

THE TRANSFORMATION FROM CORPUS ANIMALE TO CORPUS SPIRITUALE ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE

INTRODUCTION

There will be a transformation from *corpus animale* to *corpus spirituale*. In this article we attempt to show Augustine's explanations or descriptions of the different characteristics of *corpus animale* and of *corpus spirituale*. Special attention is given to the characteristics of the *corpus animale*, in order that we may show later the difference of the transformed resurrection-life body or the *corpus spirituale*. A short evaluation of some relevant literature is included in this introduction.

M. Pontet's unexpected statement in *L'exégèse de S. Augustin Prédicateur* that Augustine seemingly followed the conception of the Fathers who were disciples of the Greek tradition, specifically Hilary of Poitiers and Origen, concerning the risen body of Christ, has been challenged by others. M. Pontet says of Augustine and of these Fathers:

"Saint Augustin croit si réellement à cette Incarnation qu'il n'arrive pas à se représenter la chair du Christ, même ressuscitée et montée aux cieux, comme une chair spirituelle! Sa nature reste physique, et physique sa présence. C'est pourquoi aussi cette présence demeure locale et partant unique. Où est le Christ, né de Marie, crucifié, glorifié? Au ciel, et en tant que tête de l'Eglise il n'est pas ailleurs. En conséquence, dit-il à ses fidèles, adhérez à lui par la charité, poussez vers lui votre *sursum corda* (cf. *In Ps.* 30, *En.* 2, S.1, 10; *Guelf.* 20,2), restez 'sous cette tête', vous qui êtes ses membres et qui vous nourrissez de ce corps dont vous faites partie (cf. *In Jo. Tr.* 27,1). Cette conception de saint Augustin a passé dans la Tradition théologique, qui dans son ensemble admet que le Christ ressuscité possède toujours un corps, un organisme de chair, d'une chair mystérieusement transformée et proche parente de l'esprit. Mais il peut être intéressant d'évoquer ici la Tradition grecque, assez différente. Les Pères grecs, s'appuyant sur l'affirmation paulinienne: 'Seminator corpus animale, surgit corpus spirituale' (*1 Cor.* 15,44), pensaient que le corps ressuscité de Jésus avait été comme absorbé dans la gloire divine. Ils ne l'apercevaient plus comme un solide, comme un bloc à trois dimensions, ayant des membres et des parties extérieurs les uns aux autres. Hilaire leur disciple, qu'une fois de plus nous trouvons meilleur exégète qu'Augustin, disait du Ressuscité qu'il avait été 'transformé en gloire spirituelle' (*In Ps.* 118, CSEL,

[A. ZINGERLE], p. 492; *De Trinitate* 11, 40 et 49. Jérôme, *In Jerem.* 3, 17, PL 24, 818; *In Marcum Tractatus*, in *Anecdota Maredsolana* III, II, p. 356.) [I find this reference incorrect. There is no statement of Jerome on the transformation of Jesus into glory. The possibly applicable statement is: *Ipse enim et in inferno est, et in caelo est*]. Il répétait la pensée d'Origène qui avait écrit: "Jusqu'à la croix ... le Christ a souffert dans sa chair; mais une fois suspendu à la croix, l'économie charnelle a pris fin. Ressuscité des morts, Jésus-Christ est monté au ciel, là où le feu lui a montré son chemin. Aussi l'Apôtre disait-il: 'Si nous avons connu le Christ selon la chair, désormais nous ne le connaissons plus de cette manière'. Car l'holocauste de sa chair, offert par le bois de la croix, a uni la terre au ciel, les choses humaines aux choses divines" (*In Levit. Hom.* 1, 4, PG. 12,410). Saint Augustin pressent bien ce feu de la gloire. À l'occasion il affirme que l'immortalité n'est qu'un autre nom de la spiritualité, que non seulement notre âme doit être brûlée comme un holocauste, mais *notre corps même* (*In Ps.* 50,23). Il a l'air de rejoindre la tradition, mais en fait il lui fausse compagnie. Pour ne s'être pas fait du corps glorieux de Jésus une idée assez spirituelle, il se trouve incapable d'exposer sur la présence eucharistique une synthèse tout à fait cohérente. Il ne voit pas comment Jésus-Christ, dans son humanité, peut être au ciel et sur terre, comment bilocation, une 'multilocation' sont possibles. Et cela parce qu'il se représente le corps du Christ, quoique libéré des contraintes terrestres (*In Ps.* 30, *En.* 2, S. 1, 10), comme un corps placé dans le ciel, de pied en cap si j'ose dire (*In Jo. Tr.* 27, 3; *In Jo. Tr.* 30,1; *Guelf.* 13,2), circonscrit dans ce lieu sublime. Plus familier avec l'exégèse des Pères grecs, il n'est pas douteux qu'il eût poussé plus loin le spiritualisme, et que du coup, parlant du Christ total, il eût proposé du rapport entre la tête et ses membres un schéma moins spatial et moins sujet à certaines objections imaginatives¹.

Here we are not going to discuss this statement in all its aspects. We shall limit ourselves to mentioning that this was challenged and corrected by C. Journet, in his article *Saint Augustin et l'exégèse traditionnelle du 'corpus spirituale'*. Neither shall we give a summary to the whole of Journet's reaction. We shall rather be contented to limit ourselves to pointing out that C. Journet gives a different interpretation of the Greek Fathers and of Augustine concerning the risen body of Christ, with our intention of correcting M. Pontet. Here, therefore, we confine ourselves to the theme of the *corpus spirituale*. According to C. Journet, some Greek Fathers, like John Chrysostom and John Damascene and Hilary, who was a follower of the Greek tradition, believed in the transformation of the *corpus animale* of Christ to a *corpus spirituale* at His resurrection. C. Journet equates these two bodies with *corpus psychikon* and *corpus pneumatikon* respectively². G. Philips summarizes the controversy between M. Pontet

¹ M. PONTET, *L'exégèse de S. Augustin prédicateur*, Paris, Aubier, 1944, p. 413-415.

² C. JOURNET, *Saint Augustin et l'exégèse traditionnelle du 'corpus spirituale'*, in *Augustinus Magister II*, Paris, 1954, p. 882 and 887.

and C. Journet³.

C. Journet says that Origen's position is a deviation from the early doctrine of the Fathers⁴. While some of the Fathers maintain that the actual body will be saved and rise into heaven, whereas the actual body will be deprived of salvation. Concerning Hilary's position, Journet contends that there will be a transformation of the actual body. Journet asserts this on the basis of Hilary's statement which is found in *Tractatus in II Ps.* 41:

"As far as it pleases Him and as He finds it worthy, God will restore the broken bodies, from nothing other than the old ones, and they will be given a fitting splendor, which will come not from another material but from the very same one which they had in the beginning. So that nature may not be destroyed completely by the resurrection of the corruptible bodies into the glory of incorruption, a change will take place, but only of the condition of quality. For it is not a different body, although it will rise into another, since the Apostle says, 'It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption. It is sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory. It is sown in weakness, it will rise in strength. It is sown an animal body, it will rise a spiritual body' (*I Cor.* 15,44). Therefore, a change will take place; but no annihilation will happen. And when what it was rose into what it was not, it did not lose the original, but obtained honor"⁵.

Journet gives another proof taken from *Tractatus in LV Ps.* 12:

"For it is not from a material, which is exterior to all who will rise, that the body is formed, nor is its nature restored from a foreign origin or from external causes; but it is the very same body which rises into perfection with eternal splendor; and it is by change rather than by creation that it becomes new"⁶.

³ G. PHILIPS, *Le mystère du Christ*, in *Augustinus Magister* III, Paris, 1954, p. 214.

⁴ C. JOURNET, *ibid.* p. 883, following F. PRAT's exposition in *Origène*, Paris, 1907, p. 92-94, says on Origen's position: "Impossible de nier ici une déviation de la doctrine antérieure des Pères".

⁵ "Prout enim ei placet, et in conspectu eius dignum est, confracta reparabit, non ex alia aliqua, sed ex veteri atque ipsa originis suae materie speciem illis complaciti sibi decoris impertiens: ut corruptibilium corporum in incorruptionis gloriam resurrectio, non interitu naturam perimat, sed qualitatis conditione demutat. Non enim aliud corpus, quamvis in aliud resurget, Apostolo dicente: 'Seminatur in corruptela, resurget in incorruptela; seminatur in ignominia, resurget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, resurget in virtute, seminatur corpus animale, resurget spirituale (*I Cor.* 15,42-44)'. Fit ergo demutatio, sed non affertur abolitio. Et cum id quod fuit, in id quod non fuit surgit; non amisit originem, sed profecit ad honorem." *Tractatus in 2 Psalmum* 41, PL 9,285-286.

⁶ "Neque enim resurrecturis omnibus ab exteriori materia corpus acquiritur, neque peregrinae originis externarumque causarum natura redhibetur: sed id ipsum in profectum aeternae claritatis emergit, fitque in eo demutatione potius quam creatione, quod novum sit." *Tractatus in 5 Psalmum* 12, PL 9,362.

Beside correcting Pontet's interpretation of Hilary and Origen, Journet points out that among the Greek Fathers Irenaeus of Lyons, John Chrysostom and John Damascene hold the teaching of the transformation of the *corpus animale* to *corpus spirituale*⁷. Augustine, according to Journet, teaches the same thing. Among the many texts from Augustin that prove this, Journet chooses the following:

(i) From *De Fide et Symbolo* 6,13:

"The Gentiles, however, for the most part, set themselves diligently to ply us with the arguments of the philosophers, to the effect that they affirmed that there cannot be anything earthly in heaven. For they do not know the Scriptures nor do they understand the sense in which it has been said, 'It is sown an animal body, it rises a spiritual body' (1 Cor. 15,44). For there it has not been put as though the body were transformed into a spirit and became a spirit, just as even now our body, which is called animal, has not been transformed into a soul and became a soul. But by a spiritual body is meant that one which has been made subject to the spirit, so much so that it is fit for the heavenly habitation, since even earthly frailty and blemish have been changed into heavenly purity and stability"⁸.

(ii) From *Enchiridion ad Laurentium* 91:

"For even after the resurrection the body of Christ was called flesh. The apostle, however, says, 'It is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body' (1 Cor. 15,44), because the harmony between the flesh and the spirit

⁷ See C. JOURNET, op. cit., p. 882, for Irenaeus of Lyons; p. 887, John Chrysostom and John Damascene, who, according to C. Journet, sums up John Chrysostom. For references in these Fathers, see the following: IRENAEUS OF LYONS (c. 130-200), *Contra Haereses* 5,7,1,2, PG 7,1139-1141; *Contra Haereses* 5,13,5; *Contra Haereses* 5,14,1, PG 7,1160. The last two references are a discussion on 1 Cor. 15,50. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM (c.347-407), *In Epistolam Primam ad Corinthios, Homilia* 41,3, PG 61,359; on 1 Cor. 15,44. JOHN DAMASCENE (c. 675-749), *Epistula ad Corinthios* 1,5, PG 95,697-700. The Apostolic Fathers, mentioned by C. Journet, who taught the resurrection of the body are the following: CLEMENT OF ROME (circa 96), in *Ad Corinthios* 26, *Patres Apostolici* I (ed. by F.X. FUNK), Tubingae, 1901, p. 134. IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH, in *Epistula ad Trallianos* 9, *Patres Apostolici* I (ed. by F.X. FUNK), Tubingae, 1901, p. 248. POLYCARP OF SMYRNA (70/82-156/168), in *Martyrium S. Polycarpi* 14,2, *Patres Apostolici* I (ed. by F.X. FUNK), Tubingae, 1901, p. 330. The Apologists of the second century mentioned by C. Journet are the following: TATIAN, *Oratio adversus Graecos* 25, PG 6,861. ATHENAGORAS, *De Resurrectione Mortuorum* 15, PG 6,1004-1005.

⁸ "Sed gentiles plerumque philosophorum argumentis nobiscum agere student, ut dicant terrenum aliquid in caelo esse non posse. Nostras enim scripturas non noverunt nec sciunt quomodo dictum sit: Seminatur corpus animale, surgit corpus spiritale. Non enim ita est, quasi corpus vertatur in spiritum et spiritus fiat, quia et nunc corpus nostrum, quod animale dicitur, non in animam versum est et anima factum; sed spiritale corpus intellegitur, quod ita spiritui subditum est, ut caelesti habitationi conveniat, omni fragilitate ac labe terrena in caelestem puritatem et stabilitate mutata atque conversa". *De Fide et Symbolo* 6,13, CSEL 41,15-16.

will be so perfect, the spirit keeping alive the subjected flesh without need of nourishment, that no part of our nature shall be in discord with another"⁹.

(iii) From *De Civitate Dei* 22,21:

"The spiritual flesh will be subject to the spirit, but it will be flesh, not spirit, just as the carnal spirit was subject to the flesh and yet was spirit, not flesh ... A human being in this life is called spiritual, though still remaining carnal, because of his body and though he is still aware of another law in his body, battling against the law of reason (*Rom.* 7,23). But he will be spiritual even in body, when the same flesh rises again and the words of the Scripture are fulfilled, in that what is sown as an animal body is raised as a spiritual body (*1 Cor.* 15,44)"¹⁰.

W. Schumacher in his work *Spiritus and Spiritualis: A Study in the Sermons of Saint Augustine* included the theme of *corpus animale* and *corpus spirituale* without adding anything substantial to what Journet had already given. Moreover, Schumacher was forced to give a very capsulized exposition, for it was his intention to limit his sources only to the *Sermons*. On account of this, he was restrained from examining further the Augustinian concept of *corpus animale*. This is not, however, closely connected with his work. His concern rather is the *corpus spirituale*, as this forms an integral part of his field of research. He maintains that Augustine contributed very little towards a clarification or amplification of Paul's words on the *corpus spirituale*¹¹. Let us give here Schumacher's statement:

"The *corpus animale* of which St. Paul spoke was not meant in any derogatory sense; rather, it means a body animated by a soul, ψυχή, which it serves as an instrument. *Corpus spirituale* is that body which serves as an instrument for a principle of activities in a higher order, that of spiritus. This *spiritus* of St. Paul is the human soul which has been totally penetrated by and is now subjected to the Spirit of God. Just as *corpus animale* is not a body 'made of soul', but rather a body moved by and subject to a human soul, so *corpus animale* does not 'become a spirit', but is directed and penetrated by *spiritus*. The ψυχή and πνεῦμα of St. Paul are not two distinct entities; rather, the former is the human soul in itself and the latter, the same soul in a higher

⁹ "Propter quod et post resurrectionem corpus Christi, caro appellata est (Lc. 24,39). Sed ideo ait Apostolus, Seminatur corpus animale, resurget corpus spirituale: quoniam tanta erit tunc concordia carnis et spiritus, vivificante spiritu sine sustentaculi alicuius indigentia subditam carnem, ut nihil nobis repugnet ex nobis". *Enchiridion ad Laurentium* 91, PL 40,274.

¹⁰ "Erit ergo spiritui subdita caro spiritalis, sed tamen caro, non spiritus; sicut carni subditus fuit spiritus ipse carnalis, sed tamen spiritus, non caro ... et homo spiritalis sic in hac vita dicitur, ut tamen corpore adhuc carnalis sit et videat aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae; erit autem etiam corpore spiritalis, cum eadem caro sic resurrexerit, ut fiat quod scriptum est: Seminatur corpus animale, resurget corpus spirituale." *De Civitate Dei* 22,21, CSEL 40/2,634.

¹¹ W. SCHUMACHER, *Spiritus and Spiritualis: A Study in the Sermons of Saint Augustine*, Mundelein, Illinois, 1957, p. 192.

state, totally penetrated by the Holy Spirit. St. Augustine followed the Apostle's thought on this subject, and contributed little more than a clarification of a few ideas of his master".

Since Schumacher could not find in the *Sermons* any explanation of what a *corpus animale* is, except that it is the former state of the human body before it has become *spirituale*, and, therefore, would mean that *corpus animale* can be rendered as the present human body, or as *caro mortalis* or *caro corruptibilis*¹², he proceeded to describe Augustine's conception of the *corpus spirituale*. Let us give here his summary:

"This *corpus spirituale*, therefore, is the human body as it will exist in a new state after the general resurrection; it does not become *spiritus*, but remains essentially a body. But this body, like Christ's after the resurrection, can well be called *spirituale*, since it will be completely at the service of the human spirit"¹³.

We shall not enter into discussion here with Schumacher. Neither shall we pretend that we can offer something substantially different from what he and Journet have already said, in opposition to Pontet. We agree with Schumacher and Journet, and with them we disagree with Pontet. Rather, we would like to mention that no author, as far as we know, has already given an exposition of a major discussion between Augustine and the Manicheans concerning the *corpus animale* centering especially on linguistic interpretation of *Gen. 2,7*. This will be our task in the first section.

I. THE PHYSICO- AND PSYCHOSOMATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE *CORPUS ANIMALE*

In this section we wish to concentrate mainly on demonstrating the physico- and psychosomatic characteristics of the *corpus animale*. We hope to show that Augustine saw them as deriving from the Greek word for soul: *pnoé*.

A. Before the first sin the body of man was not a spiritual body but an animal body

Augustine has pointed out that *1 Cor. 15,45a*, "The first man Adam became a living soul", is a direct quotation from *Gen. 2,7*: "Then the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into him the

¹² W. SCHUMACHER, *ibid.*, p. 193.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

breath of life; and man became a living soul", as a scriptural proof of Paul to say that man was created with an animal body¹⁴. Augustine confirms this, but is challenged by the Manicheans, who give another interpretation of *Gen.* 2,7¹⁵. In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.10, written in 388/389, Augustine thinks that man himself should be taken not as spiritual but still as animal, at this point when God made him a living soul by breathing into him the spirit of life.

"But we should not yet consider man as spiritual but still as animal when he was instituted in paradise, that is, in the happy life and he accepted the commandment of perfection that he might also be made perfect by the word of God. Therefore, after he sinned by turning away from the command of God, he was also sent out of paradise, and he remained animal. And so, therefore, we all first bear the animal man, we who were born after sin from him, until we bear the spiritual Adam, that is, our Lord Jesus Christ, who committed no sin (*1 Pet.* 2,22); and after we have been re-created and made alive by Him, we shall be brought back to paradise, where that thief was rewarded by living with Him on that very day that he departed from this life (*Lk.* 23,43)"¹⁶.

In *Retractationes* 1,10.3, Augustine corrects his earlier statement given above, by saying that it is not man himself but only his body that was made animal. But even already in *De Civitate Dei* 13,2, which was written in 417/418, and, therefore, dates before the *Retractationes* which were written in 426/427, he had already changed that statement, which he re-expressed later in the *Retractationes*. In *De Civitate Dei* 13,23,¹⁷ he

¹⁴ See *Epistula* 205,2.9, CSEL 57,330.

¹⁵ The core of the discussion is found in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.10 and 11, PL 34,201-202 and in *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,408-414.

¹⁶ "Nondum tamen spirituales hominem debemus intelligere, qui factus est in animam viventem, sed adhuc animale. Tunc enim spiritualis effectus est, cum in paradiso, hoc est in beata vita constitutus, praeceptum etiam perfectionis accepit, ut verbo Dei consummaretur. Itaque postquam peccavit, recedens a praecepto Dei, et dimissus est de paradiso, in hoc remansit ut animalis esset. Et ideo animale hominem prius agemus omnes, qui de illo post peccatum nati sumus, donec assequamur spirituales Adam, id est Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, qui peccatum non fecit (*1 Pet.* 2,22); et ab illo recreati et vivificati, restituamur in paradysum, ubi latro ille cum ipso eo die meruit esse, quo vitam istam finivit (*Lc.* 23,43)". *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.10, PL 34,201.

¹⁷ "In corpore ergo animali primum hominem factum sic apostolus loquitur. Volens enim ab spiritali, quod in resurrectione futurum est, hoc quod nunc est animale discernere: *Seminatur, inquit, in corruptione, surget in incorruptione; seminatur in contumelia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale*. Deinde ut hoc probaret: *Si est, inquit, corpus animale, est et spiritale*. Et ut quid esset animale corpus ostenderet: *Sic, inquit, (et) scriptum est: Factus est primus homo in animam viventem*. isto igitur modo voluit ostendere quid sit corpus animale, quamvis scriptura non dixerit de homine primo, qui est appellatus Adam, quando illi anima flatu Dei creata est: Et factus est homo in corpore animali; sed: *Factus est homo in animam viventem*. In eo ergo quod scriptum est: *Factus est primus homo in animam*

argues as follows: The first man, before he sinned, did not have a spiritual body. To say that before sin he had already a spiritual body would be to misunderstand Paul, who says, "If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual body" (*1 Cor.* 15,44). Augustine explains that Paul's statement here is a direct quotation from *Gen.* 2,7b; and Paul does this in order to prove that man in his original state had an animal body. Therefore, the first man before he sinned had an animal body and not a spiritual body. The main point that Augustine is driving at here is that the first man did not come to have an animal body as a consequence of sin. The first man, although spiritual before sin, was created with an animal body¹⁸. Therefore, this animal body was not given him as a punishment for sin. Augustine asserts this in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8,10: "Therefore, after he sinned by turning away from the command of God, he was also sent out of paradise, and he remained animal"¹⁹. In this text, although Augustine speaks of man himself and not only of his body - we pointed this out earlier - it is clear, nevertheless, that man did not come to have an animal body as a punishment for sin. In the *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, using more precise statements, and going deeper into the nuance of words used in *Gen.* 2,7, Augustine defends further, against some interpreters, his position that the first man was created with an animal body. And his argument is this: The Greek word used for the breath of life (*spiritus vitae*) that was blown into man is *πνοή* and not *πνεῦμα*, and therefore, the body of man given essence by this animating principle is not spiritual but animal. Some interpreters, on the contrary, disagree with Augustine and maintain that the breath of life (*spiritus vitae*) blown by God into man was part of His substance. This part of His substance became the soul of man. Augustine has earlier dismissed this as absurd. For him this would reduce God to the level of the creature, which is changeable, liable to error, susceptible to the blemish of sin and corruption, in the same manner as the soul of man is.

"Accordingly, we ought to understand this passage in such a way that the statement 'He breathed into him the spirit of life and man was made into a living soul' (*Gen.* 2,7) should not make us believe that the soul is a part of the nature of God which has become the soul of man, and that we may be forced to say that the nature of God is changeable. The truth is at variance with this

viventem, voluit apostolus intellegi corpus hominis animale". De Civitate Dei 13,23, CCL 48,407.

¹⁸ We are not going to touch upon Augustine's philosophy of creation here. This is not within the scope of this work. For a work on this, the reader is referred to C.J. O'TOOLE, *The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine*, Washington D.C., 1944. The theme of the creation of man is discussed p. 84-94.

¹⁹ "Itaque postquam peccavit, recedens a praecepto Dei, et dimissus est de paradiso, in hoc remansit ut animalis esset". *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8,10, PL 34,201.

error of the Manicheans. For, as they are motivated by pride, the mother of all heretics, they dare to say that the soul is the nature of God. And in this point they are pressed by us when we say to them, "Therefore, God's nature commits error and is pitiable; it is corrupted by the blemish of vices and sins".²⁰

In *De Civitate Dei* 13,24 the discussion is amplified. It is here, too, that Augustine clearly states that *Gen.* 2,7 is the basis of Paul's statement in *1 Cor.* 15,44-49, which deals with the contrast between the *corpus animale* and the *corpus spirituale*. In this work, some interpreters as Augustine explains, assume *Gen.* 2,7 to mean that the soul was not given to man at the breathing of God but that it was already in him and was just brought to life by the Holy Spirit. They see this Old Testament text in the light of the New Testament text found in John, where it is narrated that Christ, after He rose from the dead, breathed (*insufflavivit*) into His disciples, saying to them, "Receive the Holy Spirit". Thus while in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.11, Augustine says that the Manicheans believe that the breath of life (*spiritus vitae*) as expressed in *Gen.* 2,7 is a part of the substance of God that was converted into the soul of man, in *De Civitate Dei*, he explains that some interpreters also think that the soul of the first man may already had been there in him, dormant or even dead, but that this soul was brought to life by God's breathing into man the breath of life, which is the Holy Spirit. Augustine contends that they have wrongly interpreted the event narrated in *Jo.* 20,22, and, therefore, have mistakenly thought that the breath of life (*spiritus vitae*) breathed into man, which is spoken of in *Gen.* 2,7, is the same Holy Spirit which was received by the apostles and is spoken of in *Jo.* 20,22.

Augustine rebuts the error with the following arguments²¹: First, it cannot be that what happened during the time when the risen Lord said to his disciples, "Receive the Holy Spirit" (*Jo.* 20,22) was similar to what happened at the creation of the soul of man, and, therefore, the words "Receive the Holy Spirit" signify the same as "God breathed into man the breath of life (*spiritus vitae*), and man became a living soul". If they were the same, Augustine argues, then the Evangelist in *Jo.* 20,22 would have gone on to say, "And they became a living soul", just as the narrator in

²⁰ "Sic ergo debemus intelligere hunc locum, ut non quia dictum est, *Insufflavivit in eum spiritum vitae et factus est homo in animam viventem*, credamus illam veluti partem naturae Dei in animam hominis fuisse conversam, et cogamur dicere naturam Dei esse mutabilem: in quo errore maxime istos Manicheos veritas premit. Sicut enim est mater omnium haereticorum superbia, ausi sunt dicere, quod natura Dei sit anima. Et hinc urgentur a nobis, cum eis dicimus, Ergo natura Dei errat et misera est, et vitiorum labe corrumpitur et peccat". *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.11, PL 34,201-202.

²¹ See *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CC 48,409.

Gen. 2,7 did. Second, if this were said, then it would mean that the Spirit of God is, in a sense, the life of the soul, and without the Spirit the rational souls of human beings are dead, although by their presence the bodies appear to look alive. Third, this was not what actually happened at the creation of man. The Scriptures give evidence of what actually happened: "And God fashioned dust from the earth in man" (*Gen.* 2,7).

"Therefore, this man, formed from the dust of the earth or from mud (for the dust was moistened), or as I may say it more plainly as the Scriptures relate, this 'dust from the earth', the apostle teaches, became an animal body when it received a soul: 'And this man was made into a living soul', that is, this dust, when fashioned, was made into a living soul"²².

What, therefore, Augustine is insisting here upon is this: the animal body (*corpus animale*) of a human being is nothing other than an animate body. And the animating principle of this body is called *πνοή* and not *πνεῦμα*. This is the first characteristic of the *corpus animale*.

B. The Greek word for the human soul is πνοή and not πνεῦμα. Why?

Above we mentioned that the animate body of man is a *corpus animale* and not a *corpus spirituale* precisely because the word used for the soul that animates it is *πνοή* and not *πνεῦμα*. Here we shall give the distinction that Augustine makes between these two Greek words. This distinction shows how Augustine justifies his conception of *corpus animale* in the context of creation as described in *Gen.* 2,7. At the same time it attributes to the *corpus animale* another quality: mortality.

1. *Pneuma*

- (i) This is the usual term for the Holy Spirit²³. Augustine refers to *Jo.* 20,22: "Receive the Holy Spirit"; *Mt.* 28,19: "Go and baptize all nations in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit"; *Jo.* 4,24: "God is spirit".
- (ii) *Pneuma*, however, can be applied to man, animal, or wind as a

²² "Hunc igitur formatum hominem de terrae pulvere sive limo (erat enim pulvis umectus) - hunc, inquam, ut expressius dicam, sicut scriptura locuta est, *pulverem de terra animale corpus factum esse docet apostolus, cum animam accepit: 'Et factus est iste homo in animam viventem'*, id est, formatus iste pulvis factus est in animam viventem". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,409.

²³ "Hic vero, ubi legitur: *Et finxit Deus hominem pulverem de terra et insufflavit sive inspiravit in faciem eius spiritum vitae*, non ait Graecus *πνεῦμα*, quod solet dici Spiritus sanctus ...". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,410.

physical phenomenon²⁴. In this case *pneuma* is rendered into Latin by the word *spiritus*. Augustine refers to *1 Cor.* 2,11: "Among mankind, who knows the truth about man except the spirit of man within him"; *Eccli.* 3,21: "Who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward into heaven, and the spirit of the animal goes downward into the earth?"; *Ps.* 148,8: "Fire, hail, snow, ice, spirit of the storm".

2. *Pnoé*

- (i) The word is used for the created world more often than for the Creator²⁵.
- (ii) To mark the distinction between the creature and the Creator, some Latin versions translate the word *πνοή* by *flatus* (breath) instead of *spiritus* (spirit). For example: *Isaiah* 57,16: "I have made every breath". "Every breath" means "every soul"²⁶.
- (iii) The word is rendered in Latin by *flatus* (breath), *spiritus* (spirit), *inspiratio* (breathing into, inspiration), or *aspiratio* (breathing on)²⁷.

In all the references given above, namely, *Jo.* 20,22, *Mt.* 28,19 and *Jo.* 4,24, In the Greek text the word used is *πνεῦμα* and not *πνοή*, and in Latin *spiritus* instead of *flatus*. It follows that even if in *Gen.* 2,7 the phrase, "He breathed into his face the spirit of life" were said in this way - if we may rephrase it - "He breathed into his face *πνεῦμα*", Augustine

²⁴ "... πνεῦμα vero numquam nisi spiritum, sive hominis (de quo ait apostolus: *Quis enim scit hominum quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est?*) sive pecoris (sicut in Salomonis libro scriptum est: *Quis scit si spiritus hominis ascendat sursum in coelum et spiritus pecoris descendat deorsum in terram?*) sive istum corporeum, qui etiam ventus dicitur ...". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,410-411. See also *Sermo* 128,9, PL 38,717; here Augustine points out that both men and beasts have *spiritus vitae*. Angels have also the *spiritus vitae*. Both angels and men are distinguished from beasts not by *spiritus vitae* but by reason and intellectual faculties. Similar statements are made in the following: *De Genesi ad Litteram* 12,7, CSEL 28/1,389; *De Trinitate* 14,16,22, CCL 50A,452-453; *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* 4,18, CSEL 28/2, 328. See also W. SCHUMACHER, *Spiritus and Spiritualis: A Study in the Sermons of Saint Augustine*, p. 75.

²⁵ "... (ait) πνοήν, quod nomen in creatura quam in Creatore frequentius legitur ...". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,410.

²⁶ "... unde nonnulli etiam Latini propter differentiam hoc vocabulum non spiritum, sed flatum appellare maluerunt. Hoc enim est in Graeco etiam illo loco apud Esaiam, ubi Deus dicit: *Omnem flatum ego feci*, omnem animam sine dubitatione significans". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,410.

²⁷ "Quod itaque Graece πνοή dicitur, nostri aliquando flatum, aliquando spiritum, aliquando inspirationem vel aspirationem, quando etiam Dei dicitur, interpretati sunt". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,410.

feels that he is not obliged to refer that breath of life (*spiritus vitae*) to the Creator Spirit, considering that πνεῦμα is used not only of the Creator but also of the creature.

"In all these testimonies from the Scriptures, we see, indeed, insofar as the Greek versions are concerned, that it is not πνοή which has been written but πνεῦμα; however, insofar as the Latin versions are concerned, it is not *flatus* but *spiritus*. Therefore, in the passage where it is written: 'He inspired', or if it is to be said more properly: 'He breathed into his face the spirit of life', if the Greek version had put not πνοή, as it is actually read, but πνεῦμα, it would not follow that we would be forced to take it for the Creator Spirit, which in the Trinity is the Holy Spirit, seeing that πνεῦμα, as it has been said, is frequently said not only of the Creator but also of the creature"²⁸.

From the text cited above, we see that Augustine's argument is based merely on frequency of usage. Πνεῦμα is used more frequently, so much so that even if - *dato sed non concesso* - in *Gen. 2,7* πνεῦμα were used instead of πνοή, it would still not follow that the former had to be taken for the Holy Spirit.

But the Manicheans answer again: Why add "of life" to "spirit", if he had not intended the Holy Spirit? And why make "living" modify "soul" (*anima*) in "Man was made into a living soul" if the life of the soul which was imparted to it by the gift of the Spirit is not meant? Augustine sees these questions as arising from incorrect interpretation of scriptural texts, since these have been taken out of context. He, therefore, insists that statements on creation, as given in the Book of Genesis, should be taken in connection. Thus, *Gen. 2,7* should be seen in the light of *Gen. 1,24*: "Let the earth produce a living soul". This means that the term "living soul" in *Gen. 2,7* is identical with the term "living soul" in *Gen. 1,24*. This proves that the beasts, too, - referred to the "living soul" in *Gen. 1,24* - have the "spirit of life" just as a human being has. As human beings and the rest of animal creation equally are called "living soul", human beings, therefore, have to be counted among the animals with respect to their body, since their souls are rational. And, likewise, the souls of the human beings are not of the same substance as the Holy Spirit or as God. *Gen. 2,7* should also be seen in the light of or together with *Gen. 7,22*: "And all

²⁸ "In his quippe omnibus testimoniis scripturarum, quantum ad Graecos adinet, non πνοήν videmus scriptum esse, sed πνεῦμα; quantum autem ad Latinos, non flatum, sed spiritum. Quapropter in eo, quod scriptum est: *Inspiravit*, vel si magis proprie dicendum est: *Insufflavit in faciem eius spiritum vitae*, si Graecus non πνοήν, sicut ibi legitur, sed πνεῦμα posuisset, nec sic esset consequens, ut Creatorem Spiritum, qui proprie dicitur in trinitate Spiritus sanctus, intellegere cogeremur; quando quidem πνεῦμα, ut dictum est, non solum de Creatore, sed etiam de creatura dici solere manifestum est". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,411.

things which have the spirit of life, and every one who was on the dry land died". This means that human beings, besides being counted among the animal creation, not only because in a similar manner to them they have the "spirit of life" (πνοήν) but also and precisely because they share with them the same mortal nature, are said to have *corpus animale*. Thus mortality is the second characteristic of the *corpus animale*.

"But when he [=the author] said 'spirit' (*spiritum*), these interpreters allege, he would not have added 'of life' (*vitae*) unless he had wanted the Holy Spirit to be understood by it; and when he said, 'Man was made into a living soul' (*Gen. 2,7b*), he would not have added 'living' (*viventem*), unless he had meant the life of the soul, which was given to it through the gift of the Spirit of God. For, they say, when the soul lives in a manner appropriate to its own life, what need there was to add 'living' except to ensure that it meant the life which was given to it through the Holy Spirit. What is this, but to fight strenuously for a false opinion and to read the Holy Scriptures inattentively? Was it a great effort not to go far, but to read slightly earlier in that very same book, 'Let the earth produce the living soul' (*Gen. 1,24*), at the time when the terrestrial animals were all created? Then how much effort would it take them to notice, a few chapters later, what has been written: 'And all things which have the spirit of life, and everyone who was on the dry land died' (*Gen. 7,22*), when he insinuated that all things that lived on the earth perished in the flood?"²⁹

From the text cited above, we see that Augustine's reference to *Gen. 7,22* truly proves that *corpus animale* is mortal; nevertheless, it shows mortality as a consequence of sin, because the flood-narrative centers on the sins committed by humanity. We may, therefore, ask: Does not Augustine seem to overlook the fact that he has been speaking of human nature in its pre-fall state? We are inclined to say that he does.

²⁹ "Sed cum dixisset, inquit, *spiritum*, non adderet *vitae*, nisi illum sanctum (*Spiritum*) vellet intellegi; et cum dixisset: Factus est homo in animam, non adderet *viventem*, nisi animae vitam significaret, quae illi divinitus impertitur dono Spiritus Dei. Cum enim vivat anima, inquit, proprio suae vitae modo, quid opus erat addere *viventem*, nisi ut ea vita intellegeretur, quae illi per sanctum Spiritum datur? Hoc quid est aliud nisi diligenter pro humana suspicione contendere et scripturas sanctas neglegenter adtendere? Quid magnum erat non ire longius, sed in eodem ipso libro paulo superius legere: *Producat terra animam viventem*, quando animalia terrestria cuncta creata sunt? Deinde advertere quod scriptum est: *Et omnia, quae habent spiritum vitae, et omnis, qui erat super aridam, mortuus est*, cum insinuaret omnia quae vivebant in terra perisse diluvio?" *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,411-412.

C. *Animals are animate bodies*

By taking together *Gen.* 1,24 and *Gen.* 7,22, Augustine claims, we find "living soul" and "spirit of life" even in animals (beasts). And in *Gen.* 7,22 the Greek term used for "spirit of life" is πνοή. What does this mean? This means that "animals" should be taken in the sense of animate bodies, possessed of bodily sense-perception which comes through the possession of the soul. But when "animal" is applied to human beings, it also means that their souls were created by the breath of God, and that human beings were created to live in animal bodies, which come into life when the souls begin to live in them. Sense-perception is the third property of the *corpus animale*.

"If, therefore, we find both 'living soul' and 'spirit of life' even in the beasts, as Divine Scripture usually says, and when in this passage, too, we read, 'All things which have the spirit of life' (*Gen.* 7,22), the writer did not say πνεῦμα but πνοήν, why, then, do we not say, 'What need there was to add 'living' since the soul cannot exist unless it lives?' And why did he need to add 'of life' after he had said 'spirit'? But we take it that Scripture had said it in its usual way, 'living soul' and 'spirit of life', since it wished us to understand by 'animals' animate bodies, which obviously possess sense-perception through the soul. However, concerning the creation of man, we forget the way in which Scripture usually speaks. It speaks straightforwardly in its own way, telling us that man indeed received a rational soul. It wants us to understand that this soul [of man] was created not in the same way as those of the other physical creatures which were made from water and earth, but by God's breathing. Man was thus made to live in an animal body, which takes place when the soul lives in it, just as what happened in the case of the other animals, concerning which Scripture said, 'Let the earth produce a living soul'; and it also spoke of them as having a 'spirit of life'. Here also the Greek word is not πνεῦμα but πνοήν. And it is certain that with this word it means not the Holy Spirit but the soul of animals"³⁰.

³⁰ "Si ergo et animam viventem et spiritum vitae etiam in pecoribus invenimus, sicut loqui divina scriptura consuevit, et cum hoc quoque loco, ubi legitur: *Omnia quae habent spiritum vitae*, non Graecus πνεῦμα, sed πνοήν dixerit: cur non dicimus: Quid opus erat ut adderet *viventem*, cum anima nisi vivat esse non possit? aut quid erat ut adderet *vitae*, cum dixisset *spiritum*? Sed intellegimus *anima viventem* et *spiritum vitae* scripturam suo more dixisse, cum animalia, id est animata corpora, vellet intellegi, quibus inesset per animam perspicuus iste etiam corporis sensus. In hominis autem conditione obliviscimur, quem ad modum loqui scriptura consueverit, cum suo prorsus more locuta sit, quo insinualet hominem etiam rationali anima accepta, quam non sicut aliarum carum aquis et terra producentibus, sed Deo flante creatam voluit intellegi, sic tamen factum, ut in corpore animali, quod fit anima in eo vivente, sicut illa animalia viveret, de quibus dixit: *Producat terra animam viventem*, et quae itidem dixit habuisse in se spiritum vitae; ubi etiam in Graeco non dixit πνεῦμα sed πνοήν; non utique Spiritum sanctum, sed eorum animam tali exprimens nomine". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,412.

D. The human soul does not have the same substance as the Wisdom of God

The Manicheans presented to Augustine yet another difficulty concerning the substance of the soul. They contend: If the breath of God is to be taken as having issued from the mouth of God, and if this has to be taken as the soul of man, would it not be that the soul of man is of the same substance as the Wisdom of God, of which Scripture says that It has come out of the mouth of God? Augustine answers that the Wisdom of God was not breathed out but came out the mouth of God: "I came out of the mouth of the Most High" (*Eccli.* 24,3). He, therefore, makes a distinction between "breathed out" (*efflatam esse*) and "came out" (*prodisse*). "To breathe out" is to expel a breath without taking it from one's own natural substance. By inference, to "come out", as in the case of the Wisdom of God, Augustine would have explained, would mean God Himself reaching out, thus the Wisdom of God and God Himself are of the same divine substance. Augustine considers the expression "God breathed out into the face of man the breath of life" as the most suitable way of describing God's action. It is an anthropomorphic description that most fits God's act in creating the soul. The soul of man is not of the substance of God, nor is it the Holy Spirit. This is the fourth characteristic of the *corpus animale*.

"But, they say, the breath of God is to be taken as having issued from the mouth of God, which if we believe it to be the soul, it will follow that we must admit that it is of the same substance and is equal with His Wisdom, which says, 'I came out of the mouth of the Most High' (*Eccli.* 24,3). Wisdom did not say at all that It has been breathed out of the mouth of God, but that it has come out of His mouth. Besides, just as when we breathe out we can expel our breath without taking it from our substance, by which we are human beings, but from the surrounding air, drawing it in and letting it out by inhaling and exhaling, so Almighty God can also produce a breath without taking it from His own substance nor from His subject creation, but from nothing. And it is said in a way most suitable to His actions that He inspired or breathed this breath when He implanted it in man's body, since He is immaterial, who breathes out an immaterial breath; however, He is immutable who produces the mutable, because as uncreated He made the created breath. Therefore, in order that these people who want to speak about the Scriptures, but do not pay close attention to the language of the Scriptures, may know that it is not only that something of equal and identical nature (with God) is said to come out of His mouth, let them listen and read the written passage where God says, 'Because you are lukewarm and neither hot nor cold, I shall go on to spit you out of my mouth' (*Rev.* 3,16)"³¹.

³¹ "Sed enim Dei flatus, inquit, Dei ore exisse intellegitur, quem si animam crediderimus, consequens erit, ut eiusdem fateamur esse substantiae paremque illius sapientiae, quae dicit: *Ego ex ore Altissimi prodii*. Non quidem dixit sapientia ore Dei efflatam se

With this curse, referred to probably with a double intention, namely, first, to prove that not all that comes out of the mouth of God are of His substance like the breath of life, and second, to insult his opponents, Augustine brings the discussion to an end. He proceeds on the basis of his understanding of *Gen. 2,7*, which we have explained above, to convince his readers not to withhold consent to Paul's statement in *1 Cor. 15,44-49*, where the apostle makes the distinction between the *corpus animale* and the *corpus spirituale*.

II. THE MORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE *CORPUS ANIMALE*: THE CONCUISCENCE OF THE FLESH AGAINST THE SPIRIT

As a consequence of the fall, the *corpus animale* of human beings deteriorated. There is a split between the tendencies of the spirit and the flesh. Not only do the flesh and the spirit lust against each other (*Gal. 5,17*), but the flesh weighs down the spirit (*Wis. 9,15*), and the law in the flesh wars against the law in the spirit (*Rom. 7,23*). The conflict between the flesh and the spirit is the source of sufferings of humanity. The transformation of the *corpus animale* to *corpus spirituale* will bring about the absolute harmony between the flesh and the spirit.

We may also ask: Was there a kind of sexual libido before the fall? Several good works have been devoted to Augustine's concept of concupiscence. F.J. Thonnard's *La notion de concupiscence en philosophie augustinienne* is a study within the philosophical system of Augustine. G.I. Bonner's *Libido and Concupiscentia in St. Augustine* is centered on the sexual concept. A section of W.A. Schumacher's *Spiritus and Spiritualis: A Study in the Sermons of Augustine* is an exploration of the meaning of concupiscence in relation to the concept of *spiritus*; this is, however, limited to the sermons of Augustine. Because of the author's choice of texts R. Orbe, in *San Agustín y el problema de la concupiscencia en su marco histórico*, shows a strong inclination to equate Augustine's concept

fuisse, sed ex eius ore prodisse. Sicut autem nos possumus non de nostra natura, qua homines sumus, sed de isto aere circumfuso, quem spirando ac respirando ducimus ac reddimus, flatum facere cum sufflamus: ita omnipotens Deus non de sua natura neque subiacenti creatura, sed etiam de nihilo potuit facere flatum, quem corpori hominis inserendo inspirasse vel insufflasse convenientissime dictus est, incorporeus incorporeum, sed inmutabilis mutabilem, quia non creatus creatum. Verum tamen ut sciant isti, qui de scripturis loqui volunt et scripturarum locutiones non advertunt, non hoc solum dici exire ore Dei, quod est aequalis eiusdemque naturae, audiant vel legant quod Deo dicente scriptum est: *Quoniam tepidus es et neque calidus neque frigidus, incipiam te reicere ex ore meo*". *De Civitate Dei* 13,24, CCL 48,412.

of concupiscence only with its sexual significance. T. van Bavel, in *Christians in the World*, chapter III, gives Augustine's broad conception of concupiscence.

Our study will cover Augustine's broad concept of concupiscence in the perspective of the transformation of the flesh, from *animale* to *spirituale*. Our approach is to examine Augustine's use principally of *Gal.* 5,17: "For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; these are opposed against each other, that you do not what you like to"; of *Wis.* 9,15: "For the flesh weighs down the soul"; and of *Rom.* 7,23: "But I saw in my members another law at war with the law of my mind". We have found one hundred sixteen references to *Gal.* 5,17, twenty two to *Rom.* 7,23, and several to *Wis.* 9,15, as parallels to *Gal.* 5,17. Both from the testimony of the Scriptures and from his own experiences and those of others, Augustine is able to explain the cause of the desire of humanity for the transformation of the *corpus animale* to *corpus spirituale*. He directs his case earlier to the Manicheans, and later to the Pelagians³².

A. The controversy with the Manicheans (392-396)

1. The concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit is a penalty for the primal sin

We find the first reference to *Gal.* 5,17 in the *Disputatio contra Fortunatum* 21, written in 392. Fortunatus contends that the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit is not a penalty for sin; it exists in us as a portion of the evil that dwells everywhere in the created world. The sin of our first parents was not voluntary; they did it by the doing of what was not subject to the law of God.

"For it is said by the apostle that 'the knowledge of the flesh is hostile to God; it is not subject to the law of God; neither can it be' (*Rom.* 8,7). Therefore, it is evident from these things that the good soul seems to sin not voluntarily, but by doing of that which is not subject to the law of God. It likewise follows that the 'flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit lusts against the flesh, so that you do not do what you want' *Gal.* 5,17). Again, 'I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind and leading me captive in the law of sin and of death. Therefore, miserable man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of death, unless it be the grace of God through our

³² See *Retractationes* 1,8, CSEL 36,45-46: He refers to his previous position expressed in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,18,52; 2,20,54; 3,18,50 f., where he speaks of the disorder arising from the conflict between the flesh and spirit as a just punishment for the primal sin. See also *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 6,4, PL 45,1509: Against Julian he recollects his controversy with the Manicheans on the origin of the concupiscence of the flesh in all its manifestations. The question *unde* appears eight times. He accuses Julian of being a supporter (*adiutor*) of the Manicheans.

Lord Jesus Christ, through whom the world has been crucified to me and I to the world' (*Rom. 7,23-25*)³³.

Inasmuch as concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit - Fortunatus calls this an evil that dwells in us - descended from the supreme evil and is a part of it, the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit is not inherited.

"For it is certain that this evil which dwells in us descends from an evil author; and that this root, as you may call it, is a small part of that evil which dwells everywhere. The Lord called this root and tree evil that never bears good fruit, which His Father did not plant, and which deserves to be rooted up and cast into the fire (*Mt. 15,13; 3,10*)"³⁴.

As we can see from the texts quoted above, Fortunatus uses four scriptural texts to support his contention, namely, *Rom. 8,7*, *Gal. 5,17*, *Rom. 7,23-24* and *Mt. 15,13* or *3,10*. Augustine, however, thinks that Fortunatus's interpretation of these texts are mistaken. In response to Fortunatus, he corrects the other's interpretation. Concerning the knowledge of the flesh (*prudentia carnis*) in *Rom. 8,7*, Augustine explains that it arises from habits by which some are inclined to perform evil actions. These habits have begun through voluntary sinning that was followed by "pernicious sweetness and pleasures" that took hold of the mind, so that the mind is so implicated that it can no longer conquer what it has fashioned for itself by sinning. However with God's illumination, the mind will be able to conquer these habits. Adam and Eve's sin was voluntarily committed. Because we descended from them, we were plunged into sin, and by voluntarily sinning may acquire the *prudentia carnis*. We ourselves can verify this.

"I say that there was free exercise of will in that man who was first formed. He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist his will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God. But after he voluntarily sinned, we who have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity. But each one of us can

³³ "Nam dictum est ab apostolo, quod *prudentia carnis inimica sit deo; legi enim dei non est subiecta, nec enim potest*. Paret ergo his rebus, quod anima bona factione illius, quae legi dei non est subiecta, peccare videtur, non sua sponte, namque idem sequitur, quod *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciat*. Dicit iterum: *Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivum me ducentem in legem peccati et mortis*. Ergo miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius nisi gratia dei per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est et ego mundo?". *Contra Fortunatum Disputatio 21*, CSEL 25/1,103.

³⁴ "Cum constet hoc quod in nobis versatur malum, ex auctore malo descendere et portiunculam esse mali hanc radicem, quam tu esse dicis, ut non sit ipsa radix, sed sit portiuncula mali, eius mali, quod ubique versatur. Quam radicem et arborem malam dominus noster appellavit numquam fructus bonos adferentem, quam non plantavit pater suus, ac merito eradicari et in ignem mitti". *Contra Fortunatum Disputatio 21*, CSEL 25/1,102.

with a little reflection find out that what I say is true. Today in our actions, before we are implicated by any habit, we have the free choice of doing something or of not doing it. But, when by that liberty we have done something, and the pernicious sweetness and pleasure of that deed have taken hold of the mind, by its own habit the mind is so implicated that later it cannot conquer what it has fashioned for itself by sinning ... If you will find out the truth of my sayings, start not to swear by God, you will see that this habit moves on to what it has got used to. And this is what wars against the soul; this is the habit formed in the flesh. This, indeed, is the knowledge of the flesh, which, as long as it cannot be subjected to the law of God, so long is it the mind of the flesh (cf. *Rom.* 8,7). But when the soul is enlightened, it ceases to be the mind of the flesh. For thus it is said, the mind of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God, just as if it were said that snow cannot be warm. But as snow is melted by heat and ceases to be snow, so that it may become warm, so the knowledge of the flesh, that is, the habit made with the flesh, when our mind has been enlightened, and when God has subjected to Himself the whole man, that is, to the will of the divine law, forms a good habit in place of the bad habit of the soul³⁵.

What wars in man against each other are his two wills, and not two natures, one good and the other evil. This is testified in *Mt.* 12,33,35 by the symbolism of the two trees. The one symbolizes good will; and the other evil will. Augustine offers this argument to contradict Fortunatus, who claims that the evil tree symbolizes the supreme evil, which, according to him is proved by the testimony of *Mt.* 15,13 and 3,10. For Augustine the two opposing wills are two opposing concupiscences, namely, the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the spirit.

"Accordingly, it is most truly said by the Lord of the two trees, the one good

³⁵ "Liberum voluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est. Ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino voluntate eius resisteret, si vellet dei praecepta servare, postquam autem libera ipse voluntate peccavit, nos in necessitatem praecipitati sumus, qui ab eius stirpe descendimus. Potest autem unusquisque nostrum mediocri consideratione invenire verum esse, quod dico. Hodie namque in actionibus nostris antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid vel non faciendi. Cum autem ista libertate fecerimus aliquid et facti ipsius tenuerit animam perniciosa dulcedo et voluptas, eadem ipsa consuetudine sua sic implicatur, ut postea vincere non possit, quod sibi ipsa peccando fabricata est ... Si ergo vultis experiri verum esse, quod dico, institute non iurare, videbitis illam consuetudinem ferri quo solet. Et hoc est, quod adversus animam pugnat, consuetudo facta cum carne. Ipsa est nimirum carnis prudentia, quae quamdiu ita est, legi dei subici non potest, quamdiu prudentia carnis est; sed inluminata anima desinit illa esse carnis prudentia. Sic enim dictum est prudentiam carnis non posse legi dei esse subiectam, quemadmodum si diceretur glaciale nivem calidam esse non posse. Nullo pacto enim quamdiu nix est, calida esse potest. Sed quemadmodum illa nix calore resolvitur et desinit nix esse, ut possit calefcere, sic illa carnis prudentia, id est consuetudo facta cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra inluminata et ad arbitrium divinae legis totum hominem sibi deus subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam". *Contra Fortunatum Disputatio* 21, CSEL 25/1,103-105.

and the other evil, which, as you have recalled, have their corresponding fruits. This means that the good tree does not yield evil fruits; and the evil tree does not yield good fruits, so long as it is evil. Let us take two men, one good and the other evil. As long as the former remains good, he cannot yield bad fruits; and the latter, as long as he remains evil, cannot yield good fruits. But, in order that you may understand, these two trees have been so placed by the Lord in order to signify their free choice. These two trees are not two natures; rather, they are our wills. He himself says it in the Gospel: 'Either make the tree good, or make the tree evil' (*Mt. 12,33*)³⁶.

Fortunatus' argument is that on the testimony of *Rom. 7,23-25* man, because of the presence of evil in him, which is a portion of that evil which dwells everywhere, sins involuntarily. To this Augustine retorts that man's incapability of avoiding tendencies to sin is primarily due to his ontological likeness to Adam who sinned, and to his own will to live according to the tendencies which the flesh has towards moral corruptions, which lead to forming of habits of sin. Augustine puts forward two arguments, namely, the ontological likeness to Adam through descent from him who voluntarily sinned - this is said by Paul in *1 Cor. 15,21*: "through the disobedience of one, we all were made sinners ... since through one man came death..." - and the voluntary evil actions done repeatedly such that evil habits have been formed; this is said by Paul in *1 Cor. 15,49*: "so long as we bear the image of the earthly man".

"As long therefore as we bear the image of the earthly man (*1 Cor. 15,49*), that is to say, as long as we live according to the flesh which is also called the old man, we have the necessity of our habit, so that we do not do what we will"³⁷.

Let us take note that Augustine's argument here is based on *1 Cor. 15,21* and on *1 Cor. 15,49*. In the preceding chapter we showed that these two verses mean being mortal through lineage from Adam by birth and being made corrupt by sinning. This is explained by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 13,23 and earlier in *Disputatio contra Fortunatum*. According to

³⁶ "Ex quo illae duae arbores, bona arbor et mala arbor, quas commemorasti, verissime dictum est a domino quod suos fructus habeant, id est neque bonam posse dare malos fructus neque malam bonos, sed malos quamdiu mala est. Accipiamus duos homines: bonum hominem et malum hominem. Quamdiu bonus est, malos fructus dare non potest; quamdiu malus est, fructus bonos dare non potest. Sed ut intellegas istas duas arbores sic esse a domino positas, ut ibi significaretur liberum arbitrium, non naturas esse istas duas arbores, sed voluntates nostras, ipse ait in evangelio: *aut facite arborem bonam aut facite arborem malam*". *Contra Fortunatum Disputatio* 21, CSEL 25/1,105.

³⁷ "Quamdiu ergo portamus imaginem terreni hominis, id est quamdiu secundum carnem vivimus, qui vetus etiam homo nominatur, habemus necessitatem consuetudinis nostrae, ut non quod volumus faciamus". *Contra Fortunatum Disputatio* 21, CSEL 25/1,106.

Augustine, what is said by Paul in *1 Cor.* 15,21 and 49 explains what he says in *Gal.* 5,17. The concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit has come down to us as punishment for the primal sin. It cannot come from nature itself, since all creation was created by the good God, and therefore it is good.

"The Apostle speaks, therefore, concerning that sin of man and that habit of the soul formed together with the flesh: 'Let no one deceive you; the whole creation, which was made by God, is good' (*Eph.* 5,6; *1 Tim.* 4,4). The same apostle, whom you referred to, says: 'Just as through the disobedience of one, many will be made righteous, since through man came death, and through man came the resurrection of the dead' (*1 Cor.* 15,21)"³⁸.

In *Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas* 46³⁹, written in 394/395, a virtually anti-Manichean work, Augustine repeats his explanation of *Gal.* 5,17. Here, however, he associates *Gal.* 5,17 with *Rom.* 8,7: "For the knowledge of the flesh is against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, nor can it be". Properly speaking Augustine refers this condition to man under the law, but in his later writings, dating from 396, he extends it to man even under grace.

Sharply and with an address to the Manicheans, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,51⁴⁰, written in 396, he puts forward an argument with its explanation, which, if it were proved untrue, would reverse the description of man and his actions. Man would not have been considered as living now in a distorted condition as a punishment for sin; his evil actions, which now are considered sinful, would not be sinful. This time Augustine associates *Gal.* 5,17 with *Rom.* 7,18-19. Even in these texts which describe man's fate because of the primal sin, Augustine sees a spark of hope for man's emerging from the state of being condemned to death⁴¹. Yet he does not withdraw his contention that *Gal.* 5,17 and *Rom.* 7,18-19 are statements of facts on the penal state of man.

"Nevertheless some things done through ignorance are disapproved and are judged to need correction, as we read in the divinely authoritative books. For the Apostle says: 'I have obtained mercy because I did it in ignorance' (*1 Tim.*

³⁸ "De isto ergo peccato hominis et de ista consuetudine animae facta cum carne apostolus dicit: *nemo vos seducat: omnis creatura, quae a deo facta est, bona est*. Dicit idem apostolus, quem tu ipse commemorasti: *sicuti per unius inobaudientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, sic et per unius dicto audientiam iusti constituentur multi, quoniam per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum*". *Contra Fortunatum Disputatio* 21, CSEL 25/1,105-106.

³⁹ *Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas* 46, CSEL 84,120-121.

⁴⁰ *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,51, CCL 29,305.

⁴¹ "Sed haec omnia hominum sunt ex illa mortis damnatione venientium" *De Libero Arbitrio*. 3,51, CCL 29,305.

1,13). And the prophet says: 'Remember not the sins of my youth and of my ignorance' (Ps. 25,7). Even wrong things done by necessity when a man wills to do right, but has not the power are to be disapproved. For thus, it is written, 'The good that I would, I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do'. Again, 'To will is present within me; but how to perform that which is good I find not' (Rom. 7,18-19). And, furthermore, 'The Flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary to one another so that you do not what you want to' (Gal. 5,17). These are the words of men emerging from the state of being condemned to death. If this is not a punishment, but a nature of man, there are no sins. If man does not depart from the original state in which he was created, in such a way that he could not become better, then he is doing what he ought, even when he does evil. But now man might be good if he were different. However, because he is what he now is, he is not good, nor is it within his power to be good, either because he does not see what he ought to be, or, seeing it, has not the power to be what he sees he ought to be. Who can doubt that his is a penal state?"⁴².

2. The penalty for the primal sin lies in the incapability of the soul to govern the flesh absolutely

Before the entrance of sin the soul ruled the flesh absolutely according to its free will. The *ordo naturalis*, i.e. first God, then soul, and lastly the flesh, - this is the Platonic order⁴³ - was safeguarded without any danger of the flesh reigning over the soul. But after the entrance of sin as a punishment and by divine order the soul was assigned to dwell in an inferior and mortal body such that it rules it no longer absolutely but only as the laws of the universe allows. In connection with Gal. 5,17, Augustine discusses this idea first in *De Libero Arbitrio*. Here he uses the words *post peccatum*, which, later in his clarification to Marcellinus in *Epistula* 143,5-6, is the right verbalization of this thought, that the first sin was not the sin just of the individual Adam but was the sin of the first parent of

⁴² "Et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam inprobantur et corrigenda iudicantur, sicut in divinis auctoritatibus legimus. Ait enim apostolus: *Misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci*; ait et propheta: *Delicta iuventutis et ignorantiae meae ne memineris*. Sunt etiam necessitate facta inprobanda, ubi vult homo recte facere et non potest. Nam unde sunt illae voces: *Non enim, quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago*; et illud: *Velle adiacet mihi perficere autem bonum non invenio*; et illud: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis*? Sed haec omnia hominum sunt ex illa mortis damnatione venientium; nam si non est ista poena hominis sed natura, nulla ista peccata sunt. Si enim non receditur ab eo modo quo naturaliter factus est ita ut melius esse non possit, ea quae debet facit cum haec facit. Si autem bonus homo esset, aliter esset. Nunc autem quia ita est, non est bonus nec habet in potestate ut bonus sit, sive non videndo qualis esse debeat, sive videndo et non valendo esse qualem debere esse se videt. Poenam istam esse quis dubitet?". *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,51, 172-175, CCL 29,305.

⁴³ PLATO, *Timaeus* 34c, (A. RIVAUD, ed.), Paris, 1956, p. 147.

mankind. In *De Libero Arbitrio* we read:

"After the entrance of sin, however, the soul, ordained to dwell in inferior and mortal bodies, does not rule its own body according to its free will, but as the laws of the universe allow"⁴⁴.

The clarification made by Augustine in *Epistula* 143,6, written in 412, is of paramount importance. He explains that we who are descendants of Adam, regardless of how our souls are made to join our bodies, suffer from the same penalty consequent to that sin. This penalty lies in the incapability of the soul to govern the flesh with absolute freedom. This was not so before the entrance of sin.

"For whether all souls are derived by propagation from the first, or, in the case of each individual, are singly created, or, being created apart from the body, are sent into it, or, whether they introduce themselves into the bodies spontaneously, without doubt this creature endowed with reason, that is, with the nature of a human soul, after the entrance of sin was ordained to dwell in inferior and mortal bodies. However, it does not rule its body absolutely according to free will. This is consistent with the sin of the first man. For it has not been said: 'After his own sin', or, 'After he has sinned'; but it has been said: 'After sin', so that if it were possible, whatever might afterwards be determined by reason as to the question whether sin was his own or of the first parent of mankind, it might be understood that in saying, 'the soul, appointed, after the entrance of sin, to occupy an inferior body, does not govern its body absolutely according to its own free will'. What has been said is true, since 'the flesh lusts against the spirit' (*Gal.* 5,17), and 'we groan in oppression' (*2 Cor.* 5,4), and 'the body, which corrupts, weighs down the soul' (*Wis.* 9,15)... For before the entrance of sin the soul of the first man did govern the body with perfect freedom of will, although that the body was not yet spiritual, but animal. But after the entrance of sin, that is, after the sin was committed in that flesh from which sinful flesh was thenceforward to be propagated, the rational soul is so destined to occupy an inferior body, that it does not govern its own body with absolute freedom of will ... But even those who do no acquiesce in this view have no just ground for taking offence at the sentence quoted from my book; for it is certain, if I am not mistaken, that even if the infirmity be the consequence not of sin, but of nature, it was at all events, only after the entrance of sin that bodies having this infirmity began to be produced; for Adam was not created thus, and he did not beget any offspring before he sinned"⁴⁵.

⁴⁴ "In corporibus autem inferioribus atque mortalibus post peccatum ordinata regit corpus suum, non omnimodo pro arbitrio sed sicut leges universitatis sinunt". *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,34.118, CCL 29,295.

⁴⁵ "Sive enim ex illa una omnes animae propagentur sive singillatim in singulis fiant sive extra creatae mittantur sive in corpora sponte mergantur, procul dubio creatura ista rationalis id est humanae animae natura in corporibus inferioribus, hoc est terrenis post peccatum ordinata regit corpus suum non omnimodo pro arbitrio interim, quod constat peccatum primi hominis. Non enim dictum est: 'Post peccatum suum' aut: 'Posteaquam peccavit', sed dictum est: 'Post peccatum', ut, quodlibet postea, si fieri posset, discussa

We may summarize Augustine's arguments as follows: (i) The incapability of the soul to rule the flesh absolutely according to its free will is a penalty for sin; this is consistent with the nature of sin. The refusal or the disobedience of the flesh to be controlled fully by the mind is a penalty which corresponds to the refusal or to the disobedience of our first parents to the command of God. (ii) Since it was only after the entrance of sin that offspring were begotten, we who are descendants of Adam, the first parent of mankind, similarly experience the incapability of our minds to control the concupiscences of the flesh.

B. The Controversy with the Donatists (394-411)

There is only one reference to *Gal.* 5,17 in the anti-Donatist works of Augustine. Against the Donatists, Augustine is not concerned with the problem of concupiscence. However, he once uses *Gal.* 5,17, together with *Mt.* 22,39: "Love your neighbours as yourself", and with *Eph.* 5,29: "For no man ever hates his own flesh", in order to justify his war against them. He equates "the lusts of the spirit against the flesh" to his desire to attain unity with the Donatists. Accordingly he claims his war against them to be praiseworthy; for the spirit wars against the flesh not out of hatred but out of love; not for disunity, but for unity. Thus, when accused by Petilianus on the basis of *Mt.* 5,9: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God", that those on Augustine's side "make a pretence of peace by wickedness, and seek unity by war", Augustine answers:

"For if we seek unity by war, our war could not be praised in more glorious terms, seeing that it is written, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself' (*Mt.* 22,39). And again, it is written, 'No man ever hated yet his own flesh' (*Eph.* 5,29). And yet 'the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh' (*Gal.* 5,17). But if no man ever hated his own flesh, and yet a man lusts against his own flesh, here you have unity sought by war, so that the body, being subject to correction, may be brought under submission. But what the spirit does against the flesh, waging war with it not in hatred but in love,

ratio declareret sive peccatum eius sive peccatum parentis carnis eius, recte dictum intellegeretur, quod dictum est: 'Post peccatum in inferioribus corporibus ordinata regit corpus suum non omni modo pro arbitrio', quia et *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et ingemescimus gravati et corpus, quod corrumpitur, adgravat animam* ... nam illius primi hominis anima ante peccatum etiamsi nondum spiritale corpus sed animale tamen pro arbitrio regebat. Post peccatum autem, id est posteaquam peccatum in illa carne commissum esset, ex qua deinceps propagaretur caro peccati, anima rationalis sic est in inferioribus corporibus ordinata, ut non omni modo pro arbitrio regat corpus suum ... nec sic istis verbis nostris habent quod suscenseant. Constat quippe, nisi fallor, eandem carnem, etiamsi non vitio sed natura infirma est, tamen post peccatum coepisse nasci, quia neque ita creatus est Adam neque aliquem genuit ante peccatum". *Epistula* 143,6, CSEL 44,255-257.

is done by those who are spiritual against those who are carnal, that they may do towards them what they do towards themselves, because they love their neighbours as neighbours indeed. But the war which the spiritual wage is that correction which is in love; their sword is the word of God"⁴⁶.

C. The controversy with the Pelagians (412-430)

1. "Shameful" concupiscence is a consequence of the primal sin

Augustine's discussion on the concupiscence of the flesh with the Pelagians is centered more on its sexual concept. Although his struggle against the Pelagians had already started in earnest in 412, it is, however, only in and after 418 that we see him taking up the problem of concupiscence, which he discussed much earlier with the Manicheans. Before 418 the Pelagians were concerned with the problems of original sin, of death, and of man's natural capacity to do good⁴⁷.

The first problem is concerned with the relation of the condemnation of concupiscence with marriage. If concupiscence is censured, is marriage eventually censured? Julian understands Augustine to censure marriage, because the bishop of Hippo censures shameful concupiscence: "You censure fleshly lust; therefore, you eventually condemn marriage".

Augustine, however, answers: The censure of fleshly lust does not result in the condemnation of marriage; for fleshly lusts come out not of marriage but of sin. Marriage was instituted and blessed by God. It existed before sin. God gave Adam and Eve their seminal power⁴⁸. Even original sin does not render marriage evil⁴⁹. The Pelagians, therefore, err in interpreting Augustine.

"Since this is the case, they undoubtedly err who think that when fleshly lust is censured, marriage is condemned. It is as though this fleshly lust comes out of marriage and not of sin. Were not those first spouses, whose marriage God blessed, saying, 'Be fruitful and multiply' (*Gen.* 1,28) - 'naked without any

⁴⁶ "Nam si bello quaerimus unitatem, non potuit laudari praeclarius bellum nostrum; quandoquidem scriptum est, *Diligens proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum*. Et iterum scriptum est, *Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit*. Et tamen *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*. Quod si nemo carnem suam odio habet, et tamen adversus carnem suam concupiscit; ecce bello unitas quaeritur, ut corpus castigatum servituti subjiatur. Quod autem spiritus facit adversus carnem, non odio, sed dilectione belligerans; hoc spirituales faciunt adversus carnales, ut quod agunt erga se, agant et erga illos, quia diligunt proximos tanquam proximos: sed bellum spirituum est illa in charitate correptio, gladius eorum sermo Dei est". *Contra Litteras Petiliani* 2,68.154, PL 43,307-308.

⁴⁷ See R. ORBE, *San Agustín y el Problema de la Concupiscencia* in *Revista Española de Teología* 1 (1940) 313-337, p. 319.

⁴⁸ *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,35.40, CSEL 42,198.

⁴⁹ *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,33.38, CSEL 42,196-197.

shame' (*Gen.* 3,1)? Why then did disorder from their members arise, except because an indecent motion arose there, which marriage certainly would not have, unless men have sinned"⁵⁰.

If we follow the text closely, we see that Augustine's argument for censuring lust is based on the sinning of our first parents; it was a sin of disobedience, for which they were punished by the indecent motion of their generative members; and because of their incapability to contain this indecent motion, they were confused (*cur ergo ex illis membris confusio post peccatum, nisi quia exstitit illic indecens motus, quem, nisi homines peccassent, procul dubio nuptiae non haberent?*). In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,6.7⁵¹, written between 418 and 421, and in *Contra Julianum* 5,7.25⁵², written in 422, Augustine explains that this motion is *indecent* because the members have become "disobedient" (*motum ideo indecentem quia inobedientem*).

Adam and Eve began to be conscious of this disobedient and indecent motion of the generative members immediately after they transgressed the commandment. This disobedience of the generative members is a just punishment. It is "a more fitting demonstration of the just deprivation of the human nature"; "it is most duly retributed to himself". Augustine uses *Rom.* 7,23 as a statement on the revolt of the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit.

"On that very occasion, after the first man has transgressed the law of God, he began to have another law in his members which wars against the law of his mind (*Rom.* 7,23), and he felt the evil of his own disobedience when he experienced the disobedience of his flesh, a most just repayment. Such then was 'the opening of the eyes' (*Gen.* 3,5), which the serpent promised him in his temptation. It was, in fact, the knowledge of something which he had better been ignorant of. Then, indeed, did man perceive within himself what he had done; then did he distinguish evil from good, not by avoiding, but by enduring it. For it certainly was not just that obedience should be rendered by his ser-

⁵⁰ "Quae cum ita sint, profecto errant qui cum vituperatur libido carnalis damnari nuptias opinantur, quasi morbus iste de conubio sit, non de peccato, nonne illi coniuges primi, quorum nuptias benedixit deus dicens: *crescite et multiplicamini, nudi erant et non confundebantur?* Cur ergo ex illis membris confusio post peccatum, nisi quia exstitit illic indecens motus, quem, nisi homines peccassent, procul dubio nuptiae non haberent?" *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,5.6, CSEL 42,216-217. See also *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,35.40 and 2,36.41, CSEL 42,198-199: in connection with *Gen.* 1,28; God endowed the first pair with seminal power.

⁵¹ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,6.7, CSEL 42,219.

⁵² *Contra Julianum* 5,7.25, PL 44,790.

vant, that is, by his body, to him, who did not obey his own Lord"⁵³.

After sin man lost full control of his disobedient generative members. Lust sometimes refuses to act when the mind wills it; often it acts against its will. This was not the case originally with the generative members⁵⁴. Like the other extremities and the other parts of the body, the generative members obeyed the direction of the mind, and functioned for the purpose for which they were made. But after the entrance of sin, unlike the other members, which still obey the direction of the mind, the generative members no longer obey.

"Well, how significant is it that the eyes, lips, tongue, hands, feet, the bending of the back, neck, and sides, when our body is free from any obstacle and is healthy, have been placed within our power such that we move them to do the function proper to them? However, when it comes to man's function of procreation, why is it that the members created for this purpose do not serve the direction of the will, but lust is waited for in order to set these members in motion, as though it has right over them, and sometimes it does not act when the mind wills it, but at other times does, even when the mind does not will it?"⁵⁵.

One may wonder, without having read Augustine thoroughly, how valid the explanation by the Bishop of Hippo is today for the rebellious motions of the genital members. With the advance of knowledge, especially in psychological and medical sciences, it is now known that lust and the consequent motions of the genitals and its other consequences originate primarily in a brain-center through the prompting of the will, and initially by the eliciting of the will by the intellect. This would put the origin of lust primarily in attitudes and not merely in the biological natural system. To assume that this is a finding of modern science is only half the truth. Augustine knew something of this even in his earlier writings. In *De Vera*

⁵³ "Ibi homo primitus dei lege transgressa aliam legem repugnantem suae menti habere coepit in membris et inoboedientiae suae malum sensit, quando sibi dignissime retributam inoboedientiam suae carnis invenit. Talem quippe etiam serpens oculorum apertionem seducendo promiserat, ad aliquid videlicet sciendum, quod melius nesciretur. Tunc in se quippe sensit homo quod fecit, tunc a bono malum non carendo, sed perpetiundo discrevit. Iniustum enim erat, ut obtemperaretur a servo suo, id est a corpore suo ei qui non obtemperarat domino suo". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,6.7, CSEL 42,218.

⁵⁴ *De Civitate Dei* 13,15, CSEL 40/1,633.

⁵⁵ "Nam quid est, quod oculi, labia, lingua, manus, pedes, inflexiones dorsi, cervicis et laterum ut ad opera sibi congrua moveantur positum in potestate est, quando ab impedimentis corpus liberum habemus et sanum, ubi autem ventum fuerit, ut filii seminentur, ad voluntatis nutum membra in hoc opus creata non serviunt, sed expectatur, ut ea velut sui iuris libido commoveat, et aliquando non facit animo volente, cum aliquando faciat et nolente?". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,6.7, CSEL 42,218-219. See also *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,35.40, CSEL 42,198-199.

Religione 40,74 (391) he speaks of the beauty of pleasure in the context of the good relationship between the interior man and the exterior man in an individual and of the relationship between a man and a woman in the process of begetting offspring. Besides being biological, this process primarily originates, in normal circumstances, from an agreement between two persons, the man and the woman. The production of the semen, the ejaculation, and finally the insemination, originally come from the functioning of a brain-center (*per genitales vias ab ipso vertice defluit in infima voluptate*).

"... another part receives the latent numerical qualities of the living person, and is fitted to result in offspring. Prompted either by an agreement of two bodies or by a phantasm of that kind, it [=the semen] flows, by a functioning of the brain, through the genital paths in basest pleasure"⁵⁶.

In *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10,12 (401-415) Augustine maintains that lust arises both from the interaction of the mind and the flesh: *Ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. Ex utroque enim fit...* This text proves again that biological process, like nocturnal ejaculation, even if we claim it to be purely natural, may not always be free from the influence of one's attitudes. Later in this chapter, we shall elaborate on Augustine's statements concerning the interaction of the mind and the flesh with respect to lust⁵⁷.

The loss of control over lust causes shame.

"Must not this bring shame to the freedom of the human will, when in contempt to God's command it has lost proper dominion even over its own members?"⁵⁸.

Out of shame for their nakedness, Adam and Eve covered their generative members with fig-leaves (cf. *Gen.* 3,7). Augustine's argument for proving that "shameful" concupiscence is a consequence of the primal sin is mainly

⁵⁶ "... aliud totius animalis latentes numeros accipit et incohat in prolem et sive convenientia duorum corporum sive tali aliquo phantasmate commotum per genitales vias ab ipso vertice defluit in infima voluptate". *De Vera Religione* 40,74, CCL 32,236.

⁵⁷ See M. MÜLLER, *Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts bis Thomas von Aquin. Eine moralgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Regensburg, 1954, p. 25. This author speaks of the function of our nervous system in connection with the sexual biological phenomenon; of the ideal of marriage in paradise; of the teachings on the same themes by Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Chrysostom. He shows Augustine's influence on Leo the Great, Fulgence of Ruspe, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville and others, including the scholastics.

⁵⁸ "Hincine non erubesceret humani libertas arbitrii, quod contemnendo imperantem deum etiam in membra propria proprium perdidisset imperium?" *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,6,7, CSEL 42,219. See also *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,36,41, CSEL 42,199.

based on the testimony of *Gen.* 3,7: "Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons". We have found this argument at least four times. In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,6.7 Augustine refers to how our first parents covered their naked members. He interprets this to mean a wilfull covering with flimsy materials the disobedient naked members of the ashamed offenders. The genitals were concealed so that decency might be attained, since they were ashamed of their indecent pleasure. Later in the same work, namely, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,30.52⁵⁹ as well as in *De Civitate Dei* 14,17⁶⁰ and in *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,16.32⁶¹ Augustine claims that the first couple made themselves girdles with those fig-leaves. Girdles are called in Greek περιζώματα and in Latin *campestris*. These were used as loin-clothings even later by youths, who, according to the Roman custom, stripped for exercise on the playing-field. In *De Civitate Dei* 14,17 Augustine says that these girdles were used to cover Adam and Eve's shameful naked generative members (*pudenda*).

When quoted wrongly, and accused dishonestly by Julian of maintaining that there would be no concupiscence had man not first sinned, Augustine corrected and strongly asserted that he did not say this in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*. He said instead, "There would be no shameful concupiscence".

"He says, 'You repeat and affirm: there would be no concupiscence, unless man had first sinned; there would be marriage, however, even if nobody had sinned'. I did not say: There would be no concupiscence, because there is also a concupiscence of the spirit, which is to be praised, with which wisdom is craved for (cf. *Gal.* 5,17; *Wis.* 6,21). But I said: 'There would be no shameful concupiscence'. Let my words be exactly repeated, which he himself also used, in order that it may appear how dishonestly they are related by him"⁶².

⁵⁹ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,30.52, CSEL 42,309.

⁶⁰ *De Civitate Dei* 14,17, CSEL 40/2,40.

⁶¹ *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,16.32, CSEL 60,448; see also *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,36.41, CSEL 42,199.

⁶² "'Ais iterum', inquit, 'et dicis: nulla esset concupiscentia, nisi homo ante peccasset, nuptiae vero essent, etiamsi nemo peccasset'; non dixi: nulla esset concupiscentia, quia est et glorianda concupiscentia spiritalis, qua concupiscitur sapientia, sed dixi: 'nulla esset pudenda concupiscentia'. Relegantur verba mea, quae etiam ipse posuit, ut quanta ab illo fraude commemorentur adpareat". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,30.52, CSEL 42,308. See also *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,1.1, CSEL 42,212; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,33.53, CSEL 42,213: lust (*libido*) became a disease (*morbus*) after the entrance of sin; *Contra Julianum* 3,26.64, PL 44,735; Augustine takes up again his statement found in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,1.1, CSEL 42,212.

2. *The words of the Scriptures are the conclusive arguments for the belief that there was primeval purity*

Before the entrance of sin primeval purity would have consisted in the following: the procreative members would have been excited at the command of the will, and not by the ardour of lust (*aestu libidinis*); in order to beget children, virginal integrity would have been corrupted for conception of the fetus not by the force of turbid heat (*vi turbidi ardoris*), but by the command of the gentlest love (*imperio tranquillissimae caritatis*), such that there would be no pain and bleeding on the part of the virgin; child-birth, if it had happened, would not have involved pain. That our first parents enjoyed these privileges, except for child-birth, since there was none, was earlier said vaguely by Augustine in *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10⁶³ written between 401 and 415; but this was said expressly later by him and confirmed in *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,15.31⁶⁴ written in 420/421. It is however, in *De Gratia Christi et De Peccato Originali* 2,35,40 that he distinctly said that these privileges would have been transmitted to us, had our first parents not sinned.

"However, if nature had not been dishonored by sin, far be it that we should think that the subsequent marriages in Paradise had been such that in them the procreative members would have been excited to produce offspring not by the command of the will, just as the foot is moved for walking, the hand for working, the tongue for speaking, but by the ardour of lust. Virginal integrity would have been vitiated for conception not by the turbid force of lustful heat as now happens; but it would have been submissive to the dominion of the gentlest love; and in that way, there would be no pain and no bleeding of the virgin in love-making, just as there would be also no groaning in pain of a mother in child-birth"⁶⁵.

The Pelagians question the validity of these statements. These are incredible since they are unverifiable in actual life. No actual proof nor concrete example of that primeval purity can be presented.

"Because in this state of mortality they are not experienced, they are therefore not believed in. Pelagius does not find an example of that primeval purity after

⁶³ *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10, CSEL 28/1,278.

⁶⁴ *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,15.31, CSEL 60,448.

⁶⁵ "Si autem peccato non fuisset dehonesta natura, absit ut opinemur tale futuras fuisset nuptias in paradiso, ut in eis ad prolem seminandum non nutu voluntatis, sicut pes ad ambulandum, manus ad operandum, lingua ad loquendum, sed aestu libidinis membra genitalia moverentur nec, sicut nunc fit, virginitatis integritas ad concipiendos fetus vi turbidi vitaretur ardoris, sed obsequeretur imperio tranquillissimae caritatis et eo modo non esset dolor et cruor virginis concumbentis, quomodo non esset etiam matris gemitus parientis". *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,35,40, CSEL 42,198-199.

nature was truly transformed for the worse by sin"⁶⁶.

Augustine admits these objections. However, he argues against them that if Scriptures are believed on many points which are not experienced now, or for narrations which we believe as true now, why should scriptural statements on primeval purity not be accepted? He likewise claims that he is speaking only to believers.

"But we are speaking to believers who know how to believe in Scriptures, even though no examples are adduced to the truth that was experienced. For how may I show now that man was made out of the dust, without any parents, that a wife was formed for him out of his own side? And yet what the eye no longer discovers faith makes them believe"⁶⁷.

The conclusions drawn from testimonies of the Scriptures cannot be easily discredited. Although they do not state that the original condition of married life was unattended by prurient pleasure; that the delivery of children would not have been accompanied by pain and groaning; death would not be the fate of any one born; yet, Scriptures state that all these, including shameful concupiscence, would not have existed had sin not been committed. The words of the Scriptures, therefore, are the conclusive arguments.

"Thus, it cannot indeed be shown now that both the first nuptial acts were done gently without lustful passion, and the motion of the procreative members, like that of the other members of the body, was not excited by the unrestrained ardour of lust, but according to the direction of the will - such nuptial acts would have continued had the disgrace of sin not intervened -; but, from those which have been written with divine authority it can rightly be believed. For I do not find now any child-birth without pain and groaning, any birth without the prospect of a future death; and yet, according to the truth of the Sacred Scriptures, there would not have been groaning on the part of the mother in child-birth and death of the human being, if sin had not proceeded. Nor would that which abashed our first parents, who hid their procreative members, have happened, because that also has been written in the sacred writings as having followed the previous sin"⁶⁸.

⁶⁶ "Haec ideo non creduntur, quia in ista mortalitatis conditione inexperta sunt. In deterius quippe vitio mutata natura non invenit primae illius puritatis exemplum". *De Gratia Christi et De Peccato Originali* 2,35.40, CSEL 42,198-199.

⁶⁷ "Sed fidelibus loquimur, qui noverunt credere divinis eloquiis etiam nullis adhibitis expertae veritatis exemplis. Quomodo enim nunc ostendam sine ullis parentibus de pulvere hominem factum eique de suo latere coniugem? Et tamen quod oculus iam non invenit, fides credit". *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,35.40, CSEL 42,199.

⁶⁸ "Sic ergo et primarum nuptiarum sine libidinis passione tranquillitas et motus genitalium sicut aliorum membrorum non ad effrenati calor incitamentum, sed ad voluntatis arbitrium - quales nuptiae perseverassent, si peccati non intervenisset obprobrium - nunc ostendi non potest, sed ex his quae divina auctoritate conscripta sunt non immerito credi potest. Sic enim modo non invenio sine pruriente libidine concumbentem. Sicut non

Do Augustine's arguments really prove that if sin had not been committed, nuptial acts would be performed with the command of the gentlest love and not with the force of the turbid heat of lustful pleasure? This question leads us to investigate further whether Augustine holds that before sin our first parent enjoyed a certain kind of sexual pleasure.

3. *A kind of concupiscence with its accompanying sexual pleasure possibly existed already before sin: The nature of this possible sexual pleasure*

What is problematic nowadays is whether Augustine, even already in his earlier writings, held the possibility that there was a kind of sexual pleasure before sin. We contend that Augustine, even in his earlier writings, hold the possibility that our first parents enjoyed sexual pleasure, although it was not of the same quality as now. With its primeval quality sexual pleasure did not numb the mind; whereas after the fall sexual pleasure deadens the mind. There are two reasons which we can bring forward for our contention: (i) In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8,10; written in 388/389, Augustine says that man was created as animal - he later corrected this by saying that he meant that the first man bore an animal body, as we pointed out in the preceding section - when at the breathing of the breath of life into him, he became a living soul: "But we should not yet consider man as spiritual but still as animal when he became a living soul". We pointed out earlier that one of the characteristics of an animal body is sense-perception. Without doubt, in the thinking of Augustine, the feeling accompanying sense-perception before sin must be pleasurable, considering that the first pair enjoyed paradisian happiness; and such happiness was existential and therefore enjoyed by them as a unity of body and soul. We may then conclude that the feeling through sexual contact by the first pair in the primeval state would have been pleasurable. (ii) In *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10, written in 401, Augustine uses the word *qualem* which is a term used to indicate *quality* and not substance *in se*. We shall now discuss this more extensively. The Latin text of Augustine's statement in *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10 reads as follows:

"Quamvis honestius meliusque credatur, ita fuisse tunc illorum hominum corpus animale constitutorum in paradiso, nondum mortis lege damnatum, ut non haberent appetitum carnalis voluptatis, qualem nunc habent ista corpora,

invenio sine dolore et gemitu parturientem, sine futura morte nascentem, et tamen secundum scripturam sanctarum veritatem gemitus parturientis et mors hominis non fuissent, si peccatum non praecessisset; sic nec illud unde erubuerunt, qui membra illa texerunt, quia et hoc in eisdem sanctis litteris praecedente peccato scriptum est consecutum". *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,36.41, CSEL 42,199.

quae iam ex mortis propagine ducta sunt"⁶⁹.

We translate this text into English as follows:

"However well and better it may be believed that the animal body of those human beings placed then in Paradise, not yet condemned by the law of death, such that they did not have the desire of carnal pleasure, of the (*qualem*) kind which these bodies now have, that have come already from the propagation of death."

Let us follow the text closely. Augustine is comparing the state of the animal body in Paradise (*corpus animale constitutum in paradiso*) with the state now (*qualem nunc habent ista corpora*). In the primeval state the *corpus animale* was not subject to the law of death (*nondum mortis lege damnatum*); after the entrance of sin, it was subject to the law of death (*ex mortis propagine ducta sunt*), and the bodies of the following generations were and are derived from those bodies which were subject to death. If our first parents had not sinned, they would have had the desire for the same carnal pleasure, because it had not the same quality (*qualem*) as the quality of sexual pleasure that the body enjoys now. Had Augustine used *quem* or *quam*, which would refer correspondingly to *appetitus* and *carnalis voluptatis*, relative pronouns used to indicate a substance and not a quality of a substance, then it would be reasonable to say that Augustine maintained that there was no appetite for sexual pleasure in the primeval state. However, he says, "*ut non haberent appetitum carnalis voluptatis, qualem nunc habent ista corpora, quae iam ex mortis propagine ducta sunt*". This phrase suggests the presence of concupiscence with the concomitant carnal pleasure, the quality of which changed because of sin. What, therefore, Augustine is saying is this: as a consequence of sin there was a change in the quality of concupiscence with its accompanying pleasure to another quality. This change is implied in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.10, written in 388/389, where Augustine says that our first parents, who were already in state of paradisiacal happiness, could still have become perfect had they obeyed God's command. However, because they did not, they were deprived of that happiness; they were sent out of Paradise; and they retained their animal condition.

"For in that instance he [sc. man] became spiritual when in Paradise, that is to say, being placed in the state of a happy life, he accepted also the command for perfection in order that he might be made completely perfect by the words of God. Therefore, after he sinned by turning away from the command of God, he was sent out of Paradise and remained in an *animalis* condition"⁷⁰.

⁶⁹ *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10, CSEL 28/1,278.

⁷⁰ "Tunc enim spiritualis effectus est, cum in paradiso, hoc est in beata vita constitutus, praeceptum etiam perfectionis accepit, ut verbo Dei consummaretur. Itaque postquam peccavit, recedens a praecepto Dei, et dimissus est de paradiso, in hoc remansit ut animalis esset". *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,8.10, PL 34,201. See also *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,12.16,205: the *naturalis ordo*, which consists in the operation of Wisdom in the soul and through the soul in the body, was maintained in the state of paradisiacal happiness.

What could the expulsion from Paradise mean, but the deprivation of primeval happiness? What could the deprivation of primeval happiness mean, but the deterioration of the human conditions as a whole, and, therefore, the deterioration of the primeval quality of concupiscence with its accompanying pleasure? In *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10 Augustine's description of the process of deterioration gradually becomes clearer. He describes the deterioration of the animal body according to *Gen.* 2,17: "On the day that you eat of it, you shall die", and according to *Rom.* 7,22-25: "For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive of the law of sin which dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord". In these scriptural texts we see that death and conflict between the tendencies of the flesh of the spirit are the main characteristics of the human body in its deterioration. In the following paragraph and in the same context, Augustine gives a possible description of the quality of the primeval state of the *corpus animale* and its appearance after sin. In the primeval state the animal bodies of our first parents had the possibility of not dying; they also had the possibility of receiving an angelical form and a celestial quality. After the fall, however, the animal bodies of human beings were subject to death, which had gained dominion over them like a lethal disease; the presence of death as a disease changed that quality with which before the fall the first pair had full dominion over their bodies. After the fall the law in the members led them captive in the law of sin.

"Similarly those human beings, bearing bodies which were truly animal, that would not die unless they had sinned, and once would receive an angelical form and a celestial quality, as soon as they transgressed the command, death itself as a lethal disease was conceived in their bodies; and it changed that quality with which they had dominion over the body in such a way that they had no reason to say: 'I see another law in my members at war with the law of my mind' (*Rom.* 7,23)"⁷¹.

What then was the primeval quality of concupiscence with its accompanying pleasure? In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,11.15 and 2,12.16 Augustine explains *Gen.* 1,18: "It is not good that the man should

⁷¹ "Ita illi homines animalia quidem corpora gerentes, sed non moritura, nisi peccassent, acceptura autem angelicam formam caelestemque qualitatem, mox ubi praeceptum transgressi sunt, eorum membris velut aliqua aegritudo letalis mors ipsa concepta est mutavitque illam qualitatem, qua corpori sic dominabantur, ut non dicerent: *video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae*". *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10, CSEL 28/1,279.

be alone" and *Gen.* 2,21,22: "So the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and while he slept took one of his ribs and closed up its place with flesh; and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man he made into woman and brought her to the man". He maintains that the author signified the natural order in which Wisdom governed the spirit and the spirit governed the flesh. In the primeval state Wisdom so possessed the spirit and the appetite of the soul, through which we act with the members of our body, that order was safeguarded and the flesh was dominated by the spirit and did not lust against the spirit. Accordingly, in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,11.15, Augustine says:

"He begins to explain the way the woman was made; and it is said that she was made in order to help the man so that from their spiritual union spiritual offspring would be born, that is to say, good works of divine praise, when man orders and the woman obeys; he is governed by Wisdom; she is governed by the man, considering that Christ is the head of the man and the man is the head of the woman. Accordingly it is said: "It is not good for man to be alone" (*Gen.* 2,18). For still there was something to be done, in order that not only the soul would rule the body, because the body acts as a servant, but also in order that reason, which is virile (*virilis ratio*), would submit to his dominion its own animal part, and with the help of this virile part it would dominate the body. In accordance with this example the woman was made, whom the order of creation places under the dominion of the man, in order that what appears clearly in two human beings, that is, in the male and the female, in their relation with one another, could also be considered in one man; such that the interior mind, as the virile (*virilis*) reason, contains as subdued the appetite of the soul, through which we work with the members of the body, and makes its helper the way according to the just law, just as the man should govern the woman, and should not allow her to dominate the man, because the house where this happens is perverse and miserable"⁷².

In *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10 Augustine describes the physical and psychological phenomena in the process of love-making for the purpose of creation. Our first parents had absolute dominion over lust and over their

⁷² "Incipit exponi quomodo sit facta femina: et facta dicitur in adiutorium viri, ut copulatione spirituali spirituales fetus ederet, id est bona opera divinae laudis; dum ille regit, haec obtemperat; ille a sapientia regitur, haec a viro. Caput enim viri Christus, et caput mulieris vir. Ideoque dicitur: *Non est bonum solum hominem esse*. Adhuc enim erat, quod fieret, ut non solum anima corpori dominaretur, quia corpus servilem locum obtinet, sed etiam virilis ratio subiugaret sibi animalem partem suam, per quod adiutorium imperaret corpori. Ad huius rei exemplum femina facta est, qua rerum ordo subiugat viro; ut quod in duobus hominibus evidentius apparet, id est in masculo et femina, etiam in uno homine considerari possit: ut appetitum animae, per quem de membris corporis operamur, habeat mens interior tanquam virilis ratio subiugatum, et iusta lege modum imponat adiutorio suo, sicut vir debet feminam regere, nec eam permittere dominari in virum; quod ubi contingit, perversa et misera domus est". *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2,11.15, PL 34,204-205.

procreative members just as over any other members. That dominion was not opposed by any internal force that caused difficulty, of whatever nature (*sine ulla molestia*). Instead, love-making was pleasurable in all respects. Let us quote the text in Latin.

"Quae cum ita sint, cur non credamus illos homines ante peccatum ita genitalibus membris ad procreandos filios imperare potuisse, sicut caeteris, quae in quolibet opere anima sine ulla molestia et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet?"⁷³.

This text, however, seems to have given many translators difficulty. The phrase "*quae in quolibet opere anima sine ulla molestia et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet*" is the main difficulty. Because of the position of *sine* and because of the absence of the *comma* (,) after *molestia* in many manuscripts, some have thought that *sine* also modifies *et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet*. Some, however, think that *sine* does not modify *et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet*. An understanding of the function of *sine* has a key importance in an interpretation of Augustine's thought. If *sine* is read twice then it would appear that here Augustine is saying that there was *no* sexual pleasure, of whatever kind, in paradise. This is apparently what a French translator renders:

"S'il en est ainsi, pourquoi ne pas croire que ces premiers hommes, avant le péché, pouvaient commander aux organes de la génération afin de procréer des enfants, comme ils commandaient aux autres membres que l'âme meut sans aucune gêne et *sans* l'aiguillon du plaisir pour les appliquer à quelque tâche?"⁷⁴.

A German translator seems to be of the same way of thinking.

"Das ist nun einmal so. Warum glauben wir also nicht, dass die Menschen vor dem Sündenfall ihren Zeugungsgliedern ebenso gebieten konnten wie den übrigen Gliedern auch, die die Seele zu jedwedem Werk mühelos und gleichsam *ohne* Lustbegierde bewegt?"⁷⁵.

A Spanish translator would seem to depart from the previous two in favoring the presence of a certain kind of joy achieved by our first parents in their sexual relationship in paradise: *sino más bien con cierto placer de alegría*.

"Siendo las cosas así, ¿por qué no creeremos que aquellos hombres antes del pecado pudieron imperar sobre los miembros genitales para engendrar a los hijos, como imperan sobre los otros, que el alma mueve en cualquier acto sin molestia alguna, sino más bien con cierto placer de alegría?"⁷⁶.

⁷³ *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10, CSEL 28(1),279.

⁷⁴ P. AGAËSSE & A. SOLIGNAC, *La Genèse au sens littéral*, BA 49, p. 115.

⁷⁵ C.J. PERL, *Aurelius Augustinus, Über den Wortlaut der Genesis*, Bd. II, Paderborn, 1964, p. 103.

⁷⁶ B.M. PÉREZ, *Del Genesis a la Letra*, Madrid, BAC 15, 1957, p. 1027.

The difficult phrase to interpret in the text is: *et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet*. Lewis and Short, in *A Latin Dictionary*, translate *et*, when used "to subjoin a word or phrase which more accurately defines or more briefly comprehends what goes before" as "and indeed", "and moreover", "and that too". The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* translate *et*, when "adding a positive to a negative clause" as "and rather, and on the contrary". It appears from the text that Augustine is comparing the dominion of the soul over the rest or other members of the body with its dominion over the procreative members. Under normal conditions the soul now moves the other members without difficulty. Augustine thinks that before the entrance of sin the soul also had an effortless dominion over the procreative members. Because of the *et*, the phrase *et quasi pruritu voluptatis movet* appears to be said in contrast, or in order to add a positive clause to the negative *sine ulla molestia*. *Quasi* is translated by Lewis and Short as "as if", "just as", "as it were", and is similar to *veluti*, *sicuti*, *tamquam*. The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* translates *quasi*, when used "with indicative, in an actual comparison", as "as is the case if", "in the same degree or manner as"; and when used "with clause reduced to a single word or phrase" as "as", "like". Forcellini, in *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*, equates it with *tamquam*, *velut*, *perinde ac si*. *Pruritus* is here clearly a sexual term; it means "itch" or "sexual excitement". *Voluptas* means "satisfaction", "enjoyment", "pleasure", "delight". If Augustine says that the soul moves the rest of the members of the body without any difficulty, *but (et)* as though with the itch of pleasure (*quasi pruritu voluptatis*), what could that pleasure be that accompanied the love-making between our first parents in the primeval state? It was truly sexual⁷⁷. Therefore, we translate the text as follows:

"As this is now the human condition [= all will die as a result of the first sin], why would we not believe that those first human beings before sin could command their generative members at will in order to procreate offspring, just as the soul moves the other members in other work without any difficulty but with a certain feeling of pleasure?"

Let us go more deeply into this particular question. In *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1,19 (338/389), in connection with *Gen.* 1,27-28: "God made them male and female; and He blessed them, saying: Be fruitful and multiply; beget offspring and fill the earth", Augustine admits *also* an interpre-

⁷⁷ The reader may compare this with Augustine's use or interpretation of *quasi* in *De Civitate Dei* 22,21, CSEL 40/2,634, with respect to the quality of the *caro spiritualis* and *spiritus carnalis* in the light of 1 Cor. 3,1: "*Non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritalibus, sed quasi carnalibus*"? In Augustine's interpretation of Paul, *quasi spiritalibus* means truly spiritual people; and *quasi carnalibus* means truly carnal people.

tation of the union between man and woman in a spiritual sense: *Licet enim nobis eam etiam spiritualiter accipere*. However, in *Retractationes* 1,9 he rejects this earlier interpretation: "... de qua dictum est: *crescite et multiplicamini, in carnalem fecunditatem post peccatum conversam esse credendam, si non potest alio modo dictum videri, nisi ut putentur illi homines non habituri fuisse filios homines, nisi peccassent, omnino non adprobo*". The change in Augustine's interpretation, that is, from a spiritual union to a true physical union through sexual intercourse, was made at a much earlier date than the *Retractationes*. In *De Bono Coniugali* 1,1, written in 401, he already maintains that children would have been begotten through sexual intercourse, even if our first parents did not sin.

"Therefore the first natural bond of human society is man and wife... For they are joined one to another side by side, they who walk together and look together where they are going. Then follows the connection of fellowship in children. A child alone is a worthy fruit not of (any other) union of husband and woman, but of sexual intercourse. For a certain relationship of friends or of a brother and a sister could also exist between two sexes without such kind of sexual union, one ruling and the other serving"⁷⁸.

Augustine repeats this same position in *De Civitate Dei* 14,22⁷⁹ (418/420). He discounts the allegorical interpretation of *Gen.* 1,27-28. Instead, he asserts that, because of the difference in sex, our first parents would have begotten children through sexual intercourse and not through other kinds of union.

It has to be noted, however, that Augustine is ready to admit that there could also have been an asexual production of children. In *De Bono*

⁷⁸ "Prima itaque naturalis humanae societatis copula vir et uxor est... Lateribus enim sibi iunguntur, qui pariter ambulant et pariter quo ambulant intuentur. Consequens est conexio societatis in filiis, qui unus honestus fructus est non coniunctionis maris et feminae, sed concubitus. Poterat enim esse in utroque sexu etiam sine tali commixtione alterius regentis, alterius obsequentis amicalis quaedam et germana coniunctio" *De Bono Coniugali* 1,1, CSEL 41,187-188.

⁷⁹ "Nos autem nullo modo dubitamus secundum benedictionem Dei crescere et multiplicari et implere terram donum esse nuptiarum, quas Deus ante peccatum hominis ab initio constituit, creando masculum et feminam, qui sexus evidens utique in carne est. Huic quippe operi Dei etiam benedictio ipsa subiuncta est. Nam cum scriptura dixisset: *Masculum et feminam fecit eos*, continuo subdidit: *Et benedixit eos Deus dicens: Crescite et multiplicamini et implete terram et dominamini eius* (*Gen.* 1,27-28), et cetera. Quae omnia quamquam non inconvenienter possint etiam ad intellectum spiritalem referri, masculum tamen et feminam non sicut simile aliquid etiam in homine uno intellegi potest, quia videlicet in eo aliud est quod regit, aliud quod regitur; sed sicut evidentissime apparet in diversi sexus corporibus, masculum et feminam ita creatos, ut prolem generando crescerent et multiplicarentur et impleverent terram, magnae absurditatis est reluctari". *De Civitate Dei* 14,22, CSEL 40/2,45-46.

Coniugali 2,2 he thinks it possible for our first parents to have begotten children without the medium of sex, just as Jesus was formed in the womb of a virgin and as the bees (*apes*) reproduce without the medium of sex: "...qui potuit carnem Christi in utero virginali formare et, ut iam ipsius infidelibus loquar, qui potuit apibus prolem sine concubito dare...". He repeats the example of the bees in *De Civitate Dei* 15,27: "*alia vero in quibus nihil sit maris et feminae, sicut apes*".

Similarly, however, Augustine also admits the possible existence of *libido* in paradise. At least five parallels could be given for this: *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,35.59; *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,17.35; *Contra Julianum Opus Imperfectum* 3,177;4,39;6,22. In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,35.39 he admits it to be possible as a concession to the Pelagians; however, he makes a distinction between the quality of concupiscence before the fall and now: "*hoc si dicit, saltem consideret nunc in hominibus non esse quod dicit*". M. Müller⁸⁰ gives a description of Augustine's development in interpreting *Gen.* 1,28. He points out that Augustine admits a possibility of *libido* in paradise that is submitted to the command of the will. The author exposes there Augustine's admission in *De Civitate Dei* 14,22 f. and in *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,17.35. In his later writings Augustine says that after the fall the intensity of this ardour is so strong that it overpowers the mind.

"This lust assumes power not only over the whole body, and not only from the outside, but also internally; it disturbs the whole man, when the mental emotion combines and mingles with the physical craving, resulting in a pleasure surpassing all physical delights. So intense is the pleasure that when it reaches its climax there is an almost total extinction of mental alertness; the intellectual sentries, as it were, are overwhelmed"⁸¹.

In later years Augustine is no longer concerned with whether there was sexual pleasure (*voluptas*) or not in the primeval state. He avoids arguing further with the Pelagians by admitting it as a possibility in

⁸⁰ *Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts bis Thomas von Aquin*, Regensburg, 1954, p. 23 and following.

⁸¹ "Haec autem sibi non solum totum corpus nec solum extrinsecus, verum etiam intrinsecus vindicat totumque commovet hominem animi simul adfectus cum carnis appetitu coniuncto adque permixto, ut ea voluptas sequatur, qua maior in corporis voluptatibus nulla est; ita ut momento ipso temporis, quo ad eius pervenitur extremum, paene omnis acies et quasi vigilia cogitationis obruatur". *De Civitate Dei* 14,16, CSEL 40/2,37-38. Trans. by H. BETTENSON, *City of God*, Harmondsworth, 1980, p. 577.

Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum 1,17.35⁸² written in 420/421. Augustine concedes to the Pelagians the possibility that there was a kind of concupiscence and sexual pleasure in the primeval state. But still he wants to emphasize that there was a change of quality in that concupiscence and pleasure.

"However, whichever of the remaining two you would have chosen, there is no need to strive against you with any disputation. For even when you have not chosen the fourth, in which there is the highest tranquility of all the obedient members without any lust, since the urgency of your arguments has made you already hostile to it, at least what I placed in the third place will please you that that carnal concupiscence, whose impulse attains to the final pleasure (*postremam voluptatem*), which much delights you, would never arise in Paradise, except at the bidding of the will it was necessary for procreation. If it pleases you to situate this in Paradise, and if it appears to you that in that state of happiness they could beget children through that concupiscence of the flesh, which neither would go ahead of nor hesitate to follow nor go beyond the dominion of the will, then we do not object. For concerning this matter which we are dealing with, it is enough for us to say that concupiscence now among such men is not such as (*qualem*) you concede could exist in the place of that

⁸² See *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,17.34,35, CSEL 60,450-451. A. TRAPÈ understands the words *qualis nunc est*, when Augustine speaks of concupiscence in comparing man's condition now with that in paradise, to mean the "nature" and not the "degree" of concupiscence: "È certo che S. A. quando parla della concupiscenza *qualis nunc est* non pensa al *grado*, ma alla *specie*. Egli distingue tre *specie* di relazioni tra il senso e la ragione: primo, l'immunità della concupiscenza, stato felicissimo in cui la ragione si servirebbe dei sensi come ora si serve delle mani o dei piedi; secondo, la concupiscenza soggetta alla ragione, tale cioè che non provocherebbe alla lotta, né spingerebbe al peccato; terzo, la concupiscenza *qualis nunc est*, causa continua di lotta e incentivo al male. Dal paradiso terrestre egli esclude energicamente questa seconda concupiscenza, non la prima; perchè, così egli mille volte, o la concupiscenza è un vizio in se stessa o quella che noi sperimentiamo è stata viziata dal peccato (cf. *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 1,70,II,208;III,187;IV,19;V,17;VI,22; *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* I,17;34-35 etc.). È chiaro allora che quando S. A. dice a Giuliano: "*Si dixeris, qualis nunc est, talem fuisse concupiscentiam carnis ante peccatum, vincet te procul dubio Manichaeus*" (*Op. im.* VI,14), si riferisce alla concupiscenza disordinata come tale, a quella cioè che intendiamo comunemente quando usiamo questa parola. Qui non si tratta di gradi, ma di natura: la concupiscenza o è soggetta alla ragione o no lo è; nel primo caso poteva anche esserci nel paradiso terrestre - S. A. non vuol discutere - nel secondo caso no, assolutamente". A. TRAPÈ, *Un celebre testo de Sant'Agostino sull' "Ignoranza e la difficoltà"*, in *Augustinus Magister II*, 1954, p. 800. We would like to call the attention of Trapè that Augustine maintains also the presence of *glorianda concupiscentia* and of *concupiscentia bona* in paradise. Therefore, concupiscentia does not have only a pejorative meaning. Cf. *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,30.52, CSEL 42,308; *En. in Ps.* 118,S.8,3, CCL 40,1687. The other reference where we can find texts about the possibility of *libido* in paradise are the following: *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 3,177, CSEL 85,478; 4,29, PL 45,1360; 6,22, PL 45,1553. Unlike Trapè, we maintain that for Augustine there possibly was a change in the degree or quality of concupiscence.

happiness. For as (*qualis*) it now is, the intelligence of all men certainly confesses, although with modesty, since it solicits with inordinate and importunate uneasiness even the chaste even when they are unwilling and try to check it by temperance; and it frequently subsides itself when they are willing; it inflicts on the unwilling..."⁸³.

Augustine gives four possible conditions of paradisian sexual life: (i) as often as even they pleased they would have had intercourse; (ii) they would bridle lust when intercourse was not necessary; (iii) lust would arise at the summons of the will just at the time when chaste prudence would have perceived beforehand that intercourse was necessary; (iv) there was no lust at all, as every other member served for its own work, so for its own work the organs of generation also would obey the commands of those that willed, without any difficulty. Of these four only the third was agreeable to both Augustine and the Pelagians.

In the fourth possibility, that is, there was the highest tranquility of all obedient members without any lust, Augustine seems to maintain that his giving in to the position of the Pelagians was not a real admission. It was a painful concession. This is because he could not bring them to accept his own position, and at the same time he could not completely discredit their arguments. This would indicate that the theory of the possibility of *libido* and sexual pleasure, in paradise is not really that of Augustine himself; it remains that of the Pelagians. Augustine expresses his dislike for sexual pleasure, although apparently he admits the possibility of its existence from nature: "Who, however, with a sound mind would not prefer no pleasure (*voluptas*) at all had been given us by nature?"⁸⁴.

⁸³ "Duarum vero reliquarum quamlibet elegeritis, non est adversus vos ulla contentione laborandum, etsi enim quartam nolueritis eligere, ubi est omnium oboedientium membrorum sine ulla libidine summa tranquillitas, quoniam iam vos ei fecit vestrarum disputationum inpetus inimicos, illud vobis saltem placebit, quod tertio loco posuimus, ut illa carnalis concupiscentia, cuius motus ad postremam, quae vos multum delectat, pervenit voluptatem, numquam in paradiso, nisi cum ad gignendum esset necessaria, ad nutum voluntatis exsurgeret, hanc si placet vobis in paradiso collocare et per talem concupiscentiam carnis, quae nec praeveniret nec tardaret nex excederet imperium voluntatis, vobis videtur in illa felicitate filios potuisse generari non repugnamus. Ad hoc enim, quod agimus, sufficit nobis, quia nunc talis in hominibus non est, qualem in illius felicitatis loco esse potuisse conceditis, qualis quippe nunc sit, profecto omnium sensus mortalium etsi cum verecundia confitetur, quia et castos etiam nolentes eamque temperatiam castigantes inquietudine inordinata inopportunaque sollicitat et plerumque sese volentibus subtrahit, nolentibus ingerit". *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 1,17.35, CSEL 60,451-452.

⁸⁴ Augustine quotes these words of Cicero in *Contre Julianum* 4,72, PL 44,774. See also *De Civitate Dei* 14,16, CCL 48,439: "Quis autem amicus sapientiae ... non mallet, si posset, sine hac libidine filios procreare".

4. *Shameful concupiscence is both the daughter and the mother of sin. Jesus Christ was born without sin*

Shameful concupiscence did not come upon nature except through the sin of our first parents. In this respect it is a daughter of sin (*filia peccati*). However, when it yields consent to the commission of shameful deeds, then it is a mother of sins (*peccatorum mater multorum*).

"This very ardour, whether it follows or goes ahead of the will, nevertheless itself moves the members as though under its own power; these members cannot be moved at will; and in this manner it shows itself not to be a servant of the commanding will, but a punishment of a disobedient will. It is to be excited not by free choice, but by a certain exciting stimulus, and, therefore, it is a cause of shame. This concupiscence of the flesh, which although is not accounted sin in the re-born, nevertheless did not come upon nature except through sin; from this, I may say, the concupiscence of the flesh is as a daughter of sin, and, when it yields consent to the commission of shameful deeds, whatever offspring is born of the mother of many sins is bound by the original sin, unless he is born again in Him, whom the virgin conceived without the excitement of concupiscence; therefore, when He deigned to be born in the flesh, He alone was born without sin"⁸⁵.

5. *Concupiscence comes from the interaction of both soul and the flesh*

There is a substantial union between the soul and the body. For this reason the flesh by itself alone cannot desire anything. It only does so when in union with the soul. Neither does the soul lust for anything except in union with the body. Concupiscence arises from both the soul and the flesh, in a relation of unity (*ex utroque enim fit*).

"Very truly and very truthfully indeed has it been written, 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh' (*Gal. 5,17*). However, I think that all the learned as well as the unlearned will not doubt that the flesh without the soul can't lust for something. For this reason the cause of carnal concupiscence itself is not only in the soul, but much less is it in the flesh alone. It arises from both in relation with each other; from the soul, because without it no pleasure can be felt; from the flesh, in its turn, because without it no

⁸⁵ "Qui certe ardor, sive sequatur sive praeveniat voluntatem, non tamen nisi ipse quodam quasi suo imperio movet membra, quae moveri voluntate non possunt, atque ita se indicat non imperantis famulum, sed inobedientis supplicium voluntatis nec libero arbitrio, sed inlecebro aliquo stimulo commovendum et ideo pudendum. Ex hac carnis concupiscentia, quae licet in regeneratis iam non deputetur in peccatum, tamen naturae non accidit nisi de peccato, ex hac, inquam, concupiscentia carnis tamquam filia peccati et, quando illi ad turpia consentitur, etiam peccatorum matre multorum quaecumque nascitur proles originali est obligata peccato, nisi in illo renascatur, quem sine ista concupiscentia virgo concepit, propterea, quando nasci est in carne dignatus, sine peccato solus est natus". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,24.27, CSEL 42,239-240. See also A. TRAPÈ, *Un celebre testo de Sant'Agostino sull' "Ignoranza e la difficoltà"*, in *Augustinus Magister* II, p. 798; R. ORBE, *San Agustín y el Problema de la concupiscencia en su marco histórico*, in *Revista Española de Teología* 1 (1940-41), 331.

carnal pleasure can be felt"⁸⁶.

Augustine, however, distinguishes between the lust of the soul (*anima*) and the lust of the spirit (*spiritus*). The lust of the spirit (*spiritus*) although the soul is substantially united with the body, is completely free from the conflict that arises from the lust of the flesh. This happens when in certain actions, like reading, writing, discussing, listening, doing works of mercy and other humanitarian deeds, the flesh shows obedience and does not offer any opposition. The lust of the soul, however, is still mingled with the opposition of the flesh.

"The apostle, therefore, says that the flesh lusting against the spirit is without doubt a carnal delight, which the spirit (*spiritus*) has from the flesh and has with the flesh against the delight which it alone (*solus*) has. Indeed, unless I make a mistake it alone has that desire without the mixture of the pleasure of the flesh and with the covetousness for carnal matters, with which the soul (*anima*) desires and faints at the threshold of the house of the Lord (*Ps.* 83,2); it alone has also that desire, with respect to which it is said to it: You desired wisdom; keep the commandment, and the Lord will give it to you (*Eccli.* 1,26). For when the spirit commands the members of the body to the effect that they serve this desire, with which it alone is inflamed, just as when a book is taken, when something is written, read, discussed, listened to, when finally a loaf of bread is broken and given to the hungry, and other works of mercy and humanitarian deeds are shown, the flesh shows obedience and does not excite the concupiscence. These and other desires of the same nature, with which the soul alone (*sola anima*) longs, when they are opposed by something, which delights the same soul according to the operations of the flesh, then the flesh is said to lust against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh"⁸⁷.

⁸⁶ "Verissime quippe ac veracissime scriptum est: *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem*; sed tamen carnem sine anima concupiscere nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. Ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. Ex utroque enim fit: ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio ulla sentitur, ex carne autem, quod sine illa carnalis delectatio non sensitur". *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10,12, CSEL 28/1,309. See also *De Natura et Gratia* 56,66, PL 44,288: the concupiscence of the flesh comes not from the substance but from the operations of the flesh; *Contra Julianum* 5,14.41, PL 44,812; *Sermo de Utilitate Jejunii* 4, PL 40,709-710.

⁸⁷ "Carnem itaque concupiscentem adversus spiritum dicit apostolus carnalem procul dubio delectationem, quam de carne et cum carne spiritus habet adversus delectationem, quam solus habet. Solus quippe habet, ni fallor, illud desiderium non cum carnis voluptate vel carnalium rerum cupiditate conmixtum, quo desiderat et deficit anima in atria domini; solus habet etiam illud, de quo ei dicitur: *concupisti sapientiam: serva mandatum, et dominus praebebit illam tibi*. Nam cum spiritus imperat membris corporis, ut huic desiderio serviant, quo solus accenditur, velut cum adsumitur codex, cum aliquid scribitur, legitur, disputatur, auditur, cum denique panis frangitur esurienti et cetera humanitatis ac misericordiae praestantur officia, oboedientiam caro exhibet, non concupiscentiam movet. His atque huius modi bonis desideriis, quibus sola anima concupiscit, cum adversatur

Augustine's contention that concupiscence comes from both the soul and the flesh, in substantial union with each other, leads to some conclusions. First, he cannot be branded as strictly dualistic. Second, he cannot be accused of limiting the concept of concupiscence to sexual appetites. It is this second point which interests us here.

6. Concupiscence is not only sexual: besides sexual appetites there are other manifestations of concupiscence

Concupiscence is not only sexual. Earlier against the Manicheans, Augustine says that concupiscence is the conflict between two wills in man. And later in *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 4,28, he warns Julian against accusing him of having said that the concupiscence of the flesh is excited only for the pleasure of the procreative organs. Concupiscence, for Augustine, is experienced in every organ.

"You say this in such a manner as though we claim that concupiscence of the flesh is excited only for the pleasure of the genitals. It is certain that concupiscence itself is experienced in every sense organ"⁸⁸.

Concupiscence is manifested in various ways. Augustine shows this by often identifying the description of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit as described in *Gal.* 5,17 with the conflict of the law in the members with the law of the mind as portrayed in *Rom.* 7,23. Various names are given to concupiscence on account of this identification. However, he discounts *passio* because in ecclesiastical language this is a more neutral term⁸⁹.

*a. Adpetitus carnalis voluptatis or pruritus voluptatis*⁹⁰.

It is the appetite for sexual pleasure, which already existed before sin in a much less intense degree. After the entrance of sin its intensity increases to a degree that overwhelms.

*b. Lucta animae et carnis*⁹¹.

It is the battle between the flesh and the spirit; the spirit struggles to defend its dominion over the flesh; while the flesh struggles to reverse

aliquid, quod eandem animam secundum carnem delectat, tunc dicitur caro concupiscere adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem". *De Genesi ad Litteram* 10,12, CSEL 28/1, 309-310.

⁸⁸ "Ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam voluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare. Prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum concupiscit, ipsa cognoscitur". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 4,28, PL 45,1352.

⁸⁹ "Sed passio in latina lingua, maxime usu loquendi ecclesiastico, non ad vituperationem consuevit intellegi". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,33.55, CSEL 42,313.

⁹⁰ *De Genesi ad Litteram* 9,10, CSEL 28/1,278-279.

⁹¹ *Sermo* 128,3.5, PL 38,715.

this order⁹². In *De Civitate Dei* 19,4⁹³ Augustine calls this order the *ordo naturae*; in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,25.5 he describes the struggle of the spirit in defending its dominion over the flesh as the desire of the *ordo naturalis*. In *Timaeus* 6, Plato speaks of the precedence in value of the soul over the flesh. For Augustine the lust of the flesh springs from interior evil tendencies and leads to every form of disgraceful act (*in quaeque flagitia*). The virtue of temperance bridles this lust.

"Then, again, what of virtue itself, which is not among the primary gifts of nature, since it comes upon them later at the introduction of teaching? Although it claims the topmost place among the human goods, what is its activity here but unceasing warfare against vices, not the external ones, but the internal, not those of others, but clearly our very own? This is the greatest struggle of that virtue, which in Greek is called σωφροσύνη and in Latin *temperantia*, with which carnal concupiscences are bridled, lest they draw the mind to consent to every disgraceful act. For it is not true that there is no vice, when the apostle says, 'the flesh lusts against the spirit'; to this vice there is an opposing virtue, as the same apostle says, 'the spirit lusts against the flesh'. He adds, 'For these are opposed against each other, so that you do not what you wish to do' (*Gal.5,17*)"⁹⁴.

Augustine sometimes calls this *rixa*⁹⁵ and *vitium* as opposed to *virtus*⁹⁶.

c. *Cupiditas*.

It is a desire for beyond what is necessary for decent living. In Greek its equivalent is *philarguria*; another Latin term is *avaritia*. *Philarguria* derives from ἄργυρος (silver). Strictly speaking it is a desire for money, for, among the ancients, coins were often either made of or mixed with silver. It is, however, to be understood not only of excessive desire for money, but also for anything that is beyond what is sufficient⁹⁷. In *En. in Ps.* 118, *Sermo* 22,1 Augustine speaks of covetousness (*cupiditas*) as a manifestation of the lust of the flesh against the spirit. In the context

⁹² *De Civitate Dei* 14,16, CSEL 40/2,38.

⁹³ *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,25.5, CSEL 40/2,376.

⁹⁴ "Porro ipsa virtus, quae non est inter prima naturae, quoniam eis postea doctrina introducunt supervenit, cum sibi bonorum culmen vindicet humanorum, quid hic agit nisi perpetua bella cum vitiis, nec exterioribus, sed interioribus, nec alienis, sed plane nostris et propriis, maxime illa, quae Graece σωφροσύνη Latine temperantia nominatur, qua carnales frenantur libidines, ne in quaeque flagitia mentem consentientem trahant? Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum, sicut dicit apostolus, *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum*; cui vitio contraria virtus est, cum sicut idem dicit, *spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem*. Haec enim, inquit, invicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis". *De Civitate Dei* 19,4, CSEL 40/2,375; trans. by H. BETTENSSON, *City of God*, p. 853-854.

⁹⁵ *Sermo* 128,9.11, PL 38,719.

⁹⁶ *De Civitate Dei* 19,4, CSEL 40/2,375.

⁹⁷ *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,17.48,166, CCL 29,303; *De Genesi ad Litteram* 11,15, CSEL 28/1,347.

he speaks of it as a desire that is counteracted by love. This makes concupiscence of the flesh equivalent to the desire against love and the commandment of love. Consequently it may be equated with hatred.

"On this account also, after he said above in this great Psalm: 'Your commandment is exceedingly broad' (Ps. 118,96), he showed in the following verse how broad it is by saying, 'How I love your law, Lord'. Love is, therefore, the breadth of the commandment. For how can it be that what God commands to be loved is loved, and the commandment itself is not loved? For this itself is the law. He says, 'It is my meditation all the day'. Look how I have loved it, such that it was my meditation all the day: or, rather, as the Greek has it, 'the whole day', which more fully expresses the continuity of meditation. However, what is for all time is to be understood as that which is forever. By such love covetousness is counteracted; such covetousness oftentimes contradicts our performing the commands of the law, when the flesh lusts against the spirit; the spirit lusting against the flesh (Gal. 5,17) ought to love the commandment of God so that it may be its meditation the whole day"⁹⁸.

*d. Grave Bellum or Bellum Intestinum*⁹⁹.

It is an internal quarrel - it is serious (*grave*) for being internal - between the flesh and the spirit; it arises from internal carnal motions. It opposes our efforts to serve God and to work for unity, since it is itself an alienating force. It opposes desire for unity not only within ourselves, but also our work for unity among different men¹⁰⁰. In this perspective concupiscence of the flesh is a desire for disunity.

*e. Desiderium Peccati*¹⁰¹.

It is the desire to and of sin that has become a part of our actual vitiated nature. Thus concupiscence also means sinfulness.

⁹⁸ "Propter quod etiam in magno isto psalmo cum superius dixisset: *Latum mandatum tuum valde*, in hoc sequenti versu ostendit unde sit latum, dicens: *Quomodo dilexi legem tuam, Domine!* Dilectio est igitur latitudo mandati. Unde quippe fieri potest ut diligatur quod Deus iubet diligere, et ipsa iussio non diligatur? Ipsa est enim lex. *Tota*, inquit, *die meditatio est*. Ecce quomodo eam dilexi, ut tota die meditatio mea esset; vel potius, sicut graecus habet: *totam diem*, ubi magis continuatio meditantis exprimitur. Id autem intelligitur per omne tempus, quod est semper. Tali expugnatur dilectione cupiditas, quae saepe faciendis legis iussionibus contradicit, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne; adversus quam spiritus concupiscens, ita debet diligere legem Dei, ut totam diem meditatio eius sit". *En. in Ps. 118, Sermo 22,1, CCL 40,1736.*

⁹⁹ *En. in Ps.143,5, CCL 40,2075; In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus 34,10, CCL 36, 316-317; Sermo 25,4, PL 38,168-169; Sermo 128,8, PL 38,716: sexual concept; De Civitate Dei 19,4, CSEL 40/2,375; De Civitate Dei 21,15, CSEL 40/2,546.*

¹⁰⁰ *Sermo Morin 11,12, MA I,633: in connection with Mt. 5,9; one may become an effective peacemaker, only if first one is able to attain internal peace.*

¹⁰¹ *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis 6,12, CSEL 42,11: concupiscence when allowed to reign is sinful and culpable; De Civitate Dei 19,4, CSEL 40/2,375; De Spiritu et Littera 33,59, PL 44,239: he sometimes calls concupiscence of the flesh languores vetustatis.*

f. Mala Dilectio.

It is a love opposed to the love for wisdom that leads to the kingdom (Wis. 6,21). In *En. in Ps.* 118, *Sermo* 8,4 Augustine uses this description to show that concupiscence of the flesh is a desire that goes against the desire for righteousness, which is expressed in *Ps.* 118,20: "My soul longs for your justification for all time". He starts by posing as a principle: "No one could long for (*concupiscere*) a desire (*desiderium*) for justice except by longing for justice"¹⁰². In order to distinguish *concupiscere*, which is a longing or a desire for what is absent and also for what is present, from *desiderare*, which is a longing for what is only absent, he applies the concept of concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit to the desires that oppose justifications. Now, justifications are not mere words but actual works for and of righteousness (*Nam quid sunt iustificationes, nisi opera iusta, non verba?*). In accordance with this idea Augustine would be placing *mala dilectio* in opposition to hope (*spes*), which he often equates with *desiderium sanctum*¹⁰³ because in hope there is a certain possession of the future reality, the fullness of which is still being desired. Accordingly, the concupiscence of the flesh as *mala dilectio* is contrary to hope.

"Is this what I have said above, that love itself with which a thing is loved must be loved because it should be loved, just as the love with which a thing is loved must be hated because it should not be loved? Certainly we hate our concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; and what is this concupiscence but an evil love? However, we love concupiscence, by which the spirit lusts against the flesh (*Gal.* 5,17); and what is this concupiscence but a good love? When, however, it is said, 'it must be loved', what else is meant than 'it must be longed for' (*concupiscenda*). For this reason, since the justification of God is, properly speaking, longed for (*concupiscitur*), the lust (*concupiscentia*) for the justification of God is, properly speaking, longed for (*concupiscuntur*). For this can be said in another way as follows: If the justification of God is, properly speaking, 'loved', then the love for the justification of God is, properly speaking, 'loved'. Or is 'to long for' (*concupiscere*) different from 'to desire' (*desiderare*)? It is not that *desiderium* is not *concupiscentia*, but not all *concupiscentia* is *desiderium*. For both those which are possessed and which are not possessed are longed for (*concupiscuntur*); since by longing for (*concupiscendo*) man enjoys (*fruitur*) the things which he actually possesses; by desiring (*desiderando*), however, he longs for (*concupiscit*) things which are absent. What is desire (*desiderium*), therefore, but the longing

¹⁰² "Non enim possem concupiscere desiderium iustitiae, nisi concupiscendo iustitiam". *En. in Ps.* 118, *Sermo* 8,4, CCL 40,1688.

¹⁰³ See the following: *En. in Ps.* 91,1, CCL 39,1279: in connection with Rom. 8,24-25: "Christiani non sumus, nisi propter futurum saeculum"; *En. in Ps.* 62,11, CCL 38,800: God appears to us in our holy desire; *In Epistulam Ioannis, Tractatus* 4,6, PL 35,2008: "Tota vita christiani boni, sanctum desiderium est".

for (*concupiscentia*) things that are absent? But how can the justification of God be absent unless when it is not known? Or is it to be considered absent when it is known and not done? For what is justification but works of justice, not mere words?"¹⁰⁴.

g. *Contentio Mortis*.

Concupiscence is a manifestation of the strife of death: "Now however, when the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, there is a strife of death"¹⁰⁵. In *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83,70 Augustine identifies the conflict between the flesh and the spirit, as described by Paul in *Gal.* 5,17, with the strife of death, as expressed by Paul in *1 Cor.* 15,55.

"For 'Death, where is your strife?' would not have been said, if it [sc. death] did not resist and fight back. The strife of this death is also described in that passage: 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For they resist and oppose each other, so that you do not do what you want' (*Gal.* 5,17)"¹⁰⁶.

h. *Indomita Carnalis Consuetudo*.

This is a habit of sin. Because of this habit tendencies to perversion arise as though from a natural enemy. The flesh, however, is not an enemy from nature. What is to be considered as an enemy is the habit and the inclination of the soul to use the flesh for evil purposes. This habit and

¹⁰⁴ "An hoc est quod superius dixi, quod diligenda sit etiam ipsa dilectio qua diligitur quod diligi oportet; sicut odio habenda est dilectio qua diligitur quod diligi non oportet? Odio quippe habemus concupiscentiam nostram qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; et quid est ista concupiscentia, nisi mala dilectio? Et diligimus concupiscentiam nostram qua spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem; et quid est ista concupiscentia, nisi bona dilectio? Cum autem dicitur: Diligenda est, quid aliud dicitur quam, concupiscenda est? Quocirca quoniam recte concupiscuntur iustificationes Dei, recte concupiscitur concupiscentia iustificationum Dei. Hoc enim alio modo sic potest dici: si recte diliguntur iustificationes Dei, recte diligitur dilectio iustificationum Dei. An aliud est concupiscere, aliud desiderare? Non quod non sit concupiscentia desiderium, sed quia non omnis concupiscentia desiderium est. Concupiscuntur enim et quae habentur, et quae non habentur; nam concupiscendo, fruitur homo rebus quas habet; desiderando autem, absentia concupiscit. Desiderium ergo quid est, nisi rerum absentium concupiscentia? Sed Dei iustificationes absentes esse quomodo possunt, nisi quando nesciuntur? An et quando sciuntur et non fiunt, absentes habendae sunt? Nam quid sunt iustificationes, nisi opera iusta, non verba?" *En. in Ps.* 118, *Sermo* 8,4, CCL 40,1688. See also *Sermo* 177,6, PL 38,956; *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 3,170, PL 45,1318: in connection with 1 Jo. 2,15-16; he condemns the desire for the world as something permanent.

¹⁰⁵ "Modo autem, quando caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem, contentio mortis est: non quod volumus facimus". *Sermo* 128,9,11, PL 38,718.

¹⁰⁶ "Non enim diceretur *Ubi est, mors, contentio tua?* si non resistisset et repugnasset. Ipsius contentio etiam illo loco describitur: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem. Haec enim invicem sibi resistunt et adversantur, ut non quae vultis illa faciatis*". *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83,70, PL 40,80.

inclination reveal themselves in a desire that goes against the desire of the *naturalis ordo*, where the soul must naturally rule over the body.

"The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are against each other' (*Gal.* 5,17). For this is said of the carnal habit which is not corrected, against which the spirit lusts, not in order to destroy the body, but in order to make the concupiscence of the body, i.e. with its evil habit vanquished, subject to the spirit, which is what the order of nature desires for¹⁰⁷.

i. Libido.

This is an appetite, which possibly existed before the fall, but then within the full dominion of the will¹⁰⁸. After the fall, however, it became a sickness (*morbus*) in that it refused to be fully controlled by the will¹⁰⁹. It became the source of acts which in the Platonic thinking wisdom forbids.

7. The concupiscence of the flesh and of the spirit against each other is the conflict between the law in the members and the law of the mind

Augustine equates *Gal.* 5,17: "For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit lusts against the flesh", or *Wis.* 9,15: "For a perishable body weighs down the soul", with *Rom.* 7,18: "For I can will what is right, but I cannot do it", or *Rom.* 7,23: "But I can see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members". He does this at least twenty-two times¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁷ "*Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur. Dictum est enim hoc propter indomitam carnalem consuetudinem, adversus quam spiritus concupiscit, non ut interimat corpus, sed ut concupiscentia eius, id est consuetudine mala edomita faciat spiritui subiugatum, quod naturalis ordo desiderat*". *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,24.5, CSEL 80,21.

¹⁰⁸ *Contra Duas Epistula Pelagianorum* 1,17.35, CSEL 60,451.

¹⁰⁹ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,33.55, CSEL 42,312; *De Civitate Dei* 14,15, CCL 48,438: "Est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae avaritia; est libido quomodocumque vincendi, pervicacia; est libido gloriandi quae iactantia nuncupatur. Sunt multae variaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam vocabula propria, quaedam vero non habent. Quis enim facile dixerit, quid vocetur libido dominandi...".

¹¹⁰ *En. in Ps.* 70, *Sermo* 2,1, CCL 39,959-960; *En. in Ps.* 134,12, CCL 40, 1946; *En. in Ps.* 140,16, CCL 40,2037; *Sermo* 56,5.7, PL 38,380; 242,8.11, PL 38,1142-1143; *De Continentia* 9,22,23, CSEL 41,168: he gives three kinds of union: (i) Christ-church; (ii) husband-wife; (iii) spirit-flesh; *Contra Fortunatum Manichaeum* 21, CSEL 25/1,103; *De Spiritu et Littera* 33,59, CSEL 60,218; 53,61, CSEL 60,278; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,31.35, CSEL 42,246-247; *De Anima et eius Origine* 4,23.36, PL 44,545: spiritus est quo agimus, ratiocinamur, intelligimus, sapimus; *Contra Julianum* 6,13.40, PL 44,844; *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 6,11, PL 45,1520; 6,14, PL 45,1528: he takes up Ambrose's statement in *De Poenitentia* 1,2.3: our flesh is a body of death (*Rom.* 7,24); 6,17, PL 45,1539; *De Gestis Pelagii* 30,54-55, CSEL 42,110; *Sermo* 141,2, PL 38,815; *Sermo Morin* 11,12, MA 1,633.

We are not going to discuss all of these references. Our aim is only to show how he came to equate them.

In *En. in Ps. 70, Sermo 1,5*, written between 414 and 415, Augustine describes the present human condition as fragile, as a captive, and with conflicting tendencies, even when aided by the grace of Christ.

"For the grace of Christ has made you strong and immobile against all temptations by the enemy. But there is also human fragility; there is still primeval captivity; there is also the law in the members at war against the law of the mind (*Rom. 7,23*)... the body that corrupts still weighs down the soul (*Wis. 9,15*)"¹¹¹.

In *En. in Ps. 70, Sermo 2,1*, he goes on to explain how we have been made captives and subject to death. This recurred through our ontological union with the first man who sinned: *Expertus ergo malum Adam: omnis autem homo Adam*. This is explained by Paul in *Rom. 5,12*: "Therefore as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned" and in *1 Cor. 15,21*: "For as by a man came death". However, in human beings there is not only but two directions, namely, the way to death, which we share with Adam who sinned, and the way to redemption, which we enjoy through Christ¹¹². The way to redemption is described in *1 Cor. 15,21*, "by a man also has come the resurrection of the dead". Final redemption consists in the transformation of the body. The reality of hope for transformation is expressed by Paul in *1 Cor. 15,46*: "But it is not the spiritual which is the first but the physical, and then the spiritual". In the state of captivity there is a polarization between the status of captivity and the status of being redeemed. A captive groans for redemption, which to a

¹¹¹ "Firmum enim te facit gratia Christi, et immobilem adversus omnes tentationes inimici. Sed ibi est et humana fragilitas, ibi est adhuc prima captivitas, ibi est et lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, et captivum volens ducere in lege peccati: adhuc corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam". *En. in Ps. 70, Sermo 1,5*, CCL 39,945.

¹¹² "Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed iam erat natura seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccatum vitiata et vinculo mortis obstricta iusteque damnata non alterius condicionis homo ex homine nasceretur. Ac per hoc a liberi arbitrii malo usu series calamitatis huius exorta est, quae humanum genus origine depravata, velut radice corrupta, usque ad secundae mortis exitium, quae non habet finem, solis eis exceptis qui per Dei gratiam liberantur, miseriarum conexione perducit". *De Civitate Dei 13,14*, CSEL 40/1,632. See also *De Civitate Dei 13,13*, CSEL 40/1,631: the concupiscence of the flesh and the spirit comes as an inborn controversy; our body is the scene of death's assault or of his victory, as the result of the first disobedience. *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia 1,31,35*, CSEL 42,297: our flesh although under the law of sin is nevertheless in the hope of redemption.

certain extent he already has; while redemption itself proclaims our state of captivity (*Nam et ipsa redemptio clamat captivitatem nostram*). Paul describes this state of captivity as a condition where we experience the law in the members, which wars against the law of the mind, and leads us captive to the law of the sin (*Rom. 7,23*). Augustine says that this is itself our first captivity, in which the flesh wars against the spirit (*Gal. 5,17*). It is an internal division in man, which came as a consequence of Adam's refusal to be subject to Unity itself.

"Therefore, the first captives are those who belong to the first man; for they are captives on account of this, that is to say, on account of the first man, in whom we all die; because, 'it is not the spiritual which is the first, but the animal, then the spiritual' (*1 Cor. 15,46*). On account of the second man they are subsequently (*secundi*) redeemed. For assuredly redemption itself also proclaims our captivity. For what are they redeemed from if they have not been captives before? We voice this captivity, which the apostle recommends more expressly in his Epistle, by recommending some words and we repeat: 'I see another law in my members, at war with the law of my mind, and leading me captive to the law of sin which is in my members' (*Rom. 7,23*). This itself is our first captivity, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit (*Gal. 5,17*). This, however, came from the punishment of sin, in order that man who did not want to be subject to unity, would be divided against himself"¹¹³.

D. The concupiscence of the flesh is transmitted to us from Adam who sinned

The Manicheans, the Pelagians, and the Catholics agree on the existence in human beings of discord between the flesh and the spirit. However, they disagree on the origin and explanation of this discord. The Manicheans attribute it to the existence of both evil and good natures in man. The Pelagians attribute it to the force of habits, which originated from the beginning, and, therefore, is natural¹¹⁴; sin does not originate from this conflict; sin is an imitation of the sin of Adam, who also imi-

¹¹³ "Primi ergo captivi, id est, pertinentes ad primum hominem; propter hoc enim captivi, propter primum hominem in quo omnes morimur; quia *non prius quod spiritale est, sed quod animale postea spiritale*. Propter primum hominem primi captivi; propter secundum hominem secundi redempti. Nam et ipsa redemptio clamat captivitatem nostram. Unde enim redempti, si non antea captivi? Et eam captivitatem expressius ab apostolo insinuatam ex epistula eius, verba quaedam commemorantes, insinuavimus, et repetimus: *Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivum me ducentem in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis*. Ipsa est prima captivitas nostra, qua concupiscit adversus spiritum caro. Venit autem hoc de poena peccati, ut homo adversus seipsum divideretur, qui uni subditus esse noluit". *En. in Ps. 70, Sermo 2,1*, CCL 39,959-960.

¹¹⁴ *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,45, CSEL 42,299.

tated the sin of the devil¹¹⁵. Adam was, therefore, not the first one who sinned. It was the devil. Even Eve sinned before Adam. Sin, therefore, does not originate from the concupiscence of the flesh; neither it is transmitted through our union with Adam. The Catholics, represented by Augustine, who followed the teaching of Cyprian, Hilary of Poitiers, Gregory of Nazianzus, and especially of Ambrose¹¹⁶, maintain that the concupiscence of the flesh came to exist in us because it was transmitted through Adam. Addressing Julian, Augustine states:

"Neither we, nor you, nor the Manicheans, doubt that in human beings there exists the discord between the flesh and the spirit, concerning which it has been written: 'I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh. For I can will what is right, but I cannot do it' (*Rom.* 7,8), and other scriptural texts similar to this. This text, however, is more plain: 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, the spirit, however, against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other such that you do not do what you want' (*Gal.* 5,17). However, concerning the question where this discord in human beings comes from, there is a disagreement; and there are three opinions presented; one is ours, the other is yours, and the third is that of the Manicheans... Ambrose, therefore, says that this discord came to exist in our nature through the sin of the first man. You, however, say that it is caused by force of habit. The Manicheans say that it is due to the mixture of two co-eternal natures, one good and the other evil"¹¹⁷.

Against the Pelagians Augustine contends that nature, which is good because of the will of God, and the corruption of nature, which is evil because of the evil will of the first man, are propagated simultaneously¹¹⁸. The core, however, of the discussion between the Pelagians and Augustine is the meaning of Paul in *Rom.* 5,12: "Therefore, as sin came

¹¹⁵ *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,47, PL 45,1161.

¹¹⁶ "Possunt etiam videri caro atque anima ab odore, tactu gustuque luxuriae separatae in una domo se adversus incursantia vitia dividentes, caro et anima subjicientes se legi Dei, removens a lege peccati. Quorum licet dissensio per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam verterit; ut nequaquam sibi paribus ad virtutum studiis convenirent". AMBROSE, *Expositio in Lucam* 7,141, CCL 14,262-263. See AUGUSTINE, *Contra Julianum* 2,5, PL 44,680.

¹¹⁷ "Discordiam carnis et spiritus, de qua scriptum est, *Scio quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum: velle enim adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non, et cetera huiusmodi, atque illud multo manifestius, Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem: haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis faciat: esse in hominibus nec nos dubitamus, nec vos, nec Manichaei: sed unde sit in homine uno ista discordia, inde dissensio est, et tres proferuntur in hac dissensione sententiae; una nostra, vestra altera, tertia Manichaeorum ... Dicit ergo Ambrosius, hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus, per praevaricationem primi hominis accidisse nostrae naturae: vos autem dicitis, ex vi consuetudinis: Manichaei dicunt, ex commixtione duarum naturarum coaeternarum, boni scilicet et mali". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 3,178, PL 45,1321-1322.*

¹¹⁸ *De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali* 2,33.38, CSEL 42,197.

into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned". In *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,47 Julian insists that Augustine's interpretation of *Rom.* 5,12 is mistaken:

"However, I see that the Apostle has said nothing that would despise generation of human beings, nothing that would condemn natural innocence, that would brand as crime a divine work"¹¹⁹.

For Julian it is by imitating the example set by the devil who first sinned that sin comes to exist in us. This, he claims, is testified by *Wis.* 2,24.25 (*Vetus Latina*): "However, by the envy of the devil death entered into the world. They, however, imitate him who belong to his party"¹²⁰. Augustine, however, retorts that it is not that sin which is imitated that enters into the world, but that sin which is contracted through birth.

"But it is asked, what kind of sin entered into the world through one man: whether that which was committed by imitation, or that which was contracted by birth. The former, i.e., that which was committed by imitation, entered into the world only through him, who, being the first, did not imitate anybody, and introduced the example of sinning to the rest who will imitate it; this is the devil. The latter, however, i.e., that which was contracted by birth, entered only through him, who, being the first, was born of no one, and inflicted upon the rest, who are to be born, the beginning of the origin; this is Adam"¹²¹.

Augustine agrees with Julian's interpretation of *Wis.* 2,24.25¹²². However, he thinks that Julian is changing the subject of discussion by referring to this text. He insists, therefore, that what they are both discussing is not any sinner, but the sinner through whom sin entered into the world. This is the point of discussion concerning *Rom.* 5,12. Augustine claims that there Paul is speaking for sin *by birth* and not of sin *by imitation*.

"Consider that, concerning the imitation by angels and men, you say nothing that pertains to its cause; but only you have not wished to keep silent. For we are not arguing on any sinner, who at some time or other sinned in the world,

¹¹⁹ "At ego video Apostolum nihil quod ad infamationem generationis spectaret humanae, nihil quod ad condemnationem innocentiae naturalis, nihil quod ad crimen divini operis, protulisse". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,47, PL 45,1161.

¹²⁰ Earlier discussion is found in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 2,45, CSEL 42,299. This is taken up again in *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,47, PL 45,1161.

¹²¹ "Sed quaeritur, quale peccatum per unum hominem intravit in mundum; utrum quod imitando committeretur, an quod nascendo traheretur. Quia illud primum, id est, quod imitando committeretur nonnisi per eum intravit in mundum, qui primus neminem imitatus caeteris imitaturis peccandi introduxit exemplum, hoc est, diabolus: hoc autem alterum, id est, quod nascendo traheretur, nonnisi per eum intravit in mundum, qui primus a nemine generatus, generandis caeteris originis ingessit initium, hic est Adam". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,49, PL 45,1163.

¹²² *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,43, PL 45,1162.

but on him, through whom sin entered the world. If, whenever, it is asked concerning the example of sin, the devil is the answer. If it is concerning the contraction by birth, Adam is the answer. Accordingly, the Apostle who says, "Through one man sin entered into the world" (*Rom. 5,12*) means by it the sin through generation. For the sin by imitation entered into the world not through one man, but through the devil¹²³.

Julian inquires further about the testimony of *Eccli. 25,33* (*Vetus Latina*): "The beginning of sin was done by a woman; and because of her we all die". According to Julian, it appears that sin came from both sexes¹²⁴. Augustine again thinks that this text speaks of sin by imitation; and he insists once more that in *Rom. 5,12* Paul is speaking of that sin that came to us by birth from one man.

"Do they who sin imitate Eve? Or did the sin of humanity rather take its beginning from her? It has been written, 'The beginning of sin was done by a woman; and because of her we all die' (*Sir. 25,33, Vetus Latina*). Why, therefore, don't you like to listen because the apostle said rather, 'one man, through whom sin entered into the world' (*Rom. 5,17*), because he meant by it not imitation but generation? For just as the beginning of sin comes from a woman, so the beginning of generation comes from a man. For first a man inseminates in order that a woman may bear. Therefore, through one man sin entered into the world because it entered through a *semen generationis*, which the woman receives from man and conceives. He alone who was born of a woman without sin did not wish to be born in this manner"¹²⁵.

¹²³ "De imitatione igitur Angelorum et hominum intellige te nihil ad causam pertinens dicere; sed tantum tacere noluisse. Disputamus enim, non de quocumque peccatore, qui quandocumque peccavit in mundo; sed de illo per quem peccatum intravit in mundum: ubi si quaeratur exemplum imitationis, diabolus invenitur; si contagium generationis, Adam. Proinde, dicens Apostolus, *Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum*, peccatum generationis intellegi voluit. Imitationis enim peccatum, non per unum hominem, sed per diabolum intravit in mundum". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,49, PL 45,1163.

¹²⁴ "Ineptis ita, ut vix teneam cachinnum, qui dicis generationem ab uno homine coepisse; cum et diversitas sexuum, et lectio divina testetur, generationem non esse potuisse, nisi duo prius homines, id est vir et mulier, exstissent". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,57, PL 45,1166. See *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,56, PL 45, 1166: *Eccli. 25,33* is considered by Augustine; he recalls it as having been referred by Julian in order to contend that it was the woman who was the beginning of sin.

¹²⁵ "Numquid enim Evam non imitantur peccantes, aut peccatum generis humani non magis ex ipsa sumpsit initium? A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam, sicut scriptum est, *morimur omnes*. Cur ergo non vis attendere, propterea potius Apostolum unum dixisse hominem, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia non imitationem, sed generationem volebat intellegi? Sicut enim a muliere initium peccati fuit, sic initium generationis a viro est: prior enim vir seminat, ut femina pariat: ideo per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia per semen generationis intravit, quod a viro excipiens concepit femina: quo more nasci noluit, qui solus sine peccato est natus ex femina". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 2,56, PL 45,1166.

Augustine proclaims Ambrose victorious over the Manicheans and the Pelagians. The concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit is poured upon our nature through the sin of the first man.

"Therefore, this evil, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit (*Gal. 5,17*), is good, says the heretic Julian. This evil has been mixed in us from another alien nature of evil, says another Manichean heretic. The Catholic Ambrose defeats them both, by saying that this evil has been poured into our nature through the sin of the first man"¹²⁶.

E. The concupiscence of the flesh is not removed by grace even when grace renews the man perfectly

In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,17.19-18.20 Augustine says:

"The concupiscence of the flesh should not be imputed to marriage; but it should be tolerated. For it is not a good coming from the natural marriage union; but it is an evil added accidentally from the ancient sin. For this reason, therefore, it happens that even of just and legitimate marriages between children of God, not children of God, but children of this world are born. This is so, since they who give birth, if they have already been re-born, give birth not because of that by which they are children of God, but because of that by which they are still children of this world. The statement of the Lord is: 'The children of this world generate and are generated' (*Lk. 20,34*). But because of that by which we are still children of this world, 'our outer man is being corrupted', the children of this world are also born, and they do not become children of God unless they are reborn. However, because of that by which we are children of God, 'the inner man is renewed from day to day' (*2 Cor. 4,16*), although the outer man is also sanctified by the bath of regeneration and has received the hope of lack of corruptibility in the future, on account of which he is justly called a temple of God (*1 Cor. 6,19-20*) ... The whole of this is said not only because of our present sanctification, but principally because of that hope of which the same apostle says in another place: 'But even we ourselves who have the first fruits of the spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our body' (*Rom. 8,23*). If, therefore, the redemption of our body is awaited for, as the Apostle says, surely that which is awaited for is still hoped for and not yet possessed"¹²⁷.

¹²⁶ "Hoc ergo malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, haereticus Julianus dixit esse bonum: hoc malum ex aliena mali natura nobis esse commixtum dicit alius haereticus Manichaeus: hoc malum per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam, catholicus ambos vincit Ambrosius". *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 5,5, PL 45,1436.

¹²⁷ "Carnis autem concupiscentia non est nuptiis imputanda, sed toleranda. Non enim est ex naturali conubio veniens bonum, sed ex antiquo peccato accidens malum. Propter hanc ergo fit, ut etiam de iustis et legitimis nuptiis filiorum dei non filii dei, sed filii saeculi generentur, quia et hi qui generant, si iam regenerati sint, non ex hoc generant quod filii dei sunt, sed ex quo adhuc filii saeculi. Dominica quippe sententia est: *filii saeculi huius generant et generantur*. Ex quo itaque sumus adhuc filii saeculi huius,

In *Contra Julianum* 6,13.40 Augustine discusses Julian's accusation against him on the basis of this statement. In this citation Julian omits the phrase, "and they do not become children of God unless they are reborn. However"¹²⁸. On the basis of this citation Julian maintains that "the baptized are cleansed only in part" and that "grace does not perfectly renew man". Augustine answers that what he says above contains the experience of a baptized person: "we groan within ourselves" (*Rom.* 8,23); "we who are in this habitation sigh in oppression" (*2 Cor.* 5,4); "the corruptible weighs down the soul; and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that muses upon many things" (*Wis.* 9,15). Despite the body which is weak and mortal, and is itself the source of the weakness and sickness of mortality, grace renews man perfectly, both in body and in soul, since it brings man even to immortality of body and to full happiness. This perfect renewal involves now deliverance from all sins, but not from all evil, nor from all corruption of mortality, by which the body weighs down upon the soul (*Wis.* 9,15).

"As though already dwelling immortally in heaven among the angels, you ridicule the words of weakness and mortality. Explaining them not according to my meaning, but according to your deception, you also claim that I have said 'that grace does not perfectly renew man'. I do not say this. Listen to what I say: 'Grace perfectly renews man', since it leads him even to immortality of the body and to full happiness. It also renews man perfectly now, as regards complete deliverance from all sins, not as regards all evil, nor all corruption of mortality, by which the body weighs down the soul. From this comes the groaning which the Apostle acknowledges also as his own, by saying, 'We ourselves groan within ourselves' (*Rom.* 8,23)"¹²⁹.

exterior homo noster corrumpitur, ex hoc et huius saeculi filii generantur nec filii dei nisi regenerentur fiunt; sed ex quo sumus filii dei, interior renovatur de die in diem, quamvis et ipse exterior per lavacrum regenerationis sanctificatus sit et spem futurae incorruptionis acceperit, propter quod et templum dei merito dicitur. Corpora vestra, inquit apostolus, templum in vobis spiritus sancti est, quem habetis a deo, et non estis vestri; empti enim estis pretio magno. Glorificate ergo deum in corpore vestro. Hoc totum non solum propter praesentem sanctificationem, sed maxime propter illam spem dictus est, de qua idem alio loco dicit: sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes et ipsi in nobismet ipsis ingemiscimus adoptionem expectantes, redemptionem corporis nostri. Si ergo redemptio corporis nostri secundum apostolum expectatur, profecto quod expectatur adhuc speratur, nondum tenetur". De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia 1,18.20, CSEL 42,232-233.

¹²⁸ "Nec filii dei nisi regenerentur; sed". See the repetition of the text in *Contra Julianum* 6,13.40, PL 44,844.

¹²⁹ "Sed tu tamquam in caelo iam inter Angelos immortaliter habitans, verba infirmitatis et mortalitatis irrides; et ea exponens non secundum meum sensum, sed secundum dolum tuum, dixisse me affirmas, 'quod gratia non perfecte hominem novum faciat'. Non hoc dico: attende quod dico. Gratia perfecte hominem novum facit; quandoquidem et ad corporis immortalitatem plenamque felicitatem ipsa perducit. Nunc etiam perfecte innovat

Baptism also effects the sanctification of the body. It does not, however, remove the corruption of the body by which it weighs down the soul. Nevertheless, it perfects something of the body also, such that a baptized who does not succumb to the desires of the flesh is aided by grace in order that he may persevere in holiness, while the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.

"Even now through baptism sanctification is certainly conferred also on the body; nevertheless, its corruption now which also weighs down the soul itself (cf. *Wis.* 9,15) is not taken away. And, therefore, though the bodies are chaste when the members do not serve the desires of sin, - because of this they have begun to belong to the temple of God - nevertheless, there is something in this whole structure that grace perfects, as long as the flesh lusts against the spirit in order to incite evil movements that must be restrained, and the spirit lusts against the flesh in order that holiness may persist"¹³⁰.

In the case of renewed persons, the flesh is like hostile inferior enemies who are incapable of winning; nevertheless, they strongly hold on something which they have captured. So is the case of the flesh, since the law of sin partly holds it in captivity. Since it is possessed by the law of sin, it resists the law of the mind; but renewed by the grace of Christ, it refuses obedience to its own desires.

"And so, although the law itself of sin holds something of the flesh as its captive, whence it resists the law of the mind, nevertheless, it does not reign in our body although mortal, if it does not obey its desires. For it is normal that enemies, against whom one is at war, are usually both at the same time inferior in the struggle and after being conquered hold something as captive"¹³¹.

hominem, quantum attinet ad liberationem ab omnibus omnino peccatis, non quantum ad liberationem attinet ab omnibus malis, et ab omni corruptione mortalitatis, qua nunc corpus aggravat animam. Unde est gemitus, quem suum quoque confitetur Apostolus dicens, *Et ipsi in nobismetipsis ingemiscimus*". *Contra Julianum* 6,13.40, PL 44,844.

¹³⁰ "Sanctificatio ergo per Baptismum etiam nunc confertur et corpori, non tamen nunc corruptio eius aufertur, quae ipsam quoque aggravat animam. Et ideo quamvis casta sint corpora, cum desideriis peccati membra non serviunt, propter quod ad templum Dei pertinere coeperunt: est tamen quod gratia in tota ista aedificatione perficiat, quamdiu caro concupiscit adversus spiritum ut motus malos qui refrenandi sunt incitet, et spiritus adversus carnem ut sanctitas perseveret". *Contra Julianum* 6,13.40, PL 44,844-845.

¹³¹ "Atque ita quamvis lex ipsa peccati captivum teneat aliquid carnis, unde resistat legi mentis, non tamen regnat in nostro licet mortali corpore, si non oboeditur desideriis eius. Solent enim et hostes, adversus quos dimicatur, et inferiores esse in certamine et victi aliquid tenere captivum". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,31.35, CSEL 42,247.

F. Every normal person experiences concupiscence of the flesh

Only those who have already fully submerged themselves in the desires of the flesh no longer suffer concupiscence of the flesh. Augustine thinks, however, that they live in a wrong kind of peace¹³². A normal person constantly prays to be freed from the conflict between the flesh and the spirit; he consistently asks for forgiveness for sins. In connection with *Mt. 5,10* Augustine follows Cyprian: "Your will be done on earth as in heaven", in saying that this will happen only when "earth", which stands for our "flesh", and "heaven", which stands for our "spirit", are in harmony¹³³. Even now when the tendencies of the flesh are pressed into the service of the tendencies of the spirit, we do not have the power to extinguish the ardor of the concupiscence of the flesh. According to Augustine, this is what Paul means by "We do not what we will" (*Gal. 5,17b*). This condition will remain as long as we are flesh. Death will bring it to an end, until after resurrection the spirit and the flesh are in complete harmony with each other.

"'We do not do what we want' (*Gal. 5,17b*). Why? Because we wish that there were no lusts, but we cannot avoid them. Whether we like it or not, we have them; whether we will it or not, they solicit, they allure, they excite, they disturb, they want to arise. They are repressed, yet not extinguished, so long as 'the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh' (*Gal. 5,17*). Will this be so, even when man had died? No. You leave aside the flesh, how then will you bring with you the lusts of the flesh?"¹³⁴.

The concupiscence of the flesh struggling against the concupiscence of the spirit causes groaning among both nonbelievers on the way to conversion and believers¹³⁵. It pricks them both from birth to the day of burial (*Eccli. 40,1*)¹³⁶. It is more readily aroused by memory¹³⁷, by those who have experienced incontinence in the past; it is heightened in the unchaste as they become older; it is much stronger among the youth; it

¹³² *Sermo* 30,3,4, PL 38,189.

¹³³ *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 4,9,25, CSEL 60,553.

¹³⁴ "Non quod volumus facimus. Quare? Quia volumus ut nullae sint concupiscentiae, sed non possumus. Velimus nolimus, habemus illas: velimus nolimus, tiillant, blandiuntur, stimulant, infestant, surgere volunt. Premuntur, nondum extinguuntur; quamdiu *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*. Numquid hoc etiam cum mortuus fuerit homo? Absit. Deponis carnem, quomodo tecum trahis concupiscentias carnis?". *Sermo* 128,9,11, PL 38,718.

¹³⁵ *En. in Ps. 118, Sermo* 19,3, CCL 40,1727; *En. in Ps. 134,12*, CCL 40, 1946-1947.

¹³⁶ *En. in Ps. 140,16*, CCL 40,2037; *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 6,14, PL 45,158: concupiscence of the flesh is a *vitium congenitum*.

¹³⁷ *Confessiones* 8,11, CSEL 33,191-192.

is tempered, although not absent, among the aging and the aged.

"Sisters and brothers, so long as we live here, this is always the case. It is the case even with us, who have grown old in this warfare. Indeed, we have fewer enemies; but we have them. Our enemies have already been worn out in a certain sense through age; nevertheless, even when worn out, they do not stop to disturb the tranquility of old age with many sorts of motions. The conflict is sharper among the youth. We know it; we passed through it. 'Therefore, the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh' (*Gal. 5,17*)"¹³⁸.

What about the case of clerics? In our day it would be comical, if not ridiculous, to bring to a Synod or a Council the question whether clerics or monks have been freed from concupiscence. It has become too obvious that they are not. But during Augustine's time the case was brought forward for discussion first in the Synod of Diospolis (415)¹³⁹ and later in the Council of Carthage (417). A distinction was made between 'crime' and 'sin'. A cleric or a monk may judicially be settled to have not committed any crime; but this does not mean that he has been fully delivered from tendencies to sin. He who has not committed any crime may, therefore, be eligible for ministerial or episcopal ordination¹⁴⁰.

What about the case of eunuchs (*spadones*)?¹⁴¹ Castration does not remove the root of concupiscence. It simply lessens its intensity, since the material with which sexual concupiscence operates in eunuchs has been removed. Scripture itself gives a proof of the presence of concupiscence in eunuchs: "He sees with his eyes and groans, like a eunuch embracing a virgin and sighing" (*Eccli. 30,20*).

Righteous people also groan from the pain they suffer in the struggle against the concupiscence of the flesh. Cyprian, in *De Oratione Dominica* 16-18, Gregory of Nazianzus, in *Apologia I de Sua Fuga*, and Ambrose, in *De Poenitentia* 1,2,3, speak of their own experiences, according to *Gal. 5,17*, *Rom. 7,23* and *Eccli. 40,1*. Augustine repeatedly appeals to their authority in order to speak of the evil of concupiscence after the entrance of sin, against the position of Julian who holds that the concupis-

¹³⁸ "Ergo quamdiu hic vivitur, fratres, sic est: sic et nos qui senuimus in ista militia, minores quidem hostes habemus: sed tamen habemus. Fatigati sunt quodam modo hostes nostri iam etiam per aetatem; sed tamen etiam fatigati non cessant qualibuscumque motibus infestare senectutis quietem. Acrior pugna iuvenum est: novimus eam, transivimus per eam. Caro ergo concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis". *Sermo* 128,9.11, PL 38,719.

¹³⁹ See *De Gestis Pelagii* 6,16, CSEL 42,68, and 30,54-35,60,106-115.

¹⁴⁰ *De Gestis Pelagii* 30,54-55, CSEL 42,107-108.

¹⁴¹ *Contra Julianum* 6,14.11, PL 44,845.

cence of the flesh was not due to sin, but is natural and good¹⁴².

Even Plato and Cicero, whom Augustine considered as Gentiles, testified to their experiences. They both taught the evil of concupiscence. Certainly both these philosophers strongly influenced Augustine's thinking.

"I beg you, do not let the philosophy of Gentiles be more honest than our Christian philosophy, which is the one true philosophy, for its name means the quest or love for wisdom. Consider Tullius's words in the dialogue *Hortensius*, which should delight you more than those of Balbus, who takes the part of the Stoics. What he says is true; but it concerns the inferior part of man, that is, the body; and it cannot help you. See what he says about the vigor of the mind against the pleasure of the body. He says, 'Should the pleasures of the body be sought for, which as Plato says truly and earnestly are enticements and the baits of evils?'. He adds 'What a destruction of health, what an impairing of healthy skin and of body, what wretched loss, what dishonor is not evoked and elicited by pleasure? When its emotion is most intense, it is most inimical to philosophy. The pleasure of the body cannot be in accord with great thought. For who can pay attention, or follow reasoning, or think of anything at all, when he is under the influence of pleasure, which no other pleasure is more intense than it? Whose whirlpool is so great that it strives day and night, without the slightest intermission, to arouse our senses that they be drowned in extreme pleasures? Who, however, with a sound mind would not prefer no pleasure at all had been given us by nature'. He said these, who did not believe anything on the life of the first pair, nothing on paradisiacal happiness, nothing on the resurrection of the body. Let us, meanwhile, who have learned in the true and holy philosophy of true godliness that the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh (*Gal. 5,17*), blush as we hear the true judgements of the ungodly"¹⁴³.

¹⁴² *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* 6,14, PL 45,1528-1529; *Contra Julianum* 6,23.70, PL 44,866.

¹⁴³ "Obsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia Gentium, quam nostra Christiana, quae una est vera philosophia, quandoquidem studium vel amor sapientiae significatur hoc nomine. Vide enim quid in *Hortensii* dialogo dicat TULLIUS; quae magis verba te delectare debuerant, quam Balbi Stoicorum partes agentis: quae licet vera, tamen de parte hominis inferiore, hoc est, de corpore fuerunt, et te nihil adiuuvare potuerunt. Vide quid iste pro vivacitate mentis contra voluptatem corporis dicat. 'An vero', inquit, 'voluptates corporis expetendae, quae vere et graviter a Platone dictae sunt illecebrae esse atque escae malorum? Quae enim confectio est', inquit, 'valetudinis, quae deformatio coloris et corporis, quod turpe damnum, quod dedecus, quod non evocetur atque eliciatur voluptate? Cuius motus ut quisque est maximus, ita est inimicissimus philosophiae. Congruere enim cum cogitatione magna voluptas corporis non potest. Quis enim cum utatur voluptate ea, qua nulla possit maior esse, attendere animo, inire rationem, cogitare omnino quidquam potest? Cuius autem tantus est gurgis, qui dies et noctes sine ulla minimi temporis intermissione velit ita moveri suos sensus, ut moventur in summis voluptatibus? Quis autem bona mente praeditus, non mallet nullas omnino nobis a natura voluptate datas?' Haec ille dixit, qui nihil de primorum hominum vita, nihil de paradisi felicitate, nihil de corporum resurrectione crediderat. Erubescamus interim veris disputationibus impiorum, qui didicimus in vera verae pietatis sanctaque philosophia, et contra spiritum carnem, et contra carnem

All, therefore, experience the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit. Those who think that they do not Augustine warns:

"And you too are a human being. If you do not want to believe me, examine yourself. Do you so live in this corruptible body, which weighs down the soul (Wis. 9,15), that the flesh does not lust against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh? Is this conflict not within you? Is there no concupiscence of the flesh, which resists the law of the mind? If in you there is nothing that resists something else, look at your situation as a whole. If your spirit is not in discord with your flesh which lusts against it, see whether the whole of your mind does not consent to your flesh; see whether indeed there is no battle, because there is a perverse peace. It is possible that you consent entirely to the flesh, and there is no conflict"¹⁴⁴.

G. Unbridled concupiscence of the flesh leads to external harmful acts

The internal conflict between the flesh and the spirit may have its external consequences. Plato speaks of those who have no experience of insight and virtue, thus giving way to the concupiscence of the flesh like beasts which in their greedy struggle to satisfy their lusts butt each other with horns and kill each other.

"Then they who have no experience of insight and virtue, but spend their whole time in revelling and similar affairs, are carried apparently from the middle to below and back again, and wander so all their life from one to the other; but never once have they begun beyond and seen or been carried to the true above, nor have they really been filled with what is real, nor tasted steadfast and pure pleasure. Like beasts of the field their eyes look ever downward, their heads are bent to the ground and to the table, and so like beasts they guzzle and satisfy their lusts, and in their greedy struggle for such pleasures they butt and kick with horns and hoofs of iron, and kill each other because they cannot be satisfied, inasmuch as what they are trying to fill is not the real and continent part of themselves, nor is what they are putting into it real"¹⁴⁵.

In *De Civitate Dei* 14,19, Augustine refers to the Platonists' explanation and assimilates it in order to explain that, when turbid and not orderly

concupiscere spiritum". *Contra Julianum* 4,72, PL 44,774. See also *De Civitate Dei* 14,16, CCL 48,439.

¹⁴⁴ "Et tu homo es; si non vis credere mihi, intende tibi. Itane tu ita vivis in hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam, ut caro non concupiscat adversus spiritum tuum, et spiritum adversus carnem tuam? Ista rixa non est in te? Nulla est concupiscentia carnis, quae resistat legi mentis? Si nihil in te alteri resistit, vide totum ubi sit. Si spiritus tuus a carne contra concupiscente non dissentit, vide ne forte carni mens tota consentiat; vide ne forte ideo non sit bellum, quia pax perversa est. Forte in totum carni consentis, et nulla rixa est" *Sermo* 30,3.4, PL 38,189.

¹⁴⁵ PLATO, *The Republic* 586, (A.D. LINDSAY, trans.), London, 1980, p. 288.

directed, anger and lust could lead to acts which wisdom forbids¹⁴⁶. In *Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas* 48 which is an earlier work, he enumerates the consequences of consent to the concupiscence of the flesh according to *Gal.* 5,19: "Now the works of the flesh are evident: fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, animosity, jealousy, dissension, heresy, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like, of which I tell you, as I have told you, that they who do them will not possess the kingdom of God". In *De Civitate Dei* 15,5 he gives the example of the slaying of Remus by his brother Romulus out of lust for glory; in *De Civitate Dei* 15,7 he claims that the first crime of murder, that of Abel by Cain, occurred because of "diabolical envy". And in *Contra Litteras Petilianus Donatistae* 2,68,154 he speaks of the war waged by the Donatists against the Church. These examples seem to resemble what Plato cites in *The Republic* 586: The men at Troy, as Stesichorus says, fought over the image of Helen in their ignorance of the truth. Augustine shows a strong inclination to condemn, such deeds, for the reason that he encourages the sharing of possessions with the united affection of partners. The measure of possession of common properties is proportionate to one's ability to love his partner in them.

"A man's possession of goodness is in no way diminished by the arrival, or the continuance, of a sharer in it; indeed, goodness is a possession enjoyed more widely by the united affection of partners in that possession in proportion to the harmony that exists among them. In fact, anyone who refuses to enjoy this possession in partnership will not enjoy it at all; and he will find that he possesses it in ampler measure in proportion to his ability to love his partner in it"¹⁴⁷.

To achieve a state where both goodness and affection are shared both on the smaller and wider scale, is a painful undertaking. It involves conflict between the wicked; between the wicked and the good; and even

¹⁴⁶ In *Sermo* 128,5,7, PL 38,716, Augustine, referring to sexual concupiscence, says: "Multi concupiscentiis carnalibus et damnabilibus victi, committunt quaeque facinora atque flagitia, et immunditiis tam pessimis volutantur, quae turpe est etiam dicere; et dicunt sibi ista verba Apostoli. Vide quid dixit Apostolus. *Ut non ea quae vultis, illa faciatis* (*Gal.* 5,17). Nolo facere, cogor, compellor, vincor, facio quae nolo, sicut ait Apostolus (*Rom.* 7,19): *Quia caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem, ut non ea quae vultis, illa faciatis*".

¹⁴⁷ "Nullo enim modo fit minor accedente seu permanente consorte possessio bonitatis, immo possessio bonitas, quam tanto latius, quanto concordius individua sociorum possidet caritas. Non habebit denique istam possessionem, qui eam noluerit habere communem, et tanto eam reperiet ampliorem, quanto amplius ibi potuerit amare consortem". *De Civitate Dei* 15,5, CSEL 40/2,65.

between the good, while they are on their way to perfection¹⁴⁸. It demands "carrying each other's burden" (*Gal.* 6,2); correction for the unruly, encouragement for the faint-hearted, support for the feeble, patience with all; admonition not to return evil for evil (*1 Thes.* 5,14 f.); instruction for the offender in a kindly spirit; watchfulness against temptation (*Gal.* 6,1); quickness in forgiving (*Eph.* 4,26); private correction for person to person offences; however, in order to instill fear in the rest, public rebuke of persistent sinners damaging society is permitted (*1 Tim.* 5,20)¹⁴⁹. In the context of the growth of the Church as a community, Augustine speaks of the possible achievement now of peace *only* in hope. Meanwhile the Church has to suffer from opposition from many sides to its desire and works for justice¹⁵⁰.

H. Because the flesh lusts against the spirit, it does not mean that we should hate our flesh

In *De Utilitate Jejunii* 4,4-5 Augustine warns against a mistaken interpretation of *Gal.* 5,17. One should not be led to brand the flesh as an enemy. God is the Creator of both the spirit and the flesh. The flesh is, therefore, good. In fact, we all have a natural affection for our flesh. This is testified by Paul in *Eph.* 5,29; "No one has ever hated his flesh". *Gal.* 5,17 and *Eph.* 5,29 are not two contradictory statements.

"Do not think, therefore, that the flesh is an enemy of the spirit, as though the creator of the flesh and the creator of the spirit are not the same. For many, torn by the desires of the flesh, think in this manner and deviate from truth. They attribute one author to the flesh and another to the spirit. However, they refer to the statement of the apostle as though to a testimony, which they do not understand: 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh' (*Gal.* 5,17). This is true. But, why do you not consider also another statement: 'For no one hates his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, just as Christ the Church' (*Eph.* 5,29). In the first statement which I mentioned, it appears that there is a sort of conflict between two enemies, the flesh and the spirit. In the other, however, there is a sort of marital union: 'For no one hates his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, just as Christ does the Church' (*Eph.* 5,29). What, therefore, shall we do with these two statements? If they are contradictory, which one shall we reject, and which one shall we hold on to? But they are not contradictory ... Everyone therefore loves his own

¹⁴⁸ "Concupiscentia ergo spiritalis contra alterius potest pugnare carnalem vel concupiscentia carnalis contra alterius spiritalem, sicut inter se pugnant boni et mali; vel certe ipsae concupiscentiae carnales inter se duorum bonorum, nondum utique perfectorum, sicut inter se pugnant mali et mali, donec eorum, qui curantur, ad ultimam vitoriam sanitas perducatur". *De Civitate Dei* 15,5, CSEL 40/2,65.

¹⁴⁹ *De Civitate Dei* 15,6, CSEL 40/2,66.

¹⁵⁰ *En. in Ps.* 147,20, CCL 40,2156.

flesh, the apostle says; besides the saying of the apostle everyone experiences it in himself"¹⁵¹.

The flesh is not a prison cell of the soul, nor its chain, nor its enemy¹⁵². A statement, however, in *Contra Academicos* 1,3,9, "*cum hoc corpus, hoc est tenebrosus carcerem, dereliquerit*" seems to contradict this. If we scrutinize the context, however, we find that this was said by Licentius and not by Augustine. The concept of the flesh as a prison of the soul was held by some of Augustine's contemporaries; it came through the influence of Plato. If Augustine ever admitted *caro* as *carcer*, he meant by it the corruption that comes from the inclinations of the flesh, but not the substance itself of the flesh. Thus he explains *Ps.* 141,8: "Bring my soul out of prison".

"Our body could also be called a prison, not because it is a prison which God has made, but because it is subject to punishment and liable to death ... Therefore, if flesh is a prison for you, it does not mean that the body is your prison, but the corruption of the body. For God, because He is good, has made the body good. But, being a just judge, he imposed corruption. You receive the former from His goodness, and the latter for punishment. He said this, 'Bring my soul out of prison' to mean 'Bring my soul out of corruption'"¹⁵³.

The flesh is a friend. It will be for us a friend forever when the last enemy, which is death, has been destroyed (*I Cor.* 15,26), when the sting

¹⁵¹ "Ne ergo arbitretur Dilectio vestra, quod inimica sit caro spiritui, quasi alter sit auctor carnis, alter sit auctor spiritus. Multi enim hoc putantes vere rapti ab ipsa carne deviarunt, et alterum auctorem carni, alterum spiritui posuerunt. Utuntur autem quasi testimonio apostolico, quod non intelligunt: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*. Hoc verum est; sed quare et aliud non attendis: *Nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habet; sed nutrit et fovet eam, sicut et Christus Ecclesiam*? In illa prima sententia quam commemoravi, quasi quaedam lucta duorum inimicorum videtur, carnis et spiritus; quia *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*. In hac autem tanquam copulatio conjugalitatis: *Nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habet: sed nutrit et fovet eam, sicut et Christus Ecclesiam*. Quid ergo facimus inter has duas sententias? Si contrariae sunt, quam respiciamus, quam tenebimus? Sed non sunt contrariae ... Diligit ergo unusquisque carnem suam, Apostolus dicit, et praeter Apostoli dictum unusquisque in se probat". *Sermo de Utilitate Jejunii* 4,4, PL 40,709-710.

¹⁵² *Sermo de Utilitate Jejunii* 4,4, PL 40,709-710.

¹⁵³ "Posset dici et corpus nostrum carcer, non quia carcer est quod fecit Deus, sed quia poenale et mortale ... Ergo si caro tibi carcer est, non corpus est carcer tuus, sed corruptio corporis tui. Corpus enim tuum fecit Deus bonum, quia bonus est; corruptionem intulit iustus, quia iudex est: illud habes de beneficio, illud habes de supplicio. Hoc ergo dixit: *Educ de carcere animam meam, Educ de corruptione animam meam*". *En. in Ps.* 141,18, CCL 40,2058. See also *De Civitate Dei* 11,23, CCL 48,342: he argues against Origen, who says that souls are imprisoned in the bodies as a punishment for withdrawing from God; *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,24,48-51, CSEL 80,20-22.

of death, which is sin, has been conquered (*I Cor.* 15,55)¹⁵⁴. At death the flesh is not put away as something which we have to flee from; it is simply laid aside as our integral constituent, which we are to receive again, and, when it is received, it will never part from us, for it will have become a spiritual body¹⁵⁵. Both the spirit and the flesh together will abide in eternity¹⁵⁶.

Sometimes our flesh stands for our whole selves. To love one's flesh is thus to love oneself; and to hate one's flesh is thus to hate oneself. What we should hate in the flesh is its vices or faults. These are evils which exist in a good substance, as something added to it as punishment.

"Let us listen to the apostle. He says: 'I know that there is nothing good that dwells in me, that is, in my flesh' (*Rom.* 7,18). He certainly says this, because the fault of the flesh in a good thing is not good, and when this shall have ceased to exist, it will be flesh, but it will no longer be a corrupted or faulty flesh. However, the same teacher shows us that this pertains to our nature, by saying, first: 'I know that there is nothing good that dwells in me', in order to explain which he adds, 'that is, in my flesh'. Therefore, he says that he himself is his flesh. It is not the flesh itself then that is our enemy. When its faults are resisted, it is itself loved, because it is itself which is cared for. 'No one

¹⁵⁴ "*Si enim Spiritus eius qui suscitabit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis; qui suscitavit Christum Iesum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra* (*Rom.* 8,11). Quid timetis? Quid etiam pro ipsa carne solliciti estis? *Capillus capitis vestri non peribit* (*Lc.* 21,28). Adam peccando damnavit in mortem corpora vestra; sed Iesus, *si est Spiritus eius in vobis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra*; quia suum sanguinem dedit pro salute vestra. Promissum reddi dubitas, qui tale pignus tenes? sic ergo, homo, non erit mortis illa contentio, sic implebitur quod dictum est, *Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius* (*Rom.* 7,24)? *Quia Christus Iesus, si Spiritus eius habitat in vobis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra*. Sic liberaberis de corpore mortis huius, non corpus non habendo, vel alterum habendo; sed non ulterius moriendo. Si enim non adderet, *mortis huius*, et diceret, *Quis me liberabit de corpore*? forte suggeretur error cogitationi humanae, et diceretur: Vides quia non vult Deus nos esse cum corpore? *De corpore*, inquit, *mortis huius*. Mortem tolle, et bonum est corpus. Detrahatur mors novissima inimica, et erit mihi in aeternum caro mea amica. Nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit. Etsi spiritus concupiscit contra carnem, et caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (*Gal.* 5,17); etsi modo rixa est in ista domo, maritus litigans, non perniciem, sed concordiam quaerit uxoris. Absit, fratres mei, absit ut spiritus concupiscendo contra carnem oderit carnem. Vitia carnis odit, prudentiam carnis odit, contentionem mortis odit. Corruptibile hoc induat incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induat immortalitatem; seminetur corpus animale, resurgat spirituale (*I Cor.* 15,53,44); et videbis plenam perfectamque concordiam, videbis creaturam laudare Creatorem; Si ergo *Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis; qui suscitavit Christum a mortuis ... non propter merita vestra, sed propter munera sua*". *Sermo* 155,14.15, PL 38,848-849.

¹⁵⁵ *De Continentia* 8,19, CSEL 41,163.

¹⁵⁶ *De Continentia* 8,21, CSEL 41,165-166.

ever hates his own flesh' (*Eph.* 5,29), as the apostle himself says"¹⁵⁷.

Since the flesh is our friend, martyrdom is not a sign of contempt for the flesh. Martyrdom is a patient preparation, through suffering and death, for an invulnerable health and happy immortality (*per dolorem et mortem inviolabilis sanitas et felix immortalitas comparatur*)¹⁵⁸. One should not fast to the detriment of physical health. Everybody has the natural obligation and right to physical health and to maintain it in order to be fit for work in an through life. While we should care for physical health, we should be more concerned with cultivating the spirit; not seek riches and pleasures in material wealth as an end in itself but as a means to carry on in the task of helping others. Thus, in a letter to Proba, who belonged to a Roman family of great wealth and of noble lineage, Augustine admonishes:

"Therefore, what Scripture has said of riches: 'If riches abound, do not set your heart upon them' (*Ps.* 61,11), I also say to you concerning pleasure: 'If pleasures abound, do not set your heart upon them'. Do not therefore think highly of yourself because these things are not wanting, because these things are yours in abundance, flowing as though from a most copious fountain of earthly felicity. By all means look down upon your possession and do not value them much, lest you seek in them something beyond a perfect health of the body. For this health is not to be despised because of its necessary uses for life before 'this mortal puts on immortality' (*I Cor.* 15,54), that is, true, perfect, and everlasting health, which is neither weakened by earthly infirmities nor nourished with corruptible gratification, but, enduring with celestial vigor, is animated by eternal incorruptibility. The Apostle himself says: 'Make no provision for the flesh in order to fulfill its lusts' (*Rom.* 13,14), because we take care of the flesh, but only insofar as it is necessary for health. 'For no one hates his own flesh' (*Eph.* 5,29), just as he himself likewise says. Hence he also admonishes Timothy, who, as it appears, is too severe upon his body, that he should 'take a little wine for his stomach's sake, and for his frequent

¹⁵⁷ "Audiamus apostolum, *Scio*, inquit, *quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum*. Hoc utique ait, quia vitium carnis in re bona non est bonum: quod cum esse destiterit, caro erit, sed iam vitiata vel vitiosa non erit. Quam tamen ad nostram pertinere naturam idem doctor ostendit prius dicendo: *scio, quia non habitat in me*, quod ut exponeret, addidit: *hoc est in carne mea, bonum*. Se itaque dicit esse carnem suam. Non ergo ipsa est inimica nostra; et quando eius vitiis resistitur, ipsa amatur, quia ipsa curatur. *Nemo enim umquam carnem suam odio habuit, sicut ipse apostolus dicit*". *De Continentia* 8,19, CSEL 41,163-164.

¹⁵⁸ *De Patientia* 8,7, CSEL 41,669; see also *Sermo* 277,3, PL 38,1259: God will restore our body and spirit. *De Civitate Dei* 13,20, CCL 48,403: Death, after a righteous life, lived through sufferings, both from internal and from external causes, is desirable, since it will bring about transformation of the body.

infirmities' (1 Tim. 5,23)¹⁵⁹.

Not only do we have a natural affection for our flesh and are obliged to care for it; but we should also have love and respect for the flesh of others. We see this extension of love for the flesh in Augustine's thinking, according to Paul's thought, of the flesh as the temple of the Spirit (cf. 1 Cor. 5,19-20; 3,16). We have found eleven references in connection with 1 Cor. 6,19-20¹⁶⁰, concerning love and respect for the flesh, both ours and those of the neighbours. In *Epistula* 187¹⁶¹, Augustine considers

¹⁵⁹ "Quapropter quod scriptura dixit de divitiis: *Divitiae si adfluant, ne adponatis cor*, hoc etiam de deliciis tibi dico: *Deliciae si adfluant, ne adponas cor*. Non ideo te magni pendas, quod non desunt, quod affatim suppetunt, quod velut ex fonte largissimo terrenae felicitatis fluunt. Omnino haec in te despice atque contemne, ne in his quicquam requiras praeter integram corporis valitudinem. Haec enim contemnenda non est propter necessarios usus vitae huius, antequam *mortale hoc induatur immortalitate*, hoc est vera et perfecta et perpetua sanitate, quae non terrena infirmitate deficiens corruptibili voluptate reficitur, sed caelesti firmitate persistens aeterna incorruptibilitate vegetatur. Nam et ipse apostolus: *Carnis*, inquit, *providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis*, quia gerimus curam carnis sed ad necessitatem salutis. *Nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit*, sicut ipse itidem dicit. Hinc est, quod et Timotheum nimium, sicut apparet, corporis castigatorem admonet, *ut modico vino utatur propter stomachum et frequentes suas infirmitates*". *Epistula* 130,3,7; CSEL 44,48-49. See also *Vita S. Augustini, Auctore Possidio* 22, PL 32,51-52; *Regula* 3; *Sermo* 61,9-13, PL 38,412-414: Augustine exhorts the rich and demands that they give what they do not need to the materially deprived. Health is the measure of how much the rich should give, and of how much the poor should demand and receive. T. VAN BAVEL's explanation of community and poverty in *The Evangelical Inspiration of the Rule of Saint Augustine*, in *The Downside Review* 91,311 (1975) 92-94, will serve as good complementary reading.

¹⁶⁰ *Sermo* 278,7, PL 38,1271; *Sermo* 82,10,13, PL 38,512: man is a temple of God in every respect: "Modo autem tu ipse es templum Dei. Templum intras, templum exis, templum in domo tua, templum surgis"; *Epistula* 187,8,26 CSEL 57,103: Baptised infants are temples of God; *Sermo* 161,2, PL 38,879: we are temples of God in the context of the Total Christ; *Sermo* 161,6, PL 38,880-881: sin against the flesh is sin at the same time against the spirit; *De Continentia* 8,23,25, CSEL 41,168,172: Eph.5,22-25 is discussed in the context of the Total Christ; *De Bono Coniugali* 11,13, CSEL 41,204-205: married peoples' bodies are temples of the spirit; *De Bono Viduitatis* 6,8, CSEL 41,312: Paul's praise of virginity, in 1 Cor. 7,34, that the unmarried woman is holy both in body and in spirit, does not mean that the loyal and chaste married woman is not holy in body but only in spirit: "Unde et illud, quod de innupta Paulus apostolus dixit: *ut sit sancta et corpore et spiritu*, non sic accipiendum est, quasi nupta fidelis et caste et secundum scripturas subdita viro non sit sancta corpore, sed tantummodo spiritu". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,18,20, CSEL 42,232: we are temples of the Spirit in view of the redemption of our bodies; *Contra Duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* 4,4, CSEL 60,52: he recalls his defense of the sacredness of the flesh, as temple of the Spirit, against the Manicheans, who consider it evil; *Contra Litteras Petiliani* 2,68,154, PL 43,307: love for the flesh is parallel to love for neighbour.

¹⁶¹ *Epistula* 187,8,26, CSEL 57,103-104.

infants and even unspiritual human beings - the *animalis homo* in *1 Cor.* 2,14 - as temples of the Spirit to the same extent as full grown human beings. Further on, he says that God is present even in those who refuse to glorify and thank God and in those who are on the way to faith¹⁶². In connection with *1 Cor.* 3,16-17, he warns against sins of the flesh, particularly adultery; and in connection with *1 Cor.* 6,19-20, he warns against fornication. Sins committed against the flesh and contempt for the flesh are sins committed against the temple of God and contempt for the temple of God. This is true, irrespective of the place and condition surrounding the acts¹⁶³. The believers are instruments, through which the Holy Spirit forgives sins, because they are temples of the Spirit¹⁶⁴. Just as there is a unity between love for God and love for neighbours, which two cannot be split up¹⁶⁵, so there is also a unity between sin against God and sin against the temple of God.

"Therefore, just as there are two commandments, so also there are two kinds of sins. For one sins either against God, or against man. You sin against God also by corrupting His temple in you. Certainly God redeemed you by the blood of His Son. Even before you were redeemed, whose servant were you, except His who created everything? He wished in a peculiar way to possess you who have been redeemed by the blood of His Son. The Apostle says, 'You were not your own; for you were bought with a big price; glorify and carry God in your body' (*1 Cor.* 6,19-20)"¹⁶⁶.

Affection for the flesh may breed obligation. Because of our natural affection and respect for the flesh, from a sense of responsibility we want proper burial for the dead. Failure to do this causes us pain (*1 Kings*

¹⁶² *Epistula* 187,9,29, CSEL 57,106.

¹⁶³ *Sermo* 82,10,13, PL 38,512; *Sermo* 161,2, PL 38,878.

¹⁶⁴ *Sermo* 99,9, PL 38,600.

¹⁶⁵ *In Epistulam Ioannis, Tractatus* 10,3, PL 35,2055.

¹⁶⁶ "Quomodo ergo duo sunt praecepta, sic et duo genera peccatorum. Aut enim in Deum peccatur, aut in hominem. Peccatur autem in Deum, etiam corrumpendo templum eius in te: etenim Deus redemit te sanguine Filii sui. Quanquam et antequam redimereris, cuius servus eras, nisi eius qui condidit omnia? Peculiariter quodam modo te habere voluit redemptum sanguine Filii sui. *Et non estis vestri*, inquit Apostolus; *empti enim estis pretio magno: glorificate et portate Deum in corpore vestro*". *Sermo* 278,7,7, PL 38,1271. The idea of representation is very strongly expressed here. Augustine's repetition of Paul's word *portate* shows this; it means to carry God in us. Thus in the following statement he exhorts us to safeguard the flesh in reference to God: "Ergo ille a quo redemptus es, fecit te domum suam. Numquid tu vis everti domum tuam? Sic nec Deus suam, hoc est, te ipsum. Si tibi non parcis propter te ipsum, parce tibi propter Deum, qui te fecit templum suum. *Templum enim Dei sanctum est*, inquit, *quod estis vos*; et, *Qui templum Dei corruperit, corrumpet illum Deus* (*1 Cor.* 3,17). Quae peccata homines quando faciunt, putant se non peccare, quia nulli homini nocent". *Sermo* 278,7,7, PL 38,1271.

13,21-22)¹⁶⁷; in burying the dead as happened with the remains of Saul and Jonathan (2 *Sam.* 2,5) we are worthy of praise. During Augustine's time it was common to bury the dead at the memorials of the martyrs. For believers proper burial of dead neighbours was an even greater testimony of their faith in the resurrection of the body.

"But as for burying the body, whatever is done is of no aid to salvation, but an obligation of humanity according to that affection by which 'no one ever hates his own flesh' (*Eph.* 5,29). Therefore it is fitting that a person takes care, as well as he is able, of the flesh of his neighbour, when he who cared for it has departed. And if they who do not believe in the resurrection of the body do this, how much more should they who believe do the same, so that a service of this kind rendered to the body, that is dead but nevertheless will rise and will abide in eternity, may also be a testimony of our faith"¹⁶⁸.

I. Affection, love and respect for the flesh, despite its weight upon the spirit, is grounded in hope for its transformation

The love for the flesh, despite its weight upon the spirit, is grounded in hope for the transformation of the flesh from *animalis* to *spiritalis*. We see this line of thought in Augustine's treatment of *Gal.* 5,17 or *Wis.* 9,15 or *Rom.* 7,23, with either *1 Cor.* 15,44: "It is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body", or *1 Cor.* 15,53: "It is necessary that this corruptible [sc. flesh] must put on incorruption, and this mortal [sc. flesh] must put on immortality". We have found eight references to this. In *Sermo* 277,4.4 and in *De Civitate Dei* 22,21, Augustine admits that no one among us has ever actually experienced the future glory of the resurrection-life bodies. In *De Civitate Dei* he even expresses fear of giving the exact status of the *caro spiritalis* (*vereor ne temerarium sit omne, quod de illa profertur, eloquium*). At the same time, however, he expresses hope, coming from the experience of blessings received now, which are signs from which we may conjecture the future condition of the body¹⁶⁹. In *De Civitate Dei*, he speaks more of the physical status of the *caro spi-*

¹⁶⁷ *De Cura pro Mortuis Gerenda* 7,9, CSEL 41,635.

¹⁶⁸ "Corpori autem humando quidquid impenditur, non est praesidium salutis, sed humanitatis officium secundum affectum, quo *nemo unquam carnem suam odio habet*. Unde oportet ut quam potest pro carne proximi curam gerat, cum ille inde recesserit qui gerebat. Et si haec faciunt, qui carnis resurrectionem non credunt, quanto magis debent facere qui credunt, ut corpori mortuo, sed tamen resurrecturo et in aeternitate mansuro impensum eius modi officium sit etiam quodam modo eiusdem fidei testimonium". *De Cura pro Mortuis Gerenda* 18,22, CSEL 41,658-659.

¹⁶⁹ *En. in Ps.* 73,2, CCL 39,1006: in connection with *Ex.* 3,8, the promise of Chanaan, and with *1 Cor.* 15,46-49, temporal kingdom, earthly happiness, and the like, are to a certain degree experienced now, while we still bear the *corpus animale*.

ritalis in connection with *Lk.* 21,18: "But not a hair of your head will perish"; he likewise includes its moral characteristics.

"Therefore, whatever has perished from the living bodies or from the corpses after death will be restored; and with it will rise simultaneously all that has remained in the graves and has changed from the oldness of the animal body into the newness of the spiritual body, clothed with incorruption and immortality ... In no way can it be withdrawn from the omnipotence of the Creator, but 'not a hair of its head will perish' (*Lk.* 21,18). The spiritual flesh will therefore be made subject to the spirit, but, nevertheless, it will be flesh, not spirit; just as the carnal spirit itself has been made subject to the flesh; it is nevertheless spirit, not flesh. We have an experience of this situation in the distorted condition of our state of punishment. For the apostle was speaking to the people who were carnal not in respect of the flesh, but, indeed, in respect of the spirit: 'I could not speak to you as spiritual, but as carnal' (*1 Cor.* 3,1). Man in this life is so called spiritual, although he is still carnal by reason of the body, and he sees another law in his members warring against the law of his mind (cf. *Rom.* 7,23); he will, however, be spiritual even in body, when the same flesh has risen in order that what has been written be fulfilled: 'It is sown an animal body, it will rise a spiritual body' (*1 Cor.* 15,44). But what and how extensive the grace of the spiritual body is, I fear that all the descriptions which are given about it are rash, since it has not been experienced yet by us. And yet we should not keep silent about the joy of our hope, on account of the praise due to God; and it was from the inmost marrow of the burning holy love that it was said: 'Lord, I have loved the beauty of your house' (*Ps.* 25,8). With God's help, let us conjecture, as best as we can, from His blessings which He bestows on good and bad alike in this life of troubles, how great that joy will be, which of course we cannot worthily describe, since we have not experienced it yet. For I leave out the joy of the first man, when God created him upright; I leave out the happy life of that pair in the fertility of Paradise, since it was so short that it did not last long enough to be felt by their children. Who could fully describe all the evidence of God's goodness towards mankind, in this life which we know, in which we still are, whose temptations we continually suffer, or rather it is itself wholly a temptation, so long as we live it, and however great the progress may be that we make"¹⁷⁰.

¹⁷⁰ "Restituetur ergo quicquid de corporibus vivis vel post mortem de cadaveribus periit, et simul cum eo, quod in sepulcris remansit, in spiritalis corporis novitatem ex animalis corporis vetustate mutatum resurget incorruptione adque immortalitate vestitum ... nullo modo subtrahi poterit omnipotentiae Creatoris, sed capillus in eo capitis non peribit. Ergo erit spiritui subdita caro spiritalis, sed tamen caro, non spiritus; sicut carni subditus fuit spiritus ipse carnalis, sed tamen spiritus, non caro. Cuius rei habemus experimentum in nostrae poenae deformitate. Non enim secundum carnem, sed utique secundum spiritum carnales erant, quibus ait apostolus: *Non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritalibus, sed quasi carnalibus*; et homo spiritalis sic in hac vita dicitur, ut tamen corpore adhuc carnalis sit et videat aliam legem in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae; erit autem etiam corpore spiritalis, cum eadem *caro sic resurrexerit*, ut fiat quod scriptum est: *Seminatur corpus animale, resurget corpus spiritale*. Quae sit autem et quam magna spiritalis corporis gratia, quoniam nondum venit in experimentum, vereor ne temerarium sit omne, quod de illa profertur eloquium. Verum tamen quia spei nostrae gaudium propter Dei

In *Sermo* 277¹⁷¹ Augustine warns against fear for the continuity of the disharmony of the flesh and the spirit in the resurrection-life bodies. The spiritual bodies will enjoy perfect health (*sanitas perfecta*). In *Epistula* 143¹⁷² he assures his reader that the soul will rule the spiritual body at will. In *De Gestis Pelagii*¹⁷³ he explains how this will happen. The conflict between the law in the members and the law of the mind will be dissolved. The flesh, then, subjected to the spirit in absolute tranquility will esteem the spirit immortally.

On many occasions Augustine, aware of the reality of the concupiscence of the flesh and of its inextinguishable nature, warns against lapsing into the tendencies of the flesh. With reference to the possible difficulty that *Gal.* 5,16 gives: "Walk in the spirit, lest you gratify the desires of the flesh", he always points out that the apostle did not say, "*et concupiscentias carnis non habueritis*", but "*ne perfeceritis*"¹⁷⁴. In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, he expresses the hope for a full liberation of the just, with emphasis on their liberation in all respects from concupiscence of the flesh.

"If, however, absolutely nothing of our flesh were held captive, not even under the devil, since even there the remission of sin has been achieved, such that sin may not be imputed to it, which is properly called the law of sin, nevertheless under the law itself of sin, that is, under its concupiscence, unless our

laudem non est tacendum et de intimis ardentis sancti amoris medullis dictum est: *Domine dilexi decorem domus tuae*: de donis eius, quae in hac aerumnosissima vita bonis malisque largitur, ipso adiuvante coniciamus, ut possumus, quantum sit illud, quod nondum experti utique digne eloqui non valemus. Omitto enim, quando fecit hominem rectum; omitto vitam illam duorum coniugum in paradisi fecunditate felicem quoniam tam brevis fuit, ut ad nascentium sensum nec ipsa pervenerit: in hac, quam novimus, in qua adhuc sumus, cuius tentationes, immo quam totam tentationem, quamdiu in ea sumus, quantumlibet proficiamus, perpeti non desinimus, quae sint indicia circa genus humanum bonitatis Dei, quis poterit explicare?". *De Civitate Dei* 22,21, CSEL 40/2,634-635. *Lk.* 21,18 is also used by Augustine for proving that aborted fetuses and infants who died rise into a perfect state. *De Civitate Dei* 22,12,13,14, CSEL 40/2,618-623. Both sexes will continue to exist. There will no longer be lust (*libido*), which is the cause of confusion. When all defects are removed from the bodies, their essential nature will be preserved. A woman's sex is not a defect; it is natural. Sexual organs will no longer have their former use but will be a part of the new beauty of the body. Here lies the difference between the resurrection-life bodies and the primeval state of the bodies. They will be better in every respect. *De Civitate Dei* 22,17, CSEL 40/2,625. All of us, men and women, will attain the perfect stature as the risen Christ did. *De Civitate Dei* 22,18, CSEL 40/2,628: in connection with *Eph.* 4,10f.

¹⁷¹ *Sermo* 277,4.4, PL 38,1259.

¹⁷² *Epistula* 143,6, CSEL 44,256.

¹⁷³ *De Gestis Pelagii* 30,55, CSEL 42,110.

¹⁷⁴ *Epistulae ad Galatas Expositio* 47, CSEL 84,123.

flesh were held captive to a certain degree, how could the statement of the same apostle be true: 'Waiting for the adoption, the redemption of our body' (*Rom.* 8,23)? Insofar as then redemption of our body is still being waited for, to this extent it is still captive to a certain degree under the law of sin. Accordingly he [sc. the apostle] exclaims: 'O wretched man that I am; who will deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ' (*Rom.* 7,24-25). How shall we understand this, except that 'the body which corrupts weighs down the soul' (*Wis.* 9,15)? When, therefore, this very body is received incorruptible, there will be a full liberation from the body of this death; those who are going to rise to punishment will not be liberated from it. It means that to the body of this death there pertains the condition that there is another law in our members which indeed wars against the law of the mind (*Rom.* 7,23), while 'the flesh lusts against the spirit', although it does not subjugate the mind, because the spirit also lusts against the flesh (*Gal.* 5,17)¹⁷⁵.

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¹⁷⁵ "Attamen, si omnino nihil carnis nostrae captivum teneretur non quidem sub diabolo, quia et ibi facta est peccati remissio, ut peccatum non inputetur, quod proprie lex peccati vocatur, tamen sub ipsa lege peccati, hoc est sub concupiscentia sua, nisi aliquantum teneretur caro nostra captiva, quomodo esset verum, quod ait idem apostolus: *adoptionem expectantes, redemptionem corporis nostri*? In tantum igitur adhuc expectatur redemptio corporis nostri, in quantum adhuc ex aliqua parte captivum est sub lege peccati. Unde et hic exclamans ait: *infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum*. Ubi quid intellecturi sumus, nisi quia corpus quod corrumpitur, adgravat animam? Cum ergo id ipsum corpus iam incorruptibile recipitur, plena erit liberatio a corpore mortis huius, a quo non liberantur, qui sunt ad poenam resurrecturi. Ad corpus ergo mortis huius intellegitur pertinere, ut alia lex in membris repugnet quidem legi mentis, dum *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum*, etsi mentem non subiuguet, quia et spiritus adversus carnem". *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* 1,31.35, CSEL 42,246-247. See also *Sermo* 128,9.11, PL 38,719: Augustine exhorts his readers to battle against the corruptible tendencies of the flesh and to a hope for victory: *Exercete bellum. Sperate Triumphum*.