

## JULIAN AND AUGUSTINE ON THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL

In *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,26<sup>1</sup>, Augustine remarks that the Pelagians raise the superfluous matter of the origin of the soul in their controversy. This is a rather surprising remark for everyone who knows how he was himself at odds with the problem of the soul's origin. They do this, according to Augustine, in order to cause confusion in matters which are clear. The Pelagians accuse me of linking up the transmission of the soul with the transmission of the sin.<sup>2</sup> Augustine asks himself amazedly where they ever read this in the writings of orthodox authors. He continues saying that original sin is one of the essential issues of the debate. Its existence is clearly affirmed in Holy Scripture, and the church has of old and with authority defended the tradition that children are baptized because of original sin, and this practice is known all over the world. In this case it is not fitting, according to Augustine, to raise such an obscure problem in relation to so a just, well-founded and well-known doctrine.<sup>3</sup> Everyone knows that Augustine found the question of the soul a very difficult one, and he did so till the end of his life.<sup>4</sup>

For Julian the question of the origin of the soul is very important, as appears from the fact that in his work *Ad Florum* he accuses Augustine to have not dealt with this particular part of his work *Ad Turbantium*. Julian is here referring to Augustine's first answer to *Ad Turbantium*, namely, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II.<sup>5</sup> Augustine reacts by saying that he

<sup>1</sup> CSEL 60, p. 518: "Addunt sane ad latebrarum suarum nebulas Pelagiani de origine animae non necessariam quaestionem ad hoc, ut res manifestas aliarum rerum obscuritate turbando moliantur latendi locum." Cf. Julianus, *Epistula ad Rufum*, frg. 11.16, CCSL 88, p. 338.

<sup>2</sup> *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,26, CSEL 60, pp. 518-519: "Aiunt enim 'nos animarum traducem cum peccati traduce contueri.'"

<sup>3</sup> *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,26, CSEL 60, p. 519: "Quapropter quisquis vel de anima vel de quacumque re obscura id adstruit, unde hoc quod verissimum, fundatissimum, notissimum est destruat, sive sit ille filius sive inimicus ecclesiae, aut corrigendus est aut cavendus."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Retractationes* II,45, CCSL 57, p. 127.

<sup>5</sup> *Ad Florum* II,25, CSEL 85,1, p. 179: "Nam et commemoratam a me formationem corporis et ingressum animae, quam novam in unoquoque a Deo conditam tam ratio quam legis sacrae ecclesiaeque catholicae confirmat auctoritas, ut spero, arte praeteriit."; see also II,28, CSEL 85,1, p. 182; II,61, CSEL 85,1, pp. 207-208; IV,5, PL 45, 1340.

received only a summary of Julian's work *Ad Turbantium*, and that in this summary nothing about the problem of the soul was found.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, Augustine has to defend himself, the more so because Julian raises the question again in *Ad Florum*.

In the first part of this article, I will treat Julian's view on the creation of the soul and his criticism of Augustine. Then I will examine Augustine's answers to the objections of Julian. Finally, by way of a conclusion, I will evaluate the arguments of both authors.

### I. JULIAN'S VIEW ON THE SOUL

As I have demonstrated in another article, one of Julian's most important thoughts about God is his emphasis on the universality of God's creative activity; Julian continually underlines that the created things deserve the predicate "good" because they are created by a good God.<sup>7</sup> One can even say that this fundamental insight is one of the main reasons why Julian opposes Augustine.<sup>8</sup> For Julian God is the creator of the human being, soul and body. God's permanent creative activity manifests itself, in the most evident way, precisely in creating the soul. Each soul is created anew by God for every human being. Therefore, this soul is in no way indebted to the flesh or to the human seed as such and has nothing to do with them.<sup>9</sup> Speaking about the soul, Julian uses particularly the terms *anima* and *animus*. Although one does not find in Julian a systematic exposition of this theme, one can globally say that Julian uses the word *anima* when he deals with the soul as opposed to the body. In this case what matters is the soul as it is created by God. When Julian uses the term *animus*, he is dealing with the soul as the seat of thinking and of the will. He speaks, e.g., of *animus rationabilis*, which is for him the source of all virtues and the instrument of controlling the body, for the soul is equipped for this task.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Opus imperfectum* II,25, CSEL 85,1, p. 179.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum: a Plea for a Good Creator*, in *Augustiniana* 38 (1988) 5-24.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 1.15.16.20.23-26.28-30.33.35-36.45.55 etc., CCSL 88, pp. 340; 344-348.351.353-354.

<sup>9</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 28, CCSL 88, p. 347; frg. 75, CCSL 88, p. 359; *Ad Florum* II,25, CSEL 85,1, p. 179; II,28, CSEL 85,1, p. 182; III,44, CSEL 85,1, p. 384.

<sup>10</sup> "Cunctarum origo virtutum in rationabili animo sita est, et affectus omnes, per quos aut fructuose aut steriliter boni sumus, in subiecto sunt mentis nostrae: prudentia, iustitia, temperantia, fortitudo."; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 108, CCSL 88, p. 365; "Administrationem corporis (...) animo esse commissam"; frg. 282, CCSL 88, p. 388.

Besides these terms, one finds in Julian also the word *mens* to designate thinking as such. Here again we find a relationship with the virtues, which are submitted to the *mens*, or better, which find their origin in the rational mind.<sup>11</sup>

The rational aspect of the *animus* can also be represented by the term *ratio*. The *ratio* is to be considered as a gift of God, impressed on the *animus*. Through the *ratio* we learn, e.g., that we are the image of God because of our soul.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, we may not make too great a distinction between these different terms. There is no problem for Julian to speak of the distinction between soul and body and to use the term *anima* in the first part of his discussion, thereafter continuing with the word *animus* in order to vary his style.<sup>13</sup>

The virtues, according to Julian, have their origin in the rational mind; they are congenital.<sup>14</sup> In this sense Julian can declare that there is an innate excellence<sup>15</sup> in all human beings, thus taking over a well-known idea of stoic philosophy which he has probably found by reading Cicero; this idea, however, remains rather general and is not elaborated in a personal way by Julian.<sup>16</sup>

With regard to Julian's discussion with Augustine, one must emphasize that for Julian sexual reproduction is only limited to the body.<sup>17</sup> In other words: soul and body possess a different substance,<sup>18</sup> and at the level of the soul only God is actively creative. The human being is *imago Dei*<sup>19</sup> on account of the gift of the soul; the human person is a rational being that transcends all other living beings, plants and animals, because of this rationality. Rationality is for Julian one of the manifestations of the

<sup>11</sup> See in addition to the in n. 10 already quoted text from *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 108, CCL 88, p. 365, also *Ad Florum* I,37, CSEL 85,1, p. 27; VI,26, PL 45, 1562.

<sup>12</sup> "Secundum, quod ut viventibus sensu ita sentientibus ratione praestamus, quae impressa est animo, ut conditoris imago doceretur, ad cuius aequae respicit dignitatem arbitrii concessa libertas."; *Ad Florum* I,94, CSEL 85,1, p. 109.

<sup>13</sup> See *Ad Florum* II,61, CSEL 85,1, p. 207.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Ad Florum* IV,129, PL 45, 1426; see also *Expositio libri in Iob XXXI*,18, CCL 88, p. 85.

<sup>15</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 85, CCL 88, p. 362.

<sup>16</sup> Concerning Cicero, see *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 22: "Virtus est consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia." Also F. REFOULÉ, *Julien d'Éclane, théologien et philosophe*, in *Recherches de science religieuse* 52 (1964) 233-247, p. 237 admits this, although he thinks that Julian, in his concrete application of this stoic idea, departs from it.

<sup>17</sup> *Ad Florum* II,61, CSEL 85,1, p. 207.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 75, CCL 88, p. 359; *Ad Florum* II,28, CSEL 85,1, p. 182; III,44, CSEL 85,1, p. 384.

<sup>19</sup> *Ad Florum* IV,39, PL 45, 1359.

*multiplex gratia Christi*,<sup>20</sup> it is something extremely important because it enables the human being to know and to follow God's will. The human being, as an image of God, knows what God demands of the human person, who is, so to speak, "at home" in God's commandments. As rational beings, human persons possess a "point of contact" with God that is given by Him, and they know what God expects from them. The innate human reason<sup>21</sup> belongs to their nature,<sup>22</sup> distinguishing them from the animals, which they surpass because of their reason.<sup>23</sup> By virtue of this "surplus value", it belongs to the task of the soul to govern the body, which is the slave of the soul.<sup>24</sup> The soul is the better part and is enabled to control the body with all its impulses and cupidities.<sup>25</sup> The gift of the soul is not something negligible, rather it is a gift of God, and so great a gift cannot be so insignificant that the human being would not be able to restrain its lower part, that is, the body. What would be the value of this gift, if it could not make us capable of controlling our desires in conformity with what the generous God has ordered us?<sup>26</sup>

It is right to emphasize that Julian's view of the creation of a new soul for every human being lies in the line of the tradition of creationism, which is also found in Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose and Jerome.<sup>27</sup> The

<sup>20</sup> *Ad Florum* I,94, CSEL 85,1, p. 109.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Ad Florum* II,151, CSEL 85,1, p. 274; II,185, CSEL 85,1, p. 302.

<sup>22</sup> *Ad Florum* IV,43, PL 45, 1361; IV,59, PL 45, 1374.

<sup>23</sup> *Ad Florum* V,38, PL 45, 1473; concerning the stoic background of this idea, see M.L. COLISH, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. I. Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature* (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 34), Leiden, 1985, p. 129.

<sup>24</sup> *Ad Florum* VI,26, PL 45, 1562; in the writings of Julian, the expression *imago Dei* can refer to the human soul in general, as well as to a part of the soul, namely the *mens*; in this case, the rational capacities of the soul are understood; cf. *Ad Florum* I,37, CSEL 85,1, p. 27.

<sup>25</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 116, CCSL 88, p. 366: "Quoniam ex imparibus bonis compositi sumus, animum corpori debere dominari, quorum 'alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum beluis (...) esse commune' (Sall., *Cat.* I,2); et ideo id quod est melius, id est animum, virtute praeditum (...) et membris corporis bene et cupiditatibus imperare."

<sup>26</sup> Here we must take into account Julian's refusal to admit that the human being by nature, from the very beginning, would be handicapped in his ethical task as a consequence of Adam's Fall, and therefore unable to accomplish God's commandments; cf. *Ad Florum* I,79, CSEL 85,1, p. 94; IV,38, PL 45, 1357-1359.

<sup>27</sup> With regard to the problem of the origin of the soul in general, see P.F. BEATRICE, *Tradux peccati. Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale* (Studia Patristica Mediolensia, 8), Milaan, 1978, p. 99 ff; creationism is here understood to mean that God created from nothing a new soul for every individual human being at the moment of the conception, or in the womb of the mother, or at the moment of being born; see P.B.J. BICHANIUK, *Creationism*, in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia* IV, p. 428; cf. also A.

following arguments play a role for the adherents of this view: as a spiritual reality, the soul cannot originate from something material; at the same time, the soul cannot belong to God's essence since it is created; therefore, the soul is the result of God's each time newly creating activity. This view means the rejection of emanatism, and such a rejection is related to the reverence for the divine transcendence. Indeed, the nature of God as a perfect, unique, spiritual substance which is indivisible, gets into difficulties in the doctrine of emanatism. Moreover, the human soul lacks several characteristics which are specific to God's nature, such as immutability and eternal *esse a se*.<sup>28</sup>

Julian places sin radically on the level of the soul: sin is always the result of the moral action of a rational being. Committing sin is due to one's own responsibility; it is the consequence of a bad use of reason and will. This bad use, however, must be situated on the level of morality and not on that of the created reality.

In the light of this context Julian's criticism of Augustine becomes perhaps clear. According to Julian, it is immediately evident that the *novitas* of the soul proves that one cannot speak of any guilt, spot or stain on this level. That which the soul is, it is this thanks to God. Julian cannot accept that God's image, which the human being is by virtue of his soul, would be born in guilt because of the sins of other human beings, especially the sin of Adam, for, strictly speaking, the soul is separated from the creation of the body.<sup>29</sup> It is Julian's conviction that God's dignity itself guarantees human innocence,<sup>30</sup> for there is no iniquity in God.<sup>31</sup>

It is for Julian inconceivable that a human being can be born with an original sin, for in that case original sin would belong to the created nature, especially on the level of the soul which is pre-eminently God's

MICHEL, *Traducianisme*, in *DThC* XV, 1353-1354; G. ROTUREAU, *Ame*, in *Catholicisme* I, 430-434; V. GROSSI, *Anima umana*, in *Dizionario patristico e di antichità cristiane* I, 206-209.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. J.E. ROYCE, *Origin of Human Soul*, in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* XIII, p. 471; MICHEL, *a.c.*, 1350-1365, who offers a concise, but clear survey of the various theories of the origin of the soul.

<sup>29</sup> "Cum anima, inquit, patris mea sit et anima filii mea sit, quo testimonio ut multis aliis docetur animam nihil debere seminibus, quam Deus iuri suo vindicat, iniquissimum, inquit, et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago alienis gravetur operibus."; *Ad Florum* III,44, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 384.

<sup>30</sup> "Deum vero nascentium conditorem ita dicimus, ut quoniam certum est Deum catholicorum, qui verus est, nihil facere posse, quod malum est, ipsius opificis dignitate homines, qui ab eo fiunt, ante voluntatis usum de manibus eius iniqui et rei nullo modo exire credantur ..."; *Ad Florum* III,124, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 440; cf. III,162, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 467.

<sup>31</sup> *Ad Florum* III,136, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 443.

gift. Augustine should draw the logical conclusion that God himself is responsible for the fact that the human being is born with original sin.<sup>32</sup>

As is well-known, there was a vehement discussion about the nature and place of the *concupiscentia* in the controversy of Julian with Augustine.<sup>33</sup> Julian counts *concupiscere* as belonging to the realm of bodiliness. He rejects Augustine's interpretation of the *concupiscentia carnis* as sinful desire, as irrationality and as movement carrying away from God. Julian's experience of sexuality must not have constituted a great problem in his own life.<sup>34</sup> According to Julian, *concupiscere* belongs to the created order, or to the nature willed by God. In contrast with Augustine, he considers *concupiscentia* as a natural quality, on a par with, e.g., seeing, hearing, feeling and so on.<sup>35</sup> The assertion that we have control of our other senses, but not of *concupiscentia*, is for Julian unacceptable,<sup>36</sup> the more so because it is a necessary condition for procreation:<sup>37</sup> without *concupiscentia* procreation becomes impossible; however, it is the soul, *imago Dei*, which has control of the whole process.

Julian's protest against the so-called lack of control of this *concupiscentia* is strongly linked to his ethics: human persons who defend this idea do this only in order to have an excuse for an amoral life.<sup>38</sup> According to Julian's ethical concepts, this desire should be under the control and the command of the reason: "When the mind of a wise person who submits pleasure to the dignity of love, rouses the desire and sets it in order, he never exceeds the limits of this task ...".<sup>39</sup>

It does not hold true to consider Julian as a 'laxist' theologian who extols sexuality into the skies, as has been done sometimes in the past, in imitation of Augustine.<sup>40</sup> Julian's concern and protest against Augustine is

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Dicta in quadam disputatione publica*, CCSL 88, p. 336; cf. *Ad Florum* III, 159, CSEL 85, 1, p. 463.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. G. BONNER, *Concupiscentia*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon* I, 7/8, 1113-1122, especially 1119-1122 (with bibliography).

<sup>34</sup> See P. BROWN, *Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century A.D.: Augustine and Julian of Eclanum*, in *Tria corda. Scritti in onore di A. Momigliano a cura di E. Gabba* (Biblioteca di Athenaeum, 1), Como, 1983, 49-70.

<sup>35</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 294, CCSL 88, p. 390.

<sup>36</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 173, CCSL 88, pp. 375-376.

<sup>37</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 177, CCSL 88, p. 376.

<sup>38</sup> *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 85, CCSL 88, p. 361; frg. 86, CCSL 88, p. 362-363.

<sup>39</sup> "Cum igitur sapientis animus, qui voluptatem subicit dignitati amoris et incitat et ordinat appetitum, numquam fines transit officii ..."; *Commentarius in canticum canticorum*, frg. 6, CCSL 88, p. 400; cf. frg. 3, CCSL 88, p. 399; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 233, CCSL 88, p. 383.

<sup>40</sup> See LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum*, 18-19.

directed against the idea that the control of lust would escape us;<sup>41</sup> Julian is taking very seriously one's own responsibility on the level of guilt: what we do and who we ethically are belong both to our own responsibility, because God, the good Creator and righteous Judge, has created us so that we are able to do what we should do, and He supports our good intentions with his grace.<sup>42</sup> If Julian appeals to the argument for the creation of the soul, he does so, in my opinion, because of several very important reasons:

1. respect for the good Creator;
2. nature cannot contain (moral) evil, for in that case human responsibility would be undermined;
3. taking seriously personal responsibility.

Undoubtedly, it is clear that God's creative goodness and the human ethical responsibility urge Julian, relying on his view of the soul, to react against Augustine. Augustine's statement that the Pelagians raise the question of the soul in order to create confusion might seem reasonable in the framework of the controversy, but Julian forces *de facto* Augustine to answer.

## II AUGUSTINE'S ANSWER

How does Augustine answer Julian's arguments? These arguments are: a) the soul is for every human being created anew by God; b) therefore, the soul owes nothing to the body; c) the powers of reason and will must be situated on the level of the soul; d) consequently, sin must be related to reason and will; e) the whole construction of original sin is built on sand, since it is impossible that a sin can be transmitted by physical way.<sup>43</sup>

Julian's argument is all the more powerful because Augustine has been troubled by the problem of the creation of the soul during his whole

<sup>41</sup> Regarding Augustine's position, see e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,7, CSEL 42, p. 219; regarding Julian's reaction, see *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 175, CCSL 88, p. 376; *Ad Florum* III,187, CSEL 85,1, p. 485-488.

<sup>42</sup> See M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aeclanum on Grace. Some Considerations*, in E. LIVINGSTONE (ed.), *Studia Patristica* 27. Papers presented at the Eleventh International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1991, Leuven, 1993, 342-349.

<sup>43</sup> One finds this objection also repeatedly in modern literature; see e.g. K. SCHEFFCZYK, *Urstand, Fall, und Erbsünde. Von der Schrift bis Augustinus* (Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, II,

3a.1), Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1981, p. 218; K. FLASCH, *Augustin. Einführung in sein Denken*, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 205; G. BONNER, *Adam*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon* I, 1/2, Basel-Stuttgart, 1986, 63-87, col. 83 (he poses only the problem); cf. also G.J.P. O'DALY, *Anima, animus*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon* I,1/2-3, Basel-Stuttgart, 315-340, especially 319-322.

life, and even at the end of his life in the *Retractationes* he admits that he still understands so little of this question.<sup>44</sup> The great problem for Augustine lies in the fact that Holy Scripture gives no decisive answer about this difficult question. Already in *De libero arbitrio* III,56-59,<sup>45</sup> Augustine has examined several possible interpretations related to the origin of the soul, namely: traducianism, pre-existence and creationism. He does not arrive at a satisfactory answer, although he admits in III,56 that the theory of traducianism would mean a good solution to the problem of original sin. Nevertheless, he remains reserved with this solution.<sup>46</sup> He rejects in *Epistula* 143,5-6, the opinion of Origen who holds that the soul dwells in the body as a punishment because of a pre-existent sin.<sup>47</sup> Also in *De Genesi ad litteram* VII,1<sup>48</sup> and the following chapters the problem is dealt with thoroughly, but again Augustine does not find an answer. Only Tertullian's view of a bodily traducianism is rejected.<sup>49</sup> The origin of the human soul is also the theme of *Epistula* 166 (415), addressed to Jerome; there Augustine puts the question when and how children, in a creationist perspective, can commit sins which are forgiven through baptism (166,10).<sup>50</sup> This question recurs in *Epistula* 180,2 (416)<sup>51</sup> and *Epistula* 190 (418), in which Augustine remains undecided between traducianism and creationism. Augustine is still uncertain and ignorant at the moment that Julian uses the doctrine of creationism against the doctrine of original sin.<sup>52</sup>

In his discussion with Julian Augustine recognizes that the creation of the soul is an obscure matter for him and that he likes more to be instructed about it than to instruct others; he does not dare to say anything

<sup>44</sup> *Retractationes* I,1,3, *CCSL* 57, p. 10: "Nam quod attinet ad eius originem, qua fit ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo uno ait qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in animam vivam, an similiter fiant singulis singuli, *nec tunc sciebam, nec nunc scio*." For a good survey of Augustine's struggle with this problem, see G.J.P. O'DALY, *Augustine on the Origin of Souls*, in *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für H. Dörrie* (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, 10), Münster (Westfalen), 1983, 184-191.

<sup>45</sup> *CCSL* 29, pp. 307-310.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Epistula* 98,1 (408-410), *CSEL* 34, pp. 520-521; 143,5-6 (dating from 412), *CSEL* 44, pp. 255-256; cf. O'DALY, *a.c.*, 184-186.

<sup>47</sup> In this context, see W. THEILER, *Augustin und Origenes*, in *Augustinus* 13 (1968) 423-432.

<sup>48</sup> *CSEL* 28, pp. 201ff.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* X,25-26, *CSEL* 28, pp. 328-332; O'DALY, *a.c.*, 189.

<sup>50</sup> *CSEL* 44, pp. 560-561.

<sup>51</sup> *CSEL* 44, p. 698.

<sup>52</sup> With respect to Augustine's hesitation and its influence on later writers, see G.R. EVANS, *Augustine on the Soul: the Legacy of the Unanswered Questions*, in *Augustinianum* 25 (1985) 283-294.

about this question that he does not know himself.<sup>53</sup> He endorses generally "the thesis of our faith that the good God is the creator of souls and bodies".<sup>54</sup> In a certain sense, this sounds as a preference for creationism, but one can not call it a real affirmation.

It is true that Augustine rejects explicitly the reproach of defending a *tradux animarum*-doctrine like the Manichees. Thus he reacts in *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,26 to the thesis that he would be asserting that the transmission of the souls is intimately linked up with the transmission of sins.<sup>55</sup> It is interesting, in my opinion, to see how Augustine by this reaction makes things more difficult for himself: if one cuts the ties between the two sorts of transmission, it becomes more difficult to find a solution to the problem of the transmission of original sin, for Augustine explicitly believes that the sin of Adam is transmitted to his descendants.

Augustine radically rejects also the idea of an emanation of the soul from God. Therefore, he does not accept the idea of a progressive darkening of a divine part by successive procreations, as, according to Augustine, is the case, e.g., in Manicheism. Basing himself on his knowledge of Manicheism, Augustine does not refrain from correcting Julian's presentation of the Manichean doctrine of the soul.<sup>56</sup> Thereby, Augustine propo-

<sup>53</sup> It shows at least the intellectual honesty of Augustine that he never keeps silent about this argument of Julian, even if it puts him into an awkward position; cf. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,11, CSEL 60, p. 471; IV,2, CSEL 60, p. 521; IV,24, CSEL 60, p. 549; *Contra Iulianum* V,17, PL 44, 794; *Opus imperfectum* II,62, CSEL 85,1, p. 208; II,178, CSEL 85,1, p. 299; IV,104, PL 45, 1400.

<sup>54</sup> "Fides nostra bonum Deum creatorem et animarum et corporum novit."; *Opus imperfectum* III,174, CSEL 85,1, p. 475; cf. *Contra Iulianum* III,13, PL 44, 709: "Deus enim qui est animarum, ipse est etiam corporum conditor ..."; V,26, PL 44, 800: "Ego enim secundum catholicam fidem, totum hominem, totam scilicet animam totumque corpus eius Deo summo et vero tribuo creatori ..."; see also *Opus imperfectum* III,46, CSEL 85,1, p. 387; IV,125, PL 45, 1422. On the basis of these texts, I do not understand how one can say that Augustine relapses into Manicheism; cf. W. GEERLINGS, *Zur Frage des Nachwirkens des Manichäismus in der Theologie Augustins*, in *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* 93 (1971) 45-60, p. 57.

<sup>55</sup> "Quod ubi et quando in eorum qui defendunt adversus istos catholicam fidem, vel sermonibus audierint vel litteris legerint nescio."; CSEL 60, p. 519; cf. also *Opus imperfectum* III,174, CSEL 85,1, p. 475.

<sup>56</sup> In *Opus imperfectum* VI,6, PL 45, 1510, Augustine makes the following remark: if he would not have known that Julian had read his *De duabus animabus*, he would have concluded that Julian was ignorant about Mani's teachings of the mixture of the good and the evil substances; Julian refers to Augustine's work in *Ad Florum* I,44, CSEL 85,1, p. 31; V,40, PL 45, 1476.

ses his own view on the two souls in Manichean doctrine.<sup>57</sup> According to the Manichees, there are two souls: one proper to the flesh, which is by nature evil because it has emanated from an evil substance *coeterna Deo*, and another soul which is a part of God (*particula Dei*) and, consequently, good by nature but defiled by the mixture with the evil substance. In the struggle between both substances what matters is the liberation of the good soul. If the latter does not succeed in liberating itself, it will be stricken by the globe of darkness, and it will be in all eternity detained by it as a punishment. The good soul is not destined for the eternal fire, as Julian asserts, but shut up in the globe of darkness as punishment, just as the prince

<sup>57</sup> According to R. FERWERDA, *Two Souls. Origen's and Augustine's Attitude towards the Two Souls Doctrine. Its Place in Greek and Christian Philosophy*, in *Vigiliae Christianae* 37 (1983) 360-378, especially pp. 360-364, Augustine's view on the two souls would be an incorrect representation. Ferwerda follows here H. PUECH, *Les sources de Plotin. Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* V, Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1957, p. 39. He bases himself also on J.P. ASMUSSEN, *Die Gnosis* III. *Der Manichäismus*, München, 1980. Ferwerda states that Augustine is the only author to speak about two souls in one person (pp. 360-361). The Manichees just believed in a (good) soul and an (evil) body; the soul descended from God into the body. Augustine would have used the gnostic distinction between soul and mind - namely, that the pneuma is the higher, and the psychè the lower soul - in order to accuse the Manichees of a theory of two souls (p. 362). The reason for doing so would be that God's justice is at stake. Ferwerda refers here to Origen.

I admit that in Manicheism (with the exception of Augustine) the theory of two souls in one body is never mentioned. Nevertheless, Ferwerda's explanation of Augustine's talk about two souls is, in my opinion, not entirely satisfactory. According to me, the reproaches leveled by Augustine at the Manichees are the following ones: *primo*, their view on the good soul as a part of God detracts from God's immutability; *secundo*, their radical condemnation of bodiliness as such runs counter Augustine's belief in the resurrection of the body which is also created by God; *tertio*, their 'substantiation' of evil means for Augustine a detraction of the Christian idea of *sanatio* and salvation, and this idea is contradicted by the Manichean doctrine of *separatio*. God's justice only indirectly gets into difficulties, namely where, according to Augustine, God's omnipotence has something to do with evil, and his justice permits evil on account of his justice because of the historical sin of Adam. When Augustine speaks of two souls in the Manichean doctrine, it seems to me that this is in a certain sense the logical deduction of the radical opposition between the substance of evil and the divine soul in the human being, which take action against each other. With regard to this objection, see also the restriction made by G. Madec in his review of Ferwerda's article (*Revue des études augustiniennes* 30 (1984) 370). After all, even apart from the question of the two souls, Augustine censures the Manichees for their oppositional dualism. Even if Augustine would have invented the theory of the two souls, it remains true that this is for Augustine only a deduction from their condemnable view on created reality *in toto*. Concerning Augustine's view on the Manichean doctrine of soul as such, see also F. DECRET, *Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine. Les controverses de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix avec saint Augustin*, Paris, 1970, pp. 210-212; 218-219; 255-257.

of darkness is shut up.<sup>58</sup> Augustine emphasizes that for the Manichees the whole human being is evil and belongs to an evil creator,<sup>59</sup> except this small divine part, which alone has to suffer by the agitation flowing from the power of darkness.<sup>60</sup>

Augustine's basic thesis always remains: any explanation of the origin of the soul which does not do justice to original sin cannot be true because the doctrine of original sin is attested by Holy Scripture as well as by the tradition of infant baptism. An obscure question may not destroy what is *verissimum, fundatissimum, notissimum*.<sup>61</sup> Augustine admits fully that he knows no answer to the problem of the creation of the soul. He does not know whether the soul is corrupted by the contact with the flesh or is already corrupted in Adam, but he finds that our first care must concern the healing of the soul, for it is unquestionable that the soul is wounded.<sup>62</sup>

While admitting that he has no satisfactory explanation concerning the "origin" of the soul, Augustine appeals to two basic principles in order to justify his position, namely, Holy Scripture and experience. With respect to experience, Augustine points out that the soul, which is the ground of our being in the image of God,<sup>63</sup> is weighed down by the mortal body<sup>64</sup>,

<sup>58</sup> *Opus imperfectum* VI,6, PL 45, 1510: "Manichaeus ergo duas animas, sive spiritus, sive mentes, unam propriam carnis, eandemque non accidente vitio, sed coaeternam Deo naturam malam, alteram vero naturam bonam tanquam Dei particulam, sed illius malae permixtione maculatam, in homine uno esse contendit; et hinc vult fieri, ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, utique bonum, per animam suam malam, ut eum teneat implicatum; spiritus autem adversus carnem, ut ab illa commixtione liberetur. Quod si nec ultima mundi conflagratione potuerit, tunc eum dicit affigi tenebrarum globo, atque in aeternum tali supplicio detineri."

<sup>59</sup> "Hoc autem totum opificium, quod est homo, et malum et mali esse dicit auctoris."; *Opus imperfectum* III,155, CSEL 85,1, p. 461.

<sup>60</sup> "Non corpora, sed animas aucupari diabolus potuit dicere Manicheus; corpora enim dicit ad gentis tenebrarum naturam, unde est et diabolus, pertinere. Proinde secundum Manicheum non corpora, quae ipsius sunt, sed animas bonas, quae ipsius non sunt, dicitur diabolus aucupari..."; *Opus imperfectum* III,174, CSEL 85,1, p. 475.

<sup>61</sup> *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* III,26, CSEL 60, p. 519; cf. *Retractationes* II,45, CCSL 57, p. 127 about *Epistula* 166 to Jerome. See also *Contra Iulianum* V,17, PL 44, 794.

<sup>62</sup> See *Contra Iulianum* V,17, PL 44, 794; V,53, PL 44, 814; *Opus imperfectum* II,178, CSEL 85,1, p. 299; M.-M. LABOURDETTE, *Le péché originel dans la Tradition vivante de l'Église*, in *Revue Thomiste* 84 (1984) 357-398, p. 392.

<sup>63</sup> "... anima, hoc est Dei imagine ..."; *Opus imperfectum* IV,39, PL 45, 1360. Concerning Augustine's texts about *imago Dei* in the discussion with Julian, see J. HEIJKE, *St. Augustine's Comments on 'Imago Dei'* (Classical Folia, Supplement III), 1960, pp. 82-86. As regards Augustine's view on the human soul as *imago Dei* we refer to H. SOMERS, *Image de Dieu. Les sources de l'exégèse augustinienne*, in *Revue des études augustinienne*

something that everyone experiences (inside oneself or in others) through all sorts of physical suffering, which weigh down our mind.<sup>65</sup> Human

nes 7 (1961) 105-125; J.F. SULLIVAN, *The Image of God. The Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence*, Dubuque, Iowa, 1963, pp. 42-53; A. SOLIGNAC, *Image et ressemblance II. Pères de l'Église*, in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité VII*, 1971, 1418-1422; T.A. FAY, *Imago Dei: Augustine's Metaphysics of Man*, in *Antonianum* 49 (1974) 173-197; BONNER, *Adam*, 83.

<sup>64</sup> For Augustine, just as for Julian, the human being is God's image through his soul, and especially through the most excellent part of the soul, namely, the *mens* or the *intellectus*. Because the human being, according to Augustine, was created initially as serving the rational soul, it becomes understandable why Augustine, in his discussion with Julian, mentions the weighing down of the soul by the mortal body because of the breaking of the harmonious subordination of the body to the soul by Adam's Fall, that is, by Adam's rational choice against God. Until 412, Augustine thought that the image of God in the human being was destroyed completely. However, from *De spiritu et littera* 48 (CSEL 60, p. 202) on, he believed rather that it was deformed; see his correction concerning *De Genesi ad litteram* VI,38 (CSEL 28, p. 199) in *Retractationes* II,24, CCSL 57, p. 110: "In sexto libro quod dixi Adam imaginem Dei secundum quam factus est, perdisse peccato, non sic accipiendum est tamquam in eo nulla remanserit, sed quod tam deformis ut reformatione opus haberet." Only because God loves us, the image of God is rediscovered, reformed, renovated, that is, again orientated towards God. The potential relationship with God is again actualized by God's merciful help. Consequently, the human being retains, even after the Fall, his intellectual capacities, but has lost, as it were, their orientation. It is this idea which we meet also in the controversy. Indeed, Augustine declares in *Contra Iulianum* IV,15, PL 44, 744: "Bonum dicis hominum naturam, quae talis gratiae opitulationem meretur. Quod gratanter audirem, si hoc propterea quia rationalis natura est diceres, neque enim gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum lapidibus, aut lignis pecoribusque praestatur; sed quia imago Dei est, meretur hanc gratiam; non tamen ut eius bona voluntas possit praecedere praeter gratiam, nec vel ipsam prior det ut retribuat illi, ac si gratia iam non sit gratia, dum non datur gratuita et redditur debita."; cf. SULLIVAN, *The Image of God*, p. 53.

<sup>65</sup> *Opus imperfectum* VI,27, PL 45, 1572. It might be tempting to link Augustine's statement about the corruptibility that weighs down the soul with the platonic theme of the body as a prison of the soul. In this point, however, I think that we should be cautious, for Augustine ascribes the creation of the body also to God; see *Opus imperfectum* III,176, CSEL 85,1, p. 476. Moreover, he always emphasizes the resurrection of the body, and from then on all the corporeal imperfections will be taken away. In addition to this, Augustine considers the weighing down of the soul as a punishment of Adam's sin; in this sense, he interprets this fact in a theological way. And finally, Augustine follows Ambrose in rejecting the platonic idea that God would be only the Creator of the soul, whereas the body would be created by lesser gods; cf. *Contra Iulianum* II,19, PL 44, 686; *Opus imperfectum* I,116, CSEL 85,1, p. 133. P. COURCELLE, *Connais-toi toi-même: de Socrate à Saint Bernard*, t. II, Paris, 1975, pp. 368-371 has sufficiently demonstrated that Augustine, in his later writings, rejected this platonic opinion: "Cet appesantissement est l'effet du péché originel, non la cause de ce péché. C'est l'âme pécheresse qui a rendu la chair corruptible." (p. 370) See in particular *De civitate Dei* XIV,3, CCSL 48, pp. 416-417; cf. also XII,27, CCSL 48, pp. 383-384; cf. A. ADAM, *Das Fortwirken des Manichäismus*

beings are essentially marked by mortality, and this mortality is due to the fact that we have been procreated, that is, because we are children of parents. Whereas Julian stands up for our own responsibility, Augustine will underline our being in the world thanks to and together with others, in order to affirm that our soul is hindered by our body and that this is caused by others.

In other words, Augustine proposes from experience the *discordia carnis et spiritus*: the tension between flesh and mind. That the soul dwells in a mortal body and that the latter constitutes a serious obstacle for the soul, particularly with respect to its rational capacities, is for Augustine an important fact.<sup>66</sup> To be sure, Augustine admits fully that the human person as rational being is superior to the animals, but he relativizes immediately this superiority by comparing it with God, the highest and immutable good.<sup>67</sup> Augustine's great concern is his experience that our mortal body weighs down the human soul, *imago Dei*, and he seeks an explanation of this fact.<sup>68</sup> It may be fine that the human being because of his rational superiority is to be situated on a higher level than the animals, but at the same time it cannot be denied that only the human being - precisely by virtue of his rationality - suffers from the pain of mortality.<sup>69</sup> Augustine

bei Augustin, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 69 (1958) 1-25, p. 4.

<sup>66</sup> "Numquid enim caret corruptione corporis? Annon est malum quod aggravat animam? (*Sap.* 9,15) Numquid caret ignorantiae malo, per quod a nescientibus innumerabilia perpetrantur mala?"; *Contra Iulianum* VI,49, PL 44, 851; "Quare ergo grave iugum super eum a die exitus de ventre matris eius? Cur tanta corruptibilitas corporis, ut hac aggravetur anima eius? (*Sap.* 9,15) Cur tanta mentis optusio, ut etiam plagis erudiatur tarditas eius?"; *Opus imperfectum* I,54, CSEL 85,1, p. 51; see also III,44, CSEL 85,1, p. 385; V,11, PL 45, 1441; VI,20, PL 45, 1546.

<sup>67</sup> "Sed ut tibi sic loquar tanquam homini homo, et talis homo cuius terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem (cf. *Sap.* 9,15), nihil est in creaturis quod attinet ad institutarum divinitus merita naturarum, rationali mente praestantius. Unde fit consequens ut mens bona magis sibi placeat, magisque se ipsa delectet, quam quaelibet alia creatura. Quam vero periculose, immo perniciose sibi placeat, cum per hoc tumescit typho et morbo inflationis extollitur, quamdiu non videt sicut videbit in fine summum illud et immutabile bonum, in cuius comparatione se spernat, sibique illius caritate vilescat, tantoque spiritali eius impleatur, ut id sibi non ratione sola, sed aeterno quoque amore praeponat..."; *Contra Iulianum* IV,28, PL 44, 752-753.

<sup>68</sup> "Quid igitur meruit imago Dei ut ad impedimentum rerum sciendarum corruptibile corpore gravetur, si nullum est originale peccatum?"; *Opus imperfectum* III,44, CSEL 85,1, p. 385; cf. III,45, CSEL 85,1, p. 386; IV,43, PL 45, 1363; IV,75, PL 45, 1381; V,3, PL 45, 1434; VI,9, PL 45, 1516 etc. See F. REFOULÉ, *Misère des enfants et péché originel d'après saint Augustin*, in *Revue Thomiste* 63 (1963) 341-362, p. 351.

<sup>69</sup> "Nempe corruptibile corpus est et asini et hominis et tamen non asini aggravat, sed hominis animam; ... sic ergo et in libidine agnosce et pecoris naturam et hominis poenam, si animam non habes asininam"; *Opus imperfectum* IV,56, PL 45, 1373; see Y. DE MONT-

states that it costs a lot of trouble before people become scholars, and that, when one compares their knowledge to that of Adam,<sup>70</sup> even the few that can be termed as wise are *plumbei*, because, in contrast with Adam, the perishable body weighs down their souls. Therefore, human beings must put in great efforts in order to learn something.<sup>71</sup>

Against Julian's thesis that we all as rational beings know what we should do on account of innate virtues, Augustine holds that *all* human beings are born with a certain slowness of mind. Even those persons who are called acute thinkers, must always exert themselves in order to learn. Moreover, we know that there are physically and mentally handicapped persons<sup>72</sup>. According to Augustine, the only explanation for this lies in the Fall of Adam. In his *Confessiones*, Augustine has described in a penetrating way the difficulties of the process of learning. And even in his old days, he remembers this. He describes in *Opus imperfectum* III,154<sup>73</sup> the life of a little child: first weeping, then laughing, then learning to speak, then going to school in order to become able to read and to write. All

CHEUIL, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, in *Recherches de science religieuse* 44 (1956) 193-218, in particular pp. 217-218.

<sup>70</sup> Concerning Augustine's view on Adam in this period, see M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julien d'Éclane et Augustin d'Hippone. Deux conceptions d'Adam*, in *Collectanea Augustiniana. Mélanges T.J. van Bavel*, publiés par B. BRUNING, M. LAMBERIGTS, J. VAN HOUTEM (BETL, 92 A-B), Leuven, 1990, 373-410, especially pp. 382-409.

<sup>71</sup> "Nunc de plumbeo ad intellegendum acumine, haeretice verbose, responde. Nemo est certe qui nollet, si id esset in hominis potestate, ingenio vividus atque ad intellegendum acutissimus nasci; et quam rari sunt quis ignorat? Qui tamen omnes ipsi paucissimi, si hominis, qui primus est factus, comparentur ingenio, plumbei iudicantur. Non enim tunc, sicut nunc corpus corruptibile aggravabat animam (*Sap.* 9,15)."; *Opus imperfectum* IV,75, PL 45, 1381; V,1, PL 45, 1432; V,3, PL 45, 1434; V,11, PL 45, 1442; VI,9, PL 45, 1515; VI,13, PL 45, 1525; VI,29, PL 45, 1578.

<sup>72</sup> "Omnibus congenita est quaedam etiam tarditatis mentis, qua et hi qui apellantur ingeniosi, non tamen sine aliqua laboris aerumna (...) discunt ... Quidem etiam corpore et aliquando monstroso, multi obliviosi, multi ad intellegendum tardi et obtunsi, multi iracundi, multi libidinosi, nonnulli etiam omnino excordes fatiueque nascuntur. Quid aliud catholica respondet fides, nisi haec omnia mala, ex natura quae peccato contagione vitata est, exoriri?"; *Opus imperfectum* VI,9, PL 45, 1515-1516; cf. *Contra Iulianum* V,18, PL 44, 795; *Opus imperfectum* I,54, CSEL 85,1, p. 51. It is obvious that *mortalitas* in Augustine's writings has a broader meaning than the biological death; it means also a psychological and intellectual deficiency, inherent to our mortal existence. See in this respect F. FLOËRI, *Remarques sur la doctrine augustinienne du péché originel*, in *Studia Patristica* 9 (TU, 94), Berlin, 1966, p. 416-421, especially p. 416; cf. J. CLÉMENCE, *Saint Augustin et le péché originel*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 70 (1948) 727-745, p. 739.

<sup>73</sup> CSEL 85,1, p. 459; see also I,4, CSEL 85,1, p. 8; III,155, CSEL 85,1, p. 461; VI,13, PL 45, 1525; cf. DE MONTCHEUIL, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, p. 198-199; REFOULÉ, *Misère des enfants et péché originel d'après saint Augustin*, pp. 349-350.

those things are not performed without difficulty: the slaps are inversely proportional to the progress of the intellect. Meanwhile, one can become sick or has to suffer another harm. One makes great efforts but does not always succeed: *Volens tenere nec valens*.<sup>74</sup> The experiential reality proves sufficiently that a theoretical discourse about innate knowledge is *de facto* ineffective.<sup>75</sup> To reinforce his thesis Augustine points to the *moriones*, the mentally handicapped, who are so foolish that one scarcely attributes to some of them the intelligence of animals.<sup>76</sup>

The strength of Augustine's argument consists in the fact that, even if one chooses radically the solution of creationism as answer to the problem of the creation of the soul, one is confronted with the bare reality of perceiving little of the *imago Dei* in, e.g., mentally handicapped people. That which chiefly should refer to God and reflect, as it were, God's permanent creative activity seems to be fundamentally darkened in many persons. Proposing that the virtues are impressed on the human mind so that everyone knows what should be done may be a beautiful theoretical ideal, but this theoretical concept proves to be untenable when confronted with our actual experience. In its extreme form this "evil" can only be adequately explained, according to Augustine, within the framework of God's omnipotence and justice, if one admits that something went wrong at a certain moment of our history, and this moment was the Fall of Adam. In other words: something wrong happened to the human being as *imago Dei*. Augustine notices that *all sorts of suffering* on the level of the soul are irreconcilable with an unquestioning acceptance of the soul as the image of God.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> *Opus imperfectum* VI,13, PL 45, 1525; see J. DOIGNON, *Clichés antiques sur l'âme "enténébrée" de l'enfant dans les écrits anti-pélagiens d'Augustin*, in *L'etica cristiana nei secoli III e IV: eredità e confronti. XXIV Incontro di studiosi dell'antichità cristiana* (Roma, 4-6 maggio 1995) (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum, 53), Roma, 1996, pp. 409-412.

<sup>75</sup> Augustine acknowledges of course that the human being is able to gradually diminish his ignorance, but however much he knows, there always remains a relative ignorance which only will end at the final fulfilment; see *Opus imperfectum* I,36, CSEL 85,1, p. 27.

<sup>76</sup> "Quis autem nesciat, quos vulgo moriones vocant, natura ita fatuos, ut quibusdam eorum pene sensus pecorum conferatur?"; *Contra Iulianum* III,10, PL 44, 707; cf. already *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I,32, CSEL 60, p. 31; *Epistula* 166,17, CSEL 43, p. 570; see also *Contra Iulianum* V,18, PL 44, 795; VI,1, PL 44, 821; *Opus imperfectum* III,155, CSEL 85,1, p. 462; III,161, CSEL 85,1, pp. 466-467; III,198, CSEL 85,1, pp. 497-498; IV,75, PL 45, 1381; IV,125, PL 45, 1422; IV,134, PL 45, 1429.

<sup>77</sup> See *Contra Iulianum* III,9, PL 44, 706; III,10, PL 44, 707; III,12, PL 44, 708; V,4, PL 44, 784; VI,67, PL 44, 864; *Opus imperfectum* I,40, CSEL 85,1, p. 30; I,49, CSEL 85,1, p. 42; II,117, CSEL 85,1, p. 249; II,178, CSEL 85,1, p. 299; III,110, CSEL 85,1, pp.

Julian rejects the idea of transmission and punishment with regard to the *peccatum originale*. He does so on account of his conviction that the soul is created by God, as well as on account of his distinction between the order of willing and of being created. Augustine, on the contrary, refers to the fact that we find deficiencies, even there where God's permanent creative activity must be situated first and foremost, namely, in the creation of the soul. And the same is true of the body. In so far as body and soul are nature, they are God's work; but in so far as they are vitiated, they point to punishment.<sup>78</sup>

In any case, he who chooses creationism as the explanation of the origin of the soul in every human being should also account for the fact that the soul of many people is fundamentally vitiated. The theoretical ideal of innate virtues and knowledge is in flat contradiction with experience.

In addition to the weighing down of the soul by our perishable body<sup>79</sup> and to the rational and psychological deficiencies of the soul, Augustine points to a third aspect, namely, to the *vanitas* which characterizes our earthly existence. It plays an important role in his *Opus imperfectum*. Here Augustine refers often to Psalm 143:4: "*Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt*".<sup>80</sup> He attaches so great an impor-

431-432; III,161, *CSEL* 85,1, pp. 466-467; IV,39, *PL* 45, 1359-1360; IV,75, *PL* 45, 1381-1382; IV,123, *PL* 45, 1420-1421; V,1, *PL* 45, 1433; V,11, *PL* 45, 1441-1442; VI,17, *PL* 45, 1540; VI,20, *PL* 45, 1546-1547; VI,26, *PL* 45, 1565-1566; VI,36, *PL* 45, 1594; VI,37, *PL* 45, 1596. Cf. in particular DE MONTCHEUIL, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, p. 216-217; and REFOULÉ, *Misère des enfants et péché originel d'après saint Augustin*, pp. 346-347; 350-351.

<sup>78</sup> "Tu autem, qui propterea malos nasci posse non putas, quia Deus bonus eos creat, contendere, si potes, nec corpora nasci posse vitiosa, quia et ipsa Deus integer creat, contendere postremo sicut malos, quia bonus eos creat, ita nec tardos ingenio nec fatuos homines nasci, quia sapiens eos creat. An non est malum fatuitas, cum scriptura dicat incomparabiliter amplius fatuum lugendum esse quam mortuum? Sicut ergo nobiscum non dicitis Deum fatuitatis auctorem, cum tamen nasci fatuos homines Deo creante fateamini, sic nos auctorem malitiae non dicimus Deum et tamen originalis obligatione peccati malos homines nasci non nisi creante ipso, qui non creat homines nisi ipse, recte possumus dicere."; *Opus imperfectum* III,155, *CSEL* 85, pp. 461-462; "Ita constat Deum bonum malos non creare, quemadmodum constat Deum sapientem fatuos non creare."; III,161, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 466; see also IV,75, *PL* 45, 1381 and *Contra Iulianum* III,10, *PL* 44, 707.

<sup>79</sup> Needless to say that Augustine repeatedly refers to Wisdom 9,15: "Corpus enim quod corrumpitur aggravat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem."; for a survey, see A.-M. LA BONNARDIÈRE, *Biblia Augustiniana. A.T. Le livre de la Sagesse* (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1970, pp. 289-292; one can add to her list: *Opus imperfectum* IV,67; VI,13; VI,17.

<sup>80</sup> See *Opus imperfectum* I,4, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 8; I,5, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 8; I,36, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 26; I,63, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 60; I,92, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 104; II,178, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 299; II, I,110, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 431; V,1, *PL* 45, 1433; V,11, *PL* 45, 1441; VI,20, *PL* 45, 1547;

tance to this text that some authors have written "[ceci] devient comme le point d'appui de la théologie d'Augustin sur la déchéance de l'homme créé dans la vérité et désormais soumis à la vanité, à la condition d'une créature qui change et qui passe".<sup>81</sup> This verse expresses for Augustine the idea that, since the Fall of Adam, the original creation *ad similitudinem Dei* has been lost, and, consequently, the human being no longer lives in the light of the truth.<sup>82</sup> The human being was *similis veritati*, but became *similis vanitati*,<sup>83</sup> which is only understandable if God permits it on account of his justice (*non creante*) because of original sin, for this is in contrast with the original situation of the first human beings.<sup>84</sup> Augustine's point is a theologically interpreted intellectual depravation, which is situated in the present vale of tears<sup>85</sup> where our nature *in ipsam mortalitatem lapsa est*; this is the reason why our days pass away as a shadow and mortality is, as it were, attached to us.<sup>86</sup> In other words, this *vanitas* shows a (theological) loss of perspective inherent to our dark earthly existence. Our existence would be "hopeless", if we were not liberated by Christ, the *veritas* (John 14:6), who is the only one to liberate us really (John 8:32; 8,36).

VI,27, PL 45, 1572.

<sup>81</sup> L. CHEVALIER & H. RONDET, *L'idée de vanité dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin*, in *Revue des études augustiniennes* 3 (1957) 221-234, p. 232.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *Opus imperfectum* I,5, CSEL 85,1, p. 8; I,63, CSEL 85,1, p. 60. For Augustine, the *similitudo* is lost through the Fall, but not the *imago Dei* as *capacitas Dei*. Through grace the human being will be put back in a relationship of *similitudo*; this means that one is again in the right perspective of faith: directed towards God; then, in a dynamic process, and thanks to the permanent action of divine grace, one begins more and more to bear a likeness to God: "Similitudo quae per Dei gratiam renovatur de die in diem."; *Opus imperfectum* III,110, CSEL 85,1, p. 431. In respect to the distinction *imago-similitudo*, see R.A. MARKUS, "Imago" and "Similitudo" in Augustine, in *Revue des études augustiniennes* 10 (1964) 125-143; T.E. CLARKE, *The Eschatological Transformation of the Material World according to Saint Augustine*, Woodstock (Maryland), 1956, pp. 23-29.

<sup>83</sup> "Dic mihi, quare 'homo' etiam 'vanitati similis factus est' (Ps. 143:4), qui factus fuerat similis veritati."; *Opus imperfectum* I,36, CSEL 85,1, pp. 26-27.

<sup>84</sup> "Ex qualibet ergo et quantalibet parte omnes, qui ex illo (Adam) nati sunt, ille unus fuerunt sive secundum solum corpus sive secundum utramque hominis partem, quod me nescire confiteor nec me pudet, et vos, fateri nescire quod nescio, nec ideo tamen nescio de omni homine scriptum esse: 'Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt' (Ps. 143:4), quia et alibi eadem sancta scriptura dicit: 'Verum tamen universa vanitas omnis homo vivens' (Ps. 38:6), quod iusto Deo creante non fieret, si peccatum originale non esset."; *Opus imperfectum* II,178, CSEL 85,1, p. 299; cf. V,11, PL 45, 1441; VI,20, PL 45, 1547; *Contra Iulianum* VI,33, PL 44, 783.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *Opus imperfectum* V,1, PL 45, 1433; *Contra Iulianum* VI,39, PL 44, 843.

<sup>86</sup> See *Opus imperfectum* V,11, PL 45, 1441; VI,27, PL 45, 1572.

Thus we are released from the bonds of suffering and sin.<sup>87</sup>

One must admit that Julian's theory is not always consistent. I have stressed enough that, according to him, human beings know what they should do on account of their innate virtues. But he himself complains consistently of the fact that only a few people are wise or courageous and, distinguishing themselves from the ignorant masses, really are seeking the truth. Augustine does not deny this, but he will use Julian's complaint to make him face the fundamental question: what is the cause of the fact that the human being, originally so well created, experiences so great difficulty to learn useful and salutary things and prefers to avoid this effort? Julian's theoretical sketch of the human capacities fails when confronted with practice.

It is undeniable that Augustine cannot offer a satisfactory answer to the question of the creation of the soul and that the thesis of creationism causes him problems regarding the transmission of original sin. In this sense, one must admit that Julian reveals a weak point in Augustine's view on original sin. But, at the same time, one must recognize that the creationist concept of the creation of the soul causes a number of fundamental problems. How can one explain that so many and serious deficiencies exist within the rational capacities of the soul if they are the result of God's actual and creative activity? Therefore, Augustine does not doubt that we all are marked by Adam's sin, since we belong to his descent. Because of Adam we are, from our birth on, sinners, alienated from God, beings who need salvation and whose existence is marked by mortality and imperfection.

When two clever persons discuss with one another, probably both are often partly right. This is also the case with Julian and Augustine. Theoretically speaking, Julian is right in asserting that it is difficult to defend a transmitted original sin on the basis of creationism. On the other hand, Augustine is right in observing that concrete experience shows clearly that the theory of creationism offers no answer to the problem of mental deficiencies.

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<sup>87</sup> "Unde (sc. miseria) non liberat nisi qui dixit: 'Veritas liberabit vos' (Joh. 8:32); et 'Ego sum veritas' (Joh. 4:6); et 'Si vos filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis' (Joh. 8:36). Non enim a vanitate nisi veritas liberat; sed secundum gratiam, non secundum debitum; per misericordiam, non per meritum. Sicut enim iudici fuit ut vanitati subicere-mur; ita misericordiae est ut veritate liberemur, et ipsa bona merita nostra nonnisi Dei dona esse fateamur."; *Contra Iulianum* VI,39, PL 44, 843; cf. CLARKE, *The Eschatological Transformation of the Material World according to Augustine*, pp. 34-40.