

THE LAST CONGRUOUS VOCATION

The late Augustine has been and is still an unpopular and terrifying figure to many people¹). In his later years he resolutely asserted God's absolute priority in the process of the creature's salvation. Because this divine sovereignty seemed to deny the liberty of the human being, this assertion caused and still causes a vigorous opposition. John Burnaby, for example, who studied Augustine's thought on love in detail, expressed his impression: "Nearly all that Augustine wrote after his seventieth year is the work of a man whose energy had burnt itself out, whose love had grown cold"²).

I want in this paper to reexamine Augustine's understanding of the relation between divine grace and human liberty. I will argue that Augustine's thought on divine grace and human liberty in his later years does not mean the exhaustion of his power of thought, but shows the maturity which resulted from an effort that could synthesize divine grace and human liberty. I will assert further that Augustine did not change his basic thought on this matter since his first discovery in *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*³). J.P. Burns recently made a new detailed study of this long-discussed problem. Through his genetic methodology, he traced the development and the change in Augustine's thought during his long deliberation and in his vigorous polemical controversy against Pelagian groups⁴). I will elaborate my assertion through a criticism of Burns' important work.

¹) O. ROTTMANNER, *L'augustinisme*, traduction de J. Liebaert, dans *Mélanges de science religieuse*, VI^{me} année, Cahier I, Avril 1949, p. 31-48, depicted the severe figure of the late Augustine masterfully.

²) J. BURNABY, *Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of Saint Augustine*, London, 1938, p. 231.

³) Eugene TESELLE, *Augustine the Theologian*, London, 1970, p. 333-334, perceived "a sharp change" of emphasis in 418 and "a heightened interiorization of Augustine's understanding of man's relation to God". But he thought that "There is no change, I think, in Augustine's psychology". Gotthard NYGREN, *Das Prädestinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins*, Lund, 1956, p. 48, asserts the consistency of Augustine's thought on the problem of predestination. "Er bleibt dem Aufriss der Probleme von Ad Simplicianum sein ganzes Leben getreu, obwohl die Prädestinationslehre später aus äusseren Gründen immer stärker bei ihm hervortritt, bedeutet das nichts principiell Neues".

⁴) J. Patout BURNS, *The development of Augustine's doctrine of operative grace*, Paris, 1980, p. 14.

I. THE ABANDONMENT OF THE THEORY OF 'CONGRUOUS VOCATION'?

Burns admits that Augustine's thought of the divine sovereignty over the human will was sustained almost unchanged from the time of its first discovery in *Ad Simplicianum* until his last day. But Burns asserts that his explanation of the ways and means by which God achieves his salvific purposes, that is, his explanation of the divine operation on the human will, was perceptively changed during twenty years⁵). In his first discovery of the operative grace in *Ad Simplicianum*, Burns insists, Augustine saw the divine operation only in the manipulation of the environmental means, by which God persuades man's will externally⁶). Burns names this way of God's persuasion 'congruous vocation' according to the text of *Ad Simplicianum* I, 2, 13. The congruous vocation, Burns further asserts, presupposes a good disposition to which God provides a divine vocation⁷). Burns contends that after 418 Augustine abandoned the theory of the 'congruous vocation' and substituted for it the theory of the 'interior grace', which directly operates on man's will, and produces a good will⁸). The human consent by which one believes in God is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

I have the following two questions about this assertion.

1. Is the congruous vocation which is described in *Ad Simplicianum* truly limited to the divine manipulation of the external means and does it presuppose a good human disposition?

2. Does the direct operation of the so-called 'interior grace' upon man's will in his later years exclude the character of vocation and reject the human role of responding to the vocation?

II. THE CONGRUOUS VOCATION IN *DE DIVERSIS QUAESTIONIBUS AD SIMPLICIANUM*

Let us read carefully the second question of the first book of *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* in order to find Augustine's true intention, which made him speak of the congruous vocation. This section treats the questions which arise from the ninth chapter of Paul's

⁵) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 7.

⁶) *Id.*, p. 45.

⁷) *Id.*, p. 155.

⁸) *Id.*, p. 158.

Epistle to Romans, especially the question about the election and rejection of Isaac's children⁹).

In the first place, Augustine describes Paul's intention in this chapter: *Et primo intentionem Apostoli, quae per totam Epistolam viget, tenebo, quam consulam. Haec est autem, ut de operum meritis nemo gloriatur, de quibus audebant Israelitae gloriari, quod datae sibi legi servissent, et ex hoc evangelicam gratiam tamquam debitam meritis suis percepissent, quia legi serviebant*¹⁰). The example of Jacob and Esau serves to illustrate most obviously Paul's intention. The point which Paul grasped in this example is expressed in the following two propositions: *Non ex operibus, sed ex vocante*¹¹) and *Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei*¹²). Augustine interprets the first verse as the announcement of the priority which the grace of faith has over the human merits of deeds. Then he expresses his new understanding, which is distinguished from his former one. According to his new understanding, the faith itself should be regarded as a divine gift¹³), though he formerly regarded the faith as the act which is not a gift, but which is in one's power¹⁴). The proposition, *Non ex operibus, sed vocantibus* is now to be understood as the proclamation that the divine vocation precedes all human merits including the faith itself. But here is a peculiar difficulty. A question arises, "Why did not Esau get the divine vocation which would cause him to believe in God?" When man answers this question, "Because Esau did not want to believe", then man can infer that Jacob got the merciful vocation because of his willingness to believe, and that Jacob had what he had not accepted, that is his merit of deeds, of which he can be proud¹⁵). This is the difficulty which is inherent in the schema 'vocation-response'. This schema aims at establishing the divine priority of the vocation on the one hand and protecting the spontaneous decision of the human will on the other.

⁹) D. MARAFIOTI, *Alle origine del teorema della predestinazione (Simpl. I, 2, 13-22)*, in *Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum* 25, Congresso internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione, Atti II, Roma, 1987, p. 265, made a sharp analysis of the text of *Ad Simplicianum* I, 2, 13-22. He regards the theory of 'congruous vocation' as a provisional attempt to solve the question of Esau's rejection. He says, "La via della vocatio congrua, quindi, non dà pienamente ragione del fatto che Esau non abbia ricevuto la grazia, e Agostino la abbandona".

¹⁰) *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, I, 2, 2.

¹¹) The Epistle to the Romans 9, 12.

¹²) The Epistle to the Romans 9, 16.

¹³) *Ad Simpl.*, I, 2, 7.

¹⁴) *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, 68, 5.

¹⁵) *Ad Simpl.*, I, 2, 10.

However, in order to protect the human autonomy of decision, man must concede the merit of deeds and the ground of human pride. Augustine had discovered the liberty of the human will in the long struggle against Manichean determinism¹⁶). He could never leave this fact of human liberty. But he had also to understand Paul's intention that man should not be proud of his merits. The difficulty is immanent in the cooperation between God and human being. This cooperation is expressed in the following sentence. *Ut velimus enim et suum voluit et nostrum*¹⁷). Augustine points out the core of this difficulty. *Nam si propterea solum dictum est, 'Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei' quia voluntas hominis sola non sufficit et juste recte vivamus, nisi adjuvemur misericordia Dei; potest et hoc modo dici, igitur non miserentis est Dei, sed volentis est hominis, quia misericordia Dei sola non sufficit, nisi consensus nostrae voluntatis addatur*¹⁸). When man wants to protect human spontaneous will, man must also admit the consent of human will as the sign of human merits. In order to defend Paul's intention without denying the human responding faculty, man must make conspicuous the absolute priority of the divine calling in the midst of the schema, 'vocation-response'.

Augustine makes the first step toward the solution of the difficulty by stating as follows: *At illud manifestum est, frustra nos velle, nisi Deus misereatur: illud autem nescio quomodo dicatur, frustra Deum misereri, nisi nos velimus. Si enim Deus miseretur, etiam volumus*¹⁹). When God has mercy, then we also have will. The divine mercy which causes the human will expresses the divine sovereignty over the human will. The consent of the human will is indeed indispensable for the schema 'vocation-response', but man can not will without God's mercy. But how is it possible that such God's mercy takes effect? In order to explain this, Augustine asserts the 'congruous vocation'. God's mercy and God's vocation is not the same. The vocation has not the absolute sovereignty over the human will. Man can reject the divine calling. Therefore, the following sentence holds good in this phase: *Non*

¹⁶) Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, London, 1967, p. 59, pointed out the Manichean lack of sense for the tension within the will itself in the following words, "The complexities of doubt, of ignorance, deep-rooted tensions within the citadel of the will itself, are deliberately ignored in Manichaeism. With all their talk of 'setting-free', the Manichees had no room, in their religious language, for more subtle processes of growth for 'healing', for 'renewal'.

¹⁷) *Ad Simpl.*, I, 2, 10.

¹⁸) *Id.*, I, 2, 12.

¹⁹) *Ibid.*

miserentis est Dei, sed volentis est hominis. The one who can respond to a divine vocation is the one who can understand the vocation. Then the divine mercy does not seem to have the absolute efficacy. The one who responds to a divine calling seems to be able to be proud of the faculty by which he can respond to it. Augustine can not admit such a human boast. The primal reason why man can respond to a divine vocation is not that he has the faculty to respond to it, but that God has mercy to him and provides a 'congruous vocation' to him. If God had called him in a way, which is too high for him to understand, he could not respond to it. God provides another vocation to a person who failed to grasp a vocation, if God has a mercy for him. God keeps providing the vocations one after another until the man at last grasps the divine vocation. God's mercy has a absolute efficacy through the 'congruous vocation'. This divine efficacy through the congruous vocation is the true reason why a person can respond to a vocation. All depends upon God's mercy. Man's faculty plays no decisive role. Burns asserts that congruous vocation "required prior good disposition to which the preacher could appeal"²⁰). There are indeed such cases. But that is not the point of the 'congruous vocation'. If all congruous vocations require such good dispositions, God can not call a person who has no such good disposition. God could save only the man who has a good ability to believe. But this is absurd. For God has all means to call suitably the man who has a stone heart and rebels against God, if God has mercy upon him. All depends upon God's mercy.

The concluding part of the first book suggests that the congruous vocation does not presuppose the good disposition of the human being. (Augustine stated this sentence as regards the reason of the election, but the congruous vocations are means by which the elected are unfailingly invited to God. Therefore this sentence has to do with the congruous vocation.) *Non enim habeo quod intuear in eligendis hominibus ad gratiam salutarem, si ad examen hujus electionis aliqua cogitatione permittor, nisi vel majus ingenium, vel minora peccata, vel utrumque: addamus etiam, si placet, honestas utilesque doctorinas. Quisquis ergo fuerit, quam minimis peccatis irretitus atque maculatus (nam nullis quis potest?) et acer ingenio, et liberalibus artibus expolitus, eligendus videtur ad gratiam. Sed cum hoc statuerem, ita me ridebit ille qui infirma mundi elegit ut confundat fortia, et stulta mundi ut confundat sapientes, ut eum intuens et pudore correctus, ego irrideam multos et prae quibusdam*

²⁰) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 155.

*peccatoribus castiores et prae quibusdam piscatoribus oratores*²¹). Augustine further narrates Paul's conversion as the case of the most rebellious will. There is no principal difference between this narration and the one in later years. *Quid volebat Saulus nisi invadere, trahere, vincere, necare christianos? Quam rabida voluntas, quam furiosa, quam caeca! qui tamen una desuper voce prostratus, occurrente utique tali viso, quo mens illa et voluntas refracta saevitia retorqueretur ad fidem, repente ex Evangelii mirabili persecutore mirabilior praedicator effectus est*²²). The congruous vocation works upon such a rebellious will and upon such a bad disposition. Burns' limitation of the divine operation only to the one which works upon a good disposition is not correct.

Burns further limits the way of the congruous vocation only to environmental means. "The congruous vocation worked by the adaptation of environmental means, especially knowledge, to the prior dispositions of an individual"²³). But Augustine characterizes the divine vocation by the expression which suggests the occurrence caused by internal admonition: *Incipit autem homo percipere gratiam, ex quo incipit Deo credere, vel interna vel externa admonitione motus ad fidem, ... sed nullo modo autem credidisset, nisi vel secretis per visa mentis aut spiritus, vel manifestioribus per sensus corporis admonitionibus vocaretur*²⁴). Burns apologizes for his limitation by saying that "Like the interior illumination which manifests truth and the admonition of the law which indicates justice, the persuasive call to believe move the will by giving knowledge. All three are effective in gaining the consent of the will, but all three are external to it, located in the intellect"²⁵). But I doubt whether Augustine distinguishes the will from the intellect as located in a different space. Augustine indeed distinguishes the will from the intellect, but not as though each were located externally²⁶). The intellect should be admitted within, in the will. Augustine never admits the will which implies no knowledge. The unconscious knowledge drives will's search to know. And the will does not rest unless he clearly grasps the knowledge which drives him unconsciously²⁷). When man feels persuaded, then the intellect works not only externally, but also

²¹) *Ad Simpl.*, I, 2, 22.

²²) *Ibid.*

²³) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 145.

²⁴) *Ad Simpl.*, I, 2, 2.

²⁵) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 44.

²⁶) *De trinitate* X, 11, 18.

²⁷) *De trinitate* X, 1, 1. X, 2, 4.

inwardly, within the will. Burns' understanding of the relation between will and intellect is too narrow, and this narrowness drives him to distinguish the congruous vocation in *Ad Simplicianum* artificially from the 'interior grace' in later years.

III. THE INTERIOR GRACE IN LATER YEARS

The Donatist controversy and the Pelagian controversy made Augustine deepen his thought on the relation between divine grace and human will. But does this deepening of his understanding mean the change of his principal thought and abandonment of the theory of the 'congruous vocation'?

After 418 Augustine perceptively emphasizes the innerly-working divine grace. The following sentence in *De gratia Christi* shows clearly the change of the stress in Augustine's thought. *Haec gratia si doctrina dicenda est, certe sic dicatur, ul altius et interius eam Deum cum ineffabili suavitate credatur infundere, non solum per eos qui plantant et rigant extrinsecus, sed etiam per seipsum qui incrementum suum ministrat occultus, ita ut non ostendat tantummodo veritatem, verum etiam impertiat charitatem. Sic enim docet Deus eos qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, simul donans et quid agant scire, et quod sciunt agere*²⁸). Pelagius admits the divine operation on the human will, but through the law and doctrine. These divine operations somehow resemble Augustine's divine vocation. In order to make clear the difference, Augustine stresses the innerly-operating divine grace. J. Lebourlier pointed out the change of Augustine's thought at the time when Augustine wrote *De correptione et gratia* (426-427). "Il semble bien que le système de la 'vocatio congrua' soit dépassé, que Dieu ne se borne plus à triompher des volontés rebelles en adaptant habilement sa 'vocatio' à leurs dispositions, mais qu'il a le pouvoir d'agir directement à l'intime des volontés pour les transformer elles-mêmes et adapter d'abord leurs dispositions à la 'vocatio'"²⁹). Following this assertion, J.P. Burns attempted to elaborate the hypothesis. "Augustine abandoned the theory of conversion by a vocation adapted to the prior disposition of the elect ... The

²⁸) *De gratia christi et de peccato originali* I, 13, 14.

²⁹) J. LEBOURLIER, *La responsabilité du pécheur*, dans *Augustinus Magister*, Actes III, Paris, 1954, p. 299, did not, however, deny congruous vocation in Augustine's later works. He says, "Le texte suivant, de la même date, montre bien pourtant que, s'il l'a perfectionné, saint Augustin n'a sûrement pas abandonné le schéma de la 'vocatio congrua'".

congruous vocation required in the elect a capacity and disposition to believe in Christ and ask for God's assistance. This disposition had been provoked and cultivated by the threat of damnation in the law. The theory itself was, moreover, designed to maintain the integrity of the human will and the autonomy of its response of faith by utilizing environmental influences, rather than the infusing of new dispositions and willing, to explain the efficacy of the divine operation"³⁰). The change of emphasis can be perceived most clearly in the explaining of the process of conversion. Augustine now says that the conversion is caused not by the external vocation, but by the divine direct operation on the human will. The conversion consists in the spring from unwillingness to believe in God to willingness. *Quis trahitur, si iam volebat? et tamen nemo venit, nisi velit, trahitur ergo miris modis, ut velit, ab illo, qui novit intus in ipsis hominum cordibus operari, non ut homines, quod fieri non potest, nolentes credant, sed ut volentes ex nolentibus fiant*³¹). But does this change of stress mean the abandonment of the theory of 'congruous vocation'? Indeed the vocation concedes the key-position to the human being, because the final decision lies in the human consent. But the final intention of the 'congruous vocation' which Augustine introduced in *Ad Simplicianum* is not the protection of the human autonomy, but the pointing out of the omnipotent divine ability to accommodate to human deficiencies, which can not easily respond to the divine vocation. The congruous vocation expresses the divine activity which increases its intensity in proportion to the degree of the lack of the human autonomy. The adjective 'congruous' does not express the aptitude of the human disposition, but the divine adaptability to the human impotence.

Augustine became doubtful of human autonomy more and more in the process of Pelagian controversy. It seemed to Augustine that the vocation which presupposed a will with few deficiency of the responding faculty had no more effect. And the possibility of responding to the vocation seemed to gradually disappear. There remains solely the one human will which lies in the innermost human being. This will does not desire at any rate by himself to believe in God. Is there any 'congruous vocation' which can excite this will to God? The late Augustine did not say that there is no vocation which can be congruous to this will, but

³⁰) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 157-158.

³¹) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I, 19, 37.

pointed out the last congruous vocation which directly operates upon the human will. The late Augustine did not, therefore, abandon the theory of congruous vocation, he did not substitute for it the theory of the interior grace. He searched the last possibility of the congruous vocation and found it in the operative grace which directly works upon the human will. Augustine had already thought of the extreme case in *Ad Simplicianum*, that is, the case of a stubborn heart which obstinately rebels against God. He asks whether there is not a congruous vocation to this heart, and rejects this supposition, saying: *Quis audeat dicere defuisse Deo modum vocandi, quo etiam Esau ad eam fidem mentem applicaret, voluntatemque conjugeret, in qua Jacob justificatus est? Quod si tanta quoque potest esse obstinatio voluntatis, ut contra omnes modos vocationis obdurescat mentis aversio; quaeritur utrum de divina poena sit ipsa duritia, cum Deus deserit non sic vocando, quomodo ad fidem moveri potest. Quis enim dicat modum quo ei persuaderetur ut crederet, etiam Omnipotenti defuisse?*³²). Any stubbornness and any bad will of human being can not make invalid the divine will to invite and save the person on whom God has mercy. God has all means to call and save a human being, if God has mercy upon him. All depends upon God's mercy. The fact of the most rebellious and bad will does not make invalid the efficacious congruous vocation of God, but this fact points out God's judgement on this will. Augustine did not say that there was no possibility of this will to return to God. But he asserted that a contingent fact of the most rebellious will pointed out the judgement of God. Augustine already showed the possibility of a rebellious will to return to God in the case of Paul's conversion, in *Ad Simplicianum*. The man who had thought of the last possibility of the congruous vocation could not abandon the theory of the congruous vocation in reflection on the badness of the human will in his later years. We should say that the late Augustine saw 'the last congruous vocation' in bad will's conversion which was caused by the divine interior grace.

Burns explains Augustine's interior grace in the following expressions: "The divine operation reverses a contrary disposition towards evil in bringing a person to faith in Christ. Moreover, it actually produces the consent of faith"³³). "The grace of conversion is operative: it produces human willing and consent"³⁴). "The consent by

³²) *Ad Simpl.* I, 2, 14.

³³) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 157.

³⁴) *Id.*, p. 158.

which one believes the gospel is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who subsequently effects good willing and promotes good action of believers through the gift of charity”³⁵). But what does the expression ‘produce human willing and consent’ mean? Does God make a will anew and give it magically to a person who has no will formerly and resembles a marionette? Or does God drive a bad will from a person and pour a divine will into a empty pipe of the human will? What does the attribution of the consent to the Holy Spirit mean? Does it mean that the human being is no more the subject of consent?

It seems to me that Burns, who characterizes the interior grace as the producing factor of the new will, wants to deprive the divine interior grace of the vocative character, and human beings of the responding faculty to this vocation. The following sentence strengthens my suspicion: “Had he (Augustine) continued to allow the limited human autonomy in responding to the vocation which was implied in his explanation of divine sovereignty in *De spiritu et littera*, Augustine would have conceded a Pelagian explanation of the beginning of the process of salvation”³⁶). The explanation of the divine working on the human will without vocative character leads to making the divine working a magical one, and to making a human being a marionette. Such a interpretation of the divine interior grace in Augustine’s later years is not correct.

Augustine himself used the expression *vocatio* many times in his later years. *Quibus meritis bonae voluntatis Deus illum (Paulum) ab his malis ad bonam mirabili et repentina vocatione convertit?*³⁷). *Vocatione illa alta atque secreta sic ejus ageret sensum ut eidem legi atque doctrinae accommodaret assensum*³⁸). Burns himself cites a text which contains this expression: *reluctanti enim prius auditus divinae vocationis ipsa dei gratia procuratur ac deinde in illo iam non reluctante studium virtutis accenditur*³⁹). Burns comments on this text: “God does not simply provide an occasion for conversion and then bestow his gift on those

³⁵) *Id.*, p. 149.

³⁶) *Id.*, p. 139-140. Burns asserts further that the late Augustine denied the natural desire for God (p. 140). Indeed the late Augustine did not admit the desire which is immanent to human nature. But he had an insight into a divine light which touched a man at the bottom of his being and made him convert to God. “Sed commemoratur, ut convertatur ad Dominum, tanquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo averteretur quodam modo tangebatur” (*De trinitate* XIV, 15, 21).

³⁷) *C. duas ep. Pel.* I, 19, 37.

³⁸) *Epistola* 217, 5.

³⁹) *C. duas ep. Pel.* 4, 6, 13.

who respond. A person's own opposition to the gospel is first overcome by the gift of this hearing and then he is excited to virtue"⁴⁰). But here manifestly are divine vocation and human response. It seems that Burns interprets the gift of hearing as the will to hear. He says: "The true interpretation of this passage (Isaiah I, 19-20), Augustine replied, recalls that according to Proverbs 8, 35, *the will to hear* is prepared by the Lord"⁴¹). But the gift of hearing does not immediately mean the will to hear. The gift of hearing is given to a person who does not want to hear (*reluctanti*). Responding to the vocation, he becomes one who wants to hear. Burns omits one step. By hearing the vocation, something new occurs, that is, the change of the will. But this change of the will occurs in response to the vocation, not in the chemical reaction which presupposes some fixed quality. This response does not presuppose the good quality and the good will as Pelagianists assert and Burns fears. In the response itself something new occurs which he had not before, that is, the good will. The primary cause of this good will is the divine vocation. Therefore man can not be proud of his good will. Burns fails to understand the process of this will's transfiguration. Burns' interpretation of the text reveals his understanding of the interior grace which does not admit the human response. But Augustine did not intend to deprive the human will of responding faculty. Augustine was satisfied when the absolute priority of the divine congruous vocation, which suitably caused human willingness, was defended. Augustine found the sure protection against the boast of human merit in the congruous vocation, which admits the human response but crushes the human pride, because all depends upon God's mercy.

In face of many misunderstandings about the operative grace of the late Augustine, it is of great importance for us to understand how the late Augustine thought the interior grace works upon human will⁴²). Augustine's understanding of the interior grace in later years is expressed most compactly in the following text: *Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur*⁴³). When we compare this text with the following sentence

⁴⁰) J.P. BURNS, *o.c.*, p. 154.

⁴¹) *Id.*, p. 154.

⁴²) A. TRAPÉ, *Liberta e grazia*, in 'Studia Ephemeridis' Augustinianum 24, congresso internazionale su S. Agostino, Atti I, Roma, 1987, p. 199, modestly replies to the question how the interior grace works: "Il vescovo d'Ippona è più modesto. Risponde: miris modis, in maniere mirabili, secondo le sue ininvestigabili vie".

⁴³) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* XVII, 33.

in *Ad Simplicianum*, the change of the stress is conspicuous: *Ut velimus enim et suum esse voluit et nostrum; suum vocando nostrum sequendo. Quod autem voluerimus solus praestat, id est, posse bene agere et semper beate vivere*⁴⁴). Our willingness (*ut velimus*) which had been attributed both to God and to us in *Ad Simplicianum* was attributed only to God in this later work. What does it mean that our willingness does not belong to ourselves, but only to God? Didn't the late Augustine recognize the human being as the subject of his own will and did he regard the human being as a God's marionette who did not have his own will? It is not without reason that many people regarded the late Augustine as the man who wanted to deprive the human being of spontaneous response. But this text of his later years should not be interpreted as the one which asserts that the human being is God's marionette. Augustine wrote before this text: *Et quis istam etsi parvam dare coeperat charitatem, nisi ille qui praeparat voluntatem et cooperando perficit, quod operando incipit? Quoniam ipse ut velimus operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens*⁴⁵). Augustine asserts that God starts our willingness. Why don't we rather than God stand at this beginning of our will⁴⁶? Augustine explains this divine operation with the example of Paul's conversion. *Ut autem de caelo vocaretur et tamen magna efficacissima vocatione converteretur, gratia Dei erat sola: quia merita ejus erant magna, sed mala*⁴⁷). Augustine gives an account of the transfiguration of bad will to good will which is caused by the beginning work of the divine grace. The text which follows suggests that this beginning work of God is the divine justification of sinners. *Ideo necessarium est homini, ut gratia Dei non solum iustificetur impius, id est, ex impio fiat iustus cum redduntur ei bona pro malis, sed etiam cum fuerit iam iustificatus ex fide, ambulet cum illo gratia, et incumbat super ipsam ne cadat*⁴⁸). When God justifies a sinner, God does not

⁴⁴) *Ad Simpl.* I, 2, 10.

⁴⁵) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* XVIII, 33.

⁴⁶) A. SAGE, *Praeparatur voluntas a domino*, dans *Revue des études Augustiniennes*, 10, Paris, 1964, p. 10, interprets the *sine nobis* as *sine nobis operantibus*. "Aussi Augustin écrit-il sans sourciller: *Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur*' (*sine nobis operantibus*, mais non pas *sine nobis credentibus*)". J. LEBOURLIER, *o.c.*, p. 300, explains the *sine nobis* by saying, "le passage postérieur (celui du *De gratia et libero arbitrio*) s'entend en mettant la (coupure) entre *vocatio* et *consentement*". Therefore Lebourlier admits vocative character of interior grace in Augustine's later works. Cf. H. RONDET, *La liberté et la grâce dans la théologie augustinienne*, dans *Saint Augustin parmi nous*, Paris, 1954, p. 214-216.

⁴⁷) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* V, 12.

⁴⁸) *Id.* VI, 13.

cooperate with this impious man, but God does it alone (*Deus solus sine nobis*). This text was not written by a man who wanted to deny the human response to a divine vocation, but by a man who understood the real beginning of the new human life which is caused by the divine justification of sinners.

I cite another text in order to make the interior grace understood more clearly. In *De correptione et gratia*, Augustine recommends reprimands as the painful stimulation to conversion from evil life, and points out the most effective one. *Haec est correptionis utilitas, quae nunc maior, nunc minor pro peccatorum diversitate salubriter adhibetur; et tunc est salubris, quando supernus medicus respicit. Non enim aliquid proficit, nisi cum facit ut peccati sui quemque poeniteat. Et quis hoc dat, nisi qui respexit apostolum Petrum negantem et fecit flentem?*⁴⁹). For Augustine, the beginning of divine operation upon man's will is this divine glance. Augustine stresses this divine activity separately from the human response when he says that God alone stands at the beginning of our willingness. Augustine thus interprets Jesus' glance upon Peter in the night before the crucifixion as the inner occurrence in Peter in the book *De gratia christi* in 418: *Unde non potest dici quod corporalibus oculis eum Dominus visibiliter admonendo respexerit. Et ideo, quod ibi scriptum est: Respexit eum Dominus, intus actum est, in mente actum est, in voluntate actum est. Misericordia Dominus latenter subvenit, cor tetigit, memoriam revocavit, interiorem gratia sua visitavit Petrum, interioris hominis usque ad exteriores lacrimas movit et produxit affectum. Ecce quemadmodum Deus adiuvando adest voluntatibus et actionibus nostribus! Ecce quemadmodum et velle et operari operatur in nobis!*⁵⁰). Augustine clearly shows here how he thinks when he says that God works upon our will. When we read Augustine's expression such as *trahitur ergo miris modis ut velit*⁵¹), we should remember that Augustine thought of the divine interior grace which was symbolically described as the inner glance of God-Man.

The late Augustine who told of the interior grace was not the man whose love had grown cold, but the man who felt his heart warming, perceiving the inner glance which mercifully looks into his innermost being.

Kyoto-hu (Japan)

Eiichi KATAYANAGI

⁴⁹) *De correptione et gratia* V, 7.

⁵⁰) *De gratia christi et de peccato originali* I, 45, 49.

⁵¹) *C. duas ep. Pel. I*, 19, 37.