

FREEDOM OF THE WILL

A systematic and biographical sounding of Augustine's thoughts on human willing¹

*"La grâce triomphe en nous,
non du libre arbitre, mais du péché"*
[A. Sage]

I. INTRODUCTION

The Catholic church honours Augustine (354-430)² as the 'doctor gratiae', but has not officially acknowledged all his basic thoughts on grace. A hundred years after his death — a century in which grace and freedom were the most current theological topics — the church accepted Augustine's radical statements on divine grace and human freedom, but rejected his suggestion of grace's irresistibility (Council of Orange, 529)³.

¹ This article is developed in a Utrecht theological study-group in which, apart from the author, H.W. de Knijff, A. Vos, A. H. Looman-Graaskamp, H. Veldhuis, E. Dekker and B. van den Toren participate. A shorter version of this article, less documented and without Latin, is published in Dutch in *Kerk en Theologie* 44 (1993) 219-243; its title is *Vrij zijn en zichzelf niet meester. Een systematische analyse van wilsvrijheid in Augustinus' (latere) denken*.

² A good introduction to Augustine's life and work is offered by H. VON CAMPENHAUSEN, *Lateinische Kirchenväter*, Stuttgart 1960¹, 151-223. The unrivalled biography is P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo. A biography*, Boston/London 1967¹. Instructive introductions to Augustine's complex thoughts still are E. GILSON, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, Paris 1928¹, 1941² (repr. 1982 in: *Études de Philosophie médiévale* XI), p. 185-217 discuss 'la liberté chrétienne'; and J. BURNABY, *Amor Dei. A study of the religion of St. Augustine (The Hulsean Lectures for 1938)*, Norwich 1938¹, 1991², for our theme see esp. p. 183-255.

³ A historical setting and a theological analysis of the Semipelagian discourse is given by J. CHÉNÉ, *Les origines de la controverse semi-pélagienne*, in *L'année théologique augustinienne* (1953) 56-109. Cf. the evaluation of A. MCGRATH, *Iustitia Dei. A history of the doctrine of justification*, vol I: *From the beginnings to 1500*, Cambridge 1986, 74: 'Although the Council declined to teach the doctrines of double predestination and irresistible grace, it must be pointed out that it is questionable whether these may be considered to be authentically Augustinian, in that they are not explicitly taught by Augustine, even though they may appear to follow logically from his teaching. If the epithet 'Augustinian' is understood to mean 'conforming to doctrines explicitly taught by Augustine after 396', it may be asserted that Orange II endorses an Augustinian doctrine of justification'. Cf. O. PESCH & A. PETERS, *Einführung in die Lehre von Gnade und Rechtfertigung*, Darmstadt 1989², 34-40: 'und doch war Orange die Rettung Augustins für die ganze Kirche' (39). Because of a private initiative by Caesarius of Arles who was a moderate 'Augustinian',

In later ages this suggestion was often turned into a cornerstone of orthodoxy, whereas conversely a great part of the accepted Augustinian thought on the subject was still disclaimed as a stumbling block.

The discussion about freedom and grace, which often centered in the debates on power or impotence of the human will, not only aroused people in the early history of the church. The differences between Augustinianism and Pelagianism violently revived at the beginning of 'Modernity'. Men like Luther, Calvin and Jansenius accused the Catholic church of their days and its theological and practical leaders of having abandoned the Augustinian theological heritage (partly in favour of a more 'Pelagian' view). In reaction, these reformers radicalized Augustine's basic ideas⁴. In the most articulate Protestant tradition of that time, the Dutch Reformed theology, the Augustinian doctrine of grace was seen as the core of all theology, and the doctrine of predestination was considered to be the key to this core (canons of Dordrecht, 1618-1619)⁵.

The investigation I offer is a systematic and historical analysis of the question, whether and how Augustine's thoughts guarantee freedom of the human will. My two main objectives are (1) answering this question by means of four of his last writings, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *De correptione et gratia*, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono per-*

many of Augustine's statements on freedom, sin and grace, which were practically rejected in Valence (528), were accepted in Orange (529). Strangely, the canons of Orange disappeared in the 8th century and did not reappear until 1538; so the elaborations of the Medieval doctrines of grace were quite independent from these canons.

⁴ In Protestant theology the problems of freedom and grace have always inspired and troubled people (see for instance C. GRAAFLAND, *Van Calvijn tot Barth. Oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de leer der verkiezing in het Gereformeerd Protestantisme*, 's Gravenhage 1987²). In Roman-catholic theology the debate about 'Jansenism' revives every now and then; one example is G. DE BROGLIE, *Pour une meilleure intelligence du 'De correptione et gratia'*, in: *Augustinus magister. Congrès international augustinien Paris, 21-24 septembre 1954, actes*, Paris 1954, in: *Études Augustiniennes* [EA], 317-337; besides, perhaps the major point discussed by the 'nouvelle théologie' (H. de Lubac, H.U. von Balthasar a.o) was nature and grace and the 'natural' autonomy of man.

⁵ The theme is not, however, a specific ecclesiastical concern. Western culture which has emancipated from its Christian background since the Renaissance, struggles with the same problem in the questions of human autonomy. The Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement can be regarded as great attempts to realize this autonomy by virtue of reason and imagination resp. The twentieth century has experienced its *echec* in many ways. Post-modernism, for instance, pioneers an extreme anti-autonomism which — *les extrêmes se touchent* — simultaneously turns into a hyper-autonomism. Perhaps a new openness may be discovered for the Augustinian 'middle-course' which is extremely critical and asks for further exploration.

*severantiae*⁶, and (2) checking whether this answer fits in the development of Augustine's thoughts on the subject.

Two restrictions should be indicated beforehand: (a) The first objective will be elaborated on by a semantic and systematic, and not by a complete textual analysis. (b) The second objective can result in no more than a representative biographical-systematic sounding, not a full exposition and analysis of all the works of Augustine which discuss this theme.

The central clarification which I intend to advance is the distinction and connection between two things both of which can be indicated by Augustine as '(free) will'. As far as I know, Augustinian scholarship until now has hardly paid its debts to the importance of this distinction. I mean *liberum arbitrium* and (*libera*) *voluntas*, which can be circumscribed as the faculty of free judgement or consent, and the complex of inclinations or dispositions⁷. Augustine's theory of will tends to distinguish these two

⁶ In this article its abbreviation will be GLA, CG, PS and DP resp. The edition I used is *Oeuvres de saint Augustin 24: Aux moines d'Adrumète et de Provence*. Texte de l'édition bénédictine, intr., trad. et notes par J. CHÉNÉ et J. PINTARD, Paris 1962. An other useful edition *Sankt Augustinus - Der Lehrer der Gnade. Gesamtausgabe seiner antipelagianischen Schriften*, herausgeg. v. S. KOPP, T. G. RING und A. ZUMKELLER, Bd. VII, Würzburg 1955¹, 1987². The other abbreviations I use will be: LA (*De libero arbitrio*), CD (*De civitate Dei*), OI (*Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*), S (*Ad Simplicianum*), and DEP (*Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*). For these works, except OI, I used the editions of the *Oeuvres de saint Augustin*.

⁷ Some recent detailed studies in this field of investigation are F. J. WEISMANN, *The problematic of freedom in St. Augustine: towards a new hermeneutics*, in: *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* [REA] 35 (1989) 104-119; F. BERTHOLD, *Free will and theodicy in Augustine: an exposition and critique*, in: *Religious Studies* 17 (1981) 525-535; R. J. O'CONNELL, 'Involuntary sin' in the 'De libero arbitrio', in: REA 37 (1991) 23-36; and esp. J. WETZEL, *Augustine and the limits of virtue*, Cambridge 1992 (in *Vrijgeven doet deugd. Wetzel en de augustijnse wilsvrijheid*, in: *Jaarboek 1991-1992 van het Thomas van Aquino Instituut te Utrecht*, okt. 1993, I gave an extensive critical review of Wetzel's study). The best and most extended art. on the present subject is M. HUFTIER, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, in: *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 33 (1966), 187-281; Huftier, however, concentrates on freedom, not on will; he indicates (but does not elaborate on) the distinction of *arbitrium* and *voluntas* on p. 266: "Plus profondément que les volontés-affections, il y a la volonté-instrument qui demeure au pouvoir de l'homme". Some earlier studies which are still very useful are F.-J. THONNARD, *La notion de la liberté en philosophie augustinienne*, in: REA 16 (1970) 243-270; and esp. X. LÉON-DUFOUR, *Grâce et libre arbitre chez Augustin. A propos de 'consentire vocationi Dei ... propriae voluntatis est'*, in: *Recherches de science religieuse* 33 (1946) 129-163; J. MAUSBACH, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus. Zweiter Band: Die sittliche Befähigung des Menschen und ihre Verwirklichung*, Freiburg (im Br.) 1909¹, esp. 25-139. In general, these studies sometimes mention the distinction I focus on, but hardly regard it as the core of Augustine's view, nor elaborate on it; Wetzel does notice it, but finally disclaims it by his interpretation of irresistible grace.

kinds of 'will' or 'will-power'.

Since it is well-known that Augustine was a defender of free will in his early years, while many scholars are not so sure about his last, I turn to his last writings on the subject. Was freedom of the will eventually rejected? My answer mainly based on a semantic analysis of GLA and CG will be negative. And from a biographical sketch of Augustine's theology, this work turns out to be rather representative. Thus, in this article I want to analyze Augustine statements on free will, systematically and historically, in an attempt to define his basic position which stresses the predominant role of grace but does not rule out free will. This analysis starts from GLA. I will not discuss whether the freedom of will, pressed by some other important ideas of Augustine's does not collapse after all (that might happen in his conception of the grace of Christ, divine prescience, original sin and predestination)⁸.

This article is framed as follows. In II a semantic-systematic analysis of GLA (and CG) will be given, concentrating on the key concepts of *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas*. Section III indicates how Augustine's argumentations in these works have their systematic point in the background of the (Semi)Pelagian discussion. Next, section IV offers some further clarifications, especially from CG, of the distinction and connection of the *arbitrium* and the *voluntas*. Section V offers a sketch of Augustine's 'intellectual biography' on this theme in order to place the results of my analysis in the entire development of his thoughts on the subject. Section VI collects the harvest of this development. Finally, VII summarizes the Augustinian theory of the will. The text of the article can be read as one continuous argument. The footnotes give the necessary documentation and some important details.

II. WILLING AND THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT IN GLA

When formulating his thoughts on freedom and grace in GLA, Augustine feels at home. In 427 he is asked for advice by monks from Hadrumetum who read a radical version of Augustine's theory of grace⁹ and found it too deterministic. Two of these worried monks consulted Augustine. Many other monks of their monastery may have felt even more orthodox than Augustine did — just like his friend (and colleague) Evo-

⁸ For Augustine's doctrine of predestination and prescience I have done this in two articles called *Augustijnse kiesheid* (I en II) offered to *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift*.

⁹ They read it in a letter which Augustine had sent to a priest of Rome, Sixtus (the future pope Sixtus III) in 418 (*Epistula* 194).

dius¹⁰ who was Hadrumetum's neighbouring bishop but had not been able to pacify the monastery. Since 425 people like Evodius call themselves 'the fearless lovers of all-or-nothing grace'¹¹. In GLA Augustine not only marks his position over against pelagian-minded monks but also and even primarily over against these 'lovers'¹².

GLA does not define the key concepts. If we, however, check their grammatical forms and semantic connotations in their contexts, we can 'reconstruct' their systematic contents. It is remarkable that Augustine is quite consequent in using *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* as relatively distinct terms¹³. These words refer to different, but closely related realities — although the term *voluntas* can indicate both of them¹⁴. In almost all cases the first term has the following form: 'the [free] power of judgement of the will' ([*liberum*] *arbitrium voluntatis*). Obviously Augustine points at something 'of the will', something which accompanies and guides our willing, but is not identical with it. Let us take the two elements apart.

(1) Considering the descriptions of *voluntas* Augustine must mean a complex reality which has degrees and forms. There can be a bad and a good 'will', even at the same time. This will can be more or less integrated or self-contradictory. The will can be stronger or weaker, good or bad, better or worse¹⁵. When it is stated that it is free (*libera voluntas*),

¹⁰ Evodius exclaimed as early as 395 (as 'recorded' by Augustine in *De libero arbitrio* III,3,7): "Voluntas illius mihi est necessitas". In that dialogue Augustine answers by claiming more openness for human freedom and responsibility.

¹¹ P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo*, 403.

¹² We must ask whether he does not yield to their view after all when he, once more, is asked to reply to a group which is less 'orthodox' than both these 'lovers' and Augustine — to the Semipelagians behind PS and DP. This requires an analysis of Augustine's doctrine of predestination in PS and DP (cf. art. mentioned in note 8).

¹³ See for instance GLA IV,9: "Non autem intrat in tentationem, si voluntate bona vincat concupiscentiam malam. Nec tamen sufficit arbitrium voluntatis humanae nisi a Domino victoria concedatur oranti". The change of terms is significant; it remains vague or confusing when there would be no further distinction of concept and reference in these terms, but becomes meaningful and to the point when there is a distinction between *arbitrium* and *voluntas*. Some more examples: GLA II,26; XX,41 (quoted in note 20).

¹⁴ Augustine often uses expressions (as we still do) in which it does not make a difference, for the *pointe*, to distinguish the two structural aspects of willing (*voluntas* and *arbitrium*). In these cases he simply uses *voluntas*.

¹⁵ See for instance GLA XVII,33: "Qui ergo vult facere Dei mandatum et non potest, iam quidem habet voluntatem bonum, sed adhuc parvam et invalidam; poterit autem, cum magnam habuerit et robustam". Cf. GLA XIV,29: *cor lapideum* is *durissima voluntas*; GLA XV,30: "Gratia Dei semper est bona, et per hanc fit ut homo bonae voluntatis, qui prius fuit voluntatis malae. Per hanc etiam fit ut ipsa bona voluntas, quae iam esse coepit, augeatur et tam magna fiat, ut possit implere divina mandata quae voluerit, cum valde perfecteque voluerit"; CG VIII,17: "quid aliud rogavit nisi ut habeant liberrimam, fortissi-

then this freedom too is something which has degrees and forms¹⁶. The reverse of this freedom is described as a kind of weakness (*infirmitas*) or addiction (*servitudo*) which also has several degrees¹⁷. Besides, there is an asymmetric relation: insofar as the *voluntas* becomes good, its freedom (*libertas*) qualitatively increases, but when it becomes bad, its freedom decreases. In short, *voluntas* usually has the connotation of 'all that we want'; it refers to the complex of inclinations.

Having faith has characteristics very similar to those of the *voluntas*¹⁸. Faith too can increase or decrease. It can be too weak to be an important factor in the entire field of forces in man's inner life; but it can also grow and become the integrating factor of man's mental household, till man's mind is completely well-formed in the life everlasting when faith has become vision (*visio beata*).

mam, invictissimam, perseverantissimam voluntatem?".

¹⁶ Unlike I. BOCHET, *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*, Paris 1982, 112: "Il [sc. le libre arbitre] s'identifie avec la *voluntas*", I agree with J. BALL, *Les développements de la doctrine de la liberté chez saint Augustin*, in: *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 55 (1957) 404-413, p. 375: "Tout s'éclaire, pensons-nous, et tout s'explique quand on discerne à travers ses textes une distinction capitale, qui passe trop souvent inaperçue: il ne faut pas confondre libre arbitre et liberté". This suggestion has become the central point of the study of M. HUFTIER: *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, art. cit. The distinction between *liberum arbitrium* and *libertas*, however, must be balanced by the distinction between *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* which Huftier touches but hardly elaborates on (see p. 198: "Et c'est précisément en expliquant cette doctrine que s. Augustin, insistant sur la distinction entre libre arbitre, qui est un bien de nature, et bonne volonté, qui est grâce surnaturelle et gratuite, est amené à certaines formules qui, isolées de leur contexte, ont pu prêter à confusion", cf. p. 258-270). Ball's and Huftier's findings are based on an examination of Augustine's entire work.

¹⁷ So *libertas* is not opposed to 'which is necessary in order to stay alive' or necessity in an ontological or logical sense. About these kinds of necessity Augustine does not speak in his last works. Yet they are somehow presupposed (cf. the articles mentioned in note 8).

¹⁸ Normally Augustine and his opponents do not seem to understand *fides* as (a set of) separate acts of believing; nor are they asking for the object of faith which has to be offered (which the tradition has called the *fides quae*). They concentrate on the factual believing as a lasting mental reality; in modern terms: the acquisition or disposition of faith (its width, depth, duration), in traditional terms: the *fides qua*. This faith can be considered as a kind of *voluntas*; cf. *Epistula* 217: "quisquis suo corde credit in Deum, non nisi sua libera credere voluntate, cum potius illi oppugnant arbitrium liberum, qui oppugnant Dei gratiam"; *ibid.*: "initium fidei, ubi est etiam initium bonae, hoc est piaie voluntatis". Augustine also acknowledges the fact that the *fides* is linked with the *liberum arbitrium*, see PS II,5 (472): "Quanquam et ipsum credere, nihil aliud est quam cum assensione cogitare"; cf. *De spiritu et littera* 54: "quid est credere, nisi consentire verum esse quod dicitur? consensio autem utique volentis est".

(2) The two main characteristics mentioned of the (*liberum*) *arbitrium* (*voluntatis*) can be recognized in both aspects of *arbitrare* and *liberum*: (a) discerning or knowing and (b) willing or choosing or consenting. As such it is the personal centre of freedom and responsibility, of initiating and responding. It is the core to which God addresses his gifts of grace, by incentives, orders and offers¹⁹. Since grace does not eliminate the will but makes it incline to the good²⁰, it must operate on the level of the *voluntas* (by addressing the *arbitrium*).

The aspect of consent presupposes alternativity — in fact, Augustine indicates two kinds of alternativity²¹: It is the will's proper thing to will or not to will, and to will something good or to will something bad²². Hence, the will's *arbitrium* has an alternativity on the subject-side (the power to will, by which it can will or can not-will) and an alternativity on the object-side (the objects of will, which can be good or bad — either of which can be willed). If this is the specific freedom of the *arbitrium*, this freedom is different from the *libertas* of the *voluntas*²³.

¹⁹ Very explicitly in GLA XIII,26: God's address to the *arbitrium* to obey the commandments is accompanied by the appeal to ask for the power to accomplish it (GLA ends in a prayer). Cf. GLA XVIII,37 speaks about the incentives directed to the *arbitrium*: "Cur ergo dictum est: 'Diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo est', nisi quia praecepto admonitum est liberum arbitrium, ut quaereret Dei donum?"; the same idea in GLA IV,6; IX,21; XI,23; XIV,29. See also GLA II,2 - V,11: many texts from the Bible prove that there is a *liberum arbitrium* which is addressed (e.g. GLA II,4: "quomodo iubet [sc. Deus], si non liberum arbitrium"). The notion of sollicitation which presupposes the *arbitrium* is also shown in e.g. CD V,9.

²⁰ See GLA XX,41: "gratiam Dei (...) qua voluntas humana non tollitur (...) ita esse in Dei potestate, ut eas quo voluerit quando voluerit, faciat *inclinari*, vel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, vel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse iudicat, occultissimo quidem iudicia, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimo". We must ask at what point this 'inclining' becomes violating. In CG and esp. PS and DP the aspects of cooperation and incentive, which counterweigh the ideas in GLA, are hardly mentioned anymore.

²¹ See esp. GLA III,5. Cf. "Et utique cui dicitur: 'Noli vinci', arbitrium voluntatis eius sine dubio convenitur. Velle enim et nolle propriae voluntatis est", GLA IV,6 (*voluntas* in the latter part of this sentence most likely refers to — the will of — the *arbitrium*, mentioned in the former part). "Itaque, fratres, debetis quidem per liberum arbitrium non facere mala, et facere bona (...)", GLA X,22.

²² See e.g. GLA IV,6 and GLA X,22. *Bonum* usually means that which God wants and which is offered by grace.

²³ I. Bochet correctly remarks: "Il faut donc introduire une distinction — qu'Augustin n'explicite pas toujours — entre libre arbitre et liberté" (*op. cit.*, 112). These two concepts, however, are of different kinds: a specific reality (power of choice) and an abstract property (being free); it is better to speak of either *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* or *libertas* (*arbitrii*) and *libertas* (*voluntatis*).

Moreover, there is an important third aspect (c): Man's power of judgement or consent is his central capacity to *accept* in the first place. The *arbitrium* does not make the good and true to which it consents, it has to recognise them, they have to be offered to it — which can only be done by God's creating grace²⁴. The *arbitrium* cannot make its good inclinations (*voluntates*) either: another thing which can only be done by grace. As the power to accept, that is: in its susceptibility for the good offered and realized by grace, the *arbitrium* is *meant* to accept only *what is true and good*. It *can*, however, consent to what is false or bad. Augustine often defines the *arbitrium* by saying what it is intended to do²⁵. If it

²⁴ "Certum est nos velle, cum volumus; sed ille facit ut velimus bonum", GLA XVI, 32; in this sentence the willing seems to be assigned to man, willing the good to God. "Itaque, ut hoc verbum, quod non ab omnibus capitur, ab aliquibus capiatur, et Dei donum est, et liberum arbitrium", GLA IV, 7. In this sentence even within willing something good — for instance accepting a word of God — God('s giving) and man('s accepting) are distinctly indicated. Grace has to help continuously: "Ergo et victoria qua peccatum vincitur, nihil aliud est quam donum Dei, in isto certamine adiuvantis liberum arbitrium", GLA IV, 8; cf. IV, 9: "Nec tamen sufficit arbitrium voluntatis humanae, nisi a Domino victoria concedatur oranti, ne intret in tentationem". Cf. VI, 13: "si se [sc. gratia] subtraxerit, cadit homo, non erectus, sed praecipitatus libero arbitrio"; GLA XV, 31: "Quare dat, si homo facturus est, nisi quia dat quod iubet, cum adiuvat ut faciat cui iubet" (cf. *Confessiones* X, 40 and 60).

²⁵ This description of the *arbitrium* also corresponds quite well with the résumé of Léon-Dufour (*art. cit.*, 150, 151): "Le libre arbitre est essentiellement appétit de bonheur, appétit qui, s'il est considéré indépendamment de son objet, apparaît comme un poids intérieur, une 'gravité' congéniale: c'est une tendance, un amour. Cependant il est une faculté indifférente, en ce sens qu'il n'est nécessité ni au bien ni au mal: il peut choisir entre le bien et le mal à accomplir. Même après le péché originel il demeure en l'homme: c'est une faculté inadmissible (...). Ce libre arbitre n'est en réalité aucunement efficace par ses propres forces". To my mind G. DE PLINVAL: *Aspects du déterminisme et de la liberté dans la doctrine de saint Augustin*, in: REA (1955) 346-378 incorrectly thinks that the nature of the *liberum arbitrium* is almost completely limited to the aspect which Léon-Dufour called 'gravité': "ce qui constitue pour lui l'essence du libre arbitre, ce ne sont, à proprement parler, ni la faculté d'un choix, ni la conscience claire des motifs, ni l'absence de toute sollicitation extérieure, ni même la maturité des raisons, mais l'adhésion expresse de la volonté". This aspect is its most important one (it reflects the *arbitrium*'s purpose and is stressed over against the [Semi]Pelagians), but there are more constitutive aspects. Huftier shows that this aspect (c) is characteristic for all Augustine's descriptions of the *arbitrium*: "Le libre arbitre apparaît ainsi comme une aptitude positive à acquérir la vraie liberté, c'est-à-dire à être fixé de plus en plus profondément dans le bien auquel il tend, et donc à ne plus pouvoir le mal, à ne plus pouvoir pécher" (*art. cit.* 232). Because of the asymmetry of (basic) options Huftier is right in stating: "Le vouloir libre consiste moins à choisir qu'à consentir, à se fixer dans le vouloir de ce dont on ressent l'attrait" (*art. cit.* 254). According to Huftier this element is so strong for Augustine that "ce risque [de défaillir et d'opter pour le mal] ne définit pas le libre arbitre; il lui est accidentel, c'est une de ses possibles modalités d'exercice" (*art. cit.* 280). I agree that

rejects truth and goodness, the *arbitrium* degenerates by becoming 'enslaved' in some form and to some extent; it develops a function unnatural to it²⁶. The *arbitrium* is sometimes described as a susceptibility or desire for the good; in factually consenting to the good it performs that for which it is made²⁷.

In sum, 'will' in Augustine's understanding usually means (1) an inclination which can be stronger or weaker, directed to this or to that. As such Augustine calls it 'free' (*libera*) to the degree that it is directed to what is 'good'. This inclination is accompanied by (2) a movement of acceptance or consent which can be given to or can be withheld from this or that. Because of this second aspect, the will can be called 'free' (*liberum*) with respect to this alternativity, which is a lasting feature of the will. *Voluntas* and *liberum arbitrium* can be used one for another, but they do not coincide. Augustine's descriptions presuppose a distinction of two kinds of willing and two kinds of freedom, which also comprise two kinds

there is asymmetry; but not in the way Huftier states. It is true that *factually* choosing the bad is accidental to the *arbitrium*, but so is *factually* consenting to the good; yet, the *possibility* of a bad consent is essential to it, just like the *possibility* of a good consent and the *factual desire* for the good, for God (also see below, note 86).

²⁶ Choosing the bad, turning away from God's grace, runs against its natural, that is its intended function. "Le libre arbitre demeurant ainsi faite pour la vérité, demeurant finalisée vers le bien, a besoin de le trouver attirant, délectable (...)" (p. 254). Cf. CD XIV 1: "Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc vere est liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non servit. Tale datum est a Deo (...)" ; cf. e.g. *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manicheorum* XII 12: "illo solo dominante liberrimus", and *In Joannem* XLI 8: "Eris liber, si fueris servus".

²⁷ The ultimate background and model of Augustine's concept of human freedom is, of course, God's freedom — God who is free *and* cannot do any evil. For God in relation to our theme, two Augustinian thoughts: (1) "Si, ut dicis, 'boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est', non habet libertatem Deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est", OI VI 11; (2) "in ipso Deo summum est liberum arbitrium, qui peccare nullo modo potest (...) si enim Deus est, consequentissime justus est, et ideo summe maximeque habens liberum arbitrium, peccare tamen non potest Deus", OI V 38, cf. *ibid.* VI 10. Thus, God has (perfect) *libertas* and a (perfect) *liberum arbitrium*. What God is by nature, He has intended man to become by grace: "tunc felicius liberi erimus, quando non poterimus servire peccato, sicut nec ipse Deus: sed nos ipsius gratia, ille vero sua natura", OI VI 19. Huftier: "La liberté est réalisée de manière analogue en Dieu et chez la créature. Chez Dieu seul, en qui la liberté se trouve d'une manière éminente, liberté et autonomie se confondent. Chez la créature, la liberté est pouvoir d'auto-détermination, non pas d'autonomie", *art. cit.* 281. Cf. 207: "Mais il reste que, en Dieu ou chez les hommes, sous l'une ou l'autre modalité, le libre arbitre est substantiellement le même. Si quelque chose a péri avec le premier péché, c'est non pas le libre arbitre, mais la liberté de ne pas pécher", (that difference of modality is explained on p. 209: "chez la créature, le libre arbitre n'est pas par nature impeccable: il ne *se réalise* pas d'une manière univoque en Dieu et chez la créature", [emphasis added]).

of 'can'²⁸. They are closely related. The *liberum arbitrium* is actualized by God's creating grace, and the dispositional will, if it consists of good inclinations, by that grace by which God meets his creation²⁹.

In order to conclude this paragraph I make three remarks.

(1) It is worth observing that in GLA, CG (and also in PS and DP) Augustine hardly speaks of the specific willing of the *liberum arbitrium*; he is preoccupied with the willing or not-willing of the *voluntas*. Even the aspect of consent is, as it were, taken into the willing of the *voluntas*. This is a very understandable contraction, since someone's *voluntates* tell us in which things his actual consent has invested itself. They form the factual field of one's (inner) forces within which the *arbitrium* has to make its consent.

(2) Augustine is (I think legitimately) convinced that in many texts from Scripture it is not the willing of the *arbitrium* but that of the *voluntas* which is at stake. He especially refers to many texts of the apostles Paul and John, which are relevant to the themes of freedom, grace, election and

²⁸ Cf. Léon-Dufour on the state of fallen man: "Saint Augustin s'est placé sur le plan des objectants et a fait appel à une distinction entre les deux 'potestas' ou entre deux 'possibilitas': en soi, abstraitement, l'homme a le pouvoir de croire, il a donc le libre arbitre; mais concrètement il ne peut l'exercer, son libre arbitre est donc inefficace (...)" (art. cit. 160). Léon-Dufour observing that there are two powers or possibilities of the *liberum arbitrium*, does not connect this distinction with that of *arbitrium* and *voluntas* (in which, according to me, its back-ground is found).

²⁹ The conclusion of my analysis (based on GLA, CG, DP and PS) and the analysis of Léon-Dufour (based on a close reading of *De spiritu et littera*) basically coincide with the analysis of Huftier which is based on Augustine's entire oeuvre (see art. cit. 230): "Ainsi donc, à l'encontre du pélagianisme, Augustin va s'efforcer d'établir que liberté et libre arbitre sont deux choses distinctes; que liberté s'oppose, non pas à nécessité, mais à servitude; et donc, que le libre arbitre peut exister, substantiellement le même, avant et après le péché, mais que, après le péché, il a besoin d'être libéré par la grâce pour pouvoir, précisément, s'approcher du but vers lequel il tend de toutes ses forces et en fonction duquel il se définit: le bien, la justice, l'impeccabilité"; cf. p. 224, 231-232. The main difference is that Huftier tends to eliminate or at least minimize the aspect of choice in the nature of the *arbitrium*, while I see it as a subordinate but essential element. Huftier is reacting against the view that Anselm, in stating that the *libertas arbitrii* is not defined by the possibility or power to sin (but by that of keeping righteousness for its own sake), departs from Augustine who defined freedom as "potentia bene vel male operandi", a definition which was attributed to Augustine in the 12th century. He shows, and correctly I think, that Anselm's positive definition is very Augustinian. However, Augustine also defines the *arbitrium* as a faculty of choice between good and evil. The element of choice is, in the fundamental asymmetry of the options, an aspect which returns in the Augustinian descriptions again and again.

merit, and which speak of all the things which God works for us even in our very willing³⁰.

(3) Nowhere in GLA and CG, nor in PS and DP does Augustine say that the *liberum arbitrium* does not exist, or has been lost after the fall, or has become defective, or vanishes when a stronger grace is given (sc. the grace of Christ)³¹. In order to grasp the impact of Augustine's statements it is important to distinguish carefully between the things he says and the things he does not say. Not saying something does not imply denying something. We could be tempted to extrapolate his statements too easily. To my experience Augustine is normally quite accurate about what he 'positively' states (and, consequently, about what he does *not* say). If we consider his opening paragraph in GLA, in which Augustine marks his position by drawing frontiers in two directions³², we are invited to assume, conversely, that he presupposes the presence and the functioning of the *arbitrium* up to the end. But why then is he silent about it? Perhaps we are able to find a clue that makes sense of this silence (which is not a denial), and it is very likely that this clue can be found, if anywhere, in the specific nature of the question as it emerged in the Semipelagian discussion.

III. THE (SEMI)PELAGIAN DEBATE AND AUGUSTINE'S POINT

Pelagius already challenged Augustine to define more precisely what man's personal centre, his *liberum arbitrium* 'can realize by itself' without needing an extra support of God ('extra' compared to what God already does as man's Creator). Augustine repeatedly discusses the 'pow-

³⁰ See for instance "Revelavit autem nobis per Scripturas Sanctas, esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium", GLA II 2. "Primum, quia ipsa divina praecepta homini non prodesse, nisi haberet liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quo ea faciens, ad promissa praemia perveniret", ibid. "Quomodo iubet [sc. Deus], si non est liberum arbitrium?", GLA II 4. Most of Augustine's later works are supposed to be read as commentaries on statements from Scripture — as theological exegesis. A good example is offered in the doctrine of election: PS V 10 (496).

³¹ Esp. see CG XIII 42 (364-366).

³² One group: "Propter eos qui hominis liberum arbitrium sic praedicant et defendunt, ut Dei gratiam qua vocamur ad eum et a nostris malis meritis liberamur, et per quam bona merita comparamus quibus ad vitam perveniamus aeternam, negare audeant et conentur auferre, multa iam disseruimus (...)". The other group: "Sed quoniam sunt quidam, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium, aut quando gratia defenditur, negari existiment liberum arbitrium, hinc aliquid scribere ad vestram Charitatem, Valentine frater (...) compellente mutua charitate curavi" (GLA I 1, 91). Cf. above, first par. of section II, and footnote 64.

ers' which the *arbitrium* is or is not supposed to have at its disposal³³. From this background, the Semipelagian question, which is more specified³⁴, is whether someone begins to believe and keeps on believing by virtue of his own *liberum arbitrium*. In answer to this specific question Augustine defines his view: Having faith is not realized by us, by our *arbitrium*; it is realized by God.

Augustine offers a clarification by saying that the real possibility of faith is given to our nature; yet by this very fact its reality has not been given as well. The reality of faith can be given in contact with God, but it is not a given from the start³⁵. This thought seems to presuppose that God's grace is the realizing power which adds some realities to human nature. God does not automatically do this: His freedom in giving faith to creatures should be respected. Does God, however, also respect human freedom in (re)creating the *voluntates*?³⁶

In the (Semi)Pelagian discussion we can expect the arguing parties to concentrate on the aspect of 'merit'. In opposition to the Semipelagians the argumentations of PS and DP even have their point in this notion of *meritum*. If man is able to do something by his own powers, he has a meritorious ground with respect to God; and then God owes man in return. For the Pelagians the human *voluntas* — for the Semipelagians the *fides* is such a ground; Augustine denies both. Differently put, what makes faith an inchoative, increasing and steadfast inclination of man? Augustine and his opponents really seem to enquire after this kind of 'making' and its meritoriousness: who is the author of 'that' in man? The opposition states that man can do that; Augustine doesn't think so.

³³ See CG XII 37-38: "tales vires habeat eius voluntas"; "in viribus suis"; "habens virtutem liberi arbitrii". For the overestimation of the *vires* of the *arbitrium* or *voluntas*, see *Epistula* 194, 188, *Sermo* 265D. Another repeated statement of Augustine is that the *arbitrium* is there, but by itself "non sufficit", e.g. *Sermo* 156 (cf. what can the *arbitrium* accomplish, "hoc potest?") and 165, *Epistula* 177 ("quamvis esse non dubitur arbitrium voluntatis, tamen eius potestas non sufficiat, nisi adiuvetur infirmitas"). In OI VI Augustine specifies that the *vis* of the *arbitrium* is invested in the *voluntas* which follows the *arbitrium*; this power can be lost. The need for prayer also proves the need for grace: see e.g. *Epistula* 175, 179 (why pray when the *arbitrium* or *voluntas* are supposed to have the desired thing in their power?). As a preacher one can ask people not to be weakened because they have a *liberum arbitrium* — which is not sufficient, however, for fulfilling what is asked (*Sermo* 165).

³⁴ See below, section V (on *Ad Simplicianum*).

³⁵ PS V 10: "Ut enim sit naturae, fidem posse habere; numquid et habere? 'Non enim omnium est fides' (2 *Thess* 3:2): cum fidem posse habere sit omnium".

³⁶ Bochet opts for a positive answer (it is a pity that she does not elaborate on it): "il y a une relation essentielle entre la grâce et le libre arbitre, indépendamment même du péché" (*op. cit.* 316). My analysis points in the same direction.

It is unlikely that Augustine would not accept merit at all, since (1) he emphasizes, for instance in CG, that choice and merit are crucial requisites which occur in the original state of man (see the next paragraph). Moreover (2), up to his last writings Augustine keeps on talking about a justified reward or punishment, even in the state of sin, for man's behaviour with regard to grace's offering³⁷.

Summarizing paragraph II as the background of I we must say that the *arbitrium* cannot realize his *voluntates* as living mental forces³⁸. They are given to a human being, when God 'makes' them in him. Augustine does not say that the *arbitrium* does not have any power, nor that it has no importance whatsoever in this realization by God. He simply does not make positive statements here. Again, not stating a thing is not, however, denying something. If we consider the nature of the (Semi)Pelagian controversy, this not-stating turns out to have its reasons: that aspect was not central to the discussion³⁹. Augustine agrees with the Semipelagians that there is a *liberum arbitrium* and that it can make good or bad judgements. They disagree, however, on the factual power this *arbitrium* is supposed to have over all things to which we are (or become) inclined. It is even likely that in the term *liberum arbitrium* this power was included, at least in (semi)Pelagian ears; then Augustine must have preferred to avoid it.

If we not only regard the aspect of power, but also that of choice, there are still more reasons for this silence. As we shall see from his biography, Augustine's preoccupation with free will as the faculty of choice was motivated by his concern with evil. If God cannot be the author of sin, man must be that author; then man must have (had) a fundamental alternativity, between turning to God and turning away from Him. Thus, choice is strongly related to (the factual choice for and existence of) evil⁴⁰. Augustine has always remained reluctant in admitting that freedom

³⁷ Besides (3), if he is convinced that the *liberum arbitrium* is not only active when man sins, but also when grace is offered, would it be improper to call consenting to the good (if one can dissent) a meritorious thing? Of course it is a very much reduced kind of meritoriousness.

³⁸ In his *Confessiones* he shows that the *arbitrium* cannot completely control them even when they are realized. See also the next section, III (1).

³⁹ In this sense I agree with Gilson who says (*op. cit.* 205): "il n'y a pas de problème de la grâce et du libre arbitre chez saint Augustin".

⁴⁰ Cf. "A libero arbitrio exordium sumpsisse peccatum", DEP III 25; cf. OI III 96, V 16 and 60-62. But compare OI V 61 (quoted in note 51) in which Augustine states that God created a good will in man, but He did not want to force man to respond to His initiative, so He left it to the *arbitrium* to respond; hence there is a positive motive for giving man a faculty of choice! For not compelling must open the possibility of rejection (although the rejection itself is not good).

as alternativity presupposed in sinning, is also constitutive for doing the good. Of course he is right in minimalizing its importance, for instance by noticing that there is an important asymmetry between consenting to the good and its alternative: the former is commendable while the latter is rejectable. Yet, if there would be no alternative at all, there would be no responsibility, no sin. Another good reason for minimalizing the role of choice is given by the role of grace: if the main question of the debate is what the *arbitrium* can accomplish on its own (without grace therefore), then Augustine correctly states that it is self-sufficient only for doing evil⁴¹.

IV. THREE SYSTEMATIC CLARIFICATIONS

It is easy to see how important the relation between the *arbitrium* and the *voluntates* is. The former may be intrinsically free (to consent or dissent), its factual consent or dissent will largely depend on the factual dispositions and their strength. So let us pause at three clarifications of the relation between *voluntas* and *arbitrium*. These elucidations can be linked directly with the outcome of our analysis so far.

⁴¹ I. Bochet briefly and effectively summarizes the difference of opinion as follows (using two quotations from Augustine): "pour les pélagiens, 'il n'y a pas de libre arbitre si l'homme a besoin de l'aide divine'; pour Augustin, au contraire, 'la grâce confirme le libre arbitre'" (*op. cit.* 314). Bochet recalls Augustine's preference to compare the relationship God-man with that of parents-children, whereas Pelagius prefers the comparison of the adolescent who becomes independent from his father (according to Augustine Julian of Eclanum considered man to be[come] "emancipatus a Deo"; Julian meant 'freed by God', not 'freed from God', but Augustine obviously takes his position to come down to the idea expressed by the latter translation). If Augustine states that the *arbitrium* and the (*bonae*) *voluntates* are from God, he agrees with the (semi)Pelagians on the fact that the *arbitrium* is sustained by God. Augustine is convinced that man's history reaches deeper in his nature than the (semi)Pelagians want. So the main question in the discussion is, whether man's created nature has the power to realize or initiate the good, or whether realizing or even initiating requires, apart from creating grace, an additional grace of God. The Pelagians thought that this latter grace only needs to inform us; thanks to God's creating grace invested in our nature, which always remains intact, we are able to transform this 'information' in good works by the very forces of that nature (see G. GRESHAKE, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit. Eine Untersuchung zur Gnadenlehre des Pelagius*, Mainz 1972, esp. 54-71). This view was never Augustine's. We have seen that his thoughts were already a decisive step ahead of this opinion during his priesthood in Hippo, while afterwards he advanced one more step. Not until the Semipelagians revived the discussion did the final step become an issue of debate; in opposition to the Pelagians the discussion had its point in the preliminary step. Augustine's unusually harsh campaign against the Pelagians, and his mild opposition to the Semipelagians may very well have this background.

(1) In a place in CG the attention is focused on man's original state⁴². In that state the *arbitrium* was free to accept or refuse the grace which God offered to man. Now, accepting grace was facilitated by the fact that the *arbitrium* was supported by a *voluntas*, a good *voluntas*, which God had created in man as well⁴³. So man had a basis of good inclinations which could be enlarged or reduced⁴⁴. Hence, it was mainly due to a basic good inclination (*bona voluntas*), that the *arbitrium* was able to accept God's primary offer⁴⁵. So even before the fall there is a structural relationship between *arbitrium* and *voluntas* which contains the *arbitrium* as dependent on the *voluntas* to some degree. The free consent of the will, which remains at the disposal of the *arbitrium*, is factually predisposed by the *voluntates*⁴⁶, and this relation is anchored in a created

⁴² See CG XI 31 - XII 34.

⁴³ CG XI 32 (340): "Tunc ergo dederat homini Deus *bonam voluntatem* (...)", by which man is created as *rectum*; placed in that condition it was up to man's *liberum arbitrium* to remain *rectum* or become *concurvatus*.

⁴⁴ This analysis of man's original state does not contradict the ideas on man developed above on merit (see section III), since of course, the primary *voluntas* is not the (indirect) result of free acts performed by man himself, so it is not a meritorious capacity. And of course, God's offer cannot be reduced to any possible merit on man's side, since it is the free continuation of God's free creating activity. In this original position only acceptance can have some merit. Augustine stresses this aspect of merit; a lot depends on it since eternal life will be given only when man accepts God's offering, which is the *praemium* for accepting (which therefore can hardly be called a reward). Thus, choice and merit do play an important part from the beginning of man's existence!

⁴⁵ At this point (CG XII 33 - XII 34) Augustine introduces two famous distinctions. (1) "Posse non peccare" (original human state) — "non posse non peccare" (the state of fallen man) — "non posse peccare" (the state of glorified man). If the *arbitrium* remains after sinning, neither the second *non posse* nor the third one can be taken too strictly. They must be dispositional, and cannot be (onto)logical impossibilities (see note 97: material, not formal impossibilities; and cf. E. DEKKER, *Richer than Midas. The use of modal logic in the theology of Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609)*, Master's Thesis Utrecht University, Faculty of Theology 1988, p. 22-23). (2) "Adjutorium sine quo non" (grace offered before the fall) — "adjutorium quo" (grace offered after the fall). Again, if the *arbitrium* is a constitutive element of human nature, created by God, as Augustine explicitly confirms (see note 76), then RAHNER's analysis (in *Augustin und der Semipelagianismus*, in: *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 62 (1938) 171-196: "Hätte er den Begriff der zureichenden Gnade deutlicher erfasst, so hätte er auch ein *auxilium sine quo non* für den gefallenen Menschen zugeben müssen (...)'" (181), must be correct.

⁴⁶ In GLA some examples of this 'cannot' are given, like that of people who are unvoluntarily overcome by fear in certain circumstances: "Quare non subsistebant per liberum arbitrium, sed per timorem turbata voluntate fugiebant, nisi quia Deus dominatur et voluntatibus hominum", GLA XX 41. In the last part of this sentence Augustine moves beyond this 'cannot': it is directly related to God.

structure⁴⁷. If this is correct, it is another good reason for Augustine's silence about the fact that the *arbitrium* is supposed to remain intact. He approaches its functioning from the side of what it is able to accomplish: in that respect it is seriously bound by the *bona/mala voluntas*. Augustine's phenomenological and practical sensibility let him concentrate on this side of human willing. Yet it is not a minor point, whether the *arbitrium* is still existing and functioning in the sinner, or not. For if it is, then God still regards it as man's 'address' and does not want to overrule it. This does make a difference in the execution of man's restoration by God!

(2) An important hint in clarifying the nature of the (mental) *consuetudines* is a remark which Augustine sometimes makes, namely that sinning makes a man a servant or even slave of sin, while doing well makes him a servant of grace⁴⁸. Thus it is not simply that sinning is enslaving while doing the good and believing is liberating. In fact, all repeated consents, to the bad *and* to the good, cause 'enslavement' or 'liberation'. Both can grow an inner habit which predispose man in either direction. So there must be a connection between separate actions (of the *arbitrium*) and inclinations (of the *voluntas*) which is independent of its quality. Volitions, if repeated, result in dispositions. The reason why the quality of the acquired disposition does make a difference still, cannot just be the formative character of habits. This character must also be a creational characteristic of human nature. The difference must spring from something

⁴⁷ Because of this distinction and connection I basically agree with J. RIST, *Augustine on free will and predestination*, in: *Augustine. A collection of critical essays*, ed. by R. A. MARKUS, New York 1972, 221: "What we should call psychological compulsions are not compulsions for Augustine. (...) his love is a weight (*pondus*) which drives him to good and evil, or rather is his good and evil will". In our dispositions is stored what we somehow want; even when we no longer consent to it, it is still the 'residu' of what we willed and as a living force it is still a will (*voluntas*). Thus, of sins (even of original sin) we must say that we 'want' that to which they dispose us: they are part of our willing as well. The only important difference with respect to acquired dispositions is, that we did 'not personally choose for' these inclinations. Choice and consent did not precede; they follow. Hence, a disposition can compel the *arbitrium* to consent, but then (a) the disposition itself embodies a wish or need of the person involved, so that an element of his own 'will' is compelling him, (b) the *arbitrium* consents to that disposition anyway (cf. OI III 187: "quae carnali suo motu nec praecederet nec excederet hominis voluntatem, sed eius semper sequeretur arbitrium, profecto nec manicheus"). N.B.: a disposition never compels (it only inclines), a compulsive habit does compel: what makes the difference?

⁴⁸ See e.g. CG I 2 and GLA XV 31: "Semper autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper bona", GLA XV 31, and "Aut enim a iustitia libera est, quando servit peccato, et tunc est mala; aut a peccata libera est, quando servit iustitiae, et tunc est bona. Gratia vero Dei semper est bona (...)", *ibid.*

extra. Augustine suggests: that is the presence or absence of grace⁴⁹. God who is good cannot create bad things when they are willed by man. Hence, although both good and bad inclinations are formative or predisposing, there must be an asymmetry between them; and that asymmetry causes the qualitative difference which is expressed in saying that sin enslaves while grace liberates. Augustine supposes that God is also involved in the acquisition of a bad disposition: Its dispositional force is felt as a just 'punishment' (*poena*) for consenting to something bad.

(3) Another suggestion complements this observation. Augustine often states that all good things come from God. Nothing can bring itself into existence, so man too cannot create unless God creates first. Thus, he is consequent in stating that *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* are created by God⁵⁰. Within this presupposition he makes a difference between what is created as a basis of our nature and what 'can be built on top of' that. Thus, the *arbitrium* and an inchoative *bona voluntas* are basic (belonging to our *natura*) and they are brought into existence by God's creating grace. Yet a great deal of our *voluntas* has to be formed in the course of our life: this part must be brought into (mental) existence by that grace by which God unfolds what He creates. Therefore it is true, as Augustine sometimes says, that God 'makes' the (*bona*) *voluntas*⁵¹, or as he repeatedly states, that the *bona voluntas* is 'a Deo' (in all its forms, from preparing to per-

⁴⁹ Cf. *Enchiridion* IX 30: "Liberaliter enim servit, qui sui domini voluntatem libenter facit. Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est, qui peccati servus est. Unde ad juste faciendum liber non erit, nisi a peccato liberatus esse iustitiae coeperit servus. Ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti obedientiam".

⁵⁰ Cf. from DEP (quoted in note 73) that once a *voluntas* is created, grace works with (if it is a good one) or against it (if it is bad); cf. GLA V 12: "nec gratia Dei sola, nec ipse solum [*sc.* liberum arbitrium], sed gratia Dei cum illo", and GLA XVII 33: "ut ergo velimus operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum operatur".

⁵¹ See e.g. OI V 61: "Quasi non potuerit Deus hominem facere voluntatis bonae; in qua eum tamen permanere non cogeret, sed in ejus esset arbitrio sive in ea semper esse vellet, sive non semper (...). Bonae igitur voluntatis factus est homo, paratus ad obediendum Deo (...); *factus*, the term used for describing God's creating. And see OI V 56: "Itane vero, Iuliane, ex homine hominis voluntas non oritur, cum homo bonum opus Dei sit? (...) Dic ergo unde, si non de natura, id est non de ipso homine, si non de libero ejus arbitrio, dic, rogo, unde voluntas hominis oriatur?" Cf. GLA XVI 32, DP and PS in which Augustine often says that God makes man's *voluntates*; in the context of these works these *voluntates* cannot mean the original good will, but all willing that can be gained in the process of salvation after the Fall. Augustine gives some hints about the relation of the *liberum arbitrium* and the *voluntas*; see e.g. OI V: "bona opera Dei sunt natura et liberum arbitrium: in his, inquis, voluntas exoritur, sed non de his"; *ibid.*: "si ergo et voluntas in homine vel in ejus libero arbitrio de nihilo exorta est, quis iam fecit?", and *Epistula* 188: "proprium quippe arbitrium nisi Dei gratia iuvetur, nec ipsa bona voluntas esse in homine potest".

fecting). However, if the *liberum arbitrium* plays a constitutive role throughout the process of man's history, in all its three main phases (in the state of creation, redemption and glorification), we should conclude that an important part of our *voluntates* are built up by God's grace only when the *arbitrium* has consented to something good. A human being gets what he wants: if he repeatedly consents to something the desire for it becomes stronger. Many dispositions are formed in man by God who looks at man's volitions. In this way (only) the *arbitrium* can 'make it that' God realizes a disposition in man. Thus the link between the *arbitrium* and the *voluntates* runs via God! If this is true, then an important part of all that manifests itself in us as (our) 'willing' has come into us by our consent (of which we are not always aware) and the just activity by which God actualizes our dispositional nature⁵². As such it gains a certain preponderance over our power of consent⁵³. When we will something bad, this means that our *arbitrium* becomes 'addicted' to that bad thing to the degree and in the form in which it is willed by us after some time in which we consented to it. Pelagius considered such addictions to be unreal.

V. THE WILL AND ITS FREEDOM IN AUGUSTINE'S DEVELOPMENT

Let us widen the perspective of our inquiry. It would support the view of this article if the results of my analysis of GLA and CG on freedom and grace were consistent with the main lines of Augustine's thought on the subject. There are two groups of writings concerning freedom and grace: (1) the works written after his conversion and during his priesthood (385-400); (2) the works written during the anti-Pelagian campaign, which were first addressed mainly to Pelagius (410-420) and later mainly to Julian of Eclanum (420-430). I wish to repeat that I do not give a full account of the content of the works mentioned; I can only take a selection as representative as possible and relevant to our theme.

(1) Let us start with a brief preliminary impression of Augustine's background. It is remarkable that *voluntas* generally has the meaning of

⁵² Cf. PS VI 11: "Misericordia igitur et iudicium in ipsis voluntatibus facta sunt". There are two principles which get — by the Creator — their 'sediment' in the soul or mind as a repercussion of our consents; cf. the formulation cited in note 58 from *Contra Fortunatum*.

⁵³ If this is correct, we need to distinguish between two kinds of inclinations: Those inclinations given to us by grace 'before' the *arbitrium* consents (in order to 'make' it consent), and those 'after' its consent. Both are made or 'done' by God in us, but in different ways; the latter are more 'our' dispositions than the former.

'reasonable desire or appetite', 'intention' or 'impulse' in non-christian Ancient thought⁵⁴. Thus from Augustine's philosophical background *voluntas* has the meaning of a qualified tendency, a mental attitude, a lasting wish or even virtue. From a practical Roman background (jurisprudence), however, *voluntas* as volition was coined by the need to determine whether a 'will' becomes manifest in any action. In this context *voluntas* is primarily considered not as an inclination of the will, but as a volition, a specific act of the will⁵⁵. Augustine combines both senses or uses. In his works *voluntas* usually has a general philosophical meaning, but sometimes he can use it in its practical meaning which is more often connected with the *liberum arbitrium*. If we will something, a disposition (*voluntas*) and a volition (an act of the *liberum arbitrium*) come together⁵⁶.

(2) It is quite understandable that Pelagius and the 'Semipelagians' found some of the ideas which they used against Augustine, now an aging bishop, in the writings of Augustine as a convert. This appeal, however, only had a very limited ground, since at that time Augustine was already moving towards ideas which finally matured around 395-398. A glance at the documents demonstrates this. I will start by looking at some early works which we compare with some later ones.

De libero arbitrio book I is one of the first works which Augustine composed after his conversion to Catholic theology and to the church. In this book he argues for the existence of the (*libera*) *voluntas* which has to be the cause of evil in man and in the world⁵⁷. Who is 'the author of

⁵⁴ For instance in Aristotle, Chrysippus, Cicero and Seneca, see N. W. GILBERT, *The concept of will in early latin philosophy*, in: *Journal of the history of philosophy*, I (1963), 17-35.

⁵⁵ See A. DIHLE, *The theory of the will in classical Antiquity*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1982, 132-144.

⁵⁶ Although he correctly indicates the tendency which rules the meaning of *voluntas*, J. RIST, *art. cit.* (see note 46), 220, states a little too much by saying: "As in Seneca, the word *voluntas* is in Augustine almost to be translated as 'moral self' or 'moral personality'".

⁵⁷ See LA I [ed.: AUGUSTINUS, *Theologische Frühschriften 'Vom freien Willen' ('De libero arbitrio')*, 'Von der wahren Religion' ('De vera religione'), Lat. & Germ., übers. v. W. THIMME, Zürich/Stuttgart 1962, 108]. It is generally accepted that books I and II were written several years before book III (388 resp. 395). Some representative quotations: "Quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est?" (80); "Non enim aut peccatum esset aut recte factum quod non fieret voluntate. Ac per hoc poena iniusta esset et praemium, si homo voluntatem liberam non haberet. (...) Debit igitur deus dare homini liberam voluntatem" (108). For LA III also see below, VI (2). N.B.: LA III 74 states that, since man's *arbitrium* has to be offered something in order to know and will it and this offering is not in its power, then taking or leaving what is offered by God (or his own inclination), is in its power.

evil'? Because of His goodness it cannot be God. Therefore, evil comes from man, more specifically from man's will. Man could — and should — have not-willed it, but, in fact, he did will it. Because of this basic alternative man is rightly held responsible for sin and its consequences.

After the interim period in Thagaste and at the beginning of his time as a bishop of Hippo, Augustine resumed the discussion with the Manichees and came to a first formulation of the difference — so to speak within the *voluntas* — between *liberum arbitrium* and mental *consuetudines*. In *Contra Fortunatum*⁵⁸ he states that man's free will is influenced by habits which do not eliminate freedom of choice but rather frame it. Will is not only expressed in volitions, but also in dispositions. We need God's recreating grace to transform these dispositions if they are bad, and we need His creating grace to form good dispositions. Besides, when Augustine realizes the complexity and range of habits during his pastoral work, and when he senses to what extent they are a heritage of earlier human decisions⁵⁹, he feels urged to make the theological distinction between the situation of the first man and that of all other men who have succeeded him. This distinction belongs to his leading ideas on freedom and grace ever since. After Adam every man is more or less, in this or that way caught up in acquired and inherited habits. If they are somehow

⁵⁸ In LA Augustine usually speaks of *voluntas* without a further specification; yet, even in this early work he somehow distinguishes: "nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat, quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium" (I 20-21). Since in the *Acta seu disputatio contra Fortunatum manichaeum* (in: *Oeuvres de St. Augustin* 17, p. 164 and 176-178) the main question is, once again, "Unde malum?", Augustine concentrates on bad internal habits (which he considers to be *poena* for sinful acts). He navigates between two cliffs. On the one hand he demonstrates "Quod liberum arbitrium si non dedisset Deus, iudicium puniendi nullum iustum esse posset (...) Quia qui non voluntate peccat, non peccat. Hoc arbitrio omnibus apertum esse atque perspicuum. (...) peccatum non esse ubi non est liberum arbitrium" (164). On the other hand: "(...) in nostris actionibus antequam consuetudine aliqua implemur, liberum arbitrium habemus faciendi aliquid, vel non faciendi (...)"; whereas after having committed a sin "consuetudo facta in carne" (178), a habit which predisposes the *arbitrium* to certain choices. A summary of Augustine's opposition to the Manichee Fortunatus can be found in *Contra Fortunatum* 22: the distinction between two bad *naturae* is reduced to that of two bad *voluntates nostrae*. For a wider setting of this discovery of the *consuetudo*, see P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo*, 149-150 (a few examples of such habits are given in 350-351). Cf. Wetzel's biographical analysis of Augustine's development in which he observes the same shift of emphasis (no natures, no acts, but mental customs; *op. cit.* 86, 96). For *consuetudines* originated from the *arbitrium*, cf. also *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* II, q. Exodi, q. 18; *De patientia* XVII; OI III 112.

⁵⁹ See for instance LA III.

bad, they severely obscure man's knowing and willing of the good and of God⁶⁰.

Newly ordained as a bishop Augustine not only wrote *De libero arbitrio* III and his last anti-Manichaean works, but he also intensely studied Paul. In this time the ideas which we just sketched were maintained and deepened by thoughts on sin and grace. In an earlier study, in 394, on Paul's letter to the Romans Augustine already adhered to the theory that God's grace is responsible for the accomplishment of all good things in the Christian life, since He 'makes' the good will (the good dispositions) and all that is required for the external performance of deeds. Yet, the initiative to willing and doing good things — which initiative is called believing — comes from man's side⁶¹. A few years later, in his *Ad Simplicianum* (396) he proceeds to the idea that grace operates faith as well. He will not abandon this insight anymore. Even the initiative to goodness is placed in God's hands. Does this take human freedom out of human hands? Augustine cannot mean this: he still presupposes the *liberum arbitrium* to exist and to exercise its freedom of consent. So on the one hand God realizes faith in us; on the other hand man can consent or dissent. Augustine's central concern, however, is what the *arbitrium* factually is able to do in the entire field of inner impulses⁶². He has become convinced that the answer must be: not much, considering its motivational

⁶⁰ In his *Retractationes* Augustine says that the ideas of LA are compatible with those developed in his anti-pelagian works if his analyses of LA are seen as describing Adam's case before the Fall. We noticed that in LA he hardly distinguishes between Adam and everybody else; we also noticed that he hardly distinguishes between *voluntas* and *liberum arbitrium* in that work — I think that these two things are connected. My thesis would be: What is stated of the 'will' in LA must be maintained for the (will of the) *liberum arbitrium* in Augustine's later works, not for the *voluntas*. Restricted in this way the statements on free will in connection to foreknowledge apply to all men in all states. When the *voluntates* are largely perverted (that is, basically turned away from God), then, though direction to the good remains a real possibility in itself for the *arbitrium*, it is practically unable to re-direct itself to that for which it is made.

⁶¹ See *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Ep. Apostoli ad Romanos*, 44; cf. *De sermone Domini in monte I*, 18/55.

⁶² See S I, Q. 2, 21: "Liberum voluntatis arbitrium plurimum valet; imo vero est quidem, sed in venundatis sub peccato (*Rom* 7:14) quid valet? (...) Quis habet in potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo ejus voluntas moveatur ad fidem? (...) voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occurrerit quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo potest: hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in homine potestate". For this shift in Augustine's thought, see P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo*, 152-154.

complexities largely permeated by sin which are often long standing. From the very beginning of his goodness man is dependent on God⁶³.

Against the background of this view he began writing his *Confessions*. Especially in book VIII Augustine describes his conversion as a breakthrough in the struggle of two competing dispositions. For our argumentation it is important to note that in this description Augustine uses the term *tota voluntas* in two different meanings. He depicts himself as a man divided between conflicting *voluntates* until one of them is chosen; by virtue of this choice the entire will which was divided into many, becomes one⁶⁴. So choice, the specific act of the *arbitrium*, makes man's will whole again: apparently this root of his willing is especially identified with his 'centre', which is 'one'. In the same context he speaks of his soul which cannot perform *tota voluntate*, since it is torn between the desire (*voluntas*) for the eternal and the desire for temporal goods (so again between options: there is choice). In this context it is not the root of willing but the entire complex of desires or dispositions (*voluntates*) which should be 'one' in order to possess a 'complete' or integrated 'self'. Again, the internal twofold structure of willing appears.

Augustine's view in his seventies is not fundamentally different from his view in his forties. In *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (428) he refers to *Ad Simplicianum*. In the latter work he already revised a view which he had held earlier (a view which was used against him by the Semipelagians). He adds that he experienced this insight as a revelation⁶⁵. In *De gratia et libero arbitrio* and its covering letters (426-427) he endorses a view which is very much in line with *Ad Simplicianum*. GLA opens with a twofold statement: Grace cannot be defended in such a way that the power of consent or judgement is eliminated; nor can that power

⁶³ M. E. ALFLATT, *The development of involuntary sin in St. Augustine*, in: *Revue des études augustinienes* 20 (1974) 115-118 discerns the same development and gives a more detailed analysis of *Contra Fortunatum*; but for the systematic part of his analysis, cf. the precise criticism of O'CONNELL, *art. cit.*

⁶⁴ *Confessiones* VIII 24: "donec eligatur unum, quo feratur tota voluntas una, quae in plures dividebatur". It is also remarkable that Augustine's experiences his breakthrough as the emergence (and liberation) of his *liberum arbitrium* which already was there, but was wrapped in passionate *voluntates* (*Confessiones* IX 1). By the way: converting the *arbitrium* is something different from converting the *voluntates*! They are connected however. For understanding *conversio* the distinction of *arbitrium* and *voluntas* seems to be crucial too. Cf. e.g. PESCH & PETERS, *op. cit.*, 29.

⁶⁵ PS IV 8: "quam mihi Deus in hac quaestione solvenda, cum ad episcopum Simplicianum, sicut dixi, scriberem, revelavit"; cf. *Retractationes* II, 27.

be defended in such a way that grace becomes superfluous⁶⁶. We have seen how he unfolds this insight⁶⁷.

(3) We now turn to Augustine's middle-period. We have already observed that the breakthrough of the insight that we need freedom and grace came more than ten years before the Pelagian controversy. We just observed that this insight was resumed some ten years after the official condemnation of Pelagianism⁶⁸. In between, but still before the discus-

⁶⁶ The covering letter to GLA, *epistula* 214 (*Ad Valentinum abbatem epistula prima*) indicates the same two groups are indicated when Augustine says that by faith "neque negetis gratiam Dei, neque liberum arbitrium sic defendatis, ut a Dei gratia separetis, tamquam sine illa vel cogitare aliquid vel agere secundum Deum ulla ratione possimus, quod omnino non possumus" (2). So again we find two poles or cliffs, which reoccur in the opening ch. of GLA: On the one hand, the Scriptures teach "et liberum hominis est arbitrium et gratia Dei, sine cuius adiutorio liberum arbitrium nec converti potest ad Deum, nec proficere in Deum" (6). God offers the law as something to be kept and He judges persons by their deeds: two things which would not make sense if men did not have a *liberum arbitrium*. On the other hand, the *arbitrium* is not able to acquire knowledge and wisdom without the help of grace (7). In sum, as formulated by *Ep.* 215 (the second letter which is addressed to Valentine and accompanies GLA), Augustine is sure of the Catholic faith "quae neque liberum arbitrium negat sive in vitam malam sive in bonam, neque tantum ei tribuit, ut sine Dei gratia valeat aliquid (...)" (4). Cf. also note 28. In some other texts Augustine marks his position over against the same two possible aberrations, see *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* LIII 8; *Sermo* 348A; *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* I 47; *Contra Iulianum* IV. In fact, in his anti-Manichean works Augustine departs from the first error, which annihilates the *liberum arbitrium*; in his anti-Pelagian works he departs from the second one, which overestimates the *liberum arbitrium* (for this second position, see e.g. *Retractationes* I 9: against the Pelagians "qui sic asserunt voluntatis arbitrium, ut gratiae Dei non relinquunt locum", and *Epistula* 175: "extollendo liberum arbitrium nullum relinquunt locum gratiae Dei, qua christiani sumus". In DEP II 1-5 Augustine shows that he is fully aware of standing in the middle, opposing to two sides, the Manichean and Pelagian distortion of the truth. Not only underestimation, but also overestimation will lead to an 'inflation' of the *liberum arbitrium* in the end (cf. OI III 122; the law as well as the *arbitrium* cannot give love to me, and yet love does not inflate, but erects it, makes it upright again).

⁶⁷ See esp. section II of this article.

⁶⁸ Many scholars have noticed that Augustine already had developed his view on grace in its basic lines before the Pelagian controversy. Thus W. S. BABCOCK, *Augustine's interpretation of Romans (AD 394-396)*, in: *Augustinian studies* 10 (1979) 55-74; E. PORTALIE was one of the first scholars who noted the importance of *Ad Simplicianum* for Augustine's development, in his article (*saint*) *Augustin*, in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, I 2268-2472, Paris 1902 (transl. in R. J. BASTIAN, *A guide to the thought of St. Augustine*, Chicago 1960, see esp. p. 182, 224); J. WETZEL basically agrees with this view, see his *The recovery of free agency in the theology of St. Augustine*, in: *Harvard theological review* 80 (1987) 110-111, cf. his *Augustine and the limits of virtue*, op.cit. 165 f.; J. BALL, *art. cit.* 406-407; A. SAGE, *art. cit.* 19; J. RIST, *art. cit.*, 240; A. MCGRATH, *Iustitia Dei*, p. 24; O. H. PESCH & A. PETERS, *op. cit.*, 19.

sion could become rather violent, the same insight is formulated in a work as well-balanced as *De spiritu et littera* (412)⁶⁹. Here Augustine says that God's grace does a range of things for man without man: from giving incentives to giving the will to believe. However, in doing all this grace gives man the opportunity to accept or reject its gifts. God's grace does not compel, it discloses (liberates) the right insight and — especially — the pleasure to will the good: grace persuades (*suasio*)⁷⁰. Again we can

⁶⁹ "Liberum ergo arbitrium evacuumus per gratiam? Absit: sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus. Sicut enim lex per fidem (*Rom* 3:31), sic liberum arbitrium per gratiam non evacuitur, sed statuitur" (*De spiritu et littera* XXX 52, CSEL LX). Again two poles: the first one is (see esp. XXXIII 57) that the *liberum arbitrium* is a natural (that is: created) reality which also plays an important part in God's redemptive work (if there would be no *arbitrium*, the law could not be addressed to man). The second pole: God's grace 'has' to do many things if a *bona voluntas* is factually going to exist. Grace gives incentives, "sive extrinsecus (...) sive intrinsecus (...), sed consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est. His ergo modis quando Deus agit cum anima rationali, ut ei credat; neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio, si nulla sit suasio vel vocatio cui credat; profecto et ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in homine, et in omnibus misericordia ejus praevenit nos: consentire autem vocationi Dei, vel ab ea dissentire, sicut dixi, propriae voluntatis est. (...) Accipere quippe et habere anima non potest dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi consentiendo: ac per hoc quid habeat, et quid accipiat, Dei est: accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est", XXXIV 60 (240-241). It is noteworthy that in this important passage consenting is connected with *voluntas*, not with *liberum arbitrium*. *Voluntas* usually refers to 'will' in general; when it had to be indicated more accurately, the (will of the) *arbitrium* must be meant. On the other hand, the factual consent of the *arbitrium* is strongly influenced by the inclinations (*voluntates*) which a human being already has, so for consenting or dissenting not only volitions but also dispositions are decisive and therefore *voluntas* can justifiably refer to both. For an accurate analysis of this fragment and its position in Augustine's entire theology, cf. LÉON-DUFOUR, *art.cit.*

⁷⁰ See the last footnote; the aspect of persuasion, incentive, resuscitation, encouragement, warning etc. recurs throughout Augustine's works, see e.g. *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* III 112: "ut a captivitate liberata, ad liberatorem suum liberati suavitate amoris, non servili amaritudine timoris adtrahatur". Especially Huftier and Léon-Dufour stress this element (e.g. Huftier: "Loin de contraindre, la grâce libère de l'intérieur; mais elle attend toujours, pour produire son efficacité, le consentement de la volonté; elle permet à la volonté de dire oui, elle l'y incite, mais sans jamais la violenter" [p. 258]). This element of persuasion has to be specified, since Augustine often repeats that there is only one kind of incentive which is convincing in the good sense: love, which is accompanied by joy or even pleasure (e.g. "non obligatio, sed delectatio, quanto fortius nos dicere debemus, trahi hominem ad Christum, qui delectatur veritate, delectatur beatitudine, delectatur justitia, delectatur sempiterna vita, quod totum Christum est?", *In Joannem* XXVI 4-5). Huftier carefully observes the link between effectiveness and power on the one hand and precisely love and joy on the other hand: "La délectation, qui n'est pas antécédente à l'action, nous donne le pouvoir de consentir effectivement au bien" (*art. cit.* 256).

conclude that there must be an important distinction between the human power of consent and anything else which we commonly call 'willing'⁷¹.

At the same time that Augustine composed *De spiritu et littera* he wrote *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* in which we can find the most explicit confirmation of the view that according to him the *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* are distinct realities. The former is characterized as having an alternativity (which can be misused), the latter is specified as good will which cannot be misused only if God gives this inability to misuse it. Both are given to man by God, but the first as a natural good (a central part of the basis of man's nature created by God) and the second as a grace-given good (which is added to that basis)⁷².

Another important and nuanced work from the middle period is the *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* (420-421) which can be seen as the opening work of the debate with Julian of Eclanum that dominates the second decade of Augustine's anti-Pelagian campaign⁷³. Augustine opens the first book of this work with Julian's statement that the Catholics, just like the Manichees, hold that the *liberum arbitrium* is destroyed since Adam. Augustine's reply is a rhetorical question: "But which one of us did say that the *liberum arbitrium* has vanished from the human race by the sin of the first man?" It is the *libertas* possessed by Adam which is lost to all later men⁷⁴. It is, in fact, the power to live well, which has to be

⁷¹ Augustine often uses the words *motus* (impulse, 'Regung', 'neiging') and *consensus* ('consent', 'acceptance', 'instemming') when he analyzes the case of Paul in *Romans* 7 (after 393 Augustine regularly comments on this Bible-text), see for instance DEP I 20 — again an indication of the distinction between disposition and volition, *voluntas* and *arbitrium*.

⁷² The most clear formulation of the question of the relation between *voluntas* and *arbitrium* can be found in *De Spiritu et littera* 57: "utrum voluntas illa qua credimus, etiam ipsa Dei donum sit, an ex illo naturaliter insito libero adhibeatur arbitrio". Its most clear answer: "Quapropter nisi obtineamus non solum voluntatis arbitrium quod huc atque illuc liberum flectitur, atque in naturalibus bonis est, quibus et male uti potest — sed etiam voluntatem bonam, quae jam in eis bonis est quorum esse usus non potest malus nisi ex Deo nobis esse non posse, nescio quemadmodum defendamus quod dictum est: 'quid enim habes quod non accepisti' (1 Cor 4:7)", *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum ad Marcellinum* II 30.

⁷³ For the Pelagian controversy, see esp. G. BONNER, *St. Augustine of Hippo. Life and controversies*, Norwich 1963¹, 1986², 312-394. For Julian see F. REFOULÉ, *Julien d'Éclane, théologien et philosophe*, in: *Recherches de Science religieuse* LII (1964) 42-84, 233-247; M. LAMBERIGTS, *Julian of Aclanum: a plea for a good creator*, in: *Augustiniana*, 38 (1988) 5-24; and P. BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo*, 381-398.

⁷⁴ "Quis autem nostrum dicat quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de genere humano? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa, quae in paradiso fuit (...) nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per ipsum peccent maxime omnes (...)", DEP I 5). Cf. DEP I 29: Augustine agrees with the Pelagians that

denied of the *arbitrium*⁷⁵. The Pelagians assign too much power to the *arbitrium*, and by promoting it in this way they actually bring it down⁷⁶.

VI. A RECAPITULATION OF AUGUSTINE'S DEVELOPMENT

Is it possible to form an integrated picture of the basic ideas on human free will as emerging from Augustine's development? Augustine often explicitly says that the *liberum arbitrium* is created by God⁷⁷; so it is something essentially positive. He has quite a few statements which clearly and explicitly state that the *liberum arbitrium* has remained after the fall⁷⁸. As far as I know he only once says that it has been lost after the fall; and this statement, in the *Enchiridion*, must be corrected by its context⁷⁹. The texts do not give evidence for the supposition that Augus-

"liberum arbitrium in omnibus esse naturaliter nec Adae peccato perire potuisse" if it does not compromise grace; the same is conceded and demanded in IV 12.

⁷⁵ DEP I 29: "(...) quid est quod iste libero arbitrio vult bene vivendi tribuere *potestatem*, cum haec *potestas* non detur nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum (...)". Also see DEP I 6: "Quae potestas nisi detur a Deo, nulla esse potest ex libero arbitrio (...)"; and II 17: Pelagius states that "etiamsi gratiae defuerit adiutorium, potest, quamvis difficiliter, impleri bonum per liberum arbitrium". In fact, this power is not just lost by the Fall, man never possessed it.

⁷⁶ DEP I 5 and I 8. Cf. J. BALL, *art. cit.* 412: "Il ne reproche pas à Julien de revendiquer le pouvoir de choisir; sans celui-ci, bien sûr, il n'y a plus ni responsabilité, ni mérite, ni démerite. Mais il lui reproche d'exagérer ce pouvoir". Also see from the same years *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II 8 (ed. *Oeuvres Augustiniennes* 23): "*Non liberum negamus arbitrium*, sed 'si vos Filii liberavit', ait veritas, 'tunc vere liberi eritis' (*Joh* 8:36)".

⁷⁷ See e.g. *De spiritu et littera* III 5: "Nos autem dicimus humanam voluntatem sic divinitus adjuvari ad faciendam justitiam, ut praeter quod creatus est homo cum libero arbitrio voluntatis, praeterque doctrinam qua ei praecipitur quemadmodum vivere debeat, accipiat Spiritum Sanctum, quo fiat in animo ejus delectatio (...)".

⁷⁸ See quotation of DEP, note 73. Cf. also *Expositio epistolae ad Galatas* 46; *Epistula* 157 ("neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tollitur, qui iuvatur, sed ideo iuvatur, quia non tollitur"); *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* V, q. Deuteronomii, q. 15 ("non enim aufert, sed adiuvat bonae voluntatis arbitrium"); *Expositio quar. prop. ex ep. ad Romanos* 37 ("sed cavendum, ne quis arbitretur his verbis [*sc.* of the apostle Paul] auferre nobis liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quod non est"). Again and again Augustine repeats his main thesis: the *arbitrium* remains, but does not have the power of factually consenting to the good nor of effecting its good consents; see e.g. *De bono viduitatis* 17.

⁷⁹ I checked all Augustine's statements on *liberum arbitrium* and *voluntas* on CETEDOC, *Library of Christian Latin texts on CD-Rom*, Brepols publishers, 1991. If a scholar wants to show that Augustine denies the existence of the *arbitrium* after the Fall, he usually quotes *Enchiridion* IX 30: "Sicut enim qui se occidit, utique vivendo se occidit, sed se occidendo non vivit, nec se ipsum potest resuscitare: ita cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, victore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrium (...)". In this text Augustine cannot mean, however, that the *arbitrium* is really lost or does not exist anymore, since: (1) This

tine became more pessimistic in this respect as he grew older. The younger Augustine could be pessimistic as well; for instance in LA III we can read a sentence which almost literally seems to state that the *arbitrium* (as the faculty to choose between good or bad) does not exist anymore⁸⁰.

sentence is immediately followed by a description of the state of addiction or servitude, not of extermination. (2) In this and the next chapters Augustine does not say that since the *arbitrium* does not exist anymore, man cannot imagine having merited grace, but only that man is not free to do something good by his *arbitrium* (usually he says: human beings prove the existence of their *arbitrium* because of the fact that they sin — thus, the only point he wants to make is: the *liberum arbitrium* exists, but it is factually involved in serving the bad and cannot break this bond by its proper forces). (3) *Enchiridion* XXVIII 107 uses exactly the same image (that of suicide) without making the loss of the *arbitrium* the clue of the similarity — instead, Augustine says that the mercy of God liberates the *arbitrium* from the servitude of sin and death ("post illam ruinam major est misericordia Dei, quando et ipsum arbitrium liberandum est a servitute cui dominatur cum morte peccatum"). (4) In *ibid.* 105, Augustine states that Adam, if he had not sinned, would have become incapable of sinning, "nec ideo carebit arbitrio": so even the state of "non posse peccare", which will be the eschatological state, does not entail an elimination of the *arbitrium*, on the contrary — would it then be lost in the mean-time and re-given or re-created in a more literal sense by grace? (5) The *Enchiridion* was written when the discussion on nature, freedom and grace had attained a more brutal form in discussion with Julian of Eclanum; nevertheless, Augustine remained peaceful and critical-nuanced (MAUSBACH, *op. cit.* 18-19, on the *Opus imperfectum*: "Es gibt kaum eine polemische Schrift in der Weltliteratur, die den Argumenten des Gegners so ehrlich und weitherzig Raum gönnt, wie Augustins letztes Werk gegen Julian"). In the OI Augustine repeats several times that he does not deny the existence of the *arbitrium* after the Fall; he only affirms that it is 'factually' bound by the options of sin.

⁸⁰ At the end of *De libero arbitrio* III (III 52, ed. THIMME p. 317) the state of man after the Fall is pictured. Augustine proceeds with an important sentence which can be translated in two ways (for the following analysis I am indebted to Dr. E. Dekker). The Latin reads: "Relinquitur ergo ut haec poena iusta de damnatione hominis veniat. *Nec mirandum est quod vel ignorando non habet arbitrium liberum voluntatis ad eligendum quod recte faciat, vel resistente carnali consuetudine, quae violentia mortalis successionis quodam modo naturaliter inolevit, videat quid recte faciendum sit et velit nec possit implere.* Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima (...). Nam sunt re vera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas". There are two possible distinct translations (esp. depending on what grammatical subject the sentence has): (1) "Man darf sich nicht darüber wundern, dass er infolge seiner Unwissenheit keine freie Willensentscheidung hat, das Rechte auszuwählen, oder dass er infolge des Widerstandes der fleischlichen Gewohnheit, die durch den Zwang der ererbten Todverfallenheit gewissermassen zur zweiten Natur geworden ist, das Rechte zwar sieht und auch will, aber nicht vollbringen kann" (THIMME, 317; the last part of the sentence has not been correctly translated, it must read: "das Rechte zwar sieht, aber weder will noch kann vollbringen"). (2) "It is not very surprising that the free judgement of the will either is not such with respect to choosing that it chooses in the right way, or — because of the carnal habits which have become second nature by virtue of the compulsion of mortal transmission — it does discern what it should do, but is neither willing nor able to accomplish it" (transl. is mine).

On the other hand, the old Augustine can say explicitly, for instance in OI⁸¹, CG⁸² and DP⁸³, that the *arbitrium* has remained even after the Fall. Augustine may have become more pessimistic about the fact of just how deep the servitude of the *arbitrium* may be.

What, then, is the *liberum arbitrium*? It is the freedom of judgement which cannot be lost⁸⁴; it belongs to human nature as created by

As an aside: it is remarkable that in *De natura et gratia* 67 exactly the same sentence recurs. Did Augustine copy it later on? Even if the first translation is the most plausible one, then the point is, in my eyes, not that a human being does not have a *liberum arbitrium* anymore, but that the *arbitrium* is not capable of factually choosing the things which are good to choose. Habits of the inner life are 'preselectors' of man's choices, because those dispositions or cognitions which would enable the right choice are missing ("non habet (...) ad eligendum"; cf. a similar expression: "quia et liberum arbitrium ad diligendum Deum primi peccati granditate perdidimus", *Epistula* 217: the factual voluntary love for God has been lost). The loss or 'missing' which are meant appear as *ignorantia* and *difficultas*: a lack or a blockage in insight and affection.

⁸¹ "Hoc enim restat in ista mortali vita libero arbitrio, non ut impleat homo iustitiam cum voluerit, sed ut se supplicii pietate convertat ad eum cuius dono eam possit implere", S I, 1, 14. Although it is true that Augustine does say in this sentence that the *liberum arbitrium* remains, the point of his remark is that the *arbitrium* is that faculty by which all people want to be (and should become) happy. This is stated over against a notion of the *arbitrium*'s freedom as the possibility of freely doing good or bad ('freely' meaning here that it can undisturbedly do whatever it likes since the options would be equal); Augustine replies by stating what it is meant to do: to discern-and-will, to consent to the good. Weismann, to whom I owe this quotation, does not notice this (*art. cit.* 110), so that he takes Augustine to say more than he in fact does.

⁸² "Liberum arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere", CG I 2. Cf. CG VI 9: when someone sins again and says "Non accepi", then must be answered: "acceptum gratiam Dei suo in malum libero amisit arbitrio" does not mean that the *arbitrium* is lost, but that the grace which it received is lost by the *arbitrium* which turned to evil.

⁸³ "Non quia credere vel non credere non est in arbitrio voluntatis humanae, sed in electis praeparatur voluntas a Deo", *De dono perseverantiae* 10. In this sentence Augustine does not say that belief or non-belief is not up to the *liberum arbitrium*. He says that his point does not concern belief or non-belief, but the nature of the *voluntas* with respect to grace.

⁸⁴ Many scholars agree that this freedom is maintained by Augustine during his entire theological career; see for instance J. MAUSBACH, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus*, 25 f.f.; LÉON-DUFOUR, *art. cit.*; J. BALL, *art. cit.*, p. 410: "il précise que la liberté perdue, ce n'est pas le pouvoir de choisir entre le bien et le mal, mais c'est la splendide rectitude originelle de la liberté exempte de la concupiscence, telle qu'Adam l'avait reçue. Le libre arbitre subsiste après la chute et sans lui l'homme serait incapable de commettre le péché"; and M. HUFTIER, *art. cit.*, p. 203: "Il est certain que notre libre arbitre est identiquement le même que celui d'Adam. Mais il se trouve néanmoins dans un conditionnement bien différent". J. WETZEL argues for the interpretation that Augustine does not think the freedom of consent or dissent cannot be lost (*op. cit.*, esp. 197 ff.).

God⁸⁵. The *arbitrium* comprises (a) a faculty of choice or consent⁸⁶ in which two potencies closely cooperate (intellect and will), and (b) a desire for happiness — for the good — for God⁸⁷.

⁸⁵ See a.o. LA II 18, 47: Augustine says that God created the *arbitrium* as well as the *voluntas*; S, Q. I 14 and II 21; *De spiritu et littera* 57-58: "Prius igitur illud dicamus (...) quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum a Creatore animae rationali, illa media vis est, quae vel ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest. (...) Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, et in agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes justissime judicentur". Cf. *Enarrationes in psalmos* 31, 16: "Cum libero arbitrio me creavit Deus; si peccavi, ego peccavi... ego, ego, non fatum, non fortuna, non diabolus; qui nec ipse coegit, sed ego persuadenti consensi" (cf. *En. in ps.* 110, 2 in which Augustine also says that the *arbitrium* is created); *Contra Gaudentium* I 21: "Datum est ergo homini quando creatus est, liberum arbitrium; sed ut si esset malefaciens, fieret patiens". In several places Augustine says that the *liberum arbitrium*, which can be misused when it consents to evil, is also required for its intended use, consenting to the good: "tale est, ut sine illo recte vivere nequeamus" (*Retractationes* I 9). Sometimes he discusses the question whether God had to create it in men (as in LA II); his answer is affirmative. Thus, the *arbitrium* as the faculty of choice is not only created by God, but also respected in His work of salvation. If we combine this with another statement to which Augustine remains faithful throughout his work ("natura humana non malum est, quia natura est", *OI* III, 206), we can conclude that the *liberum arbitrium* belongs to human nature ("Naturam et liberum arbitrium rectissime bona confiteris esse Dei opera", *OI* V 56), to that basis of our being that cannot become bad in itself. The *arbitrium*'s freedom of consent, then, is an essential property of man.

⁸⁶ As we have seen choice is an essential element of the *liberum arbitrium* (see above, II (2); also see e.g. *De 83 quaestionibus*, q. 24: "Est igitur et peccatum et recte factum in libero voluntatis arbitrio", cf. quotations of footnotes 16-17, 61, 73-74. Cf. *De gestis Pelagii* XXXV 65: "propriam voluntatem habeat unusquisque aut facere aliquid aut non facere"; *Contra Faustum* XXII 22: "peccandi vel non peccandi"; *Retractationes* I 26: "utrum et peccatum et recte factum in libero sit voluntatis arbitrio"; *ibid.* "duo ergo libri sunt, in quorum secundo disputatum est de libero arbitrio voluntatis siue ad malum operandum siue ad bonum". Cf. PESCH & PETERS, *Einführung*, 177-178: "'Freiheit' (libertas) und 'freier Wille' (liberum arbitrium) ist in Orange augustinisch und das heisst hier: im biblischen Sinne von Freiheit (von der Sünde und für Gott) gemeint. Der anthropologisch-psychologische Unterschied zwischen *Freiheit* und *Wahlvermögen* ist noch unklar bzw. bleibt ausser betracht". It is true that the element of choice is not stressed, but it is already there.

⁸⁷ To be more precise: all men want to become happy; and therefore they need to become good. Man's will or desire to become happy is called an immutable aspect of his nature, so also an essential property: "Immutabilis autem, cum qua homo creatus est et creatur, illa libertas est voluntatis, qua beati esse omnes volumus et nolle non possumus; sed haec ut beatus sit quisque non sufficit, nec ut vivat recte", *OI* VI 12; cf. *Enchiridion* 31, CD XIV 11. And this will to be happy is, just like the will for truth and justice (which Huftier, *art. cit.* 211, calls 'inadmissible' too), closely connected with the *liberum arbitrium*: "Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quaerimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt, quae ad beatitudinem ducunt", *ibid.* VI 11; cf. *ibid.* VI 26. This immutable desire which cannot be lost does not

When Augustine states, within this framework, that the *liberum arbitrium* is or has become unfree, the point of such a statement must be, to my view, that the *arbitrium* is impeded in its action, or that its choice is more or less 'predisposed' by cognitive and affectionate dispositions which are inherited or have already been acquired (*voluntates*)⁸⁸. The power to consent or dissent, as the subject-side of the *arbitrium*, is presupposed. Seen from its object-side the *arbitrium* depends on dispositions for the outcome of its factual consent; if these dispositions are bad, the *arbitrium* easily or even unavoidably chooses the wrong thing. If it wants to choose the right thing (that which is true and good), it has to struggle with the dispositional cognitions and affections which the *arbitrium* practically may be unable to discern and overcome⁸⁹.

VII. AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF WILL: A CONCLUSION

(1) Augustine's analyses of freedom and grace can be valued as the discovery and elaboration of the insight that there must be an extensive and important 'middle-area' between (accidental) human acts of judgement or consent and the created (essential) nature of the human mind. We can call it the area of 'accidental nature', the area of dispositions and inclinations. This field of internal habit-forming has an impact on our power of consent, although never a deterministic one. This dimension of human nature largely is the complex 'sediment' of free human volitions, since even if consent may not be given by every man in full freedom (*libertas*) — because of poor internal and external circumstances — at least a completely free consent was given by a first man in better earlier circumstances. The complex of habits itself predisposes the *arbitrium*'s subsequent volitions; it restricts its options. This dimension of the soul or mind has an accidental nature, even though some of the inclinations can turn out

include the power to accomplish the desired: "per suam potestatem beatus esse solus Deus potest" (*De Genesi contra Manicheos* II 24). Man has to receive it. Since happiness in concreto consists in communion with God, we may conclude that the desire for God is also an essential property of man's nature, belonging to his *liberum arbitrium*. Huftier notices how intensely Augustinian definitions of the *arbitrium* are determined by this desire: "la volonté est faite pour permettre à une créature raisonnable de s'orienter vers le bien consciemment et sous sa propre responsabilité" (270). The openness to the good and God, or "se laisser orienter et fortifier par la grâce", is something which remains after the Fall (p. 277). Cf. note 25 and 26.

⁸⁸ As an example see the discussion of the quotation from *De libero arbitrio* III 52, above (note 80).

⁸⁹ M. HUFTIER, *art. cit.* 279, and H. BARTH, *Die Freiheit der Entscheidung im Denken Augustins*, Basel 1935, 149-150, come to a very similar conclusion.

to be characterized by a degree of factual unchangeability. We might create a spectrum in which, in the case of bad dispositions, we can see a variety from small vices to original sins.

(2) Now, when we turn to the will and its freedom in particular, Augustine appears to include a distinction between two kinds of 'will': (a) One is a constant potency which can discern and consent; the second kind (b) is an inclination which can be stronger or weaker. The first power, the *liberum arbitrium* has two structural aspects: knowing and willing; the latter aspect actually is the source of its specific freedom, which is the freedom to consent or dissent. The second power, usually called *voluntas* is composed of dispositions, attachments and preferences (in which affectionate and cognitive components can be recognized as well⁹⁰). This power can be gained and lost in many degrees (as strength and duration of willing vary) as well as forms (as the objects of its willing vary).

The *arbitrium*, as man's central address, rules his inner life, but for the performance of its judgement or consent it is dependent on the *voluntates* in a special way. We may summarize the distinction in Augustine's personal words: 'We do not say that by Adam's sin free judgement (*liberum arbitrium*) has been lost from human nature. [We only say] that it is sufficient for sinning in men who are subjected to Satan; that it is not sufficient, however, for good and faithful living unless by God's grace human willing itself (*voluntas*) is liberated and supported for doing, speaking and thinking whatever is good"⁹¹.

If the distinction has been analyzed correctly, there must be a twofold 'can' and a twofold 'being free' as well — one of which is related to the faculty of free judgement, whereas the other one is related by the complex reality of dispositions⁹². Seen from its subject-side the *arbitrium*

⁹⁰ See e.g. *De spiritu et littera* in which the aspect of *doctrina* (which is conveyed by the law of the Old Testament) is distinguished from the aspect of *delectatio* (which is given by the Holy Spirit). The first aspect can be without the second, but not conversely. Thoughts as well as desires have to be given by God. In *volunta(te)s* they are usually taken together, as inclinations. Cf. H. BARTH, *op. cit.* 94: "Der Wille vertritt die Bewegungen der Seele in ihrer Totalität. 'Voluntas est quippe in omnibus [motibus]; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt' [CD XIV 6]".

⁹¹ DEP II 10: "Peccato Adae arbitrium liberum de hominum natura perisse non dicimus; sed ad peccandum valere in hominibus subditis diabolo; ad bene autem pieque vivendum non valere, nisi ipsa voluntas hominis Dei gratia fuerit liberata et ad omne bonum actionis, sermonis, cogitationis adiuta".

⁹² Compare R. J. O'CONNELL, *art. cit.* 28: "Augustine means us to see that we can lack (not 'lose') the power of free choice by reason either of ignorance, or of difficulty, or of both: but those are two distinct deficiencies, and must be dealt with as such, as Augustine himself consistently does". In my opinion this lacking resp. losing has to be

can always consent or dissent; seen from its object-side it is factually dominated by the influence of the dispositions⁹³.

Liberum arbitrium as well as *voluntates* are created by God. A basis of *voluntas* is created, and can be extended in a good way (with the help of grace) or in a bad way (without the help of grace); this *voluntas* can also be re-created⁹⁴. The *arbitrium* too is created, but cannot increase or decrease; yet it can be used well (if it consents to what is true and good) or misused (if it consents to what is false and bad). It is a crucial question whether this unfolding is or is not done by way of respecting and consulting the *liberum arbitrium*. We noticed Augustine's silence, and found some good reasons for this silence. Yet, considering the majority of his statements his answer must be: God respects free judgement for all human conditions or states⁹⁵.

attributed to different faculties: we can lack the *voluntas* and its *libertas*, but cannot lose the *arbitrium* and its *liberum esse*.

⁹³ Of course, the options of the *arbitrium* are also restricted by facts and structures of the outside-world — the world of the body and the society. Augustine hardly discusses them (we can guess his reasons), neither do I (because of this article's theme). The options formed by human dispositions and abilities, by which man is inclined to will/think/feel and perform only certain things, are a special case of 'objects', since in those objects of the *liberum arbitrium* the *arbitrium* is always confronted, somehow, with something man already 'wills', i.e. is inclined to think/will/feel/perform. In the outside world this can only be said of a limited part of the options which are or are not accessible.

⁹⁴ The need for 're-creation' is obvious once we realize the effects of sin. After sinning our *voluntas* is severely compromised so that the *arbitrium* cannot easily re-accept another offering of grace: First, we need to be forgiven (we are somehow depressed by guilt), and second, inner being needs to be 're-enabled' to consent to the good again, since the *mala voluntas* factually inclines us to the bad. The 'bad will' which has come into us has to disappear and a new 'good will' has to be created.

⁹⁵ We could say that the first kind of freedom can be called the 'formal freedom': the power and possibility to consent freely, whereas the second could be called 'material freedom': the power and possibility to realize or effectuate certain objects of consent or dissent. These terms are defined by E. DEKKER and H. VELDHUIS, *De menselijke vrijheid. Een systematische analyse*, in: *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 1993 (this art. will be published in English). The terms 'formal' and 'material' occur for instance in D. Chantepie de la Saussaye's discussion with J. H. Scholten; see LA SAUSSAYE, *Beoordeling van het werk van dr. J. H. Scholten over de leer der Hervormde Kerk*, Utrecht 1885², 299 (here 'kiesvrijheid' is connected with *liberum arbitrium* and 'zedelijke vrijheid' with *libertas*) and in E. BRUNNER, *Der Mensch im Widerspruch*, Zürich 1941, 530, 555; but neither La Saussaye nor Brunner defines them very accurately. From Augustine one must say that the material level not only 'factually' limits the possibilities to realize the options, but also 'factually' limits the options themselves. Augustine usually regards the freedom of judgement (*libertas arbitrii*) in its 'material' dimension, and is silent about its formal dimension. This concentration and contraction is very understandable, since in what we usually call freedom this side of the problem often is the 'central practical issue'. If there

(3) By way of conclusion let us summarize the basic elements of human willing, which Augustine implicitly and explicitly distinguishes. His main distinction is that of *liberum arbitrium* and *volunta(te)s*.

(a) Human beings have a *liberum arbitrium* and keep it even after sinning. It comprises:

- a twofold unity of intellect and will;
- a faculty of choice (judgement, consent);
- a desire for or orientation to the true and good, to man's happiness (which consists in community with God).

(b) As a potency of knowing and willing the *arbitrium* is created and sustained by God; it belongs to the human nature in the strict sense.

(c) All that the *arbitrium* 'wills' is stored in inclinations by God's additional creating grace:

- if it is something good, then it makes man free (then grace meets this consent), yet
- if it is something bad, then it makes unfree or captive (then grace does not support it).

This 'stored willing' is a complex of real forces in man's inner life, a complex of many movements of will and thought (motives).

(d) God does not produce the acts of the *arbitrium* (its volitions-and-cognitions);

(e) The *arbitrium* is in charge of our nature, but its factual power is limited since the 'executive power' is largely formed by the (complex) *voluntas* on which the *arbitrium* depends for its factual consents seen from their object-side.

(f) Apart from the *arbitrium*

- there are more things given 'to' us by way of creation (and as such they are already part of the *arbitrium*'s responsibility);

were not the element of the *liberum arbitrium*, one could call Augustine's "non posse non peccare" a material determinism. The Middle Ages found their way in the direction of a more accurate elaboration of the dimension of the formal as well as the material freedom; see e.g. Bernard of Clairvaux (cf. my art. *Human and divine freedom in the theology of Bernard of Clairvaux*, in: *Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie* 54 (1993) 271-295; and see esp. Duns Scotus (cf. JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Contingentie en vrijheid. Lectura I* 39, ingeleid, vertaald en van commentaar voorzien door A. VOS Jaczn., H. VELDHUIS, A. H. LOOMAN-GRAASKAMP, E. DEKKER en N. W. DEN BOK, Zoetermeer 1992, see esp. 32-36 (an English re-worked edition will be published this spring). Medieval scholars concentrated on the internal structure of the *liberum arbitrium*, esp. the relation between the intellect and the will. Will (*voluntas*) is increasingly limited to the will of the *arbitrium*; for disposition the term *dispositio* or *habitus* is used. The Augustinian distinction between *arbitrium* and *voluntas* often reappears in that of *consensus or nutus* and *motus*.

- there are other things given 'to' us as creatures, and as such they are addressed to our *arbitrium* (like good, or even bad, inclinations which serve to incite us);
- there are other things passed to us by way of procreation (among which original sin) so that the *voluntates* must be distinguished in acquired and inherited inclinations⁹⁶.

In order to respect the consistency of Augustine's entire theory of grace as much as possible — which urges to acknowledge (a)-(b) and (c) — I have inserted (d), in connection with (a), as a more precise statement. The created *arbitrium* is (only) the potency to consent⁹⁷.

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⁹⁶ We may look at this survey from God's side and summarize His 'share' in the entire complex as follows. God creates the *arbitrium* and the *bona(e) volunta(te)s*. Because the latter are added to the former (partly in man's original state, partly after that), only the former activity of God is called creation, while the latter normally is called grace. God does not create the inherited dispositions, but let them be transmitted from parents to children; generally, bad dispositions must have a specific nature since God can only actualize good things.

⁹⁷ Because of this clarification we must say that God creates the acquired *voluntates* in the human soul when the *arbitrium* has consented to good inclinations. A further enquiry after the Augustinian theory of will demands a comparison between the writings on grace and those on the (trinitarian) image of God, esp. *De Trinitate*. The main question will be: Is it possible to identify the *liberum arbitrium* of the former works with the *mens* of the latter? The *memoria*, *intelligentia* and *voluntas* of the *mens* may include, in fact, (aspects of) the *liberum arbitrium* and the *voluntas*. Yet, within the theory of the image too this would raise serious complications — for instance the important distinction, within the *mens*, of *imago* and *similitudo*, or the 'dynamic movement of the mind to' God. We may expect from Augustine's basic thoughts on freedom and grace (as sketched above), that the central distinction we found in his theory of grace will have some parallel in that of the mental trinity in its various forms analyzed by Augustine. The main question must be sharpened by an examination of freedom, which occurs in Augustine's analysis of the *arbitrium*: How exclusive is the emphasis on the *libertas voluntatis* in his trinitarian analyses? Is the *liberum arbitrium* eventually overruled, or sustained? Last but not least: Especially the *Contra Julianum opus imperfectum* deserves a more detailed analysis on freedom and grace.