

JAMES OF VITERBO'S REJECTION OF GILES OF ROME'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE NATURAL LOVE OF GOD OVER SELF

This article will establish that in his discussion of whether a man loves God more than himself by natural love, James of Viterbo (c.1255-1308) repeats and rejects Giles of Rome's (1243/7-1316) arguments for an affirmative answer to the question. James' rejection of Giles' position on this issue is important for two reasons. First, James rejects Giles' Thomistic belief that humans have a natural inclination to love God more than self.¹ James' position is a return to the *natura curva* position of the eleventh century, which holds that nature works only for its own perfection, and that grace is required for any love that is not based on self-love.² Second, James' rejection of a natural inclination for loving God affects his interpretation of the famous Aristotelian dictum, "the notes of friendship (*amicabilia*) which exist in regard to another, come from the notes of friendship which exist in regard to one's own self."³ Whereas Giles interprets this statement to refer only to the love of fellow creatures, James understands it to mean that any sort of love unassisted by grace has its roots in self-love.

¹ Gregory Stevens, "The Disinterested Love of God According to St. Thomas and Some of His Modern Interpreters," *The Thomist* 16 (1953): 307-33, 497-541. The relevant texts of Thomas are collected and translated in: 515-528.

² For a discussion of the issue in the twelfth century, see Arthur Landgraf, "Charité," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, t. 2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1953), cols. 572-579. For the relationship between Thomas Aquinas and the twelfth-century thinkers Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of St. Victor, see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "Le problème de l'amour pur et la solution de Saint Thomas," *Angelicum* (1929): 83-124. For a more general discussion of the relation between Thomas and earlier thinkers, see Pierre Rousselot, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Bd. 6, Hft. 6 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1908); L-B. Gillon, "Primacia del apetito universal de Dios según Santo Tomás," *Ciencia Tomista* 63 (1942): 328-342; M-R. Gagnebet, "L'amour naturel de Dieu chez Saint Thomas et ses contemporains," *Revue Thomiste* 48 (1948): 294-446; 49 (1949): 31-102.

³ "Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum," Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 9.4.1166a1-2. For the importance of this passage, see Rousselot, 7.

To argue that James' position on natural love involves a deliberate rejection of Giles' position, a set of objections and replies in James' *Quodlibet* 2, q. 20 (1294-1295) will be compared with Giles' *Quodlibet* 4, q. 14 (1289).⁴ James' question is titled: "Whether a man by natural love loves God more than himself, or conversely?" Giles' question is similar: "Whether a man must love God more than himself?"⁵ The present discussion will not be an exhaustive treatment of James' position, but it will show how James assesses and reacts to the arguments of Giles.

In the objections of his question, James gives three ways for arguing that *simpliciter et absolute* a man loves God more than self by natural love. The third objection is drawn from a consideration of God as the causal, whole, and final good (*bonum causale, totale, et finale*). This third objection contains within it three different arguments based on these three different considerations of God as good.⁶ Although the general thrust of these arguments can be found in Thomas Aquinas, it will be shown that this set of three arguments is found explicitly in Giles of Rome, and that James of Viterbo often uses Giles' own language when explaining these

⁴ James of Viterbo, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 20, in *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A., Disputatio Secunda de Quolibet*, ed. Eelcko Ypma (Würzburg: Augustin-Verlag, 1969), 202-214. For the date, see Eelcko Ypma, "Recherches sur la productivité littéraire de Jacques de Viterbo jusqu'à 1300," *Augustiniana* 25 (1975): 273-274; Idem, introduction to *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. Disputatio Prima de Quolibet* (Würzburg: Augustin-Verlag, 1968), vi; Idem, introduction to *Jacobi de Viterbio ... Disputatio Secunda*, vi; Palémon Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, 2 vols., *Études de Philosophie Médiévale*, 17-18 (Paris: Vrin, 1933-34), vol. 2, 310. For a controversy about the dates of James' works, see John F. Wippel, "The Dating of James of Viterbo's *Quodlibet* I and Godfrey of Fontaine's *Quodlibet* VIII," *Augustiniana* 24 (1974): 348-386. For a recent discussion of James of Viterbo and bibliography, see Edward P. Mahoney, "James of Viterbo," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 5 (London: Routledge, 1998): 58-60.

Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4, q. 13, in *Quodlibeta* (Louvain: 1646; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), 234-237. For the date of *Quodlibet* 4 as 1289, see Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano I: Le opere prima del 1285. Il commenti aristotelici; parte II," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 2, n. 1 (1991): 74. For discussions of dates, see Francesco del Punta, Silvia Donati, and C. Luna, "Egidio Romano," in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. 42 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993): 321, 331; Glorieux, 300. For a recent discussion of Giles and bibliography, see Francesco del Punta and Cecilia Trifolgi, "Giles of Rome," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4: 72-78.

⁵ James, 202: "Vigesimo quaeritur: Utrum homo naturali dilectione magis diligit Deum quam se ipsum, aut e converso." Giles, 234: "Utrum homo magis debeat diligere Deum, quam seipsum?"

⁶ James, 158-159.

arguments.⁷ Moreover, the three arguments in James' third objection are presented in the same order in which Giles presents them. To establish this point, each of these three arguments will be analyzed separately. The conclusion of the article will emphasize the importance of James' rejection of Giles' position.

The analysis of each argument (God as the causal good, whole good, and final good) will also have three parts. First, James' presentation of each individual argument will be given. Second, each argument will be compared with the corresponding argument in Giles' question. Third, for philosophical interest, James' reply to each argument will be given.

The first argument, which proceeds from the fact that God is the causal good (*bonum causale*), is presented by James in four steps:⁸

- (C1) God produces and conserves everything in being.
- (C2) Consequently, God is more intimate (*intimior*) to any single thing than it is to itself.
- (C3) The good of a creature is more reserved (*reservatur*) in God than it is in the created thing itself, since God brings about (*facit*) its being more than the creature does.
- (C4) Therefore a creature loves God more than itself.

Giles begins the first argument by stating (C2), "... we say that God is more intimate (*magis intimus*) to whatever thing, than the thing is to its own self."⁹ The form of the argument is the same as that found in James, because Giles uses an expanded version of (C1) in which he argues that this intimacy between God and a creature is based on the special way in which the creature is an effect and vestige or likeness (*vestigium vel similitudo*) of God. To some extent a creature is a likeness of a God in the way that the impression of a seal in wax is the likeness of the seal. But a difference between the two types of likeness is important for understanding (C1). The impression of the seal remains in the wax after the seal has been withdrawn. But if God ceases to preserve a creature in existence, then the creature disappears. The likeness of a creature to God has a dependence

⁷ To compare these arguments with the text of Thomas Aquinas, see his *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 26, art. 3. See also note 1 above.

⁸ James, 203: "Prima ratio sumitur ex eo quod Deus est bonum causale. Nam omnia in esse producit et in esse conservat. Sic autem conservat, quia est intimius unicuique rei magis quam ipsa sibi. Et ita bonum creaturae magis reservatur in Deo quam etiam in ipsa re creata, quia Deus magis facit ad eius esse quam ipsamet. Quare magis diligit naturaliter creatura Deum quam se."

⁹ Giles, 235: "... dicimus enim quod Deus sit magis intimus cuilibet rei, quam res ipsa sibi ..."

that is more like the causal dependance of the likeness of a seal reflected in water. Once the seal has been removed, then the likeness does not remain in the water, but rather disappears.¹⁰ The connection between (C1) and (C2) is now clearer. God is more intimate to a thing than it is to itself because God brings about (*facit*) the conservation of a creature's essence more than the essence of that creature does.

Giles uses (C2) to establish (C3). (C2) states that a creature is dependant upon God in such a way that without God a creature cannot exist, and if the creature were annihilated, God could make it again (*reficeret*).¹¹ Therefore, if the creature considers in what respect his good is the divine good, because of the above-mentioned dependance upon the divine good for its existence, it would seem to the creature that its good is more present in the divine good than in its own self.¹²

One important difference in Giles' presentation of the argument is that he uses an additional premiss to move from (C2) to a modified version of (C3) and (C4). The additional premiss is that a creature can know that its good is more present in God than in itself. Giles' version of (C4) concludes that if we should consider that God is the cause and conserver of every good, then we act most badly (*pessime*) if we do not choose God more than ourselves, because we know that our good is more reserved (*reservetur*) in God than in ourselves.¹³

Unlike James, Giles here explicitly discusses the love practiced by rational agents, who can know that God is the producer and conserver of their good. Whereas James' version of (C4) argues that all creatures naturally love God more than themselves, Giles' version states that we must love God more than ourselves precisely because we know that our good is present in God more than in ourselves. Nevertheless, the similarity between the two arguments has been shown. Both argue for their

¹⁰ Ibid.: "Hujusmodi autem vestigium, vel similitudo non est sicut similitudo sigilli reperta in cera, quia absente sigillo remanet ejusmodi similitudo in cera; sed magis est sicut similitudo sigilli in aqua; est enim tantae fluxibilitatis, quod ad momentum non retinere formam sigilli, nisi semper adesset sigillum." For Giles' understanding of *vestigium*, see Giles of Rome, *In Primum Librum Sententiarum* (Venice: 1521; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), d. 3., q. 2, f. 22v-23v.

¹¹ Giles, Quodlibet 4, q. 14, 236: "... Deus facit magis ad conservationem creaturae, quam ipsa creatura; sine Deo enim etiam ad momentum non posset existere creatura: et si annihilata esset creatura, Deus, quando vellet, ipsam reficeret."

¹² Ibid.: "Si ergo creatura adverteret, quantum bonum esset bonum divinum, et quod si annihilata esset per illud bonum refici posset, et quod sine illo bono esse non posset, videret, bonum suum magis esse in illo bono divino, quam in se ipsa."

¹³ Ibid.: "Igitur si consideremus quod Deus sit omnis boni causativus et conservativus, pessime agemus si non magis deligamus [sic] Deum, quam nos ipsos, cognoscentes, quod bonum nostrum magis reservetur in Deo, quam in seipso ..."

conclusions from considerations of God's causation and consequent intimacy with creatures.

James' reply to the argument focuses on two different uses of "*intimus*". James admits that with respect to the causality of a creature's conservation in existence God is more intimate to the creature than it is to itself. The reason is that God is the cause of the creature, and the creature is not the cause of itself. But if intimacy is considered as flowing from union or unity, every creature is more intimate to itself than it is to God. James seems to be arguing that since every creature is one thing itself and different from God, it follows that with respect to unity every creature is more intimate to itself than to God. In this objection James accepts (C1), but he thinks that (C2) is not relevant to the question. James argues that love is based on considerations of unity. It follows from that since a creature is united to itself most of all, it will naturally love its own self most of all.¹⁴

The second argument, which proceeds from the fact that God is the whole good (*bonum totale*), is presented by James in four steps:¹⁵

- (T1) In God is contained the ground (*ratio*) of every good.
- (T2) Every good is compared (*comparatur*) to him as a part is compared to the whole.
- (T3) The part naturally loves the whole more than itself.
- (T4) A creature naturally loves God more than itself.

James gives a traditional line of reasoning to establish (T3) and to show its relevance to human action. In nature we see that a hand, which is a part of the body, naturally exposes itself to danger for the preservation of the whole body. Since reason (*ratio*) imitates nature, there is a counterpart in political action. The good citizen naturally exposes himself to the danger of death for the preservation of the political community (*res publica*). Therefore the good citizen loves the good of the community more than he loves his own good. The examples of the hand and the

¹⁴ James, 211: "... dicendum est quod Deus est intimior rei quam res sibi ipsi, quantum ad causalitatem conservationis; quia plus dependet res quaelibet a Deo quam a se secundum rationem causae, cum res non sit causa sui ipsius; Deus autem est ei causa. Sed quantum ad rationem unionis vel unitatis, magis est intima res quaelibet sibi ipsi quam Deo. Unio autem maxime consideranda est in amicitia sive dilectione."

¹⁵ James, 203: "Secunda ratio sumitur ex eo quod Deus est bonum totale; quia in ipso continetur ratio omnis boni, et omne aliud bonum comparatur ad ipsum, ut pars ad totum. Pars autem naturaliter magis diligit totum quam se." (T4) is not explicitly formulated.

citizen endangering themselves for the good of the whole show that the part loves the whole more than it loves itself.¹⁶

The presentation of this argument by Giles is more condensed than that found in James. Giles' argument begins by making a statement that combines both (T1) and (T2): "... God is the whole good, having in himself any good whatever."¹⁷ To establish (T3), Giles does not mention the traditional argument of the good citizen sacrificing himself for the state, but he does give a detailed discussion of the example concerning how the part of the body sacrifices itself for the good of the whole. Giles argues that the greater love of the part for the whole is naturally stamped (*impressus*) by an instinct of nature on the members of our body. In general, this self-sacrificing love of the part for the whole is naturally inserted (*inditus*) into any part. If this were not the case, then the arm would not expose itself to danger or death for the good of the head.¹⁸ For Giles, creatures do not have an inclination for their own perfection alone, but they have within themselves a greater inclination for the whole good, which is God.

Since Giles has established that the part has a natural instinct to sacrifice itself for the whole, and a creature is a certain expression of that whole good which is God, (T4) follows, namely that it is natural for a creature to love God more than its own self. This emphasis on natural inclination is an insight originally put forth by Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the natural love of God.¹⁹ However, the structure of the argument and the order in which the arguments as a whole are presented show that James' primary target was the argument as presented by Giles.

At the end of the second argument Giles discusses briefly the dictum of Aristotle mentioned in our introduction, namely that "the notes of friendship that are for another come from the notes of friendship that

¹⁶ Ibid.: "... quia pars naturaliter se exponit ad conservationem totius, sicut manus naturali inclinatione exponit se ad resistendum vel ad suscipiendum ictum pro conservatione totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, ideo istud etiam invenitur in actibus politicis. Bonus enim civis exponit se mortis periculo pro conservatione rei publicae." This argument is common to many medieval authors. For its role in Thomas Aquinas' thought, see Stevens: 523-532. For Aristotle's discussion of the good citizen exposing himself to the danger of death for the sake of the political community, see *Ethica Nicomachea* 9.8.1169a17-27.

¹⁷ Giles, 236: "... Deus sit bonum totale habens in se quodcumque bonum."

¹⁸ Ibid.: "... in ipsis autem membris nostris hanc legem esse impressam ex instinctu naturae percipimus, quod partes se exponant periculo et morti pro defensione totius; quod non esset, nisi naturaliter esset inditus partibus quod plus diligenter totum quam seipsas."

¹⁹ For Thomas' originality, see Gagnebet: 414.

are for ourselves."²⁰ Love between creatures is a love between parts. Consequently, this type of love for another can be based on self-love. Since the love of a creature for God is the love of a part for the whole, it follows that the love for the whole good is entirely different from love for neighbor, and cannot come from self-love.²¹ In the conclusion of this article it will be shown that James of Viterbo thinks that this dictum of Aristotle holds true not just for the love that one creature has for another creature, but for any purely natural love. The reason is that James rejects Giles' belief that the part has a natural instinct to sacrifice itself for the good of the whole.

James' reply to the argument is directed against (T2) and (T3). He states that a part is included in the whole in two ways. In one way the part is one thing with the whole. In this sense the part loves the whole with a love equal to that by which it loves itself, since they both are one. In another sense, the part can be considered as different (*diversa*) from the whole. Inasmuch as the part is different from the whole, it loves itself more than the whole.²²

To reject Giles' position, James needs to address the two different examples which provide support for (T3), which are the hand sacrificing itself for the body and the good citizen sacrificing himself for the good of the community. James discusses these two issues separately. First, he attacks the doctrine that creatures have a natural inclination to love the whole more than themselves. According to James, when the good of a part is sacrificed for the good of the whole, this sacrifice is caused not by the natural appetite of the part, but rather by the natural appetite of the whole which uses the parts. Here James discusses the case of the hand or arm being endangered for the welfare of the body. The hand or the arm does not expose itself to danger. On the contrary, the whole body exposes such less worthy parts to danger in order to protect a more noble (*nobilior*) part

²⁰ See note 3. Giles' version differs from that found in the version presented in James' response by stating, "quae sunt ad nos ipsos" rather than "ad se ipsum." See Giles, 236; James, 208. James (214) reproduces "ad nos ipsos" when attacking the position of Giles.

²¹ Giles, 236: "Intelligenda sunt de amore partis ad partem, nam amabilia unius partis ad aliam surrexerunt ex amicabilibus, quae sunt ad seipsum. Non autem intelligenda sunt esi [eti?] de amore partis ad totum: quasi pars magis debeat diligere totum, quam seipsum."

²² James, 212: "Uno modo ut includitur in toto ... Unde hoc modo eadem et aequali dilectione diligit se et totum; nec est comparatio inter ea, quia hoc modo non sunt diversa. Alio modo potest considerari pars ut est diversa a toto. Nam, licet aliquo modo sit eadem toti, tamen habet diversitatem quamdam a toto. Et hoc modo pars magis diligit se quam totum."

like the eye. Similarly, in the universe God permits evil among parts on account of the good of the whole universe.²³ Whereas Giles thinks that the part has impressed within itself a natural instinct for the good of the universe, James thinks that the part is ordered to the good of the whole by an external orderer. In this respect, James foreshadows the teaching of John Duns Scotus on the issue.²⁴

Similarly, James maintains that when a citizen chooses to expose himself to danger for the sake of the political community, he is primarily acting for his own benefit. There are two ways in which such citizens intend their own benefit. First, there are those who endanger themselves for glory and the praise of the political community. Consequently, since they primarily love praise and glory, they love themselves more than the political community.²⁵ Praise and glory are extrinsic goods. There is another type of citizen who exposes himself to danger for the good of virtue. This virtuous citizen endangers himself not because he loves the community more than himself, but rather because he loves the good of virtue, which pertains to his own perfection (*pertinens ad perfectionem hominis*). Indeed, he loves himself even more than the citizen who acts for praise and glory loves himself, since virtue is an intrinsic good, whereas praise and glory are extrinsic goods.²⁶ Such a man loves the good of the community more than the good of his body, which he is prepared to sacrifice; however, he does not prefer the public good to the good of virtue. This is clear from the fact that such a citizen would not expose himself to the loss of the good of virtue for the sake of the political community.²⁷

²³ Ibid., "Nam, ut videtur, pars non exponit se ipsam pro conservatione totius, sed totum est illud quod exponit partem pro salute sui, et partem viliorem pro salute partis nobilioris, ut manum pro oculo. Sic enim et in universo Deus permittit malum partis, propter bonum totius."

²⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, supp. dist. 27, in Allan B. Wolter, ed., *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 432: "... exempla ista non ostendunt propositum. Solummodo enim manifestant quod totum magis diligit bonum suiipsius vel partis principalioris totius quam partis minus principalis."

²⁵ James, 212: "Sicut enim illi qui exponunt se periculis pro salute communitatis, ut ex hoc laudentur, non magis diligunt communitatem quam se, immo magis diligunt se quam communitatem, dum propriam laudem et gloriam intendunt ..."

²⁶ Ibid.: "Et tanto amplius dicendum est hoc, tam de istis quam de his qui propter laudem hoc faciunt, quamvis quanto bonum virtutis est maius bonum et magis pertinens ad perfectionem hominis quam laus quae est extrinsecum bonum."

²⁷ James, 212-213: "... huiusmodi civis nollet amittere bonum virtutis propter communitatem salvandam."

This understanding of the good citizen is of particular interest because it reflects a debate at the University of Paris between the Arts Faculty and some theologians. In his *Quodlibet* 10, q. 3, Godfrey of Fontaines mentions that there is a dispute between the Peripatetics who use Aristotle's theory of friendship to show that ethics is primarily a type of self-love, and those theologians who interpret Aristotle by following reason as enlightened by faith.²⁸ James' understanding of the good citizen's self-sacrifice, and his distinction between extrinsic goods and intrinsic goods, follows closely the position taken by Siger of Brabant, who argued that a good person (*bonus*) differs from a bad person (*malus*) in that he rightly acts for his highest good, which is the good of virtue. The good citizen is willing to sacrifice his extrinsic goods of health and life for the good of the state, but it is only because he recognizes that by doing so he acquires for himself the more important extrinsic good of virtue.²⁹ It is interesting that in the interpretation of Aristotle and in the understanding of the good citizen's action, James follows the interpretation of the Arts Faculty and not the theologians. In the conclusion, we will see how James combines Siger's position with Bernard's *natura curva*, which states that nature unassisted by grace is primarily self-interested.

The third argument for the natural ability to love God more than self proceeds from the fact that God is the final good (*bonum finale*). James presents the argument in four parts:³⁰

- (F1) God is the end of all things, for the sake of which (*propter quem*) all things are.

²⁸ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* X, q. 6, in *Le dixième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. Jean Hoffmans, *Les Philosophes Belges*, t. 4, fasc. 3 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1931), 318: "Inter differentias quae ponuntur inter theologos qui sequuntur dictamen rationis secundum illustrationem luminis et fidei et inter peripateticos qui sequebantur dictamen rationis solum secundum illustrationem rationis naturalis ..." I hope to discuss the positions of Godfrey and Siger in a further study.

²⁹ Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones Morales*, q. 5, in *Siger de Brabant, Écrits de logique, de morale, et de physique*, ed. Bernardo Bazán (Louvain: Publications Universitaires; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), 103-105.

³⁰ James, 203: "Tertia ratio sumitur ex eo quod Deus est bonum finale. Est enim omnium finis, propter quem sunt omnia; et ideo propter ipsum diligenda sunt omnia. Sed propter quod unumquodque est, et illud magis. Quare ipse maxime et super omnia est naturaliter diligendus." For (F3), cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora* 1.2.72a29-30, in *Aristoteles Latinus*, IV, 1-4, 2nd ed., eds. Lawrence Minio-Paluello and Bernard Dodd (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1968), translatio Iacobi, 9: "... semper enim propter quod est unumquodque, illud magis est, ut propter quod amamus; illud amicum magis est."; translatio Ioannis, 114: "... semper enim propter quod est unumquodque illud magis est, sicut propter quod amamus, illud amicum magis."

- (F2) Therefore all things are to be loved for the sake of him (*propter ipsum*).
- (F3) But that on account of which every single thing exists, is more. (*Sed propter quod unumquodque est, et ille magis*).
- (F4) Therefore God is to be loved naturally most of all (*maxime*) and above all things (*super omnia*).

(F3) plays the central role in this argument. The use of "God" as the object of the preposition "*propter*" links the argument from (F1) to (F3). Everything is for the sake of God (*propter quem*), and is to be loved on account of him (*propter ipsum*). The word "*magis*" in (F3) is linked with "*maxime*" in (F4). (F3) can be rephrased as: anything for the sake of which something else exists, is more (*magis*) than something which exists for its sake. Since God is that for the sake of which everything is, it follows that God is to be loved most of all (*maxime*) and above everything else.

Giles' presentation of this argument follows the same structure and uses many of the same words, but it differs in the formulation of (F1) because of Giles' emphasis on participation. Giles begins by asserting that our good is good only insofar as it participates in the divine good (*in quantum participat divinum bonum*). Giles then uses this version of (F1) to establish (F2), which is that our good is to be loved on account of the divine good (*propter divinum bonum*).³¹ Here Giles too emphasizes the importance of "*propter*". Everything is loved on account of (*propter*) the divine good, but the divine good is not loved on account of (*propter*) anything, because it is essentially and *per se* good. Giles points out that we love our neighbor on account of (*propter*) the society that we share with him in the divine good.³²

The version of (F3) found in Giles is worth reproducing because of its similarity to that found in James: *propter quod unumquodque, tale et illud magis*. The move to (F4) is the same as that found in James. Since

³¹ Giles, 236: "Si ergo bonum nostrum non est bonum, nisi in quantum participat divinum bonum, consequens est, quod non sit diligendum, nisi propter illud divinum bonum, cujus participatione habet quod sit bonum: quodlibet ergo debet diligere se ipsum sive suum bonum propter divinum bonum."

³² Ibid.: "Proximum autem debent diligere propter societatem, quam habet cum ipso in illo summo bono ..."

we love our own good on account of (*propter*) the divine good, it follows that we must love the divine good more (*magis*) than our own good.³³

Although Giles primarily discusses participation in this third argument, he uses participation in a way that considers God as the final good. This linkage between participation and the consideration of God as the final good becomes clear after Giles establishes (F4) and continues to discuss the difference between love of neighbor and love of God. Giles explains that we do not have goodness by participating in our neighbor, but rather by our participating in God. Consequently, our good is not to be loved on account of (*propter*) our neighbor as the final good (*finaliter*), but on account of the divine good. God is the final good for the sake of which (*propter*) we must love both ourselves and our neighbor.³⁴ The connection between James' presentation of the argument as involving God as the final good and Giles' discussion of participation is now clear. God is the final good precisely because every created good participates in God and is to be loved for the sake of that divine good.

James replies to this argument in two ways. First, he attacks the relevance of (F3) to the argument. James' argument is that just because something is more (*magis*) in an absolute sense, it does not follow that it is more to us. James makes the distinction between that which is most lovable in itself and that which is most lovable to us. This distinction is analogous to that between those things which are most knowable in themselves and those which are most knowable to us. We do not always know best those things which are themselves most knowable. Similarly, we do not always love those things that are better, but instead we love those things that are more joined to us (*nobis coniunctiores*). God is the most lovable thing (*maxime diligibilis*) because he is the most good (*maxime bonus*). However, since a man is more united (*maxime unus*) to himself than he is to God, it follows that he loves himself more than he loves God. James' first major criticism of the argument is his assertion that the argument from (F1) to (F3) only proves that God is most lovable in himself, but it does not prove that God is most lovable to man.³⁵

³³ Ibid.: "... Cum bonum nostrum sit diligendum propter divinum bonum, consequens est quod magis debeamus diligere Deum, quam nos ipsos, et divinum bonum magis, quam nostrum bonum."

³⁴ Giles, 236-237: "... sumus enim boni non participatione proximi, sed participatione Dei: nec est bonum nostrum diligendum finaliter propter proximum, sed propter Deum et propter divinum bonum."

³⁵ James, 213: "... dicendum est quod non semper magis diligimus meliores, sed nobis coniunctiores. Licet ergo Deus sit maxime bonus, naturaliter tamen quilibet est sibi ipsi maxime unus, et ideo naturali dilectione magis diligit homo se quam Deum. Arguit ergo ratio ista quod Deus sit maxime diligibilis, ex eo quod est maxime bonus, non tamen quod

James' second major criticism of the argument is based on two uses of the preposition "*propter*".³⁶ These two uses correspond to the traditional distinction between the two types of love, *dilectio concupiscentiae* and *dilectio amicitiae*. The distinction has its roots in Geoffroy of Poitiers and William of Auxerre.³⁷ *Dilectio amicitiae* is the love which wills good for another, whereas *dilectio concupiscentiae* wills another's good for oneself. The first use of "*propter*" is to refer to an end (*finis*). In this way, to be loved as an object of "*propter*" is to be loved as an end. James argues that to love some being as an end is to love this other being with *dilectio concupiscentiae*.³⁸ In this sense, (F2) is correct to assert that a man loves his own good on account of (*propter*) God. But since this love for God is the love of him as an end, this love is a *dilectio concupiscentiae*. Since such love desires another's good for one's own sake, it follows that a man cannot in this sense love God more than himself, since he is loving God as his own end.³⁹

In another sense, the object of "*propter*" can be the moving cause (*causa movens*). In this sense someone can love a man on account of (*propter*) another, as when someone loves a servant on account of (*propter*) his lord. The love for the servant has the love for the lord as its moving cause. In this sense someone will love his friend on account of (*propter*) himself, since the love for the friend has its origin in self-love.⁴⁰ Such love is a *dilectio amicitiae*. It is worth quoting James' discussion of this love in full:

But a man does not love himself by a natural love on account of (*propter*) God just as on account of (*propter*) a moving cause, rather more conversely

a nobis maxime diligatur naturali dilectione, sicut ex eo quod est maxime verum, arguitur quod sit maxime cognoscibilis; non tamen quod a nobis maxime cognoscatur."

³⁶ I am omitting for two reasons the short reply found on p. 213, lines 371-374. First, it does not directly show any problems with Giles' argument. Second, its explanation requires a full exposition of James' position, which I plan to undertake in a further study.

³⁷ Landgraf: 577-578. See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, II, tr. II, cap. 4, ed. Jean Ribailier, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum*, v. 17 (Rome: Collegium Bonaventurae, 1982), 42-43. For a discussion of William of Auxerre's position, see Gillon: 332-334; Gagnebet: 398-400.

³⁸ James, 213: "Vel potest importare habitudinem causae, sicut dicitur aliquid diligere propter finem; et sic diligere aliud propter aliud habet locum in dilectione concupiscentiae. Tali enim dilectione diligitur finis."

³⁹ James, 213-214: "... homo naturali dilectione diligit se propter Deum, sicut propter finem; et ideo Deum maxime diligit sicut finem; quae dilectio est concupiscentiae."

⁴⁰ James, 213: "Vel potest importare habitudinem causae motivae, sicut dicitur aliquis diligere unum hominem propter alium, ut servum propter dominum; quia dilectio domini est causa movens ad dilectionem servi. Sic etiam dicitur aliquis diligere amicum propter se, quia dilectio amici originem habet ex dilectione sui."

[he loves] God on account of (*propter*) himself, since, according to the natural love of friendship (*dilectio amicitiae*), the notes of friendship which exist in regard to another, come from those notes of friendship which exist in regard to our own selves. But a man loves himself on account of (*propter*) God by the love of charity, just as on account of (*propter*) the moving cause, since according to the love of this sort, the notes of friendship which belong in regard to himself and to his neighbor, come from those notes of friendship which exist in regard to God ...⁴¹

James refers here to the commonplace Aristotelian dictum mentioned both at the beginning of this article and in Giles' discussion of the argument from God as the whole good. It is noteworthy that both Giles and James interpret the dictum to mean that the love of neighbor has its basis in self-love. Their disagreement concerns the application of the dictum to God. Since Giles accepts the Thomistic notion that every creature has a natural inclination to love God more than itself, he thinks that Aristotle's dictum is irrelevant to the discussion of love for God. In contrast, James of Viterbo thinks that Aristotle's statement refers to any purely natural love, including the natural love for God.

Why does James take this position against his Augustinian predecessor? A full exposition of James' position will be reserved for a further study. However, it is important that two remarks be made here. First, James' position that all natural love has its roots in self-love finds support in the text of Aristotle, but it also has a history in the mystical and theological literature of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries. Theologically, James' position is not far from that taken by William of Auxerre, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and others. Indeed, James discusses Bernard's position that natural love is self-interested in the body of the question.

Bernard teaches that there are four grades of love. According to the first grade, a man loves himself on account of (*propter*) himself. According to the second grade, a man loves God on account of (*propter*) himself. In the third grade, a man loves God on account of (*propter*) God. According to the fourth and highest grade of love, someone not only loves God on account of (*propter*) God, but he loves himself on account of (*propter*) God. According to James' interpretation of Bernard, the first two

⁴¹ James, 214: "Sed, sicut propter causam motivam non diligit homo naturali dilectione se propter Deum, immo magis econverso Deum propter se, quia, secundum dilectionem naturalis amicitiae, amabilia quae sunt ad alterum, veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad nos ipsos. Dilectione vero caritatis diligit homo se propter Deum, sicut propter causam motivam, quia secundum dilectionem huiusmodi amabilia quae sunt hominis ad se et ad proximum, veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad Deum ..."

grades pertain to natural love, whereas the third and fourth require grace.⁴²

James lists these four grades after he explains that he understands the Aristotelian doctrine of friendship to state that every natural love comes from self-love. For James, there is no disagreement between Bernard and the Aristotelian dictum on natural love. Consequently, James easily incorporates Aristotelian self-love into his ethical thought precisely because he takes Aristotle to be agreeing with Bernard about nature's inability to transcend self-love.

Philosophically, James' interpretation of Aristotle has its roots more in the Arts Faculty than in his immediate theological predecessors. In his interpretation of Aristotle's view on friendship and in stating that the good citizen endangers himself not for the good of the community but for his own intrinsic good of virtue, James is siding with Siger against Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Giles of Rome.⁴³

Although James disagrees with Thomas and Godfrey, his main target is Giles. James explicitly rejects Giles' three arguments based on a consideration of God as the causal, the whole, and the final good. Not only does James present these arguments in the same order as they occur in Giles' *Quodlibet* 4, q.14, but the arguments which he attacks have the same or very similar structure to those found in Giles, and often the same words and phrases are used. James clearly finds Giles' views on the natural love for God to be both theologically and philosophically insufficient.

⁴² James, 208-209. For the text of Bernard, see *De diligendo Deo*, 8.23-10.30, 15.39-40, in Bernard of Clairvaux, *Opera*, vol. 3, eds. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), 138-144, 152-154. For a discussion of love in the works of Bernard, see Etienne Gilson, *La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard* (Paris: Vrin, 1934); Pacifique Delfgaauw, "La nature et les degrés de l'amour selon S. Bernard," in *Saint Bernard théologien: Actes du Congrès de Dijon, 15-19 septembre 1953, Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis* 9 (1953): 234-252; G.R. Evans, *The Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1983), 107-137. For the position that Bernard is discussing fallen nature, since in the twelfth century the metaphysical distinction between nature and grace had not yet been clarified, see Garrigou-Lagrange: 106-107; Delfgaauw: 237-239.

⁴³ Thomas' position is more nuanced. For Thomas, before the Fall humans could love God more than themselves out of natural powers, but after the Fall healing grace is necessary. See Thomas Aquinas, *S.T.*, I-II, q. 109, art. 3. For a text of Giles on whether it is possible to perform a good action without grace, see *Quodlibet* 2, q. 29, in *Quodlibeta*, 120-122. However, he does not discuss the love of God more than self. For a parallel passage in Thomas, see *S.T.*, I-II, q. 109, art. 2. For discussions of Giles on the relationship between charity and merit, see *Quodlibet* 6, q. 2, in *Quodlibeta*, 354-357; *In tertium librum sententiarum*, d. 30, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (Rome: 1623; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1968), 618-621.

It is at this point that James' understanding of the relationship between nature and grace is most evident. Compared with the position taken by his theological contemporaries, James' approach is anomalous because he combines Siger's approach to Aristotle with St. Bernard's understanding of *natura curva*. By nature every man loves his own self most of all. It is only through grace that God is loved above everything, and this supernatural love of charity becomes the source for a heightened love of self and neighbor which is subordinated to the love of God. It is interesting that James of Viterbo, when rejecting the arguments for the natural love of God, deliberately attacks those arguments which were presented by Giles of Rome, who was not only a member of the same Augustinian Order, but also his predecessor in the same chair at the University of Paris.⁴⁴

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