

THE ORDERING AND ORIGIN OF THE SOUL'S FACULTIES ACCORDING TO GILES OF VITERBO, O.E.S.A.*

The *Commentarium super librum primum Sententiarum* "ad mentem Platonis" of Giles of Viterbo, dating from the early sixteenth century, follows the long list of *Sentences* commentaries written by medieval masters of theology.¹ Reaching only the seventeenth distinction of Book I before its author was compelled by administrative responsibilities to abandon the project around 1512, it is yet a large and ambitious work, distinctive for the way it buttresses Christian theological doctrines with classical myth and poetic imagery. It successfully informs questions established in scholastic discourse with interpretations reflecting a new emphasis on Platonic and poetic theology. Over the past four decades scholars have commented on this interesting blending in various ways. Eugenio Massa interpreted Giles's intention as "to liberate theology from the systematic foundation it had under medieval Scholasticism and establish a new humanistic theology."² Massa, however, also recognizes that Giles often used Platonic texts to reinforce the conclusions of his scholastic predecessors.³ John O'Malley has observed that Giles did not, contrary to what many would expect, "reject the scholastics as too tainted with Aristotle and too rigorously systematized for him to be able to

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¹ F. Stegmüller's *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols., (Würzburg, 1947) gives ample evidence of the frequency of production of *Sentences* commentaries. On the *Commentarium ad mentem Platonis* and its author see especially John W. O'Malley, S.J. *Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform* (Leiden, 1968). Eugenio Massa, *I Fondamenti metafisici della «dignitas hominis»*, Torino 1954 contains an edition of chapters 53-66 of Egidio's commentary, which lie midway between the preface and the place where Egidio abandoned the project. All citations from Egidio's commentary in this article are based on Vat. Lat. 6325. Corrections based on readings of four other MSS (Rome, Bib. Angelica 636; Naples, BN, VIII F 8; Naples, BN XIV H 71; Hamburg, Staats-und Univ., Codex Philol. 308) are signalled in the notes. Corrections to Massa's version have been made without indication in the text.

² *I Fondamenti*, p. 3.

³ "Sovente Egidio usa i testi di Platone semplicemente per dimostrare non aristotelicamente le dottrine di Aristotele" (*Ibid.*, p. 18, n. 144).

tolerate."⁴ Giles, in his *Sentences* commentary and elsewhere, rather "follows in a general way the topics treated by the great scholastics and, although his manner of argument is different from theirs, his conclusions are not so distinctive as we might have anticipated."⁵ O'Malley concludes by noting, however, what he calls a strange anomaly, that as an administrator Giles promoted the study of scholastic theology "with an insistence truly remarkable for somebody convinced that the properly Christian philosophy was that of the Ficinian Plato."⁶ Elsewhere I have argued that Giles shows remarkable freedom when choosing to follow one school or another to answer particular questions, but that what is consistent and distinctive about his method of treatment is the use of classical literary texts to illustrate his conclusions.⁷

The synthesis of scholastic and poetic approaches to theological issues is especially evident in Giles's writings on the soul. It will be in evidence here, as this paper examines two questions on the soul that Giles treated midway in his commentary. Both questions are concerned with the faculties or powers that were seen to account for the soul's many different operations such as memory, sense perception, and the ability to abstract. The first asks whether there is any proper ordering among the faculties. The second asks whether one faculty may be said to originate from another. Both questions were treated frequently in commentaries on Book 1 of the *Sentences* because that book is devoted to reflecting on the theological mystery of the Trinity, and the faculties of the human soul had a long history of being used as analogies for the persons of the Trinity.⁸

⁴ John W. O'Malley, S.J. *Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform: A Study in Renaissance Thought*, (Leiden, 1968), p. 62. Such an anti-Aristotelian description would fit some Renaissance scholars. Mario Nizolio (1488-1567), for example, openly criticized Aristotle and saw Ciceronian rhetoric as a proper replacement for Peripatetic logic. Giles's relation to Aristotle is more complex.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁷ See D. Nodes, "Humanism in the Commentary *ad mentem Platonis* of Giles of Viterbo," *Augustiniana* 45 (1995), 285-298; "Homeric Allegory in Egidio of Viterbo's Reflections on the Human Soul," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales*, 65 (1998), 351-363.

⁸ For centuries before Giles wrote, it was widely held that the soul performs its various operations, from controlling bodily functions and taking in sensory data, to exercising memory, imagination, reason, will, and all intellectual functions, through individual faculties or powers. Katherine Park has observed that in the Middle Ages "the powers were acknowledged as central to any account of the soul," but she is quick to add that "there was no consensus as to what they were," ("Albert's Influence on Late Medieval Psychology," in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, ed. J. Weisheipl, O.P., Toronto 1980, p. 506). Further, how those powers subsist in relation to the soul and each

Giles makes his presentation as an heir to the major strands of ancient and medieval thought. It was chiefly from Augustine that Peter Lombard appropriated the concept that trinities exist in the operations of the soul, and at *Sentences* Bk. 1, Distinction 3, Chapter 2, "*Quomodo in anima sit imago Trinitatis*," Peter gave the Augustinian framework to commentators: when discussing the Trinity, invoke the unity of the soul as an image of God's unity but also consider ways the soul contains triune elements among its powers or faculties.⁹ A series of complications arose when to this framework were added questions of the ordering and origin of those elements. The Nicene Fathers had labored over the ordering and origin among the divine persons and had articulated the doctrines of the procession of the Son by way of generation or birth or begetting (γέννᾶ) and the procession of the Spirit (ἐκπόρευσις) not by way of generation or birth or begetting. The prevailing doctrine rejected logical orderings according to time or simple causality as inappropriate when speaking of the divine persons of the Trinity. It affirmed an ordering of origin among the Persons, but one entailing neither priority nor posteriority in time nor any superiority or inferiority in being or nature. Orthodox doctrine, thus preserving the mystery of three ordered yet coequal and coeternal persons, allowed any analogy drawn from nature only a partial correspondence. A century later Augustine found his useful analogies by focusing on mental processes, as seeing, for example, entails a trinity of thing seen, the seeing by the imagination, and the tending or willing that focuses on the object.

other was never resolved for as long as the question remained intelligible. Do they fall into certain natural categories? Do they derive from one another in sequence? One can compare questions about the soul that Aristotle asks at the beginning of *De anima*, of which two are relevant here, as articulated, for example, by W. Charlton: Is the soul a thing with parts? (402b 1); Is all soul the same in kind, or are there different souls, the soul of a horse, the soul of a dog, the soul of a man, and so on? (402b 1-8) (See William Charlton, "Aristotle's Definition of Soul," in *Aristotle's De anima in Focus*, ed. Michael Durrant [London and New York, 1993]). Are they substances distinct from the soul? Are they the soul's parts? Are they just names for each of the various operations that the one undivided soul was thought to perform? Ample interest existed in these questions in their own right; but a respected though troublesome tradition linking human psychology and reflections on the divine nature as Trinity contributed to their ongoing presence and the turbulence accompanying their discussion. Because the soul is made in God's image, it is one and simple as God is. But the powers of the soul were multiple and were traditionally arranged in three categories, as presented in Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine.

⁹ See *Sentences* 1, D3, Ch. 2 - 4. The Blackfriars edition of the *Summa theologiae* (ed. Timothy L. Sutor, vol. 11, [New York and London, 1970], p. 90 n. 9) speaks of Lombard's presentation here as "the source of the scholastic dialectic on this as on so many other matters." The importance of Aristotle to the development of this and most other topics in medieval theology and philosophy, however, must be emphasized.

He also presented a trinity of three levels of seeing: physical sight, the imagining of objects in the mind, and abstract, intellectual sight.¹⁰ The analogy that satisfied Augustine most applies intellectual processes, being mindful, understanding, and loving, to the Good, or God himself, because in Augustine's view, when God is the subject, each of those actions, though distinct, entails the others, simultaneously and co-equally, in a unified act.¹¹ As mentioned, Augustine is mainly where Peter Lombard drew his inspiration for drawing the connection, but he, like Augustine, also acknowledged the limitations of virtually all analogies in this context.¹²

The reintroduction of Aristotelian psychology and the addition of commentaries on Aristotle by Muslim scholars brought other images to the forefront for later medieval Christians to consider when presenting the faculties as an analogy for the persons of the Trinity.¹³ Aristotle's *De anima*, 2.3 identifies three species or aspects of soul: vegetative, sensitive, and rational, and compares them to the progression of numbers and geometric figures, one from another. "For alike in figures and in things connected with soul," writes Aristotle, "the earlier form exists potentially in the later, as, for instance, the triangle potentially in the quadrilateral, and the nutritive faculty in that which has sensation."¹⁴ Aristotle's distinction among vegetative, sensitive, and rational faculties, had been reflected in Augustine but was now reintroduced to the West from a non-Christian context. This still gave Christian commentators the opportunity to develop the trinitarian analogy, but in doing so they risked presenting a static hierarchy of comprehensiveness and importance from one element to the other, thereby failing to represent divine persons that are co-equal and

¹⁰ See in particular *De Trinitate* 11.2, 2-5. *De genesi ad litteram* 12.37 distinguishes between carnal sight and intellectual or spiritual sight.

¹¹ See *De Trinitate* 10.

¹² On Peter's recognition of the limits of Augustine's psychological analogies, perhaps excluding *mens*, *notitia*, *amor*, see Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1994), p. 243-244.

¹³ *De anima* was part of the "third entry" of Aristotle. L. Minio-Paluello, however, (*Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle* [Amsterdam, 1972]) has shown that *De anima* came into the West first by direct translations from the Greek and not by way of the Muslim commentators and translators of their works as is often assumed. Thomas seems to have used a version of Aristotle's *De anima* that was derived from the translation of William of Moerbeke, composed between 1265 and 1268.

¹⁴ *De Anima* 2.2-3, 414b, trans. R.D. Hicks, (Buffalo, 1991), p. 44. Averroes was one influential commentator who interpreted Aristotle's discussion of the faculties as referring to distinct substances.

co-eternal, yet possessing an order of origin among themselves.¹⁵ It is not surprising that many later adherents to Augustine's psychological analogies against the newly introduced framework from Aristotle were inclined to consider the distinctions among the soul's faculties as more verbal than real.¹⁶

Thomas Aquinas met the challenge differently, and as the scholastic part of Giles's presentation follows the Thomistic adaptation of Aristotle, it is helpful to outline how Thomas treats the issue in his *Sentences* commentary.¹⁷ Thomas begins his account of the ordering of the faculties by repeating the two basic principles of order that doctrine rejects as ways to understand the ordering of the divine persons in the Trinity time of coming into being and simple causality. He first acknowledges arguments against ordering based on origin in time, because all of the faculties are simultaneous and present in the soul from its creation:

It seems that one faculty (*potentia*) does not originate from another, since, for all things that are simultaneous, no element arises from another.

Now all the faculties are in the soul at the same time from the creation of the soul.

Therefore, one faculty does not arise from another.¹⁸

¹⁵ Aristotle was influential in late medieval formulations of the distribution of the faculties. "Separate but related, the faculties occupied a static hierarchy of dependence and nobility ranging from the lowest faculty of nutrition to the highest faculty of intellect. . . They were further grouped into three different kinds of soul" (*Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. Charles B. Schmitt et al., Cambridge 1988, p. 467).

¹⁶ Massa (*I fondamenti*, p. 17) mentions Alcher of Clairvaux, Philip the Chancellor, John de Rochelle (Massa seems to confuse him with Robert Grosseteste), Richard of Middleton, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham as scholars who agreed with Augustine but who held that the soul was one but that there was no real distinction among the faculties.

¹⁷ John O'Malley maintained that "it is hard to find an obvious and consistent correlation between Giles's work and the corresponding ones of Saint Thomas" (*Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform*, p. 63). While it may be true that "Giles did not have a profound first-hand knowledge of scholastic authors," as O'Malley suggests (*ibid.*), Giles seems to have made detailed use of Thomas for his discussion of the faculties of the soul. For a discussion of the structure of the beginning of Giles's commentary in light of the *Summa* of Thomas see Daniela Gionta, "Scholastik und Platonismus im Prolog zum Sentenzenkommentar des Aegidius von Viterbo," *Augustiniana* 39 (1989): 132-153. Thomas was attracted to the teachings of Aristotle in an environment where philosophy was considered a necessary propaedeutic to theology. See M. D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1954), pp. 173-175.

¹⁸ "Videtur quod una potentia non oriatur ex alia. Quaecumque enim simul sunt, unum ex altero non oritur. Sed omnes potentiae simul sunt in anima ex creatione. Ergo una non oriatur ex alia" (Lib. 1, Dist. 3, Q. IV, a.3). Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, ed. R.P. Mandonnet, O.P. (Paris, 1929), p. 118. All citations of Thomas's *Sentences* commentary are taken from this edition. Translations

Thomas then acknowledges arguments against their ordering being one of simple causality, since "one faculty is not the subject of another faculty, because an accident cannot be the subject of an accident. Therefore, one faculty does not arise from another."¹⁹ Then, to explain how they are ordered according to origin, Thomas distinguishes the faculties according to actions and externals, that is, according to the objects of each faculty. Understanding, the object of reason, follows perception, the object of sensation. From the vantage point of the objects of the faculties we see clearly that there is an ordering. And since there is reciprocal relation between the objects and the faculties connected with them, it follows that there is an ordering to the faculties themselves:

The faculties are distinguished according to their actions. And the activity of one faculty follows naturally from the activity of another faculty and originates from it; just as understanding follows upon perception. Therefore so it is also among the faculties themselves.²⁰

To illustrate the nature of that ordering, Thomas appropriates Aristotle's explanation of the ordering of the three aspects of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, from *De anima*, II.3:

All numerical quantities, which derive naturally from the number one, must descend in order, because one number comes forth only from one number; and so since many faculties proceed from the essence of the soul, we say that there is a natural ordering among the soul's faculties; and although they all flow forth from that essence, still one comes forth from another that stands between it and the essence; and from this it stands to reason that a later faculty presupposes in its definition a prior one, and the action of the later depends on that of the prior. For if we define intellect, it is defined by its action, which is to understand, and in the definition of this faculty's action there is included the action of a prior faculty and the faculty itself.²¹

are mine.

¹⁹ "Una potentia non est subiectum alterius, quia accidens non est subiectum accidentis. Ergo una potentia non oritur ex alia." *Ibid.*

²⁰ "[Contra,] potentiae determinantur secundum actus. Sed actus unius potentiae sequitur naturaliter ad actum alterius potentiae, et originatur ex ipsa; sicut intelligere sequitur ad hoc quod est tenere notitiam. Ergo ita est etiam in potentia." *Ibid.*

²¹ "Omnis numerositas, quae descendit naturaliter ab aliquo uno, oportet quod descendat secundum ordinem, quia ab uno non exit nisi unum; et ideo cum multae potentiae egrediantur ab essentia animae, dicimus, quod in potentiis animae est ordo naturalis; et cum omnes fluant ab essentia, una tamen fluit mediante alia; et inde est, quod posterior potentia supponit in definitione sui priorem, et actus posterioris dependet a priori. Si enim definiamus intellectum, definietur per suum actum, qui est intelligere, et in definitione actus eius cadet actus prioris potentiae, et ipsa potentia." *Ibid.*

The faculties thus resemble various geometrical figures under the one species of figure. The form triangle exists potentially in the form quadrilateral, and so the figures are arranged in order of comprehensiveness.²²

Finally, Thomas replies to the initial objections by retaining the validity of their basic premise while showing that simultaneity and the lack of a substance / accident relationship do not prevent the fact of ordering according to origin, when this principle is properly understood:

First of all, therefore, it must be said that although the faculties are simultaneous, nevertheless one is naturally prior to the other. Secondly, it must be said that an accident does not have the power in itself to produce another accident; but one accident can proceed from a substance with another accident standing in between, according to what is presupposed in the subject.²³

Thomas gives that account in his *Sentences* commentary at the place where Peter Lombard presents the human soul as analogous to the Trinity. Inasmuch as the use of Aristotle's mathematical analogy presents an ordered relationship among simultaneous elements independent of simple causality, Thomas' application to the trinitarian context is successful. But the mathematical hierarchy still fails to reflect the paradox of the ordering of origin among co-equal elements. Thomas seems to have realized this and reworked the Aristotelian perspective closer to reflect the trinitarian mystery. This is suggested by his treatment of the same questions in the *Summa theologiae*, where in Ia.77, art. 4 he presents each of three different orderings from different perspectives, each having its own validity from the particular perspective.²⁴ By "order of

²² In his own commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, Thomas will point out that this understanding of the interrelatedness of all geometrical figures is something on which even the Platonists agree. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's De anima*, Lecture 5, trans. K. Foster, O.P. and S. Humphries, O.P. (Notre Dame, 1994), p. 94. This commentary was composed between 1259 and 1268, between Thomas' writing of his commentary on the *Sentences* and his writing of the *Summa theologiae*.

²³ "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis sint simul tempore, nihilominus tamen una naturaliter prior est altera. Ad secundum dicendum, quod accidens ex seipso non habet virtutem producendi aliud accidens; sed a substantia potest unum accidens procedere mediante alio, secundum quod illud, praesupponitur in subiecto" (Thomas, *Scriptum . . . Lombardi*, p. 118).

²⁴ Thomas maintains the soul's unity while also arguing that the distinction between the soul and its faculties was a real one by introducing a new category into the formula. The distinction was real because the soul belonged to the logical category of substances while the faculties fell under the second species of quality. *Summa theol.* 1.77.1: "Cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens; et est in secunda specie qualitatis." See also O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, Vol. 1

development," each faculty precedes that faculty which it readies for action. Thus the nutritive powers precede the sensory, and the sensory the rational. Natural ordering reverses that sequence and considers the rational powers before the sensory powers and the sensory before the nutritive. Each faculty's domain or sphere of influence reverses the pattern again. The domain of the nutritive is the body only, and that of the sensory is the body and beyond. Then there are rational faculties whose domain is data from the sense world as well as the metaphysical realm of being. For this third way of ordering Thomas drew more deeply from Aristotle's *De anima*, noting that for the second and third domains that connect the soul with externals, two additional powers, namely appetite and locomotion, are required. These additional powers enable the soul to tend towards and then to reach the externals.²⁵ This scheme of showing multiple perspectives lays a foundation for preserving in even greater measure the dynamic aspect of the relation of the persons of the Trinity. And the dynamics are mainly what interest Giles when he takes up the topic at the end of the fifteenth century.

Giles, however, first argues for the moral significance of a search for order among the faculties by invoking Plato. Where Thomas with Aristotle appealed to the geometrical analogy and concluded logically that the faculties must have order, Giles with Plato emphasized humanistically that learning that order will also prevent the soul from experiencing harm and misery, because it will know which faculties should serve and which rule:

Any multiplicity of things, unless it has an order, as in a state or in an army, generally exists in confusion. And so an order must be sought among the faculties of the soul, lest we experience strange things in our flesh, as if our body has been mutated. . . . We should look for an order among those things which afflict us with perpetual harm and misery unless discipline is established and proper order controls them.²⁶

This, we recall, was Plato's aim when in *Republic* Book Four he compared

(Louvain, 1942), pp. 497-507; P. Künzle, *Das Verhältnis der Seele* (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1956), pp. 144-218.

²⁵ See *De anima* II, 3. 414b19-32.

²⁶ "Multitudo omnis nisi ordinem habeat, sicuti in civitate et in exercitu, confundere solet omnia. In potentiis itaque animae ordo quaerendus est, ne membris, velut in corpore, mutatis monstra patiamur. . . . Quaerendus tamen ordo in iis est, quae nisi disciplina instituantur rectoque regantur ordine, perpetuis et iniuriis et miseria nos afficiunt (ch. 65)."

the relation of the parts of the soul to the functioning of a kingdom.²⁷ In that analogy, as Giles notes, "reason (*ratio*) is likened to a king, soldiers to self-regard or emotion (*ira*), and the people to appetite (*cupiditas*)."²⁸

To present the ordering itself, Giles discusses orderings of the faculties from three interrelated perspectives, just as Thomas did in the *Summa*. Giles's orderings of Plato's kingdom are made according to objects or externals, nature, and time. Considered from externals, the proper ordering is soldiers, king, people. According to nature, it is king, soldiers, and people.²⁹ According to time it is people, king, soldiers. The multiple perspectives they provide lead the reader to discover the natural hierarchy of the faculties within a dynamic relationship, mirroring the natural ordering of origin within the dynamic relationship among the persons of the Trinity.

Giles first presents an ordering of the faculties according to time, not, of course, in the sense of the coming into being of each faculty but rather according to their order of action. Giles agrees with his predecessors that the simultaneous creation of the faculties precludes any ordering based on their coming into being at different times:

No matter how often as we separate out and distinguish the class [of faculties], the sub-groups of the faculties, as separated, seem to exist all at the same time: for one subgroup does not seem to be prior to another.³⁰

The ordering according to time refers to their operations. The senses are first to act, and they inform reason, and reason in turn stirs the will. Thus Giles's ordering according to time also parallels the Neoplatonic triad of sense perception, imagination, and intellectual sight, featured in Augustine.

Giles observes a similar multiplicity among plants:

²⁷ *Rep.* 434e - 444e. Plato also discusses the tripartite soul in *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Symposium*. Other medieval theologians adapted this analogy. William of Auvergne, for example, "presents the soul as king of a kingdom, . . . making reason the king's councillor, sending other powers to do his bidding at his will and making the senses inspectors which travel about and report what they see faithfully to their king" (G.R. Evans, *Philosophy and Theology in the Middle Ages*, (London and New York, 1993), p. 91. William's paradigm is built on the same analogy from Plato's *Republic* that Giles eventually uses. Giles, however, has reason, not the soul itself, represent the king, and the emotive and appetitive powers represent the soldiers and people, respectively.

²⁸ "Ratio regi, milites irae, populus cupiditatibus comparatus est" (65).

²⁹ Duns Scotus presents a similar conception of the ordering of the faculties *pro statu naturae*. See *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann et al., (Cambridge, Eng., 1982), p. 626.

³⁰ "At quoties dividimus ac partimur genus, membra partionis simul sunt, neque alterum est altero prius" (65).

If you consider the time of generation, trees first bring forth leaves, then flowers, and then fruits. But if you measure by nature or the concept of perfection, what must stand in first place is that for whose sake the whole operation happens. And so fruits will obtain the primacy of place and flowers will follow them, and leaves will follow them. But if they are compared from the outside with the eyesight, first will be the sweet flowers, than which the eyes behold nothing more joyful, pleasant, and beautiful.³¹

Giles goes on to show that the five physical senses also possess multiple orderings. Using the internal ordering according to time, vision stands first, since, as Giles notes, "we are accustomed to look at things before apprehending them with the other senses."³² But when it comes to ordering according to the faculty's objects, vision stands last, "since in our vision we see spiritual things, which are older and prior to all other things."³³ Hearing follows as a second divine sense, then smell and taste, and finally touch.³⁴

When Giles returns to present the faculties themselves, he notes that if one judges according to the objects of the respective faculties, will (*voluntas*) comes after reason, since the good follows the true. Then there is the ordering of the faculties according to nature and perfection, and here the full moral emphasis returns, for "whoever keeps this ordering is made wise and happy."³⁵ It is here too that Giles has to work both to acknowledge that the rational faculty, *ratio*, the intellective soul, is at the top of the list in all of Plato, as he says, while also maintaining his position that the primacy of place belongs to the will. This is to follow Plato's path as interpreted by Giles's teachers, Agostino Nifo and Marsilio Ficino.³⁶ The natural and optimum ordering gives first place to the will,

³¹ "Arbores enim, si generationis tempus aspicias, primo frondes, deinde flores, postremo poma gignunt; quod si ordinem ex natura perfective metiaris, id primo statuendum loco est, cuius gratia fiunt omnia. Poma itaque principatum obtinebunt, haec flores, hos frondes consequentur. Sin vero extrinsecus oculisque spectantibus comparabuntur, primae erunt partes suavium florum, quibus nihil oculi intueantur laetius, iucundius, gratius" (65).

³² "Omnia inspicere prius quam aliis apprehendere sensibus consuevimus" (65).

³³ "Cum caelestia obtutu videamus, quae aliis omnibus antiquiora prioraque sunt" (65).

³⁴ In Aristotle's *De anima* 414b33, 434a27, and 435a11-435b9 touch is given primacy of place in one ordering pattern as the most fundamental sense. Thomas Aquinas gives ample treatment to touch in his commentary on the *De anima*. Giles seems to pass over this discussion in his abbreviated reference to the five senses.

³⁵ "Quem qui servat, et sapientem et beatum facit" (65).

³⁶ Nifo (1449/70-1538), Giles's teacher of philosophy at Padua, broadened his own devotion to Aristotle and Averroes with Platonic and Hermetic doctrines. Giles studied briefly under Ficino, the leader of the Platonic movement at Florence.

although according to sequential ordering it follows the reason and is informed by it.

If we investigate the parts of reason, intelligence does not rule the will, but rather the will rules intelligence; and although which one is better is still a matter of controversy, Plato gives first place to love. For although the reason leads, common countrymen also customarily go before great kings when they are about to lead their army through dense woods, in out of the way places, and nevertheless the king's will commands all the powers of the kingdom. Therefore when in the tenth book of *Laws* Plato enumerates the agitations of the soul, he mentions willing in the first place, then he mentions contemplating. In the *Symposium* he affirms that love enters through the heads of men, and finally that it holds sway over mortal humans as well as over the immortal gods.³⁷

It is now time for Giles to illustrate these multiple perspectives with imagery drawn from poetry and myth, as he does at the end of every question he discusses in the commentary. Here he points to Homer's presentation of Aphrodite as the goddess "overcome by Athena, wounded by Diomedes, and mocked by Zeus."³⁸ This reflects the orderings according to externals and time, which put reason and sense perception above the will. In Virgil, Giles writes, the third, divine, ordering according to nature and perfection is observed, since primacy of place and *imperium sine fine* is given to the offspring of Venus. Giles's main emphasis in connection with the divine Trinity is well served as he is able to proclaim a natural ordering of the faculties amid a dynamic relationship.

That is how Giles prepared the context to present the second question, one faculty's origin from another. As he notes, in order to reflect the Trinity, the faculties must originate one from the other, as the Son and Spirit originate from the Father. "But how will [the faculties] present themselves as an image and likeness of the Trinity, unless one proceed from the other?" he asks.³⁹ Giles recalls the Aristotelian procession or

³⁷ "Si etiam rationis partes scrutemur, non intelligentia voluntati, sed voluntas intelligentiae imperat; et quamquam in controversia adhuc sit utra pars praestet, Plato primas amoris semper dedit. Licet enim ratio ducat, ducit et rusticus plerumque magnos reges, per avia nemorum ducturos exercitum; imperat tamen universis regni potestatibus voluntas. Quare cum decimo Legum libro [Leg. 10, 896 e-897a] animae agitationes numeraret, primo loco velle, deinde considerare commemoravit. In Symposio [Symp. 18, 195e] per hominum capita amorem ingredi, et tandem affirmat illum tam hominibus mortalibus, quam etiam diis immortalibus imperare" (65).

³⁸ "... Venerem a Pallade victam, a Diomede sauciam, a Iove derisam" (65). See *Iliad* 5.129-132; 428-30; 455-459.

³⁹ "Sed quonam pacto illae effigiem simulacrumque Trinitatis prae se ferent, nisi altera manarit ab altera?" (66).

generation (*dimanatio*) of one number from another and then presents a parallel case of the progression from the Good, to knowledge of the Good, to desire for (love of) the Good, again reflecting Augustine's highest psychological analogies for the Trinity:

If anyone does not desire the good, it is either because he does not know what it is, or because he knows it badly; and so he does not know the good who does not desire it, and he does not desire it who does not pursue it.⁴⁰

Thus, alongside the demand of logical necessity is a moral necessity. The generation of numbers and geometrical figures also requires a progression, and this progression is reflected in a triad in the soul. This time Giles emphasizes the Neoplatonic triad of being, life, and understanding, found in Marius Victorinus and adapted by Lombard:⁴¹

If life is added to a body, its nature is different than if life is withheld. And if sense is added to a living being, it is different from that which lacks sense, or finally, if it is endowed with sense, if it enjoys reason, it is far different than if lacks reason.⁴²

Having made the case for the fact of the ordering of the faculties on moral grounds, Giles is content to confirm their principle of origin, one from another, on logical grounds: "Reason demands that one faculty originate from another."⁴³ When it comes to the faculties, however, the concept of origin is a relative one. From one perspective, the lower faculties are the subject and the material cause of reason, while reason is both the efficient and final cause of the lower faculties.

The lower faculties should be considered prior to the more eminent ones not by nature or perfection, but by generation... And so it stands that the faculties proceed from the soul according to their own order, one from the other, but,

⁴⁰ "Si quis non appetit [bonum], vel quia non novit, vel quia male novit; non itaque novit bonum, qui non appetit, nec appetit qui non sequitur" (66).

⁴¹ See Marcia Colish, *Peter Lombard*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1994), p. 239.

⁴² "Corpori si vivens additur, alia est natura, quam si vivens tollatur. Ita si vivo sensum adicitur, aliud ab eo est, quod sensu caret, vel denique sensu praeditum, si ratione utatur, aliud longe quam si ratio in eo desideretur" (66).

⁴³ "Exigit ratio, ut altera ab altera oriatur" (66). Giles articulates this proof within a Western trinitarian context strongly influenced by Augustine and reinforced by Thomas Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotle. In the scope of trinitarian theology, this argument favors the Filioque, and it is reasonable to assume that Giles himself did. Yet before Giles ends his examination of this question he qualifies the sense of linear recurrence by recalling through Epimionides that the soul is the cause of all the faculties. In fact the soul, he says, stands as efficient cause, the final cause, and as the subject of the faculties.

as I have indicated, in a different manner.⁴⁴

It remains for Giles only to illustrate this second question from mythology. He does this by interpreting the twin births of Diana and Apollo, representing sensitive and intellective faculties respectively, from Latona, i.e., the soul in its human context. Zeus, however, is the children's divine father. Although the two are offspring from the same birth, Diana is born first, because knowledge arises from the senses. After she is born, Diana herself functions as obstetrician, as it were, to Apollo. Diana, the perceptive faculty of the soul, yet remains a virgin, because she has no contact with matter itself but only with its forms. Giles, borrowing from Plato's *Cratylus*, says that Diana's service is to hunt out of the forest of matter prey in the form of sensory data, which she afterwards gives to her brother. Their relative status is symbolized by the bow each possesses:

Each has a bow, that is, [each has] the power of knowing, but Diana deals with things individually, Apollo with universals.⁴⁵ The art of archery is, in fact, nothing other than the power of discourse; for it is by means of arrows, which are near us [and] taken from our quiver, that those fleeing animals that are far from us, are captured. Thus indeed by means of the bow both the brother and sister use arrows and, through the agency of the things they possess, both come to know and pursue what formerly they neither had nor knew about. And if it seems difficult to anyone that sense uses reasoning and discourse, let him read Averroes; for he so applies the thinking part to the mind and makes it close, that although [sense perception] does not use the bow of the brother who strikes at universals, nevertheless it obtains its own bow whereby there is hunting in the capture and reasoning of individual things.⁴⁶

Given the framework of dynamic interrelationship with which Giles

⁴⁴ "Deteriores potestates, non natura aut perfectione, sed generatione praestantioribus priores habendae sunt . . . Constat itaque potentias ab anima suo ordine manare, alteram per alteram, diversa tamen, ut dixi, ratione" (66).

⁴⁵ The duality here refers to two kinds of thought, inductive and deductive; empirical and abstract, and possibly reflecting the distinction between the organic and intellective aspects of the single human soul. See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.*, pp. 464 ff. Giles rejected outright the idea of multiple souls in man.

⁴⁶ "Uterque arcum habet, hoc est cognoscendi vim, sed Diana in singulis, Apollo in universis versatur. Nihil est quippe aliud sagittandi ars, quam discurrendi vis; sagittis namque, quae penes nos nostra e pharetra ducuntur, ea, quae procul absunt, fugientia animalia capiuntur. Ita nempe arcu, sagittis utitur et soror et frater, ac, per ea quae habent, et norunt et assequuntur, quae neque prius habebant neque norant. Quod si cui difficile videatur, ut sensus ratiocinio discursuque utatur, Averroem legat; is enim cogitantem partem adeo menti admovet et vicinam facit, ut quanquam fratrum arcum non attingat, qui universa ferit, proprium tamen arcum obtineat, quo in singulorum captu et ratiocinatione venatur" (66).

presented the ordering of the faculties, one can understand why he presents their origin also from multiple perspectives. As has been mentioned, this is an effective way to approach the paradox of the order of origin of the persons of the Trinity. Yet we must note that this strategy also makes Giles speak more as a materialist than one may expect. Despite his Platonic commitment to the reality of the intelligible world, as well as to the divine nature of the soul evident in his reference to Zeus as its divine parent, here he adopts a position in the debate over the origin of cognition that Aristotle, Thomas, and Averroes supported, epitomized throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance by the sentence, "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*" (There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses).⁴⁷ Nature and perfection give the highest position to the intellective faculty, for which the sensual faculty exists and performs. But if one focuses on generation, then the lower faculty is the cause of the higher. This is an effective way to show how one element standing between its source and a third element may be said to be that from which the third element also proceeds, while allowing for other orderings that suggest a dynamic relationship among the three.

All this attention to the faculties in Giles's *Sentences* commentary from the High Renaissance may seem surprising. It has been pointed out that even by the fourteenth century human cognition interested philosophers and theologians more than the nature of the soul and its faculties.⁴⁸ Faculty psychology, however, continued to prove useful even in Giles's time, when the scholastic logomachy that had been its legacy was being strongly criticized. Philipp Melanchthon, one of the bitterest critics of Scholasticism, summarized the turmoil over the organic faculties responsible for sense perception as *magna et inepta* in his own *Liber de anima*, dating from 1540 (final version 1553). But even Melanchthon continued to speak of will, cognition, memory, and judgment as "interior

⁴⁷ See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.*, p. 470. The epitomizing sentence appears in several writers of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, including Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Giovanni Pico, "as a catch-phrase to summarize Aristotle's position. The sentence does not appear in Aristotle *per se*, however, and it is thought that it may have appeared in the Latin translation of one of Aristotle's commentators or the Arab philosophers." See Paul F. Cranefield, "On the Origin of the Phrase '*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*,'" *Journal of the History of Medicine*, 1970, pp. 77-80. See Aristotle, *De anima* III,8 432a and 434b. Giles is adopting this viewpoint and not simply referring to it.

⁴⁸ "Fourteenth-century philosophy presents a great variety of solutions to the problem we have been dealing with. In that period, human cognition interested philosophers and theologians much more than the nature of the soul and its faculties." See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.*, pp. 625-628.

faculties" in that text. The fifteenth-century German Carthusian Gregor Reisch, author of the influential textbook *Margarita philosophica*, another scholar who voiced the Aristotelian doctrine that "All our knowledge is derived from the senses," continued to speak of three sense types in his doctrine of the powers: external (the five senses), internal five (serving as a bridge), intellection (dealing with universals).⁴⁹ Particularly in commentaries on the *Sentences*, the ongoing utility of the faculties as a way to approach a principal mystery of the Christian faith is evident.⁵⁰

Giles enriches the medieval legacy of abstract dialectic on both questions. He begins with scholastic disputation and ends with poetic exegesis. In the final analysis, he not only reinforces the tradition connecting the human soul and its divine creator; he also presents an eloquent lesson in happiness that comes by learning the proper ordering of the faculties. In this sense his work stands in relationship to other Renaissance scholars, who looked back to classical, patristic, and medieval texts and produced a "fusion of rhetoric and dialectic into a reformed oratory."⁵¹

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⁴⁹ See *Camb. Hist. Ren. Phil.* 466-67, 471.

⁵⁰ Today cognitive scientists may have relegated the discussion about the substance or number of the soul's powers to the museum of psychological quackery, but the concepts endure under the heading of "folk psychology." They remain convenient handles for grasping and referring to complex mental processes and for distinguishing certain types of mental acts from others. Even if there is a single process at the molecular level underlying all mental processes (reflecting earlier language about the unified soul), in human experience hearing still differs from computation, and computation from willing.

⁵¹ This is how Letizia Panizza describes *De vero falsoque bono* of Lorenzo Valla. See L. Panizza, "Lorenzo Valla's *De vero falsoque bono*, Lactantius and Oratorical Scepticism," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 41 (1978): 76-107.