenbaum sitzend vernimmt Augustinus eine Kinderstimme, die ruft: "Tolle et Lege", "Nimm und liess". Augustinus schlägt die Bibel auf und findet in den Paulusbriefen folgenden Satz, der ihn endgültig bekehrt:

Nicht in Völlereien und Trinkgelagen sollt ihr schwelgen,
Nicht in Wollust und Ausschweifungen,
Nicht in Streitereien und Eifersüchten,
Sondern zieht den Herrn Jesus Christus an
Und pflegt nicht weiter das Fleisch in seinen Begierden.
(Römer 13, 13f.)

Der Garten im Bild ist hier lediglich durch den Zaun mit der Rosenhecke angedeutet. Blickt man jedoch an der Person, vorbei, die am rechten Bildrand steht und den Freund Augustinus, Alypius, darstellt, so entdeckt man eine der schönsten Landschaftsdarstellungen dieser Zeit. Bei dieser Art der Landschaftsdarstellung könnte man meinen, die Romantiker hätten Gozzolis Landschaftsauffassung adaptiert. Durch ein Tal schlängelt sich ein Weg an einer Klosteranlage vorbei, zu einem Landcastello hoch auf einen Hügel und verliert sich in der Weite der Landschaft. Diese ist geprägt durch vereinzelte Bäume, Hecken und Wald. Die Perspektive wird zusätzlich durch Farbperspektive unterstützt. Die im vorderen Teil kräftigen Farben werden im Bildmittelgrund bräunlich und zum Horizont hin verlieren sie sich ins Bläuliche. Der linke Bildhintergrund wird durch einen festungsartigen Bau dominiert, vor dessen Mauern sich noch zwei weitere Personen aufhalten. Die Komposition ist der des Bildes von Fra Angelico ähnlich. Auch hier haben sich zwei Personen zur "Bekehrungsszene" gesellt.[72] **Abb. 38**

[71] "'Das Sitzen eines jeden unter seinem Weinstock und unter seinem Feigenbaum' ist ein stehender Ausdruck, den die Heilige Schrift gebraucht, um eine Zeit ungestörten Friedens zu kennzeichnen,[...] 'Unter dem Feigenbaum ruht', sagt der Heilige Hieronymus, 'wer die Süssigkeit des Heiligen Geistes geniesst und sich sättigt an seinen Früchten.'" (in Isaiam 18, 35; ML 24, 673). Zitiert aus: Forstner, 1986, S.158.

[72] Henri Marrou: Augustinus, Mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten, Hamburg, 1958, S. 27. Courcelle, 1969, S. 95-96.

Die Regelübergabe **Abb. 12**

Das Bildfeld beinhaltet drei Szenen. Auf einem Berg im Bildhintergrund sieht man Augustinus vor einer Gruppe von Mönchen. Laut Legende besuchte er die Eremiten auf dem Monte Pisano, um deren Lebensweise kennenzulernen.[73] Die Folge davon ist die erste Klostergründung, die am rechten Bildrand dargestellt wird. Sie zeigt Augustinus, wie er den Augustiner-Eremiten die Klosterregel übergibt. Die Szene des linken Bildrandes schildert ebenfalls eine Legende. Augustinus befindet sich auf einem Spaziergang am Strand und trifft dort, während er über die Dreieinigkeit und deren Zusammenhänge nachdenkt, ein Kind, welches versucht mit Hilfe eines Löffels das Meer in ein kleines Loch zu füllen. Als Augustinus diesem die Unsinnigkeit seines Tun zu erklären versucht, erwidert das Kind, dass es leichter sei das Meer in dieses Loch zu bringen, als für ihn die Dreieinigkeit zu deuten. Darauf erkennt Augustinus, dass es sich um das Christuskind handelt. Alle drei geschilderten Episoden beruhen auf Legenden.[74] **Abb. 39**

Betrachtet man nun das Bild der "Regelübergabe" an die Augustiner-Eremiten, so findet sich eine Landschaftsauffassung, die der der Gotik entspricht. Durch die Kombination dreier unabhängiger Szenen, stellt sich Gozzoli das Problem, diese auch im Bild voneinander zu trennen. Es gelingt ihm zunächst durch die Aufteilung der Personen in zwei Gruppen, ohne wechselseitige Beziehungen aufzubauen. Wirksam wird diese Trennung vor allem durch die Landschaftsbarrieren: Die chronologisch erste Szene spielt auf dem Monte Pisano im Bildhintergrund, einem felsenzerklüfteten Berg mit steil aufragenden unbewachsenen Klippen. Auf einem Plateau, auf der Spitze des Berges, befindet sich eine Klosteranlage und einzelne Gebäudeteile zwischen Büschen und Bäumen. Etwas unterhalb des Berges, positioniert Gozzoli eine Gruppe von Menschen überdimensionierter Grösse. Es ist der Besuch von Augustinus bei den Eremiten am Monte Pisano dargestellt. Im vorderen rechten Bildteil wird als zweite Szene die Regelübergabe durch Augustinus an die Augustiner-Eremiten gezeigt. Diese wird allein schon durch die Mönche, die im Kreis **Abb. 40, 41**

[73] Vgl.: Rudolph Arbesmann: Henry of Friemar's "Treatise on the Origin and Development of the Order of the Hermit Friars and its true and real Title", in: Augustiniana 6, 1956, 37-145.

[74] Henri-Irénée Marrou: St. Augustin et l'ange, une légende médiévale, in : Christiana Tempora. Mélanges d'Histoire, d'Archéologie, d'Epigraphie et de Patristique, Rom, 1978, S. 401-449.

um Augustinus knien, abgetrennt, zusätzlich durch die Kirchenanlage im Hintergrund.

Die linke Szene zeigt die Legende mit dem Christuskind am Meer. Die Landschaftsdarstellung unterscheidet sich hier völlig von den bisher gezeigten und ist bewusst in einer traditionellen Art und Weise gestaltet. Ein Rückgriff auf Traditionen scheint hier bildlich umgesetzt, denn auch die Augustiner-Eremiten wollten auf ihre lange Geschichte bis hin zu Augustinus zurückblicken und diese verifizieren.[75] Die hinter dem Christuskind gezeigte Landschaft hat expressiven Charakter. Eine Zypresse erhebt sich vor einem kleinen Wäldchen über die gesamte Bildhöhe. Links hinter diesem Baum wird der Blick in eine hügelige Landschaft freigegeben, in der sich noch eine Stadt mit zahlreichen Türmen und ein Castello befinden. Der zerklüftete Berg, der "Monte Pisano", ähnelt eher einer Felsklippe, die auf ihre Umgebung schroff abweisend reagiert. Die hoch aufragende Zypresse wird hinter dem weissgekleideten Mönch wiederholt. Hierdurch entsteht eine natürliche Rahmung für die Szene am 'Monte Pisano'.

Monikas Tod **Abb. 11**

Auch dieses Fresko enthält drei Erzählungen. Die Hauptszene setzt sich aus 'Monikas Tod' und der Erhebung ihrer Seele in den Himmel zusammen. Dieser Szene geht zeitlich die links im Hintergrund dargestellte Episode vorweg: Im Innenhof eines Hauses in Ostia treffen sich Augustinus und Monika und sprechen über den Tod und das Weiterleben im Jenseits. Demgegenüber spielt sich die rechts im Hintergrund gezeigte Szene nach dem Tode Monikas ab. Dabei handelt es sich um die Abreise Augustinus aus Italien mit einem Schiff.[76]

Eine wiederum sehr interessante Landschaftsdarstellung findet sich im Bild "Tod der Monika". Am rechten Rand gewährt Gozzoli einen Aus- und **Abb. 42**

[75] Rudolph Arbesmann: Outstanding Augustinian Humanists, The Tagastan, O.S.A., X, 1947, S.101-112.

[76] "'Die meisten stimmen darin überein, im Holz des Schiffes und im Mast ein Bild des heiligen Kreuzes zu sehen.' So sagt der Heilige Augustinus in seinem Johanneskommentar (Vortr. 2.2): 'Niemand kann das Meer dieser Welt überschreiten, wenn nicht Christi Kreuz ihn trägt [...] Lass dich tragen vom Schiff, lass dich tragen vom Holz; glaube an den Gekreuzigten und du wirst zum Ziele gelangen können.'" Forstner, 1986, S.400.

Durchblick durch eine Arkadenloggia. Auf einem Schiff sieht man Augustinus mit seinen Gefährten, wie sie Italien verlassen. Herausragend ist hier die im Hintergrund gezeigte Gebirgslandschaft, die sich am Horizont im Abendrot verliert. Ausdrucksstark ist auch der am rechten Bildrand zu sehende Fischer, der beim Arbeiten gezeigt und harmonisch in dieses Landschaftsensemble integriert wird. Die Gebirgszüge steigen in natürlichen Formationen am Horizont hinter dem Meer auf und verlieren sich nach links. Es kann an dieser Stelle von einer Weltlandschaft gesprochen werden.

Links im Bild wird in einem Innenhof in dem sich einige Pflanzen befinden, das Gespräch zwischen Monika und Augustinus gezeigt, das sich kurz vor dem Tod der Mutter ereignet haben soll. **Abb. 43**

Beide rahmen die Hauptszene "Tod der Monika", welche in einem für den Betrachter geöffneten Raum stattfindet, der gerade Platz genug für die Frauen und das Bett der Sterbenden bietet. Davor werden alle drei Szenen durch den Fussboden zusammengefasst, der sich über die gesamte Bildbreite erstreckt.

"Im 15. Jahrhundert ziehen es die Künstler vor, den Horizont höher anzusetzen; das haben sie mit Mittelalterlichen Werken gemein. Die Meister des gotisierenden Stils, wie zum Beispiel Gozzoli, schufen auf diese Weise einen mehrschichtigen Landschaftshintergrund. Andererseits diente für die Maler, die sich für räumliche Konstruktionen entschieden, das anheben des Horizontes als Mittel, eine aktive Tiefenwirkung zu erreichen. Die energisch zurückweichenden Linien des Fußbodens, der Wände, Häuser und Portikus ergaben einen exakten geometrischen Aufbau und brachen gleichsam die Wände. Nach oben verlaufende diagonale Linien spielen eine große Rolle in den Wandmalereien von Massolino, Fra Angelico, Filipo Lippi und gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts bei Girlandajo [sic!]. Die sich nach oben zu nähernden Linien vermögen in der Regel, einen räumlichen Eindruck intensiver zu erwecken als analoge Linien, die nach unten verlaufen. Zu Beginn des Quattrocento wählten solche Maler wie Masaccio, Castagno oder Uccello nicht selten das entgegengesetzte kompositorische Hilfsmittel. In der Dreifaltigkeit *in Sta. Maria Novella senkt der Künstler den Horizont, verbirgt die Linien des Fußbodens und beseitigt dadurch in erheblichem Maße den Eindruck der Tiefe. Zu einem analogen Mittel greift auch Uccello, als er ein monumentales Wandbild für den Dom von Florenz malt. Besonders konsequent wendet Castagno dieses Verfahren an. Ein Vergleich seines* Abendmahls *mit dem* Abendmahl *Girlandajos zeigt, daß die perspektivische Konstruktion des Fußbodens*

eine aktivere räumliche Wirkung hervorruft als die in der Perspektive dargestellte Decke." [77]

Welche Rolle kommt nun der Innenraumdarstellung, der Stadtlandschaft und der Natur im Zyklus zu? Bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung wird lediglich der Bildraum aufgefüllt, um den im Vordergrund Agierenden einen Spielraum zu geben. Auch Konventionen spielen eine Rolle, indem gewisse Formen vom Künstler verlangt werden. Betrachtet man jedoch den Zyklus genauer, so ist auffällig, dass das Bildthema nicht in der Tradition früherer Zyklen, wie des Marien- oder Christuslebens, steht. Die Darstellungsweise der Handlung, deren Abläufe und besonders der Bildhintergründe, ist also folglich nicht von vornherein zwingend vorgegeben. Dagegen bleibt die Lebensgeschichte von Augustinus verbindlich. Welche Szenen daraus als Bildthemen zu entnehmen sind, kann durch vielerlei Aspekte bestimmt werden.

Es stellen sich mehrere Fragen:
1. Ist es für den Betrachter relevant, gewisse Bildhintergründe für bestimmte Themen zu sehen?
2. Ist dies für das Verständnis der dargestellten Themen wichtig? Muss der Bildhintergrund in den Erzählzusammenhang mit eingebunden werden?
3. Was bewog den Künstler, einen bestimmten Bildhintergrund für eine bestimmte Szene zu wählen?

Als erster Punkt soll nun über die dem Bildhintergrund zukommende Rolle im Zyklus nachgedacht werden. Diese ergibt sich aus der dargestellten Handlung und bietet ihr eine Spielfläche, einen Raum, in dem agiert werden kann. Weiterhin könnte eine unterstützende Beziehung zur Handlung geschaffen werden. Bestimmte Handlungsstränge werden durch Natur oder Architektur hervorgehoben, so dass sie verständlicher werden. Dies findet man etwa im Bild der "Ankunft in Mailand". Hier wird die Architektur als unterstützendes Element eingesetzt. Die Säule, die Augustinus in der Szene, in der ihm die Reitsporen abgenommen werden, hinterfängt, hebt ihn hervor. In derselben Weise unterstützen die Arkadenbögen die beiden Folgeszenen. Die hinterfangende, hervorhebende Hintergrundgestaltung ist jedoch nicht immer zwingend. Der Hintergrund kann auch als Gegenpol zum Hauptmotiv und in direkter Konkurrenz dazu stehen. Im Bild der "Einschulung in Tagaste" tritt die Stadtlandschaft

Abb. 15, 22, 18

[77] Danilowa, 1983, S. 317.

deutlich durch die Vielfältigkeit und Komplexität der einzelnen Architekturelemente hervor, so dass sie zu den im Bildvordergrund handelnden Personen in Konkurrenz um die Aufmerksamkeit des Betrachters steht. Die Rolle des Bildhintergrundes könnte in diesem Fall eine Erweiterung der Komplexität des Bildes und eine Konzentrationserhaltung für den Betrachter bewirken, indem dieser mit grösserem und längerem Interesse das Werk betrachtet. Für die Möglichkeit der Wiedererkennung einer Szene spielt der Hintergrund für den Betrachter eine wichtige Rolle, wie es im Fresko "Abreise aus Rom", deutlich wird. Hier findet sich im linken Bildhintergrund eine Stadt, die durch Architekturzitate sofort als Rom zu identifizieren ist.

Damit kommt man zur ersten Frage, ob es für den Rezipienten von Relevanz ist, bestimmte Bildhintergründe in den Bildern vorzufinden. Geht man wiederum vom Bild "Abreise aus Rom" aus, so ist es für den Betrachter von grosser Bedeutung, die Stadt Rom zu identifizieren, da er ansonsten lediglich einen Zug von Personen in einer Landschaft vorfinden würde. Dieser erkennt Rom links im Bildhintergrund und kann assoziieren, dass die Reiter im Bildvordergrund aus der Stadt kommen. Für die Betrachtung des Zyklus ist es häufiger von Bedeutung Hintergrundinformationen zu erhalten. Nimmt man die „Bekehrungsszene", so ist es wichtig, eine ruhige Hintergrundkulisse zu schaffen, die dem Betrachter die Assoziation von Ruhe und Kontemplation ermöglicht. Für ihn ist es also meist wichtig, durch den Hintergrund Impulse zu erhalten, die die eigentliche Szene unterstützen. **Abb. 14**

Dies berührt schon den Bereich der zweiten Frage. Für das Verständnis der Themen ist der Bildhintergrund häufig von grosser Bedeutung, dies muss jedoch nicht notwendig so sein. Nimmt man die "Predigt des Ambrosius", so dient der Hintergrund wie in einer Theaterkulisse der Ausstattung des Bildes und nicht dem Verständnis. Somit muss der Bildhintergrund auch nicht in den Erzählzusammenhang eingebunden werden. **Abb. 16**

Was veranlasst nun einen Künstler bestimmte Bildhintergründe für gewisse Szenen zu wählen? Das Thema spielt sicher häufig eine Rolle. Ist es eine ruhige, beschauliche Szene, wählt der Künstler einen ruhigen Hintergrund und umgekehrt. Häufig sind jedoch vorhandene Quellen und Vorbilder relevant. Darauf soll weiter unten noch näher eingegangen werden.

"Das klassische Mittel der Betrachtereinstellung ist sicher die Perspektive in all ihren Erscheinungsformen, den früheren Vorläufern (Bedeutungsperspektive, umgekehrte Perspektive), den geometrischen Lösungen und den späten Verfallsformen. Durch die Perspektive oder durch die allgemein räumliche Einrichtung des Bildes wird der Betrachter zum Bild hin situiert, in Position gebracht - was man noch unter den Mitteln der äußeren Orientierung buchen könnte. Aber Perspektive leistet mehr als die Vermittlung zwischen dem Raum des Betrachters und dem Bildraum. Sie reguliert schließlich auch die Position des Rezipienten zur inneren Kommunikation, sprich: Darstellung des Bildes."[78]

So erklärt Kemp, was die Perspektive für den Betrachter bedeuten kann. Es kann aber sicher auch auf den Bildhintergrund, der ja im Augustinuszyklus von Gozzoli stark perspektivisch gestaltet wurde, zutreffen. Die architektonisch-perspektivische Gestaltung im Zyklus spiegelt zudem eine Denkweise wieder, die auf Erneuerung und Modernität in Wissenschaft und Kunst eingeht. *"Viele architektonische Motive in den Fresken der Renaissance sind weniger durch die realen Bauten der Stadt inspiriert als vielmehr durch jene Idealarchitektur, mit der man die Straßen dekorierte, einer Architektur also, die zu schaffen man träumte."*[79]

Einer der Wenigen, der sich auch mit der Frage der Architektur und Landschaftsdarstellung im Zyklus in S. Agostino intensiver beschäftigte, war Lagaisse. Er erkannte den Reichtum der Architekturdarstellungen und die Weiterentwicklung von Gozzolis Landschaftsdarstellungen innerhalb des Zyklus. Lagaisse spricht die Bedeutung der Hintergrundmotive für den Augustinuszyklus an.[80] Es stellt sich die Frage, warum selbst die Wissenschaftler, die sich mit den Darstellungen in San Gimignano beschäftigten, auf die doch augenscheinliche Bedeutung der Bildhintergründe kaum oder gar nicht eingehen und zumeist zu einem Urteil gelangen, dass die Begabung Gozzolis als wunderbaren Erzähler rühmt. Burckhardt, der die Fresken von Gozzoli in San Gimignano nicht gesehen hat, schreibt im Bezug auf die Cappella Medici: "Die schon erwähnte Ausstattung mit Architekturen, Gärten, Landschaften ist fabelhaft prächtig; auch hier ist Benozzo ein begeisterter Entdecker neuer Sphären des Darstellbaren."[81]

[78] Wolfgang Kemp: Kunstwerk und Betrachter: Der rezeptionsästhetische Ansatz. in: Kunstgeschichte, Eine Einführung, Berlin, 1986, S. 206.
[79] Danilowa, 1983, S. 73.
[80] Lagaisse, 1934, S.115.
[81] Burckhardt, 1855, S.805. Vgl. Fussnote 2.

4.4. Die Figuren

Die bisher eruierten Themen des Innenraumes und der Landschaft stellen für die figürliche Darstellung und deren Szenen die Kulisse dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die Geschehnisse aus dem Leben des Augustinus gezeigt. Gozzoli gelingt es, die einzelnen Geschichten und deren Handlungsabläufe auf wenige Haupt- und Nebenfiguren zu reduzieren. Sechs von siebzehn Bildern sind beschränkt auf weniger als sieben Personen pro Darstellung. Der Grossteil der Fresken beinhaltet grössere Ansammlungen von Figuren, die eine Anzahl von zwanzig leicht überschreiten können. Dabei können in einem Bild die Hauptfiguren öfter auftreten und sich wiederholen. Zu unterscheiden ist zusätzlich zwischen Hauptfiguren, Nebenfiguren, die am Geschehen beteiligt sind, Nebenfiguren, die am Geschehen nicht beteiligt sind, sowie Assistenzfiguren, die nicht in den eigentlichen Erzählzusammenhang gehören und zumeist stark portraithafte Züge aufweisen.

Betrachtet man zunächst die Hauptfiguren des Zyklus, so sind dies nach Augustinus, Monika und Ambrosius. Es finden sich je nach Szene noch weitere Hauptfiguren in den Bildern. In der "Einschulungszene" ist es am linken Bildrand neben Monika, Augustinus Vater, Patricius, und der Lehrer der Grammatikschule, welcher zweimal in das Bild aufgenommen wird. Bei der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago" ist es der direkt am Geschehen beteiligte Doktor. In der Szene der "Ankunft am Hafen von Ostia", ist die Augustinus begrüssende Figur, als hochstehende Persönlichkeit und somit als weitere Hauptperson kenntlich. Im Bild der "Ankunft in Mailand" ist ausser Bischof Ambrosius noch der Stadtpräfekt Theodosius namentlich zu nennen. Der "Bekehrungsszene", ist am rechten Bildrand, Alypius, der Freund von Augustinus, beigestellt. In der Szene der Christuslegende ist das Christuskind als Hauptfigur zu sehen. Bei der Darstellung der "Diskussion mit dem Häretiker Fortunatus" steht dieser Augustinus als Hauptfigur gegenüber. **Abb. 22, 21, 19, 15, 14, 9**

Nach Augustinus tritt im Zyklus am häufigsten seine Mutter auf, so im ersten Bild der "Einschulung in Tagaste", sodann im dritten Bild des "Fürbitte Monikas", weiterhin bei der "Predigt des Ambrosius", bei der "Taufe Augustinus" und in ihrer "Todesszene". In der Häufigkeit folgt Ambrosius, der mit seinem Auftreten in drei Bildern dargestellt ist. **Abb. 20, 16, 7**

Betrachtet man nun die Hauptfigur Augustinus, so kommt dieser in jedem der Bilder ein- oder mehrmals vor. Einzige Ausnahme bildet das Fresko des "Fürbitte Monikas". Im ersten Bild des Zyklus stellt Gozzoli ihn

zweimal als Kind dar. Zwischen seinen Eltern stehend, in ein zeitgenössisches grünes Patriziergewand mit Pelzborde gekleidet, wird er vom Lehrer der Grammatikschule abgeholt. Er wird in der folgenden Szene desselben Bildes nochmals dargestellt. Hier steht er, eine Tafel mit dem Alphabet in der Hand haltend, neben dem Lehrer. Die Hauptfigur Augustinus wird hier von Gozzoli nicht explizit hervorgehoben, sondern verliert sich eher in der Vielfalt der am Geschehen beteiligten Personen. Unterstützt wird dies dadurch, dass die beiden Szenen nicht im Bild zentriert, sondern an den rechten und linken Bildrand gerückt sind. Im folgenden wird Augustinus bis einschliesslich der "Bekehrungsszene" als Doktor der Philosophie und Rhetorik gezeigt. Bis zur Szene der "Taufe von Augustinus" wird er auch nicht mit einem Nimbus ausgestattet und somit nicht als Heiliger dargestellt.

Schon allein an der sich wiederholenden, immer gleichen Kleidung ist Augustinus unschwer als Hauptfigur zu erkennen. Er trägt ein tiefrotes, knöchellanges Gewand, mit einem Schulterüberwurf mit weisser Borde und weissen Bündchen an den Ärmeln, dazu einen weissen Kapuzenkragen. Als Doktor zeichnet ihn die rote Mütze mit dem weissen gewellten Rand aus. In den Bildern, die ihn als Reisenden zeigen, trägt Augustinus einen weissen Mantel. Er wird in den Bildern meist an zentraler Stelle gezeigt, was ihn wiederum als Hauptfigur hervorhebt. In den mehrszenigen Bildern, wie bei der "Ankunft in Mailand" und der "Predigt des Ambrosius", wird allein durch die mehrmalige Wiederholung der Hauptfigur in einem Bild deren Wichtigkeit hervorgehoben. Diese Wiederholung verwirrt jedoch gleichzeitig den Betrachter, da dieser erst einmal die Szenen voneinander unterscheiden muss. Wie wichtig Gozzoli bestimmte Szenen sind, erkennt man an der 'Sporenabnahme' im Bild der "Ankunft in Mailand", die im Fresko in Pisa erneut aufgegriffen wird.[82] Vom Zeitpunkt der Taufe an wird Augustinus konsequent als Mönch der Augustiner-Eremiten oder als Bischof dargestellt. Gozzoli zeigt ihn ausserdem fortan mit einem Nimbus und zeichnet ihn somit als Heiligen aus. Augustinus wäre allein durch die Kleidung nicht mehr unmittelbar zu erkennen. Durch die meist im Bild zentriert erscheinende Position und den beschrifteten Nimbus, welcher ihn als Heiligen Augustinus auszeichnet, ist er als Hauptfigur jedoch jederzeit auszumachen.

Abb. 15

[82] Ugo Procacci: Sinopie e Affreschi. Milano, 1961, S.135.

Monika ist im Zyklus von Beginn an als Heilige dargestellt. Im ersten Bild am linken Bildrand trägt sie noch reiche, weltliche Kleidung. Ganz in Weiss mit einem Gazeschleier und einem goldenen Nimbus, hebt sie sich stark von den anderen Figuren ab. In den folgenden Bildern, in denen Monika dargestellt ist, wird sie als Nonne in einem roten Gewand gezeigt. In zwei Bildern tritt sie als Hauptfigur auf: Im "Fürbitte Monikas" und im "Tod der Monika".
Im Bild "Tod der Monika" wird diese im Bett sitzend dargestellt. Sie hat die Hände zum Gebet erhoben und blickt auf die Erscheinung des Christuskindes. Monika ist, wie die sich im Raum befindlichen Frauen, in Ordenskleidung gewandet. Hier spielt Gozzoli auf den Orden der Augustinerinnen an, der laut Legende von Augustinus gegründet worden ist.

Interessant sind die dargestellten Frauen durch ihre Gestik. Besonderes auffallend ist der nach oben erhobene Kopf einer Nonne, die die Seele Monikas in den Himmel entschweben zu sehen scheint. Ein wichtiges Detail fügt Gozzoli bei der ganz rechts stehenden Frau ein, indem er sie neugierig, hinter der Schulter einer Mitschwester, aus dem Bild blicken lässt. Ihr Blick richtet sich direkt an den Betrachter. Die Darstellung einer weiteren nimbierten Frau, neben Monika, ist aussergewöhnlich. Sie könnte jedoch als ehemalige Geliebte Augustinus verstanden werden, die ihm den Sohn Adeodatus gebar. Dieses Kind könnte eventuell der am linken Bildrand dargestellte Jüngling sein.[83]

In den meisten Bildern des Zyklus gelingt es Gozzoli, zahlreiche Nebenfiguren in das Bildgeschehen zu integrieren. Die Schauplätze werden dadurch belebt und für den Betrachter vielfältiger.

Gozzoli war ein besonders guter Beobachter von Mimik und Charaktergesichtern. Wenn es ihm auch teilweise nicht gelang, sich von einer etwas statischen Malweise zu lösen, so finden sich doch in den Gesichtern der dargestellten Personen viele Variationen und Typen wieder. Nimmt man als Beispiel das Bild "Augustinus lehrt in Rom", so erkennt man in den Gesichtern der Zuhörer eine derartige Bandbreite von Charakteren, so dass der Eindruck entsteht, Gozzoli habe seine Umgebung portraitiert und im Zyklus verewigt. Ein herausragendes Beispiel für Gozzolis Können findet sich im Bild des "Todes des heiligen Augustinus" wieder. Die um den Leichnam Stehenden drücken den Schmerz um

[83] Vgl.: Courcelle, 1969, S.101.

Augustinus durch eine vielfältige Gestik und Mimik aus. So haben sie zum Beispiel die Hände zum Gebet gefaltet, den Blick auf Grund von innerlicher Zerrissenheit gesenkt, sie halten den Kopf in die Hand gestützt oder haben die Hände flehend nach oben gerissen. Versunken in innerer Andacht, die Hand aus Scham vor das Gesicht haltend, zeigt Gozzoli die Trauernden. Einige werden singend und lesend dargestellt. Die Liturgie wird von seinem Nachfolger Possidius, der nunmehr Bischof wurde, auf der linken Seite des Freskos übernommen, während sich alle anderen Trauernden in einem Halbkreis um den Toten gruppieren. Der im Hintergrund auf der linken Seite hinter Augustinus stehende Mönch neben dem bärtigen Trauernden, ist mit der weiter oben beschriebenen Frau im Bild der "Tod der Monika" vergleichbar, da er seinen Blick erhebt und zu beobachten scheint, wie die Seele von Augustinus von Engeln in den Himmel gehoben wird.

Das besondere Können Gozzolis zeigt sich unter anderem auch in der **Abb. 44**
Darstellung der Kinder. Lagaisse vergleicht Gozzolis Kinderdarstellungen mit denen von Luca della Robbia.[84] Stokes bezeichnet das Christuskind als, "*one of the most exquisitely natural children the painter ever drew*"[85]. Auch Wingenroth beschreibt die Kinderdarstellungen Gozzolis als sehr gelungen, dass selbst Pintorrichio davon beeinflusst worden sei.[86] Schon im ersten Bild der "Einschulung in Tagaste" sieht man in der Loggia der Schule wundervolle Kinderdarstellungen. Die Züchtigung des Jungen auf der rechten Seite ist Gozzoli hervorragend gelungen. Die Darstellung von Kindern findet sich in weiteren fünf Bildern des Zyklus. Eine der schönsten Szenen ist die am rechten Rand im Bild der "Tod der Monika". Zwei nackte Kinder, die mit dem eigentlichen Geschehen nichts zu tun haben, fliehen vor einem bissigen Hund. Herausragend ausgearbeitet sind die in Bewegung gezeigten Kinder. Während alle anderen Figuren in feierlicher Stille verharren, drücken sie durch ihr Treiben Lebendigkeit aus und stehen somit in krassem Gegensatz zu jenen.

Die Kinder erfüllen die Funktion, gesteigerte Bewegung in das Bild zu bannen. Die Personen, die zum Geschehen gehören, werden in verhaltenen Gesten und Emotionsbezeugungen dargestellt. Eine übersteigerte

[84] Lagaisse.1934, S.86.
[85] Hugh Stokes: Bonozzo Gozzoli, London, o. J., S. 15.
[86] Wingenroth, 1897, S.42.

Mimik unter den Trauernden wäre nicht angebracht. Als Ausdruck von Lebhaftigkeit und Bewegungsdrang sind die Kinder und der Hund für Gozzoli die Möglichkeit auch dieses Können zu beweisen, sie dienen zugleich als Katalysator für die Ungezwungenheit, die den anderen Figuren nicht zugestanden werden kann. Ähnliches fordert Alberti für ein gelungenes Kunstwerk.[87] Die Kinder stellen somit den Gegenpol zum Tode dar und versinnbildlichen das Leben. Die Liebe zu Kinderdarstellungen findet sich in vielen von Gozzolis Bildern wieder. Sie ist deshalb erstaunlich, da Kinder in dieser Zeit selten in Bildern vorkommen, besonders Schuldarstellungen sind nicht oft zu finden. Eines der wenigen Beispiele, die Gozzolis Schuldarstellung nahekommen, ist ein Stich, der Pollaiuolo (um 1459-1464 datiert) zugeschrieben wird.[88]

Eine weitere Besonderheit im Zyklus ist die starke Einbindung von Assistenzfiguren. Damit sind Figuren gemeint, die offensichtlich mit dem Geschehen im Bild nichts zu tun haben. Meist stehen sie am Rand des Bildes an exponierter Stelle, häufig erhöht. All diese Figuren zeichnen sich durch stark portraithafte Züge aus. Oft blicken sie aus dem Bild heraus. Die auffälligsten Assistenzfiguren finden sich im Bild der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago", die am linken Bildrand auf eine Art Podest gestellt sind. Weiterhin Befinden sie sich im Fresko "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" am rechten Bildrand, bei der "Abreise aus Rom" am rechten und linken Bildrand auf einer Art Felsplateau, in der "Taufe des Augustinus" am rechten Bildrand und im "Tod der Monika" rechts vor dem Einblick in das Sterbezimmer. Der Wunsch liegt nahe, diese Figuren, ähnlich wie es im "Zug der heiligen drei Könige" in Florenz geschah, namentlich zu benennen. Diverse Versuche wurden in dieser Hinsicht von verschiedener Seite unternommen.[89]

[87] Analog der rhetorischen Satzbaulehre fordert Alberti eine Zusammensetzung von Flächen zum Glied, von den Gliedern zum Körper, von Körpern zum Bild. Analog zur Rhetorik sind in Bezug auf den Gedankeninhalt wie die Darstellung Begriffe wie Inventio, Dispositio und Ornatus, zu Varietas, Copia und besondere Schmuckformen gerechnet werden, Forderungen, um eine dem Inhalt angemessene Darstellung zu bewirken. Vgl. Leon Battista Alberti: De pictura, ed. Cecil Grayson, Opere Volgari, Bd. III, Bari, 1973, S. 7-107.

[88] John Goldsmith Philips: Early Florentine Designers and Engravers, Cambridge, 1955, S.12.

[89] Unter anderem bei Courcelle, Cole Ahl, Pecori.

Betrachtet man die Assistenzfiguren genauer, so drücken sie grosses Selbstbewusstsein und Strenge aus. Sie könnten als Zeugenfiguren beigefügt worden sein. So vermutet Cole Ahl in der am rechten Bildrand stehenden Figur der "Taufe von Augustinus" Fra Domenico Strambi[90],den Pecori wiederum in der Szene des "Todes der Monika" mit dem rechts vorne stehenden Mönch identifiziert.[91] Auch wird häufig ein Selbstportrait von Gozzoli in den Bildern des Zyklus vermutet. Die aufgrund ihrer grossen Ähnlichkeit mit dem Selbstportrait in der Medici Kapelle naheliegendste Darstellung, ist die am rechten Bildrand der "Abreise aus Rom" stehende Figur. **Abb. 45**

Eines der wichtigsten Merkmale in Gozzolis Kunst der Figurendarstellung sind die Handgesten, die in immer neuen Variationen angewandt werden. Offene erhoben, ineinandergelegte, überkreuzte, hinweisende Hände usw. werden von Gozzoli in perfekter Art dargestellt, und scheinen starke Bedeutungsträger zu sein. Auffällig sind die Gesten im Bild "Augustinus lehrt in Rom". Im Vergleich zu denen der "Einschulungszene" sind sie nüchtern und kontrolliert, bezeugen den hohen Grad an Bildung und Geist der Zuhörerschaft und drücken diesen auch durch die Handgesten aus. Eine Zeichnung von acht Handgesten aus Gozzolis Musterbuch, zeigt, wie wichtig sie ihm waren.[92] Es entsteht der Eindruck, als dienten die Handgesten in Gozzolis Bildern als zusätzliche Ausdrucksmöglichkeit für Gefühlsregung. Besonders deutlich wird dies im Bild "Tod des Augustinus".

Die Kleidung der Figuren entspricht der zeitgenössischen Tracht, wie die knielangen Mäntel und die enganliegenden Hosen der Männern oder die unter der Brust gegürteten Kleider der Frauen. "*Benozzo a donné la plus place à la représentation du costume: à cet égard son œuvre est une mine très riche.*"[93] Die Kostüme der Dargestellten sind vielfältig. So findet sich zum Beispiel im Fresko "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" bei den neben der Kathedra Stehenden orientalisch anmutende Kleidung, die sich besonders in der Kopfbedeckung wiederspiegelt. Auffällig ist zudem, dass selten Personen ohne Kopfbedeckung gezeigt werden.

[90] Cole Ahl, 1996, S.124 f.
[91] Pecori, 1975, S. 535.
[92] Degenhart, 1968, Kat. 460.
[93] Lagaisse, 1934, S.147.

Im Zyklus sind auch zahlreiche Tiere, von dem in der Szene "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" dargestellten sitzenden Hund, über die Pferde bei der „Abreise aus Rom" bis hin zu der "Ankunft in Mailand", wo die Pferde nochmals wiederholt werden, vorhanden. Der Hund im Bild "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" nimmt eine wichtige Stellung ein. Im vorderen Bildfeld sitzt er vor Augustinus. Die Hinzufügung eines Hundes konnte im Mittelalter als Sinnbild eines Predigers dienen. So schreibt Ambrosius in seiner Schrift über das Sechstagewerk: "Wie jeder Christ, besonders jeder Vorsteher, ein Hündlein Gottes sein soll." (6.7.)[94] Die Tierdarstellungen entspringen den Bestiarien und Musterbüchern, die in den Werkstätten der Maler üblich waren.[95] Selbst Burckhardt erkennt die Vorliebe von Gozzoli für "exotische Tiere, die Liebe und Wertachtung für Pferde und fremde Völker".[96]

Quid spectas volucres, pisces et monstra ferarum
Et virides silvas aetereasque domos?
Et pueros, iuvenes, matres canosque parentes,
Queis semper vivum spirat in ore decus?
Non haec tam variis finxit simulacra figuris
Natura, ingenio foetibus apta suo:
Est opus artificis: pinxit viva ora Benoxus.
O superi, vivos fundite in ora sonos.[97]

Dieses Epigramm haben die Pisaner am Freskenzyklus von Gozzoli im Camposanto anbringen lassen, betont Vasari. Es trifft in seinem Lob auch ganz und gar auf den Zyklus in San Gimignano zu. Verblüffend ist hierbei die Ähnlichkeit mit dem Text Albertis: "*Jenes Geschichtsbild wirst Du loben und bewundern können, welches derart mit gewissen, ihm eigenthümlichen Reizen ausgestattet ist, dass jeder Beschauer desselben, ob gelehrt oder ungelehrt, dadurch erfreut und bewegt wird. Das was an dem Geschichtsbilde zuerst Vergnügen hervorruft, ist der Reichthum und die Mannigfaltigkeit der Gestalten. Wie bei den Speisen und in der Musik Neuheit und Abwechslung umsomehr gefällt, als sie vom alten und Gewohnten abweichen, so erfreut sich der Geist überhaupt an jeder Fülle und jedem Wechsel, und desshalb gefällt auch in der Malerei*

[94] Forstner, 1986, S. 267.
[95] Degenhart, 1968, S. 375.
[96] Jacob Burckhardt: Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, hrsg. von Konrad Hoffmann, Stuttgart, 1985, S.198 ff.
[97] Vasari, 1878, Bd. III., S. 45-68, S.49.

Reichhaltigkeit und Mannigfaltigkeit. Jenem Bilde werde ich Fülle und Mannigfaltigkeit zusprechen, wo man in richtiger Postirung alte und junge Männer, Knaben, Frauen, Mädchen, Kinder, Hühner, Hündchen, Vögel, Pferde, Rinder, Gebäude, Ortschaften u. dgl. Dinge vermischt sieht. [...]"[98]
Spannend ist die inhaltliche Übereinstimmung beider Texte. Alberti verweist in seinen Schriften ausdrücklich als Beispiele auf Brunelleschi, Donatello, Ghiberti und Masaccio[99], deren Verbindung zu Gozzoli noch genauer erörtert wird.

4.5. Das Bildlicht und die Farbigkeit

Weder über das Bildlicht noch über die Farbigkeit der Bilder können genaue Aussagen gemacht werden, denn die Maltechnik, die Gozzoli anwandte, lässt kaum noch Schlüsse in diese Richtung zu. Gozzoli benutzte eine Art Mischtechnik, indem er zwar den Grossteil der Bilder in Feuchtputz (al fresco) malte, sie jedoch immer noch al secco (auf den Trockenputz gemalt) überarbeitete. Im Laufe der Zeit hat die Schicht des al secco gelitten, so dass zumindest bei der Farbanalyse Vorsicht geboten ist.

Betrachtet man das Bildlicht des Zyklus, so ist festzustellen, dass Gozzoli bei den meisten der Bilder die natürliche Lichtquelle der Kapelle mit in seine Bildkonstruktion einbezogen hat. Im untersten Register stimmen der Lichteinfall des Fensters der Kapelle mit den Schlagschatten und den Schatten in und auf den Gewändern der Figuren überein. Bei den Bildern des zweiten Registers sind auf der linken Wandseite Diskrepanzen zu der natürlichen Lichtquelle erkennbar. Gozzoli lässt hier das Licht stets von links einfallen, während das tatsächliche Licht von rechts kommt. Die Bilder der rechten Wandseite berücksichtigen wiederum den Lichteinfall des Fensters. In den Szenen des obersten Registers ist es aufgrund des schlechten Erhaltungszustandes schwer, den Lichteinfall zu bestimmen. "*In allen Arten des Freskos sind Wand und Bild auf das engste miteinander verbunden. Schon durch diesen äußeren Vorgang steht das Fresko in stärkster Beziehung zur Architektur. Form und Umfang des Bildes, doch auch Maß und Richtung des Lichtes sind dadurch in einer Weise festgelegt,*

[98] Leon Battista Alberti: Drei Bücher über die Malerei, in: ders.: Kleinere kunsttheoretische Schriften (hrsg. v. Hubert Janitschek), Osnabrück 1970 (Quellenschriften für Kunstgeschichte und Kunsttechnik des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, Bd. 11, Nachdruck der Ausgabe Wien 1877), S.116 ff.
[99] Ebd., Prolog S. 8.

wie in keiner anderen Gattung der Malerei."[100] Zusätzlich nutzt Gozzoli bei den Innenraumdarstellungen gemalte Lichtquellen in Form von Fenstern, um Schatten zu motivieren.

Erstaunlich ist die im Zyklus bis auf wenige Aussnahmen berücksichtigte natürliche Lichtquelle. Das Licht in den Bildern bestimmt sich zumeist durch die Schattenführung. Häufig kann man jedoch feststellen, dass Gesichter, Kleidung oder Gegenstände wie aus sich selbst leuchten, als besässen sie eine innere mystische Lichtquelle. Das Licht und seine Wirkung wird stark gedämpft durch die Betonung der Farbe.

Gozzoli benutzt, soweit dies noch zu erkennen ist, in seinem Zyklus kräftige Farben, sowohl für die Kleidung der Figuren, als auch für seine Architektur und Landschaftsdarstellungen. Sichtbar wurden die Farben erst wieder nach der neuesten Restaurierung von 1990. Ein in der Kleidung häufig vorkommender Farbton ist das Rot. Dieses wird in vielfältigen Schattierungen benutzt. Von einem kräftigen Braunrot bis hin zu einem Blaurot. Korrespondierend setzt Gozzoli diesem Blau und Grün gegenüber. Die genannten drei Farben finden sich dann auch in der Architektur und der Landschaft wieder, so dass eine Einheit zwischen Personen, Architektur und Landschaft auch durch die Farbgebung hervorgerufen wird. Als Glanzpunkte treten demgegenüber immer wieder Gold- und Gelbtöne auf. Die Farbe wird auch perspektivisch genutzt. Sie verliert im Bildhintergrund an Intensität und geht häufig, wie beim "Tod der Monika", in ein blasses Blau über.

Die intensive farbige Gestaltung der Architektur erscheint dem heutigen Betrachter befremdlich. So sind die Kreuzrippengewölbe in der "Ankunft in Mailand" in einem starken Grünton gehalten, während sich in den Zwickeln eine goldgelbe Marmorierung befindet. Eine starke Farbigkeit ist in allen Bildern Gozzolis zu finden und wird bis hin zur Bildrahmung übernommen. Auch die Scheinarchitektur der zwischen den Bildern liegenden Pilaster ist farblich gefasst. Die Malerei im Chor wirkt harmonisch. Sie korrespondiert mit der gesamten Ausgestaltung der Kapelle, vor allem durch die Farben, die relativ intensiv sind. Schwarze Konturen und die eingesetzten Schattenpartien schwächen die Grellheit der Farbkombinationen ab.

[100] Richard Zürcher: Italienische Wandmalerei, Meisterwerke des Freskos vom Mittelalter bis Tiepolo, Zürich, 1944, S. 7.

"Von ganz anderem Temperament als Fra Angelico erweisen sich seine jüngeren Zeitgenossen Benozzo Gozzoli und Fra Filippo Lippi. [...] Vollends in Gozzolis Bildern triumphiert die Bundtheit irdischen Lebens unbekümmert um die Heiligkeit der Themen, [...]."[101]

4.6. Die Beziehungsgeflechte des Zyklus

Schwerpunkte bilden sich aus den wechselseitigen Beziehungsgeflechten der Figuren zueinander. Gozzoli gelingt es, Blickrichtungen zu verschmelzen, sie werden unterstützt durch gegenseitige Berührungen und hinweisende Handgesten. Dabei treten die Gesichter und ihre Mimik in besonderer Art hervor. Gozzoli spielt mit der Portraithaftigkeit der Figuren in den Bildern, gibt jeder einen eigenen Charakterzug, so dass jede ihre eigene Geschichte zu erzählen hat. Auffällig in allen Bildern des Zyklus ist die stille Art des Korrespondierens und der Kommunikation der Personen miteinander und zum Betrachter hin, dies wird bedingt dadurch, dass Gozzoli immer wieder durch die aus dem Bild herausführende Blickrichtung einzelner Personen den Betrachter anspricht. Gefühl, Emotion und Stimmung wird bei Gozzoli hauptsächlich durch die differenzierte Gestaltung der Gesichter transportiert. Dies geschieht jedoch nicht nur innerhalb eines geschlossenen Bildes, sondern wird vom Maler dazu benutzt, einzelne Bilder miteinander zu verbinden.

Bei Betrachtung des Zyklus im Gesamtzusammenhang stellt man fest, dass einzelne Sequenzen und individuelle Episoden in direkter Beziehung oder in Opposition zueinander stehen können. Die äussersten Szenen des untersten Registers beginnen mit der "Einschulung in Tagaste" und "Abreise aus Rom". Die Funktion dieser Szenen entspricht dem Übergang vom öffentlichen Bereich des Mittelschiffs hin zum Sanktuarium des Mönchschors. Beide Szenen sind durch Personen, Architektur und Landschaft definiert, eine profane Welt wird gezeigt. Sie stehen im Kontrast zu den Schilderungen über die intellektuelle Aktivität des Heiligen.

[101] Zürcher, 1944, S. 14.

In den Szenen der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago"[102] sowie "Augustinus lehrt Rhetorik und Philosophie in Rom" wird der Protagonist in Innenräume gesetzt. Die Szenen stehen sich gegenüber. Sie korrespondieren miteinander, indem in der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago", die beiden am linken Bildrand stehenden Figuren spiegelbildlich den beiden in "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" am rechten Bildrand stehenden entsprechen. Es scheint sich bei genauer Betrachtung der Gesichter um dieselben Personen zu handeln. In beiden Bildern haben sie offensichtlich nichts mit dem Geschehen zu tun. Sie blicken aus den Bildern heraus und schaffen somit eine Art Symmetrie über den Betrachter hinweg. Der angrenzenden Szene der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago" folgt die der für das Seelenheil ihres Sohnes betenden Monika[103]. Der Haltung des stolz vor seinem Professor knienden Studenten entspricht die der andächtig ergebenen Mutter vor einem Altar. Gozzoli schafft hier einen bewussten Kontrast zwischen der Welt der profanen Wissenschaft und der Kontemplation im Glauben, zwischen Augustinus Stolz und der Frömmigkeit Monikas.

Die Szenen, welche das nächste Register einleiten, spielen sich wiederum im öffentlichen Raum ab. Es handelt sich hierbei um die "Ankunft in Mailand" und die "Predigt des Ambrosius". Sie zeigen eine heitere, in zeitgenössischer Tracht gekleidete Gesellschaft, von stark verkürzte Architektur hinterfangen. Beide Szenen stehen im Kontrast zu der folgenden, der "Bekehrungsszene". Sie bilden den Abschluss der den Manichäern verpflichteten Lebensweise von Augustinus. Die Stellung der

[102] Das Fresko zeigt die „Einschreibung in die Universität von Karthago". Die rechte Bildhälfte ist durch Feuchtigkeit zerstört. Die nur noch schemenhaft zu erkennende Figur des Augustinus kniet vor einem Doktor der Universität Karthagos und unterzieht sich dem Ritus der Einschreibung. Die am linken Bildrand auf einem Podest erhöht stehenden Personen scheinen der Szene nicht direkt beizuwohnen, da sie entweder aus dem Bild herausblicken oder in sich versunken sind. Die Gesichter zeichnen sich durch stark portraithafte Züge aus.

[103] Die Szene ist die erste, die an der Fensterfront angebracht ist. Durch starke Zerstörung und wiederholte Rekonstruktionen ist hier kaum mehr die Hand Gozzolis zu erkennen. Man kann lediglich den Aufbau des Bildes mit seiner Figurenanordnung als von Gozzoli vorgegeben annehmen. Monika kniet in einem Kirchenraum vor einem Altar, um für das Seelenheil ihres Sohnes zu beten. Dabei wird sie von einigen sie umgebenden Frauen im Gebet unterstützt. Rechts im Bild tritt Monika nochmals auf und leitet zum vierten Bild über, indem sie die Hand zum Abschiedsgruss an ihren Sohn erhebt.

"Bekehrungsszene" über der der betenden Monika ist wohl durchdacht. Das flehend erhobene Profil Monikas weist den Betrachter direkt auf den Moment der Bekehrung von Augustinus. Beide Episoden sind neben dem Hochaltar angebracht. Diese Art von Korrespondenz im Zyklus verbindet die einzelnen Kompartimente und Szenen.

Mit in den Zyklus einbezogen werden muss die Dekoration der Laibung und der Pfeiler des Eingangbogens des Chores. Oberhalb der Pfeilerkapitelle sind links Johannes der Täufer und rechts Elias dargestellt. Johannes der Täufer wird als Vorbild asketisch-mönchischen Lebens verehrt; ebenso Elias, der als Anachoret zum Vorläufer des christlichen Eremitentums wurde. Die Darstellung von Elias als Eremit setzt sich erst im Barock durch, deshalb ist es aussergewöhnlich ihn als Teil des Zyklus vorzufinden. An den Pfeilern findet sich auf der linken Seite die Heilige Monika. Die frühesten Darstellungen Monikas sind aus der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts bekannt.[104] Daneben ist auf der Innenseite der Heilige Gimignano oder Geminianus, der im 4. Jahrhundert Bischof von Modena wurde und als Stadtpatron von San Gimignano verehrt wird, dargestellt. Er trägt das Modell der Stadt in seinen Händen. Darunter befinden sich links der Heilige Sebastian und rechts der Heilige Bartholus. Beide sind Schutzheilige gegen die Pest und Lepra. Der Heilige Bartholus, auch Bartolo Buompedoni genannt, war Augustiner-Tertiarier in Pisa und starb 1299 an Lepra. Er ist in S. Agostino in San Gimignano begraben. Das Fresko zeigt eine der frühesten Darstellungen seiner Wunderheilungen.

Auf der gegenüberliegenden Seite befinden sich oben auf der Aussenseite die Heilige Fina, die zusammen mit dem Heiligen Geminianus Stadtpatronin von San Gimignano ist. An der Innenseite ist der Heilige Nikolaus von Bari dargestellt. Dieser Heilige hat für die Augustiner-Eremiten besondere Bedeutung, da der Heilige Nikolaus von Tolentino geboren worden sein soll, nachdem ein Engel seinen Eltern eine Wallfahrt zum Grab des Nikolaus von Bari geraten hatte. Darunter sind innen der Heilige Nikolaus von Tolentino und aussen Raphael und Tobias dargestellt. Nikolaus von Tolentino trat sehr jung in den Orden der Augustiner-Eremiten ein und wurde 1466 Heilig gesprochen. Erstaunlich ist die

[104] George Kaftal: Iconography of the Saints in Central and South Italian Schools of Painting, Florenz, 1965, S. 793. Karl Künstle: Ikonographie der Heiligen, Freiburg, 1926, S. 454.

schnelle Aufnahme seines Bildnisses in den Zyklus in San Gimignano. Es handelt sich um eine der ersten bildlichen Darstellungen. Darunter befindet sich eine predellenartige Szene, die im Leben des Heiligen spielt. Der Heilige schwebt über den Köpfen von Soldaten und Würdenträgern, während eine Person gefesselt am Boden liegt, die mit einer Keule erschlagen werden soll. Nach der Legende hat der Heilige diese, seinen Bruder oder Vetter, nach der Verurteilung zum Tode aus der Verdammnis gerettet.[105]

Raphael und Tobias waren in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts in der Toskana populär.[106] Tobias, bekrönt mit einem Strahlenkranz, hält einen Fisch in seinen Händen. Raphael, in Engelsgestalt, in ein Peplos gekleidet und nimbiert, hält eine Schale in seiner Hand. Ihnen beigestellt wird ein Hündlein. Die augenscheinliche Modernität der Heiligen kann mit der modernen Darstellung der Augustinusvita in Einklang gebracht werden. Sie entspricht dem Gedankengut der Augustiner-Eremiten des 15. Jahrhundert. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die Pfeilerdekoration und die Vita zusammen konzipiert wurden.[107]

4.7. Vorstudien, Zeichnungen und die Sinopien

"Ebendort [San Gimignano] verfertigt er für die Mönche von Monte Oliveto ein Kruzifix und andere Bilder. Aber das beste Werk, das er dort schuf, befindet sich in der Hauptkapelle von Sant'Agostino, es ist ein Fresko und stellt dar die Geschichte des hl. Augustinus von seiner Bekehrung bis zu seinem Tode. Sämtliche Zeichnungen zu diesem Werke sowie zahlreiche von Pisa habe ich in meiner Sammlung von Handzeichnungen."[108]

[105] Bibliotheca Sanctorum, Roma, 1967, IX, S. 959.

[106] E. H. Gombrich: Tobias and the Angel, in: Symbolic Images, London, 1972, S. 26-31.

[107] In einem Vertragstext wird Nero di Bicci als Mitarbeiter Gozzolis genannt. Er hat laut eigener Angaben in der Fensterlaibung Heiligendarstellungen angefertigt, die heute nicht mehr vorhanden sind. Vgl.: Crowe/Cavacaselle, 1975, S. 272. Zusätzlich führt Pecori Giusto d'Andrea als Mitarbeiter Gozzolis an. Vgl. Pecori, 1975, S. 536.

[108] Giorgio Vasari: Die Lebensbeschreibungen der berühmtesten Architekten, Bildhauer und Maler, deutsch hrsg. von G. Jaetschke, Bd. II, Straßburg,1904, S. 82.

Vasari schreibt, er habe alle Zeichnungen und Studien für die Augustinusvita besessen. Leider befindet man sich heute nicht mehr in dieser glücklichen Lage. Nur zwei Zeichnungen, die direkte inhaltliche Parallelen zu den Fresken in San Gimignano aufweisen, sind bekannt. Die erste zeigt die "Predigt des Ambrosius", die andere die sogenannte "Zahnschmerzlegende des Augustinus". Die Zeichnung "Augustinus hört die Predigt des Heiligen Ambrosius" befindet sich heute im Besitz des Darmstädter Landesmuseums. Sie weicht in wesentlichen Punkten von dem ausgeführten Fresko ab, da sie nur die Szene der Predigt zeigt: Ambrosius am rechten Bildrand predigt erhöht von einer Kanzel, am linken Bildrand sitzt Augustinus und hört zu. Um die beiden Hauptpersonen sitzen und stehen einige andere Figuren. Während in der Zeichnung nur eine Szene dargestellt ist, wird die Darstellung im Zyklus um drei Szenen erweitert. Zur Predigt kommt noch, wie schon weiter oben beschrieben, die 'Diskussion mit Ambrosius' und das 'Treffen Monikas mit Ambrosius' hinzu. Betrachtet man nur die Predigt, so ist Ambrosius, soweit noch zu erkennen, in Position und Komposition aus der Zeichnung übernommen. Aus Platzmangel wird Augustinus Ambrosius nicht mehr gegenüber gezeigt, sondern in der rechten unteren Bildecke sitzend positioniert. Interessant ist die Sitzhaltung, die schräg von hinten gezeigt wird, Augustinus dreht seinen Kopf nach links, so dass ihn der Betrachter erkennen kann. Die sitzenden Frauen sind im Fresko ähnlich plaziert wie in der Zeichnung, dort sind nur zwei Frauen durch Schraffur und Umrisslinien etwas deutlicher gegeben, die anderen werden lediglich schwach angedeutet. Der Zeichnung ist eine erklärende Beischrift, die eventuell für den Auftraggeber als Erläuterung diente, eingefügt. Sie besagt: "*Come santo Aughustino a pie di un ficho in un orto gli venne un grande dolore di denti a modo che non poteua parlare...* [teilweise nicht lesbar] *...Pregnate Idio per me. Venne un libro da cielo..*[...]".[109] Die schriftliche Beifügung wurde 1910 von Venturi als Handschrift Gozzolis identifiziert.[110] **Abb. 16**

Die zweite noch, bekannte Zeichnung, heute in Cambridge im Fogg Art Museum, zeigt die sogenannte "Zahnschmerzlegende des Augustinus". Die Episode geht in den 'Confessiones' der Taufe voraus. "[...]*Du foltertest* **Abb. 14**

[109] Courcelle, 1969, S. 94 f.

[110] Degenhart, 1968, Teil I, Bd.2, S. 473. Vgl.allg. Robert W. Scheller: Exemplum, Model-Book Drawings and the Practice of Artistic Transmission in the Middle Ages (ca. 900-ca. 1470), übers. von Michael Hoyle, Amsterdam, 1995.

mich damals mit Zahnschmerz, und als er so heftig wurde, daß ich nicht mehr sprechen konnte, da kam mir der Gedanke, all die Meinen, die um mich waren, aufzufordern, Dich, den Gott alljeglichen Heiles, für mich anzuflehen. Das schrieb ich auf die Wachstafel und liess es ihnen vorlesen. Und kaum hatten wir die Knie zum Gebet gebeugt, schwand der Schmerz[...]".[111] Auch in dieser Zeichnung wird das Gezeichnete durch eine Beischrift erläutert. Die Szene bei dem ausgeführten Fresko ist in die "Bekehrungszene" umgewandelt, da diese für den Auftraggeber und den Orden von grösserer Bedeutung war, als die der "Zahnschmerzlegende". Kompositorisch behält Gozzoli jedoch beinahe den Aufbau der Zeichnung bei: Der unter einem Feigenbaum sitzende Augustinus, hält den Kopf in die linke Hand gestützt. Der daneben stehende Alypius weist auf Augustinus. Erstaunlich hierbei ist, dass die Zeichnung eine Szene aus der Augustinusvita zeigt, die im Zyklus selbst später nicht mehr zu finden ist. Geht man davon aus, dass beide Zeichnungen Vorstudien sind, die als Kompositionsideen für den Auftraggeber gedient haben, so beweist die Cambridger Zeichnung den grossen Anteil von Gozzoli in der Findung einzelner Szenen. Auch das Leben Augustinus muss Gozzoli während der Vorbereitung zum Zyklus bekannt gewesen sein.

Ausser den beiden Vorstudien finden sich noch weitere Zeichnungen, die man mit den Fresken in San Gimignano in Verbindung bringen kann. In der Tradition des Quattrocento verfügte auch Gozzoli über eine Mustersammlung. Die Zeichnungen und Skizzen gingen in leicht abgewandelter Form in zahlreiche Bilder ein. Das Blatt, das den Erzengel Michael und einen Putto zeigt, heute im Kupferstichkabinett Dresden, kann mit den Schmuckpilastern in San Gimignano in Verbindung gebracht werden. Dort finden sich ähnliche Putti wieder.

Ein Blatt aus dem Gabinetto Nazionale delle Stampe in Rom zeigt verso den Kopf eines Bischofs. Dieser weist grosse Ähnlichkeit mit dem Fresko der "Lossagung des Heiligen Franziskus von seinem Vater" in Montefalco auf. Die Zeichnung geht aber noch einmal in San Gimignano ein: "Augustinus im Gehäus".

Zahlreiche Architekturstudien sind aus dem Musterbuch der Gozzoli-Werkstatt erhalten. Wenn diese auch nicht dieselben Elemente aufweisen wie der Zyklus in San Gimignano, so verdeutlichen sie doch das starke

[111] Confessiones IX.4.

Interesse an antiker Architektur. Degenhart belegt anschaulich die Tradition der Musterbücher und darüber hinaus die Häufigkeit kopierter antiker Architektur.[112] Dieses Architekturinteresse spiegelt sich im Zyklus in San Gimignano wieder, wo zahlreiche architektonische Details in phantasievoller Bearbeitung in den Zyklus übernommen wurden. "*Another source consists of the repertories of copies after fragments of classical architecture[...], which are also found in other drawing books. It is worth pointing out that the date proposed for this corpus makes this the earliest extant example of the genre.*"[113]

Ein Blatt aus dem Berliner Kupferstichkabinett zeigt den Heiligen Laurentius, eine Frau mit Kind und zwei Putti, die eine Girlande tragen. Schon Degenhart erkannte die grosse Ähnlichkeit dieses Blattes mit Arbeiten Gozzolis. "*Ein (von dekorativen Engelsköpfen und Wappen) getragenes Fruchtgehänge taucht in Angelicos Umkreis erstmalig innerhalb der Dekoration der Nikolauskapelle im Vatikan auf. Ähnlich der vorliegenden Zeichnung mit girlandentragenden Putti kommt dieses Dekorationssystem bei Gozzoli erst in seinen Fresken in S. Agostino zu San Gimignano vor. Dort sind zum Pilasterschmuck Engelknaben verwendet, die unseren Putti so verwandt sind, daß die Zeichnung auch dadurch in den Gozzoli-Kreis zu rücken ist.*"[114]

Im Oktober 1990 wurden durch die Restaurierungsarbeiten am Zyklus von Benozzo Gozzoli neue Erkenntnisse über seine Technik gewonnen. An der Fensterwand wurden die Fresken erstmalig abgenommen und Sinopien entdeckt. Vergleicht man sie mit denen im Camposanto in Pisa, zeigen sie Gozzolis Handschrift. Cole Ahl veröffentlichte erstmals diese Sinopienreste.[115] Die Sinopie der Bekehrungsszene zeigt deutlich die Sitzhaltung von Augustinus, der den Kopf in Kontemplation nach unten neigt. Seine Hände hat Augustinus im Schoss zusammengelegt. Es fehlt die Bibel, die in der Ausführung des Freskos zu sehen ist. Es war wahrscheinlich geplant, die Bibel, wie in der Bildunterschrift beschrieben, aus dem Himmel erscheinen zu lassen. Die Kleidung von Alypius und Augustinus ist nur schemenhaft angedeutet. Hier erkennt man Gozzolis

[112] Degenhart, 1968, S. 479 ff.

[113] Scheller, 1995, S. 374. Abb. 240. Siehe auch M. Wiemers: Zur Funktion und Bedeutung eines Antikenzitats auf Benozzo Gozzolis Fresko "Der Zug der Könige", in: Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte, Nr. 50 (1987), S. 441 - 470.

[114] Degenhart, 1968, S. 488.

[115] Cole Ahl, 1996, S. 138 f.

Können in der Zeichnung. Schnell hingeworfene Linien deuten grob die Umrisse der Personen an. Es ist zu vermuten, dass zusätzlich zu den Sinopien noch Kartons zur Vervollständigung der Fresken benutzt wurden.

Die anderen Sinopienfragmente der Fensterwand zeigen die "Ankunft am Hafen von Ostia" und ein kleines Detail der "Fürbitte Monikas" für ihren Sohn. Die Technik von Gozzolis Fresken ist eine Mischung aus Feucht- und Trockenmalerei. Auf die Malschicht, die feucht aufgetragen wurde, setzte Gozzoli zur Verfeinerung von Details und Farbnuancierung noch eine al secco Schicht, die häufig heute nicht mehr zu erkennen ist. Borsook erkennt dies und schreibt: "*...he continued to sketch out the main lines of his compositions via sinopie on the rough plaster wall, which was gradually covered with successive patches of smother plaster where the colours were introduced. [...] Many draperies, palms and cypresses are done in secco.*"[116] Ein Rastersystem, welches Gozzoli über die Sinopien legte, war vor der Restaurierung noch zu erkennen. Dadurch war jedes Bild in querrechteckige Flächen aufgeteilt und erleichterte somit die Arbeit an den Fresken. Dies ist im Bild der "Einschulung in Tagaste" noch teilweise zu erkennen.

4.8. Die Bildunterschriften und ihr Bezug zu den Bildern des Zyklus

Es scheint unerlässlich zu sein, sich mit den Bildunterschriften und den Quellenschriften auseinanderzusetzen, die häufig für die Bildunterschriften herangezogen wurden. Es sind dies in erster Linie die 'Confessiones'[117] des Augustinus und in manchen Fällen apokryphe Legendentexte.

Im ersten Bild findet sich folgende Bildunterschrift: **Abb. 22**

QUEMADMODUM BEATUS AUGUSTINUS INPUERILI
ETATE A PATRE PATRITIO ET MATRE MONIKA
MAGISTRO GRAMATICE TRADITUS ULTRA MODUM
BREVI PROFECIT TEMPORE

Dieser Text bezieht sich ausschliesslich auf die linke Episode des Bildes, das heisst auf die Übergabe des Augustinus an den Lehrer der

[116] Eve Borsook: The Mural Painters of Tuscany, From Cimabue to Andrea del Sarto, Oxford, 1980, S. 110. Vgl. Procacci, 1961, S. 68-69.
[117] Der Confessionestext von Augustinus ist eine Art Autobiographie.

Grammatikschule. Zum rechten Teil, der die Prügelstrafe und die Schule selbst zeigt, findet sich in der Bildunterschrift keine Erläuterung. Jedoch schreibt Augustinus selbst dazu: "*So brachte man mich in die Schule, die Buchstaben zu erlernen, und ich Ärmster wusste nicht, wozu das nützlich sein konnte. Gleichwohl bekam ich Schläge, wenn ich im Lernen träge war.*"[118] Hier beschreibt er zunächst, dass er die Buchstaben zu lernen hatte. Genau dies ist im Bild in der rechten Szene wiedergegeben: Am Bildrand steht Augustinus neben dem Lehrer mit einer Tafel in der Hand, auf der sich bei genauer Betrachtung das Alphabet finden lässt.

Gozzoli hat die Prügelstrafe mit in das Bild übernommen, jedoch nicht Augustinus, sondern ein stellvertretendes Kind eingesetzt, das die Strafe zu ertragen hat. Ob es nun nicht schicklich war, Augustinus mit entblöstem Gesäss zu zeigen, oder ob die Szene durch eine nochmalige Wiederholung von Augustinus noch unübersichtlicher geworden wäre, muss offengelassen werden. Erstaunlich ist jedoch, dass die Bestrafung, die Augustinus in den 'Confessiones' erwähnt, in das Bild übernommen worden ist. Wenn auch das Kind nicht Augustinus darstellt, so müsste dem belesenen Betrachter die Assoziation zum Text der 'Confessiones' deutlich werden.

Die Bildunterschrift erklärt nun ihrerseits das, was in den 'Confessiones' so nicht zu finden ist. Sie beschreibt die linke Szene des Bildes, in der Augustinus von einem Lehrer der Schule abgeholt wird, und sich die Eltern von ihm verabschieden. Für den rechten Bildteil ist eine Beschreibung unerheblich, da eine Kenntnis der 'Confessiones' vorauszusetzen ist.

Im Bild "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago" findet man folgende Bildunterschrift: **Abb. 21**

AUGUSTINUS CUM DECIMUM ET NONUM AGERET
ANNUM CARTAGINENSI I[N] UNIVERSITATE MAGNO
HONORE ADMISSUS FUIT ... TRIU[M]PHO ET ...
[ca. 45 Buchstaben fehlen][119]

[118] Zitate stammen aus den "Confessiones" Augustinus. Aurelius Augustinus: Bekenntnisse, übersetzt und eingeleitet von Wilhelm Thimme, München, 1982, hier: I.9.

[119] Die fehlenden Buchstaben wurden von Esche in ihrer Zahl geschätzt und logische Ergänzungen vorgenommen. Esche, 1991, S. 266 ff.

Augustinus berichtet in den 'Confessiones' dazu folgendes: "*Ich kam nach Karthago, der Hauptstadt, da schwirrte mir ums Haupt ein Gewimmel von Liebeshändeln.*"[120] "*Und schon glänzte ich in der Rednerschule, freute mich stolz und blähte mich auf in meiner Eitelkeit.*"[121] Die vorhandene Bildunterschrift hebt die Wichtigkeit des Studiums und einer strengen Universitätsausbildung in den damaligen Wissenschaften nochmals hervor, wie sie im Bild gezeigt wird. Ganz im Gegensatz dazu stehen die Worte, mit welchen Augustinus selbst diese Zeit in Karthago beschreibt. Er erläutert lediglich, dass er grossen Erfolg in der Rednerschule gehabt habe, und artikuliert seinen Stolz und seine Eitelkeit.

Warum im Zyklus weder in den Bildszenen, noch in der Bildunterschrift darauf eingegangen wird, ist vordergründig unverständlich, könnte jedoch in dem verlorengegangenen Bild- und Schriftteil angedeutet gewesen sein. Stellt man sich indes die Umstände während dieses Auftrages im Kloster vor, so wird es verständlicher. Das Kloster sollte reformiert werden, so dass es wichtiger war, einen strebsamen, ernsten, jungen Augustinus zu zeigen, der als Vorbild für die Mönche dienen konnte, als einen weltlichen.[122]

Die Bildunterschrift im dritten Bild ist komplett zerstört. Es findet sich aber in den Bekenntnissen eine interessante Stelle, die auch die nächste Szene, die die "Abreise aus Karthago", beinhaltet. Er schreibt: "*Meine Mutter weinte heftig über meine Abreise und folgte mir bis zum Meer. Aber ich täuschte sie, als sie mich mit Macht festhielt, um entweder meinen Entschluss zu ändern oder mit mir zu gehen, und gab vor, ich wolle einen Freund nicht allein lassen, der auf günstigen Wind zur Abfahrt wartete. Ich belog meine Mutter - eine solche Mutter - und entging ihr so"[...] „Denn als sie sich dennoch weigerte, ohne mich zurückzukehren, konnte ich sie nur mit Mühe überreden, in einer dem Andenken des heiligen Cyprian geweihten Kapelle, die sich ganz in der Nähe des Schiffes befand, während der Nacht zu verweilen. In derselben Nacht reiste ich heimlich ab und überliess meine Mutter ihren mit Fürbitte und Gebet vermischten Tränen um mich.*"[123] Die aussergewöhnliche Beziehung zwischen Augustinus und **Abb. 20**

[120] Confessiones, III. 1.
[121] Ebd. III. 3.
[122] Crowe und Cavalcaselle (1975, S. 271) schreiben, die linke Bildhälfte sei zerstört.
[123] Confessiones, V. 8, 15.

seiner Mutter wird im folgenden Bild deutlich, in dem Gozzoli die betende Mutter und ihren einsamen Abschied zeigt.

Das Bild über die "Abreise Augustinus aus Karthago" ist, wie weiter oben schon beschrieben, zerstört. Lediglich zwei Worte der Bildunterschrift sind erhalten: **Abb. 57**

AUGUSTINUS...NAVIGIO

Das Bild zeigte Augustinus auf einem Schiff. In den 'Confessiones' schreibt er: "*Aber in eben dieser Nacht segelte ich ohne sie ab, die betend und weinend zurückblieb [...].Der Wind blies und schwellte unsere Segel, und die Küste entschwand unseren Blicken. Sie aber stand frühmorgens da, fast wahnsinnig vor Schmerz, und füllte mit ihren Klagen und Seufzen deine Ohren [...] . Ich aber ging nach Rom.*" [124]

Beide Bilder stimmen mit dem Text der 'Confessiones' überein. Die Bilder der "Fürbitte Monikas" und "Augustinus verlässt Afrika" werden durch die zum Abschied winkende Mutter zusammengerückt. So entsteht denn auch im Bild der "Fürbitte Monikas", durch die zweimalige Darstellung Monikas - zum einen betend in der Kapelle, zum anderen ihrem Sohn nachwinkend - eine enge Verbindung zum folgenden Bild "Augustinus verlässt Afrika". Die Kapelle, in der Monika verweilt, ist, nach der Beschreibung von Augustinus, in der Nähe des Hafens zu vermuten.

Da beide Bildunterschriften fehlen, kann leider kein Vergleich gezogen werden. Es ist aber anzunehmen, dass sie sich, wie die anderen auch, in unterstützender Weise auf die darüberliegenden Szenen bezogen.

Im Bild der "Ankunft im Hafen von Ostia", ist ebenfalls keine Bildunterschrift mehr zu erkennen. Auch wird in den 'Confessiones' nichts über die Ankunft im Hafen berichtet. Es ist also anzunehmen, dass Gozzoli die Bildidee selbst entwickelte, und dies nicht durch schriftliche Quellen bedingt war. **Abb. 19**

Die Szene "Augustinus lehrt in Rom", enthält folgende Bildunter schrift: **Abb. 17**

[124] Ebd. V. 8.

... GNA PRECIRUORUM VIRORUM FREQENTIA AC SCHOLASTICORUM CONSESSU GRECHA IN SCHOLA PUBLICE RETORICHAM AC PHILOSOPHIAM LEGEBAT

Eine erstaunliche Diskrepanz stellt sich heraus, zwischen dem Bild, seiner Unterschrift sowie dem Bericht der 'Confessiones'. In der Bildunterschrift wird von einer grossen Zuhörerschaft, einer öffentlichen Griechisch-Schule und von berühmten Männern gesprochen.[125] Dies wurde im Bild von Gozzoli ausgeführt, indem er die Zuhörerschaft in gesetzterem Alter darstellt. Sie sind reich gekleidet und befinden sich, in der prächtigen Halle einer Villa. Augustinus selbst schreibt in den 'Confessiones' lediglich dazu: "*Inzwischen hatte ich mit Eifer die Arbeit aufgenommen, deretwegen ich nach Rom gekommen war, lehrte die Redekunst und sammelte zunächst in meiner Wohnung einige Zuhörer.*"[126] Auch hier scheint es wichtiger zu sein, eine strenge, ernsthafte Stimmung und ein feierliches Umfeld zu haben, als einige wenige Zuhörer in einem Zimmer zu zeigen.[127] Warum es allerdings berühmte Männer sind, die Augustinus lehrt, bleibt offen. Stellt man jedoch einen Bezug zu den Augustiner-Eremiten und zum Auftraggeber her, so waren diese in jener Zeit stark in der Verbreitung und Erforschung der Wissenschaft tätig, so dass die Vermutung, die Bildunterschrift diente direkt dem zu reformierenden Orden, naheliegt.[128]

Im Bild selbst findet sich bei einem links im Vordergrund Sitzenden **Abb. 46** ein aufgeschlagenes Buch mit dem Text: RHETORICE EST SCIENTIA QUE IN PERSUADENDO COSUSTIT [consistit]. Das Zitat des aufgeschlagenen Buches verdeutlicht ausdrücklich die Intention des Zyklus, der die Lehre und die Wissenschaft besonders hervorhebt. Es wird explizit auf die Rhetorik als Wissenschaft und ihre Bedeutung verwiesen.

[125] H. Braunert: Das Athenaeum zu Rom bei den "Scriptores Historiae Augustae". Bd. IV, 2, Bonn, 1964, S. 9-41. Man könnte einen Vergleich zum Athenaeum und dem im Bild dargestellten ziehen.

[126] Confessiones, V. 12.

[127] Siehe oben: Zur "Einschreibung in Karthago", S. 53-54. Lagaisse vergleicht dieses Bild mit der platonischen Akademie des 15. Jahrhunderts in Florenz. Vgl. Lagaisse, 1934, S. 144.

[128] Auffällig ist, dass sowohl Pecori, 1975, S. 534, als auch Courcelle, 1969, S. 92 eine Bildunterschrift anführen, die so im Orginal nicht zu finden ist. So zitiert Courcelle: "<Quemadmodum Augustinus Rome In Schola Greca Retoricam Ac Philosofi> Am Legebat".

Courcelle entdeckte den Zusammenhang des Zitates mit Cicero.[129] Dies bezeugt, dass zumindest der Auftraggeber die Wichtigkeit Ciceros im Werk von Augustinus zu schätzen wusste. "*Jeden Augenblick taucht unter der Feder Augustins bewußt oder unbewußt ein Zitat oder ein Anklang an Cicero oder Vergil auf - und er schrieb für ein mitwissendes Publikum, das fähig war, solche Stellen zu erkennen und jedesmal die gleiche harmlose oder verfeinerte Freude mitzuempfinden.*"[130]

Liest man die Bildunterschrift im Bild der "Abreise aus Rom", **Abb. 18**

QUEMADMODUM AUGUSTINUS A SIMACHO
ROMANORUM PREFECTO MEDIOLANUM MISSUS
RECTORICAM AC PHILOSOFIAM LECTURUS SUMMO CUM
APPARATU ET GLORIA ROMA URBE RECESSIT,

so stellt man fest, dass erst erklärt wird, warum Augustinus Rom verlässt und sich nach Mailand begibt. Es finden sich auch Übereinstimmungen mit dem Text in den 'Confessiones' wieder: "*Als man nun von Mailand nach Rom zum Stadtpräfekten schickte, er möge für jene Stadt einen Lehrer der Rhetorik besorgen, der seine Reise dahin auf Staatskosten zurücklegen konnte, bewarb ich mich. [...] Ich erreichte es durch einen Probevortrag [...], dass Symmachus der damalige Präfekt, mich dahin entsandte.*"[131] Hervorragend wird die aussergewöhnlich reiche Ausstattung der Reisenden dargestellt, dies soll das im Text Erläuterte verdeutlichen, nämlich die Reise auf Staatskosten. Wie ein Staatsmann zu reisen, bedeutete eine grosse Ehrenbezeugung. In der Bildunterschrift nicht erwähnt, findet sich dies jedoch in den 'Confessiones'. Das Bild besteht auch hier aus einer Mischung der Bildunterschrift und dem Confessionestext.

Im Bild selbst findet sich eine von zwei viktorienhaften Engeln getragene Kartusche mit der Inschrift:

ELOQUII SACRI DOCTOR PARISINUS ET INGENS
GEMIGNANICI FAMA DECUSQUE SOLI HOC PROPRIO

[129] Courcelle, 1969, S.92.
[130] Marrou, 1958, S. 15.
[131] Confessiones, V. 13.

SUMPTU DOMINICUS ILLE SACELLUM INSIGNEM IUSSIT PINGERE BENOTIUM MCCCCLXV

Hier wird der Auftraggeber Fra Domenico Strambi, der den Zyklus initiierte, als "eloquii sacri doctor parisinus" belegt.[132]

Im Bild der "Ankunft in Mailand" steht in der Bildunterschrift: **Abb. 15**

QUEMADMODUM AUGUSTINUS EX URBE MEDIOLANUM VENIENS LECTURUS PHILOSOFIAM ATQUE RECTORICAM SUMMO CUM SCOLARIUM ET DOTORUM OMITUTU / AB IMPERATORE THEODOSIO ET SANCTO VIRO AMBROSIO GRATANTUR ET HONRIFICE RECEPTUS EST

In der Bildmitte werden Augustinus, wie im Text beschrieben, die Sporen abgenommen. Auch die in der Inschrift geschilderte Begrüssung von Theodosius und Ambrosius stimmt mit dem Bild überein. Augustinus schreibt in den 'Confessiones' zu diesem Punkt: "*So kam ich nach Mailand zum Bischof Ambrosius[...] Mit väterlicher Freundlichkeit nahm dieser Gottesmann mich auf und hatte an meiner Übersiedlung bischöfliches Wohlgefallen.*"[133] Die Bilderklärung bezieht sich auf alle drei Szenen. Da in den 'Confessiones' lediglich von einer freundlichen Begrüssung durch Ambrosius berichtet wird, muss davon ausgegangen werden, dass Gozzoli oder der Auftraggeber den Wunsch hegten, weitere erläuternde Szenen beizufügen. Die Sporenabnahme ist ein Zeichen für den hohen Rang, der Augustinus zugestanden, und konstituiert zugleich die logische Fortsetzung der Reise auf Staatskosten, wozu auch die Begrüssung durch den Stadtpräfekten Theodosius zählt.[134]

Die "Predigt des Ambrosius" wird im folgenden Bild gezeigt, die Bildunterschrift lautet: **Abb. 16**

[132] "Parisinus" bezieht sich auf die Universitätsausbildung Strambis. Kapitel 4. : Der Auftraggeber Fra Domenico Strambi.

[133] Confessiones, V. 13.

[134] Ein im Hintergrund dargestellter junger Mann mit Mütze, wird durch eine Inschrift als 'ADNEODAT' bezeichnet. Hieraus könnte man schliessen, dass es sich bei dem Jungen um Adeodatus, den Sohn von Augustinus, handelt.

QUALITER AUGUSTINUS APUD MEDIOLANUM ESISTENS
TUM...MATRE [ca. 45 Buchstaben fehlen] FUI / SANCTISSIMI
VIRI AMBROSII INCEPIT LUMINE FIDEI
[ca. 75 Buchstaben fehlen].

Die im Bild eingefügte Szene einer persönlichen Auseinandersetzung zwischen Ambrosius und Augustinus findet sich weder in den 'Confessiones' noch in der Bildunterschrift. Zur Klärung dieser Frage müssen andere Quellentexte herangezogen werden, in denen von der Zusammenkunft mit Ambrosius gesprochen wird. So steht in der 'Legenda Aurea' geschrieben: "*Doch einstmals geschah es, daß Ambrosius lange wider seinen Irrwahn [Augustinus war lange Zeit Anhänger des Manichaismus] disputierte und Augustinus mit klaren Gründen und Beweisen also überzeugte, daß der Wahn von nun an ganz und gar aus seinem Herzen getilgt war.*"[135]

Eine Übereinstimmung mit dem Confessionestext und dem Bild, findet sich in der Predigtdarstellung des Ambrosius. "*Um ihm aber meine inneren Bedrängnisse auszuschütten, musste ich eine längere Musse abwarten, und die fand sich niemals. Freilich hörte ich ihm allsonntäglich zu, wie er, das Wort der Wahrheit recht austeilte* [136]*[...] und Ambrosius hatte keine Zeit [...].*"[137]

Die dritte Szene im Bild, 'Monika kniet vor Ambrosius', lässt sich zu folgender Stelle in den Confessionestexten in Beziehung setzen: "*Eam vero ille propter eius religiosissimam conversationem.*"[138] Kaftal erläutert diese Szene wie folgt: „*Monica having given up certain costums of the African church to which Ambrose was opposed, he blesses her.*"[139] Wie er zu dieser Deutung gelangt ist unklar und wird bei ihm nicht näher erläutert.

Die "Bekehrungsszene" enthält nur noch Fragmente der Bildunter schrift. **Abb. 14**

[135] Jacobus da Voragine: Legenda Aurea, übersetzt von Richard Benz. Jena, 1925, S. 636.
[136] Confessiones, VI. 3.
[137] Ebd., VI. 11.
[138] Ebd., VI., 2, 2.
[139] Kaftal, 1965, S.104.

[ca. 40 Buchstaben fehlen] FICU ESISTERET AUDIVIT VOCEM E[X] CELO BICENTEM SIBI / ...[O]RTO CO ...MINI D[OMI]N[U]M P[ER]FUSUS LUCE SECURITATIS ERASIT CHATOL[ICUS]

Es wird im Text von einem "*Luce securitatis*" und einer himmlischen Stimme gesprochen, die Augustinus zum Lesen auffordert. Dies ist im Bild auch dargestellt. Hinter dem Baum links sind noch die Reste eines Strahlenkranzes und das Licht, das auf Augustinus fällt, zu erkennen. Die 'Confessiones' berichten anders: "*Ich aber warf mich, weiss nicht wie, unter einen Feigenbaum zur Erde und liess den Tränen freien Lauf [...]. Und sieh, da hörte ich vom Nachbarhause her in singendem Tonfall, ich weiss nicht, ob eines Knaben oder eines Mädchen Stimme, die immer wieder sagte: Nimm und lies!*"[140] Augustinus las, wie weiter oben schon erwähnt, aus den Paulusversen und sagte dazu: "*Weiter wollte ich nicht lesen, brauchte es auch nicht.*"[141]

Die Bildunterschrift, soweit noch zu erkennen, ist im Bild konkret wiedergegeben. Woher die Idee stammt, die Bibel aus dem Himmel schweben zu lassen, ist unklar, wird aber schon im Text der Vorzeichnung genannt.[142] Sie verweist zumindest auf den göttlichen Ursprung der heiligen Schrift. J. und P.Courcelle führen eine Bildunterschrift an, die mit der tatsächlichen nicht übereinstimmt.[143] Wie es zu dieser Abweichung kommen konnte, lässt sich bisher nicht rekonstruieren.

Die Bildunterschrift der "Taufe des Augustinus" besagt: **Abb. 13b**

QUEMADMODUM POSTQUAM A BEATO VIRO AMBROSIO AUGUSTINUS SA[NC]TUS SACRUM SUSCEPIT BATTI[SUUM] / PARITER COMPOSUERUNT ET COMPONENDO DECANTARUNT AD FINEM US... CELESTEM INNUM DEUM LAUDAMUS

[140] Confessiones, VIII. 12.
[141] Ebd., VIII. 12.
[142] Vgl.: Kapitel 5.7. Vorstudien, Zeichnungen und die Sinopien, S. 50.
[143] Courcelle übernimmt nicht alle Bildunterschriften in sein Buch, hier zitiert er jedoch wie folgt: <Cum Amarissime F> Leret, Audivit Vocem E Celo Dicentem Sibi: "Tolle, Lege", Et Statim Usus Luce Euasit." Courcelle, 1969, S. 97.

Augustinus selbst schreibt über die Taufe nichts in seinen 'Confessiones'. Überliefert sind jedoch die Worte, die Ambrosius an den Neophyten richtete: "*Nicht meiner Unschuld rühme ich mich, sondern der Erlösung. Ich rühme mich nicht, weil ich etwa ohne Sünde wäre, sondern weil meine Sünden vergeben sind, Christus mein Fürsprecher beim Vater ist und sein Blut für mich vergoß. So wurde die Sünde selbst zum Preis der Erlösung, durch die Christus in mein Inneres trat. Denn die Schuld ist fruchtbarer als die Unschuld: Unschuld verführte mich zum Hochmut, Erkenntnis der Schuld aber gab mir die Demut zurück.*"[144] Zusätzlich hierzu befinden sich im Bild noch zwei weitere Inschriften. Die erste, an der Rückwand des Baptisteriums heisst: TE DEUM LAUDAM[US] / TE DOMINU[M] CONFITEM[UR]. In der 'Legenda Aurea' wird dies kurz erwähnt. Ambrosius soll während der Taufe zu Augustinus gesagt haben: "Te deum laudamus" dieser antwortete ihm: "Te dominum confitemur".[145] Durch den Umstand, dass das "te deum" auch in der Bildunterschrift Erwähnung findet, wird eine Verbindung zwischen Unterschrift und Inschrift hergestellt. Die zweite Inschrift im Bild befindet sich im Taufbecken: A DI PRIMA D'APRILE MILLE CCCCLXIIII. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine der Datierungen, die der Künstler anbringt.[146]

Erstaunlich ist, dass das Baptisterium im Bild durch Gozzoli eine oktogonale Form erhielt, und man in den sechziger Jahren bei Ausgrabungen in Mailand das Baptisterium wiederentdeckte. Ebenso wie das Gemalte besitzt das Orginal die Form eines Oktogons.[147] Es wäre vorstellbar, dass die Art des Baptisterium bis in die Zeit Gozzolis bekannt war; auch das in Florenz ist in einer oktogonalen Form errichtet.

Die Szene der Taufe stellt erstmals eine Verbindung zum Orden der Augustiner-Eremiten her. Die 'Confessiones' sind kurz nach der Ordensgründung von Ordenshistorikern 'korrigiert' worden. Im Anschluss an das Kapitel über die Taufe wurden Legenden eingefügt. Es wurde damit beabsichtigt dem Orden eine Tradition zu geben. Heinrich von Friemar bezeichnet den, in den 'Confessiones' wichtigen "Simplicianus", als

[144] Voragine, 1925, I. 6, 21.

[145] Bis heute wird dies in der Liturgie der katholischen Kirche benutzt.

[146] Eine weitere Datierung befindet sich in der schon erwähnten Kartusche im Bild der "Abreise aus Rom". Die Daten sind unterschiedlich, so ist zu vermuten, dass durch die unterschiedliche Datierung, der Zyklus nicht chronologisch gemalt wurde.

[147] A. Paredi: Il Battistero di S. Giovanni alle Fonti, Milano 1963, S.65.

Eremiten. Dies könnte eventuell der im Bild dargestellte Mönch mit weissem Bart sein.[148] Die Mönche im Bild tragen die Kutten des Augustiner-Eremitenordens.[149]

Im Bild der "Regelübergabe" werden drei Legenden gezeigt: **Abb. 12** 'Augustinus bei den Eremiten' in der Toskana, die 'Erscheinug des Kindes am Strand' und die 'Regelübergabe' selbst.

Die zum Bild gehörende Unterschrift besagt:

QUALITER AUGU[STINUS] S[AN]C[TU]S VISITATIS
HEREMITIS DE MONTE PISANO A...ST DATAM EIS
REGULAM A D[OMI]NO NOST[RO] IHESU XR[IST]O SUB
CUIUSDAM SCITULI EFFIGUIE / SECUS LITU ... TUDINEM
MORIS AD PARVAM FOVEAM DE ... AC DIFFICILE
INDIVIDUE TRINITATIS COGNITIONE ESISTIT
INFORMATES

Aus oben bereits genannten Gründen können diese Episoden in den 'Original-Confessiones' nicht belegt werden. Man findet sie jedoch an anderer Stelle, wo berichtet wird, dass Augustinus vor seiner Rückkehr nach Afrika bei den Eremiten in der Toskana die Ordensregel übergeben habe.[150] Die Szene mit dem Kind am Strand ist eine mittelalterliche Legende und wird stellenweise auch auf andere Heilige übertragen.[151] In der Bildunterschrift werden die drei oben genannten Episoden exakt wiedergegeben. Dies ist notwendig, denn sie beruhen auf Legenden, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch keine grosse Verbreitung gefunden hatten und für den Betrachter erklärungsbedürftig waren. Dass diese Legenden in den

[148] Rudolph Arbesmann: Henry of Friemar's "Treatise on the Origin and Development of the Order of the Hermit Friars and its true and real Title", in: Augustiniana 6, 1956, S. 90 ff.

[149] Die für die Augustiner-Eremiten vorgeschriebene Festtagskleidung ist Schwarz, während im Alltag weisse Gewänder getragen wurden. Die Darstellung der Mönche in Gozzolis Bild, verweist daher auf die Feierlichkeit des Augenblicks. Zu den Ordensvorschriften vgl. Heimberger, 1933, S. 398.

[150] Arbesmann, 1956, S. 39.

[151] Henri-Irénée Marrou, St. Augustin et l'ange, une légende médiévale, in: Christiana Tempora, Mélanges d'Histoire, d'Archéologie, d'Epigraphie et de Patristique, Rom, 1978, S. 401-449.

Zyklus eingefügt wurden, hat sicher auch mit dem Selbstverständnis der Augustiner-Eremiten zu tun, die sich als direkte Nachfolger von Augustinus etablieren wollten. So ist die Legende mit dem Christuskind am Strand, "*nur eine Legende, deren Schicksal sich vom 13. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert verfolgen läßt.*"[152]

Im Bild "Tod der Monika" sind wiederum drei Szenen gezeigt: Die 'Ekstase von Ostia', der 'Tod der Monika' und die 'Rückkehr von Augustinus nach Afrika'. **Abb. 11**

Die Bildunterschrift besagt:

QUE[M]ADMODU[M] S[AN]C[TU]S AUGUSTINUS APUD HOSTIA[M] TIBE[RINOM] ESSISTENS HUBITIS AD QUANDA[M] OSPITII FENESTRA[M]..ENTISSIMA...E ...MONACHA DIVINIS COLLOQUIUS... POST [ca. 40 Buchstaben fehlen] / CUIDA[M] PUERLI SPETIE DE MANU SACERDOTIS ESILIENS... TRANSMIGRAVIT AD CELUM ASSUMPTO NAVIGIO CU[M] ALIPPIO EVO[DIO] EIUS[QUE] FILIO ADEODATO MULTIS...[NAVIG]AVIT AFFRICHA[M]

Über dieses Ereignis berichtet Augustinus in den 'Confessiones': "*Wir überlegten, wo wir dir am besten dienen könnten, und schickten uns an, gemeinsam nach Afrika zurückzukehren. Und als wir in Ostia am Tiber angelangt waren, starb meine Mutter.* "[153] „*Als nun der Tag herannahte, an dem sie aus dem Leben scheiden sollte, [...] da traf's sich, [...] dass wir beide, ich und sie, allein an einem Fenster gelehnt dastanden. Es schaute auf den inneren Garten des uns beherbergenden Hauses, dort bei Ostia am Tiber [...] fragten wir uns [...] wie wohl das ewige Leben der Heiligen sein werde. [...] so wie wir uns eben streckten in raschem Gedankenflug die ewige, über allem waltende Weisheit berühmten [...] so dass das ewige Leben wäre wie dieser Augenblick höchster Erkenntnis.*"[154] Monika starb im Alter von sechsundfünfzig Jahren. Augustinus, der hier erstmalig als "Sanctus" bezeichnet wird, war damals dreiunddreissig. Die Szene, der Abreise nach Afrika, wird in den 'Confessiones' nicht beschrieben. Man

[152] Marrou, 1958, S.126.
[153] Confessiones, IX. 8.
[154] Ebd., IX. 9.

findet sie jedoch in der 'Vita des Possidius'[155] und in der 'Legenda Aurea' wieder.

Auch hier sind alle drei Szenen in der Bildunterschrift konkret erläutert. Sowohl im Bild als auch im Text findet sich eine Mischung aus den 'Confessiones' und der Vita des Possidius wieder. Wichtig scheint die Hervorhebung Monikas zu sein. Auf die weiter oben schon eingegangen wurde. Pecori, Crowe und Cavalcaselle und Courcelle[156] erwähnen für der Bildunterschrift, die in keinem ihrer Texte wiedergegeben wird, eine Beifügung, die wie folgt, von ihnen zitiert wird: "F. D. M. Paris". Einhellich vertreten sie die Meinung, dass sich diese Beifügung auf den Auftraggeber Fra Domenico Strambi bezogen habe, den sie auch im Bild als den rechts vorne stehenden Mönch identifizierten. Es findet sich tatsächlich in einigen alten Fotografien eine Inschrift dieser Art, jedoch nicht in der Bildunterschrift, sondern oberhalb des Textes. Man könnte vermuten, dass es sich um eine Beifügung einer späteren Zeit gehandelt hat.

In der Bildunterschrift zu "Augustinus segnet das Volk" findet sich folgender Text: **Abb. 10**

QUEMADMODU[M] SANCTUS AUGUSTINUS STATIM POST ASSUMTUM EPISC ... [P]OPUL[UM] BENED[IXIT]

Augustinus wird hier erstmals als Bischof gezeigt abweichend davon findet sich in den Berichten von Possidius eine Stelle, in der Augustinus Bischofsweihe erst nach dessen Begegnung mit Fortunatus angesetzt wird: "*Und als Bischof verkündete er das Wort des ewigen Heils noch eindringlicher und glühender, mit größerer Autorität.*"[157] Im Bild wird offenbar direkt die Szene nach der Bischofsweihe gezeigt, dies wird auch in der Bildunterschrift so erläutert.

[155] Adolf Harnack: Possidius, Augustinus Leben, in: Abhandlungen der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, Berlin, 1930.

[156] Pecori, 1975, zitiert auf S.535: „una delle Quali ha sotto le iniziali F.D.M.Paris". Crowe und Cavalcaselle, 1870, zitieren auf S.271: "Tod der Heil. Monica: im Vordergrund zwei Mönche, von denen der eine mit „F.D.M. PARIS." als Strambi bezeichnet ist," Courcelle, 1969, übernimmt das Zitat von Pecori auf S. 102.

[157] Harnack, 1930, Kap.8.

Im nun folgenden Bild wird die oben bereits erwähnte Szene der "Diskussion mit dem Häretiker Fortunatus" gezeigt. Sie lautet: **Abb. 9**

...[AUGUSTI]NUS DISPUTAM CUM FORTUNATO / VERSUS HERETICIS EOS PUPLICE SUPERAVIT

Augustinus links, mit Mitra, diskutiert mit dem vor ihm stehenden, im Doktorengewand gekleideten Fortunatus.[158] Possidius schreibt dazu: "*In der Stadt Hippo nun hatte die Pestilenz der Manichäer sehr viele Bürger und Zugezogene infiziert und durchdrungen; Verführer und Täuscher war ein Presbyter der Häresie namens Fortunatus [...]. Da traten die Bürger von Hippo an Augustinus heran und forderten, daß er jenen manichäischen Presbyter [...] aufsuche, und mit ihm über das Gesetz verhandle. [...] Aber da Fortunatus schon früher in Karthago den heiligen Augustinus kennengelernt hatte [...] fürchtete er, sich mit ihm zu messen [...]. Die Disputation begann und wurde zwei Tage lang durchgeführt. In ihr vermochte der manichäische Lehrer [...] weder die katholische Darlegung zu widerlegen, noch zu beweisen, daß die manichäische Sekte von Wahrheit gestützt werde.*"[159] Die Szene im Bild wird auf nur wenige Personen reduziert. Fortunatus und Augustinus bilden die Hauptfiguren, so wie es in der Bildunterschrift erläutert wird, die wiederum durch Possidius inspiriert ist.

Unter dem Bild "Augustinus im Gehäus" findet man die folgende Erklärung: **Abb. 8**

QUEMADMODUM HIERONIMUS PAULO ANTE ...US / AUGUSTINUM DE CELESTI GLORIA INFORMAVIT

Augustinus, im 'Gehäus' sitzend und schreibend, blickt nach links oben, wo ihm Hieronymus in einem Strahlenkranz erscheint. Dieses Ereignis ist eine Überlieferung der 'Epistula Sancti Augustini ad Cyrillum

[158] In der Zeit seines Episkopates kämpfte Augustinus für die Durchsetzung des Christentums und gegen Häretiker wie die Donatisten und Manichäer, dessen Anhänger er früher selbst war.
[159] Harnack, 1930, Kap. 9.

Hierosolymitanum' des 'Pseudo Augustin'.[160] Dieser gibt an, Augustinus habe an Hieronymus mit der Bitte geschrieben, ihn über "celesti gloria" aufzuklären. Der in der Zwischenzeit Verstorbene, sei Augustinus erschienen und habe ihm über das Leben nach dem Tod berichtet. Es ist eine Übereinstimmung von Bild, Bildunterschrift sowie Quellentext zu finden. Die Abbildungen von sowohl Augustinus als auch Hieronymus im Gehäus sind ein gängiger Topos und beruhen auf Legenden.[161]

Das letzte Bild des Zyklus zeigt den "Tod des Augustinus". Es wird **Abb. 7** mit folgenden Worten erläutert:

> QU[E]MADMODUM IN OBITU BEATI AUGUSTINI A QUAM PLURIMIS EIUS ANIMA IN CELIS COMITANTIBUS ANGELIS FERRI VISA E[S]T

Augustinus liegt aufgebahrt im Vordergrund des Bildes, Mönche umstehen ihn und trauern. Seine Seele wird von zwei Engeln in einer Gloriole in den Himmel erhoben. "*An allen Gliedern des Leibes unversehrt, mit ungeschwächtem Augenlicht und Gehör und in unsrem Beisein und unter unsern Augen und Gebeten, wie geschrieben steht, entschlief er mit seinen Vätern, hochgebracht in einem guten Alter, und in unserer Gegenwart wurde für die Gott wohlgefällige Beisetzung seines Leibes das Opfer dargebracht, und er wurde bestattet.*"[162] Nach Possidius sei Augustinus im Alter von sechsundsiebzig Jahren gestorben.[163] Die Inschriften der unteren Bilderreihe beschreiben leicht verständliche Szenen. Sie zeigen, teilweise sinnverändernd, die Berichte der 'Confessiones'. Die Inschriften des zweiten Kompartiments hingegen, sind zweizeilig und erklären häufig legendäre Ereignisse, die nicht in allen Fällen bekannt oder alleine durch die Bildwiedergabe verständlich sind. Entsprechendes wird im dritten Kompartiment angegeben. Die Bildunterschriften enthalten keine wortwörtlichen Übernahmen aus

[160] Vgl. Courcelle 1965, S. 104. Louise Pillions: La légende de saint Jerôme d'après quelques peintures italiennes du XVe siècle conservées au Musée du Louvre, in: Gazette des Beaux-Arts, 50, 1908, S. 303-318.

[161] Ebenso wie die Christuslegende, wurde auch diese Episode auf mehrere Heilige angewandt.

[162] Harnack, 1930, Kap. 31.

[163] Ebd., Kap. 31.

Quellentexten, sondern sind für den Zyklus von Benozzo Gozzoli konzipiert worden.

Unverständlich sind die von Pecori, Crowe und Cavalcasselle sowie Courcelle von den Originalen abweichend zitierten Bildunterschriften. Bei allen werden sie nur stellenweise angeführt und sind dann häufig anders als jene, die in San Gimignano zu lesen sind. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob die Bildunterschriften im Laufe der Zeit verändert, ergänzt oder gar neu hinzugefügt wurden. Bisher wurde auf diese Diskrepanz noch nie hingewiesen. Es obliegt der zukünftigen Forschung zu klären, ob eine der oben genannten Thesen zutrifft.

Vergleicht man den Zyklus von San Gimignano mit anderen aus dieser Zeit, so erkennt man eine starke didaktische Absicht in Gozzolis Augustinusvita, die mit den Worten des Heiligen zutreffend erläutert werden kann: "*Intellige, ut credas*"[164], man müsse verstehen um zu glauben.

[164] Marrou, 1958, S. 63.

5. Ein narrativer Zyklus?

Benozzo Gozzoli wird bis auf unsere Zeit als einer der narrativen Maler des 15. Jahrhunderts beschrieben. "*Benozzo war mit einer seltenen Fähigkeit nicht nur der Ausführung sondern auch der Erfindung begabt: er besaß eine Lebhaftigkeit, eine spontane Frische beim Erzählen eines Ereignisses, die das Kind in unserer Brust wachruft und die Freude am Märchen.*"[165] Berenson versuchte, seine Eindrücke in Worte zu fassen und benutzte unter anderem den Begriff des Erzählens, wenn er diesen auch nicht näher erläutert. Dies mag für den Anfang unseres Jahrhunderts verständlich gewesen sein, als man versuchte, Gozzoli mit Raffael und Leonardo zu vergleichen.[166]

Wenn jedoch bei Cole Ahl immer wieder davon die Rede ist, dass "*Benozzo is confident as a narrator*"[167], dies jedoch nie zu klären versucht wird, muss die Frage gestellt werden, ob Gozzoli mit der Augustinusvita wirklich einen narrativen Zyklus geschaffen hat?
Deshalb bedarf es zunächst einer Begriffserklärung. Laut Duden-Fremdwörterbuch bedeutet "narrativ" oder "Narration": "In erzählender Form darstellend, erzählend, Erzählung, Bericht."[168] Diese Begriffsdeutung gilt für die Sprachwissenschaften. Überträgt man den Begriff allerdings auf die Kunstwissenschaften so wird er problematisch. Was versteht man unter einem erzählenden Bild bzw. einem erzählenden Zyklus? Ist es eine Abfolge von Bildmotiven, die zusammengesetzt eine Geschichte ergeben, so muss dies noch nicht erzählend sein, da der Betrachter vielleicht die Zusammenhänge nicht versteht, also die zusammengesetzen Motive ihm nichts erzählen. Es muss einen Verlauf geben, der nicht unterbrochen wird, um eine Erzählung zu erhalten.

Betrachtet man nun den Zyklus von Gozzoli, so finden sich erzählende Elemente. Der Zyklus beginnt mit der Geschichte der "Einschulung in Tagaste", setzt sich fort über einige Episoden und endet mit der Szene des "Augustinustodes". Insoweit ist der Zyklus als narrativ zu bezeichnen, eine chronologische Folge wird eingehalten. Auch die Abfolge der Bilder, eine konsequente Vorgabe der Richtung, enthält narrative Elemente. Betrachtet man nun jedoch die einzelnen Bilder und ihre Szenen, so bricht Gozzoli **Abb. 22**

[165] Berenson, 1925 , S.102
[166] Lagaisse, 1934, S. 73.
[167] Cole Ahl, 1996, S.127.
[168] Duden, Fremdwörterbuch, 1982.

immer wieder aus dem linearen Erzählablauf aus. Die Erzählung wird immer wieder angehalten, zum Beispiel durch die Hintergrundgestaltung.

Besonders auffällig ist dies in den mehrszenigen Bildern. Nimmt man das erste Bild der "Einschulung in Tagaste" mit ihren zwei Handlungssträngen, der Verabschiedung und der Schule selbst, so sind beide Szenen architektonisch und räumlich getrennt. Links bei der Verabschiedung von Augustinus wird die Episode unter die Eingangloggia plaziert. Durch den vorderen Pfeiler und den Bogen wird die Familie von Augustinus hervorgehoben. Der hinzutretende Lehrer befindet sich jedoch noch ausserhalb der familiären Grenzen und lediglich ein Teil seines Gesichts und die Hände überschreiten diesen Bereich. Die Schulszene rechts wird ebenfalls durch die Architektur der Loggia hinterfangen. Der Lehrer steht jetzt mit Augustinus am rechten Bildrand beide blicken in das Bild nach links. Die Erzählabfolge, die eigentlich von links nach rechts verläuft, wird hier durch die Person des Lehrers und einiger Schüler, die konsequent nach links ausgerichtet sind und dadurch den Erzählfluss hemmen, gehindert. Sie lassen den Eindruck entstehen, als laufe der Erzählstrang von rechts nach links ab. Somit ist auch eine Überleitung zum nächsten Bild erschwert. Die Hauptfiguren sind an den rechten und linken Bildrand gedrängt, durch die Bildmitte eröffnet sich ein tiefer Blick in den Bildraum. Die beiden Schüler, die in der Gassenflucht stehen, orientieren sich in der Blickrichtung zur Verabschiedungszene, doch gehören sie durch die sie hinterfangende Architektur zur der Schulszene.

Ungewöhnlich ist hierbei, dass die Bildmitte im eigentlichen Sinne von Handlung frei ist, somit Gozzoli den Betrachter nicht auf die gewohnte Mitte hinweist, sondern die Hauptszenen nach rechts und links verbannt. Der Erzählablauf wird hier bewusst unterbrochen und angehalten. Der Betrachter muss sich den Zugang zum Bild förmlich erkämpfen.

Bei der Betrachtung des nächsten mehrszenigen Bildes der "Ankunft in Mailand", ist der erste Impuls, diesem Bild einen rein erzählerischen Ablauf zuzuschreiben. Das Bild wird durch vier Säulen in vertikale Komponenten und zusätzlich in einen vorderen und hinteren bespielbaren Bildraum geteilt. Der Erzählablauf beginnt im linken Bereich des Bildes vor der ersten Säule der Loggia. Dort stehen die Pferde und Diener, mit denen Augustinus aus Rom gekommen ist. Der diesem Geschehen zur Verfügung stehende Raum links der Säule wird durch einen Diener und einen Pferdekopf überschritten und leitet so zur nächsten Szene, der der 'Sporenabnahme', über. Hier steht Augustinus direkt vor der zweiten Säule und wird von ihr hinterfangen. Er ist in dieser Szene in den Mittelpunkt der

Abb. 15

Bildfläche gesetzt und eben durch die hinterfangende Säule noch stark betont. Es hat den Anschein, als wäre dies die Hauptszene des Bildes, jedoch handelt es sich lediglich um eine vorbereitende Nebenszene. Der Blick führt von dieser an den rechten Bildrand, wo Augustinus von Bischof Ambrosius begrüsst wird. Diese Episode wird an den rechten Bildrand gestellt und wird durch den rechten Bogen der Loggia betont.

Bei flüchtiger Betrachtung ist man überzeugt, den Erzählstrang erkannt zu haben, allerdings wechselt dieser nun in den hinteren Spielraum der Loggia. Durch die Öffnung der Brüstung des mittleren Arkadenbogens dringt der Blick in den Bereich der Loggia ein und erkennt eine weitere Szene: 'Augustinus wird von Theodosius begrüsst'. Der kniende Augustinus wird durch den rechten Arm des vor der Säule stehenden Augustinus leicht verdeckt. Auch Theodosius, der gerade aus einer Tür schreitet, wird von dieser leicht verdeckt. Keine der beiden Personen wird ganz gezeigt. Die Figuren hinter dieser Szene beeinträchtigen die Konzentration des Betrachters. Gozzoli bricht aus dem eigentlichen Erzählablauf aus und führt diesen in den Bildmittelgrund, um dort eine weitere Szene ins Bild zu integrieren. Diese anfänglich sehr unscheinbare Episode entpuppt sich allerdings als wesentlich wichtiger als die der 'Sporenabnahme'. Das bewusste Ausbrechen Gozzolis aus dem linearen Erzählablauf steigert die Betrachtungsintensität. Nach längerer Beobachtung des Bildes werden wichtige Szenen, auch aus den hinteren Bildbereichen, für das Auge sichtbar.

Im nun folgenden Fresko der "Predigt des Ambrosius" sind ebenfalls drei Szenen enthalten. Hier tritt die Architektur aufgrund eines grösseren Spielraumes zurück. Ähnlich wie im ersten Bild werden die Haupterzählstränge an den rechten und linken Bildrand gesetzt. Eine Erzählabfolge ist nicht mehr zu erkennen. Beginnt man am linken Bildrand mit der 'Diskussion zwischen Bischof Ambrosius mit Augustinus', so verhindert die Figur des Augustinus durch ihre Stellung eine flüssige Folgebetrachtung des Bildes. Durch den nach links aussen gewandten Blick und den scharfen Rückenkontur wird eine Grenze gesetzt. Der Betrachter muss sich neu orientieren und findet die folgende Szene der 'Predigt' am rechten Bildrand. Auch hier werden die dem Prediger Ambrosius zugewandten Personen, die mit ihren Rückenpartien gänzlich in die Bildmitte zeigen, als Trennung für die Episode eingesetzt. Bildmittig, an zentraler Position und durch einen Blick in den Bildraum freigegeben, folgt dann die dritte Szene, die der 'Begegnung Monikas mit Ambrosius'. Durch die Abgrenzung der beiden auffälligeren äusseren Szenen und dem Monika

Abb. 16

überfangenden Arkadenbogen wird eine intime Situation inmitten einer grossen Menschenmenge geschaffen und die Szene aus der Erzählstruktur des Bildes ausgeklammert.

Diesem Fresko gegenüber liegt das der "Regelübergabe". Die 'Christuslegende' am linken Bildrand wird, wie im obigen Bild schon von Gozzoli angewandt, streng abgetrennt. Dies erfolgt durch die Zuwendung von Augustinus zum Kind und die Abwendung aus der Bildmitte. Das Christuskind erscheint im Zyklus völlig unvermittelt. Die Qualität des linearen Erzählens ist dadurch genommen. Ebenso strikt getrennt von der restlichen Szenerie ist die 'Regelübergabe'. Diese scheint, soweit es Gozzoli möglich war, an den Rand des Bildes gerückt worden zu sein. Augustinus, durch den Arkadenbogen und durch die Erhöhung eines Podestes hervorgehoben, wird von den ihn umgebenden Mönchen gleichsam abgeschirmt. Die dritte Szene verliert sich im oberen Bildbereich und wird bewusst aus dem Kontext der anderen beiden Szenen isoliert. **Abb. 12**

Das vielgepriesene Narrative in den Werken Gozzolis wird im Augustinuszyklus durch eine immer wieder spannungsvolle Unterbrechung einer klaren Struktur ersetzt. Gozzoli setzt in einigen Bildern einer rein linearen Erzählform eine entgegen, die den Betrachter zwingt, sich vom gewohnten Sehverhalten zu lösen. Einzelne Bilder wiederum können durchaus als narrativ betrachtet werden; ebenso manche Übergänge in den Bildern, wie bei dem der "Fürbitte Monikas" und der "Augustinus verlässt Afrika"[169]. So entsteht eine für den Betrachter interessante Mischung aus einer teilweiser linearer Erzählform, die immer wieder durch Pausen bzw. einer entgegenlaufenden Struktur des Erzählens unterbrochen wird.

[169] Das vierte Bild, welches sich unterhalb des Chorfensters befindet, wurde durch eindringende Feuchtigkeit komplett zerstört. Eine Rekonstruktion des 19. Jahrhunderts zeigt ungefähr die ehemals dargestellte Szene. "Augustinus verläßt Afrika" und begibt sich auf einem Schiff in Richtung Italien.

6. Einordnung der Augustinusvita

6.1. Einordnung in Gozzolis Werk

Benozzo Gozzoli, eigentlich Benozzo di Lese di Sandro, wurde nach neuesten Erkenntnissen im Herbst oder Winter 1421 in Florenz geboren.[170] Aufgrund von Padoa-Rizzo wiederentdeckten Unterlagen können seine ersten künstlerischen Arbeiten für die Bruderschaft von S. Agnese al Carmine auf das Jahr 1439 datiert werden.[171]

Die künstlerische Entwicklung im Werk Benozzo Gozzolis von seinen Anfängen bis hin zum Zyklus der Augustinusvita 1465 unterliegt mehreren Perioden und einer Veränderung in der Darstellungsweise. Es lassen sich jedoch schon in seinen frühesten Arbeiten Anklänge an das Werk in San Gimignano finden. Gozzolis Beteiligung an den Fresken im Kloster San Marco in Florenz sind belegt. Durch die Restaurierungsarbeiten von 1975 und 1983 hat man Gozzolis Hand in einigen Arbeiten nachweisen können.[172] An dieser Stelle lässt sich bereits die Umgangsweise des Künstlers erkennen, sie tritt in der Körperlichkeit von Figuren und einer harmonischen Farbgebung zutage und wird später immer wieder von ihm angewandt. Auch die starke Einflussnahme Fra Angelicos ist auffällig.

Bereits 1450 gelang es Gozzoli, erste eigene Aufträge zu erhalten, die sich vorerst auf Umbrien begrenzten. Dementsprechend schuf er die Freskenzyklen in Montefalco, in den Kirchen San Fortunato und San Francesco sowie in Viterbo für das Kloster Santa Rosa.[173] Darüber hinaus **Abb. 47**

[170] Padoa-Rizzo, 1992, S.150 ff.

[171] Anna Padoa-Rizzo schlüsselt in ihrem Aufsatz die Tätigkeit Benozzo Gozzolis für die beiden Kirchen auf und weist in Dokumenten die Mitarbeit Gozzolis für Werke der Kirche S. Agnese nach. Vgl. Anna Padoa-Rizzo: L`attivita di Benozzo Gozzoli per la Compagnia di Santa Maria delle Laudi e Sant`Agnese (1439,1441), Florenz, 1991. Vgl. auch: R. G. Mather: Documents mostly new relating to Florentine Painters and Sculptors of the fifteenth Century, in: Art Bulletin, XXX, 1948, S. 40-43. G. Bacchi: La Compagnia di Santa Maria delle Laudi e di Sant`Agnese nel Carmine di Firenze, in: Rivista storica Carmelitana, II, 1931, n. 4, S. 137-159; 1932, n. 1-2, S. 12-39.

[172] G. Bonsanti: La chiesa e il convento di San Marco a Firenze,. II, 1990, S. 158

[173] Elisabeth Giese: Benozzo Gozzolis Franziskuszyklus in Montefalco: Bildkomposition als Erzählung, Frankfurt, 1986. P. Pouncy: A Drawing by Benozzo Gozzoli for his fresco-cycle at Viterbo, in: The Burlington Magazine LXXIX, 1947, S. 9-13. P. Pouncy: An eye-wittness account of Benozzo`s fresco-cycle at Viterbo, in: The Burlington Magazine LXXIX,1947, S.98.

sind zahlreiche Tafelgemälde aus dieser Zeit bekannt.[174] Seinen ersten selbständigen Zyklus schuf Gozzoli 1450 in Montefalco in der Kirche San Fortunato.[175] Der dem Schutzpatron der Kirche gewidmete Zyklus ist leider nur noch bruchstückhaft erhalten. In den verbliebenen Fresken erkennt man Ansätze von Gozzolis erfinderischer und kompositorischer Eigenständigkeit. Die thronende Maria und der musizierende Engel enthalten in der Farbgebung, in ihrer Körperlichkeit, der Räumlichkeit des Throns und dessen architektonischer Gestaltung schon sehr viele Ansätze, die in San Gimignano zu erkennen sind. Besonders auffällig ist die Darstellungsweise der ornamentalen und figürlichen Bildrahmung. Hier findet sich bereits Gozzolis Können wieder. Die in den Rosetten gemalten Büsten sind auch in der "Vorlesung in Rom", fast originalgetreu im Fries der Innenraumdarstellung übernommen. Auch hier setzt Gozzoli auf die Wirkung von Komplementärfarben.

Von den Franziskanern beauftragt, schuf er 1452 im selben Ort, in der Kirche San Francesco, seinen zweiten Zyklus. Es entstand eine Folge über das Leben und Wirken des Heiligen Franziskus in zwölf Bildern. Gozzoli hatte dabei schon unter ähnlichen Voraussetzungen wie später in San Gimignano zu arbeiten, da der Zyklus für einen gotischen Chor und dessen Architektur vorgesehen war. Zudem handelte es sich hier wie in San Gimignano um eine Heiligenvita. Die Konzeption in Montefalco lässt schon die des Augustinuszyklus vorausahnen. Die Umsetzung von Architektur im Bild ist in San Francesco noch etwas flacher und weniger dem realistischen Empfinden der Renaissance angepasst. Die Landschaftsdarstellung orientiert sich hier sehr stark an der des Franziskuszyklus von Assisi.[176] Im formalen Aufbau des Augustinuszyklus in San Gimignano greift Gozzoli auf die Franziskusvita zurück. Unter jedem Bildfeld wird ein erklärendes Schriftband eingefügt, die Bilder werden durch ornamentale Pilaster getrennt, jedes Bild ist gerahmt. Auch die Abfolge der Fresken ist in gleicher Weise aufgebaut: Von links unten beginnend läuft die Bilderfolge nach rechts oben.

[174] Alle Tafelgemälde, die Benozzo Gozzoli zugeschrieben werden, findet man im *Catalogo completo* von Padoa-Rizzo, 1992.
[175] S. Nessi: Un restauro di Benozzo Gozzoli a Montefalco, in: Commentari, XVI, 1965, S.222-224; und S. Nessi: Museo Comunale di San Francisco a Montefalco, 1990, S.37.
[176] Giese, 1986, S.199 ff.

Eines der beeindruckendsten Bilder des Franziskuszyklus in Montefalco ist die sogenannte "Krippenfeier in Greccio". Hier greift Gozzoli durch die perfekt konstruierte Architektur der Kirche mit doppelläufigen Pilastern, der Tiefenräumlichkeit, der Kinderdarstellung und der Farbkombination seinen späteren Arbeiten voraus. Hinsichtlich der Szenerie ist dieser Zyklus durch das grosse Vorbild in Assisi geprägt.[177] Ein Aufenthalt in Assisi ist belegt.[178] Gozzoli hat eine kleine Arbeit für die Franziskaner in Assisi geschaffen, ein "vir dolorum", ein dornenbekröntes Haupt Christi, welches sich heute in der Schatzkammer der Basilika befindet. Ebenso sind im Zyklus schon Portraitfiguren enthalten, wenn auch nicht so häufig und ausgeprägt, wie in denen von Florenz und San Gimignano. **Abb. 48**

In San Francesco in Montefalco befindet sich eine weitere von Gozzoli ausgemalte Kapelle, die mit Szenen aus dem Leben des Heiligen Hieronymus verziert ist. Erstaunlich ist die Darstellung eines imaginären Flügelaltars, den Gozzoli geschlossen zeigt und ihn vor die Szenen des Hieronymus setzt. Die fiktive Architektur des Altars ist sehr realistisch gestaltet. Besonders die Idee, an der linken Altarseite noch einen Vorhang zu malen, der hinter dieser festgemacht wird, ist beeindruckend. Links vom Altar befindet sich eine Darstellung des Hieronymus in Doktorenkleidung, die in malweise und Ausdruck genau der Person des Augustinus in San Gimignano entspricht.

1453 befand sich Gozzoli in Viterbo. Hier hatte er den Auftrag, in der Kirche Santa Rosa für die Franziskanernonnen einen Zyklus über das Leben der Heiligen Rosa zu schaffen. Leider ist dieser Zyklus 1652 durch Umbauarbeiten in der Kirche völlig zerstört worden. Interessant wäre, hier die formale Ausarbeitung Gozzolis zu sehen, da es sich an dieser Stelle, ähnlich wie in San Gimignano, um ein Thema handelt, das eine starke Ideenfindung vom Künstler forderte.

Ab 1456 folgten Aufenthalte in Städten Mittelitaliens. Weiterhin ist Gozzolis Beteiligung an der Krönungszeremonie von Papst Pius II. im

[177] Padoa-Rizzo, 1992, S.40 ff.
[178] Ebd.

Januar 1458 ebenso seine Arbeit an den Fresken in Santa Maria d'Aracoeli in Rom für das gleiche Jahr nachgewiesen.[179]

Ein wichtiger Einschnitt in Gozzolis Leben war der Auftrag von Cosimo de Medici, den "Dreikönigszyklus" für seine Hauskapelle zu gestalten.[180] Nach Abschluss dieser Arbeit führte sein Weg 1464 nach San Gimignano, wo ein weiterer Grossauftrag auf ihn wartete. Gozzoli freskierte in der Kirche S. Agostino die "Vita des Heiligen Augustinus".Nach einem kurzen Aufenthalt 1458 in Rom wurde Gozzoli von den Medici nach Florenz berufen. Dort erhielt er den Auftrag, ihre Palastkapelle zu dekorieren. Der "Zug der Heiligen drei Könige", den Gozzoli für sie schuf, ist sein bekanntestes Werk. In der prachtvollen Art der Landschaftsdarstellung und der Jagdszenen im Hintergrund finden sich Elemente, die Gozzoli in veränderter Form im Augustinuszyklus wiederverwendet. Auch die prachtvolle Ausstattung der Pferde und seiner Reiter sowie die wirkungsvolle und interessante Art und Weise, Portraits in die Bildfolgen einzubauen, finden sich teilweise in San Gimignano wieder.[181] Gozzoli arbeitete hier erstmals in einem für das Quattrocento entworfenen Innenraum, der von Michelozzo konzipiert worden war. Anklänge an die Ornamentik der Fussböden und der Kapellendecke Michelozzos finden sich in den Fresken in San Gimignano wieder.

Nach Fertigstellung der Arbeit in Florenz 1464 begab sich Gozzoli nach San Gimignano, um dort den Auftrag der Augustiner-Eremiten zu übernehmen. Während der Zeit im Kloster schuf er eine weitere grössere Arbeit in der Umgebung. In Certaldo malte er ein Tabernakel mit Szenen über die "Giustiziati", den sogenannten Hingerichteten, aus. Die Fresken sind in einem schlechten Erhaltungszustand.

Am 1. Januar 1469 verpflichtete sich Benozzo Gozzoli, die Freskierung der Nordwand des Camposanto in Pisa zu übernehmen.[182] Der grösste

[179] A. Greco: La cappella di Nicolò V del Beato Angelico, Roma, 1980.
[180] R. Hatfield: The compagnia dei Magi, in: Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute, XXXIII, 1970, S.107-161. A. Grote: Gozzoli`s Frescoes in the Palazzo Medici-Riccardi, A hitherto unpublished letter, in: Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute, XXVII,1964, S. 321-322.
[181] Hatfield, 1970, S. 107-161.
[182] Igino Benvenuto Supino: Le opere minori di Benozzo Gozzoli a Pisa, Roma, 1894.

von ihm geschaffene Freskenzyklus zeigte dreiundzwanzig Szenen des Alten Testaments. Die immense Leistung dieser monumentalen Bilderfolge wurde am 1. Mai 1484 abgeschlossen. Durch einen Bombenangriff 1944 wurde der grösste Teil dieser Fresken unwiederbringlich zerstört. Gozzoli hat hier einen Höhepunkt seiner Schaffenskraft erreicht. Sein Können zeichnet sich nicht nur in der schieren Grösse und Ansammlung der Freskenbilder, sondern auch durch die wundervoll verkürzten Architekturdarstellungen, die weit in den Bildhintergrund führen, aus. Ebenso bedeutend sind auch die Figurenansammlungen, die den Bildraum beleben. Schon in San Gimignano lassen sich erste Anklänge dieser Begabung finden. Erst in Pisa konnte sich seine Schaffenskraft und Phantasie voll entfalten.[183]

Kurz vor Beendigung der Arbeiten im Camposanto in Pisa schuf Gozzoli seine letzten kleineren Zyklen in Castelfiorentino: Das "Tabernacolo della Madonna della Tosse" und das Tabernacolo "della Visitazione". Beide zeigen Szenen des Marienlebens und befinden sich heute im Kommunalmuseum in Castelfiorentino.[184]

Sein letztes Werk, eine Kreuzigungsdarstellung, begann Benozzo Gozzoli 1497 in Pistoia, wo er am 4.10.1497 starb, bevor er seine Arbeit beenden konnte.[185]

6.2. Einordung Gozzolis in das künstlerische Umfeld

Gozzoli scheint vielen Einflüssen anderer Künstler unterworfen gewesen zu sein. Seine Malweise veranlasst immer wieder dazu, ihm 'grössere und berühmtere' Vorbilder zuzuweisen. Diese mag es gegeben haben. Doch ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass Gozzoli, der in einer Zeit lebte, die vom Geiste Fra Angelicos, Masaccios, Uccellos und Ghibertis geprägt war, beeinflusst wurde. Sie alle haben mehr oder weniger Neuerungen in ihre Werke aufgenommen und diese individuell weiterverarbeitet.

Noch vor der Tätigkeit an der Paradiestür mit Ghiberti ist seine Arbeit unter Fra Angelico im Kloster San Marco bekannt. 1447 folgte er Fra

[183] Cristina Acidini Luchinat: Benozzo Gozzoli, Firenze, 1994, S.57 ff.
[184] Rosanna Caterina Proto Pisani: Gli affreschi di Benozzo Gozzoli a Castelfiorentino (1484-1490), Castelfiorentino,1987.
[185] Alberto Chiappelli: Di due ultimi lavori, finora sconosciuti, di Benozzo Gozzoli e della morte di lui, secondo nuovi documenti pistoiesi, Pistoia, 1921.

Angelico nach Rom, um sich an Arbeiten im Vatikanspalast zu beteiligen. Die Zusammenarbeit mit Fra Angelico erstreckte sich auf die Domkapelle S. Brizio in Orvieto und die Cappella Niccolina in Rom.[186] Gozzoli war lange Zeit Schüler Fra Angelicos, und der Einfluss seines Lehrers ist in vielen Fällen unverkennbar. Im Kloster San Marco in Florenz war Gozzoli nachweislich an dessen Arbeiten beteiligt. Auch Fra Angelico setzte sich schon früh mit Werken anderer Maler auseinander. So erkennt Procacci Berührungspunkte in den um 1430 datierten Werken Angelicos mit der Kunst Masaccios.[187] Ebenso wird die Auseinandersetzung mit der Antike, welche man häufig nur Masaccio, Brunelleschi und Michelozzo zuschreibt, in einigen Zeichnungen Fra Angelicos und Gozzolis deutlich.

Gozzolis Zeichnung des "Rossebändigers" aus dem British Museum in London lässt eine Beschäftigung mit der Antike erkennen. Degenhart schreibt dazu: "*Die Zeichnung des Rossebändigers steht Zeichnungen des jungen Gozzoli in der Periode seiner Beteiligung an Angelicos Ausmalung der Nikolauskapelle nahe, damals als Gozzoli auch Motive aus diesen Wandbildern durch die Kopie bewahrte. Es ist selbstverständlich, daß Gozzoli auch im Zeichnerischen Angelico als Vorbild empfand.*"[188] Gozzoli übernahm in vielen Teilen die Art Angelicos: Die stille innenliegende Kraft, die aus den Figuren strömt und ihre statische Haltung. Er entwickelte sich jedoch in Bezug auf die Hintergrundgestaltung und die perspektivische Bearbeitung über Angelico hinaus. Der starke Einfluss, den dieser auf Gozzoli ausübte, ist unverkennbar. "*Vor allem zehrte Gozzoli zeitlebens von einem Mustervorrat, den er bei seiner Mitarbeit an Fra Angelicos Wandbildern anlegte, seien es Kopien nach diesen selbst oder solche nach Zeichnungen Angelicos.*"[189]

Die Zusammenarbeit mit der Werkstatt Lorenzo Ghibertis an der "Paradiestür" des Baptisteriums in Florenz gibt für die Entwicklung **Abb. 49**

[186] C. Gilbert: Fra Angelico's fresco cycles in Rome, Their number and dates, in: Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte, XXXVIII, 1975, S. 245-265. Cinzia Valigi: Gli affreschi di Luca Signorelli nella Cappella di San Brizio nel Duomo di Orvieto, Terni, 1990. Vgl. allg.: Wingenroth, 1897.
[187] Procacci, 1955, S. 14 f.
[188] Degenhart, 1967, S. 449 f.
[189] Degenhart, 1967, S.457.

Gozzolis weitere Aufschlüsse. Nach einem Vertragstext[190] sollte Gozzoli vom 24. Januar 1445 für drei Jahre am Bronzeportal mitarbeiten.[191] 1447 war er jedoch bereits in Rom am päpstlichen Hof tätig. Nach Dupré und Padua Rizzo soll Gozzoli einige Reliefplatten selbständig ausgeführt haben. Bartalini bezweifelt dies jedoch.[192] Diese Diskussion ausschliessend, ist festzustellen, dass Gozzoli in seinen Werken, besonders in San Gimignano, die perspektivische Arbeitsweise Ghibertis übernimmt. Die "Jakobszenen" in Ghibertis "Paradiestür" sind formal ähnlich aufgebaut wie die "Ankunft in Mailand" von Gozzoli. Die Bearbeitung der Loggia bei Gozzoli mit den drei Bögen findet sich auch bei den "Jakobszenen" wieder, wo ebenso wie in San Gimignano drei Episoden einer Geschichte in ein Bildfeld integriert werden.

In Ghibertis Werkstatt arbeitete auch Paolo Uccello. Wingenroth geht soweit, Gozzoli als Schüler Uccellos zu bezeichnen.[193] Unverkennbar ist die stilistische Ähnlichkeit in beider Tierdarstellungen. So ist zum Beispiel die Art der Ausführung von Pferden vergleichbar. Es lassen sich Parallelen zwischen dem Reiterstandbild Uccellos, im Florentiner Dom, und der Szene "Abreise aus Rom" ziehen. Die Struktur des Pferdes und des reitenden Augustinus sind dem Reiterstandbild Uccellos verblüffend ähnlich. Sicher ist die gegenseitige Kenntnis ihrer Kunst. Beispielhaft dafür ist unter anderem der 'laufende Affe' in Gozzolis Fresko im Camposanto in Pisa, der identisch in einer Zeichnung Uccellos aus Wien auftritt. Degenhart erklärt sich diese Ähnlichkeit durch die Entstehung von Tiermusterbüchern, ab 1400 in Florenz.[194] **Abb. 50**

Auch mit Giottos Werken hatte Gozzoli direkten Kontakt, als er, wie schon beschrieben, für die Franziskanermönche in Assisi sein "vir dolorum" anfertigte. Bekannt dürften Gozzoli auch die Arbeiten von Giotto

[190] In diesem Vertrag mit Ghiberti wird Benozzo Gozzoli ausdrücklich als "dipintore" bezeichnet. Dies drückt sich auch in der Höhe seiner Bezahlung aus. Vgl. Padoa-Rizzo, 1992, S. 210.

[191] Richard Krautheimer: Lorenzo Ghiberti, Bd. 2, Princeton, 1982, S.362f., 205f., 333.

[192] M. G. Ciardi Dupré: Sulla collaborazione di Benozzo alla Porta del Paradiso, in: Antichità Viva, VI, Nr. 6, 1967, S. 60-73. Vgl. Padoa-Rizzo, 1992, S. 30 f. R. Bartalini: Benozzo Gozzoli, Milano, 1990, S. 109 -123.

[193] Wingenroth, 1897, S. 62.

[194] Degenhart, 1967, S. 376.

in Santa Croce in Florenz gewesen sein: Der "Tod des Augustinus" in Gozzolis Freskenzyklus ist im Aufbau dem "Tod des Heiligen Franziskus" in Santa Croce ähnlich.

Das von Brunelleschi 1419 begonnene Ospedale degli Innocenti wird im "Tod des Augustinus" formal in den Bildhintergrund übernommen. Hier zeigt sich eines der Momente, an denen man Gozzolis Auseinandersetzung mit der Architekturproblematik seiner Zeit deutlich ablesen kann. **Abb. 51**

Eine Analogie zum Bild der "Tod der Monika" findet sich in einer Miniatur der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts vom Meister der Observanz wieder. Es zeigt den Tod Monikas und die Abreise Augustinus nach Afrika. Heute befindet sich das Blatt im Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge. Christiansen erkennt: "*An analogy for the composition is Benozzo Gozzoli's later fresco of the Death of Saint Monica in the choir of Sant'Agostino in San Gimignano.*"[195] **Abb. 52**

6.3. Einordung von Gozzolis Augustinusvita in die Tradition des Bildthemas

Zahlreiche Einzelbilder zu Augustinus Leben sind vorhanden. Die wohl bekanntesten sind "Die Vision des Heiligen Augustinus" von Botticelli aus Ognissanti in Florenz und von Carpaccio, der dasselbe Thema in der Scuola di San Giorgio in Venedig darstellt.[196] Ganz ähnliche Bearbeitungen dieses Sujets finden sich auch nördlich der Alpen. So in Jan van Eycks "Hieronymus im Gehäus" und Barthélemy d'Eycks "Thomas von Aquin".[197]

Augustinuszyklen in Italien

Einundzwanzig Zyklen des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts über das Leben des heiligen Augustinus sind bekannt. Sie wurden von Courcelle analysiert.[198]

[195] Keith Christiansen: Painting in Renaissance, Siena 1420-1500, New York, 1989, S. 100.
[196] Roberts, 1959, S. 288 f. Martin Kemp: The Taking and Using of Evidence with a Botticellian Case Study by Martin Kemp, Journal XLIV, 1984, S.207-215.
[197] Eberhard König: Das Liebentbrannte Herz, Der Wiener Codex und der Maler Barthélemy D`Eyck, Graz, 1996, S. 58.
[198] Courcelle, 1969, S. 76 f.

Der Zyklus von San Gimignano ist einer von dreien aus dem Quattrocento und der einzige in toskanischer Renaissancemanier. Die Ikonographie der Fresken in San Gimignano unterscheidet sich in wesentlichen Punkten von den anderen Zyklen. Hier findet sich keine 'Wanderszene' wieder, doch wird erstmals der 'Tod des Heiligen' dargestellt.[199] Die Szenen, der "Einschreibung in die Universität in Karthago" und der "Abreise aus Rom" sind ebenso wie 'Monika bei Ambrosius' und die 'Christuslegende' Bilderfindungen Gozzolis. Diese Szenen werden in der Folgezeit für Augustinuszyklen verpflichtend. Der Zyklus nimmt das Thema "Augustinus im Gehäus" wieder auf, ähnlich wie dies im Chor der Augustinereremitenkirche in Gubbio (nach 1400) dargestellt wurde.[200]

Die Szene, die die Eremiten in der Toskana zeigt, ist in San Gimignano erstmals in einen monumentalen Zyklus integriert. Bis dahin ist sie nur in der Lebensbeschreibung von Augustinus des Jacques Legrand (um 1400) und in der Historia Augustini (1430-40) zu finden.[201] In San Gimignano fehlen die postumen Wunder und Wunderheilungen, die für die Zyklen des 14. Jahrhunderts charakteristisch sind, wobei Augustinus in Gozzolis Zyklus als ausgeprochener intellektuell Gelehrter aufgefasst wird.

Gozzoli war ein entscheidender Lieferant für die formale Gestaltung der Augustinusvita, wenn auch die Kompositionen teilweise aus älteren Zyklen stammen und von dort übernommen wurden.[202] So zum Beispiel die Miniaturen aus einem Florentiner Manuskript, 1433 datiert und von A. di Lorenzo signiert.[203] Es gibt für dieses Manuskript grosse Zuschreibungsprobleme, die von Masaccio bis Fra Angelico differieren.[204] Einige Szenen dieser fast skizzenhaften Darstellungen sind denen in San Gimignano im Aufbau sehr ähnlich.[205] So ist die erste Szene der

Abb. 53, 54, 55

[199] Ebd., S. 105 f.
[200] Ebd., S. 81-99.
[201] Ebd., S. 11-13, 25-64.
[202] Dieter Blume: Wandmalerei als Ordenspropaganda, Bildprogramme im Chorbereich franziskanischer Konvente Italiens bis zur Mitte des 14. Jht., Worms, 1983, S. 30 ff.
[203] Es handelt sich um ein aus der Nationalbiliothek Florenz stammendes Manuskript, bezeichnet mit B.N.,II. 1.112., mit 317 Seiten. Die Seiten 315 r° bis 317 r° zeigen das Leben des Heiligen Augustinus.
[204] D. Fava: La Bilioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, Milano, 1938, S.30, pl.II.
[205] Courcelle bringt das Manuskript auch mit den der Fresken in San Gimignano in Verbindung, Courcelle, 1969, S.76.

"Einschulung in Tagaste" ihr vom formalen Aufbau vergleichbar. Die Hand- und Armhaltung des Lehrers und der kindliche Augustinus, der zwischen seinen Eltern steht, ist in beiden Szenen fast gleich gestaltet. Die betende Monika aus Florenz, ähnelt durch den Einblick, der in die Kapelle gewährt wird, der in San Gimignano. Auch in der Szene "Augustinus lehrt in Rom" ist der Vergleich mit Gozzoli angebracht. Wichtig sind dabei der zentral sitzende Augustinus, der von seinen Schülern umgeben wird sowie seine frontale Stellung. Die Darstellungsweise des sitzenden Augustinus in der "Bekehrungsszene", und seines Todes, weisen Parallelen zum Zyklus in San Gimignano auf.[206]

Die Fresken der Kirche "degli Eremitani" in Padua, 1338 von Guariento für den Chor gemalt, enthalten nur noch wenige Szenen aus dem Leben des Heiligen Augustinus, da sie 1944 durch einen Bombenangriff grossteils zerstört wurden. Lediglich fünf Szenen blieben erhalten.[207]

Auch die Fresken der Kirche S. Agostino in Fabriano sind in einem sehr schlechten Erhaltungszustand. Sie wurden auf 1216 datiert und soweit noch zu erkennen in einem sehr 'archaischen' Stil gemalt.[208]

Die Szenen des Heiligen Augustinus, in der Kirche S. Agostino in Gubbio von Ottavio Nelli, entstanden um 1400. J. und P. Courcelle schreiben zu diesen Fresken: "*L'importance du cycle de Gubbio est considérable pour l'histoire de l'iconographie augustinienne; si ces peintures murales annoncent l'oeuvre que Benozzo Gozzoli créera à San Gimignano environ soixante ans plus tard [...]*".[209] Fünfundzwanzig Szenen zeigen hier das Leben des Heiligen. Jedes Bild enthält eine Bildunterschrift wie in San Gimignano. In den schriftlichen Anfängen beider Zyklen wird auf die Bilder verwiesen. Beginnt in San Gimignano diese mit "*Quemadmodum*", so steht zu Beginn in Gubbio "*Hic*". Ausserdem sind viele der Bildinhalte von San Gimignano auch in Gubbio enthalten. Sie sind lediglich durch postume Wunderszenen angereichert.[210] **Abb. 56**

Die vier kleinen vatikanischen Tafeln, die von Salimbeni aus Sanseverino aus den Marken gemalt wurden, sind in das frühe 15.

[206] Ebd., S. 77-83. Hier vergleicht Courcelle nicht nur den Bildaufbau sondern auch die Bildidee und den literarischen Zusammenhang zu den Bildern.
[207] Ebd., S. 51.
[208] Ebd., S. 51-59.
[209] J. und P. Courcelle, Iconographie de Saint Augustin. Les cycles du XIVe siècle. Paris, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1965, S. 85.
[210] Ebd., S. 86-99.

Jahrhundert datiert. Sie zeigen vier Szenen aus dem Leben des Heiligen Augustinus und werden stilistisch den Fresken von Nelli zugeordnet.[211] In einem Bostoner Manuskript, das auf die zweite Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts datiert wird, finden sich nach Courcelle typische Merkmale narrativer Zyklen des 15. Jahrhunderts wieder, zu denen sie auch San Gimignano zählen.[212]

Die Tradition des Bildthemas ist trotz der bekannten einundzwanzig Zyklen im Vergleich zu anderen Heiligenviten gering. Zudem sind die bekannten Zyklen über Jahrhunderte verteilt. Warum dieses Bildthema so selten aufgegriffen wurde, hängt unter anderem auch damit zusammen, daß die Franziskaner die Bildprogramme erstmals auch als Mittel für die Werbung des Ordens erkannt haben, während die anderen Orden damit vorsichtiger umgegangen sind.

[211] Ebd., S. 104 -105.

[212] Augustini Imaginibus Adornata. Manuskript de Boston, Public Library, n° 1483, S.XV, inédit. mit Texten von Pierre und Jeanne Courcelle, Paris, 1964.

7. Schlussbetrachtung

"Einige sind der Meinung, die Schönheit bestehe in einer bestimmten Anordnung oder in einem ebenmäßigen Verhältnis sämtlicher Glieder, gepaart mit zarter Abtönung der Farben. Dieser Ansicht pflichten wir deshalb nicht bei, weil eine derartige Anordnung der Teile nur bei zusammengesetzten Gegenständen möglich ist, und demnach nichts Einfaches schön sein könnte. Wir bemerken jedoch, daß die reinen Farben, die Lichtstrahlen, eine einzelne Stimme, das Funkeln des Goldes und der lichte Glanz des Silbers, die Wissenschaft, die Seele, der Geist und Gott, alles einfache Substanzen, schön sind, und wir erfreuen uns daran in hohem Maße als an etwas sehr Schönem. Ferner umfaßt jenes Ebenmaß alle Glieder des zusammengesetzten Körpers derart, daß es nicht in einem einzelnen Gliede für sich, sondern in Ihrer Gesamtheit besteht. Den einzelnen Körperteilen für sich würde demnach die Schönheit nicht zukommen. Jedoch beruht das Ebenmaß der ganzen Zusammensetzung auf den Teilen."[213]

Ficinos Auffassung von Ästhetik kann auch auf den Zyklus Gozzolis angewandt werden. Die Schönheit steckt im Detail, in der Einzelheit und wird so im gesamten betrachtet zu einer herausragenden Komposition.

Die Augustinusvita Benozzo Gozzolis kann als ein Höhepunkt seines Œuvre gesehen werden. Hier hatte Gozzoli die Gelegenheit, Bilderfindung und Komposition selbst zu gestalten, ohne auf überkommene Vorbilder achten zu müssen. Mit einer Freude an Detailgenauigkeit und dem Bewusstsein der überragenden Thematik des Zyklus, schuf Gozzoli Bilder mit reich ausgestatteten Stadtkulissen, naturgetreuen Landschaften und exakt konstruierten Innenräumen, vor deren Hintergrund er die Augustinusvita mit zahlreichen Figuren jeglicher Schattierung auftreten liess.

Seine Figuren verblüffen immer wieder durch ihren grossen Reichtum an Gestik in ihren Handhaltungen und auch in ihrer Potraithaftigkeit.

Wenn man Gozzoli ein grosses Können an "narratio" zugesteht, so muss dies noch weiter gefasst werden. Er erzählt nicht nur eine Geschichte oder gar ein 'amüsantes Märchen', sondern versteht es, den Betrachter an das Werk zu fesseln und ihn darin stetig Neues entdecken zu lassen. Wichtige Momente des Zyklus muss man sich erarbeiten, sie können nicht in einfacher Form abgelesen werden. So gelingt es Gozzoli, mit Witz und

[213] Marsilius Ficinus: Sopra lo amore. (Über die Liebe. übers. v. Paul Hasse), Leipzig, 1914.

Geist die Vita eines Menschen zum Leben zu erwecken. Die Schwerpunkte liegen dabei nicht nur im einzelnen Bild, sondern in einer übergreifenden Gegenüberstellung und der Korrespondenz der Bilder miteinander.

In den Bildunterschriften wird letztendlich die didaktische Intention des Zyklus hervorgehoben und unterstützt. Das Zusammenwirken der Bilder und Bildunterschriften zueinander hängt in starkem Masse mit dem wichtigsten Quellentext, den Confessiones des Augustinus, zusammen. Es wird die intellektuelle Auseinandersetzung mit der Vita des Heiligen die der Zyklus wiederspiegelt, deutlich. Erstaunlich hierbei ist, dass es bislang nur Ansätze einer Analyse des oben genannten Zusammenwirkens in der Kunstwissenschaft gab. Erforscht werden müsste demnach zuerst, ob die Bildunterschriften im Laufe der Zeit Veränderungen unterworfen waren, und von dort aus böte sich die Möglichkeit weiterzuarbeiten.

Die Einflüsse auf Gozzolis Arbeiten wurden in einem Kapitel mit seinen anderen Zyklen bearbeitet. Wichtige Einflüsse erhielt der Künstler sicherlich in erster Linie von Fra Angelico und Lorenzo Ghiberti, seinen Lehrern in den Jugendjahren. Des weiteren gingen Impulse von Uccello und Masaccio aus.

Die wenigen Augustinus-Zyklen in Italien boten kaum Anhaltspunkte und Verbindungen zu der Augustinusvita in San Gimignano.

Die ersten Kapitel sollten in einer Art von Ausblick verdeutlichen, welche Möglichkeiten im Forschungsbereich des Zyklus noch bestehen. So ist die Observanzbewegung der Augustiner-Eremiten in dieser Zeit von immenser Wichtigkeit für den Zyklus, ebenso wie der Auftraggeber und Reformer Fra Domenico Strambi. Ohne diese Gegebenheiten wäre der Zyklus in seiner Art nicht zustandegekommen.

Zusammen mit Piero della Francescas Fresken in Arezzo und Donatellos Altarblatten für San Lorenzo war der in der Kapelle in San Gimignano dargestellte einer der wichtigsten Zyklen, die in dieser Periode geschaffen wurden.

Humanistische Einflüsse, ein Ausblick

"*Diversi diversa Patres, sed hic omnia*

dixit Romano eloquio, mystica sensa tonans."[214]

Die formale Gestaltung des Augustinuszyklus hängt, auch von der wachsenden Bedeutung Augustinus und seiner Schriften in der Renaissance und der humanistischen Bewegung im 15. Jahrhundert, ab. Augustinus wird neu entdeckt. "*Mit dem 15. Jahrhundert vermehrte sich, [...] der Besitz und die Verbreitung der Schriften des Altertums außerordentlich: endlich kamen auch die sämtlichen noch vorhandenen griechischen Philosophen wenigstens in lateinischer Übersetzung unter die Leute. Nun ist es zunächst sehr bemerkenswert, daß gerade einige der Hauptförderer dieser Literatur der strengsten Frömmigkeit, ja der Askese ergeben sind. [...] Derselbe Maffeo Vegio, welcher das dreizehnte Buch zur Aneide dichtete, hatte für das Andenken S. Augustinus und dessen Mutter Monica eine Begeisterung, welche nicht ohne höheren Bezug gewesen sein wird. Frucht und Folge solcher Bestrebungen war dann, daß die platonische Akademie zu Florenz sich förmlich zum Ziele setzte, den Geist des Altertums mit dem des Christentum zu durchdringen.*"[215] Dies geschieht stellenweise auch im Zyklus in San Gimignano, wenn zum Beispiel im Bild "Augustinus lehrt in Rom", ein Zuhörer ein aufgeschlages Buch hält, in dem der Zusammenhang von Rhetorik und Philosophie bei Cicero zitiert wird.

Kristeller schreibt über dieses Phänomen in der Renaissance: "*Der Renaissance-Humanismus war ein ciceronisches Zeitalter, in dem Studium und Nachahmung von Cicero ein weitverbreitetes Anliegen war, [...]. Nach der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts erfaßte der Einfluß humanistischer Gelehrsamkeit über die Grenzen der 'studia humanitas' hinaus alle Bereiche der Renaissance Kultur [...].*"[216] Wichtig scheint auch, dass die Rhetoriker versuchten, Philosophie und Rhetorik miteinander zu verbinden. Die Durchdringung der Renaissancekultur mit antiken Zitaten ist in allen Bereichen zu finden, "*in den bildenden Künsten wie in den verschiedenen Wissenschaften, ohne dabei die Originalität der einzelnen Leistungen zu beeinträchtigen.*"[217]

[214] Inschrift auf dem Fresko im Lateran, das den heiligen Augustinus darstellt, erste Hälfte des 6. Jahrhunderts. Vgl.: Marrou, 1958, S. 132.
[215] Jacob Burckhardt, 1985, S. 350.
[216] Paul Oskar Kristeller: Humanismus und Renaissance I, Die antike und mittelalterliche Quellen. München, 1947, S. 25.
[217] Ebd., S. 27.

Den Stellenwert, den Augustinus in der Renaissance einnimmt, erkennt man unter anderem an den Vertretern des Neo-Platonismus, die Augustinus anführen, um den Versuch zu unternehmen, ihre Lehre mit dem Christentum zu verbinden.[218] Augustinus bekannte sich stärker als andere zu Platon und Plotin. Eine wiederholte These von ihm war, dass die platonische Lehre der christlichen näher stehe, als andere heidnische Philosophien. Dies führte soweit, dass sogar Theologen Kommentare zu Plato verfassten, wie Aegidius von Viterbo, ein Ordensgeneral der Augustiner, in einem Kommentar zu den Sentenzen "ad mentem Platonis". "*Die zentrale und einflußreichste Figur des Renaissance-Platonismus ist Marsilio Ficino, in dem sich das mittelalterliche philosophische und religiöse Erbe mit den Lehren des griechischen Platonismus zu einer Synthese vereinigt.*"[219]

Der Einfluss von Augustinus auf die Renaissance ist von herausragender Bedeutung. Im frühen Mittelalter war dieser vor allem in den Gebieten der Theologie und Pädagogik zu finden, und setzte sich in der Renaissance fort. "*Doch neben diesen traditionellen Einflüssen Augustinus, deren Bedeutung nicht unterschätzt werden sollte, stoßen wir manchmal auch auf eine offensichtlich anders geartete Einstellung zu seinem Werk. Für Petrarca, der der scholastischen Theologie keine Beachtung schenkt und sie ablehnt, aber seine religiöse Überzeugung immer betont, war Augustinus einer der beliebtesten Autoren, der sogar einen entscheidenden Einfluß auf seine geistige Entwicklung ausübte. Abgesehen von den zahlreichen Zitaten, sind besonders zwei Beispiele wert, erwähnt zu werden. So gab Petrarca seinem intimsten Werk, dem SECRETUM, die Form eines Dialogs zwischen Augustinus und dem Autor, wobei gerade Augustinus die Rolle des geistigen Führers übernimmt und die Zweifel und Fragen des Dichters löst. In dem berühmten Brief, in dem Petrarca schildert, wie er den Mont Ventoux bestieg, berichtet er, daß er Augustinus Confessiones aus der Tasche zog, sie ganz zufällig aufschlug und auf eine Stelle traf, die genau seine eigene Empfindung zum Ausdruck brachte: 'Und da gehen die Menschen hin und bewundern die Höhen der Berge, das*

[218] Hier sind unter anderen zu nennen: Niccolo Niccoli, Giannozzo Manetti, Donato Acciajuoli und Papst Nicolaus V.
[219] Ebd., S. 57

mächtige Wogen des Meeres, die Weiten des Ozeans und den Umschwung der Gestirne, und vernachlässigen dabei sich selbst."[220]

Auch Ficino und die platonische Schule verdeutlichten immer wieder eine starke Verbundenheit mit Augustinus. So gehen wesentliche Gedanken des Heiligen in die philosophischen Werke Ficinos ein. Die platonische Akademie von Florenz beherrschte zumindest den Kreis um die Medici, zu dem man auch Gozzoli in seiner Schaffenperiode in Florenz zählen sollte. Die Ideen der Akademie, besonders die der "Unsterblichkeit der Seele" und die der "platonischen Liebe" verbreiteten sich ab Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts rasch. Sie waren nicht wenig durch die Theorien von Augustinus bestimmt. "*In der Kontemplation treten der Leib und alle äußeren Dinge in den Hintergrund, und die Seele zieht sich in sich selbst zurück, das heißt, sie vertieft sich in das ihr eigene Wesen, und dort entdeckt sie nicht nur ihre eigene Göttlichkeit, sondern - in einem stufenweisen Aufsteigen - die intelligible Welt, die transzendenten Ideen und Gott selbst, der ihre gleichsame Quelle und ihr Wesen bildet.*"[221] Diese Idee spiegelt der Freskenzyklus von Gozzoli in beispielhafter Weise wieder, der Aufstieg Augustinus in eine vergeistigte Welt, die Erkenntnis von Gott, bis zur Aufnahme in den Himmel.

Durch den immensen Anstieg der Beliebtheit, der sich Augustinus im 15. Jahrhundert erfreute, ist in gewisser Weise auch die Initiierung des Zyklus zu verdanken. Wenn auch nur als ein geringer Teilaspekt zu betrachten, so passt auch der Augustinuszyklus in das Bild, dass sich die Philosophen und Theologen zum Neo-Platonismus und ihrer Vorstellung neuer Lebensweise machten.

[220] Kristeller, 1947, S. 81.

[221] Paul Oskar Kristeller: Humanismus und Renaissance II. Philosophie, Bildung und Kunst, München, 1980, S.106.

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Abb. 1


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SCS NICHOLAVS DE TOLETINO
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


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


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


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

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


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


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




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


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


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


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


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


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




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




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


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


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


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


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

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


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



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RECENT RESEARCH INTO PELAGIANISM WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF JULIAN OF AECLANUM

1. Introduction

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N.V. PEETERS S.A., KLEIN DALENSTRAAT 42, B-3020 HERENT

RECENT RESEARCH INTO PELAGIANISM[1] WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF JULIAN OF AECLANUM

1. Introduction

The Pelagian controversy, which raged primarily in the western part of the Roman Empire[2], is generally considered to have been the first theological controversy to have confronted the Latin Christian church and there can be little doubt that its reception left a profound mark on the history of western theology. The African Church Father Augustine of Hippo earned the honorary title *doctor gratiae* for his part therein on account of his many interventions as the eminent defender of grace against the Pelagians whom he accused of being the *inimici gratiae*[3]. Augustine's works contain an often pointed summary

[1] Reliable surveys, particularly with respect to Pelagius, can be found in the following (in chronological order): C. GARCIA-SANCHEZ, *Pelagius and Christian Initiation: A Study in Historical Theology*, Washington, 1978, 9-103 (concentrates on recent interpretations of Pelagius' vision of the sanctity of the Church); F.G. NUVOLONE, *Pélage et Pélagianisme. I. Les écrivains*, in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 12,2 (1986) 2889-2923; O. WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustinus und Pelagius*, in C. MAYER & K.H. CHELIUS (Hrsg.), *Internationales Symposion über den Stand der Augustinus-Forschung vom 12. bis 16. April 1987 im Schloss Rauischholzhausen der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen* (Cassiciacum, 39/1), Würzburg, 1989, 189-217; G. BONNER, *Pelagius/Pelagianischer Streit*, in TRE 26 (1996) 176-185. In light of the fact that reference can be made with respect to Pelagius to the excellent study of O. Wermelinger, a supplement to which is offered in a recent study penned by the present author, the Pelagius segment can be kept to a minimum; cf. M. LAMBERIGTS, *Pélage: la réhabilitation d'un hérétique*, in J. PIROTTE & E. LOUCHEZ (eds.), *Deux mille ans d'histoire de l'Eglise. Bilan et perspectives historiographiques* (RHE 95/3 [2000]), pp. 97-111. At the same time, in light of the aims of the symposium, in the context of which the present contribution is being offered, attention has been explicitly drawn once again to a number of elements in order to satisfy the target audience. Our own attention will focus for the most part on Julian of Aeclanum, whose works, certainly within the context of the Pelagian controversy, extend widely beyond those of all the other Pelagians.

[2] The reader is reminded, perhaps unnecessarily, that the role of Rufinus the Syrian in the debates surrounding the *tradux peccati* dogma should not be underestimated; cf. NUVOLONE, *Pélage et Pélagianisme*, 2890-2891; vgl. also W. DUNPHY, *Rufinus the Syrian's Books*, in *Augustinianum* 23 (1983) 523-529; ID., *Marius Mercator on Rufinus the Syrian. Was Schwartz mistaken?*, in *Augustinianum* 32 (1992) 279-288.

[3] See, for example, G. BONNER, *Augustine and Pelagianism*, in *Augustinian Studies* 24 (1993) 27-47 (Reprint in ID., *Church and Faith in the Patristic Tradition. Augustine, Pelagianism, and Early Christian Northumbria* (Collected Studies Series), Aldershot, 1996 [7th study]). While a good survey of the studies devoted to Augustine's part in the controversy would be far from an unnecessary luxury, such a survey remains beyond the boundaries of the present literature review.

of what he considered to be objectionable in Pelagian thought[4]. It would appear, however, that the tradition was not always so ill at ease with Pelagian perspectives as was the case with Augustine of Hippo, certainly if one takes into account the fact that several so-called Pelagian documents have survived to the present day because the said tradition had ascribed them to other, "orthodox", Christian authors. Perhaps the most striking example thereof is Pelagius' *Epistula ad Demetriadem*, authorship of which was ascribed for a significant period of time either to Jerome or to Augustine himself[5] on account of the quality of the ascetic content of the work. When scholars came to be convinced that the work could be ascribed with certainty to Pelagius, it suddenly acquired the epithets 'un-evangelical' and 'non-Pauline'[6], a somewhat surprising change of perspective given the fact that Pelagius' writings tended to afford a significant amount of space to commentary on the letters of Paul[7].

2. Dogmatic heresy versus historical reality

The manner with which Augustine struggled with the Pelagians led in part to the fact that dogmatic theology, rooted in doctrinal presuppositions, transformed Pelagianism into a system that was quickly qualified as heretical[8]. Constant elements in the presentation of this system as set of coherent dogmatic propositions included the suggestion that the human person was capable of maintaining the commandments of God under his/her own steam, as it were, and that he/she was

[4] See in this regard O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius* (Päpste und Papsttum, 7), Stuttgart, 1975, esp. pp. 278-282.

[5] Cf. PL 30, 15-45; PL 33, 1099-1120.

[6] Cf. G. DE PLINVAL, *Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme*, Lausanne, 1943, pp. 245-251; J. B. VALERO, *Las bases antropologicas de Pelagio en su tratado de las Expositiones*, Madrid, 1980, pp. 326-330. De Plinval is also worthy of praise for being among the first who provided a more positive picture of Pelagius from the historical-critical perspective. For the English speaking world, reference can be made in this regard to J. FERGUSON, *Pelagius*, Cambridge, 1956 (reprint, New York, 1978). B.R. REES, *Pelagius: A Reluctant Heretic*, Woodbridge, 1988 offers a well written outline of the Pelagian controversy but does not as such introduce anything new.

[7] See in this regard *Expositiones XIII epistularum Pauli: Pelagius' Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul*, ed. A. SOUTER (Texts and Studies, 9/2), Cambridge, 1926; H.J. FREDE, *Ein neuer Paulustext und Kommentar* (Vetus Latina. Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel, 7-8), Freiburg, 1973-1974, 2 vol. Th. DE BRUYN, *Pelagius' Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, Oxford, 1993.

[8] Foor a good survey see C. GARCIA-SANCHEZ, *Pelagius and Christian Initiation*.

able to realise his/her own salvation. According to this presentation of Pelagian teaching, emphasis was firmly placed on the potentialities of the will in the human struggle for perfection. As a consequence, Pelagians were accused of affirming only a *gratia adiuvans*. In addition, such grace was considered to be an "external" form of assistance whereby the Law, the Gospels and the example of Christ were 'offered' to the human person who was free to accept their assistance or reject it without restraint or hindrance[9]. At the same time it was argued that Pelagianism denied the dogma of original sin and its consequences for human nature[10], although it should be noted that prior to the time of Augustine and his colleagues[11] the ancient literature makes no reference to such a dogma, certainly not as it was proposed by the African bishops. Following Augustine's lead, furthermore, the Pelagians were accused of maintaining a theologically indefensible distinction between the Kingdom of God and eternal life[12]. Objections raged that the Pelagians were upholding a naturalistic image of the world and humanity in which the revelatory component was insufficiently represented[13]. Without questioning the value of a systematising condemnation of (non-existent but) potentially dangerous dogmatic propositions, it remains difficult nonetheless to avoid the conclusion that more than a few of the so-called heretical positions ascribed to Pelagianism came to be presented by other authors and at different times as completely legitimate and indeed as orthodox.

[9] One would be justified in asking the question at this juncture as to whether sufficient account has been taken of the fact that Pelagius and his followers located themselves explicitly in a context of faith from which they reflected on the potential of the human person.

[10] Cf. R. HEDDE & É. AMANN, *Pélagianisme*, in DThC 12,1: "Grande hérésie qui vit le jour en Occident au début du Ve siècle et qui, partant d'une exagération des forces du libre arbitre, aboutissait à nier la nécessité de la grâce divine, la transmission du péché originel, la distinction entre l'ordre naturel et l'ordre surnaturel", a perfect rendering of what can be found among dogmatic theologians.

[11] Let it be clear once and for all that Augustine was not present when Caelestius was condemned in 411 and that apparent unanimity existed within the African church, at least among the bishops, with regard to the dogma of the fall.

[12] For a survey see F. REFOULE, *La distinction "Royaume de Dieu-vie éternelle" est-elle pélagienne*, in *Recherches de Science religieuse* 51 (1963) 247-254, esp. 247-249.

[13] See the survey in WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustinus und Pelagius*, 189-190.

3. The Truth of the Historians and other Problems

Within the arena of patristic research in the last decennia, the traditional image of Pelagianism outlined above has been the subject of significant refinement at a variety of levels. At the same time, scholars have not hesitated to offer serious criticism of Augustine's vision of the fall, free will and grace[14]. In the space allotted to us we will endeavour to sketch a number of striking developments in scholarly research into the figure of Pelagius himself, particularly in light of the fact that much work has been done in this regard over the last 50 years that has led, at least where church historians are concerned, to a thorough modification of our perspective on a figure who had once been elevated to the status of western arch-heretic par excellence.

A. Pelagius

Born in Brittany[15], Pelagius was known from 380-410 primarily as a Christian ascetic and teacher. Active in Rome up to 410, he enjoyed great respect among Rome's aristocratic classes on account of his highly principled life style and his ethical demands with respect to life of a Christian[16]. He tended to place the emphasis on those ethical values that continued to enjoy significant respect in the aforementioned milieus and formulated critical observations concerning the fact that since 380 many had embraced Christianity for opportunistic reasons but were unwilling to take its demands seriously. It might be reasonable to argue that such criticism was not typical of Pelagius. Indeed, it remains possible that the same objections were likewise formulated by other authors of the period. The fact remains, however, that in light of similar emphases or on account of ideological presuppositions in the (recent) past Pelagius' work tended either to be generously extended or (hyper-)critically restricted[17]. As a conse-

[14] Restrained by the limits of the present contribution, we are unable to address this sometimes radical criticism of Augustine in greater detail. An interesting endeavour to offer a critical evaluation of Augustine's critics from the perspective of Augustine himself can be found in R. DODARO & G. LAWLESS (eds.), *Augustine and his Critics. Essays in honour of Gerald Bonner*, London & New York, 2000.

[15] Cf. AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 186,1, CSEL 57, p. 45.

[16] See in this regard esp. P. BROWN, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, London, 1972, pp. 183-226.

[17] A significant gulf exists between G. DE PLINVAL, *Recherches sur l'œuvre littéraire de Pélage*, in RPh 60 (1934) 9-42 and R.F. EVANS, *Four Letters of Pelagius*, London, 1968. The fact that a maximalist such as De Plinval was inclined to express

quence, and in spite of intensive research into the question of authenticity concerning Pelagius' writings, scholars still lack certainty in this regard[18]. It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that a not unimportant group of authors shared a similar intuition with respect to the earnestness with which the ethical demands of Christianity were being treated at the time. It should likewise be noted, albeit as an aside, that a reliable edition of Pelagius' commentary on the letters of Paul has only recently been placed at our disposal[19]. All this has led to the requirement that a significant number of ideas that have been ascribed to Pelagius on the basis of a broader understanding of the *corpus Pelagianum* deserve to be treated with the utmost prudence and that

severe critique of those tending more towards a restricted view such as T. BOHLIN, *Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis*, Uppsala & Wiesbaden, 1957, remains evident; cf. G. DE PLINVAL, *Points de vue récent sur la littérature pélagienne*, in RechSR 29 (1951) 282-294; cf. also the survey to be found in WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustinus und Pelagius*, 192-193. Evans's well documented restrictions were even considered by Wermelinger to be too broad still. He thus suggests that questions ought to be asked with respect to the attribution of the letters *Ad Celantiam*, *De divina lege*, and *Ad Claudiam* to Pelagius. The suggestion made by NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2915-2917 and WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustin und Pelagius*, 215 that the works *De divitiis*, *De malis doctoribus* and *De castitate* might be ascribed to the later bishop of Rome, Sixtus III, is rejected in the complex argumentation of A. KESSLER, *Reichtumskritik und Pelagianismus. Die pelagianische Diatribe de divitiis: Situierung, Lesetext, Übersetzung, Kommentar* (Paradosis. Beiträge zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur und Theologie, 43), Freiburg, 1999, 136-144. All three authors accept the fact that the authorship question cannot be settled once and for all on the basis of the material we have at our disposal. The present author is more interested in the observation that Sixtus was himself a supporter of Pelagius; cf. AUGUSTINUS, *Epistula* 191,1, CSEL 57, 164: "magni momenti *patronus* (= Sixtus)". The question of the actual author of the abovementioned corpus to one side, it remains true that the corpus in question reveals that we are dealing with a highly ascetic individual who, within Christianity, desired to inspire his audience to take his message seriously.

[18] Certitude exists only with respect to the commentary on Paul, the letter to Demetrias and the *Libellus fidei* (although the present author is inclined to have doubts in this regard, partly on account of the clear parallels with the *Libellus* of Caelestius) and a number of fragments including *De natura* en *Pro libero arbitrio*. See in this regard R.F. EVANS, *Pelagius. Inquiries and Reappraisals*, London, 1968; ID., *Four Letters of Pelagius*. Cf. also WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustinus und Pelagius*, passim and KESSLER, *Reichtumskritik und Pelagianismus*, p. 8.

[19] Cf. FREDE, *Ein neuer Paulustext und Kommentar*. Manuscripts regularly appear with respect to other Pelagian documents which claim to provide a better and/or more complete text. See, for example, H.J. FREDE, U. FRÖHLICH & H. STANJEK, *Vetus Latina-Fragmente zum Alten Testament. Die pelagianische Epistula ad quandam matronam christianam*, Freiburg, 1996.

those documents adjudged to be authentically Pelagian should be employed with the necessary critical distance.[20] At the same time, one should account for the possibility that propositions designated as Pelagian on account of their parallel concerns, e.g. for the poor, may not indeed be deserving of such title[21]. It remains somewhat bizarre to have to observe that the idea that concern for the poor, as formulated in the *Corpus Caspari*[22], has been ascribed the label Pelagian, while the situation in Sicily at the time, in which the gulf between the rich and the poor was enormous, clearly justified a special concern for the fate of the poor and a bitter critique of the vast wealth of a few rich families[23].

It has become clear in the meantime that in both his commentaries on the letters of Paul, written prior to the eruption of the Pelagian controversy[24], and in his other writings Pelagius desired to distance himself as an orthodox Christian from significant heterodox movements of his time, including Arianism, Manicheism and the positions adopted by Jovianus[25]. It was his resistance to the second of

[20] It is clear that Pelagius' text was later reworked to appear more "Pelagian" or indeed more "anti-Augustinian" than the author originally intended!

[21] See the study of KESSLER, *Reichtumskritik und Pelagianismus*, 6ff. Even the distinction between Pelagic (works ascribed to Pelagius) and Pelagian (works of Pelagius' disciples and sympathisers) that has become the custom since G. GRESHAKE, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit. Eine Untersuchung zur Gnadenlehre des Pelagius*, Mainz, 1972, has been a source of difficulty in this regard: how can one speak with certainty of sympathy for Pelagius if one is obliged to agree that such depends on ideological presuppositions and not on attested facts?

[22] Julian's concern for the poor is explicitly mentioned in relation to his Pelagian sympathies; cf. GENNADIUS *De viris illustribus* 46. The idea that concern for the poor might be an expression of genuine Christian engagement would appear to have been ignored.

[23] Cf. J.N.L. MYRES, *Pelagius and the End of Roman Rule in Britain*, in JRS 50 (1960) 21-36; J. MORRIS, *Pelagian Literature*, in JTS NS XVI (1965) 26-60. Critical observations, especially with regard to the British roots of Pelagianism, have been formulated by W. LIEBESCHUETZ, *Did the Pelagian Movement have Social Aims?*, in *Historia* 12 (1963) 227-241; ID., *Pelagian Evidence on the Last Period of Roman Britain?*, in *Latomus* 26 (1967) 436-447.

[24] In regard to the rediscovery of Paul and the complex problems associated therewith (among others the dialogue with classical culture), see the documented study of J. TAUER, *Neue Orientierungen zur Paulusexegese des Pelagius*, in Augustinianum 34 (1994) 313-358.

[25] Cf. T. BOHLIN, *Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis*, Uppsala & Wiesbaden, 1957; cf. also G. BONNER, *How Pelagian was Pelagius? An Examination of the Contentions of Torgny Bohlin*, in *Studia Patristica IX. Papers presented to the Fourth International Conference on Patristic Studies held at Christ Church*, Oxford 1963 (Texte und Untersuchungen, 94), Berlin, 1966, p. 350-358 (Reprint in ID., *Church and Faith in the Patristic Tradition. Augustine, Pelagianism, and Early Christian Northumbria*, Aldershot, 1996 [3rd study]); GRESHAKE, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit*, 27ff.

the aforementioned movements that ultimately explains his emphasis on the existence of free will: he considered Manichean determinism as a danger to authentic Christian ethics,which he maintained could only exist in so far as components such as freedom and responsibility were safeguarded.

Precisely because of the fact that he took such freedom and responsibility seriously, Pelagius thus insisted that the human person, who had received the *posse* from God, had a *duty* to live a life without sin. This need not imply that such de facto actually took place[26] – as noted above, the idea behind the *impeccantia*, so frequently ascribed to Pelagius and oft considered part of the evidence proving the arrogance of his teaching in this regard, was in fact based on the unjustified criticism of Jerome[27]. Based on his emphasis on human freedom and responsibility, Pelagius was forced to defend himself at a relatively early stage against the accusation that he had neglected God's grace[28], a charge that he continuously (and rightly) denied[29]. Indeed, it is possible to speak in this regard of a Pelagian theology of grace at the level of creation, revelation and forgiveness[30]. Although the highly

[26] Cf. in this regard Pelagius' commentary on Rom 6 in T. DE BRUYN, *Pelagius' Commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Translated with Introduction and Notes*, Oxford, 1993, pp. 96-100 together with the author's instructive remarks, esp. pp. 42-43.

[27] For the location of the terminology and the dogma see HIERONYMUS, *Dialogi contra Pelagianos* I,26, CCSL 80, p. 33; II,16, CCSL 80, p. 74; III,3, CCSL 80, p. 101; III,12, CCSL 80, p. 113. Cf. on this point Pelagius' position: *De natura et gratia* 44,52, CSEL 60, p. 271 and the commentary of Augustine: "Hoc et nos dicimus, iungamus dexteras". Pelagius explicitly stated in Diospolis, moreover, that he did believe in the theoretical possibility that human beings could act without sin, although he added that he had never met such a person; cf. AUGUSTINUS, *De gestis Pelagii*, 6,16, CSEL 42, 68-69. With respect to the importance of Jerome in the conceptualisation of Pelagius see, in particular, R.F. EVANS, *Pelagius, Fastidius, and the Pseudoaugustinian De Vita Christiana*, in JThS N.S. 13 (1962) 72-98; ID., *Pelagius' Veracity at the Synod of Diospolis*, in J. SOMMERFELDT (ed.), *Studies in Medieval Culture*, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1964, 21-30; ID., *Pelagius. Inquiries and Reappraisals*, London, 1968. A survey of points upon which the different parties *were in fact* in agreement within the Pelagian controversy as a whole would be of enormous value.

[28] Y.-M. DUVAL, *La date du "De natura" de Pélage. Les premières étapes de la controverse sur la nature de la grâce*, in REA 36 (1990) 257-283. Duval has convincingly argued that we should date this work around 407.

[29] Cf. in this regard G. GRESHAKE, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit*, chapter II: Die Gnadenlehre des Pelagius (pp. 47-157).

[30] In addition to the already mentioned study of Bohlin see especially GRESHAKE, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit*; GARCIA-SANCHEZ, *Pelagius and Christian Initiation*, 187-289; cf. also J. DEMPSEY, *Pelagius's Commentary on St. Paul*, Rome, 1937.

actualising study of Greshake has been the subject of a number of critical reviews – particularly on account of his intense critique of Augustine –, he still deserves credit for the fact that he endeavoured to, albeit in his own headstrong fashion, to read Pelagius through his own eyes[31], an exercise that established a definitive break with the vision of the latter's theology as lacking in grace[32].

J. Rivière pointed to the orthodox character of Pelagius' Christology[33], while Greshake[34] made it clear that the *Christus exemplum* hypothesis involved more than a mere "external" following of Christ's example[35]. Where Augustine was to place the emphasis in the discussion with the Pelagians on the importance of infant baptism as argument for the fact that salvation is only possible via Christ and as proof that every person is born with original sin, Pelagius wanted to speak about and address himself to adults in his theological and liturgical propositions. As a matter of fact, prior to the outbreak of the controversy, it was still relatively unproblematic and in line with the tradition to refer to the importance of baptism for adults. Baptism was considered a break with the old, the beginning of new life, enlightenment, unification with Christ etc.[36]

With respect to peripheral accusations such as the distinction between the Kingdom of God and eternal life mentioned above, it has been satisfactorily proven that this distinction stems in its formulation from Augustine and is nowhere to be found in Pelagius[37].

Pelagius desired to live his Christian ideals as an ascetic within the Church. The familiar adage *Extra ecclesiam salus non est*: salvation in Christ is only offered within the Church as mediating instance. It is only if one neglects or ignores this fundamental fact that

[31] Cf. G. DE PLINVAL, *L'heure est-elle venue de redécouvrir Pélage?*, in *REA* 19 (1973) 158-162; A. ZUMKELLER, *Neuinterpretation oder Verzeichnung der Gnadenlehre des Pelagius und seines Gegners Augustinus*, in *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974) 209-226.

[32] See in this regard also E.D. LAVENDER, *The Development of Pelagius' Thought within a Late Fourth Century Ascetic Movement in Rome*, Saint Louis, 1991.

[33] Cf. J. RIVIÈRE, *Hétérodoxie des pélagiens en fait de rédemption?*, in *RHE* 41 (1946) 5-43; cf. also J.MCW. DEWART, *The Christology of the Pelagian Controversy*, in *Studia Patristica* 17,3, Oxford, 11982, 1221-1244.

[34] *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit*, 124-125.

[35] Cf. also W. GEERLINGS, *Christus Exemplum. Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins* (Tübinger theologische Studien, 13), Mainz, 1978, 216.

[36] Cf. GARCIA-SANCHEZ, *Pelagius and Christian Initiation*, esp. chapter IV.

[37] See REFOULE, *La distinction "Royaume de Dieu-vie éternelle" est-elle pélagienne*, 253-254.

one is able, albeit without justification, to accuse him of having placed too much emphasis on the personal potential of the human person. While it is evident that for Pelagius the sanctity of the Church as *corpus Christi* was related in essence to the sanctity of its members, a sanctity that was conceived of as dynamic, it must be stated nevertheless that the virtue of humility had an important role to play in the struggle to attain such sanctity on account of one's recognition of one's personal limitations[38]. Commentators have rightly emphasised the fact that Pelagius also distanced himself in his writings from the Novatian idea of Christians as *perfecti*[39], which need not imply that the grace of baptism does not involve ethical obligations on the part of the human person: the sanctity of the Church is also a task of the faithful[40].

The final (theological) curtain fell for Pelagius in 418 with the condemnation issued by the emperor (30th April 418), by the African bishops (1st May 418) and, under pressure, confirmed by Zosimus in his *Epistula Tractoria*. Genuinely desiring to be a true believer, Pelagius had explicitly stated to Augustine, nevertheless, that he himself condemned all those who maintained that God's grace was not necessary for every human act[41], but the *Doctor gratiae* was not very gracious. Pelagius was forced to leave Palestine. It is probable that he moved to Egypt at this juncture[42].

[38] See S. THIER, *Kirche bei Pelagius* (Patristische Texte und Studien, 50), Berlin & New York, 1999. In the present author's opinion, this study, as with that of Garcia-Sanchez, offers convincing arguments against the old idea that Pelagius considered the Church to be redundant as salvific gift; see in this regard the survey of WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustin und Pelagius*, 193-194.

[39] GARCIA-SANCHEZ, *Pelagius and Christian Initiation*, 104-116.

[40] GARCIA-SANCHEZ, *Pelagius and Christian Initiation*, 161-170, esp. p. 169: "If a Christian thinks that he can be a member of Christ's Church without bearing the fruits of holiness, he is not worthy of such membership. To be a member of Christ means to imitate Christ; Christians must bear fruits of mutual love, as Christ loved his Church."

[41] Cf. AUGUSTINUS, *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* II,2, CSEL 42, p. 125: "Anathemo qui vel sentit vel dicit gratiam Dei, qua Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere, non solum per singulas horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam; et qui hanc conantur auferre poenas sortiantur aeternas."

[42] *Collectio Avellana*, *Epistula* 49, CSEL 35, 113-115.

B. *Caelestius*[43]

Several studies tend to refer to Pelagius and Caelestius in one and the same breath. Scholars are even inclined to suggest that Caelestius, who would appear to have been much more combative than Pelagius[44], certainly in the Pelagian controversy, was in part responsible for the negative image associate with the latter. It remains a pity, therefore, that so little is known with respect to Caelestius[45]. Although he appears in many respects to have been more belligerent during the Pelagian controversy, very little of his writings as a whole have survived to the present day[46]. This might perhaps serve to explain why we had to wait until 1994 before an exhaustive systematic study of Caelestius saw the light of day[47]. This study carefully brings together all the "confirmed" data relating to Caelestius' life and offers, in addition, a detailed analysis of his trial in Carthage in 411. The potential relationship between Pelagius and Caelestius is likewise carefully considered. The frequently employed image of master and pupil is presented in a nuanced fashion and the differences between the two figures are charted with precision. Honnay argues, by way of conclusion, that each figure should be ascribed his own responsibility in the context of the Pelagian controversy and that the contribution of Pelagius should not be glossed over at the expense of Caelestius.

Based on the small amount of material that has been preserved[48], one can determine that Caelestius had probably expressed his

[43] For an introduction see G. BONNER, *Caelestius*, in *Augustinus Lexikon* I/5-6, Basel, 1992, 693-698. The best evaluation in terms of content based on a thorough study of the sources and of recent literature can be found in G. HONNAY, *Caelestius, Discipulus Pelagii*, in *Augustiniana* 44 (1994) 271-302. Honnay also subjects a number of "certainties" with respect to Caelestius to critical analysis!

[44] Caelestius, not Pelagius, desired to be ordained priest in Carthage (he was ultimately ordained in the East); Pelagius distanced himself (briefly) from Caelestius during the proceedings at Diospolis; Caelestius, not Pelagius, presented himself in person in Rome in 418 to defend his cause. As a matter of fact Caelestius continued to defend his case up to the Council of Ephesus.

[45] With respect to this figure and the potential attribution of works thereto see G. HONNAY, *Caelestius, Discipulus Pelagii*, in Augustiniana 44 (1994) 271-302.

[46] See NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2893-2895; WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen*, p. 205.

[47] HONNAY, *Caelestius, Discipulus Pelagii*. Honnay engages in the discussion in an intelligent manner based on all the relevant literature. The most relevant literature relating to Caelestius has been assembled once again in M. LAMBERIGTS *Caelestius*, in A.D. FITZGERALD, *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, Grand Rapids-Cambridge, 1999, pp. 114-115.

[48] See NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2893-2895.

critique of the idea of a *tradux peccati* at a relatively early stage in a no longer extant opus[49], although Pelagius, long before the controversy, had likewise been critical of Augustine's positions, his *De natura* having already been written in 405/7. Differences between the two, however, can also be established with certainty. Based on what has survived of his *Definitiones* one is left with the impression that Caelestius, far more than Pelagius, placed the emphasis on the freedom of the will and that hamartiology and soteriology had thus acquired a more evidently background position in his regard. This might partly explain why Pelagius distanced himself from[50] at Diospolis (415), where he was acquitted[51]. In light of the *Libellus fidei* of both Pelagius and Caelestius, this distancin apparently did not last very long.

C. *Iulian of Aeclanum*

Renewed interest has also been evident in recent years for Julian of Aeclanum[52]. As was the case with respect to Pelagius, a number of commentaries on the Scriptures have been ascribed to Julian in the 20th century. Before exploring this fact in more detail, it seems appropriate to note at this juncture that Julian was in several respects more important than some of his predecessors in the context of the Pelagian controversy. Indeed he engaged in discussion with Augustine in a much more direct and thorough manner. The extent to which fragments and larger segments of his work have survived to the present day remains exceptionally good. Indeed, chapters I-VI of *Ad*

[49] Cf. *Praedestinatus* 88, PL 53, 618.

[50] Cf. THIER, *o.c.*, p. 323. The extent to which such distancing can be considered authentic is open to discussion; cf. EVANS, *Veracity*, esp. pp. 28-29. WERMELINGER, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustin und Pelagius*, 212 is of the opinion, however, that Evans attaches too much faith on this point to Augustine's vision and concludes: „Die Anklage selbst beweist noch nicht, dass Pelagius der Verfasser dieser Schriften ist. (...) Wir können auch hier sagen, der Beweis für die Unehrlichkeit des Pelagius ist noch nicht erbracht." Cf. also his thorough examination of Pelagius' attitude in Diospolis in his work *Rom und Pelagius*, 79-81.

[51] It is striking that the "Pelagians" also argued their case in the East (e.g. with Nestorius) or, as was the case with respect to Julian of Aeclanum, sought refuge with critics of Jerome such as Theodore of Mopsuestia. See in this regard M. LAMBERIGTS, *Les évêques pélagiens déposés, Nestorius et Ephèse*, in *Augustiniana* 35 (1985) 264-280 (with additional literature).

[52] For a further study of Julian's life and work see the recent survey of M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julianus von Aeclanum*, in *RAC*; J. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 60), Leiden, Boston & Köln, 2001.

Florum have survived in their entirety thanks to Augustine's Opus imperfectum, in which the latter exhaustively quotes the position of his adversary before formulating his counter arguments[53]. The punctuation of the text-critical edition of M. Zelzer makes this crystal clear. One can easily follow where Augustine interrupts his own line of thought and hands the floor to his adversaries etc.[54] For the Pelagian controversy, A. Bruckner's study served for decades as the point of departure for virtually every survey relating to research into Julian of Aeclanum[55]. Bruckner's work remains interesting on account of the fact that it offers a good survey of the source material employed by the author, although it has been surpassed at a variety of levels by the above mentioned work of J. Lössl. This has to do with new discoveries.

Indeed, after the publication of Bruckner's research, the number of works that scholars were inclined to ascribe to Julian grew dramatically. In 1913, for example, G. Morin proposed Julian as the author of a *Tractatus prophetarum Osee, Iohel et Amos*[56]. According to Morin, the three commentaries had once belonged to a larger, more complete commentary dealing with all twelve of the minor prophets. In 1915 A. Vaccari published a work in which he claimed to be able to prove that a certain *Expositio libri Job* had been written by Julian of Aeclanum. Vaccari based himself for the most part on philological arguments (together with content based arguments in which he

[53] Such a way of acting was unique in the ancient world and reveals the seriousness with which Augustine took the criticism of his opponents to heart. Further evidence of Augustine's behaviour can be derived from Julian's critique that the former had misrepresented texts from *Ad Turbantium* in his *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II. Augustine was reacting in fact to a summary of Julian's work that had been sent to him from Italy. When he was finally able to read *Ad Turbantium* in its entirety he recognised that he had not always represented Julian's positions in an adequate manner. While *Contra Iulianum* was thus intended to serve as an exhaustive response to Julian, it remains impossible to determine whether Julian ever had the chance to read it.

[54] M. ZELZER (ed.), *Aurelius Augustinus, Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* (CSEL 85,1), Vienna, 1974. For a critical review of this edition see A. PRIMMER, *Textvorschläge zu Augustinus Opus imperfectum*, in *Latinität und alte Kirche*. Festschrift für R. Hanslik zum 70. Geburtstag (Wiener Studien, Beiheft 8), Vienna- Cologne-Graz, 1977, pp. 235-250. For the remainder of the work we continue to be indebted to the edition in *Patrologia Latina*. It is interesting to note that Augustine apparently reacted with less haste in books V and VI, only to give the floor to Julian more extensively (especially in book VI), without interrupting him immediately, as had been the case in e.g. book I.

[55] *Julian von Eclanum. Sein Leben und seine Lehre*, Leipzig, 1897.

[56] For a critical text edition see L. DE CONINCK & J. D'HONT, *CCSL* 88.

claimed to be able to determine the presence of Pelagian ideas)[57]. Both attributions were positively received[58]. Vaccari was less successful in 1916 when he claimed to have discovered a commentary on the Psalms written by Julian[59]. R. Devreesse made it quite clear that the segment of this work that had been preserved *in extenso* (Pss. I-XVI) was in fact a translation of the work of Theodore, a translation that could be ascribed nevertheless to Julian (one should not forget that Julian spent a period of time with Theodore of Mopsuestia and that he may well have occupied himself with such a translation during his "idle" moments)[60]. The so-called *Epitomè*, ascribed by Bouwman[61] to Julian himself, was more problematic since several recent authors were inclined to prefer to ascribe it to a later summariser of the translation of Julian[62]. While degrees of dependence on Julian at the literary level and at the level of content can be established, the final result ultimately belongs to the history of reception.

Although there would appear to be a level of consensus on Julian authorship with respect to the attribution of exegetical works, recent research has led, nevertheless, to an ever growing unanimity that another work, ascribed by some to the bishop of Aeclanum, should be removed from his list of publications. Indeed, consensus would appear to have been reached, in my opinion prematurely, that

[57] A. VACCARI, *Un commento a Giobbe di Giuliano di Eclana*, Rome, 1915.

[58] With one exception, namely J. STIGLMAYR, *Der Jobkommentar von Monte Cassino*, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 43 (1919) 269-288. On both formal and content based grounds Stiglmayr maintained that Julian could not be the author of the work in question. In his study *Il Commento Cassinense di Giobbe*, in *Miscellanea Amelli*, Badia di Montecassino, 1920, pp. 43-51 Vaccari offers a detailed counter-attack to Stiglmayr's criticisms. For a reaction see J. STIGLMAYR, *Zum Jobkommentar von Monte Cassino*, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 45 (1921) 495-496. The present author is of the opinion that a systematic response to Stiglmayr's objections has still to be written.

[59] A. VACCARI, *Nuova opera di Giuliano Eclanense*, in *Civiltà Cattolica* 67 (1916) 578-593.

[60] Cf. R. DEVREESSE, *Le commentaire de Théodore de Mopsueste sur les Psaumes*, in *Rbibl* 37 (1928) 340-366; 38 (1929) 35-62.

[61] G. BOUWMAN, *Des Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar zu den Propheten Osee, Joël und Amos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Exegese*, Rome, 1958, pp. 10-11. Bouwman's study is of particular importance with respect to the exegetical part of Julian's work; see also his *Zum Wortschatz des Julian von Aeclanum*, in *ALMA* 27 (1957) 141-164.

[62] DE CONINCK, p. XXV-XXXVI; I.-M. DUVAL, *Iulianus Aeclanensis restitutus. La première édition "incomplète" de l'œuvre de Julien d'Eclane*, in *Revue des Études augustiniennes* 25 (1979) 162-170.

the *Libellus fidei* is not by Julian of Aeclanum[63]. If I use the word premature it is because of the fact that to the present day no single systematic comparison of the authentic works of Julian with the aforementioned *Libellus fidei* has been made[64]. It remains interesting to note, nevertheless, that if the authorship of the said work is to be located in Northern Italy then the level of opposition with respect to African perspectives must likely have been much greater than scholars are sometimes inclined to think.

In spite of the fact that the source material for prospective Julian authorship increased spectacularly in the first quarter of the 20th century, the scholarly world had to wait until the 1950's before this part of his work was given due attention, namely in the studies of Baxter[65] and Bouwman[66]. Both authors focused their attention of use of terminology as a means whereby a degree of certainty could be acquired with respect to the Julian authorship of certain works. Their research (together with that of Vaccari and Morin) made it clear that Julian's Latin was somewhat technical and that he had a preference for the use of substantives (with particular preference for fourth declension words)[67]. Scholars also observed a preference for abstract terms as well as the frequent use of the supina on ire etc. Without going into detail, however[68], it ought to be noted that this approach to the question of disputed authorship did not account for a great deal of progress and that the wholesale attribution of all sorts of works to Julian, an approach in which Bouwman in particular would appear to have excelled, did not gain much in the way of scholarly acceptance[69].

[63] Cf. BRUCKNER, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 31-33, NUVOLONE; *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2907; LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 12-13.

[64] This need not imply that the present author is convinced by Bouwman's arguments (*Des Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, pp. 2-5) with respect to the potential authorship of Julian, only that he is of the opinion that serious research in this regard remains an urgent desideratum. While WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius*, pp. 220-226 offers an initial step in this direction, he does not solve all of the problems; cf. J. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, p. 13. Lössl is likewise unsuccessful in introducing new elements on this point. It thus remains unclear why one should ascribe less weight to philological arguments than to historical ones. A whole series of text-critical problems are raised but this does not constitute a thorough "evaluation" of the manuscripts.

[65] J.H. BAXTER, *Notes on the Latin of Julian of Eclanum*, in *ALMA* 21 (1951) 5-54.

[66] G. BOUWMAN, *Zum Wortschatz des Julian von Aeclanum*, in *ALMA* 27 (1957) 141-164.

[67] BOUWMAN, *Des Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, pp. 31ff.

[68] See in this regard LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 94-101.

[69] See also in this regard the highly critical review of D. DE PLINVAL, *Julien*

A different sort of interest in Julian's use of terminology can be found in the text-critical editions. Both Zelzer[70] (although more in the context of her edition of Augustine) and De Coninck have shown a great deal interest in Julian's use of words. While Zelzer's edition in particular was subject to serious critical review[71], observations concerning the edition of De Coninck tended rather to be marginal. Detailed and thorough studies of Julian's commentaries on the Scriptures had to wait until the 1990's and the beginning of the new millennium. I. Strobl devoted a fairly comprehensive study to Julian's commentary on the prophet Joel[72]. A broader study of Julian's exegesis can be found, however, in the fifth chapter of the abovementioned work of J. Lössl (pp. 147-249)[73]. Lössl's volume together with a number of articles in journals[74], correctly focuses attention on the exegesis of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Lössl likewise endeavours to locate Julian's exegesis more clearly in the context of the history of western exegesis as a whole, particularly by comparing it with that of major figures such as Augustine and Jerome. Lössl's research makes it clear that a great deal of unexplored territory exists with respect to the Julian's exegetical works.

It would be difficult to say the same with respect to the works in so far as they are directly related to the controversy with Augustine. At the beginning of the 1960's several interesting studies were published in short succession in this regard. F. Clodius offered an analysis of the vision of Julian of Aeclanum and of Augustine of Hippo with respect to freedom of the will, grace and their relationship with one another[75]. F. Perago explored the points of discussion that had arisen between

d'Eclane devant la Bible, in *Recherches de science religieuse* 47 (1959) 345-366, which offers particular critique on the level of attribution.

[70] M. ZELZER (ed.), *Aurelius Augustinus, Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum.*

[71] A. PRIMMER, *Textvorschläge zu Augustinus Opus imperfectum* and ID., *Rhythmus- und Textprobleme in Aug. Op. Imperf.* 1-3, in *Wiener Studien* NS 9 (1975) 186-212; 11 (1977) 182-218.

[72] I. STROBL, *Eine Untersuchung zum Verständnis alttestamentlicher Prophetie anhand des Julian von Aeclanum zugeschriebenen Kommentars zum Propheten Joël*, Vienna, 1991.

[73] An essential orientating summary is lacking at the end of this otherwise detailed study.

[74] Cf. his studies *Julian of Aeclanum's Tractatus in Osee, Iohel, Amos*, in *Augustiniana* 51 (2001) 5-31; ID., *A shift in Patristic Exegesis. Hebrew Clarity and Historical Verity in Augustine, Jerome, Julian of Aeclanum and Theodore of Mopsuestia*, in *Augustinian Studies* 32 (2001) 157-175.

[75] Reference should be made for this survey to F. CLODIUS, *El libre albedrío según Julian de Eclano*, in *Anales de la Facultad de Teologia* 14 (1962) 99-134.

Augustine and Julian with respect to the questions of justice, values and the salvation of the pagans. His work emphasised that two understandings of nature (one based on grace the other departing from the Stoic notion of the unblemished nature of the human person) were in fact irreconcilable76. Of great interest was the discussion that arose between F. Refoulé[77] and F.-J. Thonnard. In a two volume study Refoulé had pointed, on the one hand, to the Aristotelian roots of Julian's philosophical thought patterns while suggesting, on the other hand, that Julian should be seen as a forerunner of Thomas Aquinas. Refoulé's contentions concerning the relationship between Julian and Aristotelian thought were based on a suggestion already made by Bruckner[78]. Refoulé was severely criticised by Thonnard, who argued that Julian's philosophical perspectives should be seen against the background of his controversy with Augustine[79]. For Thonnard, Julian was an eclectic who employed his knowledge in a polemical fashion in order to force Augustine into an awkward predicament[80].

The first attempt at a theological synthesis was made by E.S.P. Jones[81] who studied Julian's theology from the following perspectives: God's justice, humanity, integrity and as saviour of the world[82]. While

[76] F. PERAGO, *Il valore della tradizione nella polemica tra S. Agostino e Giuliano d'Eclano*, in *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell' Università di Napoli* 10 (1962/1963) 143-160.

[77] F. REFOULE, *Julien d'Éclane, théologien et philosophe*, in *Recherches de science religieuse* 54 (1964) 42-84; 233-247.

[78] BRUCKNER, *Julian von Eclanum*, pp. 90ff. Bruckner's suggestion is interesting in the sense that he thereby deviated from the conventional opinion that Julian's teaching was profoundly Stoic; cf. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, p. 101 for this widely held opinion. As we shall indicate further below, we are inclined to support the idea that Julian should be taken seriously as a theologian and believer.

[79] F-J. THONNARD, *L'aristotélisme de Julien d'Éclane et de Saint Augustin*, in *REA* 11 (1965) 296-304.

[80] Thorough research into Julian's philosophical sources has shown in the meantime that one should first look to Cicero in this regard and that Julian's philosophical knowledge rarely if ever extends beyond that which can be found therein; cf. LAMBERIGTS, *Iulianus von Eclanum*; M. STEIN, *Bemerkungen zu Iulianus von Aeclanum*, in *JAC* 43 (2000) 122-125 for confirmation of this hypothesis. The present author is of the opinion, moreover, that the word eclectic is often taken unnecessarily as a negative determination: every period either consciously or unconsciously adopts a number of the insights of the preceding period without the need of a thorough familiarity therewith.

[81] E.S.P. JONES, *Julian, Bishop of Aeclanum. Exegete and Theologian* (unpublished doctoral dissertation), Saint Andrews, 1965.

[82] With regard to the question of justice see also V. PERAGO, *Una "querelle" del V secolo sulla giustizia, la virtù, la salvezza degli infideli*, in *Asprenas* 9 (1962) 32-40.

this study, which incidentally was never published and thus did not receive the attention it ultimately deserved, was a serious attempt to render Julian's vision in an objective manner, it remains subject nonetheless to a number of prejudices, particularly with respect to its judgement of Augustine.

Based in part on the outline established by Wermelinger, an ever increasing interest has become evident since the 1980's in Julian's own perspectives on a variety of matters. N. Cipriani, for example, has published an elaborate study focusing on Julian as a man of letters, especially in his work *Ad Florum*[83]. In an exemplary study, P. Brown has highlighted the difference between Julian and Augustine with respect to their knowledge of medicine, especially in relation to human sexuality[84]. An original contribution going into considerable detail on Julian's understanding of human pain was published recently by J. Lössl based on the author's thorough study of the sources.[85] E. Clark has made it clear how a difference in their appreciation of corporeality can explain the profound gulf between Augustine and Julian with respect to sexuality in marriage[86]. Clark rightly notes that for Julian sexual desire is a necessary prerequisite for bringing the natural goal of marriage to completion, namely in procreation[87]. Although theological concepts were never completely absent from the aforementioned studies, they have nevertheless received a more systematic treatment in the publications of McGrath, Lamberigts and Barclift. In an otherwise rather programmatic contribution McGrath turns the reader's attention to differences in perspective with respect to the question of justice[88]. In a series of

[83] N. CIPRIANI, *Aspetti letterari dell'Ad Florum di Giuliano d'Eclano*, in *Augustinianum* 15 (1975) 125-167.

[84] P. BROWN, *Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century*, in E. GABBA (ed.), *Tria Corda. Scritti in onore di A. Momigliano*, Como, 1983, pp. 49-70.

[85] J. LÖSSL, *Julian of Aeclanum on Pain*, in *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 10 (2002) 203-243.

[86] E.A. CLARK, *Adam's Only Companion. Augustine and the Early Christian Debate on Marriage*, in *Recherches augustiniennes* 21 (1986) 139-162.

[87] E.A. CLARK, *Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels. Augustine's Manichaean Past*, in ID, *Ascetic Piety and Woman's Faith. Essays on Late Ancient Christianity*, Lewiston, 1986, pp. 291-349.

[88] A.E. MCGRATH, *Divine Justice and Divine Equity in the Controversy between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum*, in *Downside Review* 101 (1983) 312-319. It is the present author's opinion that this study devotes too little systematic attention to the biblical basis upon which Julian founded his vision of justice. By basing his concept of justice on "to each his due" Julian's biblical dossier was clearly more significant than scholars have maintained. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 130ff. could likewise have been more detailed in this regard.

articles, Lamberigts has given pride of place to the importance of Julian's concept of God as the basis for his theological convictions. Julian's detailed arguments favour the divinity of the creator who stands as guarantor for the goodness of creation[89]. God's goodness comes to the fore in an eminent fashion in the creation of a good soul in the birth of every newborn infant[90]. Given the fact that the ethical behaviour of the human person is to be situated for Julian precisely on the level of the soul, the notion of inherited sin in newborn infants is for him unthinkable and indeed incomprehensible. Such would imply, as a matter of fact, that God himself as creator would have to be considered responsible for the sin and guilt present in the soul. Rooted in his belief in the personal responsibility for his or her ethical of every human being, Julian is unable to accept, in part on account of his vision of justice, that everyone since Adam has been born in guilt and that Adam's sin is the sole and exclusive reason for this fact. For Julian, Adam is nothing more than a "homo olim defunctus"[91]. Indeed, for Julian, sin has to do in essence with one's personal moral life: sin is to be located at the level of the human will and cannot affect or harm the nature of the human person as he/she appears as a created being[92]. As a consequence of this perspective, Julian's allusions to grace, a concept that received significant attention in his works, came to be given a different and far from dull interpretation when compared with Augustine[93]. Clearly indignant about the fact that such a serious matter could not be raised as the subject of a synod, Julian was likewise convinced that, based in part on literature from the east[94], the Church was under threat from Manicheism. He was severely irritated by the fact that Zosimus had changed his opinion concerning the Pelagians, a criticism that compelled Augustine to prefer to allude to

[89] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum: A Plea for a Good Creator*, in *Augustiniana* 38 (1988) 5-24.

[90] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Eclanum and Augustine on the Origin of the Soul*, in *Augustiniana* 46 (1996) 243-260.

[91] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julien d'Eclane et Augustin d'Hippone: deux conceptions d'Adam*, in *Augustiniana* 40 (1990) 393-435.

[92] P.L. BARCLIFT, *In Controversy with Saint Augustine: Julian of Eclanum on the Nature of Sin*, in *RTAM* 58 (1991) 5-20.

[93] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum on Grace. Some Considerations*, in *Studia Patristica* 27 (1993) 342-349.

[94] N. CIPRIANI, *L'Autore dei testi pseudobasiliani riportati nel C. Iulianum (I,16-17) e la polemica agostiniana di Giuliano d'Eclano, in Congresso internationale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione (Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986). Atti I. Cronaca del Congresso. Sessioni generali. Sezione di Studi I.* (Studia Ephemeridis "Augustinianum", 24), Rome, 1987, pp. 439-449.

Innocent in his reactions rather than to Zosimus[95].

An endeavour to offer a synthesis with respect to Julian of Aeclanum has recently been published by J. Lössl[96]. After a detailed introductory survey, the study offers an profound contribution with respect to Julian's life, formation, and intellectual profile. As we noted above, a great deal of attention is focused on Julian's exegetical works. The study gives evidence of a significant knowledge of the literature and a thorough mastery thereof. The apparent need for further analysis of Julian's exegetical works has been addressed by the author's more recent publications in this regard. While we highly recommend this work, one, albeit minor reservation cannot be avoided. It would appear that the author has not offered a systematic analysis of Julian of Aeclanum's theology as expressed in the context of his controversy with Augustine[97].

By way of conclusion it seems appropriate that we should underline the fact that Julian's position in the controversy differed considerably from that of Pelagius on several levels. Julian focused more attention on marriage and *concupiscentia*, dealt in greater detail with the question of justice, reflected more extensively on the human nature of Christ and its relationship with our own nature and devoted a great deal of his energy to the Genesis narrative. The present author is likewise convinced that Julian was less interested in the ascetic aspects of Christian life. This fact is probably related, at least in part, to his theological point of departure, namely his desire (more intense than Pelagius) to contest the theological convictions of Augustine. Nevertheless, the very magnitude of Julian's surviving works makes him, in our opinion, the most interesting participant in the controversy, although this cannot be the reason why he was canonised for a short period...[98].

D. *Other figures*

We noted above that Caelestius referred to Rufinus the Syrian when he was asked about possible opponents of the *tradux peccati*

[95] M. LAMBERIGTS, *Augustine and Julian of Aeclanum on Zosimus*, in *Augustiniana* 42 (1992) 311-330.

[96] LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*.

[97] Lössl is well aware of this fact and is currently preparing a monograph in collaboration with the present author in which this problem will be studied in greater detail.

[98] H.-I. MARROU, *La canonisation de Julien d'Eclane*, in *Historisches Jahrbuch* 77 (1958) 434-437 (= *Patristique et humanisme* (Patristica Sorbonensia, 9)), Paris, 1975, pp. 373-377.

dogma. Both Pelagius and Caelestius sought refuge via Africa in the East after their departure from Italy. Pelagius spent a period of time with John of Jerusalem and was deemed orthodox by the bishops assembled in Diospolis. Caelestius received in Ephesus what had been refused him in Africa, namely priestly ordination. After being exiled from Italy he sought refuge in the East and was well received, at least for a time, by Nestorius[99]. He continued to hope to the last that the emperor in Constantinople would rehabilitate him and his supporters. Points of contact can also be established with respect to Julian of Aeclanum. His presumed father-in-law, Aemilius of Beneventum[100], was sent together with Gaudentius of Brescia[101] to the East in an attempt to rehabilitate John Chrysostom. Julian himself likewise endeavoured to convince Rufus of Thessalonica to support his cause[102]. After his departure from Italy he spent a period of time in Sicily with Theodore of Mopsuestia. Together with Caelestius he endeavoured to argue his case with Nestorius in Constantinople but he and his supporters were ultimately refused a hearing in Ephesus and the curtain finally fell on the drama[103].

[99] LAMBERIGTS, *Les évêques pélagiens déposés, Nestorius et Ephèse*, offers a survey of the sources.

[100] For family relationships see J.A. BOUMA, *Het Epithalamium van Paulinus van Nola*, Assen, 1968; LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, p. 56ff.

[101] See Ch. & L. PIETRI, *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire. 2. Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne* (313-604), Rome, 1999, s.v. Gaudence de Brescia.

[102] Cf. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 290-292.

[103] LAMBERIGTS, *Les évêques pélagiens déposés, Nestorius et Ephèse*, pp. 279-280. The present author continues to be intrigued by the fact that someone like Marius Mercator has endeavoured to connect Julian, Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia with one another. In the aforementioned study I suggest that Julian did not play a significant role in Ephesus (if indeed he was present there) and that he was thus reduced to a figure *in margine* thereafter. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, p. 318, n. 387 questions this suggestion without offering serious arguments in support of his doubts: „Darauf dass Julian zumindest im Umfeld des Konzils von Ephesus eine aktive Rolle spielte, lässt sich also aus einer Reihe von Indizien (for one of the indications Lössl appeals to Coelestinus of Rome; the only certainty in this matter is that Coelestinus was not present at Ephesus; the attribution of a greater knowledge of events to him than to those present at the council seems untenable) schließen. Gleichzeitig fehlt es jedoch … an Quellen". The source material (which is not the same as learned suspicion) does not offer sufficient basis for ascribing an active role to Julian at Ephesus. If Julian and his followers had been so well received in the East how must we explain why he asked Sixtus (a former Pelagian sympathiser) to be reinstated in the Western Church. We likewise find it impossible to understand why Lössl proposes that Julian was indeed (potentially) present at Ephesus on the basis of *absence*. The fact remains that the group surrounding John as well as that surrounding Cyrillus accused the opposing party of the fact that they included Caelestiani among their ranks. If we were

All by all, it is somewhat surprising that a systematic study of reciprocal points of contact with the Eastern part of the empire remains lacking to the present day, at least with respect to the Pelagian controversy. It would be of considerable value in this regard if a systematic study were to be devoted, for example, to Anianus of Celada[104]. Indeed, based on documents written by Pelagius himself, Anianus appears to have already reacted around 414/417 to Jerome's attack on Pelagius in *Epistula ad Ctesiphontem*. Anianus appears likewise to have supported Pelagius at Diospolis. While he was to distance himself, in line with Pelagius, from the propositions condemned at Diospolis, this did not prevent him from attacking Jerome who was later to ask Augustine to respond to the attack. The same Anianus was to translate the works of John Chrysostom apparently on behalf of Julian of Aeclanum[105] and of the group of people who were to address a letter to Augustine of Aquileia. A sermon addressed to the newly baptised appears to have been a source of inspiration for their opposition to the dogma of original sin[106]. Anianus also appears to have written a letter to Orontius[107], the latter being referred to in a list of bishops who had supported the Pelagian cause in the presence of Nestorius. As a matter of fact, his translation of John Chrysostom's sermon on the Gospel of Mathew was dedicated to Orontius[108]. Anianus ultimately saw himself as a victim in the entire affair, associating his fate with that of Orontius. He was likewise inclined to envisage his dispute as directed against Manichean aberrations and

to follow Lössl, we would thus be obliged to locate followers of Caelestius in both parties. If that were the case, however, then we would at least have a right to expect Lössl to explain (preferably on the basis of sources) why they were to be found in both groups. Is it not unusual in this regard that Augustine of Hippo went in search of the authentic acta of Diospolis via Cyrillus while the latter would appear to have been in no great hurry to place his signature under the *Tractoria of Zosimus*?

[104] NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2908-2912 continues to be the guide in this regard. The fact that we do not know where Anianus came from explains the spelling variations in his name (Anianus or Annianus) and the place with which he is associated (Celada, Celeda, Celenda).

[105] NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2908.

[106] See in this regard esp. J.-P. BOUHOT, *Version inédite du sermon Ad Neophytos de saint Jean Chrysostome utilisée par saint Augustin*, in *REA* 17 (1971) 27-41.

[107] A. PRIMMER, *Die Originalverfassung von Anianus' Epistula ad Orontium*, in *Antidosis. Festschrift für Walther Kraus*, Vienna, 1972, pp. 278-289.

[108] Cf. H. MUSURILLO, *John Chrysostom's Homilies on Matthew and the Version of Annianus*, in *Kyriakon. Festschrift Johannes Quasten I*, Münster, 1970, pp. 452-460; R. SKALITZKY, *Annianus of Celeda: His text of Chrysostom's Homilies on Matthew*, in *Aevum* 45 (1971) 208-233.

was of the opinion that he had the support of John Chrysostom in this regard. Anianus' convictions would ultimately appear to be close to some of those of Julian and Pelagius[109].

A detailed and thorough study of Sixtus, pope from 432 to 440, was undertaken by P. Carefoote in 1995[110]. It is interesting to note in this regard that a Roman, at least in his earlier years, had shown a degree of sympathy for the ideas of Pelagius. He was to abandon Pelagius, however, after the latter's condemnation in Zosimus' *Tractoria*[111], and offer his services to Coelestinus in his correspondence with the East after Ephesus. When Julian asked Sixtus to reinstate him in the Western Church his request was met with refusal, in part on account of the insistence of Leo I[112]. While what once attracted Sixtus in Pelagius remains difficult to determine nowadays, it remains interesting to note nevertheless that Pelagius had left an impression on him, at least for a period (even after the outbreak of the controversy).

4. Some concluding observations

The survey we have provided in the present contribution is far from exhaustive. We have drawn little attention, for example, to the large collection of anonymous documents associated with Pelagianism[113], a significant number of which still require to be published in critical editions. Many of these documents have been labelled Pelagian on account of the simple fact that they contain an appeal for an authentic ascetic Christian life. Pelagian attribution is also frequently based on "presumed Pelagian basic principles" [114]. What we intend thereby is that scholars have established a concept of what they think Pelagianism represents in terms of content and have gone off in search of authors on this basis. The picture changes considerably if one treats the preserved literature as a collection of independent

[109] NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2909.

[110] P. CAREFOOTE, *Augustine, the Pelagians and the Papacy. An Examination of the Political and Theological Implications of Papal Involvement in the Pelagian Controversy*, Leuven, 1995.

[111] Cf. the exemplary study of O. WERMELINGER, *Das Pelagiusdossier in der Tractoria des Zosimus*, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 26 (1979) 336-368.

[112] LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum*, pp. 319-321.

[113] NUVOLONE, *Pélage et pélagianisme*, 2915-2923 offers a highly compact survey.

[114] KESSLER, *Reichtumskritik*, makes it clear, for example, that *De divitiis* need no be located per se in the "Pelagian" camp.

products written by a variety of authors who were attracted by the emergence of asceticism (which is much broader than a life of abstinence) and put their ideas into writing on these grounds. One should be wary of ascribing the epithet Pelagian to an author simply because he was critical towards the rich or because he sent a letter of consolation to a widow. One should be especially wary of forgetting that the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseille, who were not particularly overjoyed with Augustine's ideas on grace, free will and predestination, were inclined to defend positions that differed little in many respects from those of Julian, for example[115]. Building on this observation one would be justified in asking whether resistance, albeit perhaps lacking explicit articulation, to the positions adopted by Augustine was not more extensive and widespread, without thereby attaching the label Pelagian thereto. Indeed one would be justified in asking whether resistance to African ideas was not spread over a wider front, without considering such resistance to have its roots in Pelagianism.

A further observation is related to the claim to coherence within the Pelagian group. Given the well known fact that Julian makes few references to Pelagius in his works, one might be more inclined to suggest that he represents a different sort of thinking to that of Pelagius: sustained attention for ascetic themes (such as poverty or health) is ultimately lacking in Julian. Julian, rather, was a dogmatician who reflected on matters such as the goodness of nature, the goodness of the creator, human freedom, human responsibility, God's justice, Christ's humanity etc.

Serious attention should also be paid to possible lines of association between the Pelagian reaction to Augustine and contacts with the East. It is clear that Pelagius, Caelestius and Julian had connections with the East. Anianus of Celada placed his translation of John Chrysostom in part at the service of those who contested Augustine's position. It is evident that a great deal of research has still to be done in this regard.

It has also become evident that politics (and not only ecclesial politics) had a significant role to play in the Pelagian controversy. Reference should be made in this regard to the manner with which Pelagius and Caelestius were condemned, the fact that Julian was denied the right to debate in a synod and the ambiguous – to say the

[115] See in this regard the brilliant study of D. OGLIARI, *Gratia et certamen. The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the so-called Semipelagians*, Leuven, 2002 (unpublished doctoral dissertation).

least – stance of the bishops of Rome (none of whom ever condemned Pelagianism on the basis of the African interpretation thereof; cf. the doctoral dissertation of P. Carefoote). There is thus clear evidence that the controversy did not restrict itself to the realms of theology, it also enjoyed both social and political relevance.

We are inclined to argue on the basis of the present survey that progress in historical research into the Pelagian controversy has led to a degree of "dogmatic" deterioration. What we mean thereby is that traditional representations of Pelagianism are no longer tenable in light of the fact that historical research has demonstrated that such a thing as a Pelagian School never existed. It is the present author's opinion that differentiation and nuance with respect to the idea of a "school" belong among the most valuable contributions of patristic research. In spite of the scarcity of sources, it has become apparent that consistent "theories" have not done justice to the complex historical reality.

Should our observations somehow find their way into the dogmatic manuals then we think that this survey will have served it purpose.

Mathijs LAMBERIGTS

THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONCEPT CONCUPISCENTIA IN AUGUSTINE'S EARLY ANTIMANICHAEAN WRITINGS (388-391)

Julian of Aeclanum accuses Augustine that the latter had never been able to rid himself of his Manichaean background. This statement has prompted contemporary authors to examine the use of the concept of *concupiscentia* by Augustine and the Manichees. The possibility is brought forward that Augustine would have borrowed this concept together with its sexual implication from this Christian sect. In this way the negative connotation of *concupiscentia* would have entered in the Christian inheritance.[1] In this article we are led by the following questions: In what way did Augustine use the concept of *concupiscentia* in his early writings? Was Augustine for his use of the term *concupiscentia* directly dependent on the Manichaean use of the term? Or did he rather bases his theory on concupiscence on the Scriptures and than primary on Paul? The first position might imply an identical use of the term by both the Manichees and Augustine. This use would be explainable on the basis of Augustine's Manichaean past. The second case would provide a similarity between Augustine and the Manichees both invoking Paul but using their own

[1] J. VAN OORT, *Augustine and Mani on Concupiscentia sexualis*, in: J. DEN BOEFT and J. VAN OORT, *Augustiniana Traiectina*, Paris, 1987, p. 137-152; ID., *Augustine on sexual concupiscence and original sin*, in: LIVINGSTONE, E. (ed.), *Studia Patristica. Vol. 22: Papers presented at the tenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford*, Leuven, 1989, p. 382-386. Kam-Lun Edwin LEE, *Augustine, Manichaeism, and the Good* (Patristic Studies, 2), New York, 1999 (on *concupiscentia*, see p. 54 –59). Johannes Van Oort discovers a remarkable conformity to Manichaeism regarding the random sexual desire (as a *motus inordinatus*) through which sin is propagated. He thinks that there is "possibly here" an influence of Manichaeism in Augustine. Kam-Lun Edwin Lee defends the existence of a direct link between the concept of concupiscence and Augustine's understanding of the Manichaean doctrine of evil. Lee tries to prove this in two steps, namely by trying to show that (a) "there is a link between Augustine's understanding of this notion in Manichaeism and his general use" and (b) that "Augustine acquires the strong sexual overtone he gives to *concupiscentia* from the Manichaean understanding of the term". According to him, "there is a change of emphasis in the concept of *concupiscentia* early around 388 when Augustine consciously attempts to equate the term with (the Manichaean notion) of libido." His second statement is that *concupiscentia* becomes part of the notion of *consuetudo* that is influenced by the Manichaean notion of evil as wickedness and mortality. Finally, he maintains that there is a continuity in the notion of *concupiscentia* before and after Augustine's focus on the Pauline writings. Lee concentrates his research on Augustine's "formative years prior to 400" (introduction, p. xii).

interpretation scheme's. In order to answer these questions we will take a look at some central passages regarding *concupiscentia* in Augustine's writings prior to Augustine's ordination to priesthood (391). The period examined is the one during which Augustine becomes familiar with Neo-platonic philosophy, starts developing arguments against the Manichees and augments his knowledge of the Bible.

No concupiscentia in Augustine's philosophical writings prior to his antimanichaean works

An analysis by means of the *Cetedoc Library of Christian Latin Texts* (*CLCLT*) yields a surprising conclusion: the concept of *concupiscentia* is absent in Augustine's writings prior to 388[2]. This means: it does not occur in *Contra Academicos* (386-387), *De beata uita* (386-387), *De ordine* (386-387), *Soliloquia* (386-387), *De immortalitate animae* (387), *De quantitate animae* (387/388), nor in the first book of *De libero arbitrio* (387). The concepts of *cupiditas* and *libido*, however, do occur at this early stage.[3] In his philosophical writings *cupiditas* and *libido* appear as obstacles to wisdom and the happy life. Wisdom does not match with *libidinis immoderatio atque sordes, perniciosae cupiditates* and *falsae uoluptates*. Augustine urges Zenobius to devote himself to the study of philosophy in the following way:

> "sic enim mihi notum est ingenium tuum et pulchritudinis omnimodae amator animus sine libidinis inmoderatione atque sordibus, quod signum in te futurae sapientiae perniciosis cupiditatibus diuino iure praescribit, ne tuam causam deseras falsis uoluptatibus inlectus, qua praeuaricatione nihil turpius et periculosius inuenire potest".[4]

It is typical of Augustine that each time he urges someone to devote oneself to the study of philosophy, he warns that no bigger

[2] *Concupiscentia* then appears in *De Musica* VI (388-390) 5.13; PL 32,1170 and 14.44; 1186 (in a quotation of 1 John 2:15-16). Around the same time we find the concept in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388/389) 20.31; CSEL 90,99; (2x, one is Gal 5:24); 1.23.35; 2.12.16; 2.12.17; 2.26.39 (104. 137s. 138s. 164s.)

[3] Cf: "Let us first make the philological point that he does not often use the term *concupiscentia* early in his career: he favors *cupiditas* and *libido*". J.T. BEANE, *The Development of the notion of concupiscence in Saint Augustine. A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1993, p. 67.

[4] *De ordine* 1.4; CC 29,93ss.

hindrance for getting to know the truth exists as a life addicted to lust.[5] Although these exhortations are vague, giving up one's lusts is a conditio sine qua non before one can even start the search for wisdom. The concepts of *cupiditas* and *libido* therefore merit a closer look. So does the verb *concupiscere* which is philologically linked to *concupiscentia* and which does occur in Augustine's philosophical writings and is moreover connected to reaching the happy life.

Concupiscere

The verb concupiscere is derived from the inchoative form (sc) of *cupere*, to desire, preceded by the prefix –con (heavy, strong). *Concupiscere* therefore means "to have a strong desire for".[6] From the expectation that *concupiscentia* generally (but not always) carries "a bad and sexual connotation"[7], we might expect a similar connotation for the verb *concupiscere*. Indeed, the present participle of the verb (*concupiscens*) forms the basis for the substantive *concupiscentia*. It is therefore remarkable that *concupiscere* does not share this meaning in the early Augustine. *Concupiscere* is not an elaborated theme in Augustine's early writings; it is casually used as a variant of *diligere* and *quaerere* with the meaning "strongly desire for". The verb is used in a positive way. In *Contra Academicos* (386-387), in the discussions of Augustine's friends, as well as in his own speech, the expression "*id quod (magnopere) concupivit*" seems to refer consequently to the truth and the port of wisdom.[8] A similar use of the verb can be found in *De ordine* (386). The important bonum where Augustine and his friends were craving for (*concupivimus*) is: choosing, wanting, knowing and loving nothing else than the discovery of the truth.[9] And when in

[5] E.g. the exhortation to Licentius in *De ordine* 1.4; CC 29,94: "Ergo adgrediamur, Licenti, freti pietate cultores, et uestigiis nostris ignem perniciosum fumosarum cupiditatum opprimamus".

[6] See: Terry L. MIETHE, *Augustine and Concupiscence*, in: ID. (ed.), *Augustinian Bibliography, 1970-1980. With Essays on the Fundamentals of Augustinian Scholarship*, Westport / London, 1982, p. 195-218, p. 200.

[7] G. BONNER, *Libido and concupiscentia in St. Augustine*, in: F.L. CROSS, *Studia Patristica 6* (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 81), Berlin, 1962, p. 303-314 (= G. BONNER, *God's Decree and Man's Destiny. Studies on the Thought of Augustine of Hippo*, London, 1989, p. 303-314 (article IX), p. 308.

[8] *Contra Academicos* 1.3 and 3.2; CC 29,6ss. 35s.

[9] *De ordine* 2.20; CC 29,135ss.: "Quae uota ut deuotissime inpleantur, tibi maxime hoc negotium, mater, iniungimus, cuius precibus indubitanter credo atque confirmo mihi istam mentem deum dedisse, ut inueniendae ueritati nihil omnino praeponam, nihil aliud uelim, nihil cogitem, nihil amem, nec desino credere nos hoc tantum bonum, quod te promerente concupiuimus, eadem te petente adepturos".

Soliloquia (386-387) the ratio asks Augustine to pray to reach that which he desires (*ora salutem et auxilium qui ad concupita pervenias*)[10] the reference is to God and the soul which Augustine wants to know (*Deum et animam scire cupio*)[11]. The same positive meaning of *concupiscere* occurs, besides in the Dialogues, once again in *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* (388): "If wisdom or truth is not desired with all the powers of the soul, it shall not be found at all" ("Nam si sapientia et ueritas non totis animi uiribus concupiscatur, inuenire nullo pacto potest")[12]. We however also find *concupiscere* as a desire to objects which should not be desired. In *De uera religione* (391) Augustine quotes for example the prescript from Exodus 20:17: "You shall not covet your neighbour's property" ("Ne concupiscas rem proximi tui")[13] In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388) Augustine refers for the first time to Galatians 5:17: "the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh" ("caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem"). He will pay much more attention to this verse as he is rereading Paul from 392 onwards.

Cupiditas

A first definition of *cupiditas* can easily be derived from the exposition Augustine offers in *Soliloquia*, a record of his internal dialogue with Reason. Augustine makes plain that what is not loved for itself is not loved (*quod non propter se amatur non amatur*).[14] Thus, having made progress in his search for wisdom, he states: "Now, I at least love Wisdom for herself alone, while as to other things, it is for her sake that I desire their presence or absence, such as life, ease, friends"[15]. So, the real danger does not come from the desire of any lower things that are sought or endured on account of some-

[10] *Soliloquia* 1.1.1 ; CSEL 89,3s.

[11] *Soliloquia* 1.2.7 ; 11s.

[12] *De Moribus ecclesiae catholicae* 1.17.31; CSEL 90;35s., *The Catholic and Manichaean ways of life. Translated by D.A. Gallagher, Ph.D. and .I.J. Gallagher, Ph.D.* (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 56), Washington, 1966, p. 27.

[13] *De uera religione* 46.89; CC 32,245: "ualet enim ad hoc etiam, quod praeceptum est : ne concupiscas rem proximi tui".

[14] *Soliloquia* 1.13.22; CSEL 89,34: "Iam certe ostendi nihil aliud me amare, si quidem quod non propter se amatur, non amatur".

[15] *Soliloquia* 1.13.22; 34: "Ego autem solam propter se amo sapientiam, caetera uero uel adesse mihi uolo, uel deesse timeo propter ipsam; uitam, quietem, amicos". *Two books of Soliloquies. Translated by Rev. Charles C.Starbuck, A.M.*, in: Ph. SCHAFF (ed.), *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. VII, Edinburgh / Grand Rapids, p. 531-560, p. 545.

thing else (*propter aliud*), in casu wisdom. Therefore, *cupiditas* appears as the love (*amor*) propter se for temporal objects. This is confirmed by a definition of *cupiditas* we find in *De diversis quaestionibus* (388/396): "Nihil aliud est cupiditas nisi amor rerum transeuntium".[16] The concept *cupiditas* is frequently accompanied by a genitive indicating the specific kind of longing which is meant. Augustine speaks of wealth, offices of honour and so on. Typical of *cupiditas* is that the desire causes perturbations in the inner peace. *Cupiditas* is accompanied by the fear of loss. Except for fear, the objects of *cupiditas* can cause distress and extreme joy. Fear, distress and joy constitute a kind of "pathology of the soul" [17]. From the antimanichaean works onwards, Augustine is explicitly concerned with the question where evil comes from. He then regularly quotes 1 Timothy 6:10: "*radix omnium malorum cupiditas*" [18]. As we will see, this biblical quote has to serve his point against the Manichees who believed that an evil substance was the cause of all evil. According to Augustine, however, the origin of evil must be situated in *cupiditas* conceived as *mala uoluntas*. It is therefore rarely and exceptional that *cupiditas* is mentioned in a positive way. This is for example the case in *Contra Academicos* (386-387), one of Augustine's earlier writings, where Augustine mentions the *inueniendi ueri cupiditas*, the longing to discover the truth, by which the whole philosophical project is indicated.[19]

Libido

In *De libero arbitrio I* Augustine offers two definitions of *libido*. The first one is given after an analysis of adultery. To Augustine, the one who commits adultery is as guilty as the one who would commit the same crime given a reasonable opportunity[20], or as

[16] *De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus* 83.23; CC 44A,29s.

[17] W. BABCOCK, *Cupiditas and caritas. The early Augustine on love and Human Fulfilment. The ethics of St. Augustine*, Atlanta, 1991, p. 63-66. "Following Cicero and Varro, Augustine gives a fourfold classification to the passions: joy (*gaudere*), desire (*cupere*), fear (*metere*) and grief (*dolere*)" J.T. BEANE, *o.c*, p. 60, n.103.

[18] See: *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* 1.19.35 and 36; CSEL 90,39ss., *Contra Fortunatum* 21; CSEL 25/1,100ss., *De libero arbitrio* 3.17; CC 29,303s., *De diuersis quaestionibus octaginta tribus* 36.1; CC 44A,54ss. and so on.

[19] *Contra Academicos* 1.3; CC 29,6ss.

[20] This might be a gospel reference to Matthew 5:28 where however *concupiscere* is used: "ego autem dico uobis quia omnis qui uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam iam moechatus est eam in corde suo". Augustine quotes this verse for the first time in *De sermone Domini in monte* (393) 1.33; CC 35,38s.

the one who does it with consent of his partners in the crime. For Augustine, the evil aspect of a bad deed is therefore not situated in the deed itself, but in the intention, in *libido*, "*id est improbanda cupiditas*"[21]. An analysis of manslaughter has to give a further clarification and elaboration of this definition. As a starting point in the argumentation Augustine introduces someone committing manslaughter, not out of desire to gain possession of something, but because he fears that some evil may befall him. The reason why this deed would be bad can then not be found in the fact of "desiring a life free of fear" (*cupere sine metu vivere*) itself. Otherwise, blame is placed upon all who love what is good. Therefore, Augustine draws an important distinction: "*The desire to live free from fear is characteristic not only of the good, but also of evil men, with this difference, that good men desire it by turning their love from whatever cannot be possessed without fear of loss, evil men, bent upon enjoying such things securely, try to remove hindrances stand in their way. As a result, they lead a life of crime and wickedness which should be called death rather than life*"[22]. The final conclusion (formulated by Evodius, the conversation partner of Augustine) implies at the same time a definition of the culpable desire: "*I have come to my senses, and I am very glad to have a clear understanding of the nature of that blameworthy desire (culpabilis cupiditas) called passion (libido). I now see that it is the love of things which each one can lose against his will (earum rerum amor, quas potest quisque invitus amittere)*"[23]. Both definitions show that libido is closely related to *cupiditas*, a term which is hardly ever used in a positive way. The affinity to *cupiditas* is likewise found in a third definition of *libido* which Augustine later mentions in *De mendacio* (394/395): "*etenim libido quoque ipsa recte definitur adpetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponuntur*"[24].

[21] *De libero arbitrio* 1.4.10; CC 29,216s.

[22] *De libero arbitrio* 1.4.10; 216s.: "Cupere namque sine metu uiuere, non tantum bonorum, sed etiam malorum omnium est: uerum hoc interest, quod id boni appetunt auertendo amorem ab his rebus, quae sine amittendi periculo nequent haberi; mali autem, ut his fruendis cum securitate incubent, remouere impedimenta conantur, et propterea facinorosam sceleratamque uitam, quae mors melius uocatur, gerunt". *The free Choice of the Will, translated by R. P. Russell, O.S.A.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, vol. 59), Washington, 1967, p. 63-241, p. 80.

[23] *De libero arbitrio* 1.4.10; 217: "Respicio et admodum gaudeo tam me plane cognouisse, quid sit etiam illa culpabilis cupiditas, quae libido nominatur. Quam esse iam apparet earum rerum amorem, quas potest quisque inuitus amittere". *The free Choice of the Will, translated by R. P. Russell, O.S.A.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, vol. 59), Washington, 1967, p. 63-241, p. 80.

[24] *De mendacio* 7.10.16; CSEL 41,421.427.435.

This definition is similar to the one found of *cupiditas* in *Soliloquia* (386-387) and *De diversis quaestionibus* (388/396) cited above.

Nevertheless, when Augustine uses the term *libido*, the desire seems not so much directed to concrete objects as this is the case with *cupiditas*. *Cupiditas* is regularly used by Augustine with a genitive indicating the (inferior) object that is loved. *Libido* is rather used with a gerundium construction, for example in the expressions: *libido gloriandi*, *libido mentiendi*, *libido dominandi*, *libido ulciscendi*... *Libido* implies thus not so much greed or avarice as such, but it is rather associated with a wrong attitude. For Augustine the *regnum illius libidinis* contains a broad spectrum: pride, envy, jealousy, laziness, stubbornness, and so on.[25] Nevertheless, libido tout court not seldom does carry a sexual connotation. In *Soliloquia* (386-387) Augustine tests himself to which degree he is already removed from and purified of his desires to transitory things such as wealth, honours and delicious food. He uses the term *cupiditas*, but exactly when he speaks of the longing for a wife, the term *libido* occurs.[26] In *De ordine* (386-387) Augustine speaks of *illa foeda libido* when the lover of Pyramus kills herself on his dying body.[27] *Libido* is mentioned again when Augustine speaks of the prostitutes. The women of the streets also have their place in the order: if one forbids prostitution the illicit sexual acts (*libido*) will cause disorder everywhere.[28] And finally, is it no mere coincidence that the main example in *De libero arbitrio* leading to a definition of libido is the analysis of adultery? Our intuition is confirmed. Even when the concept concupiscentia appears, *libido* keeps on occurring in a sexual connotation, for example in the

[25] *De libero arbitrio* 1.11.22; CC 29,226.

[26] The term libido only occurs once in *Soliloquia*, namely in 1.10.17; CSEL 89,27: "A:... Quamobrem, satis, credo, iuste atque utiliter pro libertate animae meae mihi imperaui non cupere, non quaerere, non ducere uxorem. R: Non ego nunc quaero quid decreueris, sed utrum adhuc lucteris, an uero iam ipsam libidinem uiceris". To be correct, we should remark that Augustine could also use "uxoris cupiditas" to indicate the desire for a wife (*Soliloquia* 1.14.25; CSEL 89,38).

[27] *De ordine* 1.24; CC 29,101: "Arripe illius foedae libidinis et incendiorum uenenatorum execrationem, quibus miseranda illa contingunt: deinde totus adtollere in laudem puri et sinceri amoris, quo animae dotatae disciplinis et uirtute formosae copulantur intellectui per philosophiam et non solum mortem fugiunt, uerum etiam uita beatissima perfruuntur".

[28] *De ordine* 2.4 ; 108: " Quid sordidius, quid inanius, dedecoris et turpitudinis plenius meretricibus leonibus ceterisque hoc genus pestibus dici potest? Aufer meretrices de rebus humanis, turbaueris omnia libidinibus; constitue matronarum loco, labe ac dedecore dehonestaueris. Sic igitur hoc genus hominum per suos mores impurissimum uita, per ordinis leges condicione uillissimum".

anti-Manichaean exposition on the old-testament stories of the patriarchs and their relationship with women.[29] Bonner thought that *libido* and *concupiscentia* when used in a sexual connotation seem mutual interchangeable, but when any other than sexual lust is meant, *libido* would have been preferable.[30] Whether or not *concupiscentia* may also be regularly used as to indicate any other lust than sexual, remains the question to be solved. Here it seems indeed that *libido* as such is often sexual.

Reaching the happy life

We already made clear that *cupiditas* and *libido* form obstacles in man's longing for the happy life. In his early works, Augustine describes how the soul must climb up from the inferior changeable things to the unchangeable Truth. Though divine providence is affirmed as favouring this steady progression, Augustine admits that the time and peace of a leisured otium are required for the project of this philosophical contemplation. But can the soul really find its way back to God through reasoning or mystical contemplation? In *De libero arbitrio* it is reaffirmed that understanding (*intelligentia*) is man's highest good[31], but the crucial turning point is the affirmation that the hallmark of the wise man is good will: *bona uoluntas*[32]. Th. Scott rightly points out that Augustine realizes that "what demands of us is not understanding, but love and obedience and while ignorance may separate us from God, it is sinful lust for temporal things that stands as the real barrier. While it is, of course, true that we should strive to develop reason and to have it rule over our passions, it is not by any special development of reason that we return to God. It is the will and the will alone that chooses either to love what is eternal or to love what is temporal, and the turning of the soul to God is a matter of fundamental choice for every person, not the ultimate attainment of a few select souls"[33].

In *De libero arbitrio* (book 1, 387) Augustine makes the pursuit of the good life somehow coincide with the happy life. This life

[29] *Contra Faustum* 22; CSEL 25,1,591ss.

[30] "when used to describe sexual desire (...) the two words are virtually interchangeable, but when any other lust is mentioned, libido is the one used, very occasionally supplemented by cupiditas" G. BONNER, *o.c.*, p. 304.

[31] *De libero arbitrio* 1.1.3; CC 29,211, R.J. O'CONNELL, *De libero arbitrio I. Stoicism Revisited*, in: *Augustinian Studies* 1 (1970) 49-68, p. 54.

[32] *De libero arbitrio* 1.1132ss. 217ss.; R. J. O'CONNELL, *o.c.*, p. 55.

[33] Th. K. SCOTT, *Augustine. His Thought in Context*, New York, 1995, p.121-122.

consists in the joy provided by the possession of a good will. "*Any man with the will to lead a good and upright life, provided he prefers this will to all fleeting goods, will acquire so great possession with such great ease*", says Augustine, "*that to have what he wills is the same thing as to will it*".[34] Why is it then, that a person attains happiness by means of his free will, while the majority of people are unhappy and all want to be happy? Augustine answers that those who are happy, are not happy because they want to live a happy life (even bad men desire this) but because they live an upright life. "(...) *unhappy men do not attain what they want, namely the happy life, for they do not also will what must be its companion, and without which no one can deserve to attain it, namely an upright life (...) Hence, when we say that men are unhappy by their own choice, we are not saying they want to be unhappy but that their will is such that unhappiness results of necessity and even against their will*" [35]. Obviously, Augustine jumped to conclusions as he changed his topic from the good will to the attainment of the happy life ("with such great ease"). At least at this point, he demonstrates no awareness of the fact that people can be entangled in *cupiditas*; the fact that people may be deceived by what they think is the happy life, though mentioned, is not developed at this point. Furthermore, Augustine does not break through to the deeper level, namely to the time before the fall: neither does he speak of the fall of the soul, nor of the fall of Adam and Eve. As we will see, Augustine will gradually give more attention to these considerations in elaborating the theme of *concupiscentia*.

[34] *De libero arbitrio* 1.13.29; CC 29,231: "Ex quo conficitur ut, quisquis recte honesteque uult uiuere, si id se uelle prae fugacibus bonis uelit, adsequatur tantam rem tanta facilitate, ut nihil aliud ei quam ipsum uelle sit habere quod uoluit" – And the core of the paragraph: "atqui hoc ipsum gaudium quod huius boni adpetitione gignitur, cum tranquille et quiete atque constanter erigit animum, beata uita dicitur; nisi tu putas aliud esse beate uiuere quam ueris bonis certisque gaudere". *The free Choice of the Will, translated by R. P. Russell, O.S.A.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, vol. 59), Washington, 1967, p. 63-241, p. 100.

[35] *De libero arbitrio* 1.14.30; CC 29,231s.: "Itaque cum dicimus uoluntate homines esse miseros, non ideo dicimus quod esse miseri uelint, sed quod in ea uoluntate sunt, quam etiam his inuitis miseria sequatur necesse est". *The free Choice of the Will, translated by R. P. Russell, O.S.A.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, vol. 59) Washington, 1967, p. 63-241, p. 101.

Concupiscentia in the early antimanichaean writings (388-391)

In 387/388 Augustine starts a direct anti-Manichaean campaign. After his mother died in Ostia, Augustine moves from Rome back to Thagaste where he is confronted with his Manichaean past. At that time the authorities in Carthage had just organised a mopping-up operation against the heretical Manichees.[36] By Augustine's "direct" antimanichaean campaign we mean that he no longer only intentionally writes against the Manichees (as he did in De libero arbitrio I), but that he starts manifestly writing against their beliefs even mentioning the Manichees in the title of his works.[37] Still before his ordination to priesthood in 391 Augustine writes *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* (387/388), *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388/389) and *De uera religione* (390/391).[38] In these writings Augustine uses the Christian-technical term *concupiscentia*, a word he previously had not used in his philosophical writings. Is the sudden appearance of *concupiscentia* in these antimanichaean writings mere coincidence? Or, would it be possible to discover a link between Augustine's antimanichaean campaign and his making use of the concept *concupiscentia*?

Concupiscentia in De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et manichaeorum

Let us first take a look at *concupiscentia* in Augustine's work on the Catholic and the Manichaean ways of life. "Begun at Rome in 387 *De moribus ecclesiae* is Augustine's first response undertaken directly against the Manichees, though it was completed after **De Genesi adversus Manicheos**, at Thagaste in 389".[39] The aim of *De*

[36] P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo. A biography (A new edition with an Epilogue)*, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 2000 (first published: 1967), p. 127.

[37] *De libero arbitrio* I was intended to the Manichaean ideas on evil, though the Manichees are not explicitly mentioned in this book. Cf. *Retractationes* 1.9; CC 57,23ss.

[38] Paulinus spoke of Augustine having written an anti-manichaean Pentateuch before his ordination to priesthood: (1) *De libero arbitrio*; (2) *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*; (3) *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*; (4) *De Moribus Manichaeorum*; (5) *De uera religione*. Ph. SCHAFF (ed.), *The writings against the Manichaeans and against the Donatists* (A select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Series I, Vol. 4), Grand Rapids, 1996 (repr. 1887), p. 39. Regarding *De libero arbitrio* R.J. Teske however writes: "the second two books were written at Hippo after his ordination to priesthood in 391, probably closer to 395, when he sent a copy of the finished work to Paulinus of Nola (ep. 31.7)". R.J. TESKE, *Libero arbitrio, De*, in: A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 494-495, p. 494.

[39] K. COYLE, *Moribus ecclesiae Catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum, De*, in : A. D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 571.

moribus is twofold: (1) to defend the Old Testament against the Manichees and (2) to demonstrate the inferiority of the Manichean asceticism in contrast to the purity of the Catholic morals.[40]

One of the very first times Augustine uses the substantive *concupiscentia* he does so – and this is surprising – in line with the positive notion of the verb *concupiscere*. In *De moribus* 1.17.32 Augustine quotes from the Old Testament book of Wisdom 6:12-20:

> "Wisdom is glorious, and never fadeth away, and is easily seen by them that love her, and is found by them that seek her. She preventeth them that coveth her (praeoccupat qui se concupiscunt), so that she first showeth herself unto them. He that awaketh early to seek her shall not labor; for he shall find her sitting at his door. To think, therefore, upon her is perfect understanding, and he that watcheth for her shall quickly be secure. For she goeth about seeking such as are worthy of her, and she showeth herself to them cheerfully in the ways and meeteth them with al providence. For the beginning of her is the most true desire of discipline (disciplinae concupiscentia). And the care of discipline is love, and love is the keeping of her laws, and the keeping of her laws is the firm foundation of incorruption; and incorruption bringeth near unto God. Therefore the desire of Wisdom (concupiscentia sapientiae) bringeth to a kingdom"[41]

In this quote the verb *concupiscere* as well as the substantive *concupiscentia* is used. Both are related to the search for wisdom. The book of Wisdom was a favourite with Augustine "doubtless on account of its decided Platonic quality".[42] Indeed, Augustine starts *De moribus* in a rather philosophical vein: he revisits the themes of the

[40] *De Moribus* 1.1.1-1.2.3; CSEL 90,3ss. Cf. K. COYLE, *o.c.*, p. 571. and ID., *Augustine's De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae. A study of the Work, its Composition and its sources*, Fribourg, 1978, p.76-79.

[41] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 1.17.32; CC 90,36s.: " (...) Clara est (...) et quae nunquam marcescat sapientia, et facile uidetur ab iis qui diligunt illam, et inuenitur ab iis qui quaerunt illam: praeoccupat qui se concupiscunt, ut illis se ostendat. Qui uigilauerit ad illam, non laborabit : assidentem enim illam inueniet foribus suis. Cogitare enim de illa, sensus est consummatus; et qui uigilauerit propter illam, cito erit securus: quia dignos seipsa circuit quaerens, et in uiis ostendit se illis hilariter, et omni prouidentia occurrit illis. Initium enim illius uerissimum disciplinae concupiscentia est. Cura ergo disciplinae dilectio est; et dilectio custoditio legum illius est: custoditio autem legum, confirmatio incorruptionis est; incorruptio autem facit proximum Deo. Concupiscentia itaque sapientiae deducit ad regnum". *The Catholic and Manichaean ways of life. Translated by D.A. Gallagher, Ph.D. and I.J. Gallagher, Ph.D.* (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 56), Washington, 1966, p. 27-28.

[42] Ph. SCHAFF (ed.), *The writings against the Manichaeans and against the Donatists* (A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Series I, Vol. 4), Grand Rapids, 1996 (repr. 1887), p. 49 n. 3.

happy life and the search for wisdom. At the same time, he demonstrates the harmony of the Old and the New Testament. In Augustine's view, Wisdom 6:12-20 forms a parallel to Matthew 7:7 ("Ask and it shall be given you, seek and you shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you") and to Matthew 10:26 ("There is nothing concealed that will not be disclosed"). Defending the Old Testament in general, Augustine argues that the Manichees ought not to pervert the figurative sense of the Old Testament for the purpose of deceiving their followers. Finally, the content of Wisdom 6:12-20 also directly applies to Augustine's critique on the Manichees. They had to abjure their "silly legends" and "unmeaning material imaginations". First of all, they should *desire* to understand divine things.[43] It is remarkable that the positive notion of concupiscentia we come across here in the following years seems to move to the background of Augustine's thought: Wisdom 6:20 containing the expression *concupiscentia sapientiae* reoccurs no earlier than in the Pelagian Controversy.[44]

In *De moribus* Augustine also applies the concept of *concupiscentia* in its specific meaning of excessive appetite for food. The concept is used to criticize the Manichaean eating habits. The Manichees referred to the apostle Paul as their authority in order to defend their prescripts regarding food: "Bonum est fratres, non manducare carnem, neque bibere uinum" [45] (Romans 14:21). The letters of Paul were at the centre of the Manichaean preaching. In *De moribus* Augustine starts verbal dispute on how to read Paul. He criticizes the Manichees for only quoting the first words of Romans 14:21 without adding what follows "neque in quo frater tuus offenditur, aut scandalizatur, aut infirmatur" [46]. This important addition, says Augustine, shows the intention of the apostle in giving the admonition. Augustine subsequently places Romans 14:21 in its historical context. At the time of Paul, meat and wine were offered to

[43] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 1.17.30-32 ; CC 90,34ss.

[44] "Sap. 6:20: Concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum. Après une citation isolée à l'intérieur du texte Sap. 6,12 à 20 transmis par le De moribus ecclesiae catholicae I, 17 (32), écrit en 387-388 à Rome, le verset Sap. 6, 20 n'appartient qu'à la controverse antipélagienne". A.-M. LA BONNARDIERE, *Biblia Augustiniana. A.T. Le livre de la Sagesse* (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1970, p. 103. La Bonnardière refers to *De civitate dei* 14,7; CC 48,421ss. (Sap. 6:20 together with Phil. 1:23 and Psalm 118:20); *En. in Ps.* 118, s. 8,3; CC 40,1687 (Sap. 6:20 together with Ps. 118:20); *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 2.10.23 and 2.30.52; CSEL 42,275s.308s.

[45] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 2.14.31; CSEL 90,114.

[46] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 2.14.31; 115. (This verse is also quoted in: 1.33.71; 76.

the gods of the Gentiles. Therefore, the 'weaker' had to prevent themselves from the risk of taking part in idolatry. The 'stronger', says Augustine, did realise that "nothing is unclean except from an evil conscience". Nevertheless, they too felt it their duty to abstain from this food. They did so in order not to give scandal to the weaker ones.[47] For Augustine, the Manichaean prohibition to eat flesh was quite a different case: it was based on idle fictions, such as the fact that the flesh would be made from pollution itself. Moreover, the teachings of the Manichees did not seem to be consistent: someone eating a piece of flesh, not out of concupiscence, but for health's sake could not remain under the elect, whereas a glutton giving in to excessive appetite eating no animal matter would be permitted to remain.[48] According to Augustine, the true defilement is not in eating flesh as such, but in the desire itself: one should not indulge in concupiscentia in regard to eating. Augustine regards this as an application of the general idea expressed by Paul in Romans 13:14: "And as for the flesh, take no thoughts for its lusts" ("et ne carnis curam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis")[49].

The lives of the catholic ascetics were an excellent application of Paul's prescription. In *De moribus* 1.31.67 Augustine describes for example the monastic life in the desert. Regarding the monks' order of the day, he writes: "They then take something to eat, allowing themselves only enough to maintain their health and bodily strength, thus preventing the appetite (*concupiscentia*) from satisfying itself, even on such poor and lowly fare as is provided. They abstain, not only from meat and wine in order that their bodily desires (*libidines*) may be kept under control, but also from those foods considered by some to be purer since they are more stimulating to the palate and stomach – a ridiculous and disgraceful subterfuge by which such individuals seek to excuse their shameful desire for certain exquisite

[47] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 2.14.31; 115.

[48] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 2.13.28-30; 112ss. and 2.17.51; 133s. See also 2.15.36-37; 121s. on the reason why the Manichees prohibit the use of flesh. – Augustine also explains the difference between Catholic and Manichaean abstinence in Contra Faustum 30.5; CSEL 25/1,752ss. The main difference is again situated in the motives of abstinence. Catholics do so "in order to subdue the body, that the soul may be more humbled in prayer". Manichees do so because they considered animal food as unclean and because abstinence was a sign of the electi as opposed to the auditors. J.K. COYLE, *Augustine's "De moribus ecclesiae catholicae". A study of the Work, its Composition and its Sources* (Paradosis, 25), Fribourg, 1978, p. 414-415 and Contra Faustum 30.5.

[49] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 2.14.31; CSEL 90,114s.

foods apart from meat".[50] In passing Augustine criticizes those people who reject certain food as unclean, but who do not refrain from eating other, more appetitive and more expensive, food. Besides some Christians, Augustine probably has the Manichees in mind.[51] Indeed, the central aim is to show the general superiority of Christian asceticism over Manichaean asceticism. A bit further on he says: "All of their efforts are (...) directed, not to rejecting certain kinds of food as corrupt, but to overcoming concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and preserving brotherly love".[52] In this context, Augustine mobilizes Bible verses (especially Pauline verses) against the Manichaean food taboos: "for the clean all things are clean" (Titus 1:15), "what goes into the mouth does not defile a man, but that which comes out of the mouth, that defiles a man" (Matthew 15:11), "food for the belly and the belly for food, but God will destroy both it and them" (1 Corinthians 6:13), "for neither shall we suffer any loss if we do not eat, nor if we do eat shall we have any advantage" (1 Corinthians 8:8) and finally: "It is good, brethren, not to eat meat and not to drink wine, nor to do anything by which thy brother is offended" (Romans 14:21).[53] It is clear that the concept of *concupiscentia* and the Pauline verses are subject of exegesis whereby both the Manichees and Augustine were trying to put Paul on their side.

[50] *De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae* 1.31.67; "corpus deinde reficitur, quantum saluti et salubritati satis est, coercente unoquoque concupiscentiam, ne se profundat uel in ea ipsa quae praesto sunt parca et uelissima. Ita non solum a carnibus et uino abstinent pro sufficientia domandarum libidinum, sed ab iis etiam quae tanto concitatius uentris et gutturis prouocant appetitum, quanto quasi mundiora nonnullis uidentur: quo nomine solet turpe desiderium exquisitorum ciborum, quod a carnibus alienum est, ridicule turpiterque defendi". *The Catholic and Manichaean ways of life. Translated by D.A. Gallagher, Ph.D. and I.J. Gallagher, Ph.D.* (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 56), Washington, 1966, p. 52.

[51] *Ooit een land van kloosters. Teksten van Augustinus over het kloosterleven.* Inleiding en vertaling door Prof. Em. T.J. van Bavel o.s.a., Heverlee-Leuven, 1999, p. 46 n. 8.

[52] *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* 1.33.71; CSEL 90,76: «Itaque non reiciendis generibus ciborum quasi pollutis, sed concupiscentiae perdomandae, et dilectioni fratrum retinendae inuigilat omnis industria». *The Catholic and Manichaean ways of life. Translated by D.A. Gallagher, Ph.D. and .I.J. Gallagher, Ph.D.* (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 56), Washington, 1966, p. 54.

[53] See *De moribus ecclesiae catholciae* 1.33.71; 76: "Omnia munda mundis" (Tit. 1:15 et "Non quod intrat in os uerstrum uos coinquinat, sed quod exit" (Matt. 15:11); "Esca uentri, et uenter escis, Deus autem et hunc et illas destruet" (1 Cor. 6 :13) et alibi : "Neque si manducauerimus, abundabimus; neque si non manducauerimus, egebimus" (1 Cor. 8:8); et ilud prae prae cetereis : "Bonum est, fratres, non manducare carnes, neque bibere uinum, neque in quo frater tuus offenditur" (Rom. 14:21). *The Catholic and Manichaean ways of life. Translated by D.A. Gallagher, Ph.D. and I.J. Gallagher, Ph.D.* (The Fathers of the Church, vol. 56), Washington, 1966, p. 54-55.

Concupiscentia in De Genesi contra Manichaeos

While still working at *De moribus* Augustine wrote an exposition on Genesis against the Manichees in order to counter their version of creation which was "seducing the faithful".[54] Augustine turns to Genesis because he would like to find an answer to the Manichaean quest where evil comes from. Paying attention to the theme of *concupiscentia*, we will see that Augustine offers a highly figurative[55] explanation of the Genesis story, in which he also introduces neo-platonic interpretation schemes.

Have power over the beasts

The first hit of *concupiscentia* in *De Genesi* is found in Augustine's allegorical explanation of God's commandment to have power over the fishes in the sea, the birds of heaven and all reptiles that creep upon the earth (Genesis 1:28). Augustine writes:

> "... we can (...) understand this verse spiritually in the sense that we should hold in subjection all the affections and emotions of the soul (affectiones et motus animi), which are like those animals, and have mastery over them by temperance and modesty (per temperantiam et modestiam). For if we do not rule these emotions, they burst forth and turn into the foulest habits (foedissimae consuetudines), carrying us off with all sorts of destructive pleasures (diversae perniciosaeque delectationes) and making us like every kind of beast. But when we rule them and hold them in subjection, they become completely tame and live in harmony with us. For the emotions of our mind are part of our nature. They are even nourished along with us by knowledge of the finest rational and moral principles of eternal life, as if by the grain and the fruit-trees and the green plants. Man's life is happy and peaceful (beata atque tranquilla) when all his emotions are in accord with reason and the truth. Then they are called joys and holy, chaste and fair loves (gaudia, et amores sancti, et casti et boni). But if they are not in accord [with reason] and are managed with negligence, they tear the mind apart and dissipate it, making life most miserable (vita miserrima). Then they are called perturbations and lusts and evil desires (perturbationes, et libidines, et concupiscentiae malae). We have been commanded to crucify them in ourselves with all the energy we can until death is swallowed up in victory (1 Cor. 15:54). For the Apostle says, "Those who belong to Jesus Christ have crucified their flesh with its perturbations

[54] K. COYLE, *Genesi adversus Manichaeos, De*, in: A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 378-379, p. 378.

[55] *On Genesis. Two books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 22-23 (introduction) (Cf. *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.1.1; CSEL 91,67). At the beginning of book II Augustine notes: "This whole narrative unfolds, not clearly, but in figures, so that it might exercise the minds of those seeking the truth and call them from carnal labors to spiritual labors". *On Genesis*, p. 91.

and desires" ("Qui autem Jesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum perturbationibus et concupiscentiis") (Gal. 5:24)."[56]

In this commentary we encounter material and vocabulary which reminds us of Augustine's philosophical writings. In order to attain a happy and peaceful life, man has to gain control over the emotions by temperance and modesty. Emotions of the soul that are in harmony with reason are called *gaudia et amores sancti, et casti et boni. Concupiscentiae malae*, on the contrary, run parallel with *perturbationes* and *libidines*. These are the emotions or movements of the soul that cause a most miserable life because they are not in harmony with reason. Augustine introduces the notion of *concupiscentia* by documenting his insights with two Pauline texts, 1 Corinthians 15:54 and Galatians 5:24. The apostle Paul comments the Old Testament book on Genesis as an authority. This is important since the Manichees were using Paul in order to prove the supposed opposition between the Old and the New Testament.[57] Moreover, the scriptural

[56] *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.20.31; 98s.: "recte tamen intelligitur etiam spiritualiter, ut omnes affectiones et motus animi, quos habemus istis animalibus similes, subditos haberemus, et eorum dominaremur per temperantiam et modestiam. Cum enim non reguntur isti motus, erumpunt et pergunt in foedissimas consuetudines, et per diuersas perniciosasque delectationes nos rapiunt, et faciunt similes omni generi bestiarum. Cum autem reguntur et subiiciuntur, omnino mansuescunt et nobiscum concorditer uiuunt. Non enim a nobis alieni sunt motus animi nostri. Pascuntur etiam nobiscum cognitione rationum et morum optimorum, et uitae aeternae, tanquam herbis seminalibus et lignis fructiferis et herbis uiridibus. Et haec est hominis vita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus ejus rationi veritatique consentiunt; et uocantur gaudia, et amores sancti, et casti et boni. Si autem non consentiunt, nihilominus dum negligenter geruntur, conscindunt et dissipant animum, et faciunt uitam miserrimam; et uacantur perturbationes, et libidines, et concupiscentiae malae. De quibus iam nobis praecipitur, ut eas cum quanto possumus labore crucifigamus in nobis, donec absorbeatur mors in uictoriam (1 Cor. 15:54). Dicit enim Apostolus: Qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum perturbationibus et concupiscentiis (Gal. 5:24)". *On Genesis. Two books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 78-79.

[57] Paul's letters were favourite literature among (African) Manichees. The Manichees read Paul as if he was condemning the Law (i.e. the Old Testament). P. ALFARIC, *Les Écritures manichéenne*. Vol. 2. *Étude analytique*, Paris, 1918-1919, p. 164. Cf. e.g. Augustine's remark in Ex. Prop. Rm. 13. Augustine from his side, discovered that the divergences between Paul and the Old Testament were rather apparent than real. In *Confessiones* 7.21.27 he writes: "With avid intensity I seized the sacred writings of your Spirit and especially the apostle Paul. Where at one time I used to think he contradicted himself and the text of his words disagreed with the testimonies of the law and the prophets, the problems simply vanished". *Confessiones. Translated with*

quotes introduce *concupiscentia* as a variant of *perturbationes* and *libidines*. Finally, those were considered to be Christians who are expected to crucify their flesh with its perturbations and desires.

A bit further on in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* Augustine returns to God's commandment to have power over the beasts. He does so in a prophetic commentary on the passage where he draws a comparison between the sixth day of creation and the coming of Christ as a stage in human history. He says:

> "On that day man was placed over the cattle, and the serpents and the birds of heaven, just as in this age, Christ rules souls obedient to him who have come to his Church in part from the Gentiles and in part from the Jewish people. Thus, whether given over to carnal desire (carnalis concupiscentia), like the cattle, or blinded by dark curiosity (tenebrosa curiositas), like the serpents, or puffed up with pride (superbia), like the birds, men might be tamed by him and grow gentle" [58].

In this allegorical interpretation of man's superiority over the cattle, the serpents and the birds, it is Christ who masters those who are given over to carnal desire, curiosity and pride. A. Labhard remarks that Augustine's enumeration of the beasts (*pecora / serpentes / uolatilia coeli* or *aues*) does not totally correspond to the enumeration given in Genesis 1:26 (*pisces maris / uolatilia coeli / omnes pecora et ferae / [omnis terra] / omnia reptilia, quae super terram repunt*) nor the enumeration offered in Genesis 1:28 (*pisces maris / uolatilia coeli / repentia omnia quae repunt super terram*). The fishes have disappeared in Augustine's interpretation. Moreover the order in which Augustine presents the beasts ("*pecora / serpentes / uolatilia coeli or aues*") does not correspond to any order presented in

an introduction and notes by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, 1991, p. 130. The predominance of Paul from *De Moribus ecclesiae catholicae* I onwards and the link with Manichaeism is also noted by J.K. COYLE, *Augustine's "De moribus ecclesiae catholicae". A Study of the Work, its Composition and its Sources* (Paradosis, 25), Fribourg, 1978, p. 187-188.

[58] *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1. 23.40; CSEL 91,109: "Et praeponitur homo in illo die pecoribus et serpentibus et uolatilibus coeli, sicut in ista aetate Christus regit animas obtemperantes sibi, quae ad Ecclesiam eius, partim de Gentibus, partim de populo Iudaeorum uenerunt; ut ab eo domarentur atque mansuescerent homines, uel carnali concupiscentiae dediti sicut pecora, uel tenebrosa curiositate obscuritati quasi serpentes, uel elati superbia quasi aues". *On Genesis. Two books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 87.

the Genesis-text.[59] Therefore it is likely that Augustine had an already existing interpretation scheme in mind and that he therefore dropped the "fishes" in order to be able to present the triad of carnal desire, curiosity and pride. We will soon come across further evidences proving that this is indeed the case (cf. infra, *The Fall of Adam and Eve* and *concupiscentia in De vera religione*).

The Fall of Adam and Eve

Augustine's commentary on the power over the beasts made clear that 'evil desires' must be suppressed or at least brought in harmony with reason in order to attain the happy life. What than does Augustine write on concupiscence in regard to the fall (Genesis 3:1-7) when Adam and Eve are dismissed from the happy life?

Augustine indicates Adam and Eve's sin as *superbia*. Augustine explains that the serpent persuades Adam and Eve to sin *through pride*. The serpent promises that by eating from the fruit of the tree in the middle of paradise they would not die but would be like gods knowing good and evil. Augustine clarifies that Adam and Eve were persuaded "to love to excess their own power". As is the custom with pride Adam pushes the fault upon Eve and the woman subsequently passes the guilt upon the serpent. Augustine refers to Ecclesiastes 10:15 for pride as "the beginning of every sin". Pride seems to be a violation of the right order because man did not receive the capacity of being happy on the basis of his own power without God ruling. Augustine's detailed analysis of Genesis 3:1-7 moreover learns that sinning is also related to a violation of the balance of power between virile reason and the soul's appetitive part.

Augustine's analysis of Genesis 3:1-7 is in fact an actualisation of the biblical account. Augustine understands Adam in an allegorical way as representing virile reason (*uirilis ratio*) while Eve represents the lower part of the soul (*inferior animae pars*). In Augustine's view the woman was created to provide an illustration of the fact that virile reason should hold subject the soul's appetite part by means of which we control the members of our bodies. The ideal 'spiritual union' between man and woman implies that the "the flesh does not lust against the spirit" (Galatians 5:17) but is subjected to the spirit, that is,

[59] A. LABHARDT, *Curiositas. Notes sur l'histoire d'un mot*, in: *Museum Helveticum* 17 (1960) 206-224, p.222-223, but he compares Augustine's enumeration in 1.23.40 only with Gen. 1:26. Augustine quotes Genesis 1:26 in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.17.27; 94s. and Genesis 1:28 in *De Genesi contra Manicheaos* 1.20.31; 98s.

so that carnal desire (*concupiscentia carnalis*) is not opposed to reason, but rather ceased, by obeying to be carnal". The right order, which may not be violated seems to be that of 1 Corinthians 11:3: "For Christ [i.e. the wisdom of God] is the head of man and the man is the head of woman".

What then happens in sinning? Using the words *cupiditas* and *libido* Augustine offers the following analysis of the fall:

> "Even now nothing else happens in each of us when one falls into sin than occurred then in these three: the serpent, the woman and the man. For first the suggestion is made, whether by thought or by the senses of the body, by seeing or touching or hearing or tasting or smelling. When this suggestion has been made, if our desire (cupiditas) is not aroused toward sinning, the cunning of the serpent will be excluded. If, however, it is aroused, it will be as though the woman were already persuaded. At times reason checks and suppresses in a virile way even desire (cupiditas) that has been aroused. When this happens, we do not fall into sin, but we are crowned for our modest struggle. But if reason consents and decides that what desire (libido) has stirred up should be carried out, man is expelled from the whole happy life as if from paradise" [60].

Augustine distinguishes three stages in committing a sin: (1) the suggestion, (2) the arousal of our desire and (3) the consent of reason. When we commit a sin our reason is brought to consent by the arousal of the soul's appetitive part. It is however possible not to respond the suggestion that is made, or even, in case the desire which might be aroused, to suppress it by reason. What happens in Adam and Eve

[60] *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2.14.21; CSEL 91,142s.: "Etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur, cum ad peccatum quisque delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus, serpente, muliere, et uiro. Nam primo fit suggestio siue per cogitationem, siue per sensus corporis, uel uidendo, uel tangendo, uel audiendo, uel gustando, uel olfaciendo: quae suggestio cum facta fuerit, si cupiditas nostra non mouebitur ad peccandum, excludetur serpentis astutia; si autem mota fuerit, quasi mulieri iam persuasum erit. Sed aliquando ratio uiriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit. Quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum, sed cum aliquanta luctatione coronamur. Si autem ratio consentiat, et quod libido commouerit, faciendum esse decernat, ab omni uita beata tanquam de paradiso expellitur homo". *On Genesis. Two books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 117. – The stages of suggestion, pleasure and consent are also mentioned in *De sermone Domini in monte* 1.12.34 –35; CC 35,36ss. They are "three distinct degrees of the same sin, accordingly as it is in the heart, in a deed, or in a habit. These three types degrees of sin are, as it were, three types of death". *Saint Augustine, Commentary on the Lord's sermon of the Mount. Translated by D.J. Kavangh* (Fathers of the Church. A new translation, 11), Washington, 1977[3], p. 53-55.

indeed exemplifies what happens in each one of us. Hence, Augustine speaks of *our* being dismissed from the happy life when we sin.[61]

To what extent has the sin of Adam and Eve an influence on our present situation? Augustine makes clear that *mortalitas* is the punishment of sin. Adam and Eve were dismissed from paradise in a mortal body.[62] And with them humanity lost its previous immortality. Does Augustine speak of any other consequence of Adam and Eve's sin? Does he speak of concupiscence, or even of inherited concupiscence? In order to answer this question we need to take a look at the punishments of the serpent, Eve and Adam.

The punishment of the serpent lies in the fact that it has in its power those who despise God's commandments. In Genesis 3:14 God punishes the serpent: "You will creep upon your chest and belly and you will eat the earth all the days of your life". In Augustine's allegorical explanation of this verse the term "chest" signifies pride (*superbia*); the term "belly" refers to "carnal desire" (*carnale desiderium*) and "eating the earth" symbolises the "third kind of temptation", namely "curiosity" (*curiositas*). According to Augustine "eating the earth" means "penetrating things deep and dark, but nonetheless temporal and earthly". In other words: the serpent represents the three temptations: pride, carnal desire and curiosity.[63] The fact that this triad here reoccurs strengthens the idea that while explaining man's power over the beasts (*De Genesi contra manichaeos* 1.23.40; 91,109) Augustine had indeed an already existing interpretation scheme in mind.

As a consequence of the sin, the woman will bear children in pain. This punishment refers to the condition of mortality, but also to the difficulties experienced by the 'hidden woman' to bear offspring: *"there is no restraint from carnal desire (uoluntas carnalis) which does not have pain in the beginning, until habit has been bent toward*

[61] *On Genesis. Two books against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 31 (introduction) (cf. *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2.14.21; CSEL 91,21s. quoted in note 60: unoquoque nostrum – cupiditas nostra – labimur – coronamur).

[62] God had threatened them with death when he gave the commandment not to eat from the fruit of the tree in the middle of paradise. After the fall Adam and Eve were dressed in garments of skin. According to Augustine these garments signify the mortality of this life because they are made from death animals. J. PEPIN, *Saint Augustin et le symbolisme néoplatonicien de la vêture*, in: *Augustinus Magister. Vol.1: Communications* (Congrès International Augustinien, Paris, 21-24 septembre 1954) (Études augustiniennes. Séries Antiquité, 1), Paris, 1954, p. 293-306.

[63] *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2.17.26 – 2.18.27; CSEL 91,148s.

the good deed. In order that this habit might be born, there was a painful struggle with bad habit".[64] Likewise the punishment of the man is explained in a way beyond the literal of merely labouring on earth and dealing with the necessities of life. The punishment rather refers to the fact that anyone born in this life has difficulty in discovering the truth because of the corruptible body: "the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul, and earthly habitation presses down the mind that thinks many thoughts" (Wisdom 9:15). In other words: the mortal body seems to imply consequences for the soul, but Augustine does not go so far as to say that we inherit sin (or any form of concupiscence), or that our situation has turned to the worst because of Adam and Eve's sin.

The analysis of *concupiscentia* in *De Genesi contra Manichaeaos* has provided us the following insights: *(1)* Augustine does not seem to borrow any notion of *concupiscentia* from the first three books of Genesis. He uses a variety of words indicating evil desires of temptations: *cupiditas*, *libido*, *desiderium carnale*, *superbia*, *curiositas*... Using the biblical term *concupiscentia* Augustine refers twice to Paul, namely to Galatians 5:17 and Galatians 5:24 *(2)* In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* Augustine works with a triad of temptations consisting of *carnalis concupiscentia*, *curiositas* and *superbia*. Augustine discovers this triad in the beasts of Genesis 1:26 and Genesis 1:28 and in the punishment of the serpent (Genesis 3:14). *(3)* It seems as if Augustine balances between on the one hand the idea that we are able to freely resist sin and on the other hand the admission that Adam and Eve's sin also compromises our capability to discover truth. Augustine does not go so far as to pretend that we inherit sin, nor does he say that our situation has turned towards the worst by Adam and Eve's sin. Augustine rather describes our situation as similar to that of Adam and Eve. *(4)* It is not sure whether Augustine could convince his Manichean adversaries. Questions such as why the serpent was able to convince Adam and Eve still remain till the end of the book. To the modern reader it is clear that Augustine's exposition on Genesis

[64] *De Genesi contra Manicheaos* 2.19.29; 150s.: "... quod nulla abstinentia fit a uoluntate carnali, quae non habeat in exordio dolorem, donec in meliorem partem consuetudo flectatur. Quod cum prouenerit, quasi natus est filius, id est ad bonum opus paratus est affectus per consuetudinem bonam. Quae consuetudo ut nasceretur, cum dolore reluctatum est consuetudini malae". *On Genesis. Two books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 124.

explains *that* humans fell into sin (according to Augustine by free will) but that he does *not* explain *why* humans would ever freely choose to sin if they were created good.[65] And this is exactly part of the Manichaean quest. A new element I would like to add: *(5)* If Augustine's argumentation could not sufficiently convince the Manichees he could however score by depicting the Manichaean error in a way similar to his description of the serpent of the Genesis story, using the triad of pride, carnal desire and curiosity:

> "That error creeps in its chest and belly and eats the earth. For it deceives none but the proud who claim for themselves what they are not, and who soon believe that the supreme God and the human soul have one and the same nature. They deceive also those caught in carnal desires, who are glad to hear that it is not they themselves who do whatever they do in their wantonness, but the nation of darkness. They deceive also the curious who are wise about the things of earth and search out spiritual things with an earthy eye".[66]

Concupiscentia in De uera religione

Just before his ordination, Augustine wrote *De uera religione* (390/391), a work dedicated to Romanianus, a Manichee belonging to the leading circles of Thagaste. Previously, Augustine had been instrumental in leading Romanianus to the Manichees, now he writes in order to invite him to Christianity.[67] This book is an expression of Augustine's own position, rather than a polemic. Through Romanianus Augustine addresses all Manichees and all those seeking true religion.[68]

[65] Also in Gen 1-3 the answer is not found.

[66] *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2.26.40; CSEL 91,165s.: "... ille ergo error pectore et uentre serpit, et terram manducat. Non enim decipit, nisi aut superbos, qui sibi arrogantes quod non sunt, cito credunt quod summi Dei et animae humanae una eademque natura sit; aut desideriis carnalibus implicatos, qui libenter audiunt quod quidquid lasciue faciunt, non ipsi faciunt, sed gens tenebrarum; aut curiosos, qui terrena sapiunt, et spiritualia terreno oculo inquirunt". *On Genesis. Two books on Genesis against the Manichees and On the literal interpretation of Genesis: an unfinished book. Translated by R.J. Teske, s.j.* (The Fathers of the Church. A new Translation, 84), Washington, 1991, p. 136-137.

[67] "Augustine had previously dedicated *Contra Academicos* to Romanianus seeking to lead him to study philosophy" (*Contra Academicos* 2.8; CC 29,28s.; Conf. 6.14.24; CC 27,89ss.)

[68] J.P. PRENDIVILLE, *The Development of the Idea of Habit in the thought of Saint Augustine*, in: *Traditio* 28 (1972) 29-99, p. 43; F. VAN FLETEREN, *Augustine's De vera religione. A new Approach*, in: *Augustinianum* 16 (1976) 475-497; F. VAN FLETEREN, *Vera religione, De*, in: A. D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 864-865.

What has Augustine written on *concupiscentia* in *De uera religione*? More than two third of the quotes are Pauline, but surprisingly the word *concupiscentia* does not occur in a Pauline quote. It does however occur, but in reference to the Johannine *concupiscentia* of 1 John 2:15-16: *"Nolite diligere mundum, quoniam ea, quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi".*[69] ("Love not the world, for all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life"). The verse is first cited by Augustine in De musica 6.14.45[70], but it becomes a real theme in *De vera Religione*. The importance of 1 John 2:15-16 in this work may be deduced from Augustine's recurrent reference to it. The verse occurs both near the beginning (*De uera religione* 3.4) and the end (*De uera religione* 55.107) of the work where it functions as an exhortation to Romanianus. In the middle of the work (*De uera religione* 38, 70-71) it serves as a way of categorising different kind of vices which Christians should try to overcome in order to climb the ladder of perfection.[71]

Augustine interprets the threefold concupiscence of St. John in a special way. *Concupiscentia carnis* is seen as referring to the love of the lower pleasures (*uoluptates infimae*), to the addiction to carnal pleasures, to voluptuousness and more general to the desire of lust. The *concupiscentia oculorum* covers a broad spectrum: curiosity and the fact of "being madly delighted by some showy spectacle".[72] According to Augustine, the *ambitio saeculi* from 1 John 2:16 refers to pride and to the pursuing of vain and idle power. In *De vera religione* Augustine, moreover, uses the three-fold cupidity in an inventive way in his allegorical exegesis of Jesus' temptations in the desert (Matthew 4:3-10). He explains that Christ overcame these three temptations. The *concupiscentia carnis* is related to the demand to

[69] The Vulgate reads "superbia vitae" for the third form of desire. Augustine's "ambitio saeculi" appears in the K-version.

[70] Book VI of *De Musica* was probably completed in Thagaste ca. 390. See: U. POSSANI, *Il sesto libro*, in: *De Musica* (Lectio Augustini, Settimana Agostiniana Pavese, 5), Palermo, 1990 p., 65.

[71] The second part of *De uera religione* can be divided as follows: Introduction: the three kinds of concupiscence and the three temptations of Christ (§38, 69-71); the remedy for uoluptas (§39,72-§45,82); the remedy for pride (§45,84 - §48,93); the remedy for curiosity (§49, 94 – 51, 100); Conclusion (§52, 101-§55, 107).

[72] In *De uera religione* Augustine charges the Manichees with *concupiscentia oculorum*: he reproaches those who, while trying to resist the flesh, envision immense spaces of light which they see limited by certain bounderies. Augustine focuses on those who let themselves be led by the deceitful senses. These people think that they understand the truth, but in fact they are deluded by their shadowy phantasms.

change stones in bread. The pleasure of the flesh has to be kept in bounds so that one does not give in to the feeling of hunger. The worldly desire for power is related to the kingdoms of the world which were shown to Jesus by the devil. Finally, *curiositas* is explained by the question to Jesus to cast himself down from the pinnacles of the temple: one should not try to explore divine power by subjecting it to visible experiments, says Augustine.[73] The second part of *De uera religione* is devoted to steering the soul clear of the triple concupiscence. To this end, Augustine speaks successively about the remedy for lust, pride and curiosity.

It is important to consider the context in which these three vices appear in *De uera religione*. The ascent of man to God by means of true religion is the central theme of the work. After an explanation of evil (11, 21-23, 44) Augustine moves towards the central theme of the work: the ascent of man to God by means of true religion (24, 45 – 54, 106). It should not surprise us too much that falsity and the threefold vice (pleasure, pride and curiosity) are included precisely in the section of the soul's ascent to God. *De uera religione* is certainly not the only book of the Augustinian corpus where Augustine describes an ascent including vices as hindrances.[74] In *De uera religione* Augustine could replace *libido*, *uoluptas* and *cupiditas* by the term *concupiscentia*. This might be an indication that this term gradually takes over the place and the meaning of the previous terms. Augustine's idea on vices seems to be amplified in the sense that they are not only hindrances on man's ascent to God, but that they remind man at and admonish him to union with God. Regarding the three kinds of concupiscence Augustine concludes:

> "What can fail to urge man to strive for virtue, when his very vices urge him? Curiosity seeks nothing but knowledge, which cannot be certain knowledge unless it be knowledge of eternal things which remain ever the same. Pride seeks nothing but power, which has reference to facility in acting. But power is attained only by the perfect soul which is submissive to God and which with great live turns towards his kingdom. Bodily pleasure seeks nothing but rest, and there is no rest save where there is no poverty and no corruption."[75]

[73] According to D. Dideberg, Mt. 4 : 1-10 (Jesus' temptations in the desert) can be found in the Augustinian corpus as an illustration of the Johannine threefold cupiditas "dès le *De uera religione*, de 390, jusqu'aux *Tractatus in epistulam Ioannis*, de 407". Apart from *De uera religione* 38, 70-71; CC 32,232s. Dideberg refers to *Sermo* 284.5; PL 39,1291s., *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 8.13; CC 38,55ss. and *Tract in epist. Io.* 2.14; PL 35,1996s. D. DIDEBERG, *Saint Augustin et la première épître de saint Jean. Une théologie de l'Agapè* (Théologie Historique, 34), Paris, 1975, p. 186.

[74] Cf. F. VAN FLETEREN, *Ascent of the Soul*, in: A.D. FITZGERALD (ed.), *o.c.*, p. 63-67.

[75] *De uera religione* 52.101; CC 32,252s.: "Quid est autem, unde homo comme-

It even seems that the 'triple cupidity' of lust, pride and curiosity is a "remote negative image – an *effigies veritatis* – of the Holy Trinity itself."[76]

Some considerations on the origin of the threefold concupiscence

Augustine's interpretation of 1 John 2:16 is certainly not a straightforward exegesis of St.-John's letter. We can substantiate this claim by comparing Augustine's interpretation of the threefold concupiscentia with the (probable) intention of the biblical writer. In the expression – ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός, σάρξ evokes not only physical (or sexual) appetite, but it also implies the broader biblical sense of fragile and sinful humanity, of the "flesh lusting against the spirit" (reference to: Galatians 5:17, Ephesians 2:3, 1 Peter 2:11). This broader biblical context is certainly not absent in Augustine's understanding of *concupiscentia*. Yet, in *De uera religione* (as well as in the *Confessiones*) Augustine's concretisations of *concupiscentia carnis*, as one of the three kinds of concupiscence, primarily seem to refer to physical pleasures and sensual appetites. The biblical term – ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν is rather unspecified in St-John's letter. Probably the author intended to refer to the eyes conform with the biblical usage, namely as ministers of arrogance, greed and lewdness. In Augustine, however, *concupiscentia oculorum* receives the rich signification of curiositas and "being madly delighted by some showy spectacle". St. John's – ἡ ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου refers to the vaunting of livelihood, the showing off material possession and the goods of this world. 1 John 3:17 sheds light on this. In Augustine the *ambitio saeculi* is about pride as primal sin and cause of the fall.

A close look at the emergence and the progressive systematisation of the triad *uoluptas*, *curiositas* and *superbia* in the Augustinian corpus can shed some more light on the fact that Augustine's interpretation of 1 John 2:16 is not an ordinary exposition of St.-

morari non possit ad uirtutes capessendas, quando de ipsis uitiis potest? Quid enim appetit curiositas nisi cognitionem, quae certa esse non potest nisi rerum aeternarum et eodem modo se semper habentium? Quid appetit superbia nisi potentiam, quae refertur ad agendi facilitatem, quam non inuenit anima perfecta nisi Deo subdita et ad eius regnum summa caritate conuersa? Quid appetit uoluptas corporis noso quietem, quae non est nisi ubi nulla est indigentia et nulla corruptio?". *Of true religion* (Gateway editions, 6042), Chicago, 1959, p. 96.

[76] *In Contra Secundinum* 10; CSEL 25/2,919ss. (399) Augustine will clearly see them as false imitations of God (O. DU ROY, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*, Paris, 1966, p. 350, n.1).

John's text. The threefold cupidity seems to take form in *De moribus ecclesiae* (387/388). The objects of the three forms of *concupiscentia* are indeed present in this text, namely as *illecebrae corporis*, *gloria popularis*, *per imaginationes… rerum scientia* (*curiositas*), but they do not yet form a clear pattern (*De moribus ecclesiae* 20.37 –21.38; CSEL 90,41ss.). Augustine must have had 1 John 2:16 at the back of his mind since he quotes the precedent verse 1 John 2:15, which in St.-John's letter introduces the three kinds of concupiscence: "*Huic ergo auctoritati Noui Testamenti qua iubemur 'nihil mundi huius diligere*" (*De moribus ecclesiae* 21.39; 44s.). The schema of lust, pride and curiosity further develops in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388/389) where it appears no less than three times. It first occurs in Augustine's explanation of man's superiority over the beasts (1.23.40: *carnalis concupiscentia – tenebrosa curiositas – elati superbia*; CSEL 91,108s.). It is found a second time in the allegorical reading of the punishment of the serpent (Genesis 3:14) (2.27.41-2.28.42; 166ss.: *superbia – carnale desiderium – curiositas*) and a third time regarding the same verse in a description of those who are deceived by the serpent of the manichaean heresy (2.26.40; 165s.: *superbi – desideriis carnalibus implicati – curiosi*). In each of these cases Augustine mentions the three vices without any link to 1 John 2:16. In the sixth chapter of *De musica* (390) we find this triad at least twice in a long passage on how the soul turns away of the Truth: *carnalis uoluptatis – superbia excellentia – curiositas* (6.13.39; PL 32,1184) and *carnalis uoluptatis – honores et laudes – exploratio* (6.14.48; 1185). Although 1 John 2:16 with the enumeration of the three forms of concupiscence is part of the immediate context, Augustine's own enumeration of the threefold cupidity does not follow the order of the Johannine text.[77] This is once again an argument for the (largely) independent development of the triad in relation to the Johannine verse.

[77] To be correct, it should be mentioned that the triad *sensibilis uoluptas*, *curiositas* and *superbia* (in the Johannine order!) is already found in 6.13.39-40, but it is 'hidden' between other terms: "Amor igitur agendi aduersus succedentes passiones corporis sui, auertit animam a contemplatione aeternorum, sensibilis uoluptatis cura eius auocans intentionem (…) Auertit etiam amor de corporibus operandi (…) Auertunt phantasiae atque phantasmata (…) Avertit denique amor uanissimae cognitationis talium rerum (…) et ex his curiositas nascitur (…) Generalis uero amor actionis (…) superbia proficiscitur." After the Johannine quote in 6.14.44, however, the triad appears more clearly in 6.14.45 ("non ad carnales uoluptatem… non ad superbam excellentiam suam (…), non ad superfluam uel perniciosam curiositatem") and in 6.14.48 ("Quamobrem neque in uoluptate carnali, neque in honoribus et laudibus hominum, neque in eorum exploratione quae forinsecus corpus attingunt, nostra gaudia collecemus"). O. DU ROY, *o.c.*, p. 347, n.6.

From then on the scheme seems familiar to Augustine. In *De uera religione* (69-107) Augustine offers a systematic exposition describing the three forms of *concupiscentia*. Though 1 John 2:15-16 is quoted up to three times Augustine's enumeration of the threefold *cupiditas* does not follow the order of St. John. In the tenth chapter of the Confessiones we find an equally important and elaborate discussion of the threefold cupidity, namely in the form of an examination of conscience. Augustine quotes 1 John 2:16 three times and discusses the *concupiscentia carnis* (30, 41 – 34, 53; CC 27,176ss.), the *concupiscentia oculorum* (35, 54 – 36,58; 184ss.) and the *ambitio saeculi* (36,59 – 41,66; 187) at length. A short note on the triad appears shortly afterwards in *Sermo Denis* 14; MA 1,65ss.[78] (around 401).

Meanwhile, Augustine could detect the three forms of cupidity behind other biblical texts. At some places the idea of the threefold concupiscence even becomes a binding factor in Augustine's exegetical method of biblical texts commenting each other. In an allegorical interpretation of Psalm 8:8, for example, Augustine interprets the "beasts of the field" as people looking for *carnales uoluptates*, the "birds of the air" prefigure the *superbi* and the fishes of the see are the *curiosi*. Augustine subsequently quotes 1 John 2:16 and refers to the three temptations of Christ (cf. Matthew 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13).[79]

[78] In *Sermo Denis* 14; MA 1,65ss. (written around 401) Augustine explains 1 John 2: 16. "In concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas est, in ambitione saeculi superbia est". He subsequently dwells on the carnalis uoluptatis appetitio, the turpis curiositas and the ambitio saeculi. He concludes his exposition by an enumeration of the three vices in the inverse order: "Ubi mors uenerit, nulla remanebit ambitio, nulla curiositas oculorum, nulla appetitio sordidarum et carnalium uoluptatum: una uita contemta omnia superantur" (*Sermo Denis* 14.2-4; MA 1,65ss.).

[79] A fusion of the threefold concupiscence (but no explicit reference to 1 John 2:16) with Psalm 8 is found in *Confessiones* 5.3.4; CC 27,59: "They do not kill their own pride (*exaltationes*) like high-flying birds (*uolatilia*), their curiosity (*curiositates*) like 'fishes of the sea' (*pisces maris*), and their sexual indulgence (*luxurias*) like 'the beasts of the field (*pecora campi*) (…)". – The interpretation Augustine previously gave in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.23.40 (CSEL 91,108ss.) must have come in handy. The enumeration of the beasts, however, is not the same. *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*1.23.40 has the following links: (1) *pecora – carnalis concupiscentia*; (2) *serpentes – tenebrosa curiositas*; (3) *uolatilia coeli* or *aues – superbia* – In *Confessiones* 13.21.30; 259 we still find another enumeration: "Restrain yourselves from the savage cruelty of arrogance (*ab immani feritate superbia*), from the indolent pleasure of self-indulgence (*ab inerti uoluptate luxuriae*), and from 'knowledge falsely so called' (*a fallaci nomine scientiae*) (cf. 1 Tim. 6:20). Then the wild animals are quiet (*bestiae mansuetae*) and the beasts are tamed (*pecora edomita*) and the serpents are rendered harmless (*innoxii serpentes*): in allegory they signify the affections of the soul. The

Furthermore, the link between 1 John 2:16 and Augustine's explanation of Jesus' temptations in the desert as found in *De uera religione* and repeated in *Enarationes in Psalmos* 8.13; CC 38,55s., reappears in *Sermo* 284.5; PL 38,1291s.[80] and in *In Iohannis epistulam tractatus* 2,14; PL 35,1996s.[81] Finally, Augustine's capacity to be creative with the threefold cupidity emerges in his interpretation the parable of the banquet (Luke 14:16-24). Augustine finds that the excuses made by the invited guests in the parable follow an order inverse to the one of 1 John 2:16. The *concupiscentia carnis* is prefigured in the words "I have married a woman", the *concupiscentia oculorum* is found in the evasion "I have bought five yokes of oxen" and the *ambitio saeculi* may be discovered in the excuse "I have bought a countryhouse".[82]

haughtiness of pride (*fastus elationis*), the pleasure of lust (*delectatio libidinis*), and the poison of curiosity (*uenenum curiositatis*) (1 John 2:16) are the passions of a dead soul". O' Donnell has proposed that the beasts enumerated here correspond to an enumeration in Psalm 148,10: "... *bestiae et omnia pecora, reptilia et volatilia pennata...*" (J.J. O' DONNELL, *Confessiones II*, p. 451 and *Confessiones III*, p 393). – The birds are left out.

[80] In *Sermo* 284, 5; PL 38,1291 (397 or 418) Augustine draws the following links: "in pane, concupiscentia carnis; in promissione regnorum, ambitio saeculi; in curiositate tentationis, concupiscentia oculorum". He repeats the three vices as *carnalis voluptatis, honores et sublimitates saeculares and superfluae uel damnabiles curiositates*. Remark that Augustine neither follows the Johannine order, nor the order of Jesus' temptations. He, however, concludes by enumerating the vices in the order of John: "... tria sunt, aut voluptas, aut curiositas, aut superbia".

[81] *In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus* 2:11-14; PL 35,1995ss. (406-407) Augustine uses 1 John 2:16 as a point of departure in his exposition. He interprets *concupiscentia carnis* as *desiderium ad carnem* (12), *concupiscentia carnis* as *curiositas* (13) and *ambitio saeculi* as *superbia*. Augustine subsequently discovers the vices in Jesus' temptations in the desert. He the Johannine order which corresponds to the order of temptations in Matthew and Luke.

[82] *Sermo* 122, 6; PL 35,684: "Nolite diligere mundum, nec ea quae in mundo sunt. Quisquis dilexerit mundum, non est charitas patris in illo. Quoniam omnia, quae sunt in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi. Ab imo coepit: quo euangelium terminauit. Inde ille coepit, et unde euangelium coepit, inde iste terminum posuit. Concupiscentia carnis: uxorem duxi. Concupiscentia oculorum: quinque iuga boum emi. Ambitio saeculi, uillam emi." – 1 John 2:16 also plays a role in the second Pelagian controversy. Augustine's interpretation of the verse is by then less complex. It concentrates on one element of the triad: *concupiscentia carnis*. Julian thinks *concupiscentia* as such is innocent, whereas Augustine affirms that it is sinful because it is not from the Father, but from the world. D. DIDEBERG, *Saint Augustin et la première épître de saint Jean. Une théologie de l'agapè* (Théologie historique, 34), Paris, p. 187ff ; M. LAMBERIGTS, *De Polemiek tussen Julianus van Aeclanum en Augustinus van Hippo. Een bijdrage tot de theologiegeschiedenis van de tweede pelagiaanse controverse (418-430)*, unpublished doctoral thesis KU-Leuven, Leuven, 1988, dl. 1, p. 200-251 and dl. 2, p. 51-144.

Looking at the progressive systematisation of the triad, it seems that the influence of 1 John 2:16 increases, but it also seems that the biblical verse is not the first or only source of the triad. Did Augustine find the scripture quotation to be a good summary to express ideas previously derived from any other source? Where could Augustine have come upon this triad? Procopé writes:

> "... his source for the triad is generally thought to lie somewhere in the 'Platonic writings', the *libri Platonicorum* (*Conf.* Vii.13), which he had been reading around the time of his conversion. Now the closest parallel in surviving Platonist literature – and the fact of a 'parallel' between two texts does not automatically prove the earlier text to be a 'source' for the later – to Augustine's threefold cupidity for pleasure or excellence or sights (Ver. Rel. 69) comes in a work by Plato himself. Returning in Book IX of the Republic to the theme of the soul and its three parts, he indicates that each 'part' of the soul has its own desire: the 'appetitive part' wants physical pleasure; the 'spirited part' strives for power, victory and glory: while the 'reasoning part' seeks knowledge. This account – and it is only one among several somewhat varying accounts which Plato gives of the threefold soul – does present a trio of desires not unlike Augustine's, with the important difference that, for Plato, the drive for knowledge is our highest instinct, whereas Augustine would never treat the 'lust of the eyes' as superior or preferable 'concupiscence'. More seriously, Augustine is most unlikely to have known this passage. The Republic, unlike the Timaeus and the Phaedo, had not been translated into Latin – as far as we know; Augustine does not seem to have read Plato in Greek, and the literature which survives from the centuries between the two writers provides no convincing parallel to the triad which they appear to have in common."[83]

Augustine's triad with the three types of vices indeed corresponds to Plato's tripartition of the soul. The Greek terms used by Plato in Book IX of the Republic are: τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ λογιστικόν.[84] Pleasure is the vice of the desiring part of the soul, pride can be seen as the vice of the courageous part of the soul and curiosity belongs to the rational part of the soul.[85] Is this correspondence no mere coincidence? Procopé doubts that Augustine was familiar with this text in Plato, but he is right when he asserts a bit further on in his article that Augustine "certainly knew, perhaps from Cicero or from some doxography, that Plato had 'made the soul

[83] PROCOPE, *a.c.*, p. 1301.

[84] *Republic* IV 434d-445b (especially 439e-442c). Plato returns to the issue in Republic IX 580d – 583a and 588b-592a. J. Adam (ed.), *The Republic of Plato*, Vol. 1-2, Cambridge / London / New York / Melbourne, 1979.

[85] Cf. the reference to the Platonian division of the soul in e.g. DU ROY, *o.c.*, p. 344-345 n. 2.

tripartite', but that was a commonplace with a variety of possible interpretations".[86] Attempts to trace back the triad to one particular Neo-platonic author, were undertaken by W. Theiler (referring to Porphyry) and J. O' Donnell (referring to Plotinus).[87] Both proposals were criticized by Du Roy.[88] As Procopé says, no convincing parallel has been found.[89] The same holds true for the Greek and Latin church fathers. Several fathers have taken up a scheme of threefold desire, but in tripartitions that do not correspond to the Augustinian division.[90] In Latin patrology the exegesis of 1 John 2:16 has nowhere received the importance nor the richness of Augustine's triad.[91]

Therefore, we should not underestimate Augustine's capacity to create new syntheses based on his cultural background. The Plotinian influence is certainly present in Augustine's view on pride. In Enneads V, 1, 1-8 a treatise we know Augustine read[92], Plotinus explains the fall of the soul in terms of a primal 'audacity' (τόλμα) along with the desire to belong to oneself. Such motives have clear affinities with

[86] PROCOPÉ, *o.c.*, p. 1302. – In *De Ciuitate Dei* 14.49; Augustine writes: "Plato triplicem fincit animum". Cf. CICERO, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.20. (Procopé, *a.c.*, p. 1305 n.17)

[87] W. THEILER, *Porphyrius und Augustin*, Halle, 1933, p. 37 and 40; R. J. O'-CONNELL, "The plotinian fall of the soul", in: *Traditio* 19 (1963) 1-32.

[88] W. Theiler associates the augustinian scheme with Porphyry (without excluding a possible influence of stoicism, see my note 92) but he does not quote any text of Porphyry offering a similar triad. (W. THEILER, *Porphyrios und Augustin*, Halle, 1933, p. 37 en 40). Du Roy criticizes the double presupposition at the basis of Theiler's work, namely: "Augustine ne peut avoir élaboré lui-même de tells schèmes, et quand on en trouve chez lui qui ne sont pas chez Plotin, ils proviennent de Porphyre"; J. O'Connell thought that the scheme could be traced back to Plotinus (R. J. O'CONNELL, *a.c.*, p. 24-32). Du Roy, however, doubts whether curiositas stems from πολυπράγμων found in Enneads III, 7, 11, 15. Du Roy, *o.c.*, p. 344-345.

[89] A. Labhardt refers to Seneca (Ep. 59,15) though not without he himself uttering doubts. (A. Labhardt, "Curiositas. Notes sur l'histoire d'un mot et d'une notion", in: *Museum Helveticum* (1960) 206-224, p. 222. Regarding this quote O. Du Roy admits that the triad might have existed before, but he does not doubt that Augustine's use of it is highly original; Procopé classifies Seneca, Ep. 59,15 as "the closest – and not very convincing – parallel". – The stoic tripartitions quoted by Theiler are disposed by both DU ROY, *o.c.*, p. 345-346, n.3 ("peu convainçants") and PROCOPÉ, *a.c.*, p.1305 n. 16 ("still less convincing"). These quotations are: Epiktet. *Entretiens* 3,2,1; Cicero, *De officiis* II, 5, 18; Mark. Aurel., *Pensées* VII, 5, 55 and Stob. II 115,5 W. (THEILER, *a.c.*, p. 40 n.1).

[90] DIDEBERG, *o.c.*, p. 184.

[91] DIDEBERG, *ibid.* – The triad appears in Ambrosius, Ambrosiaster, Cyprien, Hieronymus and Tertullian.

[92] Augustine quotes Enneade V i (10) as *de tribus principalibus substantiis* in *De Ciuitate Dei* 10.23 (DU ROY, *o.c.*, p. 84, n.2; PROCOPE, *a.c.*, p. 1302, n. 22.

Augustine's notion of *superbia*, as we can see from *De moribus* 12.20 where Augustine calls it 'audacia' and defines its intention as "suae potestatis esse cupit".[93] Together with bible verses such as Ecclesiastes 10:15, this might explain the primacy Augustine gives to pride, unlike Plato. The link between *curiositas* and *concupiscentia oculorum* might have arisen in Augustine's mind while writing the paragraphs on *temperantia* in *De moribus* 35-39. There are some indications that the link between *curiositas* and *concupiscentia oculorum* is 'in the making'[94]: (a) Augustine reminds St. John's warning not to love the world (*nihil mundi huius diligere*). The three kinds of concupiscence are not mentioned, but – as will become clear- Augustine might have had them at the back of his mind. Augustine presents a "Platonist interpretation of the 'world' as the realm of the senses: *amandus igitur solus Dei est; omnis uero iste mundus, id est, omnia sensibilia contemnenda*". 1 John 2:15-16 suggests that the influence of the sensible world is threefold: alongside *corporeas illecebras laudemque popularem*, a third kind of temptation might exist; (b) Augustine draws a contrast between on the one hand "true knowledge of the *invisibilia et divina*" and on the other hand, "a fallacious *rerum scientia* derived de *corporibus per imaginations*". Procopé remarks that Augustine was already familiar with the terms *imagines* and *simulacra* as impediments to real knowledge (see: *Contra Academicos* 3.18 and *De beata vita* 33). *Curiositas* was not mentioned in this context. The concept of *curiositas* simply meant "desire for superfluous knowledge" (*De ordine* 1.31; 2.17) or for "occult knowledge" (*De ordine* 2.27, 42). Exactly in *De moribus* 38 (where the three kinds of concupiscence nearly emerged) the prohibition against being curios is equated with *cavendum esse simulacris* (1 John 5:21). According to Procopé "the contrast between love of genuine and love of spurious

[93] Cf. O'CONNELL, "The Plotinian Fall of the Soul", in: *Traditio* 19 (1963) 24-32, p. 28-30. O. Du Roy supports O'CONNELL at this particular point: "Je suis entièrement d'accord avec lui voir dans Enn. V,I, 1, 1-8 un texte bien connu d'Augustin comme l'avait déjà montré A. Solignac. De même la composante plotinienne (*tolma*) de la superbia augustinienne est indubitable comme on le voit dans le De Mor., I, 12, 20, PL, XXXII, 1320, où Augustin l'appelle *audacia* et en définit l'intention par *suae potestatis esse cupit*" (O. DU ROY, *o.c.*, p. 344-345,n.1 (ad nr. 2). Du Roy's approval at this point, though he is making critical comments, is also noted by N. J. TORCHIA, *St. Augustine's treatment of superbia and its Plotinian Affinities* in: *Augustinian Studies* 18 (1987) 66-80.

[94] I follow J.F. Procopé's argument: PROCOPÉ, *a.c.*, p. 1305 n. 5. The quotations in my paragraph on the link between *curiositas* and *concupiscentia oculorum* refer to Procopé's note.

wisdom" was "a commonplace in ancient moralising about *curiositas*". "In writings of Cynic tendency, any persuit of useless knowledge was just 'vain curiosity'"; (c) "In *De moribus* the notion that sight is our prime sense and that *visibilia* can do duty for *sensibilia*" provides "a weapon against the Manichees". In *Confessiones* 10.54 a significant addition is found: "the eyes are our most important sense when it comes to knowledge: *oculi... sunt ad noscendum in sensibus principes*. Hence our desire for experience as against sheer pleasure, our *experiendi per carnem vana et curiosa cupiditas, ... concupiscentia oculorum eloquio divino appellata est*."[95] The link between *uoluptas* and *concupiscentia carnis* is not surprising. I point to the fact that Augustine takes up the notion *concupiscentia carnis* from 1 John 2:16 whereas previously he generally used *carnalis concupiscentia*, *carnalis desiderium*...

Some considerations on "Augustine, Manichaeism and the Good" by Kam-lun Edwin Lee

Before concluding, we would like to make some critical observations on Kam-lun Edwin Lee's book *Augustine, Manichaeism and the Good*. In the fourth chapter of this book, entitled "concept of personal evil", Lee has proposed a direct link between Augustine's use of the term *concupiscentia* and his understanding of the Manichaean notion. Treating the concept of concupiscence Lee has tried to prove that there is a change of emphasis in the concept of *concupiscentia* early around 388. According to Lee Augustine would have consciously attempted to equate the term *concupiscentia* with the "Manichaean notion of libido". In this process, which he sees completed in 390, when *De uera religione* was composed, *concupiscentia* would have acquired a strong sexual overtone. Lee admits that Augustine has not forsaken the more general understanding of *concupiscentia* as uncontrolled desire for worldly things, but he also finds in this a result of the influence from the Manichaean concept of evil as loss of tranquillity.[96]

To our opinion, Lee is too fast in drawing conclusions. We have pointed out that *concupiscentia* occurs in Augustine's works no earlier than in 388 when Augustine used *concupiscentia* in the context of food. It is therefore premature to discover already from 388 onwards

[95] PROCOPÉ, *o.c.*, p. 1304 n. 11 and 1305 n. 5.

[96] Kam-lun Edwin LEE, *Augustine, Manichaeism and the Good* (Patristic Studies, 2), New York, 1999, p. 41-59.

of a change of emphasis in the concept of *concupiscentia* in Augustine's corpus. In 390 *concupiscentia carnis* is indeed sexual, but one might not forget that in *De uera religione* Augustine does not only elaborate on *concupiscentia carnis* but also on *concupiscentia oculorum* and on *ambitio saeculi*. Thus, *concupiscentia carnis* is only part of the picture. Moreover, Augustine clearly states in the *Confessiones* that *concupiscentia carnis* might not be limited to the sexual realm.[97] The position of Lee implies that libido is a sexual term which (at least in Augustine's thought) was used by the Manichees. He does however not sufficiently prove this.[98] Anyway, we need to remark that *libido* is a classical term which as a matter of fact also occurs in the Bible. Augustine uses this term not only in a sexual sense, but also with a general meaning for example in *De Sermone domini in monte* where *libido* is used to indicate the element of consent in sinning.[99] Finally, regarding the assertion that Augustine would have derived the notion of uncontrolled desire from Manichaeism, T. van Bavel has uttered the critique that we should consider the possibility that Augustine draws upon an general philosophical conviction, rather than on Manichaeism. Indeed, also Plato had spoken of ἄτακτος κίνησις (unordered, uncontrolled movement) and in *De civitate Dei* 14,19; CC 48,441s.

[97] The most remarkable and interesting text regarding the sexual interpretation of *concupiscentia carnis* in the early Augustine is probably *De sermone Domini in monte* 1.36 where Augustine understands *fornicatio* as "every kind of carnal and lustful concupiscence" (*carnalis et libidinosa concupiscentia*). Augustine legitimates this interpretation on the basis of scripture: *"Indeed since the Scriptures so constantly give to idolatry the name of fornication (cf. Ezech 16.20v) and since the Apostle Paul calls avarice idolatry (cf. Col. 3,5; Eph. 5:5), who can doubt that every evil concupiscence may be rightly called fornication?"* Augustine explains the metaphor as following: *"For when the soul disregards the higher law by which it is governed, and prostitutes itself as though for a price, then it corrupts itself through base delight in lower natures." Avaritia*, idolatry and *infidelitas* (in the sense of unbelief) all belong to this kind of *fornicatio*. In other words: the concept of *concupiscentia* is not limited to the sexual realm, but a term normally given a sexual interpretation, is broadened to every kind of *concupiscentia*. – Lee could at least have remarked that *concupiscentia* keeps on occurring in the context of food, e.g. in *De sermone Domini in monte* 2.59; CC 35,155 and *Confessiones* 10.31.45-47; CC 27,178ss. Moreover, he could have mentioned that in *De mendacio* 7.10; CSEL 41,428s. (394/395), treating the question whether or not a white lie can be used to prevent sexual abuse Augustine speaks of *libido* (with and without sexual connotation), not of *concupiscentia*.

[98] Lee bases this assumption on a reference to *libido* in the description of the Manichaean myth. LEE, *o.c.*, p. 54-55.

[99] Th. F. MARTIN, *Rhetoric and Exegesis in Augustine's interpretation of Romans 7:24-25a* (Studies in Bible and Early Christianity, 47), Lewiston / Queenston / Lampeter, 2001, p. 56.

Augustine explicitly mentions the position of the neo-platonici regarding the *inordinate moveri* by the *libido*.[100]

Secondly, Lee makes much of a thing of the mentioning of the word *consuetudo* in *De uera religione*. He says that the general optimism of the earlier dialogues is replaced by a general recognition of human fallenness in terms of carnal *consuetudo*.[101] In the following paragraph Lee explains the vicious circle mechanism which he finds in *De uera religione*:

> "To summarize, the vicious circle begins as the soul voluntarily defects toward bodily pleasure. This defection causes bodily corruption that burdens the soul with increased susceptibility to the appeal of further bodily pleasure. The dynamic notion of turbulence inherent in the Manichaean idea of bodily pleasure is now put to work in this mechanism of a vicious circle. Moreover, the blinding effect due to ignorance is an added assurance of bondage to this pleasure. There is then no need for the supposition of a substantial evil principle to work behind the scenes in a person, because the enticement of the bodily pleasure with its blinding effection the soul is enough to keep a fallen human in perpetual bondage. In abstinance of divine grace, the human existential condition of "corruption" provides an alternative explanation to the phenomenon of human struggle. Or, in other words, the flesh" as an evil principle is this corruptive condition, characterized by the soul's earthy affection, being sustained in the mortal body. Consuetudo, then, is the corruptive condition -or the flesh- played out in the vicious circle mechanism, from which comes the mysterious gravitation toward evil".[102]

According to Lee, at the point when the full theory of *consuetudo* is developed, *concupiscentia* is only a part of the picture. Nevertheless, he writes that already in *De uera religione concupiscentia* plays a central role in the concept of *consuetudo*. In Augustine's explanation of the relationship between the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes and the *ambito saeculi*, Lee finds the "gist of the theory of personal evil":

> "bondage comes as one's pride leads to self-love in the form of the pursuit of carnal delights, and one's curiosity adds to the viciousness of the situation by deceiving the soul into thinking that there is no alternative (i.e., worshipping God as the highest truth) (xxxviii.69). Under general consideration, concupiscentia is the force that keeps one in bondage. Although the blinding effect of concupiscentia oculorum helps the enticement of uoluptas or concupiscentia carnis to work (xx. 40), it seems that it is the enticing sweetness (dulcedo) of he latter that does the more serious damage by drawing one back to sin repeatedly (xv. 29), and hence, as the logic goes, enables consuetudo to entrench"[103].

[100] T.J. VAN BAVEL, *Augustinus' houding tegenover seksualiteit*, in: *Kleio* 22 (1993) 176-185, p. 180-182.
[101] LEE, *o.c.*, p. 73
[102] LEE, *o.c.*, p. 51.
[103] LEE, *o.c.*, p. 58.

Lee is truly right in pointing out that there is a link between the ideas of bodily pleasure and ignorance. There is indeed a mutual influence. Augustinus writes: *"Nolite certare nisi cum consuetudine corporum. Ipsam uincite, uicta erunt omnia."* Still it seems to him that the "unhappy friends of this world" fear to be separated from worldly things so that "nothing is more toilsome to them than to be at rest". This is due to falsehood which originates in sin and deceives us so that we think something is what it is not (20.40; CC 32,211s. and 35.65-67; 229ss.).[104] However, asserting that Augustine works out a systematic theory of a vicious circle and perpetual bondage already in *De uera religione*, is pushing the issue too far. In our opinion, the three-fold concupiscence of 1 John 2:16 primary functions as a comprehensive term for all kind of vices. Only a few years later, in 395, Augustine writes in his commentary on Psalm 8: "Now these three kinds of vices, namely the pleasure of the flesh, and pride and curiosity, include all sins. And they appear to me to be enumerated by the apostle John, when he says "Love not the world, for all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life."[105] His most important critique on the Manichees seems to be: "It is very easy to execrate the flesh, but very difficult to not to think carnally."[106] The Manichees dismissed the flesh, but what more urgently they need to do, is stop thinking carnally. Augustine here points

[104] Cf. "he (=Augustine) is aware of the stages by which the *consuetudo corporum* can tighten its hold on a man. It leads him to neglect God, to prefer corporeal things to their Creator. And this sin brings its penalty with it. It feeds the sinner with deceptive pleasures which are merely passing, and do not satisfy him. In fact, they torture him most painfully, and eventually lead him into error. He begins to think that the material object he loved is the first form, when it is the lowest form of all, namely that of a corporeal thing. And, even when he attempts to avoid sin, his materialistic point of view can still deceive him about God. For he images God as an immense light that he sees about him here. He promises himself a future dwelling place with this light, but he does not know that he is still caught in the concupiscence of the eyes, and that he is carrying this world with him in his effort to transcend it. He thinks that he has reached another world simply by imaging the bright part if this world infinitely extended." PRENDIVILLE, *a.c.*, p. 32-33.

[105] That Augustine could use the three-fold cupidity in an inventive way, can be illustrated by the way he uses it in his allegorical exegesis. In his commentary on Psalm 8 as well as in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* the triad of concupiscence is discovered in the beasts of the field (carnal voluptuousness), the birds on the air (pride) and the fishes in the sea (fantasy and imagination). "The curious who walk to the paths of the sea, search in the deep after the temporal things of this world, which like paths of the sea, vanish and parish as quickly as the water comes together again after it has given room in the passage of ships or fish."

[106] *De uera religione* 40 ; CC 32,235ss.

to the material way in which the Manichees conceived God and parts of lights which in their vision had spread everywhere. Augustine charges the Manichees with *concupiscentia oculorum.*

The vicious circle which Lee discovers, is not to be found as such in Augustine. Lee therefore seems to make *De uera religione* much more ponderous than it really is.[107] By reading *De uera religione* one should imagine a ladder of perfection leading from earth to heaven. From the second half of *De uera religione* onwards (29.52; 221) Augustine uses a discourse of ascent. With this he touches a neoplatonic theme which dominates much of Augustine's early thinking. The elaboration on the threefold concupiscence and how it must be overcome, (cf. supra), should be seen against this background. The ascent is here described by means of biblical themes: starting with the old, outer and earthly man chained by the desire to temporal objects, moving forward to the new, inner and heavenly man. (Cf. 1 Corinthians 2:15; 1 Corinthians 4:16). Augustine is aware that the transformation from the old man into the new, can not fully be reached in this life. Nevertheless, the upward line of the soul's ascent towards the vision of God is a characteristic of *De uera religione*. Prendiville, who investigated the topic of *consuetudo* in *De uera religione*, writes:

> "...de vera religione is still hugging the coastline of Plotinus, where sin is weakness rather than defiance, cured by greater wisdom and a change of plan, rather than contrition or expiation, and where there is the same optimistic view that habit alone stands between God and the soul"
>
> "Sinful habits are not regarded primary as productive of disobedience, revolt, rebellion against God, but as hindrances to seeing God"
>
> "Accept the medicine of Revelation, Augustine says...do not burry yourself in the world of the senses, and you will conquer yourself, attain the selfpossession necessary to see God." [108]

This runs counter to the assessment of Lee that "the general optimism of the earlier dialogues is replaced by a general recognition of the effect of human fallenness".[109] Firstly, the term 'optimism' is not an adequate term to describe Augustine's early view because it sug-

[107] It seems as if Lee is aware that he offers an over-interpretation of the problem of the struggle of the flesh in *De uera religione*. Lee is aware of the fact that Augustine seems to feel that the key problem of the struggle of the flesh resides in the mind. Nevertheless, Lee wants to continue asking the question of "the true nature of this "flesh" – the principle of personal evil – that Augustine *has only implicitly* assumed in the foregoing discussion" (my italics).

[108] PRENDIVILLE, *a.c.*, p. 56 (three quotes).

[109] LEE, *o.c.*, p.73.

gests that the later Augustine would be a pessimist, whereas in fact, grace is accepted as a gift which can only be positive. It would be better to assess man's power consequently in the light of God's grace. Secondly, although Prendiville and Lee both seem to speak of 'optimism' and 'pessimism' taking as a point of view (only) man's ability to proceed toward the vision of God, they come to a different assessment of the same work. This difference is closely related to Lee's argument that "despite Augustine's use of a discourse of ascent from *uer. rel.* xxix.52 onwards, his intention is to point out the presence of human perversity which, without the correction of divine grace, will undoubtedly prevent one from seeing God (e.g. xxxiii.62)." [110] Grace is assumed, but in my opinion Lee exaggerates the impact of evil in the composition of *De uera religione*. Augustine does indeed accept the fall, he speaks of personal evil and evil which is *poena peccati* and therefore not an evil but a good. My point is that Augustine elaborates these ideas on evil however without clearly willing to imply an elaborated system or even a spiral of evil which could be an alternative to the Manichaean idea on evil as a substance forcing us to commit evil deeds.

By reading ideas on a 'vicious circle mechanism' already in *De uera religione*, Lee is able to minimize the influence of Augustine's rereading of Paul: he stresses the fact "*that the content of Augustine's notion of consuetudo is already found in De uera religione, although there could be a clarification along the Pauline route*". [111] As to *concupiscentia*, Lee speaks of "*the continuity in the notion of concupiscentia before and after Augustine's focus on the Pauline text*". [112] Yet, it is no earlier than in *Acta contra Fortunatum* (392) that Augustine clearly and explicitly restricts the full exercise of free will to the first man:

> "I say that there was free exercise if will in that man who was first formed. He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist his will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God. But after he voluntarily sinned, we who have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity." [113]

[110] LEE, *ibid.*
[111] LEE, *o.c.*, p. 53
[112] LEE, *ibid.*
[113] *Acta contra Fortunatum* 22; CSEL 25/1,103s.: "liberum uoluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est. Ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino uoluntati eius resisteret, si uellet dei praecepta seruare. Postquam autem libera ipse uoluntate peccauit, nos in neccessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stripe descendimus" (Comp. *De libero Arbitrio* 3.17.48; CC 29,303). Ph. SCHAFF (ed.), *The writings against the Manichaeans and against the Donatists* (A select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Series 1, Vol. 4), Grand Rapids, 1996 (repr. 1887), p. 121.

The explanation of how freedom can turn into necessity is in fact an enlargement to the meta-level of mankind of what Augustine finds on the individual level:

> "But each one of us can by little consideration find that what I say is true. For today in our actions before we are implicated by any habit, we have free choice of doing anything or not doing it. But when by that liberty we have done something and the pernicious sweetness and pleasure of that deed has taken hold upon the mind by its own habit the mind is so complicated that afterwards it cannot conquer what by sinning it has fashioned." [114]

In his dispute with Fortunatus Augustine was challenged to explain how Paul was "consistent with his faith" since the Manichaean priest had used some Pauline verses (Romans 8:7 and Galatians 5:17) in order to support Manichaean dualism. As to Romans 8:7 Augustine explains that the *prudential carnis* does not imply an evil nature fighting against the law of God. The *prudential carnis* cannot possibly be under the law of God, just as "snow cannot be warm". Just as snow melts by heat, so the mond of the flesh can make 'good habit' in stead of evil habit. This is possible "when our mind had become illuminated, that is when God has subjected for Himself the whole man to the choice of the divine Law". As to Galatians 5:17 Augustine states: "what wars against the soul is habit formed in the flesh (*consuetudo facta cum carne*)". He recalls the fact that we still live according to the "old" or "earthly man", this is: "according to the flesh" (cf. 1 Corinthians 15:21, comp. 5:19).[115] In short: concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit has come down to us as a punishment for primal sin which was voluntarily committed, but God promises us to set us free from the law of sin and death through Christ.

Lee is certainly right when he says that Augustine challenged by the Manichees had no choice but to study Paul. In his subsequent Pauline commentaries Augustine will even work out a scheme defending the Law and making use of the concept *concupiscentia*. This scheme reflects "both (1) the stages of human history as per-

[114] *Acta contra Fortunatum* 22; 104; : "potest autem unusquisque nostrum modiocri consideratione inuenire uerum esse, quod dico. Hodie namque in actionibus nostris antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid uel non faciendi. Cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosa dulcedo et uoluptas, eadem ipsa consuetudine sua sic inplicatur, ut postea uincere non posit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est". Ph. SCHAFF (ed.), *The writings against the Manichaeans and against the Donatists* (A select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Series I, Vol. 4), Grand Rapids, 1996 (repr. 1887), p. 121.

[115] *Acta Contra Fortunatum* 22; CSEL 25/1, 103ss.

ceived in relation to the law of Sinai and the coming of Christ and (2) various dispositions of the human person in relation to the evil and morally good".[116] I am not going into further detail, but I only point to the fact that these ideas are new and not yet in *De uera relgione*.

Conclusions and final remarks: Concupiscentia as a Manichaean idea taken over by Augustine?

The concept of *concupiscentia* appears in the Augustinian corpus from 388 onwards, as soon as Augustine starts his direct anti-manichaean campaign writing *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et Manichaeorum* (387/388) and *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388/389). Augustine's first usage of the concept *concupiscentia* in *De moribus* 1.17; CSEL 90,34s. is based on a quotation of Wisdom 6:12-20. Although the positive connotation of the concept *concupiscentia* is in line with the positive use of the verb *concupiscer*e in Augustine's early writings, the positive connotation subsequently seems to have disappeared to the background of Augustine's thought. The concept of *concupiscentia* reappears in *De Moribus* in its negative sense, namely as an equivalent of an excessive appetite for food while criticizing the Manichaean eating habits. In *De Genesi* Augustine concentrates on the allegorical explanation of Gods commandment to have power over the beasts, i.e. to crucify the flesh with its perturbations and desires. Augustine differentiates the concept *concupiscentia* according to (some of) the beasts enumerated in Genesis: the cattle represents the *carnalis concupiscentia*, the serpents are blinded by dark *curiositas* and the birds are puffed up with *superbia*. In his explanation of Genesis, Augustine depicts the Manichaean error in a way similar to his description of the serpent, using the triad pride, carnal desire and curiosity. The same triad is worked out in a splendid way in *De uera religione* (391) on the basis of 1 John 2:15-16. The three temptations should be hold in subjection in order to move forward from the old and earthly man towards the new and heavenly man. Especially the concept of *concupiscentia oculorum* was used by Augustine against the Manichees to criticize their imaginations of large spaces of light and their carnal way of thinking God. In other words: the term *con-*

[116] W. S. BABCOCK, *Augustine's interpretation of Romans (A.D. 394-396)*, in: *Augustinian Studies* 10 (1979) 55-74, p. 59. – See: *Prop. ad Rom.* 13-18; CC 84,6ss. *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 66-68; CC 44A,150ss. *Ad Simplicianum* 1.1-2; CC 44,7ss. (implicitly).

cupiscentia occurs both in an exhortation to overcome the temptations as well as in critique on the Manichaean believe and their concupiscent behaviour.

The concept of *concupiscentia* seems to be a 'more biblical equivalent' of *cupiditas* and *libido*. Though the number of *concupiscentia*-hits in Augustine's early works may not be exaggerated, the gradual increase of the term *concupiscentia* in Augustine's work runs parallel to the increase of his knowledge of Bible. Up to 391 Augustine refers to the following Bible verses containing either the word *concupiscentia* or the verb *concupiscere*: Romans 13:14, Galatians 5:17.24, Exodus 20:17 and 1 John 2:15-16. The specific meaning of *concupiscentia* as 'excessive appetite for food', for instance, might not be clear from the quoted verse Romans 13:14, but the fact that greediness is an aspect of the biblical meaning of *concupiscentia* is clear from other biblical verses, such as Ecclesiasticus 23:6 and Genesis 25:34 (which Augustine quotes in *Confessiones* 10.46). Regarding the interpretation of the threefold *concupiscentia* in 1 John 2: 15-16 we made clear that the triad *concupiscentia carnalis – superbia – curiositas* was used by Augustine before his actual use of the triad of the First letter of St. John. Since *concupiscentia* is a biblical term, Augustine did not necessarily borrow it from Manichaeism. Assuming that *concupiscentia* was a concept well known by the Manichees, that Paul had a lot of prestige in Manichaean circles it seems that Augustine could and did use the concept concupiscentia to fight the Manichees with their own weapons. Further research regarding the use of *concupiscentia* in Manichaean texts might reveal further parallelisms between Augustine and Manichaeism sharing biblical texts. Further research regarding the use of concupiscentia in Manichaean texts might reveal further parallelisms between Augustine and Manichaeism sharing biblical texts.

Van Oort has pointed to the fact that both the Manichees and Augustine share the aspect of unordered and uncontrolled desire. However, this aspect should not necessarily be derived from Manicheaism, since the idea is already present in Augustine's description of the reign of *libido* (cf. *De libero arbitrio* 1.11.22; CC 29,226). Moreover, Augustine knew of the neoplatonic position regarding the *inordinate mouveri*. What is left of the theory that the strong sexual overtone in *concupiscentia* would be based on the Manichaeism implication of *libido* or *concupiscentia*? Up till 391 we could only find the sexual meaning of *concupiscentia carnis* in *De uera religione* but this is only one type of *concupiscentia* and it is limited to one hit. The sexual implication of *concupiscentia* is frequent in Augustine's dis-

pute with Faustus (397/399) on the Old Testament and is especially used by the late Augustine in the Pelagian controversy.

I do agree with Lee pointing to the difference between the Johannine and the Pauline notion of *concupiscentia* in Augustine: the Johannine notion of concupiscentia fails to bring out the issue of inner struggle as forceful as Paul does. Indeed, the Johannine concept of *concupiscentia* rather offers Augustine a structural help for the elaboration on the theme of *concupiscentia*. The idea that different types of concupiscence reinforce each other is certainly present. Furthermore, Augustine is indeed looking for an explanation on evil and he does so in terms of *concupiscentia* but I have serious doubts whether Augustine tried to imply any elaborated system explaining evil and offering an alternative to the Manichean legend already in *De uera religione*. Firstly, in *De Genesi*, Augustine holds that the corrupted body weighs down the soul (Wisdom 9:15), but he does not say that our situation has turned to the worst because of Adam and Eve. Secondly, the large place Lee gives to evil in *De uera religione* seems to run counter to the general optimism of the book. In *De uera religione*, the threefold concupiscence is placed in the context of an ascent. The meaning of *concupiscentia* is even amplified: the temptations not only function as obstacles towards the happy life, but they also remind man at his true vocation. Thirdly, if Augustine hold a clear theory on the necessity of evil already in *De uera religion*e, why than is he still looking for an explanation in *Acta contra Fortunatum* and subsequently struggling with the problem in the Pauline commentaries?

By speaking of a "direct link" between Augustine and Manichaeism, Lee has tried to move beyond the research of J. van Oort who is "only willing to concede the possibility of a common root between the two views"[117]. Nevertheless, Lee's "direct link" remains – as to say – 'in Augustine's head': between Augustine's *understanding* the Manichaean notion and between Augustine's own notion. Augustine's writing on *concupiscentia* surely runs parallel with his anti-Manichaean debate. I doubt whether Augustine tried to imply an already elaborated system on evil in *De uera relgione*. Rather than taking over the Manichaean notion of *concupiscentia* he might have been 'forced' to write on *concupiscentia* because of the Manichaean debate. He concentrates on Scripture and defends his ideas with the authority of Scripture. Doing so, he has to take seriously the Pauline

[117] LEE, *o.c.*, p. 54.

insight of mans inability to attain the good without God's grace. What Augustine writes is a critique on Manichaeism, rather than being indebt. And: Could (part of) the common root looked for between Augustine and the Manichees not simply be Paul?[118]

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AUGUSTINE ON PREDESTINATION: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RECEPTION

Augustine's doctrine of predestination cannot be separated from its reception; for this began in Augustine's lifetime. Augustine himself was the first to deal with the impact of his doctrine upon contemporary theology; and this had implications for the further reception process. In a certain sense this is just another way of saying that Augustine's doctrine of predestination underwent a development[1], not only in the period from 393 to 397[2], but also in the late 420s, when Augustine revised and reinterpreted his earlier teaching and thereby participated in the reception process, which by then had already begun. Thus it is above all Augustine's own œuvre that allows us to study his doctrine of predestination not only from its sources and early development, but also in the light of its consequences for the reception.

1. Beginnings: *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos (393/4)*

Augustine's doctrine of predestination originates in the context of the development of his doctrine of grace (*gratia*), his soteriology.[3] However, its origins do not coincide with the beginnings of his

[1] J. M. RIST, *Augustine on Free Will and Predestination. Journal of Theological Studies. New Series* 20 (1969) 420-47, while outlining developments of individual aspects, presents Augustine's doctrine of predestination on the whole as a monolithic phenomenon; similarly, though shorter and with a slightly different angle, G. J. P. O'DALY, *Predestination and Freedom in Augustine's Ethics*, in: G. VESEY (ed.), *The Philosophy in Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 85-97.

[2] As recently demonstrated by V. H. DRECOLL, *Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins*. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 109 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999).

[3] In a certain sense this is coextensive with Augustine's work as a whole, though some, like Drecoll (n. 2) 21-22, seem inclined to accept only those parts of Augustine's thought as strictly 'soteriological', or as 'doctrine of grace', which actually employ the expression *gratia* in a theological ('soteriological') sense. Yet Augustine had a notion of the 'God-drivenness' of salvation (Wetzel) long before he linked it to the word *gratia* and long before he understood *gratia* with all the implications which this term has, e. g., in *Ad Simplicianum* or the *Confessiones*. It is true that from 397 the lowest common denominator is the concept of grace developed in *Ad Simplicianum*. However, the later Augustine is keen to link the post-*Ad Simplicianum* concept of grace with that which he had held earlier, or which, in a sense, he had 'always' held. Nevertheless, his doctrine of predestination arises from that narrower 'doctrine of grace' developed in his Pauline exegesis culminating in *Ad Simplicianum* 1.2.

soteriology in his earliest writings (386 to 390), or with the first theological (salvation-historical) use of *gratia* in *De vera religione* (391).[4] Even the Pauline use of *gratia* is initially less central here than one might assume.[5] Rather, Augustine comes across the problem of predestination when he first attempts a literal reading of Romans 8:28-30 in his *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos* (393/4).[6] In this passage God is said to foreknow (*praescire*) those who will respond positively to his call to faith. God's call therefore is a call that corresponds to the foreknown outcome, *vocatio secundum propositum*: Called are only those who are going to respond positively. They are the *electi*, foreseen by God to have faith (*fides*), which is equivalent to their being predestined to conform to Christ: *quos praescivit et praedestinavit*... The cornerstones of Augustine's interpretation of these verses in his *exp. prop. Rom* are therefore God's prescience and the elect's free decision to believe. The former seeks to uphold the principle that salvation can only come from God,[7] the latter, that this must not contradict human freedom; humanity must remain involved in the God-driven salvation process.[8]

Just how useful a concept of divine *praescientia* was for Augustine in *exp. prop. Rom* is illustrated by his exegesis of Romans 9:11-13 in that work.[9] Again, human freedom is among Augustine's prior concerns. Is it not denied, he asks, if Romans 9:13 (*Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui*) is understood to state that God decides *a priori* who is elected and who rejected? Divine *praescientia* answers the question: God 'foreknows' how either twin will 'act' – 'acting' here

[4] On the soteriological dimension of *De vera religione* as compared to that of the earlier writings cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 84-143.

[5] It is the doctrine of the four stages (*ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace*), in which *gratia* first appears (in this specific use) in *exp. prop. Rom*; cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 147-64.

[6] It first appears as a problem in *exp. prop. Rom* 55 (CSEL 84, 30); cf. J. LÖSSL, *Intellectus gratiae. Die erkenntnistheoretische und hermeneutische Dimension der Gnadenlehre Augustins*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 38 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 54-55; Drecoll (n. 2) 165.

[7] J. WETZEL, *Predestination, Pelagianism, and foreknowledge*, in: E. STUMP and N. KRETZMANN (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 49-58 at 49, called this the 'God-drivenness' of salvation (cf. also above n. 3).

[8] Later, in *sermo* 169.11.13 (PL 38, 923A), Augustine was going to say: 'He who made you without you does not justify you without you. And so he made you when you were unknowing; he justifies you when you are willing.'

[9] Cf. *exp. prop. Rom* 60-61 (CSEL 84, 33-36); Lössl (n. 4) 55-56; Drecoll (n. 2) 165-66.

not understood as 'performing good works', 'doing good' (that would contradict Romans 9:12 (*non ex operibus*)), but as meritum that triggers the *electio* (*nullo merito non est electio*), a free act of faith that opens the hearts of the electi to receive the Holy Spirit, who in turn grants, as God's gift (*donum dei*), the electi the ability to do good (*bonum operari*), to perform good works. No one can do good without this grace from God. Yet God does not force this grace upon any one. He merely foresees those who by their own free are going to open themselves in a (merited) act of faith to receive it, and then grants them it (as unmerited).[10]

There are two dimensions of divine preeminence in this model. One is substantial, the other temporal: Though God leaves the ultimate decision about the *initium fidei* to human beings, there is nothing they can (or would even want to) do with this 'power' except submit to God's grace. After all, only the chosen are foreseen in this way. It is only they who make that decision anyway. Thus *praescientia* here smacks already of *praedestinatio*, even more so since God is really eternal, timeless. His *praescientia* is to be thought of as preceeding (and thereby causing) everything, notwithstanding the human ability to make free choices; and if put in salvation-historical terms, God's call preceeds all the choices and all the good works which the *vocati* might have been able to do on their own account before they were called.

Nevertheless, Augustine was not happy with this model, because it still ascribed a merit to the free (albeit foreseen) act of faith, while grace was supposed to be granted without merit. Divine power did not yet reign supreme; for while the believer, though free, was not able to do good without God's grace, God, it might seem, was not free to grant his grace unless the believer (though foreseen by God) took a (merited) free will decision to respond to God's call and have faith. A grace that really deserved its name had to be granted *ante praevisa merita*,[11] or better, *sine ullis praecedentibus meritis*,[12] no matter how insignificant those merits might be compared to the ability to do good, and no matter how God might arrange things (by foreseeing only those who are going to respond positively) so as not to appear restric-

[10] On the 'synergistic' character of this solution cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 167 n. 66.

[11] As A. SAGE, *Faut-il anathématiser la doctrine augustinienne de la prédestination. Revue des études augustiniennes* 8 (1962) 233-42, 240 points out, Augustine did not use this expression, though it seems applicable in the present context; see also Rist (n. 1) 426 n. 1.

[12] Cf. *ep.* 194.2/3 (CSEL 57, 178.14/182.5) dating from 418; Lössl (n. 4) 278-80.

ted in his action. However, Augustine did not immediately see such a close link between grace and faith.[13] It only occured to him as he ventured more deeply into the Pauline spiritual universe.

2. Development: *Epistolae ad Galatas expositio (394/5)*

It is in his *Epistolae ad Galatas expositio* (394/5) that for the first time Augustine speaks of faith as grace *(gratia fidei)*.[14] Yet he does not yet explicitely state that faith is caused by grace. He only makes the connection: Grace is the salvific state in which one is when one has faith. The underlying idea is that of a progress from the state *sub oneribus legis* to that of *gratia*.[15] Yet it is not the *initium fidei*, in which Augustine is interested here (i. e. the question how faith is first acquired and grace takes over), but in the effects of grace that lead to perfection (love in Christ, *dilectio spiritualis*), once the transition from the state *sub lege* to that of *sub gratia* has taken place.[16]

The stress on effects gives *gratia fidei* a strongly ethical connotation. Augustine is far from saying that someone with *gratia fidei* can recline and rest. What he is saying is that *ante gratiam fidei* nobody can boast of good works;[17] and again, this does not imply that in the state of *gratia fidei* one may boast of one's good works but that one may boast in the Lord; for it is *gratia Christi* which is the source of one's ability to do good. *Glorietur* ('one may boast') here alludes to Galatians 6:14, where Paul says that he boasts of nothing but Christ's cross, but more significantly to 1 Corinthians 1:31 (2 Corinthians 10:17), which from *Ad Simplicianum* 1.2.21 onward Augustine often cites in view of the utter gratuitousness of faith: 'Whoever boasts, may boast in the Lord,' *qui gloriatur, in domino glorietur*.[18]

[13] This is the conclusion reached by Drecoll (n. 2) 171.

[14] The expression occurs more than thirteen times, more often than any other juncture with *gratia* in *exp. ep. Gal*; for details cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 171-87.

[15] Cf. *exp. ep. Gal* praef. (CSEL 84, 55): *...scribit apostolus ad Galatas..., ut intelligant gratiam dei id secum agere, ut sub lege iam non sint...*; for the wider implications of intelligant in this passage and, subsequently, the nature of the process in question cf. Lössl (n. 4) 62-65.

[16] Thus explicitely *exp. ep. Gal* 38 (CSEL 84, 106-107).

[17] *Exp. ep. Gal* 44 (CSEL 84, 118.13f.): *nullo modo quisquam ante gratiam fidei de bonis operibus glorietur.*

[18] P.-M. HOMBERT, *Gloria gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce*. Études augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 148 (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 1996) has shown that Augustine's whole theology of grace is built around this verse.

Another aspect of *gratia fidei* not being a state of rest is that of a moral struggle as illustrated by Galatians 5:17 (*caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem*). The *dilectio spiritualis* is constantly in danger of being overturned by *concupiscentia carnis*. For Augustine the verse must imply that this struggle takes place in the state of *gratia fidei*. Otherwise Paul would have denied the freedom of the will (*liberum arbitrium*).[19] As a consequence, those who subscribe to worldly wisdom (*prudentia carnis*), do so not because the gratia fidei deserts them. Rather, they desert it. Instead of facing the struggle they abandon it. They follow (*sequi*), or are being led (*duci*) by, the flesh – to their damnation.[20]

Thus the juncture '*gratia fidei*' in *exp. ep. Gal* has two consequences. First, it links faith to grace and therefore calls in question the separation of *initium fidei* and *initium gratiae*. This may not yet have a deep impact in *exp. ep. Gal* itself, for here Augustine does not yet tackle the question concerning the *initium fidei*. However, he will have to tackle it eventually, and he will do so with his view firmly on God as the sole cause of salvation – with all the consequences this has for his concept of freedom. At the same time *gratia fidei* stresses more strongly than any previous concept the ethical aspect of salvation: In *gratia fidei* the believers find themselves freed from the realm of sin and the law. They have the opportunity to do good works and to attain glory in Christ. Yet this involves a struggle, a struggle, ultimately, between good and evil in oneself. With *gratia fidei* the believers are equipped to win that struggle. Defeat is therefore merely a sign that one has squandered the unmerited grace of faith and deserves punishment, damnation. Thus *gratia fidei* points more strongly than previous concepts to a notion of God as the sole cause of salvation, which might ultimately call in question human freedom; but, paradoxically, it also stresses more strongly than previous concepts the human responsibility for the success of the salvation process (or rather, the blame for its failure).

[19] Cf. *exp. ep. Gal* 46 (CSEL 84, 120): *putant hic homines liberum voluntatis arbitrium negare apostolum nos habere nec intelligunt hoc eis dictum, si gratiam fidei susceptam tenere nolunt, per quam so-lam possunt spiritu ambulare et concupiscentias carnis non perficere, si ergo nolunt eam tenere, non po-terunt ea, quae uolunt, facere.*

[20] *Exp. ep. Gal* 47 (CSEL 84, 123): *non autem pati adversitatem carnis, sed duci a carne damnatio est.* Rist (n. 1) 422f. points out that even in his later teaching Augustine sees no contradiction between freedom and being drawn by irrational desires: Even 'if we sin "automatically", we sin willingly.'

There is one more hint as to where Augustine, in *exp. ep. Gal*, may have looked for an answer to the question concerning the *initium fidei*. In a couple of passages he links grace and 'the mercy of God' (*misericordia dei*) that liberates from sin.[21] In *quaestio* 68 of *De diversis quaestionibus* LXXXIII a year or two later he does it again, but now he elaborates a little more on what he means by sin. He applies the metaphor found in Romans 9:21[22] of a 'lump of clay', *massa luti*, which the potter can mould into either graceful or disgraceful vessels, to humanity as a whole. Humanity, he writes, is but a 'lump of sin' (*massa peccati*). Through the sin committed 'by our nature in paradise' and all the individual sins following after it every single human being has squandered the meritum and therefore deserves (*deberi*) *aeterna damnatio*. Nobody has a right to complain about this to God.[23] On the contrary, those who are rescued from this state, because God has shown mercy with them, have every reason to be grateful.[24] In other words, God owes humanity nothing. Considering the sinfulness of humanity his grace is sheer mercy. It is totally gratuitous.

We are not yet dealing here with a fully fledged version of Augustine's doctrine of an inherited original sin. True, the expression *massa peccati* reminds already strongly of that of *massa damnata* in later works,[25] but in *q.* 68 the line between the 'sin of our nature in paradise' and our present sinfulness is only vaguely drawn. A precise causal link between Adam's sin, humanity's sinfulness and individual sins is not established, and it will not be for some time. Even in *Simpl.* 1.2 it is not central to predestination,[26] but merely a supporting concept to explain why not everybody is predestined and why those who are can only be grateful. It is in this function that its contours – and nothing more – are becoming visible in *exp. ep. Gal* and *q.* 68.

[21] Cf. *exp. ep. Gal* 24.11/17 (CSEL 84, 87.18; 88.23): *...iustitia fidei ... non pro merito data est ... sed pro misericordia et gratia dei ... ut ipse [mediator] liberaret a peccatis iam per transgressionem legis coactos confiteri opus sibi esse gratiam et misericordiam domini...*

[22] *An non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam?*

[23] Cf. Romans 9:20: *o homo tu quis es qui respondeas deo?*

[24] *Div. qu.* 68 (CCL 44A, 177): *ex quo ergo in paradiso natura nostra peccauit* [Gen 3:6] *... omnes una massa luti facti sumus, quod est massa peccati.*

[25] Cf. *ep.* 190.3 (CSEL 57, 144.15); *ep.* 194.3 (CSEL 57, 187.4); *ench.* 8.27 (CCL 46, 64.43); *ciu. dei* 21.12 (514.13 Dombart-Kalb); *c. Iul.* 6.1 (PL 44, 821.52); *c. Iul. imp.* 1.141 (CSEL 85/1, 161.83). All these references date from 416 or after, i. e. at least 20 years later than *q.* 68.

[26] Cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 213 n. 162, 234 nn. 210-11.

3. Culmination: *Ad Simplicianum 1.2.1-13 (397)*

What is at the centre of the development of Augustine's doctrine of predestination is the drawing together of the originally separated aspects of election, faith and grace to a monocausal saving act of God. Augustine does that in *Ad Simplicianum* 1.2 (397), an *exegesis* of Romans 9. The purpose of the whole of Romans, he begins, is to argue that nobody can boast of one's works and their merits (*operum merita*).[27] Historically, this went against the Jews who boasted that because they had served the law of Moses they had deserved God's favour (*gratia*). This is why they demanded that the gentiles, too, should adapt the law (*Iudaica sacramenta*), if they wanted to share that grace. Yet the Jews were wrong in their assumption. A grace merited through works is not really grace (Romans 11:6). The grace of the Gospel (*gratia evangelica*), the grace of Christ (*gratia Christi*), is granted without preceeding merits from works. Yet works continue to matter, of course. However, they are effects of grace rather than causes. Nobody is able to do good (*bene operari non posse*) prior to having accepted grace through faith (*nisi per fidem perceperit gratiam*). 'Accepting grace' here still means, similar to *exp. ep. Gal*,[28] 'beginning to have faith in God (*credere deo*) moved by internal or external admonition'. Grace is thus the medium in which the object of faith is presented and in and through which faith is aroused (on the human level, i. e. on the level of the *vocati*) and becomes able to relate to this object.[29] It is not (yet), strictly, the cause of faith.

This it can only become when linked to the concept of *electio*, 'according to which the *propositum* (Romans 9:11b) is maintained (*maneret*)' on the human level, i. e. the level of *vocatio*.[30] Yet this link also generates a *prima facie* contradiction. Previously, Augustine had supposed that the human response to v*ocatio* was an act of faith based on a free will decision. It was this freely willed act that was supposed to 'maintain the *propositum*'. How does this square with the assump-

[27] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.2 (CCL 44, 24-25).

[28] Cf. also the use of *gratia fidei* at the beginning of the passage: *Simpl.* 1.2.2 (CCL 44, 24): *...hoc saepe testatur fidei gratiam praeponens operibus non ut opera extinguat sed ut ostendat non esse opera praecedentia gratiam, sed consequentia...*

[29] This impression of grace (with its different way of communicating *admonitiones*) as a medium is strengthened by some examples Augustine cites, e. g. the process of preparing for baptism (the state of the catechumens) and the story of Cornelius in Acts 10; cf. Lössl (n. 4) 82-83; Drecoll (n. 2) 219-20.

[30] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.4 (CCL 44, 28).

tion that it is divine electio which guarantees that maintenance (e. g. in the face of humanity on the whole failing to use its free will to chose faith)? Previously, in *exp. prop. Rom*, Augustine had tackled the apparent contradiction between divine *electio* and human freedom with the concept of divine *praescientia*.[31] God, he had argued, 'foreknew' that Jacob, in a decision based on free will, was going to respond positively to his call and have faith. Now however, in *Simpl.* 1.2, he comes to the conclusion that if *electio* depended on something which God foreknew Jacob was going to do, i. e. cause, on the basis of a free will decision of his own, be it *fides* or *opera*,[32] it would not be *electio* as defined by Romans 9:11a;[33] for it would contradict the notion that God alone is the cause of salvation.

Yet Augustine, still following the principle '*nullo merito non est electio*', continues to look for *momenta meritorum* that would explain why God elects the one and not the other.[34] Could it be their very natures? He asks. No, he answers, Jacob and Esau are of one seed, *ex uno concubito*, and they have one creator, *ex uno creatore*. Moreover, he continues, if to be loved by God was part of Jacob's nature, God could not have loved and elected Jacob, before he even existed.[35] No, Jacob was created good to be elected, he concludes, rather than elected to be created good. Maybe one cannot speak here of *electio* after all, he then suggests.[36] However, that would contradict the literal meaning of the text, he objects (*sed dictum est: 'ut secundum electionem...'*). No, he concludes, there has to be *electio*, but it must be conceived in such a way that it grounds in God's original propositum, which is to call everybody to be justified by grace. This original *propositum* does not change, when human beings sin, for the simple reason that God put *electio* in place, through which he singles out those who believe (*credentes*). Thus there are *momenta meritorum* after all, namely the good works of the believers, which are the fruit of their justification by grace. Yet again, this does not mean that *electio* is depending on these works. Rather, *electio* depends on God's *propositum* that preceeds everything else.

[31] See above nn. 6 and 9.

[32] The distinction now becomes irrelevant. Everything is to be thought of as caused by grace.

[33] 'For when they were not yet born and had not yet done anything good or bad...' (*cum enim non-dum nati essent neque aliquid egissent bonum aut malum...*).

[34] Cf. above n. 9 and *exp. prop. Rom* 52 (CSEL 84, 34.16).

[35] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.5 (CCL 44, 29-30).

[36] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.6 (CCL 44, 30): *...ne aliqua electio hic possit intellegi.*

Interestingly, Augustine here tries to illustrate this point once more with the help of the concept of divine prescience: God does not foreknow the merits of the faithful *qua merits* but *qua* gifts from God (*dona dei*).[37] He still needs this concept to reconcile his concept of election with Ephesians 1:4 (*elegit nos deus ante mundi constitutionem*). In this verse, he argues, *electio* has to be understood in terms of divine *praescientia*. God foreknows those whom he elects on the basis of being justified by his grace. However, this only shows that the difference between prescience and predestination is becoming increasingly irrelevant, and the concept of prescience superfluous; for God foreknows nothing which is not predestined. This is overwhelmingly clear when applied to Esau; for if God foreknows Jacob's merits only *qua* gifts of grace, there is nothing which he could foreknow in Esau's case.[38]

It is the impossibility to state Esau's case in positive terms that compels Augustine to abandon the concept of *praescientia* in the context of his doctrine of predestination; for what is it that merits God's hate for Esau, if not the absence of God's mercy? And how does this square with God's justice? Why did God not show mercy with Esau in such a way that he was inspired to have faith, to respond to the call and to do good?[39] It cannot have been Esau's ill will (*nolle*); for even good will (*velle*) as established by faith is not sufficient to reach perfection (Romans 9:16: *non volentis neque currentis sed miserentis est dei*), but requires additional help from God (*adiutorium dei*).[40] Thus even God's prescience of Esau's *mala voluntas* could not explain Esau's reprobation, just as God's prescience of Jacob's *bona voluntas* cannot explain Jacobs election; for it is an effect, not a cause of his election.[41] It is already *donum dei*. It is put into effect by God's mercy, which is bestowed upon the *electi* in such a way that (as *vocati*) they cannot but accept the call, because it fits them (*aptum*). They are *congruenter vocati*, their call is *vocatio congrua*. They are moved (by the call), they understand (what the call entails) and they follow (the

[37] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.6 (CCL 44, 30-31).

[38] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.8 (CCL 44, 32.222-26). This is the only passage in *Simpl.* 1.2 in which Augustine employs the expression praedestinare, in the context of rejecting the concept of *praescientia bonorum operum*; cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 227 n. 192.

[39] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.9 (CCL 44, 33-34).

[40] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.10 (CCL 44, 35).

[41] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.11-13 (CCL 44, 36-38); cf. especially p. 38 line 364-65: *effectus misericordiae*.

call).[42] The *vocati sed non electi* in contrast do not fit the call.[43] Again God's foreknowledge is applicable to the former, but, by implication, not to the latter.[44] Judging from this one might say that, in a certain sense, the chosen, in so far they have an insight in their state, share in God's knowledge concerning their state. If this were the heart of Augustine's doctrine of predestination it could hardly be seen as being in danger of denying human freedom.[45] Yet it is not. Esau's case is still pending, and it reminds us that we are not dealing here with a variation to a Platonist participatory epistemology, but with something different.

4. Consolidation: *Ad Simplicianum 1.2.14-22 (397)*

God, Augustine continues, could have conditioned Esau in the same way as Jacob. He could have turned his mind (*mens*) to faith by adding *bona voluntas*.[46] Instead, he did nothing. As a consequence, 'the ruin of Esau's mind persisted against all kinds of vocations'

[42] *Simpl.* 1.2.13 (CCL 44, 38.367-68): *ut et moverentur et intellegerent et sequerentur*; for the wider implications of intellegere in this context cf. Lössl (n. 4) 85. Drecoll (n. 2) 231 n. 200, in his critique of J. PAOUT BURNS, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes, 1980), 44, in contrast, considers it 'reductionist' to interpret this passage in such a way that Augustine understands *intellegere* as the primary, or decisive, effect of grace. However, it may be Drecoll's understanding of *intellegere* here that is reductionist, an impression confirmed by the note p. 243 n. 227 on the juncture *intellectus gratiae* as understood by Lössl (n. 4). Moreover, *intellegere* here is not, as Drecoll further argues, to *moveri* what *ratio* is to *auctoritas*, as in *vera rel.* 24; cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 122-27. Rather, like in the relationship between *auctoritas* and *ratio*, *intellectus* is the higher goal of a dynamic learning process (initiated and driven by grace) of *moveri* and *sequi*; cf. on this also Lössl (n. 4) 47; ID., *Autorität durch Authentizität. Augustins Lehre von den Lebensaltern in 'De vera religione'. Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 59 (1996) 3-18, 4-6; ID., *The One. A Guiding Concept in De vera religione. Revue des études augustiniennes* 40 (1994) 79-103, 97 n. 81.

[43] Augustine here opposes *vocati* and *electi* according to Matthew 20:16: *multi vocati, pauci electi*. He is only interested in these two expressions, *vocati* and *electi*, not in *multi* and *pauci*, i. e. in the verse as such, with its implications concerning the numbers of *vocati* and *electi*.

[44] *Simpl.* 1.2.13 (CCL 44, 38.377-78): *cuius autem miseretur, sic eum vocat, quomodo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non respuat.*

[45] For a discussion of the question of freedom in this context cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 231-32 and n. 202.

[46] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.14 (CCL 44, 38-39).

because of 'the obstinate character of his will'.[47] But why should God have done nothing to save Esau? Because of malice? Certainly not, Augustine insists, citing Romans 9:14.[48] Rather, God must have acted on the basis of some inscrutable kind of justice (*alicuius occultae atque ab humano modulo investigabilis aequitatis*), of which traces (*inpraessa vestigia*), however, are also visible in human dealings. Judging from these we must assume that Esau's reprobation represents a (self-inflicted) punishment. It is part of a deal in which Esau owes everything and God (strictly) nothing. Indeed it would be iniquitous to turn against God and demand his mercy as some kind of moral obligation. It would be the kind of *impudentia* referred to in Romans 9:20a (*o homo tu quis es qui respondeas deo?*).

This applies to the whole of humanity, Augustine points out once more, as already in *q.* 68, especially since humanity is a *massa peccati*, since all have died in Adam (1 Corinthians 15:22), the origin of human contempt against God.[49] Yet as in *q.* 68, this hint at the concept of original sin is not constitutive for the doctrine of predestination. It is still kept rather vague and only serves as a human backdrop to God's inscrutable justice, which does not force anyone to sin, but leaves the sinner alone (in every sense of the word). The only way God interferes in human affairs is through grace, in order to justify, to save, and to liberate.[50] Romans 9:20a applies to all human beings, even, and, in a way, especially, to those, in whom grace has already become operative.[51]

[47] *Simpl.* 1.2.14 (CCL 44, 39.406-407): ... *obstinatio voluntatis, ut contra omnes modos vocationis obdurescat mentis eversio.*

[48] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.16 (CCL 44, 41.443-45): *'quid ergo dicemus? numquid iniquitas est apud deum? absit!' sit igitur hoc fixum atque immobile in mente sobria pietate!*

[49] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.16 (CCL 44, 42.468-69): ... *'in Adam omnes moriuntur', a quo in universum genus humanum origo ducitur offensionis dei.* Note that Augustine here only refers to 1 Corinthians 15:22 and not to Romans 5:12 (*in quo omnes peccaverunt*), which he begins to quote in this context only 14 years later. Some have concluded from this that Augustine ignored the doctrine of original sin in this context, at least before 411; cf. S. LYONNET, *Rom 5:12 chez saint Augustin. Note sur l'élaboration de la doctrine augustinienne du péché originel*, in: *L'Homme devant Dieu. Mélanges offerts au père Henri de Lubac*. Théologie 56 (Paris: Aubier, 1963), 327-39, 331.

[50] As Drecoll (n. 2) 234 n. 210 points out, there is therefore no need to trace Augustine's doctrine of predestination to the concept of original sin as found in Ambrosiaster.

[51] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.17 (CCL 44, 43-44), where Augustine, with the help of 1 Corinthians 3:1-3, points out that even Christians are still called *carnales*, but that they are nevertheless able to make progress in the spirit, because they have already received initial grace.

Not that human beings sin (or, 'in Adam', cannot but sin) is at the centre here, but that God's judgment is inscrutable and that nobody can say why God ordained it so in the first place. Original sin and its effects are not, and will never be, more than a 'dark corollary' to predestination.[52] Not what human beings do, or can, or cannot, do, is the question, but what God can do, and what he does, or does not, do to save humanity. It is in *De libero arbitrio* that Augustine discusses the former question. Yet already here he demonstrates that not God is the cause of evil, but human freedom. He never states that human freedom has the power to save. Therefore he never has to retreat from his position in *De libero arbitrio*. Even before the Fall, he argues in *De libero arbitrio* 3, human freedom was able to do good only in so far as it did not reject God's grace. In so far it did, it chose *impudentia* and *superbia* and caused the Fall in Adam. Through the Fall and under the condition of original sin it is definitely good for nothing, i. e. it necessarily causes nothing but evil,[53] unless God lifts it out of that condition through grace.[54] Towards the end of his life, in his *Retractationes* of 427, Augustine compares his intention in *De libero arbitrio* 2-3 and *Ad Simplicianum* 1.2 respectively: 'It is one thing to ask from where evil originates (*unde sit malum*) and another thing to ask from where to get back to the original state or to progress to the greater good.' [55]

Augustine generally focuses on the latter. God's love, he argues, is not aimed at the guilt in Jacob, which is extinguished, but at the grace bestowed.[56] Equally, God's hate (Romans 9:13) is not aimed at Esau as a creature – for God does not hate his creatures (Wisdom 11:25) –, but at the sin that made Esau a *vas in contumeliam*.[57] The fact that God makes this happen does not cast any doubt over his goodness. On the contrary, it only confirms God's goodness; and this

[52] Cf. Wetzel (n. 7) 49.

[53] Cf. *lib. arb.* 3.24-25 (CCL 29, 317-21) and J. LÖSSL, *Wege der Argumentation in Augustinus' De libero arbitrio. Theologie und Philosophie* 70 (1995) 321-54, 352-53.

[54] Naturally, Augustine's understanding of divine praescientia in *lib. arb.* 3, too, matches that in *Ad Simplicianum*; cf. Barry A. DAVID, *The Meaning and Usage of 'Divine Foreknowledge' in Augustine's De libero arbitrio* 3.2.14–4.41. *Augustinian Studies* 32 (2001) 117-156.

[55] Cf. *retract.* 1.9.2 (CCL 57, 24): ... *aliud est enim quaerere unde sit malum et aliud est quaerere unde redeatur ad pristinum vel ad maius perveniatur bonum*; cf. Lössl (n. 53) 330-32, 332.

[56] *Simpl.* 1.2.18 (CCL 44, 45.561-63): *sed dilexit in eo non culpam quam delebat, sed gratiam quam donabat.*

[57] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.18 (CCL 44, 45-46).

not only for one, but for two reasons. Firstly, it is merely good and proper that *vasa in contumeliam* are *vasa irae*, vessels of wrath, 'hated'; for sin is evil, and to hate sin is good. Secondly, God has a (good) purpose in making (or allowing) this (to) happen, namely to demonstrate his power to the better *usus* and the *correctio* of those whom he intends to save from *impietas* – by instilling in them *timor domini*.[58]

God never ceases to create *bona*,[59] even after humanity becomes a *massa peccati*, a lump of sin and guilt (*originalis reatus*). Only now God 're-creates' humanity in such a way that he – indulgently – 'cuts' those whom he intends to save 'out' of this 'lump' thereby saving them (Ecclesiasticus 33:13-14) while leaving the rest – justly – to their (well-deserved and self-inflicted) punishment, eternal damnation.[60] The fact that God acts in this way must not, or indeed cannot, be questioned (Romans 9:20a). It certainly cannot be taken as an indication that God is in any way wicked (Romans 9:14). From the point of view of the saved (*electi*) this whole state of affairs is most certainly good in more than one way; for even the punishment of the damned is for the purpose of the ever greater progress (*proficiant*) of their (the *electi*'s) salvation;[61] for it reminds them that their salvation is not based on their merits but on God's mercy (Romans 9:15).

Thus whoever wants to boast should do so in the Lord (1 Corinthians 1:31). That is the understanding of grace (*intellectus gratiae*) demonstrated by Paul and the example of the *iustificati*.[62] Human freedom means a lot (*plurimum valet*). It exists in any case, but it is severely limited under the present condition of human sinfulness.[63] There is a struggle going on between *caro* and *spiritus*,

[58] Any query is again quashed with a reference to Romans 9:20; cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.18 (CCL 44, 46.592); for a critical assessment of this 'logic of terror' cf. K. FLASCH, *Logik des Schreckens* (Mainz: Dieterich, ²1995); for a response to Flasch cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 240-50.

[59] *Simpl.* 1.2.20 (CCL 44, 51.697-99): *tunc facta est una massa omnium, veniens de traduce peccati et de poena mortalitatis, quamvis deo formante et creante quae bona sunt; on massa and tradux peccati* cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 233 n. 206 and 234 n. 210.

[60] *Simpl.* 1.2.20 (CCL 44, 52).

[61] *Simpl.* 1.2.20 (CCL 44, 52-53).

[62] P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 359 once aptly commented on this passage as follows: 'Paul had spoken; Augustine had understood. That should be enough.'

[63] Cf. *Simpl.* 1.2.21 (CCL 44, 53.741-42): *sed in venundatis sub peccato quid valet?* The expression *venundatis sub peccato* alludes to Romans 7:14 (*scimus enim quod lex spiritalis est, ego autem carnalis sum, venundatus sub peccato*). Augustine's rhetorical question suggests that under the condition of sin freedom is actually worth nothing.

which freedom alone, without the help of grace, cannot win (Galatians 5:17).[64] The human will is not able to motivate itself.[65] It needs outside attraction (*delectare*), just as the intellect, too, needs outside stimulation in order to get going.[66] This outside impulse comes with *electio*, the initial act of God previously described as God's mercy (*misericordia/misereri*).[67] It is hidden (*occulta*), i. e. not obvious; there are no outside criteria, like intelligence or learning, that would indicate who is motivated by God's initial grace, and who is not. Indeed, according to Scripture, God tends to choose the intellectually and morally weak, the *infirma mundi* and the *stulta mundi*, to confuse the strong.

Yet that, too, is no criterion. God is inscrutable (Romans 11:33). The question is not who is, or who is not, chosen and what happens to those who are, or who are not, chosen, but how does the salvation process work. Augustine's answer in *Simpl.* 1.2 is, through grace, without preceeding works, gratuitously, as something that enables the sinner to respond positively to God's call and do good works, that justifies and saves. Thus the ethical focus of *exp. ep. Gal* is retained, but Augustine makes it clearer than ever that faith, like works, is preceeded and initially caused by grace. His focus is not on *gratia fidei*, but on *initium fidei gratia*. As a consequence divine *praescientia* is no longer as important a concept as previously to explain how the human freedom of the will remains intact under these circumstances. Under the condition of sin, Augustine now argues, human freedom, though it still exists, is good for nothing (but evil). The concept merely serves to demonstrate that humanity, not God, is to blame for evil. It is of no use to explain how the transition takes place from a *state sine gratiam* to one *sub gratia*. Of course, once grace is operative (in those in whom it is operative, in the *electi*), freedom, too, can be said to be active towards salvation, as a gift of grace. The *electi* are *liberati*. Freedom involves them in God's salvific work. Augustine therefore never denies freedom, he only qualifies its different functions in the

[64] *Simpl.* 1.2.21 (CCL 44, 53).

[65] *Simpl.* 1.2.22 (CCL 44, 55.794-97): *sed voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occurrerit quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo postet. Hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate.*

[66] In the light of this analogy developed in § 22 the juncture '*intellectus gratiae*' at the beginning of § 21 is not as accidental, or marginal, as, e. g., Drecoll (n. 2) 240ff. and especially 243 n. 227 suggests. 'Das Gnadenhandeln ist eben nicht nur als Verleihung von Einsicht beschreibbar' (241). How true! For it is 'Verleihung von Einsicht', or: it is not without 'Verleihung von Einsicht'. Grace occurs (*occurere*) to the intellect and the will and jointly motivates both faculties through *delectare*. If it does not, there is nothing. *Delectare* has no opposite.

[67] *Simpl.* 1.2.22 (CCL 44, 54.768-71).

different salvific states in which human beings find themselves. Under the condition of sin it serves to damnation, under the condition of grace it serves to salvation, while nothing definite can be said about its origins in the transitional area between election and reprobation; for in this area it has first to be (re-) defined; and it is God who (re-) constitutes and (re-) defines it, by rendering the *liberi liberati*.[68]

By linking *gratia* and *electio* in this way Augustine reminisces a concept dominant in his early thought, namely that of God as immutable, omnipotent and omnipresent.[69] It is a matter of controversy, whether this constitutes a break with or a culmination of his teaching on grace between 393 and 397, in which he explained predestination with the help of the concept of divine *praescientia*.[70] Be that as it may, it seems Augustine was not entirely satisfied with that earlier teaching, while, after expressing only a few initial doubts,[71] he soon wholeheartedly subscribed to the argument of *Simpl.* 1.2, and clung on to it for the rest of his life.

[68] Cf. Rist (n. 1) 425. One can neither say that in *Simpl.* 1.2 Augustine denies the human freedom of the will, nor, as Burns (n. 42) 43-44 has argued, that he reconciles or relates (in the concept of a *vocatio congrua*) a free decision for faith on the sinner's part with a gratuitous act of grace on God's part which puts the sinner into a state of grace in which he or she finds faith. For Augustine only the second aspect is relevant for the *initium fidei*. For – structurally – very similar reasons one cannot say that Augustine develops a doctrine of 'double predestination' (*gemina praedestinatio*) in *Simpl.* 1.2. Strictly speaking only God's saving action is something of which one can speak in Augustine's view. *Reprobatio* or, let alone, *praedestinatio in peccatum* do, strictly speaking, not occur (as such). They are merely aspects of *electio*, as it takes place in a situation in which humanity is a *massa peccati*; cf. already O. ROTTMANNER, *Der Augustinismus. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Studie* (München: Lentner, 1892) 17-18.

[69] Cf. e. g. the idea of 'The One' in *vera rel.*; Lössl, The One (n. 42); or the doctrine of God and the soul in *De beata vita*; cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 27-49. The positive influence on the development of this motif at that stage was Neo-Platonist (Monist), the negative impulse was anti-Manichean (= anti-Dualist). In 397 the anti-Manichean aspect was still relevant. Against Flasch (n. 58) 29 *Simpl.* 1.2 cannot be said to mark a return to Manicheism; cf. T. G. RING, *Bruch oder Entwicklung im Gnadenbegriff Augustins?* Kritische Anmerkungen zu K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. *Augustiniana* 44 (1994) 31-113, 37-69.

[70] Cf. the discussion in Drecoll (n. 2) 245-46. The main proponent of the 'break-theory' is Flasch (n. 58). Yet Drecoll points out that Flasch does not sufficiently recognise the continuity between the earlier Pauline exegesis and *Simpl.* 1.2 regarding the concept of a 'limited freedom'. As early as in *exp. prop. Rom* 8 (CSEL 84, 6) Augustine argued that *in nobis autem ante gratiam non est liberum arbitrium, ut non peccemus, sed tantum ut peccare nolimus*, while in *Simpl.* 1.2.10 (CCL 44, 35) he still maintains *ut velimus enim et suum esse voluit et nostrum, suum vocando, nostrum sequendo*. For Flasch (n. 58) 287 n. 43 himself *nostrum* is here the criterion.

[71] Cf. *ep.* 37.3 (CCL 44, 4.26-31) to Simplicianus dating from the same year as *Simpl.* 1.2.

5. Application: *Confessiones (ca. 400)*

The existential dimension of the argument of *Simpl.* 1.2 is often underestimated. It was not Augustine's aim to present a systematic account[72] or to solve some exegetical riddle. Augustine did not intend to scare his readers, to instil in them terror in the face of a God who has no universal salvific will[73] and is *a priori* decided to condemn the majority of human beings to hell.[74] Nor does Augustine want to frustrate any ethical effort on the part of human beings, to relativise the value of human beings, to justify theologically the development of the church of his time into an increasingly corrupt mass institution, or to agitate against the Jews of his time.[75]

None of this is in Augustine's mind when he first applies the findings of *Simpl.* 1.2 to the case of his own life in his *Confessiones*, thus initiating the reception process of his doctrine of predestination. Already the title of the *Confessiones*, published around 400,[76] suggests this: Augustine wants to link his confession of his sinfulness with his gratitude caused by, as he believes, and for, God's grace.[77] This is why large swathes of the *Confessiones* are structured as a prayer (a dialogue with God), while the work is at the same time an exhortation (*protreptikos*) addressed to an intended audience.[78] It is Augustine's

[72] Cf. the discussion in Drecoll (n. 2) 245 n. 228.

[73] Thus Rottmanner (n. 68) 25; Flasch (n. 58) 79; cf. Flasch's suggestion that Augustine works out a 'logic of terror', which anticipated that of western terror regimes ever since; similarily, though with the intention of defending Augustine, T. G. RING, *Die pastorale Intention Augustins in Ad Simplicianum de diversis quaestionibus*, in: C. MAYER, K. H. CHELIUS (eds.), *Homo spiritalis. Festgabe für Luc Verheijen zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*. Cassiciacum 38 (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1987), 171-84, who argues that Augustine, with pastoral intentions, employed a rhetoric of terror. Augustine introduces the motif of *timor domini* (cf. above n. 58) only to illustrate the positive effect of the deserved and self-inflicted (because based on their, not God's, will) punishment of the *reprobati* on the *electi*. Thus God's salvific will is still universal. It exerts a positive effect on those whom it reaches, while it is limited by the will of those who remain hardened.

[74] As mentioned earlier (cf. above n. 43), Augustine does not cite Mt 20:16 in order to oppose *multi* and *pauci*, but *electi* and *vocati*.

[75] Cf. the discussion in Drecoll (n. 2) 249-50; Ring (n. 69).

[76] Cf., more precisely, P.-M. HOMBERT, *Nouvelles Recherches de Chronologie augustinienne*. Études augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 163 (Paris: Institut d'Études augustiniennes, 2000), 9-23.

[77] On the significance and yet preliminary character of this observation cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 255 n. 14. As C. MAYER, *Confessio/confiteri. Augustinus-Lexikon* 7/8 (1994) 1122-34 points out, *confiteri* is at the same time praise and confession of sin.

[78] Cf. E. FELDMANN, *Confessiones. Augustinus-Lexikon* 7/8 (1994) 1134-93.

coming to have *fides* and receiving *sacramentum* (baptism) which is to encourage the addressees not to despair about their *non posse*, their being *infirmi*, but to wake up *in amore misericordiae tuae et dulcedine gratiae tuae*, which makes *boni, potentes*, people able to do good, out of *infirmi*.[79]

To use one's own life story to defend a certain theological stance is an old motif of Early Christian apologetics.[80] In fact, it goes back to Saint Paul (Galatians 1-2), whom Augustine seems to have had in mind as a model for his account of his own life.[81] The autobiographical aspect of *Conf.* also adds to the plausibility of the 'dark corollary' of Augustine's doctrine of predestination. The Augustine of *Conf.* 1-6 comes across as a *reprobatus*. Due to his *superbia* he is in deep error about just everything that matters, especially his own sinfulness,[82] but also about God and human nature; and since God is omnipresent, this is, according to God's decree (*praecepto*), a pain (*dolor*) to him.[83] Only in hindsight Augustine can see this past *miseria* as salutary. God acted on him in such a way that he became aware of the extent of his *miseria*, and *prepared* to receive God's grace.[84] When God converts[85] him by teaching him about his true nature[86] and

The 'intended audience' does not only include 'friends' and 'loved ones (in Christ)', but also outsiders (inside as well as outside the Church) whom Augustine wants to touch with the power of his story.

[79] *Conf.* 10.3.4 (CCL 27, 156.15-35).

[80] For a brief historical survey cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 263-67.

[81] On this aspect cf. P. FREDRIKSEN, *Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions and the Retrospective Self. Journal of Theological Studies. New Series* 37 (1986) 3-34.

[82] Cf. *conf.* 5.10.18 (CCL 27, 67.6-11): *adhuc enim mihi videbatur non esse nos, qui peccamus, sed nescio quam aliam in nobis peccare naturam et delectabat superbiam meam extra culpam esse et ... non confiteri me fecisse ... et excusare me amabam et accusare nescio quid aliud...*

[83] Cf. *conf.* 2.2.4 (CCL 27, 19.36f.): *qui fingis dolorem in praecepto et percutis, ut sanes, et occidis nos, ne moriamur abs te*; on the meaning of dolor in this context cf. J. LÖSSL, Dolor/dolere. *Augustinus-Lexikon* 3 / 4 (1999) 581-91.

[84] Cf. *conf.* 6.6.9 (CCL 27, 79.6-10); 6.14.24 (CCL 27, 89.19-24).

[85] Cf. *conf.* 8.12.30 (CCL 27, 132.52): *convertisti enim me ad te*; and *conf.* 8.7.16 (CCL 27, 123.2): *retorquebas me ad me ipsum* (for the consequence of the latter cf. below n. 88).

[86] Cf. in detail Drecoll (n. 2) 275-313; for the epistemological and hermeneutical dimension cf. also Lössl (n. 4) 213-45. The profound understanding of God and grace caused by grace (*intellectus gratiae*) is as, if not more, decisive for the salvation process as the psychological and moral effects of grace.

revealing to him how bad things could have turned out,[87] Augustine not only begins to love God and the way in which he has dealt with him throughout his life, he also hates himself like God hates Esau according to *Simpl.* 1.2 (Romans 9:13b), i. e. he hates his (past) sinfulness.[88] The 'psychology'[89] of the conversion is the same as that described in *Simpl.* 1.2.13-14. God works through the intellect and the will, refocusing the mind through *illuminatio* and motivating the person through *admonitio*.[90] As a consequence the inner person is attracted to God and led to a mystical journey, while on the ethical level *concupiscentia* is gradually suppressed and *infirmitas* is replaced with *firmitas*.[91] And it is indeed God who is at work here. The human person for his or her part, while highly motivated and intellectually and morally active, is aware that nothing of this is his or her merit.[92] Instead of trying and willing and running on his or her own account the human person turns to God in prayer; and it is in this context that Augustine utters the famous phrase *da quod iubes et iube quod vis*, 'give what you ask for and then ask for what you want.'[93]

[87] Cf. *conf.* 5.9.16 (CCL 27, 65-66) the story of Augustine's near fatal illness in Rome in 383. If he had died, he would have been eternally damned *ad inferos*, because of the *vinculum originalis peccati, quo omnes in Adam morimur*. Note that here, too, Augustine only cites 1 Corinthians 15:22 in support of his doctrine of original sin. Romans 5:12 is still conspicuously absent (cf. above n. 49). Yet cf. the reminiscences of Gen 3 in the story of the theft of pears *conf.* 2.4.9 (CCL 27, 21-22); Feldmann (n. 78) 1169; Lössl (n. 4) 215 n. 22. The scenario of original sin against the background of which Augustine develops his doctrine of predestination becomes already much more elaborate in *conf.* than it had been in *Simpl.* 1.2

[88] Cf. *conf.* 8.7.16 (CCL 27, 123.5-9): *et videbam et horrebam ..., ut invenirem iniquitatem meam et odissem.*

[89] For this expression in this context cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 231 n. 201.

[90] Cf. the conclusion of the 'garden scene' in conf. 8.12.29/30 (CCL 27, 131.36-38/132.45): *statim quippe cum fine huiusce sententiae quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo omnes dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt ... tali admonitione firmatus...* Note that the intellectual state is reached prior to the moral state, something that continuously escapes Drecoll (n. 2) 321-24. Also, the intellectual conversion is of course not some kind of conveyance of additional information that would enlighten Augustine, but a profound re-orientation of his intellect that removes any ambiguity and doubt from his mind. Drecoll (n. 2) 322 notices that for a moment, but this does not influence his general understanding of 'intellect' in this context, which is very different from that of Augustine; cf. in contrast Lössl (n. 4) 221-25.

[91] Cf. *conf.* 10 (CCL 27, 155-93), especially 10.30.41-42 (CCL 27, 176-77); Drecoll (n. 2) 340-42.

[92] Cf. Augustine at the moment of his conversion, *conf.* 8.12.28-29 (CCL 27, 130-31).

[93] Cf. *conf.* 10.29.40, 31.45, 37.60 (CCL 27, 176.2, 179.52, 188.3); *Simpl.* 1.2.21 (CCL 44, 53-54): *petere iubemur ut accipiamus, et quaerere ut inveniamus.*

6. Reactions and responses: *Pelagius, Julian of Aeclanum and the Massilians*

Towards the end of his life Augustine remembers that it was especially against this sentence that Pelagius reacted, when he first read the *Confessiones*.[94] That was around 405. A decade later, when this clash of theological opinions[95] had erupted into a major doctrinal controversy, Augustine accused Pelagius chiefly of denying God's grace as necessary for salvation and of teaching that one could easily keep the commandments and reach a state free of sin, if one only relied on one's natural moral powers.[96] Yet in *De natura*,[97] his first response to Augustine, Pelagius criticised what had been a more marginal issue in Augustine's earlier doctrine of grace, the teaching that human nature is corrupted by sin, and that mainly for this reason grace is necessary for salvation.[98] When Augustine responded to *De natura* in *De natura et gratia*,[99] this marginal issue had become more central to his work, especially since he had begun linking Romans 5:12 to 1 Corinthians 15:22.[100]

[94] Cf. *dono perseu.* 53 (PL 45, 1026) dating from 429: *ferre non potuit*; and W. A. LÖHR, Pelagius' Schrift 'De natura': Rekonstruktion und Analyse. *Recherches augustiniennes* 31 (1999) 235-94, 291 n. 140; cf. also J. LÖSSL, *Julian von Aeclanum. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer Überlieferung*. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 60 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 54.256-59.

[95] At the beginning it was indeed not more than just that, as also Caelestius, who was condemned in 418 together with Pelagius for denying original sin and grace, remarked at his first trial in 411, cited by Augustine, *grat. pecc. orig.* 2.4.4 (CSEL 42, 169): *licet quaestionis res sit ista, non haeresis*; similarily Pelagius at the synod at Diospolis in 415 when asked to condemn those accused of the charges made by his opponents, cited by Augustine, *gest. Pel.* 6.16 (CSEL 42, 69): *anathematizo quasi stultos, non quasi haereticos, siquidem non est dogma*; cf. Lössl (n. 94) 254.

[96] Cf. *gest. Pel.* 35.61 (CSEL 42, 115-16); for a detailed analysis of this passage in its context cf. O. WERMELINGER, *Rom und Pelagius*. Päpste und Papsttum 7 (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1975), 108-116.

[97] Traditionally, *De natura* has been dated 414, into the early stages of the first Pelagian controversy (411-418), more recently it has been argued Pelagius wrote it around 405; for more details cf. the titles listed under n. 94.

[98] According to Augustine Pelagius held that Adam's sin was strictly Adam's only. Everybody else sinned by imitating Adam. Human nature, as a substance, cannot be corrupted by sin; cf. *nat. grat.* 9.10 and 19.21-20.22 (CSEL 60, 238.247).

[99] Dated 415; cf. G. BONNER, *Natura et gratia, De*, in: A. D. FITZGERALD OSA (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 582.

[100] For the first time in 406 in *De genesi ad litteram* 9-10; cf. E. TE SELLE, *Augustine the Theologian* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970), 265.316. Yet it is a matter of controversy whether this coincides with the origin of Augustine's 'mature' doctrine of original sin. Some, e. g. P. RIGBY, *Original Sin*, in: Fitzgerald (n. 99) 607-614, 608, argue for an earlier starting point, others, like A. SAGE, *Péché originel*. Naissance d'un dogme. *Revue des études augustiniennes* 13 (1967) 211-48, for a later one (411/2). Cf. also above n. 49.

Pelagius argues in *De natura* that human beings are – by their very nature as God's creatures[101] – able to do good; human nature cannot be corrupt; sinfulness is merely a lack of goodness; even Augustine held this view in *De libero arbitrio*. In *De natura et gratia* Augustine responds to this that human nature, created good, is corrupted by sin. Everybody has sinned 'in Adam'. Humanity is a *massa damnata*, unable to contribute anything to its salvation from this situation, for which no one else can be blamed than each individual human being him- or herself. The damnation of all would only be just. If some are elected as vessels of mercy, it is because of an act of sheer divine grace, to which gratitude is the only meaningful response.[102] Augustine shows that Pelagius's reading of *De libero arbitrio* is selective[103] and that he has never ascribed any salvific power to human freedom, any ability to do good and to overcome evil. This ability, he had always held, was, if at all, constituted exclusively by God's grace.

He now stresses – more than in *Simpl.* 1.2 and *Conf.* – that this grace is the grace of Christ bestowed in baptism,[104] without which no one can be saved. He also elaborates more than in his earlier works on grace that salvation is salvation from original sin 'in Adam'.[105] This shift of emphasis is partly due to the fact that Augustine has to defend his doctrine in the context of controversies.[106] He is challenged on the questions of the state of human nature and of the ability of human beings to respond to God's call. His opponents (Pelagius and after 418 in particular Julian of Aeclanum) contest the notion that human nature

[101] Cf. Bonner (n. 96): 'Pelagius indeed spoke of grace, but essentially in terms of created nature, so that the ability to avoid sin lies not so much in the power of choice as in the necessity of nature, whose author is God.' For more details on Pelagius's teaching of grace see G. GRESHAKE, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit. Eine Untersuchung zur Gnadenlehre des Pelagius* (Mainz: Grünewald, 1972).

[102] Cf. *nat. grat.* 3.3, 4.4, 5.5 (CSEL 60, 235-36); Lössl (n. 4) 246.

[103] Cf. *nat. grat.* 68.81 (CSEL 60, 296); *lib. arb.* 3.18.50 (CCL 29, 304-305).

[104] Cf. the quotation of Romans 13:14 *conf.* 8.12.29 (CCL 27, 131) as cited by Wetzel (n. 7) 54-57, 57, though out of context (cf. in contrast above n. 90); and *nat. grat.* 4.4 (CSEL 60, 236).

[105] He needs not have done this. *Simpl.* 1.2 suggests that it would have been sufficient to point to the inscrutability of God's judgment (Romans 11:33) to justify God's course of action, to have mercy with some (Romans 9:15) and allow others to remain hardened (Romans 9:18) – on what ground so ever.

[106] This applies already for the years between 397 and 411, when Augustine developed his doctrine of original sin in the course of the Donatist controversy; cf. on this W. SIMONIS, *Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche und Erbsünde bei Augustinus. Theologie und Philosophie* 43 (1968) 481-501; ID., *Anliegen und Grundgedanke der Gnadenlehre Augustins. Münchner theologische Zeitschrift* 34 (1983) 1-21.

is corrupted, human freedom is good for nothing (but evil), and that grace (e. g. in baptism) has therefore nothing to build on, i. e. humanity has nothing to contribute to the salvation process. However, Augustine's opposition of 'sin in Adam' and 'salvation in Christ' should also be seen in the context of his continuing efforts to revive Pauline theology in its own right, from its own principles, against tendencies to distort it with assumptions drawn from other traditions. In this respect the continuing influence, in affirmative as well as negative terms, of his Manichean, anti-Manichean and Neo-Platonist past and present is of particular importance.

This last point is well illustrated by the discussion between Augustine and Julian of Aeclanum about the allegedly Manichean *epistula ad Menoch.*[107] Julian cites this text in his *Ad Florum*, a polemic against Augustine's *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, in order to demonstrate the Manichean nature of Augustine's teaching on grace. The author of *ep. ad Men.* argues that in order to be saved (*splendida reddi*) one must find out one's original state (*qualiter prius fueris*), the kind of soul from which one has emanated (*ex quo genere animarum emanaveris*).[108] Following John 3:6 he principally thinks of two kinds, spiritual (*spiritalis*) and carnal, or corporeal.[109] God is the *auctor* of the former, the devil of the latter.[110] He is *corporum auctor per concupiscentiam. Concupiscentia* is the root of all evil (1 Timothy 6:10).[111] It fights against the spirit through the body, i. e. the senses (Galatians 5:17). From the body comes only evil (Galatians 5:19), from the soul only good (Galatians 5:22).[112] Therefore physical procreation is evil (Romans 9:16: *non est volentis*, i. e. it is done *animo nolente*; cf. Romans 7:19). The devil is the *peccatum* that (according to Romans 7:8) causes *concupiscentia*. The law (*lex*) forbids the usus of evil, i. e. of *concupiscentia*. It helps those who are from God, but not those who are from the devil. In the latter sin is revived (Romans 7:9) and they are killed.[113] *Ep. ad Men.* thus distinguishes *animae spiritales* as

[107] Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.172-187 (CSEL 85/1, 473-90); for a critical edition of the *epistula ad Menoch* cf. M. STEIN, *Epistula ad Menoch.* Manichaica Latina 1 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998); for a discussion of the controversy between Augustine and Julian cf. Drecoll (n. 2) 188-92; Lössl (n. 4) 380 and 395-96. The controversy between Julian and Augustine took place in the 420s.

[108] C. *Iul. imp.* 3.172 (CSEL 85/1, 473.5-6).

[109] C. *Iul. imp.* 3.172 (CSEL 85/1, 473.5-6/9-12); John 3:6: *quod nascitur de carne caro est et quod nascitur de spiritu spiritus est.*

[110] *C. Iul. imp.* 3.174 (CSEL 85/1, 475.7-10).

[111] C. *Iul. imp.* 3.175 (CSEL 85/1, 475.4-5.10-11); cf. above n. 64.

[112] Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.177 (CSEL 85/1, 477).

[113] Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.186 (CSEL 85/1, 484).

(*bonae*) *voluntates*, who originate (*emanate*) from God and are certain to be saved, and *miserae animae*, who serve their *libido animo nolente*, are defined by *concupiscentia* as *malum naturale*, and *originate* (*emanate*) from the devil (who is conceived as another God).[114]

Augustine, in his response, does not recognise this text as Manichean,[115] disagrees with its understanding of John 3:6 – it is about physical birth and spiritual rebirth, not two spiritual principles opposing each other[116] – and outlines his position: The *natura vitiata* of the first man is that of all humanity through natural propagation. It is not the nature of a second type of humanity created by a second eternal God (of darkness).[117] Galatians 5:17 is not about the struggle between a good and an evil substance, 'but of a (good) substance with a vice which that substance has contracted from the sin of the first man through generation.' [118] Both, Pelagians and Manicheans deny the true nature of evil, the former by rejecting the concept of *natura vitiata*, the latter by declaring it a substance.[119]

[114] Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.187 (CSEL 85/1, 486-87); *ep. ad Men.* here also distinguishes *peccatum actuale* which takes place *extra corpus*, and *concupiscentia* as *malum naturale* which exists is close connection with *corpus* (according to 1 Corinthians 6:18b: *qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat*); cf. Stein (n. 107) 22-23 and 97-98.

[115] C. *Iul. imp.* 3.172 (CSEL 85/1, 473.13-16): *si dicam tibi istam Manichaei epistulam me omnino nescire, quamvis verum dicam, omnino non credes et mecum vana, ut soles loquacitate contendes*. For the credibility of this remark cf. Stein (n. 107) and Drecoll (n. 2) 187 n. 106. Stein doubts not so much the honesty of Augustine's remark as the authenticity of *ep. ad Menoch* as a Manichean document, let alone a writing from Mani's own hand. In contrast, Drecoll doubts Augustine's sincerity and seriously holds Mani's authorship possible. Julian claims that the work circulated in Constantinople ca. 420.

[116] Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.174 (CSEL 85/1, 475.16-17): God is the only, good, creator of bodies and souls.

[117] C. *Iul. imp.* 3.173 (CSEL 85/1, 474-75): *tu dic, si potes, quomodo non adiuves Manichei verba sacrilega de concupiscentia carnis, quam propterea tu negas de natura primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata in nostram naturam futura propagatione descendere, ut eam putetur ille deo coaeternae teneb-rarum genti rectissime deputare. insipientissime quippe et impudentissime abs te negatur malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum...*; cf. above nn. 64 and 111.

[118] C. *Iul. imp.* 3.175 (CSEL 85/1, 476.13-15).

[119] Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.177 (CSEL 85/1, 478.53-56); 3.183 (482-83). The case in point is marriage and procreation. The Manichees advocated not to make use of *concupiscentia* in this way at all. For Julian, *concupiscentia* within marriage was a good. For Augustine it meant putting a vice to a good use. In his view Julian's position was as dualistic as the Manichean one; *c. Iul. imp.* 3.185 (CSEL 85/1, 483-84): *numquid apostolus omnem concupiscentiae carnalis usum vituperat qui dicit: 'et si acceperis uxorem, non peccasti et, si nupserit virgo, non peccat'* (1 Corinthians 7:28)? *ergo Manichaeus, quid loquatur, ignorat. sed nec tu, quid loquaris, intellegis, qui putas aliud*

To refute the Manicheans was already Augustine's aim in *De libero arbitrio*. There he wanted to show that the sole cause of evil is *liberum voluntatis arbitrium*, and that there exists no *natura mali* created by God as a source of evil for which human beings are not responsible.[120] After introducing the concept of *liberum voluntatis arbitrium* in book 1 he demonstrated (in book 2) that God was *forma aeterna et incommutabilis* of everything, who also governs everything through *providentia*.[121] As a result he faced, in book 3, the question how the *liberum voluntatis arbitrium* can turn away from God, the *incommutabile bonum*, in a voluntary act of sin (*motus voluntarius*). If God causes everything through *providentia* and knows everything through his omniscience, i. e. if he foreknows everything that will happen in the future (*praescius omnium futurorum*), does he then not cause human beings to sin?[122] Augustine's answer is No. God causes *voluntates* to exist, but he merely foreknows how they are going to act. The will itself, by definition, cannot be determined, or forced, by anything except itself.[123] It is a first cause. God causes it to function in this way. And what applies to any free act, applies to sin, too. God foreknows that we are going to sin, but he does not cause (determine, necessitate) us to sin. If, or when, we sin, we sin voluntarily.[124]

This applies even then, Augustine argues, when we sin *ignorantia* and *necessitate*, or *difficultate*.[125] Augustine introduces these expressions with Biblical references.[126] The references relating to *necessitas*, Romans 7:18 and 19 and Galatians 5:17, are the same as those found in the *ep. ad Menoch*, where they are used to refute the

significasse apostolum quam carnis concupiscentiam..., qua ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum (Galatians 5:17)*, ex primi hominis praevaricatione descendere...*

[120] Cf. *retract.* 1.9.1 (CCL 57, 22-23) and above under section 4.

[121] *Lib. arb.* 2.9.26 (CCL 29, 254); for further details cf. the discussion in Drecoll (n. 2) 192-93.

[122] *Lib. arb.* 3.1.1-4 (CCL 29, 274-76); cf. Lössl (n. 53) 345.

[123] Cf. *lib. arb.* 3.18.50 (CCL 29, 304): *an ... cogit invitum*? Augustine's response to the question of Julian of Aeclanum: *et quomodo potest ese voluntas libera, si bonum semper velle cogatur?* Cf. *c. Iul. imp.* 1.101 (CSEL 85/1, 118.8-9, 119.23-24): *si enim cogitur, non vult.*

[124] *Lib. arb.* 3.3.6 (CCL 29, 278); cf. Lössl (n. 53) 346.

[125] Cf. *lib. arb.* 3.18.51 (CCL 29, 305.12/16); 3.18.52 (306.51).

[126] 1 Timothy 1:13 (*misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci), Psalm 24:7 (delicta iuventutis et ignorantiae meae ne memineris*), Romans 7:19 (*non enim quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago*), Romans 7:18 (*velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio*), and Galatians 5:17 (*caro concupiscit adversus spiritum...*); cf. above nn. 64, 111, 117 and 119.

freedom of the will. Augustine may have known[127] that the Manicheans used these verses for this purpose and responded accordingly by building them into his defence of freedom in *Lib. arb.* This has consequences. In *exp. prop. Rom*, *exp. ep. Gal* and *q.* 66 he had explained *necessitas* from the *state sub lege*.[128] Now, in *Lib. arb.*, he explains it from the Fall and its effect, *concupiscentia*: 'In this state man is not good and does not have it in his power to be good.' [129] *Ignorantia* and *difficultas*, he concedes, are not strictly speaking natural.[130] Nor are they therefore strictly speaking sinful. Rather, they result from a first sin. Only that was strictly speaking committed entirely voluntarily, *libera voluntatis arbitrio*.[131] Yet in a certain sense *ignorantia* and *difficultas* are natural;[132] for under the condition of the Fall a natural *liberum arbitrium recte faciendi* is purely hypothetical. It is irretrievably lost through the Fall,[133] and only recoverable through grace, although a certain ability 'to try to be good' (*studiis*) remains.[134] It exists, so to speak, as a kind of neutral middle ground between the *stultitia* of the culpably damned and the *sapientia* of those predestined to salvation.[135] However, it is not sufficient for salvation. Therefore, even though the will's lack of power to do good results from the

[127] Not necessarily from the *ep. ad Menoch* (cf. above n. 115), but from another source.

[128] Cf. above in the first and second section. The two explanations, from the *state sub lege* and from original sin, do, of course, not exclude each other. The difference lies merely in the different emphasis.

[129] *Lib. arb.* 3.18.51 (CCL 29, 305.27-30): *nunc autem quia ita est, [homo] non est bonus nec habet in potestate ut bonus sit.*

[130] *Lib. arb.* 3.18.52 (CCL 29, 306.52-55).

[131] *Lib. arb.* 3.19.54 (CCL 29, 306.23-25). The difference between sin and punishment for (original) sin is less significant here than it might appear at first glance; for, as Rist (n. 1) 422 notes, according to Augustine 'all action is done willingly or unwillingly, and all unwilling action is done after a conscious struggle in which the individual is overborne by external [= physical!] pressure. Thus in the moral area sins committed through an unthinking acceptance of the norms of one's upbringing or environment are always deserving of punishment. If we sin [in a psychological sense] "automatically" [i.e. by acting out our (sinful) nature], we sin willingly;' cf. also Drecoll (n. 2) 196 n. 130.

[132] *Lib. arb.* 3.18.52 (CCL 29,

[133] *Lib. arb.* 3.18.52 (CCL 29, 306.56-57).

[134] *Lib. arb.* 3.22.64 (CCL 29, 312.9ff.): *inde incipit anima proficere.*

[135] *Lib. arb.* 3.24.71/73 (CCL 29, 317.7-9; 319.87-88): *medium quod neutrum dici potest*; cf. W. E. MANN, *Augustine on evil and original sin*, in: Stump-Kretzmann (n. 7) 40-48, 47; E. STUMP, *Augustine on free will*, in: Stump-Kretzmann (n. 7) 124-47, 140-41. However, Mann and Stump do not consider the fact that Augustine moved on from this position.

punishment of a sin someone else has committed,[136] the limitation thus put on the will does not result in its elimination. The fact that it is not free to do good does not mean that it sins involuntarily.[137]

Therefore, like the author of the *ep. ad Menoch*, Augustine in *Lib. arb.* knows sins committed *necessitate*, underpins this assumption with Romans 7:18/19 and Galatians 5:17, assumes that *concupiscentia* is the underlying reason for this circumstance, and links *concupiscentia* to natural procreation so as to be able to call it, in a certain sense, natural. Yet unlike the author of the *ep. ad Menoch* – and later Julian of Aeclanum! – Augustine does not assume *concupiscentia* and its consequences to be a created state, but a punishment for original sin to be redeemed by grace.

During the last few years of his life (428-430) Augustine has to defend this reading of *Lib. arb.* not only against outright opponents like Pelagius and Julian of Aeclanum, but also against such comparatively friendly interpreters as the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseille.[138] In his response to the latter in *De praedestinatione sanctorum* of 428 he admits that in his Pauline exegesis prior to *Simpl.* 1.2, especially in *exp. prop. Rom*, he, too, had erred in a similar way as they (*similiter errarem*) for he, too, had held that faith was not gratuitous, but an act meritorious on the part of the person committing it (*nostrum proprium*), though it could not be committed without prior stimulation from an external *admonitio*, like the proclamation of the Gospel.[139] However, he points out, since *Simpl.* 1.2 (= 397) he has moved on. Now, he argues, it is the Massilians who go wrong, if they do not share his new position[140] and continue to hold that it is (part of)

[136] I. e. a sin someone else, i. e. Adam, has committed as an 'actual sin'. Later Augustine will say that 'in Adam' we all have committed this sin, not as an 'actual sin', but as 'original sin'; cf. J. M. Rist, *Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptised* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 121-35.

[137] Will (*voluntas*) here understood as identical with the human person; cf. Rist (n. 1) 422.

[138] Cf. M. DJUTH, *The Hermeneutics of 'De libero arbitrio'* III: Are There Two Augustines? *Studia Patristica* 27 (1993) 281-89 (for the Massilian controversy); R. H. WEAVER, *Divine Grace and Human Agency. A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy* (Mercer University Press, 1996); and Lössl (n. 4) 288-309.

[139] *Praedest. sanct.* 3.7 (PL 45, 964). In the light of the evidence laid out above under section 1 and 2 Augustine's admission that he was wrong is largely gratuitous. He probably could have got away by saying that in his writings prior to *Simpl.* 1.2 his argument concerning the *initium fidei* was simply not yet clear, but somewhat muddled.

[140] Cf. *praedest. sanct.* 4.8 (PL 45, 965); cf. Djuth (n. 138) 283; for the expression *possibilitas boni* in this context cf. *ib.* passim.

human nature to be capable of doing good,[141] i. e. that the human freedom of the will has a natural *possibilitas boni*,[142] without which one could not even properly respond to God's call,[143] i. e. without which one could not even formulate a working concept of grace.

Augustine's discussion of the relevant passages of *Lib. arb.* 3 in his *Retractationes* of 427 shows why he differed from Pelagius, Julian and the Massilians. Their interest had been to establish the natural constitution of the freedom of the will. Augustine had been interested in the origin of good and evil. In *Lib. arb.* 3 he had not yet worked out a clear concept of the good will and its nature. Therefore it was possible to mistake his idea of the *potestas* of the will, its power to act, with the *possibilitas boni*, its ability to do good. Yet from the context of his reflections on the Fall and the necessity of grace in *Lib. arb.* 3, and even more so in the contemporary exegetical works,[144] it was fairly clear where Augustine was heading towards. When Pelagius argued in *De natura* that the *possibilitas boni* was part of human nature and could never be lost, Augustine was quick to respond that Pelagius denied original sin (i. e. the very event, in Augustine's view, in which it was in fact lost) and, consequently, the need for redemption through the grace of Christ (*gratia Christi*) bestowed in baptism.[145] Seventeen years later, in a response to the monks of Hadrumetum, he reiterates this very point. The consequence of the fall is precisely 'the loss of an upright will that depends upon the possession of the *possibilitas boni* ... The *possibilitas boni* that Pelagius attributes to created human nature, though once placed in Adam's nature as a gift of divine generosity, perished in the fall ... What

[141] Which in the late Augustine's understanding includes the embrace of faith; cf. above section 2.

[142] Cf. Djuth (n. 138) 285: According to Pelagius's *De libero arbitrio* and the related Hadrumetan and Massilian positions 'the *possibilitas boni* pertains to the necessity of voluntary nature, that is, to its essential makeup.' In other words, a will that can only sin, is not really a will, because it is not free, i. e. it is not free not to sin; cf. on this also Julian of Aeclanum in *Ad Florum 5 apud Aug. c. Iul. imp. 5* (PL 45, 1431-1506); T. D. J. CHAPPELL, *Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom* (London: Saint Martins Press, 1996) on the innovative character of Augustine's concept of *mala voluntas*. Julian of Aeclanum held it to be a Manichean concept (cf. above Julian's citation of the *ep. ad Menoch* as a proof of that).

[143] Cf. Djuth (n. 138) 284 n. 13. Unconquerable grace is not really grace, because it does not enable the elect to choose (between accepting and rejecting) the good.

[144] *Lib. arb.* 3 dates ca. 396, *exp. prop. Rom* 393/4, *exp. ep. Gal* ca. 394/5, *qq.* 66-68 396 and *Simpl.* 1.2 397.

[145] Cf. *nat. grat.* 2.2-3.3 (CSEL 60, 235); cf. above at the beginning of this section.

Pelagius [and now the Hadrumetans who reiterate his argument fail] … to realise is that liberation [through grace] implies the bestowal of the *possibilitas boni* on the fallen moral agent so that he [or she] may effectively choose good.' [146] The word 'effectively' is important here. For Augustine it is one thing to say that a person lacks the *possibilitas boni*, i. e. that he or she cannot effectively choose between good and evil, and another thing: that a person is free to choose. A person may well be free to choose, but not able to put his or her choice into effect.[147] Already in *De spiritu et littera* of 412 Augustine called the mere freedom of choice *liberum arbitrium* and the effective form, put into effect by grace, *libertas arbitrii*;[148] and he was never to deny the existence of that mere freedom of choice.[149] It was the creational rest in the fallen sinner, and as such the presupposition that grace would work in those cases in which it was bestowed; for 'if choice is [even] possible in the absence of grace, so, too, it is [*a fortiori*] possible in its presence.' [150] *Cogi velle* is unthinkable in the elect as it is in the damned. This does not affect the inability of either, saved or damned, effectively to resist God's will, i. e. to be predestined or not. The former, by the power of grace, consent to and work along with God, the latter make choices against God's will, but cannot resist it either, because God uses their negative choices to 'bring good out of evil'.[151]

[146] Djuth (n. 138) 286; cf. *De correptione et gratia* 12.37-38 (PL 44, 939-40), especially: *subventum est igitur infirmitati voluntatis humanae, ut divina gratia indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter ageretur*; cf. Rist (n. 1) 435-36.

[147] Cf. Djuth (n. 138) 287: 'Unlike the *possibilitas boni*, which is separable from human nature, the power of choice [*liberum arbitrium*] is not.' Augustine spends the first eight books of *De correptione et gratia* to develop this point in order to argue that it makes sense to correct wrongdoers, and he already held it against Julian of Aeclanum in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* 1.2.5 (CSEL 60, 425-26); cf. Lössl (n. 4) 315-16.

[148] *Spir. litt.* 30.52 (CSEL 60, 208-209); cf. Lössl (n. 4) 193.

[149] Cf. e. g. *corr.* 10.27, 14.45 (PL 44, 921.943); *praedest. sanct.* 16.33, 18.37 (PL 44, 973.987-88); *De dono perseverantiae* 13.33 (PL 45, 1013). Lössl (n. 4) 294-95.308 n. 526.

[150] Djuth (n. 138) 288; on the irresistability of grace and the use of Proverbs 8:35LXX (*praeparatur voluntas a domino*) in this context, cf. Rist (n. 1) 435-37; cf. above n. 146.

[151] Cf. *corr.* 14.43 (PL 44, 942); Lössl (n. 4) 295. According to *corr.* 13.40 (PL 44, 941) God's will has already fixed the (limited!) number of those who are saved. In corr. 15.44-49 Augustine attempts to square that with 1 Timothy 2:4 (*vult omnes homines salvos fieri*). This verse, Augustine argues, applies only to the elect, and since in this life we cannot yet distinguish the elect from the reprobate we have to apply it in such a way that we hope and pray and desire for all to be saved.

What grace does is to restore in the elect Adam's original righteousness and surpass it,[152] though not in this life, yet, nevertheless, necessarily.[153]

7. Conclusion: *Consequences for the reception*

Whether this final version of Augustine's doctrine of predestination is inspired by 'Stoic compatibilism, such as that found in the thought of Seneca and Chrysippus,' [154] is a matter of judgment. Some, though having described it in similar terms as Djuth, have hesitated using the term.[155] Others have described it differently and refuted the idea that we are dealing here with some form of compatibilism, but then again come to a similar conclusion.[156] This conclusion is that if there is nothing in humanity that can respond to the call of God's grace, it is difficult to establish the value of grace in human terms. In principle, Augustine does hold that there exists such a something in humanity, even after the Fall, namely the mere freedom of choice (powerless in terms of doing good rather than bad), yet in practice that means little; for before God's grace can become effective, the power to do good, including in terms of assuming faith, has to be, so to speak, switched on; the freedom of the will to do (rather than only

[152] For a comparison of the nature of Adam's original righteousness and the help given after the Fall cf. *corr.* 11.32-12.35 (PL 44, 935-37).

[153] Cf. *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 11.24 (CSEL 42, 24-25) of 415/6, where Augustine stresses the need of frequent (daily) prayer, especially the prayer not to be led into temptation (Matthew 6:13); cf. Lössl (n. 4) 250-51, especially n. 211.

[154] Djuth (n. 138) 288, based on the account of God's providence in *De civitate dei* 5.1-11 (190-211 Dombart-Kalb); cf. also M. DJUTH, *Stoicism and Augustine's Doctrine of Human Freedom after 396*, in: J. SCHNAUBELT, O. S. A. & F. VAN FLETEREN (eds.), *Augustine: Second Founder of the Faith*. Collectanea Augustiniana 1 (New York: Lang, 1990), 387-401; C. Kirwan, *Augustine* (London: Routledge, 1989), 117-19.

[155] Rist (n. 1) 422-23; cf. Rist (n. 136) 130.185.

[156] Stump (n. 135) 125 argues that we can describe Augustine's doctrine as 'libertarianism', though when she compares Augustine's theory of the will in *De libero arbitrio* with that in his later works (pp. 137-39), she has her doubts. On p. 142 she concludes that '...unless Augustine is willing to accept that God's giving of grace is responsive to something in human beings, even if that something is not good or worthy of merit, I do not see how he can be saved from the imputation of theological determinism with all its infelicitous consequences;' cf. also O'Daly (n. 1) 92-93: When, in *De spiritu et littera* 34.60 (CSEL 60, 220), 'Augustine asserts that "to consent to God's call ... is the act of one's own will ... he is proclaiming his own brand of determinism, a determinism which he believes to be compatible with human freedom.'

choose) good has to be made effective so as to be able to respond to God's call.[157]

Augustine's doctrine of predestination, worked out in detail as it was, down to the very number of the saved, has had a strong appeal throughout the history of thought. Its deceptive elegance has attracted many minds, as other papers in this volume may attest to. Yet many have also been repelled by it, already in Augustine's life time. At first glance this is surprising, since Augustine took such pain explaining himself, and since so much of his work remains extant. One would assume that one would quickly come to terms with it, if one only tried to understand it from the way and the context in which it emerged. Yet this is rarely done. Often studies focus on some writings,[158] or even on but one,[159] yet draw the most momentous conclusions; or they look at the work as a whole, but separate the issues without sufficiently relating them to one an-other.[160] Nevertheless, even if it is studied with sufficient care, Augustine's doctrine still holds in itself an enormous potential for confusion and controversy.

Take, for example, Augustine's concept of freedom of choice (*liberum arbitrium*). Is it a freedom of spontaneity, 'not so much the ability to do otherwise, as the ability to act free of compulsion or restraint?' [161] Augustine would have disagreed. Even *sine gratia* its

[157] Yet again, even in the fallen state human freedom is, of course, responsive, but not to God's call, but to concupiscence. *Trahat sua quemque voluptas*, Augustine approvingly quotes a Virgilian phrase, *Tractatus in Iohannem* 26.4 (CCL 36, 261); cf. Lössl (n. 4) 176. 'We recall the equally notorious Stoic tag, *Fata volentem ducunt sed nolentem trahunt*. It is not surprising that if the voluptas is provided by divine grace, people have been tempted to say that for Augustine this grace is irresistible. Leaving Jansen [or, for that matter, Calvin or Jonathan Edwards; cf. O'Daly (n. 1) 93-97] for a modern scholar, we may observe that Peter Brown has recently committed himself to saying that according to Augustine "a man is capable of allowing himself to be drawn to act by the sheer irresistible pleasure of the object of his love" [cf. Brown (n. 62) 374]. But Augustine never uses the word "irresistible" in this sort of context, and we must remember that "to be compelled to will" in his view makes no sense.' Rist (n. 1) 423.

[158] Like Drecoll (n. 2), who describes the development of Augustine's doctrine of grace up to *Conf.* and is very reluctant to be drawn into a debate about the late Augustine.

[159] Like Flasch (n. 58).

[160] Like Mann (n. 135), Wetzel (n. 7) and Stump (n. 135); cf. also nn. 104 and 156. Mann treats evil and original sin without looking at the development and the reception of the doctrine of predestination, Wetzel dissolves rather than solves the problems raised by the doctrine of predestination by pointing to the christological dimension. Stump largely ignores the soteriological dimension.

[161] O'Daly (n. 1) 96. Rist (n. 1) 440 puts it this way: '...man is a puppet, free in the sense only of being arranged to act in a way which is not subject to external pressures. All men are thus "free"; the elect are free from serious sins, the damned are free from virtue. The elect are slaves of *caritas*, the damned are slaves of *cupiditas*.'

only restriction was not being able to do good. It could still choose between different evils. Yet how can this be understood in fundamental philosophical terms? Is not even the ability to do one evil rather than the other a *possibilitas boni*? Or, in turn, does not the separation of the *possibilitas boni* from the concept of freedom amount to a denial of freedom as the ability to do otherwise? And is not in that case Augustine's concept of freedom a concept of freedom as spontaneity after all? Pelagius and Julian of Aeclanum certainly thought so,[162] and the reception followed them, not Augustine. For instance, Luther followed Augustine in allowing spontaneity to human action, yet he did not follow him in calling this spontaneity freedom. On the other hand, Catholic authors, starting from Erasmus,[163] followed Augustine in calling his concept a concept of freedom, but concluded that in this case it must imply the ability to do at least some good. In the fallen state, without grace, freedom may only be good for evil (*ad malum sufficit*),[164] but in a certain sense even this evil amounts to some good;[165] for it uses a good, freedom, and will itself be used as a good, i. e. as punishment of the sinners for the use of the saved.

What about 'double predestination'? We saw that in *Simpl.* 1.2 Augustine did not (yet) speak of predestination of the damned. In fact, while abandoning the concept of divine prescience in the case of those predestined to salvation he retained that concept for the damned to avoid the impression that they are in any way driven to sin by God; and he reiterates this view in *De dono perseverantiae* at the end of his life. Yet in the meantime, in De anima et eius origine of 419/420, he does speak of predestination to eternal death.[166] True, he qualifies this expression by adding that by this he does not mean that God actively determines the sinners to sin in order to punish them. Rather, he punishes them because they are sinners.[167] Later, in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, he adds that God does not actively harden their hearts

[162] Julian even cites the early Augustine in his support; cf. Julian, *Ad Florum apud* Augustine, *c. Iul. imp.* 1.44/78 (CSEL 85/1, 31.93) citing Augustine, *De duabus animabus* 15 (CSEL 25/1, 70): *peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel ammittendi, quod iustitita vetat et unde liberum est abstinere*. However, in his response Augustine insisted that in *De duabus animabus* he had spoken of freedom prior to the Fall; cf. Lössl (n. 4) 377-79 nn. 357, 360; Lössl (n. 94) 55.112.141.146.207.

[163] Or, for that matter, Aquinas; cf. Stump (n. 135) 140.

[164] *Corr.* 11.31 (PL 44, 936).

[165] Cf. Rist (n. 1) 424 n. 1.

[166] *An. orig.* 4.16 (CSEL 60, 396.8): *...quos praedestinavit ad aeternam mortem...*, which includes, as Augustine does not fail to add, unbaptised infants, *propter originale peccatum*.

[167] Cf. Rist (n. 1) 428.

(Romans 9:18), he merely allows them to be hardened.[168] Nevertheless, Augustine's 'slip' is revealing. It occurs again in his *Encheiridion de fide spe et caritate* dating from the early 420s. Here he speaks of God making good use of evil by the damnation of those whom he has predestined to punishment;[169] and again he clarifies his position by saying that by this he means 'the foreknowledge and acceptance by God of the fact of calamitous sin',[170] not God determining, or causing, sinners to sin. Thus while Augustine still rejects the concept of predestination to eternal punishment and death on a factual level, he starts already using it on a terminological level. He rejects it, because in his view it would question the justice of the punishment, which is only ascertained, if the sinners are guilty. Yet in Augustine's view the sinners are guilty, because they are culpably participating in the Fall, and because they are really free, even after the Fall. Once these assumptions are less strongly held, as in the Early Modern reception of Augustine, the tendency to parallelise predestination to eternal salvation and predestination to eternal punishment and to drop the artificial distinction between predestination and prescience in the case of the reprobate becomes stronger. In so far as, as we have seen, the link between the doctrines of original sin and predestination is less strong already in Augustine than is often assumed, this tendency can already be felt in Augustine himself. In any case his choice of language is revealing, and it is not surprising that in a different context, with a different concept of freedom,[171] Augustine's doctrine of predestination could easily be developed further into a doctrine of double predestination – and indeed was.

When Augustine set out to develop his doctrine of predestination, he already had a notion of God's grace preceeding and in some sense even 'preparing' the human will, externally – through *admonitio*. Yet at that early stage he also still believed that it lay in human hands to accept or to reject God's offer. This he began to consider an error. Within a few years he developed a theory of grace as irresistible. He himself found it irresistible to follow that path, to take away from creation all means for salvation and hand them over to God, who alone would employ them rationally, justly and securely.

[168] Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 23.45 (PL 44, 910-11).

[169] *Encheiridion* 26.100 (CCL 46, 103.6-7): *bene utens et malis tanquam summe bonus, ad eorum damnationem quos iuste praedestinavit ad poenam.*

[170] Rist (n. 1) 429.

[171] Cf. e. g. above in the previous paragraph on Luther's understanding of the concept.

God alone, he found, was a safe bet; creation, even though it was God's creation, and good, still smacked too much of the *nihil*, from which it was created; the Fall was the most obvious proof of that.[172] Yet soon Augustine had to defend this position against opponents and clarify it to those, even among his supporters, who 'misunderstood' it as a denial of human freedom. He thereby initiated a reception process that continues to the present day, with enormous consequences.

Josef LÖSSL

[172] Cf. Rist (n. 1) 440-42.

THE EPISTLE OF JAMES IN AUGUSTINE AND HIS PELAGIAN ADVERSARIES: SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS[1]

In 1954, Jean Daniélou, in the opening line of a brief survey on the relationship between the Fathers of the Church and the Scriptures, lamented that "[t]he most neglected aspect of the immense corpus of writings, which the Fathers have bequeathed to us, is their exegesis of Holy Scripture."[2] I would contend that this statement, in spite of the fact that it is fifty years old and in spite of the recent popularity of the history of Patristic exegesis as a field for comment and for research,[3] still contains much truth. I would also contend that this statement remains true in the particular case of Augustine and, moreover, that it remains precisely on point with respect to Augustine's (as well as his Pelagian adversaries') relationship to the Epistle of James.

Obviously, space does not permit me to address either of the first two of these contentions. In this paper, however, I will attempt to show how our current lack of knowledge regarding the third contention has impoverished and confused us with regard to both the reception of James and, more broadly, the history of the exegesis of

[1] This paper reflects, in part, research performed for a S.T.L. thesis which was successfully defended in the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven's *Faculteit Godgeleerdheid* in September of 2001. Note well that since that project was limited to the single pericope of James 2:14-26, I am presently unable to offer thoroughly detailed comments with regard to evidence gleaned from the presence of other portions of James in Augustine or to offer definitive conclusions regarding the presence of James in either Augustine's predecessors or contemporaries.

[2] Jean DANIÉLOU, S.J., "The Fathers and the Scriptures," *Theology* LVII (February, 1954) : 83.

[3] For examples of the recent popularity of this trend, note that two separate English-language projects specifically addressing the Fathers' relationship to the Scriptures are underway. The first, the series *Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture*, has already issued a handful of its projected 27 volumes. It is under the general editorship of Thomas Oden. The second is simultaneously less well-known and targeted more toward academicians and specialists. It is under the editorial direction of Robert Wilken and expects to publish a volume on *The Song of Songs* by January of 2003, with volumes on *1 Corinthians and Isaiah* soon to follow. While it has not confined itself to the realm of Patristics, it is also interesting to see that a journal has emerged which, by its very existence, demonstrates the rising importance of the history of exegesis for contemporary scholars. The first volume of *Annali di storia dell' esegesi* appeared in 1984.

the "lesser"[4] New Testament books. I will first show how more and more detailed research into the reception history of James can and has provided data which calls for a rethinking of several of the current conclusions about the date of James' reception in the West. And, second, I will show how research into the way Augustine himself used James can both shed light on some of the central issues of the Pelagian Controversy as well as raise several questions which would doubtlessly reward further inquiry and evaluation.

Relative Paucity of Published Materials on Augustine's Relationship to both the Bible and the Letter of James

I contend that the relative paucity of published works which have addressed Augustine's exegesis of Scripture has compromised modern scholarship's understanding of both the man and his thought. I base this on the fact that even a cursory reading of the works of Augustine makes it clear that he both thoroughly knew and diligently employed the Scriptures.[5] Indeed, in the opinion of Leuven professor *emeritus* T.J. Van Bavel, the Scriptures were so interwoven into Augustine's literary style and mode of expression that one's capacity for discovering quotations and allusions to them are often only limited by the investigator's general knowledge of the Scriptures and of their wording in the translations employed by Augustine.[6]

Worse still is the fact that studies which address Augustine's use of the book of James remain practically non-existent.[7] In fact, up to

[4] Of course, this is not to imply that James is *in se* insignificant or that it was regarded as insignificant by Augustine. Instead, here the word "lesser" is used merely to remind the reader of the *relatively* insignificant role the letter of James plays today and has played in the past when compared with other biblical books, e.g., Paul's letter to the Romans.

[5] Hubertus Drobner has written: "As with all the Fathers of the Church, Augustine knew and quoted most of the Bible by heart ... his texts ... are impregnated with biblical vocabulary, allusions and images that are often recognizable only if one knows precisely with which words he quoted different biblical phrases." See Hubertus R. DROBNER, *Studying Augustine: An Overview of Recent Research, in Augustine and His Critics*, eds. Robert DODARO and George LAWLESS (London: Routledge, 2000), 24. Similar sentiments have also been espoused by Joseph Trigg. He writes: "Like Tertullian, Augustine was a brilliant polemicist who employed scriptural interpretation incessantly in his writing." See Joseph W. TRIGG, *Message of the Fathers of the Church: Biblical Interpretation*, Message of the Fathers of the Church Series, gen. ed. Thomas Halton, vol. 9 (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1988), 43.

[6] T.J. Van Bavel, private discussion with author, Fall 1999, Augustijns Historisch Instituut, Heverlee, Belgium.

[7] Note the relatively recent observation of Scannerini on this question: "Qui ac-

today, there exist less than a dozen publications which deal in any substantial way with Augustine's relationship to the letter (or to parts of the letter) or to the letter's (or to part of the letter's) acceptance and use by Augustine in comparison with other Patristic authors.[8] Of

cenniamo solo a qualche linea generale della interpretazione agostiniana, perché manca finora uno spoglio completo di tutti I passi che trattano del nostro brano." See Stefano SCANNERINI, *Giustificazione per la fede, giustificazione per le opere. Linee di storia dell'esegesi di Giacomo 2:20-24 e 26, in: Annali di storia dell'esegesi* 6 (1989): 181.

[8] Of these publications (and excepting the short monograph of Bergauer), only a few of the shortest devote their entirety to both Augustine and to the letter of James. The list that I have thus far been able to compile includes the following: Paul ALTHAUS, *'Bekenne einer dem andern seine Sünden.' Zur Geschichte von Jak. 5,16 seit Augustin*, in *Zur Geschichte van Jakobus 5,16 seit Augustinus*, (Leipzig: D. Werner. Scholl, 1928), 165-194; Paulus BERGAUER, *Der Jakobusbrief bei Augustinus und die damit verbunden Probleme der Rechtfertigungslehre* (Wien: Verlag Herder, 1962); Johannes BEUMER, *et daemones credunt (Iac. 2,19) Ein Beitrag zur positiven Bewertung der fides informis, Gregorianum* 22 (1941): 231-251; Jean-Paul BOUHOT, *La lecture liturgique des Épîtres Catholiques d'après les sermons d'Augustin*, in *La lecture liturgique des Épîtres Catholiques dans l'Église ancienne*, eds. Ch.B. AMPHOUX and J.-P. BUHOUT (Lausanne: Editiones du Zèbre, 1996), 269-281; Robert ENO, *Some Patristic Views on the Relationship of Faith and Works in Justification*, in *Recherches augustiniennes* 19 (1984): 3-27; Georg PFLIGERSDORFFER, *Demut und Genade zu Jakobus 4,6 bei Augustinus*, in *Chartulae Festschrift für Wolfgang Speyer* Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, vol. 28 (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1998), 244-252; Stefano SCANNERINI, *Giustificazione per la fede, giustificazione per le opere. Linee di storia dell'esegesi di Giacomo 2:20-24 e 26*, in *Annali di storia dell'esegesi* 6 (1989): 169-187; Vittorio SUBILIA, *La giustificazione per fide*, Biblioteca di cultura religiosa 27 (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1976); and Walter THIELE, *Augustinus zum lateinischen Text des Jakobusbriefes*, in *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche* 46 (1955): 255-258. Note that this list does not include any of a number of articles and monographs which deal with either the correspondence or the debates between Augustine and Jerome. These works, when they address Augustine's letter 167 to Jerome and/or Jerome' brief response in his letter number 134, of necessity must address Augustine's exegesis of James 2:10. For an article which addresses this issue, see Giovanni Menestrina, "L'Epistola 167 *'de sententia Iacobi apostoli'* (Giac. 2,10) di Sant'Agostino," Bibbia e Oriente 20 (1978): 43-49. For two examples of recent monographs which engage these questions (albeit with different conclusions), see Ralph HENNINGS *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Augustinus und Hieronymus und ihr Streit um den Kanon des alten Testaments und die Auslegung von Gal. 2,11-14*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae series, 21 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994) and Alfons FÜRST, *Augustins Briefwechsel mit Hieronymus*, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum series, 29 (Münster: Aschendorfsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1999).

these,[9] the majority deal explicitly with aspects of James 2, and almost half of the total deal specifically with aspects of James 2:14-26. Interestingly, with so few publications spread over the other four and one-half chapters of the letter, it would seem that the field is literally wide open for studies which deal with Augustine's use of and relationship to James.

The Relevance of Researching James' Reception for Contemporary Scholars

At five chapters and slightly over one hundred verses, James' length and content are nothing when compared with that of any of the four gospels or with that of a lengthy tract such as Paul's letter to the Romans. Moreover, unlike either of the Gospels or the major portions of the Pauline corpus, James was not immediately recognized as having stemmed from an apostle or a direct associate of an apostle.[10] Given the two facts of its relatively small size and late acceptance, close study of the letter's *Überlieferungsgeschichte* would seem to hold the promise of substantial (and relatively easily obtainable) benefits with respect to questions such as canon formation, canon criteria, and textual transmission and translation. Furthermore, its small size is an advantage in making the amount of citation and allusion data more manageable,[11] as is also its late reception in so far as it limits the number of writers who certainly made reference to it. Oddly, however, and as equally distressing as the paucity of publications on Augustine and James mentioned above, is the degree to which this doubt and confusion continues to linger among modern

[9] This list of works was compiled through a check of the following sources: the card catalogue of the Augustijns Historisch Instituut in Heverlee, Belgium; the 6 vols. (i.e. literature published through 1993) of the *Bulletin d'ancienne littérature chrétienne latine; the "Bulletin" of the Revue des études augustiniennes*; the Italian journal *Annali di storia dell' esegesi*; Sieben's *Exegesis Patrum* and the allied publication of the *Bibliographia Patristica* (for the years 1956-1990); and, finally, the electronic bibliography known as the *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* or CAG. Searches performed using the CAG's database included searching the "Title" heading for occurrences of the following key words: "Giacomo"; "Iacobi"; "Jacobo"; "Jacobum"; "Jacobus"; "Jacobusbrief"; "Jacques"; "Jakobus"; "Jakobusbrief"; and "James."

[10] Indeed, Eusebius, writing in the early part of the fourth century, noted the difficulties that the letter experienced in becoming recognized. On this, cf. *Historia ecclesiastica* III, 25, where he uses the term "disputed" (τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων) to describe the book of James as well as those of 2 Peter, 2 John, 3 John, and Jude.

[11] E.g., combing through all the references by every Patristic author to all 28 chapters of the Gospel of Matthew would probably amount to a life's work, even with the help of CD-ROM's and reference tools such as *Biblia Patristica*.

exegetes and commentators regarding this rather fundamental question.[12] They simply do not agree on the answers to questions such as which authors in the tradition knew of the existence of the letter, which ones actually cited the letter and, even more specifically, which ones regarded the letter as authoritative, i.e., as Holy Scripture.[13]

Reception of James according to Commentators

Perhaps the only thing on which commentators can agree is that the epistle of James is absent from the *Canon Muratori*.[14] Indeed, even

[12] For assessments of the data relevant to the reception and use of the Letter, in various levels of detail and complete with various conclusions and interpretations, see, e.g., Joseph B. MAYOR, *The Epistle of St. James* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1897; reprint Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1978), xlviii-lxviii; James Hardy ROPES, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of Saint James*, ICC series (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1916; reprint 1968), 84-103; R.V.G. TASKER, *The General Epistle of James* (London: The Tyndale Press, 1956; reprint 1957), 16-19; Franz MUßNER, *Der Jakobusbrief*, HthKNT series (Freiburg: Herder, 1975), 33-42; Bruce M. METZGER, *The Canon of the New Testament. Its Origin, Development, and Significance* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1987) *passim*; James B. ADAMSON, *James The Man and His Message* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989), 147-162 and John PAINTER, *Just James. The Brother of Jesus in History and Tradition* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 2000), 234-236.

[13] For example, cf. the list of citations and allusions to the letter in Biblia Patristica to that of commentators such as Ropes and Adamson. The former, although even its subtitle indicates the compilers' intention to include all relevant evidence (i.e., even what many would label as "allusions" or mere "verbal similarities"), lists more than 575 uses of the letter, with more than 40 included in vol. 6, a vol. dedicated exclusively to the fourth century Western writers Hilary, Ambrose and Ambrosiaster. See, Biblia Patristica: Index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la littérature patristique, vols. 1-7 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1975-2000), various pp. The latter, on the other hand, both largely downplay the evidence and seem intent on concluding that James played only a minimal role in the church generally and the Western church particularly.

[14] Assumed here are both an early date and a Roman provenance for the *Canon Muratori*. For a defense of the early date of the fragment, see, respectively, an article and book review (of the 1992 book by HAHNEMAN, cf. this same n. *infra*) by Everett FERGUSON *Canon Muratori. Date and Provenance*, in *Studia Patristica* 17,2, ed. Elizabeth A. LIVINGSTONE (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1982), 677-682 and Journal of Theological Studies 44 (1993) : 691-697. For an earlier claim that the fragment is actually of a 4th century provenance see A.C. SUNDBERG, Jr., *Canon Muratori: A Fourth Century Document*, in Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973) : 1-41, or, more recently, Geoffrey M. HAHNEMAN, *The Muratorian Fragment and the Development of the Canon* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992), esp. pp. 215-218 for his conclusion. Now, for a masterful rebuttal of Hahneman's theses, see J. VERHEYDEN, *The Canon Muratori: A Matter of Dispute*, forthcoming in the published proceedings of the 2001 Jubilee Meeting of the *Colloquium Biblicum Louaniense*. In his conclusion (p. 27 in my copy) to this paper Verheyden succinctly writes: "None of the arguments that have been put forward by Sundberg and Hahneman in favor of a fourth-century Eastern origin of the Fragment carries weight." Allow me to express my thanks here to Prof. Verheyden for pre-publication access to this work.

the work of Irenaeus generates problems for them. They cannot agree on either the frequency of his references[15] or on his opinion of the letter's authority.[16] Tertullian, in spite of being listed as referring to

[15] In his commentary, Mußner lists some 4 references to the letter by Irenaeus while the *Biblia Patristica* lists 8. Of these, that of *Adversus Haereses* IV,16,2 (cf. *Sources Chrétiennes* vol. 100, p.562) with its reference to James 2:23 and the phrase *"Abraham ... credidit Deo et reputatem est illi ad iustitiam et amicus dei vocatus est* seems to me, in spite of its slightly altered wording, to qualify as citation, especially when it is compared to the generally uniform *Vetus Latina* text as given in the Beuron edition (for the full bibliographical information, see p. 7, n. 26 *infra*). There, for the so-called "F" *Texttyp* we read *"... credidit Abraham domino ... et amicus dei vocatus est."* For dissenting opinions as to the significance of this phrase note the words of Ropes and Adamson. Ropes, after having dismissed this evidence as a probable "coincidence" (p. 90) sweepingly concludes (p. 100) by remarking that "Before the middle of the fourth century there is no clear trace of any acquaintance with James [in the Western church]. The *Canon of Muratori* omits it; Irenaeus *makes no certain use of it*" (italics added). Adamson on p. 148 declares that the words of IV,16,2 are "clearly a verbatim quotation from Jas. 2:23," while going on to note (p. 149) that: "We conclude that neither the African or Roman Church up to the time of Augustine knew the Epistle of James or ascribed any importance to it." Note that the blanket nature of this observation, besides assuming that the work of Irenaeus was either lost or remained unread in both Rome and North Africa down to c. 400, is further brought into question by the presence of citations and exegesis of the letter of James in the works of Pelagius. *Contra* the first part of this observation, it is manifest that Tertullian (and many other Western writers) knew and used the work of Irenaeus. In fact, in the early decades of the last century, there a considerable debate was waged *not* over the question of whether Tertullian knew Irenaeus, but whether he knew him in Greek or in Latin. For highlights of the debate, see A. Souter, "The Date and Place of the Latin Translator of Irenaeus," in *Nouum Testamentum Sancti Irenaei Episcopi Lugdunensis*, eds. William SANDAY, Cuthbert HAMILTON TURNER et al., Old-Latin Biblical Texts Series, no. VII (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923), lxv-lxx. For examples of more recent, if less detailed, comments on this subject, see J.H. WASZINK, *Tertullian's Principles and Methods of Exegesis*, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition in Honorem Robert M. Grant*, eds. William R. SCHOEDEL and Robert L. WILKEN (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 21 and W.H.C. FREND, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), 350. (Though familiar with both of these works, I was helpfully reminded of these particular contents in an endnote of Maureen A. Tilley's *The Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist World* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1997), 185 n. 11. (n.b., the references given here have been altered and corrected due to the facts that different editions of Frend's work were consulted and an error exists in the aforementioned note.)) For more on the evidence of the presence of James in the work of Pelagius, cf. pp. 8-10 *infra*.

[16] I.e., Did Irenaeus regard James as Scripture in the same sense as he did with the Old Testament and other, soon-to-become "canonical," portions of the New Testament, e.g., Matthew? Cf. the words of Mußner from p. 41: " ... ob er ihn aber als γραφή wertete, lässt sich nicht erkennen." For more details regarding Irenaeus' cita-

James six times in *Biblia Patristica*,[17] is excluded from having had any knowledge of the Epistle by Ropes, Mußner, Bruce and Adamson. Further, after a careful scrutiny of the commentators that even bother to mention Cyprian,[18] Hippolytus,[19] Novatian[20] or Lactantius,[21] one is left with the impression that the possibility that any of these four writers knew and used James is somewhere between slim and none.

With Hilary of Poitiers, however, the evidence becomes less debatable. Of the six uses of James that have been attributed to Hilary by *Biblia Patristica*, by far the clearest is the use of James 1:17 found

tion techniques and the closely related issues of his view of the canon and authority, see *Der Hirt des Hermas*, trans. Norbert Brox, Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern, eds. N. BROX, G. KRETSCHMAR and K. NIEDERWIMMER, vol. 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 57-61, along with the accompanying nn.

[17] *Biblia Patristica*'s editors note one use each for James 1:12; 2:23; 4:10; 5:11; 5:12; and 5:17. For the locations of these uses, which, interestingly, all occur in different works, see *Biblia Patristica Index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la littérature patristique*, vol. 1, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1975), 524-525.

[18] Note that the possibility of the letter of James having been used or recognized as authoritative by Cyprian was ruled out by von Soden long ago. See his *Das lateinische Neue Testament in Afrika zur Zeit Cyprians* Texte und Untersuchungen 33, gen. eds. Adolf HARNACK and Carl SCHMIDT (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1909), 13, where he writes: "Fraglos is dagegen, daß 2 P[etrus] und Jak[obus] keinesfalls im Cyprianischen Kanon Platz gefunden haben" and note that no references to the letter appear in an otherwise copious collection of indices found on pp. 618-637.

[19] For Hippolytus, Mußner is non-committal and uses his nn. to send the reader to articles both pro and contra while Adamson (p. 149) and Ropes (p. 101 excursus text), in spite of giving fuller treatments of the issues, both come down against the possibility that Hippolytus used our letter.

[20] Novatian's use of Scripture is (at least to my knowledge) yet to be substantially treated in any publication. Still, note that Diercks in his critical edition of Novatian's extant works does see a reference to James 1:17 in *De trinitate* IV (cf. CCL 4, p.17). In my judgement, however, this is at best an allusion given the facts that (1) there is so little verbatim textual correspondence and, (2) the idea of God's immutability could have come from any number of sources. He writes: "nec se umquam in aliquas formas uertit aut mutat, . . ."; cf. the relevant portion of James 1:17 taken from the Beuron edition with the "F's" and "V's" representing variant readings from 2 different *Textypen* for the same term: "apud quem non est (F) permutatio/ (V) transmutatio (F) vel/ (V)nec (F) modicum/ (V) uicissitudinis (F) obumbrationis/ (V) obumbratio."

[21] For what is quite possibly a use of James by Lactantius, see Pierre MONAT, *Lactance et la Bible: Une propédeutique latine à la lecture de la Bible dans l'Occident constantinien. Tome II: Notes* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1982), 125 n.2 where he writes: "Mais, dans bien des passages, l'*Épitomé* semble préciser ou ajouter une référence à l'Écriture (... *epist.* 57,3 p. 740,8 qui semble ajouter le souvenir de Jac. 1,15 à une remarque sur la mort que provoque la concupiscence; ...)."

in *De trinitate* IV, 8.[22] Here, Hilary removes all doubt regarding his knowledge of James by using the introductory formula "*et Iacobus apostolus dixerit*." However, two things regarding this citation are well worthy of note. First, the wording of these lines are not free from textual difficulties: while it is certainly a highly probable reading, it is not unanimously supported by all the extant manuscripts.[23] Second, and even more damaging, is the external evidence we possess regarding Hilary's biography. In a word, it is all but certain that he composed books IV-XII of *De trinitate* and probably books I to III as well – after he had been exiled to the East.[24] Obviously, this is significant in so far as he might have become familiar with, or even introduced to, the book of James as authoritative Scripture only *after* he left Latin territory. If this is true, it somewhat undermines the implication/claim that he was the first (post-Irenaean? cf. pp. 5-6 and nn. 15-16 *supra*) Western author to make substantial use of the letter.

After Hilary, although scholarly opinion is still far from unanimous, some find evidence for asserting that Ambrosiaster,[25] Ambrose[26]

[22] For Hilary, *Biblia Patristica* notes the following for uses of James: James 1:2-3 (1x); 1:17 (3x); and 2:23 (2x). For the complete information on these, see *Biblia Patristica Index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la littérature patristique*, vol. 6, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1995), 366-367.

[23] For the data, see CCL 62, p. 109 and the n. for lines 28/29.

[24] For a relatively recent discussion, see E.P. MEIJERING, *Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity: De Trinitate 1, 1-19, 2, 3* Philosophia Patrum Series, vol. 6 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982), 1-11, esp. p. 10 and the bibliographical notes which accompany these pages. On p. 10, Meijering writes: "So we are inclined to agree with M. Simonetti that the whole of *De Trinitate* was written in exile with knowledge of the Greek Fathers, especially Athanasius."

[25] While Ropes, Mußner and Adamson all refer to 1 use of James by Ambrosiaster, i.e., a reference to 5:20 in the *Ad Galatas* 5:10 section of his *Commentarius in Pauli epistulas*, the compilers of *Biblia Patristica* believe that they have located no less than 12 uses of the letter in this author's limited corpus. For their list, see the same pages of vol. 6 mentioned for uses of James by Hilary in n. 22 *supra*.

[26] Confusion also exists regarding Ambrose's relationship to our Epistle. Note that vol. 6 of *Biblia Patristica* lists some 26 instances where Ambrose employed the Epistle in some fashion and compare this with Ropes assertion (p. 100) that "it is worthy of note that even Ambrose never directly quotes from it," with Adamson's claim (p. 150) that "Ambrose does not quote it," and with Thiele's assessment that "[Zitate] aus Ambrosius genannten Stellen reichen für eine Beurteilung nicht aus." For this last quotation, see the brief discussion of the evidence for the citation of James by Patristic authors in *Vetus Latina: Die Reste der altlateinischen Bible nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Erzabtei Beuron, 26/1 Epistulae Catholicae*, ed. Walter THIELE (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1969), 58*. While the scope of this study has not allowed me the time for a full analysis of the *Biblia Patristica*

and Priscillian[27] all made use of the letter.

Interestingly, this tangle of data is at least partially responsible for some commentators assigning the ultimate acceptance of James in the Roman church to the relatively late date of 405.[28] However, there exists evidence which indicates that the letter of James was accepted as authoritative and even that it had been closely studied (if not memorized) by members of that community several years prior to this date. In fact, although the evidence has been routinely overlooked, it remains true that Pelagius made substantial use of James and, more importantly, that he did so in a way which indicates that the letter was rather well-known among the Christians of Rome before 400. This evidence for Rome is significant in that it allows us to assert that the three most influential sections of the Western and Latin speaking church were all on the same page regarding the book of James probably as early as the 380's. This assertion may be made in light of the facts that (1) Hilary probably (re-) introduced the letter to Gaul upon his return from exile, (2) Augustine made occasional allusions to it in his early works,[29] and (3) it was included in the official (catholic) North African canonical lists of 393/397.[30]

list, it would seem highly unlikely that all 26 instances from their research would turn out to be mere allusions. Once again, for *Biblia Patristica*'s list, see the same pages of vol. 6 mentioned for uses of James by Hilary in n. 22 *supra*.

[27] Adamson (p. 151; cf. Ropes p. 102) is the primary source for the claim of Priscillian's usage of our Epistle. Note well, however, that he very vaguely summarizes the data he has collected with the phrase "numerous quotations in the tractates of the heretic Priscillian."

[28] Cf. Mußner, *Der Jakobusbrief*, 42 where he writes "Papst Innozenz I. nennt in seiner Liste der kanonischen Schriften des NT in seinem Brief an Bischof Exuperius von Toulouse vom Jahre 405 auch den Jak-Brief. Damit hatte sich das kanonische Ansehen unseres Briefes in der römischen Kirche für immer durchgesetzt." Of course, it should be noted that the wording of this comment does not specifically *exclude* that the letter was regarded as canonical and therefore authoritative before c. 405.

[29] Indeed, in *De moribus eccl.*, a work which is normally dated to 387/388, Bauer, the CSEL (vol. XC) edition editor, points to 4 uses of James. Although none of these qualify as citations, that which is found at XXVI, 51 is a reasonably clear allusion to James 1:17 (cf. p. 55). Here, Augustine writes: "Non enim ad haec satis est uoluntas bona, sed opus est magna quadam ratione atque prudentia, qua nemo uti potest, nisi deus ille fons omnium bonorum id tribuerit." Cf. the "F" *Texttyp* of the *Vetus Latina* for the first ? of James 1:17: "omnis datio bona et omne donum perfectum desursum descendit a patre luminum ..."

[30] For more on these synods and on Augustine's involvement therein, see pp. 16-17 (along with appropriate nn.) *infra*.

Pelagius and His Writings

Pelagius, who was clearly active in Rome from the 380's on,[31] employed our letter multiple times in his (undisputed) literary productions.[32] The majority can be found in his *Expositio ad Romanos*, a work which, it must be remembered, was penned between 405 and 410, well before the beginning of the controversy and well before there had been any serious questioning of his (or his followers') orthodoxy.[33]

[31] Note the pithy, if slightly imprecise, summary of what is known regarding the first decades of Pelagius' life by de Bruyn: "Pelagius was active in Rome during the last two decades of the fourth century and the first decade of the fifth. We know little of his life prior to his arrival in Rome in the early 380's." See Theodore DE BRUYN, *Pelagius's Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1993), 10. The best critical edition of the Latin text remains that of A. SOUTER. See his *Pelagius's Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul. II Text and Apparatus Criticus*, Texts and Studies Series, IX, gen. ed. J. Armitage ROBINSON (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1926). For more detailed comments about the life and chronology of Pelagius and his activity, see, among a plethora of possible sources, B.R. REES, *Pelagius: Life and Letters* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: The Boydell Press, 1998), xii-xv and, though older, George DE PLINVAL, *Pélage: Ses écrits, sa vie, et sa réforme* (Lausanne: Librairie Payot, 1943), 13-71, of which pp. 13-15 comprise a chronological table. On the date of the commentary, cf. de Bruyn, *Pelagius's Commentary*, p. 11 along with the relevant literature listed in n. 64. Note well, however, that some of the data which scholars rely upon for the biography of Pelagius is either questioned or refuted by Duval. See Yves-Marie DUVAL, *Pélage est-il le censeur inconnu de l'adversus Iovinianum à Rome en 393?*, in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 75 (July-December, 1980) : 525-557, esp. 526-530; 536; 540-542; and 551-552.

[32] The question of which works may be justifiably attributed to Pelagius is too complicated to be addressed here. While virtually no one would question his authorship of the Pauline commentary attributed to him or of the so-called letter to Demetrias, compositions such as *De uirginitate*, *De diuina lege*, and *De uita christiana* (all of which contain uses of James) are variously more suspect. The places where Pelagius cites or alludes to James in these 2 undisputed works are as follows: *Ad Demetriadem*, 19,3 (James 3:2); 25,3 (James 4:7); and *Expositio in Romanos* 1:11; 2:2; 3:28; 5:4; 5:10; 12:12; 13:10; 13:13 and 14:4. These passages of the commentary include uses of James 4:15; 2:23; 2:26 (cf. 2:17); 1:2; 4:4; 1:2; 2:15-16; 3:14 and 4:11, respectively. It goes without saying that a more careful perusal of Pelagius' authentic writings combined with a thorough search of these works with a CD-ROM research tool would probably yield still more examples of instances where our letter was used by him.

[33] In fact, during the period in which he wrote his Pauline Commentary, Pelagius was almost universally held in high regard. Indeed, to use Augustine's own attitude as an example, it was approximately 415 before he had lost his sense of general respect for the Pelagians and their associates. It even seems fair to say that he was reluctant to engage them polemically. For support of this idea, cf., e.g., Allan D. FITZGERALD, ed. *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B.

The Significance of James in and for Pelagius

Given the scope of this paper, it is probably better to omit a detailed discussion of the content of Pelagius' comments which involve the letter of James. In fact, my primary point can be made just as well by observing the *form* by which he introduces his uses of James.

In addition to the implicit authority he assigns to the Epistle by assuming Jacobean authorship of the letter and by labeling this James as "blessed" (*beatus*), Pelagius betrays concern that some among his circles of contact have claimed that an internal contradiction existed within Paul's writings specifically and within the New Testament more generally.[34] Surely he would not have done the latter had he possessed serious qualms about the epistle's status. Even more significantly, it would seem justifiable to conclude that Pelagius and, by extension, his intended readers, must have known the Epistle of James quite well. Evidence for this assertion is provided by the quotes of James found in his remarks on Romans 5:4 and 13:13. In his comments on 5:4 he writes: " ... *sicut Iacobus ait: 'omne gaudium existimate, fratres,'* ***et reliqua*** (cf. James 1:2)," while at 13:13 he writes: " ... dicente Iacobo: *'si enim zelum amarum habetis,'* ***et cetera***.

Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1999), s.v. "Pelagius, Pelagianism," by Eugene TeSelle, where TeSelle notes that "Augustine seemed reluctant to attack Pelagius himself. He was aware of Pelagius's reputation for piety and the support that he had in the clergy and among powerful Roman families." It is also worth noting that TeSelle's remarks seem to be reflections and assimilations of conclusions expressed by Gerald Bonner several years ago. Compare the second remark above with this observation made by G. BONNER, *Pelagianism and Augustine**, in *Augustinian Studies* 23 (1993): 40-42, viz., "As late as 412, ... Augustine knew Pelagius only by repute, as a holy man of no small spiritual advancement," "With Pelagius himself he remained on civil terms, ... ," and, most notably, "Augustine, in Africa, still at this time preoccupied [with other duties and writings], ... had far less motive than Jerome to embark upon a campaign against Pelagius, *a man with a reputation for piety, as Augustine himself recognized, and who enjoyed the friendship of many of Augustine's friends*. Perhaps by 415 Augustine's views were changing" (italics added). Finally, see also Bonner's 1970 Villanova Lectures, published as *Saint Augustine and Modern Research on Pelagianism*, The Saint Augustine Lecture Series, ed. Robert P. RUSSELL (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1972), pp. 38 and 40 respectively. Here, Bonner writes: " ... up to the year 416 [Augustine's role in the Pelagian Controversy] is marked by a curious reserve," and "thus far [i.e. to 414], Augustine still considered the Pelagians as brothers not heretics."

[34] Indeed, his words "Now if these verses seem to contradict the sense of the other verses, ... (quod si haec eorum sensui uidentur esse contraria ...)" disclose his own intention to demonstrate that no such contradiction existed.

(cf. James 3:14; emphases added)"[35] The very fact that Pelagius was comfortable with stopping off his quotations of James with phrases like *"et reliqua"* and *"et cetera"* indicate that, in all probability, Pelagius expected his audience to know James well enough to be able to call to mind the lines that followed his explicit quotation and to apply them to his larger point. In short, Pelagius' use of these phrases offers indirect proof that the Epistle of James was accepted, carefully studied and, perhaps, even memorized in the Christian communities of Rome prior to 405. Although precisely how much earlier remains difficult to determine, it is certain that Pelagius' audience could not have come to know the Epistle of James this well overnight.[36] Prima facie, this would seem to amount to a significant piece of evidence for what may fairly be called a rediscovery, if not an outright discovery, of the epistle of James in the Rome of the late fourth century.

[35] See Souter, *Pelagius's Expositions*, pp. 42 and 105 respectively. Although one might initially suspect that these abbreviated references to Scripture were made by the hand of a later editor or copyist and, thus, do not support the argument made here, this suspicion is put to rest by the facts that: (1) the vast majority of Pelagius' scriptural citations in the commentary are not abbreviated, even in instances where the quotations are relatively lengthy; (2) in the case of several of the abbreviated citations, the context of Pelagius' argument makes it clear which particular aspect of the verse(s) in question he wanted his readers to remember (cf., e.g. the comments on Romans 5:4, where the abbreviated reference to James 1:2-4 was inserted in between other references to trials and suffering); and, (3) Souter, in his highly detailed analysis of the commentary and its transmission history, offers no hint that anything might be suspect regarding the abbreviations. In fact, on p.92 and before giving a list of more than 30 places where such abbreviations occur, he notes: "When a scripture passage is not quoted in full, it is customary to add *et reliqua* or *et cetera* to the quoted words."

[36] While Pelagius' uses of James clearly represent new avenues for investigation, I have here omitted discussion of the uses other, oft-neglected, Western writers made of the letter. Are we sure that (roughly) contemporary writers such as Tyconius (ca. 330-390) and Julian of Aeclanum (ca. 380-454) did not know, accept, and use it? How about successors such as Leo the Great or John Cassian? Regarding the particular case of Tyconius, note that the Scripture Index of William S. Babcock's edition contains no reference to James in the *Liber regularum*, the only work of Tyconius' (apart from fragments of his commentary on the book of Revelation) which is extant. Note also that Maureen Tilley has written: "In the New Testament [Tyconius] passed over 2 and 3 John and all of the Catholic Epistles except 1 Peter." Respectively, see William S. BABCOCK, *Tyconius: The Book of Rules*, SBL Texts and Translations series, vol. 31 (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholar's Press, 1989), 152; Tilley, *The Bible in Christian North Africa*, 117 and n.79.

The Role of James 2:14-26 and "Faith vs. Works" in the Pelagian Controversy

Returning to the works of Augustine, what may be said regarding his use of the letter during the period of the Pelagian Controversy? Preliminary research indicates that, overall, references to our letter may be found at least ninety times in the whole of the bishop's anti-Pelagian corpus.[37] Also interesting, and contrary to what one might expect, a close investigation of Augustine's use of the pericope of James 2:14-26 during that same period reveals that, within his fifteen anti-Pelagian works and in spite of multiple and repeated discussion of such Jacobean issues as the means of justification and the relationship of faith to works,[38] there exists only one citation and only one clear allusion of James 2:14-26 to which we may point with confidence.[39] Respectively, they occur in *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 7,18 and in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* III, 5,14.

[37] Once again, let it be well noted that this number of 90 uses is, in all probability, not exhaustive. This number reflects a heavy reliance on critical edition indices and on personal reading. More detailed analysis, especially with a CD-ROM could increase this number significantly.

[38] In fact, no less than thirteen of these fifteen contain at least something substantial in this regard.

[39] This is *not* to say that the pericope is otherwise absent from the works of the period 411-430. In all, I have located some 21 uses of these thirteen verses, the vast majority being places where Augustine refers to James 2:19. Furthermore, though space does not permit a full discussion of the details, I believe that we can legitimately qualify Augustine's use of James 2:14-26 in the period 411-430 in three ways: (1) As more of a pastoral than a polemical text; (2) As a passage the exegetical significance of which evolved little from that which was established in earlier works; and, (3) As a passage which normally functioned as a "support" passage for other, more consequential verses. That James 2:14-26 was more of a pastoral than a polemical text is most easily demonstrated by the fact that of Augustine's twenty-one references, fourteen are found within his *sermones* while only two occur in his more polemical, i.e., specifically anti-Pelagian, writings. (Note that this is not to imply that Augustine's *sermones* do not contain significant amounts of polemical material. Note also that the references which occur in the *epistulae* are excluded from this calculation since each letter must be independently analyzed in order to determine to what extent they may be categorized as polemical.) That the Bishop of Hippo's understanding of the meaning of James 2:14-26 did not appreciably evolve during the period 411-430, may be demonstrated with a quick comparison between his exegesis as found in paragraph 6 of *Epistula 2**, a letter which dates from between 426 and 428, and section 15 of *De fide et operibus*, a work which almost certainly originates from late 412 or early 413. In the latter, after citing James 2:14 and several of Jesus' pronouncements as recorded in the gospels, Augustine remarked that no one "can obtain eternal life without keeping the commandments, [i.e.] by faith alone, which without works is dead," that no one should "think that faith alone, or a dead faith, that is, a faith without works, is sufficient for eternal life," and that hell will be populated by "those who neglected to do

In *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 7,18, Augustine dedicates a paragraph to the "balancing" of the position he had just argued for in 7,17, namely, that salvific faith is purely the gift of God and is in no way merited by any works that might have been performed prior to that gift having been received.[40] As he begins 7,18, Augustine expresses concern that some might misinterpret Paul. Specifically, he feared that some might assume that Paul was trying to convey the idea that a faith could be regarded as genuine, and thus as salvific, even if it occurred in isolation from good works or was coupled to a "bad life" (*etiamsi male uiuat et bona opera non habet*). To correct this potential misunderstanding, the Bishop of Hippo brought together Galatians 5:6 and James 2:19.[41] In this passage and through the subtle means of placing these two texts in close proximity, Augustine was able both to balance the two temporal aspects of justification (i.e., that, on the one hand, there could be no efficacious works *prior* to the gift of true faith and, on the other hand, that loving works are guaranteed to *follow* a genuine giving of the gift of faith) and to credibly harmonize the

good works" since it is impossible to "obtain eternal life by a faith that is dead." (For the English see Augustine. *On Faith and Works*. Ancient Christian Writers Series, vol. 48, trans. Gregory J. Lombardo (New York: Newman Press, 1988), 32. For the Latin, see CSEL 41, p.67: his non seruatis ad uitam ueniri potest per solam fidem, quae sine operibus mortua est. ... nam profecto ne sibi quisquam de fide, quae sine operibus mortua est, uitam promittat aeternam, ... bona operari non curauerant, tamquam de ipsa fide mortua ad uitam perueniretur aeternam.) In *Epistula 2**, Augustine accepts as valid James' assertions that "faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead, since even the demons believe and shudder," before going on to observe that the demons' ultimate condemnation is rooted in the fact that their deeds are unsubstantiated by a love-based belief. (For these English lines, see Augustine *Letters 1*-29**, Fathers Of The Church Series vol, 81, trans. Robert B. Eno (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 22. For the Latin, see CSEL 88, p.13: fides sine operibus mortua est in semetipsa, quia et daemones credunt et contremiscunt.) Finally, note that passages such as Matthew 22:1-14; Mathew 16: 15-18; Romans 1:17/Habakkuk 2:4; 1 Corinthians 13; and, most especially, Galatians 5:6 are all, to various degrees and in various locations, supported by referencing James 2:14-26. Note also that, during this period, it was rare for 2:14-26 to be submitted to a sustained and independent exegesis.

[40] Interestingly, 7,17 is little more than a *catena* of Pauline texts including 1 Corinthians 7:25, Ephesians 2:8-9 and Romans 1:17.

[41] Indeed, the final phrase of the Galatians verse "sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur" can be demonstrated to have been consistently used by Augustine well into the final decade of his life to balance the role of faith with that of works in the true Christian life. For additional uses in the period of the Pelagian controversy see *De spiritu et littera* (written in 412) 16,28; 26,46; 32,56; 33,59; *De gestis Pelagii* (written in the end of 416 or in 417) 15,34 (2x) and *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* (written in 421) III, 5,14, a text which is discussed in more detail in the text *infra*.

prima facie discrepancy which exists between Paul and James.[42] He wrote:

> For, after he had said in a certain passage, "For in Christ neither circumcision nor the lack of circumcision is worth anything," he immediately added, "but faith which works through love (cf. Galatians 5:6)." This is the faith which separates the faithful of God from the unclean demons. For they too, as the apostle James says, "believe and tremble (cf. James 2:19)," but they do not do good works. They, therefore, do not have this faith from which the righteous live (cf. Romans 1:17 and Habakkuk 2:4), that is, the faith which works through love (cf. Galatians 5:6), so that God gives them eternal life in accord with their works. But because we have our good works from God (cf. Ephesians 2:8-9) from whom we have both faith and love, the same teacher of the nations also called eternal life itself a grace.[43]

The one clear allusion to James 2:14-26 in Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings can be found in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* III,5,14.[44] The allusion comes in the section's second half, after Augustine has carefully distinguished between the "sinner," who has the "correct and Catholic faith in God (in *Deum fidem rectam et catholicam*)," and the morally faultless individual who, because of his

[42] This harmonizing feature of Augustine's works is repeatedly observable in the anti-Pelagian corpus. See, e.g., *De spiritu et littera* 7,11-12; 9,15; 13,22; 32,56 and *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,15.

[43] The English translations used here are those of Roland J. Teske. See WSA, I/23-I/26: *An Answer to the Pelagians* (New York: New City Press, 1997-1999). The Latin for this section reads (Cf. PL 44, col. 892): qui cum dixisset quodam loco, In Christo enim Jesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet, neque praeputium; mox addidit, sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur. ipsa est fides quae fideles Dei separat ab immundis daemonibus: nam et ipsi, sicut dicit apostolus Jacobus, credunt et contremiscunt; sed non bene operatur. Non ergo habent istam fidem ex qua justus vivit, id est, quae per dilectionem operatur, ut reddat ei Deus vitam aeternam secundum opera ejus. Sed quia et ipsa bona opera nobis ex Deo sunt, a quo nobis et fides est, et dilectio, propterea idem ipse Doctor Gentium, etiam ipsam vitam aeternam gratiam nuncupavit.

[44] In part (for the passage in its entirety, cf. p. 14 and n. 46 *infra*), the Latin of III,5,14 reads "quae licet sine operibus neminem saluat," with "fides" being the clear referent of the pronoun. James 2:14b, according to the *Vetus Latina*, reads "opera autem non habeat numquid potest fides (sola) salvare eum," with almost this exact wording being shared by all three of the major *Texttypen* which the Beuron edition provides (i.e., the "S", "F" and "V"). James 2:20b, again according to the *Vetus Latina*, reads "quoniam fides sine operibus neminem saluat," although it should be noted that for this verse only the "F" and "V" *Texttypen* are given. In short, in addition to giving yet another example of the Bishop's "harmonizing" of Paul and James (recall the close proximity of multiple Pauline texts to the James phrase), it seems quite plausible that, here, Augustine took the idea of salvation contained in 2:14b and linked it with the "without works" phrasing of 2:20 in order to call to the mind of the (perceptive and Biblically-knowledgeable) reader, the whole of James 2:14-26 without specifically mentioning that apostle's letter.

incorrect faith, "leaves this life to face damnation (*de hac uita damnandus abscedat*)." He writes that the "sinners"[45]:

> accuse themselves of all their sins and praise God in all their good works ... On account of this faith they depart from this life to be set free and to be admitted into the company of those reigning with Christ. Why, if not on account of their faith? "Without works faith saves no one," (*quae licet sine operibus neminem saluat;* cf. James 2:14 and 2:20) for it is not bad faith, but "the faith which works through love" (cf. Galatians 5:6); yet even sins are forgiven through faith, because "the righteous live from faith" (cf. Romans 1:17 and Habakkuk 2:4). But without faith even those works which seem good are transformed into sins, for "everything that does not come from faith is sin" (cf. Romans 14:23).[46]

The Significance of these Results for the History of the Pelagian Controversy

While these two applications of James 2:14-26 are of interest in their own right, it is also true that this dearth of uses indirectly supports the conjecture of Stephano Scannerini that the issue of "grace vs. works" must not have played a substantial role in the Pelagian Controversy.[47] Given the facts that James was both regarded as Scripture[48] and, as such, was readily accessible to both parties (here recall also that the passage was repeatedly used and thoroughly exegeted in Augustine's non-Pelagian writings, e.g., *De fide et operi-*

[45] Naturally, those to whom the Bishop here refers are "sinners" only in the sense that they continue to struggle with the earthly flesh and its various *concupiscentiae*. To be a "sinner" in this sense is a good thing insofar as this is a reflection of the self-deprecation and aversion to pride which is often engendered by the indwelling Holy Spirit. This concern for genuine faith is one of the foundational issues which leads Augustine to include references to James 2:14-26. Note also that there is probably an implicit reference here to several of Christ's parables in which Jesus also went to some lengths to differentiate "genuine" faith from the hypocritical faith of the Pharisees. Cf., esp., Luke 18:9-14 and the parable of the Pharisee and the tax collector.

[46] The Latin of this passage reads (Cf. CSEL 60, p.503): in omnibus delictis suis se accusat, in omnibus bonis operibus deum laudat ... de hac uita liberandus et in consortium cum Christo regnaturorum recipiendus emigrat, quare nisi propter fidem? quae licet sine operibus neminem saluat – ipsa est enim non reproba fides, quae per dilectionem operatur –, tamen per ipsam etiam peccata soluuntur, quia iustus ex fide uiuit, sine ipsa uero etiam quae uidentur bona opera in peccata uertuntur; omne enim quod non est ex fide, peccatum est.

[47] See Stefano Scannerini, "Giustificazione per la fede,"184, where he writes: "Tra pelagiani e agostinisti si discute quindi sulla lettera di Giacomo, ma non sul problema fede-opere (prova ne è che Cassiano nella *Collatio XIII* non fà cenno al nostro passo): al centro delle polemiche è il v. 10 del c. 2 di Gc."

[48] For more on the presence of James in the canons of the North African synods and councils from of 393, see n. 54 *infra*.

bus),[49] could it be a mere coincidence that it was so rarely employed? It would seem then that the issue of "faith vs. works" was one upon which the opposing sides agreed, or, although this is less likely, was one upon which they "agreed to disagree." Regardless, as there was virtually no discussion between Augustine and his opponents about the true meaning of James 2:14-26, it is difficult to believe that our pericope would *not* have been polemically employed had either side seen it to their advantage to do so.

Important Avenues for Further Investigation

A more thorough investigation into Augustine's usage of the letter of James is warranted by both practical and theoretical considerations. Practically, such an investigation, properly performed, would fill a real *lacuna* in the field of Augustinian studies.[50] Theoretically, careful investigation into Augustine's relationship to the letter of James is justified for three reasons: because it was known and used by his opponents;[51] because Augustine was the first Western writer to make large-scale use of the letter; and, because the years of Augustine's life and ministry roughly correspond to (or comprise the first full generation after) what turned out to be a very important period for the epistle's acceptance and use within the Western church. In fact, each of these three "theoretical considerations" raises multiple questions. For example, is it possible to account for the presence of James as authoritative Scripture in the writings of Pelagius? How, i.e., via whom, did this tradition regarding James reach him? What can be done to resolve the confusion which presently reigns – as well as the overly facile picture which is so often presented – regarding the letter's reception in the West? Is an authoritative answer even possible? Who was the first Westerner to regard James as inspired Scripture? Regarding the actual use of the epistle, how does the exegesis of James by Augustine's predecessors, contemporaries and opponents differ from that of Augustine? Is there any discernable relationship between them? Further, How can we account for the fact that, all told, Augustine may

[49] In *De fide et operibus* see 14,21; 16,27; 21,38; 27,49 and, perhaps most interestingly, 15,24-25.

[50] Indeed, I have as my primary goal for the next few years the pursuit of just such an investigation and the compiling of its results into an acceptable doctoral dissertation. Such a dissertation would form a significant part of a research project recently awarded to Prof. Dr. Mathijs Lamberigts of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven by that university's *Onderzoeksraad*. For the opportunity to be employed as part of this project, allow me to express my gratitude to both Prof. Lamberigts and the members of KUL's research council.

[51] Cf. section on Pelagius and his use of James as found on pp. 8-10 *supra*.

have made use of James 500 (or more) times?[52] In addition to what he himself writes in the *Retractationes*, can anything else be known regarding his now-lost "commentary" on James? What about Augustine's role in the actual process of James' use and reception in North Africa? Was it active or passive? I.e., did Augustine make such extensive use of James because he felt compelled to integrate the (relatively recent) decisions of the North African episcopacy into his writing and preaching ministry; or, was he so genuinely affected by the contents of the letter of James that he integrated it into his productions as a partial fulfillment of what he saw as his role as a nurturing shepherd of the church? Finally, if, as seems to be likely, his role was more of the latter, could we go so far as to claim that Augustine is, at least from the human point-of-view, in some sense responsible for the canon of Scripture as we know it today?[54]

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[52] Though the details are too complicated to discuss here, note that I have substantial reason to believe that this number could be even higher. Also interesting is Wordsworth's remark that an unnamed and apparently contemporary "Dean of Chichester" had amassed "a long list" of some 389 "quotations" of James in Augustine's works. For the full quote, see J. Wordsworth, "The Corbey St. James (ff), and its Relation to other Latin Versions, and the Original Language of the Epistle," in *Studia Biblia Essays in Biblical Archaeology and Criticism and Kindred Subjects* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885), 129 and n.2. Of course, compared to the Bishop of Hippo's use of other biblical books (e.g. John, Romans, the Psalter), 500 does not seem so large. Nevertheless, the number 500, when it is compared to the number of times that Augustine's Western predecessors used the letter, becomes quite significant. As noted *supra*, even by the most "inclusive" standards, i.e., that of *Biblia Patristica*, only 26 uses of James are attributable to Ambrose, the Latin Father who seems to have most frequently cited James prior to Augustine.

[53] Cf. *Retract.* II, 32 (CCL 57, p. 116). Here, the Bishop provides his readers with only a tantalizingly short comment (i.e., ca. 7 lines in the aforementioned edition) about the existence of this now lost work.

[54] According to Bruce Metzger he was. He notes that the import of the multiple 4th and 5th century North African councils (i.e., those held under the primate Aurelius beginning in 393) for the issue of the canon was that they gave the issue a sense of closure for the Western church: "The great debate of so many generations was practically over. But it remained for someone to say that it was over. It was Augustine who, in three provincial synods, cast his weight for the twenty-seven books which we know as the Christian Scriptures." See Metzger, *The Canon of the New Testament*, 237-238. Odd though it might seem, Augustine, in spite of having not yet been ordained a bishop and in spite of having only recently been ordained a priest (in 391), apparently played a substantial role in the leadership of these gatherings from the outset. On his role, see G. Bardy, "Conciles d'Hippone au temps de saint Augustin," Augustiniana 4 (1955): 441-458, esp. 442-443; F.L. Cross, "History and Fiction in the African Canons," *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s., 12-2 (1961): 227-247; and J.E. Merdinger, *Rome and the African Church in the Time of Augustine* (New Haven, Connecticut and London: Yale University Press, 1997), esp. chapter 6 "The Council of Hippo and Clerical Appeals within Africa." Interestingly, Cross even goes so far as to give Augustine credit for having originated the idea of regular councils. Cf. his article, p. 229: "... Augustine conceived the plan of regular councils. The year was 392." For the list of books comprising the Old and the New Testaments as drafted and approved by these synods, see canon 36 of the 397 council in CCL 149, p. 43.

CALVIN'S CONCEPT OF PREDESTINATION AND THE LANGUAGE OF DISPOSSESSION

In this article I deal with Calvin's concept of predestination from the viewpoint of perseverance and possession. Ever since the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius the focus of the debate on predestination has been mainly on problems related to the freedom of will or the lack of it. It is my purpose in this essay to bring to the surface a more archaic layer underlying more sophisticated arguments about the dependence or independence of the human faculties and the distinctions within divine grace, and that is the problem of possession. The apostle Paul, for one, has phrased predestination in terms of possession and it is traces of this notion that I try to discern in the most articulate defender of predestination, Calvin. For reasons of time and space I concentrate on Calvin, being unable to elaborate on the intricacies of the prehistory of predestination in its founding fathers, the apostle Paul and Augustine. Yet they do make their appearance, not as the main characters of my story but as illustrators –more often than not by way of contrast – of Calvin's stance. Apart from spatial economy, there is another reason for their relative absence. If, in my view, Calvin's doctrine of predestination can somehow be articulated, both Paul and Augustine are a much harder nut to crack. Theirs is a language and thought which is much more enigmatic and, in a sense, inaccessible than Calvin's. Dealing, then, with Calvin is, as far as I am concerned, only the beginning of a longer trajectory into the history of concepts such as free will, grace, perseverance, possession and predestination.

If, in his early works, Augustine, like an acrobat, has proven himself to be capable of intellectual and literary flexibility, as soon as predestination becomes the issue all he resorts to is the story of Adam's fall (as the improper use of the *posse peccare*) and God's grace (as the ultimate gift of the *non posse peccare/mori*). No attempt is made to trace back this story of bliss and damnation to the fragile fabric of signs covering the inner workings of the mind, God's mind no less than man's mind, that is, let alone that the problem of time, once so prominently and enigmatically present, would be appealed to in order to sharpen the contours of man's impossible fate. Here a touch of irony makes itself felt. Had not the great works on the human condition, be it the private fate of the sinner-believer in the *Confessions*, the fate of mankind in *De civitate dei* or the fate of the Trinity-man in *De trinitate*, been marked by the subtle configuration of time, plot and destiny? So subtle, indeed, that time was seen to destroy the

possibility of plot altogether forcing the searching mind to come up with more refined poetical alternatives if it wanted to tell the combined stories of man, mankind and its maker and redeemer in a proper way. All the more remarkable the story of predestination looks in the deceptive splendour of its simplicity. Here we have a story and a solid plot indeed: Adam's fall and redemption in the light of God's hidden judgement. But, for all its solidity, this is a story with a crack in it, a crack that is far from turning the narrative into a tragic one. Since it is impossible to connect the beginning to the end, the story cannot be told at all. It falls flat. As a result, knowing – or believing – what we will be in the embrace of eternity, 'we shall never be again as we were.' Does this not sound like redemption on the condition of another Fall? What then is left, in Augustine's concept of predestination, of the complex of time, plot and memory in which the end was underlying the beginning, 'hope or else despair... to be redeemed from fire by fire'?[1] For, unless we are able to look history in the face and keep its unfathomable darkness at bay, there is no point in looking ahead. At the same time it is crystal clear for Augustine that man is utterly incapable of doing just that, of dealing with the pastness of the past, of getting grip of a beginning. To disentangle this knot of the presence – and absence – of being and time had been Augustine's lifelong ambition and preoccupation: to reach out for the word that would constitute the integrity of time whether in the guise of behavioural continence, peace and vision of mind, the movements of the Trinity encompassing both divine and human memories, or the vicissitudes of the city of God preserving its identity, however hidden, throughout its toilsome journey on earth; an ambition, in other words, that aimed at integrating a solution into a question, a question into a solution, a future into a past, a past and future into a present. Given those antecedents of desire and of hope and despair, it seems legitimate to ask: how much of that obsessive attention does sound through in the repetitiveness of history's summary as the irresistible gift of destiny?

Augustine's superior grace as embodied by predestination seems to silence past voices by speaking for them thus recasting the polyphony of past performances into a monologue, a monody, or, rather, into a Word spoken once and for all. Yet there is a flaw in putting things this way. For grace abounding in Christ would seem to imply that in the course of time things have changed for the better and

[1] T.S. ELIOT, Four Quartets (Little Gidding IV), *Collected Poems* (London, 1936), p. 221.

that, from the human viewpoint at least – a posteriori, that is – the notion of history only makes sense if its nature of successiveness is being acknowledged. Adam's sin has in one way or another been overtaken by Christ's atonement and there is no denying that the former event is preceded by the latter. From the viewpoint of grace itself the picture looks different, however. There it is not only irresistible grace that blurs the boundaries between past, present and future – which would in a way be acceptable as the expression of God's supra-temporal decree. More problematically, the human response to irresistible grace would, by definition, also be contaminated by the radiation of superior grace revealing itself in its anthropological disguise of perseverance. In my view it is the nature of perseverance that is the crux of Augustine's so-called doctrine of predestination rather than the accompanying problems of free will and divine wilfulness. Or, to put it more precisely, the problems of free will and divine decree can only be properly addressed on the condition that they be embedded in perseverance, in a notion, that is, in which time and eternity meet. Any other option would end up in one Pelagian stance or another since it would hypostatise the human will into a set of a-temporal faculties to be used anytime and anywhere while remaining uncorrupted and incorruptible themselves. Augustine's problem, on the other hand, would seem to be that in order to maintain sustainability and durability, such perseverance would only be possible if being predestined would mean being possessed by the spirit of Christ to such a degree as to be replaced by him. And, although Augustine is less radical than the founding father of predestination, the apostle Paul, whose physical language of possession ('it is no longer I who live but Christ who lives in me' Gal 2:19-20) he – interestingly – shuns, there is no doubt that for him Christ has indeed become the all-absorbing centre of history. As James Wetzel puts it elegantly: 'The doctrine of predestination becomes, in essence, the claim that Christ's humanity is prior to Adam's, even though Jesus of Nazareth, like any descendant of Adam, is born into historical time and has a genealogy. In Jesus Christ, time and eternity have conjoined; for those who are his heirs, there is no longer a need to reckon the human incarnation a failure. When flesh and spirit war, as they seem inevitably to do in life, that is a birth pang rather than a death throe. Adam may have obscured the difference between living and dying by choosing flesh in the way in which he chose it. Who is in a position to

[2] James WETZEL, *Predestination, Pelagianism, and Foreknowledge* in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, eds. E. STUMP and N. KRETZMANN (Cambridge, 2001), p. 56.

throw stones? The one who could chose not to, and the result is that life is still before us' (56).[2] Yes, 'before us', but what about the past? 'The one discharge from sin and error/The only hope, or else despair....'[3] Is the hope thus established really a hope in which future success is not alien to past failure and despair? In other words, can the person who perseveres be called historical, time-bound, created all in one piece? Has he ever known the 'unfamiliar name of love'?[4] Apart from encompassing a future, does perseverance as the enactment of predestination have a (compatible) past? It is only after those questions have be answered, that the problem of priority and posteriority – such as Christ's priority over Adam – can be correctly assessed and the one and only question underlying all others be asked: is perseverance, 'the one discharge from sin and error,' sustainable as present?

What about Calvin? Does he solve the aporias we have detected in Augustine's concept of predestination and mend the cracks in the golden bowl of destiny? If we were to go by his own ambition to recreate a Biblical doctrine with the help of the one and only reliable interpreter in the field, a positive answer could be expected. Nothing is further from the truth, however. Although we as yet do not know how Augustine's stance accounts for man's past in the light of his future, so much is clear that all Calvin has to offer us is future as he makes abundantly clear in the following passage:

> Although it is now sufficiently plain that God by his secret counsel chooses whom he will while he rejects others, his gratuitous election has only been partially explained until we come to the case of single individuals, to whom God not only offers salvation, but so assigns it, that the certainty of the result remains not dubious or suspended. These are considered as belonging to that one seed of which Paul makes mention. For although adoption was deposited in the hand of Abraham, yet as many of his posterity were cut off as rotten members, in order that election may stand and be effectual, it is necessary to ascend to the head in whom the heavenly Father has connected his elect with each other, and bound them to himself by an indissoluble tie. Thus in the adoption of the family of Abraham, God gave them a liberal display of favour which he has denied to others; but in the members of Christ there is a far more excellent display of grace, because those ingrafted into him as their head never fail to obtain salvation.

[3] Eliot, Little Gidding.
[4] Eliot, Little Gidding.

Hence Paul skilfully argues...that when God, after making a covenant of eternal life, invites any people to himself, a special mode of election is in part understood, so that he does not with promiscuous grace (*promiscua gratia*) effectually elect all of them. The words, "Jacob have I loved," refer to the whole progeny of the patriarch, which the prophet there opposes to the posterity of Esau. But there is nothing in this repugnant to the fact, that in the person of one man is set before us a specimen of election, which cannot fail of accomplishing its object (*ad metam suam perveniat*). It is not without cause Paul observes, that these are called a *remnant* (Romans. ix. 27; xi. 5); because experience shows that of the general body many fall away and are lost, so that often a small portion only remains. The reason why the general election of the people is not always firmly ratified, readily presents itself – viz. that on those with whom God makes the covenant, he does not immediately bestow the Spirit of regeneration, by whose power they persevere in the covenant even to the end. The external invitation [change = *mutatio*][5] without the internal efficacy of grace which would have the effect of retaining them, holds a kind of middle place (*medium quiddam*) between the rejection of the human race and the election of a small number of believers.[6]

Far from being innocence-driven, the future proliferates from a split – the external invitation as a *medium quiddam* between election and rejection – in the rhetorical *locus* of predestination;[7] a split that itself cannot be part of the picture. Suppose it were part of the picture, then a third possibility would present itself in addition to the yes and no of predestination that would, of course, undermine the very *locus* of predestination itself. Yet the third possibility dominates the scene. For all his clarity of style, Calvin's is a muddled train of thought in this matter. On the one hand, the end game of divine predestination is situated in the mystical body of Christ: 'in the members of Christ the power of grace shines all the more brilliantly since, having being ingrafted in his head, they [the elect] never perish from salvation.'

[5] There is a text-critical problem here; the Latin text has *mutatio* (change); the French text which has 'invitation' would seem to make more sense.

[6] John CALVIN, *Institutio christianae religionis* (1559), book III in P. BARTH and G. NIESEL eds., *Johannis Calvini Opera Selecta*, vol. 4 (München, 21959), III, 21, 7; pp. 377-8. English translation: Henry Beveridge, transl., *Institutes of the Christian Religion by John Calvin* (Grand Rapids, 1989), pp. 209-10.

[7] Cf. For the emphasis on Calvin's work as a collection of *loci* and *disputationes* see R.A. MULLER, *The Unaccommodated Calvin; Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition* (New York, 2000).

Thus being tucked away inside the head of Christ – a more radical version of the Pauline image of Christ as the head and the faithful as the members of his body – the individual elect – or, taken as a collect body, the remnant elect are granted the gift of perseverance. Being possessed by someone stronger, and yet no different from the elect himself, there is no more room for hesitation 'because God not only offers him salvation but grants it in such a way that the certitude of its effect can neither be in suspense nor in doubt.' On the other hand, Calvin's distinction between general and special election is far from clear. Whilst the individual elect is frozen as it were in the head of Christ, history and time abound with the vicissitudes that inhere the general election. As we have seen, grace being not promiscuous, general election can in turn become part of special election. What are we to think of perseverance when the distinction between the rejection of the human race and the election of the happy few may be drawn in God's hidden wisdom but cannot be discerned in time and history, the latter rather being characterised by delay (*non protinus*)? How can this delay be reconciled with the suspense-less certitude so characteristic of the chosen one?

Contrary to appearances Calvin's is not primarily a theology of the word. For, corresponding to possible delay is the spirit of future regeneration that, for its part, is based on the *medium quiddam*, the invitation/change between the rejection of the human race and the election of a tiny few. There is, however, reason to doubt the ability of that invitation to make itself heard because it is hard to see how it could bridge the gap between full-fledged election and rejection. As for that election proper, its capacity to arrogate voice can equally be doubted. For the rock-like certitude and suspenselessness of the individual elect is a matter of blind trust or utter despondency. About that trust songs and psalms can be sung and Scripture can be read time and again as a confirmation of God's decrees and covenant, but the 'blindness' of that trust, the state of possession in Christ's head, cannot be articulated, because its factuality has no relation whatsoever to any longing for it. In that respect later pietistic, mainly Lutheran expressions of desire (*Ich will bei meinem Jesu bleiben*) are both alien to Calvin's thought and, perhaps, at the same time to be seen as an attempt to get out of the web of its aporetic intricacies. Thus the *medium quiddam* as external invitation – not itself being part of predestination and perseverance proper – is mirrored by an 'experience' of predestination that is equally external to its execution. And execution – or, in more religious terms, gift – is what predestination and perseverance are about rather than being concerned with a pos-

sible quest for their appropriation. Therefore, if modern interpreters such as Jürgen Moltmann and Heiko Oberman have emphasised the effect of predestination in real life – on the Calvinist refugees, for instance – as the hope (Moltmann) and the consolation (Oberman) derived from its being given as a promise come true over and against the vicissitudes of history, they hit the nail on perseverance's head.[8] This trust is indeed built on the fact that one's fate is insured, so to speak, with an all-powerful divinity and that, if need be, this insurance can be taken out. However, this hope and consolation are quite unlike Augustine pawning his voice in his outcry da *quod iubes, iube quod vis*. Augustine, for his part, refrains from renouncing the ownership of that voice altogether. As a consequence, he avoids being silenced down by divine force. He rather keeps claiming its very power. Conversely, the voice of Calvin's elect, however biblical, is mute despite the 'wordiness' of their faith and trust. Here the *da quod iubes* is separated from, or rather absorbed by, the *iube quod vis*. True, the vocation and invitation persist even in the face of so many once chosen falling out of grace. Whilst Ismael, Esau and countless others (up to the majority of the people of Israel – *totus fere Israel* –) have decided to opt out of their privileged status and their apostasy is proclaimed in a thunderous voice that mocks their so-called freedom of choice: 'Jacob I have loved and Esau I have hated', the whisper of perseverance can still be heard: 'In Isaac the seed was called; the same vocation has persisted in Jacob/*eadem vocatio in Jacob duravit*.' So it seems, at least. And, admittedly, predestination and perseverance are about sustainability and duration. It is hard to see, however, how this persistent vocation can ever reach out to 'the external invitation without the internal efficacy of grace which would have the effect of retaining them (*quae ad eos retinendos valida esse*),' holding 'a kind of middle place (*medium quiddam*) between the rejection of the human race and the election of a small number of believers.' How can the elect, safe forever inside the head of Christ, like being part and parcel of the innermost layer of a Russian doll, make himself heard to the other voice, the 'humanistic' one counselling moderation, not yet in the possession of the efficient grace that would validate its sustainability? Does not the one voice of Jacob the elect kill out the other one of delay and hesitancy (the *non protinus*)? Is not the one as much a *conditio sine qua non* for the shaping of perseverance as the

[8] J. MOLTMANN, *Prädestination und Perseveranz, Geschichte und Bedeutung der reformierten Lehre "de perseverantia sanctorum"* (Neukirchen,1961), and H.A. OBERMAN, *De erfenis van Calvijn; grootheid en grenzen* (Kampen 1988).

other? As far is Calvin is concerned, it does not seem so since it is difficult to see how perseverance proper could be subject to delay and possible failure (of interior grace to materialise). Yet both are 'vocations' the speaking of which is the exclusive privilege of their one and only 'possessor'. Being called is, sooner or later, being possessed. Could that nucleus – the inner core of the Russian doll- ever be widened into a more general invitation without losing voice? Can the 'later' subsist without being devoured on the spot by the 'sooner'? Conversely, is not humanism of a kind (a *medium quiddam*) a prerequisite for speaking at all? In its attempt to convey to the reader the overall picture of election and rejection, the auctorial voice of the *Institutes*, for one, is bound to be 'humanistic'. To speak *as* an elect is not the same as speaking *about* an elect, or, for that matter, about the invitation to become one. Or do the two exclude one another to the effect of general muteness? In that case, the Calvinist refugees would understandably draw consolation from their being elect. In them the *vocatio duravit*. As a result, the story of their lives is being rewritten, or, rather, their lives are being reshaped so as to be resistant to deflection and hesitation. The price they pay, however, is their becoming strangers to their own destiny. That destiny itself is firm like a rock. Yet it has no name (other than being buried in Christ). There is, in other words, no storyline to be detected in the life of predestination and perseverance. On the contrary, 'nameable' life as spread out in time and history is catapulted out of this cocoon into the futurology of proliferation. Just as Christ himself in Calvin's famous *extra-calvinisticum* is in heaven whilst his presence on earth is spiritual – and yet, whether in heaven or on earth, is none else than the undivided Christ – so the spirit of regeneration is driven forward by the identity of the elect (the remnant as the hard core of the chosen who do not drop out but stay where they are and persevere till the end) as possessed by the durability and sustainability of their lives in Christ. Insofar as they really exist, they are indeed *apud deum*. But what about their voice? *Vocatio duravit*: does that not sound like a dream of someone who, like Benedict of Nursia, has a nocturnal vision in which, watching from a tower window, he sees the world beneath him?[9] To adapt this vision's to Calvin's elect we should add: including the entirety of his own life. Yet, although shouting to the point of hoarseness, he cannot make himself heard and fails to connect with the scene beneath him. From a different point of view – the same for

[9] Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, ed. A. DE VOGÜÉ, Sources Chrétiennes 260, book II, c. 35. p. 240.

Calvin, that is – the person enwrapped in the scene of perseverance beneath attempts to cry out to his beholder who happens to be none other than his very own self. *Abyssus vocat abyssum*: 'the abyss calls upon the abyss.' But inside the very *vocatio*, inside the gift of destiny, that is, a voice is smothered that is forever struggling to tell how, 'innocence-driven', it came there, and to recount the horrors of the past. Being on the brink of doing so, that voice is folded in the wings of the dove ascending. Unlike the bird in Benedict's nocturnal vision which, disguised as the soul of a befriended bishop, passes by the window on its way from the corruptible body to the freedom of heavenly joy, the dove of Calvinist predestination and perseverance, does not let go but closes in on its prey just to catch it and carry it upward.

The idea that, while still suffering from the tribulations of time, one's life in its accomplished shape is stored away in heaven, *apud deum*, has the potential of sheer beauty. Such would indeed be the presence of perseverance as a source of hope and consolation. And in a sense the aesthetics of Calvinism such as the Weberian picture of *vocatio* evoking the hard working merchant who accumulates his earthly capital instead of spending it, in view of the fact that his real capital is stored in a celestial bank, could be read along those lines. Yet not all is well. In this very image of the Weberian Calvinist – which in my view has a point, regardless of the correctness of the technicalities involved – the presence of perseverance is overlayered by another aspect of time, the future. That future in turn looks decidedly different from the longing of the medieval pilgrim on his way to the earthly or heavenly Jerusalem: '*de longinquo te saluto*/from afar I salute you' or Abelard's '*O quanta qualia, sunt illa sabbata*/O, how great and how good will those Sabbaths be'. Nor can it be put on a par with a quintessentially Protestant classic such as *The Pilgrim's Progress*. In either case, medieval or Bunyan – like devotion – desire expresses itself in stories being told – up to stories to kill time as in the *Canterbury Tales* – or images being pictured from the sloth of despond to the knocking on the door of the heavenly castle. As far as Calvinist orthodoxy or Puritanism is concerned, all it has been capable of is to repeat the Calvinist *loci* in the very words of Calvin himself. On the one hand this linguistic hold of Calvin over his followers can be seen as proof of the extraordinary power of his language which, in its clarity and scarcity, is as beautiful and empty as a Saenredam church. On the other hand, we have evidence here that the *locus*-nature of Calvin's writings is such as to prevent extension, reflection and elaboration in other terms than those of the *locus* itself. Thus the harsh definition of predestination as God's decree with regard to

election and rejection strikes back, so to speak, and squeezes any possible future back into the presence of hard core predestination and perseverance. Or, more precisely, even Calvin's attempt itself at crawling out of his self-fabricated *locus* in order to fill in the picture of predestination (general election as a broadening of special election, the invitation and the *non protinus*) turns out to be appearance rather than reality. All it achieves is to buy time, or, to stick to the financial imagery, to borrow time, which, in the end, reveals itself as evaporating into thin air when once more reduced to, and overtaken by, the factuality of God's eternal decree.

Before having yet another go at the passage culminating in the *medium quiddam* of the humanistic voice – which, given the density and aporetic nature of the text would be quite tempting yet little promising and could be continued *ad infinitum* –, we should now turn to the question we raised before embarking on our textual soundings: where, if anywhere, can we trace the vivifying s/Spirit of the writer/reader/faithful destined to be *apud deum*? What is its *locus*? In terms of narrativity – as the general structuring of a text – this questions boils down to asking whether a plot can be found in Calvin's text. Spirit and plot, then, or, rather, letter or death, that is the question.

So much has become clear from the above analysis: on closer inspection a variety of images can be detected within the narrow space of the *locus* of predestination that vie for a place: the course of history in which the divine invitation regarding general election is sent out, the uncertainty, from the human viewpoint at least, of what the fate of individuals will be over the years, the promise of the spirit of regeneration and underlying it all the hard core information of the *locus* that some are preordained to eternal life and others to eternal damnation. What I have tried to do so far is somehow to read the picture; unsuccessfully so since the *locus* (eternal election and eternal rejection) remains a dead letter which may cause all sorts of turbulence by drawing out variations on the basic theme but fails to provide the reader/user with a coherent narrative. But why use narrative and plot when, technically speaking, the discourse of *loci*, disputation and argumentation we deal with is of an entirely different order?

In my view we face the crux of the problem here, and unless we crack this nut as it appears in Calvin's work, we will have no access to the meaning of predestination. First and foremost, Calvin's prose (in the *Institutes*) is to be seen as *Gebrauchsprosa*, as a collection of loci which can be used or applied 'at random' for teaching and preaching. Regardless of the possible pietistic strands that, according to Muller, are part and parcel, of that prose, the topics are primarily disjoint, that

being the condition on which they can be meaningfully used as *loci*. In that respect later, more dogmatic and systematic efforts to make much of the organisational structure of the *Institutes* are, as Muller rightly argues, indeed to be dismissed as anachronistic.[10] Now, whilst the *locus* (of predestination, for instance), can in a sense be considered a dead body, a *nature morte*, that is to be vivified by the voice of the Word or the Spirit, it is precisely the transition from the one state to the other that would seem so problematic. Caught in Calvin's rhetorical embrace of moderation (not knowing too much, not knowing too little about God's *arcana*), the Word and Spirit themselves appear somehow to be driven out insofar as they are no intrinsic part of the *locus*. Perhaps they figure more freely in the performative acts of preaching and praying, but even there the problem of their being encapsulated in the rhetoric of *loci* cannot be avoided. No language, however powerful, can conceal itself from Calvin's rhetorical touch that imbues it with moderation and some sort of literalness. Yet at he same time we have seen how the content of a *locus* such as 'predestination' can be at once so problematic and dynamic that, almost violently, it breaks out of its rhetorical constraints (the message of eternal life or eternal damnation) proliferating into the breadth of time and history, its ever receding horizon being the spirit of future regeneration. To assess the fact that, appearances notwithstanding, the *loci* are not there just for the taking, requires some sort of plot, some way of telling what the persevering reader 'experiences' beyond the catechetic – short-lived – mode of authority-based reception.

Now, in order to be able to underpin the perseverance of the reader with a sustained plot, however hypothetical, I focus on the relationship between the constraints of rhetoric (the *locus*) and that which is (possibly) being constrained. Doing so, I proceed by way of circumlocution. One of the reasons for this approach is my wish to avoid problems concerning the semantics of *loci* becoming mixed up with the muddled discussion resulting from the discovery of 'pietistic strains' in Calvin's writings whose status either as present in the text itself or in the mind of the reader, or somewhere in between, is far from clear. The more urgent question presenting itself does not so much concern the 'pietistic strains' as rather the semantic force inside the rhetorical *locus*. To bring out the intertwined presence of those two features, force and form, I apply the more archaic model of Pauline language to Calvin's text, whose force is expected to bring to the surface 'the language of possession and immediacy.'

[10] Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, p. 161.

For Calvin the head of Christ is the one and only place in which there is a unity of place and time since it lodges those who can no longer fall from grace. This divine *caput* containing those who have persevered, or, what comes down to the same, those who will persevere to the end can be called a chronotope (as coined by Bakhtin), time and place being blended into one. Now, perhaps because of its familiarity, we are used to take this imagery for granted, to take it, quite flatly, for a fact in the 'topological' sense of the word. However, as we have seen already, dense though this chronotope may be, underlying it is a variety of lines being drawn. In other words, both time and spaciousness are so restless within the image as to break it open. Christ turned out to be present 'extra-calvinistically' – in more than one place, and yet in one place – in a more complicated way than just being in heaven embracing his elect. The elect, in their turn, proved to live a kind of a double life insofar as, if really elect, they were incapable of falling out of grace. Yet how could one tell them apart from those, within the realm of general election, faced with delay, those 'on which the spirit of regeneration is not immediately bestowed that would give them the power to persevere in the covenant to the end'?

Realising that in dealing with the *locus*-nature of Calvin's predestination we have a special problem at our hands in establishing spirit and plot, the least we can say is that examples can be given in which destiny – as the contraction of the human condition inside divine holiness – is traced in its dramatic course. On a slightly wild note (in particular in view of the introduction as an extra of the flying soul of the befriended bishop of Capua) the vision of Benedict quoted above is, for instance, furnished with spatial and temporal unity. For so much is clear that the spatial and temporal extension unfolding in the vision makes sense as it can be said meaningfully to contract into the chronotope of the world as observed in its entirety. In that respect, the story (being told by Benedict's biographer, Gregory the Great) has plot and spirit. For all the differences, it breathes an air of familiarity and intimacy.

Why is it that, apart from the flattening down of potential drama as a result of the constraints imposed by the *locus*, we are inclined to take a communication such as the one that the elect are safely in the head of Christ (*capiti suo insiti numquam a salute excidunt*) for a fact without even asking ourselves what this concise presence means and how much is left intact of the identity of the inhabitants? In other words, why is it that this state of affairs does not evoke in the reader an even more vivid sense of drama than the one conveyed by the

'contractions' of Benedict? The answer seems simple. It is our over-familiarity with the language of Paul, which, reproduced, often to the letter, by Augustine, Calvin, Jansenius, Pascal and others, prevents us from appreciating it in its revolutionary freshness. Are we able at all to wonder what exactly it means to be in (the head of) Christ without being able to fall out of it? How did our elect come there in the first place and how long did it take them?

In a recent book, The Religion of the Apostle Paul,[11] the New Testament scholar John Ashton has sprung a *coup de foudre* on his discipline by bluntly picturing Paul as a shaman. To begin with his spectacular conversion on the Damascus road, Paul's career as an apostle was further determined by this event as well as by the spiritual energy derived from it. If we consider spiritual flexibility in time and space accompanied by extraordinary powers (such as exorcism) that correspond to the blurring of the constraints of time and space to be one of the main features of shamanism, the Pauline texts with a ring of mysticism and possession prove to be charged with a power that was decidedly lacking in later, more metaphorical interpretations. Let us reread, for instance, the text from the Letter to the Galatians about the fusing of identities in Christ, this time quoting it in full:

> For I through the law died to the law, that I might live to God. I have been crucified along with Christ; it is no longer I who live but Christ who lives in me; and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me (Gal 2: 19-20).

As Ashton notes, it is once again over-familiarity that 'dulls' the crudity and cruelty implied in the picture of crucifixion which, aestheticised throughout the ages, is looked at in a metaphorical rather than in a natural sense. 'Here if anywhere we are in what Hugh Kenner calls "the whispering forest of traditional poetry, where the very words to which millions of minds respond have helped to form the minds that respond to them."' [12] However, prior to metaphors is the realism of Paul's language whose effect on the reader is, or should be, all the more unsettling in view of the fact that the focus of his preaching is on resurrection rather on the crucifixion. The latter event, could not, according to Ashton, fail to evoke in Paul's contemporaries 'the sheer horror of this barbarous form of execution.' But the weak option of metaphorical language having been ruled out, why did Paul

[11] John ASHTON, *The Religion of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven, 2000).

[12] Ashton, *The Religion*, p. 231; Hugh KENNER, *The Pound Ezra* (London,1972), p. 521.

express his new identity in Christ in terms of being crucified along with his 'possessor'? The answer, Ashton asserts, is given by 'shamanism':

> It is to be found, I suggest, in his actual experience of an agonizing death that preceded a new kind of life. This is in fact what Paul says (!); but the clue to understanding what he says, if we could only see it, comes from a very dissimilar religious tradition, that of shamanism. In asserting that he died to the law and was crucified with Christ, Paul is referring to the anguished struggle that preceded the blinding revelation of his call. The event that the two verbs allude to is the traumatic experience that led up to his decision to abandon the law; the indispensable precondition of the call itself, and also its negative or observe side. The abandonment of the law is now seen as a death to the law. In shamanistic terms it was the victorious outcome of a terrible struggle. Sin, like a malign demon, had seizes on the law as an instrument with which to keep Paul in subjection. Paul had just had a vision of the Crucified and Risen Christ. It was natural for him to describe his own terrifying experience in terms of the recalled vision. Whatever it was that had previously been at the centre of his life, the new centre is Christ. Looking back on his pre-Christian past, he generally sees it to have been dominated by the law. Only in Romans 7, where he describes the struggle itself, does he see the temptation to cling to the law as the consequence of the occupancy of Sin. From now on, though, it is Christ, not Sin, who lives in him. How are we to make sense of this extraordinary statement? No rational human being can think of himself as being occupied by another. Whatever name we give to Paul's conviction, it unquestionably depends on his awareness that Christ is no longer an ordinary human being but a spirit' (232-3).

I have quoted this passage in full in order to highlight the strand of sheer archaic power in a text whose strength, in the course of history, has been considerably toned down. Apart from the possible rights or wrongs of Ashton's rapprochement between Paul and shamanism, what he succeeds in bringing to the fore is the intensity and the 'natural', literal status of a statement ('It is no longer I...') prior to its being contaminated by a more distant way of reading. What we have here is a man really dead to the law and really possessed by the spirit of Christ. More importantly, this very possession turns out to contain a story – as a combination of spirit and plot –, a story of conversion as possession whose antecedents and after-match are wiped out in their shape of successive events by the fiery intensity of vision. Struck with blindness on the road to Damascus Paul's has become a vertical way of life: dead to the law, alive in Christ, and yet this very verticality abounds with voices. Voices about the struggle in one's members (Romans 7), the afflictions of life under the gospel, the sighing and suffering of creation longing for the children of God to be revealed, the rejection of Israel, the trust that 'all Israel will be saved.'

Those voices are bound to remain mute, however, as long as they are spoken by the 'letter that killeth'. Conversely, they come alive when uttered by the 'spirit that vivifies'. 'Shamanisticially' speaking, that means that words only make sense if spoken *apud deum*. For his part, Paul makes it abundantly clear what speaking *apud deum* means: living and speaking beyond the constraints of time, place and identity. Yet, rather than being dispersed and scattered high up in the air, living in the spirit means a solution being integrated into a question, a past into a future, a future into a present. It means being compressed to the point of being possessed as a precondition for telling the story and preaching the gospel to the end of the earth.

An additional advantage of Ashton's 'shamanist' approach is that it offers us a clearer view of the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of Paul's thought. Thus the famous passage about 'a thorn given me...to buffet me, to prevent me from being raised too high' (2 Corinthians 12:1-10) fits in with Paul's 'being crucified with Christ'. Once more we have a story governed by the combination of spirit and plot. As for plot, Paul tells, within the frame of boasting of visions and revelations, the story of 'a man in Christ, fourteen year ago, whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows, snatched up, this man as far as the third heaven. And I know that this man – whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows – was snatched up into Paradise and he heard things ineffable that humans cannot utter.' If we leave aside the intricate problems of interpretation (the combination of boasting of frailty and the reaching/not reaching of the third heaven), we face, Ashton argues, once again the account of someone dying and rising with Christ as based on a visionary experience (in Ashton's view: the experience on the Damascus road). So, as for spirit, we once more see plot (the telling of a story including life's turmoil, and, more in particular, the suffering and the being frail for the sake of Christ), being condensed to spirit. It is this spiritual nature of Paul's story (and boasting in adversities) that lends authority to his preaching. 'For if I choose to boast I will not be without sense, for I shall be telling the truth. But I refrain lest anyone reckon in my regard something beyond what he sees in me or hears from me.' So, really to understand the preacher the audience should in a sense reverse the message as far as its width is concerned. The stories – the preaching of the gospel in ever widening circles – remain the same. But, when listening to Paul one has to weigh his speech for what it is worth and reduce it to the source it springs from. Underlying its universalism is a one-time condensation into the being in Christ.

Finally, we can see how the spatial co-ordinates of this power-centred blend of spirit and plot affect the course of history at large. It is not only the conflicting members in one's own body and mind ('who will deliver me from this body of death?') nor the adversities suffered in preaching the gospel while extending its dimensions in space to the most remote corners of the earth, but rather the vertical line that intersects (with) the horizontal one and subsumes the vicissitudes of life and history. Thus even Paul's grand design of history in Romans 9-11 which bases the redemption of the gentiles on the rejection of Israel, breaks down, in a sense, when stumbling on an insight that turns out to be deeper and more forceful than the pro's and cons, the yes and no of the divine plan with his people so as to overturn previous deliberations: 'I want you to understand this mystery, brethren: a hardening has come upon part of Israel, until the full number of Gentiles come in, and so all Israel will be saved as it is written....' (Romans 11:25-26). Right at the end, then, of what has become known as the charter of predestination (Romans 9-11) – 'so then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills' –, a new element is introduced by means of a 'category change' one that 'transcends the period of human choice and focuses on the boundless mercy of God.' [13] How this prospect of supreme reconciliation can be squared with Paul's exhortation to his audience to accept the gospel and strive for perfection with the risk of eternal damnation in case of refusal and negligence, or of eternal damnation as a result of God's decree, is hard to see. Yet, following E. P. Sanders, Ashton counsels acceptance of the possibility of both options being true at the same time, both the life of faith as an athletic contest and the 'image of God as the omnipotent king of creation: he created the world and he will save all that he created,'; or, as Sanders puts it: 'It [all that God created being saved] is this image which takes control in the closing verses of Romans 11.' Once more bringing his 'shamanistic' reading of Paul into action, Ashton adds an interesting reminder to this solution. 'It is less a matter of thought, even lateral thought [i.e., the category change as proposed by Sanders], than of an oracular insight, one that reverses, or rather complements, the insight with which Paul began. This too came to him as a sudden revelation' (197).

One of the merits of Ashton's approach towards Paul is to have pointed to a possible source of the extraordinary strength of his

[13] E.P. SANDERS, *Paul,* Oxford Past Masters Series (Oxford, 1991), pp. 125-7; quoted by Ashton, *The Religion*, p.196.

writings. The question that remains to be answered is whether ultimately the origin of this strength is to be found outside the text or in the very textuality itself. In case we opt in favour of the latter possibility – Ashton himself, by emphasising the opposition between religion (shamanism: experience-bound) and theology (discourse-bound) seems to diminish a bit the chances of the text itself being 'shamanistic' – we would have at least one explanation of the power of Paul's language. There is indeed a Dostojevsky-like drive in it which makes the effect of rhetorical refinement such as the discussion of the law in Romans 7 all the more magical, establishing distinctions and clear-cut arguments and blurring them at the same time. Those distinctions are there all right and so are the metaphors and the category changes. What governs it all, however, is possession, the being dead for the law, crucified and risen with Christ. Being possessed in Paul's case means that there is no observer allowed into this enclosure. Unlike Benedict watching the entire world beneath him and his biographer, Gregory the Great telling the story (*sicut ipse narravit*) and unlike many visionaries whose visions, despite claims to the contrary, are bent on the expansive aspects of communication, Paul is his own, that is Christ's, man. Whilst the accounts of great mystics such Teresa of Avila and Mechtild of Magdeburg replete with plot as the narration of a succession of events including the possibility of *peripeteia* ('after a long period of feeling elated and/or despondent, a sudden change took place and I was then and there carried away…' etc.), Paul's story is different. Here the reader is not 'voyeuristically' invited to observe or, somehow, to participate. The language of occupancy just does not allow room for being handled in such a way. Plot is absorbed by spirit – as if struck by blindness – and together they represent a seamless blend of vitality and drama. Small wonder that the one and only conclusion Paul draws from his freshly established identity and from his having heard 'things ineffable that humans cannot utter' is the arrogation of voice as the *authority* to preach the gospel: 'Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God…' (Romans 1:1).

After this excursus on Paul, let us have a final go at Calvin. Despite the fact that Paul as processed through Augustine is the progenitor of Calvin's doctrine of predestination, the difference between the two is striking. Whilst in some way or another Paul being in Christ as crucified, dead and resurrected is the driving force behind his preaching, Calvin is notoriously reticent with regard to any involvement in his own language sticking as he does to the (Kantian) principle: *de nobis ipsis silemus*. That does not mean, though, that a more

personal commitment such as Luther's outspokenness on this issue or, for that matter, the later, pietistic language of adherence and confirmation to Christ would be more to the Paulinian point. Nor does it mean that Calvin's is a less powerful concept of authority.

So much is for sure: Calvin is most positively not a shaman. Nowhere do we find him, like Paul, exercising his powers on the basis of the claim that he himself is or has been in Christ. Yet the elect are. Who then are the elect and what language do they speak: the language of possession? On the contrary. Those who '*capiti suo insiti numquam a salute excidunt*/who placed in his head never fall from salvation' have no name. They are mute. Unlike Paul, they are not dead, crucified and risen with Christ and have, therefore, no story to tell, not even the unnameable story of how they were lifted up into the head of Christ after being struck blind by vision. Not surprisingly, as we have noted above, experiential Calvinism has sought to bend the co-ordinates of space and time from possession and perseverance as vertical moments up in eternity's heaven into the more horizontal dimensions of the believer's existence on earth. That believer could be seen probing his life for possible traces of the Spirit as ever so many testimonies to his being elect, pondering the latter possibility as much as the one of 'ineffectual calling'. And if, as Muller and others would argue, this is not a faithful interpretation of Calvin's thought, the Weberian, more activist image of the hard working, over-confident Calvinist, shows an equally 'bent' shape of the co-ordinates of space and time in which the gift of destiny and perseverance in its temporal appearance is equally hard to pinpoint. On the other hand, one of the few attempts to present Calvinist doctrine as the subject matter of a real story, James Hogg's *Confessions of a Justified Sinner*, is, significantly, phrased in terms of possession. Since being elect, in view of what I have called its muteness, cannot be related to real life, a ghost story is all that there is left. Possessed by a *Doppelgänger* who, *sub forma boni*, manifests himself as an angel of light but turns out to represent the prince of darkness, the story's hero elect becomes thinner and thinner. He indeed turns into his own phantom. Exiled from the community of human mortals, he ultimately evaporates altogether. Of course, Hogg's 'memoir', whatever its real intents, can be dismissed as a distortion of Calvin's thought, but, then, can one read Calvin and escape such a verdict?

After so many attempts to penetrate the ever-eluding harshness of Calvin's predestination, it is time finally to take the measure of the cracks and splits we noted in his picture of predestination. By way of summary and conclusion the following can be said. In the end, the

humanistic voice of the *medium quiddam* as the calling between 'rejection of the human race and the election of a small number of believers,' whose indeterminate presence turned out to be at the root of hesitancy and proliferation (into the spirit of future regeneration) reflects dispossession rather than possession. For all its determinacy and steadiness Calvin's is a language of hesitancy, not the hesitancy *post festum*, spreading into the life and times of the Calvinist faithful but, rather, in the heart of predestination itself. Unlike Paul who saw himself forcefully identified with his own destiny, Calvin remains an onlooker at his own fate. Yet there is possession in the air: the elect as they are preserved and persevering safely in the head of Christ. That story can, however, only be told as the drama of dispossession. The solid rock of predestination reveals cracks ever increasing or diminishing proportionate to the proximity or distance of the observer. Here the ultimate paradox of the gift of destiny and perseverance reveals itself: to acquire voice it has to be close by, seamlessly, in fact; in terms of presence, that means that, in order fully to enjoy that gift, one has to be in the head of Christ. Seen from afar, however, its contours become remoter and remoter, the appropriating voice weaker and weaker. Ultimately, that voice can no longer make itself heard except in terms of dispossession. But, as we know, the Calvinist language of calling, vocation and invitation does not become less articulate for all that; nor does the authority of appropriation. In fact, the practice of Calvinist language reverses this situation of increasing weakness: the further away the gift of predestination, the louder the voice. Only a shaman could solve this paradox of the simultaneity of possession and dispossession. Calvin's shaman is in heaven though and so is the authentic voice of his elect since their destiny is pawned in Christ. For all the loudness of preaching, praying and arguing, that voice cannot be restored in its integrity *apud deum* here and now. No happy ending here in which the voices of past and present can be heard, no past to be made up for, no plot unfolding but a letter that, without losing any of its constraints, proves miraculously to be nothing but future and spirit.

M. B. PRANGER

PELAGIAN/ANTI-PELAGIAN PREACHING: PREDESTINATION, GRACE, AND GOOD WORKS IN THE SERMONS OF JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, OESA (d. 1380)

In his classic study, *Amor Dei*, John Burnaby wrote in his preface:

> "The years in which this book has been written have been a time in which pride, hatred, and violence have seemed the rulers of this world, and the meditation of an ancient ideal has been too easily oppressed by a sense of futility. St. Augustine stands for the faith that an advancing knowledge and an increasing love of the Eternal God is the only foundation upon which frail men can build the love of one another and learn to live together in peace … It may be that at long last a broken world will come back to the love of that Beauty which is old, but ever new." [1]

If only it were true. Burnaby wrote these lines in 1938. Sixty-five years later, we are still living in a broken world, and Augustine's teaching of Love remains the only remedy for the pride, hatred, and violence that continues to infect and comprise the *saeculum*, regardless of the moralistic and religious rhetoric used for self-justification. Augustine has been forgotten, and rendered mute, and that is, perhaps, precisely why this collection of essays is needed, even though it is other facets of Augustinianism with which we are concerned, namely, the bishop of Hippo's teachings on grace, free will, predestination, and original sin, which also, somehow, are as relevant today, if we only have ears to listen, as they were in the early fifth century when Augustine met Pelagius head-on.

I. Perspectives and Points of Departure: History and Theology

Pelagianism is a misnomer. And the same can be said for the derivatives pseudopelagianism, semi-pelagianism, and the *pelagiani moderni*. All are outgroup terms used rhetorically to condemn the position of one's opponents, once we move beyond the original historical setting of the early fifth through the early sixth century and the condemnations of the Second Council of Orange (529). The most strident campaign against the 'modern Pelagians' of the Middle Ages, launched by Thomas Bradwardine and his *De causa dei contra Pelagianos modernos* of 1344, was based on a theological polemic

[1] JOHN BURNABY, *Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine* (London, 1938), vii.

that placed virtually the entire Christian tradition under the ban, including Augustine himself. As Adolf von Harnack argued, the battle between Augustinianism and semi-Pelagianism was not a battle for the original teachings of the Church over-against new doctrine – for semi-Pelagianism was, according to Harnack, the position of Tertullian, Ambrose, and Jerome – but it was a fight for a specific interpretation of Augustine over-against Augustine himself,[2] a position that was elevated to the status of explaining the Reformation by Karl Werner and Theodore Kolde.[3] When one looks hard enough, and with the proper lens, one can find Pelagianism, or semi-Pelagianism everywhere, not only in the theology of the later Middle Ages, but also in the teachings of the Christian tradition in its entirety, including Augustine and the Holy Scriptures: witness the epistle of James, that letter of straw as Luther called it. It would not be surprising if the anti-Pelagian zealots, if they were really honest, would also condemn some of the teachings of Jesus himself, though for reasons of 'good form' would most likely simply interpret Christ's exhortations in Pauline fashion. What is at issue is the 'Gospel according to Paul', or at least a particular reading thereof. Thus Harnack could suggest that Bradwardine led Church history to Staupitz and Luther, consequently preparing the way for the Reformation and Luther as the 'father of modern times', when the pure light of the Gospel had finally shown through once again. Nevertheless, Harnack also asserted that Luther must be seen as a medieval individual, whose theological development cannot be understood if not placed in context of late medieval nominalism, and that the Reformation in no way emerged *ex novo*, but was brought about by social, political, and cultural, as well as by theological, factors.[4] Harnack was very clear with what he intended. Theologically, or dogmatically, Luther was the harbinger of modernity, standing with Paul and Augustine over-against the entire medie-

[2] Adolf von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 3 vols. (Darmstadt, 1964; reprint of the 4th edition, Tübingen, 1910), III, 241.

[3] Theodor KOLDE, *Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation und Johann von Staupitz. Ein Beitrag zur Ordens und Reformationsgeschichte* (Gotha, 1879); Karl WERNER, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters. Vol. 3: Der Augustinismus in der Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters* (Wien, 1883); For an overview of scholarship dealing with the issue of late medieval Augustinianism and the emergence of the Reformation, see E.L. SAAK, *High Way to Heaven. The Augustinian Platform Between Reform and Reformation*, 1292-1524, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 89 (Leiden, 2002), Appendix A.1, 683-708.

[4] See Adolf VON HARNACK, „Die Reformation und ihre Voraussetzung", in Harnack, *Erforschtes und Erlebtes, Reden und Aufsätze* IV (Giessen, 1923), 72-140; cf. *idem, Lehrbuch*, III, 808-902.

val tradition, whereas historically, Luther was an individual of his times, a medieval man. It was, perhaps, only Heiko Oberman who was the true successor of Harnack in reformulating, reshaping, correcting, and restating, as well as refuting, Harnack's insights in a hard-fought campaign against the Luther Renaissance, which adopted a theological understanding as the historical reality. Oberman, as Harnack, though in very different terms, held together the theological with the historical, in arguing for the historical impact of theology against social history, and for the historical importance of Luther over-against the Luther Renaissance.[5] The same perspective must be held up, at

[5] Heiko A. OBERMAN, *Reformation: Epoche oder Episode?* ARG 68 (1977), 56-109; ID., *Martin Luther. Vorläufer der Reformation, in Verifikationen.* Festschrift für Gerhard Ebeling zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. Eberhard JÜNGEL, Johannes WALLMANN, and Wilfrid WERBECK (Tübingen, 1982), 91-119. Cf. Harnack, *Die Reformation und ihre Voraussetzung*, 72-140: „Der nachtridentinische Katholicismus und Socinianismus sind in vieler Hinsicht modernen Erscheinungen, aber auf ihren religiösen Kern gesehen sind sie es nicht, vielmehr Consequenzen des mittelalterlichen Christentums. Die Reformation, wie sie sich in dem Christenthum Luther's darstellt, ist dagegen in vieler Hinsicht eine altkatholische, resp. auch eine mittelalterliche Erscheinung, dagegen auf ihren religiösen Kern beurtheilt, ist sie es nicht, vielmehr Wiederherstellung des paulinischen Christenthums im Geiste einer neuen Zeit ... Es ist eine ganz einseitige, ja sträflich abstracte Betrachtung Luther's, die in ihm den Mann der neuen Zeit, den Helden eines heraufsteigenden Zeitalters oder den Schöpfer des modernen Geistes feiert. Will man solche Helden erblicken, so muss man zu Erasmus und Genossen oder zu Männer wie Denck, Franck, Servede und Bruno gehen. In der Peripherie seines Daseins, ja auch in manchen Tiefen seines Wesens, war Luther eine altkatholisch-mittelalterliche Erscheinung ... In jenen Jahren [i.e., 1519-1523] ist Luther über sich selbst erhoben worden und hat die Schranken seiner Eigenart scheinbar überwunden – er ist die Reformation gewesen, sofern sich Alles in ihm zusammenfasste, was die Rückkehr zum paulinischen Christenthum und die Begründung eines neuen Zeitalters zugleich bedeutete. Damals ist auch der Bund zwischen dem Protestantismus und Deutschland geschlossen worden. Gewiss, das evangelische Christenthum ist der Menschheit geschenkt worden, und umgekehrt, der deutsche Geist hat sich auch heute noch lange nicht dem Protestantismus unterworfen." Harnack, *Lehrbuch*, III, 809-811. For Harnack, no less than for Oberman, Luther was a medieval individual, but one who assumed a transhistorical impact and relevance. Harnack's own German nationalism, however, comes through in rather chilling terms when he continued the above, published in 1910, with the following: „... dennoch gehören Protestantismus und Deutschthum untrennbar zusammen. Wie die Reformation im 16. Jahrhundert das Deutsche Reich gerettet hat, so ist sie noch immer seine stärkste Kraft, das fortwirkende Princip und das höchste Ziel." *Ibid.*, 811. Harnack, however, was never a member of the *Volkspartei* as was Seeberg, and after the war, argued for the establishment of a social democracy, including the democratization of both church and state; see Michael BASSE, *Die dogmengeschichtlichen Konzeptionen Adolf von Harnacks und Reinhold Seeberg*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 82 (Göttingen, 2001), 257-264. Harnack's "transhistoricizing" Luther ba-

least as a goal, for interpreting the theology of the later Middle Ages, for no one in the later Middle Ages appealed to Pelagius as an authority and it was only the zealots who labeled their opponents as the 'modern Pelagians', a designation that perhaps might have theological validity, but that has no historical content.

There were no Pelagians in the later Middle Ages, and the semi-Pelagians that one can find, were such as adherents of an Augustinianism that can be described as the entire theological tradition of the West. The attempts to explicate what humans can achieve *ex puris naturalibus* were such as attempts to clarify ambiguities inherent in Augustinianism itself, taken in its broadest terms.[6] Though Pelagianism is a misnomer, the issues involved were, and remain, central: the relationship between grace, free will, predestination, good works, and original sin. As I have argued elsewhere, what Oberman called the

sed on dogmatic, even if not on political, determinations, without keeping the historical Luther clearly in mind, leads to the dangers Oberman saw in the Luther Renaissance and the equating of Luther with the German Geist; see Heiko A. OBERMAN, *The Nationalist Conscription of Martin Luther* in OBERMAN, *The Impact of the Reformation* (Grand Rapids, MI, 1994), 69-78. The historical Luther, and thus the imperative to *re-historicize* Luther, Oberman saw as the defense against the "Germanization" of Luther, while still recognizing the inherent, inseparable, to use Harnack's term, nature of the Reformation as a "German event": „Luther als wortgewaltiger Feldprediger im Kriegsrat der Reichsritter oder im Lager der Bauern wäre eine nationale Figur geworden. Reichseinigung unter einem solchen Nationalhelden hätte Deutschland zu Beginn der Neuzeit kurzfristig am meisten genützt. Die Sache der Reformation aber hätte er damit selber preisgegeben. Der deutsche Luther ist für die Selbstfindung der Nation eine schwere Last gewesen. Als Volksheld hat er sich verweigert – eben so ist er deutsches Ereignis geworden." OBERMAN, *Luther. Mensch Zwischen Gott und Teufel* (Berlin, 1982), 57. Luther's own views of Germany, his pained lament for Germany, he expressed so forcefully in his letter of 26 March 1542 to Jacob Propst: Germany was ruined, a thing of the past and would never again be what it was, taking confidence in itself, rather than in God, WABR 10.23,3-19; or in Harnack's terms, that the German Spirit had not subjected itself to the Reformation. The historical Luther stands as the necessary correction and contradiction against all attempts to abuse his transhistorical impact. For Harnack, it was the Luther of dogma that could do so; for Oberman, it was only the historical Luther who could do so, who was also the needed correction to a theological Luther, even that of Harnack. Nevertheless, Harnack's view of Luther as a medieval individual, though one who had recovered the Pauline-Augustinian Gospel, was a view Oberman very much shared. For Harnack, see Kurt NOWAK and Otto Gerhard OEXLE, eds., *Adolf von Harnack. Theologe, Historiker, Wissenschaftspolitiker* (Göttingen, 2001).

[6] For the definition of *ex puris naturalibus*, as well as of other significant terms of late medieval theology, see Heiko A. OBERMAN, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and late medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge, 1963; reprint: Durham, N.C., 1983), 459-476.

'Augustinian Renaissance' of the later Middle Ages, cannot be attributed to a renewed campaign against the 'modern Pelagians'.[7] The Augustinian hermit, Alfonsus Vargas, for example, knew his Augustine as well as did Gregory of Rimini, and lectured on the *Sentences* of Lombard in Paris in 1344, directly after Gregory. Alfonsus was clear that his confrère, Thomas of Strassburg, had erred in his portrayal of the relationship between predestination and God's foreknowledge of human merit based on free will, though without having labeled Thomas as 'semi-Pelagian'. Indeed, in Alfonsus' treatment of predestination in distinction 41 of the first book of the *Sentences*, the word Pelagianism is not to be found; although Alfonsus once mentioned the *error Pelagii*, he did not relate such to any contemporary challenge of the "modern Pelagians".[8] This did not, however, prevent him from asserting his interpretation of genuine Augustinian doctrine. Yet this was a debate that was conducted in the realms of university theology, the attempt to defend the doctrines of faith. When we move from the academic theology of the later Middle Ages, and of the late medieval Augustinian Order, to the pastoral theology, the question that presents itself is how can a pastoral theology be effective, that is not itself subject to the condemnation of being 'semi-Pelagian'? Is not all pastoral theology, to a degree, inherently 'semi-Pelagian'? Berndt Hamm, after all, has claimed that the *Frömmigkeitstheologie* of the later Middle Ages, and thus virtually all late medieval theology, should be so described.[9] Consequently we must await Luther for a purified Augustinianism, or rather, a purified Paulinism, which essentially was the position of both Harnack and Oberman as well. Answers to these questions are perhaps ultimately left to the theologian to answer, but here I can point historically to an attempt to hold together a strongly anti-Pelagian pastoral theology with a pastoral emphasis on moral development, progress, and exhortation, namely, that found in the sermons of the fourteenth-century Augustinian friar, Jordan of Quedlinburg, to whom I turn in attempt to hold together the history and the theology of the questions the doctrines behind the label of Pelagianism presented in the later Middle Ages.

[7] E.L. SAAK, *The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages*, in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1997), 1: 367-404.

[8] *Ibid.*, 396.

[9] Berndt HAMM, *Frömmigkeitstheologie am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts. Studien zu Johannes von Paltz und seinem Umkreis*, BhTh 65 (Tübingen, 1982), 253ff.

II. Jordan of Quedlinburg and his Sermons

Thanks to the work of Robrecht Lievens in The Netherlands, Jordan of Quedlinburg is a name generally known.[10] Unfortunately the same cannot be said for the scholarship that has been pursued in the rest of Europe, or in the United States. In 1854 Wilhelm Moll argued that Jordan, together with St. Bernard, were the two preachers who exerted the greatest influence on the religious life of The Netherlands in the later Middle Ages.[11] Yet, except for the volume edited in 1911 by Johannes Flensburg containing a few selected sermons of Jordan in their low German translation,[12] it was only a century later that Jordan was treated in monographic fashion in Lievens' rich catalogue of Jordan's manuscripts in the Low Countries, published in 1958.[13] Aside from the work of Walter Baier,[14] which focused more on Ludolph of Saxony than on Jordan, and that of the present author,[15] Jordan, with

[10] Robrecht LIEVENS, *Jordanus van Quedlinburg in de Nederlanden. Een Onderzoek van de Handschriften* (Ghent, 1958).

[11] Wilhelm MOLL, *Johannes Brugman en het godsdienstig leven onzer vaderen in de vijftiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1854), 159.

[12] Johannes FLENSBURG, *Die mittelniederdeutschen Predigten des Jordanus von Quedlinburg in Auswahl* (Lund, 1911).

[13] See note 10 above. Jordan was, however, given brief treatments by the late nineteenth-century German historians of preaching; see R. CRUEL, *Geschichte der deutschen Predigt im Mittelalter* (Detmold, 1879), and A. LINSENMAYER, *Geschichte der Predigt in Deutschland von Karl dem Großen bis zum Ausgang des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1886). Jordan is virtually absent from the most recent survey of German preaching in the Middle Ages, which is also the most comprehensive account since Cruel and Linsenmayer. His name appears a mere five times, all in a single article dealing with sermons employing knowledge of the natural world. He is mentioned as a mere *exemplum* himself, as a name dropped, without information or analysis to improve the state of research of the past one-hundred years; see Elisabeth SCHINAGL-PEITZ, *Naturkundliches Wissen in lateinischen und deutschen Predigten des Spätmittelalters*, in *Die deutsche Predigt im Mittelalter*. Internationales Symposium am Fachbereich Germanistik der Freien Universität Berlin von 3.-6. Oktober 1989, ed. Volker Mertens and Hans-Jochen Schiewer (Tübingen, 1992), 285-300. Jordan is further completely missing in Carolyn MUESSIG, ed., *Medieval Monastic Preaching*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 90 (Leiden, 1998), even though his sermon collections were frequently copied by Benedictines and Carthusians, thus blurring the boundaries between mendicant and monastic preaching.

[14] Walter BAIER, *Untersuchungen zu den Passionsbetrachtungen in der 'Vita Christi' des Ludolf von Sachsen. Ein quellenkritischer Beitrag zu Leben und Werk Ludolfs und zur Geschichte der Passionstheologie,* 3 vols., Analecta Cartusiana 44, Institut für Englische Sprache und Literatur, Universität Salzburg (Salzburg, 1977).

[15] E.L. SAAK, *Religio Augustini: Jordan of Quedlinburg and the Augustinian Tradition in Late Medieval Germany*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Arizona, 1993); ID., "*Quilibet Christianus: Saints in Society in the Sermons of Jordan of*

few exceptions, such as the articles of Jeremiah Hackett,[16] has been ignored ever since. One small fact should be sufficient to indicate the regretable extent of this major lacuna: Jordan was the author of more sermons, extant in more manuscripts, than any other member of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine before Martin Luther: 1098 sermons in all, as a minimum.[17]

Between the time when he stepped down as Prior Provincial of the Saxon-Thuringian Province of his Order in 1351 and his death in 1380,[18] Jordan, who had begun his career as lector in his Order's *studium generale* in Erfurt, and then later in Magdeburg, composed three major collections of sermons: his *Opus Postillarum*, completed in or shortly after 1365, his *Opus Jor*, or yet another series of *sermones de tempore*, and his *Opus Dan*, or *Sermones de sanctis*. His *Opus Postillarum*, which contains as *sermones* such theological works as Jordan's *Meditationes de Passione Christi*, his *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, his *Tractatus de virtutibus et viciis*, and his *Expositio de Antichristo*, is extant in numerous manuscripts and was published in Strassburg in 1483.[19] His *Opus Jor* is, in contrast, extant in only three

Quedlinburg, OESA, in *Models of Holiness in Medieval Sermons*, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, Texts et Études du Moyen Âge 5, ed. Beverly MAYNE KIENZLE, with Edith WILKS DOLNIKOWSKI, Rosemary DRAGE HALE, Darleen PRYDS and Anne T. THAYER (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1996), 317-338; ID., *The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages*, in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus. 2 vols. (Leiden, 1997), 1: 367-404; ID., "The Creation of Augustinian Identity in the Later Middle Ages." Aug(L) 49 (1999), 109-164; 251-286; ID., *High Way to Heaven*.

[16] Jeremiah HACKETT, *The Use of a text quotation from Meister Eckhart by Jordan of Quedlinburg OSA*, in *Proceedings of the Patristic-Medieval and Renaissance Conference* 2 (Villanova, 1977), 97-102; ID., "Verbum mentalis conceptio in Meister Eckhart and Jordanus of Quedlinburg. A Text Study," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 29 August-3 September 1977, 2 vols. (Berlin/New York, 1979), 2: 1003-1011; ID. *Augustinian Mysticism in Fourteenth-Century Germany: Henry of Friemar and Jordanus of Quedlinburg*, in *Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue*, ed. Frederick VAN FLETEREN, Joseph C. SCHNAUBELT, OSA, and Joseph REINO (New York, 1994), 439-456.

[17] See E.L. Saak, "Saints in Society," 319.

[18] For an overview of Jordan's biography, see SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, 243-267.

[19] For a list of the manuscripts, see Adolar ZUMKELLER, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken* (Würzburg, 1966), nr. 648. Jordan's *Opus Postillarum* was published without pagination or foliation, and will be cited here according to sermo and section.

manuscripts and was never printed,[20] whereas his *Opus Dan*, also extant in numerous manuscripts, received six editions, the last being the Paris edition of 1521.[21] In his *Opus Dan* we find his *Tractatus de articulis fidei* and in his *Opus Jor*, his *Tractatus de filiatione divina*.[22] In short, Jordan's sermons cross generic boundaries and are as much theological works as they are collections of model sermons. With the exception of his *sermones de sanctis*, his two other major collections are theological biblical commentaries organized according to the lectionary, and represent the theology of the Augustinian *studia* in an analogous fashion as do commentaries on Lombard that of the universities. They thus are precious sources for evaluating the pastoral theology of the Augustinian *studia*, which had as their primary goal the training of teachers and preachers, for the Order itself, as well as for its society.[23]

In his sermons, Jordan did not mention the 'modern Pelagians'. The image of Augustine one finds is that of the founder of the Order of hermits, together with that of the bishop, and doctor of the Church. Augustine was not portrayed as the *malleus hereticorum*, as he had been already by Philip of Harvengt in the twelfth century, and as he was immortalized on the ceiling of the Church of St. Augustine in Mainz, a *Prachtexemplar* of the Baroque. For Jordan, Augustine was the *sapiens architechtor ecclesiae*, and the Order's *pater et preceptor*.[24] With such images, Jordan strove to imitate Augustine in all

[20] According to Zumkeller's *Manuskripte*, nr. 643, Jordan's *Opus Jor* is extant in Vatican City, Vat. Bibl. MS. lat. 448, 458 fols., the manuscript I have used, and in the two following manuscripts, though not complete: Berlin, StB MS. Theol. Fol. 293, 304 fols., and Windsheim, Ratsb. MS 7 (20), 298 fols.

[21] See Zumkeller, *Manuskripte*, nr. 641. The editions of the *Opus Dan* were Ulm, s.a., Strassburg, 1481 and 1484, Paris, 1500, 1509, and 1521.

[22] The *Tractatus de articulis fidei* is sermo 102. See also Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 4, n. 231; the *Tractatus de filiatione divina* is sermones 50-52 of the *Opus Jor*, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 97rb-106rb.

[23] See SAAK, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 4.

[24] In his *Vita Sancti Augustini* Jordan did mention Augustine having refuted heretics, and explicitly mentions the Pelagians: "Eodem siquidem tempore multe et quasi infinite hereses in Africa pullulabant, Donatiste namque velut sub professione continentium ambulantes erant in ingenti numero per omnes ferre Africanas regiones constituti qui Circumcelliones dicebantur superba audacia homines etiam violenter et cum armis ad suam sectam trahentes. Manichei nichilominus versuta calliditate multos seducebant. Pelagianiste similiter novas hereses publice et per domos disseminare callide conabantur. Felix etiam hereticus, Maxentius, Pascentius, Felicianus, Faustus, Secundinus, Petilianus et multi alii heretici, quod enumerare longum et superfluum esset, doctrinas varias et prophanas in cordibus infirmorum seminabant. Contra quos omnes preclarissimus magister ecclesie et veritatis velut fortissimus athleta pro fidei

aspects of life, and exhorted his confrères to do the same, including in their teaching and preaching. Jordan, as Augustine, was not a systematic theologian, yet central doctrines can be extracted from his sermons that leave no doubt, that even though Pelagianism as such was not an issue for Jordan, when we look behind the label, predestination, grace, good works, and original sin were indeed, to the extent that it would be fitting **to christen Jordan ???**, in echoes of Augustine himself, as his Order's *Lector et Predicator Gratie*.[25]

III. The Justice of Fighting the Devil: Good Works and the Call to Battle

In Jordan's sermons we do not find discussions of the scholastic formulations *ex puris naturalibus* or the *facere quod in se est*. Yet he is clear when it comes to the progress in the religious life the Christian must make. Drawing on the three stages of Christian life derived originally from Pseudo-Dionysius, Jordan argued that the believer must progress from the state of the *incipientes*, to that of the *proficientes*, reaching finally the state of the *comtemplativi*.[26] Good works

sinceritate scriptis et dictis continue dimicavit et eos publica disputatione confutavit." JORDANI DE QUEDLINBURG, *Vita Sancti Augustini* 13,7, Paris Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 251, fol. 68rb. Jordan's Vita has now been edited in Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 774-810. The edition of Jordan's Vita by Cyril Lawrence Smetana, O.S.A. is unfortunately not of sufficient quality to be able to be used for scholarly purposes ; see Cyril Lawrence SMETANA, O.S.A., *Life of Saint Augustine by John Capgrave, edited from British Library Additional MS 36704 together with Jordanus of Saxony's Vita s. Augustine* [sic!] from Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 251, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts 138 (Toronto, 2001), 75-111. In his *Opus Dan (Sermones de sanctis)* (ed. Strassburg, 1484; without foliation or pagination), Jordan treated Augustine in sermons 129-151. Here we find reference to Augustine having refuted heretics (sermo 129B), but the image of Augustine presented is that of "... dux pauperum et religiosorum ... lux doctorum et contemplativorum ... speculum perfectorum et omnium prelatorum ..." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Dan* (ed. Strassburg, 1484), sermo 140A. Neither Pelagius nor the Pelagians or Pelagianism is mentioned anywhere in any of these sermons.

[25] See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 4.

[26] "... deus est sicut motor primus, a quo virtus motiva derivatur in animam, sicut a quodam fonte paterno, a quo fluit gratia in animam per quam deus movet liberum arbitrium ad se amandum et virtuose operandum. Hec autem motio dei in anima triplex est secundum triplicem statum: incipientes movet ad culpe compunctionem et peccatorum dolorosam rememorationem; proficientes movet ad profectus spiritualis continuam progressionem; sed contemplativos movet ad divine dulcedinis internum degustationem." Jor. *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 11A (ed. Strassburg, 1483). This three-fold scheme stems from Ps.Dionysius' *De ecclesiastica hierarchia* (PG 3, 369-584), yet

and the acquisition of the virtues are what effect the development. For Jordan, as for his Order's theologians from Aegidius Romanus to Martin Luther, the Christian life was a battle against the devil, a *pugna continua*, and good works, as he wrote in his *Opus Jor*, "ought to be placed before all other weapons [used to fight the devil] as the king's standard."[27] Works of love reign supreme for the devil fears nothing more than love.[28]

One can only make progress in the Christian life, and fight the devil, by following God's will, which is revealed most of all in the Ten Commandments. In his *Opus Postillarum* Jordan gave a radical interpretation of the Law. In expositing the parable of the sower of Matthew 13, Jordan inverted the interpretation found in his source, the *Commentary* on Matthew of Jordan's teacher and confrère Albert of Padua. Albert had explained the thirty-fold, sixty-fold, and one hundred-fold yields very traditionally, whereby the first is that of the married, the second, that of the chaste, and the third, that of the virgins; or, the thirty-fold yield is that of the doctors, the sixty-fold, that of the martyrs, and the 100-fold, that of the apostles; or, the thirty fold yield was that of observing the old law, the sixty fold, that of observing the new law, and the hundred fold, that of observing the monastic counsels. Jordan followed Albert for the first interpretation, but inverted the order for the second and third. For Jordan, the apostles yielded a thirty-fold harvest, the martyrs, a sixty-fold, and the doctors a 100 fold, but then he continued. The 100 fold yield Jordan equated with observing the old law, the sixty-fold, with observing the new law,

Jordan most likely took his description of the three-fold stages of the Christian's progress from either Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, *Secunda* Secundae q. 186, art. 1, ad 3; GILES OF ROME, *Tractatus de laudibus divine sapientie*, (ed. Rome, 1555; reprint: Aegidius Romanus, Opuscula I, Frankfurt, 1968), fol. 31va; or HENRY OF FRIEMAR, *Tractatus de adventu verbi in mentem*. Markus Wriedt has pointed to this well-known schema in the works of Johann von Staupitz, which Wriedt traces back to Hugh of St. Cher, Johannes Gerson, Dionysius the Carthusian, and Augustinus Favaroni; M. WRIEDT, *Gnade und Erwählung. Eine Untersuchung zu Johann von Staupitz und Martin Luther* (Mainz, 1991), 223.

[27] "... diabolus ... fidem, spem, caritatem et bona opera laborat auferre, sed debet quilibet resistere de fide scutum facere, de spe galeam, de caritate lanceam, opera autem debet ponere super omnia arma tamquam regis insignia." Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Opus Jor*, sermo 114, MS Vat. lat. 448, fol. 191va.

[28] "Impugnamus autem eum [*scil.* diabolum] per bona opera, quae sibi sunt a tota specie contraria et maxime per caritatem, quia ut dicit Hugo in Expositione Regulae, 'nihil est quod ipse diabolus tantum timeat quantum caritatis unitatem.' [HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, *Expositio in Regulam Sancti Augustini* 1, PL 176, 883C]." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 437B (ed. Strassburg, 1483).

and the thirty-fold, with observing the counsels. Jordan elevated the observance of the old law, above that of the new.[29]

When I first read Jordan's treatment of this parable, I thought that it must have been a scribal error that had inverted the exposition. Yet Jordan's interpretation is witnessed in both the manuscript tradition and the printed edition of 1483, so that even if he had intended otherwise, his text speaks clearly. Moreover, there are sufficient theological reasons in Jordan's sermons to defend his claim that the observance of the old law should be placed above that of the new. As already mentioned, Jordan argued that God's will was revealed most of all in the old law, which Christians must follow in their battle against the vicious incursions of Satan. Moreover, Jordan, in keeping with his view of this parable, put forth an equally radical interpretation of justice, of that which makes one just. Jordan was not concerned with how the Christian can find a righteous God, a *via securior* for the Christian to follow,[30] but rather with being just and doing that which is just, which he defined as paying what one owes, based on Matthew 18:28, *Redde quod debes*.[31] All sin, for Jordan, was equated with debt, so that debt was the more encompassing category. When one does not render what one owes, one sins.[32] There are four creditors

[29] "Notandum autem quod Matthei tertio decimo [Mt. 13:18-23] magis explicite agitur de huiusmodi fructibus ubi dicitur quod alius centesimus, alius sexagesimus, alius trecesimus. Primus est virginum; secundus continentium; tertium coniugatorum. Vel primus est doctorum; secundus martirum; tertius apostolorum. Vel primus datur per observantiam legis veteris; secundus per observantiam legis nove; tertius per observantium consiliorum … Unde Matthei 19 dicitur: *vos qui* reliquistis omnia et *secuti estis me, centuplum accipietis* [Mt. 19:29]." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 137G (ed. Strassburg, 1483). Cf.: "Nota quod triplex ponitur fructus istius seminis, scilicet tricesimus, sexagesimus et centesimus. Primus est coniugatorum; secundum continentium; tertius virginum. Vel primus est doctorum; secundus est martirium; tertius apostolorum. Vel primus datur propter observantiam antique legis; secundum propter observantiam nove; tertius propter observantium consiliorum." ALBERT OF PADUA, *Expositio Evangeliorum Dominicalium* (ed. Venice, 1476), fol. I-2^{rb}.

[30] Cf. Hamm, *Frömmigkeitstheologie*, 247-303.

[31] "Introducitur autem hic virtus iustitie cuius est reddere unicuique debitum suum. Et hec est eius propria ratio prout describitur et a philosophis et a iurisperitis." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, Berlin, StB MS theol. lat. qu. 175, fol. 84ra.

[32] "Dicendum quod pro tanto dicuntur peccata debita quia inde peccata contraximus, quia debita non solvimus, id est, quia non fecimus quod debuimus et ob hoc iudici penam debemus. Sicut ergo qui non solvit pecuniam creditori statuto termino dupliciter incurrit debitum ultra debitum pecunie, puta debitum culpe, ex eo quod non solvit per quod offendit creditorem, et debitum pene, quam debet iudici ex eo quod contra iustitiam egit, sic in proposito ex eo quod non facimus debitum nostrum illis

whom the Christian must pay. To God, one owes religion; to oneself, self-governance; to one's neighbor, love, and to the devil, resistance and battle.[33] There is a single standard of justice, defined as paying all one's debts, which more over is the same standard of justice by which Christians will be judged in the final judgement, when Christ will ask one whether one has paid all one's debts. The basis for determining whether one has paid all one's debts is the old law, the God of the Old Testament who demands of his followers strict obedience. This is Jordan's view of justice, and of justification. It is unrelenting and cannot be fulfilled, but it is what he holds up as the standard for all who are in war with the devil, as should, he asserts, every preacher, as well as every confessor in the confessional.[34] Fulfilling the old law, good works, and merit, comprise for Jordan the standard of justice the Christian must meet in order to fight the devil, and to achieve justification before God and thus to gain eternal salvation. In his view of justification, Jordan was not semi-Pelagian, but was seemingly thoroughly Pelagian, espousing a doctrine of justification *solis operibus* based on fulfilling the old law, the revealed will of God.

quibus debemus, contrahimus duo mala scilicet peccatum et reatum: peccatum quantum ad culpam; reatum quantum ad penam, que utraque nomine debiti intelliguntur. Ex quo patet quod potius et melius dicitur hic 'debita nostra' quam 'peccata <nostra>', quia plus petimus dicendo *dimitte nobis debita* <nostra>, quia per hoc petimus <nobis> dimissionem culpe et pene, quam si diceremus, 'dimitte nobis peccata nostra', quia nonnunquam dimittitur peccatum quantum ad culpam, remanente reatu quo ad penam. Ulterius quia dictum est quod inde peccata contrahimus quia debita nostra quibus debemus non solvimus, dubitaret aliquis et que debita debeamus." *Ibid.*, fol. 82^{vb}.

[33] "Sciendum quod quaedam debemus deo supra nos, quaedam nobisipsis intra nos, quaedam vero proximis nostris iuxta nos, quaedam etiam diabolo, qui est infra nos." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 436A (ed. Strassburg, 1483); "Postremo videndum quid debemus diabolo, qui infra nos est ipse et satellites eius scilicet peccata et vitia. Et … debemus ei tria scilicet inimicitiam, resistentiam et pugnam." *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 437B (ed. Strassburg, 1483); "Propter quod est sciendum quod aliquid debemus deo, aliquid nobisipsis, et aliquid proximis nostris. Debemus enim deo religionem; nobisipsis debitam gubernationem; proximis mutuam dilectionem." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, Berlin, StB, MS theol. lat. qu. 175, fol. 88^{r-v}.

[34] "*Redde quod debes*, Matthei 18 [Mt. 18:28]. Licet haec verba parabolice dicta fuerint a servo debitum a suo converso atrociter extorquente, mystice autem haec verba possunt accipi ut dicenda a summo iudice ad quemlibet hominem in morte vel in iudicio extremo rationem ab ipso iudicialiter exigente … ad praesens tamen accipi possunt ut dicantur a quolibet praedicatore et doctore vel etiam confessore fideles ad redditionem sui debiti fideliter exhortante dicendo cuilibet redde quod debes." *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 436A (ed. Strassburg, 1483).

The problem Jordan faced, however, was that left on their own, humans cannot fulfill the law, for they don't even know what it is that they owe. Nevertheless, the absolute standard of justice remains as the call to battle against the devil. It is, however, only by the grace of God that Christians begin to realize precisely what it is that they owe, the extent thereof, and their inability to meet the requirements. Thus they must pray, *Forgive us our debts*, which Jordan associated with the beatitude of weeping. It is only by the grace of God that Christians can even recognize what it is that they owe, a knowledge given, according to Jordan, by the *donum scientie*, and the extent to which they are, on their own, incapable of meeting their debts.[35] The grace of God reveals what it is that Christians owe as well as the fact that they cannot pay their debts, and thus they weep, and Christ will console their weeping.[36] It is only here that one begins to recognize Jordan's thoroughly Augustinian theology, which appears not so much as one that was the precursor to Luther, as it was one that echoed beforehand that of Calvin. The only way out of the condemnation of the law, God's absolute standard of justice, for Jordan, as for Calvin, was the mercy of God and the doctrine of election and predestination.

[35] "Nec etiam possumus esse iusti nisi reddamus cuique debitum suum, sed quid sit illud debitum quod tenemur cuique nescimus nisi per donum scientie." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, Berlin, StB, MS theol. lat. qu. 175, fol. 84ra.

[36] "Unde absque dono scientie opera iustitie facere non possumus, propter quod dicit Isaie 53: *in scientia sua iustificavit multos* [Is. 53:11], et loquitur de Christo cui attribuuntur dona spiritus sancti in ratione meriti, quia propter meritum suum nobis dantur. Unde etiam ipse spiritus sanctus dicitur *spiritus filii*, ad Galatas 4 [Gal. 4:6]. Christus igitur in scientia sua, id est per donum scientie, iustificat, id est, iustos facit multos docendo videlicet eos quid cuique debeant, puta quid deo, quid sibiipsis et quid proximis; et nichilominus que debita peccando contraxerunt. Et quia hec omnia sine dono scientie scire non valemus, ideo in hac petitione spiritum scientie postulamus. Introducitur consequenter hic beatitudo luctus, que secundum Augustinum adaptatur dono scientie per quod scitur de quibus lugendum sit [Aug. de serm.dom. 2,11,38 (129,840-842)], cuius etiam convenientie signum est in natura que idem membrum ordinavit ad visum et ad luctum. Lugendum est autem pro delictis et peccatis tam que commisimus contra deum tam que contra nosmetipsos vel etiam contra proximos nostros. De hoc luctu dicit psalmo: *Quasi lugens et contristatus sic humiliabitur* [Ps. 34:14]. Non solum etiam lugendum est pro peccatis propriis, sed etiam pro alienis quod est maioris perfectionis ... Lugere autem peccata est ipsa odire, itaque surgamus ad destructionem eorum. Est <autem> et alius luctus qui etiam ad hanc beatitudinem pertinet, scilicet lugere pro incolatu presentis miserie et pro dilatione <celestis> glorie. Hoc luctu luxit propheta cum dicebat: *heu michi quia incolatus meus prolongatus est*, etc. [Ps. 119:5]. Huic beatitudini respondet pro premio consolatio, que in hac vita inchoatur, perficitur autem in futura. Dignum est enim ut qui propter deum hic tristatur, ipse a deo consoletur." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, Berlin, StB, MS theol. lat. qu. 175, fol. 84ra-b.

IV. Grace and Predestination

That humans are not able to fulfill the law on their own, was, for Jordan, the result of the Fall. Original sin had so marred human nature that the sinner, in and of himself, is the daughter of Babylon, the destroyer of the order of nature, the abuser of all creation, of all scripture, and of all grace.[37] Humans are captive to sin. "By ourselves we are weak and fragile," Jordan lamented in the sermons comprising his *Meditationes de Passione Christi*,"and devoid of all good, unless we are held by the right hand of God."[38] Never certain of his own righteousness, one must "never think himself to be safe from the devil ... man is wretched and fragile, certain of nothing except the death of Christ alone."[39] After having detailed the wonders of the state of nature before the Fall in his *Opus Postillarum*, Jordan was clear about the effects of original sin.Echoing Augustine, Jordan assured his audience that, "The free will certainly remains after the fall, but it is depraved and rotten, because with sin came the difficulty to do the good and the propensity to do evil. With his free will before the fall, man was able to sin and able not to sin, but after the fall, man is able to sin and not able not to sin. The image of God in the soul also remains after the fall, but afterwards, it is a deformed image."[40] After the fall,

[37] "Significanter autem anima peccatrix dicitur filia Babilonis et confusionis, quia ipsa est eterna confusione digna, qui totum ordinem divine dispositionis deordinavit. Peccator enim quantum in se est deordinatio est omnium naturarum. Est enim abusor omnium creaturarum, omnium scripturarum, omnium gratiarum, contemnit etiam per peccatum consortium divinarum personarum et ideo omnium deordinator ex verbis merito filia Babilonis, id est, confusionis appellatur." Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Opus Jor*, sermo 84, Vat. Lat. 448, fol. 152^{rb}.

[38] "nos ex nobis esse infirmos et fragiles, ac omni bono vacuos, nisi dextera dei nos manu teneat." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Meditationes de Passione Christi*, art. 34, Basel, UB, MS B.V. 26, fol. 23va.

[39] "nunquam ... se puteat securus de diabolo ... homo miser et fragilis, certe de nullo nisi solum de morte Christi." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Meditationes de Passione Christi*, Basel, UB, MS B.V. 26, art. 62, fol.39^{vb}; cf. "... quia enim pena, quam peccator debet sustinere, excedit vires eius, ideo ordinavit deus ex magna misericordia ut pro eo et cum eo primo satisfaciat meritum passionis Christi, qui per suam passionem non solum mundum redemit sed etiam suum meritum pro peccatoribus satisfacit." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 104, Vatican City, MS Pal. lat. 448, fol. 180^{rb}; "... ut videlicet petamus eruari a potestate diaboli quia expellatur ab anima nostra ... petamus non confidentes de merits nostris, sed de sola misericordia dei." Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Opus Jor*, sermo 97, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 171ra.

[40] "Remansit quippe liberum arbitrium sed depravatum et imminutum, quia per peccatum difficultatem recipit ad bonum et pronitatem ad malum. Prius enim homo per liberum arbitrium poterat peccare et non peccare, sed post potuit peccare et non potuit non peccare. Imago etiam dei remansit in anima post peccatum, sed quasi deformata." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 7B (ed. Strassburg, 1483); cf. Aug. correpт. 12 (936) and civ. 22,30 (863,52-864,73).

Jordan affirmed, humans can only wallow in sin, for without the *auxilium dei*, they are incapable of doing anything else.[41] In replying, perhaps, to the scholastic formula f*acientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam*, Jordan asserted that everything one does from oneself, not having been moved by God, *omne quod quis facit ex se ipso, non ex deo motus*, is sin and is nothing at all.[42]

[41] "... homo enim per se labi in peccatum potest, sed per se surgere non potest sine auxilio gratie dei ..." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 131, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 215^{rb}; "Hic cadunt due questiones. Prima, utrum homo possit se preparare ad gratiam sine gratia. Secunda, utrum ex neccessitate detur gratia se preparanti ad gratiam. Ad primam respondeo, quod gratia dicitur duplex: uno modo, ipsum habituale donum infusum anime a deo; secundo modo dicitur gratia auxilium dei moventis animam ad bonum. Primo modo accipiendo gratiam preexigitur aliqua preparatio ad eam, quia nulla forma introduci potest nisi in materia disposita. Et hec preparatio paulative, quandoque fit subito, quia ut dicitur Ecclesiastici 1<1>: *facile est in oculis dei honestare pauperem* [Sir. 11:23]. Et in hanc preparationem non potest homo sine gratia, secundo modo dicta. Sed ad istam secundo modo dictam non requiritur aliqua preparatio ex parte hominis quasi preveniens divinum auxilium, scilicet potius quecumque preparatio in homine esse potest, est ex auxilio dei moventis animam ad bonum. Dicitur ergo homo se preparare ad gratiam, scilicet habitualem in quantum movetur eius liberum arbitrium a deo per gratiam pre-venientem, que non dicitur donum sed dei auxilium movens animam ad hec preparatoria ... Ad secundam questionem respondeo: quod preparatio hominis ad gratiam potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo ut a libero arbitrio et sic nullam necessitatem habet ad gratie consecutionem, quia donum gratie excedit omnem pre-parationem virtutis humane. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a deo movente et tunc habet necessitatem ad illud ad quod ordinatur a deo, non quidem coactionis sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio dei deficere non potest. Unde Johannis sexto: *Qui audit a patre meo et didicit, venit ad me* [Io. 6:45]. Sequitur secundum scilicet motus divina per gratiam; hoc significatur per angelum qui movebat aquam. Hic motus dicitur fuisse vel propter sacrificia, que in illa piscina abluebantur vel propter lignum crucis quod in ea dicitur iacuisse a tempore Salomonis usque ad tempus Christi et tunc incepit super nature; sed certum est quod angelus fecit talem motum et ex illa aqua vim sanativam habuerit. Signat autem iste motus aque motum illum, quo deus movet liberum arbitrium per gratiam. Unde sicut aqua illa ex se non habet vim illam sed ex motu angeli, sic actus liberi arbitrii ex se vim merendi non habet, sed movente per gratiam ut dictum est." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 99, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 173^{rb}-174ra; "Sed an ista preparatoria preveniant gratiam et an ista possumus sine gratia, dicendum quod gratia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur habituale donum, quod est principium operis meritorii. Alio modo dicitur gratia auxilium gratuitum dei interius animam moventis sine bonum propositum inspirantis. Primo modo non oportet presupponere aliquod aliud donum habituale in anima quia sic procederetur in infinitum. Secundo autem modo gratia procedit tale habituale donum, nam sine divino auxilio, quo movetur liberum arbitrium ad bonum, non possumus nos preparare ad gratiam." *Ibid.*, sermo 247, fol. 382^{vb}.

[42] "... considerandum est quod omne, quod quis facit ex se ipso non ex deo motus, peccatum est et nichil." Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Opus Jor*, sermo 103, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 179^{rb}.

Good works, for Jordan, certainly are possible, but they are so as gifts of God. As he asserted in the *Opus Postillarum*, Jordan viewed good works not as something humans performed or achieved, but as dona dei of which humans were to be faithful administrators. "We owe stewardship," Jordan affirmed,

> of those goods conceded to us, for God did not give us those goods which we have from Him on account of our merits, or so to say, on account of our beautiful hair, but on account of His own goodness and for His service. For example: Princes and lords concede some goods to their men in the feudal pact so that their men might be able to do some services for them or might pay a certain debt from them. Therefore, the goods which we hold from God are not to be considered given to us from God as our own, but rather for our use so that we might be administrators and stewards of them, rather than our own lords.[43]

Even though I have not found the exact formulation explicitly in the works of Jordan that was put forth by his younger confrère of the later fourteenth and early fifteenth century, Antonius Rampegolus, in his handbook for preachers, his *Figure Bibliorum*, Jordan would certainly have agreed: *sola gratia liberat hominem*.[44]

Justification *sola gratia, ante previsa merita*, was the Augustinians' position from Gregory of Rimini and Alfonsus Vargas, to Jordan and Rampegolus, and with few exceptions, such as Gregory and Hugolino of Orvieto,[45] was not as such associated with a campaign contra *Pelagianos modernos*.[46] Grace, for Jordan, was what enabled

[43] "... debemus pensionem deo de bonis nobis concessis. Non enim deus dedit nobis bona illa, quae habemus ab eo, propter nostra merita vel secundum modum loquendi, propter nostros pulchros capillos, sed propter suam bonitatem et ad suum servitium. Exemplum de principibus et dominis qui hominibus <suis> concedunt alia bona in foedum ut de ipsis faciant ei cetera servitia vel certam pensionem de eis solvant. Igitur bona, quae tenemus a deo, non reputemus nobis data <a deo> ut propria sed tamquam ad usum concessa ut eorum simus administratores et dispensatores potius quam domini." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 436A (ed. Strassburg, 1483); "... debet omnia bona sua ab eo [scil. deo] recognoscere sicut vasallus infeudatus a domino suo. Quidquid enim boni habemus totum dei est, nec quicquam nobis proprium usurpare vel vendicare possumus nisi peccata." *Ibid.*, sermo 402B (ed. Strassburg, 1483). Similar statements were made by the Augustinians Hermann of Schildesche, Johannes Zachariae, and Johannes von Dorsten. See A. ZUMKELLER, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters* (Würzburg, 1984), 289, 378.

[44] "... sola gratia divina liberat hominem." ANTONIUS RAMPEGOLUS, *Figure Bibliorum*, De diabolo, Uppsala, UB, MS 162C, fol. 33^{ra-b}; cf. Aug. conf. 8.5.10 (119,8-12); for Rampegolus, see Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 529-535, 594-618.

[45] See Christoph Burger's contribution to this volume.

[46] See Saak, "Reception," 396.

the sinner to perform good works and to rise above fallen nature. Grace, all grace, for Jordan, was *gratia infusa*, a gift of God, which Jordan equated with *gratia gratis data*. In effect, Jordan redefined the scholastic *gratia gratum faciens* over a hundred years before Staupitz did so as that grace that makes God pleasing to humans. Thus we pray *Pater Noster*, as a *captatio benevolentie*, not of God's good will, but of our own, for we are already pleasing to God, and we pray for God's kingdom to come, not that we might come to the kingdom, but that the kingdom might come to us. God had sent his son to die for human sin. It was sinful humans who needed to learn not to find a pleasing God, but to recognize the loving father. Yet this could only be effected by grace, and all grace, including the infused gifts of God, was given *gratis*.[47]

Only with the grace of God, could humans perform good works and fight the devil. No one can take confidence in one's works, for no one, from the infant who has lived for only a day, to the just and the saint, is free from sin.[48] No one can ever pay all that one owes. Thus the saint as well as the sinner must recognize their dependence on God, and be thankful, and humble. Humility, indeed reigns supreme, for Jordan went beyond even his own Order's emphasis on the insufficiency of works to argue for a fourteenth-century version of *simul iustus et peccator*: "And this is the argument: that a humble sinner is better than someone just, but proud, because by the very fact that a sinner humbles himself, he is already no longer a sinner, and the just person, by the very fact that he is proud, is already no longer just."[49]. It is only the humble sinner, who confesses himself as such, who is truly the saint.

[47] See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 4.

[48] "Circa quod considerandum quod nullus, quantumcumque magni meriti, de suis iustitiis presumere debet … nullus enim scire potest pro certo an opera sua vera sint an iusta; falsa enim iustitia multos decepit … nostrae iustitiae purae non sunt sed semper habent aliquid macule … Nemo est absque peccato, nec infans cuius est unius diei vita super terram. Item nec quicumque iusti et sancti sunt sine peccato." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 374B (ed. Strassburg, 1483).

[49] "Et hic est argumentum: quod melior est peccator humilis quam iustus superbus, quia eo ipso quod peccator se humiliat, iam non est peccator, et iustus eo ipso quod superbit, iam non est iustus." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 376A (ed. Strassburg, 1483); cf : "In hoc evangelio [Lc. 18:9-14] commendatur virtus orationis et ostenditur quia in qua consistat summa totius humane perfectionis. Et introducitur hic duo homines: unus iustus et alter peccator. Iustus, quia nescivit orare, fuit reprobatus; sed peccator, qui scivit orare, fuit iustificatus." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 256, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 396$^{rb\text{-}va}$.

Given Jordan's view of grace, combined with his emphasis on works and the law, one might be tempted to claim that he espoused a theory of justification much as did Gabriel Biel in the fifteenth century, namely, one that was simultaneously by grace alone and by works alone, whose theology, according to Oberman, was semi-Pelagian. Moreover, both Jordan and Biel advocated a dialectic of God's justice and mercy, which Biel placed in the context of the dialectic of God's ordained and absolute power. God's mercy, for Biel, is evidenced by the latter, whereas God's justice is operative within the former; the merciful God bound himself to an ordained order of justice in which the *viator* must do his very best in order to receive the promised infusion of grace. The ordained order, as Oberman described it, "proves to be the 'dome' within which the actual life of the *viator* unfolds."[50]

It is actually, however, the differences between the theology of Biel and that of Jordan that should be stressed. Jordan did not employ the dialectic of God's absolute and ordained powers, and moreover, was thoroughly Augustinian when it came to the issue of predestination. Based on Augustine's two cities, Jordan argued that the saints, the good and the just, "ought to give Christ the greatest thanks because they were called by Christ out of the entire degenerate mob and chosen by grace from the number of the damned."[51] Moreover, if Gregory of Rimini merited the title *tortor infantium*, it is one he could have shared with Jordan. Unbaptized babies Jordan associated with the damned and condemned to hell,[52] followed closely on their heals by mothers who killed their infants before baptism. In doing so, they

[50] Oberman, *Harvest*, 176.

[51] "... ut iusti plurimum deo regratientur quia quod boni sunt non habent a natura sed a divina gratia ... debent ergo iusti Christo plurimas gratias agere quod de massa tota corrupta vocati sunt a Christo et electi per gratiam de numero pereuntium." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 72, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 133^{rb}; "... non totum genus humanum damnatur, sed aliqui eliguntur ad salutem qui valde pauci sunt respectu multitudinis damnatorum." *Ibid.*, sermo 248, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 385ra. Jordan's pastoral teaching of predestination, however, is seen in his comment that the statement that one predestined is able to be damned, is true *in sensu diviso*: "Ut in errorem mittantur si fieri potest etiam electi, hoc dicit, quia predestinatio licet sit certa non tamen tollit libertatem arbitrii. Ista enim propositio, 'Predestinatus potest damnari,' falsa est in sensu composito; in sensu diviso, vera est." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 456A (ed. Strassburg, 1483).

[52] In discussing the effects of Christ's Passion, Jordan lists one as freeing the patriarchs, among others, from limbo, but, then adds: "Damnati autem et pueri non baptizati huius meriti capaces non fuerunt. Ideo tales non liberavit sed in statu suo reliquit." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 143, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 234^{rb}.

deprived the angels of great good and sent the souls of their children straight to hell, and they themselves were not far behind. "Oh God," Jordan lamented, "how greatly will they be tortured." [53] Many are called, Jordan affirmed, but only few are chosen, the few, the elect, the predestined, who were so *ante previsa merita*.[54] Thus we come to realize that Jordan's theology was actually the inverse of that of Biel. Whereas for Biel the 'outer realm' signified God's mercy, within which God ordained the 'dome' of justice, for Jordan, the 'outer realm' was equated with God's justice, within which God's mercy was operative for the elect: God's mercy was a subset of God's justice. And here we see again the Augustinian elements of Jordan's theology: the saints are those who have been chosen by Christ from the degenerate mob of the damned, the *massa perditionis*. Jordan's combination of grace and predestination with an emphasis on works and the law, was not that of a semi-Pelagian, but was that of a Calvinist, almost two hundred years before Calvin.

V. The Return to God

Jordan was not in search of the merciful God. He already knew the loving father. The question his theology addresses was once one recognizes God's love revealed in Christ, once one already knows the loving father, now what? How does one live in a world situated on the battle field between God and the devil? In this light, Jordan's doctrine of grace and predestination was a call to arms, in a battle that was fought with works of love. He was Augustinian enough to know well that he preached to a *corpus permixtum* amongst which one found many sinners, who also could be saints. Predestination was the work of God, not a mark of the Church, which was in a corporate battle with the forces of Satan.[55]

Yet we would misunderstand Jordan if we did not recognize what is perhaps the major focus of his theology, and that which distinguishes it from all comparisons with the theology of Luther, or Calvin: Jordan's view of the return to God.[56] For Jordan, Christians are

[53] "Infelices mulieres, que partum impediunt vel suffocant sine baptismate … quantum bonum angelis aufferant … et quantum maledictionem incurrunt … O deus quantum cruciabitur, qui puerum non baptizatum interficit et animam ad infernum mittat."JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Jor*, sermo 65, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 124^{ra-b}.

[54] See note 51 above.

[55] See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 4.

[56] See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 5.

not so much *viatores* as they are *peregrini*, resident aliens in the world, making their way back to their homeland. Jordan set forth a Neoplatonic-Augustinian ontology, for which Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were his sources, whereby the human soul progresses in ascending states of being, from the *esse nature*, to the *esse gratie* and finally to the *esse glorie*, which he equated with the Pseudo-Dionysian progression of the *incipientes*, the *proficientes*, and the *perfecti* or *contemplativi*. The infusion of grace is what effects the progression, elevating the soul to a higher level of being.[57]

The justification of the impious, Jordan explained, happens in a single moment with respect to God. However, in the course of nature we find succession, and thus God desires that there be progression, even though God is able to effect justification instanteously as well, as the thief on the cross proves. In the natural, usual progression, there is first of all the infusion of grace. The movement of the free will towards God comes second, followed, though, by sin, which first must be recognized, and then despised, which then leads to the remission of guilt in contrition, confession, and satisfaction, all of which are designed to show us how great is our sin and blindness.[58]

In three sermons of his *Opus Postillarum* on Luke 17:19, *Rise, and go, for your faith has saved you*, Jordan spelled out the steps by which the soul returns to God.[59] The human soul is equated with the

[57] See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, ch. 4.

[58] "… dicendum quod licet plura requirantur ad iustificationem impii, omnia tamen sunt simul tempore. Sed quia ordine nature unum est prius alio, ideo successive fieri describuntur. Naturali enim ordine in iustificatione impii primum est gratie infusio; secundum, motus liberi arbitrii in deum; tertium, motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; quartum, remissio culpe, que tamen omnia a deo fiunt uno instanti. Sic in proposito certum est quod deus potuit illum cecum [Mc. 8:22-26] statim uno momento perfecte sanare, sed successive facere voluit ut designaret qualiter nos peccatis obscurati spiritualiter ordine quodam reducamur ad lucem … quem [scil. cecum] verbo totum simul deus curare poterat, paulatim curat, ut magnitudinem humane cecitatis ostendat, que vix et quasi per gradus ad lucem redeat et gratiam suam nobis indicat, per quam singula perfectionis incrementa adiuvat. Unde licet deus uno instanti possit peccatorem sanum facere, exemplum de latrone, regulariter tamen ad conversionem nostram ex parte nostra plura successive requiruntur videlicet peccati cognitio, peccati displicentia, contritio, confessio, et satisfactio, que nobis sunt successiva, sed deus potest supplere omnia in uno momento. Igitur quando alique sic auxilio gratie prevenientis in tantum illustrati fuerint, ut peccata sua saltem in grosso conspiciant … deinde cetera mala que ex peccato nascunt considerantes demum ad perfectam cognitionem omnium suorum defectuum illuminatione habitualis gratie perducentur quod designat in eo quod post omnium istorum malorum considerationem subiungitur." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 458D (ed. Strassburg, 1483).

[59] See JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermones 394-395 (ed. Strassburg, 1483); cf. *ibid.*, sermones 458-460.

leper of the Gospel passage due to the defect of original sin, and thus these words are spoken to all, regardless of the state of being, for the *incipientes* are to rise from actual sin; the *proficientes*, from laziness; and the *contemplativi* are to rise from a withdrawn quietude.[60] In relating the Surge of Luke with that of the Song of Songs 2:10, and the *itinerarium* of Habakkuk 3, Jordan explained that there are nine journeys the soul must take to progress from its origin in God in order to arrive back at its end in God. The first is that of the soul's creation; the second, the soul's conversion; the third, humiliation; the fourth, self-knowledge, the fifth, self-denial; the sixth, self-renunciation; the seventh, the imitation of Christ; the eighth, contemplation; and the ninth, reunion, signified by the *Vade*, whereby Christ says to the soul *vade extra me, vade coram me, vade a me; vade in te; vade extra te; vade a te; vade post me; vade ad me, and vade in me*.[61] Such a return to God was not, for Jordan, a substantive union, which was the heresy of the Free Spirit, against which Jordan had written a treatise now

[60] "Omnis enim anima propter infectionem peccati originalis leprosa est, sed mundatur per lavacrum baptismi. Sunt autem fideles per baptismum regenerati in triplici differentia. Quidam enim sunt in peccatis actualibus iacentes; alii sunt a bono opere torpentes; tertii sunt quieti contemplationis vacantes. Hos singulos dominus alloquitur in verbis premissis dicens cuilibet secundum statum suum, Surge et vade, ubi duo iubentur. Primo iubetur surgere cum premittit, Surge. Sed quia non sufficit viatori surgere sed oportet eum ambulare, ideo secundo iubetur procedere et ambulare cum adiungitur, et vade. Primo ergo isti iubentur surgere et hoc tripliciter secundum eorum triplicem statum. Surgere inquam a peccatis quantum ad primos; surgere a torpore quantum ad secundos; et surgere a quiete quantum ad tertios." JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 394A (ed. Strassburg, 1483).

[61] "*Vade*. Quia non sufficit deo sponso anime eam surgere nisi etiam vadat, ideo postquam dixit *Surge*, adiunxit et *Vade*. Sic etiam in Canticis ubi dicit *Surge*, addit *propera* [Ct. 2:10], qualiter autem ad iussionem sponsi anima ire et properare debeat. Circa hoc sciendum quod animam ad perfectionem tendentem antequam finem sue peregrinationis attingat, oportet ire novem itinera, ut sic circumitum faciendo demum redeat in suum principium a quo profluxit … Primum iter anime est in sua creatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade extra me.' Secundum iter est in sua conversatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade coram me.' Tertium iter est in sui humiliatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade a me.' Quartum iter est in sui consideratione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade in te.' Quintum iter est in sui abnegatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade extra te.' Sextum iter est in rerum renunciatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade a te.' Septimum iter est in Christi imitatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade post me.' Octavum iter est in dei contemplatione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade ad me.' Nonum iter anime est in sui cum deo unione, et quantum ad hoc dicit, 'Vade in me.' Et sic completo circumitu isto anima redit in suum principium." Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Opera Postillarum*, sermo 395A (ed. Strassburg, 1483). Jordan then continues with explications of each of the journeys in this and in the following sermon.

lost.[62] Humans, as he clarified in his *Tractatus de filiatione divina* of his *Opus Jor*, are to become sons of God not by nature, but by adoption whereby the union is one of love, effected by grace.[63] It was only by the redemptive act of Christ that humans can pray, *Abba, pater*.[64] Jordan's theology of *theosis* was based firmly in his theology of the cross. The Passion of Christ was the Christian's exemplar, which must be followed to return to one's origin and end, union with God. Before that time, the human soul suffers inquietude, even in contemplation, as it continues to fight the battle with Satan, until one finally returns home and is no longer an alien, but is embraced by God on the eighth day, the final Sabbath and image of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, with which Jordan closed his *Opus Postillarum*, when we will finally be at rest, in perfect peace, and when we will perfectly love and praise God, in the end, without end.[65]

VI. Jordan and Late Medieval Theology

It would be easy to view Jordan as a typical example of late medieval, semi-Pelagian, *Frömmigkeitstheologie*, as did essentially Martin Elze in a very superficial reading of Jordan's *Meditationes de Passione Christi*.[66] Such an interpretation, however, misses the boat.

[62] Romana GUARIENERI, Il movimento del Libero Spirito. In *Archivio Italiano per la storia della pietà* 4 (1965), 351-708; Robert E. LERNER, *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages*. Berkeley 1972.

[63] Sermons 50-52 of Jordan's *Opus Jor* are designated in the Vatican manuscript as a *Tractatus filiatione divina*, Vat. Lat. 448, fol. 97^{rb}-106ra; "Nos vero esse quidem possumus in eis [*scil.* persone Trinitatis] unum, unum tamen cum eis esse non possumus quia unius substantie nos et ipsi non sumus, sic autem in nobis vel nos in illis ut illi unum sunt in natura sua, nos autem unum in nostra. Sunt quippe ipsi in nobis sicut deus in templo, sumus autem nos in illis sicut creatura in creatore suo. Ideo ergo addit in nobis quod unum efficimur fidelissima caritate gratie dei tribuendum esse, non nobis. Ista ergo unio accipienda est secundum conformitatem affectum et transformationem amoris." Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Tractatus de filiatione divina*, *Opus Jor*, sermo 51, Vat. lat. 448, fol. 101va.

[64] "Nos igitur per sanguinem Iesu Christi adoptionis filii effecti confidenter clamamus Abba pater, secundum Apostolum ad Galatas quarto [Gal. 4:6]. Audenter ergo dicere possumus pater noster. JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, Berlin, StB, MS theol. lat. qu. 175, fol. 73va.

[65] JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Opus Postillarum*, sermo 460 (ed. Strassburg, 1483); cf. JORDAN OF QUEDLINBURG, *Expositio Orationis Dominice*, lectio 2, Berlin, StB MS theol. lat. qu. 175, fol. 75va; Aug. civ. 22,30 (866,145-148).

[66] Martin ELZE, *Das Verständnis der Passion Jesu im ausgehenden Mittelalter und bei Luther. In Geist und Geschichte der Reformation. Festgabe Hanns Rückert zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. K. SCHOLDER (Berlin, 1966), 127-151.

The original controversy between Augustine and Pelagius *cum suis* concerned pastoral as much as academic theology. At some point, however, the names of the participants became abstracted to signify theological positions, rarefied into the substantive nouns of 'Augustinianism' and 'Pelagianism' existing in the realm of theological debate when pastoral theology was often ignored, though always lurking underneath. Throwing around theological labels to damn one's opponents somehow got away from the pastoral issue of how the Christian is to live a Christian life. The relationship between predestination, grace, and good works, doctrines placed in an order of which Jordan would have approved, was based on how one viewed the effects of the Fall, and the impact of original sin. Jordan was clear: the fall of Adam and Eve had distorted all of creation, and even if free will remained, humans on their own could only wallow in sin, unable to do otherwise. In our portrayals of the theology of the later Middle Ages, that of Jordan should not be overlooked, as it has been for too long. *Sentences* commentaries were wonderful intellectual constructs, but the flesh and blood of theology is to be found in the pastoral theology designed for teaching, in Jordan's terms, what it is exactly that humans owe God in the battle between God and the devil. In the trenches, the labels had little or no meaning; the issues signified by the '–isms' did indeed. One would err if one refrained from describing Jordan's theology as *Frömmigkeitstheologie*, as much as one would, were one to claim it as semi-Pelagian. Jordan knew the lay of the land, and that the Christian lived in the ontological tension of being an alien, caught between the *esse nature* and *esse glorie*, which only the *esse gratie* could bridge, and even so, only partially as long as the battle continued. In such a cosmic conflict, good works were essential, as the weapons to fight the forces of Satan. What distinguished the theology of Jordan from that of his younger confrère, the doctor *operum bonorum*, Martin Luther, was not the issue of Pelagianism or Anti-Pelagianism, but rather the historical context and philosophical presuppositions, not to mention personal style. Times had changed indeed from the fourteenth to the early sixteenth century, yet the battle remained, as did the fundamental questions. What Luther had to fight so hard to discover, Jordan already knew: the righteous, loving God, evidenced most of all, most similar to Luther, in Jordan's *theologia crucis*. The question to which Jordan addressed his sermons, was now what? Having realized that the Christian is the adopted son of God, predestined for glory, a member of the eternal city of God, what now in the temporal campaign against the diabolical? Jordan offered a moral answer, though one not without theological implications,

whereas Luther proposed a theological answer, though one not without moral implications. Somehow for both Jordan and Luther, not to mention Calvin, to reduce the issues to the academic realm of substantive adjectives fails to capture the depth and the import of the historical situation. Luther lived in the last days, which for Jordan lay still in the future.[67] Yet both Augustinian friars were intimately involved in their societies, concerned most of all for the salvation of the souls of their flocks and in preserving the majesty of God and the lordship of Christ.

If the Church is best described by the formula *Ecclesia reformata semper reformanda*, the Pelagian/Anti-Pelagian debate is by the phrase *Questio determinata semper determinanda*. It is an on-going struggle, one that must be answered ever anew, which is every moment. And herein lies the continued relevance of Augustine, for the fifth century, the fourteenth century, and the sixteenth century, no less than for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; for 412 CE, no less than for 1365 or 1517, or 1938, or 2001. The challenge of Pelagius must never be forgotten, nor dismissed as a heresy long since condemned to oblivion, used only to stigmatize one's adversaries. It must be struggled with ever anew, with ever new answers to the issues it raised, for it penetrates to the very heart of the Christian life, and how one is to live *coram deo*. Such answers were given, which merit remembering not only as historical artifacts, but also in the on-going discussion, in the sermons of Jordan of Quedlinburg, a fourteenth-century Augustinian friar, a son of Augustine, who upheld divine love as the unifying, healing, and salvific factor of the Christian life lived between God and the devil, when it is infinitely difficult to know or to recognize the demarcation of the forces within the *corpus permixtum*, aside from the eternal, Augustinian doctrine of divine love revealed in the cross of Christ. If only Burnaby had been right!

E.L. Saak

[67] See OBERMAN, *Luther. Mensch Zwischen Gott und Teufel* (Berlin, 1982); Jordan composed sermo 455 of his *Opus Postillarum*, part of three sermons, 455-457 comprising his *Expositio de Antichristo*, in 1365, in which he he affirmed the Antichrist had not yet made his appearance.

GREGOR, HUGOLIN UND DER JUNGE LUTHER

Der derzeitige Stand der Pelagius-Forschung macht es auch für einen protestantischen Kirchenhistoriker unmöglich, ähnlich unbefangen wie seine Vorgänger in früheren Generationen die Urteile zu übernehmen, die Augustin in seinen späten Jahren über Pelagius und über Julian von Aeclanum fällte. Er wird 'pelagianisch' oder 'semipelagianisch' nur noch in Anführungszeichen denken und niederschreiben wollen. Doch auch den, der über die Berechtigung von Vorwürfen viel differenzierter zu denken gelernt hat, lädt die im doppelten Wortsinne ungeheure – gewaltige und bedrohliche – Wirkungsgeschichte der Kontroverse noch dazu ein, ihr nachzudenken. Stellungnahmen von drei Autoren aus dem vierzehnten und dem beginnenden sechzehnten Jahrhundert sollen hier dargestellt werden, Aussagen der Hochschullehrer aus dem Orden der Augustinereremiten Gregor von Rimini, Hugolin von Orvieto und Martin Luther. Bei Luther beschränke ich mich wegen der günstigen Forschungslage auf einige ausgewählte Stellungnahmen in seinen frühen Wirkungsjahren. Das geschieht in dem Bewusstsein, dass eigentlich Beiträge über Bonaventura, Johannes Duns Scotus, Wilhelm von Ockham, Petrus Aureoli, Thomas Bradwardine, Thomas Buckingham, Jean de Mirecourt einerseits, über Luther in seinen späteren Jahren und über Calvin in diesem Bande nicht fehlen dürften.

Gregor von Rimini war wohl der profilierteste Antipelagianer des späten Mittelalters. Neben dem offiziellen Ordenslehrer Aegidius von Rom spielte er im Orden der Augustinereremiten eine wichtige Rolle, mit Sicherheit als Universaliennominalist, aber auch als Verfechter einer Gnadenlehre, die sich an Augustins später Position orientierte. Für die Lutherforschung ist Gregor von Rimini deswegen von besonderer Bedeutung, weil Luther dann, wenn er den Kommentar Gregors zu den ersten beiden Büchern der Sentenzen des Lombarden nicht schon vor der Leipziger Disputation im Jahre 1519 gekannt hat, doch durch Johann Eck bei dieser Gelegenheit auf dieses Werk aufmerksam gemacht worden ist, das Luthers eigene Aussagen stützen konnte. Hugolin von Orvieto war innerhalb des Augustinereremitenordens minder profiliert als Gregor. Aber auch er gehörte zu den spätmittelalterlichen Theologen, die bewusst antipelagianisch lehren wollten. Für Martin Luther schließlich spielte es eine große Rolle, dass Augustins antipelagianische Schriften die Ergebnisse bestätigten, zu denen er selbst bei der Exegese der Psalmen und einiger Briefe des Apostels Paulus gekommen war. Luther vertrat denn auch sowohl vor seinen Studenten im Hörsaal als auch in der

Auseinandersetzung mit Johann Eck aus Ingolstadt und danach mit Erasmus von Rotterdam eine entschieden antipelagianische Position.

Die Frage, um die es in den Kontroversen ging, die in der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts an der theologischen Fakultät der Universität Paris ausgefochten wurden, war von großer Bedeutung für die Grundlegung der Ethik: Kann allein ein Christ, dessen Verhältnis zu Gott ungetrübt ist, ethisch gut handeln, oder kann das auch der Todsünder, der Heide, der Moslim, der Jude? Für Luther stand dann im 16. Jahrhundert nicht so sehr die Grundlegung der Ethik im Vordergrund als vielmehr die Heilssicherheit: Heil erwartete er allein von Gottes Gnade, nicht aber auf der Basis eines Zusammenwirkens zwischen Gott und dem Menschen.

1. Was steckt hinter dem Vorwurf des Pelagianismus: Aufrechte Empörung oder akademischer Ehrgeiz?

Wenn ein Theologe des 14. Jahrhunderts in Paris im Rahmen seiner Sentenzenlesung den Vorwurf erhob, ein anderer Theologe sei in die Ketzerei des Pelagius zurückgefallen, kann nicht von vornherein ausgeschlossen werden, dass er das unter anderem auch deswegen tat, weil er Aufmerksamkeit erregen wollte. An der theologischen Fakultät der in ganz Europa berühmten Universität Paris die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus kommentiert zu haben stellte ja im 14. Jahrhundert den Höhepunkt der akademischen Laufbahn eines Theologen dar. Sich an diesem Ort für ein akademisches Lehramt qualifiziert zu haben, verschaffte Ansehen und Vorteile für eine kirchliche oder sonstige gesellschaftliche Karriere. Es galt dabei einen guten Eindruck zu hinterlassen, sowohl durch Orthodoxie als auch durch Originalität. Zumindest das Letztere war gar nicht einfach. Ungefähr im Jahre 1240 waren die 'Sententiae' das Textbuch für den theologischen Unterricht schlechthin geworden. Originell zu sein war also hundert Jahre später schwierig geworden. Statt den Text des Lombarden auszulegen, formulierten die vielversprechenden Nachwuchs-Theologen nun Fragen, die sich mehr oder weniger nahe daran anlehnten. Und nicht selten verloren sie sich in Subtilitäten, wie es der (positiv gemeinte) Ehrenname des Jean de Ripa OFM 'doctor supersubtilis' verrät.

Als beispielsweise die beiden Universitätsgelehrten aus dem Orden der Augustinereremiten Gregor von Rimini und Hugolin von Orvieto im Rahmen ihrer Vorlesungen über die Sentenzen des Lombarden in der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts behaupteten, andere Theo-

logen seien Pelagianer, wollten sie dadurch vermutlich ihre eigene Rechtgläubigkeit um so leuchtender herausstellen und für die Orthodoxie an der Universität Paris eintreten. Gregor von Rimini und Hugolin von Orvieto nannten ihre jeweiligen Gegner nicht beim Namen, und sie beschränkten ihre Angriffe auf bereits Verstorbene. Auf diese Weise vermieden sie es, allzu viel Anstoß zu erregen. Der Wunsch, bei den Studierenden Interesse zu wecken, mag aber selbst bei diesen Eiferern für Augustins Gnadenlehre mitgespielt haben. Gregor und Hugolin mussten sich profilieren. War doch die Konkurrenz groß: gleichzeitig mit ihnen lasen auch die 'baccalaurei sententiarii' anderer Orden sowie Weltgeistliche in Paris die Vorlesung über die Sentenzen. Hugolin von Orvieto beispielsweise hatte gleichzeitig neun solcher Konkurrenten. In den Bettelorden durften in der Regel nur solche Bewerber in Paris über die Sentenzen lesen, die diese Aufgabe bereits andernorts mit Erfolg hinter sich gebracht hatten.[1] Der handfeste Vorwurf, Andersdenkende seien in die verurteilte Ketzerei des Pelagius zurückgefallen, versprach die nötige Aufmerksamkeit unter den Studierenden zu erregen.

Die Universität Wittenberg, an der Martin Luther wirkte, war viel weniger bedeutend als die von Paris. Besaß diese in der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts eine gesamteuropäische Ausstrahlung, so waren im Laufe des 15. Jahrhunderts zahlreiche Landesuniversitäten gegründet worden. Die erst 1502 gegründete Universität Wittenberg musste ihre Daseinsberechtigung zu dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem Luther dort zu wirken begann, erst noch beweisen. Der Wirbel um den aufsehenerregenden Professor Martin Luther lockte zahlreiche Studenten in die kleine Stadt, von der man damals sagte, sie liege am Rande der Zivilisation. Freilich blieb Luther mit seiner Kritik nicht im Rahmen dessen, was einem Hochschullehrer zugestanden war, und so verlor sein Landesherr Johann Friedrich nach dem verlorenen Schmalkaldischen Krieg denn auch den Kurkreis mit Stadt und Universität Wittenberg.

Luther erhob den Vorwurf des Rückfalls in die verurteilte pelagianische Ketzerei nicht im Zusammenhang seiner Vorlesung über die Sentenzen. Er beschuldigte verstorbene und zeitgenössische Theologen dessen erst später im Verlauf seiner Karriere, als Professor der Theologie in akademischen Disputationen und Vorlesungen. Eine Überschätzung der Fähigkeiten des Menschen vor Gott kennzeichnete seiner Überzeugung nach die gesamte zeitgenössische Theologie.

[1] Vgl. VENÍCIO MARCOLINO, *Der Augustinertheologe an der Universität Paris*, in: Heiko A. OBERMAN (Hg.), *Gregor von Rimini. Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, Berlin 1981 [SuR 20], 127-194, hier: 149-150.

Auch Luther griff Verstorbene an, aber im Unterschied zu seinen Ordensbrüdern des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts nannte er sie beim Namen. Der Buchdruck schließlich verbreitete seine Auffassungen weit über den akademischen Wirkungskreis hinaus und verlieh ihnen dadurch unerhörte Sprengkraft.[2]

2. Der Vorwurf des Pelagianismus bei Gregor von Rimini (†1358).

Im Orden der Augustinereremiten genoss Gregor von Rimini das Vorrecht, im Universitätsjahr 1343/1344 die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus kommentieren zu dürfen.[3] Gerade Gregor von Rimini diese Chance zu geben, dürfte auf dem Generalkapitel des Ordens 1341 in Toulouse beschlossen worden sein.[4] Er war bereits 1323 bis 1329 als Lektor in Paris gewesen und hatte danach in Bologna, Padua und Perugia gewirkt. Als er sich in Paris selbst auf seine Aufgabe vorbereiten durfte, las er im Blick auf diese Aufgabe ausgiebig in Augustins Werken.[5] Zur Frage, ob andere Theologen in die als Ketzerei verurteilten Auffassungen des Pelagius zurückgefallen seien, äußerte sich Gregor vor allem in seinem Kommentar zum zweiten Buch der Sentenzen, und zwar zu den Distinktionen 26-28. Schon der Lombarde selbst hatte in den 'Sententiae' an dieser Stelle Augustin ausgiebig angeführt, und zwar auch Aussagen aus dessen antipelagianischem Spätwerk 'Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum'. Es lag also nahe, gerade zu diesen Distinktionen der Frage nachzugehen, ob die Aussagen von Theologen, die in Geltung standen, den Anforderungen genügten, die Augustin hier formuliert hatte.

Gregor stellte die Fähigkeit des Menschen, 'moralisch gut' zu handeln, zur Debatte. Wenn er generalisierend von 'dem Menschen' redete, dann fasste er damit alle Menschen als Nachkommen Adams und Evas ins Auge. Präzise formulierte er, welche Bedingungen er voraussetzte: Ein Mensch handelt kraft seines freien Willens und seiner natürlichen Kräfte. Zur Seite steht ihm lediglich Gottes allgemein geltender Einfluß. Unter den 'natürlichen Kräften' verstand Gregor diejenigen Kräfte, die einem Menschen auch nach dem Sündenfall Adams und Evas noch geblieben sind, nicht etwa Adams Grundausstattung vor dem Fall. Er warf die Frage auf, ob ein Mensch

[2] Vgl. beispielsweise Berndt MOELLER, *Das Berühmtwerden Luthers*, in: *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 15 (1988), 65-92, und Berndt HAMM, *Die Reformation als Medienereignis*, in: *Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie* 11 (1996), 137-166.

[3] Vgl. MARCOLINO (wie Anm. 1), 170.

[4] Vgl. MARCOLINO (wie Anm. 1), 145.

[5] Vgl. MARCOLINO (wie Anm. 1), 151.

ohne eine spezielle Gnadenhilfe Gottes irgendeine Tat verrichten könne, die 'moralisch gut' genannt zu werden verdiene.[6] Gregor stellte damit die Frage, wie schwer die Folgen des Sündenfalls auf allen Menschen lasteten. Wozu ist der Mensch nach dem Sündenfall in seinem Erkennen, Wollen und Tun noch in der Lage? Kann er noch erfüllen, was Gott zu Recht von ihm fordert?

Gregor von Rimini bündelt die Argumentation derjenigen theologischen Gegner, die er als Pelagianer bekämpft. Nach seiner Darstellung führen sie für ihre Sicht der Fähigkeiten des Menschen drei Argumente ins Feld und stützen sie durch Zitate aus der Bibel, aus Hieronymus und aus Augustin:

1) Der Mensch kann die Gebote des Gesetzes aus natürlichen Kräften erfüllen. Also kann er auch aus natürlichen Kräften ein moralisch gutes Werk tun.
2) Nach dem Zeugnis der Heiligen Schrift hat Gott dem Menschen zahlreiche Gebote gegeben. Da Gott dem Menschen gebietet, gute Werke zu tun, muss er dazu in der Lage sein. Gott kann ja keine sinnlosen Gebote geben.
3) Wenn der Mensch solche Werke nicht tun könnte, dann würde niemand sündigen, der keine guten Taten täte.[7] Die als Pelagianer gebrandmarkten Theologen führen dafür Augustin selbst an.[8]

Gregor von Rimini bekämpft diese Berufung auf Augustin seinerseits mit einem Augustinzitat aus 'De praedestinatione sanctorum': „Keiner ist sich selbst genug, wenn es darum geht, ein gutes Werk zu beginnen oder zu vollenden. Vielmehr kommt für das Beginnen und für das Vollenden eines jeden guten Werkes 'unsere Tüchtigkeit von Gott'."[9] Gegen jene Ansichten, die er als erneuerten Pelagianismus

[6] Ich zitiere die kritische Ausgabe: GREGORII ARIMINENSIS (künftig abgekürzt zitiert als: Greg Arim) OESA *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, edd. A. DAMASUS TRAPP/ Venício MARCOLINO, Berlin/New York, 6 Bde. und Registerband, 1979-1987. Angegeben sind jeweils Bandzahl, Seitenzahl, Zeilenzählung. – GREG ARIM, *In 2 sent dist 26-28 q 1* (Bd. 6, 22, 12-14): "Utrum homo secundum praesentem statum, stante influentia dei generali, possit per liberum arbitrium et naturalia eius absque speciali dei auxilio agere aliquem actum moraliter bonum." – Die "quaestio 1 additionalis", abgedruckt auf den Seiten 17-22 der modernen Edition, ist fast wortwörtlich identisch mit dem Textus ordinarius und bleibt deswegen außer Betracht.

[7] Greg Arim, In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 (Bd. 6, 22, 22 - 23, 17).

[8] GREG ARIM, In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 (Bd. 6, 23, 15-16) zitiert Augustin, De duabus animabus 12, 17 (PL 42, 107).

[9] GREG ARIM, In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 ad opp (Bd. 6, 23, 19-22) zitiert Augustin, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 2, 5 (PL 44, 963). Augustin seinerseits zitiert 2. Kor. 3, 5.

brandmarkt,[10] will er beweisen, dass der Mensch auf Gottes Gnade angewiesen ist.

Ein Vergleich macht deutlich, dass Gregor und die von ihm attackierten Gegner nicht dasselbe meinen, wenn sie von einer 'moralisch guten' Handlung sprechen. Die Anforderungen der von Gregor attackierten Theologen an eine moralisch gute Handlung unterscheiden sich grundlegend von denen, die er selbst stellt. In den Johannes Duns Scotus zugeschriebenen 'Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus' heißt es beispielsweise: Eine ethisch gute Handlung, die mit einer moralisch guten Handlung gleichbedeutend ist, kann auch der Ungläubige tun. Genügt es doch, dass diese Handlung der rechten Anweisung der Vernunft entspricht?[11] Petrus Aureoli unterschied so: Man kann auf zweierlei Weisen vollkommen tugendhaft sein. Die eine Weise erreicht nur ein Christ. Denn nur seine Taten sind auf das letzte Ziel ausgerichtet. Die andere Weise erreicht beispielsweise auch ein heidnischer Römer, der sein Leben für seine Vaterstadt Rom einsetzt. Petrus Aureoli nannte sowohl Aristoteles als auch Augustin als Autoritäten für Definitionen von Tugend. Er konstatierte durchaus, dass er mit der Sichtweise, die er sich zu Eigen machte, von Augustins Auffassung abwich. Doch das veranlasste ihn nicht dazu, den für ihn maßgeblichen Tugendbegriff des Aristoteles in Frage zu stellen. Im Unterschied zu diesen beiden Theologen stellte Gregor von Rimini die

[10] GREG ARIM, *In 2 sent dist 26-28 q 1* (Bd. 6, 23, 26-27. 29-24, 2): "plurimum dissonant a doctrina sanctorum et ab ecclesiasticis definitionibus faventque cuidam errori Pelagii condemnato ... ostendam aliam partem fuisse de articulis damnatis Pelagii, aut, si in aliquo discordat, magis deviare a catholica veritate quam dictum Pelagii, et ob hoc ipsam non esse ab aliquo catholico sustinendam ..." – Vgl. zu Gregors Gnadenlehre die Dissertation eines der Mitarbeiter an der kritischen Edition, Manuel Santos Noya, Die Sünden- und Gnadenlehre des Gregor von Rimini, Frankfurt am Main 1990 [Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 23, Bd. 388]. Santos Noya behauptet eine Unzeitgemäßheit Gregors und Hugolins: „Man kann die Entwicklung der Moraltheologie des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts als einen langsam, jedoch kontinuierlich fortschreitenden Prozess der Zurückdrängung des augustinischen Gottestotalitarismus zugunsten einer zunehmenden Bewusstwerdung der moralischen Autonomie des Menschen beschreiben." (52) Ferner: „Obwohl die meisten Autoren sich in diesem Punkt nicht so dezidiert wie Durandus und Ockham äußern, kann man behaupten, dass eine weitgehende Trennung zwischen Religion und Moral, zwischen den Verhaltensregeln des Glaubens und denen der Vernunft, zum allgemeinen Lehrgut der Moraltheologie in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts gehört." (56)

[11] WADDING, Bd. DUNS SCOTUS, *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus q 3 no 11* (ed. 3, Lyon 1639, 452b/453a): "Et haec bonitas est duplex, et sic actus bonus est duplex, scilicet ethicus et ecclesiasticus. Actus ethicus dicitur actus elicitus secundum rectum dictamen rationis, cum omnibus circumstantiis debitis inesse actui. Et isto modo potest tam fidelis quam infidelis elicere actum bonum moraliter ..."

folgenden Forderungen an eine Handlung, die er als 'moralisch gut' anzuerkennen bereit war: Wer moralisch gut handeln will, muss Gott um Gottes selbst willen entweder aktuell oder habituell lieben. Durch den Sündenfall ist jedoch allen Menschen die Fähigkeit dazu verloren gegangen. Diese ererbte Unfähigkeit aller Nachkommen des ersten Menschenpaares ist nach dem Sündenfall verdiente Strafe. Die Fähigkeit zur Gottesliebe kann nur Gott und muss demnach auch Gott selbst einem Menschen erneut schenken, damit dieser moralisch gut handeln kann. Demnach kann niemand die erste Gnade verdienen, nicht einmal 'de congruo'.[12] Gott selbst muss jeweils neu durch eine spezielle Gnadenhilfe den Menschen unterstützen, damit dieser moralisch gut handeln kann, fordert Gregor. Taten von Heiden sind schlecht und verkehrt, ganz gleich, wie man sie nennen mag. Ein Römer, der sein Leben für sein Vaterland gibt, erlangt zwar irdischen Ruhm, aber tugendhaft genannt zu werden verdient er nach Gregors Auffassung nicht. Soll eine Handlung darüber hinaus Verdienst bei Gott erwerben, dann muss Gott selbst dem, der sie tut, zuvor die rechtfertigende Gnade geschenkt haben.

Als Universaliennominalist dachte Gregor von Rimini viel stärker vom einzelnen Akt her als die meisten von ihm kritisierten Theologen, die davon ausgehen, dass Gott einen bestimmten 'habitus' verleihe. Gregor vermied es zwar nicht, von einem 'habitus' zu reden. Aber den Akzent setzte er doch ganz deutlich auf die für jeden moralisch guten Akt jeweils neue Gnadenhilfe Gottes.

Gregor war sich dessen bewusst, dass er eine Position vertrat, die seit Augustin wieder weitgehend in Vergessenheit geraten ist. Er warf seinen Gegnern vor, sie irrten schlimmer als Pelagius selbst. Habe dieser doch immerhin noch zugegeben, dass der Mensch auf die Offenbarung Gottes angewiesen sei, um zu erfahren, was er wollen und was er tun solle.[13] Die – nicht mit Namen genannten – Gegner dagegen meinten, der Mensch brauche Gottes Hilfe nicht einmal dafür, zu erkennen, was Gott ihm gebiete. Gregor war nicht der erste, der diesen Vorwurf erhebt, zeitgenössische Theologen seien ärger als der Erzketzer Pelagius. Schon der Kanzler der Universität Oxford, der in dieser Funktion über deren Rechtgläubigkeit wachen musste, Johannes Lutterell, hatte Wilhelm von Ockham vorgeworfen, er sei ein Pelagianer. Und die päpstliche Untersuchungskommission hatte

[12] Vgl. GREG ARIM, *In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 art 1* (Bd. 6, 32, 2-14).

[13] Vgl. GREG ARIM, *In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 art 2* (Bd. 6, 58, 17-31; 59, 1f. 6-31; 61, 17-22).

dann gegen Ockham den Vorwurf erhoben, den Gregor nun seinen ungenannten Gegnern macht, er irre sogar noch schlimmer als Pelagius.[14]

Als „einen gewissen modernen [Autor]" attackierte Gregor Aussagen des Adam Wodeham. Dieser habe die Ansichten des Pelagius vergröbert und sei deswegen in dessen Irrtum verfallen. Wenn er nur betone, es stehe Gott ja frei, gute Werke als verdienstlich zu akzeptieren oder auch nicht, meine Adam Wodeham bereits der pelagianischen Irrlehre entkommen zu sein. Er vertrete die These, ein Mensch könne aus natürlichen Kräften Gottes Gebote erfüllen.[15] Damit stehe Adam Wodeham auch keineswegs allein. In der Tat kann sich Adam beispielsweise auf Duns Scotus berufen, der gegen Bonaventura folgendermaßen polemisiert hatte: Wenn man Todsündern sage, wer nicht aus der caritas heraus handeln könne, der sündige, dann nehme man den Todsündern allen Mut. Diese Sorge, Todsünder zu entmutigen, teilte Gregor von Rimini nicht.

Ohne beide mit Namen zu nennen, attackierte Gregor ferner Johannes Duns Scotus und Wilhelm von Ockham. Von Duns zitierte er die Aussage, der sündige Mensch könne allein aus natürlichen Kräften Furchtreue (attritio) hegen und damit die Voraussetzung schaffen, sein Verhältnis zu Gott wieder zu bereinigen. Einmal mehr sind die Voraussetzungen jedoch verschieden. Denn um Furchtreue zu empfinden, bedarf es laut Duns nicht der 'Liebe zu Gott über alles'. Vielmehr verleiht Gott dem, der bloß Furchtreue empfindet, die 'dilectio dei super omnia' und macht dadurch aus der bloßen Furchtreue echte Reue.[16]

Gregor behauptete ferner, Ockham lehre, dass der Mensch auch nach dem Fall aus natürlichen Kräften Gott über alles lieben und folglich moralisch gut handeln kann.[17] Doch redete Gregor damit auf ähnliche Weise an Ockhams Intention vorbei, wie er es bei Duns

[14] Vgl. BERNDT HAMM, *Promissio, pactum, ordinatio*, Tübingen 1977 [Beiträge zur historischen Theologie; 54], 365 und Anm. 107. – Zur Position des Thomas Bradwardine vgl. Heiko A. OBERMAN, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine. A fourteenth century Augustinian.* A study of his theology in its historical context, Utrecht 1957.

[15] Vgl. GREG ARIM, *In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 art 2* (Bd. 6, 60, 11-28).

[16] Vgl. Christoph Peter BURGER, *Der Augustinschüler gegen die modernen Pelagianer: Das 'auxilium speciale dei' in der Gnadenlehre Gregors von Rimini,* in: Heiko A. OBERMAN (Hg.), Gregor von Rimini (wie Anm. 1), 195-240, hier: 213-214.

[17] Vgl. Greg Arim, In 2 Sent dist 26-28 q 1 art 3 (Bd. 6, 65, 3-6). Gregor von Rimini referiert Ockham In 1 Sent dist 1 q 2 concl 1 (Opera theologica, ed. Gál, Bd. 1, 1967, 397, 14 – 398, 10).

Scotus getan hat. Ockham stellt sehr viel bescheidenere Forderungen als Gregor an eine Handlung, die als gut gelten kann. Die 'antipelagianische' Sicherung gegen jede Überschätzung menschlicher Möglichkeiten bringt Ockham in Gottes Freiheit an, eine Handlung zu akzeptieren oder auch nicht.[18]

Gregor von Rimini zitiert die Aussagen derjenigen Theologen, die er des Rückfalls in die Ketzerei des Pelagius zeiht. Aber er nennt ihre Namen nicht. Ich halte es nicht für sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die Studenten diese Ansichten irgendwann im Laufe ihres Studiums schon einmal gehört hatten und erkannten, wen er meinte. Dann aber wird annehmbar, dass Gregor aus Überzeugung die Ansichten des späten Augustin vertrat und allenfalls in zweiter Linie deswegen polemisiert hat, weil er als hoffnungsvoller Nachwuchstheologe auch Aufsehen erregen wollte.

3. Der Vorwurf des Pelagianismus bei Hugolin von Orvieto (um 1300 – 1373).

Hugolin von Orvieto studierte von 1334 bis 1338 in Paris Theologie und las dort über die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus im Studienjahr 1348/49, also fünf Jahre nach Gregor. 1364 gehörte er zu den Begründern der theologischen Fakultät der Universität Bologna. 1368 wurde er zum Ordensgeneral ernannt. 1371 wurde er Administrator des Bistums Rimini. Ihm wurde der Titel eines Patriarchen von Konstantinopel verliehen.[19]

Hugolin geht im Rahmen seines Sentenzenkommentars zweimal ausführlich auf die Frage ein, ob ein Mensch nach dem Sündenfall die doppelte Forderung Gottes, ihn selbst und seinen Nächsten zu lieben, allein aus natürlichen Kräften erfüllen könne oder ob er dazu auf die Gnade Gottes angewiesen sei.[20] In den 'Principia', den feier-

[18] Vgl. BURGER (wie Anm. 16), 215.

[19] Zur Rezeption des Sentenzenkommentars Hugolins im 14. Jahrhundert und zu den wichtigsten Werken der Sekundärliteratur vgl. das Vorwort des Editors Willigis Eckermann zum ersten Band der kritischen Ausgabe des Sentenzenkommentars: *Hugolini de Urbe Veteri OESA Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum*. Tomus Primus [Cassiciacum Supplement-Bd. 8], Würzburg 1980, V-IX. Ich zitiere auch hier wie bei der Edition des Kommentars Gregors Bandzahl, Seitenzahl, Zeilenzahl.

[20] HUGOLIN, *In 2 Sent d 26 q unica* (Bd. 3, 397-422) unter der Überschrift: "Utrum viator possit dilectione finita ex puris naturalibus frui deo?", und: In 3 Sent. d 27 q unica (Bd. 4, 95-109) unter der Überschrift: "Utrum praeceptum de dilectione dei possit implere viator carens caritate?"

lichen Vorlesungen, mit denen jeweils die Kommentierung eines der vier Bücher der Sentenzen eröffnet wurde, erörterte Hugolin mehrfach, welche Fähigkeiten der menschliche Wille auch nach dem Sündenfall noch besitze und in welcher Form Gott den menschlichen Willen beeinflusse. Darüber wurde damals in Paris lebhaft diskutiert. Hatte nun Thomas Bradwardine recht, der die Gnade Gottes so stark herausstellte, oder vielmehr Thomas Buckingham, der eine mittlere Position vertrat und Bradwardine beschuldigte, er sei ein Determinist? Um der Diskussion, die manchen zu heftig verlief, ein Ende zu machen, wurde 1347 der Zisterzienser Mirecourt verurteilt.[21] Ihm wurde unterstellt, er habe behauptet, Gott sei Urheber der Sünde. Mirecourt wehrte sich: Er habe nur sagen wollen, die Kraft zum Tun des Guten wie des Bösen habe der Mensch von Gott.[22] In seiner Einleitung zur Kommentierung des ersten Sentenzenbuches differenzierte Hugolin noch zwischen den Positionen Bradwardines und Mirecourts. In der Einleitung zum zweiten Buch dagegen behauptete er schon vereinfachend, die Verurteilung Mirecourts treffe auch Bradwardine. Noch Jahre später, als Hugolin die Statuten der theologischen Fakultät von Bologna redigierte, war ihm die Gefahr eines theologischen Determinismus so gegenwärtig, dass er in diese Statuten eine ganze Reihe von abzuweisenden Irrtümern aufnahm, die er schon in seiner Sentenzenlesung als Irrtümer Mirecourts abgelehnt hatte.[23]

Mit noch mehr Eifer aber stritt Hugolin gegen diejenigen, die seiner Auffassung nach die Fähigkeiten des menschlichen Willens, das Gute zu tun, überschätzten. Um weder Determinist zu sein noch die Kraft des menschlichen freien Willens zu überschätzen, fand er die folgende Lösung: Gottes allgemeiner Einfluss (communis influentia) ist Teilursache des Guten wie des Bösen, da er alles Tun überhaupt erst ermöglicht. Zum Tun des Guten aber ist der Mensch ungleich stärker auf Gottes Hilfe angewiesen als zum Tun des Bösen. Für seine bösen Taten ist er ganz und gar verantwortlich. Des Menschen Wille ist hierfür die „ganze und zureichende" Teilursache: *causa partialis,*

[21] Vgl. William J. COURTENAY, *John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past*, in: RThAM 39 (1972), 224-256, und RThAM 40 (1973), 147-174; hier: 150 und 173-174 mit Anm. 186.

[22] Vgl. Friedrich STEGMÜLLER, *Die zwei Apologien des Jean de Mirecourt*, in: RThAM 5 (1933), 40-78 und 192-204; hier: 202, 15-19.

[23] Vgl. Christoph BURGER, *Freiheit zur Liebe ist Geschenk Gottes. Hugolin von Orvieto († 1373) als Schüler Augustins*, in: Kenneth HAGEN (Hg.), Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300-1650). Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of his Sixtieth Birthday, Leiden 1990, 21-40, hier: 26.

integra et sufficiens.[24] Seine guten Taten aber verdankt ein Mensch im Wesentlichen der Hilfe Gottes. Sein Wille ist in diesem Falle bloß halbe Teil-Mitursache: *semiconcausa partialis*.[25] Wie für Gregor von Rimini gilt auch für Hugolin, dass schon seine Definition der moralisch guten Handlung deutlich macht, dass er ganz und gar von der Gnade Gottes ausgeht: für gute Taten ist eine besondere Gnadenhilfe Gottes erforderlich. Zum ewigen Leben annehmbar wird der Mensch für Gott durch die angenehm machende Gnade. Ein Mensch, der wirklich gut handeln kann, muss Gott über alles und um seiner selbst willen lieben.[26] Vergleicht man die Aussagen Hugolins mit denen des Petrus Lombardus, der ja den Willen des Menschen ins Zentrum seiner an Augustin orientierten Aussagen gestellt hatte, so fällt auf, dass Hugolin die bleibende Angewiesenheit des menschlichen Willens auf Gottes Gnade ungleich stärker betont.[27] Hugolin kritisierte Ockham, ohne ihn zu nennen, während es in seiner Zeit eigentlich die Regel war, den angegriffenen Gegner beim Namen zu nennen.[28] Es geht ihm um die gleiche Aussage Ockhams, die auch Gregor von Rimini bereits angegriffen hatte: „Aus bloß natürlichen Kräften kann der Mensch sich vornehmen, Gott über alles zu lieben."[29] Wie Gregor von Rimini vor ihm sagte auch Hugolin: Kein Mensch kann ohne spezielle Hilfe Gottes auch nur erkennen, was er denn wollen sollte.[30]

[24] Vgl. HUGOLIN, *In 1 Sent, principium primum, quaestio, art 1* (Bd. 1, 12, 51-58).

[25] Ebd.

[26] Vgl. HUGOLIN, *In 2 Sent d 26 q unica art 1* (Bd. 3, 399, 79-81): A 'frui' idem sit sicut diligere summe gratis et tamquam finem omnium finium actu vel habitu praestitutum.

[27] HUGOLIN, *In 1 Sent, principium primum, quaestio, art 1* (Bd. 1, 13, 77-78): 'Quod qualitercumque voluntas causat, causat taliter in virtute primae causae'; error.

[28] Vgl. Manfred SCHULZE, *'Via Gregorii' in Forschung und Quellen*, in: Heiko A. OBERMAN (ed.), Gregor von Rimini (wie Anm. 1), 1-126; hier: 26: „Anderes konstatieren wir hingegen im Falle von Kritik und Ablehnung. Hier wird im 14. Jahrhundert mit auffallender Akribie zitiert und der im Text meist als *quidam* bezeichnete Opponent in der Regel vom Autor selbst am Rande der Textkolumne mit Name und Fundort angegeben. Hugolin schreibt, es handele sich um einen allgemein akzeptierten Satz."

[29] Vgl. HUGOLIN, *In 2 Sent d 26 q unica art 1* (Bd. 3, 401-402, 157-158): "Ex puris naturalibus potest homo dictare, quod deus est super omnia diligendus." – OCKHAM, *In 1 Sent d 1 q 2* (ed. Gál, Bd. 1, 397, 7-10): Adico primo quod obiecto fruibili ostenso voluntati per intellectum ... potest voluntas active elicere actum fruitionis, et hoc ex puris naturalibus, circa illud obiectum.

[30] Vgl. HUGOLIN *ebd.* (Bd. 3, 402, 158-160): Anullus in hac vita de lege communi potest cognoscere, quid recte volendum quoad vitam virtuosam sine speciali auxilio dei ...

Gott über alles zu lieben bedarf der Zustimmung des Glaubens. Diese Zustimmung aber kann niemand allein aus natürlichen Kräften besitzen. Sonst wäre der Glaube ja kein Geschenk Gottes – und Hugolin postuliert, dass dem so sei. Er beruft sich dafür auf Augustins Schrift "De praedestinatione sanctorum".[31] Hugolin versucht einer Überschätzung der Kraft des menschlichen Willens dadurch zu entkommen, dass er den Anteil des Willens an guten Taten als sehr geringfügig bezeichnet.

4. Der Vorwurf des Pelagianismus beim jungen Luther.

In der Lutherforschung hat es sich eingebürgert, die Mitte von Luthers Leben erst nach dem Jahr 1521 beginnen zu lassen, obwohl er damals bereits 38 Jahre alt war. Die Entdeckung der Werke des späten Augustinus und die entschiedene Stellungnahme in diesem Sinne, also die Entscheidung für einen konsequenten Anti-Pelagianismus, führte bei Luther auch zu einer deutlichen Stellungnahme gegen 'Pelagianismus' in der eigenen Zeit, den er zu sehen meinte. Welche Auffassung von Augustins Gnadenlehre Luther bei seinen Erfurter Klosterbrüdern und akademischen Lehrern kennen lernte, ist verständlicherweise eine leidenschaftlich umstrittene Frage.

Der Forscher aus dem Orden der Augustinermönche Adolar Zumkeller hat auf der Basis zahlreicher Artikel 1984 ein umfangreiches Werk publiziert, mit dem er beweisen wollte, dass in dem Orden, dem Luther und er selbst angehörten, auch zu Luthers Zeit eine streng antipelagianische Ausrichtung geherrscht hat. Schon die spätmittelalterlichen Augustinereremiten hätten die Werke des Menschen als vor Gott unzureichend betrachtet.[32] Meines Erachtens entspricht dies allerdings nicht der historischen Wirklichkeit. Denn wäre Luther schon in seiner Zeit im Erfurter Kloster gründlich anhand der antipelagianischen Schriften Augustins geschult worden, dann wäre seine reformatorische Entdeckung viel besser vorbereitet gewesen[33] Viel-

[31] Vgl. HUGOLIN *ebd.* (Bd. 3, 402-403, 177-187).

[32] Vgl. Adolar ZUMKELLER, *Das Ungenügen der menschlichen Werke bei den deutschen Predigern des Spätmittelalters*, in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 81 (1959), 265-305. Vgl. ferner von dems.: *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters*, Würzburg 1984. Vgl. dazu die Rezension von Christoph BURGER, in: ThLZ 111 (1986), 291-293.

[33] Das gilt trotz der Differenzen zwischen dem Verständnis der Rechtfertigung bei Augustin einerseits, bei den Reformatoren andererseits, das Berndt HAMM betont hat: *Was ist reformatorische Rechtfertigungslehre?*, in: Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 83 (1986), 1-38, hier: 6-15.

mehr las Luther während seiner theologischen Studien, die er vor allem in Erfurt trieb, von Augustin nur De trinitate, De civitate Dei, die Confessiones und Predigten[34] und entdeckte als Student in diesen Werken keine spezifisch antipelagianische Zuspitzung. Auch seine Lehrer vermittelten ihm diese nicht. Wäre es anders gewesen, dann wäre seine Behauptung, er habe sich in Wittenberg radikal neu orientieren müssen, völlig verfehlt, unabhängig davon, ob diese Neu-Orientierung nun als Umbruch oder als Ergebnis einer langsamen Entwicklung verstanden wird. Wie auch immer man seinen reformatorischen 'Durchbruch' datieren mag und welche Erkenntnisse man auch im Einzelnen dazu rechnen mag, eindeutig ist jedenfalls, dass Luther nach seiner Neuorientierung entschlossen war, nicht menschlichen Leistungen – in welcher Form der Mitwirkung mit Gottes Gnade auch immer –, sondern allein der Gnade Gottes entscheidendes Gewicht zuzubilligen. Seine eigene Paulus-Exegese fand Luther in den antipelagianischen Schriften Augustins weitgehend bestätigt. Erläuterte Luther doch den Römerbrief im akademischen Jahr 1515/16, den Galaterbrief 1516/17 und den Hebräerbrief, den er damals noch für einen echten Paulusbrief hielt, 1517/18. Er war begeistert von den Bänden sechs und acht innerhalb der elfbändigen Augustinus-Edition des Johannes Amerbach von 1504-1506, in dem die antipelagianischen Schriften zusammengestellt worden waren.[35] Er las (erstmals oder aber mit verändertem Verständnis) Augustins 'De spiritu et littera' und fand darin die Einsichten, zu denen er sich durchgerungen hatte, bestätigt. Ferner zog er 'De peccatorum meritis et remissione', 'Contra Iulianum' und 'De nuptiis et concupiscentia' heran.[36] Paulus-Lektüre und Augustin-Lektüre verstärkten einander gegenseitig.[37]

Einige Beispiele für Luthers Argumentation will ich herausgreifen: Einen Abschnitt aus seinen Notizen für seine Vorlesung über den Römerbrief, Aussagen über Erasmus in Briefen an Freunde und

[34] Vgl. Reinhard SCHWARZ, *Luther*, in: *Die Kirche in ihrer Geschichte*, Band 3, Lieferung I, Göttingen 1986, 18-19.

[35] Vgl. zu dieser Ausgabe Berndt HAMM, *Frömmigkeitstheologie am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts. Studien zu Johannes von Paltz und seinem Umkreis*, Tübingen 1982, 320-321 mit den Anmerkungen 115 und 116.

[36] SCHWARZ, *Luther* (wie Anm. 34), 33.

[37] Vgl. SCHWARZ, *Luther* (wie Anm. 34), „12. Mit Paulus und Augustin gegen die scholastische Theologie", 32-37. Älter, aber nach wie vor brauchbar, ist Leif GRANE, *Modus loquendi theologicus. Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie* (1515-1518), Leiden 1975.

einige Sätze aus seiner Nachbereitung der Leipziger Disputation im Jahre 1519, den Resolutiones.

Natürlich will niemand ein Pelagianer sein, und doch verfällt man in dessen Ketzerei, notierte Luther sich für seine Römerbriefvorlesung.[38] Zu Römer 1, 17, der für ihn laut seinem späten Selbstzeugnis so entscheidenden Aussage, in der von Gottes Gerechtigkeit die Rede ist, notierte Luther sich für die Studierenden: Augustinus hat in 'De spiritu et littera' dazu gesagt: „Deswegen wird sie 'Gerechtigkeit Gottes' genannt, weil Gott dadurch, dass er an ihr Anteil gibt, gerecht macht."[39] Er referierte, dass dem Menschen nach der Auffassung derjenigen Theologen, die er als 'Pelagianer' angriff, Liebe zu Gott über alle Dinge und eine gewisse Erfüllung der Gebote Gottes aus eigener Kraft möglich war mit der einzigen Einschränkung, dass nur der die Gebote Gottes wirklich nach der Intention Gottes erfüllen könne, der im Stande der Gnade sei. Wie zornig er darüber werden konnte, das zeigt sich daran, dass er am Schreibtisch in seine lateinischen Notizen für die akademische Vorlesung eine deutsche Verwünschung einflocht.[40] Sein Verständnis der Sünde verschärfte sich.[41] Wie sehr jeder Mensch auf Gottes Gnade angewiesen ist, das wird nach Luthers Ansicht unzureichend ernst genommen, wenn die verheerenden Wirkungen der Erbsünde verharmlost werden.

Im Herbst des Jahres 1516 schrieb er dem Humanisten Spalatin, seinem Vertrauensmann am kurfürstlichen Hofe, dieser möge doch Erasmus die Lektüre derjenigen antipelagianischen Schriften Augustins empfehlen, die er zur Vorbereitung seiner eigenen Vorlesung über den Römerbrief herangezogen hatte.[42] An seinen Ordensbruder Johann

[38] LUTHER, *Vorlesung über den Römerbrief*, Scholion zu Rm 14, 1, 1515/1516: "Nam etsi nunc nulli sunt Pelagiani professione et titulo, plurimi tamen sunt re vera et opinione, licet ignoranter ..." (WA 56, 502, 15).

[39] LUTHER, *Vorlesung über den Römerbrief*, Scholion zu Rm 1,17, 1515/1516 (WA 56, 172, 6-7). Luther zitiert Augustin, *De spiritu et littera* 11, 18 (PL 44, 211).

[40] LUTHER, Scholien zur Römerbriefvorlesung, 1515/1516 (WA 56, 274, 11-13): "Quocirca mera deliria sunt, que dicuntur, Quod homo ex viribus suis possit Deum diligere super omnia Et facere opera precepti secundum substantiam facti, Sed non ad Intentionem precipientis, quia non in gratia. O stulti, o Sawtheologen!" Weitere einschlägige Aussagen bei SCHWARTZ, *Luther* (wie Anm. 34), 34, Anm. 11. – Auf die Unterschiede zwischen Luthers schriftlichen Vorbereitungen auf die Vorlesungen und dem, was er seinen Studenten in der Vorlesung dann wirklich diktierte, hat Gabriele SCHMIDT-LAUBER hingewiesen: *Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief 1515/16. Ein Vergleich zwischen Luthers Manuskript und den studentischen Nachschriften*, Köln etc. 1994 [Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe; 6].

[41] Vgl. HAMM, *Was ist reformatorische Rechtfertigungslehre?* (wie Anm. 33), 15: „2. Die radikale Sünde", und SCHWARZ, *Luther* (wie Anm. 34), 34-35.

[42] Vgl. LUTHER, *Brief an Spalatin vom 19. Oktober 1516* (WABr 1, 70, 8-16).

Lang schrieb er, Erasmus habe Christus und die Gnade Gottes nicht genug betont.[43]

Im Jahre 1519 behauptete Luther in seinen ausführlichen Erläuterungen zur Leipziger Disputation, die scholastischen Theologen trieben es noch schlimmer als seinerzeit die Pelagianer: sie behaupteten, dem Menschen sei [trotz der Erbsünde] noch stets das Gebot der Vernunft deutlich.[44] Eine These Ecks nannte er rundheraus pelagianisch.[45] Wer behaupte, ein gutes Werk oder echte Buße anfangen zu können, bevor jemand noch die Sünden verabscheue oder die Gerechtigkeit liebe, der sei ein Pelagianer.[46]

Luther zog Aussagen aus Augustins antipelagianischen Schriften heran, um seine zeitgenössischen Gegner als ebenso schlimme oder gar noch schlimmere Ketzer verunglimpfen zu können als eben den Erzketzer Pelagius. Ihm ging es dabei freilich im Unterschied zu seinen Vorgängern im 14. Jahrhundert nicht so sehr um die Grundlegung der Ethik als vielmehr um die Heilsgewissheit überhaupt. Wenn der Mensch einen Beitrag dazu leisten muss, Gott zu lieben und ihm zu vertrauen, also: zu glauben, dann hielt Luther das für verhängnisvoll. Seiner Überzeugung nach muss vielmehr Gott selbst den Menschen derart verwandeln, dass dieser in die Lage versetzt wird, sich an seinem eigenen Ort zu sehen, dem Ort des Geschöpfs, statt selbst Gott sein zu wollen.

[43] LUTHER, *Brief an Johann Lang vom 1. März 1517* (WABr 1, 90, 18): "timeo, ne [Erasmus] Christum et gratiam Dei non satis promoveat ..."

[44] LUTHER, *Resolutiones Lutherianae super propositionibus suis Lipsiae disputatis*, 1519 (WA 2, 395, 3.5; vgl. 394, 34 und WA 6, 193, 5): "Scholastici ... super Pelagianos addunt, hominem habere dictamen naturale rectae rationis ..."

[45] LUTHER, *Resolutiones Lutherianae super propositionibus suis Lipsiae disputatis*, 1519 (WA 2, 410, 31. 32): "Eccii propositio ... ad haeresim pertinens Pelagianorum ..."

[46] LUTHER, *Resolutiones Lutherianae super propositionibus suis Lipsiae disputatis*, 1519 (WA 2, 421, 15-19. 25-26): "Qui opus bonum aut poenitentiam a peccatorum detestatione ante dilectionem iustitiae incipi nec in eo peccari asserit, hunc inter Pelagianos haereticos numeramus ... Est ergo expresse heresis Pelagiana dicere, penitentiam ante dilectionem iustitiae incipi."

5. Zusammenfassung.

Die zentrale Frage, um die es bei den Diskussionen der drei kurz dargestellten akademischen Theologen ging, war dieselbe wie die, die in der gleichzeitigen Katechese auch gestellt wird: Wie können Menschen das Doppelgebot der Liebe erfüllen?[47] Die drei Augustinertheologen meinten es jeder an seinem Ort und zu seiner Zeit bitter ernst, wenn sie gegen 'moderne Pelagianer' wetterten. Zugleich freilich differiert die Funktion des Vorwurfs, die Gegner seien Pelagianer, erheblich zwischen Gregor und Hugolin einerseits, Luther andererseits. Gregor und Hugolin attackierten ihre Gegner streng im Rahmen akademischer Theologie. Ihnen ging es darum, welche Handlungen als moralisch gut qualifiziert werden dürfen und ob der Mensch nach dem Sündenfall überhaupt noch dazu in der Lage sei. Die Vorwürfe, die sie erhoben, meinten sie ernst. Es waren nicht in erster Linie Versuche, Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen. Nicht umsonst bemühte sich Hugolin, sobald es in seiner Macht lag, Universitätsstatuten zu redigieren, seine Ablehnung eines theologischen Determinismus auch universitätspolitisch festzulegen. Luther reduzierte und konzentrierte diese Fragestellung nochmals auf das, was für ihn zentral war, auf den Glauben, durch den allein seiner Überzeugung nach ein Christ Gott als seinem Schöpfer, Erlöser und Heiligmacher entsprechen kann. Luthers Interesse verschob sich von der Gottes- und Nächstenliebe hin zum Glauben.[48] Er vertrat die Angewiesenheit des Menschen auf Gottes Gnade mit noch mehr Nachdruck als Gregor und Hugolin. Er meinte bei vielen Theologen eine Unterschätzung der Macht der Sünde feststellen zu müssen. Wenn dem tatsächlich so war, dann schätzten sie auch die Erlösung durch Christus zu wenig hoch. Damit aber stand für ihn das Fundament des Glaubens auf dem Spiel. Im Namen der Konzentration auf 'Christus allein' protestierte er gegen jede Mitwirkung des Menschen am Erlangen des Heils. Keine Rede auch nur vom freien Willen als von einer 'semiconcausa partialis' wie bei Hugolin. Keine Rede auch davon, dass der Wille mitwirken dürfe, wenn Gott den Anfang mache und die Vollendung

[47] Vgl. Christoph BURGER, *Gottesliebe, Erstes Gebot und menschliche Autonomie bei spätmittelalterlichen Theologen und bei Martin Luther*, in: *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 89. Jahrgang, 1992, 280-301.

[48] Vgl. Berndt HAMM, *Von der Gottesliebe des Mittelalters zum Glauben Luthers*. Ein Beitrag zur Bußgeschichte, in: Lutherjahrbuch 65, 1998, 19-44.

schenke, wie Erasmus von Rotterdam 1524 vorschlagen wird.[49] In Bezug auf die ewige Seligkeit wollte Luther einzig und allein von Gottes Gnade abhängig sein.

Christoph BURGER

[49] ERASMUS VON ROTTERDAM, *De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio*, IV, 8 (Ausgewählte Schriften, hg. von Werner Welzig, Bd. 4, Darmstadt 1969, 170 und 172). Zur Interpretation vgl. Cornelis AUGUSTIJN, *Erasmus und seine Theologie: Hatte Luther recht?*, in: DERS. (Hg.), *Erasmus. Der Humanist als Theologe und Kirchenreformer*, Leiden 1996, 293-310, und Christoph BURGER, *Erasmus' Auseinandersetzung mit Augustin im Streit mit Luther*, in: Leif GRANE, Alfred SCHINDLER und Markus WRIEDT (Hgg.): *Auctoritas Patrum. Zur Rezeption der Kirchenväter im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*. Mainz 1993. [Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz. Abteilung Abendländische Religionsgeschichte; Beiheft 37], 1-13.

FORTUNE OR FAILURE? THE PROBLEM OF GRACE, FREE WILL AND PROVIDENCE IN PETER ABELARD

I. Introduction: Peter Abelard and the problem of medieval rationalism.

In a wonderfully lucid and compelling essay, L.M. de Rijk, the Dutch expert in medieval logic, praises Peter Abelard not just for his natural ingenuity, but more precisely for the acuity of his talent, for what is called his *acumen ingenii*. Abelard lives by logic, according to De Rijk, with logic being as much a life's passion as an art for this masterdialectician.[1] Anyone who reads this essay and has a firsthand knowledge of De Rijk himself, will not be able to suppress at least a smile at this remark, as life and work of De Rijk himself show him to be a veritable Dutch Peter Abelard, radiating a similar passion for logic and philosophy. The entire essay then, which deals with Abelard's handling of universals as well as with his ethics, demonstrates how Abelard was able to pry open some of the toughest questions facing his generation. We could put things in an even broader context perhaps by saying that these very questions had in fact been handed down since late antiquity, since the time of Augustine and Boethius. They were merely beginning to get a new treatment in the twelfth century. But De Rijk goes further in his assessment, and we should heed his carefully formulated remarks here, as he sets out to argue how for Abelard logic is indispensable. In the last instance, so he summarizes his hero's intellectual position, logic acts as the judge in every philosophical or theological discussion, not because it is theological or philosophical but because it is *discussion*.[2]

One would perhaps expect De Rijk to end it here, as one can hardly expect a better insight in and more praise for Abelard's logical qualities than to point to his debating skills. But De Rijk pushes things further still, as he quotes from Abelard's fourth book on *Dialectic*. In it Abelard states explicitly that divine grace has conferred knowledge

[1] See L.M. DE RIJK, *Pierre Abélard (1079-1142). Scherpzinnigheid als hartstocht*, Akademie van Wetenschappen afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks 44 no. 4 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1980) 47pp. For a shorter reworking of this text in German, see L.M. DE RIJK, *Peter Abälard (1079-1142): Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns*, in: R. THOMAS e.a. (ed.), *Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung*. Trierer Theologische Studien Bd. 38 (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag) 125-138. Where applicable, I shall refer to both versions.

[2] See De Rijk, "Scherpzinnigheid", p. 46, „Meister und Opfer", p. 131.

of logic to only a few. According to De Rijk's interpretation here, while this comment is on the surface meant as a criticism of Bernard of Clairvaux and his companions, it derives its thrust from the fact that Abelard clearly sees logic as a kind of divine grace.[3] It even appears as if the importance of logic in Peter Abelard for De Rijk is oddly enhanced by seeing it as divine grace. It is at least intriguing that De Rijk has chosen to end his article precisely on this point. Despite all Abelard's vital ideas, which the essay has described at great length, a divine blessing at the end, like a nunc dimittis at the end of mass, is deemed indispensable. If not to bring out the force of Abelard's logic, then surely to communicate the revolutionary impact it had on his medieval contemporaries. Focusing on the structure of De Rijk's article in this way helps us to shed light on what is in fact a deeper seated problem, namely the problem how to assess the Christian nature of Abelard's thought. Although De Rijk stays clear from simplified abstractions, such as the view that Abelard was a medieval Voltaire, an iconoclastic forerunner of European Enlightenment thought, he nevertheless argues with full force that logic absorbs everything for Abelard, to the point even of taking priority over Scripture. Logic qualifies humans, more especially it qualifies Abelard's fierce intellect, as it provides him with the tools to interpret nature first, only thereafter to resort to the exegesis of Scripture, which requires explanation and interpretation.[4]

Still, one may ask whether De Rijk's analysis fully supports his own contentions. As an example we may look to his point of the subserviency of Scripture. As he walks us through much of the *Ethics*, De Rijk refers his readers periodically to the various passages which Abelard draws from Scripture, as if suggesting that these are helpful to the author to underline his chosen moral position. The reason Abelard can freely quote from Scripture, however, is not simply because these biblical examples offer us such nice illustrations of his arguments, but because they provide him with a useful summation of his ethical ideas, perhaps even originating them. In other words, they lie at the heart of his ideas, containing his arguments as if compressed in a nutshell. By allowing him to peel off the shell so as to bring out their relevance in full daylight, the scriptural examples appear to play a constructive, and perhaps even constitutive, role in the conception

[3] See De Rijk, "Scherpzinnigheid", p. 46, „Meister und Opfer", pp. 130-131.
[4] See De Rijk, "Scherpzinnigheid", p. 44.

and elaboration of his thoughts.[5] If the above insight is correct, it may not be so easy to distinguish between Abelard's use of the tool of logic on the one hand and his choice, on the other hand, to illustrate his arguments with the help of numerous biblical references. It is likewise difficult to detect a clear priority of Nature over Scripture.[6] This is not to claim that the order indicated here by de Rijk must be reversed. Rather, what I want to imply is that the whole concept of order in this respect may be problematic, as what we have before us here is more a continuous process of ordering, as Abelard feels himself sufficiently free to make his own arrangement of authorities and arguments (*rationes*) without being hampered by any preconceived notions of hierarchy.[7]

While De Rijk may have pushed too far in his enthusiasm to see Abelard as having received the gift of logic through the direct intervention of divine grace, he leaves us with an image of Bernard that is likewise not entirely convincing. For just as Abelard was able to work with Scripture in an astute manner which did not seem to countervail his proclaimed preference for Nature, so Bernard may have had more logic in him than Abelard, or De Rijk for that matter, may have ever deemed possible. For all Bernard's proclaimed preference for scriptural authority instead of rational arguments, when he finally meets his opponent, if only on paper, namely in the famed Letter 190, it seems his biblical quotations are neiter as accurate nor as pertinent

[5] It appears that in his selection of scriptural passages (e.g. about adultery in Matth. 5:28), as in his general choice of examples, there lurks an autobiographical undertone in Abelard's reasoning. It is not so much my concern here to find out whether this is deliberate or not, but rather to show how such examples give his reasoning in both the *Ethics* and the various *Planctus* a particular urgency, heightening the significance of these works. Below I shall quote Abelard's Ethics from D.E. LUSCOMBE (ed.), *Peter Abelard's Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), while the text of Abelard's *Planctus* is taken from W. MEYER, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur mittellateinischen Rhythmik* (1905; Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms-Verlag, 1970) 340-374.

[6] For an analysis of the relationship between Nature and Scripture in the twelfth century as a balanced one rather than one implying hierarchy, see W. OTTEN, *Nature and Scripture: Demise of a Medieval Analogy*, in Harvard Theological Review 88 (1995) 257-284.

[7] This idea of a continuous process of ordering aptly describes Abelard's own method of working. Aside from making the dating of his writings notoriously difficult, it brings up larger questions which the present article cannot address in depth. For a good evaluation of this problem, see C.J. MEWS, *On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard*, ADHLMA 52 (1985) 73-134; repr. in C.J. MEWS, *Abelard and his Legacy* (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 2001).

as those drummed up by Abelard in his *Ethics*.[8] What made Bernard triumph before the various ecclesiastical tribunals of his days clearly was not the weight of the evidence, neither rationally nor scripturally. Bernard's victory was due in part to his successful stategy of silencing his opponent before they could engage in outright battle, as De Rijk does not fail to point out. But it was likewise due to his clever maneuvering by which he was able to dwarf himself at every occasion in an attempt to beat his opponent precisely by pumping him up. With Bernard painting himself as a poor soul who is so inspired by love for Christ that his empathy leads to identification, Abelard is pushed into the role of an onlooker, a spectator of the suffering Christ, as the first step on the road to becoming his enemy.[9] While Abelard may claim that Bernard lacks grace, to use De Rijk's imagery, his handling of the Abelard file demonstrates how the acuity of mind of this Cistercian abbot is as great and passionate as that of his opponent.

While this may nuance our impressions of both Abelard and Bernard, it does not make our assessment of the Christian nature of Abelard's thought any easier. Was Abelard perhaps more Christian than previously thought and Bernard less Christian? That could indeed be the direction in which one needs to go if looking for a solution that might satisfactorily inform contemporary readers. But perhaps it is advisable not to go down that road at all. Perhaps a competition in the arena of orthodoxy is simply not the right approach. Instead, we may have to content ourselves with the fact that Bernard and Abelard, while fierce opponents on the outside, were closer in many respects than has previously been assumed.[10] Still, some of the

[8] On scriptural and patristic authority in Abelard and Bernard with specific reference to Letter 190, see M.B. PRANGER, *Sic et Non: Patristic Authority Between Refusal and Acceptance: Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux*, in I. BACKUS (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West. From the Carolingians to the Maurists* (Leiden: Brill, 1997) 165-193. On pp. 187-88 Pranger states: "Bernard's biblical references are no longer, or, more precisely, not yet 'Probestellen'. Their being quoted is supposed to have the reader participate in an ongoing discourse which, even if it is presented in the guise of an argument or debate, owes its continuity and consistency to the artful intentions and the manipulative skills of the writer."

[9] See Epistola 193, in: J. LECLERCQ, H. ROCHAIS (eds.), *S. Bernardi Opera Vol. VIII. Epistolae* (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1977) 44-45. In this short letter addressed to Ivo of Reims, Bernard portrays Abelard as directy attacking Christ: Homo est egrediens mensuram suam, in sapientia verbi evacuans virtutem crucis Christi.

[10] For a recent evaluation of their conflict set within its twelfth-century bounds, see P. GODMAN, *The Silent Masters. Latin Literature and Its Censors in the High Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 3-31.

concepts honed by De Rijk in his seminal essay can perhaps be used to shed more light on the identity and difference of logic and grace in Peter Abelard. Taking our starting-point in the concepts of logic and grace, we may then probe further into the complex set of problems that may well be seen as one of the perennial queries in Christian theology, namely the relationship between grace and free will. While this relationship, when put against the background of the history of Augustinianism, is more often than not treated as a non-relationship, with Augustine as the orthodox champion of grace and Pelagius as the dissenter trying to salvage free will, our introduction via De Rijk's essay has the advantage of offering us a more oblique, and hence a relatively fresh entry into this matter. We shall now turn, therefore, to the relationship between logic and grace.

II. Logic and grace: from Augustine to Peter Abelard.

By all available standards in Christian theology, logic and grace do not form a natural pair. Nor is their contrast one of natural opposites. Logic, or dialectic, can best be described as the art of words, the art by which one tries to achieve what may be called a verbal capturing of reality. Grace, on the other hand, especially when taken in the Augustinian sense of the word, has to do with divine intervention, often of a transcendent nature, by which one is shown that this reality is in the hand(s) of God. When extending the concept of grace to include the development of history, personal or collective, grace easily transforms into predestination. And predestination is that form of grace with which the later Augustine, under threat of the Pelagian heresy, became intensely preoccupied.[11] But before surrendering to such well-known stereotypes, let us look more closely to how De Rijk's Abelardian pair of logic and grace fits with its Augustinian original.

[11] While I am well aware that Pelagianism, when taken in a technical sense, only applies to the conflict between Augustine and his opponent Pelagius on the meaning and scope of divine grace, in the history of Christian thought the Pelagian conflict centering on the possibility of a sinless life has had a notable tendency to spill over into the conflict about predestination. The roots of this tendency can be found in Augustine himself, as he returned to the issue of predestination in the context of the second Pelagian controversy (418-430). See A. FITZGERALD O.S.A. (ed.), *Augustine Through the Ages. An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999) s.v. Pelagius and Pelagianism (E. TeSelle, 633-640); s.v. predestination (M. Lamberigts, 677-679, esp. 678).

When relating the concepts of logic and grace to a model that might have looked in any way familiar to Augustine, two suggestions for further reflection immediately present themselves. Taking one's starting-point in the concept of logic, one might be inclined at first sight to compare this model to the Augustinian pair of *scientia* and *sapientia*.[12] Undertaking such a comparison, one could interpret *scientia* as the equivalent of logic for Abelard, – not that they are in any way identical terms, with *scientia* pointing to Augustine's background in the encyclopedic culture of late antiquity and logic pointing ahead to the intellectual Aristotelianism that would follow Abelard –, while *sapientia* could be seen as indicating the kind of knowledge that is infused by divine grace. For Augustine, however, this meant at the same time that it was not possible that sapientia be fully attained in this life, as the very term was radiant with a kind of eschatological charge. Yet *sapientia* is something to which one should always aspire. There is a certain 'unearthly' ring to it, moreover, which made it especially valuable as an intellectual tool for Augustine. If one's *scientia* is not perfect, it can be compensated for by *studium sapientiae*,[13] which is nourished after all by fides as much as by ratio. In the case of *sapientia*, however, the addition of faith to knowledge has the effect of making human knowledge more effective, through a kind of transcendent shortcut, even though wisdom never transforms into a full-blown dependence on divine grace without retaining a firm basis in humanity's natural understanding.

Taking our starting-point in the notion of grace, on the other hand, we are naturally drawn to the earlier mentioned pair of grace and free will. The difficulty with this oppositional pair, which Augustine coined and fiercely defended under the mounting pressure of Pelagius and his supporters, such as Julian of Eclanum, is that it has so shaped our view of Christianity in the West that it is hard to come out from under its spell. If we try to nuance its importance to manageable proportions by comparing it to *scientia* and *sapientia*, it appears that the emphasis in the second pair is less on knowing than on acting, with Augustine especially interested in how to make human action

[12] On this distinction in Augustine's vocabulary, see H.I. MARROU, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (1958; Paris: Editions E. de Boccard, 1983) 561-569. See also E. GILSON, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1949) 149-163.

[13] See Marrou, *Saint Augustin*, p. 567, who sees *studium sapientiae* as a kind of middle term between *scientia* and *sapientia*.

conform to divine commandment.[14] With Augustine striving so radically to be in conformity with God's will, human free will becomes inevitably seen as a kind of aberration. It takes on a kind of randomness, reflecting a sort of arbitrary decision making suitable more to humanity's instincts than to its mind. Grace, on the other hand, becomes something of an actively guiding divine force, by which one is able to rein in one's instincts so as not to have these hamper the following of divine orders.

Following the above analysis, the anti-Pelagian tendency of his later thought appears to dominate the discussion on Augustine's ethical viewpoints to the point where his theology is often sketched as one in which the extreme reliance on grace tends to paralyze any creative, ethical speculation. This is reinforced by Augustine's own remarks. For the good life, so one commonly finds, is a life in which the person living it is a sojourner in this life, a pilgrim who, while travelling to his homeland, finds himself roaming in a so-called *regio dissimilitudinis*.[15] There is considerable doubt whether he can ever reach the homeland in this life, that is, whether the achievement of this goal must in the final analysis not be viewed as more eschatological, or psychological in an idealistic sense, rather than ethical. The ideal of the good life thus changes imperceptibly into the distant ideal of a beatific vision for Augustine. This may explain why Augustine shows so little interest in elaborating structural answers for concrete ethical questions,[16] with the single exception of the problem of lying – a problem found equally intriguing by Kant. His ultimate interest, so we

[14] Despite many indications to the contrary in Augustine's work, it is important to heed Christopher Kirwan's advice that 'belief in free decision of the will is the main philosophical difference between him (scil. Augustine) and the Protestant Reformers.' See Chr. KIRWAN, *Augustine* (London: Routledge, 1989) 82.

[15] See e.g. *Confessiones* VII.X.16; CC 27,103:...et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis....

[16] I forego a discussion of Augustine's sermons here, in which ethical discussion may in general be related more specifically to his juridical role as bishop. It is interesting in this regard that Martha Nussbaum sees Augustine as not particularly interested in the ethical dimension of his work. See her *Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 18, where she describes the quandary of Augustinian ethics as follows: "God has set up certain ethical standards; it is our job to do what God wants. Truth and God's grace are out there; but the ability to see ethical truth or to reach for grace is not something we can control. There is, therefore, no reliable method by which we can construct an ethical norm from the scrutiny of our deepest needs and reponses and desires." See also *Augustine Through the Ages*, s.v. Ethics, pp. 320-330; s.v. *Mendacio, De/Contra mendacium*, pp. 555-557 (B. Ramsey O.P.).

are led to conclude, lies more with an 'ethics of the beyond', and to the extent that we are able to develop an insight in this matter at all, it falls under the heading of divine predestination. As a result of this development, so we already hinted above, it seems we have a picture in which human free will is increasingly confused by its own random, if not licentious behavior. The only way this confusion can be countered is by divine determinism, i.e., predestination. Anticipating the views of John Calvin more than reflecting the dynamics of Augustinian thought, in which the relationship with God is always more dialogical than hierarchical, predestination thus becomes seen as the funnel through which God dispenses divine grace on this earth in anticipation of the future life one is to enjoy in the hereafter.[17]

While this 'predestinarian cloud' overshadows many an analysis of medieval thought as it slowly developed from Augustine to Calvin, we should not let it conceal the fact that medieval thinkers could find numerous other ways for divine grace to manifest itself. I am thinking here of various discussions on the role of providence, especially in Gregory the Great and Boethius who, each in their own right, were perhaps as important as Augustine in contributing to what we now commonly call the medieval worldview.[18] Early medieval thought harbours in fact a *plethora* of different views on the relationship between the human agent and the divine creator/protector.[19] Still, in all those cases it is clear that the relationship involved is ultimately of a vertical nature, requiring an act of worship to rather than an intimate dialogue with God. The fact that this is so should not be entirely blamed on Augustine, although his influence on later de-

[17] See John CALVIN, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* III.XXI (on double predestination) and XXIV (on effectual calling), transl. by H. Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995) 202-211; 239-258.

[18] On providence and free will in Boethius, see H. CHADWICK, *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) 242-247. See also A.W. ASTELL, *Job, Boethius and Epic Truth* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) *passim*. On the notion of constantia mentis as Gregory the Great's attempt to keep one's balance in the midst of adversity, see C. STRAW, *Perfection in Imperfection* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 236-256.

[19] One may think here generally of the works by Johannes Scottus Eriugena (cf. *De divina praedestinatione* and *Periphyseon*) and Anselm of Canterbury (cf. *Cur Deus Homo*; *De originali peccato* and *De casu diaboli*). While the formal ties of both thinkers to Augustine have been investigated, their joint ties both to Augustine and to each other have not been structurally explored. It is my contention that this research, when done properly, would throw much needed light on the history of Augustinianism in the early Middle Ages.

bates was in many respects crucial. But it is true that the very weight of this historical development complicates any retrospective endeavor to draw a clear comparison between such categories as grace and free will in the aftermath of Augustine, as they betray a basic asymmetry. This asymmetry penetrates medieval models of providence as much as those of predestination to the point where they seem to become less suitable for theological analysis.

In my view the relevance of Abelard's ethical stance comes in precisely on the point of this endemic asymmetry. Given its medieval framework, in which the relationship between the human agent and the divine creator/protector is by definition a vertical one, – in view of later nominalist developments, one might argue, even increasingly so –[20], the importance of Abelard's contribution as I see it lies precisely in the fact that he undertakes a conscious attempt to try and create a level playing field for the encounter of human motivation and divine guidance, where after Augustine this balance seemed to have become lost. Thus he strives to reach a fair balance between on the one hand the need to explain and legitimate human actions and, on the other, the need to adhere to an overarching concept of justice which explicitly includes the notion of divine judgment. As De Rijk elucidates, he does so by adding a third element between the will (*voluntas*), which in the Augustinian school of his days was deemed the dominant factor in distinguishing between good and evil, and the action taken as a result of this will (*actio, exsecutio*). This third element is the so-called *consensus*, the human consent to carry out the act. According to De Rijk, for Abelard the defining moment is the transition from *consensus* to *actio*, and not, as is often thought, between *voluntas* and *consensus*. While Abelard remains staunchly Augustinian in the sense that he attributes a central role to the faculty of the will,[21] his choice to play off the will against consent is merely an

[20] On the impact of nominalism and what he calls 'the disintegration of the medieval synthesis', see L. DUPRÉ, *Passage to Modernity. An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) 174-181.

[21] See R. BLOMME, *La doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques de la première moitié du XIIe siècle* (Louvain: Publications universitaires, 1958) for an analysis of the respective positions of the school of Laon, the followers of Abelard and the school of St. Victor. While there are definite similarities between the Augustinian position of Abelard and that of Hugh of St. Victor, a major difference is the nuances that Abelard adds to the position of the will. See Blomme, p. 315: "Abélard parlait en effet tantôt de consensus, tantôt d'*intentio*. Hugues considère purement et simplement les vocables *consensus*, *voluntas* ou *propositum* comme des synonymes." On the same page Blomme notes also how Hugh considers the external act as having a psychological impact on human behaviour, something which Abelard denies.

auxiliary strategy to nuance the terms of the debate. The major difficulty for him is to try and make the distinction between the consenting moment and the (un)ethical act itself transparent. To that end he introduces such famous examples as that of a slave who kills his master in self-defense, as he would certainly have been killed himself had he chosen not to do so. In either case, however, a choice is involved. That Abelard's is not exactly a revolutionary ethical mind becomes clear from his famous dictum that the slave should have preferred to undergo this evil instead of inflicting it. It would have been better, so his argument goes simply and crudely, had the slave chosen to let himself be killed instead of killing his master.[22]

That *consensus* is a middle term for Abelard, as De Rijk aptly demonstates, is true in more ways than one. On the one hand, it mediates on the horizontal level between the individual's will, which generically encompasses desire as well as longing, and his or her specific actions. De Rijk keenly points out how all Abelard's examples have a definite social character, thereby indicating to us that what is at risk underneath is the stability of the social order.[23] In a move which transcends the framework of De Rijk's article, it seems legitimate to argue that *consensus* also has a mediating role to play on the vertical level for Abelard. For is it not so that in the last resort the thing to which one consents or not is respect for divine law? In a way, one might go so far as to state that divine law forms the explicit substrate of the social order for Abelard, as the horizontal and the vertical level must ultimately merge for him. This then is where in my view the real problems for Abelard's ethics seem to come in. This, in other words, is where Abelard truly meets Augustine, not the authoritative icon of his contemporaries but the historical bishop who, while engaged in battle with the Pelagian heresy, faced very similar problems. For what, so Abelard begins to ask reluctantly, if the horizontal and the vertical do not converge, but instead follow divergent paths?[24]

[22] See De Rijk, "Scherpzinnigheid", p. 177; „Meister und Opfer", 136-137. Unfortunately the German version does not make this point as forcefully as the Dutch text. On the example of the master and his servant, see *Ethica*, ed. Luscombe, 8: 8-12: ...nequaquam uoluntas ista tamquam mala est improbanda, per quam ille, ut dicis, mortem euadere, non dominum uoluit occidere, et tamen deliquit consentiendo, quamuis coactus timore mortis, iniustae interfectioni quam eum potius ferre quam inferre oportuit.

[23] For this horizontal sense of justice Abelard, interestingly enough, uses the terms *ratio providentiae* and *dispensatio*. See *Ethica*, ed. Luscombe, 44:11-12 and De Rijk, "Scherpzinnigheid", p. 186.

[24] When explaining how God is the prover of the hearts and the reins (*probator*

To solve this problem, Abelard does not feel at liberty simply to return to the concepts of grace and free will which he inherited from Augustine, as he will gradually come to develop his own alternatives. More remarkably perhaps, given that Abelard was a Benedictine monk for a good part of his life, he neither appears content to employ a concept of justice which embraces the human and the divine in one sweep, i.e., the sweep of monastic penitence. This was the model favoured by Anselm of Canterbury, whose monastic approach allowed him to settle adequately all problems of morality, at least *in nuce*, by rooting his theological explanation in the historical God-Man. From his *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm's arguments flow out naturally and inseparably into both *De conceptu virginali* and *De originali peccato*, strengthening the divine as well as the human aspect of his overall approach to justice. While Abelard repeatedly calls on the Christ of the Gospel, as is the case in his various *Theologies*, he does so primarily to confer a kind of divine blessing on his own trinitarian experiments rather than seeing these experiments themselves as flowing forth naturally from the nature of the divine. Intellectually this means that he cannot employ the concept of divine grace as a kind of fall-back position, invoking Christ's redemption merely as a shortcut which helps to explain away difficult ethical problems. But can we infer from the fact that he does not do so that logic for Abelard has absorbed all the qualities that we normally associate with divine grace? To put it even more sharply, is logic really to be considered the Abelardian equivalent of divine grace, as De Rijk seems to suggest?

This seems to me to be a solution which by all medieval standards pushes things too far. And as much as De Rijk is right in seeing Abelard's *Ethica* as a theological work, in contrasting logic and grace he appears to slip in an anachronistic concept of theology. Consequently, what he sees as the ultimate conflict between Abelard and Bernard, namely the fact that Bernard relies explicitly on grace, while Abelard plays up the importance of logic with such intensity that the art itself becomes identified as a gift of grace, needs in reality not to have been the source of any conflict at all. Logic is a matter of talent and talent is a matter of grace, conferred as it is upon the individual who can make use of it for the praise of God. In that res-

cordis et renum, cf. Jer. 20:12), Abelard hints at the divergence of human jurisprudence and true divine justice. See *Ethica*, ed. Luscombe, 40:15-19: Vnde sepe per errorem uel per legis, ut diximus, coactionem innocentes punimus uel noxios absoluimus. Probator et cognitor cordis et renum dicitur Deus, hoc est, quarumlibet intentionum ex affectione animae uel infirmitate seu delectatione carnis prouenientium.

pect, Bernard would not disagree much with the principles of Abelard's *Ethics*. But where Abelard wants to use the art of logic to solve ethical matters, Bernard prefers to stay within the stable Augustinian framework of grace and free will and, so one may assume, of that of traditional predestination. Abelard, meanwhile, begins to use his logical insights to make progress in the field of ethics, which can be shown especially from his constructive analysis of *consensus*. What should not be forgotten, however, is that in doing so Abelard also conjures up a new set of problems. For if it is true, as Abelard seems to hold, that human justice is by definition fallible, since only God who judges the *puritatem aequitatis* can be trusted to scrutinize the hearts and minds of sinners adequately, how can he be so confident that he can offer us a reliable insight in the structure of divine providence? What's more, how does he think he can do so by pushing the bounds of what is, in the last resort, merely the human art of logic?

III. Providence in Abelard:

In his *Ethics* Abelard is concerned to make the dynamics that go into the notion of human consent transparent. He is apparently content with this approach even though he knows that the human justice system, including the ecclesiastical courts, will never be flawless. But just as God knows and, in the end, will dispense true justice, so humans in their heart will truly know whether they are guilty or innocent. At least, this is how his reasoning seems to go. For that reason his *Ethics* has an alternative title pointing to the importance of self-knowledge: *Scito teipsum*. To understand this title, we may point here to the long tradition of introspection that has come down to us from antiquity.[25] In that respect we should not forget that the twelfth century is also the era of the discovery of the individual,[26] which gives Abelard's notion of self-knowledge a specific autobiographical twist. But with regard to the topic of this article, the question arises whether we can also see his title as referring to the interiorisation of sin and guilt which has become such a staple of anti-Pelagian Augustinianism. I shall come back to this point when drawing some conclusions at the end.

[25] See P. COURCELLE, *Connais-toi toi-même: de Socrate à Saint Bernard* (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1974-75) for an expansive treatment of this topic in the history of philosophical and theological thought.

[26] See C. MORRIS, *The Discovery of the Individual*, 1050-1200 (1972; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

For now let us concentrate first on what clues Abelard's reflections on providence may give us. The point that will interest us most is whether he can guarantee, and if so then how, that ultimately there is indeed a convergence of horizontal and vertical justice to be found, both in the created and the social order? Even if Abelard does not employ a concept of justice that is intrinsically anchored in the concept of the God-Man, as in the case of Anselm of Canterbury, it is nevertheless true that his notion of providence has ties with the second person of the Trinity. In *Theol. Christ.* I 20, with reference to a quotation about the prologue to St. John's Gospel from Gregory the Great, we find him stating:

> *Verbum itaque dicit conceptum mentis et quamdam intelligentiae locutionem, quae in mente formatur, ad cuius similitudinem Vnigenitus Dei dicitur et quasi quaedam eius intellectualis ac perpetua locutio, in cuius prouidentia omnium ab aeterno praefixa consistit operatio atque ordinatio.*[27]

What is clear from this passage, and is restated by him frequently elsewhere, is that providence is a property of the Divine Word, as in it the working of all (created) things has been pre-established. Providence has the connotation of care here, as elsewhere it is combined with *tutela* in a quotation from Macrobius.[28] It carries the further sense of stability, as Abelard calls it a permanent word, contrasting it with audible and transitory words. Here we sense the background of Augustine's Neoplatonism, as he quotes from *De civitate Dei* XVI, saying that *divina locutio est ipsa Dei dispositio*.[29] But the Platonic tradition could reach Abelard also along different channels, namely through Cicero and Macrobius. In the spirit of thought of these authors Abelard relates its importance closely to the role of the Holy Spirit, whom he equates with the World Soul, calling it 'the life of the

[27] References are to E.M. BUYTAERT O.F.M. and C.J. MEWS (eds.), *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica*, CCCM XI-XIII (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969-1987) according to chapter and pagenumber. For this passage, see *Theol. Christ.* I 20, ed. Buytaert, CCCM 12, 79-80.

[28] See *Theol. Christ.* II.85, ed. Buytaert, 169: Hoc quoque addidit (scil. Plato) nos esse in dominio Dei cuius tutela et prouidentia gubernamur. This passage is part of a long quotation from Macrobius' *In Somnium Scipionis* I.13.

[29] This is the Augustine text as Abelard quoted it in the first and second redaction of the *Theol. Christ.* He amended it in the third to match *De civitate Dei 16.6* ; CCL 48,506s. more precisely.

universe', and to whom we can likewise attribute both the role of providence and the fullness of divine science.[30]

It is true that Abelard's position betrays a kind of imbalance here. This imbalance may derive in part from his desire not to follow a strict Augustinian position here, as he clearly wants to salvage the role of human free will. For that he finds the Aristotelian argument convincing (cf. *rectae rationes*)[31] that in a case of the strictest notion of divine providence, there would be no point in *consiliari aut negotiari*.[32] Going from Abelard's *Theologies* to his *Ethics*, one way of approaching Abelard's definition of *consensus* is to see it precisely as an attempt to fence off the little maneuvering space humans have in their lives to engage at all in counseling and negotiating. Given the ecclesiastical reforms in the twelfth century and its ever growing and more invasive bureaucracy, this was no unimportant achievement.[33]

But if humans have indeed some room to maneuver before they get down to consent (*consensus*), so does God. The noted imbalance in Abelard's sense of providence cannot fail to affect also the role of the divine, at least potentially. It is at this point that the notion of grace comes in for Abelard. In *Theol. Christ.* V.26, a position which he repeats in *Theol. Schol.* III.24, Abelard states that one can speak about God's will (*velle*) in two ways:

> *Velle itaque Deus duobus modis dicitur, aut secundum uidelicet prouidentiae suae ordinationem, secundum quod scilicet aliquid disponit apud se ac deliberat statuitque in sua prouidentia, ut sic postmodum compleat; aut secundum consilii sui adhortationem uel approbationem qua unumquemque ad hoc admonet, quod per gratiam suam remunerare paratus esset.*[34]

[30] See *Theol. Christ.* I.95, ed. Buytaert, 111-112: (Speaking about Plato again, from the *Timaeus*, having quoted a.o. Cicero, Pythagoras, Vergil and Macrobius) De cuius quidem summae rationis ordinatione, cum subditur quod haec ipsa, mundi uidelicet anima, 'causas omnium quae proueniunt prouidet', diuinam ei omnium naturarum prouidentiam assignat et diuinae plenitudinem scientiae; ex quo ipsa etiam Deus innuitur.

[31] See *Theol. Christ.* III.5, ed. Buytaert, 196: Scimus quidem a Peripateticis, quos nunc dialecticos appellamus, nonnullas et maximas haereses tam Stoicorum quam Epicureorum rectis rationibus esse repressas, e.g., Stoic fate… non tamen ideo cuncta ex necessitate proueniunt, ut scilicet humani pereat libertas arbitrii.

[32] See *Theol. Christ.* III.5, ed. Buytaert, 196 with reference to Aristotle, *Periermenias* 9, 18b in Boethius' translation.

[33] At the same time it may offer us a better explanation of his *Ethics* than a narrowly biographical reading by which Abelard is put in a position of conflict with the Church's penitential code.

[34] See *Theol.Christ.* V.26, ed. Buytaert, 357-58 and *Theol. Schol.* III.24, ed. Mews, CCCM 13, 510.

The first sense in which he takes the divine will, equating it with providence, is remarkably similar to the interpretation of consent which he **elaborates** in his *Ethics*: God deliberates and then consents, after which he executes his plan. The second notion is much weaker, however, as all we have here is merely a kind of divine admonishment to lead the good life. Apparently, counseling and negotiating is not just for humans. In Abelard's theological view, God is also in the business of advising and adhorting humans to do his will, after which he then is ready or prepared (*paratus*) to remunerate them through his grace. God's readiness to reward humans through his grace might sway them to do his will. Depending on how one interprets the little phrase *per gratiam suam*, Abelard may seem to come awfully close to the Pelagian heresy here, for is grace not almost seen here as a reward for human merit? And yet, as his works frequently show, Abelard clearly wants to stay far from that. What then may be the point of his position?

One way to explain what Abelard seems to be involved in here is to see this distinction between two kinds of divine will as a kind of acknowledgement of the possibility that the horizontal and vertical concepts of justice may indeed follow diverging paths without sacrificing completely his trust in divine providence. Just as in his *Ethics* the divine order precedes and underlies the social one, so here God's general providence underlies his weaker will to offer people salvation at least as an option. But does Abelard truly see it as a viable one? Far from offering a kind of Pelagian picture, as if he was primarily interested in coming out from under a strict sense of divine providence in order to plead for a merit-based ethics, the converse seems altogether more plausible. After all, it is clear that Abelard has little trust in human free will, however much he is willing to defend it, and he is not at all ready to give up on the guidance of divine providence. Thus there may be more arguments in favour of seeing the distinction between God's two wills as his precaution against despair rather than his advocacy of a merit-based ethics. That Abelard is interested in offering a precaution against despair becomes clear from his example in *Theol. Schol.* III.102 about the case of a doomed man (*dampnandus*).[35] In Abelard's view God's providence equals foreknowledge here, meaning that from eternity God sees the doomed man do those things that will get him doomed. What Abelard clearly tries to avoid

[35] For the entire passage, see *Theol. Schol.* III.102, ed. Mews, 541-542. See esp. p. 542: Verbi gratia, prouidit ab eterno, id est presciuit, hunc qui dampnandus est facere per que dampnetur.

here in his interpretation of providence is to interpret such instances of divine foreknowledge as cases of causal determinism. This he would consider fatal, not because such an interpretation undermines the divine freedom of will, as would be the later Scotist position, but because it excludes the possibility of human self-improvement. Instead of Pelagius' attempt to have human merit count towards salvation, we have in Abelard an essential fear not that God's omnipotence and providence will rule out luck and coincidence – that they do not, as he makes clear based on philosophical arguments – but that they will close off any and all possibility for human self-improvement.[36]

That this is indeed Abelard's position is brought out even more clearly from an example he uses a little further on in *Theol. Schol.* III.107.[37] Here he discusses the meaning of predestination, that charged Augustinian term implying such a firm divine control of history, much more so than mere providence, that it potentially rules out all human free will. For Abelard predestination is different from providence because it is directly tied to salvation. Thus predestination goes to the heart of the convergence of horizontal and vertical justice in a way that providence does not. His examples all have a soteriological purpose, in that he wants to leave open the possibility of human salvation, even when simultaneously trying to safeguard God's free will. Thus Abelard argues that, while it is indeed necessary for God to save every one predestined, it is not thereby necessary that God save this or that man. As he states:

> Non enim si recipiamus quia predestinatum omnem necesse est saluari, ideo de singulis predestinatis concedere cogimur ut tam hunc hominem quam illum dicamus quia necesse est saluari. Sublato quippe nomine predestinatorum, in quo est uis necessitatis sicut in apposita determinatione, non ita recipimus quia hunc uel illum necesse est saluari. Hinc in quodam sensu recipimus quod predestinatum necesse est saluari, hoc est eum qui talis est, cum sit predestinatus, saluari necesse est.[38]

....Eum qui talis est, cum sit predestinatus, saluari necesse est... The meaning of the phrase 'that it is necessary that every predestined one be saved' is rendered by Abelard as 'that it is necessary that he

[36] While Abelard's *Ethics* is mostly analyzed on the point of how he defines human sin and guilt, it should not be forgotten that the consequence of his intentional ethics is that there arises more room for moral self-improvement. In this sense, Abelard's position foreshadows the virtue ethics of Thomas Aquinas.

[37] See *Theol. Schol.* III.107, ed. Mews, 543-44.

[38] See *Theol. Schol.* III.107, ed. Mews, 544.

who is such that he is predestined, be saved.' This is indeed a solution on the level of logic. For here the concept of necessity is upheld without solidifying into a kind of rigid causal determinism. But soteriologically it opens up an abyss, as divine protection flattens out into a pattern of simultaneous instantiation. This becomes clear from Abelard's subsequent examples. At one point he even goes so far as to say that there is not more of a connection between God's ability to foresee events and their actual unfolding than between the ability of humans to witness events and the events witnessed. Thus we are equally justified in stating: I see that this person writes or that person commits adultery, as we are in stating alternatively that God foresees such occurrences. In both cases it is necessary that, when I see the person write or commit adultery, or when God does so through foreknowledge, he or she is actually in the process of writing or committing adultery. But even when we admit that the connection between the knowledge of an occurrence and the occurrence itself is no longer of a causal nature, it does not thereby gain soteriological validity. In other words, the end of causal determinism does not usher in a new era of theological redemption. Sin, as the ill-fated consequence of human free will and a conditioning aspect of what it means to be human for Abelard, remains with us during the course of our lives. As is made clear by the context of his argument, the modal term 'necessary' here does not imply that actions like adultery cannot be stopped or avoided. It simply means that humans can never shun the yoke of their responsibility. This is true, so one could infer from the example of the damnandus, both in the case of divine providence as in the unforeseen case of divine forgiveness. As Abelard stipulates: *...omne peccatum magis uoluntarium quam necessarium sit et ex libero procedens arbitrio, non ex aliqua coactione naturae, vel diuinae prouidentiae compulsione.*

...Eum qui talis est, cum sit predestinatus, saluari necesse est ... omne peccatum magis uoluntarium quam necessarium sit... The problem of logic is solved but it turns now into what is both a larger and a deeper problem, namely how to get insight in what seems in the end to be a matter of divine discretion. For how do you know whether you are predestined, or how do you know whether in the end your sins qualify more as necessary than as voluntary, so that to that extent you can feel absolved from guilt? For all the success of Abelard's attempts in his *Ethics* to try and make human consent the defining ethical moment, so as to put the blame where the guilt is, he is clearly aware that underneath all this there lurks a deeper problem to which, for lack of a better word, we may still refer as the problem of grace. To this we shall now turn to formulate some conclusions.

IV. Grace and the Self in Abelard:

... Eum qui talis est, cum sit predestinatus, saluari necesse est. If anyone in the twelfth century had reason to worry about being saved, it was Peter Abelard. Overflowing with talent, well-positioned to have a magnificent career, he broke the rules of the clerical trade and made a disgrace of himself.[39] Little wonder then that for him getting access to grace was of the utmost importance. This may explain his fascination with questions pertaining to the problem of salvation, which seem indeed to have always been in the front of his thinking, as they are quite literally strewn throughout his theological works. As the above analysis has shown, however, for all Abelard's fascination with debate and discussion, the art of logic may have been a great help to him in finetuning the definition of the problem, including the problem of morality, but it could not offer a solution, insofar as he was well aware that salvation was not to be achieved through logical advances alone. Nor through theological ones, for that matter.[40] At the end of the day, therefore, it appeared Abelard found himself quite literally left to his own devices.

This may in itself be a very valuable conclusion. For if this is really true, as I indeed have come to believe, then Abelard's remarkable interest in self-knowledge and introspection, much as it reflects the discovery of the individual as an important aspect of twelfth century literary production, is at the same time and, perhaps more deeply so, an attempt to find out whether he was *...talis, cum sit predestinatus*, whether he himself belonged to the number of the predestined. On a more structural level, then, what Abelard teaches us is that the instrument of self-knowledge may be more suited to make ethical than psychological progress, with ethics being seen as the art best suited to anticipate eschatological justice. The relevance of his introspective works would thus go beyond the help they afford in uncovering the details of his lifestory, even if they never quite lead us into the labyrinthine halls of the inner self, which Augustine's *Confessions* have done so memorably.[41] But how is it that they serve

[39] For a recent study of Abelard's entire dossier, see M.T. CLANCHY, *Abelard. A Medieval Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

[40] Still, it remains true that salvation is the point of doing theology for Abelard. See *Theol. Schol.* I.1, ed. Mews, 318: Tria sunt, ut arbitror, in quibus humanae salutis summa consistit, fides uidelicet, caritas et sacramenta.

[41] See W. OTTEN, *The Bible and the Self in Medieval Autobiography: Otloh of St. Emmeram (1010-1070) and Peter Abelard (1079-1142)*, in: D.E. AUNE and J. MACCARTHY (eds.), *The Whole and Divided Self. The Bible and Theological Anthropology* (New York: Crossroad, 1997) 130-157.

progress in ethical thinking? Here the bringing in of the Pelagian problem is relevant indeed. For by mapping out how the self responds to tragedy, not just in his *Historia calamitatum* but also in his various *Planctus*, what Abelard seems to be doing is in fact designing a counter-morality,[42] one in which the perspective of tragic loss retrospectively opens up new possibilities for human agency, leaving the dilemma of grace *versus* free will behind.

As I have tried to show in the above analysis, it is clear that Abelard in his (theo)logical works wants to stay firmly within the bounds of Christian thought. Yet we should seriously ask whether the morality found in his more creative writing involving self-knowledge and/or introspection is in fact not meant to be an alternative to, rather than a correction or precision of, the traditional Christian dichotomy of grace *versus* free will. And if so, we should go further and evaluate the implications of his alternative. What to think, for example, of the famous *planctus* about Dinah and Sichem (Gen. 34)? In it we find him retelling the story of Dinah being raped by Sichem, son of the Hivite ruler, in lyrical form. In order not to bring dishonour to her family, he decides to marry her and he and the male members of his family get circumcised. But Dinah's brothers Simeon and Levi, Jacob's sons, decide to kill the house of Sichem nonetheless, since they allegedly could not accept their sister being treated as a whore. In Dinah's lament, however, far from dwelling on the rape as the conspicuous cause for a series of unforgivable but unavoidable events, Abelard recreates instead what was fatally destroyed, the budding relationship between Dinah and Sichem. Moreover, he eulogizes it as a possible and positive choice, one seen as all the more vital because it never was to be.[43]

Obviously this is a rather radical reinterpretation of Abelard's ethical project, the contours of which would need to be much more

[42] My approach in the final section of this article is influenced by Martha Nussbaum, who holds that in order to understand Greek ethics, one should not only peruse the volumes of Greek philosophy but also mine the riches of literature, especially Greek tragedy. See M.C. NUSSBAUM, *The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (1986; rev. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1-21.

[43] For the text of this *planctus*, see W. MEYER, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur mittellateinischen Rhythmik* (1905; Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms-Verlag, 1970) 366-367.

firmly drawn.[44] But if true, it could also be of enormous help in solving some problems of twelfth century mentality which have puzzled generations of scholars, one of them being the question whether the renaissance of that age was informed chiefly by Christian or by pagan motifs. As an answer to De Rijk's idea that Abelard considered logic the gift of grace, and an attempt to refine the Pelagian problem beyond its Augustinian parameters of sin and guilt,[45] it may well be Abelard's specific legacy to have made an earnest beginning with the design of a new morality, one suited more adequately to a post-monastic, urban, individualized and intellectual environment, in short, the environment of the schools rather than the cloister. Distinguishing characteristic of his morality seems to be the feature that grace is seen as that space afforded by the divine to the human order in which the self does not merely consent to goodness, but can actively bring it about through a dialogical, rather than dialectical, interplay of literary creation and moral re-creation. Abelard's logic of predestination, then, may in the end have been more about logic than about predestination. After all, the crucial motive for him was not to uphold the necessity that God save this or that person, but to make clear that the very concept of salvation must inevitably give rise to its own necessity.

Willemien OTTEN

[44] For a recent study of Abelard's Ethics, see J. MARENBON, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 213-331. In his segment on 'Ethics in Practice' (pp.316-323) Marenbon makes insightful comments along the line of inquiry which I have set out here about Abelard's homilies and his *planctus*, yet he does not explore the structural ties to Abelard's formal ethical theory.

[45] If my theory holds water, it would seem to undermine De Rijk's idea that Abelard is refining the Augustinian position after all. Despite his Augustinian influence, he may just not be, interested as he is in designing an individualized and post-monastic morality which is all his own.

THE "GHOST" OF PELAGIUS IN SEMINARY HANDBOOKS IN THE NETHERLANDS, from the middle of the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century.

1. Introduction and definition of the problem

After the previous treatises on Pelagius and his great opponent Augustine, and after the contributions on the effects of their debate in later centuries, we arrive as it were from the highlands to the lowlands. For it is lowlands when one leaves the great theologians and university theology and enters the domain of the seminaries. These institutions, erected all over the Catholic world since the Council of Trent, were intended to elevate the formation of the Church to a higher level. Their importance for the Catholic variant of Latin Christianity can hardly be overestimated. Even so, these institutions are lowlands, after and besides the great Fathers and theologians from university circles. Certainly until the end of the Ancien Regime, someone who was talented and /or had money and yearned for more than a role within the regular pastoral work would not go to a seminary.[1] It is true that in the nineteenth century, an end came to this second-rate status, for after the closure of the old university of Louvain virtually everyone had to go to the seminary. However, seminaries therefore did not become highlands in the landscape of theological practice. It took a while before these institutions became more than simple, and especially practical, vocational training centres.[2]

This contribution also leads to lowlands, because it discusses seminaries in the Netherlands. It is, first of all, related to the seminary of the archdiocese of Mechelen, and then to the seminary which, until 1967, trained the secular clergy, first of the archpriesthood of Holland, Zeeland, and West-Friesland, and, since 1853 also of the diocese of

[1] See, e.g. J. LAENEN, *Geschiedenis van het seminarie van Mechelen* (Mechelen, 1930), pp. 106, 126, 162, 165; J. ROEGIERS, *De Leuvense theologen en de Verlichting. Onderwijs, wetenschap, polemiek en politiek van 1730 tot 1797* (Leuven, 1979), pp. 257-258. N. VON TRIPPEN (ed.), *Das Kölner Priesterseminar im XIX. Jahrhundert. Festschrift zur Feier des 250jährigen Bestehens am 29. Juni 1988* (Siegburg, 1988), p. 27; J.M. WHITE, *The diocesan seminary in the United States. A history from the 1780s to the present* (Notre Dame (Ind.), 1989), pp. 5-7.

[2] M. CLOET (ed.), *Het bisdom Gent (1559-1991): vier eeuwen geschiedenis* (Gent, 1991), p. 382-382; White, *Diocesan seminary*, p. 159 and 264.

Haarlem. Otherwise, looking at the research from which this contribution evolves, the seminary at Warmond must be named before the institution at Mechelen. Only by agreeing to write a history of Warmond and its theological education, Mechelen appeared on the horizon.[3]

Founded in 1799, Warmond lacked a theological tradition of its own and was obliged to borrow from other, older institutions. During the first four decades of its existence it used a printed course of theology which originated from Mechelen.[4] After a closer look it soon became clear that this course, too, had a history. It appeared to be an 'update' of a handbook from a hundred years earlier, also from Mechelen. This previous history clamoured for attention. For if these seventeenth and eighteenth century handbooks were placed side by side, and then added to by the first Warmond edition of 1892, then it would be possible to place the developments in theological education in a historical perspective. Thus, the investigation into the treatment of the Pelagian debate can also be seen as an investigation into the possibilities that such a coherent group of sources can offer.

This investigation applies to more than 1.100 double-columned folio pages from the seventeenth century, approximately 3.500 pages in octavo from the eighteenth century, and nearly 900 pages of the nineteenth century handbook. The maximum effort would be to read all of this; however, it was impossible and unnecessary to do so. The indices with which, at least the handbooks from Mechelen, ended, offered a faster and more specific approach. However, I found that they were not designed for questions concerning Pelagius and semi-pelagianism. These, Augustine's opponents, have, as far as the indices are concerned, the status of ghosts. As far as there were any directly useful headings, the passages referred to were far from complete. Pelagius and his followers are, therefore, like ghosts: virtually invisible yet omnipresent. In order to discern them, a technique was devised, using catchwords borrowed from Pelagius-related issues. Then, using the table of contents, the search was pointed at possibly relevant treatises, *quaestiones* and other text units. Here, especially treatises on grace, justification and merit were used. Furthermore, attention was paid to sections from treatises on God, Creation, and the

[3] See also Th. CLEMENS, J. JACOBS, *Bouwstenen voor de geschiedenis van een seminarie: Warmond 1799-1967*, in: *Trajecta: tijdschrift voor de geschiedenis van het katholiek leven in de Nederlanden*, 9 (2000), pp. 97-111.

[4] L. WINKELER, *Het onderwijs op Warmond, 1799-1967*, in: *Trajecta*, 9 (2000), pp. 134-167, esp. 136-137.

Fall and useful touchstones such as the question of the fate of deceased non-baptized children.

The order of the presentation of the research results is based on the succession of the three handbooks. An attempt to evaluate these results concludes this contribution.

2. Comparing the handbooks

In his extensive entry on the history of theology in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, M.-J. Congar calls the end of the seventeenth century the period in which universities are no longer centres of original thought. He sees the cause in the absorptive action of the Gallican and Jansenist strife and the domestication of university theology through Josephinism. Despite this loss of originality, the teaching of theology continued, both at the universities and in the seminaries of the secular and regular clergy. According to Congar, this explains why theological courses and handbooks along systematic lines replaced commentaries on Thomas and the Liber Sententiarum. This also explains the success since then of the seminary handbook.[5]

2.1 The handbook by Laurentius Neesen

The first specimen to be discussed fits, as far as the date of publication is concerned, almost perfectly within Congar's chronology. It is the *Universa Theologia in tomos duos divisa* by Laurentius Neesen. He was born in 1612 in St. Truiden. According to the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, he was solely educated at Louvain and even reached the licentiate in theology.[6] According to J. Laenen, the former archivist of the archdiocese of Mechelen, he studied at the seminary.[7] Be this as it may, both informants agree that Neesen, in the year of his ordination in 1638, was appointed praeses and professor of theology at the seminary of Mechelen. For this contribution it is important to notice that Neesen finished his theological education before the publication of Jansenius' book on *Augustine*, while his own handbook, published since 1675, may be considered the result of a long period of involvement in the education at the Mechelen seminary.

[5] M.J. CONGAR, *Théologie*, in: *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (DTC), 15 (Paris, 1946), c. 432.

[6] DTC, 11(1931), c. 60.

[7] Laenen, *Geschiedenis*, p. 73.

The publication of the printed reflection of Neesen's educational work was nearly done when he died in 1679. In 1684 three treatises on the cardinal virtue of justice were published, and in 1687 the different parts of the course were combined under the title *Universa theologia in tomos duos divisa ad mentem SS. Augustini et Thomae exposita*. It seems that the absence of the other cardinal virtues were thus accepted. Reprints of this combination or of separate parts date from 1693, 1707, and 1715 and, according to Laenen, even 1730.[8]

The distinguishing mark for Neesen's Universa Theologia, is that the order follows that of the *Summa Theologia*.[9] Corresponding to Thomas Aquinas' tripartite division, the first section is on God, then the acts of humankind, and in the end on the Sacraments as the way to achieve salvation. This deserves our attention, for in it we receive an insight into the 'architecture' of seventeenth-century theology at Mechelen. The master builder has made it clear, even in the titles of the sections, that he has wished to work in the spirit of Augustine and Thomas, but he especially follows the latter where it concerns the major composition. The result is a central section, which is formed by the treatises *De Deo Uno*, up to the redemption by Christ. This 'main building', only one-ninth of the 'surface area', may be considered small, compared to the volume of the two 'outbuildings'. One of them covers roughly five-ninth of the 'surface area' [10] and is made up of three interconnecting parts which house the discussions on the importance of human acts, the three divine virtues, and the cardinal virtue of justice. The second outbuilding covers approximately three-ninth of the 'surface area' and houses the discussion on the sacraments. This part of the structure is in fact a composite building with, in the centre, a hall for the sacraments in general, surrounded by a large room for confession, and smaller rooms for the Eucharist and marriage, baptism and ordination, and a few backrooms for Confirmation and the Extreme Unction.

This whole structure was not only the result of the theological education at Mechelen, but, according to the title pages of the oldest

[8] *Colonia Agrippina*, apud *Hermannum Demen*, 1687. The ecclesiastical imprimatur in this edition gives a nice idea of the publication history of the separate parts. See also Laenen, *Geschiedenis*, p. 77, although, due to many misprints and mistakes this work cannot be considered as an always trustworthy source.

[9] See addenda 1.

[10] The calculation of the 'surface area' is based on the number of pages.

prints, also explicitly meant for this seminary.[11] This destination matches the style of teaching. The student is addressed directly and, through questions and counter-arguments, led through the material. It is interesting to note that, on the one hand, a precise knowledge of theological reasoning is required, while on the other hand not science but devotion is important. It is therefore not surprising that the first part carries the title *theologia christiana affectiva*.[12] Laenen is in that respect correct when he remarks that Neesen's work is more adequate for devotional reflection than a treatise for dry study.[13] There are indeed many quaestiones and dubia, but these are flanked by *recollectiones affectivae* and, especially in the first part, result in prayer.

Furthermore, it is distinguishing that the discussion of the *theologia moralis* is directed on purpose towards pastors and confessors, and wishes to be practical.[14] Especially in this part of his theology course Neesen takes part in the current debate between Probabilism and Probabiliorism. Referring to Augustine, he assumes that someone who, in matters of redemption, places the uncertain above the certain, sins greatly. He prefers what is *securior* and *tutior* and mentions this on the title pages of those parts covering the contents of the second and third sections of the *Summa*.[15] Where the design of the exterior is borrowed from Thomas, the spirit of bishop of Hippo rules in the interior.

In this 'building', Pelagius, his students and semi-pelagians are, by excellence, the house ghosts. Even if not explicitly named, they are

[11] See L. NEESEN, *Theologia moralis christiana de actibus humanis ad mentem SS. Augustini, & Thomæ. Continens tutiores, & securiores regulas dirigendi conscientias pastoribus, confessariis, & omnibus sacræ theologiæ studiosis perutilis. / Authore rever. Admod. domino Laurentio Neesen canonico theol. metropol. ecclesiae Mechliniensis, nec non seminarii praeside. Ad usum theologorum seminarii archi-episcopalis*. Mechliniæ,: typis Gisberti Lintsii, 1675. See also the titles in footnote 11 and 14.

[12] L. NEESEN, *Theologia christiana affectiva de Deo uno in essentia, trino in personis, et verbo incarnato ad mentem SS. Augustini et Thomæ, omnibus pastoribus, confessariis, theologis ad perfectionem vitæ christianæ aspirantibus summe utilis. Ad usum theologorum seminarii archi-episcopalis*. Coloniæ Agrippinæ: Sumptibus Balth. ab Egmont & sociorum, 1678.

[13] Laenen, *Geschiedenis*, pp. 75-76.

[14] See the appropriate title words in footnote 10, 11 and 14.

[15] See besides the title in footnote 10 also L. NEESEN, *Theologia moralis christiana de sacramentis ad mentem ss. Augustini & Thomæ continens securiores & tutiores regulas ea administrandi & suscipitudi (= suscipiendi). Pastoribus, confessariis, & omnibus sacræ theologiæ studiosis perutilis. Ad usum theologorum seminarii archi-episcopalis*. Coloniæ Agrippinæ: sumptibus Balth. ab Egmont & sociorum, 1677. The position is also clearly discernible in the dedication and the preface of the book.

always and everywhere present. Answering the question whether it is God's absolute will that all men are to be saved, Neesen denies this.[16] He agrees that it is *de fide* to teach that Christ has died for all, but he definitely does not agree with Pelagius that the many who in fact have died or will die in sin, have done or will do so because they did not wish to be saved.[17] When predestination is treated and relevant heresies are discussed, Pelagius is reproached that he has taught that human nature is not tainted by the original sin and that man, even without the extra grace, is still capable through the good works of the free will, to receive the grace of predestination. When Pelagius, in the debate, assents, and leaves some room for grace, he is reproached for inferring external grace. This is the grace of law and teaching and Christ's example. Even the Pelagius who, through fear of conviction, eventually agrees that internal grace is needed and that this must be distinguished from free will, still, according to Neesen, holds on to the conviction that the free will in man is sufficient to lead a good and holy life. He also claims that God thus predestines the adult to grace, based on the good works of the free will.[18]

Following this, the heresies of the semi-pelagians are summed up. Mentioned in particular is the freedom they leave for human beings to earn grace themselves; the first step on the road to redemption. Furthermore, their idea is countered that God destined children who died too early, to grace due to the foreknowledge God has of the good works they would have done, had they lived longer.[19]

After all this, it is clear that Neesen does not agree with Pelagius' assumption that there had been a state of nature in which man would have lived without sin and without grace, but with unbridled passions and longings and subjected to death and suffering. According to Neesen, the first man was created with supernatural gifts. That is why Adam's fall was so radical and man needs grace so much.[20]

This need for grace is central in the treatises on grace, justice and merit. Neesen walks the middle road between the opinions of Pelagius and the Reformation. To this end, a teaching on grace is worked out in several *divisiones*. Opposite the *gratia habitualis prima*

[16] L. NEESEN, *Vniversa theologia in tomos duos divisa ad mentem SS. Augustini et Thomæ exposita. Hæc editio correcta a pluribus erroribus, in aliâ impressione commissis* (Coloniæ Agrippinæ: apud Hermannum Demen, 1687), I.1, p. 61-62.

[17] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.1, p. 63.

[18] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.1, pp. 73-74

[19] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.1, p. 74.

[20] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.1, pp. 107-109.

and *secunda* is the *gratia actualis*, which can be subdivided into the *operans* and *cooperans*, *excitans* and *adjuvans*, *praeveniens* and *subsequens* or *antecedens*, *concomitans* and *subsequens*, and of course the problematical twins *sufficiens* and *efficax*.[21]

Especially the treatise on grace is filled with evidence and counterevidence against Pelagius. To the question whether man in the state of fallen nature can do good without grace, the (negative) answer is made up of eight pieces of evidence and five objections.[22] According to Neesen, in depraved nature man, without grace, cannot love God above all, resist temptation and persist until the end.[23] The necessity of grace is, according to Neesen, so great that even a redeemed man, who has been given the *gratia habitualis*, still needs the *gratia actualis* for every single act.[24] Man without grace cannot fully keep natural law[25] or even prepare him self to receive grace.[26] Nevertheless, in the treatise on merit, Neesen upholds that it is de fide to learn that man can receive from God in two ways: as something he earns (*de condigno*) and as something God gives him without any obligation (*de congruo*).[27] However, the possibility to earn is limited. Man cannot oblige God to admit him to salvation. Moreover, in strict sense the grace of justification or perseverance cannot be received as wages.

To conclude, it appears that Neesen has become embroiled in the debate between Augustine and Pelagius. The liveliness of his involvement can best be understood by his arduous adherence to the Catholic Reformation. In defence thereof, he had to work against Reformation but also against Molinism. In these debates, he chooses, without hesitation, the side of Augustine. That he, here and there, gives positive explanations of Baius' ideas[28], is again an argument in favour of the fact that the interior of his theological 'building' is indeed arranged and coloured *ad mentem S. Augustini*. Even more surprising is that Neesen has been able to keep his seminary outside the Jansenist strife.[29]

[21] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, pp. 215-224.
[22] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, pp. 227-229.
[23] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, pp. 229-233.
[24] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, pp. 232 and 235.
[25] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, p. 236.
[26] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, p. 238.
[27] Neesen, *Vniversa theologia*, I.2, pp. 250-251.
[28] DTC, 11(1931), c. 61.
[29] Laenen, *Geschiedenis*, p. 94.

2.2 Petrus Dens' handbook

The second handbook under discussion is that of Petrus Dens.[30] He was born in 1690 in Boom, near Antwerp, and did his *humaniora* with the Oratorians in Mechelen. His study of the Artes led him in 1709 to Louvain, where he also studied theology from 1711 to 1715. He eventually received his licentiate in theology as well.[31] Soon after his ordination in 1715, he was employed as professor in theology, first at the Abbey of Affligem (1717) and shortly afterwards at the seminary of Mechelen (1721). In 1729 he left the seminary, after he had succeeded through the 'via concursus' to become prebendary of the metropolitan church of St. Rombouts. He returned in 1735, this time as president, and kept this function until his death on February 15, 1775. Just as Neesen, he as well led the seminary of the archdiocese for approximately forty years.

Being responsible for theological education, he must have reached the conclusion that the handbook of his illustrious predecessor was in need of revision. In 1758, this conclusion led to the publication of two parts, which, according to the title, were an addition to Neesen's handbook.[32] Dens gave, as a reason for the publication of his *Supplementum* that in Neesen's work the discussion on the *virtus religionis* was absent. From the beginning, he wanted to do more than just provide an addition. If his initiative would be well accepted, more treatises of the theological course would be published. As an advance, a second treatise appeared within six months. This became part two of the *Supplementum*, and carried the title *Dictata de poenitentia*. Thus, it was not directly clear that this was a substitution.

The intervention of the governor of the Austrian Netherlands by decree on May 2nd, 1759, meant that this course of action could not be continued. Part of the contents of the course, would contain principles considered by the state to be against the '*maximes inviolables*' of the land, and against the rights of His Majesty. This was because they removed the church and clergy from his control. Only after Dens'

[30] See for his life and work, the entry by J.FORGET in DTC, 4 (1920), c. 422-423 and the details given by K. SWENDEN in *Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek* (NBW), 13 (1990), c. 202-205.

[31] According to DTC, 4 (1920), c. 421, Dens only received his licentiate on Oct. 5th, 1733. In NBW, 13 (1990), c. 203, this is corrected into Oct. 5, 1723.

[32] P. DENS, *Supplementum Theologiae Rev. Adm. D. Laur. Neesen. De virtute religionis reliquisque virtutibus justitiae annexis, et de virtute temperantiae. Secunda pars continet ejusdem Dictata de sacramento poenitentiae*. Mechelen: J.F. Vander Elst, 1758, 2 vols.

death in 1775 would the complete course be published, including the two treatises forbidden earlier.

Because the theology of Mechelen was at first published as loose treatises, each with its own title, the structure is not immediately clear. After some time, all these treatises received one title, and Petrus Dens appeared, posthumously but correctly, as the author of the *Theologia ad usum seminariorum et sacrae theologiae alumnorum*.[33]

Thomas and Augustine are no longer part of the title of these two theology courses in Mechelen. However, as far as Thomas is concerned, the structure of the *Summa* is maintained.[34] Again, the treatises on the One and Triune God are the central part. This time, the main 'building' is much smaller than a hundred years previous with Neesen. Not one-tenth, but one-twentieth of the surface area is dedicated to the contents of *Pars prima* of the *Summa*. This loss is virtually completely compensated by the *Pars tertia*. It is striking that especially the cohesion between the two wings appears to have disappeared, seeing the order in which it was published and the abundance of the individual parts.[35] For the rest, the relation with Thomas is enforced by references per section to *pars*, *quaestio*, and *articulus* in the *Summa*.

Less obvious is whether the spirit of Augustine still influences the interior. An exterior reference would make it appear otherwise. The doubts voiced by the Jansenist *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques* in 1759 on the prohibition of publication almost seems like the banishment of the church father. Dens is related to the Jesuits and his new theology would distance itself from the teachings of the Church. It was feared that Dens' opinions on grace and morals would instead appear in the theology taught at seminaries previously, that is, in the time of Neesen. This theology was still kept in honour at Louvain.

This type of information predicts a large swing in the theology at Mechelen. In the first instance, the evidence from the indices corroborates this change. With the names of Baius, Jansenius, and Ques-

[33] See for further developments on the publication of Dens' handbook in 1758-1759 and 1775-1779, Theo CLEMENS, *Petrus Dens en de Mechelse theologie. Rond de uitgavegeschiedenis van een befaamd seminariehandboek* in: Jan JACOBS (ed.), *Boeken als bron: opstellen aangeboden aan dr. Marcel Gielis bij gelegenheid van zijn vijfentwintigste dienstjubileum aan de Theologische Faculteit Tilburg 1976-2001* (Tilburg, 2001), pp. 69-90.

[34] See addendum 2. The Mechelen edition of 1819 is used to compare Dens' handbook with the others. This edition is a fairly trustworthy reproduction of the original text and is the first edition since Warmond was founded.

[35] Clemens, *Petrus Dens en de Mechelse theologie*, pp. 73-76.

nel, one finds references to the places where their heresies were investigated. On the contrary, Pelagius' name is absent. However, it is too fast a move to assume that he has moved out or has graduated from house ghost to respectable inhabitant. Leafing through the same treatises as with Neesen, Pelagius and the semi-pelagians are still there and fought against. Above all, after the conviction of Jansenius and Quesnel, Dens shows him self more cautious. He criticises for example, both Molinists as Thomists, and the schools of Augustinians and Lovanienses in his discussion of the *scientia media*. Furthermore, he refers to the heresy of the semi-pelagians on this point.[36] As far as God's will for redemption is concerned, he confirms that God, previewing the fall of Adam, still wishes everyone to reach redemption, even those rejected. Criticising even Augustine, he searches for the solution in the distinction between the *voluntas antecedens* and the *voluntas consequens*. Here, he encourages his readers to be careful in reading Estius, Sylvius and Neesen. In favour of Augustine, Dens remarks that the church father had to formulate his points of view in his struggle against the Pelagians and the semi-pelagians and that he, in other works, does agree with the better solution.[37]

A remarkable difference between Dens and Neesen appears when both discuss predestination and a catalogue of heresies on this issue is given. Dens gives a summary of his predecessor without showing his passion.[38] He appears scholastic and practical. In the dedication of 1758, he says that he does not wish to dwell on speculation but wishes to provide something that is useful for the pastor, confessor and spiritual director. His own passion is practice and in this, he, just like his predecessor, chooses the safer road. This is clear in the treatises on the virtue of religiosity and confession, which he had already published in 1758. These are the only ones which can, with certainty, be ascribed to him. As far as his own opinion is concerned, it is characteristic that he closes an overview of the discussion on the number of damned with, as *conclusio practica*, that the proposed solutions are uncertain. For those who search certainty, it is better to choose the narrow road. In his opinion, those who live the good life will also die a good death. However, the way most people live, arouses the qualm of their damnation.[39]

[36] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract.1-4, nr. 31.
[37] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract 1-4, nr. 39.
[38] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract 1-4, nr. 47.
[39] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract 1-4, nr. 50.

When we continue reading, it appears in the treatise on the creation of man, that Dens considers the *natura pura* a possibility. In this, he differs from Neesen. He can only do so, without the danger of getting too close to the Pelagian points of view, by consequently pointing out the differences between the state of *natura pura* and the state of man after the Fall.[40]

In the treatise on faults and sins, the Pelagians again appear in their denial of the original sin. On this particular point, it is especially interesting that Dens characterises the Anabaptists and Socinians as modern Pelagians, but does not yet take notice of the optimistic, enlightened views on human nature.[41] Also interesting, in comparison to Neesen's *Vniversa theologia*, is the insertion of a digression on the Immaculate Conception of Mary. For a while, this was a touchstone in deciding to which camp one belonged. The defence of the Immaculate Conception was reserved for anti-Jansenists. Dens does not yet call this *de fide*, but does accept it because of the devout convictions of devout people and the celebration of the feast of Mary's Immaculate Conception by the universal church.[42]

Pièce de résistance is of course the treatise on grace. Here, we find subtle divisions of different types of grace. Here, Dens shows his detachment regarding the discussions on the grace issue between Thomists, Molinists and Congruists. In deciding his own position, he had to rely on escape routes, for example by defining works moraliter 'good' but not good enough to entail redemption. To claim that they were redemptive was Pelagian. On the other hand, it was Baian to say that they were sinful.[43] To avoid any misconception, the treatise on grace ends with an overview of all condemned heresies. In the *dicta* 23, 24 and 25, Pelagius and the semi-pelagians head the list with Luther, Calvin and Baius as their more recent companions. Jansenius and Quesnel have the dubious honour of closing the list.

In closing the discussion on the eighteenth-century revision of the theology of Mechelen, we can conclude that Dens, in his Pelagian debate, eventually chooses for Augustine and against Pelagius. For him, human nature after the Fall is not completely ruined, but is nonetheless damaged. To reach redemption, God's grace is always needed. He is much more careful in this than was Neesen. This is not strange. During his theology studies, the papal bull *Unigenitus* had appeared.

[40] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract 1-4, nr. 99-100.
[41] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract 5-7, nr. 132.
[42] Dens, *Theologia*, I, tract 5-7, nr. 137.
[43] Dens, *Theologia*, II, tract 3, nr. 5.

This document has been of use as a watershed in the landscape of Catholic theology. The theological 'building complex' of Dens knows increasingly different ghosts than Neesen's. In defence of his Augustinianism, Dens had to keep in mind the condemnations of Baius, Jansenius and Quesnel. Besides, he was more interested in the promotion of a very serious religious life than in theoretical exercises around dogmatic problems. It is of interest that his treatise on the virtue of religiosity was presented as a supplement to Neesen's handbook, while his own handbook lost that religious vitality which marked the theology of his predecessor.

2.3 The Theologiae dogmaticae compendium of Jan De Bruijn, dating to 1892

When the university of Louvain was closed in 1797, and the French Revolutionaries also seized the northern Netherlands colleges in 1798, measures had to be taken to ensure the continuation of the education of priests. Even though other options were available, the different church districts chose to set up seminaries themselves, or in combination with other areas.[44] In these institutions, just as in the seminaries of the southern Netherlands, the *Theologia* of Dens was used for the contents of the theology course.[45] Editions appeared until 1880-1881.

This piece of information by itself already deserves attention. The same is true for the changes made in the editions of 1819 and 1828-1830, and especially, for the new update which began to appear in 1850. Within this discussion, it suffices to say that the theology of Mechelen was in use until at least 1839 in the Dutch seminary at Warmond. In that year, its old president J.M. Chedeville and its old handbook were put aside as being too Jansenist and too Gallican.[46]

[44] Th. CLEMENS, *Een onbedoeld kind van de revolutie. Veranderingen in de opleiding van priesters voor de Rooms-Katholieke Kerk van de Noordelijke Nederlanden na 1795*, in *Trajecta*, 3 (1994), pp. 307-327.

[45] Lodewijk WINKELER, *'Ten dienste der seminaristen: handboeken op de Nederlandse priesteropleidingen, 1800-1967'*, in: *Jaarboek Katholiek Documentatie Centrum 1987*, pp. 18 and 45-45; Laenen, *Geschiedenis*, p. 243; J. ART, *Kerkelijke structuur en pastorale werking in het bisdom Gent tussen 1830 en 1914* (Kortrijk-Heule, 1977), pp. 92 and 94.

[46] J.C. VAN DER LOOS, *Geschiedenis van het seminarie-Warmond tot 1853* in: *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van het Bisdom Haarlem*, 48(1932), pp. 452-460. Winkeler, *Het onderwijs op Warmond*, pp. 140-141.

Apparently, things can take a turn! Which handbook then took the place of the Mechelen *Theologia* is not known, but the first two teachers since 1839 had been educated in Rome[47] and the third studied at Munich for a few years.[48] Thus, we at least know that these three professors came across a different theological tradition than that of the old Louvain university and Mechelen seminary.

All of this serves as an introduction to the third handbook, the *Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium* by Jan De Bruijn. He was teacher of dogmatic theology from 1864 to 1893. As Neesen and Dens, by the end of his career he has printed his course. De Bruijn had no other education than that of his own seminary, in the years 1848-1852. However, because of that, he can be considered a product and representative of the renewal after 1839. If this assumption is correct, De Bruijn must have been formed by the theology of Franz Leopold Liebermann.

This Alsatian theologian lived from 1759 to 1844 and, as president of the seminary founded in Mainz in 1805, belonged to the circle of anti-Enlightenment and anti-state church followers.[49] His Institutiones theologicae, which first appeared in 1819-1821, were recommended in a Mechelen catalogue as already a classic in various German seminaries. It was also recommended due to its pure Latin, good methods, certain teaching and sublime philosophy. Of the author, it was said that he knew the best methods to combat the current bad tenets. He was also praised in a letter dated to Aug. 13, 1828, by Pope Leo XII.[50] Well, this handbook, which was rewritten in 1831 in an even more Ultramontane spirit[51], was available from 1832-1833 in the Netherlands, in the fourth edition, put into circulation by the Louvain publishers Vanlinthout and Vandenzande.

The use of Liebermann at Warmond is not proven. That De Bruijn had this theologian as director, in the double sense of the word, is suggested through the subtitle of his own handbook. There, it says that the *compendium* is collected from Liebermann and other theo-

[47] It concerns M.T. Timmermans (1839-1842) en W. Steenhoff (1842-1851). Cf. Van der Loos, *Geschiedenis van het seminarie*, pp. 574-578 and 584-585.

[48] It concerns O.A. Spitzen (1851-1858). Cf. Van der Loos, *Geschiedenis van het seminarie*, p. 590-592.

[49] H. JEDIN (ed.), *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, VI.1 (Sonderausgabe, Freiburg etc., 1985), pp. 268-269.

[50] See the catalogue by HANICQ in the Mechelen *Directorium* of 1830.

[51] J.-M. MAYEUR etc. (ed.), *Geschichte des Christentums*, 11(Freiburg, 1997), p. 108.

logians.[52] This still leaves much room for different influences. However, the order of the list of abbreviations affirms the especial interest of Liebermann amongst other theologians. His name and his *Institutiones theologicae* precede the otherwise alphabetical list. Further doubt may be removed by continuous references in the text. This dependence on another theological tradition than the Louvain/-Mechelen one gives rise to the question what the results were for the reorientation at Warmond after 1839.

When comparing De Bruijn's *Compendium* to the two previously discussed handbooks, it is immediately clear that a completely new structure is used.[53] No longer is the treatise on the One and Triune God at the beginning. It is still present, but now hides behind the double wall of the d*emonstratio christiana* and the *demonstratio catholica*. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the contents of the second part of the *Summa* are absent. These changes are partly due to the disintegration of the one, all-inclusive, theological course. This one course made it possible, until within the nineteenth century, for only one teacher to run a whole seminary. At Warmond, this unity disappeared after 1832 due to the growing differentiation in the field of theological education. In that year, moral theology became a separate course. In 1833, a teacher for liturgy appeared, and in 1837/1838 respectively, pastoral theology and church history were set apart. De Bruijn therefore, being responsible for dogmatic theology, had a more restricted working area than Neesen and Dens. This does not alter the fact that as far as the other, more defensive part of the book, is concerned, a considerable change has taken place in comparison with Neesen and Dens. There are new ghosts and this time they appear especially from outside!

The question, which in this discussion must be asked immediately, is whether the interior has also been changed. In addition, whether the old ghosts have disappeared. That something has changed is evident because De Bruijn's *Compendium* is made up of only two parts, and thus has less room for digressions than his predecessors. That is exactly why it is all the more obvious that a relatively large number of pages is dedicated, for example, to the discussion of new ways of thinking about the origin of the world and mankind.[54] Here, Darwin appears as the ghost in the theological

[52] The complete title reads: J. DE BRUIJN, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium, quod ex Liebermann aliisque theologis conscripsit et cursui quatuor annorum adaptavit*. Leiden: J.W. van Leeuwen, 1892.

[53] See addendum 3.

[54] De Bruijn, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium*, II, pp. 11-33 and 48-62.

stronghold. As far as the old debates are concerned, much attention is paid to human nature and original sin. The Fall is presented as an especially crucial moment in salvation history.[55] That the battle with Jansenism has been fought is clear from the teaching that un-baptised children miss the *visio beatifica* but need not suffer sensorily. Rather, they rejoice in being part of much of God's goodness and in natural perfection. Furthermore, the victory of the anti-Jansenists can be seen in more than ten pages' affirmation of Mary's Immaculate Conception.[56]

In the discussion of the teaching of redemption, it is clear that Augustine is continuously cited, this time however to defend conclusions which had not been made by the Augustinians in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. In details, De Bruijn hardly differs from Dens, where he picks a path between the heresies of the Pelagians and opponents, whom he indicates as 'predestinationists'. In his conclusions he goes further, especially where the general offer of grace is concerned. In his handbook, the *gratia sufficiens* is a bit more *efficax* than in the handbooks of his predecessors. Besides, in the thorny issue of the case of un-baptised children, he retreats even further by declaring the difficult reconciliation of the general will for salvation and the absence of baptism as an impenetrable mystery.[57] In conclusion, the recommendation of the devotion to the Sacred Heart should be pointed out in connection with the teaching of redemption. Man is sinful and in need of mercy, and through this symbol of a loving and pitying God, he received a better insight into his own prospects of final joy than the complex teaching of grace could have offered.[58]

3. Conclusions

An initial remark in conclusion to this discourse concerns the somewhat surprising role played by seminaries as producers of theology, where the low status of seminary education, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, would have suggested a more consuming role.

A second point requesting attention is the strange continuity that the handbooks indicate. With only few handbooks, centuries can be spanned. This opens new perspectives for comparative research in more than just the Pelagian question.

[55] De Bruijn, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium*, II, pp. 71-94.
[56] De Bruijn, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium*, II, pp. 93-94 and 95-106.
[57] De Bruijn, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium*, II, p. 188.
[58] De Bruijn, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium*, II, pp. 131-134.

Furthermore, it can be established that the realization of the mutual relations between the theological handbooks can offer good possibilities over a longer period of time in studying the continuity and discontinuity of theological education, and its dating.

As far as the Pelagian debate is concerned, the comparison of the handbooks shows that changes in theology are as slow as movements in tectonic plates. However, they do move and can be studied in detail. In the long run, Roman Catholic theology does go through transformations slowly but surely. These changes do not only apply to the architecture of the whole but also the individual chambers. Applied to the problem of grace, the comparison of the handbooks shows that an initial disconcerting movement of update-to-update is actually technically perfectly balanced and harmless material. The seventeenth century ghost is as it were transformed into a mantlepiece figurine.

The architectural metaphors lead to the remark that, according to the building plans, what was the main building is of no priority in the actual building history. With Neesen and Dens, the wings existed before the main building. This is food for thought and emphasises the need for research on the genesis of theological handbooks.

The slowness of long-term movements agrees with the many complications in the short term, such as those surrounding the publication of the handbook by Dens. Here as well, there remains much to be done.

In conclusion, because of all the changes and vicissitudes, the spirit in which theology is used does change and new ghosts appear. However, much also remains the same and the question arises whether the real ghosts ever disappear completely, and whether we should strive to do so.

Theo CLEMENS

Addenda 1

L. NEESEN, *Universa Theologia in tomos duos divisa ad mentem SS. Augustini et Thomae exposita* (ed. Keulen: H. Demen, 1687, 2 vols. in 1 bd., fo)

I.1: Theologia christiana affectiva (Oldest approbation: May 6, 1678; total paged leafs: 138).

0.	De theologia et locis theologicis	1
1.	De Deo Uno	8
2.	De Deo Trino	87
3.	De statu primi hominis and De reparatio per Verbi Incarnatione	107

I.2: Theologia moralis pars prima complectens generalia principia & universales regulas actuum humanorum (Oldest approbation: Nov. 3, 1675; total paged leafs: 256).

1.	De actu humano	1
2.	De beatitudine an anima illius sit capax	11
3.	De passionibus animae	21
4.	De voluntario	27
5.	De libero arbitrio	34
6.	De causis impedementibus	39
7.	De circumstantibus actuum	56
8.	De objecto voluntatis	64
9.	De actibus voluntatis tam elicitis quam imeratis	75
10	De esse morali actus humani	91
11	De conschientia	105
12	De voluntate Dei, tamquam regula remota	123
13	De virtutibus (in het algemeen)	127
14	De peccatis	132
15	De praxi confessariorum circa peccatores consuetudinarios	155
16	De peccato originali	166
17	De legibus	179
18	De gratia	214
19	De justificatione	243
20	De merito	250

II.1: Theologia moralis (pars secunda) de virtutibus (Oldest approbation: Nov. 1, 1678; total paged leafs: 137).

1.	De virtute fidei (with paragraphs: De ecclesia (p. 18); De autoritate concilii (p. 28); De scriptura canonica (p. 32); De traditionibus	1
2.	De virtute spei	69
3.	De virtute charitatis	84

II.2: Tractatus tres de justitia et jure (Oldest approbation: Oct. 26, 1683; total paged leafs: 247).

1.	De justitia et jure generatim	1
2.	De contractibus	41
3.	De injuriis & damnis & restitutione	150

II.3: Tractatus moralis christiana de sacramentis (Oldest approbation: Aug. 4, 1676; total paged leafs: 360).

1.	De sacramentis in genere	1
2.	De baptismo	35
3.	De confirmatione	53
4.	De sacramento eucharistiae et de sacrificio missae	60
5.	De poenitentia (also: irregularitates, indulgentiae and purgatorium)	138
6.	De extrema unctione	263
7.	De ordine	274
8.	De sponsalibus et matrimonio	295

ADDENDA 2

P. DENS, *Theologia*: order and scope of the treatises in the Mechelen edition of P.J. Hanicq, 1819, 7 vols.

Bd Nr	Title	Numbering of the *dicta*	Paging	Number of pages
***	**Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, I**	***		***
1.1	Tractatus de Deo et attributis divinis	1-55	1- 91	91
1.2	Tractatus de SS. Trinitatis mysterio	56-76	92-124	33
1.3	Tractatus de angelis	77-87	125-141	17
1.4	Tractatus de creatione mundi	88-105	142-165	24
	Subtotal			**165**
***	**Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II**	***		***
1.5	Tractatus de actibus humanis	1- 85	166-303	138
1.6	Tractatus de vitiis et peccatis	86-173	304-448	145
1.7	Tractatus de conscientia	174-194	448-496	49
2.1	Tractatus de virtutibus	1-154	1-291	291
2.2	Tractatus de legibus	1- 97	292-475	184
2.3	Tractatus de gratia	1- 25	476-528	53
2.4	Tractatus de justificatione	26- 34	529-542	14
2.5	Tractatus de merito	35- 41	543-556	14
3.1	Tractatus de jure et justitia	1-151	1-307	307
3.2	Tractatus de contractibus	1- 78	308-512	205
4.1	Tractatus de virtute religionis	1-305	1-439	439
	Subtotal			**1839**
***	**Thomas Aquinas, *Summa, III***	***		***
5.1	Tractatus de incarnatione	1-42	1-67	67
5.2	Tractatus de sacramentis in genere	1-49	68-155	88
5.3	Tractatus de baptismo + dissertatio	1-43	156-246	91
5.4	Tractatus de confirmatione	1-13	247-266	20
5.5	Tract. de venerabili sacram. euchar.	1-66	267-375	109
5.6	Tractatus de sacrifio missae	1-21	376-442	67
5.7	Tractatus de censuris	1-19	443-487	45
5.8	Tractatus de irregularitate	1-29	488-512	25

6.1	Tractatus de sacram. poenitentiae	1-285	3-444	442
6.2	Tractatus de indulgentiis	286-300	445-488	44
7.1	Tractatus de extrema unctione	1- 20	5- 48	44
7.2	Tractatus de ordine	1- 15	49- 91	19
7.3	Tractatus de sponsalibus	1- 24	92-145	20
7.4	Tractatus de matrimonio	25-136	146-378	233
7.5	Tractatus de quatuor novissimis	1- 32	379-427	49
	Subtotal			**1363**
	Total			**3367**

Explanation

1. The order of treatises generally depends on the order of the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas.
2. The numbering of the *dicta* (dictate numbering) in all editions from 1758 is virtually unchanged and is thus not only useful for references but also for distinguising other entities than the treatise.

Addenda 3

J. DE BRUIJN, *Theologiae dogmaticae compendium, quod ex Liebermann aliisque theologis conscripsit et cursui quatuor annorum adaptavit.* Leiden: J.W. van Leeuwen, 1892, viii-435-vii + viii-434-viii pp.

Jaar 1	*Theologia dogmatica generalis (225 p.)*	*1*
0	Prolegomena in theologiam dogmaticam	3
1	Demonstratio christiana	6
1.1	Revelationis theoria	10
1.2	Revelationis existentia	32
2.	Demonstratio catholica	107
2.1	Demonstratio historica	109
2.2	Demonstratio immediata	141
3.	Regula fidei (with among other things 'rationis usus in theologia')	185
jaar 2	*Theologia dogmatica specialis (204 p.)*	*229*
1.	Introductio in theologiam specialis	232
2.	De ecclesia	254
3.	De Deo Uno et Trino	345
jaar 3	*Theologia dogmatica specialis (207 p.)*	*1*
1.	De Deo creatore (here also: the Immaculate Conception)	4
2.	De humani generis redemptione (here also: Sacred Heart)	107
3.	De gratia Christi	152
jaar 4	*Theologia dogmatica specialis (219 p.)*	*213*
1.	De sacramentis	215
1.1.	Baptismus	262
1.2.	Confirmatio	284

1.3.	Eucharistia	296
1.3.1	Realis presentia	296
1.3.2	Missae sacrificium	319
1.3.3	Eucharistiae sacramentum	345
1.4.	Poenitentia	361
1.5.	De indulgentiis	380
1.6.	Extrema unctio	389
1.7.	Ordo	393
1.8.	Matrimonium	403
2.	Status hominis post mortem	415

ZUR CHRISTOLOGIE BEI SIMON FIDATI VON CASCIA OESA († 1348) UND MARTIN LUTHER (1483-1546)*

Martin Luther aus Erfurt in Thüringen und Simon Fidati von Cascia in Umbrien scheint auf den ersten Blick außer der Tatsache, dass beide dem Orden der Augustiner-Eremiten angehörten, wenig zu verbinden. Ein genaueres Studium ihrer Schriften lässt jedoch einige Gemeinsamkeiten im theologischen und speziell im christologischen Denken erkennen. Die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Theologen besteht aber nicht in erster Linie in einer direkten Abhängigkeit Luthers von bestimmten Lehren Simons, wie dies in den zwanziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts immer wieder behauptet und diskutiert wurde.[1] Vielmehr liegt das Verbindende zwischen den beiden Autoren zum einen in der Neubesinnung auf das Evangelium und zum anderen in dem Willen, das Leben nach dem Evangelium zu gestalten. Auf diesem Hintergrund kann der 15 Bücher umfassende Evangelienkommentar des Simon Fidati von Cascia mit dem Titel "*De gestis Domini Salvatoris*" einiges zur Interpretation der Lehre Martin Luthers beitragen.

1. *Die erneute Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen Luther und Simon*

Will man der Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen Luther und Simon nachgehen, steht man vor der Schwierigkeit, dass Luther kein Werk Simons explizit nennt, das er als Quelle benutzt haben könnte oder das ihn selbst beeinflusst haben könnte. Gleichwohl wurde in einigen Lehren, vor allem in den Aspekten Glaube, Buße und Werke sowie in den Aussagen zum Aristotelismus, eine Affinität zwischen den beiden Augustinern festgestellt.

Diese Nähe resultiert meines Erachtens aus einer bestimmten Haltung und Motivation, die beide gleichermaßen kennzeichnet: Es ist

* Dieser Beitrag ist die überarbeitete Fassung eines Vortrages, der am 07.08.2002 anlässlich des Tenth International Congress for Luther Research, University of Copenhagen, Department of Church History, gehalten wurde.

[1] Vgl. A. V. MÜLLER, *Una fonte ignota del sistema di Lutero: Il beato Fidati da Cascia O.S.A. e la sua teologia*, Quaderni de "Bilychnis" Nr. 2, Rom 1921, 55 Seiten. In jüngerer Zeit hat sich A. ZUMKELLER, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters* (Cassiciacum, Bd. 35), Würzburg 1984, 477-482, mit dieser Frage ausführlich auseinandergesetzt.

dies die Atmosphäre des Aufbruchs, der Neubesinnung auf das Evangelium und des Bemühens zur Bekehrung zum Evangelium.

Simon war ein augustinischer Spirituale, der Jesus gemäß den Evangelien darstellte und dabei auf den Heiligen Geist vertraute, dass er die Aussagen der Heiligen Schrift richtig verstehen und erklären könne. Luthers Werk entstand etwa 200 Jahre später und unter anderen Vorzeichen, doch sind auch seine Schriften vom Impuls der Erneuerung aus dem Evangelium, von der Rückbesinnung auf das Evangelium und vom Bestreben, das Evangelium im Leben zur Auswirkung kommen zu lassen, geprägt.

Diese gemeinsame Haltung von Luther und Simon bildet die Basis, auf der sich immer wieder die Frage stellt, ob und inwiefern Luther in dem einen oder anderen Aspekt seiner Lehre durch seinen italienischen Mitbruder beeinflusst wurde.

2. *Simons Evangelienkommentar*

Die Bezeichnung des Hauptwerkes Simons als Evangelienkommentar, der jetzt erstmals in einer vollständigen textkritischen Edition vorliegt,[2] assoziiert, dass es sich hierbei um einen gattungstypischen fortlaufenden Kommentar zu den vier Evangelien handelt. Dies ist jedoch nicht der Fall, sondern vielmehr besteht die Intention des Autors darin, durch sein in 15 Bücher gegliedertes Werk den Leser, der zu monastischen, klerikalen oder gebildeten weltlichen Kreisen gehören kann, zur Verwirklichung des christlichen Lebens aufzufordern. Dieselbe Intention zeigte Simon bereits in seiner Frühschrift *L'ordine della vita cristiana*, die er – um weitere Kreise anzusprechen – 1333 als ersten Erwachsenenkatechismus in italienischer Volkssprache (volgare) verfasste.[3]

Die 15 Bücher des Evangelienkommentars sind mit den folgenden Titeln überschrieben:

(1.) *De mysteriis Verbi increati facti incarnati*: Über die Geheimnisse des ungeschaffenen Wortes, das Fleisch geworden ist

[2] SIMON FIDATI DE CASSIA OESA, *De gestis Domini Salvatoris*, ed. Willigis Eckermann, Bd. 1-6 (Cassiciacum Suppl.-Bd. 12-17), Würzburg 1998-2002 (Bd. 7 in Vorbereitung, Erscheinungstermin Frühjahr 2003).

[3] Vgl. N. MATTIOLI (ed.), *L'ordine della vita cristiana delle sentenze de' Santi Padri*, in: *Il beato Simone Fidati da Cascia. I suoi scritti editi ed inediti* (Antologia agostiniana II), Rom 1898, 125-223. Siehe auch A. LEVASTI (ed.), *La vita cristiana*, in: *Mistici del duecento e del trecento*, Mailand/Rom 21937, 607-680 (Mailand 1960).

(2.) *De Virgine Maria*: Über die Jungfrau-Mutter und ihre Taten nach dem Evangelium
(3.) *De praecursore*: Über die Eltern, das Entstehen und die Entwicklung des Vorläufers (gemeint ist Johannes der Täufer)
(4.) *De vita Christi*: Über das Leben und die Taten des Herrn und Erlösers. Von diesem vierten Buch hat das Gesamtwerk den Titel *De gestis Domini Salvatoris* erhalten.
(5.) *De miraculis*: Über die Wunder
(6.) *De parabolis domini et salvatoris nostri Jesu Christi*: Über die Parabeln
(7.) *De similitudinibus*: Über die Gleichnisse
(8.) *De vitiis a salvatore reprehensis*: Gegen die Laster nach dem Evangelium
(9.) *De virtuosis et pro virtute sermonibus domini salvatoris*: Über die Aufforderung zur Tugend. Gerade das Verwirklichen der Tugenden und Meiden der Laster ist nach Simon eine wesentliche Voraussetzung auf dem Weg zu einem christusförmigen Leben.
(10.) *De sermone domini in monte*: Über die Bergpredigt
(11.) *De disceptationibus seu disputationibus*: Über die Scheltworte
(12.) *De finali testamento dilectionis Jesu Christi sive de sermone domini post coenam*: Über das Testament der Liebe
(13.) *De passione et morte salvatoris nostri*: Über das Leiden des Herrn
(14.) *De morali gloria secundum evangelium*: Über den moralischen Ruhm nach dem Evangelium
(15.) Das 15. Buch trägt laut Simons Einleitung den Titel *De fine hominum* (Über das Ende der Menschen), tatsächlich jedoch die Überschrift *De doctrina Christi per verba* (Über die Lehre Christi durch Worte).[4]

Simons Methode besteht darin, immer wieder auf die Evangelien zurückzugreifen, aus ihnen zu zitieren und sie zu kommentieren. Gelegentlich kommt es zwar zu fortlaufenden Kommentierungen von Evangelienteilen, nicht jedoch zu einem kontinuierlichen Kommentar aller Evangelien.

[4] Das 15. Buch hat posthum Johannes von Salerno, ein Mitbruder und langjähriger Vertrauter Simons (1317-1388), aus drei zunächst eigenständigen Traktaten Simons zusammengestellt. Es besteht aus den Traktaten *De iustitia christiana*, *Breviliber de amicitia christiana*, *Tractatus de iusto iure dominii et moribus dominandi*.

Da Simon relativ früh und unerwartet in Rom verstarb, wurde das Werk durch Johannes von Salerno gemäß den vorhandenen Manuskripten ediert und mit Zwischenüberschriften versehen.[5] Dies erklärt auch die Tatsache, dass in den Evangelienkommentar verschiedene Einzeltraktate sowie ein Kurzbuch (*breviliber*) eingegangen sind.

3. *Die Christologie bei Simon und Luther*

Bei der Beurteilung der Frage nach Luthers Beziehung zu Simon soll im Folgenden das Hauptaugenmerk auf die Christologie gelenkt werden, die ohne Zweifel im Zentrum der Lehre der beiden Theologen steht.[6]

Die Christologie Luthers fasst das Schlagwort "*solus Christus*" zusammen. Bei Simon wiederum findet sich eine Formulierung, die man dieser Aussage an die Seite stellen kann; er schreibt: „Denn das Ziel von allem ist Christus, auf den jedes religiöse Bestreben zielt."[7] Daraus ergeben sich einige Konsequenzen:

3.1 *Jesus, der Weg zum Vater*

Beide Autoren stimmen darin überein, dass der Zugang zu Gott dem Vater allein über Jesus Christus erfolgt.

Luther schreibt: „Wenn wir also Gott wahrhaft finden, Gott richtig erkennen und zu ihm sicher gelangen wollen, dann lasst uns Christus anschauen, nach dem Satz (Joh 14,9.7): 'Wer mich sieht, sieht den Vater.' Ebenfalls: 'Wenn ihr mich erkannt habt, habt ihr auch den Vater erkannt.' Auf diese Weise versammelt das Wort die umherschweifenden Gedanken unseres Herzens in dieser einen Person, die Christus ist, Gott und Mensch „so dass wir zu dem Urteil kommen, dass es außer Christus keinen Gott gibt und [sc. kein Gott] gefunden

[5] Inwieweit Johannes von Salerno auch redaktionell in den Text eingegriffen hat, bedarf einer gesonderten Untersuchung.

[6] Die Bezugnahme auf Luther erfolgt auf der Basis der Weimarer Ausgabe (WA) sowie der Bekenntnisschriften der Lutherischen Kirche (BSLK), Göttingen [7]1976. Eine weitere Grundlage bildet der Artikel „Luther, Martin" von Otto Hermann Pesch im LThK 6[3] (1997) 1129-1140, bes. 1134. Siehe auch M. LIENHARD, *Au cœur de la foi de Luther*: Jésus-Christ, Paris 1991. Für die Simon-Zitate wird die neue Edition (vgl. Anm. 2) zugrunde gelegt.

[7] Nam finis omnium Christus, ad quem omnis religiosa festinat intentio (2, 31: I, 218, 48f.).

werden kann. 'Glaubst du nicht', sagte er, 'dass der Vater in mir ist, und ich im Vater?' (Joh 14,10)."[8]

Simon äußert sich hinsichtlich der Erkenntnis des Vaters und des Kommens zu ihm folgendermaßen: „Wenn wir den ewigen Vater erkennen, zu ihm voll Mühe gelangen wollen, ist Christus der Weg. Niemals kommt man nämlich zur Erkenntnis des Vaters, wenn nicht vorher der Sohn bekannt wird. Denn es gab weder den Vater ohne den Sohn, noch existierte der Sohn ohne den Vater; durch wechselseitige Beziehung wurde der eine der Weg zum anderen (Mt 11,27). Wer also den ewigen Vater sucht, suche Christus, den ewigen Sohn. Er ist sogleich der direkteste Weg zum Vater. Wer kennt nämlich den Vater außer der Sohn oder derjenige, dem 'der Sohn ihn offenbaren' will (Mt 11,27)? Wer führt direkter zum Vater als jener, der aus ihm seit Ewigkeit hervorging? Aber eher sträflich als erfreulich wäre die Erkenntnis, zum Vater aus dem Glauben auf dem Weg, welcher der Sohn ist, zu gelangen, wenn wir nicht auf demselben [sc. Weg] in Ewigkeit zu demselben [sc. dem Vater] als Glückseligkeit kämen.

Aber der Weg zum Vater durch den Glauben ist als derselbe auch der Weg zu seiner Seligkeit, denn unseretwegen ist er vom Himmel herabgestiegen und Mensch geworden (Joh 1,14), damit der in die Irre geratene Mensch auf dem rechten Weg zum Himmlischen zurückgerufen würde. Er besaß und lehrte himmlische Sitten, in denen der Weg besteht, durch welchen den Menschen die göttliche Anschauung selbst gezeigt wird."[9]

[8] Igitur cum Deum vere invenire, Deum recte cognoscere et ad eum certo pervenire volumus, Christum intueamur, secundum sententiam: 'Qui videt me, videt Patrem'; Item: "Si novistis me, novistis et Patrem'. Ad hunc modum colligit verbum vagas cogitationes nostri cordis in hanc unam personam, quae est Christus, Deus et homo, ita, ut extra Christum sentiamus nullum Deum esse et inveniri posse. 'Non credis', inquit, 'quod Pater in me est et ego in Patre?' (WA 40, 3; 337, 17-22).

[9] Si aeternum Patrem cognoscere volumus, si ad illum pervenire satagimus, Christus est via. Numquam enim pervenitur ad notitiam Patris, nisi prius Filius notus fiat. Nam nec Pater esset sine Filio, nec exstaret Filius sine Patre, mutua relatione unus ad alterum (Mt 11,27) factus est via. Igitur aeternum Patrem inquirens, Christum quaerat Filium aeternum. Via protinus direc-tissima est ad Patrem. *Quis* enim *novit Patrem nisi Filius* aut *cui voluerit Filius revelare* (Mt 11,27)? Quis rectius ad Patrem ducit quam ille, qui ab ipso aeterne processit? Sed plus esset poenalis quam delectabilis cognitio ad Patrem ex fide per viam, quae Filius est, pervenire, nisi per eandem aeterne ad eundem pro beatitudine veniremus.

Sed qui via est per fidem ad Patrem, idem et iter ad eius beatitudinem, etenim propter nos descendit de caelis et homo factus est (Jo 1,14), ut ad cae-lestia revocaretur per rectam viam homo factus erroneus. Et mores tenuit et docuit ipse caelestes, in quibus est via, qua hominibus ostendatur visio ipsa divina (7, 42: III, 361, 22 – 362, 36).

Weiter führt Simon aus: „Der Weg der wahren Weisheit ist uns Christus geworden, denn in ihm sind alle Schätze der Weisheit verborgen (Kol 2,3). ... Und der Apostel sagt zu den Korinthern (1 Kor 1,30): 'Er ist uns Weisheit von Gott geworden.' Wenn also Christus der Weg der Weisheit geworden ist, ist es Torheit, alles zu wissen – wenn es das überhaupt gibt – und ihn nicht zu kennen; ihn allerdings zu kennen und das Übrige nicht zu kennen, ist höchste Weisheit. Er ist der Weg der Wahrheit, wer von ihm abirrt, wird in Ewigkeit trauern. ... Wenn jemand den Glauben, wenn jemand Christus, den Weg der Führung, den Weg der Weisheit, den Weg der Wahrheit angenommen hat, bleibe er fest auf ihm, denn nicht wer begonnen hat, sondern wer ausharrt, wird gerettet werden (Mt 10,22. 24,13). ... Es gibt keinen besseren Weg als Christus, der im Jenseits das Leben, im Diesseits der Weg zum Leben ist."[10]

3.2 *Jesus soll in seiner menschlichen Form gesucht werden*

Für Martin Luther wie für Simon Fidati hat die Betrachtung der Person Jesu in ihrem Verhalten und in ihren Äußerungen einen hohen Stellenwert. Der Blick auf Jesus als Menschen ruft denjenigen, der sich mit dem Leben Jesu Christi beschäftigt, dazu auf, in diesem das angemessene Verhalten des Menschen Gott gegenüber zu sehen.

Zu dieser Thematik schreibt Luther: „Man muss auf der Jakobsleiter hinaufsteigen, auf die Gott sich stützt, deren Füße die Erde neben dem Haupt Jakobs berühren. Wenn du handeln, über dein Heil nachdenken willst, dann unterlass alle Gedanken des Gesetzes, alle Traditionen der Philosophie und lass dich zur Krippe hinreißen und zum Schoß der Mutter und schau ihn als Saugenden, Wachsenden und Sterbenden an; dann kannst du 'entlaufen' allen Verängstigungen, Irrungen und dieses Schauspiel hält dich auf dem rechten Wege."[11]

[10] Via verae sapientiae nobis factus est Christus, quoniam *in* ipso *sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae absconditi* (Col 2,3). ... Et Apostolus ad Corinthios dicit (1 Cor 1,30): Ipse *factus est nobis sapientia a deo*. Proinde si via sapientiae factus est Christus, scire omnia, si qua sunt, et ipsum ignorare, insipientia est, ipsumque sane scire ceteraque nescire, summa sapientia est. Via est veritatis, a qua aberrans lugebit aeterne, ... Si quis fidem, si quis Christum, viam directionis, viam sapientiae, viam veritatis accepit, firmus in illa permaneat, etenim non qui inceperit, sed *qui perseveraverit, salvus erit* (Mt 10,22; 24,13).
..., sed nulla melior nisi Christus, qui in superioribus vita, in inferioribus via vitae, ... (7, 42: III, 363, 73 – 364, 98).

[11] Ascendendum per scalam Iacob, in qua deus nititur, cuius pedes tangunt terram iuxta caput Iacob. Quando vis agere, cogitare de salute tua, omissis omnibus cogitationibus legis, traditionibus philosophiae rapias te in praesepe et gremium matris et

In ähnlicher Weise schreibt Simon zur Betrachtung der menschlichen Äußerungen Jesu Christi: „Unter allen [sc. Wegen] ist der angemessenere und direkte Weg der, dass Christus so gesucht wird, wie er gemäß dem Bericht des Apostels gefunden wurde; er sagt nämlich (Phil 2,7): 'Und im Äußeren wurde er als Mensch erfunden'; der Sohn Gottes ist mit dem Gewand unseres Menschseins bekleidet worden, in dem er den Menschen erscheinen und sich so unter den Menschen aufhalten wollte, dass er von den Suchenden gefunden werden konnte. In den Verhaltensweisen, in denen uns Christus erschien, sollen wir ihn suchen. In der Form eines Menschen lebend (Phil 2,7) zeigte er den Menschen, was sie in ihm zu finden sich bemühen sollten. Durch das Wort lehrte er die Lebensführung, er tat es durch das Werk, durch das Verhalten wurde er als Mensch erfunden (Phil 2,7). Er lebte über das hinaus, was zum Menschen gehört. Seine Handlungen mögen angeschaut werden; in ihnen möge er gesucht werden und wird er als Mensch gefunden (Phil 2,7). Er wurde beschnitten als Mensch (Lk 2,21), zum Tempel getragen als Mensch (Lk 2,22), er floh nach Ägypten als Mensch (Mt 2,13), er fürchtete sich als Mensch (Mk 14,33) ... er wurde geschlagen als Mensch (Joh 18,23), er hat gelitten als Mensch (Lk 22,15), er wurde gekreuzigt als Mensch (Lk 23,33), er ist gestorben als Mensch (Lk 23,46) und wurde begraben als Mensch (Mt 27,59-60), er erstand auf, weil er ein Mensch war (Lk 24,46), er ist aufgefahren als Mensch (Joh 20,17), auch und weil er ein Mensch in allem war, aber die Sünde weit abgeschlagen war. So wurde er 'als Mensch erfunden' (Phil 2,7), so suche und finde ihn der Mensch, und den Gefundenen halte der Mensch fest, ohne ihn loszulassen, und führe ihn in das Gemach des Geistes (Hld 3,1-4), bis er selbst in die ewigen Zelte einführt."[12]

spectes eum suggentem, crescentem, morientem; tum entlauffen potes omnibus pavoribus, erroribus et hoc spectaculum retinet in recta via (WA 40, 1; 79, 7 – 80, 2).

[12] Est inter omnes quaedam via decentior, compendium habens, ut sic quaera-tur, ut ab Apostolo refertur inventus, inquit enim (Phil 2,7): *Et habitu inventus ut homo*, indutus est dei Filius nostrae humanitatis habitum, in quo apparere hominibus voluit sicque inter homines conversari, ut posset a quaerentibus inveniri.

Qualibus modis nobis apparuit Christus, in talibus inquiramus.

In forma hominis degens (Phil 2,7) monstravit hominibus, quid in ipso invenire satagerent.

Verbo vitam agendam docuit, egit opere, *habitu inventus* est *ut homo* (Phil 2,7). Supra id, quod hominis est, vivebat.

Inspiciantur actiones eius, in illis quaeratur et invenietur *ut homo* (Phil 2,7).

Circumcisus ut homo (Lc 2,21), ad templum delatus ut homo (Lc 2,22),
fugit in Aegyptum ut homo (Mt 2,13), timuit ut homo (Mc 14,33),
...

Aus diesen beiden Textpassagen zeigt sich also deutlich, dass sowohl bei Luther als auch bei Simon das Menschsein Jesu eine wichtige, wenn nicht gar die entscheidende Rolle spielt. Denn über den Menschen Jesus gelangt der Glaubende zur Gottheit Jesu.

3.3 *Das Kreuz Jesu und die Annahme des eigenen Kreuzes*

In einem weiteren Aspekt lassen sich zwischen Luther und Simon Konvergenzen feststellen: Es handelt sich um die Auffassung vom Kreuz und um die Bewertung des Kreuzes, das der Christ täglich annehmen soll.

In der 94. und 95. These spricht Luther einen wesentlichen Gedanken zur Annahme und zum Tragen des Kreuzes aus, indem er darauf verweist, dass Kreuz und Leid ein sichereres Zeichen für die Annahme des Menschen durch Gott sind als ein Leben in ungestörter Sicherheit. Die Ablassthesen aus dem Jahre 1517 lauten: „Man muss die Christen ermahnen, dass sie Christus, ihrem Haupt, durch Leiden, Tod und Hölle nachzufolgen trachten und so mehr darauf vertrauen, durch viel Trübsal in den Himmel einzugehen als durch die Sicherheit eines (Schein-)Friedens.“ [13]

Simon kommentiert die Annahme des täglichen Kreuzes und die Nachfolge Jesu (Mk 8,34; Mt 16,24; Lk 9,26) mit folgender Bemerkung: „Wer ihm also nachfolgen will, lege den eigenen Willen, die Weisheit des Fleisches und das menschliche Wissen gänzlich ab und gehe nicht freudigen Sinnes und in seinem Reichtum schwelgend einher, sondern nehme sein Kreuz nicht nur ein einziges Mal, sondern täglich auf sich (Lk 9,23). Denn das von der Welt trennende Schwert des Kreuzes muss immer gezückt in der Hand gehalten werden, da sich die Welt jeden Tag mit ihren Freuden anbietet und das Fleisch unablässig den Geist bekämpft (Gal 5,17). Deshalb muss immer die Frechheit desjenigen, der Unverschämtes anbietet, zurückgestutzt

verberatus ut homo (Jo 18,23), passus ut homo (Lc 22,15),
crucifixus ut homo (Lc 23,33), mortuus ut homo (Lc 23,46),
sepultus ut homo (Mt 27,59-60), resurrexit quia homo (Lc 24,46),
ascendit ut homo (Jo 20,17), etiam et quia homo in omnibus procul pulso peccato.
Sic igitur *inventus ut homo* (Phil 2,7), ita eum quaerat et inveniat homo
et inventum teneat nec dimittat homo,
et introducat *in cubiculum* mentis (Cant 3,1-4), donec ipse in aeterna tabernacula introducat (6, 7: III, 61, 80 – 62, 112).

[13] Exhortandi sunt Christiani, ut caput suum Christum per penas, mortes infernosque sequi studeant, ac sic magis per multas tribulationes intrare celum quam per securitatem pacis confidant (WA 1; 238, 14-21).

werden, und das Fleisch zurückgedrängt werden, damit es nicht über unseren Geist die Oberhand gewinnt."[14]

Simon erläutert die Annahme des Kreuzes noch etwas näher: „[sc. Das Kreuz] ist zum Fortschritt anzunehmen, damit wir durch unsere Gemütsverfassung, durch unsere Lebensweise, unser Verhalten, durch Denken und Handeln Jesus nachfolgen. Er nahm sein Kreuz auf seine wunderbare und lobenswerte Weise auf sich, nehmen also auch wir das unsrige nach unserem Vermögen an."[15] „Folgen wir dem armen, demütigen, verachteten, schließlich unschuldig für uns gekreuzigten und gestorbenen Christus, der bestimmte, dass auf dem Weg, auf dem er selbst einherging, auch seine Nachfolger zur Vollendung gelangen. Es ist aber das Kreuz anzunehmen, und zwar nicht jener hölzerne Querbalken, nicht jene Konstruktion aus Holz, ... sondern das ganze Leben des Menschen im Glauben an Christus, losgelöst von der Welt, in Niedrigkeit und Bestrafung verbracht, froh in der Seele, wenn wir von außen mit Belästigungen verfolgt werden."[16]

„Klarer aber, was das Kreuz ist, das wir tragen sollen, erklären die folgenden Worte des Erlösers: 'Denn wer sein Leben retten will, wird es verlieren; wer aber sein Leben um meinetwillen und um des Evangeliums willen verliert, wird es retten' (Mk 8,35). Siehe das moralische Geheimnis des Kreuzes, das Leben in dieser Welt zu verlieren, damit es in der anderen gerettet wird. Und ein vorbehaltliches Versprechen ist in der Annahme des Kreuzes hinzugefügt: Wer sein Leben verliert (Mk 8,35), wer den Begierden dieser Welt aus keiner anderen Absicht oder Ursache absagt als wegen Jesus und wegen seines im Glauben angenommenen Evangeliums, wegen des Glaubensgutes und des notwendig zu Glaubenden, das er lehrt, und wegen des zu Meidenden, das er verbietet, und wegen des Auszuführenden,

[14] Proinde, qui vult post eum ire, propriam voluntatem, sapientiam carnis, humanum sapere omnino deponat, et non delectato sensu et opulente incedat, sed accipiat crucem suam, non semel, sed *cotidie* (Lc 9,23). Quoniam gladius crucis decisivus a mundo semper evaginatus tenendus est, cum omni die mundus se offerat cum delectationibus suis et caro incessanter spiritum impugnet (Ga 5,17). Unde semper recidere oportet importunitatem importuna offerentis et carnem reprimere, ne spiritui nostro praevaleat (9, 39: IV, 453, 20 – 454, 26).

[15] Tollenda est ad profectum, ut affectu, vita, moribus, theoria, actu sequamur Jesum. Accepit ipse suam crucem, suo mirabili et laudabili modo, accipiamus et nos nostram pro modulo nostro (9, 39: IV, 454, 34-36).

[16] ..., sed Jesum pauperem, humilem, contemptum, denique innocenter pro nobis crucifixum et mortuum, qui ea via, qua ipse incessit, statuit suos sequaces in gloriam pervenire. Est autem crux tollenda, non illud patibulum ligneum, nec illa lignorum strues, ... sed tota vita hominis in fide Christi discopulata a mundo, vilitate et poenalitate acta, et animo gaudere, cum ab extra molestiis agitamur (9, 39: IV, 454, 39-46).

das er befiehlt,[17] und wegen des zu Hoffenden, das er unter dem Versprochenen bereithält, dennoch so, dass dies zum Handeln anvertraut ist und vom Menschen in seinen zwei Bereichen [gemeint sind Leib und Seele] fortgeführt wird, dessen Leben wird, wenn er dies glaubt und tut, gerettet werden."[18]

Es bleibt somit festzuhalten, dass die Thematik des Kreuzes und die gläubige Annahme desselben im Leben zwei Bereiche darstellen, die Luther und Simon gleichermaßen betonen.

3.4 *Die Heilsereignisse um Jesus und ihr existentielles Verständnis*

Luther hat in der Soteriologie einen besonderen Akzent gesetzt, der in den Worten "*pro me, pro nobis*" zusammengefasst wird. Er hebt vor allem die Beziehung der Heilsereignisse auf das eigene Leben hervor, während ihr Fürwahrhalten, d. h. die *fides historica*, in den Hintergrund tritt.

Im Kleinen Katechismus, im Artikel von der Erlösung, schreibt Luther im Jahre 1529: „Ich gläube, daß Jesus Christus, wahrhaftiger Gott vom Vater in Ewigkeit geborn und auch wahrhaftiger Mensch von der Jungfrauen Maria geborn, sei mein HERR, der mich verlornen und verdammpten Menschen erlöset hat, erworben, gewonnen und von allen Sunden, vom Tode und von der Gewalt des Teufels nicht mit Gold oder Silber, sondern mit seinem heiligen, teuren Blut und mit seinem unschüldigen Leiden und Sterben, auf daß ich sein eigen sei und in seinem Reich unter ihme lebe und ihme diene in ewiger Gerechtigkeit, Unschuld und Seligkeit, gleichwie er ist auferstanden vom Tode, lebet und regieret in Ewigkeit; das ist gewißlich wahr."[19]

[17] Vgl. die Tugend-Laster-Konzeption bereits in *L'ordine della vita cristiana*: Durch das Verwirklichen der Tugenden und Meiden der Laster kommt man auf dem Weg, den Willen Gottes zu tun, der wiederum das christliche Leben ausmacht, weiter.

[18] Liquentius autem, quid sit ipsa crux, quae tolli iubetur, verba salvatoris subiecta declarant: *Qui enim voluerit animam suam salvam facere, perdet eam; qui autem perdiderit animam suam propter me et* propter *evangelium, salvam faciet eam* (Mc 8,35). Ecce crucis morale mysterium, animam in hoc mundo perdere, ut in alio salva fiat. Et pollicitatio conditionalis apposita est in tollendo crucem, quoniam *qui* perdit *animam suam* (Mc 8,35), qui renuntiat concupiscentiis huius mundi non alia intentione vel causa, sed propter Jesum et propter evangelium eius in fide receptum, propter credibilia necessarioque credenda, quae docet, et propter vitanda, quae prohibet, et propter agenda, quae iubet, et propter speranda, quae sub pollicitatione continet, ita tamen, ut haec tradita sunt in actionem, ab utroque homine deducantur, credentis anima salva erit haec agentis (9, 39: IV, 454, 51 – 455, 62).

[19] BSLK 511, 23-38.

Der Große Katechismus antwortet auf die Frage „Was gläubst Du ... von Jesu Christo?" mit den Worten: „Ich gläube, daß Jesus Christus, wahrhaftiger Gottessohn, sei mein Herr worden." – „Was ist nu das, 'ein Herr werden?'" – „Das ist's, daß er mich erlöset hat von Sunde, vom Teufel, vom Tode und allem Unglück. Denn zuvor habe ich keinen Herrn noch König gehabt, sondern unter des Teufels Gewalt gefangen, zu dem Tod verdammpt, in der Sunde und Blindheit verstrickt gewesen."[20]

Die Notwendigkeit zu glauben, dass der Glaubende selbst in den Vorgang der Erlösung eingebunden ist, kommt in der Hebräerbriefvorlesung von 1517/18 im Kommentar zu Hebr 5,1 („Jeder Hohepriester wird für die Menschen eingesetzt") zum Ausdruck. Zu diesem Vers heißt es: „Anzumerken ist, dass es für den Christen nicht genug ist zu glauben, Christus sei für die Menschen eingesetzt, wenn er nicht glaubt, auch er sei einer von ihnen."[21]

Bei Simon kommt die Vorstellung, die Heilsereignisse müssten auf das eigene Leben des Glaubenden bezogen werden, zwar nicht so explizit zur Sprache wie bei Luther, doch finden sich auch bei ihm Gedanken, die in diese Richtung zielen:

Ein Beispiel dafür ist Simons Auslegung von Mt 3,15 („Es ziemt sich für uns, die ganze Gerechtigkeit zu erfüllen"); er schreibt dazu: „Aber jenes heilige Verständnis erhielten wir von jenem Wort, wonach die Glieder Christi, durch Willen und Verhalten gleichförmig geworden, gehalten sind, alle Gerechtigkeit auf ihre Weise zu erfüllen."[22]

Ferner bemüht Simon die Vorstellung vom *Totus Christus* und sieht die wahrhaft Glaubenden dazu verpflichtet, die Taten Christi auf sich zu beziehen und wie Christus zu handeln: „Und deshalb, wenn Christus behauptet, er werde die ganze Gerechtigkeit durch Schicklichkeit erfüllen, drängt er den zukünftigen Leib und spricht sich nicht außerhalb des zukünftigen Leibes aus. Im Plural nämlich präsentierte er sich, in einer Ausdrucksweise, die wir in ähnlicher Form in keinem Teil des Evangeliums finden. Aber wegen des von neuem durch die Gnade zu schaffenden Körpers und wegen der in der Tugend wachsenden Glieder, die ihm anhangen, hat Christus in dieser Sprechweise

[20] BSLK 651, 31-40.

[21] Notandum, quod non satis est Christiano credere Christum esse constitutum pro hominibus, nisi credat et se esse unum illorum (WA 57, III; 169, 10-11).

[22] ..., sed illam sacram intelligentiam ab isto verbo suscepimus, qua Christi membra voluntate atque moribus sibi conformia omnem iustitiam implere suo modo tenentur (9, 3: IV, 295, 42-44).

geredet: „So geziemt es sich für uns, die ganze Gerechtigkeit zu erfüllen" (Mt 3,15). Dies soll nicht nur auf Christus und Johannes allein bezogen werden, sondern auf Christus und den Leib, den er sich von neuem zurechtmachen wird."[23]

Die existentielle Thematik kommt auch in der Kreuzesnachfolge zum Ausdruck, die Simon folgendermaßen umschreibt: „Denn es ist würdig mit Blick auf Christus, der das Kreuz unseretwegen auf sich nahm, wenn auch wir das Kreuz annehmen, indem wir ihm folgen, nicht seinetwegen, sondern unseretwegen, weil wir ihm durch unsere Nachfolge nichts hinzufügen, sondern für uns ein Hügel von Verdiensten gebildet wird."[24]

Schließlich verdeutlicht Simon die Notwendigkeit, die Botschaft Jesu auf das eigene Leben zu beziehen, bei seiner Auslegung von Mk 1,15 („Und glaubt dem Evangelium"): „Viele glauben zwar *das* Evangelium, aber sie glauben nicht *dem* Evangelium. Das erste kann neben dem zweiten bestehen, aber das zweite nicht neben dem ersten ... *Dem* Evangelium zu glauben, bedeutet also christusförmig und evangeliumspraktisch zu werden."[25]

4. *Ausblick*

In diesen Ausführungen über Martin Luther und Simon Fidati ging es im Wesentlichen darum, einen Vergleich der beiden Theologen, und zwar mit besonderem Blick auf die Christologie, anzustellen. Die Untersuchung ihrer Aussagen zu den vier behandelten christologischen Aspekten, nämlich Jesus als Weg zum Vater, zweitens das Suchen Jesu in seiner menschlichen Form, drittens das Kreuz Jesu und die daraus resultierende Annahme des eigenen Kreuzes und schließ-

[23] Ac per hoc, cum Christus se asserit omnem iustitiam per decentiam impleturus, futurum corpus ipse compellat nec se praeter corpus futurum enuntiat. Plurali enim numero se posuit, quod in aliqua evangelii parte simile genus loquendi numquam reperimus. Sed propter corpus creandum de novo per gratiam et membra in virtute nascentia, cohaerentia sibi, Christus tali loquendi genere est fatus (Mt 3,15): *Sic decet nos implere omnem iustitiam*. Nec referantur haec ad Christum et ad solum Johannem, sed ad Christum et ad corpus sibi denuo coaptandum (9, 3: IV, 295, 53 – 296, 61).

[24] Quoniam dignum est Christo crucem accipienti propter nos, si et nos accipiamus crucem sequentes ipsum, non propter ipsum, sed propter nos ipsos, quia nihil sibi adicimus sequentes ipsum, sed pro nobis componitur cumulus praemiorum (9, 24: IV, 390, 140-143).

[25] Multi siquidem credunt evangelium, sed non credunt evangelio, primum praeter secundum, sed alterum praeter primum esse non potest. ... Proinde evangelio credere hoc est, quod fieri christiformem et evangipraxem (9, 7: IV, 312, 93-99).

lich die existentielle Sicht der christologischen Heilsereignisse, dürften deutlich gemacht haben, dass in zentralen Punkten der Christologie etliche Parallelen bestehen und beide Autoren ähnliche oder gar übereinstimmende Positionen vertreten. Freilich wird man nicht so weit gehen, eine direkte Abhängigkeit Luthers vom Evangelienkommentator zu behaupten, auch wenn es sehr naheliegend ist, dass Luther – gerade auch als Bibelübersetzer und -kommentator – Simons Werk zumindest gekannt und wohl auch studiert hat. Vielmehr sollte gezeigt werden, dass sich die Konvergenzen aus einer ähnlichen Motivation und aufgrund einer jeweils ähnlichen Zeit des Auf- und Umbruchs erklären lassen, in der Luther wie Simon verstärkt und gezielt auf das Evangelium zurückgreifen.

Nachdem jetzt eine kritische Edition des Evangelienkommentars vorliegt, bietet es sich an, den Vergleich zwischen Luther und Simon auf weitere zentrale Punkte ihrer Lehren, wie z. B. auf ihre Aussagen zum Evangelium oder zur Rechtfertigung, auszudehnen. Denn gerade die beiden letztgenannten Punkte spielen auch für Simon Fidati eine nicht unbedeutende Rolle, so dass sich eine Untersuchung lohnen dürfte.

Willigis ECKERMANN OSA

BENOZZO GOZZOLI'S LIFE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE IN SAN GIMIGNANO
the Subscripted Text Revisited

In the first number of this volume Matthias Strauss[1] published a useful and detailed description of the frescoes, 1463-1465, located in the church of Sant-Agostino at San Gimignano that depict the Life of Saint Augustine. In Strauss's Dissertation for the Degree of Master of Arts, he points out several details in the architecture and in the landscape, which would doubtless remain hidden for a superficial visitor viewing the church.

However, to my mind it remains unclear as to why the illustrations should be numbered in a reverse fashion and not in parallel with the descriptions provided by the text. Starting at number 22, he works his way back to number 7 as the last of the representations and adds some more detail for the later numbers.

Worse, Strauss makes mistakes in his transcription of the subscripted texts of the scenes, especially when guessing at the illegible bits. These you can see for yourself where photos of the texts have been made. On p. 75, as Strauss tells us 'Unverständlich sind die von Pecori, Crowe und Cavalcasselle, sowie Courcelle[2] von den Originalen abweichend zitierten Bildunterschriften. Bei allen werden sie nur stellenweise angeführt und sind darum häufig anders als jene die in San Gimignano zu lesen sind... Bisher wurde auf diese Diskrepanz noch nie hingewiesen', evidently he is unaware of having done precisely the same thing himself. Of the 17 paintings only three are well transcribed. The texts of two of the scenes have disappeared entirely. Transcriptions of the remaining 12 scenes have been recorded incorrectly.

Since I have reason to believe that Strauss's study is likely to be regarded as a more or less complete description of the Gozzoli frescoes, I deem it necessary herewith to offer the reader a revised and more accurate version of the transcriptions.

[1] M.. STRAUSS, *Die Augustinusvita von Benozzo Gozzoli aus der Kirche S. Agostino in San Gimignano*, in *Augustiniana* 52 (2002), 5-114, and 57 illustrations. Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Geschichtswissenschaften, Kunsthistorisches Institut, zur Erlangung des akad. Grades eines Magister Artium.

[2] Jeanne et Pierre Courcelle (see under no. 7) do not give all the subtitles but those they do give are almost entirely faultless.

1. In the text to the first picture: Augustine's parents present him to the schoolmaster of Tagaste (*Abbildung 22*) on p.60, MONICA is written with a 'C' and not with a 'K'.

2. The subtitle to the sixth picture: Augustine teaching in Rome (*Abb. 17*) the transcription on p.64 has PRECIRUORUM but this should be PRECIPUORUM. Again on p.64 Strauss transcribes the last word of the text depicted on the open book of the man sitting on the left as COSUSTIT whereas it ought to be CONSISTIT.

3. The text to the seventh painting: Augustine is shown leaving Rome (*Abb. 18*) on p.65 has been correctly transcribed without any mistakes. At the top of the scene however, a text is contained within a cartouche referring to Prior Domenico Strambi OSA by whom Gozzoli was commissioned. The text is given as GEMIGNANICI but it should read GEMIGNANIACI instead, see p.65, as is confirmed by Courcelle p.92.

4. The eighth scene: Augustine's arrival in Milan (*Abb. 15)*, on p.66. Here I offer more probable words as follows: for DOTORUM read DOCTORUM, for OMITUTU read COMITATU, for GRATANTUR read GRATANTER and for HONRIFICE read HONORIFICE.

5. The text to the ninth scene: Augustine and Ambrose are engaged in a theological dispute and Ambrose is preaching to the people (*Abb. 16*), is only partly legible as can be seen on p.67. However, there is no doubt that the word FUI must be read as being FUIT.

6. The following painting presents the Conversion of Augustine in the Garden (*Abb. 14*). The transcription of the defective subtitle on p.68 should not read BICENTEM but DICENTEM. Again on p.68 Strauss provides a text to the scene of Augustine's baptism (*Abb. 13*). Here the text should not be BATTI[SUUM] but BATTI[SMUM]. The baptismal font carries a date in Italian as "First of April 1464", see p.69, and *Abb. 13b*, but in that case PRIMA has to be changed into PRIMO.

7. About the twelfth picture: Augustin's visit to the Hermits of Monte Pisano, the Presentation of the Rule and the Conversation with the Child at the Sea (*Abb. 12*), I wrote a study, see ALBERIC DE MEIJER OSA, *Saint Augustine and the Conversation with the Child on the Shore*: The History behind the Legend, translated from the Dutch by Jan Busch OSA, in *Augustinian Heritage* 39 (Villanova, PA, 1993), 21-34. This study appears to have been completely unknown to Strauss otherwise he would surely not have made as many mistakes in the transcription as he did. Since JEANNE AND PIERRE COURCELLE, *Iconographie de Saint Augustin*, II: Les cycles du XV^e^ siècle (Paris 1969), 85-106, pl. XLV-LXV, make no mention of it, in 1991 I asked the then Prior, Fr. Giuseppe Pucci OSA, if he would be so kind as to have the text transcribed for me[3]. Together with two of his friends, Vasaturo among them, Fr. Pucci was able to determine the subscripted text below the scene. This I have had printed both in *Holland* 23 (1991), note 27, and in *Augustinian Heritage* 39 (1993), note 23. Here I give the text again for the third time so that the reader may compare it to that given by Strauss on p.70:

   QVALITER AVGV[STINVS] C [VM] S [VIS] VISITATIS HEREMITIS DE MONTE PISANO A...ST DATAM EIS REGVLAM A D[OMI]NO NOSTR[O] IHESV CHRISTO SVB CVIVSDAM SCITVLI EFFEGIE / SECVS LITV[S] [S]IMILITVDINEM MARIS AD PARVAM FOVEAM DE ARD[VA] AC DIFFICILI INDIVIDVE TRINITATIS [CO]GNITIONE EST[I]TIT INFORMATVS.

8. The thirteenth scene. This shows the death of Monica (*Abb. 11*). The words in Strauss's transcription on p.71 require correcting as follows: not TIBE[RINOM] but TIBE-[RINAM]; not HUBITIS but HABITIS; not COLLOQUIUS but COLLOQUIIS; not PUERLI but PUERILI.

[3] On p.21, note 47, Strauss tells us that he spoke with Prior Remualdo [sic] Vasaturo. However, Romualdo Vasaturo is no Augustinian and certainly not the Prior. He is the author of a booklet entitled *Chiesa di s.Agostino in San Gimignano* (1993), with texts in both Italian and English. In the English version, note 17, Vasaturo makes mention of my original text: *Augustinus aan het Spaarne*, in *Holland* 23 (Haarlem 1991), 53-72.

9. In the description of the fourteenth scene: Augustine blesses the people (*Abb. 10*), Strauss writes on p.72 ASSUMTUM whereas it is quite clear that this should be ASSUNTUN. The completion of the word EPISC... should be EPISC[OPATUM] as the Courcelles did on p.103.

10. The fifteenth scene. The Dispute with Fortunatus (*Abb. 9*) on p.72. Here the transcription DISPUTAM should be corrected to DISPUTANS and PUPLICE needs to become PUBLICE.

11. The sixteenth scene (*Abb. 8*). This penultimate painting shows St. Jerome appearing to Augustine and the ...US on p.73 may be completed as DEFUNCTUS.

12. In the seventeenth and final scene: the death of Augustine (*Abb. 7*), the subscripted text has been copied without mistakes.

Albéric de MEIJER OSA

BOEKBESPREKINGEN – COMPTES RENDUS

V. H. DRECOLL, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins. Tübingen, 1999. (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 109)

Selbstverständlich hat er *De beata vita*, *De immortalitate animae*, *De libero arbitrio*, *De vera religione* (wo man den Begriff Gnade in einer Wechselbeziehung zu *salus* und *vita* zum ersten Mal in den Werken Augustins entdecken kann), die ersten exegetischen Werke der Paulusbriefe (u.a. de *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos*, de *Epistola ad Galatas expositio*) und schließlich die *Confessiones* als *objectum materiale* für seine Untersuchung gewählt. In all diesen Traktaten untersucht er den Argumentationsverlauf, den Kontext der Schlüsselbegriffe und die Schöpfungs- und Erlösungsvorstellung im Hinblick auf ihre Verknüpfung mit der Entwicklung des Gnadenbegriffes, z. B. in *De vera religione* und in der frühen Paulusexegese. Als junger Suchender stellt er schon einen Zusammenhang her zwischen Gnade und Erlösung, und er vertieft diese Betrachtungsweise im Laufe seines Lebens immer mehr im Hinblick auf die Fragen, mit denen er konfrontiert wird oder die er sich selbst stellt. Drecolls Forschungsmethode bedeutet keinenfalls, dass er sich nicht ständig mit der abundanten Sekundärliteratur auseinandergesetzt hat. Es gelingt ihm nicht nur mit dem jungen Augustinus im Gespräch zu bleiben – Anliegen des Autors war es, die frühen Entwicklungen in der Gnadenlehre Augustins darzustellen – sondern es zeigt sich auch, dass er sich von den Forschern, die ihm vorangegangen sind, an bestimmten Punkten hingewiesen weiß. Es soll jetzt schon gesagt werden, dass es eines der großen Verdienste dieser Arbeit ist, dass sowohl die primären Texte in den sorgfältigen Textanalysen, als auch die Ergebnisse der Studien zu ihrem Recht kommen – auch wenn die Ergebnisse manchmal aufregen, weil sie bisher erworbene Einsichten auf Grund der Textlesung kritisieren. Augustins Texte werden in dieser Untersuchung nirgendwo in das Procustesbett irgendeiner anachronistischen Vorraussetzung gelegt.

Konform der chronologischen Reihenfolge der Traktate Augustins, zeigt Drecoll dass Augustin in *De immortalitate animae* (387) neuplatonische Gedanken hinsichtlich des Gottes- und Seelenbegriffes verarbeitet hat und Gott von ihm als umfassende, leben- und formgebende Weltseele betrachtet wird, dabei die Unterscheidung zur Individualseele vernachlässigend. Gerade dort, wo der Gnadenbegriff in *De vera religione* (389-91) zur Sprache kommt, bleibt dieser Gottesbegriff unterschwellig wirksam, obschon Augustin in *De animae*

quantitate (387-388) diesen Gott- und Seelenbegriff explicit umgedeutet hat. Schon hier wird klar, dass Drecoll die unterschiedlichen Ebenen in den Texten zu unterscheiden weiß, eine sehr fruchtbare Feinfühligkeit im Umgang mit Texten zeigt. Vor allem auch seine Forschungen zu den *Confessiones* (400) zeichnen sich hierdurch aus. Aus seiner überzeugenden und wertvollen Analyse der *De vera religione* wird deutlich, dass Augustin Gott als unveränderliche Transzendenz, und als alles bestimmendes, formverleihendes und belebendes Prinzip versteht und sein pneumatologisch geprägter Gnadenbegriff, der in *De beata vita* (386) schon implizit verankert war, organisch mit diesem seinem Gottesbegriff verbunden ist. Er hebt nämlich hervor, dass der Mensch zwar durch Erkenntnis und Ethik Zugang zu dieser Unveränderlichkeit hat, aber dass es trotzdem von Gott abhängt, ob er das glückselige Leben erreichen wird. Demgemäß versteht Augustin Schöpfung und Erlösung als passives Geformt- und Belebtwerden, wobei die Erlösung Wiederherstellung und Vollendung der Schöpfung ist. Drecoll stellt überzeugend dar, dass die Gnade Gottes bei Augustin nicht darum notwendig ist, weil der Mensch minderwertig oder schlecht ist, sondern weil er Kraft und Unterstützung von außen benötigt und bekommt.

Die Parallellität zwischen Heilsgeschichte und Individualität findet man auch in Augustins früher Paulusexegese: das *frui* ist auf den Heiligen Geist zurückzuführen, Erlösung hängt nicht nur von der Erkenntnis von Gott ab und die Erkenntnisfähigkeit – die trotz der Sündhaftigkeit des Menschen erhalten bleibt – ist dem Handeln Gottes zu verdanken. Diese antimanichäischen Tendenzen setzen sich in Augustins erster Konzeption der Gnadenlehre anhand paulinischer Texte fort: Gnade wird hier vor allem als Kraft spezifiziert, die ermöglicht, das Gerechte zu tun und die Begierde zu besiegen. Wird Glaube dabei noch immer ethisch aufgefasst, so wird Gnade als Gabe des Geistes im engen Zusammenhang mit der Verleihung der Liebe gesehen. Im Kommentar auf den Galaterbrief (394) wird die Gnadengabe auch auf die Entwicklung des Menschen im Glauben bezogen, obschon der Glaube immer noch vor allem als *meritum* betrachtet wird. Erst in *ad Simplicianum* I, 2 wird der Glaube mehr direkt auf die Gnade zurückgeführt, so wie auch die Berufungsgnade für den Menschen notwendig ist, um zu gutem Willen und Glauben zu kommen. Weil in *ad Simpliciamum* I, 2 so deutlich wird, dass die *misericordia Dei* unabhängig ist vom menschlichen Handeln und Gottes – vom Menschen unverdiente – Gnadegabe also das Gegenteil der Entwertung des Menschen zum Ziel hat, zeigt sich hier am klarsten, dass die Vorstellung von Gott als alles bestimmende Größe und die Ablehnung

des Manichäismus ineinandergreifen. Meines Erachtens zeigt Drecoll sehr überzeugend, dass Augustin in *ad Simplicianum* I,2 eine Gnadenlehre entwickelt, in der der Mensch sich in einem äußerst spannungsvollen Stand der Verheißung befindet, die aber eher von dem Bewusstsein *sub gratia* als vom beklemmenden Gefühl *sub lege* leben zu müssen, gekennzeichnet ist. Dabei versteht man sich selbst als „Gefäße des Zornes". Augustin wird hier recht getan.

Schließlich zeigt Drecoll anhand einer feinsinnigen Analyse der *Confessiones*, dass die Abfolge von Buch VII und VIII der frühen Paulusexegese entspricht; das menschliche Unvermögen und die *infirmitas*, vergleichbar mit der Situation *sub lege* (VII), werden stets vom befreienden Gnadenhandeln Gottes überwunden. Unter Beachtung der unterschiedlichen Textebenen zeigt Drecoll hervorragend, dass Augustin auf der inneren Ebene die unerlöste Situation im heilsgeschichtlichen Gesamtplan als positiv deutet, weil das erlösende Handeln Gottes der Erlösungsbedürftigkeit immer entspricht. Erst in den *Confessiones* zeigt sich, nach Drecoll, dass die *visio beatifica* christologisch statt neoplatonisch geprägt (IX-X) ist und dass die Schöpfung und Erlösung (XII-XIII) zusammenhängen, weil Augustin die eschatologische Vollendung in der Neuformung des Menschen als *spiritualis* sieht. So wie in *De beata vita* wird Gott in den *Confessiones* auch nicht nur als bestimmende Geistigkeit vorgestellt, die in einem Abstraktionsprozess erkannt werden kann, sondern als eine „Größe", die alles bestimmend ist und als solche vor allem die Umformung des Einzelnen im Hinblick auf die Erfüllung im Eschaton verursacht.

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass es Drecoll gelungen ist, auf Grund sorgfältiger textbezogener Analysen und in fortwährender Auseinandersetzung mit der Sekundärliteratur, Augustins Gnadenlehre nun einmal nicht im Kontrast zur Erbsündenlehre zu erklären, sondern dessen Gnadenauffassung anhand der Untersuchung von Wörtern wie *salus* und *gratia*, *divinus amor* und *animus* in ihrem (entwicklungsgschichtlichen) Kontext auf hervorragende Weise zu beleuchten. Das Entstehen der Gnadenlehre wird dabei zurückgeführt auf Augustins Auseinandersetzung mit dem Neuplatonismus, Manicheïsmus, mit Plotinus und Porphyrius, aber gleichzeitig auf den augustinischen Gottesbegriff. Man bekommt nicht nur eine Sicht auf die ersten Phasen in der Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre, man bekommt auch eine Sicht auf Augustins Idee der göttlichen Initiative, das menschliche Unvermögen und das menschliche Verhalten im Erlösungsvorgang. Plotin geht davon aus, dass der Mensch sich auf eigene Kraft mit Gott vereinigen kann. Augustin behauptet, dass der Mensch

durch die Kraft der Gnade dazu fähig ist, das Gute, was er tun will, auch wirklich zu tun. Diese Studie stellt klar und deutlich dar, dass die Güte Gottes, beziehungsweise des Menschen, sich bei Augustin nicht gegenseitig ausschließen. Das ist eine sehr wertvolle Erkenntnis.

Zwei Bemerkungen sollten jedoch noch gemacht werden. Erstens bleibt einigermaßen unbeachtet, dass Augustin vor allem in den *Confessiones* und im Gegensatz zu der Tatsache, dass er abstrakt von Gott spricht (Schönheit), Gott immer mehr nicht als „Größe", sondern als eine Person erfahren hat. Zweitens zeigt sich, dass die Genauigkeit, mit der eine Historiographie geschrieben werden muss, sich hier nicht an der Feinfühligkeit, mit der die Texte analysiert worden sind, messen kann. Die Historiographie ist unvollständig (wo werden die älteren katholischen Dogmengeschichten besprochen?). Unvollständig zitierte Titel im ersten Kapitel kommen in der Literaturliste nicht vor (Wiggers, S. 1; auf S. 407 ist nicht zu finden). Die im ersten Kapitel zu kurz besprochenen Untersuchungen werden in der Bibliographie wohl ausführlich genannt (Cf. die Studien von L.F. Pizzolato, 19; 399). Die Einleitung des Buches ist meiner Meinung nach eine verpasste Gelegenheit.

Es wäre aber sehr ungerecht, wenn ich mit diesen Bemerkungen abschließen würde. Das Verdienst dieser Untersuchung ist schließlich, dass die Bedeutung der Termini wie etwa *gratia* in aller Tiefe und Dynamik gezeigt wird sowohl durch die Analyse des Kontextes, in dem sie stehen, als auch durch die Darstellung der Quellen Augustins. Das macht das Buch wertvoll. Vielleicht auch, weil Drecoll von einer Gnadenauffassung ausgeht, die auf die ihrerseits augustinisch geprägten Salvatore Iodice und Gisbert Greshake gründet, klingen die Forschungsresultate der katholischen Theologen vertraut in den Ohren. Das nimmt jedoch nicht hinweg, dass die deutliche und übersichtliche Wiedergabe der Forschungsresultate dem Kenner und demjenigen, der Augustin weniger gut kennt, den Prozess, in dem Augustin immer mehr Einsicht bekam hinsichtlich der Verbundenheit von Menschen mit Gott und umgekehrt, deutlich vor Augen stellt.

Paul van Geest

ANTHROPOS LAIKOS, Mélanges Alexandre FAIVRE à l'occasion de ses 30 ans d'enseignement. Edités par Marie-Anne VANNIER, O. WERMELINGER et G. WURST. (Paradosis 44). Fribourg Suisse, Editions Universitaires, 2000. xx-371 pp. S.Fr. 75. ISBN 2-8271-0882-8.

This book in honour of A. Faivre contains 31 articles about the theme of the origin and the history of the distinction between cleric and layperson. A first group of articles deals with the origins of Christianity. F. Blanchetière: the importance of the marginals or the proselytes; the first expansion of the discipleship of Jesus is understandable if one takes into account the spread of the eastern cults into the West. C. Coulot: the foundation of the community of Damascus; the three stories. S. Mimouni: the rite of adhering to a Jewish brotherhood, in particular that of the Pharisees (not of the Essenes), was at the origin of Christian baptism. M. Sachot: the proclamation of Holy Scripture in the synagogue suggests that Christ is considered as the new and complete Torah.

A second group of articles deals with the organisation of the church during the first four centuries. J.K. Coyle: the order in the cosmos as willed by God and the order in society has influenced Christianity. P. Mattei: the ecclesiology of Tertullian; interim balance of the state of research; Tertullian shows a preference for the common priesthood of the faithful; he radicalizes the notion of church. D. Vigne: Justin and prophetism; Justin owes to the prophets not only the content of his discourses but also the essence of his faith. M. Philonenko: Thôbarabau; magic invocation of the god of new birth. M. Scopello: gnostic thinkers about allegory. J.-M. Prieur: cross and cruci-fixion in the writings of Nag Hammadi; the different interpretations: 1) the Saviour himself is crucified; 2) the Saviour redeemed the crucified and brought him to the Father; 3) the Saviour has no relationship at all with the crucified. B. Pouderon: the bishop as "head of the people" in the Clementine romance; James and Peter are equal in dignity and seen in a Judaeo-Christian light. A. Jakab: the organisation of the Christian community of Alexandria according to Clement of Alexandria; a layperson can represent the christian elite and hold an ecclesial office. A. Le Bellouec: interreligious dialogue in ancient Alexandria; the pharaohic religion; Judaism, Hellenism, Christianity.

Another group of articles (of which that on Pelagius responds mostly to the purpose of this review) is connected with the fourth and fifth century. G. Dorival: the Fathers of the first five centuries put the

classic culture and Hellenism at the service of Christian faith; the literary genres, the methods of textual interpretation, the allegorical method; through the help of Hellenism the Christian writers argued against Hellenism. M.-A. Vannier: whether John Cassian was Scythe or Provençal?; Cassian was a witness of evangelical life accommodated to the Provence. J. Gascou: The ancient ecclesial onomastics; about the mysterious pre-Christian names, in particular for Christian churches. P. Maraval: monasticism was originally a nonclerical mouvement; its lay character was essential for a monastic vocation. R. Minnerath: the vanishing of the permanent diaconate due to the fact that the activity of the deacons was reduced more and more to liturgical tasks. M. Canévet: the submission to Christ and the submission of Christ; Gregory of Nyssa on 1 Cor. XV,27-28; the word "submission" is related to the body of Christ, that is, the Church united with its Redeemer. O. Wermelinger, the "tempus medium" according to Pelagius; Augustine calls into question this notion of a life of justice by virtue of nature; he differs from Pelagius' opinion concerning the role of Christ; Pelagius sees Christ only intervening in the last phase of the process and He works only from outside by his doctrine and example; Augustine's interpretation seems to not be completely exact.

Two studies deal with the critique of manuscripts. B. Gain: description of ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi I,VI,33; series Pseudo-Athanase, collectio Sichardiana, letter of St. Bruno. F.G. Nuvolone: the Legend of Christ, the last priest of the temple of Jerusalem; priority of the long text.

Then two historical studies follow. F. Rapp: the Waldenses at Strasbourg at the end of the Middle Ages. R. Epp: the rise of the laypeople in the Church of France in the 19th century. The book ends with five articles devoted to actual problems. H. Delhougne: translating the Bible for the liturgy. D. Singles: A "holy people" under the weight of the sacred; the distinction between clerics and laypeople found its origin in the distinction between the profane and the sacred. P. Vallin: prophecy and sacrament; the prophetic word is the principle of the sacramental acts. G. Vincent: Protestant ecclesiology and political habitus; other sciences have an influence on theology. G. Alberigo: the "Church of the poor" according to John XXIII and Vatican II.

T.J. van Bavel

Sabah FERDI, Augustin de retour en Afrique 388-430. Repères archéologiques dans le patrimoine algérien. Photographies de M.C. CHERIETT. Fribourg (S.), Editions universitaires – Tipasa (Algérie), Musée de Tipasa, 2001. (175 pp.; 1 carte; 116 photographies). 48 SFr. ISBN 2-8271-0895-X.

Ce livre est un album d'images commentées avec présentation et description des monuments, sites et paysages de l'Africa au temps d'Augustin. Le but de l'auteur est de faire visiter, de façon suggestive, le milieu au sein duquel Augustin a vécu après sa conversion au christianisme et son retour en Afrique. Dans l'introduction l'auteur décrit, entre autres, l'organisation administrative et ecclésiastique de l'Afrique romaine ainsi que les trois cités: Hippone, Carthage et Rome. Le chapitre le plus important et longue est consacré aux voyages d'Augustin sous le titre "les déplacements" (pp. 33-145). Les missions d'Augustin évêque l'ont conduit en des lieux et selon des itinéraires qui recouvrent l'ensemble de l'Est algérien et une partie du centre de l'Algérie d'aujourd'hui. Il est certain que la plupart des villes et des sites ont été vus ou visités par Augustin. Mais il est aussi évident qu'il n'a pas été partout. Nous n'avons pas de preuves, par exemple, qu'il connaissait Djemila (Cuicul), Timgad (Thamugadi) ou Tipasa (Tipasa). Mais l'ensemble des photographies nous donne une bonne impression des villes de ce temps. L'auteur nous offre en outre de brèves notes historiques pour chaque ville. Les deux derniers chapitres traitent de l'environnement culturel en du souvenir d'Augustin à Hippone (pp. 147-165). Je ne peux que recommander vivement cet album à nos lecteurs.

T.J. van Bavel

Sharon M. KAYE – Paul THOMSON, On Augustine. Wadsworth Philosophers Series. Belmont (USA). (83 pp.). ISBN 0-534- 58362-8.

This book provides a brief insight into several ideas of Augustine. We will enumerate the problems treated. First we meet those regarding theodicy, such as evil, determinism, free will, the great chain of being, divine culpability, grace, original sin, divine morality. Under the heading "knowledge" we find the following themes: scepticism, the *cogito*, innatism, empiricism, illumination, perception, the ontological proof, science. Problems regarding the inner man are: trinity, the subconscious, mental language, time. A last field of ques-

tions encompasses ethics and political theory: the two cities, *caritas* and *cupiditas*, enjoyment and use, voluntarism, culture and education, political pessimism, justice, the state as penal order. The impression that this little book leaves is very ambiguous. It contains interesting remarks, as far as it shows the highlights of Augustine's contribution to Western thought: the ontological argument, the *cogito*, the theories of time, language and knowledge, the existence of the subconscious, and, most importantly, the notion of will. However, its brevity has also serious disadvantages. The danger is that the reader is not sufficiently put in contact with Augustine's texts, but much more with the opinion of his interpreters. The authors blame Augustine not only for leaving his work inconclusive and rambling, but also for not regarding philosophy as the queen of the sciences. I would like more room for the student to form his or her own opinion.

T.J. van Bavel

John D. CAPUTO, On Religion. (Thinking in Action). London-New York, Routledge, 2001. VIII-147. Hbk 30 $. ISBN 415-23332-X.

Religion is love of God, who is a reality beyond the real. How is religion still a source of inspiration, even after the death of God? Caputo's intention is to explain and to show the truth of the statement of J. Derrida "religion without religion". In my own words: the first "religion" is a deed, the second time it is a structure. Caputo writes: God is a deed, not a thought; God is a question, not an answer. There is a deeply religious element within us all, with or without religion. In his discussion references are made to many modern philosophers: Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Heidegger, Descartes, Wittgenstein. Even two films, *Star Wars* of George Lucas and *The Apostle* of R. Duvall, are analyzed.

More important for the readers of this review is that this little, well-written book is strongly based on some ideas of Augustine, such as the question "What do I love, when I love my God?"; The only measure of love, is love without measure; Our hearts are restless; We do not know who we are; I have become a question to myself; There is a learned ignorance (*docta ignorantia*); Love drives our search to know (*fides quaerens intellectum*); Doing the truth (*facere veritatem*); In the Kingdom of God, the insiders are out, while the outsiders are in. Therefore, the author calls his book a post-modern repetition of Augustine. Caputo considers the impossible as the stuff of which religion

is made, so that to believe what seems unbelievable is really faith, hope against hope is really hope, loving in an impossible situation is really love. The impossible is God's element, because the impossible disturbs the modern idea of what is possible. Faith cannot be reduced to the churches or to organized faiths; nevertheless, the author does not deny that they have a role to play, for a religion without the body of a community and its traditions is a bloodless abstraction.

The secularization has had serious consequences: the old Augustinian idea of the "self", this sinful, self-questioning, passionate, prayerful, weepy being of divided will has been displaced by a sovereign, self-possessed, dispassionate "thinking thing". The moderns created sharp lines between subject and object, consciousness and the external world, science and religion, faith and reason, public and private, rational and irrational, empirical and a priori, cognitive and non-cognitive, fact and value, is and ought, descriptive and normative, sacred and profane, religious and secular. This has lead to an exaggerated stress on subjectivity and relativism. More and more religion became lodged in subjectivity. Relativism manifested itself as "nothing is true, one belief is as good as another" or as perpetual (and conplacent) agnosticism. Augustine, on the contrary, held that, if we want to find God, who is the most transcendent reality, we have not to go outside, but to go in (*intra me, supra me*).

Although many thoughts in this book deserve serious consideration and approval, sometimes I ask myself if the author is not underestimating the role of reason and knowledge. Is there "a truth without knowledge" (expression used by Caputo)? Is the God of the Bible not more a personal God than "the Force" in which some moderns believe? Is it Augustine's conviction that when we love anything, it is really God whom we love, however obscurely? Would Augustine allow us to say: "The name of God is the name of what we love and desire"? Must we not nuance the statement "In his *Confessions* Augustine said that the Scriptures may have many meanings, so long as all of them are true"?

We cannot deny that truth plays for Augustine an important role. Instead of asserting "Augustine belonged to the phenomenon of Christian Neoplatonism" I would prefer: Augustine was a Christian making use of the neoplatonic philosophy.

T.J. van Bavel

ONTVANGEN BOEKEN - LIVRES REÇUS

2000-2002

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