




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


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
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LE PROJET HERMÉNEUTIQUE AUGUSTINIEN

II. Herméneutique et existence*

1. - LA COMPRÉHENSION SELON AUGUSTIN

La distance qui va de l'*interpretatio* à *intellegere* est grande: l'*interpretatio* joue chez Augustin le rôle, double il est vrai, d'une traduction et d'une interprétation; l'*intellegere*, c'est-à-dire la compréhension, joue le rôle d'une intériorisation de soi-même comme le pôle ultime du sujet. Explicitons avec les mots de P. Ricœur cette notion d'herméneutique, à la fois en tant que modèle d'explication et d'interprétation épistémologique et en tant qu'ontologique: "*c'est cette présupposition d'une herméneutique comprise comme épistémologie qui est essentiellement mise en question par Heidegger et, à sa suite par Hans Georg Gadamer*"¹.

Si dans toute interprétation la compréhension est nécessaire, l'inverse n'est pas forcément vrai, à savoir que dans toute compréhension l'interprétation serait nécessaire. La compréhension est de l'ordre du *καθ'αυτό* et relève de la nature existentielle de l'homme. En revanche, l'interprétation est aussi bien pour Augustin que pour Heidegger un mode dérivé de la compréhension et de l'explicitation. Lorsque je comprends une chose, cette chose devient pour moi-même l'autre de moi-même incorporé en moi, et je me comprends moi-même dans la chose. C'est pourquoi la compréhension est d'ordre ontologique.

"La volonté de comprendre l'Écriture ne se réduit pas à un processus épistémique indifférent, qui se jouerait entre les points fixes d'un sujet et d'un objet, elle procède de l'inquiétude fondamentale et d'un mode d'être de l'homme, du *Dasein* voué à la recherche du sens"².

Entre compréhension et être, il y a une identification étroite, car dit Augustin, "*concevoir une chose autrement que ce qu'elle n'est, c'est ne*

* Voir *Augustiniana* vol. 48, 1998, pp. 255-286.

¹ P. Ricœur, *Du texte à l'action*, p. 88.

² J. Grondin, *L'universalité de l'herméneutique*, PUF, Paris, 1993 p. 31.

*pas la comprendre du tout, puisqu'on ne la conçoit pas telle qu'elle est*³.

Par contre, l'interprétation est distincte de la compréhension. L'interprétation signifie avant tout, la traduction (*translatio*) des mots ambigus (*ambigua*) ou des mots inconnus (*ignota*), et elle est avant tout de l'ordre épistémologique. C'est pourquoi la connaissance des langues et la connaissance des choses (*scientia rerum*) sont nécessaires pour pouvoir traduire. L'interprétation est au service du *sensus auctoris*⁴ ou encore de la *scribentis intentio*⁵.

A la notion de *comprehendere* se rattache, chez Augustin, l'exégèse de la *Lettre aux Ephésiens* 3,18. Le verset de ce passage est lié très étroitement à notre enracinement dans l'amour afin que nous puissions mieux comprendre: "*in caritate radicati atque fundati, ut possitis comprehendere cum omnibus sanctis quae sit longitudo, latitudo, altitudo et profundo*"⁶.

Mais la notion de *comprehendere* n'est pas seulement explicitée à partir d'une interprétation du texte biblique, elle est aussi définie dans la pensée classique. Cicéron déclare dans le *De natura Deorum*: "*Quel usage y-a-t-il pour les pieds sans la marche? des mains s'il n'y a rien à comprendre?*"⁷. Pour Cicéron il y a un rapport étroit entre ce qu'on saisit et la main. On pourrait dire que le sens de la réflexion cicéronienne est de voir un corrélat entre les mains et l'action de comprendre. Le saisir implique qu'il y ait quelque chose à portée de la main.

Augustin articule, on le sait, très harmonieusement la culture classique avec la culture biblique. La notion de "compréhension" telle que nous

³ "Quisquis igitur ullam rem aliter quam ea res est intellegit non eam intellegit. Non ergo potest quidquam intellegi nisi ut est. Nos autem aliquid ita ut est intellegimus, velut hoc ipsum nihil intellegi, quod non ita ut est intellegitur", *De Div. Quaest.* q. 32 (CC 44 A p. 46; BA 10 p. 95).

⁴ "Et plerumque a sensu auctoris devius aberrat interpres, si non sit doctissimus", *De Doc. Chr.* II,13,19 (CC 32 p. 44).

⁵ *En. in Ps.* 104, 14 (CC 40 p. 1544).

⁶ La Bible de Jérusalem signale des analogies stoïciennes à propos de cette énumération *longitudo, latitudo, altitudo et profundum*. Le Dictionnaire, *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, consacre dix pages à l'expression *comprehendere*. Le verbe latin *comprehendere* correspond aux verbes grecs *καταλαμβάνω, συλλαμβάνω*. Les stoïciens parlaient d'une représentation compréhensive. "Sauf le sage, personne ne sait quoi que ce soit, et cela Zénon le montrait par un geste: il montrait la main, les doigts étendus: c'est là la représentation (*visum*), disait-il, puis il repliait un peu les doigts: c'est là l'assentiment (*assensus*); ensuite quand il avait complètement fermé la main et qu'il montrait le doigt, il déclarait que c'était là la compréhension (*comprehensio*), c'est pourquoi il lui a donné le nom de *κατάληψις* qui n'était pas utilisé avant lui", Cicéron, *Premiers Académiques*, XLVII.

⁷ "Quid enim pedibus opus est sine ingressu, quid manibus si nihil comprehendum est?", *De nat. Deorum*, I,33.

l'utilisons aujourd'hui présente chez lui le trait spécifique de rassembler en un seul concept "*comprehendere*" toutes les particularités différentielles.

"Qu'est-ce donc comprendre? C'est, je l'ai déjà dit, la largeur dans les bonnes œuvres, par lesquelles la bonté est poussée jusqu'à aimer les ennemis; la longueur, pour que les maux soient patiemment supportés en faveur de cette largeur; la hauteur, pour qu'on n'espère pas quelque chose de vain et temporel; quant à la profondeur, elle touche au mystère de la grâce gratuite, cachée dans les secrets de la volonté de Dieu"⁸.

Il ne s'éloigne pas de Cicéron lorsqu'il rapproche l'acte de comprendre et ce qui est à portée de la main comme le résultat d'un acte de connaissance non seulement du point de vue théorique mais aussi bien pratique.

"En effet, nous comprenons les œuvres par les mains, la joie des actions par la largeur, car la tristesse produit les angoisses (*angustias*); mais la hauteur à laquelle est associé l'essentiel, l'attente par la rétribution de la sublime justice de Dieu qui demeure en chacun et selon ses œuvres en donnant la vie éternelle à ceux qui par leur persévérance dans les bonnes œuvres, cherchent la gloire, l'honneur et l'immortalité. Ensuite la longueur par laquelle tout corps est étendu, elle signifie la tolérance, c'est pourquoi ceux qui sont patients sont dits tolérants. La profondeur préfigure le mystère du sacrement qui est imprimé au monde"⁹.

Cette perspective nous semble assez proche du langage heideggerien au sujet de la *Vorhandenheit*. Pour Heidegger "*le Vorhandene est conformément à son sens, référé d'une certaine façon, à un étant pour lequel il arrive pour ainsi dire devant la main*"¹⁰. La *Vorhandenheit* telle que la comprend Heidegger a la particularité d'associer le caractère

⁸ "Quid ergo comprehendere? quae sit, inquit, *latitudo*, sicut iam dixit, in bonis operibus, quibus benivolentia porrigitur usque ad diligendos inimicos, et *longitudo*, ut longanimitate pro hac latitudine molestiae tolerantur, et *altitudo*, ut pro his aeternum quod in supernis est praemium, non vanum aliquid temporale speretur, et *profundum*, unde gratuita gratia Dei secundum secretum", *Epis.* 140,16,63 (CSEL 44 p. 210). Heidegger parle de la "*latitudo, longitudo, altitudo et profundum*" par rapport à la foi et comme sens de l'effectuation de la vie intérieure (*des inneren Lebens*), M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (supplément d'Oskar Becker) p. 290.

⁹ "Per manus enim opera intellegimus, per latitudinem hilaritatem operantis, quia tristitia facit angustias; per altitudinem autem, cui caput adiungitur, expectationem retributionis de sublimi iustitia dei, qui reddet unicuique secundum opera sua, his quidem, qui secundum tolerantiam boni operis gloriam et honorem et incorruptionem quaerentibus vitam aeternam. Itaque etiam longitudo qua totum corpus extenditur, ipsam tolerantiam significat, unde longanimes dicuntur qui tolerant. Profundo autem, quod terrae infixum est, secretum sacramenti praefigurat", *Epist.* 55,14,25 (CSEL 34/2 pp. 196-197).

¹⁰ J. Taminiaux, *Lectures de l'ontologie fondamentale*, Jérôme Millon, Grenoble, p.159.

ontologique de l'être au comportement de quelqu'un. C'est donc une manière de relier l'aspect théorique et praxique dans un seul et même concept.

Le mot *Vorhandene* est "l'exact équivalent linguistique du mot grec *προχειρόν*, qu'utilise Aristote dans la *Métaphysique* (A 2, 982 b 13)"¹¹. Chez Platon l'association entre ce qui est à la main et le connaître est mise en relation d'une façon étroite. "*Qui est in promptu*" et "*ante manus positus*" peuvent être des expressions synonymes. Cela signifie ce qui est visible et ce qui se manifeste. Dans le *Phédon*, Platon se définit comme quelqu'un qui n'est pas un fabricant de mythes mais plutôt comme quelqu'un qui les a à portée de la main et qui les connaît (61 d)¹². Nous trouvons dans la Bible également le verbe *προχειρίζω*, surtout dans les *Actes des Apôtres* 3,20. Dans ce contexte le sens est essentiellement temporel.

Dans le langage d'Augustin, nous pouvons parler de l'importance de ce qui est pour la main ou à portée de la main à travers l'expression *ad manum posita*. Quelques auteurs considèrent qu'il y a une correspondance étroite entre le *Vorhandene* et cette même expression; c'est comme si on cherchait à trouver les raisons historico-phénoménologiques du concept chez Heidegger dans la tradition philosophique occidentale.¹³

Une remarque s'impose dans cet exposé: notre souci n'est pas de chercher à montrer une simple filiation historique et langagière de la réflexion heideggerienne à ajouter à Augustin. Il s'agit pour nous d'approcher au sens propre la lecture heideggerienne de la pensée augustinienne. Néanmoins, la découverte sémantique de certains concepts est le premier indice d'une ré-appropriation heideggerienne de la pensée augustinienne.

¹¹ *Idem*, p. 158.

¹² J.-F. Courtine, "*Donner/prendre: la main*", in *Heidegger et la phénoménologie*, Vrin, Paris, 1990, pp. 284-288, trace en quelque sorte une généalogie du mot heideggerien *Hand* dont il est partie constitutive de toutes les expressions telles que: *Vorhandenheit*, *Zuhandenheit*, *Handwerk*. Dans ce tracé, l'histoire du mot est assez simplifiée. C'est l'importance de la «main» en tant que concept philosophique heideggerien qui est lieu heuristique de discussion. Les exemples d'Anaxagore et d'Aristote sont pris dans un sens très littéral de l'expression «main»: "Ce n'est point comme le soutenait naïvement Anaxagore, parce que l'homme a des mains qu'il est plus intelligent que les autres animaux, mais c'est parce qu'il est plus intelligent (*phronimôtaton*) qu'il a des mains", p. 284; par rapport à Aristote J.-F. Courtine cite un passage du *De partibus animalium* 687 a 8. "La main semble bien être non pas un outil, mais plusieurs. Car elle est pour ainsi dire un outil qui tient lieu des autres (*organon pro organon*). C'est donc à l'être capable d'acquérir le plus grand nombre de techniques que la nature a donné l'outil de loin le plus utile, la main", p. 285.

¹³ Cf. J. F. Lanchas, *Heidegger desde la perspectiva de Agustín de Hipona*, in *Universitas Humanistica*, vol. 10, 1979, p. 126.

Cette expression, *ad manum posita* apparaît uniquement dans les *Confessions*, livre X, où Augustin analyse la fonction et le rôle que joue la mémoire dans la connaissance intellectuelle:

“Mais quand j’entends qu’il y a trois espèces de questions: Une chose est-elle (*an sit*), qu’est-elle? (*quid sit*), quelle-est-elle? (*quale sit?*)” (...) A ce propos nous découvrons qu’apprendre ces notions - dont nous ne tirons pas les images par les sens, mais que, sans image et comme elles sont en réalité, nous discernons par elles-mêmes au-dedans - ce n’est pas autre chose que ceci: rassembler en quelque façon par la réflexion les éléments que la mémoire contenait à l’état dispersé et désordonné, ensuite prendre soin par l’attention de les placer pour ainsi dire à portée de la main dans cette mémoire où ils étaient auparavant éparpillés afin qu’ils se présentent désormais facilement à leur intention de l’esprit qui leur est devenue familière”¹⁴.

Ces notions sont essentiellement de deux genres: la première pose la question de l’existence des choses en tant que telle; la deuxième et la troisième posent des questions sur l’essence de ces mêmes choses. L’interrogation alors porte sur l’origine de ces deux sortes de questions? D’où viennent-elles? Et par où sont-elles rentrées dans la mémoire? (*Unde et qua haec intrauerunt in memoriam meam?*) Augustin déclare qu’elles sont déjà dans la mémoire et qu’elles le sont, non comme des images, mais comme elles sont véritablement (*sicuti sunt*). Ces notions sont à portée de la main (*ad manum posita*). Mais qu’est à dire, à portée de la main? Augustin explique qu’à partir du moment où ces notions au plus profond de la mémoire sont disposées plus facilement à l’attention de l’esprit (*intentio*), ce même esprit est prêt à les comprendre et à les connaître:

“Que de notions de ce genre porte ma mémoire, qui, une fois découvertes, ont été, ainsi que j’ai dit, comme placées à portée de notre main! Cela s’appelle les avoir apprises et les savoir”¹⁵.

¹⁴ “At vero, cum audio tria genera esse quaestionum, an sit, quid sit, quale sit. (...) Quocirca invenimus nihil esse aliud discere ista, quorum non per sensus haurimus imagines, sed sine imaginibus, sicuti sunt, per se ipsa intus cernimus, nisi ea, quae passim atque indisposite memoria continebat, cogitando quasi conligere atque animadvertendo curare, ut tamquam ad manum posita in ipsa memoria, ubi sparsa prius et neglecta latitabant, iam familiari intentioni facile occurrant”, *Conf. X*, 10, 17-11, 18 (CC 27 pp. 163-164).

¹⁵ “Et quam multa huius modi gestat memoria mea, quae iam inuenta sunt et, sicut dixi, quasi ad manum posita, quae didicisse et nosse dicimur”, *Conf. X*, 11, 18 (CC 27 p. 164).

1.1 - Une entente sur les choses et sur les signes: le "*De Doctrina Christiana*"

L'importance du *De Doctrina Christiana* est attestée par le grand intérêt qu'on porte à son égard, tout au long du moyen âge, chez les commentateurs médiévaux. La première partie de ce traité (livres I et II) a été écrite en 396. Les deux derniers livres ont été ajoutés aux alentours de 427. Ces renseignements nous sont donnés par Augustin lui-même dans les Révisions¹⁶.

Un des objectifs de ce traité serait, comme le dit Augustin lui-même, d'interpréter les Écritures selon certaines règles afin de mieux former ceux qui veulent les connaître. Pour H.-I. Marrou le *De Doctrina Christiana* est un modèle de l'expression de la culture chrétienne.¹⁷ Sur lui sont bâtis les premiers piliers d'une culture et d'une éducation chrétienne en forme d'exposé.

La première distinction établie par Augustin tout au début du *De Doctrina Christiana* est par elle-même significative: Augustin parle d'un *modus inueniendi, quae intellegenda sunt*, et d'un *modus proferendi, quae intellecta sunt*, dans l'étude (*tractatio*) de l'Écriture.

L'expression *tractatio* apparaît une toute première fois dans le *prologue*, lorsqu'Augustin déclare que l'interprétation de l'Écriture tient à certaines règles (*praeceptam quaedam tractandarum scripturarum*).¹⁸ Ces règles importantes permettent d'ouvrir à ceux qui la lisent, les mystères cachés et les obscurités de l'Écriture.

"Il est pour l'interprétation des Écritures, des règles qui peuvent, à mon sens,

¹⁶ "Ayant trouvé inachevés les livres de *La doctrine chrétienne*, j'ai préféré les terminer plutôt que de les laisser ainsi et de passer à la révision d'autres ouvrages. J'ai donc complété le troisième livre qui avait été écrit jusqu'au passage où il est rappelé ce que dit l'Évangile de la femme qui cache le levain dans trois mesures de farine, jusqu'à ce que tout fermente (III,25,35). J'ai ajouté aussi un dernier livre, et j'ai terminé cet ouvrage en quatre livres, dont les premiers aident à comprendre l'Écriture, et le quatrième indique comment il faut exprimer ce qui a été compris", *Rect.* II,4,1 (BA 12 p. 457).

¹⁷ H.-I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, p. 389.

¹⁸ L'expression *tractatio* peut avoir plusieurs significations. *Tractatio* vient du verbe *tracto* qui signifie précisément manier, pratiquer: traiter une question ou un sujet, faire un sermon, expliquer et interpréter. Un deuxième sens est celui qui démontre un mode de comportement: une manière d'agir contre quelqu'un. Cf. A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens*, Brepols, Turnhout, 1954, p. 822. Dans le *Lexicon Totius Latinitatis*, de A. Forcellini, Padoue, 1940, p. 759, le terme *tractatio* donne le même sens; le synonyme en allemand: *Behandlung* et *Bearbeitung*.

être enseignées sans difficulté à ceux qui s'intéressent à ces études; ils pourront ainsi progresser non seulement en lisant d'autres commentateurs qui ont élucidé des points obscurs des Lettres divines, mais encore en les élucidant eux-mêmes pour d'autres"¹⁹.

Elles en permettront finalement la compréhension en même temps que sa transmission à d'autres. Le sens de cette découverte met en évidence quelque chose d'ordre ontologique et reflète la compréhension en tant que phénomène total de la compréhension de l'étant spirituel dans sa totalité. Ainsi donc, le sens fondamental de la *tractatio scripturarum* doit être compris comme mode d'invention et d'expression de ce qui a été compris.

Cette distinction est importante²⁰. Elle doit être rattachée à celle qui va suivre, la distinction entre *res* et *signum*. En effet, Augustin dit que toute science a pour objet soit les choses (*res*) soit les signes (*signa*)²¹. Cependant les choses (*res*) sont dites par les signes. Chaque science, qu'elle s'occupe des choses ou qu'elle s'occupe des signes, utilise les signes comme moyen d'apprendre les choses. Dès lors, la fonction de l'herméneute est d'interpréter d'emblée soit les choses, soit les signes. Les signes, nous dit Augustin, sont des objets qu'on utilise pour signifier quelque chose. Mais on pourrait croire, malgré la différence établie entre signe et chose, que les signes ne sont pas, eux aussi, des choses. Or les signes sont des choses, sinon ils ne seraient point. Et cependant, ils sont d'un tout autre ordre.

L'expression *res* doit d'être explicitée. Augustin n'en donne pas clairement la détermination. Au premier abord, *res* signifie la réalité ou l'effectivité d'une chose comme telle. *Res* signifie donc, à la fois, l'essence d'une chose et la chose en tant que telle, réellement. Les niveaux épistémologique et ontologique sont associés sans qu'il y ait une nette distinction entre les deux.

¹⁹ *De Doc. Chr. Prologus* (CC 32 p. 1; BA 11/2 [1997] p. 65).

²⁰ Cette distinction est probablement d'origine cicéronienne, *De oratore*, II, 116-120. Toutefois Augustin semble aller beaucoup plus loin dans la distinction entre le *modus inveniendi* et le *modus proferendi*, car le premier mode dépasse de loin la simple compréhension d'une *τέχνη*, c'est-à-dire d'une *ars*. En revanche, pour Cicéron, le mode de l'invention qui vient de l'*excogitatio* et le mode de l'expression à travers de laquelle on exprime cette invention appartiennent aux *artes liberales*. La première, appartient à la dialectique et la seconde, à la rhétorique. Or, le sens augustinien du *modus inveniendi* va beaucoup plus loin car il veut "présenter" l'amour de Dieu en tant qu'acte d'amour et principe donateur de cet "Être amoureux".


²¹ "Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum, sed res per signa discuntur"; *De Doc. Chr.* I,2,2 (CC 32 p. 7).

C'est pourquoi on peut affirmer que la *res* présente un caractère d'indifférence et de neutralité par rapport au caractère ontologique qu'elle transporte²². Nonobstant cela, nous pouvons repérer les traits distinctifs de ces deux aspects de la *res*: logique et ontologique

La procédure dialectique d'Augustin dans le *De Doctrina Christiana* rappelle la procédure de Platon dans le *Sophiste*. Dans ce dialogue Platon "avait rapporté à la science dialectique (τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐπιστήμης) l'art de diviser selon les genres (κατὰ γένη διαίρεισθαι)"²³, par une méthode dialectique appelée la pêche à la ligne. Dans la recherche d'une définition, on fait le triage afin d'arriver à un genre suprême.

Pour Augustin cette manière de procéder est formellement attestée et il parle de Tichonius, célèbre rhétoricien et orateur qui avait établi des règles pour l'interprétation des livres des Écritures. Une de ces règles était précisément celle de la division en genres et espèces.²⁴

Regardons le schéma d'Augustin:



Nous constatons la division dialectique selon trois sortes de distinctions: *res/signa*; *uti/frui*; *summa res/res utendum*. La première

²² Le mot *res* dans le lexique médiévale donne plusieurs interprétations. Pour une analyse détaillée de cette expression on peut consulter: J. Hamesse, *Res chez les auteurs philosophiques des XIIe siècles et XIIIe siècles ou le passage de la neutralité à la spécificité* in *Coloquio Internazionale del lessico Intellettuale Europeo*, a cura di. M. Fattori et M. Bianchi, edizioni dell Ateneo, 1982. Dans cet exposé l'auteur essaye de tracer l'évolution sémantique de ce mot à travers le moyen âge. Son allusion à S. Augustin et au *De Doctrina Christiana*, montre l'importance de ce mot pour les divers auteurs médiévaux. "Le terme *res* est utilisé d'une part pour exprimer une des notions premières du savoir et d'autre part pour désigner un attribut transcendantal de l'être. On voit donc, *res* évoluer dans deux sens très différents: dans le premier cas, et nous sommes ici en logique, *res* devient l'objet de la pensée (il y a donc passage du concret à l'abstrait), dans le second cas, et nous sommes alors en métaphysique, *res* devient l'essence même de l'être (il y a donc passage de la banalité du mot chose à la spécificité la plus grande)", p. 93. De ces deux sens à la fois logique et ontologique nous les trouvons chez Augustin, cependant ils sont entremêlés et le plus souvent, il ne les spécifie pas. Néanmoins il nous semble que le sens ontologique est bien plus fort que celui du sens logique.

²³ Jean Pépin, *Saint Augustin et la dialectique*, Villanova University Press, 1976, p. 171.

²⁴ "Quarta Tyconii regula est de specie et genere. Sic enim eam vocant, volens intellegi speciem partem, genus autem totum, cuius ea pars est, quam nuncupat speciem, sicut unaquaeque civitas pars est utique universitatis gentium; hanc ille vocat speciem, genus autem omnes gentes", *De Doc. Chr.* III,34,47 (CC 32 p. 106).

distinction définit une pré-structure ontologique qui s'identifie à la distinction déjà établie entre le *modus inveniendi* et le *modus proferendi*. La division de ces trois termes souligne le mode d'être de la division préliminaire de l'être, entre *modus inveniendi* et *modus proferendi*, et à la fois la classification qui détermine la division interne au mode propre d'être.

La première division marque la différence entre *res* et *signa*; la seconde, la distingue dans la *res frui* et *uti*, la troisième division établit la distinction entre la *summa res* et la *res utendum*.

Quelles sont les choses dont il faut jouir? Ce sont celles qui concernent la *summa res*, c'est-à-dire la Trinité.²⁵ Seul le Dieu Trinitaire peut nous donner le bonheur permanent, et pour cette raison il est le seul dont nous puissions jouir et dont nous puissions user²⁶. Mais quelles sont les sources de ces deux concepts *uti* et *frui*?²⁷, qui deviendront le leitmotiv de toute la mystique médiévale? Où Augustin est-il allé chercher cette distinction? Certains auteurs parlent d'une source cicéronienne. En effet, Cicéron parle de la distinction entre *honestum* et *utile*²⁸, car Augustin dans les *Div. Quaest.* 83 en fait usage²⁹. Mais pour R. Lorenz, la source trouve son origine dans l'œuvre *De philosophia* de Varron auquel Augustin fait allusion dans le *De Civitate Dei*³⁰.

²⁵ "Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, eademque trinitas, una quaedam summa res communisque omnibus fruendis ea", *De Doc. Chr.* I,5,5 (CC 32 p. 9).

²⁶ T. van Bavel, *Fruitio, delectatio and voluptas in Augustine*, in *Augustinus*, vol. 38, 1993, pp. 500-501.

²⁷ Comme principales études sur ces deux concepts, signalons: T. van Bavel, *Fruitio, delectatio and voluptas in Augustine*, in *Augustinus* vol. 38, 1993, pp. 499-510; O. Donovan, *Usus and fruitio in Augustine*, *De Doctrina Christiana*, in *The journal of theological studies*, vol. 33, 1982, pp. 361-397; R. Lorenz, *Die Herkunft des augustinischen Frui deo*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* vol. 64, 1952-53, pp. 34-60; R. Holte, *Béatitude et sagesse. Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne*, *Études Augustiniennes*, 1962, essentiellement les pages 207-231.

²⁸ *De Officiis*, II,9; III,11.


²⁹ Cf. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, q.30.

³⁰ Cf. R. Lorenz, p. 40. Les sources anciennes, notamment néoplatoniciennes de la *frui deo* augustinienne se trouvent dans la désignation ancienne et surtout patristique du *Ἀπολαύειν θεοῦ*. Nous la trouvons chez Porphyre et également chez Plotin où elle a joué un rôle considérable; cf. R. Lorenz, *art. cit.* p. 50. Toutefois, nous croyons que ce qui manque à la doctrine néoplatonicienne du *ἀπολαύειν θεοῦ*, associée souvent à l'idée de l'*ὁμοιωσις θεοῦ* c'est le *telos* biblique compris à la fois dans sa fonction de *telos* divin et de *telos* humain. I. Bochet explicite très bien ce *telos* par rapport au couple *frui* et *uti* en disant: "Le *De doctrina Christiana* expose d'abord le précepte de l'amour de Dieu, puis le précepte de l'amour du prochain qui est lié à l'amour de soi, avec le souci très marqué de tout faire converger dans l'amour de Dieu (cf. I,22,21 et 26,27)", I. Bochet,

La deuxième distinction relève la détermination ontologique situant le don authentique de l'Être dans ses deux dimensions essentielles correspondant à la *summa res* et à la *res utendum*. Il y a une circularité entre le mode de l'Être donné qu'est Dieu lui-même et l'étant spirituel par excellence, à savoir, la sainte Écriture en tant qu'explicitation de cet Être comme don d'amour.

Au livre II, Augustin reprend non pas la question des choses - ce qu'elles sont, qui a été l'objet d'une étude au livre I - mais l'autre pôle de la division dialectique, à savoir les choses qui sont représentées par des signes et ce qu'ils signifient (*modus proferendi*).

Voyons son schéma de la division des choses significées:



La distinction entre choses et signes, établie tout au début du *De Doctrina Christiana*, ne prétend pas distinguer les choses (*res*) des signes (*signa*) en fonction d'une différence insurmontable. En effet, les signes tout en étant différents des choses sont pourtant les énoncés des choses. La compréhension, elle, se trouve précisément au croisement des choses et des signes et elle signifie le phénomène totalisant de ces deux aspects: celui des choses en tant que telles, et celui des signes en tant que signifiés des choses. Mais en outre, il semble évident aussi que ce qui est en jeu dans ce traité est le rapport circulaire entre ce qui est à comprendre et ce qui est à expliquer.

Notes complémentaires au De Doctrina Christiana, BA 11/2 Institut d'Études augustiniennes, Paris, 1997, p. 461. Ce qui nous semble très particulier chez Augustin à propos de la doctrine du *frui* et *uti* et spécialement le *frui deo* c'est le passage entre une conception naturelle de l'être de l'homme qui a la finalité de son propre être tant dans une *eudaimonia* hétéronome, fondée en Dieu que dans une *eudaimonia* autonome fondée dans l'homme qui aime soi-même et son prochain et qui se réjouit de soi-même en tant qu'être naturel. Or ce qui est intéressant chez Augustin c'est précisément le passage ontologique d'un principe co-naturel entre amour et jouissance de Dieu comme déterminations de l'être de l'homme à un principe qui est pourtant toujours au-delà de cette co-naturalité. Le sens mystique de cet amour de soi et jouissance de soi comme cause de son être en Dieu permet ce passage d'un principe naturel à un principe spirituel sans qu'il y ait une rupture de fait. Étant donné cela, nous croyons que ce n'est pas le néoplatonisme ni même le platonisme qui permettent seuls la soudure entre ce principe naturel et le principe spirituel, mais une philosophie stoïcienne et porphyrienne teintées d'un aristotélisme mitigé fournissant les bases d'une dialectique entre ces deux aspects.

2. - LA RES EN TANT QU'EXISTENCE: UTI ET FRUI

Dans le *De Doctrina Christiana* le rapport entre connaissance de soi et amour de soi est défini en termes de jouissance:

“Jouir, en effet, c’est s’attacher à une chose par amour pour elle-même (*propter ipsam*). User au contraire, c’est ramener l’objet dont on fait usage à l’objet qu’on aime, si toutefois il est digne d’être aimé”³¹.

Seulement dans la connaissance de soi-même, le *soi* n’est pas traité comme un objet mais comme quelque chose qui se rattache à une chose par amour à cause d’elle-même³². “Puisque l’objet de la connaissance coïncide avec le sujet connaissant, on peut dire que la connaissance que l’esprit a de lui-même appartient au même niveau de perfection que celui de l’esprit”³³.

Augustin exprime ici une corrélation entre amour (*amor*) et chose (*res*) comme étant une relation symétrique, dont la finalité de connaissance et l’amour ne sont pas au-dehors d’elle-même. Dans l’*Éthique à Nicomaque* Aristote définit le Bien comme *la fin finale, c’est-à-dire le Bonheur*³⁴. La finalité du bien est, dit Aristote, “ce qui est toujours choisi pour soi-même et jamais à cause d’autre chose”³⁵. Ce passage se trouve intimement lié au contexte platonicien du livre de la *République*, où Platon parle du Bien qu’il faut aimer pour lui-même et non pas en vue d’un autre³⁶.

Dans l’usage, nous dit Augustin, les choses sont utilisées comme

³¹ “Frui enim est amore alicui rei inhaerere propter se ipsam. Uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est”, *De Doc. Chr.* I,4,4 (CC 32 p. 8).

³² Dans la phrase, la fonction de *propter ipsam* est assez ambiguë mais c’est ce qui attire le plus l’attention. Est-ce que la proposition *propter ipsam* se rattache plutôt au datif *alicui rei* ou doit-on la comprendre plutôt du côté de soi-même, dans la mesure où le caractère propre de soi c’est la jouissance? La finalité du jouir c’est être heureux et donc *propter ipsam*, bien que grammaticalement elle qualifie la finalité de ce rattachement à cause de cette même chose, cette même chose ne tombe pas au-dehors de soi-même car la fin ultime de l’homme est jouir de soi et de Dieu. Ainsi la traduction pourrait être aussi: “Jouir, en effet, c’est s’attacher à une chose à cause de soi-même”. Un autre texte qui va dans le sens que nous suggérons se trouve également dans le *De Doctrina Christiana*: “Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se atque proximo propter Deum: cupiditatem autem, motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter Deum”, III,10,16 (CC 32 p. 87).

³³ G. Verbeke, *Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu*, in *Augustiniana*, vol. 4, 1954, p. 510.

³⁴ Aristote, *Éthique à Nicomaque*, I,5 1097 b 24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1097 b 30.

³⁶ Platon, *République* 357 b; 358 a.

objets et c'est en tant qu'objets qu'elles sont aimées. "En effet, *user c'est prendre pour soi quelque chose au gré de la volonté*"³⁷. Et Augustin ajoute encore que "*celui qui use d'une chose n'en jouit pas totalement; car il prend pour soi au gré de sa volonté: il ne la cherche pas à cause de lui-même mais à cause d'une autre fin*"³⁸.

La différence ontologique entre *uti* et *frui* est au cœur de la théorie eudaimonique d'Augustin qui reprenant la maxime d'inspiration cicéronienne proclamait: *Beati omnes esse volumus*. La jouissance est donc cette vertu qui nous amène à être heureux. La finalité du bien (*finis boni*), c'est de nous rendre heureux. Le bonheur est seulement possible grâce à une philosophie comme recherche de la sagesse, qui ne s'oppose pas à la *praxis* religieuse. Le *bios philosophicos* augustinien est en quête d'une réalisation de ce qui est le plus propre du soi-même: l'équilibre entre une vérité contemplative et une vertu pratique.

La différence ontologique entre *uti* et *frui* dans la réflexion augustinienne peut-elle être explicitée avec les notions heideggeriennes de l'ontologie de la *Zuhandenheit* et de la *Vorhandenheit*³⁹? La *Zuhandenheit* est le mode d'être du *Dasein* qui se caractérise par la maniabilité, alors que la *Vorhandenheit* est le mode d'être du *Dasein* qui se caractérise par l'être donné. Qu'il y ait une proximité entre les deux pensées pourrait constituer l'objet d'une étude à part.

Le *bios philosophicos* chez Augustin est lui-même la réalisation du mode de vie contemplative et du mode de vie active. Si la philosophie est pour Augustin la recherche du bonheur et que le chemin de la vie bonne et heureuse n'est autre que la vraie religion, il semble que *frui* signifie aussi l'accomplissement d'un *bios praxikos*. Mais, quelles sont les choses dont il faut jouir? Selon Augustin, nous devons jouir, tout d'abord, de Dieu lui-même.

"Donc les choses faites pour la jouissance sont le Père, le Fils et le Saint-Esprit, trinité identique à elle-même, unique et souveraine réalité (*summa res*).

³⁷ "Uti est enim assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis", *De Trin.* X,11,17 (CC 50 p. 330).

³⁸ "Non autem omnis qui utitur fruitur si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit non propter illud ipsum sed propter aliud appetivit", *Ibidem*.

³⁹ Heidegger dans la *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* p. 270, et d'après le supplément d' Oskar Becker, fait une citation précisément de ce texte du *De Doctrina Christiana*. La trinité est alors le suprême et l'immuable bien; c'est d'elle qu'on doit jouir. Le souci existentiel est accompli dans la jouissance de cette trinité. La *cura* par laquelle Heidegger désigne comme *das Bekümmertsein* est la caractéristique fondamentale de la vie.

Bien commun de tous ceux qui en jouissent"⁴⁰.

Mais l'autre chose dont nous devons jouir c'est de nous-mêmes. "Qu'est-ce donc s'aimer, sinon vouloir être présent à soi pour jouir de soi?"⁴¹. Cette présence de soi à soi-même identifie en quelque sorte l'esprit et la connaissance de soi comme jouissance et comme amour de soi. La question est alors de savoir comment on peut aimer ce qu'on ne connaît pas⁴². La réponse est donnée en fonction d'une étroite relation entre connaître et aimer. De même que si on ne s'aime pas on ne se connaît pas, de même aussi, si on ne se connaît pas on ne s'aime pas non plus.

2.1 - "Amor sui" et "notitia sui"

Ce qu'Augustin désigne par *amor sui* et *notitia sui* se trouve essentiellement dans les livres IX et X du *De Trinitate*. La rédaction de ce traité au sujet de la Trinité commence en 399, mais elle est interrompue. Les douze premiers livres ont été publiés à l'insu d'Augustin⁴³. En tout état de cause le *De Trinitate* est postérieur à la rédaction des trois premiers livres du *De Doctrina Christiana*. En dépit de cela, nous formulons l'hypothèse que la doctrine de la triade analogique de la Trinité divine dans l'esprit humain pourrait être une reformulation ontologique plus recherchée et plus développée, du couple *uti* et *frui*, exposé dans le *De Doctrina Christiana*. Certes, la doctrine du *uti* et *frui* se trouve déjà dans des textes antérieurs au *De Doctrina Christiana*, comme le signale très bien O. Donovan⁴⁴. Toutefois, pour R. Lorenz il y a une association étroite entre les termes ontologiques du *uti* et *frui* du *De Doctrina Christiana* et du *De Trinitate* X,11,17 où Augustin établit la même distinction qu'il reprend dans le *De Civitate Dei* XI,25 où Augustin présente la triade de la *natura-usus-doctrina* développée⁴⁵.

Dans le *De Trinitate*, Augustin développe une triade dans la

⁴⁰ "Res igitur quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, eademque trinitas, una quaedam summa res, communisque omnibus fruentibus ea", *De Doc. Chr.* I,5,5 (CC 32 p. 9).

⁴¹ "Quid est autem amare se, nisi sibi praesto esse velle ad fruendum se?", *De Trin.* IX,2,2 (CC 50 p. 295).

⁴² "Nam quomodo amat quod nescit?", *De Trin.* IX,3,3 (CC 50 p. 296).

⁴³ *Retract.* II,15 (BA 12 p. 475).

⁴⁴ O. Donovan, *Usus and fruitio in Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana*, in *The Journal of theological studies*, vol. 33, 1982, pp. 373-383.

⁴⁵ R. Lorenz, *Die Herkunft des augustinischen Frui Deo*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, vol. 64, 1952-53, pp. 34-42.

structure de l'esprit humain qui est une image de la trinité. Cette triade est composée de trois éléments: *mens*, *amor*, *notitia*. La question: cette structure triadique ne sera-t-elle pas un développement de la notion de *frui* dans le *De Doctrina Christiana*? Nous croyons que la réponse est positive, néanmoins nous n'allons pas ici la développer davantage.

Augustin veut trouver dans l'homme l'image de la trinité:

"Dans cette âme j'ai trouvé une sorte de trinité: celle de l'âme, de la connaissance par laquelle elle se connaît, de l'amour par lequel elle s'aime et aime sa connaissance"⁴⁶.

Il y a une correspondance étroite entre l'amour, la connaissance et l'esprit lui-même qui possède ces facultés. Mais l'amour est présent dans l'esprit (*mens*) dans un double sens: d'une part, l'amour est présent dans la connaissance de l'âme lorsqu'elle connaît et d'autre part, l'amour est dans l'âme elle-même comme cause de soi-même. "*L'âme se connaît soi-même, dans son acte même de la connaissance; de cette connaissance découle, également direct et nécessaire, l'amour de soi*"⁴⁷.

Pour Augustin l'acte intellectuel engage par lui-même l'amour de cet acte. Cette triade ontologique dans l'esprit humain ne fait qu'une seule substance.

"Quand l'âme s'aime, il y a deux choses, l'âme et son amour. Il y en a deux aussi, quand elle se connaît: l'âme et sa connaissance. Donc, l'âme, son amour, sa connaissance, sont trois choses et ces trois choses n'en font qu'une"⁴⁸.

L'importance du binôme de l'âme et de son amour s'inscrit dans la logique du précepte biblique 1Jo.4,16: «*Deus caritas est*»⁴⁹. La *mens*, *amor* et *notitia* ne sont que le déploiement du premier commandement «*diliges dominum tuum ex toto corde tuo*», Mt.22,37.

L'âme ne peut pas s'aimer si elle ne se connaît pas. L'âme quand elle s'aime montre donc deux choses, l'esprit et son amour qui sont deux, mais il y a un seul esprit.

Mais quand l'âme aime un être il y a trois choses: l'*ego*, le *quod amo* et l'*amor*. Ces trois choses sont présentes à l'âme comme une seule et

⁴⁶ "In ea quaedam trinitas invenitur, id est mens et notitia qua se novit et amor quo se notitiamque suam diligit", *De Trin.* XV,3,5 (CC 50 A p. 465).

⁴⁷ E. Hendriks, *Introduction au De Trinitate* (Bibliothèque augustinienne, 15), Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1991, p. 72.

⁴⁸ "Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se novit. Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt et haec tria unum sunt", *De Trin.*, X,4,4 (CC 50 p. 297).

⁴⁹ Cf. *De Trin.* IX,1,1.

même chose. Toutefois, s'interroge Augustin, quand on s'aime est-ce qu'il n'y aurait pas deux choses au lieu de trois?

“Quand on s'aime soi-même, celui qui aime et ce qui est aimé sont un même être: tout comme aimer et être aimé sont une même chose, quand quelqu'un s'aime. On exprime deux fois la même chose quand on dit: il s'aime et il est aimé de soi. Car alors, aimer n'est pas autre chose qu'être aimé; tout comme celui qui aime n'est pas autre que celui qui est aimé. Mais il reste que l'amour et ce qui est aimé, même alors, sont deux choses. Car lorsqu'on s'aime soi-même, il n'y a d'amour que si l'amour même est aimé. Or s'aimer et aimer son amour sont choses différentes. L'amour n'est pas aimé sinon aimant déjà quelque chose: où rien n'est aimé, il n'y a nul amour. Deux choses donc, quand on s'aime: l'amour et ce qui est aimé. Car alors, le sujet et l'objet de l'amour ne font qu'un”⁵⁰.

En s'aimant celui qui s'aime identifie l'amour de son être à son propre amour; celui qui aime (*amans*) s'identifie au principe aimant (*amatur*). Par ce principe il y a une identification entre sujet et objet. Dans ce cas, s'aimer et être aimé, sont une seule et même chose. Or, pour R. Lorenz le *frui* est ce qui est précisément défini soit par le sujet soit par l'objet⁵¹. Ainsi vouloir être présent à soi pour jouir de soi identifie à la fois l'acte de présence à soi par l'acte de s'aimer soi. Et de même que l'acte par lequel l'âme se connaît et aime sa connaissance s'identifie à une seule et même chose, de même aussi la connaissance par laquelle l'âme se connaît s'identifie au principe connaissant qu'est l'âme tout entière.

2.2 - Le cercle herméneutique dans l'Écriture

Nous avons tenté jusqu'ici de traiter de la théorie de la signification chez Augustin de façon à saisir la portée ontologique de sa théorie du langage et de la compréhension. Par la suite nous avons entamé une interprétation du *De Doctrina Christiana* en développant les aspects fondamentaux

⁵⁰ “Amans enim et quod amatur hoc idem est quando se ipse amat, sicut amare et amari eodem modo idipsum est cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur cum dicitur, amat se, et, amatur a se. Tunc non est aliud atque aliud amare et amari, sicut non est aliud atque aliud amans et amatus. At vero amor et quod amatur etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim quisquis se amat amor est nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor nisi iam aliquid amans quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt cum se quisque amat, amor et quod amatur; tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est, *De Trin.* IX,2,2 (CC 50 p. 294).

⁵¹ R. Lorenz, *Fruitio dei bei Augustin* in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* vol. 63, 1950-51, pp. 82-83. Cf. T. van Bavel, *Fruitio, delectatio and voluptas in Augustine in Augustinus*, vol. 38, 1993, p. 501.

d'une ontologie dialectique qui détermine le caractère pré-ontologique de l'Être comme don d'amour. Autrement dit, si le *De Magistro* donnait à partir d'une théorie du langage et de la signification, une vérité immuable comme aboutissement d'une relation entre l'acte de signifier et la signification elle-même, dans le *De Doctrina Christiana* c'est au contraire, la prééminence ontologique à toute explicitation de cette énonciation.

Nous allons maintenant développer la problématique du cercle herméneutique, tout d'abord au sens d'une application à la méthode d'interprétation biblique. Ensuite, nous analyserons le cercle herméneutique en tant que théorie générale de la compréhension philosophique. Nous procéderons ici avant tout à une analyse épistémologique de cette théorie de l'interprétation. Finalement nous tâcherons de démontrer une "*ontologie de la compréhension*" à partir d'une herméneutique de la facticité de l'âme chez Augustin comme lieu par excellence d'une réalité effective. Dans ce dernier point nous devons trouver un point de passage qui relie la théorie de la signification, telle qu'elle est analysée dans le *De Magistro* et dans le *De Doctrina Christiana*, et une herméneutique factuelle en tant qu'ontologie de la compréhension.

Le premier cercle herméneutique de l'Écriture se trouve très bien exprimé par Augustin lorsqu'il dit "*Quapropter in veteri Testamento est occultatio novi, in novo Testamento est manifestatio veteris*"⁵². La tradition biblique et patristique établit un rapport étroit entre l'Ancien Testament et le Nouveau Testament grâce à une compréhension unitaire de la totalité de l'Écriture. Si l'Ancien Testament présente une occultation du Nouveau Testament et qu'à son tour le Nouveau Testament manifeste l'Ancien Testament, le sens de l'accomplissement herméneutique de l'Écriture est seulement possible dans ce rapport étroit entre occultation et désoccultation. L'Écriture devient donc l'étant spirituel par excellence dans sa totalité qui se manifeste par un incessant mouvement entre recouvrement et dévoilement.

Dans une autre formule plus évocatrice encore, Augustin déclare "*Quamquam et in vetere novum lateat et in novo vetus pateat*"⁵³. Entre la première expression et la seconde, le choix des mots est vraiment pertinent: la connexion des expressions comme *occultatio* et *manifestatio*, d'une part, et *lateat* et *pateat*, d'autre part, se laisse comprendre selon un sens ontologique⁵⁴. Le sens de l'Écriture est seulement saisi dans une

⁵² *De Cat.Rud.* IV,8 (CC 46 p. 128).

⁵³ *Quaest. in Hept. Quaest. Exo.* q.73 (CC 33 p. 106).

⁵⁴ L'expression *occultatio* rappelle ici le mot grec *λαντανω* qui est précisément l'opposé de *ἀλήθεια*: occultation et oubli - *λήθη* et non occultation - *ἀλήθεια*. Le rapport entre caché et non caché comme la double face d'une même réalité est ce que Heidegger

unité de l'ensemble testamentaire et cette unité reflète à son tour la différence ontologique de chacun. Une différence qui est interprétée par Augustin comme la retraite et la manifestation du sens de l'Écriture; le Nouveau Testament est caché dans l'Ancien Testament, alors que l'Ancien Testament est explicité dans le Nouveau Testament. Ce qui est frappant dans cette perspective d'Augustin à l'intérieur de la démarche compréhensive de l'Écriture, c'est que c'est au cœur de cette Écriture que se trouve le mouvement entre "oubli et restauration"⁵⁵ que seul le Verbe incarné peut attester.

2.3 - L'appropriation de l'Écriture comme un type d'appropriation ontologique

I. Bochet fait une analyse de l'"interprétation scripturaire et compréhension de soi" chez saint Augustin à partir d'une lecture comparative entre les *Confessions* et le *De Doctrina Christiana*. Cette démarche est inspirée essentiellement par l'herméneutique ricœurienne. Il y a une circularité entre le sujet qu'interprète le texte sacré, lequel est en retour lui aussi interprété par le texte. Cette circularité est bien démontrée par I. Bochet au niveau épistémologique⁵⁶. C'est en effet, dans la mesure où le sujet qui interprète le texte sacré est à son tour interprété par le texte que le rapport entre interprétation scripturaire et compréhension de soi forment une "épistémologie de la compréhension"⁵⁷. Mais est-ce que la pensée d'Augustin en reste pourtant là? La démarche heideggerienne est belle et bien ontologique. Elle est définie par P. Ricœur comme une

désigne en tant que: "La non-occultation est le trait fondamental de ce qui est déjà apparu et a laissé derrière soi l'occultation", *Essais et conférences*, Gallimard, 1958, pp. 313-314. Et encore plus loin Heidegger explicite le rapport intrinsèque de ce demeurer à la fois caché et désocculté: "Je demeure caché à moi-même, quant au rapport à moi-même de ce qui autrement n'est pas caché. Le non-caché, de son côté, se trouve ainsi caché, de même que je le suis à moi-même dans mon rapport à lui", *Idem*, p. 320. Le rapport clair-obscur, ou encore *occultatio* et *manifestatio*, dont parle Augustin doit être compris selon la totalité de l'essence divine qui par soi-même demeure le sens total de cette dialectique occultation-désoccultation. C'est dans le même sens que P. Ricœur affirme "le moment historique de la philosophie du symbole, c'est celui de l'oubli et aussi celui de la restauration: oubli des hiérophanies; oubli des signes du Sacré; perte de l'homme lui-même comme appartenant au Sacré", *Herméneutique des symboles et réflexion philosophique*, in *Archivio di Filosofia*, vol. 31, 1961, p. 52.

⁵⁵ P. Ricœur, *Herméneutique des symboles et réflexion philosophique*, p. 52.

⁵⁶ I. Bochet, *Interprétation scripturaire et compréhension de soi. Du De Doctrina Christiana aux Confessions de saint Augustin*, in *Comprendre et interpréter*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1933.

⁵⁷ P. Ricœur, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique*, p. 11.

“herméneutique ontologique”.

“Il y a deux manières de fonder l’herméneutique dans la phénoménologie. Il y a la voie courte, dont je parlerai d’abord, et la voie longue, celle que je proposerai de parcourir. La voie courte, c’est celle d’une ontologie de la compréhension, à la manière de Heidegger. J’appelle «voie courte» une telle ontologie de la compréhension, parce que rompant avec les débats de méthode, elle se porte d’emblée au plan d’une ontologie d’être fini, pour y retrouver le comprendre non plus comme mode de connaissance, mais comme un mode d’être”⁵⁸.

Étant donné que l’approche ontologique heideggerienne est celle qu’il nous intéresse ici de traiter, nous allons tenter de démontrer une ontologie de la compréhension chez Augustin.

En effet, nous pouvons parler d’une circularité herméneutique qui met en place une compréhension de soi et une interprétation scripturaire, mais nous devons parler aussi d’une circularité ontologique: la précompréhension du texte sacré par l’homme signifie une précompréhension de l’homme lui-même, anticipé par le texte sacré. C’est à partir de là que la compréhension accède à une réflexion critique. “*Tel est le cercle: l’herméneutique procède de la pré-compréhension de cela même qu’en interprétant elle tâche de comprendre*”⁵⁹.

Heidegger dans son cours du semestre d’été de 1923, qui a comme titre *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, parle d’Augustin en disant: “*Augustin nous donne la première herméneutique de grand style*”⁶⁰. L’idée de style ici doit moins expliciter la théorie herméneutique comme doctrine de l’art de l’interprétation que comme la compréhension de l’homme dans son rapport avec l’Écriture. Certes, l’idée de style et de l’art d’interpréter sont incluses dans l’ontologie de la compréhension, mais elles n’épuisent pas le sens de cette ontologie herméneutique.

Heidegger exprime également quels sont les auteurs qui marquent son acheminement vers cette herméneutique de la facticité (existence concrète et le réel).

“Mon compagnon de route dans ma recherche fut le jeune Luther et mon modèle Aristote que le premier détestait. Kierkegaard me donnait des impulsions, et les yeux, c’est Husserl qui me les a implantés”⁶¹.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁹ P. Ricœur, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁶⁰ M. Heidegger, *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, p. 12.

⁶¹ *Idem*, p. 5. Cf. J. Greisch, *L’herméneutique dans la phénoménologie comme telle. Trois questions à propos de Réduction et donation*, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, vol. 96, 1991, p. 43.

En effet, l'importance de la figure de Luther dans cet ouvrage est moins significative pour elle-même que pour ce qu'elle suscite à travers elle. Or que suscite-t-elle derrière elle, ou qui suscite-t-elle? Toute la tradition biblique, et principalement celle qui inaugure l'avènement du Christ, c'est-à-dire le *Nouveau Testament*, saint Paul et finalement, saint Augustin.

La notion de *Faktizität* doit pouvoir allier la conception de l'homme de la tradition philosophique grecque et le concept de l'homme de la tradition biblique.

Heidegger interprète dans *Hermeneutik der Faktizität* un passage du *De Doctrina Christiana* (III,1,1). Le contexte de ce commentaire s'inscrit dans la présentation que Heidegger fait du concept traditionnel d'herméneutique.

Le texte d'Augustin cité par Heidegger doit être situé: il se trouve au livre III du *De Doctrina Christiana*, là où Augustin développe les règles de l'interprétation de l'Écriture par rapport aux expressions figurées, c'est-à-dire les "*signa ambigua*".

Nous devons rappeler que la grande division établie par Augustin dans le plan de l'œuvre, et dont nous avons déjà parlé, était celle de la distinction ontologique entre les choses qui sont et les choses qui sont signifiées. Au livre I Augustin avait traité des choses qui sont avant de parler des choses signifiées, lesquelles font l'objet d'étude du livre II. Augustin y développe son herméneutique de la signification en parlant d'abord des signes naturels ou propres. Mais c'est finalement au livre III qu'il analysera les signes figurés.

"L'homme qui craint Dieu, cherche consciencieusement sa volonté dans les saintes Écritures. Rendu doux par la piété, qu'il ne recherche pas les controverses. Prémuni par la science des langues, qu'il ne se laisse pas arrêter par des mots et des locutions inconnus; pourvu de la connaissance de certaines choses nécessaires, qu'il n'ignore pas l'essence et le caractère de celles qu'on emploie à titre de comparaison; appuyé sur l'exactitude du texte, obtenue par un travail avisé et scrupuleux de correction, qu'il vienne, ainsi équipé, dissiper et ré-

"Dans quelle attitude doit-il l'homme avancer par rapport à l'interprétation non transparente de l'Écriture dans la crainte de Dieu (*Furcht Gottes*), dans l'unique souci (*alleinige Sorge*) de la recherche de la volonté divine dans l'Écriture; elle a été formée dans la piété (*Frömmigkeit*) afin qu'il ne s'attaque pas aux querelles des mots; équipé (*praemunitus*) de la connaissance linguistique qu'il ne reste pas accroché aux mots inconnus et tournures du discours, muni de la connaissance (*Kenntnis*) de divers objets et événements natu-

soudre les ambiguïtés des Écritures⁶².
rels⁶³.

Le texte cité ci-dessus ne sera pas parfaitement compris si on ne tient pas compte de ce qu'Augustin a déclaré auparavant au livre II du même traité. Il explicite plus clairement quels sont les degrés spirituels nécessaires à la compréhension de l'Écriture⁶⁴; le premier, la crainte (*timor*), que Heidegger appelle la crainte de Dieu (*Furcht Gottes*); le second, la piété (*pietas*) que Heidegger désigne par *Frömmigkeit*, mais elle peut également être identifiée à ce que Heidegger désigne par *alleinige Sorge*, car la piété produit une crainte comme forme de sagesse; le troisième, la science (*scientia*) qu'il désigne par la connaissance (*Kenntnis*) de divers objets et événements naturels. Voyons ce que nous dit Augustin dans le *De Doctrina Christiana* livre II:

"C'est donc avant tout, de la crainte de Dieu que nous avons besoin, pour nous tourner vers la connaissance de sa volonté et savoir ce qu'il nous prescrit de désirer et de fuir. Il est nécessaire que cette crainte éveille en nous la pensée de notre mortalité et de notre mort à venir, et qu'elle attache sur le bois de la croix, en les y clouant comme des chairs, tous les mouvements de l'orgueil. C'est ensuite de la piété que nous avons besoin pour nous rendre doux et pour ne pas contredire l'Écriture divine, soit quand comprise, elle frappe quelques-uns de nos vices, soit, quand incomprise, nous nous imaginons être capables de mieux juger et de mieux enseigner. (...) Après ces deux degrés de la crainte et de la piété, on arrive au troisième, le degré de la science, celui dont je me suis proposé de parler dans le livre présent. Car c'est là que s'exerce toute personne qui a du goût pour les divines Écritures et s'y applique avec l'intention de ne trouver rien d'autre en elles que le devoir d'aimer Dieu pour Dieu et le prochain pour Dieu. (...) J'ai traité de ces deux préceptes au livre précédent quand j'ai parlé des choses. (...) De fait cette science qui lui donne un saint espoir ne rend pas l'homme vantard mais gémissant"⁶⁵.

⁶² "Homo timens deum voluntatem eius in scripturis sanctis diligenter inquit. Et ne amet certamina pietate mansuetus; praemunitus etiam scientia linguarum, ne in verbis locutionibusque ignotis haereat, praemunitus etiam cognitione quarundam rerum necessarium, ne vim naturamve earum, quae propter similitudinem adhibentur, ignoret, adiuvante etiam codicum veritate, quam sollers emendationis diligentia procuravit, veniat ita instructus ad ambigua scripturarum discutienda atque solvenda", *De Doc. Chr.* III,1,1 (CC 32 p. 77).

⁶³ "In welcher Ausstattung der Mensch an die Auslegung nichtdurchsichtiger Stellen der Schrift herantreten soll: in der Furcht Gottes, in der alleinigen Sorge, in der Schrift Gottes Willen zu suchen; durchgebildet in der Frömmigkeit, auf daß er nicht Gefallen habe an Wortzänkereien; ausgerüstet mit Sprachkenntnis, daß er nicht an unbekannten Worten und Redeweisen hängen bleibe; versehen mit der Kenntnis gewisser natürlicher Gegenstände und Begebenheiten", M. Heidegger, *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, p. 12. Cf. *De Doc. Chr.* III,1,1.

⁶⁴ Ces trois degrés sont également explicités par Augustin dans les *Div. Quest.* 83, q.36,4.

⁶⁵ *De Doct. Chr.* II,7,10 (CC 32, p. 37).

Des trois degrés nécessaires à la compréhension de l'Écriture dont parle Augustin, les deux premiers sont ceux qui se rapportent non pas au niveau de la *scientia* mais au niveau plus élevé, celui de la *sapientia*: "*la crainte du seigneur est en effet le commencement de la sagesse*"⁶⁶. Les deux degrés sont effectivement le don de l'être, car ils se rapportent aux choses qui sont: "*modus inveniendi quae intelligenda sunt*", c'est-à-dire celles qui concernent le mode d'avoir par lequel celui qui reçoit peut donner en retour:

"Toute chose, en effet, dont on ne se prive pas en la donnant, n'est pas encore possédée comme elle devrait l'être, tant qu'on la possède sans la donner"⁶⁷.

Si dans les deux premiers degrés de la compréhension de l'Écriture, ce sont les choses qui sont qui font objet d'étude et si c'est uniquement dans la suite (troisième degré) que surgit la science, celle qui étudie le rapport des signes aux choses, alors il s'agit bien de la question de la circularité herméneutique entre pré-compréhension et compréhension. Dès lors, le sens de la *corrélacion explicite entre la science des Écritures et le gémissément de soi*, dont parle I. Bochet, parallèlement établi entre le *De Doctrina Christiana* et les *Confessions* ne peut pas être saisi totalement si on ne l'accomplit pas avec le sens de l'interprétation heideggerienne. I. Bochet a voulu éclairer les *Confessions* à la lumière du *De Doctrina Christiana* en démontrant ainsi une circularité entre interprétation scripturaire et compréhension de soi:

"L'interprétation scripturaire apparaît cette fois-ci comme le principe de la compréhension qu'Augustin a de lui-même dans les *Confessions*"⁶⁸.

Cette corrélation étroite entre interprétation scripturaire et compréhension de soi se situe au troisième degré, celui de la science⁶⁹. Or, la relation entre interprétation scripturaire et compréhension de soi

⁶⁶ "Initium enim sapientiae timor domini", *De Doc. Chr.* II,7,11 (CC 32 p. 38). La crainte de Dieu est l'amour de Dieu. Dans le livre X,36,58 des *Confessions* Augustin parle d'un *timor castus* par lequel l'homme craint Dieu et évite d'être orgueilleux et superbe. Dans la *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* p. 233, Heidegger discute l'importance de la crainte de Dieu dans l'interprétation du livre X des *Confessions*: la crainte (*Furcht*) est alors définie comme l'amour de Dieu (*Gottesliebe*). En effet, Augustin distingue, dans les *En. in Psalmos* XVIII,10 (PL 36 p. 155), le *timor castus* du *timor non castus*. Et dans l'*Ev. Joh. tract.* 85,3 (CC 36 p. 539) cette même distinction est définie selon les termes d'un *timor servilis* et d'un *timor castus*.

⁶⁷ "Omnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur et non datur, nondum habetur quomodo habenda est", *De Doct. Chr.* I,1,1 (CC 32 p. 6; BA 11/2 [1997] p. 76).

⁶⁸ I. Bochet, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁶⁹ *Idem*, p. 31.

n'est pas accomplie seulement au niveau de la science mais aussi aux deux autres niveaux dont parle Augustin, à savoir ceux de la crainte et de la piété.

Revenons maintenant au commentaire de Heidegger sur le texte d'Augustin.

L'expression allemande *Ausstattung*⁷⁰ traduit l'expression latine *praemunitus* (*prae-munitus*) laquelle signifie précisément être mis en avant de quelque chose. Dans le texte latin, le *praemunitus etiam* détermine ce qui prémunit l'homme en plus des deux autres degrés cités en tout premier lieu, la crainte et la piété, à savoir, la connaissance des langues. Or cela suppose donc que le *praemunitus* se rapporte à l'ensemble des trois degrés et non pas seulement à celui de la *scientia*, c'est-à-dire à la manière dont l'homme est équipé pour mieux comprendre l'Écriture. Par conséquent le *praemunitus* désigne la disposition de l'homme à recevoir le don de Dieu. Dans le *prologue*, Augustin, répondant à ses adversaires les met en garde par rapport à deux aspects:

“Avant de commencer, toutefois, je dois répondre, me semble-t-il, à ceux qui critiqueront ces règles ou qui seraient prêts à les critiquer, si je ne les apaisais auparavant. Au cas, d'ailleurs où même après cet apaisement, quelques-uns les critiqueraient, ils ne troubleront pas, du moins, ni ne ramèneront d'une étude utile à une paresse ignorante, les autres qu'ils pourraient ébranler s'ils ne les trouvaient prémunis (*praemunitus*) et préparés”⁷¹.

⁷⁰ Dans *Sein und Zeit* l'expression *Ausstattung* apparaît trois fois. La première occurrence se trouve au § 5 où Heidegger explicite que le mode de l'interprétation ontologique de l'étant est essentiellement ontico-ontologique. C'est cette même structure qui détermine l'“équipement” propre de l'homme. L'interrogation sur le sens de l'être du *Dasein* doit être à la mesure de son propre “équipement” et les déficiences de sa compréhension doivent être comprises en fonction d'une inadéquation de la construction conceptuelle sur ce mode d'être du *Dasein*. Ce mode d'être ne signifie pas une saisie immédiate mais une prédonation (*Gegebenheit*) sous le mode de la compréhension propre de cet être. La deuxième occurrence se trouve au § 10 où il s'agit de délimiter le champ de cette analytique du *Dasein*. Les deux définitions de l'anthropologie traditionnelle sont mises en évidence. C'est précisément dans la définition de l'homme comme *ζῷον λόγον ἔχον* de la pensée grecque que le *λόγος* constitue l'équipement de dignité supérieur, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 58. La dernière occurrence se trouve au § 21 qui discute le concept de monde dans l'ontologie cartésienne. L'ontologie cartésienne est un bon exemple d'une déficience sur le mode d'être de l'étant, saisi en primauté pour les qualités matérielles de cet étant. C'est donc par une déficience du comportement thématique de l'être du *Dasein* que «l'équipement» de l'étant n'est envisagé que sur le mode de détermination d'une *res extensa* et cela indépendamment de la question du monde comme tel.

⁷¹ “Quod antequam exordiar, videtur mihi respondendum esse his, qui haec reprehensuri sunt aut reprehensuri essent, si eos non ante placaremus. Quod si nunnuli etiam post ista reprehenderint, saltem alios non movebunt nec ab utili studio ad imperitiae pigritiam revocabunt, quos movere possent, nisi praemunitos praeparatosque invenirent”.

Pour Augustin il y a un mode d'être de l'homme mis en avant comme mode de pré-compréhension de l'Écriture. Il y a corrélation entre le mode anticipatif de l'être et le mode anticipatif de la pré-compréhension du sens de l'Écriture. Les degrés dont parle Augustin ne sont pas de simples états d'âme et d'esprit, ils sont le don de l'amour de Dieu lui-même à travers lequel l'homme s'approche de l'Écriture. La crainte et la piété ne sont que l'amour de Dieu et la sagesse⁷². Les trois degrés qui sont exigés des hommes pour qu'ils voient dans l'Écriture le signe visible de Dieu reflètent le mode d'être de l'homme en tant que don de Dieu.

Les trois degrés dont parle Augustin peuvent se rapporter à ce que Heidegger désigne par la *Vorhabe*, la *Vorsicht* et le *Vorgriff* qui font la structure préalable à la compréhension: la *Vorhabe* est la pré-acquisition, la *Vorsicht*, la pré-vision, et le *Vorgriff* l'anticipation.

Néanmoins, lorsque le *praemunitus* est compris en tant que manière pour l'homme d'être équipé au niveau de la connaissance scientifique, c'est-à-dire la *scientia*, il est alors une *instructio*. En effet, c'est également le sens de l'expression allemande *Ausstattung*.

Le sens de l'interprétation heideggerienne est de déterminer la précompréhension facticielle de l'homme par rapport au sens anticipatif de l'Écriture. Autrement dit, quelle est, d'une part, la conception de l'homme qui est pré-visionnée et anticipée dans la compréhension de l'Écriture et quelle est, d'autre part, le caractère facticiel de cette compréhension comme visée et sens de la question de l'homme? Essayons d'expliquer le dédoublement de ce que Heidegger comprend par herméneutique en utilisant la pensée d'Augustin. Pour Augustin la compréhension de l'Écriture doit dire d'avance quelles sont les choses en vue de la jouissance et quelles sont celles dont on a l'usage, à savoir Dieu lui-même et l'homme, et par delà les choses dont on jouit qui relèvent de la précompréhension, il y a pour nous des choses à signifier en tant qu'objet de jouissance. Cette pré-

De Doct. Chr. proemium, 1 (CC 32 p. 1).

⁷² L'idée de *timor dei* chez Augustin ne signifie rien d'autre que l'amour de Dieu. Dans le livre X des *Confessions* l'amour de Dieu suppose la crainte de Dieu: "non amare te nec casta timere te", *Conf.* X,36,59 (CC 27 p. 187). L'association entre crainte de Dieu et amour de Dieu est liée à l'exégèse du *Psaume* 18: «timor domini castus, permanens in saeculum saeculi». L'interprétation d'Augustin sur le *timor dei* est en fait double: elle doit pouvoir justifier la parole du *Psaume* mais en même temps la parole de l'apôtre qui dit: «Timor non est in charitate». C'est cette double affirmation biblique qu'Augustin tente de justifier en parlant d'un *castus timor* et d'un *servilis timor* dont fait état le livre X des *Confessions*. Dans les 83 *Questions* Augustin rapproche la notion de crainte de celle d'amour. Augustin déclare à propos de la crainte de Dieu: le seul qu'on ne puisse craindre sans l'aimer" *De Div. Quaest.* 83, q.36 (BA 10 p. 106).

compréhension est double: l'une va dans le sens de l'existence facticielle comme point de départ d'une compréhension, et l'autre va dans le sens de l'explicitation compréhensive de cette herméneutique facticielle. Dès lors, les choses visant la jouissance dont parle Augustin s'identifient à l'herméneutique de la facticité dont parle Heidegger et les choses à signifier sont l'herméneutique comme théorie compréhensive, en tant qu'explicitation de cette facticité. Autrement dit, le rapprochement conceptuel entre Augustin et Heidegger se situe au niveau de la notion de compréhension comme dimension ontico-ontologique et pas simplement épistémologique.

«Pour Heidegger, l'herméneutique n'est plus une discipline théorique, une théorie générale de l'interprétation, mais une dimension interne de la facticité elle-même. Cela veut dire que le «comprendre» qui est une dimension intrinsèque de la vie factuelle, n'est pas un comportement de type cognitif⁷³.

Dans la suite de l'argumentation de Heidegger on comprend mieux le sens de ce qu'il vient de dire quand il cite un passage du livre de *La Genèse au sens littéral, livre imparfait, d'Augustin*. Le choix de Heidegger est un signe révélateur du caractère ambivalent de cette facticité de l'homme comme expression auto-compréhensive de lui-même et de Dieu. Cette facticité est d'une part l'empreinte divine dans l'homme, mais en contrepartie, elle est aussi l'empreinte humanisée de l'homme en Dieu. La question étant celle de savoir comment il est possible de parler d'une appropriation de l'homme en Dieu et de Dieu dans l'homme.

2.4 - La facticité de l'âme

Comme nous venons de le voir, Heidegger cite à deux reprises Augustin. Nous avons déjà fait référence à la première citation. Mais nous n'avons pas encore justifié ce rapprochement entre Augustin et Heidegger du point de vue d'une filiation conceptuelle à l'égard de la notion de *Faktizität*. Selon G. Agamben on trouve une première origine ancienne du mot *Faktizität* chez Augustin; c'est lui qui dit: *facticia est anima*⁷⁴. Il

⁷³ J. Greisch, *Ontologie et temporalité*, p. 37.

⁷⁴ Cf. G. Agamben, *La passion de la facticité in Heidegger. Questions concrètes*, Collège International de Philosophie, Osiris, Paris, 1988, p. 63. L'auteur indique où il a puisé cette information: dans le *Thesaurus linguae latinae*. Pour notre part, nous avons essayé d'aller plus loin dans les recherches. Dans nos recherches au CETEDOC, nous avons constaté dans le *Corpus Augustinianum* que le mot *facticia* - *facticium* et *facticiorum* apparaît trois fois dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre d'Augustin. Celle dont parle G. Agamben se trouve dans le *Contra Fortunatum*; la seconde se trouve dans le *Contra Faustum* et la troisième dans *Locutiones in Heptateuchum*. Mais pour notre cas, deux expressions seulement, à savoir celles de *facticia* et de *facticiorum*, nous intéressent plus

exploite encore le rapprochement étymologique du terme *Faktizität* avec celui de *faitiche*. C'est pourquoi G. Agamben esquisse une brève histoire de la sémantique du mot et de son entrée dans le monde européen. "*Les dictionnaires nous disent que ce mot est entré au XVIII^e siècle dans les langues européennes par le portugais feitiço*" ⁷⁵. Ensuite il essaye de rapprocher le mot *facticius* du mot *fétiche* selon l'usage freudien et même marxiste.

Nous pensons que le mot *facticius* peut avoir un sens enrichissant si nous l'envisageons par rapport à une famille sémantique commune dans sa racine à *facio*, *factum*, d'où vient *facticius*, et qui est celle de: *faber*, *fabricator*, *fabricans*. Non seulement nous justifions ce rapprochement grâce à l'origine du mot portugais, qui signifie effectivement quelque chose qui a été fait ou produit (*factum*)⁷⁶, mais parce que dans le langage augustinien ces expressions sont très fréquentes⁷⁷. La création, c'est-à-dire

précisément: "Quid vero et de magistro ipso dicemus, ac sanctimonii totius auctore Jesu, et hujus ipsius professionis puellarum caelibes sponso, qui in evangelio tria genera taxans spadonum, unum nativum, alterum facticium, tertium voluntarium", *Cont. Faust.* 30,4 (PL 42 p. 492); "Locutio est a parte totum significans; non enim quia fusiles tantummodo nominavit, fieri sculptiles, ductiles fictilesque permisit vel ullum genus simulacrorum aut qualicumque facticiorum deorum", *Loc. in Hep. Loc. Exo.* 138 (CC 33 p. 421).

⁷⁵ G. Agamben, *op. cit.*, p. 73. Cf. *Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, Fétichisme*, p. 983.

⁷⁶ Les expressions *facticio*, *factivo*, *factitivo* et encore *factivel* dénotent toutes, dans la langue portugaise, l'idée selon laquelle quelque chose a été fait non par nature, mais par production artificielle. Le sens peut encore s'élargir jusqu'à l'idée de ce qu'il est possible de faire, ce qui arrive au cours des événements. On voit alors certains écrivains utiliser le mot *factivel* pour désigner au cours de l'histoire tous les actes qui ont été faits et qui ont une empreinte spécifiquement humaine. Cf. A. Morais Silva, *Grande Dicionário da Língua Portuguesa*, Editorial confluência, Lisboa, 1953, pp. 19-20. "Portugal era desde longos anos um povo de aventureiros, que mais pareciam romanescos paladinos, do que soldados perseverantes numa empresa factivel e humana, Latino Coelho, *Camões*, p. 280; Sampaio Bruno, *A Ditadura*, p. 125.

Chez Thomas d'Aquin nous trouvons l'expression *factivae*, utilisée dans un contexte aristotélicien: "Et quae sunt cum ratione exponit, cum subdit, quod omnes «artes activae», ut fabrilis et aedificativa et ceterae hujusmodi, quarum actiones in materiam exteriorum transeunt et omnes scientiae, quae scilicet non habent operationem in exteriorum materiam transeuntem, sicut sunt scientiae morales et logicae, omnes inquam hujusmodi artes, potentiae quaedam sunt", *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, IX, 1788.

⁷⁷ H. Arendt dans *Le concept d'amour chez Augustin*, Deuxtemps Tierce, Paris, 1991, analyse précisément la compréhension augustinienne de la *praxis* humaine et celle de la création divine grâce aux concepts de *faber*, *fabricator*, *fabricans*. G. Agamben associe très volontiers *facticius* à *fétiche*, mais il faut savoir qu'employé dans ce sens, il est plutôt révélateur du caractère inauthentique et impropre de l'être. Nous pensons que *facticius* se rapproche dans le langage augustinien de ce qui est produit et qui est pour ainsi dire agent

l'univers créé par Dieu est, comme le dit Augustin, une *fabrica*: "*Mundus enim appellatur non solum ista fabrica quam fecit Deus, coelum et terram, sed habitatores mundi mundus vocantur*"⁷⁸. Le monde est alors une fabrique (*Fabrica Dei*): Dieu l'a fait non pas comme un artisan (*artifex*) qui produit quelque chose extérieur à celui qui l'a produit, mais au contraire, Dieu produit le monde comme s'il était au milieu de ce monde. "*Par contre l'homme reste étranger à sa propre fabrication*". (...) "*Il se tient au dehors de ce qui est créé et, en tant que tel, il n'a pas de pouvoir sur lui*"⁷⁹.

"Dieu n'a pas fait le monde comme le fait le fabriquant (*faber*). Il est extérieur à l'arche qu'il fait, et elle est placée dans un autre lieu, lorsqu'elle est fabriquée; et bien qu'elle soit juxtaposée, celui qui la produit, subsiste dans un autre lieu, extérieurement à ce qu'il fait. Mais Dieu fabrique le monde en déversant, là où il est placé il l'a produit; Il ne l'a pas extrait de quelque chose, comme si extérieurement il déversait la partie qu'il fabrique"⁸⁰.

Or dans le contexte du passage *Facticia est anima* nous tâcherons de comprendre la nature de l'âme par rapport à cette fabrication divine. Il s'agit de comprendre comment l'âme est *facticia*. Quelle est la nature ontologique de cette *facticité* et comment se définit-elle par rapport à la production divine et humaine?

La discussion engagée dans ce passage s'inscrit dans une dispute entre Augustin et Fortunat, au sujet de l'âme. Il s'agit de distinguer la nature de l'âme de la nature de Dieu. Cette distinction se fonde dans le caractère facticiel de l'âme par rapport à Dieu, et donc, dans une distinction radicale entre œuvre produite et fabriquant.

"Augustin: - En niant que l'âme soit substance de Dieu, j'ai voulu nier qu'elle soit Dieu. Mais elle a Dieu pour auteur, ayant été créée par Dieu. Autre est le Créateur, autre son œuvre. Celui qui a créé ne peut absolument pas être corruptible; mais ce qu'il a fait ne peut absolument pas être égal à celui qui l'a fait. Fortunat: - Mais moi non plus je n'ai pas dit que l'âme est semblable

passif de cette production dans l'ordre de l'Être. Seul Dieu est «fabricateur». Mais *facticius* peut avoir aussi le sens de quelque chose qui est de fait et dont la facticité rentre dans l'ordre de la production humaine comme quelque chose de propre. Dans ce sens le débat entre Heidegger et Hannah Arendt peut être éclairant. Les études de J. Taminiaux sont importantes à cet égard.

⁷⁸ *Epist. Ioh.* 2,12 (PL 35 p. 1995).

⁷⁹ H. Arendt, *Le concept d'amour chez Augustin*, p. 54.

⁸⁰ "Non enim sic fecit, quomodo facit faber. Forinsecus est arca quam facit, et illa in alio loco posita est, cum fabricatur; et quamvis juxta sit, ipse alio loco sedet qui fabricat, et extrinsecus est ad illud quod fabricat; Deus autem mundo infusus fabricat, ubique positus fabricat, et non recedit aliquo, non extrinsecus quasi versat molem quam fabricat", *Trac. in Ioh.* 2,10 (CC 36 p. 16).

à Dieu. Mais puisque tu as dit que l'âme est facticielle (créée) et qu'il n'y a rien hors de Dieu, je demande d'où Dieu a tiré la substance de l'âme"⁸¹.

É. Gilson explicite très bien la distinction entre être créateur et être créé selon les deux modes, celui de l'être fabriquant et celui de l'être fabriqué: "(...) *l'homo faber ne peut en aucun cas devenir un homo creator, parce que n'ayant lui-même qu'un être reçu, il ne saurait produire ce qu'il n'est pas, ni dépasser dans l'ordre de la causalité le rang qu'il occupe dans l'ordre de l'être*"⁸². Pour É. Gilson la différence entre *homo faber* et *homo creator* est justifiée par le simple fait qu'une loi de causalité est inhérente à cette distinction. La causalité divine est à la fois nécessaire et toute puissante, car elle est la cause de l'être; elle est la possibilité pure de production. L'effet de cette production est la cause contingente, et c'est précisément comme cela qu'est défini l'être qui est produit.

L'idée de production se rattache, chez Descartes, aux idées produites par l'esprit humain et qui sont à la base de la discussion, dans la troisième *Méditation*, entre les *ideae factae*, les *ideae innatae* et *adventitiae*⁸³. Dans les *Objections*, Descartes revient encore sur cette distinction en déclarant à ce propos:

"Par le mot *Idea* j'entends tout ce qui peut être en notre pensée, et (...). J'en ai distingué de trois sortes: à savoir «*quaedam sunt adventitiae*», comme l'idée qu'on a vulgairement du soleil; *aliae factae vel factitiae*, au rang desquelles on peut mettre celle que les Astronomes font du soleil par leur raisonnement; et *aliae innatae, ut idea Dei, mentis, corporis, trianguli, et generaliter omnes quae aliquas essentias veras, immutabiles et aeternas representant*"⁸⁴.

Pour Descartes, les idées factices sont un produit de l'entendement humain, elles sont faites. La distinction entre les trois genres d'idées est

⁸¹ "Augustinus dixit: Animam sic negavi esse substantiam Dei, ut negem illam esse Deum: sed tamen ex Deo auctore esse, quia facta est a Deo. Aliud est qui fecit, aliud quod fecit. Qui fecit, corruptibilis esse omnino non potest: quod autem fecit, omnino non potest aequale esse illi qui fecit. Fortunatus dixit: Nec ego dixi animam esse similem Deo. Sed quia dixisti facticiam esse animam, et nihil praeter Deum; quaero undenam Deus animae substantiam adinvenit", *Cont. Fortu.* 12 (BA 17 p. 147). Descartes parle dans sa troisième *Méditation* des *ideae factae*: Ex his autem ideis aliae innatae, aliae adventitiae, aliae a me ipso factae mihi videntur"; cf. *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Vrin, Paris, 1978, p. 38.

⁸² Cf. É. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, Vrin, Paris, 1948, p. 91.

⁸³ Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, p. 38.

⁸⁴ *Lettre à Mersenne* 16 juin 1641, III, 383. Sur cette question voir A.T., VII, p. 279-282.

déterminée par la *plus realitatis objectivae in se continent*”⁸⁵. Aux idées innées sont attribuées une causalité objective majeure, c’est-à-dire, qu’elles participent d’une plus grande perfection d’être.

“Car en effet celles [les idées] qui me représentent des substances, sont sans doute quelque chose de plus, et contiennent en soi (pour ainsi parler) plus de réalité objective, c’est-à-dire, participent par représentation à plus de degrés d’être ou de perfection, que celles qui me représentent seulement des modes ou des accidents”⁸⁶.

La distinction entre les idées est une conséquence de la causalité d’être sur laquelle les penseurs médiévaux ont profondément médité. C’est cette même causalité qui est discutée par É. Gilson dans le contexte de la distinction entre la causalité de l’*homo faber* et celle de l’*homo creator*⁸⁷. Mais entre idée factice et idée innée, la causalité devient beaucoup plus nuancée qu’on ne l’imagine et, par conséquent, il faut introduire une différence entre la causalité nécessaire et la causalité contingente. Si l’idée factice représente l’idée produite par l’entendement d’une réalité, alors l’être objectif de l’idée est indifférencié, que ce soit par rapport à l’idée innée ou par rapport à l’idée factice, car l’idée innée aussi bien que l’idée factice présentent la même distinction entre l’idée de l’être objectif et la chose elle-même. Ainsi donc, la causalité objective dont parle Descartes, à propos des idées factices et des idées innées, se distingue par le degré de plus grande ou de plus petite causalité inhérente à la *res*.

“Mais il n’est pas vrai aussi que l’idée représentant toutes les perfections que nous attribuons à Dieu ne peut pas avoir plus de réalité objective que celles qui ont la réalité finie”⁸⁸.

Or pour Descartes, “toute idée étant ouvrage de l’esprit, sa nature est telle qu’elle ne demande de soi aucune autre réalité formelle, que celle qu’elle reçoit et emprunte de la pensée, ou de l’esprit, dont elle est seulement un mode, c’est-à-dire, une manière ou façon de penser”⁸⁹. Alors la distinction ontologique entre idées innées, factices et adventices reste un problème dans la détermination essentielle de la réalité objective

⁸⁵ Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, p. 41. Discussion qui est engagée par Heidegger dans *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, § 26, Bd. 17, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, pp. 140-146.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

⁸⁷ É. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-89.

⁸⁸ “Nec verum etiam est ideam, omnes illas perfectiones quas deo tribuimus repraesentantem, non habere plus realitatis objectivae quam habeant res finitae”, *Objections*, 5^{em}. Réponse, A.T. VII, p. 365.

⁸⁹ Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, p. 41.

de l'idée innée en ce qu'elle a de plus, par rapport à toute autre idée qui n'est pas produite par l'*ego*. Autrement dit, comment est-il possible de distinguer nettement l'idée produite de l'idée innée si toute idée produite par l'esprit est inhérente à l'*ego*?

Or il y a deux idées innées: l'*ego* et Dieu. S'il en est ainsi, comment Descartes distingue-t-il l'*ego cogito* de Dieu et l'*idea facticia* de l'*idea innata*? Pour Augustin l'âme est facticielle, elle n'a aucun principe suffisant pour se produire elle-même. D'où le rapprochement entre Augustin et Descartes de ce point de vue, car les idées factices sont précisément celles produites par l'esprit humain sans que ce mode de production ne soit ramené à sa cause de production. Mais alors, qui échappe à cette logique productive, selon Descartes? Pas même Dieu, car l'être objectif de l'idée de Dieu peut être aussi fruit d'une production. De ce point de vue, la causalité objective ne peut pas rendre compte de la véritable distinction entre idée factice et idée innée, seul le degré d'intentionnalité peut le faire. D'une part, le *majus* et *minus* de cette causalité détermine le degré de causalité inhérent à la *res*. D'autre part, elle est ce par quoi une causalité extrinsèque à nous nous est imposée, par le simple fait que la réalité qui est Dieu est plus grande que moi et de ce fait, *extra me*. "*Et enfin n'est-il pas vrai aussi que Dieu serait très peu de chose s'il n'était point plus grand que ce que nous en concevons*"⁹⁰. Le problème soulevé dans la méditation cartésienne est double: d'un côté comment l'idée factice de la causalité objective peut-elle être ramenée à une totalité, qui de ce fait, inclut en elle-même l'idée innée; de l'autre comment concilier cette totalité causale de l'idée factice avec l'idée de Dieu qui *est extra me*?

Le lecteur pourrait se demander pourquoi il nous est nécessaire de déconstruire le concept de causalité objective chez Descartes, qui est encore héritier de la notion de causalité médiévale. Parce que nous voulons montrer qu'on peut ramener les *ideae* (surtout les *ideae factae* et *ideae innatae*) à la production de l'idée en tant que production de l'esprit, et par conséquent arriver à un principe d'indifférenciation entre les deux idées. La différenciation des idées comme *modi cogitandi* permet de poser précisément le problème de l'effectivité de cette idée par l'*ego sum* et celui du Dieu infini. Dans ce cas, comment Descartes établit-il une réelle distinction entre les deux substances? Pour Augustin, l'idée n'est pas

⁹⁰ "Nec denique verum est, perpusillum fore deum, si non sit major quam a nobis intelligatur", *Objectiones*, p. 365. Cet argument de Descartes rappelle ce qui dit S. Anselme dans le *Proslogium*: le "*aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest*" et celui aussi d'Augustin dans le *De Doctrina Christiana* (I,7,7): "*aliquid quo nihil melius sit atque sublimius illa cogitatio conetur attingere*".

uniquement la forme de la pensée, mais davantage, le remplissement de cette pensée. Ce qui permet à Augustin d'affirmer: "*facticia est anima*", c'est le fait que le sens de l'être de la facticité de l'âme n'est pas indéterminé. Par contre, Descartes, "*méconnaît la manière d'être de l'ego, parce qu'il s'en tient à la certitude de son existence, sans distinguer une telle catégorie épistémique d'un existential ontologique déterminé*"⁹¹.

La critique heideggerienne de cet *ego sum substantial*, dont parle J.-L.Marion, fondée sur la critique que Heidegger fait à Descartes dans les *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*⁹². Mais Heidegger fait une critique semblable dans *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie*, où il discute la *realitas objectiva* de la Méditation III de Descartes, "*comme un équivalent du terme scolastique de quidditas*" qu'il distingue de la réalité objective de Kant⁹³. La critique de Heidegger dans cette œuvre s'est attachée encore à la critique de l'indétermination du sens de l'ego au détriment du *sum*. Or pour nous cette même réalité objective fait problème non seulement en ce qui concerne l'indifférenciation de cet ego mais aussi l'indifférenciation des idées innées et des idées factices. D'où les problèmes qui résultent d'une lecture ontologique cartésienne tant de l'idée factice que du remplissement effectif de cette idée. Augustin nous le fait découvrir à partir de la facticité de l'âme. La filiation cartésienne et heideggerienne à son égard est fondamentale pour comprendre l'importance d'Augustin vis-à-vis de Descartes et de Heidegger. C'est pourquoi nous avons discuté la pensée de Descartes en tant que troisième intervenant pour saisir en contraste et par confrontation ce qui, d'une part, unit Augustin, Heidegger et Descartes, et d'autre part, ce qui distingue Descartes d'Augustin et de Heidegger.

En outre, ce qui a motivé notre déconstruction des idées factices (*ideae facticiae*) chez Descartes, en tant qu'elles dévoilent, l'indétermination de cet *ego sum*, et qui nous a permis d'aboutir à la conception d'âme factice (*facticia anima*) en tant que mode de production divine, c'est le présupposé que les notions de *Faktizität* chez Heidegger et *facticia* chez Augustin correspondent effectivement à la notion de l'étant intramondain. C'est au cœur de ce statut d'étant intramondain qu'on peut déceler les traits à la fois divins et humains.

Notre deuxième thèse est la suivante: l'*herméneutique de la facticité* ne pourrait-elle mieux promouvoir ce qu'Augustin comprend par

⁹¹ J.-L.Marion, *Réduction et donation*, PUF, Paris, 1989, p. 132.

⁹² M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, GA 61, p. 172-173. Cf. J.-L.Marion, *Réduction et donation*, PUF, 1989, p. 120.

⁹³ M. Heidegger *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie*, p. 59.

res. Si la *res* accomplit sa fonction logique et ontologique au sens où elle est à la fois ce par quoi une chose est comprise comme chose et ce par quoi la chose est chose en tant que telle, il ne nous reste qu'à chercher, dans la possibilité propre du soi-même qu'est le *Dasein* (*Faktizität*), l'effectivité de la chose elle-même. Ce qui nous intéresse ici, c'est l'*herméneutique de la facticité* au sens d'un étant intramondain en tant que chose elle-même. L'âme selon Augustin, est *facticia* non parce que son mode de production est artificiel mais parce que sa production est en quelque sorte un *analogans* par rapport au mode de production divine. C'est dans ce sens que Heidegger déclare dans *Hermeneutik der Faktizität* à propos du verset biblique: "*Et factum est und: et fecit Deus* - c'est une analogie par rapport au *Faciamus - Fiat*, exprimé par Dieu"⁹⁴. De cette manière l'âme est considérée comme un être concrété (*concreatum*).

2.5 - "*Fides quaerit, intellectus invenit*"

A l'encontre de la plupart des Pères de l'Église, Augustin s'est intéressé à la relation entre foi et raison. Il dit dans le *De Trinitate*: "*Fides quaerit, intellectus invenit*"⁹⁵. On pourrait de manière générale affirmer le cercle de cette manière: "*chercher pour trouver, trouver pour chercher*":

"Car on le cherche pour le trouver avec plus de douceur; on le trouve pour le chercher avec plus d'ardeur"⁹⁶.

Six siècles plus tard saint Anselme (1033-1109) parle dans son *Proslogium* d'une *fides quaerens intellectum*. L'influence de la pensée d'Augustin subie par le moine de Cantorbéry n'est point méconnue: G. Madec s'interroge sur la viabilité de l'existence d'une herméneutique anselmienne à la manière de ce qu'on peut trouver dans le *De Doctrina Christiana* d'Augustin⁹⁷. A l'époque romantique déjà, F. Schleiermacher utilisait un distique du *Proslogium* de saint Anselme, qu'il introduit dans la page titre de sa *Glaubenslehre*. Saint Anselme y exprime le dilemme du *credo ut intelligam*. "*Neque enim quaero intelligere, ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. - nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non*

⁹⁴ M. Heidegger, *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, p. 23.

⁹⁵ Cf. *De Trinitate*, XV,2,2 (CC 50A p. 461).

⁹⁶ "Nam et quaeritur ut inveniatur dulcius, et inveniatur ut quaeratur avidius", *ibidem*.

⁹⁷ G. Madec, *Y a-t-il une herméneutique anselmienne?*, dans *Les mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XIe-XIIe siècles*, Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris, 1984, pp. 491-500.

*fuerit, non intelliget*⁹⁸.

Ce choix de F. Schleiermacher dénote tout d'abord l'importance de la question dans la sphère herméneutique; elle ne doit donc pas être comprise comme l'œuvre du hasard.

Sans doute à l'époque d'Augustin, le *credo ut intellegam* est une conséquence du problème du sens de l'Écriture, et de la manière dont celle-ci peut répondre au problème direct ou indirect de l'existence humaine. A l'époque romantique elle est plutôt une conséquence du rapport entre l'Écriture et le monde du texte, dont parle aujourd'hui Ricœur. Le monde du texte est pour les romantiques la critique textuelle, l'art de l'interprétation et de la compréhension comme un *organon* des sciences de l'esprit.

Le *De Doctrina Christiana* est un bon exemple de l'effort d'Augustin à cette époque-là, pour répondre aux problèmes de l'interprétation de l'Écriture et des difficultés qu'y trouve le lecteur. Pour comprendre l'Écriture sainte il faut connaître les différentes sciences, celles qu'on distingue généralement comme sciences de l'esprit et sciences de la nature. Mais d'autre part l'Écriture sainte contient en elle-même toutes les sciences en forme d'un *organon* systématisé à partir de l'étant spirituel en général.

La lecture de la Bible ne va pas de soi. "*La Bible est un livre difficile. Pour Augustin, pour les intellectuels chrétiens de son temps elle était, bien plus encore que pour nous, chargée d'obscurités, d'apories, de mystère*"⁹⁹.

Que l'étude sur l'Écriture reflète l'effort humain d'une compréhension herméneutique sur la vérité de la Révélation, cela n'implique pas moins que cette compréhension est aussi le mouvement de la raison humaine. L'Écriture éveille le sens de l'homme vis-à-vis de lui-même et vis-à-vis de Dieu. De ce fait, la foi n'est pas seulement l'expression kérygmatisée de la révélation, elle est aussi le lieu d'un nouveau jaillissement de la *theoria* (θεωρία), c'est-à-dire de la *contemplatio* comme critique herméneutique d'une simple *speculatio*.

Dès lors, s'il y a un système philosophique chez Augustin, sa particularité est de pouvoir englober dans son rationalisme critique le

⁹⁸ F. Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Schriften und Entwürfe. Der christliche Glaube 1821-1822*, Band 7, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1980. Cf. S. Anselme, *Proslogium*, I, Cerf, Paris, 1986, p. 100: "Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. [Nam et hoc credo: quia nisi credidero, non intelligam]". Cette dernière partie de la phrase est distincte de celle citée par F. Schleiermacher. Dans sa citation il y a la reprise d'un autre passage d'un autre ouvrage de S. Anselme, *Epistola de incarnatione Verbi, Opera omnia*, Schmitt, vol. I, 1946, p. 284.

⁹⁹ H.-I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, p. 478.

problème de la foi en tant que *loi fondamentale de l'existence*¹⁰⁰, et celle-ci peut répondre aux questions fondamentales de l'homme.

P. Ricoeur exprime le dynamisme d'une herméneutique du symbolique qui cherche à se dépasser lorsqu'elle se met en dialogue avec la pensée critique et réflexive: le "*symbole donne à penser*", car il est précisément le lieu de la donation au milieu du langage. Le symbole émerge de l'acte même de l'expression mais c'est de l'acte de l'expression que s'engage une autre pensée prête à recommencer à nouveau. Rappelons à cet égard la critique herméneutique de la symbolique païenne que nous avons analysée précédemment¹⁰¹.

2.5.1 - "*Intellegere*" et "*credere*"

Qu'entendons-nous par croire? Augustin donne une réponse assez claire: "*croire n'est rien d'autre que penser avec assentiment*"¹⁰². Dans un autre texte, Augustin présente une définition semblable "*croire est consentir qu'est vrai ce qui est dit*"¹⁰³. L'expression *assentio* ou encore *consentio* est l'équivalent du terme grec stoïcien *συγκατάθεσις*, utilisé déjà par Clément d'Alexandrie. L'usage en est repris à Aristote¹⁰⁴. En effet, la conception aristotélicienne de la foi (*πίστις*) dans ce contexte nous semble plus développée que chez Platon. Chez Aristote la foi n'est pas seulement le résultat d'une simple connaissance doxique, située dans le domaine de l'opinion sensible, comme elle est chez Platon, car la *doxa* est à l'opposé de l'*ἀλήθεια*.

Chez Aristote, la foi en tant que jugement du vrai et du faux, fait partie de la vérité de notre connaissance: la foi est une fonction du *νοῦς θεωρητικός*, l'intellect théorique¹⁰⁵. Cette conception, comme d'ailleurs celle des stoïciens, est reprise par Augustin. Dans sa *Métaphysique* Aristote désigne la foi comme une *ὑπόληψις*, un jugement qui présente un caractère d'universalité. Et dans les *Topiques*, cette foi est désignée par une *ὑπόληψις σφόδρα*, c'est-à-dire un consentement par excellence même. Pour Augustin, les mots *assentio*, *consentio*, et *assumptio*, sont des désignations équivalentes. Il les utilise pour définir la foi en tant que jugement de croyance venant affermir la raison et à l'appui de celle-ci.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

¹⁰¹ Voir *Augustiniana*, vol. 48, 1998, p. 255ss.

¹⁰² "Quamquam et ipsum credere, nihil aliud est, quam cum assentione cogitare", *De Praed. sanct.* II,5 (PL 44 p. 963).

¹⁰³ "Quid est enim credere, nisi consentire verum esse quod dicitur?" *De Spir. et Litt.* 31,54 (PL 44 p. 235).

¹⁰⁴ *Topiques*, III,1, 116a 3.

¹⁰⁵ *Éthique Nicomaque*, VI,2 1139a 27-28.

“L’ordre de la nature requiert que lorsque nous apprenons une chose, l’autorité précède la raison. Car la raison peut paraître infirme, laquelle après s’être déclarée, recourt ensuite à l’autorité pour s’affermir (*assumit*)”¹⁰⁶.

Dans plusieurs textes d’Augustin concernant le rapport entre foi et raison la première semble avoir le rôle primordial¹⁰⁷. La foi est le symbole de l’autorité. Entre autorité et raison, la raison a une priorité réelle, alors que la foi a une priorité chronologique¹⁰⁸. Toutefois, il y a d’autres textes où Augustin inverse la priorité de la foi vis-à-vis de la raison. L’antériorité du penser est nécessaire, car “*quelqu’un peut-il croire à quelque chose si, premièrement, il ne pensait pas à ce qu’il devrait croire*”?¹⁰⁹ Dans une lettre écrite aux alentours de 412 et adressée à une femme du nom de Pauline, Augustin discute, d’une manière assez complexe, du rapport entre foi et vision. “*Pour marquer la différence qu’il y a entre voir et croire, n’est-ce pas assez de dire qu’on voit les choses présentes et qu’on croit les choses absentes*”?¹¹⁰. Ce qui est à comprendre relève de la vision présentifiante, alors que ce qui est à croire relève de la croyance par témoignage. Nous pouvons dire aujourd’hui, qu’Augustin se livre à une réflexion phénoménologique du voir et du croire de l’intérieur d’une compréhension de la dynamique foi-raison.¹¹¹ La raison fonctionne selon des critères perceptifs d’ordre sensitif ou intellectif, alors que la foi fonctionne selon le critère du témoignage: témoignage d’autrui¹¹². C’est

¹⁰⁶ “*Naturae quidem ordo ita se habet, ut cum aliquid discimus, rationem praecedat auctoritas. Nam infirma ratio videri potest, quae cum reddita fuerit, auctoritatem postea, per quam firmetur, assumit*”, *De mor. eccl. cath.*, I,2,3 (BA 1 pp. 138-139).

¹⁰⁷ “*Intellegere vis? Crede. Deus enim per prophetam dixit: «nisi credideritis, non intellegetis». (...) Ergo noli quaerere intellegere ut credas, sed crede ut intellegas*”, *Tract. in Ioh.* 29,6 (CC 36 p. 287); “*Nisi enim et aliud esset credere, aliud intellegere et primo credendum esset quod magnum et divinum intellegere cuperemus, frustra propheta dixisset: «nisi credideritis, non intellegetis»*”, *De Lib. arb.* II,2,5 (CC 29 p. 239).

¹⁰⁸ “*Tempore auctoritas, re autem ratio prior est*”, *De Ord.* II,9,26 (CC 29 p. 122).

¹⁰⁹ *De Praed. sanc.* II,5 (PL 44 p. 962).

¹¹⁰ “*Num satis est, ut inter videre et credere hoc distare dicamus, quia praesentia videntur, creduntur absentia?*”, *Epis.* 147,2,7 (CSEL 44 pp. 280-81).

¹¹¹ “*Constat igitur nostra scientia ex visis rebus et creditis. Sed in his quae vidimus vel videmus nos ipsi testes sumus in his autem, quae credimus, aliis testibus movemur ad fidem cum earum rerum, quas nec vidisse nos recolimus nec vidimus, dantur signa vel in vocibus vel in litteris vel quibusque documentis, quibus visis non visa credantur*”, *Idem*, pp. 281-282.

¹¹² Dans *Le visible et l’invisible* Merleau-Ponty parle d’une foi perceptive qui, en d’autres termes, est l’être-au-monde. Tout au début du livre il fait une transposition du questionnement augustinien sur le temps par le questionnement de l’être-au-monde: “*Ce que saint Augustin disait du temps: «qu’il est parfaitement familier à chacun, mais qu’aucun de nous ne peut l’expliquer aux autres» il faut le dire du monde*”, *Le visible et*

pourquoi la raison a les moyens de nous faire voir et de nous montrer ce qui est à penser et à comprendre. “On pourrait dire en somme, que notre science se compose de deux sortes de connaissances: des choses vues, des choses crues”¹¹³. C’est dans le même sens qu’Augustin affirme dans le *De vera religione* que la foi tient au rapport temporel: “Or, la foi en, des événements temporels, passés ou futurs, est affaire de croyance plutôt que d’intelligence”¹¹⁴.

Plus encore, la raison a les moyens de faire comprendre les faits des choses à croire¹¹⁵ (et qui ne sont pas nécessairement ceux qui concernent la Révélation), même si la foi par elle-même ne peut pas nous montrer ce qu’elle porte comme croyance, à laquelle nous avons seulement accès par le témoignage d’autrui¹¹⁶. La raison a ainsi une antériorité, elle montre ce que la foi ne peut pas faire. L’autre argument utilisé pour justifier la préséance de la raison sur la foi est que la raison juge de la rationalité de cette foi¹¹⁷.

l’invisible, Gallimard, 1964, p. 17. Pour Merleau-Ponty, il faut que “je croie au monde et aux choses d’abord” et c’est seulement à partir de là que “nous sommes conduits à chercher, sous la réflexion elle-même” les raisons de ce croire”, *Idem*, p. 76. Or pour Augustin, la foi, qui est de l’ordre temporel, pour ainsi dire au monde, s’identifie avec le monde. Elle cherche à comprendre les raisons de son croire au moyen d’une réflexion qui l’accompagne comme l’autre de sa pensée. Mais si la foi est définie, comme le fait Augustin, à partir d’un point de vue perceptif, elle est originellement liée au témoignage d’autrui. Ce témoignage d’autrui appartient pour lui à la totalité de la science des choses présentes et des choses absentes. Pour Merleau-Ponty la science, c’est-à-dire la foi perceptive doit pouvoir intégrer dans ce monde “le regard d’autrui sur les choses”, p. 86. C’est précisément cela que fait Augustin dans des termes analogues, pour expliquer le rapport foi-raison.

¹¹³ É. Gilson, *Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin*, Vrin, Paris, 1929, p. 33.

¹¹⁴ “Temporalium autem rerum fides, sive praeteritarum, sive futurarum, magis credendo quam intelligendo valet”, *De Vera rel.* 25,46 (CC 32 p. 216; BA 8 p. 87).

¹¹⁵ “Non autem immerito scire nos dicimus non solum ea, quae vidimus aut videmus, verum et illa, quae idoneis ad quamque rem commoti testimoniis vel testibus credimus. Porro si scire non incongruenter dicimur etiam illud, quod certissimum credidimus, hinc factum est, ut etiam recte credita, etsi non adsint sensibus nostris, videre mente dicamur. Scientia quippe menti tribuitur, sive per corporis sensus sive per ipsum animum aliquid perceptum cognitumque retineat, et fides ipsa mente utique videtur, quamvis hoc fide credatur, quod non videtur”, *Epis.* 147,3,8 (CSEL 44 p. 282).

¹¹⁶ “Nec quia dixi ea credi, quae absunt a sensibus nostris, sic accipiatur, ut inter illa deputentur, quae aliquando vidimus et nos vidisse retinemus certique sumus, quamvis tunc non praesto sint, cum recoluntur a nobis; neque enim inter credita sed inter visa deputantur et ideo nota sunt, non quia fidem habuimus aliis testibus, sed quia nos vidisse sine dubio recordamur et scimus”, *Idem*, p. 281.

¹¹⁷ “«Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis» ubi procul dubio discrevit haec duo deditque consilium, quo prius credamus, ut id, quod credimus, intellegere valeamus, proinde ut fides praecedat rationem, rationabiliter iussum est. Nam si hoc praeceptum rationabile non

Par contre, Augustin semble contredire l'“ordre des raisons” dans le *De Libero arbitrio*.

“Si, en effet croire n'était pas une chose et comprendre une autre, s'il ne fallait pas d'abord croire les grandes et divines vérités que nous désirons comprendre, c'est en vain que le prophète aurait dit: si vous ne croyez pas, vous ne comprendrez pas”¹¹⁸.

D'autres textes encore vont dans le même sens en affirmant la pré-séance de la foi par rapport à la raison: “*Nous devons croire avant de comprendre et veiller à ce que notre foi soit sincère*”¹¹⁹.

Peut-on parler ici d'un principe d'incohérence augustinienne? Notre réponse est négative. L'argumentation d'Augustin, parfois très philosophique et d'autres fois, moins, dépend des circonstances de son activité d'écrivain, des œuvres et du questionnement qui y sont inhérents. En tant qu'homme d'Église et en tant qu'intellectuel, l'écrivain laisse transparaître sa propre existence. Pour cette raison, Augustin adapte son argumentation et sa réflexion à la spécificité propre de chaque œuvre et au type de problème qu'il y poursuit.

Néanmoins, il y a une constante, partagée par la plupart des textes, c'est la distinction assez nette entre foi et raison comme entités différentes mais complémentaires¹²⁰. Entre ce qui est à croire et ce qui est à comprendre il y a un mouvement incessant. Nous pouvons donc affirmer que pour Augustin le phénomène de la foi dans cette circularité de l'*intellectus fidei* est pris au sens bipolaire: la foi en tant que donné théorique et la foi en tant que don donné par la grâce de Dieu. En ce sens H. A. Wolfson parle d'une double théorie de la foi chez Augustin¹²¹. De même T. van Bavel, lorsqu'il dit “*qu'Augustin découvre l'acte de foi d'abord comme une réalité profane*”¹²². Dès lors la notion de foi fait appel à un double volet herméneutique: le premier explicite le sens de cette foi dans la sphère

est, ergo inrationabile est; absit si igitur rationabile est, ut magnam quamdam, quae capi nondum potest, fides antecedit rationem, procul dubio quantulumcumque ratio, qua hoc persuadet, etiam ipsa antecedit fidem”, *Epis.* 120,1,3 (CSEL 34.2 pp. 706-707).

¹¹⁸ “Nisi enim et aliud esset credere, aliud intellegere et primo credendum esset quod magnum et divinum intellegere cuperemus, frustra propheta dixisset: «nisi credideritis, non intellegetis»”, *De Lib. Arb.* II,2,6,17 (CC 29 p. 239).

¹¹⁹ “Prius autem quam intellegamus credere debemus vigilandumque nobis est ne ficta sit fides nostra”, *De Trin.* VIII,5,8 (CC 50 p. 277).

¹²⁰ *Tract. in Ioh.* 8, 7 (CC 36 p. 86): “Aliud est intellegere velle quod clausum est, aliud nolle credere quod apertum est”; voir aussi *De Vera rel.* 49,96 (CC 32 p. 249).

¹²¹ H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, Cambridge, Massachussets, 1970, p. 129.

¹²² T. van Bavel, *De la raison à la foi*, in *Augustiniana*, vol. 36, 1986, p. 16.

du théorique, ce que Heidegger appelle la précompréhension; le deuxième trouve son sens dans l'acte de croire en tant qu'acceptation.

2.5.2 - "Intellegere" et "credere" dans le Sermon 43

Le sermon 43 comporte un intérêt particulier¹²³: il présente d'une manière synthétique la théorie herméneutique augustinienne. Certains y voient l'effort d'Augustin de concilier le *intellegam ut credam* avec le *crede ut intellegas*. D'où son intérêt. Mais il y a d'autres raisons. 1° - Augustin condense la problématique de la compréhension dans son rapport avec la foi par une analyse existentielle et existentielle très enrichissante; 2° - le rapport entre comprendre et croire est établi d'une manière dialogique, à telle enseigne que la réflexivité, entre croire et comprendre et comprendre et croire, est établie de manière claire et paradigmatique; 3° - Augustin développe dans ce schéma dialogique et réflexif une dynamique entre le je et le tu, entre la compréhension humaine et la compréhension divine.

La lecture biblique à la base de la discussion de ce sermon est la *Première Lettre* de saint Paul aux *Corinthiens* 4,7. Il est important de souligner ce passage dans notre lecture philosophique. En fait Augustin fait allusion à d'autres passages bibliques dans ce sermon mais ceux-là ne concernent pas directement notre propos.

L'allusion est la suivante: "*Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti?*" La première question à poser est de savoir pourquoi Augustin a choisi précisément ce passage de *ICor.4,7* au détriment du passage de *Isaïe, 7,9*, et qui d'après É. Gilson, est l'exacte formule de son expérience personnelle¹²⁴. Pour É. Gilson le passage d'*Isaïe* rend légitime les propos d'une philosophie chrétienne.

Or entre les deux versets bibliques il y a une distance: celle qui va d'une exégèse biblique strictement liée à un *intellectus fidei*, à celle d'une exégèse ontologique et anthropologique qui s'engage au-delà de cet *intellectus fidei*. Nous allons essayer de le démontrer plus loin.

Le "*nisi credideritis non intellegitis*" est commenté dans le souci de comprendre le rapport circulaire entre raison et foi selon les différents *topoi* de la réflexion augustinienne qui se jouent dans plusieurs de ses œuvres; ils sont diversifiés à l'intérieur d'un discours qui fait jouer alternativement le rapport entre foi et raison.

¹²³ La date de composition de ce sermon est, selon P. Verbraken, inconnue: cf. *Études critiques*, Steenbrugis, 1977, p. 63. Toutefois, dans l'édition anglaise, *The Works of Saint Augustine. Sermons*, trad. E. Hill, New City Press, New York, 1990, il est daté aux alentours de l'an 400.

¹²⁴ É. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, Vrin, Paris, 1948, p. 29.

Que la foi soit antérieure à la raison ou que la raison soit antérieure à la foi, ce qui est important pour Augustin est de savoir que les deux sont distinctes et qu'elles fonctionnent de façon complémentaire et indissociable. Il y a certes une condition exprimée dans la parole d'Isaïe: *si on ne croit pas on ne comprendra pas*. Il semble alors que la compréhension est restreinte à ceux qui croient. De ce point de vue le rapport - croire et comprendre - est engagé à l'intérieur d'un *intellectus fidei* et, pour cette raison, le cercle herméneutique semble ne pas satisfaire les exigences générales d'une compréhension.

Mais l'exégèse augustinienne de ICor.4,7 donne un tout autre sens interprétatif au rapport *credo ut intellegam*. Il est possible de parler d'un cercle herméneutique au sens heideggerien, et bien sûr, dans son prolongement, ricœurien. La différence entre la démarche heideggerienne et ricœurienne du cercle herméneutique consiste dans le point de départ méthodologique de la compréhension. Pour Heidegger c'est tout d'abord, "en tant que comprendre que le *Dasein* se projette (*entwirft*) vers des possibilités (*Möglichkeiten*)"¹²⁵. La projection du *Dasein* vers ses propres possibilités s'instaure dans la compréhension et dans l'explicitation (*Auslegung*). L'explicitation est fondée et dérive de la compréhension et non l'inverse, ce n'est pas l'explicitation qui fonde la compréhension. L'attitude augustinienne à l'égard de la compréhension semble bien proche de l'ontologie de la compréhension chez Heidegger. Mais c'est dans le travail de mise en œuvre d'une théorie de l'interprétation comme telle que la proximité entre Augustin et P. Ricœur peut être envisagée, celui-ci étant très imprégné d'une herméneutique biblique. Goulven Madec signale à cet égard:

"Le recueil d'essais d'herméneutique de Paul Ricœur intéresse les études augustinienes sur deux points: directement par l'étude de signification de la doctrine augustinienne du péché originel; indirectement par la formule du cercle herméneutique «il faut comprendre pour croire, il faut croire pour comprendre»"¹²⁶.

L'apport indirect du cercle herméneutique ricœurien par rapport à l'étude d'Augustin tient seulement au fait que c'est une épistémologie de l'interprétation et que le caractère ontologique de la compréhension est centré davantage sur l'aspect éthique de l'interprétation. Néanmoins P. Ricœur a le mérite d'avoir objectivé ce cercle d'une manière claire et dans l'aboutissement d'une longue tradition.

¹²⁵ M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 121.

¹²⁶ Cf. *Notes sur l'intelligence augustinienne de la foi*, dans *Revue des Études augustinienes*, vol. 17, 1971 p. 132.

“«Il faut comprendre pour croire, mais il faut croire pour comprendre». Ce cercle n'est pas un cercle vicieux, encore moins mortel; c'est un cercle bien vivant et stimulant”¹²⁷.

Augustin développe dans le *Sermon* 43 le paradigme de la compréhension et ceci après avoir passé en revue les deux définitions de l'homme, celle du récit biblique, l'homme créé à l'image de Dieu, et celle de la définition philosophique ancienne de l'homme, animal rationnel:

“Tout homme veut comprendre, il n'est personne qui n'ait ce désir; mais tous ne veulent pas croire. On me dit: je dois comprendre pour croire; je réponds: crois pour comprendre. C'est donc entre nous une espèce de controverse, l'un disant: Je dois comprendre pour croire, et l'autre: Au contraire crois pour comprendre”¹²⁸.

Ce paradigme, exprimé comme: *intellegi omnis homo vult*, rappelle ce que dit Aristote tout au début de la *Métaphysique*: “*Tous les hommes désirent naturellement connaître*”. Cet *incipit* donne au lecteur la tonalité de l'enjeu qui va se dérouler tout au long du livre. Pour Aristote le désir mène à la connaissance (*epistêmê*), mais pour Augustin, il amène à la compréhension (*intellegere*). Entre le désir de connaître d'Aristote et la volonté (*voluntas*) de comprendre d'Augustin, ce qui marque une fois de plus la ressemblance de leurs idées, c'est l'accent mis sur le caractère volitif de l'espèce humaine. La volonté marque finalement le caractère distinctif de l'homme vis-à-vis des autres animaux et ceci sur le même plan que la propre faculté de connaître. Aristote déclare dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* (1139 a) que le désir appartient au *νοῦς πρακτικός*, c'est lui qui doit conduire à la vérité de l'intellect pratique. Pour Augustin, c'est à l'homme qu'appartient cette capacité (*capax*) de comprendre, car nous avons une raison et nous pouvons dire que nous seuls avons ce désir de comprendre. Parce que nous avons une raison nous nous distinguons des animaux.

Ainsi donc, dans un premier temps, il semble que la volonté de comprendre est quelque chose d'universel et que la compréhension existe chez tous les hommes sans exception. Pourtant, la compréhension (*intellegere*) n'est pas l'instance ultime de l'homme. Bien que le désir de comprendre soit inhérent à tous les hommes, s'il n'y avait pas une raison, il serait impossible à quiconque de comprendre. “*Nam rationem habemus*

¹²⁷ P. Ricœur, *Finitude et culpabilité. La symbolique du mal*, II, Montaigne, Paris, 1960, p. 327.

¹²⁸ “*Intellegi omnis homo vult; intellegere nemo est qui nolit; credere non omnes volunt. Dicit mihi homo: Intellegam ut credam. Respondeo: Crede ut intellegas. Cum ergo nata inter nos sit controversia talis, quodam modo, ut ille mihi dicat: Intellegam ut credam, ergo ei respondeam: Immo crede ut intellegas*”, *Serm.* 43,4 (CC 41 p. 509).

*et antequam intellegamus, sed intellegere non valemus, nisi rationem habeamus*¹²⁹.

Par conséquent le comprendre est une partie constitutive de la raison, mais distincte de la raison (*sed aliud est intellectus, aliud ratio*). C'est pourquoi, nous avons une raison avant de comprendre, car nous ne pourrions pas comprendre si nous n'avions pas de raison. Autrement dit, il est possible qu'il n'y ait pas de compréhension, mais ce qui n'est pas possible, c'est l'absence de raison. L'antériorité ontique et ontologique de la raison vis-à-vis de la compréhension est fondamentale. Pourquoi? La raison constitue le sens ultime de l'homme comme un l'au-delà de tout ce qui est définissable. En ce sens, la raison est distincte de la compréhension. Bien que la compréhension se présente comme une volonté universelle elle ne l'est pas tout à fait, car tous les hommes n'accèdent pas à cette compréhension. Au premier caractère d'universalité s'oppose celui de la particularité.

Le croire, au contraire du comprendre, n'appartient pas à la volonté de tous les hommes. Pour cette raison, la double assertion n'est exprimée que pour accentuer l'opposition entre comprendre pour croire et croire pour comprendre. Mais, se demande Augustin, qui sera le juge neutre face à cette «dispute»? C'est au prophète qu'est réservée la meilleure place pour juger, non au poète¹³⁰. Quand Augustin parle ici du prophète comme de celui qui est le meilleur médiateur et le meilleur herméneute de la parole divine, c'est-à-dire, comme celui par qui Dieu parle (*per quem loquitur deus*), il a probablement à l'esprit la formule du *De civitate Dei*: les prophètes sont les premiers interprètes bien avant les poètes¹³¹. Dans l'*Ion* de Platon, il y a deux classes d'interprètes: celle des poètes et celle des rhapsodes. Les poètes sont appelés les "*interprètes des dieux*" car ils sont les "*débiteurs de tous ces beaux poèmes*"¹³². En effet, ils sont

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 509.

¹³⁰ "Quem judicem inventuri sumus? Discussis omnibus hominibus, nescio utrum meliorem judicem invenire possimus, quam hominem per quem loquitur Deus. Non eamus ergo in hac re et in hac controversia ad litteras saeculares, non inter nos judicet poeta sed propheta", *Serm.* 43,4 (CC 41 pp. 509-510).

¹³¹ "Soli igitur illi theologi poetae, Orpheus, Linus, Musaeus et si quis alius apud Graecos fuit, his prophetis Hebraeis, quorum scripta in auctoritate habemus, annis reperiuntur priores. Sed nec ipsi verum theologum nostrum Moysen, qui unum verum Deum veraciter praedicavit"; *De Civ. Dei*, XVIII,37 (CC 48 p. 632). Ce qui doit retenir ici particulièrement notre attention c'est que pour Augustin ce sont les prophètes qui introduisent à l'enseignement de l'Écriture. C'est pourquoi ils sont appelés les *γραμματοεισαγωγοί*. Et Augustin explique ce que cela signifie: *les guides ou introducteurs des lettres*, *De Civ. Dei*, XVIII,39 (CC 48 p. 634).

¹³² Platon, *Ion* 533 e.

inspirés et possédés par un dieu. Les rhapsodes, par contre, sont les interprètes des interprètes (*ἐρμηνεων ἐρμηνης* 535 a), car ils interprètent les œuvres des poètes.

2.5.3 - La définition de l'homme dans le Sermon 43

Nous cherchons à démontrer maintenant l'appropriation ontologique du passage de ICor.4,7 comme explicitation de la précompréhension.

1. Le verset ICor. 4,7 prépare et développe une herméneutique du *intellegam ut credam* et du *credam ut intellegam*, qui est bien plus poussée que celle du *nisi credideritis non intellegitis*.
2. L'exégèse de ICor.4,7 élargit l'horizon du *credo ut intellegam* dans sa portée anthropologique et ontologique.

1. Augustin déclare à propos de la foi: "Ne nous glorifions pas de la foi que nous possédons comme si nous y étions pour quelque chose car nous l'avons reçue: c'est Dieu qui nous l'a donnée"¹³³. Et de même "c'est à Dieu que nous devons d'être ce que nous sommes. Si nous ne sommes pas un pur néant, à qui le devons-nous sinon à Dieu?"¹³⁴.

Dès lors, le sens de l'interrogation que le verset prête à l'interlocuteur est celui de la visée du sens de ce qu'on a et de ce qu'on a reçu. Et ce qu'on a et ce qu'on a reçu est aussi bien la foi que la raison. Dans le *De libero arbitrio* l'herméneutique du *credo ut intellegam* est spécialement liée à la preuve de l'existence de Dieu. C'est une herméneutique du croire et du comprendre à l'intérieur d'une intelligence de la foi.

"Puis à ceux qui déjà croyaient, il dit: cherchez et vous trouverez, car on ne peut considérer comme trouvé ce que l'on croit sans le connaître, et personne ne devient apte à trouver Dieu, s'il ne croit d'abord ce qu'il est destiné à connaître ensuite"¹³⁵.

Dans le *Proslogium* de saint Anselme, la démarche de l'intelligence de la foi est à la base de la recherche des preuves de l'existence de Dieu. saint Anselme fait appel à la même autorité scripturaire de Isaïe,7,9 dont fait usage Augustin. La démarche anselmienne d'une *fides quaerens intellectum*, dans le *Proslogium*, trouve des échos dans la recherche (*quaeramus*

¹³³ "Nec de ipsa fide tamen ita gloriandum est, quasi aliquid non possimus. Non enim fides nihil est, sed magnum aliquid; quam si habes, profecto accepisti", *Serm.* 43,2 (CC 41 p. 508).

¹³⁴ "A deo debemus esse quod sumus. Quia non nihil sumus, a quo nisi a Deo habemus? Quid habes quod non accepisti?", *Serm.* 43,3 (CC 41 p. 508).

¹³⁵ "Deinde iam credentibus dicit: Quaerite et invenietis; nam neque inventum dici potest quod incognitum creditur neque quisquam inveniando deo fit idoneus, nisi ante creditur quod est postea cogniturus", *De Lib. arb.* II,2,6,17 (CC 29 p. 239).

instantanée) entamée dans le *De libero arbitrio* II,2,5, laquelle prétend démontrer, par la suite, l'existence de Dieu. La "*fides quaerit, intellectus invenit*" ou encore l'expression équivalente, mais dans une formule négative, "*neque inventum dici potest quod incognitum creditur (...) nisi ante crediderit quod est postea cogniturus*", peuvent bien être considérées comme des expressions semblables à celle de saint Anselme. G. Madec l'exprime dans une très belle formule. "*Au fond s'il y a une herméneutique anselmienne, c'est celle du «credo ut intellegam»*"¹³⁶. Cette herméneutique théologique pratiquée par saint Anselme "*exige qu'on ne fasse pas usage des arguments d'autorité. Cette «époque» lui a été suggérée par le De Libero arbitrio augustinien, au même titre que l'instance de l'insipiens et le principe de l'intelligence de la foi*"¹³⁷. Mais le caractère restrictif de la parole d'Isaïe détermine aussi le caractère restrictif de cette intelligence de la foi qui cherche à trouver ce qui est cru antérieurement.

2. L'exégèse de ICor4,7 explicite une nouvelle conception herméneutique, celle du croire et du comprendre à lumière d'une précompréhension anthropologique et ontologique¹³⁸. Autrement dit, tandis que l'herméneu-

¹³⁶ G. Madec, *Y a-t-il une herméneutique anselmienne?*, in "*Les mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XIe-XIIe siècles*", p. 493.

¹³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 493.

¹³⁸ Dans le texte de la *Vulgate* il est dit: "*Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis?*" Nous avons voulu transcrire le verset afin d'explicitier le sens du verbe latin *accipio*. En effet le verbe grec est λαμβάνω, qui a aussi le sens de comprendre. Mais outre le sens sémantique de ce verbe, il y a d'autres rapprochements plus importants. En fait, c'est ce même verbe qui rentre dans la constitution d'un autre, celui précisément de παραλαμβάνω et qui est très discuté par Heidegger dans la *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* à propos des lettres aux *Galates* et aux *Thessaloniciens*, lesquelles renvoient de temps en temps à certains passages des deux lettres aux *Corinthiens*. Heidegger s'attache à saisir le sens de la foi des communautés chrétiennes primitives à travers ce qu'il appelle la *christliche Lebenserfahrung*. Or, la foi n'est que l'expérience éprouvée facticiellement et ressaisie dans l'authenticité. En effet, l'expérience de la vie facticielle du christianisme primitif relève de la compréhension et de l'acceptation (*das Annehmen*) comme expérience authentique qui ne s'origine ni à partir d'une simple conception théorique ni à partir d'une simple tendance pratique; la discussion de Heidegger porte essentiellement, d'une part, sur cette dialectique entre «recevoir» porteur d'un dynamisme existentiel et ontologique, et d'autre part, celui du «devenir chrétien» ou «suivre le Christ» qui fait prendre connaissance de ce qu'on devient. L'expérience de ce devenir est quelque chose d'authentique et de facticiel. Dans le sens premier, Heidegger explicite cette appropriation grâce au verbe grec (δέχεσθαι), employé plusieurs fois, dans tout le *Nouveau Testament*, afin d'explicitier le caractère spécifique de cette réceptivité qu'est l'événement historique du christianisme. Cf. I Tes. 1,6. Dans le second sens, Heidegger explicite une «acceptation réceptive» (παραλαμβάνειν) au sens de prendre connaissance (εἶδεναι). "I Thess. 1,6: Das γενέσθαι ist ein δέχεσθαι".

tique de *Is.7,9* est une exégèse qui travaille à l'intérieur d'un *intellectus fidei*, et ne dépasse pas le cadre conceptuel d'une herméneutique religieuse, à savoir celle prescrite par E. Gilson comme étant une philosophie chrétienne, l'exégèse de *1Cor.4,7* la dépasse en se compromettant dans une herméneutique au sens général.

Mais on peut établir un autre type de parallélisme entre ce qui est exprimé dans le *sermon* 43 et ce qui est exprimé dans le *De Libero Arbitrio* II,3,7 grâce à la définition de ce que l'homme est. Dans les deux textes, il est question à un moment donné de l'existence comme fondement radical de la nature de l'homme. Ce qui définit l'homme est tout d'abord son existence (*esse*), sa vie (*vivere*), et finalement la compréhension (*intellegere*). Mais pour Augustin, de ces trois sortes d'évidences - *esse, vivere, intellegere* -, celle qui excelle est celle du comprendre (*intellegere*), car elle inclut en elle-même les deux autres. Si on peut parler d'une ascension des niveaux d'être dans le *De Libero Arbitrio*, on peut de même aussi en parler dans le *Sermon* 43.

“Parce que de ces trois propriétés: l'existence, la vie, l'intelligence, la pierre a bien l'existence, l'animal a la vie et pourtant, je pense, la pierre ne vit pas et l'animal ne comprend pas; en revanche, il est absolument certain que qui comprend possède aussi l'existence et la vie; c'est pourquoi je n'hésite pas à juger meilleur celui qui possède ces trois propriétés que celui à qui il en manque ne serait-ce qu'une seule”¹³⁹.

Des trois propriétés ici énumérées celle qui est la plus fondamentale est celle de l'intelligence, de la compréhension: elle inclut toutes les autres dans le cas de l'homme. Elle est à la fois inclusive et exclusive. Celui qui comprend doit avoir nécessairement l'existence et la vie. En revanche,

θαὶ τὸν λόγον, ein «Annehmen der Verkündigung» (...). Das δέχεσθαι hat die Trübsal mit sich gebracht, die auch fortbesteht, doch ist zugleich eine «Freude» lebendig (μετὰ χαρᾶς), die vom heiligen Geist kommt (πνεύματος ἁγίου) - die ein Geschenk ist, also nicht aus der eigenen Erfahrung motiviert wird”. (...) “παραλαμβάνειν besagt nicht ein Anhören, sondern ein Annehmen mit der Gewinnung eines lebendigen Wirkungszusammenhangs mit Gott”, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, pp. 94-95; cf. T. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, University of California Press, 1995, pp. 182-184.

Le sens de notre rapprochement entre Augustin et Heidegger, au sujet de ce recevoir qui est explicité dans le passage de *1Cor.4,7* tient au fait qu'il se trouve aussi en jeu avec l'explication heideggerienne de ce recevoir. Bien qu'Heidegger ne cite pas explicitement ce passage, il est question à plusieurs reprises des commentaires et des parallélismes entre des passages des *Lettres aux Corinthiens* et celle aux *Thessaloniens*. Ce qui est discuté par Heidegger est le problème de l'expérience facticielle en tant que détermination de l'historicité authentique du christianisme comme phénomène théorique et pratique.

¹³⁹ *De Lib. arb.* II,3,7,22 (CC 29 p.240) (BA 6 p. 277).

l'être qui n'a pas l'intelligence est celui qui a seulement l'existence et la vie et il est donc un être non rationnel.

Dans le *Sermon* 43 Augustin exprime une idée semblable en parlant de ces trois propriétés de l'être:

"Il y a le bois, il y a les pierres; par qui existent-ils? par Dieu. Et nous, qu'avons-nous reçu en plus? Le bois, la pierre, n'ont pas la vie, nous l'avons. Nous l'avons, il est vrai, en commun avec les arbres et les plantes. On prête aussi la vie à la vigne; (...) La vigne verdoie, c'est signe de vie; elle dessèche, c'est signe de mort. Mais c'est une vie privée de sentiment. Qu'avons-nous de plus? ce sentiment même. Vous connaissez les cinq sens du corps: la vue, l'ouïe, l'odorat, le goût, le toucher; (...) Mais si nous avons les cinq sens, les bêtes les ont aussi. Nous avons donc quelque chose de plus; et cependant, mes frères, si nous considérons déjà en nous tous ces biens que je viens d'énumérer, quels motifs d'action de grâce, quels sujets de louanges envers le Créateur! Mais qu'avons-nous encore de plus? L'esprit, la raison, le discernement, ce que n'ont pas les bêtes, ni les oiseaux ni les poissons"¹⁴⁰.

Le déploiement qu'Augustin fait ici des trois niveaux d'être, mieux explicités que dans le *De Libero arbitrio*, va servir à déterminer la nature de l'homme. Mais plus encore, c'est dans ce déploiement qu'Augustin répète à plusieurs reprises ce que nous avons de plus dans notre essence, "*quid plus?*", "*quid nos amplius?*", et encore "*amplius quid habemus?*" Or, ce que l'homme a reçu de plus excellent, c'est précisément qu'il est un être doué de raison; il est un *animale rationale* et pour cela il a été créé à l'image de Dieu (*ad imaginem et similitudinem*). Les deux définitions sont en quelque sorte enchevêtrées l'une dans l'autre.

Mais le sens ontologique de ICor. 4,7 est renforcé lorsqu'Augustin explique dans le *De Trinitate* le sens de ce recevoir.

"Ainsi le Saint Esprit est-il celui de Dieu qui nous le donne, et le nôtre à nous qui le recevons. Il ne s'agit pas de l'esprit source de notre existence, esprit propre à l'homme et immanent à lui, mais cet Esprit-là est nôtre d'une autre manière, au sens où nous disons: Donnez-nous notre pain quotidien. Il est vrai que l'esprit considéré comme propre à l'homme, nous l'avons, bien entendu, reçu aussi. Qu'est-ce que tu as, dit l'Apôtre, que tu n'aies reçu? Mais autre chose est ce que nous recevons pour nous faire être et ce que nous recevons pour nous faire saints"¹⁴¹.

¹⁴⁰ *Serm.* 43,3 (CC 41 pp. 508-509): *Les plus beaux sermons de saint Augustin*, trad. par G. Humeau, tome I, Études augustiniennes, Paris, 1986, pp. 182-183.

¹⁴¹ "Spiritus ergo et dei qui dedit et noster qui accepimus. Non ille spiritus noster quo sumus, quia ipse spiritus est hominis qui in ipso est, sed alio modo iste noster quo dicimus et: *Panem nostrum da nobis*. Quamquam et illum spiritum qui hominis dicitur utique accepimus. *Quid enim habes, inquit, quod non accepisti?* Sed aliud est quod accepimus ut essemus, aliud quod accepimus ut sancti essemus", *De Trin.* V,14,15 (CC 50 p. 223; BA 15 p. 459).

Aussitôt on comprend mieux le sens ontologique de cet avoir et recevoir. D'une part, ce que nous avons reçu signifie une donation de l'être de notre existence, ce qu'explique la définition de l'homme comme animal rationnel et comme créature faite à l'image de Dieu. Mais d'autre part, ce que nous avons reçu, signifie aussi la donation en tant que réception qui nous identifie au principe donateur. De ce fait la foi est comprise dans l'identité propre de l'homme, que ce soit celle qui est seulement dans le principe ontologique de l'avoir, ou celle qui est dans le principe du «recevoir en l'acceptant». A ce propos il nous semble opportun de rappeler ce qu'Augustin développe dans le *De Genesi ad litteram* au sujet de la *conversio-formatio* et *aversio-informitas* qu'explicite la nature de l'homme dans un sens ontologique et où le stade de la *formatio* implique l'adhésion libre de l'homme à l'achèvement de cette création divine¹⁴². Or le passage de l'*informitas* à la *forma* est le passage ontologique de cet avoir (*habere*) au recevoir (*accipere*) ou encore en d'autres termes, le passage de la précompréhension à la compréhension.

2.6 - "*Verbum meum*" et "*Verbum Dei*"

La question herméneutique pose d'avance la définition de l'homme, elle est la pré-vision ou encore l'anticipation du sens questionné. Ce qui est interrogé et questionné est lui-même une détermination de cette même anticipation. Ce qui est recherché est déjà une détermination du mode de l'être de cette interrogation. Dans le *sermon* 43, les deux branches du cercle herméneutique qu'exprime le "*intellege, ut credas verbum meum et crede, ut intellegas, verbum dei*" sont une seule et même vérité, la première détermine le sens de la parole humaine et la deuxième détermine le sens de la parole divine dans une totalité compréhensive que comprend le mode d'être de cette compréhension.

"Donc, en un sens, cet homme a dit vrai quand il a dit: je veux comprendre pour croire; et moi également je suis dans le vrai quand j'affirme avec le prophète: crois d'abord pour comprendre. Nous disons vrai tous les deux; donnons-nous donc la main; comprends donc pour croire et crois pour comprendre; voici en peu de mots comment nous pouvons accepter l'une et l'autre ces deux maximes: comprends ma parole pour arriver à croire, et crois à la parole de Dieu pour arriver à la comprendre"¹⁴³.

¹⁴² Cf. *De Gen.ad litt.* I,4,9 (BA 48 pp. 92-93); III,20,31 (BA 48 pp. 262-263).

¹⁴³ "Ergo ex aliqua parte verum est quod ille dicit: «intellegam ut credam», et ego dico, sicut dicit propheta: immo crede ut intellegas, verum dicimus, concordemus. Ergo intellege ut credas, crede ut intellegas. Breviter dico quomodo utrumque sine controversia

«Donnons-nous la main» a une signification fondamentale: elle affirme la nécessité d'une liaison entre l'herméneutique compréhensive de la raison et l'herméneutique compréhensive de la foi. Le dialogue entre celui qui affirme: «je veux comprendre pour croire» et Augustin qui affirme en syntonie avec le prophète «je veux croire pour comprendre» souligne l'importance d'une communion de sens à partager.

Dans le *De Trinitate* Augustin parle également d'un *verbum interius* et d'un *verbum Dei*. Entre le *verbum interius* humain et le *verbum Dei* il y a une ressemblance. C'est cette ressemblance ontologique qui est le fondement d'une herméneutique existentielle. L'herméneutique apophatique est déterminée par le couple *allegoria-aenigma*, lequel dérive de l'herméneutique existentielle où le *verbum dei* et le *verbum interius* sont la réalité elle-même. Cette réalité existentielle a un caractère facticiel: elle n'est pas une image née de Dieu mais une «image» créée par Dieu dans l'homme.

De la même manière que le *verbum Dei* fonde le *verbum hominis*, de même aussi le caractère ontologique de la ressemblance entre *verbum dei* et *verbum hominis* fait la dérivation du *verbum exterius*, c'est-à-dire la parole qui est proférée par la voix.

“Il nous faut donc parvenir jusqu'à ce verbe de l'homme (*verbum hominis*), à ce verbe d'un être doué d'une âme raisonnable, à ce verbe de l'image de Dieu - non l'image née de Dieu, mais l'image créée par lui - verbe qui n'est ni proféré dans un son, ni pensé à la manière d'un son, qui est nécessairement impliqué dans tout langage, mais qui, antérieur à tous les signes dans lesquels il se traduit, naît d'un savoir immanent à l'âme, quand ce savoir s'exprime dans une parole intérieure telle quelle. La vision de la pensée est alors la réplique exacte de la vision du savoir. Ce savoir quand il se traduit par un son ou par un signe corporel, ne se traduit pas tel qu'il est, mais tel qu'il peut être vu ou entendu par le corps. Mais quand ce qui est dans le verbe reproduit exactement ce qui est dans la connaissance, c'est alors qu'il y a verbe vrai, vérité telle que l'homme la souhaite: à savoir, que ce qui est dans la connaissance soit aussi dans le verbe; que ce qui n'est pas dans la connaissance ne soit pas non plus dans le verbe; on reconnaît là le «cela est, cela n'est pas». C'est ainsi que la ressemblance de l'image créée se rapproche, autant que faire se peut, de la ressemblance de l'image engendrée, celle en vertu de laquelle on affirme que Dieu le Fils est substantiellement semblable à son Père en toutes choses”¹⁴⁴.

accipiamus. Intellege, ut credas, verbum meum; crede, ut intellegas, verbum dei”, *Serm.* 43,9 (CC 41 p. 512).

¹⁴⁴ “Parvenendum est ergo ad illud verbum hominis, ad verbum rationalis animantis, ad verbum non de deo natae sed a deo factae imaginis dei, quod neque prolativum est in sono neque cogitativum in similitudine soni quod alicuius linguae esse necesse sit, sed quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedat et gignatur de scientia quae manet in animo

C'est dans la nature intérieure de l'homme que la relation entre *verbum dei* et *verbum hominis* subsiste. La visée ultime de cette herméneutique compréhensive vise donc à comprendre l'homme à travers une herméneutique existentielle. A une herméneutique du voir s'oppose une herméneutique de l'«entendre» et du «comprendre» ce qu'on entend. Une herméneutique de l'«entendre» implique nécessairement la parole d'autrui. Elle est antérieure à toute langue.

“Certainement tu n'as rien dans le corps qui te soit plus cher que les yeux. Or je montre que tu as quelque chose de plus cher que tes yeux, à tel point que tu devrais avouer, que ce à quoi je parle est plus cher en toi que tes yeux. Ce à quoi je parle je l'affirme, non ce par quoi je parle: je joins l'esprit, je l'excite grâce à l'oreille, je parle à l'esprit, grâce au son, j'exhorte et j'édifie l'esprit. J'interroge au sujet de l'esprit et à partir de lui-même et j'interroge l'homme de cette manière. Je disais il y a déjà quelque temps que si quelqu'un voulait t'enlever les trésors ou les yeux, et des deux tu aurais choisi les yeux, bien que souffrant tu aurais perdu les trésors afin de ne pas perdre les yeux.

Je t'interroge maintenant au sujet des yeux eux-mêmes. S'il t'est permis d'avoir l'un et l'autre, les yeux et l'esprit, c'est le bonheur. Mais s'il n'est pas possible d'avoir les deux et que l'un des deux t'est proposé, choisis ce qui est le meilleur: perdre les yeux du corps ou de l'esprit. Si tu perdais l'esprit, tu serais bête; si tu perdais les yeux, tu aurais l'esprit, tu serais homme. Dis et choisis ce que tu veux. Qu'est-ce que tu veux être, un homme aveugle ou un animal vivant? Tu as clamé tu as choisi: ce que tu as choisi, d'où l'as-tu perçu? Qu'est-ce que j'ai montré pour que tu le demandes? ai-je montré quelques couleurs belles, quelques formes très gracieuses de l'or et l'argent? Est-ce que je vous ai mis sous les yeux des pierres précieuses, dignes d'être contemplées? Rien de cela: toutefois tu l'as clamé et en l'acclamant vous faites connaître ce que vous avez choisi. D'où vous avez vu ce que vous avez choisi; c'est l'esprit lui-même à qui je parle. D'où tu as choisi ce que tu as entendu par ma parole: crois ceci en tant que parole de Dieu”¹⁴⁵.

quando eadem scientia intus dicitur sicuti est. Simillima est enim visio cogitationis visioni scientiae. Nam quando per sonum dicitur vel per aliquod corporale signum, non dicitur sicuti est sed sicut potest videri audirive per corpus. Quando ergo quod est in notitia hoc est in verbo, tunc est verum verbum et veritas qualis exspectatur ab homine ut quod est in ista, hoc sit et in illo; quod non est in ista, non sit et in illo. Hic agnoscitur: *Est, est; non, non*. Sic accedit quantum potest ista similitudo imaginis factae ad illam similitudinem imaginis natae qua deus filius patri per omnia substantialiter similis praedicatur”, *De Trin.* XV, 11, 20 (CC 50 A p. 488).

¹⁴⁵ “Certe nihil habes oculis carius: nihil quidem, sed in corpore. Nam ostendo aliquid carius quod habeas quam oculos tuos: modo confiteberis, cui loquor, carior est in te quam oculi tui. Cui loquor, dico, non per quod loquor, per aurem mentem convenio, per aurem mentem excito, per sonum menti loquor, mentem exhortor, mentem aedifico. Quaero ab ipsa mente, et de ipsa mente, et interrogo hominem hoc modo. Iam dudum dicebam, si quis tibi vellet auferre thesauros aut oculos, unum de duobus, eligeres oculos: quamvis

Heidegger établit le caractère circulaire du comprendre qui projette son être vers des possibilités qui explicitent le caractère propre de cet être. Cette circularité compréhensive est possible grâce à une “ressemblance” entre l’antériorité du mode d’être du comprendre par rapport à l’explicitation de ce caractère propre du comprendre. Cette même ressemblance, formulée par Augustin entre *verbum Dei* et *verbum hominis* produit la dérivation du caractère apophatique de la parole. Dans la parole proférée le verbe qui résonne extérieurement est le signe d’une parole intérieure. À l’intérieur de ce verbe intérieur habite le verbe de Dieu. La nature de l’homme est pour ainsi dire “mélangée” à la nature divine. La fin ultime de cette herméneutique compréhensive vise à savoir la nature de l’homme et la nature du verbe de Dieu:

“«Ce que l’homme est» c’est le sens, la visée de la question herméneutique”. [Ce que l’homme est], c’est l’intention et le geste de la transcendance elle-même, une recherche de Dieu, un «entre»; la limite (Dieu-animal, les deux assumés), en perpétuel au-delà; l’homme est une porte d’entrée pour la grâce; l’idée pleine du sens de l’homme c’est un théomorphisme”¹⁴⁶.

Cet “entre” dont parle Heidegger vise d’une part l’idée de l’homme dans son “animalité” mais également l’idée de Dieu dans son «animalité» et, d’autre part, le redoublement de l’idée de Dieu dans sa divinité par le simple fait que c’est Dieu lui-même qui élève l’humain au-delà de l’homme même; cela suppose l’Incarnation.

H.-G. Gadamer dans *Vérité et méthode* analyse ce rapport entre verbe intérieur (*logos endiathetos*) et parole extérieure (*logos prophorikos*) dans le cadre d’une réflexion ontologique où le langage est précisément le

dolens, amitteres thesauros, ne perderes oculos. Modo de ipsis oculis interrogo. Si utrumque liceat tenere, felicitas est, oculos et mentem. Si non liceat utrumque, et unum horum proponatur: elige quod melius est, perdere oculos corporis, an mentem. Si perdideris mentem, pecus eris; si perdideris oculos, habebis mentem, homo eris. Dic, elige quod velis. Quid vis esse, homo caecus, an vivens pecus? Acclamastis, elegistis: quod elegistis, unde vidistis? quid ostendi, ut clamaretis? Aliquos pulchros colores, aliquas venustissimas formas, aurum, argentum ostendi? gemmas vobis inspiciendas aliquas protuli? Nihil horum: tamen adclamastis, et acclamando vos elegisse significastis. Unde vidistis quod elegistis, ipsa est mens, cui loquor. Unde elegisti quod audisti per verbum meum, hoc crede in verbum dei”, *Serm.* 265 C, *Miscellanea Augustiniana*, vol. pp. 505-506.

¹⁴⁶ “«Was der Mensch ist» Sinn, Absehen, Hermeneutik dieser Frage! Er ist «die Intention und Geste der Transzendenz selbst», ein Gottsucher, ein Zwischen [...] «Grenze» (Tier-Gott, beides übernommen) ein ewiges Hinaus, ein «Einfallstor für die Gnade» (...) die einzige sinnvolle Idee von Mensch ganz und gar ein Theomorphismus”, *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, p. 25.

milieu (*medium*) de l'expérience herméneutique. Le rapport entre langue et verbe est un des exemples de l'herméneutique dans laquelle saint Augustin est pris comme moment essentiel¹⁴⁷.

Le *théomorphisme* dont parle Heidegger n'est rien d'autre que cette "in-carnation" de Dieu dans l'homme et de l'homme en Dieu.

Dans un autre *sermon*, 293 D, Augustin parle du *verbum Dei* et du *verbum meum* en termes de ce qui est caché et de ce qui est dévoilé.

"Il est la parole, moi je suis la voix. Jean dit: la voix existe et je me réjouis à cause de la voix de l'époux. En fait, tu es la voix, Il est la parole; mais Il est la parole et la voix. Pourquoi le seigneur est-il la parole et la voix? Parce que le «Verbe s'est fait chair». En effet, de même que la parole que notre cœur intérieur engendre, est dans notre cœur, mais elle est cachée à ceux qui sont extérieurs à nous, ainsi de la même manière ce que je vous dirai est caché pour vous mais pas pour moi; la parole est déjà dans mon cœur: pour qu'elle avance jusqu'à vous, la voix est associée et ce qui était caché en moi parvient jusqu'à toi, sans qu'elle s'éloigne de moi, lorsqu'elle parvient à toi. Si cette parole est à moi qu'est-ce que le «Verbe» de Dieu? Celui qui était auprès du Père, se cachait auprès du Père: afin qu'il vienne jusqu'à nous, la chair a été associée et il s'est avancé vers nous, sans s'éloigner du Père"¹⁴⁸.

CONCLUSION

Il est utile à ce moment-ci de rappeler les idées fondamentales que nous avons développées ici. Il nous semble tout à fait légitime de parler d'une herméneutique chez Augustin. Certes, bâtir une herméneutique de l'interprétation n'a pas été le privilège d'Augustin, en tout cas de lui tout seul. Au contraire, Augustin s'inscrit déjà dans une longue tradition liée à une exégèse biblique mais également grecque. L'herméneutique augustinienne est héritière d'une histoire et d'une critique herméneutique appliquée par les Pères de l'église à la Bible. S'il est vrai qu'il y a chez

¹⁴⁷ H.-G. Gadamer, *Vérité et méthode*, pp. 268-278; voir aussi J. Grondin, *Gadamer und Augustin. Zum Ursprung des hermeneutischen Universalitätsanspruches*, in *Verstehen und Geschehen*, Jahressgabe M. Heidegger Gesellschaft, 1990, pp. 46-62.

¹⁴⁸ "Ille verbum est, ego sum vox, Iohannes dixit: Vox est et gaudio gaudet propter vocem sponsi. Tu enim vox, Ille verbum; sed Ille et verbum et vox. Quare dominus et verbum et vox? *Quia verbum caro factum est*. Sicut enim verbum quod parit cor nostrum intus est in corde nostro, et latet eos qui sunt extra nos: sicut modo quod dicturus sum latet vos, me autem non latet; iam est in corde meo verbum: ut autem procedat ad vos, assumitur vox, et pervenit ad te quod latebat in me, nec, cum pervenit ad te, recedit me. Si hoc verbum meum, quid Verbum dei? Qui erat apud Patrem, latebat apud Patrem: ut exiret ad nos, assumpta est caro quasi vox; et ad nos processit, et a Patre non recessit", *Serm. 293 D, Miscellanea Augustiniana*, p. 513.

Augustin une herméneutique ou un art de l'interprétation, il n'est pas moins vrai non plus que cette interprétation scripturaire est accompagnée d'une compréhension de soi et du "soi". Nous pouvons donc nous demander s'il est vrai qu'Augustin a une "ontologie" de la compréhension qui lui soit propre, et encore, si Augustin présente une nouvelle compréhension pour le développement ultérieur de cette herméneutique philosophique. Finalement, avons-nous cherché à trouver une herméneutique existentielle en vue d'une proximité entre lui et Heidegger?

La première idée à expliciter ici à l'égard d'Augustin concerne la notion de "*hermeneia*"; elle est avant tout liée à une symbolique religieuse. L'"*hermeneia*" est signe d'une médiation qui se noue entre les hommes et le divin. Dans la critique des "*interpretationes*" païennes, Augustin élabore une herméneutique que nous pouvions désigner comme une herméneutique de la *circon-spection* où le caractère de visibilité des idoles est déterminé par une pratique fonctionnelle de ces mêmes idoles, où le jeu de la visibilité-invisibilité n'atteint pas la réalité, le Christ lui-même. De la simple apparence des dieux païens il ressort une invisibilité théorique sans consistance réelle, mais qui d'elle-même est le "commerce" avec les choses à la disposition des hommes.

Si la critique de la symbolique religieuse traduit une ontologie de la médiation et comme milieu de communication, la théorie de la signification et du langage traduit également un lieu de médiation et de communication. De ce milieu et de cette communication Heidegger parle également dans l'*Herméneutique de la facticité*¹⁴⁹. De ce point de vue l'herméneutique n'est pas à comprendre uniquement comme l'art de l'interprétation, mais plutôt comme une saisie de l'être lui-même. Pour Augustin ce *medium* est également le Christ, la sagesse incarnée. Pour Heidegger ce milieu et cette communication sont l'Être en tant que don par Amour.

C'est de l'analyse du *De Magistro* dans sa théorie sur la signification et sur le langage qu'Augustin développe la théorie du maître intérieur. Le maître intérieur conduit du dehors de l'esprit au dedans afin que nous y apprenions la vérité immuable: "*Foris admonet, intus docet*"¹⁵⁰. Même s'il y a une grande distance entre Augustin et Heidegger à propos de la vérité dont il faut tenir compte, car la vérité pour Heidegger n'exprime que la lumière de l'Être ou encore "*la translucidité du Dasein*", il y a pourtant une certaine proximité dans la mesure où cette vérité doit dépasser aussi bien pour Augustin que pour Heidegger le simple état de présence manipulable.

¹⁴⁹ M. Heidegger, *Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, p. 13.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *De Mag.* XI,36; XIV,46.

Dans l'analyse que nous avons faite du *De Doctrina Christiana* nous avons continué la démarche d'une ontologie visant la compréhension de l'être spirituel. Les choix des textes, tels que le *De Magistro*, le *De Doctrina Christiana*, et finalement les *Sermons* doivent être compris dans notre lecture, comme une tâche fondamentale afin de montrer la cohérence de l'herméneutique ontologique chez Augustin.

Le *De Doctrina Christiana* développe et insiste sur la donation de l'être divin en tant qu'amour comme préalable ontologique à toute explicitation de la compréhension scripturaire et de la compréhension de soi. Les niveaux de la crainte et de la piété sont des dons de Dieu, tout autant que l'amour divin est un don. L'interprétation scripturaire et la compréhension de soi sont précédées par ce don d'Amour comme jouissance et usage (*frui et uti*). A cette ontologie de la compréhension de l'Écriture et de soi est intimement liée une affectivité ontologique de la jouissance et de l'amour.

Dans un deuxième moment nous avons passé en revue les aspects les plus importants de l'herméneutique biblique chez Augustin. C'est en effet en tant qu'art de l'interprétation que nous avons tenté de tracer les caractéristiques essentielles des principes pour une interprétation appliquée à l'Écriture.

Dans cette herméneutique biblique nous avons montré comment le cercle herméneutique du *credo ut intellegam* est caractéristique d'une épistémologie de l'interprétation. Toutefois nous avons tenté de prolonger ce cercle herméneutique par la démarche épistémologique qui associe l'interprétation scripturaire à la compréhension de soi, en l'inscrivant dans une "ontologie de la compréhension" et dans une "ontologie du don". En développant le caractère existentiel de cette herméneutique ontologique nous avons pu constater qu'elle se rattache à une conception de l'homme, liée essentiellement à la définition gréco-biblique. D'où l'expression paulinienne: "*Quid habes quod non accepistis?*" Le don de l'Être par amour et le don de la grâce de Dieu sont intimement liés. Remarquons que de cette cohérence et de cette cohésion entre la définition grecque et la définition biblique Heidegger parle également, dans l'*Herméneutique de la facticité*. Cette cohésion est d'ailleurs maintenue dans *Sein und Zeit*

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THE ORDERING AND ORIGIN OF THE SOUL'S FACULTIES ACCORDING TO GILES OF VITERBO, O.E.S.A.*

The *Commentarium super librum primum Sententiarum* "ad mentem Platonis" of Giles of Viterbo, dating from the early sixteenth century, follows the long list of *Sentences* commentaries written by medieval masters of theology.¹ Reaching only the seventeenth distinction of Book I before its author was compelled by administrative responsibilities to abandon the project around 1512, it is yet a large and ambitious work, distinctive for the way it buttresses Christian theological doctrines with classical myth and poetic imagery. It successfully informs questions established in scholastic discourse with interpretations reflecting a new emphasis on Platonic and poetic theology. Over the past four decades scholars have commented on this interesting blending in various ways. Eugenio Massa interpreted Giles's intention as "to liberate theology from the systematic foundation it had under medieval Scholasticism and establish a new humanistic theology."² Massa, however, also recognizes that Giles often used Platonic texts to reinforce the conclusions of his scholastic predecessors.³ John O'Malley has observed that Giles did not, contrary to what many would expect, "reject the scholastics as too tainted with Aristotle and too rigorously systematized for him to be able to

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¹ F. Stegmüller's *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols., (Würzburg, 1947) gives ample evidence of the frequency of production of *Sentences* commentaries. On the *Commentarium ad mentem Platonis* and its author see especially John W. O'Malley, S.J. *Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform* (Leiden, 1968). Eugenio Massa, *I Fondamenti metafisici della «dignitas hominis»*, Torino 1954 contains an edition of chapters 53-66 of Egidio's commentary, which lie midway between the preface and the place where Egidio abandoned the project. All citations from Egidio's commentary in this article are based on Vat. Lat. 6325. Corrections based on readings of four other MSS (Rome, Bib. Angelica 636; Naples, BN, VIII F 8; Naples, BN XIV H 71; Hamburg, Staats- und Univ., Codex Philol. 308) are signalled in the notes. Corrections to Massa's version have been made without indication in the text.

² *I Fondamenti*, p. 3.

³ "Sovente Egidio usa i testi di Platone semplicemente per dimostrare non aristotelicamente le dottrine di Aristotele" (*Ibid.*, p. 18, n. 144).

tolerate."⁴ Giles, in his *Sentences* commentary and elsewhere, rather "follows in a general way the topics treated by the great scholastics and, although his manner of argument is different from theirs, his conclusions are not so distinctive as we might have anticipated."⁵ O'Malley concludes by noting, however, what he calls a strange anomaly, that as an administrator Giles promoted the study of scholastic theology "with an insistence truly remarkable for somebody convinced that the properly Christian philosophy was that of the Ficinian Plato."⁶ Elsewhere I have argued that Giles shows remarkable freedom when choosing to follow one school or another to answer particular questions, but that what is consistent and distinctive about his method of treatment is the use of classical literary texts to illustrate his conclusions.⁷

The synthesis of scholastic and poetic approaches to theological issues is especially evident in Giles's writings on the soul. It will be in evidence here, as this paper examines two questions on the soul that Giles treated midway in his commentary. Both questions are concerned with the faculties or powers that were seen to account for the soul's many different operations such as memory, sense perception, and the ability to abstract. The first asks whether there is any proper ordering among the faculties. The second asks whether one faculty may be said to originate from another. Both questions were treated frequently in commentaries on Book 1 of the *Sentences* because that book is devoted to reflecting on the theological mystery of the Trinity, and the faculties of the human soul had a long history of being used as analogies for the persons of the Trinity.⁸

⁴ John W. O'Malley, S.J. *Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform: A Study in Renaissance Thought*, (Leiden, 1968), p. 62. Such an anti-Aristotelian description would fit some Renaissance scholars. Mario Nizolio (1488-1567), for example, openly criticized Aristotle and saw Ciceronian rhetoric as a proper replacement for Peripatetic logic. Giles's relation to Aristotle is more complex.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁷ See D. Nodes, "Humanism in the Commentary *ad mentem Platonis* of Giles of Viterbo," *Augustiniana* 45 (1995), 285-298; "Homeric Allegory in Egidio of Viterbo's Reflections on the Human Soul," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, 65 (1998), 351-363.

⁸ For centuries before Giles wrote, it was widely held that the soul performs its various operations, from controlling bodily functions and taking in sensory data, to exercising memory, imagination, reason, will, and all intellectual functions, through individual faculties or powers. Katherine Park has observed that in the Middle Ages "the powers were acknowledged as central to any account of the soul," but she is quick to add that "there was no consensus as to what they were," ("Albert's Influence on Late Medieval Psychology," in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, ed. J. Weisheipl, O.P., Toronto 1980, p. 506). Further, how those powers subsist in relation to the soul and each

Giles makes his presentation as an heir to the major strands of ancient and medieval thought. It was chiefly from Augustine that Peter Lombard appropriated the concept that trinities exist in the operations of the soul, and at *Sentences* Bk. 1, Distinction 3, Chapter 2, "*Quomodo in anima sit imago Trinitatis*," Peter gave the Augustinian framework to commentators: when discussing the Trinity, invoke the unity of the soul as an image of God's unity but also consider ways the soul contains triune elements among its powers or faculties.⁹ A series of complications arose when to this framework were added questions of the ordering and origin of those elements. The Nicene Fathers had labored over the ordering and origin among the divine persons and had articulated the doctrines of the procession of the Son by way of generation or birth or begetting (γένννα) and the procession of the Spirit (ἐκπόρευσις) not by way of generation or birth or begetting. The prevailing doctrine rejected logical orderings according to time or simple causality as inappropriate when speaking of the divine persons of the Trinity. It affirmed an ordering of origin among the Persons, but one entailing neither priority nor posteriority in time nor any superiority or inferiority in being or nature. Orthodox doctrine, thus preserving the mystery of three ordered yet coequal and coeternal persons, allowed any analogy drawn from nature only a partial correspondence. A century later Augustine found his useful analogies by focusing on mental processes, as seeing, for example, entails a trinity of thing seen, the seeing by the imagination, and the tending or willing that focuses on the object.

other was never resolved for as long as the question remained intelligible. Do they fall into certain natural categories? Do they derive from one another in sequence? One can compare questions about the soul that Aristotle asks at the beginning of *De anima*, of which two are relevant here, as articulated, for example, by W. Charlton: Is the soul a thing with parts? (402b 1); Is all soul the same in kind, or are there different souls, the soul of a horse, the soul of a dog, the soul of a man, and so on? (402b 1-8) (See William Charlton, "Aristotle's Definition of Soul," in *Aristotle's De anima in Focus*, ed. Michael Durrant [London and New York, 1993]). Are they substances distinct from the soul? Are they the soul's parts? Are they just names for each of the various operations that the one undivided soul was thought to perform? Ample interest existed in these questions in their own right; but a respected though troublesome tradition linking human psychology and reflections on the divine nature as Trinity contributed to their ongoing presence and the turbulence accompanying their discussion. Because the soul is made in God's image, it is one and simple as God is. But the powers of the soul were multiple and were traditionally arranged in three categories, as presented in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine.

⁹ See *Sentences* 1, D3, Ch. 2 - 4. The Blackfriars edition of the *Summa theologiae* (ed. Timothy L. Sutor, vol. 11, [New York and London, 1970], p. 90 n. 9) speaks of Lombard's presentation here as "the source of the scholastic dialectic on this as on so many other matters." The importance of Aristotle to the development of this and most other topics in medieval theology and philosophy, however, must be emphasized.

He also presented a trinity of three levels of seeing: physical sight, the imagining of objects in the mind, and abstract, intellectual sight.¹⁰ The analogy that satisfied Augustine most applies intellectual processes, being mindful, understanding, and loving, to the Good, or God himself, because in Augustine's view, when God is the subject, each of those actions, though distinct, entails the others, simultaneously and co-equally, in a unified act.¹¹ As mentioned, Augustine is mainly where Peter Lombard drew his inspiration for drawing the connection, but he, like Augustine, also acknowledged the limitations of virtually all analogies in this context.¹²

The reintroduction of Aristotelian psychology and the addition of commentaries on Aristotle by Muslim scholars brought other images to the forefront for later medieval Christians to consider when presenting the faculties as an analogy for the persons of the Trinity.¹³ Aristotle's *De anima*, 2.3 identifies three species or aspects of soul: vegetative, sensitive, and rational, and compares them to the progression of numbers and geometric figures, one from another. "For alike in figures and in things connected with soul," writes Aristotle, "the earlier form exists potentially in the later, as, for instance, the triangle potentially in the quadrilateral, and the nutritive faculty in that which has sensation."¹⁴ Aristotle's distinction among vegetative, sensitive, and rational faculties, had been reflected in Augustine but was now reintroduced to the West from a non-Christian context. This still gave Christian commentators the opportunity to develop the trinitarian analogy, but in doing so they risked presenting a static hierarchy of comprehensiveness and importance from one element to the other, thereby failing to represent divine persons that are co-equal and

¹⁰ See in particular *De Trinitate* 11.2, 2-5. *De genesi ad litteram* 12.37 distinguishes between carnal sight and intellectual or spiritual sight.

¹¹ See *De Trinitate* 10.

¹² On Peter's recognition of the limits of Augustine's psychological analogies, perhaps excluding *mens*, *notitia*, *amor*, see Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1994), p. 243-244.

¹³ *De anima* was part of the "third entry" of Aristotle. L. Minio-Paluello, however, (*Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle* [Amsterdam, 1972]) has shown that *De anima* came into the West first by direct translations from the Greek and not by way of the Muslim commentators and translators of their works as is often assumed. Thomas seems to have used a version of Aristotle's *De anima* that was derived from the translation of William of Moerbeke, composed between 1265 and 1268.

¹⁴ *De Anima* 2.2-3, 414b, trans. R.D. Hicks, (Buffalo, 1991), p. 44. Averroes was one influential commentator who interpreted Aristotle's discussion of the faculties as referring to distinct substances.

co-eternal, yet possessing an order of origin among themselves.¹⁵ It is not surprising that many later adherents to Augustine's psychological analogies against the newly introduced framework from Aristotle were inclined to consider the distinctions among the soul's faculties as more verbal than real.¹⁶

Thomas Aquinas met the challenge differently, and as the scholastic part of Giles's presentation follows the Thomistic adaptation of Aristotle, it is helpful to outline how Thomas treats the issue in his *Sentences* commentary.¹⁷ Thomas begins his account of the ordering of the faculties by repeating the two basic principles of order that doctrine rejects as ways to understand the ordering of the divine persons in the Trinity time of coming into being and simple causality. He first acknowledges arguments against ordering based on origin in time, because all of the faculties are simultaneous and present in the soul from its creation:

It seems that one faculty (*potentia*) does not originate from another, since, for all things that are simultaneous, no element arises from another.

Now all the faculties are in the soul at the same time from the creation of the soul.

Therefore, one faculty does not arise from another.¹⁸

¹⁵ Aristotle was influential in late medieval formulations of the distribution of the faculties. "Separate but related, the faculties occupied a static hierarchy of dependence and nobility ranging from the lowest faculty of nutrition to the highest faculty of intellect. . . They were further grouped into three different kinds of soul" (*Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Charles B. Schmitt et al., Cambridge 1988, p. 467).

¹⁶ Massa (*I fondamenti*, p. 17) mentions Alcher of Clairvaux, Philip the Chancellor, John de Rochelle (Massa seems to confuse him with Robert Grosseteste), Richard of Middleton, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham as scholars who agreed with Augustine but who held that the soul was one but that there was no real distinction among the faculties.

¹⁷ John O'Malley maintained that "it is hard to find an obvious and consistent correlation between Giles's work and the corresponding ones of Saint Thomas" (*Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform*, p. 63). While it may be true that "Giles did not have a profound first-hand knowledge of scholastic authors," as O'Malley suggests (*ibid.*), Giles seems to have made detailed use of Thomas for his discussion of the faculties of the soul. For a discussion of the structure of the beginning of Giles's commentary in light of the *Summa* of Thomas see Daniela Gionta, "Scholastik und Platonismus im Prolog zum Sentenzenkommentar des Aegidius von Viterbo," *Augustiniana* 39 (1989): 132-153. Thomas was attracted to the teachings of Aristotle in an environment where philosophy was considered a necessary propaedeutic to theology. See M. D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1954), pp. 173-175.

¹⁸ "Videtur quod una potentia non oriatur ex alia. Quaecumque enim simul sunt, unum ex altero non oritur. Sed omnes potentiae simul sunt in anima ex creatione. Ergo una non oriatur ex alia" (Lib. 1, Dist. 3, Q. IV, a.3). Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. R.P. Mandonnet, O.P. (Paris, 1929), p. 118. All citations of Thomas's *Sentences* commentary are taken from this edition. Translations

Thomas then acknowledges arguments against their ordering being one of simple causality, since "one faculty is not the subject of another faculty, because an accident cannot be the subject of an accident. Therefore, one faculty does not arise from another."¹⁹ Then, to explain how they are ordered according to origin, Thomas distinguishes the faculties according to actions and externals, that is, according to the objects of each faculty. Understanding, the object of reason, follows perception, the object of sensation. From the vantage point of the objects of the faculties we see clearly that there is an ordering. And since there is reciprocal relation between the objects and the faculties connected with them, it follows that there is an ordering to the faculties themselves:

The faculties are distinguished according to their actions. And the activity of one faculty follows naturally from the activity of another faculty and originates from it; just as understanding follows upon perception. Therefore so it is also among the faculties themselves.²⁰

To illustrate the nature of that ordering, Thomas appropriates Aristotle's explanation of the ordering of the three aspects of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, from *De anima*, II.3:

All numerical quantities, which derive naturally from the number one, must descend in order, because one number comes forth only from one number; and so since many faculties proceed from the essence of the soul, we say that there is a natural ordering among the soul's faculties; and although they all flow forth from that essence, still one comes forth from another that stands between it and the essence; and from this it stands to reason that a later faculty presupposes in its definition a prior one, and the action of the later depends on that of the prior. For if we define intellect, it is defined by its action, which is to understand, and in the definition of this faculty's action there is included the action of a prior faculty and the faculty itself.²¹

are mine.

¹⁹ "Una potentia non est subiectum alterius, quia accidens non est subiectum accidentis. Ergo una potentia non oritur ex alia." *Ibid.*

²⁰ "[Contra,] potentiae determinantur secundum actus. Sed actus unius potentiae sequitur naturaliter ad actum alterius potentiae, et originatur ex ipsa; sicut intelligere sequitur ad hoc quod est tenere notitiam. Ergo ita est etiam in potentia." *Ibid.*

²¹ "Omnis numerositas, quae descendit naturaliter ab aliquo uno, oportet quod descendat secundum ordinem, quia ab uno non exit nisi unum; et ideo cum multae potentiae egrediantur ab essentia animae, dicimus, quod in potentiis animae est ordo naturalis; et cum omnes fluant ab essentia, una tamen fluit mediante alia; et inde est, quod posterior potentia supponit in definitione sui priorem, et actus posterioris dependet a priori. Si enim definiamus intellectum, definietur per suum actum, qui est intelligere, et in definitione actus eius cadet actus prioris potentiae, et ipsa potentia." *Ibid.*

The faculties thus resemble various geometrical figures under the one species of figure. The form triangle exists potentially in the form quadrilateral, and so the figures are arranged in order of comprehensiveness.²²

Finally, Thomas replies to the initial objections by retaining the validity of their basic premise while showing that simultaneity and the lack of a substance / accident relationship do not prevent the fact of ordering according to origin, when this principle is properly understood:

First of all, therefore, it must be said that although the faculties are simultaneous, nevertheless one is naturally prior to the other. Secondly, it must be said that an accident does not have the power in itself to produce another accident; but one accident can proceed from a substance with another accident standing in between, according to what is presupposed in the subject.²³

Thomas gives that account in his *Sentences* commentary at the place where Peter Lombard presents the human soul as analogous to the Trinity. Inasmuch as the use of Aristotle's mathematical analogy presents an ordered relationship among simultaneous elements independent of simple causality, Thomas' application to the trinitarian context is successful. But the mathematical hierarchy still fails to reflect the paradox of the ordering of origin among co-equal elements. Thomas seems to have realized this and reworked the Aristotelian perspective closer to reflect the trinitarian mystery. This is suggested by his treatment of the same questions in the *Summa theologiae*, where in Ia.77, art. 4 he presents each of three different orderings from different perspectives, each having its own validity from the particular perspective.²⁴ By "order of

²² In his own commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, Thomas will point out that this understanding of the interrelatedness of all geometrical figures is something on which even the Platonists agree. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's De anima*, Lecture 5, trans. K. Foster, O.P. and S. Humphries, O.P. (Notre Dame, 1994), p. 94. This commentary was composed between 1259 and 1268, between Thomas' writing of his commentary on the *Sentences* and his writing of the *Summa theologiae*.

²³ "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis sint simul tempore, nihilominus tamen una naturaliter prior est altera. Ad secundum dicendum, quod accidens ex seipso non habet virtutem producendi aliud accidens; sed a substantia potest unum accidens procedere mediante alio, secundum quod illud, praesupponitur in subiecto" (Thomas, *Scriptum . . . Lombardi*, p. 118).

²⁴ Thomas maintains the soul's unity while also arguing that the distinction between the soul and its faculties was a real one by introducing a new category into the formula. The distinction was real because the soul belonged to the logical category of substances while the faculties fell under the second species of quality. *Summa theol.* 1.77.1: "Cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens; et est in secunda specie qualitatis." See also O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, Vol. 1

development," each faculty precedes that faculty which it readies for action. Thus the nutritive powers precede the sensory, and the sensory the rational. Natural ordering reverses that sequence and considers the rational powers before the sensory powers and the sensory before the nutritive. Each faculty's domain or sphere of influence reverses the pattern again. The domain of the nutritive is the body only, and that of the sensory is the body and beyond. Then there are rational faculties whose domain is data from the sense world as well as the metaphysical realm of being. For this third way of ordering Thomas drew more deeply from Aristotle's *De anima*, noting that for the second and third domains that connect the soul with externals, two additional powers, namely appetite and locomotion, are required. These additional powers enable the soul to tend towards and then to reach the externals.²⁵ This scheme of showing multiple perspectives lays a foundation for preserving in even greater measure the dynamic aspect of the relation of the persons of the Trinity. And the dynamics are mainly what interest Giles when he takes up the topic at the end of the fifteenth century.

Giles, however, first argues for the moral significance of a search for order among the faculties by invoking Plato. Where Thomas with Aristotle appealed to the geometrical analogy and concluded logically that the faculties must have order, Giles with Plato emphasized humanistically that learning that order will also prevent the soul from experiencing harm and misery, because it will know which faculties should serve and which rule:

Any multiplicity of things, unless it has an order, as in a state or in an army, generally exists in confusion. And so an order must be sought among the faculties of the soul, lest we experience strange things in our flesh, as if our body has been mutated. . . . We should look for an order among those things which afflict us with perpetual harm and misery unless discipline is established and proper order controls them.²⁶

This, we recall, was Plato's aim when in *Republic* Book Four he compared

(Louvain, 1942), pp. 497-507; P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele* (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1956), pp. 144-218.

²⁵ See *De anima* II, 3. 414b19-32.

²⁶ "Multitudo omnis nisi ordinem habeat, sicuti in civitate et in exercitu, confundere solet omnia. In potentiis itaque animae ordo quaerendus est, ne membris, velut in corpore, mutatis monstra patiamur. . . . Quaerendus tamen ordo in iis est, quae nisi disciplina instituantur rectoque regantur ordine, perpetuis et iniuriis et miseria nos afficiunt (ch. 65)."

the relation of the parts of the soul to the functioning of a kingdom.²⁷ In that analogy, as Giles notes, "reason (*ratio*) is likened to a king, soldiers to self-regard or emotion (*ira*), and the people to appetite (*cupiditas*)."²⁸

To present the ordering itself, Giles discusses orderings of the faculties from three interrelated perspectives, just as Thomas did in the *Summa*. Giles's orderings of Plato's kingdom are made according to objects or externals, nature, and time. Considered from externals, the proper ordering is soldiers, king, people. According to nature, it is king, soldiers, and people.²⁹ According to time it is people, king, soldiers. The multiple perspectives they provide lead the reader to discover the natural hierarchy of the faculties within a dynamic relationship, mirroring the natural ordering of origin within the dynamic relationship among the persons of the Trinity.

Giles first presents an ordering of the faculties according to time, not, of course, in the sense of the coming into being of each faculty but rather according to their order of action. Giles agrees with his predecessors that the simultaneous creation of the faculties precludes any ordering based on their coming into being at different times:

No matter how often as we separate out and distinguish the class [of faculties], the sub-groups of the faculties, as separated, seem to exist all at the same time: for one subgroup does not seem to be prior to another.³⁰

The ordering according to time refers to their operations. The senses are first to act, and they inform reason, and reason in turn stirs the will. Thus Giles's ordering according to time also parallels the Neoplatonic triad of sense perception, imagination, and intellectual sight, featured in Augustine.

Giles observes a similar multiplicity among plants:

²⁷ *Rep.* 434e - 444e. Plato also discusses the tripartite soul in *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Symposium*. Other medieval theologians adapted this analogy. William of Auvergne, for example, "presents the soul as king of a kingdom, . . . making reason the king's councillor, sending other powers to do his bidding at his will and making the senses inspectors which travel about and report what they see faithfully to their king" (G.R. Evans, *Philosophy and Theology in the Middle Ages*, (London and New York, 1993), p. 91. William's paradigm is built on the same analogy from Plato's *Republic* that Giles eventually uses. Giles, however, has reason, not the soul itself, represent the king, and the emotive and appetitive powers represent the soldiers and people, respectively.

²⁸ "Ratio regi, milites irae, populus cupiditatibus comparatus est" (65).

²⁹ Duns Scotus presents a similar conception of the ordering of the faculties *pro statu naturae*. See *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann et al., (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), p. 626.

³⁰ "At quoties dividimus ac partimur genus, membra partionis simul sunt, neque alterum est altero prius" (65).

If you consider the time of generation, trees first bring forth leaves, then flowers, and then fruits. But if you measure by nature or the concept of perfection, what must stand in first place is that for whose sake the whole operation happens. And so fruits will obtain the primacy of place and flowers will follow them, and leaves will follow them. But if they are compared from the outside with the eyesight, first will be the sweet flowers, than which the eyes behold nothing more joyful, pleasant, and beautiful.³¹

Giles goes on to show that the five physical senses also possess multiple orderings. Using the internal ordering according to time, vision stands first, since, as Giles notes, "we are accustomed to look at things before apprehending them with the other senses."³² But when it comes to ordering according to the faculty's objects, vision stands last, "since in our vision we see spiritual things, which are older and prior to all other things."³³ Hearing follows as a second divine sense, then smell and taste, and finally touch.³⁴

When Giles returns to present the faculties themselves, he notes that if one judges according to the objects of the respective faculties, will (*voluntas*) comes after reason, since the good follows the true. Then there is the ordering of the faculties according to nature and perfection, and here the full moral emphasis returns, for "whoever keeps this ordering is made wise and happy."³⁵ It is here too that Giles has to work both to acknowledge that the rational faculty, *ratio*, the intellective soul, is at the top of the list in all of Plato, as he says, while also maintaining his position that the primacy of place belongs to the will. This is to follow Plato's path as interpreted by Giles's teachers, Agostino Nifo and Marsilio Ficino.³⁶ The natural and optimum ordering gives first place to the will,

³¹ "Arbores enim, si generationis tempus aspicias, primo frondes, deinde flores, postremo poma gignunt; quod si ordinem ex natura perfective metiaris, id primo statuendum loco est, cuius gratia fiunt omnia. Poma itaque principatum obtinebunt, haec flores, hos frondes consequentur. Sin vero extrinsecus oculisque spectantibus comparabuntur, primae erunt partes suavium florum, quibus nihil oculi intueantur laetius, iucundius, gratius" (65).

³² "Omnia inspicere prius quam aliis apprehendere sensibus consuevimus" (65).

³³ "Cum caelestia obtutu videamus, quae aliis omnibus antiquiora prioraque sunt" (65).

³⁴ In Aristotle's *De anima* 414b33, 434a27, and 435a11-435b9 touch is given primacy of place in one ordering pattern as the most fundamental sense. Thomas Aquinas gives ample treatment to touch in his commentary on the *De anima*. Giles seems to pass over this discussion in his abbreviated reference to the five senses.

³⁵ "Quem qui servat, et sapientem et beatum facit" (65).

³⁶ Nifo (1449/70-1538), Giles's teacher of philosophy at Padua, broadened his own devotion to Aristotle and Averroes with Platonic and Hermetic doctrines. Giles studied briefly under Ficino, the leader of the Platonic movement at Florence.

although according to sequential ordering it follows the reason and is informed by it.

If we investigate the parts of reason, intelligence does not rule the will, but rather the will rules intelligence; and although which one is better is still a matter of controversy, Plato gives first place to love. For although the reason leads, common countrymen also customarily go before great kings when they are about to lead their army through dense woods, in out of the way places, and nevertheless the king's will commands all the powers of the kingdom. Therefore when in the tenth book of *Laws* Plato enumerates the agitations of the soul, he mentions willing in the first place, then he mentions contemplating. In the *Symposium* he affirms that love enters through the heads of men, and finally that it holds sway over mortal humans as well as over the immortal gods.³⁷

It is now time for Giles to illustrate these multiple perspectives with imagery drawn from poetry and myth, as he does at the end of every question he discusses in the commentary. Here he points to Homer's presentation of Aphrodite as the goddess "overcome by Athena, wounded by Diomedes, and mocked by Zeus."³⁸ This reflects the orderings according to externals and time, which put reason and sense perception above the will. In Virgil, Giles writes, the third, divine, ordering according to nature and perfection is observed, since primacy of place and *imperium sine fine* is given to the offspring of Venus. Giles's main emphasis in connection with the divine Trinity is well served as he is able to proclaim a natural ordering of the faculties amid a dynamic relationship.

That is how Giles prepared the context to present the second question, one faculty's origin from another. As he notes, in order to reflect the Trinity, the faculties must originate one from the other, as the Son and Spirit originate from the Father. "But how will [the faculties] present themselves as an image and likeness of the Trinity, unless one proceed from the other?" he asks.³⁹ Giles recalls the Aristotelian procession or

³⁷ "Si etiam rationis partes scrutemur, non intelligentia voluntati, sed voluntas intelligentiae imperat; et quamquam in controversia adhuc sit utra pars praestet, Plato primas amoris semper dedit. Licet enim ratio ducat, ducit et rusticus plerumque magnos reges, per avia nemorum ducturos exercitum; imperat tamen universis regni potestatibus voluntas. Quare cum decimo Legum libro [Leg. 10, 896 e-897a] animae agitationes numeraret, primo loco velle, deinde considerare commemoravit. In Symposio [Symp. 18, 195e] per hominum capita amorem ingredi, et tandem affirmat illum tam hominibus mortalibus, quam etiam diis immortalibus imperare" (65).

³⁸ "... Venerem a Pallade victam, a Diomede sauciam, a Iove derisam" (65). See *Iliad* 5.129-132; 428-30; 455-459.

³⁹ "Sed quonam pacto illae effigiem simulacrumque Trinitatis prae se ferent, nisi altera manarit ab altera?" (66).

generation (*dimanatio*) of one number from another and then presents a parallel case of the progression from the Good, to knowledge of the Good, to desire for (love of) the Good, again reflecting Augustine's highest psychological analogies for the Trinity:

If anyone does not desire the good, it is either because he does not know what it is, or because he knows it badly; and so he does not know the good who does not desire it, and he does not desire it who does not pursue it.⁴⁰

Thus, alongside the demand of logical necessity is a moral necessity. The generation of numbers and geometrical figures also requires a progression, and this progression is reflected in a triad in the soul. This time Giles emphasizes the Neoplatonic triad of being, life, and understanding, found in Marius Victorinus and adapted by Lombard:⁴¹

If life is added to a body, its nature is different than if life is withheld. And if sense is added to a living being, it is different from that which lacks sense, or finally, if it is endowed with sense, if it enjoys reason, it is far different than if lacks reason.⁴²

Having made the case for the fact of the ordering of the faculties on moral grounds, Giles is content to confirm their principle of origin, one from another, on logical grounds: "Reason demands that one faculty originate from another."⁴³ When it comes to the faculties, however, the concept of origin is a relative one. From one perspective, the lower faculties are the subject and the material cause of reason, while reason is both the efficient and final cause of the lower faculties.

The lower faculties should be considered prior to the more eminent ones not by nature or perfection, but by generation... And so it stands that the faculties proceed from the soul according to their own order, one from the other, but,

⁴⁰ "Si quis non appetit [bonum], vel quia non novit, vel quia male novit; non itaque novit bonum, qui non appetit, nec appetit qui non sequitur" (66).

⁴¹ See Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1994), p. 239.

⁴² "Corpori si vivens additur, alia est natura, quam si vivens tollatur. Ita si vivo sensum adicitur, aliud ab eo est, quod sensu caret, vel denique sensu praeditum, si ratione utatur, aliud longe quam si ratio in eo desideretur" (66).

⁴³ "Exigit ratio, ut altera ab altera oriatur" (66). Giles articulates this proof within a Western trinitarian context strongly influenced by Augustine and reinforced by Thomas Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotle. In the scope of trinitarian theology, this argument favors the Filioque, and it is reasonable to assume that Giles himself did. Yet before Giles ends his examination of this question he qualifies the sense of linear recurrence by recalling through Epimionides that the soul is the cause of all the faculties. In fact the soul, he says, stands as efficient cause, the final cause, and as the subject of the faculties.

as I have indicated, in a different manner.⁴⁴

It remains for Giles only to illustrate this second question from mythology. He does this by interpreting the twin births of Diana and Apollo, representing sensitive and intellective faculties respectively, from Latona, i.e., the soul in its human context. Zeus, however, is the children's divine father. Although the two are offspring from the same birth, Diana is born first, because knowledge arises from the senses. After she is born, Diana herself functions as obstetrician, as it were, to Apollo. Diana, the perceptive faculty of the soul, yet remains a virgin, because she has no contact with matter itself but only with its forms. Giles, borrowing from Plato's *Cratylus*, says that Diana's service is to hunt out of the forest of matter prey in the form of sensory data, which she afterwards gives to her brother. Their relative status is symbolized by the bow each possesses:

Each has a bow, that is, [each has] the power of knowing, but Diana deals with things individually, Apollo with universals.⁴⁵ The art of archery is, in fact, nothing other than the power of discourse; for it is by means of arrows, which are near us [and] taken from our quiver, that those fleeing animals that are far from us, are captured. Thus indeed by means of the bow both the brother and sister use arrows and, through the agency of the things they possess, both come to know and pursue what formerly they neither had nor knew about. And if it seems difficult to anyone that sense uses reasoning and discourse, let him read Averroes; for he so applies the thinking part to the mind and makes it close, that although [sense perception] does not use the bow of the brother who strikes at universals, nevertheless it obtains its own bow whereby there is hunting in the capture and reasoning of individual things.⁴⁶

Given the framework of dynamic interrelationship with which Giles

⁴⁴ "Deteriores potestates, non natura aut perfectione, sed generatione praestantioribus priores habendae sunt . . . Constat itaque potentias ab anima suo ordine manare, alteram per alteram, diversa tamen, ut dixi, ratione" (66).

⁴⁵ The duality here refers to two kinds of thought, inductive and deductive; empirical and abstract, and possibly reflecting the distinction between the organic and intellective aspects of the single human soul. See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.*, pp. 464 ff. Giles rejected outright the idea of multiple souls in man.

⁴⁶ "Uterque arcum habet, hoc est cognoscendi vim, sed Diana in singulis, Apollo in universis versatur. Nihil est quippe aliud sagittandi ars, quam discurrendi vis; sagittis namque, quae penes nos nostra e pharetra ducuntur, ea, quae procul absunt, fugientia animalia capiuntur. Ita nempe arcu, sagittis utitur et soror et frater, ac, per ea quae habent, et norunt et assequuntur, quae neque prius habebant neque norant. Quod si cui difficile videatur, ut sensus ratiocinio discursuque utatur, Averroem legat; is enim cogitantem partem adeo menti admovet et vicinam facit, ut quanquam fratrum arcum non attingat, qui universa ferit, proprium tamen arcum obtineat, quo in singulorum captu et ratiocinatione venatur" (66).

presented the ordering of the faculties, one can understand why he presents their origin also from multiple perspectives. As has been mentioned, this is an effective way to approach the paradox of the order of origin of the persons of the Trinity. Yet we must note that this strategy also makes Giles speak more as a materialist than one may expect. Despite his Platonic commitment to the reality of the intelligible world, as well as to the divine nature of the soul evident in his reference to Zeus as its divine parent, here he adopts a position in the debate over the origin of cognition that Aristotle, Thomas, and Averroes supported, epitomized throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance by the sentence, "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*" (There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses).⁴⁷ Nature and perfection give the highest position to the intellective faculty, for which the sensual faculty exists and performs. But if one focuses on generation, then the lower faculty is the cause of the higher. This is an effective way to show how one element standing between its source and a third element may be said to be that from which the third element also proceeds, while allowing for other orderings that suggest a dynamic relationship among the three.

All this attention to the faculties in Giles's *Sentences* commentary from the High Renaissance may seem surprising. It has been pointed out that even by the fourteenth century human cognition interested philosophers and theologians more than the nature of the soul and its faculties.⁴⁸ Faculty psychology, however, continued to prove useful even in Giles's time, when the scholastic logomachy that had been its legacy was being strongly criticized. Philipp Melanchthon, one of the bitterest critics of Scholasticism, summarized the turmoil over the organic faculties responsible for sense perception as *magna et inepta* in his own *Liber de anima*, dating from 1540 (final version 1553). But even Melanchthon continued to speak of will, cognition, memory, and judgment as "interior

⁴⁷ See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.*, p. 470. The epitomizing sentence appears in several writers of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, including Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Giovanni Pico, "as a catch-phrase to summarize Aristotle's position. The sentence does not appear in Aristotle *per se*, however, and it is thought that it may have appeared in the Latin translation of one of Aristotle's commentators or the Arab philosophers." See Paul F. Cranefield, "On the Origin of the Phrase '*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*,'" *Journal of the History of Medicine*, 1970, pp. 77-80. See Aristotle, *De anima* III,8 432a and 434b. Giles is adopting this viewpoint and not simply referring to it.

⁴⁸ "Fourteenth-century philosophy presents a great variety of solutions to the problem we have been dealing with. In that period, human cognition interested philosophers and theologians much more than the nature of the soul and its faculties." See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.*, pp. 625-628.

faculties" in that text. The fifteenth-century German Carthusian Gregor Reisch, author of the influential textbook *Margarita philosophica*, another scholar who voiced the Aristotelian doctrine that "All our knowledge is derived from the senses," continued to speak of three sense types in his doctrine of the powers: external (the five senses), internal five (serving as a bridge), intellection (dealing with universals).⁴⁹ Particularly in commentaries on the *Sentences*, the ongoing utility of the faculties as a way to approach a principal mystery of the Christian faith is evident.⁵⁰

Giles enriches the medieval legacy of abstract dialectic on both questions. He begins with scholastic disputation and ends with poetic exegesis. In the final analysis, he not only reinforces the tradition connecting the human soul and its divine creator; he also presents an eloquent lesson in happiness that comes by learning the proper ordering of the faculties. In this sense his work stands in relationship to other Renaissance scholars, who looked back to classical, patristic, and medieval texts and produced a "fusion of rhetoric and dialectic into a reformed oratory."⁵¹

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⁴⁹ See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.* 466-67, 471.

⁵⁰ Today cognitive scientists may have relegated the discussion about the substance or number of the soul's powers to the museum of psychological quackery, but the concepts endure under the heading of "folk psychology." They remain convenient handles for grasping and referring to complex mental processes and for distinguishing certain types of mental acts from others. Even if there is a single process at the molecular level underlying all mental processes (reflecting earlier language about the unified soul), in human experience hearing still differs from computation, and computation from willing.

⁵¹ This is how Letizia Panizza describes *De vero falsoque bono* of Lorenzo Valla. See L. Panizza, "Lorenzo Valla's *De vero falsoque bono*, Lactantius and Oratorical Scepticism," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 41 (1978): 76-107.

JAMES OF VITERBO ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

The relationship between essence and existence (*esse*) was a hotly contested issue among late thirteenth century thinkers.¹ Of the many analyses devoted to this problem, one of the more historically informative was provided by James of Viterbo, a Master in the Theology faculty at the University of Paris from 1293 to 1300.² However, James' position on this issue has often puzzled his commentators. Some have thought that James defended in some manner a real distinction between essence and existence.³ Others have viewed him as an opponent of the real distinction.⁴ Some have even thought that he defended an intentional

¹ For the historical background of this problem see M. D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le 'De ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1926), pp. 135-205; E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 420-7; J. Wippel, "Essence and Existence," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 385-410.

² On James' life and career, see D. Gutiérrez, *De B. Iacobi Viterbiensis O.E.S.A. vita, operibus, et doctrina theologica* (Rome, 1939); E. Ypma, "Recherches sur la carrière scolaire et la bibliothèque de Jacques de Viterbe † 1308," *Augustiniana* 24 (1974), pp. 247-82; J.F. Wippel, "The Dating of James of Viterbo's Quodlibet I and Godfrey of Fontaines' Quodlibet VIII," *Augustiniana* 24 (1974), pp. 348-86; E. Ypma, "Recherches sur la productivité littéraire de Jacques de Viterbe jusqu'à 1300," *Augustiniana* 25 (1975), pp. 223-82. For a general survey of James' philosophical thought, see F. Casado, "El pensamiento filosófico del Beata Santiago de Viterbo," *La Ciudad de Dios* 163 (1951), pp. 437-54; 164 (1952), pp. 301-31; 165 (1953), pp. 103-44, 283-302, 489-500. For a study of James' metaphysical positions, see my "The Metaphysical Structure of Finite Being According to James of Viterbo" (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1998).

³ E. Hocedez, *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia. Texte précédé d'une introduction historique et critique* (Louvain, 1930), p. 88; D. Gutiérrez, pp. 83-5.

⁴ L. De Raeymaeker, *Philosophie de l'Être* (Louvain, 1946), p. 141; F. Casado, "El pensamiento filosófico ...," *La Ciudad de Dios* 164 (1952), p. 323. In a similar vein, R. Imbach views James as someone who has followed the method of Siger of Brabant by resolving the ontological problem of essence and existence through linguistic analysis. See his "Averroistische Stellungnahmen zur Diskussion über das Verhältnis von *Esse* und *Essentia*," in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, ed. A. Maieru and A.P. Bagliani (Rome, 1981), pp. 299-339.

distinction.⁵ Still others have held that he defended an intermediate position.⁶

In this paper I present an explication of James' position on this topic by means of a careful reading of his texts. My focus will be on determining the kind of distinction that obtains between an essence and its *esse*. Since James' own solution arises from a criticism of the views of his contemporaries, I shall begin by briefly describing the main positions on the essence/existence relation that were popular in his day.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There was common agreement among medieval thinkers that essence and existence are wholly identical in God, though not in creatures. Controversy broke out concerning the precise kind of non-identity that must obtain between a created essence and its existence. By the time of James of Viterbo's Parisian regency, three kinds of distinction had been advanced. One view maintained that essence and existence are really distinct. This kind of distinction is present in things as they exist in reality, prior to any rational analysis by the human mind. A second theory maintained that their distinction is merely logical, having its origin in the work of human reason. A third theory claimed to find an intentional distinction between essence and existence. Such a distinction is regarded as intermediate between a real and logical distinction.

While contemporary scholars generally agree that Thomas Aquinas defended a real distinction between essence and existence, in the late thirteenth century it was Giles of Rome who was its best known advocate. One of the chief motives behind his position was the need to preserve the contingent and limited character of created being. Creation is viewed by

⁵ H. Rüssmann, *Zur Ideenlehre der Hochscholastik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Heinrich von Gent, Gottfried von Fontaines und Jakob von Viterbo* (Freiburg, 1938), pp. 136, 138.

⁶ J. Wippel, "Essence and Existence," pp. 404-5. See also his "James of Viterbo on the Essence-Existence Relationship (Quodlibet I, Q. 4), and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Relation between Nature and Supposit (Quodlibet 7, Q. 5)," in *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter*, ed. W. Kluxen (Berlin, 1981), pp. 777-87; "The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo," in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. P. Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 131-64. According to M. Grabmann, James has tried to conjoin and harmonize the logical and real distinctions. See his "Doctrina S. Thomae de distinctione reali inter essentiam et esse ex documentis ineditis saeculi XIII illustratur," in *Acta hebdomadae Thomisticae Romae celebratae 19-25 Novembris 1923 in laudem S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Rome, 1924), pp. 131-90.

Giles as analogous to natural generation: the latter entails a real distinction between matter and form; the former between essence and existence. In his *Theoremata de esse et essentia* (1278-85), Giles offers a series of arguments to support the real distinction. One argument is drawn from the potentiality of created nature. From the fact that a created nature can be and not be it follows that it is not its own *esse*, but is in potency to *esse*, which has the character of an act. Another argument is based on the finitude of created nature. Since no creature is simply infinite, no creature could be identical with its *esse*. Creaturely *esse* must be limited by being received in an essence. Another argument is grounded on the composition found in created nature. Giles reasons that if creatures were identical with their *esse*, they would completely lack composition, because *esse* itself does not participate in a further actuality. It would follow also that creatures by their own nature would be wholly immutable. But this of course is contrary to the nature of the created.⁷

It is clear that in all of these arguments Giles wants to distinguish metaphysically between God and the creature. Creatures are contingent, limited, and composite; God is necessary, infinite, and absolutely simple. If a creature were really identical with its existence, it would in fact be God. On these points Thomas Aquinas would agree with Giles. Yet on two other points he appears to go much further than Aquinas. First, Giles places great emphasis on the "separability" of essence and *esse*. One sees this in an argument found in Theorem XII. There Giles provides additional argumentation to show that in everything outside of God essence and existence really differ. His first argument begins with the claim that one can understand the essences of sensible things without understanding their *esse*, and without these essences possessing actual existence. Thus one can know what a rose is, even if no roses exist. Essence and *esse* are separable, at least in thought. Things which can be separated only by the intellect differ at least logically; however, if these things are really (*realiter*) separated, then it is necessary that they be really distinct. Giles observes that although one might doubt whether things really distinct can be really separated, there can be no doubt that those things which are really separated are really distinct. Now the essences of sensible substances can be really separated from their *esse*, for these things are capable of not

⁷ *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, pp. 23-6. On the dating of the *Theoremata*, see *Aegidii Romani opera omnia*, III.1. *Apologia*, ed. R. Wielockx (Florence, 1985), pp. 241-60.

existing. Therefore, their essences are really distinct from their *esse*.⁸ Thomas Aquinas, by contrast, rejects the claim that an essence could be "separated" from its *esse*.⁹

A second point of deviation concerns Giles' frequent description of *esse* as a thing (*res*).¹⁰ This suggests that *esse* is itself a kind of essence. This is clearly a departure from Aquinas, who spoke of *esse* not as a thing, but rather as a principle of being. By using this kind of language Giles has left himself open to the charge that he has "reified" *esse*. Modern commentators are divided over whether his theory of real distinction is genuinely different from that of Aquinas.¹¹ At the very least, it appears

⁸ *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, pp. 67-8. "Prima via sic patet. Nam possunt intelligi hae res sensibiles absque eo quod intellegantur esse et absque eo quod habeant esse. Quod esse non possunt nisi essent in potentia ad esse. Possum enim intellegere rosam, nulla rosa existente. Postquam enim per sensum vel per doctrinam acquisivi scientiam de rosa, existere ipsius rosae vel esse eius nihil facit ad scientiam meam, quia obiectum intellectus non est esse sed quidditas. Advertendum tamen quod aliqua separantur secundum rem, aliqua vero secundum intellectum tantum. Sicut ergo invenimus aliqua ab invicem separari, sic ab invicem sunt diversa. Si ergo separantur secundum intellectum tantum, saltem differunt ratione, si vero realiter separantur, oportet quod realiter sint diversa. Et si dubium est utrum aliqua realiter diversa possunt realiter separari, tamen dubium esse non potest quod quae realiter separantur, realiter differunt. Si enim essentia realiter semper esset coniuncta ipsi esse, semper realiter haberet esse, et numquam posset non esse. Eo ergo ipso quod huiusmodi naturae sensibiles possunt non esse, vel non semper fuerunt coniunctae ipsi esse, quia aliquando inceptum esse, arguere possumus quod sint in potentia ad esse et quod habent essentiam realiter differentem ab esse."

⁹ See Thomas' *De spir. creat.* q. 1. Note in particular: "Unde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum, et duplicem potentiam. Nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva eius. Remoto igitur fundamento materiae, si remaneat aliqua forma determinatae naturae per se subsistens, non in materia, adhuc comparabitur ad suum esse ut potentia ad actum: *non dico autem ut potentiam separabilem ab actu, sed quam semper suus actus comitetur*" (italics added).

¹⁰ Note the following passages from the *Theoremata*: "Esse autem quod causatur a forma totius ut in decima nona propositione patebit, est res differens ab ipsa forma" (p. 101); "Verum quia in propositione quinta et etiam in duodecima multis rationibus probatur et etiam hic ostendetur quod esse et essentia sunt duae res ..." (p. 127); "Et, sicut materia et quantitas sunt duae res, sic essentia et esse sunt duae res realiter differentes" (p. 134). Giles accepts the Avicennian distinction between the *forma partis*, which is the substantial form of a thing, and the *forma totius*, which refers to the whole essence. For more on this, see *Theoremata*, pp. 39-46.

¹¹ For some discussions of this, see G. Suarez, "El pensamiento de Egidio Romano en torno a la distinción de esencia y existencia," *La ciencia tomista* 75 (1948), pp. 364-71; P. Nash, "Giles of Rome on Boethius' 'Diversum est esse et id quod est'," *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), pp. 57-91; A. Pattin, "Gilles de Rome, o.e.s.a. (ca. 1243-1316) et la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 23 (1953), pp. 80*-116*; P. Nash, "The Accidentality of Esse According to Giles of Rome,"

that Giles formulated his teaching on essence and existence in a manner different from Thomas Aquinas. Although he followed Thomas in conceiving *esse* as an actuality, he seems to have gone much further than Aquinas in emphasizing the reality of the distinction.

Giles' theory of real distinction provoked a vigorous reaction from his contemporaries. Perhaps his most outspoken critic was Henry of Ghent. In his *Quodlibet* I, q. 9 (Christmas 1276), Henry charged him with having misunderstood the manner in which creatures participate being, and then proceeded to bring a series of arguments against his theory of real distinction.¹² In rejecting a real distinction, however, Henry does not wish to assert an identity between essence and existence, such that the essence of a creature would be pure subsisting *esse*. He agrees with Giles that a creature is not its own *esse*; however, the distinction found here is not real, nor merely logical, but rather "intentional."

Drawing upon Avicenna, Henry distinguishes a two-fold *esse* in creatures. The first, which he calls "essential being" (*esse essentiae*), is found in a creature essentially, although still by participation, insofar as the essence of the creature has a formal exemplar in God. By means of its essential being, the essence of a creature falls under the categories. The second *esse* found in creatures Henry names "existential being" (*esse existentiae*). A creature has this not from its own essence but from God, insofar as it is an effect of the divine will. According to Henry, a creature has existential being in the manner of an accident supervening, as it were, on an essence. However, he is careful to note that *esse existentiae* is not an accidental reality (*res accidentis*), because it does not modify something preexisting. Rather it is through its existential being that a thing possesses actual existence.¹³ Consequently, the essence of a creature does not have

Gregorianum 38 (1957), pp. 103-15; G. Trapé, "L' 'esse' partecipato e distinzione reale in Egidio Romano," *Aquinas* 12 (1969), pp. 443-68.

¹² For Henry's text see *Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet I*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1979), pp. 47-62. For the dating of Henry's *Quodlibets* see P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320* (Paris, 1925-35), Vol. 1, pp. 177-99. For a general presentation of Henry's position, see J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938), pp. 273-326; J. Gómez Caffarena, *Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante* (Rome, 1958), pp. 65-126. On Henry's quarrel with Giles, see E. Hocedez, "Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction réelle (1276-1287)," *Gregorianum* 8 (1927), pp. 358-84; J. Paulus, "Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et de Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et l'existence," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 13 (1940-2), pp. 323-58.

¹³ *Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet I*, pp. 53-4. "Et est hic distinguendum de esse, secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in fine V^{ti} Metaphysicae suae, quod quoddam est esse rei quod habet essentialiter de se, quod appellatur esse essentiae, quoddam vero quod

esse when it is considered purely in itself, but rather as it possesses a relation to the divine essence. Insofar as an essence has a relation to the divine essence as to a formal cause, there belongs to it *esse essentiae*. Insofar as the essence of a creature is an effect of the divine essence in the order of efficient causality, it possesses *esse existentiae*.

Between the essence of a creature and its *esse essentiae* Henry finds only a logical distinction. However, he refuses to say the same with regard to an essence and its *esse existentiae*. Since one can understand the essence of a creature even if it lacks actual existence, the distinction between essence and existence must be more than logical. Of course, Henry will refuse to allow a real distinction, and so he is led to postulate a new kind of distinction intermediate between a logical and a real distinction.¹⁴

An intentional distinction occurs between two intentions, that is, between two constitutive notes of one and the same essence. In such a distinction the concept of the one intention excludes the concept of the other, without thereby disturbing the real identity of the thing being conceived.¹⁵ To illustrate how this occurs Henry likes to use the example

recipit ab *alio*, quod appellatur esse actualis existentiae. Primum esse habet essentia creaturae essentialiter, sed tamen participative, in quantum habet formale exemplar in Deo. Et per hoc cadit sub ente, quod est commune essentiale ad decem praedicamenta, quod a tali esse in communi accepto imponitur, et est illud esse rei definitivum quod de ipsa ante esse actuale solum habet existere in mentis conceptu. De quo dicitur quod definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Secundum esse non habet creatura ex sua essentia sed a Deo, in quantum est effectus voluntatis divinae iuxta exemplar eius in mente divina. Unde quia istud esse non habet ex sua essentia, sed quadam extrinseca participatione, ideo illud esse modum accidentis habet quasi superveniens essentiae, propter quod Commentator super V^o Metaphysicae, exponens differentiam utriusque esse, dicit quod quaestio de esse uno modo pertinet ad praedicatum de genere, alio autem modo ad praedicatum de accidente. Unde et quamquam istud esse secundum reducitur ad praedicatum accidentis quia modum accidentis habet, non tamen rem accidentis dicit, quia non advenit ipsi iam praeexistenti, sed per ipsum, ut dictum est, habet res existere.”

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55. Note in particular: “Si loquamur de primo esse creaturae, illud sola ratione differt ab essentia creaturae, nec potest ei abesse, quia non habet illud ab alio effective sed solum formaliter ... Si vero loquamur de secundo esse creaturae, illud, licet non differt re ab essentia creaturae, non tamen differt ab illa sola ratione, in quantum intellectus diversis conceptionibus capit de ea quod est et quod tale quid est, substantia vel accidens, sed etiam differt ab illa intentione, quia quantum ad tale esse ipsa essentia creaturae potest esse et non esse. Esse enim habet in quantum alterius effectus quidam est, non esse autem habet de se, et in illud non esse cadit quando ille qui fecit quod est, conservare desinit. Et ideo de tali esse non potest concedi quod essentia creaturae est suum esse, quia esse essentiae nunc existens in actu potest esse non ens, sicut prius fuit ens.”

¹⁵ See Henry's discussion in *Quodlibet V*, q. 6 (Paris, 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961), fol. 160v-163v. Note in particular: “Sed appellatur hic intentio aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentiae alicuius, natum praecise concipi absque aliquo alio a quo non

of a genus and specific difference. "Animal" and "rational" differ intentionally; they enter into composition to form the species "man." In conceiving of animality one does not at all conceive of rationality, and one can of course conceive of animals that are irrational. According to Henry, an intentional distinction is not reducible to a mere distinction of reason.¹⁶ As he observes in *Quodlibet X*, q. 7 (Christmas 1285), "animal" and "rational" cannot differ merely logically, for then they could not form a composition, and one would be incompatible with the opposite of the other. Moreover, if genus and difference were only logically distinct, each could be predicated of the other, and it would happen that the specific difference would coincide with the definition of the genus. One would then have to admit that "to be an animal" is the same as "to be rational." Furthermore, one should not say that a genus and difference differ really, for then the species composed from them would be only an accidental unity.¹⁷

differt re absoluta, quod similiter pertinet ad eandem. Unde dicitur intentio quasi intus tentio: eo quod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua determinate tendit, et non in aliquid aliud quod est aliquid eiusdem rei, ut sic super idem in re per intellectum, cuius est dividere ea quae sunt idem in re, formentur diversi conceptus, ut de diversis penes conceptum mentis, eisdem autem in re" (fol. 161rL). "Cum enim, ut dictum est, diversitas intentionum non potest esse nisi inter illa quae uniuntur in eodem secundum rem: ita quod conceptus unius penitus excludit conceptum alterius, et e converso ... vel ita quod aliquid quod est in conceptu unius excluditur extra illud quod est in conceptu alterius" (fol. 161vN).

¹⁶ Giles of Rome was among those who maintained that there could be no intermediate distinction between the real and logical distinctions. See his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* q. 9 (Venice, 1503; repr. Frankfurt/Main, 1968), fol. 19v. Note in particular: "Secunda etiam distinctio non videtur conveniens: quia non videtur quod sit aliquod differre medium inter differre re et ratione ... Sed quod sit dare differre medium inter differre re et ratione non videtur intelligibile." For more on Henry's theory of distinctions, see J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand*, pp. 208-57.

¹⁷ *Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet X*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven, 1981), p. 165. "Et quaero utrum videat tertio quod rationale et animal non differunt sola ratione sicut definitio et definitum, ut nullam faciant compositionem neque omnino fiat ex eis aliquod compositum, sed plus, non solum quoad differre secundum magis vel minus in eodem modo differendi secundum speciem, quemadmodum in Deo plus differunt sapientia et bonitas quam esse et vivere, sed quoad differre alio et alio modo differendi secundum speciem, quia faciunt aliquam compositionem in specie constituta ex ipsis? Et hoc ideo, quia nullo modo definitio est extra rationem et intellectum definiti nec e converso, sicut genus est extra rationem et intellectum differentiae et e converso. Nec etiam differunt re, et tantum quantum differunt substantia et accidens, quia tunc species constituta ex ipsis non esset unum per se, sed tantum per accidens, aut saltem non esset unum simplex in forma secundum rem. Sed medio modo, scilicet plus quam ratione sola et minus quam re. Re vera, nisi claudat oculum rationis luci veritatis, non potest hoc non videre. Clarum enim est quod differunt plus quam sola ratione. Aliter enim genus posset praedicari de

In sum, Henry regards the distinction between essence and existence as intermediate between the real and logical distinctions. He rejected quite harshly Giles' theory of real distinction, but he also refused to reduce the "intentional distinction" to a mere distinction of reason. If essence and actual existence were only logically distinct, then one could not understand an essence as not existing. According to Henry, the existence (*esse existentiae*) of a creature contains something not found in its essence, namely, a relation to God as to an efficient cause.

Giles' theory of real distinction was also rejected by Godfrey of Fontaines.¹⁸ As Godfrey observes in his *Quodlibet* III, q. 1 (Christmas, 1285), neither *ens* nor *esse* denotes some real addition to that of which it is predicated. Thus whether one construes being (*ens*) existentially, as when one says "this is," or whether one takes it predicationally, for example, "this is a man" or "this is white," by *esse* is not understood something other than that to which it is joined.¹⁹ According to Godfrey there is a real identity between *esse* and essence; any distinction between them is only logical (*secundum rationem*).²⁰

In the short version of *Quodlibet* III, q. 1, Godfrey brings a series of arguments against the real distinction. In one argument, he reasons that the notion of being (*ens*) when predicated of a subject adds less than the notion of "one" (*unum*), since being is included in every notion, while "one" makes an addition to the notion of being. Now "one" does not add something real to the essence of that of which it is predicated; therefore,

differentia et e converso, sicut definitio praedicatur de definito et e converso, nec esset differentia extra rationem generis nec e converso, sicut definitio non est extra rationem definiti nec e converso. Quae plane falsa sunt. Clarum etiam est quod differunt minus quam differentia realiter ex genere et differentia non constitueretur unum in forma simpliciter, quod est species, sicut non constituitur ex substantia et accidente, quod falsum est."

¹⁸ For an excellent presentation of Godfrey's thinking on essence and existence, see J.F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, 1981), pp. 39-99.

¹⁹ *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. M. De Wulf and A. Pelzer (Louvain, 1904), p. 163. "Quocumque ergo modo accipiatur ens cum dicitur: hoc est simpliciter, vel hoc est homo, vel hoc est album, per esse non intelligitur aliud quam id ipsum cui adiungitur." For the dating of Godfrey's *Quodlibets*, see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, pp. xxi-xxviii.

²⁰ Godfrey concisely states his view in *Quodlibet* IV, q. 2: "Sed mihi videtur quod esse existentiae et essentia omnino sint idem secundum rem et differunt solum secundum rationem et modum intelligendi et significandi, nullam omnino compositionem facientia, sicut nec currere et cursus vel huiusmodi" (p. 235).

neither does "being".²¹ A second argument is grounded on Aristotle's claim that "being" and "one" are one and the same because they add nothing to a third term to which they are joined. Thus man (*homo*), an existent man (*ens homo*), and one man (*unus homo*) all denote the same thing. Yet this would not be the case if being were to add a "thing" (*aliqua res*) to the essence of which it is predicated.²² A third argument is drawn from Averroes. Anything is a being either through its own essence or through something added to it. If the latter, then one may ask if this addition is a being through itself or through something else added to it. Either one will arrive at something which is a being *per se*, or an infinite regress will occur. Therefore, anything is a being through its own essence.²³ A fourth argument reasons that being (*ens*), entity (*entitas*), and essence signify really the same thing; they differ only in their manner of signifying. According to Godfrey, a concrete noun such as *currens* (one who runs), an abstract noun such as *cursus* (running), and a verb such as *currere* (to run) do not denote diverse things. Similarly, *essentia*, *ens*, and *esse*, which are related to each other as abstract noun, concrete noun, and verb, all signify really one and the same thing: the meaning (*res significata*) is the same in each, though the manner of signifying varies.²⁴

In defending a real identity of essence and existence Godfrey also rejects Henry's theory of intentional distinction. In *Quodlibet* III, q. 1 Godfrey advances several objections against Henry. In reply to the latter's

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 303: "Prima talis est. Ens minus habet addere quam unum, cum ratio entis includatur in omni ratione; non sic ratio unius quae se habet saltem ad rationem entis per additionem. Sed unum non addit aliquid reale super essentiam eius de quo dicitur. Ergo nec ens nec per consequens esse a quo ens dicitur."

²² *Ibid.* "Secunda talis est. Secundum Philosophum, quarto Metaphysicae, ens et unum sunt unum inter se quia nihil addunt tertio cui adiunguntur. Unde secundum ipsum, homo, ens homo, et unus homo non dicunt aliud et aliud sed id ipsum. Sed hoc non esset si ens adderet aliquam rem super essentiam eius de quo dicitur ens." For Aristotle, see *Meta.* IV, 2 (1003b25ff).

²³ *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, p. 303. "Tertia talis est, et est ratio Commentatoris ibidem. Unumquodque aut est ens per essentiam suam sive per se aut per aliquid additum. Si per aliquid additum, de illo quaeretur per quid est ens; et si est ens per se, eadem ratione standum erat in primo ponendo quod primum erat ens per se. Si autem ad hoc ponatur quod illud sit ens per aliud, ita etiam erit de illo alio, et ibit in infinitum. Relinquitur ergo quod unumquodque sit ens per se et non per aliquam rem additam et sic sequitur idem quod prius." For the Averroistic source of this argument, see *In IV Meta.* (Venice, 1562), Vol. 8, fol. 67v.

²⁴ *Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, pp. 303-4. "Quarta talis est. Nomen concretum et nomen abstractum et verbum non dicunt diversas res, sicut patet de istis: *currens*, *cursus* et *currere*. Ergo a simili nec ista: *essentia*, *ens* et *esse*, quae se habent sicut nomen abstractum et nomen concretum et verbum."

contention that *esse existentiae* adds to essence a relation to God in the order of efficient causality, Godfrey counters that by means of a relation a thing does not enjoy substantial being (*esse simpliciter*) but only relative being (*ad aliud esse*). He also rejects the claim that the operation of an agent could terminate in a relation or in something relative. Moreover, the existence of a relation naturally presupposes the existence of its foundation. It would follow (on Henry's theory), that an essence would have to be understood to exist before it could be understood to have a relation to existence. Godfrey infers that in addition to the relation by which an existing essence is referred actually to its cause, there must be something in it by which it is formally determined in its substantial being.²⁵

II. JAMES' THEORY OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

Turning now to James' own discussions of the essence-*esse* distinction, one sees that his own view develops out of careful reflection on the views of his contemporaries. In explicating his thinking on this issue I shall consider his texts in their chronological order.

A. *Quodlibet I*, q. 4 (1293)

James first and most extensive treatment of the relationship between essence and existence is found in *Quodlibet I*, q. 4, where he is asked whether creation can be preserved if *esse* and essence do not really differ.²⁶ The phrasing of this question calls to mind the position of Giles of Rome, and indeed the opening objection, which argues that the real distinction is needed to preserve the doctrine of creation, is based on the analogous character of generation and creation.²⁷ James begins his reply

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 175. "... quoniam per respectum non habet res esse simpliciter et absolute, sed tantum ad aliud esse, nec operatio alicuius agentis terminatur per se ad aliquem respectum vel ad aliquid respectivum. Operatio autem creatoris terminatur ad esse creaturae, et omnis relatio in suo esse praesupponit naturaliter esse sui fundamenti, et sic oportet praeintelligi essentiam esse antequam intelligatur aliquis respectus eius ad esse et cetera. Praeter ergo huiusmodi respectum quo essentia existens dicitur actualiter ad suam causam, oportet in ea esse etiam intelligi aliquid quo formaliter determinetur ad esse simpliciter et absolute."

²⁶ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, ed. E. Ypma (Würzburg, 1968), pp. 43-61 ("Utrum salvari posset creatio si non differret realiter esse et essentia in creaturis").

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 43:2-6. "Sicut enim se habent materia et forma in generatione, sic se habent esse et essentia in creatione. Sed si materia et forma realiter non differrent, non posset salvari generatio. Ergo similiter si essentia et esse non differrent realiter non posset salvari creatio."

by distancing himself from Giles' position. He observes that if essence and existence in no way really differ in creatures, then the doctrine of creation cannot be preserved; however, if they do not differ really in the manner in which some claim, still creation can be maintained.²⁸ Thus James agrees with Giles' claim that the doctrine of creation requires that there be more than a merely logical or intentional distinction between *esse* and essence. However, one can expect that his theory of real distinction is going to differ quite markedly from the one advanced by Giles.

James's discussion in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4 is divided into four parts: first, he briefly explains the meaning of the terms "essence" and "*esse*"; secondly, he states the various opinions that have been held on the essence-*esse* relation; thirdly, he presents his own view; finally, he explains how creation entails a real distinction between essence and *esse*. With regard to the first point, James tells us that by "essence" he understands any predicamental reality (*res predicamentalis*) taken in itself and as distinct from others, whether belonging to the category of substance or of accident. Like being (*ens*), essence is analogously common to all the categories. As substance is being in an absolute sense (*ens simpliciter*), while accident is being in a qualified sense (*ens secundum quid*), so when essence is predicated simply and absolutely it means a thing (*res*) belonging to the category of substance. An accident, on the other hand, is an essence only in a qualified sense.²⁹ With regard to *esse* James distinguishes three possible meanings. First, *esse* can be understood as a noun (*nominaliter*). In this sense it means the same as essence, just as "to read" (*legere*) viewed as a noun means the same as "reading" (*lectio*). This is the manner in which *esse* is understood by Boethius and Aristotle, and by those who speak of an *esse essentiae*.³⁰ In a second sense, *esse* can be

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43:14-8. "Ad istam quaestionem sine praeiudicio, immo cum debita reverentia cuiuscumque opinionis, videtur mihi esse dicendum quod, si nullo modo different realiter essentia et esse in creaturis, non posset salvati creatio. Si tamen non different realiter illo modo quo doctores quidam ponunt ea differre, posset nihilominus salvati creatio."

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 44:28-35. "Quantum igitur ad primum, sciendum est quod nomine essentiae intelligi potest quaelibet res praedicamentalis secundum se sumpta et ut est ab alia distincta, sive sit res praedicamenti substantiae sive accidentis. Essentia enim commune est omnibus praedicamentis sicut et ens et eodem modo communitatis. Verum quia substantia est ens simpliciter, accidens vero secundum quid, ideo cum dicitur essentia simpliciter et absolute, intelligitur res praedicamenti substantiae. Accidens enim non est essentia simpliciter, sed essentia quaedam."

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 44:48-58. "De esse autem sciendum est quod esse potest tripliciter sumi. Uno enim modo sumitur nominaliter. Infinitivi enim secundum grammaticos possunt nominaliter sumi. Et hoc modo esse idem est quod essentia, sicut legere nominaliter

taken as a verb (*verbaliter*), insofar as it signifies the act of being (*actus essendi*). In this sense *esse* means the same as "to exist" (*existere*): it refers to actual existence, and it signifies the same as the verb "is", as when we say "a man is" or "God is."³¹ Thirdly, *esse* can be taken as a verb (*verbaliter*), though not as signifying the act of existence, but rather the relation of a predicate inhering in a subject. In this sense *esse* functions as the copula.³² In the present text, James tells us, he will understand *esse* in the second sense as the act of being. The question thus becomes one of determining the kind of distinction present between a substantial essence and its act of being.³³

Having clarified the terms, James next sets forth the main positions on the essence-*esse* relationship that were defended by his contemporaries. He suggests that the current dispute among theologians concerning essence and *esse* has its origins in an older philosophical debate concerning the meaning of being (*ens*). He finds this to be reasonable, since *ens* and *esse* seem to mean the same thing. According to James, philosophers have

sumptum idem est quod lectio. Et secundum hunc modum sumitur esse a Boetio, in *Libro De Hebdomadibus*, cum dicit: 'Diversum est esse, et id quod est.' Et similiter in aliis regulis consequentibus, sicut patet per expositionem Commentatoris ibidem, qui dicit quod esse ibi accipitur pro essentia vel subsistentia. Similiter autem et Aristoteles frequenter hoc modo accipit esse pro essentia scilicet et quidditate. Esse autem sic acceptum est illud quod dicitur esse essentiae id est quod est ipsa essentia." Here the "Commentator" refers to Gilbert of Poitiers. For Gilbert's commentary see N. M. Häring, ed., *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto, 1966), pp. 193-5.

³¹ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, pp. 44:59-45:63. "Alio modo sumitur esse verbaliter, secundum quod significat actum essendi. Nam verba significant per modum actionis vel passionis; et hoc modo esse idem significat quod existere. Et hoc est esse quod dicitur actualis existentiae et significat idem quod hoc verbum est quando praedicatur secundo adiacens, ut cum dicitur: homo est vel Deus est."

³² *Ibid.*, p. 45:64-70. "Tertio esse et est sumitur verbaliter, non tamen dicit actum existendi, nec aliquem actum secundum se, licet significet per modum actus, sed dicit habitudinem inhaerentiae praedicamenti ad subiectum; et sic est copula. Et hoc est illud est quod praedicatur tertio adiacens, ut cum dicitur: homo est animal. Dicitur enim praedicari quia magis se tenet ex parte praedicati. Dicitur autem tertium adiacens, eo modo quo medium dicitur tertium respectu extremorum quae copulat."

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 45:75-86. "De esse igitur primo et tertio modo sumpto non procedit quaestio, sed de esse secundo modo accepto. Quod quidem, licet possit accipi communiter in omnibus entibus, speciali tamen modo in substantia, quae sicut habet essentiam simpliciter, sic et existere. Accidentia vero, sicut non habent essentiam simpliciter sed secundum quid, sic etiam nec existere. Unde et quantum ad dubitationem de differentia essentiae et esse, nihil refert accipere ipsum esse communiter vel specialiter. Sed quia in quaestione fit mentio de creatione, quae principaliter ad substantiam terminatur, et etiam quia simpliciter et absolute nominatur esse, ideo videtur quaestio contrahi ad esse substantiale, sicut ad essentiam substantialem, ut supra dictum est. De his enim magis est sermo apud doctores."

understood *ens* in two different ways. Aristotle maintained that *ens* signifies the essence of that of which it is predicated, such that anything exists and is called a "being" through its own essence.³⁴ On the other hand, Avicenna claimed that *ens* signifies an intention or disposition superadded to that of which it is predicated. On this view a thing would be called a being not through its own essence but by something added to it, just as a thing is said to be white or black by means of something added to it. Thus Avicenna maintained that *ens* denotes an accident or accidental disposition in that of which it is predicated.³⁵

Similarly, theologians have spoken about *esse* in various ways. According to one view, *esse* does not denote a thing (*res*) distinct from essence. If there is a distinction between the two, it is only according to reason (*secundum rationem*).³⁶ This position, which would seem Aristotelian in its inspiration, defends a merely logical distinction between essence and *esse*. As we have noted, this was the position of Godfrey of Fontaines.

A second theory maintains that *esse* denotes a thing (*res*) distinct from essence. Although an essence is an actuality, it does not by itself enable a thing to exist actually. Another actuality, namely "actual being" (*esse actuale*), must be added to it. Though added to essence, *esse* is not a predicamental accident; rather, it belongs to the category of substance. It is neither form, nor matter, nor something composed of matter and form. Instead *esse* is a certain superadded act by which the composite itself and

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 45:90-46:101. "His itaque praemissis ad intellectum quaestionis, videndum est quod de differentia essentiae et esse diversi doctores opinati sunt. Circa quod sciendum quod, sicut de ente fuit diversus modus loquendi apud philosophos, sic et de esse apud doctores modernos. Fortassis autem diversitas loquendi de ente origo fuit et occasio diversimode loquendi de esse; et rationabiliter. Nam ens et esse idem videntur importare, sicut legere et legens. Fuit autem apud philosophos duplex modus dicendi de ente. Aristoteles enim, in *IV Metaphysicae*, dicit quod ens significat essentiam omnis eius de quo dicitur, ita quod unumquodque est et dicitur ens per suam essentiam. Cui et eius commentator Averroes assentit declarans hoc necessario esse dicendum." For Aristotle see *Meta.* IV, 2 (1003b25ff.). For Averroes see *In IV Meta.*, fol. 65v-66r.

³⁵ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 46:102-7. "Avicenna vero dixit quod ens significat intentionem seu dispositionem superadditam illi de quo dicitur, ita quod unumquodque dicitur ens non per essentiam suam, sed per aliquid superadditum, sicut res aliqua dicitur alba vel nigra per aliquid superadditum, quod est accidens illi rei. Unde posuit quod ens dicit accidens sive accidentalem dispositionem in eo de quo praedicatur." James' source for this reference to Avicenna would seem to be the well-known comment of Averroes: "Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit, quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei" (*In IV Meta.*, fol. 67r).

³⁶ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 46:108-11.

everything in it exist. Thus it is a thing (*res*) distinct from essence.³⁷ This view, which asserts a real distinction between essence and *esse*, is exactly the position defended by Giles of Rome. There is no indication that James also is thinking of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, the descriptions of essence as an actuality and *esse* as a thing (*res*) are Aegidian, not Thomistic.³⁸

Finally, a third theory maintains an intermediate position. It denies that *esse* denotes a thing (*res*) distinct from essence; instead, *esse* differs from essence intentionally. On this view *esse* simply denotes the essence with a relation to its cause. This intentional distinction is less than a real distinction but more than a logical one. James cites Robert Grosseteste as a source for this theory, although he notes that later writers have also adopted this position and have added some refinements to it.³⁹ Most likely James has in mind Henry of Ghent, who defended this theory in his

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 46:112-20. "Alii vero dicunt quod esse dicit rem aliam ab essentia. Nam, ut dicunt, licet essentia sit actualitas quaedam, ista tamen actualitas non sufficit ad hoc ut res dicatur actu existere, sed oportet quod superaddatur ei quaedam alia actualitas; et hoc vocatur esse actuale. Quod quidem non est accidens tamquam ad genus accidentis pertinens, magis autem pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae. Non tamen est forma neque materia neque compositum ex his, sed est actus quidam superadditus per quem compositum ipsum et omnia quae sunt in composito dicuntur existere. Et ita est res alia ab essentia."

³⁸ For Giles' claim that essence denotes an actuality see *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, pp. 52-8. Further support for the claim that this theory of real distinction is that of Giles of Rome may be found in James' remarks later in the text, when he has to criticize this theory: "Et licet non videatur esse aliquid cogens ad ponendum huiusmodi esse, negari tamen aut improbari non debet tamquam aliquid falsum aut impossibile, praecipue cum excellentes doctores hoc posuerint, qui nobis multorum bonorum causa fuerunt et ad quorum altissimum intellectum, quem de hoc et de multis aliis pulcris theorematibus habuerunt, ego et mihi similes ascendere ac pervenire non sumus idonei" (p. 54:379-84). The phrase "pulcris theorematibus" seems to be a very clear reference to Giles' *Theoremata de esse et essentia*.

³⁹ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, pp. 46:121-47:134. "Alii vero ponunt quod esse non dicit aliam rem ab essentia, tamen differt ab essentia intentione; quod quidem est differre minus quam re et plus quam ratione. Nam, ut dicunt, esse dicit essentiam cum respectu ad agens; essentia autem cum huiusmodi respectu non videtur dicere aliam rem a se ipsa sine huiusmodi respectu, sed dicit aliam intentionem. Hunc autem modum dicendi videtur aliquantulum tangere Lincolniensis circa principium, *II Posteriorum*, ubi dicit quod 'esse dictum de causa prima indicat ipsam essentiam ipsam omnino simplicem causae primae. Dictum vero de aliis non praedicat nisi ordinationem et dependentiam eorum ab ente primo quod per se est. Et haec ordinatio et dependentia nihil multiplicat in essentia dependente.' Sed alii posteriores hunc modum dicendi magis expresserunt et declaraverunt, et ad ipsum aliqua addiderunt. Narrare autem rationes harum opinionum et mutuas ad se invicem obviationes atque defensiones brevitatis gratia dimittatur ad praesens." For the text of Grosseteste see his *In II Post. Anal.* c. 1 (Venice, 1514; repr. Frankfurt/Main, 1966), fol. 33v.

well-known quarrel with Giles.

Having distinguished the various positions on the *esse*/essence relationship, James next sets forth his own view. He takes as his point of departure the following quote from Anselm: "Just as light (*lux*), to give light (*lucere*), and that which gives light (*lucens*) are related to each other, so are essence (*essentia*), to be (*esse*), and that which is (*ens*), i.e., that which exists (*existens*) or subsists (*subsistens*)."⁴⁰ James notes that "light" (*lux*) and "to give light" (*lucere*) are related to each other as the abstract to the concrete, for "to give light" denotes light itself by way of action, and verbs are said to be concrete in their significations. Consequently, *esse* and essence are related to each other as the concrete to the abstract, and as the concrete differs from the abstract, so *esse* differs from essence.⁴¹

In order to determine the kind of distinction found between essence and *esse* James turns to consider the significations of abstract and concrete terms. He observes that a concrete term always signifies more than an abstract term, since the latter signifies only form, while the former signifies both form and its subject. Sometimes a concrete term signifies really more (*plura secundum rem*) than an abstract term, as in the case of creatures, where form and subject are distinct. At other times, a concrete term signifies only logically more (*plura tantum secundum rationem*), as in the case of God, in whom form and subject are distinct only according to our mode of understanding.⁴² Furthermore, although the concrete signifies

⁴⁰ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 47:136-40. "Diversis igitur opinionibus de differentia essentiae et esse utcumque decursis, quid mihi de hoc probabiliter tenendum videatur, consequenter exponam. Propter quod sciendum quod, sicut dicit Anselmus, *Monologion* 6 capitulo: 'Sicut se habent ad invicem lux, lucere, et lucens, sic sunt ad se invicem essentia, esse et ens, hoc est existens sive subsistens.'" For the text of Anselm see *Monologion* c. 6, ed. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946), Vol. I, p. 20.

⁴¹ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 47:141-8.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 47:149-48:158. "Ad videndum autem differentiam concreti et abstracti, considerandum est, an significant idem vel diversum. Ad quod videtur esse dicendum quod semper concretum plura significat quam abstractum. Nam abstractum significat solum formam; concretum vero significat formam et subiectum. Sed quandoque concretum significat plura secundum rem quam abstractum, ut in creaturis, ubi non est idem forma et subiectum formae, nec habens et quod habetur. Quandoque vero significat plura tantum secundum rationem, ut in Deo, in quo idem est habens et quod habetur, et in quo non est aliud forma et subiectum formae, nisi secundum modum intelligendi." Cf. James' remarks in *Quodlibet* III, q. 7: "... sciendum quod abstractum dicit formam secundum se, ut iustitia, concretum autem, ut iustus, dicit formam ut in subsistentia. In creaturis autem forma subsistit in subiecto quod est aliud re ab ipsa forma; et ideo in creaturis concretum et abstractum differunt re, propter id quod concretum significat ex consequenti scilicet subiectum. In Deo autem forma non subsistit in alio; et ideo concretum et abstractum differunt in Deo secundum modum" (*Disputatio tertia de*

both subject and form it does not signify them in an equal manner. A concrete term signifies form primarily and a subject secondarily. James supports this by referring to the teaching of Averroes and Anselm on denominative names. The latter were what Aristotle had called paronyms, i.e., terms which derive their name from some other term, but differ from it in their ending. Aristotle gave as an example the term "grammarian" (*grammatikos*), which is derived from "grammar" (*grammatike*).⁴³ Identifying denominative names with concrete names, James observes that both Averroes and Anselm had held that a denominative name signifies a subject and an accident, but the accident primarily and the subject secondarily. By "subject" one means not only substance, but also everything that is joined with the accident.⁴⁴

Consequently, when one considers an abstract term and a concrete term in its primary meaning, both signify the same thing and are identical. However, when one regards a concrete term in its secondary meaning, it differs from an abstract term. This difference is real in the case of creatures and only logical in the case of God. Applying this to essence and *esse*, James reasons that in creatures *esse* signifies primarily essence and secondarily everything which is joined to an essence and without which the latter does not and could not exist actually. Presumably he has in mind all of the individuating accidents that are found in existing things. Therefore, in the case of creatures there is a real distinction between *esse* and essence.⁴⁵

quolibet, ed. E. Ypma [Würzburg, 1973], pp. 100:221-101:228).

⁴³ *Categories* 1, 1a12-16.

⁴⁴ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 48:158-66. "Licet autem concretum significet subiectum et formam, non tamen aeque principaliter; sed primo et principaliter formam, ex consequenti autem subiectum. Unde dicit Commentator, in *V Metaphysicae*, quod nomen denominativum, quod idem est quod concretum, significat subiectum et accidens, sed accidens primo, subiectum autem secundario. Et Anselmus dicit, in libro *De Grammatico*, quod nomen denominativum significat accidens per se et subiectum per aliud. Et licet per subiectum intelligatur substantia specialiter, tamen in nomine subiecti etiam includitur omne id cui accidens est coniunctum." For Averroes see *In V. Meta.*, fol. 117r. For Anselm see *De Grammatico*, ed. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946), Vol. I, pp. 156-7, 159-61. For more on Anselm's theory of paronymy, see D. Henry, *The De Grammatico of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy* (South Bend, 1964), esp. cc. 4-5; *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (London, 1967), pp. 31-116.

⁴⁵ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 48:173-9. "Cum igitur, ut ex dictis patet, essentia et esse se habeant sicut abstractum et concretum, quantum ad principale significatum idem sunt, quantum vero ad secundarium, in Deo quidem differunt solum secundum rationem, in creaturis autem differunt etiam secundum rem, ita quod esse significat principaliter ipsam essentiam; ex consequenti autem omne quod essentiae coniunctum est et sine quo essentia non invenitur nec inveniri potest in actu. Et hoc in creaturis est aliud secundum

James goes on to note that the real distinction between essence and *esse* is grounded on the composite character of creaturely being. No created essence in and by itself can exist actually; rather, in its actual existence it is always found joined with another principle that enters into real composition with it.⁴⁶ It is evident that he does not mean a composition of essence and existential act; instead the composition is one that remains wholly in the order of essence. James makes this point explicit by introducing the Boethian distinction between *esse* and *id quod est*:

Hence in the real composition which is found in a creature there differs in it *esse* and *quod est*, that is, essence and that which exists (*existens*) or being (*ens*), because according to Boethius, in his *De Hebdomadibus*, 'In every simple being *esse* and *id quod est* are identical, but in a composite being *esse* and the thing itself are distinct,' for *esse* and *id quod est* are diverse in it. So too, from the same real composition there arises a diversity between essence and *esse*. For *esse* and *ens* denote the same thing. Whence if essence and *ens*, or *id quod est*, differ really (*secundum rem*), it is necessary to say that essence and *esse* differ really (*secundum rem*).⁴⁷

Boethius had argued that in every creature there is found a real composition of *esse* and *id quod est*. James interprets the Boethian *esse* to mean *essentia*, and *id quod est* to mean *ens*. Hence he sees the Boethian distinction to be between essence and *ens*. Since *ens* and *esse* have the same signification, James reasons to a real composition of *essentia* and *esse*.

It is important to note that Boethius plays an important role in the medieval debate on essence and existence and was frequently cited as an authority for the real distinction. In his commentary on the *De hebdomadibus*, Thomas Aquinas understood the distinction between *id quod est* and *esse* in terms of his own teaching on essence and *esse*. Thomas took the Boethian *esse* to mean the act of being; *id quod est* refers

rem ab essentia."

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48:180-2. "Nulla enim creata essentia potest secundum se et solitaria existere in actu, sed semper invenitur secundum existentiam actualem alii coniuncta quod facit cum ipsa compositionem realem."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 48:182-49:190. "Unde, sicut ex compositione reali quae invenitur in creatura, differt in ipsa esse et quod est, idest essentia et existens vel ens; quia secundum Boetium, in libro *De Hebdomadibus*: 'Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet, omni autem composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est,' diversum enim est in ipso esse et id quod est, sic ex eadem compositione reali provenit diversitas inter essentiam et esse. Nam esse et ens idem dicunt. Unde si essentia et ens, vel id quod est, differunt secundum rem, oportet dicere quod essentia et esse secundum rem differunt." For the text of Boethius, see *Boethius: Theological Tractates*, tr. H. F. Steward, E. K. Rand, S. J. Tester (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 40-42.

to the subject of being, which "exists" insofar as it participates the act of being. Thus in the case of creatures there is a real distinction between *quod est* and *esse*.⁴⁸ Similarly, Giles of Rome also interpreted the Boethian axioms as supporting the real distinction.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Henry of Ghent rejected this reading of Boethius. Henry thought that the distinction between *esse* and *id quod est* should be understood as a distinction between God and the creature. According to Henry's reading *esse* refers not to created *esse*, but rather to uncreated *esse*. Thus he finds no support in Boethius for the supposed real distinction between essence and existence.⁵⁰ The general consensus among modern historians is that the Boethian distinction between *id quod est* and *esse* is a distinction between an individual subject and its form. The Thomistic real distinction is usually said not to be found in Boethius' text.⁵¹ As we have seen, James of Viterbo also seems to adopt this reading of Boethius.

When we read further in James' text it becomes clear that the distinction between essence and *esse* simply mirrors the distinction between nature and supposit:

And because '*id quod est*' is called the supposit, it can even be said that as essence and supposit differ, so do essence and *esse*. Now although the term supposit signifies primarily essence, secondarily it signifies all of the other things which are conjoined to an essence. Hence according to John Damascene, the supposit is the substance with its accidents. And so in its secondary meaning supposit differs really from essence. And one should speak similarly about essence and *esse*, as is clear from what has now been said.⁵²

⁴⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Boetii De hebdomadibus*, Leonine ed., Vol. 50 (Rome, 1996), pp. 270-4.

⁴⁹ For a thorough analysis of Giles' reading of Boethius, see P. Nash, "Giles of Rome on Boethius' '*Diversum est esse et id quod est*'," *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), pp. 57-91.

⁵⁰ *Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet I*, pp. 57-62. Note in particular: "Quid ergo mirum si diversum sit esse et quod est, quia diversi sunt Deus et creatura. Unde esse non supponit ibi pro esse creato ... sed pro esse increato" (p. 58). Giles of Rome will charge Henry with having fundamentally misread Boethius' text. See his *De esse et essentia*, q. 9, fol. 18vb-19ra.

⁵¹ For a review of the secondary literature on this problem in Boethius, see R. McNerny, *Boethius and Aquinas* (Washington, DC, 1990), pp. 161-98. McNerny proposed to show in this work that Aquinas' reading of Boethius was correct, i.e., that Boethius did teach what Aquinas said he did. For a critical review of this claim, see A. Côté, "La question de l'*esse* chez Thomas d'Aquin et Boèce," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 92 (1994), pp. 327-35.

⁵² *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 49:191-8. "Et quia id quod est dicitur ipsum suppositum, ideo etiam dici potest quod, sicut differt essentia et suppositum habens essentiam, sic differt essentia et esse. Suppositum autem, licet significet principaliter ipsam essentiam, ex consequenti tamen significat omnia alia quae sunt essentiae coniuncta. Unde secundum Damascenum, suppositum est substantia cum accidentibus, et ideo,

In the case of creatures, "supposit" primarily signifies essence and secondarily all of the individuating notes which must be added to an essence if it is to possess real existence. In any finite supposit one will find a composition of substance and accidents. Therefore, a finite supposit will contain more than what is expressed by its essence, for no essence whether substantial or accidental can exist unless it enters into composition with something else. Thus in creatures nature and supposit are really distinct.

Just as nature cannot be identified with supposit, so too on James' theory there cannot be a mere identity between essence and *esse*, for in its secondary meaning *esse* differs from essence:

Thus *esse* and *ens* primarily signify essence, and secondarily other things which are conjoined or can be conjoined to an essence, without which an essence is not found nor can be found to be actual, and without which something is not called an *esse* or *ens*. And so with regard to their primary meaning, *lucere* and *lux*, *vivere* and *vita*, and *esse* and *essentia* are the same. But with regard to their secondary meaning they differ, as has been said before. And because of this difference *lux* is not called *lucere* or *lucens*, nor is *essentia* called *esse* or *ens*. Rather, something having essence (*habens essentiam*) is called an *esse* and an *ens*. Now the latter is the supposit. Hence according to this it can be said that *esse* and *ens* denote the essence itself as it exists in the supposit, and as it constitutes the supposit, because they denote the essence as conjoined to other factors which are implied secondarily by the supposit.⁵³

Given these remarks, one might wonder whether it is truly correct to speak of James as having defended a real distinction between essence and *esse*. When *esse* is understood in its primary meaning, it is the same as essence; it is only in its secondary meaning that a real distinction occurs. Later in

quantum ad id quod significat ex consequenti, differt realiter ab essentia. Et similiter dicendum est de essentia et esse, sicut patet ex iam dictis." For the text of John Damascene, see his *Dialectica*, cc. 25-6, ed. O. Colligan (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1953), pp. 23-4.

⁵³ *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 49:203-14. "Sic etiam esse et ens principaliter significant essentiam ipsam; ex consequenti autem alia quae coniunguntur vel coniungi possunt essentiae, sine quibus essentia non invenitur nec potest inveniri in actu, et sine quibus non dicitur aliquid esse vel ens. Et ideo, quantum ad principale significatum, idem est *lucere* et *lux*, et *vivere* et *vita*, et *esse* et *essentia*; quantum vero ad secundarium differunt, sicut praedictum est. Et propter hanc differentiam *lux* non dicitur *lucere* aut *lucens*, nec *essentia* dicitur *esse* aut *ens*; sed *habens essentiam* dicitur *esse* et *ens*. Hoc autem est suppositum. Unde secundum hoc posset dici quod *esse* et *ens* dicunt ipsam essentiam ut est in supposito, et ut constituit suppositum; quia dicunt essentiam ut coniunctam aliis quae per suppositum ex consequenti importantur."

the text James admits that in determining the degree of identity or diversity between essence and *esse* more weight should be given to the primary meaning of *esse*. Thus he concludes that essence and *esse* principally and simply (*principaliter et simpliciter*) are the same, but in a secondary (*ex consequenti*) and qualified sense (*secundum quid*) they are different. Although it is only in a qualified sense that he admits a distinction between essence and *esse*, James notes that such a distinction is necessary, for it arises from the composition necessarily found in any creature.⁵⁴

Be this as it may, James is convinced that his own theory can accommodate the traditional positions on essence and *esse*, and that it can reconcile the teaching of Aristotle and Avicenna on being. According to James, both Aristotle and Avicenna have grasped a part of the truth. Being (*ens*) in its primary meaning signifies the essence of that of which it is predicated. Thus what Aristotle and Averroes have said is true, namely, that anything is a being through its own essence (*per essentiam suam*).⁵⁵ However, being (*ens*) also has a secondary meaning. It signifies something superadded and accidental to a creature. In this sense, only God is a being through his own essence; every created being "is" only because something has been added to it (*per aliquid superadditum*). Thus no created essence can exist actually without entering into a composition with something really distinct from it. James notes that one can speak of this "addition" as an accident, in the sense in which something belonging to one category is "accidental" to something of another category, that is, because the one is outside the essence of the other. Therefore, there is truth in what Avicenna has said, namely, that anything is a being (*ens*) through something superadded to it.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 53:353-54:359. "Et quia identitas et diversitas magis debent considerari secundum principale significatum, ideo potest dici quod essentia et esse principaliter et simpliciter sunt idem, ex consequenti autem et secundum aliquid non idem. Quantumcumque autem haec differentia sit ex consequenti, est tamen necessaria, quia provenit ex compositione quae necessario invenitur in qualibet creatura; et ideo non est abicienda, sed consideratione digna."

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 52:322-53:327. "Nam, quantum ad principale significatum, ens non aliud significat quam essentiam uniuscuiusque de quo dicitur, sicut album solam qualitatem dicitur significare de principali significato; et sic veritatem habet quod dicit de ente Aristoteles, et Commentator, scilicet quod unumquodque est ens per essentiam suam."

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53:328-38. "Quantum vero ad significatum secundarium, ens significat aliquid superadditum et accidens in creaturis, ita quod hoc modo omne ens creatum est ens per aliquid superadditum. Solus autem Deus est ens per suam essentiam. Nullius enim creaturae essentia invenitur aut inveniri potest in actu, sine coniunctione ad aliquid aliud, quod habet ad ipsam realem diversitatem. Et illud aliud dici potest accidens, eo modo quo res unius praedicamenti dicitur alii rei alterius praedicamenti accidere, quia non est ei essentialis: secundum quem modum substantia etiam accedit accidenti. Et sic habet

Similarly, each of the three main theories on essence and *esse* possesses some share of the truth. The first position, which defends a merely logical distinction between essence and *esse*, is reasonable if one takes into account the principal meaning of *esse*. However, if this theory means to exclude any difference between *esse* and *essentia*, then it is dubious, since *esse* at least secondarily denotes something diverse from essence.⁵⁷

The second position, which defends a real distinction, is also reasonable. But with respect to the way in which it is expounded it too is doubtful, for it assumes that *esse* is a certain actuality superadded to essence, which is neither matter nor form nor a composite of these nor an accident. According to James, there does not seem to be a compelling reason to posit this, and no authorities (whether philosophical or theological) can be found to support this theory. Avicenna's teaching on being and *esse* can be explained in other ways equally satisfactory without positing an actuality of this kind. Even Boethius' teaching in the *De hebdomadibus* does not require one to assume that *esse* is an actuality distinct from essence.⁵⁸

The third opinion, which posits an intentional distinction between *esse* and essence, maintains that *esse* adds to essence a relation to a cause. While essence denotes a relation to God as to an exemplar cause, *esse* denotes a relation to God as to an efficient cause. James finds this claim to be doubtful, since, although a creature is related to God as to an exemplar and efficient cause, it is not the case that all names signify this relation, but only such names as "created" (*creatum*), "produced" (*factum*), and "modelled" (*exemplatum*). Strictly speaking, neither *esse* nor essence

veritatem quod dicit Avicenna de ente, scilicet quod unumquodque est ens per aliquid superadditum, quia ens significat accedens et aliquid superadditum."

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54:363-7. "Prima enim opinio, quae ponit quod essentia et esse non differunt realiter, si intelligatur quantum ad principale significatum rationalis est. Si vero intendat excludere omnimodam differentiam dubitabilis est, quia, ut iam patet ex dictis, saltem secundo diversum aliquid dicit esse ab essentia."

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 54:368-78. "Secunda vero opinio, quantum ad hoc quod ponit essentiam et esse realiter differre, rationabilis est. Sed quantum ad modum ponendi, ut in hoc quod ponit quod esse est quaedam actualitas essentiae superaddita, quae neque est materia neque forma neque compositum neque accedens, dubitabilis est, tum quia non videtur esse aliqua ratio necessario cogens ad hoc ponendum, tum quia etiam nulla videtur posse induci auctoritas aut alicuius philosophi aut alicuius doctoris sacri quae hoc exprimat. Nam quod dicit Avicenna de ente et esse potest aliis modis aequè convenientibus exponi quam ponendo huiusmodi actualitatem. Auctoritas etiam Boetii, in libro *De Hebdomadibus*, ut ex superius dictis patet, non inducit ad ponendum tale esse quod sit quaedam actualitas alia ab essentia."

denotes a relation. Essence signifies a thing or nature simply in itself; *esse* in its primary meaning signifies the same as essence. Nevertheless, James does find an element of truth in this opinion. *Esse* in its secondary meaning signifies all of those accidents without which an essence cannot and does not exist actually. Among these is a relation to God as to an exemplar and efficient cause.⁵⁹

Having developed his own theory on the distinction between essence and existence, and having defended some manner of real distinction between them, in the final part of his discussion in Quodlibet I, q. 4 James explains why the doctrine of creation requires a real distinction of essence and *esse*. As we have noted, this was a favorite thesis of Giles of Rome, and as one might expect, James' understanding of it is quite different from that of Giles. According to James, Giles' position was motivated by the following argument. In everything which has been made and in every production there is necessarily a real diversity of factors, which are related to one another as potency to act. Strictly speaking, neither potency nor act alone is made, but rather potency is made under act (*potentia sub actu*) and act is made in the potency (*actus in potentia*). This is said to be what happens in the case of generation, whose principles are matter and form. Therefore, since creation is a kind of production (*factio*), it is necessary that in the creature there be diverse elements, which are related to each other as potency to act. Here the act to which creation refers is *esse*, since creation is said to terminate in *esse*. Thus Giles concluded that neither *esse* nor essence is made by itself, but an essence is made under *esse* (*essentia sub esse*), or *esse* is produced in the essence (*esse in essentia*).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 54:385-55:401. "Tertia vero opinio, quae ponit quod esse dicit supra essentiam respectum ad agens, videtur quidem esse dubitabilis quantum ad aliquid. Nam, licet creatura referatur ad Deum, et sicut ad causam exemplarem et sicut ad causam effectivum, non tamen sub quolibet nomine, sed solum sub aliquo nomine importante respectum; cuiusmodi sunt creatum, factum, exemplatum, et huiusmodi. Unde, cum nec essentia nec esse simpliciter dicta respectum important, non videtur quod esse dicat essentiam cum respectu ad agens. Sed secundum alium modum videtur haec positio esse rationalis. Dictum est enim quod esse significat ex consequenti omnia illa sine quibus essentia non invenitur nec inveniri potest actu, et inter ista est respectus ad agens; immo videtur speciali quodam modo et magis inter alia, quod esse ex consequenti significet respectum huiusmodi. Nullum enim accidens adeo inseparabiliter est annexum creatae essentiae sicut respectus ad Deum. Nam ab aliis accidentibus forte per divinam potentiam posset absolvi essentia creaturae, ut sine illis existeret; ab habitudine autem et respectu ad Deum nullatenus absolvi potest, quia non potest esse quod sit quid creatum et a Deo non dependeat."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57:468-80.

In James' view this argument is not compelling. For in order to preserve an act-potency composition in creatures, it is not necessary to follow Giles in positing *esse* as a superadded actuality. In every creature there necessarily occurs a composition of substance and accidents, and hence a real diversity of many factors. James reasons that in every composite it is necessary that there be one ingredient which is primary and perfect, while the others are secondary and imperfect. The former has the character of an act; the latter of a potency. Strictly speaking, in a creature it is the substantial essence which has the character of an act, while accidents possess the nature of a potency. An accident is regarded as secondary and imperfect, since it depends upon substance as a cause of its being (*entitas*). In a qualified sense, however, it is substance which may be regarded as potency, and an accident as an act, because an accident gives *esse* to substance in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*).⁶¹

Therefore, in order to preserve the act-potency composition present in all creatures it is sufficient to appeal to the distinction between substance and accident. There is no need to introduce the Aegidian theory of essence and existence. James agrees with Giles that creation terminates in *esse*, but by *esse* he means not an actuality superadded to essence but rather the substantial essence as it is united with its accidents. Similarly, Giles' analogy between creation and generation needs to be qualified. While it is true that generation requires a real distinction between matter and form, it is not the case that matter and form are related in generation as essence and *esse* in creation. Instead, matter is to form as accident is to

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 57:486-58:507. "Quantum ad primum sciendum quod, et si non ponatur tale esse, tamen potest salvari convenienter in eo quod creatur realis diversitas aliquorum, quorum unum se habet ut potentia, reliquum vero ut actus, et quorum unum dicitur fieri in alio vel sub alio. Et potest etiam salvari quod creatio terminatur ad esse. Nam, ut ex supradictis patet et verum est, in omni creato necessario incidit compositio substantiae et accidentis, ac per hoc realis diversitas plurium. In omni autem composito ex pluribus oportet unum esse principale et perfectum, aliud autem vel alia minus principalia et imperfecta. Et illud quod est principale et perfectum habet magis rationem actus; quae autem sunt minus principalia et imperfecta habent rationem potentiae, ex hoc ipso quod a principali dependent. Et sic in composito creato ipsa essentia substantialis habet rationem actus. Accidens vero habet rationem potentiae simpliciter et absolute loquendo, quia essentia substantialis est principalis et perfecta, accidentalis autem est minus principalis et imperfecta et a substantiali dependens, sicut a causa suae entitatis. ... Et quamvis loquendo simpliciter et absolute substantia habeat rationem actus, accidens vero potentiae, tamen secundum quid et aliquo modo est e converso, quia accidens dat esse substantiae secundum quid; constituitur autem in esse per substantiam simpliciter."

substance.⁶² Generation differs from creation, since in the case of generation form which preexists potentially in matter comes to be actually in it. Matter then becomes a part of the thing generated. But this is not the case with creation: substance does not preexist potentially in an accident, since neither exists prior to being created. Instead substance and accident preexist potentially in the active power of God, and through creation they are brought into actual existence by God, who does not thereby become a part of creation.⁶³

B. De divinis praedicamentis, q. 1 (1293-4)

James' *De divinis praedicamentis* contains thirty-two questions, the first twenty-nine of which were disputed by him between his first and second Quodlibet. In the opening question he is concerned with the problem of whether God may truly be called a being, i.e., whether the proper and complete notion of being can be applied to God.⁶⁴ In his analysis of this problem one finds an examination of the term being (*ens*), and an analysis of the relationship between essence and *esse*. His discussion of these topics strongly resembles his earlier treatment in Quodlibet I, q. 4. With regard to the term being, James again notes a disagreement among the philosophers: on the one side, Aristotle and Averroes claim that being (*ens*) signifies the essence of that of which it is predicated; on the other side, Avicenna holds that being (*ens*) signifies an accidental disposition or intention superadded to that of which it is predicated.⁶⁵ From these two ways of speaking about being there arises a diversity of views among modern thinkers on the essence-*esse* relationship. James again accounts for this by noting that that *esse* and *ens* seem to

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 60:575-81. "Quod enim primo assumitur, scilicet quod essentia et esse sic se habent in creatione sicut materia et forma in generatione, non est concedendum, quia esse principaliter idem dicit quod essentia, ut dictum est; ex consequenti autem non idem, quia esse ex consequenti dicit illa quibus essentia est coniuncta. Sed melius secundum hoc diceretur quod sicut se habet materia et forma in generatione, sic se habet accedens et substantia in creatione, ut ostensum est."

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 61:598-605. "Potest autem et alio modo manifestari dissimilitudo creationis et generationis, quantum ad hoc quod tam in creato quam in generato oportet quod sit potentia et actus. Nam id quod generatur praeexistit potentia in materia quae postmodum est pars geniti; et ideo in generato oportet esse diversa realiter actum et potentiam, et generatio terminatur principaliter ad compositum ex diversis realiter. Id autem quod creatur praeexistit potentia in Deo qui non efficitur pars rei creatae."

⁶⁴ *Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis I-X*, ed. E. Ypma (Rome, 1983), pp. 1-32 ("Utrum Deus dicatur vere ens").

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5:114-6:134.

signify the same thing, namely the act of existing (*actus existendi*). *Esse* signifies the same as *existere*, while *ens* means the same as *existens*. However, if *esse* is taken as a noun (*nominaliter*), then it means the same as essence, just as *legere* viewed as a noun means the same as *lectio*. In this text, James tells us, he is going to follow common usage and take "essence" to mean the thing (*res*) itself to which the act of being (*actus essendi*) is attributed, and by *ens* he will understand the act of being.⁶⁶

Turning his attention to the modern debate on essence and *esse*, James observes that some thinkers, showing a preference for the teaching of Aristotle and Averroes, say that *esse* and essence differ only logically and in their manner of signifying, as for example, *currere* and *cursus*, *lucere* and *lux*, and *sapere* and *sapientia*. On this view, essence signifies the same reality as the act of being; thus the act of being that belongs to a thing is not other than the thing itself.⁶⁷ Other thinkers, drawing inspiration from Avicenna, claim that there is more than a merely logical distinction between essence and *esse*. Hence they say that *esse* denotes something superadded to essence. But here a disagreement arises. Some maintain that *esse* adds to essence a certain actuality, which is something absolute. Such an actuality could be called an "accident" of existing things, not because it is a predicamental accident, but rather because it is outside of the essence and definition of existing things. This theory, which would

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6:146-7:160. "Ex hac autem diversitate loquendi de ente apud philosophos, videtur provenisse diversitas modorum loquendi de esse et essentia apud modernos doctores. Nam esse et ens idem significare videntur, quia scilicet utrumque dicit actum existendi. Unde sicut esse idem significat quod existere, sic ens idem quod existens. Et sic eundem actum important; nisi forte esse sumatur nominaliter. Tunc enim idem est quod essentia, sicut legere nominaliter sumptum, idem est quod lectio; quamvis diceret aliquis, quod etiam essentia dicit actum essendi, sicut lectio dicit actum legendi. Verumtamen, secundum communem accipiendi modum, essentia dicitur res ipsa cui attribuitur actus essendi. Unde et Avicenna non distinxit essentiam ab esse vel ente, sed distinxit rem vel quidditatem. Verumtamen, accipiamus nunc essentiam pro ipsa re cui convenit esse; ens vero pro ipso actu essendi."

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7:161-73. "Quidam igitur, considerantes magis dicta Aristotelis et Commentatoris, quae multum videntur rationabilia, dixerunt quod essentia et esse non differunt nisi ratione et secundum modum significandi, sicut currere et cursus, lucere et lux, vel, secundum verba Augustini, sicut sapere et sapientia. Nam secundum *Augustinum*: 'Sicut ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia,' 'sic ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia.' Et si quidem hoc intelligeret quod essentia sub nomine essentiae dicit eundem actum quem dicit esse, tunc sine contradictione verum est. Sed isti intendunt plus dicere, quod non solum essentia sub nomine essentiae, sed etiam essentia ut res vel quidditas, vel quocumque nomine nominetur, eandem rem dicit cum actu essendi, ita quod actus essendi, conveniens cuilibet re, non est aliud ab ipsa re." Here James quotes from Augustine's *De Trinitate* V, c. 2 (CCSL 50.207), and *De Civitate Dei* XII, c. 2 (CCSL 48.357).

seem to be the position of Giles of Rome, posits a real distinction between essence and *esse*.⁶⁸ Other thinkers hold that *esse* adds to essence not something absolute, but simply a relation to God in the order of actual efficient causality. Thus *esse* differs from essence not really but only in intention. This is quite obviously the theory of Henry of Ghent.⁶⁹

Having sketched the three main positions on the essence-*esse* relationship that were common in his day, James next gives his own view, which he regards as another way of maintaining that being (*ens*) denotes something superadded to essence. He begins by laying down two points. First, no created thing exists or could exist simply by itself (*solitaria*), not conjoined to something. For example, an accident does not exist unless it is joined to substance, and a substance does not exist unless it is joined to accidents. All creatures are characterized by mutability, and therefore composition. Such a composition cannot be merely one of essence with something relative (as in the theory of Henry), but also requires a union of essence with something absolute. Therefore, every created being has something absolute united with it, without which it does not and cannot exist.⁷⁰

Secondly, James notes that created things, when they are joined

⁶⁸ *Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis I-X*, pp. 7:174-8:186. "Alii vero, considerantes dicta Avicennae et Algazelis, sicut patet de *doctoribus* qui primo hoc expresse tetigerunt, ponunt quod *esse* differt ab *essentia* non solum ratione, sed amplius quam ratione, et quod *esse* dicit aliquid superadditum *essentiae*. Sed isti diversificantur. Quidam enim dicuntur quod *esse* supra *essentiam* addit quamdam actualitatem, quae est aliquid absolutum, ita quod *esse* actuale est quaedam actualitas superaddita rebus quae dicuntur *esse*. Haec autem actualitas potest dici accidens rebus quae dicuntur *esse*; non quia in rei veritate sit accidens, quasi ad genus accidentis pertinens; magis autem reducitur ad praedicamentum substantiae; sed dicitur accidens quia est extra *essentiam* et rationem rerum quae *esse* dicuntur." Once again the description of *esse* as a *quaedam actualitas superaddita* seems to indicate that James has in mind the theory of Giles of Rome.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8:193-6. "Alii vero dicunt quod *esse* addit quidem super *essentiam* non aliquid absolutum, sed habitudinem ad Deum in ratione efficientis causae secundum actum. Unde dicunt quod superaddit *esse* supra *essentiam* aliquid differens non re sed intentione. ..."

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9:222-34. "Est enim primo considerandum quod nulla res creata existere invenitur solitaria et alii non coniuncta, immo nec existere potest; quia accidens non existit nisi coniunctum substantiae, et substantia non existit nisi coniuncta accidenti. Eo enim ipso quod creatum est, non est solitarium. Nam omne creatum mutabile est et defectibile et est compositum. Non potest intelligi mutatio, nisi per separationem alicuius ab aliquo et coniunctionem alicuius cum aliquo. Similiter et compositio plura requirit. Et non solum requirit mutatio et compositio coniunctionem ad aliquid relatum et ad habitudinem, immo etiam ad aliquid absolutum; quia secundum relationem non attenditur per se mutatio, nec relatio facit compositionem cum suo fundamento. Nullum igitur creatum, sive sit substantia sive accidens, existit solitarium et alii non coniunctum."

together, remain essentially distinct. Categories (*praedicamenta*) and predicable things (*res praedicabiles*) do not cross over or mingle with one another. From this it follows that one thing is called an "accident" of another insofar as it is extraneous to it and outside its essential nature. And so when it is said that no thing exists unless joined to another, in this way not only does an accident exist only as joined to substance, but even substance possesses existence only as joined to accidents. It follows that no thing exists unless because it is joined to something added to it, which is accidental to it.⁷¹ James is thus able to find some degree of truth in Avicenna's teaching that being (*ens*) denotes an accidental disposition and something superadded in creatures, since no thing is called a being unless because it is conjoined to something else. In this sense it is correct to say that a creature exists through something added to it, which is an accident of it. Nevertheless, one must be careful to distinguish the ways in which this may occur. This notion of "through" sometimes denotes conjunction and causality, as when an accident exists through substance, since it is caused by substance; at other times "through" denotes only conjunction. It is in the latter sense that a substance exists through its accidents, because it does not exist without them.⁷²

From the composite character of created being James reasons to a distinction between essence and *esse*:

According to this manner of speaking, if it were asked what *ens* or *esse* signifies, we would say that first and foremost it signifies the thing (*res*) which is called being (*ens*), and to which the act of being (*actus essendi*) belongs. But consequently and secondarily it signifies that addition by which a thing is called a being inasmuch as it is joined to it. Now this addition is not a determinate this or that, but universally a thing is called a being as it is

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9:237-10:246. "Secundo considerandum est quod res creatae, cum ad invicem coniunguntur, secundum suas essentias remanent distinctae. Non enim invicem transeunt aut permiscuntur. Praedicamenta enim et res praedicabiles immixtae sunt. Ex hoc sequitur quod una dicitur accidens alii in quantum est extranea ab ea et praeter essentialem rationem ipsius. Et ideo, cum dictum sit quod nulla res existat nisi alii coniuncta, et una res dicatur accidere alii, hoc modo non solum accidens substantiae, immo et substantia accidenti, sequitur quod nulla res existit, nisi per hoc quod est coniuncta alicui sibi addito, quod est sibi accidens."

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 10:247-56. "Ex his autem verificari potest dictum *Avicennae* quod ens dicit aliquid superadditum absolutum et dispositionem accidentalem, quia nulla res dicitur ens, nisi per hoc quod alii coniungitur. Et sic quaelibet res hoc modo est ens per aliquid superadditum sibi, quod est accidens ei. Tamen sciendum quod, cum dicitur quaelibet res esse ens per aliquid superadditum, hoc quod dico 'per' quandoque dicit coniunctionem et causalitatem; hoc modo accidens existit per substantiam. Aliquando dicit solam coniunctionem et non causalitatem; et hoc modo substantia existit per accidens, quia non existit sine eo."

conjoined to everything without which it cannot be found. Therefore, when it is said that a thing is a being through some superaddition, by this superaddition is understood everything without which that thing, which is called a being, could not be found in act.⁷³

One recognizes this to be fundamentally the same position that James had defended in his first Quodlibet. Once again a primary and a secondary meaning of *esse* are distinguished, and again *esse* is ultimately identified with the subsisting individual. Once again it is the real composition of substance and accidents necessarily found in the creature that requires one to recognize a distinction between essence and *esse*.

In advancing this theory James agrees with Giles and Henry that a thing is a being because of something superadded to it. But he parts company with Giles by denying that what is added is a determinate actuality. A substance may be said to have real existence not because it has received "*esse*", but rather because it has received some predicamental accidents. Nevertheless, if one concedes to Giles that there is such an actuality, then James will agree that first and foremost it is by conjunction with it that a thing is a being. He sees his own theory, then, as including Giles' view, and as saving a real distinction between essence and *esse*.⁷⁴

Similarly, James believes that he is able to salvage what is true in Henry's theory. Everything which exists only as conjoined to another must have an efficient cause. Thus *esse* does imply a relation to a cause; however, it does so secondarily (*per posterius*). Although the conjunction and the relation to a cause exist simultaneously, the former is logically prior to the latter, for any relation is naturally posterior to its foundation. According to James, Henry's theory is true but it is not sufficient, for *esse*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 10:257-11:265. "Secundum ergo hunc modum dicendi, si quaeratur quid significet ens vel esse, dicemus quod principaliter et primo significat rem quae dicitur ens, et cui convenit actus essendi. Consequenter autem et secundario significat illud additum per quod res dicitur ens in quantum est illi coniuncta; hoc autem additum non est determinatum hoc vel illud; sed universaliter res dicitur ens prout est coniuncta omni illi sine quo res inveniri non potest. Unde, cum dicitur res est ens per aliquid superadditum, per hoc superadditum intelligitur omne illud sine quo illa res, quae dicitur ens, inveniri non potest in actu."

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11:268-75. "Unde, secundum hunc modum, hoc superadditum non est aliqua actualitas determinata, sicut dicit opinio secunda supra dicta, quamvis, si sit dare illam actualitatem, potest dici quod principaliter et praecipue per coniunctionem ad illam res dicitur ens, et pro tanto illa vocatur esse. Tamen, simpliciter loquendo, per coniunctionem ad omne illud sine quo non invenitur existere, res dicitur ens vel esse. Unde hic modus dicendi includit secundam opinionem, et salvat realem differentiam inter esse et essentiam."

predicates more than merely a relation to an efficient cause.⁷⁵

It is evident from this text that James wishes to defend more than a merely logical distinction between essence and *esse*. No thing is a being simply in virtue of its own essence; it is a being because of something added to it. Although he rejects Giles' theory of *esse* as a determinate actuality superadded to essence, he is able to admit at least nominally a real distinction between essence and *esse*. It is the real composition of substance and accidents present in any creature that supports such a distinction.

One sees too that it is the presence of essential composition that grounds the distinction between created being and God. James himself makes this clear later in the text, when he notes four differences between created and uncreated being. First, a creature possesses being because of something absolute added to it. This is not the case with God, who lacks internal composition. Thus *esse* in creatures is an accident, while in God it is the thing (*res*) which is God.⁷⁶ Second, a creature is a being because of the relation it has to a cause. This follows from the fact that it is composed of parts. Since God lacks all internal composition, he exists without any such relation.⁷⁷ Third, God is total and unlimited being (*ens totale et illimitatum*), since he is a being absolutely, not through a union with something else. A creature is a partial and limited being (*ens parziale*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11:276-91. "Salvat etiam tertiam opinionem quae dicit, quod esse dicit essentiam cum habitudine ad principium primum ut est actu efficiens. Haec enim positio sequitur ad praedictum modum dicendi. Omne enim quod non existit nisi alii coniunctum, oportet quod habeat causam agentem per quam coniungatur illi sine quo esse non potest. Et sic omne tale dicit habitudinem ad agens, licet haec habitudo ad agens per posterius importetur in nomine entis vel esse, ita quod ens primo dicit essentiam ut coniunctam alii rei absolute. Et quia haec coniunctio non potest esse nisi per agens, consequenter dicit essentiam sub habitudine. Et licet sit simul tempore coniunctio illa et respectus ad agens, prius tamen naturali intellectu est coniunctio quam respectus; nam respectus quilibet natura posterior est suo fundamento. Sic igitur opinio quae dicit quod esse dicit essentiam cum habitudine ad agens, vera quidem est, sed non sufficiens, quia plus dicit esse ut dictum est."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16:409-15. "Prima igitur differentia potest accipi ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam ens creatum est ens per aliquid superadditum absolutum sibi coniunctum; Deus autem non, quia in eo non est hoc et hoc. Unde esse in creaturis est accidens; in Deo non, sed est ipsa res quae Deus est. Et sicut non dicitur Deus in ordine ad aliquid aliud sibi coniunctum, sic nec ens. Unde est ens essentialiter et per essentiam; ens creatum est ens accidentaliter et per aliquid superadditum."

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16:415-19. "Ex hac autem prima differentia sequitur secunda, videlicet quod ens creatum est ens ex habitudine ad agens; ens autem divinum est sine habitudine. Nam illud quod est ens per coniunctionem plurium, indiget causa coniungente, quae est agens."

et limitatum), since it exists only as joined to something.⁷⁸ Fourth, divine being is immutable, because it lacks a composition of parts. Creatures are mutable, since they possess accidents in virtue of which they are said to be changed.⁷⁹

C. De divinis praedicamentis, q. 6 (1293-4)

In this question James asks whether God is a member of a genus or predicament.⁸⁰ In his discussion of this he makes a passing reference to the distinction between essence and existence, when he distinguishes a twofold potentiality in creatures. One is found only in material things (due obviously to the presence in them of matter), while the other is common to all created beings, and is derived by comparison to the first cause on which they depend. James then notes:

But from this potentiality, which is in all things by comparison to their cause, there follows in all things the potentiality that is by comparison to something else, without which [a creature] cannot exist actually. For every creature is composite and joined to another. Therefore, every creature is a this and this (*hoc et hoc*), and there is in all [creatures] potency and act. And this is the root of the difference between *esse* and *essence*.⁸¹

From the fact that a being is caused there follows in it a composition of parts, and hence a distinction of essence and *esse*. The metaphysical composition that characterizes every creature is not one of essence and existential act, but one of thing and thing. Such a composition remains

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17:450-5. "Tertia differentia est, quia ens divinum est ens totale et illimitatum. Et hoc quia non dicitur ens per coniunctionem ad aliquid, sed dicitur ens absolute, sicut si aliquid diceretur calidum non ex additione, esset calor infinitus. Ens autem creatum est ens partiale et limitatum. Et hoc quia non est ens absolute, sed ex coniunctione ad aliquid."

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17:458-63. "Quarta differentia est, quia ens divinum est ens immutabile. Nam illud in quo non est hoc et hoc immutabile est. Omnis enim mutatio est per separationem alicuius ab aliquo. Ens autem mutabile est. Unde dicit Augustinus, *V De Trinitate*, capitulo secundo, quod omnis creatura mutabilis est, quia habet accidentia secundum quae mutari dicitur. Essentia autem divina immutabilis est." For this in Augustine, see *De Trinitate* Bk. V, ch. 4 (CCSL 50.209).

⁸⁰ *Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis I-X*, pp. 143-85 ("Utrum Deus sit res alicuius generis vel praedicamenti").

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159:438-43. "Ex hac autem potentialitate, quae inest omnibus per comparisonem ad causam consequitur in omnibus potentialitas; quae est per comparisonem ad aliquid aliud, sine quo non potest esse actu. Nam omne creatum est compositum et alii coniunctum. Ideo omne creatum est hoc et hoc, et est in omni potentia et actus. Et hoc est radix differentiae inter esse et essentiam."

wholly in the order of essence.

D. Quodlibet III, q. 7 (1295)

In this text James has an opportunity to make some interesting remarks on essence and *esse*. He is asked whether a plurality or distinction of real absolute modes in God is repugnant to his simplicity.⁸² The text begins with two arguments given to show that a plurality of real modes is repugnant to the divine simplicity. According to the first argument, the plurality by means of which the creature primarily recedes from God is repugnant to the divine simplicity. But such is the plurality of real modes; therefore, such plurality is repugnant to the divine simplicity. To support the minor premise, it is argued that the plurality by which the creature falls short of divine simplicity cannot be one of reason (*pluralitas rationis*), since such a plurality is indeed present in God, nor is it one of things (*pluralitas rerum*), since God could create a substance devoid of any accidents. In the case of the latter, such a substance would not be composed of things, but would still fall short of divine simplicity. This could only be accounted for by positing within it a plurality of real modes.⁸³

According to the second argument, a plurality that impedes a predication *per identitatem* is repugnant to the divine simplicity. But such is the plurality of real modes. This is evident, because *esse* and essence differ *secundum modum realem*, which (as some say) is to differ intentionally. Thus one is not predicated of the other by a predication *per*

⁸² *Disputatio tertia de quolibet*, pp. 93-127 ("Utrum pluralitas vel distinctio modorum realium absolutorum in Deo repugnet eius simplicitati").

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 93:3-17. "Illa enim pluralitas repugnat divinae simplicitati per quam creatura primo recedit a divina simplicitate. Sed per pluralitatem modorum realium creatura primo recedit a divina simplicitate. Igitur talis pluralitas repugnat divinae simplicitati. Maior patet. Minor sic ostenditur. Per pluralitatem enim rationis creatura non recedit a divina simplicitate, quia huiusmodi pluralitas in Deo est absque detrimento suae simplicitatis, nec etiam per pluralitatem rerum recedit creatura primo a divina simplicitate. Posset enim Deus facere aliquam substantiam simplicem absque omni accidente. In tali autem substantia non esset diversitas vel pluralitas rerum, et tamen constat quod recederet et deficeret a divina simplicitate. Quare oporteret in huiusmodi substantia esse aliam diversitatem sive pluralitatem per quam recederet a simplicitate divina, nec posset esse alia pluralitas nisi modorum realium. Quare per huiusmodi pluralitatem recedit creatura primo a divina simplicitate."

identitatem.⁸⁴

To the first of these arguments James replies that the creature primarily recedes from divine simplicity by a plurality of things, and secondarily by a diversity of real modes. Although a plurality of things entails composition, a plurality of modes, simply and absolutely, does not. Nevertheless, because a distinction of modes in a creature always follows upon a diversity of things, it is true that a plurality of modes in a creature entails composition (though clearly in an accidental manner).⁸⁵ In response to the claim that God could create a substance that lacked accidents, James points out that God cannot create a substance that lacks relative accidents, since all creatures depend upon him and are related to him as a cause. Nevertheless, one might object that relative accidents are not things but modes of a thing, and as such they do not enter into composition with substance. To this James replies that, although God could make a substance that lacked all actual absolute accidents, he could not make a substance that lacked the aptitude to receive such accidents. Consequently, in all creatures there is at least a composition of things in aptitude, and therefore any creature necessarily falls short of the divine simplicity.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93:18-26. "Praeterea illa pluralitas quae impedit praedicationem per identitatem illorum quae plura dicuntur, repugnat divinae simplicitati. Cuius ratio est, quia ex divina simplicitate provenit quod omnia quae sunt in Deo et quae dicuntur de ipso, praedicantur de se invicem praedicatione per identitatem. Sed pluralitas modorum realium impedit praedicationem per identitatem. Quod patet, quia esse et essentia differunt secundum modum realem; quod est differre intentione, ut quidam dicunt. Et ideo unum de alio non praedicatur praedicatione per identitatem. Igitur pluralitas modorum realium repugnat divinae simplicitati."

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 125:967-126:983. "Ad illud ergo quod obicitur primo, quod per pluralitatem modorum realium creatura primo recedit a divina simplicitate, dicendum est quod creatura primo recedit a divina simplicitate per pluralitatem rerum, secundario autem et ex consequenti per diversitatem modorum realium. Quod sic patet. Pluralitas enim rerum inducit compositionem. Pluralitas autem diversorum modorum, simpliciter et absolute sumpta, non inducit compositionem. Tamen, quia in creaturis distinctio modorum semper sequitur diversitatem rerum et compositionem, ideo pluralitas modorum, prout in creaturis, compositionem inducit. Unde accidit huic pluralitati quod compositionem inducat in quantum scilicet est in tali re, quae est creatura, in qua diversitas modorum provenit ex diversitate rerum vel ex compositione sive ex his sive huic. Et ita per utramque distinctionem recedit creatura a divina simplicitate; sed primo et principaliter per illam quae est rerum, ex consequenti autem per eam quae est modorum, non in quantum est modorum absolute, sed in quantum est modorum talium et in tali re, scilicet creatura."

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 126:986-1004. "Sciendum est enim quod Deus non potest facere substantiam aliquam sine accidente, saltem respectivo. Non enim potest facere creaturam aliquam quae non dependeat ab ipso et quae non habeat relationem ad ipsum sicut ad causam. Sed quia statim aliquis obiceret quod relatio non est res quae compositionem inducat, sed est

To the second argument, which affirmed that a plurality of modes impedes a predication *per identitatem*, James replies that a distinction *secundum modum* is a distinction only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*). Therefore, it impedes a predication *per identitatem* only in a qualified sense. As for the claim that essence and *esse* differ modally, James replies that they differ in creatures not only *secundum modum* but also *secundum rem*.⁸⁷

III. CONCLUSION

Having carefully read James' texts, we can now formulate some conclusions about his own view of the relationship between essence and existence. His thinking on this issue develops out of careful reflection on and criticism of the views of his contemporaries. Finding that each of the three main theories in his day contains some truth, James attempts to develop a compromise position. Essence is related to *esse* as the abstract to the concrete. Distinguishing a primary and a secondary meaning of *esse*, he maintains that, when *esse* is taken in its primary meaning, it is identical with essence; however, when it is taken in its secondary meaning, it is really distinct from essence, since it includes everything without which an essence does not and cannot exist.

It is not surprising, then, that scholars have disagreed about James' position. Nevertheless, it seems evident that he does not wish to defend a merely logical distinction between essence and *esse*. Such a distinction

modus quidam, ideo ulterius est dicendum quod Deus potest facere substantiam sine accidente absoluto in actu, non autem in aptitudine. Non enim posset Deus facere substantiam aliquam quae non esset susceptiva accidentis absoluti, vel in qua non posset esse accidens absolutum, licet posset facere aliquam substantiam non habentem actu accidens aliquod absolutum, sicut etiam de accidente dici solet quod potest fieri a Deo actu sine subiecto, non tamen aptitudine. Sicut ergo accidens, quantumcumque actu existat sine subiecto, vere est accidens et est compositum compositione huic propter solam aptitudinem inhaerendi, quae ad eo tolli non potest ipso manente, sic et substantia, quantumcumque actu existat sine accidente absoluto, quia tamen potest illud suscipere, dicitur in ea esse compositio rerum in aptitudine. Unde patet quod creatura primo recedit a divina simplicitate per diversitatem quae est rerum, vel in actu vel in aptitudine."

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127:1025-38. "Ad secundum quod obicitur, quod pluralitas modorum impedit praedicationem per identitatem, dicendum est quod distinctio secundum modum non est distinctio simpliciter sed secundum quid; et ideo non impedit praedicationem per identitatem simpliciter sed secundum quid. ... Ad illud autem quod inducitur de *esse* et essentia, dicendum est quod in creaturis differunt non solum secundum modum sed etiam secundum rem, ut alias declaratum est; et ideo non praedicatur unum de alio praedicatione per identitatem."

would not suffice to preserve the doctrine of creation, nor would it account for the real composition present in finite being. Furthermore, there is no evidence for the claim that James defends an intentional distinction; indeed, it is unlikely that he thought that such a distinction is possible.

Should one, therefore, regard James as a partisan of the real distinction? In *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, he does admit that there is a real distinction between essence and *esse*, and that it is required by the Christian doctrine of creation. In *Quodlibet* III, q. 7, he says that essence and *esse* differ *secundum rem*. However, some caution is required. In its primary meaning, *esse* is the same as essence; it is only in its secondary meaning that one can speak of it as really distinct from essence. Thus James appears to recognize the distinction as real only in a qualified sense.

Moreover, if one construes the theory of the real distinction in an Aegidian or Thomistic sense, James would have to be regarded as an opponent of real distinction. For both Thomas and Giles the real distinction is one of essence and existential act. For James the real distinction is simply a restatement of the Boethian distinction between a concrete individual and its nature. *Esse* does not enter into composition with essence; rather, the metaphysical composition found in the creature is located wholly in the order of essence. James equates *esse* and *ens*. This is clearly a departure from Thomas, for whom *ens* is something having *esse*, while *esse* is that by which an *ens* is.⁸⁸ By contrast, James thinks that *ens* and *esse* both signify something having essence (*habens essentiam*). It is evident too that James rejects Giles' theory of *esse* as a determinate actuality, a *res* that when added to an essence makes it exist. For James *esse* in its secondary meaning signifies essence as it is joined to all of the accidents necessary for its actual existence. While Giles uses the relation between matter and form as a model for understanding the essence-*esse* distinction, James prefers to conceive the latter using the model of substance and accidents.

In sum, it seems best to regard James's theory not as an "intermediate position," but as a compromise position. He does not wish to find a middle ground between a logical and real distinction (as did Henry of Ghent), but rather to create a synthesis out of the partial truth in the three main positions. His thinking on essence and existence is grounded on the metaphysical composition that characterizes the creature. Like all orthodox thinkers, James recognizes the absolute simplicity of the divine nature. In all created beings, on the other hand, he finds a composition of

⁸⁸ Cf. *In XII Meta.*, lect. 1 (M.-R. Cathala--R.M. Spiazzi, ed. [Turin-Rome, 1950]), n. 2419: "Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens."

substance and accidents. No created essence (whether substantial or accidental) is sufficient for its own existence: always another essence must be added to it. An individual thing (*esse*) cannot be reduced to its substantial essence. In this sense the distinction between essence and *esse* is a real one, since it is prior to any rational analysis by the mind.⁸⁹

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⁸⁹ I would like to thank Kevin White for his comments on this paper.

THE CREATION OF AUGUSTINIAN IDENTITY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

The influence of Augustine of Hippo on intellectual life in the West has been omnipresent. Yet the term 'Augustinianism' has assumed such a wide variety of definitions that in and of itself it does not say much at all about the actual adherence to the teachings of St. Augustine. The definitional quagmire resulting from attempts to determine the legitimate uses of the adjective 'Augustinian' is exemplified in the historiographical debates surrounding Augustine's influence on the emergence of Reformation theology, and on the theology of Martin Luther in particular. There is, nevertheless, little dispute among scholars that the fourteenth century witnessed a renaissance of Augustinianism, though there is considerable disagreement concerning what that renaissance entailed, and even moreso over its origin and impact.¹ While modern scholars can continue to debate the validity of various references for the label 'Augustinian', or the requirements for 'being an Augustinian', the late medieval Augustinian Hermits clearly articulated their own understanding of their religious identity as the true sons and heirs of their father Augustine. The ongoing endeavor by members of the Order to prove that St. Augustine was the unique father and founder of the *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* culminated in the *Collectanea Augustiniana* and the *Liber Vitasfratrum* of the fourteenth-century Augustinian friar, Jordan of Quedlinburg (d. 1380). The creation of the Augustinian identity, however, was a campaign that had begun virtually simultaneously with the institution of the Order itself. The present article traces the creation of the Augustinian Order's narrative identity, which was based on the emergence of the Augustinian myth, constructed in the early decades of the fourteenth century.²

¹ See E.L. Saak, "The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages," in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1997), 1: 367-404; *idem*, "Late Scholasticism: Augustine's Influence on." In: *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan Fitzgerald, OSA, et al., Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1999: 750-755; see also my forthcoming study, *Spiritual Knowledge. Jordan of Quedlinburg and the Theological Program of the Augustinian 'Studia' in the Later Middle Ages*.

² A narrative identity is the "...circular relation between what we may call a 'character'—which may be that of an individual as well as that of a people—and the narratives that both express and shape this character." Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1984-1988), 3: 248; *cf.* Paul Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations*

I. MYTHIC ORIGINS

On July 15, 1255, Pope Alexander IV summoned representatives from the Orders of St. Augustine and St. William, from the followers of Friar John Bonus, the Brethren of Favali, and the Bricinenses to convene at Sancta Maria del Popolo in Rome.³ The result of the discussions was the foundation and first General Chapter of a new Order, which "...legitimized for the first time the imposition of a certain rule on diverse religious groups and the change from rules already approved."⁴ From this time forward, the diverse members constituting the union were to be brought, "into a single observance of the way of life and a uniform regulation of living."⁵ Thus the Order of Hermits of Saint Augustine came into existence, confirmed by the bull *Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae*, issued by Alexander IV on April 9, 1256.⁶

The new Order grew quickly and spread throughout Europe, consisting of four provinces in Germany alone by the end of the thirteenth century.⁷ Yet with such expansion the problem of definition soon arose. The Hermits had to defend their right to be called the sons of Augustine as no other religious Order, following in the footsteps of Augustine himself. Their claim to a unique relationship with the Bishop of Hippo did not go unchallenged. At the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, the foundation of new Orders was forbidden, a prohibition which was repeated at the Second Council of Lyon (1274). At the later council, Pope Gregory X gave indication of future plans for the hermits of Augustine and the Carmelites

(Evanston, Ill, 1974), 46; and *idem*, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savange (New Haven, 1970), 513f and 538-543.

³ See R. Kuiters, "'Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae. Commentary,'" *Augustiniana* 6 (1956): 14-36; Kaspar Elm, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Wilhelmitenordens*, Münstersche Forschungen 14 (Köln, 1962), 108-119; and Balbino Rano, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden. Regla, Monasterio de Tagaste y Sermones ad fratres in eremo," in *San Agustín en el XVI Centenario de su Conversion 386/87-1987, La Ciudad de Dios, Revista Augustiniana* CC (1987) (El Escorial, 1987), 649-727.

⁴ Kuiters, "Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae," 14.

⁵ "...in unam ordinis observantiam, et vivendi formulam uniformem." *Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae*, ed. Albericus de Meijer, *Augustiniana* 6 (1956): 9-13; 12 (hereafter cited as *LEC*).

⁶ For an analysis of *Licet Ecclesiae* and a discussion of the historical developments leading up to and stemming from the Great Union, see Kuiters, "Licet Ecclesiae," (as in note 3 above).

⁷ The German provinces were: 1. Rheinland-Swabia; 2. Bavaria; 3. Thuringia-Saxony; and 4. Cologne-Belgium.

by allowing them to remain in their current state until future notice.⁸ It is possible, however, that it was only the intervention of Cardinal Richard Annibaldi, the protector of the OESA, that persuaded the Pope to follow these lines; according to the Franciscan chronicler Salimbene, Gregory was planning to suppress the OESA until Annibaldi stepped in.⁹ The original draft of the decree at Lyon seems to give more validity to Salimbene than one might expect from a member of an Order in competition with the OESA, since it contains a qualifying phrase, later removed, referring to the Carmelites and the OESA as Orders, "claiming to have been established before the said council (i.e. Lateran IV)."¹⁰ Whether or not Annibaldi played the seminal role in the OESA's survival, not only was the Order not disbanded, but it also flourished in the later thirteenth century, before receiving official and firm confirmation from Pope Boniface VIII.¹¹ These early legal challenges to the Order's legitimacy made most evident the need for firm documentation that the historicity of the Augustinian Hermits was beyond question. The support of Boniface VIII was not sufficient, as was soon to become clear.

In 1327 Pope John XXII granted the petition of the Prior General of the OESA, William of Cremona, for the Hermits of St. Augustine to establish a monastery large enough to house twenty-five to thirty friars adjoining the basilica of St. Peter in Ciel d'Oro in Pavia, where according to tradition, King Luitbrand had brought Augustine's body.¹² The Augustinian Hermits were also given permission to celebrate the divine office in the basilica together with the Augustinian Canons, who previously had been the sole custodians of Augustine's relics. This privilege, on the one hand, gave official recognition to the Order as the true heirs of St. Augustine,¹³ but on the other initiated a long dispute

⁸ Rudolphus Arbesmann, "Henry of Friemar's 'Treatise on the Origin and Development of the Order of the Hermit Friars and its True and Real Title.'" *Augustiniana* 6 (1956): 37-145; 77, n. 159 (hereafter cited as Arbesmann, *HFT*; the text of Henry's *Tractatus* is found on pages 90-145, which will hereafter be cited as *Hen. Tract.*).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 78, n. 161.

¹⁰ "...Carmelitarum et Eremitarum s. Augustini ordines, qui se asserunt ante dictum concilium institutos..." as cited by Arbesmann, *HFT*, 77, n. 159.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, 77, n. 160.

¹² See *ibid.*, 41; and *Jordani de Saxonia Liber Vitasfratrum* 1,18, ed. Winfridus Hümpfner and Rudolph Arbesmann, *Cassiciacum* 1 (New York, 1943): 62,3-67,135 (hereafter Hümpfner's introduction will be cited as Hümpfner, intro. and the text of Jordan's *Liber Vitasfratrum* as *VF*).

¹³ Jordan of Quedlinburg would use the OESA's custody of Augustine's tomb as such evidence in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*; see *VF* 1,17 (61,63-70). Regarding John XXII's donation to the OESA of St. Augustine's tomb, Jordan states this act was revealed to a

between the Hermits of St. Augustine and the Augustinian Canons regarding which was the real *Ordo Sancti Augustini*. It was only four years later, after extensive negotiations with the Canons, that the OESA was actually able to begin residency at St. Peter in Ciel d'Oro. The early negotiations did not, however, put an end to the controversy. The conflict evoked a series of treatises from both sides arguing for historical priority.¹⁴ In the fifteenth century it became a *cause célèbre* until Pope Sixtus IV prohibited all further discussions of the issue on May 13, 1484.¹⁵ Already in the 1330's, a Canon wrote a treatise against the privileged state of the Hermits, brashly stating his intent to demonstrate that,

...blessed Augustine is neither the unique father nor patron of the aforesaid brother hermits, nor are the hermits the special sons of blessed Augustine in any sense other than are the friar preachers or other religious whatsoever who are bound by the Rule of blessed Augustine, such as the Regular Canons. In short, the hermits were founded neither uniquely nor especially by blessed Augustine. Further, I will show that blessed Augustine never wore the habit of the hermits, nor that he wrote their Rule or gave them their way of life, nor that he lived with them personally, but rather, he lived with the Regular Canons, for whom he principally and uniquely handed down a way of life and wrote a Rule based on their living together, from which the Regular Canons get their name.¹⁶

fratri nominato in Ordine; see VF 1,18 (65-67). Hümpfner argued that this *frater nominatus* was Jordan himself (Hümpfner, intro., li). Although Jordan does not clearly state that it was he who had this vision, it became accepted in the Order that he did; the seventeenth-century Augustinian bibliographer, P. Elssius, for example, in his entry on Jordan wrote: "An. 1327. visionem mirabilem habuit, qua protendebatur corpus S.P.N. Augustini esse Ordini Eremitico redonandum." P. Elssius, *Encomiasticon Augustinianum*, (Bruxellis, 1654; reprint: Westmead, Farnborough, Hants, England, 1970). 411; cf. Hümpfner, intro., li.

¹⁴ See Arbesmann, *HFT*, 58f; Kaspar Elm, "Augustinus Canonicus-Augustinus Eremita: A Quattrocento Cause Célèbre," in *Christianity and the Renaissance. Image and Religious Imagination in the Quattrocento*, ed. Timothy Verdon and John Henderson (New York, 1990), 83-107; 86.

¹⁵ See K. Elm, "Augustinus Canonicus-Augustinus Eremita." Cf. Alberic de Meijer, O.S.A., "Saint Augustine and the Conversation with the Child on the Shore. The History Behind the Legend," *Augustinian Heritage* 39 (1993): 21-34.

¹⁶ "Intendo in hoc opusculo clare ac lucide demonstrare....quod beatus Augustinus non est praedictorum fratrum heremitarum singularis pater nec patronus, nec ipsi fratres heremite ipsius beati Augustini filii speciales nec singulares aliter quam sunt fratres praedicatores vel alii religiosi quicumque, qui regula beati Augustini innituntur, alii tamen a canonicis regularibus. Ita quod, breviter, ab ipso beato Augustino nec specialiter nec singulariter sunt instituti. Item quod ipse beatus Augustinus habitum istorum fratrum heremitarum numquam detulit nec portavit nec eorum regulam nec modum vivendi eis tradidit nec conscripsit nec cum eis personaliter convixit, sed potius cum regularibus canonicis, quibus principaliter et singulariter convivendo certum vivendi modum et certam

The ban on new religious Orders at the Fourth Lateran and the Second Council of Lyon, combined with the challenge from the Canons, necessitated a defense from the Hermits. The Hermits needed to show that they were an established Order previous to the Fourth Lateran on the one hand, and on the other, that they, and they alone, were the singular heirs of Augustine. They needed to prove their antiquity, their legitimacy, and their authenticity. In short, they needed their own history to establish, for themselves and for all detractors, that only the Hermits had the right to refer to Augustine as *pater noster*. This was the context in which, in the course of the first half of the fourteenth century, the Augustinian Hermits created the Augustinian myth.

To call the early fourteenth-century Augustinian Hermits 'myth makers' may sound both unhistorical and counter to their own understanding of what they were doing. Nevertheless, the appellation describes their use of language and argumentation. There is no reason to doubt that in the minds of the authors of the texts to be discussed shortly it was the historical Augustine who effected the institution of the OESA, yet on the linguistic level a mythic shift occurred. The term 'Augustinus' no longer signified the historical individual, but rather the 'founder of the Order'. 'Augustinus' became a term in a second-order semiological system. The language became mythic when 'Augustinus' assumed the signification of *pater noster*.¹⁷

Pointing to the mythic language used to recount the biography of Augustine, however, is in itself insufficient for discerning the Augustinian myth. Looking beyond the function of the language to the function of the mythic one discerns that the myth created was a myth of origins and foundations, an etiological micro-myth.¹⁸ Mythic foundational accounts, William Doty has explained, "...may be emphasized strongly during periods when fragmentation or attenuation threaten social structures. A period of cultural breakup may produce a conservative reaction, leading to an almost magical reaffirmation of the normative breakthrough of order

regulam, a qua regulares canonici nuncupantur, tradidit et conscripsit." Vat., Bib. Apost., MS Vat. Reg. 565, fol. 1", as quoted by Arbesmann, *HFT*, 59. Arbesmann notes that "the manuscript was written in 1354 by the Canon Regular Durandus de Aln (Ahlen in Westphalia?)." *Ibid.*, 58, n. 57.

¹⁷ See Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. by Annette Lavers (New York, 1972), 114-117; cf. James Liszka's theory of transvaluation as presented in his study, *The Semiotic of Myth. A Critical Study of the Symbol* (Bloomington, Ind., 1989).

¹⁸ For a classification of myths, as well as an excellent introduction to the study of myths, see William G. Doty, *Mythography. The Study and Myths and Rituals* (Alabama, 1986).

into chaos in the primeval era.”¹⁹ The situation the Order faced in the first half of the fourteenth century may not have been one of cosmic chaos, but it was one that threatened its legitimacy and indeed, its very existence. In this context Augustinians appealed to the mythic origins of the OESA when Augustine re-established order from the chaos of his dispersed heirs. Myth creates and explains reality. The Augustinian myth provided the meaning for the Order’s way of life.²⁰ The early fourteenth-century hermits constructed a biography of Augustine which gave historical proof of their Order’s historical primacy. In so doing, the hermits drew from the medieval biographies of Augustine, yet transformed the accounts to form the Order’s narrative identity as the true sons of their father Augustine.

II. THE MEDIEVAL AUGUSTINE

The Middle Ages were not lacking for eulogies to Augustine. In the twelfth century, Peter Comestor compared Augustine to Abraham, claiming that by his expositing holy scriptures and by his being the wise architect of the apostolic life in providing his Rule, Augustine became an Abraham, the father of many.²¹ When in the early fourteenth century members of the OESA wrote Augustine’s biography anew, they had ample material upon which to draw that lauded Augustine’s life, teaching, and influence. The *vitae* of Augustine written by Possidius, Philip of Harvengt, and Jacobus

¹⁹ Doty, *Mythography*, 26.

²⁰ Cf. M. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, 1957), 97.

²¹ Petrus Comestor *Sermo in festo S. Augustini*, 32 (PL 198,1707). Sermo 32 presents a lengthy analogy between Augustine and Abraham. The typology of Augustine as an *alter Abraham* continued, as we find in a sermon of the Bishop of Avignon, Fernandus de Hispania, preached in 1352: “[Augustinus est] gloriosus Christi confessor velut alter Abraham...”. This sermon is embedded in Jordan of Quedlinburg’s *Opus Dan [Sermones de sanctis]* (Strassburg, 1484) as sermo 150 (hereafter Jordan’s *Opus Dan* will be cited as *Jor. OD*). It appears in the midst of a series of Jordan’s sermons on Augustine (*sermones* 129-151). The rubric reads: “Sermo de sancto Augustino, factus a magistro Fernando de Hispania persona saeculari et episcopo in Avinione, praesentibus omnibus cardinalibus, anno domini Mccclij.” Josef Kürzinger has also pointed to a manuscript of this sermon, Munich, BStB MS Clm. 18223, which gives the same rubric on fol. 233^v; see J. Kürzinger, *Alfonso Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*. 22 (Münster, 1930), 98-99. Cf. “Sancti Augustini commendationes diversorum doctorum: Augustinus est alter magnus Abraham...”, Simon de Bruna, OESA (d. 1448), *Collectanea*, Brünn, UB, MS A. 87 (IV. Z. e. 11), fol. 24^v; as cited by A. Zumkeller, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken, Cassiciacum* 20 (Würzburg, 1966), nr. 776 (p. 357)(hereafter cited as *MSS*).

de Voragine formed the base upon which the late medieval Augustinians built their own mythic accounts. Two elements of Augustine's *curriculum vitae* were of particular importance: first, when and where he first established a monastery; and second, when he composed his Rule, and for whom. Minute alterations of the details could have enormous consequences for representations of Augustine as having originally been the father of the Hermits, or the founder of the Regular Canons. To perceive the importance of the shifts in emplotments central to the emergence of the Hermits' account, one must have the traditional rendering of the 'Medieval Augustine' clearly in mind. Thus before turning to the creation of the Augustinian myth, I begin with brief descriptions of the three medieval lives of Augustine that served as the textual substratum for the later medieval reinscription of Augustine's biography.

A. *Possidius*

The foundational account of Augustine's life for the Middle Ages was the *Vita Sancti Aurelii Augustini* of Possidius (d. c. 437), the bishop of Calama, who had spent many years as Augustine's companion. Possidius set out to present the origin, development, and final end of his hero Augustine, based on his own personal experience.²²

In Possidius' biography, the overwhelming image of Augustine that emerges is that of the Church Father. Possidius first treated the period from Augustine's conversion to his ordination and founding a monastery in Hippo. He then turned to Augustine's campaign against the Manicheans, Donatists, Arians and Pelagians. Augustine's daily life as bishop follows, and Possidius continued by relating Augustine's last days, from the writing of the *Retractationes* to his death and burial. The theme stressed is the triumph of the Church effected by Augustine; day by day the unity of

²² *Vita S. Augustini Episcopi Auctore Possidio*. Possidio, *Vita di S. Agostino*, ed. Michele Pellegrino, Verba Seniorum 4 (Alba, 1955), Praef, 38,22-26; PL 32,33 (hereafter cited as: Possid. vita Aug., with the page and line numbers of the reference in Pellegrino's edition given in parenthesis, followed by the PL reference). The most recent critical edition is *Vita di Cipriano, Vita di Ambrogio, Vita di Agostino*, ed. A.A.R. Bastiaensen, Scrittori greci e latini, Vite dei santi 3 (Fondazione Lorenzo Valla 1975). Possidius' *Vita* also formed the basis for miscellaneous anonymous *Vitae Sancti Augustini* in medieval collections of saints lives, such as the *Vitae Sancti Augustini* contained in Paris, BnF MS lat. 11750, fol. 148^r-151^r (11th cent.), Paris, BnF MS lat. 11753, fol. 122^{vb}-128^{ab} (12th cent.), and Paris, BnF MS lat 11758, fol. 163^{va}-188^{ra} (13th cent.).

peace and the brotherly love of God's Church increased, achieved by Augustine's work.²³

In comparison with later *vitae*, the space given to Augustine's early life by Possidius is notably meager. Augustine's birth, early education and conversion are all treated by Possidius in the first chapter, which is not of exceptional length. In chapter two Possidius presented a brief discussion of Augustine's abandoning his position as *rhetor* and his decision to become a *servus dei* at the age of thirty.²⁴ Chapter three continues with Augustine's return to Africa and in chapter four, Possidius recounts how Augustine was made presbyter by acclamation, orchestrated by Valerius, the Bishop of Hippo.²⁵ Then follows what would become the central issue for the Augustinian myth: Augustine's establishment of a monastery. "Directly upon being made presbyter," chapter five begins,

...Augustine founded a monastery within the church compound, and began to live with the servants of God according to the custom and way of life established by the holy apostles: essentially, that no one in that society would possess anything of their own, but everything would be held in common, and that [goods] would be distributed to each on the basis of need; which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland.²⁶

Possidius continued to emphasize Augustine's monasticism and its influence on the growth of the Church. Augustine having been made bishop, and with the progress of true doctrine increasingly winning out over heresy, "serving God in the monastery under and with St. Augustine, clergy of the Church of Hippo began to be ordained....from that monastery, which began and grew through that memorable man, the peace and unity of the Church first asked with great desire and then received clergy and bishops, which continued thereafter."²⁷ Possidius himself knew of at least ten monks whom Augustine sent forth to various Churches, and these in

²³ Possid. *vita Aug.* 13 (82,1-6; *PL* 32,44).

²⁴ Possid. *vita Aug.* 2 (44,1-46,4; *PL* 32, 34-36).

²⁵ Possid. *vita Aug.* 3-4 (48,1-52,25; *PL* 32,36-37).

²⁶ "Factus ergo presbyter monasterium intra ecclesiam mox instituit et cum Dei servis vivere coepit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam: maxime ut nemo quicquam proprium in illa societate haberet, sed eis essent omnia communia, et distribueretur unicuique sicut opus est, quod iam ipse prior fecerat, dum de transmarinis ad sua remeasset." Possid. *vita Aug.* 5 (52,1-8; *PL* 32,37).

²⁷ "Proficiente porro doctrina divina, sub sancto et cum sancto Augustino in monasterio Deo servientes ecclesiae Hipponensi clerici ordinari coeperunt....ex monasterio quod per illum memorabilem virum et esse et crescere coeperat magno desiderio poscere atque accipere episcopos et clericos pax Ecclesiae atque unitas et coepit primo et postea consecuta est." Possid. *vita Aug.* 11 (72,1-11; *PL* 32,42).

turn founded monasteries. Thus, Augustine's influence, way of life and teaching spread throughout Africa and beyond.²⁸

Possidius gave a detailed description of Augustine's daily life as a monk, including information on his dress, eating habits—noting especially his view on the healthiness of drinking wine in moderation²⁹—and admonitions against associations with women, all of which became standard in later medieval accounts. Yet on two points Possidius gave less than clear cut answers, which opened the door to imagination, manipulation and creation when these two issues became the center of heated controversy: the foundation of Augustine's *first* monastery and the composition of his Rule. As mentioned above, Possidius expressly tells of Augustine founding a monastery upon becoming presbyter. He does not, however, indicate that this was Augustine's first such foundation. Although he writes that in this monastery Augustine, "began to live with the servants of God according to the custom and way of life established by the holy apostles," the verb 'began' is ambiguous, since after expositing just what such a life entailed based on Acts 4:32-35, Possidius adds the phrase, "which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland."³⁰ Such a formulation gave later authors the leeway to claim, at least implicitly, that Augustine had previously lived as a monk, if not having already established a monastery himself well before having been made presbyter.³¹ Such ambiguity could have been avoided had Possidius mentioned Augustine's authorship of a monastic Rule, which was to become the second major pillar in the later debates. Indeed, Possidius' silence on this issue has contributed to the controversies surrounding the authenticity of the Augustinian Rule to the present day.³²

²⁸ Possid. vita Aug. 11 (74,12-26; PL 32,42).

²⁹ Possid. vita Aug. 22 (120,8-11; PL 32,51-52).

³⁰ Possid. vita Aug. 5 (52,7-8; PL 32,37).

³¹ For discussion on the importance of this phrase in later accounts, see B. Rano, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden. Regla, Monasterio de Tagaste y Sermones ad fratres in eremo," in *San Agustín en el XVI Centenario de su Conversion 386/87-1987, La Ciudad de Dios, Revista Agustiniana* CC (El Escorial, 1987): 649-727; 679-710.

³² For the Augustinian Rule and its complex textual and historiographical traditions, see L. Verheijen, *La Règle de saint Augustin*, I, *Tradition manuscrite*; II, *Recherches historiques* (Paris, 1967); see also *idem*, *Nouvelle Approche de la Règle de saint Augustin* (Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1980). Cf. George Lawless, OSA, *Augustine of Hippo and His Monastic Rule* (Oxford, 1987), and especially pages 127-135. Thirty years after the publication of Verheijen's exhaustive study, erroneous comments concerning the Rule are still made, and made as assertions without taking into account the state of the scholarship on the Rule, or offering evidence to the contrary. Thus Marcia Colish can still claim that the Augustinian Rule was originally a letter to nuns; see Marcia L. Colish, *Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition, 400-1499* (New Haven, 1997), 52.

Much of the late medieval controversy between the Augustinian Canons and Augustinian Hermits over which Order was most authentically Augustine's true heir, revolved around the issue of which Order was the first to have received the Rule from Augustine. Had Possidius been explicit on this point, perhaps by the fourteenth century it would have been moot. Yet nowhere in his *Vita* did Possidius even allude to the *Regula Sancti Augustini*. There is, perhaps, an indirect reference. The passage in question is Possidius' explication of Augustine having lived "according to the custom and way of life established by the holy apostles." Possidius takes his exposition from Acts 4:32-35, which is also to be found in the Rule. Luc Verheijen has pointed out that the particular sequence of Acts 4:32 and 4:35 is found only twice in all patristic literature: in Possidius' *Vita* and in the *Regula Sancti Augustini*.³³ This is at least suggestive evidence that Possidius knew the Rule, even though he did not explicitly attribute such a work to Augustine. In any event, later authors were not content to leave the matter as seemingly open as did Possidius. Although basing their accounts to a large extent on Possidius, both Augustinian Canons and Hermits went considerably beyond their source regarding the details of Augustine's early monastic experience, while at the same time taking over from Possidius the centrality of the monastic life to Augustine's biography and paternity.

B. Philip of Harvengt

In the mid twelfth century, the Premonstratensian abbot of the monastery of Bonne Espérance near Cambrai, Philip of Harvengt (d. c. 1182), composed his *Vita Sancti Augustini*, which Jordan would later refer to as the *legenda famosa*. The Premonstratensians, according to Jacques de Vitry, himself an Augustinian canon at Oignies beginning in 1211, had been founded by Norbert of Xanten as a reform of the Regular Canons living under the Augustinian Rule.³⁴ That Philip was deeply concerned with fostering the truly religious life is evidenced by his treatise *De institutione clericorum*, which, although written for clerics in general, "is nevertheless a discussion of the clerical and cloistered life which is addressed by a regular canon to members of his own order."³⁵ According

³³ L. Verheijen, *Règle*, 2: 89-95.

³⁴ Jacques de Vitry, *Historia Occidentalis*, 22; *The Historia Occidentalis of Jacques de Vitry. A Critical Edition*, ed. John Frederick Hinnebusch, O.P., Spicilegium Friburgense 17 (Fribourg, 1972), 133,3-12.

³⁵ Caroline Walker Bynum, *Docere verbo et exemplo. A Aspect of Twelfth-Century Spirituality*, Harvard Theological Studies 31 (Missoula, Montana, 1979), 13.

to Carolyn Bynum, the canonical movement of the twelfth century, to which the Premonstratensians belonged, in its renewed search for following the apostolic life represents "a fundamental turning point in the history of Christianity, a change perhaps as deep and as lasting as the fragmentation of the church in the sixteenth century or the spread of Christianity in the second to fourth centuries A.D."³⁶ The defining characteristic of the new spirituality was the emphasis on teaching and edifying within the context of the 'mixed life', whereby the *vita activa* is given equal weight with the *vita contemplativa*, signified by the exhortation 'to teach by word and example' (*docere verbo et exemplo*, and its equivalents). In summing up the different orientations of monks and canons, Bynum notes that "canonical authors see regular canons as teachers and learners, whereas monastic authors see monks only as learners."³⁷ In his sermons on St. Augustine, Peter Comestor, an Augustinian Canon in the abbey of Saint-Loup at Troyes as early as 1135/36, who later retired to St. Victor, was clear that Augustine was more than 'just' the giver of the Rule: Augustine was the renewer of the apostolic life, providing the Canons with their lives' simplicity, chastity and humility, leading them from his own table to that of Christ. Thus, Augustine served as a new Abraham.³⁸ In this context Philip of Harvenge wrote his life of Augustine, who was, in Philip's words, "the perfect imitator of the apostles."³⁹

Philip's life of Augustine differs from that of Possidius most notably in the former's attention to Augustine's early life. Of the thirty-three chapters comprising Philip's biography, the first fourteen cover the period from Augustine's birth to his baptism, as compared with the single chapter devoted to the same material in Possidius' *Vita*.⁴⁰ Philip drew his material from the *Confessions*, including the account of Augustine's conversion experience, omitted by Possidius. Philip then narrated Augustine's decision to become a *servus dei*, his return to Africa and becoming presbyter, before recounting his election to the episcopacy and daily life as bishop. Augustine's old age follows, including the election of Augustine's successor, Heraclius, the invasion of the Vandals and Goths into Africa, and the miracles Augustine performed before his death,

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

³⁸ Petrus Comestor, *Sermo* 30 (PL 198,1790-1792), and note 21 above.

³⁹ "...[Augustinus] qui perfectus fuit imitator eorum [scil. apostolorum]..." *Philippi de Harvenge Abbatis Bonae Spei Vita Beati Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi*, 33 (PL 203,1205-1234; 1234); hereafter cited as: Phil. vita Aug.

⁴⁰ Phil. vita Aug. 1-14 (PL 203,1205-1215); cf. Possid. vita Aug. 1 (42-44; PL 32,34-35).

expanding those related by Possidius.⁴¹ Philip followed the same procedure for his treatment of Augustine's death and burial, before turning in his final chapter to the translations of Augustine's body, the first being from Hippo to Sardinia, which Philip simply relates with the comment that how this occurred, when it occurred, or by whom, he could not say, since he was not able to find a source.⁴² Philip does, however, give a rather lengthy account of the *translatio secunda*, brought about by Luitbrandus, king of the Lombards, who brought Augustine's body back to Pavia and built St. Peter in Ciel d'Oro to house the relics, for which Philip expresses his deep admiration and envy.⁴³ Augustine, for Philip, was not simply the legislator of the Augustinian Canons, but was their model and teacher: Augustine "is the splendor and embodiment of our profession, he is the mirror and measure of our religion."⁴⁴

After Augustine renounced his position as *rhetor* and was baptized by Ambrose, he returned to Africa and first came to Carthage, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Innocentius.⁴⁵ He then returned to Thagaste, where he lived as a layman for a period of three years together with his friends, passing his time with study, teaching and writing.⁴⁶ When Augustine visited Hippo, he was conscripted by the congregation and Bishop Valerius for their new presbyter, which he accepted, as both Possidius and Philip relate, only with tears for having to leave his contemplative life. Most aware of Augustine's disposition to the monastic life, Valerius gave him a garden in which he could establish a monastery, and live in community according to the rule of the apostles, "as he had already done," Philip affirms, "when he had returned from across the sea to his homeland."⁴⁷

⁴¹ Phil. vita Aug. 30 (PL 203,1227-1228); cf. Possid. vita Aug. 29 (156,11-158,30; PL 32,39).

⁴² Phil. vita Aug. 33 (PL 203,1230-1231).

⁴³ Phil. vita Aug. 33 (PL 203,1234).

⁴⁴ "...non mediocriter arguendus est culpae qui se clericum profitetur, nisi Augustinum praeceptorem suum tenere diligit, devote recolat, sedulo veneretur. Ipse quippe est decus et forma hujus nostrae professionis, ipse speculum et regula nostrae religionis." Phil. vita Aug. 31 (PL 203,1229).

⁴⁵ Phil. vita Aug. 17 (PL 203,1217).

⁴⁶ Phil. vita Aug. 18 (PL 203,1218).

⁴⁷ "Tandem flentem et frustra renitentem B. Valerius de turba segregavit, et, licet invitum presbyterum ordinavit. Sciens vero desiderium ejus propositum, quod scilicet cum clericis nihil habentibus, nihil habens optabat vivere, dedit hortum in quo mox aedificato monasterio coepit ejusdem propositi fratres colligere, et cum eis secundum modum et regulam sanctorum vivere apostolorum, ut omnia scilicet essent eis communia et nullus diceret sibi aliquid proprium, et distribueretur unicuique quod esset necessarium. Quod quidem ipse prior jam fecerat, quando de transmarini ad sua redierat." Phil. vita Aug. 18 (PL 203,1219).

Here Philip simply borrowed from Possidius, often word for word, except for the addition of Valerius' donation of a garden for Augustine's first monastery. This is Philip's first mention of Augustine's formal foundation of a monastery, although, as Possidius, he seems to infer that Augustine lived a monastic life already in Thagaste, with his repetition of the phrase, *which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland*. And as Possidius, Philip did not mention here Augustine having composed a monastic Rule for his monastery. Three chapters later, however, Philip relates Augustine's election to the episcopacy, followed by his battle against heresy and, having been made bishop, his founding a monastery in the episcopal residency, where he lived in common with his priests. From this monastery, Philip relates echoing Possidius, the apostolic life spread and flourished throughout Africa and overseas, following the canonical model as instituted by Augustine.⁴⁸ After describing Augustine's daily life as bishop rather briefly, Philip explicitly tells of Augustine's authorship of a monastic Rule. Bringing together the servants of God into a regulated community, Augustine taught his brothers the way of living in poverty, chastity and obedience, so that his group of clerics might truly live a common life. Yet to provide for the continuation of such a life in perpetuity, Augustine composed a monastic Rule, which proclaimed the obligations of an inferior in the community, a superior, and the community as a whole. To ensure that such regulations be well-known and followed, he prescribed the reading of the Rule each week, and he himself lived by its precepts as an example.⁴⁹ Thus, whereas Possidius had been silent, Philip was explicit that Augustine founded his first monastery in the garden given him by Valerius, and then a second monastery within the bishop's residence. Only thereafter as bishop did he compose a Rule for his clergy, with whom he lived a common life. In Philip's account, Augustine composed his Rule for his Canons, and was indeed, the founder of the canonical life, for which he was the mirror and measure. For the twelfth-century Canons, there was no question—the Bishop of Hippo was their founding father.

The canonical tone of Philip's *Vita* is evident not only from his chronology of Augustine's monastic foundations and composing his Rule. Philip rewrites Possidius' narrative, giving it a definite canonical color, and gloss, whereby it becomes clear that Augustine's episcopal monastery was the beginning of the Regular Canons:

⁴⁸ Phil. vita Aug. 22 (PL 203,1221).

⁴⁹ Phil. vita Aug. 27 (PL 203,1225).

Possid. vita Aug. 11
(72,1-74,26; *PL* 32,42)

Proficiente porro doctrina divina, sub sancto et cum sancto Augustino in monasterio Deo servientes ecclesiae Hipponensi clerici ordinari coeperunt...

Similiterque et ipsi ex illorum sanctorum proposito venientes Domini ecclesiis propagati et monasteria instituerunt et studio crescente aedificationis verbi Dei ceteris ecclesiis promotos fratres ad suscipiendum sacerdotium praestiterunt. Unde per multos et in multis salubris fidei, spei et charitatis ecclesiae innotescente doctrina, non solum per omnes Africae partes, verum etiam in transmarinis, et per libros editos atque in Graecum sermonem translatos, ab illo uno homine et per illum multis favente Deo, cuncta innotescere meruerunt.

Phil. vita Aug. 22
(*PL* 203,1221)

Factus vero episcopus...

et per totam Africam hactenus emortuam apostolicae religionis insignia redivivo virore diffudit. Unde nonnulli episcopi tantae sanctitatis aemulatores effecti, multos de eodem monasterio fratres sibi donari petierunt, sub quorum cura et custodia multas Ecclesias ad serviendum Deo commiserunt. Illis vero propositi sui non immemores, et doctrinam salutarem quam a sancto voto acceperant, redolentes, monasteria etiam collectis clericis instituerunt, e quibus postmodum multos, proficiente eorum religione et fidelium devotione, ad instruenda alia monasteria emancipaverunt. Sic non solum in Africa, verum etiam in transmarinis partibus hujus propositum religionis et canonica norma professionis multos Dei famulos congregavit, multas Ecclesias ordinavit.

Even when Augustine was living a contemplative life in Thagaste before his ordination as presbyter, he fulfilled the office of Mary and Martha,⁵⁰ an image not found in Possidius. Moreover, Philip referred to Augustine as teaching *verbo et exemplo*, the hallmark of the canonical ideal:

Possid. vita Aug. 7
(60,1-62,26; *PL* 32,38-39)

Et docebat ac praedicabat ille privatim et publice in domo et in

Phil. vita Aug. 21
(*PL* 203,1220)

Praedicabat autem passim et publice, loquens verbum Dei cum omni fidu-

⁵⁰ Phil. vita Aug. 18 (*PL* 203,1218).

ecclesia salutis verbum cum omni fiducia adversus Africanas haereses, maximeque contra Donatistas, Manichaeos et paganos, libris confectis et repentinis sermonibus, ineffabiliter admirantibus Christianis et collaudantibus et hoc ipsum ubi poterant non tacentibus sed diffamantibus...

Et inde iam per totum Africae corpus praeclara doctrina odorque suavissimus Christi diffusus et manifestatus est, congaudente quoque id comperto ecclesia Dei transmarina. Quoniam sicut dum patitur unum membrum, compatiuntur omnia membra, ita cum glorificatur unum membrum congaudent omnia membra.

cia, omnem haereticum destruens, catholicos instruens, infundente ei Spiritu sancto ineffabilem gratiam, mirantibus cunctis discretam ejus facundiam.

Cujus famam nominis non solum Africana, verum etiam transmarina jam noverat Ecclesia, ineffabiliter gaudens quod talem ei Deus incernam contulerat, cujus verbo et exemplo illuminari meruerat.

Augustine, for Philip, was not only the great church father and legislator of the Regular Canons; he was also their teacher and exemplar, who taught as much by his outward deeds, as by his spoken and written words—in *vultu et habitu, in sermone et moribus*.⁵¹ If Possidius' biography of Augustine idealized Augustine the Bishop, Philip presented a narrative representing Augustine as the founding father of the Regular Canons. Yet just as Philip 'rewrote' Possidius, so in the early fourteenth century would Jordan of Quedlinburg and his fellow Augustinians 'rewrite' Philip, using his *legenda famosa* as a major source for a new emplotment whereby Augustine was first and foremost the founder and father of the hermits.

C. *The Legenda Aurea*

The third major source contributing to the image of the historical Augustine in the later Middle Ages, was the life of Augustine included in Jacobus de Voragine's *Legenda Aurea*. Born c. 1229, Jacobus entered the Dominican Order in 1244, and having studied in Bologna and Genoa, became subprior in Genoa and later prior in Como. After fulfilling various other offices within the Order, Jacobus was named archbishop of Genoa in 1292, an office he held until his death six years later. He is best known as

⁵¹ Phil. vita Aug. 24 (PL 203,1222).

the author, or compiler, of the *Legenda Aurea*, completed during the years 1252-1260.

The *Legenda Aurea* was one of the most widely spread texts in the Middle Ages, extant in various forms in more than 900 manuscripts.⁵² The critical edition of the collection consists of 178 chapters, which provided the Order of Preachers with substantial material for its pastoral mission. Chapter 120 is *De Sancto Augustino*.⁵³ Jacobus' account begins with a general introduction, praising Augustine as excelling all other doctors of the Church, just as the Roman Augustus surpasses all other kings, and thus Augustine alone is worthy of comparison with the sun.⁵⁴ Jacobus then traced Augustine's life, beginning with his birth to Monica and Patricius. As Philip of Harvengt, Jacobus recounted from the *Confessions* Augustine's own recollections of his youth, from his involvement with the Manichees, to his conversion to philosophy, becoming a *rhetor* in Milan and his increasing adherence to Ambrose.⁵⁵ Jacobus then treated Augustine's conversion at some length, drawing from the *Confessions* the major events leading up to the *tolle, lege* scene.⁵⁶ The *Vita* continues with Augustine's baptism, immediately after which Ambrose and Augustine together composed the hymn, *Te Deum Laudamus*,⁵⁷ followed by his return to Africa with Nebridius and Evodius. In Thagaste Augustine began living a communal life, based on fasting, prayer, study and teaching, though Jacobus does not claim that Augustine and his community became *servi dei*.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, from that community Augustine's fame spread and he was soon made presbyter in Hippo by Valerius, whereupon he founded a monastery of clerics.⁵⁹ Jacobus' account continues with brief descriptions of Augustine's service

⁵² See Barbara Fleith, *Studien zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der Lateinischen Legenda Aurea*, Subsidia Hagiographica, n. 72. Société des Bollandistes (Bruxelles, 1991), 9-16; and *idem*, "The Patristic Sources of the *Legenda Aurea*. A Research Report," in *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West*, ed. Irena Backus, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1997): 1:231-287; cf. Sherry L. Reames, *The Legenda aurea. A Reexamination of Its Paradoxical History* (Madison, WI, 1985), 135-163.

⁵³ For the use of the *Legenda Aurea* as a 'handbook' for preachers, see Fleith, *Studien*, 37-42. The *Legenda Aurea* also played a role in the Dominican educational system; see *ibid.*, 406-413.

⁵⁴ Iacopo da Varasse *Legenda Aurea*. Ed. Giovanni Paolo Maggioni. Millennio Medievale 6, Testi 3. 2 vols. Firenze, 1998, c. 120, p. 841,3; hereafter cited as *LA*, with page and line references given in parenthesis.

⁵⁵ *LA*, 120 (842,22-844,49).

⁵⁶ *LA*, 120 (844,51-847,100).

⁵⁷ *LA*, 120 (847,101-104).

⁵⁸ *LA*, 120 (848,121).

⁵⁹ *LA*, 120 (848,123-849,129).

to the Church and elevation to the episcopacy, his daily life and household, and his campaigns against heretics, before relating his last days and death while the Vandals were ravaging Africa, in the year 440, according to Jacobus.⁶⁰ The final third of Jacobus' biography is devoted to praises of Augustine by Jerome, Ambrose, Gregory the Great, Prosper, Remigius and Bernard, to the two translations described as well by Philip of Harvengt, and to twelve distinct accounts of the miracles Augustine performed after his death.⁶¹ Jacobus concluded by emphasizing Augustine's ascetic life of shunning riches and honors, and recounting the works he composed.⁶²

Jacobus' *legenda de Sancto Augustino* draws from the *vitae* of Possidius and Philip of Harvengt, but is markedly different from the two primary biographies. Although throughout the Middle Ages biography and hagiography were closely related genres and often indistinguishable, Jacobus' treatment fits more squarely within the latter genre than the former. If Possidius' Augustine was the celebrated Bishop of Hippo, and Philip's Augustine's was the exemplary founder of the canonical life, Jacobus' Augustine was the outstanding catholic saint. Whereas both Possidius and Philip introduced their *vitae* with personal statements of humility before the task of trying to portray the life of such a man of God,⁶³ Jacobus began directly by singing Augustine's praises, noting how Augustine "was magnificent in his life, famous in his teaching, blessed (*felix*) in his glory."⁶⁴ Not only did Jacobus compare Augustine with the Roman Augustus, but also analyzed the etymology of Augustine's name, claiming that it derived from *augeo* and *astin*, which mean 'city', and *ana*, which is that which is above (*sursum*). Thus, Augustine is as a heavenly city, the city of God.⁶⁵

In this light, it may not be surprising that Jacobus did not devote much space to the details of Augustine's life, aside from his conversion and death. His purpose was not so much to recount the historical Augustine as it was to reveal the Church's saint.⁶⁶ Yet it is noteworthy that in Jacobus' account, Augustine's life is stripped of its monastic

⁶⁰ *LA*, 120 (849,130-856,230).

⁶¹ *LA*, 120 (857,254-866,396).

⁶² *LA*, 120 (866,397-872,521).

⁶³ Possid. *vita Aug.*, Praef. (38,19-40,42; *PL* 32,33-34); Phil. *vita Aug.*, Prol. (*PL* 203,1205).

⁶⁴ "...Augustinus dicitur magnificus, felix, praeclarus. Fuit enim magnificus in vita, praeclarus in doctrina, felix in gloria." *LA*, 120 (842,19-20).

⁶⁵ *LA*, 120 (841,10-14).

⁶⁶ Reames writes: "The saint's involvement in the ecclesiastical affairs of his day...goes almost unmentioned in the *Legenda*. Nor does Jacobus preserve many glimpses of Augustine's care for his own flock." Reames, *The Legenda Aurea*, 150-151.

components. As mentioned above, Jacobus did not apply the appellation *servus dei* to Augustine when telling of his return to Thagaste, a term that carried monastic connotations, even if somewhat vague, and one that both Possidius and Philip of Harvengt used for Augustine and his followers at that time. Moreover, Jacobus nowhere mentioned Augustine having composed a Rule. Even though Jacobus' own Order followed the *Regula Sancti Augustini*,⁶⁷ the only reference or allusion to Augustine's monastic life in Jacobus' account, aside from lauding Augustine's ascetic daily life albeit not placed in a monastic setting, is the narrative of Augustine's founding a monastery of clerics upon being ordained presbyter. Immediately upon becoming presbyter, Jacobus writes, Augustine "founded a monastery of clerics and began to live according to the way of life (*regulam*) established by the holy apostles; from this monastery approximately ten monks became bishops."⁶⁸ Jacobus, however, omitted the qualifying phrase found both in Possidius' and Philip's *vitae*, namely, *which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland*. Jacobus' text gives no basis whatsoever, even for pure speculation, to assert that Augustine had lived a monastic life, even in a non-technical sense, at any time before he was made presbyter. One cannot explain this omission away by suggesting that perhaps Jacobus was unaware of the earlier treatments. Not only does he explicitly mention Possidius' *vita* in the introduction to his *legenda*,⁶⁹ but this very account is drawn from Possidius, as is evidenced by the number of monks who became bishops. Possidius mentioned that he personally knew of approximately ten holy, venerable, continent and learned servants of God, whom Augustine sent out to other Churches when asked. Philip of Harvengt gave no such number. Yet Jacobus' truncated account of Possidius is not limited to the omission of the phrase, *which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland*. The account of Augustine's monks being sent out from his monastery to serve other Churches, thereby spreading Augustine's doctrine throughout Africa and beyond, is found in the *vitae* of both Possidius and Philip when they narrate Augustine's founding of his *second* monastery, namely, the one he established upon being elevated to the episcopate. Based on the relationship between Jacobus' text and that of Possidius, whereby Jacobus' phrase, ... *de cujus monasterio fere X episcopi sunt electi* ... echoes

⁶⁷ Cf. Rano, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden," 670-673.

⁶⁸ "Qui statim monasterium clericorum instituit et coepit vivere secundum regulam a sanctis apostolis constitutam, de cujus monasterio fere X episcopi sunt electi." *LA*, 120 (849,128-129).

⁶⁹ *LA*, 120 (842,21).

Possidius' ... *nam ferme decem, quos ipse novi ... beatus Augustinus diversis ecclesiis...rogatus dedit...*⁷⁰ Jacobus compressed Augustine's presbyterial and episcopal monastic foundations into a single event, and divested that institution of its importance to the African Church and Augustine's influence attributed to it by Possidius and Philip of Harvengt. In sum, whereas for Possidius and Philip Augustine's true miracle was his life as a monk-bishop, for Jacobus, Augustine's monasticism was incidental at best; Augustine's saintly life was witnessed most of all by the miracles he performed long after his earthly existence. With Jacobus, Augustine's life itself became translated from the genre of hagiographical-biography, to biographical-hagiography. The biographical and hagiographical components of the 'medieval' Augustine, would in the early fourteenth century be combined anew by Jordan of Quedlinburg in his attempt to recover and reconstruct the 'historical' Augustine, conscripted for his own Order's foundation, legitimation, and program.

III. THE CREATION OF THE AUGUSTINIAN MYTH

In his *Sermones de sanctis*, composed after 1365, Jordan of Quedlinburg gave a preeminent place to Augustine.⁷¹ Whereas all other doctors of the Church could be compared to stars, Jordan eulogized echoing Jacobus de Voragine's *Legenda Aurea*, only Augustine was worthy of comparison with the sun.⁷² Jordan's estimation of Augustine was so great that he claimed: "...blessed Augustine can be called the city of God...just as whatever is necessary for life can be had in a city, so in blessed Augustine

⁷⁰ *LA*, 120 (849,120); cf. Possid. vita Aug. 11 (74,12-15; *PL* 32,42).

⁷¹ Jordan devoted sermons 129-151 of the 271 sermons of the *Opus Dan* to Augustine; in addition, sermons 59 and 185 are *De translatione Sancti Augustini*.

⁷² "...[Augustinus] ceteros ecclesie doctores tam ingenio quam scientia vicit incomparabiliter. Unde cum aliis doctores assimilentur stellis, ipse soli comparatur." Jor. *OD*, sermo 59D. This image Jordan quoted from *LA*, 120 (841,3-4). Jordan did not, however, simply repeat previous praise. For Jordan, Augustine had renewed the apostolic life after the time of the apostles, see *VF* 3,2 (326ff); and he displayed the same perfections as St. Paul: "Et he sex perfectiones accipiuntur penes sex que contigerunt circa apostolum Paulum cum esset in via versus Damascum, que etiam invenimus in beato Augustino. Prima perfectio est divine gratie preveniens illustratio. Secunda est suiipsius omnimodo delectio. Tertio est divini nutus inspiratio. Quarta est voluntatis in deum totalis transformatio. Quinta est mentis in seipsa ascensio. Sexta est naturalium virium relictio." Jor. *OD*, sermo 135A.

can be found whatever is necessary for salvation.”⁷³ Jordan even went so far as to assert that Augustine’s teaching held such weight “that nothing in divine scriptures is secure that is not confirmed by his authority.”⁷⁴ Augustine was the lord and head of all doctors of the church; he was the *sapiens architector ecclesie*, having restored the foundation of the apostolic life after the time of the apostles.⁷⁵ Augustine was the city on the hill, letting his light shine on all people.⁷⁶ As such, Augustine founded his Order of hermits, his true heirs and sons, who were to be the *imitatores Patris nostri Augustini*; as Jordan insisted in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*, the hermits were to follow Augustine as “the exemplar and rule of all our actions.”⁷⁷ Thus, as Augustine, so was his Order to be the ‘city of God’.⁷⁸

Jordan’s praise of his Order’s founder was echoed within the Order throughout the later Middle Ages. The late fourteenth-century Augustinian, Augustinus Novellus de Padua, extolled Augustine’s works as exceeding those of all other authors in richness, order, and eloquence.⁷⁹ A contemporary, Simon of Cremona (d. after 1390)—the *recollector Hugolini*⁸⁰ — uniformly began each of his sermons with a quotation from

⁷³ “...beatus Augustinus civitas dei dici potest...sicut reperitur in civitate quicquid est necessarium vite, sic in beato Augustino quicquid est necessarium saluti invenitur.” Jor. OD, sermo 130B.

⁷⁴ “Tante enim autoritatis est eius doctrina, ut nihil in divinis scripturis sit solidum quod non sit eius autoritate confirmatum.” Jor. OD, sermo 131A.

⁷⁵ “Beatissimus Augustinus dominus et caput est omnium doctorum. Nam sicut lux inter corpora habet locum primum, sic et hic inter omnes doctores obtinet principatum. Hic est sanctissimus Augustinus, qui tam sapiens architector ecclesiae fundamentum post sanctissimos apostolos construxit et reparavit.” Jor. OD, sermo 130A; cf. VF 3,3 (330,3-332,54).

⁷⁶ “...beatus Augustinus fuit civitas non abscondita sed manifesta cunctibus gentibus.” Jor. OD, sermo 130B; “Nam sicut sol est fontale principium luminis ipsam lunam et stellas illustrans et ad omnem partem suos radios diffundens, sic beatus Augustinus lumen sue sapientie in omnes alios diffundens, quia revera hodie omnes doctores palpitarent in tenebris ignorantie nisi haurirent de fonte sapientie...alii doctores comparantur stellis, Augustinus autem soli, quia sicut sol illuminat totum mundum, sic Augustinus totam ecclesiam perfudit lumine sue sapientie et doctrine.” Jor. OD, sermo 185C.

⁷⁷ “...beatissimus Pater noster Augustinus, qui debet esse omnis nostrae actionis exemplar et regula...” VF 1,11 (36,32-33).

⁷⁸ Cf. LA, 120 (841,12-15).

⁷⁹ “[Augustinus] omnes formae scriptores, qui de rebus sanctis sive in ipsis gentilium sive in nostris litteris ediderint, ubertate, ordine et elegantia superavit.” Augustinus Novellus de Padua, *Sermo ad clerum in honorem S. Augustini*, Basel, UB, MS A.N. IV. 13, fol. 221^r-224^r; 223^r.

⁸⁰ See D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Booklore.” *Augustiniana* 6 (1956): 146-274; 255-263.

Augustine, the *lux doctorum*.⁸¹ And the later fifteenth-century General of the Order, Ambrosius de Cora (d. 1485), not only repeated and expanded Jordan's arguments for the primacy of the OESA as the only true heirs of the historical Augustine, but also claimed that the hermits were the first *fratres* to have preached the Gospel to the people.⁸² Singing Augustine's praises was certainly not unique to members of the *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*. Yet such hyperbole assumed additional shades of meaning in the writings of the friars. It was not just Augustine who was lauded, but Augustine as the historical founder of the Order.

The creation of the Augustinian myth can be detected and illustrated in four texts, all written between 1322 and 1334. The first is an anonymous *Vita* of Augustine; the second, an anonymous treatise on the origins of the OESA; the third, is Nicholas of Alessandria's *Sermo de Beato Augustino*; and the fourth is Henry of Friemar's *Tractatus de origine et progressu ordinis fratrum heremitarum et vero ac proprio titulo eiusdem*. When read in light of the 'Medieval Augustine', these texts evidence the creation of the mythic Augustine, the appropriation of Augustine for the OESA.⁸³

⁸¹ Simon of Cremona, *Opus epistolarum dominicalium*, Tübingen, UB, MS Mc 329, 125 fols.; e.g.: "...quia ut ait lux doctorum Augustinus de trinitate..." (fol. 1^r); "...doctorum lux Augustinus libro de sancta virginitate capitulo 42..." (fol. 7^r); "...lux doctorum Augustinus in sermone..." (fol. 211^r); "...lux doctorum Augustinus libro de oratione dominica..." (fol. 222^r). Simon's sermons are extant in thirty-two manuscripts and were printed in Reutlingen in 1484; see Zumkeller, *MSS*, nr. 787 (366-368). Zumkeller gives the title as *Sermones super epistolas dominicales*; in the Tübingen MS Simon refers to his work as "...opus epistolarum dominicalium totius anni..." fol. 1^r. The appellation of Augustine as the *lux doctorum* is seen already in a hymn on Augustine from the later thirteenth century: "Salve lux et dux doctorum/ malleus haereticorum/ conterens perfidiam." F.J. Mone, *Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters aus Handschriften herausgegeben und erklärt*, 3 vols. (Freiburg, 1853-1855), 3: 205, nr. 815.

⁸² "Ubi nota, quod primi fratres, qui praedicaverunt evangelium populo, fuerunt fratres heremitarum Sancti Augustini." Ambrosius de Cora, *Chronica sacratissimi Ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini*, (Rome, 1481), 742; Ambrosius de Cora, *Defensorium Ordinis fratrum heremitarum Sancti Augustini*, (Rome, 1481), 499-616; see also Balbino Rano, "San Agustín y su Orden en Algunos Sermones de Agustinos del Primer Siglo (1244-1344)," *Analecta Augustiniana* 53 (1990): 7-93.

⁸³ For the entire discussion that follows, cf. Rano, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden." For my interpretation of the historical narratives here discussed, I have drawn from Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York, 1985); Adam Zachary Newton, *Narrative Ethics* (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, esp. vol. 3 (Chicago, 1988); Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *The Past as Text. The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography* (Baltimore, 1997); and Hayden White, *The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore, 1987).

A. *The Vita Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi*

Manuscript Plut. 90 sup. 48 of the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence begins with an anonymous *Vita Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi*.⁸⁴ Though the manuscript was written in 1470, the *Vita* was originally composed between 1322 and 1331.⁸⁵ The codex contains a number of saints' lives, as well as the treatise on the origins of the Order and the *Sermo* to be discussed below. The author of the *Vita* was the prior of Santo Spirito, the Augustinian house in Florence. In the later thirteenth century Santo Spirito flourished, benefitting from the commercial growth of the city, becoming, as Arbesmann states, "the religious and cultural center of the *Oltrarno*. As a matter of fact, soon the whole urban district across the Arno was called after Santo Spirito."⁸⁶ From 1287 Santo Spirito was also the site of Order's *studium generale in Curia Romana*.⁸⁷ Thus, Arbesmann concludes that the author of the *Vita* "was a man of administrative skill, experienced in the spiritual guidance of a religious community, and possessed of a keen sense for the needs of the time."⁸⁸ The manuscript as such is an "organic whole," whereby the anonymous compiler put together a "long line of holy ancestors the Augustinian Hermits of his day could claim for their institute."⁸⁹ The Life of Augustine,

...may well be called the cornerstone of the entire series. For, in it, Augustine is pictured as the great successor of the two founders and fathers of eremitical monasticism, St. Anthony and St. Paul the first Hermit. The *Vitae* that follow tell us about the virtues and miracles of holy men who distinguished themselves by their common devotion to the eremitical mode of monastic life which St. Augustine is said to have first organized in the western Church.⁹⁰

The author of the *Vita*, which is rather brief, strung together portions of texts from Augustine's *Confessiones*, though Arbesmann posits an older Life, no longer extant, that served as the direct source.⁹¹ For present purposes the three interpolations Arbesmann identifies as providing an

⁸⁴ For a description of the manuscript, and for an analysis of the *Vita*, see R. Arbesmann, "The 'Vita Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi' in Cod. Laurent. Plut. 90 Sup. 48." *Traditio* 18 (1962): 319-355.

⁸⁵ Arbesmann, "Vita," 331-332.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 326-327.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 329.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 322. For a listing of the contents of the ms. see *ibid.*, 320-321.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 322.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 336ff.

'eremitical gloss' on the text are of greatest importance. The first is the account of Augustine's baptism. Repeating the inherited lore that after his baptism Augustine and Ambrose composed the hymn *Te deum laudamus* spontaneously in alternating phrases, the *Vita* proceeds to claim that Ambrose then invested Augustine in the habit of a hermit, based on the pseudo-Ambrosian *Sermo de baptismo et conversione S. Augustini*.⁹² The second interpolation in the *Vita* Arbesmann points to is the account of Augustine, together with Alipius, Nebridius and Adeodatus, seeking a suitable place for living the monastic life. Finding a group of hermits in Tuscany following the traditions of Paul, the first Hermit, and St. Anthony, Augustine stayed with the Tuscan hermits for some time, and, quoting the *Vita*, "gave to them a way of life (*modus vivendi*), which later he widely established among the clerics and hermits in Africa."⁹³ The third piece of evidence Arbesmann brings forth is the account drawn from Possidius of Augustine's foundation of a monastery within the Church compound after having been made presbyter. Noting that Augustine had been granted both the permission and land for doing so by Bishop Valerius, the author of the *Vita* then comments as follows: "Likewise he established other monasteries in deserted and wooded places."⁹⁴ Taken together, Arbesmann claims:

The aetiological character of the three interpolations we have discussed is obvious. In the first place, they serve to explain the Order's full title: 'ordo fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini.' Moreover, in our author's time most of the information available concerning the origin of the Order overwhelmingly pointed to Tuscany and the Tuscan Hermits of the thirteenth century. The three legends provided the connecting links between St. Augustine and the Order of the Hermit Friars of St. Augustine as recognized by the popes in the course of that century. They soon became a fixed part in the Order's tradition.⁹⁵

Though the author of the *Vita* gives Augustine's biography a eremitical flavor, he is still rather vague regarding the connections between Augustine's eremiticism, and that of the OESA. In the story of Ambrose investing Augustine in a habit upon his baptism, not found in the previous

⁹² *Ibid.*, 340.

⁹³ "Cum quibus Augustinus aliquo tempore habitans modum vivendi, quem latius postea in Africa clericis et eremitis constituit, eis dedit." Anonymous, *Vita Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi*, Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, MS Plut. 90. Sup. 48, fol 1^r-13^r; fol. 7^r (hereafter cited as: Anon. *Vita*); as quoted by Arbesmann, "Vita," 341.

⁹⁴ "Sic ipse alia monasteria construxit in locis desertis et nemorosis." Anon. *Vita*, fol. 8^r; as quoted by Arbesmann, "Vita," 348.

⁹⁵ Arbesmann, "Vita," 349.

lives of Augustine, the phrase included in the *Vita* does not describe the habit Augustine assumed as the habit of the Order.⁹⁶ The second interpolation is inconclusive as well. While emphasizing the eremitical desires of Augustine and his associates, realized, according to the *Vita*, in Tuscany among the group of hermits following Paul and Anthony, there is no explicit connection between the *modus vivendi* Augustine provided for the group, and the *Regula Sancti Augustini*;⁹⁷ the *Vita* only confirms that Augustine gave the Tuscan hermits the same *modus vivendi* that he later established among the clerics and hermits in Africa.⁹⁸ The same ambiguity applies to the account of Augustine's establishing a monastery within the Church compound after his ordination. Arbesmann seemingly tries to make more of the passage than perhaps is warranted, when he states that after the story found in Possidius, the author of the *Vita* "then rather abruptly adds (fol. 8'): 'Sic ipse alia monasteria construxit in locis desertis et nemorosis.'" Arbesmann then presents the lengthier account of Augustine's monastic foundations as present in the treatise on the Order's origins, using the fuller version to explain the one line of the *Vita*. The line in question, however, does not appear as abrupt when read as the conclusion of the passage and in parallel with Possidius:

Possid. vita Aug. 5
(52,1-8; PL 32,37)

Factus ergo presbyter monasterium
intra ecclesiam mox instituit et cum
Dei servis vivere coepit secundum
modum et regulam sub sanctis apos-
tolis constitutam: maxime ut nemo
quicquam proprium in illa societate
haberet, sed eis essent omnia com-
munia, et distribueretur unicuique

Anon. *Vita*, fol. 8'

Factus ergo presbyter monasterium
in illa ecclesia mox instituit et cum
dei servis vivere cepit secundum
modum et regulam sub sanctis apos-
tolis constitutam.

⁹⁶ "...Ambrosio eum cucullam induente et habitum servorum dei...", Anon. *Vita*, fol. 7r.

⁹⁷ In analyzing Possidius' statement that Augustine upon being made presbyter *cum dei servis vivere coepit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam*, Verheijen dismisses the association of the terms *modus* and *regula* with a monastic Rule in a technical sense: "Mais dans la séquence *secundum modum et regulam*, le terme de *regula* ne peut pas avoir le sens technique de 'règle monastique'. Il doit être plus ou moins identique à celui de *modus*, si bien qu'il faut comprendre 'selon la façon de vivre...'" Verheijen, *Règle*, 2: 183.

⁹⁸ See Arbesmann, "Vita," 341.

sicut opus erat, quod iam ipse prior
fecerat, dum de transmarinis ad sua
remeasset.

Sic ipse alia monasteria construxit in
locis desertis et nemorosis.

The line, *Sic ipse alia monasteria construxit in locis desertis et nemorosis* of the *Vita*, interprets Possidius' *quod iam ipse prior fecerat, dum de transmarinis ad sua remeasset*, yet in so doing leaves the temporal sequence ambiguous: the author does not specify whether Augustine had established "other monasteries" before or after the monastery he founded as presbyter, whereas Possidius' account is clear regarding Augustine's prior monastic life. Though the phrase *in locis desertis et nemorosis* puts an eremitical spin on the account, the *Vita*, in its rewriting of Possidius, refrains from suggesting an unambiguous relationship between Augustine's early monastic life and the OESA.

The clearest association of Augustine's eremiticism with that of the OESA is found in a section which Arbesmann considers to be appendices to the *Vita*,⁹⁹ the third of which,

...is a brief note on the religious Orders which follow the Augustinian Rule (fol. 11^v-12^r). It reflects the beginning of a long-drawn dispute between the Augustinian Hermits and Canons, both claiming for themselves the privilege of being the first religious Order founded by St. Augustine. Showing himself not averse to scholastic reasoning, our author makes the following subtle distinction. The *ordo fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini* professes the Augustinian Rule *ex institutione*, that is, on the basis of its foundation by St. Augustine, their institute 'having proceeded from those who had received the said Rule from the same father Augustine and had carried his venerable body to Italy.' The *ordo canonicorum regularium*, on the other hand, professes the Augustinian Rule *ex devotione* only, its beginning dating no further back than 'to St. Ruf, bishop in a region of France about the year 1104 from the Incarnation of Our Lord.' Apparently satisfied with having disposed of the difficulty by his clever argument, the author quickly concludes the note with a short reference to the Order of St. Dominic 'and many other Orders of men as well as women.'¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Arbesmann considers the *Vita* to have three appendices, the first consisting of verses in praise of Augustine, the second, an account of the two translations of Augustine's body, and the third, a discussion of the Orders which follow the Augustinian Rule. See Arbesmann, "Vita," 349-353.

¹⁰⁰ Arbesmann, "Vita," 351-352. Arbesmann does not cite the manuscript for his discussion quoted here, though he translates passages therefrom. For the attribution of St. Ruf as the founder of the canons, see Arbesmann, "Vita," 352.

There is, however, nothing in the text that states that Augustine *founded* the OESA. In the manuscript the section of text in question is given the title: *Instituit regulam canonicis*. The text begins by affirming that Augustine 'rewrote' the canonical rule which had been handed down by the apostles after Christ's ascension, but had been neglected for a long time. A multitude of religious follow this Rule and it is avowed by the church of God.¹⁰¹ The author then proceeds to mention the Orders that follow the Rule:

From its institution: the Order which is now called [the Order] of hermit brothers of Saint Augustine, which came about from those having received the said Rule from the same Father Augustine, and from those having carried his venerable body to Italy. From devotion: the Order of Regular Canons, which was begun by Rufus, bishop in a region of France in the year of our Lord's Incarnation 1110; and the Order of Friar Preachers, which was begun by blessed Dominic in the region of Tolouse approximately in the year of our Lord's Incarnation 1200; and many other Orders of men as well as of women.¹⁰²

There is no question that the OESA is given a special status, following the Rule *ex institutione* whereas all others follow the Rule *ex devotione*. Yet though the OESA arose from those who received the Rule from Augustine himself, Augustine did not write his Rule *for* the hermits. Earlier in the *Vita*, as noted above, the author claimed that Augustine provided the Tuscan hermits with a *modus vivendi*, without, however, explicitly designating such as the Rule. Nor is there explicit mention of the Rule in the author's discussion of Augustine's written works.¹⁰³ Leaving no doubt that the OESA has a special status following the Rule *ex institutione*, and providing an eremitical gloss to Augustine's biography not to be found in previous accounts, the author of the *Vita* is indeterminate with regard both to the composition of the Rule and to Augustine's monastic foundations. Moreover, he distances the OESA from Augustine's original

¹⁰¹ "*Instituit regulam canonicis*. Hic denique canonicam regulam ab apostolis post ascensionem domini primo traditam, sed longo tempore post neglectam, luculento sermone rescripsit, quam innumerabilis perfecta sequitur multitudo religiosorum et dei ecclesia multiplici illustrantium virtute profitetur." Anon. *Vita*, fol. 11^v-12^r.

¹⁰² "Ex institutione ordo qui nunc fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini nuncupatur, qui ex recipientibus ab eodem patre Augustino dictam regulam ac portantibus Italiam eius venerabile corpus evenit. Ex devotione ordo canonicorum regularium, qui ordo Rufo episcopo in partibus Gallie orta annos dominice incarnationis M.CX. [sic] incepit. Et ordo fratrum predicatorum, qui a beato Dominico in partibus Tolosanis circa annos dominice incarnationis M.CC. initium habuit. Multique alii ordines tam marium quam mulierum." Anon. *Vita*, fol. 12^r.

¹⁰³ Anon. *Vita*, fol. 9^v

group of hermits by referring to Augustine's Order as that Order "which is now called the [Order] of Hermits of Saint Augustine [emphasis mine]." ¹⁰⁴ The relationship between Augustine's eremiticism and the OESA had not been firmly established. That would be the accomplishment of the prior of Santo Spirito's contemporaries.

B. *The Initium sive Processus Ordinis Heremitarum Sancti Augustini*

The same manuscript that contains the anonymous *Vita* includes as well a treatise on the origins of the OESA with the title *Initium sive Processus Ordinis Heremitarum Sancti Augustini*. ¹⁰⁵ The author of the *Initium*, as the *Vita*, is not known, though the two works originated in the same general circles. Balbino Rano, the editor of the *Initium*, dates the work approximately to 1330. ¹⁰⁶

The *Initium* places the origins of the OESA within the historical development of western monasticism, with a special focus on the eremitical traditions. Taking Jerome's *Vita sancti Pauli primi eremite* as his point of departure, the author argues that from the early anchorites, namely, Elias, John the Baptist, Anthony and Paul the first Hermit, "every Order and religion of the modern religious takes its origin and beginning." ¹⁰⁷ Following these first hermits, Basil and Pachomius established the apostolic life in the East, ¹⁰⁸ whereas Augustine then did so in the West. After treating Augustine's monastic foundations, the author proceeds to discuss briefly the origins of the other religions, namely, the Benedictines, the Cistercians, the Regular Canons, the Carthusians, the Franciscans and the Dominicans. ¹⁰⁹ He then turns to listing the General priors and the papal approbations of the OESA, beginning in the later twelfth century, and culminating in the Great Union under Alexander IV. His desire to emphasize the antiquity of his Order is clear, when, for example, he begins his discussion of the OESA, having first treated the

¹⁰⁴ See note 102 above.

¹⁰⁵ Anon. *Vita*, fols. 57^v-62^v.

¹⁰⁶ "Debío de ser en un tiempo no posterior aproximadamente al año 1330." Balbino Rano, "Los dos Primeras Obras Conocidas sobre el Origen de la Orden Agustiniiana," *Analecta Augustiniana* 45 (1982): 331-376; 335.

¹⁰⁷ "Ab istis namque anachoritis omnis Ordo et religio modernorum religiosorum sumpsit exordium et principium." Anonymous, *Initium sive Processus Ordinis Heremitarum Sancti Augustini*, ed. Balbino Rano, in "Los dos Primeras Obras Conocidas sobre," 331-351; 337 (hereafter cited as: *Initium*).

¹⁰⁸ *Initium*, 337.

¹⁰⁹ *Initium*, 341. For the treatment of the origins of the other religions, see *Initium*, 341-343.

other Orders, with the phrase, *Ante quorum tempora*.¹¹⁰ Moreover, he portrays the OESA as the genuine inheritors of the ancient eremitical tradition when he concludes that not only the OESA, "but virtually all religions have their beginning and origin from our ancient fathers."¹¹¹ The *Initium* continues with a mystical interpretation of the founders of religious Orders, associating them with Old Testament Fathers. Thus Basil is interpreted as the 'ante diluvian' Enoch, and Augustine is equated with Noah, for Noah "entered the arch of the Lord so that human kind might be saved," and Augustine "entering the Church of God, freed human kind from heretics."¹¹² Noah's three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth, are then interpreted as the three branches of religious that follow Augustine: "For Shem is interpreted as the Regular Canons, who fight under Augustine's Rule. Ham is understood as those who follow Augustine's Rule and life out of love. But Japheth is interpreted as those brother hermits, who, since they came to their country, having multiplied grasp the world with the example of their holy life and the clarity of knowledge."¹¹³ The entire treatise is designed to prove the temporal and qualitative priority of OESA within the religious life of the Church, based on the example of Augustine, who was "not only the father of hermits, but even lived himself as a hermit."¹¹⁴

Whereas Augustine's eremiticism and its relationship to the OESA in the *Vita* was indistinct, it is explicit in the emplotment of the *Initium*. Based on the *Confessions* and Possidius, the *Initium* goes far beyond the anonymous *Vita* in reconstructing an account of Augustine's early monastic life and offers conclusive evidence for Augustine's composition

¹¹⁰ *Initium*, 344.

¹¹¹ "...non tantum nos, sed fere omnes religiones a nostris patribus antiquis initium et principium habuerunt." *Initium*, 345.

¹¹² "Per patres enim sanctos ante diluvium, quorum Enoch adhuc vivit, patres omnium heremitarum, monachorum, servorum Dei omnium qui ultra mare fuerunt intelligitur beatus Basilius, qui floruit anno CCCLXX, cuius vita et regula usque in presens quam plures vivunt. Per Noë, qui archam Domini, ut salveretur genus humanum, intravit, beatus Augustinus intelligitur, qui intrans Dei Ecclesiam, humanum genus ab hereticis liberavit." *Initium*, 345.

¹¹³ "Per quos triplex genus Augustinum sequentium designatur. Nam per Sen intelliguntur canonici regulares, qui sub eius regulam militant. Per Cam, qui ex amoris calore vitam et regulam Augustini sequuntur. Sed per Iaphet, fratres isti heremite, qui ex quo ad terras venerunt exemplo sancte vite et scientie claritate multiplicati mundum comprehendunt." *Initium*, 345-346.

¹¹⁴ "Et multa alia dicit, que manifestissime ostendunt eum non tantum heremitarum patrem, verum etiam ipsum heremitam fuisse." *Initium*, 340.

of the Rule for his first group of hermits, who were the forebearers of the OESA:

Possid. vita Aug.
(52,1-8; PL 32,37)

Anon. *Vita*, fol. 8^r-12^r

Initium, 338-340

Factus ergo presbyter monasterium intra ecclesiam mox instituit et cum Dei servis vivere coepit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam: maxime ut nemo quicquam proprium in illa societate haberet, sed eis essent omnia communia, et distribueretur unicuique sicut opus erat, quod iam ipse prior fecerat, dum de transmarinis ad sua remeasset.

Factus ergo presbyter monasterium in illa ecclesia mox instituit et cum dei servis vivere cepit secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam. Sic ipse alia monasteria construxit in locis desertis et nemorosis.

(fol. 8^r)...

Instituit regulam canonicis: Hic denique canonicam regulam ab apostolis post ascensionem Domini primo traditam, sed longo tempore post neglectam, luculento sermone rescripsit, quam innumerabilis perfecta sequitur multitudo religiosorum et dei ecclesia multiplici illustantium virtute proficitur. (fol. 11^v-12^r)

Circa quod tempus in Italia primo, deinde in Affrica, beatus pater Augustinus et doctor regulam apostolicam post Domini ascensionem ab apostolis traditam, sed diu neglectam, luculento sermone conscripsit ... Et in *legenda sua*, quam scripsit sanctus Possidonius episcopus, dicitur quod ordinato Augustino in iponensi ecclesia sacerdote, mox monasterium servorum Dei instituit, et cepit secundum regulam apostolicam vivere, quam ipse prius fecerat dum a transmarinis ad sua remeasset. Que omnia [probant] nedum quod ipsam regulam in Italia instituerit, immo quod ipse anacrita, dum fuit in Italia post suam conversionem, extiterit.

From the comparison of the *Initium* with the *Vita* and Possidius, a number of observations can be made. Possidius makes no mention of Augustine's composition of a monastic Rule, but simply notes his foundation of a

monastery upon being made presbyter, though Possidius comments that Augustine had previously lived a monastic life. As discussed above, the *Vita* includes this passage from Possidius, yet 'summarizes' the ending of Possidius' account without giving any temporal indication of when Augustine had founded the 'other monasteries'. The *Vita*, then, in an 'appendix', includes a discussion of Augustine's composing his Rule, an account not found in Possidius, nor the other medieval *vitae*. The *Initium* includes these two passages of text from the *Vita*, but inverts the order. The account of Augustine having composed the Rule comes first in the *Initium*, and does so in words very similar to the *Vita*. The comment that Augustine 'eloquently put together in writing the apostolic rule handed down by the apostles after the Lord's ascension, but for a long time neglected,' appears only in the *Vita* and the *Initium*, which suggests that one text either borrowed from the other, or that both had a common source. Given the textual variations of the phrase between the *Vita* and the *Initium*, it is unlikely that the author of the *Vita* drew from the *Initium*; the text in the *Initium* is far more explicit with regard to Augustine's active composition of the Rule and its relationship to the OESA. Whereas the *Vita* gives this account to begin the appendix dealing with Augustine's institution of the Rule, referring to Augustine simply in the third person, leaving him unnamed in the text (*Hic denique canonicam regulam...rescripsit*),¹¹⁵ the *Initium* designates Augustine as *beatus pater Augustinus et doctor*. Further, whereas the *Vita* has Augustine 'writing again' the canonical Rule handed down by the apostles, the *Initium* distances the Rule from all canonical connotations, and gives Augustine a far more active role in claiming that blessed father and doctor Augustine 'put together in writing the apostolic rule' (*regulam apostolicam ... conscripsit*).

The *Initium* then continues by discussing the various possible locations for Augustine's first eremitical community. Whereas the *Vita* was vague concerning the chronotopic account of Augustine's monasticism, the *Initium* is explicit: "first in Italy, then in Africa."¹¹⁶ The precise location of Augustine's first hermitage, however, is left indeterminate; the author of the *Initium* mentions the possibility of Milan, Mons Pisanus, and Centumcellae, but notes that a decisive answer cannot be given due to the length of time this occurred in the past, and the scarcity of sources (*ex longitudine temporis quam ex pigritia scriptorum*). It could even have been, the author suggests, in several places where this took place.

¹¹⁵ Anon. *Vita*, fol. 11^v.

¹¹⁶ "...in Italia primo, deinde in Affrica..." *Initium*, 338.

Nevertheless, it was most certainly in Italy, and for that first community, Augustine wrote his Rule.¹¹⁷ The author continues with a brief discussion of Monica's death, and then includes the passage from Possidius, affirming that upon being ordained presbyter by bishop Valerius, Augustine founded a monastery and lived according to the apostolic rule, "which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland."¹¹⁸ Whereas the *Vita* summarized this line from Possidius with the nebulous reference to "other monasteries in desert and wooded places," the *Initium* used Possidius' testimony as proof of the Italian origins of Augustine's eremiticism: "All these things show no doubt that [Augustine] instituted his own Rule in Italy, and even more so, that he himself lived as an anchorite in Italy after his conversion."¹¹⁹ In contrast to the narratives of the medieval tradition, as well as that of the Florentine *Vita*, which employed Possidius' remark *which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland*, as a vague conclusion, or even afterthought, to the account of Augustine's establishing a monastery after having been made presbyter, the *Initium* gives the phrase content by having first established Augustine's composition of the Rule for his first eremitical community in Italy, to which then Possidius' phrase, *...which he had previously done... (iam ipse prior fecerat)* refers back in the emplotment of the *Initium*. As if to leave no doubt, the author of the *Initium* changed Possidius' "[Augustine] began to live...according to the custom and way of life established by the holy apostles," simply repeated by the author of the *Vita*, to "[Augustine] began to live according to the apostolic Rule," whereby in place of the somewhat vague "according to the custom and way of life constituted by the apostles," (*secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam*), the author of the *Initium* referred back to the 'apostolic rule' (*regulam apostolicam*) which "blessed father and doctor Augustine put together in writing," (*beatus pater Augustinus et doctor...conscripsit*).

The author of the *Initium* did not stop here with his rewriting of Possidius. Having sufficiently dealt with Augustine's eremitical origins in Italy, the author then turned to Africa. Whereas Possidius simply reported Augustine's establishing a monastery within the Church compound after having been made presbyter, the *Initium* claimed that Augustine lived an eremitical life, "according to the apostolic Rule," with blessed Valerius in

¹¹⁷ *Initium*, 338-339.

¹¹⁸ *Initium*, 339-340.

¹¹⁹ "Que omnia [probant] nedum quod ipsam regulam in Italia instituerit, immo quod ipse anacrita, dum fuit in Italia post suam conversionem, extiterit." *Initium*, 340.

a villa.¹²⁰ For this passage the author might have been taking his inspiration from Philip of Harvengt's *Vita*, rather than from Possidius. As seen above, Philip claimed that Valerius gave Augustine a garden in which to establish a monastery after having ordained him as presbyter, which seems more closely related to a villa than does Possidius' wording, *intra ecclesiam*. The point to be made is that the *Initium* is clear that Augustine's second eremitical community was that in Hippo, together with Valerius. After his ordination as bishop, the author continued, Augustine then "founded many monasteries in solitary places, in which he stayed, as the father of many, teaching, correcting and regulating his very own anchoritic sons, so that they might serve God worthily in keeping with the apostolic Rule."¹²¹ Taken all together, the author concluded, it is manifestly clear that Augustine "was not only the father of the hermits, but even was himself a hermit."¹²²

Such a statement was not without political implications in 1330. It was made precisely when the OESA was in negotiations with the Regular Canons concerning custody of Augustine's tomb in St. Peter in Ciel d'Oro in Pavia, having been granted such privilege in 1327, yet unable to establish themselves as custodians until 1331.¹²³ The *Initium* was not written simply for the edification of members of the OESA. After asserting Augustine's eremitical foundations and life, the author then launched a frontal attack against his opponents:

Nor does it matter that the Regular Canons say that they received the Rule from blessed Augustine in Africa, whereby they call themselves Canons of St. Augustine. Wherefore they would have cause, some say, because in Africa Augustine gave his Rule and founded monasteries as much to and for the Canons as to and for hermits, and that we did not come about from the said hermits. This does not seem to be true with regard to the Canons, since Abbot

¹²⁰ "In Affrica vero, ut ipse dicit in *sermone de vita clericorum*, quod cum beato Valentino [*sic*] in villa habitabat, et secundum regulam apostolicam vivebant." *Initium*, 340.

¹²¹ "Et postquam episcopus fuit yponensis, quam plurima monasteria in solitudine construxit, in quibus sicut pater plurimum morabatur, ipsos suos filios anacortas instruendo, corrigendo et ordinando, ut Deo digne et secundum regulam apostolicam servirent." *Initium*, 340.

¹²² After citing an apocryphal phrase from Augustine's *In Iohannis Evangelium*, and from the pseudo-Augustinian *sermo de passione Domini Nostri Iesu Christi*, the author concludes: "Et multa alia dicit, que manifestissime ostendunt eum non tantum heremitarum patrem, verum etiam ipsum heremitam fuisse." *Initium*, 340.

¹²³ See Arbesmann, "Vita," 332; cf. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 180 and *passim*.

Ioachim said that the Regular Canons had their beginning from blessed Rufus, bishop in parts of France.¹²⁴

The author established both the antiquity of the OESA and its continuity with Augustine's original eremitical communities by then briefly discussing the origins of the various religious Orders, and the manifestation and approbation of the OESA in the context of that development.¹²⁵ Under the papacies of Alexander III, Innocent III, Gregory IX and Alexander IV, the prior generals of the Order received special privileges. Alexander IV, however, played a special role:

Pope Alexander, from his love of blessed Augustine, [who] appeared to him in a vision with a large head, but small body, in the first year of his pontificate increased the Order as much in members as in privileges, bringing together into this Order the Bricinenses, the Brethern of Favali, the followers of Friar John Bonus, and the Williamites, granting the Order privileges as never before to any other religion.¹²⁶

This is the earliest account of Alexander's vision of Augustine in association with the Great Union. As we will see, it would be repeated by Nicholas of Alessandria, Henry of Friemar and Jordan of Quedlinburg.¹²⁷ With this account, the *Initium* established a connection between Augustine's original foundation of hermits in Italy, and his role in Alexander's establishing the OESA in the Great Union. There is a continuity between Augustine's eremiticism, and the eremiticism of the Augustinian Order, emphasized by the *Initium's* concluding by returning to Jerome's discussion of the early desert fathers, to which Augustine and his hermits are added.¹²⁸ With the *Initium*, Augustine was not simply the

¹²⁴ "Nec obstat quod canonici regulares dicunt quod a beato Augustino in Affrica regulam receperint, ex quo dicunt se canonicos beati Augustini. Unde motivum habuerint, quidam dicunt, quod tam canonicis quam ipsis heremitis in Africa regulam dedit et monasteria construxit, et a dictis heremitis non evenimus. De canonicis non videtur verum, quoniam abbas Iohachyn dicit quod canonici regulares initium habuerunt a beato Rufo episcopo in partibus Galliae." *Initium*, 341.

¹²⁵ *Initium*, 341. For the discussion of the origins of the various Orders, see *Initium*, 342-343.

¹²⁶ "... predictus papa Alexander ab amore beati Augustini, ei in visione magnus capite et parvus membris apparens, primo anno sui pontificatus predictum Ordinem tam in personis quam in gratiis augmentavit, huic Ordini brictones, fabarios, iambonitas, atque guglielmitas iungendo, gratias numquam similes alicui religioni traditas [condonando]..." *Initium*, 345.

¹²⁷ Arbesmann argued that Henry's account of the vision in his *Tractatus* was the first Augustinian mention of the vision; see Arbesmann, *HFT*, 131. Henry's and Jordan's treatments of the vision will be discussed below.

¹²⁸ *Initium*, 349.

historical bishop of Hippo and author of the apostolic Rule; for the OESA he had become *pater noster*.

C. Nicholas of Alessandria's Sermo de beato Augustino

The third text in the Laurenziana manuscript that pertains to the creation of the Augustinian myth is a sermon on Augustine, preached in Paris in 1332 by Nicholas of Alessandria, edited together with the *Initium* by Rano. Nicholas of Alessandria became master of theology at Paris in 1333, and attended the General Chapter at Grasse in 1335, where the negotiations with the Regular Canons over the custody of Augustine's tomb were confirmed. Three years later he was also present in Siena at the General Chapter which renewed affirmation of the agreement. He may be the same Nicolas de Alessandria designated as 'lector in the Curia' on 19 May 1327, who together with the Prior General William of Cremona and three others entered negotiations with the Canons and the commune of Pavia regarding Augustine's tomb.¹²⁹ His *Sermo de beato Augustino* in any event clearly testifies to his commitment to and skill in presenting the Hermits' case.

The sermon is divided into two distinct parts. The first consists of praises of Augustine's learning, character, and service to the Church, taking the pericope from 1 Maccabees 2:17: *Magnus es in hac civitate et ornatus fratribus et filiis*. In part two Nicholas turned to the history and development of western monasticism, beginning with Paul the first Hermit and Anthony. He continued by tracing the dispersals of the earliest eremitical groups, some of whom settled in Italy. Nicholas then treated Augustine's conversion and early monastic experiences, his composition of the Rule for the Tuscan Hermits, his return to Africa and his establishment of monasteries there. Virtually skipping over Augustine's life after his monastic foundations, Nicholas moved rather quickly to a brief mention of Augustine's death and the translations of his body, before finally arriving at the development of the Augustinian Hermits, placed chronologically well before the origins of the other Orders, namely, the Regular Canons, the Franciscans, and the Dominicans. He proceeded with his account by listing the earliest known Priors General of the Order, pointing to the papal privileges they received, and the papal approbations of the Order culminating in Alexander IV's Great Union, concluding with a list of the Priors General of the Order through William of Cremona and the OESA assuming custody of Augustine's tomb. The sermon closes with what could

¹²⁹ Rano, "Las Dos Primeras Obras Conocidas," 353-354.

be seen as a third section, though which functions as a final *determinatio* of the matter at hand: Nicholas offered eight arguments and three proofs from authority to establish once and for all that Augustine not only was the founder of the Hermits, but also lived himself as one, thereby authenticating the historical continuity between Augustine's eremitical life, and that of the OESA.

In Nicholas' sermon the representation is intensified in three respects: first, the detail given regarding Augustine's composition of the Rule and foundation of monasteries; second, the argument against the Canons; and third, the mythic elements of the historical account.

In Nicholas' historical reconstruction there is no longer a question regarding Augustine's composition of the Rule for his first eremitical community in Italy, nor where that first community was located. As stated above, the second part of the sermon begins with an account of the origins of eremitical monasticism with Paul the first Hermit and Anthony. From these origins, the eremitical life had three branches, founded by Basil and Pachomius in the East, and by Augustine in the West.¹³⁰ The followers of Paul and Anthony were dispersed by a combination of persecutions and divine providence. As a result, some of these early hermits came to Italy. There, they heard of a group of hermits living between Rome and Viterbo, who had originated from two groups: one around a hermit named Anthony, who lived on Mons Pisanus, and the other, the group of hermits led by blessed Mamilianus, who lived near Sardinia.¹³¹ The new arrivals joined the group in the hermitage between Rome and Viterbo, and there the community grew and prospered, and built one hundred cells, in the place called Centumcellae. The inhabitants of the region built for the hermits a church dedicated to the Holy Trinity, and there, Nicholas affirmed, "in the course of time, was the first location of the Order of Hermits of Saint Augustine."¹³² The reason for this Nicholas gave a little later on in the sermon. Turning to Augustine's conversion and baptism, Nicholas repeated the story of Augustine and Ambrose composing the *Te deum laudamus*. He

¹³⁰ Nicolas de Alessandria, *Sermo de Beato Augustino*, ed. Balbino Rano, in "Los dos Primeras Obras Conocidas," 353-364 (hereafter cited as: Nic.Al. *Sermo*); cf. *Initium*, 337-338.

¹³¹ Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 364. In the Laurenziana manuscript a short *Vita* of Mamilianus follows directly that of Augustine; Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, MS Plut. 90 Sup. 48, fol. 13^r-15^v.

¹³² "Dicti autem heremite in prefata heremo inter Romam et Viterbium in tantum numero et merito satis cito creverunt, quod ibidem C cellas construxerunt iuxta locum qui Centum cellis dicitur et habitatores illius regionis in dicta heremo ecclesiam in honorem Sancte Trinitatis ipsis fratribus edificarunt et ibi in processu temporis fuit primus locus Ordinis heremitarum sancti Augustini..." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 365.

then relates how for more than a year Augustine lived in the hermitage of Ambrose and Simplicianus outside Milan to be taught by his two seniors, who had been so instrumental in his conversion. Augustine did not at that time compose his Rule, since, Nicholas affirmed, he lived with Ambrose and Simplicianus as their student, not as their master.¹³³ During this period Augustine was persuaded by his mother to return to Africa, and on their way, they came upon the community of hermits in Centumcellae and stayed with them for a period of approximately two years. Asked by the community, Augustine composed his Rule for the group, "and from that time on they were called the hermit brothers of Augustine by reason of the Rule given to them, whereas previously they were only called hermits."¹³⁴ Moreover, Nicholas also gives a precise date for the Rule's composition. In the first section of the sermon, in praising Augustine's administrative abilities, Nicholas used Augustine's providing a Rule as an example, which "he composed," Nicholas affirmed, "940 years ago."¹³⁵ Since the sermon is explicitly dated in 1332,¹³⁶ Nicholas assigned the composition of the *Regula Sancti Augustini* to the year 392.¹³⁷

Nicholas continued to build an argument from biographical details. At the time of his baptism Augustine was thirty years old and he was thirty-three when Monica died at Ostia. Thus, Nicholas argued, he spent

¹³³ Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 366-367.

¹³⁴ "Instigante autem pia matre que affectabat eodem sepulcro cum viro suo in propria civitate recondi, ut ipse dicit 9 *Confess.*, ad Affricam...remeabat querens cottidie locum sibi aptum ad serviendum Deo. Cum vero ad introitum Tussie percinxit, plures servos Dei heremiticam vitam ducentes tam in monte Pisano quam in locis aliis ad predictam vitam aptis in dicta provincia invenit, et tandem ad locum Centumcellarum applicuit. Cum quibus fratribus diu commoratus, rogatus ab eis ut regulam et normam vivendi [traderet], ipsis composuit in loco sancte Trinitatis de Centumcellis. Et ex tunc vocati sunt fratres heremite Augustini ratione regule date qui prius heremite tantummodo dicebantur." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 367. Nicholas continues by noting the aptness of Augustine's composing the Rule for the hermits in the church of the Holy Trinity; *ibid.*

¹³⁵ "Tertio, requiritur in prelato bono regularitas familie. Opus enim laudat opificem. Qualis enim est rex talis lex et talis grex. Quomodo autem beatus Augustinus regularem familiam statuerit patet satis ex ordinatissima regula sua, sub qua quasi infiniti regulariter et sancte vivunt et vixerunt. Iam iam sunt anni 940 quam composuit modo qui in fine narrabitur." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 361.

¹³⁶ The explicit states: "Hec Magister Nicolaus de Allexandria, anno Domini M CCC XXXII, Parisiis." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 376.

¹³⁷ For contemporary scholarship's dating of the Rule, see Lawless, *Augustine of Hippo and his Monastic Rule*, 148-154; Lawless reviews the various scholarly opinions and then concludes: "Barring more convincing evidence to the contrary, c. 397 seems to be a more likely time of composition for Augustine's Rule." *Ibid.*, 153. Nicholas seems not to have recognized the problem his dating posed for his argument, since at least by contemporary reconstructions, Augustine was ordained presbyter in 391.

approximately two years with the Tuscan hermits and one in the hermitage at Milan.¹³⁸ Nicholas then brought in Possidius as proof text, citing the passage: "having been ordained presbyter, Augustine established a monastery and began to live with the servants of God according to the custom and way of life established by the holy apostles."¹³⁹ This clinches the argument for Nicholas: "From this it is perfectly clear that Augustine instituted and lived by the said Rule first in Italy."¹⁴⁰ Above I have stressed the ambiguity to which this phrase in Possidius gave rise. Even the author of the *Initium* was vague regarding the precise location of Augustine's first eremitical community for which he composed the Rule, affirming only, and using this line of Possidius as proof, that it was first in Italy. With Nicholas clarity was achieved. Possidius' *which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland*, refers to Augustine's composing the Rule in 392 for the Tuscan hermits in Centumcellae, which was the first location of the *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini*.

Nicholas was just as precise with regard to Augustine's monastic foundations. The first was that in Centumcellae. Nicholas then proceeded to Augustine's arrival in Africa, where together with his friends, he was received by Bishop Valerius. Regarding the African theater of Augustine's monastic operations, in the *Initium* only explicit mention is made of the villa which Valerius gave to Augustine, together with the further comment that Augustine founded many monasteries after he was ordained bishop, though the author of the *Initium* used Possidius' account of Augustine's monastic foundation upon being made presbyter as proof of the Italian priority of Augustine's eremiticism.¹⁴¹ In comparison, Nicholas restored the proper order, as well as having combined Philip of Harvengt's garden with the *Initium*'s villa: after Augustine was received by Valerius, "Valerius gave him a certain garden in a certain wooded villa, so that together with his associates who followed him, they could live an eremitical and solitary life."¹⁴² Thereafter, having been ordained presbyter, Augustine founded another monastery adjoined to the church in

¹³⁸ Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 367-368.

¹³⁹ "...factus presbyter instituit monasterium et cepit vivere secundum regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam, quod ipse [*scripsi*; ipsum ed. Rano] prior fecerat, cum a transmarinis ad propria remeasset." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 368.

¹⁴⁰ "Ex quo manifeste patet quod dictam regulam instituit et servavit primo in Ytalia." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 368.

¹⁴¹ See note 119 above.

¹⁴² "Defuncta igitur matre Augustini apud Hostia tyberina, in Affricam cum sociis profectus est, quem sanctus Valerius yponensis episcopus paterne suscepit et ei quemdam hortulum in quadam villa silvestri dedit, ut ibidem cum sociis qui ei adherebant solitariam et solitam agerent vitam." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 368.

Hippo, repeating the account of Possidius.¹⁴³ Finally as bishop, Augustine founded many monasteries and hermitages "in which the servants of God, in keeping with the way of life and habit which he had seen in Italy, might live according to the Rule which he had composed."¹⁴⁴ Nicholas thus clearly distinguished four stages of Augustine's monastic foundations. The first was in Centumcellae; the second was in Valerius' garden/villa; the third was in the church compound in Hippo after having been made presbyter; and the fourth was multiple foundations after having been ordained bishop. Such clarity was called for in 1332 precisely due to the on-going debates having been initiated over whether Augustine originally wrote his Rule for the Canons or for the Hermits. Nicholas left no doubt.

With his precision of detail and dating concerning the development of Augustine's eremiticism, Nicholas was clear that Augustine *first* founded his Order of Hermits. Moreover, in Nicholas' representation a new argument for the OESA's priority over against the Regular Canons is advanced: the Order's habit. After delineating the four stages of Augustine's monastic foundations, Nicholas then argued:

Some however believe that the friars, because they were hermit friars only lived in the said place and in other similar places outside the city, and in Augustine's monastery adjoined to the Church in Hippo, lived the Regular Canons. But if truth be known this was not the case, as much because all religious overseas are clothed with a black tunic girded with a belt, as the friars of St. Basil, as because at that time no one in that region had seen such a habit as that which the Regular Canons now wear, and because Abbot Joachim in his *Exposition on the Apocalypse* clearly said that the Regular Canons had their origin from blessed Rufus, bishop in parts of France, approximately in the year of our Lord 1090. The Canons were called the Canons of St. Augustine, because Rufus gave them Augustine's Rule. From these Canons in time came blessed Dominic.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 368.

¹⁴⁴ "Quando autem fuit in dicta ecclesia yponensis episcopus ordinatus, quam plura monasteria solitaria et heremitica construxit, in quibus servi Dei iuxta morem et habitum quem in Ytalia viderat regulam ab eo conditam servabant..." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 369.

¹⁴⁵ "Quidam autem quod fratres credunt quod fratres heremite solum in dicto loco et similibus extra civitatem habitarent et in illo monasterio, iuxta ecclesiam Canonici regulares, sed, salva veritate, hoc non videtur, tum quia omnes religiosi ultramarini tunica nigra desuper cincta zona induuntur, ut fratres sancti Basilii, tum quia illo tempore nullus ibi talem habitum vidit qualem nunc portant Canonici regulares, tum quia abbas Joachim in *expositione super apokalisim* [sic] expresse dicit quod Canonici regulares ortum habuerunt a beato Rufo episcopo in partibus Gallie circa annos Domini M^oXC. Dicuntur tamen Canonici sancti Augustini, quia beatus Rufus eis regulam beati Augustini dedit. Ex quibus Canonis in processu temporis fuit beatus Dominicus." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 369-370.

Nicholas had previously concluded the first part of his sermon with the same argument, placed in context of his exposition of the pericope, making the distinction between Augustine's brothers (*fratres*) and sons (*filii*). Augustine's brothers are all those who founded Orders based on his Rule, such as the Regular Canons, founded by Rufus, the Order of Preachers, founded by Dominic, and many others.¹⁴⁶ "But we," Nicholas continued,

are Augustine's sons, born immediately from him, and therefore we clearly carry his sign, namely the habit which he used directly after his baptism. For never overseas had such a habit been seen as that which the Regular Canons wear, but all religious were clothed in black, and girded with a belt over the tunic.¹⁴⁷

For Nicholas the habit itself differentiated the OESA from the Regular Canons, and was a sign of the primacy of Augustine's foundation. The habit of the OESA was that of Augustine, from the time of his baptism, and was one that only his true sons were entitled to share. It is only in light of the force of his argument that Nicholas can then make such conciliatory comments as the one with which he concluded his proof of the Hermits' priority: "The issue, however, is not to be greatly disputed, especially because if Augustine founded that Order and ours, it all goes to the praise of that glorious father, how very many sons in Christ he bore."¹⁴⁸

Nicholas' historical evidence and arguments were designed to present convincing proof of Augustine's original foundation of the OESA. Embedded within the fictive narrative of the historical facts, however, were mythic elements. As the author of the *Initium*, Nicholas included the account of Augustine appearing to Alexander IV as catalyst for the Great Union:

Initium, 344-345

Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 372

Insuper tempore Alessandri pape
III^{ti} erat prior predicti Ordinis frater
Phylippus de Parrana, supernorum

Tempore Allexandri quarti, frater
Philippus de Parana [prior generalis
fuit]. Quo tempore beatus Augusti-

¹⁴⁶ Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 363.

¹⁴⁷ "Sed nos sumus filii immediate ab eo geniti, ideo plene portamus signum ipsius, scilicet habitum quo usus fuit statim post conversionem. Nunquam enim ultra mare talis habitus visus est qualem portant Canonici regulares, sed omnes religiosi induuntur de nigro et super latam tunicam corrigia cinguntur." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 363.

¹⁴⁸ "Non est autem in hoc disputandum, maxime quia, et si illum Ordinem et nostrum instituit, totum ad laudem ipsius gloriosi patris cedit quanto plures filios in Christo genuit." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 370.

amator et lampas luminis virtutum. Cuius tempore predictus papa Alexander ab amore beati Augustini, ei in visione magnus capite et parvus membris apparens, primo anno sui pontificatus predictum Ordinem tam in personis quam in gratiis augmentavit, huic Ordini brictones, fabarios, iambonitas, atque guglielmitas iungendo, gratias numquam similes alicui religioni traditas [condonando], ut in suis privilegiis continetur, predictum fratrem Phylippum volens, ut antea erat, priorem dicti Ordinis preficere, qui obmissis huius gratia multis lacrimis fere recusare obtinuit. Et tunc fratrem Lanfranchum de Mediolano, virum prudentem, eis priorem instituit generalem, ut per se suosque, fideles a vitiis et a peccatis franchos faceret, quod plene usque in hodiernum diem faciunt et facient de bono in melius in agro Domini mirifice fructificantes, ipso auxiliante, qui est unus in substantia, trinus in personis. Qui est laudabilis et benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen.

nus dicto pape Allexandro in visione apparuit grandis capite, sed membris exilis, ut ipse Papa testatus est, ex quo motus fuit dicto nostro Ordini unire plures alios Ordines qui erant aequaliter heremite, scilicet britones et sabarios, inter quos multi sic uniti erant in marchia Anconitana, guillemmitas et iambonitas.

Tunc autem adimpleta fuit prophetia abbatis Joachim in *expositione* quam fecit *super apokalypsim*, ubi dicit: Surgit [sic] ordo novus qui videtur novus et non est, induti nigris vestibus et accincti desuper zona. Hii crescent et fama divulgabitur ipsorum et predicabunt fidem quam defendent usque in finem mundi. Per angelos enim istos intelliguntur aliqui ordinis iustorum, quorum unus erit fervens et ardens ad secandam vineam reproborum ac si spiritu Elye. Qui erit ordo heremitarum emulantium vitam angelorum, quorum vita erit quasi ignis ardens in amore et zelo Dei ad comburendum tribulos et spinas, ne mali abutantur amplius patientiae Dei. Surgent enim equi nigri et hii defendent Ecclesiam et fides singulariter erit in eis et predicabunt veritatem et resistent filio iniquitatis et usque in finem fortiter stabunt. Gaudeant ergo heremitarum duces, quorum pater Paulus primus heremita. Hec ille.

Facta autem unione omnium predictorum heremitarum sancti Augustini generalis prior fuit frater Lanfranchus de Mediolano per ecclesiam Romanam institutus.

In the *Initium*, Alexander is moved by his own love for Augustine, who then appeared to him with a large head but small body, whereupon Alexander effected the Union. With Nicholas there is a change, which can be seen as an intensification of the mythic. Nicholas nowhere mentions Alexander's love for Augustine. Augustine assumes a more active role with Nicholas, whereby based on Augustine's appearing to Alexander, Alexander was moved to act, whereas in the *Initium*, Alexander's love for Augustine preceded the vision, which then prompted his action. The author of the *Initium* makes Alexander the subject of the verb, performing the activity, adding the vision in a dependent clause — *Alexander ... augmentavit* — whereas Nicholas places the verbal action with Augustine — *Augustinus ... apparuit* — attributing to Alexander a passive role — *ex quo motus fuit ... unire*.¹⁴⁹ Such re-employment would then later become even more definite in Jordan's narration, when Jordan claimed that Augustine appeared to Alexander, as a divine oracle, wanting to end the dispersion of his own religion.¹⁵⁰ There is a marked shift in the attribution of the initiative for the Great Union from Alexander to Augustine.¹⁵¹ Nicholas goes even further when he then associates for the first time the foundation of the OESA in the Great Union with the *novus ordo* prophesied by Joachim.

All the evidence taken together, Nicholas claimed, proves that "blessed Augustine was the leader, teacher, head and father of the hermits."¹⁵² Nicholas concluded by arguing that the Church's approbation of the Order did not occur by chance, but that the Church declared the OESA to be the true sons of Augustine with good reason, and had from ancient times. Thus the Order merits its unique title, even if other orders as well follow Augustine's Rule.¹⁵³ Nicholas' intensifications of the

¹⁴⁹ Nicolas continued with a list of the Order's prior generals, extending to and including William of Cremona; see Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 372-373.

¹⁵⁰ VF 1,14 (47,80-85).

¹⁵¹ The shift is from the *Initium*'s *Alexander ab amore beati Augustini, ei in visione...apparens...augmentavit*.; to Nicolas' *beatus Augustinus dicto pape Allexandro in visione apparuit...ex quo motus fuit dicto nostro Ordini unire*.; and then to Jordan's *beatus Augustinus, volens dispersionem suae Religionis congregari...in visione apparuit...ex qua visione velut divino oraculo papa commonitus unionem...consummavit*. See also Rano, "San Agustín y los origenes de su Orden," 658-667; and esp. 658-659, where Rano also presents these three versions, together with Henry of Friemar's, in chronological succession, without, however, commenting on the relationship between them and construction of the myth.

¹⁵² "Sic ergo apparet quod beatus Augustinus dux, magister, caput et pater fuit heremitarum." Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 373.

¹⁵³ Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 375-376.

historical details combined with mythic elements and his campaign against the Regular Canons, heightened as well the security of his co-religious listening to his sermon in Paris in 1332; as the true sons of Augustine they and they alone were entitled to call Augustine *pater noster*. The same essential argumentation and strategy would two years later be formulated anew in the first treatise explicitly written in defense of the Order, the *Tractatus* of Henry of Friemar.

D. Henry of Friemar's *Tractatus*

In 1334, as he was nearing the end of his career, Henry of Friemar composed his *Tractatus de origine et progressu ordinis fratrum heremitarum et vero ac proprio titulo eiusdem*. Henry began his treatise with a statement of purpose:

Because some, being ignorant of the path of conversion and comportment of the most glorious doctor, blessed Augustine, our unique father and patron, are able to question by what reason the brothers of our religion are especially said to be the brothers of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine in comparison with the other religious professing his Rule, the above stated truth, namely, wherefore justly and rationally such a title is attributed especially to us by the holy Roman church, is therefore able to be made know in three ways.¹⁵⁴

Henry then notes that such a truth is evident from Augustine's conversion, from his comportment, and from various statements and deeds concerning the Order's approbation.¹⁵⁵ These he treated in chapters one through three respectively, before summarizing the evidence in chapter four. Chapter five then continues with an enumeration of the Priors General of the Order, both before and after the Great Union. The treatise concludes with a short chapter highlighting the Order's brothers of famous sanctity. Throughout Henry was clear that his purpose was to offer conclusive proof that only the OESA had the right to be called the true sons of Augustine, whose origins can be traced from the time of Augustine himself. In so doing, Henry also contributed to the creation of the Augustinian myth.

¹⁵⁴ "Quia nonnulli ignorantes modum conversionis et actum conversationis gloriosissimi doctoris beati Augustini, singularis patris nostri et patroni, possent dubitare, ex qua ratione fratres nostrae religionis prae ceteris religiosis suam regulam profitentibus fratres ordinis eremitarum sancti Augustini specialiter dicerentur: ideo praedicta veritas, quare videlicet iuste et rationabiliter nobis per sanctam Romanam ecclesiam sit talis titulus specialiter attributus, potest via triplici declarari." Hen. *Tract.* 1 (90,1-8). I have translated *actus conversationis* as comportment, to distinguish this term from *modus vivendi*.

¹⁵⁵ Hen. *Tract.* 1 (90,9-11).

In chapter one Henry addressed Augustine's conversion and baptism. The catalysts for his baptism were divine inspiration, and the erudition of St. Ambrose. Yet in conjunction with these, was the influence of Simplicianus. According to Henry, Simplicianus was a hermit, "who first in Rome served God most devoutly from his youth following the example of Paul, the first Hermit, and blessed Anthony, and afterwards, coming to Milan, fervently lead a solitary and eremitical life with many associates."¹⁵⁶ Augustine visited Simplicianus, confessing to him the errors of his life, whereupon Simplicianus read him the lives of blessed Anthony and other desert fathers, and told him of the example of Victorinus, who publically confessed his faith. Upon hearing such accounts, Augustine was set on fire for the catholic faith, leading eventually to his conversion and baptism.¹⁵⁷ Though Arbesmann claimed that Henry was the first Augustinian to have made Simplicianus into a hermit,¹⁵⁸ the first mention of Simplicianus as a hermit is actually found in the *Sermo de beato Augustino* of Nicholas of Alessandria:

Nic.Al. *Sermo*; 364-365

Hen. *Tract.* 1 (90,15-19)

Sanctum autem Simplicianus, quem sepe nominat pater Augustinus in libro *Confessionum*, existens Rome, exemplo predictorum heremitarum a iuventute sua devotissime vivere et Deo servire cepit, qui, Mediolanum veniens, vitam solitariam et heremiticam cum multis sociis devotissime duxit.

...[beatus Simplicianus eremita] qui primo Romae exemplo Pauli primi eremitaie et beati Antonii a sua iuventute deo devotissime serviebat et postmodum veniens Mediolanum vitam solitariam et eremiticam cum multis sociis ferventissime duxit.

Furthermore, the close parallels between this passage in the texts of Henry and Nicholas, suggest that either they had a common source, or that Henry used Nicholas' *Sermo*. Henry mentions that he drew from *antiquae legendae non abbreviatae*, yet such sources are no long extent, if they ever

¹⁵⁶ "Nam licet primarium motivum suae conversionis habuerit per divinam inspirationem et per beati Ambrosii salutarem eruditionem, complementum tamen suae conversionis habuit per beatum Simplicianum eremitam, qui primo Romae exemplo Pauli primi eremitaie et beati Antonii a sua iuventute deo devotissime serviebat et postmodum veniens Mediolanum vitam solitariam et eremiticam cum multis sociis ferventissime duxit." Hen. *Tract.* 1 (90,12-19).

¹⁵⁷ Hen. *Tract.* 1 (90,19-91,29).

¹⁵⁸ Arbesmann, *HFT*, 45-49.

were. As Arbesmann notes, Jordan referred to Philip of Harvengt's *Vita Sancti Augustini* as *legenda famosa, solemnitas et antiqua*, which should caution against giving too much weight to the adjective *antiqua*.¹⁵⁹ If such legends were common knowledge to the members of the Order, it does cause one to question why earlier texts such as the anonymous Florentine *Vita* and the *Initium* were completely silent in this regard. In any case, Henry did not restrict his account to that given by Nicholas. Henry attributed to Simplicianus the story in the *Confessions* of Ponticianus having read Augustine the *Vita* of Anthony, which served as a major stimulus for his continued path toward conversion.¹⁶⁰ In Henry's account, after his encounter with Simplicianus, Augustine became a catechumen and together "with Alipius and Adeodatus began to live with blessed Simplicianus and his associates according to the way of life of those friars, by whose examples he was converted to the catholic faith."¹⁶¹ Henry continued by repeating the story of Augustine's baptism and his composition together with Ambrosius of the *Te deum laudamus*, leaving Augustine's investment with the monastic habit to the following chapter. Making sure that no one would miss the import, Henry concluded the first chapter by arguing:

From these things it is evidently clear, that since blessed Augustine, from the example of the hermit saints, who were the first founders of our religion, was ultimately converted to the faith of Christ by blessed Simplicianus and for a certain time stayed with him and his associates [dressed] in their habit and afterwards handed down the rule of living to our brothers following this eremitical life (as will be discussed below), that justly and reasonably the holy Roman Church called our brothers the friars of the Order of hermits of St. Augustine; for even though our brothers before being given the Rule by blessed Augustine were simply called hermits, nevertheless, based on the Rule given them by blessed Augustine that title for the Order was approved by the Roman Church, and from that time on they were appropriately called the friars of the Order of hermits of St. Augustine, whose unique and true father was Augustine, not only through his taking on the habit, but even from his living with them for a long time and his giving of the Rule, as will clearly be seen below.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ See Arbesmann, *HFT*, 51ff.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ "Et ex tunc beatus Augustinus, factus catechumenus a beato Ambrosio, cum Alipio et puero Adeodato coepit vivere cum beato Simpliciano et sociis eius secundum modum illorum fratrum, quorum exemplis est conversus ad fidem catholicam." Hen. *Tract.* 1 (91,36-39).

¹⁶² "Ex quibus evidenter patet, quod cum beatus Augustinus exemplo sanctorum eremitarum, qui fuerunt primarii nostrae religionis fundatores, per beatus Simplicianus ad fidem Christi ultimate conversus fuerit et cum eodem et sociis suis in ipsorum habitu per

In chapter two Henry then begins with Augustine's baptism and assuming the habit of a hermit, given him by Ambrose and Simplicianus, together with an explication of the symbolic meaning of the habit.¹⁶³ He then turns to Augustine's journey back to Africa. On the way, Augustine happened upon the hermits in Centumcellae, and stayed with them for a period of two years. For these he composed his Rule, and the hermitage in Centumcellae became the first location of the Order.¹⁶⁴ Finally arriving in Africa, Augustine was received by bishop Valerius. Knowing of Augustine's monastic desires, Valerius gave him a garden in a wooded villa where he could devote himself to contemplation, prayer and study.¹⁶⁵ Henry then brought in Possidius, to prove that Augustine's first monastery was that in the garden of Valerius: "In which place, as Possidius said, having directly built a monastery, he began to gather brothers of the same mind and with them to live according to the way of life and rule of the holy apostles, which he had already done even earlier when he returned from across the sea to his homeland."¹⁶⁶ Henry apparently here inverted the temporal sequence, because he continued with Augustine's ordination as presbyter,¹⁶⁷ emphasizing that his first monastery was that in Valerius' garden. Possidius' phrase *which he had previously done when he returned from across the sea to his homeland*, is used as

tempus aliquod steterit et postea fratribus nostris hanc vitam eremiticam sectantibus regulam vivendi per se ipsum tradiderit (ut infra dicitur): quod iuste et rationabiliter sancta Romana ecclesia nostros fratres ordinis eremitarum sancti Augustini appellavit; licet enim fratres nostri prius ante dationem regulae per beatum Augustinum dicerentur simpliciter eremitae, ex regula tamen ipsis per beatum Augustinum tradita per Romanam ecclesiam iste titulus ordini approbatus fuit, ut ex tunc appropriate dicerentur fratres ordinis eremitarum sancti Augustini, quorum singulis et verus pater esset non tantum per habitus assumptionem sed etiam per suum diuturnum convictum et regulae dationem, ut infra clarius apparebit." Hen. *Tract.* 1 (92,53-68).

¹⁶³ Hen. *Tract.* 2 (92,1-95,67).

¹⁶⁴ Hen. *Tract.* 2 (95,68-96,90); cf. Nic. Al. *Sermo*, 365-367. The textual parallels between Nicolas' *sermo* and Henry's *Tractatus* again are suggestive of Henry's knowledge of Nicolas' text; whereas the author of the *Initium* claimed it most uncertain precisely where Augustine's first eremitical community in Italy had been, Nicolas is then clear that it was Centumcellae, which Henry was as well. If Centumcellae had been long established in the *legendae antiquae* as the first location of the OESA, it seems odd that the author of the *Initium*, or that of the Florentine *Vita*, apparently had no knowledge thereof.

¹⁶⁵ Hen. *Tract.* 2 (97,110-117); cf. Nic. Al. *Sermo*, 368.

¹⁶⁶ "In quo loco, ut dicit Possidius, mox aedificato monasterio coepit eiusdem propositi fratres colligere et cum eis vivere secundum modum et regulam sanctorum apostolorum, quod etiam ipse pridem iam fecerat, quando trans mare ad sua redierat." Hen. *Tract.* 2 (97,117-121).

¹⁶⁷ Hen. *Tract.* 2 (97,121-127).

evidence of Augustine's early monastic foundations, before having been ordained. In chapter three Henry mentioned Augustine's monastery in Valerius' garden as proof of Augustine's eremitical life, again citing Possidius as evidence, and then a final time in chapter four, summarizing the points made in the first three chapters. In the last reference, Possidius' emplotment is restored, whereby Augustine founded a monastery upon his ordination as presbyter, used as conclusive proof of Augustine's early foundations:

Hen. *Tract.* 2
(97,112-121)

Qui agnito suo proposito, quod orationi et devotioni et studio sacrarum litterarum ardentius insistere desideraret, in quadam villa silvestri sibi hortellum dedit, ut sic ab hominum conversatione semotus in illo loco solitario quietius studio, orationi et contemplationi vacaret. In quo loco, ut dicit Possidius, mox aedificato monasterio coepit eiusdem propositi fratres colligere et cum eis vivere secundum modum et regulam sanctorum apostolorum, quod etiam ipse pridem iam fecerat, quando transmare ad sua redierat.

Hen. *Tract.* 3
(101,87-93)

... hoc idem fecit in Africa in illo hortello sibi dato per beatum Valerium in quadam villa silvestri extra Hipponem, ubi monasterium eremiticum instituit, in quo plures fratres eiusdem propositi collegit, ut patet ex tertio articulo auctoritate Possidii; in quo etiam monasteria extra civitatem Hipponensem beatus Augustinus creditur spiritum exhalasse et coram praedictis fratribus vigilantibus et orantibus feliciter obdormisse.

Hen. *Tract.* 4
(106,19-33)

Tertia est, quod, licet de eo legatur, quod factus presbyter monasterium clericorum mox instituerit, cum quibus coepit vivere secundum regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam, hoc tamen non est sic intelligendum, quod tunc primo regulam et modum vivendi apostolicum instituerit, quando istud monasterium clericorum iuxta ecclesiam construxit, quia prius in Italia in loco et habitu eremitico ipsam nostris fratribus composuit, tradidit et servavit. Quod patet expresse per auctoritatem sancti Possidii, qui vitam beati Augustini conscripsit, in quo libro sic dicit, quod 'factus presbyter monasterium instituit et

coepit vivere secundum regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam, quod tamen ipse prius fecerat, cum a partibus transmarinis ad propria remeasset.' Ex quo verbo manifeste apparet, quod illam regulam prius in Italia instituit et servavit, antequam in Africam applicaret.

What had been a vague reference, for Henry, as for Nicholas, was explicit evidence of Augustine's early eremitical life.

Henry only treats Augustine's early monasticism, omitting discussion of Augustine's monastic foundations after having been ordained bishop. For Henry, the point to be made is that Augustine first lived as a hermit, and founded his Order accordingly; the rest is inconsequential. Thus in chapter three, Henry continued his argument "that blessed Augustine assumed the monastic habit of our fathers and held to an eremitical life with them from the time of his own conversion and also gave them a rule and way of life," by bringing forth authorities, both of words and deeds.¹⁶⁸ Henry first mentioned Ambrose and the pseudo-Ambrosian *Sermo de baptismo et conversione sancti Augustini*, which he had cited previously in chapter two. The second proof-text offered is the pseudo-Augustinian *sermo de Passione*, from which Henry then quotes.¹⁶⁹ He then claimed as his third point his overall theme, which he repeatedly hammers home, namely, that the members of the Order of Hermits of Saint Augustine "are the true and proper sons of blessed Augustine and he is their true father, which is clear because he wore their habit in their hermitage and gave them the Rule of living."¹⁷⁰ After

¹⁶⁸ "Nam quod beatus Augustinus habitum monasticum nostrorum patrum assumpserit et vitam eremiticam cum eis in principio suae conversionis tenuerit ac etiam regulam et modum vivendi eis tradiderit, hoc ex variis auctoritatum dictis et etiam ex variis factis ostendi potest." Hen. *Tract.* 3 (98,1-5).

¹⁶⁹ Hen. *Tract.* 3 (98,6-99,28).

¹⁷⁰ "Tertio, hoc idem patet sic. Quod enim ordo fratrum eremitarum sancti Augustini et fratres illius ordinis sint veri et proprii filii beati Augustini et ipse sit eorum verus pater, ex hoc patet, quod eorum habitum in eremo portavit et eis regulam vivendi tradidit,

citing canon law which pertained to the privileges of the OESA, Henry concluded that only the OESA has the right to be called by its title, even though other Orders might be called by Augustine's name and live according to his Rule; only the OESA is the original and true Order of Augustine and therefore "that title, *ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini* belongs only to our Order and to no other."¹⁷¹ He then repeats the three pieces of evidence to prove that Augustine lived as a hermit, namely, his living as such with Simplicianus, his stay with the Tuscan hermits at Centumcellae, and finally, his establishing a monastery in Valerius' garden, citing Possidius as proof. Directly following, Henry claimed that this was confirmed by Pope John XXII in public consistory, which he, Henry, had heard from a reliable witness. Shortly thereafter, in the same chapter, in summarizing his arguments, Henry again mentioned the same approbation.

This begs the question of who this reliable witness might have been. Above I noted the textual parallels between Henry's *Tractatus* and Nicholas of Alessandria's *Sermo*. Though not absolutely conclusive, the *quidam vir authenticus*, from whom Henry had heard this tale, seems to have been Nicholas, since Nicholas included such a discussion in his *Sermo*:

Hen. *Tract.* 3 (101,94-102,108)

Et hoc, prout audiui a quodam viro authentico, fuit in publico consistorio coram sanctissimo patre domino Johanne XXII et omnibus cardinalibus declaratum, cui sententiae etiam ipse dominus Johannes praedictus dicitur consensisse, inducens pro argumento,

Hen. *Tract.* 3 (104,164-105,174)

Hoc idem patet tertio ex gestis sanctissimi patris et domini domini Johannis papae XXII, qui ad devotam instantiam reverendi patris magistri Guillelmi de Cremona primo anno generalatus sui officii sacro approbante collegio dominorum cardinalium locum et custodiam venerabilis

Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 373

... [Guillelmus de Cremona] qui primo anno officii sui a domino Johanne papa XXII locum et custodiam corporis sacratissimi patris Augustini deinceps in perpetuum impetravit sacro approbante cardinalium collegio et hoc quia tam domino Pape quam collegio cardina-

ut patet ex supradictis." Hen. *Tract.* 3 (99,29-33).

¹⁷¹ "Ex quo patet, quod iste titulus *ordo eremitarum sancti Augustini* est solum proprius nostro ordini et nulli alii." Hen. *Tract.* 3 (100,64-66); see *ibid.*, (100,56-101,80) for Henry's discussion of the title.

quod fratres nostri sint veri et proprii filii beati Augustini et quod ipse verus et proprius pater noster est, quia nobis regulam suam prius tradidit (quam servamus) quam eam traderet canonicis regularibus ...

Et ideo ex illo motivo et aliis rationabiliter motus fuit idem papa Johannes, ut caput suis membris, magistrum suis discipulis reuniret.

corporis sanctissimi patris et patroni nostri beati Augustini in perpetuum nostro ordini commendavit, contulit et donavit, confirmans illam donationem athenitico privilegio et gratioso, in quo sic ait:

‘Dignum quidem aestimavimus,

ut pater suis filiis, caput suis membris, magister suis discipulis, dux suis militibus sub tanto patre devote militantibus uniretur.’

lium declaratum fuit per privilegia summorum pontificum superius nominatorum et per auctoritates inferius nominata [sic] quod beatus Augustinus nostrum Ordinem instituit immediate dando regulam, ut super patuit, et eundem nobiscum habitum portavit. Ex quo in privilegiis concessionis sue idem dominus Johannes papa XXII^{us} dicit: ‘Quod in loco ubi tumultatus est tantus pater dignum arbitratur et congruum quod ibi ultra id quod sibi honoris et laudis ab universali exhibetur Ecclesia singulari quadam reverentia a dilectis filiis priore generali et fratribus Ordinis heremitarum eiusdem sancti Augustini specialiter honoretur, quatenus inibi tamquam membra suo capiti, filii patri, magistro discipuli, duci milititer coherentes Deo et ipsi sancto auctoritate fulti apostolica precordialius iubilent ubi et preceptoris eorum, patris, ducis et capitis Augustini noverint reliquias fore sepultas ...’ Sic

ergo apparet quod beatus Augustinus dux, magister, caput et pater fuit heremitarum.

Henry did not cite the text of the bull, *Veneranda sanctorum patrum* verbatim; Nicholas' text is much closer to that of John XXII, though not without its own interpolations.¹⁷² It thus seems highly unlikely that Henry was using a text of the bull itself for his source. Moreover, Henry first stated that he had heard this account from a witness, rather than that he had read it, or had been present at the consistory himself. Nicholas' sermon would have served exceedingly well as his source, and Nicholas may indeed have been the witness from whom he heard the account. Further, Henry quoted the same passage from Joachim to argue that the OESA should be identified with the *novus ordo* as did Nicholas.¹⁷³ Though this last example in itself does not go far to suggest Henry's knowledge of Nicholas' *Sermo*, another parallel is more difficult to dismiss. Arbesmann considered Henry to have been the first Augustinian to have made the claim that "before founding his own Order, St. Francis of Assisi had been a member of the Augustinian hermitage of St. James of Aquaviva near Pisa."¹⁷⁴ The same account, however, is found in Nicholas' *Sermo*, word for word:

Hen. *Tract.* 5 (111,8-112,39)

Tempore vero Innocenti III frater Johannes, dictus de Cella. Circa quod tempus beatus Franciscus cum dictis fratribus habitavit; et quidam asserunt, quod fuerit frater dicti ordinis in loco sancti Jacobi de Aquaviva iuxta Pisas.

Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 371

Tempore Innocentii pape tertii frater Iohannes dictus de Cella, circa quod tempus beatus Franciscus cum dictis fratribus habitavit et quidam dicunt quod fuit frater dicti Ordinis in loco sancti Iacobi de Aqua viva iuxta Pissas.

¹⁷² For the text of the bull, see Arbesmann's notes to Hen. *Tract.* 3 (104,164-105,174; 133-134).

¹⁷³ Hen. *Tract.* 4 (108,83-109,97); cf. Nic.Al. *Sermo* (372). For Joachimist influences in the OESA, see Marjorie Reeves, "Joachimist Expectations in the Order of Augustinian Hermits," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 25 (1958): 111-141; cf. A. Zumkeller, "Joachim von Fiore und sein angeblicher Einfluss auf den Augustiner-Eremitenorden (Kritische Bemerkungen zu einer Untersuchung M. Reeves)," *Augustinianum* 3 (1963): 382-388.

¹⁷⁴ Arbesmann, *HFT*, 62-63.

Yet, *pace* Arbesmann, neither Henry, nor Nicholas was the first to make the connection between Francis and the Augustinian hermits in Italy. In his discussion of the religious Orders that arose after the early Augustinian hermits, the author of the *Initium* then returned to the early groups of Tuscan anchorites and hermits, from whom the OESA itself originated. Among these the author mentioned blessed William and blessed Galganus.¹⁷⁵ He then commented: "Blessed Francis, visiting those said hermits, filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit in the year of our Lord 1206 began the perfect Order of friars minor."¹⁷⁶ If the version whereby Francis not only visited the Augustinian hermits in Tuscany, but also lived with them and perhaps was even one of them, had been commonly known within the Order in 1330, the author of the *Initium* surely would have reported the fact; yet he limited his account to Francis' visit to the Tuscan hermits. Only then with Nicholas do we find the account of Francis, as some say, having been a member of the Augustinian hermits in the hermitage of St. James of Aquaviva, near Pisa, which Henry copied verbatim. The author of the *Initium*, Nicholas, and Henry all composed their works within approximately four years of each other, 1330, 1332, and 1334 respectively. If the story of Francis' Augustinian origins had been common knowledge, it seems strange that the author of the *Initium* would have toned down the story to a mere visit, and have omitted the precise location thereof. It could be that both Nicholas and Henry used the same source, which perhaps was also their common source for their parallel representations of Simplicianus as a hermit, not found in the *Initium* or the earlier Florentine *Vita*. Yet even if not completely conclusive, taken together the evidence strongly suggests that Henry knew Nicholas' *Sermo*, and used it as a major source for his *Tractatus*. Henry was present in Paris in 1329 for the General Chapter, at which the negotiations with the Canons were again discussed,¹⁷⁷ and as mentioned above, Nicholas may very well have been involved with the negotiations from the very beginning. It is thus certainly possible that the two had met in Paris, or at least that they had known each other, given their respective positions in the Order. It should also be noted that Henry embellished the accounts found in Nicholas. I have already discussed this with regard to Henry's portrayal of Simplicianus. With the Francis account, in some of the manuscripts of the

¹⁷⁵ *Initium*, 343.

¹⁷⁶ "Beatus autem Franciscus dictos heremitas visitans, Sancti Spiritus gratia aff[li]atus, anno Domini MCCVI^o perfectum Ordinem fratrum minorum incepit." *Initium*, 343.

¹⁷⁷ Arbesmann, *HFT*, 43.

Tractatus there are additional interpolations. Arbesmann included these in his edition by printing them in smaller font and marking them as particular to a given manuscript, without having discussed the possibility of redaction.¹⁷⁸ Yet if Henry was 'rewriting' Nicholas, it could very well have been that he first included a more straight-forward account drawn from Nicholas and then later re-worked his source, thus yielding the interpolations in the other manuscripts.

Henry's rewriting of Nicholas can also be seen in the third story that Arbesmann saw as originating with Henry, namely, the vision of Alexander IV.¹⁷⁹ Above I have pointed to the development in the representations of the vision, which first appears in the *Initium*. Henry's version is far closer to Nicholas' than to that of the *Initium*, which again, in light of the evidence presented here suggests that Henry had Nicholas' *Sermo* on his desk:

Initium, 344-345

Nic.Al. *Sermo*, 372

Hen. *Tract.* 3
(103,120-134)

Insuper tempore Allessandri pape III^{ti} erat prior predicti Ordinis frater Phylippus de Parrana, supernorum amator et lampas luminis virtutum. Cuius tempore predictus papa Alexander ab amore beati Augustini, ei in visione magnus capite et parvus membris apparens, primo anno sui pontificatus predictum Ordinem tam in personis quam in gratiis augmentavit, huic Or-

Tempore Allexandri quarti, frater Philippus de Parrana. Quo tempore beatus Augustinus dicto pape Allexandro in visione apparuit grandis capite, sed membris exilis, ut ipse Papa testatus est, ex quo motus fuit dicto nostro Ordini unire plures alios Ordines qui erant aliquantulum heremite, scilicet britones et sabarios, inter quod multi sic uniti erant in marchia Ancho-

Nam tempore Alexandri papae IV, ut ipsemet testatus est, beatus Augustinus eidem in visione apparuit grandis quidem capite sed membris exilis. Ex qua visione tamquam divino oraculo ipse papa commonitus univit fratribus eremitis sancti Augustini plures alios ordines similiter in eremis habitantes, mandans ipsis ut, quicumque ex eis essent idonei ad fructificandum

¹⁷⁸ Hen. *Tract.* 5 (111-112); cf. Arbesmann, *HFT*, 81-88.

¹⁷⁹ In his notes to Henry's presentation of the vision, Arbesmann refers the reader to the note in *VF* (450, note 9), concerning Jordan's version of the vision, in which Arbesmann and Hümpfner state that Henry was the first Augustinian to have included the vision, which has a parallel at least in the Franciscan tradition regarding Francis appearing to Innocent III in a vision.

dini brictones, faba-
rios, iambonitas, atque
guglielmitas iungendo,
gratias numquam simi-
les alicui religioni
traditas [condonando]

...

nitana, guillermitas et
iambonitas.

in populo per doctri-
nam verbi divini, quod
illi deberent in civi-
tatibus habitare et
exemplari vita ac salu-
tari doctrina simulque
confessione provida
dei populum irrigare
aliis fratribus nihilo-
minus secundum dis-
positionem prioris
generalis in eremo re-
manentibus, muniens
eos privilegiis et gratiis
tali statui congruenti-
bus. In qua quidem vi-
sione beatus Augusti-
nus aperte ostendit se
esse verum caput et
verum patrem huius
ordinis et per conse-
quens ipsos fratres esse
veros filios et vera
membra ipsius.

Two points are to be noted in this regard. First, Henry followed the version of the vision as found in Nicholas more closely than he did that in the *Initium*, and thus what I said above concerning the variations between the *Initium* and Nicholas applies as well to Henry's account, namely, an emphasis on the active role given to Augustine. Second, Henry did not simply copy Nicholas' version. As he did with the story of Simplicianus, Henry embellished the text as found in his source. There are two aspects of Henry's emplotment that merit special mention. First, he increased the active role of Augustine even further by being the first to refer to Augustine's appearance to Alexander as a divine oracle. As mentioned above and as to be discussed in more detail below, Jordan would take this over from Henry, while then adding his own contribution of attributing the instigation of the Union completely to Augustine's will (*volens dispersionem suae Religionis congregari*). If Nicholas' version represents an intensification of the story as given in the *Initium*, Henry's interpolation

is an intensification of Nicholas. Second, Henry went beyond the mere repetition of the mythical account. To this vision Henry joined the mission statement of the OESA: Alexander's charging the Order with teaching and preaching, sending the hermits into the cities.

For in the time of Pope Alexander IV, as he himself testified, blessed Augustine appeared to him in a vision with a large head, but small body. From this vision, as if from a divine oracle, the Pope was moved to unite with the hermit friars of St. Augustine many other Orders living similarly in hermitages, commanding them that their members capable of doing so were to bring forth fruits among the people by teaching the divine word, because they were to live in the cities and to nourish the people of God by their exemplary life, their salutary teaching, and by hearing confessions...¹⁸⁰

The distinction in the Order's history drawn by Alexander's commissioning the sons of Augustine to teach and preach in the cities supplies proof of the OESA's antiquity and continuity. As Henry affirmed, the OESA was much older than either the Franciscan or the Dominican Order with regard to its institution by Augustine himself, although in terms of its missionary, pastoral endeavor received from Alexander, it followed the other two mendicant Orders. Thus Henry was able to meet challenges regarding the OESA's recent origins. The Order itself can be traced back to Augustine, yet its missionary presence in the cities is dated to the time after the Great Union. Henry provided a defense for the ecclesiastical and papal confirmation of the Order's legitimacy in light of Lateran IV's ban on new religious Orders.¹⁸¹ This distinction Jordan would later designate as that between the *status antiquus* and *status modernus*.

In his exposition of Augustine's vision to Alexander, Henry affirmed the Order's pastoral mission to bear fruit among the people, making provisions for the embodiment of Augustine. In his vision to Alexander, Augustine appeared with a large head but small body, which then was in need of 'filling out'. As Henry explicitly stated, the members of the Order were the members of Augustine's body: "holy mother Church recognized for our Order the most holy Augustine for our true father and unique head, and consequently the friars of this Order ought to be called

¹⁸⁰ "Nam tempore Alexandri papae IV, ut ipsemet testatus est, beatus Augustinus eidem in visione apparuit grandis quidem capite sed membris exilis. Ex qua visione tamquam divino oraculo ipse papa commonitus univit fratribus eremitis sancti Augustini plures alios ordines similiter in eremis habitantes, mandans ipsis ut, quicumque ex eis essent idonei ad fructificandum in populo per doctrinam verbi divini, quod illi deberent in civitatibus habitare et exemplari vita ac salutari doctrina simulque confessione provida dei populum irrigare..." Hen. *Tract.* 3 (103,120-128).

¹⁸¹ Hen. *Tract.* 4 (109,98-105).

his true sons and his own members."¹⁸² The OESA was to be the embodiment of Augustine. With Henry's *Tractatus*, the Augustinian myth was beginning to create the Augustinian identity.

It is certainly possible that the historical representations of the Order's origins had long been part of the Order's oral traditions, only achieving written form some sixty to seventy years after the Great Union. Yet in the earliest texts narrating the Order's foundations, first by Augustine and then by Alexander IV—or rather, first by Augustine personally, and then later by Augustine supernaturally—the story does not emerge full-blown all at once. The author of the anonymous Florentine *Vita* may have been at work before he saw the dire need for the extensive account that his co-religious shortly thereafter gave, but certainly the author of the *Initium* sought to use whatever material he could come up with as evidence. Thus the *Initium* gives the first mention of St. Francis in connection with the Tuscan hermits, and the first textualization of Augustine appearing to Alexander IV in a vision. Approximately two years later, Nicholas of Alessandria offered embellished accounts of both these events, and turned Simplicianus himself into a hermit. Apparently drawing directly from Nicholas, Henry of Friemar then composed the first treatise explicitly as a defense of the Order, in which he too then rewrote what he found in his source. The stories may have all been 'common knowledge', and they certainly would become so, but between 1330 and 1334, in Florence, Paris, and Erfurt, the accounts of the OESA's origins became increasingly mythicized as they became increasingly textualized.

It is tempting as well to see the embellishment of the myth progressing as it moved north. Having begun in Italy, most likely in Florence with the *Vita* and *Initium*, the myth of Augustine spread to Paris with Nicholas' *Sermo*, and then received its most flowery expression in the Erfurt of Henry. Such an *itinerarium* is especially compelling if I have been successful above in arguing for Henry's textual dependency on Nicholas' *Sermo*. Yet the fact remains that regardless of Henry's appeal to 'ancient legends', and regardless of the *quidam dicunt*'s offered by Henry and Nicholas as rhetorical strategies for giving their accounts plausibility, unless new sources are discovered, the earliest texts extant representing the origins of the OESA are the ones I have treated above, and the ones in which we find a development of the story, the texts in which we find the creation and embellishment of the Augustinian myth. Nicholas' *Sermo* is

¹⁸² "...quod sancta mater ecclesia sanctissimum Augustinum nostro ordini pro vero patre et singulari capite recognoscit et per consequens fratres huius ordinis eius veri filii et eius membra propria dici debent." Hen. *Tract.* 3 (105,174-177).

the earliest extant text that explicitly names Centumcellae as the first location of the OESA, Augustine having lived with the hermits there for two years, and at their request, composed his Rule, which then he later established in Africa, once having returned to his homeland. If Nicholas' *Sermo* was also the earliest textual witness available, then recognizing a development of the account would be more tenuous, being the first textualization of an oral tradition. But the fact that the *Initium* leaves the precise details vague, arguing only, though forcefully, that Augustine's first hermitage was in Italy, and there he first wrote the Rule, suggests that the tradition of Centumcellae was not so firmly established in 1330 that it was simply accepted as fact. The generally known, accepted, and repeated account of Augustine's early eremitical life was created and established in the course of the 1330's when the author of the *Initium*, Nicholas, and Henry created the Augustinian myth in answering the question of what made one an Augustinian, a question that was not simply existential, but one that demanded a clear answer in the political contest for custody of Augustine's relics and tomb. In the early fourteenth century, the Augustinian Order was transformed into a 'mythic community'.¹⁸³

(to be continued)

The Hague

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¹⁸³ The term, 'mythic community' bears similarities to Brian Stock's 'textual communities'; see Stock, *The Implications of Literacy. Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Princeton, 1983); *idem, Listening For The Text. On the Uses of the Past* (Baltimore, 1990). The difference is that the center around which the community is formed is a particular myth rather than a particular text, though acknowledging the difficulties in defining a 'text' as distinct from a 'myth'. The Augustinian myth was certainly textual, but the text of the myth was not necessarily limited by any given written text. In this light, with a broad understanding of 'text', a mythic community can be considered to be a special type of textual community. To this extent, a 'mythic community' also resembles Renaissance civic myths: see, for example, Donald Weinstein, *Savonarola and Florence. Prophecy and Patriotism in the Renaissance* (Princeton, 1970); Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton, 1981); and Richard Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (New York, 1980).

A RECALCITRANT EDITOR OF GILES OF ROME, JACOBUS OF SIENA, O.S.A.

When Jacobus of Siena (c.1495-c.1555) published his edition of the *Metaphysicales Quaestiones Aureae* along with two other treatises of Giles of Rome in 1552, he addressed a prefatory letter to Christopher of Padua, prior general of the Augustinian Order (1551-1569), in the hope that it would win favor for him.¹ Jacobus doubtlessly viewed his edition as an achievement in which he could take pride. During his lifetime he had already attained the status of *magister*, held the office of provincial in two provinces, and served as regent of studies at the *studium generale* in Perugia. Yet within a very short time he was denounced by the same prior general as "a crazy man, ungrateful son, deceitful religious, false Christian, and devoid of reason." Stripped of his status as a *magister* with all of the attendant privileges, Jacobus ended his days in a most unhappy state. The tragic story of his arriving at such a sad finale has previously lain buried in the registers of the priors general of the Order.²

Since the material in the registers tends to reflect problems that needed attention by the priors general, reliance on them as the main source

¹ The only known autograph of Jacobus is found in the original acts of the general chapter of Recanati of May 1547, which are preserved in the Archivio Generale Agostiniano in Rome, Cc. 37, f. 201r, where he signed as "Ego fr. Iacobus Senensis, Rheni et Suevi diffinitor." Since this article is composed in English, the form Jacobus will be used rather than Iacobus. Iacobus in the Vulgate is rendered by English James, Italian Giacomo.

² The registers of Giles of Viterbo, edited by Albericus de Meijer, O.S.A., those of Girolamo Seripando, edited by David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., and five of those of Christopher of Padua, edited by Arnulf Hartmann, O.S.A., have been published in the series *Fontes Historiae Ordinis Sancti Augustini*. The pertinent volumes are: *Aegidii Viterbiensis, O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus II: 1514-1518* (Rome, 1984); *Hieronymi Seripando O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus I: 1538-1540* (Rome, 1982); id. II: 1540-1542 (Rome, 1983); id. III: 1542-1544 (Rome, 1985); id. IV: 1544-1546 (Rome, 1986); id. V: 1546-1548 (Rome, 1988); id. VI: 1548-1551 (Rome, 1990); *Christophori Patavini, O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus I: 1551-1552* (Rome, 1985); id. II: 1552-1554 (Rome, 1989); id. III: 1554-1555 (Rome, 1992); id. IV: 1556-1557 (Rome, 1995); id. V: 1557-1558 (Rome, 1997). These works will be referred to as, e.g., AEGIDIUS, II, with item number, SERIPANDO, I, with page number and CHRISTOPHER, I, with item number. Consultation of the registers of Seripando has been much facilitated by the improved index in *Hieronymi Seripando, O.S.A. Registra Generalatus 1538-1551, Index Generalis*, ed. Albericus de Meijer, O.S.A. (Rome, 1996).

of information results in a rather negative portrait of the conditions of the Order in Italy in the first half of the sixteenth century, roughly, the lifetime of Jacobus. When Jacobus was still a young religious, Martin Luther began his revolt and was followed by many others. Since there were no mass defections in Italy, many members of the Order there did not immediately respond to the gravity of the situation of the Church by a thorough reform of their religious lives. One of the factors that retarded reform during this period was the ease with which dispensations could be obtained from the Roman Curia.³ Other factors were long-standing practices within the Order and privileges that individuals were unwilling to surrender. During his generalate (1538-1551) Jerome Seripando exerted mighty efforts to improve the quality of religious life. However, until the Church itself entered into a consistent process of reform, the efforts within an individual religious order would not prove fully effective.⁴ The Council of Trent did not take up the question of the reform of the religious until the twenty-fifth and last session in November and December 1563, several years after the death of Jacobus of Siena.

Nonetheless, Jacobus deserves to have his history related and his own composition, *Tractatus Locorum Methaphisicalium in Dictis Authoris Contradictionis Imaginem Conferentium*, which he published in the same volume as the three works of Giles, reexamined in a calmer climate than when Christopher of Padua dismissed it as shallow, inept, and showing little thought. Moreover, a brief study of Jacobus's contribution to Egidian scholarship is timely, as the Unione Accademica Nazionale, which has begun the process of preparing a critical text of the *opera omnia* of Giles of Rome, will examine the work of previous editors.⁵ The present article, then, provides background material for Jacobus and his edition and poses questions as well about his work for further study.

³ See the remarks of Hubert Jedin, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient*, 4, 2 (Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 1975), 172-73. An example of curial permission is seen in the case of the other Jacobus Senensis, who obtained a brief to live outside the monastery. See Appendix I.

⁴ See the comment on Seripando by David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., *The Augustinians from the Protestant Reformation to the Peace of Westphalia 1518-1648*, translated by John J. Kelly, O.S.A. (Villanova, 1979), 61.

⁵ See *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* in the series *Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi* of the Unione Accademica Nazionale. The projected *prolegomena* alone involve 15 separate volumes in which the manuscript tradition and the printed editions will be listed in detail. The first part of the first volume, *Catalogo dei manoscritti: Città del Vaticano*, was published in Firenze, 1986.

STUDIES AND PROMOTION AS *MAGISTER*

Although at least two friars bearing the name Jacobus Senensis appear in the registers of the priors general of the sixteenth century, one can, for the most part, distinguish one from the other.⁶ The subject of the present article is first mentioned in the register of Giles of Viterbo (1507-18) as a formed student assigned to Florence in June 1514.⁷ At this time he could not have been less than eighteen years old.⁸ In July of the next year, he was stationed at Perugia.⁹ Two years later in 1517, the register notes that he was to be transferred to Padua if he could not be received at Perugia.¹⁰ However, he certainly went to Padua later since he was made *cursor* there on 5 March 1520.¹¹ He was advanced to *lector* at Bologna on 7 August 1523 with the proviso that he first complete the usual scholastic acts and be declared worthy by the regent.¹²

By May of 1526 he had become *baccalarius* and was appointed to serve as substitute discreet for the province of Cologne at the general

⁶ In this article only those passages of the registers of the priors general which clearly refer to Jacobus Senensis, the editor of Giles of Rome, will be employed. Another Jacobus Senensis, who did not have an academic degree, was older and outlived Jacobus the editor. He is described as "admodum senex" in November 1556 (CHRISTOPHER, IV, 956). See Appendix I.

⁷ AEGIDIUS, II, 49.

⁸ The "Ratisbon" Constitutions of the Order originally set the age for reception as a novice at fourteen: "nullus ... iunior quatuordecim annis." This provision was later changed to eleven: "dispensamus ut pueri annorum undecim recipi possit." Allowing for a year of novitiate, the earliest time for profession was twelve, but the newly professed was under the care of a religious until twenty: "usque ad vicesimum suae aetatis annum." See *Las primitivas Constituciones de los Agustinos*, ed. Ignacio Aramburu Cendoya, O.S.A. (Valladolid, 1966), 57-59 and 63. However, in 1507 the general chapter of Naples ordered that no one should be admitted to the Order before attaining his twelfth year: "nisi duodecim annum attigerit." In addition, no novice was to be released from the novitiate before age eighteen: "nisi decimum octavum aetatis annum impleverint." See *Analecta Augustiniana*, 9 (1921-22), 67.

⁹ AEGIDIUS, II, 427.

¹⁰ AEGIDIUS, II, 793.

¹¹ Archivio Generale Agostiniano, Dd. 13, *Registrum Ordinis Erem. Divi Augustini Vicario G. R.mo M. Gabrieli Veneto inceptum anno MDXVIII usque ad annum MDXX*, f. 127: "Fratrem Iacobum Senensem cursorem fecimus in gimnasio patavino."

¹² A.G.A., Dd. 14, *Registrum Ordinis Fratrum Eremitarum Sancti Augustini inceptum prima Ianuarii MDXXI sub Rm.o P. Generali Magistro Gabriele Veneto*, f. 132v: "Fratrem Iacobum Senensem lectorem sacrae theologiae fecimus in gymnasio nostro bononien[si] cum solitis gratiis. Volentes tamen ut prius solitos scolasticos actus ibidem absolvat et regentis auspicio dignus declaretur quam lectoris aut munere aut nomine gaudeat."

chapter held at Treviso that year.¹³ At this time, the substitute representatives of provinces which failed to send one of their own religious were frequently chosen from among the *magistri*.¹⁴ It was a regular practice for the *magistri* to attend the general chapter during which they held disputations.¹⁵ The reason for the choice of Jacobus is not known.

In addition, the general was accustomed to confer scholastic promotions at the general chapters. The register of Gabriel of Venice (1519-1537) contains a detailed description of the scene at the 1526 chapter of Treviso. After the regular appointments had been made, some *magistri* came forward and asked that certain young friars who had not been able to fulfill all of the requirements be promoted with the hope of better results in the future. When the general reluctantly acceded to this request to please these *magistri*, other masters of theology, who considered themselves the equals of the former ones, came forward and made the same request for their students. The general relates how he was torn between not wanting to give offense to the second group and not wanting to lower the standards by promoting unworthy candidates. He finally decided to honor the request because of the need to supply new masters of theology to fill the ranks left vacant through death and assignments to other duties. Especially the *studium* at Siena, which had once enjoyed having a good number of excellent *magistri*, was now in great need of replacements. Accordingly, he advanced three bachelors of theology to the rank of *magister*. One of the three was Jacobus of Siena.¹⁶ Jacobus, presumably, then spent some time at Sant'Agostino in Siena in discharging his academic responsibilities.

¹³ A.G.A., Dd. 15, f. 81v, published in *Anal. August.*, 9 (1921-22), 43: "Provinciae Coloniae Discretus Ven. Bacchalarus fr. Jacobus Sen."

¹⁴ Cf. Gutiérrez, *The Augustinians 1518-1648*, 44, in reference to the appointment of Gabriel della Volta as president of the chapter of Venice 1519: "The pope gave him also the authority of supplying the votes of the absent capitulars. The president of the chapter could choose his own voters in conformity with a long-standing custom of the old religious orders." As of 1538 by reason of the decision of the Cardinal Protector, Nicholas Ridolfi, who was deputed to approve the acts of the chapter of Verona, the absent vocals at the chapter were to be supplied by those who were *magistri* for at least ten years. "Et preferantur seniores sanioresque ipsis in moribus, nec non numerus, praesertim diffinitorum suppleatur nonnisi ex eis, qui in dicto numero graviores probatioresque censentur." *Anal. August.*, 9 (1921-22), 53.

¹⁵ For example, at the chapter of Naples in 1539, the Order had 142 masters of theology in Italy, of whom 75 attended the chapter. SERIPANDO, I, p. 32. The *additiones* to the Ratisbon Constitutions allowed certain *magistri* to have a voice in the general and provincial chapters. Cf. Aramburu Cendoya, *Las primitivas Constituciones*, 121. But see the previous note.

¹⁶ See A.G.A., Dd. 15, f. 83v, published in *Anal. August.*, 9 (1921-22), 259-60.

Thus far Jacobus's life appears to have proceeded smoothly, culminating in his achievement of the status of *magister*. This position opened the door not only to privileges within the Order but also to the assuming of offices of authority. It is quite clear from the registers of Seripando and Christopher of Padua that masters of theology were often chosen as provincials and were frequently employed by the generals as vicars or visitators in carrying out special assignments. From the following incidents, selected from the references to him in the registers, one can gain insight into Jacobus's character and his manner of relating as subject to superiors and as superior to subjects. The study of his personal history provides the context within which his final conflict with authority can be judged more equitably than if it were seen as an isolated incident.¹⁷

PROVINCIAL IN SICILY

The next mention of Magister Jacobus of Siena in the generals' registers occurs under the date of September 1537. Jacobus was in Sicily locked in a lengthy controversy with Magister Aloysius of Naro. The dispute had arisen over various financial matters, but the only one specified concerns the price of a horse.¹⁸ Despite the repeated interventions of the vicar general of the Order, Joannes Antonius of Chieti, and even in the face of possible action by the civil authorities, Aloysius was able to forestall the final resolution of the case for another two years.¹⁹ Finally at the time of the general chapter at Naples in 1539, the

¹⁷ Not all of the references to Jacobus in the register are treated in the present study. Some are too fragmentary to be useful here.

¹⁸ SERIPANDO, I, p. 63.

¹⁹ A.G.A., Dd. 17, *Registrum Ordinis Fratrum Heremitarum Sancti Augustini inceptum anno Domini MDXXXVII die XV Julii tempore vicariatus R. M. Io. Antonii Aprutii* (1537-38) scribente Magistro Cherubino de Cassia, f. 204 (6 September 1537): "Ven. Fratrem Raymundum de Caltabellocta iudicem delegatum in causa Mag. Jacobi Senen. constitutum per predecessorem nostrum confirmavimus cum praedicta auctoritate ei collata ac cum quibuscumque clausulis in ea concessis. Monuimus per easdem Magistrum Aloysium de Naro ut sententiam in eum latam pareat, et infra terminum decem dierum satisfaciatur, sub poena privationis provinciae et conventus ac omnium graduum quas habuerit, necnon et sub poena excommunicationis super quibus non possit dispensari nisi per duo Capitula Generalia. Adiecimus quod, durante contumacia et rebellione ipsius, Fr. Raymundus et Magister Jacobus simul et seorsum possint invocare auxilium brachii vice-regis, addentes appellationis terminum duorum mensium ante quas debeat dictus Mag. Aloysius coram nobis personaliter comparere si de aliquo se senserit aggravatum."

A.G.A., Dd. 17, f. 204r-v (25 September, 1537): "Eundem [Magistrum Fernandum Melithensem] non tantum provincialatus officii munere fungi sed ad omnia in melius reformanda nostrum visitatorem ac vicemgerentem instituimus sibiue tamquam ordinario

judges of causes decided definitively in favor of Jacobus.²⁰ As is evidenced from the registers of the generals, such disputes over horses and mules occurred often enough.²¹ The incident demonstrates both Jacobus's tenacity in pressing his claims to monies owed him and the difficulty the generals had in resolving such problems, themes that reoccur below.

Before the general chapter of Naples, Jacobus had been elected provincial of the province of Sicily and, as such, attended the chapter.²² Besides winning his case against Magister Aloysius, Jacobus received certain commissions. He was authorized to have recourse to the viceroy to bring under obedience all troublesome and rebellious friars. Expressly cited was a friar who owed a debt of fifty scudi in gold for a loan taken to get out of prison.²³ In the post-capitular acts, the new prior general, Girolamo Seripando, established a *studium* at Palermo and levied a tax on the houses of the province to pay for its upkeep.²⁴ Later in August 1540, the general limited the scope of the *studium* to the study of dialectic and philosophy.²⁵

iudici causam Magistri Iacobi Senensis et Magistri Aloysii de Naro penitus absolvendam ac decidendam denuo commisimus, iam revocando quam superioribus diebus cuidam fratri Raymundo fecimus facultatem ac dedimus commissionem."

A.G.A., Dd. 17, f. 205v: "Cum constat per tres latas sententias Magistrum Aloysium de Naro in causa existente inter ipsum et Magistrum Jacobum Senensem de principali reum esse, liberationem expensarum factarum extra regnum et ommisionem damnorum et interesse in preiudicium gravissimum dicti Magistri Jacobi, nunc denuo per arbitros factam et promulgatam, non amisimus. Propterea decrevimus ut is, quod causam damni dedit, et damna persolvere teneatur. Committentes Magistro Alexio de Fivizzano, vicario nostro in Sicilia, et tam de expensis factis intra regnum quam extra ac etiam de quibuscumque hac de causa occursis damnis, diligentem esset facturus inquisitionem et super expensis et huius damnis de principali persistentibus sententiis in robore suo, laturus esset finalem sententiam; ipsum vero M. Aloysium mox coactus ad satisfaciendum universum debitum sub quodam ab ipso assignando termino. Addentes poenas si, elapso termino, non satisfecerit aut de consensu partis rationes non dederit satisfaciendi, privationis omnium graduum, necnon activi et passivi vocis, et exilii conventus et provinciae. Quibus censuris neglectis et incuris, facultatem sibi fecimus habendi recursum ad brachium vice-regis."

²⁰ SERIPANDO, I, p. 63.

²¹ For example, at the same chapter Alexius of Fivizzano was ordered to pay twenty ducats for a mule that he had taken from the convent of Malta. SERIPANDO, I, p. 62.

²² SERIPANDO, I, pp. 37-40 include in the list of those at the chapter: "Provincia Siciliae: Definitor magr. Aloysius Narensis, Provincialis magr. Iacobus Senensis." On 26 May, the general confirmed the acts of the provincial chapter and the election of Jacobus. See SERIPANDO, I, p. 69.

²³ SERIPANDO, I, p. 70.

²⁴ SERIPANDO, I, p. 69.

²⁵ SERIPANDO, II, p. 42.

Shortly after the chapter, on 7 June 1539, Seripando ordered Jacobus under obedience to expel Alphonsus de Vitali, an apostate infamous for his low morals, from the convent of Palermo. Jacobus had forced him on the community as its procurator even though Alphonsus had not been absolved of his apostasy. On this occasion, and again on 23 June, Seripando admonished Jacobus about the duty of following the proper provisions of law in the exercise of his office.²⁶ Seripando also soon found Jacobus's handling of other problems in the province unsatisfactory. Too many questions that should have been settled by Jacobus as provincial were being referred to the prior general. Already on 21 August 1539, less than six months into Jacobus's provincialate, Seripando urged him to reform and pacify the province, saying that otherwise he would be forced to consider appointing someone else who would be more competent.²⁷

Still another instance of bad judgement shown by Jacobus in the conduct of his office is seen in the case of Peter of Caltabellotta. Peter was prior of the convent there but gave up the office in response to a promise of Raymundus of Caltabellotta to give a donation of capital assets to the community under the condition that Peter resign. However, Raymundus did not keep his part of the agreement and conducted himself in a scandalous manner. Peter then requested permission from Jacobus to present his case to the prior general, but Jacobus refused. When Seripando became aware of the situation, he appointed Magister Aloysius of Naro as visitator of the convent. On 5 September Seripando also wrote Jacobus to reprimand him for having ignored the definitions of the general chapter in the matter. In referring to the chapter Seripando probably had in mind the definition of the general chapter of Naples in 1539 concerning the need of superiors to issue testimonial letters to those who wished to go to Rome for a "just and urgent cause."²⁸ In his letter the general also repeated his warning to replace Jacobus as superior unless he showed improvement.²⁹

In a letter of 5 November 1539, Seripando prescribed that students were to complete at least two years at the *studium* at Palermo before going elsewhere to study. Seripando recommended that Jacobus exercise special care for the *studium* and the novices because if these two concerns were rightly attended to, other errors could be more easily pardoned.³⁰

²⁶ SERIPANDO, I, pp. 79 and 102-03.

²⁷ SERIPANDO, I, p. 112.

²⁸ SERIPANDO, I, 41 and *Anal. August.*, 9 (1921-22), 59: "Superiores autem Romam proficisci volentibus, iusta urgenteque causa, debebunt litteras eis concedere testimoniales, quo R.mum Patrem suis in negotiis emergentibus possint consulere."

²⁹ SERIPANDO, I, 127-28.

³⁰ SERIPANDO, I, p. 159.

Nonetheless, three days earlier on 2 November, Seripando had already appointed Magister Gaspar of Syracuse as visitator of the house at Messina.³¹ On 28 November, the prior general directed Gaspar to investigate charges that Jacobus had physically assaulted the prior and had unjustly tried to get money from the convent for the expenses of the general chapter.³² Jacobus must have written to Seripando at this point, because on 27 December the general responded that the situation at Messina was being addressed. As for Jacobus's concern that he was under attack by the general because of his mistakes in administering the province, Seripando noted that he only wished to see the directives of the general chapter put into practice in the province. If Jacobus complied with these, Seripando remarked, he had nothing to fear.³³

Despite his previous reassurance, Seripando decided in August 1540 to appoint Magister Angelus of Genazzano as his vicar in Sicily until the provincial chapter to be held at Pentecost 1541. Angelus had previously come to Sicily to settle some personal financial claims that Jacobus had not be able to resolve for him.³⁴ As he was unsure whether Angelus was willing to accept this office, the prior general sent him alternative letters. If he was not willing to accept the office, he should send the first letter to Jacobus; if willing, he should present the other in person. In the first letter, the general sent a case concerning a friar at Syracuse back to Jacobus with instructions to solve it himself. In response to Jacobus's complaint that the visitator at Messina, Gaspar of Syracuse, had extended his attentions to Syracuse as well, Seripando noted that he had already admonished Gaspar to cease interfering. The general also insisted that the provincial chapter not be delayed but be celebrated at the normal time. In the alternative letter, Seripando noted that he had received so many complaints about Jacobus that he found it necessary to send Angelus of Genazzano as his vicar for the province. This second letter also contained the general's demand that the provincial chapter be celebrated at Pentecost.³⁵ The absence of further correspondence directed to Jacobus during his provincialate may indicate that Angelus accepted the office. Finally, at the chapter in 1541 Magister Marianus of Palermo was elected provincial.³⁶

³¹ On Magister Gaspar of Syracuse see David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., "Patres ac Theologi Augustiniani Qui Concilio Tridentino Interfuerunt," *Anal. August.*, 21 (1948), 142-43.

³² SERIPANDO, I, pp. 158 and 177.

³³ SERIPANDO, I, p. 200.

³⁴ SERIPANDO, I, pp. 62, 112, 144-45, and 164.

³⁵ SERIPANDO, II, p. 41.

³⁶ SERIPANDO, II, p. 272.

REGENT IN PERUGIA

The record is silent about Jacobus's whereabouts for the next year, but on 10 July 1542, Seripando appointed him regent at Perugia.³⁷ At the same time the prior general wrote to the provincial of the Le Marche province asking him to employ Jacobus for preaching assignments, and on 6 August, he confirmed Jacobus's assignment to preach at Siena during Lent.³⁸

At Perugia a situation soon developed that put Jacobus in conflict with the prior, Magister Marcus of Treviso. At the end of the 1542 summer season, the members of the *studium* were allowed to go to a suburban area for a day of relaxation. Some of them then spent the night outside the monastery without the permission of the prior. Very late in the night a few of them proceeded to the nearby convent of St. Catherine where they disturbed the nuns by throwing stones at the windows, shouting, and singing lascivious songs. Outraged by such disgraceful conduct, Seripando enjoined the prior on 5 September to conduct a thorough investigation including exacting testimony under oath in order to determine the guilty. In the meantime lectures were suspended.³⁹ On 20 September, Seripando sent another letter authorizing the resumption of studies.⁴⁰ At the same time he wrote Jacobus to reprove him for having openly opposed the prior and thereby having contributed to the collapse of discipline in the house.⁴¹ In a separate letter the prior was ordered to expel Jacobus if he continued to cause problems.⁴² Soon afterwards, without having obtained permission, Jacobus and two lectors traveled to Rome to see Seripando in person only to meet with a public reprimand and be ordered to return to Perugia on 18 October.⁴³ In acting as he did, Jacobus had violated the definition of the general chapter of Naples in

³⁷ SERIPANDO, II, p. 314.

³⁸ SERIPANDO, II, pp. 314 and 329.

³⁹ SERIPANDO, III, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁰ SERIPANDO, III, pp. 29-30.

⁴¹ SERIPANDO, III, p. 30: "numquam nos putasse tanta eum usurum levitate et inconstantia, ut publice priorem accusaret, iudicaretque ea quae sui fori non erant, et sic audaciam peccandi iuventuti subministraret."

⁴² SERIPANDO, III, p. 31.

⁴³ SERIPANDO, III, pp. 48-49. To the three Seripando applied the same term he used of Jacobus alone above: "maxima inconstantia usi." On Seripando's presence in Rome at this time, see David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., *Hieronymi Seripandi <<Diarium de vita sua>>* (Rome, 1963), 51-52. Seripando also ordered the prior to take possession of the goods of the three religious and to destroy the lectors' patents to preach.

1539 concerning trips to Rome.⁴⁴ On 10 November Seripando sent a letter exhorting the community at Perugia to observe regular life, obey the prior, and avoid factions. The regent, Jacobus, was again directed to attend to his own duties and not to interfere with those of the prior.⁴⁵

Notwithstanding this incident, Jacobus managed to recover some standing with Seripando. He was chosen as a substitute for an absent provincial at the general chapter at Rome in May 1543.⁴⁶ At the chapter Jacobus lost his position as regent at Perugia.⁴⁷ He was, however, named president of the next provincial chapter of the province of Siena.⁴⁸

PROVINCIAL OF SIENA

Despite his previous unsatisfactory performance in Sicily, Jacobus was elected provincial of the province of Siena and received the general's confirmation in that office on 19 June 1543. In the same dispatch, Seripando urged Jacobus to adhere faithfully to the tenor of the letters he had issued to the province at the end of the visitation he had made from 24 November to 9 December 1539. The prior general also expressed his displeasure that, in his capacity of president of the provincial chapter, Jacobus had allowed Leonardus of Capalbio to preach even though he was aware of the latter's previous contumacious conduct. Not long before, Leonardus, who had gone to Sicily without permission, had been imprisoned and expelled from that province by Seripando's orders.⁴⁹

Before receiving the general's letter confirming him in office, Jacobus had begun to act by removing from office the prior of the house at Colle di Val d'Elsa after only a single day's visit there. The prior, Raphael of Colle, had been appointed at the provincial chapter less than a month before but was accused of being overly familiar with a woman. Raphael appealed the decision. On 28 June the general wrote Jacobus to

⁴⁴ *Anal. August.*, 9 (1921-22), 59: "De illis praeterea, qui Romam petunt, illa cautio additur; ne quis ausit Romam se recipere absque litteris Provincialium causam referentibus, idque sub poena carceris." In his register cited in the previous note, Seripando refers only to the lack of permission of the prior.

⁴⁵ SERIPANDO, III, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁶ SERIPANDO, III, p. 132. Paul III named Seripando the president of the chapter (SERIPANDO, III, p. 129-30). As such, it was his decision to assign Jacobus to represent the absent provincial. Cf. note 14 above.

⁴⁷ SERIPANDO, III, p. 151.

⁴⁸ SERIPANDO, III, p. 162.

⁴⁹ SERIPANDO, III, pp. 182-83. Seripando's instructions to the province are found in SERIPANDO, I, pp. 192-93. For Leonardus see SERIPANDO, III, p. 105 (January 1543).

say that he would personally deal with the situation at Colle. On the next day, Seripando suspended the provincial's decree. In the register the general noted that Jacobus seemed to have acted more out of impulse than with due consideration. He may have been zealous, Seripando conceded, but it was not with "zeal according to wisdom."⁵⁰ On 5 August in company with Jacobus, Seripando visited the convent at Colle. The general urged all live together in peace and warned that he would remove the disobedient. He also laid down injunctions for Raphael to follow. If he refused to follow these directives, Jacobus was to remove him from office.⁵¹

The case did not end with the general's provisions. A few months later on the general's orders, issued on 18 October, Jacobus and the first definitor of the province, Magister Antonius of Siena, conducted another investigation concerning Raphael's compliance with Seripando's directives.⁵² After this visit to Colle, Jacobus made an unfavorable report, but the other visitor disagreed with him. On 24 November, Seripando then commissioned Magister Franciscus of Gambassi to conduct a still further investigation and to decide the matter once for all. In his instructions Seripando again made mention of the precipitous action of Jacobus before having received confirmation in office as provincial.⁵³ The register does not inform us of the decision made by Franciscus, but on 5 January 1544, Seripando commended him for having settled the case in a satisfactory manner.⁵⁴

Jacobus continued in office until Pentecost 1545 when he was succeeded by Magister Ioannes Augustinus of Siena.⁵⁵ Seripando directed the president of the chapter, Magister Aurelius of Castiglione Fiorentino, to compel Jacobus to settle two grievances held against him. During one of his visits to Colle di Val d'Elsa, Jacobus had demanded two scudi from the community in compensation for a theft committed against him. Jacobus was now to restore the money. The friars at Arezzo where Jacobus had given a course of Lenten sermons had also lodged a complaint against him.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ SERIPANDO, III, pp. 193-95. Note especially: "Qua in re, quae veluti impetu potius quam consilio facta notari potest, ... *zelus* quid inesse potuit, *sed non secundum scientiam*." Seripando is employing a reference to Rm. 10:2: "Aemulationem Dei habent sed non secundum scientiam."

⁵¹ SERIPANDO, III, p. 208.

⁵² SERIPANDO, III, p. 236

⁵³ SERIPANDO, III, p. 253-54. Seripando's remark about Jacobus reads: "initio officii sui—nondum a nobis confirmatus—ea tentarat quae in sua potestate non erant."

⁵⁴ SERIPANDO, III, p. 265.

⁵⁵ SERIPANDO, IV, p. 160.

⁵⁶ SERIPANDO, IV, pp. 119-20.

AT SANT'AGOSTINO IN SIENA 1545-1555

After the chapter, Jacobus returned to the convent of Sant'Agostino in Siena, where, as at Perugia, he quickly antagonized the prior, Magister Ioannes Baptista of Fermo. On 12 August 1545, in response to the prior's complaints that Jacobus had revealed secrets of the Order to lay people and rebelled against him, Seripando ordered the prior to expel Jacobus from the convent. To reverse this judgment, Jacobus had to appeal in person to the general at Trent. After he managed to convince Seripando that the charges were false, Seripando rebuked the prior in a letter of 28 August in which he also commanded him to provide Jacobus with quarters and a servant.⁵⁷ Apparently, Jacobus's services were not employed in the *studium*. On 16 November, Seripando approved Jacobus's taking two youths under his instruction and care.⁵⁸ A year later, on 9 November 1546, Seripando gave Jacobus a general permission to teach Sacred Scripture wherever he was needed.⁵⁹

At the general chapter celebrated at Recanati in May 1547, Jacobus was appointed the substitute definitor of the Rhine-Swabian province.⁶⁰ At the chapter also, Jacobus was named to serve as *socius* of the provincial of Siena, Magister Humbertus of Siena, who would hold the office from 1549-1551.⁶¹ Jacobus must have been on good terms with Humbertus, who was serving as prior of Sant'Agostino in Siena, for Humbertus soon wrote the general for permission to allow Jacobus to use the infirmary as an additional room.⁶² Unfortunately, community life was so marred by factions and conflicts that Seripando had to send a stern letter of rebuke to the friars and to appoint a visitator in June 1548. In the following September Seripando also visited the house himself.⁶³

In addition to the internal problems of the community, soldiers were quartered at Sant'Agostino around this time.⁶⁴ The city of Siena had a long history of internal turmoil because of the conflicts among parties of

⁵⁷ SERIPANDO, IV, pp. 207 and 214-15.

⁵⁸ SERIPANDO, IV, p. 242.

⁵⁹ SERIPANDO, V, p. 78.

⁶⁰ A.G.A., Cc. 37, f. 201, published in *Anal. August.*, 9 (1921-22), 154. See also SERIPANDO, V, p. 125.

⁶¹ SERIPANDO, V, p. 139.

⁶² SERIPANDO, V, p. 217. Not all of the rooms of the monastery were available to the friars, as will be seen below.

⁶³ SERIPANDO, V, pp. 310 and SERIPANDO, VI, p. 46 (Sept. 12, 1548).

⁶⁴ SERIPANDO, VI, pp. 90 (December 1548) and 148 (May 1549).

its citizens. Desiring to acquire Siena for his own family, Pope Clement VII had launched an attack, which was beaten back with the help of Charles V in 1526. The Emperor took the city under imperial protection and stationed Spanish troops there in 1531. Gradually, the protection became domination, which, in turn, led to revolts and the expulsion of the Spaniards in 1546 and 1552.⁶⁵ Because of its proximity to the Porta Tufi and the large size of the monastery, Sant'Agostino was a desirable location for quartering soldiers. The convent's suitability for this purpose is also evidenced by the fact that, after the city had been conquered by the forces supporting the imperial claim in 1555, troops would again be stationed at Sant'Agostino.⁶⁶

Some of the discord in the community may have reflected the political conflicts among the families of the friars. On 12 October 1549 Seripando sent a letter to the community regarding a serious abuse. Friars were going about the city at night, and some even wore secular clothing. In Seripando's view such activity led to the religious being held in contempt and constituted a "danger to the city" (*neque sine civitatis periculo*), perhaps a reference to suspected conspiratorial involvement of some of the friars. Seripando warned the friars that he had requested Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, the imperial governor from 1547 to 1552, to punish any friars who might be found outside the monastery late at night.⁶⁷

CHRISTOPHER OF PADUA'S VISITATION

On 16 May 1551 at the general chapter of Bologna, Christopher of Padua was elected prior general. Since Christopher had been procurator of the Order from 17 January 1547 and vicar of Seripando for some months before his election, he probably was aware of Jacobus's past difficulties.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, his first dealings with Jacobus went smoothly enough in as much as he named him to a commission in November 1551 to investigate

⁶⁵ See "Siena" in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* and *Enciclopedia Italiana*.

⁶⁶ For more information on conditions of the convent especially after 1555 see Karl Gersbach, O.S.A., "A Disturbance at Sant'Agostino, Siena, January 1565," in *Conventos Agostinos*, X Congreso Internacional de Historia de la Orden de San Agustín, (Madrid, 20-24 de octubre de 1997), ed. Rafael Lazcano, O.S.A. (Rome, 1988), 633-49.

⁶⁷ SERIPANDO, VI, p. 240. On Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, see Ericka Spivakovsky, *Son of the Alhambra, Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza 1504-1575* (Austin, Texas and London, 1970).

⁶⁸ See Gutiérrez, *The Augustinians 1518-1648*, 58-59.

the charge of heresy against Magister Michael Angelus of Scarlino.⁶⁹ A year later the general's attitude toward Jacobus changed when Jacobus presented him with a copy of his edition of *Metaphysicales Quaestiones Aureae* of Giles of Rome during a general visitation of Siena from 23 October to 2 November 1552.

In an attempt to win the good will of the recently elected prior general, Jacobus had included in the work a prefatory letter written in the effusive style of the time. In the heading of the letter, Christopher is called "most learned in letters" and "most worthy general." In the body of the letter, the general is cited as "most outstanding for piety, endowed with every virtue, fluent in every branch of study," and so forth. At the end, he is addressed as "most excellent father, chief model of the Christian religion and noble ornament of the Augustinian Order." In his eagerness to flatter the general, however, Jacobus was led to employ an infelicitous comparison intended to show the superiority of the addressee over his predecessors. Jacobus wrote: "that the Order, nearly desiccated and overshadowed, may at last flourish and shine again under such a great leader as you."⁷⁰ It was the words "nearly desiccated and overshadowed" (*ferme exsiccata atque obscura*) that gave offense to the general, in whose eyes they amounted to an insult to Seripando and the generals before him.⁷¹

Although Christopher of Padua was dissatisfied with many aspects of the book, such as the many typographical errors, he decided to limit his correction to the offensive prefatory letter. He told Jacobus to replace it with a shorter and more acceptable one at his own expense, but Jacobus refused. No amount of persuasion on the part of the general could change his mind. The imprudence that had appeared before at times in Jacobus's life now came into full play. We do not know his motivation, whether it was his anger at the general's rejection of his letter, the money he would have to spend to make the correction, or a combination of the two.⁷² Clearly, even aside from the issue of obedience to his superior, Jacobus acted very foolishly in not acceding to the general's wishes in the matter.

⁶⁹ CHRISTOPHER, I, 229.

⁷⁰ The complete text of Jacobus's prefatory letter is found in Appendix II.

⁷¹ See CHRISTOPHER, II, 107 for the decree of Christopher of Padua. In citing the offending phrase the general changes the wording to "religionem exsiccatam et obumbratam."

⁷² Noted above are several instances of Jacobus's pressing financial claims. To these can be added his claim for three scudi at the general chapter of Rome, 1543. See SERIPANDO, III, p. 158.

On his part, Christopher of Padua responded with severity. On 27 October, while still at Siena, he issued a letter containing a general prohibition forbidding the publication of any book, work, preface, or letter without his permission or that of the procurator of the Order. He explained that he was moved to issue this command because of the "hallucinations" (*deliramentis*) published by Jacobus of Siena, whose remarks dishonored his predecessors in general and Seripando in particular and made light of the laws and ordinances of the Order.⁷³ In rejecting the general's reasonable demand to replace the prefatory letter, Jacobus had shown himself to be not only disobedient but "a crazy man, ungrateful son, deceitful religious, false Christian, and devoid of reason." Jacobus's offensive phrase about the Order's condition proved his malice according to the general, who concluded by depriving Jacobus of "every grade and dignity."⁷⁴

A careful reading of the prefatory letter, however, leads to other conclusions than those reached by the general. Jacobus begins by noting the insufficiency of all creatures. Humans, each of whom begins existence with the mind as a *rasa tabula*, have a special need of help. So too the Order started in deepest want but was enriched by the labor of its learned men, whose works have now been neglected for too long. Jacobus bemoans the loss or unavailability of the works of nineteen Augustinian writers. The Order, he notes, was in danger of losing the fruits of learning that these men had labored to give it. He faults the leaders of the Order (*nostrae religionis optimates*) for having allowed matters to come to such a sorry state. Just as the Church needs to value the Scriptures, so too the Order needs to appreciate its intellectual treasures. In support of his argument, he cites Sirach 20: 29: "Hidden wisdom and unseen treasure — of what value is either?" It is, therefore, a source of joy that the Order now has a great leader able to restore it from its desiccated and overshadowed state.

One should note that in this prefatory letter Jacobus was writing only in a very narrow scholastic context when he faulted past leaders of

⁷³ CHRISTOPHER, II, 107: "Sumus adducti quoque quibusdam deliramentis, quae a fratre Iacobo Senensi impudenter conscripta et temere nunc nuper impressa sunt, quem nominare, vel ut verius dicatur inhonorare, tot ac tantos gravissimos ac reverendissimos patres, praedecessores nostros, vel et longe reverendum praecessorem nostrum nusquam satis laudatum virum eo indigniori modo tractare, quo dignior et praeclarior semper extitit et extat eorum fama."

⁷⁴ CHRISTOPHER, II, 107: "ut tanti esset hominis dementia, qui obedientiae religioni suae quondam et in hac parte nobis promissae stulte oblitus, posthabita ab eo pietate officiosi filii, quid viro christiano agendum esset non recordatus, immo in reprobum sensum inductus, se dementem hominem, ingratum filium, mendacem religiosum, fictum christianum, demum rationis expertem, nedum nobis sed et iis omnibus, qui haec ipsa sua gesta perpenderit, aperte declaravit."

the Order. Their specific failing according to him was to permit the neglect of the Order's intellectual heritage by not preserving and propagating the works of the Order's philosophers and theologians. Christopher of Padua appears to have understood Jacobus's remarks in a much wider context as a criticism of the whole life and condition of the Order. In his decree he cites Jacobus for making light of the laws, holy ordinances, and constitutions of the Order.⁷⁵

As a kind of postscript to his decree, Christopher of Padua issued a warning that those who detract others could expect even worse measures to be applied to them. He clearly intended Jacobus's case to serve as an example. One may wonder, however, whether the prior general's reaction is not best understood, at least in part, as another manifestation of a tendency of authorities in the intellectually tense atmosphere of the sixteenth century to suppress all criticism and dissent.

FINAL YEARS

The general's decree automatically removed all of the privileges that Jacobus had enjoyed as a *magister*. Among these was the loss of his personal servant, special funding, exemption from assistance at portions of the office in choir, attendance at general chapters, and any other special permissions that he had. In addition, he was no longer permitted to preach.⁷⁶ This loss of status only served to make Jacobus more defiant even to the point of complaining about the general in an insolent manner. Upon learning of Jacobus's insubordination, Christopher of Padua expressed his displeasure in letter of 23 November 1553 to the prior of Siena, Magister Paulus of Siena, and enjoined him to put Jacobus in prison if he should do anything bad or unfitting.⁷⁷

However, political events of larger dimensions than the internal workings of the Order were to determine the outcome. In July 1552 the Sienese had revolted against imperial authority. With the help of the French they drove out the 300 troops of the Spanish garrison and the 400

⁷⁵ CHRISTOPHER, II, 107: "Tantum, inquam, patrum sanctissimas leges et probatas ordinationes reprehendere seipsum parvi faciens minime erubuit," and "tot honoratorum et summopere laudatorum patrum, ... honorem et dignitatem improbe laceraverit et eorum sanctas constitutiones ... aut sacras canones saepe momorderit."

⁷⁶ A.G.A., Ff. 2 *Transumptum Epistolarum Christ. Patavin. 1551-1553*, ff. 159-60 contains a list of preachers with Jacobus's name crossed out.

⁷⁷ CHRISTOPHER, II, 822. On Paulus Senensis see Gutiérrez, "Patres ac Theologi," 158-59, and Gersbach, "A Disturbance at Sant'Agostino," 633-49.

supplied by the Duke of Florence.⁷⁸ Siena was soon engaged in a full-scale war with the imperial forces trying to retake the city. With the help of the Duke of Florence, Cosimo I, the imperials laid seige to the city from March 1554 to 17 April 1555, during which time starvation set in and the population was reduced to 8,000 persons.⁷⁹ The community at Sant'Agostino was also reduced from more than sixty friars before the war to a mere eighteen after the end of the war.⁸⁰ It is virtually certain that Jacobus died around this time, for from 10 August 1555 to the last reference on 11 January 1556 the register treats of arrangements made concerning the disposition of his books, room, and monies owed to him.⁸¹

A further indication of the disfavor into which Jacobus had fallen in the eyes of Christopher of Padua is seen in the general's continuing suspicions concerning him even after the presumed time of his death. On 10 August 1555, some months after the capitulation of the Sienese, the prior general ordered the prior of Sant'Agostino to send him a list of all of Jacobus's books, "including those that were under suspicion."⁸² Perhaps the general was trying to prevent possible problems for the Order by his vigilance against heresy. By this time Pope Paul IV had ascended the papal throne and inaugurated a campaign of reform characterized by harsh measures especially against those suspected of heresy.⁸³

To all intents and purposes, the condemnation of Jacobus of Siena by the prior general resulted in a *damnatio memoriae* for the man and his work within the Augustinian Order. None of the historians or bibliographers of the Order before Perini make any mention of him. Perini, who gives only brief biographical information based on the registers of the

⁷⁸ Spivakovski, *Mendoza*, 284-317. During his visit to Siena Christopher of Padua found himself briefly involved as peacemaker in the quarrels among the leaders of the city. See CHRISTOPHER, II, 94.

⁷⁹ *Enciclopedia Italiana*, "Siena."

⁸⁰ CHRISTOPHER, V, 324 (13 November 1557).

⁸¹ CHRISTOPHER, III, 1053, 1132, 1174, 1368, 1379 and CHRISTOPHER, IV, 39. Cf. Davide Perini, O.S.A., *Bibliographia Augustiniana cum notis biographicis: Scriptores Itali* (Firenze, 1929-37), 3, 186: "Videtur illum [Jacobum] non attigisse quinquagesimum quintum aetatis annum." As noted above, my estimate places Jacobus's age around sixty at the time of his death.

⁸² CHRISTOPHER, II, 1053 and 1174.

⁸³ See Ludwig, Freiherr von Pastor, *The History of the Popes*, ed. R. F. Kerr, 14 (St. Louis, 1924), 176 concerning Paul IV: "His first streps in the direction of reform, in the summer of 1555, showed ... that he would, now that he was in possession of the supreme power, display the greatest rigor."

priors general, uses the work of Giuseppe Boffito as his source for the citation of Jacobus's work.⁸⁴

Despite the censure of the prior general, Jacobus's edition of Giles circulated. Boffito notes that there are exemplars in various libraries in Italy.⁸⁵ In addition to those cited by him, one can add the copies in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana and in the library of the Augustinianum in Rome. The reader's attention is now directed to a more detailed consideration of the publication.

JACOBUS'S EDITION OF *METAPHYSICALES QUAESTIONES AUREAE* OF GILES OF ROME

The title page of Jacobus's edition of Giles of Rome reads as follows:

*METAPHYSICALES / QVAESTIONES AVREAE / DOMINI AEGIDII
ROMANI BITHVRICENSIS ARCHIPRAESVLIS ORDINIS / Diui
Augustini, ab innumeris mendis dilutae, argumentis,
responsisque ac / annotationibus, nec non indice locuple-
tatae, per Magistrum Iacobum / Senensem eiusdem Augusti-
niana professionis in / germanum nitorem redactae. /*

*Eiusdem Aegidii de Coeli materiali compositione Contra
Averro. /*

*Eiusdem Aegidii de Intellectuum humanorum pluritate
Contra Averro. /*

*TRACTATVS LOCORVM / METAPHYSICALIVM DICTI AVCTORIS /
Contradictionis speciem mentientium eiusdem Magistri
Iacobi / Senensis Heremicolae trutina depromptus. /*

Venetijs Apud Octavium Scotum D. Ama Dei / MDLII

Jacobus's claim, not unusual in editions of this period, that he has corrected many errors is repeated in his dedication.⁸⁶ Unfortunately,

⁸⁴ Giuseppe Boffito, *Saggio di Bibliografia Egidiani*, (Firenze, 1911), 42.

⁸⁵ Boffito, *ibid.*: "Esemplare nella biblioteca Marucelliana, nella Nazionale fiorentina, ecc., nella romana, nell'Alessandrina, ecc."

⁸⁶ See the dedication to Cardinal Mignanelli: "iam ab innumeris erratis excussa."

Jacobus's edition, especially in the part composed by him, is somewhat spoiled by typographical errors, another source of irritation for Christopher of Padua.⁸⁷

Jacobus's redaction of the *Metaphysicales Quaestiones Aureae* was not the first. Several editions had preceded: Venice, 1499, per Petrum de quarengijs [!]; and Venice, 1501, per Simonem de Luere; and Venice, 1505. Bruni remarks that all the printed editions, including that of Jacobus, lack Giles's treatment of Aristotle's books 3, 5, 9, and 11.⁸⁸

The 1501 edition of Venice was edited by Joannes Baptista of Tolentino, O.S.A., who dedicated the work to Gratianus Ventura of Foligno, vicar general of the Order (1498-1501) and later prior general (1501-1504). Among his reasons for publishing the work, Joannes Baptista cites its usefulness for students.⁸⁹ While Jacobus may have been familiar with this edition, he employed at least one other source, edition or manuscript, in addition to it or instead of it for his own text, which presents some material not in the 1501 Venice edition.⁹⁰

Similarly, Giles's edition of *De Coeli Materiali Compositione contra Averroistas* was preceded by several others: Padua, 1493, per Hieronimum de durantis [!]; Venice, 1500, per Simonem de Luere; Venice, 1502, per Bonetum Locatellum; and Venice, 1503, per Bonetum Locatellum.⁹¹ Jacobus's edition of *De Intellectuum Humanorum Pluritate Contra Averroistas*, also known as *Tractatus de Plurificatione Intellectus Possibilis*, follows upon an edition of Padua, 1493, per Hieronimum de durantis [!] and another of Venice, 1500, per Simonem de Luere.⁹² These last two editions appear in the same volumes as the respective editions of *De Coeli Materiali Compositione*.

⁸⁷ CHRISTOPHER, II, 107: "opus totum exactissima castigatione indigere, quodque videre est, quam plurimis erroribus vel ab impressore, vel correctore, aut ab utroque commissis refertum sit."

⁸⁸ Gerardo Bruni, *Le opere di Egidio Romano* (Firenze, 1936), 56-57.

⁸⁹ On Joannes Baptista († c.1525) see Perini, 4, 13-14. In his letter of dedication, Joannes Baptista writes: "...mira et incredibili allectus iucunditate, tum ipsius dicendi lepore, tum etiam ipsorum aberrantium iuvenum profectu, ac nostre alme heremitice religionis decore...."

⁹⁰ For example, in the first question of the first book, Jacobus gives a paragraph beginning: "Praeterea felicitas est per se bonum sufficiens," which is not found in the 1501 Venice edition. I have not had the opportunity to examine the other early editions of the *Quaestiones*.

⁹¹ Bruni, 73. Whether the 1503 was merely a reprinting of the 1502 needs to be determined.

⁹² Bruni, 73-74.

It is clear that in the case of the treatises *De Coeli Materiali Compositione* and *De Pluritate Intellectuum*, Jacobus was reprinting these works to replace the Padua edition of 1493, which had been edited by Giles of Viterbo, later prior general of the Order (1507-18) and then cardinal.⁹³ Jacobus repeats word for word the assertion of Giles of Viterbo at the end of the work that he has published the two treatises because they were most useful for students and the texts were hard to find.⁹⁴

Giles of Viterbo in Padua, 1493

Habeto itaque, candide lector, tres has questiones clarissimi doc. Eg.; duas, scilicet, de celi materia et unam de possibili intellectu: quas ideo posuimus quoniam summam iuvenibus in eis utilitatem esse novimus et raram apud homines copiam videramus. F. Egidius Eremita Viterbiensis castigavit et dedit.

Jacobus in Venice, 1552

Habeto itaque, candide lector, tres has questiones clarissimi doc. Aegi.; duas, scilicet, de celi materia, et unam de possibili intellectu, quas ideo posuimus quoniam summam iuvenibus in eis utilitatem esse novimus et raram apud homines copiam videramus. Frater Iacobus Senensis castigavit et dedit.

In his prefatory letter, Jacobus also indicates that Christopher of Padua helped to sponsor his edition.⁹⁵ Jacobus's publication needs to be seen not just as an individual effort but as part of a larger project to revive Egidian studies within the Order. David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., points out that the general chapter of Naples in 1539 introduced a reform of studies by insisting that the texts of Aristotle be taught rather than those of John of Jandun († 1328) and Averroes (Ibd Rushd † 1198). Where possible, the teachings of Giles of Rome were to be followed and, where material from him was not available, the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas was to be adhered to. Gutiérrez notes that this was the first time that Order officially

⁹³ Giles of Viterbo also worked on an edition of the commentary of Giles of Rome on Aristotle's *Physics*, Padua, 1493. In his article on Giles of Viterbo in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, F.X. Martin, O.S.A., notes that these works were prepared while Giles was still a student at Padua.

⁹⁴ Egidio's notation is found on folio 7 verso and Jacobus's on folio 60 verso.

⁹⁵ See Jacobus's preface in Appendix II: "Paternitas Tua Reverendissima, dum Aegidij Doctoris nostri Methaphisicalia exquisita quesita, diu in numeris involuta erratis ut imprimerentur quam mox operam navavit, cuius dispositione en in lucem prodeunt."

adopted Aquinas as a guide.⁹⁶ The chapter's directive to replace the works of Averroes and John of Jandun with those of Giles and Thomas was intended to correct the tendency among philosophers in Italy at the time to revive the interpretation of the former pair against the new humanistic reading of Aristotle, especially in the area of psychology.⁹⁷ In ordering that the students read the text of Aristotle but follow the interpretation (*iuxta viam*) of Giles of Rome, the chapter affirmed the humanistic ideal of returning directly to the ancient sources while at the same time readopting Giles of Rome as the official *magister* of the Order, a position first taken by the general chapter of Florence in 1287.⁹⁸

In his visitation of the Order, Seripando actively promoted the program of studies adopted by the chapter.⁹⁹ Moreover, he showed interest in the publication of Giles's works. In writing to Magister Herennius of Naples on 28 November 1542, he urged him to bring with him the edition of the second and third books of Giles's commentary on the *Sentences*, which Herennius had edited.¹⁰⁰ Later on 21 July 1550, Seripando expressed his great delight in an edition of Giles's *Expositio in Librum de Causis* by Aegidius of Florence.¹⁰¹ Towards the end of his generalate, when he published the new constitutions in 1551, Seripando announced his intention of setting aside the money received from the sale of the book in a fund to promote the publication of Augustinian authors. In turn, when Christopher of Padua succeeded Seripando as general in May 1551, he began implementing Seripando's plan by gathering the works of Giles of Rome and assigning them to various editors in the Order.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., "Los Estudios en la orden Agustiniana desde la edad media hasta la contemporánea," *Anal. August.*, 33 (1970), 106-07. The text of decree of the chapter reads: "Quantum vero ad studia reformanda pertinet, sancitur et definitur, ne placita Averrois et Iandoni penitus deinceps defendantur; sed textus aristotelicus in philosophia, in theologia vero textus Magistri sententiarum lectitentur et defensentur Omnes vero lectiones iuxta viam domini Aegidii nostri Romani legantur et disputentur, et ubi eius scripta deficiunt, ex divi Thomae Aquinatis doctrina conformi suppleatur."

⁹⁷ See Katherine Park and Eckhard Kessler, "The Concept of Psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Charles B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge, 1988), 462.

⁹⁸ See Gutiérrez, "Estudios," 79-80.

⁹⁹ Gutiérrez, "Estudios," 107-08.

¹⁰⁰ SERIPANDO, III, p. 69-70. Gutiérrez remarks (note 50, *ibid.*) that the work was not published.

¹⁰¹ SERIPANDO, VI, pp. 342-43. The edition was that of Venice, 1550, apud Iacobum Zoppinum. See Bruni, 68-69.

¹⁰² Under Christopher of Padua's direction a volume of Giles's treatises appeared in 1555 in Rome, "apud Antonium Bladum." In this work, *Primus Tomus Operum D. Aegidii Romani*, Christopher's letter of dedication to Cardinal Marcello Cervini, later

Even though Jacobus may have begun work on his edition of Giles earlier than 1551, his edition fitted very well into the scheme of studies proposed by the chapter and promoted by the generals. Giles's *Quaestiones Metaphysicales*, *De Coeli Materiali Compositione* and *De Intellectuum Humanorum Pluritate* form a trio chosen by Jacobus to supply texts for the study of select questions in metaphysics, physics, and psychology. Psychology was not considered a separate discipline until later, but Aristotle's *De anima* was read and discussed at the universities as a requirement for the bachelor of arts degree.¹⁰³ Of the texts chosen by Jacobus, two were considered anti-Averroist treatises as is shown in their titles. As some fifty years had elapsed since the previous editions, a new edition of the three works of Giles was in order.

Jacobus dedicated the volume to Cardinal Fabio Mignanelli, who was appointed as *legatus a latere* to Siena on 13 August 1552 in an attempt to bring peace to the troubled political situation.¹⁰⁴ Since Jacobus does not refer to this last office in his dedication, but only to Mignanelli's elevation to the cardinalate in November 1551, Jacobus apparently based his choice of Mignanelli on their previous acquaintance when they were both at Bologna in 1542-43 rather than on the cardinal's role as mediator.

In the dedication Jacobus praises the ancients who first laid down the paths of study in the arts and sciences. He cites a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* II (993b10-15) concerning the lyre players, Timotheus and Phrynis as examples of persons who successively enriched the art of music. A comparison with the so called "Anonymous Translation" shows that Jacobus was familiar with a Latin version of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* though not necessarily the one cited here.¹⁰⁵

Marcellus II, explains the background.

¹⁰³ Park and Kessler, *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, 455-56.

¹⁰⁴ Mignanelli was of Sienese origin. Bishop of Lucera in Apulia 1540-53, he was named governor of Bologna in 1541, nuncio at Venice in 1543, representative at the Diet of Worms in 1544. He was promoted to the college of cardinals on 20 November 1551 and appointed bishop of Grosseto in 1553. He died in Rome 10 August 1557. See *Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevii*, III, ed. G. Gulik and C. Eubel, 36, 222, and 246. In his dedication Jacobus refers to some of these positions.

¹⁰⁵ See *Metaphysica*, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem in *Aristoteles Latinus* 25, 2 (Leiden, 1976), 36. Phrynis (second half of fifth century B.C.) was an outstanding master of the lyre and the teacher of Timotheus (c.450-c.360 B.C.), who was the chief representative of the "new music." See "Phrynis" and "Timotheus," 4, in *Der Kleine Pauly*, ed. K. Ziegler and W. Sontheimer (Stuttgart, 1964).

Jacobus

Non solum hiis dicere gratiam iustum est quorum aliquis opinionibus communicaverit, set et hiis qui adhuc superficialiter aliquid enuntiarunt; nam habitum nostrum praeexercitati sunt. Si enim Thimotheus non fuisset, multam melodiam non haberemus; si autem non Phrines, Thimotheus non fuisset.

Anonymous Translation

Non solum autem hiis dicere gratiam iustum est quorum aliquis opinionibus communicatus est, sed et hiis superficialiter enuntiantibus; et enim hii conferunt aliquid; nam habitum nostrum preinstruxerunt; nam si Thimotheus non fuisset, multam melodiam non haberemus; et si non Phrinis, Thimotheus non fuisset.

Later, after citing the accomplishments of Cardinal Mignanelli in extravagant language, he asks that his gift be received by the cardinal in the way Artaxerxes II was willing to accept small gifts with no less pleasure than great ones.¹⁰⁶

JACOBUS'S *TRACTATUS LOCORUM METAPHYSICALIUM*

Along with the edition of the three works of Giles, Jacobus published his own treatise, which he describes as taken from his own balance (*trutina*). The purpose of the work as a help to students is set forth in the title placed at the head of the work: *Tractatus Locorum Methaphysicalium in Dictis Auctoris Contradictionis Imaginem Conferentium a Magistro Iacobo Senensi Ordinis Divi Augustini pro Iunioribus Depromptus* [corrected from the edition's "De Promptivis"]. Jacobus's treatise serves as an illustration of the material and method employed in the classes that he taught to young Augustinians.

In the work Jacobus reviews each of the *quaestiones* in the *Metaphysicales Quaestiones* of Giles of Rome for all eight books printed in the edition.¹⁰⁷ His inquiry is based on apparent contradictions between the positions adopted by Giles in different places within the

¹⁰⁶ "Proinde voluminis parvitas ad V.D.R. magnitudinem tute ingreditur, que ferme secundus Arthaxerses, non minus humanum atque Regium, parva a parvis hilariter suscepisse quam prompte magnos magna tribuisse censebit." The remark is based on the statement in Plutarch's life of Artaxerxes II, chapter 4, that there was nothing given to him so small which he did not accept willingly. Jacobus may have found this reference in a book of exempla.

¹⁰⁷ As noted above, the printed edition of Jacobus and his predecessors do not contain Giles's treatment of books 3, 5, 9, and 11.

Metaphysicales Quaestiones or between statements expressed in that work and statements found in other works of Giles. His treatment follows a basic pattern. (1) He summarizes the position adopted by Giles in the particular *quaestio* under consideration and sometimes provides a summary of the argumentation supporting the opinion or even, on occasion, arguments against it. (2) He then presents the statement or statements in Giles's writings which appear to contradict the enunciated position. (3) Finally, he offers his solution to the dilemma by making a distinction, or offering an explanation, which may be drawn from Giles himself or from another author, especially St. Thomas Aquinas. Even a superficial reading of the text reveals a tendency to show the agreement between Giles and St. Thomas, e.g. *est haec etiam responsio S. Tho.* Jacobus's language for indicating the three steps tends to be formulaic. Some examples are (1) *quaestionis 5 summa est*, or *circa quaestionem 4 cuius videtur summa*; (2) *oppositum tamen sensisse videtur* or *oppositum tamen habere videtur*; (3) *solvitur per ipsum* or *solvitur quoniam*.

In the *quaestio* in medieval scholasticism, such as is seen in the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas, a position was stated and then followed by proofs for it with objections that were answered. Jacobus's work differs from the usual treatment in that the apparently opposed opinion is derived from Giles of Rome himself. As a model for his approach, Jacobus had the work of Marco Antonio Zimara, *Solutiones Contradictionum in Dictis Averrois*, the first edition of which appeared at Venice in 1508.¹⁰⁸ Zimara's method consists in exposing the apparent contradiction, e.g., *secunda contradictio ibidem est ista*, and offering a solution, e.g., *sed ad hoc solventes dicimus quod*. There can be no doubt about Jacobus's familiarity with Zimara since he refers to him in several places.

In his *Tractatus* Jacobus displays a broad knowledge of the works of both Giles and St. Thomas. From Giles he cites material from *Super de anima*, *Super physicam*, *Super libros Sententiarum*, and *Quodlibeta*. In the works of St. Thomas, he refers to passages in *Summa theologiae*, *Summa contra gentiles*, *Scripta super libros Sententiarum*, *In XII libros Metaphysicorum expositio*, *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate*, and *Quaes-*

¹⁰⁸ Zimara (1460-1523) was noted for his commentaries on Aristotle. Until recently, he has been considered an orthodox Averroist. His *Tabula Dilucidationum in Dictis Aristotelis et Averrois* (Venice, 1537) became the standard indices for the two authors. The *solutiones* were gathered together in the posthumous edition of Venice, 1550: *Contradictionum solutiones in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois: quae sparsim ac mendose variis in libris legebantur, in unum collectae et castigatae*. See the references to him in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*.

tiones de quolibet. In addition to his use of the works of Giles and Thomas, Jacobus employs texts of St. Augustine, Scotus, St. Albert the Great, and Marco Antonio Zimara. References to non-scholastic commentators on Aristotle, such as Averroes and Themistius († c. 390 A.D.) are also found. Like Zimara, Jacobus does not present quotations in the text, but the authors' positions are stated clearly in summary form accompanied by the citation of the location of the text. e.g., *S. Tho. p.par.q.79.ar.2*.

Such an ample command of authorities on Jacobus's part leads to at least a *prima facie* supposition that his treatise is not without merit. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to analyze Jacobus's use of sources and lines of argumentation in detail. Yet such a study is needed in order to make an adequate evaluation of the *Tractatus*, since one can hardly rely on the hasty judgment passed on it by Christopher of Padua.¹⁰⁹

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¹⁰⁹ CHRISTOPHER, II, 107: "levitatem et ineptiam in quibusdam componendis parum pensitatis elucidationibus iisque incudendis"

APPENDIX I

The Other Jacobus Senensis

In the registers of the priors general of this period, references are found to a Frater Jacobus Senensis, other than the main subject of the present article. The assumption followed here is that there is only one such other Jacobus Senensis during this period. For the sake of clarity he will be designated Jacobus Senensis II.

The first reference occurs in the register of Egidius of Viterbo where on 8 December 1517, Jacobus Senensis II was given the faculty to preach during Lent. Since Jacobus of Siena I was still a student at this time, it is highly unlikely that the reference applies to him.¹ The next mention occurs almost twenty-six years later, when on 11 November 1543 Seripando wrote to Magister Cherubinus of Cascia, the provincial of Umbria, requesting documents pertaining to a dispute between Cherubinus and Sant'Agostino at Siena concerning Frater Jacobus Senensis II.²

Jacobus II obtained a brief from the Roman Curia which allowed him to remain outside of the Order. On 15 February 1545 he presented it to Seripando as proof of the legitimacy of his absence and was assigned to live in the convent at Tivoli, where he was to serve as chaplain to a confraternity.³ Five years later on 30 August 1550, he obtained the prior general's permission to live outside the Order in order to provide for his aged mother.⁴

From the register of Christopher of Padua, we learn that Jacobus II was held in the Picena Province and accused of crimes that merited a sentence on 26 June 1556 to undergo imprisonment with a two or three month diet of bread and water and then to be expelled from the province.⁵ On 2 August 1556, Christopher of Padua wrote the provincial of the Roman province asking him to station Jacobus II in one of the houses of that province. At this point the register refers to him as "Frater Jacobus Senensis seu Firmanus."⁶ He could not be sent back to Siena at this time because the community there was in dire straits after the siege.⁷ On 6 November 1556 the general wrote to the prior of Aquapendente, a convent of the Roman province, telling him to keep Jacobus II since he was

¹ AEGIDIUS, II, 959.

² SERIPANDO, III, p. 251. On Magister Cherubinus of Cascia see Gutiérrez, "Patres ac Theologi," 124-26.

³ SERIPANDO, IV, p. 107.

⁴ SERIPANDO, VI, 361.

⁵ CHRISTOPHER, IV, 590.

⁶ CHRISTOPHER, IV, 690.

⁷ See Gersbach, "A Disturbance at Siena," 636-38.

exceedingly old (*admodum senex*). At the behest of the provincial, the prior had told him to leave but without indicating any new location to which he could go.⁸ Finally on 26 June 1557, the general directed the prior of Aquapendente to send Jacobus II back to his own province.⁹

On 10 February 1559, Christopher of Padua wrote to the prior of Orvieto to satisfy the claims of Jacobus II against the convent.¹⁰ It appears that Jacobus II was stationed at Sant'Agostino at this time, for we find two references, dated 21 May 1560 and 24 June 1561, granting concessions to him because of his age and weakness.¹¹ A final reference of 22 April 1564 indicates that Jacobus II was appointed confessor to the nuns of the convent of St. Nicholas in Siena.¹²

APPENDIX II

Prefatory Letter to Christopher of Padua from Jacobus of Siena

Reverendissimo in Christo literarum omnium consultissimo,
Totius eremitarum ordinis Sancti Augustini Generali dignissimo,
Magistro Christophoro Patavino,
Frater Iacobus Senensis Augustinianus, Theologorum postremus.

Verbum quippe Divinum, Reverendissime Pater, illud in dies comprobatur, nullam umquam creaturam sibi satis fuisse, ut nedum terrestres, sed nec coelestis absque coelesti, nec spiritualis spirituali dissocia adhuc propria moliri opera inveniat, quanto magis inops homo quoad corporalia mundum nudus ingrediens, quoad spiritualia, tamquam rasam tabulam cuiusvis expertem figure, intellectum possibilem in sui primordio concreatum accipiens, omnium bonorum indiguus, ope non egebit aliena? Nostra sane Eremitarum Religio, sicut et caetera, in sui ortus exordio, et temporalium et doctrine est paupertatem experta, atqui illam ad gloriam, hanc ad in gloriam sibi existimavit. Verum ad doctrine procul pellendam pauperiem, patrum nostrorum plurimum labor insudavit, lucubrationes

⁸ CHRISTOPHER, IV, 956.

⁹ CHRISTOPHER, V, 37.

¹⁰ A.G.A., Dd. 28, f. 372r. I am indebted to Fr. Arnulf Hartmann, O.S.A., for allowing me to use the as yet unpublished parts of his transcription of the register of Christopher of Padua.

¹¹ A.G.A., Dd. 29, ff. 91 and 180.

¹² A.G.A., Dd. 29, f. 280v.

diversas edendo; nos segnes, ignavi, diuturneque, ut dicunt, leme^a merito diiudicamur, dum eas nec in nostrum nec in proximorum obsequium esse satagimus. En Aegidij, nostre Religionis^b luminis, complura pulverulescent opuscula, ut de caractere,^c de bona fortuna, de ecclesiastica potestate, de laudibus divine sapientie, super cantica canticorum, in Epistolas ad Roma[nos] et ad Corinthios, in 3 senten[tias] exivia^d a patre.¹ Delitescit Iacobus de Viterbio super senten[tias], et quodlibet[a]^e 4, de regimine Christiano.² Augusti[nus] de Ancona in omnes Epistolas Pauli et canonicas, in actus Apostolorum, in Apocalip[sim].³ Albertus Patavus in Penthateucum, in omnes Epistolas Pauli.⁴ Henricus de Vrinaria de perfectione hominis, de incarnatione, de quadruplici instinctu, super Ethicam omnibus celebrior, 6^f quodlibet[a].⁵ Hermanus in 4 sententiarum, de 4 sensibus sacre scrip[turae], Encheridion Christianum, de in claustrum anime, de 5 sensibus; super Ethicam, super Genesi[m].⁶ Simon Cassianus de doctrina Christiana, in Simbolum, de disciplina spirituali.⁷ Bartholome[us] Urbinas, milleloquium super Augusti[no], opus mirandum, de bello spirituali.⁸ Petrus Picens in 4 senten[tias], in omnia opera Salomonis.⁹ Augusti[nus] de Roma in omnes Epistolas Pauli, in Apocalip[sim], in Ethi[cam], de sponsa Christi Ecclesia, de perfectione iustitie, de peccato originali.¹⁰ Iohannes Dathus de divinis attributis, de potentiis anime, de Trinita contra Faustum.¹¹ Honofrius Archiepiscopus Florentinus super 4 Evangelistas, super actus Apostolicos.¹² Mitto Micha[e]lem Massanum, Gerardum Senensem, Gerardum Bergomensem, Iacobum Toletanum, Andream^g Mediolanensem, Dionisium Burgensem, Hilarium Comensem, qui suis voluminibus Religionis fuissent decori.¹³

Quamobrem non intensius nobis se offert admirandum quam condolendum quod nostre religionis optimates per quamplures annorum transactas orbitas, alia sibi ob oculos statuentes in tot tantorumque illustrium virorum luculentissimis voluminibus conniverint. Porro sicuti sanctissima orthodoxa atque catholica Christiana Religio ferme in lustris cubaret, si quo minus Apostolorum, Evangelistarum, Prophetarum, Doctorumque complurium scripturis illustraretur, unde fidelium mentes vitalia ac salvifica exhaurirent ientacula, sic spetiales sub ipsa fideliter militantes Religiones in neglectum caederent, ni spetialium suorum preclarium virorum decorarentur. Nam sicut ridiculus ac pannosus merito

^a Lemae, -arum, the form given in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, is taken from Greek ἡ λημη, which signifies an effusion of material from the eyes.

^b Corrected from religionie.

^c Corrected from carectere.

^d Exivia appears to be a neologism with the meaning here of works that have gone astray from the author.

^e Corrected here and below from quolibet[a].

^f The numeral "6" is taken here to modify the following *Quodlibeta*.

^g Corrected from Audream.

quispiam censebitur, qui etsi revera locuples, divitiis tamen terra suffossis minime potitur, sic quevis Religio quotislibet scientificis Doctoribus scientiam exarantibus praefulserit, dum horum opera invisa occuluntur, omnibus totos dies contemptibilis^h perserverat, neque enim in ventum protulit Ecclesiast[icus] XX: Sapientia invisa et thesaurus absconditus, que utilitas in utrisque?ⁱ Opportune igitur ac tempestive Altissimus, sapientium sapientiam perdens ac prudentium prudentiam reprobans,^j P[aternitatem] T[uam] Reverendissimam, omni religiositate praestantissimam, omni virtute praeditam, omni disciplinarum genere faecundissimam, mundana conculcantem, mundi sapientiam pessundantem, super coeremitarum caulam accomodum ac pervigilem praefectum constituit, qui, tamquam mundo emortuus, seculi perfunctorias dignitates^k aspernatus, uti verus Christi assecla, humilitatem toto pectore amplexus, tantummodo sibi crediti gregis ornamentum ac salutem spectabit. Non est igitur quod quis demiretur si tantum ac talem pastorem eremicolae oves adeptae, et montes exultant ut arietes, et colles sicut agni,^l quandoquidem caeteris posthabitis insigniis, iam nunc sub columbae spetie, divinae humanaeque pacis praesage, de spiritali vita commonefacti, bonorum operum in religione faecunditatem, paterni tui animi lenitatem,^m in nobis filiis tuis sinceram contemplabimur dilectionem, sicque quas spiritus primitias assecuti detinentes, abba pater iugiter ingemiscemus,ⁿ quo fiet ut pacifico ordine directa religio ferme exiccata atque obscura, te tali ac tanto duce quandoque reflorat et corruscet, quod facile eucontinget dum ipsius religionis accensae lucernae non ultra sub modio negligentur, verum candelabris superponantur, ut indigenis, advenis, ac convenis lumen inpartiant.^o Maximam aequidem in eius Generalatus primordio, de sui ovilis celsitudine curam habere prae se tulit P[aternitas] T[ua] Reverendissima, dum Aegidij Doctoris nostri Methaphisicalia exquisita quesita, diu in numeris involuta erratis, ut

^h Corrected from contentibilis.

ⁱ Cf. Vulgate: Eccl. 20:32: "Sapientia absconsa et thesaurus invisus: quae utilitas in utrisque?"

^j Cf. Vulgate: 1 Corin. 1:19: "Scriptum est enim: Perdam sapientiam sapientium, et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo."

^k Corrected from dignitates.

^l Cf. Vulgate: Ps. 113:4 & 6: "Montes exultastis sicut arietes et colles sicut agni ovium."

^m Corrected from lenitatem.

ⁿ Cf. Vulgate: Rom. 8:15: "Non enim accepistis spiritum servitutis interim in timore, sed accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum in quo clamamus: Abba (Pater)." Also Rom. 8: 22-23: "Scimus enim quod omnis creatura ingemiscit et parturit usque adhuc. Non solum autem illa, sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes: et ipsi intra nos gemimus adoptionem filiorum Dei expectantes."

^o Cf. Vulgate: Matt. 5:15-16: "Neque accendunt lucernam et ponunt eam sub modio, sed super candelabrum, ut luceat omnibus, qui in domo sunt. Sic luceat lux vestra coram hominibus ut videant opera vestra bona, et glorificent patrem vestrum, qui in caelis est."

imprimerentur, quam mox operam navavit, cuius dispositione en in lucem prodeunt. Caepit autem providentia sua ab imis, artem aemulata ac naturam, hinc non ab re tota Eremitarum professio, de qua sic derepente benemerita est, singulos in dies maiora suscipere confidit, pro cuius iccirco vitae incolumnitatem^p ac longaevitatem^q sedulo Altissimum obsecramus. Vale, pater Optime, Christianae Religionis praecipuum paradigma et Augustinianae Decus Augustum.

Bibliographical Notes to the Prefatory Letter

For the most part, the following notes are limited to identifying the authors and works cited in the prefatory letter by providing initial bibliographical entries concerning manuscript sources and first editions, especially pre-1551 ones, for the specific works cited by Jacobus. In addition to specialized studies, the following sources have been consulted.

- 1) Johannes Felix Ossinger, O.S.A., *Bibliotheca Augustiniana* (Ingolstadii et Augustae Vindelicorum, 1768; reprinted Torino, 1963).
- 2) Davide Perini, O.S.A., *Bibliographia Augustiniana cum notis biographicis: Scriptores Italiani* (Firenze, 1929-37), published in four parts, each with its own page numbering. Both Ossinger and Perini are outdated, but sometimes still useful.
- 3) Adolar Zumkeller, O.S.A., *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken* (Würzburg, 1966).

¹ Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus) († 1316), chosen by the Order as the leader of the Augustinian school of philosophy and theology. For a listing of his works, editions, and manuscripts, see Gerardo Bruni, *Le opere di Egidio Romano* (Firenze, 1936). The Unione Accademica Nazionale has undertaken the preparation of a critical edition of *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*. See note 5 in the main section above. The researcher needs to consult these volumes as they appear.

- 1) *De charactere*, first edition Rome, apud Antonium Bladum, 1555 (Bruni, 118).
- 2) *Expositio in Aristotelis librum de bona fortuna*, Venice, 1496; Venice, 1525; and Venice, apud Octavianum Scotum, 1551 (Bruni, 54-56).
- 3) *Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate*, not published until Firenze, 1908 (Bruni, 136).

^p Corrected from incolumnitatem.

^q Corrected from longaevitatem.

- 4) *Tractatus de laudibus divinae sapientiae*, first edition Padua, 1553, then Rome, apud Antonium Bladum, 1555 (Bruni, 121-22).
- 5) *Expositio super Cantica canticorum*, first edition Rome, apud Antonium Bladum, 1555 (Bruni, 113).
- 6) *Expositio in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*, Rome, apud Antonium Bladum, 1555 (Bruni, 112).
- 7) *Expositio super Epistolas Pauli ad Corinthios*, not edited (Bruni, 112-13).
- 8) *Commentarius in Primum Sententiarum*, Venice, 1492; Venice, 1502; Venice, 1521 (Bruni, 113-15); *Commentarius in Secundum Sententiarum*, Venice, 1482 and Basil, 1513 (Bruni, 115-16); *Commentarius in tertium Sententiarum*, not published until Rome, 1623 (Bruni, 116).

² James of Viterbo († 1308). See David Gutiérrez, O.S.A., *De B. Iacobi Viterbiensis, O.E.S.A., vita, operibus, et doctrina theologica* (Rome, 1939).

1) *Lectura super quatuor Libros Sententiarum* (Gutiérrez, 26).

2) *Quodlibeta quatuor* (Gutiérrez, 30-34). The *Quodlibeta quatuor* have been edited by Eelco Ypma, O.S.A., *Jacobi de Viterbo O.E.S.A. Disputatio Prima de Quodlibet* (Würzburg, 1968); *Secunda* (Rome, 1969); *Tertia* (Rome, 1973); *Quarta* (Rome, 1975).

3) *De regimine Christiano ad Bonifatium VIII, libri duo*. Gutiérrez (35-36) cites the first edition as Rome, 1914.

³ Augustine of Ancona, referred to at times as Augustinus Triumphus. See Blasius Ministeri, O.S.A., "De Augustini de Ancona, O.E.S.A. († 1328), vita et operibus," *Analecta Augustiniana* 22 (1952), 7-56 and 148-262.

1) Jacobus refers to "in omnes Epistolas Pauli et canonicas." Ministeri (196-200) lists the individual commentaries and extant manuscripts. See also Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, nn. 124-25).

2) Ministeri also lists *Postilla (lectura) in Epistolas canonicas* (193-96) as well as *Glossa ex glossis Sanctorum in Epistolas canonicas* (192-93). See also Zumkeller, (*Manuskripte*, n. 123).

3) Jacobus's "in actus Apostolorum" is cited as *Glossa ex glossis sanctorum in Actus Apostolorum* (Ministeri, 189-91).

4) *Glossa ex glossis sanctorum in Apocalypsim*, Ministeri (191-92) and Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, n. 122).

⁴ Albert of Padua († 1328 or 1323).

1) Ossinger (669) cites a manuscript preserved at the Augustinian convent at Padua for *Expositio in Genesim, in Leviticum, in Deuteronomium, in Exodum, et Numeros*. Perini (3, 71) repeats Ossinger, but gives no extant manuscripts. However, see Fridericus Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi*, vols. 1-7

(Madrid, 1940-61) and vols. 8-9 (supplement) (Madrid, 1976-77), nn. 1064.1 - 1064.7 in supplement.

2) *In omnes Epistolas D. Pauli lib. 14* Ossinger (669) and Perini (3, 71) cite no extant manuscripts or editions.

⁵ Henry of Friemar, the Elder (Henricus de Frimaria). Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, p. 125) points out that there are two authors by this name: the elder († 1340) and the younger († 1354). The only work that can be attributed with certainty to the younger is a commentary on the Sentences. See also Zumkeller's articles on "Heinrich von Friemar" in *Lexikon des Mittelalters* (München and Zürich, 1977 ff.). Ossinger and earlier authors do not distinguish the two.

1) *Liber de perfectione interioris hominis* (Ossinger, 953).

2) *Liber de Incarnatione Verbi*, for which Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, n. 306) cites four manuscripts.

3) *Liber de quatuor instinctibus*, Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, nn. 307) cites a first edition of Venice, 1498, followed by Hagenau, 1513, and Paris, 1514. Latin version with the middle high German translation found in *Der Traktat Heinrichs von Friemar über die Unterscheidung der Geister*, ed. Robert Warnock and Adolar Zumkeller, OSA. (Würzburg, 1977).

4) *Commentaria in decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis* (Zumkeller, *Manuskripte*, n. 302 and Ossinger, 953).

5) On Jacobus's "Quodlibeta," see Ossinger (954) *Quodlibeta tria, duo Parisiis disputata*, with no manuscripts cited for the work. Joseph Pamphilus, who wrote some 30 years after Jacobus, mentions only "*Quodlibetta duo*" in his *Chronica Ordinis Fratrum Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* (Rome, 1581), f. 41r. Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, nn. 328-28b) cites three works *Quodlibet primum*; *Abbreviatio Quodlibeti XIV Godfridi de Fontibus*; and *Quodlibet aliud*. The last he considers dubious.

⁶ Herman of Schildesche († 1357). For a modern treatment of Herman, see Adolar Zumkeller, O.S.A., *Schriftum und Lehre des Hermann von Schildesche* (Würzburg, 1959).

1) *Liber super primo Sententiarum*, lost according to Zumkeller (*Hermannus*, 6).

2) *Compendium de quatuor sensibus Scripturae* (Zumkeller, *Hermannus*, 23-40).

3) The identification of Jacobus's reference to *Encheridion Christianum* is problematic; *Tractatus de decem preceptis et de duodecim consiliis* seems likely (Zumkeller, *Hermannus*, 98-99).

4) *Clastrum animae* (Zumkeller, *Hermannus*, 67-78).

5) *De quinque sensibus*, no manuscripts according to Zumkeller (*Hermannus*, 100).

6) Zumkeller (*Hermannus*, 147) maintains that *In Ethica Aristotelis libri decem* is falsely assigned to Hermannus.

7) Jacobus's "super Genesim" could refer to either *Opus sex dierum duplex* or to *Postilla super Genesim*. No manuscripts found for either one according to Zumkeller (*Hermannus*, 67 and 100).

⁷ Simon Fidati of Cascia († 1348). See Nicola Mattioli, O.S.A., *Il Beato Simone Fidati da Cascia ... e i suoi scritti* (Rome, 1898). Jacobus of Siena cites two of Fidati's Italian works under Latin titles.

1) *De doctrina Christiana, Capitoli di dottrina Cristiana* (Perini 2, 64).

2) *In Simbolum, Espositione de Credo in Dio* (Perini, 2, 64). (Stegmüller, n. 7644).

3) *De disciplina spiritualium lib. I* (Perini, 2, 65-66).

⁸ Bartholomew of Urbino († 1350).

1) *D. P. Aurelii Augustini Milleloquium Veritatis*. Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, p. 88) cites the first edition as Lyons, 1555.

2) Jacobus's mention of *De bello spirituali* probably refers to *De re bellica spirituali per comparationem temporalis partes III*, but there also exists *Opus de pugna spirituali* (Perini, 1, 204). Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, n. 174) lists this latter as doubtful.

⁹ Peter of Brunniquello (Petrus Picens, Petrus de Brunniquello seu de Rupe Maura) († 1328).

1) Ossinger (164) cites *Tabula supra Magistrum Sententiarum* with a manuscript at the convent of Regensburg. Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, n. 750) cites *Tabula brevis et utilis super quatuor libros Sententiarum*, but considers the work of doubtful attribution.

2) Ossinger (164) cites *Comment. in Proverbia*, *Comment. in Ecclesiasten*, and *Comment. in Cantica Canticorum* with no manuscripts.

¹⁰ Augustine Favaroni of Rome († 1443). See Salesius Friemel, O.S.A., *Die theologische Prinzipienlehre des Augustinus Favaroni von Rom O.E.S.A. († 1443)*, (Würzburg, 1950).

1) Perini (2, 51) lists commentaries on the epistles *ad Romanos*; *ad Galatas*; *ad Ephesios*; *ad Philippenses*; *ad Colossenses*; *prima ad Corinthios*. See Stegmüller, *Repertorium*, nn. 1499-1505, 1. The commentary on *ad Philippenses* has been edited by Gonzalo Díaz, O.S.A., in *Estudios sobre la baja edad media*, (El Escorial, 1977), 1-142.

2) *Lectura super Apocalypsim*. See Stegmüller (*Repertorium*, nn. 1506-07).

- 3) *Commentum Magistri Augustini de Roma ... super primo Ethicorum Aristotelis; Commentum eiusdem super secundo Ethicorum Aristotelis* (Perini 2, 51-52).
- 4) *Tractatus de sacramento unitatis Christi et Ecclesiae, sive de Christo integro*, edited by A. Piolanti (Città del Vaticano, 1971).
- 5) *De perfecta iustitia militantis Ecclesiae in presenti*, edited by Gonzalo Díaz, O.S.A., in *Un tratado inédito sobre la santidad de la Iglesia de Agustín Favaroni († 1443)* (El Escorial, 1959).
- 6) *De peccato originali liber I* (Perini, 2, 51).

¹¹ Joannes Dathus (*floruit* 1460). See Ossinger (288-90) and Perini (2, 9) for the following works:

- 1) *Liber de attributis divinis*; Ossinger cites a manuscript at Regensburg.
- 2) *Liber de potentiis animae*.
- 3) *Libri S. P. Augustini contra Faustum, Crescentium et de Trinitate in conclusiones redacti*.

¹² Onofrius Stecchetti de Visdomini of Florence († 1403).

- 1) *Libri IV expositionis super quatuor evangelia*.
- 2) *Expositio seu Commentaria in Acta Apostolorum*.

For both of these see Perini (3, 211) and Ossinger (871-72). No manuscripts.

¹³ For the remaining names given by Jacobus, see the following references.

- a) Michael de Massa († 1337), Ossinger (567-68), Perini (2, 191-92) and Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, nn. 690-99).
- b) Gerardus de Senis († 1336), Ossinger (827-29), Perini (3, 187-89) and Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, nn. 255-60).
- c) Gerardus Bergomensis († 1355), Ossinger under "Carrara Gerardus" (208-09) Perini (1, 202-03) and Stegmüller (n. 2459).
- d) Iacob Tolentanus, possibly the lector and prior at Tolentino mentioned in *Iuliani de Salem, O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus 1451-1459*, ed. Daniela Gionta (Rome, 1994), n. 584 and n. 600.
- e) Andreas de Mediolano, probably the one who was author of *Commenta in Genesim* († after 1540). See Ossinger (573) and Perini (2, 201). See also *Anal. Aug.* 7 (1917-18), 435, permission to receive the *magistralia insignia* in 1494. However, there were also two earlier friars with the same name. See *Anal. Aug.* 5 (1913-14), 123-26, documents from 1358; and *Anal. Aug.* 6 (1915-16), 339, document from 1432.
- f) Dionysius de Burgo S. Sepulchri († 1342), Perini (2, 26-28) and Zumkeller (*Manuskripte*, nn. 233-34a).
- g) Hilarius Comensis, unidentified.

LA PAIX THÉOLOGIQUE MANQUÉE À LOUVAIN EN 1685

Fait curieux, c'est à Bruxelles que naissent les essais pour réaliser la paix à l'université de Louvain. Celle-ci — Douai étant devenue française — est désormais la seule université des Pays-Bas. Elle est située dans le diocèse de Malines, dont l'archevêque habite au centre de la capitale, Bruxelles, dans la rue de l'Évêque.

L'archevêque, Alphonse de Berghes, prélat pacifique, prend l'initiative de réconcilier les deux partis en présence, d'un côté l'Université suspectée de jansénisme, et de l'autre la Société de Jésus, d'un molinisme provocant. Le prélat zéléteur semble aussitôt gagner à la cause le P. Libert De Pape, recteur des jésuites de Bruxelles. Néanmoins les essais bruxellois échoueront. Nous en ferons le récit.

Au cours des siècles, dans leurs "constitutions" et leurs "mandements", les papes et les évêques faisaient un fréquent usage de leur pouvoir doctrinal. Normalement ils enseignaient par leurs mandements; dans des cas plutôt exceptionnels, en cas d'erreurs graves, ils prononçaient une condamnation; en cas de dissensions théologiques trop retentissantes, ils recommandaient la paix, en imposant le silence sur la matière; à l'occasion d'une condamnation¹ ils interdisaient, même sévèrement, toute dispute, toute polémique, voire toute publication, et parfois même tout à la fois. Normalement les partis opposés qui exprimaient le désir de se réconcilier, pouvaient compter sur l'appui de l'autorité supérieure. C'était, entre autres, le cas en 1668-1669, lorsque les évêques de France, sur le désir de Louis XIV, préparaient la "paix de l'Église"². Il en était ainsi à Louvain³ en

¹ Ces faits appartiennent à l'histoire de l'Église en général ou à celle du jansénisme en particulier. Voir les auteurs. Quant à la paix des théologiens, je rappelle ici les mesures prises par Rome à l'occasion de la condamnation de Baius (1567), des *Congregationes de auxiliis*, au tournant des 16e-17e siècles, les condamnations de Jansénius (1643-1666). Voir les historiens pertinents.

² Pour une consultation rapide voir F. Bluche, *Dictionnaire du Grand Siècle*, Paris, 1990, 134 et 1138.

³ Sources principales: G. Huygens, *Theses theologicae, id est articuli theologorum Lovaniensium exhibiti ... Archiepiscopo Mechliniensi, causa concordiae ineundae cum RR.PP. Societatis Jesu et aliis...*, Louvain, 12 julii 1685, 32 p. Id., *Theses theologicae adversus Anti-Theses*, Louvain, 1685, 12 p. Id., *Theses theologicae refutatoriae apologiae pro nuperis Anti-Thesibus*, Louvain 31 août 1685, Louvain, 1685, in-8°, 8 p. Ph. De Vos

1685, lors de cette "paix manquée".

Les circonstances

Depuis 1640, l'année qui marque le début du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme, la Faculté de théologie de Louvain n'a plus connu aucune paix. Après que sous Urbain VIII, Innocent X et Alexandre VII, les controverses dogmatiques ont été plus ou moins étouffées, les querelles au sujet de la morale laxiste et rigoriste, qui auraient dû cesser après les condamnations d'Alexandre VII (1665-1666) et d'Innocent XI (1679)⁴, se rallument. Aussitôt, plus venimeuses que jamais, les discussions reprennent au sujet de la pastorale, surtout concernant la pratique du confesseur au confessionnal; entre autres la controverse sur l'usage du secret de la confession, licite en certaines circonstances, fait du bruit. Le Saint-Siège intervient aussitôt en condamnant les thèses soutenues au Séminaire de Malines par François van der Vliedt, disciple du professeur Gommaire Huygens de Louvain⁵. Ce dernier, professeur très en vue, prétend seulement commenter les *Instructions aux confesseurs* de saint Charles Borromée. Sa *Methodus absolvendi et remittendi* (1673/74) veut amener les confesseurs à faire un usage fructueux de leur pouvoir de délier et de lier⁶. Ce livre est vigoureusement attaqué de divers côtés, surtout de la part des jésuites, les adversaires les plus combattifs de Huygens.

Le 28 août 1681 il sera même condamné par l'Inquisition espagnole⁷, mais le Saint-Office, qui a pris connaissance de son *Apologie*, ne veut pas aller si loin.

Le gouvernement espagnol, c'est-à-dire le roi Charles II à Madrid⁸, et ses gouverneurs généraux successifs à Bruxelles, le Conseil privé,

s.j., *Anti-Theses ad Theses theologicas seu articulos exhibitos ... per Gummarum Huygens*, Louvain, 1685, 21 p. Id., *Apologiae pro Anti-Thesibus ad Theses ... Gummari Huygens...*, Louvain, 1685, 15 p. Cf. C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, VIII, 915-916. Gabriel du Pac de Bellegarde, *Mémoires historiques touchant l'Université de Louvain et les Églises des Pays-Bas, surtout depuis 1680-1713*, ms. de l'O.B.C., (aux archives de l'État à Utrecht), t.I, chap. XXI: *Projet de conférence proposé par l'archevêque de Malines, entre les jésuites et les docteurs de Louvain*, f° 49-50. Les sources secondaires seront mentionnées occasionnellement.

⁴ Voir les différentes éditions de H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion*.

⁵ Voir le décret condamnatore du 18 novembre 1682 dans M. Steyaert, *Opuscula*, édition Louvain 1703, I, 355.

⁶ Voir *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, VII, 350-355.

⁷ Voir L. Ceyssens, *La seconde période du jansénisme*, II, Bruxelles, 1974, 352.

⁸ Voir une étude consacrée à l'attitude de la cour d'Espagne vis-à-vis du jansénisme, à paraître bientôt dans la *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*.

prennent des mesures contre les "suspects" de Louvain, parmi lesquels le professeur Gommaire Huygens, l'auteur de la *Methodus*, est spécialement visé. Tandis que Madrid et Bruxelles poursuivent ces "suspects" et empêchent leur promotion, Rome les protège plutôt⁹. De là naît une violente controverse, surtout entre le Père Philippe De Vos, professeur chez les jésuites de Louvain et le professeur Huygens. Les Thèses et Anti-thèses se succèdent¹⁰, au grand scandale du public.

Alphonse de Berghes, archevêque de Malines (mais habitant Bruxelles), prélat pacifique, du tiers parti, tout en étant suspecté de favoriser le jansénisme, et ayant été dénoncé et même molesté pour cette raison¹¹, mais regrettant depuis longtemps ces dissensions théologiques et le scandale qui s'en est suivi, essaie d'arriver à un accommodement entre ses théologiens, surtout ceux de Louvain, où les deux partis, jésuite et universitaire, ne cessent de se quereller. Déjà en 1677 il avait fait des efforts en ce sens; et le pape Innocent XI et Ignace Diertins, provincial des jésuites, l'en avaient félicité¹². Mais à cause de la députation louvaniste à Rome (1678-1679) et de son résultat¹³, ses efforts avaient lamentablement échoué. Les dissensions s'étaient même aggravées.

Pourtant en 1683, de Berghes, membre du Conseil d'État, engage celui-ci à intercéder chez le gouverneur général pour rétablir la concorde; il essuiera de nouveau un échec. Malgré tout, l'archevêque pacificateur ne se décourage pas et en novembre 1684, il entreprend une nouvelle tentative pour laquelle il cherche l'aide du recteur des jésuites bruxellois.

Pourtant celui-ci, Libert De Pape¹⁴, n'est pas professeur de théologie et ne semble pas non plus avoir jamais enseigné cette matière, mais pour de Berghes, c'est un homme de choix; il est le fils de Léon-Jean¹⁵, le "chef-président" ou premier ministre, cet homme puissant et autoritaire

⁹ Voir Ceyssens, *La seconde période*, passim.

¹⁰ C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, VIII, 910-917, où sont mentionnés les écrits de part et d'autre.

¹¹ L. Ceyssens, *La citation à Rome d'Alphonse de Berghes, archevêque de Malines (1679-1680)*, dans Id., *Jansenistica, Studiën*, II, 128-192.

¹² Cf. J. Berthier, *Innocentii PP. XI epistolae ad principes*, I, Rome, 1890, 389. Le P. Diertins avait répondu, de Louvain, le 31 janvier 1677: "... Gaudeo Illustrissimam Suam Gratiam persistere in cogitatione convocandi utramque partem dissidentium. Cum omni respectu admitto, quod ad nos attinet, oblatum congressum ..."; cf. G. Huygens, *Theses theologicae adversus Anti-Theses*, 20 août 1685, conclusio quinta.

¹³ L. Ceyssens, *De Leuvense deputatie te Rome (1677-1679)*, in Id., *Jansenistica, Studiën*, I, 170-253.

¹⁴ Il fut souvent recteur, en divers lieux; provincial de 1700 à 1704. A. Poncelet, *Nécrologe des jésuites de la province Flandro-Belge*, Wetteren, 1931, 140; Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, VI, 178.

¹⁵ Voir *Biographie nationale*, V, 612-615.

qui domine les gouverneurs généraux successifs et les Conseils; qui, de plus, est très royaliste sinon gallican et entend étendre le pouvoir royal et la compétence des Conseils même sur l'université indépendante de Louvain.

Ce recteur pourrait donc intervenir auprès de son père prépotent, du gouverneur-général docile, des Conseils et surtout auprès de ses confrères qui font la lutte à Louvain.

En novembre 1684 l'archevêque s'adresse donc à ce recteur. Du Pac écrit:

"... M. de Berghes était bien assuré des dispositions pacifiques des théologiens de Louvain, mais il ne l'était pas également de celles des jésuites; il en fit néanmoins la proposition au P. de Pape, recteur du Collège de Bruxelles, en novembre 1684 ... Le jésuite parut y acquiescer de toute la plénitude du coeur, et déclara même qu'il allait faire réciter dans son collège un *Veni Creator* pour demander à Dieu de répandre sa bénédiction sur un si bon dessein..."¹⁶.

Tandis que de Berghes espère que De Pape prendra contact avec ses confrères de Louvain, il se met lui-même en relation avec les professeurs séculiers de Louvain, du moins avec les plus remuants d'entre eux, Gommaire Huygens et ses collègues "suspects" et "exclus". Les négociations pourront commencer.

La première entrevue (27 février 1685)

Le 27 février, à 9 heures du matin, au palais épiscopal, devant l'archevêque, se rencontrent d'un côté le P. De Pape, de l'autre le professeur Gommaire Huygens pour faire un premier pas vers la paix théologique. D'après Huygens, ils conviennent d'un plan d'action, que chacun s'engage à respecter. Chaque parti engagé dressera une liste des points doctrinaux qui lui déplaisent chez le parti adverse. Ils se

¹⁶ Dupac, I, 51-52. Sur cette première entrevue entre l'archevêque et le recteur, nous ne sommes pas très bien renseignés. Le P. De Pape admet qu'il a été invité par l'archevêque; "eumdem subiecisse mihi stimulos plures ut partes inter sese dissidentes perducerem ad conferentiam aliquam, cuius scopus esset pax et concordia in controversiis theologicis concernentibus fidem et mores, quibus miserius in dies affligitur Belgium nostrum. Adlaboravi serio, fateor, ad conferentiam hanc, ut funditus extirparentur scandala quae reclusis academiarum et scholarum repagulis, ad ipsa multorum pulpita et sermones quotidianos, tam publicos quam privatos, prorumpunt passim, neque solum catholicis mentibus offendicula affricant, verum etiam haereticis, quibus circumcingimur undequaque ... et quamquam dubius de candore doctorum Lovaniensium quibus cum congregandum erat ... certus tamen de sincero desiderio meo ..."; De Vos, *Anti-Theses*, praefatio. Ce doute initial, l'archevêque l'eut pareillement à l'égard des jésuites; Du Pac l'affirme, et de Berghes lui-même l'avouera; cf. infra.

communiqueront cette liste. De part et d'autre on y répliquera par écrit, jusqu'à quatre fois au maximum; après cela, il y aura une discussion orale en vue d'un accord final. Si on n'y aboutit pas, les actes des pourparlers seront envoyés au Saint-Siège pour obtenir une décision pontificale. Il s'agit donc, au moins d'après Huygens, d'une réelle "convention"¹⁷.

Le P. De Pape est affirmatif. Lorsque dans la matinée du 27 février il a rencontré chez l'archevêque le professeur Huygens en vue d'une pacification, il y a consenti avec plaisir, mais il n'y a nullement été question de la manière de procéder. Il est vrai, Huygens avait laissé tomber qu'avant de parvenir à une paix, il entrevoyait de graves difficultés, à quoi De Pape avait répondu qu'il n'en voyait pas si ce n'est que les partis pourraient exiger des préliminaires en vue de parvenir à une paix vraiment durable et efficace. Ni Huygens, ni l'archevêque n'auraient réagi sur cette remarque. Après avoir échangé des signes de bienveillance, le recteur avait quitté le palais archiépiscopal, et le jour même il avait noté ces détails dans son journal.

Qui des deux témoins dit l'entière vérité? En tout cas, chacun d'eux, d'après ce qu'il croit convenu entre eux, se met au travail.

À Louvain, Huygens prend contact avec ses collègues, les "suspects", les "exclus". Avec leur accord, et probablement avec leur aide, il rédige la liste des points en litige qui feront l'objet des futures négociations. Il y consacre plusieurs semaines. Finalement, le 23 mars, il met sa signature sous la liste avec quatre collègues de Louvain, et plus tard même avec deux "suspects" de Malines.

Cette liste des thèmes louvanistes, Huygens les imprimera dans sa Thèse du 12 juillet 1685. En voici au moins les grandes lignes:

I. *Dieu cause efficiente des bonnes oeuvres:*

- a. La grâce du Christ; six points particuliers;
- b. La liberté; douze points;

II. *Dieu cause exemplaire, règle des mœurs:*

¹⁷ Dans l'introduction de sa thèse du 20 août 1685, Huygens emploie même le terme *contract*: "Contractus ... ita sonat: pars utraque scripto tradet Illmo ... Archiepiscopo illas suas sentencias quas a parte altera novit impugnari, quae deinde per Illum Dominum alteri parti communicabuntur, eo fine ut haec contra replicet; postmodum pars utraque in defensionem suarum sententiarum duplicet et postea, si opus, procedatur ad quadruplicam, et denique ad collationem verbalem. Quibus omnibus peractis, si ad concordiam nondum fuerit ventum, missis actis ad S. Sedem, ultima illinc decisio expectanda erit. *Additum fuit*: utrique parti licitum fore interrogare alteram de articulis non expressis, num eas teneat; sique pars interrogata articulos petitos a se teneri responderit, ei incumbet eosdem cum aliis scripto traditis sustinere et defendere. Si vero responderit illos a se non teneri, nulla super istis articulis poterit quaestio aut molestia".

- a. L'ignorance; onze points¹⁸;
- b. La probabilité; douze points;

III. Dieu cause finale:

Article unique: le précepte de la charité; 18 points;

IV. L'administration du sacrement de la pénitence:

Article unique: l'absolution à la confession; quatre points;

"Ita sentimus, salvo tamen iudicio superiorum nostrorum, ac praecipue Sedis apostolicae, cuius iudicio articulos nostros perlubenter submittimus, in quibus coram praedicto ... Reverendissimo Domino convenire non potuerimus. Datum Lovanii die 23 martii 1685; (signé) Franciscus van Vianen, Gummarus Huygens, Bartholomeus Pasmans, Joannes Libertus Hennebel. Signarunt etiam Mechliniae Joannes Lacman S.T.D. et Franciscus vander Vliedt S.T.L.

Ces signataires veulent-ils personnellement participer aux futures négociations? Font-ils confiance à leur négociateur Huygens et ratifieront-ils seulement les conventions qu'il conclut? En tout cas, comme telle, la Faculté de théologie de Louvain n'a nullement été mêlée à l'entreprise. La liste des articles est recopiée plusieurs fois pour être distribuée, entre autres à l'archevêque, au P. De Pape, au gouverneur général, à l'inter-nonce.

De son côté, le P. De Pape ne s'est pas reposé après l'entrevue du 27 février. *Studio quo potui et amore concordiae singulari*, il s'est mis à la besogne. Il en a référé à son provincial Gilles Estrix¹⁹, un homme de valeur, antijanséniste ardent de longue date, de qui il reçoit bientôt — la date exacte manque — une espèce de délégation officielle, même assez solennelle:

"... Vu la pleine confiance que j'ai en vous et en votre doctrine, je vous charge de vous choisir un compagnon, et de partager avec lui à ces conférences de paix, d'y proposer et d'y conclure, et je tiendrai pour valable tout ce que vous agirez dans cette négociation"²⁰.

Chose curieuse, le provincial ne désigne aucun de ses professeurs

¹⁸ L'ignorance, obstacle à la responsabilité et excuse du péché, jouait dans les polémiques. Voir par exemple à Rome, Bibliotheca Angelica, fonds antico, Ms 897, une controverse très proluxe sur l'ignorance entre Gilbert de Choiseul, évêque de Tournai, et Jean de Brier, recteur des jésuites à Tournai.

¹⁹ L. Ceyssens, *L'influence de Gilles Estrix sur l'origine de la députation louvaniste à Rome (1677-1679)*, dans *Gregorianum* 30 (1949), 130-157; cf. *Jansenistica minora*, I, fasc. 4; C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, III, 466-474; L. Ceyssens, *Les religieux belges à Rome et le jansénisme*, dans *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, 48-49 (1978-1979), 291.

²⁰ De Vos, *Anti-These*, 7-8; 13.

de Louvain pour dresser la liste des points litigieux qui, de la part des jésuites, feront l'objet des futures négociations.

Plus curieux encore, et qui n'a nullement été prévu lors de la première rencontre, le P. De Pape ne s'adresse pas seulement à son propre provincial, mais aussi à celui des franciscains, en vue de mêler ceux-ci à l'accommodement.

En effet, les franciscains se battent dans les rangs des jésuites, mais en simples soldats. En 1678 ils ont même collaboré à la création de la Société secrète pour la lutte contre le jansénisme, et y ont joué leur rôle. Mais si le P. De Pape mêle à la pacification les franciscains qui n'y ont pas été invités, pourquoi ne s'adresse-t-il pas aussi à d'autres religieux surtout aux carmes déchaussés, qui eux aussi combattent vaillamment le jansénisme et ont collaboré à la Société secrète²¹, qui trouva même un commissaire très actif à Rome en la personne du P. Séraphin de Jésus-Marie. En 1679 le P. Jacques de la Passion avait publié un opuscule fort agressif: *Aliquot propositiones novissimorum casuistarum in materia poenitentiae*²², qui dénonce 347 propositions jansénistes, avec cette note finale éloquente: "Sat pro hac vice". Certes, depuis peu, les carmes et les jésuites ne se courtisent plus à cause du dernier volume des *Acta Sanctorum* qui a présenté Simon Stock, le fondateur des carmes, sous un jour peu favorable. Mais malgré tout, - les jésuites le savaient - aucune paix n'était réalisable sans l'intervention des carmes, si obstinément antijansénistes!

Cependant, sans les carmes, mais avec les trois lecteurs franciscains, Jacques van den Eynde, Regnier Payez, Gaspar van Paesschen²³, le P. De Vos S.J., Louvaniste comme eux, composera vers le début d'avril 1685 leurs drôles d'"articles doctrinaux" qui devront être discutés dans les futures négociations; le P. De Vos en donne le texte dans ses Anti-Theses.

En voici le résumé:

²¹ L. Ceyssens, *Een geheim genootschap ter bestrijding van het jansenisme in België*, in Id., *Jansenistica. Studiën*, I, Malines, 1950, 343-397. Le P. François Cauwe, O.F.M., écrivain, auteur d'un ouvrage de spiritualité très connu (*De pelerinagie van het kindje Jezus*, Gent, 1673) avait, sous le pseudonyme de François Raymakers, engagé une polémique avec Huygens; les Pères Patrick Duffy et François Porter, franciscains irlandais de Louvain, se démenaient à Rome, chacun de son côté, au service de la Congrégation secrète, pour y faire condamner un très grand nombre de propositions jansénistes de Louvain. Duffy en dénonça 345, Porter 105; des premières Rome ne s'est jamais occupée; des secondes elle en condamnera 31 en 1690, sous Clément VIII, cf. note 24.

²² L. Willaert, *Bibliotheca Janseniana Belgica*, Bruxelles, 1949-1951, n° 4002. Le grand acteur des carmes, à Rome, fut le P. Séraphin. Voir L. Ceyssens, *De carmelitarum Belgicorum actione antijanseniana*, in *Analecta Ordinis Carmelitarum*, 17 (1952) 3-120.

²³ Ces noms reviennent dans Dalmatius van Heel, *Theologische en philosophische Theses*, Den Haag, 1931.

1° Dans les futures négociations on omettra les propositions qu'au nom du roi d'Espagne, le P. Duffy²⁴ a dénoncées à Rome et dont le Saint-Office a déjà commencé l'examen;

2° Si Huygens négocie un accord au nom d'autres docteurs de Louvain, il devra produire leur autorisation;

3° Pour attester leur soumission au Saint-Siège, juge en dernier ressort, les partis signeront d'abord un formulaire, à savoir celui d'Alexandre VII, mais avec cet ajout: "Uti et generaliter damno et rejicio quidquid Sedes apostolica vel Congregatio generalis S. Romanae et universalis Inquisitionis occasione earundem vel similium controversiarum damnavit, prohibuit etc., idque eo sensu et modo quibus S. Sedes vel dicta Congregatio prohibuit et damnavit. Atque haec omnia supradicta ita juro, sic ...";

4° Huygens doit d'abord répondre au professeur Nicolas Du Bois qui, depuis six mois, dans ses cours et ses écrits, lui demande de s'expliquer sur sa doctrine relative à l'usage du secret de la confession. Son silence prolongé ne présage rien de bon pour ce qui est d'une réconciliation future.

En réalité il ne s'agit pas ici d'"articles" doctrinaux à discuter dans les futures négociations comme il avait été demandé lors de l'entrevue du 27 février et qu'on attendait depuis lors, mais de réelles *conditions sine qua non*, à remplir préalablement à toute négociation; conditions qui n'ont pas été prévues et qui sont très difficiles à remplir pour différentes raisons²⁵.

Quant à la première condition relative à Duffy, qui de ceux qui les connaissaient ne douterait de l'authenticité de ses très nombreuses propositions, qui, d'ailleurs, furent négligées à Rome? Leur authenticité n'a jamais été examinée, mais ne devait pas dépasser celle des 31 propositions condamnées, laquelle a été examinée et trouvée fort déficiente²⁶.

Quant à la seconde condition, n'avait-il pas été convenu que Huygens entamerait des discussions avec le P. De Pape? Ses "articles" n'avaient-ils pas été signés par ses collègues "suspects"?

²⁴ J'ai publié beaucoup sur ce franciscain extraordinaire; cf. *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie ecclésiastiques*, XIV, 1003-1004.

²⁵ Voir les réponses orales de Huygens, lors de la rencontre du 27 avril 1685, dans De Vos, *Anti-Theses*; cf. *infra*.

²⁶ Voir C. Sylvano Pera, *Historical notes concerning ten of the thirty-one rigoristic propositions condemned by Alexander VIII*, dans *Franciscan Studies*, 20 (1960) 1-130; L. Ceyssens, *La vingt-quatrième des trente et une propositions jansénistes condamnées à Rome en 1690*, dans *Antonianum*, 32 (1957) 47-70; Id., *Les I^{re}, II^{re}, III^{re} et XIX^{re} des propositions condamnées en 1690*, dans *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 50 (1968) 33-66.

Quant à la troisième condition, elle était offensante, mettant en doute la bonne foi des Louvanistes, qui pourtant avaient déjà prêté leur serment académique approuvé par le pape. De plus elle soulevait le problème désormais insoluble du formulaire et du "fait". Surtout les ajouts malinois rendaient ce serment spécial absolument inacceptable²⁷. Quant à donner satisfaction à Nicolas Dubois²⁸, ce docteur improvisé, bouffon et bavard, méritait-il une réponse? Tout le monde le connaissait pour son incapacité et sa passion. En somme, ces conditions préalables ne constituaient-elles pas un rejet camouflé de tout essai de pacification?

Vers l'échec

Les préparatifs terminés, les négociations peuvent commencer. Le 3 avril Huygens, accompagné de Hennebel, son collègue et ami, se rend à Malines où l'archevêque réside temporairement. Ils apportent les copies de leurs "articles" que, pour commencer, ils font signer par les théologiens malinois, "suspects" et "exclus" comme eux. Ils communiquent à de Berghes l'exemplaire destiné au P. De Pape, qui, à leur regret et déception, n'a encore rien présenté. Le même soir ils continuent leur voyage vers Bruxelles, où ils confient un exemplaire de leurs articles au gouverneur général Grana (qui mourra deux mois plus tard, le 19 juin) et à l'Inter-nonce Tanara, qui tous deux pourront en avertir leurs maîtres, le roi et le pape, et peut-être les réjouir.

Ils annoncent aussi au P. De Pape, qu'ils ont remis leurs articles à l'archevêque qui attend encore ses articles à lui. Ils apprennent que l'archevêque, s'il n'avait pas été absent, aurait déjà reçu ceux "des réguliers". En effet, puisque de Berghes tardait à Malines, De Pape s'y était rendu le 9 avril, mais à son arrivée à Malines, l'archevêque venait de retourner à Bruxelles, ayant averti par lettre le P. Recteur qu'il lui remettrait les "articles" des Louvanistes dès qu'il présenterait les siens.

Le 11, dans sa réponse, De Pape avertit l'archevêque de son voyage inutile et promet de lui remettre "nos articles" à la première occasion. Le 16, lundi de la Semaine sainte, dans l'après-midi, le recteur apprend que l'archevêque est de retour, mais lorsque, le soir, il se présente à l'archevêché, il ne peut être reçu, le prélat étant indisposé. Il remet donc

²⁷ Dans sa lettre du 1^{er} août à Du Vaucel, Arnauld (II, 546-547) se lance dans une diatribe contre l'exigence de ce formulaire spécial.

²⁸ L. Ceyssens, *La promotion de Nicolas Du Bois à la chaire d'Écriture sainte (1654)*, dans *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, 34 (1692), 489-553; cf. *Jansenistica minora*, VIII, fac. 65.

son pli au chanoine A. Desclin, aumônier général de l'armée. Celui-ci, ayant pris connaissance du contenu, et ayant constaté qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'articles doctrinaux, mais de conditions préalables, prie le recteur de les reprendre; mais sur les instances de celui-ci, il les accepte quand même pour les remettre à l'archevêque.

Les "conditions" parviennent effectivement entre les mains de l'archevêque, qui ne devait pas en être moins mécontent que l'aumônier général.

Le 24, il avertit De Pape d'avoir communiqué "les conditions" au professeur Huygens qu'il attend instamment pour en commencer la discussion.

En effet, le 26 avril, vers neuf heures et demie du matin, De Pape est averti par Louis Dominique Malo, secrétaire à l'archevêché, que les Louvanistes y sont arrivés et qu'on l'y attend aussi vite que possible²⁹.

L'échec

Le recteur, qui le 27 février s'était présenté seul, se fait accompagner de son confrère Maximilien Le Dent³⁰, autrefois à Louvain professeur très 'attrionniste'. Vers 10 heures, ils se trouvent rue de l'Évêché, et sont introduits dans la bibliothèque, salle spacieuse, tranquille, propice à une session prolongée.

Bientôt ils se trouvent en face des professeurs Huygens, Pasmans et le fameux juriste Van Espen, qui cependant disparaît aussitôt. Prenant la direction, De Berghes salue les personnes présentes, surtout le P. De Pape, qui a reçu pleins pouvoirs de la part de son provincial en vue d'aboutir à un accord selon la convention du 27 février. Il lui remet les articles des Louvanistes.

De Pape refuse de les accepter, malgré l'insistance de l'archevêque, car s'il dispose de pleins pouvoirs de la part de son provincial, il n'en a pas reçu de la part de celui des franciscains; de plus, le 27 février, il n'y a eu aucune convention réelle; si les jésuites et les franciscains n'ont pas encore présenté leurs articles doctrinaux, ils ont leurs "conditions" qui préalablement à toute discussion devront être remplies. Le professeur Huygens s'y prend oralement. Ne pouvant arrêter son éloquence, les jésuites n'écoutent guère. Il leur faut une réponse écrite, ferme, indiscutable, valable pour l'avenir.

Les jésuites ne faisant aucune concession et les Louvanistes ne pou-

²⁹ Voir les *Anti-Thèses* du P. De Vos, aussi pour les détails suivants.

³⁰ C. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, II, 1930-1931.

vant fournir sur le champ une réponse écrite, signée par leurs collègues, la première session est sans issue. Ce sera aussi la dernière.

De Berghes ne peut cacher son désappointement. Par deux fois il répète sa conclusion: les jésuites ne veulent pas la paix. On le lui avait bien prédit³¹. "Inconciliés", inconciliables les partis se séparent, prêts à se combattre plus que jamais.

Après l'échec

Depuis l'archevêché, la déception et la désillusion se répandent. À Louvain elles semblent même avoir affecté le trop fameux Nicolas Du Bois, ce faux chef de la Congrégation secrète pour combattre le jansénisme, car au mois de mai encore, comme s'il n'était pas au courant, il aborde Jean van Neercassel, vicaire apostolique de Hollande, de passage à l'Université, pour lui communiquer sa joie de la future pacification³².

À Rome aussi, on apprend l'échec avec regret. En effet, dans son premier enthousiasme, l'archevêque avait averti son agent romain, François Valentini, de son heureuse initiative, avec l'intention de la faire apprécier par la curie. L'internonce aussi avait écrit à ce sujet, de sorte que la nouvelle s'était répandue dans la Ville éternelle.

Le 19 mai 1685, Louis de Vaucel, agent janséniste, grand épistolier, écrit à Neercassel:

"On a su ici la proposition que les jésuites de Flandres avaient fait de s'accorder sur le fond de la doctrine; que l'internonce en avait écrit. Mais comment ces Pères pouvaient-ils avoir cette pensée, à moins qu'ils ne voulussent renoncer à leur grâce molinienne, à la probabilité et à tant d'autres maximes de la morale relâchée que Messieurs de Louvain font profession de condamner ..." ³³.

³¹ "Denique, post iteratam et frustraneam oblationem scripti toties memorati, cum ad egressum iam staremus parati, dixit Dominus Archiepiscopus: prophetam fuisse illum qui sibi Mechliniae vaticinatus fuerat: Patres Societatis inventuros modum quo declinarent conferentiam de doctrina. Cui reponsum fuit, et Lovanii et Bruxellis vaticinatos esse plures, per recusationem aliquam illos de universitate interturbaturos conferentiam hanc ..."; De Vos, *Anti-Theses*.

³² Utrecht, OBC, Inv. 511; Neercassel à A. de Sclessin, 26 mai 1635: "Dum Lovanii fui, me convenit Dominus de Bois, ostendens se pertaesum contentionum, et cupere inire amicum foedus illis cum eximiis viris quos contra variis in negotiis contendit. Eximio Vianen indicavi quid illo ex viro audierim".

³³ Utrecht, OBC, Inv. 121, f° 4007.

Le même jour Valentini avait répondu à De Berghes:

"... J'ai participé à quelques-uns de nos Messieurs l'accommodement que V.S.I. espère de pouvoir s'en suivre à l'égard des points controversés entre les théologiens, et cette nouvelle leur a été fort agréable, et (ils) souhaitent que ce traité préliminaire se termine et conclue avec un bon succès; partant ils L'exhortent à perfectionner ce qu'Elle a commencé, avec assurance qu'ils L'assisteront en cela s'il en sera besoin. M. l'abbé Casoni³⁴, qui a donné la connaissance de cette disposition à Sa Sainteté en est extrêmement joyeux, et m'a dit de L'assurer de ses profonds respects; il apprendra volontiers quand l'autre parti aura encore mis entre ses mains le papier contenant leurs opinions et lorsque l'échange en aura été fait ..."³⁵.

Vers le 26 mai, sur l'ordre du pape, le cardinal secrétaire d'État, Cibo, passe au Saint-Office les papiers relatifs à l'accommodement de Louvain³⁶.

Valentini, Rome 23 juin, à De Berghes:

"... Je suis extrêmement déplaisant d'apprendre que le règlement (pacification) qu'on espérait devoir conclure entre les théologiens soit allé en fumée. Cette Cour en avait conçu quelque espérance et [était] assez disposée à croire que les Pères Jésuites ont empêché de leur côté cet ouvrage, ne voulant pas que ce diocèse soit en paix, pour faire éclater d'autant plus leur doctrine ..."³⁷.

Valentini qui ne peut obtenir le récit des négociations, lui demande, le 7 juillet, de lui envoyer au moins une copie de la thèse qui se prépare à Louvain³⁸.

Les polémiques finales ultérieures

Apparemment après avoir hésité longuement (d'avril à juillet) le professeur Huygens, qui se sent berné, fait défendre en plein été, à la fin de l'année scolaire, cette thèse qui a été une des principales sources de notre récit:

Theses theologiae id est articuli theologorum Lovaniensium exhibiti Illustrissimo ac Reverendissimo Domino Archiepiscopo Mechliniensi causa

³⁴ Il s'agit de Laurent Casoni, plus tard assesseur du Saint-Office et cardinal, qui, homme du tiers parti, mais tenu pour janséniste, joua un grand rôle à Rome; cf. *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, XXI, 407-415; P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, *Tussen centrum en periferie, tussen systeem en leer? Lorenzo Casoni (1645-1720) en de Hollandse zending*, dans *Archief voor de geschiedenis van de katholieke kerk in Nederland*, 25 (1983) 181-202.

³⁵ Archives de l'Archevêché de Malines n° 1858, correspondance Valentini, III, 12.

³⁶ Vatican, Archives de la Nonciature de Flandre, 147, f° 221.

³⁷ *Correspondance Valentini*, III, 121.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 122.

Concordiae ineundae cum RR.PP. Societatis Jesu et aliis, quas praeside ... Gummaro Huygens ... defendet Joannes Beauver, Gemblacensis, in collegio Adriani VI ... die 12 julii 1685, Louvain, Guillaume Streyckwant, 1685, in-8°, 12 pages non numérotées.

D'après l'énoncé de son titre, la Thèse reproduit les articles doctrinaux en litige de la part des Louvanistes, mais dans une préface (de quatre pages) elle retrace l'historique de la paix manquée, selon les vues de Huygens. Celui-ci cherche-t-il à rouvrir les négociations, ou veut-il les enterrer sous une épitaphe à son avantage?

Quoi qu'il en soit, cette thèse aurait dû intéresser le public louvaniste; pourtant nous ne disposons d'aucun renseignement sur le déroulement de la soutenance³⁹. Les jésuites et les frères mineurs y ont-ils assisté? ont-ils formulé des objections? La thèse ne devait certainement pas leur plaire. Aussi, bientôt après, à une date non précisée, mais encore en juillet, le P. De Vôs y a-t-il répondu:

Anti-theses ad Theses seu articulos exhibitos ... causa praetensae concordiae ineundae ... defendet P. Goswinus Van Geffen eiusdem societatis, exercitio hebdomadario Lovanii apud PP. Societatis Jesu, Louvain, Jérôme Gossin, 1685, in-4°, 21 p.

Cette Anti-thèse conteste surtout les allégations historiques de Huygens et reproduit maints documents et attestations du P. De Pape. Nous y avons puisé beaucoup pour notre récit et nous n'allons pas y revenir. Mais il y a des auteurs de l'époque qui y sont revenus, par exemple Antoine Arnauld qui, le 1^{er} août, écrit de Bruxelles à Du Vaucel, son correspondant romain:

"Le P. De Vôs, jésuite, a fait une thèse (contre celle de M. Huygens que je vous ai envoyée ...) la plus insolente et la plus maligne qui se puisse concevoir. Il a l'impudence entre autres choses de dire que le pape a été satisfait de ce que l'Université de Louvain a fait sur la condamnation des Cinq propositions, mais que les réguliers n'en sont pas satisfaits. Et qu'ainsi ils sont en droit de leur demander, par leurs préliminaires, qu'ils s'explicassent davantage et qu'ils signassent le formulaire auquel ils ajoutent diverses choses, qu'ils prétendent qu'ils doivent jurer avant qu'ils puissent entrer avec eux en aucune conférence. Si cela se souffre à Rome, on sera obligé de croire qu'on y est bien lâche contre ceux qui ont une grande cabale, et qu'on n'y aime guère la paix de l'Eglise ni son bien"⁴⁰.

³⁹ La lettre annuelle 1685 du provincial des jésuites de la province Flandro-belge; cf. A. Gaillard, *Inventaire sommaire des archives de la Compagnie de Jésus*; elle aurait pu nous renseigner, mais elle manque. Merci à M. Eddy Put de ses recherches quoique vaines.

⁴⁰ A. Arnauld, *Oeuvres complètes*, II, 524.

De fait, Rome s'offensa en premier lieu de la thèse de Huygens qui avait paru d'abord. Elle fut censurée aussitôt, le 8 août déjà. En l'apprenant à Bruxelles, Arnauld eut une violente réaction. Le 14 septembre, il écrivit à Du Vaucel à Rome:

"Ce que vous nous mandez avoir vu aux portes de S. Pierre, m'a glacé le coeur. Dieu le pardonne aux auteurs d'un si grand scandale et qui peut avoir de si terribles suites ... C'est uniquement pour n'avoir pas voulu se déclarer contre les quatres articles du Clergé de France"⁴¹.

Néanmoins Valentini annonce le 18 août à de Berghes:

"... Je travaille incessamment pour faire disposer Sa Sainteté à enjoindre aux jésuites de passer outre à la conférence qui se devait faire entre eux et les théologiens séculiers ... vu que c'est l'unique moyen pour y établir le repos et la paix ..."⁴².

Apparemment Du Vaucel travaille dans le même sens à Rome, car le même 18 août, il annonce à Neercassel d'avoir donné au P. Joseph Sabbatini, augustin, membre du Saint-Office, les thèses de Huygens du 2 juillet qui les trouve très belles, mais il ajoute "étant si précises et si courtes, je crains qu'elles ne donnent prétexte à leurs adversaires de remuer, et qu'elles lèvent contre eux quelques nouvelles brouilleries ..."⁴³.

Le 1^{er} septembre, Du Vaucel communique à Neercassel:

"Les thèses de Huygens viennent d'être censurées. Nous nous efforçons de faire condamner également celles du P. De Vos. Priez entre-temps les professeurs Huygens et Vianen de se tenir tranquils jusqu'à la mauvaise opinion ne se soit dissipée"⁴⁴.

De fait, le 5 septembre parut à Rome la censure des *Anti-thèses* du P. De Vos; elle est mentionnée dans l'ancien *Index librorum prohibitorum*, 1681-1704, p. 307, tandis que celle de Huygens n'y figure pas.

Le 15 septembre 1685, Du Vaucel envoie le décret contre le P. De Vos, avec cette note: "... Le Saint Père y était d'abord contraire à cause de son mécontentement qu'il a toujours de MM. de Louvain (à cause de leur attitude dans l'affaire de la Déclaration du Clergé de France), mais on l'y a engagé en lui représentant que c'était le seul moyen d'empêcher qu'on ne s'échauffe de plus en plus".

De fait, de part et d'autre les thèses et les Apologies⁴⁵ vont se multiplier, mais étant trop polémiques, elles n'attirent pas l'attention ni ne

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, II, 560.

⁴² Valentini, III, 1 29.

⁴³ OBC, Inv. 121, f° 4919.

⁴⁴ OBC, Inv. 121, f° 1921.

⁴⁵ Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque*, VIII, 916-917.

provoquent de condamnation.

Le 15 septembre Valentini fait savoir à de Berghes:

"Je diffèrai de faire savoir ... que la thèse des docteurs de Louvain ait été défendue par la Congrégation du Saint-Office jusqu'à l'Antithèse des jésuites eût été encore défendue, pour savoir lui envoyer toutes les deux (censures) ensemble, comme Elle pourra le remarquer par les deux exemplaires ci-joints. Il est encore à craindre que l'ajustement qu'on espérait par-delà sur les points controversés ... ne soit jamais effectué. Je ne sais comment l'une et l'autre partie recevra la nouvelle ..."⁴⁶.

De son côté, le 22 septembre, le Conseil privé interdit aux deux partis de publier les décrets romains avant que, selon le droit, ils n'aient été soumis à son placet ou visa, de sorte que Rome craint une reprise de l'ancien conflit sur la promulgation des décisions romaines, et que l'internonce soupçonne l'archevêque de Berghes de ne pas vouloir publier la condamnation de son ami Huygens⁴⁷.

Sont-ils vraiment bienheureux les pacifiques et seront-ils appelés "enfants de Dieu" (Mt 5,9)?

Sint-Truiden

Lucien CEYSSENS

⁴⁶ Valentini, III, 135.

⁴⁷ Voir la Nunziatura di Fiandra, correspondances des mois de novembre et de décembre 1685; registres 147 et 75. Le 6 octobre 1685, Valentini avait averti l'archevêque: Par les censures de Huygens et de De Vos, Votre Seigneurie "pourra remarquer les sentiments de ces Messieurs [romains], touchant ladite conférence, et pour ce, Elle fera très prudemment de s'excuser et [de] désister de cette affaire, et [j'] ai de la joie d'apprendre par ses dernières qu'Elle y est tout à fait disposée, car comme elle observe fort bien, Elle ne peut s'attirer que de l'inimitié des deux côtés, outre que la chose ne pourrait pas être trop agréable à cette cour qui n'incline point à décider es temps présents les questions dont il se traite, selon ce qui s'en publie ici, à cause de la diversité des opinions, outre que les quelques-uns des docteurs séculiers, notamment ceux de Louvain qui ont été à Rome [en 1678-1679], ne sont pas en bonne estime, selon ce que m'en a dit un grand cardinal [Cibo], qui n'approuva pas leur conduite et [pour] avoir trompé feu M. Favoriti pour avoir été trop facile à leur ajouter foi ..."; Valentini, III, 148. Il faut noter que les relations Rome-Louvain s'empiraient justement alors à cause de l'affaire De Witte et la Déclaration du clergé; cf. L. Ceyssens, *L'Université de Louvain et la Déclaration*, 287-300. Le problème de Louvain fut le suivant: Rome exigeait des professeurs de théologie qu'ils s'opposent à cette Déclaration, ce qu'ils firent volontiers. Mais Rome voulut davantage: l'affirmation que la Faculté de théologie avait toujours tenu une doctrine contraire. Or cela leur était impossible, vu que leur principal représentant, Adrien Florensz, plus tard pape Adrien VI, avait publié un avis contraire, avis qui, sans provoquer de réaction, avait été republié pendant le bref pontificat, au su de tout le monde. De là l'hésitation des Louvanistes et le mécontentement de Rome. Il paraîtra bientôt, dans le *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, une étude sur Adrien Florensz (pape Adrien VI) et la disgrâce de Rome en 1682.

THE WISE MAN AND THE LIMITS OF VIRTUE IN *DE BEATA VITA*: STOIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY OR AUGUSTINIAN IRONY?

Augustine's early dialogue *De beata vita* takes as its subject matter one of the commonplaces of ancient philosophical inquiry: "what is happiness and how does one attain it?" To begin one's inquiry into Augustine's relationship with ancient philosophy on the goal of philosophy by taking *De beata vita* as a starting point not only strikes the right note but seems fitting. James Wetzel's recent work, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, attempts a reconstruction of Augustine's philosophical development using *De beata vita* as the starting point.¹ Wetzel ventures a description of Augustine's interaction with ancient philosophy by taking the self-sufficiency of virtue as the center of Augustine's dialogue with late antique philosophy. *De beata vita* functions in Wetzel's argument as the work which shows Augustine's commitment to an essential Stoic approach to the attainment of happiness. And from there Wetzel goes on to argue how this commitment to a Stoic conception of virtue as the way to beatitude causes difficulties for Augustine until he finally abandons it when he becomes fully committed to a Pauline notion of grace and adopts a posture which sets severe limits on virtue.

Wetzel maintains that in the early writings Augustine "embraced the Stoic convergence of virtue, autonomy, and happiness in wisdom. It set for him philosophy's ideal, and he would reckon the success of the individual philosophies against it."² Wetzel sees Augustine's "Stoic attempt to describe the convergence between virtue and happiness" as important because "without it his metaphysical concerns with autonomy stand apart from his normative interests in human flourishing, and it then becomes hard to understand why he would have viewed failures of virtue as failures, rather than expressions , of autonomy."³ This way of

¹ James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 55-61.

² *Ibid.*, 11.

³ *Ibid.*, 15.

formulating the Augustinian problematic is curious, for it describes Augustine in a way that seems somewhat foreign to his own conceptions.

Wetzel insists on Augustine's Stoic beginnings at Cassiciacum against a much older tradition in the works of Holte, Du Roy, Mandouze, and TeSelle, among others, who construe Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues as an eclectic blend of the fruits of Augustine's Ciceronian and Neoplatonic apprenticeship in philosophy.⁴ The entire weight of Wetzel's argument rests on *De beata vita* 4.25, where Augustine presents a portrait of the proverbial wise man. Wetzel's notion that Augustine's portrait in *De beata vita* 4.25 is an unabashed endorsement of the Stoic conception of the sage also depends on a reference to an aphorism from Terence which Augustine seems to use approvingly: "since what you wish for is impossible, better wish for what is possible." For Wetzel, Augustine's portrait fits so well the image of the Stoic sage that Augustine remains essentially Stoic in his approach to "the happy life."

Two points should be obvious immediately. First, the wise man functions as a trope in the ancient philosophical discourse on virtue, happiness, and human self-sufficiency. And in much of the Hellenistic philosophical tradition the wise man is variously disfigured, caricatured, and lampooned depending on which portrait of the wise man one prefers and which image is in for criticism.⁵ So Augustine's use of the trope should be read in part as his contribution to this tradition. In which case our interpretation of him should consider what tack he takes in relation to the wise man. Second, Augustine's Terentian impulse should probably not be read at face value, since he uses words from the comic poet which seem to celebrate a kind of mediocrity, the last thing one would associate with the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. So taken in tandem, the use of the philosophical trope of the wise man and the appropriation of a comic poet

⁴ Ragnar Holte, *Béatitude et sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962) sets Augustine in the context of early Christian eclecticism towards ancient philosophy; Olivier du Roy, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1966), 149ff., sees an unusual synthesis of Neoplatonism and Cicero in *De Beata Vita*; A. Mandouze, *Saint Augustin. L'aventure de la raison et de la grâce* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968), also sees the early Augustine in an eclectic vein.

⁵ Notice Cicero's comments in *Tusculan Disputations* 2.22 that such a man in whom absolute wisdom exists has never been seen even though the philosophers attempt to provide a description of him.

given to all manner of verbal puns and jokes,⁶ should alert us to the possibility that Augustine might be up to the something comic: perhaps a parody of the wise man.

What I propose to do here is first, to provide an assessment of Wetzel's interpretation of *De beata vita*. Then, I will proceed to offer an analysis of Augustine's description of the wise man in *De beata vita* and his use of Terence which attempts to make sense of the seeming incongruity of the description of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25 and the portrait of Augustine's mother Monica, who is presented as Wisdom's mouthpiece in the dialogue. My analysis should not be construed as a review of Wetzel's entire project, though some of what I suggest will have implications for the philosophical itinerary the Wetzel proposes for Augustine. My main concern is to assess Wetzel's claim that *De beata vita* represents Augustine's early commitment to a Stoic conceptualization of the constitutive elements of the happiness (beatitude) and how it is attained. TeSelle's much earlier interpretation of Augustine's philosophical reflections at Cassiciacum⁷ will serve as a point of departure for my own comments, since it is far more sensitive to the rhetorical aspects of the dialogue than what Wetzel offers. TeSelle's recognition of the disparity between the description of the wise man (*De beata vita* 4.25) and the concluding thoughts of the dialogue (*De beata vita* 4.34-35) suggests at least two things. Either Augustine was unclear about what he intended to argue as the way to beatitude and therefore presented two contradictory ways toward that end, or Augustine probably intended his portrait of the wise man to be read in a less than straightforward manner.

It will be important to my argument to follow Augustine's use of Terence not only in *De beata vita* but also in *De civitate Dei* 14.25 and in *De trinitate* 13. The last two are admittedly much later than *De beata vita*, but they will help to illuminate just what Augustine thought he was doing with Terence in *De beata vita*. In *De beata vita* alone Augustine adopts Terence on three occasions: twice in 4.25 and once in 4.32. In all of these uses Augustine seems to be adapting Terence for his own purposes, and may give some indication of Augustine's tendency toward the ironic when dealing with the comic poet. In both *De civitate Dei* 14.25 and *De trinitate* 13, however, he is not nearly as ironic and is explicit on just how he

⁶ See, for example, George E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment* (Norman, OK.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994 [2nd ed.]), 328-360.

⁷ Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 61-67.

means to be understood when he appropriates Terence in speaking of the wise man's moderated desire in wishing for only what he can attain.

Now to the wise man, Terence, and Wetzel's interpretation of Augustine. Immediately upon citing Terence's "since what you wish for is impossible, better wish for what is possible" in *De beata vita* 4.25 Augustine asks: "How will he be unhappy to whom nothing happens against his will, since he cannot want anything which he sees he cannot get?" And then answers: "For he has his will directed toward very definite things so that, whatever he does, he does only according to some precept of virtue or divine law of wisdom, and in no way can these be taken from him."⁸ Certainly, someone with a will directed towards definite things and under the guidance of "virtue or the divine law of wisdom" is someone whose acquisitions may be said to be beyond vulnerability. Such a description seems to fit the Stoic sage. But what exactly does Augustine mean by "virtue or the divine law of wisdom," when Augustine also maintains unequivocally by the end of *De beata vita* that the wisdom which gives beatitude is the Son of God, who is truly God, and this, on divine authority (*De beata vita* 4.34)?

But what should be called wisdom except the wisdom of God? Moreover, we have received on divine authority that the Son of God is none other than the wisdom of God, and the Son of God is truly God. Therefore, whoever possesses God is happy, which we all agreed upon at the outset of this symposium.⁹

As Augustine indicates here, the conclusion of the dialogue was never in doubt right from the beginning. Augustine's description of wisdom notwithstanding, Wetzel contends that Augustine tries to "describe beatitude in such a way that it remains fully under human control and fully complete." Wetzel claims that such a posture creates difficulties for Augustine's conception: "First, there is the dilemma posed by our involvement with external goods."¹⁰ And second, "there is the threat posed by vulnerability of virtue itself."¹¹ But does Augustine actually set out to describe beatitude in such a way that it remains fully under human control and fully complete in *De beata vita* as Wetzel claims? Why should

⁸ *De beata vita* 4.25 (CCSL 29, 79). Translated by Mary T. Clark. *Augustine of Hippo: Selected Writings*. Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 186. I have adopted Mary Clark's translation throughout. Henceforth CWS.

⁹ *De beata vita* 4.34 (CCSL 29, 84). CWS, 192.

¹⁰ Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, 56.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

Augustine refer to the Son of the Trinity as the wisdom which grants beatitude if beatitude is fully under human control?

Wetzel manages to make his argument while ignoring most of the dialogue, and he pays no attention to the progression of the conversation as it unfolds towards the finale. Almost all that Wetzel has to say depends on that very small section of the dialogue where Augustine describes the wise man. But equally surprising is that Wetzel ignores almost everything else that Augustine wrote at Cassiciacum, even though both *Contra Academicos* and *De ordine* contain reflections on the happy life. Wetzel, however, assimilates *De beata vita* to Augustine's concerns in *De libero arbitrio* Book 1, since Wetzel is convinced that Augustine appropriation of Stoic themes in *De libero arbitrio* Book 1 reflects old commitments he had when he wrote *De beata vita*. No doubt, *De libero arbitrio* 1 presents its own peculiar problems about the acquisition of beatitude and what role the will plays in it. But it is hardly credible to ignore everything else Augustine does in the rest of *De beata vita* in order to establish a line of development which would be untenable if all the evidence were brought into view. Even if Wetzel is correct that in *De libero arbitrio* 1 Augustine argues for the invulnerability of virtue as the way to happiness, that is not the argument of *De beata vita*.

Moreover, before Augustine wrote *De libero arbitrio* 1 (388) he had already worked on *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae*, his first work after his baptism in 387. *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* continued Augustine's reflections on the "happy life" along lines laid out in *De beata vita*. Wetzel, nevertheless, ignores the link between *De beata vita* and *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* while insisting on the similarities between *De beata vita* and *De libero arbitrio* Book 1, similarities which seem questionable when he insists that both "elaborate an ideal of beatitude which would inscribe happiness within virtue and thereby use self-determination to limit the vulnerability of misery."¹² Any credible argument about the nature of Augustine's early thought about beatitude and how it is acquired would have to set *De libero arbitrio* Book 1 side by side with *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* with *De beata vita* as the starting point, if in fact *De libero arbitrio* is necessary to the argument.

Wetzel justifies his approach, however, in the context of disputing what he describes as Marcia Colish's premature attempt to "divorce Augustine from Stoic ethics."¹³ As he puts it: "The novelty of *De*

¹² Ibid., 122.

¹³ Ibid., 72.

moribus ecclesiae, a work nearly contemporaneous with book 1 of *De libero arbitrio*, can easily be overdramatized." Wetzel continues:

Although it is certainly important that Augustine has transformed the virtues in the language of love of God, he has yet to suggest that the ground of the virtues is ultimately God's love for us. The reversal of perspective that introduces divine agency into the very heart of human willing is still years away. Colish surely overstates her case when she claims that the source of the virtues in *De moribus* serves as 'a well-spring that combines the divine initiative with the human response.' The mere invocation of love does not compromise Stoic autarky with divine initiative.¹⁴

The accuracy of Wetzel's reading of Colish is not my concern here. What matters for my purposes is how Wetzel manages to critique Colish's use of *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae*, while remaining indifferent to the prospect that the supposedly overdramatized novelty might in fact undermine Wetzel's claim of Augustine's unabashedly Stoic beginnings, and with it the kind of narrative of Augustine's philosophical development that he proposes. What is more, Wetzel's assertion that "the mere invocation of love does not compromise Stoic autarky with divine initiative" simply ignores the fact that the invocation of love is already present in Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues and is mentioned by Augustine in *De beata vita*. When Monica recalls the words of Ambrose of Milan at the end of the dialogue saying "help O trinity those who pray," she ends with the treble invocation of faith, hope and love: "This is unmistakably the happy life, a life which is perfect, toward which it must be presumed that, hastening, we can be led by a well-founded faith, joyful hope, and ardent love" (*De beata vita* 4.35).¹⁵ So the language of love is not absent in *De beata vita*, and it is encapsulated in so much that Augustine and his interlocutors have to say about possessing God (*habere deum*). *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae*, then, develops more systematically what is already present in the Cassiciacum dialogues.

While ignoring the entire argument in *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* on beatitude, Wetzel, however, insists that whatever precision Augustine gives to the four cardinal virtues as aspect of the love of God is merely rhetorical since his view of the virtues in *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* is substantially that same one he articulates in *De libero arbitrio*. But why this need to discount *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae*? For Wetzel, even though the language of love "evokes the importance of the affections to beatitude and suggests the personal quality of human interest in God,"

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ CWS, 193.

Augustine's "actual description of the consummation of virtuous love is coolly intellectual."¹⁶ And "it is hard to imagine that love of God in *De moribus* sets the fuse for the explosion of affections in the *Confessiones*." As he puts it: "Several years after his conversion, Augustine continues to worship the God of Abraham at that altar of the philosophers."¹⁷ The rhetorical flourish actually conceals another problem which Wetzel appears to overlook, that is, the difference between what Augustine himself experiences and how he theorizes about them at the time of the experiences in question and later on. It is simply not tenable to ignore what Augustine himself writes about his own experiences soon after his conversion in *Soliloquia* and *De ordine*, for example, and still maintain that in one small section of *De beata vita* one can distill Augustine's entire attitude towards ancient philosophy. One has to wonder whether Wetzel has taken Augustine's arguments in both *De beata vita* and *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* seriously enough to warrant the kind of claim he makes of Augustine's Stoic commitments.

There is certainly an element in Wetzel's criticism which depends on using a later standpoint to argue for what is supposedly missing in the early Augustine. Wetzel seems to assume that if Augustine does not use the explicit language of divine initiative in the way that he eventually does in the mid-390's when he takes his most decisive turn in speaking of the initiative of grace, then he could not possibly see love as the ground of the virtues, even after Augustine has defined the four cardinal virtues as aspects of the love of God. In spite of the apparent coherence he claims for his approach to the early Augustine, Wetzel's methodological defenses begin to weaken somewhat in a later point in his discussion. He offers a caveat that concedes a great deal. Wetzel writes:

The real limitation of my method, as far as I am concerned, is that my perspective must follow Augustine's transformation of philosophy as an internal development of his theology. This puts me in the position of having to use his early works, *De beata vita* and *De libero arbitrio* I, as my source of his Stoic ideal of virtue's invulnerability, even though he has already begun in these works to modify his philosophical inheritance to reflect his own interests.¹⁸

But if Wetzel's approach compels him to sort out Augustine's philosophical indebtedness, shouldn't Augustine's modifications be "the story" instead of the other way around? And should not all the evidence

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 73.

¹⁸ Ibid., 122.

from the Cassiciacum dialogues and *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* be considered?

Wetzel continues in a way that raises questions about his criticism of Colish, for example: he writes that "Because an internal perspective can assess external influences only after they have been appropriated, it automatically loses some of the ways in which Augustine leaves his impress on what he inherits. But it would be a tall order for any perspective to supply the whole story."¹⁹ Oddly enough, it is Colish's attempt to supply the whole story which earns her some of Wetzel's criticisms. And simply to claim that one cannot tell the whole story is no excuse for the wholesale omissions in Wetzel's account of Augustine's early philosophical tendencies.

Turn to the details of Wetzel's reading of *De beata vita* and the omissions turn into contrivance, as Wetzel sets forth what he takes to be main theme in *De beata vita*. He writes that "it concerns the completeness of beatitude, or the issue of what we need to have beatitude in its fullest measure."²⁰ This may seem an accurate description of the overall objective of the dialogue. But it is not as innocuous as it appears. To ask what one needs to have beatitude, which is Augustine's preoccupation, is not quite the same thing as asking how one can possess beatitude in its fullest measure. If it were simply an infelicity in Wetzel's statement of Augustine's objective, it wouldn't matter. But Wetzel's argument, in fact, depends on reading Augustine's objective as one concerning "the completeness of beatitude." To speak of having beatitude in its fullest measure is to suppose that one could have beatitude in some measure without having it completely, a point Augustine expressly denies throughout the dialogue. There is no middle ground: either one has beatitude or one does not (*De beata vita* 4.24).

Wetzel rightly observes that for Augustine only the one who possesses God enjoys beatitude, adding that "to possess God is to have adopted the standard of eternal wisdom in our conduct."²¹ On the face of it this assertion also does not seem at all problematic, since Augustine defines eternal wisdom as the Son of God. Surprisingly, Wetzel then goes on to write that "In *De beata vita*, however, the content of this eternal wisdom does not extend much beyond the pithy wisdom of Terence, whom Augustine cites approvingly for guidance in the use of temporal things:

¹⁹ Ibid., 122.

²⁰ Ibid., 57.

²¹ Ibid.

'since what you want cannot be done, want what you can.'"²² And in a footnote several pages later Wetzel mentions that "the object of beatitude in *De beata vita* is not, strictly speaking, God, but the appropriation of the wisdom of God." "This appropriation," he claims, "amounts to an exercise of virtuous self-definition, or conforming ourselves to the measure of all things, the Logos."²³ Here, then, the object of beatitude is no longer God but the wisdom of God which, according to Wetzel, is something quite distinct. Wetzel's note is not only incomprehensible in light of so much that Augustine maintains throughout the dialogue, it also contradicts Wetzel's own assessment of Augustine's view that to have beatitude is to possess God.²⁴

Wetzel never says exactly what Augustine means by wisdom; nor does he make any reference to Monica, Augustine's mother, who is presented by Augustine as the voice of Wisdom. Can Monica's piety and her words of wisdom be reconciled with the conception of the Stoic sage? Possibly, but not without the devaluation of the philosophers, since in so many of the comparisons Augustine makes throughout *De beata vita* between Monica and Cicero, for example, it is Monica who comes out the better. And if Monica's piety can be compared with the wisdom of the philosopher only to the detriment of the latter, why the alleged equation of the Stoic sage and the Christian saint that Wetzel fastens to Augustine?²⁵ If, on the other hand, Augustine's portrait of his mother as the source of wisdom does not matter to our evaluation of the dialogue then what exactly does one make of the way Augustine concludes the *convivium*?

Augustine is explicit in saying that he wanted that disparate group of people because the "happy life" (*beatus*) is not the concern of philosophers only, that even his uneducated relatives, Lastidianus and Rusticus, could contribute to the discussion. Although the two remain silent throughout the dialogue and are to a large extent inconsequential to the arguments proffered, that cannot be said for Augustine's representation of Monica, or even of his son Adeodatus. Regardless of whatever else Augustine says about the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25, the content of divine wisdom in *De beata vita* most certainly extends beyond Terence's rule for daily living, in spite of what Wetzel supposes. If, as Terence has it, moderation allows one to live a life without "perturbations," moderation

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 62 n31.

²⁴ Ibid., 57.

²⁵ Ibid., 59.

also means a life of mediocrity.²⁶ To miss this element in the Terentian maxim is to miss the comedy entirely.

I turn now to the details of Augustine's description of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25 to consider what it yields. According to Augustine, there is no middle position between happiness and unhappiness, just as there is no middle ground between life and death (*De beata vita* 4.24). "Therefore, no one doubts that everyone in need is unhappy, nor are we alarmed that even wise men need certain things for their bodies." For the "soul in which the happy life is placed" has no need for such things as the body requires. The soul can live without the needs of the body: The soul that has the happy life is itself "complete and no soul, being complete, needs anything; and while it takes whatever seems necessary for the body if it is there, if it not there, the lack of such things will not crush it." Augustine appears to be setting a very high standard for the life of beatitude. He proceeds to give his sketch of the wise man.

Every wise man is strong, and the strong man entertains no fear. For every wise man fears neither bodily death nor sufferings. For the banishment, prevention, or delay of such pains he would need all those things of which he is capable of being in want. Yet he does not fail to use them well if they are there. For very true is that aphorism, 'It is foolish to suffer what you can avoid.' Therefore, he will avoid death and pain as far as it is possible and fitting that, if he does not avoid them, he will not be unhappy when they occur but because he refused to avoid them when it was possible, behavior which is a clear sign of folly. And so whoever does not avoid these things will be unhappy not from enduring them but from folly.²⁷

✓ Taken at face value Augustine's words here present the wise man as a man well suited to all conditions of life: He has absolutely no fear, neither good fortune nor misadventure can upset his hold on happiness, because his soul can do without the needs of the body; although he does not shun the use of other goods if they are available to him. And if he cannot avoid suffering or other kinds of misfortune he is not made unhappy, as long as his behavior has been "careful and proper." In the

²⁶ Cf. Christopher Kirwan, *Augustine* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 19-20, where he observes that it is probably "an innovation" on Augustine's part to take an entirely different route towards the fulfilment of desire from what Aristotle, the Stoics and the sceptical traditions offered, namely trimming one's desires in order to overcome obstacles in the way.

²⁷ *De beata vita* 4.25 (CCSL 29, 78-79). CWS, 184-185.

midst of all this stands Augustine's adaptation of an aphorism from Terence (*Eunuchus* 761): "It is foolish to suffer what you can avoid."²⁸

Augustine invokes Terence (*Andria* 305-306) again when he comes to the end of his description, saying that "indeed, this aphorism of the comic poet is no less true: 'Since what you wish for is impossible, better wish for what is possible,'" asking rhetorically, "how will he be unhappy to whom nothing happens against his will, since he cannot want anything which he sees he cannot get?" Augustine adds that such a person has his "will directed toward very definite things so that, whatever he does, he does only according to some precept of virtue or divine law of wisdom" which cannot be taken away from him (*De beata vita* 4.25). The conclusion is categorical: the wise man wills only that which is virtuous and conforms to wisdom and modulates his desires to suit the conditions in which he finds himself. The wise man lives a life which conforms perfectly to wisdom, because whatever he does is guided by some precept of virtue or the divine law of wisdom. This makes almost incongruous the juxtaposition of the wise man's moderated desire and his possession of wisdom.

✓ How then are we to understand Augustine's portrait of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25, and in particular his use of Terence? Is this Augustine's endorsement of the Stoic notion of the self-sufficiency of virtue and the equanimity of the Stoic sage? Is it simply Augustine's attempt to present his own version of this philosophical trope? Or is it something else? How does Augustine want his use of the aphorism from Terence to be read, an aphorism from a comic poet which appears to be celebrating virtue through lowered expectations? Is Augustine's posture comic? There are certainly some comic moments in the dialogue. Perhaps the most telling is when Monica describes the Academic skeptics as epileptics, after she receives a summary of their views from Augustine. Augustine describes Monica's coup de grace, and writes that they concluded their conversion for that first day, departing in a hail of laughter (*De beata vita* 2.16).

On Augustine's own premises life presents the wise man with moments of suffering, bodily danger, and misfortune. Since one cannot live without such hardships intruding in one's life, wisdom requires that the wise man do all that he can to avoid them, and then if his efforts should prove inconsequential, he must endure his suffering. The wise man's fortunes are no different from anyone else's. His happiness is not

²⁸ Ruth Allison Brown, *S. Aureli Augustini: De beata vita* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), 164.

disturbed, however, because his misfortune does not affect his soul, which acts according to virtue and the law of divine wisdom. As TeSelle summarizes Augustine: the wise man "will always refrain from desiring what is unattainable, and he will commit himself to what can be desired with perfect certitude, a course of life always in accord with virtue."²⁹ But there may be an inherent problem with this image and its claim that the wise man lives in accordance with virtue.

✓ TeSelle too believes that Augustine was committed to the Stoic conception of the wise man as the embodiment of beatitude at the time of his conversion.³⁰ However, TeSelle also recognizes something of a contradiction between the image of the wise man here in *De beata vita* and how the dialogue concludes. How TeSelle deals with this dissonance suggests that perhaps the more obvious reading of *De beata vita* 4.25 may not necessarily be the most helpful in understanding Augustine's strategy in the dialogue. For TeSelle maintains that "there is little preparation for the conclusion, in which Augustine, who has been speaking in the customary fashion of wisdom as a virtue, suddenly reverses his perspective" and suddenly speaks of the wise man as someone who contemplates wisdom and is embraced by God. According to TeSelle, the conclusion "is arrived at through what seems a sudden leap in the argument." TeSelle acknowledges that hints of it have been present, it is true, from the very start, especially in the comments of Monica, who represents a Christian piety able to outrun the doctrines of the philosophers. It is Monica who even at the beginning sees that the food of the soul consists in knowledge (II,8); who, without philosophical training, anticipates Cicero's insight that happiness is not merely the possession of what one desires (II, 10); and who preempts a point that Augustine has been saving as his final word in the discussion of unhappiness (IV, 27).³¹

"But these," TeSelle, insists, "are only hints strewn along the way, and by themselves they are not sufficient basis for the conclusion. That conclusion, he maintains, "grows rather out of the main philosophical analysis in the dialogue, the one which leads the notions of virtue and vice in the direction of the Platonist contrast between Plenty and Poverty."³² But is it necessary to set Monica's role in the dialogue apart from all of

²⁹ TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian*, 63.

³⁰ Ibid., 62.

³¹ Ibid., 65.

³² Ibid., 65-66.

this, when in fact Augustine presents her as the voice of Wisdom?³³ And if in fact Augustine concludes in a way wholly at variance with the notion that virtue is happiness, should we not rethink the assumption that his portrait of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25 is meant to be an endorsement of a Stoic conception of beatitude and how it is attained?

The Terentian maxim speaks about the moderation of desire. On the other hand, Augustine's reference to acting according to virtue and the divine law of wisdom imply quite the opposite. That is, the wise man is wholly taken with the love of virtue and wisdom that he is able to live in a manner indifferent to the life of the body, and all this on his own efforts. There is no allusion here that the wise man receives divine aid towards his achievements. The self-sufficiency of the wise man is at odds with Monica's "assist O Trinity, those who pray" with which the conversation ends.

Is it not more than conceivable that Augustine never meant his portrait of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25 to be taken as his conception of the "wise man" as such. The wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25 is all the things that Monica is not. But there is something else. Augustine provides immediately following his description of the wise man another portrait of yet another man who appears to be the quintessence of happiness. The caricature is more evident in the second case, and might help to illuminate the possibly ironic and comic aspects of Augustine's portrait of the wise man.

Augustine sets up the discussion by making the presentation all the more ideal by throwing in the proviso that the wealthy man Sergius Orata, who Cicero presents in one of his works, had no desire for anything, and that whatever he wanted he had achieved (*De beata vita* 4.26): he has achieved all his desires and seems to be without any wants. Licentius, one of Augustine's students, responds that Orata could still be afraid of losing his possessions, and thus the fear itself would be an example of a certain lack in him. So assuming a half-decent intelligence he should be aware of the prospect of loss, in which case he would be in fear and therefore a most unlikely candidate for happiness.

Much of the conversation here simply goes over territory that is covered in a previous discussion where Monica makes the case in a different context that having all that one wants does not constitute

³³ Jean Doignon, "'Vie heureuse' et perfection. Variantes philosophiques dans l'unisson d'Augustin et de Monique à la fin de *De beata vita*," *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 41 (1995): 309-314, appears to split the difference on the conclusion of *De beata vita*: Augustine expressing himself in a platonic form while Monica come across in the words of the Stoics.

happiness. Once again it is Monica who reminds the participants that the description of Orata as someone without need is misleading, and not only because he might have a fear of loss. Rather, no greater want exists than the lack of wisdom itself, since beatitude is impossible without it. "Are we going to consider him in want, if he be without silver and money, and not in want if he should lack wisdom?" Monica asks (*De beata vita* 4.27). And so Augustine writes that he was filled with joy and delight because it was she who had uttered that truth which, as gleaned from the books of the philosophers, I had intended to bring forward as an imposing final argument. (*De beata vita* 4.27)

Monica knows by a different source what Augustine has gleaned from books. Unless Augustine is misleading his readership there is an admission here that his mother had anticipated his final argument: "Do you see now that a great difference exists between many and varied doctrines and a soul that is devoted to God? For from what other source flow these words that we admire?" The end of the sequence also shows something of Augustine's rhetorical strategy. On more than one occasion he presents an argument only to expose its weakness later on. Orata is offered as an example, though the ensuing discussion has the goal of showing the inadequacy of the model. The portrait of the wise man may be subject to a similar devaluation.

There is an aspect of Augustine's portrait of the wise man which may already indicate something of the transition from that image to the description of Sergius Orata, "the wealthy man without need." It is contained in the condition Augustine mentions at the end of his description of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25. When Augustine claims that the wise man lives according to "some precept of virtue or divine law of wisdom" he adds that these cannot be taken away from the wise man. The question is whether Augustine means this in fact or whether there are elements of a parody here? Does someone who lives by modulating his needs and expectations so as not to be disappointed offer the best model of virtue? Can such a person be said to possess happiness in such a way that it is beyond vulnerability? Put another way, what kind of virtue is it, when its chief characteristic is that it does not suffer disappointment? And is Augustine presenting the self-sufficiency of virtue when he insists at the end that the good life belongs to those who know not only the one through whom (and I suspect the passive may not be incidental) they are led into the truth but the bond that ties them to that truth (*De beata vita* 4.35).

Notice too that Augustine speaks of wisdom as plenitude (*plenitudo*) in *De beata vita* 4.31-32. So even though he is prepared to accept Cicero's definition that moderation and restraint are the greatest

virtues (*De beata vita* 4.31) he is inclined to argue that wisdom is of such a nature that it does not admit of the normal way in which moderation is presented as the mother of the virtues. He maintains that Cicero is able to make his case for wisdom as a kind of moderation by suggesting that *modestia* comes from *modus* and *temperantia* from *temperies*, so "where there is measure and proper blend, there is nothing too much or too little."³⁴ In which case, what is superabundant still lacks something because it overflows and is not properly measured. So Augustine proposes to speak of wisdom as measure, and then he invokes Terence once again in a context that is anything but conventional: "This is the most useful principle in life: nothing too much."³⁵ How Augustine manages to turn the Terentian maxim, "nothing too much" (*Andria* 61), into an encomium for the pursuit of wisdom is pure ingenuity.

On any reading Augustine's appropriation of the phrase is peculiar. Taken by itself the Terence's "nothing too much" seems to be another endorsement of the notion of moderated desire, but Augustine uses it here to claim something unique: "For wisdom is nothing but the measure of the soul, that is, that by which the mind is liberated so that it neither runs over into too much nor fall short of fullness." Augustine's use of "nothing too much" is meant to underscore the fact that wisdom provides order to the mind or soul by not giving either too much of what it needs or too little of what it lacks. Augustine makes the Terentian maxim mean what it seems to deny at first sight, which is what he seems to have done with its variant in *De beata vita* 4.25. Augustine's use of Terence in both *De beata vita* 4.25 and 4.32 indicates how easily he adapts the comic poet to his purposes, and usually with an objective that seems contrary to what the aphorisms imply on face value.

It might be relevant now to consider Augustine's use of another variant of the aphorism he uses in connection with the wise man in a much later context where he has the philosophers under his purview. In *De civitate Dei* 14.25 we find Augustine citing the same line from Terence, but this time with explicit criticism of what those words celebrate, namely the prospect of moderating one's desires in order to be able to attain what one wants. Augustine asks whether in our current condition anyone can live the life he wishes when so little, if anything, is in our control. The very idea of someone living as he wishes seems to Augustine not only unremarkable but dubious, "since he has put the screw on himself and ordered himself not to wish for what is beyond his power, but to wish for

³⁴ *De beata vita* 4.32 (CCSL 29, 83). CWS, 190.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 191.

what he can get." He next cites Terence: "Since what you wish is not within your power, direct your wish to what you can achieve."³⁶ Augustine then asks: "Now is this man happy just because he is patiently miserable?" And he answers with an emphatic "no," because if the happy life is not loved it is not possessed (*beata quippe uita si non amatur, non habetur*).³⁷

Augustine's use of Terence here is expressly negative. This fits well into his generally critical assessment of ancient philosophy in the *De civitate Dei*. Augustine goes on to write that if someone loves the happy life "he must needs love it more dearly than all other things, since everything else that he loves must be loved for the sake of the happy life."³⁸ The way Augustine writes about the happy life in *De civitate Dei* 14.25 is almost unchanged from how he speaks of it in *De beata vita*. In both works Augustine writes of possessing the happy life and possessing God. What is more, in *De beata vita* he uses *habere deum* and *beatus* almost interchangeably (e.g. *De beata vita* 3.21).

Given Wetzel's claim that in Augustine's *De beata vita* the content of divine wisdom does not extend beyond Terence's rule for life, one would have to assume that Augustine later use of Terence is indeed a departure from Augustine's earlier usage. But is that in fact the case? Wetzel himself makes no reference to *De civitate Dei* 14.25, although he discusses Augustine's criticism of Stoic psychology in Books 9 and 14 of *De civitate Dei* (p. 98-111) and refers to 14.6 (p. 101), 14.7 (p. 104), 14.8 (p. 102), and 14.9 (p. 103). The absence of any discussion of Augustine's reference to Terence in *De civitate Dei* 14.25 is somewhat curious, then, in light of what Wetzel makes of the maxim in *De beata vita*.

Moreover, the different uses to which Augustine puts Terence, twice in *De beata vita* (4.24 & 4.32) and once in *De civitate Dei* 14.25, raise questions about what Augustine thought he was doing when he invoked the comic poet. We have already seen that when Augustine uses Terence in *De beata vita* 4.32 to speak about wisdom as a kind of moderation he alters what it means to say "nothing too much." So when Augustine uses the two variants of the aphorism in *De beata vita* 4.25 and *De civitate Dei* 14.25 to suggest two apparently different things we need to be alert to his rhetorical posture in each case.

³⁶ *De civitate Dei* 14.25. *St. Augustine: City of God*, translated by Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), 589-590.

³⁷ *De civitate Dei* 14.25 (CCSL 48, 448).

³⁸ *St. Augustine: City of God*, translated by Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984), 590.

Two things need to be kept in view here. In the first place, Augustine inverts the kind of rhetorical question he poses after his use of the maxim, he does not do the same thing in *De beata vita* 4.25 and in *De civitate Dei* 14.25. In the former he asks the question: "how will he be unhappy to whom nothing happens against his will?" In the latter he poses the question: "how is this man happy just because he is patiently miserable?" The same aphorism, two different rhetorical questions. The question in *De civitate Dei* assumes that the person who lives according to Terence's maxim has simply made his peace with misery. In *De beata vita* it assumes that in fact such a person, to whom nothing happens against his will, is happy. And it is this rhetorical claim to happiness in *De beata vita* 4.25 which proves so conclusive to Wetzel.

But in *De beata vita* Augustine sets up a prospect that is nearly impossible to attain. And it is not at all unlikely that the portrait Augustine presents of the wise man who lives in accordance with virtue or the divine law of wisdom is a rhetorical move. Augustine may simply be following convention by presenting the wise man as he is normally constructed in order to subvert the image. There are some similarities between the wise man and Orata. The wise man of *De beata vita* 4.25 shares the same pedigree as the rich man in *De beata vita* 4.26 in one important sense. They both lack something. The only real "lack" that the wise man experiences comes in the form of his possible fear of appearing unwise, whereas the rich man's folly consists in his lack of fear in losing his temporal goods. If the wise man must make preparation for the possible misfortunes that can befall him and would be foolish in not doing so, then neither his claim to the precepts of virtue nor his undivided attention to supposedly divine law (*ex uirtutis quodam praecepto et diuina lege sapientiae*) saves the wise man from misery.

Certainly, an ironic reading of Augustine on this point would have to contend with the obvious fact that a straightforward reading of *De beata vita* 4.25 seems to suggest the exact opposite. But if there is any credibility to this interpretation of Augustine's portrait of the wise man in *De beata vita*, it is because it is the only one which does not make nonsense Augustine's conclusion and much of the ground established in the early part of the dialogue. Augustine presents the wise man in much the way that the philosophical tradition would have him. So what we have in *De beata vita* 4.25 is exactly the portrait as the philosophers claim, a claim towards self-sufficiency which the comic poet Terence captures aptly. But the portrait is not meant to be Augustine's endorsement of the image, and still less of Augustine's supposedly Stoic commitments. There is far too much in the rest of the Cassiciacum dialogues that argue against Stoic

materialism and the self-sufficiency of virtue to lend such a theory any credibility. To the extent that Augustine presents Monica as Wisdom's representative we may also be warranted in taking Monica as the "wise man," so to speak, since Augustine dares to say at one point that Monica spoke so persuasively that "we, entirely oblivious of her sex, believed that some great man was with us."³⁹ And a "great man" indeed whose grasp on wisdom is the more certain, whereas the wise man's is a mere pretense.

If one still insists on *De beata vita* 4.25 as an endorsement of the Stoic notion of the self-sufficiency of virtue then it would have to be maintained that Augustine's dialogue presents a blatant inconsistency or at best an ambiguous posture, at once claiming that the virtue of the wise man ensures beatitude, while also insisting the devotion to God, as the Christian religion proposes, and as Monica represents, is the way to happiness. If, on the other hand, the last word belongs to Monica, as Augustine claims at several points in the dialogue, then, the apparent Stoicism of *De beata vita* would have to be considered suspect.

And there is this: Augustine's use of Terence in *De trinitate* 13. Wetzel in fact begins his second chapter with a reference from *De trinitate* 13 about Augustine's view that no one is happy who does not get what he wants, and that not all those who have what they want are happy. These are in fact the very themes Augustine deals with in *De beata vita*. They are also to some extent how one could caption Augustine's portrait of the wise man and of Orata in *De beata vita* 4.25 and 4.26 respectively. Wetzel, however, does not discuss much of what Augustine states in *De trinitate* 13, except a brief reference in a later footnote, even though Augustine addresses directly what Terence proffers in relation to the philosophical tradition. Wetzel notes that Augustine "cites Terence's maxim as the epitome of pagan wisdom," and "disparages this wisdom as pathetic 'counsel given to the wretched, lest the wretched be more wretched.'" Wetzel adds that "in *De beata vita*, an early work, Augustine is disposed to accept Terence's advice," however.⁴⁰

The early/later contrast easily disposes of what possible misrepresentation might be entailed in Wetzel's analysis of Augustine's use of Terence in *De beata vita*. Moreover, the philosophical themes and the Ciceronian text (*Hortensius*) Augustine cites and alludes to in *De trinitate* 13 are the very ones he uses in *De beata vita*. So the years that separate

³⁹ CWS, 174.

⁴⁰ Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, 105 n35.

the writing of *De beata vita* from *De trinitate* Book 13 may be less important than the possible fact that Augustine is repeating in *De trinitate* 13 what he had always thought about Terence and the claims of philosophy when he was at Cassiciacum. It is impossible to summarize Augustine here without losing the force of his criticism. But excerpts of his extensive remarks should suffice:

Writing about the man who appears to have much under his control, Augustine comments that "In his courage he may well be prepared to take whatever adversity comes upon him and to bear it with equanimity; but he would prefer it not to come upon him, and if he can he sees to it that it does not. So he is prepared for both eventualities, but in such a way that he hopes for one and avoids the other, and if he runs into the one he would avoid, he willingly bears it because what he wanted could not come about. He endures it therefore in order not to be pushed under completely, but he would rather not be pushed at all. How then can he be said to live as he would like?"⁴¹ Compare this with Augustine's description of the wise man in *De beata vita* 4.25: "Every wise man is strong, and the strong man entertains no fear. For every wise man fears neither bodily death nor sufferings. For the banishment, prevention, or delay of such pains he would need all those things of which he is capable of being in want. Yet he does not fail to use them well if they are there. For very true is that aphorism, 'It is foolish to suffer what you can avoid.' Therefore, he will avoid death and pain as far as it is possible and fitting so that, if he does not avoid them, he will not be unhappy when they occur but because he refused to avoid them when it was possible, behavior which is a clear sign of folly. And so whoever does not avoid these things will be unhappy not from enduring them but from folly."⁴²

It is after this that Augustine goes on to add that "But if he cannot avoid them, although his behavior has been careful and proper, they will not make him unhappy. Indeed, this aphorism of the comic poet is no less true: 'Since what you wish for is impossible, better wish for what is possible.' And then Augustine poses that rhetorical "how will he be unhappy to whom nothing happens against his will, since he cannot want anything which he sees he cannot get?"⁴³

In *De trinitate* 13 Augustine states unambiguously that in fact the wise man's equanimity is a farce: "How then can he be said to live as he

⁴¹ *De trinitate* 13.7.10 (CCSL 50a, 395). *The Trinity*, translated by Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 1991), 351.

⁴² *De beata vita* 4.25 (CCSL 29, 78-79). CWS, 185-186.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 186.

would like? Because he is willingly brave in bearing unflinchingly what he would rather had not been inflicted on him?" He contends that "the reason he will what he can do is that he cannot do what he wills. That is the sum total, whether it makes you laugh or cry, of the happiness of proud mortals who boast that they live as they want because they bear patiently with what they do not want to happen to them. This, they say, is what Terence put so well." And so Augustine removes the pretense: "Since what you will can never be, will what you can do." "Who would deny that this is very sensibly said?" he asks, insisting that "it is advice given to an unhappy man how not to be unhappier still. To a happy man, however, such as all men want to be, it is neither right nor true to say what you will can never be."⁴⁴ So much for Augustine's approving use of Terence in *De beata vita*. Augustine insists in *De trinitate* 13 that his presentation of Terence is what Terence had always been understood to be saying. In other words, Augustine already assumed this when he adopted Terence's words in *De beata vita* 4.25, hence the deliberate irony in the portrait of the wise man that I have suggested.⁴⁵

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⁴⁴ *De trinitate* 13.7.10 (CCSL 50a, 395-396). *The Trinity*, translated by Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 1991), 351.

⁴⁵ In *Retractiones* 1.2 Augustine comments on a section of *De beata vita* 4.25. It is significant that he does not revise what he says about the wise man as being inconsistent with his later thinking on the use of Terence's *Andria* in both *De civitate Dei* 14.25 and *De trinitate* 13. What he comments on is the fact that he had defined the happy life as dwelling in the soul of the wise man regardless of the condition of his body. This he realizes appears to contradict the language and thought about the resurrection of the body I Corinthians 15. His retraction, then, involves the implied body-less beatitude of the wise man who has beatitude in his soul. It is this indifference to the body in the life to come which he believed needed correcting. We should also note that in *De trinitate* 13, where he gives his review of the Terentian maxim Augustine also refers to the erroneous opinion which would consign beatitude only to a disembodied soul (*De trinitate* 13.9.12), mentioning in passing his argument in *De civitate Dei* 12 on the issue.

JAMES OF VITERBO'S REJECTION OF GILES OF ROME'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE NATURAL LOVE OF GOD OVER SELF

This article will establish that in his discussion of whether a man loves God more than himself by natural love, James of Viterbo (c.1255-1308) repeats and rejects Giles of Rome's (1243/7-1316) arguments for an affirmative answer to the question. James' rejection of Giles' position on this issue is important for two reasons. First, James rejects Giles' Thomistic belief that humans have a natural inclination to love God more than self.¹ James' position is a return to the *natura curva* position of the eleventh century, which holds that nature works only for its own perfection, and that grace is required for any love that is not based on self-love.² Second, James' rejection of a natural inclination for loving God affects his interpretation of the famous Aristotelian dictum, "the notes of friendship (*amicabilia*) which exist in regard to another, come from the notes of friendship which exist in regard to one's own self."³ Whereas Giles interprets this statement to refer only to the love of fellow creatures, James understands it to mean that any sort of love unassisted by grace has its roots in self-love.

¹ Gregory Stevens, "The Disinterested Love of God According to St. Thomas and Some of His Modern Interpreters," *The Thomist* 16 (1953): 307-33, 497-541. The relevant texts of Thomas are collected and translated in: 515-528.

² For a discussion of the issue in the twelfth century, see Arthur Landgraf, "Charité," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, t. 2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1953), cols. 572-579. For the relationship between Thomas Aquinas and the twelfth-century thinkers Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of St. Victor, see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "Le problème de l'amour pur et la solution de Saint Thomas," *Angelicum* (1929): 83-124. For a more general discussion of the relation between Thomas and earlier thinkers, see Pierre Rousselot, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Bd. 6, Hft. 6 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1908); L-B. Gillon, "Primacia del apetito universal de Dios según Santo Tomás," *Ciencia Tomista* 63 (1942): 328-342; M-R. Gagnebet, "L'amour naturel de Dieu chez Saint Thomas et ses contemporains," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948): 294-446; 49 (1949): 31-102.

³ "Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum," Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 9.4.1166a1-2. For the importance of this passage, see Rousselot, 7.

To argue that James' position on natural love involves a deliberate rejection of Giles' position, a set of objections and replies in James' *Quodlibet* 2, q. 20 (1294-1295) will be compared with Giles' *Quodlibet* 4, q. 14 (1289).⁴ James' question is titled: "Whether a man by natural love loves God more than himself, or conversely?" Giles' question is similar: "Whether a man must love God more than himself?"⁵ The present discussion will not be an exhaustive treatment of James' position, but it will show how James assesses and reacts to the arguments of Giles.

In the objections of his question, James gives three ways for arguing that *simpliciter et absolute* a man loves God more than self by natural love. The third objection is drawn from a consideration of God as the causal, whole, and final good (*bonum causale, totale, et finale*). This third objection contains within it three different arguments based on these three different considerations of God as good.⁶ Although the general thrust of these arguments can be found in Thomas Aquinas, it will be shown that this set of three arguments is found explicitly in Giles of Rome, and that James of Viterbo often uses Giles' own language when explaining these

⁴ James of Viterbo, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 20, in *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A., Disputatio Secunda de Quolibet*, ed. Eelcko Ypma (Würzburg: Augustin-Verlag, 1969), 202-214. For the date, see Eelcko Ypma, "Recherches sur la productivité littéraire de Jacques de Viterbo jusqu'à 1300," *Augustiniana* 25 (1975): 273-274; Idem, introduction to *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. Disputatio Prima de Quolibet* (Würzburg: Augustin-Verlag, 1968), vi; Idem, introduction to *Jacobi de Viterbio ... Disputatio Secunda*, vi; Palémon Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, 2 vols., Études de Philosophie Médiévale, 17-18 (Paris: Vrin, 1933-34), vol. 2, 310. For a controversy about the dates of James' works, see John F. Wippel, "The Dating of James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet* I and Godfrey of Fontaine's *Quodlibet* VIII," *Augustiniana* 24 (1974): 348-386. For a recent discussion of James of Viterbo and bibliography, see Edward P. Mahoney, "James of Viterbo," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 5 (London: Routledge, 1998): 58-60.

Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4, q. 13, in *Quodlibeta* (Louvain: 1646; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), 234-237. For the date of *Quodlibet* 4 as 1289, see Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano I: Le opere prima del 1285. Il commenti aristotelici; parte II," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 2, n. 1 (1991): 74. For discussions of dates, see Francesco del Punta, Silvia Donati, and C. Luna, "Egidio Romano," in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. 42 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993): 321, 331; Glorieux, 300. For a recent discussion of Giles and bibliography, see Francesco del Punta and Cecilia Trifolgi, "Giles of Rome," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4: 72-78.

⁵ James, 202: "Vigesimo quaeritur: Utrum homo naturali dilectione magis diligit Deum quam se ipsum, aut e converso." Giles, 234: "Utrum homo magis debeat diligere Deum, quam seipsum?"

⁶ James, 158-159.

arguments.⁷ Moreover, the three arguments in James' third objection are presented in the same order in which Giles presents them. To establish this point, each of these three arguments will be analyzed separately. The conclusion of the article will emphasize the importance of James' rejection of Giles' position.

The analysis of each argument (God as the causal good, whole good, and final good) will also have three parts. First, James' presentation of each individual argument will be given. Second, each argument will be compared with the corresponding argument in Giles' question. Third, for philosophical interest, James' reply to each argument will be given.

The first argument, which proceeds from the fact that God is the causal good (*bonum causale*), is presented by James in four steps:⁸

- (C1) God produces and conserves everything in being.
- (C2) Consequently, God is more intimate (*intimior*) to any single thing than it is to itself.
- (C3) The good of a creature is more reserved (*reservatur*) in God than it is in the created thing itself, since God brings about (*facit*) its being more than the creature does.
- (C4) Therefore a creature loves God more than itself.

Giles begins the first argument by stating (C2), "... we say that God is more intimate (*magis intimus*) to whatever thing, than the thing is to its own self."⁹ The form of the argument is the same as that found in James, because Giles uses an expanded version of (C1) in which he argues that this intimacy between God and a creature is based on the special way in which the creature is an effect and vestige or likeness (*vestigium vel similitudo*) of God. To some extent a creature is a likeness of a God in the way that the impression of a seal in wax is the likeness of the seal. But a difference between the two types of likeness is important for understanding (C1). The impression of the seal remains in the wax after the seal has been withdrawn. But if God ceases to preserve a creature in existence, then the creature disappears. The likeness of a creature to God has a dependence

⁷ To compare these arguments with the text of Thomas Aquinas, see his *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 26, art. 3. See also note 1 above.

⁸ James, 203: "Prima ratio sumitur ex eo quod Deus est bonum causale. Nam omnia in esse producit et in esse conservat. Sic autem conservat, quia est intimius unicuique rei magis quam ipsa sibi. Et ita bonum creaturae magis reservatur in Deo quam etiam in ipsa re creata, quia Deus magis facit ad eius esse quam ipsamet. Quare magis diligit naturaliter creatura Deum quam se."

⁹ Giles, 235: "... dicimus enim quod Deus sit magis intimus cuilibet rei, quam res ipsa sibi ..."

that is more like the causal dependance of the likeness of a seal reflected in water. Once the seal has been removed, then the likeness does not remain in the water, but rather disappears.¹⁰ The connection between (C1) and (C2) is now clearer. God is more intimate to a thing than it is to itself because God brings about (*facit*) the conservation of a creature's essence more than the essence of that creature does.

Giles uses (C2) to establish (C3). (C2) states that a creature is dependant upon God in such a way that without God a creature cannot exist, and if the creature were annihilated, God could make it again (*reficeret*).¹¹ Therefore, if the creature considers in what respect his good is the divine good, because of the above-mentioned dependance upon the divine good for its existence, it would seem to the creature that its good is more present in the divine good than in its own self.¹²

One important difference in Giles' presentation of the argument is that he uses an additional premiss to move from (C2) to a modified version of (C3) and (C4). The additional premiss is that a creature can know that its good is more present in God than in itself. Giles' version of (C4) concludes that if we should consider that God is the cause and conservator of every good, then we act most badly (*pessime*) if we do not choose God more than ourselves, because we know that our good is more reserved (*reservetur*) in God than in ourselves.¹³

Unlike James, Giles here explicitly discusses the love practiced by rational agents, who can know that God is the producer and conservator of their good. Whereas James' version of (C4) argues that all creatures naturally love God more than themselves, Giles' version states that we must love God more than ourselves precisely because we know that our good is present in God more than in ourselves. Nevertheless, the similarity between the two arguments has been shown. Both argue for their

¹⁰ Ibid.: "Hujusmodi autem vestigium, vel similitudo non est sicut similitudo sigilli reperta in cera, quia absente sigillo remanet ejusmodi similitudo in cera; sed magis est sicut similitudo sigilli in aqua; est enim tantae fluxibilitatis, quod ad momentum non retinere formam sigilli, nisi semper adesset sigillum." For Giles' understanding of *vestigium*, see Giles of Rome, *In Primum Librum Sententiarum* (Venice: 1521; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), d. 3., q. 2, f. 22v-23v.

¹¹ Giles, Quodlibet 4, q. 14, 236: "... Deus facit magis ad conservationem creaturae, quam ipsa creatura; sine Deo enim etiam ad momentum non posset existere creatura: et si annihilata esset creatura, Deus, quando vellet, ipsam reficeret."

¹² Ibid.: "Si ergo creatura adverteret, quantum bonum esset bonum divinum, et quod si annihilata esset per illud bonum refici posset, et quod sine illo bono esse non posset, videret, bonum suum magis esse in illo bono divino, quam in se ipsa."

¹³ Ibid.: "Igitur si consideremus quod Deus sit omnis boni causativus et conservativus, pessime agemus si non magis deligamus [sic] Deum, quam nos ipsos, cognoscentes, quod bonum nostrum magis reservetur in Deo, quam in seipso ..."

conclusions from considerations of God's causation and consequent intimacy with creatures.

James' reply to the argument focuses on two different uses of "*intimus*". James admits that with respect to the causality of a creature's conservation in existence God is more intimate to the creature than it is to itself. The reason is that God is the cause of the creature, and the creature is not the cause of itself. But if intimacy is considered as flowing from union or unity, every creature is more intimate to itself than it is to God. James seems to be arguing that since every creature is one thing itself and different from God, it follows that with respect to unity every creature is more intimate to itself than to God. In this objection James accepts (C1), but he thinks that (C2) is not relevant to the question. James argues that love is based on considerations of unity. It follows from that since a creature is united to itself most of all, it will naturally love its own self most of all.¹⁴

The second argument, which proceeds from the fact that God is the whole good (*bonum totale*), is presented by James in four steps:¹⁵

- (T1) In God is contained the ground (*ratio*) of every good.
- (T2) Every good is compared (*comparatur*) to him as a part is compared to the whole.
- (T3) The part naturally loves the whole more than itself.
- (T4) A creature naturally loves God more than itself.

James gives a traditional line of reasoning to establish (T3) and to show its relevance to human action. In nature we see that a hand, which is a part of the body, naturally exposes itself to danger for the preservation of the whole body. Since reason (*ratio*) imitates nature, there is a counterpart in political action. The good citizen naturally exposes himself to the danger of death for the preservation of the political community (*res publica*). Therefore the good citizen loves the good of the community more than he loves his own good. The examples of the hand and the

¹⁴ James, 211: "... dicendum est quod Deus est intimior rei quam res sibi ipsi, quantum ad causalitatem conservationis; quia plus dependet res quaelibet a Deo quam a se secundum rationem causae, cum res non sit causa sui ipsius; Deus autem est ei causa. Sed quantum ad rationem unionis vel unitatis, magis est intima res quaelibet sibi ipsi quam Deo. Unio autem maxime consideranda est in amicitia sive dilectione."

¹⁵ James, 203: "Secunda ratio sumitur ex eo quod Deus est bonum totale; quia in ipso continetur ratio omnis boni, et omne aliud bonum comparatur ad ipsum, ut pars ad totum. Pars autem naturaliter magis diligit totum quam se." (T4) is not explicitly formulated.

citizen endangering themselves for the good of the whole show that the part loves the whole more than it loves itself.¹⁶

The presentation of this argument by Giles is more condensed than that found in James. Giles' argument begins by making a statement that combines both (T1) and (T2): "... God is the whole good, having in himself any good whatever."¹⁷ To establish (T3), Giles does not mention the traditional argument of the good citizen sacrificing himself for the state, but he does give a detailed discussion of the example concerning how the part of the body sacrifices itself for the good of the whole. Giles argues that the greater love of the part for the whole is naturally stamped (*impressus*) by an instinct of nature on the members of our body. In general, this self-sacrificing love of the part for the whole is naturally inserted (*inditus*) into any part. If this were not the case, then the arm would not expose itself to danger or death for the good of the head.¹⁸ For Giles, creatures do not have an inclination for their own perfection alone, but they have within themselves a greater inclination for the whole good, which is God.

Since Giles has established that the part has a natural instinct to sacrifice itself for the whole, and a creature is a certain expression of that whole good which is God, (T4) follows, namely that it is natural for a creature to love God more than its own self. This emphasis on natural inclination is an insight originally put forth by Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the natural love of God.¹⁹ However, the structure of the argument and the order in which the arguments as a whole are presented show that James' primary target was the argument as presented by Giles.

At the end of the second argument Giles discusses briefly the dictum of Aristotle mentioned in our introduction, namely that "the notes of friendship that are for another come from the notes of friendship that

¹⁶ Ibid.: "... quia pars naturaliter se exponit ad conservationem totius, sicut manus naturali inclinatione exponit se ad resistendum vel ad suscipiendum ictum pro conservatione totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, ideo istud etiam invenitur in actibus politicis. Bonus enim civis exponit se mortis periculo pro conservatione rei publicae." This argument is common to many medieval authors. For its role in Thomas Aquinas' thought, see Stevens: 523-532. For Aristotle's discussion of the good citizen exposing himself to the danger of death for the sake of the political community, see *Ethica Nicomachea* 9.8.1169a17-27.

¹⁷ Giles, 236: "... Deus sit bonum totale habens in se quodcumque bonum."

¹⁸ Ibid.: "... in ipsis autem membris nostris hanc legem esse impressam ex instinctu naturae percipimus, quod partes se exponant periculo et morti pro defensione totius; quod non esset, nisi naturaliter esset inditus partibus quod plus diligenter totum quam seipsas."

¹⁹ For Thomas' originality, see Gagnebet: 414.

are for ourselves."²⁰ Love between creatures is a love between parts. Consequently, this type of love for another can be based on self-love. Since the love of a creature for God is the love of a part for the whole, it follows that the love for the whole good is entirely different from love for neighbor, and cannot come from self-love.²¹ In the conclusion of this article it will be shown that James of Viterbo thinks that this dictum of Aristotle holds true not just for the love that one creature has for another creature, but for any purely natural love. The reason is that James rejects Giles' belief that the part has a natural instinct to sacrifice itself for the good of the whole.

James' reply to the argument is directed against (T2) and (T3). He states that a part is included in the whole in two ways. In one way the part is one thing with the whole. In this sense the part loves the whole with a love equal to that by which it loves itself, since they both are one. In another sense, the part can be considered as different (*diversa*) from the whole. Inasmuch as the part is different from the whole, it loves itself more than the whole.²²

To reject Giles' position, James needs to address the two different examples which provide support for (T3), which are the hand sacrificing itself for the body and the good citizen sacrificing himself for the good of the community. James discusses these two issues separately. First, he attacks the doctrine that creatures have a natural inclination to love the whole more than themselves. According to James, when the good of a part is sacrificed for the good of the whole, this sacrifice is caused not by the natural appetite of the part, but rather by the natural appetite of the whole which uses the parts. Here James discusses the case of the hand or arm being endangered for the welfare of the body. The hand or the arm does not expose itself to danger. On the contrary, the whole body exposes such less worthy parts to danger in order to protect a more noble (*nobilior*) part

²⁰ See note 3. Giles' version differs from that found in the version presented in James' response by stating, "quae sunt ad nos ipsos" rather than "ad se ipsum." See Giles, 236; James, 208. James (214) reproduces "ad nos ipsos" when attacking the position of Giles.

²¹ Giles, 236: "Intelligenda sunt de amore partis ad partem, nam amabilia unius partis ad aliam surrexerunt ex amicabilibus, quae sunt ad seipsum. Non autem intelligenda sunt esi [eti?] de amore partis ad totum: quasi pars magis debeat diligere totum, quam seipsum."

²² James, 212: "Uno modo ut includitur in toto ... Unde hoc modo eadem et aequali dilectione diligit se et totum; nec est comparatio inter ea, quia hoc modo non sunt diversa. Alio modo potest considerari pars ut est diversa a toto. Nam, licet aliquo modo sit eadem toti, tamen habet diversitatem quamdam a toto. Et hoc modo pars magis diligit se quam totum."

like the eye. Similarly, in the universe God permits evil among parts on account of the good of the whole universe.²³ Whereas Giles thinks that the part has impressed within itself a natural instinct for the good of the universe, James thinks that the part is ordered to the good of the whole by an external orderer. In this respect, James foreshadows the teaching of John Duns Scotus on the issue.²⁴

Similarly, James maintains that when a citizen chooses to expose himself to danger for the sake of the political community, he is primarily acting for his own benefit. There are two ways in which such citizens intend their own benefit. First, there are those who endanger themselves for glory and the praise of the political community. Consequently, since they primarily love praise and glory, they love themselves more than the political community.²⁵ Praise and glory are extrinsic goods. There is another type of citizen who exposes himself to danger for the good of virtue. This virtuous citizen endangers himself not because he loves the community more than himself, but rather because he loves the good of virtue, which pertains to his own perfection (*pertinens ad perfectionem hominis*). Indeed, he loves himself even more than the citizen who acts for praise and glory loves himself, since virtue is an intrinsic good, whereas praise and glory are extrinsic goods.²⁶ Such a man loves the good of the community more than the good of his body, which he is prepared to sacrifice; however, he does not prefer the public good to the good of virtue. This is clear from the fact that such a citizen would not expose himself to the loss of the good of virtue for the sake of the political community.²⁷

²³ Ibid., "Nam, ut videtur, pars non exponit se ipsam pro conservatione totius, sed totum est illud quod exponit partem pro salute sui, et partem viliorem pro salute partis nobilioris, ut manum pro oculo. Sic enim et in universo Deus permittit malum partis, propter bonum totius."

²⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, supp. dist. 27, in Allan B. Wolter, ed., *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 432: "... exempla ista non ostendunt propositum. Solummodo enim manifestant quod totum magis diligit bonum suiipsius vel partis principalioris totius quam partis minus principalis."

²⁵ James, 212: "Sicut enim illi qui exponunt se periculis pro salute communitatis, ut ex hoc laudentur, non magis diligunt communitatem quam se, immo magis diligunt se quam communitatem, dum propriam laudem et gloriam intendunt ..."

²⁶ Ibid.: "Et tanto amplius dicendum est hoc, tam de istis quam de his qui propter laudem hoc faciunt, quamvis quanto bonum virtutis est maius bonum et magis pertinens ad perfectionem hominis quam laus quae est extrinsecum bonum."

²⁷ James, 212-213: "... huiusmodi civis nollet amittere bonum virtutis propter communitatem salvandam."

This understanding of the good citizen is of particular interest because it reflects a debate at the University of Paris between the Arts Faculty and some theologians. In his *Quodlibet* 10, q. 3, Godfrey of Fontaines mentions that there is a dispute between the Peripatetics who use Aristotle's theory of friendship to show that ethics is primarily a type of self-love, and those theologians who interpret Aristotle by following reason as enlightened by faith.²⁸ James' understanding of the good citizen's self-sacrifice, and his distinction between extrinsic goods and intrinsic goods, follows closely the position taken by Siger of Brabant, who argued that a good person (*bonus*) differs from a bad person (*malus*) in that he rightly acts for his highest good, which is the good of virtue. The good citizen is willing to sacrifice his extrinsic goods of health and life for the good of the state, but it is only because he recognizes that by doing so he acquires for himself the more important extrinsic good of virtue.²⁹ It is interesting that in the interpretation of Aristotle and in the understanding of the good citizen's action, James follows the interpretation of the Arts Faculty and not the theologians. In the conclusion, we will see how James combines Siger's position with Bernard's *natura curva*, which states that nature unassisted by grace is primarily self-interested.

The third argument for the natural ability to love God more than self proceeds from the fact that God is the final good (*bonum finale*). James presents the argument in four parts:³⁰

- (F1) God is the end of all things, for the sake of which (*propter quem*) all things are.

²⁸ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* X, q. 6, in *Le dixième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. Jean Hoffmans, *Les Philosophes Belges*, t. 4, fasc. 3 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1931), 318: "Inter differentias quae ponuntur inter theologos qui sequuntur dictamen rationis secundum illustrationem luminis et fidei et inter peripateticos qui sequebantur dictamen rationis solum secundum illustrationem rationis naturalis ..." I hope to discuss the positions of Godfrey and Siger in a further study.

²⁹ Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones Morales*, q. 5, in *Siger de Brabant, Écrits de logique, de morale, et de physique*, ed. Bernardo Bazán (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), 103-105.

³⁰ James, 203: "Tertia ratio sumitur ex eo quod Deus est bonum finale. Est enim omnium finis, propter quem sunt omnia; et ideo propter ipsum diligenda sunt omnia. Sed propter quod unumquodque est, et illud magis. Quare ipse maxime et super omnia est naturaliter diligendus." For (F3), cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.2.72a29-30, in *Aristoteles Latinus*, IV, 1-4, 2nd ed., eds. Lawrence Minio-Paluello and Bernard Dodd (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1968), translatio Iacobi, 9: "... semper enim propter quod est unumquodque, illud magis est, ut propter quod amamus; illud amicum magis est."; translatio Ioannis, 114: "... semper enim propter quod est unumquodque illud magis est, sicut propter quod amamus, illud amicum magis."

- (F2) Therefore all things are to be loved for the sake of him (*propter ipsum*).
- (F3) But that on account of which every single thing exists, is more. (*Sed propter quod unumquodque est, et ille magis*).
- (F4) Therefore God is to be loved naturally most of all (*maxime*) and above all things (*super omnia*).

(F3) plays the central role in this argument. The use of "God" as the object of the preposition "*propter*" links the argument from (F1) to (F3). Everything is for the sake of God (*propter quem*), and is to be loved on account of him (*propter ipsum*). The word "*magis*" in (F3) is linked with "*maxime*" in (F4). (F3) can be rephrased as: anything for the sake of which something else exists, is more (*magis*) than something which exists for its sake. Since God is that for the sake of which everything is, it follows that God is to be loved most of all (*maxime*) and above everything else.

Giles' presentation of this argument follows the same structure and uses many of the same words, but it differs in the formulation of (F1) because of Giles' emphasis on participation. Giles begins by asserting that our good is good only insofar as it participates in the divine good (*in quantum participat divinum bonum*). Giles then uses this version of (F1) to establish (F2), which is that our good is to be loved on account of the divine good (*propter divinum bonum*).³¹ Here Giles too emphasizes the importance of "*propter*". Everything is loved on account of (*propter*) the divine good, but the divine good is not loved on account of (*propter*) anything, because it is essentially and *per se* good. Giles points out that we love our neighbor on account of (*propter*) the society that we share with him in the divine good.³²

The version of (F3) found in Giles is worth reproducing because of its similarity to that found in James: *propter quod unumquodque, tale et illud magis*. The move to (F4) is the same as that found in James. Since

³¹ Giles, 236: "Si ergo bonum nostrum non est bonum, nisi in quantum participat divinum bonum, consequens est, quod non sit diligendum, nisi propter illud divinum bonum, cujus participatione habet quod sit bonum: quodlibet ergo debet diligere se ipsum sive suum bonum propter divinum bonum."

³² Ibid.: "Proximum autem debent diligere propter societatem, quam habet cum ipso in illo summo bono ..."

we love our own good on account of (*propter*) the divine good, it follows that we must love the divine good more (*magis*) than our own good.³³

Although Giles primarily discusses participation in this third argument, he uses participation in a way that considers God as the final good. This linkage between participation and the consideration of God as the final good becomes clear after Giles establishes (F4) and continues to discuss the difference between love of neighbor and love of God. Giles explains that we do not have goodness by participating in our neighbor, but rather by our participating in God. Consequently, our good is not to be loved on account of (*propter*) our neighbor as the final good (*finaliter*), but on account of the divine good. God is the final good for the sake of which (*propter*) we must love both ourselves and our neighbor.³⁴ The connection between James' presentation of the argument as involving God as the final good and Giles' discussion of participation is now clear. God is the final good precisely because every created good participates in God and is to be loved for the sake of that divine good.

James replies to this argument in two ways. First, he attacks the relevance of (F3) to the argument. James' argument is that just because something is more (*magis*) in an absolute sense, it does not follow that it is more to us. James makes the distinction between that which is most lovable in itself and that which is most lovable to us. This distinction is analogous to that between those things which are most knowable in themselves and those which are most knowable to us. We do not always know best those things which are themselves most knowable. Similarly, we do not always love those things that are better, but instead we love those things that are more joined to us (*nobis coniunctiores*). God is the most lovable thing (*maxime diligibilis*) because he is the most good (*maxime bonus*). However, since a man is more united (*maxime unus*) to himself than he is to God, it follows that he loves himself more than he loves God. James' first major criticism of the argument is his assertion that the argument from (F1) to (F3) only proves that God is most lovable in himself, but it does not prove that God is most lovable to man.³⁵

³³ Ibid.: "... Cum bonum nostrum sit diligendum propter divinum bonum, consequens est quod magis debeamus diligere Deum, quam nos ipsos, et divinum bonum magis, quam nostrum bonum."

³⁴ Giles, 236-237: "... sumus enim boni non participatione proximi, sed participatione Dei: nec est bonum nostrum diligendum finaliter propter proximum, sed propter Deum et propter divinum bonum."

³⁵ James, 213: "... dicendum est quod non semper magis diligimus meliores, sed nobis coniunctiores. Licet ergo Deus sit maxime bonus, naturaliter tamen quilibet est sibi ipsi maxime unus, et ideo naturali dilectione magis diligit homo se quam Deum. Arguit ergo ratio ista quod Deus sit maxime diligibilis, ex eo quod est maxime bonus, non tamen quod

James' second major criticism of the argument is based on two uses of the preposition "*propter*".³⁶ These two uses correspond to the traditional distinction between the two types of love, *dilectio concupiscentiae* and *dilectio amicitiae*. The distinction has its roots in Geoffroy of Poitiers and William of Auxerre.³⁷ *Dilectio amicitiae* is the love which wills good for another, whereas *dilectio concupiscentiae* wills another's good for oneself. The first use of "*propter*" is to refer to an end (*finis*). In this way, to be loved as an object of "*propter*" is to be loved as an end. James argues that to love some being as an end is to love this other being with *dilectio concupiscentiae*.³⁸ In this sense, (F2) is correct to assert that a man loves his own good on account of (*propter*) God. But since this love for God is the love of him as an end, this love is a *dilectio concupiscentiae*. Since such love desires another's good for one's own sake, it follows that a man cannot in this sense love God more than himself, since he is loving God as his own end.³⁹

In another sense, the object of "*propter*" can be the moving cause (*causa movens*). In this sense someone can love a man on account of (*propter*) another, as when someone loves a servant on account of (*propter*) his lord. The love for the servant has the love for the lord as its moving cause. In this sense someone will love his friend on account of (*propter*) himself, since the love for the friend has its origin in self-love.⁴⁰ Such love is a *dilectio amicitiae*. It is worth quoting James' discussion of this love in full:

But a man does not love himself by a natural love on account of (*propter*) God just as on account of (*propter*) a moving cause, rather more conversely

a nobis maxime diligatur naturali dilectione, sicut ex eo quod est maxime verum, arguitur quod sit maxime cognoscibilis; non tamen quod a nobis maxime cognoscatur."

³⁶ I am omitting for two reasons the short reply found on p. 213, lines 371-374. First, it does not directly show any problems with Giles' argument. Second, its explanation requires a full exposition of James' position, which I plan to undertake in a further study.

³⁷ Landgraf: 577-578. See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, II, tr. II, cap. 4, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, v. 17 (Rome: Collegium Bonaventurae, 1982), 42-43. For a discussion of William of Auxerre's position, see Gillon: 332-334; Gagnebet: 398-400.

³⁸ James, 213: "Vel potest importare habitudinem causae, sicut dicitur aliquid diligere propter finem; et sic diligere aliud propter aliud habet locum in dilectione concupiscentiae. Tali enim dilectione diligitur finis."

³⁹ James, 213-214: "... homo naturali dilectione diligit se propter Deum, sicut propter finem; et ideo Deum maxime diligit sicut finem; quae dilectio est concupiscentiae."

⁴⁰ James, 213: "Vel potest importare habitudinem causae motivae, sicut dicitur aliquis diligere unum hominem propter alium, ut servum propter dominum; quia dilectio domini est causa movens ad dilectionem servi. Sic etiam dicitur aliquis diligere amicum propter se, quia dilectio amici originem habet ex dilectione sui."

[he loves] God on account of (*propter*) himself, since, according to the natural love of friendship (*dilectio amicitiae*), the notes of friendship which exist in regard to another, come from those notes of friendship which exist in regard to our own selves. But a man loves himself on account of (*propter*) God by the love of charity, just as on account of (*propter*) the moving cause, since according to the love of this sort, the notes of friendship which belong in regard to himself and to his neighbor, come from those notes of friendship which exist in regard to God ...⁴¹

James refers here to the commonplace Aristotelian dictum mentioned both at the beginning of this article and in Giles' discussion of the argument from God as the whole good. It is noteworthy that both Giles and James interpret the dictum to mean that the love of neighbor has its basis in self-love. Their disagreement concerns the application of the dictum to God. Since Giles accepts the Thomistic notion that every creature has a natural inclination to love God more than itself, he thinks that Aristotle's dictum is irrelevant to the discussion of love for God. In contrast, James of Viterbo thinks that Aristotle's statement refers to any purely natural love, including the natural love for God.

Why does James take this position against his Augustinian predecessor? A full exposition of James' position will be reserved for a further study. However, it is important that two remarks be made here. First, James' position that all natural love has its roots in self-love finds support in the text of Aristotle, but it also has a history in the mystical and theological literature of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries. Theologically, James' position is not far from that taken by William of Auxerre, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and others. Indeed, James discusses Bernard's position that natural love is self-interested in the body of the question.

Bernard teaches that there are four grades of love. According to the first grade, a man loves himself on account of (*propter*) himself. According to the second grade, a man loves God on account of (*propter*) himself. In the third grade, a man loves God on account of (*propter*) God. According to the fourth and highest grade of love, someone not only loves God on account of (*propter*) God, but he loves himself on account of (*propter*) God. According to James' interpretation of Bernard, the first two

⁴¹ James, 214: "Sed, sicut propter causam motivam non diligit homo naturali dilectione se propter Deum, immo magis econverso Deum propter se, quia, secundum dilectionem naturalis amicitiae, amabilia quae sunt ad alterum, veniunt ex amabilibus quae sunt ad nos ipsos. Dilectione vero caritatis diligit homo se propter Deum, sicut propter causam motivam, quia secundum dilectionem huiusmodi amabilia quae sunt hominis ad se et ad proximum, veniunt ex amabilibus quae sunt ad Deum ..."

grades pertain to natural love, whereas the third and fourth require grace.⁴²

James lists these four grades after he explains that he understands the Aristotelian doctrine of friendship to state that every natural love comes from self-love. For James, there is no disagreement between Bernard and the Aristotelian dictum on natural love. Consequently, James easily incorporates Aristotelian self-love into his ethical thought precisely because he takes Aristotle to be agreeing with Bernard about nature's inability to transcend self-love.

Philosophically, James' interpretation of Aristotle has its roots more in the Arts Faculty than in his immediate theological predecessors. In his interpretation of Aristotle's view on friendship and in stating that the good citizen endangers himself not for the good of the community but for his own intrinsic good of virtue, James is siding with Siger against Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome.⁴³

Although James disagrees with Thomas and Godfrey, his main target is Giles. James explicitly rejects Giles' three arguments based on a consideration of God as the causal, the whole, and the final good. Not only does James present these arguments in the same order as they occur in Giles' *Quodlibet* 4, q.14, but the arguments which he attacks have the same or very similar structure to those found in Giles, and often the same words and phrases are used. James clearly finds Giles' views on the natural love for God to be both theologically and philosophically insufficient.

⁴² James, 208-209. For the text of Bernard, see *De diligendo Deo*, 8.23-10.30, 15.39-40, in Bernard of Clairvaux, *Opera*, vol. 3, eds. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), 138-144, 152-154. For a discussion of love in the works of Bernard, see Etienne Gilson, *La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard* (Paris: Vrin, 1934); Pacifique Delfgaauw, "La nature et les degrés de l'amour selon S. Bernard," in *Saint Bernard théologien: Actes du Congrès de Dijon, 15-19 septembre 1953, Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis* 9 (1953): 234-252; G.R. Evans, *The Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1983), 107-137. For the position that Bernard is discussing fallen nature, since in the twelfth century the metaphysical distinction between nature and grace had not yet been clarified, see Garrigou-Lagrange: 106-107; Delfgaauw: 237-239.

⁴³ Thomas' position is more nuanced. For Thomas, before the Fall humans could love God more than themselves out of natural powers, but after the Fall healing grace is necessary. See Thomas Aquinas, *S.T.*, I-II, q. 109, art. 3. For a text of Giles on whether it is possible to perform a good action without grace, see *Quodlibet* 2, q. 29, in *Quodlibeta*, 120-122. However, he does not discuss the love of God more than self. For a parallel passage in Thomas, see *S.T.*, I-II, q. 109, art. 2. For discussions of Giles on the relationship between charity and merit, see *Quodlibet* 6, q. 2, in *Quodlibeta*, 354-357; *In tertium librum sententiarum*, d. 30, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (Rome: 1623; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), 618-621.

It is at this point that James' understanding of the relationship between nature and grace is most evident. Compared with the position taken by his theological contemporaries, James' approach is anomalous because he combines Siger's approach to Aristotle with St. Bernard's understanding of *natura curva*. By nature every man loves his own self most of all. It is only through grace that God is loved above everything, and this supernatural love of charity becomes the source for a heightened love of self and neighbor which is subordinated to the love of God. It is interesting that James of Viterbo, when rejecting the arguments for the natural love of God, deliberately attacks those arguments which were presented by Giles of Rome, who was not only a member of the same Augustinian Order, but also his predecessor in the same chair at the University of Paris.⁴⁴

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THE CREATION OF AUGUSTINIAN IDENTITY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

II*

IV. FROM MYTH TO IDENTITY

To be an Augustinian: this is the phrase for which we seek definition. The title of the Order itself was sufficient for Jordan: " ... many have been able to live eremitically as religious, who [even] call themselves hermits, but that part of our title, 'of Saint Augustine' distinguishes us from them."¹ 'To be an Augustinian' for Jordan, was then most fundamentally to be a member of that Order entitled to bear the name of Augustine's heirs. In this Jordan was following Henry of Friemar, who had claimed that the title *Ordo Eremitarum Sancti Augustini* belonged only to that Order which had its origin in Augustine's first monastic community, that Order alone whose members could call Augustine *pater noster*.²

Establishing Augustine's paternity of the OESA was not, however, a given for the Order in the early fourteenth century. Facing the challenge from the Regular Canons together with that of Lateran IV, the Augustinian hermits had to prove their claims of origins; they were forced to legitimate their existence. It was in this context, as we have seen, that in the early years of the 1330's, the Augustinian myth was created.

Accepting the authenticity of the myth, and routinely following the Rule did not, however, as such make one truly an Augustinian; the habit, as Jordan affirmed, did not make the monk.³ One must live the life established by the Bishop of Hippo himself. This certainly was the Augustini-

* Cf. *Augustiniana* 49 (1999) 1-2, pp. 109-164.

¹ "Rursus plures possunt esse adhuc Religiosi eremitice viventes, qui se scribunt 'Eremitas', sed illud, quod ponitur in titulo 'sancti Augustini', distinguit nos ab illis." *VF* 1,17 (59,16-18); cf. *Hen. Tract.* 3 (99,35-101,80).

² *Hen. Tract.* 3 (100,56-101,80).

³ "... quia habitus non facit monachum, sed professio et observantia regularis ...," *VF* 1,20 (72); cf. E.L. Saak, "The *Figurae Bibliorum* of Antonius Rampegolus: MS Uppsala C 162," in *Via Augustini. Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation. Essays in Honor of Damasus Trapp, O.S.A.*, ed. Heiko A. Oberman and Frank A. James, III, in cooperation with Eric Leland Saak. *SMRT* 48 (Leiden, 1991): 19-41; 34.

an Gerardo of Bergamo's argument in his quodlibetic question, *De praesantia religionis sancti Augustini*, debated in Paris in 1333. Not appealing to any of the historico-mythic elements that were so important for the authors treated above, and for Jordan to be treated forthwith, Gerardo formed his argument for the legitimacy of the OESA on the basis of its legitimately adhering and conforming to the way of life expressed in Augustine's Rule.⁴ Jordan would have heartily agreed. To be an Augustinian, one had above all to live as an Augustinian. How one could best do so, how one could know whether one was a true son of Augustine, was the question to which Jordan sought to provide a definitive answer in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*. As the Augustinian myth revealed, Augustine needed embodiment, and to ensure such embodiment was Jordan's goal. Jordan as historian defended his Order against the Canons' claims to priority, and his own textualization of the Augustinian myth provided the social glue that bound together the diverse individual members within the single body of the Order in the later Middle Ages. When the Augustinian myth was put in service of a programmatic mission, the Augustinian myth gave birth to the Augustinian identity. This identity was still in its embryonic stage in Henry's *Tractatus*; Jordan would textually bring it to term in his *Collectanea Augustiniana* and *Liber Vitasfratrum*.

A. Jordan's *Collectanea Augustiniana*

Manuscript 251 of the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal in Paris is the autograph copy of Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Collectanea Augustiniana*. The parchment manuscript measures 248 x 186 mm. As the ascribed title suggests, this manuscript contains a miscellany of writings dealing with Augustine. In his Prologue, Jordan mentions that he gathered together into one volume a number of sermons of Augustine, together with other works, including the *Vitae* of Augustine and Monica. These Jordan sent to the Order's *studium* in Paris, most likely delivering the manuscript personally in 1343 on his official visitation of the French Province.⁵ Fol. 2^{ra-vb} contains a *Tabula* of

⁴ See Kaspar Elm, "De praesantia religionis S. Augustini: Eine als verloren geltende Quaestio quodlibetica des Augustiner-Eremiten Gerhard von Bergamo (d. 1355)," in *Mittelalterliche Texte. Überlieferung—Befund—Deutungen*, Kolloquium der Zentralkommission der Monumenta Germaniae Historica am 28./29. Juni 1996, MGH.SS 42, ed. Rudolf Schieffer (Hannover, 1996), 155-172.

⁵ "... quosdam sermones beatissimi patris nostri ac doctoris eximii Augustini, cum quibusdam aliis tractatibus, seu opusculis, vel legendis, de vita et gestis eiusdem sancti patris, ac sue pie matris sancte Monice atque de translationibus eorum ... in unum

the work's contents:

Tituli sermonum Aurelii Augustini episcopi, ad fratres suos in eremo apud Hipponem et aliorum in hoc volumine contentorum.

Sermo primus, de margaritis regularis institutionis: *Fratres mei et letitia cordis mei*

Sermo secundus, de pace: *Fratres carissimi, O si sciretis*

Sermo tertius, de silentio: *Silentium fratres*

Sermo quartus, de prudentia: *Fratres carissimi non solum silentium*

Sermo quintus, de misericordia: *Fratres carissimi, annuntio gaudium magnum*

Sermo sextus, de obedientia et eius discrezione: *Fratres mei dilectissimi, obedientie oportet*

Sermo septimus, de perseverantia: *Fratres mei, sicut dicit Apostolus*

Sermo octavus, de ira et odio: *Fratres mei dilectissimi, sicut omni habere memoriam*

Sermo nonus, de puritate conscientie et virtute spei: *Ad spirituale gaudium*

Sermo decimus, de fletu et penitentia: *Scitote fratres carissimi*

Sermo undecimus, de humilitate et superbia: *Fratres mei ubi superbia*

Sermo duodecimus, de fortitudine: *Quia in hac vasta solitudine*

Sermo tertius decimus, de iustitia: *Ut bene nostis fratres carissimi*

Sermo quartus decimus, contra loquentes sublimia et sapientes huius mundi: //fol .2^{rb}//
Scriptum est fratres carissimi

Sermo quintus decimus, de memoratone extremi iudicii: *Fratres mei dilectissimi, in omnibus operibus vestris*

Sermo sextus decimus, de otiositate fugienda: *Apostolus Petrus*

Sermo septimus decimus, de invidia: *Fratres mei desiderantissimi, nolite*

Sermo duodevicesimus, de murmuratoribus et penis inferni: *Demorantibus vobis in eremo*

Sermo undevicesimus, de vigilia nativitatis domini: *Attingimini filii potentes*

Sermo vicesimus, de nativitate domini: *Fratres carissimi et dilectissimi, Christus homo*

Sermo vicesimus unus, de tribus generibus monachorum et de paupertate: *Ut nobis per litteras*

Sermo vicesimus secundus, de oratione: *Fratres mei et letitia cordis mei, tempus est*

Sermo vicesimus tertius, de obedientia et de superbia: *Nichil sic deo placet*

Explicit sermones sancti Augustini ad fratres eremitas.

Incipit sermo eiusdem ad presbyteros Hipponenses de obedientia: *In omnibus operibus vestris*

volumen collegi ..." Jordani de Quedlinburg, *Collectanea Augustiniana*, Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, fol. 1^v (hereafter cited as *Jor. Coll.*). The title is given by Hümpfner intro., xxiv-xxv.

De communi vita clericorum, sermo primus: *Propter quod volui*

Sermo secundus: *Caritati vestre*

De tribus constitutionibus Augustini super proprietate clericorum.

Quod tibi liceat habere proprium, ex libro de vita clericorum

Sermo Sancti Augustini ad clericos de legendo //fol. 2^{va}// sacram scripturam: *Scriptum est fratres*

Sequuntur sermones sancti Augustini ad populum.

Sermo de epiphania domini et querendo Christum: *Audistis fratres carissimi*

Sermo de caritate vel pietate: *Fratres carissimi, non recorder*

Sermo de eo quod scriptum est, 'Beatus qui post aurum non abiit, de inventione reddenda': *In scripturis divinis legimus*

Sermo de penitentia: *Admones fratres*

Sermo de ieiunio et oratione: *Adversus demonum nequitiam*

Sermo de cogitationibus: *Primum quidem de cogitationibus*

Decretum observantie regularis sancti Augustini, quod a quibusdam dicitur regula prima eiusdem: *Communi diffinitione decrevimus*

Regula sancti Augustini prima: *Ante omnia fratres carissimi, diligatur deus*

Item regula eiusdem quam speculum appellat: *Hec sunt que ut observetis precipimur*

Excerptum de quodam sermone sancti Augustini, quid nomine prepositi importetur: *Quamvis omnis qui presunt*

Exhortatio sancti Augustini ad fratres: *Fratres oportet nos*

Exhortatio sancti Augustini ad sanctimoniales sorores: *Sicut parata est*

//fol. 2^{va}// Ex sermone sancti Augustini de instructione monachorum Heliam et Heliseum

Tractatus de vita et gestis sancti Augustini

De translatione sancti Augustini duplici

Annotatio temporum beati Augustini

Commendatio sancti Augustini ex auctoritatibus diversis quinquagenita unius doctorum

Tractatus de vita sancte Monice, matris sancti Augustini

De translatione sancte Monice

Metrum pro depingenda vita sancti Augustini

Legenda de sancto Augustino

To date, Jordan's autograph has been the only known copy of his *Collectanea*. Zumkeller lists three additional manuscripts containing only the

Vita Sancti Augustini.⁶ In the fifteenth century Jordan's *Vita* served as the major source for John Capgrave's *Life of Augustine*.⁷ In 1684 J. Hommey, based on the autograph, published Jordan's *Vita Sancti Augustini*, together with the other texts of *Collectanea*, aside from the *Sermones*, the *Regulae*, the *Legenda de Sancto Augustino*, the *Metrum pro depingenda vita Sancti Augustini* and the *Vita Monicae*.⁸ The *Catalogus Codicum Hagiographicorum Latinorum* of the Bibliothèque nationale de France, however, lists manuscript lat. 5338 as containing a *Vita Sancti Augustini, de translatione ejusdem prima, de translatione secunda, and annotatio temporum beati Augustini episcopi*.⁹ The catalogue further notes: *Auctore, ut videtur, Jordano de Saxonia*. Paris, BnF, MS lat. 5338, fol. 1^{ra}-108^{vb} is actually a previously unknown fifteenth-century copy of the entire *Collectanea*. The first and last quires, however, are missing, and the *Sermones* follow the other texts, rather than preceding them as in Paris, Bibl. de l'Arsenal, MS 251. The manuscript begins with the *Vita*, though lacking the first quire, the text is preserved only from the end of chapter nine, or fol. 62^{va} of the autograph. I am currently preparing a critical edition of Jordan's *Collectanea Augustiniana*, which will include a thorough study of this manuscript, together with a detailed analysis of the construction of the autograph, a study of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and complete collation of all extant textual witnesses. Paris, BnF MS lat. 5338 takes on added importance for the critical edition since quire nine of Paris, Bibl. de l'Arsenal MS 251 is missing. The text in the autograph breaks off on

⁶ Adolar Zumkeller, *Manuskripte von Werken der Autoren des Augustiner-Eremitenordens in mitteleuropäischen Bibliotheken*, Cassiciacum 20 (Würzburg, 1966), 287, nr. 639 (hereafter cited as Zumkeller, *MSS*, with the page reference given in parenthesis). The manuscripts are: Brussels, Bibl. Royale 1351-72, 14. s., fol. 35^r-47^v; Toulouse, Bibl. de la Ville 169, 14. s., fols. 1 sqq.; and Vienna Kaiserl. Privatbibl. 9375.A. n. 22, 15. s., fol. 81-96. Cf. *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis*, edd. Socii Bollandiani, 2 vols. (Bruxelles, 1898-1901), I: 125-128; *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis. Novum Supplementum*, ed. Henricus Fros. (Bruxelles, 1986), 101-105.

⁷ See Rudolph Arbesmann, "Jordanus of Saxony's *Vita S. Augustini*: The Source for John Capgrave's *Life of St. Augustine*," *Traditio* 1 (1943): 341-353.

⁸ J. Hommey, *Supplementum Patrum* (Paris, 1684), 569-659; I have used the Paris 1696 edition of this work. Hommey's text of the *Vita*, however, is not without its problems. A complete collation of the *Vita* of Jordan's autograph with the text of Hommey yielded 278 variant readings. Many of these are simple mis-readings or eye-skips, yet others are of more substantial nature, based on what is apparently Hommey's attempts to correct and/or improve Jordan's text.

⁹ *Catalogus Codicum Hagiographicorum Latinorum Antiquiorum Saeculo XVI qui asservantur in Bibliotheca Nationali Parisiensi*, ed. Hagiographi Bollandiani (Bruxellis, 1890), II: 261.

fol. 96^{vb} with chapter 22 of the *translationes Sanctae Monicae* (26 chapters are listed in the separate *tabula* for the *translationes* on fol. 89^{vb}-90^{ra}), continuing then mid-stream on fol. 97^{ra} with the *Legenda de Sancto Augustino*. As indicated in the *Tabula*, which follows Jordan's Prologue, after the translations of Monica yet preceding the *Legenda de Sancto Augustino* was to be a versified life of Augustine, given the title, *Metrum pro depingenda vita Sancti Augustini* (fol. 2^{vb}).¹⁰ This text is preserved in Paris, BnF MS lat. 5338 (fol. 48^{rb}-51^{rb}), which is then followed by a versified life of Paul the first Hermit (fol. 51^{rb}-52^{va}), not mentioned in the *Tabula* of Jordan's autograph.

It is reasonable to assume with Hümpfner that Jordan prepared his *Collectanea* to present to his brothers in Paris when he made his visitation of the French Province in 1343.¹¹ With this work Jordan brought the discussion of the Order's origins to a new level. He based his narrative of Augustine's biography on a previously unused collection of sources: the sermons of Augustine himself. These sermons, which Jordan used as the major proof-texts for his *Vita Sancti Augustini*, offered hard evidence of Augustine's eremiticism for these were the *Sermones ad fratres suos in eremo*. No longer was there need to debate the details, offering creative reconstructions of Augustine's early monastic life in Italy and in Africa; the evidence was at hand. Thus in the prologue to his *Vita*, Jordan stated that he "resolved to insert nothing in this work that was not confirmed by Augustine's own words or by other authenticated sources."¹²

Hümpfner considered Jordan's accepting the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* as authentic works of Augustine 'regrettable,' much in the same fashion as Arbesmann viewed Henry of Friemar's lack of historiographical acumen. Referring to Jordan's use of these pseudo-Augustinian sermons for his *Liber Vitasfratrum*, Hümpfner comments:

In view of the manner of historical writing of this time, Jordanus deserves much credit for his critical attitude and his sincere efforts both to report only ascertained facts and to understand their background and interrelations ... In view of this evident striving for a critical and objective attitude towards matters of tradition, the failure of Jordanus to recognize the false attribution of the

¹⁰ Cf. *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Mediae Aetatis. Novum Supplementum*, 104, n. 799. The missing quire in the autograph has not previously been mentioned by scholars, nor has the *Metrum pro depingenda vita Sancti Augustini*; see for example Arbesmann, "Jordan of Saxony's *Vita*," 344 and Hümpfner, intro., xxiv ff.

¹¹ Hümpfner, intro. xxv.

¹² "... nichil huic operi inserendum censui, quod non ipsius propriis dictis, aut aliorum authenticis scriptis confirmetur." Jordani de Quedlinburg, *Vita Sancti Augustini*, Prol., Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 251, fol. 54^{rb}. Hereafter Jordan's *Vita Sancti Augustini* will be cited as: *Jor. Vita*.

Sermones ad Fratres in Eremo is all the more regrettable. An additional cause was the confused and confusing controversy between the Augustinian Hermits and Regular Canons.¹³

The debate between the Hermits and the Canons was certainly a factor, even though Arbesmann argued that Jordan deplored the controversy, preferring to focus on religious obedience rather than historical priority.¹⁴ Though Jordan makes very conciliatory statements regarding the Canons and their coexistence with the Hermits as custodians of Augustine's tomb both to close his *Collectanea* and in his later *Opus Dan*,¹⁵ his 'deploring' the issue should be read in the broader context of his arguments for the priority of the Hermits.

The polemical nature of Jordan's *Collectanea*, as well as that of his *Liber Vitasfratrum*, is called into question by Hümpfner's argument that Jordan had conceived of the *Liber Vitasfratrum* already as a student in Bologna and Paris, using the *Collectanea* as preparatory material.¹⁶ In the Prologue to the *Collectanea*, Jordan states that he collected into one volume material which he had received from Paris, Rome, and other established monasteries.¹⁷ On this basis, together with Jordan's self-reference as 'least among the scholars of Paris,' Hümpfner claimed that "the material was mainly collected in Paris,"¹⁸ which he assumed Jordan himself had begun doing already in 1319-1322, at least five years previous to the

¹³ Hümpfner, intro. lxxiv-lxxv; cf. Arbesmann, *HFT*, 45 and 66.

¹⁴ Arbesmann, *HFT*, 59-60; cf. *VF* 2,14 (165,3-179,412).

¹⁵ "Quod quidem festum reconditionis eiusdem sacratissimi corporis ibidem tam a canonicis regularibus quam a fratribus eremitarum ordinis in eadem basilica sancti Petri in celo aureo deo et eidem beatissimo patri utriusque ordinis eorum institutori pariter famulantibus condigna honorificentia peragitur et usque in hodiernum diem annis singulis sollemniter celebratur. Regnante domino nostro Iesu Christo cui est honor et gloria in secula seculorum, Amen." *Legenda Sancti Augustini*, *Jor. Coll.*, fol. 104^{ra}. In his sermon *De translatione Sancti Augustini* of his *Opus Dan*, Jordan showed no signs of contention: "Unde pro maiori veneratione tanti Patris, iuxta ecclesiam sancti Petri in caelo aureo in qua requiescit, duo monasteria duorum ordinum quos idem pater seipsum instituisse legitur existunt constituta; unum videlicet canonicarum regularium et aliud fratrum heremitarum, qui diebus et noctibus in eadem ecclesia convenientes ad honorem et laudem dei et beati Patris Augustini divinis officiis invigilant incessanter." *Jor. OD*, sermo 59F.

¹⁶ Hümpfner, intro., l-li.

¹⁷ "... quosdam sermones beatissimi patris nostri ac doctoris exemii Augustini ... prout ad me fide digna assertione ac fideli communicatione undequaque exemplaria devenerunt, quibusdam quidem de Parisiis, quibusdam vero de Curia Romana, nonnullis quoque de antiquis et approbatis monasteriis ad me perductis, in unum volumen collegi ..." *Jor. Coll.* fol. 1^v; cf. Hümpfner, intro., xxiv-xxv.

¹⁸ Hümpfner, intro. xxv.

onset of the controversy with the Canons.¹⁹

There is, however, no firm evidence for such an early origin of Jordan's conception for writing the history of his Order. Moreover one must question whether this was even possible, at least with regard to the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*. The origins of these sermons remain in a fog of uncertainty and only a separate, thorough study of all the relevant material might shed new light on the matter. For now it must suffice to say that Hümpfner considered the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* to have been compiled by a Benedictine monk long before Jordan's time.²⁰ Jordan's collection of the sermons nevertheless is the first such collection, and his manuscript was used by the Maurists and subsequently Migne for their editions, albeit containing a much expanded number of sermons. Hümpfner pointed to the *Sermones beatissimi patris Augustini ad heremitas fratres suos* collected by the Chancellor of the University of Paris, Robert de Bardis.²¹ Two manuscripts containing de Bardis' collection claim that the sermons were 'found in Paris' by de Bardis. The collection, and the order of the sermons thereof, is parallel to that of Jordan, leading Hümpfner to posit that de Bardis either copied from Jordan or from the same sources as Jordan.²²

Robert de Bardis was Chancellor from 1336 to 1349, a friend of Petrarch's, and a respected scholar of Augustine. Katherine Walsh has noted Hümpfner's claim regarding the relationship between Jordan's collection and that of de Bardis, though Walsh argues that the copying process must have gone in the reverse.²³ Hümpfner had mentioned that the relationship between de Bardis' collection and Jordan's could only be established by comparing the Vatican and Parisian manuscripts of Robert's collection, a task he was prevented from carrying out due to World War II. The Vatican manuscript, however, rather than stemming from the early fifteenth century as Hümpfner supposed based on the printed catalogue, actually dates from the first half of the fourteenth century; the manuscript, according to Walsh, is a typical example of Parisian book production of the second third of the fourteenth century, and was de Bardis' personal

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, xxiv.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, xxix.

²¹ *Ibid.*, xxvii.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Katherine Walsch, "Wie ein Bettelorden zu (s)einem Gründer kam. Fingierte Traditionen um die Entstehung der Augustiner-Eremiten," in *Fälschungen im Mittelalter*. Internationaler Kongress der Monumenta Germaniae Historica, München, 16.-19. September 1986, Teil V: *Fingierte Briefe, Frömmigkeit und Fälschung Realienfälschungen*, MGH.SS 33/V (Hannover, 1988), 585-610; 599.

copy.²⁴ The sermons contained in this collection, however, are not given the title *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and thus Walsh argues that Jordan, though not having been responsible for the collection as such, was the one to give the collection its name.²⁵ In this light, it seems highly unlikely that de Bardis used Jordan's *Collectanea* as his model, but it is most suggestive that Jordan's collection was made based on that of de Bardis; in other words, that Jordan came across the sermons only sometime after 1336. Moreover, Balbino Rano argues that the compiler/author of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, whoever that might have been, used the historical works of Henry of Friemar, Nicholas of Alessandria and the Anonymous Florentine, thus pointing as well to the origins of the sermons sometime after 1334.²⁶ If the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* did not exist before the early 1330's, then Jordan could not have begun his literary work on the *Collectanea* already in 1319-1322 in Paris, aside from in a most rudimentary form. This would further imply that Jordan himself was probably not the one who found the sermons, since he was at this time lector in Magdeburg. Yet had he made his desire of collecting material on Augustine known—and Hümpfner claimed that by 1338 at the General Chapter in Siena, knowledge of Jordan's project was already widespread in the Order²⁷—his co-religious in Paris could very well have sent him the *sermones*, perhaps as copied from de Bardis, which would then also coincide with Jordan's statement in the Prologue to the *Collectanea* that he gathered together into one volume sources which he had received.

Hümpfner argued that while Jordan was still in Bologna he developed the inspiration for his *Liber Vitasfratrum*, having been influenced by the Dominican *Vitasfratrum* and the *Libellus de principiis Ordinis Praedicatorum* of that Order's second General, the blessed Jordan of Saxony (d. 1237).²⁸ It may have been natural for our Jordan to have longed for such a book while a student at Bologna as the one he eventually wrote, yet the evidence suggests another context. From 1322 to c. 1333 Jordan was lector in Erfurt, working very closely with Henry of Friemar. Henry exercised a considerable influence on Jordan. When Jordan assumed his position in Erfurt Henry was already an old man, having been born in 1245. Jordan himself testifies to Henry's age in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*. In his list of the outstanding scholars of the Order, Jordan includes Henry and praises

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 600.

²⁶ See Balbino Rano, "San Agustín y los orígenes de su Orden," 710-720.

²⁷ Hümpfner, intro. xxx.

²⁸ Hümpfner, intro. 1.

his studiousness. Even in his old age, as a septuagenarian and beyond, Jordan relates, Henry studied night and day, and would remain in his study, even though 'some young and new lector' might insist on daily academic disputations. There can be little doubt that the *lector recens aliquis* was Jordan himself, who would have arrived in Erfurt when Henry was seventy-seven years old. There was much affection between the two, and Jordan reveals his having often heard from Henry that although his head never hurt from studying, sometimes his backparts did (... *nonnumquam dorsum suum ex incubitu studii doluisse confessus est*)!²⁹ And as seen above, during the years at least from 1329 to 1334, Henry was viscerally engrossed in the debates with the Canons over custody of Augustine's tomb in Pavia, and thus over the two Orders' respective claims to historical priority. His involvement in this issue might also have been the reason why in 1331 he delegated the responsibility of adjudicating the case of the archbishop of Magdeburg's murder to Jordan.³⁰ It is most plausible to assume that Jordan likewise became rapt with the Order's case during this time. Whereas coming to Erfurt eager for scholarly disputations in public forum, working closely with Henry, Jordan may very well have redirected his efforts, especially after his experience in 1327, two months before the Order received permission to establish a house in Pavia and was given custody of Augustine's body. As related in the *Liber Vitasfratrum*, William of Cremona, the General of the Order at the time, was divinely moved to begin to consider the possibilities of regaining possession of Augustine's body. Although, Jordan confesses, such a suggestion seemed unthinkable and indeed impossible, William was comforted by a divine oracle and began negotiations with the Papacy.³¹ That William would be successful was indicated to a well-known brother of the Order in a vision. The *frater nominatus in Ordine* was surely none other than Jordan.³² In the vision, the brother saw himself together with many other Augustinians, in a Church not of their Order, in which was a large tomb of a great bishop that had fallen into disrepair. As the brothers were gazing at the tomb, the image of the bishop on the tomb rose and went to the altar, and began to sing, "Come, come, come, my sons, and listen to me, and I will teach you the fear of the Lord." The brothers all sat before

²⁹ VF 2,22 (238,142-154).

³⁰ *Gesta Archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium* 42, ed. Guilelmus Schum, MGH.SS 14.361-484 (Hannover, 1883; reprint: New York, 1963), 434; See also *Urkundenbuch des Klosters Unser Lieben Frauen zu Magdeburg*, nr. 187 dated 10 Nov. 1331, ed. Gustav Hertel (Halle, 1878), 171.

³¹ VF 1,18 (62,22-63,31).

³² Hümpfner, intro. li.

the bishop and he then gave them such exhortation as a father would give to his sons. On this basis, Jordan affirms, "that brother understood that he was spiritually in the presence of blessed Augustine." Augustine then gave each of the brothers a drink from a glass, and when they had all drunk Augustine blessed them and returned to his tomb, whereupon the friars all began to weep, but Augustine comforted them saying in the words of Christ, "Do not weep, my sons, for I will be with you until the end of the world." Whereupon the brother woke, and still tasted the sweetness of the drink he had been given. From this vision, he was filled with wonder and praised God, hoping that the vision indicated that something beneficial for the Order was to come, and sure enough, within two months the documents arrived notifying the Order of the Pope's decision to entrust them with Augustine's body.³³

While it might be tempting to view this account as having stemmed from Jordan having partaken a bit too much from the glass *cum potu valde claro et pulchro* before he had the vision, it can also be seen as a state-

³³ "Porro ista diu affectata reunio, antequam facta esset, cuidam fratri nominato in Ordine per visum revelata fuit hoc modo. Videbatur enim ei, quod ipse cum multis fratribus et melioribus personis Ordinis esset in quadam ecclesia non nostri Ordinis, in qua erat quoddam sepulcrum elevatum unius magni sancti episcopi, sicut ex figura imaginis desuper sculptae ostendebatur. Quod quidem sepulcrum minus decenter a personis illius ecclesiae tenebatur. Nam pulpita et candelabra antiqua cum pulveribus irreverenter superiacata apparebant. Itaque fratribus in ecclesia stantibus et sepulcrum aspicientibus, ecce imago episcopi visa est se elevare et illas scorias super se iactatas indignanter reicere. Et sic surgens episcopus de tumulo pontificaliter indutus ivit stare ante altare et invitans ad se fratres cantare coepit: *Venite, venite, venite, filii, audite me: timorem Domini docebo vos*. Et cantavit haec verba in nota gradualis, sicut episcopi in inthronizationibus cantare solent. Quo expleto sedit ipse, et fratres omnes ante se per ordinem sedere iussit. Et tunc dulcem exhortationem velut pater suis filiis fecit. Ex quo iste frater intellexit in spiritu illum fore beatum Augustinum. Volens autem idem antistes fratribus amorem ostendere singularem, habebat quidem in manu sua vitrum mundum cum potu valde claro et pulchro, bibit ipse primo et postea per ordinem de manu singulis propinavit, intonans valde dulciter et cantans illud: *Aqua sapientiae salutaris potavit eos Dominus*. Et cum pervenisset episcopus ad fratrem istum, bibit et ipse, fuitque potus nobilis et dulcis, inusitatum saporem habens quasi claretum antiquum, ex quo potu frater iste totus exhilarius fuit. Et cum bibissent omnes, episcopus benedixit eis, et sic ad sepulcrum suum redire coepit. Quod videntes fratres unanimiter fleverunt, dolentes de patris recessu. Ipse autem consolans eos paterne ait eis: 'Nolite flere, filii. *Ecce enim vobiscum ero usque ad consummationem saeculi*.' Hoc dicto frater iste evigilabit et invenit os suum, linguam et palatum de potu illo valde dulcoratum. Unde repletus stupore et gaudio gratias egit Deo, sperans illam visionem non esse otiosam, sed alicuius boni pro Ordine praesagam, sicut non multo post claruit in effectum. Nam infra duos menses vel circa venerunt litterae certae de Curia Romana nuntiantes nova, quomodo corpus beatissimi Patris Augustini esset Ordini redonatum. Per omnia benedictus Deus." *VF* 1,18 (65,98-67,135).

ment of his own realization of Augustine's paternity of the Order. And it could very well have been only as a result of such a vision that Jordan turned from seeking academic debate in the classroom to putting his energies into investigating the true sons of Augustine, their origins and their history and what it meant to be such in the first place. Working together then with Henry, he could have developed the conception for his project at that time, and began making known that he sought documentation of all sorts for the history of the Order, to extend on a grand scale the work that Henry in his very old age was sketching in his *Tractatus*. For such a project, in the years around 1327 and shortly thereafter, he would have known as well that a major issue in the debate with the Canons was the biography of Augustine with respect to his monastic foundations. Thus Jordan set to work and began seeking information. Sometime in the mid 1330's he was then sent the sermons of Augustine, which Jordan recognized as having been addressed to Augustine's own hermits. In the later 1330s, Jordan was busy writing the life of Augustine anew, from the ground up, so to speak, as well as working on his sermons, and fulfilling his teaching and administrative responsibilities. When in 1343 he was appointed to make the visitation of the French province, what better gift could he bring along than the first results he had achieved based on the material that his brothers in Paris had procured for him, to gather it all together into one volume, to bring back to Paris the fruits of knowledge that had sprung from there in the first place, as he stated in his Prologue to the *Collectanea*?³⁴

Though such a portrayal is not based on concrete evidence, given the problems with dating the origins of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and given the context of Erfurt in the late 1320's and early 1330's, it seems as plausible, if not certainly more so, than Hümppfner's assumptions that Jordan conceived of his *Liber Vitasfratrum* while a student in Bologna, and then began preliminary work in Paris collecting material for his *Collectanea*, deploring all the while the controversy with the Canons. Jordan's participation in Henry's campaign to defend the Order against the position of the Canons, continuing the work of his beloved teacher on a grand scale, seems more likely to account for the origins of Jordan's en-

³⁴ "Ipsumque ad locum parisiensem Mare utique copiosum, unde omnia scientiarum flumina exire dinoscuntur destinare satagi. Quatenus exinde fluat iterum per ordinem universum, obsecrans in visceribus caritatis, ut quicumque fratrum de studio conventus nostri parisiensis, cui hunc librum in libraria eiusdem conventus ad communem utilitatem ponendum pro munusculo caritatis donare decrevi, in eo legerit vel eum forsitan transcribi fecerit, oret pro donantis anima, ut Augustini meritis celi fruatur gaudiis. Amen." Jor. Coll. fol. 1^{vb}.

deavor than his own piety in Bologna and Paris as a student. It also places both the *Collectanea* and the *Liber Vitasfratrum* within the context of the debates, which both texts bear witness. Hümpfner himself, after all, points to the final form of the *Collectanea* as taking shaping only after 1334. Despite what may seem on the surface like conciliatory remarks, much as those of Nicholas of Alessandria, Jordan could throw bones to the Canons only because in his eyes there was nothing in fact to debate; the Hermits were the only legitimate first-born sons of their father Augustine, the founder of the Order. And Jordan could prove this based on Augustine's words themselves, words preached to his own hermits, which offered the textual basis for Jordan's re-plotment of Augustine's biography in the most extensive narrative since that of Philip of Harvengt. Jordan's *Vita Sancti Augustini* certainly evidences an ingenious reworking with the eye of a textual critical through the source material, the new as well as the old. On this basis, with his *Vita Sancti Augustini* together with his *Liber Vitasfratrum*, Jordan gave new meaning and new foundations to his Order's mythic origins.

Jordan's *Vita Sancti Augustini* is based on a close reading of Augustine's *Confessions* and *Retractations*, together with the 'Medieval Augustine', namely, the *Vitae Sancti Augustini* of Possidius, Philip of Harvengt and Jacobus de Voragine's *Legenda Aurea*. Jordan supplemented this textual foundation with the sermons of Augustine brought together in his *Collectanea*—and the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* most of all—as well as with the *Chronica* of Datius, Bishop of Milan. In his *Annotatio temporum beati Augustini episcopi*, which follows the *Vita* in the *Collectanea*, Jordan reconstructed the basic outline of Augustine's life as extracted from the *Confessions*. In the *Annotatio* no mention is made of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, and there it no evidence that they were used. Jordan refers only to Augustine's foundation of a monastery in Hippo before his ordination, which Jordan could have taken from Possidius' comment that Augustine founded a monastery upon being made presbyter, as he had previously done when he returned from overseas. It could be that the *Annotatio* represents Jordan's earliest work on his new project. Retracing Augustine's early years, Jordan argues that Augustine was thirty years of age when he was swayed by Ambrose's preaching, though not yet completely converted to the Christian faith. The following year, when he was thirty-one, Augustine visited Simplicianus. It was only thereafter when he was thirty-two that he was finally converted to Christ, and at Easter of his thirty-second year he was baptized. The following year, namely, his thirty-third, Monica died at Ostia and Augustine returned to Africa, remaining a layperson for a period of three years, which extended

from the construction of his monastery outside of Hippo to his ordination as presbyter, the latter thus having occurred in his thirty-sixth year. Jordan expressly rejects the opinions of those who claim that Augustine was baptized when he was thirty years old, or when he was thirty-three.³⁵ This reconstruction thus quashes speculation that Augustine established his first monastery in Italy and wrote the Rule for the Tuscan hermits of Centumcellae. Yet this does not imply that Jordan was immune from repeating the mythical aspects of the Order's origins. His *Vita Sancti Augustini* provided the historical proof for the Hermit's claims, including new evidence for the connections between Augustine's monasticism in Italy and Africa which rendered the possible stay at Centumcellae irrelevant.

³⁵ "Anno suo xxx^o per predicationem Ambrosii conversus est ab errore Manicheorum, ut dicit in fine quinti libri *Confessionum*, sed non dum ad fidem christianam et hoc patet sexto libro *Confessionum*, capitulo undecimo, ubi dicit se iam tricenarium et adhuc in eodem luto hesitantem. Anno suo trigesimo primo perrexit ad Simplicianum, de quo ipse narrat octavo libro *Confessionum*, capitulo primo. Quod autem hoc fuerit post annum suum trigesimum completum patet ex eo quod ipse in sexto libro dixerat se tricenarium et tunc interposito toto libro septimo. In octavo dicit se perrexisse ad Simplicianum et post subdit referens de Ponti<ci>ano et de compunctione sua quam habuit in orto sub ficu, et de sua ibidem totali conversione, que omnia potuerunt peragi eodem anno. Anno igitur tricesimo secundo, ad fidem conversus est totaliter et hoc in orto sub ficu, ut dictum est. Et quoniam hoc factum fuit viginti diebus ante vindemiales ferias, ut ipse dicit nono libro *Confessionum*, capitulo secundo, patet quod non potest stare dictum eorum qui dicunt quod anno illo fuerit baptizatus, quia annus ille terminabatur idibus novembris qui fuit dies natalis sui, ut dicit in libro *De beata vita*, quem librum fecit in rure existens. In quo rure fuit a principio vindemiarum usque ad tempus paschale, ut colligitur ex nono libro *Confessionum*, capitulo secundo et capitulo sexto. Anno vero xxxii^o baptizatus est tempore paschali. Nec potest dici quod prius fuerit baptizatus, salvo contextu narrationis sue in libro *Confessionum* ut ex dictis patet. Et hoc etiam expressius habetur ex libro suo *De academicis* in cuius proemio sumpto ex libro *Retractationum* ipse dicit quod illum librum scripsit nondum baptizatus et in fine eiusdem libri *De academicis* dicit quod cum scriberet illum librum erat agens annum xxxiii^{um} etatis sue. Ex quo manifeste convincitur eum non prius anno xxxiii^{mo} fuisse baptizatum. Et transierat iam de illo anno quantum est ab idibus novembris usque ad pascha. Quod autem tempore paschali baptizatus fuerit hoc expresse dicit Possidonius et potest haberi ex illo quod dicit nono libro *Confessionum* capitulo sexto: Inde ubi tempus advenit, quo me nomen dare oportuit. Tempus enim quo cathecumini in ecclesia nomen dare solebant et baptizari erat tempus paschale. Anno eodem etatis sue scilicet xxxiii^{mo} mater sua apud Ostia Tibernia defuncta est, ut ipse dicit nono libro *Confessionum*, capitulo undecimo in fine. Ex quibus patet quod dictum illorum stare non potest qui dicunt eum in tricesimo suo anno fuisse baptizatum, nec aliorum qui dicunt eum tempore baptismi fuisse triginta trium annorum complete; predicta ergo omnia absque scrupulo certissima sunt ex dictis suis propriis ... Deinde reversus in Africam ad agros proprios ibi ferme per triennium cum suis deo pariter servientibus in ordine adhuc laicali commoratus est, ut dicit Possidonius. Et in illo triennio comprehenditur etiam tempus illud quo adhuc laicus existens construxit monasterium in eremo apud Hipponem usque ad presbyteriatum." *Annotatio temporum*, *Jor. Coll.*, fol. 72^{ra-7b}.

In Jordan's account, Simplicianus is given a role of even larger proportions than he already had in the representations of Nicholas of Alesandria and Henry of Friemar. God gave Augustine the idea, Jordan relates, to go to Simplicianus to confess the errors of his earlier life and to learn from him, since Simplicianus, a hermit, had served God most devoutly from his youth. This Augustine did, and Simplicianus exhorted him to follow the example of Victorinus, whose story Simplicianus told Augustine. Based on this example, Augustine was so moved that he only desired to serve God. Thus he was converted from the exhortation of the old saint Simplicianus and from the examples of Simplicianus' community of hermits, which Augustine desired to follow.³⁶ Having then been baptized by Ambrose, "Augustine received from that saint Simplicianus the habit of holy comportment and the form of living, which later he would spread everywhere in Africa."³⁷ Thus, when Augustine on the instigation of his mother decided to return to Africa, "he went to St. Simplicianus asking him for some servants of God from his own group of brother hermits whom he could take along with him to Africa and with them establish the Order there."³⁸ Simplicianus granted his request and gave him twelve friars, with whom Augustine returned to Africa, together with his friends Nebridius, Evodius, Alipius, and Pontianus, his mother, Monica, and son, Adeodatus. This information Jordan had from one of the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo*, which then also named the twelve, a passage that

³⁶ "Cum autem iam via Christi sibi placeret, sed per ipsam adhuc ire pigeret, misit dominus in mentem eius visumque est ei bonum pergere ad Simplicianum heremitam servum dei, audierat ei quod a iuventute sua devotissime deo servierat et vere sic erat. Iam vero senuerat et multa expertus, multa edoctus erat, et beatus Ambrosius vere eum ut patrem diligebat. Cui estus cordis et errorum circuitus manifestans, ipse scilicet Augustinus devote postulavit ut vir sanctus proferret ei quis esset aptus modus vivendi. Sic affecto ut ipse erat ad ambulandum in via dei, videbat enim plenam ecclesiam et alius sic ibat, alius autem sic displicebat quippe ei quidquid agebat in seculo pre dulcedine dei et decore domus eius quam dilexit. Simplicianus autem eum hortari cepit et ad humilitatem Christi precipue invitavit et inter invitandum Victorini Romani quondam rethoris conversionem in medium recitavit. Rome siquidem multis annis Victorinus ille magister fuerat, et ob insigne preclari magisterii statuum in Romano foro habere meruerat, qui tandem conversus loquacem scolam suam deserens in scola Christi humilis discipulus effectus est. Hoc exemplo commonitus Augustinus ad imitandum exarsit, et soli deo servire proposuit." Jor. *Vita*, 4.1-3, fol. 57^{a-b}.

³⁷ "Ab ipso sancto Simpliciano sancte conversationis habitum formamque vivendi accepit, quam postmodum in Africa exuberans redolevit." Jor. *Vita*, 6.5, fol. 59^b.

³⁸ "Post hec autem cum instigante eius pia matre de Mediolano recedere et ad Africam remeare diserneret, adivit sanctum Simplicianum petens ut sibi aliquos de fratribus suis eremitis servos dei donaret, quos secum in Africam assumeret et cum eis ibi ordinem plantaret." Jor. *Vita*, 7.1, fol. 60^a.

Jordan inserted into his *Vita* as proof.³⁹ Having returned to Africa, Jordan and his band of followers sought a place where they could live a life devoted to God, which they found outside of Hippo, where bishop Valerius built for them a monastery. Here they began to live as a group according to the apostolic rule.⁴⁰ Jordan is very clear: this monastery was Augustine's first monastery, and there he gathered together dispersed hermits, giving them a form of living in keeping with the apostolic way of life and "thus Augustine instituted the Order of Hermits."⁴¹

This then was the first of Augustine's three principal monastic foundations. In the autograph each such foundation is given a separate rubricated heading. The second monastery Augustine founded was in Valerius' garden, after having been made presbyter. Though having been ordained a priest, Augustine still desired to live the monastic life. Being aware of this fact, and having often visited Augustine in his hermitage, Valerius gave him a garden in the city of Hippo where he could establish a second monastery and thus, even as priest, continue to live his monastic life following the apostolic rule, whereby no one would have private possessions, but everything would be held in common and distributed according to need, "which he had previously done," Jordan continued, "when he had returned from across the seas to his homeland, as Possidius said."⁴² Thus Jordan had made the bridge. There was no longer any need

³⁹ "Cuius piis precibus pius ille pater Simplicianus annuens dedit ei duodecim fratres viros religiosos, cum quibus adiunctis sibi carissimis amicis suis qui diu secum fuerant, Nebridio, Evodio, Alipio, et Pontiano, cum matre et filio Adeodato, ad Africam proficiscendi iter arripuit. De hoc ipse in sermone de tribus generibus monachorum, qui incipit *Ut nobis per litteras declaravit sanctus pater Hieronimus*, loquens de genere et ordine heremitarum ..." *Jor. Vita* 7.1, fol. 60^a. Jordan then quotes from sermon 21 of his own collection of the *sermones ad fratres in eremo*, *Jor. Coll.* fol. 26^{a-b}, which is also sermon 21 in the Migne edition, *PL* 40,1268-1269. The twelve hermits named are: Anastasius, Fabianus, Severus, Nicolaus, Dorotheus, Issac, Nicostratus, Paulus, Cyrillus, Stephanus, Iacobus, and Vitalus.

⁴⁰ "Itaque apud Hipponem in eremo segregata a gentibus locum aptum ad serviendum deo inveniens cum favore et subsidio sancti Valerii Hipponensis episcopi monasterium ibidem edificavit et in eo fratres eremitas quos undique per nemora conquisivit una cum amicis et fratribus prius eidem adherentibus collocavit et cum eis vivere cepit secundum regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam." *Jor. Vita* 9, fol. 61^{a-b}.

⁴¹ "In prefato autem monasterio ipse Augustinus copiosum numerum fratrum congregavit, quibus et modum vivendi secundum formam vite apostolorum tradidit et sic ordinem eremitarum ipse instituit. *Jor. Vita* 9 fol. 62^a.

⁴² "Reverso itaque Augustino ad monasterium suum, non enim sine monastica disciplina voluit vivere, placuit sancto seni Valerio ordinatori eius ipsum cum suis fratribus in eremo paterne visitare et eis ad tempus pro devotione commanere. Et tunc cognito proposito Augustini quod omnino cum fratribus suis nichil habentibus, nichil habens optabat vivere, monasterium autem istud in eremo nimium distabat a plebe, cuius curam ipse iam

to speculate on what this phrase in Possidius signified, creating differing accounts of Augustine's Italian monastic experience. With Jordan the case was closed. Possidius' statement referred to the monastery outside of Hippo, which Augustine had first established upon returning from Italy. Yet the Italian origins of the Order were simultaneously established, since that first eremitical community was originally comprised of the *servi dei* from Simplicianus' hermitage whom Jordan had taken along with him from Milan. The eremitical way of life was thus transplanted from Simplicianus' Milan to Augustine's Africa, and it was the latter that served as the stock for all further growth, for it was there, Jordan confirms, that Augustine instituted the Order of Hermits. Moreover, Jordan had proved his point with the very words of Augustine. Yet Jordan did not stop here. Whereas Henry of Friemar linked the Order's charter to preach and teach in the cities with Augustine's appearing to Alexander the IV, Jordan explains that in his second monastery Augustine taught his friars monastic discipline and the observance of the Rule, as well as educating them in the study of holy Scriptures, "so that already they might not live only for themselves, but would also be able to be of benefit to others."⁴³ Augustine's hermits in his second monastery were to be hermits indeed, but living in the city were to study the scriptures in order to serve the populace. This ideal Augustine continued in his third monastic foundation, that which he established after becoming bishop as a monastery of clerics within the episcopal residence.⁴⁴ There was no question: Augustine's Hermits were founded before his Canons, five years before, as Jordan calculated in his *Annotatio*.⁴⁵ In his first monastery outside of Hippo

presbyter habebat gerere, dedit ei hortum civitati propinquum in quo mox monasterium edificavit et in eo de fratribus prioris monasterii quosdam secum locavit, colligens nichilominus et alios eiusdem propositi fratres clericos servientes et ibidem deo pariter et in communi viventes, secundum modum et regulam sub sanctis apostolis constitutam, maxime ut nemo quidquam proprium in illa sancta societate haberet, sed eis essent omnia communia et distribueretur unicuique sicut opus erat, quod iam ipse prior fecerat, dum de transmarinis ad sua remeasset, ut ait Possidonius." *Jor. Vita* 11.1, fol. 62^b.

⁴³ "Hos quoque fratres idem pater in omni disciplina et observantia regulari instruxit et nichilominus eos studio sacre scripture erudit, ut iam non tantum sibi in simplicitate viverent sed et alii prodesse valerent." *Jor. Vita* 11.1 fol. 63^a.

⁴⁴ "Videns autem beatus Augustinus quod necesse erat episcopum assiduam hospitalitatis humanitatem quibusque venientibus sive transeuntibus exhibere, quod in monasterio fratrum convenienter fieri non valebat, voluit in ipsa episcopali domo monasterium secum habere clericorum, ut qui presbyter in horto cum fratribus vixerat in episcopio nichilominus pauper cum pauperibus deo regulariter serviret." *Jor. Vita* 13.1 fol. 64^b.

⁴⁵ "Sic enim oportet dicere si volumus salvare calculationem Possidonii, qui dicit eum vixisse in clericatu annis ferme quadraginta et secundum hoc factus est clericus et presbyter anno suo tricesimo sexto. Stetit autem in presbyteratu antequam fieret episcopus per

Augustine had founded his Order of Hermits, which then continued in his second monastery in the city of Hippo, the members of which were to be preachers and teachers for the community. Only after having been ordained bishop did Augustine give a monastic rule to his priests, the *Canons*. And again, Jordan established this *curriculum vitae* based on Augustine's own words, both those of the *Confessions*, and most of all those of his own sermons which he had delivered both to his own hermits and to his own priests.⁴⁶ And this was knowledge that Jordan's brothers in Paris could use very well indeed! It was also the basis for Jordan's comprehensive treatment of the Order, the *Liber Vitasfratrum*, which he completed fourteen years after donating his *Collectanea* to the *studium* in Paris.

The same fervor for the eremitical origins of the Order is present throughout his *Liber Vitasfratrum*. As Jordan explained in the dedicatory letter to the lector in Avignon, John of Basel, the *Liber Vitasfratrum* was to enable one to determine whether one was a true son of Augustine and thus a true member of Augustine's Order and Augustine's religion. For his *magnum opus* Jordan re-narrated Augustine's biography in his treatment of the development of the Order, placed in context of the history of western monasticism. Jordan used his own *Vita Sancti Augustini* as a major source, inserting sections therefrom as needed. In his later work he also cited three additional *Sermones ad fratres in eremo* from those contained in the *Collectanea*. Yet while not leaving the controversy with the *Canons* behind completely, in his *Liber Vitasfratrum* Jordan assumed a far broader perspective and scope: the Augustinian religious identity itself.

biennium, vel circa ut colligitur ex *Cronica* Eusebii, qui inter conversionem suam per beatum Ambrosium factam et episcopatum calculat octo annos. Quorum tres transegerat Mediolani et Rome, et apud Ostia Tibernia usque ad mortem matris, ut patet ex supradictis. Tres vero alios exegit morans apud agros proprios eo modo quo dictum est. Restat duo anni in presbyteratu, quod tempus videtur satis proportionatum considerata numerositate librorum quos ipse presbyter se scripsisse fatetur in primo libro *Retractationum*. Et secundum hoc non vixit in episcopatu nisi annis xxxviii. Obiit enim annorum lxxvi ut dicit Possidonius et idem in *Cronica* memorata. Et sic intelligendum quod ait Possidonius: Vixit, inquit, in clericatu vel episcopatu annis ferme xl^a, ut duo anni referantur ad presbyteratum et residui ad episcopatum. Et sic totum tempus clericatus sui fuerunt anni xl^a." *Annotatio temporum*, *Jor. Coll.*, fol. 72^{rb-va}.

⁴⁶ A number of the sermons Jordan includes in his *Collectanea* are designated as *sermones ad presbyteros suos*, which later became part of the larger corpus of the *sermones ad fratres in eremo*.

B. The *Liber Vitasfratrum*

Jordan's *Liber Vitasfratrum* is an extensive commentary on the Order's Rule and *Constitutions*. In his dedicatory letter to John of Basel, Jordan followed the salutation with the Rule's central dictum: "to have one heart and soul in God."⁴⁷ The entire work should be seen as an exposition of this precept. John had sought Jordan's advice on who is "a true son of our most blessed father Augustine."⁴⁸ Jordan offered his work as a mirror, so that by reading it, "any brother will be able to know based on his own life, whether he is a true son of our most holy father Augustine and thereby, a true brother of his Order."⁴⁹ In the Prologue Jordan stated that he collected accounts of the notable lives and deeds of the fathers and brothers of the Order⁵⁰ "... lest the examples of holy religion from the fathers and the brothers of times past fade into a cloud of oblivion."⁵¹ These served as examples of the true *religio Augustini*, instituted by St. Augustine himself.

Jordan opened chapter one of the *Vitasfratrum* by recalling the life of the first Christian community: "The whole body of believers was united in heart and soul. No one claimed any of his possessions as his own, but everything was held in common ... distributed to any who stood in need." (Act. 4:32f).⁵² He then commented: "Augustine, the most blessed Father and sower of our holy religion, intending to renew the apostolic life, based his entire vision on these words."⁵³ The common life was the most fundamental principle of Augustine's Order. According to Jordan, it was comprised of four parts: the communion of living together in a given place, the communion of spiritual union, the communion of worldly pos-

⁴⁷ "... cor unum et animam unam habere in Deo." VF, Epist. (1).

⁴⁸ "Mirae caritatis virtus ex profluio pectoris vestri emanans fonte de quibusdam quaestionibus dudum conscientiam vestram, ut scripsistis, perurgentibus, utpote qui beatissimi Patris nostri Augustini verus filius existere ...", VF, Epist. (1,5-8).

⁴⁹ "... tum quia eius lectione frater quilibet, an sit verus filius Patris nostri sanctissimi Augustini ac per hoc verus frater Ordinis sui, ex vita propria sua cognoscere valebit ...", VF, Epist. (2,21-23).

⁵⁰ VF, Prol. (3,11-13).

⁵¹ "... ne exempla sanctae Religionis a patribus et praecedentium temporum fratribus in oblivionis nublium deducantur ...", VF, Prol. (3,8-10).

⁵² Acts 4:32-34; as cited in VF 1,1 (7,3-8).

⁵³ "Beatissimus Pater et sacrae nostrae Religionis plantator Augustinus, intendens vitam apostolicam renovare, super praelibatis verbis totam suam intentionem fundavit." VF 1,1 (7,9-11).

sessions, and the communion of distributing goods according to need.⁵⁴ On these four pillars of the *vita communis* Augustine based his Rule, and Jordan organized his *Vitasfratrum* accordingly, treating each in respective parts.⁵⁵

In Part One Jordan narrated the origins of the Order within the broader context of the history of western monasticism. He discussed the Order's habit, title, move to the cities, papal confirmation, and stipulations for living the combined *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa*. In Part Two he proceeded to expound the meaning of the Rule's principle—to have one heart and one soul in God—as expressed in the ideals of humility, charity, chastity, obedience, singing the canonical hours, and prayer. In Part Three apostolic poverty as exemplified in the Acts of the Apostles and renewed by St. Augustine's Rule becomes the focus. The final section of the work is devoted to the principle of 'different but equal', whereby all brothers are aptly provided for according to their need, and not by hard-and-fast norms.

Throughout, Jordan illustrated his commentary with *exempla* from the Fathers—many of which are taken from the *Vitaspatrum*—and from exemplary brothers of 'modern times'. Jordan concluded each part of the *Vitasfratrum* with a chapter on how the Constitutions of the Order pertain to the doctrine first expounded. His overall purpose was to give his brothers a "hand-book" of the *religio Augustini*, to provide them with the goals, ideals, and examples of what it meant to be a member of Augustine's Order.

When Jordan completed his *Liber Vitasfratrum* in 1357, the debate with the Canons over the true heirs of St. Augustine may not have been the only controversy in his mind. On July 5, 1350, Richard FitzRalph, the Bishop of Armagh, attacked mendicant privileges in his *Proposicio*, preached before Clement VI in full consistory.⁵⁶ His central thesis was not primarily the doctrine of apostolic poverty *per se*—as has traditionally been asserted—but rather, as Katherine Walsh has shown, the illegitimacy of mendicant privileges, namely, the rights of the friars to "preach, hear confessions, and bury the laity in their churches while retaining their privileged position of exemption from ordinary diocesan jurisdiction."⁵⁷

⁵⁴ The four parts are: *communio localis cohabitationis*; *communio spiritualis unionis*; *communio temporalis possessionis*; and *communio proportionalis distributionis*. See, *VF* 1,1 (7-9).

⁵⁵ See *VF* 1,1 (9,60-65).

⁵⁶ Katherine Walsh, *Richard FitzRalph in Oxford, Avignon and Armagh. A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate* (Oxford, 1981), 350.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 353.

In FitzRalph's mind, the friars interfered with the *cura animarum* and thus they were corruptors of the church's pastoral mission. According to the bull of Boniface VIII, *Super Cathedram* (1300), which Clement VI reiterated in 1349,⁵⁸ friars had the right to preach freely as long as they did not interfere with the preaching of the *praelati*.⁵⁹ FitzRalph pounced on the meaning of the term *praelati* and argued that the term included not simply the bishops, but all those holding church offices.⁶⁰

FitzRalph saw in the friars a contradiction between their involvement in society and their vow of poverty. By obtaining privileges, acting as confessors to kings and princes, and—in the case of the Franciscans — denying that they held *dominium* of their property,⁶¹ the friars proved themselves to be hypocrites, even heretics. In his *De Pauperie Salvatoris* of 1356, FitzRalph went one step further than he had in his *Proposicio* and presented a detailed plea for the abolition not only of mendicant privileges, but also of the Orders themselves.

After the publication of FitzRalph's *De Pauperie Salvatoris* the mendicant controversy became a much debated issue both in Oxford and in Avignon. A papal commission was appointed to investigate the matter, but the *status quo* was preserved when the cause died inconclusively with FitzRalph himself in 1360.⁶²

Jordan must have been aware of this debate when finishing his *Liber Vitasfratrum*. Indeed, it has been argued that Jordan's primary intent was to defend his Order's position on apostolic poverty.⁶³ Jordan did devote ample space to the discussion of the Augustinian view of poverty in his *Liber Vitasfratrum*.⁶⁴ Yet the doctrine of poverty *per se* was not the primary bone of contention for FitzRalph. Rather, the mendicant privileges of preaching and hearing confessions formed the basis for his

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 359.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 368.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 369.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 375.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 447. FitzRalph's attack on mendicant privilege elicited response from the friars, and in the OESA particularly from Geoffrey Hardeby, whose *Liber de vita evangelica* was the only treatise that directly answered FitzRalph's *De Pauperie Salvatoris*; see Walsh, *Richard Fitzralph*, 394 and 413f; cf. Fulgence Mathes, "The Poverty Movement and the Augustinian Hermits." *AAug.* 31 (1968): 5-154; *AAug.* 32 (1969): 5-116; *AAug.* 32 (1969): 5-78.

⁶³ Mathes, "The Poverty Movement," 79-110.

⁶⁴ See *VF*, Part 3.

attacks.⁶⁵ Jordan briefly discussed the papal sanctions of the OESA's right to preach and hear confessions in his chapter concerning the introduction of the Order into the cities,⁶⁶ but his treatment is brief; it forms a stage in the much more encompassing exposition of the origins and development of the Order and gives no indication that it was intended as a defense against a formidable challenge. Jordan, having served as an inquisitor and having written a treatise—now lost—against the heresy of the "Free Spirit,"⁶⁷ was no stranger to asserting orthodoxy against those whom he judged had distorted church doctrine. It is likely that if he had envisioned his *Liber Vitasfratrum* as a reply to FitzRalph, he would have given some indication of this intent. In his lengthy treatment of poverty, the language is in the mode of explication and explanation, not in that of exoneration. There is no firm evidence, aside from temporal proximity, to claim that Jordan composed his *Liber Vitasfratrum* in the heat of the mendicant controversy. This is not to say that he was unaware of the matter, and it is not unlikely that when he submitted his work to the Prior General, Gregory of Rimini, he did so with hopes of contributing to the affirmation of the *religio Augustini*.

While Hümpfner supposes the early origin of the *Vitasfratrum*, he does argue that the mendicant controversy brought the work to fruition. Upon his election as General of the Order in May 1357 at the General Chapter of Montpellier, Gregory of Rimini attacked the decline in the observance of poverty and common life within the Order.⁶⁸ Everywhere he looked, Gregory wrote in a letter to the Provinces of his Order on July 18, 1357, brothers accumulated their own money and sought worldly honors, preferring the way of the seculars, "and thus the path of religion is deserted (... *sicque religiositatis deserta semita* ...)."⁶⁹ In light of FitzRalph's campaign against the mendicants, these words take on added importance, especially since Gregory was well aware of the issue being

⁶⁵ Walsh, *Richard Fitzralph*, 401. FitzRalph's doctrine of the dominion of grace, however, has been seen to reflect the "proto-type" as later adopted by Wycliff; cf. *ibid.*, 385.

⁶⁶ VF 1,16 (57-59).

⁶⁷ See R. Lerner, *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1972), 130, n. 13, and Hümpfner, intro., xlv.

⁶⁸ Hümpfner, intro., liiif.

⁶⁹ *Gregorii de Arimino O.S.A. Registrum Generalatus, 1357-1358*, ed. Albericus de Meijer, *Fontes historiae Ordinis Sancti Augustini*, Prima series, *Registra Priorum Generalium* 1. Institutum Historicum Augustinianum (Romae, 1976) 4, nr. 1; *AAug.* 4 (1911/12): 372-376, as quoted by Hümpfner, intro., liii.

debated in the Curia.⁷⁰

As evidence that Jordan wanted urgently to offer his solution to the problem, Hümpfner pointed to a passage in which Jordan announced a *Tractatus specialis in fine libri* concerning the miracles of St. Nicholas of Tolentino.⁷¹ This treatise is to be found neither at the end of the *Vitasfratrum*, nor anywhere else in Jordan's works. Thus Hümpfner claimed that Jordan did not have time to compose this treatise; the mendicant controversy prompted his haste in sending his *Vitasfratrum* to the General.

There is, however, absolutely no connection between this passage and the issue of poverty or of mendicant privileges. Jordan announced a *Tractatus specialis* in the chapter concerning the care of sick brothers.⁷² In fact, the very same passage could be used with more validity to argue for an early date of composition. Jordan was discussing the miracles of Nicholas of Tolentino; he had heard many, but could not remember them in detail (*distincte non recole*).⁷³ His intention of writing a special treatise dealing with the miracles of Nicholas could have been inspired by a decree of the General Chapter at Paris in 1329, which asked for all miracles of Augustinians to be collected and reported to the next General Chapter.⁷⁴ Those of Nicholas would have had special importance since in 1325 John XXII set in motion the process for Nicholas' canonization.⁷⁵ Though the Acts of the General Chapter at Venice in 1332 are silent regarding the success of this decree,⁷⁶ these circumstances provide a mo-

⁷⁰ Writing to the Order's provinces from Vienna on Nov. 16, 1358, Gregory explicitly called for measures to combat Fitzralph's attacks; see Greg. Reg. nr. 733 (373).

⁷¹ Hümpfner, intro., lvi.

⁷² VF 2,11 (136-142).

⁷³ VF 2,11 (142,149-150).

⁷⁴ *Acta Capitulorum Generalium et Provincialium*, ed. E. Esteban, *AAug.* 2 (1909)-4 (1912); *AAug.* 4 (1911/12): 87 (hereafter cited as: *Esteban*); as quoted by Hümpfner, intro., li.

⁷⁵ Although the canonization process was begun by John XXII in 1325, Nicholas was not canonized until 1446. For the initial testimony concerning Nicholas' canonization, see *Il Processo per la Canonizzazione di S. Nicola da Tolentino*, ed. Nicola Occhioni, OSA (Rome, 1984). However, the decree from the Paris general chapter does not specifically refer to Nicholas. Rather, it continues, after the passage cited by Hümpfner, by expressing a special interest in Aegidius Romanus; *Esteban*, *AAug.* 4 (1911/12): 87.

⁷⁶ Hümpfner, intro., li. However, an anonymous Augustinian from Pisa wrote a *Vita brevis aliquorum fratrum heremitarum*; see R. Arbesmann, "A Legendary of Early Augustinian Saints," *AAug.* 29 (1966): 5-58. Michael Goodich places this treatise, as well as both Henry of Friemar's *Tractatus* and Jordan's *Liber Vitasfratrum* in the context of the Paris mandate. See Michael Goodich, *Vita Perfecta: The Ideal of Sainthood in the Thirteenth Century*, Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 25 (Stuttgart, 1982), 54; cf. Hümpfner, intro., li.

re likely context for interpreting Jordan's declaration of a future *Tractatus specialis* concerning Nicholas than does the mendicant controversy.

When we return to the debate with the Canons, we are on firm ground, since Jordan explicitly mentioned the issue. The very crux of the debate (*totum pondus questionis*) was how one made one's profession. The Canons, the flesh and blood behind Jordan's anonymous *alii*, vowed obedience to a prelate, rather than vowing obedience to the Rule itself.⁷⁷ The Hermits profess obedience "to live until death without possessions and in chastity according to the Rule of blessed Augustine," first to God, then to the Virgin Mary, and finally to the Prior General and his successors. Their vow is not only obedience to the Rule or to a prelate, but to follow these three basic components of religion: obedience to God, to Mary, and to the General of the Order.⁷⁸

As previously mentioned, Arbesmann argued that Jordan deplored the controversy with the Canons, preferring to focus on religious obedience, rather than historical priority.⁷⁹ The extent of Jordan's antipathy towards the issue needs to be determined within the broader context of the treatise. In Arbesmann's proof text, Jordan included not only the OESA and the Canons, but all Orders that follow St. Augustine's Rule, namely, the Dominicans, Praemonstratensians, and "many others."⁸⁰ Jordan's strategy was not one of historical priority *per se*.⁸¹ Rather, as Nicholas of Alessandria and Henry of Friemar, Jordan focused on establishing the true sons of St. Augustine. He admitted that many Orders say that they are the Order of St. Augustine, and many others are hermits, but only the OESA can properly claim to be called 'The Order of Hermits of St. Augustine'.⁸² In fact, Jordan argued, neither the Regular Canons nor the Dominicans—both of whom follow St. Augustine's Rule—bear the appellation 'Order of St. Augustine' in their title.⁸³ Even if not the first to receive Augustine's Rule, the Hermits are the true Order of St. Augustine by reason of 1) their original, primordial, institution, (by Augustine the Order was *primordialiter propagatus*); 2) by reason of their following the Rule; 3) by reason of their papal affirmation and approbation as the true Order of St. Augustine; and 4) by reason of their possessing St. Augusti-

⁷⁷ VF, 2,14 (177,336-347).

⁷⁸ VF 2,14 (177,348-356).

⁷⁹ Arbesmann, *HFT*, 59-60.

⁸⁰ VF 2,14 (173,225-229).

⁸¹ As Hümpfner noted, Jordan omitted the legend that Augustine provided the hermits in Tuscany with a Rule; Hümpfner, intro., lxxiv.

⁸² VF 1,17 (59,9-60,23).

⁸³ VF 2,17 (60,35-37).

ne's most holy body.⁸⁴ These four reasons can be applied to no other Order, thus confirming the fact that the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine is the true, original, and only, Order of St. Augustine.⁸⁵ If Jordan deplored the dispute with the Canons, he did so because he saw it as completely unnecessary. Even if the Canons could prove that they were the first to receive Augustine's Rule, Jordan's preference would be to be a member of the Order that most faithfully represented the *religio Augustini*; in his mind, there was no question—it was the Hermits.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, Jordan did not refrain from putting forward a claim to the historical priority of the Hermits. Based on the reconstruction of Augustine's biography in his *Vita Sancti Augustini*, Jordan explicitly stated: "... [Augustine] gave the Rule to the brothers, and not to the Canons."⁸⁷ His reasoning was that Augustine composed his Rule before he became a bishop and consequently he did not have the legal right to give his Rule to the Canons, since they were not under his authority.⁸⁸ Augustine, Jordan explained, wrote two Rules, or rather, wrote the same Rule twice for different recipients—one for the friars and one for the Canons, although the latter did not exclude the friars.⁸⁹ Yet the priority clearly lies with the friars and their original institution by Augustine.⁹⁰ When Jordan deplored the continued debate between the Canons and the Hermits, he did so because for him there was in fact nothing to debate.

Whereas in 1334 Henry of Friemar had already given the Order its first historical legitimization with his *Tractatus*, Jordan offered a comprehensive exposition of the Augustinian way of life—valid and continuous from its founder to his own time. There are sufficient parallels between the works of Henry and Jordan to intimate that Jordan derived the concept of his *Vitasfratrum* from Henry's *Tractatus*. As Henry's title states, his subject was the origin and development of the Order, and Jordan adopted this two-fold plan accordingly when in his Prologue he explained that he

⁸⁴ VF 1,17 (61,63-70).

⁸⁵ VF 1,17 (61,70-72).

⁸⁶ VF 2,14 (173,229-237); cf. Hermann of Schildesche's *Sermo de beato Augustino*, which Hermann gave in Paris in 1334; see A. Zumkeller, *Schriftum unde Lehre des Hermann von Schildesche* (Würzburg, 1959), 117-128.

⁸⁷ "... istam Regulam fratribus dedit et non canonicis ...". VF 2,14 (167,62).

⁸⁸ VF 1,14 (167,62-64).

⁸⁹ VF 2,14 (169,133-138). For Jordan's discussion of the tradition of the Rule, see this entire section. There are two manuscript traditions of this chapter. Hümpfner states that they represent Jordan's change of mind regarding the authenticity of the *Decretum*; see Hümpfner, intro., lxxvii; cf. VF 2,14 (169,139 col. A-170,164 col. A) and VF 2,14 (170,156-166 col.B).

⁹⁰ VF 2,14 (172,194-195).

will gather his material, "around the origin and development" of the Order (*circa hoc originem progressumque eiusdem Ordinis*).⁹¹ Further, according to Henry, the original principle of the Order stemmed from the most holy fathers.⁹² He opened chapter six of his treatise, which contains *exempla* from outstanding brothers, by claiming: "... but because some holy seeds were fruitfully germinated from the roots of such holiness of this Order's first fathers, I, therefore, was eager to put down in writing what I could find out about the famous fathers of our Order whose sanctity was well known."⁹³ And finally, Henry referred to the Order as 'the holy progeny of the said fathers' (*illa sancta propago praedictorum patrum*).⁹⁴

This sentiment and terminology were taken over by Jordan, who based his work on the principle that "the life of the brothers derived from the life of the fathers."⁹⁵ In Part One he traced Augustine's progeny (*illa sancta propago sancti Augustini*)⁹⁶ from the earliest desert fathers to the Great Union. Furthermore, Jordan incorporated entire sections of Henry's treatise.⁹⁷ Noting that in his *Tractatus* Henry sought to discuss the foundation, approbation, and confirmation by *exempla* of the Order, one should not fail to recognize the similarity to Jordan's overall scheme. Taken all together, the evidence currently available strongly suggests that Jordan conceived of his work in the later 1320's and early 1330's working together with Henry in Erfurt, precisely as the controversy with the Canons was foremost in Henry's mind, and was an issue raging throughout the Order, challenging the Order's religious identity.

Jordan began his work with a statement of purpose. Because the memorable deeds of the outstanding members of the Order should never be forgotten, Jordan affirmed, echoing Henry, "... I was desirous to gather together the life and deeds of the fathers and brothers of our Order ... so that the examples of holy religion from the fathers and brothers of times past might not fade into a cloud of oblivion, but rather be stored

⁹¹ VF Prol. (7,13-14).

⁹² Hen. Tract. 4 (106,34-35).

⁹³ "... verum quia a radice tantae sanctitatis primorum patrum huius ordinis nonnisi sancta germina deicit propagari, ideo sub compendio pro aedificatione fratrum fratres famosae et notoriae sanctitatis huius nostri ordinis, de quibus compertum habui, studui annotare." Hen. Tract. 6 (18,1-5).

⁹⁴ Hen. Tract. 4 (110).

⁹⁵ "... ex vita patrum formatur vita fratrum." VF Prol. (5,58-59).

⁹⁶ VF 1,14 (46,41).

⁹⁷ See VF 1,7 (22ff).

away in eternal memory."⁹⁸ Although the *Liber Vitasfratrum* is not a work of history *per se*, it is eminently historical. Jordan was intent on presenting only what he knew to be true: "... truth is obtained most of all in fact; the facts that are able to be known from the particular deeds of devout persons are actually few with respect to those things that God secretly works in individual holy men ... Therefore, I put down those few accounts that are known to me in some way."⁹⁹ For Jordan history was based on fact. Whereas Henry of Friemar had claimed for the Augustinians the title of the Joachite *novus ordo* and solidified his argument for the historical primacy of the Order with Augustine's two-year sojourn at Centumcellae, Jordan, as already seen in his work on the *Collectanea*, recognized that the chronology of Augustine's biography could not support more than a brief visit to the hermits at Centumcellae, and he makes no reference to the *novus ordo*. In addition, as mentioned above, Jordan based his case against the Canons on an historical analysis of Augustine's Rule; Augustine could not have given his Rule to the Canons first because he was not yet a bishop and therefore he did not have jurisdiction over them. The representation of the Order's early history provided Jordan with the material for the first part of his *Liber Vitasfratrum*.

Jordan began by establishing the character of the apostolic life initiated by Christ, who gave the apostles the example and rule for living.¹⁰⁰ The apostolic community grew over time, and gave birth to three generations of offspring. The first (*prima propago*) was the apostles themselves, who maintained the communal life after the Lord's resurrection, as narrated in the Acts of the Apostles.¹⁰¹ Yet in time, the fervor of that first faith died down and became lax.¹⁰² A group that remembered the pristine perfection of the apostolic community withdrew from the city and from association with those who were negligent in order to renew the apostolic institution in secret; thus the second generation.¹⁰³ The third generation resulted once again from a 'cooling off' of devotion, and this

⁹⁸ "... ne exempla sanctae Religionis a patribus et praecedentium temporum fratribus in oblivionis nubilum deducantur, sed potius in aeterna memoria recondantur, idcirco studui patrum ac fratrum singularium gestorum et notabilium meritorum eiusdem Ordinis vitam gestaque ...," VF Prol. (3,8-12).

⁹⁹ "Quod maxime veritatem obtinet in his, quae in facto consistunt; qualia sunt huiusmodi, quae de gestis particularibus personarum devotarum sciri possunt, quae revera pauca sunt respectu eorum, quae Deus occulte operatur in singulis viris sanctis ... Perpauca igitur utcumque mihi cognita conscripsi." VF Prol. (3,21-4,27).

¹⁰⁰ VF 1,2 (10,25-26).

¹⁰¹ VF 1,2 (10,26-32).

¹⁰² VF 1,2 (11,63-69).

¹⁰³ VF 1,2 (11,69-12,76).

time the move was by individuals who carried the apostolic fervor, but unable to live accordingly, left their parents and friends and chose a solitary life. For this reason, "they were called monks and on account of their common life, they were called cenobites."¹⁰⁴ This third form of the apostolic community lasted for many years, up until the time of the first hermits, St. Paul, and St. Anthony.¹⁰⁵

Jordan then proceeded to discuss the three types of monks.¹⁰⁶ Among the desert fathers were the anchorites, who live entirely alone, cenobites, who live in communities, and the sarabaites. These last were "detrimental and execrable," only pretending to live holy lives, like Ananias and Saphira; even if they appear as angels, in reality—if one could see their inner selves—they are really wolves.¹⁰⁷ This type of monk should be avoided at all costs.¹⁰⁸

Having brought the development of monasticism thus far, Jordan then entered into a rather lengthy discussion of the comparative values and dangers of the anchoritic and the cenobitic lives. The anchoritic form of monasticism provides the individual with the opportunity of pursuing his own perfection and in this sense the anchorite is the more perfect type of monk.¹⁰⁹ The anchorite's life, however, is so harsh and difficult that before entering upon such a vow, "one should be thoroughly practiced in all righteousness and virtue, and filled with the Holy Spirit."¹¹⁰ Not only will one have to be content living alone in the desert on whatever bread and water can be found, but even greater danger, Jordan cautioned, will come from the devil; as Jerome told of Paul, "no one knows what great temptations of Satan he bore."¹¹¹ The serpent came to Eve in paradise when she was alone—and prevailed. It is certain, Jordan warned, "that the Tempter goes for solitude. Wherefore it is necessary that the solitary man

¹⁰⁴ "Qui propter solitariae vitae distractionem monachi nominati sunt et ex communione consortii coenobitae dicti sunt." *VF* 1,2 (12,81-86).

¹⁰⁵ *VF* 1,2 (12,87-90).

¹⁰⁶ *VF* 1,3 (13,3-5). Jordan could have drawn on a number of sources for his discussion of the different types of monks, e.g. Cassian. coll.pat. 18 (1089-1124), or Ps.Aug. erem. 21 (Jor. Coll., fol. 26^a-27^{vb}; *PL* 40,1268f).

¹⁰⁷ *VF* 1,3 (14,30-40).

¹⁰⁸ *VF* 1,3 (13,3-5).

¹⁰⁹ *VF* 1,4 (16).

¹¹⁰ "... volentes transire ad vitam eremiticam debent prius esse omni iustitia et virtute praeexercitati atque Spiritu Sancto repleti ..." *VF* 1,4 (16,17-19).

¹¹¹ "Unde etiam de isto sancto Paulo dicit Hieronymus, quod quantas ipse temptationes Satanae pertulerit, nulli hominum cognitum habetur ..." *VF* 1,4 (17,57-59).

be well armed against the enemy."¹¹²

For these reasons, the cenobitic life is safer.¹¹³ Community is not to be shunned but cultivated, for Christ himself promised that where two or three are congregated in his name he will be among them. Thus, how much more does this apply when many are gathered.¹¹⁴ Indeed, "it is better to say the canonical hours together with the brothers in church than alone in your cell."¹¹⁵ Therefore, Jordan concluded, "the cenobitic life is more secure and is more conducive to acquiring perfection, whereas the anchoritic life is suitable for those already perfect."¹¹⁶ Thus, the most perfect form of monastic life would be to combine the anchoritic and the cenobitic lives,¹¹⁷ and this was the accomplishment of St. Augustine.

There is no doubt, Jordan claimed, that Augustine was a cenobite.¹¹⁸ Nowhere is it read that Augustine was ever an anchorite.¹¹⁹ Yet although he was a bishop, he desired solitude. Jordan interpreted this solitude as that of an anchorite, although he admitted that Augustine never actually lived as an anchorite.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, "although Augustine was never an anchorite in the strict sense, as has been shown, it is not subject to doubt that he often partook of an anchoritic life."¹²¹

This dual form of life was possible because of a distinction regarding the meaning of the term 'hermit'. Both anchorites and cenobites could dwell in a hermitage, that is, a solitary anchorite could live *in eremo*. This is also possible, on the other hand, for cenobites. Removed from the crowd and commotion of secular life, yet living in community, cenobites could also be *in eremo*. Whereas anchorite and cenobite refer to the type of life, hermit signifies the place of dwelling. Therefore, there are anchoritic hermits and cenobitic hermits (*eremitaе anachoritaе et*

¹¹² "Serpens etiam ille in paradiso, volens temptare matrem generis nostri Evam, solitariam eam aggressus est. Ex quibus omnibus convincitur, quod temptator solitudinem amat. Quare oportet hominem solitarium bene esse armatum contra hostem." VF 1,4 (17,60-63).

¹¹³ VF 1,5 (18,3).

¹¹⁴ VF 1,5 (19,35-37).

¹¹⁵ "... quod melius est dicere horas canonicas in congregatione fratrum in ecclesia quam seorsum in cella ..." VF 1,5 (19,42-43).

¹¹⁶ "... vita cenobitica securior est et aptior ad perfectionem acquirendam, vita vero anachoritica competit iam perfectis." VF 1,5 (20,84-86).

¹¹⁷ VF 1,6 (21,3-4).

¹¹⁸ VF 1,7 (22,8-9).

¹¹⁹ VF 1,7 (22,16-17).

¹²⁰ VF 1,7 (26,103-111).

¹²¹ "Verum licet Augustinus numquam fuerit anachorita ex statu, ut ostensum est, sed actum anachoritarum non est dubium eum saepius habuisse." VF 1,7 (27,123-125).

eremitae coenobitae),¹²² and Augustine—from his time with Simplicianus, including both his stay with the hermits of Tuscany and his return to North Africa—lived as an eremetical cenobite.¹²³ Augustine combined the "best of both worlds" and on this basis, founded his Order.

After the death of Augustine, the brothers who lived under the saint's guidance were dispersed due to the increasing hostility of the Vandals, who desecrated their monasteries and profaned their rites. This did not, however, result in the loss of Augustine's heritage. Some of the brothers fled Africa and came to Tuscany, and there regrouped

... some in solitary cells, and others in eremetical communities ... serving the Lord, just as the Lord inspired them. And thus, that holy community, instituted by blessed Augustine and, as it is said, always guarded by him, was in no way broken asunder or abolished, but remained preserved in some good fathers, until in most recent times God deemed it worthy to call together that dispersion, just as He once congregated the dispersion of the Israelites.¹²⁴

Even before this eventually occurred, the Church, beginning with Pope Innocent III, recognized the dispersed Order of Hermits of St. Augustine and granted them privileges. Thus the OESA preceded both the Franciscans and Dominicans, who were of more recent origin.¹²⁵ In addition, Jordan claimed, because they were hermits, the fathers of the OESA lived in more simplicity than even St. Francis, thus preserving the Augustinian origins of the apostolic life by focusing on religious devotion, as had Gerardo of Bergamo, without straining the historical record whereby Francis first lived as an Augustinian.¹²⁶

According to Jordan, at the Fourth Lateran Council Innocent III stopped just shy of officially confirming the Order, having avoided the issue with the word 'acceptance'. After such recognition, the gradual reunification continued apace.¹²⁷ In 1243 Innocent IV, recognizing the considerable fruits that the Dominicans and Franciscans were bringing the Church, desired to increase their benefit. Thus, he brought the diverse groups of Augustinian hermits living in Tuscany into a single Order, and

¹²² VF 1,7 (22,10-15); cf. VF 1,2 (12,90-96).

¹²³ VF 1,7 (23-26).

¹²⁴ " ... nonnulli eorum in cellis solitarie, alii in coenobiis eremiticis se receperunt, servientes Domino sicut cuique Dominus inspiravit. Et sic illa sancta communio per beatum Augustinum instituta et per eum semper, ut dictum est, observata non omnino dirupta fuit et abolita, sed in aliquibus bonis patribus extitit conservata, donec novissimis temporibus illam dispersionem Deus dignatus est congregare, sicut olim dispersiones Israelis congregavit." VF 1,14 (45,15-22).

¹²⁵ VF 1,14 (46,47-48).

¹²⁶ VF 1,14 (45,34-36).

¹²⁷ VF 1,14 (46,44-50).

assigned to them a Cardinal Protector (Richard Annibaldi).¹²⁸ There were still, however, many other faithful heirs of St. Augustine who yet remained scattered. "At which time," Jordan explained recounting the myth of the Order's foundation,

... blessed Augustine, wanting to end the dispersion of his own family, appeared in a vision with a large head but small body, to Innocent's successor to the apostolic seat, Pope Alexander IV. On account of this vision, as if by a divine oracle, the Pope was moved to complete the union that had been begun by his predecessor, Pope Innocent.¹²⁹

Whereas Augustine had originally founded his Order of Hermits in the monastery outside of Hippo, he 're-founded' them by appearing in a vision to Alexander. Jordan's account of this vision is the most developed version, and only with Jordan do we find Augustine's appearance motivated by Augustine's will to reunite the dispersed members of his own religion.

Thus began the *status modernus* of the Order, whose father was St. Augustine, by means of his foundation, and whose mother was the Church, through its approbation. Jordan distinguished the *status modernus* from the *status antiquus* just as he did the *patres* from the *fratres*. He did not view the *status antiquus* and the *status modernus* as "two conditions" in succession,¹³⁰ but rather as two stages in the single *status religionis* of Augustine's Order. The continuity—not the diversity—is stressed. *Status* was a legal term and in this case refers to the way of life established by Augustine; the adjective *antiquus* or *modernus* signified the period pre- and post-Union respectively.¹³¹ Jordan was not setting forth a theory of

¹²⁸ VF 1,14 (46,62-47,79).

¹²⁹ "Unde beatus Augustinus, volens dispersionem suae Religionis congregari, succedenti ei in Sede apostolica, scilicet domino Alexandro papae IV, in visione apparuit, grandis quidem capite, sed membris exilis. Ex qua visione velut divino oraculo papa communis unionem per praedecessorem suum dominum Innocentium inchoatam consummavit." VF 1,14 (47,80-85).

¹³⁰ Cf. K. Elm, "Augustinus Canonicus-Augustinus Eremita," 93, and *idem*, "Elias, Paulus von Theben und Augustinus als Ordensgründer. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung der Eremiten- und Bettelorden des 13. Jahrhunderts," in *Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewusstsein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. Hans Patze, Vorträge und Forschungen 31 (Sigmaringen, 1987), 371-397; 387.

¹³¹ The unity of the term *status* as employed by Jordan can be seen in his analysis of the two different meanings of the term *religiosi*. In one sense, a person can be a *religiosus* if he or she has taken a private vow to God. Such *religiosi* do not bind themselves to a Rule, but rather adopt their way of life freely. These cannot be said to have a *status religionis*. The other definition of *religiosi* applies to those who have bound themselves in solemn profession to God according to an approved Rule. These *religiosi* do have a *status religionis* and are properly said to be *in statu Religionis*; see VF 2,25 (252,28-40); cf.

history, but presented historical evidence to establish that the OESA and the original hermits gathered around Augustine were of one and the same stock. The apostolic life of the apostles, true evangelical poverty—the same as that practiced by Christ and the apostles—was renewed by Augustine's Rule and accepted by the Church.¹³² Both the *patres* and the *fratres* followed the same Rule, the same way of life, in short, the same *status religionis*.

If Jordan can be said to have a theory of history, it is not one of successive *status*, but of continuous decline and renewal. This is seen in his discussion of the three *propagationes*, which eventually led to that holy community of St. Augustine's offspring, and in Jordan's treatment of the stages of development of apostolic poverty. Holding possessions in common — which even the pagan philosophers affirmed as a component of natural law¹³³ — was originally the principle of all Christians in the first apostolic community. In time, as the Church grew in members and in societal influence, the doctrine of apostolic poverty was gradually relaxed, becoming increasingly restricted to the *religiosi*, until finally restored to its pristine form by the Rule—and Order—of St. Augustine¹³⁴, whose members, as the apostles, live with "one heart and soul in God."

Therefore, this religion's holy community is able to be that city, that is, a union of cities, about which it is said in the Psalm, *Glorious things are said of you, City of God*. Glorious things, I say, are told about your origin (*de propagatione tua*) which you once had from your father, namely blessed Augustine; even more glorious things, however, are said about your confirmation (*de institutione tua*), which you have from your mother, that is, the holy universal church.¹³⁵

The Augustinian Order was truly the "city of God," a beacon in a dark sea with waves of decline and renewal. Jordan was certainly aware of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*. It is, however, the differences that should be

Hen. *Tract.* 4 (109,98-102).

¹³² VF 3,1 (320,8-16); VF 3,3 (330,3-9).

¹³³ VF 3,1 (322,63-75).

¹³⁴ VF 3,2 (326ff).

¹³⁵ "Haec igitur sancta communio huius Religionis potest esse illa civitas, id est civium unio, de qua dicitur in psalmo: Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei. Gloriosa, inquam, dicta sunt de propagatione tua, quam olim habuisti a Patre, scilicet beato Augustino; gloriosiora vero dicta sunt de institutione tua, quam habes a matre, scilicet sancta universali Ecclesia." VF 1,20 (70,76-81). This is the only place I have found where Jordan refers to the institution of the Order as derived from the Church. Usually, the foundation and institution of the Order is explicitly attributed to Augustine, with the Church's affirmation, and confirmation. See VF 1,14 (45f).

stressed between Jordan's use of the image 'the city of God' in his *Vitas-fratrum*, and Augustine's *magnum opus et arduum*. For the Bishop of Hippo, the account of the city of God was the history of salvation; it began with the separation of the light from darkness and reached its final end in the beatitude of eternal, heavenly peace. There is indeed a historical dimension to Augustine's city of God, but the historical is always in a dialectical relationship with the trans-historical.¹³⁶ For Jordan, the Order as the city of God is completely historical. It enjoys divine protection and guidance, but it functions as a historical example. Jordan never equated membership as such in this city of God with beatitude. Jordan's city of God, namely the exemplary function of the Order, is the model of the most perfect Christian life. Yet the Order as the city of God occupies a special place in the history of Christianity. To see more precisely how this was so for Jordan, we must look back to the Order's founder himself, St. Augustine.

Augustine harmonized the anchoritic and the cenobitic lives, and he established his Order on this principle. In his person and in his Order Augustine united the active with the contemplative life. For Jordan the contemplative life did not consist in meditation alone, but included the cure of souls and spiritual growth in all forms, carried out by preaching, guiding, and teaching. The active life pertained to physical necessity, of oneself or of a neighbor.¹³⁷ All aspects of the spiritual life are part of the contemplative life.¹³⁸ Augustine instituted his Order as a contemplative Order, but one that was to minister and preach to the people. Because of this original institution, the Church "directed the 'little brother hermits' of St. Augustine to the cities."¹³⁹ Just as St. Augustine, who frequently sought the solitude of contemplation, so the brothers of the Order lead a eremitical life of meditation and contemplation, but are eager to impart

¹³⁶ For Augustine's view of history and the city of God, see R.A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* (Cambridge, 1970) and Sigurd Böhm, *La Temporalité dans l'Anthropologie Augustinienne* (Paris, 1984).

¹³⁷ *VF* 1,10 (33,6-9); cf. "Tertia conclusio est quod utraque vita simul est perfectissima ... opera vite active ea que fiunt ad subventionem proximi corporalem; contemplative vero ea que fiunt ad lucrum et profectum spiritualem, ut predicare et huiusmodi." Jor. *OD*, sermo 39B.

¹³⁸ See E.L. Saak, "Quilibet Christianus: Saints in Society in the Sermons of Jordan of Quedlinburg, OESA," in *Models of Holiness in Medieval Sermons*, Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, Texts et Études du Moyen Âge 5, ed. Beverly Mayne Kienzle, with Edith Wilks Dolnikowski, Rosemary Drage Hale, Darleen Pryds and Anne T. Thayer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1996), 317-338; 322.

¹³⁹ "Sane hunc modum primarie institutionis Ordinis attendens sacrosancta mater Ecclesia fratres eremicolas sancti Augustini ad civitates direxit ..." *VF* 1,11 (35,23-25).

their spiritual goods to others by their works and their doctrine, teaching equally by example and word.¹⁴⁰

For Jordan the harmony of the anchoritic and cenobitic lives, together with the union of the active and contemplative lives, form not merely a perfect life, but the most perfect life.¹⁴¹ This *vita perfectissima* was the unique accomplishment of Augustine. In his Rule and institution Augustine taught the most perfect life to his Order, which, as no other, is therefore able to be the city of God. The true sons of Augustine hold a special place within the history of Christianity as the embodiment of the *vita perfectissima*, and Augustine, Jordan reminded his brothers, "is to be the exemplar and rule of all our actions."¹⁴² As much as they were able, the Augustinian Hermits were to be 'the imitators of our Father Augustine' (*imitatores Patris nostri Augustini*).¹⁴³ It was thus that the heirs of the historical Augustine were able to be in the city and yet the city on the hill.

In his *Liber Vitasfratrum* Jordan used the foundational myth of the OESA to unite the *fratres* with the *patres*, the *status modernus* with the *status antiquus*. The over-arching theme of the entire work is the exhortation to imitate the life of Augustine, which Jordan had narrated in his *Vita Sancti Augustini*. The phenomenon of mythic imitation provided the link between the friars of Jordan's day and their Order's founder. For the Augustinians, Augustine's primordial foundation (*primordialiter propagatus*) was the archetype which they strove to imitate in their daily lives.¹⁴⁴ The imitation of Augustine gave the Augustinians their legitimacy, their unity, and their memory: it gave them their religious identity. The OESA was a mythic community,¹⁴⁵ centered around the most perfect life established by Augustine, of which the *fratres* of the later Middle Ages were both the heirs and the imitators. While the historical argument of Jordan's text provided the members of the Order with the narrative of what made an Augustinian an Augustinian, the Augustinian myth itself equipped the Order with its self-understanding as a religious community in

¹⁴⁰ VF 1,11 (35,25-36,33). Cf. Caroline Walker Bynum, "The Canonical Concern with Edification Verbo et Exemplo," in *idem*, *Jesus as Mother. Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1982), 36-40.

¹⁴¹ See VF 1,4 (15ff).

¹⁴² "...qui [Augustine] debet esse omnis nostrae actionis exemplar et regula ..." VF 1,11 (36,32-33).

¹⁴³ VF 2,21 (226,2-3).

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Eliade, *The Sacred and The Profane*, 101 and 105, and *idem*, *The Myth of Eternal Return* (New York, 1954).

¹⁴⁵ See note 183 in Part I of this article.

late medieval society.

During the century that separated the Great Union from Jordan's *Liber Vitasfratrum*, the OESA had developed from a conglomerate of various eremitical groups each following Augustine's Rule, into the saint's true sons and heirs. Jordan's *Liber Vitasfratrum* is the most comprehensive expression of the Order's identity in the later Middle Ages. It is a handbook for teaching how one was to be an Augustinian, complete with examples. Whereas in the course of the 1330's the Augustinian myth was created by the Anonymous Florentine, Nicholas of Alessandria, and Henry of Friemar in context of the Order's debate with the Canons over which group was most authentically Augustine's true heirs, Jordan, who most likely conceived of his plan in the same context, textualized the myth on a grand scale, diffusing it through all aspects of the Order's life. The members of Augustine's religion were to imitate Augustine in all ways; he was their rule and exemplar for life within the Order. When Henry of Friemar recounted how Augustine appeared to Alexander IV, Henry turned the vision into a divine oracle. Jordan repeated Henry's insight, and added his own contribution by making the initiative for the Great Union that of Augustine himself, and Augustine's desire to reunite the dispersed members of his own *religio*. And whereas Henry associated the Order's charge to preach, teach and hear confessions among the people in the cities with Alexander's approbation of the newly reunited Order, Jordan laid the foundation thereof in his *Vita Sancti Augustini* by showing how Augustine instituted his second monastery and taught its members the Holy Scriptures so that they would live not only for themselves, but also to minister to the populace. This then became his *cantus firmus* for the entire *Liber Vitasfratrum*, for this life comprised the combination of the anchoritic and cenobitic that Augustine had accomplished and passed along to his sons as the *vita perfectissima*.

The complex of factors that comprised the Order's *vita contemplativa* was based on the model of Augustine, which the Order supported and defended as uniquely its own. Only the members of Augustine's religion could legitimately call Augustine *Pater noster*, as the author of the *Initium*, Nicholas of Alessandria, Henry and Jordan all made clear time and time again. It was not just an ideal that the sons of Augustine were following: it was a programmatic mission of perpetuating Augustine's heritage. By being Augustinians the hermits were filling out the body of Augustine which was so diminished as it appeared to Alexander IV. The myth of Augustine, as it was created in the early years of the 1330's, started to flow as blood through the veins of Augustine's body throughout all facets

of the Order, giving it life and form, based on the Order's narrative identity as emplotted in Jordan's *Vita Sancti Augustini*. For grasping Augustine's heritage in the later Middle Ages, scholars must look beyond the explication of theological doctrines: the religious Augustinianism of the late medieval sons of Augustine formed the core of the phenomenon that can be labeled late medieval Augustinianism. In the later Middle Ages 'being an Augustinian' was determined by one's adherence to the Augustinian identity, created by the true sons of Augustine in the early decades of the fourteenth century.

The Hague

Eric Leland SAAK

ADRIANUS DE APPELTERN THE ONLY AUGUSTINIAN SUFFRAGAN OF UTRECHT 1502 - CA. 1507*

On February 20, 1502 Frederick, marquis of Baden, bishop of Utrecht (1496-1516), commissioned his secretary Hartlenus Hundebeke at his castle Duurstede to inform the five chapters of Utrecht, that he had chosen Adrian of Appeltern, Austin friar of Dordrecht, to be *vicarius in spiritualibus* and suffragan of Utrecht¹.

The reason for this was that the "elect is well acquainted with our country and its inhabitants and also able to preach to the people" (onser lande ende maniere unser undersaten beest konde hadde en oick bequaem is unse undersaten dat woert Goidts toe preken).

The bishop asked the chapters to approve his decision and to send plenipotentiaries to Rome, so that the Pope could confirm the appointment. In fact Adrian had already been chosen on February 7, as Michael Keyen, the public notary of the chapter of the cathedral tells us in his daily notes².

* With thanks to Dr. J. Hynd, Eindhoven, for checking my English text.

¹ A.M.C. van Asch van Wyck "Archief der vijf kapittelen te Utrecht", *Kronyk van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht* 2 (Utrecht 1846), 149. The medieval bishops of Utrecht acted in the bishopric more as temporal sovereigns than as spiritual leaders. With respect to the latter they chose from the regular clergy a *vicarius in spiritualibus*. Consequently Frederick of Baden on his sepulchral monument in the *Stiftskirche* at Baden-Baden is represented in a suit of armour with a mitre on his head, A.J. van de Ven, "De graftombe van bisschop Frederik van Baden", *Jaarboekje van Oud-Utrecht* 1947-1948, 62-78.

² "Eadem die [7 Februarii 1502] admissus fuit frater Adrianus de Apeltern terminarius augustinensis Dordracensis in Traiecto ad suffrageanatum", *Dagelijkse aantekeningen van notaris Michiel Keyen 1502-1504*, Rijksarchief Utrecht, today Het Utrechts Archief, Domkapittel, Ms 4305, 3 vol. (not foliated), here 4305-1. It is a small MS., measuring 15x11,5 cm. with an average text space of 12,5x6,5 cm., not easy to read because of Keyen's tiny and unclear handwriting. For this reason I am indebted to Dr. H.L.Ph. Leeuwenberg of the HUA, who kindly afforded me several of his transcriptions of Keyen's notebooks. At the beginning of the Register of resolutions of the States of Utrecht (6 April 1495) he

Adrian's predecessor, Judocus van Dale OP of Malines, who had been appointed titular bishop of Sebaste on February 13, 1495, may have died at the beginning of the year 1500³. It took some time for Frederick to find a capable successor. In the mean time, the suffragan bishops of Cambrai and Paderborn, respectively, Giles van der Heijden, de Merica, OCarm. (1505) and John Velmaker of Fritzlar OFM (1504) regularly assisted at ordinations⁴.

Frederick thought that the diocese of Utrecht could no longer remain without a suffragan of its own and so made haste to resolve the matter. The canons obviously listened to the appeal of their bishop, since Pope Alexander VI appointed Adrian of Appeltern bishop of Sebaste on April 18, 1502 and granted him the usual privileges, that is to say, the faculty to elect his consecrator, dispensation of all ecclesiastical censures, the permission to officiate as suffragan in the diocese of Utrecht, and to accept the annual stipend of 200 Rhenish guilders granted to him by Bishop Frederick⁵. The official appointment as suffragan of Utrecht followed on August 4, 1502⁶. Meanwhile, on February 22, Keyen drafted

calls himself: "Michael Keyen de Breda clericus Leodiensis diocesis ... capitulorum quinque ecclesiarum Traiectensium scriba", see facsimile in *Geschiedenis van de provincie Utrecht I tot 1528* (Utrecht 1997), 254.

³ J.F.A.N. Weijling, *Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de wijbisschoppen van Utrecht tot 1580*. (Diss. K.Un.Nijmegen), Utrecht 1951, 258-262. Also appeared in *Archief Geschiedenis Aartsbisdom Utrecht* (AAU) 70 (1951), 1-347.

⁴ *Ibidem*, 274-276. Of the latter Keyen (note 2) tells us that the "suffraganeus episcopus Paderbornensis" administered on February 19, 1502 in the cathedral of Utrecht the holy ordinations. Of Giles van der Heijden "suffraganeus Cambricensis" he says that on July 31, 1502 he preached in the Utrecht Carmelite-church.

⁵ G.Brom, *Archivalia in Italië belangrijk voor de geschiedenis van Nederland*, 1,2 (RGP, kleine serie, 6). 's-Gravenhage 1909, 651 (= nn. 1852-1855). C. Eubel, *Hierarchia catholica medii aevi*, II (Patavii² 1960), 233, 276 where his family name is spelled Appelkern.

⁶ "Officiatorum reverendissimi Frederici de Baden 1496-1516", ed. *Vereeniging tot beoefening van Overijsselsch regt en geschiedenis* 1 (Deventer 1872), 291-292: "Frederick etc. Reverendo in Christo patri et Domino Adriano Apeltorn eadem gratia Episcopo Sebastensi ac sacre theologie bacculario ordinis Augustinorum salutem et in commissis debitam adhibere diligentiam ut per nostras civitatem et diocesim Traiectensem officium nostrum pontificale liberum exercere ordines sacros et non sacros temporibus debitis et consuetis ministrare et celebrare quecunque loca de novo consecranda et alia negotia ad divinum cultum pertinentia consecrare polluta, reconsiliare, et alia facere et exercere que ad hujusmodi pontificale officium de consuetudine spectare noscuntur valeatis vobis praesentibus licentiam et plenariam auctoritatem concedimus et impertimur. Et quia de consensu et voluntate nostra per sanctam sedem apostolicam vobis de pensione ducentorum florenorum renensium currentium iuxta tenorem bulle singulis annis quoad vixeritis ex bonis mensis episcopalis dicti nostri episcopatus per nos solvenda, liberrime sit provisum, et pensio hujusmodi assignata et ressuata extitit volumus propterea et

a document for the appointment of monies from the treasury for the suffragan, made copies of it, had it signed, and gave it to master William Buser and got nothing for it, but drank with Adrian a glass of wine. A month later, on March 29, Adrian was invited together with some canons by Keyen for dinner, and again on April 13, April 20 and May 19⁷.

1. WHO WAS ADRIAN OF APPELTERN?

In Utrecht he was not unknown. From Keyen we already know that he was the terminarius of the Augustinians at Dordrecht. The fact that he delivered a sermon to the people on the dedication-day of St. Martin's cathedral, July 22, 1501⁸ could have been decisive in persuading Frederick

presentibus protestamur quod ad solutionem et satisfactionem ressuat pensionis ducentorum florenorum currentium ut supra solutio fieri debet de tribus mensibus in tres menses, incipientes mense augusti presentis anni et sic consequenter de aliis mensibus salvo quod officium nostrum vicariatus in pontificalibus in nostra diocesi vos personaliter exercere et adimplere debeatis nisi infirmitas corporalis aut aliud diffortunium impediatur. In quorum omnium et singulorum fidem et testimonium praemissorum has nostras litteras nostra manu signatas sigilli nostri jussimus et fecimus appensione communiri. Datum in castro nostro Vollenhove Anno Domini millesimo quingentesimo secundo mensis augusti die quarta".

After the appointment Adrian paid a visit to his bishop and the "Dominus suffraganeus Traiectensis" from Vollenhove returned to Utrecht on September 10, 1502, Keyen (note 2).

⁷ "Die martis 22 Septembris [lege: Februarii] fuit festum S. Petri ad cathedram et concepi instrumentum constitutionis sindicorum pro suffraganeo et ingrossari feci et subscribere et tradidi magistro Wilhelmo Buser et nichil recepi sed propinavi domino suffraganeo". - "Item [29 Martii] pransus fui cum domino vicario in pontificalibus futuro suffraganeo; ibidem eciam erant Beyer, Bokeler et ac Spierinc et nichil solvimus". - "Eadem die [13 Aprilis] pransi fuimus Beyer et ego cum T. Malsen; ibi eciam futurus suffraganeus, Haza, Hubertus [?] questor cum uxore et consumpsimus quilibet in vino 1 stuferum et cenavimus in domo et habuimus ½ quartam vini pictantie". - "Item [20 Aprilis] pransi fuimus Beyer et ego cum d. vicario; ibi eciam erant socius eius et novus suffraganeus, Johannes Dedel, m. Symon medicus, Keyl et Kaluwe ac filius sororis vicarii et bibimus 4 quartas vini renensis quarum duas dedit d. vicarius de vino exequiarum filie d. Johannis Renesse militis et lusimus pro aliis quartis unde nichil ego solvi et cenavimus in domo et habui d. Johannem Herstraten et d. Gerardum succentorem et bibimus 4 quartas vini quas ipsi solverunt et eciam portarunt salmonem et elst". - "Die jovis 19 Maii pransus fui cum patre de Jherusalem ibi eciam erant novus suffraganeus, Zenden, Malsen, Haza, Bernardina, Laen ac socius patris et Wernerus [?] et pater propinavit symbolum meum videlicet 1 braspenning et Beyer fuit in Bethleem et cenavi in domo et habui Beyer et d. Bartholdum de Alcmaria et bibimus 1 quartam vini renensis quam ipse solvit".

⁸ "Item Domino Adriano lectori ordinis s. Augustini qui fecit sermonem in ostensione reliquiarum huiusmodi -39-", *Bronnen tot de bouwgeschiedenis van den Dom te Utrecht*, ed. W. Jappe Alberts, 2e deel, 2e stuk, Rekeningen 1480/81-1506/07 (RGP, grote serie 129). 's-Gravenhage 1969, 583 (= 1 maart 1501-1 maart 1502). See also F.H.A. Rikhof,

to propose him to the chapters as his candidate. Possibly Adrian had preached more than once in the cathedral - as a terminarius he was obliged to - but we have no information about it.

When we consider Adrian's coat of arms we see that he was a relative of James of Appeltern "the last medieval dean of Utrecht's cathedral"⁹. His father, a prominent nobleman of Guelderland, Lord of Appeltern and Persingen, procured for him in 1472, at an early age, a prebend in the chapter of the cathedral. The following year, James reached the age of majority being 18 years old and began his studies at the university of Cologne. Repeatedly he is mentioned as a canon between 1480 and 1507 in the cathedral's accounts because of missions for the chapter, especially in Guelderland. In the last edited account, 1506-1507, he is called *praepositus* of Elst¹⁰. James of Appeltern, although not a priest, was chosen dean of the chapter on January 15, 1509. He was ordained to the priesthood on Easter Saturday April 7, 1509¹¹. At the end

in *Bedevaartplaatsen in Nederland* 1: Noord- en Midden-Nederland (Amsterdam-Hilversum 1997), 744-45 (= Utrecht, Kathedrale kerk van St. Maarten, Domkerk, Kerkwijdingsdag met processie), where he says that the absolute culminating-point in the cult of relics in the cathedral was once in seven years on dedication-day, July 22. On July 22, 1501 Adrian, lector of the Augustinian order, preached to the people. In his study "Prediking voor de leken in de stad Utrecht 1500-1580" in: *Utrechters entre deux* (Utrecht 1992), 112-146, R.H. Pegel quotes the example of Adrian of Appeltern, who was appointed suffragan of Utrecht, because Frederick of Baden considered it all-important, that Adrian, belonging to a mendicant order was highly experienced in preaching to the people (p. 125-126).

⁹ K. Heeringa "Jacob van Appeltern, de laatste middeleeuwse domdeken van Utrecht", *Verslag van de algemeene vergadering der leden van het Historisch Genootschap op 11 april 1928*, 4-23. Adrian's coat of arms can be seen on an impression in wax of his seal, attached to a charter of August 18, 1503, with which we will deal below, described by Weijling (note 3), 280, as follows: Christ with the Samaritan woman at the well; at the right: a bishop with a crosier [St. Augustine?], and left: St. Mary with the Child. Here below: a shield with, in counter-company, St. Andrew's cross of silver and red billets, surmounted by a mitre. The legend runs: S (igillum) D (omi)ni Adriani de Appeltern episcopi Sebasten (is). This coat of arms corresponds with that of the Lords of Appeltern and Persingen of the quarter of Nijmegen: In gold in counter-company a St. Andrew's cross of silver and red billets, J.B. Rietstap, *De wapens van den tegenwoordigen en den vroegeren Nederlandschen adel* (Groningen 1890), 286. The Lords of Appeltern lived temporarily in different strongholds, among others at Beuningen, Doddendaal, Dukenburg, Hernen and Persingen, see F. Gorissen, "Die Burgen im Reich von Nimwegen", *Niederrheinisches Jahrbuch* 4 (1959), 105-168, with illustrations of coats of arms and some genealogical registers, among which Adrian, however, does not appear.

¹⁰ *Bronnen* (note 8), in *Indice*, s.v. Jacob van Appeltern. He belonged also to Keyen's circle of friends who were regularly invited to dinner (cf. note 2).

¹¹ G. Brom "Naamlijst der Priesters, die in het bisdom Utrecht gewijd zijn van 1505-1518", *AAU* 23 (1896), 423 and 24 (1897), 72. James of Appeltern was not quick to receive this ordination. Pope Alexander VI allowed him on August 12, 1501 to postpone

of May 1525 James fled Utrecht for Charles, Duke of Gueldre, the antagonist of his Bishop Philip of Burgundy, who had died on April 7, 1524. He himself died on May 27, 1525¹².

About Adrian's youth we are not informed. We do not know when and where he was born nor when he joined the Augustinian order. The first almost certain notice about him dates from May 28, 1491, during the general chapter of the order held in Rome. The prior general, Anselmo da Montefalco, granted Adrian of Dordrecht permission to obtain the degree of lector in theology at Bologna¹³. When this occurred we do not know. Considering, however, the fact that Adrian, when appointed *vicarius* of Frederick of Baden, is entitled bachelor of theology, it is obvious that he had already become lector, the first step on the way to the doctor's degree, and that he studied, possibly at Bologna, for another two years to obtain the bachelor's degree. After that he would have returned to his monastery at Dordrecht in order to teach theology to his young confrères. Although he is called lector in the cathedral's account of July 22, 1501¹⁴, this does not necessarily mean that he did not proceed in the scholarly field. The qualification of *lector* can also stand for teacher of theology. Furthermore, we have no information telling us when and by whom he was consecrated bishop.

it for two years, but he had to receive the ordination because he was in possession of the parish church of Wassom (diocese of Liège), G.Brom, *Archivalia* (note 5), I,1 (RGP, kleine serie, 2), 's-Gravenhage 1908, 176 (= no. 501).

¹² H.F.van Heussen and M.van Rijn, *Historie ofte beschrijving van 't Utrechtsche bisdom*, etc. 1 (Leiden 1719), 93. James of Appelteren seems to have been a difficult person. The postponement of his ordination already shows this. Worse was to follow when he came into conflict with William of Enckevoirt, a prelate living in Rome, who already had gained a great number of benefices in the Low Countries. Appointed, under Julius II (1503-1513), dean of the cathedral of Utrecht – he already was dean of St.John's there – a struggle arose between him and the sitting dean of the cathedral, James of Appelteren, who would not give up his office. The question was not yet resolved in 1517 and again in 1519. Of these years executorial letters have been preserved according to which he was discharged from his office by judges, delegated by the Pope, in Enckevoirt's favour, but James would not budge. In the end the secular power had to be called in, see: K.Heeringa, *Inventaris van het archief van het kapittel ten Dom* (Utrecht 1929), no. 2483 and W.A.J.Munier SSCC, "De curiale loopbaan van Willem van Enckevoirt voor het pontificaat van Adriaan VI", *Archief Geschied. Kath. Kerk in Nederland* 1 (1959), 142.

¹³ "Eadem die [28 Maii 1491] dedimus licentiam lectorandi Bononie fratri Adriano de Dordracō", Rome, Arch.Gen.OSA, *Registrum Dd* 8, fol.67, ed. in: N.Teeuwen OSA - A.de Meijer OSA, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire médiévale de la province augustinienne de Cologne. Extraits des Registres des prieurs généraux, 1357-1506* (Heverlee-Louvain 1961), no. 981 (= *Augustiniana* 11 (1961), 406).

¹⁴ See note 8.

2. ADRIAN'S ACTIVITIES AS A BISHOP IN 1502

We are rather well-informed about Adrian's acting as suffragan in the diocese of Utrecht, although this lasted only a few years. Weijling¹⁵ collected information concerning these activities from several sources, but after him new ones have come to light.

Utrecht

We have already seen that Adrian of Appeltern was appointed bishop of Sebaste by Pope Alexander VI on April 18, 1502, and that the appointment as suffragan was officially confirmed by Bishop Frederick of Utrecht on August 4 of the same year. Whether, having been elected, he went on to participate in the general procession of April 30, 1502, is unknown. The account of the cathedral from March 1, 1502 to March 1, 1503, mentions the suffragan participating in it, but his name is not given¹⁶.

In the same account we read that on the feast of the dedication of the cathedral, July 22, 1502, there were three suffragans in the procession and at the high mass¹⁷. These three bishops were Adrian of Appeltern, Giles de Merica, who was at the Carmelites on July 31, and John Velmaker, who officiated as substitutes during the vacancy of the own suffragan¹⁸.

¹⁵ Weijling (note 3), 276-280.

¹⁶ "Item dedi pro vino propinato domino suffraganeo qui interfuit processioni generali ultimo die Aprilis [30 apr.1502] celebrata -15-6", *Bronnen* (note 8), 613. From another account of the same source for candles it appears that this special procession on April 30, 1502 was held "pro prospero felicique successione et reditu archiducis Philippi" (*ibidem*, 610). A same procession took place in the next year on the feast of St. Matthias [Febr. 25, 1503] "pro pace et tranquillitate etc. et felici reditu archiducis cum deportatione ligni Domini" (*ibidem*, 610), and on the day after Translatio S. Martini [July 5, 1503] "pro felici reditu archiducis Philippi" (*ibidem*, 637). Philip the Fair, who was married at Lier on October 20, 1496 to Joan of Castile, the second daughter of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile, was called by his wife's parents to come to Spain in order to be inaugurated by the Cortes as the future successors to the throne. The journey took place from November 4, 1501 to November 12, 1503, see: Antoine de Lalaing, "Voyage de Philippe le Beau en Espagne en 1501", *Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas*, éd. L.P. Gachard e.a. (Bruxelles 1876), 121-385.

¹⁷ "Item propinavit capitulum nostrum in festo dedicationis ecclesiae nostrae [22 Julii 1502] tribus dominis suffraganeis qui stationem et summam missam interfuerunt sex amphoras vini videlicet 18 qu, facit cum portitoribus 2-11--". *Bronnen* (note 8), 615.

¹⁸ See p... Keyen (note 2) mentions this fact in his daily notes: "Die veneris 22 Julii fuit festum beate Marie Magdalene et dedicationis ecclesie traiectensis et dominus Adrianus episcopus Sebastensis novus suffraganeus celebravit et fecit offitium in primis

On September 24 Adrian administered holy orders in the cathedral for the first time¹⁹, and four days later he was Keyen's guest at dinner along with an Austin friar of Dordrecht²⁰.

The Holy Year 1500 was greatly celebrated in Rome, notwithstanding the threat of the Turks²¹. In other countries, in the following year, the indulgence of the Jubilee could be earned without travelling to Rome. Two thirds of the earnings were destined for the war against the Turks, but that failed for the greater part, inasmuch as the sovereign lords would participate in the selling of the indulgences. The papal commissioner for the Netherlands, Raymond Cardinal Peraudi, indicated which cities would be accorded the privilege for the indulgence which only lasted a few months²². At Utrecht the promulgation of the indulgence was postponed by the chapter of the cathedral, even after Pope Alexander had extended the Jubilee for another year until September 30, 1501. Cardinal Peraudi even sent a threatening letter on August 16, 1502 from Strasbourg to the chapter dealing with their refusal to promulgate the papal indulgence within the diocese. On 9 September, 1502 writing from his castle at Vollenhove, Bishop Frederick of Baden also urged the chapter to resolve the problems it had with Peraudi²³.

Finally, the indulgence of the Holy Year was promulgated at Utrecht in the cathedral on October 9, 1502. Michael Keyen fully reported the solemnity in his daily notes: "On October 9, 1502 after Vespers and Compline, the canons of the five Utrecht chapters, the Canons Regular of St. Augustine with the Dominicans, Franciscans and Carmelites, the Knights of St. John and those of the Teutonic Order, passed in procession with

vesperis misse et secundis vesperis. Et dominus decanus traiectensis habuit invitatos in prandio dictum dominum suffraganeum ac Cameracensem et Monasteriensem [Paderbornensem ?] suffraganeos et prelatos ecclesiarum Traiectensium et socios".

¹⁹ "Eadem die [24 Septembris] novellus dominus suffraganeus pro prima vice ministrat sacros ordines in ecclesia traiectensi" (Keyen).

²⁰ "Die mercurii 28 Septembris pransus fui cum d. Adriano episcopo Sebastensi suffraganeo; ibi eciam erant Bokeler, magister Symon medicus, capellanus episcopi et quidam alter frater monasterii augustiniensium et Johannes de Mechelinia qui propinavit 3 quartas vini bibiti" (*ibidem*).

²¹ L. von Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste* III (Freiburg 1899), 507-513. The proclamation of the bull of the jubilee 1500 (December 20, 1498) is edited in *Codex documentorum sacratissimarum indulgentiarum neerlandicarum* (1300-1600), ed. P. Fredericq (RGP, kleine serie, 21). 's-Gravenhage 1922, 397-399.

²² R.R. Post, *Kerkelijke verhoudingen in Nederland vóór de Reformatie van ± 1500 tot ± 1580* (Utrecht- Antwerpen 1954), 474-475.

²³ *Codex documentorum* (note 19), 410-412, 414-421, 423-426, 430-432, 437-442. Since only the Holy Year indulgence was permitted, it is conceivable that the Utrecht chapter feared the loss of considerable revenue.

crosses and banners through the *Donkerstraat* to the *Buurkerk* (the official parish church). There the deans of the cathedral and Oldminster (St.Salvator), papal commissioners, transmitted the conduct of the ceremony to the suffragan [whom we may suppose to have been Adrian of Appeltern]. The knights John of Renesse and John of Nyevelt received his blessing and absolution and the banners of the pope and the legate. The two commissioners kneeling presented the bull of indulgence wrapped in gold-thread to the suffragan, who brought it in procession, assisted by the Benedictine abbots of St.Paul and of St.Lawrence (Oostbroek) to St.Martins's cathedral. There the hymn "O Crux ave spes unica" was sung in the nave of the church and thereafter the *Te Deum*, accompanied by the organ. When the choir came to the verse "Quos precioso sanguine" the suffragan and both commissioners erected the Cross in the middle of the church. Subsequently the hymn "Vexilla regis prodeunt" was sung. The cantors sang "O crux ave" three times before the cross. Instead of "de passionis tempore" they sang all the time "gratioso tempore". Finally there was a sermon to the people"²⁴.

Hoorn

At the end of the same month we find Adrian of Appeltern at Hoorn in Westfrisia settling a controversy between the municipality and three convents of the third order of St.Francis concerning contributions for the fortification of that city, which had been imposed on various

²⁴ Keyen (note 2): "*Introductio indulgentiarum*. Eadem die [9 Oct. 1502] post vespervas et completorium venerunt ad pulsum maioris campane ad ecclesiam Traiectensem quattuor alie ecclesie ac Regulares, predicatorum, minores et carmelite necnon S.Katharine et ordinis Theutonicorum et sic processionaliter cum crucibus et vexillis accesserunt ecclesiam civilem per plateam dictam de Donkerstraet, intrantes retro ad turrin ecclesie. Et in choro domini decani maioris [ecclesie] et S.Salvatoris, commissarii apostolici, tradiderunt suffraganeo traiectionensi potestatem. Qui et benedixit et absolvit duos milites, videlicet Iohannem de Reness et Iohannem de Nyevelt, et tradidit eis ad genua provolutis vexilla pape et legati. Et tunc dicti duo commissarii tradiderunt suffraganeo ad genua etiam provolutum bullam indulgentiarum pulcre cum pallio aureo ornatam. Qui illam ulterius processionaliter assistentibus sibi S.Pauli et in Oostbroec abbatibus deportavit in ecclesiam traiectionensem. Et exivit processio tunc ex janua meridionali ecclesie civilis ad ecclesiam traiectionensem. Et in navi ecclesie decantata antiphona O crux, in organis decantatum fuit Te Deum. Et cum cantaretur Quos pretioso sanguine, etc. dictus suffraganeus et ambo commissarii erexerunt crucem in medio ecclesie. Et de post decantatus fuit ymnpus Vexilla regis. Et illum versum O crux ave cantarunt tres chorales ante crucem ad respondentem ter. Et chorus semper finivit reliquam materiam. Et loco dicti de passionis [tempore] etc. cantatum semper fuit gratioso tempore. De post factus fuit sermo in eadem navi ecclesie ad populum".

monasteries. The convent of St. Agnes and that of St. Gertrude had to pay 50 guilders and that of St. Catherine 105 guilders²⁵. The three arbiters, among them Adrian of Appelter, bishop of Sebaste, on October 27, 1502, endorsing the verdict, edited a charter, saying that the nuns should contribute for the time of 14 years towards the costs of the municipality²⁶. About this question it is possible that Keyen (note 2) already on August 29 had written a letter to the dean of Westfrisia, telling that Adrian after the feast of the Holy Cross [September 14], when he had to administer holy orders, would go there²⁷.

Utrecht, Cathedral

On the eve of St. Martin's-day, November 10, Adrian celebrated the first vespers²⁸ in the cathedral and on the feast-day itself the high mass. In return for this, the chapter offered him two jars of wine²⁹. He received the same recompense on Christmas Day, celebrating the mass in the cathedral³⁰. That same day he was at dinner with Keyen³¹.

²⁵ P.M.Bots, *De oude kloosters en abdijen van het tegenwoordige bisdom van Haarlem* (Rijnsburg 1883), 245-249.

²⁶ C.J.Gonnet and R.D.Baart de la Faille, *Inventaris van het archief der stad Hoorn* (Haarlem 1918), 449 (= no.1254); P.Koster, *Hoorn in de middeleeuwen* (Amsterdam 1929), 109.

²⁷ "Die lune 29 Augusti scripsi ex parte ecclesie nostre missivam decano Westfrisie super eo quod missuri essent dominum suffraganeum ibidem post Crucis proxime qui hic erit ministraturus ordines sacros et quod interea singula prepararet et eciam resolutionem de certis dubiis per eum scriptis. Scripsi tamen sub nomine meo de mandato tantum".

²⁸ "Item celebrate fuerunt vespere valde solempniter et episcopus Sebastensis suffraganeus fecit officium" (Keyen).

²⁹ "Item capitulum nostrum propinavit domino suffraganeo celebranti summam missam in festo beatissimi Martini patroni nostri duas amphoras vini qu. quilibet quia mustum pro 3½ st. comp. facit unacum portitura 21-6-", *Bronnen* (note 8), 617-618.

³⁰ "Item capitulum nostrum propinavit domino suffraganeo missam in festo Nativitatis Christi celebranti duas amphoras vini musti facit 6 qu., pro qualibet qu. tres st. facit unacum portitura -18-6-", *ibidem*, 618.

³¹ "Eadem die [25 Decembris] celebraui [=Keyen] missam tertiam de die in altari meo, et pransus fui cum domino decano Traiectensi; ibi eciam erant alii socii cenobitales, ac suffraganeus cum Reess et Uterwije" (Keyen MS. 4305-2, [fol.1]).

3. ADRIAN'S ACTIVITIES IN 1503

Utrecht

Mention is made, in the second part of Keyen's MS. (note 2), of the fact that on February 4, 1503, Adrian returned from Frisia with two persons, but he does not tell us for what reason he had been there. Then on March 11, 1503, the suffragan administered holy orders in the cathedral and Theodoricus Wadding became a priest. On Maundy Thursday [April 13] he consecrated the chrism in the cathedral with 12 assistants³².

Tiel

Weijling (note 3) referring to a note in Van Leeuwen's edition of the *Auctoris incerti Chronicon Tielense*³³ states that Adrian of Appeltern visited the church of Tiel possibly on May 14, 1503. It deals with the consecration of the new choir of St. Martin's church in 1400. In the manuscript a later hand added a not so clear note in the margin. From this one can conclude that the building of the second side-aisle of the church was begun in the second half of the 15th century and completed just after 1500 between the feastday of St. Servatius (May 13) and that of St. Vitus (June 15)³⁴. Then follows that in the same year, which however is not given, Adrian, Bishop of Sebaste and suffragan to Utrecht's Bishop Frederick of Baden was at Tiel on Sunday *Cantate*, that is the fourth Sunday after Easter³⁵. It is not mentioned what Adrian did there, but it could have been that he consecrated the church which had been completed by then.

For Tiel Sunday *Cantate* was a special feast-day. In the manual for the church, written in 1571 by the parish priest Peter of Teeffelen, there is

³² "Eadem die [4 Februarii 1503] redierunt ex frisia dominus suffraganeus, decanus...[illegibile name] et magister Ulricus circa hora prandii". - "Eadem die [11 Martii 1503] dominus suffraganeus administrat sacros ordines in ecclesia traiectensi... et dominus Theodoricus Wadding ordinatus fuit presbyter". - Item [April 13] feci cedulam de 12 assistantibus suffraganeo in consecratione crismatis" (Keyen).

³³ *Auctoris incerti Chronicon Tielense*, ed. J.D.van Leeuwen (Trajecti ad Rhenum 1789), 433, note (d).

³⁴ "Anno XVc iterum factum annihilatum in die Servatii et inter Viti tempus ad edificium consummatum et relique tunc fuerunt juncte".

³⁵ "Et anno eodem Tiglate Dominica Cantate a venerabili patre domino Adriano Episcopo Sebastiensis et suffraganeo ipsius Episcopi Traiectensis domini Frederici de Baden [consecrata ?]".

a list of feasts for which the bells of the church had to be rung. On this list also *dominica Cantate* figures "propter Inventionem reliquiarum"³⁶. He does not mention, however, whose relics these are, possibly of the church's patron St. Martin. The only Sunday *Cantate* occurring in the years 1502-1507 between May 13 and June 15 is that of May 14, 1503, so we may assume that Adrian visited Tiel on that particular day.

Rijswijk, near the Hague

Having safely returned from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, Comen Gheryt of Leiden erected on July 13, 1502 a crucifix near the bridge at Rijswijk. As early as August 1502 the parish priest Sybrant Willems built a little chapel over it³⁷. Adrian of Appeltern was invited to consecrate the cross and the chapel. This occurred on July 27, 1503 and the bishop granted an indulgence of 40 days to everyone praying five times the Pater noster and the Ave Maria, and again 40 days for those who gave alms for the chapel³⁸.

³⁶ J.S. van Veen, "Handboekje van den Tielschen pastoor Petrus van Teeffelen" *AAU* 42 (1916), 74-278, here 107.

³⁷ "In t jaer ons Heeren 1502 den 13ten dach in Julio soe wert dat beelde van den Heyligen Cruys an die brugge tot Rijswijck geset s morghens omtrent seven uuyren bloet up den heerwech van Comen Gheryt van Leyen ende hadde gheweest ten Heylighe Lande"; "up datselfde jaer up Sinte Bertelmeesavent [August 23] soe wert die capelle angeleyt by den pastoer meester Sybrant Willems ende die capellemeesters". This is written on a fly-leaf of the oldest register of the church at Rijswijk, J. Smit, "De kapel van het H. Kruis te Rijswijk", *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, nieuwe serie 21 (1928), 47-53, here 48.

³⁸ "De 27e Juli 1503... wert dat beelde van den Heyligen Cruys gewijt ende geconsecreert van den eerwaardigen Vader in Christo heer Adriaen, biscop van Sebaste, suffragaen tot Uuytrecht, ende gaf up die tijt allen menschen, die daer spreken vijf P (ater)s ende 5 Ave Marien tot gehoechgenisse der passien ons Heeren, staende in der staet der gracen, 40 daghen oflaets, ende noch 40 daghen aan allen denghenen, die daer geven haer aelmissen tot behoef der capelle", *ibidem*, 49. The expenses for this were eight pounds. Concerning Adrian, Smit made a mistake. He attributed the consecration to Adrian of Utrecht, later Pope Adrian VI, but he never was bishop of Sebaste and in 1503 he was still professor at the university of Louvain.

Utrecht, Carmelite-church

The devotion to St. Anne, mother of the Blessed Virgin, was widespread in the second half of the 15th century in the Rhineland and the Low Countries³⁹. It started in Mainz, where they kept a relic from the head of the saint, brought from Bethlehem at the beginning of the 13th century. In the church of the Carmelites at Mainz a fraternity in honor of St. Mary and St. Anne was erected and confirmed by the archbishop on June 1, 1499⁴⁰. The silver-gilt shrine in the shape of the head of the saint, preserved in St. Stephen's church was stolen on November 29, 1500 and brought to Düren⁴¹. There it remained since the citizens of Düren systematically refused to give it back⁴². Consequently Düren became a much frequented place of pilgrimage to the present day.

Following their confrères of Mainz, the Carmelites of Utrecht, on instigation of Adrian of Appeltern, erected, in or about 1503, a confraternity of St. Anne in their church, which is now the Roman Catholic cathedral of St. Catherine⁴³. Raymund, Cardinal Peraudi, whom we met earlier⁴⁴, had just edited in Germany a printed letter of indulgence in honor of St. Anne⁴⁵.

On August 18, 1503 Adrian confirmed the confraternity of St. Anne, which he himself had erected in the church of the Carmelites at Utrecht and granted an indulgence of 40 days to all those who prayed five times an Ave Maria before the statue of St. Anne or devoutly read the letter of indulgence edited by Peraudi⁴⁶, which the Carmelites had propagated.

³⁹ T. Brandenbarg, *Heilig Familieleven*. Verspreiding en waardering van de Historie van Sint-Anna in de stedelijke cultuur in de Nederlanden en het Rijnland aan het begin van de moderne tijd, 15de/16de eeuw (Nijmegen 1990); *St. Anna in Düren*, hrsg. von Erwin Gatz (Mönchengladbach 1972).

⁴⁰ Gatz, 163. The Carmelites, who proclaimed St. Anne patron of their order, were the principal propagators of this devotion.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 114.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 163-185.

⁴³ A. Eekhof, "Twee aflaatprenten, uitgegeven en van toelichting voorzien", *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, nieuwe serie 7 (1910), 1-14, here 8.

⁴⁴ See p. 293. Peraudi died at Viterbo on September 5, 1505 and was buried in SS. Trinità, the church of the Austin Friars, where his tomb is still preserved, see: A. Röpcke, "Geld und Gewissen. Raimund Peraudi und die Ablassverkündigung in Norddeutschland am Ausgang des Mittelalters", *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 71 (1992), 43-80, with three illustrations of it.

⁴⁵ A facsimile in Eekhof (note 43) between p. 4 and 5.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, 9-10; *Catalogussen van de bij het Stadsarchief bewaarde archieven*, door S. Muller Fzn, I: De aan de stad Utrecht behorende archieven (Utrecht 1913), 57 (= no. 360). Brandenbarg (note 39) mentions this letter on p. 232-233, note 68, but erroneously

This document is preserved in the municipal archives of Utrecht with Adrian's seal pendent⁴⁷. Eekhof edited the text⁴⁸. The following year Adrian repeated the indulgence also for the purpose of gaining new members for the confraternity⁴⁹.

4. CONSECRATIONS AND GRANTINGS OF INDULGENCES IN 1504

Gouda

At Gouda, rich in monasteries during the middle ages, where the Augustinians of Dordrecht possessed, probably since 1447, a home for their *terminarii*, which was located in the Zeugestraat, and which is mentioned in a document as late as 1577, preserved in the judicial archives of the town⁵⁰, there is a Jerusalem chapel, still standing today behind the

attributed the letter to the bishop of Utrecht instead of to the suffragan.

⁴⁷ See above note 9.

⁴⁸ Eekhof (note 43), 13-14. It runs: "Adrianus Apelttern, Dei et apostolice sedis gracia episcopus Sebastensis et reverendissimi in Christo patris et domini domini Frederici marchionis de Baden, episcopi Traiectensis in spiritualibus vicarius generalis, universis et singulis cuiuscumque status aut condicionis existant ad quos nostre presentes littere pervenerint, salutem in Domino sempiternam. Quum pia nos devocio divinaque inspiratio multipliciter ammoneant et hortentur, universos Christifideles in quantum possumus et valemus incitare et exhortari ad extollendum et ampliandum honorem divinum quo ad divinam gratiam et gloriam captandam aptiores reddantur et graciosiores; attendentes insuper, quod illis potissimum, exhiberi deceat gratitudinis beneficium, e quibus exordium sumpsit salus omnium. Hinc est quod nos singulari affectione devicti in laudem regine glorie et filie sublimissime matris cupientes honorare, Annam sanctissimam extollimus et laudamus, omnique honore dignam predicamus et dicimus, felix radix illius arboris, que nobis protulit pomum salutis meritoque decet laudari a fidelibus, quibus tante contulit beneficium pietatis; quare ad sanctissime predictae matrone Anne laudem, eiusque deifere filie gloriam, fraternitatem laudabilem in conventu fratrum ordinis eiusdem intemerate virginis Marie de Monte Carmeli, in civitate Traiectensi a nobis noviter erectam et fundatam, confirmamus et approbamus, insuper quoque omnibus Christifidelibus ubilibet constitutis predictam fraternitatem assummentibus quociens oraciunculam illam a nobis approbatam quam presencium baiuli [= procuratores] prenotati ordinis et conventus fratres impressam distribuunt coram imagine sancte Anne legerint, aut qui legere nequeunt quinquies salutacionem Anglicam dixerint ob honorem sanctissime Anne coram sua imagine, tociens quadraginta dies indulgenciarum de iniunctis eis penitenciis misericorditer in Domino relaxamus. In quorum robur, fidem et testimonium sigillum nostrum presentibus est appensum. Anno Domini millesimo quingentesimo tercio, die vero mensis Augusti decima octava".

⁴⁹ Muller (note 46), 57 (= no.361). About the history of the Carmelites at Utrecht, see C.de Boer OCarm., "Het Carmelietenklooster te Utrecht", *AAU* 38 (1912), 72-103, but the confraternity of St.Anne is not mentioned.

⁵⁰ J.Taal, *De Goudse kloosters in de Middeleeuwen* (Hilversum 1960), 11.

choir of St. John's church. It is a twelve-sided building with a vault of bricks in the shape of a star⁵¹. Gijsbert Willems Raet, vicar of St. John's and former pilgrim to Jerusalem, founded the chapel in 1497. In his last will of February 13, 1505 the chapel is called "sepulcrum Domini" and it was donated to the Brethren of the Common Life (*Collatiebroeders*), who lived in the adjacent monastery of St. Paul. Vorstman⁵² edited various documents from the archives of the Brethren, and in one of them Adrian also figures. It is the history of the foundation of the Jerusalem chapel, written by John of Emmerik. He tells us that Adrian of Appeltern consecrated the altar of the chapel in 1504, being himself present, but he does not know at what date this occurred, since the letter of the consecration was lost⁵³.

Utrecht, Cathedral

In Keyen's daily notes (note 2) we find that Adrian was preaching in the cathedral during the evening of March 3, 1504, being the second Sunday of Lent⁵⁴. We do not know if it was a special occasion. However, it is the only evidence of a sermon, delivered by Bishop Adrian in the cathedral of Utrecht, mentioned by Keyen in his daily notes between 1502 and 1504.

⁵¹ *Voorlopige lijst der Nederlandsche monumenten van geschiedenis en kunst*, VI: De provincie Zuidholland (Utrecht 1915), 80. A plan and a cross-section of the chapel in *Kunstreisboek voor Nederland*, 5th ed. (Amsterdam 1965), 411.

⁵² M.A.G. Vorstman, "Stukken betreffende de Broeders des Gemeenen Levens en inzonderheid die van Gouda", *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkelijke Geschiedenis* 7 (1847), 65-167, here 143-148. He edited a great number of documents, which he found in "an old manuscript", but does not tell us where it is preserved. Presumably he refers to Cartularia, now preserved in the regional archives "Hollands Midden" at Gouda, cf. A.G. Weiler, *Volgens de norm van de vroege kerk*. De geschiedenis van de huizen van de broeders van het Gemene leven in Nederland (Middeleeuwse studies, XIII). Nijmegen 1997, 208.

⁵³ "Item consecratum est ejusdem capellae altare, et tantumdem pavimenti, quantum intra cancellos et murum nostri refectorii continetur (ubi et idem dominus Gysbertus postea sepultus est), anno domini millesimo quingentesimo quarto a domino Adriano de Appelterne, episcopo Sebastensi. Sed non exstant inde littere. - Hanc consecrationem ego Iohannes Embricae, qui haec scripsi, oculis meis vidi" (Vorstman, 142).

⁵⁴ "Eadem die [3 Martii, dominica Reminiscere, secunda Quadragesimae, 1504] dominus suffraganeus fecit sermonem post Completorium in ecclesia Traiectensi" (Keyen, MS. 4305-3).

Elburg

In July 1504 Adrian is recorded in two places. The first is Elburg. Whether or not he was there in person cannot be deduced from the source. The suffragan of Utrecht on July 21, 1504 granted an indulgence of 40 days to those who came to pray at the seven crosses, standing along the way from Elburg to Doornspijk. The document with Adrian's seal is preserved in the regional archives of Elburg, Nunspeet and Oldenbroek⁵⁵. The year before, on August 15, 1503, Raymond Cardinal Peraudi, then staying at Cologne, promulgated an indulgence of 100 days for the visitors of the Calvary at Elburg. Frederick of Baden also granted a forty day indulgence on July 6, 1504, issued from his castle at Vollenhove. Both documents likewise are preserved in the above mentioned archives⁵⁶.

To understand what is meant by these crosses and Calvary, we can refer to an analogue at Wageningen. On a map of 1570, designed by Thomas Witteroos, four crosses can be seen along the way in the direction of Arnhem. The road runs to the now no longer existing parish church of Old-Wageningen, where is written "Ten Heyligen Cruys" (At the Holy Cross)⁵⁷. The author of the article, with a printed map, mentions that on the map of Wageningen, designed by James of Deventer ca. 1560, this Way of the Cross can also be seen as having seven crosses, which is more correct, he says, and he refers to the seven crosses between Elburg and Doornspijk and the indulgence letters of 6 and 21 July, 1504⁵⁸. In the 15th and 16th centuries the devotion to the seven occasions on which Jesus fell under the Cross was very popular. The definitive propagation of the Way of the Cross with 14 stations, as we know it today, arose not earlier than the 18th century and was propagated by the Franciscans.

⁵⁵ "1504, juli 21. Adrianus de Apeltern, bisschop van Sebaste, vicaris-generaal in pontificalibus van Fredericus, bisschop van Traiectum, verleent een aflaat van 40 dagen aan hen, die berouwvol en na belijdenis hunner zonden op bepaalde dagen komen bidden bij de zeven kruisen, buiten de stad Elburgum opgericht op den weg tusschen die stad en de parochiekerk van Doernspijk. Datum anno millesimo quingentesimo quarto die vicesima prima mensis Iulii", A.J. van de Ven, *De oudste archieven van de gemeente Elburg en van den zeepolder Oosterwolde* ('s-Gravenhage 1932), 361 (= no. 678).

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, 359 (= no. 669), Peraudi was requested by his chaplain Peter Jacobi of Vollenhove, canon of St. Peter's, Utrecht; and 361 (= no. 677).

⁵⁷ H.L. Driessen, "Ten Heyligen Cruys bij Wageningen", *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen Gelre* 38 (1935), 133-137.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, 137. See also T. Steenbergen and J. Tersteeg, "Wageningen", *Bedevaartplaatsen in Nederland*, I: Noord- en Midden-Nederland (Amsterdam-Hilversum 1997), 792-795, with illustrations of the two maps mentioned.

Rugge, near Brielle

A week after the granting of the indulgence at Elburg we find Adrian of Appeltern in the monastery of St.Elisabeth which belonged to the Augustinian Canons Regular at Rugge, near Brielle. This location, although nothing of the buildings has been preserved, later became a place of pilgrimage. In a barn of the monastery 19 religious, arrested by the Protestants, in 1572 were hanged and died as martyrs for the catholic faith: the so-called Martyrs of Gorinchem⁵⁹.

The monastery of St.Elisabeth was founded in 1403 by Hugo, Lord of Heenvliet, and some inhabitants of Voorne. In 1406 it was admitted to the Chapter of Windesheim⁶⁰.

Matthias, bishop of Budua and suffragan of Utrecht on August 12,1421 declared that he had consecrated a number of altars between the years 1405 and 1413⁶¹. Adrian of Appeltern was at Rugge on July 28,1504. He consecrated the two remaining altars and granted two indulgences each of 40 days. Moreover he changed the holy patrons of the altars, which had been consecrated by Bishop Matthias. The solemnity is fully described by Van Heussen and Van Rijn⁶².

Axel

In August 1504 Adrian consecrated the hall of the parish church at Axel in Flemish Zeeland. The municipality paid him a honorarium⁶³.

⁵⁹ P.J.Margry, "Gorinchem", *Bedevaartplaatsen* (note 58), 231-245.

⁶⁰ J.G.R.Acquoy, *Het klooster te Windesheim en zijn invloed*, 3 (reprint Amsterdam 1968), 40; H.F.van Heussen and H.van Rijn, *Oudheden en gestichten van het rechte Zuid-Holland en van Schieland* (Leiden 1719), 277-333.

⁶¹ A.A.Arkenbout, "Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het Regulierenklooster van St.Elisabeth te Rugge bij Brielle", *Ons voorgelacht*. Maandblad van de Zuidhollandse vereniging voor genealogie 20 (1965), 261-328, here 288-289. He quotes from the Cartulary of the monastery, preserved in the regional archives Voorne-Putten en Rozenburg at Brielle.

⁶² Van Heussen-Van Rijn (note 60), 319-323, see Appendix 1. For the history of the monastery, see *Monasticon Windeshemense*, hrsg. von W.Kohl, E.Persoons und A.G.Weiler, 3: Niederlande (Brüssel 1980), 394-414.

⁶³ "Item ghepresenteert mynen heere den souvergaen van Utrecht, als hy hier binnen dcser stede wiën ende consecreren die voorkerccke", Axel, Stadrekening 5 augustus 1504, G.C.Juten, "Priesters in de vier Ambachten", *AAU* 35 (1909), 222-239, here 223. Weijling (note 3), erroneously mentions Hulst as the place of action, but this refers to the precedent item of 1493.

Hattem

The Guelders city of Hattem received Adrian two months later. The new choir of the parish church, dedicated to St. Andrew and St. Catherine, was completed in 1504. He consecrated it on October 8, 1504 together with the altar of St. Anne and the statues of the two patron saints of the church⁶⁴.

Utrecht

Adrian's last activity for the year 1504, as far as we know, was the celebration of the high mass on the feast of St. Martin, November 11, in the cathedral of Utrecht. For this the chapter awarded him with six quarts of wine⁶⁵.

We may assume that during this year the suffragan also administered the ordinations in the cathedral. We found the mentioning of one day, i.e., the feast of St. Matthew, September 21, 1504. Michael Keyen (note 2) recorded it because his friend John Bokeler, who was regularly invited by him to dinner, was ordained deacon⁶⁶.

⁶⁴ "1504, october 8. De consecratione chori novi. Chorus novus edificatus, consecratus est anno Domini millesimo quingentesimo quarto a suffraganeo de Apeltorn, episcopo Sebastienzi, octava die mensis octobris. Eodem die fuit consecratum altare sancte Anne et imagines sancti Andree et Katherine patronorum", Hattem, Municipal archives, *Cartularium*, note on fol.1, and transcript in *Privilegiënboek*, p.8, as quoted by F.A.Hoefer, *Aanteekeningen betreffende de kerk van Hattem*, 2 vol. (Arnhem 1900), here II, 90 (= bijlage XXXIII). An altarstone with five crosses and a reliquary, with the inscription "... van Apeltoren", was discovered in the floor of the church, Weijling (note 3), 278. See also *Voorloopige lijst der Nederlandsche monumenten van geschiedenis en kunst* IV: De provincie Gelderland (Utrecht 1917), 101: Ned. Herv. Kerk (HH.Andreas en Catherina).

⁶⁵ "Item capitulum nostrum propinavit Domino suffraganeo cantanti missam in die obitus b.Martini 6 qu vini cum portitore -20--", *Bronnen* (note 8), 665.

⁶⁶ "Die sabbati fuit festum sancti Mathei apostoli et evangeliste et celebrati ac ministrati fuerunt sacri ordines maiores in ecclesia traiectensi et Johannes Bokeler promotus fuit ad diaconatum", MS. 4305-3.

5. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE YEAR 1505

Bruxelles

In the church of St.Gudule at Brussels, today the cathedral of St.Michael and St.Gudule, a memorial service was celebrated on January 14, 1505 for the late Queen Isabella of Castile, who had died on November 26, 1504. Three bishops were present, among whom "le suffragant d'Utrecht" is the first named⁶⁷.

Utrecht, ordinations of 1505

One of the specific tasks of a suffragan was to ordain clerics, secular as well as religious, to minor and major orders. Brom published lists of priests ordained in the diocese of Utrecht between 1505 and 1518⁶⁸. He omitted the names of those who received minor orders to make the lists not too long and because most men later became priests. In the year 1505 there were ordinations on February 8, March 8, March 22, May 17, September 20 and December 10. Neither the place of action nor the name of the bishop have been recorded. The first place of designation would of course have been the cathedral of Utrecht, but it could equally have taken place in any other church or chapel. Similarly, the first person to be designated would have been the diocesan bishop, but in those days the bishop of Utrecht mostly stayed in his castles of (Wijk bij)Duurstede and Vollenhove, and since he was busy with secular affairs, he used to leave these functions to his suffragan. Brom supposes, that Jacob de Ridder OP, bishop of Hebron administered by far the most, if not all, of the

⁶⁷ *Chroniques de Jean Molinet*, ed. G.Doutrepont et O.Jodogne, II, 1488-1506 (Bruxelles 1935), 538-554: "Des obseques celebréz en Bruxelles pour très catholique princesse, madame Ysabel, royne de Castille, de Leon et Grenade. Le XIIIe jour du mois de janvier an. XVcIIII (=1505) furent faites les vigilles, en l'église de Saint Goule en Bruxelles... L'ordre de la procession... premier vinrent Jacobins, Carmes et Cordeliers... puis vinrent les prelatz, aucuns mitréz, l'aultres non, et III. evesques, c'est asscavoir, le suffragant d'Utrecht, l'evesque de Tournay et l'evesque d'Arras".

⁶⁸ G.Brom, "Naamlijst der Priesters, die in het bisdom Utrecht gewijd zijn van 1505 tot 1518", *AAU* 23 (1896), 386-471; 24 (1897), 1-85. The names of the ordinandi are noted in a manuscript of the State Archives of Utrecht, today *Het Utrechts Archief*, Dom 118, entitled "Registrum ordinandorum inchoante anno quinto usque ad annum XVIII sub magistro Ulrico Byell scholastico ac canonico Traiectensi". Brom refers to it as an absolutely unique specimen of our church history prior to the Reformation, *ibidem*, 388.

ordinations mentioned in the register in the name of Frederick of Baden⁶⁹. However, Jacob de Ridder did not become a suffragan before March 1507. Consequently we may presume that in the years 1505 and 1506 Adrian of Appeltern was the bishop presiding at the ordinations. It appears from Frederick's statement of February 14, 1505, that Adrian of Appeltern administered the minor order of acolyte to James of Arnhem, son of Theodoric⁷⁰. This certainly occurred on February 8, 1505. It appears also that on that day minor orders were administered. On the same day two Austin friars were ordained to the priesthood by Adrian, namely Adrian of Rotterdam and John of Haarlem⁷¹. The above mentioned Jacob Theodoric de Arnhem was ordained a priest on March 22, 1505, together with Adrian's confrère of Dordrecht: "Fratr Cornelius de Dordracō ordinis sancti Augustini"⁷². Before that, on March 8, 1505, two other Augustinians Judocus Gerardi and Peter of Bolsward (de Boelsvardia) became priests⁷³. Among the remaining ordinations of this year no Augustinians are mentioned.

At the end of his study Brom gives three tables of priests, deacons and subdeacons ordained during the years 1505-1518⁷⁴. For the year 1505 there were 275 priests, among them 200 seculars and 75 religious - five Augustinians as we already mentioned - 305 deacons and 303 subdeacons.

Zoeterwoude

The Knights of St. John at Haarlem possessed the parish church of Zoeterwoude. Within its territory stood a chapel dedicated to the Blessed Virgin given into the charge of the Knights in 1487 by its owner Tieleman Oem van Wijngaarden. At the beginning of the 16th century the chapel, as yet not consecrated, was already in decay. It was duly renovated and the work was finished in 1505. Adrian of Appeltern was invited to consecrate

⁶⁹ *Ibidem* 24 (1897), 67-68.

⁷⁰ "Mensis Februarii die decima quarta 1505. Frederik, Markgraaf van Baden, bisschop van Utrecht, getuigt dat Adriaan de Apelteren, bisschop van Sebaste, den Utrechtschen priester [sic] Jacob van Arnhem Dirkszoon heeft bevorderd tot den rang van acoliet", P.N. Doorninck en N. Wynaendts van Resandt, *Inventaris van het Oud-Archief van het kasteel Middachten*, II, opgemaakt door N. Wynaendts van Resandt (Arnhem 1914), 63 (= no. 752).

⁷¹ Brom (note 68), 23 (1896), 389.

⁷² *Ibidem*, 392. In 1502 a Cornelius Nicolai de Dordracō studied theology, as a *cursor*, in the general monastery of Sant' Agostino in Rome, Teeuwen-de Meijer (note 13), no. 1029 (= *Augustiniana* 11 (1961), 609).

⁷³ *Ibidem*, 390.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, 24 (1897), 54-57.

the chapel in the name of the bishop of Utrecht in honor of Our Lady of Victory, St.Panthaleon, and the patron of the hospitallers, St.John the Baptist⁷⁵.

It may be useful at this stage to offer some explanation of the two titular saints first mentioned. In order to do so we have to transport ourselves mentally to the island of Rhodes, where since 1310 the Knights of St.John had had their headquarters after they had been expelled from the Holy Land, until they had to flee again from the Turks in 1523 to the island of Malta. Hence we know them now as the Knights of Malta. But the Crescent Moon had sailed out earlier with a big fleet intent on conquering Rhodes. The Turks attacked the island on July 27,1480, the feast-day of St.Panthaleon, but the Grand-Master of the order, along with his knights, slew them in a terrible battle and the rest of the Turkish fleet fled in an easterly direction. The devastated churches were replaced by new churches, one in honor of Our Lady of Victory, the other in honor of St.Panthaleon, to whose intercession in particular the order ascribed the victory. They petitioned the Pope to accord spiritual favours to the new churches in order to preserve the memory of the victory for ever. Pope Innocent VIII decided on May 31,1485 that henceforward the name-day of St.Panthaleon should be celebrated as a feast-day for the entire Church and that in the whole order churches should be dedicated to Our Lady of Victory, granting indulgences to those contributing towards their construction.

In 1501 the commander of St.John at Haarlem, John William Janssen, applied to the Bishop of Utrecht asking him to confirm the papal favours for the church at Haarlem and the chapel of Zoeterwoude. On November 2,1501 Frederick of Baden granted this request. But the commander had more plans. He wished to demolish the chapel of Zoeterwoude and build a new one. This also was allowed and thus on June 1,1505 the suffragan of Utrecht arrived for the consecration of the chapel. In addition, he also consecrated altars in honor of the three patron saints and of St.Catherine, St.Agnes, and St.Elisabeth. Adrian decided that the consecration of the chapel should be celebrated every year on the Sunday after Assumption (August 15).

⁷⁵ For this and the next data: C.J.Gonnet, "Sint Panthaleon, patroon van de kapel te Zoeterwoude", *Bijdragen Geschiedenis bisdom Haarlem (BBH)*, 2 (1874), 195-210.

Haarlem, Knights of St.John

In the above mentioned letter of Adrian of June 1, 1505⁷⁶, which is described in the Chartulary of the Knights of St.John at Haarlem, he also tells us that he consecrated a number of altars in their chapterhouse, but a date is lacking. Perhaps it took place the very next day June 2, 1505, when he was at Haarlem, as we shall see below. The altars were dedicated to St.Mary of Victory, St.Panthaleon, St. John the Baptist, and SS.Jerome, Sebastian and Anthony. This fact was to be commemorated every year on the Sunday after the feast of St.Jerome (September 30)⁷⁷.

Haarlem, Beguinage

From another source it is known that Adrian was at Haarlem on June 2, 1505 for the blessing of a statue of St.Mary in the chapel of the Beguinage, and that, according to Weijling⁷⁸, he administered the sacrament of confirmation, for which the municipality rewarded him with five pounds and wine.

The miraculous oak statue of the Blessed Virgin is still present in town. It dates from about 1500, is 45 cm. high, and is known as Our Lady of Haarlem. Today it stands in St.Joseph's church, built in the 19th century on the place of the former Beguinage, and is much venerated by the faithful citizens of Haarlem⁷⁹.

The oldest mention of the blessing of the statue by Adrian of Appeltern is a note by John Albert Ban, rector of the Beguinage from 1630 until 1644, which was found in a *Rituale Romanum* (Antwerp 1620)⁸⁰.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, 209-210. See Appendix 2.

⁷⁷ For the history of the Knights of St.John at Haarlem, see: F.Allan, *Geschiedenis en beschrijving van Haarlem*, II (Haarlem 1874, reprint 1973), 249-386.

⁷⁸ Weijling (note 3), 279.

⁷⁹ W.Helversteijn, *Sint Josephkerk Haarlem Honderdvijftig jaar, 1843-1993*, Kroniek van de kerk op het Begijnhof (Haarlem 1993), 120-127; B.Speet, "Haarlem. Mariakapel in de parochiekerk van St.Joseph", *Bedevaartplaatsen* (note 58), 398-403. The crowns of Mary and the Child, both scepters and the crown of stars were stolen in 1974 and afterwards in 1983 a great number of silver ex-voto's of which 11 still remain, Margry (note 80), 33-34; Helversteijn, 120, and 123.

⁸⁰ F.M.K.van Kersbergen, "Oude gebeden en zegeningen bij de beeltenis van Onze Lieve Vrouw van Haarlem", *BBH* 31 (1908), 314-319, here 317: "Memoriae S (acrum). Anno millesimo quingentesimo quinto die secunda Junii, consecrata est haec statua B.Mariae Virginis a R.mo Domino Adriano Episcopo Sebastensi et Suffraganeo Ultrajectensi. Qui concessit indulgen: quadraginta dierum omnibus in statu gratiae coram ea quinquies salutationem angelicam recitantibus"; P.J.Margry, "Onze Lieve Vrouw van

In 1629 the Vicar Apostolic Philip Rovenius, visiting the Beguinage, granted a forty day indulgence to those praying the Litany of Mary before the statue⁸¹.

Ten years later, the same Rovenius edited a letter in which he tells us that on visiting the Beguinage in September 1638, he saw the statue, which had been blessed by Adrian of Appelteren on June 2, 1505. Because many miracles were associated with the statue, Rovenius was requested to grant indulgences for the augmentation of the devotion. He then granted a fifty day indulgence to the prayers of the Litany of Loreto⁸². This event of 1639 is recorded by rector Ban in another *Rituale Romanum* (Antwerp 1625) on a quire bound with the book⁸³. Margry doubts whether Rovenius twice within such a short time would have granted almost identical indulgences and supposes that Ban's note of 1629 is a mistake and that the authentic one is that of 1639⁸⁴.

John Albert Ban also compiled rules and charters for the Beguinage which were approved by Philip Rovenius on December 5, 1631. Chapter 7 states that the beguines of this court are obliged to attend holy mass every day... and that after mass on week-days the priest will pray the Litany of Loreto before the miraculous image of Mary, which was blessed in 1505 by Sebastian [read: Adrian], Bishop of Sebaste and suffragan of Utrecht, and is kept here with many miracles⁸⁵.

Haarlem. Een 20e-eeuwse opleving van een oude devotie", *Haarlem-Jaarboek* 1984 (Haarlem 1985), 26-45, here 43, note 5. This study also appeared as a pamphlet, appendix to *Devotionalia* (Eindhoven, december 1985), 23pp. See also J.A.F.Kronenburg Csr, *Maria's heerlijkheid in Nederland VI* (Amsterdam 1909), 458-465. The *Rituale Romanum*, originally at the Beguinage, is preserved today in the Museum Catharijneconvent, Utrecht, Collection Library of St. Joseph's parish Haarlem, no. 63b, Margry, 43.

⁸¹ "Illustrissimus et Reverendissimus Dominus Philippus Archiepiscopus Philippensis concessit omnibus qui intersunt dum recitantur Litaniae aut eas separatim legunt coram hac statua Beatae Mariae Virginis miraculosa quadraginta dierum Indulgentias. Datum Anno 1629", Van Kersbergen (note 80), 317.

⁸² The letter is edited by C.J.Gonnet in Allan's *Geschiedenis van Haarlem* (note 77), II, 637, see Appendix 3. Cf. C.J.Gonnet, "Het archief van het Begijnhof te Haarlem", *BBH* 10 (1882), 116-169, here 124-125 (= no. 14).

⁸³ Van Kersbergen (note 80), 314. This *Rituale Romanum* also is preserved in the Museum Catharijneconvent, Utrecht, Collection Library St. Joseph's parish, Haarlem, no. 63a, Margry (note 80), 43, note 5.

⁸⁴ Margry, 44, note 19.

⁸⁵ "De beggijnen van desen Hove sijn gehouden alle daghen misse te hooren in haare kercke. Ende naer de misse op alle werkedaghen, sal den Priester lesen die Lauretanische Litanien voor het mirakeleus beeld van de H.Maria, welcke op desen Hove van den Jaere vijftthien hondert en vijft geweest is, van Sebastiaen [sic] biscop tot Sebasten, ende Wybisscop van Utrecht gewijdt, ende met groote mirakeulen alhier bewaert is",

Haarlem, S.Maria ten Zijl

Most probably, being at Haarlem in June 1505, Adrian paid a visit to the Sisters of the so-called Zijklooster. This convent, originally founded in 1372 for women of the third order of St.Francis, in 1428 adopted the Rule of St.Augustine as the convent of St.Mary ten Zijl, and as such was the last nunnery to be incorporated into the Chapter of Sion of the Canons Regular of St.Augustine⁸⁶.

The Cartulary of Zijklooster, formerly preserved in the Seminary of the diocese of Haarlem at Warmond and now in the Museum Catharijneconvent, Utrecht, has been edited by C.J.Gonnet⁸⁷. Page 5 of the edition preserves a letter of Giles van der Heijden, de Merica OCarm, bishop of Beirut (Beritensis) and suffragan of Cambrai, who, as we have already seen⁸⁸, also officiated as suffragan of Utrecht. In this letter, which is undated, Giles declares that, with the consent of Frederick of Baden, he granted several spiritual favours to the monastery. At the end of the letter is a transcription of an addition by Adrian of Appeltern, testifying that he had granted to the Sisters and commensals of ten Zijl an indulgence of 40 days every time they carry out one of the following acts of piety. Firstly, whoever on awaking in the morning and praying five times Ave Maria says: Dear God, let me pass this day in thine honor and in salvation of my soul, and considers in the evening how she in fact spent the day. Secondly: whoever renders service to the spiritual father in whatever way. Thirdly: whoever goes about in a friendly way with the other sisters and speaks kindly with them. Lastly: whoever receives guests with kindness whether serving them food or drink or does their washing or any other things they need doing⁸⁹.

F.M.K.van Kersbergen, "Nog eenige bijzonderheden omtrent de beeltenis van Onze Lieve Vrouw van Haarlem", *BBH* 31 (1908), 435.

⁸⁶ P.M.Verhoofstad, *Inventaris der archieven van kerken, kloosters en staties berustend in het archiefdepot van het bisdom Haarlem* (Haarlem 1959), 37-57; E.Ypma OSA, *Het generaal Kapittel van Sion. Zijn oorsprong, ontwikkeling en inrichting* (Nijmegen-Utrecht 1949), 11, 18, 41-43.

⁸⁷ C.J.Gonnet, "Cartularium van het Zijklooster te Haarlem (Convent der Kanonessen-Regulieren ten Zijl)", *BBH* 16 (1890-1891), 1-379.

⁸⁸ See p. 288.

⁸⁹ "Ick broeder Adriaen van Appeldoorn [read: Appeltern], biscop van Buruth [read: Sebaste], suffragaen mijns ghenadichs heren van Utrecht, hebbe gegeven die susteren ende commensalen van Zijl XL dagen aflaets van ingesette penitencie, soe menichwerven als men enige van dese nagescreven punten doet. In den eersten soe wie 's morgens als hij opstaet leest vijf Ave Maria, seggende: lieve Heer laet ic desen dach overbrengen tot uwer

6. ADRIAN'S LAST YEAR 1506

Utrecht, ordinations

Just as in the previous year, in 1506 there were six days for ordinations, i.e. February 28, March 28, April 11, June 6, September 19 and December 19⁹⁰. All together 304 priests were ordained, among them 202 seculars and 102 religious, and 297 deacons, and 295 subdeacons⁹¹.

In this year too Adrian administered priestly ordinations to five of his confrères. This was on September 19 and they were Theobaldus Jacobi, Cornelius Michaelis of Bergen, and Cornelius Danielis⁹². In addition on December 19 Johannes of Delft and Petrus of Enkhuizen were ordained by Adrian, always assuming he was still alive⁹³.

Dordrecht

At Dordrecht, in the street called Zwindrechtstraat, now the Dolhuisstraat, there stood until after 1580 the house of the Cellebrothers or Brothers of St. Alexius who had arrived in the town prior to 1441. They along with their female branch were engaged in the care of the sick, especially those who were victims of the plague, and in the interment of the deceased⁹⁴. The Canons Regular of St. Augustine at Eemstein, under whose protection they were, granted them a house in the Dolhuisstraat⁹⁵.

eere ende tot zalicheyt mynre zielen. Ende 's avonts overdenct hoe hij den dach overgebracht heeft. Item soe wye pater dienstelic is hetsij wair dattet is. Item soe wie mit sijn medesusterkijns vreedsamelic ommeget ende minliken toesprect. Item soe wie die gasten minliken ontfact ende dient, hetsij in eten, in drinken, wassen off in een ander dingen die sij te doen hebben", Gonnet, Cartularium (note 87), 299-301 (= no. 220); Verhoofstad (note 86), 39 (= no. 132).

⁹⁰ Brom (note 68), 1896, 316-405.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, 1897, 54-57.

⁹² *Ibidem*, 1896, 403.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, 1896, 404.

⁹⁴ *Geschiedenis van Dordrecht*, I: De geschiedenis tot 1572, eindred. J. van Herwaarden (Dordrecht-Hilversum 1996), 147-149.

⁹⁵ Before this the Cellebrothers lived in a few little houses in the street, named Vriesestraat, which in the 15th century were called *huyskens van de swarte mannekens* (small houses of the little black men), because of their black clothing, and where plague-patients were nursed, C.J.P. Lips, *Wandelingen door Oud-Dordrecht* 2 (Zaltbommel 1974), 456. Today in the Dolhuisstraat a part of the monastery still stands (*ibidem*, 393-395 with

A chapel was built there. On August 9, 1506 Adrian of Appeltern, in the name of the bishop of Utrecht, granted an indulgence of 40 days to those patronizing the altar of the chapel. From this it is supposed that the chapel together with its altar were ready at that time⁹⁶.

Gouda

We have already dealt with the Brethren of the Common Life and their Jerusalem chapel⁹⁷. In 1506 Adrian was once more in touch with the house of the Brethren, dedicated to St. Paul. On November 10 of that year Frederick of Baden, bishop of Utrecht, authenticated a relic of St. Paul, a part of his rib, set into a statue of the patron-saint, and granted a forty day indulgence to all those coming to venerate the statue in the monastery church. On the same day Adrian also edited a letter of the same tenor⁹⁸. This also forms the final act of Adrian's life which has been transmitted to us.

7. DEATH AND INTERMENT

Precisely when Adrian of Appeltern departed this life is just as unknown as the date of his birth. It could have occurred towards the end of 1506 or at the beginning of 1507. His successor, namely as suffragan of Utrecht, the Dominican James (de) Ridder of Kalkar was appointed by Frederick of Baden on March 12, 1507, although he had already been consecrated bishop of Hebron on July 10, 1506⁹⁹. On August 13 of that

a photograph ca. 1880 on p. 389). See also *Oude gebouwen te Dordrecht* by J.C. Overvoorde a.o. (Dordrecht 1900), 28, no. 7.

⁹⁶ J.L. van Dalen, "Het Cellebroedersklooster te Dordrecht", *BBH* 25 (1900), 304-308, here 305-306.

⁹⁷ See p. 300.

⁹⁸ Vorstman (note 52), 157-159, followed by "Item in eadem forma de verbo ad verbum litteras de suffraganeo domini Trajectensis, scilicet Adriano de Appeltern, Episcopo Sebastensi"; Taal (note 50), 88, who also published a picture of the monastery, facing p. 117, which finally was demolished in 1943. St. Paul's statue is now preserved in the Museum Catharinagasthuis at Gouda. For the history of the monastery and the aforementioned documents, see Weiler, *Volgens de norm* (note 52), 138-149.

⁹⁹ Weijling (note 3), 282.

year he paid the due amount to the Camera Apostolica in Rome¹⁰⁰. It is not known as to where he went on to function as suffragan¹⁰¹.

Adrian is said to have been interred in the church of the Carmelites, later the church of St.Catherine of the Knights of St.John, and today the cathedral of the archdiocese of Utrecht. In about 1600 Buchelius wrote his *Monumenta*¹⁰², mentioning his name there but without giving a date. However, it is not quite clear if Van Buchel transcribed Adrian's tombstone or that he saw the text on one of the then there present stained glass windows¹⁰³. Between these representations in the column at the right of fol.83v, within two lines, one reads: "D(ominus) Adrianus de Appeltern Sebastien(sis) Ep(iscopus) Suffraganeus Traiectensis". Above this text Van Buchel writes: "Visitatio Elisabethae et D(ivae) Virginis", and next to it: "Puerperium D(ivae) Elisabeth". Below Adrian's text is written: "Christus a Jo(hann)e tingitur". Underneath Buchelius copied a coat of arms: in a shield a cross-beam charged with three diamonds, but this is not Adrian's coat of arms, as we have already noted, from the confirmation letter of the confraternity of St.Anne¹⁰⁴. Under the whole text is written: "in medio baptisterii". The meaning of which could be that Adrian of Appeltern has been interred in the baptistery of the church¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁰ Brom, *Archivalia* (note 5), I,1 (= no.1045).

¹⁰¹ Eubel, *Hierarchia* (note 5), 163 is not clear in his statement. He mentions James as suffragan of Utrecht under the year 1503, while in the list of the suffragans of Utrecht (*ibidem*, 276) he notes the year 1506.

¹⁰² A.Buchelii, *Monumenta passim in templis et monasteriis Traiectinae urbis atque agri inventa*, Het Utrechts Archief, MS. bibl.XXVIII, L 1, fol. 83v. He describes what he found in the church of the Knights of St.John, which in Adrian's day belonged to the Carmelites (f.83r-84r).

¹⁰³ Buchelius who copied a great number of coats of arms, probably also copied those of the Knights of St.John, who after 1528 were in the possession of the church, including texts for the saints and for the persons likely to have donated the windows.

¹⁰⁴ See note 9.

¹⁰⁵ After these texts relating to Adrian, Buchelius writes: "Sequitur locus lavandis ut videtur manibus destinatus, ubi quatuor vitra sequentibus signis et picturis notata, a dextris: Historie van het vrouken op de putte ende Christo [History of Christ and the Samaritan at the well]". Finally one reads: "duorum Eremitarum simulacra". This could mean that these windows do deal with Adrian, as Weijling (note 3), 279 supposes. See also above note 9, where we considered Adrian's coat of arms.

8. EPILOGUE. AFTER ALL: ANOTHER AUGUSTINIAN SUFFRAGAN OF UTRECHT

We sub-titled this study: Adrian of Appeltern the only Augustinian suffragan of Utrecht. However, this is only partly true, because there was another Augustinian of the monastery of Dordrecht, who received an appointment as suffragan of Utrecht, James Lisse, son of a mayoral family of Dordrecht and mentioned as prior of the Augustinian monastery there in 1428-1429 and 1432-1441¹⁰⁶. This was during the Utrecht schism (1423-1449)¹⁰⁷, and thus in quite other circumstances. We shortly will report upon this schism.

After the death of Bishop Frederick of Blankenheim in 1423 two parties contested the secular and spiritual power within the diocese of Utrecht: the Lokhorsts and the Lichtenbergers, the former partisans of the Hooks, the latter intimates of the Cods. One party chose Sweder of Culemborg as successor of Frederick, the other Rudolph of Diepholt. Neither was confirmed by the Pope, but an outsider: Rhabanus of Helmstedt, bishop of Speyer, was appointed¹⁰⁸. In 1425 Rhabanus stood down and the Pope then appointed Sweder of Culemborg to the See of Utrecht¹⁰⁹. The other party supported Rudolph of Diepholt, who in fact ruled the diocese in the years 1428-1431, but beyond the temporal power, Sweder was acknowledged by many as the real bishop. From 1430 onwards he resided at Dordrecht.

The new Pope, Eugene IV (1431), sent a legate to the Low Countries to resolve the question. There they demanded the deprivation of Sweder and appealed, not to the Pope, but to a General Council. In 1431 both candidates travelled to the Council of Basle, which had been convoked by the Pope, and soon came into conflict with Eugene IV himself. On December 10, 1432 Eugene IV appointed Sweder of Culemborg titular bishop of Cesarea¹¹⁰, and Rudolph of Diepholt bishop of Utrecht¹¹¹. However, in January 1433 the Council decided otherwise

¹⁰⁶ G.D.J.Schotel, *Het klooster, het Hof en de Kerk der Augustijnen te Dordrecht* (Dordrecht 1861), 55-56; Weijling (note 3), 67-68, 225-227.

¹⁰⁷ J.de Hullu, *Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het Utrechtsche schisma* (Den Haag 1892). For what follows see R.R.Post, *Kerkgeschiedenis van Nederland in de middeleeuwen*, II (Utrecht-Antwerpen 1957), 2-18.

¹⁰⁸ C.Eubel, *Hierarchia* (note 5), I, 460.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*, 491.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, II, 113.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*, II, 253.

and acknowledged Sweder as the legitimate bishop of Utrecht¹¹². Rudolph asked for a re-examination of the question, but before matters had gone that far Sweder of Culemborg died at Basle on September 22, 1433.

Playing it safe, Pope Eugene appointed Rudolph again bishop of Utrecht on October 16. The opposing party, acting in belief that Sweder had been the legitimate bishop of Utrecht, considered the diocese as being vacant. In February 1434 twelve canons, assembled at Dordrecht, elected Walraven of Meurs bishop of Utrecht. The election was confirmed by Walraven's brother, the archbishop of Cologne¹¹³.

Furthermore, Walraven appealed to the Council to which Rudolph also was summoned. Eugene IV transferred the Council to Ferrara in 1437, but the rebellious councilfathers continued to assemble at Basle, and two years later they dethroned the Pope. On November 5, 1439 they elected Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, who was living as a hermit at Ripaille on Lake Geneva. He took the name of Felix V, was crowned on July 24, 1440, and is the last antipope in history¹¹⁴. Before his coronation, Felix V created on April 12, 1440 five cardinals among them Walraven of Meurs, who declined the honor, because he was unable to gain possession of his diocese and seems never to have received the cardinal's hat¹¹⁵.

Along with Walraven of Meurs, James Lisse, prior of the Austin Friars at Dordrecht, had come to Basle. On October 1, 1440 he was admitted into the Council¹¹⁶.

¹¹² J. Gill SJ, *Constance et Bâle-Florence* (Paris 1965), 140-141.

¹¹³ According to J. Helmuth, *Das Basler Konzil 1431-1449. Forschungsstand und Probleme* (Köln-Wien 1987), 110, the diocese of Utrecht was represented by 29 participants. For many years the Utrecht electoral question was a political affair of the first degree (*ibidem*, 191). "Am 3. Mai 1436 entschied das Konzil in der Utrechter Bistumsangelegenheit zu gunsten der vom Kapitel vollzogene Postulation des... Walram von Mörs mit der beigefügten Erklärung, dass dem (vom Papst am 10. Dezember 1432 providierten) Rudolf von Diepholt kein Recht auf das Bistum zustehe", K. Eubel, "Die durch das Basler Konzil geschaffene Hierarchie", *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte* 16 (Rom 1902), 269-286, here 278. For the Council of Basle see further: *Concilium Basiliense. Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte des Concils von Basel*, I-VIII (Basel 1896-1936), and C. J. Heffele - H. Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, VII, 2e partie (Paris 1916), 924-1100.

¹¹⁴ Eubel (note 5), II, 92. On April 7, 1449 Felix abdicated and was made cardinal of Sabina by Pope Nicholas V. He died on January 7, 1451 (*ibidem*, 9, 11). See for him: *Amadée VIII - Félix V, premier duc de Savoie et pape 1383-1451* (Actes du colloque château de Ripaille à Thonon-les-Bains, 23-26 oct. 1990), éd. B. Andermatten et A. Paravicini Bagliani (Lausanne 1992).

¹¹⁵ Eubel, *Römische Quartalschrift* (note 113), 273.

¹¹⁶ "Sabbati prima octobris 1440. In congregacione generali incorporati fuerunt medio juramento: frater Jacobus Liess prior conventus Dordracensis ordinis sancti Augustini Trajectensis diocesis...", *Concilium Basiliense* (note 113), VII: Die Protokolle des Concils

In June 1441 Felix V appointed him titular bishop of Tripolis and suffragan of Utrecht¹¹⁷. Just like Walraven of Meurs - who renounced his claim to the See of Utrecht in 1448 and became bishop of Münster in October 1450, dying there in 1456¹¹⁸ -, James Lisse was unable to function as suffragan of Utrecht. Whether ordinations and consecrations were performed by him is unknown. He must have died soon, as we know from a document, dated April 9, 1443¹¹⁹.

In the municipal archives of Dordrecht three copy-books of acts (1403-1532) are preserved. In the second volume (1425-1469) there is a transcript of a document, dated June 13, 1442. On this date a number of letters, dealing with a house belonging to James Lisse, were ordered by the judges to be transcribed into the register¹²⁰. In one of the letters, dated January 16, 1434, eleven members of the Augustinian community declare to have given the said house to James, the prior, and his heirs. The Augustinians committed themselves to celebrate a yearly mass for him and the inhabitants of his house. Moreover to light a candle on his grave in which also his parents lie, and that on the Monday after the feast of St. James (July 25). The grave, under a big blue stone, was located immediately in front of the entrance to the choir of the church¹²¹. This letter was pierced by another under James Lisse's hand and seal, dated May 15, 1439. And so, we may suppose that James Lisse found his last resting-place there.

1440-1441, hrsg. von Hermann Herre (Basel 1910), 256.

¹¹⁷ "Im Juni 1441 wurde der Augustiner Jacobus Liss zum Titularbischof von Tripolis befördert unter Anweisung einer jährlichen Pension auf die Einkünfte des Bistums Utrecht, woraus hervorgeht, dass er dort als Weihbischof fungieren sollte; dies wird ihm aber nur in dem beschränkten Maasse möglich gewesen sein, als der Erwählte desselben, Walram von Mörs, in dessen Besitz gelangen könnte", Eubel, *Römische Quartalschrift* (note 113), 283; Eubel, *Hierarchia* (note 5), II, 256, note 2; 276.

¹¹⁸ Eubel, *Hierarchia*, II, 194, 253.

¹¹⁹ "Int jaer XLII des dinxdages voer palmen IX daghe in aprilie [= April 9, 1443]... heeren Jacop Liss bisscop van Tripolis wijlen eer prior van den Augustijnen cloester bynnen der stede zaligher ghedachte..." J.L. van Dalen, "Het Klooster en de Kerk der Augustijnen te Dordrecht", *BBH* 26 (1901), 1-46, here 26.

¹²⁰ Dordrecht, Stadsarchief I, Inv., no. 14, fol. 194r-v (= no. 2289). I would like to thank Mr. J. Alleblas of the Dordrecht archives, who kindly sent me photocopies of it.

¹²¹ "Dese memory sal alle jaer ghedaen worden met een bornende waskaersse opten grave des prioers sijde voer die optrede daer op dees tijt eenen groten blauwen sarck op leyt ende des voerghenoemden priors ouders in begraven leggen ende toebehoert ende dat jaerghetyde voerscr. salmen doen des maendaghes na Sinte Jacobs dach". See also P.A. Henderikx, *De oudste bedelordekloosters in het graafschap Holland en Zeeland* (*Hollandse studies* 10). Dordrecht 1977, 118, 142; *Geschiedenis van Dordrecht* (note 94), 329.

CONCLUSION

Since James Lisse was appointed suffragan of Utrecht by the antipope Felix V and never functioned as such, we may indeed say that Adrian of Appeltern is, to date, the only Augustinian suffragan of Utrecht.

Eindhoven (Pays-Bas)

Alberic DE MEIJER O.S.A.

APPENDIX 1

Adrianus de Appeltern, bishop of Sebaste, consecrates two altars in the church of the monastery of St. Elisabeth at Rugge, and changes the patrons of the other altars. July 28, 1504.

Het zy aan alle menschen, zoo tegenwoordige als toekomstende, bekend dat in 't jaar 1504, den 28 July, de eerw. Vader in *Christus*, Heer *Adrianus*, by Gods genade Bisschop van Sebaste, en in 't Bisschoppelijke de algemeene Vikaris van ... Heer *Fredericus* Bisschop van Utrecht, in onze kerk twee outaaren heeft ingewijdt: Het eene staat aan de zuidzijde, het tweede aan de noordzijde, en zijn beidegaar in rang de allerleste aan de westzijde. Het eerste aan de westzijde staande, heeft hy ingewijdt ter eere van den Almogenden Godt, van de HH.Maagden en Martelaressen, *Agnes*, *Barbara*, *Appolonia*, *Lucia*, *Dorothea*; en van alle de HH.Maagden onzes Heere *Christus*. De vijf gemelde Maagden waren te voren tot Patronessen van andere outaaren gewijdt (of aangesteld) geweest; maar vermits ons inzicht was de Patroonen der outaaren te veranderen, te verplaatzen, en te vermenigvuldigen: en uyt zijn antwoord verstaan hebbende dat het geoorloft was: zoo hebben wy de voornoemde HH.Maagden doen inwijden (tot Patronessen) en van de andere altaaren op dit outaar doen overbrengen. En op de gemelde outaaren hebben wy, gelijk beneden aangewezen zal worden, andere Patroonen doen stellen. Het andere outaar heeft de voorn. Bisschop ingewijdt ter eere van de HH.Abten *Bernardus* en *Benedictus*; van de HH.*Franciscus* en *Antonius*; en ter eere van alle HH.Abten en Monniken. En hy heeft geordoneert dat de wijding van deze twee outaaren geviert zoude worden op het wy-feest van onze kerk en van onze andere outaaren: te weten op den Zondag na O.L.Vrouwe bezoeking. En op dat

dezelve outaaren met behoorlijke eerbewijzingen bezocht, en van de Christene geloovigen geduurig geëert mogen worden, heeft hy, zoo aan de inwoonders als aan de buiten-luiden uyt godvruchtigheid herwaart koomende, die de gemelde outaaren op het Wy-feest, en op ieder feest van alle de Patroonen der voorn. altaaren, bezoeken, en 'er het Gebed des Heere of een ander godvruchtig gebed voor leezen, indien zy in staat van genade zijn, achtervolgens Gods barmhertigheid en zonderlinge genade-gunst, verleent 80 dagen afaats: te weeten 40 dagen wegens den Bisschop van Utrecht, en noch 40 op zyn eigen gezag: dewelke verdient konnen worden op het feest der wijdinge, en op ieder feest van de Patroonen der gemelde outaaren. Noch heeft hy aan alle de ledematen van dit Klooster, ieder dag, verleent 20 dagen afaats, of afslag van de opgeleide boetplegingen, zoo dikwils zy de voornoemde outaaren, met de zelfde godvruchtigheid als boven zullen bezoeken.

En nademaal de Bul van den eerw. Vader in *Christus*, Myn Heer *Matthias* Bisschop van Biduanen, noopende het wijden van de Kerk en de outaaren voornoemd, duidelijk uytdrukt aan welke (Heiligen) zoo wel de Kerk als de outaaren toegewijdt zyn; zoo hebben wy, ten einde de nakomelingen niet ongerust of twyfelmoedig mogen zyn over de rechte Patroonen der altaaren, goedgevonden by geschrift na te laten, wat eene verandering, verplaatzing, en vermenigvuldiging, dat 'er in de Patroonen der outaaren is geschiedt. In de Bulle van *Matthias*, Bisschop van Biduanen, staat aangetekend dat het hoofd-outaar ter eere van den almogenden Godt, van de H.Maagd *Maria*, en van de H.weduwe *Elizabet*, Patronesse des Kloosters en der Kerke, ingewijdt is. Maar op ons verzoek heeft de eerw. Vader in *Christus*, de Heer *Adrianus*, boven vermeld, als hy de twee voorgemelde outaaren wijde, het H. *Kruis* van 't outaar, dat nu het altaar van de HH. *Martinus*, *Willebrordus*, en alle HH.Belijders genoemd word, overgebracht op het hoofd-altaar; en heeft geordoneert dat het hoofd-outaar voortaan ook het outaar zoude zyn van 't H.*Kruis*. Het outaar van S.*Augustinus* en S.*Apollonia* zal volgens zijne ordonantzie voortaan den naam hebben van het outaar der vier Kerkleeraaren, *Augustinus*, *Gregorius*, *Hieronimus*, *Ambrosius*. En de H.*Elizabet* heeft hy verplaatst op het nieuwe altaar van alle heilige Maagden: 't welk hy ook haar ter eere heeft gewijdt. Het outaar van de HH.*Stephanus*, *Laurentius*, *Hieronymus*, *Lucia* en *Dorothea* heeft hy geschikt ter eere van de HH.Martelaaren *Stephanus*, *Laurentius*, *Cornelius*, *Bonifacius*, *Vincentius*, en *Sebastianus*: en den H.*Hieronymus* heeft hy eene plaats aangewezen op het outaar van S.*Augustinus*: doch de HH.*Lucia* en *Dorothea* heeft hy geplaatst op het altaar van alle HH.Maagden: 't welk hy ook haar ter eere heeft gewijdt. Het outaar van den H.Geest, en van S.*Catharina*, heeft hy geschikt voor de

Heiligen, dewelke eerst op S.*Martinus* altaar geplaatst waren: en die hy hen van daar heeft verplaatst. Het outaar van de H.Maagd heeft hy geschikt voor de H.weduwe *Anna*, de moeder der H.Maagd, voor S.*Josef*, haren Bruidegom, en voor alle de heilige vrienden (bloedverwanten) van *Christus*. Het outaar van de HH.Apostelen *Petrus* en *Paulus* en van S.*Agnes*, heeft hy geschikt voor de HH.*Petrus*, *Paulus*, *Andreas*, *Jakob* den Meerdere, en voorts voor alle de HH.Apostelen van *Christus*. En de H.*Agnes* heeft hy overgebracht op het nieuwe altaar der HH.Maagden, 't welk hy ook haar ter eere heeft ingewijdt. Het outaar van den H.*Andreas*, en van S.*Maria Magdalena*, heeft hy geschikt voor de HH.*Maria Magdalena*, en haare zuster *Martha*; en vorders voor de H.weduwe *Monica*, en voor alle heilige weduwen en ongetrouwde vrouwen. En S.*Andreas* heeft hy op het altaar van alle de HH.Apostelen overgebracht. Het outaar van S.*Lucas* en S.*Barbara* in het Kapittelhuis, heeft hy geordoneert dat voortaan het outaar zal zyn van de HH.Evangelisten *Matthaeus*, *Marcus*, *Lucas*, en *Johannes*: en de H.*Barbara* heeft hy op het altaar der HH.Maagden gebracht: 't welk hy ook haar ter eere heeft ingewijdt. Het outaar in het Koor, 't welk *Martinus* by Gods genade Bisschop van Magionne ter eere van het H.*Kruis*, van de HH.Belijders *Martinus*, *Willibrordus*, en *Bernardus*, en van alle heiligen, wel-eer had ingewijdt¹²², heeft hy geordoneert dat voortaan het altaar zal zyn van de HH.Bisschoppen en Belijders, *Martinus*, *Willebrordus*, *Nicolaus*, *Servatius*, *Hubertus* en *Eligius*, en van alle de HH.Belijders van *Christus*. Het H.*Kruis* heeft hy overgebracht op het hoofdoutaar: Alle de Heiligen op het outaar van den H.*Geest* en S.*Bernardus* op het nieuwe outaar, 't welk 't zijner eere, en ter eere van meer andere Heiligen, is ingewijdt. Dit alles heeft de voornoemde Heer *Adrianus*, na het inwijden van de twee outaaren, gedaan: houdende zyn Bisschoppelijke gewaad aan, en gaande van 't eene outaar naar het andere. En met de Patroonen heeft hy insgelijks de aflaten verplaatst; dewelke zoo op het feest der Kerk-wijdinge, als op hunne feestdagen, verleent waren geweest. Dit hebben wy op de Bulle van den Heer *Matthias* schriftelijk willen nalaaten: op dat daar over geene ongerustheit of twijfelmoedigheid mogt voorvallen.

Van Heussen-Van Rijn, *Oudheden en gestichten van het rechte Zuid-Holland en van Schieland* (Leiden 1719), 319-323.

¹²² Martinus de Campina, de Blijja OCist, bishop of Majo and suffragan to Sweder of Culemborg, bishop of Utrecht. He consecrated this altar on July 27, 1433, Weijling (note 3), 219-225, here 220.

APPENDIX 2

Adrianus de Appeltern, bishop of Sebaste and suffragan of Utrecht, declares to have consecrated the chapel, the cemetery, and some altars at Zoeterwoude and also altars in the chapterhouse of the Knights of St. John at Haarlem, granting indulgences of 40 days. He also saw the bull of Pope Innocent VIII for the Knights of St. John and confirms the indulgence, mentioned in it. June 1, 1505.

Adrianus de Apeltern, Dei et apostolice sedis gratia Episcopus Sebastensis ac reverendissimi in Christo patris et domini nostri domini Fredrici Marchionis Badensis, eadem gratia episcopi Trajectensis, in pontificalibus Vicarius generalis, universis et singulis presentes literas inspecturis Salutem in Domino sempiternam.

Quanto frequentius fidelium mentes ad devotionis opera inducimus tanto salubrius eorum animarum saluti providemus. Cupientes igitur ut ecclesia, altaria una cum cimiterio per nos, opitulante Dei clementia, cum solemnitatibus in talibus fieri congruis et consuetis, dedicata et consecrata, ecclesia vero sive capella in Soeterwou, in honore gloriose virginis Marie de Victoria, Sancti Panthaleonis et Johannis Baptiste, Altaria vero in eadem capella predicta situata, in honore Sanctissime virginis Marie de Victoria, Panthaleonis, Johannis Baptiste, Katharine Virginis, Agnete et Elisabeth Vidue, cujusquidem dedicationis dies dominica post Assumptionis Marie celebrabitur. Altaria vero in domo capitulari domus hospitalis Sancti Johannis in Haerlem situata, una cum ejusdem domus jamdicte ampliacione cum similibus solemnitatibus predictis, per nos, eadem Spiritus¹²³ sancti gratia cooperante, in honore gloriose virginis Marie de Victoria, Sancti Panthaleonis martiris, Johannis Baptiste, Jheronimi, Sebastiani et Anthonii, cujusquidem dedicationis dies dominica post festum Sancti Jheronimi celebrabitur, debitis honoribus frequententur et venerentur; Omnibus vero penitentibus et confessis qui dictam ecclesiam seu capellam in Soeterwouda et altaria, omnibus festivitatibus Pasche, Penthecoste, omnium Sanctorum, natalis Domini nostri Jhesu Christi, Epiphanie, Circumcisionis, Cinerum, Parascheves, Ascensionis Domini, venerabilis Sacramenti, devotionis causa visitaverint et flexibus genibus, tres orationes dominicas et totidem salutationes angelicas legerint ac omnibus festivitatibus gloriose virginis, omnium apostolorum, martirum, confessorum, evangelistarum, ac per eorundem festorum octavas, Nec non

¹²³ The text erroneously has *supra*.

qui luminaria ornamenta, libros, calices, vel qui in eorum testamenta aut extra, aurum vel argentum aut aliud quodcunque clenodium ad hujusmodi cappelle, altarium ac domus hospitalis reparationes, conservationem et manutenentionem et divini cultus augmentationem, donaverint, legaverint donarique procuraverint, Etiam qui missis, sermonibus et omnium divinarum horarum solempnitatibus, in eadem capella celebratis, lectis seu cantatis presentes interfuerint, aut qui eadem divina celebraverint ac celebrari curaverint, Etiam qui cimeterium seu ambitum devotionis causa visitaverint et circuierint, pro Christi-fidelium animabus orando, quotienscumque premissa vel aliquid premissorum adimpleverint, de omnipotentis Dei misericordia et beatorum Petri et Pauli, apostolorum ejus, auctoritate confisi, quadraginta dies indulgentiarum de injunctis eis penitentiis, misericorditer in Domino relaxamus. Preterea ad clausulas, in bulla ordinis Sancti Johannis a Sanctissimo Domino nostro Innocentio papa octavo, pie recordationis, concessa et emanata, cujusquidem transscriptum sanum, integrum, non vitiatum neque cancellatum, vidimus ac legimus, indulgentiam sic ut premititur, impertimur et concedimus, Et precipue ad clausulam: Qui predictas de novo constructas ecclesias seu cappellas vel altaria earum in die habite victoriae predictae a primis vesperibus vigilie usque ad occasum solis diei festivitatis ejusdem devote visitaverint. - In cujus rei testimonium et omnium fidem presentes literas sigilli nostri appensione jussimus et fecimus communiri. Datum anno Domini Millesimo quingentesimo quinto die prima Junii.

C.J.Gonnet, "Sint Panthaleon, patroon van de kapel te Zoeterwoude", *BBH* 2 (1874), 209-210.

APPENDIX 3

Philippus Rovenius, Archbishop of Philippi, Vicar Apostolic in Holland, grants a 50 day indulgence to those who will pray the Litany of Loreto before the statue of the Blessed Virgin in the church of the Beguinage at Haarlem. February 7, 1639.

Philippus Dei et Apostolicae sedis gratia Archiepiscopus Philippensis, et per Confoederatas Belgii Provincias, atque Trans Isulanae

partes vicarius apostolicus, Praepositus Aldensaliensis, omnibus hasce literas visuris Salutem in Domino.

Ea quae pietati et devotioni fidelium fovendae et augendae conducunt par est ut speciali favore prosequamur. Cum itaque in nupera nostra visitatione in mense Septembri Anno 1638 Harlemi facta depraehenderimus in Oratorio, seu Ecclesia curiae Begginarum ejusdem oppidi quandam antiquam et piam imaginem Beatissimae Virginis Dei genetricis Mariae, quondam ab Adriano Episcopo Sebastensi et Suffraganeo Ultrajectensi Anno 1505 2° Junii, consecratam, eandemque plurimis miraculis a Deo ad invocationem Beatissimae Virginis honoratam: Rogati sumus ut pro augmento devotionis eorum qui preces suas coram dicta Sancta Imagine, Deo et Beatissimae Matri Virgini Mariae offerunt, dignaremur quosdam favores et gratias spirituales concedere: Itaque de divina misericordia confisi, et speciali insuper autoritate et facultate a Sanctissimo D.N.Domino Urbano Papa Octavo accepta muniti, benigne concessimus et concedimus per praesentes, ut quicumque coram dicta Sacra Imagine Beatissimae Virginis, Dei genetricis Mariae Litanias Lauretanis devote recitaverint, aut iisdem dum leguntur in dicto Oratorio pie interfuerint, quinquaginta dierum Indulgentiam et remissionem quoad poenas peccatis suis debitas secundum formam Ecclesiae consuetam consequantur, idque toties quoties hoc praestiterint in statu gratiae, vel cum synchero dolore de peccatis suis, Praesenti concessione in perpetuum valitura.

In fidem praemissorum hasce literas sub nomine et sigillo nostro consueto expediri fecimus. Ultrajecti die septima Februarii Anno Millesimo Sexcentesimo trigesimo nono, Pontificatus S.N.Domini Urbani Papae Octavi Anno decimo sexto.

Phil. Archiep. Philippen. Vic. Aplic.

Ex mandato Illustrissimi Domini

Jod. à Moock

Secretarius.

F.Allan, *Geschiedenis en Beschrijving van Haarlem*, II (Haarlem 1877), 636-638.

JACOBI DE VITERBIO O.E.S.A.
QUAESTIONES DE DIVINIS PRAEDICAMENTIS
QUAESTIO XXVI

Cette question¹ demande s'il y a opposition en Dieu: "Utrum in Deo sit oppositio secundum omnes modos". Rédigée de façon habituelle, elle donne plusieurs arguments démontrant qu'il y a en effet opposition en Dieu. Un argument se dirige contre le *Respondens* qui soutenait qu'en Dieu n'existe qu'une opposition relative tandis que deux autres affirment que tous les modes d'opposition se trouvent en Dieu, ou qu'il n'y a aucune opposition, même pas relative. Par contre deux arguments soutiennent qu'en Dieu existe en effet une opposition relative.

Jacques de Viterbe compose la réponse en trois parties. Il expose d'abord le véritable sens du terme *oppositio*; ensuite il demande quels sont les différents modes d'opposition et quelle est la raison propre de chacun d'eux; finalement il examine si en Dieu il y a opposition et comment.

Le traité se termine par la réfutation ou la résolution des arguments donnés au début.

Le texte figure dans les cinq manuscrits, dans le *ms* 117 de la Bibliothèque de Bordeaux (B) aux feuillets 74^{vo}-78^{vo}, dans le *ms* VII C 4 de la Biblioteca Nazionale de Naples (N) aux ff. 71^{vo}-75^{vo}, dans le *ms* 200b de la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Padoue (P), dans le *ms* 213 de la Biblioteca Angelica à Rome (R) aux ff. 104^{vo}-110b, et dans le *ms* 56 de la Bibliothèque de Toulouse (T) aux ff. 182^b-190^{vo}.

On y trouve les mêmes caractéristiques que dans les questions précédentes². À plusieurs endroits le texte du manuscrit toulousain a noirci

¹ Voir: Jacobi de Viterbio o.e.s.a. Quaestiones de Divinis Praedicamentis. Quaestio XVIII. *Augustiniana* 38 (1988), 67-98; Quaestio XIX. *Ib.* 39 (1989), 154-185; Quaestio XX. *Ib.* 42 (1992), 351-378; Quaestio XXI. *Ib.* 44 (1994), 177-208; Quaestio XXII. *Ib.* 45 (1995), 299-318. Quaestio XXIII. *Ib.* 46 (1996), 147-176; Quaestio XXIV. *Ib.* 46 (1996), 339-369; Quaestio XXV. *Ib.* 48 (1998), 131-163.

² Nous renvoyons aux éditions suivantes: ARISTOTELES et AVERROES, *Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera, selectis translationibus ... illustrata ... Averrois Cordubensis in ea ... Commentarii*. ed. Venetis 1562/74; re-ed. Frankfurt 1963. Vol. I, IV, VIII etc.; *Aristoteles Latinus* (AL) 1961 sqq. I; AUGUSTINUS, *De Civitate Dei*. PL 41; CCL 48; *De Natura Boni*, PL 42; BOETHIUS, *De Interpretatione, Introductio ad Syllogismos. De Trinitate*. PL 64; DIONYSIUS, *De Divinis Nominibus*. PG 3; HUGO A S. VICTORE, *De Sacramentis*. PL 176; JACOBUS DE VITERBO, *De Divinis Praedicamentis. Quaestiones I-X*

et est devenu illisible. Quant à l'orthographe, nous avons mis *idea*, *annihilare*, *chymaera*, *definitio*, *pulchitudo*, *impossibilitas*, *pallidum*, *analogum*, *numquam* etc. où les scribes ont écrit *ydea*, *anihilare*, *cimera*, *diffinitio*, *pulcritudo*, *incomposibilitas*, *palidum*, *anologum*, *nonquam*, *sigillatum* et ainsi de suite.

DE PRAEDICAMENTIS IN DIVINIS QUAESTIO XXVI

Quaestio est: Utrum in Deo sit oppositio secundum omnes modos sui vel species.

1. Et arguebatur quod sic. Nam in Deo multum et paucum, quae opponuntur relative. Duae enim relationes vel notiones sunt paucae
5 respectu quinque vel quatuor, et haec sunt multae respectu illarum. In Deo etiam est unum et multitudo, quae opponuntur privative, scilicet sicut divisibile et indivisibile. In Deo etiam est magnum et parvum, quae sunt contraria secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis. Nam Deus dicitur magnus, et parvum etiam attribuitur Deo secundum Dionysium; et quia
10 contradictio includitur in omni alia oppositione, videtur etiam quod in ipso Deo sit contradictio, et sic omnes species oppositionum.

2. Praeterea, quia Respondens dicit quod in Deo est oppositio, non secundum omnes modos, sed solum secundum unum, scilicet oppositio relativa, arguebatur multipliciter contra ipsum, et aliqui probant quod
15 aliqua, alii vero quod nulla, sic dicendo etiam ut relativa.

Arguebatur ergo quod in Deo sit oppositio relativa contraria. In

ed. YPMA. Romae 1983. Quaestiones XI-XVII. ed. YPMA. Romae 1986. Quaestiones XVIII-XXV. ed. YPMA. in *Augustiniana* 38 (1988) sqq. [cf. note 1]; JOHANNES DAMASCENUS, De Fide Orthodoxa. PG 94; De Fide Orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Certanius. ed. E.M. BUYTAERT, N.Y./Louvain/Paderborn 1955; Dialectica. PG 94; St John Damascene. Dialectica. Versions by Robert Grosseteste. ed. O.A. COLLIGAN O.F.M., N.Y./Louvain/Paderborn 1953; SIMPLICIUS, Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. ed. A. PATTIN, 2 vol. Paris/Louvain 1971, Leiden 1975.

1 oppositio *ante* sit BN 2 sui/suis R; sui vel *lect.inc.* T 3 in Deo *add.* est N 4 paucae/pauci N 5 respectu *lect.inc.* T 6 scilicet *om.* BN 9 magnum/magnum BN et parvum *om.* B etiam/et T etiam attribuitur ... alia oppositione *corr.* B1; *om.* B 10 in ipso Deo/ibi R videtur etiam ... species oppositionum *om.* BN 13 solum/etiam BN; tantum R 15 alii/aliqua T dicendo/in Deo T 16 relativa *om.* TP

8. Vol. I pars I 35E; Bekker 5^b; Aristoteles Latinus (AL) I 16,17; 94,95.

9. De Divinis Nominibus, cap. IX (II,III); PG 3,910 B,911 A.

Deo enim est duplex modus processionis, qui dicuntur habere contrarietatem, cum dicuntur habere unum commune genus, quod est processio. Quae autem dividunt e diverso idem, ergo sunt contraria. Haec
20 autem duplex processio est per modum intellectus et voluntatis.

Item, in Deo sunt par et impar, quae sunt contraria. Est enim ibi numerus trinarius, qui est impar, et binarius, qui est par. Unde idem numero ipse gaudet.

Item, in Deo sunt diversae species habitus, ut sapientia, iustitia.
25 Diversae species generis contrariae sunt. Similiter sunt ibi diversae species relationum, quia quaedam sunt ibi numeri modo, et haec plures, ut similitudo et aequalitas, quaedam modo potentiae, ut Pater et Filius; diversae autem species contrariae sunt. Igitur in Deo est contrarietas.

3. Praeterea, contraria dicuntur etiam quae sunt factiva contrariorum,
30 secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae. Sed in Deo sunt rationes factivae contrariorum, ut idea albi et nigri. Ergo in Deo sunt aliqua contraria, et cetera.

Vel alio modo, quia, sicut diversitas in effectu arguit diversitatem in causa, vel formalem vel virtualem, sic contrarietas contrarietatem.

35 4. Praeterea, quod sit in Deo omnis oppositio, ostenditur sic. Secundum Hugonem, de Sacramentis, omnis pulchritudo, quae est in creaturis per gratiam, est in Deo per naturam. Sed oppositio in creaturis pertinet ad pulchritudinem rerum. Ergo in Deo est oppositio quaelibet.

5. Praeterea, quod sit in Deo contradictio ostenditur. Deus non est
40 nihil, sed est ens.

Item, Deus est non ens, cum secundum Dionysum Deus intelligatur per ablationem omnium, et sic est non ens. Ens autem et non ens sunt contradictoria.

Item, intelligit simul ens aliquid cum ens illud.

45 Item, potest aliquid terminare et annihilare.

6. Praeterea, quod in Deo sit oppositio privativa ostenditur, quia in eo

17 dicuntur habere *lect.inc.* T 19 quae/quod BN e diverso/e converso BN 20 per/secundum BN 21 ibi *om.* BN 23 ipse/ipsi B 25 similiter/sic autem N 26 relationum/relationis N quia quaedam *om.* BN; *add.* relationes T numeri/numerus B modo/modi BN 29 etiam *post* quae sunt BN 30 secundum Philosophum ... factivae contrariorum *om.* B 35 Deo/eo T 39 in Deo *add.* oppositio N Deus *add.* enim BN 41 ens/causa B intelligatur *add.* Deus B 42 autem/enim N 45 annihilare/adnihilare BN; anihilare T 46 Deo/eo T

30. Vol. VIII 262^{no}G; Bekker 1055^a; AL XXV 2,193; XXV 3,205; Vol. VIII 119 AB; Bekker 1018^a; AL XXV 2,97; XXV 3,105 sq.

36. Hugo de S. Victore, De Sacramentis. Lib. I pars I cap. III; PL 176,188 sq.

est distinctum et indistinctum, genitum et ingenitum, quae privative opponuntur.

Item, Deus est nec creatura alicuius rei, qua creatura non est
50 creativus illius, nec potest esse regressus ad hoc ut sit creativus. Ergo in eo est privatio et habitus.

7. Praeterea, ostendebatur quod in ipso nulla sit oppositio. Oppositio enim dicit distantiam, diversitatem, repugnationem. Haec non sunt in Deo in quo sunt unum. Una enim Persona est in alia, et quidquid est in una, est
55 in alia.

8. Praeterea, arguebatur specialiter quod in Deo non sit relatio. Secundum enim Simplicium relativa differunt ab aliis oppositis, quia alia opposita habent diversitatem ex seipsis. Relativa autem ex aliquo alio, scilicet ex fundamento. Sed hoc non potest esse in divinis, ubi est solum
60 una res. Ergo non est ibi oppositio relativa.

1. In contrarium, scilicet quod in Deo sit relatio, ut relativa oppositio, arguebatur quia in Deo est Personarum distinctio, sed non per absoluta, ergo per relationes. Sed solum relationes oppositae habent vim
65 distinguendi. Ergo est ibi oppositio relativa.

2. Praeterea, quod sola oppositio relativa sit ibi, ostenditur ex eo quod omnes aliae imperfectionem videntur importare. Omnis autem imperfectio est a Deo removenda.

70 Responsio. Dicendum quod haec quaestio primo aspectu videtur esse facilis et breviter determinabilis.

Prima facie videtur esse dicendum, sicut a pluribus dicitur, quod oppositio est in Deo, non tamen secundum omnes modos. Est enim ibi oppositio relativa, non autem aliae oppositiones.

75 Si autem volumus diligentius perscrutare, apparebit haec quaestio difficilis, nam, licet in Deo sint relationes, non tamen satis est manifestum an sint ibi secundum rationem oppositionis, quia oppositio, ut patebit, videtur imperfectionem importare. Dicimus enim quod in Deo vere est

49 qua/quae N; quae est B 50 nec potest ... sit creativus *om.* B 52 oppositio *om.* T
54 (quidquid) est *om.* T 56 arguebatur/arguitur N 57 oppositis/suppositis B 63 arguebatur *om.* T 64 ergo *corr.* B1; *om.* B (relationes) oppositae/oppositiones BNT
67 imperfectionem *add.* aliquam T 70 responsio *add.* et BN 72 prima *add.* enim T
esse *om.* T 73 tamen/tantum BN enim/tamen B; tantum N 75 si/sed B autem
om. BN perscrutare/perscrutari BN 77 rationem/relationes BT; rationes NP

relatio, sed tamen non secundum rationem accidentis, eo quod accidens
80 imperfectionem dicit.

Si igitur oppositio dicit imperfectionem, tunc esset dicendum quod, licet sit ibi relatio, non tamen secundum rationem oppositionis.

Si vero oppositio non dicit imperfectionem communiter sumptam, tunc videtur adhuc dubium, quare non sint ibi aliae species oppositionis,
85 sed sola relatio. Unde utrobique dubium habet quaestio.

Ad huius igitur quaestionis dissolutionem aliqualem, sic procedendum est.

I Primo enim videndum est quae est propria ratio oppositionis.

90 II Secundo videndum est de modis oppositionis, quomodo conveniunt et differunt ab invicem; per quod patebit propria ratio uniuscuiusque modi.

III Tertio videndum erit et inquirendum, an oppositio sit in Deo, et quomodo.

95 I Quantum igitur ad primum sciendum quod nomen oppositionis, si consideretur proprie, proprietates significandi imposita est; tamen dicitur de corporibus secundum quod habent positionem vel situm. Dicitur enim oppositio, idest contrapositio; positio autem est corporum secundum quod quanta sunt et dicuntur corpora opposita, idest contraposita, accipiendo
100 positionem in loco, quorum loca sunt contraposita.

Unde oppositio convenit corporibus ut ponuntur in loco et in ipsis locis in quibus ponuntur. Illa autem loca dicuntur contraposita quae ab invicem maxime distant, ut oriens et occidens, auster et septentrio, sursum et deorsum, dextrum et sinistrum, ante et retro. Haec enim dicunt
105 positionis differentias; et quia est inter ea distantia maxime dicuntur opposita, idest contraposita.

Extensum autem ex hoc est nomen oppositionis ad omnem distantiam, sive in qualitatibus sive in actionibus sive in relationibus, ut illa quae maxime distant dicantur opposita. Et secundum hoc videtur quod
110 ratio oppositionis consistat in hoc quod est distantia vel distare

79 eo/ secundum B 81 si igitur ... imperfectionem *om.* BN esset/esse B; erit *corr.* B1
88 est *om.* B; *add.* quia BN; *add.* in questione R 89 enim *om.* BNT (videndum) est
om. T (quae) est/sit BN propria/prima B 90 oppositionis/oppositis BT 92 erit/est
BN 95 sciendum *add.* est T nomen/natura BN si ante nomen B 96
significandi/significanda T imposita/impositis BN; imponitur T est *om.* BN tamen
add. proprie B dicitur *corr.* B1; *om.* B; de T 97 positionem/compositionem N 98
(autem) est *om.* BN 99 contraposita/composita BN 100 positionem/compositionem
BN 102 illa/aliam B contraposita/composita N 107 oppositionis *om.* BN 110 (vel)
distare *om.* B

quomodocumque, sed maxime distare.

Sed ulterius, non quaecumque distantia maxima facit oppositionem, nam substantia et accidens maxime distant, non tamen sunt opposita. Ideo videtur ulterius requiri ad rationem oppositionis convenientia in genere.

115 Sed hic assignant quidam tria esse de ratione oppositionis, scilicet alicuius generis convenientia, ideo substantia et accidens non opponuntur vel linea et albedo, et maxime distantia; unde album et pallidum non opponuntur, quia non maxime distant. Similiter nec duae albedines dicuntur requiri in quolibet oppositionis modo, nam de contrariis
120 manifestum est secundum Philosophum in X.

Item relativa conveniunt in genere et distant maxime secundum relationem.

Item, contradictoria conveniunt in genere, quia negatio et affirmatio sunt in eodem genere; differunt autem et distant maxime secundum
125 contradictionem.

Item, privativa in eodem genere sunt eadem ratione qua et contradictoria, et maxime distant secundum huiusmodi oppositionem.

Sed hoc quod dicitur de generis convenientia videtur esse dubium.

130 Primo, quia negatio et privatio, cum dicant non ens, non sunt in genere.

Secundo, quia in contrariis non requiritur universaliter generis convenientia. Quod patet per Philosophum in V, ubi dicit quod ea quae sunt in genere et differentia uno modo, dicuntur contraria.

135 Item, in Praedicamentis, quod contraria vel sunt in eodem genere, vel in diversis generibus, vel ipsa sunt genera. Ideo non videtur verum universaliter. Sed si debet verificari, oportet quod esse in genere sumatur large, scilicet vel per se vel per reductionem. Sic enim negatio et privatio sunt in genere.

112 maxima/maxime BN 114 requiri/inquiri BN 115 hic/hoc T ratione/genere B
117 (distantia) unde/ideo R; ut BN 119 dicuntur/videntur BN 121 conveniunt in
genere *corr.* T1 *post* maxime; *om.* T 124 autem/tamen BN 126 eadem ratione *om.*
BN 130 negatio et privatio/privatio et negatio BR 132 non *add.* videtur N requi-
ritur *add.* etiam BN 133 dicit/dicitur B 134 (sunt) in *om.* B et differentia ... in
eodem genere *om.* B 135 quod/quia sunt N 138 sic/sicut B

120. X Metaphys. cap. 8. Vol. VIII 260^o LM; Bekker 1055^a; AL XXV 2, 192; XXV 3, 203 sq.

133. V Metaphys. cap X. Vol. VIII 118^o M; Bekker 1018^a; AL XXV 2, 97; XXV 3, 105 sq.

135. Vol. I pars I 54^o KL; Bekker 14a; AL I, 37.

140 Item, quantum ad contraria non est universaliter verum, sed
quantum ad aliqua contraria et secundum aliquem modum; et ideo haec
conditio, scilicet convenientia in genere, non est universaliter et simpliciter
vera; universaliter non propter contraria, simpliciter non propter
contradictoria et privativa, quia negatio non est in genere simpliciter sed
145 secundum quid.

Sed hoc quod dicitur de distantia, non est verum simpliciter.
Distantia enim est diversitas quaedam. Non autem quaecumque diversa
sunt maxime; illa sunt opposita, ut dictum est de diversis praedicamentis.

Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod ad oppositionem tria requiruntur.

150 Primum est diversitas, secundum est impossibilitas, tertium est
universitas. Quae tria sic se habent, quia diversitas est quasi genus
oppositionis. Dico autem quasi, quia non est genus, sed commune, nec
analogum, sicut unum et alia huiusmodi.

Inpossibilitas vero est quasi differentia specifica, et in hoc
155 consistit propria ratio oppositionis.

Unitas vero est passio propria oppositionis.

Unde, si haec tria declarentur, determinata erit perfecte ratio et
natura oppositionis in generali.

1 Prima igitur conditio est diversitas. Oportet enim oppositionem
160 habentia esse diversa. Unde primo considerandum quod recte dicitur
diversitas et non differentia. Differt enim diversitas et differens, quia
differens aliquo modo differt; ideo ea quae differunt, oportet etiam esse
convenientia. Diversum autem non oportet in aliquo convenire. Omne
differens est diversum, non autem e converso; quandoque tamen ponitur
165 inproprie differens pro diverso.

Est autem sciendum quod, cum dicitur aliqua esse diversa quae in
nullo conveniunt, intelligendum est de convenientia generis, nam
convenientia attributionis invenitur in his quae sunt quantumcumque
diversa, ut inter Deum et creaturam.

170 Unde quando conveniunt genere, dicuntur differentia, sed secundum
diversa. Quando autem aliqua conveniunt solum analogia vel attributione,
dicuntur diversa.

142 conditio *lect.inc.* T 144 negatio *add.* et privatio T non est in genere *lect.inc.* T
148 (diversa) sunt/differunt B de/ex T 150 (tertium) est *om.* T 151 (diversitas)
est/enim N 152 commune *add.* sic T 154 impossibilitas/impossibilitas BN;
possibilitas T vero *om.* T in hoc/ea BN; *om.* T 155 ratio oppositionis/rationis N
156 passio *om.* N propria *add.* vel N 158 in generali *om.* B 160 dicitur *om.* N
161 (diversitas) et/est N 162 ideo/quia B etiam *add.* ea BN 164 quandoque tamen
lect.inc. N 168 quae sunt *post* quantumque BN 170 sed secundum ... dicuntur diversa
om. B

Sicut autem dictum est, non semper opposita conveniunt genere, accipiendo oppositionem communissime, licet accipiendo magis coartate
 175 verum sit. Ideo oppositio, sic communiter sumpta, non debet dici differentia sed diversitas, nam oppositio communiter sumpta est plus quam differentia. Omnia enim differentia sunt aliquo modo opposita, quia differentia sunt in eodem genere et contrarietatem habent, vel ratione sui, ut differentiae, vel ratione eorum per quae constituuntur, ut species.

180 Item, vel habent contrarietatem immediate et ratione sui, vel ratione eorum superiorum, ut homo et pirus, et cetera.

Non autem omnia opposita sunt differentia, quia non omnia sunt in eodem genere, communiter sumendo oppositionem. Unde, cum Philosophus dicit in X, "quod contraria sunt in eodem genere", accipit contraria
 185 magis proprie et coartate. Quod patet, quia probat hoc ex transmutatione, et tamen non omnia contraria sunt invicem transmutabilia, ut par et impar.

Item, est considerandum quod diversitas generale est, quia omne aut est idem aut diversum, et bene convenit in definitione oppositionis. Licet enim idem et diversum sint specialiter in substantia, tamen ad omnia
 190 applicantur, ut habent modum substantiae, quia albedo dicitur eadem vel diversa. Et licet distinguatur a dissimili et inaequali, tamen aequae commune, quia omne dissimile est diversum, licet ex alia ratione dicatur dissimile et diversum.

Unde diversitas et multitudo et divisio aequae sunt communia
 195 secundum praedicationem, multitudo et divisio generaliora sunt secundum rationem, quia comprehendunt et dissimile et inaequale, quae sunt species multitudinis.

Sic etiam dicendum de uno et eodem. Unde patet quomodo se habent haec ad invicem et diversitas et differentia.

200 Dico autem multitudo et divisio, vel potest dici quod divisio est idem quod distinctum, nisi forte secundum rationem, quia distinctio tollit

173 opposita/composita T 174 licet/sed BN 175 sit/sic N 176 differentia/dupliciter BN 177 eodem/aliquo BN 181 pirus *lect.inc.* BN 183 communiter sumendo oppositionem/sumendo oppositionem commune B 186 sunt *add.* sibi N; *add.* ad T; *add.* in R 187 generale/generalis BN 188 (idem) aut/et BN 189 idem *om.* B 190 vel *om.* B 191 (dissimili) et/vel BN 192 licet/sed BN 193 dissimile et diversum/diversum et dissimile T 194 Unde *add.* et B multitudo/similitudo B 197 multitudinis/similitudinis BN 199 haec *post* ad invicem BN 200 divisio/omnino B 201 quod *om.* BNTR distinctum *lect.inc.* B; destinationi R

173. voir l. 150 sqq.

184. X *Metaphys.* Vol. VIII 272 CD; Bekker 1058^a; AL XXV 2, 200, 201; XXV 3, 213 sq.

confusionem, et cetera.

Multitudo vel divisio, quia idem sunt, cum ratio multitudinis in
divisione consistat, distinctio autem opponitur confutioni. Unde distinctio
205 habet locum in omnibus praedicamentis, quia possunt aliqua esse multa et
differentia, et tamen non distincta, quia non sunt actu. Actus enim est qui
distinguit, et cetera; tamen solet accipi distinctum pro differenti et diverso,
et cetera.

Item, est sciendum quod diversum potest accipi proprie, et sic
210 solum habet locum in entibus. Non ens enim nec est idem nec diversum.
Unde hoc modo non est commune ad oppositionem, quia contradictio est
inter ens et non ens.

Alio modo dicitur diversum secundum quod omne quod non est
idem dicitur diversum, et sic dicitur de non ente, quia licet non ens non sit
215 proprie diversum, tamen potest dici non ratione; et hoc modo diversitas
sumitur in notificatione oppositionis.

2 Ulterius videndum est de secunda conditione quae requiritur ad
rationem oppositionis, scilicet impossibilitas. Opposita enim quocumque
220 modo oppositionis non se compatiuntur in eodem simul secundum tempus
et secundum rationem; et in hoc consistit propria ratio oppositionis et
convertitur cum oppositione.

Omnia enim quae sic sunt diversa quod non se compatiuntur in
eodem secundum idem, sunt opposita aliquo genere oppositionis, et e
225 converso omnia opposita quocumque genere oppositionis hoc habent quod
non se compatiuntur in eodem supposito secundum idem et respectu
eiusdem.

Licet enim idem sit pater et filius, non tamen respectu eiusdem, et
licet idem sit albus et niger, non tamen secundum eandem partem. Et sic
230 patet quod, licet omnis oppositio sit diversitas, non tamen e converso.

Aliqua enim sunt diversa quae se compatiuntur in eodem, ut
substantia et accidens, et Deus et creatura in eodem supposito. Unde
supposita numquam coniunguntur ad constitutionem unius Personae.

235 Sed hoc quod dictum est videtur habere dubium, scilicet quod
opposita sunt quae se non compatiuntur in eodem, et e converso quae se

203 vel/aut B 204 autem om. N 206 (tamen) non add. sunt BN 214 idem dicitur
corr. B1; om. B dicitur/est R et sic om. BN; hoc modo R licet post non ens BN
non/ut B 215 hoc modo/haec B 220 tempus add. sed B; add. et R 223 quod/quae
B se om. N 228 et filium non tamen/omnino cum BN 229 albus/albus BN ni-
ger/nigrum BN (niger) non om. BN 232 creatura/natura BN

non compatiuntur sunt opposita, nam duae albedines non se compatiuntur in eodem subiecto, nec tamen sunt opposita.

Item, album et pallidum non se compatiuntur, nec tamen sunt
240 opposita.

Item, color et sapor sunt contraria, cum sint diversae species eiusdem generis, et similiter scientia et virtus et diversae scientiae et diversae virtutes quae sunt in eadem anima, immo in eadem potentia.

Et dicendum ad primum, quod duplici albedine quae se non
245 compatiuntur, hoc non est ex diversitate formae, sed est ex unitate subiecti, quia ex quo est unum subiectum, non potest informari pluribus formis eiusdem rationis, quia eadem est perfectio illarum. Repugnantia ergo non est ex parte albedinum. Opposita autem non se compatiuntur ratione
250 ipsorum quae opposita dicuntur, quia secundum se repugnantiam habent.

Vel melius dicendum quod aliqua non se compatiuntur, hoc est vel propter illorum ad invicem repugnantiam, et sic opposita non se compatiuntur, vel hoc est propter illud in quo illa nata sunt suscipi, quia non aliter perficeretur per unum quam per aliud. Ideo frustra essent in illo.
255 In rerum autem natura nihil est frustra.

Vel dicendum quod hoc propter multam convenientiam, quia sunt idem ratione subiecti et eodem modo subiectum perficerent; opposita autem non sunt in eodem propter eorum repugnantiam.

Ad aliud autem quod dicitur de albo et pallido, dicendum quod,
260 licet non sint contraria simpliciter et perfecte, sunt tamen contraria aliquo modo et imperfecte. Quod patet, quia transmutatio est ex mediis, non solum ex extremis; termini autem transmutationis sunt contrarii. Unde et Philosophus ait, in V Physicorum, quod medium, comparatum ad utrumque
265 extremum, utrumque est. Et sic secundum quod aliquo modo habet rationem alterius extremi, dicitur contrarium aliquo modo.

Ad illud vero quod dicitur de diversis speciebus qualitatis

237 sunt/sicut BN 241 item color et ... in eadem potentia *om.* BN 247 (subiectum) non *om.* B 248 perfectio *add.* respectu B 249 autem/enim T ratione/respectu BN 253 illa/aliam B 254 perficeretur/perficerentur RT (per) aliud/aliam BN 255 In *om.* B rerum autem natura/natura autem rerum BIN rerum autem natura ... propter multitudinem *corr.* B1; *om.* B 256 Vel/et B1 quod *add.* propter B1 258 non/si B 261 simpliciter/similiter T 262 Quod/et BN quod patet *om.* B; *corr.* B1 263 extremis/terminis BN transmutationis/transmutationum B et *om.* BN 264 (ait) in *om.* BN Physicorum/Topicorum B

existentibus in eodem subiecto, dicendum quod non sunt idem. Nam non
est idem primum subiectum coloris et saporis et odoris, licet subiectum
270 remotum sit idem; et ideo sunt in eodem, licet non secundum idem.

De habitibus animae breviter dicendum quod, vel sunt in eadem
anima secundum diversas potentias, vel, si sunt in eadem potentia, hoc non
est secundum idem, non quia potentia habeat in se partium diversitatem.
Sed dico non secundum idem, idest non respectu eiusdem obiecti, quia
275 habitus est relativum; respicit enim obiectum.

Unde diversitas obiectorum facit quod possint esse in una potentia,
tamen intelligendum est de diversitate obiecti formalis. Sic in relativis
idem est pater et filius respectu diversorum; sic in contrariis, quorum ratio
sumitur ex aliquo extremiori, possunt contraria esse in eodem ut ad diversa
280 comparantur.

Et sic patet de secunda conditione oppositionis.

3 Ulterius est videndum de tertia conditione quae est sicut proprietas
quaedam oppositionis.

285 Haec autem conditio est unitas, idest quod unum uni opponatur.
Haec enim proprietas consequitur omnem oppositionem et omnem speciem
oppositionis, sed tamen differenter. Unum enim dicitur, vel ratione
singularitatis quod est numero unum, vel ratione conformitatis vel
attributionis quod est specie vel genere unum.

290 In oppositione igitur contradictoria unum uni opponitur ratione
singularitatis. Licet enim Socrates et Plato sint unum conformitate, non
tamen ei propositioni quae dicit "Socrates currit" opponitur contradictorie
"Plato non currit", sed solum haec "Socrates non currit".

Unde contradictio requirit identitatem numeralem, quia est eiusdem,
295 non nominis tantum, sed rei et nominis non synonymi, sed eiusdem
nominis ad idem secundum idem; similiter et in eodem tempore.

In aliis autem oppositionibus sufficit unitas conformitatis; quod in
contrariis evidentius patet. Nam omne album omni nigro est oppositum,
non solum album in aliquo subiecto opponitur nigro, quod est ibi possibile

268 eodem/aliquo BN nam non/non enim BN 269 primum/principium T; proprium R
coloris/corporis B licet add. idem B 271 (quod) vel/licet T 275 (habitus) est/et BN
277 (intelligendum) est/sit BN 279 extremiori lect. inc. BN 283 conditione/
oppositione N ulterius est ... quaedam oppositionis om. B 286 consequitur/sequitur T
omnem oppositionem/omnia opposita T 292 ei propositioni/ex propositione NT (Pla-
to) non om. BN haec/hoc NT 294 identitatem/unitatem BN; lect. inc. T 295 non
synonymi sed eiusdem nominis om. BN 296 (ad) idem add. et B 298 patet/apparet BN
nam omne om. BN omni/enim BN 299 ibi possibile/ impossibile BN

esse in eodem subiecto, immo etiam nigro existenti in alio subiecto actu; et hoc ratione conformitatis utriusque nigri, propter quam accipiuntur ut unum.

Et quod quidem dicunt quod non, dicendum quod hoc verum est, accipiendo contraria ut sunt termini transmutationum; sic enim solum sunt circa idem numero.

Sed accipiendo solum secundum rationem contrarietatis, sufficit unitas conformitatis. Quod patet per Philosophum, in Praedicamentis, quod "palam est quod circa idem subiectum vel specie vel genere nata sunt fieri contraria circa idem" genere, ut aegritudo et sanitas in corpore animalis, et albedo et nigredo in corpore.

Similiter circa idem specie, ut iustitia et iniustitia in anima, vel specie, ut sanitas et aegritudo in animali, et est species subalterna.

Non autem dixit de numero, quia hoc est manifestum, ut Damascenus dicit in Logica. Idem enim corpus contrariorum esse susceptibile convenit secundum sui ipsius transmutationem.

Similiter potest dici quod quandoque sufficit unitas attributionis in contrariis, scilicet quando contraria non sunt in eodem genere, ut, secundum Augustinum, Deo contrariatur malum creaturae, hoc est in quantum Deus est bonus. Bonitas autem Dei et creaturae non est in eodem genere, sed est analogum ad Deum et creaturas.

Hoc idem patet de privatione, scilicet quod sufficit unitas conformitatis. Unde omnis visio omni caecitati opponitur ratione conformitatis, tamen, si consideretur ut est ibi transmutatio, sic circa idem numero similiter oppositio relativa. Sic autem omnis paternitas omni filiationi opponitur relative ratione conformitatis, licet magis proprie si sit eiusdem numero.

Sed circa illam proprietatem oppositionis dubitatur. Videtur enim quod uni opponantur plura, ut virtuti morali duo vicia, ut liberalitati prodigalitas et avaritia.

300 alio/aliquo B 303 (dicendum quod) hoc om. BN 304 (ut) sunt om. B 306 sufficit *lect. inc.* T 309 contraria *post* circa idem BN (animalis) et/ut B 310 in corpore *add.* et B 315 susceptibile *ante* contrariorum BN 318 ut/unde B 320 et *add.* ad B 321 patet *post* de privatione BN 322 caecitati/cocitati N 324 omnis om. N 325 relative/relatione BN si sit om. N 327 proprietatem *lect. inc.* B 328 opponantur/opponuntur N; opponatur T

307. Vol. I pars I 54 JK; Bekker 14^a; AL I 37, 113.

314. Dialectica cap. LVII; PG 94, 646A; cap. 41 ed. Colligan, p. 41.

318. De Natura Boni cap. XIX (19); PL 42, 557.

330 Ad hoc autem concedunt quidam quod dicta proprietas exceptionem recipit in moralibus, ut patet in dicto exemplo. Sed videtur etiam quod in aliis sit instantia. Aequale enim opponitur magno et parvo, et multa opponitur uni et paucis, ut patet per Philosophum in X.

Et ideo est aliter dicendum quod sine exceptione illa verum est
335 quod unum opponitur uni secundum unum modum oppositionis. Idem opponitur pluribus et in eodem genere oppositionis; idem secundum diversas rationes opponitur pluribus, vel idem opponitur pluribus, ut illa plura habent unam rationem; quod patet in exemplis inductis. Multum enim opponitur uni et paucis, sed non eodem modo oppositionis. Opponitur
340 enim uni sicut habitus privationi, scilicet ut indivisibile divisibili; paucis enim opponitur relative, nec etiam eodem modo accipitur multum utrobique. Multum enim absolute sumptum opponitur uni; ut autem dicit multitudinem excedentem opponitur paucis.

Similiter de aequali dicendum quod magnum et paucum opponuntur
345 aequali, non ut plura sunt, sed ut conveniunt in una ratione, scilicet excessus, scilicet quia magnum excedit, parvum exceditur. Aequale autem nec excedit nec exceditur.

Vel aliter dicendum quod aequale est medium magni et parvi, sumptum per privationem utriusque, quia aequale est quod neque est
350 magnum neque parvum. In quantum ergo est medium, non opponitur eis. Medium enim secundum quod medium non opponitur extremis, sed opponitur utrique in quantum habet rationem utriusque, quia medium comparatum ad utrumque est aequale, respectu parvi est magnum et respectu magni est parvum.

355 Vel aliter, quia aequale, ut est medium, non opponitur eis, sed ut negat utrumque; et sic accipitur, ut supra dictum est, extremum.

Sic etiam pallidum non est contrarium albo et nigro secundum comparisonem, quia, ut comparatur ad utrumque, utrumque est; in quantum vero medium non.

332 instantia/distantia BN; *lect. inc.* T 333 opponitur/opposita B 335 (secundum) unum *om.* BN oppositionis *lect. inc.* N idem /unum B; item R 336 opponitur/opponuntur T (oppositionis;) idem *add.* etiam B 338 (rationem) quod/ut BN; *om.* R 340 divisibili/indivisibili BN 345 (ut) plura/prima BN 346 magnum *lect. inc.* T 347 (autem) nec/non N 353 (est) aequale *add.* et T (parvi) est *om.* T parvi est magnum et respectu magni/et magnum BN 357 secundum comparisonem *om.* R

333. X *Metaphys.* Vol. VIII 264 EF, 265 K; Bekker 1055^b; AL XXV 2, 194, 195; XXV 3, 206 sq.

356. voir l. 324 sqq.; voir l. 229 sqq.

360 Quod autem dicitur de virtutibus, dicendum est quod in quantum
medium est, non opponitur duobus extremis, sed in quantum habet
rationem boni, extrema vero ambo rationem mali. Et sic extremum unum
non secundum eandem rationem opponitur alteri extremo et virtuti
secundum rationem boni et mali, extremo autem sicut malum malo.

365 Ex dictis igitur patet, quid est oppositio secundum propriam
rationem; quare est diversitas quaedam eorum quae in eodem secundum
idem esse non possunt; cuius proprietas est quod unum uni tantum sit
oppositum.

Diversitas ergo communius est oppositione. Quod patet, quia aliqua
370 sunt diversa, quae in eodem possunt esse, ut linea et albedo. Opposita
autem non possunt simul esse in eodem secundum idem, et alia diversa
quae sunt in eodem esse non possunt, solent dici disparata. Haec autem
sunt quae sunt diversis generibus; quae enim sunt in eodem genere
necessario sunt opposita, ut supra dictum est.

375 Item, aliquid potest esse diversum a pluribus, ut linea ab albedine et
scientia. Unum tamen tantum uni opponitur.

Sciendum tamen quod, ut dictum est, illa quae sunt in eodem
genere semper sunt opposita. Quae autem sunt diversis generibus, aliqua
sunt opposita, aliqua non, sed tantum diversa. Nam quae in eodem
380 secundum idem esse possunt, non sunt opposita, ut linea et albedo. Quae
autem in eodem secundum idem esse non possunt, dicuntur opposita, puta
linea et scientia, et similiter gravitas et motus localis.

Sed tunc est dubium. Quia quae sunt contraria, unum potest
385 contrariari multis, ut lineae opponitur scientia et virtus, quia neutrum cum
illa esse potest.

Et dicendum quod in talibus, si unum opponitur pluribus, hoc est
ratione convenientiae alicuius quae est in illis pluribus, propter quam
convenientiam accipiuntur ut unum, ut virtus et scientia, et haec
390 conveniunt, quia sunt in subiecto incorporeo. Et secundum hoc opponuntur

360 virtutibus *add.* similiter P (dicendum) est *om.* BN 363 eandem/unam N virtuti
add. et B 364 malum *om.* B 365 (quid) est/enim T 366 quaedam/quae de BN
367 (proprietas) est *om.* B tantum *om.* N 370 possunt esse ... sunt in eodem *om.* BNT
375 aliquid *om.* BN diversum/diversitas B 381 puta/ut N 386 potest/possunt T
387 quod *add.* si T opponitur/convenit B 389 (accipiuntur) ut/et B 390
incorporeo/corporeo B

374. voir l. 113 sqq.

377. voir l. 135 sqq.; voir l. 192 sqq.

lineae, quae non potest esse nisi in corpore.

Sic igitur patet de primo principali, scilicet de ratione oppositionis in quibus consistit, et cetera.

395 II Nunc secundo videndum est de modis oppositionis, et eorum convenientia et differentia.

Modi autem oppositionis satis noti sunt. Distinguit enim Philosophus, in Praedicamentis et in V, quatuor modos, scilicet contradictionem, privationem, contrarietatem et relationem; quae quidem
400 quatuor dicuntur species oppositionis, sed magis debent dici modi oppositionis, quia oppositio non est sicut genus ad haec, sed est commune analogum, et etiam ratio oppositionis assignata est analoga. Alius enim modus vel ratio diversitatis est in alia et alia oppositione. Analogum autem dicitur diversis modis, secundum prius et posterius et secundum
405 attributionem unius ad alterum.

1. Primus autem modus oppositionis est contradictio, ut Philosophus dicit in X, post contradictionem principalior et prior est privatio, quia, ut dicit Philosophus, "privatio est contradictio quaedam", et praecedit contrarietatem, quia, sicut omnis privatio est quaedam contradictio, et non
410 econverso, sic omnis contrarietas est quaedam privatio, et non econverso.

Unde et contrarietas privatio dicitur, non tamen ut dicit Philosophus in X. Dicitur autem contrarietas privatio, vel, quia in uno contrariorum clauditur, privatio alterius, secundum quem modum utrumque contrariorum indifferenter est privatio respectu alterius, vel quia semper unum
415 contrariorum habet se ut privatio respectu alterius, scilicet illud quod est imperfectius et vilius, ut frigidum respectu calidi; et sic de aliis. Et utrumque modum innuit Philosophus in X; eo autem loco est contrarietas.

Ultimo autem est relatio, quia minimum habet de ratione

395 Nunc/Item N 398 modos *add.* oppositionis BN 399 contrarietatem *ante* privationem BN 400 sed magis ... oppositionis *om.* B 402 etiam *add.* ratione N 404 (modis) secundum *add.* quod B 407 in X/in IV B 409 omnis *corr.* B1; *om.* B; *lect. inc.* N 412 vel quia ... respectu alterius *om.* BN 415 habet se/habent T

398. Vol. I pars I, 52^{vo} GH; Bekker 11^b; AL I 30, 31.

398. V Metaphys. Vol. VIII 118^{vo} M, 119 ABC; Bekker 1018^a; AL XXV 2, 97; XXV 3, 105, 106.

406. X Metaphys. Vol. VIII 262^{vo} HJ; Bekker 1055^{ab}; AL XXV 2, 193; XXV 3, 205.

417. Vol. VIII 262^{vo} GHJ; Bekker 1055^{ab}; AL XXV 2, 199 sq.; XXV 3, 205 sq.

Vol. VIII 272 A; Bekker 1057 AL XXV 2, 200; XXV 3, 213 sq.

Vol. VIII 275^{vo} JK; Bekker 1058^b; AL XXV 2, 202, 203; XXV 3, 216 sq.

oppositionis, in tantum ut non videatur oppositio.

420 Quomodo autem haec sic se habeant per ordinem patebit magis in assignando differentias earum; de quibus consequenter videndum, scilicet de convenientia earum et de differentia.

425 Circa quod sciendum quod per ea quae dicta sunt de ratione oppositionis, patet de convenientia omnium earum ad invicem, idest quod est illud in quo omnes conveniunt.

Sed nunc videndum de convenientia aliquarum specialiter inter se, et de differentia ipsarum. Et primo de contradictione, quia prima est, videndum est.

430 De qua sciendum est quod contradictio habet duas condiciones per quas differt ab omnibus aliis, aliquas vero per quas differt a contrarietate et relatione et convenit cum privatione, aliquas vero per quas differt a privatione etiam specialiter.

Differt siquidem contradictio ab omnibus aliis.

435 Primo quidem, quia contradictio est oppositio secundum rationem, aliae vero sunt oppositiones secundum rem. Nam contradictio est affirmatio et negatio opponentiae, et sic utraque pars contradictionis est enuntiatio, sic per intellectum componentem et dividentem. Et ideo aliae operationes sunt sine opere rationis. Contradictio autem non est sine opere intellectus.

440 Sed circa istam contradictionem oritur duplex dubitatio.

Prima est, quia etiam contrarietas videtur esse secundum rationem. Dicuntur enim aliquae propositiones contrariae, aliquae contradictoriae, ut pater per Philosophum in Perihermeneias.

445 Ad hoc dicendum, licet sit dubitatio logicalis quod ubicumque est oppositio affirmationis et negationis in propositionibus, ibi est contradictio. Sed quia vera lex contradictionis hoc est quia si una est vera, reliqua est falsa, et e converso, ita quod numquam simul verae vel simul falsae esse

419 (in tantum) ut/quod BN 420 magis *post* assignando B 421 earum/earundem B
de quibus *lect. inc.* T 422 convenientia *lect. inc.* T 424 earum/eorum B 426
nunc/tunc BN aliquarum/aliqua^liter B 427 ipsarum/earum T quia/quae P 428
(videndum) est *om.* B; videndum est *om.* P 433 contradictio *corr.* N1; *om.* N 434
contradictio est oppositio/oppositio est contradictio T 436 pars *corr.* B1; *om.* B 437
Et ideo/sic B 441 circa/contra B 443 ut patet per/secundum B 444 in *add.* libro N
445 dicendum *add.* quod B 447 (est) vera/falsa N 448 falsa/vera N

non possunt, ideo, si aliquae propositiones inveniantur oppositionem
 450 habere, quarum una sit affirmativa, alia negativa, et possunt simul esse
 falsae vel simul verae, illae deficiunt ab oppositione contradictoria, et
 dicuntur esse contrariae secundum similitudinem quamdam ad
 oppositionem contrariam; verbi gratia, omnis homo est albus, omnis homo
 non est albus falsae sunt simul, licet non secundum totum.

455 Sed haec "omnis homo est albus" falsa est pro non albo. Unde in
 hoc deficiunt a contradictione, quod non possunt simul esse falsae; sed
 aliquid retinent de natura contradictionis, quia nunquam possunt esse simul
 verae et in aliqua materia, ut naturali et remota, nec simul verae nec simul
 falsae. Ideo in hoc, in quo deficiunt a contradictione, non dicuntur
 460 contradictoriae, secundum quid tamen, quia non possunt esse simul verae;
 tamen quando sunt simul falsae, non secundum totum sunt simul falsae, et
 ita aliquid est ibi de contradictione; tamen propter similitudinem quamdam
 ad oppositionem contrariam quae est in re, dicuntur huiusmodi
 propositiones contrariae.

465 Similitudo autem in hoc consideratur. Contraria enim quaecumque,
 sive immediata sive mediata, numquam simul in eodem esse possunt.
 Aliqua tamen contraria sunt quorum utrumque potest non inesse subiecto,
 ut patet in contrariis mediatis, quia corpus aliquod potest esse neque album
 neque nigrum, quia erit pallidum, licet contraria immediata necessarium sit
 470 alterum eorum inesse susceptibili.

Similiter propositiones dicuntur esse contrariae quae possunt esse
 simul falsae quasi contrariae mediata, quorum neutrum alium inest;
 numquam tamen simul verae, quia nulla contraria simul insunt subiecto. Et
 hanc similitudinem assignat Boetius in tractatu de introductionibus in
 475 Syllogismis.

Alia dubitatio, quae oritur circa conditionem praedictam
 contradictionis, est quia, cum res sit prior eo quam secundum rationem,
 videtur secundum hoc contradictio, quae est oppositio secundum rationem

450 alia/altera B esse *add.* non N 451 falsae/verae N verae/falsae N 455 albo
add. haec autem omnis homo non est alius, falsa est pro albo B 458 (verae) et *om.* N
 verae nec simul *om.* N 459 (in hoc) in quo *om.* N 460 quid tamen/cum B 462
 aliquid/quid T aliquid est ibi/est ibi aliquid B 463 oppositionem/oppositam B 466
 (immediata) sive *corr.* B1; *om.* B immediata sive mediata/mediata sive immediata B
 468 ut patet ... insunt subiecto *om.* R 469 licet/vel B 470 susceptibili/susceptibile B
 474 similitudinem *corr.* B1; *om.* B 475 Syllogismus *lect. inc.* BN

474. Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricalos PL 64, 771 B; 775 A.

De Interpretatione I. PL 64, 323 C sq.; De Interpretatione II. PL 64, 476 D sq.

480 esse posterior aliis, quae sunt secundum rem.

Ad hoc autem dicendum quod, licet formaliter et comprehensive
contradictio sit in ratione originaliter tamen est etiam in se, quia
affirmationi et negationi subiacet res. Unde et illa, quae subiacet
affirmationi et negationi, etiam contradictorie opponi dicuntur in quantum
485 sunt origo affirmationis et negationis.

Si enim dico "Sortes sedet, Sortes non sedet", sessio et non sessio
etiam est extra animam, et opponuntur contradictorie quia ex eis accipit
intellectus contradictionem.

Quod autem sic sit, patet per Philosophum, in Praedicamentis, ubi
490 dicit de privatione quod "privatum esse et habere habitum, non est idem
quod privatio et habitus. Habitus enim est visus, privatio autem est
caecitas. Habere autem visum non est visus, neque caecum esse caecitas".

Et licet haec non sint idem, scilicet privatum esse et habere habitum
cum privatione et habitu, tamen dicit quod eodem modo oppositionis
495 opponuntur sicut privatio et habitus. Et inducit ad hoc exemplum de
affirmatione et negatione, sic dicens "non est autem <neque hoc> quod sub
affirmatione et negatione", idest res significata per affirmationem et
negationem, "affirmatio et negatio. Affirmatio quidem enim est oratio
affirmativa, negatio autem oratio negativa.

500 Eorum autem quae sub affirmatione et negatione, nullum est oratio;
dicuntur autem et haec opponi ad invicem ut affirmatio et negatio, etenim
in his modus oppositionis idem". "Ut enim affirmatio ad negationem
opponitur, velut sedet huic non sedet, ita et quae sub utroque res
opponuntur, scilicet sedisse et non sedisse".

505 Dicitur enim negatio res, non quia ipse sit res, sed quia aliquid
realiter negatur, et non solum secundum rationem apprehendentem.

Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod contradictio, ut aliquid est
secundum rationem, posterior aliis est secundum hanc considerationem;
ratione vero rei subiectae praecedat alias.

481 hoc *add.* hoc T autem *om.* B et comprehensive/ex comprehensione B 482
etiam/et BT 484 contradictorie/contradictione B 490 dicit *add.* quod B privatum
lect. inc. B et/est N 491 autem *om.* B 492 (visus) neque/nec B 493 habitum/
visum N 494 tamen dicit/cum dicat B 495 inducit *corr.* B1; adducit B 499 autem
om. B 500 quae *add.* sunt BP nullum/ nulla B 501 ad *om.* BNT invicem *lect.*
inc. BNT 503 velut/vel ut BR res *ante* sub utroque B 504 et non sedisse *om.* B
505 aliquid *om.* N 508 posterior *add.* autem N est *ante* aliis B; *om.* N

510 Unde in X Metaphysicae dicitur contradictio est prima oppositio, in
Praedicamentis vero postponit eam omnibus aliis, ultimo determinans de
ipsa; cuius rationem assignat Simplicius, dicens quod alia opposita
praesupponit contradictioni, quia illa sunt secundum rem, contradictio
autem solum secundum rationem.

515 Ordinem vero aliarum trium sic ponit. Primo enim agit de relatione,
ut de eo quod minimum habet de ratione oppositionis, ut patebit; post de
contrarietate ante privationem, quia utrumque contrariorum est res aliqua,
non sic in privatione. Sed ordo qui supra dictus fuit, est secundum
rationem oppositionis.

520 Et sic patet de prima conditione contradictionis, per quam differt a
ceteris.

2 Secunda vero conditio est quod contradictionis nullum est medium,
sicut patet ex I Posteriorum et ex X Metaphysicae. Alia vero opposita
525 habent medium, licet non universaliter.

De contrariis enim patet quod quaedam sunt mediata, sive sit
medium nomine sive non nominatur, sed per abnegationem sumptum, ut
hoc in praedicamentis.

Similiter privativa medium habent, ut dicit Philosophus in X, in
530 quo assignat differentiam eius a contradictione. Habet enim medium per
abnegationem. Unde dicit quod omne quod est, est aequale vel non
aequale, quia haec sunt contradictoria.

Non autem omne est aequale vel inaequale quae sunt privativa, sed
solum quod natum est suscipere hoc, sicut omne quod est, vel est videns
535 vel non videns. Non autem omne quod est, vel est videns vel caecus, immo
est aliquid quod nec est videns neque caecum. Et hoc verum est de

510 dicitur/dicit quod NB 511 vero/autem N 512 alia opposita/illa oppositio B
513 praesupponit/praeposuit N 515 vero/autem N; om. T 516 de ratione oppositionis
om. B patebit/patet N 518 non/nec B 520 per quam differt ... quod contradictionis
om. B 523 Secunda lect. inc. T 524 (patet) ex om. B (et) ex om. BR 533 omne
add. quod BN est om. B 534 sicut/sed est T 535 (quod) est om. T 536 (immo)
est om. T (quod) nec/non N neque/nec P

510. Vol. VIII 118^{vo} LM; Bekker 1018^a; AL XXV 2, 97; XXV 3, 216 sq.

Vol. VIII 262^{vo} GHJ; Bekker 1055^b; AL XXV 2, 193; XXV 3, 205 sq.

511. Vol. I pars I 52^{vo} sqq.; Bekker 11^b sqq.; AL I, 108 sqq.; 69 sqq.

512. ed. Pattin II 516, 517.

524. Vol. I pars II 37^{vo} D; Bekker 72^a; AL IV, 287.

524. X Metaphys. Vol. VIII 262 HJ; Bekker 1055^b; AL XXV 2, 193; XXV 3, 205.

529. X Metaphys. Vol. VIII 262 J; Bekker 1055^b; AL XXV 2, 193; XXV 3, 205.

privatione proprie sumpta ut negatio in subiecto apto nato.

Relatio etiam medium habet, ut quidam dicunt. Licet enim Aristoteles non dixerit hoc, tamen non negat expresse. Architas enim hoc
540 ponit, scilicet quod relative oppositorum sit medium et ut dominantis et servi quod liberum, et magni et parvi quod aequale. Sic ergo patet de duabus conditionibus contradictionis, secundum quas differt a ceteris.

Est autem una conditio eius secundum quam differt a contrarietate et relatione tantum, et secundum quam convenit cum privatione. Hoc
545 autem est quia una pars contradictionis est non ens, et similiter privationis. Contrarietatis autem et relationis utraque pars est ens.

Est etiam una conditio secundum quam contradictio differt a privatione, quia privatio ponit subiectum. Est enim negatio in subiecto, sive apto sive non apto, tamen magis proprie dicitur privatio si sit aptum.
550 Negatio autem non ponit necessario subiectum. Unde non videns potest dici et de chimera et de lapide et de oculo.

Privatio autem, ut dictum est, ponit subiectum; et hoc dicit Philosophus in V Metaphysicae.

Sic ergo quatuor sunt conditiones contradictionis, et secundum duas
555 differt ab omnibus aliis, et secundum unam differt a privatione.

De privatione autem dicendum quod convenit cum contrarietate et relatione per habere medium et esse secundum rem, in quibus duobus contradictio differt ab omnibus aliis; differt ab eis ambobus, quia altera pars privative oppositorum est non-ens.

560 In illis autem utraque pars est ens, cum contrarietate non specialiter convenit, quia utriusque oppositionis extrema sunt extremorum vel termini transmutationis et motus. Quod saltem de aliquibus contrariis et aliquibus

537 proprie *add.* est N ut *add.* est N 538 etiam/autem N enim/autem N 539 (Architas) enim/autem N 540 (medium) et *om.* NR et servi *om.* B 541 quod/secundum B; et N 542 conditionibus contradictionis/contradictionibus BT; contradictionis *om.* N 543 (est) autem/enim N secundum quam/quod B contrarietate/contradictione B 544 convenit *ante* secundum quam T 547 est etiam/etenim N; *lect. inc.* T; *om.* R quam *add.* una B 548 (Est) enim *add.* una B negatio/privatio P 549 tamen/sive B si *om.* B 550 potest *add.* etiam B 553 (Philosophus) in *om.* BT 554 sic/si B 555 (aliis) et *om.* N unam/aliam B 557 per habere *om.* N; habere *lect. inc.* T 558 differt *add.* autem N 560 non/vero B 561 quia/quod N utriusque/utrique B (extrema) sunt *om.* N 562 quod/quia BT (contrariis) et/ab BT 563 quod/et B

539. Simplicius in Praedicamentis; ed. Pattin II 523.

553. V Metaphys. Vol. VIII 134 ABC; Bekker 1022^b; AL XXV 2, 108, 109; XXV 3, 117 sq.

privativis est verum, licet non universaliter de omnibus; quod etiam contradictioni convenit ut accipitur in rebus, non autem ut in rationibus.

565 In hoc autem differt a relativis quae non sunt termini transmutationis, cum simul sint, ut dicitur.

Differt autem privatio a contrarietate, quia in contrariis, in quibus est transmutatio, est regressus. In privatione autem non est regressus. Sed hoc non est verum de omnibus privationibus, sed de aliquibus; quae autem
570 sint illae nihil ad praesens. Require in Simplicio.

Cum contrarietate vero convenit privatio, quia utraque una extremitas est non-ens. Differt autem ab ea quia requirit subiectum; et hoc patet ex dictis.

Sic de contrarietate vero dicendum, quod convenit cum relatione,
575 quia utriusque extrema dicunt esse, et in hoc differt utraque a privatione et habitu, et quia habet medium et quia est realis; in quo differunt a contradictione et conveniunt cum privatione. Quomodo autem convenit cum privatione et quomodo differt ab ea, iam patet per dicta. Similiter quomodo differt a contradictione.

580 De relatione vero dicendum quod aliquas condiciones, per quas ab omnibus aliis differt, habet, et potest dici quod haec sunt tres.

1. Prima est quia relatio est oppositio positiva, non autem peremptiva neque oppugnativa. Aliae vero non sunt positivae, sed peremptivae et oppugnativae.

585 Contradictio siquidem oppugnativa, quia non-esse repugnat esse, et e converso, sunt etiam peremptiva et remotiva, quia unum removet aliud, quia uno existente aliud non est. Et sic non sunt positivae, quia non coexistunt.

Similiter privatio et contrarietas et oppugnationem habent et
590 remotionem, quia unum oppugnat alteri et removet alterum; non autem sunt positivae, quia non coexistunt.

Et si dicatur quod coexistunt, quia album in pariete et nigrum in

563 quod/et B 564 (convenit) ut/neque B; non N; nec T (autem) ut *om.* B; non P
566 cum *ante* differt B dicitur *om.* R 567 autem/cum *ante* Differt B 568 (privatio-
ne) autem/enim B (non) est *om.* T 571 contrarietate/contradictione N; contrarietas
T utraque/utriusque R una/unitas T 572 extremitas/pars R differt/differunt B
requirit/requiritus T 574 Sic de *lect. inc.* B; quod de T; Sic *om.* P 575 esse/ens N
576 (habitu) et *om.* B 580 quod *add.* licet T 581 differt *lect. inc.* T; *ante* ab omnibus
aliis B habet *ante* per quas ab B haec sunt tres/habet tria B 582 quia/quod B
positiva/privativa B 585 oppugnativa *add.* est B 586 remotiva/remotiva N 587
aliud *post* non est BT 589 (contrarietas) et *om.* B

oculo sunt contraria, quia dictum est quod sufficit unitas conformitatis in privatione et contrarietate, dicendum quod per se loquendo non coexistunt, 595 sed unum removet aliud, quia habent fieri circa idem numero. Si autem coexistunt, hoc est secundario.

Relatio autem non est peremptiva vel remotiva, quia unum non perimit aliud vel removet, neque oppugnat alii sed coexistunt; ideo est positiva.

600

Sed hic est dubitatio, quia non videtur verum quod relatio non sit remotiva vel peremptiva, quia hoc est commune omnium oppositorum quod circa idem esse non possunt; et sic unum oppositorum removet aliud.

Item, relativa se perimunt invicem; ideo secundum Philosophum, in 605 Praedicamentis, relativa posita se ponunt et interempta se interimunt.

Ad hoc autem dicendum, et primo ad primum, quod semper unum oppositorum removet aliud, in quantum non sunt simul in eodem secundum idem. Sed non sic accipitur remove in proposito, sed dicitur unum remove aliud et perimere, quia uno existente actu in rerum natura, 610 aliud desinit esse actu, sicut existente actu albo, desinit esse actu nigrum. Sic autem relativa non sunt remotiva, quia uno existente actu, non desinit aliud esse actu, immo magis ponitur aliud actu, et ideo dicuntur positiva.

Ad secundum dicendum quod relativa sunt ad invicem peremptiva, in quantum uno perempto perimitur aliud, sicut uno posito ponitur aliud, 615 cum sint simul natura. Sed non sic accipitur hic peremptivum, sed accipitur hic quod unum sit peremptivum alterius, quia existentia unius est peremptio alterius.

Item dubitatur quomodo relativa non dicuntur oppugnativa. Videtur 620 enim quod sic, ex hoc ipso quod sunt opposita.

Dicendum quod si oppugnare dicatur non esse simul in eodem, sic omnia opposita sunt oppugnativa. Sed oppugnatio proprie plus importat;

593 conformitatis/contrarietatis B 597 autem/vero BN 598 aliud *lect. inc.* B co-
existunt *lect. inc.* N; *add.* et N 600 hic est/videtur hic esse B (non) sit *om.* B 602
remotiva vel peremptiva/peremptiva vel remotiva B commune *lect. inc.* T; de ratione B
604 se perimunt/inperimunt T; se *om.* R 605 posita *om.* B interimunt/perimunt N
606 (primum) quod/quia B 610 (aliud) desinit/designit N (esse) actu *om.* N 612
ponitur/ponuntur B (ponitur) aliud *om.* T (aliud) actu/ad actum BT et *om.* P 613
Ad *om.* N 614 perimitur/interimitur N posito *om.* T 615 hic *om.* B 616 hic/sic B
617 peremptio/interemptio B; deperditio R 620 enim *add.* secundum T secundum
add. quod T autem *om.* B

videtur enim importare distantiam vel diversitatem cum distantia.

Secundum autem Simplicium sola diversitas introducit
625 oppositionem in relativis; in aliis autem diversitas cum distantia.

Et intelligendum quod diversitas sola facit oppositionem relativam,
hoc adiuncto quod non sunt simul circa idem secundum idem. Sunt igitur
relativa diversa, non tamen distantia, sed magis habent propinquitatem et
convenientiam. Unde dicit Simplicius quod oppositio relativa "ex
630 convenientia ad invicem diversitatem colligit".

Et sic patet prima proprietas relativorum secundum quam ab aliis
differunt; quae melius patebit ex secunda.

2. Secunda conditio vel proprietas ipsorum est, quia unum ipsorum id
635 quod est dicitur alterius, ut pater id quod est dicitur filii, et duplum
dimidii, et e converso.

Alia vero opposita non sic. Non enim dicitur bonum mali, et
malum boni, neque caecitas visionis et visio caecitatis, nec negatio
affirmationis et affirmatio negationis. Et ex hoc patet magis prima
640 differentia, scilicet quomodo relativa habent ad invicem convenientiam;
haec enim convenientia consideratur ex habitudine qua unum dicitur
alterius et e converso; et hoc enim dicuntur connexa esse. Haec enim
habitus mutua est eorum connexio.

645 Sed hic est dubium, quia contraria, secundum quod contraria, sunt
ad aliquid. Contrarium enim contrario contrarium est.

Et dicendum quod, si considerentur contraria secundum rationem
contrarietatis, sic sunt ad aliquid et non sunt contraria.

Si vero considerentur ea in quibus invenitur ratio contrarietatis, ut
650 album nigrum et huiusmodi, sic sunt contraria. Unde contraria in quantum
contraria sunt ad aliquid et non contraria, sed ea quae contrarietate

625 (in) relativis *add.* et BT 626 sola facit/facit solam B 627 hoc *add.* autem B
(non) sunt *om.* B (propinquitatem) et *om.* T 629 convenientiam *corr.* B1;
differentiam B 632 differunt/differt N; *add.* secundum B ex/in N 634 conditio vel
proprietas/proprietas vel conditio B (ipsorum) est *om.* N quia/quod N (unum)
ipsorum *corr.* B1; oppositorum B 635 (ipsorum id quod est) dicitur *corr.* B1; *om.* B
637 (mali) et/nec T 639 (negationis) et *om.* B; nec R 641 haec enim convenientia
om. BTRP qua/quia B 642 esse *om.* B 646 (sunt) ad *om.* T enim/tamen B 649
si vero ... sic sunt contraria *om.* B 651 (quantum) contraria *corr.* B1; *om.* B

624. ed. Pattin II 523.

629. ed. Pattin II 524.

participant sunt contraria et non ad aliquid.

Sed adhuc remanet dubium; et videtur mirabile quomodo contraria secundum quod contraria, sunt contraria et cum hoc etiam sunt ad aliquid.

655 Non videretur inconveniens, quia non est inconveniens quod aliqua secundum aliam et aliam rationem sint contraria et sint ad aliquid. Sed dicere quod contraria secundum quod contraria, nullo modo sunt contraria sed sunt ad aliquid, hoc videtur mirabile.

Et dicendum secundum Simplicium quod verum est quod dictum
660 est, scilicet quod contraria solum sunt ad aliquid, quia convenit eis proprietas eorum quae ad aliquid, scilicet coexistere et ad invicem dici, non autem secundum contraria secundum hunc modum. Sed tamen ratio contrarietatis facit alia esse contraria, scilicet illa quibus convenit, quia ratio contrarietatis facit illa oppugnare, sicut albedo in quantum albedo non
665 est alba, participans tamen albedine dicitur album; tamen albedo est factiva albi, quia facit aliud dici album et esse eo modo quo forma dicitur facere. Et est illud exemplum conveniens de albedine, scilicet quaelibet contrarietas non sit res vel forma superaddita his quae dicuntur contraria, tamen est modus essendi realis et habet in hoc modum formae.

670 Et quod dictum est de nomine contrarietatis, dicendum est de nomine oppositionis et contradictionis et privationis, quia privativum privabilis privativum et contradictorium contradictorii contradictorium.

Et sic patet de secunda conditione relationis.

675 3. Tertia conditio est, quia relatio vel oppositio relativa accipit differentiam vel diversitatem ex alio. Licet enim de se dicat diversitatem, tamen haec diversitas ortum habet et causam ex alia diversitate, scilicet fundamenti; propter quod character dicitur fundamentum ipsum.

Aliae vero oppositiones ex se ipsis habent diversitatem quantum est
680 de natura oppositionis ipsorum, et si considerentur secundum principalem acceptionem ipsorum.

Hoc autem ideo dico, quia contraria dicuntur, ut dicitur in V,

652 (contraria) et *om.* N 654 (et) cum *lect. inc.* B 656 (sint) contraria/differentiae B
658 hoc videtur mirabile *om.* B 659 Et *add.* est B 660 quod contraria *add.* secundum
quod contraria N 661 (coexistere) et *om.* N 663 illa *om.* N 664 (facit) illa/ea T
non *om.* B 665 tamen/cum BN 671 privationis/privativi BNT quia *add.* ratio B
672 privabilis/privatur N contradictorii/contradictionis BT 675 (conditio) est *om.* BT
quia/ vel B 682 ideo/ratio N in V *add.* Metaphysicae B

659. ed. Pattin II 523.

670. Vol. VIII 118^{vo} M, 119 AB; Bekker 1018^a; AL XXV 2, 97; XXV 3, 105, 106.

682. Vol. VIII 260^{vo} LM; Bekker 1055^a; AL XXV 2, 192; XXV 3, 203 sq.

factiva contrariorum vel acceptiones, vel passiva vel privationes contrariorum. Sed hoc est secundum quamdam attributionem ad ea quae
 685 primo et principaliter dicuntur contraria. Unde accipiunt diversitatem ex alio, verbi gratia album et nigrum sunt contraria, et similiter privatio albi et nigri contrariae sunt secundum Augustinum, et eorum contrarietas accipit diversitatem ex diversitate albi et nigri; sic motus ad contraria ut dealbatio et denigratio.

690 Relativa vero oppositio, et principaliter accepta, semper praeexigit aliam diversitatem.

Et sic patet relationis contradictio vel proprietates.

4. Potest autem addi et quarta, scilicet quod relatio inter omnes
 695 species oppositionis minimam diversitatem dicit, quantum est de natura oppositionis secundum se.

Aliae autem requirunt magnam diversitatem. Et hoc patet, quia dictum est quod relativa oppositio semper praeexigit aliam diversitatem, sed sufficit minimam diversitatem ad causandum diversitatem relativam,
 700 quia sufficit sola diversitas modorum essendi.

Utrum autem relatio, habens solum diversitatem modorum essendi pro fundamento, inveniat in creaturis vel in solo Deo, nihil ad propositum, quamvis quidam dicant quod in Deo nullam praeexigit diversitatem realem. Sed de hoc dictum est supra, in quaestionibus de
 705 relatione, et dicebatur aliquid iam.

Unde dicit Simplicius quod inter relativa quaedam "magis insinuant diversitatem, ut duplum et dimidium", quaedam "minus, ut scientia et scibile", forte quia unum est mensura et exemplar alterius. Hoc autem neque totaliter fere, ut aequales ad invicem.

710 Et Boetius dicit in libro De Trinitate similiter. "Sane sciendum

687 contrariae sunt secundum Augustinum ... diversitate albi et nigri *om.* P 688 ut dealbatio/vel albatio N 690 principaliter/principalis BT 692 patet *add.* etiam N 694 et/etiam N relatio *add.* relativa B; oppositio relativa T 695 minimam diversitatem ... natura oppositionis *om.* B 699 minimam diversitatem ... quia sufficit *om.* N causandum/ostendendum B 701 autem *om.* N 704 diversitatem *add.* rationem N sed de hoc ... aliquid *om.* R quaestionibus *lect. inc.* B 705 dicebatur/dicetur N 706 unde/et B; sed R quaedam/quidam N 707 minus *lect. inc.* B 709 fere *om.* B ut *add.* sunt B

698. De Civitate Dei XXI, 4. PL 41,713; CCL 48,762.

704. voir Quaestio XI. ed. Ypma p. 39 sqq; Quaestio XIII. ed. Ypma p. 80 sq.; 112 ad 7.

705. De Civitate Dei XXI, 4; PL 41,713; CCL 48,762.

706. ed. Pattin II, 524.

710. PL 64, 1255A, 1256 A.

<est> non semper talem esse relativam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens praedicetur, ut est servus ad dominum. Differunt enim, nam omne aequale aequali aequale est, et simile simili, et idem eidem. Et similis est relatio in Trinitate Patris ad Filium et utriusque ad Spiritum Sanctum, ut
 715 eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem". Et subdit "quod si id in cunctis <aliis> rebus non potest inveniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas".

Et si obicitur quod videtur quod sit in rebus creatis, quia idem est potentia et illud idem pro cuius sit actu et eadem res sub diversis modis.

Et dicendum quod re vera potest concedi quod sit relatio inter
 720 potentiam et actum, quod sunt diversi modi reales, quorum alter principium est alterius.

Tamen adhuc dissimile est in divinis quantum ad aliud, quia potentia est modus imperfectus, actus autem perfectus. Unde in his est origo vel relatio, et etiam imperfectio. Sed in Deo est origo et relatio sine
 725 imperfectione, quia illi diversi modi eiusdem rei, quae est essentia divina, sunt aequae perfecti, et ideo magis accedit ad diversitatem realem differentia potentiae et actus propter rationem perfectionis et imperfectiois, et dicuntur diversae res. Quod aliqualiter concedi potest, propter diversitatem perfecti et imperfecti, tamen una essentia sunt, ut alibi
 730 dictum est.

Sic igitur patet de propriis conditionibus et proprietatibus relativae oppositionis, per quas differt ab omnibus aliis, quae sunt coexistentia ad invicem dici et accipere diversitatem ex alio.

Quarta autem conditio, scilicet quae est importare et praesupponere
 735 minimam diversitatem, forte non convenit soli relationi, nam contradictio aequae minimam importat. Quod patet, quia ubicumque est multitudo et pluralitas, ibi est contradictio, quia ibi est divisio, quae dicit hoc non esse illud, nisi forte dicatur sicut et verum est, et ita diceretur quod est contradictio secundum quid; secundum quid autem convenit aliis, ut
 740 patebit.

711 non/quod N 712 praedicetur/praedicatur B differunt/differt N omne/esse N
 713 similis/ similiter T 715 (si) id/illud B 717 quod sit *om.* B; sit *post* in rebus P
 quia/quod N 718 pro cuius/pro quo B; postea R sit/fit NR (actu) et *add.* est N
 721 principium *post* alterius B 722 quantum/quia BT 723 perfectus/imperfectus B
 726 accedit/ accidit B 732 aliis *add.* per B 733 ex alio *om.* N 734 scilicet *om.* B
 735 diversitatem/ entitatem B non *om.* B relationi/rationi B 737 dicit/dicitur N
 738 illud/ ideo T 739 (contradictio) secundum quid *add.* Et ideo vero est illa quarta
 conditio simpliciter loquendo N ut *om.* B

Ex his potest magis patere quod supra dictum est, quomodo oppositio primo dicitur de contradictione, secundo de privatione, tertio de contrarietate, ultimo de relatione; quod sic patet.

De relatione enim minime dicitur, quia non dicit oppugnationem et
745 interemptionem sicut alia, sed connexionem et quia dicuntur ad invicem, et quia habet ortum ex alia diversitate, et minimam diversitatem dicit. Omnia enim hoc indicant quod relatio est minima diversitas, et per consequens oppositio.

Inter alia vero est ordo secundum diversitatem, quia maior est
750 diversitas inter ens et non-ens quam inter ens et ens. Ideo contradictio et privatio praecedit contrarietatem.

Item, contradictio praecedit privationem, quia plus sunt diversa ens et non-ens absolute, quam ens et non-ens in subiecto aliquo, quod dicit privatio.

755 Et sic patet secundum principale, scilicet de modis oppositionum et eorum differentia et convenientia.

III Nunc tertio videndum est, an in Deo sit oppositio secundum omnes suos modos. Circa quod sciendum quod hic duo implicantur, primo utrum
760 sit in Deo oppositio et, dato quod sit, an secundum omnes suos modos qui iam dicti sunt.

Ponitur autem communiter quod in Deo est oppositio, non tamen secundum omnes suos modos, sed solum est ibi oppositio relativa, secundum quam oppositionem Personae distinguuntur.

765 Quod autem sit in Deo oppositio declaratur. Constat enim, et supponitur secundum fidem catholicam, in Deo esse Personarum distinctio. Omnis autem distinctio est per aliquam oppositionem, nisi sit distinctio materialis, quae in Deo locum non habet. Est igitur in Deo oppositio.

Quod autem sola oppositio relativa, sic ostendunt. Non enim inter
770 Personas potest esse oppositio contradictionis, quia sic distinguuntur entia a non-entibus, quod non est dicendum in divinis Personis, nec etiam

741 quod supra dictum est *om.* BR 744 non/nec B; ut T 745 sicut *add.* et N sed/et B (et) quia/quod BT dicuntur/dicitur BT 746 (et) quia/quod B dicit *om.* BR omnia enim hoc ... ordo secundum diversitatem *om.* P 747 hoc *om.* N 749 vero/non B 750 (et) ens/non ens B 751 contrarietatem. Item ... praecedit *om.* BT 752 (plus) sunt *om.* N diversa/diversum N 756 eorum/earum BNP 759 hic/haec BN 760 (utrum) sit *post* in Deo BP (quod) sit *om.* B 761 sunt *add.* positae B 763 suos *om.* N 765 sit *post* in Deo B declaratur/declarat N; *add.* sic B enim *om.* B 767 Omnis autem ... distinctio est *om.* B 768 quae/quod T 769 ostendunt/ostendit N 770 quia/et N

distinguuntur divinae Personae secundum oppositionem privationis et habitus, quia sic distinguuntur perfecta ab imperfectis, vel imperfecta ab perfectis, neque etiam secundum oppositionem contrarietatis, quia sic
 775 distinguuntur quae sunt diversa secundum formam, cum contrarietas sit differentia secundum formam; quae differentia non est in divinis Personis, quia earum est una forma sicut et essentia. Unde Ad Phil. 2 dicitur "qui cum in forma Dei esset".

Relinquitur ergo quod non est distinctio Personarum, nisi secundum
 780 relationes, non quaslibet, sed originis. Et hoc etiam fuit supra declaratum.

Quomodo est et universaliter et simul de illis tribus oppositionibus, arguunt quod non sint in divinis ex duplici differentia eorum ad relationem; quarum una est quae iam tracta est, scilicet quia in relatione unum relativorum non removet aliud, in aliis autem oppositis sic.

785 Secunda est, quia in aliis oppositionibus semper unum se habet ut perfectum, aliud vero ut imperfectum. In relativis autem non oportet, sed aliqua possunt aequae perfecta esse, ut in relativis aequiparantiae; et haec differentia supra non fuit tacta.

Et potest addi tertia ratio, quia aliae sunt oppositiones oppugnativae
 790 et dicunt distantiam quae in divinis non est; licet sit ibi distinctio, non tamen distantia.

Sed in praedictis accidit dubium. Primo, quantum ad hoc quod dicunt quod in divinis est oppositio quia est distinctio, dubitatur, quia
 795 verum est quod in Deo sunt Personae distinctae. Sed opposita non possunt esse in eodem secundum idem. Personae autem divinae et relationes, per quas distinguuntur, sunt in eodem et secundum idem, scilicet in divina essentia, in qua non est hoc et hoc, et ideo nec etiam relativa oppositio. Prout videtur ibi erit maxime, si verum est quod oppositio relativa semper
 800 accipit diversitatem ex alio; relationi autem in divinis non praesupponitur

773 sic *om.* N (perfecta) ab *om.* N (imperfecta) ab/a B imperfecta ab perfectis/perfectis ab imperfectis N 776 non *om.* B 777 sicut *om.* BT; sic R et *add.* una BT Unde/quia B dicitur *add.* filius N 778 cum/tamen B 780 relationes/rationes B 781 (est) et *om.* B 782 sint/sit BT; *om.* PR eorum/earum ; *om.* R 783 quia/quod N 784 aliud/aliam B 786 vero *om.* B 787 aliqua possunt *om.* B 788 supra *post* tacta B 789 (aliae) sunt *om.* N oppositiones *add.* supra N 793 ad hoc *om.* N 794 dicunt/dicit N quia/quae T (dubitatur) quia/quod B 796 esse *om.* BT per/secundum B; per quas/quibus R 799 (verum) est *om.* T 800 relationi/relationem B autem/ita T; *add.* enim BT

777. Ad Philipenses II, 6.

780. voir l. 580 sqq.

aliqua diversitas realis. Erit ergo ibi relatio, non tamen ut oppositionem dicit; et similiter erit ibi distinctio, non tamen per oppositionem.

Et si dicitur quomodo potest hoc esse, dicendum quod, sicut relatio vere in Deo est, non tamen ut est accidens sicut in creaturis, ita erit ibi
805 vera relatio, non tamen ut oppositio est; et similiter distinctio erit ibi sine oppositione.

Ex alia parte, si ponitur in Deo oppositio relativa, non videtur quod debeat negari contradictio, quidquid sit de privatione et contraria. Dicimus enim quod Pater non est Filius et e converso, et, sicut in arguendo dictum
810 est, contradictio includitur in aliis, cum sit proprie oppositio. Praeterea, etiam de contraria et privativa videtur, sicut in arguendo tactum est. Et ideo videtur ex una parte quod nulla sit ibi ponenda, ex alia parte videtur quod quaelibet sit ibi ponenda.

Ut ergo salventur et dicta communia et satisfiat his quae sunt dubia,
815 circa hoc potest dici quod relativa oppositio simpliciter est in Deo solum; aliae vero non sunt in ipso simpliciter, sed secundum quid et aliquo modo. Quod ergo communiter dicitur, verum est simpliciter.

Ut igitur hoc pateat, videndum est singillatim de singulis.

Et primo de relativa oppositione, dicendum quod illa est in divinis.
820 Sed tunc est declarandum, quomodo ibi possunt salvari ea quae pertinent ad rationem talis oppositionis.

Ad hoc potest dici uno modo quod, sicut relatio in Deo est vere, non tamen secundum id quod imperfectionis est, quia non est ibi ut accidens, ita posset dici quod est ibi oppositio relativa, non tamen quantum
825 ad hoc secundum quod requirit diversitatem fundamenti et secundum quod sumit diversitatem ex alio.

Est autem ibi quantum ad omnes conditiones talis oppositionis,

801 Erit/est B 802 et/sed N erit/est B 804 vere om. N (Deo) est ante in Deo BN tamen om. N 805 vera/vere N distinctio post erit ibi B 807 si add. non R 808 contradictio lect. inc. T et om. B contraria/contrarietate N 809 (e converso) et om. BT 810 proprie/prima N 811 de/ducitur quod N contraria et privativa/privativa et contraria B tactum est add. totum B 812 ideo om. B alia om. N; add. etiam P ex alia ... ibi ponenda om. B 814 salventur/salvantur T (salventur) et om. BR (communio) et add. etiam N his/eis B 815 hoc om. B simpliciter post in Deo B 816 vero add. autem N simpliciter ante in ipso B 817 ergo om. B 818 est/sit N; videndum est/videtur B 819 primo/prima T illa/ista N 822 relatio post est B 823 (vere) non om. B tamen om. T id/illud BT (imperfectionis) est om. B quia/quod BN (non) est om. N 824 posset/potest T 825 (hoc) secundum om. B 827 omnes/alias N

quae sunt coexistere et ad invicem dici, et minimam diversitatem dicere.

Sed si sic dicatur, non salvatur ratio oppositionis, quae est non esse
 830 in eodem secundum idem; et ideo, si relatio est in Deo ut oppositio,
 oportet quod sit ibi aliqua diversitas in fundamento. Et sic etiam oportebit
 ibi esse illam conditionem, quae est sumere diversitatem ex alio.

Et ideo dicendum, sicut supra tactum fuit, quod essentia divina est
 fundamentum diversarum relationum secundum aliud et aliud, non
 835 secundum aliam et aliam rem, cum sit una simplex res, sed secundum
 alium essendi modum, scilicet absolutum, ita quod sunt ibi plures modi
 essendi absoluti, super quibus fundantur modi essendi relativi. Et haec
 diversitas sufficit ad oppositionem relativam, quia, ut dictum est, sufficit
 modica diversitas ad relativam oppositionem causandam. Et sic, praeter
 840 diversitatem quam dicit oppositio relativa, est ibi quaedam diversitas
 modorum absolutorum, quae est origo et fundamentum et causa diversitatis
 relativae: et non minus differunt illi modi absoluti quam relationes, immo,
 si liceat sic loqui, magis, cum sint horum fundamentum.

Qui autem sint illi modi, dictum fuit: esse naturale, et intelligibile
 845 et appetibile.

Sed tunc occurrit dubitatio. Prima est, quomodo isti modi, cum sint
 absoluti, possunt causare distinctionem, cum esse absolutum in divinis sit
 commune tribus.

850 Ad hoc autem dicendum quod isti modi sic se habent quod unus
 originem ducit ab altero, ut esse intelligibile a naturali, et appetibile ab
 utroque. Unde ad hos modos sequitur relatio originis, quae oppositionem
 habet et distinctionem; non autem sic est de aliis modis essendi in Deo.

Licet enim inter eos sit aliquis ordo, non tamen origo proprie, sed
 855 inter hos solos est ratio originis. Nisi enim ponantur hi modi, et secundum

828 (coexistere) et *om.* N diversitatem/entitatem B 829 salvatur/solvitur B 830
 est/sit N 832 conditionem *add.* contradictionis NT diversitatem *post* ex alio N 836
 absolutum/absoluti B ita/scilicet B sunt *om.* B; *post* essendi P; sint R 837 essendi
om. BN; *corr.* B *post* absoluti B *add.* sicut sunt absoluti B (fundantur modi) essendi
om. B 840 diversitas *om.* B; ad oppositionem ... quaedam diversitas *om.* P 843
 horum/harum T 844 (naturale) et *om.* BR 850 quod/ut N unus/unum B 851
 intelligibile/intellectuale N 852 oppositionem/oppositio B 853 essendi/causandi R
 855 enim/autem T hi modi/his modis B

833. voir l. 675 sqq.

838. voir l. 694 sqq.

844. Quaestio XIII. ed. Ypma p. 159.

hos modos esse originem, non posset salvari origo in divinis, ut videtur, nam relatio non originatur ex relatione, nec relatio est terminus productionis sed essentia, quia processio est secundum communicationem essentiae vel naturae. In Deo autem relatio consequitur hanc originem.

860 Item, nec ipsa essentia ut essentia est absolute originatur a se ipsa, quia nihil se ipsum producit, nec utrumque simul, scilicet essentia et relatio, quia ex quo essentia ut essentia est, nec est generans nec genita nec principium vel terminus generationis, cum sit commune tribus, nec etiam ipsa relatio est generans aut genita, sed consequens generationem vel
865 processionem, sequitur quod nec utrumque simul erit generans vel genitum. Oportet ergo dicere quod essentia ipsa, non ut essentia est absoluta, sed essentia secundum unum modum essendi, est generans, secundum alium est genita, secundum alium procedens. Relationes autem quae sequuntur hos modos essendi, vel, ut melius dicatur, essentia secundum unum modum est
870 principium generandi active, secundum alium est terminus generationis.

Non est enim dicendum quod essentia vel absolute vel sub tali modo sit generans vel genita. Persona enim dicitur a personali proprietate, quae totum includit, scilicet essentiam, modum et relationem, ut supra fuit dictum. Tamen bene potest dici et est verum, quod essentia sub tali modo
875 est principium vel terminus generationis.

De essentia vero absolute sumpta etiam hoc dici potest, quod sit principium vel terminus generationis, quia sic dicit rem communem tribus. Ex hoc potest videri quid dicit potentia generandi, quia scilicet essentiam sub tali modo; et quia talis modus includitur et insinuat per relationem.
880 Ideo dicitur ab aliquibus quod relatio, ut est eadem essentiae vel essentia ut subintrat proprietatem relativam, est potentia generandi, et cetera.

Quod autem assumitur, quod omne absolutum est commune tribus, isti autem modi si essent, non essent communes sed proprii sicut relatio,

856 originem/originetur B videtur/dicitur N 857 nam relatio ... ex relatione om. B
859 autem om. B 860 ut essentia est om. B 861 nihil add. per BT ipsum/ipsa N;
ipsam B producit/producitur NT; lect. inc. N simul om. B; add. sed T 862
(generans) nec/vel B nec principium om. B 865 (generans) vel/et N genitum/
generatum B 866 ergo om. T (ut) essentia om. B 867 est generans ... modos
essendi om. B 869 essentia/esse N 870 active add. et B 871 enim corr. B1; om. B;
add. idem P tali add. conditione N 872 genita/genitum N enim/autem N 873
quae lect. inc. B 874 sumpta om. B dici add. non N 877 tribus add. et N 878
ex/et T 878 dicit/sit T 879 modo om. N 880 (relatio) ut/non B (essentia) ut/cum
BT 882 omne/esse B 883 relatio/relativa B

dicendum quod verum est de absolutis modis ad quos non sequitur relatio
885 talis, ut dictum est.

Item, isti sunt tales modi, quia quilibet includit totam divinam perfectionem, et ipsi non dicunt perfectionem aliam et aliam, sed solum modum alium habendi perfectionem.

Est enim sciendum quod isti modi non sunt natura, intellectus et
890 voluntas, quia haec etiam dicunt speciales rationes perfectionum, sed esse naturaliter, intelligibiliter et appetibiliter. Deus enim habet esse naturaliter secundum suam naturam, habet esse intelligibiliter secundum quod se intelligit et concipit, et appetibiliter secundum quod se diligit, et secundum quemlibet modum omnis divina perfectio comprehenditur; sunt enim
895 aequales hi modi et similes.

Unde, licet tribus Personis conveniat natura, intellectus et voluntas, non tamen esse naturaliter, intelligibiliter, appetibiliter, quia in alia est esse naturaliter, in alia intelligibiliter, in alia appetibiliter; in ipsa natura divina concipiente est naturaliter, in conceptu formato intelligibiliter, in amore
900 spirato appetibiliter.

Secunda dubitatio est circa hoc quod communiter dicitur, quod distinguuntur solum per relationes, non per modos absolutos.

Et dicendum ad hoc quod verum est quod Personae solum per
905 relationes distinguuntur, ut per hoc quod dico solum excludatur ipsa res absoluta, non autem modus talis qualis dictus est.

Unde in relatione divina includitur ille modus qui est eius fundamentum. Unde illi non solent designari a suis propriis nominibus, sed simul cum relationibus insinuantur. Unde dicit Damascenus quod relationes
910 istae non significant substantiam divinam neque dignitatem, sed existentiae

884 sequitur/pertinet B sequitur *add.* relatio distinctiva, quia sunt communes, sed ad hoc sequitur N 885 est *om.* T 886 quia/quod N totam *om.* B 887 perfectionem *add.* aliquam N 889 enim/autem B sunt *add.* aliud B; non sunt *om.* P 890 speciales *lect. inc.* B sed/secundum N; *add.* etiam B esse *om.* B 891 et *om.* NR appetibiliter *corr.* P1; *mss.* apprehensibiliter naturaliter ... appetibiliter/naturaliter et apprehensibiliter et intelligibiliter B 892 (quod) se *om.* B; *add.* in se T 896 conveniat/conveniant B 897 naturaliter, intelligibiliter, appetibiliter, quia in alia est esse *om.* N 899 conceptu/intellectu B formato *lect. inc.* T 900 (hoc) quod/quia T 904 per relationes *om.* B 907 relatione/ratione B includitur/intelligitur B 908 illi *add.* modi N suis *lect. inc.* T 910 istae/realiter B

885. voir l. 850 sqq.

909. De Fide Orthodoxa I cap. VIII. PG 94,818 A; ed. Buytaert p. 35.

modum; et infra dicit quod secundum perfectitudinem hypostaseos, idest secundum modum existentiae, intelligimus differentiam in Personis.

Utrum autem isti modi existendi, qui sunt fundamentum relationum, debeant dici differre re vel ratione, vel quomodo, dictum fuit supra, et
915 infra dicetur in quaestione de prius et posterius.

Sic igitur patet quid dicendum sit de oppositione relativa in divinis, et cetera.

Nunc videndum est de contradictione. Et dicendum quod est in Deo
920 non simpliciter, sed secundum quid et aliquo modo, quia contradictio est esse et non esse. Cum autem in Deo omnia sint una res absoluta non potest ibi accipi non esse simpliciter; quod est non esse secundum rem absolutam.

Sed non esse secundum quid potest ibi accipi, propter differentiam modorum essendi, quia sapientia non est bonitas, quantum ad modum
925 essendi, nec Pater est Filius.

Et quanto est maior distinctio, magis reservatur ibi contradictio. Oportet enim quod ubicumque est pluralitas, quod ibi sit aliqua contradictio. Propter hoc ergo non-esse secundum quid habet in Deo locum contradictio.

930 Haec enim sunt contradictoriae: Pater est Filius, Pater non est Filius, et est una vera et alia falsa. Similiter sapientia est iustitia, sapientia non est iustitia, referendo hoc non ad rem, sed ad modum secundum quem differunt.

Et si dicitur quod negatio removet et etiam est imperfecta,
935 dicendum quod unum eorum quae sunt in divinis, removetur ab alio, non quantum ad rem quam dicunt, quae est una, sed quantum ad modum. Et talis remotio bene convenit in divinis, non ut dicit imperfectionem, sed magis consequitur perfectionem divinam, sicut et ipsa multitudo; de cuius ratione est divisio, quae negationem vel remotionem dicit unius ab alio. Est
940 igitur ibi contradictio secundum quid, quamvis dici posset quod esset ibi simpliciter, quia non est de ratione contradictionis absolute quod negetur

911 infra *lect. inc.* BN 919 contradictione *lect. inc.* BP; contradictoria RT 920 non ante est in Deo N 922 ibi ante non potest N quod/quia B *add.* non B 924 sapientia/essentia B 926 contradictio/contradictionem N 927 (enim) quod *om.* N est *add.* aliquid B 928 habet *post* in Deo T 931 (vera) et *om.* N 932 (hoc) non *om.* B 934 si/sic B 935 (quae) sunt/est T 936 quae est una *om.* B 937 divinis/Deo B (non) ut *om.* N 940 igitur *om.* N 941 simpliciter *om.* N quia/quod BT

911. ibidem cap. VIII. PG 94,830 A; ed. Buytaert p. 44.

914. Quaestio XI. ed. Ypma p. 33 sqq.; Quaestio XII. ed. Ypma p. 83 sqq.

res vel modus, sed quidquid sit illud.

De privatione autem dicendum quod, secundum quod dicit negationem in subiecto apto nato, sic non est in Deo, quia nulla est
945 carentia in Deo eius quod natum sit haberi.

Prout vero privatio dicit negationem in subiecto, sine tamen aptitudine habendi, sic est ibi, sicut et contradictio, non quia negetur res sed modus, ut ingenitum est privatio, et aliqua alia. Unde privatio dupliciter est in divinis deficienter.

950 Primo, quia non est ibi ut supponit aptitudinem subiecti, sed solum subiectum.

Secundo, quia non est ibi quantum ad rem, sed quantum ad modum, sicut de contradictione dictum est.

Et si obicitur de remotione et imperfectione, dicendum sicut de
955 contradictione dictum est. Nam talis remotio non repugnat Deo, nec etiam ponit imperfectionem.

Cum enim dicitur Pater ingenitus, non removetur vel negatur perfectio sed modus, quia ingenitum non dicit perfectionem sed modum existentiae, secundum Damascenum.

960 De contrarietate vero dicendum quod potest poni in divinis, sed inter quae considerandum est. Inter attributa quidem non, quia haec sunt in eodem secundum idem; omnia opposita autem non sunt in eodem secundum idem.

Licet enim aliqua attributa sint in Deo quae habere videntur
965 contrarietatem, ut sunt in creaturis, tamen ut sunt in Deo, non sunt contraria. Quod patet, quia sicut formae contrariae habent oppositionem proprie secundum quod sunt in actu, secundum autem quod sunt in potentia non dicuntur opposita proprie, cum contraria in potentia possunt esse simul in eodem, ut corpus pallidum simul est potentia album et
970 potentia nigrum. Possunt tamen dici opposita secundum quamdam relationem et attributionem ad actum vel ad contraria in actu. Ideo autem non sunt contraria absolute ut sunt in potentia quia sunt ibi unitive.

942 vel/sed N sed *om.* N 943 autem *om.* N 947 (sicut) et *corr.* T1; *om.* T 948 alia *lect. inc.* T 949 dupliciter/dicit B est *post* divinis N 950 sed/vel N 956 ponit/post N; dicit R 958 ingenitum/genitum N non/ut N perfectionem/imperfectionem T 961 (sunt) in/sub T 962 eodem *add.* differentia B omnia *om.* B in eodem/idem B; sunt in eodem *om.* T 966 sicut *om.* B 968 opposita/oppositae N 969 simul est *add.* in B 970 (et) potentia *om.* T 971 autem *om.* B 972 ut/non B quia/quae N unitive/in unione B

959. De Fide Orthodoxa I cap. VIII. PG 94,818 AB; ed. Buytaert p. 35; cap. X. PG 94,858 B; ed. Buytaert p. 51.

Oppositio autem dicit pluralitatem et diversitatem.

Similiter dicendum quod attributa sunt in Deo unitive, non actuali-
 975 ter sed in virtute. Ideo non sunt contraria, et magis sunt ibi unitive quam
 1005 contraria in potentia in subiecto; tamen attributa ut habent rationem causae
 respectu creaturarum, sic in respectu ad creaturas habent secundum quid
 contrarietatem. Sed iste respectus non est realis in Deo, nisi sicut in ter-
 mino. Et sic dicuntur contraria, quia contraria quaedam referuntur ad ipsa.

980 Eodem modo dicendum de ideis; quia sunt in Deo unitive, ideo non
 1010 sunt contrariae nisi in respectu ad creaturas, in quantum creaturae
 contrariae terminantur vel referuntur ad ipsas ut ad causas.

Si autem ideae non essent ibi unitive, haberent contrarietatem sicut
 et illa quorum sunt ideae.

985 Et si dicitur quod rationes contrariorum non sunt contrariae,
 1015 dicendum quod rationes contrariorum proprie, prout unumquodque habet
 conceptum sibi proprium, contrariae sunt, et simul non sunt in anima, sicut
 nec extra animam, ut Commentator dicit in VII, sed secundum quod ratio
 unius contrarii est aliquo modo alterius existendi; sic non habent
 990 contrarietatem in anima, quia sunt ibi unitive contraria, scilicet in uno
 1020 conceptu.

Unde, quia Deus contraria intelligit non pluribus sed uno conceptu,
 ideo non sunt in Deo ideae habentes contrarietatem nisi respective, quod
 est secundum quid, ut dictum est. Si ergo est contrarietas in divinis,
 995 oportet alibi assignare.

Et potest dici quod inter duos modos procedendi in divinis est
 contrarietas; quod sic patet.

1000 Illa enim quae eidem convenire non possunt, opposita sunt. Isti
 autem duo modi processioneis non possunt eidem convenire, ergo habent
 oppositionem, sed non opponuntur contradictorie aut privative, ut uterque
 sit ens, sed nec etiam opponuntur relative. Quod patet, quia relationes quae

974 (in Deo) unitive/unione B non/modo N 975 actualiter/actuali BNT sed/scilicet
 N in om. B (non) sunt om. N et om. N 976 ut/non B 977 sic/sicut B 979
 (et) sic om. B quaedam/quidem N 980 quia/quod B sunt post in Deo B 981 nisi
 in/non N 982 terminantur vel referuntur/referuntur B 983 ibi lect.
 inc. B 984 illa/aliae B 985 non sunt contrariae ... contrariorum om. N 989
 existendi lect. inc. TR; ex consequenti N; coextentiae B 992 Unde/ita BT quia/quod
 T 994 (ergo) est om. B 995 assignare/signare N 999 autem add. sunt BT proces-
 sionis/qui B non possunt eidem ... habent oppositionem/huiusmodi sunt ergo et cetera P
 1000 aut/nec T uterque lect. inc. N; utriusque T

988. text. com. 53. Vol. VIII 202 E.

994. voir l. 919 sqq.

consequuntur hos modos procedendi, non habent oppositionem relativam, scilicet filiatio et processio.

Relinquitur ergo quod opponuntur contrarie. Non enim sufficit
1005 dicere quod sunt disparata. Nam disparata sunt illa quae sic sunt diversa quod tamen circa idem possunt esse. Quae autem in eodem esse non possunt, etiam si sint genere diversa, tamen opposita sunt. Et ideo videtur dicendum quod haec duae processiones contrariae sunt; unde et contrariis differentiis dividuntur.

1010 Et ulterius, ex hoc potest dici quod etiam relationes quae consequuntur has processiones, sunt contrariae, ut filiatio et processio, et non sunt solum disparatae.

Sed tunc solvendum est ad obiecta in contrarium.

1015 Primum est, quia unum contrarium differt ab alio secundum formam.

Ad hoc potest dici quod non est de ratione contrarietatis, quod contraria dicant diversas formas; sufficit quod dicant diversa quaedam, quorum utrumque sit positivum sive dicant res diversas sive modos
1020 diversos. Unde actus et potentia sunt contraria; quae tamen solum dicunt diversos modos, vel, si omnino stetur quod contraria sunt diversa secundum formam, dicendum quod verum est contraria simpliciter. Sed ubi est diversitas modorum est contrarietas vera, non tamen simpliciter sed secundum quid.

1025 Duae autem processiones in divinis non dicunt diversas res, sed diversos modos. Quod patet, quia idem secundum rem est principium et terminus utriusque processiois. Differunt autem secundum modum, quia idem secundum rem, diversum autem secundum modum, est principium et terminus utriusque.

1030 Item, cum obicitur quod unum contrariorum removet aliud.

Et dicendum quod hoc est in istis duabus processionibus, quia cui

1002 consequuntur/sequuntur B 1005 (quod) sunt/sint B (sunt) illa *om.* BT 1006 quod/quia B; quae N (possunt) esse *om.* N in eodem esse non possunt/non possunt esse in eodem B 1007 (etiam) si/sicut B; *om.* T videtur *add.* esse B 1008 (unde) et/in BT 1010 quae consequuntur/consequentes N 1015 Primum/Ad primum BN est *om.* N alio/altero B 1017 ad hoc *om.* P potest dici/dicendum PB (non) est *om.* T 1018 diversa quaedam ... sive dicant *om.* B 1019 (diversas) sive/secundum in N 1020 (actus) et/in T quae tamen solum ... secundum formam *corr.* B1; *om.* B 1022 dicendum *add.* est T sed ubi est ... tamen simpliciter *om.* B 1025 Duae autem/nam ut sint T 1027 Differunt autem terminus utriusque *om.* B 1030 cum *om.* B 1031 et *om.* B

convenit una ab eo removetur alia. Talis autem remotio non repugnat divinae perfectioni, cum non attendatur secundum diversitatem rei sed modi.

1035 Sed iterum obicitur tertio quod contrariorum unum est perfectum, aliud imperfectum.

Et dicendum ad hoc quod non est de ratione oppositionis contrariae absolute loquendo. Quod patet per Simplicium, quia saepe dicit quod contrarium sit aequae potentia et aequae principale et aequae secundum naturam in quo a privative oppositis differt.

1040 Si autem in contrariis unum est principalius, hoc provenit non ex ratione contrarietatis, sed ex ordine rerum, quia, cum contraria differant specie, non sunt in creaturis aliquae duae species aequae perfectae. In divinis autem, ubi omnia dicunt eandem rem, est ibi contrarietas sine tali gradu; in creaturis autem non est propter gradum et ordinem creaturarum.

Et si dicatur quod etiam in Deo non est multitudo sine ordine, et quod istae duae processiones habent ordinem ad invicem, dicendum quod in Deo est ordo, non tamen gradus secundum perfectionem propter identitatem rei.

1050 Inter processiones ergo est ordo quidam, non tamen gradus secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Unde et de ratione contrariorum bene est ordo aliquis ipsorum ad invicem, non tamen gradus secundum perfectionem.

1055 In creaturis tamen non est ordo contrariorum sine gradu perfectionis propter ordinem eorum, qui est sicut numerorum ad invicem.

Sic igitur duae processiones contrariae sunt. Et ulterius potest concludi quod, quia non minus distinguit oppositio contraria quam relativa, quia, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, adhuc distingueretur ab eodem per diversum procedendi modum et relationes contrarias, ut supra in

1032 convenit *om.* B 1033 (cum) non *om.* N attendatur/attendat B 1035 tertio *add.* consequitur T quod/quia N; *lect. inc.* T 1037 ad hoc *om.* T quod *add.* hoc N de *om.* B 1038 (saepe) dicit *om.* N 1039 sit/fit B; *add.* et BT principale *mss* principalia 1040 oppositis/oppositi P 1041 (non) ex *om.* B 1042 cum contraria *om.* B differant/differunt B 1043 specie *add.* contraria B perfectae *add.* sed N 1044 autem *om.* N est *om.* B sine tali gradu ... et ordinem *om.* N 1045 et/ut B 1046 etiam *om.* P 1048 perfectionem propter ... tamen gradus secundum *om.* B 1052 (invicem) non *om.* B 1054 (tamen) non *corr.* B1; *om.* B 1055 invicem/unitatem N 1056 processiones *add.* ad invicem B Et/quod N; quae B; quia R 1057 quod, quia/quodque B 1058 spiritus sanctus/species N 1059 procedendi/distinguendi B

1038. ed. Pattin II, 572.

1059. Quaestio XIV. ed. Ypma p. 203; p. 201 (ad 16) sq.

1060 quaestionibus de relationibus tactum fuit.

Et si dicatur quod ista contrarietas est secundum quid, dicendum quod, licet sit secundum quid, tamen non minorem diversitatem dicit quam oppositio relativa, quae est in Deo simpliciter. Et ideo distinguit non minus quam illa; relativa quidem oppositio requirit minimam diversitatem. Ideo in Deo relativa oppositio dicitur esse simpliciter, contrarietas vero, quia requirit maiorem diversitatem, dicitur in Deo esse secundum quid, licet alio modo possit dici quod est ibi simpliciter, ut dictum est; tamen, dato quod sit secundum quid, non minus distinguit quam relativa nec tamen distinguit magis, quia est secundum diversos modos, sicut et relativa.

1070 Sed tunc videtur quod secundum hoc quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus dupliciter distinguuntur, supposito quod unus ab alio procedat, sicut catholica fides tenet. Distinguuntur enim oppositione relativa originis, et etiam diverso modo procedenti; et sic ulterius sequitur quod plus distinguatur Spiritus Sanctus a Filio quam uterque a Patre.

1075 Dicendum autem ad hoc, quod non est maior distinctio, licet sit pluribus modis, nec est inconveniens, sicut etiam non est inconveniens ponere in una Persona plures notiones et relationes quam in alia.

Vel aliter potest dici quod isti duo modi procedendi uni Personae non possunt convenire; tamen esse principium utriusque processione potest 1080 uni Personae convenire, ut Patri. Tamen non secundum eundem modum Pater est principium utriusque processione, sed secundum alium et alium modum. Illi tamen modi non habent contrarietatem sicut ipsae processiones, quia sunt in Patre unitive, ut dictum est de attributis respectu creaturarum et de ideis; verbi gratia, si dicatur quod natura in Patre, ut 1085 habet rationem veri est principium processione Filii, ut habet rationem boni est principium processione Spiritus Sancti, ut dicatur etiam quod tres illi modi possunt sic sumi ens, verum et bonum, quorum quilibet

1063 distinguit *post* non minus B 1064 quam *om.* B diversitatem/identitatem B
 1065 vero/non B; *add.* rei N 1066 requirit/dicit P esse *ante* in Deo N; *om.* R 1067
 possit/potest B (dictum) est *om.* N 1069 (sicut) et/est T 1071 dupliciter *om.* BN
 1074 distinguatur/distinguuntur T 1075 autem *om.* B maior/magis B sit *post* modis
 B 1076 nec est *om.* B sicut etiam non est inconveniens *om.* BT 1077 ponere *post*
 persona B quam *om.* BT 1078 aliter *post* dici B uni personae ... utriusque
 processione *om.* BT 1079 possunt/potest N potest/esse potest B 1080 patri/pater N
 1081 (sed) secundum/per T 1082 modi *corr.* B1; *om.* B 1084 natura in/non N 1087
 illi *lect. inc.* B possunt/possint BR sumi/sive BR et *om.* N

1067. voir l. 919 sqq.

1083. voir l. 960 sqq.

comprehendit divinam perfectionem totam. Et ille est alius modus assignandi quam supra, licet in idem redeat.

1090 Vel dicatur quod Pater, ut intellectus, est principium processio-
Filii, ut autem est volens, est principium processio-
nis Spiritus Sancti. Secundum hoc ergo dicemus quod quaelibet Persona distinguitur ab alia
duobus modis, de Filio quidem et Spiritu Sancto; patet per id quod dictum
est.

1095 Similiter Filius dupliciter distinguitur a Patre: uno modo per
oppositionem relativam originis, scilicet filiatione et paternitate, alio modo
per quamdam contrarietatem, quia Filius in eo quod Filius oppositionem
quamdam habet ad Patrem, secundum quod Pater est principium Spiritus
Sancti. Immo, hoc modo Pater habet oppositionem ad se ipsum, quia est
1100 principium duplicis processio-
nis, et Filius ad se ipsum, ut Filius est et ut
principium processio-
nis Spiritus Sancti; tamen non dicitur oppositio
contrarietatis in Patre ad se vel Filii ad se, quia sunt in eodem.

Unde secundum hoc filiatio et communis spiratio in Patre sunt
aliquo modo contrariae, quia, licet etiam in Filio sit communis spiratio, in
1105 Patre tamen sunt aliquo modo secundum alium essendi modum.

Filiatio autem et communis spiratio in Filio sunt relationes, neque
oppositae secundum relationem, nisi dicantur contrariae per attributionem
ad processiones quae sunt contrariae, sicut etiam in Patre, neque secundum
contrarietatem, sed sunt disparatae.

1110 Paternitas autem in Patre et communis spiratio ut in Filio sunt
aliquo modo contrariae. De hoc require supra in tractatu de relationibus.

Similiter Spiritus Sanctus dupliciter distinguitur a Patre, scilicet uno
modo relatione originis, secundum quam ab eo procedit, et alio modo
distinguitur ab eo, scilicet a Patre ut est principium generationis Filii.

1115 Processio enim quae est relatio Spiritus Sancti opponitur relative communi
spirationi, et opponitur contrarie quodam modo paternitati, in quantum
processio dicit alium modum originis quam generatio quam sequitur

1088 totam ante divinam NT (ille) est om. BT 1090 intellectus/intelligens NR
1091 autem om. N processio-
nis om. B 1092 dicemus/dicimus B distinguitur corr.
B1; om. B alia/alius B 1093 id/idem B; illud N 1095 dupliciter om. B 1099 pa-
ter/patet quod B quia/quod N 1100 et Filius ... principium processio-
nis om. B 1102
ad/secundum B 1104 contrariae, quia ... aliquo modo om. N 1105 tamen sunt lect.
inc. T 1106 neque lect. inc. T 1107 per attributionem ... sunt contrariae om. B
1108 (quae) sunt/dicuntur R sicut om. T etiam post in Patre T 1110 ut om. N
sunt/similiter R 1112 similiter lect. inc. T 1113 et add. in N; et om. P 1114 distin-
guitur add. etiam T eo/ea B

paternitas.

Et si dicitur quomodo idem potest esse contrarium duobus, scilicet
 1120 processio et filiationi et paternitati, dicendum quod opponitur duobus ut
 habent unitatem, quia filiatio et paternitas accipiuntur secundum unam
 processionem. Sic igitur quaelibet Persona secundum hoc dupliciter
 distinguitur ab alia.

Hoc autem inquirendo, non asserendo dictum sit, propter materiae
 1125 arduitatem.

Et sic patet quomodo in divinis est contrarietas inter processiones.

Si autem obicitur quia, si contrarietas est inter processiones
 secundum quid, et dictum est quod etiam in attributis et in ideis est
 1130 secundum quid, videtur quod ideae sint distinctae Personae. Et dicendum
 quod alio et alio modo sumitur hic quod dicitur secundum quid.

Intelligitur secundum quid utrobique. Cum enim dicitur quod in
 attributis et ideis contrarietas secundum quid, intelligitur secundum quid,
 quia solum secundum respectum aliorum ad ipsa. Ut autem dicitur quod in
 1135 processionibus est contrarietas secundum quid, intelligitur quod non est ibi
 secundum rem et rem, sed secundum diversos modos.

Et sic patet de oppositione in ipso ut comparatur ad creaturas, an
 aliquo modo oppositionis opponatur creaturis.

Et dicendum quod sic oppositione siquidem relativa opponitur sicut
 1140 scibile scientiae in quantum est terminus relationis creaturae.

De contradictione dicendum etiam quod sit ita, scilicet quod illud
 quod est creaturae, negatur a Deo, non quidem quantum ad rem, sed
 quantum ad modum; nam omnis res et perfectio quae est in creatura, est
 etiam in Deo, sed non eodem modo quo est in creatura.

1145 Vel dicendum quod negatur et res, quia essentialiter differt creatura
 a creatore. Et quod dicitur, quod creatura vel perfectio creaturae prae-
 existit in Deo, verum est, quia ibi in Deo prae-existit aliquid

1119 dicitur/dicatur B idem potest esse ... paternitas accipiuntur *om.* B; accipiuntur
corr. T; opponuntur N 1120 (processio) et *om.* P dicendum *om.* N 1126 pa-
 tet/apparet B 1127 Si autem obicitur ... inter processiones *om.* B 1129 (quid) et/ut N
 quod etiam *om.* B (attributis) et *add.* etiam P (ideis) est *om.* B 1130 (est)
 secundum quid *om.* P Et dicendum *om.* N 1131 (dicitur) secundum quid *om.* N
 1132 utrobique. Cum enim ... secundum quid *om.* BN 1134 secundum respectum/
 respectu B 1136 (secundum) rem *lect. inc.* N 1138 opponatur/opponentur N 1139
 Et/vel T sicut/ut B 1141 etiam/est R sit/sic P ita *add.* quod T illud quod/illa
 quae N 1142 est *om.* B negatur/vere est B non quidem *lect. inc.* N 1144 (non)
 eodem *om.* N; eo P est *post* in creatura B 1145 dicendum *add.* etiam B differt/et
 dicitur BT 1146 (Et) quod/cum B 1147 ibi *om.* N

convenientiam habens cum perfectione creaturae, sicut forma effectus prae-
existit in causa, quia in causa est aliquid habens convenientiam cum forma
1150 effectus. Non ergo solum modus, sed etiam res negatur.

Dicitur tamen res non negari ratione convenientiae attributionis,
quae est inter rem quae est creatura et rem quae est Deus, et ideo
contradictio simpliciter.

De privatione similiter dicendum ut in creaturis et huiusmodi;
1155 tamen privatio talis non dicit aptitudinem in subiecto.

De contrarietate dicendum quod nihil in creaturis contrariatur Deo,
nisi malum, quia in eodem secundum idem Deus et malum esse non
possunt. Et est haec contrarietas ratione convenientiae, quia malum
creaturae contrariatur bono creato; et quia bonum creatum convenientiam
1160 attributionis ad bonum increatum, dicitur malum creaturae contrariari bono
quod est Deus.

Creatura autem, in quantum est bona, Deo non contrariatur, nec e
converso, cum creatura non imitetur Deum sicut eius effectus.

Item, in eodem supposito possunt coniungi Deus et creatura
1165 secundum unionem, et sic non sunt contraria.

Potest tamen dici quod malum opponitur bono magis proprie
privative quam contrarie; ideo nihil est Deo contrarium proprie, in
creaturis privativum autem sic.

Et sic patet ad quaestionem.

1170 1. Ad primum dicendum quod multum et paucum non sunt in Deo,
nisi secundum quid, sicut et numerus. Haec autem sunt relativa, sicut
excessum. Excessus autem non est in Deo simpliciter, sed secundum
rationem numeri potest concedi, sicut conceditur ibi plus.

1175 Et si dicitur quod si essent, tunc essent relationes reales, dicendum
quod potest concedi; non tamen secundum eas distinguuntur Personae, sed
consequuntur Personas distinctas, sicut de similitudine. Et aequaliter
dictum fuit supra, in quaestione de relatione, ubi ostensum est quae

1148 effectus *add.* alibi B 1149 quia in causa *om.* NB (causa) est *corr.* B1; *om.* B
1150 solum/solus B 1151 negari *add.* a B 1152 (est) creatura *corr.* B1; *om.* B
1153 contradictio/contradicit B; contradicens T 1156 creaturis *add.* in B 1158 haec
om. N ratione/respectu B 1160 bono *lect. inc.* B 1162 autem/enim N Deo/Deus
BTRP 1163 imitetur *lect. inc.* dicitur B 1172 (sicut) et *om.* BP haec autem
sunt/hoc autem est NBT 1174 numeri/verum NT; omnium B 1175 reales *om.* N
1176 sed/et B 1177 consequuntur *post* distinctas P aequaliter/aequali N; aequalitate R
1178 (est) quae/quod NRT

lationes reales habeant locum in Deo, et quae non. Et quod dicitur de
 1180 magno et parvo, dicendum quod Deus dicitur magnus; tamen non est in
 Deo parvum quod dicitur relativum ad magnum.

Dionysius autem ponit in Deo parvum secundum alium intellectum,
 ut patet in libro De Divinis Nominibus. Require ibi. Et ideo oppositio
 magni et parvi non est in Deo, nisi forte secundum quod accipitur in
 1185 numero, ut trinarius dicitur maior numerus binario.

Sed quia dicitur de oppositione magni, ideo sciendum quod
 magnum et parvum dupliciter possunt accipi.

Uno modo ut dicunt quantitatem diversam, et sic sunt contraria, ut
 patet, quia sunt termini motus augmenti et diminutionis. Motus autem
 1190 semper est a contrario in contrarium.

Et si dicatur quod quantitati nihil est contrarium, dicendum, ut alias
 dictum est, quod quantitati determinatae nihil est contrarium, ut bicubito,
 indeterminatae autem sic. Haec enim suscipit magis et minus, et ideo habet
 contrarium; et secundum rationem indeterminatae quantitatis accipiuntur
 1195 termini motus augmenti et diminutionis.

Alio modo considerantur magnum et parvum ut dicunt excessum
 circa quantitatem, quia unum excedit, aliud exceditur; et sic sunt opposita
 relative. Haec autem distinctio potest colligi a Simplicio in praedicamento
 quantitatis.

1200 Quod autem dicitur de uno et multo, dicendum quod verum est eo
 modo quo dictum fuit in quaestione de uno. Unum enim dicit privationem
 secundum rationem, et cetera.

Quod autem dicitur de contradictione attendendum est. Tamen
 sciendum quod contradictio non includitur in aliis, sicut genus in
 1205 speciebus, sed sicut principale significatum analogi in aliis significatis
 secundariis, et ideo includitur in illis secundum modum illorum, et cetera.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod de diversis processionibus patet quid
 sit dicendum. De pari et impari dicendum quod sunt in Deo, et sunt

1180 (est) in *om.* T 1181 parvum *add.* dicendum B relativum/relative NRT 1183
 oppositio *add.* et N 1186 quia/quod N 1191 dicendum *add.* quod 1192 quanti-
 tati/quantitate N bicubito *add.* tricubito P 1193 indeterminatae/determinatae N
 1196 considerantur/consideratur N 1198 praedicamento/paedicamentis T 1200 uno et
 multo/multo et uno B dicendum *add.* est T 1201 enim/autem B 1206 (includitur)
 in *om.* T et cetera *om.* BP 1207 de *om.* B

1182. cap. IX § III. PG 3,411 A.

1192. Quaestio VIII. ed. Ypma p. 257 (7).

1198. In Praedicamentis. ed. Pattin II, 197 sqq.

1201. Quaestio III. ed. Ypma p. 75 sq.; Quaestio V. ed. Ypma p. 116 sq.; 131 sqq.^{AC}

contraria, sed secundum quid, sicut et ibi est numerus secundum quid.

1210 De diversis speciebus habitus, dicendum quod non contrarie in Deo, quia sunt in eo unitive, nisi dicatur contrarie secundum respectum.

De diversis autem speciebus relationum potest dici quod sunt in Deo unitive. Vel dicendum quod sunt in Deo secundum aliud et aliud, nam alio modo essentia divina est fundamentum aequalitatis et similitudinis et
1215 relationum originis. Opposita autem bene sunt in eodem secundum aliud et aliud.

3. Ad tertium dicendum, scilicet de ideis, quod patet quare non sunt contrariae, et tamen secundum respectum dicuntur aliquo modo contrariae.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis oppositio ex qua resultat in eo
1220 pulchritudo, ut oppositio processionum et relationum.

5. Ad quintum dicendum quod est in Deo contradictio modo praedicto.

6. Ad sextum dicendum quod oppositio est ibi modo supradicto; quod autem dicitur quod non est creatum, non est imperfectum.

1225 7. Ad septimum dicendum quod, licet doctores dicant nomen diversitatis et alia plura esse vitanda in Deo, tamen potest dici quod, cum in Deo sit multitudo, de cuius ratione est divisio, quod est in Deo divisio, quae tamen maxime videtur inter alia repugnare Deo; sed est divisio secundum quid, sicut et numerus.

1230 Sic etiam potest concedi diversitas secundum quid et differentia, simpliciter autem non.

Unde sancti utuntur his nominibus, tamen vitantur a doctoribus simpliciter sumpta et ad vitandum errorem; cum autem ponuntur a doctoribus, cum additione ponuntur.

1235 8. Ad octavum patet quid sit dicendum.

1. Ad primum in contrarium dicendum quod verum concludit.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod contradictio et privatio important imperfectionem quando res negatur. A Deo autem nulla res negatur, nam,

1209 sicut *om.* B et *om.* N 1210 habitus, dicendum ... diversis autem *om.* B 1211
dicatur/dicantur T 1213 Deo/eo N 1214 aequalitatis *add.* et relationis BT 1217
dicendum *add.* est T 1221 contradictio/oppositio B 1223 oppositio *add.* et privatio P
est *add.* etiam B ibi *add.* in N 1224 autem dicitur quod *om.* B creatum/creatus T
1226 vitanda *post* in Deo B cum in Deo sit multitudo/hoc est in Deo sicut similitudo B
1227 divisio *add.* quod est in divinis divisio B 1228 quae tamen ... est divisio *om.* P
1230 differentia/dupliciter N 1232 tamen/ut B 1233 simpliciter/similiter T 1239
autem/vero P

1240 et si res quae est creatura negatur, dicitur non negari in quantum habet ibi aliquid correspondens conveniens.

De contrarietate autem quid sit dicendum, patet supra.

Eindhoven

Eelcko YPMA, O.S.A.

LE P. MICHEL VAN HECKE À ROME (1670-1687)

Non sans raison, ce religieux augustin (1620-1687) a intéressé les historiens. Voir J.F. Foppens, *Bibliotheca Belgica*, Bruxelles, 1739, II, 893; J.N. Paquot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ... des Pays-Bas*, Louvain, 1758, II (in-fol.), 587-588; A. Keelhof, *Geschiedenis van het klooster der ... Augustijnen te Gent*, Gand, 1864, 247-248; *Biographie nationale ... de Belgique*, t. II (1884-1885), 819-820; E.Reusens, *Documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'Université de Louvain*, Louvain, 1889-1892, V, 292-293; H.G. Hoogewerff, *Bescheiden in Italië omtrent Nederlandsche kunstenaars en geleerden*, III, La Haye, 1917, 47-148 et passim.

Historien du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme, j'eus à m'en occuper aussi. En 1952 je décrivis la première partie de sa vie (1620-1670) sous ce titre étrange *P. Michaël van Hecke op weg naar Rome*, (Van Hecke sur le chemin de Rome) dans *Augustiniana*, 2 (1952) 248-274; 3 (1953) 63-73.

En effet, ce religieux ambitieux, vaniteux, intrigant, arrogant, d'après Du Vaucel¹, aussi "inquiet et turbulent", s'était rendu la vie impossible tant à l'Université de Douai qu'à celle de Louvain, et surtout dans sa Province religieuse. Volontiers, quoiqu'ayant été lui-même janséniste, il se faisait passer pour une victime innocente des jansénistes. "Par désespoir", selon Lupus², il cherchait une échappatoire à Rome. Par sa diplomatie il réussit si bien auprès des internonces, surtout de Jacques Rospigliosi, bientôt cardinal-neveu, qu'ils le recommandèrent spécialement à Rome, même pour y enseigner. Effectivement il fut invité par le pape Clément X (1670-1676), qui attendait même son arrivée avec impatience. Van Hecke termine sa brève autobiographie, bien arrogante, par cette phrase:

"... *Reversus sum Romam* [il y avait déjà été en 1661-1662] *anno 1670, intrans Urbem 4 junii. Coepi docere publice Sanctam Scripturam in Sapientia die 7 novembris 1670. Deo gratias*!"

Nous allons ici suivre la carrière romaine de Van Hecke (1670-1687), qui coïncide avec la seconde et la plus importante partie de sa vie,

¹ Lettre de Rome du 24 mars 1691, dans O.B.C., Port-Royal n° 2656.

² Voir plus bas.

mais qui n'est pas moins compliquée que la première.

Sur cette seconde période, il existe une abondante documentation: aux Archives du Vatican, *Nuntiatura di Fiandra*, à la Biblioteca Angelica à Rome, décrite par Hoogewerff, *Bescheiden*, III, surtout pp. 108-115; aux Archives générales des augustins à Rome (auxquelles nous référerons avec le sigle *AGA*; Via Paolo VI, 25, I-00193 Roma); aux Archives de la Oud-Bisschoppelijke Clerezie [OBC] qui reposent aux Archives de l'État à Utrecht. Nos propres volumes de sources du jansénisme et de l'antijansénisme réfèrent souvent à Van Hecke.³

1670

Avec son serviteur le frère laïc Christian Lippens (†1719), "religieux très actif et dévot"⁴, Van Hecke, vu l'expérience de son premier voyage à Rome en 1661, entreprend son second voyage au printemps de 1670, de sorte qu'il échappe au froid de l'hiver et au chaud de l'été. Il arrive le 4 juin, quand le beau stable s'est déjà établi. Il s'installe au grand couvent Sant'Agostino, où réside la curie générale. Étant appelé par le pape en non pas par le général, il obtient un appartement dans la secrétairerie générale, un peu à l'écart de la communauté. Il connaît sans doute déjà le général Jérôme Valvassori (1667-1673)⁵ et certains autres membres de la curie générale et de la curie pontificale. Naturellement lui-même y est aussi déjà connu. Mais dans cette dernière curie, il a des protecteurs fidèles et puissants, entre autres le cardinal François Albizzi⁶, le farouche antijanséniste, qui croit volontiers que l'augustin nouvellement arrivé est réellement une victime des jansénistes belges, et qu'il doit le soutenir afin d'endiguer cette hérésie qui se répand et se fortifie.

Au couvent Sant'Agostino, bien situé, au centre de la Rome d'alors, Michel ne se trouve pas trop loin du Quirinal, résidence ordinaire des papes, du Vatican, du Saint-Office, de l'Université Sapienza, ni de la Propagande à la Piazza d'Espagne. De plus il y dispose d'une bonne bibliothèque, laquelle, devenue *statale*, sous le nom *Angelica*, reste, aujourd'hui encore, ouverte au public.

Naturellement Michel apporte une documentation antijanséniste,

³ Voir entre autres *Sources ... 1661-1672*, Louvain, 1968, p. LXXIV-LXXVII, une notice biographique.

⁴ Keelhoff, 252.

⁵ Voir B. van Luijk, *L'ordine agostiniano e la riforma monastica*, dans *Augustiniana*, 20 (1970) 663-668.

⁶ Voir L. Ceyssens, *Le cardinal François Albizzi (1593-1684). Un cas important dans l'histoire du jansénisme*, Rome, 1977.

dans laquelle se trouve certainement son précieux manuscrit, *Augustinus usu agnito*, déjà en partie imprimé, dont, d'après lui, les jansénistes empêchent l'achèvement, sachant qu'il s'agit d'une réfutation définitive de leurs erreurs et hérésies⁷. En guise de revanche, Michel pourra le publier à Rome avec une recommandation du Saint-Office.

Bientôt Michel étonne ses confrères par son éloquence à la chaire de vérité. Il se fait entendre souvent. Il étonne même ses supérieurs, puisqu'il est nommé professeur d'Écriture sainte à l'Université romaine, La Sapienza, institut que feu le pape Alexandre VII a doté d'un édifice énorme. Professeur d'exégèse? Michel est-il donc un spécialiste dans la matière? Le deviendra-t-il durant les quatorze ans de son enseignement⁸? Il n'y a aucun indice qui permette de l'affirmer avec certitude. Lui, publiciste qui n'a pas cessé de publier et qui a laissé en manuscrit tant d'écrits, ne s'est nullement fait remarquer par ses connaissances bibliques.

En tout cas, ayant à préparer et à donner ses cours d'Écriture sainte, à partir du 7 novembre, Michel ne peut pas encore s'occuper de son chef-d'œuvre inachevé. Mais quand le 21 novembre 1670 arrive à Rome le Vicaire apostolique Jean Van Neercassel, avec son secrétaire Balthasar van Welinckhove, Michel trouve le temps d'aller accuser au Saint-Office ce digne prélat de jansénisme⁹, pour lequel il aura bien des égards plus tard.

En 1670 Michel s'occupe également de la politique française à l'occasion de la Petite Assemblée de 1667¹⁰.

⁷ L'internonce Airoidi écrit le 3 août 1669: " Un'opera non mai più composta ne veduta; è necessaria per disgombrare le nuvole degli insegnamenti del sudetto Giansenio". Ceyssens, *Op weg*, dans *Augustiniana*, 3 (1953) 72.

⁸ Voir M. Renazzi, *Storia dell'Università Sapienza di Roma*, 3 vol., Roma, 1805

⁹ Voir J. Bruggeman et A.J. Van de Ven, *Inventaire des pièces d'archives françaises* ..., La Haye, 1972, n° 2656. Il faut remarquer que Michel désirait depuis longtemps faire carrière en Hollande comme préfet des missions des augustins. Mais André Cruesen, archevêque de Malines, son ami et protecteur d'alors, l'a jugé incapable de cette tâche importante. Cf. Ceyssens, *Op weg*, dans *Augustiniana*, 2 (1952) 273-274. Michel entretient une correspondance avec le savant cardinal cistercien Jean Bona au sujet du livre historique que ce dernier a consacré à l'usage du pain azyme dans la liturgie, livre qui ne plaît pas à tout le monde, Michel inclus. Celui-ci lui écrit longuement le 21 décembre 1672; cf. R. Sala, *Epistolae selectae*, Torino, 1755, 183-185, et passim. Mais le cardinal sérieux connaît son correspondant. Il écrira le 20 mai 1673 à François Van Vianen, professeur à Louvain: "... Homo ille de quo scribis [Van Hecke] eiusque artes notissimae mihi sunt; nam de me etiam ausus est perperam loqui. Monui D. Internuntium, ut sibi de ipso cave-ret ...": Ceyssens, *La seconde bulle*, Bruxelles, 1968, I, 66.

¹⁰ Voir Hoogewerff, III, 105.

1672

Naturellement Michel s'occupe aussi des affaires de sa propre Province. Le P. Lupus, lui aussi religieux à l'histoire curieuse¹¹, lui écrit le 5 août 1672:

"... Et a provinciale capitulo nulla est spes; medesima omnes electiones sunt conspirationes. Hinc optarem priorem generalem constitui per breve apostolicum et illi injungi ut hic introduceret bullam Clementis VIII de reformatione regularium ..." ¹²

Pour sa part Michel profite personnellement d'un bref apostolique du 7 décembre 1672¹³. L'Assistant général pour la Germanie vient de mourir sans avoir terminé son mandat. Son successeur n'est pas nommé par le Conseil du général, mais par le pape qui, sans doute, a été abordé par Michel ou par son protecteur le cardinal Albizzi. Devenu assistant de Germanie, Michel désire s'occuper de sa propre Province. Mais celle-ci, quoi qu'elle se nomme *Province de Cologne*, appartient-elle au district de Michel? C'est une question qui sera longtemps discutée¹⁴. En tout cas la Province ne désire pas son intervention, tout comme le Conseil général n'est pas heureux de sa nomination. Cela se remarquera.

Michel veut, entre autres, offrir à sa Province un nouveau bréviaire, mais ce plaisir lui sera refusé parce qu'il y a introduit une dédicace faisant son propre éloge avec la mention de son titre d'Assistant général.

Michel se mêle aussi des querelles du jour, entre autres, des discussions sur les *Monita salutaria B.M.V.* de A. Widenfelt¹⁵, et sur le *Système de la nature* de Malebranche.

Pour contrarier l'influence que Michel ne manque pas d'exercer à Rome, surtout sur les affaires de sa Province, Lupus, qui n'est nullement son ami ni son admirateur, le mentionne plusieurs fois dans sa correspon-

¹¹ Voir L. Ceyssens, *Chrétien Lupus. Sa période janséniste (1640-1660)*, dans *Augustiniana*, 15 (1965) 294-314, 629-660, et *Sa période ultramontaine (1660-1681)*, ibidem, 25 (1975) 293-329; 27 (1977) 238-310; 28 (1978) 373-400; 29 (1979) 394-424; 30 (1980) 157-188; 31 (1981) 268-319.

¹² Bibliotheca Angelica, ms. 896, f° 115v.

¹³ Gand, Couvent des augustins, *Liber Mechliniensis*, p. 292-294. Le bref adressé directement à l'intéressé est si plein d'éloges que les détails ne peuvent venir que de Michel lui-même.

¹⁴ AGA, Aa 37, f° 53-54v: *Informazione*

¹⁵ Voir P. Hoffer, *La dévotion à Marie ... Autour des "Avis salutaires" ...* Paris, 1939. Le P. Alexius de Lannoy, récollet, ayant fortement prêché contre Widenfelt, provoqua un pamphlet *Den recht Uyt gheleyden Kerckuyt, of Ulula seu bubo ecclesiasticus P. Alexii*. Van Hecke écrivit: *Judicium Michaelis ... super folio isto famoso dicto: Ulula seu Bubo ecclesiasticus recte expositus*; Hoogewerff, III, 102.

dance avec les Romains¹⁶, même d'une manière défavorable. Par exemple, le 25 mai 1674 au cardinal Jean Bona:

"Omne Belgium admiratur talem virum esse factum Patris Generalis assistentem adeoque illi datas esse vires ad turbanda omnia ...".

Le 29 juin 1674 au même:

[Les conseillers bruxellois] "indignantur ac scandalizantur Patri ... Heckio Romae fieri auctoritatem turbandi hanc provinciam. Deinde indignatur quod idem P.Heckius apud Eminentissimos Dominos ita audeat abuti decreto regio ... Asserunt se plurimum scandalisatos a duobus eiusdem Patris Heckii emisariis ... Dum talia scribere cogor, utinam nescirem litteras. Interim Eminentia Vestra novit arcanas miseras coenobiorum. Et ut meis dictis fiat fides atque haec afflicta provincia liberetur ab istis turbinibus, oro ... postulare institutionem de moribus Patris Heckii ...".

Le 14 juillet, Lupus parle des "machinae P. Michaelis Heckii".

Naturellement, s'étant renseigné de plusieurs côtés, l'intègre cardinal Bona est arrivé à connaître le P. Michel. Il écrit le 20 mai 1673 au professeur François Van Vianen à Louvain:

"... Homo ille de quo scribis, eiusque artes notissimae mihi sunt, nam de me etiam ausus est perperam loqui. Moneo internuntium..."¹⁷..

De ce qui précède on peut facilement conclure que Michel et Lupus ne s'entendent nullement. Cependant, au grand dépit de Michel, c'est Lupus qui est élu provincial le 28 juin 1676, et qui essaie de pacifier finalement la Province. Il annule donc l'élection de Fr. Bassery, faite au chapitre des révoltés à Anvers. Mais Rome intervient. Le général Oliva annule cette cassation, avec l'assentiment de ses assistants¹⁸, surtout à l'instigation de Van Hecke.

Néanmoins Lupus peut espérer réussir sous le pontificat du nouveau pape rigoriste Innocent XI (1676-1689), d'autant plus que, professeur à l'Université de Louvain, il doit se rendre à Rome, avec le professeur François van Vianen¹⁹ pour y défendre la faculté de théologie, continuellement soupçonnée de jansénisme, et afin d'y dénoncer une liste de propositions laxistes.

Le Père F. Spyliart, *Historia monasteriorum Iprensium* (ms. conservé au couvent des augustins à Gand), écrit p. 420:

"In aprili [1677] per Germaniam de mandato regis atque academiae Lovanien-

¹⁶ Voir L. Ceyssens, *La correspondance de Chrétien Lupus avec Augustin Favoriti*, dans *Augustiniana*, 23 (1973) 131-217, 371-421.

¹⁷ Voir L. Ceyssens, *Sources ... 1673-1676*, p. 66.

¹⁸ Voir AGA, Dd, 113, f° 327rv.

¹⁹ L. Ceyssens, *De Leuvense deputatie te Rome (1677-1679)*, dans *Historisch tijdschrift*, 19 (1940) 118-131; 20 (1941) 99-136.

sis, contra zelosorum novas sententias [laxistas] missus est Romam ... Lupus, provincialis, et una eademque via etiam propter difficultates nostrae provinciae contra nostros praetendentes provinciam omnino dependentem subicere regimini inusitato Rmi P.N. Generalis, quae radicitus ac primario ortum habuerunt a P. Magistro Van Eecke, Gandensi, assistente existente Romae pro provincia Coloniensi Belgica ...".

Cette venue de Lupus, on le comprend, inquiète Michel et même son protecteur le cardinal Albizzi. La bibliothèque Angelica conserve plusieurs écrits de Michel agissant contre cette venue, entre autres une protestation au nom des confrères belges, où Michel indique ceci:

"Ita mihi dictavit praesens memoriale Eminentissimus Cardinalis Albitius et datum fuit Sanctitati Suae per D. De Lucca, auditorem"²⁰.

Sous le vicaire général - en fonction depuis le 26 décembre 1676 - Dominique Valvassori, supérieur plus indépendant que son homonyme Nicolas, Michel n'a pas pu empêcher Lupus d'arriver à Rome le 27 mai 1677, ni de se fixer au grand couvent Sant'Agostino. Mais Michel voulait au moins empêcher Lupus de participer aux travaux des délégués louvanistes. Lorsque le 4 juin suivant le vicaire général réunit son conseil pour traiter les affaires de la Province de Flandre, "primo praecessit quaedam instantia ... assistentis Germaniae, qui petiit instanter, instantissime ut attente consuleretur an sit danda licentia P. Magistro Lupo agendi procuratorem universitatis Lovaniensis, ne quid damnum inde religioni nostrae irrogetur ..."²¹.

Van Hecke se rend également impossible à la Congrégation des assistants le 16 février 1678, où il s'agissait de nommer, vu l'absence prolongée de Lupus, un provincial vicaire. Puisque, dans cette question Van Hecke était considéré comme 'parti', il fut prié de quitter la salle. "Unde ipsemet P. Assistens discessit a congregatione, sed de novo ad eam rediens, dixit se velle assistere eo quod ipse non fuerit nec sit pars ... Reposuit ... P. Vicarius generalis ... Respondit iterum P. Assistens ... Cumque a congregatione exire recusaret, idem ... P. Vicarius congregationem dimisit ..."²².

Toutefois Lupus allait réellement participer à ces travaux et même contribuer beaucoup au bon succès des négociations. Michel, qui doit cohabiter avec le Louvaniste, ne cesse d'offrir au Saint-Office des écrits contre la députation louvaniste et en particulier contre son confrère Lupus. Mentionnons les quatre *In Christianum Lupum denunciationes*²³.

²⁰ Voir Hoogewerff, III, 104.

²¹ AGA, Dd 115, f°419r.

²² Voir AGA, Dd, 115, f° 20 rv.

²³ Hoogewerff, III, 108-111.

Michel croit à l'imminent échec des Louvanistes et de Lupus en particulier, qu'il accuse d'erreurs et d'hérésie. Il raconte le 3 janvier 1678:

"P. Lupus ipso Nativitatis die adivit assistentem Germaniae ... Actum de propositionibus Lovaniensium. In quibus se pertinaciter manere et mansurum proterve respondit Lupus, assistente frustra illum monente et convincente ad obedientiam praestandam Ecclesiae. Dixit [Lupus] inter caetera Ecclesiam non posse damnare ea quae ipse docet. Interim res Lovaniensium cum foetore debebunt suspendi quia dicunt isti deputati ad se non spectare quod alii eiusdem Facultatis docent, quamvis interim et Lupus et Vianen habeant sua puncta ad quae respondere debebunt ... Ita speciosa haec legatio in fumum abit, et re infecta redibunt ..."²⁴

Cependant Van Vianen et Lupus retourneront à Louvain en 1679 avec un résultat inespéré, très favorable à leur Faculté et à leur doctrine. Martin Steyaert, licencié, qui sert de secrétaire aux députés, écrit longuement là-dessus, le 8 avril 1679, lors de son retour prématuré. Il ne manque pas de mentionner Van Hecke:

"Adversarium se prae caeteris prae bui P. Van Hecke ... tum ob domesticam cum Lupo simultatem, antiquasque cum Lovaniensibus rixas ... Conatus eius inconditosque animi aestus ob honorem communis patriae tacemus ..."²⁵

Lupus réussit aussi à se réhabiliter à la curie augustinienne et à sauver pour autant sa Province. Le 11 mars 1678 le vicaire général Valvasori note:

"Post serotinam audivimus a P. Provinciali Belgii ... quam feliciter tractaverit cum Eminentissimo ... Cybo [secrétaire d'État] pro provincia Coloniensi, quamque juste reposuerit impostoribus. Eundem provincialem efficaciter persuasimus ut se purget omnino etiam coram Sanctissimo a nota quam illi insperserat calumniose quidam factiosus homo [Heckius]"²⁶

Abandonnons provisoirement les affaires de Louvain. D'ailleurs depuis le chapitre général de 1679 Michel n'est plus assistant. Et puisque Dominique Valvassori, le vicaire général, est devenu général, l'influence de Michel à la curie sur les affaires de l'Ordre s'éteint complètement.

Cependant pour sa part, Michel connaît des moments heureux sous le pontificat d'Innocent XI. En 1678 Georges Salomons, confrère et ancien disciple, lui consacre un poème: *Heroicon Adm. Rev. ac eximio P. Magistro Michaeli Heckio in ordine Eremitarum S.P. Augustini, totius Germaniae, Austriae, Poloniae etc. assistenti generali, in Sapienza romana sacrarum litterarum lectori, necnon Sancti Officii consultori et qualificatori*

²⁴ Voir Ceyssens, *Sources ... 1677-1679*, p. 179.

²⁵ Voir Ceyssens, *Sources ... 1677-1679*, p. 404.

²⁶ AGA, Dd, 115, f° 112v.

dignissimo, imprimé à Naples en 1678, cum superiorum permissu, 18 pages²⁷.

En 1678 également, lors de la réfection des bâtiments du couvent des augustins à Gand, une pierre commémorative consacrée au grand Gan-tois y est placée.

Nous venons de signaler que Michel est nommé consultant du Saint-Office, sans doute grâce au cardinal Albizzi. Dans cette congrégation Michel trouve une occupation continuelle. Il doit assister aux interminables réunions, deux fois par semaine, une sous la présidence des cardinaux, une autre sous la présidence du pape, pendant laquelle les nombreux assistants doivent rester debout. Michel doit participer à la censure des nombreux livres dénoncés. Il aura donc à lire sérieusement certains ouvrages, et à écrire un jugement raisonnable, car il devra le lire en public à la congrégation des cardinaux. Il a laissé de nombreuses censures²⁸, relatives par exemple à l'*Amor poenitens* de Neercassel²⁹, aux oeuvres de Malebranche, à la lettre de Gilbert de Choyseul, évêque de Tournai³⁰.

Grâce au cardinal Albizzi, Michel devient aussi consultant de la Propagande, ce qui lui permet d'intervenir dans les affaires du clergé hollandais, qui l'intéressent toujours. De plus, au terme de son enseignement à la Sapienza (après 13 ans), il devient professeur au collège de la Propagande, d'une matière non précisée, sans doute l'exégèse, comme à la Sapienza. Il aura donc des Hollandais parmi ses élèves. De ceux-ci, il s'entretient dans sa correspondance, plutôt amicale, avec le Vicaire apostolique Neercassel. Certains d'entre eux se feront valoir, même d'une manière néfaste. À un moment non précisé, Michel devient aussi préfet des études du collège de la Propagande. Il continue donc à avoir une vie bien remplie. Pourtant, par rancune, il continue de s'occuper de Louvain. Après le succès de la députation romaine, la réaction des antijansénistes a été très forte. Ils ont même créé une "congrégation" [association] secrète pour l'accusation des jansénistes. Des centaines de propositions erronées ou hérétiques, dont plusieurs sont attribuées au P. Lupus, ont été rassemblées et imprimées. Le délégué de l'association, le P. François Porter, franciscain du collège irlandais à Louvain, doit en obtenir la condamnation à Rome. Michel y contribue³¹.

Mais par suite de ses succès à Rome Michel devient imprudent,

²⁷ Un exemplaire est conservé à la Biblioteca Angelica.

²⁸ Voir Hoogewerff, III, 97-115.

²⁹ Voir C.P. Voorvelt, *De Amor poenitens van Johannes van Neercassel* (thèse de Nymègue), Zeist, 1984.

³⁰ Voir L. Ceyssens, *Sources ... 1680-1682*, p. 97-99; Hoogewerff, III, 114-115.

³¹ Voir Hoogewerff, III, p. 111.

même à l'égard des jésuites. Assistant de Germanie, il a composé un écrit: *De abusibus Jesuitarum in administratione spiritali ac temporalis Collegii Germanici S. Apollinaris de Urbe*³².

Au Collège de la Propagande, Michel, professeur et préfet, fait souvent défendre des thèses et veut que ses collègues en fassent autant. Or le 20 décembre 1682, quand le professeur de morale, un Irlandais, fait défendre une thèse d'actualité sur l'attrition, à savoir si la simple crainte de l'enfer est suffisante pour recevoir l'absolution, Michel interrompt la discussion pour imposer par un discours violent, sa propre opinion augustinienne et rigoriste contre l'interprétation laxiste des jésuites. De la sorte il offense à la fois le président de la thèse et les jésuites. Le premier ne manque pas de se plaindre aussi bien auprès de la Propagande qu'auprès du Saint-Office; les jésuites adressent au seul Saint-Office de longues et véhémentes doléances contre "immoderatum agendi modum quem P. Waneck [sic] ante aliquos dies in publica disputatione Collegii de Propaganda Fide coram omnibus prae se tulit, non sine publico scandalo ... Iste homo impotens sui ... Hic homo jesuitis plurimum infestus est, quos ipse traducit in scripto satyrico a me lecto, quasi juratos hostes caritatis et amoris Dei ... Sed quidquid blateret homo ille infrenitus ..." ³³, il a contrevenu au décret du 5 mai 1667³⁴, et doit en porter la responsabilité.

En effet, la Propagande réagit aussitôt en suspendant le coupable de sa préfecture, mais après appel de Michel, le pape annule cette mesure. Le Saint-Office ne s'occupe guère de l'incident, le pape Innocent ayant assez de telles disputes³⁵. C'est à cause de la même attitude du pape, que la censure des nombreuses propositions louvanistes, déjà prête, n'est pas publiée³⁶. De même Michel est prié d'oublier son chef-d'oeuvre si important *Augustinus usu agnitus*.

Cependant Michel peut aussi inscrire quelques réussites au Saint-Office à son compte. Par exemple en collaborant à la censure des sept points (dits jansénistes) auxquels il était absolument nécessaire de croire. Contre ces points Michel avait, le 8 août 1683, adressé au cardinal Cybo,

³² Voir Hoogewerff, III, 106.

³³ Archives générales des jésuites, 74A, f 80v-81r.

³⁴ Voir L. Ceysens, *L'origine du décret du Saint-Office concernant l'attrition (5 mai 1667)*, in *Ephemerides theologiae Lovanienses*, 25 (1940) 83-91.

³⁵ Voir L. Ceysens, *Romeinse brieven uit de Ierse periode van het Belgisch antijansenisme (1680-1684)*, in *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, 23-24 (1944-1948) 106-116.

³⁶ Voir Ceysens, *Van de veroordeling der 65 lakse proposities in 1679 naar de veroordeling van de 31 rigorische proposities in 1690*, in *Miscellanea moralia in honorem ... Arthur Jansen*, Gembloux, 1948, I, 77-109.

secrétaire d'État, une lettre de 3 pages³⁷.

Naturellement, étant ostensiblement ultramontain, Michel agit contre la *Déclaration du Clergé de France* de 1682. Le cardinal Destrée, ambassadeur de France, en eut peur³⁸. Mais quand en 1684, Michel, qui a l'intention de traduire en néerlandais le vieux *Catechismus romanus*, veut faire censurer le *Grote Catechismus* (Grand Catéchisme) du P. Cornelis Hazart³⁹, jésuite, il essuie un échec. Il fait part de sa désillusion à Mgr Neercassel, le 16 décembre:

"... Patres Societatis cum Minoritis Belgis et Hibernis movent omnem lapidem ut Catechismus flandricus evadat censuram dum opera aliorum prohibeantur. Etiam se adiungit illis Dominus Schelstraet, custos bibliothecae Vaticanae, qui etiam conatur me suspectum reddere, qui firmus sto pro antiquis semitis Patrum nostrorum. Debebat meminisse se a quo habet omnem promotionem suam et agere conformiter ad intentionem SSmi D.N., qui est custos integerrimus depositi augustiniani ... Sed ille emissarius jesuitarum [Schelstraete] potest aliquid intelligere de historia ecclesiastica, in qua tamen et suos naevos habet, de theologia vero positiva Patrum parum aut nihil intelligit. Forte ambit per jesuitas altiore promotionem ..."⁴⁰

Quoique Michel corresponde fort amicalement avec Neercassel, dont il croit qu'il partage son propre augustinisme, il doit en 1684 participer à l'examen de l'*Amor poenitens*, dont la première partie lui plaît, mais dont la seconde lui déplaît. À cette occasion, le 20 août, Louis Du Vaucel écrit à Ernest Ruth d'Ans:

"Je viens d'apprendre que le P. Van Hecke est fort échauffé contre le livre du P. Hazart et que cela lui fait oublier son premier zèle contre l'*Amor poenitens* ... C'est une bonne diversion. Il poussera à bout M. Schelstraete ..."⁴¹

Du Vaucel écrit à Arnould, le 22 juillet 1684:

"... Le P. Van Hecke à qui on a imposé silence, ne laisse pas, comme l'on croit, de cabaler secrètement et l'on ne doute point que les jésuites n'en fassent de même..."⁴²

Le 25 avril 1686, quelques mois avant sa mort Mgr Neercassel envoie cent florins à Michel en récompense de tout de qu'il fait pour la mission, mais, certes, il ne l'aurait plus fait après sa mort. Car Michel

³⁷ Archives du Vatican, Nunziatura di Fiandra, vol. 203, recueil sans pagination. Voir L. Ceyssens, "Les sept points" jansénistes, dans *Augustiniana*, 3 (1953) 194-223, 4 (1954) 47-69; voir surtout 4 (1954) p. 55-67. Ces sept points furent condamnés le 6 août 1683.

³⁸ Voir Pierre Blet, *Les assemblées du Clergé et Louis XIV de 1670 à 1693*, Rome, 1972, p. 318.

³⁹ Voir *Biographie nationale*, VIII, 813-816; cf. Hoogewerff, III, p.115-117.

⁴⁰ Voir OBC, 591, p. 4236.

⁴¹ Voir les Archives de l'Archevêché de Malines, Correspondance de Vaucel.

⁴² Arnould, *Oeuvres*, II, 441-445.

allait collaborer au futur désastre de la mission, en empêchant le capable Hugues Van Heussen d'être nommé successeur du Vicaire apostolique. En effet, relateur au Saint-Office, Michel contribuera à la censure de quelques petits écrits de Van Heussen⁴³, censure qui aura des suites énormes.

Michel, à son tour, mourut à Rome, au couvent Sant'Agostino, le 25 septembre 1687, à l'âge de 71 ans, sans doute sans être beaucoup regretté. Comme d'habitude, les agents du Saint-Office se présentaient aussitôt pour récupérer dans les écrits laissés par le défunt ce qui concernait leurs dicastères. De son côté, le pape Innocent qui avait eu tant à souffrir de Louis XIV, désirait se réserver ce que le bon ultramontain avait laissé sur les affaires de France⁴⁴. Le bibliothécaire conventuel, pour sa part, incorpora dans ses rayons les écrits et les manuscrits retrouvés. Ils y sont toujours disponibles. C'est la véritable survie pour le P. Michel à Rome.

Sint-Truiden

Lucien CEYSENS

⁴³ Voir P. Polman, *Romeinse bronnen over de kerkelijke toestand der Nederlanden*, La Haye, 1952, III, 39-42.

⁴⁴ Voir Marc Dubruel, *En plein conflit*, Paris, 1927, 83-84.

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